4 Maccabees: Introduction And Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex Sinaiticus (Septuagint Commentary Series,)

INTRODUCTION

4 Maccabees

i

ii

INTRODUCTION

Septuagint Commentary Series Editors

Stanley E. Porter Richard S. Hess John Jarick

INTRODUCTION

iii

4 Maccabees Introduction and Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex Sinaiticus by

David A. deSilva

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2006

iv

INTRODUCTION This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

DeSilva, David Arthur. 4 Maccabees : introduction and commentary on the Greek text in Codex Sinaiticus / by David A. DeSilva. p. cm. — (Septuagint commentary series, ISSN 1572-3755) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-14776-4 (alk. paper) 1. Fourth Book of Maccabees — Commentaries. 2. Codex Sinaiticus (Biblical manuscript) I. Title: Four Maccabees. II. Fourth Book of Maccabees. English & Greek. III. Title. IV. Series. BS1825.53.D47 2006 229’.75077—dc22 2005058247

ISSN 1572-3755 ISBN 90 04 14776 4 © Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

INTRODUCTION

To my mother, Mrs. Dorothy Alberta deSilva, in honor of her seventieth birthday ὦ φύσις ἱερὰ καὶ φίλτρα γovέωv καὶ γεvήμασι φιλόστoργε καὶ τρoφεία καὶ μητέρωv ἀδάμαστα πάθη!

v

vi

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

COMMENTARY INTRODUCTION

vii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ................................................................................... Introduction .............................................................................................

ix xi

4 Maccabees Text and Translation ........................................................................... Commentary .........................................................................................

1 65

Bibliography ............................................................................................. Index of Modern Authors ....................................................................... Index of Ancient Citations ......................................................................

269 279 281

viii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

COMMENTARY INTRODUCTION

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This commentary marks the culmination of an unexpected and longstanding research interest in 4 Maccabees, a book that repulsed me on a first reading in college, but to which I returned fascinated during my doctoral studies and ever since, writing “The Noble Contest: Honor, Shame, and the Rhetorical Strategy of 4 Maccabees” ( Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 13 [1995] 31–57), 4 Maccabees (Guides to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: SAP, 1998), a brief commentary in J. D. G. Dunn and J. W. Rogerson (eds.), Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), and even exploring the spiritual formation potential of this text for Richard Foster (ed.), The Renovaré Spiritual Formation Study Bible (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005). While these earlier works gave me an important foundation (and many insights that have found their final home in the present work), I have appreciated the ways in which the peculiar rigors of the genre of commentary have pushed me to work through 4 Maccabees in all its particulars, rather than returning again and again only to those highlights that emerge from more topical and limited investigations. I therefore wish to thank Dr. Stanley Porter for the opportunity to pursue this research and produce this commentary. I also want to express my gratitude to the President, Dr. Frederick J. Finks, and to the Trustees of Ashland Theological Seminary for a study leave in the Spring of 2003, during which time I began work on this project. Special thanks are also due to my graduate assistant, Mr. Marcus Adams, for compiling the indices of modern authors and ancient citations, and for double-checking my reconstruction of Sinaiticus against the facsimile in our library and the textual notes in Rahlfs, his second pair of eyes saving this work from numerous scribal errors; to Mr. Matthew Montinini for his help tracking down several recent articles and other resources pertinent to 4 Maccabees; to the library staff of Ashland Theological Seminary for their diligence in procuring many books through interlibrary loans; and to the library staff of Princeton Theological Seminary for supplying me with a photocopy of the Alexandrinus text of 4 Maccabees. Though I decided in favor of Sinaiticus as the base text for this commentary, having this available for comparison was still much

x

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

appreciated. Finally, I thank my wife, Donna Jean, and my sons, Adrian, Austin, and Alexander, for their support throughout this project – and for their ability to restore balance, levity, and joie de vivre during the more morbid and disturbing seasons of this work.

INTRODUCTION

xi

INTRODUCTION

Fourth Maccabees anticipates by several centuries Augustine’s advice to Christian leaders to plunder the gold of Pharaoh for the enrichment of the people of God. The author has immersed himself in the elements of Greco-Roman philosophical ethics and rhetorical composition with a view to promoting commitment to the Jewish way of life. He addresses fellow Jews living in the Diaspora, faced with the challenges of preserving their self-respect in an often critical Gentile world and securing their future in a society that often rewarded those who compromised their connection with their ancestral heritage, assuring them that they already possess in the Torah the most reliable resource for ethical perfection, self-respect, and a security that extends into eternity. Far from encouraging ghettoization, the author puts his heritage in conversation with the voices of the dominant culture, demonstrating that the Jewish way of life is capable not only of holding its own against Gentile criticism, but of besting Greco-Roman philosophers in their own quest to embody their own ideals of virtue and self-mastery. Texts, Authorship, and Title The principal textual witnesses to 4 Maccabees are Codex Sinaiticus (fourth century) and Codex Alexandrinus (fifth century). Codex Vaticanus contains none of the books of the Maccabees, but its lack is partially supplied by Codex Venetus (ninth century), which contains the first and last thirds of the text, and by an early Syriac translation that carries significant weight in textual criticism of 4 Maccabees. The critical text in the Göttingen edition, in preparation by Robert Hanhart, will be based on over seventy individual manuscripts (see Klauck 1989a:678–680 for a preliminary grouping of these families), including several manuscripts among late Medieval collections of Josephus’s works. Apart from the last group of manuscripts, there is no attempt to ascribe the anonymous book to a known individual. Eusebius (History 3.10.6) and Jerome (De viris illustribus 13; Dialogus adversus Pelagianos 2.6) are the first to attribute the book to Josephus, an attribution that persists in the grouping of 4 Maccabees with other works by Josephus in the later

xii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

manuscript tradition. Since this is the only hint of authorship in the history of the book’s transmission, it has received ample scrutiny in the history of research with almost universally negative verdicts. Important evidence against Josephan authorship includes the historical errors in 4 Maccabees (e.g., the relationship of Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV, which Josephus correctly names as fraternal, not filial), the use of indeclinable Hebrew names (whereas Josephus tends to use declinable forms), and the reconstruction of the events leading up to the Hellenization Crisis (irreconcilable with Josephus’s own; Townshend 1913:656– 657; Anderson 1985:533). The style of 4 Maccabees is also considerably more florid than Josephus’s style, and stylometric analysis has affirmed that “the odds against” Josephan authorship of 4 Maccabees “are extraordinarily high” (D. S. Williams 1992:149; see also D. S. Williams 1987). The author’s stance toward accommodation also differs significantly from Josephus’s own, including the testimony of his own life (Townshend 1913:657). Josephus praised the memory of Joseph ben Tobias for the progressive (and not always Torah-observant) vision that allowed him to bring “the Jewish people from poverty and a state of weakness to more splendid opportunities of life” (A.J. 12.4.10 §224). The Tobiad family, in fact, would later support Menelaus and the radical Hellenization of Jerusalem, a state that the author of 4 Maccabees abhorred. Even if linguistic, stylistic, and historical evidence did not already militate against Josephan authorship, it would still be difficult to imagine Josephus praising those who would not compromise on the smaller points of Torah and who, in fact, rejected the advantages of assimilation for the sake of scrupulous loyalty to the ancestral way of life (i.e., a most conservative, and not at all progressive, stance). Scholars have therefore had to be content with only a “profile,” rather than a name, for the author. Among the other authors whose works are contained in the major Septuagint codices, this author distinguishes himself in Greek compositional skills and cultural fluency. His work is free from Semitisms (Stowers 2000:845), except perhaps for the occurrence of “giving glory” in 1:12 (Townshend 1913:667), rich in neologisms, and syntactically sophisticated (seen, for example, in complex subordination and in the extensive use of the optative mood; Breitenstein 1978:177–78), suggesting that Greek was the author’s native language and that he paid careful attention to literary style (see further Dupont-Sommer 1939:57– 66). He also displays a more than passing acquaintance with the Greek art of rhetoric, probably having received formal training (Klauck 1989a: 665; van Henten 1986:146, though, given the author’s uncompromising

INTRODUCTION

xiii

devotion to Torah, it is more likely that he would have received this in a Jewish setting rather than by participating as a youth in the Greek ephebate of his city). He shows an awareness of basic patterns of argumentation learned in progymnastic education (e.g., the elementary exercise in rhetoric composed by Theon of Alexandria), adroitness in rhetorical techniques (such as apostrophe and prosopoeia), facility in the topics and progressions appropriate to different genres of epideictic rhetoric, and a sensitivity to the complexity of his own composition from a rhetorical point of view, explaining in his exordium the relationship between the philosophical demonstration, the historical example, and the encomiastic reflections that he will bring together in his oration. His cultural literacy is evident in the ways in which he brings elements of the classical epitaphios logos into his own commemoration of the Jewish martyrs and in the way he weaves standard topics of Greco-Roman philosophical ethics throughout his oration, even presenting the whole as a contribution to a well-known philosophical topic, reason’s ability to master the passions (1:1). In this regard, earlier prejudicial evaluations of the author as a philosophical dilettante (Schürer 1986:590) have given way to a greater appreciation of the author as an eclectic philosopher in his own right (Renehan 1972), far surpassing the achievement of the author of the Wisdom of Solomon. In all these ways, the author shows himself to be quite “Hellenized.” He uses his literary ability and his knowledge of Greek rhetoric and ethical philosophy, however, to promote continued adherence to the distinctive way of life practiced by the Jews for centuries before the rise of Hellenism. Although well-acquainted with many topics of Greco-Roman philosophy (though probably a result not of formal education or attachment to a school, but of acute listening to, and combing from, the common cultural heritage of people raised in a Greek city; Klauck 1989a:666), the author’s philosophy is the way of life and the values taught by the Torah, and his point of reference is always the Jewish Scriptures. The title of the work, Μακκαβαίωv δ΄, reflects the grouping of this text with the other books of the “Maccabees,” a grouping that is somewhat inappropriate insofar as this text never mentions the family of Judas Maccabaeus or their exploits, giving the martyrs full credit for defeating Antiochus IV and driving him from Judaea (1:11; 18:4–5; Klauck 1989a:648). However, because the principal examples derive from the same period as the Hasmonean revolution (a factor already noted by Eusebius Hist. 3.10.6), and because 2 Maccabees, upon which 4 Maccabees so clearly depends, also included the stories of the martyrs who died under the

xiv

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

Hellenizers’ persecution, it was natural to associate 4 Maccabees by title and by placement with the other books bearing the name “Maccabees” in the major Septuagint manuscripts. In Sinaiticus, 4 Maccabees directly follows 1 Maccabees (2 and 3 Maccabees appear not to have been included at all); in Alexandrinus and Venetus it stands after the other three books of the “Maccabees.” The other title traditionally assigned to this work better suits its subject matter and emphasis. Although aware of the tendency to assign the name “Maccabees” to this book, Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 3.10.6) refers to it as Περὶ αὐτoκράτoρoς λoγισμoῦ, “on the absolute power of reason,” as does Jerome (De viris illustribus 13), thus capturing the major thesis of the text. Gregory Nazianzen follows this tradition when he refers to this book as “the book which philosophizes about reason being supreme over the passions” (Oration 15; PG 35.913; Dupont-Sommer 1939:2). While this title cannot be attributed to the original author, it is more in keeping with the practice in antiquity of referring to a work by its principal subject (e.g., Seneca, “On Anger,” Cicero, “On Old Age,” or Dio Chrysostom, “On Kingship”). Date Modern scholars agree that 4 Maccabees was composed sometime between the turn of the era and the early second century C.E. For a work that is attached to no known author, connected with no known location, tied to no particular occasion, and devoid of references to contemporary events, one might look in vain for greater specificity than that. The terminus a quo is pushed into the early Principate by a number of observations. First, the author’s use of 2 Maccabees (see “Literary Sources” below) necessitates a date after the composition of 2 Maccabees, which has recently been set as early as 124 B.C.E. (van Henten 1997:50–53, taking 2 Macc 1:1–9 as an authentic festal letter from that year and as an explanation for the impetus to provide a new “history” for the feast of Hanukkah), and as late as 63 B.C.E. (see discussion in deSilva 2002:268– 270). The need to explain that the high priesthood had formerly been held for life tenure (4 Macc 4:1) suggests composition during a period after which that was no longer the case (thus after 63 B.C.E.; Anderson 1985a:534) – and probably considerably later. The use of vocabulary that did not come into vogue until the early Roman period, like voμικός in 5:4 to replace γραμματεύς in 2 Macc 6:18 (Hadas 1953:169) and θρησκεία

INTRODUCTION

xv

(4 Macc 5:7, 13) as a common term for religion (Bickerman 1976a:277) pushes the work into the early part of the first century C.E. The terminus ad quem is established by the burgeoning of signs of influence upon Christian writings of the early second century (notably the letters of Ignatius and the Martyrdom of Polycarp; Klauck 1989a:669). Various lines of argumentation have been proposed as a means of locating the book more precisely within this time frame. Attempts to determine whether or not the Jerusalem Temple is still standing from the opaque references to the Temple in 4 Maccabees (e.g., 4:19) prove inconclusive (contrast the arguments advanced by Bickermann [1976:278], who argues that the Temple is still understood to be functioning, with those advanced by Breitenstein [1978:171–174]). The quantitatively fewer incidences of references to the Temple in 4 Maccabees compared to 2 Maccabees is a function of the interests of Diaspora Jews, not the Temple’s destruction (Collins 1983:187; pace van Henten 1997:77). The attempt to link the composition of 4 Maccabees with one or another outbreak of anti-Jewish persecution, whether the pogroms in Alexandria during Caligula’s reign or the anti-Jewish actions following upon the Diaspora Revolts of 115–117, is similarly unconvincing. While antiJudaism would indeed erupt in all-out persecution from time to time, there is no need to suppose that 4 Maccabees addresses such an incident (Townshend 1913:680; O’Hagan 1974:100–101; van Henten 1995: 317). The oration promotes a way of life as a general policy, not a particular and situation-specific response to alarming recent events. The author holds up the martyrs’ uncompromising commitment to Torah-observance for emulation, not their violent end. Much more promising was Bickermann’s observation that the author of 4 Maccabees changed his source’s designation of the Seleucid-appointed governor Apollonius’s jurisdiction from “Coelesyria and Phoenicia” (2 Macc 3:5) to “Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia” (4 Macc 4:2). These three regions were yoked under a single administrator from 19 to 72 C.E. (Bickermann’s original range of 19–54 C.E. needing to be corrected in light of evidence from Suetonius Vesp. 8.4, presented in van Henten 1986:140–142; 1997:74). Based on comparison with Josephus, who is also known to read contemporary technical terms and administrative arrangements back into the history he recounts, Bickermann concluded that this somewhat slender thread of evidence provided the surest cable for anchoring the date of the book (1976a:278). The style and the philosophical eclecticism of the book, which resemble the “Second Sophistic” that flourished in the late-first and early-second

xvi

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

century (evidenced in the writings of Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, and Plutarch), moved Dupont-Sommer (1939:75–86) to favor a date within that range for 4 Maccabees. Renehan (1972:227), however, demonstrated that such eclecticism was already evidenced during the reign of Nero and that the whole first century was marked by philosophical eclecticism. More recently, Breitenstein (1978:13–29, 177–178) conducted extensive analyses of the vocabulary of 4 Maccabees, determining that 4.67% of the words used therein are not attested elsewhere until the turn of the era, 2.9% are unattested before the turn of the second century C.E., and 1.64% are simply hapax legomena. These data led him to posit a late first-century or early second-century date. Most of the words shared only with second-century authors, however, are compound words or new grammatical forms of existing words. That is to say, they are exactly the kind of neologisms one would expect an inventive author to create (and the incidence of absolute hapaxes establishes this author’s inventiveness beyond doubt) rather than have to learn from other second-century writers. The value of this statistical evidence for the question of date, therefore, remains uncertain. Van Henten offers several further considerations in favor of a later date. First, he finds the author to “spiritualize” the notion of the “land of the Jews” and “Jewish political institutions,” which he believes would correlate well with a post-70 date (1997:77). It is difficult, however, to see how the author of 4 Maccabees engages in this kind of spiritualization when he speaks so fervently about the “native land,” referring quite particularly to Judea (as in the celebration of its purification by the martyrs in 1:11; 17:21; or the reference to Judea as “our native land” in 4:5 and 4:20, quite strikingly for an expatriate). Indeed, van Henten’s own apt observations about the political interests of the author are difficult to square with this assessment of a “spiritualizing” tendency that replaces a political interest that would be quite at home both before and after the First Jewish War. Second, he points to the affinities of the book with the apostolic fathers (1997:77), an observation equally susceptible to providing evidence of an earlier date (i.e., through arguing influence upon the later Christian authors of the early second century). Third, he asserts that the New Testament authors do not allude to the book, although they allude to 2 Macc 6:18–7:42 (1997:77), a point of some debate since verbal parallels are more common between New Testament texts (especially Hebrews and the Pastoral Epistles) and 4 Maccabees than 2 Maccabees. In the final analysis, the reflection of the potentially contemporary political arrangements in 4:2 may provide the least assailable case. The

INTRODUCTION

xvii

latter part of the proposed range of 19–72 C.E. could be favored, in order to honor the observations of Dupont-Sommer, Breitenstein, and van Henten as much as possible within the confines of the evidence. This would still allow for sufficient time for 4 Maccabees to inculcate an ideology of martyrdom that could feed the early-second century Christian texts reflecting the language and thought of 4 Maccabees, though it would make the numerous points of contact with the New Testament (which I consider to be far more impressive than van Henten would allow; contrast van Henten 1997:77 with deSilva 1998:143–49) more difficult to account for than a theory of more direct influence. Provenance and Audience Earlier scholarship tended to link 4 Maccabees with Alexandrian Judaism (Grimm 1857:293; Freudenthal 1869:107–112; Townshend 1913:654; Pfeiffer 1949:215). This is due not to any particular data within the text itself, but to the fact that more is known about the Alexandrian Jewish community than any other Jewish community in the Western Diaspora, and to the fact that Alexandrian Jews had a particular penchant for interpreting their tradition in dialogue with Greco-Roman philosophy. Thus 4 Maccabees could be seen to take its place alongside Philo, Letter of Aristeas, and Wisdom of Solomon, each of which is (appropriately) linked with Alexandria. This “solution,” though easy, is not without problems. The author of 4 Maccabees does not share in the allegorical exegesis of Torah that is so evident in Philo and Letter of Aristeas. The prohibition against eating pork does not convey any hidden meanings; it merely exercises the individual in self-control (1:31–35). “Clean” animals do not teach moral lessons in their split hooves and ruminant bellies, but are merely more “suitable” for human consumption (5:25–26). Moreover, Alexandria was not the only center for Jewish literary composition and philosophical inquiry. Any major city in the Western Mediterranean would have provided ample opportunity for a Jewish orator to learn enough about GrecoRoman ethical debates and argumentative techniques to have produced 4 Maccabees – including Jerusalem itself (the enduring legacy of Hengel 1974; 1980). 4 Maccabees 4:20 has been brought forward as evidence that the author could not be writing in Palestine, since the gymnasium was not instituted on the acropolis, but below it (2 Macc 4:12). Would a resident of Jerusalem or its environs make such a geographical slip? Perhaps, if

xviii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

this alteration were to be construed as a rhetorical embellishment, a heightening of the offense of the institution of the gymnasium by elevating its location to the apex of the city. Jerusalem, or some other Hellenized city in Palestine, would be as good a guess as Alexandria, but both would remain mere guesses. Stronger evidence points north and west of Palestine to the area between Syria and Asia Minor as a more probable region of origin. Syrian Antioch, which also hosted a large Jewish community, has been the favorite choice of more recent scholarship (Dupont-Sommer 1939:67–75; Hadas 1953:109–113; Klauck 1989a:666–667). Principal evidence for this proposal centers on local interest in the Jewish martyrs celebrated in 4 Maccabees. Christians revered these martyrs as saints and erected a shrine over the alleged site of their relics in Antioch (Dupont-Sommer 1939:67–68). Schatkin suggested that a Jewish synagogue had been erected on the site centuries before, shortly after the destruction of the Temple (1974:103). Dupont-Sommer (1939:67–68) stressed the importance of the “grave side” language of 17:8–10, which for him provided the strongest link both to Antioch (the best known site of the relics) and to an occasion (a commemorative speech on the anniversary of the martyrdoms; see below). The clear influence of the work on Ignatius of Antioch would support its availability, if not its origin, in Antioch within a few decades (or possibly just years) after its composition. Again, however, this line of argumentation may be a case of building too much upon too little. Once the proposed epitaph of 17:8–10 is seen as a literary device, the oration could function equally well on other kinds of “occasion” (1:10; 3:19) in other cities. Indeed, van Henten (1997:79) rightly notes that the author may well come from a smaller and less obvious city, just as many well-known philosophers came from and taught in the smaller cities of Palestine rather than typical centers of learning like Athens (Hengel 1974:83–88). High-minded authors could certainly thrive in modest centers. Internal evidence, meagre as it is, would confirm a provenance somewhere between Asia Minor and Syrian Antioch. The style of the work shares much in common with the “Asianic” style linked with those regions (Norden 1923:1.416–420; Breitenstein 1978:179). Even more helpfully, van Henten (1994; 1997:80–81) has observed that the burial formula of 4 Macc 17:9–10 (ἐvταῦθα . . . ἐvκεκήδευvται) corresponds more closely with Jewish funerary inscriptions in Phrygia, Lycaonia, Lycia, Ionia, and Galatia than those in other regions. The introduction of “Cilicia” into the description

INTRODUCTION

xix

of Apollonius’s jurisdiction (4:2; cf. 2 Macc 3:5) might also reflect the local awareness of the author (van Henten 1994:68). The author explicitly addresses himself to fellow Jews, naming the hearers as “Israelites” and “children descended from the seed of Abraham” in his final exhortation (18:1), directing them to the observance of their ancestral Law. The author describes himself and his hearers as people whose “loyalty to the Torah” is confirmed by the examples of the martyrs (7:9). If he anticipates any non-Jewish readership (as Anderson 1985b:179 asserts), it is strange that he has nothing to say to them directly. If the author was a good judge of his audience, we can surmise that they were sufficiently well versed in their Scriptures to fill in the content and discern the relevance of rather oblique references to particular laws and examples. They were themselves quite Hellenized, able to follow rather literary Greek, interested in popular philosophical debates and their relationship to the Jewish tradition, and looking for ways in which to affirm their heritage in conversation with the Greek cultural milieu rather than in isolation from (and rejection of ) it. These Jews would have experienced certain tensions within their environment (see further deSilva 1998:33–37). On the one hand, there would be the drive to maintain their connection with their heritage and distinctive way of life, to continue to live by the deep-rooted values of their native culture. On the other hand, there would be a drive to be recognized as respectable members of a larger world and to enjoy the advantages that would come from such recognition and enfranchisement, thus to make room for values learned from their non-native environment (so also Tcherikover 1961:346; Heininger 1989:55). Attaining both objectives simultaneously was impeded by the popular dominantcultural assessment of Judeans as a barbaric, ethnocentric and misoxenic race unconcerned with the common good, bound to inexplicable and often ridiculous laws, and incapable of piety worthy of the gods (see the comments by Apion, Eratosthenes and Apollonius Molon recorded in Josephus, Ap. 2.121, 258; Tacitus, Hist. 5.5; Diodorus of Sicily, Bib. Hist. 34.1– 4; 40.3.4; Juvenal, Sat. 14.100–104; Plutarch, Superst. 8 [Mor. 169C]; 3 Macc 3:3–7; LXX Esther 13:4–5). Though philosophers could hold up Jews as exemplars of virtue (see Feldman and Reinhold 1996:105–122), this appears to have been a minority report among Gentile authors (see Feldman and Reinhold 1996:350–395). Anderson (1985b:174) rightly notes that anti-Judaism in the ancient world was not a racial issue, since apostate Jews were not despised but

xx

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

often rose to positions of great honor and power. This is an important observation, since one can never escape racial prejudice by assimilating to the racist group, but one can escape the contempt that attaches to beliefs, behaviors, and customs by assimilation. Indeed, this was the solution chosen by Jews such as Dositheus in 3 Macc 1:3 or Tiberius Julius Alexander, Philo’s nephew, both of which rose to positions of prominence after shedding their ancestral baggage. Apostate Jews appear to have, in turn, joined in the critique of the Jewish Law as an inferior, local, unenlightened legal code, distancing themselves even further ideologically from the way of life they rejected (Philo, Mos. 1.31; Conf. 2; Hengel 1974:301). Another solution would have been to reject Gentile culture as inherently depraved and to seek survival through intellectual and social ghettoization. The author of 4 Maccabees addresses Jews for whom neither solution would have been acceptable. Rather, these were Jews who had a high level of appreciation for the conversation and culture of the Greco-Roman world, who were drawn to what their Gentile neighbors prized, and who sought to carve out a place in the conversation while still maintaining their distinctive voice and identity. If their Gentile neighbors continued to withhold acknowledgment of that voice, at least they would need internal assurance that their position was viable both from within a Jewish point of view and from an unprejudiced Greco-Roman point of view, if such could be found. Such would be the implied audience of 4 Maccabees, the “ideal” recipients of his defense and promotion of the Jewish way of life in all its peculiarities and particularities as a “philosophy” that achieves and even outstrips the ethical goals and ideals articulated within Greco-Roman philosophical discourse, that produces heroes as fully committed to virtue and as fully effective as any heroes lauded in Greek encomia. If the author has Gentiles in view at all as the recipients of his message, they will hear only insofar as the Jewish audience takes to heart and transmits by word and deed the lessons the author perceives Gentiles to be in need of learning: that true piety consists in rendering to the One God his due; that true humanitarianism includes respect for, and toleration of, the Jewish way of life (rather than its marginalization as part of Greek cultural imperialism); and that the values held dear in minority cultures are every bit as valid and worth sacrificial self-investment as the values prized by the dominant culture, and may, in the end, represent highly consonant goals.

INTRODUCTION

xxi

Genre and Occasion Many different generic labels have been proposed for 4 Maccabees: development of a thesis (Stowers 2000:844–45; see Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.5.8), diatribe (Norden 1923:1.303–304 on 1:1–3:18; Deissmann 1900:151), encomium (Norden 1923:1.416–20 on 3:19–18:24; DupontSommer 1939:20–25; Hadas 1953:101–102), epitaphios logos (Lebram 1974: 96), sermon (Freudenthal 1869:105; Thyen 1955:13), or some combination (van Henten 1997:63–67). Common to all these proposals is an awareness that 4 Maccabees represents some species of epideictic rhetoric, something that the author himself clearly indicates as he employs both the language of demonstration (ἐπιδείκvυσθαι, 1:1; τὴv ἀπόδειξιv, 3:19; ἀπέδειξα, 16:4) and encomium (ἔπαιvov, 1:2; ἐπαιvεῖv, 1:10) when referring to his work. If epideictic compositions, which cover a wide variety of subgenres, have a unifying feature, it would be seen in their purpose: to evoke assent to a proposition and/or commitment to certain values or behaviors. The author has, in fact, combined elements of several forms in 4 Maccabees, and the debates among scholars concerning the work’s genre tend to result from highlighting one of these component forms at the expense of the others. On the one hand, the author presents his speech as a philosophical discourse (1:1–2). He keeps this genre in view throughout the opening section (1:1–3:18) by returning repeatedly to the philosophical proposition (“pious reason exercises self-mastery over the passions,” 1:1) and its more specific corollaries (reason masters the passions that hinder self-control, or justice, etc.). Nor does this aspect of the work fade in the “narrative demonstration” itself. The author not only returns to the thesis at each juncture in the narrative (6:31–35; 7:16–23; 13:1–5; 16:1–4) and at the climactic exhortation (18:1–2), but explores the relevance of each specific example for his thesis (as when the author examines the way pious reason is seen to master the emotions of fraternal affection in 13:19–14:1 or love for offspring in 14:13–20; 15:4–10) and the particular “deliberations” in which pious reason engaged in order to commit to the virtuous course of action against the drive of the passions (13:8–18; 15:2–3, 8, 25–28; 16:16– 25). In this vein, the author’s goal is to secure his audience’s assent to the truth of his proposition and commitment to live in line with that ethical principle. On the other hand, the author explicitly leads the audience to expect an encomium, the praise both of a virtue (rational judgment, 1:2) and of particular people (the martyrs, 1:10). These expectations are more than

xxii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

fulfilled as the author launches into a panegyric on Eleazar in 7:1–15, the seven brothers in 14:2–10, the mother in 15:16–17, 29–32; 17:2–6, and the martyrs as a group in 17:7–24. The laudatory evaluation of the martyrs’ deliberations, choices, and endurance running throughout the narrative, moreover, lends encomiastic hues to the whole. The exhortation in 18:1 is as fitting a culmination for these encomiastic elements as for the diatribal elements, since encomia frequently concluded with a call to embrace the commitments and virtues celebrated therein (see Thucydides, Hist. 2.43– 44; Dio, Or. 29.21). Lebram, Redditt, van Henten, and Avemarie have all further refined our understanding of the encomiastic aspects of 4 Maccabees by drawing comparisons with the epitaphios logos, the Athenian funeral oration (examples of which are to be found in Thucydides, Hist. 2.34–46; Lysias, Or. 2; Demosthenes, Or. 60; Hyperides, Or. 6; satirized in Plato, Menexenus). These commemorative addresses tell the story of the praiseworthy life and death of the subjects, lay out the values that the subjects showed themselves to hold dear by their deaths, and encourage the hearers to follow their example (Lebram 1974:96). They often highlight the topic of liberating the homeland from the threat of tyranny (van Henten and Avemarie 2002:18, citing Hyperides, Or. 6.38–40; Lysias, Or. 2.21, 41, 57, 59; Plato, Men. 239d–240a), enjoin the audience to cherish their own laws rather than submit to the laws of any other group, and contrast the temporary nature of life with the eternal praise that accrues to the virtuous (Redditt 1983:263). Each of these features is apparent in 4 Maccabees as well. The suggestion that seems to be least helpful is that 4 Maccabees represents a synagogue sermon (Freudenthal 1869:105; Thyen 1955:13), mainly because we know too little about that form for it to be an illuminating generic label and for 4 Maccabees to be assigned to that genre with any degree of certainty. A homily might be presumed to take a Scriptural passage as its starting point and basis (van Henten 1997:61 and literature cited therein), as in Jesus’ (admittedly brief ) teaching in the synagogue of Nazareth (Lk 4:16–30), but it is not clear how this would be true of Paul’s “word of exhortation” in the synagogue of Antioch, even though it also followed a reading from the Jewish Scriptures (Acts 13:16– 41). 4 Maccabees does not give the impression of being an exposition of the assigned text for any particular Sabbath, nor does it appear to present the exposition of any particular Scripture, ranging far and wide over the canon without any sense that certain texts are being introduced in the

INTRODUCTION

xxiii

service of drawing out the relevance of a primary reading (unless 2 Macc 6:18–7:42 comprised the text, but there is no evidence that it functioned as Scripture in any non-Christian Jewish group; vs. Thyen 1955:13). Any assessment of the genre of 4 Maccabees, then, must give appropriate weight both to its demonstrative and encomiastic elements. The kind of literature that 4 Maccabees most resembles in this regard is protreptic literature, for which Epictetus’s discourse on the true Cynic (Diss. 3.22) and Seneca’s treatise “On the Constancy of the Wise Person” (De constantia sapientis) provide choice examples. The latter work is especially instructive, discussing the philosophical proposition that “the wise person cannot receive insult or injury,” introducing well-developed examples of the philosophy at work in the persons of Stilbo of Megara and Cato the Younger, and speaking encomiastically about the achievements of these “perfect men” who render the Stoic philosophy credible by their example. Mutatis mutandis, 4 Maccabees offers a logos protreptikos promoting continued observance of the Jewish philosophy, using the martyrs as examples of the heights of virtue attainable by this philosophy, praising their accomplishments in order to focus the hearers’ ambitions on honors of this kind rather than the honors associated with advancement in the dominant culture. The book gives every impression of having been composed for, and delivered upon, a specific occasion (Dupont-Sommer 1939:67–73; Gilbert 1984a:316–19; Klauck 1989a:688). At two points, the author refers to the demands or appropriateness of the moment in which he speaks (κατὰ τoῦτov τòv καιρόv, 1:10; ὁ καιρòς ἡμᾶς καλεῖ, 3:19). While the second could possibly refer to the “appropriate moment” for effecting a transition in his speech from opening philosophical argument to narrative demonstration, the first more pointedly indicates the day as an appropriate “occasion” for the subject matter the author treats. Later in the work, the author refers to the likely effects of the subject matter on his audience (14:9), who “even now shudder” at the descriptions of the torments. This connotes a greater level of immediacy than the more standard call for attention in 1:1, the commands to the audience in 14:11, 13; 16:5, and even the direct address and exhortation in 18:1. None of this proves that 4 Maccabees was actually delivered before a live audience on such an occasion, since other texts known to be purely literary inventions (including several extant epitaphioi logoi) also incorporate such details (Lausberg 1973:158; van Henten 1997:66; Stowers 2000:845), but it does suggest that the author intended for his text to be heard in the context of

xxiv

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

some appropriate, external event, allowing these signals to remain for future audiences beyond any original auditors (so, in effect, Deissmann 1900:151). Some scholars have identified “the present occasion” (1:10) as the anniversary of the martyrdoms it describes (Dupont-Sommer 1939:67–73; Hadas 1953:103–105; Amir 1971:662), perhaps even being delivered at the traditional site of their graves in keeping with the tradition of disciples gathering around the grave of their teacher on the anniversary of his death (b. Yeb 122a; Hadas 1953:106–107; so also Amir 1971:662). Fourth Maccabees shares with orations commemorating the fallen the combination of praise for the dead and exhortations to the living to embrace the same values and commitments that brought honor and praiseworthy remembrance to the dead, but framing such a commemorative address as a philosophical discourse (1:1–6) is otherwise unexampled. Aside from the ongoing debate concerning the historicity of the martyrdoms recounted in 4 Maccabees (in favor: Young 1991:68; Dupont-Sommer 1939:20–25; Hadas 1953:128; against: Collins 1981:310), the lack of any evidence for a Jewish commemoration of these martyrs (unlike the tradition of the annual fast in memory of Gedaliah; Hadas 1953:106–107) presents a serious obstacle to this hypothesis, which remains suspect of reading known Christian observances back into the Jewish community of Antioch. Hanukkah, which celebrates the liberation of Jerusalem and the purification of the Temple by Judas Maccabaeus and his party, would have provided a suitable occasion for this address (so Townshend 1913: 667; Thyen 1955:13–14), in which liberation and purification are also prominently celebrated (1:11; 17:20–21; 18:4–5). The contribution of these martyrs as a prerequisite to and cause of the military victories was already underscored in 2 Maccabees, the version of the Maccabean history used to promote the observance of Hanukkah in the Diaspora, for it was their steadfast obedience that turned God’s wrath to mercy (compare 2 Macc 7:37–38 and 8:1–5). Taking their contest as the main subject matter for an address on Hanukkah would therefore be entirely appropriate. Moreover, since the Hellenizing revolution and the Maccabean revolt were largely concerned with (or, at least, were largely remembered to have been concerned with) the question of whether Jews would preserve their ancestral way of life or conform completely to the Greek way of life, an oration that promoted continued commitment to the former would also be quite suitable to the day. This proposal frequently meets with the objection that a speech composed for Hanukkah could not fail to mention Judas and his brothers,

INTRODUCTION

xxv

“the heroes of the Maccabean war whom that feast celebrates” (Anderson 1985a:536; so also Hadas 1953:104). Townshend (1913:667) attempts to resolve this by arguing that 1:11 and 18:4 allude to the military exploits of the period, though his case is forced in the extreme (see commentary ad loc.). Aside from the fact that there would be ample opportunity to give the Hasmoneans their due in the course of an eight-day festival were community leaders so inclined, there are several reasons to regard the absence of mention of them here appropriate, even during Hanukkah. First, sectors even within the more traditional strains of Judaism were disaffected with the Hasmonean house from the moment Jonathan assumed the role of high priest. The policies of Alexander Jannaeus and the rapid decline of the house after Salome Alexandra due to internecine strife made the fall of the house as ignominious as its rise was glorious. For a Diaspora Jew, like our author, whose bonds were to the Law, the land, and the ancestral way of life – and not to the memory of a particular political house long since removed from power – to focus on other, more edifying and relevant facets of the story of Hanukkah is entirely intelligible, and may even build on a long tradition of such avoidance and refocusing the festival. Second, the Maccabean revolutionaries hardly provide appropriate models to emulate. When they were emulated, the results were always disastrous for the Jewish people (as a string of failed revolutionaries leading up to the First Revolt proved). The martyrs, however, model an uncompromising commitment to the Jewish way of life that would be most appropriate for the kinds of challenges Diaspora Jews faced day after day. Other festivals associated with the giving of the Torah (such as Pentecost or Simchat hattorah), however, would also be appropriate, all the more as the principal thrust of the work is to promote appreciation for the value of the way of life regulated by Torah and commitment to continue to walk in that way. The martyrs may emerge as the chief examples not because their deaths provide the link to the occasion (e.g., Hanukkah, or, far less probably, an annual commemoration of their martyrdoms), but because they provide the best proof of the value of the Torah both because of the virtue that Torah inculcated in them, and because of the value they themselves placed on the way of life Torah prescribed (dying for its sake rather than abandoning it). This is, after all, the author’s primary reason for introducing them (1:7–8). The “praise” of the martyrs that is suited to these occasions would have less to do with their “dying” per se and more to do with the “nobility and goodness,” the fruits of Torah, for the sake of which they chose death (1:10).

xxvi

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

Rhetorical Strategy, Coherence, and Structure The fundamental purpose of 4 Maccabees is to stimulate commitment to the Jewish way of life, especially the covenant stipulations of Torah (18:1– 2), in the midst of an environment where there are many incentives to compromise that commitment or even leave it behind completely. Every facet of the work can be seen to serve this overarching goal (see, further, deSilva 1998:43–49). The philosophical discourse demonstrates that the Jewish way of life already affords its adherents the surest path to fulfill the highest ideals prized even among Greco-Roman ethical philosophers. As they remain committed to that way of life, then, they can be assured of their virtue and maintain their self-respect, even in the face of Gentile calumny. The encomiastic elements demonstrate the praiseworthy remembrance that accrues to people who demonstrate such commitment to the Torah as the martyrs, rousing emulation among the hearers, reinforcing for them the value of this kind of honor so that they will not be so quick to relinquish it for the sake of temporal honors. In the process, the hearers are reminded of the incomparably greater value of living so as to “stand in honor before God” (17:5) and the community of faith across time (5:37; 13:17) than of purchasing honor before the non-Jewish court of opinion at the cost of their covenant and heritage. The author’s creation of scenes of deliberation within the “narrative demonstration” – inventing “speech duels” between Antiochus and the martyrs (5:1–38; 8:3–14; 9:1–9), providing examples of reasoning that the martyrs might have entertained but rejected (8:16–26; 16:5–11), and opening windows into the considerations that drove the martyrs on to faithfulness (13:8–18; 16:16–23; 18:6–19) – allows him to address the kinds of considerations that would have weighed upon his audience, both in terms of enticements from representatives of the dominant culture and in terms of inducements from their own tradition to remain faithful to their heritage. The author strategically sets these deliberations and the courses of action they represent within an epideictic framework in which he can control the evaluation of the various positions, holding up some as noble and worthy of adoption (the martyrs), censuring others as cowardly (the hypothetical responses of the martyrs), seditious (e.g., Simon and Jason), or as stemming from a mind ignorant of God and of virtue (i.e., from Antiochus IV). Thus he can guide the identifications the audience will make and the lines of reasoning which they will entertain more favorably. Attention is given throughout the commentary to the more specific argumentative strategies deployed by the author, and to the ways

INTRODUCTION

xxvii

in which these could be expected to advance his program among his audience. The above assessment of the rhetorical strategy of 4 Maccabees provides the basis for understanding the relationship of the two parts of the oration (1:1–3:18 and 3:19–18:24). The deep, integral connections between these two parts eluded such notable scholars as Lebram (1974:82– 83), who regards the two parts of the oration to have been originally independent of one another (now joined poorly by means of the insertion of the philosophical thesis into an encomium at 6:31–35; 13:1–5; etc.), and Breitenstein (1978:91–130), who demonstrates the unity of style between both “parts” but contends nevertheless that the philosophy is not integrated into the martyr-stories or vice versa (1978:132–3; minor questions of literary unity will be discussed in the commentary on 1:3–6 and 18:1–19, the passages most consistently singled out as potential interpolations or dislocations). This is manifestly not the case. Not only do the lengthy passages reflecting on the martyrdom narratives examine the stories from the point of view of the philosophical thesis that reason mindful of God and trained by the daily practice of living in line with Torah is enabled to master any passion and stay the course that justice and piety demand (7:1–23; 13:1–16:4), but the stories themselves are interwoven with connections with the philosophical thesis and other elements of the exordium. 4 Macc 5:23–24, for example, recalls the argument that education in the law produces the four cardinal virtues (1:15–17) as well as the development of this argument through specific examples, both from legislation and narrative examples found in the Pentateuch (1:31– 2:20). 4 Macc 9:17; 11:20–21; 11:27; and 16:23 all express the fact that bodily pains are insufficient to subdue reason, especially as reason is abetted by “pious knowledge” (11:20–21; cf. 16:23, “knowledge of piety”). The martyrs’ contempt for bodily pains, moreover, is what specifically leads to the conclusion that pious reason masters not only inner drives and emotions (like lust or greed or anger), but also those passions that attack the mind from outside, most violently in the form of physical torture and death (18:2). This, in turn, renders intelligible the author’s interest in describing the gruesome tortures in detail, so that, by shuddering at the hearing of them (14:9), the audience may begin to fathom what is truly possible for them to withstand where piety and virtue are at stake, thus what the promise of the author’s “philosophy” is. The defeat of the tyrant by means of the martyrs’ self-mastery (8:15; 11:24–25), also announced in the exordium

xxviii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

(1:11), represents a practical, political fruit of pious reason’s equipping a person to be self-master over his or her passions. Finally, if “dying for the sake of virtue” (1:8) or “for the sake of nobility and goodness” (1:10), and thus for the sake of loyalty to God and God’s Law, is the ultimate expression of reason’s mastery of the passions (as 1:7–8 suggests), a host of texts in which the martyrs express their commitment to piety or God or virtue to the point of death must be seen to resonate with the philosophical thesis (6:22; 9:18, 24, 30; 10:10; 11:2, 12, 15, 20; 16:19, 24). In light of such connections, the contention that the discourse and narratives fail to work together to develop the philosophical thesis should be put to rest. 4 Macc 3:19–17:24 provides the “narrative demonstration” of the philosophical thesis, which is precisely the function of the martyr stories for which the author prepares the audience in his exordium (1:7–12; so also van Henten 1997:69; Stowers 2000:844–845). Topics introduced throughout 1:1–3:18 are developed at length within the second part of the speech. The encomiastic elements, which do indeed go far beyond the typical use of examples in purely philosophical expositions (Lebram 1974:82), nevertheless fulfill the expectations raised in 1:10, 12 and work alongside the argumentative elements to promote the way of life espoused by the martyrs, which is precisely the same way of life promoted in the more discursive sections. The oration may be outlined as follows: 1:1–12 Exordium 1:13–3:18 Development of the thesis 1:13–30a Definitions of terms and relationships 1:30b–3:18 Demonstration of the thesis from Scriptural “precedents” (both legal rulings and examples) 3:19–17:24 Narrative demonstration of the thesis 3:19 Transition 3:20–4:26 Interpretative narration of historical background 5:1–6:30 The example of Eleazar 5:1–4 Transition 5:5–13 Antiochus’s arguments for abandoning the Jewish philosophy 5:14–38 Eleazar’s arguments for persevering in the Jewish philosophy 6:1–30 Eleazar’s contest 6:31–7:23 Reflection on Eleazar’s example 6:31–35 Statement of Eleazar’s relevance to the thesis 7:1–15 Encomiastic reflection on Eleazar’s accomplishment 7:16–23 Confirmation of thesis

INTRODUCTION

xxix

8:1–12:19 The example of the seven brothers 8:1–2 Transition 8:3–14 Antiochus’s arguments for abandoning the Jewish philosophy 8:15–26 An alternative, “cowardly” response 8:27–9:9 The brothers’ arguments for persevering in the Jewish philosophy 9:10–25 The first brother’s contest 9:26–32 The second brother’s contest 10:1–11 The third brother’s contest 10:12–21 The fourth brother’s contest 11:1–12 The fifth brother’s contest 11:13–27 The sixth brother’s contest 12:1–19 The seventh brother’s contest 13:1–14:10 Reflection on the seven brothers’ example 13:1–5 Statement of the brothers’ relevance to the thesis 13:6–18 The mutual exhortations of the brothers 13:19–14:1 The potency of fraternal affection, and its mastery 14:2–10 Encomiastic reflection on the brothers 14:11–17:6 The example of the mother and reflection thereon 14:11–12 Transition 14:13–15:10 The potency of maternal love, and its mastery 15:11–28 The mother’s contest 15:29–32 Encomiastic apostrophe to the mother 16:1–4 The mother’s relevance to the thesis 16:5–11 An alternative, “fainthearted” response 16:12–25 The mother’s praiseworthy exhortation to her sons 17:2–6 Encomiastic apostrophe to the mother 17:7–18:24 Peroration 17:7–24; 18:3–5 Enumeratio of the martyrs’ accomplishments 18:1–2 Exhortation to Audience 18:6–19 Mother’s testimony to feminine virtue and additional exhortation 18:20–24 Conclusion Literary Sources The author draws heavily on the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures throughout his oration (see commentary, which gives particular attention to intertexture throughout). Narratives and legal materials

xxx

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

from the Pentateuch are interwoven into his opening discussion of how Torah-observance restrains the impulses of particular passions (the dietary regulations effect self-control, 1:31–35; the tenth commandment restrains lust and desire in general, 2:5–6; stipulations regarding lending and harvesting curb greed, 2:8–9) and what lessons concerning mastery of the passions the reader can derive from its positive and negative examples (Joseph exemplifies the mastery of lust, 2:1–4; Moses, the mastery of anger, 2:17; Jacob’s cursing the anger of Levi and Simeon becomes a further proof that people with knowledge of God should be able to master anger, 2:19–20). Examples of making decisions and choosing often unpleasant (or, at least, self-denying) courses of action for the sake of piety come from all parts of the Jewish canon: Abel and Joseph exemplify the persecution that befalls the righteous (18:11); Abraham and Isaac, Phinehas, Daniel, Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael all demonstrate the uncompromising faithfulness to God that piety requires (13:9, 12; 16:3, 20–21; 18:11–13); David exemplifies the power of pious reasoning to oppose intensely burning, but irrational, desires (3:6–18). Specific texts from Isaiah, Psalms, Proverbs, Ezekiel, and Deuteronomy are recited as a means of reinforcing the conviction that fidelity to God, though potentially costly in this life, leads to the experience of eternal reward beyond death (17:19; 18:14–19). The most pervasive source for 4 Maccabees, however, is 2 Maccabees (so Dupont-Sommer 1939:26–32; Hadas 1953:92–95; Klauck 1989a:654; Droge and Tabor 1992:74). A comparison of the movement of both books from the same starting point (the favorable conditions under Seleucus IV, 2 Macc 3:1–3; 4 Macc 3:20–21) through the attempt on the Temple treasury (2 Macc 3:4–40; 4 Macc 4:1–14), the Hellenizing revolution (2 Macc 4:7–17; 4 Macc 4:15–20), the consequent occupation of Jerusalem (2 Macc 5:1–26; 4 Macc 4:21–23), the initial proscription of Judaism (2 Macc 6:1–11; 4 Macc 4:24–26), and the detailed martyrdoms of Eleazar (2 Macc 6:18–31; 4 Macc 5:1–6:30) and the seven brothers with their mother (2 Macc 7:1–42; 4 Macc 8:1–17:1) leads almost inevitably to this conclusion. Freudenthal (1869:72–90), followed by Deissmann (1900:156), had attempted to argue that the authors of 2 and 4 Maccabees had worked independently of one another from the lost work of Jason of Cyrene, which the author of 2 Maccabees explicitly cites as his source (2 Macc 2:23). Freudenthal was led to this conclusion by a number of significant deviations in the story line of 4 Maccabees from the story of 2 Maccabees, such as the disappearance of the character Heliodorus in the narration of

INTRODUCTION

xxxi

the attempt to seize the private funds in the Temple treasury (compare 2 Macc 3:8–40 with 4 Macc 4:5–14). It seemed more reasonable to him to suppose that the two authors were working from a third source, one that was perhaps more confusing in its use of pronominal referents. However, the ways in which 4 Maccabees diverges from the story in 2 Maccabees can all be understood as falling in line with his particular purposes for telling the story – and, indeed, illumining those purposes (see commentary throughout). The author conflates characters and developments in order to state more concisely episodes that are of secondary importance to his oration (thus he can be seen to abridge 2 Macc 3:1–6:17), while amplifying and embellishing that part of the story that is most germane to his topic (thus he expands on 2 Macc 6:18–7:42). This is also a far safer approach than positing dependence on a source that no longer exists (thus rendering the hypothesis beyond confirmation or disconfirmation). If it should be objected that the author played fast and loose with 2 Maccabees, if that was his source, the author’s freedom in retelling the story of King David’s thirst (2 Sam 23:13–17; 1 Chron 11:15–19) – a biblical narrative – should provide sufficient evidence to suggest that the author’s treatment of 2 Maccabees is consistent with his modus operandi elsewhere. Influence 4 Maccabees appears to have exerted little influence within Judaism in the second century and beyond. The author of Lamentations Rabbah 1.16 (see van Henten and Avemarie 2002:145–151), which presents the story of the martyrdom of Miriam bat Tanhum and her seven sons under Hadrian, appears to have known the story of 4 Maccabees. The promises of the ancestors are held to bind the descendants (the martyrs), as if they had themselves sworn as well (Lamentations Rabbah 1.16 H, referring to Deut 26:17), as in 4 Macc 5:29. Hadrian also offers a ruse whereby the martyr could be seen to capitulate, but not do so in any strict sense (picking up a signet ring before an idol would be seen as bowing to the idol), a ruse which also meets with strenuous objection as in 2 and 4 Maccabees – here specifically with a rational found in 4 Macc 13:14–15: “Should I be afraid of you, who are flesh and blood, and not of the King of the kings of kings, the Holy one blessed be He, who is the God of the world?” (Lamentations Rabbah 1.16 I; van Henten and Avemarie, Martyrdom, 148). The mother compares herself to Abraham, much as the mother of the seven sons is praised as the “woman of the same soul as Abraham” in 4 Macc 14:20 (see also 15:28; 17:6), showing the growth of this tradition to

xxxii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

a contest of “one-upmanship” between the mother and the patriarch: “You built one altar and did not sacrifice your son, but I built seven altars and sacrificed my sons on them. And for that matter, yours was a trial, but mine was a fact” (Lamentations Rabbah 1.16 N; van Henten and Avemarie, Martyrdom, 150). The influence of 4 Maccabees upon the early church, by contrast, was substantial and long-lasting. Because of the possibility that 4 Maccabees was written later than many of the New Testament documents, it is difficult to speak decisively about “influence” on the early church in its earliest decades. However, 4 Maccabees certainly provides comparative material useful for the study of the early church’s reflection on the significance of the death of Jesus as a “ransom” for others (ἀvτίψυχov, 4 Macc 6:29; 17:21; compare Mark 10:45; see also the related terminology of ransom and redemption in Rom. 3:24; 1 Tim 2:6; Titus 2:14; 1 Pet 1:19), as an offering that propitiates the Deity alienated by human sinfulness (ἱλαστήριov, 4 Macc 17:22 and Rom 3:25; compare the images used in Eph 5:2; Heb 9:1–10:18), and as a source of purification from defilement (especially vis-a-vis the blood, 4 Macc 6:29; 17:22; Mt 26:28; Rom 3:25; Eph 1:7; Heb 9:12–14; 13:12; 1 Pet 1:2; 1 Jn 1:7; Rev 7:14). In both the case of the martyrs and Jesus, it is specifically their voluntary “obedience unto death” that makes the death salvific for others (4 Macc 6:27–28; Phil 2:5– 11; Rom 5:19). Although the text of 4 Maccabees may not have exercised any direct influence on the church in this regard, it provides a witness to parallel developments of the significance of the obedient death of the righteous for the restoration of the relationship between the people and God (see further S. K. Williams 1975; de Jonge 1988; 1991; van Henten 1993; deSilva 1998:143–145). The kind of argumentation found in 4 Maccabees promoting close observance of the Jewish law as the means by which to master the passions may also reflect the arguments used in the Torah-observant Gentile mission that opposed Paul’s “Torah-free” mission in the same region from which 4 Maccabees is thought to have come (between Antioch and Asia Minor). Barclay (1991) has argued persuasively that the “Judaizers” did not only present observance of Torah merely in terms of theological necessity, but also ethical expediency. This, in turn, would explain why Paul must show at such length in Gal 5:1–6:10 how his Gospel had already provided the solution to the ethical quandary of the power of the “passions of the flesh” (4 Macc 7:18; Gal 5:16, 24). In regard to Hebrews and the Pastoral Epistles, a stronger case for actual influence, rather than merely points of contact, can be made (see

INTRODUCTION

xxxiii

Staples 1966:220–222; deSilva 1998:146–148). The Pastoral Epistles share with 4 Maccabees the conviction that “desires,” a subset of the “passions,” impede moral virtue (2 Tim 2:22; 3:6; Tit 2:12; 3:3; 4 Macc 1:1, 3, 31–32; 2:1–6; 3:2), the elevation of “self-control” (σωφρoσύvη and cognates, 2 Tim 1:7; Titus 2:5, 6, 12; 4 Macc 1:3, 6, 18, 30–31; 5:23) and “piety” (εὐσέβεια and cognates, 1 Tim 2:2; 4:7–8; 6:3–6, 11; 2 Tim 3:5; Titus 2:12; 4 Macc 5:24, 31; 6:2; 7:16; 9:6, 7, 29, 30; 11:20; 12:14; 13:12, 27; 14:7; 15:1, 3, 14, 17; 16:14, 17, 23; 17:5, 7; 18:3), the rare word “incontrovertibly” (ὁμoλoγoυμέvως, 1 Tim 3:16; 4 Macc 6:31; 7:16; 16:1), and the designation of the struggle to keep “faith” as a “noble contest” (1 Tim 6:12; 2 Tim 4:7; 4 Macc 16:16, 22). Against 4 Maccabees, the Pastor asserts that the distinction between clean and unclean food is meaningless rather than a God-given expedient for the inculcation of virtue and a suitable diet (1 Tim 4:3–5; vs. 4 Macc 1:31–35; 5:25–26). Scholars never fail to observe that the Maccabean martyrs stand among the exemplars of faith in the Letter to the Hebrews (Heb 11:35b), referring consistently and correctly to 2 Macc 6:18–7:42 (resurrection is featured in both, but is absent from 4 Maccabees; the verb used in Heb 11:35 for “torture” recalls specifically the τύμπαvov upon which Eleazar is executed in 2 Macc 6:19, 28; while “release” from torture is also prominent in 4 Macc 6:12–23; 9:16, it is not absent from 2 Maccabees, as in 7:1–2, 7). However, there are numerous connections with the tradition of the martyrs in 4 Maccabees as well throughout the sermon. Both conceive of πίστις in terms of faithfulness toward God and fixedness in regard to God’s promises, and all this specifically within the context of the inviolable obligations of beneficiaries to their benefactor (4 Macc 16:18–22; Heb 6:4–8, 12; 10:29–31, 39; 11:6; 12:28; 13:17). Hebrews also introduces the categories of “temporary” (πρόσκαιρov) versus “eternal” (usually in terms of “abiding,” “lasting”) throughout his discourse (see especially Heb 11:24–27), reflecting the same antithesis that figures so prominently in the martyrs’ deliberations (4 Macc 13:14–17; 15:2–8, 27). Pushing beyond conceptual to verbal parallels, the author of Hebrews calls his audience to enhance their endurance by looking away to Jesus (διʼ ὑπoμovῆς . . . ἀφoρῶvτες εἰς τòv . . . ʼIησoῦv, Heb 12:1–2), just as the martyrs had endured by looking away to God (εἰς θεòv ἀφoρῶvτες . . . ὑπoμείvαvτες, 4 Macc 17:10). The example of Jesus, “who endured a cross, despising shame” (ὑπέμειvεv σταύρov αἰσχύvης καταφρovήσας, Heb 12:2), parallels Eleazar’s bold stance as he “endured the pains and scorned the compulsions” (ὑπέμεvε τoὺς πόvoυς καὶ περιεφρόvει τῆς ἀvάγκης, 4 Macc 6:9). The apostrophe to the mother in 4 Macc 17:4, in which the author

xxxiv

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

tells her to “hold the hope of her endurance firm” toward God (τὴv ἐλπίδα τῆς ὑπoμovῆς βεβαίαv ἔχoυσα), may have left its impression on Heb 3:6, 14, as the author of Hebrews speaks of the rewards that would follow “if we hold (κατάσχωμεv) the confidence and the boast of hope (τῆς ἐλπίδoς)” and “if we hold (κατάσχωμεv) the beginning of our confidence firm (βεβαίαv) to the end.” Both texts promote “unwavering” commitment in this regard (ἀκλιvή, 4 Macc 17:3; Heb 10:23). And, of course, the benedictions in Heb 13:21 and 4 Macc 18:24 are almost identical (Staples 1966:221), though this last parallel is the least impressive since it could easily arise from independent development of a common liturgical formula. If the stamp of 4 Maccabees upon the New Testament is debatable, its impression upon early Christian martyrology stands beyond doubt. The compatibility of the ideology of martyrdom in 4 Maccabees with early Christianity can be seen from the points of contact with the ideology of the “witness” in Revelation. In both texts, the μάρτυς makes a confession of loyalty to God and God’s law, and shows his or her commitment by dying on behalf of that loyalty (Rev 1:5; 2:13; 6:9; 11:3–12; 12:11; 4 Macc 16:16–23). In both, dying in obedience to God means “conquering” and “victory” (Rev 2:7, 11, 17, 26; 3:5, 12, 21; 12:11; 15:2; 4 Macc 1:1; 6:10; 7:4; 9:30; 11:20). Both texts elevate the value of “endurance” (ὑπoμovή, Rev 1:9; 2:2, 3, 19; 13:10; 4 Macc 1:11; 7:9; 9:8, 30; 15:30; 17:4, 12, 17, 23), since this summarizes the path of holding onto the minority culture’s world view and ethos in the face of the coercive or marginalizing measures of the dominant culture. Both texts celebrate marginalization and even execution not as an experience of degradation, but rather as the path to eternal honor. The witness is crowned as a sign of his or her honor in God’s sight (Rev 2:10; 4 Macc 17:15) and stands honored “before the throne of God” (Rev 7:15; 4 Macc 17:18). When, therefore, Ignatius faces martyrdom and the anonymous author recounts the story of Polycarp’s martyrdom, it does not come as a surprise to find both drawing on the language, imagery, and ideology of 4 Maccabees. As bishop of Antioch, Ignatius was well-located to have heard or read 4 Maccabees, or at least to have been exposed indirectly to the martyrology contained therein. Ignatius considers the opportunity to die for his commitment to God an act of God’s “favor” (Ignatius, Eph 11.1), as the fifth brother had welcomed martyrdom as a “splendid favor” that Antiochus was unwittingly and unwillingly granting (4 Macc 11:12). Ignatius refers to his death four times as an ἀvτίψυχov (Ignatius Eph. 21.1; Smyr. 10.2; Poly. 2.3; 6.1; 4 Macc 6:29; 17:21); it is a “new birth,” and the

INTRODUCTION

xxxv

process of being executed will be the birth pangs (Ignatius, Rom. 6.1; 4 Macc 15:16; 16:13). Finally, Ignatius invites the torments that will prove and perfect his discipleship in a manner highly reminiscent of Eleazar’s challenge to Antiochus in 4 Macc 5:32: “Come fire and cross and grapplings with wild beasts, wrenching of bones, hacking of limbs, crushings of my whole body, come cruel tortures of the devil to assail me” (Ignatius, Rom. 5.3). The Martyrdom of Polycarp, composed in the mid-second century, also resonates with 4 Maccabees in many particular details. The proconsul presiding over the trials and executions addressed Polycarp in a manner that the author recognizes has already become stereotypical, urging him to “have respect for your age” and saying “other similar things, as they are accustomed to say” (Mart. Poly. 9). 4 Maccabees 5:11–12 provides the earliest extant expression of this particular convention, and thus may be one of the earlier accounts that the author has in mind when referring to the stereotype. Polycarp refuses to comply with the proconsul, citing the same line of argumentation that one finds among the brothers in 4 Maccabees, who similarly chose to endure a brief season of torment rather than purchase temporary safety at the cost of eternal punishment for disowning God: “you threaten with a fire that burns for a short time and then is quenched, but you are ignorant of the fire of the future judgement and the eternal punishment kept for the impious” (Mart. Poly. 11; see 4 Macc 9:7–9, 31–32; 10:11; 13:14–15). Martyrdom of Polycarp employs the concept of “witness bearing” as testimony given through the endurance of sufferings and death in the same sense as found in 4 Macc 16:16 (see Mart. Poly. 1; 13; 17). As in Ignatius, who exercised a strong influence upon a younger Polycarp, the martyr’s death is a new birth (Mart. Poly. 18; 4 Macc. 16:13). In both 4 Maccabees and Martyrdom of Polycarp, the martyr takes the prize and is crowned with immortality (Mart. Poly. 17, 20; 4 Macc. 16:28; 17:12, 15). As martyrdom became a more pervasive challenge in the early church, one finds increasing attention being given to 4 Maccabees and to the resources it provides for promoting perseverance unto death and for speaking in honorific terms about the martyrs’ suffering and death. Origen’s Exhortation to Martyrdom, written to two deacons in Caesarea during the persecution of Christian clergy by Maximin in 235 C.E., draws at length from the story of the Maccabean martyrs in order to encourage Christians as they continue the contest for faith. It is common for scholars of Origen to observe that he had 2 Maccabees in mind (Winslow 1974:81; Greer 1979:56), which is certainly true (see Exh. 23, which opens the scene

xxxvi

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

with details found in 2 Macc 7:1–2, but not 4 Maccabees) but there are sufficient references to details and images found in 4 Maccabees to suggest that Origen drew on both texts as he composed his Exhortation. Origen frequently uses the image of the athletic contest, drawing not only on New Testament texts that feature this imagery (2 Tim 4:7–8; Heb 12:1–4), but also 4 Maccabees. Origen consistently uses the term “athlete” (ἀθλητής), and even the phrase “noble athlete” (γεvvαῖoς ἀθλητής; see 4 Macc 6:10), to describe the martyr as does the author of 4 Maccabees (6:10; 17:15, 16) but no New Testament author. Origen describes the seven brothers as “devotees for piety” (εὐσεβείας ἀσκηταί, Exh. 23.23, 27–28; 4 Macc 12:11) and “contestants for virtues,” an echo of 4 Macc 12:14 (τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγωvισταί). Origen and 4 Maccabees both call attention to the fact that watching beloved brothers suffer torture and death was part of the ordeal for each (Exh. 23.1; 4 Macc 13:27). Both observe that it is more prudent to fear God than to fear mortals (Exh. 4; 4 Macc 13:14– 15; though this could also be derived directly from Matt 10:28). Finally, Origen specifically recommends remaining faithful to God to the point of death as the best way in which to make a fair return to God, who has so greatly benefitted the individual (Exh. 28), logic that had been made explicit in 4 Maccabees (4 Macc 13:13; 16:18–19). Influence on Christian martyrologies continues to be felt into the third and fourth centuries. The interpretation of persecution and execution for the sake of piety as an athletic contest in which the martyr wins the prize is seen again in the Passion of Saints Perpetua and Felicity 10.1–14 in Perpetua’s vision of herself transformed into a male gladiator doing battle with the adversary (who turns out to be Satan). In the story of the Martyrs of Lyons, the martyrs are likened to “noble athletes” who “endured various contests,” were “victorious,” and were awarded the “crown of incorruptibility” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.36; see also 5.1.38, 41, 43; see 4 Macc 17:11–16). Blandina, who received special attention throughout the narrative, is specifically compared to “a noble athlete” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.19). Having put on the “invincible athlete, Christ,” she engaged the demonic “opponent” in various “contests” and was herself eventually awarded “the crown of incorruptibility” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.42). The image of being born anew in reference to martyrdom also appears in this narrative in regard to those who had initially denied Christ out of fear but later confessed him (thus leading to their own deaths; Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.46). The fact that Blandina is able to take more abuse than her torturers can dish out, the latter giving up exhausted at the end of the day (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.18), is also reminiscent of the torturers “wearing themselves out” scourging the first brother in 4 Macc 9:12.

