Distributed Cognition and the Will INDIVIDUAL VOLITION AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
edited by
Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stephens
Distributed Cognition and the Will
Distributed Cognition and the Will Individual Volition and Social Context
edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stephens
A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
( 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please e-mail
[email protected] or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. This book was set in Stone Serif and Stone Sans on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong and was printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Distributed cognition and the will : individual volition and social context / edited by Don Ross . . . [et al.]. p. cm. ‘‘A Bradford book.’’ Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-262-18261-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-262-68169-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Will. 2. Act (Philosophy) 3. Distributed cognition. I. Ross, Don, 1962– BJ1461.D57 2007 128 0 .3—dc22 10 9 8 7 6
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Contents
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1 Introduction: Science Catches the Will Don Ross
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2 The Puzzle of Coaction 17 Daniel M. Wegner and Betsy Sparrow 3 What Kind of Agent Are We? A Naturalistic Framework for the Study of Human Agency 39 Paul Sheldon Davies 4 The Illusion of Freedom Evolves Tamler Sommers 5 Neuroscience and Agent-Control Philip Pettit 6 My Body Has a Mind of Its Own Daniel C. Dennett 7 Soft Selves and Ecological Control Andy Clark
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8 The Sources of Behavior: Toward a Naturalistic, Control Account of Agency 123 Mariam Thalos 9 Thought Experiments That Explore Where Controlled Experiments Can’t: The Example of Will 169 George Ainslie 10 The Economic and Evolutionary Basis of Selves Don Ross
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11 Situated Cognition: The Perspect Model Lawrence Lengbeyer 12 The Evolutionary Origins of Volition Wayne Christensen
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13 What Determines the Self in Self-Regulation? Applied Psychology’s Struggle with Will 289 Jeffrey B. Vancouver and Tadeusz W. Zawidzki 14 Civil Schizophrenia Dan Lloyd Index
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George Ainslie is chief psychiatrist at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and studies the motivational implications of hyperbolic discounting (picoeconomics). His Breakdown of Will was recently a target book in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Wayne Christensen is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Adelaide and studies the evolution of cognition and agency. His recent articles include ‘‘Neuroscience in context: the new flagship of the cognitive sciences’’ (coauthored with Luca Tommasi) appearing in Biological Theory and ‘‘Cognition as high order control’’ to appear in New Ideas in Psychology. Andy Clark is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, at Edinburgh University in Scotland. He is the author of several books including Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (MIT Press, 1997) and Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2003). His research interests include robotics and artificial life, the cognitive role of human-built structures, specialization, and interactive dynamics in neural systems, and the interplay of language, thought, and action. Paul Sheldon Davies is Associate Professor of philosophy at The College of William and Mary. Author of Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions (MIT Press, 2001), he is presently writing a book on naturalism and human agency. Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor, and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and Co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. Harold Kincaid is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Ethics and Values in the Sciences at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has published widely in the
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philosophy of science, particularly on issues in the philosophy of social science and the unity of science. His coedited volumes Value Free Science: Ideal or Illusion? and The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics are forthcoming from Oxford University Press. Lawrence Lengbeyer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Academy. His recent published and presented work has dealt with a wide variety of topics, including selflessness, courage, racist belief, sexist humor, anti-Semitism, artists’ rights, self-deception, make-believe, reactions to fictions, cognition and emotion, and mental compartmentalization. Dan Lloyd is a professor in the Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, and the author of Simple Minds (MIT Press, 1989) and Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness (MIT Press, 2003). Philip Pettit is the Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University, where he teaches political theory and philosophy. His recent books include A Theory of Freedom (OUP, 2001), and a selection of papers Rules, Reasons and Norms (OUP, 2002). He is the co-author of a number of books, including recently The Economy of Esteem (OUP, 2004), with Geoffrey Brennan; and Mind, Morality and Explanation (OUP, 2004), a selection of papers co-authored with Frank Jackson and Michael Smith. Don Ross is Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Finance, Economics, and Quantitative Methods at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and Professor in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. His book Economic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation was published by MIT Press in 2005. Every Thing Must Go with J. Ladyman, and Midbrain Mutiny with C. Sharp, R. Vuchinich, and D. Spurrett, will appear in 2007. Tamler Sommers is Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota, Morris. He is writing a book on moral responsibility and the emotions. Betsy Sparrow is doctoral candidate in Psychology at Harvard University. She studies the experience of authorship in action and thought, and has published a series of recent research papers in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. David Spurrett is Professor of Philosophy at the Howard College Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, where he is director of the mind AND world working group and of the cognitive science program. His active re-
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search areas relate to phenomena of disordered agency (including addictions), philosophy of science and metaphysics. He is also one of the editors of the South African Journal of Philosophy. G. Lynn Stephens is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He specializes in the philosophy of mind, consciousness, and psychiatry and is author, with George Graham, of When Self-consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts, published by MIT Press. Mariam Thalos is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. Her research focuses on foundational questions in the sciences, especially the physical, social, and decisional sciences. She is the author of numerous articles on causation, explanation, and how relations between micro and macro are handled by a range of scientific theories, as well as articles in political philosophy and action theory. She is a former fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University, and the Tanner Humanities Center, and is current working on two book projects, The Natural History of Knowledge and The Natural History of the Will. Jeffrey B. Vancouver is Associate Professor of Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Ohio University. He studies the dynamics underlying human motivation in work contexts and recently published a series of papers in the Journal of Applied Psychology on the role of beliefs on motivation and behavior using a control theory perspective. Daniel M. Wegner is Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. He studies the role of thought in self-control and social life, and is author of White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts and of The Illusion of Conscious Will. Tadeusz W. Zawidzki is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at George Washington University in Washington, DC, and studies the relations between, and the evolution of, language and cognition. He is recent author of several articles on these issues and forthcoming author of the monograph Dennett (Oneworld).
1 Introduction: Science Catches the Will Don Ross
If there were an all-star list of concepts from the history of western philosophy based on the volume of attention over the years, the concept of will would be among the list’s elements. The reasons for this are not obscure. It has been taken as a principal source of human specialness that we are putatively original authors of some events, which themselves then get dignified as a select subset called ‘‘actions.’’ Exercises of will have been regarded as a sui generis type of process, events of ‘‘agency.’’ This in turn opens a raft of questions as to who else besides the prototypes of agency, individual human beings, might also partake wholly or partly of it. Animals? Infants and cognitively impaired people? Suitably organized and structured groups of people? Integral parts or functionally distinctive parts—‘faculties’—of people? These questions in turn seem to rest on resolution of others. Does agency essentially involve rationality, and if so, of what kind and beyond what threshold? How can the apparently close relationship between agency and motivation by reference to reasons be squared with the intuition that spontaneous, subjectively nondeliberative decisions to act seem like the paradigmatic exercises of will—even though someone who always and only acted spontaneously and unpredictably would likely not be deemed an agent at all, and so not be thought to properly will anything? During every age of western philosophy without exception these questions, and the assumptions required to make sense of them, have been in prominent play. The concept of will is central in pre-modern Christian philosophy for obvious reasons: the main theme of the Christian myth is a gift of free will to humans by an omnipotent god, resulting in a drama that is complex, to put it mildly. The consequent entrenchment of a conceptual network based around the will in all aspects of western moral culture left the notion less vulnerable than most of its fellow pre-modern conceptual all-stars when the scientific revolution arrived. The majority of early modern philosophers were inclined to accommodate the concept of will into scientific metaphysics
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rather than aim to displace it or explain it away. Hume, as usual, is the great exception, while his foil Descartes also plays his customary role as the exemplary synthesizer. Ingeniously, Descartes borrowed the Christian conception of will as the basis of both human specialness and human sinfulness so as to buttress his version of science-friendly epistemology. That is, will was presented by him as a necessary part of the source of all error, from which it required rescue and discipline by the faculty of understanding. But because he allowed the will to retain its role as the source of sui generis mental activity, he was able to appeal to it to try to insulate his program for sweeping mechanization of nature from both apparent counterexamples based on nonmechanical human agency and from dangerous conflicts with the prevailing moral and social order. There were too many sharp minds in the church of Descartes’s day for this cunning to turn the intellectual authorities then and there, but despite losing almost all battles to his critics in the debates following the Meditations, he gradually—posthumously—won the war. The efforts of Hume and Nietzsche notwithstanding, Cartesian dualism became the basis for the prevailing popular metaphysics of both the natural order and of morality in western culture. So it clearly remains. However, the academy—or at least that part that is led by science—has almost all defected from the popular picture. Among professional students of mind and behavior, dualism has few adherents. However, support for the idea of free will, under some alternative interpretation, probably still commands majority assent, at least if the alternative is taken to be the thesis that the appearance of agency is an illusion. Two simple propositions stand in the way of banishing the concept of will to the realm of caloric and demonic possession—and the Cartesian faculty of understanding. First, it is difficult to see how attributions of moral responsibility can be justified if no one is really the author of their actions. It is, of course, generally recognized among philosophers and psychologists that discomfort at a belief’s consequences cannot be invoked to refute it. If we have been blaming and punishing people, on a vast scale, who in fact cannot possibly deserve it, then we should be prepared to see our moral culture and the institutions that rest on it revised. However, contemplation of this vertiginous challenge is discouraged by the second simple proposition: no argument against the existence of the will, however cogent, seems to carry conviction stronger than everyone’s sense that they can, for example, decide to raise their left arm and then feel and watch it go up. And if we can each autonomously choose to raise or not raise our arms, presumably we
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can autonomously choose to pilfer or not pilfer the pension fund and poison or not poison our enemies. Thus, although dualism is a marginalized intellectual preference these days, the pivotal concept of will on which it has always rested remains philosophically current. We can note signs of unease in semantic trends, however. Philosophers and scientists tend no longer to use the word ‘‘will’’ by itself—that is, apart from its occurrence in the phrase ‘‘free will.’’ This reflects the fact that no one continues to believe in classical faculty psychology (popularity of cognitive modules in some quarters notwithstanding). Thus while free will might be the most natural name for a putative real phenomenon, the idea that it resides in the capacities of some sort of entity is disreputable. When philosophers are inquiring into the nature of the will itself, as opposed to free will, they are more likely to say they are investigating agency. I do not advise them against this more cautious language, but it can obscure the fact that in the worldviews of many avowedly naturalistic philosophers a traditional pre-modern concept still influentially lurks. Among philosophers who have recently wrestled with this challenge, the two most widely read are Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. Davidson’s approach is analytic: he tries to break down the monolithic problem of how will can exist in a natural world into less grandiose constituent problems that, while still hard, might be tractable.1 Such problems include ‘‘Can reasons be causes?’’ and ‘‘How is it possible that people sometimes act so as to disappoint themselves with respect to their own standing preferences?’’ If these questions and others like them can be given sensible naturalistic answers, then in the course of working them out we are in effect learning how to reconcile the familiar inherited conceptual network around the will with our scientific metaphysics. Dennett, by contrast, has preferred to tackle what I called the monolithic problem synthetically and head-on: in two books (1984, 2003) and many supporting articles, he has argued that much of what has traditionally been said about the will is indeed shown by science to be illusory, but that the consequences of this for everyday moral life have been greatly exaggerated. We have, as Dennett famously puts it in the earlier book, all the free will worth wanting. Endorsing this conclusion, if we do so, can still leave us wondering whether we have all the will, simpliciter, worth wanting from the point of view of a metaphysics of the person that is both comprehensible and in accord with scientific evidence; this is the issue that motivates Dennett’s second book on the subject.
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The pressure of the scientific evidence in question has recently become much more acute than in the past. The main source of early modern tension, the fact that mechanical determinism was a broadly successful program in post-Newtonian physics, might have made the will into an object of philosophical suspicion, but it can hardly be said to have constituted true scientific evidence against it. However, the vast increase in the sophistication of the brain and behavioral sciences over the past few decades changes the situation dramatically. We are beginning to understand, on the basis of direct empirical investigation, how human behavior at various scales of analysis is controlled and influenced. From this perspective, the will has always mainly been a black box into which have been bundled all efferent behavioral control factors that have been inferred to exist but remained unexamined by science. As long as that set included most of the hypothesized factors, philosophers could freely speculate without inviting justified charges of fecklessness. This circumstance no longer prevails. The factors that are lately being dragged out of the black box arise on both micro and macro scales. By ‘‘micro’’ factors I refer to influences on short-term decisions and fine-grained calibration of action: that is, withinbrain causal antecedents of raising or not raising arms, pulling or not pulling triggers, and, in a realm of pressing policy relevance, taking or not taking another drink, cigarette, slice of pie, or pull on the slot machine lever. By ‘‘macro’’ factors I refer to influences on the gradual sculpting of personalities and selves, as manifest in dispositions to particular patterns of action, operating at time scales measured in months and years. I do not intend here to urge a binary distinction, but to draw attention to a continuum of scales by focusing on two contrasting points. My examples above do not capture the extrema on the continuum. For those, consider on the one side a baseball player ‘‘deciding’’ to tip his bat just up or just down as the pitch crosses the plate, which cannot possibly (because of processing speed considerations) be a personal decision in the sense of involving his deliberative consciousness or even his frontal cortex. On the other extreme, a human personality is partly constrained by patterns in natural selection that have unfolded over hundreds of millions of years. On both of these limiting sides, many think or feel that we have passed beyond the domain of will and into that of exogenous causation. Moral culture is heavily preoccupied with aspects of agency, and with its limits, on all scales. We hold people responsible for pulling triggers and taking drinks. We massively reward good characters and try to blight the lives of bad ones. Controversies over the relative contributions of ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘nurture’’ to human character are conducted tirelessly and with moral pas-
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sion on both sides, and social scientists are often resented for promoting evidence in favor of structural rather than agent-driven causes of outcomes. Most societies allow insanity defenses to reduce or remove criminal liability, but this is controversial with conservatives. Millions of people around the world deny rationally incontrovertible evidence for evolution because they fear that natural selection threatens the sense of human and divine autonomy. Issues around the nature of will and agency thus embroil leading fronts of scientific progress directly in ideological, political, and legal tempests. Nearer to the micro end of the continuum, science is opening the black box of the will in two main ways. First, ingenious behavioral experiments of a kind pioneered by Libet (e.g., 1985), and extended by subsequent researchers whose leading representative is Wegner (2002), have confounded basic widespread assumptions supposedly grounded in everyday unreflective experience to the effect that events such as conscious subjective choices to raise arms must temporally precede all arm-raisings that are not brought about by extra-personal forces. The brain, it turns out, prepares such actions before its personal, conscious ‘‘operator’’ is aware that it is doing so. Furthermore false impressions of being consciously and subjectively in control of micro-scale actions as they unfold can reliably and relatively easily be induced by manipulation of environmental conditions. I will not try to further summarize this work here, since the reader is about to encounter extended descriptions of it in several of the chapters to come. Suffice to say that it seems on its face to undermine, or at the very least to greatly complicate, the second of what I identified above as the two ‘‘simple propositions’’ that have allowed the Cartesian will so much longer a life in serious inquiry than most of its conceptual kin. The other avenue along which science is disrupting traditional ideas of will and agency at the micro scale is through attention to the architecture of the mind/brain. Descartes believed that the body, including what we now call the nervous system, was a mechanical system, basically a hydraulic network of pulleys and levers. The will’s task in administering this network was simply to increase and decrease distributions of tension at the site in the brain where chords and cables converged. This assumption contributed greatly to the plausibility of the simplicity and unity of the Cartesian will, from whence it derived most of its explanatory power. As vividly described by Dennett (1991, and elsewhere) and Glimcher (2003), Descartes’s conception of the will as a fused control point that coordinates and regulates reflexes in discharge of action plans it itself spontaneously originates not only survived through many decades of early neuroscience, it
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positively shaped the dominant research paradigm in that discipline due to Sherrington. Over the past fifteen to twenty years, this paradigm has been blasted to ruins. First, experience in artificial intelligence demonstrated that real-time management of complex behavior involving networks of interrelated subroutines comes with stringent limitations on the extent to which sequencing of actions can be allowed to bottleneck at central control points. Early AI designs for performing even severely limited subsets of the everyday human task repertoire tended to resemble mini Soviet Unions, grievously incapable of supplying behavioral responses adequate to meet environmental demands the moment the latter were allowed to become the least bit difficult to predict and monitor (Brooks 1999). The nexus of brain and environment, it came generally to be recognized, is a complex system dominated by nonlinear feedback, amplification and damping, that can be (imperfectly) managed only by information-processing systems that are themselves complex (Thelen and Smith 1994; Port and van Gelder 1995). Several philosophers of mind and cognitive science, including Dennett, have contributed significantly to developing the implications of complex, distributed models of cognition and control. Most would agree that the foremost figure among these philosophers is Andy Clark. After devoting his early work to issues surrounding the kind of cognitive architecture needed to account for manifest behavioral patterns (both competencies and characteristic breakdowns and errors), Clark turned to cultivating a truly radical consequence of the recognition that the will cannot be a simple lever or identified with a spatiotemporal point. This is that the will, insofar as it is identified with the efferent aspect of the agent, person, self or mind, cannot nonarbitrarily be contained within the brain and body of the human organism (Clark 1997, 2003; Clark and Chalmers 1998). I will again not attempt to summarize this perspective or the arguments for it here, since Clark himself attends to this task in a later chapter. The basic argument schema may be stated quite straightforwardly, however. When the Cartesian will is regarded as the nonphysical principle of activity, the whole brain is effectively made part of the external environment. But once we abandon dualism and begin distributing control of behavior, including such behavior as we deem fit to call ‘‘action,’’ around in the brain, our hold on the boundaries of the will begins to slip, along two dimensions. First, a point implicit in all distributed-control models, it becomes entirely unclear how to distinguish the will, now no longer a faculty that is among the mind’s components, from the whole agent, which is in turn often treated as synonymous with the self and the person. Second, and
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more distinctive of Clark’s position, once we allow that ‘‘devices’’ within the brain, such as perceptual systems, can be aspects of the self because they exercise control functions (both directly and via their roles in complex feedback loops), it emerges as arbitrary if we try to necessarily consign external prostheses and environmental scaffolds to the will’s external environment merely because they are not implemented in the body’s cells. People, like many other animals, reorganize their environments in idiosyncratic ways to help regulate their own behavior. Is a typical person’s inner ear less a part of herself than her computer, organized as it is to remind her of her projects, organize and conserve her latest thoughts and cue new ones that cohere with them, and manage a large part of her communication with others? Are you performing an action as an agent, responsive to reasons rather than causes, when you multiply two large numbers? You know you couldn’t do this without your frontal cortex, and you’re inclined to take your frontal cortex as part of the system that implements your will (or selfhood, agency, etc.). But could you multiply the numbers without the pen and paper or calculator you use? Could you do it without a culture that provided a symbolic notation for conceptualizing your task in the first place, and then for keeping track of the subroutines it requires? So if cortex is part of the system that implements your will—which implements you— why not your essential cultural technology for doing arithmetic? If we are persuaded by Clark and like-minded thinkers to allow the self/ person/mind to be distributed outside the organism casing, then the undermining of the traditional will from the micro direction meets and makes common cause with such undermining from the macro side. As the examples above are intended to illustrate, the exploding new interdisciplinary sciences (evolutionary psychology and anthropology, behavioral and institutional economics, multi-agent modeling, complex system simulation) that study cultural evolution, imitation, convergence to equilibria in games, and the unplanned origins of institutions and norms, all emphasize the extent to which interpersonal dynamics establish the enabling conditions for the actions of persons qua relatively behaviorally unified agents. But then, and especially in conjunction with micro-scale influences from subpersonal processes in the brain, they seem to make will and agency redundant. The work of Libet, Wegner, and Dennett suggests that your brain is built to be able to initiate and steer many of your actions with little or no deliberation or phenomenal awareness. Then consideration of social dynamics suggests that a necessary condition for your brain’s ability to stay on track is a relatively stable social environment, furnishing norms and targets for
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imitation that have evolved in the culture to get precisely such jobs done. At this point there seems no evident task left for a vestigial will. Just as well, one might think—another bit of prescientific metaphysical litter goes into the bin. But now recall that when we put pressure on the will as a Cartesian point-mass it became increasingly difficult to distinguish from the concept of the self. If the will is eliminated, does not the self disappear with it, and for the same basic reasons? Can the progress of science convince us that there are no individual persons but only biological individuals pushed into certain sorts of behavioral dispositions rather than others by the complex dynamics interlocking their brains and their cultural/social environments? Note that in wondering about the existence of persons without calling into question the existence of distinguishable instances of H. sapiens we are not raising doubts about the status of any biochemical or biopsychological facts. Some might take us to be wondering about a metaphysical fact, but this does not interest scientists, and even many philosophers deny that there are such facts. If the question seems important, it is because persons—as opposed to human organisms—are at the center of moral culture. It is indeed difficult to imagine how people would function, would indeed even be people, if they did not suppose that they were substantially responsible for at least their own moral and social choices in adolescence and adulthood. The concepts of the will and the self appear to rise or fall together. Among contributions to this volume, I have explicitly mentioned the work of Dennett, Wegner, and Clark as leading elements of the book’s intellectual background. One further scene-setter now needs introduction. I noted earlier that although talk of ‘‘free will’’ is still common at least in philosophy, the ‘‘will’’ simpliciter is rarely invoked due to the conviction that it is not a mental organ, and that there’s no evident other sort of entity it could be instead. Recently, however, the psychiatrist and behavioral economist George Ainslie has rehabilitated frank talk of the will. He has been able to do this because he has found a new ontological interpretation for it. According to Ainslie, the will is not an organ but a habit, a recurrent (to considerably varying extents from person to person) pattern in people’s behavior. Development of this perspective begins from observing that people’s (and other animals’) preferences are sensitive to anticipated delays of rewards in a way that makes them singularly ill-suited to maximization. In particular, they are discounted into the future by hyperbolic-shaped functions that lead preferences to temporarily reverse as an individual’s tempo-
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ral distance to the elements in her reward stream changes (see Ainslie’s chapter for details). This goes a long way, Ainslie argues, toward explaining addiction and other pathologies of rational choice identified by behavioral economists. But then it raises a puzzle as to how most of us rise above our natural inconsistency so as to approximate the prudent investors recognized as agents in microeconomic theory. Ainslie proposes that the answer to this puzzle lies in the ability to see that inconsistency now predicts defeat of currently entertained long-term projects. As a result disappointment over future prospects can arise not just in the future, about which discounting makes us unduly cavalier, but in the more highly motivating present. Furthermore the tendency to pay attention to the predictive aspect of preference consistency and inconsistency is something a person can cultivate and become habituated to. Such cultivation and habituation amounts, says Ainslie, to creation and maintenance of will. So here we have a perspective in which the will is in no way metaphysically mysterious but is also cut loose from its conceptual background in Cartesianism and faculty psychology. It is particularly interesting in this connection that Ainslie further models the will as emerging from the bargaining activity of subpersonal interests—something that follows, he argues, from hyperbolic discounting—thus echoing the general theme of distributed cognition theorists. Simultaneously, his picture depends on the idea that what induces the bickering and selfish subpersonal units to settle their differences and, in so doing, give rise to willpower are social pressures: if your gang of interests fails to coordinate while your neighbor’s coalition (forced together like yours through inhabiting the same agent at the macro scale) succeed, then yours will all jointly stand to be exploited by the more consistent team. So, far from taking the concept to be rejected by new theories of distributed cognition and social-dynamical influence on stabilization of selves and characters, Ainslie offers a new model of will that revives the idea by appeal to those very resources. Thus inspired by the possibility that the apparent threats to the cogency of the idea of will might instead turn out be the basis of its reemergence as a scientific subject, we gathered together the contributors represented in this volume to evaluate the prospects. The banner for our deliberations was the Mind and World (mAw) working group founded at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in eThekwini (Durban), South Africa, in 2002. mAw’s aim is to develop and apply models of mind as distributed and extended. It has built a close working relationship with the Center for Ethics and Values in the Sciences at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. The
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mAw conference on Distributed Cognition and the Will, co-sponsored by UKZN and the Center, was held in Birmingham on March 18–20, 2005. The papers gathered as chapters in this volume are descendants of the presentations given there, refined by virtue of the extended critical discussion they individually and collectively provoked. The chapters address the status of the concepts of the will and the self on the basis of first taking for granted that the recent scientific developments that put pressure on them must not be denied, avoided, or lazily interpreted so as to seem harmless to traditional views. This volume thus does not represent a debate between naturalists and others; all contributors are motivated by a commitment to take science seriously. Only about half of the chapters are by philosophers; the remaining half are by behavioral scientists of various disciplinary persuasions. I will briefly the survey the contents to come in order to give the reader an idea of the thematic trajectory we had in mind in choosing an order for them. Chapter 2 by Daniel Wegner and Betsy Sparrow summarizes the most basic source of the new scientific challenge to the traditional concept of the will: the empirical evidence, gathered to a significant extent in Wegner’s lab, that our standard perception of the subjective experience of will as causing our voluntary behavior on micro scales is an illusion. Wegner and Sparrow then propose an explanation for this illusion that introduces the book’s other main themes. The explanation in question is that the illusion of will has been selected (both biologically and culturally) because in underwriting our sense of responsibility for our effects on social stability, it promotes maintenance of that stability, from which individuals in turn derive benefits. Thus the relationships among neural dynamics, behavioral dynamics, and social dynamics as the basis for the phenomenon of the self as a stabilization device, are put onto the table at the outset. They remain there throughout the volume. In chapter 3 Paul Sheldon Davies raises reasons for fearing that Wegner and Sparrow are too quick to seek an ecumenical accommodation of our traditional cultural model of the agent in the face of their data. This is a recurrent issue for naturalistic philosophers: to what extent should we aim to domesticate the counterintuitive findings of science so as to go on feeling comfortable in our conceptual skins, and to what extent should we embrace the exposure of our folk myths as we learn more about a universe that was not designed, and in particular was not designed to be understood by us (since natural selection didn’t directly favor those of our ancestors who could explain any but a handful of ecologically local phenomena)?