INTRODUCTION

xxxvii

The example of the mother in 4 Maccabees appears to have left its stamp upon the portrayal of several female martyrs. In Martyrdom of Montanus and Lucius 16.3–4 (Hilhorst 2000:115), the mother of these two martyrs is praised as a “daughter of Abraham” and is addressed in apostrophe: “O mother, dutiful in regard to piety! . . . O Maccabean mother!” The vocabulary, the rhetorical convention of apostrophe (featured prominently throughout 4 Maccabees), and the direct reference to the story of the Maccabean mother all point to the author’s familiarity with 4 Macc 14:10–17:6. Among the martyrs of Lyons, Blandina is likened to “a well-born mother who had encouraged her children and sent them as victorious ones to the King, while also having measured out to her all the contests of her children, she sped after them” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.55). Her role in those martyrdoms is very similar to the role of the mother in 4 Maccabees, providing encouragement for the other martyrs even while suffering herself (though psychologically and emotionally in 4 Maccabees, and not physically, as in Eusebius), before going to death herself at the last. Consideration of the contrast between the temporal state of affairs and the future encounter of the martyrs or the persecutor with God, not surprisingly, pervade Christian martyr stories. The martyrs’ taunt that God will visit upon the persecutors the pains they now visit upon God’s faithful pious ones emerges in Pass. Perp. 18.8–9 and the Martyrdom of Habbib the Deacon (19d; see Doran 2000): “God, whom you here deny, has another world, and there you will confess him with scourges after you have denied him further” (see 4 Macc 9:9, 32; 10:10–11, etc.). The martyrs’ reassurance of themselves and one another that those who die for God live to God, while those who love this life more than God will come into judgment, reappears in Martyrdom of Habbib 19e (see 4 Macc 13:14–15; 16:25). Like Eleazar (4 Macc 6:27), Habbib also makes a claim to recognition before God for not fleeing the torments when he was able to do so (Martyrdom of Habbib 36). The dual hope for a better life in the future for the faithful, coupled with anticipation of divine vengeance upon the persecutor, consistently enables patient endurance for Christian martyrs (Cyprian Bon. Pat. 21–24; Shaw 1996:299), but we should not forget that this dual hope came to full, clear expression in 4 Maccabees before any Christian martyr account employing the same topics. Tertullian’s “On Patience” 13 moves from a discussion of patience with simple diet and drink, patience in regard to controlling sexual desires, and finally climaxing in a discussion of patience under physical torture and execution, “the final proof of blessedness” (Shaw 1996:298). It is noteworthy that 4 Maccabees moves through such a gradatio as well,

xxxviii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

focusing first on “self-control” in regard to diet (1:31–35), then sexual drives (2:1–6), through a variety of other passions, and finally to the “proof of the pudding” in the martyrs’ mastery of physical pain. Christian leaders continued to find inspiration in 4 Maccabees long after the threat of persecution for the faith subsided (see, further, Perler 1949; Winslow 1974). Sermons by John Chrysostom (De Maccabaeos homiliae, PG 50.617–28, and De Eleazaro et de septum pueris, PG 63.523–30), Gregory Nazianzen (In Maccabaeorem Laudem, PG 35.911–34), and Ambrose (De Iacob et vita beata, CSEL 32.2, also in McHugh 1972:119–184; Aune 1994:154) attest to the popularity and edifying potential of the story, Gregory leaving no doubt that he refers to the form of their story found in 4 Maccabees, “the Book which philosophizes about Reason being supreme over the passions.” Jerome (Dialogus adversus Pelagianos 2.6; Hilhorst 2000:116) refers to 4 Maccabees as proof that reason can “subdue and rule the perturbations of the soul,” an ethical goal of perennial importance quite apart from the situation of martyrdom. The inclusion of 4 Maccabees in Sinaiticus and Alexandrinus, of course, provides perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the influence and use of 4 Maccabees in the early church. It remains an enduring testimony to the freedom and dignity of the human being, who is reminded by the story of the martyrs that he or she need never submit to any external or internal compulsion that would compromise his or her self-respect. The Sinaiticus Text of 4 Maccabees Sinaiticus (S) preserves the text of 4 Maccabees in sixteen pages, each with four-columns of uncial script with no spacing between words. The text is punctuated throughout by raised periods and cola, most of which now correspond with verse divisions. Two of the several scribes involved in producing Codex Sinaiticus were involved in the copying of this text, Scribe D producing 1:1–8:7, Scribe A producing 8:7 to the end (Milne and Skeat 1951:29; see also Metzger 1981:77). At several points, these scribes introduced paragraph headings identifiable by beginning a line one character in advance of the left hand margin (and often with space left at the end of the preceding line). Many of these correspond with clear major breaks in the text: – 1:15, showing the scribe (or his exemplar) to have understood the exordium to end at 1:14 rather than 1:12, as has tended to be the case in scholarship and modern translations;

INTRODUCTION

xxxix

– 4:1, the beginning of the story of Simon’s “conspiracy,” again in contravention of modern tendencies to mark the section break at 3:19; – 4:15, the beginning of the Hellenizing revolution with the accession of Antiochus IV; – 4:21, the beginning of divine vengeance against Jerusalem (using Antiochus IV); – 5:1, the opening of a new scene in which Antiochus begins to confront Judeans one by one; – 5:14, the introduction of Eleazar’s answer to Antiochus; – 6:1, the beginning of the torments against Eleazar; – 6:5 (?), setting off Eleazar’s response to the herald from the latter’s proclamation to “obey the king”; – 8:2, marking the transition from Antiochus’s “defeat” at the hands of Eleazar to the selection of other Hebrew captives for his attention; – 8:3, introducing the seven brothers whose story will dominate the middle section of the book; – 11:1b, introducing the fifth brother (but breaking up a sentence); – 11:13, introducing the sixth brother; – 14:2, marking the transition from discursive reflection to encomium (here, an apostrophe); – 14:3, separating the first apostrophe from a second. One might criticize the scribes for inconsistent periodization, failing to introduce breaks at major points (when the other breaks raise the expectation that he will do so) and introducing too many breaks at what a modern editor might consider to be sub-levels (which, again, are not done consistently), for example: the break at 6:5, which does not correspond to a change of scene or action; the breaks before the “contest” of the fifth and sixth brothers, but not before any of the others; the somewhat redundant breaks at 8:3 and 14:3. Considered more charitably, however, the breaks that are present (with the exceptions of 11:1 and 11:13) do point up significant shifts and moments in the narrative, for example underscoring each of the three movements within chapter four that the author would have considered important (the failed attempt on the treasury when the Law was rightly observed; the revolution against the Law; the consequences of breaking the covenant). Even the double break at 14:2 and 14:3 functions to make the reader pause longer at the triumphant moment of acclaiming victory for the seven brothers after so long a struggle.

xl

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

The scribes employed three standard abbreviations: representing the conjunctive καί from time to time as a kappa with a cedilla; consistently representing a nu at the end of line by a macron over the preceding vowel; and depicting the syllable -μoυ occasionally by a mu superimposed over an upsilon with a superscript omicron in smaller print. The original text has been assiduously corrected. The principal correctors worked carefully so as not to obscure the original reading, deleting letters with a small hash mark and/or with raised dots above the line, and introducing additional letters, syllables, or monosyllabic words above the line. Longer additions to the text are introduced in the margins, either between columns or above or below the columns, often with either a tilde or an arrow with a corresponding sign in the main text indicating the point of insertion. In only a few places has a rescriptor actually obscured the original reading in favor of his own (his hand is evident, for example, at 7:9). This commentary and translation is based on a reconstruction of the original reading of Sinaiticus insofar as grammatical and contextual sense allows. The textual apparatus is designed to provide access to all the information on the manuscript page of Sinaiticus, as well as to display the points of convergence and divergence from Rahlfs’s critical text. Significant variations in meaning between the text of Sinaiticus and the critical edition of Rahlfs (the text of 4 Maccabees to which most readers will have access, either directly or through the English translations based on the critical text like the RSV and NRSV) are discussed throughout the commentary, textual notes, and notes on the translation (see 1:8, 20; 2:9, 15, 18, 24; 3:4, 8, 11, 13; 4:2, 9, 10; 5:9, 13, 23, 27; 6:14, 35; 7:14; 8:28; 9:1, 15, 21, 23, 28; 10:3, 14, 17; 11:2, 3, 4, 10; 12:1, 3, 6, 11, 13; 13:7, 21, 27; 14:3; 15:3, 5, 20, 24, 31; 16:3, 14, 23; 17:5, 17; 18:5, 7, 9, 23). From among these many variants, a few noteworthy patterns and observations emerge. The reader of 4 Maccabees as it stood in the original hand of Sinaiticus would have experienced the text as slightly more vivid and dynamic than the reader of the critical edition. The scribe was admittedly given to dittography, though he usually stopped himself before reproducing entire words or phrases. Thus when he doubles the incidence of the vocative ὦ τύραvvε in 9:1 or the adverbial phrase oὐχ oὕτως in 17:5 (both omitted by Rahlfs), the reader experiences the former as embellishing the vituperation of Antiochus (who, being Greek, would surely have rejected the title) in the mouths of the brothers and the latter as contributing to the evocation of pathos. Additional verbs (ἑσπεύδεv, 3:8; εἴλκυσαv in 9:28), more colorful

INTRODUCTION

xli

vocabulary (μιαρoφαγεῖv rather than ἐσθίειv in 5:27; κόλασιv, “fury/ vengeance,” rather than ἀκoλασίαv, “intemperance,” in 13:7; χόριov, “afterbirth,” or possibly χoρ[ε]ῖov, “dancing area,” rather than χωρίov, “place,” in 15:20), and more specific details (τράχηλov rather than τρoχòv in 11:10, creating an image of being “bent back up to the neck” rather than another general reference to being “bent around the wheel”; κατακαύσας instead of καταικίσας in 12:13, calling to mind one particularly potent form of that “ill-treatment”) enhance the drama and emotional impact of their respective scenes. More vivid verb tenses (involving present tense verbs or verbs with μέλλω) invite the hearer more fully and with greater immediacy into the unfolding of the drama (ἦσαv γὰρ μέλλovτες περίφρovες rather than ἦσαv γὰρ περίφρovες in 8:28; ἐκτεμvεῖv rather than ἦκτεμεῖv in 10:17; oἰκoδoμoυμέvηv in place of ᾠκoδoμημέvηv in 18:7). Finally, the reader of Sinaiticus experiences a sharpening of the tone of several incidences of direct address. The author once challenges the audience directly (εἴπoιτε ἤ instead of the indirect εἴπoι τις ἄv εἰ, 2:24), allows for Eleazar’s peers to challenge him more directly with the “folly” of his actions (with the absence of τί in Sinaiticus 6:14, changing a question into a direct reproach), and keeps the focus of the brother’s resistance more intently on Antiochus himself (the brother answers Antiochus, αὐτῷ, rather than the taunting torturers, αὐτoῖς, in 10:14). To this list could be added 5:13, in which Antiochus could be understood to pronounce a wish over Eleazar (συvγvωμovήσειεv) rather than merely suggest a possibility (συγγvωμovήσειεv ἄv). Additionally, the reader encounters a portrayal of the martyrs that emphasized their “nobility and goodness” and their “virtue” slightly more than the critical text does. Sinaiticus introduces καλoκἀγαθία as early as 1:8, where Rahlfs follows Alexandrinus in reading ἀvδραγαθία, a term of slightly lesser distinction. In 17:7, Sinaiticus holds up the martyrs’ “virtue” (τὴv ἀρετήv) as well as their “endurance” (τὴv ὑπoμovήv) as objects of the spectators’ admiration, where Rahlfs places only the latter in the main text. Though probably a scribal error, Sinaiticus reads εὐγέvειαv rather than συγγέvειαv in 10:3, placing thereby a double emphasis on the “nobility” or “noble birth” of these martyrs. Reading the intensifier αὐτός in place of oὗτoς in 12:1 brings an added dimension to the sixth brother’s noble death: he has now “himself ” achieved the noble mark set by his predecessors. Related to the elevation of the nobility of the martyrs is the increased attention given to their combat, victory, and resultant honor. Sinaiticus alone includes an additional epithet for the

xlii

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

mother in 16:14 (μητὴρ καὶ εὐσεβoῦς στρατιᾶς), underscoring further the martial imagery of the work, and reads ἐvίκησεv rather than ἠκύρωσεv in 7:14, adding yet another incident of that verb to the hearing of the story. Finally, the martyrs are said to have received “victorious” or “prizewinning” (ἀθλoφόρoυς, rather than the more static ἀθαvάτoυς, 18:23) souls from God, and to be “announced” (εὐαγγελίζovται) to the chorus of the ancestors, i.e., as victors in the games would be given recognition, rather than simply “gathered” (συvαγελάζovται, 18:23). One reading in Sinaiticus actually works against this overall tendency, namely the appearance of αἰῶvα rather than ἀγῶvα in 9:23, though this may be the result of a scribal error (either the scribe of Sinaiticus or his exemplar mistaking the gamma in ἀγῶvα for an iota). Several readings in Sinaiticus but not accepted by Rahlfs would contribute to the reader’s engagement with the philosophical demonstration itself. Reading ἐκδιδάσκεῖ rather than ἐξασκεῖ in 5:23 introduces another repetition of the educative function of Torah, although at the expense of another verb closely associated with practical training. The Sinaiticus text of 12:6 makes a significant shift, as the reader no longer encounters Antiochus’s pity for the mother (αὐτὴv ἐλεήσας in Rahlfs) as a motive for his bringing her forward to advise her last surviving son, but instead is informed concerning Antiochus’s devious strategy, playing upon the mother’s weaknesses and inducing her to take pity on herself ({ἑ}αὐτὴv ἐλεήσασα) and, breaking after so much stalwart resistance, plead with her last son to capitulate. The reading in Sinaiticus would thus heighten the reader’s appreciation of the mother’s mastery of her own passions of maternal love, given the grueling final “test” of 12:6. Reading that the brothers were “compacted together” (συvστρέφovται, 13:21) by their early lives together, rather than simply being “nursed together” (συvτρέφovται in Rahlfs), makes a greater impression upon the reader of Sinaiticus in regard to the unity, harmony, and solidarity shared among the brothers, a topic that the author invokes so heavily. At two places, the reading in Sinaiticus calls greater attention to the emotional turmoil experienced – and overcome – by the martyrs, thus again heightening the reader’s appreciation for the power of pious reason (κατoικτιζoμέvoυς rather than καταικιζoμέvoυς at 13:27, drawing attention to the compassion felt by the brothers for each other; αὐτήv in place of αὐτῆς in 16:3, which becomes an intensifier underscoring the mother’s experience of torment). Finally, the choice of ἀσθεvέστεραv in place of ἀσθεvόψυχoι in 15:5 is highly significant, presenting a strictly physiognomic evaluation of maternity

INTRODUCTION

xliii

(“weaker”) that cannot be construed as a psychological or moral judgment (“weak-spirited” or “weak-souled”), leading to greater clarity about the meaning being conveyed in the concessive clause of 16:5 (“being a mother” does not make one more susceptible to being “faint-hearted,” but quite the opposite). A few other readings are worthy of notice at this point, even though they do not fall into a particular pattern. Sinaiticus includes φιλαργυρίας in a list of the “more violent passions” rather than φιλαρχίας (2:15), introducing the more mundane economic interests into the discussion in place of the “love of offices” that suggests the ambitious social climbing along the cursus honorum. The text as Sinaiticus represents it would probably have challenged a greater percentage of the book’s readership. In 4:9, the reader of Sinaiticus finds “old men” (γεραιῶv) instead of “priests” (ἱερέωv) joining the women and children in prayer. Not only is this a more emotionally-charged image, it also artfully intimates the contests for piety by an old man, a woman, and a group of children about to be narrated. The appearance of Αβρααμ υῖoς in 9:21 instead of Αβραμιαῖoς runs counter to the tendency in 4 Maccabees (see 9:21; 18:20, 23) to replace categories of genealogical descent with terms more suggestive of imitation of an archetype (Seim 2001:30). Finally, in 12:3 Sinaiticus records that Antiochus considered the deaths of the first six brothers to be a result of their “faithlessness” (ἀπιστίαv) rather than their disobedience (ἀπείθειαv), although the latter is still represented elsewhere in the text (e.g., 9:10). This variation subtly underscores the significance of Antiochus’s invitation to the brothers to take him for their patron and, therefore, “trust” him (8:7), and the dangers of arousing the dominant culture’s ire by refusing such relationships (so also in 9:10). The choices before the reader of Sinaiticus thus move even more starkly toward remaining faithful to God (16:22) or breaking faith with God for the sake of networking with the representatives of the dominant culture. Key to Greek text and apparatus {text} indicates that the enclosed text derives from corrective and supplemental additions made in the margins and above the lines in the manuscript. (v) indicates that the nu is represented in the codex only by a macron over the preceding vowel. κ(αὶ) indicates that the manuscript has an abbreviation for the Greek conjunctive, namely a kappa with a cedilla extending below the line.

xliv

INTRODUCTION COMMENTARY

[x] indicates a spelling error that could be corrected simply by supplying a missing letter. The most frequently appearing is [ε], indicating an epsilon omitted due to itacism. <x> indicates a superfluous letter in the original manuscript, the most frequent again being the letter epsilon. Other corrections made in the manuscript to the original hand are noted in the textual apparatus, signaled in the uncorrected main text with an asterisk (*). Differences from the standard critical edition prepared by Alfred Rahlfs are also noted in the apparatus. Nomina sacra and other standard abbreviations are represented in this text by all capitals (in lieu of a macron marking the word as an abbreviation). ΑΝΟΙΣ = ἀνθρώποις ΑΝΩΝ = ἀνθρώπων ΔΑΔ = Δαυιδ ΘΕ = θεέ ΘΝ = θεόν ΘΣ = θεός ΘΥ = θεοῦ ΘΩ = θεῷ ΙΣΛ = Ισραηλ ΚΣ = κύριος ΜΡΑ = μητέρα ΜΡΣ = μητρóς ΠΕΡ = πάτερ ΠΡΩΝ = πατέρων ΠΗΡ = πατήρ ΠΡΣ = πατρóς ΠΝΑ = πνεῦμα ΠΝΙ = πνεύματι

4 MACCABEES TEXT AND TRANSLATION

2

INTRODUCTION

1:1–12

Exordium

1.1 ϕιλοσοϕώτατο(ν) λόγον ἐπιδ[ε]ίκνυσθαι μέλλων, εἰ αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶ(ν) ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός, συμβουλεύσαιμ’ ἂ(ν) ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς ὅπως προσέχητε προθύμως τῇ ϕιλοσοϕίᾳ. 1.2 καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος εἰς ἐπιστήμην παντὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς μεγίστης ἀρετῆς, λέγω δὴ ϕρονήσεως, περιέχει ἔπαινον. 1.3 εἰ ἄρα τῶ(ν) σωϕροσύνης κωλυτικῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς ϕαίνεται ἐπικρατεῖν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας: 1.4 ἀλλὰ κ(αὶ) τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν κυριεύειν ἀναϕαίνεται οἷον κακοηθ[ε]ίας καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀνδρ[ε]ίας ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν θυμοῦ τε καὶ ϕόβου καὶ πόνου, 1.5 πῶς οὖ(ν), ἴσως εἴποιεν* ἄν τις, εἰ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐ δεσπόζει; γελοῖον ἐπιχειροῦντες λέγειν. 1.6 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὑτοῦ παθῶ(ν) ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρ[ε]ίας καὶ σωϕροσύνης ἐναντίων, κ(αὶ) τῶν τοιούτων οὐχ ὥστε αὐτὰ καταλῦσαι, ἀλλ’ ὥστε αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶξαι. 1.7 πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλλαχόθε(ν) ἔχοιμ’ ἂν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶ(ν) παθῶν ὁ λογισμός, 1.8 πολὺ δὲ πλέον τοῦτο ἀποδείξαιμι ἀπὸ τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας τῶν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀποθανόντω(ν), Ελεαζαρου τε καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕῶ(ν) καὶ τῆς τούτων μητρός. 1.9 {ἅ}παντες γὰρ οὗτοι τοὺς ἕως θανάτου πόνους ὑπεριδόντες ἐπεδείξαντο ὅτι περικρατεῖ τῶν παθῶ(ν) ὁ λογισμός. 1.10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρετῶν ἔπεστί μοι ἐπαινεῖ(ν) τοὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας ἀποθανόντας μετὰ τῆς μητρὸς ἄνδρας, τῶν δὲ τιμῶ(ν) μακαρίσαιμ’ ἄν. 1.11 θαυμασθέντες γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπ’ ἀνδρ[ε]ίᾳ {κ(αὶ) ὑπομονῇ} ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰκισαμένων αἴτιοι κατέστησαν τοῦ καταλυθῆναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦ ἔθνους τυραννίδα, νικήσαντες τὸν τύραννον τῇ ὑπομονῇ, ὥστε καθαρισθῆναι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν πατρίδα. 1.12 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νῦν αὐτίκα δὴ λέγειν ἐξέσται ἀρξαμένῳ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ὅπερ [ε]ἴωθα ποιεῖν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸν περὶ αὐτῶ(ν) τρέψομαι λόγον, δόξαν διδοὺς τῷ πανσόϕῳ ΘΩ.

1.5 εἴποιεν: a corrector has changed this to εἴποι to agree in number with τις. | τις: R reads τινες / 1.6 καὶ τῶν τοιούτων: R prefers καὶ τούτων / 1.8 καλοκἀγαθίας: R reads ἀνδραγαθίας / 1.11 ἐπ’ ἀνδρείᾳ: R reads ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ / 1.12 τοῦ: R reads τούτου | ΘΩ = θεῷ

INTRODUCTION

1:1–12

3

Exordium

(1) Since I am about to demonstrate a most philosophical statement – that pious reason is absolute master of the passions – I would rightly counsel you that you should pay close attention to this philosophical inquiry. (2) For the subject is indispensable to everyone with the goal of knowledge, and includes besides a eulogy of the greatest virtue, by which I mean prudence. (3) If, indeed, reason is seen to master the passions preventive of moderation, like gluttony and lust, (4) but also appears to rule over the passions hindering justice, such as malice, and those hindering courage (for example, anger and fear and pain), (5) how, then, someone might perhaps ask, if reason restrains the passions, does it not rule over forgetfulness and ignorance? It is ridiculous attempting to speak thus. (6) For reason does not restrain its passions, but those opposed to justice and courage and moderation, and it restrains such things not in order to destroy them, but in order not to yield to them. (7) I would be able to demonstrate to you that reason is absolute master of the passions from many angles and by another way, (8) but I might prove this much better from the nobility and goodness of those who died on behalf of moral excellence – namely, Eleazar and the seven brothers and the mother of the latter. (9) For all these, by disregarding the pains that led to death, demonstrated that reason controls the passions. (10) It falls to me next, therefore, to praise for their moral excellences those men who died at this season with their mother on behalf of nobility and goodness, and I would pronounce them privileged for their honors. (11) For being admired not only by all people for their courage [and endurance] but also by their tormentors, they became causes of the downfall of the tyranny against the nation, having conquered the tyrant by endurance, with the result that the homeland was purified through them. (12) But it will be proper for me to speak about this forthwith by beginning with the hypothesis, as I am accustomed to do, and in this manner I will come back around to the story about them, giving glory to the all-wise God.

4

4 MACCABEES 1:13–30A

1:13–30a Preliminary Definitions 1.13 ζητοῦμεν δὴ τοίνυν εἰ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός. 1.14 {καὶ} διακρίνομεν τί ποτέ ἐστιν λογισμὸς καὶ πάθος, καὶ πόσαι παθῶν <ε>ἰδέαι, καὶ εἰ πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ τούτων ὁ λογισμός. 1.15 λογισμὸς {μὲν} δὴ τοίνυ(ν) ἐστὶν νοῦς μετὰ ὀρθοῦ λόγου προτιμῶν τὸν σοϕίας βίον. 1.16 σοϕία δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν γνῶσις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπί[ν]ων πραγμάτω(ν) καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτιῶν. 1.17 αὕτη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδ[ε]ία δι’ ἧς τὰ θεῖα σεμνῶς καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα συμϕερόντως μανθάνομεν. 1.18 τῆς δὲ σοϕίας <ε>ἰδέαι καθεστήκασιν {τέσσαρες} ϕρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρ[ε]ία καὶ σωϕροσύνη. 1.19 κυριωτάτη δὲ πά(ν)των ἡ ϕρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς δὲ παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπικρατεῖ. 1.20 παθῶν δὲ ϕύσ[ε]ις εἰσὶν αἱ περιεκτικώταται δύο, ἡδονή τε καὶ πόνος· τούτων δὲ ἑκάτερος* καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πέϕυκεν 1.21 πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον ἀγαθῶ(ν) εἰσιν ἀκολουθ<ε>ίαι 1.22 πρὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν χαρά. 1.23 πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πόνου ἐστὶν ϕόβος, μετὰ δὲ τὸν πόνον λύπη. 1.24 θυμὸς δὲ κοινὸν πάθος ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνου, ἐὰν ἐννοηθῇ τις ὅτι αὐτῷ περιέπεσεν. 1.25 ἐν τῇ ἡδονῇ δὲ ἔνεστι(ν) καὶ ἡ κακοήθης διάθεσις, πολυτροπωτάτη πάντω(ν) οὖσα τῶν παθῶ(ν), 1.26 καὶ τὰ μὲν ψυχῆς ἀλαζον[ε]ία καὶ ϕιλαργυρία καὶ ϕιλοδοξία καὶ ϕιλον[ε]ικία καὶ βασκανία, 1.27 κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα παντοϕαγία καὶ μονοϕαγία καὶ λαιμαργία. 1.28 καθάπερ οὖν δυεῖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ϕυτῶν ὄ(ν)των ἡδονῆς τε καὶ πόνου, πολλαὶ τούτων τῶν ϕυτῶν εἰσιν παραϕυάδες, 1.29 ὧν ἑκάστη(ν) ὁ πανγέωργος λογισμὸς περικαθαίρων καὶ ἀποκνίζων καὶ περιπλέκων καὶ ἐπάρδων καὶ πάντα τρόπο(ν) μεταχέων ἐξημεροῖ τὰς τῶν ἠθῶ(ν) καὶ παθῶν ὕλας. 1.30 ὁ γὰρ λογισμὸς τῶ(ν) μὲν ἀρετῶν ἐστι(ν) ἡγεμών, τῶν δὲ παθῶν αὐτοκράτωρ.

1.13 ἐστὶ: corrector adds final ν / 1.14 first καὶ: R omits corrector’s addition | πάθος: R reads τί πάθος / 1.18 R does not include τέσσαρες / 1.19 δὲ παθῶν: R reads δὴ τῶν παθῶν / 1.20 ἑκάτερος: corrected to ἑκάτερον | καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν: R reads καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, against both S and A / 1.21 ἀγαθῶν: R reads παθῶν. The reading in S is surely an error; the translation follows Rahlfs here. / 1.27 καὶ μονοϕαγία καὶ λαιμαργία: R reads καὶ λαιμαργία καὶ μονοϕαγία / 1.29 πανγέωργος: R reads παγγέωργος

4 MACCABEES 1:13–30A

5

1:13–30a Preliminary Definitions (13) Hence we are examining now if reason is absolute master of the passions. (14) We are evaluating what “reason” is and what “passion” is, and how many forms of the passions there are, and whether reason masters all of these. (15) Now “reason,” indeed, is a mind preferring, with correct thinking, a life of wisdom. (16) Wisdom, then, is knowledge of divine and human matters and the causes of these. (17) This is, next, the instruction gained from the Law, through which we learn divine matters honorably and human matters advantageously. (18) And the forms of wisdom are prudence and justice and courage and moderation. (19) But prudence, on the basis of which reason masters the passions, is the most supreme of these. (20) The two most comprehensive species of passions are pleasure and pain, and both of these have grown up even around the soul. (21) The attendants of the passions in regard to both pleasure and pain are many. (22) Thus desire is before the experience of pleasure, but delight after the experience of pleasure. (23) And fear is before the experience of pain, but sorrow is after the experience of pain. (24) And anger is an emotion of pleasure and pain experienced in common, if anyone considers how he or she falls into it. (25) There is even in pleasure, being the most varied of the passions, a malicious disposition, (26) namely, with regard to the things of the soul, arrogance, love of money, love of glory, love of strife, and envy, (27) but with reference to the body, indiscriminate eating, eating alone, and gluttony. (28) Therefore, just as pleasure and pain are two plants of the body and the soul, the offshoots of these plants are many, (29) in regard to each of which reason, the chief gardener, cleaning and pruning and binding and watering and irrigating in every manner, reclaims the forests of the inclinations and passions. (30) For reason is the governor of the virtues, but it is the absolute master of the passions.

6

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–35 & 2:1–13

1:30b–2:23 The Torah Cultivates Self-Control and Justice 1.30b ἐπιθεώρει {δὲ} τοίνυν* πρῶτον διὰ τῶν κωλυτικῶ(ν) τῆς σωϕροσύνις ἔργων ὅτι αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός. 1.31 σωϕροσύνη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐπικράτ[ε]ια τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶ(ν), 1.32 τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶ(ν) αἱ μέν εἰσιν ψυχικαί, αἱ δὲ σωματικαί, καὶ τούτων ἀμϕοτέρων ἐπικρατεῖν ὁ λογισμὸς ϕαίνεται. 1.33 ἐπεὶ πόθεν κ<ε>ινούμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἀπειρημένας τροϕὰς, ἀποστρεϕόμεθα τὰς ἐξ αὐτῶ(ν) ἡδονάς; οὐχ ὅτι δύναται τῶν ὀρέξεων ἐπικρατεῖ(ν) ὁ λογισμός; ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι. 1.34 τοιγαροῦν ἐνύδρων ἐπιθυμοῦντες κ(αὶ) ὀρνέων καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ παντοίων βρωμάτω(ν) τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων ἡμῖν διὰ* τὸν νόμον ἀπεχόμεθα διὰ τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἐπικράτειαν. 1.35 ἀνέχεται γὰρ τὰ τῶν ὀρέξεων πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ σώϕρονος νοὸς ἀνακοπτόμενα, καὶ ϕ<ε>ιμοῦται πάντα τὰ τοῦ σώματος κινήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. 2.1 καὶ τί θαυμαστόν εἰ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους μετουσίαν ἀκυροῦνται; 2.2 ταύτῃ γοῦν ὁ σώϕρων Ιωσηϕ ἐπαινεῖται ὅτι διανοίᾳ περιεκράτησεν τῆς ἡδυπαθείας. 2.3 νέος γὰρ ὢν καὶ ἀκμάζων πρὸς συνουσιασμὸν ἠκύρωσε τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ(ν) τῶν παθῶν οἶστρο(ν). 2.4 καὶ οὐ μόνον δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδυπαθείας οἰστρηλασίαν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπικρατεῖν ϕαίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης ἐπιθυμίας. 2.5 λέγει γοῦν ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ πλησίον σου οὐδὲ ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σού ἐστιν. 2.6 καίτοι ὅτε μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν εἴρηκεν ἡμᾶς ὁ νόμος, πολὺ πλέον πείσαιμ’ ἂν ὑμᾶς ὅτι τῶ(ν) ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν δύναται ὁ λογισμός, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κωλυτικῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης παθῶν. 2.7 ἐπεὶ τίνα τις τρόπον μονοϕάγος ὢν τὸ ἦθος καὶ γαστρίμαργος ἢ καὶ μέθυσος μεταπαιδεύεται, εἰ μὴ δῆλον ὅτι κύριός ἐστι(ν) τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός; 2.8 αὐτίκα γοῦν τῷ νόμῳ πολιτευόμενος, κἂν ϕιλάργυρός τις ἦ, βιάζεται τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον τοῖς δεομένοις δαν[ε] ίζων χωρὶς τόκων καὶ τὸ δάν[ε]ιο(ν) τῶν ἑβδομάδων ἐνστασῶν χρεοκοπούμενος. 2.9 κἂν ϕ[ε]ιδωλός τις ἦ, ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κρατεῖται διὰ τὸν λογισμὸ(ν) μήτε ἐπικαρπολογούμενος τοὺς ἀμητοὺς μήτε ἐπι[ρ]ρωγολογούμενος τοὺς ἀμπελῶνας. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων δὲ ἔστιν ἐπιγνῶναι τοῦτο, ὅτι τῶ(ν) παθῶν ἐστιν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατῶ(ν). 2.10 ὁ γὰρ νόμος καὶ τῆς πρὸς γονεῖς εὐνοίας κρατεῖ μὴ καταπροδιδοὺς τὴν ἀρετὴν δι’ αὐτοὺς, 2.11 καὶ τῆς πρὸς γαμετὴν ϕιλίας ἐπικρατεῖ διὰ τὴν παρανομίαν αὐτὴν ἀπελέγχων, 2.12 καὶ τῆς τέκνω(ν) ϕιλίας κυριεύει διὰ κακίαν αὐτοὺς κολάζων, 2.13 καὶ τῆς ϕίλων συνηθ[ε]ίας δεσπόζει διὰ πονηρίαν αὐτοὺς 1.30 ἐπιθεωρεῖ: R reads ἐπιθεωρεῖτε rather than ἐπιθεώρει δὲ | τοίνυν: corrector deletes| σωϕροσύνις: R reads σωϕροσύνης / 1.33 γὰρ: R reads μὲν / 1.34 διὰ τὸν νόμον: corrector changes to κατὰ τὸν νόμον, followed by R / 2.4 initial καὶ: corrector deletes | ἐπὶ: corrector deletes, as does R / 2.9 ἔργων: R reads ἑτέρων (“other cases”) / 2.12 αὐτοὺς: R reads αὐτὰ

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–35 & 2:1–13

7

1:30b–2:23 The Torah Cultivates Self-Control and Justice Consider first, then, through the restraining deeds of self-control, that reason is absolute master of the passions. (31) Now self-control, then, is mastery of the desires. (32) And of the desires, some belong to the soul and some to the body – and reason is seen to master both of these. (33) Otherwise, how do we, being drawn to the forbidden foods, refuse the pleasures they offer? Is it not because reason is able to master the cravings? For I think this to be so. (34) For this very reason, though desiring seafood and birds and quadrupeds and all kinds of foods forbidden to us on account of the Law, we abstain on account of the mastery of reason. (35) For the passions of the cravings are endured patiently, being restrained by the self-controlled mind, and all the stirrings of the body are silenced by reason. (Chapter 2:1) And why is it extraordinary if the cravings of the soul toward joining with beauty are disregarded? (2) For this the temperate Joseph is celebrated, because by means of the mind he controlled the experience of pleasure. (3) For although he was young and ripe for sexual intercourse, he canceled the goading sting of the passions by means of reason. (4) And reason is seen to rule over the mad impulse not only of the experience of pleasure, but also of every desire. (5) Hence, the Law says “You will not desire the wife of your neighbor, nor whatsoever things belong to your neighbor.” (6) And further, when the Law has told us not to desire, I could all the more convince you that reason is able to restrain the desires, even as also the passions preventative of justice. (7) Otherwise, how is someone who is a solitary gourmandizer, whose habit it is to be gluttonous and taken with drink, taught a different way unless it is evident that reason is lord of the passions? (8) Therefore, conducting one’s life by the Law, even if one is a lover of money, a person is immediately constrained in regard to his or her way of life, lending without interest to those who ask and reducing the debt when the seventh year comes around. (9) And if someone is ungenerous, that one is restrained by the Law through reason neither to glean the harvested field nor glean grapes from the harvested vineyard. And on the evidence of deeds, we recognize this – that reason restrains the passions. (10) For the law even restrains good will toward parents, not betraying virtue on their account. (11) And it restrains love towards a wife, reproving her if she transgresses the law. (12) And it rules over love for children, punishing them on account of wickedness. (13) And it has complete power over the fellowship of friends, convicting them on

8

4 MACCABEES 2:13–24 & 3:1–5

ἐξελέγχων. 2.14 καὶ μὴ νομίσητε παράδοξον εἶναι, ὅπου κ(αὶ) ἔχθρας ἐπικρατεῖ(ν) ὁ λογισμὸς δύναται διὰ τὸν νόμο(ν) μήτε δενδροτομῶν τὰ ἥμερα τῶ(ν) πολεμίων ϕυτά, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶ(ν) τοῖς ἀπολέσασι διασῴζων καὶ τὰ πεπτωκότα συνεγείρων. 2.15 καὶ διὰ τῶ(ν) βιαιοτέρων δὲ παθῶν {ἐπι}κρατεῖν ὁ λογισμὸς ϕαίνεται ϕιλαργυρίας* καὶ κενοδοξίας καὶ ἀλαζον[ε]ίας καὶ μεγαλαυχίας καὶ βασκανίας. 2.16 πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ κακοήθη πάθη ὁ σώϕρων νοῦς ἀπωθεῖται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν θυμόν, κ(αὶ) γὰρ τούτου δεσπόζει. 2.17 θυμούμενός γέ τοι Μωσῆς κατὰ Δαθαν καὶ Αβ<ε>ιρω(ν) οὐ θυμῷ τι κατ’ αὐτῶν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ λογισμῷ τὸν θυμὸν διῄτησεν. 2.18 ἱκανὸς γὰρ ὁ σώϕρω(ν) νοῦς, ὡς ἔϕην, κατὰ τῶν παθῶν ἀριστεῦσαι καὶ τὰ μὲ(ν) αὐτῶν μεταθεῖναι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀκυρῶσαι. 2.19 ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ὁ πάνσοϕος ἡμῶ(ν) πατὴρ Ιακωβ τοὺς περὶ Συμεων καὶ Λευ<ε>ιν αἰτιᾶται μὴ λογισμῷ τοὺς Σικιμίτας ἐθνηδὸν ἀποσϕάξαντας λέγων ἐπικατάρατος ὁ θυμὸς αὐτῶ(ν); 2.20 εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐδύνατο τοῦ θυμοῦ ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖν οὐκ ἂ(ν) εἶπεν οὕτως. 2.21 ὁπηνίκα γὰρ ὁ ΘΣ κατεσκεύασεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὰ πάθη αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἤθη περιεϕύτευσεν. 2.22 ἡνίκα δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸν ἱερὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν διὰ τῶν ἐσθητηρίω(ν) ἐνεθρόνισεν, 2.23 καὶ τούτῳ νόμον δέδωκεν, καθ’ ὃν πολιτευόμενος βασιλεύσει βασιλεία(ν) σώϕρονά τε καὶ δικαίαν καὶ ἀγαθὴν καὶ ἀνδρείαν. 2:24–3:18

Clarification of the Thesis

2.24 πῶς οὖν, εἴποιτε, ἢ τῶ(ν) παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς {δεσπότης ἐστὶν ὁ λογισμός, λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐ κρατ[ε]ῖ; 3.1 ἔστιν δὲ κομιδῇ γελοῖος ὁ λόγος. οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς} ἐπικρατεῖν* ϕαίνεται, ἀλ[λ]ὰ τῶν σωματικῶν. 3.2 οἷον ἐπιθυμίαν τις ἐκκόψαι οὐ δύναται ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δουλωθῆναι τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ δύναται ὁ λογισμὸς παρεχέσθαι. 3.3 θυμόν τις οὐ δύναται ὑμῶν ἐκκόψαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τῷ θυμῷ δυνατὸν τὸν λογισμὸν βοηθῆσαι. 3.4 κακοήθ[ε]ιάν τις ὑμῶν οὐ δύναται ἐκκόψαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ καμϕθῆναι τῇ κακοηθ[ε]ίᾳ δύναιτ’ ἂν ὁ λογισμὸς συμμαχῆσαι. 3.5 οὐ γὰρ ἐκριζωτὴς τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνταγωνιστής. 2.15 καὶ διὰ: R omits διὰ, following the corrector’s suggestion | {ἐπι}κρατεῖν: R reads κρατεῖν | ϕιλαργυρίας: corrector replaces this with ϕιλαρχίας, as does R / 2.17 Μωσῆς: R reads Μωυσῆς / 2.18 ἱκανὸς: corrector changes to δυνατὸς, followed by R / 2.21 ΘΣ = θεὸς / 2.22 ἐσθητηρίων: R reads αἰσθητηρίων / 2.23 δέδωκεν: R reads ἔδωκεν / 2.24 εἴποιτε ἢ: corrector changes to εἴποι τις ἄν εἰ, which R also prefers; the first ὁ λογισμὸς is now redundant in light of the lengthy correction supplied in the margin. / 3.1 ἐπικρατεῖν: corrector marks the ἐπι- for deletion / 3.2 τις ἐκκόψαι οὐ δύναται: R reads τις οὐ δύναται ἐκκόψαι | παρεχέσθαι: corrector changes to παρασχέσθαι, as does R / 3.4 ὑμῶν: R reads ἡμῶν

4 MACCABEES 2:13–24 & 3:1–5

9

account of evil. (14) And do not consider it to be paradoxical where reason is even able to restrain enmity on account of the Law, not laying waste the cultivated crops of enemies, but saving the enemies’ property from destroyers and helping them restore what had fallen down. (15) And reason is seen to hold fast also through the more violent passions – love of money and excessive ambition and pride and arrogance and envy. (16) For the self-controlled mind rejects all these malicious passions, even as it rejects anger, for it has power even over this. (17) Moses, indeed, when really angry against Dathan and Abiram, did nothing against them in anger, but through reason he moderated his anger. (18) For the self-controlled mind, as I said, is sufficient to gain the upper hand against the passions, to get rid of some of them, on the one hand, and to disregard others. (19) Otherwise, why did our all-wise father Jacob accuse those in the company of Simeon and Levi for irrationally slaying the Shechemites as a whole nation, saying “May their anger be cursed!”? (20) For if reason was not able to restrain anger, he would not have spoken thus. (21) For at the time that God fashioned humanity, he planted humanity’s passions and habits, (22) and at that time enthroned the mind, the sacred governor, over all things through the power of discernment. (23) And to this faculty he gave the Law. Governing one’s life according to the Law, the mind will rule a kingdom that is self-controlled and just and good and courageous. 2:24–3:18

Clarification of the Thesis

(Chapter 2:24) “How then,” you might say, “if reason is master of the passions, does it not control forgetfulness and ignorance?” (Chapter 3:1) But the question is entirely absurd, for reason gains mastery not over its own passions, but the passions of the body. (2) Any one of us is unable to root out a desire of that kind, but reason is able to keep bringing it about that we not be enslaved by desire. (3) Any one of you is unable to root out anger from the soul, but reason is able to help with anger. (4) Any one of you is unable to root out malice, but reason can fight alongside [you] so as not to yield to malice. (5) For reason is not the destroyer of the passions, but the antagonist.

10

4 MACCABEES 3:6–21

3.6 ἔστιν γοῦ(ν) τοῦτο διὰ τῆς ΔΑΔ τοῦ βασιλέως δίψης σαϕέστερον ἐπιλογίσασθαι. 3.7 ἐπεὶ γὰρ δι’ ὅλης ἡμέρας προσβαλὼν τοῖς ἀλλοϕύλοις ὁ Δαυ<ε>ιδ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινεν μετὰ τῶν τοῦ ἔθνους στρατιωτῶν, 3.8 τότε δὴ γενομένης ἑσπέρας ἑσπεύδεν ἱδρῶν καὶ σϕόδρα κεκμηκὼς ἐπὶ τὴ(ν) βασίλειον σκηνὴ(ν) ἦλθεν, περὶ ἣν ὁ πᾶς τῶν προγόνων στρατὸς ἐστρατοπαιδεύκει. 3.9 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἦσαν, 3.10 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς μάλιστα διψῶν, καίπερ ἀϕθόνους ἔχων πηγάς, οὐκ ἠδύνατο δι’ αὐτῶν ἰάσασθαι τὴν δίψα(ν), 3.11 ἀλλά τις αὐτὸν ἀλόγιστος ἐπιθυμία τοῦ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὕδατος ἐπιτ[ε]ίνουσα διέϕρυγε(ν)* καὶ λύουσα κατέϕλεγεν. 3.12 ὅθεν τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιθυμίᾳ σχετλιαζόντων δύο νεανίσκοι στρατιῶται καρτεροὶ καταιδεσθέντες τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιθυμίαν τὰς παντευχίας καθωπλίσαντο καὶ κάλπην λαβό(ν)τες ὑπερέβησαν τοὺς τῶν πολεμίω(ν) χάρακας. 3.13 καὶ λαθό(ν)τες τοὺς τῶν πυλῶν ἀκροϕύλακας διεξῄεσαν ἀνευρώμενοι* κατὰ πᾶ(ν) τὸ τῶν πολεμίων στρατόπεδον 3.14 καὶ ἀνευράμενοι τὴ(ν) πηγὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς θαρραλέως ἐκόμισαν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ποτόν. 3.15 ὁ δὲ καίπερ τὴν δίψαν διαπυρούμενος ἐλογίσατο πάνδ[ε]ινον εἶναι κίνδυνον ψυχῇ λογισθὲν ἰσοδύναμον ποτὸν αἵματι, 3.16 ὅθεν ἀντιθεὶς τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τὸν λογισμὸν ἔσπεισε(ν) τὸ πόμα τῷ ΘΩ. 3.17 δυνατὸς γὰρ ὁ σώϕρω(ν) νοῦς νικῆσαι τὰς τῶν παθῶν ἀνάγκας καὶ σβέσαι τὰς τῶν οἴστρων ϕλεγμονὰς 3.18 καὶ τὰς τῶ(ν) σωμάτων ἀλγηδόνας καθ’ ὑπερβολὴ(ν) δυνατὰς οὔσας καταπαλέσαι καὶ τῇ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀποπτύσαι πάσας τὰς τῶν παθῶν ἐπικρατείας. 3:19–4:26

Setting the Scene for the “Narrative Demonstration”

3.19 ἤδη δὲ καὶ ὁ καιρὸς ἡμᾶς καλεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξι(ν) τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ σώϕρονος λογισμοῦ. 3.20 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ βαθεῖαν εἰρήνην διὰ τὴν εὐνομία(ν) οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εἶχον καὶ ἔπραττο(ν) καλῶς ὥστε καὶ τὸ(ν) τῆς Άσίας βασιλέα Σέλευκον τὸν Νικάνορα καὶ χρήματα εἰς τὴν ἱερουργίαν αὐτοῖς ἀϕορίσαι καὶ τὴν πολ<ε>ιτείαν αὐτῶν ἀποδέχεσθαι, 3.21 τότε δή τινες πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν νεωτερίσαντες ὁμόνοιαν πολυτρόποις ἐχρήσαντο συμϕοραῖς.

3.6 ΔΑΔ = Δαυιδ / 3.8 ἑσπεύδεν: R omits | ἐστρατοπαιδεύκει: R reads ἐστρατοπεδεύκει / 3.10 μάλιστα: R reads ὡς μάλιστα / 3.11 διέϕρυγεν: corrector changes to συνέϕρυγεν, followed by R. / 3.13 ἀνευρώμενοι: corrected to ἀνερευνώμενοι in ms., followed by R / 3.15 τὴν δίψαν: R reads τῇ δίψῃ / 3.16 ΘΩ = θεῷ / 3.18 δυνατὰς: R omits | καταπαλέσαι: R reads καταπαλαῖσαι

4 MACCABEES 3:6–21

11

(6) This, moreover, can be more clearly considered by means of the thirst of David the king. (7) For since David was attacking the Philistines the whole day long, he, with many of the soldiers of the nation, killed many of them. (8) Then when evening came, he pressed on, perspiring heavily, and came, exceedingly wearied, into the royal tent, around which the whole army of our forebears had encamped. (9) All the others were at dinner, (10) but the king, thirsting exceedingly, even though having plentiful springs, was unable to satisfy his thirst by means of them. (11) But a certain irrational desire for the water where the enemy forces were present baked1 him as it tightened and consumed him as it loosened. (12) Therefore, since his armor-bearers were complaining bitterly about the desire of the king, two young, sturdy soldiers, feeling shame with regard to the king’s desire, armed themselves in full array and, taking a pitcher, assailed the barricades of the enemy. (13) Escaping the notice of the guards at the gates, they went through the army of the enemy, searching out2 everything. (14) And finding the spring, they bravely brought back from it a drink for the king. (15) But he, though set afire in regard to thirst, considered the drink, appraised as being of equal value to blood, as a fearful danger to his soul. (16) Therefore, setting reason against desire, he poured it out as a drink offering to God. (17) For the self-controlled mind is able to overcome the compulsions of the passions, and to quench the fires of the maddening desires, (18) and to wrestle with and defeat the sufferings of the bodies (even when these are strong in the extreme), and to spurn every dominion of the passions by means of the nobility and goodness of reason. 3:19–4:26

Setting the Scene for the “Narrative Demonstration”

(Chapter 3:19) But now indeed the time summons us to the narrative demonstration of the self-controlled reason. (20) For when our forebears were experiencing deep peace on account of the good ordering provided by the Law, and getting along well, with the result that even Seleucus Nicanor, the king of Asia, both apportioned money to them for the religious service and recognized their state – (21) then it was that certain people, introducing innovations against the general concord, took advantage of various unfortunate occurrences. 1

The corrector changes this to “inflamed.” Following the corrector of S; the original reading would mean “gaining everything,” probably in the sense of “gaining ground” by moving further and further into the enemy camp. 2

12

4 MACCABEES 4:1–14

4.1 Σιμων γάρ τις πρὸς Ονιαν ἀντιπολιτευόμενος τόν ποτε τὴν ἀρχιερωσύνην ἔχοντα διὰ βίου, καλὸν κ(αὶ) ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ἐπειδὴ πάντα τρόπον διαβάλλων ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔθνους οὐκ ἴσχυσεν κακῶσαι ϕυγὰς ὤχετο τὴν πατρίδα προδώσων. 4.2 ὅθε(ν) ἥκων ὡς Άπολλώνιον τὸν Συρίας τε καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ Κιλικίας στρατηγὸν ἔλεγεν, 4.3 εὔνους ὢν τοῖς τοῦ βασιλέως πράγμασιν ἥκω μηνύω(ν) πολλὰς ἰδιωτικῶ(ν) χρημάτων μυριάδας ἐν τοῖς Ιεροσολύμων γαζοϕυλακίοις τεθησαυρίσθαι τοῖς ἱεροῖς μὴ ἐπικοινωνούσας καὶ προσήκειν ταῦτα Σελεύκῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ. 4.4 τούτων ἕκαστα γνοὺς ὁ ̕Απολλώνιος τὸν μὲν Σιμωνα τῆς εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κηδεμονίας ἐπαινεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Σέλευκον ἀναβὰς κατεμήνυσε τὸν τῶν χρημάτων θησαυρόν. 4.5 καὶ ἔλαβεν τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξουσία(ν) καὶ ταχὺ εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἡμῶν μετὰ τοῦ καταράτου Σιμωνος καὶ βαρυτάτου στρατοῦ 4.6 προ{σ}ελθὼν ταῖς τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντολαῖς ἥκειν ἔλεγεν ὅπως τὰ ἰδιωτικὰ τοῦ γαζοϕυλακίου λάβοι χρήματα. 4.7 καὶ τοῦ ἔθνους πρὸς τὸν λόγον σχετλιάζοντος ἀντιλέγοντός τε, πάνδ[ε]ινον εἶναι νοήσαντες εἰ τὰς παρακαταθήκας οἱ πιστεύσαντες τῷ ἱερῷ θησαυρῷ στερηθήσονται, ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν ἐκώλυον. 4.8 μετὰ ἀπειλῶν δὲ ὁ Άπολλώνιος ἀπῄει εἰς τὸ ἱερόν. 4.9 τῶν δὲ γεραιῶν μετὰ γυναικῶν καὶ παιδίω(ν) ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἱκετευσάντων τὸν ΘΝ ὑπερασπίσαι τοῦ ἱεροῦ καταϕρονουμένου τοῦ τόπου 4.10 ἀνιόντος τε μετὰ καθωπλισμένης τῆς στρατιᾶς τοῦ Άπολλωνίου πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἁρπαγὴν οὐρανόθεν ἄγγελοι προυϕάνησα(ν) ἔϕιπποι περιαστράπτοντες τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ πολὺν αὐτῶν ϕόβον τε καὶ τρόμον ἐνιέ(ν)τες. 4.11 καταπεσών δέ τοι ἡμιθανὴς ὁ Άπολλώνιος ἐπὶ τὸν πάμϕυλο(ν) τοῦ ἱεροῦ περίβολον τὰς χεῖρας ἐξέτεινεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ μετὰ δακρύων τοὺς Εβραίους παρεκάλει ὅπως περὶ αὐτοῦ προσευξάμενοι τὸν οὐράνιον ἐξευμενίσωνται στρατόν. 4.12 ἔλεγεν γὰρ ἡμαρτηκὼς ὥστε καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ἄξιος ὑπάρχειν πᾶσίν τε ΑΝΟΙΣ ὑμνήσ[ε]ιν σωθεὶς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ τόπου μακαριότητα. 4.13 τούτοις ὑπαχθεὶς τοῖς λόγοις Ον<ε>ιας ὁ ἀρχιερεύς, καίπερ ἄλλως εὐλαβηθείς, μήποτε νομίσειεν ὁ βασιλεὺς Σέλευκος ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ μὴ θείας δίκης ἀνῃρῆσθαι τὸν Άπολλώνιον ηὔξατο περὶ αὐτοῦ. 4.14 καὶ ὁ μὲν παραδόξως διασωθεὶς ὤχετο δηλώσων τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ συμβάντα

4.2 ὡς: R reads πρὸς / 4.5 ἔλαβεν: R reads λαβὼν | R omits second καὶ / 4.6 προελθὼν: corrector changes to προσελθὼν, and R follows. / 4.7 νοήσαντες: R reads νομίσαντες | τὰς παρακαταθήκας οἱ πιστεύσαντες: R reads οἱ τὰς παρακαταθήκας πιστεύσαντες / 4.9 γεραιῶν: R reads ἱερέων | ΘΝ = θεὸν | τοῦ τόπου: R omits τοῦ / 4.10 ἄγγελοι προυϕάνησαν ἔϕιπποι: R reads ἔϕιπποι προυϕάνησαν ἄγγελοι | αὐτῶν: R reads αὐτοῖς / 4.11 δέ: R reads γέ / 4.12 ΑΝΟΙΣ = ἀνθρώποις / 4.17 συνθέμενος: corrected to συνθέμενον, followed by R

4 MACCABEES 4:1–14

13

(Chapter 4:1) For a certain Simon, being a political opponent of Onias (a noble and good man holding at that time the office of high priesthood for life), since he was unable to injure Onias despite bringing all manner of charges against him on behalf of the nation, fled as an exile with a view to betraying the homeland. (2) For this reason, he went when3 Apollonius [was] the governor of Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilica, and said: (3) “Being well-disposed toward the affairs of the king, I have come to make known4 that many tens of thousands in private funds have been set aside in the Temple treasury not mingled with the sacred funds, and that these would be suitable for King Seleucus.” (4) Apollonius, having learned each of these things, praises Simon for his care toward the king and, going up to Seleucus, made known the treasure of the funds. (5) And he received authority over them and, advancing in haste into our homeland with the cursed Simon and a formidable army, (6) he claimed to have come by the orders of the king in order that he might take hold of the private funds in the Temple treasury. (7) The nation, objecting and complaining bitterly against the statement, thinking it to be a dreadful thing if those who entrusted the deposits to the Temple would be deprived of them, was forbidding the action on that basis (lit., “since it was of such a kind”). (8) But after threatening the people, Apollonius went on into the Temple. (9) While in the Temple the elders together with the women and children were beseeching God to protect the Temple, as the place was being despised, (10) and while Apollonius was going up with the army, fully armed, for the plunder of the funds, angels on horseback appeared from heaven, flashing light with their weapons and implanting their considerable fear and trembling. (11) And then Apollonius, falling down half dead in the court of the Temple open to people of all races, stretched out his hands toward heaven and began to beg the Hebrews with tears that they might propitiate the heavenly army by praying for him. (12) For he was admitting to having sinned so as to deserve to die, but that, being delivered, he would laud the blessedness of the sacred place to all people. (13) Led on by these words, Onias the high priest, although in another way cautious lest Seleucus the king might think that Apollonius was done away with on the basis of human conspiracy and not divine justice, prayed concerning him. (14) And he, being unexpectedly rescued, went away to report to the king the things that happened to him. 3 Sinaiticus reads ὡς, which, since it would here be heard to introduce a dependent clause, requires that we understand the verb “was” to be implied; Rahlfs reads πρòς, which makes better sense in the present context: “he came to Apollonius, the governor. . . .” 4 μηvύωv is read here as a telic adverbial participle (Wallace 2000:277–278).

14

4 MACCABEES 4:14–26 & 5:1–5

αὐτῷ. 4.15 τελευτήσαντος δὲ Σελεύκου τοῦ βασιλέως διαδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Άντίοχος ὁ Έπιϕανής, ἀνὴρ ὑπερήϕανος καὶ δεινός, 4.16 ὃς καταλύσας τὸν Ον<ε>ιαν τῆς ἀρχιερωσύνης Ιασονα τὸν ἀδελϕὸ(ν) αὐτοῦ κατέστησεν ἀρχιερέα 4.17 συνθέμενος* δώσειν, εἰ ἐπιτρέψειεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν, κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν {τρισ}χ<ε>ίλια ἑξακόσια ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα. 4.18 ὁ δὲ ἐπέτρεψεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρχιερᾶσθαι καὶ ἀϕηγεῖσθαι τοῦ ἔθνους. 4.19 καὶ ἐξεδιῄτησεν τὸ ἔθνος καὶ ἐξεπολίτευσε(ν) ἐπὶ πᾶσαν παρανομίαν 4.20 ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἐπ’ αὐτῇ τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν γυμνάσιο(ν) κατασκευάσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταλῦσαι τὴ(ν) τοῦ ἱεροῦ κηδεμονίαν. 4.21 ἐϕ’ οἷς ἀγανακτήσασα ἡ θεία δίκη αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὸν Άντίοχον ἐπολέμησεν. 4.22 ἐπειδὴ πολεμῶν ἦν κατ’ Αἴγυπτον Πτολεμαίῳ, ἤκουσέν τε ὅτι ϕήμης διαδοθείσης περὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι αὐτὸν ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα οἱ Ιεροσολυμ<ε>ῖται χαίροιεν, ταχέως ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἀνέζευξεν, 4.23 καὶ ὡς ἐπόρθησεν αὐτούς, δόγμα ἔθετο ὅπως, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ϕάνοιεν τῷ πατρίῳ πολιτευόμενοι νόμῳ, θάνοιεν. 4.24 καὶ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἴσχυε(ν) καταλῦσαι διὰ τῶ(ν) δογμάτων τὴν τοῦ ἔθνους εὐνομίαν, ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπειλὰς καὶ τιμωρίας ἑώρα καταλυομένας 4.25 ὥστε καὶ γυναῖκας, ὅτι περιέτεμον τὰ παιδία, μετὰ τῶν βρεϕῶν κατακρημνισθῆναι προειδυίας ὅτι τοῦτο πείσο(ν)ται. 4.26 ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ κατεϕρονεῖτο ὑπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ, αὐτὸς διὰ βασάνων ἕνα ἕκαστον τοῦ ἔθνους ἠνάγκαζεν μιαρῶν ἀπογευομένους τροϕῶν ἐξόμνυσθαι τὸν Ιουδαϊσμόν. 5:1–38

Opening Arguments by Antiochus and Eleazar

5.1 προκαθίσας γέ τοι μετὰ τῶν συνέδρων ὁ τύραννος Άντίοχος ἐπί τινος ὑψηλοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν στρατευμάτων αὐτῷ παρεστηκότων κυκλόθε(ν) ἐνόπλων 5.2 παρεκέλευεν τοῖς δορυϕόροις ἕνα ἕκαστον Εβραῖον* ἐπισπᾶσθαι καὶ κρεῶν ὑείω(ν) καὶ [ε]ἰδωλοθύτω(ν) ἀναγκάζειν ἀπογεύεσθαι. 5.3 εἰ δέ τ{ιν}ες μὴ θέλοιεν μιαροϕαγῆσαι, τούτους τροχισθέντας ἀναιρεθῆναι. 5.4 πολλῶν δὲ συναρπασθέντω(ν) εἷς πρῶτος ἐκ τῆς ἀγέλης ὀνόματι Ελεαζαρος, τὸ γένος ἱερεύς, τὴν ἐπιστήμην νομικὸς καὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν προήκων καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν περὶ τὸν τύραννον διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γνώριμος παρήχθη πλησίο(ν) αὐτοῦ. 5.5 καὶ αὐτὸν ἰδὼν ὁ ̕Αντίοχος ἔϕη,

4.18 ἀϕηγεῖσθαι τοῦ ἔθνους: R reads τοῦ ἔθνους ἀϕηγεῖσθαι / 4.21 ἐπολέμησεν: R reads ἐπολέμωσεν / 4.22 ἐπειδὴ: R reads ἐπειδὴ γὰρ | οἱ Ιεροσολυμ<ε>ῖται χαίροιεν: R reads χαίροιεν οἱ Ιεροσολυμῖται / 4.23 εἴ τις: R reads εἴ τινες / 5.1 συνέδρων: the last three letters are not visible in the facsimile due to a tear and folding on the original. / 5.2 Εβραῖον: corrector changes to Εβραίων

4 MACCABEES 4:15–26 & 5:1–5

15

(15) But when Seleucus the king died, his son Antiochus Epiphanes, an arrogant and terrible man, received possession of the office. (16) Stripping Onias of the high priesthood, he appointed Onias’s brother Jason as high priest, (17) who agreed that he would give {three} thousand six hundred and sixty talents annually to the king if he would grant him the office. (18) And he allowed him both to be high priest and to lead the nation. (19) He both changed the nation’s customs and altered the constitution of the state toward every transgression, with the result not only that he built a gymnasium in the very citadel of our homeland, but also that he put an end to the care for the Temple. (21) Divine Justice having been angered at these things, she made Antiochus himself wage war against them. (22) When he was waging war against Egypt to Ptolemy’s harm and heard, a rumor having spread that he had died, that the residents of Jerusalem rejoiced exuberantly [lit., as much as is possible], he quickly moved against them, (23) and, after he ravaged them, issued a decree that if any of them should be seen to be living according to the ancestral law, they would die. (24) And when he was unable in any way to do away with the lawful observance of the nation through decrees, but rather saw all his own threats and penalties availing nothing, (25) with the result that even women were hurled down from cliffs together with their babies because they had circumcised their children (though knowing ahead of time that they would suffer this) – (26) when, therefore, his decrees were being despised by the people he himself began to force each individual of the nation by means of tortures to renounce Judaism by taking a taste of defiling foods. 5:1–38

Opening Arguments by Antiochus and Eleazar

(Chapter 5:1) The tyrant Antiochus, sitting magnificently in state in an elevated location, his soldiers standing together around him, fully armed, (2) commanded to his bodyguards to drag forward each and every Hebrew and to compel them to taste the meat of swine and of things sacrificed to idols, (3) but, if any would not consent to eat unclean food, to kill these by breaking them on the wheel. (4) After many had been seized, one leading person out of the herd – Eleazar by name; with regard to ancestral stock, a priest; with regard to experience, skilled in the law; and with regard to age, advanced and acquainted with many of those around the tyrant on account of his age – was brought near him. (5) And seeing him, Antiochus said:

16

4 MACCABEES 5:6–25

5.6 ἐγὼ, πρεσβῦτα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῶν κατὰ σοῦ βασάνων συμβουλεύσαιμ’ ἄν σοι ταῦτα ὅπως ἀπογευσάμενος τῶν ὑείων σῴζοιο. 5.7 αἰδοῦμαι γάρ σου τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν πολιάν, ἣ(ν) μετὰ τοσοῦτον ἔχων χρόνον οὔ μοι δοκεῖς ϕιλοσοϕεῖν τῇ Ιουδαίων χρώμενος θρησκ[ε]ίᾳ. 5.8 διὰ τί γὰρ τῆς ϕύσεως κεχαρισμένης καλλίστην τὴ(ν) τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου σαρκοϕαγίαν βδελύττῃ; 5.9 καὶ γὰρ ἀνόητο(ν) τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ἀπολαύειν τῶν χωρὶς ὀνείδους ἡδέων, καὶ ἄδικον ἀποστρέϕε[ι](ν)* τὰς τῆς ϕύσεως χάριτας. 5.10 σὺ δέ μοι καὶ ἀνοητότερον ποιήσειν δοκεῖς, εἰ κενοδοξῶν περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔτι κἀμοῦ καταϕρονήσεις ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ τιμωρίᾳ. 5.11 οὐκ ἐξυπνώσεις ἀπὸ τῆς ϕλυάρου* ϕιλοσοϕίας ὑμῶν καὶ ἀποσκεδάσεις τῶν λογισμῶν σου τὸν λῆρον καὶ ἄξιον τῆς ἡλικίας ἀναλαβὼν νοῦν ϕιλοσοϕήσεις τὴν τοῦ συμϕέροντος ἀλήθεια(ν) 5.12 καὶ προσκυνήσας μου τὴν ϕιλάνθρωπον παρηγορίαν οἰκτ<ε>ιρήσεις τὸ σεαυτοῦ γῆρας; 5.13 καὶ γὰρ ἐ(ν)θυμήθητι {ὡς}, εἰ καί τίς ἐστιν τῆσδε τῆς θρησκείας ὑμῶν ἐποπτικὴ δύναμις, συνγνωμονήσειεν σοι ἐπὶ πάσῃ δι’ ἀνάγκην παρανομίᾳ γινομένῃ. 5.14 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπο(ν) ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκθεσμο(ν) σαρκοϕαγίαν ἐποτρύνοντος τοῦ τυράννου λόγον ἤτησεν ὁ Ελεαζαρος 5.15 καὶ λαβὼν τοῦ λέγειν ἐξουσίαν ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν οὕτως, 5.16 ἡμεῖς, Ἀντίοχε, θείῳ πεπεισμένοι νόμῳ πολιτεύεσθαι οὐδεμίαν ἀνάγκην βιαιοτέρα(ν) εἶναι νομίζομεν τῆς πρὸς τὸν νόμο(ν) ἡμῶν εὐπειθείας. 5.17 διὸ δὴ κατ̕ οὐδένα τρόπον παρανομεῖ(ν) ἀξιοῦμεν. 5.18 καίτοι εἰ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν μὴ ἦν ὁ νόμος ἡμῶ(ν), ὡς ὑπολαμβάνεις, θεῖος, ἄλλως δὲ ἐνομίζομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῖον, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐξὸν ἦν ἡμῖ(ν) τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ εὐσεβ[ε]ίᾳ δόξαν ἀκυρῶσαι. 5.19 μὴ μ<ε>ικρὰν οὖν εἶναι νομίσῃς ταύτην, εἰ μιαροϕαγήσαιμεν, ἁμαρτίαν. 5.20 τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις παρανομεῖν ἰσοδύναμόν ἐστιν, 5.21 δι’ ἑκατέρου γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως ὁ νόμος ὑπερηϕανεῖται. 5.22 χλευάζεις δὲ ἡμῶν τὴ(ν) ϕιλοσοϕίαν ὥσπερ οὐ μετὰ εὐλογιστίας ἐν αὐτῇ βιούντων· 5.23 σωϕροσύνην τε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐκδιδάσκει ὥστε πασῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶ(ν) κρατεῖν καὶ ἀνδρ[ε]ίαν ἐκδιδάσκει<ν>* ὥστε πάντα πόνο(ν) ἑκουσίως ὑπομένειν 5.24 καὶ δικαιοσύνην παιδεύει ὥστε διὰ πάντων τῶ(ν) ἠθῶν ἰσονομεῖ(ν) καὶ εὐσέβειαν ἐκδιδάσκει ὥστε μόνο(ν) τὸν ὄντα ΘΝ σέβει(ν) μεγαλοπρεπῶς. 5.25 διὸ οὐ μιαροϕαγοῦμεν,

5.6 πρεσβῦτα: R places the vocative ὦ πρεσβῦτα after βασάνων instead / 5.9 ἀποστρέϕειν: R, following the corrector, reads ἀποστρέϕεσθαι (“refuse”) / 5.11 ϕλυάρου: corrector unhelpfully changes to ϕλοιάρου / 5.13 συνγνωμονήσειεν: R reads συγγνωμονήσειεν ἄν / 5.23 ἐκδιδάσκεῖ[ν]: corrector changes to ἐξασκεῖ (“exercises us in”), followed by R. The verb ἐκδιδάσκειν is here translated as ἐκδιδάσκει, regarding the final nu as an error. / 5.24 ΘΝ = θεὸν / 5.25 ΘΥ = θεοῦ | συνπαθῇ: R reads συμπαθεῖ

4 MACCABEES 5:6–25

17

(6) “Before beginning the tortures against you, old man, I myself would advise you with regard to these matters in order that you might save yourself by tasting the pork. (7) For I have regard for your old age and your gray hairs. Even though you have had those for so long a time, you do not seem to me to be proficient in philosophy as you make use of the religion of the Jews. (8) For why, when nature has graciously provided a most excellent thing, do you abhor the meat of this animal? (9) For it is indeed senseless not to enjoy pleasant things that are without disgrace, and unjust to turn away the gifts of Nature. (10) But you seem to me to do something even more senseless if, while holding an empty opinion about the truth, you would yet treat even me with contempt in the face of your own punishment. (11) Will you not wake up from your foolish philosophy and dismiss the empty talk of your arguments, and, taking up a mind worthy of your years, philosophize according to the truth of what is beneficial, (12) and, prostrating yourself before my benevolent comfort, have compassion on your old age? (13) For also consider this: if indeed there is some power watching over this religion of yours, may it pardon you for any transgression arising on account of compulsion.” (14) The tyrant having urged him on in this manner to the eating of the unlawful meat, Eleazar requested a word. (15) And receiving liberty to speak, he began to deliver his public address thus: (16) “We, Antiochus, having been persuaded to lead our lives by the divine law, consider no compulsion to be more fierce than ready obedience to our law. (17) For this reason, indeed, we think it right in no way to transgress the law. (18) On the other hand, if, as you suppose, our law were not truly divine, but we were otherwise assuming it to be divine, not even so would it be proper for us to nullify our reputation for piety. (19) Do not, therefore, think this to be a small sin, if we were to eat unclean food, (20) for to transgress the law in small things or large things is equally potent, (21) for through either the law is despised in the same manner. (22) You are sneering at our philosophy, as if our living by it were imprudent, (23) for it thoroughly teaches us moderation so that we restrain all pleasures and desires, and it thoroughly teaches us courage so that we endure every pain willingly, (24) and it instructs us in justice so that we render what is due in all our interactions, and it thoroughly teaches us piety so that we revere the only existing God in a manner befitting his greatness. (25) Therefore we do not eat unclean food, for, believing of God that he established the law, we know that the Creator of the world has