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Davies’s chapter 4 leads straightforwardly into Tamler Sommers’s application of the same general concern to the more specific question of whether our scientific knowledge is compatible with the idea that people as moral agents are causally responsible for their actions. Sommers doesn’t just wonder about this: he argues forcefully for incompatibility, for what might be called cold-water naturalism about moral responsibility understood on the model of causal responsibility. Though defending this conclusion is Sommers’s main purpose in the chapter, he follows the general line of Dennett’s 1984 book on free will—but not the line of Dennett (2003). He suggests that if we take his advice and give up our illusion of responsibility, this need not have the corrosive effects on social stability that the (conceptual) conservative fears, and that might be thought to follow from Wegner and Sparrow’s explanation of the illusion of will. Phillip Pettit, in chapter 5, provides a much more sustained argument for Sommers’s second conclusion above. Pettit has long been among the foremost developers of the theory of agency as a social phenomenon. He extends that development in showing how the will need not cause any actions on micro scales in order for our responsibility as agents to be truthfully attributed and to be functionally selected by cultural evolution so as to regulate behavior that underwrites social stability. Agency, according to Pettit, merely requires our conforming our socially significant behavioral dispositions to answerability to reason on relatively macro scales, and this in no way requires control of fine-grained actions by the will on micro scales. It might be said that this idea emerges as nearly a consensus in the book. Of all the authors here, only Davies seems to be somewhat skeptical on the point. The chapters to this point, after Wegner’s and Sparrow’s survey of evidence in the first half of theirs, all concentrate on the implications for moral and social agency of skepticism about willful causation on the micro scale. In chapter 6 Daniel Dennett addresses this too, but also begins to widen the target to consider the implications of recent behavioral and cognitive science for our ability to understand ourselves not just as moral agents but as agents or selves at all. He is not in the least skeptical about this prospect, but he thinks we have hard work to do in order to recover a clear picture. Like most authors in the book, Dennett thinks that our microscale agency is based on a foundation of macro-scale agency. He agrees with Pettit in emphasizing the crucial role of interpersonal communicative coordination. But whereas Pettit emphasizes coordination on standards of reason for the sake of justification of action, Dennett draws attention to a logically prior level on which we are under pressure to make agents of
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ourselves: if we didn’t, we couldn’t engage in complex communication in the first place, and such communication is basic to the construction of the distinctive ecological niche our species has filled. Having Andy Clark’s chapter 7 on selfhood as an aspect of niche construction follow Dennett’s allows us to recapitulate the wider history of the extended and distributed mind hypothesis. Dennett originally suggested and inspired it, but Clark fully developed and elaborated it. In his chapter Clark explains how selves exercise will (at appropriate scales) by means of what he calls ‘‘soft’’ or ‘‘ecological’’ control. Selves, he argues and explains, are problem-solving assemblages of expropriated ecological resources. Crucial among these resources, we might suppose, are culturally evolved standards of publicly sanctioned reasons for action. If this supposition is added to Clark’s account, then it and Pettit’s can naturally be conjoined with Dennett’s to form a model of the self and its control capacities that replaces the one demolished by the evidence of Wegner and colleagues. By this point in the book, more traditional philosophers might be grumbling that their patient analytical labors over the years are being casually brushed aside here by scientistic show-and-tell. Where, they might ask, are the careful arguments required for systematically showing, in detail, that the distributed, extended, virtual, nonfacultative self and will can in fact perform the conceptually unifying function that motivated the oldfashioned versions of the concepts? Mariam Thalos’s chapter 8 is the longest in the book because providing this patient engagement is the task she takes on. Agency, she shows analytically, must be distributed if philosophers are to have any hope of backing out of various logical cul-de-sacs into which they have driven themselves in their attempts to come to grips with the concept, and if they are to grasp the possibility of a scientific account of it. While nonphilosophers might find themselves skimming this chapter, readers and critics who are analytic philosophers are likely to regard it as the serious core of the book. Philosophers will join everyone else in appreciating George Ainslie’s chapter 9. It does two main things. First, it provides a concise introduction to his theory of the will based on hyperbolic discounting as sketched above, and his theory was the single most important motivator for the questions asked at our conference and in this book. This part of the chapter will be a valuable resource for readers new to Ainslie’s model. Second, the chapter defends the value of thought experiments, often employed by Ainslie in developing his ideas, as guides to the nature of the mind and the person. Ainslie’s thought experiments will intrigue philosophers because
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most will be aware that the kind of naturalism promoted by Dennett, which forms another foundation block for the account of self and will in the book, has promoted skepticism about the possibility for thought experiments to contribute to empirical knowledge; Dennett has said on other occasions that most philosophers’ thought experiments are failures of imagination disguised as insights into necessity. In this context it is surely interesting to find the importance of some thought experiments being defended by a scientist. Ainslie does some useful philosophy himself here by analyzing some of the features that distinguish illuminating thought experiments from those that indeed obfuscate in the ways Dennett has cataloged. If the reader accepts Ainslie’s conclusion, it will be mainly because the sample thought experiments he provides indeed seem irresistible. To the extent that they are, the reader will discover that while her attention was officially on thought experiments, she imbibed compelling reasons to also endorse Ainslie’s theory of the will. Among those who agree that Ainslie’s is the most promising and exciting positive model of the will now on offer, it might be seen as surprising that it comes from the discipline of behavioral economics. If any discipline has over its history treated the will as a pure black box, it is economics, and as Davis (2003) cogently argues, its leading neoclassical incarnation has not incorporated even a substantial concept of the individual person, let alone the self. However, while economists have indeed tried to get by with a psychologically thin conception of the person, they have made the concept of the agent fundamental to their science, and have done more careful modeling of agency in a vast range of real and hypothetical scenarios than any other inquirers. In chapter 10, I sketch a framework by which selves can be endogenously generated in a class of dynamic game-theoretic models that break no foundational rules of neoclassicism (thus asking us to surrender none of its axiomatic power). My approach specifically exemplifies the general theme of many papers in the book (including Wegner’s, Pettit’s, Dennett’s, Clark’s, Thalos’s, and Ainslie’s): the self is depicted as virtually created in niche construction, in order to perform the function of simultaneously stabilizing and intermediating the micro-scale dynamics of the distributed individual mind/brain and the macro-scale dynamics of society and culture. Selves, in my view, do not exist despite the complexity of these dynamics at both scales, they exist because of it. The three following chapters lend symmetry to the book’s organization. Early chapters (Sommers, Pettit, Dennett, Clark) concentrate on macroscale issues. Middle papers (Thalos, Ainslie, Ross) work on the seam between macro- and micro-scale phenomena. The final three chapters focus
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on the micro side and go deeper into the mind/brain. In chapter 11 Lawrence Lengbeyer provides a schematic model of how the distributed will might actually go about allocating its attention and control functions. Though his account is couched in conceptual terms and doesn’t attempt to specify measurable parameters, he is careful to attend to its motivation in phenomena from experimental psychology. A natural question the reader can carry forward from Lengbeyer’s chapter to the following one, chapter 12, by Wayne Christensen is: To what extent is Lengbeyer’s schematic model at the mental/functional level consistent with Christensen’s detailed survey of what we know about the distribution of control in the vertebrate brain? Christensen sounds a strong warning that, as with most new and exciting ideas, enthusiasm for distributed control in cognitive science can carry theorists farther than the evidence warrants, and indeed to extremes where evident falsehoods are embraced. Christensen’s sketch of the architecture of neural control is compatible with a good deal of functional distribution and decentralization, as he makes clear. However, he makes equally clear that there is a straightforward sense in which the brain incorporates a control hierarchy with an executive, subordinates, and a vector of information flow that makes attribution of these roles nonmetaphorical. After considering both Lengbeyer’s and Christensen’s chapters, readers might naturally want to ask: Does Lengbeyer’s pmanager system have the sorts of attention-allocating and plan-guiding capacities to be the right functional specification of the executive neural system characterized by Christensen? Christensen’s sketch of neural control architecture is broadly cybernetic, in the rigorous sense of Wiener (1948). It can thus be taken as a solid empirical platform for Vancouver and Zawidzki’s defense in chapter 13 of cybernetic control theory in applied psychology as against a dominant stream among practitioner advisors who seem to believe that modeling people as agents requires that we reject cognitive science. Vancouver and Zawidzki provide no evidence that their foils are familiar with Wegner’s work; one surmises that if they were, they would be deeply disconcerted by the evidence, while at the same time confirmed in their view of the cognitive and behavioral sciences as dehumanizing. I hope that the chapters in this book—Vancouver’s and Zawidzki’s specifically, on one level, but then all the chapters together, on another level—provide compelling evidence that such a view is simply ignorant. Real science does not imply a threat to our status as agents answerable to social demands for justification, for the reasons explored by Sommers, Pettit, Dennett, Clark, Thalos, and Ross. It does imply a challenge to lazy ‘‘morality’’ that simply follows conven-
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tion, endorses familiar platitudes and thereby invites sleepy quietism in the face of problems. The book closes with a riveting application of this general perspective, in chapter 14, to a genuinely tragic problem, schizophrenia. Dan Lloyd first makes clear how devastating this widespread condition is, how resistant it is to effective intervention, and how baffling it must seem if one insists on cleaving to conventional models of agency and its relationships to reason and to the unity of the self. He then sketches an original model, supported by simulation evidence of his own and some clinical support, according to which schizophrenia is the symptom of dynamic coordination failure among parts of the distributed mind with respect to self-monitoring of attention and action cueing against time. This micro-scale breakdown pattern in dynamics is then suggested by Lloyd to be potentially analogous to loss of a democratic society’s ability to function as a coherent agent—that is, as a genuine community—when standards of answerability to evidence in public discourse are debased, especially by the very officials most clearly responsible for maintenance of them. Having followed Lengbeyer, Christensen, and Vancouver and Zawidzki into micro-scale manifestations of the distributedness of agency, Lloyd thus ends the book by returning the reader to its opening focus on the relationship between social stability and answerability to reason that, far from being overthrown along with the simple Cartesian will, is given increased emphasis when we buttress philosophical speculation with science and take the consequences seriously. Despite the different and occasionally conflicting perspectives on display in this book, we find here a firm consensus that we are collectively and individually better off for acknowledging that the comfortable conceptual image of the will and the self that has been characteristic of western culture for several centuries is paying diminishing returns, and for aiming to marshal our species’ talent for coordinated collective agency to build a more accurate one. Note 1. Davidson’s most important work on the will (agency) is gathered in his 1980 book. References Brooks, R. 1999. Cambrian Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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Clark, A. 1997. Being There. Cambridge: MIT Press. Clark, A. 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, A., and D. Chalmers. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58: 7–19. Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davis, J. 2003. The Theory of the Individual in Economics. London: Routledge. Dennett, D. 1984. Elbow Room. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown. Dennett, D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking. Glimcher, P. 2003. Decisions, Uncertainty and the Brain. Cambridge: MIT Press. Libet, B. 1985. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of the conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529–66. Port, R., and T. van Gelder, eds. 1995. Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press. Thelen, E., and L. Smith. 1994. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wegner, D. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wiener, N. 1948. Cybernetics. New York: Wiley.
2 The Puzzle of Coaction Daniel M. Wegner and Betsy Sparrow
Forward movement creates so many chances for awkward stalls and collisions, decisions about who goes first, right or left, mini-crises that make one conscious of authority and position. —Francine Prose 2000, The Blue Angel
When people do things together, who is the author? There is a puzzle of coaction, for example, in whether Fred Astaire or Ginger Rogers should be credited as the artist who inspired the couple’s classic dance duets. Who was really doing the dancing? Cartoonist Bob Thaves remarked that even though Astaire was great, ‘‘Rogers did everything he did, backwards and in high heels.’’ In the whirl of their tightly coupled performances, who was to know that he truly led and she followed? And just like their footwork, their romance in the film musical Top Hat posed the same puzzle. One reviewer noted: ‘‘He plays the role of the pursuer and she the pursued, but it is Rogers who controls the game’’ (Mueller 1985). The fact is that for Fred and Ginger, and for every coacting couple, group, or collective, the puzzle of coaction is open to multiple possible solutions at every moment. The perception of the authorship of coaction can shift and shimmer from one coactor to another in our minds, and we may even perceive that the action is being produced by no individual—and instead by the group as a unit. This chapter is concerned with how people go about solving the puzzle of coaction in everyday life, particularly when it comes to perceiving their own role in coaction. As we will see, understanding how people perceive coaction will take us well beyond the matter of sorting out credits among agents—leading eventually to a key insight into the vexing question of why people experience their own actions as consciously willed. The puzzle of coaction may be the reason we each have the experience of acting.
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Forms of Coaction Coaction occurs when one agent’s action is influenced by or occurs in the context of another agent’s action—and together they do something that is not fully attributable to either one alone. A prototypical case of coaction occurs when a bride and groom together grasp a knife and cut into their wedding cake. The movement is jointly determined, giving immediate rise to the question of authorship. There are several possible forms of coaction, varying in the nature of the linkage between coactors. Although these forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they are worth enumerating to review the range of potential coactions. 1. Physically coupled action The most obvious form of coaction occurs when agents are physically linked in some way. Fred and Ginger often held hands, for example, and such coupled action appears as well in many other instances: wrestlers in a clinch, pallbearers carrying a casket, children playing ring-around-the-rosy, a couple having sex, a group at a se´ance guiding the planchette on a ouija board, runners in a three-legged race, or teams in a tug of war, all share mechanical connections that influence their actions. Coupled action may occur with a designated leader, or it can arise without recognized leadership. 2. Psychologically coordinated action When an agent moves in a way that takes into account the action of another agent, coaction occurs through coordination. This is perhaps the broadest class of coaction, including every sort of turn-taking and all the coactions that involve the synchronized pursuit of action plans. People marching in a band, playing tennis, doing the wave, having a snowball fight, or having a conversation are examples. These kinds of coactions occur by plan or impromptu with or without leaders. 3. Mimicry When one agent copies the action of another, there is coaction. There may also be partial mimicry, as when one agent copies another’s action and transforms it. In the case of mimicry, of course, it is typically understood that the first agent to act is the leader. Leadership of mimicry can be unclear when the mimicking is not consciously undertaken, however, and there are also cases of mutual mimicry (After you . . . no, after you . . . no really, after you, etc.) when it becomes progressively more difficult to discern who started the coaction. 4. Obedience and conformity When one agent issues a suggestion or command to another and so guides the other’s action, coaction can also be said to have occurred. Obedience includes a whole realm of social activities,
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from teaching, parenting, and following a recipe or written instructions, to participating in hypnosis, yielding to the influence of the mass media, or following orders to commit an act of war. Obviously the analysis of coaction involves most of the field of social psychology, not to mention pretty much every other social science. Much is known, then, about why and how people engage in coaction. The specific concern here is how, in the context of coaction, individuals perceive their own authorship and assign causal responsibility to self and others for the actions in question. The point of noting these forms of coaction is to highlight the fact, at the outset, that life is full of opportunities in which it may be unclear who is responsible for what is being done, and in which one’s own action can be embedded in complex surroundings that might make the authorship of that action difficult to distinguish. All that is needed to blur one’s authorship is a physical connection to another person, an attempt to coordinate action with a person or mimic what is done, or a circumstance in which one follows a person’s explicit direction. Every such case occasions the question ‘‘Whodunit?’’ Authorship Processing We each have ready answers to questions of our own authorship. Asked whether you are the one reading this sentence, you could quickly concur. This facility for knowing what we are doing suggests that the human being has evolved a set of systems for the purpose of establishing knowledge of authorship of own action (Wegner and Sparrow 2004). These systems are exquisitely crafted, and include ways of learning from the body itself what it is doing (sometimes known as proprioception or introception), ways of establishing authorship by examining how the mind may have contributed to the action, and ways of incorporating external information about the social circumstance of the action—in particular, the presence and potential contribution of other agents. These systems typically operate together to produce one’s sense of authorship. The sources of information they provide are independent, so they may add or subtract from each other, but they come together to produce the experience of consciously willing the action. The experience of conscious will, in this sense, is the final common pathway served by multiple indicators of authorship. These indicators are integrated to produce the sense that ‘‘I did it,’’ that ‘‘I didn’t do it,’’ or any of the gradations in between.
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Body Information The body learns what it is doing through several sensory channels. Proprioception or introception of own movement involves systems sensitive to information fed back from the muscles to the brain (Georgieff and Jeannerod 1998), sensory information from joints, tendons, and skin (Gandevia and Burke 1992; Matthews 1982), visual information encountered as the eyes watch the body in motion (Daprati et al. 1997; Nielson 1963), and information fed forward by the brain to the muscles (Frith, Blakemore, and Wolpert 2000). The nature of feedback from body to brain has been studied at length. The history of psychology and physiology feature classic works by Sherrington (1906), von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950), Sperry (1950), and others investigating the role of efference (brain to body pathways) and afference (body to brain) in the production of action (Scheerer 1987). This research shows that people are able to sense joint positions and muscle movements directly. Still the sense of our own bodies can be remarkably weak when inconsistent visual information is encountered (Graziano 1999). People who are shown mirror or video representations of others’ limbs in place of their own, for instance, can develop illusions that they are authors of the others’ action (Nielson 1963), and this illusion is particularly compelling in people with schizophrenia (Franck et al. 2001; Daprati et al. 1997), movement disorders (Sirigu et al. 1999), and phantom limb experiences (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996). The experience of bodily feedback can also be overridden by feed-forward processes. The brain produces sensory images of completed action, a kind of movement plan or template, and authorship experiences are attenuated when these expectations are not met (e.g., Blakemore and Decety 2001; Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith 2000). The interplay between feed-forward and feedback is responsible, for example, for the fact that one cannot tickle oneself, in that knowledge of the feed-forward plan apparently leads to the cancellation of the feedback of the sensation (Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith 1998, 2000). Studies of proprioception only tell part of the story of authorship processing, for two reasons. First, research on the body does not explicate how we come to experience authorship for actions that seem to take place inside the mind (e.g., adding up numbers in your head). How do you know that you did that? Research on the body also does not encompass the key role of perceptions of intention, planning, and premeditation in the attribution of authorship.
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Mind Information The assessment of one’s authorship is not just a polling of the body. It also takes into account information about one’s thoughts, favoring actions as authored by self when thoughts occur prior to the action and are consistent with the action. The theory of apparent mental causation proposes that the self-perception of the relationship between conscious thoughts and consciously cognized actions underlies the experience of consciously willing the action (Wegner 2002; Wegner and Wheatley 1999). Normally, of course, we experience our actions as being caused by our intentions, and we interpret the intention–action sequence as evidence in favor of the efficacy of our conscious will; philosophers have often taken this personal observation as the basis for theories of human action (Bratman 1987; Searle 1983), and there is continued debate on the validity of this interpretation (Pockett, Banks, and Gallagher 2006). If mental causation is only apparent, however, we should expect that experiences of conscious will might be enhanced or undermined as a result of experimental manipulations of the apparent co-occurrence of thought and action. A number of studies reveal that the experience of conscious will is susceptible to just such manipulation. Research testing this theory has found that when people are primed to think about actions just prior to their occurrence, they experience an enhanced sense of authorship for those actions—even when the actions are not their own. One set of studies explored whether people might come to experience the actions of others as under their control—when they are watching in a mirror as the other person standing close behind them extends arms on each side and makes a series of gestures (in a pantomime known as ‘‘Helping Hands’’). These studies revealed that people report an enhanced sense of control over the other’s arm motions when they hear the instructions for movement that the other is following—as compared to when the instructions are not heard (Wegner, Sparrow, and Winerman 2004). Simply knowing the actions in advance seems to yield an enhanced sense of authorship for them. Moreover this enhanced control was accompanied by an experience of empathy for the other’s hands as well; participants who had heard the hand movement instructions were particularly likely to show emotional reactions (skin conductance responses) when they watched while one of the hands snapped a rubber band on the other’s wrist. In other studies, research participants have been led to think incidentally about some item—say, a frog or a deer—and then were asked to ‘‘type randomly’’ at a computer keyboard for several minutes and subsequently rate
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the likelihood that they typed a number of different words. These participants rate their likelihood of typing ‘‘frog’’ or ‘‘deer’’ more highly than the likelihood of typing comparable words, and are particularly likely to report such authorship if they had encountered the primed word just prior to the random typing task (Gibson and Wegner 2003). Similarly, when people are asked to discern which of two moving blocks on a computer screen they are controlling, they are inclined to select the one whose eventual resting place they were primed to think about by a prior presentation of a block on screen (Aarts, Custers, and Wegner 2004). Reduced levels of thought relevant to an action have the expected complementary effect: when people doing a series of simple tasks (e.g., winding thread on a spool) are asked to try not to think about what they are doing during a task, they become less likely to report intending to perform that task (Wegner and Erksine 2003). These findings all involve people performing actions alone, but similar observations have been made in cases of coaction. Individuals placed in hand-to-hand contact at a computer keyboard and asked to ‘‘read the muscle movements’’ of another person, for example, have been found to report being influenced by that person in their keyboard responses. They answer a series of questions correctly at the keyboard even though the person whose muscles they are ostensibly reading never hears the questions and was instructed to remain inert. The participants were entirely responsible for the communications and yet experienced their own actions as being performed by the other (Wegner, Fuller, and Sparrow 2003). This failure to recognize self as the source of coaction is the basis of the discredited technique of ‘‘facilitated communication,’’ the practice of holding the hand of an autistic or otherwise communication-impaired person in the attempt to help that person type at a keyboard. Messages ‘‘facilitated’’ in this way are typically produced by the facilitator—who nonetheless experiences the messages as issuing from the autistic client ( Jacobson, Mulick, and Schwartz 1995). Coaction that occurs when people operate a ouija board together is open to a similar analysis. People moving a computer mouse together in an experiment simulating the ouija board report greater intention to stop an onscreen cursor on a particular item when they have been prompted to think about that item and know that the other person has not experienced this prompt (Wegner and Wheatley 1999). And when people are given to believe that their actions have helped or hurt another, they become prone to report that they intended and caused such a result when they are led to have thoughts relevant to the action before its apparent occurrence (Pronin et al. 2006). It seems there are many instances in which people take their
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own thoughts into account on the way to inferring their intention and developing an experience of will for an action—even when those thoughts have no authentic causal relation to their action. These illusions of conscious will suggest that the experience of will is not an authentic indicator of how action is caused (Wegner 2002, 2003, 2004). Social Information In addition to information from the body and mind, information gleaned from the social circumstances in which an action is performed has a remarkably strong effect on the experience of conscious will for the action. A renowned instance of this effect occurred in the obedience studies conducted by Stanley Milgram (1963). Research participants were led to believe that they were teaching another participant in an experiment by applying electrical shocks whenever he performed incorrectly, and many were found to apply such shocks willingly—to the point of apparently placing him in grave danger and possibly causing his death. Yet these people were only willing to accept a modicum of responsibility for this action. Participants obeying the experimenter reported what Milgram called an agentic shift: ‘‘the person entering an authority system no longer views himself as acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person’’ (Milgram 1974, p. 133). The Milgram experiment represents an unusually powerful psychological situation (Ross and Nisbett 1991). When people are pressed by strong social circumstances into doing things they would not otherwise do, it makes sense that they would recognize these circumstances and view their own authorship as reduced. The experimental literature on causal attribution in social psychology reveals that people are indeed influenced by the presence of external forces and agents to attribute less causality to self (Gilbert 1998; Heider 1958; Jones et al. 1972; Kelley 1967). What this literature also shows is that social circumstances often do not need to be very powerful to undermine the experience of authorship. Human sensitivity to the influence of social circumstances on authorship is highly acute, as people respond to subtle cues that can rapidly and radically alter perceptions of who is in charge. Perceivers’ attributions of authorship are influenced, for example, by very small perturbations in the relative salience of individuals’ contributions to coaction. A person wearing a brightly colored shirt is more likely to be held responsible for the direction of a group discussion than someone dressed so as to blend in, even when contributions are the same (McArthur and Post 1977). A person looking into a mirror is more inclined to rate self as
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Figure 2.1 The alphabet maze.
responsible for hypothetical actions than someone without a mirror (Duval and Wicklund 1972, 1973), apparently because of increased salience of self as a causal agent. And such salience also operates when people are viewed from different physical perspectives. Perceivers looking at someone face-on, rather than over the person’s shoulder, are more inclined to hold the person responsible for action (Taylor and Fiske 1978). Subtle variations in the timing of contributions to coaction also appear to influence authorship judgments. When two people are walking along the sidewalk hand in hand, for example, and they take the opportunity of a break in traffic to cross to the other side of the street, they have engaged in a coaction. The question of which one decided to make the crossing just then is likely to be determined by what could be very small differences in the timing of their actions. The one who is perceived to have made the move first—even by a matter of a split second—will tend to be seen as the leader of this particular segment of their walk. A mere glance at one’s cowalker might be enough to signify that the move is to be made, and people often seem aware of such subtleties as they maneuver on walks together. On occasion the walkers may discover that neither was really leading and they’ve become lost, but the far more common pattern is for both to know at each turn who is author of their coaction. The influence of such fine differences in the timing of action and gaze on the experience of authorship for coaction was examined in a series of studies recently conducted in our laboratory (Sparrow and Wegner 2006). For these studies a participant was asked to perform the action of tapping out the letters of the alphabet in order with a conductor’s baton by following a line connecting letters on a maze (see figure 2.1). The task involved tapping the letters on the click of a metronome set to click once per second. The participant and experimenter sat on either side of a Plexiglas
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Figure 2.2 Experimenter (left) and participant (right) coaching.
sheet showing the maze (see figure 2.2), with the participant facing the letters. The participant completed the maze several times. This task was entirely straightforward for participants, as all were happily quite familiar with the alphabet. After each completion of the maze, participants took a minute to rate the action on a set of scales measuring their experience of authorship. The scales included measures of the degree to which they felt responsible for the action, felt in control of the action, performed the action deliberately, performed the action voluntarily, and caused the action. Ratings on these scales were highly correlated, and were summed to yield an overall measure of authorship. The basic idea of the studies was to examine how various activities performed by the experimenter during the maze task might impinge on the participant’s sense of authorship for this simple movement. In a first experiment, participants completed the maze three times. For half of these participants, the experimenter also had a pointer and pointed at letters in time with the participant and metronome. For the other participants, the experimenter directed her gaze letter by letter through the maze in time with the participant. Perceivers are typically able to read the eye movements of a person to infer what is intended (Bekkering and Neggers 2002), so this study examined whether the gaze of the experimenter might be read and understood as might the experimenter’s pointer movement.
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In these between-subject sets of pointer and gaze trials, the experimenter carried out three different coactions (counterbalanced in order across participants). For one trial (with pointer or gaze), the experimenter pointed or looked at exactly the same letter as the participant. On this simultaneous trial, each person started on ‘‘A’’ and proceeded through the alphabet. For another trial, the participant started on ‘‘B’’ and the experimenter started on ‘‘A’’—for this leading trial, then, the participant was always one step ahead of the experimenter. For a third trial, the participant started on ‘‘A’’ and the experimenter started on ‘‘B’’—for this following trial, the participant was always one step behind the experimenter. This variation in the sequence of their activities was the only indication to participants of what was different across the three trials. At no point in the introduction of the tasks did the experimenter ever mention the terms ‘‘leading’’ or ‘‘following’’ or explicitly direct the participant’s attention to the experimenter’s gaze. All the tasks were introduced solely by reference to the details of the participant’s required movement. The results revealed that participants’ reports of their experience of authorship were remarkably sensitive to the experimenter’s coaction. Participants reported experiencing greater authorship for action during leading than during following, with simultaneous trials between these extremes. This was true whether the experimenter used the pointer or gaze to trace the alphabet. So, as in the case of the walkers stepping off the curb to cross the street, the one who does so first experiences greater authorship for the action, and the one who does so second experiences less authorship for the action—even though both are performing a coordinated coaction and their individual movements are indistinguishable. These findings also indicate that the experimenter’s timed gaze placement has the same effect. Perhaps this is why it feels annoying to have someone read over your shoulder or watch as you work on a puzzle; their gaze exerts a kind of pressure that makes it less clear that you are the boss. In this series of studies a second experiment arranged for participants to complete the same alphabet trials, but the experimenter always used a pointer, while some participants moved a pointer and others moved their own gaze. As in the initial study, leading produced greater authorship than following, and this was no different for participants using pointers or gaze. Apparently the person who is leading or following another’s pointer movement with his or her own gaze experiences the same relative changes in authorship as the person leading or following with the pointer; watching ahead of someone’s action makes you feel more the author of your eye movements than watching behind it.
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We also wondered whether these effects were due to the participant’s awareness that the experimenter could perceive their relative position—or if this effect might also occur in participants who were working with an experimenter who could not see their relative position. In a third experiment, then, participant and experimenter were placed in separate rooms with an embedded one-way mirror between them. Participants could see the experimenter, but knew the experimenter could not see them. Under these conditions, leading again induced greater authorship than following, so it appears that having one’s coaction monitored by the experimenter was not essential to the influence of asynchronous action on authorship attributions. There need not be mutual knowledge of the relative timing of coaction to produce these social effects of relative timing. Finally, we were curious about the degree to which these effects might be general across people, or whether they might be limited to people who are particularly attuned to the perception of other agents. Perhaps people who are ‘‘mindblind’’ (Baron-Cohen 1995) might not have the same acute sensitivity to the relative position of the experimenter’s movement. Their experience of authorship might be determined more by their body and mind inputs and less by perceptions of the social circumstances of action. To assess this possibility, we had participants in a fourth experiment complete a pretest questionnaire to assess their autism-quotient (AQ ) (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), a self-report measure of individual differences in the sensitivity to social cues and other autism-relevant characteristics. The study revealed that participants who scored high on autism-like traits reported authorship that was unaffected by their position relative to the experimenter, whereas participants with higher levels of social sensitivity showed the effects of experimenter position as in the prior studies. The participants with autismlike traits had reduced authorship levels for coaction regardless of position. These experiments, taken together, suggest that the authorship experience of normal adults is highly sensitive to relatively minor variations in the social context of a simple action. The alphabet maze presented no challenge to any of the participants, so it is unlikely that any real leading or following was taking place. Yet participants reported a reduced sense of authorship when their action occurred after that of the experimenter, and an enhanced sense of authorship when it occurred before. Apparently it doesn’t take much in the way of social circumstances to override the multiple sources of authorship information in body and mind and produce an alteration in overall authorship experience. Someone else doing an action just before or after we do it makes us feel differently about whether we did it.