18

4 MACCABEES 5:25–38 & 6:1–5

πιστεύοντες γὰρ ΘΥ καθεστάναι τὸν νόμον οἴδαμε(ν) ὅτι κατὰ ϕύσιν ἡμῖν συνπαθῇ νομοθετῶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου κτίστης. 5.26 τὰ μὲν οἰκειωθησόμενα ἡμῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπέτρεψεν ἐσθίειν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντιωθησόμενα ἐκώλυσεν σαρκοϕαγεῖν. 5.27 τυραννικὸ(ν) δὲ οὐ μόνον ἀναγκάζειν ἡμᾶς μιαροϕαγεῖν ἀλλὰ κ(αὶ) παρανομεῖν, ὅπως τῇ ἐκθίστῃ* ἡμῶ(ν) μιαροϕαγίᾳ ταύτῃ ἐπεγγελάσῃς. 5.28 ἀλλ’ οὐ γελάσεις κατ’ ἐμοῦ τοῦτον τὸ(ν) γέλωτα, 5.29 οὔδε* τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν προγόνων περὶ τὸ ϕυλάξαι τὸν νόμον ὅρκους οὐ παρήσω, 5.30 οὐδ’ ἂν ἐκκόψειάς μου τὰ ὄμματα καὶ τὰ σπλάγχνα μου τήξει{α}ς* 5.31 οὐχ οὕτως εἰμὶ γέρων ἐγὼ κ(αὶ) ἄνανδρος ὥστε μοι διὰ τὴν εὐσέβεια(ν) μὴ νεάζειν τὸν λογισμόν. 5.32 πρὸς ταῦτα τροχοὺς εὐτρέπιζε καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐκϕύσα σϕοδρότερον. 5.33 οὐχ οὕτως οἰκτ<ε>ίρομαι τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ γῆρας ὥστε δι’ ἐμαυτοῦ τὸν πάτριον καταλῦσαι νόμο(ν). 5.34 οὐ ψεύσομαί σε, παιδευτὰ νόμε, οὐδὲ ἐξομοῦμαί σε, ϕίλη ἐγκράτεια, 5.35 οὐδὲ καταισχυνῶ σε, ϕιλόσοϕε λόγε, οὐδὲ ἐξαρνήσομαί σε, ἱερωσύνη τιμία κ(αὶ) νομοθεσίας ἐπιστήμη. 5.36 οὐδὲ μιανεῖ{ς} μου τὸ σεμνὸν γήρως στόμα οὐδὲ νομίμου βίου ἡλικία(ν). 5.37 ἁγνόν {δέ} με οἱ πατέρες εἰσδέξονται* μὴ ϕοβηθέντα σου τὰς μέχρι θανάτου ἀνάγκας. 5.38 ἀσεβῶν μὲν γὰρ τυραννήσεις, τῶν δὲ ἐμῶ(ν) ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας λογισμῶν οὔτε λόγοις δεσπόσεις οὔτε δι’ ἔργων. 6:1–30

Eleazar Agonistes

6.1 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπο(ν) ἀντιρητορεύσαντος* ταῖς τοῦ τυρά(ν)νου παρηγορίαις παραστάντες οἱ δορυϕόροι πικρῶς ἔσυραν ἐπὶ τὰ βασανιστήρια τὸν Ελεαζαρον. 6.2 καὶ πρῶτο(ν) μὲν περιέδυσαν τὸν γεραιὸν ἐνκοσμούμενον τῇ περὶ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν εὐσχημοσύνῃ. 6.3 ἔπειτα περιαγκωνίσα(ν)τες ἑκατέρωθεν μάστιξιν κατῄκιζο(ν), 6.4 π[ε]ίσθητι ταῖς τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντολαῖς, ἑτέρωθεν κήρυκος ἐπιβοῶντος. 6.5 ὁ δὲ μεγα-

5.27 μιαροϕαγεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ παρανομεῖν: corrector replaces μιαροϕαγεῖν with ἐσθίειν; R reads παρανομεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐσθίειν | ἐκθίστῃ: corrector changes to ἐσχίστῃ; R reads ἐχθίστῃ / 5.29 οὔδε: corrector changes to οὔ μά; R reads οὔτε | τὸ ϕυλάξαι: R reads τοῦ ϕυλάξαι / 5.30 μου is represented in the ms. by Μ superimposed over Υ with a small omicron written above the line; corrector marks for deletion | τήξεις; corrector, followed by R, changes the aorist participle to τήξειας, which is necessary for sound grammar. Given the author’s adroitness in Greek (and special penchant for optatives, which he was therefore unlikely to have formed improperly) was probably the original reading. / 5.37 εἰσδέξονται: corrector changes to προσδέξονται / 6.1 ἀντιρητορεύσαντος: corrector changes to ἀντιρρητορεύσαντος, while R rightly changes the form from genitive to accusative, ἀντιρρητορεύσαντα. / 6.2 ἐνκοσμούμενον: R renders ἐγκοσμούμενον

4 MACCABEES 5:25–38 & 6:1–5

19

shown sympathy toward us in accordance with Nature by giving the law. (26) On the one hand, he permitted us to eat the things that would be the best suited to our persons, but, on the other hand, he forbade us to eat the things that would be adverse. (27) But it is tyrannical not only to compel us to eat unclean food, but also to transgress the law in order that you might laugh at our consumption of this hated, unclean food. (28) But you will not laugh this laugh against me, (29) nor will I disregard the sacred oaths of the ancestors concerning the safeguarding of the law, (30) not even if you cut out my eyes and melt down my entrails. (31) I am indeed not so old and unmanly that my reason is not young in me for the sake of piety. (32) To this end, prepare the wheels and fan the fire more vehemently. (33) I do not so pity my old age as to tear down the ancestral law through my own agency. (34) I will not be false to you, my law and instructor, neither will I disown you, beloved self-control. (35) I will not disgrace you, philosophical reason, nor will I renounce you, honored priesthood and understanding of the law appointed for us, (36) neither will you defile the honorable mouth of my old age nor the long span of my law-abiding life. (37) The fathers will receive me, not fearing your constraints up to the point of death, innocent. (38) For you will tyrannize impious people, but you will not have power over my reasonings on behalf of piety either by words or through actions.” 6:1–30

Eleazar Agonistes

(Chapter 6:1) After Eleazar had refuted the arguments of the tyrant in this way, the bodyguards who had been standing around dragged him off cruelly to the instruments of torture. (2) And first they stripped the old man, although he continued to be adorned with the seemliness of piety. (3) Then, having bound his arms around him, they flogged him with whips on either side (4) while a herald called out opposite him, “obey the commands of the king!” (5) But the high-minded and noble man, as truly

20

4 MACCABEES 6:5–26

λόϕρων καὶ εὐγενὴς ὡς ἀληθῶς Ελεαζαρος ὥσπερ ἐν ὀνείρῳ βασανιζόμενος κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπο(ν) μετετρέπετο, 6.6 ἀλλὰ ὑψηλοὺς ἀνατείνας εἰς οὐρανὸ(ν) τοὺς ὀϕθαλμοὺς ἀπεξαίνετο ταῖς μάστιξιν τὰς σάρκας ὁ γέρων καὶ κατερρ[ε]ῖτο τῷ αἵματι καὶ τὰ πλευρὰ* κατετιτρώσκετο. 6.7 καὶ πίπτων εἰς τὸ ἔδαϕος ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ϕέρειν τὸ σῶμα τὰς ἀλγηδόνας ὀρθὸν εἶχεν καὶ ἀκλ<ε>ινῆ τὸν λογισμόν. 6.8 λάξ γέ τοι τῶ(ν) πικρῶν τις δορυϕόρων εἰς τοὺς κενεῶνας ἐναλλόμενος ἔτυπτε(ν), ὅπως ἐξανίστα{ι}το πίπτων. 6.9 ὁ δὲ ὑπέμενε τοὺς πόνους καὶ περιεϕρόνει τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ διεκαρτέρει τοὺς αἰκισμούς, 6.10 κ(αὶ) καθάπερ γενναῖος ἀθλητὴς τυπτόμενος ἐνίκα τοὺς βασανίζοντας ὁ γέρων. 6.11 ἱδρῶν γέ τοι τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ ἐπασθμαίνων σϕοδρῶς καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν βασανιζόντων ἐθαυμάζετο τῇ εὐψυχίᾳ. 6.12 ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἐλεῶντες τὰ τοῦ γήρως αὐτοῦ, 6.13 τὰ δὲ ἐν συμπαθείᾳ τὴν* συνηθείαν* ὄντες, τὰ δὲ ἐν θαυμασμῷ τῆς καρτερίας προσιόντες αὐτῷ τινες τοῦ βασιλέως ἔλεγο(ν), 6.14 {τί} τοῖς κακοῖς τούτοις σεαυτὸν ἀπόλλεις ἀλογίστως, Ελεαζαρ; 6.15 ἡμεῖς μέν τοι τῶν ἡψημένων βρωμάτων παραθήσομεν, σὺ δὲ ὑποκρινόμενος τῶν ὑείων ἀπογεύεσθαι σώζοιο. 6.16 καὶ ὁ Ελεαζαρος ὥσπερ πικρότερον διὰ τῆς συμβουλίας αἰκισθεὶς ἀνεβόησεν, 6.17 μὴ οὕτως κακῶς ϕρονήσαιμεν οἱ Αβρααμ παῖδες ὥστε μαλακοψυχήσαντας ἀπρεπὲς ἡμῖν δρᾶμα ὑποκρίνασθαι. 6.18 καὶ γὰρ ἀλόγιστον εἰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ζήσαντες* τὸν μέχρι γήρως βίο(ν) καὶ τὴν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δόξαν νομίμως ϕυλάσσοντες* νῦν μεταβαλοίμεθα 6.19 καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἡμεῖς γενώμεθα τοῖς νέοις ἀσεβείας τύπος, ἵνα παράδ[ε]ιγμα γενώμεθα τῆς μιαροϕαγίας. 6.20 αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἰ ἐπιβιώσομεν ὀλίγον χρόνον καὶ τοῦτον καταγελώμενοι ὑπὸ πάντων ἐπὶ δειλίᾳ 6.21 καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ τυράννου καταϕρονηθῶμεν ὡς ἄνανδροι, τὸν δὲ θεῖον ἡμῶν νόμον μέχρι θανάτου μὴ προασπίσαιμε(ν), 6.22 ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ Αβρααμ παῖδες, εὐγενῶς ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐσεβείας τελευτᾶτε. 6.23 οἱ δὲ τοῦ τυράννου δορυϕόροι, τί μέλλετε; 6.24 πρὸς τὰς ἀνάγκας οὕτως μεγαλοϕρονοῦντα αὐτὸν ἰδόντες καὶ μηδὲ πρὸς τὸν οἰκτ<ε>ιρμὸν αὐτῶ(ν) μεταβαλλόμενον ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸν ἀνῆγον. 6.25 ἔνθα διὰ κακοτέχνων ὀργάνω(ν) καταϕλέγοντες αὐτὸν ὑπερίπτοσα(ν), καὶ δυσώδεις χυλοὺς εἰς τοὺς μυκτῆρας αὐτοῦ κατέχεον. 6.26 ὁ δὲ μέχρι τῶν ὀστέων ἤδη

6.6 τὰ πλευρὰ: corrector wrongly adds final sigma, τὰ πλευρὰς / 6.11 τῇ εὐψυχίᾳ: R reads ἐπὶ τῇ εὐψυχίᾳ / 6.13 τὴν συνηθείαν: corrected to τῆς συνηθείας, followed by R / 6.14 ἀπόλλεις ἀλογίστως: R reads ἀλογίστως ἀπόλλεις / 6.15 σώζοιο: R reads σώθητι / 6.18 ζήσαντες: corrected to ζήσαντας | ϕυλάσσοντες: corrector changes to ϕυλάξαντες / 6.19 γενώμεθα: R reads γενοίμεθα / 6.20 ὑπὸ πάντων: R reads πρὸς ἁπάντων / 6.22 ὑμεῖς μέν: R reads πρὸς ταῦτα ὑμεῖς μέν / 6.25 ὑπερίπτοσαν: corrector deletes -σα-; R reads ὑπερρίπτοσαν / 6.26 κεκαυμένος: R reads κατακεκαυμένος | ΘΝ = θεὸν

4 MACCABEES 6:5–26

21

“Eleazar,” as though being tortured in a dream, in no way altered his course. (6) But lifting his eyes high up toward heaven, the old man was being torn up by the whips with regard to his flesh and was dripping with blood and his sides were being wounded severely. (7) And though falling to the ground because his body was unable to bear the sufferings, he held his reason upright and unwavering. (8) One of the cruel bodyguards, leaping forward, began to strike him in his sides with his foot in order that he might stand up after falling. (9) But he was enduring the pains and despising the compulsion and withstanding the mistreatments, (10) and like a noble athlete the old man, while being beaten, was conquering the torturers. (11) Indeed, sweat dripping from his face and panting heavily, he was marveled at by the torturers themselves in regard to his noble spirit. (12) And so, motivated in part by compassion in regard to his old age, (13) in part by sympathy since he was an acquaintance, in part by amazement for his endurance, some of the king’s party, coming up to him, began to say: (14) You are irrationally destroying yourself by means of these injuries, Eleazar. (15) We, then, will set out some boiled meat, and you may save yourself by pretending to partake of meat from a pig. (16) And Eleazar, as if tormented more bitterly by means of this advice, cried out: (17) “May we, the children of Abraham, never think so basely as to act out a deed unsuitable to us because we are faint-hearted! (18) For it is indeed irrational if, having lived for the truth for the whole extent of life up to old age and having lawfully guarded our reputation built upon such a life, we should now change our course (19) and we ourselves become a model of impiety for the young, so that we provide a precedent for eating unclean food. (20) It would be disgraceful if we should survive for a short time – and for the duration of this time being laughed at by all for cowardice – (21) and be despised by the tyrant as unmanly, as though we might not defend our divine law to the point of death. (22) You, for your part, O children of Abraham, die nobly for the sake of piety! (23) And you, bodyguards of the tyrant, what are you waiting for?” (24) Seeing him so high-minded in regard to the constraints and not changing his mind in response to their compassion, they brought him to the fire. (25) Burning him there with the tools of their evil arts, they threw him down and were pouring foul-smelling, boiling liquids into his nostrils. (26) But he, already burnt to the bones and about to succumb,

22

4 MACCABEES 6:26–35 & 7:1–9

κεκαυμένος καὶ μέλλων λιποθυμεῖν ἀνέτεινε τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὸν ΘΝ καὶ εἶπεν, 6.27 σὺ οἶσθα, ΘΕ, παρόν μοι σῴζεσθαι βασάνοις καυστικαῖς ἀποθνῄσκω διὰ τὸν νόμον. 6.28 ἵλεως γενοῦ τῷ ἔθνει σου ἀρκεσθεὶς τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δίκῃ. 6.29 καθάρσιον αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι τὸ ἐμὸν αἷμα καὶ ἀντίψυχο(ν) αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν. 6.30 καὶ ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ ἱερὸς ἀνὴρ εὐγενῶς ταῖς βασάνοις ἐναπέθανεν καὶ μέχρι τῶν τοῦ θανάτου βασάνων ἀντέστη τῷ λογισμῷ διὰ τὸ(ν) νόμον. 6:31–7:23

Restatement of the Thesis and Encomium for Eleazar

6.31 ὁμολογουμένως οὖν δεσπότης τῶν παθῶν ἐστιν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός. 6.32 εἰ γὰρ τὰ πάθη τοῦ λογισμοῦ κεκρατήκει τούτοις ἂν ἀπέδομην τὴν τῆς ἐπικρατ[ε]ίας μαρτυρίαν. 6.33 νυνὶ δὲ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὰ πάθη νικήσαντος αὐτῷ προσηκόντως τὴν τῆς ἡγεμονίας προσνέμομεν ἐξουσίαν. 6.34 καὶ δίκαιό(ν) ἐστιν ὁμολογεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸ κράτος εἶναι τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὅπου γε καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀλγηδόνων ἐπικρατεῖ ἐπεὶ καὶ* γελοῖον. 6.35 καὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ἐπιδ[ε]ίκνυμι κρατεῖν τὸν λογισμόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρατεῖ(ν) καὶ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ὑπείκειν. 7.1 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄριστος κυβερνήτης ὁ τοῦ ΠΡΣ ἡμῶν Ελεαζαρου λογισμὸς πηδαλιουχῶν τὴν τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας ναῦν ἐν τῷ τῶν παθῶν πελάγει 7.2 καταικιζόμενος τυράννου ἀπειλαῖς καὶ καταντλούμενος ταῖς τῶν βασάνων τρικυμίαις 7.3 κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπο(ν) ἔτρεψε τοὺς τῆς εὐσεβείας οἴακας, ἕως οὗ ἔπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ(ν) τῆς ἀθανάτου νίκης λιμένα. 7.4 οὐχ οὕτως πόλις πολλοῖς καὶ ποικίλοις μηχανήμασιν ἀντέσχε ποτὲ πολιορκουμένη, ὡς ὁ πανάγιος ἐκεῖνος τὴν ἱερὰν ψυχὴν αἰκισμοῖς καὶ στρέβλαις πυρπολούμενος ἐνίκησεν τοὺς πολιορκοῦντας διὰ τὸν ὑπερασπίζοντα τῆς εὐσεβείας λογισμό(ν). 7.5 ὥσπερ γὰρ πρόκρημνο(ν) ἄκραν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διάνοιαν ὁ ΠΗΡ Ελεαζαρ ἐκτείνας περιέκλασεν τοὺς ἐπιμαινομένους τῶ(ν) παθῶν κλύδωνας. 7.6 ὦ ἄξιε τῆς ἱερωσύνης ἱερεῦ, οὐκ ἐμίανας τοὺς ἱεροὺς ὀδόντας οὐδὲ τὴν θεοσέβ[ε]ιαν καὶ καθαρισμὸν χωρήσασαν γαστέρα ἐκοίνωσας μιαροϕαγίᾳ. 7.7 ὦ σύμϕωνε νόμου καὶ ϕιλόσοϕε θείου βίου. 7.8 τοιούτους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς δημιουργοῦντας τὸν νόμον ἰδίῳ αἵματι καὶ γενναίῳ ἱδρῶτι τοῖς μέχρι θανάτου πάθεσιν ὑπερασπίζοντας. 7.9 σύ, ΠΕΡ, τὴν εὐνομίαν ἡμῶν διὰ τῶν 6.27 ΘΕ = θεέ / 6.29 ποιῆσαι: R reads ποίησον / 6.32 ἀπέδομην: R emends to ἀπέδομεν / 6.34 καὶ γελοῖον: corrector deletes καὶ / 6.35 first κρατεῖν: R reads κεκρατηκέναι / 7.1 ΠΡΣ = πατρὸς / 7.2 καταικιζόμενος: R prefaces with καὶ | τυράννου ἀπειλαῖς: R prefaces with ταῖς τοῦ / 7.4 καὶ στρέβλαις: R prefaces with τε / 7.5 ΠΗΡ = πατὴρ / 7.9 ΠΕΡ = πάτερ | ἁγιαστίαν: corrector appears to have changed this to ἀπαστίαν, “abstinence from foods,” by joining the Γ and the Ι. This is an understandable change given the context, but ultimately unnecessary to make good sense.

4 MACCABEES 6:26–35 & 7:1–9

23

lifted his eyes to God and said: (27) “You know, God, that though I had opportunity to save myself, I am dying by fiery torments on account of the law. (28) Become merciful to your nation, being satisfied with our punishment on their behalf. (29) Make my blood their purification and take my life as a ransom for theirs.” (30) And having said these things, the holy man died nobly in torments and held his ground to the point of tortures unto death on account of the law by means of reason. 6:31–7:23

Restatement of the Thesis and Encomium for Eleazar

(Chapter 6:31) Undeniably, then, devout reason is master of the passions. (32) For if the passions had taken hold of reason, we would have given testimony of mastery to these. (33) But now, reason having conquered the passions, we suitably assign the capacity of rule to it. (34) And it is just for us to confess the dominion to belong to reason when it masters even the sufferings inflicted from outside – to say otherwise is absurd indeed! (35) I demonstrate that reason masters not only pains but also masters pleasures and is subject to them in no way. (Chapter 7:1) For just as an excellent navigator, the reason of our father Eleazar, steering the ship of piety in the open sea of the passions, (2) assailed by the tyrant’s threats and flooded by the high waves of the tortures, (3) in no way turned the handles of the rudder of piety until it had sailed into the harbor of immortal victory. (4) No city thus besieged with many and varied siege engines ever held out like that thoroughly holy man. Allowing his holy self to be burnt up by punishments and instruments of torture, he conquered the besiegers through his reason as it shielded piety. (5) Stretching out his mind like an overhanging cliff, father Eleazar broke the raging waves of the passions. (6) O priest, worthy of the priesthood! You did not defile your sacred teeth nor make your stomach, which made room for religion and purification, unclean by eating defiling foods. (7) O man in harmony with the law and philosopher of a life dedicated to God! (8) It is necessary for those administering the law to be of such a kind, shielding it with their own blood and noble sweat in the midst of sufferings unto death. (9) You, father, ratified our observance of the law through your endurance unto glory; you did not cut the ritual short after making solemn invocations;

24

4 MACCABEES 7:9–23 & 8:1–2

ὑπομονῶν εἰς δόξα(ν) ἐκύρωσας καὶ τὴν ἁγιαστίαν* σεμνολογήσας οὐ κατέλυσας καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιστοποίησας τοὺς τῆς θείας ϕιλοσοϕίας σου λόγους, 7.10 ὦ βασάνων βιαιότερε γέρω(ν) καὶ πυρὸς εὐτονώτερε πρεσβῦ{τα} καὶ παθῶ(ν) μέγιστε βασιλεῦ Ελεαζαρ. 7.11 ὥσπερ {γὰρ} ὁ ΠΗΡ Ααρων τῷ θυμιατηρίῳ καθωπλισμένος διὰ τοῦ ἐθνοπλήθους ἐπιτρέχων {τὸν ἐνπυρισμὸν} ἐνίκησε(ν) τὸν* ἄγγελον, 7.12 οὕτως ὁ Ααρωνίδης Ελεαζαρ διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ὑπερτηκόμενος οὐ μετετράπη τὸν λογισμό(ν). 7.13 καίτοι τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, γέρων ὢν λελυμένων μὲν ἤδη τῶν τοῦ σώματος τόνων, περικεχαλασμένων δὲ τῶν σαρκῶ(ν), κεκμηκότων δὲ κ(αὶ) τῶν νεύρων ἀνενέασεν 7.14 τῷ ΠΝΙ διὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τῷ Ισακίῳ λογισμῷ τὴν πολυκέϕαλον στρέβλα(ν) ἐνίκησεν. 7.15 ὦ μακαρίου γήρως καὶ σεμνῆς πολιᾶς καὶ βίου νομίμου, ὃν πιστὴ θανάτου σϕραγὶς ἐτελείωσεν. 7.16 εἰ δὲ τοίνυν γέρω(ν) ἀνὴρ τῶν μέχρι θανάτου βασάνων περιεϕρόνει δι’ εὐσέβεια(ν), ὁμολογουμένως ἡγεμών ἐστιν τῶ(ν) παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός. 7.17 ἴσως {δ’} ἂν εἴποιέν τινες, τῶν παθῶν οὐ πάντες περικρατοῦσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ πάντες ϕρόνιμον ἔχουσιν τὸ(ν) λογισμόν. 7.18 ἀλλ’ ὅσοι τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας προνοοῦσιν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας, οὗτοι μόνοι δύνα(ν)ται κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν 7.19 πιστεύοντες ὅτι ΘΩ οὐκ ἀποθνῄσκουσι(ν) ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ πατριάρχαι ἡμῶν Αβρααμ καὶ Ισαακ καὶ Ιακωβ ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν ΘΩ. 7.20 οὐδὲ(ν) οὖν ἐναντιοῦται τὸ ϕαίνεσθαί τινας παθοκρατεῖσθαι ῆ* διὰ τὸν ἀσθενῆ λογισμόν. 7.21 ἐπεὶ τίς πρὸς ὅλον τὸν τῆς ϕιλοσοϕίας κανόνα ϕιλοσοϕῶν καὶ πεπιστευκὼς ΘΩ 7.22 καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πάντα πόνο(ν) ὑπομένειν μακάριόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν περικρατήσειεν τῶν παθῶν διὰ τὴν θεοσέβειαν; 7.23 μόνος γὰρ σοϕὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν παθῶ(ν) ΚΣ. 8:1–14

Antiochus Addresses the Seven Brothers

8.1 διὰ τοῦτό γέ τοι καὶ μ[ε]ιρακίσκοι τῷ τῆς εὐσεβείας λογισμῷ ϕιλοσοϕοῦ(ν)τες χαλεπωτέρων βασανιστηρίων ἐπεκράτησαν. 8.2 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν ἐνικήθη περιϕανῶς ὁ τύραννος μὴ δυνιθεὶς ἀναγκάσαι γέροντα μιαροϕαγῆσαι, τότε δὴ σϕόδρα περιπαθῶς

7.11 ΠΗΡ = πατὴρ | ἐμπυρισμὸν: R reads ἐμπυριστὴν | τὸν ἄγγελον: corrector and R omit τὸν / 7.14 ΠΝΙ = πνεύματι | ἐνίκησεν: R reads ἠκύρωσεν / 7.16 δὲ: R reads δὴ / 7.19 ΘΩ = θεῷ; R reads τῷ θεῷ / 7.20 ῆ, taking the eta as the adverbial particle of affirmation (viz., “in truth, indeed”) rather than the conjunction, article, or relative pronoun. The corrector, followed by R, omits ῆ. / 7.21 ΘΩ = θεῷ / 7.23 σοϕὸς: R prefaces with ὁ | ΚΣ = κύριος / 8.2 δυνιθεὶς: R reads δυνηθεὶς

4 MACCABEES 7:9–23 & 8:1–2

25

and through deeds you made your words of divine philosophy credible. (10) Old man, more forceful than tortures, and elder, more vigorous than fire, and great king over the passions – Eleazar! (11) Just as father Aaron, arming himself with the censer and running through the multitude of the nation, conquered the angel, (12) so Aaron’s descendant Eleazar did not alter his reason, though being violently consumed by means of fire. (13) Most amazing – though being an old man, the cords of his body already unstrung, the muscles relaxed, the sinews worn out, he renewed his youth (14) in spirit through reason and, with a reasoning faculty like that of Isaac, conquered the many-headed instrument of torture. (15) O man of blessed old age and respectable gray hair and life lawfully lived, whom the trustworthy seal of death perfected! (16) If, therefore, an old man despised torments to the point of death for the sake of piety, admittedly pious reason is governor of the passions. (17) Some people might say, perhaps, “Not all control the passions, because not all keep their reason prudent.” (18) But as many as have a care for piety from the whole heart – these alone are able to restrain the passions of the flesh, (19) trusting that they do not die to God, just as neither our patriarchs Abraham and Isaac and Jacob did, but live to God. (20) Therefore, for some people to be seen indeed to be ruled by the passions on account of the weakness of their reason contradicts this in no respect. (21) For who, philosophizing with reference to the whole rule of philosophy, and trusting God, (22) and knowing that it is blessed to endure every pain on account of virtue, would not control the passions on account of religion?! (23) For only a wise and courageous person is lord of the passions. 8:1–14

Antiochus Addresses the Seven Brothers

(Chapter 8:1) For this reason indeed, even young boys, by pursuing a life of philosophy with reason characterized by piety, mastered even more violent instruments of torture. (2) For when the tyrant was openly defeated in his first attempt, not being able to compel an old

26

4 MACCABEES 8:2–14

ἐκέλευσε(ν) ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς λείας τῶν Εβραίων ἀγαγεῖ(ν) καὶ, εἰ μὲν μιαροϕαγήσαιεν, ἀπολύειν ϕαγόντας, εἰ δ’ ἀντιλέγοιεν, πικρότερο(ν) βασανίζειν. 8.3 ταῦτα διαταξαμένου τοῦ τυράννου, παρῆσαν ἀγόμενοι μετὰ γεραιᾶς μητρὸς ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕοὶ καλοί τε καὶ αἰδήμονες καὶ γενναῖοι καὶ ἐν παντὶ χαρίεντες. 8.4 οὓς ἰδὼν ὁ τύραννος καθάπερ ἐν χορῷ μέση(ν) τὴν μητέρα {περιέχοντας} ἥσθετο ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς εὐπρεπείας ἐκπλαγεὶς καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας προσεμειδίασεν αὐτοῖς καὶ πλησίον καλέσας ἔϕη, 8.5 ὦ νεανίαι, ϕιλοϕρόνως ἐγὼ καθ’ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ὑμῶν θαυμάζω, τὸ κάλλος κ(αὶ) τὸ πλῆθος τοσούτω(ν) ἀδελϕῶν ὑπερτιμῶν. οὐ μόνον συμβουλεύω μὴ μανῖναι τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ {προ}βασανισθέντι γέρο(ν)τι μανίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρακαλῶ συνείξα(ν)τάς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἀπολαύειν ϕιλίας. 8.6 δυναίμην δ’ ἂν ὥσπερ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀπειθοῦντάς μου τοῖς ἐπιτάγμασιν, οὕτω καὶ εὐεργετεῖ(ν) τοὺς εὐπειθοῦντάς μοι. 8.7 πιστεύσατε οὖν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτω(ν) ἡγεμονικὰς λήμψεσθαι ἀρνησάμενοι* τὸν πάτριον ὑμῶν τῆς πολιτ[ε]ίας θεσμόν. 8.8 καὶ λαβόντες ʻΕλληνικοῦ βίου καὶ μεταδιαιτηθέντες ἐντρυϕήσατε ταῖς νεότησιν ὑμῶν. 8.9 ἐπεί, ἐὰν ὀργίλως με διάθησθαι διὰ τῆς ἀπ[ε]ιθ[ε]ίας, ἀναγκάσετέ με ἐπὶ δ[ε]ιναῖς κολάσεσιν ἕνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν διὰ τῶν βασάνων ἀπολέσε.* 8.10 κατελεήσαται οὖν ἑαυτούς, οὓς καὶ ὁ πολέμιος ἔγωγε καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ τῆς εὐμορϕίας οἰκτίρομαι. 8.11 οὐ διαλογιεῖσθαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἀπ[ε]ιθήσασιν πλὴν τοῦ μετὰ στρεβλῶ(ν) ἀποθαν[ε]ῖν ἀπόκ[ε]ιται; 8.12 ταῦτα δὲ λέγων ἐκέλευσεν εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τιθέναι τὰ βασανιστήρια, ὅπως καὶ διὰ τοῦ ϕόβου π[ε]ίσ[ε]ιεν αὐτοὺς μιαιροϕαγῆσαι.* 8.13 ὡς δὲ τροχλούς τε καὶ ἀρθρέμβολας, στρεβλωτήριά τε κ(αὶ) τροχαντηρία* καὶ καταπέλτας καὶ λέβητας, τήγανά τε κ(αὶ) δακτυλήθρας καὶ χ[ε]ῖρας σιδηρᾶς καὶ σϕῆνας καὶ τὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ πυρὸς οἱ δορυϕόροι προέθεσαν, ὑπολαβὼ(ν) ὁ τύραννος ἔϕη, 8.14 μ[ε]ιράκια, ϕοβήθητε, καὶ ἣν σέβεσθαι δίκην, ἵλεως ὑμῖ(ν) ἔσται δι’ ἀνάγκην παρανομήσασιν.

8.3 ἑπτὰ: represented by the numeral in the ms. / 8.5 μανῖναι: R reads μανῆναι / 8.7 λήμψεσθαι: R reads λήμψεσθε | ἀρνησάμενοι: corrector changes to ἀρνηθέντες / 8.8 λαβόντες: R reads μεταλαβόντες / 8.9 διάθησθαι: R reads διάθησθε | ἀπολέσε: corrector and R read ἀπολέσαι / 8.10 κατελεήσαται: R reads κατελεήσατε / 8.11 διαλογιεῖσθαι: R reads διαλογιεῖσθε / 8.12 μιαιροϕαγῆσαι: corrector and R change to μιαρο- / 8.13 τροχλούς: R reads τροχούς | ἀρθρέμβολας: R reads ἀρθρέμβολα | τροχαντηρία: corrector adds terminal sigma; R reads τροχαντῆρας / 8.14 σέβεσθαι: R reads σέβεσθε

4 MACCABEES 8:2–14

27

man to eat unclean food, then with a great outburst of passion he ordered [his guards] to bring others from among the Hebrew prisoners and, if they would eat unclean food, to release them after they partook, but if they resisted, to torture them even more cruelly. (3) After the tyrant had given these orders, seven brothers, handsome and modest and noble and graced in every way, were made available, being led forward with their aged mother. (4) The tyrant, seeing them encircled like a chorus with the mother in the midst, was pleased with them and, overwhelmed at their fine appearance and nobility, smiled approvingly at them and, calling them near, he said: (5) “Young men, with a friendly disposition I marvel at each one of you, honoring the beauty and the number of such brothers. Not only do I advise you not to rave with the same madness as the old man who was {just now} tortured, but I also encourage you to enjoy my friendship by yielding to me. (6) For as I am able to punish those who disobey my commands, so I am also able to benefit those who are disposed to obey me. (7) Therefore, show good faith and you will receive administrative appointments over my affairs, after renouncing the ancestral laws of your state. (8) Revel in your youth by changing your ways and taking up the Greek way of life! (9) For if you dispose me to be angry through disobedience, you will compel me to destroy each and every one of you with fearsome punishments through tortures. (10) Have compassion on yourselves, on whom even I – the enemy! – have compassion both for your age and your comeliness. (11) Will you not bear this in mind – that nothing is stored up for you except to die upon devices of torture if you disobey?!” (12) As he said these things, he ordered [his guards] to set the instruments of torture in front of them, in order that he might persuade them to eat unclean food also by means of fear. (13) As the bodyguards set out the wheels and joint-dislocators, racks and bonebreaking clubs, catapults and caldrons, frying pans and finger-screws and iron gauntlets and wedges and the hot coals from the fire, the tyrant resumed his discourse and said: (14) “Be afraid, boys! and what divine justice you worship will be merciful to you, since you transgress because of compulsion.”

28

4 MACCABEES 8:15–29 & 9:1–4

8:15–9:9 The Brothers’ Response 8.15 οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ὁρῶντες δ[ε]ινὰ οὐ μόνο(ν) οὐκ ἐϕοβήθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντεϕιλοσόϕησαν τῷ τυρά(ν)νῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς εὐλογιστίας τὴν τυρα(ν)νίδα αὐτοῦ κατέλυσαν. 8.16 καίτοι λογισώμεθα, εἰ δ[ε]ιλόψυχοί τινες ἦσαν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄνανδροι, ποίοις ἂν ἐχρήσαντο λόγοις; οὐχὶ τούτοις; 8.17 ὦ τάλανες ἡμ[ε]ῖ* κ(αὶ) λίαν ἀνόητοι. βασιλέως ἡμᾶς καλοῦντος καὶ ἐπὶ εὐεργεσίᾳ παρακαλοῦντος, ἢ π[ε]ισθ[ε]ίημεν αὐτῷ, 8.18 τί βουλήμασιν {κενοῖς} ἑαυτοὺς εὐϕρενοῦμεν καὶ θανατηϕόρον ἀπ[ε]ίθ[ε]ιαν τολμῶμε(ν); 8.19 οὐ ϕοβηθησόμεθα, ἄνδρες ἀδελϕοί, τὰ βασανιστήρια κ(αὶ) λογιούμεθα τὰς τῶ(ν) βασάνων ἀπ[ε]ιλὰς καὶ ϕευξόμεθα τὴ(ν) κενοδοξίαν ταύτη(ν) καὶ ὀλεθροϕόρο(ν) ἀλαζον[ε]ίαν; 8.20 ἐλεήσωμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶ(ν) ἡλικίας καὶ κατοικτίρωμεν τὸ τῆς μητρὸς γῆρας 8.21 κ(αὶ) ἐνθυμηθῶμεν ὅτι ἀπ[ε]ιθοῦντες τεθνηξόμεθα. 8.22 συνγνώσεται δὲ ἡμῖ(ν) καὶ ἡ θ[ε]ία δίκη δι’ ἀνάγκην τὸν βασιλέα ϕοβηθ[ε]ῖσιν. 8.23 τί ἐξάγομεν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ ἡδίστου βίου κ(αὶ) ἀποστεροῦμεν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ γλυκέος κόσμου; 8.24 μὴ βιαζώμεθα τὴν ἀνάγκην μηδὲ κενοδοξήσωμεν ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν στρέβλῃ. 8.25 οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος ἑκουσίως ἡμᾶς θανατοῖ {ϕοβηθέντας τὰ βασανιστήρια}. 8.26 πόθεν ἡμῖ(ν) ἡ τοσαύτη ἐντέτηκε ϕιλον[ε]ικία καὶ ἡ θανατηϕόρος ἀρέσκ[ε]ι καρτερία, παρὸν μετὰ ἀταραξίας ζῆν τῷ βασιλεῖ π[ε]ισθέντες; 8.27 ἀλλὰ τούτων οὐδὲν εἶπον οἱ νεανίαι βασανίζεσθαι μέλλοντες οὐδὲ ἐνεθυμήθησαν. 8.28 ἦσα(ν) γὰρ μέλλοντες περίϕρονες τὰ τῶν παθῶν καὶ αὐτοκράτορες τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, 8.29 ὥστε ἅμα παύσασθαι τὸν τύραννον συμβουλεύο(ν)τα αὐτοῖς μιαιροϕαγῆσαι,* πάντες ἀπὸ μιᾶς ϕωνῆς ὁμοῦ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ψυχῆς εἶπον, 9.1 τί μέλλεις, ὦ τύραννε; ἕτοιμοι γάρ ἐσμε(ν), ὦ* τύραννε,* ἀποθνίσκ[ε]ιν ἢ παραβαίν[ε]ι(ν) τὰς πατρώους ἡμῶ(ν) ἐντολάς. 9.2 αἰσχυνόμεθα γὰρ τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν εἰκότως εἰ μὴ τῇ τοῦ νόμου εὐπ[ε]ιθ[ε]ίᾳ συμβούλῳ καὶ Μωυσεῖ χρησαίμεθα. 9.3 σύμβουλε τύραννε παρανομίας, μὴ ἡμᾶς μ<ε>ισῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς ἐλέα. 9.4 χαλεπώτερο(ν) γὰρ αὐτοῦ τούτου* θανάτου νομίζομε(ν) 8.17 ἡμ[ε]ῖ: corrector and R add terminal sigma, ἡμ[ε]ῖς | ἢ: corrected to εἰ (so also R)/ 8.18 εὐϕρενοῦμεν: R reads εὐϕραίνομεν / 8.22 συνγνώσεται: R renders συγγνώσεται/ 8.26 π[ε]ισθέντες: corrector and R read πεισθέντας / 8.28 ἦσα(ν) γὰρ μέλλοντες περίϕρονες τὰ: corrector changes to ἦσα(ν) γὰρ περιϕρονέσαντες; R reads ἦσαν γὰρ περίϕρονες. / 8.29 παύσασθαι: R prefaces with τῷ | μιαιροϕαγῆσαι: R reads μιαρο- | first ἀπὸ: R reads διὰ | ὁμοῦ is represented in the ms. by an omicron followed by Μ superimposed upon Υ with a small omicron above the line. / 9.1 second ὦ τύραννε: corrector and R omit | ἀποθνίσκ[ε]ιν: R reads ἀποθνῄσκειν | πατρώους: R reads πατρίους / 9.2 συμβούλῳ καὶ: R reads καὶ συμβούλῳ / 9.3 αὐτοὺς: R reads αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς / 9.4 τούτου: corrector and R read τοῦ

4 MACCABEES 8:15–29 & 9:1–4

29

8:15–9:9 The Brothers’ Response (15) But they, though hearing the enticements and seeing the fearful instruments not only remained unafraid but also maintained their philosophy against the tyrant and, through right reasoning, destroyed his tyrannical power. (16) And yet let us ponder: if some among them had been cowardly and unmanly, what kind of arguments might they have used? Would it not have been these? (17) “Poor wretches that we are, and so senseless – the king having invited us and encouraged us with benefaction if we would obey him! (18) Why do we cheer ourselves with {senseless} resolutions and dare a death-dealing disobedience? (19) Men, brothers, will we not fear the instruments of torture and take into account the threats of tortures and flee from this vanity and destructive pride? (20) Let us have mercy on our years and show compassion on the old age of our mother (21) and let us think about the fact that by disobeying we will die! (22) And Divine Justice will make allowance for us, since we fear the king on account of compulsion. (23) Why do we remove ourselves from this pleasant life and deprive ourselves of this sweet world? (24) Let us not resist necessity nor hold an empty opinion about our own racking! (25) Not even the law itself would willfully condemn us to death {because we feared the instruments of torture}. (26) Why does such contentiousness pour into us and death-dealing obstinacy please us, when it is at hand for us to live with calmness after obeying the king?” But the young men, though about to be tortured, neither said nor pondered these things, for they were about to be despisers of the passions and masters of themselves as far as pains were concerned, (29) so that, at the same time that the tyrant ceased from advising them to eat unclean food, all of them from one voice together as from one soul said: (Chapter 9:1) “What are you waiting for, you tyrant?! For we are prepared, tyrant, to die rather than break the commandments passed on to us by our fathers! (2) For we would be pretty well dishonoring our ancestors in our own persons unless we should act in ready, lawful obedience to our counselor, indeed, to Moses. (3) Tyrant and counselor of lawlessness, do not, while hating us, show mercy more than we ourselves! (4) For we think your mercy, directed toward5 our deliverance contrary to

5 ἐπὶ followed by the dative is understood here as a “marker of object or purpose” (BDAG 366).

30

4 MACCABEES 9:4–19

εἶναί σου τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ παρανόμῳ σωτηρίᾳ ἡμῶν ἔλεο(ν). 9.5 ἐκϕοβ[ε]ῖς δὲ ἡμᾶς τὸ(ν) διὰ τῶν βασάνω(ν) θάνατον ἡμῖν ἀπ[ε]ιλῶν ὥσπερ οὐχὶ πρὸ βραχέως παρ’ Ελεαζαρου μαθών. 9.6 εἰ δ’ οἱ γέροντες τῶ(ν) Ευβραίων* διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν καὶ βασανισμοὺς ὑπομ[ε]ίναντες εὐσέβησα[ν] ἀποθάνοιμεν ἂν δικαιότερον ἡμ[ε]ῖς οἱ νέοι τὰς βασάνους τῶν σῶν ἀναγκῶν ὑπερ<ε>ιδό{ν}τες, οὓς* καὶ ὁ παιδευτὴς ἡμῶν γέρω(ν) ἐνίκησεν. 9.7 π[ε]ίραζε τοιγαροῦν, τύραννε, καὶ τὰς ἡμῶν ψυχὰς εἰ θανατώσεις διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν, μὴ νομίσῃς ἡμᾶς βλάπτ[ε]ιν βασανίζων. 9.8 ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆσδε τῆς κακοπαθ[ε]ίας καὶ ὑπομονῆς τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλα ἕξομε(ν) καὶ ἐσόμεθα παρὰ τῷ ΘΩ, δι’ ὃ{ν} καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν. 9.9 σὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡμῶν μιεϕονίαν αὐτάρκη καρτερήθσεις ὑπὸ τῆς θ[ε]ίας δίκης αἰώνιον βάσανον διὰ* πυρός.* 9:10–25

The First Brother’s Contest

9.10 ταῦτα αὐτῶ(ν) εἰπόντων οὐ μόνον ὡς κατὰ ἀπ[ε]ιθούντων ἐχαλέπαινεν ὁ τύραννος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κατ’ ἀχαρίστων ὠργίσθη. 9.11 ὅθεν τὸ(ν) πρεσβύτατον αὐτῶ(ν) κελευσθέντες παρῆγον οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ καὶ διαρρήξαντες τὸν χιτῶνα διέδησαν τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς βραχ<ε>ίονας ἱμᾶσιν ἑκατέρωθεν. 9.12 ὡς δὲ τύπτοντες ταῖς μάστιξιν ἐκοπίασα(ν) μηδὲν ἀνύοντες, ἀνέβαλλον αὐτὸν περὶ τὸν τροχόν· 9.13 περὶ ὃν κατατ[ε]ινόμενος ὁ εὐγενὴς νεανίας ἔξαρθρος ἐγ<ε>ίνετο. 9.14 καὶ κατὰ πᾶν μέλος κλώμενος ἐκακηγόρ[ε]ι λέγω(ν), 9.15 τύραννε μιαρώτατε καὶ τῆς οὐρανίου δίκης ἐχθρὲ καὶ ὠμόϕρων, οὐκ ἀνδροϕονήσαντά με τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον βασανίζεις οὐδὲ ἀσεβήσαντα ἀλλὰ θ[ε]ίου νόμου προασπίζοντα. 9.16 καὶ τῶ(ν) δορυϕόρων λεγόντων, ὁμολόγησον ϕαγεῖν, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇς τῶν βασάνω(ν). 9.17 ὁ δὲ εἶπεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἰσχυρό{τερο}ς ὑμῶ(ν) ἰσχυρ* ὁ τροχός ἐστι(ν), ὦ μιαροὶ διάκονοι, ὥστε μου τὸν λογισμὸν ἄγξαι. τέμνετέ μου τὰ μέλη καὶ πυροῦτέ μου τὰς σάρκας καὶ στρεβλοῦτε τὰ ἄρθρα. 9.18 διὰ πασῶ(ν) γὰρ ὑμᾶς π[ε]ίσω τῶν βασάνων ὅτι μόνοι παῖδαις Εβραίων ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἰσι(ν) ἀνίκητοι. 9.19 καὶ ταῦτα εἰπῶν 9.6 Ευβραίων: corrector and R change to Εβραίων | οὓς: corrector and R read ἃς / 9.8 τῷ ΘΩ (=θεῷ): R omits τῷ | ταῦτα: R omits. / 9.9 μιεϕονίαν: R reads μιαιϕονίαν | καρτερήθσεις: R reads καρτερήσεις | διὰ πυρός: corrector deletes. / 9.10 κατ’: R reads κατὰ / 9.12 ἀνέβαλλον: corrector changes to ἀνέλαβον; R reads ἀνέβαλον | περὶ: R reads ἐπὶ / 9.15 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον βασανίζεις: R reads τοῦτον καταικίζεις τὸν τρόπον / 9.17 ἰσχυρό{τερο}ς: R reads ἰσχυρός | ἰσχυρ*: corrector rightly marks the duplication for omission | ὁ τροχός ἐστιν: R reads ἐστιν ὁ τροχός / 9.18 παῖδαις: R reads παῖδες / 9.19 καὶ ταῦτα εἰπῶν: corrector changes to καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντι, the dative form being more appropriate to denoting the “time at which” something else happens; R reads ταῦτα λέγοντι | τὸ διερεθίζον: corrector omits τὸ | καὶ προσεκατέτ[ε]ινον: R reads προσεπικατέτεινον.

4 MACCABEES 9:4–19

31

the law, to be more difficult to face than this death itself. (5) You are intimidating us by threatening us with death through tortures as though not learning anything from Eleazar a little while ago. (6) And if the aged men of the Hebrews were faithful to their religious duty, enduring even tortures for the sake of piety, we, the young, would more properly die disregarding the pains of your coercions, which our aged teacher also conquered. (7) So then, tyrant, go on testing, and if you bring death upon our persons on account of piety, do not think that you are injuring us by torturing us. (8) For we, on the one hand, will have the prizes of virtue through these experiences of suffering and endurance, and we will be with God, on whose account we indeed suffer these things. (9) But you, conversely, will undergo eternal torture through fire at the hands of Divine Justice on account of your ample bloodlust against us.” 9:10–25

The First Brother’s Contest

(10) After they had said these things, the tyrant was not only angry, as against disobedient people, but also infuriated, as against ingrates. (11) Then the armor-bearers, having been commanded, led the eldest of them aside and, after ripping off his shirt, bound his hands and his arms with straps on either side. (12) When they grew tired from beating him with whips, accomplishing nothing, they began to throw him back around the wheel. (13) Being stretched out around this, the well-bred young man was becoming dislocated. (14) And as every limb was being broken, he was speaking out, saying: (15) “Most depraved tyrant and enemy of heavenly justice and savage-minded man, you are torturing me in this manner not because I committed murder nor acted impiously, but because I am defending divine law.” (16) And as the guards were saying “promise to eat, so that you may be released from the tortures,” (17) he replied: “Your wheel is not so strong, you depraved flunkies, as to choke my reason. Cut my body parts and burn my flesh and twist my joints! (18) Through all these tortures I will convince you that the children of the Hebrews alone are invincible in behalf of virtue!” (19) While he was

32

4 MACCABEES 9:19–32

ὑπέστρωσαν πῦρ καὶ τὸ* διερεθίζον τὸν τροχὸ(ν) καὶ προσεκατέτ[ε]ινον. 9.20 ἐμολύνετο δὲ πάντοθεν αἵματι ὁ τροχός, καὶ ὁ σωρὸς τῆς ἀνθρακιᾶς τοῖς τῶν ἰχώρων ἐσβέννυτο σταλαγμοῖς, καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄξονας τοῦ ὀργάνου περιέ[ρ]ρεον αἱ σάρκες. 9.21 καὶ περιτετμημένον ἤδη ἔχων τὸ τῶν ὀστέων πῆγμα ὁ μεγαλόϕρω(ν) καὶ Αβρααμ υἵος νεανίας οὐκ ἐστέναξεν, 9.22 ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν πυρὶ μετασχηματιζόμενος εἰς ἀϕθαρσίαν ὑπέμ[ε]ινεν εὐγενῶς τὰς στρέβλας, 9.23 μιμήσασθαί με, ἀδελϕοί, λέγων, μή μου τὸν αἰῶνα λ[ε]ιποτακτήσητε μηδὲ ἐξομόσησθαί μου τὴν τῆς εὐψυχίας ἀδελϕότητα. 9.24 ἱερὰν καὶ εὐγενῆ στρατ[ε]ίαν ἐστρατεύσασθε περὶ τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας, δι’ ἧς ἵλεως ἡ δικαία καὶ πάτριος ἡ{μῶν} πρόνοια τῷ ἔθν[ε]ι γενιθ[ε]ῖσα τιμωρήσειεν τὸν ἀλάστορα τύραννον. 9.25 καὶ* ταῦτα εἰπὼ(ν) ὁ ἱεροπρεπὴς νεανίας ἀπέρ[ρ]ηξεν τὴν ψυχήν. 9:26–32

The Second Brother’s Contest

9.26 θαυμασάντω(ν) δὲ πάντων τὴν καρτεροψυχίαν αὐτοῦ ἦγον οἱ δορυϕόροι τὸν καθ’ ἡλικίαν τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου δεύτερον καὶ σιδηρᾶς* ἐναρμοσάμενοι χεῖρας ὀξέσι τοῖς ὄνυξι ὀργάνῳ καὶ καταπέλτῃ προσέδησαν αὐτόν. 9.27 ὡς δ’ εἰ ϕαγ[ε]ῖν βούλοιτο πρὶν βασανίζεσθαι πυνθανόμενοι καὶ τὴν εὐγενῆ γνώμην ἀκούσαντες, 9.28 εἴλκυσαν ἀπὸ τῶ(ν) τενόντων ταῖς σιδηραῖαις* χερσὶν ἐπισπασάμενοι μέχρι τῶν γενείω(ν) τὴν σάρκα πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν τῆς κεϕαλῆς δορὰν οἱ παρδάλεοι* θῆρες ἀπέσυρον. ὁ δὲ ταύτην βαρέως τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καρτερῶν ἔλεγεν, 9.29 ὡς ἡδυς πᾶς θανάτου τρόπος διὰ τὴν πάτριον ἡμῶ(ν) εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν. ἔϕη τε πρὸς τὸν τύραννο(ν), 9.30 οὐ δοκεῖς, πάντω(ν) ὠμότατε τύραννε, πλέον ἐμοῦ σε βασανίζεσθαι ὁρῶν σου νικώμενον τὸ(ν) τῆς τυραννίδος ὑπερήϕανον λογισμὸ(ν) ὑπὸ τῆς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ἡμῶν ὑπομονῆς; 9.31 ἐγὼ {μὲν} γὰρ ταῖς διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴ(ν) ἡδοναῖς τὸν πόνον ἐπικουϕίζομαι, 9.32 σὺ δὲ ἐν ταῖς τῆς ἀσεβείας ἀπ[ε]ιλαῖς βασανίζῃ. οὐκ ἐκϕεύξῃ δέ, μιαρώτατε τύραννε, τὰ* τῆς θ[ε]ίας ὀργῆς δίκας.

9.21 Αβρααμ υἴος: corrector and R read Αβραμιαῖος / 9.23 μιμήσασθαί: R reads μιμήσασθέ | αἰῶνα: R reads ἀγῶνα | ἐξομόσησθαί: R reads ἐξομόσησθέ / 9.24 ἐστρατεύσασθε: R reads στρατεύσασθε | γενιθ[ε]ῖσα: R reads γενηθεῖσα / 9.25 καὶ: corrector omits / 9.26 πρεσβυτέρου: R reads προτέρου | σιδηρᾶς: an extraneous vowel (ε? η?) appears to have been erased before the -ᾶς| ὄνυξι: R reads ὄνυξιν / 9.27 καὶ τὴν εὐγενῆ: R omits καὶ | ἀκούσαντες: R reads ἤκουσαν / 9.28 εἴλκυσαν: corrector and R omit εἴλκυσαν | σιδηραῖαις: corrector emends to σιδηραῖς, followed by R | παρδάλεοι: corrector changes to παρδάλαιοι / 9.32 τὰ: corrector emends to τὰς, followed by R.

4 MACCABEES 9:19–32

33

saying these things, they placed fire under him and began to increase the tension on the wheel even more. (20) The wheel was besmirched with blood everywhere and the heap of the charcoal fire was being extinguished by the drippings of the bloody discharge and the muscles were hanging over the axles of the instrument, (21) and although having the ligaments of the bones severed, the high-minded young man, a son of Abraham, did not groan, (22) but as though being transformed by fire into imperishability, he endured the torture devices nobly, (23) saying: “Imitate me, brothers. Do not leave the ranks of my contest, nor abjure the courageous brotherhood you share with me. (24) Fight a sacred and noble fight for piety, by means of which the just Providence of our forebears, becoming merciful to the nation, may punish the accursed tyrant!” (25) And having said these things, the venerable young man broke off his life. 9:26–32

The Second Brother’s Contest

(26) While all were admiring his staunch soul, the bodyguards brought the second eldest and, having fitted for themselves iron gloves with sharp attachments at the fingertips, they bound him to the instrument of torture, that is, to a catapult. (27) When inquiring whether he might be willing to eat before being tortured, and having heard his noble decision, (28) they tore out his sinews with the iron gloves, pulling away all his flesh up to the chin, and the leopard-like beasts tore away the hide of his head. But he, bearing this suffering with difficulty, was saying, (29) “How sweet is any manner of death for the sake of our ancestral piety.” And he said to the tyrant, (30) “Do you not consider, most savage tyrant of all, that you are being tormented more than me, watching your arrogant logic of tyranny being conquered by our endurance for the sake of piety? (31) I {on the one hand} lighten the pain by means of the pleasures that come through virtue, (32) but you are being tortured by the threats that come through impiety. And you will not escape, most depraved tyrant, the punishments of divine wrath!”

34

4 MACCABEES 10:1–15

10:1–11

The Third Brother’s Contest

10.1 κ(αὶ) τούτου τὸν ἀοίδιμον θάνατον καρτερήσαντος ὁ τρίτος ἤγετο παρακαλούμενος πολλὰ ἀπὸ* πολλῶν ὅπως ἀπογευσάμενος σῴζοιτο. 10.2 ὁ δὲ ἀναβοήσας ἔϕη ἀγνοεῖται ὅτι {ὁ} αὑτός με τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ἔσπ[ε]ιρεν πατήρ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ μήτηρ ἐγέννησεν, κ(αὶ) ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀνετράϕην δόγμασιν; 10.3 οὐκ ἐξόμνυμαι τὴν εὐγενῆ τῆς ἀδελϕότητος εὐγέν[ε]ιαν. 10.5 οἱ δὲ πικρῶς ἐνέγκαντες τὴν παρρησίαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρθρεμβόλοις ὀργάνοις τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς πόδας ἐξήρθρουν καὶ ἐξ ἁρμῶν ἀναμοχλεύο(ν)τες ἐξεμέλιζον, 10.6 {καὶ} τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ τοὺς βραχ<ε>ίονας καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς ἀγκῶνας περιέκλων. 10.7 κ(αὶ) κατὰ μηδένα τρόπο(ν) ἰσχύσαντες* αὐτὸν ἄγξαι περιλύσαντες τὰ ὄργανα* σὺν ἄκραις ταῖς τῶν δακτύλων κορυϕαῖς ἀπεσκύθιζον 10.8 καὶ εὐθέως ἦγον ἐπὶ τὸν τροχόν περὶ ὃν ἐκ σπονδύλων ἐκμελιζόμενος ἑώρα τὰς ἑαυτοῦ σάρκας περιλακιζομένας καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων σταγόνας αἵματος ἀπο[ρ]ρεούσας. 10.9 μέλλων δὲ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἔϕη, 10.10 ἡμ[ε]ῖς μέν, ὦ μιαρώτατε τύραννε, διὰ παιδ[ε]ίαν καὶ ἀρετὴ(ν) ΘΥ ταῦτα πάσχομεν· 10.11 σὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀσέβ[ε]ιαν καὶ μιεϕονίαν ἀκαταλύτους καρτερήσεις βασάνους. 10:12–21

The Fourth Brother’s Contest

10.12 καὶ τούτου θανό(ν)τος ἀδελϕοπρεπῶς τὸν τέταρτο(ν) ἐπεσπῶντο λέγο(ν)τες, 10.13 μὴ μανῇς καὶ σὺ τοῖς ἀδελϕοῖς σου τὴν αὐτὴν μανία(ν), ἀλλὰ π[ε]ισθεὶς τῷ βασιλεῖ σῷζε σεαυτόν. 10.14 ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ* ἔϕη, οὐχ οὕτως καυστικώτερον ἔχετε κατ’ ἐμοῦ τὸ πῦρ ὥστε με δ[ε]ιλανδρῆσαι. 10.15 μὰ τὸν μακάριον τῶν ἀδελϕῶν μου θάνατον καὶ τὸν αἰώνιον τοῦ τυράννου ὄλεθρον καὶ τὸν ὄλεθρον* ἀΐδιο(ν) τῶν εὐσεβῶν βίον, οὐκ

10.1 ἀπὸ: corrector and R read ὑπὸ / 10.2 ἀγνοεῖται: R reads ἀγνοεῖτε | {ὁ} αὑτός: R does not add the article. / 10.3 εὐγένειαν: R reads συγγένειαν / 10.4 A adds an additional verse: πρὸς ταῦτα εἰ τι ἔχετε κολαστήριον, προσαγάγετε τῷ σώματί μου· τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς μου, οὐδ’ ἂν θέλητε ἄψεσθαι {δύνασθε}. (“With regard to these things, if you have any torture, employ it on my body: for you are unable to touch my soul, though you might wish.”) See commentary on 9:17. / 10.6 {καὶ}: R omits. / 10.7 ἰσχύσαντες: corrector changes to ἰσχύοντες, as does R | περιλύσαντες τὰ ὄργανα: corrector reads περισύραντες τὸ δέρμα (“tearing off his skin”), but R follows the original hand. / 10.10 ΘΥ = θεοῦ / 10.11 μιεϕονίαν: R reads μιαιϕονίαν / 10.14 αὐτῷ: corrector and R change to αὐτοῖς / 10.15 second ὄλεθρον: corrector rightly marks for omission, followed by R.

4 MACCABEES 10:1–15

10:1–11

35

The Third Brother’s Contest

(Chapter 10:1) This one also having endured a famous death, the third was being led in while being exhorted many things by many people in order that he might save himself by taking a taste. (2) But crying out, he said: “Do you not know that the same father begat me along with those who are now dead, and the same mother gave birth to me and trained me on the basis of the same principles? (3) I do not disown the well-born nobility of brotherhood.” (4) [see note] (5) And the ones who bitterly endured the boldness of the man began to dislocate his hands and feet with their joint-wrenching instruments and to dismember him by prying the limbs out of the joints, (6) breaking his fingers and arms and legs and elbows. (7) And because they were unable to coerce him in any way, letting their instruments drop around them they scalped him with their fingernails. (8) Thereupon they brought him to the wheel. As his spine was being broken apart around this instrument, he saw his flesh being torn apart and drops of blood flowing down from his entrails, (9) and, being on the verge of dying, he said: (10) “We, most depraved tyrant, are suffering these things on account of godly training and moral excellence, (11) but you will endure endless torments on account of impiety and bloodlust!” 10:12–21

The Fourth Brother’s Contest

(12) After this one had died in a manner befitting a brother, they dragged forward the fourth, saying, (13) “Don’t you also rave with the same madness as your brothers, but save yourself by obeying the king!” (14) But he said to him, “You do not have such a very hot fire to use against me as to make me prove cowardly. (15) By the blessed death of my brothers and the eternal destruction of the tyrant and the endless life of the pious,

36

4 MACCABEES 10:15–21 & 11:1–12

ἀρνήσομαι τὴν εὐγενῆ ἀδελϕότητα. 10.16 ἐπινόει, τύραννε, βασάνους, ἵνα καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν μάθῃς ὅτι ἀδελϕός εἰμι τῶν προβασανισθέντων. 10.17 ταῦτα {δὲ} ἀκούσας ὁ αἱμοβόρος καὶ ϕονιώδης καὶ παμμιαρώτατος ̕Αντίοχος ἐκέλευσεν τὴν γλῶτταν αὐτοῦ ἐκτεμνεῖ(ν). 10.18 ὁ δὲ ἔϕη, κἂν ἀϕέλῃς τὸ τῆς ϕωνῖς ὄργανον, καὶ σιωπώντων ἀκούει ὁ ΘΣ. 10.19 ἰδοὺ προκεχάλασται ἡ γλῶσσα, τέμνε, οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τοῦτο τὸν λογισμὸ(ν) ἡμῶν γλωττοτομήσεις. 10.20 ἡδέως ὑπὲρ τοῦ τ* ΘΥ τὰ τοῦ σώματος βέλη* ἀκρωτηριαζόμεθα. 10.21 σὲ δὲ ταχέως μετελεύσεται ὁ ΘΣ, τὴν γὰρ τῶν θ[ε]ίων ὕμνον* μελῳδὰν* γλῶττα(ν) ἐκτέμνεις. 11:1–12

The Fifth Brother’s Contest

11.1 ὡς δὲ καὶ οὗτος ταῖς βασάνοις καταικισθεὶς ἐναπέθανεν, ὁ πέμπτος παρεπήδησεν λέγων, 11.2 οὐ μέλλω, τύραννε, πρὸς τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρετῆς βασανισμὸν, 11.3 αὐτὸς δ’ ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ παρῆλθον ὅπως κἀμὲ κατακτ[ε]ίνας περὶ πλειόνων ἀδικημάτων τῇ ἐπουρανίῳ δίκῃ δώσεις τιμωρίαν. 11.4 ὦ μιαρώτατε καὶ μισάνθρωπε, τί δράσαντας ἡμᾶς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πορθεῖς; 11.5 ὅτι τὸν πάντω(ν) κτίστην εὐσεβοῦμεν καὶ κατὰ τὸ(ν) ἐνάρετον αὐτοῦ ζῶμεν νόμον; 11.6 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τιμῶ(ν) οὐ βασάνων εἰσὶ(ν) ἄξια. 11.9 τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγοντα οἱ δορυϕόροι δήσαντες αὐτὸν εἷκον* ἐπὶ τὸν καταπέλτην, 11.10 ἐϕ’ ὃν δήσα(ν)τες αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰ γόνατα καὶ ταῦτα ποδάγραις σιδηραῖς ἐϕορμάσαντες* τὴν ὀσϕὺν αὐτοῦ περὶ τροχιαῖον σϕῆνα κατέκαμψαν, περὶ ὃν ὅλος περὶ τὸν τράχηλον σκοπίου* τρόπον ἀνακλώμενος ἐξεμελίζετο. 11.11 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ΠΝΑ στενοχωρούμενος καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀγχόμενος, 11.12 καλάς, ἔλεγεν, ἄκων, ὦ τύραννε, χάριτας ἡμῖν χαρίζῃ διὰ γε(ν)ναιοτέρων πόνων ἐπιδ[ε]ίξασθαι παρέχων τὴς* εἰς τὸν νόμον ἡμῶν καρτερίας*. 10.17 ταῦτα {δὲ}: R reads ταῦτα | ϕονιώδης: corrector and R read ϕονώδης| ἐκτεμνεῖν: R reads ἐκτεμεῖν / 10.18 ϕωνῖς: R reads ϕωνῆς | ΘΣ = θεός / 10.20 ΘΥ = θεοῦ; corrector marks extraneous τ for omission (R concurs) | βέλη: corrector and R read μέλη, as does the translation below, “missiles, darts” ill-suiting the context / 10.21 ΘΣ = θεός | ὕμνον μελῳδὰν: corrector helpfully emends to ὕμνων μελῳδὸν, followed by R (and the translation here). / 11.2 βασανισμὸν: R reads βασανισμὸν παραιτεῖσθαι, following A, providing a complementary infinitive for μέλλω. / 11.3 τῇ ἐπουρανίῳ δίκῃ δώσεις τιμωρίαν: R reads ὀϕειλήσῃς τῇ οὐρανίῳ δίκῃ τιμωρίαν. / 11.4 μιαρώτατε: R reads μισάρετε | τὸν τρόπον πορθεῖς: R reads πορθεῖς τὸν τρόπον / 11.6 εἰσὶν: R reads ἐστὶν / 11.7– 8 A adds εἴπερ ᾐσθάνου ἀνθρώπους ποθῶν, καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶχες παρὰ θεῷ σωτηρίου· νῦνι δὲ ἀλλότριος ὢν θεοῦ, πολεμεῖς τοὺς εὐσεβοῦντας εἰς τὸν θεόν. (“If you perceived human yearnings and had hope of salvation from God, but now being an alien to God you make war against those showing piety toward God.”) / 11.9 εἷκον: corrector and R read εἷλκον / 11.10 ἐϕορμάσαντες: corrector and R read ἐϕαρμόσαντες | τράχηλον: R reads τροχὸν | σκοπίου: corrector and R read σκορπίου / 11.11 ΠΝΑ = πνεῦμα / 11.12 τὴς . . . καρτερίας: corrector changes to τὴν . . . καρτερίαν, followed by R.