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The susceptibility to social information in the experience of authorship is reflected in unique patterns of brain activation that occur during actual leading and following. PET scans were made for participants in one experiment while they imitated an experimenter’s actions, were imitated by an experimenter, produced actions without imitation, or produced actions while the experimenter performed other actions (Decety et al. 2002). The same brain area was found to be activated both when one was imitated and when one imitated the other (left superior temporal sulcus, STS). Meanwhile there were also differential activations in these circumstances (the right or left parietal area, respectively). This pattern suggests that the STS is involved in understanding both one’s own and another’s actions, whereas the parietal area helps to differentiate which actions originate with the self and which originate with the other. The sensitivity to social circumstances in experiencing authorship is subserved by an intricate neural architecture that operates to incorporate this information into one’s overall experience of authorship of action. Coaction and Conscious Will So why all this fuss about social effects on authorship? In one sense these effects are fascinating in themselves. It is interesting to observe that you can be driving merrily along the freeway, notice a car in a lane next to you pull slightly ahead and stay there—and get the odd sense that you’ve been bested somehow. Seemingly minute social maneuvers affect our inner sense of what we’re doing, and this strange power is disconcerting. But there is another reason to be thinking about social effects on authorship feelings, a reason that turns us toward the more general issue of why we have authorship feelings at all. Think of it this way: if the experience of conscious will is a veridical reflection of the inner causal processes whereby action is produced, why is this experience so radically sensitive to the presence of external social pressures that may in fact be irrelevant to the production of the action? Another driver’s position has nothing to do with your travel down this road at this moment. You were going there anyway. Why does this position impinge at all on your experience of authorship for driving? The Official Doctrine One clear implication of the influence of social irrelevancies on our experience of authorship is to undermine any wish we might have to accept what Ryle (1949) called the ‘‘official doctrine’’ of the mind—the idea that we
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know what we are doing. In a well-crafted critique Ryle wondered at the widespread assumption that the mind is ‘‘self-luminous’’—knowing all that it does, including its causation of action. Ryle swept such ideas into a pile he called the ‘‘official doctrine.’’ He produced a series of arguments suggesting that the person is not intrinsically informed of the mind’s workings in this way, and instead is merely in a good position to observe the mind and draw inferences about its operation. In philosophy, Dennett (1984, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2003) drew from this observation the general insight that mind is in the eye of the beholder (his conception of the ‘‘intentional stance’’). And in psychology, Bem (1967, 1972), and then Nisbett and Wilson (1977), offered a range of research findings consistent with Ryle’s critique. These various themes all center on the notion that the person is a self-perceiver rather than a self-knower—particularly when it comes to authorship. If the official doctrine were correct, the mind would always know what it does. After all, if the experience we have of consciously causing an action were a valid reflection of the entire causal enterprise producing our action, it should never be mistaken. The mind should be able to sort out and discount irrelevant circumstances such as the presence of another person performing the action before or after our own performance. At best, reports of the feeling of conscious will should reflect only the authorship information arising from the body—the proprioceptive or introceptive information noted earlier. The experience of conscious will shouldn’t be fooled by experiments that introduce extraneous information about the state of the mind before the action, and it certainly shouldn’t be pushed around by information indicating that another person is in the area and might be doing something similar! If the experience of conscious will is a conduit into the soul of our actions, an indicator of the very wellsprings of what we do, immaterial facts should not perturb it. But they do. We’ve all had the experience of deciding to order something in a restaurant, only to find that someone dining with us orders this item from the server before we’ve had a chance to speak up. At this moment, although we usually don’t mention it to anyone, we would like to be able to take the server aside and note that we had already thought of this dish and are not slavishly copying the other diner. The other diner’s actions do not have any sensible bearing on the authorship we should feel for our selection— but we find our authorship feelings are warped nonetheless. This kind of thing suggests that the official doctrine simply can’t be right. If the mind knows what it is doing as it causes its action, it can’t be swayed at every turn by inconsequential matters such as who ordered first. The social
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sources of authorship feelings in coaction, then, help us to realize that the experience of conscious will is a feeling our minds construct to reflect where they think authorship lies—not a feeling that radiates from a selfluminous mind as it reports its own causal power. Authorship and Social Accounting As this chapter is being written, there are several controversies in the news about claims of plagiarism. A Harvard undergraduate, Kaavya Viswanathan, has been accused of plagiarizing segments of her novel and the novel has been retracted by the publisher. The chairman of Raytheon Co., William Swanson, stands accused as well, in his case for parts of his Unwritten Rules of Management that were found to have indeed been written, but by someone else. The chairman took an immediate cut in pay. Claiming authorship for items that are not one’s own is a risky business, bringing social opprobrium or worse when it is discovered. And these examples are just today’s top stories. The fact is that the accounting of who has done what is a central task of every human system, the foundation of justice and morality. Our tendency even to name or think about actions seems to arise from our need to figure out who did what (Feinberg 1970). The elements of social exchange that allow us to function as a society would be upended immediately if we weren’t all keeping track at all times, at least at some level, of who does everything. Slips in accounting can destroy our system of interaction; we become concerned when authorship is confused. It bothers us when a person with schizophrenia claims to hear inner ‘‘voices’’ from others, as we know there is a lapse in appreciating authorship (Graham and Stephens 1994; Hoffmann 1986). We find ourselves getting nervous when someone such as President George W. Bush claims that God is the author of his actions (Suskind 2004). People who claim too little authorship for self, like the plagiarists who claim too much, upset our sense of justice and threaten to undo our society (Homans 1961). As a result we will forever be worrying about who called the cab, who burned the turkey, who left the cat out overnight, who clicked the remote, who lost the twist tie to the ginger snaps . . . and on and on. The importance of authorship accounting in social life makes the role of social cues in authorship judgments far more understandable. It’s not just that other people might blur for us what we think we did—it’s that everyone is continually trying to keep clear on what everyone is doing. There is a great social task at hand, the maintenance of society. With this in mind, the finding that people are influenced by who goes first in the alphabet
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task begins to take on some meaning. In essence, this realization suggests that authorship judgments have evolved in humans not merely as a way of keeping track of personal causation as compared with the forces of physics in the world, but additionally, and more profoundly, as a way of accounting for own agency in a social world where agency in coaction is the measure of all things. The experience of willing an action is enhanced when others follow, and is reduced when others lead, even when the leading and following are causally irrelevant, because the experience is produced as a reportable measure of one’s potential claim to causal influence. Conscious will is an experiential indicator that lends a sense of ‘‘meness’’ to some portion of the maelstrom of coaction in which the self is involved. And this feeling produces something more than a rational judgment of authorship. It also yields a kind of authenticity, a sort of embodiment (Niedenthal et al. 2005) to the judgment that gives it much the same punch as an emotion. Like a feeling of joy or fear or anger, a feeling of doing marks an action as one’s own in a way that is easily perceived and highly memorable. Imagine that a toddler is tugging to get your attention and you push her away, perhaps with a bit too much vigor. She falls back on her bottom and begins to cry. Yes, you feel bad because she’s crying. You feel worse because you were partly the author of that coaction, and you are responsible for what happened. The feeling that is produced in this setting, a sense of willfulness about the action, along with guilt and embarrassment for doing it, makes your authorship all too clear to you. You experience a sense of firstperson responsibility for this event that is more telling about your reactions and subsequent feelings than any amount of third-person responsibility (responsibility attributed to you by others) that might be allocated in the court of toddler justice downtown (Wegner 2004). The maintenance of social justice and the fabric of society, as well as the continued operation of morality in human affairs—these are all things that some commentators would have us believe are lost if there arises widespread belief in a deterministic model of human action (e.g., Nahmias 2002). The implosion of these social necessities does not hinge, however, on the existence of real responsibility. Thoughts do not have to cause actions for morality and human value to continue. Rather, there must be a personal perception of own responsibility. The real linchpin holding together society is first-person responsibility, the kind of thing that happens in your head and your heart when you nudge that toddler and know you did it. We could have a world of legal systems and punishment machinery
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in place to hold people responsible for what society thinks they did, but if people never had any deep inner sense that they authored their actions, all of this would be for naught. Many prisoners may believe they don’t deserve to be in prison—but what if nobody believed they ever had done something to deserve what they got? The experience of conscious will, along with its attendant moral emotions, is what gives us each an inner sense of our part in the grand scheme of coaction and allows us to accept graciously the deserts that society, by its own calculations, thinks we should get for our authorship. Conclusion The experience of consciously willing an action has long been understood as an expression of the true source of action: Actions we consciously will are those that indeed were caused intentionally by us. This is what Ryle called the ‘‘official doctrine,’’ and it is an intuition that continues to be espoused by a number of psychologists and philosophers. It turns out, though, that people in psychological experiments are remarkably open to illusions of their own authorship, coming to conclude they have done things they did not, or to believe that they have not done things they actually did do, as a result of the introduction of misleading information about the relationship that exists between their own thoughts and actions, or about the relationship between their own actions and the actions of others. In particular, the experience of coaction can be difficult to read properly. It is easy to become convinced that the irrelevant actions of others have implications for one’s own authorship. When another person mimics your action before you do it, it seems that you are less responsible for your own action; when the other mimics it afterward, in turn, you feel an enhanced sense of responsibility for the same motions. These feelings reflect erroneous authorship judgments, and so indicate that the experience of consciously willing an action is only a fallible estimate of authorship—not a direct expression of the operation of personal causation. Human sensitivity to social cues in judging personal authorship in coaction also points to a useful observation about why such authorship feelings have evolved at all. The experience of authorship seems to have developed in humans as a building block toward the creation of social exchange systems. Knowing who does what may keep society together. Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers must have had views of who was doing what in their dance team that led
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to similar cohesion—a solution to the puzzle of coaction that kept them dancing cheek to cheek. Acknowledgment This research was funded in part by NIMH Grant MH-49127. References Aarts, H., R. Custers, and D. M. Wegner. 2004. Attributing the cause of one’s own actions: Priming effects in agency judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 14: 439–58. Baron-Cohen, S. 1995. Mindblindness. Cambridge: MIT Press. Baron-Cohen, S., S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin, and E. Clubley. 2001. The autism-spectrum quotient (AQ ): Evidence from Asperger’s syndrome/high functioning autism, males and females, scientists and mathematicians. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 31: 5–17. Bekkering, H., and S. Neggers. 2002. Visual search is modulated by action intentions. Psychological Science 13: 370–73. Bem, D. J. 1967. Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review 74: 183–200. Bem, D. J. 1972. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 6, pp. 1–62. New York: Academic Press. Blakemore, S.-J., D. M. Wolpert, and C. D. Frith. 2002. Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 237–42. Blakemore, S. J., and J. Decety. 2001. From the perception of action to the understanding of intention. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2: 561–67. Blakemore, S. J., D. Wolpert, and C. Frith. 1998. Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation. Nature Neuroscience 1: 635–40. Blakemore, S. J., D. Wolpert, and C. Frith. 2000. Why can’t you tickle yourself? NeuroReport 11: 11–16. Bratman, M. E. 1987. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Daprati, E., N. Franck, N. Georgieff, J. Proust, E. Pacherie, J. Dalery, and M. Jeannerod. 1997. Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition 65: 71–86.
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Decety, J., T. Chaminade, J. Grezes, and A. N. Meltzoff. 2002. A PET exploration of neural mechanisms involved in reciprocal imitation. NeuroImage 15: 265–72. Dennett, D. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dennett, D. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press. Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Basic Books. Dennett, D. 1996. Kinds of Minds. New York: Basic Books. Dennett, D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking. Duval, S., and R. A. Wicklund. 1972. A Theory of Objective Self Awareness. New York: Academic Press. Duval, S., and R. A. Wicklund. 1973. Effects of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 9: 17–31. Feinberg, J. 1970. Doing and Deserving. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Franck, N., C. Farrer, N. Georgieff, M. Marie-Cardine, J. Dale´ry, T. d’Amato, and M. Jeannerod. 2001. Defective recognition of one’s own actions in patients with schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry 158: 454–59. Frith, C. D., S.-J. Blakemore, and D. M. Wolpert. 2000. Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 355: 1771– 88. Gandevia, S., and D. Burke. 1992. Does the nervous system depend on kinesthetic information to control natural limb movements? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 614–32. Georgieff, N., and M. Jeannerod. 1998. Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ‘‘who’’ system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 7: 465–77. Gibson, L., and D. M. Wegner. 2003. Believing we’ve done what we were thinking: An illusion of authorship. Paper presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Los Angeles. Gilbert, D. T. 1998. Ordinary personology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, pp. 89–150. New York: McGraw-Hill. Graham, G., and G. L. Stephens. 1994. Mind and mine. In G. Graham, and G. L. Stephens, eds., Philosophical Psychology, pp. 91–109. Cambridge: MIT Press. Graziano, M. S. A. 1999. Where is my arm? The relative role of vision and proprioception in the neuronal representation of limb position. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 96: 10418–21.
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Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley. Hoffmann, R. E. 1986. Verbal hallucinations and language production processes in schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9: 503–48. Homans, G. C. 1961. Social Behaviour. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Jacobson, J. W., J. A. Mulick, and A. A. Schwartz. 1995. A history of facilitated communication: Science, pseudoscience, and antiscience. American Psychologist 50: 750–65. Jones, E. E., D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, and B. Weiner. 1972. Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Kelley, H. H. 1967. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine, ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, vol. 15, pp. 192–240. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Matthews, P. B. C. 1982. Where does Sherrington’s ‘‘muscular sense’’ originate? Muscles, joints, corollary discharges? Annual Review of Neuroscience 5: 189–218. McArthur, L. Z., and D. L. Post. 1977. Figural emphasis and person perception. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13: 520–35. Milgram, S. 1963. Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67: 371–78. Milgram, S. 1974. Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper and Row. Mueller, J. 1985. Astaire Dancing: The Musical Films of Fred Astaire. New York: Knopf. Nahmias, E. 2002. When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner’s The illusion of Conscious Will. Philosophical Psychology 15: 527–41. Niedenthal, P. M., L. W. Barsalou, P. Winkielman, S. Krauth-Gruber, and F. Ric. 2005. Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review 9: 184–211. Nielson, T. I. 1963. Volition: A new experimental approach. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 4: 215–30. Nisbett, R. E., and T. D. Wilson. 1977. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84: 231–59. Pockett, S., W. P. Banks, and S. Gallagher, eds. 2006. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? Cambridge: MIT Press. Pronin, E., D. M. Wegner, K. McCarthy, and S. Rodriguez. 2006. Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming. Prose, F. 2000. The Blue Angel. New York: Harper Collins.
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Ramachandran, V., and D. Rogers-Ramachandran. 1996. Synaesthesia in phantom limbs induced with mirrors. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 263: 377–86. Ross, L., and R. E. Nisbett. 1991. The Person and the Situation. New York: McGraw-Hill. Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Scheerer, E. 1987. Muscle sense and innervation feelings: A chapter in the history of perception and action. In H. Heuer, and A. F. Sanders, eds., Perspectives on Perception and Action, pp. 171–94. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Searle, J. R. 1983. Intentionality: An Essay on the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sherrington, C. S. 1906. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Sirigu, A., E. Daprati, P. Pradat-Diehl, N. Franck, and M. Jeannerod. 1999. Perception of self-generated movement following left-parietal lesion. Brain 122: 1867–74. Sparrow, B., and D. M. Wegner. 2006. The experience of authorship in coaction. Unpublished manuscript. Cambridge, MA. Sperry, R. 1950. Neural basis of spontaneous optokinetic responses produced by visual inversion. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 43: 482–89. Suskind, R. 2004. Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush. New York Times Magazine, October 17. Taylor, S. E., and S. T. Fiske. 1978. Salience, attention, and attribution: Top of the head phenomena. In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 11, pp. 249–68. New York: Academic Press. von Holst, E., and H. Mittelsteadt. 1950. Das reafferencprinzip. Naturwissensschaften 37: 464–76. Wegner, D. M. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wegner, D. M. 2003. The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7: 65–69. Wegner, D. M. 2004. Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 649–92. Wegner, D. M., and J. Erksine. 2003. Voluntary involuntariness: Thought suppression and the regulation of the experience of will. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 684–94. Wegner, D. M., V. Fuller, and B. Sparrow. 2003. Clever hands: Uncontrolled intelligence in facilitated communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85: 1–15.
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3 What Kind of Agent Are We? A Naturalistic Framework for the Study of Human Agency Paul Sheldon Davies
What kind of agent are we? My answer is twofold. First, we do not know. At this point in the history of inquiry, traditional notions of agency are dead or dying and their replacements have yet to be born or yet to reach maturity. Second, although we are in a period of conceptual transition and thus have no developed concept of human agency, we do know what kind of agent we are not. We do know of some elements in our traditional concept that they are no longer tenable. It is important to be self-conscious about these deaths in our conceptual scheme, as they generate intellectual tension that may lead to conceptual creativity. I aim to flesh out this twofold answer to my title question. My discussion divides into four main parts. The first sketches in broad strokes a contrast between three different orientations toward inquiry—a contrast, I think, that captures some central features of the contemporary philosophical and perhaps general intellectual landscape. Of these three orientations, one is deeply naturalistic, another naturalistic but insufficiently so, and the third nonnaturalistic. The second part of my discussion introduces some of the elements of the naturalistic orientation I wish to recommend, while the third part illustrates this orientation by reviewing some of the central claims in Daniel Wegner’s theory of the will, which he defends in his splendid (2002) book The Illusion of Conscious Will. In the fourth part, however, I focus on Wegner’s discussion of the concepts ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’ from the ninth chapter of his book and argue that his claims concerning these concepts conflict with the theory of will developed in the first eight chapters. I also argue that we should resolve this conflict by taking the theory of conscious will to its full naturalistic conclusion and altering our notions ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’ even further than Wegner suggests. We should do this, I argue, in light of the main elements of my naturalistic orientation. By way of conclusion, I return to the question, What kind of agent are we? and conclude that the implications of Wegner’s
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theory, particularly the conceptual uncertainty that the theory thrusts upon us, make plausible both parts of the answer I give to my title question. Orientations toward Inquiry The first orientation, what I call conceptual conservatism, presumes that the aim of inquiry is to preserve as far as possible apparently important concepts. Two species within this genus include (1) the presumption that we should save concepts that appear important within some well-developed scientific theory and (2) the presumption that we should save concepts that appear important within our general worldview. An example of the first presumption is evident in Michael Ruse’s recent book Darwin and Design, in which he claims that the concepts ‘design’ and ‘function’ must be preserved within evolutionary theory (Ruse 2003).1 The second presumption might explain the conflict that arises in Wegner’s discussion of ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’. I am going to suggest, at any rate, that while Wegner’s theory of will threatens to undermine traditional notions associated with agency, his final chapter reverses direction. It is a move away from a naturalistic orientation toward the second form of conceptual conservatism. The second orientation, what I call conceptual imperialism, presumes that some concepts possess a special right among or dominion over all other concepts and all methods of inquiry. The aim is not to try to ‘‘save’’ apparently important concepts. Nor is the aim to try to better conform our concepts to the world. Just the opposite in fact. The aim is to delineate the contours of certain concepts and thereby specify what the world must be like in order that it fit those concepts. On this view, our concepts are not open to negotiation with respect to their presumed core content. The function of such concepts is not to put them to any test but rather to hold them fast and insist on classifying the world in terms of those concepts. Lest anyone suspect me of caricature in the case of imperialism, consider the imperialist’s orientation toward the concept ‘free will’. The imperialist presumes that some apparently important concepts are necessary in some sense or other and hence nonnegotiable, at least at their core. The claim concerning ‘free will’ is that if we alter or relinquish our traditional concept, we thereby lose our grip on a host of concepts clustering around the notions of control and responsibility. Altering or relinquishing those concepts eviscerates our conceptual scheme to such an extent we can no longer think or offer meaningful assertions about human agency. We will
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have changed the subject and lost our way. From the imperialist’s point of view, there is something inherently self-destructive about a form of inquiry in which a concept so near the core can be altered or eliminated. What then is the positive aim of imperialist inquiry concerning free will? The goal is to reflect on our concept by way of thought experiments and articulate conditions necessary and sufficient for the application of the concept. Once we have accomplished that, we can then specify what the world must be like in order that something actually fall under the concept. On the imperialist assumption that our concept must be retained, and on the basis of conditions deemed necessary and sufficient, we are forced to conclude, as Roderick Chisholm (1964) does, for example, that human beings must be akin to God with respect to the will. The imperialist claims in this case to have discovered that the core of the human self must include the capacity to initiate causal sequences leading to free actions without that capacity itself being subject to efficient causation. This is a claim about the nature of human beings based solely upon the (allegedly) nonnegotiable content of our (alleged) concept ‘free will’. Now, I will have nothing further to say about conceptual imperialism except that it contrasts starkly with the third orientation—what I call conceptual progressivism. According to the progressivist, inquiry is largely a matter of exploration. Naturalism is exploration in the way that the naturalists of the nineteenth century—Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, for example—were explorers. To adopt this orientation is to embark on the study of natural systems with the positive expectation that our settled view of the world is about to be unsettled. It is to proceed with a heightened sense that, as we approach the bounds of current knowledge, we are crossing into lands that may challenge the very categories in which our knowledge is presently expressed. This is to face the crucial possibility that we are conceptually ill-equipped to assimilate new discoveries, that we may be thrown into conceptual disarray and forced to flounder, even forced to create new conceptual categories. Genuine inquiry, for the progressivist, is always a looming threat to our current worldview and a looming challenge to our creative powers. Naturalism I turn now to describing some of the main elements of the naturalistic orientation I endorse. Naturalism-as-exploration is not a metaphysical thesis. It is concerned rather to answer the question, By what methods are we most likely to discover the truth? Applied to the study of human nature,
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the question concerns methods most likely to produce knowledge of our nature. So far as I can see, there are only two remotely plausible sources for answering this question: (1) lessons culled from human history, particularly the history of modern science and the history of culture, and (2) lessons concerning our constitution, particularly our neurology, psychology, and sociology. Considerations drawn from our history and our constitution make plausible several directives for naturalistic exploration. I will describe four such directives. Before describing my directives, however, a brief word about tactics. The directives I offer are utterly banal, and intentionally so. I want constraints on inquiry based on considerations so uncontroversial that even the imperialist cannot reject them out of hand. That has obvious strategic payoff when dealing with nonnaturalists. The downside, of course, is that serious naturalists may find these directives tiresome. But I beg your indulgence. For if I am right, the directives I offer, despite their banality, are not without power. There may even be room for serious naturalists to become better naturalists. History of Science The first directive derives from the history of science. We make progress in our knowledge of natural systems to the extent we analyze inward and identify low-level systemic mechanisms and interactions that instantiate high-level capacities. We also make progress as we synthesize laterally across related domains of inquiry, as we look for coherence among taxonomies of mechanisms postulated in associated areas of study. Such analyses and syntheses serve as mutual checks on one another. The importance of these checks is demonstrated throughout the history of science, including, for example, the evolution in our concept ‘life’ from Blumenbach (1781) and Kant (1790) to the modern synthesis in biology. The important claim is that the initial conceptual categories with which we begin such inquiry are often altered and sometimes destroyed as we analyze inward and synthesize laterally. It is an historical fact that as biology matured in the first half of the twentieth century, Bergson’s (1907) ‘life force’, a notion inherited from Blumenbach and Kant, could no longer be sustained because scientists discovered low-level physical mechanisms implementing precisely those capacities which, according to Blumenbach, Kant, and Bergson, could not be understood mechanistically. A full defense of this claim requires detailed, historical case studies2 and, on the basis of such studies, it is reasonable to accept the following directive:
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(E) For systems we understand poorly or not at all, expect that, as inquiry progresses—as we analyze inward and synthesize laterally—the concepts in terms of which we conceptualize high-level systemic capacities will be altered or eliminated. It is important that (E) expresses an expectation and nothing stronger. But it is also important that the expectation expressed can have substantive consequences for the way we frame our intellectual tasks. We should expect our initial conceptual categories to change as we analyze into complex natural systems of which we are presently ignorant. And, in light of this expectation, we should calibrate our intuitions and hunches so that an explicit openness to change in our concepts becomes our default position. It is worth pointing out that a commitment to the fecundity of analyzing inward is not a commitment to ontological reductionism. This is clear from what we have recently learned about reductionism in biochemistry. Consider the following form of reductionism: (R) For any living system S, all high-level capacities are explicable in terms of generalizations quantifying over intrinsic properties of low-level systemic mechanisms. The properties of low-level mechanisms are ‘‘intrinsic’’ in the relevant sense just in case they do not depend on the mechanisms being part of system S—just in case, that is, they are features that these low-level mechanisms possess even when extracted from S or placed in some other type of system. The lead intuition behind (R) is that high-level systemic capacities are wholly explicable in terms of certain core properties of low-level mechanisms; stability in high-level capacities is, presumably, a direct product of stability in the core properties of low-level mechanisms. But we now know that (R) is false, at least for certain kinds of biochemical systems. The work of Boogerd et al. (2005) shows that the behavior of certain complex cells decomposes not simply into the intrinsic causal properties of low-level enzymes but also into properties that enzymes acquire only in so far as they are related in the right way to certain other chemical agents. Boogerd et al. are clear that the falsity of (R) does not entail the failure of mechanistic explanation. The high-level systemic capacities of the cells they discuss are entirely explicable in terms of the causal and mechanical effects of low-level mechanisms and their relations. Nevertheless, the kind of reductionism expressed in (R) is demonstrably false. Some of the highlevel capacities exemplified by living systems are explicable only in terms of the properties of low-level mechanisms that depend crucially on their
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place in precisely those kinds of living systems. This is enough to show that a commitment to analyzing inward, to explaining high-level capacities in terms of low-level mechanisms and their interactions, in no way entails a commitment to the form of reductionism expressed in (R). And it is also worth emphasizing that the discovery reported by Boogerd et al. was accomplished precisely because they approached the study of complex cells by following the lessons that motivate the directive in (E)—by analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally. History of Culture The history of (at least) western culture should make us self-consciously suspicious of what I call dubious concepts. One category of dubious concepts comprises concepts that are dubious by virtue of descent. Concepts that descend from a worldview we no longer regard as true are dubious in this sense, provided they have not been vindicated or superseded by concepts of some well-developed scientific theory. The traditional concept ‘free will’ as elaborated by Chisholm (1964) and others is dubious in this sense, since it derives mainly from our theological ancestry and has not been vindicated by any contemporary form of inquiry. These sorts of reflections on the history of culture, properly fleshed out, warrant the following directive for inquiry: (D) For any concept dubious by virtue of descent, do not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical theorizing that we preserve or otherwise ‘‘save’’ that concept; rather, bracket the concept with the expectation that it will be explained away or vindicated as inquiry progresses—as we analyze inward and synthesize laterally. The importance of (D) consists not simply in a general mistrust of concepts with a theological heritage but also in serving as a check on the intellectual biases bequeathed to us by our predecessors. The hope is that we become self-conscious of the prejudices we may otherwise fail to notice in ourselves. In doing so, we create the intellectual space within our own inquiries to apply the lessons that motivate the expectation in (E). After all, we are the products of our history, including our cultural history, and it is naı¨ve to think that we can, simply by way of self-reflection, identify and correct the retarding effects of our culturally instituted categories. Perhaps the most pernicious effect of concepts dubious by descent is that we tend not to see the need for, or even the possibility of, analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally. We may tend to see certain concepts as inescapable and constitutive of what we are even when those concepts are the products
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of historical and cultural forces that are escapable after all. The importance of (D), at any rate, is that it broadens the efficacy of the lessons that motivate (E).3 Human Psychology Some of our most basic conceptualizing capacities lead us astray. Our tendency to over-apply the perceptual concept ‘face’—to clouds, automobile grilles, abstract paintings, and so forth—is a simple but vivid example. But there are other, more substantive cases. Contemporary cognitive psychologists maintain that the human mind comprises a host of conceptual and inferential capacities. Some of these capacities, it is claimed, dispose us to apply the concept ‘cause’ under a range of conditions, including conditions in which no causal relation obtains. Other capacities dispose us to apply one or more of a cluster of mental concepts, including ‘intention’, even when the attributed intention is absent. In general, concepts for which our conceptualizing capacities are apt to generate false positives are dubious by virtue of their psychological role.4 Now, even if you have a healthy skepticism toward contemporary cognitive psychology, the point here is still significant. It is plausible that some of our most basic cognitive and affective capacities enable us to anticipate and navigate our environments under a limited range of conditions. It is also plausible that we find ourselves, often enough, in conditions outside those limits. The resulting false positives may be, from an evolutionary point of view, a cost worth paying; the false positives may be a nuisance or even deleterious in some instances, but the presumption is that being possessed of different psychological structures would be far worse. However, from the point of view of trying to acquire knowledge, the false positives may be intolerable. As Robert McCauley (2000) has recently argued, the pursuit of scientific knowledge is probably unnatural—contrary to some elements of our nature—in precisely this sort of way. If so, then progress in knowledge is limited by the retarding effects of our own psychological architecture or, less pessimistically, by the bounds of our best efforts to creatively think or feel our way around our own structural limitations.5 If all this is right, then it is crucial from the point of view of inquiry that we become self-conscious about the conditions under which such conceptualizing capacities may lead us astray. The relevant directive is this: (P) For any concept dubious by psychological role, do not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical theorizing that we preserve or otherwise ‘‘save’’ that concept; rather, require that we identify the
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conditions (if any) under which the concept is correctly applied and withhold antecedent authority from that concept under all other conditions. As with the directive in (D), the importance of (P) is that it serves as a check that enables us to better apply the lessons that motivate (E). It serves as a check against the biases of our own psychological structures; it creates the space, by way of analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally, for us to better understand the limitations of our own abilities. Of course, (P) may be difficult to implement. It may be difficult because the capacities engage nonconsciously and because they are entrenched and thus constitutive of the way we orient ourselves to the world. It may also be difficult because the concepts, even if they reach the level of conscious reflection, are central to how we portray ourselves as agents and as inquirers. As I say, implementing (P) may require that we devise strategies for thinking or feeling our way around certain naturally distorting dispositions of thought and feeling.6 And we must be prepared to discover that implementing (P) is beyond our powers with respect to some psychological capacities. Evolutionary History At least two elementary facts concerning our evolutionary history are important. The first is that we are evolved animals. All of our capacities, including our capacities to generate and apply concepts, and including the conceptual schemes we create, have a long evolutionary history. The second is that we, along with other primates that exist today, evolved from a common hominine7 ancestor, in which case the study of our cousins is sometimes an aid to the study of ourselves. These facts, coupled with claims from psychology or neurology, enable us to formulate reasonable hypotheses concerning the structure of our psychology. They enable us to distinguish structure from noise. They do this by making it rational to choose hypotheses that fit what is known about our evolutionary history over hypotheses that do not. If taken in isolation, such evolutionary considerations are weak, but if combined with the lessons that motivate the expectation in (E)—if combined with the fruits of analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally, as ethologists and neuroscientists do—then considerations of our evolutionary history have force. A plausible evolutionary hypothesis serves as a general framework for the pursuit of low-level mechanisms and interactions; the more plausible the framework, the more compelling the low-level taxonomy. We thus should require that
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(H) For any hypothesis regarding any human capacity, make it a condition of adequacy that, as we analyze inward and synthesize laterally, we do so within a framework informed by relevant considerations of our evolutionary history. In addition to helping us to distinguish structure from noise, this directive also has implications for conceptual conservatism and imperialism. Neither the conservative nor the imperialist pays sufficient heed to the fact that our concepts are the products of our evolutionary history; the mere fact that we take ourselves to have the relevant concept is usually thought to be sufficient. But surely that is false. Surely the fact that our concepts evolved bears on the authority such concepts should have in our inquiries. Moreover neither the conservative nor the imperialist pays heed to the fact that our conceptualizing capacities are the products of our evolutionary history; the mere fact that we take ourselves to have the relevant capacity is usually taken at face value. But, once again, that is surely a mistake. The fact that our capacities evolved indicates something about their scope and limitations; the fact that they evolved should, for example, cast doubt upon certain claims concerning the sorts of properties to which our capacities are responsive. Wegner’s Naturalism Wegner (2002) employs all four directives to great effect in his approach to the topic of free will.8 Although the topic is usually broached as a problem in metaphysics, a fully satisfying theory would need to explain how freedom of will is implemented in human psychology. Indeed, it is a reasonable constraint on any metaphysical theory concerning the mind that it apply to organisms with the cognitive and affective capacities we in fact have. Perhaps a metaphysical theory of free will need not directly answer this question, but it must at least presuppose the availability of one. A central question, then, concerning free will is: How can we study the alleged human capacity for free will scientifically? It is this question Wegner sets out to answer. His answer rests upon the theory of apparent mental causation. We frame our inquiry by fixing attention not on the concept ‘free will’, but on a capacity we can be confident most humans in fact possess. We fix attention on the felt experience of willing or of having willed an action. We focus on a feeling associated with experiencing one’s self as the causal impetus and conduit of one’s own action, a feeling with the oomph of effort as its immediate object.
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Here then is a strategy for the scientific investigation of our alleged capacity for free will: study the felt experience of willing. And this takes us immediately to the lessons that motivate the expectation expressed in (E), for we may now bring to bear models from cognitive and social psychology, as well as neurology; having settled on an actual high level capacity of humans, we may begin the process of analyzing inward and synthesizing laterally. This also enables us to adhere to the directive expressed in (D), for we set to one side the concept, dubious by descent, that drove Chisholm and others to conclude that our wills are akin to God’s. Most important, once we adhere to the lessons that motivate (E)—once we turn to what is known about our neurological, psychological, and social constitution—the directive in (P) rises to the top. The theory of apparent mental causation asserts that the same properties involved in the perception of causality generally apply to the particular case of perceiving a causal relation between the pair the conscious intention to do action A and the perception of one’s self performing action A Taking his cue from the work of Albert Michotte (1954), Wegner offers the following model. Normal humans perceive instances of the above-cited pair of events—particular intentions and actions—as causally related to the extent the following conditions obtain: 1. Priority One event is perceived as occurring prior to the other 2. Consistency Both events are conceptualized in semantically related terms 3. Exclusivity No third event is perceived as an alternative cause Wegner’s hypothesis is that these are features of situations to which we are, by virtue of our psychological constitution, perceptually attuned; these are features in response to which we conceptualize a pair of events as related causally. The stronger our perception of priority, consistency, and exclusivity between a conscious intention and the perception of one’s self acting, the more likely we are to infer that the conscious intention caused the action. And when we make that inference, we tend to experience the feeling of willing. The theory, however, is not simply about mental causation; it is about the appearance of mental causation. This is crucial, for it is here that the directive in (P) exerts its full force. In the course of introducing his theory,
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Wegner says, ‘‘. . . the present framework suggests that the experience of will [the feeling of consciously willing] may only map weakly, or at times not at all, onto the actual causal relation between the person’s cognition and action’’ (p. 66). And, on the next page, ‘‘This theory of apparent mental causation depends on the idea that consciousness doesn’t know how conscious mental processes work . . . . The conscious will may . . . arise from the person’s theory designed to account for the regular relation between thought [the conscious intention to do A] and action [the perception of one’s self performing A]. Conscious will is not a direct perception of that relation but rather a feeling based on the causal inference one makes about the data that do become available to consciousness—the thought and the observed action’’ (p. 67). The point of the first passage is that the causal inference we draw concerning the relation between intention and action need not track the actual facts of our psychology. We may infer that our intention caused our action even when it did not, since we draw the inference on the basis of perceived priority, consistency, and exclusivity, and not on the basis of actual, lowlevel causes. The point of the second passage is to help explain the first passage. The appearance of mental causation may mislead because the psychological system involved in perceiving causality operates according to its own principles and on the basis of only partial information that reaches conscious awareness. Few of our cognitive and affective processes rise to the level of conscious awareness. The interpretive system involved in the perception of causality cannot operate on information it cannot access. That system sometimes receives information concerning intentions—those of which we become consciously aware—as well as information concerning actions—those we consciously perceive ourselves performing. But besides these two sources, our interpretive system operates with paltry inputs. No wonder, then, that the appearance of mental causation maps only weakly onto what Wegner calls the empirical will, that is, the actual low-level processes that cause us to act. Wegner offers a battery of evidence for the thesis that the system that generates the feeling of willing operates more or less independently from the processes that cause us to act. Consider the mechanisms that help us ‘‘protect the illusion’’ of conscious will. The illusion is the felt sense we have that our conscious intentions are the cause of our allegedly free actions. Wegner hypothesizes that our interpretive system operates with a template of the ‘‘ideal causal agent’’—an agent who is, among other things, always consciously aware of her goals prior to pursuing them. The facts of the matter indicate, however, that we often act in the absence of prior
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conscious goals—when, for example, we do things influenced by nonconscious priming. Other times we act with some intention but after the action we unknowingly revise our previous intention, only to deny or forget ever having the initial intention. This is the case, for example, in instances of cognitive dissonance. What is striking in these and related cases is that the subjects of the relevant experiments are psychologically healthy and neurologically intact, and that the phenomena involved—nonconscious primes and cognitive dissonance—are far from uncommon. And there are, furthermore, the fantastic fabrications of intentions among split-brain patients reported by Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978). Now I am unsure what to make of these latter cases, although Gazzaniga himself (e.g., in Gazzaniga 1997) appears confident that human beings are, by virtue of our neurological constitution, inveterate bullshitters. That may be an overstatement— though working in academe gives one pause!—but what is clear is the necessity of the directive expressed in (P). The interpretive system that generates conscious intentions appears to operate at some considerable distance from the nonconscious, low-level mechanisms that cause us to act. Wegner’s Conceptual Conservatism? As I see it, the power and momentum of Wegner’s argument drives us to the edge of the precipice, forcing a cluster of traditional concepts to the very brink. But, as I also see it, Wegner pulls us back at the last moment. We should not, of course, leap blindly off the edge. Our initial problem revolves around this cluster of concepts, and unless we understand the conceptual revisions forced upon us by our discoveries, we may be in no position to judge whether and how our initial problem has been solved. That said, there is still a difference between retaining concepts without affording them any antecedent authority in our inquiries and retaining concepts in order to preserve or ‘‘save’’ them. We do the former in order to understand whether we are making progress. The latter, by contrast, is objectionable from the naturalistic point of view. And my concern is that in the end Wegner’s discussion is conservative in this sense. So let us have a look. The question Wegner poses for his final chapter is this: Why, if this experience of will is not the cause of action, would we even go to the trouble of having it? What good is an epiphenomenon? The answer becomes apparent when we appreciate conscious will as a feeling that organizes and informs our understanding of our own agency. Conscious will is a signal with many of the qualities of an emotion, one that reverberates through the mind and body to indicate when we sense having authored an action. (p. 318)
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And, in the same paragraph, Wegner points out that his answer to the question is novel. He says, The idea that conscious will is an emotion of authorship moves beyond the standard way in which people have been thinking about free will and determinism, and presses toward a useful new perspective. This chapter explores how the emotion of authorship serves key functions in the domains of achievement and morality. (ibid.)
To the best of my knowledge, Wegner’s theory of conscious will is indeed new, but does it nevertheless try to conserve what ought to be discarded? Does it, in particular, try to save what it has already called into question? The thesis of Wegner’s final chapter is that, although the felt experience of will is illusory, this feeling nevertheless serves the important functions of, first, reliably indicating to the agent when she is the author of an action and when she is not, and, second, signaling to the agent actions for which it is appropriate to feel moral emotions and attribute moral responsibility. I begin with the claim about achievement and work my way toward responsibility. The claim is that the feeling of willing is a reliable guide to what we have indeed accomplished. This is not to say that the feeling of willing is always correct; often our perceptions of control do not match the causal facts involved, as the literature on ‘‘perceived control’’ suggests. Still, as Wegner puts it: Just as the experience of will allows us to know what we can control, the lack of this feeling alerts us to what we can’t control, what surely exists beyond our own minds. . . . Perceptions with no sense of will attached to them are likely to be indications of reality rather than figments of our minds. The experience of will is thus a friendly sign, a marker of things that have some ‘‘give’’ in that we have felt we could influence them by virtue of our thoughts . . . . Even if conscious will isn’t an infallible sign of our own causation, it is a fairly good sign and so gives us a rough-and-ready guide to what part of experience is conjured by us and what part is bedrock reality. (p. 333)
The claim is that the feeling of conscious willing fulfills the function of indicating to an agent which actions she has authored and which she has not. But it fulfills this function only to the extent that the feeling is reliably correlated with the actual causes of our actions, with the empirical will. In a remarkable passage, Wegner puts it this way: Conscious will is the somatic marker of personal authorship, an emotion that authenticates the action’s owner as the self . . . . Often, this marker is quite correct. In many cases, we have intentions that preview our actions, and we draw causal
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inferences linking our thoughts and actions in ways that track quite well our own psychological processes. Our experiences of will, in other words, often do correspond correctly with the empirical will—the actual causal connection between our thought and action. The experience of will then serves to mark in the moment and in memory the actions that have been singled out in this way. We know them as ours, as authored by us, because we have felt ourselves doing them. (p. 327; italics added)
The story, then, is this: often the feeling of willing correctly corresponds with the actual low-level causes of our action and, by virtue of this correspondence, the feeling of willing reliably indicates the extent of our control or achievement, while the absence of this feeling reliably indicates that we have hit upon something real that we cannot control. I do not think we can accept the claim concerning correspondence—not, at any rate, if we accept the theory of apparent mental causation. Nor can we accept that the feeling of willing serves the functions that Wegner says it serves. I will focus my criticisms on the correspondence claim. There are three points. 1. To see the first point, consider the following levels of processing in Wegner’s model: i. The feeling of willing (arises from) ii. drawing a causal inference between conscious intention and perceived action (caused by) iii. the perception of priority, consistency, and exclusivity between conscious intention and perceived action Now, the correspondence claim asserts that there is a positive correlation—a ‘‘correct correspondence’’—between i and a further level of processing, namely: iv. the empirical will—nonconscious, low-level causes of action But this claim of correspondence is implausible on its face. Wegner has provided a theory concerning the relations between i, ii, and iii. If his development of Michotte’s theory concerning the perception of causality is correct, then correlations between i, ii, and iii are nonaccidental. They hold because of our psychological architecture. They hold because an interpretive system responsive to the perception of priority, consistency, and exclusivity among pairs of events generates a causal inference, which in turn generates the cognitive emotion of authorship. None of this, however, can be said about the relation between i and iv. We have no psychological theory—no theory concerning low-level architecture—linking the con-
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scious feeling of willing to the nonconscious, empirical will. In fact, to the contrary! We have a wealth of theoretical and experimental considerations suggesting that, within the architecture of the human mind, these two processes—the feeling of will and the empirical will—run on more or less independent tracks. This, as I read it, is the take-home lesson of chapters 4, 5, and 6 of Wegner’s book. The suggestion at the close of chapter 4, in light of the ideomotor theory of action and other considerations, is that we should conceptualize our psychology as consisting fundamentally of automatic, nonconscious processes, with the conscious will being an add-on in need of special explanation. Automatisms are the rule; consciousness, the exception. The suggestion in chapter 5 is that our interpretive system operates with a template of ‘‘the ideal causal agent’’ and that this system works incessantly to forget or fabricate conscious intentions in order to conceal the extent to which our agency is nonideal—hence the efficacy of mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance. And the suggestion in chapter 6 is that our interpretive system, under a range of conditions, undermines the emotion of authorship even when our nonconscious processes are clearly the cause of the action. The well-known case of ‘‘facilitated communication’’ and the experiments reported in Wegner and Fuller (2000) make this clear. So we cannot accept the theory of apparent mental causation and also accept that the feeling of willing corresponds with the empirical will. 2. My second point is that, even if there were some sort of correspondence between i and iv—even if my first point could be defeated—we nevertheless have good grounds for denying that the correspondence is ever ‘‘correct.’’ Three brief considerations support this point. First, recall that on the theory of apparent mental causation, the causal relata are consciously accessible intentions and perceptions of oneself acting. So, in any given case, the inference drawn must be something like (CI) My consciously accessible intention to do A caused my doing A. The subsequent emotion of authorship, therefore, should be something akin to (CF) The feeling that I, by virtue of conscious, intentional effort, caused my doing A. That is, the feeling of willing is a feeling of consciously exerting the effort of initiating and executing A. But, of course, it is false that what occurred in consciousness caused A; apparent mental causation is, after all, apparent causation. The emotion of authorship mistakenly leads us to specify the
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cause of our action in consciousness, while the actual cause operates beneath the level of conscious awareness in the empirical will. So we have two quite different sorts of objects, a conscious intention that does not cause our action and a nonconscious process that does cause our action. In what sense then does the former ‘‘correctly’’ correspond to the latter? Even if we grant that a correspondence of some kind obtains, on what grounds should we agree that the correspondence is ‘‘correct’’ as opposed to ‘‘incorrect’’ or as opposed to ‘‘neither correct nor incorrect’’? The second consideration goes further. The problem is not simply that the content of the conscious feeling of willing is in error. Suppose we assume that nonconscious processes that cause us to act—those operating in the empirical will—also have intentional content. Still the intentional content of the conscious feeling is something like ‘‘I did A,’’ while the content of the nonconscious process would be distinct. In many cases the nonconscious content would have nothing to do with A. The conscious, intentional contents offered by Gazzaniga’s split-brain patients hardly correspond to what appears to have been the actual cause of their behavior.9 Consider too all the experiments in which nonconscious primes cause subjects to act in ways they do not consciously recognize or understand. In these sorts of cases there is a radical mismatch between conscious and nonconscious contents. But even in cases where both contents represent the same action, their full intentional contents diverge nonetheless. In the content of the conscious feeling of willing—in (CF)—I am represented as the cause of my action, but that cannot be part of the content of nonconscious processes, since it is implausible that I, the agent, am represented at that level of processing. The third consideration is that the empirical will is distributed. The actual causal processes are susceptible to social, causal influences. The processes that cause us to act are driven not merely by nonconscious factors internal to the agent but also by factors external to the agent—including, for example, a range of social factors described in Ross and Nisbett (1991). This means that the empirical will sometimes operates at an even greater distance from the feeling of willing. The feeling, after all, is a feeling of my having caused my own action. The feeling is that I, by virtue of a conscious intention, caused my action. And there is nothing in this feeling to even suggest that the action was caused by factors external to my own conscious awareness. In pressing these last two points, it is perhaps worth pointing out that I am not making an illicit appeal to anything akin to a Cartesian theater (as described in Dennett 1991). The conscious feeling of will isolated by
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Wegner may be described with the sentence ‘‘I authored my own action’’ but it may also be described with the sentence ‘‘this bit of internal processing caused that bit of behavior.’’ The second sentence assumes a capacity for representing some bits of internal cognitive processing; it assumes a capacity to take one’s own internal processes as objects of thought or feeling. That requires no theater unless the metaphor is stretched so thinly that every instance of having a thought or feeling somehow requires a spectator viewing a spectacle. And the first sentence may be permissible on the ground that we do not yet know which bits of internal processing we ought to designate, in which case the second sentence asserts more than we can justifiably claim to know at present.10 At any rate, since the feeling isolated by Wegner is basically the feeling that the cause of my action is wholly internal, it follows that if the empirical will is distributed over external causal factors—as Wegner claims it is—then this feeling does not correctly correspond, but rather conflicts, with the empirical will. These three considerations—that the feeling of conscious willing is false, that the intentional content (if any) of the empirical will often diverges from that of the conscious will, and that the empirical will is determined by factors external to the agent—all support the general claim that there is no meaningful sense in which the feeling of willing can correspond ‘‘correctly’’ with the empirical will. 3. But suppose I am wrong. Suppose there is some sort of ‘‘correct’’ correspondence between the feeling of will and the empirical will. Even so, such correspondence would be too weak to underwrite Wegner’s claim about achievement or control and, in consequence, too weak to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility. The reason is this: even if it were true that the feeling of willing often corresponds correctly with the empirical will, that is not enough to justify the claim that the agent, in performing a given action, knowingly exerted the right kind of control. To justifiably claim that the agent was in control and hence deserves praise or blame, it must be the case that the agent can identify the action as her own. Put in terms of Wegner’s theory, the agent must have good evidence that her action emanated from features of her empirical will that she recognizes as belonging to her character, as in some sense constituting who she is. But, as Wegner so delightfully describes, such evidence is not available from the first-person perspective, for there exists a host of conditions under which we sincerely, but erroneously, take ourselves to be the authors of our actions. A human agent cannot justifiably claim to know, merely on the basis of how things feel, that her action emanated in the right way from her character. To put the point in epistemological terms, the theoretical and
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experimental work to which Wegner appeals in the first eight chapters of his book constitutes an overwhelming defeater of the claim that one’s action emanated in the relevant way from one’s empirical will. We simply do not know our selves to that degree; the structure of our psychology works against it. My conclusion concerning the concepts ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’ is threefold. First, we should reject the claim that the feeling of willing serves the function of telling us when we have exercised control and when we have not. That claim is plausible only if we accept the correspondence claim and, as I have just argued, the correspondence claim is not plausible if we accept the theory of apparent mental causation. We should also reject the claim that the feeling of willing underwrites attributions of responsibility, on the ground that the correspondence claim, even if true, is too weak. The conclusion to draw is that if we accept apparent mental causation, we should not afford antecedent authority to either concept in framing our inquiries. That is the force of the directive in (P). We should also insist that with respect to these concepts, we first try to analyze inward and synthesize laterally. If that succeeds, the concepts will be vindicated. If it fails, the concepts will die or be transformed into something else. That is the force of (E). Second, it would indeed be useful to know the conditions under which the feeling of willing is a reliable guide to actual authorship. But if the theory of apparent mental causation is correct, and if the naturalistic directives in (P) and (E) are on the right track, then the only way to discover that the feeling of will ever corresponds correctly with the actual causes of our actions is to resist the apparently natural tendency to trust that our feeling matches the actual causes of our action. In order to discover the significance of the feeling of consciously willing, we must first achieve some distance from that feeling. We must try to discover whether and under what conditions the feeling ever correlates positively with nonconscious processes that cause us to act. And, of course, to accomplish that, we will have to discover which low-level, nonconscious processes are the actual causes of our actions. Third, suppose we eventually discover that the feeling of willing rarely corresponds positively with the causes of action. What should we conclude? One suggestion is that we try to conform our conceptual and affective capacities to better fit the world. Golfers must learn to associate a host of conscious feelings with the actual movements of the club and with the direction, distance, and spin of the ball. They do this by developing ‘‘grooves’’ in their nervous systems with hundreds of hours of repetition. Something similar is true of opera singers, who must learn to associate the
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conscious feelings of producing and hearing their own voices with the pitch, tone, and volume of the sound they produce. Perhaps there is something analogous to be learned about the feeling of willing. Perhaps we can learn to correlate certain feelings of authorship with specific low-level causes of our actions. Perhaps. But the theory of apparent mental causation should make us cautious; we should doubt that the feeling of willing locks onto the actual causes of our actions. And most important, from the naturalistic point of view, we should relinquish these cautious doubts only if we discover, as the result of adhering to the directives in (E) and (P), that the feeling does, or can be trained to, correspond with the empirical will. In the meantime we must withhold antecedent authority from the concepts ‘control’ and ‘responsibility’ as they apply to claims about human agency. We must be prepared to discover that the feeling of willing and the empirical will do not fit and cannot be made to fit. To that end, we should calibrate our expectations and hunches in such a way that we are open to the loss of certain concepts, including ones that presently strike us as ineliminable in some way. In the final paragraph of the book, Wegner says, ‘‘Our sense of being a conscious agent who does things comes at a cost of being technically wrong all the time. The feeling of doing is how it seems, not what it is— but that is as it should be. All is well because the illusion makes us human’’ (p. 342; italics added). But I wonder. Is it really the illusion that makes us human—as opposed, say, to the determination to live without illusions? More important, why afford any authority to our current understanding of what ‘‘makes us human,’’ since we have good evidence that dubious concepts persist in our current conceptualization of human nature? At any rate, the attitude of exploration that drove Darwin and Wallace should incline us—as it inclined them—toward the construction of new concepts rather than the preservation of old ones. And we may, in the course of such explorations, run up against the limits of our nature—limits on our abilities as practical agents or our abilities as inquiring agents—but we should not pretend to know them in advance. We certainly should not claim to know our limits on the basis of concepts so patently dubious by virtue of descent and by virtue of psychological role. Conclusion To return, then, to the question, What kind of agent are we? The most immediate answer is: we do not know. But, in more or less the same breath,
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we may add: we are not the ideal causal agents of our mostly theological ancestral worldview. Indeed, if the theory of apparent mental causation is true, we are not even good approximations to that ideal. The discovery of this rather basic fact forces us to re-orient the way we study our selves. And the four directives described above provide at least some of the framework of that orientation. Insofar as our cultural and psychological ideals of agency have been undermined by progress in neurology, psychology, and sociology, we must take care to resist the temptation to try to save whatever remnants appear within reach. Conceptual conservatism, with respect to concepts dubious by psychological role or by descent, is antithetical to genuine naturalism. Acknowledgments This essay was first presented at the second meeting of the Mind and World Working Group in March 2005 at the University of Alabama, Birmingham. The topic of the conference was distributed cognition and individual volition. My thanks to Harold Kincaid, Don Ross, and David Spurrett for conceptualizing and organizing a first-rate conference. George Ainslie, Don Ross, Philip Pettit, Daniel Dennett, and Daniel Wegner offered questions and comments for which I am most grateful. Special thanks to David Spurrett for detailed criticisms and suggestions on the penultimate draft. Notes 1. See Davies (unpublished). 2. Studies of the sort presented, for example, in Bechtel and Richardson (1993). See also the discussion in the next paragraph of Boogerd et al. (2005). 3. Both (E) and (D) are wielded against Ruse’s (2003) theory of design in Davies (unpublished). 4. Michotte (1954) discusses several experiments in which subjects apply the concept ‘cause’ in the absence of relevant causal relations. Sperber et al. (1995) offer recent perspectives on the same theme and Wegner (2002) acknowledges a debt to Michotte. Malle et al. (2001) discuss our capacity to apply the concepts ‘desire’, ‘belief ’, ‘intention’, and the like. 5. Wolpert (1992) also discusses the unnaturalness of science. 6. Humphreys (2004) suggests that technology already provides such devices. The epistemology of science, he says, is no longer restricted to the epistemology of human beings.
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7. According to Lewin (1998), the term ‘‘hominine’’ has replaced the earlier term ‘‘hominid’’ used to refer to the species in the human family or clade. 8. The Illusion of Conscious Will is a remarkable book in several ways. It is accessible and playful—rare virtues among academic writers—and at the same time it poses a powerful challenge to our current view of human agency. If Wegner’s theory is right, much of how we currently understand our selves is deeply mistaken. Moreover Wegner’s argumentative strategy is formidable. He offers a view of agency that unifies, or at least pulls into focus, a wide range of experimental evidence concerning a host of human capacities and infirmities. It all but impossible to dismiss his theory by quibbling with this or that bit of evidence; one must wrestle with his interpretation of the whole body of evidence. 9. One experimental subject, after reading the command ‘‘stand up and leave the room’’ with his left eye only (thus receiving the information in the nonlinguistic, right hemisphere only), stood up and walked toward the door. When asked by the experimenter why he was leaving, the subject sincerely replied ‘‘I need to get a drink.’’ 10. I am indebted in this paragraph to a question posed by Don Ross at the Mind and World conference cited in my acknowledgments. Wegner’s thoughts on this issue are given in the ‘‘Author’s Response’’ section of Wegner (2004). References Bechtel, W., and R. Richardson. 1993. Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bergson, H. 1907. Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (1911). New York: Holt. Blumenbach, J. F. 1781. Uber den Bildungstrieb (On the Formative Power). Gottingen: Johann Christian Dieterich. Boogerd, F. C., F. J. Bruggeman, R. C. Richardson, A. Stephan, and H. V. Westerhoff. 2005. Emergence and its place in nature: A case study of biochemical networks. Synthese 145: 131–64. Chisholm, R. 1964. Human freedom and the self. The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas. Davies, P. S. nd. Conceptual conservatism: Naturalism, history, and design. Unpublished manuscript. Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown. Gazzaniga, M. 1997. The Mind’s Past. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gazzaniga, M., and J. LeDoux. 1978. The Integrated Mind. New York: Plenum Press.