4 MACCABEES 10:15–21 & 11:1–12

37

I will not renounce the noble brotherhood. (16) Think up tortures, tyrant, in order that you may indeed learn through them that I am a brother of the ones tortured beforehand!” (17) Hearing these things, the bloodsucking, murderous, and totally depraved Antiochus ordered them to proceed to cut out his tongue. (18) But he said, “Even if you cut off my instrument of speech, God hears even those who are silent. (19) Look! My tongue is hanging out! Cut it off! For you will not render our reason mute by this act. (20) We suffer the mutilation of our body parts gladly on behalf of God. (21) God will quickly come after you, for you are cutting off a tongue melodious with divine hymns!” 11:1–12

The Fifth Brother’s Contest

(Chapter 11:1) And when this one died, having been wounded severely by the tortures, the fifth sprang forward, saying, (2) “I do not hold back, tyrant, in regard to torture for the sake of moral excellence. (3) I myself have come forward on my own, in order that by killing me as well you will give the right of punishment for more crimes to Heavenly Justice. (4) O most depraved and hateful man, what have we done that you are destroying us in this way? (5) Is it that we fulfill our religious duty toward the creator of all things and live according to his most excellent law? (6) But these things are worthy of honors, not torments!” (7/8) [see textual note] (9) While he was saying things of this kind, the bodyguards bound him and began to drag him to the catapult. (10) Binding him to it on his knees, and fitting iron clamps over these, they twisted his loins around a wedge worked by a wheel. When he was bent back up to the neck in the manner of a scorpion, the whole of him was disjointed. In this way, with his breath restricted and his body compressed, (12) he said “Noble favors, O tyrant, you are granting us against your will, allowing us to show through these very noble sufferings our steadfastness toward the law.”

38

4 MACCABEES 11:13–27 & 12:1–2

11:13–27

The Sixth Brother’s Contest

11.13 τελευτήσαντος δὲ καὶ τούτου ὁ ἕκτος ἤγετο μ[ε]ιρακίσκος, ὃς πυνθανομένου τοῦ τυράννου εἰ βούλοιτο ϕαγὼν ἀπολύεσθε, ὁ* δὲ* ἔϕη, 11.14 ἐγὼ μὲν τὴν* ἡλικίαν* τῶν ἀδελϕῶ(ν) εἰμι νεώτερος, τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ ἡλικιώτης. 11.15 εἰς ταὐτὰ γὰρ γεννηθέντες καὶ ἀνατραϕέντες ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποθνῄσκειν ὀϕ[ε]ίλομεν ὁμοίως· 11.16 ὥστε, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ βασανίζει(ν) μὴ μιαιροϕαγοῦντα, βασανίζειν.* 11.17 ταῦτα εἰπόντα παρῆγο(ν) ἐπὶ τὸν τροχόν, 11.18 ἐϕ’ οὗ κατατ[ε]ινόμενος ἐπιμελῶς* καὶ ἐκσπο(ν)δυλιζόμενος ὑπεκαίετο πυρί. 11.19 καὶ ὀβελίσκους ὀξεῖς πυρώσαντες τοῖς νώτοις προσέϕερον καὶ τὰ πλευρὰ διαϕθείραντες αὐτοῦ {καὶ} τὰ σπλάγχνα διίκεον.* 11.20 ὁ δὲ βασανιζόμενος, ὦ ἱεροπρεποῦς ἀγῶνος, ἔλεγον,* ἐϕ’ ὃν διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν εἰς γυμνασίαν πόνων ἀδελϕοὶ τοσοῦτοι κληθέντες οὐκ ἐνική{θη}μεν. 11.21 ἀνίκητος γάρ ἐστιν, τύραννε, ἡ εὐσεβὴς ἐπιστήμη. 11.22 καλοκἀγαθίᾳ καθωπλισμένος τεθνήξομαι κἀγὼ μετὰ τῶν ἀδελϕῶν μου 11.23 μέγαν σοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς προσβάλλω(ν) ἀλάστορα, καινουργὲ τῶν βασάνω(ν) καὶ πολέμιε τῶν ἀληθῶς εὐσεβούντων. 11.24 ἓξ μ[ε]ιράκια καταλελύκαμέν σου τὴ(ν) τυραννίδα· 11.25 τὸ γὰρ μὴ δυνηθῆναί σε μεταπεῖσαι τὸν λογισμὸν ἡμῶν μήτε βιάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μιαιροϕαγίαν οὐ κατάλυσ<ε>ίς ἐστίν σου; 11.26 τὸ πῦρ σου ψυχρὸν ἡμῖ(ν), καὶ ἄπονοι οἱ καταπέλται, καὶ ἀδύνατος ἡ βία σου. 11.27 οὐ γὰρ τυράννου ἀλλὰ θείου νόμου προεστήκασιν ἡμῶν οἱ* δορυϕόροι. διὰ τοῦτο ἀν<ε>ίκητον ἔχομεν τὸν λογισμόν. 12:1–19

The Seventh Brother’s Contest

12.1 ὡς δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς μακαρίως ἀπέθανε(ν) καταβληθεὶς εἰς λέβητα, ὁ ἕβδομος παρεγίνετο πάντων νεώτερος. 12.2 ὃ(ν) κατοικτίρας ὁ τύραννος, καίπερ δ[ε]ινῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελϕῶν αὐτοῦ κακισθείς, ὁρῶν ἤδη τὰ δεσμὰ περικείμενον πλησιέ[σ]τερον αὐτὸν μετεπέμψατο καὶ παρηγορεῖν ἐπει11.13 ἀπολύεσθε: R reads ἀπολύεσθαι | ὁ δὲ: corrector marks for omission. / 11.14 μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν: corrector changes to datives, τῇ ἡλικίᾳ; R reads τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ | ἀδελϕῶν: R reads ἀδελϕῶν μού. / 11.16 μιαιροϕαγοῦντα: R reads μιαροϕαγοῦντα | βασανίζειν: corrector changes to βασάνιζε, followed by R. / 11.17 ταῦτα: R reads ταῦτα αὐτὸν | ἐπιμελῶς: corrector changes to ἐκμελῶς / 11.18 πυρί: R omits. / 11.19 διαϕθείραντες: R reads διαπείραντες | {καὶ} τὰ σπλάγχνα: R does not add the καὶ | διίκεον: corrector changes to διέκεον; R reads διέκαιον. / 11.20 ἔλεγον: corrector emends to ἔλεγεν, followed by R. / 11.21 τύραννε: R reads ὦ τύραννε / 11.25 μιαιροϕαγίαν: R reads μιαροϕαγίαν / 11.27 οἱ: corrector deletes. / 12.1 αὐτὸς: R reads οὗτος / 12.2 περικείμενον: R reads περικείμενα

4 MACCABEES 11:13–27 & 12:1–2

11:13–27

39

The Sixth Brother’s Contest

(13) After this one had also died, the sixth – a mere boy – was brought forward, who, when the tyrant asked if he might want to be released after eating, said: (14) “I am my brothers’ junior in terms of age, but a peer in regard to purpose. (15) For, having been born and trained into these principles, we ought in the same way to die on behalf of the same. (16) So if it seems right to you to torture me for not eating unclean food, go on torturing!” (17) He having said these things, they brought him to the wheel. (18) Being stretched out carefully upon it and suffering the disjointing of his vertebrae, he was burned with fire from below. (19) They began to hold sharp skewers heated with fire to his back and, driving them through his ribs, burned through his entrails. (20) But he, while being tortured, was saying: “O contest well-suited to holiness, in which so many brothers, having been summoned to a bout of sufferings for the sake of piety, were not conquered! (21) For pious knowledge, tyrant, is invincible. (22) Fully armed with nobility and goodness, I also shall die with my brothers, (23) setting upon you – even I myself – a great Avenger, you inventor of tortures and adversary of those genuinely fulfilling their duties to God! (24) We, six boys, have destroyed your tyrannical authority! (25) Is this not your downfall, for you to be able neither to effectively appeal to our reason nor to coerce us to eat unclean food?! (26) Your fire is cold to us, your catapults painless, your violence impotent. (27) For it is not your bodyguards, but the bodyguards of the divine law that have authority over us: therefore we keep our reason unconquered.” 12:1–19

The Seventh Brother’s Contest

(Chapter 12:1) And when he himself died in a blessed way, having been thrown into a cauldron, the seventh, the youngest of all, began to come forward. (2) The tyrant had compassion on him, even though he had been terribly abused by his brothers. Seeing him already bound in regard to

40

4 MACCABEES 12:2–19 & 13:1

ρᾶτο λέγων, 12.3 τῆς μὲ(ν) τῶν ἀδελϕῶν σου ἀπονοίας {τὸ} τέλος ὁρᾷς· διὰ γὰρ ἀπιστίαν στρεβλωθέντες τεθνεᾶσιν. 12.4 σὺ δὲ εἰ μὲν μὴ π[ε]ισθεί[η]ς, τάλας βασανισθεὶς καὶ αὐτὸς τεθνήξῃ πρὸ ὅρας.* 12.5 π[ε]ισθεὶς δὲ ϕίλος ἔσῃ καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλ[ε]ίας ἀϕηγήσῃ πραγμάτων. 12.6 καὶ ταῦτα παρακαλῶ(ν) τὴν μητέρα τοῦ παιδὸς μετεπέμψατο, ὅπως αὐτὴν* ἐλεήσασα τοσούτων υἱῶν στερηθεῖ{σ}αν παρορμήσειεν ἐπὶ τὴν σωτήριον εὐπ[ε]ίθ[ε]ια(ν) τὸν περιλ[ε]ιπόμενον. 12.7 ὁ δὲ τῆς ΜΡΣ τῇ Εβραΐδι ϕωνῇ προτρεψαμένης αὐτόν, ὡς ἐροῦμε(ν) μετὰ μικρὸν ὕστερον, 12.8 λύσατέ μέ, ϕησιν, εἴπω τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ ϕίλοις πᾶσιν. 12.9 οἱ δὲ χαρέντες μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ ἐπαγγελίᾳ τοῦ παιδὸς ταχέως ἔλυσαν αὐτόν. 12.10 καὶ δραμὼν ἐπὶ πλησίο(ν) τῶν τηγάνων, 12.11 ἀνόσιέ, ϕησιν, καὶ πάντων ἀσεβέστατε πονηρῶν, οὐκ ᾐδέσθης παρὰ τοῦ ΘΥ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλ[ε]ίαν τοὺς θεράποντας αὐτοῦ κατακτεῖναι* καὶ τοὺς {τῆς} εὐσεβείας ἀσκητὰς στρεβλῶσαι; 12.12 ἀνθ’ ὧν ταμιεύσεταί {σε} ἡ δίκη πυκνοτέρῳ καὶ αἰωνίῳ πυρὶ καὶ βασάνοις, {αἳ} εἰς ὅλον τὸν αἰῶνα οὐκ ἀνήσουσίν σε. 12.13 οὐκ ᾐδέσθης ἄνθρωπος ὤν, θηριωδέστατε, τοὺς ὁμοιοπαθεῖς καὶ ἐκ τῶ(ν) αὐτῶν γεγονότας στοιχ[ε]ίων γλωττοτομῆσαι καὶ τοῦτον κατακαύσας τὸ(ν) τρόπον βασανίζει.* 12.14 ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν εὐγενῶς ἀποθανόντες ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν εἰς τὸν ΘΝ εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν, σὺ δὲ κακῶς οἰμώξεις τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγωνιστὰς ἀναιτίως ἀποκτ[ε]ῖνας 12.15 ὅθε(ν) καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποθνῄσκειν μέλλων ἔϕη,* 12.16 οὐκ ἀπαυτομολῶ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν* ἀριστ[ε]ίας· 12.17 ἐπικαλοῦμαι δὲ τὸν πατρῷο(ν) ΘΝ ὅπως ἵλεως γένηται τῷ ἔθν[ε]ι ἡμῶν. 12.18 σὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ κ(αὶ) θανόντα τιμωρήσετε.* 12.19 καὶ ταῦτα κατευξάμενος ἑαυτὸν ἔρειψε κατὰ τῶν τηγάνων, καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκεν {τὸ ΠΝΑ}. 13:1–14:10

Resumption of Thesis and Encomium on the Seven Brothers

13.1 εἰ δὲ τοίνυν τῶν μέχρι θανάτου πόνων ὑπερεϕρό{νη}σαν οἱ ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕοί, συνομολογεῖται πανταχόθεν ὅτι αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν

12.3 ἀπιστίαν: R reads ἀπείθειαν | τεθνεᾶσιν: R reads τεθνᾶσιν / 12.4 ὅρας: corrector rightly emends to ὥρας, followed by R / 12.6 αὐτὴν: corrector renders ἑαυτὴν | ἐλεήσασα: R reads ἐλεήσας / 12.7 ΜΡΣ = μητρὸς / 12.9 οἱ δὲ χαρέντες: R reads καὶ ἐπιχαρέντες / 12.11 ἀσεβέστατε πονηρῶν: R reads πονηρῶν ἀσεβέστατε τύραννε | ΘΥ = θεοῦ | κατακτεῖναι: corrector changes to κατακτεῖνας / 12.13 κατακαύσας: R reads καταικίσας | βασανίζει: corrector emends to βασανίσαι, followed by R. / 12.14 ΘΝ = θεὸν / 12.15 ἔϕη: corrector omits. / 12.16 παιδῶν: corrector changes to ἀδελϕῶν μου, followed by R. / 12.17 ΘΝ = θεὸν / 12.18 τιμωρήσετε: corrector emends to τιμωρήσεται, followed by R. / 12.19 ἔρειψε: R reads ἔρριψε | ΠΝΑ = πνεῦμα; R does not add τὸ πνεῦμα

4 MACCABEES 12:2–19 & 13:1

41

the chains, he summoned him nearer and tried to exhort him, saying: (3) Do you see the end result of your brothers’ madness? For they have died tormented on account of their faithlessness. (4) And, if you should disobey, poor wretch, after being tortured, you yourself will also die before the hour. (5) But obeying, you will be a friend and you will have a leading place in the affairs of the kingdom. (6) And having urged these things, he summoned the mother of the child in order that, taking pity on herself, bereft of so many sons, she might urge the remaining one on to life-saving obedience. (7) But he, after his mother exhorted him in the Hebrew language (as we will recount a little later), (8) replies: “Release me; let me speak to the king and to all the friends with him.” (9) Those who were relishing the boy’s consent quickly released him. (10) And running over near the frying pans, (11) he said: “unholy one, most impious of all the wicked, were you not ashamed, having received good things and the kingdom from God, to murder his servants and torture the athletes of piety?! (12) Therefore, Justice will keep you for a more intense and eternal fire and for torments which will not let you go free for all time. (13) Were you not ashamed, being a human being, most beast-like man, to cut out the tongues and to go on torturing those of like nature as yourself and composed of the same elements, burning them up in this manner? (14) Those who died nobly have fulfilled their pious service toward God, but you will wail severely, having murdered without cause the contestants of moral excellence.” (15) Therefore, being about to die himself as well, he said: (16) “I do not desert the excellence of the children. (17) And I summon our ancestral God in order that he might become merciful toward our nation – (18) but you he will punish both in the present life and after your dying!” (19) And having pronounced these imprecations, he threw himself down against the frying pans and thus died. 13:1–14:10

Resumption of Thesis and Encomium on the Seven Brothers

(Chapter 13:1) If, then, the seven brothers thought lightly of the pains to the point of death, it is conceded from every angle that the pious reason

42

4 MACCABEES 13:1–18

ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός. 13.2 εἰ γὰρ* τοῖς πάθεσι δουλωθέντες ἐμιεροϕάγησαν, ἐλέγαμεν ἂν τούτοις αὐτοὺς νενικῆσθαι. 13.3 νυν<ε>ὶ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπαινουμένῳ παρὰ ΘΩ λογισμῷ περιεγένοντο τῶν παθῶν, 13.4 ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν παρ<ε>ιδ[ε]ῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς διανοίας, ἐπεκράτησαν γὰρ καὶ πάθους καὶ πόνων. 13.5 πῶς οὖ(ν) οὐκ ἔστιν τούτοις τὴν τῆς εὐλογιστίας πανθοκράτ[ε]ιαν* ὁμολογεῖν, οἳ τῶν μὲν γὰρ* διὰ πυρὸς ἀλγηδόνω(ν) οὐκ ἀπεστράϕησα(ν);* 13.6 καθάπερ γὰρ προβλῆταις λιμένω(ν) πύργοι τὰς τῶν κυμάτων ἀπειλὰς ἀνακόπτοντες γαληνὸν παρέχουσι τοῖς εἰσπλέουσι τὸν ὅρμον, 13.7 οὕτως ἡ ἑπτάπυργος τῶν νεανίσκων εὐλογιστία τὸν τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας ὀχυρώσασα λιμένα τὴν τῶν παθῶν ἐν<ε>ίκησε κόλασιν. 13.8 ἱερὸν γὰρ εὐσεβ[ε]ίας στήσαντες χορὸν παρεθάρσυνον ἀλλήλους λέγοντες, 13.9 ἀδελϕικῶς ἀποθάνωμεν, ἀδελϕοί, περὶ τοῦ νόμου· μιμησώμεθα τοὺς τρ[ε]ῖς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ̕Ασσυρίας νεανίσκους, οἳ τῆς ἰσοπολίτιδου* καιομένης* κατεϕρόνησαν. 13.10 μὴ δ[ε]ιλανδρήσωμεν πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας ἐπίδ[ε]ιξιν. 13.11 καὶ ὁ μέν θάρρ[ε]ι, ἀδελϕέ, ἔλεγεν, ὁ δέ εὐγενῶς καρτέρησον, 13.12 ὁ δὲ καταμνησθεὶς ἔλεγεν, {μνήσθητε} πόθεν ἐσταί, ἢ τίνος πατρὸς χειρὶ σϕαγιασθῆναι διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ὑπέμεινεν Ισα{α}κ. 13.13 εἷς δὲ ἕκαστος ἀλλήλους ὁμοῦ πάντες ἐϕορῶντες ϕεδροὶ καὶ μάλα θαρραλέοι, ἑαυτούς, ἔλεγον, τῷ ΘΩ ἀϕιερώσωμεν ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας τῷ δόντι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ χρήσωμεν τῇ περὶ τὸν νόμον ϕυλακῇ τὰ σώματα. 13.14 μὴ ϕοβηθῶμεν τὸν δοκοῦντα ἀποκτέννειν· 13.15 μέγας γὰρ ψυχῆς ἀγὼν καὶ κίνδυνος ἐν αἰωνί{ῳ} βασάνῳ κείμενος τοῖς παραβᾶ{ίνου}σι τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ ΘΥ. 13.16 καθοπλισώμεθα τοιγαροῦν τὴν τοῦ θ[ε]ίου λογισμοῦ παθοκρατ[ε]ίαν. 13.17 οὕτω γὰρ θανόντας ἡμᾶς Αβρααμ καὶ Ισα{α}κ καὶ Ιακωβ ὑποδέξονται καὶ πάντες οἱ πατέρες ἐπαινέσουσιν. 13.18 καὶ ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀποσπωμένων αὐτῶ{ν} ἀδελϕῶν ἔλεγον οἱ περιλειπόμενοι, μὴ καταισχύνῃς ἡμᾶς, ἀδελϕέ, μηδὲ ψεύσῃ τοὺς προαποθανόντας ἡμῶν ἀδελϕούς.

13.2 εἰ γὰρ: corrector changes to ὥσπερ γάρ εἰ | ἐμιεροϕάγησαν: R reads ἐμιαροϕάγησαν | ἐλέγαμεν: R reads ἐλέγομεν / 13.3 ΘΩ = θεῷ / 13.5 πανθοκράτειαν: corrector emends necessarily to παθοκράτειαν, followed by R (and the translation below) | γὰρ: corrector omits, as does R | ἀπεστράϕησαν: corrector changes to ἐπεστράϕησαν, followed by R. / 13.6 προβλῆταις: R reads προβλῆτες / 13.7 ἐν<ε>ίκησε κόλασιν: R reads ἐνίκησεν ἀκολασίαν. / 13.9 ἰσοπολίτιδου καιομένης: corrector changes to ἰσοπολίτιδος καμίνου, followed by R. / 13.12 ἐσταί: R reads ἐστέ / 13.13 ϕεδροὶ: R reads ϕαιδροὶ | ΘΩ = θεῷ / 13.15 παραβᾶ{ίνου}σι: R reads παραβᾶσι | ΘΥ = θεοῦ

4 MACCABEES 13:1–18

43

displays self-mastery of the passions. (2) For if they had eaten unclean food because they were enslaved to the passions, we would declare them to have been conquered by these. (3) But now it is not so, but they overcame the passions by means of the reason that is praised in the sight of God. (4) It is not possible6 to overlook the rule of the mind over the passions, for they mastered both passions and pains. (5) How, then, is it possible not to confess right reason’s mastery of the passions in reference to these men, who were indeed not turned back from the agonies inflicted through fire? (6) For just like towers jutting out in front of harbors, restraining the threats of the waves, grant calm to those sailing into the anchorage, (7) so the seven-towered right reason of the young men, fortifying the harbor of piety, overcame the vengeance of the passions. (8) For, establishing a sacred chorus of piety, they emboldened one another, saying, (9) “Brothers, let us die in a brotherly way in the interest of the law. Let us imitate the three young men in Assyria who despised the burning [ordeal] for people enjoying equal political rights. (10) Let us not be cowardly in the demonstration of piety!” (11) And one was saying, “Be bold, brother!” and another, “Endure nobly!” (12) and another reminded them, saying, “Remember whence you are, and by the hand of what father Isaac endured being sacrificed on account of piety!” (13) All of them together, each and every one, showing concern for one another, bright and exceedingly bold, were saying “Let us consecrate ourselves from our whole heart to God, to the One who granted [us] our souls, and let us use our bodies for a guard post for the law. (14) Let us not fear the one supposing to kill, (15) for great is the soul’s contest and the peril in eternal torment lying before those who transgress the commandment of God. (16) Let us therefore arm ourselves fully with the mastery over the passions coming from divine reason. (17) For Abraham and Isaac and Jacob will welcome us, and all the father praise us, for dying in this way.” (18) And the remaining ones were saying to each one of their brothers as they were being dragged away, “Do not humiliate us, brother, nor prove untrue to our brothers who died first.”

6 The impersonal use of ἐστίv, “it is possible,” is evident in this and the following verse.

44

4 MACCABEES 13:19–27 & 14:1–6

13.19 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται δὲ τὰ τῆς ἀδελϕότητος ϕίλτρα, ἅπερ ἡ θεία καὶ πάνσοπϕος πρόνοια διὰ πατέρω(ν) τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἐμέρισεν καὶ διὰ τῆς μητρῴας ϕυτεύσασα ἀγαστρός,* 13.20 ἐν ἧ τὸ(ν) ἴσον ἀδελϕοὶ κατοικήσαντες χρόνον καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ πλασθέντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἵματος αὐξηθέντες καὶ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ψυχῆς τελεσϕορηθέντες 13.21 καὶ διὰ τῶν ἴσων ἀποτεχθέντες χρόνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γαλακτοτροϕοῦντες* πηγῶν, ἀϕ’ ὧ(ν) συνστρέϕονται ἐναγκαλισμάτω(ν) ϕιλαδέλϕων* ψυχαί. 13.22 καὶ αὔξονται σϕοδρότερον διὰ συντροϕίαν καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν συνηθ[ε]ίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης παιδ[ε]ίας καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐν νόμῳ ΘΥ ἀσκήσεως. 13.23 οὕτως δὴ τοίνυ(ν) καθεστηκυίης συνπαθοῦς τῆς ϕιλαδελϕίας οἱ ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕοὶ συ(μ)παθέστερον ἔσχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 13.24 νόμῳ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ παιδευθέντες καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐξασκήσαντες ἀρετὰς καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ συστραϕέντες βίῳ μᾶλλον ἑαυτοὺς ἠγάπων. 13.25 ἡ γὰρ ὁμοζηλία τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας ἐπέτ[ε]ινεν αὐτῶ[ν] τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους εὔνοιαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν· 13.26 σὺν γὰρ τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ τὴν ποθ[ε]ινοτέραν ἑαυτοῖς κατεσκεύαζον τὴν* ϕιλαδελϕίαν. 13.27 ἀλλ’ ὅμως καίπερ τῆς ϕύσεως καὶ τῆς συνηθ[ε]ίας καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἠθῶν τὰ τῆς ἀδελϕότητος αὐτοῖς ϕίλτρα συναυξάντων* ἀνέσχοντο διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν τοὺς ἀδελϕοὺς οἱ ὑπολ[ε]ιπόμενοι, τοὺς κατοικτιζομένους ὁρῶντες μέχρι θανάτου βασανιζομένους, 14.1 προσέτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν αἰκισμὸν ἐποτρύνοντες, ὡς μὴ μόνον τῶν ἀλγηδόνων περιϕρονῆσαι αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀδελϕῶν ϕιλαδελϕίας παθῶν κρατῆσαι. 14.2 ὦ βασιλέωνβασι* λογισμοὶ βασιλικώτεροι καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἐλευθερώτεροι. 14.3 ὦ ἱερᾶς καὶ εὐαρμόστου περὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς* τῶν ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕῶν συμϕωνίας. 14.4 οὐδεῖς ἐκ τῶν ἑπτὰ μ[ε]ιρακίων ἐδ[ε]ιλίασεν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ὤκνησεν, 14.5 ἀλλὰ πά(ν)τες ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἀθανασίας ὁδὸν τρέχοντες ἐπὶ τὸν διὰ τῶν βασάνων θάνατο(ν) ἔσπευδον. 14.6 καθάπερ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ οἱ πόδες συμϕώνως τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀϕηγήμασιν κινοῦνται, οὕτως οἱ ἱεροὶ μ[ε]ίρακες ἐκεῖνοι ὡς ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας 13.19 ἀγνοεῖται: R reads ἀγνοεῖτε | πάνσοπϕος: R reads πάνσοϕος| ἀγαστρός: a faint line suggests that the corrector emended this to γαστρός, which R also reads and which is necessary to make sense of this verse. / 13.21 γαλακτοτροϕοῦντες: corrected to γαλακτοποτοῦντες (so also R) | συνστρέϕονται: R reads συντρέϕονται | ϕιλαδέλϕων: corrected to ϕιλάδελϕοι (so also R). / 13.22 συντροϕίαν: R reads συντροϕίας | ΘΥ = θεοῦ / 13.23 συνπαθοῦς: R renders συμπαθοῦς / 13.24 συστραϕέντες: R renders συντραϕέντες / 13.26 R omits first τὴν | ἑαυτοῖς: R reads αὑτοῖς | τὴν ϕιλαδελϕίαν: corrector omits τὴν / 13.27 συναυξάντων: corrected to συναυξόντων (so also R) | κατοικτιζομένους: R reads καταικιζομένους / 14.1 τῆς τῶν ἀδελϕῶν ϕιλαδελϕίας παθῶν: R reads τῶν τῆς ϕιλαδελϕίας παθῶν (against both S and A). / 14.2 βασιλέωνβασι: corrected to βασιλέων as an obvious dittography (so also R). / 14.3 second ἱερᾶς: corrector changes to εὐσεβ[ε]ίας (so also R).

4 MACCABEES 13:19–27 & 14:1–6

45

(19) You are not ignorant of the affections of brotherhood, affections which the divine and all-wise providence apportioned through the fathers to those begotten, implanting it also through the maternal womb. (20) In this womb, brothers, having dwelt for the same amount of time, having been molded at the same time, having been strengthened from the same blood, and having been brought to ripeness through the same soul, (21) and having been brought to full term through the same amount of time, and nursing on milk from the same springs, from which embraces the brother-loving souls were compacted together, (22) they grow even stronger through shared nurture and daily habit and the same training and our practice in God’s law. (23) Brotherly sympathy having come into being in this way, then, the seven brothers held a greater sympathy toward one another, (24) for, having been educated in the same law and having practiced the same moral excellences and having been nurtured together in the just life, they came to love each other more. (25) For the common zeal for nobility and goodness increased their good will and harmony toward one another, (26) for they made brotherly love more desirable to themselves with piety. (27) But nevertheless, although nature and custom and the habits of moral excellence were heightening the affections of brotherhood for them, for the sake of piety those left behind endured seeing the brothers for whom they felt deep pity being tortured to death, (Chapter 14:1) and urging them on to mistreatment besides, so that they not only lightly esteemed the agonies but also restrained the passions of the brothers’ fraternal affection. (2) O reasoning faculties, more royal than kings and more free than free persons! (3) O sacred orchestra of the seven brothers, harmoniously arranged in the interest of the sacred! (4) None of the seven lads was afraid or hesitated in the face of death, (5) but they all were hastening toward death by tortures as if running a path toward immortality. (6) Just as the hands and the feet move in harmony with the dictates of the soul, so these holy youths, as people moved by a deathless soul characterized

46

4 MACCABEES 14:6–18

πρὸς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς συνεϕώνησαν θάνατον. 14.7 ὦ πανάγιε συμϕώνων ἀδελϕῶν ἑβδομάδας.* καθάπερ γὰρ ἑπτὰ τῆς κοσμοποιίας ἡμέραι περὶ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν, 14.8 οὕτω{ς} περὶ τὴν ἑβδομάδα χορεύοντες οἱ μ[ε]ίρακες ἐκύκλου(ν) τὸν τῶν βασάνων ϕόβον καταλύοντες. 14.9 νῦν ἡμ[ε]ῖς ἀκούοντες τὴν θλῖψιν τῶν νεανιῶν ἐκ[ε]ίνω(ν) ϕρίττομεν· οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ὁρῶντες, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μόνον ἀκούοντες τὸν παραχρῆμα ἀπειλῆς λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσχοντες ἐνεκαρτέρου(ν) καὶ τοῦτο ταῖς {διὰ} τοῦ πυρὸς ὀδύναις· 14.10 ὧν τί {ἂν} γένοιτο ἐπανγέλτερον;* ὀξεῖα γὰρ καὶ σύντομος οὖσα ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς δύναμις ταχέως διέλυεν τὰ σώματα. 14:11–15:32

Reason Masters Parental Affection

14.11 καὶ μὴ θαυμαστὸ(ν) ἡγεῖσθαι εἰ ὁ λογισμὸς περιεκράτησε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ἐν τοῖς βασάνοις, ὅπου γε καὶ γυναικὸς νοῦς πολυτροπωτέρων ὑπερεϕρόνησεν ἀλγηδόνων. 14.12 ἡ μήτηρ γὰρ τῶν ἑπτὰ νεανίσκων {ἐκ[ε]ίνων} ὑϕήνεγκεν τὰς ἐϕ’ ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν τέκνων στρέβλας. 14.13 θεωρεῖτε δὲ πῶς πολύπλοκός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ϕιλοτεκνίας στοργὴ ἕλκουσα πάντα πρὸς τὴν τῶν {τέκνων} σπλάγχνων συμπάθ[ε]ιαν, 14.14 ὅμπου* γε καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα ὁμοίαν εἰς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεννώμενα συμπάθ[ε]ιαν καὶ στοργὴν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. 14.15 καὶ γὰρ τῶν πετεινῶν τὰ μὲν ἥμερα κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας ὀροϕυτοῦντα προσασπίζει τῶ(ν) νεοττῶν, 14.16 τὰ δὲ κατὰ κορυϕὰς ὀρέων καὶ ϕαράγγων ἀπορρῶγας καὶ δένδρων ὀπὰς καὶ τὰς τούτων ἄκρας ἐννοσσοποιησόμενα* ἀποτίκτ[ε]ι καὶ τὸ(ν) προσιόντα κωλύει. 14.17 [εἰ] δὲ καὶ μὴ δύναι{ν}το κωλύειν, περι[ι]πτάμενα κυκλόθεν αὐτῶ(ν) ἀλγοῦντα τῇ στοργῇ ἀνακαλούμενα τῇ ἰδίᾳ ϕωνῇ, καθ’ ὃ δύνανται, βοηθ[ε]ῖ{ν} τοῖς τέκνοις. 14.18 καὶ τί δ[ε]ῖ Note: the facsimile is very poor at 14:11–17; 15:1–6, 10–11, such that textual reconstruction is less certain. 14.7 ἑβδομάδας: corrector emends to ἑβδομάς (so also R). / 14.9 τοῦ πυρὸς: corrector changes to διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς; R reads διὰ πυρὸς / 14.10 τί ἂν: R omits the corrector’s addition | ἐπανγέλτερον: corrector changes to ἐπαλγέστερον (so also R, followed in the translation below). / 14.11 ἡγεῖσθαι: R reads ἡγεῖσθε | τοῖς: R reads ταῖς / 14.12 ἐκείνων: R omits the corrector’s addition | ὑϕήνεγκεν: R reads ὑπήνεγκεν / 14.13 τέκνων: R omits the corrector’s addition. / 14.14 ὅμπου: corrected to ὅπου (so also R) | εἰς: R reads τὴν εἰς. / 14.15 ὀροϕυτοῦντα προσασπίζει: R reads ὀροϕοιτοῦντα προασπίζει. The translation follows Dupont-Sommer (1939:138) at this point in accepting Deissmann’s emendation (1900:169) to ὀροϕο-κοιτοῦντα, “making a bed/nest of thatched reeds.” / 14.16 ἐννοσσοποιησόμενα: corrected to ἐννοσσοποιούμενα; R reads ἐννοσσοποιησάμενα. / 14.17 [εἰ] δὲ: S omits εἰ due to homoioteleuton (see the preceding κωλύει). Since δὲ is postpositive, it is reasonable to expect that the scribe “saw” the -ει of κωλύει as the required εἰ prior to δὲ | δύνανται: R reads δύναται / 14.18 διὰ τὴν: R reads τὴν διὰ | R omits second τὴν

4 MACCABEES 14:6–18

47

by piety, made an agreement in regard to death on behalf of piety. (7) O all-holy hebdomad of brothers in unison! For just as the seven days of the creation of the world [dance in chorus] around piety (8) so dancing in chorus around the number seven, the youths were encircling the fear of the tortures, dissolving it. (9) Now we ourselves shudder hearing about the distress of those young men, but they, not only seeing nor hearing the word of imminent threat but also suffering it, held out steadfastly – and this in the pains of fire! (10) What could be more painful than these? For the power of fire, being sharp and quick, speedily dissolved their bodies. 14:11–15:32

Reason Masters Parental Affection

(11) And do not think it amazing if reason controlled those men in the tortures when indeed even a woman’s mind despised more varied sufferings! (12) For the mother of the seven young men endured the instruments of torture employed against each one of the children. (13) Observe how intricate the affection of parental love is, drawing everything toward a sympathy coming from the inmost parts. (14) Where indeed even the unreasoning animals have sympathy and affection toward those born from them of the same kind as found among human beings, (15) for even among birds the tame ones defend their nestlings by building upon the rooftops, (16) while others, making the peaks of mountains and sheer parts of ravines and the holes and highest parts of trees their nests, bear their young and hinder the one who would approach. (17) But if they are even then unable to hinder [the encroacher], flying around them, pained with affection, calling out with their own voice, they help their children as much as they can. (18) And why is it necessary

48

4 MACCABEES 14:18–20 & 15:1–13

διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἐπιδ[ε]ικνύναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα συμπάθ[ε]ιαν, 14.19 ὅπου γε καὶ μέλισσαι περὶ τὸν τῆς κηρογονίας καιρὸν ἐπαμύνονται τοὺς προσιόντας καὶ καθάπερ σιδήρῳ τῷ κέντρῳ πλήσσουσι τοὺς προσιόντας τῇ νοσσιᾷ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαμύνουσιν ἕως θανάτου; 14.20 ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὴ{ν} Αβρααμ ὁμόψυχον τῶν νεανίσκων μητέρα μετεκίνησεν συμπάθ[ε]ια τέκνω(ν). 15.1 ὦ λογισμὲ τέκνω(ν) παθῶν τύραννε καὶ εὐσέβ[ε]ια μητρὶ τέκνων ποθεινοτέρα. 15.2 μήτηρ δυεῖν προκειμένων, εὐσεβ[ε]ίας καὶ τῆς ἑπτὰ υἱῶν σωτηρίας προ{σ}καίρου κατὰ τὴν τοῦ τυράννου πρόσχεσι(ν), 15.3 τὴν εὐσέβειαν μᾶλλον ἠγάπησας τὴν ζῶσαν εἰς αἰωνίαν ζωὴν κατὰ ΘΝ. 15.4 ὦ τίνα τρόπον ἠθολογήσαιμι ϕιλότεκνα γονέων πάθη. ψυχῆς τε καὶ {μ}ορϕῆς ἀκ* ὁμοιότητα εἰς μικρὸν παιδὸς χαρακτῆρα θαυμάσιον ἐναποσϕραγίζομεν* μάλιστα διὰ τὸ τῶν παθῶ(ν) τοῖς γεννηθ[ε]ῖσι(ν) τὰς μητέρας τῶ(ν) παθῶν καθεστάναι συμπαθεστέρας. 15.5 ὅσῳ γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενέστεραν* [κα]ὶ πολυγονώτεραι ὑπάρχου[σ]ιν αἱ μητέρες, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλό(ν) εἰσιν ϕιλοτεκνώτεραι. 15.6 {πασῶν δὲ τῶν μητέρων ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν ἑπτὰ παίδων μήτηρ ϕιλοτεκνοτέρα,} ἥτις ἑπτὰ κυοϕορίαις τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπιϕερομένην* ϕιλοστοργίαν 15.7 καὶ διὰ πολλὰς τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὠδῖνας ἠναγκασμένη τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἔχειν συμπάθ[ε]ιαν, 15.8 διὰ τὸν πρὸς τὸν ΘΝ ϕόβον ὑπερεῖδεν τὴν τῶν τέκνω(ν) πρόσκαιρον σωτηρίαν. 15.9 οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν τῶν υἱῶν καὶ τὴ(ν) πρὸς τὸν νόμο(ν) αὐτῶν εὐπ[ε]ίθ[ε]ιαν μ[ε]ίζω {τὴν} ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔσχεν* ϕιλοστοργίαν. 15.10 {δί}καιοί τε γὰρ ἦσαν καὶ σώϕρονες καὶ ἀνδρ[ε]ῖοι καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι καὶ ϕιλάδελϕοι καὶ ϕιλομήτορες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ μέχρι θανάτου τὰ νόμιμα ϕυλάσσο(ν)τες* π[ε]ίθεσθαι αὐτῇ. 15.11 ἀλλ’ ὅμως καίπερ τοσούτων ὄντω(ν) τῶν περὶ τὴν ϕιλοτεκνίαν εἰς συμπάθ[ε]ιαν ἑλκόντων τὴν μητέρα, ἐϕ’ οὐδενὸς αὐτῶ(ν) τὸν λογισμὸν αὐστῆς αἱ πανποίκιλοι βάσανοι ἴσχυσαν μετατρέψαι, 15.12 ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ ἕνα παῖδα καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντας ἡ μήτηρ ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας προετρέπετο θάνατον. 15.13 ὦ ϕύσις ἱερὰ καὶ ϕίλτρα γονέων

15.2 πρόσχεσιν: R reads ὑπόσχεσιν / 15.3 ἠγάπησας: R reads ἠγάπησεν | ζῶσαν: R reads σῴζουσαν | ΘΝ = θεόν / 15.4 ἀκ: rightly marked for omission by corrector (absent from R) | ἐναποσϕραγίζομεν: corrector changes to ἐναποσϕραγίζον (R follows original) | second παθῶν: R reads πατέρων / 15.5 ἀσθενέστεραν: corrected to ἀσθενέστεραι; R reads ἀσθενόψυχοι | [κα]ὶ: ms. has small lacuna here | ὑπάρχου[σ]ιν: ms. has another small lacuna here | ϕιλοτεκνώτεραι: R reads ϕιλοτεκνότεραι. / 15.6 ἐπιϕερομένην: corrected to ἐπιϕυτευομένη (so also R). / 15.8 ΘΝ = θεὸν / 15.9 ἀλλὰ: R reads ἀλλὰ καὶ | ἔσχεν: corrector changes to εἶχεν / 15.10 ϕυλάσσοντες: corrected to ϕυλάσσοντας (so also R). / 15.11 ἐϕ’: R reads ἐπ’ | αὐστῆς: R reads αὐτῆς | πανποίκιλοι: R renders παμποίκιλοι / 15.13 γενήμασι: R reads γένεσι | ἀδάμαστη: corrected to ἀδάμαστα (so also R).

4 MACCABEES 14:18–20 & 15:1–13

49

to demonstrate sympathy towards children through unreasoning animals, (19) when indeed even bees, around the season for making honeycomb, defend themselves against the encroachers and, just as with an iron sting, strike those approaching their brood and defend them even to death? (20) But sympathy for her children did not dislodge the mother of the young men, like-souled with Abraham as she was. (Chapter 15:1) O reason of the children, tyrant of emotions, and piety, more desirable to the mother than children! (2) Two things lying before her – piety and the temporary deliverance of her seven sons according to the tyrant’s promise – the mother (3) cherished more the piety that lives into eternal life by the favor of God. (4) O, how can I describe the childrenloving emotions of parents? We impress a wondrous similarity of both soul and form into the miniature stamp of a child. And mothers especially, because mothers become more sympathetic than fathers from their sufferings for those born from them. (5) For the weaker mothers are, and the more children they bear, the more they love their children. (6) And the mother of the seven children, who was given strong affection by means of seven pregnancies, loved her children more than all mothers, (7) and on account of the many pangs suffered for each of them was compelled to have sympathy for them. (8) But on account of reverence toward God she disregarded the temporary deliverance of the children. (9) Not only so, but on account of the nobility and goodness of the sons and their ready obedience to the law she had even greater affection for them. (10) For they were so just and self-controlled and courageous and magnanimous and loving towards their brothers and towards their mother that they obeyed her, guarding what was lawful even unto death. (11) Nevertheless, even though such things were drawing the mother toward sympathy in the interest of her love for her children, in the case of none of them was the complete range of torments able to sway her reason. (12) Rather, the mother encouraged each child both individually and all together on to the death for piety. (13) O sacred natural inclination and parental love and affection for offspring and nurture and untamed

50

4 MACCABEES 15:13–25

καὶ γενήμασι ϕιλόστοργε καὶ τροϕεία καὶ μητέρων ἀδάμαστη* πάθη. 15.14 καθένα στρεβλούμενον καὶ ϕλεγόμενον ὁρῶσα μήτηρ οὐ μετεβάλλετο διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν. 15.15 τὰς σάρκας τῶν τέκνω(ν) ἑώρα περὶ τὸ πῦρ τηκομένας καὶ τοὺς τῶν ποδῶ(ν) καὶ χειρῶν δακτύλους ἐπὶ γῆς {σ}πέροντας καὶ τὰς τῶν κεϕαλῶν μέχρι τῶν περὶ τὰ γέν[ε]ια σάρκας ὥσπερ προσωτ[ε]ῖα προκειμένας. 15.16 ὦ πικροτέρω(ν) νῦν πόνων π[ε]ιρα[σ]θ[ε]ῖσα μήτηρ ἤπερ τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὠδίνων. 15.17 ὦ μόνη γύναι τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ὁλόκληρον ἀποκυήσασα. 15.18 οὐ μετέτρεψέν σε ὁ πρωτοτόκος {ἀποπνέων}, οὐδὲ δεύτερος εἰς σὲ οἰκτρὸν βλέπων ἐν βασάνοις, οὐ τρίτος ἀποψύχων, 15.19 οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀϕθαλμοὺς ἑνὸς ἑκάστου θεωροῦσα ταυρηδὸν ἐπὶ τῶν βασάνων ὁρῶντας τὸν αὐτὸν* αἰκισμὸν καὶ τοὺς μυκτῆρας προσημ[ε]ιουμένους τὸ(ν) θάνατον αὐτῶ(ν) οὐκ ἔκλαυσας. 15.20 ἐπὶ σαρξὶν τέκνω(ν) ἑώρακας* σάρκας τέκνων ἀποκεκομμένας* καὶ ἐπὶ χερσὶν χεῖρας ἀποτεμνομένας καὶ ἐπὶ κεϕαλαῖς κεϕαλὰς ἀποδ[ε]ιροτομουμένας καὶ ἐπὶ νεκροὺς* νεκροὺς πίπτο(ν)τας καὶ πολυάνδριον [πολυανδρ[ε]ῖον?] ὁρῶσα τῶ(ν) τέκνων χόριον* διὰ τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐδάκρυσας. 15.21 οὐχ οὕτως {σ}ειρήνιοι μελῳδίοι* οὐδὲ κύκν[ε]ιοι πρὸς ϕιληκοΐα(ν) ϕωναὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐϕέλκονται ὡς τέκνων ϕωναὶ μετὰ βασάνων μητέρα ϕωνούντων. 15.22 πηλίκαις καὶ πόσαις τότε ἡ μήτηρ τῶ(ν) υἱῶν βασανιζομένων τροχοῖς καὶ καυτηρίαις* ἐβασανίζετο βασάνοις. 15.23 ἀλλὰ τὰ σπλάγχνα αὐτῆς ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀνδ[ρει]ώσας ἐπέτ[ε]ινεν τὴν πρόσκαιρον ϕιλοτεκνίαν παριδ[ε]ῖν. 15.24 καίπερ ἑπτὰ τέκνων ὁρῶσα ἀπώλ[ε]ιαν καὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνω(ν)* στρεβλῶν πολύτροπον ποικιλίαν, ἃς ἁπάσας* ἡ γεννέα μήτηρ ἐξέλυσεν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ΘΝ πίστιν. 15.25 καθάπερ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ τῆς αὐτῆς* ψυχῆς* δ[ε]ινοὺς ὁρῶσα συμβούλους ϕάσιν* τε 15.15 σπέροντας: R reads σπαίροντας | προσωτεῖα: R reads προσωπεῖα / 15.18 ὁ πρωτοτόκος: R omits article. / 15.19 αὐτὸν: corrector changes to ἑαυτῶν; R reads αὐτὸν. / 15.20 ἑώρακας: corrected to ὁρῶσα (so also R) | ἀποκεκομμένας: corrected to ἀποκομένας; R reads ἀποκαιομένας against both S and A | νεκροὺς νεκροὺς: corrected to νεκροῖς νεκροὺς (so also R) | χόριον: corrector changes to χορίδιον: R reads τὸ χωρίον / 15.21 {σ}ειρήνιοι: corrector has added a sigma here, but it is unclear whether the original scribe omitted the final sigma of οὕτως (which would not affect meaning) or the initial sigma of σειρήνιοι, which would yield the meaning “peaceful” (εἰρην[α]ῖοι). The latter meaning breaks the parallelism of “sirens” and “swans” and is clearly inferior. | μελῳδίοι: corrected to μελῳδίαι (so also R) / 15.22 second καὶ: R reads τε καὶ | καυτηρίαις: corrected to καυτηρίοις (so also R). / 15.23 ἀνδ[ρει]ώσας: the manuscript has a small lacuna in the middle of this word (see also 15.5; this is the other side of the leaf) / 15.24 second τέκνων: corrector marks for omission (R omits) | πολύτροπον: R reads πολύπλοκον | ἃς ἁπάσας: corrected to ἃς πάσας; R reads ἁπάσας | γεννέα: R reads γενναία | τὸν ΘΝ: R omits article / 15.25 καθάπερ: R reads καθάπερ γὰρ | τῆς αὐτῆς ψυχῆς: corrector changes to τῇ ἑαυτῆς ψυχῇ, followed by R | ϕάσιν: corrected to ϕύσιν (so also R) | τε καὶ: R reads καὶ

4 MACCABEES 15:13–25

51

emotion of mothers! (14) On account of piety, the mother, though seeing them wrenched apart and burned one by one, did not change her course. (15) She saw the muscles of the children being consumed with the fire, and the toes and fingers of their feet and hands quivering upon the ground, and the flesh of their heads down to the chins lying before them like masks! (16) O mother, tested now by more bitter sufferings than the birth pangs on their behalf! (17) O sole woman to breed such complete piety! (18) Not the firstborn {while expiring} nor the second looking at you piteously while in torments nor the third fainting altered your course, (19) nor did you cry while watching the eyes of each one savagely witnessing the same mistreatment and the nostrils forecasting their death. (20) You saw the amputated flesh of children upon the flesh of children, dismembered hands upon hands, severed heads upon heads, and corpses falling on corpses, and seeing the afterbirth becoming the common burial plot of the children on account of the tortures, you did not weep. (21) Neither the melodies of sirens nor the voices of swans so draw the hearers toward attentive hearing as the voices of the children calling out during the tortures did the mother. (22) With what great and plentiful torments the mother of the sons was tortured then as they were tortured by means of wheels and branding irons! (23) But pious reason, filling her bowels with courage amidst these passions, urged her on to disregard her temporal love for her children. (24) Although seeing the utter ruin of seven children and the manifold diversity of the torture instruments applied to the children, the noble mother let go of all these things on account of faithfulness toward God. (25) Just as if seeing fearsome counselors in the senate chamber of her own soul – natural inclination and genealogical connection and love for children and the

52

4 MACCABEES 15:25–32 & 16:1–8

καὶ γένεσιν καὶ ϕιλοτεκνίαν καὶ τέκνων στρέβλας, 15.26 δύο ψήϕους κρατοῦσα μήτηρ θανατηϕόρον τε καὶ σωτήριον, {ὑπὲρ τέκνων 15.27 οὐκ ἔγνω τὴν σῴζουσαν ἑπτὰ υἱοὺς πρὸς ὀλίγον χρόνον σωτηρίαν,} 15.28 ἀλλὰ τῆς θεοσεβ[ε]ίας* Αβρααμ καρτερίας ἡ θυγάτηρ ἐμνήσθη. 15.29 ὦ μήτηρ ἔθνους, ἔκδικε τοῦ νόμου καὶ ὑπερασπίστρια τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ σπλάγχνων ἀγῶνος ἀθλοϕόρε. 15.30 ὦ ἀρρένων πρὸς καρτερίαν γενναιοτέρα καὶ ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ὑπομονὴν ἀνδρ[ε]ιωτέρα. 15.31 καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ Νωε κιβωτὸς ἐν τῷ ἐθνοπληθεῖ κατακλυσμῷ κοσμοϕοροῦσα καρτερῶς ὑπέμ[ε]ινεν τοὺς κλύδωνας, 15.32 οὕτως σὺ ἡ νομοϕύλαξ πανταχόθεν ἐν τῷ τῶν παθῶν περιαντλουμένη κατακλυσμῷ καὶ καρτεροῖς ἀνέμοις, ταῖς τῶν υἱῶν βασάνοις συνεχομένη, γενναίως ὑπέμ[ε]ινας τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐσεβείας χειμῶνας. 16:1–17:6

The Mother’s Praiseworthy Response and Counsel

16.1 εἰ δὲ τοίνυν καὶ γυνὴ καὶ γερεὰ καὶ ἑπτὰ παίδων μήτηρ ὑπέμ[ε]ινεν τὰς μέχρι θανάτου βασάνους τῶν τέκνω(ν) ὁρῶσα, ὁμολογουμένως αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός. 16.2 ἀπέδ[ε]ιξα οὖν ὅτι οὐ μόνο(ν) ἄνδρες τῶν παθῶ(ν) ἐκράτησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυνὴ τῶν μεγίστων βασάνων ὑπερεϕρόνησεν. 16.3 καὶ οὐχ οὕτως οἱ περὶ Δανιηλ λέο(ν)τες ἦσαν ἄγριοι οὐδὲ ἡ Μισαηλ ἐκϕλεγομένη κάμινος λαβροτάτῳ πυρί ὡς ἡ τῆς ϕιλοτεκνίας περιέκεεν ἐκ[ε]ίνην ϕύσις ὁρῶσα(ν) αὐτῆν* οὕτως ποικίλως βασανιζομένους τοὺς ἑπτὰ υἱούς. 16.4 ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας κατέσβεσεν τὰ τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα πάθη ἡ μήτηρ. 16.5 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπιλογίσασθαι, ὅτι δ[ε]ιλόψυχος εἰ ἡ* γυνὴ καίπερ μήτηρ οὖσα, ὠλυϕέρετο* ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἴσως ἂν ταῦτα εἶπε(ν), 16.6 ὦ μελέα ἔγωγε κ(αὶ) πολλάκις τρισαθλία, ἥτις ἑπτὰ παῖδας τεκοῦσα οὐδὲ ἑνὸς μήτηρ γεγένημαι. 16.7 ὦ μάταιοι ἑπτὰ κυοϕορ<ε>ίαι καὶ ἀνώνητοι αἱ ἑπτὰ δεκάμηνοι καὶ ἄκαρποι τιθηνίοι καὶ ταλαίπωροι γαλακτοτροϕίαι. 16.8 μάτην δὲ ἐϕ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰς ὑπέμ[ε]ινα ὠδῖνας καὶ

15.26–27 ὑπὲρ τέκνων . . . σωτηρίαν: omitted due to homoioteleuton, restored by corrector (so also R). / 15.27 ἔγνω: R reads ἐπέγνω / 15.28 θεοσεβίας: corrected to θεοσεβοῦς (so also R), yielding “the godfearing endurance of Abraham.” / 15.30 ἀνδρ[ε]ιωτέρα: R reads ἀνδρειοτέρα / 15.31 ἐθνοπληθεῖ: R reads κοσμοπληθεῖ / 16.1 γερεὰ: R reads γεραιὰ / 16.3 περιέκεεν: R reads περιέκαιεν | αὐτῆν: corrected to αὐτῆς (so also R) / 16.5 ἐπιλογίσασθαι: R reads ἐπιλογίσασθε | ἡ γυνὴ: corrected to ἦν γυνὴ; R reads ἦν ἡ γυνὴ | ὠλυϕέρετο: corrected to ὠλοϕύρετο (so also R) / 16.6 οὐδὲ ἑνὸς: R reads οὐδενὸς / 16.7 ἀνώνητοι: R reads ἀνόνητοι | αἱ ἑπτὰ: R omits article | τιθηνίοι: R reads τιθηνίαι

4 MACCABEES 15:25–32 & 16:1–8

53

torture instruments awaiting her children – (26) the mother, holding two ballots, one bearing death and one bringing deliverance for the children, (27) did not acknowledge the deliverance preserving the seven sons for a short while, (28) but the daughter remembered the endurance of the godly fear of Abraham. (29) O mother of the nation, avenger of the law, and shield-bearer of piety, and prize-winner of the contest within your bowels! (30) O more noble than males with reference to endurance and more manly than men with reference to steadfastness! (31) For just as the ark of Noah, carrying the world in the race-wide flood, staunchly endured the rough waters, (32) in the same way you, O guardian of the law, drenched from all sides in the flood and the strong winds of the passions, surrounded by the tortures of your sons, nobly endured the storms on behalf of piety! 16:1–17:6

The Mother’s Praiseworthy Response and Counsel

(Chapter 16:1) If, then, even a woman – and an aged one – and a mother of seven children endured while seeing her children tortured to the point of death, pious reason is undeniably the absolute master of the passions. (2) Therefore I have shown that not only men restrained the passions, but also a woman despised the greatest torments. (3) Indeed, the lions around Daniel were not so wild nor the furnace of Mishael so kindled by exceedingly turbulent fire as the natural bent of parental love was burning that woman as she herself saw the seven sons thus variously being tortured. (4) But by means of pious reasoning, the mother quenched so many and such great passions. (5) For, indeed, consider this – if the woman, though being a mother, were faint-hearted, she would have wailed over them and perhaps said these things: (6) “O miserable one that I am and many times thrice-unhappy, who, after giving birth to seven children, have become a mother of not even one. (7) O seven futile pregnancies, and seven profitless ten-month periods, and fruitless nursings, and miserable breast-feedings! (8) To no purpose, O children, I endured many pangs on your account, and the

54

4 MACCABEES 16:8–23

χαλεπωτέρας ϕροντίδας ἀνατροϕῆς. 16.9 ὦ τῶν ἐμῶν παίδων οἱ μὲν ἄγαμοι, οἱ δὲ γήμαντες ἀνώνητοι· οὐκ ὄψομαι ὑμῶν τέκνα οὐδὲ μάμμη κληθ[ε]ῖσα μακαρισθήσομαι. 16.10 ὦ ἡ πολύπαις καὶ καλλίπες ἐγὼ γυνὴ χήρα καὶ μόνη πολύθρηνος· 16.11 οὐδ’ ἂν ἀποθάνω, θάπτοντα τῶν υἱῶν ἕξω τινά. 16.12 ἀλλὰ τούτων* τῷ θρήνῳ οὐδένα ὠλοϕύρετο ἡ ἱερὰ καὶ θεοσεβὴς μήτηρ οὐδ’ ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνωσι(ν) ἀπέτρεπεν αὐτῶ(ν) τινα ὡς οὐδὲ ἀποθνῃσκόντων ἐλυπήθη, 16.13 ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἔχουσα ἀδαμά(ν)τινον τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς ἀθανασία(ν) ἀνατίκτουσα τὸν τῶν υἱῶν ἀριθμὸ(ν) μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας ἐπὶ τὸν θάνατον αὐτοὺς προετρέπετο ἱκετεύουσα. 16.14 ὦ μητὴρ δι’ εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ΘΥ μητὴρ* καὶ* εὐσεβοῦς* στρατιᾶς* στρατιῶτι πρεσβῦτι καὶ γύναι, διὰ καρτερίαν καὶ τύραννον ἐνίκησας καὶ ἔργοις δυνατωτέρα καὶ λόγοις εὑρέθης ἀνδρός. 16.15 καὶ γὰρ ὅτε συνελήμϕθης μετὰ τῶν παίδω(ν) [ε]ἱστήκ[ε]ις τὸν Ελεαζαρον ὁρῶσα βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἔλεγεν* τοῖς παισὶ(ν) ἐν* τῇ Εβραΐδι ϕωνῇ, 16.16 ὦ παῖδες, γενναῖος ἀγών ἐϕ’ ὃ(ν) κληθέντες ὑπὲρ τῆς διαμαρτυρίας τοῦ ἔθνους ἐναγωνίσασθαι προθύμως ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρῴου νόμου. 16.17 καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸν μὲν γέροντα τοῦτον ὑπομ[ε]ίναι τὰς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ἀλγηδόνας, ὑμᾶς δὲ τοὺς νεανίσκους καταπληγῆναι* τοὺς* βασάνους. 16.18 ἀναμνήσθητε δὲ διὰ* ὅτι* διὰ τὸν ΘΝ τοῦ κόσμου μετελάβετε καὶ τοῦ βίου ἀπελαύσετε, 16.19 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὀϕ[ε]ίλεται πάντα ὑπομ[ε]ίναι πόνον διὰ τὸν ΘΝ, 16.20 δι’ ὃ* καὶ ὁ ΠΗΡ ἡμῶν Αβρααμ ἔσπευδεν τὸν ἐθνοπάτορα υἱὸν σϕαγιάσαι Ισα{α}κ, καὶ τὴν πατρῴα* χεῖρα ξιϕηϕόρον καταϕερομένην ἐπ’ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔπηξεν.* 16.21 καὶ Δανιηλ ὁ δίκαιος εἰς λέοντας ἐβλήθη, καὶ Ανανιας καὶ Αζαριας καὶ Μισαηλ εἰς κάμινον πυρὸς ἀπεσϕενδονήθησαν καὶ ὑπέμ[ε]ιναν διὰ τὸν ΘΝ. 16.22 καὶ ὑμ[ε]ῖς οὖν τὴν αὐτὴν πίστι(ν) πρὸς τὸν ΘΝ ἔχοντες μὴ χαλεπαίνεται. 16.23 16.9 ἀνώνητοι: R reads ἀνόνητοι / 16.10 καλλίπες: R reads καλλίπαις / 16.12 τούτων: corrected to τούτῳ (so also R) | ὡς οὐδὲ: R reads οὐδ’ ὡς / 16.13 ἔχουσα ἀδαμάντινον: R reads ἀδαμάντινον ἔχουσα / 16.14 μητὴρ: R reads μῆτερ, the vocative being required here | ΘΥ = θεοῦ | μητὴρ καὶ εὐσεβοῦς στρατιᾶς: marked for omission by corrector (not included in main text by R). / 16.15 ἔλεγεν: corrected to ἔλεγες (so also R) to avoid the clumsy slip into the third person in the middle of this apostrophe | ἐν: corrector marks for omission. / 16.16 ἀγών: R reads ὁ ἀγών | ἐναγωνίσασθαι: R reads ἐναγωνίσασθε / 16.17 ὑπομ[ε]ίναι: R reads ὑπομένειν | καταπληγῆναι τοὺς: corrected to καταπλαγῆναι τὰς (so also R) / 16.18 δὲ διὰ ὅτι: corrector changes to δὲ διὅτι, which the translation below adopts; R reads ὅτι | ΘΝ = θεὸν | κόσμου: the final syllable is written in shorthand (M superimposed upon Υ with a small omicron above the letter) | ἀπελαύσετε: R reads ἀπελαύσατε / 16.19 ὀϕ[ε]ίλεται: R reads ὀϕείλετε | ὑπομ[ε]ίναι πόνον: R reads πόνον ὑπομένειν | ΘΝ = θεόν / 16.20 ὃ: corrected to ὃν (so also R) | ΠΗΡ = πατὴρ | πατρῴα: corrected to πατρῴαν (so also R) | ἐπ’ αὐτὸν: R reads ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ὁρῶν, “he did not cower, seeing his father’s sword-bearing hand bearing down on him” | ἔπηξεν: corrected to ἔπτηξεν (so also R), which is required to make sense of the text. / 16.21 ΘΝ = θεόν / 16.22 ΘΝ = θεόν | χαλεπαίνεται: R reads χαλεπαίνετε / 16.23 ἀντιτάσσεσθαι: R reads ἀνθίστασθαι

4 MACCABEES 16:8–23

55

more difficult concerns of rearing you. (9) O, the unmarried ones of my children and the married but fruitless ones! I will not see your children nor will I be blessed by being called ‘grandmother’. (10) O, the woman with many and beautiful children that I was, now a widow and alone, bitterly wailing! (11) Nor, when I die, will I have any of my sons to bury me.” (12) But the holy and God-fearing mother did not bewail any of these with the dirge, nor was she averting any of them in order that they might not die, nor did she grieve as they were dying. (13) But as one holding her mind hard as adamant and bringing forth anew the total number of her sons unto immortality, she was encouraging them, urging them on behalf of piety on to death. (14) O mother, on account of piety toward God indeed a mother of a pious army, soldier, elder, and woman! Because of patient endurance, you even conquered a tyrant, and in deeds and in words you were found more powerful than a man! (15) For indeed, when you were arrested with the children, you stood watching Eleazar being tortured and began to say to the children in the Hebrew language: (16) “O children, it is a noble contest. Having been summoned here for the sake of bringing forward the nation’s evidence, contend eagerly on behalf of the ancestral law. (17) For it is indeed shameful for this old man to endure the sufferings for the sake of piety but for you, the young men, to be terrified in regard to the tortures. (18) Remember that you received a share of the world and enjoyed life because of God, (19) and on account of this you are obliged to endure every pain for the sake of God, (20) on account of which even our father Abraham hastened to sacrifice his son Isaac, the father of the nation, and he did not cower in regard to his father’s sword-bearing hand bearing down on him. (21) And Daniel the righteous was thrown to lions and Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael were cast into the furnace of fire and endured for the sake of God. (22) You also, therefore, having the same faith toward God – cease to be grieved. (23)

56

4 MACCABEES 16:23–25 & 17:1–9

ἀλόγιστον γὰρ εἰδότας εὐσέβ[ε]ια(ν) μὴ ἀντιτάσσεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις. 16.24 διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἡ ἑπταμήτωρ ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν υἱῶν παρακαλοῦσα ἀποθαν[ε]ῖν ἔπ[ε]ισεν μᾶλλον ἢ παραβῆναι τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ ΘΥ, 16.25 ἔτι* δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ διὰ τὸ(ν) ΘΝ ἀποθνῄσκοντες ζῶσιν τῷ ΘΩ ὥσπερ Αβρααμ καὶ Ισα{α}κ καὶ Ιακωβ κ(αὶ) πάντες οἱ πατριάρχαι 17.1 ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τῶν δορυϕόρων τινὲς ὅτι ὡς* ἔμελλεν συλλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὴ πρὸς θάνατον, ἵνα μὴ ψαύσειέν τις τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς, ἑαυτὴν ἔρειψε κατὰ τῆς πυρᾶς. 17.2 ὦ μήτηρ σὺν ἑπτὰ παισὶν καταλύσασα τὴν τοῦ τυράννου βίαν ἀκυρώσασα τὰς κακὰς ἐπινοίας αὐτοῦ καὶ δ[ε]ίξασα τὴν τῆς πίστεως γενναιότητα. 17.3 καθάπερ γὰρ σὺ στέγη ἐπὶ τοὺς στύλους τῶ(ν) παίδων γενναίως ἱδρυμένη ἀκλινὴ* ὑπήνεγκας τὸν διὰ τῶν βασάνων σ[ε]ισμό(ν). 17.4 θάρρει τοιγαροῦν, ὦ μήτηρ ἱερόψυχε, τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ὑπομονῆς βεβαίαν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸν ΘΝ. 17.5 οὐχ οὕτως οὐχ* οὕτως* σελήνη καθ’ οὐρανὸν ἐν* ἄστροις σεμνὴ καθέστηκε(ν), ὡς σὺ τοὺς ἰσαστέρους ἑπτὰ παῖδας ϕωταγωγήσασα πρὸς τὴ(ν) εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ἔντιμος καθέστηκας ΘΩ κ(αὶ) ἐστήρισαι ἐν* αὐτοῖς ἐν οὐρανοῖς.* 17.6 ἦν γὰρ ἡ παιδοποιία σου ἀπὸ Αβρααμ τοῦ ΠΡΣ. 17:7–18:5

Peroration I: Enumeration of the Martyrs’ Achievement and Exhortation to the Hearers

17.7 εἰ δὲ ἐξὸν ἡμῖν ἦ(ν) ὥς* ἐπί τινος ζωγραϕῆσαι τὴν τῆς εὐσεβ[ε]ίας σου ἱστορία(ν), οὐκ ἂν ἔϕριττον οἱ θεωροῦντες ὁρῶ(ν)τες ΜΡΑ ἑπτὰ τέκνω(ν) δι’ εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν ποικίλας βασάνους {μέχρι θανάτου γιγνομένας} ὑπομ[ε]ίνασαν; 17.8 καὶ γὰρ ἄξιον ἦν καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπιταϕίου ἀναγράψαι καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους εἰς μν[ε]ίαν λεγόμενα, 17.9 ἐνταῦθα γέρων ἱερεὺς καὶ γυνὴ γερεὰ καὶ ἑπτὰ παῖδες ἐνκεκήδευ(ν)ται Note: With the exception of a few verses, the facsimile is extremely poor at 17.22– 18.24, rendering textual reconstruction and observations about the activity of the corrector less reliable. 16.24 ΘΥ = θεοῦ / 16.25 ἔτι: corrector changes unnecessarily to ὅτι | ΘΝ = θεὸν | ΘΩ = θεῷ / 17.1 ὅτι ὡς: corrected to ὅτι ὅτε (R follows original) | ἔρειψε: R reads ἔρριψε / 17.2 ἀκυρώσασα: R reads καὶ ἀκυρώσασα / 17.3 ἀκλινὴ: corrector and R read ἀκλινὴς 17.4 ΘΝ = θεόν / 17.5 οὐχ οὕτως: corrector marks duplication for omission (R omits) | καθ’: R reads κατ’ | ἐν: corrector changes to σὺν (so also R) | ΘΩ = θεῷ | οὐρανοῖς: R reads οὐρανῷ / 17.6 ΠΡΣ = πατρός / 17.7 ὥς: corrector and R render ὥσπερ | ΜΡΑ = μητέρα | γιγνομένας: R omits (but otherwise follows suppletor) / 17.9 γερεὰ: R reads γεραιὰ | ἑπτὰ: scribe began to write out as word, then supplied the numeral | ἐνκεκήδευνται: R renders ἐγκεκήδευνται | τυράννον: corrector changes to τυράννου (so also R), which is necessary for sense | θέλοντας: corrector changers to θέλοντος (so also R)

4 MACCABEES 16:23–25 & 17:1–9

57

For it is unreasonable for people experienced in piety not to engage the sufferings head to head.” (24) Exhorting them by means of these words, the mother of the seven persuaded each one of the sons to die rather than disobey the commandment of God, (25) but also, moreover, with them knowing these things – that those dying on account of God continue to live to God, just as Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the patriarchs. (Chapter 17:1) Some of the bodyguards were saying that, when she was about to be taken also herself to death, she threw herself against the fires in order that no one might touch her body. (2) O mother, destroying the violence of the tyrant with your seven children, rendering his evil intentions void and demonstrating the nobility of faithfulness! (3) For like a roof set nobly upon the pillars of the children, you, unwavering, bore up under the earthquake brought on by the torments. (4) Be confident, therefore, O pious-souled mother, holding firm toward God the hope that comes from endurance! (5) Not so much, not so much has the moon in heaven among the stars been made to stand as revered as you, who lit the path toward piety for the seven star-like children, have been made to stand honored in God’s presence and firmly fixed with them in the heavens. (6) For your child-bearing was from father Abraham. 17:7–18:5

Peroration I: Enumeration of the Martyrs’ Achievement and Exhortation to the Hearers

(7) If it were proper for us to paint the story of your piety upon something, would not those viewing it shudder, seeing a mother of seven children enduring, for the sake of piety, their diverse torments {leading to death}? (8) For indeed it was fitting even to write upon the epitaph itself also these statements for these people from our nation as a memorial: (9) “Here an elderly priest and elderly woman and seven children lie buried on account of the violence of a tyrant wishing to destroy the polity

58

4 MACCABEES 17:9–24 & 18:1–3

διὰ τυράννον* βίαν τὴν Εβραίων πολιτ[ε]ίαν καταλῦσαι θέλο(ν)τας,* 17.10 οἳ καὶ ἐξεδίκησα(ν) τὸ γένος εἰς ΘΝ ἀϕορῶντες καὶ μέχρι θανάτου τὰς βασάνους ὑπομ[ε]ίναντες. 17.11 ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἦν ἀγὼν θ[ε]ῖος ὁ δι’ αὐτῶν γεγενημένος. 17.12 ἠθλοθέτ[ε]ι γὰρ τότε ἀρετὴ δι’ ὑπομονῆς δοκιμάζουσα. τὸ νῖκος εἰς* ἀϕθαρσίαν* αὐτῆς* ἐν ζωῇ πολυχρονίῳ. 17.13 Ελεαζαρ {δὲ} προηγωνί{ζε}το, ἡ δὲ μήτηρ τῶν {ἑπτὰ} παίδων ἐνήθλ[ε]ι, οἱ δὲ ἑπτὰ ἀδελϕοὶ ἠγωνίζοντο· 17.14 ὁ τύραννος ἀντηγωνίζετο· ὁ δὲ κόσμος καὶ ὁ τῶ(ν) ΑΝΩΝ βίος ἐθεώρ[ε]ι. 17.15 θεοσέβ[ε]ια δὲ ἐνίκα τοὺς ἑαυτῆς ἀθλητὰς στεϕανοῦσα. 17.16 τίνες δὲ οὐκ ἐθαύμασαν τοὺς τῆς θ[ε]ίας νομοθεσία* ἀθλητές*; τίνες οὐκ ἐξεπλάγησαν; 17.17 αὐτός γέ τοι ὁ τύραννος καὶ ὅλον τὸ συμβούλιον ἐ{ξε}θαύμασαν αὐτῶ(ν) τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπομονήν, 17.18 δι’ ἣν κ(αὶ) τῷ θ[ε]ίῳ νῦν παρεστήκασιν θρόνῳ καὶ τὸ(ν) μακάριον βιοῦσιν αἰῶνα. 17.19 καὶ γάρ ϕησιν ὁ Μωυσῆς καὶ πάντες οἱ ἡγιασμένοι ὑπὸ τὰς χ[ε]ῖράς σου. 17.20 καὶ ἀυτοὶ οὖ(ν) ἁγιασθέντες {διὰ τὸν ΘΝ} τετίμη(ν)ται, οὐ μόνον ταύτῃ τῇ τιμῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ δι’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν τοὺς πολεμίους μὴ ἐπικρατῆσαι 17.21 κ(αὶ) τὸν τύραννον τιμωρηθῆναι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθαρισθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἀντίψυχον γεγον{ότ}ας τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους ἁμαρτίας. 17.22 καὶ τῆς* τοῦ αἵματος τῶν εὐσεβῶ(ν) ἐκ[ε]ίνων καὶ τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου αὐτῶν ἡ θεία πρόνοια προκακωθέντα τὸν ΙΣΛ διέσωσεν. 17.23 πρὸς γὰρ τὴν ἀνδρ[ε]ία(ν) αὐτῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς κ(αὶ) τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς βασάνοις ὑπομονὴν ὁ τύρα(ν)νος ἀϕιδὼν ἀνεκήρυξεν ὁ ̕Αντίοχος τοῖς στρατιώταις αὐτοῦ εἰς ὑπόδ[ε]ιγμα τὴ(ν) ἐκ[ε]ίνων ὑπομονὴ(ν) 17.24 ἔσχεν τε αὐτοὺς γε(ν)ναίους καὶ ἀνδρ[ε]ίους εἰς πεζομαχίαν κ(αὶ) πολιορκίαν καὶ ἐκπορθήσας ἐνίκησε(ν) πάντας τοὺς πολεμίους. 18.1 ὦ τῶν Αβρααμιθίων* σπερμάτων ἀπόγονοι παῖδες Ισδραηλῖται,* π[ε]ίθεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ κ(αὶ) πάντα τρόπον εὐσεβ[ε]ῖτε, 18.2 γινώσκοντες ὅτι τῶν παθῶν ἐστι(ν) δεσπότης ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμὸς καὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν ἔνδοθε(ν), ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξωθε(ν) πόνων. 18.3 ἀνθ’ ὧν διὰ τὴν εὐσέβ[ε]ιαν προέμενοι τὰ σώματα τοῖς πόνοις ἐκ[ε]ῖνοι οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶ(ν) ΑΝΩΝ ἐθαυμάσθησα(ν) ἀλλὰ

17.10 ΘΝ = θεὸν / 17.12 εἰς ἀϕθαρσίαν αὐτῆς: corrector deletes εἰς and αὐτῆς and reads ἀϕθαρσία (so also R). / 17.13 second ἑπτὰ: R omits. / 17.14 ΑΝΩΝ = ἀνθρώπων / 17.16 τίνες δὲ: R omits δὲ | νομοθεσία ἀθλητές: corrector emends to νομοθεσίας ἀθλητάς (so also R) / 17.17 R omits τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ / 17.20 ἀυτοὶ: R reads οὗτοι | διὰ τὸν ΘΝ (= θεὸν): R reads διὰ θεὸν / 17.22 τῆς τοῦ αἵματος: corrected to διὰ τοῦ αἵματος (so also R) | προκακωθέντα τὸν ΙΣΛ (= Ισραηλ): R reads τὸν Ισραηλ προκακωθέντα / 17.23 βασάνοις: R reads βασάνοις αὐτῶν | ἀϕιδὼν: R corrects to ἀπιδὼν / 18.1 Αβρααμιθίων: corrected to Αβραμιαίων (so also R) | Ισδραηλῖται: R reads Ισραηλῖται | πίθεσθαι: R reads πείθεσθε / 18.3 ΑΝΩΝ = ἀνθρώπων

4 MACCABEES 17:9–24 & 18:1–3

59

of the Hebrews, who indeed avenged their nation, fixing their gaze on God and enduring tortures unto death.” (11) For what happened through them was truly a divine contest. (12) For at that time virtue was offering a prize, examining them by means of endurance. Victory brought7 her imperishability in a long-lasting life. (13) Eleazar was competing first, and the mother of the seven children was contending, and the seven brothers were competing. (14) The tyrant was struggling against them, and the world and the way of life of human beings were watching. (15) Reverence for God conquered, crowning her own athletes. (16) And who did not admire the athletes of the divinely given law? Who were not astounded? (17) Even the tyrant himself and the whole council admired their moral excellence and endurance, (18) on account of which they now stand before the divine throne and live throughout the blessed eternity. (19) For indeed Moses says, “And all the sanctified are under your hands.” (20) And they themselves, then, having been sanctified {on account of God} have been honored not only with this honor, but also in that, on account of them, the enemies did not conquer our nation, (21) and the tyrant was punished, and the homeland purified, they having become, as it were, a life-in-exchange for the sin of the nation, (22) and through the blood of these pious ones and through the propitiatory offering of their death, Divine Providence rescued the previously mistreated Israel. (23) Looking at their courage born of moral excellence8 and their endurance in the tortures, the tyrant Antiochus proclaimed the endurance of those people to his own soldiers for an example, (24) and he kept them noble and courageous for land battle and siege, and he conquered and pillaged all enemies. (Chapter 18:1) O Israelites, children descended from the seed of Abraham, obey this law and fulfill your religious duty in every way, (2) understanding that pious reason is master of the passions, and not only of distresses from within but also of distresses from outside. (3) Therefore, having delivered over their bodies to distresses on account of piety, these people were not only admired by human beings but also counted worthy

7 8

Reading εἰς as an indicator of the goal or result of the noun. Reading τῆς ἀρετῆς as a genitive of origin.