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Humphreys, P. 2004. Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method. New York: Oxford University Press. Kant, I. 1951 [1790]. Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner Press. Lewin, R. 1998. Principles of Human Evolution. Malden, MA: Blackwell Science. Malle, B., L. Moses, and D. Baldwin. 2001. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cogniton. Cambridge: MIT Press. McCauley, R. 2000. The naturalness of religion and the unnaturalness of science. In F. Keil, and R. Wilson, eds., Explanation and Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 61–85. Michotte, A. 1963 [1954]. The Perception of Causality, trans. T. R. Miles. New York: Basic Books. Ross, L., and R. Nisbett. 1991. The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Ruse, M. 2003. Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sperber, D., D. Premack, and A. J. Premack. 1995. Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University press. Wegner, D. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wegner, D. 2004. Pre´cis of The Illusion of Conscious Will and frequently asked questions about conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 649–92. Wegner, D., and V. A. Fuller. 2000. Clever hands: Action projection in facilitated communication. Unpublished manuscript. Wolpert, L. 1992. The Unnatural Nature of Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
4
The Illusion of Freedom Evolves
Tamler Sommers
All theory is against free will; all experience is for it. —Samuel Johnson.
‘‘All Theory Is against Free Will . . .’’ Powerful arguments have been leveled against the concepts of free will and moral responsibility since the Greeks and perhaps earlier. Some—the hard determinists—aim to show that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is true. Therefore there is no free will. Others, the ‘‘no-free-will-either-way-theorists,’’ agree that determinism is incompatible with free will, but add that indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum physicists, is also incompatible with free will. Therefore there is no free will. Finally, there are the a priori arguments against free will. These arguments conclude that it makes no difference what metaphysical commitments we hold: free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts. Why? Because in order to have free will and ultimate moral responsibility we would have to be causa sui, or ‘‘cause of oneself.’’ And it is logically impossible to be self-caused in this way. Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui:1 The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far; it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic. But the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for ‘‘freedom of the will’’ in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, ¨ nchhausen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by with more than Baron Mu the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness. (1992, pp. 218–19)
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The conclusion of all of these arguments is that what we do, and the way we are, ultimately comes down to luck—the luck of the nature draw, the nurture draw, the brain-state draw, and perhaps the quantum indeterministic event draw. So while it may be of great pragmatic value to hold people responsible for their actions, and to employ systems of reward and punishment, no one is truly deserving of blame or praise for anything. My aim here is not to argue directly for this conclusion.2 I will say only that 2,500 years have passed and the reasoning behind it has never been refuted or, in my view, even seriously undermined. Yet the view that we lack free will and moral responsibility is seldom taken seriously. On the contrary, it is often dismissed out of hand, even by those who recognize the force of the arguments behind it. Philosophers who reject God, Cartesian dualism, souls, noumenal selves, and even objective morality cannot bring themselves to do the same for the concepts of free will and moral responsibility. The question is: Why? ‘‘. . . All Experience Is for It’’ We feel free. When we face a situation in which we have to make a decision, we feel, at that moment, like we can act with deep metaphysical ‘‘contra-causal’’ freedom. We believe ourselves to be in total control of the decision. We feel like a centralized ‘‘will’’ is about to cause the choice, and if it is a moral choice, we feel that we will be morally responsible for whatever choice we make. Galen Strawson (1986) gives a vivid description of this experience in the following example. ‘‘Imagine, ‘‘he writes,’’ that it is Christmas eve and you are going to buy a bottle of scotch with your last twenty dollar bill. Right outside the liquor store, there is a man with an Oxfam cup, or a beggar who is clearly in need. You must decide now whether to spend your money on the scotch, or give to the beggar. You stop, and it seems quite clear to you—it surely is quite clear to you—that it is entirely up to you what you do next—in such a way that you will have deep moral responsibility for what you do, whatever you do. The situation is in fact utterly clear: you can put the money in the tin (or give it to the beggar) or you can go in and buy the scotch. You’re not only completely, radically free to choose in this situation. You’re not free not to choose. That’s how it feels.’’ (G. Strawson 1986, p. x) Strawson’s point is that the phenomenology of decision-making leads us to believe that we are radically free and responsible—at least in the immediate moment. Philosophical theories of free will have understandably tried to save this phenomenon, or phenomenology, but at the expense of either
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dodging the central objections raised by anti–free will arguments or by lapsing into a stubborn mysterianism. (Samuel Johnson’s other famous quotation on this subject is ‘‘I know we’re free and there’s the end on’t.’’) There is another option, however—one that remains naturalistic but faces the problem squarely. We may accept the soundness of the arguments against free will, but instead of trying to justify our belief in it, we try to explain it away. An Error Theory of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Doing this means providing an ‘error theory’ of free will and robust moral responsibility (RMR):3 The error theory makes the following claims. 1. We commonly suppose ourselves and others to have the type of free will that would make us RMR for our behavior. 2. RMR does not exist—no one is ever deserving of blame or praise for any action whatsoever. 3. The widespread belief and experience that we have free will and RMR can be ‘explained away,’ that is, accounted for in such a way that does not involve the actual existence of free will and RMR. Free will skeptics have developed strong arguments for the first two claims, but they have not paid sufficient attention to claim 3. The result is that the skeptical position is dismissed out of hand. However, if we can provide a plausible explanation for why we mistakenly believe ourselves to be free and morally responsible, the first two claims gain even greater support.4 And the skeptical position can no longer be ignored. This project has been undertaken by a few others. Spinoza, for example, in the appendix to part I of the Ethics, offers the following explanation for our belief in free will: ‘‘Men believe they that they are free, precisely because they are conscious of their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined them to desire and will they have not the faintest idea, because they are ignorant of them’’ (Spinoza [1675] 1982, p. 57). Charles Darwin presented a similar type of explanation in his Notebooks: ‘‘The general delusion about free will [is] obvious—because man has power of action, & he can seldom analyze his motives (originally mostly INSTINCTIVE, & therefore now great effort of reason to discover them . . .) he thinks they have none’’ (Darwin [1839] 1987, p. 608). This simple and rather profound idea may well be part of the correct explanation. We are aware of our desires and volitions and that they cause
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our behavior. But in most cases we are ignorant of the causes or motives behind the desires and volitions themselves. Thus, as reflective and selfconscious creatures, we have developed this view of free will, this idea that certain volitions have no causes or hidden motives—that they derive from us, from the self, and only there. We believe we are causa sui because we don’t know what else could have caused our volitions. Spinoza and Darwin were, in addition, skeptics about moral responsibility. Darwin, for example, writes: ‘‘This view should teach one profound humility, one deserves no credit for anything . . . (yet one takes it for beauty and good temper), nor ought one to blame others . . . . One must view a wicked man like a sickly one . . .’’ ([1839] 1987, p. 608). But their explanations for why we attribute robust moral responsibility to ourselves and others are derivative of their explanations of why we believe we have free will. Our ignorance of the causes of our volitions leads to the erroneous belief in free will. And the belief in free will leads in turn to the erroneous belief in moral responsibility. What I want to propose is that a large part of the explanation may be the other way around: the belief in robust moral responsibility leads to the belief in free will.5 So then the question becomes: What causes the belief in robust moral responsibility? Point of Departure: P. F. Strawson and the Reactive Attitudes P. F. Strawson’s magnificent essay ‘‘Freedom and Resentment’’ suggests a way to answer this question. Strawson at the time he wrote this paper was frustrated with the free will debate, with its emphasis on the question of determinism and on metaphysical debates over the meaning of concepts such as can and possibility—Strawson thought all of this missed the point. He sought instead to locate our commitment to the concepts of free will and RMR within the general framework of human attitudes and emotions—the reactive attitudes as he called them. Attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, guilt, and love are, according to Strawson (1982), ‘‘given with the fact of human society.’’ The human commitment to these reactive attitudes, Strawson argued, is too deeply rooted to take seriously the idea that a general theoretical conviction (like a belief in the truth of determinism) can cause us to abandon it altogether. It is these reactive attitudes, and not any particular metaphysical theory, that ground our attributions of moral responsibility. Strawson and the free will error theorist agree on two very important claims: (1) that the reactive attitudes are deeply rooted in human psychology and (2) that the reactive attitudes are fundamentally connected to the
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widespread belief in free will and moral responsibility. But whereas Strawson sought to use these facts to ground or justify free will and RMR, the error theorist sees them as part of the explanation for why we mistakenly believe ourselves to be free and responsible. The reactive attitudes and our proneness to experience them, according to the error theorist, can help to explain why we commit the error in the error theory of free will. The Reactive Attitudes as Adaptations The next question we need to ask, then, is why the reactive attitudes are so deeply rooted in human psychology. Strawson never once refers to evolutionary theory in his essay, yet every one of the reactive attitudes he describes has an adaptive rationale. Evolutionary theorists since Darwin have argued that certain emotions and attitudes have been naturally selected to motivate behavior that improves social coordination. The emotions are especially valuable for their ability to motivate behavior that goes against our immediate self-interest but that serves long-term reproductive or material gains. Frank (1988), for example, argues that certain problems cannot be solved by rational action. To solve these problems—what he calls commitment problems—we have to commit ourselves to behave in ways that prove contrary to our short-term self-interest. Frank then develops what he calls the ‘commitment model’, which is ‘‘shorthand for the notion that seemingly irrational behavior is sometimes explained by emotional predispositions that help solve commitment problems’’ (Frank 1988, p. 11). Frank argues that emotions like anger, outrage, guilt, and love serve as ‘commitment devices’: psychological mechanisms designed to counteract the allure of immediate self-interest in favor of long term gains. Frank’s ‘commitment devices’ and Strawson’s reactive attitudes are virtually identical. The reactive attitudes also match up almost perfectly with the emotions that the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers (1971) hypothesized would be necessary for creating and enforcing reciprocally altruistic behavior in hominids. According to Trivers, attitudes like resentment motivate what he calls ‘moralistic aggression’: retributive acts that are often out of all proportion to the offense committed (but that serve notice not to repeat the offense in the future). The ‘self-reactive attitude’ of guilt serves two purposes: (1) to prevent individuals from engaging in cheating behavior that can harm the individual in the long run and (2) to motivate cheaters, after the deed is done, to compensate for their behavior so that future reciprocity can be preserved.
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Another role for the reactive attitudes has recently been suggested by the economist Ernst Fehr. Fehr and colleagues (2004, 2002) argue that reciprocal altruism, kin selection, and Frank’s theory are part of the story but insufficient to explain human cooperation in large groups. They argue that a phenomenon called ‘altruistic punishment’ plays an important role in norm enforcement, working to penalize free-riders enough for cooperation strategies to be adaptive. To support this view, Fehr conducted a number of public good experiments in which subjects can cooperate or defect to various degrees. After a certain number of rounds, cooperators are given the opportunity to punish defectors at a cost to themselves. Cooperators willingly suffer costs in order to punish defectors in these experiments, even when they know that they will never interact with the defectors again. (This is what makes the punishment ‘altruistic’—they will never benefit from inflicting it.) Why do they do this? Fehr argues that negative emotions, emotions like resentment, serve as the proximate mechanisms for this behavior. Even a reactive attitude as complex as forgiveness has an adaptive function. Individuals who hold long-lasting grudges lose out on too many cooperative opportunities in Prisoner’s Dilemma–like situations (Axelrod 1984). Indeed, in Robert Axelrod’s famous Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments, one of the primary characteristics of successful strategies was ‘forgivingness.’ Tit-for-Tat, the winner of the tournament, punishes (resents?) one defection. But if the defection is followed by cooperation, then all is forgiven—at least until the next defection. There is good reason to believe, then, that the attitudes and emotions that Strawson linked with the concepts of free will and moral responsibility were selected for their contributions to biological fitness in hominids.6 If Free Will Did Not Exist, We Would Have to Invent It One might wonder what this discussion of retributive attitudes has to do with the belief in free will and moral responsibility. Frank never mentions such a belief, nor does Trivers. Furthermore, as Franz De Waal (2000) and other primatologists have argued, chimpanzees may very well feel a kind of moral outrage, yet we do not attribute a belief in free will and responsibility to them. All of this is true. But we differ from chimpanzees and other intelligent social creatures in a crucial and relevant respect: we are able to question the rationality of our attitudes and the accompanying behavior. First, what do I mean by rationality? For the purposes of this argument, I will divide ‘rationality’ into two parts: ‘a-rationality’ and ‘b-rationality.’ To
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believe something is a-rational is to believe that it is ‘makes sense,’ namely that it is consistent with other beliefs that one holds to be true. So, for example, when I am mad at my wife for not sitting in our green rocking chair during the bottom of the ninth inning in game 4 of the Red Sox/Cardinals world series (because that is where she sat in the bottom of the ninth inning in game 7 against the Yankees), I am being a-irrational. My anger contradicted a belief I hold to be true: namely that the actions of two people in Hillsborough, North Carolina, have no causal effect on a baseball game being played in St. Louis (especially with the five-second satellite delay). The second sense of rationality I employ, ‘b-rationality’, is instrumental. To believe that something is ‘b-rational’ is to believe that it serves our short-term material self-interests. So, if my goal is to get to class on time, and driving will be faster than walking, then taking the car is b-rational. (And walking is b-irrational.) Let us call creatures who have the capacity to question the a-rationality and b-rationality of their emotions cognitively sophisticated (CS) creatures. My central contention in this essay is this: for CS individuals the commitment devices, or reactive attitudes, cannot work as effectively to motivate adaptive behavior unless they are accompanied by a belief in free will and RMR. Why is that? Well, let us first consider creatures who lack this capacity, who cannot question the rationality of their attitudes. De Waal (2000), for example, tells a story of chimpanzee indignation or outrage and the retributive behavior it motivates. One of the female chimpanzees De Waal studied, Puist, had earlier supported a male, Luit, against his rival Nikkie— she had helped chase Nikkie away. Later when Nikkie displayed at Puist, an act of aggression, Puist turned to Luit in search of support. But Luit did nothing to protect her. This so infuriated Puist that rather than attack Nikkie, the aggressor, she turned on Luit, barking, and chasing him across the enclosure, even hitting him. De Waal interprets Puist’s behavior as follows: She experienced a type of indignation or outrage at Luit for breaking a chimpanzee social norm, one that simply states ‘‘one good turn deserves another.’’ This indignation in turn motivated her to punish Luit, even at risk to her own personal safety. Luit will think twice about breaking that norm again in the future, as will any other chimpanzee who witnessed the incident. But if chimpanzees are able to experience indignation or outrage, they are certainly incapable of assessing whether or not the indignation is rational. Puist was not capable of asking herself whether the attitude and the accompanying behavior ‘made sense’, nor in any sophisticated way, whether they served
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her self-interest. The attitude did all the motivating work, with no backtalk or interference from the reasoning faculty.7 Now consider a similar scenario involving a CS individual. Luke, a hunter-gatherer, has been wronged by Gus. Gus did not defend Luke when he should have. (Or maybe he tried to free-ride during the hunt, or attempted to steal Luke’s mate.) Luke gets a visceral feeling of indignation or outrage, ‘‘mostly instinctive’’ as Darwin says, and the feeling motivates him to act with moralistic aggression the next time he sees Gus. If Luke were a non-CS creature, that would be the end of the story. The indignation would motivate the retributive behavior, and Luke would act. And sometimes no doubt that will still happen. But Luke, unlike Puist the chimpanzee, can question the rationality of this attitude. He can recognize that Gus is larger than he is, and that he may well get the short end of any attempt at revenge. He can also realize that what’s done is done, that there is little point in dwelling on something that already happened. Yes, he has learned to stay away from Gus, and not to trust him. But there is no point in risking his own safety, perhaps his own life, to punish him. These rational considerations may well undermine the link between attitude and behavior. And if Gus knows this, he will be more likely to commit the offense, for the risk is lower. That is the essence of a commitment problem. Now I’m not suggesting that early hominids were reflective enough to have all of these thoughts, or to think of them in such a collected manner. But it seems plausible that considerations like these have undermined the link to some degree between the commitment devices, the reactive attitudes, and the accompanying behavior. If this is correct, then a new design problem arises for CS creatures. The reactive attitudes or the commitment devices are still adaptive for their role in solving commitment and coordination problems. But greater cognitive sophistication has diminished the capacity of these emotions to motivate the accompanying adaptive behavior. CS creatures, then, need something else to offset the dampening effect of increased cognitive sophistication. This something else, I suggest, is an independent belief in the robust moral responsibility of other agents. How would this work? Well, what if, in addition to the visceral anger, Luke also had a belief or feeling that Gus deserved blame, that he ought to be punished for what he did? What if Luke felt that, his own interests aside, something would be deeply wrong with the world if Gus got away with the offense? Now the outrage is no longer a-irrational. It makes perfect sense. Luke is outraged because Gus deserves blame and punishment for his offense. And although it still might be b-irrational, contrary his to selfinterest, to act retributively, this consideration might be offset by that
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belief that something would be deeply wrong if Gus’s offense went unpunished. This belief would then fortify the link between the outrage and the retributive act. We can see this belief in RMR in action by referring to an example Frank (1988) uses to illustrate his commitment model. Jones has a $200 leather briefcase that Smith wants to steal. If Smith steals it, Jones will have to go to court to recover it and force Smith go to jail for 60 days. But the day in court will cost Jones $300 in lost earnings not to mention the tediousness of a court trial. Since this is more than the briefcase is worth, it is clearly not in Jones’ material self-interest to press charges. The problem, of course, is that if Smith knows that Jones is going to be rational in this way, then he can steal the briefcase with impunity. There’s no risk. But Frank writes: ‘‘Suppose that Jones is not a pure rationalist; that if Smith steals his briefcase, he will become outraged, and think nothing of losing a day’s earnings, or even a week’s, in order to see justice done. If Smith knows Jones will be driven by emotion, not reason, he will let the briefcase be. If people expect us to respond irrationally to the theft of our property, we will seldom need to, because it will not be in their interests to steal it. Being predisposed to respond irrationally serves much better here than being guided only by material self-interest’’ (1988, p. x). From this passage one might think that the outrage alone is sufficient to predispose Jones to act ‘irrationally.’ Frank makes no explicit reference here to any beliefs about moral responsibility or free will. But the belief is there—implicit in the remark about Jones’s need to see ‘‘justice done.’’ If Jones did not believe that Smith deserved blame and punishment for stealing the briefcase, then he would feel no need to see justice done. And the outrage, no matter how fierce, might very well not be enough. Suppose that Jones viewed Smith like he viewed a dog. He might be angry and frustrated about losing the briefcase, but he would feel no burning need to sacrifice his own interests to pursue and punish the dog who stole his briefcase. Without the belief, then, that other human beings deserve blame or punishment for their actions, Jones’s outrage would be insufficient to solve this commitment problem. With the belief, the link between attitude and adaptive behavior is fortified. So where does the experience of free will come into the picture? Taking this account even further, we could say that the phenomenology of free choice is a very complex adaptation that allows us to attribute robust moral responsibility to ourselves and others. This part of the story owes what Shaun Nichols (2004) has termed, in a slightly different context, ‘‘a perverse debt to Kant.’’8 To paraphrase Kant, the moral life of rational creatures
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cannot get off the ground unless we experience ourselves as indeterministically free agents. If we did not believe that we could have acted otherwise, or intended otherwise, or been other than we are, then how could we see ourselves as RMR for an action? And if we did not believe that others were indeterministically free agents, then how could we see offenders as deserving of blame or praise for their behavior? If Kant is right that libertarian freedom is a necessary condition for RMR, then possessing the illusion of free will would allow us to believe that attributing RMR to ourselves and others was a-rational. And if, as I have argued, the attribution of RMR is adaptive for CS creatures, then the phenomenology of free will, the illusion that we can act freely and be ultimately responsible for our actions, is adaptive as well. To recap, my argument makes the following claims: 1. Retaining the link between the reactive attitudes and the accompanying behavior is important for biological fitness in hominids. 2. Greater cognitive sophistication, which evolved for other reasons, undermines this link. The ability to assess the a-rationality and brationality of our attitudes makes it less probable that the attitude motivates the accompanying adaptive behavior. 3. A belief in the robust moral responsibility of oneself and others offsets this undermining effect, and therefore is adaptive. 4. CS creatures nevertheless do not consider it a-rational to attribute robust moral responsibility to agents who are not radically free. 5. Unless we believe ourselves and others to be radically free agents, we cannot consider it rational to attribute RMR. 6. Experiencing ourselves as radically free agents allows us to believe that we and others are radically free. 7. The experience of radical free agency, the phenomenology of free choice, and the illusion of the conscious will are adaptive for CS creatures. The conclusion, I have to stress, is not that the sole cause of the illusion of free will is the need to attribute RMR to ourselves and others. (Nor am I in any way claiming that cultural forces and social structures have had no effect on these concepts as we understand them today. Surely they have.) The phenomenology of free will may have multiple causes and origins, and the advantages outlined in my hypothesis may be only a small part of the explanation for why we possess it.9 Don Ross’s theory, chapter 10 in this volume, that selves arise as stabilizing devices for social dynamics is a highly plausible—and I believe, complementary—explanation for why we experience ourselves as having an autonomous, if predictable, self. Con-
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sider Ross’s claim that ‘‘the massive interdependency among people incentivizes everyone to regulate the stability of those around them through dispensation of social rewards and punishments’’ [my italics] (Ross, chapter 10 in this volume). My hypothesis is that the belief in RMR enables this dispensation of social rewards and punishment to occur more effectively. And again, perhaps Spinoza and Darwin were right as well: the origin of the illusion of free will is that we are aware of the desires and volitions that cause our actions, but unaware of what causes the desires and volitions themselves. My theory, then, point outs the adaptive advantages of having this phenomenology once it is in place. And the belief in free will would arise from this phenomenology and the need to justify our belief in RMR. Another point I wish to stress is this. The ‘‘explaining away’’ of RMR should not be taken to support the claim we lack other important (nondesert-related) varieties of responsibility. As compatibilists from Hume to Frankfurt to Dennett to Pettit have observed, there are numerous valuable types of responsibility that are entirely compatible with the most uncompromising naturalism imaginable. The error theorist does not disagree, for example, with Pettit’s claim that we are ‘‘conversable’’—that is, that we have the ability to track and conform to relevant reasons given to us in conversation—or that this capacity is fully compatible with determinism (see Pettit, chapter 5 in this volume). Rather, the error theorist and the compatibilist disagree on the question of whether this capacity can truly justify robust desert-entailing moral responsibility. Elsewhere (Sommers 2005) I have argued that compatiblist forms of freedom and responsibility are insufficient for this task. The argument presented in this chapter supports this claim at best indirectly—by showing why people (including philosophers) are so resistant to give up the concept of robust moral responsibility. Testing the Hypothesis To fend off some inevitable ‘‘just-so story’’ objections, I want to highlight three claims I’ve made that are testable. First, human beings (CS creatures) who deem an attitude, in a certain situation, to be irrational are less likely to perform the behavior that is often motivated by this attitude. This is a key claim but one that seems amenable to fairly straightforward empirical investigation. Experiments in social psychology might help to determine the degree to which our behavior is governed by what we deem to be rational or irrational, and especially what occurs when we think an attitude or emotion is irrational.
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Second, we believe we act with libertarian (indeterminstic) free will. Third, we do not believe it rational to attribute RMR to an agent unless we believe they have libertarian free will. These are essentially questions about what our intuitions are regarding free will and moral responsibility. Are they compatibilistic or incompatibilistic? Do we really think an agent needs to have acted with indeterministic free will in order to believe that our assignments of blame are rational and justifiable? Until recently pronouncements on this question were made from the philosopher’s armchair. Now, however, philosophers and psychologists are conducting studies that will help determine whether our intuitions are compatibilist or incompatibilist regarding our own actions, and about the actions of others.10 Much more should and will be done on this front. In addition more can be said on the more general conditions required for attributing blameworthiness. Malle and Nelson (2003), for example, contend that in order to hold someone blameworthy, we must believe they acted intentionally. But sometimes we first assign blame and afterward apply to the behavior the concept of intentionality, whether it fits or not, in order to justify the blame already assigned (Knobe, 2006). This model is quite congenial to the error theory I’ve described, for it shows how the assignment of moral responsibility can come first and the explanations for why agents are responsible come afterward, even if the explanations are false. My contention is that in addition to coming first in the psychological process, assignments of blame can come first in the evolutionary process as well. The phenomenology of free will and RMR emerged as a means of justifying blame-linked attitudes like resentment. Conclusion Of course, this account of the origins of our beliefs regarding free will and moral responsibility does not, on its own, demonstrate that these beliefs are false or illusory. But a plausible ‘explaining away’ of free will and RMR, when combined with the powerful negative arguments against these concepts makes a good case for an error theory. I have argued that Darwinian theory can be of great help in providing this explanation. It is important to note, however, that my evolutionary account differs crucially from other theories (e.g., Dennett 2003) that attempt to ‘‘naturalize’’ freedom and responsibility. Although I agree that the experience of free will and RMR can be explained naturalistically, I am nevertheless convinced that it is an illusion—that true moral responsibility, and the retribu-
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tive attitudes that presuppose it, are unjustifiable. I am also convinced that the unraveling of the illusion can have significant ethical, legal, and practical implications, both for the individual, and for a society that embraces an error theory of free will. Regarding these implications, the prevailing view among philosophers— and nonphilosophers for that matter—is that these implications would be disastrous. Everything would be permitted. Life would lose most or all of its meaning; we would be puppets on a string, living a mockery of a real human existence. As I have argued elsewhere, however, this pessimism is little more than a contemporary prejudice—it is seldom argued for, and almost always based on a distorted view of what free will skepticism really entails (Sommers 2005, and Sommers, in press). A denier of free will and RMR can live a happy, fulfilling, love-filled, moral life without in any way contradicting his or her principles. Indeed one may say, as Darwin himself said of his theory of natural selection, that there is grandeur to this view of life. Or as Einstein has written: ‘‘This realization [that there is no such thing as free will] . . . prevents us from taking ourselves and other people too seriously; it is conducive to a view of life which, in particular, gives humor its due’’ (Einstein 1982, pp. 8–9). Acknowledgments I am grateful to Alex Rosenberg, Owen Flanagan, Eddy Nahmias, Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe, and Manuel Vargus for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. I have also profited immensely from discussions at the Mind and World conference at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Notes 1. Thanks to Galen Strawson for drawing my attention to this tactful passage. 2. For recent theoretical arguments in support of this conclusion see G. Strawson (1986) and Pereboom (2001). 3. By robust moral responsibility I mean the type of responsibility that would make us truly deserving of blame or praise for our actions. I add ‘‘robust’’ in order to distinguish this desert-entailing type of moral responsibility from other uncontroversial varieties—causal responsibility, the capacity to act according to reason, the capacity to form second order volitions, and other types of ‘‘compatibilist responsibility.’’ 4. The explanandum here, in other words, is not the existence of free will. Rather, the explanandum is our belief that we have free will. One explanation might be that we
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have free will and that leads us to believe that we do. But there are other competing and perhaps more plausible explanations for our belief and these explanations need to be considered as well. 5. This is not to claim that the explanation offered by Spinoza and Darwin is false. The illusion of free will may have multiple causes (see below). What I want to suggest is that the need to see ourselves and others as RMR could also have been a factor in the evolution of this (illusory) phenomenology. 6. Flanagan (2000) is, to my knowledge, the first to explicitly consider (albeit in a different context) whether the reactive attitudes might be biological adaptations. See also Wright (1994) for an interesting discussion of the adaptive value of the moral emotions. 7. You do not have to agree with De Waal’s interpretation of Puist’s behavior to appreciate my point here. If you do not believe that chimpanzees can feel moral outrage, then simply imagine an early hominid reacting to a situation similar to the one De Waal describes. 8. Perverse, because neither he nor I endorse Kant’s (libertarian) conclusions. 9. Furthermore the illusory phenomenology surely did not come in one fell swoop after the reactive attitudes were in place. Thanks to Andy Clark for pointing out how the theory could be interpreted in this (highly implausible) manner. If my account is correct, or approximately correct, there must have been a co-evolution of sorts between the phenomenology of free will and the increasing complexity of the reactive attitudes. 10. See, for example, Nahmias et al. (2005), Nichols (2004), Nichols and Knobe (forthcoming). The data are, in my view, insufficient for any side to claim victory at present. References Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Darwin, C. 1987. Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dennett, D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking. De Waal, F. 2000. Chimpanzee Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Double, R. 1996. Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Einstein, A. 1982. Ideas and Opinions. New York: Crown. Fehr, E. 2004. The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305: 1254–58.