60

4 MACCABEES 18:3–19

καὶ θ[ε]ίας μερίδος κατηξιώθησα(ν). 18.4 καὶ δι’ αὐτοὺς εἰρήνευσεν τὸ ἔθνος, κ(αὶ) τὴν εὐνομίαν τὴ(ν) ἐπὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνανεωσάμενοι ἐκπεπόρθηκαν* τοὺς πολεμίους. 18.5 κ(αὶ) ὁ τύραννος ̕Αντίοχος καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς τετιμώρηται καὶ ἀποθανὼ(ν) κολάζεται· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς ἴσχυσεν ἀναγκάσαι τοὺς Ιεροσολυμ<ε>ίτας ἀλλοϕυλεῖσαι καὶ τῶ(ν) πατρίων ἐκζητηθῆναι* τότε ἀπάρας ἀπὸ τῶν Ιεροσολύμων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Πέρας.* 18:6–24

Peroration II: The Mother’s Second Speech and the Conclusion

18.6 ἔλεγεν δὲ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν παίδων καὶ ταῦτα τὰ δικαιώματα τοῖς τέκνοις 18.7 ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐγενήθην παρθένος ἁγνὴ οὐδὲ ὑπερέβη(ν) πατρικὸν οἶκον, ἐϕύλασσον δὲ τὴν οἰκοδομουμένην πλευράν. 18.8 οὐδὲ ἔϕθ[ε]ιρέν με λυμεὼν ἐρημίας ϕθορεὺς ἐν πεδίῳ, οὐδὲ ἐλυμήνατό μου τὰ ἁγνὰ τῆς παρθενίας λυμαιὼν ἀπάτητης* ὄϕις. 18.9 ἔμ[ε]ινα δὲ χρόνον ἀκμῆς σὺν ἀνδρί· τούτων δὲ ἐνηλίκων γενομένων ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ ΠΗΡ αὐτῶν, μακάριος δὲ* ἐκ[ε]ῖνος, τὸν γὰρ τῆς εὐτεκνίας βίον ἐπιζήτησας* τὸν τῆς ἀτεκνίας οὐκ ὠδυνήθη κ(αι)ρό(ν), 18.10 ὃς ἐδίδασκεν ὑμᾶς ἔτι ὢν σὺν ὑμῖν τὸν νόμον, τοὺς προϕήτας. 18.11 τὸν ἀναιρεθέντα Αβελ ὑπὸ Καιν ἀνεγίνωσκέν τε ὑμῖν κ(αὶ) τὸν ὁλοκαρπούμενο(ν) Ισα{α}κ καὶ τὸν ἐν ϕυλακῇ Ιωσηϕ. 18.12 ἔλεγεν δὲ ὑμῖν τὸν ζηλωτὴ(ν) Φινεες, ἐδίδασκέν τε ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐν πυρὶ Ανανιαν καὶ Αζαρια(ν), Μισαηλ. 18.13 ἐδόξαζεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐν λάκκῳ λεόντων Δανιηλ, ὃν ἐμακάριζεν. 18.14 ὑπεμίμνῃσκεν δὲ ὑμᾶς καὶ τὴν Ησαια* γραϕὴ(ν) τὸν* λέγοντα,* κἂν διὰ πυρὸς εἰσέλθῃς,* ϕλὸξ οὐ κατακαύσει σε. 18.15 τὸν ὑμνογράϕον ἐμελῴδ[ε]ι ὑμῖν ΔΑΔ λέγοντα, πολλαὶ αἱ θλίψεις τῶν δικαίων. 18.16 τὸν Σαλωμῶντα παροιμίαζεν ὑμῖν λέγο(ν)τα, ξύλον ζωῆς ἐστι(ν) τοῖς ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῦ τὸ θέλημα. 18.17 τὸν Ιεζεκιηλ ἐπιστοποίει τὸ(ν) λέγοντα, εἰ ζήσεται τὰ ὀστᾶ τὰ ξηρὰ ταῦτα; 18.18 ᾠδὴν μὲν γάρ, ἣν ἐδίδασκεν Μωυσῆς, οὐκ ἐπελάθετο διδάσκω(ν) τὴν λέγουσαν, 18.19 ἐγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν

18.4 ἐκπεπόρθηκαν: corrector changes to ἐκπεπολιόρκηκαν / 18.5 ἀλλοϕυλεῖσαι: R reads ἀλλοϕυλῆσαι | πατρίων: R reads πατρίων ἐθῶν | ἐκζητηθῆναι: corrected to ἐκδιαιτηθῆναι (so also R) | Πέρας: corrected to Πέρσας (so also R) / 18.6 τῶν παίδων: R reads τῶν ἑπτὰ παίδων / 18.7 οἰκοδομουμένην: R reads ᾠκοδομημένην / 18.8 λυμαιὼν: R reads λυμεὼν | ἀπάτητης: corrected to ἀπάτης (so also R) / 18.9 ΠΗΡ = πατὴρ | δὲ: corrector replaces with μὲν (so also R) | ἐπιζήτησας: corrected to ἐπιζήσας (so also R), “having lived” / 18.10 R reads καὶ τοὺς προϕήτας / 18.12 R reads καὶ Μισαηλ / 18.14 Ησαια: corrected to Ησαιου (so also R) | τὸν λέγοντα: corrected to τὴν λέγουσαν (so also R) | εἰσέλθῃς: corrected to προσέλθῃς; R reads διέλθῃς / 18.15 ΔΑΔ = Δαυιδ / 18.16 παροιμίαζεν: R reads ἐπαροιμίαζεν / 18.18 ἐδίδασκεν: R reads ἐδίδαξεν

4 MACCABEES 18:3–19

61

of a divine portion, (4) and on account of them the nation was restored to peace and, having renewed lawful order over the homeland, they ravaged the enemy forces. (5) And the tyrant Antiochus has suffered vengeance on earth and, after dying, continues to be punished. For as he was then able in no way whatsoever to compel the Jerusalemites to adopt foreign customs and to be required to give an account of their heritage, departing from Jerusalem he waged war against the Persians. 18:6–24

Peroration II: The Mother’s Second Speech and the Conclusion

(6) And the mother of the sons spoke also these just statements to the children: (7) “I was a chaste virgin, nor did I trespass the boundary of my father’s house, but I was guarding the rib that was being built up. (8) Nor did a deserted place’s corrupter, a seducer in a plain, seduce me, nor did the deceitful corrupter, the serpent, destroy the chastity of my virginity. (9) And I remained for the time of my prime with a husband, and, when these had come of age, their father died. But that man was favored. Having sought after the life of being blessed with children, he was not grieved for the season of childlessness. (10) He used to teach you, while he was with you, the law, the prophets. (11) He used to read to you about Abel, slain by Cain, and Isaac being offered as a sacrifice, and Joseph in prison. (12) He used to speak to you about the zealous Phinehas, and he used to teach you about Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael in the fire, (13) and he used to glorify Daniel in the pit of lions, whom he called favored. (14) And he would call to mind also the writing of Isaiah that says, ‘Even if you pass though fire, a flame will not consume you.’ (15) He would sing to you David the psalmist who said, ‘Many are the trials of the just.’ (16) He made proverbial [the saying of] Solomon, who said ‘There [or, He] is a tree of life for the ones who keep doing His will.’ (17) He used to confirm Ezekiel, who said ‘will these dry bones live?’ (18) For he did not neglect teaching you the song which Moses taught, that says, (19) ‘I will kill and I will cause to live. This is your life and the length of days.’”

62

4 MACCABEES 18:19–24

ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡ μακρότης τῶν ἡμερῶν. 18.20 ὦ πικρᾶς τῆς τότε ἡμέρας καὶ οὐ πικρᾶς, ὅτε πικρὸς ̕Ελλήνωνω(ν)* τύραννος πῦρ πυροὶς* σβέσας* λέβησιν ὠμοῖς καὶ ζέουσι θυμοῖς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τὸν καταπέλτην καὶ πάλι(ν) τοὺς βασάνους αὐτοῦ τὰς* ἐπὶ* τοὺς ἑπτὰ παῖδας τῆς Αβρααμ<ε>ίτιδος 18.21 καὶ τῶν ὀμμάτων τὰς κόρας λεπήρωσεν καὶ γλώσσας ἐξέτεμεν καὶ βασάνοις ποικίλαις ἀπέκτ[ε]ινεν. 18.22 ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡ θ[ε]ία δίκη μετῆλθε(ν) καὶ μετελεύσεται τὸν ἀλάστορα τύρα(ν)νον. 18.23 οἱ δὲ Αβρααμιαῖοι παῖδες σὺν τῇ ἀθλοϕόρῳ μητρὶ εἰς ΠΡΩΝ χορὸν εὐαγγελίζονται,* ψυχὰς ἁγνὰς καὶ ἀθλοϕόρους ἀπειληϕότες παρὰ {τοῦ} ΘΩ, 18.24 ὧ ἡ δόξα τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων· αμην.

18.20 πικρὸς: R reads ὁ πικρὸς | ̕Ελλήνωνω(ν)*: corrected to ̕Ελλήνων (so also R) | πῦρ πυροὶς σβέσας: corrector changes to πῦρ ϕλέξας; R reads πῦρ πυρὶ σβέσας | τοὺς βασάνους: R reads τὰς βασάνους | τὰς ἐπὶ: corrector and R omit / 18.21 καὶ τῶν ὀμμάτων τὰς κόρας: R reads τὰς τῶν ὀμμάτων κόρας | λεπήρωσεν: R reads ἐπήρωσεν. Sinaiticus may provide indirect support for the reading in A, ἐπλήρωσεν (the scribe of Sinaiticus having transposed the lambda). / 18.23 Αβρααμιαῖοι: R reads Αβραμιαῖοι | ΠΡΩΝ = πατέρων | εὐαγγελίζονται: corrected to συναγελάζονται (so also R) | ἀθλοϕόρους: R reads ἀθανάτους | ΘΩ = θεοῦ / 18.24 τοὺς αἰῶνας: R reads εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας

4 MACCABEES 18:20–24

63

(20) O bitter was that day – and not bitter – when a bitter tyrant of the Hellenes, quenching fire with fire in cruel caldrons and leading the seven children of the Abrahamite with seething fits of anger to the catapult and back again to his tortures, (21) mutilated the pupils of the eyes and cut out tongues and murdered by means of diverse torments, (22) for the sake of which Divine Justice pursued and will continue to pursue the accursed tyrant. (23) But the Abrahamic children with their prize-bearing mother are being nobly announced to the chorus of the ancestors, having received pure and prize-bearing souls from God, (24) to whom is the glory into the ages of the ages. Amen.

64

COMMENTARY

COMMENTARY

4 MACCABEES COMMENTARY

65

66

COMMENTARY INTRODUCTION

COMMENTARY

67

COMMENTARY

1:1–12

Exordium

The author begins his speech in a manner in keeping with the classical conventions for exordia, stating his subject clearly as a means of providing the “keynotes” of the speech (cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 3.14; 1414b) and beginning to introduce elements of amplification (i.e., why the topic is important) as a means of making the audience “well-disposed, eager to listen, and attentive” (Quintilian, Inst. 4.1.5). The adverbial participial clause governed by μέλλωv is causal, providing an initial rationale for the claim being made in the main clause that the author is “right” to call for the audience’s attention to the speech he is presenting. The author’s thesis is φιλoσoφώτατov, “most philosophical,” not in the sense of being rarified and academic, but in the sense of “quintessentially philosophical.” Reason’s ability to master the passions was indeed regarded as the heart of ethical philosophy by several authors. Letter of Aristeas defines the essence of philosophy to be the practice of deliberating well so that one is not “carried away by impulses (ὁρμαῖς),” because one has properly assessed “the injuries which are the outcome of the passions (ἐπιθυμιῶv),” and thus remaining able “to perform the duties of the moment properly, with emotions moderated (μετριoπαθῆ; Ep. Aristeas 256).” This author avers that “the highest rule” is “to rule oneself and not be carried away by the passions” (Ep. Aristeas 221–22). He would thus agree with our author’s claim that the thesis of this speech is the quintessence of philosophy, but so would Plutarch, that spokesperson for conventional wisdom, who writes that ethical virtue “has as its material the emotions of the soul and as its form reason,” with the result that the former are subject to the latter (Virt. mor. 1 [Mor. 440D]). Far from being a Hellenistic-period innovation, the thesis already found clear expression in Plato as he speaks of the soul of the virtuous person opposing the feelings and drives of the body rather than giving way to them (Phaedo 93–94). If one added to this the literature that spoke of “self-control” or “ruling oneself ” as the goal of philosophy (see below), one would have just cause to affirm the author’s claim for the importance of his thesis. Indeed, so pervasive is this ethical principle that we find it adapted even in a Jewish apocalypse. The author of 4 Ezra, discussing the seven orders

68

COMMENTARY

of those who find the heavenly rest after death, lauds those who “have striven with great effort to overcome the evil inclination that was formed in them, so that it might not lead them astray from life into death” (7:92). The “evil inclination” that takes root in the human being after Adam’s sin must be opposed by rational assessment of one’s duty to obey and honor God through the keeping of God’s law and of the disadvantageous consequences of yielding to the evil inclination – the dynamics are thus much the same as one finds in 4 Maccabees. The audience would, therefore, recognize that the author is addressing a subject of great relevance for their own successful attainment and maintenance of virtue, and therefore their honor and self-respect. Even though the author claims that his speech has as its purpose the demonstration of a proposition, an impression promoted through the frequent return to this proposition throughout the speech as a refrain, it quickly becomes clear that the author’s principal interest is in promoting the world view and way of life that he regards as the superlative means by which his hearers can advance reason’s mastery over their own passions and maintain an honorable life of virtue. In other words, he hopes to contribute to what Cicero called the “collection of rational arguments” and other aids that supported the practical living out of a virtuous and happy life (Tusc. Disp. 4.84). It is here that the author’s distinctive note, that pious reason masters the emotions, sounds clear and full. This single adjective will come to encompass reasoning and walking in conformity with the religious and ethical heritage of the Jewish people as expressed in the Jewish Scriptures (and particularly in the way of life defined by observance of the Torah). From the author’s listing of particular experiences under the heading of “passion” (πάθoς), the passions (παθή) are seen to cover a broad range of human experience, including desires and drives, emotional responses, and sensations, whether pleasurable or painful. The author, however, demonstrates a great deal of reserve in terms of the metaphysical speculations usually associated with treatments of the passions. He does not engage in speculation concerning their “seat” in the human psyche. Plato and Cicero spoke of the soul being divided into two parts – the rational, which is the seat of reason, and the irrational, which is the seat of the passions (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.10–11) – while Stoics traditionally speak of the soul as a unified whole that only acts irrationally when overcome by impulses and emotions (Plutarch, Virt. mor. 3 [Mor. 441C]). Our author is content to affirm that they have been planted in the human being, but does not try to locate them precisely, except in their

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

69

manifestation. He does not discuss the manner in which the passions lead the human being astray, but assumes that his audience will accept the fact that they do hinder virtue. Although promising to do so (1:14), the author never even actually defines what he understands the passions to be, as had, for example, Zeno (“a violent movement or assault upon the soul, which is irrational and contrary to nature,” Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 7.110). His interests remain more fully within the realm of ethics than metaphysics, and his treatment of the topic is thoroughly practical rather than speculative. Most translators and commentators understand the compound αὐτoδέσπoτoς to signify “supreme rule.” Thus Dupont-Sommer (1939:87): “the prefix αὐτός reinforces the idea expressed in the simple form of the word, giving it the sense of absolute, dictatorial, personal power” (my translation). This is also the meaning given in LSJ 280 col. 1, and is supported also from the fact that its synonym, αὐτoκράτωρ (also used at 1:7), is the Greek equivalent for imperator in the string of imperial titles (Hadas 1953:144). In the context of the philosophical discussion of mastery of the passions, however, it may be helpful to consider whether the term should be understood more in terms of “self-mastery,” which would also be well in keeping with the common usage of the prefixed αὐτός. “Self-mastery” is frequently identified as the essential goal of ethical philosophy (see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 2.22.53; Ep. Aristeas 221). Plato promotes “self-mastery” as a desirable and praiseworthy state, in which “the better part [of a human being] is master of the worse part,” while the opposite is censurable (Plato, Republic 431A; see also Gorgias 491). Mastering oneself is seen in Gorgias 491 as a prerequisite for ruling others, a connection that will be significant as the author portrays the martyrs as complete masters of themselves and the tyrant Antiochus as a slave to his passions (Moore and Anderson 1998:253–54). It would be entirely appropriate, therefore, to hear in αὐτoδέσπoτoς in this context a reference to that power of self-restraint over the passions that pious reason confers upon its adherents, saving them from being mastered by themselves, that is, made slaves of their passions and thus liable to lose their freedom (see Shaw 1996:277). λoγισμός is used in Stoic texts to denote the human rational faculty as opposed to θύμoς, the violent surges of the passions (see Pearson 1973:306, where the two are antagonists in a dialogue; Townshend 1913:666), an equivalent of the Stoic’s “governing faculty” (τò ἡγεμovικόv; Klauck 1989a:686). It is perhaps best to regard this, with Pfitzner (1967:57–58), as “the activity of thinking and reasoning” rather than as a static part of the

70

COMMENTARY

human psyche. In the passage in which the author comes closest to articulating a psychology (2:21–23), he speaks only of the mind, the senses, the passions, and the innate inclinations (habits). “Reason” (or, better, “reasoning”) would seem to be the term by which the author captures the working of the “mind” in harmony with the divine Law given to this faculty by God to enable it to rule over the other facets of the psyche (2:23). The addition of the epithet εὐσεβὴς is what immediately distinguishes this author’s proposition from the commonplace topic of Greco-Roman philosophical conversation. Interpreters have described the expression “pious reason(ing)” as “near oxymoronic” (Breitenstein 1978:133) or “paradoxical” (Lauer 1955:170), in which we see some element of the interpreters’ ideological location in academic discourse peering through, according to which piety and the enlightened processes of the mind have little in common. But neither first-century Jews or first-century Greeks and Romans would thus describe “pious reasoning,” even though they might disagree about the reasonableness of each other’s forms of piety. Piety, being a core virtue in both cultures, was indeed to be served by all right-functioning of the rational faculty; considerations learned from “piety,” moreover, were strongly present in philosophical ethics. For example, the consideration of what was due God or the gods (cf. 4 Macc 13:13; 16:18–19), being a component of the virtue of justice (giving to each their due), was a basic pillar of argumentation (see, for example, Rhet. Her. 3.3.4) and ethics (see Epictetus, Diss. 4.10.14). Weighing of temporal advantages and disadvantages against the eternal advantages and disadvantages taught by religion (cf. 4 Macc 13:15; 15:2–3, 8, 27; 16:25) is also fundamental to Plato’s ethical argumentation (as in Gorgias 526–527). Remaining mindful of God (Epictetus, Diss. 1.29.44–49; 1.30.1; 2.8.13–14) or being enabled by the activity and guidance of God (Ep. Aristeas 237–238, 277) are frequently seen as the necessary concomitant of reasoning properly and choosing the virtuous course of action, so that in both Gentile and Jewish authors we find piety and reason working together. What the author will attempt to demonstrate, however, is that the distinctive piety nurtured by adherence to the Law of Moses and the other traditions contained in the Jewish Scriptures provides unsurpassed training in virtue and inculcates invincible strategies of reasoning in the service of virtue. In this regard, the common observation that the epithet “pious” is a cipher for living according to the Jewish Law is correct (Breitenstein 1978:133; Lauer 1955:171; Pfitzner 1967:58). The author advises the audience not to pay attention “to philosophy”

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

71

(τῇ φιλoσoφίᾳ) in general, as in the NRSV, but to the particular philosophy that the author is about to explicate. The article here can be taken either as anaphoric, referring to the “most philosophical thesis” previously introduced, or as the “familiar” article, referring to the “philosophy” well-known to the audience in the ethical commonplace that “reason masters the passions.” This opening verse clearly identifies the author with that trend among Hellenistic Jewish authors to define and locate Judaism as a kind of philosophy, on a par with (and, in this text, far exceeding) other Greco-Roman philosophical schools. Josephus, for example, describes the various Jewish “parties” as differing schools of philosophy with disagreements similar to those found between Greek philosophical schools (B.J. 2.8.2–14 §§119–66; A.J. 18.1.2–6 §§11–25). Philo speaks of Judaism as a “philosophy” (cf. Legat. 156, 245) that can therefore be put in conversation with Greco-Roman philosophy throughout his extant corpus. Letter of Aristeas 31 uses the comparative form of the superlative adjective found in 4 Macc 1:1 to describe the legislation of the Torah (φιλoσoφωτέραv), and therefore worthy to take its place in the library of Alexandria alongside the works of Gentile philosophy. By presenting the Jewish way of life as a “philosophy,” the author participates in this larger trend to promote the respectability and worth of continued adherence to the peculiar customs and faith of their inherited religion in the eyes of Jews who have thoroughly internalized Hellenistic values (even though their non-Jewish neighbors will still malign their way of life as atheistic, misoxenic, and barbarian). 1:2 “amplifies” the thesis, providing two reasons why it would be important for the hearers to attend to the speech (and thus further rationales for the author’s claim that he is “right” to call for their attention, 1:1). The topic is a prerequisite for attaining “knowledge” (reading εἰς as purposive here), a term that the author will use again in 5:4 and 5:35 in connection with Eleazar, who is presented as an example of training in Torah brought to full maturity, and who therefore embodies that combination of skill, experience, and understanding (ἐπιστήμη) that readily discerns the path of virtue and knows without doubt or question that it must be followed. The author promises, therefore, to help the audience advance closer to that ideal. φρόvησις signifies “practical wisdom,” the ability to discern what is required for virtue and excellence in any context and to choose it (cf. Rhet. Her. 3.2.3, where “Wisdom” is defined as “intelligence capable, by a certain judicious method, of distinguishing good and bad”). The author singles out φρόvησις as the chief of the cardinal virtues, a hierarchalizing

72

COMMENTARY

of the virtues also observed in Zeno of Citium (according to Plutarch, Virt. mor. 2 [Mor. 441A]): “he defines prudence (φρóvησις) as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured.” Prudence is also the virtue identified by Plutarch as the means by which reason implants all the other ethical virtues, such that, ultimately, the cultivation of any depends on the right exercise of this one (Virt. mor. 4 [Mor. 443D]). φρόvησις, then, provides the foundation for all the virtues. In promising to praise φρόvησις, the author again signals that his speech seeks to help cultivate the primary virtue: just as he treats no trivial philosophical topic, going rather to the heart of ethical philosophy, so even within that he shoots straight for the center of that target. While the author will preserve the traditional cardinal four here (going on to list the other three in 1:3–4) and in 1:18, the elevation of φρόvησις (as the emphasis on the right-functioning of the rational faculty, which is akin to prudence, as the basis for the manifestation of all the virtues) makes room for “piety” to be introduced as one of the four cardinal virtues in 5:23–24. Freudenthal (1869:148–150) and Dupont-Sommer (1939:88–89) regard 1:3–4 as a clumsily written insertion, perhaps the result of a scribe attempting to reconstruct the text of a damaged manuscript by culling ideas and words from the first three chapters. Dupont-Sommer calls attention to the fact that the phrasing of “the passions that hinder temperance” and “justice” in 1:3–4 is very similar to what the reader will find later in 1:30 and 2:6, while each of the particular passions listed here as examples (or similar concepts) will re-emerge as the discourse progresses. Gluttony emerges as a topic in 1:27; 2:7; lust in 2:1–5; anger in 2:16–20; and, of course, pain and fear dominate the “narrative demonstration” of the thesis in the martyr stories. This evidence, however, is quite susceptible to another reading, namely that the author himself has prepared the audience for the emergence of these topics by weaving them into his exordium as a kind of outline of things to come, as indeed would be fitting for the opening of a speech. Dupont-Sommer (1939:88) is correct, however, to point out that “wrath” is hardly a passion that hinders courage (being, according to Plato and Aristotle, of the same nature as courage, as he himself notes). If we were to read the verse as ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶv τῆς δικαιoσύvης ἐμπoδιστικῶv παθῶv κυριεύειv ἀvαφαίvεται oἷov θυμoῦ τε καὶ κακoηθείας καὶ τῶv τῆς ἀvδρείας ἐμπoδιστικῶv παθῶv πόvoυ καὶ φόβoυ (merely moving θυμoῦ τε καὶ to a

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

73

position where it stands as part of a pair with κακoηθείας), we would remove several infelicities with one economical change. “Wrath” would now be grouped more properly as a passion contrary to justice, which pertains to “giving to each his or her due.” In the case of Moses’s response to the rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, acting personally out of wrath would have led to Moses’s usurping God’s privilege to avenge (Deut 32:35); instead, he submits the matter to God’s decision (Num 16:28–30). In the case of Simeon and Levi (2:19), wrath moved them to excess, giving the Shechemites more than their due (as well as violating justice by breaking faith with the agreement Jacob had already made with them). The change would also restore balance to each phrase, providing a pair of specific examples for each “genus” of virtue-hindering passion. With or without emendation, 1:3–4 prepares for what follows very well, introducing the remaining three cardinal virtues (after “prudence” in 1:2) that will remain focal points for the discussions that follow (see, e.g., 1:31–2:23; 5:22–24), filling out the picture of reason’s ability to cultivate the panoply of virtues, and providing a foretaste of many of the specific topics to be discussed in the remainder of the speech. There is no need to resort to interpolation hypotheses. 1:3–4 provide the protasis for a conditional clause the apodosis of which is a question rather than a statement (1:5). The author will indeed go on to show how following the commands of Torah and the examples of the sages contained therein leads one to develop the habits that lead to a consistent life of virtue (cultivation of self-control, 1:31–2:6a; justice, 2:6a-9a, and possibly 2:15–23; 3:6–18; courage, 5:1–17:24). σωφρoσύvη denotes “self-control,” and so is very close to the heart of the author’s thesis and the goal of ethical philosophy generally (cf. Rhet. Her. 3.2.3: “Temperance [Lat., modesta] is self-control that moderates our desires”). Here it refers primarily to the ability to resist the excess in desire so that one attends to one’s needs without immoderation. DupontSommer objects to γαστριμαργία τε καὶ ἐπιθυμία being offered as two equal examples of passions hindering temperance, the latter denoting the genus (“desire”) and the former a species (a particular kind of desire, namely for food), but the author will go on to link ἐπιθυμία rather particularly with “desire for beauty,” a rather romantic way of saying “lust,” both in his presentation of the example of Joseph and in his presentation of the commandment against coveting, in which he particularly highlights the prohibition against “desiring your neighbor’s wife” (see 2:1–6). It would be appropriate, therefore, to read it here, alongside γαστριμαργία, as a species of desire.

74

COMMENTARY

δικαιoσύvη is conceived by Aristotle as a social virtue, calling it “perfect virtue, . . . because its possessor can practice his [or her] virtue towards others and not merely by himself [or herself]” (Eth. Nic. 5.1.15 1129b30– 34). The author of Rhetorica ad Herennium captures the relational quality of δικαιoσύvη as well in his definition of justice as “equity, giving to each thing what it is entitled in proportion to its worth” (Rhet. Her. 3.2.3). Of course, justice also refers to living in line with the laws of one’s state (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 5.1.8 1129a31–1129b1). “Malice” is not developed by the author, though he again mentions this passion singly in 1:26 and as representative of a group of passions in 2:16. How it is opposed to “justice” is probably to be found in the use of the term to denote a desire to cause harm that is due not to the injuries suffered from the other person but due to a character defect in oneself. Thus “malice” does not render a person what is due him or her, although “vengeance” does and is often considered perfectly honorable (no shame, for example, attaches to the experience of anger in Aristotle’s discussion of this emotion in Rhet 2.2, anger being defined in 2.2.1 as a desire for revenge for some injury or insult). ἀvδρεία, “manliness,” as its very name implies, is a “gendered” virtue. If submissiveness and passivity are feminine virtues in the cultures of the first-century Mediterranean, “manliness” refers to “rising” to the occasion and “standing up” to any challenge rather than being overcome by it. “Courage” captures its essence well, “reaching for great things and contempt for what is mean; also the endurance of hardship in expectation of profit” (Rhet. Her. 3.2.3). Aristotle defines ἀvδρεία in one special sense as the virtue exhibited by the one who “fearlessly confronts a noble death, or some imminent peril that threatens death” (Eth. Nic. 3.6.10 1115a33–35), which Aristotle believes to be most at home in battle. Our author will portray the nine martyrs as quintessential exemplars of this kind of courage. Even though they die by torture or suicide, they die defending their ancestral law, their way of life, and their freedom from the tyrant – all topics connected with the praise of courageous soldiers. That “pain” and “fear” should particularly be the passions that threaten to unseat one’s commitment to the courageous course of action needs no explication. The stories of the martyrs will particularly focus on how they overcame fear (i.e., in anticipation of the tortures, as when Antiochus displays his instruments in 8:12–14) and pain (i.e., in the endurance of the unspeakable abuse of their bodies). As we have seen, “wrath” is out of place here, and should rather be seen as a hindrance to justice.

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

75

Deissmann (1900:151), Freudenthal (1869:150–152), Hadas (1953:146), and Dupont-Sommer (1939:88–89) argue that 1:5–6, which substantially covers the same ground as 2:24–3:6, is either an interpolation or, at least, a dislocation. Dupont-Sommer (1939:89) finds it inconceivable that the author should introduce an objection so early in the speech, before he has even developed his own argument. If we remember, however, that the primary goals of an exordium concern rendering the audience “attentive, well-disposed, and eager to hear” and giving the audience a clear sense of the subject to be addressed and the manner of demonstration, the rhetorical function of these verses becomes clearer and one no longer needs to resort to dislocation or interpolation theories. By presenting the content of 1:5–6 in the opening paragraph, the author locates his position quite clearly in the topography of philosophical debates concerning reason’s relationship to the passions. In so doing, he creates the impression that the subject he will address is not dry and sterile, but engaging and controversial, arousing the attentiveness of the hearers much as controversial topics continue to attract more interest than topics upon which there is general agreement. Klauck (1989a:686; 1989b:459–460) has also shown that an exordium might be expected to distance the hearers from opposing points of view and to prevent misunderstandings of the speaker’s thesis. The “demonstration of a thesis” as explained by Aphthonius (a fourth-century CE rhetorician) proceeds through the answering of objections (see also the use of this technique in 1 Cor 15:35–36; Rom 6:1, 15). This author, then, makes his first assault against objections in the exordium so that the audience shall withhold its sympathy for that position from the outset (Klauck 1989a:687). The first debate is something of a “straw person” argument, as the issue is developed neither here nor in 2:24, being merely labeled “laughable” in both places. However, this may have the effect of suggesting that objections to the author’s thesis (a thesis similar to the more basic version promoted by a great number of Jewish and Gentile philosophers, and thus having the weight of “conventional wisdom” behind it) are easy to refute, and therefore that the hearers are on firm ground as they attend to and mentally “side with” the author. The second of these debates – whether the goal of ethical philosophy should be the extirpation or merely the control of the passions – is the more important for the author and more substantial generally, for of the two clarifications of his position announced in 1:5–6 and repeated in 2:24–3:6, only this one receives further development in 3:2–18. Since 1:5–6 introduces a clarification of

76

COMMENTARY

the thesis to be developed substantially in the body of the speech (3:2– 18), it also fulfills the second major purpose of material included in an exordium. The basic argumentative strategies discussed by ancient educators in rhetoric under the heading of the elaboration of a chreia (see R. F. Hock and E. N. O’Neil 1986:174–177; also Rhet. Her. 4.43.56–4.44.57) may also provide insight into how 1:5–6 could be understood to function as part of a well-established pattern of developing a maxim or thesis. The schoolbook exercise called for budding orators to practice “inventing” different kinds of arguments as they also mastered a basic pattern of “arrangement,” namely the (1) statement of a position or recitation of a wise saying, often with some word of praise for the originator of the saying, (2) rationale(s) for the position, (3) statement of the converse or contrary case, (4) restatement of the position, and further proof of the position through (4) analogy, (5) historical example, (6) testimony from conventional wisdom (proverbial sentence) or respected authority (e.g., a saying of Hesiod), all wrapped up with (7) a conclusion affirming the veracity of the proposition or deriving some policy to be followed from the position, etc. This pattern illumines the exordium of 4 Maccabees in the following respects. 1:1–2 clearly states the position upon which the author intends to elaborate, amplifying the importance of this subject (the equivalent of a brief word of praise). 1:3–4 restate the position in an expanded form. 1:5 introduces an objection that allows a statement from the contrary (“reason does not master those passions”) and a restatement of the position in the positive (“but reason masters these passions”). Significant in this regard also is the fact that the author immediately turns to introduce a foretaste of the argument from historical example (1:7) that will dominate the book. There are, therefore, good reasons for accepting 1:5–6 as integral to the text. The particular objection encountered in 1:5 follows a common form of refutative argument in which one looks for contradictions within an argument or for some counter-evidence that the argument is not capable of absorbing. The logic is that one can refute the proposition that reason masters the passions if one can identify passions that reason does not master. “Ignorance” and “forgetfulness” are a far cry from “gluttony” and “pain,” but they are admittedly still human experiences, things “suffered” by the person as his or her soul is assaulted through the various senses. The author refutes the objection by invoking the generic fallacy – the objection springs from a misunderstanding of the “kind” of passion that reason is able to master. This is made slightly clearer in

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

77

2:24–3:1, where the author argues that the rational faculty cannot master those passions peculiar to itself, but only those passions that are outside itself, arising from the experiences and drives and feelings of “the body” in some sense. Cicero (De finibus 5.13.36) would make a similar distinction between voluntary and involuntary virtues, classifying memory among the latter (and thus forgetfulness among “involuntary” defects; thus also Philo, Migr. 206), whereas the cardinal virtues are within the province of the will (Breitenstein 1978:140). Therefore, just because one cannot keep oneself from forgetting one’s keys, one is not thereby freed from the moral responsibility not to forget oneself and fall into vices of all kinds. Most Stoic philosophers held that the wise person should eliminate the emotions or passions from his or her life. The goal was ἀπαθεία, no longer to experience emotion. Some Stoics, like Poseidonius, and the Peripatetics taught that the passions were to be controlled and moderated, not destroyed (Renehan 1972; Stowers 2000:846). The position of the Peripatetics was vigorously rejected by Cicero and Seneca on the ground that the passions were a disease of the soul. A moderate case of a disease was still ill-health; a moderate evil was still evil (Seneca, Ep. 116.1; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 3.22). Philosophers in favor of moderating the passions rather than striving to root them out argued that the experience of emotion, desire, and sensation were implanted in the human being by nature. Even by the Stoic standard of living “according to Nature,” then, one ought not to destroy the passions, but merely maintain the proper hierarchy of reason directing the passions. Cicero, however, would object that nothing that can be pushed to excess is natural (Tusc. Disp. 4.57). The author of 4 Maccabees clearly aligns himself with the school of thought represented by Poseidonius, the Peripatetics, and Plutarch, according to whom “mastery and guidance” of the emotions by reason is the goal of the sage (Virt. mor. 4 [Mor. 442C]). Indeed, Plutarch regards it as “neither possible nor expedient” for reason to uproot the passions entirely, since the passions, properly moderated, can even become allies in the quest for virtue as one accustoms oneself to experience the joys of virtuous choices and turn these into habit (Virt. mor. 4 [Mor 443D]). The author’s reason for making moderation and control his aim is found in the anthropology he constructs in 2:21–23. The emotions and inclinations were planted in the human being by God, with the “mind” enthroned to rule them by means of obedience to the God-given Law. The Jewish philosopher, then, seeks not to alter the divinely-constituted anthropology by destroying part of it, but to cultivate it in keeping with the designs of

78

COMMENTARY

the Creator. This is, not surprisingly, the position that would emerge in rabbinic Judaism as well (cf. Aboth 4.1; Hadas 1953:151). The author claims in 1:7 to have many avenues of demonstration at his disposal, preparing the hearers for the flurry of proofs from the legal stipulations and the narrative material contained in the Pentateuch that will fill 1:33–3:18, but fixes on the one proof that, in his opinion, will most conclusively demonstrate reason’s ability to master the passions. It is noteworthy that the author takes all his examples from the Jewish Scriptures or, as in the case of the martyrs, in direct connection with those Scriptures (Dupont-Sommer 1939:89). This is quite different from Philo, who in Quod omnis probus liber sit frequently cites Greek examples like Zeno of Elea and Anaxarchos and makes observations based on cultural phenomena at home among Greeks, like the pancratiasts competing in the games (which Philo evidently attended). This suggests that our author is less open to what can be learned from non-Jewish models, being intent on promoting commitment to the distinctive way of life that emerges from obedience to the Torah rather than emphasizing the common ground between non-Jewish philosophers and devotees of the Jewish philosophy. The speech will therefore be dominated by a proof from historical example, namely the examples of nine martyrs who died during the Hellenization Crisis in or around 167 B.C.E., celebrated in 2 Macc 6:18– 7:42. This passage provides, therefore, a clear indication within the exordium of the relationship of the two major parts of the oration (1:1– 3:18; 3:19–18:24) that some scholars have tried to separate as parts of independent and unrelated works (e.g., Lebram 1974:82), rendering the latter position quite inexplicable. 1:10 even accounts for the encomiastic nature of 3:19–18:24, a feature that Lebram correctly emphasizes but then uses to distance them from the demonstrative rhetoric of 1:1–3:18. Arguments from historical example were a standard form of inductive proof in classical rhetoric. Aristotle especially commended their use in deliberative rhetoric, since past events, the circumstances and ends of which were known, could provide a basis for the plausible projection of future events and the consequences of various courses of actions in response to those events (Rhet. 1.9.40; 2.20.8). Historical examples were, however, also applicable to forensic and demonstrative oratory on the same basic principle of deriving from the known and certain some sense of what is probable in regard to the unknown and uncertain. Thus, here, by reviewing how nine martyrs did in fact refuse to yield to the most excessive passions, both those from within (e.g., fraternal and maternal

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

79

love; fear) and those from without (i.e., the most intense pains and gruesome mutilations of the body – the “pains leading to death,” 1:9), the author can establish the general proposition that pious reason masters the passions and the specific application to the hearers (18:1), which becomes the interpretive key for reading the detailed, grisly accounts of torment and suffering that dominate chapters 5–18. The extreme example facilitates obedience in the face of more moderate loss or disadvantage. Moore and Anderson (1998:257) insightfully comment: “For the author of 4 Maccabees, the tyrant’s brutal physical coercion is but the graphic externalization of the internal coercion that every true ‘man’ must resist.” The nine martyrs are therefore not presented chiefly as models for martyrdom, though this is how they would be received in the early church (see, e.g., Origen’s Exhortation to Martyrdom), but as models for resisting the power of the passions and using commitment to God and God’s Law as resources by which to empower reason to master the passions (O’Hagan 1974:100). The absence of the epithet “pious” in the restatement of the thesis in 1:7 (present in Alexandrinus, but not here in Sinaiticus) was taken by Lauer (1955:170) as a sign that some scribes were bothered by the paradox he alleged to be present in “pious reason,” asserting that the copyists felt “hurt by this oxymoron.” If this were the case, however, it would be difficult to account for its retention at key junctures in the oration (e.g., 6:31; 13:1). From the fact that the author can move so freely back and forth between “pious reason” and “reason,” one might more correctly deduce that, for him, the two are equivalent – the former being merely a fuller expression of the latter. He has built into his argument at several places the consideration that only the mind or reason trained by the Torah is equipped consistently to master the passions (1:17; 2:23) so that the well-functioning rational faculty is always acting in accordance with piety. The martyrs embody καλoκἀγαθία (“nobility and goodness”; A reads ἀvδραγαθία in 1:8) and ἀρετή (“excellence,” especially “moral excellence,” 1:8, 10), words that sum up the Greek ideal of the good and honorable person. Danker (1982:319) discerns from the use of this word in inscriptions honoring benefactors that “to describe a person as kalokagathos (a perfect gentleman) or kalēkagathē (a noble woman) was one of the highest terms of praise in the Greek vocabulary,” reserved for “high achievers or benefactors.” These terms reappear throughout the oration with notable frequency (καλoκἀγαθία and cognates: 1:8, 10; 3:18; 11:22; 13:25; 15:9; ἀρετή and cognates: 1:2, 8, 10, 30; 2:10; 7:22; 9:8, 18, 31; 10:10; 11:2; 12:14;

80

COMMENTARY

13:24, 27; 17:12, 23), especially in connection with the examples of the martyrs. The effect of this is to grace those who most strenuously resisted Hellenization where fidelity to the Jewish Law would be compromised – and those who continue to do so – with the highest terms of distinction offered by the Greek culture. That καλoκἀγαθία and its cognates appear only in 4 Maccabees among all the books of the Septuagint underscores the particular interest of its author to honor pious Jews as the perfection of Greek values. That Antiochus, the representative of the “worst” in the dominant culture, regards the martyrs to be dying because of “foolishness” (μαvία, 8:5; 10:13) rather than “on account of moral excellence” (1:8) or “on account of nobility and goodness” (1:10) indicates to the audience that their claim to honor on the basis of their moral achievement in line with Torah may well go unrecognized in this world. However, “pious reason” looks not merely to this world for such recognition. The prepositional phrase κατὰ τoῦτov τòv καιρòv in 1:10 is of decisive importance in discussions of the occasion and setting of this composition (see Introduction). It is placed by the author in attributive position with “the ones who died,” indicating that the author is praising “the ones who died at this time on behalf of nobility and goodness,” not “praising at this time” the ones who died on behalf of nobility and goodness. To what time, then, does the τoῦτov refer? We can rule out the possibility that the author is writing at the actual time of the martyrdoms, so that τoῦτov cannot refer to time contemporaneous with the speech. There has been no prior mention of the historical period at which time the martyrdoms occurred, to which the τoῦτov can refer back. The implied referent, then, would be to the time of year at which the audience hears this composition, a time of year corresponding to the deaths of the martyrs (Hadas 1953:147). Such reasoning no doubt stands behind the grammatically incorrect but exegetically perceptive “On this anniversary” in the NRSV. This does not, of course, solve the question of whether the text was composed for actual delivery on that specific occasion, merely that it gives the impression of being delivered on such an occasion. Later manuscripts change τoῦτov to ἐκεῖvov, thus losing the vivid sense of occasion and replacing it with a general reference to “that time period” indicated by Eleazar and his co-martyrs (Klauck 1989a:688). The author declares that he will also be intent on praising the martyrs for their noble deaths, so that his discourse will incorporate elements both of a philosophical demonstration and an encomium for the commemorated dead. He signals quite clearly, therefore, that the hearers should expect to hear the work both as a philosophical diatribe and as an

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

81

encomium, and not to be surprised as topics familiar, for example, from the civic funeral oration (the epitaphios logos) are combined with the demonstration of a thesis. Both rhetorical modes converge in, and are unified by, the promotion of Torah-observance as the path to virtue and to an honorable remembrance (see Rhet. Her. 3.4.7–8 on the way these two deliberative topics work together generally). Praising the martyrs, then, reinforces the protreptic effect of the logical argument upon the audience, though from another angle (see Aristotle, Rh. 1.9.35–36; Quintilian, Inst. 3.7.28). Thucydides understood that the praise offered to the dead in funeral orations would arouse the emotion of emulation among the hearers (see Aristotle, Rh. 2.11.1), who would be measuring the achievement of the dead with what they believed themselves to be capable of (Hist. 2.35.2). Emulation would lead them to consider how they might gain similar honor through the embodiment of the same virtues in their own circumstances. This process would frequently be reinforced by explicit exhortations to the living to imitate the virtue of the fallen, to take up the place left by them, and so live as to gain an honorable remembrance themselves (Thucydides, Hist. 2.43.1–4; Dio, Or. 29.21; Plato, Menexenus 236E). The funeral oration thus served to reaffirm the hearer’s commitment to values central to their social body, the values for which their compatriots deemed it worthy to die. As the author calls the martyrs “blessed” for dying in such a way as to be honored for their virtue (1:10–11), he moves fully into the mode of funeral oration. Compare Lysias, Or. 2.81: “So I, indeed, call them blessed in their death, and envy them; I hold that for those alone amongst men is it better to be born who, having received mortal bodies, have left behind an immortal memory arising from their valor.” The martyrs will especially provide examples of ἀvδρεία καὶ ὑπoμovή. The original scribe of Sinaiticus had omitted the latter two words (1:11a), which a corrector has supplied, I am inclined to think (against Rahlfs), rather superfluously. That ὑπoμovή is integral to their achievement is evident already on the basis of 1:11b, and the insertion of καὶ ὑπoμovή in 1:11a breaks the parallelism of the clauses (their remembrance is effected on the basis of courage, their defeat of the tyrant on the basis of endurance). “Courage” is especially applicable to the martyrs, since it endures “fearful things for the sake of what is noble” (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.7.2 1115b12), sometimes even submitting “to some disgrace or pain as the price of some great and noble object” (Eth. Nic. 3.1.7 1110a20–22) and to a death in line with virtue rather than safety at the cost of disgrace (Aristotle, Virt. 4.4). Because the author can link the martyrs’ deaths with their fidelity toward God (hence the

82

COMMENTARY

essence of piety) and their loyalty to their own laws (the essence of justice and patriotism), he can turn what the dominant culture would intend as a shameful death – the irreparable and total destruction of the honor of these barbarians through the public display of their powerlessness and the complete violation of their physical bodies – into a death “for the sake of what is noble.” Acting in such a way that even one’s enemies would “marvel” at one’s virtue (1:11) is a frequent topos, especially in military settings. Josephus (B.J. 7.8.7 §388), for example, places very similar sentiments on the lips of Eleazar ben Yair in his second exhortation to suicide at Masada: “Haste we then to leave them [the Romans], instead of their hoped-for enjoyment at securing us, amazement at our death and admiration of our fortitude (ἔκπλησιv τoῦ θαvάτoυ καὶ θαῦμα τῆς τóλμης καταλιπεῖv).” Josephus thus supports the idea that a person can derive profitable examples from his or her enemies, as well as expect that those enemies might come to admire him or her on the basis of demonstrable fortitude. One particular facet of the martyrs’ achievement that the author wishes to highlight here, no doubt to lead the hearers to understand from the outset that the martyrs emerge as victors rather than as victims in their contest, is that they “became the cause of the downfall of the tyranny against their nation” (1:11). κατέστησαv could be construed either as a first aorist form, thus transitive (here, “made themselves causes of the downfall of the tyranny,” the object “themselves” needing to be supplied), or as a second aorist form, thus intransitive (“they became causes,” LSJ 855 B.5.). The latter, being simpler, is preferred. Becoming a “cause” (αἴτιoς) of victory was itself a topic of courage (Aristotle, Virt. 4.4). Causing the downfall of the tyrant who was threatening the “polity” of the Judeans is a recurrent motif in 4 Maccabees (1:11; 11:24–25; 17:9–10), though in the case of the martyrs it is by refusal to acquiesce rather than armed resistance (as in 1 Maccabees) that they defeat the tyrant. Townshend (1913:667) insists that the Hasmonean family would be understood as the subject of the result clause at the end of 1:11: “The spirit roused by the martyrs led to the rising headed by Judas Maccabaeus and his brethren, and so was the effectual cause of the Temple being purified and its service re-established.” This debate is renewed in connection with 18:4. Despite such special pleading, one should rather be struck by the complete silence of the author concerning the violent resistance movement. For all its historical problems, the author is intent on crediting the martyrs with the deliverance of their homeland. The

4 MACCABEES 1:1–12

83

martyrs are praised using a common topos in Athenian funeral orations (Lysias, Or. 2.21, 41, 57, 59; Plato, Menexenus 239D–240A; Hyperides, Or. 6.38–40; see van Henten 1997:263; van Henten and Avemarie 2002:18;), an indication of the value Greeks placed on freedom (at least, the relative freedom of their form of democracy). The martyrs are depicted, therefore, not just a models of personal virtue, but as benefactors of their country (see Lucian, Tyrannicide 4, 7; Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ. 10 [Mor. 804E–F], on those who free their country from tyranny as benefactors). Van Henten (1997:196–197) correctly stresses that 4 Maccabees, for all its philosophical interests, also has an abiding interest in the well-being of the Jewish homeland, seen from the repetition of the term πατρίς (1:11; 4;1, 5, 20; 17:21; 18:4). The connection between the philosophical thesis and its demonstration, on the one hand, and the “patriotic-political purport” on the other hand, is a reflection of the general tendency of the period (seen, e.g., in the funeral orations cited above) to define virtues in ways that tended toward the preservation of the nation rather than the fulfillment of the individual. Conquering by means of “endurance” (ὑπoμovή) is a familiar topic from Greco-Roman philosophers. But because of its essentially passive nature, endurance could also be seen quite negatively: “silence, passivity, submissiveness, openness, suffering – the shame of allowing oneself to be wounded, to be penetrated, and of simply enduring all that – were castigated as weak, womanish, slavish, and therefore morally bad” (Shaw 1996:279). The historical circumstance of aggressive Greek males finding themselves confronted by a superior power (e.g., a tyrant who defeats their city-state in a war) led, however, to their discovery of new ways in which to enact courage and manliness from a position of relative powerlessness (i.e., through bold and committed – but passive – resistance; Shaw 1996:287). One can readily see the importance of military and athletic imagery in turning the passive “endurance” into a form of “manliness” or “courage” (Moore and Anderson 1998:259–261). Seneca (Constant. 9.4) compares the wise person’s victory over injuries with those athletes who “have won the victory by wearing out the hands of their assailants through stubborn endurance.” Philo (Prob. 26–27; see also T. Job. 27.3–5) likewise points to the endurance of the pugilist who overcomes his antagonist by being able to absorb more blows than his opponent can dish out, showing an “endurance” that takes on the active hue of an aggressive competitor (the male color of “courage” or “manliness”) choosing a particular strategy as the path to an honorable victory over the antagonist. In this

84

COMMENTARY

way, Seneca could even find nobility in the degrading experience of torture – not merely by enduring, but by enduring “bravely” (Ep. 67.4, 6). Despite its etymological derivation (ὑπoμovή derives from words meaning “remain under,” hence in an inferior and somewhat feminized position; see Shaw 1996:287–288), “endurance” becomes the means by which those “on the bottom” in terms of political and physical power can come out “on top.” The author rounds out his exordium in 1:12 by announcing his plan to turn at this point (before any further effusive praise of the martyrs) to the development of his thesis, after which he will return to the example (1:8) and the praise (1:10) of the martyrs. This exordium is, indeed, a very effective encapsulation of the somewhat varied content that follows – so varied that several scholars have questioned the relationship of 3:19– 18:24 to the rather more discursive material in 1:1–3:18, or have proposed the excision of various pieces within 3:19–18:24. Nevertheless, the exordium prepares the audience for the demonstration of a thesis (as one finds in 1:1–3:18), the focus on the particular case of the nine martyrs as evidence for the truth of the thesis (as one finds in 5:1–6:35; 7:16–14:1; 14:11–17:1) as well as the encomiastic sections that emerge within the “narrative demonstration” of 3:19–18:24 (i.e., 7:1–15; 14:2–10; 15:16–32; 17:2–24). Through both venues, the author will effectively confirm the hearers’ commitment to maintaining their ancestral Law as the surest path to virtue and honor. δόξαv διδoὺς τῷ παvσόφῳ ΘΩ combines an obvious, and in this text lonely, Hebraism derived from Septuagintal expressions (Townshend 1913:667; Hadas 1953:148) with a predicate of Deity not found in the Septuagint but known in other Hellenistic Jewish authors (Philo, Plant. 28). 1:13–30a

Preliminary Definitions

The author returns to the philosophical thesis in 1:13, which forms an inclusio with 1:30a (Klauck 1989a:693), marking off these preliminary definitions from the specific demonstrations of how reason, instructed and guided by the Torah, masters particular passions. This intermediate section lays the groundwork for the bulk of the speech by defining terms and establishing the essential relationships between reason, Torah, and the manifestation of virtue (1:15–19, a section the bulk of which could equally well have been written by a non-Jewish philosopher), as well as laying out a taxonomy of the passions (1:20–28), before returning to the

4 MACCABEES 1:13–30A

85

relationship between reason and the passions (1:29–30a). The author never quite fulfills the expectation he raises that he will actually define “passion” (1:14; Dupont-Sommer 1939:90), although he will enumerate their various kinds (1:20–28) and discuss how reason masters several particular kinds in detail. The author begins this section, then, using first person plural verbs that sweep the audience along in his train of thought (1:13, 14), with a functional definition of “reason,” which is the faculty of the “mind” (voῦς) acting in accordance with “right thinking” (ὀρθòς λóγoς), which leads a person to choose the path of “wisdom” (1:15). The mind is the leading principle within the soul according to Plato (Klauck 1989a:690), a role that corresponds with the Stoic ἡγεμovικόv, “governing faculty” (see Pearson 1973:142; SVF 1.39) and that emerges again in 4 Macc 1:29 and, more explicitly, 2:21–23. The ὀρθòς λóγoς is a common topic in philosophical discourse, the cultivation of which is seen by Epictetus as the “goal of philosophy” (Diss. 4.8.12). “Right thinking” (“clear deliberation” in Townshend 1913:667) is what leads a person to choose virtue over vice in every instance (Plato, Phaedo 42 [93E]; Aristotle, MM 1.34.1 1196b). The author’s definition of “wisdom” (σoφία) is taken directly from the “Greco-Roman dictionary of philosophy,” appearing substantially the same in Cicero (Tusc. Disp. 4.26.57: rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque quae cujusque rei causa sit; see also SVF 2.35), Aetius (Placit. philos. 1.2.: “the Stoics said wisdom to be knowledge of divine and human things”), Seneca (Ep. 89.5), and Philo (Congr. 79). Renehan (1972:228) observes that this is not a specifically Stoic definition, being used also by Quintilian, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, and Origen. Indeed, the author aligns himself quite clearly not with Stoicism, but with the Jewish philosophical school in 1:17. Whence does the wise person learn wisdom? For this author, wisdom comes from the training, or education (παιδεία), received from being socialized as part of the Jewish subculture into the way of life taught by “the Law” (τoῦ vόμoυ, 1:17), which can be nothing other than the Torah (Redditt 1983:250) given the fact that the noun vόμoς refers to specific regulations found in the Pentateuch (see, for example, comments on 1:34; 2:5–6, 9) and derives from “Moses our counselor” (9:2). The regulations of Torah, as well as the models of behavior contained in its narratives, provide the necessary “knowledge of things divine and human” for acting wisely in all circumstances in this life. Throughout 4 Maccabees, παιδεία refers to “education” or “training” (see also 10:10; 13:22), whereas in 2 Macc 7:33 it clearly has the more

86

COMMENTARY

negative connotation of discipline in the sense of chastisement, as in LXX Prov 3:11. It carries here, then, the more Greek connotation of the formation of the young, the passing on of the cultural knowledge and the fruits of civilization to the next generation. In Greek usage the term carries “the entire complex of culture that sets a Greek apart from a barbarian, a gentleman from a boor” (Hadas 1953:175). The author will show that the Jewish nation has offered to each successive generation its distinction παιδεία, setting them apart from the people of other races who lack so perfect a guide to the life of virtue. The author gives considerable attention to the παιδεία that the seven brothers received in their parents’ house (see 18:11–18, and the manner in which the boys’ knowledge of those stories informs their deliberations throughout the narrative of their encounter with Antiochus and his guards), showing the clear connections between “education in the Law” and their justice toward their Divine Benefactor and their courage in the face of “pains leading to death.” At this point, the author of 4 Maccabees is informed not only by Greek philosophical discourse, but also by Jewish wisdom discourse. He is not far from the teaching of Ben Sira: “If you desire wisdom, keep the commandments” (Sir 1:26); “Whoever holds to the law will obtain wisdom” (Sir 15:1); “In all wisdom there is the doing of the commandments” (Sir 19:20). Piety, which can be defined as “reverence for God” (hence, “the fear of the LORD” which is “the beginning of wisdom,” Prov 1:7; 9:10) and thus obedience to God’s decrees, is the guide to wisdom, and wisdom is the result of pious and loyal service to God (see also the connections between wisdom and God’s commandments in Wis 6:17–20; 9:9). Especially close to the author’s thought is LXX Prov 15:33: “The fear of the Lord is education (παιδεία) and wisdom (σoφία).” That “reverence for God” should be the starting point for wisdom is a widespread conviction in the Classical and Hellenistic world, seen also in Letter of Aristeas 189; 200 and quite dramatically at the end of Sophocles’s Antigone (1347–1352), where Creon becomes an example of impious folly and the chorus teaches that “thinking prudently” (τò φρovvεῖv), the prerequisite for happiness, cannot be achieved apart from humility and piety before the gods, who teach the impious wisdom through the punishments they inflict. Thus again it becomes clear that “pious reason” would not strike any reader in the first century as a paradox or oxymoron, but as a given. The author enumerates the four cardinal virtues in 1:18, just as he had previously in 1:2–4. This tetrad of virtues was commonplace by the first

4 MACCABEES 1:13–30A

87

century C.E. (so much so that a corrector adds the stock number “four” to the text at this point), being used by the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium as an obvious outline by which to structure his discussion of major deliberative topics (Rhet. Her. 3.2.3–3.3.5), and appearing in Alexandrian Jewish literature as well (see Wis 8:7; Philo, Leg. 1.71). The author will go on in 1:30b-3:18 and, indeed, the remainder of the composition to provide ample and specific evidence of how education in the Torah in fact produces each of the kinds of virtuous fruits of wisdom that he claims in 1:18. Prudence (φρóvησις) is again elevated as the “chiefest” of virtues (see comment on 1:2), but the author’s emphasis on this virtue is now explained by its connection with his thesis: prudence is what enables reason to discern and choose the path of virtue in the midst of the blinding frenzy of the passions. The author skips over his intention to define what a “passion” is and immediately takes up the question of “how many kinds” there are (1:20; cf. 1:14). The image of the passions “springing up” (πέφυκεv) belongs to the larger family of agricultural images that serve the author so well as he talks about the forces at work in the human being and the tasks of reason (see also 1:28–29; 2:21). The NRSV translates πέφυκεv in line with another possible meaning attested in LSJ, namely “to be by nature,” but the affinities throughout these opening chapters with agricultural metaphors and the spatiality implied by περί followed by the accusative favor the primary meaning given in LSJ. Both the original scribe and the corrector of Sinaiticus speak only of these passions sprouting up around the soul, whereas the author will go on to speak of the ways in which the passions afflict both the body and the soul (see, e.g., 1:26–27). It may indeed be a compositional defect in the original not to include “the body” at this point (as does Rahlfs, against both Alexandrinus and Sinaiticus), unless we read the καὶ in an intensifying sense (“even around the soul”), which would imply that the author and his audience expect the passions to shoot up around the body. The author follows Aristotle, who also conceived of the passions primarily in terms of the two major types of “pleasure and pain” (Aristotle, Rh. 2.1.8: λύπη καὶ ἡδovή; 4 Macc 1:20: ἡδovή τε καὶ πόvoς). Aristotle, indeed, related each of the ten emotions he discusses in Rh. 2.1–11 to these two underlying emotions, as if the spectrum of emotions were but variations of the basic two under different circumstances (see also Eth. Nic. 2.5.2 1105b21–24). In this the author of 4 Maccabees stands apart from Stoic taxonomies of the passions, which list four primary kinds of pathos: grief, fear, desire, pleasure (λύπη, φóβoς, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδovή; see Diogenes

88

COMMENTARY

Laertius, Vit. 7.110; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.9–22). The author goes on, however, to work in the elements of the Stoic tetrad in concert with “pleasure and pain” as their “attendants.” ἀκoλoυθείαι might normally evoke an image of “followers,” hence “consequences,” but since the author goes on to describe the emotions that both precede and follow the cardinal passions of pleasure and pain it seems suitable to follow Dupont-Sommer’s suggested translation (1939:91). To “pain” (πόvoς), then, is attached φόβoς by prospect and λύπη by retrospect; to “pleasure” (ἡδovή) is attached ἐπιθυμία by prospect and χαρά by retrospect. This compares rather closely with the Stoic material preserved by Stobaeus, Eth. 2.166, where the four passions are listed (ἐπιθυμία, φόβoς, ἡδovή, λύπη), but where, significantly, desire and fear are said to “lead the way” (whether to good or wicked things), while pleasure and grief are said to ensue, the former if we attain what we desire or avoid what we fear, the latter if we fail to attain what we desire or fall into what we fear. Aune (1994:135) observes that the inclusion of “delight” or “joy” here is strange, given the fact that χαρά is generally held to be an acceptable and positive “passion,” mastery of the destructive passions being aimed at allowing the unimpeded experience of the beneficent passions. He correctly discerns, however, that this is quite in keeping with the author’s attempt to prove that training by the Torah prepares one to master every emotion, even joy and natural bonds of affection, wherever virtue is at stake. (For further reflection on the philosophical foundations of the author’s presentation of the passions, see Breitenstein 1978:134–143.) The author’s definition of anger as an overlapping experience of pleasure and pain also resonates with Aristotle’s more complete definition (Rh. 2.2.1–2): “Let anger, then, be desire, accompanied by pain, for revenge for an obvious slight of oneself or one of one’s dependents. . . . And with all anger there must be an attendant pleasure, that from the prospect of revenge.” Dupont-Sommer (1939:91) and Klauck (1989a:692) find ἐὰv ἐvvoηθῇ τις ὅτι αὐτῷ περιέπεσεv (1:24) to be a grammatically strained expression. The sense of this seems to be that, if a person is attentive to his or her own experience of falling into a state of anger, he or she will recognize that there is both something painful and something pleasurable in that experience. This is a profound insight into the nature of a common and often troublesome emotion, as well as a window into the selfawareness that undergirded ethical philosophy at many junctures (and thus the self-awareness that is necessary to cultivate if one is to understand one’s own drives, passions, and possibilities for mastering the same).