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Fehr, E., and S. Gachter. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137–40. Flanagan, O. 2000. Destructive emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 1: 259–81. Frank, R. 1988. Passions within Reason. New York: Norton. Knobe, J. 2006. The concept of intentional action: Case studies in the uses of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 130: 203–31. Malle, B. F., and S. E. Nelson. 2003. Judging mens rea: The tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 21: 563–80. Nahmias, E., T. Nadelhoffer, S. Morris, and J. Turner. 2005. Surveying free will: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18: 343–54. Nietzsche, F. 1992. Beyond Good and Evil. In W. Kaufmann, ed., The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, pp. 179–427. New York: Modern Library. Nichols, S. 2004. The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind and Language 19: 473–502. Nichols, S., and J. Knobe. 2007. Moral responsibility and determinism: Empirical investigations of folk Intuitions. Nous, forthcoming. Pereboom, D. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sommers, T. 2005. Beyond Freedom and Resentment: An Error Theory of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Dissertation, Duke University. Sommers, T. The objective attitude. The Philosophical Quarterly, in press. Spinoza, B. [1675] 1982. The Ethics and Selected Letters, S. Feldman, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Strawson, G. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson. P. F. 1982. Freedom and resentment. In G. Watson, ed., Free Will, pp. 59– 80. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trivers, R. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35–56. Wright, R. 1994. The Moral Animal. New York: Vintage.
5
Neuroscience and Agent-Control
Philip Pettit
Neuroscientific and related studies have sharpened the debate about how we, creatures composed out of neurally organized matter, can exercise the sort of agent-control over action that makes it possible for us to be held responsible for them. In this chapter I look briefly at some results that sharpen this problem, argue that the problem arises because we think of agent-control on what I call the act-of-will picture, and then try to show that by moving to an alternative conception of agent-control we can resolve the difficulty; this conception of agent-control I have already defended elsewhere (Pettit and Smith 1996; Pettit 2001a, b). The scientific results suggest not that agent-control is an illusion but that having agentcontrol is best conceived in the manner I favor, or in some closely related fashion. The chapter is in five sections. In the first three, I describe and present the challenge, identify an assumption that it presupposes and propose an alternative, and then argue that under this alternative assumption the challenge can be satisfactorily met. In the fourth section, I look more generally at the way the alternative picture relates to the standard one it displaces. And in the fifth, I offer a comment on the sort of lesson that neuroscience teaches us in this and other cases. The Challenge One of the standard assumptions in traditional philosophical lore is that actions are subject to agent-control if and only if they are the products of acts of will. Acts of will, on this approach, satisfy three crucial conditions. First, they reveal the mind of the agent in a pure or direct manner, not in the manner of the actions they prompt; they cannot be actions themselves, since they would then require prior acts of will and a regress would open up. Second, they are essentially capable of being brought to awareness by
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the agent, even in the case of habitual behavior; they are so intimately bound to the agent that no ignorance of their reality is inevitable and no error about their identity possible. And third, they are acts that the agent can initiate on demand, as choice is called for; the agent can will or not will, just as fancy goes. The act-of-will picture is highly plausible from our point of view as agents. We know what it is just to will something; we know that we are usually quite capable of telling what our will is, and what it is not; and we feel, perhaps as deeply as we feel anything, that we can display our capacity in these regards by consciously making a choice on demand: say, raising the right hand rather than the left, or the left rather than the right. ‘I’ am in charge, so the intuition has it, and being in charge, being in agentcontrol, means that for the relevant domain—however restricted this may be—things happen according to my will. My will is where I am, and what I do, consciously or otherwise, I do by willing it. The picture is beautifully caught in Iain McEwan’s novel, Atonement, when the twelve-year-old Briony reflects as follows: She raised one hand and flexed its fingers and wondered, as she had sometimes before, how this thing, this machine for gripping, this fleshy spider on the end of her arm, came to be hers, entirely at her command. Or did it have some little life of her own? She bent her finger and straightened it. The mystery was in the instant before it moved, the dividing moment between not moving and moving, when her intention took effect. It was like a wave breaking. If she could only find herself at the crest, she thought, she might find the secret of herself, that part of her that was really in charge. (McEwan 2001, p. 33)
On this picture it ought to be possible, at least in principle, to track the moment at which a person’s will forms and then to identify in the activity of the brain the process that the formation of will initiates en route to the willed action. And on this picture, equally, it ought to be possible to get someone to will or not to will a certain response, and to identify in the brain the way things switch as the will comes on stream or does not come on stream. Such possibilities have been explored in recent neuroscience and related work, but the upshot is in tension with our sense of ourselves; the experiments on record throw serious doubt on the role of will, as that has been sketched so far. They suggest either that there is no such thing as agent-control or that agent-control should not be pictured on the act-ofwill model. I hold by the second possibility, as I will be arguing here. The range of experiments I have in mind is well reviewed by Daniel Wegner (2002, ch. 2), and I will just mention two varieties. Any particular
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experiment can be questioned, of course, but it is hard to imagine that the observations made in these and related studies are not broadly correct; they are now part of a rapidly developing, mutually supportive body of results. The first sort of experiment challenges the claims that when we act we have more or less infallible access to the acts of will that lie, purportedly, at the origin of our choices. Here are three fairly familiar examples: Subjects, with a glove on the relevant hand, are asked to draw a line on a sheet of paper in a transparent drawing box. As they draw, the line they see is actually drawn by another—this is due to an arrangement of mirrors— and begins to move away from the line they try to draw. They compensate with their own drawing and experience the gloved hand seen, and the line drawn, as under their personal control (Nielson 1963). n Subjects are placed within an apparatus that magnetically stimulates the motor center of the brain, now on one side, now on the other. They are asked in a sequence of choices, each triggered by the sound of the magnet being activated, to raise either the right or the left index finger. Although the magnetic stimulation allows a fairly reliable prediction as to which finger will rise, subjects experience the movement as one that they control by will (Brasil-Neto et al. 1992). n The subjects here are amputees with a phantom arm. They see an arm move where their own phantom arm, were it real, would be; this appearance is achieved with a mirror box in which the arm seen is their own nonphantom arm or someone else’s arm. They experience the movement of the arm they see as a movement they themselves are controlling in the phantom arm (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996). n
The second variety of experiment challenges the claim that acts of will lie at the origin of what we do voluntarily and is particularly associated with the work of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues (Libet et al. 1983). Prior to that work it had been established that between 800 and 500 milliseconds before voluntary action some characteristic brain activity occurs. This came to be described as the formation of a readiness potential for action, and it was identified by many with the act of will. John Eccles, a Nobel laureate, spoke of the latency as ‘‘the mental act that we call willing’’ (Wegner 2002, p. 52). But in a series of experiments, Libet presented evidence that people only experience themselves as willing an action—an action they are asked to perform—about 200 milliseconds before the action itself: well after the appearance of the readiness potential. He drew a conclusion in radical disagreement with Eccles: ‘‘the initiation of the voluntary act appears to be an unconscious cerebral process. Clearly, free will or free
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choice of whether to act now could not be the initiating agent, contrary to one widely held view’’ (Wegner 2002, p. 54). These results establish that if willing is always needed to put an agent in control of action, and the act of will is subject to conscious experience and activation, then it is an illusion. We agents might have a generally reliable, if fallible, sense of whether something we do is a voluntary exercise. But it cannot be a general axiom, as under the act-of-will story, that an action is a voluntary exercise and is consciously a voluntary exercise, in virtue of the presence of an act of will at its origin. The first sort of experiment suggests that we identify an action as voluntary, rightly or wrongly, on the basis of something other than access to such an unmissable, unmistakeable element. And the second sort shows that even if there is such an accessible element present, it comes too late in the process to do the required causal work. These observations undermine the story that acts of will are necessary in the initiation of voluntary action and that they make the voluntary character of actions manifest and unmistakeable for their agents. One likely reaction to the observations will be to think that agent-control is therefore an illusion too, since the traditional model identifies agent-control with control by acts of will. But I think that this is not an inescapable conclusion and that it is possible to remain upbeat about our capacity for agentcontrol. A Response Strategy The challenge presented is typical of a way in which science often challenges common sense: a way in which the recondite scientific image, as Wilfred Sellars (1997) puts it, challenges the image that is manifest to us in our ordinary life. A simple example of the challenge was presented by the British physicist, A. S. Eddington, when he argued that science shows that common sense is wrong even in thinking that some things are solid, others not; physics shows that everything is composed of atoms and that atoms are composed mainly of empty space. The obvious reaction to Eddington suggests a way in which we might also react to the neuroscientific challenge. He assumed that solidity according to common sense requires that solid things be solid the whole way down, with every part being solid in the same sense as the whole. And so he argued that science shows that solidity is an illusion when it demonstrates that this connotation of solidity is unsatisfied. The obvious reaction among those of us who continue to think that ‘solid’ serves a useful func-
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tion in commonsense discussion is to deny that this is truly a connotation of the idea or, if we think it is, to revise the notion of solidity so that it ceases to be a connotation. We may say that solidity is a property of bodies in virtue of which two or more such bodies compete for the occupation of space, and we may then argue that subatomic physics does not eliminate that property but rather serves to explain it. When neuroscientific findings are invoked to challenge our idea of agent-control, then that is because of an assumption, parallel to that which Eddington made, that according to commonsense agent-control requires a history of action-production in which the formation of a consciously accessible will plays an initiating, causal role. We can escape Eddington’s challenge by thinking of solidity without any connotation that solid things are solid the whole way down. Can we avoid the neuroscientific challenge by thinking of agent-control without a connotation to the effect that will is present in the etiology of an agent-controlled action? Can we develop a plausible conception of agent-control or freedom under which the important feature is something other than the presence of an act of will in the history of the action? I think we can. The act-of-will story supposes that control belongs in the first place to actions and only in the second to agents. Actions display control so far as they are produced by acts of will and agents display control in virtue of their actions displaying control. But an alternative to the act-of-will picture is made salient by the observation that perhaps things are the other way around. Perhaps agents display control in virtue of having a relevant capacity for control and perhaps actions display control so far as they are performed in the domain or scope of such an agential capacity. The act-ofwill story suggests that in every action I produce as an agent, I am in the loop, given a place there by my generative act of will. This alternative, in a phrase from Daniel Dennett (2003), would suggest that far from being in the loop, I am the loop. My character and capacity as an agent is what gives me control over my actions, not the particular histories of their generation. I now proceed to explore such an agent-centered view of agent-control. If a horse runs a mile in one minute, we could say that it has the capacity to do this—the performance was characteristic of the animal—or we could say that it doesn’t: the fact that it ran a one-minute mile was a fluke, not a manifestation of a standing ability. Or if the horse fails to run a mile in one minute, we could say that this shows its lack of capacity or we could hold that it has that capacity but its failing to run the one-minute mile was a contingent, not a characteristic, failure. The horse with the relevant capacity, then, could or could not run a mile in a minute, for it could or could
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not manifest or display its capacity. Given that the capacity is real, the horse runs on each occasion in the presence of the capacity—its performance is within the domain of the capacity—but on the one occasion it manifests the capacity, on the other it fails to do so. We can carry over this logic to the area of agent-control, if we seek to identify agent-control with an agential capacity. The control of an agent in a given domain will be constituted by a standing capacity, and the actions of the agent that are performed in the presence of that capacity will be agent-controlled. Those actions will divide, then, into two kinds. First, those that give evidence of the capacity that is present, being characteristic of the agent-controlled agent; and second, those that fail to give evidence of the capacity: those that are performed in the presence of the capacity but that fail to show what the agent is capable of. But what capacity, if any, has a claim to be relevant to agent-control in this manner? In answer to this question, I suggest that we should look to ordinary human practice, and to the sort of capacity that we expect to find in those, including ourselves, whom we treat as agents who enjoy control. The locus where we most explicitly display our assumption that people enjoy control is in ordinary, noncoercive conversation (Pettit 2001a; Pettit and Smith 1996). Such conversation presupposes, and continually replenishes, a currency of reasons for thought and action that are recognized as relevant on all sides, even if they are sometimes weighted differently; they are considerations that are recognized as legitimating or requiring various responses. Participants to a conversation treat one another as agent-controlled to the extent that they assume of each other—and indeed of themselves—that they have a capacity to track and conform to the demands of such reasons. The demands involved will range from requirements of respect for evidence, to requirements of consistency and valid argument, to requirements of fidelity to avowals and promises. Imagine I authorize you as an interlocutor, treating you as someone with whom I can do conversational business. I will take you to have a capacity to think with recognizable reason—reason recognizable to you—about what is the case and to act with recognizable reason on the basis of how you think. By my lights you will be the sort of creature who is generally susceptible to reasons, and to the perception of what reasons demand: in particular, to the sort of perception that I think I can elicit in you by testimony or argument or persuasion. If I did not impute this capacity to you, I would not find you worth talking to: I might as well be talking to the wall.
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I call the capacity I ascribe to you in taking this view ‘conversability’. Some agents may lack conversability entirely, being out of their minds or beyond the reach of reason. And all agents are liable to lack it in some domains or in some circumstances; they will be beyond the reach of reasons on certain restricted subjects, or under certain temporary pressures. But we assume that most people have the capacity associated with conversability most of the time; that is why we think they are worth talking to. And we have no option but to assume that we ourselves generally have such a capacity, even if temporary distraction or temptation or fatigue can get in the way of its exercise. We could not sincerely put ourselves forward as candidates for conversational address by others if we did not make this assumption about ourselves. And, more important still, we could not carry on the sort of internal dialogue in which we debate with ourselves as to what we ought to think or do; we could not represent ourselves as worthy of such self-address. I suggest that we ought to identify the capacity for agent-control with the capacity to go with recognizable reasons, in awareness of what reasons are; we might think of it, more specifically, as ‘orthonomy’, the ability to be ruled by the ‘orthos’ or the right (Watson 2005; Pettit and Smith 1996). The suggestion fits with a now well-established tradition of discussion about free will, inaugurated by Peter Strawson’s 1962 essay ‘‘Freedom and Resentment’’ (Watson 1982, 2005; Wallace 1996; Wolf 1990; Dennett 1984). If we go along with the suggestion, then we will say that to be agentcontrolled in any range of action is to be conversable or orthonomous in those actions, acting in the presence of the relevant capacity: remaining, as one acts, within the reach of reason. And we can acknowledge that people who are agent-controlled in this sense may or may not always manifest conversability; they may act against recognizable reason, while retaining the orthonomous capacity to act in accord with it. We acknowledge this possibility routinely, holding people to higher expectations than their flawed performance satisfies. We recall them in such cases to the standards to which they represent themselves as faithful when they purport to be worthy interlocutors; we remind them, if you like, that they are capable of better: that, at least when exceptional cases are put aside (Frankfurt 1969), there is a sense in which they could have done otherwise than they actually did. The capacity associated with conversability is one that we naturally conceive in a realistic, down-to-earth way. We freely admit that it comes in degrees, with each of us having bad days, bad topics, and facing hurdles of
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varying difficulty as we seek to prove conversable. We freely admit that it is often exercised in the manner of an editor rather than an author, a conductor rather than a composer, with autonomously emerging behaviors—for example, the words that naturally come to us as we speak—being shaped to appropriate effect (Pettit 2001a, ch. 7). And we freely assume, perhaps most important, that people can have and exercise the partial, editorial control that the capacity gives them even when they are acting more or less habitually and unthinkingly. This is possible so far as the discipline of conversable reason is in ‘virtual’ control of action (Pettit 2001a, ch. 1). Although unthinking habit shapes what agents do, the discipline of reason will be in virtual control so far as it is ready to be activated and take charge in the event of habit failing to keep the agent in line. In that event, at least in general, the ‘‘red lights’’ will go on and ensure that the agent remains faithful to the perceived demands of reason (see Thalos, chapter 8 in this volume). Beyond the Challenge The points I have made so far are these: According to neuroscientific findings, agents can make mistakes about whether an action is willed, and even when agents correctly see an action as willed, they do so later than when the brain launches the action. These findings challenge the commonsense intuition that we agents have a distinctive sort of control over our actions. n But they pose this challenge, only on the assumption that if an action is agent-controlled, then its etiology includes the formation of an act of will, where this sort of act is necessarily accessible to the agent and can be formed on demand. n That assumption is not compulsory. In principle, we might think that an action is agent-controlled, not in virtue of the elements in its particular etiology but in virtue of the nature or constitution of the agent in whom it is produced. n There is a good case for thinking that in practice we identify actions as agent-controlled in virtue of identifying their agents as having a suitable constitution. We do this when we identify agents as conversable or orthonomous, operating within the reach of conversationally recognizable reason. n
We are now in a position to connect up these points. Suppose that we go along with the picture of agent-control as a feature of agents in the first place—their conversability or orthonomy—and a feature of actions in the
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second. We can then hold that actions are agent-controlled, not because of their particular neural etiologies but because the agents are neurally so constituted that they are conversable in relation to the actions. That means in turn that we can reject the assumption made by those who pose the neuroscientific challenge. So we can escape that challenge; we can accept the findings given and still maintain a belief in agent-control. The first sort of finding was that agents are far from infallible in identifying actions as willed or unwilled. This is not surprising under the picture presented. Assume that we learn to become relatively conversable or orthonomous over a certain range of action in the course of normal development. With any action performed within that range, we must be able to see where it is going—where our goal lies—since otherwise we would not be able to submit it to reason-based assessment. But the required ability to see where the action is going—to see, if you like, what we want or will to do—does not have to involve immediate access to an element in the etiology of the action, as under the rival picture. On the contrary, it may be an ability that is only exercised fallibly, as the action more or less gradually evolves. It may depend on a variety of cues from muscular sensation and sensory feedback, for example, not on immediate access to a presumptive act of will. And if it depends on such cues, it will be subject to precisely the sorts of error that are elicited in experiments of the first variety. The second sort of neuroscientific finding was that agents become aware of actions as willed at some time later than when the brain begins to launch the actions. Again, this should come as no surprise under the picture presented here. What makes an action one in which I have agentcontrol is the fact that in this area I can be treated successfully, whether by myself or others, as conversable and orthonomous. That I can be treated that way is a function of how I am neurally constituted: a function, for example, of the possibilities of response and reform associated with the perception that what I am doing is contrary to the reasons I recognize; a function of the fact that I am not a hopeless case with whom there is no point in remonstrating, whether the challenger be myself or another. It should not be a scandal, therefore, that before ever I become aware of myself as initiating an action of that type, my brain will have done much of the work required to orchestrate the behavior. It would be surprising were it otherwise. The experimental results discussed should no longer scandalize us, then, if we adopt the agent-centered view of control. Under this view of things, I will enjoy control of what I do so far as I can be effectively brought to book
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on my actions—brought to the book of conversable reason. I will claim such control so far as I invite others to hold me to that book, as I do in presenting myself as a conversable interlocutor. To display and claim this sort of agent-control is perfectly consistent with not being the originary, selftransparent cause of what I do, as in the act-of-will picture. It only requires that however complex and opaque the process in which actions are produced, my makeup is such that the process remains sensitive to the factors that must be in place for conversability. How should we think of decision-making under this shift of perspective? I imagine agents responding to various aspects of their surroundings, aware of prompts that would take them in one direction or another, though not perhaps aware of being aware of them. I imagine the prompts congealing to elicit a given course of action, still without the agent being aware of this activating cascade of cues. And then, as the process unfolds, I imagine an awareness of the prompt as a prompt evolving in agents, giving them a sense of where they are behaviorally headed, and taking them into the space where they can exercise the capacity that makes them conversable. Agents may or may not be able to inhibit or reinforce the unfolding action at this point of awareness. Even if they have no such ability, however, their action will be agent-controlled, so far as they can review it in the light of the reasons available overall. They can endorse or disendorse their action, and in the case of disendorsing it, they can set themselves more or less successfully against doing the same sort of thing in the future. This is what ensures that the action is performed within the domain where conversability or orthonomy rules. A General Perspective The central idea in the notion of agent-control is that I am present in the performance of an action. It is not just something that happens in or to my body, unlike a spasm or reflex or compulsion. The agent-controlled action, we all think, is me; it carries my first-person signature. The standard picture of the will in action casts the self or the ‘I’ as the unit of production. And in that role it represents the self as condensing— magically, as I think—in the formation of will. This act of the will, as we saw, is meant to be an event in the natural etiology of action but an event with very special properties. Although it is not itself something I do—it cannot be, on pain of infinite regress—it is a manifestation or epiphany of my self. Where it materializes, I am. And where it materializes, I can consciously be, standing in full awareness at the well-spring of behavior.
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The story I prefer keeps the self in the picture, and represents voluntary action as carrying my signature. But according to this story the self is not the unit of production in action so much as the unit of accountability. Although the agent-controlled action is produced by a neural complex to which I have limited access, it remains something for which I am able to assume responsibility in the forum of exchange with myself and others. As a conversational participant, actual or potential, I purport to be someone who can generally speak for what he believes and desires; can elicit expectations about how he will behave; and can give others good reason, on pain of accepting censure or penalty, to hold him to those expectations. What it means to say that the action is agent-controlled is simply that it falls within the sphere where I prove myself to be the center of responsibility—the conversable interlocutor—that I purport to be. My agent-control has little to do with the production of action, and much to do with how effectively and authoritatively I can speak for it. This control will put requirements on the way in which the action is generated, of course—it will rule out hypnotic inducement for example—but it will not be defined by the nature of that process. While the picture I have defended fits in many ways with our manifest sense of ourselves, as well as fitting with what we know from neuroscience and related work, it has one surprising implication (see Greene and Cohen 2004). A capacity like the capacity to be conversable or orthonomous is inevitably the product, not just of native makeup, but also of cultural development. We are not born responsible, any more than we are born free. We have to learn what responsibility requires and how to display it (McGeer 1996); as criminologists say, we have to be ‘responsibilized’ (Garland 2001). Because conversability is subject to this sort of formation, it is almost bound to come in degrees. One person may be conversable over a larger or smaller domain than others, as we saw, and one person may be conversable in a higher or lower degree within the domain where the capacity is exercised. This means that whether or not people exercise agent-control in an action is never a black or white question. At this point our picture of the self in action breaks quite cleanly with the act-of-will picture. On that picture, there is bound to be a fact of the matter as to whether or not the agent’s will was present in a piece of behavior; there is a bright line that will divide voluntary and properly responsible behavior from behavior that is not like this. Under our picture, by contrast, it may often be relatively indeterminate whether or not the agent was properly or fully conversable in the domain of the action; the bright line will fade into a blurry
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area. But this implication of indeterminacy is surely quite plausible, however troubling it may be for moral and legal accounting. We are creatures composed out of neurally organized matter, as I said at the beginning. It would be a miracle if we turned out to display firmer contours of control than such plastic material is capable of sustaining. The Lesson from Neuroscience I have used the neuroscientific challenge—and, in effect, the associated findings—as a ground for arguing in favor of the view that links agentcontrol with conversability or orthonomy. But is there any more pointed lesson that neuroscience teaches us in this area? I believe there is. Neuroscience has taught us in many domains that what presents itself in common sense as a controlling factor in mental performance is often a side effect of a deeper, more inaccessible center of control. And it teaches precisely the same sort of lesson here. Consider the findings of a recent study in which subjects are asked to gamble with four decks of cards, where two of the decks are stacked against them (Bechara et al. 1997). While the subjects do eventually come to register those two decks as stacked, and so to resist them, it turns out that the resistance response—or at least the disposition toward that response—is present long before any perception of the decks as stacked, or even as suspect, emerges. This is evident from fMRI imaging of what is going on in their brains when they are dealing with those decks, as distinct from the fair ones, and from associated skin conductance responses. Unconscious resistance materializes in these subjects on the basis of a subpersonal registering of the fact that things are going wrong with the suspect decks. And the eventual registering of the decks as suspect—‘there’s something I don’t like about them’—takes the form of registering them simply as decks that occasion that resistance. The lesson of this discovery is that what appears in common sense as the factor that controls one’s response—the suspect look of the stacked decks— is not really a controlling factor but rather something that becomes available in virtue of the subpersonal controls that are operative. I do not resist the stacked decks because they look suspect, as seems to be the case from the first-person point of view; I see them as suspect because, at a deeper level, I resist them. The perception of the decks as suspect may reinforce my resistance, of course, but it is not the originating cause of resistance; that cause operates below the level of my awareness and before any awareness ever comes on stream.
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What is true in this case is true in many others. I have argued elsewhere, for example, that it is not because we see something as red that we can sort it out visually and track it across different backgrounds, under different lights, from different perspectives. Rather, it is because we are equipped at a subpersonal level to do that visual sorting and tracking that we see the object as red; the red look is not a controlling factor in my mental performance but something that becomes available in virtue of the operation of lower level controls (Pettit 2003). The brain often works behind the back of the mind, and we minds—we brain-bearers—are very likely to miss the fact (Gazzaniga et al. 1998). The picture of agent-control that we have been led to adopt in order to avoid the neuroscientific challenge bears out this general lesson. Assume that if an unfolding action is perceived by me as subject to my control, then it will present itself as subject to a control I perceive myself to have: as subject, so we can put it without equivocation, to my perceived or phenomenal control. On the act-of-will picture, it is in virtue of the fact that an unfolding action is subject to my perceived or phenomenal control that it counts as agent-controlled. But, if the argument here is correct, it is not in virtue of being subject to that phenomenal control that the action is agent-controlled. Rather, it is in virtue of being agent-controlled—in virtue of being performed in the presence of a neurally supported capacity for conversability or orthonomy—that it has such a perceptual or phenomenal profile. I see an object as red so far as I am able to sort and track it appropriately—I leave out some complications—and not the other way around. In the same manner, I perceive an action as conforming to my perceived will, so far as I perform it in the presence of a capacity for agential agent-control, and not the other way around. That an action is under my agent-control is the work of a vast orchestration of neural factors: those that shape the behavior but make me at the same time into a conversable subject in the domain of the behavior. When, in the absence of deceptive setups, I perceive an action as agent-controlled—when it presents itself as subject to my perceived control—this is a case of registering a sort of control that is already assured. It is not a case of assuming control for the first time. Acknowledgment I benefited from comments received from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Victoria McGeer. I am also very grateful for discussions at a University of
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Alabama workshop about related matters, for responses received at a conference on the unity of science in Venice, and for a vibrant interdisciplinary discussion at a meeting of Old Dominion fellows in Princeton University. References Bechara, A., H. Damasio, D. Tranel, and A. R. Damasio. 1997. Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy. Science 275: 1293–95. Brasil-Neto, J. P., A. Pascual-Leone, J. Valls-Sole´, L. G. Cohen, and M. Hallett. 1992. Focal transcranial magnetic stimulation and response bias in a forced choice task. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 55: 964–66. Dennett, D. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dennett, D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York, Viking. Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66: 828–39. Gazzaniga, M., R. Ivry, and G. Mangun. 1998. Cognitive Neuroscience. New York: Norton. Garland, D. 2001. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greene, J., and J. Cohen. 2004. For the law, neuroscience changes everything and nothing. Philosophical Transactions, Royal Society 359: 1775–85. Libet, B., C. A. Gleason, E. W. Wright, and D. K. Pearl. 1983. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity. Brain 106: 623–42. McEwan, I. 2001. Atonement. New York: Anchor. McGeer, V. 1996. Is ‘‘self-knowledge’’ an empirical problem? Renegotiating the space of philosophical explanation. Journal of Philosophy 93: 483–515. Nielson, T. I. 1963. Volition: A new experimental approach. Journal of Psychology 4: 215–30. Pettit, P. 2001a. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Cambridge and New York: Polity and Oxford University Press. Pettit, P. 2001b. The capacity to have done otherwise. In P. Cane and J. Gardner, ed., Relating to Responsibility: Essays in Honour of Tony Honore on his 80th Birthday, pp. 21– 35. Oxford: Hart. Pettit, P. 2003. Looks as powers. Philosophical Issues 13: 221–52.
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Pettit, P., and M. Smith. 1996. Freedom in belief and desire. Journal of Philosophy 93: 429–49. Ramachandran, V. S., and S. Rogers-Ramachandran. 1996. Synaesthesia in phantom limbs induced with mirrors. Proceedings of the Royal Society 263: 377–86. Sellars, W. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Strawson, P. 1982. Freedom and resentment. In G. Watson, ed., Free Will, pp. 59–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, R. J. 1996. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Watson, G. 2005. A´gency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wegner, D. M. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6
My Body Has a Mind of Its Own
Daniel C. Dennett
In life, what was it I really wanted? My own conscious and seemingly indivisible self was turning out far from what I had imagined and I need not be so ashamed of my self-pity! I was an ambassador ordered abroad by some fragile coalition, a bearer of conflicting orders, from the uneasy masters of a divided empire. . . . As I write these words, even so as to be able to write them, I am pretending to a unity that, deep inside myself, I now know does not exist. —William Hamilton 1996, p. 134 Language was given to men so that they could conceal their thoughts. —Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand
‘‘My body has a mind of its own!’’ Everybody knows what this exclamation means. It notes with some surprise the fact that our bodies can manage many of their key projects without any conscious attention on our part. Our bodies can stride along quite irregular ground without falling, avoiding obstacles and grabbing strategic handholds whenever available, pick berries and get them into the mouth or the bucket with little if any attention paid, and—notoriously—initiate preparations for sexual activity on a moment’s notice without any elaborate decision-making or evaluation discernible, to say nothing of the tight ship run by our temperature maintenance system and our immune system. My body can keep life and limb together, as we say, and even arrange for its own self-replication without any attention from me. So what does it need me for? This is another way, perhaps a better way, of asking why consciousness (our human kind of consciousness, at least) should evolve at all. The sort of consciousness (if it is a sort of consciousness) that is manifest in alert and timely discriminations for apt guidance of bodily trajectory, posture, and resource allocation is exhibited, uncontroversially, by invertebrates all the way down to single-celled organisms, and even by plants.1 Since the
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self-protective dispositions of the lobster can be duplicated, so far as we can tell, in rather simple robots whose inner states inspire no conviction that they must ‘‘generate phenomenology’’ or anything like it, the supposition that nevertheless there must be ‘‘something it is like to be’’ a lobster begins to look suspicious, a romantic overshooting of anthropomorphism, however generous-spirited. If a lobster can get through life without a self (or very much of a self), why should it have a ‘selfy’ self (Dennett 1991)? Maybe it doesn’t. Maybe it (and insects and worms and . . . .) are ‘‘just robots.’’ However, leaving matters here leans on an unsatisfactory assumption to the effect that being robotic and being conscious are mutually exclusive. The ultimate issue, really, is to explain first the possibility and then the (evolutionary) actuality of consciousness in some robots (if not lobsters). After all, we are conscious, and if materialism is true, we are made of nothing but robots—cells—and is such a complex not itself a robot?2 If we want to have a way of expressing our supposition that lobsters, say, are ‘‘mere’’ automata, we need to anchor that ‘‘mere’’ to some upper bound on complexity. Let’s say that mere automata are entities (organisms or automata) that are incapable of higher order self-monitoring; while they engage in behaviors that benefit from feedback guidance, these behaviors and the states that give rise to them aren’t further represented by the entities in such a way as to permit reflective or retrospective self-evaluation. A mere automaton is stuck with whatever behaviors it can perform—though these might be conditionable—capable of being shaped or extinguished by feedback—but cannot, for instance, note that ‘‘it seemed like a good idea at the time.’’ This would enable us to investigate different styles of nervous system: from simple and relatively low-priced arrangements lacking central selfmonitoring capabilities to more expensive and sophisticated arrangements capable of significant varieties of higher level self-monitoring, without having to confront in advance the vexing question of whether or not any of these sophistications amounted to, or were sure signs of, consciousness. As we learn more about the adroitness and versatility and internal organization of spiders or octopuses (or bats or dolphins or bonobos), we might uncover some further impressive thresholds that eventually persuade us to grant consciousness (of the impressive kind—whatever that means) to these creatures, but for the time being, we are the only species that everyone confidently characterizes as conscious. Our confidence is grounded in the simple fact that we are the only species that can compare notes. Consider a remark by Daniel Wegner: ‘‘We can’t possibly know (let alone keep track of) the tremendous number of mechanical influences on our be-
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havior because we inhabit an extraordinarily complicated machine’’ (2002, p. 27; italics added). Wegner presumably wouldn’t have written this if he hadn’t been comfortable assuming that we all know what he is talking about, but just who is this we that ‘‘inhabits’’ the brain? There is the Cartesian answer: each of us has an immortal, immaterial soul, the res cogitans or thinking thing, the seat of our individual consciousness. But once we set that answer aside—as just about everybody these days is eager to do—just what thing or organ or system could Wegner be referring to? My answer, compressed into a slogan by Giulio Giorello, who used it as a headline for an interview with me in Corriere della Serra in 1997, is this: Si, abbiamo un anima. Ma e` fatta di tanti piccoli robot. Yes, we have a soul. But it’s made of lots of tiny robots. Somehow, the trillions of robotic (and unconscious) cells that compose our bodies organize themselves into interacting systems that sustain the activities traditionally allocated to the soul, the ego or self. But since we have already granted that simple robots are unconscious (if toasters and thermostats and telephones are unconscious), why couldn’t teams of such robots do their fancier projects without having to compose me? If the immune system has a mind of its own, and the hand–eye coordination circuit that picks the berries has a mind of its own, why bother making a super-mind to supervise all this? George Ainslie notes the difficulty and has a suggestion: ‘‘Philosophers and psychologists are used to speaking about an organ of unification called the ‘self’ that can variously ‘be’ autonomous, divided, individuated, fragile, well-bounded, and so on, but this organ doesn’t have to exist as such’’ (2001, p. 43). How could this be? How could an organ that doesn’t have to exist as such exist at all? And, again, why would it exist? Another crafty thinker who has noticed the problem is the novelist Michael Frayn, whose narrator in Headlong muses: ‘‘Odd, though, all these dealings of mine with myself. First I’ve agreed a principle with myself, now I’m making out a case to myself, and debating my own feelings and intentions with myself. Who is this self, this phantom internal partner, with whom I’m entering into all these arrangements? (I ask myself.)’’ (Frayn 1999, p. 143). Although Frayn might not have intended to answer his own question, I think he has in fact provided the key to the answer in his parenthesis: ‘‘I ask myself.’’ It is only when asking and answering are among the projects undertaken by the teams of robots that they have to compose a virtual organ of sorts, an organ that ‘‘doesn’t have to exist as such’’—but does have to exist.
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This, in any case, has been suggestively argued by the ethologist and roboticist David McFarland (1989) in a provocative, if obscure, essay. According to McFarland, ‘‘Communication is the only behavior that requires an organism to self-monitor its own control system.’’ I’ve been musing over this essay and its implications for years, and I still haven’t reached a stable conviction about it, but in the context of the various intricate constructions around selves and their volition offered in the present volume including the juxtaposition of Wegner’s and Ainslie’s perspectives, I think it is worth another outing. Organisms are correctly seen as multicellular communities sharing, for the most part, a common fate (they’re in the same boat). So evolution can be expected to favor cooperative arrangements in general. Your eyes may, on occasion, deceive you—but not on purpose! (Sterelny 2003). Running is sure to be a coordinated activity of the limbs, not a battle for supremacy. Nevertheless, there are bound to be occasions when subsystems work at cross purposes, even in the best-ordered communities of cells, and these will, in general, be resolved in the slow, old-fashioned way: by the extinction of those lineages in which these conflicts arise most frequently, are most costly to fitness, and aren’t ineliminable byproducts that come with the numerous gains from going multicellular in the first place (see the papers in part III of Hammerstein 2003). The result is control systems that get along quite well without any internal self-monitoring. The ant colony has no boss, and no virtual boss either, and gets along swimmingly with distributed control that so far as we can tell does not engage or need to engage in high-level self-monitoring. According to McFarland, organisms can very effectively control themselves by a collection of competing but ‘‘myopic’’ task-controllers that can interrupt each other when their conditions (hunger or need, sensed opportunity, built-in priority ranking, . . .) outweigh the conditions of the currently active task controller. Goals are represented only tacitly, in the feedback loops that guide each task-controller, but without any global or higher level representation. (One might think of such a task-controller as ‘‘uncommented’’ code—it works, but there is nothing anywhere in it that can be read off about what it does or why or how it does it.) Evolution will tend to optimize the interrupt dynamics of these modules, and nobody’s the wiser. That is, there doesn’t have to be anybody home to be wiser! But communication, McFarland thinks, is a behavioral innovation that changes that. Communication requires a central clearinghouse of sorts in order to buffer the organism from revealing too much about its current
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state to competitive organisms. In order to understand the evolution of communication, as Dawkins and Krebs (1978) showed in a classic article, we need to see it as manipulation rather than as purely cooperative behavior. The organism that has no poker face, that communicates its state directly to all hearers, is a sitting duck, and will soon be extinct. What must evolve instead is a communication-control buffer that creates (1) opportunities for guided deception, and coincidentally (2) opportunities for self-deception (Trivers 1985), by creating, for the first time in the evolution of nervous systems, explicit (and more ‘‘globally’’ accessible) representations of its current state, representations that are detachable from the tasks they represent, so that deceptive behaviors can be formulated and controlled. This in turn opens up structure that can be utilized in taking the step, described in detail by Gary Drescher (1991), from simple situation-action machines to choice machines, the step I describe as the evolutionary transition from Skinnerian to Popperian creatures (Dennett 1996). I wish I could spell all this out with the rigor and detail that it deserves. Fortunately, some of the other papers in this volume make a careful collective start. The best I can do for my part, at this point anyway, is simply gesture in the directions that strike me as theoretically promising and encourage others to continue mining this fine vein. What follows are some informal reflections that might contribute. Consider the chess-playing computer programs that I so often discuss. They are not conscious, even when they are playing world-class chess. There is no role for a user-illusion within them because, like McFarland’s well-evolved noncommunicators, they are more or less optimized to budget their time appropriately for their various subtasks. Would anything change if the program were enabled/required to communicate with others—either its opponent or other kibitzers? Some programs now available have a feature that permits you to see just which move they are currently considering (e.g., see http://chess.captain.at/), but this is not communication; this is involuntary self-exposure, a shameless display that provides a huge source of valuable information to anyone who wants to try to exploit it. In contrast, a program that could consider its communications as informal moves, social ploys, in the enlarged game of chess—the game that some philosophers (e.g., Haugeland 1998) insist is real chess, unlike the socially truncated game that programs now play—would have to be able to ‘‘look at’’ its internal states the same way a poker player needs to look at his cards in order to decide what action to take. ‘‘What am I now trying to do, and
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what would be the effect of communicating information about that project to this other agent?’’ (it asks itself). In other words, McFarland imports Talleyrand’s cynical dictum about language and adapts it to reveal a deep biological truth: explicit self-monitoring was invented to conceal our true intentions from each other while permitting us to reveal strategic versions of those intentions to others. If this is roughly right, then we can also see how this capacity has two roles to play: export and import. It is not just that we can use communication to give strategic information about what we are up to, but we can be put up to things by communication. ‘‘A voluntary action is something a person can do when asked’’ (Wegner 2002, p. 32). The capacity to respond to such requests, whether initiated by others or by oneself, is a capacity that must require quite a revolutionary reorganization of cerebral resources.3 This prospect is often overlooked by researchers eager to stress the parallels and similarities between human subjects and animal subjects when they train a monkey (typically) to ‘indicate’ one thing or another by moving their eyes to one or another target on screen, or to press one of several buttons to get a reward. A human subject can be briefed in a few minutes about such a task, and thereupon, with only a few practice trials, execute the instructions flawlessly for the duration of the experiment. The fact that preparing the animal to perform the behavior usually involves hundreds or even thousands of training trials does little to dampen the conviction that the resulting behavior counts as a ‘‘report’’ by the animal of its subjective state.4 But precisely what is missing in these experiments is any ground for believing that the animal knows it is communicating when it does what it does. And if it is not in the position of an agent that has decided to tell the truth about what is going on in it now, there is really no reason to treat its behavior as an intentional informing. Its carefully sculpted actions may betray its internal state (the way the chess program willy-nilly divulges its internal state), but this is not the fruit of self-monitoring. If something along these lines is right, then we have some reason to conclude that contrary to tradition and even ‘‘common sense,’’ there is scant reason to suppose that it is like anything to be a bat. The bat’s body has a mind of its own, and doesn’t need a ‘‘me’’ to inhabit it at all. One might thus say that only we who compare notes (strategically) inhabit the complicated machines known as nervous systems. But on the whole this metaphor may by now be causing more confusion than enlightenment. Perhaps we should say instead: we strategic signalers may be the only selves that nervous systems produce.
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Notes 1. This robotic sensitivity-cum-action-guidance is what I used to call awareness2 , to distinguish it from the reportable kind of consciousness that might be only a human gift, awareness1 (Dennett 1969), a pair of awkward terms that never caught on, though the idea of the distinction is still useful, in my opinion. 2. I find it strategically useful to insist that individual cells, whether prokaryotic, archaic, or eukaryotic, are basically robots that can duplicate themselves, since this is the take-home message of the last half-century of cell biology. No more romantic vision of living cells as somehow transcending the bounds of nanobothood has any purchase in the details of biology, so far as I can see. Even if it turns out that quantum effects arising in the microtubules that crisscross the interiors of these cells play a role in sustaining life, this will simply show that the robotic motor proteins that scurry back and forth on those microtubules are robots with access to randomizers. 3. Thomas Metzinger (Being No One, 2003) has some excellent suggestions about what he calls the phenomenal self-model and its revolutionary capacities. 4. See Sweet Dreams (Dennett 2005, pp. 169–70) for earlier remarks on this. I myself have given more credence in the past to this proposal than I now think appropriate. See Dennett (1991, pp. 441–48). References Ainslie, G. 2001. Breakdown of Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dawkins, R., and J. R. Krebs. 1978. Animal signals: Information or manipulation? In J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, eds., Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, pp. 282–309. Blackwell, Oxford. Dennett, D. C. 1969. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Little Brown. Dennett, D. C. 1996. Kinds of Minds. New York: Basic Books. Dennett, D. C. 2005. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press. Drescher, G. 1991. Made-up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press. Frayn, M. 1999. Headlong. London: Faber and Faber. Hamilton, W. 1996. Narrow Roads of Gene Land, vol 1. Oxford: Freeman. Hammerstein, P., ed. 2003. Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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Haugeland, J. 1998. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McFarland, D. 1989. Goals, no-goals and own goals. In A. Montefiore and D. Noble, eds., Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals: A Debate on Goal-Directed and Intentional Behavior, pp. 39–57. London: Unwin-Hyman. Metzinger, T. 2003. Being No One. Cambridge: MIT Press. Sterelny, K. 2003. Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Trivers, R. 1985. Social Evolution. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings. Wegner, D. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press.
7
Soft Selves and Ecological Control
Andy Clark
These bodily members are, as it were, no more than garments; which, because they have been attached to us for a long time, we think are us, or parts of us [and] the cause of this is the long period of adherence: we are accustomed to remove clothes and to throw them down, which we are entirely unaccustomed to do with our bodily members.1 —Avicenna, De anima, V.7 As interface, the skin is obsolete. . . . The clothing of the body with membranes embedded with alternate sensory and input/output devices creates the possibility of more intimate and enhanced interactivity. Subjectively, the body experiences itself as a more extruded system, rather than an enclosed structure. The self becomes situated beyond the skin.2 —Stelarc, ‘‘Parasite Visions’’
Introduction Advanced biological brains are by nature open-ended opportunistic controllers. Such controllers compute, pretty much on a moment-to-moment basis, what problem-solving resources are readily available and recruit them into temporary problem-solving wholes. Neural plasticity, exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible for such resources to become factored deep into both our cognitive and physical problem-solving routines. One way to think about this is to depict the biological brain as a master of what I here dub ‘‘ecological control.’’ Ecological control is the kind of top-level control that does not micromanage every detail, but rather encourages substantial devolvement of power and responsibility. This kind of control allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the linkages and elastic properties of muscles and tendons. And it allows (I claim) much of our prowess at thought and reason to depend on the robust and reliable operation, often (but not always) in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety of
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nonbiological problem-solving resources spread throughout our social and technological surround. Are the complex distributed systems that result in some sense ‘‘out of control,’’ beyond the reach of useful (you might even, though problematically, say, ‘‘personal’’) governance? I will argue that they are not, although understanding them requires us to rethink some key ideas about control and the nature of the self. To (try to) make this case, I will first examine some strategies for efficient, external opportunity exploiting control in simple systems. I will then argue that many of the same lessons apply to the case of higher level human problem-solving. Ecological Control Consider Shakey. Shakey, circa 1970, was the mobile robotic darling of the Stanford Research Institute: one of the very first computer-controlled mobile robots and a locus of hard (nonecological) control. Armed with a camera, wheels, and a laser range finder, and controlled by a big old mainframe whizzing along at a quarter million calculations per second, Shakey could obey typed commands such as ‘‘Push the cube to the pyramid.’’ To do so, the system would sense, process, plan, and then act out its plan. For Shakey, the body and the environment were first and foremost problems to be solved. The environment was the problem arena. The sensors detected the layout in that arena and the reasoning system planned a solution. To a large degree, Shakey’s body was just another part of the problem space: a part that needed to be sent detailed, micromanaging control signals so as to put the reasoned-out solution into practice. A contemporary analogue, though vastly faster and more sophisticated, is Honda’s Asimo. Asimo is a mainstream control paradigm walking robot that uses precise joint-angle control to mimic human walking. The solution looks pretty good but is massively energy and computation expensive. Contrast these solutions with the kinds of ecological control deployed by passive dynamic walkers3 (PDWs). Passive dynamic walkers are simplelooking two-legged devices that employ no actuation except gravity, have no control system, and as a result can enforce no joint-angle control at any time. Yet surprisingly, PDWs are capable (when set on a gentle incline) of very stable, human-like walking. Now imagine that you (playing evolution) want to exploit that kind of surprising capacity but in the context of a self-powered locomoting agent. The solution, which looks to be Nature’s own, is to walk using a kind of controlled falling-over. Powered (level terrain) walking can thus be brought about by the brain and CNS systemati-
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cally pushing, damping and tweaking a system in which passive dynamic effects continue to play a very major role. In such cases a low-energy source, a simple control system, and the body (and gravity!) ‘‘collaborate’’ to solve the walking problem. This strategy has recently been implemented in a variety of simple robots (see Collins et al. 2005) and described as ‘‘a new design and control paradigm’’ for walking robots (2005, p. 1083). As a second example, Tedrake et al. (2005) have given us ‘‘Robotoddler.’’ Robotoddler uses actor-critic reinforcement learning to acquire a control policy that exploits the passive dynamics of the body. The robot learns to change speeds and to go forward and backward, and can adapt on the go to different terrains, including bricks, wooden tiles, carpet, and a variable speed treadmill. By using passive dynamic strategies, the robot’s power consumption is dramatically reduced (to about one-tenth that of a standard robot like Honda’s Asimo). These examples serve to introduce the notion of soft or ‘‘ecological’’ control. This is the kind of control that occurs when a system’s goals are not achieved by micromanaging every detail of the desired action or response, but by using a strategy that devolves a great deal of problem-solving responsibility, making the most of some robust, reliable source of relevant order in the body, elsewhere in the brain, and/or in local environment (notice that ecological control thus names a type of effect not a single mechanism). The effect of an ecological control strategy is often (though not always) the soft-assembly of a solution. Ecological controllers that can learn onthe-go promote soft-assembled solutions, that is to say solutions that comprise a temporarily stable assembly of factors and forces recruited from whatever happens to be available. Soft-assembly itself is a notion developed in movement science according to which: Movements can be seen as ‘‘softly-assembled’’ patterns created and dissolved as tasks and environments change, with some patterns easy and preferred, and others more difficult and unstable. . . . Moreover, as these synergies are assembled, they also take advantage of the non-neural aspects of movement: effects of gravity, elastic properties of muscles and inertial effects. (Thelen and Bates 2003, p. 381)
Humans belong to the interesting class of what I’d like to call openended ecological controllers. These are systems that seem to be specifically designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the most of body and world, checking for what is available, and then (at various timescales and with varying degrees of difficulty) integrating it deeply, creating whole new unified systems of distributed problem-solving. Robotoddler,
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as I just showed, does this open-endedly for walking but can apply that kind of learning to nothing else. We humans seem able to apply the same kinds of ecologically controlled learning much more widely. In fact human agents are highly engineered so as to be able to learn to make maximal problem-simplifying use of an open-ended variety of internal, bodily, or external sources of order. For example, we can learn to use tools, sports racquets, and musical instruments in ways that exploit the intrinsic dynamics of those material structures (for discussion and lots of examples, see Clark 2003 and Clark, forthcoming). But more important for present purposes, there seems to be something analogous to (possibly identical with; see Christensen 2004) ecological control that operates in the cognitive domain. Thus suppose we ask: Could human cognition involve ecologically controlled, soft-assembled, distributed systems built of heterogeneous parts? I believe (see Clark 1997, 2003; Clark and Chalmers 1998) that the answer is yes and that minds like ours are distinguished, in part, by the ease with which brains like ours form larger problem-solving wholes that incorporate and exploit extra-neural stores, strategies, and processes. These larger problem-solving wholes, I would like to argue, are not simply extended cocoons for the ‘real’ selves, choosing agents and cognitive engines hidden deep within. Rather (or so I wish to suggest), they then are those selves, agents, and cognitive engines. To creep up on this initially unsettling idea, let’s next turn to the very idea of the self. Situating the Self Contemporary work on the nature of the self, and on the origins of the sense of self, tends to distinguish between two major contributing elements. First, there is something like a core sense of being, which involves having a point of view on the world (I see the world from over here), having a sense of what I can and cannot do (I can reach and grasp that cup, I cannot fly or jump to the roof, etc.) and having a sense of the limits and placement of my own body in space. Dogs, cats and rabbits, as well as human beings, have this core sense of their own embodiment and abilities. But second, in the human case, at least, there is also something like a complex narrative self.4 This is (roughly speaking) an understanding, co-constructed by myself and others, of the kind of person I am, the kinds of projects and interests I have, the shape of my life so far, and so on. Both elements can be significantly impacted by the opportunistic recruitment of external props and aids. Fitted with a shiny new prosthetic arm
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that can lift more weights than before, my direct, automatic, sense of what I can and can’t do must rapidly alter and catch up. Fitted with a cochlear implant that cures my deafness and (as a kind of added extra) allows me to hear sounds in ranges that most adult humans cannot detect, my core sense of my own auditory potential again changes. Accustomed to the (now automatic and unreflective) use of, say, a retinal display that allows me to invisibly retrieve information from a plug-in or courtesy of a wireless accessible database, it seems less and less clear where what ‘‘I’’ know stops and what ‘‘it’’ (the plug-in) makes available starts. If the latter claim seems less plausible than the others, imagine an agent who knows, pretty much by rote, a lot of facts about women’s basketball. Now imagine that instead of storing all of those facts in your head, you deploy a kind of heads-up display that provides instant access to the main performance statistics of key players over the last twenty years. The display might be delivered by eyeglasses, or even courtesy of a wireless implant sending signals directly into visual cortex (rather like certain newgeneration cochlear implants; see Clark 2003, ch. 1). The system is set up so that the visual sighting of a player’s name, or the auditory pickup of that name, or simply mouthing the name, activates a kind of augmented reality visual overlay displaying all the key facts and figures. Imagine too that the system is fairly flexible, allowing you also to start with categories (e.g., three-point field goal percentages in the year 2000) or with specifics (players with three-point field goal percentages of 0.350 or above) and to then retrieve information accordingly. Over a period of use, you become so accustomed to this easy, on-demand access that the plug-in (for want of a better word) becomes automatically, unthinkingly deployed, and that you usually trust what it delivers. As a result perhaps you start to behave, and subsequently to feel, as if you simply know which of any two players had the best three-point field goal percentage in any given season, and so on. Would you be wrong to feel that? The answer is by no means cut-and-dried. True, your knowing these things depend on the proper operation of the plug-in. But your knowing other things depends, equally, on the proper operation of parts of your brain. And in each case, damage and malfunction is always a possibility. True, you need to retrieve the information before it is present to your conscious awareness. But knowledge stored in long-term biological memory is in the much the same boat, until some kind of retrieval process poises it for the control of verbal report and intentional action. (For a longer and more philosophically nuanced version of this much-compressed argument, see Clark and Chalmers 1998).
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A helpful, though at best partial, parallel is with the way our sense of ‘‘seeing the whole visual scene before us’’ depends on some contemporary models, on the way information that is not currently represented in conscious visual awareness, and that is ‘‘stored’’ only in the external scene itself, is nonetheless (thereby) poised for easy access by a simple saccade. That poise-for-easy-retrieval is taken for granted in our daily planning and acting, and may be the source of our feeling that we see detail and color throughout the whole of the visual field (for discussion, see Clark 2002a; Noe 2002). This is not to say that there are no interesting differences. For example, knowledge stored in long-term biological memory is open to all kinds of subterranean processes of integration and interference (with both old and newly acquired knowledge). And neurally stored information is fluently accessible by an amazing variety of routes, and in a wide variety of situations.5 Nonetheless, the simple feeling of ‘‘already knowing’’ the answer to a question as soon as it is asked is surely the knowledge-based equivalent of the more familiar notion of transparent equipment: equipment (like the carpenter’s hammer) with which we are so familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in use, but rather rely on it to mediate our encounters with a still-wider world. Easy access to specific bodies of information, as and when such access is normally required, is all it takes for us to factor such knowledge in as part of the bundle of skills and abilities that we take for granted in our day to day life. And it is this bundle of taken-for-granted skills, knowledge, and abilities that—or so I am suggesting—quite properly structures and informs our sense of who we are, what we know, and what we can do. The Shrinking Chooser If this still feels unnatural, it is largely (I suggest) because we have in any case only the most tenuous collective grip on what it means to be a choosing, acting ‘self’, or a unified ‘mind’, and because we suffer from a chronic tendency to misconstrue the relations between our self-conscious choosings and the vast webs of nonconscious processing activity (all those whirrings and grindings of machinery, neural and perhaps nonneural, internal and perhaps external) that also structure and determine our own actions and responses. Until we form a better, more consistent image of the relationship between these factors, we cannot hope to know ourselves. There is, most (though not all) theorists will agree, a genuine (though not always sharp and all-or-nothing) distinction between those things of
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which I am consciously aware and those things of which I am not.6 Right now, for example, I am conscious of the page in front of me, of the glare of my desk lamp, and of the difficulty of formulating this particular thought! I am not, however, conscious of all the complex low-level visual processing (the parallel processing of multiple differential equations) that supports and makes possible my conscious visual awareness of the page and the glare. Nor am I conscious of whatever complex internal machinations underlie my sudden sense than I am here tiptoeing into difficult and dangerous territory. Certainly, at any given moment, not all the cognitively important goings-on in my brain are present as contents of my current conscious awareness. That is why we sometimes find thoughts and ideas, ones that we nevertheless recognize as originated by ourselves, simply ‘‘popping up in our heads’’: they are the intrusive conscious fruits of some ongoing, subterranean, nonconscious information processing. It is impossible to underestimate the significance of these nonconscious cognitive processes in the determination of the mental character of a persisting and identifiable thinking being. We must reject the seductive but ultimately barely intelligible idea that we (qua individual, thinking things) are nothing more than a sequence of conscious states. The identification of the agent or chooser with such a thin slice of themselves obscures the full suite of mechanisms whose coordinated action is responsible for much of what is distinctive of an individual chooser. The shrinkage would leave us with no real grip on the cohesion and continuity that we naturally associate with the idea of a single mind, self, or chooser persisting through time. It is illuminating, I think, to actually try the following simple experiment. For just ten minutes, keep track (as far as you can) of the contents of your conscious awareness. Unless you are totally engaged in a single all-absorbing task, you will probably end up with a sequence of oftenunconnected thoughts. A feeling of hunger, a thought about consciousness and the self, a worry about a forthcoming lecture, a glimmer of sexual arousal, a pang of anxiety, an urge to write to an old friend, another thought about the self (a good one—but where did it come from?), the strong desire for a coffee, and so on and on. The sequence of conscious contents is highly varied (in type) and radically discontinuous (in content). Themes persist, and whole trains of thought are sometimes, painfully, birthed. But the true principles of continuity, and the bulk of the thinking, choosing self, must lie largely underground. We cannot, it seems, afford to identify ourselves with the conscious contents of momentary time-slices. With this in mind Dennett (2003) responds to worries (Libet 1985, 1999) concerning the time-lag between onset of
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action and conscious awareness of a decision by noting that, ‘‘Our free will, like all our other mental powers, has to be smeared out over time, not measured at instants. Once you distribute the work done . . . in both space and time in the brain, you have to distribute the moral agency around as well. You are not out of the loop; you are the loop’’ (Dennett 2003, p. 242). Taking the whole loop of temporally and spatially spread cognitive activity seriously is, however, already to take the crucial step toward understanding ourselves as ecological control systems capable of incorporating external structures deep into their cognitive routines. For the choices before us are now relatively stark: Either, treat the mind and self as nothing but the shifting set of momentary ‘‘conscious’’ contents (thus shrinking mind and self beyond recognition) Or, allow mind and self to depend on the ongoing coordinated activity of multiple temporally spread conscious and nonconscious processes, thus inviting us to also consider certain nonbiological members of the class of nonconscious processes to contribute as deeply to the mechanical underpinnings of our minds and selves as do the nonconscious neural processes. The challenge, in other words, is this. Given the profound role of nonconscious, opportunistically recruited neural resources in the intentional origination of action, show us why (apart from some unargued prejudice) the machinery of mind and self should be restricted to the neural, the inner, or the biological. We need to seriously question the idea that neural, inner, and/or biological goings-on are in some way incredibly special. We need to rid ourselves of the idea that our brains are somehow touched with the magic dust that makes them suitable to act as the physical machinery of mind and self, while the nonbiological stuff must forever remain mere slave and tool. The relations between our conscious sense of self (our explicit plans and projects, and our sense of our own personality, capacities, bodily form, location and limits) and the many nonconscious neural goings-on that structure and inform this cognitive profile are, it seems to me, pretty much on a par with the relations between our conscious minds and various kinds of transparent, reliable, robust and readily accessed nonbiological resources. When those resources are of a recognizably knowledge- and information-based kind, the upshot is an extended cognitive system: a biotechnologically hybrid mind, a biotechnologically hybrid self.