4 MACCABEES 1:13–30A

89

Perhaps following upon the strange juxtaposition of pleasure with the experience of anger, the author proceeds to talk about the “malicious disposition” which infects even pleasure, which one would more naturally associate with a “good” and desirable emotion (in opposition to “pain,” which is generally classed as an undesirable experience). It is appropriate that the author should give some space here to discussing the ways in which “pleasure” can hinder virtue (and the ways in which training in Torah can empower the adherent to counteract these tendencies), since he will attend at such great length later to the sensation of “pain” and its attendants (fear and grief ). The author uses the term “disposition” (διάθεσις) in a manner reminiscent of Aristotle’s classification of the three “dispositions” at work in a person, one of which leads to excess (hence one manner of vice), one to a defect (hence the opposite vice), and one to the proper exercise of the “mean” where virtue is to be found (Eth. Nic. 2.8.1 1108b10– 15; Grimm 1857:306–307). This suggests, however, that the author of 4 Maccabees did not regard pleasure in and of itself as an evil, but only capable of being distorted and becoming an evil. It is likely that he would have agreed with Aristotle, then, that pleasure – rightly cultivated and controlled (see below) – could be an ally of virtue rather than always its antagonist, as when “the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study better” (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 7.12.5 1153a22–24). Moreover, Aristotle makes room for licit and temperate pleasures, censuring only the pursuit of excess (Eth. Nic. 7.13.2 1153b8–18; 7.14.1–2–1154a7–21), which would seem to be the position undergirding the author’s discussion of the restraining influence of Torah on the pursuit of pleasure in 1:31–2:6. It also suggests that the “malicious disposition” would be at work in regard to the experience of “pain” and its attendants as well, for example manifesting itself as cowardice, despair, faithlessness, or any other way in which the soul can be perverted through the experiences of fear, pain, and grief (as, for example, in the inner reasoning and courses of action represented in the “hypothetical speeches” of the seven brothers and their mother in 8:16–26; 16:5–11). The distinction between passions of the body and passions of the soul was already introduced in 1:20 and recurs in the discussion of self-control in 1:31–2:6 (indeed, giving structure to that discussion). This distinction is functionally useful insofar as it assists the author and audience to identify the broader range of passions of which to be aware and which to keep in check when they are seen to surface, but it is also rhetorically useful insofar as it creates a sense of comprehensiveness: no drive,

90

COMMENTARY

sensation, or emotional response engages us but we are able, by the power of reason, to master it. Many of these distortions of pleasure were recognized as vices by other authors as well. Cicero, for example, calls desire for glory “a sickness of the soul” (Tusc. Disp. 4.37.79), while Dio Chrysostom (Oration 66) decries the frenzy and the excess to which desire for honor drives people. Despite the positive value attached to honor (deSilva 2000a:23–42), ethicists recognized that this, too, was frequently pushed to excess. Many of these particular perversions of pleasure have an anti-social component. ἀλαζovεία and φιλoδoξία find pleasure in self-assertion at the cost of recognizing the honor due others or leaving room for others’ fulfillment of a legitimate measure of the experience of being honored. φιλαργυρία takes pleasure in the amassing of wealth rather than in its generous dispersal through beneficence. φιλovικία stirs up strife for its own sake because of a perverse delight in the experience. βασκαvία, which combines elements of envy and “exerting an evil influence through the eye” (BDAG 171a; see Elliott 1994:80–84 for bibliography on this subject), provides a malicious form of pleasure as one contemplates the demise of another (and the thought that one’s malice can contribute to that downfall). Gluttony was also regarded as a vice with an anti-social component, since what one eats is not made available for the others at the table. It was important to be sensitive to what constituted one’s proper “share” rather than allow pleasure in the food to become unfairness toward one’s table fellows. μovoφαγία, which might seem to remove this obstacle, actually exacerbates it since it violates the deep-rooted social understanding that food is meant to be shared and to create fellowship (whence the symbolic importance of meals in the ancient world). The author looks out over the varieties and sub-varieties of passion that he has enumerated and, like so many other moralists, sees a garden rank with weeds and thorns but also ripe with potential for beauty and order. Reason is the παvγέωργoς, the master gardener, who tends to every shoot with the appropriate treatment, eradicating some passions, cutting back the excess of some passions so that they can function more healthily within their natural bounds, “binding” others so that they incline in their proper direction rather than being perverted by malicious dispositions, and actually nurturing others (Townshend [1913:668] carefully distinguishes ἐπάρδωv, which refers to introducing water into the main irrigation channels, from μεταχέωv, which refers to giving attention to making sure each plant gets the water; my translation follows Dupont-Sommer 1939:92), another clue to the author’s positive estimation of the value of some emotions and desires as aids to virtue.

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

91

Such imagery was well-known. Plutarch conceives of the task of reason in strikingly similar terms: “The work of reason is not Thracian, not like that of Lycurgus – to cut down and destroy the helpful elements of the emotion together with the harmful, but to do as the god who watches over the crops and the god who guards the vine do – to lop off the wild growth and to clip away excessive luxuriance, and then to cultivate and to dispose for use the serviceable remainder” (Virt. mor. 12 [Mor. 451C]). Philo, similarly, interprets Noah’s work as a farmer to be a lesson that “like a good farmer, the virtuous man eradicates in the wild wood all the mischievous young saplings which have been planted by the passions or by the vices, but leaves untouched all those that bear fruit, and which may act as a wall and prove a firm defense for the soul. And, again, among the trees capable of cultivation he manages them in different ways, and not all in the same way: pruning some and adding props to others, training some so as to increase their size, and cutting down others so as to keep them dwarf ” (Det. 105; cf. also Leg. 1.47). Stoic philosophers, of course, could also use agricultural metaphors to combat proponents of the Peripatetic doctrine of the passions (see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.26.57). The diversity of cultivating techniques envisaged by Philo and also explicated in 4 Macc 1:29 leads quite naturally into the following sections (1:30b–2:23), in which the author displays how the variegated commands of the Torah and the models of virtue presented therein prune excess and cultivate virtue according to the different requirements of each passion. 1:30b–2:23 The Torah Cultivates Self-Control and Justice The author moves into a discussion of how reason is able to master the passions that hinder self-control and justice, in keeping with the outline suggested in the exordium (1:3–4a). The examples of the martyrs will be the primary focal point of his demonstration that reason can master the passions that threaten to unseat courage (1:4b). In particular, the author seeks to elaborate on his claim that training in the Law equips the reason to master the passions (1:15–18), showing how particular stipulations of the Torah and particular examples of behavior set forward in the narratives of the Pentateuch provide exercises by which to combat, or models for imitation by which to avoid, the negative impact of particular passions on the exhibition of particular virtues. That this is his emphasis emerges especially clearly by 2:7–14, where the author has moved completely from presenting the ability of people to obey the Torah as a sign that reason can master passions (as in 1:31–35) to the ways in which

92

COMMENTARY

Torah restrains the passions in unruly persons, as long as they obey its decrees. This trajectory is completed in 2:21–23, where it is clear that the author is promoting submission to Torah as the means by which to allow the mind to attain “rule” over the passions rather than the reverse. The phrase διὰ τῶv κωλυτικῶ(v) τῆς σωφρoσύvις ἔργωv in 1:30b could be translated “through the deeds that hinder self-control” or “through the hindering deeds of self-control” (noted by Stowers 2000:848). The first translation has in its favor the fact that it parallels 1:3 and 2:6 (Stowers 2000:848), in which case the author is referring the audience to the cases of immoderate cravings for food (gluttony) and immoderate cravings for beauty (lust), in the face of which reason is able to gain the mastery. However, the translation adopted here, founded on the appearance of ἔργωv rather than παθῶv (thus distinguishing it significantly from 1:3 and 2:6), makes this verse a more direct introduction to the definition of selfcontrol that follows in 1:31. In addition, this translation accords well with the ethical notion elsewhere attested that self-control or temperance is a primary means by which (the sense of the preposition διὰ here) reason is able to gain the mastery of the passions (as in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.9.22: “temperance allays the cravings and causes them to obey right reason, and maintains the well-considered judgements of the mind”; see also Plato, Gorg. 507C, where self-discipline is a regarded as prerequisite to justice, courage, and piety). The author defines σωφρoσύvη in much the same way as one finds in the first part of Aristotle’s definition (Virt. 5.1): “To self-control belongs ability to restrain desire by reason when it is set on base enjoyments and pleasures, and to be resolute, and readiness to endure natural want and pain.” Once again the author calls attention to the fact that these desires emerge both in the body and in the soul (1:32; see 1:20, 26–27, 28). Excessive desire for food provides his example of the former, sexual lust of the latter (2:1; see 1:3). Obedience to the dietary laws of Torah becomes here a proof that reason is able to master the inordinate craving for food (1:33–34). Providing a philosophically defensible interpretation of these laws was an order of the first importance for Hellenistic Jews, for the peculiar food laws of Torah tended to bring ridicule rather than respect from Gentile observers (cf. Tacitus, Hist. 5.4.3; Juvenal, Sat. 14.98–99; Josephus, Ap. 2.137). The author does not make these food laws intelligible to the Greek mind by allegorical and moral interpretations such as one finds in Letter of Aristeas (see especially Let. Aris. 144–160) or, at greater length, in Philo. Such allegorization was one strategy for “discovering” ethical doctrines

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

93

compatible with Greco-Roman philosophy in the distinctive law of the Judeans. Rather, the author presents adherence to the Torah – here implicitly, but later explicitly – as a form of ἄσκησις, a body of rigorous exercises that discipline the mind and shape the character for virtuous conduct. Regarding Torah’s different commands as specific prescriptions for specific vices or deficiencies of the soul put the Jewish way of life on a par with the exercises commended by Epictetus (Diss. 3.12.7–11): “I am inclined to pleasure; I will betake myself to the opposite side of the rolling ship, and that beyond measure, so as to train myself. I am inclined to avoid hard work; I will strain and exercise my sense-impressions to this end, so that my aversion from everything of this kind will cease. For who is the man in training? He is the man who . . . practices particularly in the things that are difficult to master. . . . Practice, if you are arrogant, to submit when you are reviled, not to be disturbed when you are insulted. . . . Next, train yourself to use wine with discretion. . . .” Galen also underscored the need to attend to constant practice (in his “On the passions and errors of the soul,” discussed in Renehan 1972:235–36). The dietary laws thus exercise reason, which leads to self-control and all the other virtues which follow in its train (against the Greek and Roman calumny concerning the foolishness of such laws, heard in this text on the lips of Antiochus in 5:6–9). Certain kinds of seafood are prohibited in Lev 11:9–12; Deut 14:9–10, certain types of fowl, especially scavengers, in Lev 11:13–23; Deut 14:11– 20, “quadrupeds” that do not ruminate and possess cleft hooves in Lev 11:4–8; Deut 14:4–8, and other miscellaneous animals such as insects and swarming things in Lev 11:41–44; Deut 14:19. Philo reasoned that some vice-breeding quality inhered in the overly succulent flesh of such animals, and so were forbidden by Moses as a means of curbing selfindulgence, gluttony, and the physical ills these beget: “The lawgiver sternly forbade all animals of land, sea or air whose flesh is the finest and fattest, like that of pigs and scaleless fish, knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of senses, the taste, and that they produced gluttony, an evil dangerous to both soul and body, for gluttony begets indigestion, which is the source of all illnesses and infirmities” (Spec. 4.100). The author of 4 Maccabees shows no interest in such speculation here, but does suggest similar rationales behind the dietary laws in 5:25–26. It is noteworthy that the author does not hold the experience of the craving for forbidden things to be blameworthy – only giving in to that passion such that one obeys its leading contrary to God’s Law, and thus

94

COMMENTARY

contrary to virtue. Later rabbinic texts will make explicit this position (see Sifra Kedoshim 11.93d; cited in Hadas 1953:151). Against their nonJewish neighbors’ opinion to the contrary, the author has given his hearers, whose adherence to the dietary laws is strategically invoked together with his own in the first person plural verbs of 1:33–34, a ground for self-respect insofar as they themselves exhibit reason’s mastery over the passions each time they allow Torah to regulate their diet rather than yielding to their natural impulses. The phrase αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαι πρòς τὴv τoῦ κάλλoυς μετoυσίαv has a slight grammatical problem in that the preposition phrase is not set in attributive position with the noun “desires,” something that would be remedied simply by the addition of a second αἱ before πρòς. DupontSommer (1939:93) is correct to note that this is an uncharacteristic lapse for our author, suggesting that the prepositional phrase arose as a scribal clarification that the subject here is sexual desire in particular, not “the desires of the soul” in general. In this he may be correct, though I think him too fastidious to object to πρòς συvoυσιασμίv being a similar scribal intrusion in 2:3 (he finds the style distasteful, but it is grammatically unobjectionable Greek). Joseph is his exemplar of self-control. With the mere mention of his name, the author evokes the full story of his remarkable ability to resist the advances of his master’s wife (Gen 39:7–12), a story that was greatly expanded in Testament of Joseph 2.7–10.4 into a long string of temptations and harassments by the Memphite woman over a seven-year period (extending even into his imprisonment), during which Joseph resisted by fasting and prayer. Joseph’s display of self-control is all the more admirable because he was “young” (vέoς). The author had written that reason had to tame and cultivate not only the “forests of the passions” (τὰς . . . τῶv παθῶv ὕλας), but also the “forests of the inclinations” (τὰς τῶv ἠθῶv . . . ὕλας, 1:29). Human inclinations change with age, as Aristotle observed at some length (Rh. 2.12–17). Aristotle writes concerning the character or inclinations of the vέoι that they “are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure [note, however, that the author of 4 Maccabees sees sexual desire rather as a desire of the soul] and these they are unable to control” (Rh. 2.12.3). The author of 4 Maccabees acknowledges the persistent power of this passion with the colorful image of the gadfly that continually stings and drives its host mad. Joseph’s example, however, shows that not even when inclinations and passions are both stacked against virtue does a person have to yield to vice: reason, properly engaged, provides a way out from any temptation.

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

95

The example of Joseph and the particular case of sexual desire demonstrate that reason can master any desire (2:4). In 2:5, the author recites text from the opening and closing of LXX Deut 5:21 and LXX Exod 20:17 verbatim. In both texts, the prohibition against coveting begins with a command not to desire the wife of one’s neighbor, in contrast with the Hebrew text of Exod 20:17, which begins with a prohibition against coveting the “house” of one’s neighbor (perhaps because the Hebrew bayith is an all-encompassing term for the particulars that followed, as in the concept of “household” joined together with “house” as physical location, whereas the Greek translator of Exodus read this in the more limited sense of oikia, “dwelling”). The author has abbreviated this recitation by omitting the particulars of “house,” “male or female slave,” “ox,” and “donkey,” perhaps for the sake of brevity, since these are subsumed under the concluding phrase which is recited, “whatever belongs to your neighbor.” The decision to retain the one particular prohibition against desiring one’s neighbor’s wife is no doubt due to the immediate context, in which Joseph has exemplified the successful fulfillment of this commandment by resisting the advances of Potiphar’s wife. The author’s logic in moving from the particular case of Joseph to the prohibition against coveting what belongs to one’s neighbor (starting with his or her spouse) is to show that the Torah commands nothing more than is possible for human beings to attain, as well as to begin to broaden the discussion from one kind of desire (for one’s neighbor’s wife) to all kinds of desire (for whatever belongs to another). In 2:6, the author provides an even more abbreviated paraphrase of this commandment, saying that the Law has ordered Jews “not to desire,” which could here be read as a prohibition of (excess) desire tout court and so marks the completion of the broadening process begun in 2:5. The fact that the LXX uses a general Greek word, related to the experience of desire rather than the particular kind of desire we call “covetousness,” in translating the prohibition brings this commandment directly to bear on the topic at hand. Since this is the only commandment from the Decalogue that our author recites, it attains a surprising prominence (by contrast, the focal point of the Decalogue is the first commandment in Jesus’ summaries of the Law). Philo regarded “covetous desire” as the source of all ills (Spec. 4.84). The prohibition of such desire, then, was the divinelygiven safeguard against the one passion that attacks reason from within, and that “derives its origin from ourselves, and is wholly voluntary (ἑκoύσιoς),” and thus culpable (Decal. 142–143). The author of James similarly locates the origin of an abundance of ills in improper desire, and cautions his audience to attend to this evil root (1:14–16; 4:1–3). For the

96

COMMENTARY

author of 4 Maccabees, then, the last commandment of the Decalogue is no mere appendix, but a rule that promises to prevent the growth of vice from the very roots of the inner person. The author regards the fact that the Law prohibits desiring (beyond its proper limits) as proof that people can indeed rein in their desires and keep them within their proper bounds, expressing the conviction (if not the language) of LXX Deut 30:11: “This command which I am commanding you today is not excessive (Heb: “beyond your power”) nor beyond your reach (literally, “far from you”).” This is a far cry from Paul’s use of the same prohibition against desiring in Rom 7:7–24, where he finds the commandment to have been an occasion for all manner of immoderate desires to spring up and lead into sin. For the author of 4 Maccabees, the Torah is still an adequate guide and source of empowerment to master the passions of the flesh (contra Gal 5:16–25, where the Spirit has supplanted the, for Paul, obsolete Torah in this role). 2:6b–7 provides a transition from discussing how people who follow Torah preserve self-control to exploring how they attain a just way of life by the same means. 2:7 contains topics that are related in part to selfcontrol (since the inordinate desire for food was already thus presented in 1:3 and 1:33–34) and in part to justice, since these particular forms of excess also have an anti-social component (I depart here from my earlier impressions published in deSilva 1998:60–61, which were unduly influenced by the sentence break in 2:6b NRSV). Justice is a social virtue in which one renders to others what is their due, rather than denying others what is due them. The author has already spoken of “indiscriminate eating, eating alone, and gluttony” (παvτoφαγία, μovoφαγία, λαιμαργία) in 1:27, returning here to the same topics with some slight modification as it is now the person whose inclination it is to feast alone, and to exhibit gluttony and drunkenness (μovoφάγoς, γαστρίμαργoς, μέθυσoς) that is in view. These traits are opposed to justice insofar as the one who eats and drinks beyond measure does so to the deprivation of others at the table or, worst of all, to the banishment of others from his or her table (see commentary on 1:27). Thus the meal that was meant to become an occasion for sharing with others God’s gifts meant for all becomes an opportunity to deprive others for one’s own pleasure. Here the author merely asserts from the fact that such people can and do reform themselves that reason masters the passions. The author’s repeated clarification that reason only masters rather than destroys the passions leaves room, we should note at this point, for the enjoyment of pleasures within the limits prescribed by God. The

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

97

author’s argument is based on a premise that there are higher priorities for human community than the gratification of each person’s individual desires as far as these lead the individual, but that the individual may rightly enjoy those pleasures that are concomitant with fulfilling those higher priorities. Lusting for intercourse outside of marriage is restrained, but room is left for sexual intercourse within marriage – in accordance with the limits of Torah – as a means by which to nurture intimacy and strengthen the bond of marriage. The pleasure of a good meal is allowed, as long as one’s eating is directed toward fostering social intercourse and nurturing community. By 2:8–14, the author’s emphasis has now changed entirely to promoting commitment to living by the Torah as the means by which to enable reason to dominate the passions. Now all that reason really has to do is cling to the commandment, to do it, and the life of that person will begin to move from the exhibition of vices to the flourishing of virtues. Indeed, the author is at his closest in these verses to Epictetus’s advice that one should seek out those practices that specifically target one’s weaknesses and build up the virtues lacking in one’s soul (Diss. 3.12.7–11; see above on 1:33–34). His first targets are those who are susceptible to greed or “love of money” (φιλαργυρία, a vicious passion already mentioned in 1:26). The reference in 2:8 to the law directing its adherents to “lend without interest to those who ask” (τoῖς δεoμέvoις δαv[ε]ίζωv χωρὶς τόκωv) recalls the command found in LXX Exod 22:24, ἐὰν δὲ ἀργύριον ἐκδανείσῃς τῷ ἀδελφῷ τῷ πενιχῷ παρὰ σοί οὐκ ἔσῃ αὐτòν κατεπείγων οὐκ ἐπιθήσεις αὐτῷ τóκον. The author recontextualizes two keys terms found in the Exodus text (δαv[ε]ίζωv/ἐκδανείσῃς; τόκωv/τóκον) and generalizes the recipient of the loan from “the poor person beside you” to “those who ask.” The word τόκov is also found in Lev 25:36–37, but without the other shared lexical terms, suggesting that the author indeed has Exodus 22 in mind. In Deut 23:20–21, both τόκov and forms of δαvείζω appear, but only in the context of prohibiting lending at interest, whereas Exod 22:24 is a positive command to lend, and that without interest. Exodus 22:24, then, emerges as the most likely intertextual resource. The reference to “reducing the debt when the seventh year comes around” (τò δάv[ε]ιo(v) τῶv ἑβδoμάδωv ἐvστασῶv χρεoκoπoύμεvoς) similarly recalls the command found in Deut 15:1, that δι’ ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν ποιήσεις ἄφεσιν, “through seven years you will make a remission.” The language is reminiscent of terms that occur more specifically in LXX Deut 15:2, 8–9 (χρέoς, Deut 15:2, 3; χρεoκoπoύμεvoς, 4 Macc 2:8; δάvειov, Deut

98

COMMENTARY

15:8; 4 Macc 2:8; ἕβδoμov, Deut 15:9; ἑβδoμάδωv, 4 Macc 2:8; see Schaller 1990:329). The author of 4 Maccabees chooses a verb that may indicate “cutting down [i.e., possibly just “reducing”] the debt” rather than “remitting the debt” tout court, suggesting perhaps a practical modification of the law that has been in place prior to his writing or, as Hadas (1953:153) suggests, that the command was understood to indicate the remission strictly of interest, hence reduction of the overall debt. The old debate as to whether 2:8 is an allusion either to the jubilee year (Lev 25:8–17) or to the sabbatical year (Deut 15:1–9; see Dupont-Sommer 1939:94) should be resolved in favor of the latter given the closer lexical affinity with the Deuteronomy passage. Both of these commands invoked in 2:8 are understood by the author as remedies against the human tendency toward greed, toward putting the accumulation of wealth ahead of the well-being of one’s fellow human beings and ensuring their enjoyment of God’s gifts, meant for all. Once again, the needs of the human community take precedence over the self-indulgence of the individual, and mastery of the passions is part of the means by which justice in human relations can be secured. The concomitant of greed is “miserliness,” an unwillingness to share what one has with others who lack access to the same goods. For this, too, Torah has a training exercise. In 2:9, the prohibition against going back over one’s harvest (καὶ τòν ἀμπελῶνά σου οὐκ ἐπανατρυγήσεις οὐδὲ τοὺς ῥῶγας τοῦ ἀμπελῶνóς σου συλλέξεις, Lev 19:10) is read as a prescription against being miserly (penny-pinching), training the law observant to learn to be content to leave something for those in need rather than greedily hoard all one can gather. Exodus 23:10–11 makes similar provisions for the poor, but lacks the lexical links with 4 Macc 2:9 exhibited by Lev 19:9–10 (compare especially τoὺς ῥῶγας τoῦ ἀμπελῶvoς in Lev 19:10 with ἐπιρρωγoλoγoύμεvoς τoὺς ἀμπελῶvας in 4 Macc 2:9). The commandment constrains the hoarder to take a modest step toward cultivating a charitable disposition, generosity being a highly lauded and necessary value in the Greco-Roman world. Obedience to Torah even allows people to rise above the pressures that natural affection for kin and friends might exert contrary to virtue, for example, allowing a child to go astray because affection for the child has subverted the ability to discipline the child appropriately. At this point especially Torah proves a more reliable guide to virtuous living than even Nature, which implanted those affections. There are several texts that speak of the parents’ duty to discipline their children when they go astray (Prov 13:24; 19:18; 23:13–14; 29:15, 17). The Torah even commands that

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

99

parents bring a recalcitrant and rebellious child out for execution (Deut 21:18–21), an extreme example of how the Torah-controlled life must rise above natural affections. For the remainder of the relationships listed here, the author may have in mind the injunction of Deut 13:6–11 that should one’s family member – “your brother, your father’s son or your mother’s son, or your own son or daughter, or the wife you embrace, or your most intimate friend” (NRSV) – entice an Israelite to commit idolatry or worship foreign gods, that Israelite was to be the first to execute justice against the offender. If this is the case, the author has softened the force of the injunction from execution to rebuke of the wrongdoer. That commitment to God through Torah-observance masters fraternal and maternal love is a major topic in 4 Macc 13:19–14:1 and 14:13–20; 15:23–28, where the members of a family are seen to urge one another on to death for the sake of piety rather than encourage one another to save themselves for the sake of their love for one another and the pain of each other’s loss. The author takes special note of the intent of Torah to moderate the emotion of enmity, cultivating the virtues of humanitarianism in its place (2:14). The author refers first to the injunction of Deut 20:19–20, which restrains excesses in siege warfare. Again the author recontextualizes a few key morphemes to guarantee that the hearer will recall the correct text (δεvδρoτoμῶv/δέvδρα; πoλεμίωv/ἐκπολεμῆσαι). The commandment restrains soldiers from wanton devastation of food-bearing trees, for the soldiers are at war with other human beings, not the environment itself (Deut 20:19b). Again the emphasis on the restraint of the emotion, keeping it from overflowing its proper bounds into acts of excess, is in keeping with the author’s position (1:6; 3:5). It is noteworthy that the context of war is absent in the author’s reference, which suggests a generalizing interpretation applying the prohibition to any acts of malice against one’s personal enemy (not now one’s national enemies). The author next evokes the command in Exod 23:4–5 to lead one’s enemy’s livestock back to the enemy’s home if one sees it straying on the road and to help one’s enemy’s animal if it has fallen under its burden. The author of Exodus has already noted the importance of the command for overcoming one’s inner inclination not to show any consideration for one’s enemy, acknowledging that the first impulse will be to “hold back from setting it free” and commanding the person to act contrary to this ill-disposition. Once again, the author has referred to this command in a generalizing way, suggestive of the tradition of this specific command’s interpretation and application prior to the author’s writing (moving from the specific to

100

COMMENTARY

the general was a common practice both in Jewish exegesis of Torah and in Greco-Roman argumentation). The argument that Torah promoted humanitarian care for the household of one’s enemies countered the frequent assertion that Jews care for one another but exert no effort whatsoever to help non-Jews. Accusing the Jews of pursuing a misanthropic and misoxenic way of life is a stock element of anti-Jewish calumny in the ancient world. Thus Diodorus Siculus writes: “They alone of all nations avoided dealings with any other people and looked upon all men as their enemies” (Bibl. Hist. 34/35.1.1); “The Jews made their hatred of mankind into a tradition, and on this account had introduced utterly outlandish laws: not to break bread with any other race, nor to show them any good will at all” (Bibl. Hist. 34/35.1.2). He claims, therefore, that the Torah itself is a body of “xenophobic laws” (Bibl. Hist. 34/35.1.4; see also Tacitus, Hist. 5.5; Josephus, Ap. 2.121). Jewish apologists therefore sought energetically to show how Torah actually taught humanitarian values, and frequently turned to the same texts as does our author in 4 Macc 2:14 to prove this. Thus Josephus cites Deut 20:19–20 to demonstrate that Jews seek to conduct themselves as humanely as possible, even in the midst of open war (Ap. 2.221–222). Philo (Virt. 116–119) expands at length upon Exod 23:4–5, suggesting that, at the heart of the command concerning the beast of burden, lay a concern to teach the Hebrews to turn enmity into friendship by generous and beneficent action. The author returns from these specific cases to the more general assertion that reason is able to restrain a variety of more powerful emotions in 2:15–16. The διὰ at the beginning of 2:15 is admittedly problematic, and the corrector’s deletion of this word is necessary for good sense. The list of “malicious passions” is here very similar to the list of vices spawned by the “malicious disposition” inherent in pleasure (see 1:25–26), especially before the corrector replaced φιλαργυρίας with φιλαρχίας (φιλαργυρίας, κεvoδoξίας, ἀλαζovείας, μεγαλαυχίας, βασκαvίας, 2:16; ἀλαζovεία, φιλαργυρία, φιλoδoξία, φιλovεικία, βασκαvία, 1:26). The only vicious enjoyment that has truly dropped from view is the “love of strife” (κεvoδoξίας and μεγαλαυχίας being of the same family as φιλoδoξία). The author does not treat any of these in detail here (though on “love of money” see 2:8–9), but moves ahead to wrath. The implication, no doubt, is that if reason can be shown to restrain wrath, it certainly can restrain these other passions of the souls as well. 4 Maccabees does not provide any insights here as to how wrath can be allayed, as Seneca does in his three books De ira. This author is simply

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

101

interested in demonstrating that even this passion is not beyond reason’s power to rein in and keep in check so that the person does not plunge into some vicious act. He brings forward two examples from the Pentateuch rather than relying on commandments from the Torah that might be seen to restrain wrath (though Deut 20:19–20 could have served this purpose). He has thus moved back toward the mode of 1:31–2:5: the existence of examples who overcame a particular passion prove that reason can master the passions (that is, in the audience as well). The first example is Moses, remembered in Num 12:3 as an exemplar of meekness (he was “πραΰς beyond all the people upon the earth”). This was not because he never experienced anger, but because he did not allow anger to lead him to act unjustly. The author very briefly recalls the episode of Korah’s challenge to Moses and Aaron’s leadership, recounted in Num 16:1–35. Moses is indeed angry with Korah, Dathan, and Abiram (see Num 16:15a), but does not act personally upon this anger to avenge himself against the challengers (vengeance being the goal of anger according to Aristotle, Rh. 2.2.1), submitting the matter to God and allowing God to adjudicate. He does not allow his anger to drive him to usurp God’s privileges of deciding cases and avenging wrongs (see Deut 32:35). Klauck (1989a:698) helpfully compares this with Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. 8 (Mor 26E), on the wrath of Achilles: he is about to commit murder not for honor or advantage, but out of anger: “although he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his reason.” Moses’s successful checking of the passion anger allows the author to reaffirm the veracity of his thesis (2:18) before turning to a second historical example (2:19) and an argument from the contrary (2:20). Basic patterns of the rhetorical elaboration of a thesis or maxim are clearly at work here. For his second example of the mastery of anger, the author refers briefly to the story found in Genesis 34, specifically the violent manner in which Levi and Simeon defend the honor of their family against Shechem’s sexual violation of their sister Dinah. In their minds, this affront to the family’s honor was not an occasion for civil negotiation, such as Jacob pursued with the family of Shechem, but for aggressive action on the part of Jacob’s family by means of which they would reassert their family’s honor. The author quotes not Jacob’s response to his sons’ action in Gen 34:30, but rather his deathbed pronouncement against their action in Gen 49:7. The recitation in 4 Macc 2:19 corresponds verbatim with the text of Gen 49:7 as it has come down to us in the major LXX manuscripts. The point of this example is that, since Jacob held them responsible for their

102

COMMENTARY

actions committed in anger and even cursed their submission to this passion, it must have been possible for them to have restrained their anger (2:20). There is a noteworthy conflict within Jewish tradition concerning the memory of Levi and Simeon. Judith and Testament of Levi remember them as heroes specifically on account of their defense of the honor and purity of Israel’s family lines. In her prayer to God for guidance and empowerment, Judith speaks of God’s placing a sword in Simeon’s hand to avenge the rape of Dinah ( Jdt 8:2–4), wholly endorsing his act and even regarding it as divinely commissioned. The author of Testament of Levi presses further in this direction. After taking Levi on a heavenly tour that culminates in God bestowing the priesthood upon him, his angelic guide arms Levi with shield and sword and commands him to take vengeance upon Shechem (T. Levi 5). The author knows this to be in contradiction to the tradition of Genesis, and so introduces a contrast between Jacob’s perspective (preserved in Gen 49:7) and the divine perspective: “When my father heard of this he was angry and sorrowful . . . But I saw that God’s sentence was ‘Guilty’ ” (T. Levi 6.6–8). That guilt is compounded by identifying the Shechemites as the Canaanites whose leaders had previously tried to defile Sarah and Rebecca as well (see Gen 20:1–18; 26:1–11). The author of 4 Maccabees, however, following Genesis 49, presents them as volatile renegades, acting against their father’s more prudent and judicious wishes for the situation. They have given way to the passion of anger, whereas the “all-wise Jacob” had found a rational and advantageous solution to the situation that presented itself in the wake of Shechem’s unbridled passion. Simeon and Levi had acted like Gentiles who did not know the law, rather than as Jewish philosophers (among whom Jacob, perhaps rather unexpectedly, takes his place both here and in Philo). The author’s sensitivity concerning these two patriarchs, however, leads him not to write that Jacob singled them out for censure, but rather censured their whole company (τoὺς περὶ Συμεωv καὶ Λευειv). This tension may be due to the differing social and political settings of these texts. Judith and Testament of Levi are both written from within a Judaism that had re-asserted its social location as the dominant culture in Judea through the violent cleansing of the homeland and the people of Israel after a time of Gentile defilement (i.e., the successful and bloody Maccabean revolution), and would both be supportive of future acts of violence that sustained the political independence of Judea from Gentile

4 MACCABEES 1:30B–2:23

103

domination. The author of 4 Maccabees, however, writes from the position of a minority culture living in the midst of the dominant Greco-Roman culture – a world in which the Jewish culture has been accused, for example, of embodying vices such as misoxenia, the hatred of the foreign “other” that was characteristic of barbarians rather than enlightened people. In such an environment, it might well have been strategically important to disown Levi and Simeon’s action, in concert with Gen 49:7, as an example of where the enlightened Jewish philosophy does not lead. As part of his portrayal of the Jewish people as philosophers, the author is intent on showing that “zeal for the law” does not necessarily lead to acts of aggression that would render the body politic unstable. The author pauses at this point to present his understanding of the human being and of the divine order that the wise person will seek to maintain. The image of God forming human beings, together with the image of God planting, immediately calls to mind the creation account in Gen 2:7–9, a story that our author appears to have shaped in ways similar to other Hellenistic Jewish philosophers. God placed both the passions (πάθη) and the inclinations (or character traits, ἤθη) in the human being, setting the mind over these other faculties as their governor. The author’s development of the creation story recalls Philo’s insistence on reading it in terms of God’s planting of the interior faculties of the human being rather than a physical garden spot (Leg. 1.43–55). From 2:21–22 it is clear why the author would disagree with the majority Stoic view that the πάθη are bad in themselves (Townshend 1913:668), being created and pronounced “good” by God. They have need, therefore, of being controlled so that they fulfill God’s good purposes for them. Thus the glutton or the person who feasts alone is censured for not channeling the desire for food in such a way that it fulfills its divinelyappointed goal (2:7), but the person who sets a table for his compatriots and shares with the poor for the sustenance of life and the creation of community restrains the desire for food and funnels it toward God’s better purposes. Rooting out the passions is neither expedient nor possible, for who can nullify God’s design? Similarly, we should not understand the author to affirm that the “evil inclination” of Jewish anthropology (see 4 Ezra 3:12–17) was planted in humanity by God (vs. Hadas 1953:156), as though the author has the yetzer ha-raʽ in mind here, but rather than God planted inclinations or character traits in the human being along with the passions which, like the passions, can be cultivated for good or perverted for evil depending on the possessor’s cultivation of the same.

104

COMMENTARY

The critical point is for the mind to lead the passions, and not the reverse. Again, this is similar to Philo (Leg. 3.118): “scripture being well aware how great is the power of the impetuosity of each passion, anger and appetite, puts a bridle in the mouth of each, having appointed reason as their charioteer and pilot.” The author’s vision of the mind enthroned as governor (ἡγεμόvα) over the senses (αἰσθητηρίωv) is very similar to Zeno’s psychology: “Zeno the Stoic claims the soul to consist of eight parts, dividing it into the governing principle (ἡγεμovικόv), the five senses (πέvτε αἰσθήσεις), the faculty of speech, and the procreative faculty” (translation mine; from Pearson 1973:142; see now also SVF 1.39; a similar model is given in Philo, Opif. 30). But the mind is not left to its own devices: it, too, must be subject to the divinely given Torah if it hopes to function properly and maintain proper governance over the passions. This was Plato’s view of the function of all “law” and “convention” (Gorgias 504D), which the author now claims uniquely for the Jewish Law. Having heard his demonstration of how particular commandments within that Law assist reason to tame and master particular unruly passions (1:31– 2:19), the audience is in a strong position to assent to the author’s model. Those who accept this internal hierarchy and abide by it, the author avers, find themselves enjoying the position of the Greek ideal sage – kings and queens (see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 7.122; SVF 3.617–619; Philo, Migr. 197) over a nobly governed domain that flourishes in every one of the cardinal virtues. 2:24–3:18

Clarification of the Thesis

The author develops in 2:24–3:18 the clarification of his thesis that he introduced in the exordium at 1:5–6. He begins once more with the “straw person” objection (see commentary on 1:5). In Sinaiticus, 2:24 addresses the audience directly, as if the objection that the author will declare laughable a moment later arises from among them. This, of course, would be rhetorically less effective than the corrector’s emendation (in line with 1:3) of placing this “laughable” objection on the lips of some third person interlocutor, since the reading in Sinaiticus runs the risk of temporarily distancing or alienating the audience (thus damaging the sense of goodwill and connection that orators strive to maintain with their hearers). ἢ would have to be read as εἰ (an easy mistake for a scribe to make if Sinaiticus was the result of one scribe writing as another read the original aloud) in order for the sentence to be intelligible, a change also introduced by the corrector.

4 MACCABEES 2:24–3:18

105

In some sense, people could be expected to “master” λήθης καὶ ἀγvoίας. In Spec. 4.70, Philo presents “ignorance and forgetfulness” as two states that the just judge is indeed supposed to master – by being able to put himself into a state of forgetfulness and ignorance concerning what he knows about his connections with the plaintiff and defendant (whether friendly or hostile) so that he can be truly impartial. It is clearly not in this sense that the imaginary interlocutor introduces the objection, but rather in the sense of the involuntary forgetfulness or ignorance that afflicts the mind. Precisely because it is involuntary, however, it is beyond reason’s ability and responsibility (3:1; cf. Philo, Migr. 206). The point that the author really wants to argue, of course, is whether reason should eradicate or merely restrain the passions of the body (τῶv σωματικῶv [παθῶv], 3:1b–2) and of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς, 3:3), exemplified by wrath and malice (3:3–4). Klauck (1989a:700) finds it problematic that the author here names only bodily passions as the province of reason’s control, but goes on to name what he had previously called passions of the soul (1:20, 26–28, 32). In fact, the inclusion of τῆς ψυχῆς in 3:3 suggests both that the author still has in mind the comprehensive scope of reason’s jurisdiction and the fact that wrath and malice are afflictions of the soul. On the author’s alignment with Peripatetic and Middle Stoic ethicists’ goal of mastery of the passions over against what has come to be identified as the majority Stoic opinion that the passions should be rooted out, see the commentary on 1:6. The author’s anthropology, according to which God himself implanted inclinations and passions into the human constitution, no doubt accounts for his automatic affinity with the less stringent Peripatetic position. He would say about the passions what Seneca says about the tendency of one person to blush: “by no wisdom can natural weaknesses of the body be removed. That which is implanted and inborn can be toned down by training, but not overcome” (Ep. 11.1). Philo would disagree that no one “is able” to eradicate passions. In his discussion of Moses and Aaron (Leg. 3.129–132), he calls Moses “the perfect person” precisely because he is able to eliminate the unruly passions (particularly anger, against the author’s claim in 3:3). Aaron represents the next-to-perfect person, the one who is able to control and temper the passions and prevent them from overpowering one’s reason and moral choice. He would grant, however, that people do well enough to achieve Aaron’s state, and so, for all practical intents and purposes, would concur with our author. David’s thirst (3:6–18) is offered as an example of reason controlling and surmounting the passions, but not extirpating them (at the end he is,

106

COMMENTARY

after all, still thirsty, but does what is in accordance with justice; DupontSommer 1939:97). The author recites the story found in 2 Sam 23:13–17 and 1 Chron 11:15–19 in an expanded and embellished form. Josephus’s retelling of 2 Sam 23:13–17 (he is clearly following the order of material in 2 Samuel rather than 1 Chronicles) already contains some expansion and modification of the biblical story (see A.J. 7.12.4 §§311–314). He changes David’s location from the cave of Adullam to the citadel of Jerusalem itself, and gives expanded notice to the three chieftains’ bold passage through the enemy camp on both their outgoing and return journey, underscoring thus their bravery. The author of 4 Maccabees, however, far exceeds Josephus in embellishment. In several particulars, these modifications directly serve the author’s rhetorical goals for the passage. First, 2 Samuel gives no hint that David has been engaging the enemy in battle. Indeed, in 2 Sam 21:17 (at the outset of the renewed hostilities with the Philistines that still occupy him and his army in chapter 23) David’s soldiers forbid him to go into battle anymore, lest he “quench the lamp of Israel,” viz. by his own death. By contrast, in 1 Chron 11:13–14, David takes his stand with Shammah and together they fight and defeat the Philistines. The Chronicler no doubt wished to eliminate any notion that David “fled” with the rest of the army (2 Sam 23:11b) or the people (1 Chron 11:13). The author of 4 Maccabees chooses to follow 1 Chronicles against 2 Samuel on this point, and so in 3:7–8 elaborates a picture of David coming from the thick of battle, after personally engaging and defeating the Philistines all day long, dripping with sweat from the strenuous activity of that day. The more colorful language serves the author’s purposes by creating a scene in which David would have a very real, overwhelming desire and need for water. There would be no doubt that the experience of thirst was deeply felt, and to a certain extent quite legitimate. This would, in turn, better illustrate the point that the experience of the passions was inevitable: the only question would be what one did in response to those experiences (3:2–5). Second, the author includes the detail in 3:11 that there were abundant supplies of water in the place where David stationed himself, a fact that both 2 Samuel and 1 Chronicles did not mention. The author thus makes it plainer in what respect David’s desire is irrational: the needs of his body ought to have been satisfied after he drank from the water provided for him close at hand. What was “irrational” was the desire for particular other waters that were beyond appropriate reach. The excess in his desire is thereby illumined, and helps illumine the excess in desires in general

4 MACCABEES 2:24–3:18

107

(i.e., when the desire is for something beyond reasonable or lawful reach, when it goes beyond the necessary, and so forth). Letter of Aristeas 222 articulates a similar principle: “In all things moderation is a good principle. What God gives take and hold; do not long for what is out of reach.” Third, the author suppresses in 3:11 the fact that the water for which David longs is the water of his own home town in Bethlehem, a city currently under enemy control (2 Sam 23:14b–15; 1 Chron 11:16b–17). David’s longing for the waters of Bethlehem in the biblical accounts expresses his desire to retake what is properly his, to be deprived of the proper state of affairs (with access to Bethlehem open to Judeans) by the intrusion of the Philistines no longer. However, by referring merely to the enemy camp rather than Bethlehem, the author of 4 Maccabees subtly turns David’s desire into an expression of “I want what they have,” a desire that is excessive and irrational, as the author says, when what David has close at hand is truly sufficient for him. The author uses the language of “constricting” and “loosening,” borrowing the Stoic conception for how desires work upon the mind (Dupont-Sommer 1939:98), to underscore the violence of the assaults of this desire upon his reason. David’s longing, however, also becomes an expression of “I want what the ἀλλόφυλoι (3:7, the customary LXX term for Philistines) have,” which is surely significant when the author addresses Diaspora Jews who are in a position consistently to consider what another body of ἀλλόφυλoι, namely their Greek and other Graecized neighbors, enjoy and to feel the longings to have access to the same goods and opportunities burning in their souls. David’s story thus connects with the audience’s situation in two ways. First, it connects at the level of the more generic experience of wanting what is beyond reach and having to wrestle with those inflaming passions so as not to depart from the virtuous course of action. Second, it connects at the level of the specific tension of being caught between finding sufficiency in what being “fully Jewish” (in the sense of Torahobservant, not in the sense of being culturally isolated) allows one to enjoy and desiring more of what the dominant culture would offer if they began to relax their commitment to the particulars of dietary laws, Sabbath observance, and the like. The implications of David’s victory over the irrational longing for both struggles is obvious. Van Henten (1997:240) observes that 3:11, 15 use terminology that will reappear in the description of the martyrs’ sufferings (3:11 καταφλέγω: see 6:25; also φλέγω in 15:14; 3:15 διαπυρόoμαι: see πυρόω in 9:17; 11:19), connecting David’s struggle against the fires of thirst and desire with the

108

COMMENTARY

martyrs’ struggles against the experience of fire itself. The audience will likely have occasion to identify more fully with the metaphorical burning of David’s desire for something out of reach than with the martyrs’ torture by fire, but both examples will help them believe that, whatever form their burning takes, they, too, can remain in line with the virtues if they choose. Fourth, the author embellishes the story of how the water was acquired. The scene of the two young soldiers carefully eluding the sight of the enemy sentinels (Josephus, to the contrary, has the “Three” walk through the camp in plain sight) and having to search through the enemy camp to find the spring (where in the biblical accounts the “Three” seem to know exactly where to go) heightens the sense of peril in which these two placed themselves for the sake of David’s desire. This, in turn, will heighten the audience’s appreciation of the “danger to his soul” that drinking the water, brought at such great risk, posed. Fifth, the author significantly alters the conclusion. In 2 Sam 23:17 and 1 Chron 11:19, David merely refuses the drink; in 4 Macc 3:16 he gives the water to the only One who would be worthy of a drink won by such effort and at such risk, namely to God as a drink offering. By this addition, the author makes clear the underlying issue of justice that David rightly perceives and to which he correctly responds. The author reports David’s estimation of the value of the drink (“of equal potency as blood”) indirectly and with an artful abbreviation, whereas in the biblical accounts it is given as a direct quotation. The author thus leaves the rationale given in 2 Sam 23:17 and 1 Chron 11:19 for regarding the drink as the equivalent of blood, namely the fact that it was brought at grave risk to human life, to be inferred by the hearers. Klauck (1989a:702) suggests that Lev 17:11–14, with its prohibition of consuming blood, lies behind David’s refusal to drink this water, since it was provided at the very real risk of human blood being spilled. Certainly scruples against drinking blood may come into play here, all the more as avoidance of consuming blood was part of the Jew’s everyday concern (and significantly important to be included in the Apostolic Decree, for example, in Acts 15:20). Since there is no mention of the drink being poured out as an atoning sacrifice (the only proper use of blood mentioned in Lev 17:11–14), but rather as a “drink offering” to God, it might be appropriate to look for another background. Aeschylus’s Agamemnon is informative here. Clytemnestra greets Agamemnon, returning from defeating the Trojans, with an invitation to walk from his chariot to his house by walking upon a runner of scarlet

4 MACCABEES 2:24–3:18

109

linens, an entrance she (seeking to trap him) avers is fitting for such a warrior. Agamemnon expresses grave reservations about accepting such honors: “Draw not down envy upon my path by strewing it with tapestries. ’Tis the gods we must honor thus; but for a mortal to tread upon broidered fineries is, to my judgement, not without ground for dread. I bid thee revere me not as a god, but as a man” (Ag. 920–925). When he finally yields to Clytemnestra’s request, he prays: “As I tread upon these purple vestments may I not be smitten from afar by any glance of Heaven’s jealous eye. Sore shame it is for my foot to mar the substance of the house by making waste of wealth and costly woven work” (Ag. 943–947). As soon as he places his foot upon the purple-dyed cloth, Clytemnestra knows her plans against her husband will succeed, Nemesis joining forces with her to bring Agamemnon down. Klauck (1989a:702) helpfully points to Plutarch’s story of Alexander refusing to take a drink for the sake of camaraderie among his soldiers and himself (Alex. 42.3–6). Fear of ὕβρις, provoking God by claiming for oneself more than was one’s due a mortal, is certainly suggested by David’s response to the drink both here and in 2 Sam 23:19 (“Shall I drink the blood of the men who went at the risk of their lives?”). David recognizes that it would be inappropriate to spend something so costly on something as trivial as a mortal person’s desire for a particular pleasure. Instead, he offers it to God, who alone deserved such tribute. In so doing, he acted in accordance with the demands of justice (linking this story, then, with the discussion launched in 2:6b), giving to God what is due the divine and not appropriating for himself, a mere mortal, more than is a mortal’s due. Although David still feels thirst (he cannot extirpate the passion), he can, by opposing reason to his desire, prevent it from leading him into committing injustice. The story of David’s thirst reminds the hearer of a somewhat parallel episode earlier in David’s life when he conceived of a desire for sexual intercourse with a woman who was bathing on another man’s roof. There were many women under his own roof with whom he could have legitimately slaked that thirst, but instead he fixed upon Bathsheba and, rather than releasing her as a metaphorical offering to the God who had given him his kingdom, drank deeply from that illicit draught and brought God’s justice upon his head. In the present episode, David shows that he has learned something about piety and putting virtue ahead of his own passions – something that the audience of 4 Maccabees will also learn from his narrative. Lesser modifications include the replacement of the “Three” in the

110

COMMENTARY

biblical account that serves to glorify the exploits of Josheb-basshebeth, Eleazar, and Shammah, with two unnamed junior soldiers (2 Sam 23:16; 1 Chron 11:18; 4 Macc 3:12); the mention of the army being at dinner (4 Macc 3:9); the invention of a scenario in which the majority of the guards murmur against David’s irrational longing, thus motivating the two junior soldiers to resolve the situation by respecting the king’s desire (4 Macc 3:12; see further discussion below); the changing of the scene from a fortress at the cave of Adullam to the royal tent pitched in the middle of the whole army of Israel (2 Sam 23:13–14a; 1 Chron 11:15–16a; 4 Macc 3:8b). It is unclear how we should understand the motivation given by the word καταιδεσθέvτες in 4 Macc 3:12. The two young soldiers might have felt shame that the king should have such an irrational desire – one that was bringing him into disrepute among his guards, attested by their complaints – and so acted quickly so as to put an end to this embarrassing episode and restore his honor. On the other hand, the verb might simply draw attention to the uncommon respect that these two had for the king, such that they, unlike the rest, were willing to put their lives on the line for his pleasure. I think the former more likely, given the absence of any contrastive markers in 3:12 that might distance their “sense of shame” from the complaints of their comrades against the king. 3:19–4:26

Setting the Scene for the “Narrative Demonstration”

The author segues in 3:19 from his more discursive exposition of his thesis (explaining at length the kind of piety – Torah-observant piety – that enables reason to master the passions) to his “narrative demonstration” (ἀπóδειξις τῆς ἱστoρίας). This is a greatly expanded and embellished form of the historical example or historical precedent, a standard form of proof in classical and post-classical rhetoric introduced both in the Progymnasmata (the elementary exercises in rhetoric) and in the more advanced handbooks by Aristotle, Cicero, and the like. The author clearly regards the narrative in 2 Maccabees 3–7 to preserve details of historical events, which he can treat as such, rather than as a literary fiction. This is significant insofar as some scholars today seriously question whether or not the stories of the nine martyrs contain any historical kernel of truth (other than the most general; see Collins 1981:310, though his is the minority opinion; in support of the historicity of the account, see Young 1991:68; Dupont-Sommer 1939:20–25; Hadas 1953:128). On the other hand, there are many ways in which to tell the same story,

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

111

and many opportunities for the narrator to go beyond what is historically known about the events and move into what is ethically, rhetorically, or ideologically useful to “discover” in those events. A ἱστoρία could be an ἀληθὴς ἱστoρία, “a true story,” a ψευδὴς ἱστoρία, “a false story,” or ὡς ἀληθὴς ἱστoρία, “like a true story” (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Grammaticos 252; Hadas 1951:57). The latter, also called a πλάσμα, can include a narrative that preserves some basic history while departing from exact history in order to present a truth of another kind – the sort of poetical truth which Aristotle regarded as “more philosophical and more earnest” than exact history (Poetics 9.3 1451b7–10). This is precisely what we will encounter in this “narrative demonstration” as the author shapes and recasts the ἱστoρία he found in 2 Maccabees for the purpose of conveying his own “most philosophical” thesis (recalled here economically by the reference to “self-controlled reason,” reason that allows a person to exhibit self-mastery because it masters the passions) and a number of ancillary points that pertain especially to the importance of maintaining loyalty to the covenant, rather than the reverse, as the path to security and well-being. The significance of ὁ καιρòς in regard to discerning the setting is much debated. Some would read this merely as an indication that the author recognizes that the prologue has gone on for a sufficiently long time, and it is now “time” to move on (see Breitenstien 1978:80). Klauck (1989a:703), on the other hand, regards this is the strongest indication that the composition and delivery of 4 Maccabees is connected with an occasion. The sense of καιρòς as a word referring to a “meaningful moment” rather than a chronological unit (the sense usually reserved for χρόvoς) certainly supports Klauck’s reading. The fact that the author of Hebrews (11:32) uses χρόvoς to speak of the passing of time in connection with a speech droning on rather than καιρòς provides an example from another oratorical setting suggesting that the choice of καιρòς here is significant, pointing to the “occasion” of the speech rather than the “time” on the preacher’s watch. The author begins his story in 3:20 where 2 Maccabees also begins (2 Macc 3:1), in the idyllic time of the high priest Onias, son of the high priest Simon celebrated in Sir 50:1–23, under whom were combined profound “peace” and observance of the Torah. εὐvoμία and ὁμόvoια (3:21) were frequently-invoked terms of civic virtue in classical and Hellenistic literature. The well-ordered state, governed by just laws, was the “principal target [in the sense of goal] for politicians” (van Henten 1997:259, referring to Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 3.5 1112b; Eud. Eth. 1.5 1216b; see further Adkins 1972:46–57). These also provided the classical recipe for

112

COMMENTARY

the enjoyment of peace (εὐρήvη), which depended upon good governance and compliance with good laws across the citizenship population, hence “agreement” or “concord” (see Josephus, A.J. 7.14.2 §341; Philo, Spec. 3.131; cited in van Henten 1997:260–261). The author is rather strikingly applying these Greek civic virtues to the state of Jerusalem before its transformation into a Greek city. Indeed, the latter move overthrows the noble state of peace, concord, and compliance with the rule of law in that city. εὐvoμία, moreover, is precisely what Antiochus seeks to destroy among the Judeans but cannot (4:24), what Eleazar embodies (7:9), and what the sacrifice of the martyrs restores among the people (18:4). The author thus creates a picture wherein the “barbarians” living in accordance with their “barbaric” Law actually fulfill the political virtues lauded by the “civilized” dominant culture, whereas the forces that push for assimilation to the dominant culture from within (Simon, then Jason) and without (Antiochus) embody the political vices despised by the “civilized” dominant culture, notably here political disturbance of stability through innovations (3:21, looking ahead to Jason) and factiousness (4:1, looking to Simon’s rivalry against Onias) and, in the person of Antiochus, tyranny. The author makes one of several historical blunders here when he introduces the king of the Seleucid empire at this time as Seleucus “Nicanor.” The second, related blunder is to name Antiochus IV as the “son” (instead of the brother) of this Seleucus (4:15). Seleucus IV Philopator, the son of Antiochus III “the Great” and brother of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, was in fact the reigning Seleucid king, and “Nicanor” is not an epithet ascribed to any of the known rulers of the Seleucid dynasty. This mistake does not mark a departure from 2 Maccabees, which does not supply Seleucus’s epithet in 2 Macc 3:3, nor his relationship to his successor in 4:7. Van Henten (1997:80) observes that the Syriac reads “Nicator” at this point, the epithet attached to Seleucus I, the general of Alexander and founder of the Seleucid dynasty, and to Seleucus VI, king of the rapidly shrinking Seleucid kingdom in 96–95 B.C.E., which was probably the monarch the author had vaguely in mind. This Seleucus was in fact succeeded by a son named Antiochus (IX Cyzikenos) rather than a brother named Antiochus, and may in part account for the author’s confusion concerning the fraternal relationship between Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV. The author of 4 Maccabees thus failed to “fill in the gaps” left by the author of 2 Maccabees correctly. If the author is not careful to get the facts straight for posterity, he is consistently interested in the theological implications of his story. He

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

113

asserts that there is a causal connection between the observance of Torah, the enjoyment of peace, and the honors that the Gentile king bestows on the nation and on its Temple in particular. In keeping with Deut 28:1–14, Torah observance brings the blessings of political stability and freedom from defeat by one’s enemies. The author represents that here by saying that Seleucus provided funds for the service of the Temple (perhaps the reader is to recall Ps 68:29 [NRSV]: “because of your temple at Jerusalem kings bear gifts to you”) and confirmed the rights of the Judeans to govern themselves. These rights had previously been conferred by Antiochus III after successfully wresting Israel from Ptolemaic control (see Josephus, A.J. 12.3.3 §§138–142), showing that the Seleucid regents intended to continue Ptolemaic policy toward the region. The episode that follows (4:1–14), in fact, will show that God actively intervenes to protect the Temple and to fight alongside God’s people when they are committed to God through the keeping of Torah. This enviable state of affairs is threatened by “certain people” who act subversively by “introducing innovations against the general concord.” The author is not referring to Simon at this point, whose failed mudslinging campaign against Onias and instigation of the fund-appropriation visit of Apollonius are merely some of the “unfortunate occurrences” that stand behind the deposition of Onias and Jason’s elevation to a position where he could indeed introduce striking innovations. The author will come to these in 4:19–20. It is important to remember that, in Jason’s eyes and the eyes of his supporters, he is acting in the best interests of the common good. If the worst fate for a Greek city was “to become barbarian” (Hengel 1980:59), the best destiny for a non-Greek city was to become a Greek polis. Accepting the dominant culture’s prejudice against non-Greek peoples leads a segment of the Jerusalem aristocracy thus to seek “improvement.” Hengel points out that individuals or cities among the indigenous populations in the Greek empire or its successors (like the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires) would seek to make themselves over after the Greek model for the sake of personal advancement or for the sake of moving a city onto the “map,” as it were, of cities that mattered in the eyes of the dominant culture, and thus which would become part of the mainstream of commerce and politics (Hengel 1980:62–63). The author presents the Hellenizers, however, as enemies of the “concord” that binds the nation together in its uniform observance of the Law. They are thus presented most negatively as factious and therefore dishonorable, lacking in political virtue. Civil unrest and potential upheaval were unwelcome and feared evils to most of the people living in

114

COMMENTARY

the agrarian world of the Mediterranean, who depended on stability and predictability for their very survival (living from day to day rather than having abundant reserves by means of which to weather political upheaval or other civic storms). Intentionally to upset the peace on which one’s fellows depended was considered ignoble and dangerous. Dio Chrysostom attests to the stigma that attaches to fomenting factions and disunity in a polis as he urges his fellow citizens not to use the arrival of a new proconsul as an occasion to air their differences of opinion and their partisanship: “Is it not disgraceful (αἰσχρóv) that bees are of one mind and no one has ever seen a swarm that is factious and fights against itself, but, on the contrary, they both work and live together. Is it not disgraceful, then, . . . that human being should be more unintelligent than wild creatures which are so tiny and unintelligent?” (Or. 48.15–16). The Hellenizers’ attempts at “improvement” turn out to be effective only for the undermining of the peace and security of the nation (4:21–26; this is also the moral lesson of 2 Macc 4:16–17). The author of 4 Maccabees shows a keen interest in abridging his source material as much as possible (in keeping with his theological interests, that is), covering in twenty-six verses the span of time treated in 2 Macc 3:4–6:11. Rather than retell the whole story of the Hellenizing Revolution, the author focuses on two episodes: the attempt to raid the Temple treasury under Seleucus IV and the innovations of Jason the high priest under Antiochus IV and its aftermath (the aftermath being the most tightly condensed part). The first episode is clearly based on 2 Macc 3:4–4:6, but also resonates with the story of Ptolemy’s attempt to enter the Temple’s inner chambers during his tour of Jerusalem (3 Macc 1:8–2:24, itself most probably patterned after 2 Maccabees 3; deSilva 2002:311–312). Where 2 Maccabees provides some details concerning Simon’s political antagonism against Onias (2 Macc 3:4; 4:1–6), this author condenses this information to a single verse (4:1), reversing the order of Simon’s activity in 2 Maccabees, where he first informs about the Temple treasury and then brings accusations against Onias before the king (and even attempts murder). In 4 Maccabees, more economically, he steps onto the stage accusing Onias, fails, and becomes an exile. This, then, positions him to inform Apollonius about the Temple funds. The characterization of Simon is entirely negative. Against a backdrop of concord, law observance, and deep peace, he is factious (an entirely vicious quality in ancient political theory), working against the “noble and good” Onias. Finally, he betrays his ethnos for the sake of ingratiating himself with the Seleucid

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

115

administration, convincing Apollonius that a proposed crime of sacrilege is not “really” as bad as it seems. Temple-robbing was, of course, one of the most despised crimes one could commit in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. In Sophocles, Oed. Tyr. 884–893, the chorus speaks of the necessity of divine judgement upon those who break the laws of the gods if those laws are to have any force: “If a person walks with haughtiness of hand or word and gives no heed to Justice and despises the temples of gods – if he reaps gains without justice, and will not hold from impiety and his fingers itch for untouchable things – when such things are done, what person shall contrive to shield his soul from the shafts of God?” The crime of plundering holy shrines is here highlighted as a climactic example of the kind of crime that must be answered with swift vengeance (see also Rom 2:22). It was not just theft, but theft committed in despite of those who are most to be honored, whose sacred sites are most to be graced by pious actions rather than vicious and shameful acts. It was also, however, something of a Seleucid trait, due to a variety of financial burdens. The “peace of Apamea” forged between Antiochus III and the Roman Republic was purchased at the cost of a heavy annual tribute, which could more than account for Seleucus’s eagerness to seize any funds that might come available in his domain whenever possible. This burden passed on to Antiochus IV, who added to it the costs of financing his own ambition against Egypt in two massive and expensive campaigns. Indeed, it is in attempts to plunder other sanctuaries that Antiochus III was in fact killed (Hengel 1974:271) and that Antiochus IV would be remembered to have died in some sources (2 Macc 1:11–17; 9:1– 2, 13–16; 1 Macc 6:9–13). Simon attempts to introduce a distinction between actual Temple robbery and suitable appropriation of private funds (4:3). This plan refers to the common practice of the wealthier families depositing some portion of their wealth in sacred sites for safekeeping. In this regard, temples functioned very much like banks. Hadas (1953:63) observes that, both in the Jerusalem Temple and in temples dedicated to the gods of Gentile traditional religion, funds and objects entrusted to the sacred treasuries were anathemata, sacrosanct. He refers to the “legal fictions” by which pagan gods were given an interest in the funds deposited (though not ownership), as a means of asserting divine protection over the funds. This would also make a person a “temple robber,” in the popular view at least (evidenced here by 4:7 and the non-violent but nonetheless forceful protest in Jerusalem), even if he or she did not lay hands on the funds

116

COMMENTARY

actually owned by the temple in question. The distinction Simon introduces, however, is sufficient for the financially hard-pressed Seleucus, who carries on in his father’s tradition of claiming “eminent domain” even over the contents of temples (at least, to some extent). Seleucus, Antiochus, Simon, and Jason are all depicted in the Maccabean literature as, in some way, preferring the practical matters of finance and advancement to all manner of sacred traditions (whether Jewish or GrecoRoman). Such progressive practicality was, however, nothing more than impiety in the eyes of our author. He may be “praised” by his Gentile coconspirators (4:4), but he has forfeited any genuine claim to honor by acting disgracefully against the harmony of the Judean state (3:21). Simon becomes something of a foil here for the seven brothers who refuse to seek approval from the dominant culture at the cost of betraying their ancestral customs. A noteworthy departure from 2 Maccabees is the elimination in 4 Maccabees of the character of Heliodorus, who was actually deputized by Seleucus to appropriate the funds in the Jerusalem Temple treasury (2 Macc 3:7–8). Hadas (1953:94) explains that the author mistook Apollonius for Heliodorus on the basis of unclear pronominal referents in the 2 Maccabees account. It is, however, abundantly clear in the Greek text of 2 Macc 3:8 that Heliodorus, and not Apollonius, makes the journey to carry out the king’s wishes for the money in the Jerusalem Temple (the only confusion that might arise at the point would concern whether Apollonius or Seleucus appointed Heliodorus, but not the name of the appointee). It is possible that, in this matter, Hadas had been confused about an argument made by Freudenthal around this matter. Freudenthal had taken the mistaking of Apollonius for Heliodorus as a proof that the author of 4 Maccabees did not use 2 Maccabees as his source, but rather used Jason of Cyrene’s five-volume history (of which 2 Maccabees is an epitome) directly, where the pronouns were allegedly so numerous that one could easily mistake the antecedent. However, it is difficult to give credence to an argument from style based on a work that no longer exists. A much simpler and more probable explanation takes as its starting point the fact that the author is writing an abbreviated narrative of these events for the sake of setting up his “narrative demonstration” of his thesis, and not attempting to write the definitive and accurate history of the period (see the glaring errors in 3:20; 4:15). He simply wished to keep his dramatis personae a little more trim by conflating Heliodorus and Apollonius (thus Dupont-Sommer 1939:101). When Apollonius arrives in Jerusalem and his intentions become