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Is this merely arguing over words? Why should we worry whether we accept well-integrated bio-external elements as aspects of the physical machinery of self and mind? The deepest reason to care, it seems to me, is that to fail to do so is to implicitly accept a model according to which the machinery of the self becomes identified with the machinery of conscious reason. This leads directly to a variety of fears and worries (Wegner 2002 is a nice example) concerning the authorship of many perfectly intentional actions. The remedy is to see that the choosing agent is not somehow hidden within the machinery whose operations are most accessible to consciousness. Rather, she is the whole well-tuned ensemble capable of taking responsibility for actions and of initiating actions that make sense in the light of her long-term projects and commitments. Gallagher (2005) extends the Dennettian view in just this way, writing that, ‘‘I don’t disagree with Dennett concerning the role played by nonconscious elements, except that I think we are even larger than he thinks—we are not just what happens in our brains. The ‘loop’ extends though and is limited by our bodily capabilities, into the surrounding environment, which is social as well as physical, and feeds back through our conscious experience into the decisions we make’’ (Gallagher 2005, p. 242). Confronted with this general class of proposal, according to which the machinery of mind extends out into the surrounding world, many people feel deeply uncomfortable. How, they ask, could something to which I (they mean the conscious mind) may have so little detailed access count as in any way a proper part of me? How could, to take an admittedly extreme case, the ongoing daily computations of a software agent that only ever reports back when it has found some tasty mercantile morsel count as part of my own mechanistic underpinnings? We may feel easier about this, I suspect, once we face up to the fact that this kind of relation already obtains between the conscious mind and sizable chunks of our onboard neural machinery. To see this quite concretely, imagine you are now reaching for that coffee cup sitting before you on the desk. It may seem to you that your hand and finger motions are being sensitively guided by your own conscious seeing. This, however, is not really the case. In fact fine-tuned reaching and grasping involves the delicate use of visually received information by functionally and neuro-anatomically distinct subsystems operating, for the most part, outside the window of conscious awareness. It is this nonconscious circuitry that guides the most delicate shape- and position-sensitive aspects
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of reach and grasp. (For a radical version of this, see Milner and Goodale 1995; for a more balanced account, see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). In a similar way it is the nonconscious use of visual information that is responsible for many of our fine postural corrections and compensations (e.g., standing up while riding a bus). Even in the case of our own biological brains, then, the conscious self is in (direct, micromanaging) control of much less than we think. Not just the ‘‘autonomic’’ functions (breathing, heartbeat, etc.) but all kinds of human activities turn out to be partly supported by quasi-independent nonconscious subsystems. This is no surprise, I am sure, to any sports player: it doesn’t even seem, when playing a fast game of squash, as if your conscious perception of the ball is, moment by moment, guiding your hand and racket. Nor should it come as a surprise to artists and scientists, who are often painfully aware that the bulk of their own (intentional, owned, self-expressing) creative activity flows from subterranean and nonconscious sources. What seems to matter, for our daily sense of effective agency and choice, is (1) that the conscious mind has a rough and fallible sense of what she (the embodied, embedded, perhaps technologically extended, agent) knows, wants, and can and can’t do, and (2) that sometimes at least, conscious rehearsal can be an active part of the process that leads, within that complex economy, to intentional action. The conscious contribution here need amount to no more than a gentle but subjectively experienced nudge that tips the balance of a complex, and to a large extent unconsciously selforganizing, system. The conscious mind I am thus suggesting is well-placed to act as an ecological controller in the sense outlined in the opening sections. It is for this reason that the fear of ‘‘loss of control,’’ as we cede more and more to nonconscious inner processes and to a supporting web of nonbiological scaffolding is misplaced. For what matters is not that the conscious self be micromanaging every detail of every subroutine but that, working together, the conscious mind and a variety of nonconscious subsystems provide usable, robust support for the kinds of life we lead and the kinds of activity we value. The conscious mind, on this model, finally emerges as something like a new-style business manager whose role is not to micromanage but to set long-term goals, pursue some slow deliberative reasoning, and gently nudge the larger system in certain directions, all the while actively creating and maintaining the kinds of conditions in which the overall distributed cognitive economy performs at its best.7
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The Buck That Never Stops A common objection, at about this point, goes something like this: even if external, nonbiological elements do sometimes help us—quite profoundly—in our problem-solving activities, still isn’t it always at least our biological brains that have the final say? The mental buck stops there. The brain is where I am because the brain is the controller and chooser of my actions in a way this other stuff (software, pen, paper, palm-pilot) is not. And that, it may be suggested, is why the nonbiological stuff should not count as part of the real self or cognitive system, and why our minds are not hybrids built of biological and technological parts. Human minds, so the obvious objection goes, are good old fashioned biological minds, albeit ones that enjoy a nice wraparound of power-enhancing tools and culture. This sounds sensible and proper. Until we turn up the magnification on the biological brain itself. Notice first that many processes involved in the selection and control of actions are routinely off-loaded, by the biological brain, onto the nonbiological environment. Think of the knot in the hanky, the automated desktop diary, and the software agent empowered to purchase. In reply to such an observation the sceptic is likely to invoke some kind of ultimate authority: Who was it that decided to knot the hanky, the sceptic demands? The biological brain, that’s ‘‘who,’’ and that’s YOU. Who was it that empowered the software agents to purchase? The same old brain, the same old YOU! But this reply is a major hostage to fortune. Suppose we now ask some parallel questions within the neurobiological nexus itself. Do we now conclude that the real ‘‘me’’ is to be identified only with those select elements of the neural machinery involved in ultimate decision-making? Suppose only my frontal lobes have the final say? Does that shrink the physical machinery of mind and self to just the frontal lobes? What if, as Dennett suspects, no neural subsystem has always and everywhere the final say? Has the mind and self simply disappeared? as Jerry Fodor once said, ‘‘If, in short, there is a community of computers living in my head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; and, by God, it had better be me’’ (Fodor 1998, p. 207). Perhaps not. What we really need to reject, I suggest, is the seductive idea that all these various neural and nonneural tools need a kind of stable, detached user. Instead, it is just tools all the way down. Some of those tools are indeed more closely implicated in our conscious awareness of the world than others. But
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those elements, taken on their own, fall embarrassingly short of constituting any recognizable version of a human mind or of an individual person. Some elements, likewise, must be more important to our sense of self and identity than others. And some elements will play larger roles in control and decision-making than others. But this divide, like the ones before it, tends to crosscut the inner and the outer, the biological and the nonbiological. Different neural circuits provide different capacities, and contribute in different ways to our sense of self, of where we are, of what we can do, and to decision-making and choice. External, nonbiological elements provide still further capacities, and contribute in additional ways to our sense of who we are, where we are, what we can do, and to decision-making and choice. But no single tool among this complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful, ultimately in full control, or plausibly identified as the inner ‘seat of the self’. We (we human individuals) just are these shifting coalitions (see Ainslie 2001, Ross chapter 10 in this volume) of tools. We are ‘‘soft-selves,’’ continuously open to change and driven to leak through the confines of skin and skull, annexing more and more nonbiological elements as aspects of the machinery of mind itself. The metaphor of ‘tools all the way down’ may seem to threaten, as Ross (personal communication) notes, to deconstruct itself. How can ‘tools’ be the right notion in the absence of a central intelligent user? The air of paradox is intentional. The user is nothing but the cumulative effect of the coactive unfolding of the various resources supporting different aspects of adaptive response. This unfolding is determined by a delicate mix of sparse ecological control and pure self-organization. The user is what we see (in others and ourselves) when all this is working properly: a more-or-less rational being pursuing a more-or-less unified set of goals and projects. (See Rovane 1998.) The role of others in all this is not to be underappreciated. Ross (2004) makes a powerful case that that humans (like other animals) communicate and bargain nonlinguistically using multiple analogue signaling systems (think of the continuous variety of small facial and bodily motions that may convey pleasure or displeasure, or encouragement to approach or retreat). But when such agents are also able to label their own states and those of others (e.g., pinning them down as ‘‘attracted’’ or ‘‘unattracted,’’ ‘‘interested’’ or ‘‘not interested,’’ and so on), they enter into a new kind of arena, one whose dynamics can be stabilized by a series of such all-ornothing (digital) commitments (e.g., these are achieved whenever one agent labels another’s state and the other does not reject the label). Further negotiations and coordinations among this group can then be predicated
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upon this stable baseline of publicly endorsed digital commitments. Ross depicts such practices as recursively agent-generating: that is to say, the agents that enter into the digitally modulated negotiation (or other coordination project) are defined, in part, by these very sets of commitments, and the new utility functions that accompany them. Despite all this we are prone, it seems, to a particularly dangerous kind of cognitive illusion. Because our best efforts at watching our own minds in action reveal only the conscious flow of ideas and decisions, we mistakenly identify ourselves with this stream of conscious awareness. Then, when in our more scientific moments we begin to inquire into the material and physical underpinnings of the mind and self, it can quickly seem as if much (though not all) of the brain and all the rest of the body, not to mention the surrounding social and technological webs, are just tools for that conscious user. This is the mistake that led Avicenna, the Islamic philosopher quoted at the start of the chapter, to depict his own bodily limbs as ‘‘no more than garments.’’ But garments for what? A conscious Cartesian self perhaps? To pursue this route is to embrace a hideously disfigured image of the mind and self, privileging a vanishingly small piece of the true personal and cognitive pie. A better bet, as we have already begun to see, is the de-centralized, distributed, heterogeneous vision of the machinery of mind and self powerfully championed by Dennett (see especially Dennett 1991). Much of Dennett’s work sets out to oppose the persuasive image of the ‘‘Cartesian theater’’: the mythical place inside our brains where sensory inputs, thought and ideas are all inspected by a ‘‘central meaner’’ whose wellinformed choices determine our deliberate actions. Dennett marshals a plethora of philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific evidence against such a view. His target is often thought to be simply the idea of a neural or functional center of consciousness. But Dennett’s deeper quarry, or so it has always seemed to me, has been the idea of a central self, a small-but-potent internal user relative to whom all the rest—be it neural, bodily or technological—is mere toolbox. Where we hallucinate a central self, some spiritual or neural point wherein our special individual essence resides, Dennett finds only a grab bag of tools, and an ongoing narrative: a story we (the ensemble of tools) spin to make sense of our actions, proclivities and projects. According to Dennett, we are our own best story, and our sense of self is a kind of artifact, useful for many purposes, but best taken with a pinch of salt. I will not rehearse or critique Dennett’s arguments here (though I have done so at some length elsewhere—for example, see Clark 2002b).
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Instead, I simply note that our earlier reflections lead us to the very same conclusions, unpalatable though they may initially seem. There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive essence that makes me who and what I am. In its place there is just the ‘‘soft-self’’: a rough-and-tumble control-sharing coalition of processes—some neural, some bodily, some technological—and an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which ‘‘I’’ am the central player. Giving up on the image of a hard central self raises a thorny problem. What, then, makes a grab bag of tools (a grab bag whose specific elements may shift and change over time) into a unified, cohesive self? Part of the answer, to be sure, is that we simply hallucinate more unity and cohesion than in fact exists. Related to this is the pragmatic point that for many social and legal purposes, it is convenient to simply identify the agent with the core biological ensemble. We imprison the body and brain, not the laptop! But we do this despite knowing that individual bits of neural circuitry (my hippocampus, let’s say) are themselves as incapable of being ‘guilty’ as the laptop! What we are really doing is rejecting a pattern of behavior that has itself emerged from a whole social and biotechnological matrix. But another, perhaps more interesting, part of the answer is that the unity and cohesion of the self, and the distinctness of the self (the sense we have of being individual agents, located thus and so, confronting a wider world) are not simple givens. Instead, they are (imperfect and constantly vulnerable) achievements. In other work I have discussed how the sense of location and body boundaries is constructed on the basis of coordinated signals arising within perception–action cycles. (See Clark 2003, ch. 4). The preconditions for the emergence of a rich sense of self begin to be met, I suspect, when on the basis of such information a loose-knit system begins to stabilize itself and to actively protect its own problem-solving infrastructure. Thus reflect on the (superficially disproportionate) vexation of the child whose parents enter and slightly re-arrange her bedroom when she is not around. The feeling is one of almost personal assault. The room, organized in a certain way, was integral to the child’s modes of play and study. To borrow an even simpler example, most of us keep our drinking glasses in a certain cupboard in the house. By actively stabilizing this environmental structure (putting clean glasses back in that same cupboard) we simplify the problem of future glass-location. Or consider the way files are arranged and stored in your own office. Our offices are organized in highly individual ways, dovetailed to our specific needs and to our different neurobiological profiles. We human beings actively organize our own local environments
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for cognitive purposes, and then take steps to protect this achieved organization (woe to the cleaner who disturbs the piles). Again and again, we act so as to stabilize our local environments in ways that simplify or enhance the problem-solving that needs to be done. All this is a close cousin, I claim, to our carefully constructed and defended notion of a bounded self. The narrative-spinning drive (clearly evidenced in well-known studies of the tendency toward confabulation; e.g., see Nisbett and Ross 1980), when confronted with such active efforts at stabilization, tends (I conjecture) to project the principle of stabilization further and further inward, inclining us to hallucinate a single, central organizing self. Imagine a pile of sand, deposited roughly on the ground and slowly settling into a stable arrangement of grains. Were the pile of sand self-aware, it too might hallucinate a kind of inner essence: a special grain or set of grains whose deliberate actions sculpt the rest into a stable arrangement. But there is no such essence. The sand pile simply self-organized into a more-or-less stable coalition of grains. Similarly (and here I also refer the reader to Dennett’s classic 1974 discussion of the ‘law of effect’) certain coalitions of biological and nonbiological problem-solving elements (‘grab bags of mind-tools’) prove more stable and (hence) enduring than others. These configurations have a tendency to preserve and even repeat themselves. When viewed by a conscious, narrative-spinning element, this all looks like the work of some central organizer: the real self, the real mind, the real source of all that observed order. Thus is born perhaps the image of the self as a critical yet vanishingly slim slice of the overall problemsolving ensemble (brain, body, cognitive technologies): a slice so slim and elusive that our own neural circuits (‘my’ hippocampus, ‘my’ frontal lobes) can quickly seem like its tools! That little story is mere speculation. But however it arises, this notion of a real, central, yet wafer-thin self is a profound mistake. It is a mistake that blinds us to our real nature, and leads us to radically undervalue (and misconceive) the roles of context, culture, environment and technology in the constitution of individual human persons. To face up to our true nature (soft-selves, distributed de-centralized coalitions) is to recognize the inextricable intimacy of self, mind, and world. Finding the Balance But not so fast. Isn’t there a tension in the story as I have told it? On the one hand, I want to speak of the conscious mind as a source (or sources) of ecological control, adding crucial nudges to the complex dynamics of
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much larger (potentially hybrid) cognitive and behavioral systems. On the other hand, I want to depict us as soft selves: de-centralized, distributed, and self-organizing systems that just happen to have a perspective on their own activity and an accompanying story to tell. How can both stories be true? A suggestive move is made by Velleman (2000), who notes that our own verbal utterances, encountered in the context of a narrative-spinning drive, may at times serve the purpose of helping to bring about the very thing they depict us as about to do. This is a function they could perform even in the context of a system that is largely self-organizing in just the way Dennett suggests. For example, if late at night I say to you ‘‘I’m leaving now,’’ I may say this in part as a means of bringing it about that I do, in fact, leave—that I leave, that is to say, despite my self-perceived urge to continue our conversation. This strategy can work, according to Velleman, because as a rampant narrator of my own life story, I am driven to strive for consistency, for alignment between behavior and narrative. So by saying that I am about to do so and so, I increase the costs to myself of not so doing. This trick (the addition of a new narrative-induced cost to not doing so and so) would work for silent inner rehearsal as well as for overt speech. The conscious thought or overt utterance that depicts me, to myself, as about to do so and so thus makes it more likely that I will do what I think or say. The key (as Ismael 2004, 2006, nicely notes) is simply to make the narrative run ahead, into the future, so that the drive for consistency and alignment acts as a causal influence on what we then do, rather than a post hoc (and sometimes demonstrably ad hoc8) commentary on what we have already chosen or done. Ismael (2004, 2006) then uses this as the springboard for a related but much stronger move. What is right in Velleman’s position, she suggests, is his recognition that ‘‘if the brain is generating a self-representation, there’s no reason that the thing can’t have a role in the determination of behavior, indeed, no reason that it can’t acquire an increasingly prominent role’’ (2004, p. 6). (By a ‘self-representation’ Ismael seems to mean any kind of internal model that contains even a partial representation of the agent as a distinct property-bearing individual, so any Dennett-style narrativespinning engine should count as a self-representation). But as soon as such a self-representation assumes some kind of causal role (whether by the neat trick of forward-narrating or any other means), we are no longer (according to Ismael) dealing with a simple self-organizing system that just happens to spin a story about itself. Rather, we are dealing with a system that really does include a self-model as an active principle of organization.
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Not self-organization but organization by a self-model! Such systems may behave in ways that are more flexible (so the argument continues) than any first-order self-organizing system because they can use the self-model to select among multiple responses in ways that are driven by that model, hence by stored memories, representations of goals, and so on. In this story the stress on various forms of higher level control seems to me exactly right, as does the observation that such control may often require the system to deploy some kind of model of its own nature, history, or dynamics. But for my own part, I remain wary of the idea of any single such self-model, and much more inclined (see Clark 1997) toward a vision of multiple partial models, most of which may be relatively low level (e.g., a variety of forward models of bodily dynamics; see below). As far as the most inclusive and abstract such ‘self-model’ goes (the one that corresponds most closely to the narrative self), I wonder what the notion of a model here adds to the simpler notion of systems that know some stuff about themselves and use that knowledge to help select actions? Perhaps then the contrast between self-organizing and self-governing systems is not as sharp as it first seems?9 Ismael thus depicts a kind of conflict between what she calls selfgoverning models (ones in which a self-representation plays a crucial, flexibility-promoting causal role) and truly self-organizing ones, in which there is only input-driven self-organization plus a spun narrative. The notion of ecological control, I want finally to suggest, begins to show us how to reconcile these two notions,10 and hence how to reconcile Dennett’s emphasis on the unreality of selves with Ismael’s recognition that agents with some kind of self-model may exhibit complex dynamics that are the causal consequence of that very self-model. For what I am calling ecological control is what you get when you add an inter-animated and changeable variety of thin slices of self-governance to a system in which the intrinsic, self-organizing properties of many subsystems are allowed to bear a lot (but not all) of the problem-solving strain. The self-actuating passive dynamic walker, whose direction of travel and speed of walking is selected by a local supervisory system empowered to nudge and tweak the mechanically coupled leg system, exploits a potent combination of self-organization and self-governance. Importantly, self-governance, as I am understanding it, may be the province not of any single inner self-model but of a variety of partial11 self-governing strategies, some of which may themselves involve circuitry spanning brain, body, and world, and themselves orchestrated via a higher level kind of self-organization. According to such a picture, overall self-governance, though real and important, is the emergent outcome of
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the action of a whole complex of partial self, body, and world models acting as mini ecological controllers in a distributed cognitive economy. Some of these may be simple forward models of the dynamics of bodily subsystems (e.g., see Miall and Wolpert 1996; Clark and Grush 1999), while others may be more tightly woven with systems for episodic memory and for categorization. In all cases, though, the self-governance works only because it is delicately and continuously keyed to (and often highly exploitative of) a variety of sources of order inherent in the rest of the system. True (flexible, efficient, robust) self-governance thus positively requires, or so I want to suggest, the use of ‘soft’ ecological control strategies: ones that are maximally exploitative of the order and intelligence that are distributed throughout the larger system. This suite of soft, hybridization-favoring, partial self-governing routines cannot reconstruct a stereotypic Cartesian mind or a traditional single central self. To that extent we may appreciate what is correct in Dennett’s depiction of (that kind of) self as a kind of illusion, while embracing the causal potency of (perhaps a variety of) empirically real partial self (and world) models, some of which link memory and motivation to action and choice. Conclusions: Situations and Persons How can we reconcile the vision of human agents as distributed, hybrid problem-solving ensembles with the vision of human agents as, indeed, agents: as autonomous individuals exercising control and choice? Viewing ourselves as loci of multiple systems of ecological control may provide a useful tool to attempt such a reconciliation. Ecological control systems are, first and foremost, essentially opportunistic and exploitative. They take whatever is around, and build it into fluent problem-solving routines. But they are nonetheless controllers in good standing, able to tweak and nudge complex systems in ways that promote goal-driven activity and flexible adaptive response. Seeing ourselves as biologically based (but not biologically imprisoned) engines of ecological control may help us to develop a species self-image more adequate to the open-ended processes of physical and cognitive self-creation that make us who and what we are. Acknowledgments This project was completed thanks to teaching relief provided by Edinburgh University and by matching leave provided under the AHRC
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Research Leave Scheme (grant reference number: 130000R39525). Some of the material is drawn from Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2003). Thanks to the publishers for permission to use this material here. Thanks also to Don Ross, Jenann Ismael, and Harold Kincaid for invaluable feedback and advice. Notes 1. Ibn Sina Avicenna was a Persian philosopher-scientist who lived between AD 980 and 1037. The quote is from R. Martin’s unpublished translation of his De anima (Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus), vol. 7. 2. Stelarc is an Australian performance artist whose work explores the technological transformations of embodied experience. The quote is from the Stelarc Web site at www.stelarc.va.com.au. 3. Much of this work originated in the Andy Ruina Lab, Cornell, and with original contributions by Tad McGeer. 4. See Dennett (1991, ch. 13) and Damasio (1999, ch. 7). 5. For discussion of the impact of such differences on the arguments for the ‘extended mind’, see Adams and Aizawa (2001) and Clark (2005). 6. Dennett might seem to reject this claim, as when he writes that ‘‘we cannot draw the line separating our conscious mental states from our unconscious mental states’’ (1991, p. 447). But he does not deny that many key processes operate at what he himself initially dubbed the ‘subpersonal level’. And certainly, Dennett would not deny that much of what structures my behavior emanates from purely subpersonal processes. I think that Dennett’s real target is the idea that within the smaller class of potentially directly reportable goings-on, there is a neat line between those that are at this moment conscious and those that are not. See, for example, Dennett (1997). 7. The skill of successful self-management is thus pretty much the same skill as management in certain new business sectors. In each case what matters is knowing how to exercise rather indirect forms of intervention and control: what Kevin Kelly (1994, p. 330) nicely dubs ‘co-control’. Co-control is what you get when an ecological controller has opportunistically recruited a motley of resources to deal with a current need or problem. 8. I am thinking here of the empirical evidence (though see the preceding section) to suggest that our chosen actions are frequently the results of unconscious activity that precedes the experience of conscious will. See, for example, Libet (1985), and more recent demonstrations such as Wegner (2002). For an interesting review, see Haggard (2005).
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9. Indeed, Ismael notes that the contrast between self-governing and self-organizing systems is ‘not a dichotomy’ and that ‘most animate systems fall somewhere in the space between those with fixed and those with flexible response functions’ (2004). 10. One potentially important difference is that Ismael thinks that the relation of true dynamical coupling, in which ‘controller’ (ecological or otherwise) and ‘controlled’ are engaged in a continuous reciprocal exchange, introduces important complexities and undermines the attempt to couch the relation in quite those terms. The notion of an ecological controller, Ismael might object, implies a kind of divisibility that ongoing coupled influence (between self-model and whole embodied system) cannot underwrite. Thus she writes that in such cases ‘‘there is no simple way to decompose the system into dynamically separable units’’ (2004, p. 10). For my own part, I don’t yet see why this makes a significant difference. The roles of the parts seem distinct enough, even if their ongoing co-evolution resists decomposition. For example, one part of the system may have access to stored memories and a selfprofile while another, though constantly coupled to it, does not. 11. For something like this vision of multiple partial models as a mode of control, see Arbib (1993). References Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2001. The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14: 43–64. Ainslie, G. 2001. Breakdown of Will. New York: Cambridge University Press. Arbib, M. A. 1993. Book review: Allen Newell, Unified Theories of Cognition. Artificial Intelligence 59: 265–83. Christensen, W. 2004. Self-directedness, integration and higher cognition. In D. Spurrett, ed., special issue on distributed cognition and integrational linguistics. Language Sciences 26: 661–92. Clark, A. 1997. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge: MIT Press. Clark, A. 2002a. Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 9: 54–71. Clark, A. 2002b. That special something: Dennett on the making of minds and selves. In A. Brook and D. Ross, eds., Daniel Dennett, pp. 187–205. New York: Cambridge University Press. Clark, A. 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Clark, A. 2005. Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind. Analysis 65: 1–11. Clark, A. 2007. Re-inventing ourselves: The plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, forthcoming. Clark, A., and D. J. Chalmers. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58: 7–19. Clark, A., and R. Grush. 1999. Towards a cognitive robotics. Adaptive Behavior 7: 5–16. Collins, S., A. Ruina, R. Tedrake, and M. Wisse. 2005. Efficient bipedal robots based on Passive-Dynamic Walkers. Science 307: 1082. Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes’ Error. New York: Putnam. Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens. New York: Harcourt Brace. Dennett, D. 1974. Why the law of effect will not go away. Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 5: 166–87. Dennett, D. 1978. Where am I? In D. Dennett, ed., Brainstorms. Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press. Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Little Brown. Dennett, D. 1997. The path not taken. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds., The Nature of Consciousness, pp. 417–20. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dennett, D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. London: Penguin. Fodor, J. 1998. In Critical Condition. Cambridge: MIT Press. Gallagher, S. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haggard, P. 2005. Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 290–95. Ismael, J. 2004. Emergent order: The limits of self-organization. Unpublished manuscript. Ismael, J. 2006