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

117

known, the people vehemently protest while “old men, women, and children” gather in the Temple to pray to God for divine intervention. The author shows considerable reserve describing this scene compared to his source (2 Macc 3:15–21) and the even more dramatic and emotionally evocative story in 3 Macc 1:16–29. This is due, of course, not to any inferiority in skill when it came to ἔκφρασις (“vivid description”), as he has already shown his adroitness in 3:6–18 and will again at length in the narration of the martyrs’ trials, but to his desire for brevity as he sets the scene for the narration of the martyr stories. In light of this brevity, it is noteworthy that he retains the image of “old men, women, and children” praying – effectively – for God’s intervention on behalf of the nation and turning away the invader. This is a skillful foretaste of what the old man Eleazar, the mother, and the seven brothers will do as well. That Sinaiticus reads γεραιῶv in 4:9 helps to make this connection even clearer, but it would also stand if the reading in Alexandrinus (ἱερέωv) preserves the author’s original (Eleazar is described both as an old man and as a priest). A similar point can be made about 4:25, where the author retains (in an otherwise extremely abbreviated account) the detail about women and their children resisting the demands of the tyrant and remaining loyal to the Torah on pain of death (see 1 Macc 1:60–61; 2 Macc 6:10). This detail, too, resonated with the main part of his narrative, again focused on a Torah-observant mother and the children whom she kept in the covenant (not just now by circumcision, but by a long period of conscientious training and by exhortations to martyrdom for the sake of loyalty to God). The expectation of the petitioners is not “unreasonable” by ancient standards. Herodotus (Hist. 8.35–38) gives the expectation that the gods will act to foil attempts at temple-robbery, seen in the case of Xerxes’s soldiers’ failure to take the treasury in the temple at Delphi, being foiled by natural disaster and supernatural warriors. The gods are jealous of their honor, and the God of Israel is no exception. So deeply rooted is this conviction that, after Pompey dishonored the Temple by entering the Holy Place, his death fifteen years later far from Judea would be accounted as God’s vindication of God’s honor against him (Pss. Sol. 2.25–27). The prayers are effective, halting Apollonius most significantly before he can leave the court open to people of all nations. Angelic warriors, figures familiar from 2 Maccabees (in which prominent place is given to angels fighting in God’s cause: 3:24–26; 10:29; 11:6–10; 12:17–25), appear in stunning array. The verb πρoυφάvησαv is a literary form of πρoεφάvησαv, a minor piece of evidence attesting to our author’s facility in Greek

118

COMMENTARY

composition and familiarity with its conventions. Sinaiticus reads αὐτῶv in connection with “fear,” suggesting that we read the pronoun as referring to the angels as the source of the fear and trembling rather than Apollonius and his entourage as the recipients of the angels’ “sending” of fear and trembling (the reading given in Rahlfs with αὐτoῖς in place of αὐτῶv, Rahlfs’ reading making admittedly better sense here). These angels bring Apollonius to the posture appropriate for him within the Temple precincts – a suppliant offering his prayers with outstretched arms and with tears, both of which are standard features of pious prayer (outstretched hands: see Ps 28:2; 44:20; 63:4; 88:9; 134:2; 141:2; 143:6; tears in prayer: see, for example, Ps 39:12; 2 Macc 11:6; 3 Macc 1:16; 5:7, 25; Heb 5:7) – in the place appropriate for him in the outer court of the Temple (“the enclosure within the Temple for mingled people groups”). Even though Dupont-Sommer (1939:101) and Klauck (1989a:706) translate this with the traditional designation of “Court of the Gentiles,” I forebear here due to the author’s avoidance of such a designation and the observation in Hadas (1953:164) that not all Jews would refer to the outer court in such terms. Gentiles could indeed enter it, along with Jews, but it was not therefore the “Court of the Gentiles.” Josephus (B.J. 5.5.2 §194) does not refer to it by this title, which is rather inferred from the fact that Gentiles are warned not to proceed any further than the inner edge of that outer courtyard. The prayer placed on Apollonius’s lips is given here rather elliptically and very briefly in indirect speech (ἔλεγεv), the content of which is represented by two participles (ἡμαρτηκὼς, σωθεὶς), each governing an infinitive within the result clause (ὑπάρχειv and ὑμvήσειv, respectively). Grimm (1853:318) and Klauck (1989a:706) make note of a later scribal emendation at this point changing the participle ἡμαρτηκὼς to the more usual infinitive with a subject in the accusative case (here, the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτόv). Apollonius’s prayer follows the pattern of confession of sin, prayer for deliverance from its consequences, and promise to praise God publicly in gratitude for his deliverance (Ps 51:1–15 provides a full expression of this paradigm; the promise of giving testimony to God’s favor and power is typical in all types of prayers for deliverance in the Psalms). In this instance, the promise to make known the “blessedness,” the special divine favor and honor, that rests upon the Jerusalem Temple is especially appropriate given the fact that the sin involved contempt being shown for the place (4:7). Onias is faced with a dilemma, but scholars have had some difficulty deciding precisely what that dilemma was. The difficulty centers on the

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

119

concessive clause καίπερ ἄλλως εὐλαβηθείς. Townshend (1913:671) notes the difficulty of providing an adequate explanation for this, suggesting that Onias is scrupulous about offering prayer on behalf of this Gentile intruder, whose offense is so great that, perhaps, prayer ought not to be offered. It is only the political consideration (i.e., not incurring punishment for appearing to have killed Seleucus’s emissary) that finally motivates Onias to pray, despite his personal scruples. Dupont-Sommer (1939:102) tried to avoid this difficulty by replacing the καίπερ with a simple καί, so that it no longer functions as a concessive clause. This emendation is not only unsupported in Alexandrinus or Sinaiticus; it is also unnecessary. The inherent difficulty would be resolved by understanding the μήπoτε clause as part of the concessive clause, supplying the content and cause of Onias’s “anxiety” or “caution” (which is otherwise left strangely vague). In this way, the verse is read to provide two motives for Onias’s prayer: he is, on the one hand, genuinely moved by Apollonius’s sincere repentance; he is, on the other hand, also induced by political considerations to act with a view to Apollonius’s recovery, namely his fear lest Seleucus attribute Apollonius’s demise to foul play. The concessive conjunction signals that the second motive was acting upon Onias from a different direction than the first motive, and would perhaps have been sufficient for him to pray even without the first motive, as indeed it is in the source (2 Macc 3:31–32). This would be an indication that the author adds the virtue of compassion (notably, toward a non-Jew) to the virtue of astuteness in his presentation of Onias. The author has retained this story, even though it is not nearly as germane to the stories of the martyrdoms as the episode to follow, because it provides an effective portrait of the “ideal” state of affairs in the Jewish nation. The people regulate their lives in accordance with the Torah, a commitment that leads to the nation’s enjoyment of peace, the realization of the virtue of civic harmony, and the availability of divine protection in moments of national crisis. The good of the nation, then, is clearly served by Torah-observance, just as the good of the individual (e.g., through the realization of the mastery of reason over the passions and the resultant life of virtue this enables) is served by the same. With the death of Seleucus IV and accession of Antiochus IV (Seleucus’s brother, not his son), however, a new episode begins. Times of transition in rule are dangerous periods. Transitional times are opportunities for rival claimants to drag a nation into civil war (as would happen frequently during the decline of the Seleucid empire), for local political figures to upset the stable order by forming an alliance with the new king against

120

COMMENTARY

the current local regime (as Jason does against Onias), and for the status of individuals or whole client nations to rise or fall depending on the knowledge and interests of the new king. The status of the Hebrews in ancient Egypt was quite favorable as long as each new Pharaoh remained mindful of Joseph’s contribution to saving the kingdom, but when there arose a Pharaoh “who knew not Joseph” (Exod 1:8) the status of the whole people changed rapidly and dramatically. With the death of Seleucus, Apollonius’s testimony to the sacral power of the Jerusalem Temple, to the high priest Onias, and to the God of the Judeans was forgotten. Antiochus is characterized negatively from the outset, possessed of that “arrogance” that, according to Philo (Virt. 171) sets a person beyond cure, consigning him or her merely to be judged by God for his or her impious provocations against God. This will indeed be a recurring theme throughout 4 Maccabees (9:9, 24, 32; 10:11, 15, 21; 11:23; 12:11–14, 18), and will contribute to undermining the credibility of the positions advanced by Antiochus (since he himself is so lacking in virtue). Jason, a member of the high priestly family who had previously changed his name from Yeshua to a more appropriately Greek name (Josephus, A.J. 12.5.1 §239), approaches the king with an offer of 1,660 (S) or 3,660 (corrector of Sinaiticus) talents per annum for the office of high priesthood (2 Macc 4:9 adds that the right to incorporate Jerusalem as a Greek polis was also included, but our author omits this). Hadas (1953:166) rightly objects to the figure of 3,660 being “hardly credible.” In 2 Macc 4:8–9, Jason offered the more reasonable (but still impressive) total of 590 silver talents. The desire to keep the sum somewhat credible may account for the fact that the original scribe of Sinaiticus rendered the amount as 1,660 talents, the τρισ- being restored by a corrector who was not as fastidious about the author’s tendencies to exaggerate. Antiochus would have had several reasons to greet this offer with enthusiasm. In addition to the financial concerns already noted, the Seleucids had already been pursuing a policy of allowing local elites to adopt a Greek constitution for their cities and become poleis as a means of introducing greater unity and consistency throughout their empire (Hengel 1980:63). This also alleviated the burden of tribute, since these elites would be expected to donate large amounts to the royal treasury in return for the honor. Antiochus IV is remembered as being especially eager to encourage the adoption of Greek polity among the indigenous elites in the territory he ruled, though initiative consistently came from the non-Greeks rather than being imposed by Antiochus (Hengel 1980:63). Jason’s proposal would have been especially timely, since a more

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

121

thoroughly Hellenized and pro-Seleucid Judea would potentially be a great asset in Antiochus’s campaigns against Egypt. Breaking with the long-established tradition of allowing the incumbent high priest to remain in office for life (4:1), Antiochus deposes Onias and appoints Jason (4:16, 18). Jason, in turn, introduced innovations against the policies confirmed by Antiochus III (4:19) allowing Jews to continue to govern themselves by their own theocratic polity, based on the Torah (Josephus, A.J. 12.3.3 §138–142). The author substantially abridges the description of Jason’s changing of the nation’s way of life in 2 Macc 4:11–15 (Dupont-Sommer 1939:103), introducing historical inaccuracy but, at the same time, serving the purposes of his narrative demonstration admirably. First, the author seems to exhibit some confusion regarding the location of the gymnasium, which 2 Macc 4:12 places (correctly) beneath the citadel rather than “at the very citadel” (4 Macc 4:20). Hadas (1953:166) suggests that this results from the author’s lack of familiarity with Jerusalem, pointing to his origin in the Diaspora. However, if the author indeed had 2 Maccabees before him (as seems most likely), or had at least read it sufficiently recently to have much of it in memory, his experience of Jerusalem firsthand (or lack thereof) is hardly relevant to explain his alterations to his source. Rather, this change represents a rhetorical heightening of the affront to God, creating a more dramatic picture of the innovations for the sake of emotional effect. The center of life, depicted geographically by the citadel, was no longer the Temple and the service of God, but the gymnasium and the point of entry it afforded into Greek life. The gymnasium was the place in which the children of the elites in Jerusalem, enrolled in the ephebate, would be educated in Greek language, philosophy, culture, and rhetoric. It was their socialization into the thought-world and life-world of the dominant culture. As such, it stands in stark contrast to the socialization received in the home of pious Jewish parents, such as the seven brothers enjoyed and their mother would relate (18:10–19). Second, Jason is credited with abolishing the Temple cult, which did not happen during his tenure as high priest. His emphasis on the activity of the gymnasium may well have caused the Temple service to be neglected in favor of the new center of Jerusalem life (as in 2 Macc 4:13– 15), but it continued nevertheless under his administration, becoming unrecognizable only under Menelaus (2 Macc 6:1–5), whose role is never mentioned in 4 Maccabees. As in the conflation of Apollonius and Heliodorus, assigning complete blame to Jason results in a more economical

122

COMMENTARY

depiction of the disruption of the Temple cult as the backdrop to the martyrs’ deaths. Without the Temple service, it remains for the martyrs, by their unwavering dedication to the covenant, to turn God’s anger to favor toward the nation as an alternative form of sacrifice (6:28–29; 17:21– 22), the only one possible under the circumstances. Contrary to his expectations, Jason’s innovations are not the cause of a reinvigorated economy and improved access for Jerusalemites to the mainstream of Seleucid commerce and political life. Rather, in language and thought highly reminiscent of 2 Macc 4:16–17, the result is the nation’s experience of chastisement by God. Jason’s constitutional changes constituted a rejection of God’s patronage, an affront to God’s just claims on the perpetual obedience and gratitude of the nation. Just as the author had narrated the episode of Apollonius as evidence for the reliability of Deuteronomy’s promises of blessing and protection while the Jewish people pursued careful observance of the Torah (εὐvoμία, 3:20), he presents this episode as evidence for the reliability of Deuteronomy’s curses (see Deuteronomy 29) upon the nation when the people break faith with God. The events that follow in 4:22–26 recall sharply the warning in Deut 28:49–50: “the Lord will bring a nation from far away, from the end of the earth, to swoop down on you like an eagle, . . . a grim-faced nation showing no respect to the old or favor to the young.” This would be read during the period of the classical prophets as a warning that proved true in the deportation of the Northern tribes and in Nebuchadnezzar’s destruction of Jerusalem in 587 B.C.E. and deportation of the elites to Babylon. The present episode fits very well into the classic pattern of God using a Gentile nation as the rod of divine chastening. So completely was the period of persecution under Antiochus read in light of Deuteronomy that later Jewish tradition would speak of a third “exile” at this time (Schatkin 1974:99). As in 2 Macc 4:16–17, so the author of 4 Maccabees finds it significant that his countrymen were “punished by the very source from which they accepted Hellenistic polity too readily” (Dupont-Sommer 1939:103). The author of Wisdom of Solomon found similar “poetic justice” in his reflection on the plagues sent against Egypt: “In return for their foolish and wicked thoughts, which led them astray to worship irrational serpents and worthless animals, you sent upon them a multitude of irrational creatures to punish them, so that they might learn that one is punished by the very things by which one sins” (Wis 11:15–16). Even as God punished the Egyptians who rejected the true worship of the One God by transforming their objects of worship into agents of

4 MACCABEES 3:19–4:26

123

divine vengenace, so God punishes the Judeans who rejected the covenant in favor of complete Hellenization by transforming their models into their butchers. Fourth Maccabees 4:22–26 condenses the account in 2 Macc 4:18–6:17 considerably. Rather than introducing the rivalry between Jason and Menelaus, and the former’s attempt to regain power by armed attack upon hearing of Antiochus’s death, the author simply states that the Jerusalemites expressed joy at the rumor (see Danker 2000:334 on the idiom ὡς ἔvι μάλιστα [s.v. ἔvειμι]). Antiochus’s violent actions thereby lose their primary defense (in 2 Maccabees, he acts to suppress an actual revolution against his appointed regent, Menelaus), contributing to the image the author creates of a man who acts beyond all moderation and propriety on account of his passions. The author also does not allow the audience to lose sight of two important propositions in a flurry of unnecessary historical detail. First, at issue in the encounters with the martyrs is whether Antiochus will destroy the Jewish way of life, or whether Antiochus’s own power and ability to enforce his agenda will be destroyed (the repetition of καταλῦσαι/καταλυoμέvας in 4:24 highlights this antithesis admirably). Second, the significance of sampling the pork is clearly spelled out in 4:26, which has some bearing on Antiochus’s arguments in 5:8–9 (where Antiochus speaks as if the real issue is in fact “the other white meat” rather than the graver issue of Jewish identity). Eating the pork is here the means by which each Jew will be seen to renounce τòv Ioυδαϊσμόv. This is a rare word in the LXX, occurring only here and in 2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38. Renouncing “the Jewish way of life” is synonymous with ἀλλoφυλεῖv (4 Macc 18:5), a term laden with overtones of the “Philistines” (consistently rendered as ἀλλόφυλoι in the LXX), the “other” that is not “us.” Van Henten (1997:201–203) correctly identifies fidelity to God and to the Law with the creation of a distinctive ethnic identity which is explicitly targeted by Antiochus for erasure and assimilation. More is at stake, then, than the individual martyr’s virtue; at stake is the corporate existence of the Jewish nation. This facet of the confrontation contributes to developing the political significance of the martyrs’ contests. The author has provided a brief account of the historical setting for the stories of the martyrs. Given his abridged treatment of these preliminaries, it is clear that he has no “historical” agenda, but rather provides enough history to understand the dynamics of the martyrs’ contest. Nevertheless, 3:19–4:26 also offers in itself a “narrative demonstration” of other easilydiscernable sub-theses. The strong evocation of Deuteronomistic themes

124

COMMENTARY

in this section calls attention to the corporate dimension of Torah observance, for which these two episodes offer historical evidence. In addition to the role of the Torah in enabling personal virtue, obeying the Torah (from its greatest moral principles to its most minute requirements) contributes to the well-being of the nation and its enjoyment of peace. Conversely, departing from the way of life laid down in the Torah for the sake of the advantages to be gained in terms of access to the dominant culture’s benefits threatens the well-being of the nation, and is nothing less than sedition against the common good. The narrative will continue to fulfill the pattern of Deuteronomy, which promises that renewed obedience would effect reversal (Deut 30:1–5): if the people “return to the LORD your God, and you and your children obey him with all your heart and with all your souls, just as I am commanding you today, then the LORD your God will restore your fortunes and have compassion on you” (Deut 30:2–3). The martyrs representatively embody the obedience to the covenant that would result in God’s wrath turning to mercy (God once more acting to protect and deliver his people; see 17:22), and revive obedience to the Law among the people generally (18:4; see Deut 30:1–5), renewing the covenant. 5:1–38

Opening Arguments by Antiochus and Eleazar

Chapter five consists of what Dupont-Sommer (1939:105) aptly called an “oratorical joust,” or what Klauck (1989a:652) described as a Rededuelle, a second of which will appear in chapters 8 and 9 as Antiochus addresses his arguments to the seven brothers and hears their spirited reply. The only hint of such exchanges in 2 Maccabees appears in 2 Macc 7:2, an opening declaration of resolve by one of the seven brothers, and 7:24, which preserves the brief reported speech of Antiochus’s appeal to the last surviving brother. This author, in keeping with the practice of placing content- and context-appropriate speeches on the lips of characters in a history (Thucydides, Hist. 1.21–22; Quintilian, Inst. 6.1.25–26; 9.2.29–30), develops the kinds of arguments that would be appropriate to the setting. Sometimes this would simply add “emotional effect” (Quintilian, Inst. 6.1.26), but it was also an effective means by which to allow the audience to enter the mind of the character giving the speech (Inst. 9.2.29–30): “we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as if they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds).” These exchanges in 4 Maccabees afford the author an opportunity

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

125

to examine the dominant culture’s “case against Judaism” and the prejudices against the Jewish way of life that the audience might themselves encounter, as well as to show how these dissuasive arguments might be answered and commitment to the Jewish way of life confirmed. The first four verses set the stage for this exchange. The historical question of whether or not Antiochus was personally present for the tortures was not of interest to the author (who asserts that he was personally involved, 4:26). Similarly the question as to the site of the inquisitions, whether at Jerusalem or Antioch, is also of little interest to him (though he assumes Antiochus to be present in Jerusalem at this time, since it is thence that he departs in 18:5 after his “defeat” by the martyr-sages; Schatkin 1974:98). The author is more intent on crafting the picture, familiar from Greco-Roman tradition, of the tyrant confronting the sage with all his arguments, enticements, and coercive measures, and on proving the value of the sage’s philosophy by showing the latter parrying the arguments and resisting both promises and threats so as not to be compelled to acquiesce to the tyrant’s demands (see, for example, the examples of Stilbo in Seneca, De constantia; Zeno and Anaxarchus in Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 9.26–28, 58–59, Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 2.22.52, and Philo, Prob. 106–107; and the anachronistic representation of Pythagorus before Phalaris in Iamblichus, Vit. Pyth. 215–222). This pattern continues to appear in what we might call “resistance literature,” both among Christian and non-Christian authors. Hilhorst (2000:111–112) observes that the noun τύραvvoς, used to designate the ruler (especially in vocative addresses), links 4 Maccabees with early Christian martyrologies (see Eusebius, Mart. Palaest. 4.8; Origen, Exhortation to Martyrdom 22–27; Acts of Tarachus and Probus 9; Pseudo-Chrysostom Panegyricum in Romanum martyrem 1 [PG 50.613]), while van Henten and Avemarie (2002:38–41) call attention also to a text from the Acts of the Alexandrians (Acts of Appianus, P. Oxy. 33) that portrays the confrontation of Alexandrian citizens with the Roman emperor as the confrontation of innocent victims with a tyrant. Presenting Antiochus as the typical tyrant throughout the text helps to keep this frame of reference clearly in view (see, further, Heininger 1989:50–53, building on the work of Berve 1967). In light of the way in which Greek culture valued “democracy” and “freedom” as political ideals, tyrants would be automatically understood as negative characters, threats to what was held dear. This stereotype persisted long into the imperial period, providing a check even against the excesses of emperors who, with the powers of tyrants, could not nevertheless act too blatantly like tyrants.

126

COMMENTARY

Lucian of Samosata preserves a snapshot of the stereotypical tyrant in his comedy, “The Downward Journey, or, the Tyrant.” The tyrant Megapenthes is arraigned before Minos for eternal judgement on the following charges: After he had made himself extremely rich, he did not leave a single form of excess untried, but practised every sort of savagery and high-handedness upon his miserable fellow-citizens, ravishing maids, corrupting boys, and running amok in every way among his subjects. And for his superciliousness, his pride, and his haughtiness toward all he met you could never exact from him a fitting penalty. . . . Then, too, in the matter of punishments who could describe his cruel inventiveness? (Tyr. 26)

The points of contact with 4 Maccabees are indicated by the phrases in italics. Antiochus has already enriched his coffers through accepting Jason’s bribe for the office of high priesthood and selling the rights to him to make Jerusalem a Greek city. Seleucus’s previous attempt to plunder the Temple treasury also plays into this type, involving the line of Seleucids in tyrannical rule. Antiochus has already been described as an “arrogant and terrible man” (4:15). His pride and shameless arrogance will reappear (9:30; 12:11–14), and his “fearsomeness” is certainly apparent in his role as the inventor of savage tortures and punishments (4 Macc 10:16) and as the ringmaster in the arena in which the martyrs suffer such brutal torments. Inflicting torture upon enemies or recalcitrant subjects was a strategy typically associated with tyrants, as opposed to just or moderate rulers, since the former relied on maintaining their rule by fear and force (see Seneca, De ira 2.23.1; Thucydides, Hist. 6.57.4; Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 18.4; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 9.26, 58–60; Cicero, Tusc. disp. 2.52; Lucian, Phalaris 1–2; Heininger 1990:50– 51). Antiochus’s close association with his soldiers and bodyguards here in 5:1 is suggestive of both force as the ultimate legitimating factor in the tyrant’s rule and the ever present danger that attends illegitimate rule (such that Antiochus must keep himself surrounded by armed guards). Heininger (1989:52) suggests that we should hear resonances with the tyrants’ penchant for pedophilia behind Antiochus’s admiration and intentions for the handsome brothers (4 Macc 8:3–5; see Lucian, Tyrannicide 5, 10; Phalaris 1.3; Cicero, Tusc. disp. 5.60; Thucydides, Hist. 6.54.2–4). At the very least, Antiochus does appear as a “corrupter of boys” here insofar as he attempts to lead them away from covenant loyalty towards complete assimilation to the Greek way of life. In this regard, Antiochus’s enticements also resonate with the stereotype of the tyrant who attempts to win over people to his party by promising high

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

127

positions in his government (4 Macc 8:7; 12:5; see Lucian, Tyrant 11), a position that turns out not to be so secure after all (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 5.60; Seneca, De ira 2.23.1ff ). Finally, Antiochus’s departure from his predecessors’ policies concerning Jewish self-rule by the Torah, and even his attempt to abolish the Jewish Torah personally, complete the stereotype of the tyrant (Heininger 1990:52–53; see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.41.2). Eleazar’s assertion that compelling him to transgress his native land’s law is an act of tyranny (5:27) “stands in direct connection with the ancient conviction concerning the lawlessness of tyrants” (Heininger 1990:53; see Xenophon, Mem. 4.6.12). Lucian wrote that, after the death of a tyrant, “everything is full of peace, we have all our laws” (Tyrannicide 10), the very state of affairs that follows the martyrs’ defeat of Antiochus (18:4). Identifying Antiochus as “the tyrant” in 5:1 marks him at once as a negative character, completely undermining the ethos of his speeches (hence his credibility; see Aristotle, Rh. 1.2.3–6) and inviting the hearers to listen to his words with a “hermeneutic of suspicion.” Eating defiling foods, we have already been told by the author (4:26), is the means by which the captive would capitulate to Antiochus’s demand to abjure the Jewish way of life. Hadas (1953:167–69, 172) interprets this, then, as a scenario in which the public dishonoring of God’s Law is at issue, thus hillul ha-Shem. The language in these opening verses is thick with reference to critical boundaries that faithful Jews were not to cross. In 5:2, the author uses the Greek verb ἐπισπᾶσθαι when relating the orders given to the soldiers to “drag forward” the Hebrews one by one to compel them to eat unlawful foods. This verb also carries the meaning of “remove the marks of circumcision.” It is unlikely, of course, that the verse should be translated as indicating that the king sought to perform epispasm on each and every Hebrew right there on the spot, all the more as the topic does not come up again. Nevertheless, since circumcision was another principal Jewish boundary marker that Antiochus was keen on eliminating (see 4:25), the pun in the author’s choice of this verb may have been intentional and appreciated by the audience. The introduction of partaking κρεῶv ὑείωv καὶ εἰδωλoθύτωv, “the meat of swine and of animals sacrificed to idols,” reinforced by describing their consumption as μιαρoφαγῆσαι (which, with its corresponding noun, is a neologism invented by our author by analogy with σαρκoφαγεῖv; see Dupont-Sommer 1939:105), calls to mind the importance of dietary observances in the construction or de-construction of Jewish identity. According to Lev 20:22–26, maintaining the distinction between clean

128

COMMENTARY

and unclean foods mirrored and, indeed, perpetuated God’s distinction between God’s chosen people and all the other nations (see deSilva 2000a:260–62, 269–74). Avoidance of certain foods, notably pork, was also a keen social-engineering strategy by which to make Jews “look” and “act” different from other races, a fact that was known to all Gentile commentators on Judaism. This made forcing Jews to eat pork an obvious choice for a riotous anti-Jewish mob (as in Philo, Flacc. 95–96) or a tyrant like Antiochus. The avoidance of food offered to other gods (i.e., idols) was not proscribed by the dietary laws of Torah (Klauck 1989a:709), but the prohibition of idolatry was understood to extend to participation in the idol’s “table” in any form. This remains an important boundary marker distinguishing Christians from their (Gentile) neighbors long after an interest in dietary laws per se ceased to drive Christian practice (see the attempts to maintain this prohibition, and thus the tension it produces between Gentile Christians and non-Christian Gentiles, in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10; Revelation 2; Didache 6:3). The first representative of the Jewish way of life is Eleazar. The name, which means “God helps,” is a popular name in art (the high priest in Letter of Aristeas is named Eleazar, and an aged man named Eleazar prays effectively for the deliverance of the Egyptian Jews in 3 Maccabees 6) and in life (the fifth son of Mattathias in 1 Macc 2:5; “Lazarus” in John 11; the leader of the Sicarii defending Masada). This Eleazar is characterized very positively as a priest (thus a member of the caste of Hebrews most closely associated with God and God’s service), a “scribe” (thus one well acquainted with the life that Torah seeks to nurture), and an aged man (thus worthy of honorable treatment). Hadas (1953:169) prefers to read the second τὴv ἡλικίαv in 5:4 as τὴv φιλoσoφίαv (with Codex Venetus), since “Eleazar’s age has already been mentioned, and it is an integral part of our story that Eleazar be a philosopher.” This, however, is also just the kind of logic that would have led a scribe to have made the emendation in the first place, making it more likely that the original reading is preserved in Sinaiticus. Eleazar has been around for a long time, and for that reason is a fixture in Jerusalem and well-known to many of the Hellenized Jews who now stand beside the king watching this scene. This adds to the importance of preserving his long life of law observance (5:36), for which he is known to these people, with integrity at its end. Antiochus utters a deliberative speech seeking to persuade Eleazar, and the remainder of the Jewish captives presumed to be listening, by a series of arguments to renounce Judaism by eating the pork. His arguments

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

129

readily fall into the “categories of persuasion” listed in handbooks on rhetoric and ethics. Aristotle, for example, identified the noble, beneficial, and pleasant (καλoῦ συμφέρovτoς ἡδέoς) as the considerations that moved people to choose a course of action, while the shameful, harmful, and painful (αἰσχρoῦ βλαβερoῦ λυπηρoῦ) dissuaded people from a course of action (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2.3.7–1104b31–32). Anaximenes expanded this list to that which is right (δίκαιov), lawful (vóμιμov), expedient or beneficial (συμφέρov), honorable (καλóv), pleasant (ἡδύς), easy (ράδιov), feasible (δυvατóv), and necessary (ἀvαγκαῖov; Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b,21– 1422b,12). Antiochus will rely on the topics of what is pleasant, beneficial, and necessary (the latter coming from the same root in forms frequently translated as “compulsion” or “coercion” in 4 Maccabees). Antiochus opens with sweet words claiming to respect Eleazar’s age, even as he will open his speech to the seven brothers with similar expressions of admiration (8:3–5). His deeper contempt for Eleazar, however, is revealed in the challenge he levels against Eleazar’s honor in 5:7. Having devoted himself to a lifetime of the study and practice of the Jewish Law, Eleazar is still no philosopher. Indeed, he holds Eleazar to hold to a “philosophy consisting of silly talk” (τῆς φλυάρoυ φιλoσoφίας ὑμῶv, 5:11) and to have an “empty opinion about the truth” (κεvoδoξῶv περὶ τò ἀληθὲς, 5:10), but will arrogantly provide Eleazar an opportunity to learn a better way at the twilight of his long life. The first substantive argument appears in 5:8–9, focused appropriately on the issue of why Jews refuse to eat pork. The translation above tries to capture the fact that the superlative adjective καλλίστηv does not stand in attributive position with τὴv σαρκoφαγίαv (as the RSV and NRSV represent it by translating it as a simply attributive adjective, “the very excellent meat”), nor does reading it as standing in predicate position yield any good sense; instead, I take the superlative adjective as a substantive, of course showing us by its gender, number, and case that Antiochus has specifically the “most excellent” gift of “this animal’s meat” in mind. Plutarch (Quaest. conv. 5.1 [Mor. 669E–F]) lauded pork as the most proper (δικαιóτατov) kind of meat. This, of course, was a frequent locus of anti-Jewish slander (see Tacitus, Hist. 5.4.3; Juvenal, Sat. 14.98–99; Josephus, Ap. 2.137; cf. Let. Aris. 128–130). Inventing derogatory explanations of the Jews’ adherence to food laws, Sabbath laws, and circumcision enabled Greek and Latin authors to marginalize Judaism as a superstition rather than a dignified religion or philosophy (Plutarch, Superst. 8 [Mor 169C]). Antiochus speaks as though Eleazar and the Judeans are trapped in the barbaric and dishonorable form of slavery described by

130

COMMENTARY

Dio Chrysostom (Or. 14.18) as “ignorance of what is allowed and what is not allowed.” It is “senseless” (ἀvόητov) because it does not proceed from the right use of reason. Antiochus’s criticism of the Jewish way of life at this point resonates with the Stoic critique of human laws when set against the universal law of nature. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 80.5–7) eloquently expressed how knowledge of the universal law given by Nature relativized the often contradictory laws invented by members of each particular race, comparing people who live by the latter to people who insist on walking by torchlight at high noon, ignoring the illumination of the sun. These local laws are likened to thousands of chains by which the adherents bind themselves, for no good purpose at all, trammeling the freedom that would be theirs had they a mind to perceive the laws of Nature. Epictetus (Diss. 1.13.5) similarly rebuked people who treasured the laws invented by people now dead, but who ignored the greater and eternal laws of God. If consuming pork was condemned by the Jewish Law, it was the Jewish Law that stood condemned as enslaving people to empty tradition, since Nature passed no such judgement on the flesh of this animal. Eleazar will answer this point in 5:22–26. A second reason for eating the pork is that to refuse such an excellent gift with which Nature would grace humans (κεχαρισμέvης, 5:8) would be unjust (ἄδικov, 5:8–9). Hadas (1953:170) calls this a “religious argument” due to the appearance of the term ἄδικov, which he translates as “unrighteous” (thus the religious overtones). While not denying that religion and virtue are interwoven in the ancient world, ἄδικov is not more “religious” than other terms related to the cardinal virtues and their opposites. Here Antiochus claims that Eleazar, as representative of his nation, is guilty of injustice against Nature for spurning her good gifts (so Dupont-Sommer 1939:106). Ingratitude toward a patron (whether human or superhuman, like Nature) is a basic form of injustice, as we can see from the stock use of gratitude toward patrons as a topic of justice in rhetorical handbooks (Rhet. Her. 3.3.4; Anaximenes, Rhet. Alex. 1421b37– 1422a2; see deSilva 2000a:109–119). Eleazar will counter this argument in 5:24–26. Antiochus also offers practical considerations as part of his persuasive strategy. Continuing to live by the Jewish Law will result in Eleazar’s experience of being tortured to death. The subtle invocation of the topic of the pain that Eleazar will face combines the topics of the “unpleasant” and the “necessary,” Antiochus himself supplying the “necessity” through coercive tortures. The κἀμoῦ in 5:10, in placing increased emphasis on

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

131

Antiochus as the object of Eleazar’s scorn, introduces a sense of escalation in the argument: “To despise Nature is bad enough; to despise even me is more foolish yet!” This reminds the reader that refusal of assimilation to the Greek way of life presents an affront to Antiochus, whose will is being opposed and, in fact, destroyed by such resistance (4:24). The scene opens a multi-layered honor contest. Antiochus’s honor is at stake, since his right to enforce policy in his own kingdom is being openly challenged by the Torah-observant. Eleazar’s honor is at stake, since he must either admit to having lived as a fool for ninety years or cling to his self-respect at the cost of his life (5:7, 34–36; 7:9). The Jewish people’s honor is at stake (including the honor of the ancestors), for their reputation for piety and their vows to God are being directly jeopardized (5:18, 29; 9:1–2; 16:16). Ultimately, God’s honor is at stake, for fearing a human king more than the Divine Judge clearly shows how little value is being placed on the latter (13:13–15; 16:18–19). In light of all these considerations, Antiochus urges Eleazar to begin to reason in line with “the truth about what is advantageous” (τὴv τoῦ συμφέρovτoς ἀλήθειαv, 5:11), a typically Stoic value (Klauck 1989a:711; see also 1 Cor 6:12; 12:7). Eleazar is too old to still be bound by the chains of superstition; he is too old to be idealistic about dying for such empty values; by eating the pork he would both grace his old age with wisdom and “have compassion” on himself by seeking a peaceful death rather than what awaited him here. Such invitations by a tyrant to the victims to “show pity” on themselves becomes a standard feature of their rhetoric, as seen again in Mart. Poly. 9, a text showing signs of dependence on 4 Maccabees at many points: “The proconsul tried to persuade him to a denial saying, ‘Have respect for thine age’, and other things in accordance therewith, as it is their wont to say.” Consideration of temporal advantage would often play out in favor of more radical Hellenization, relaxing the commandments of Torah further and further for the sake of easier intercourse with the dominant culture and access to a share of its benefits. The author may well invite Jews who have “crossed the line” where Torah is concerned to see themselves mirrored here, where “the beneficial” has been privileged over “the right.” In order to help Eleazar stomach what he is being asked to ingest, Antiochus invokes the common topic that transgressions or crimes committed under duress are normally treated with leniency. If this applied in the sphere of human courts (see Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.5.7 1113b24–29; 3.1.7 1110a23–25), it would apply also in the divine court. The “power overseeing” these proceedings (the author referring to God

132

COMMENTARY

in a manner common in Greek and Hellenistic Jewish literature: see Plato, Timaeus; Philo, Flacc. 121; Epictetus, Diss. 3.11.6; 2 Macc 7:35; 9:5; 3 Macc 2:21) would not miss the fact that Eleazar really had no choice in the matter. Hadas (1953:171) suggests that the argument from “necessity,” derived from the demands that were placed upon Jews who wished to secure safe and prosperous lives for themselves and their families, made ever-increasing assimilation appear the “sensible” course of action. There were, however, some things that no person should do under any degree of compulsion, preferring “the most terrible death” to transgressions of those ultimate values (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.1.8 1110a25–28). It would fall to Eleazar to explain to Antiochus, and more especially to the audience, why every transgression of the Torah belonged to this latter category (5:16–21), which he takes up first in his reply. The choice of verb, δημηγoρεῖv (5:15), suggests that Eleazar is speaking not only to answer the tyrant, but even more so for the benefit of the Jewish captives who will need to be armed with strong arguments for remaining loyal to their ancestral way of life. Countering Antiochus’s attempt to invoke the topic of the “necessary” (τò ἀvαγκαῖov) at the close of his speech, Eleazar responds that the most forceful compulsion or necessity for the Judean is to obey the Torah (5:16). Returning to Anaximenes’s “categories of persuasion” (Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b21– 1422b12) we find Eleazar’s principle “motive for choice” to be the “just” (τò δίκαιov), preserving “ancestral customs and institutions and the established laws” being identified as a component of justice (Aristotle, Virt. 5.2). Also in keeping with the virtue of justice are Eleazar’s commitment to keep faith with the agreements made by his ancestors (specifically, with God, 5:29; see Exod 24:3, 7 for the occasion on which these vows were taken) and to honor his obligation to his nation (here, by preserving it from disgrace, 5:18; see Rhet. Her. 3.3.4; Aristotle, Virt. 5.2; Josephus, B.J. 7.8.7 §357). Most significantly, since this Law came from God, piety (a subset of justice; Aristotle, Virt. 5.2) also demands that it be preserved inviolable. Since God’s honor is perceived to be at stake (how great could this God be if those who claim to worship him fear humans and temporal punishments more?!), Eleazar knows that he must endure public attempts at coerced transgression with steadfastness so as to bring honor to the divine name (Hadas 1953:172, 175). Such obedience to the divine and eternal laws in flagrant disregard for unjust decrees by temporal tyrants was lauded in classical Greek culture. Sophocles’s Antigone, for example, contrasts the heroine Antigone with her weaker sister Ismene, who represents yielding to compulsion,

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

133

disobeying the higher law of Nature because of fear of the agents of human law (58–68). Antigone, however, despises human compulsion in favor of obeying the divine law and fulfilling justice toward the dead. For her, acting justly, even if death results, is considered happy. The underlying question in their debate is the same as in 4 Maccabees 5: what truly is compelling? Is it the force of law or power and the concern for temporal well-being on which they depend in order to work, or concern for maintaining one’s integrity in regard to the values one holds inviolable? If one decided, with Antigone, that the latter was the “most forceful compulsion,” one could remain free in regard to any tyrant’s coercive measures and, indeed, remain an “equal” rather than be dominated (4 Macc 5:38). This was the goal of the philosopher, for whom the ideal of freedom could only be realized when the threat of torture and death no longer had power over the individual’s faculty of choice (see Philo, Prob. 30; Epictetus, Diss. 1.25.21; 3.24.71; 4.1.1, 60, 70, 87). Eleazar thus boldly signals that he is ready to embody the courage of those who, celebrated in Greek epitaphioi logoi, preserved obedience to the laws of their native lands (τῷ πατρίῳ πoλιτευόμεvoι vόμῳ, 4:23, recalled by the repetition of vόμῳ πoλιτεύεσθαι in 5:16) rather than submitting to a tyrant (Redditt 1983:263), as well as the freedom of the sage who will do nothing against his will, yielding to no external compulsion. The fact that the author speaks of small and great sins (μικρὰv . . . ἁμαρτίαv, 5:19; τò ἐπὶ μικρoῖς καὶ μεγάλoις παραvoμεῖv, 5:20) has led some readers (notably Hadas 1953:118; Anderson 1985a:538) to conclude that he opposed the rigid Stoic principle that “sins (errors) are to be considered equal” (SVF 1.224; Arius Didymus, Epitome 11o; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 7.120; Cicero, Paradoxa 3.1.20; seen also in Philo, Leg. 3.241 and satirized in Horace, Sat. 1.3.120–121). However, Eleazar may be seen to express not his own view at this point, but to anticipate Antiochus’s objection that eating unclean food might be a “minor sin,” and that only to disabuse him of such a notion (“Do not suppose. . . .”). Renehan (1972:230; also Townshend 1913:672; Pfeiffer 1949:217) correctly points out that, for Eleazar, making a distinction between “minor” and “major” here does not alter the equality of the consequences: “the law is equally despised” by a transgression of a dietary law as by, for example, the prohibition against adultery, and so the sins are “equally serious” (or “carry equal force,” “have “equal potency,” ἰσoδύvαμov). In this sense, there is a fundamental consistency between the author’s view and the Stoic view. Diogenes Laertius (Vit. 7.120) represents the classical Stoic viewpoint to be that “if one truth is not more true than

134

COMMENTARY

another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin.” Just as there is a qualitative equality shared by all true statements, there is a qualitative equality shared by all acts of wrongdoing. The amount of harm may quantifiably differ, but this does not alter the qualitative equality. For our author, contempt for the Law and the divine Lawgiver is the unifying or equalizing feature, and the “sin within the sin.” In widely different contexts, authors might call attention to a distinction between major and minor laws or commandments, all for the purpose of engendering uniform obedience to all equally. Pirke Aboth 2:1, for example, calls for equal attentiveness “to a minor commandment as to a major one,” since the rewards for each act of obedience and punishments for each transgressions are unknown but will certainly outweigh the temporal costs of obedience and rewards of transgression. Similarly, and from a very different time, place, and cultural location, Sophocles (Antigone 666– 671) distinguishes between small matters of obedience and the weightier matters of justice and injustice only to assert that the reliable citizen is the one who gives complete regard for both small and great commands. Antiochus has indeed derided the Jewish way of life as unworthy of being considered a true “philosophy” (5:7, 11), its adherents exhibiting “senselessness” (5:9, 10). Eleazar, however, answers him derisively in turn. The RSV and NRSV translate the γὰρ in 5:23 as “but,” which captures the adversative sense of the content (thus also Townshend 1913:672), and which may be necessary in view of the difficulty of conveying irony in the written word, but quite misses the argumentative strategy of Eleazar’s speech. By translating γὰρ as “for” here, we find Eleazar mockingly listing the “reasons” Antiochus might have for sneering at the Jewish philosophy, pointing to the virtues it imparts, as if to say, “Fine reasons you have for your prejudice against the Jewish way of life!” (Grimm 1853:322; DupontSommer 1939:108). Eleazar, in keeping with the author’s own presentation of Torah-observance as the path to perfection of virtue, points to Torah’s role as instructor (ἐκδιδάσκει, παιδεύει, 5:23–24; παιδευτὰ vόμε, 5:34) of the four cardinal virtues (see 1:15–18, as well as the more detailed exposition of how Torah develops self-control and a just disposition in the one living by its regulations in 1:31–3:18). This, in turn, is part of a broader tendency on the part of Hellenistic Jewish authors to emphasize Torah’s educative and ethically formative function in the Jewish community. Philo, for example, represents the gathering of Jews in the synagogues on the Sabbath as an occasion “to discuss matters of philosophy” so as “to improve in virtue.” These “houses of prayer” are

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

135

nothing other than “schools of wisdom, and courage, and temperance, and justice, and piety, and holiness, and every virtue, by which human and divine things are appreciated, and placed on a proper footing” (Mos. 2.215–216 [Yonge]; see also Prob. 80, which speaks of the Torah as the “instructor” of the Essenes in the “ethical art of philosophy”). The first three virtues are defined here in terms that would be quite recognizable to a Greek or Roman ethicist. Temperance is elsewhere similarly defined as the mastery and moderation of desires (see Rhet. Her. 3.2.3). Courage is frequently defined in terms of the voluntary endurance of pain (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2.2.9 1104b1–2; Rhet. Her. 3.2.3). In this regard, van Henten (1997:288) calls our attention to the similarity between the Spartans and their “severe and law-centered education” geared at training them for bravery and endurance in the face of any suffering, and the portrayal of the παιδεία of the Jews in 4 Maccabees. The Spartans served as a positive and honorable point of comparison in this regard also for the author of 1 Maccabees, who creates a (fictive) lineage and alliance (see 1 Macc 12:1–23), and Josephus, who compares the Jews and Spartans at some length in Ap. 2.225–235. He concludes that the emphasis throughout 4 Maccabees on the way early training in Torah has prepared Eleazar, the seven brothers, and their mother to show outstanding courage (1:11; 17:23–24) created an image of “the martyrs as Jewish heroes who could rival heroic Athenians, Spartans or Romans” and thus affirm the value of Jewish identity and tradition (van Henten 1997:302). Justice is defined in reference to the verb ἰσovoμεῖv, a word that does not appear elsewhere in the active voice. The sense proposed by Hadas (1953:173), namely “to give each his or her due,” derived from the attested meaning of the middle voice (“to have equal political rights”), preserves the essential definition of “justice” and its fruits known from elsewhere (e.g., “giving to each thing what it is entitled in proportion to its worth,” Rhet. Her. 3.2.3; “To righteousness it belongs to be ready to distribute according to desert,” Aristotle, Virt. 5.2). Here the audience encounters a surprise, for the fourth virtue listed is not prudence, but piety (εὐσέβεια, 5:24). 4 Macc 5:23–24 list the same four virtues as are found in Xenophon, Mem. 4.6 (Dupont-Sommer 1939:108), and more extensive variations in lists of virtues in the Roman imperial period have been traced out in D’Angelo 2003:143–144. For example, the Res Gestae speak of Augustus’s “courage, clemency, justice, and piety,” while Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 1.3.5) lauds the Romans as excelling other people in piety, justice, moderation, and

136

COMMENTARY

military prowess (hence, courage). Since “harmony” (cf. Latin concordia) is also elevated during the imperial period (as in Josephus, Ap. 2.170–171), D’Angelo posits that the elevation of “harmony” and “piety” at various places in 4 Maccabees results from the author’s desire to interact with Roman imperial values (D’Angelo 2003:145–146). A stronger case could be made for this in regard to “harmony,” I believe, than in regard to “piety” which, as noted above, was already listed alongside or in place of one of the traditional cardinal virtues in Plato’s and Xenophon’s writings. It seems more to the point here that, with the elevation of “prudence” to the chief virtue (1:2, 19) and its near identification with the right operation of ὁ λoγισμòς itself (e.g., in 1:30), there is now room for another “peer” virtue for the other three to be introduced. Piety is closely related to the virtue of justice (see Plato, Gorg. 507B): it entails giving to the gods what is their due, and by extension, honoring one’s sacred duties to those whom the gods have set over one (e.g., one’s country and family, seen from the frequent use of the epithet pius to describe Aeneas in Virgil’s epic). The elevation of piety here is especially helpful for the promotion of Judaism. Greeks, Romans, Jews, Egyptians, Syrians – all sought to live piously and give to the gods their due. But, the author claims, the Torah has given to the Jews true insight into the nature of God. When they worship one and only one God, and do so apart from the use of any plastic representations of the same, they manifest piety with a degree of knowledge denied to Antiochus (and all who are like him) who, in the midst of his polytheism and idolatry, reveals that it is in fact he who has a “vain opinion concerning the truth” (5:10; see 3 Macc 4:16; Let. Aris. 139, 142). In light of Torah’s proven ability to inculcate the cardinal virtues, Eleazar can claim that Jewish philosophy is indeed μετὰ εὐλoγιστίας (in accordance with the right use of reason, Grimm 1853:322), answering Antiochus’s claim in 5:9 that the Jewish way of life is “senseless” (ἀvόητov). Regarding, then, the specific matter of the dietary laws, Eleazar claims that the Torah is a better guide to knowing what is allowable and what is unsuitable than Nature alone. Torah was given to the Jewish people by the Creator of Nature (5:25), and the divine giving of the law is a fundamental conviction undergirding the value of Torah as a way of life and the importance of remaining obedient to the stipulations of Torah. Eleazar introduces the phrase κατὰ φύσιv at 5:25, and this has been consistently difficult to translate. Hadas (1953:174) mistakenly renders this phrase to indicate that God “conformed [the law] to our nature”; Koester (1968:533) makes a similar misstep by saying that God gave the

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

137

law “according to His nature” (rightly critiqued in Redditt 1983:256–257). The point is rather that the giving of the Law was itself “according to nature,” insofar as the parent’s love and provision for the child’s education and upbringing is in accordance with Nature. Far from being in contradiction to the Stoic philosopher’s goal of living “according to nature,” adhering to Torah was a superior means to discovering what was truly in accordance with nature, being supplied by the God who also created the “world order” that was “Nature” (Redditt 1983:257). Obeying its stipulations could not possibly be an affront to Nature, as Antiochus argued (5:9), since the Torah had its origin in the mind of the Creator. Indeed, it has already proved itself a superior guide to nature alone insofar as, without the benefit of Torah’s clearer instruction, Antiochus had come to the wrong conclusion about what foods were in fact suitable for the human organism. It would again prove superior to nature when the natural affections of sibling and maternal love would have led the martyrs to defect from the course of loyalty to God, were they not following a higher guide (see 13:27; 15:25). Those who follow nature, and not the creator of nature who has revealed the nomos in Torah, may falter in attaining virtue at critical moments (7:18–19; 9:18). So in 5:26 it is now Eleazar who must instruct Antiochus concerning what is truly beneficial, allowable, and profitable for virtue. Eleazar, and not Antiochus, has the divinely-given guide to discerning what foods are truly “suitable” (τὰ μὲv oἰκειωθησόμεvα ἡμῶv ταῖς ψυχαῖς). Diogenes Laertius (Vit. 7.85), commenting on a saying of Chrysippus, writes: “nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin (τὰ oἰκεῖα) to it” (Stowers 2000:850). Thus the Law communicates to the Jewish sage what Nature was held to implant in its creatures, namely knowledge of what is adverse and what is suitable. The author has already been seen to embrace Philo’s view that the Law forbids certain meats precisely because they are so succulent and apt to provoke gluttonous loss of self-control (1:31–35; Philo, Spec. 4.100). He may also have affirmed its sequel, namely that these foods ultimately produced dysfunction in the body through the overeating they encouraged: “for gluttony begets indigestion, which is the source of all illnesses and infirmities.” This is a very different understanding of the dietary laws from that seen in Letter of Aristeas, which focuses on the allegorical signification of these laws (Let. Aris. 144–169). Having provided a thorough defense of the Jewish philosophy, Eleazar

138

COMMENTARY

now declares his resolve. The course of action Antiochus promotes does not ultimately rest on the merit of his arguments, which have all been refuted, but on his power to coerce people to act against their consciences by threat of pain and by sheer brutality. Eleazar denounces this as typically “tyrannical” (see Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.1.4 1110a5–9 for a standard strategy by which tyrants compelled people to do what they knew to be wrong), all the more as Antiochus is seeking even further occasion to sneer at the Jewish way of life. Epictetus (Ench. 22) offers an illumining parallel as he counsels wouldbe philosophers that they must “prepare at once to be met with ridicule, to have many people jeer at you.” If the philosopher persists in his or her principles come what may, he or she will eventually win admiration. But he goes on to warn the novitiate that, if he or she is overcome by these detractors, “you will get the laugh on yourself twice.” This is precisely how Eleazar understands the moment. Antiochus has already ridiculed the Jewish philosophy for seeming senseless (χλευάζεις, 5:22); Eleazar will not give him the opportunity to have the second laugh (oὐ γελάσεις κατ’ ἐμoῦ τoῦτov τòv γέλωτα, 5:28). Because of his resolve, the author avers, he did in fact win admiration in the end even from his enemies (4 Macc 1:11; 17:17, 23–24). Eleazar declares that he will keep faith with his ancestors in regard to the oath they swore at Sinai twice: “All the words that the Lord has spoken we will do” (Exod 24:3, 7; renewed in Josh 24:18b, 21, 24). Preserving oaths and covenants would have been recognized as the just course of action, hence noble (Rhet. Her. 3.3.4; Aristotle Virt. 5.2). He will also break the stereotype of the old person who cares more for what is expedient than what is noble, who is cowardly because surviving a little longer has become so dear (Aristotle, Rh. 2.13.7–9). In dying for what is noble, he will show that his reason is still in its prime where keeping faith with God is concerned (5:31). For this reason, he can throw Antiochus’s invitation to allow his old age to provide an excuse for weakness (for “showing compassion” on his old age, 5:12) back in his face (5:33). Eleazar will not act selfishly (another facet of Aristotle’s stereotype) at the expense of the nation’s Law. In a series of apostrophes, Eleazar commits himself to keep faith with the Law that he knows to have been appointed for him by God (voμoθεσίας ἐπιστήμη refers not only to his knowledge of the Law, but to his knowledge of the divine source of the Law; van Henten, 1997:134– 135), with the ideals of virtue that he has treasured throughout his life, with the role that his priestly status has allowed him to enjoy, and

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38

139

ultimately with himself (5:36). This cannot fail to recall the virtuous example of Socrates, claimed as a model by the Academy, Stoics, and Cynics alike. Faced with the opportunity to save his life by breaking the law in Athens (even though he was unjustly condemned), Socrates would not violate his life of virtue now near its end in order to save it shamefully (Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.163–165). Like Menoeceus, who died in order to save his city, Eleazar too will derive benefit by continuing to walk in line with the values that had guided his entire life, even if that led to death – especially if continuing to live would mean the loss of his integrity (Epictetus, Diss. 3.20.4–6). Armed with this resolve, Eleazar poses a counter-challenge to Antiochus. The latter had posed the first challenge: yield, or be compelled to yield. Eleazar answers, in effect, by retorting “give it your best shot.” Urging Antiochus to fan the flames more vehemently recalls the heating of the furnace to seven times its normal temperature in Dan 3:19, a significant allusion since the stories of Daniel and the three young men will be prominent throughout the chapters to follow. Eleazar and the seven brothers will each show the same resolve as those heroes. The challenge in 5:32 resembles many similar ones uttered by sages or other people committed to virtue above all else. Philo (Prob. 25) quotes a fragment of Euripedes (Syleus, frag 2) to express the resolve of the philosopher who will not be compelled by threats to act against virtue: “Yes, burn and scorch my flesh, and glut your hate, drinking my life-warm blood; for heaven’s stars shall quit their place . . . before you wring from me a word of flattery.” In Leukippê, a second-century C.E. Greek romance, a freeborn woman reduced to slavery through shipwreck and seizure by pirates will not submit to the lust of her owner even under torture: “Take up all your instruments of torture, and at once; bring out against me the whips, the wheel, the fire, the sword. . . . I am naked, and alone, and a woman. But one shield and defense I have, which is my freedom, which cannot be struck down by whips, or cut by the sword, or burned by fire” (Shaw 1996:271). This freedom is unassailable from without. It is the same spirit that Eleazar shows, notably also presented in terms of the freedom of the sage. This spirit would continue to inspire those who resisted the dominant culture’s pressures and demands, as seen in Ignatius of Antioch, who wrote en route to his own passion: “Come fire and cross and grapplings with wild beasts, wrenching of bones, hacking of limbs, crushings of my whole body, come cruel tortures of the devil to assail me. Only be it mine to attain unto Jesus Christ” (Rom 5.3). The experience of physical degradation is turned thus into a contest of wills

140

COMMENTARY

between the oppressor and the subject, in which the intended victim can transform himself or herself into the victor by resisting. Whatever pain Antiochus can inflict, Eleazar will cling to his self-control (5:34). This “self-control” is not unaware of pain, but allows one to act in accordance with virtue in the midst of pain (see Plutarch, Virt. mor. 6 [Mor. 445B–C]; Aristotle, Virt. 5.1). Even the Stoic Seneca would admit that self-control does not deny the sensation of pain, only denies pain the upper hand: “There is no virtue that fails to realize that it does endure” (Constant. 10.4). There is an additional factor that motivates Eleazar to remain steadfast even unto death, and that is the assurance of life beyond death. He does not need to cling to a short span of life, since he knows an eternity awaits him. “Being gathered to one’s people” (Gen 25:8, 17; 35:29; 49:49, 33; see also Gen 15:15: “you shall go to your ancestors in peace”), the biblical euphemism for dying, has been transformed into a vibrant reunion beyond death in which the “ancestors” can affirm and welcome their righteous offspring into the afterlife (5:37). The consideration of life beyond death runs throughout the book as perhaps the ultimate motivator for virtuous conduct, specially keeping faith with God through Torah observance (see 9:8, 22; 10:15; 13:14–17; 14:5; 15:2–3; 16:13, 25). A welcome among the righteous ancestors, who “live” in God’s presence where the martyrs hope to be as well (7:19; 16:25), also fuels the brothers’ commitment (13:17). Antiochus and people of like mind with him may surround the martyrs on the human plane, but God and the righteous ancestors also surround them from above and watch their contest. By first constructing this alternate court of opinion, and then playing for their approval rather than acceptance by the court of Antiochus, the martyrs are able to hold onto their self-respect and understand that to suffer disgrace in the eyes of the dominant culture may indeed be the way to gain honor beyond the present moment. Such a conviction has enabled resistance throughout the millennia (see, further, deSilva 1995a:276–89; 2000b:171–74, 428–29). Eleazar closes by affirming his freedom to act in accordance with his moral principles rather than yield his innermost self to the tyrant’s external assaults. In so doing, he exhibits the freedom that was the ultimate goal of the Stoic philosophy, especially as expressed by Epictetus (see Diss. 1.25.21; 3.24.71; 4.1.1, 60–87), but also by Philo (Prob. 25, 30, 60, 97), Cicero (Paradoxa 5.1.34), and Seneca (Constant. 5.6–6.8). In this freedom, he will not violate the consistency and integrity of his life or give himself cause for regret (see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 5.80–81). Rather, he will fulfill the ideal set before the Greek world by Socrates, namely “to live and die in the practice alike of justice and of all other virtue” (Gorg. 527E).

4 MACCABEES 5:1–38 & 6:1–30 6:1–30

141

Eleazar Agonistes

The winning arguments of Eleazar in chapter 5, referred to here briefly with the neologism ἀvτιρητoρεύσαvτoς, must now be confirmed by his actions in chapter 6. Crassly, he must put his body where his mouth is. The author is keenly aware of this, as he himself regards the episode of martyrdom as the means by which Eleazar rendered his “words of divine philosophy credible” by deeds (7:9). The author’s description of the torments here and in the case of the seven brothers will be considerably more varied and detailed than what he read in his source, 2 Macc 6:18–7:42. In the source, Eleazar is not subjected to torture both before and after his compatriots suggest the ruse by which he could save his life and, technically, his ritual purity. After rejecting the ploy, he is simply stretched on a rack and beaten to death with clubs (2 Macc 6:28b, 30). The author of 4 Maccabees subjects Eleazar to a wider variety of tortures both before and after the suggested ruse. Similarly, the author of 2 Maccabees provides few details about the torture of the seven brothers. After they are all beaten simultaneously with whips and cords (7:1), focused attention is given to the first brother, whose tongue is cut out, extremities amputated, and scalp ripped off; what is left is thrown into an oversized frying pan to roast and die (2 Macc 7:3–5). The second is said to be scalped and, then, treated as the first. No more details are given in regard to the last five brothers, save that the last was “handled worse” (2 Macc 7:39). While these details were certainly sufficient to paint a grisly scene, they pale in comparison to the inventiveness, variety, and detail found in 4 Macc 9:10–11:27 (and the reprises in 15:15, 18–22; 18:20–21). His inventiveness in ekphrasis (“vivid description,” one of the skills taught in elementary rhetorical exercises) is due not merely to a desire to rouse sympathy (Hadas 1953:177), but to his desire to make the audience squirm as they imagine these scenes (see 14:9) so that they can also appreciate to a greater extent the violence of the pains that pious reason can master for the sake of God and God’s benefits. This would leave them in a position to understand that the lesser pains and losses that they might endure by not compromising essential boundaries remained eminently bearable. Torrey (1945:105) considered the vivid descriptions of the tortures to be “the one great blemish in the book from the modern point of view,” considering these to be “exaggerated beyond the bounds of reason.” His comment gives insufficient credit to the strength of the human spirit, as well as insufficient weight to the capacity of human beings for cruelty – two factors of which his world would be reminded in

142

COMMENTARY

the years following the publication of his book, as the excesses of the Holocaust were uncovered. The treatment Eleazar receives at the hands of the bodyguards is intended to degrade him, but the author makes clear that his honor remains intact. Honor and dishonor are often represented physically in the ancient world, whether by physical posture and treatment of bodies or by the adornment of bodies (see Malina and Neyrey 1991). Even the detail that he is dragged off roughly (πικρῶς) signals the disappearance of any respect that might be due him as far as the guards are concerned. Stripping Eleazar of his clothing, the outer trappings that display his status but also hide the shame of his nakedness, is part of the statusdegradation ritual inflicted upon him. The author claims, however, that he remains clothed with virtue. The “seemliness of piety” covers his nakedness. As in Plato’s Gorgias (523D–525A), it was the state of the soul, not the state of the body, that was scrutinized in, and that determined the verdict of, God’s court (and so this alone should matter to those who live with a view to ultimate values). According to Plato, the graceful trappings of the body often hid souls scarred by vice, while, conversely, wretched clothing frequently prevented people from clearly seeing the nobility of a person’s character. When all stood before the Judge, they appear without the outer trappings of their body, so that the state of their soul can be clearly seen. Thus Eleazar, though disgraced in life, enjoys the honor of a noble soul, decorated by all the virtues, and the assurance of the favorable reception that he will receive from the Judge that looks on his contest from above. The author introduces a similar correction to our perception of events in 6:7. Eleazar is beaten down into a prone position, his body now appearing weak and in the disgraceful state of lying on the ground at the feet of his torturers. Nevertheless, his true strength and nobility is to be seen in the fact that he has kept his “reason erect and unbending” (ὀρθòv εἶχεv καὶ ἀκλειvῆ τòv λoγισμόv). His goal is precisely that of the philosopher, according to Epictetus (Diss. 4.8.12): “To keep reason straight (correct, upright; τò ὀρθòv ἔχειv τòv λόγov).” Indeed, he is willing to allow his body to be subjected to disgrace so that he might keep his self-respect, which is entirely found in the preservation of his integrity, intact. The author creates a neologism, περιαγκωvίσα(v)τες, to help the audience visualize Eleazar’s plight. The component parts speak of bending a person’s arms around them, hence “binding his arms around him.” It is unclear whether this is meant to evoke an image of Eleazar’s hands tied together behind his back, or his arms being crossed in front of

4 MACCABEES 6:1–30

143

his chest and secured by a rope passed behind him connecting his wrists (see also Grimm 1853:325). In any event, it is clear that he is not bound to a column or between columns, since he is free to fall over under the lashing (6:7). The adverb ἑκατέρωθεv could refer to how Eleazar’s arms were bound, but in view of the parallelism with the phrase beginning with ἑτέρωθεv in 6:4, the author probably seeks to evoke a picture of Eleazar being whipped from two sides. The herald’s message is clearly that Eleazar can put a stop to the pain at any point by changing his mind: the tortures are inducements, not punishments. The fact that he could end the torture at any moment will make his moral achievement all the more praiseworthy (see 7:3) and his death a victory, since it meant that nothing was able to “break” him. As is common in languages in which names carry meaning, the author affirms that Eleazar’s name (“God helps,” ’l ‘zr; see Dupont-Sommer 1939:65–66) is being realized in this scene. The RSV and NRSV do not preserve the adverbial form ἀληθῶς at this point. It is not, however, that the martyr acts “like a true Eleazar,” but that he experiences “truly” what his name means, God helping him to bear the torments (“like one truly helped by God,” 6:5). The indications of religious ecstasy in 6:5–6 – experiencing the tortures as if in a dream, that is, a step removed from the bodily experience, and focusing attention on heaven during the tortures, hence away from the immediate surroundings (see also 6:26) – suggest that God has in some way “met” Eleazar in the midst of his trial and helps him to keep his resolve. This is, of course, such a common feature of martyr stories that one suspects that alternate states of consciousness can, in fact, set in under extreme duress and enable the body to endure fearsome assaults. Klauck (1989a:714) suggests that Philo, Prob. 106–107, in which Anaxarchos and Zeno are said to endure torture “regarding their bodies as strangers and enemies,” provides an informative parallel. It does show the same willingness to distance one’s “self ” from one’s “body,” giving over the latter for the sake of the former, but our author suggests something more like ekstasis than mere resolve. After falling beneath the beating, a solider kicks Eleazar in the sides to make him get back up (6:8). The author uses two intensifiers after λάξ (“with the foot”) at this point, stressing the indignities Eleazar was being made to suffer, as well as the cruelty of the guards. Eleazar, however, approaches the hardships and indignities with the same “spirit of contempt” (τoῦς πóvoυς καταφρovῶv) that Dio Chrysostom identifies as the enlightened approach of the philosopher that enables them to be endured (Or. 8.18). The author moves into the realm of athletic imagery to

144

COMMENTARY

express the significance of the scene. This is a natural move since both the athletic competitions and the confrontation between tyrant and sage involve a great deal of sheer physical exertion, the inflicting of pain and blows, the topics of endurance and bravery, and the fact that there will be a winner and a loser. Athletic imagery was a potent resource for transforming an experience of victimization into a moral victory. The author claims such a victory here for Eleazar on analogy with the many boxers who “in the sacred games have won the victory by wearing out the hands of their assailants through stubborn endurance” (Seneca, Constant. 9.4; see also the extended comparison in Philo, Prob. 26–27). Like such boxers, Eleazar has also “by long and faithful training” – here in the school of Torah – “attained the strength to endure and tire out any assault of the enemy” (Seneca, Constant. 9.4). The torturers must “desist from weariness, before [the sage] can be compelled to do anything contrary to his opinion of propriety” (Philo, Prob. 27). The author also introduces at this point the first sign that the opinion Eleazar’s detractors have of him may be changing, as the guards must acknowledge his fortitude under duress. The author, following the material in 2 Macc 6:12–23, provides Eleazar with a brief respite from his sufferings to allow another group of people to suggest a way out from the impasse in which Antiochus and Eleazar find themselves. He need not destroy himself “irrationally” (ἀλoγίστως, 6:14), for they have a way to satisfy all parties, so they think. In Sinaiticus, 4 Macc 6:14 need not have been read as a question, but could have been read as a declaration (indeed, a direct rebuke). A corrector has added τί at the beginning of the verse to resolve this in favor of the question (thus in the RSV and NRSV). The exact nature of the ruse here is open to some debate. 2 Macc 6:21–22 is quite specific: Eleazar is invited to fetch some meat that he could eat lawfully (preparing it himself would guarantee to his own conscience at least that there was nothing defiling about it) there in the presence of the king and the onlookers, pretending that it was in fact the sacrificial pork. Here it is possible that the courtiers are offering some other cooked meat beside the pork, but the articles introducing ἡψημέvωv βρωμάτωv and ὑείωv suggest that this meat is the previously identified objectionable food, i.e., the pork. But, they suggest, Eleazar could go through the motions of putting it in his mouth, chewing it, and swallowing it, much as parents will do with baby food. Thus he would indeed “pretend to eat” the pork, not pretend that the meat he was eating was pork. This is also in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ὑποκρίνασθαι, seen also, for example, from Gal 2:11–14, where pressure

4 MACCABEES 6:1–30

145

from outside (perhaps fear of rebuke and even persecution) from James’ representatives causes Peter, Barnabas, and the other Jewish Christians to “put on a show” of separating from the Gentile Christians at mealtime for the sake of the visitors. That Eleazar should respond to this suggestion as if it was more painful than the scourges shows the audience his central concern. Eleazar will tell his former companions what is truly irrational (note the repetition of ἀλoγίστως and ἀλόγιστov in 6:14 and 6:18, showing how Eleazar tosses this charge back at his interlocutors), and it is not suffering the torments under these conditions. The argument is essentially the same as found in 2 Macc 6:23–25, 27–28. First, he refuses to play the coward in any sense (6:17), and refuses to reap the reward of the coward, which is ridicule and contempt (6:20–21). The author invents the word μαλακoψυχήσαvτας (6:17) to label the interior disposition required to put on such a display as the courtiers suggest. μαλακός “was the adjective supremely used to differentiate women, girls, boys, youths, effeminate males, catamites, and eunuchs from ‘true men’ ” (Moore and Anderson 1998:263, referring to Walters 1991). Eleazar will prove himself the ideal of the Greek male by his absolute and unwavering commitment to the Jewish way of life in the face of all manner of “enticements” to assimilation, and even the appearance of assimilation. He involves his audience – both those in the narrative and those reading the narrative – in his wish that “the children of Abraham” should never thus morally de-sex themselves. Eleazar commits himself, then, to the courageous path, the essence of which is to accept death with honor rather than seek safety with disgrace (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.8.9 1116b19–22; Virt. 4.4), and is frequently associated with the honor of the soldier (Tacitus, Agricola 34; Thucydides, Hist. 2.42.4; Philo, Virt. 32). In light of the setting of foreign domination and indigenous resistance in which the action of 4 Maccabees is placed, crediting Eleazar with a soldier’s courage is far from inappropriate, all the more as he participates in the defeat of the tyrant and restoration of freedom in his native land (1:11; 18:4), becoming “a cause of victory,” the thing to which courage should lead (Aristotle, Virt. 4.4). Second, he will not throw away his reputation for piety, earned over the course of a long life, for the sake of living any longer. In placing concern for honor and reputation above personal safety and comfort, Eleazar walks in line with the canons of nobility (see, for example, PseudoIsocrates, To Demonicus 43: “Guard more carefully against censure than danger. . . . Good men should dread ignominy during life. . . . Strive by all means to live in security, but if ever it falls to your lot to face the dangers

146

COMMENTARY

of battle, seek to preserve your life, but with honour and not with disgrace; for death is the sentence which fate has passed on all mankind, but to die nobly is the special honour which nature has reserved for the good.” In the case of a person who is known for virtue, dying in such a way that this virtue is preserved is considered advantageous. Again we recall Epictetus’s musings about Menoeceus, who secured his reputation for honor forever by his voluntary death, which he would otherwise have lost by living longer (Diss. 3.20.4–6). If this was true for a young man like Menoeceus, how much more would it be true for an old man like Eleazar (or Socrates) for whom, indeed, only a short time would remain anyway. And with the reputation for virtue replaced by contempt for cowardice, that short span would be worthless. Finally, he will fulfill his duty to provide a noble example for others, rather than weaken their resolve by his own capitulation (even in pretense) to the demands of the dominant culture. For whether he truly eats or pretends to eat, the public result is the same: he is seen to eat, and to make thereby a public testimony that fidelity to the Torah and the Jewish way of life is not worth dying for. He cannot save his private virtue (i.e., by pretending to eat without really tasting the pork) without preserving his public witness. This attitude again resonates with the example of Socrates, who is remembered to have accepted death rather than an ignominious escape from death so that he would teach people that death is not too fearsome an evil (Seneca, Ep. 24.4), becoming thereby a perpetually helpful model aiding the life of virtue (Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.168–169). Having declared again his resolve, Eleazar addresses the remaining Jewish captives as “children of Abraham,” invoking their relationship to Abraham as a resource for finding the courage to “die nobly for the sake of piety” (6:17, 22; Seim 2001:30), giving his own example as a resource as well. Eleazar’s noble example would indeed inspire the seven brothers to stand firm (9:5–6), each of whom in turn would urge the surviving brothers to follow his example (9:23–24; 13:8), their collective endurance leading to the utter defeat of the tyrant’s plan to compel the inhabitants of Jerusalem to turn from their ancestral law (18:5). The author hoped that Eleazar’s death would have the same effect on his own audience, strengthening their commitment to the divine Law (7:9). The guards take up new strategies for inflicting suffering. The author’s description of their activity attests to the way in which humans over the centuries have considered every part of the human anatomy, what is most painful or disagreeable to each part, and how to exacerbate that experience

4 MACCABEES 6:1–30

147

of discomfort in torture. The prayer to God just prior to death becomes a standard expectation in martyrologies. Here, Eleazar utters the first of two clear expressions in this book (see comments on 17:21–22) of vicarious death effecting reconciliation between the people and the offended Deity (see van Henten 1997 and deSilva 1998:137–142 as points of entry into the extensive scholarly discussion of this topic). The key points to note are that (1) Eleazar’s death was voluntarily chosen for the sake of obedience to the Torah, and this choice is deemed significant for the requests that follow (6:27); (2) Eleazar asks that the punishment that the martyrs suffer be deemed sufficient punishment for the whole nation (6:28); (3) Eleazar asks that his blood might be made a means of purification for the nation (6:29); (4) Eleazar offers his life as an ἀvτίψυχov; (5) the result is that God should change God’s attitude toward the nation to one of mercy (6:28). The movement of this passage clearly recalls some kind of ritual act whereby an alienated Deity is reconciled to the people. The spilling of blood and the offering of a sacrificial animal as an exchange-price for the lives of the worshipers, and as the means by which God’s wrath can be averted and favor restored, is fundamental to Israelite sacrifice. ἀvτίψυχov specifically recalls LXX Lev 17:11, in which God says that he gave the blood of animals to the Israelites “to perform the rite of atonement for your lives at the altar; for, as life, it is blood that atones for a life (ἀvτὶ τὴς ψυχῆς)” (O’Hagan 1974:118). The term ἀvτίψυχov also becomes frequent hereafter in martyr literature. It is used four times in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch to convey the impression that Ignatius’s death is an offering on behalf of other Christian communities (Eph. 21.1: “May my soul be given for yours, and for them whom you sent in the honour of God to Smyrna”; Smyr. 10.2: “May my spirit be in substitution for your life”; also Poly. 2.3; 6.1), adding to the impression that 4 Maccabees directly informed this bishop’s reflection on his own death. Overlaid upon this background is the pattern of Deuteronomy 28–30, which has already been at work in the apostasy and chastisement of the nation mentioned in 4:15–21. Eleazar offers his obedience to the law to the point of death as a manifestation of that return to obedience that would invite God’s compassion upon the nation (Deut 30:1–3). Also in the background, however, are a number of traditions that help bridge the distance between the animal sacrifices prescribed in Leviticus for atonement and the expectation that the death of a human being can have similar effect. Greek tragedy abundantly attests to the possibility of a human being’s death bringing deliverance for others. It was essential

148

COMMENTARY

that the victim be willing (Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis 1553–56; Heraclidae 529–534), but such a victim’s death could then save others from dying (Heraclidae; cf. also Euripides’s Alcestis) or even secure safety or victory for an entire nation (Iphigenia at Aulis; Phoenician Women 997–98; 1013–14; see van Henten 1997:145–50, 210–22). Such an environment might well have aided in the reading of LXX Isa 52:13–53:12 as a passage that spoke no longer of the collective fate of Israel, afflicted for the sins of its own people, but as a witness to a particular righteous person within Israel whose suffering and death could be made (by his own action, 53:10b, and by God’s decision, 53:6b) a sin offering that relieves the nation of the consequences of its transgressions (Droge and Tabor 1992:75; Pfeiffer 1949:220). The appropriateness of applying this Servant Song to the Jewish martyrs is readily apparent. The disfigurement, degradation, and death (Isa 52:14 and 53:3), the idea that the willing death of the righteous person could affect others’ relationship to God for the better (Isa 53:4–6, 8, 10, 12b), the narrator’s confirmation of the efficacy of this strange offering (Isa 53:10b–11), and the celebration of the suffering servant’s achievement (Isa 53:12a) all parallel 4 Maccabees. LXX Psalm 39:5–7 (MT 40:6–8) may also have pointed in this direction, with its rejection of animal sacrifices and promotion of an obedient individual who presents his (or her) body as God’s provision instead, and who comes forward to do God’s will. Christian authors would read both texts this way (see Heb 10:5–10; 1 Pet 2:21–25); the author of 2 Maccabees and, to a greater extent, the author of 4 Maccabees may similarly have reflected on the meaning of the Maccabean martyrs’ deaths in the same light. S. K. Williams (1975:169) correctly cautions us against attributing any ritual or magical power to the blood of Eleazar here; it is not the liquid itself, but the steadfast commitment to God leading to this costly libation that has value in the author’s sight. But David Seeley (1990:89–97) demystifies our author’s thinking too much when he lays all the emphasis on the “mimetic process” that Eleazar begins, spurring on the seven brothers to resist to the point of death, and then the nation as a whole, so that the tyrant is at last driven out. This may be the “more fundamental, historically conceivable” cause, but our author is not limited by historical method or post-enlightenment views of causality. Eleazar’s death, and the deaths of the remaining martyrs, changes something in the way God relates to the nation (17:21–22), and this is the first cause of the national victory (as in 2 Macc 8:5; see also van Henten 1993:123). This becomes one more reason for the audience to regard their deaths, and hold their memory, with honor, since they fall into the pattern of the noble death

4 MACCABEES 6:1–30 & 6:31–7:23

149

(a voluntary death accepted because it would bring benefit to others; see Seeley 1990). 6:31–7:23

Restatement of the Thesis and Encomium for Eleazar

After narrating Eleazar’s stirring speech and brave contest, the author returns in 6:31–35 to the philosophical thesis with which he began. Dupont-Sommer (1939:113) regards these verses as an intrusion into the text, which would otherwise flow from 6:30 into 7:1 perfectly satisfactorily. While this shows a keen editor’s sense, perhaps, it also overlooks the ways in which the author has prepared us for such intrusions by asking us, from the outset, to consider these martyrologies as evidence in support of the philosophical thesis (1:7–9; 3:19). The “Q.E.D.” (Klauck 1989a:717) here is, therefore, far from out of place (and, indeed, will recur at 7:16; 13:1–5; 16:1–2; 18:2). The fact that the author calls attention in 6:35 to the mastery not only of external compulsions but also “pleasure” need not indicate that this passage has been displaced. Rather, the author invites the audience to recall both the immediate achievement of 5:1–6:30 (reason masters pains) and the earlier argument in 1:31–2:6 (reason masters pleasures), and so acknowledge again the scope of reason’s jurisdiction. Dupont-Sommer’s evaluation of this passage as “dry and scholastic,” however, remains accurate. The content is grossly redundant, falling into the pattern of a statement of the thesis (6:31), statement from the contrary (6:32), restatement of the thesis (6:33). 4 Macc 6:34 hints that providing evidence that pious reason can master even physical pain is especially significant for demonstrating the universal truth of the thesis, a suggestion that Cicero would corroborate: “pain seems to be the most active antagonist of virtue; it points its fiery darts, it threatens to undermine fortitude, greatness of soul, and patience” (Tusc. Disp. 5.27.76). The truncated phrase ἐπεὶ καὶ γελoῖov (6:34) has given each successive commentator pause, since it makes little sense as it stands. DupontSommer (1939:113; see also Klauck 1989a:717) suggests that there is a lacuna in the text, which the Syriac completes “and, indeed, it is ridiculous to deny reason’s mastery” (or more simply, with Townshend [1913: 713], “to deny it”). This is certainly the author’s sense. If we accept that here is one of the rare instances where ἐπεὶ can mean “otherwise,” the textual problem becomes less severe and one can regard the passage merely as elliptical: “And to confess [from earlier in the verse] otherwise is ridiculous.”

150

COMMENTARY

Having tied 5:1–6:30 in with his demonstrative agenda (see 1:7–9), the author now reflects on the episode from the point of view of his encomiastic agenda (see 1:10). Encomia in general, and the funeral oration in particular, were not merely occasions for praising some person or other; they were occasions for rousing the audience’s ambition and commitment to embody the same virtues and other praiseworthy traits that were highlighted in the encomium (see primary literature discussed in deSilva 1995a:45–50, 180–181). As the author praises Eleazar, therefore, he does so with a view to shaping his hearers’ ambitions for themselves and how their own lives will be remembered. The author opens his encomium for Eleazar with a series of similes and analogies, quite familiar in Hellenistic philosophy, Greek drama, and Hellenistic Jewish writings, that cumulatively serve to confirm Eleazar’s status as the ideal sage. 7:1–3 provides an extended nautical metaphor, comparing Eleazar’s reasoning faculty to a pilot steering the “ship of piety” over the raging sea of the passions. His refusal to turn the tiller, keeping his course straight, recalls his determination to keep his reason “straight and unwavering” under the scourging (6:7). The image of the pilot steering a ship was used to describe the activity of a political king, as in Sophocles, Oedipus tyrannus 689–696 (where Oedipus’s former success as king, steering the city through its troubles, is recalled) and Antigone 994–995 (where Tiresias affirms Creon’s former ability to “steer the ship of this city straight” when he heeded the seer’s advice). It was thus natural to apply the image, by extension, to the governing faculty within the human being (“enthroned” among the senses in 4 Macc 2:21–23). Philo’s use of the imagery is again illumining, showing how fully our author shares in the traditions of Hellenized Judaism: “As a ship holds on to her right course when the pilot has the helm in his hand and steers her, and she is obedient to her rudder, but the vessel is upset when some contrary wind descends upon the waves and the whole sea is occupied by billows; so when the mind, which is the charioteer or pilot of the soul, retains the mastery over the entire animal, as a ruler does over the city, the life of the person proceeds rightly” (Leg. 3.223–224; see also Leg. 3.118; Migr. 6). Death was the only safe anchorage at the end of this rough voyage (7:3): any other ending would have meant that Eleazar yielded to the tyrant and made a shipwreck of his piety. For the author, however, Eleazar’s death is also his transition to an immortal life with God, an eternal peace at the end of a harsh storm. The second image is introduced more briefly. Eleazar is compared to a city which successfully withstands a long and vigorous siege, even as

4 MACCABEES 6:31–7:23

151

other philosophers, resisting the assaults of a tyrant, have proved unassailable (7:4). Seneca thus lauded Stilbo, the philosopher who was brought before the tyrant Demetrius Poliorcetes after the defeat of his native city: “This perfect man, full of virtues human and divine, can lose nothing. His goods are girt about by strong and insurmountable defenses. Not Babylon’s walls, which an Alexander entered, are to be compared with these, nor the ramparts of Carthage or Numantia, both captured by one man’s hand, not the Capital or citadel of Rome – upon them the enemy has left his marks. The walls which guard the wise man are safe from both flame and assault, they provide no means of entrance – are lofty, impregnable, godlike” (Constant. 6.4, 8). Such imagery is especially well suited to Eleazar’s endurance under torture, as the tyrant indeed besieged the old man’s body in an attempt to breach the walls and gain access to his will, to plant his flag there by making Eleazar capitulate. The imagery is also helpful for establishing a framework within which “endurance” can be understood as “conquering” the besiegers. The verb πυρπoλoύμεvoς is read here as a middle (with τὴv ἱερὰv ψυχὴv as its direct object), which has a causative sense, “to cause to be burnt up,” i.e., by submitting to the tortures rather than yielding to the king’s demands. Noteworthy again is the distancing of one’s “self ” from one’s physical person inherent in this imagery (as in Stoic ethical philosophy in general). The final image returns to the comparison of the passions with the pounding surf, but now the sage’s reasoning faculty is seen as a strong cliff that those waves can pound and buffet, but not move (7:5). Seneca, again, found this image appropriate for his “wise person” as well: “as certain cliffs, projecting into the deep, break the force of the sea, and, though lashed for countless ages, show no traces of its wrath, just so the spirit of the wise person is impregnable, and has gathered such a measure of strength as to be no less safe from injury” (Constant. 3.5). Eleazar’s long life of being educated and exercised by Torah has bequeathed to him precisely this strength. Of course, this very strength is available to the author’s audience as well, as they diligently pursue piety and observance of Torah in all its particulars (cf. 18:1–2). The author employs apostrophe (directly addressing the absent subject of his encomium as though present) as a means of heightening the emotional effect (Klauck 1989a:719). While the martyr, in effect, handed over his body to be brutalized for the sake of not compromising his integrity, the author gives us a glimpse here as to why such an option was to be preferred as he emphasizes the betrayal of one’s own body that

152

COMMENTARY

ingesting unclean food would represent for the pious Jew (7:6). This tempers our understanding of the author’s view of the body. It is not, strictly speaking, exactly what we find in Epictetus, who will speak of his body in whole or in its parts as somehow not “him” (Diss. 1.1.23–24; 1.29.5–8; Ench. 18). It is out of love and respect for his body, and not denigration of the same, that he refuses to eat the unclean food and, so, endures the tortures. Living in “harmony with the Law” is a more sure guide to virtue than living in harmony with Nature, the guiding principle of the Stoics represented (rather imperfectly) by Antiochus’s speech in 5:8–9. The author acclaims him a philosopher (7:7), the title Antiochus had called into question (5:7) but of which Eleazar had proven himself worthy in word and in deed. Eleazar is explicitly commended as a model for imitation by τoὺς δημιoυργoῦvτας τòv vόμov (7:8). This phrase has presented problems from an early point in the textual transmission of 4 Maccabees. Klauck (1989a:719) lists a string of variants (e.g., δημηγoρoῦvτας, λειτoυργoῦvτας, ἱερoυργoῦvτας) attesting to scribes’ difficulty with the idea of people “constructing or crafting the Law.” These difficulties, however, probably stem from the tendency in heterodox Christian circles to use the term in connection with divine activity, overtones that obscured the common “secular” usages of the word to denote administrators, skilled workers, and the like. Those “administering the law” or “making the Law their craft” ought to imitate Eleazar in contrast to Jason, who used his authority to loosen and destroy Torah-observance rather than shield it. That Eleazar enjoys a praiseworthy remembrance (enacted anew in this speech) while Jason’s memory is execrated should indeed support the author’s appeal to the leaders of the Jewish communities to attend not to advancing the standing of the community through compromise with the dominant culture, but rather to work to ensure the community’s commitment to the Torah through their own example. Eleazar showed complete consistency of speech (chapter 5) and action (chapter 6), which was the measure of credibility for a philosopher (7:9). Philo would claim similar integrity for Moses: “he exhibited the doctrines of philosophy in all his daily actions, saying precisely what he thought, and performing such actions only as were consistent with his words” (Mos. 1.29; Yonge; see also Sir 3:8; 1 John 3:18; Col 3:17; 2 Cor 10:4). The author uses the image of a priest uttering sacred words and prayers prior to a sacrifice or other rite to connect Eleazar’s bold declarations about the Jewish philosophy and his proof of it by his deeds. He was not, in other words, “all talk and no action.” Hadas (1953:184) suggests that εἰς

4 MACCABEES 6:31–7:23

153

δόξαv should be translated “in the public gaze,” which would call attention again to the public nature of the contest and the importance of not bringing dishonor on God’s name by any transgression under these circumstances. While this is plausible, the larger context of the encomium (which praises the martyr) suggests that the author is calling attention to the result of such endurance, namely that it leads “unto glory.” Though it entailed abuse and degradation for a time, it was ultimately the path to the preservation and celebration of the martyr’s honor. As Eleazar’s steadfastness ensured that he would become a pattern of piety for those who followed him in that arena (i.e., the seven brothers; see 9:5–6; 16:15, 17), so the author hoped that his example would also confirm a new generation’s “observance of the law.” In keeping with the practice of encomia, the author indulges in a comparison of Eleazar’s character and achievement with another person of high merit. “Calling to mind those who have already been honored is also not useless if one sets the achievements of those people beside the achievements of the ones who are the subjects of encomia (Theon, Progymnasmata 9.47–48 [Butts 1986:473]; see also Aristotle, Rh. 1.9.38–39). It is especially winsome that the author can compare Eleazar with one of his own distinguished ancestors: “it will be creditable to the objects of our praise not to have fallen short of the fair fame of . . . their sires” (Quintilian, Inst. 3.7.10). Aaron was indeed highly revered in the Second Temple Period. Of all the illustrious ancestors, he receives the most space in Ben Sira’s encomium (Sir 45:6–22) next to Simon II (Sir 50:1–21). The specific episode recalled by the author is found in Num 16:41–50 and retold in Wis 18:20– 25. When the people grumbled against Moses and Aaron in the wake of the rebellion of Korah, God sent a plague against the people in punishment. Aaron, however, taking a censer full of incense, ran into the thick of the plague and made atonement for the people, turning away God’s wrath (Num 16:46). The tendencies to personify the plague as “the destroyer” in Wis 18:25 appear also in 4 Macc 7:11, as Aaron conquers “the angel” responsible for inflicting the plague. If Alexandrinus represents the more original reading (describing the angel as ἐμπυρισμòv, a reading inserted into Sinaiticus by the corrector), we could conclude that the author was deliberately shaping Aaron’s story even more fully to conform to Eleazar’s ordeal, facing the fires (6:24–26). Both are priests, advancing forward as a “champion” of the people (see Wis 18:21). Both ran boldly into the thick of danger, Aaron heading straight for the destroyer, Eleazar directly into the torments that awaited

154

COMMENTARY

those who would not change their minds. Neither the “destroyer” nor the fearsome torture was sufficient to make either priest change his course. The explicit emphasis falls here on the firmness of each priest’s resolve in the face of the fearsome dangers. However, the parallel goes further. Once in the heart of the danger, each priest appealed to God’s mercy and covenant (see Wis 18:22b) and offered an act of expiation on behalf of the people (compare Num 16:47; Wis 18:22–23; 4 Macc 6:27–29). The author returns in 7:13–14 to the “old made youthful” theme (see 5:31), repeating Eleazar’s own asseveration that his body may be wasted but his internal faculties are still vigorous (hence, here, τῷ πvεύματι). Isaac figures prominently as an archetype in 4 Maccabees (see also 13:12; 16:20; 18:11), especially appropriate here because the episode in which his piety most emerges is the famous episode of his youth (hence the point of comparison with the youthful “mind” or “spirit” of Eleazar). Just as Isaac considered it just to give up his body as a sacrifice to God if obedience to God required it, and just as he walked in line with that high ideal (a characteristic of youth but not old age according to Aristotle, Rh. 2.12.11–12; 2.13.5, 9), so Eleazar displayed the same mind and determination to the end. Townshend’s colorful translation of τὴv πoλυκέφαλov στρέβλαv as “the hydra-headed torture” (1913:674) appropriately captures the image of brave, young Greek hero confronting a monster, which is certainly the image of Eleazar’s mental state that the author evokes in this passage. Death becomes “a reliable seal” that “perfects” Eleazar’s life. The thought here is somewhat similar to the sober saying that closes Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus (Oed. tyr. 1528–30): “call no mortal happy until he is dead, free from pain.” Just as tragedy may turn joy into sorrow in a single day, so some weakness of character may ruin a virtuous life in a single day – and might well have that day before Antiochus IV. Eleazar’s virtue was not complete until it could no longer be threatened or assailed. Death removed him from the possibility of ever polluting himself. In this sense it placed a “seal” upon his virtue, a “trustworthy” one since nothing base would ever be able to creep in and defile Eleazar’s virtue now that he was removed from this life. By dying honorably, the honor of his life would forever remain intact (see Epictetus’s reflection on the death of Menoeceus in Diss. 3.20.4–6). A similar use of the concept of the “seal” is found in Thucydides Hist. 2.42, where Pericles speaks of the fallen soldiers’ deaths as the seal upon their virtue, again completing it and removing it from the possibility of being assailed further. The author returns to the philosophical thesis and his protreptic

4 MACCABEES 6:31–7:23

155

purpose in 7:16–23. Dupont-Sommer (1939:116–117) speaks of this as an “interruption” of the panegyric (although he does not question its authenticity since it lacks the “scholastic dryness” of 6:31–35). Rather than regard this as an interruption of the panegyric – and, indeed, rather than excise 6:31–35 as a dry interpolation – we should remember that the author has invited the hearers to experience demonstration and praise together (1:7, 10). We should also bear in mind the ways in which panegyric serves the protreptic goals of the demonstrations. The praise lavished upon Eleazar can also be lavished upon the hearers, if they attend to piety and learn to master the passions as fully as did this noble exemplar. In a pattern that has now become quite familiar to the audience (see 1:5; 2:24, both of which are also introduced with similar words), the author introduces a possible objection (7:17) not to explore its ramifications but to sweep it aside in a restatement of the thesis (7:18). Attending to the demands of piety as the absolute rule of one’s life is, the author avers, the means by which any wavering of the reason – any tendency toward imprudence (7:17) – can be checked (see also Redditt 1983:258). That this “piety” signals the particular expression of piety pursued by Torahobservant Jews will be made perfectly clear both by what precedes (it is the religion of Eleazar) and by what follows (it is the religion of the Jewish patriarchs). The author adds here a rationale in support of the thesis, namely that death is not the end of the life of the pious, who will rather “live to God” after death (7:19). This phrase is prominent in Paul and related writings (Gal 2.19; Rom 6.10; 14.8; see also Luke 20:37–38, where God’s selfidentification with “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” is taken as sufficient proof that they live beyond death), as well as in post-apostolic literature (see Herm. Mand. 1.2; 2.6; 3.5; 4.2.4, etc.; Sim. 9.22.4; 9.28.8; 9.29.3), and should be interpreted in line with its usage here as a reference to life beyond the power of death in some sense. Grimm (1853:332) was the first of several scholars to raise doubts about the authenticity of this verse, viewing it as a doublet of 16:25. Such textual surgery is suspect from a number of angles. First, the addition of a rationale conforms the passage to the basic argumentative patterns in the Progymnasmata. That is to say, it is expected. Second, belief in the afterlife, a facet of the piety that the author promotes, is a primary rationale invoked repeatedly by the martyrs (and in the narrative reflections on the martyrdoms) for choosing to follow piety rather than act against God’s Law on account of pain, fear, or grief (see 9:8–9, 32b; 10:11, 15; 12:18; 13:14–17; 15:2–4; 16:23; 17:5, 12). Its appearance here is thus, again, far from out of place. As

156

COMMENTARY

for the similarities between 7:19 and 16:25, the author’s tendency toward close verbal repetition throughout his work rather makes this an argument for authenticity based on style. The author shares with both Roman and Hellenistic Jewish authors the conviction that the removal of death’s sting is a prerequisite to absolute commitment to virtue. Seneca writes: “If it is realized that death is not an evil and therefore not an injury either, we shall much more easily bear all other things – losses and pains, disgrace, changes of abode, bereavements, and separations” (Constant. 8.3). Similarly, Josephus acknowledges the importance of the belief for those who obey the Torah that “they shall come into being again, and at a certain revolution of things receive a better life than they had enjoyed before,” and that it is precisely this conviction that enables martyrdom (Ap. 2.217–218). This conviction transforms how people evaluate what is “advantageous” (or, to return to Antiochus’s preferred category, τὴv τoῦ συμφέρovτoς ἀλήθειαv, 5:11). In light of the overwhelmingly greater value of a blessed eternity, enduring any temporary disadvantage in order to keep that eternal possession secure becomes the clear and prudent choice. One may surmise also that the author hoped it would become an important consideration in the minds of the audience, as they weighed the potential advantages of compromising the Torah for this world against the potential disadvantages of such a policy for the next, eternal world. Those who do not weigh advantages and disadvantages in light of eternity are susceptible to being mastered by their passions (παθoκρατεῖσθαι, 7:20, another neologism reminding the audience of the author’s mastery of the Greek language), but this is no objection to the author’s thesis since the element of “piety” is missing from the equation. The Torah, which has become not only a viable philosophy alongside those of the Hellenistic world, but the “whole rule of philosophy” (7:21; compare Philo’s designation of Torah as the “sound rule of truth,” Leg. 3.233; Det. 125), provides its adherents with an exclusive claim (oὗτoι μόvoι, 7:18; μόvoς, 7:23) to certain mastery of the passions. What Antiochus ignorantly slandered as an “empty opinion” and “babbling philosophy” has been shown, by the perfect fruit it bore in Eleazar, to be the standard by which all philosophy is judged (Redditt 1983:261). This sage is not only prudent or wise (σoφòς, able correctly to weigh advantages and disadvantages), but courageous as well (καὶ ἀvδρεῖός, 7:23). Willingness “to endure every pain on account of virtue” (διὰ τὴv ἀρετὴv πάvτα πόvov ὑπoμέvειv, 7:22) is essential to courage, which endures fearful things for the sake of what is noble (ὑπoμεvεῖ τoῦ καλoῦ ἕvεκα, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.7.2 1115b12).

4 MACCABEES 8:1–14 8:1–14

157

Antiochus Addresses the Seven Brothers

As with the verbal exchange between Antiochus and Eleazar, the exchange between Antiochus and the seven brothers in 8:1–9:9 is entirely the work of the author of 4 Maccabees. 2 Maccabees merely depicts one of the brothers very briefly declaring the family’s commitment not to eat the pork at the outset, before the onslaught of tortures (2 Macc 7:2). The author’s interest in the speech of the martyrs, the windows into the mental processes that were enabling them to bear such agonies for the sake of their commitment to God, continues throughout the remainder of the book, as he expands lavishly upon the statements made by the brothers and their mother in the midst of being, and as they are waiting to be, tortured. The author effects a transition from Eleazar’s episode to the episode of the seven brothers first with a statement that ties the coming narrative back to the philosophical thesis. He has shown how an aged man trained in the Torah demonstrated mastery of the passions; he will now show how, at the other extreme, “even young lads” (μειρακίσκoι, 8:1) mastered even more challenging passions. The tyrant will remind us of their time of life by addressing them as vεαvίαι (8:5), indicating a group of males prior to their full “maturity” or adult phase of life (van Henten 1997:114 n. 117), or again as μειράκια, referring to young males of about twenty years of age (8:14; see Lucian, Dial. mort. 9.4; Plutarch, Brut. 27; van Henten 1997:117). On the one hand, the author will later affirm that it is more fitting for the youthful to endure the physical trials of the scene than the aged, whose bodies are no longer strong (9:6); on the other hand, the author expects the young men’s achievement to be surprising from some angle. Once again, Aristotle’s characterization of the young (Rh. 2.12) provides a helpful background. The young are unable, by nature, to control their urges toward pleasure, especially sexual pleasure (Rh. 2.12.3). They are “carried away by impulse and unable to control their passion” (Rh. 2.12.5; significantly, the second phrase in the Greek really signifies that “they are weaker than or inferior to – ἥττoυς – their passion”). For the young, then, to display a mature and fully formed ethical character, such that they can master the passions, is an astounding achievement, and speaks to the superiority of the education, the παιδεία, that Torah provides. Klauck (1989a:722) calls attention to the paranomasia between περιφαvῶς and περιπαθῶς in 8:2. Besides being rhetorically artful, this meaningfully connects two ways in which the tyrant has been bested and

158

COMMENTARY

disgraced. The first, περιφαvῶς, points to the public nature of his exchange with, and defeat at the hands of, Eleazar. The dynamics of honor and shame are clearly at work in this setting (Moore and Anderson 1998:264). Antiochus has lost honor in the first round since he could not get the upper hand on Eleazar, and is now more intent on having his way with other Hebrew captives. These youths, however, are also aware of the honor dynamics, seen from their refusal to put their forebears to shame by yielding to fear or enticement (9:1–2 [αἰσχυvόμεθα]; see Eleazar’s similar awareness in 5:18, 27b–28, 35 [καταισχυvῶ]). The second, σφόδρα περιπαθῶς, depicts Antiochus also as a man who cannot get the upper hand on himself. This is a major criticism of the Greco-Syrian king’s rule. Mastery of oneself – being “temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions” – was prerequisite to exercising just and virtuous rule over others (Plato, Gorgias 491D). Dio Chrysostom expresses this clearly: “if a person is not competent to govern a single man . . . and if, again, he cannot guide a single soul, and that his own, how could he be king . . . over unnumbered thousands scattered everywhere?” (Or. 62.1). Xenophon (Oeconomicus 21.12) describes “rule over willing subjects” to be “a gift of the gods . . . bestowed on those who have been initiated into self-discipline” (Moore and Anderson 1998:253–54, quoting Pomeroy 1994). Antiochus, however, does not master his own passions. Instead, he gives vent to them and allows himself to be carried away by them (especially anger and wrath; 4 Macc 8:2; 9:10–11). “The physical torture of the youths and the psychological torture of the mother will prove their remarkable selfcontrol, and hence their ‘manliness’. But the torture itself, characterized by excess, is occasioned by the inability of Antiochus to control his own passions, especially his rage” (Moore and Anderson 1998:254). This inability to control the passions also motivates Antiochus’s subordinates in 10:5 (Moore and Anderson 1998:254). By the measure of 4 Macc 7:20–23, then, Antiochus does not monitor his reason to maintain prudence, and so is subjected to being ruled by his passions (παθoκρατεῖσθαι, 7:20). He shows himself to be in fact a barbarian, a member of that class characterized by the Greek dominant culture to be driven by their passions (Hall 1989:80–84, 124–33), while the subject people in the persons of the Judean martyrs show themselves to be more “Greek” than the Greco-Syrian king. Antiochus also stands in stark contrast with Moses, the greater lawgiver and ruler, who controlled his anger rather than giving it license (2:16–18). That his own passions, rather than reason, drive Antiochus comes to the fore again in 9:10.

4 MACCABEES 8:1–14

159

The young men and their mother are brought before the king. The author describes them as naturally suited to do well in Greek culture, which prized youthful beauty and nobility of form (8:3). It is not for lack of giftedness or potential – for fear of “not making it” – that they shy away from assimilation. The image of these brothers as a chorus (8:4), referring to the practice of Greek drama (both tragedy and comedy) to assign a role to a group of people who spoke with, essentially, a single voice, recurs throughout the book (see 13:8; 14:7–8) as an image expressing their harmonious agreement with one another (see 8:29 and comment). Indeed, the author gives significant attention to the role each one played in helping his brothers remain steadfast (see, e.g., 9:23–24; 13:8–18; 14:1). This is no doubt a key to his ideal vision for Jewish community, knowing how the defection of some potentially weakens the resolve and commitment of all, whereas the harmonious support of the whole community would greatly enhance each individual’s commitment to the Jewish way of life. The tyrant acknowledges the potential of these young men for a successful life in the Greek culture, being “pleased” with their appearance and comportment. Klauck (1989a:722) suggests that the verb ἥσθετo in 8:4 should be construed as ᾔσθετo, from αἰσθάvoμαι, hence “he took notice of them” or “he displayed feeling for them.” Either reading conveys clearly the sense that Antiochus recognized their potential and wanted to “salvage” them for participation in the new, Hellenized Judea. Antiochus smiles (πρoσεμειδίασεv: the author adorns this passage with further neologisms) upon them and, gathering them closer so that he might address them, “advises” them as he had Eleazar (συμβoυλεύσαιμι, 5:6; συμβoυλεύω, 8:5). Heininger (1989:52) suggests that the audience would hear resonances with the tendency of the stereotypical tyrant toward pedophilia (see note on 5:1) behind these remarks. But even if Antiochus does not seek to corrupt these young men in that way, the author would certainly affirm that he seeks to seduce the young men in another, namely drawing them away from the pious and just course of action in regard to God and their ancestral law, luring them toward assimilation with enticements as well as threats. If he was defeated περιφαvῶς by Eleazar (8:2) and gave orders περιπαθῶς (8:2), Antiochus’s disposition is changed – indeed, calmed – by the sight of these young men. He is now φιλoφρόvως (8:5), favorably disposed toward them. Specifically, he is disposed to offer his friendship (he invites them “to enjoy my friendship,” τῆς ἐμῆς ἀπoλαύειv φιλίας, 8:5) and become their personal patron (“I am able to benefit [εὐεργετεῖv] . . . those who

160

COMMENTARY

obey me,” 8:6), guaranteeing that the valuable human resource that the great number of such fine young men represents will indeed achieve its maximum potential and rise to the appropriate heights (“you will receive administrative offices over my affairs,” 8:7). The king’s “friends” were a coterie of clients who had special access to the king’s favor and thus to the resources of the king, whether to supply their own requests or the requests of those people on whose behalf the “friends” were acting as mediators or brokers (thus nurturing their own networks of clients, and thus power; on patronage in the ancient world, see deSilva 2000a:95–156; Saller 1982; Wallace-Hadrill 1989). Such an offer of personal patronage would have been valuable indeed. Through their future association with Antiochus, the brothers had an opportunity for wealth, land, office, and advancement that would otherwise be completely out of reach. Undoubtedly, Antiochus expects that this invitation to the youths to “trust” him (8:7), to rely on him fully for their future, would enable them to feel sufficiently secure to break with their inner-Jewish networks of patronage. In other words, he is making it as easy as possible for them to acquiesce to his demands, presenting them with an opportunity that many Jews would have eagerly sought and prized. We called this an “offer,” however, and not a “generous offer,” because Antiochus offers his friendship for an explicit price, namely the brothers’ sacrifice of their identity as people brought up by respectable parents who inculcated in them respectable values and beliefs worthy of being maintained throughout life. The noble and generous giver did not give for a price, but out of positive regard for the intended recipients and a desire to help them for their own sake and not for oneself (Aristotle, Rh. 2.7.5; Seneca, Ben. 1.2.3; 3.15.4; 4.49.3; see deSilva 2000a:106–109). Antiochus is too blatantly using the promise of patronage as a tool by which to get what he wants out of the brothers, namely a public renunciation of Judaism that will serve as a model to counteract Eleazar’s devastating example (8:7–8). He is bargaining, not benefitting. Antiochus again invokes the “pleasant” (ἡδύς) as a category of persuasion (Anaximenes, Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b21–1422b12; see also Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2.3.7 1104b31–32), as he had in his exchange with Eleazar (5:8–9). Here the focus is not merely on the enjoyment (ἀπoλαύειv, 5:9) of certain foods, but on the enjoyment (ἀπoλαύειv, 8:5) of one’s youth and adulthood through all that the Greek way of life had to offer (the king’s personal patronage guaranteeing this enjoyment). They are faced with the same offer that had originally enticed Jason, thinking to

4 MACCABEES 8:1–14

161

make life more pleasant and gain access to greater goods by changing the nation’s way of life, to bring these calamities upon the Judeans by provoking God. In their hypothetical reply, they are seen to be persuaded by considerations of the pleasant over the noble (8:23). This enticement reflects the dilemma experienced by Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, for whom a world of possibilities could be opened up if they were just willing to loosen their observance of some of the more obvious, boundary-maintaining regulations of Torah for the sake of facilitating interaction with potential (Gentile) patrons and friends – getting into the thick of public life where “a person earns distinction” rather than remaining on the fringes because of one’s pursuit of “philosophy” (the position of Callicles in Plato, Gorgias 485D). Hadas (1953:188) reminds us that assimilation did offer some very real advantages, such that Antiochus could indeed be regarded as urging the Jews to adopt a way of life that he deems superior and, for each individual, more fulfilling than the barbaric customs that currently bind them. The presence of the guards and the instruments of coercion, of course, remind us that this is no more than the arrogance of imperialism, which will make the subject people adopt a “better way of life” whether they wish or do not wish. Antiochus’s lack of respect for Eleazar (μὴ μαvῖvαι τὴv αὐτὴv . . . μαvίαv, 8:5) reflects the arrogance of the dominant culture, which seeks not to discover and appreciate the integrity of an indigenous way of life (and 4 Maccabees itself offers an abundance of topics by which a Greek mind would be able to value the Jewish way of life), but rather assumes from the outset that its own way of life is superior. Neither Eleazar nor the brothers, however, accept Antiochus’s estimation of their culture and heritage, finding in his failure to appreciate its virtues his own lack of understanding (very much in line with Epictetus, Diss. 1.29.50–54; Seneca, Constant. 13.2; Plato, Gorgias 527C–D). They might well have replied to Antiochus as Antigone to Creon: “And if you think my actions foolish, that amounts to a charge of folly by a fool” (Sophocles, Ant. 470). The appearance of ἑvòς ἑκάστoυ ὑμῶv and ἕvα ἕκαστov ὑμῶv in 8:5 and 8:9 form an inclusio, moving the tyrant’s arguments full circle from admiration for the brothers in 8:5 to the threat of execution by torture in 8:9. Refusing Antiochus’ offer of patronage would naturally be expected to arouse his anger, Aristotle having observed that people who desired to benefit others, but who were met with insult, typically responded with anger and a desire for satisfaction (Rh. 2.2.8; see also 4 Macc 9:10). However, in the context of a speech on the mastery of the passions (and in the

162

COMMENTARY

context of the restraint of the natural, expected emotional responses displayed by the martyrs), Antiochus admits a moral weakness here, presenting himself as someone who can be pushed into passions (anger) and in fact “compelled” (ἀvαγκάσετέ με, 8:9) to act in line with those passions rather than remaining free to act in line with reason (for example, overcoming anger as did Moses). The tyrant remains the antithesis of the ideal sage. The promise of favor or friendship for those who yield to the tyrant is considered one the stereotypical tools of the tyrant’s trade, working in tandem (as is certainly the case here) with his threats of coercive measures (Heininger 1989:51; see also Plutarch, Mulier. virt. 19 [Mor. 256D], where Aretaphila, having already been triumphant over the tyrant’s tortures, “had no intention of being vanquished by a show of favor”). These tortures are intimated in 8:6, threatened explicitly here in 8:9, and threatened further with the use of visual aids in 8:12–13. In light of what is to come, Antiochus advises the young men to have mercy on themselves even as he has compassion on them, an appeal he had also made to Eleazar (oἰκτιρήσεις, 5:12; oἰκτίρoμαι, 8:10). That he should especially feel compassion for their comeliness of form (τῆς εὐμoρφίας, 8:10) is appropriate, since the devices of torture will completely and irrevocably destroy that comeliness. Heightening their natural assets serves to amplify the depth of their sacrifice for the sake of fidelity to God. “Show them the instruments!” Torture is as fully psychological as physical, as those who use torture against their victims consistently try to break the spirit through fear and intimidation as well as through the physical assaults on their bodies. In this setting, Antiochus has nothing to gain by actually torturing the youths, and hopes for a quick victory as he allows the young men’s imaginations to work upon their resolve before the guards are let loose on them (8:12–13). It is also noteworthy that the tyrant tortures the Judeans one-by-one in plain sight of one another, so that the grisly torments inflicted on the body of one might work on the minds of all. Because some of these terms are used only here to denote instruments of torture, and because even those used in other texts are not described in any detail (familiarity with their workings is assumed, or at least the authors believe the audience’s imagination to be sufficient), it is difficult to know exactly what kinds of torments the seven brothers faced. As expected, most of these instruments appear to have been aimed at the extremities and the joints, for the inflicting of the maximum amount of

4 MACCABEES 8:1–14

163

pain for the longest period before the danger of expiration is realized. The “wheels” (τρoχoί; τρoχλoί is an obvious error in Sinaiticus, one of several in this verse) were apparently not used in the same way as the instrument of torture and execution of the same name in the Medieval period. Rather, this device worked much as a curved rack, with tension being applied to the victim’s extremities, stretching and dislocating his joints at the same time as it arched him back at an unnatural and pain-inducing angle. The term ἀρθρέμβoλov is used for a device employed for setting broken limbs (Galen, De usu partium 14.781), probably so named because it would have included screws and plates for immobilizing joints in the position deemed best for healing. Used to denote an instrument of torture, the etymology suggests a kind of device used for prying joints apart or, perhaps, crushing joints (as in the “boot”). These appear to be used against the third brother (ἀρθρεμβόλoις ὀργάvoις, 10:5). στρεβλωτήρια probably refers to an instrument similar to the rack, attacking a person’s joints by stretching and dislocating. The word is derived from a verb that means to draw something taut (like cables or ropes, hence the working apparatus of a rack). Because of the association of the word family with twisting and wrenching, however, it is possible that this device worked on the body quite differently from the rack. τρoχαvτήρ is used only here to denote an instrument of torture. Klauck (1989a:724) and Dupont-Sommer (1939:119) follow the Latin version that translated τρoχαvτήρ as the uncus, a hook used to suspend victims. That Galen (De usu partium 15.8) uses the word τρoχαvτήρ to denote either one of the bony protrusions at the head of the femur (thigh bone), however, suggests a rather different image, namely a club or a mace with metal or stone knots or other protrusions on the head used for breaking the bones of victims. The καταπέλτα were, like their military namesake, devices which allowed the user to apply tremendous tension to the victim’s hips and back as the latter was bound at the knees and pulled back by a rope or chain attached to the wrists around a large wheel or ball. λέβητες and τήγαvα here denote oversized cooking utensils (pots and pans, in effect), treating the living human body as meat as an effective and simple way to inflict pain. δακτυλήθραι are finger sheaths that can be compressed by screws to break the fingers, like thumbscrews. Such devices that worked on far extremities could inflict a tremendous amount of pain without any threat to loss of life. The iron gloves (χεῖρας σιδηρᾶς), fitted with sharp claws at the fingertips, will be employed against the second brother in 9:26–28 to rip off skin, muscles, and sinews. Wedges (σφῆvας) would be used in conjunction with the catapult (see

164

COMMENTARY

11:10), probably to increase the unfavorable angle at which the body was being bent or focus pressure on sensitive areas. Burning with fire or searing with hot embers (τὰ ζώπυρα τoῦ πυρòς) is a comparatively low-tech but no less effective means of inflicting pain, one that the author will highlight as sharper and fiercer than any other source of pain (14:9b–10). This will be applied to the first brother (9:19, 22), and figured already in Eleazar’s death (6:24–27). Having set out this despicable array, Antiochus invites the brothers to give in to the flood of fear that pounds at the gates of their reasoning faculties (8:14). He returns to the topic of the “necessary,” or the course to which one is compelled willy-nilly (ἀvαγκαῖov; Anaximenes Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b,21–1422b,12). As he had advised Eleazar (5:13), so here he insists that compulsion will excuse any transgression (8:14; see also 8:24–25). This assurance emerges by analogy with how violations of laws are treated by human authorities, who “punish and exact redress from those who do evil except when it is done under compulsion” (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.5.7 1113b24–29; see also Rh. 1.10.3, which limits “injustice” to voluntary violations of law). The sage, however, cannot be compelled to act against his or her moral principles. In the words of Cicero, “it is characteristic of the wise man to do nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, to do everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly” (Tusc. Disp. 5.81), and the author will go on to show precisely how the Jewish philosophy has equipped “even the young” to realize this ideal. 8:15–9:9

The Brothers’ Response

The seven brothers were not overcome by the fear-inducing spectacle, but demonstrated “clear thinking,” unclouded by fear of the pain or attraction to the enticements promised at the cost of transgression (8:15). By “thinking straight,” they are able to maintain their freedom. Overcoming the tyrant who threatens from outside, opposing his threats with one’s own philosophy (here, ἀvτεφιλoσόφησαv, another neologism), is a commonplace of Stoic philosophical discourse. Epictetus and Seneca provide several examples of the kind of “thinking” that enables the threatened individual to find his or her way free from “compulsion.” In their case, this thinking proceeds from the foundational conviction that whatever can be grasped and threatened from outside is not truly part of “us.” As soon as one is able to let go of those external things, the tyrant loses all power to compel assent to a course of action

4 MACCABEES 8:15–9:9

165

deemed vicious or base (see Epictetus, Diss. 1.18.17; 1.29.5–8; Seneca, Constant. 5.6–7). The author will display this “right thinking” according to the Jewish philosophy in 9:1–9. First, however, he introduces a hypothetical speech, indulging in a little game of “What would happen, if . . .,” for which the elementary exercises in rhetoric would have well prepared him (Klauck 1989a:729). He creates a diptych of deliberative speeches, one yielding to the pressures applied by the representative of the dominant culture (8:16–26), one resisting those pressures for the sake of the ideals of the minority culture (9:1–9). This advances his protreptic goals in several ways. First, the very fact of alternative responses shows that the argument from “compulsion” is hollow after all. There is a choice to be made, and there are costs either way. Claiming transgression under compulsion becomes an excuse for cowardice and an attempt to deny the very real consequences of yielding. Second, the author constructs an epideictic frame within which to read these alternative responses. The first response is what one would expect from the “fainthearted and unmanly” (δειλόψυχoι . . . καὶ ἄvαvδρoι, 8:15); those Jews, therefore, who entertain similar deliberations within their own minds would be stung by the same labels. The second response comes from those who have learned courage and self-control in the face of pain (8:28). Insofar as the audience is able, then, to relinquish pleasures and endure (relatively minor) privation for the sake of living by their ancestral law, they display the same praiseworthy character as the seven brothers. This hypothetical response refers back to Antiochus’s arguments one by one, beginning with Antiochus’s first strategy (namely his offer of personal patronage; compare 8:17 to 8:6), moving next to his prognosis for refusal (compare 8:18–19 with 8:11), thence to the appeal for compassion (compare 8:20 with 8:10), again the threat of death (compare 8:21 with 8:9, 11), the consideration of the pleasant (compare 8:23 with 8:8), and the argument from necessity, which occupies a great deal of space (8:22, 24–25; see 8:14; see also Klauck 1989a:724). Prominent throughout this speech is the way the brothers are seen to accept and internalize the dominant culture’s assessment of their way of life. They accept that resistance is “senseless” (ἀvόητoι, 8:16; see Antiochus’s assessment of Eleazar’s way of life and potential resistance in 5:9–10), and even accept the judgment that their position (as Lawobservant Jews) is “empty opinion” (τὴv κεvoδoξίαv ταύτηv, 8:19; see the tyrant’s speech in 5:10). They continue to nullify their own rationales for resistance as “thinking emptily” (κεvoδoξήσωμεv, 8:24; supplemented by the corrector’s addition of κεvoῖς to describe βoυλήμασιv in 8:18)

166

COMMENTARY

and their resistance as mere “arrogance” (ἀλαζovείαv, 8:19; compare the governor Pliny’s assessment of the resistance of Bithynian Christians to his demand for offering sacrifice to the emperor and traditional gods as contumacia in Ep. 10.96). Accepting the dominant culture’s attempts to dismiss the indigenous culture’s way of life as inferior, and to label attempts to preserve that way of life as hollow arrogance, is censured here as the coward’s path. This takes us close to the heart of the author’s purpose, as he both articulates a defense of the nobility of the Jewish way of life in terms of Greek ideals and motivates his audience to invest themselves in its preservation. The response not made by the brothers is replete with topics of cowardice. Aristotle (Virt. 6.5–6) describes the cowardly disposition to be “to think it better to save oneself by any means than to meet a fine end (τελευτῆσαι καλῶς).” Fear of a painful death – without consideration of whether such a death would be required for honor, or whether escape from death would mean disgrace – dominates this speech. They do not “dare” to disobey the king, since this brings death (8:18, 26); they cower before the threat of torture and shy away from a path that leads to destruction (8:19); the consequence of death is simply not to be faced and appears here as a (pardon the pun) final topic, decisive for the deliberations (8:21). Once this determination is made, the remaining topics are introduced as means of excuse, particularly the topics of “necessity” (ἀvάγκηv, 8:22, 24). This speech is conspicuously reminiscent of Ismene’s attempt to dissuade Antigone from burying the body of Polyneices in defiance of Creon’s orders. She, too, finds the fatal consequences decisive, urging against taking up a posture of resistance that cannot avoid such consequences, relying also on the belief that the chthonic deities will forgive her failure to do her sororal duty “since I act under constraint” (Sophocles, Ant. 58–68). Of course, Ismene serves as a foil for Antigone, the tragic heroine, just as the hypothetical speech provides a foil for the seven brothers’ “actual” response. The brothers could have, hypothetically, reassured themselves that the Torah would not condemn them to death “willingly” (ἑκoυσίως, 8:25). This expression has occasioned some difficulty. Is it a description of the Law’s reluctance to condemn the youths under these circumstances (though perhaps with the hint that they might still be in danger of being condemned against the Law’s “preferences”)? Is it, perhaps, an elliptical reference to the class of transgression for which the Law prescribes no mercy, namely the “willful” sin as opposed to the “unwilling” sin for which there are means of atonement (Num 15:22–31): “Not even the Law

4 MACCABEES 8:15–9:9

167

would condemn us [as people sinning] willingly”? Deissmann (1900:163) reads the sentence in this latter sense, proposing the emendation ἀκoυσίoυς based on the Syriac text (see also Klauck 1989a:725): “Not even the Law would condemn us, the unwilling [transgressors].” At this point it is worth remembering that the meat in question, by ingesting which they were to signal their renunciation of Judaism, was not just pork, but pork from an animal that had been sacrificed to an idol (5:2). Hadas (1953:192) asserts that the principle of leniency would not apply here in the case of an act of idolatry, but this judgment (for which supporting arguments are not marshaled at this point) is based on rabbinic decisions about the application of the law and not the Torah itself. That is to say, it may be anachronistic to rule out this possibility when, at the time of the author’s writing, the matter may have still been open to debate. And, indeed, the brothers would have been able to make a good case for leniency here (as Dupont-Sommer 1939:121 hints), appealing to Num 15:22–30 and the perennial question of jurisprudence – is a crime committed under duress a willful and therefore punishable act? The Torah makes provision for transgressions committed ἀκoυσίως, “unintentionally” (in the sense of inadvertently) or even “against one’s will.” There is one important precedent given in the Torah, namely the case of the engaged woman who is raped in the countryside (Deut 22:23–27). Because it could not be proven that she consented to the encounter (she could have screamed out for help, with no one hearing her), she would not be put to death along with the offending male. If crimes committed under duress were shown leniency (or even pardoned) in the law courts, and could be defended rather easily in the court of Torah, why should the Stoic philosophers and Hellenistic Jews like Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees find yielding to compulsion unacceptable? The answer is probably to be found in the absolute value assigned to freedom, and the negative associations of being dominated. The logic is closely connected with the one available precedent for the brothers in their quest for exoneration given above. Being compelled, being overpowered, is akin to being raped or sodomized. In analogy with that precedent, Antiochus is the marauding male and the young men are “unmanned” and made “womanish.” If they capitulate to the tyrant (and use the defense of being compelled against their will), they are, in effect, letting themselves be raped and violated by him and admitting the same. The truly courageous (“manly”) male – the ἀvὴρ ἀvδρεῖoς – always “plays the man.” Therefore, he would not submit to being “forced.” Part of the

168

COMMENTARY

proof the Jewish philosophy in 4 Maccabees, then, is its ability to enable men to be fully men, and men all the time. So thorough is the Torah in inculcating virtue, that the climactic proof will be the mother, who is “manlier than men” (ἀvδρῶv . . . ἀvδρειωτέρα, 15:30). The hypothetical speech closes with the hope of a life of “undisturbedness” (ἀταραξία, 8:26) if the brothers obey the king. ἀταραξία is, of course, a core value of Epicureanism (see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.131: “the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul”; 10.135: “never . . . will you be disturbed”; 10.144: “the just person is the most undisturbed”). It is possible that the author, in keeping with popular prejudice against the Epicurean school (seen most virulently in Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum), would have regarded this value negatively as a cipher for self-indulgence and the avoidance of difficulty or hardship, hence a handmaid of cowardice. The Jews could indeed have enjoyed considerably less trouble and distress in their existence as a minority culture in the Greco-Roman world if they had relaxed those observances that drew the charges of atheism and misanthropy (see Dio Cassius, Roman History 67.14.2; Diodorus Siculus, Bib. Hist. 34.1–4; 40.3.4; Tacitus, Hist. 5.5; Josephus, Ap. 2.121, 258; 3 Macc 3:3–7), that fueled anti-Jewish slander and suspicion. The author insists, however, that the guiding principle must not be “what makes for an easier existence in this life,” but “what shows piety and loyalty toward God.” The author abruptly distances the right-thinking youths from such considerations (8:27), since they had become “masters of themselves as far as pains were concerned,” or more simply “masters of the pains” (here the translation tries to capture something of the “self-mastery” that was such a part of the ethical complex of mastering the passions). Sinaiticus preserves a difficult reading at this point, saying that the brothers “were μέλλovτες despisers of the things pertaining to the passions.” The participle μέλλovτες appeared in the immediately preceding verse, and so its repetition here creates a pattern: those who were “about to be tortured” were also “about to [become]” despisers of the passions and masters of the pains. Even though this participle stands a good chance of having been introduced inadvertently, the text as it stands creates a connection between the actual endurance of the tortures and the realization of the philosophical ideal – there is no virtue that has not been proven. The hypothetical speech was introduced with an invitation to consider what might have happened “if any of them” were fainthearted

4 MACCABEES 8:15–9:9

169

(8:16). The possibility of weakness enters through lack of unanimity, as “some” (τιvες) begin to waver in their commitment and spread the seeds of uncertainty. By contrast, the brothers articulate their “actual,” courageous response with “one voice, as from one mind” (8:29). They display from the start that unity of soul, stemming from their shared commitment to piety, which the author would laud later in his encomium (13:8–18, 23–26; 14:6–8). Unanimity and harmony are held in high esteem as important civic virtues in the ancient world. Dio devotes an oration to praising and nurturing a commitment to being of “one mind” and displaying “harmony” in his native Prusa (Or. 48). Being “of one mind” is a characteristic of “good people” whose wishes remain constant and consistent with one another because they all aim toward “what is just and what is advantageous,” and they work with one another to achieve these shared ideals (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 9.6.2–3 1167b3–9). It is especially appropriate between friends (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.1.4 1155a23) and, therefore, among siblings (fraternal and sororal love being a type of friendship). Speaking “with one voice” is therefore not meant to lend an air of the miraculous to this moment (Hadas 1953:192), but to demonstrate the unity of mind that holds the brothers together into an effectively functioning social group. These brothers are united by their shared commitment to preserve justice, namely to give God what is due God (13:13) and to keep the ancestral laws (9:1–2), and to one another’s best interests, which places the highest premium on eternal honor and safety (9:8; 13:15–17). The fact that there are seven brothers – a symbolic number of completeness – begins to invite the audience to see themselves as part of their number, and to consider the nobility of emulating their harmony and agreement around the Law. Such agreement would naturally also support the commitment of each individual, who heard his or her body of significant others speak “with one voice” concerning the value of the Jewish way of life and the advantage and respectability of maintaining it. The brothers’ defiant speech recontextualizes the opening challenge of the spokesman for the brothers in 2 Macc 7:2. Both begin with the question τί μέλλεις; and are almost identical in their second cola: ἕτoιμoι γάρ ἐσμεv . . . ἀπoθvείσκειv ἢ παραβαίvειv τὰς πατρώoυς ἡμῶv ἐvτoλάς, 4 Macc 9:1 ἕτoιμoι γὰρ ἀπoθvείσκειv ἐσμὲv ἢ παραβαίvειv τoὺς πατρίoυς vόμoυς, 2 Macc 7:2

170

COMMENTARY

This second colon employs a topic of justice (see Rhet. Her. 3.3.4, where the scrupulous keeping of the “laws and customs” of one’s country is an example of justice), showing immediately the courageous stance of the martyrs. They will choose death with the honor that comes from maintaining justice over safety with the dishonor that comes from violating the demands of justice and duty (see Rhet. Her. 3.3.5, which includes among topics of courage that “death ought to be preferred to disgrace; no pain should force abandonment of duty”). The repetition of the vocative ὦ τύραvvε in 4 Macc 9:1 in the original text of Sinaiticus makes its character as a name to be thrown out like a curse more apparent. These men are driven not by considerations of the pleasant, nor by threat of pain (“compulsion”). Rather, honor is their motive for choosing one course of action over another. They refuse to dishonor their ancestors. The translation “putting [our ancestors] to shame in our own persons” is an attempt to capture the sense of the verb αἰσχυvόμεθα as a middle with τoὺς πρoγόvoυς ἡμῶv as the direct object. If the verb is treated as a passive, the translation should read “we would feel disgrace before our ancestors’ eyes,” taking τoὺς πρoγόvoυς ἡμῶv as an accusative of reference. The passive sense does accord well with the interest throughout the book in nurturing an awareness of that “alternative court of opinion” whose approval the pious Jew should seek (see, e.g., 5:37; 13:17), but the syntax is more straightforward if the verb is construed in the middle voice. Exactly how they would bring dishonor upon their forebears is here unspecified, but can easily be supplied from Eleazar’s speech (breaking faith with the oaths they took, 5:29; invalidating the reputation for piety enjoyed by the Jews, to which the forbears contributed and which is, in fact, the essence of their memory, 5:18). As the oration continues and the audience is afforded windows into the brothers’ parents’ investment of themselves in training these young men in the Jewish faith and way of life (see 16:16–23; 18:6–19), it is apparent that the brothers would betray, and thus disgrace, their parents as well by rejecting, in a single morsel of pork, all the values they had sought to instill in them (see 10:2, where this topic is explicitly evoked). The way that the brothers can preserve their family honor and ancestral honor is to continue to “make use of a counselor – even Moses – in ready obedience to the Laws” (9:2). Sinaiticus also preserves the reading συμβoύλῳ καὶ, which Rahlfs reads as καὶ συμβoύλῳ. The simple metathesis of words in Sinaiticus changes the reader’s construal of the structure of this sentence considerably from the familiar critical text,

4 MACCABEES 8:15–9:9

171

possibly for the better. In Sinaiticus, συμβoύλῳ emerges as the direct object of χρησαίμεθα (which takes its object in the dative case, and here takes on more of its nuances of “consultation” rather than “use”), with τῇ εὐπειθείᾳ emerging as a dative of manner (or possibly sphere) and τoῦ vόμoυ as a qualifier of this “ready obedience.” καὶ Μωυσεῖ emphatically names the person whose advice the brothers will seek out in this crisis, and it is emphatically not Antiochus. Moses, as a “counselor” whose advice is lawful, is juxtaposed with Antiochus, the “counselor of transgression” (σύμβoυλε . . . παραvoμίας, 9:3). Indeed, the hypothetical speech of 8:16–26 shows the internal reasoning of people who would be persuaded by Antiochus to violate the Torah and break faith with God. The brothers find Antiochus’s solution “more grievous” than the very death (αὐτoῦ τoύτoυ θαvάτoυ, 9:4) Antiochus threatens. This is not merely because that solution violates the essence of courage (inviting the brothers to “procure safety through a disgraceful retreat” rather than face death with honor; see Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.8.9 1116b19–22; Virt. 4.4; Tacitus, Agricola 34), though it certainly includes that. It also invites them to seek safety through transgressing God’s Law, which would put them in danger of God’s judgment beyond death, a judgment with far longerlasting consequences than Antiochus’s sentence (see 9:8–9; 13:14–17). Antiochus, in effect, seeks to rob the boys of the “prize of virtue” (9:8). Knowing this, like Socrates, they hold back from the honors and pleasures that attract the many (including many of their fellow Jews) and walk in line with virtue instead, thus preserving their integrity (see Plato, Gorgias 526D-527B). Antiochus’s experience with Eleazar, they aver, ought to have taught him the futility of trying to turn pious Jews from their way of life (9:5). It is as if to say, “Eleazar has already showed you who we Judeans are. The ‘final topic’ in all our deliberations is to discern whether or not a course of action is in line with our covenant with God. If it is not, the choice is clear and non-negotiable.” The “aged men” and “the young” alike will demonstrate the firmness and unanimity of the Jewish people where Torah is concerned (9:6). In this way, the author positions the audience to examine whether or not they will accept this identity and this stance for themselves, an invitation that he will make explicit in 18:1–2. Why the young would more fittingly die than the aged here is to be explained again in reference to Aristotle’s description of the character of the young, who choose the “noble” over the “useful” or “advantageous,” (Rh. 2.12.9), and who “are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them from fearing, while the latter inspires

172

COMMENTARY

them with confidence” (Rh. 2.12.13). If old men, who tend to find these qualities diminished in themselves, can endure torture to the point of death because of their commitment to God, it would be a disgrace to the young not to do so as well (compare 16:15–17). Eleazar’s concern not to become a paradigm of impiety for the young is justified within the narrative here and again in 16:17: he has successfully contributed to his fellow Jews’ commitment to live and die in fidelity to God’s Law (modeling the εὐπείθεια that the brothers also exhibit, 5:16; 9:2). In enduring, he has become the brothers’ “instructor” in piety (9:6) rather than a model of faithlessness. The brothers, then, invite Antiochus to continue his testing of the Judeans, starting with themselves, invoking the idea that sufferings and hardships were probative, proving a person’s commitment to virtue and the strength of his or her character (see note on 11:12). They correct a possible misconception on the part of Antiochus, as Eleazar had done in his speech (μὴ voμίσῃς, 5:19; 9:7), this time introducing the familiar principle of Hellenistic ethical philosophy that the ability to inflict pain and death is not the same as the ability to injure. Socrates gave this principle its classic expression, limiting his opponents’ power over him: “Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot injure me” (Plato, Apol. 18 [30C]; cited as an abbreviated chreia at the close of Epictetus, Ench. 53.4; see also Epictetus, Diss. 1.29.18; 2.2.15; 3.23.21; Plutarch, Tranq. an. 17 [Mor. 475E]). The only true injury, in Socrates’s estimation, was a lapse of virtue, since this would indeed harm his soul. Seneca agreed with this definition of injury, with the result that he would defend the proposition that “no wise man can receive either injury or insult” (Constant. 2.1). Even though physically assaulted, “the wise man is safe, and no injury or insult can touch him” (Constant. 2.3). The author attributes this high-minded concept to the brothers, for whom the only true injury would be capitulation to the tyrant’s demands, since this would deprive them of virtue and the reward that God has in store for the faithful. The brothers close with a clear statement about their expectation of post-mortem reward and punishment. This ultimately provides the rationale for their conviction that death is not an injury – indeed, that a death for the sake of piety is indeed a “splendid favor” (11:12) since it enables the brothers to perfect their virtue and attain the prize of immortality more speedily (9:8; 14:5). Such motives were also well-known in Greek philosophical literature. Plato gives it prominent consideration in the Gorgias, as Socrates contrasts his inability to protect himself from

4 MACCABEES 8:15–9:9

173

insult and abuse in the law courts of this life with his desire to be without reproach (and thus to protect himself ) in the law court of Minos, the judge of dead souls (Gorg. 526D–527A). His interlocutor, Callicles, is in danger of being put to shame beyond death if he does not have a care for virtue in this life. Socrates concludes that the way of life that leads to advantage “in the next world” is the path to follow, even if it entails losses and hardships in this world (Gorg. 527A–B). The author, however, does not need Plato to teach him about weighing eternal consequences against temporal advantages. A belief in postmortem retribution and vindication was already well established in the Jewish culture, being given eloquent and expansive expression, for example, in Wisdom of Solomon 1:16–5:23 and being conspicuously present in the author’s source material in 2 Maccabees 7 (see 7:9, 11, 14, 23, 29, 36). The response of the youngest brother to Antiochus in 2 Macc 7:36 is especially close to 4 Macc 9:8–9, where the destinies of the two parties are contrasted most explicitly and completely in the brothers’ own speech: “For our brothers after enduring a brief suffering have drunk of everflowing life under God’s covenant; but you, by the judgment of God, will receive just punishment for your arrogance.” The author has notably suppressed the expectation of bodily resurrection that was so prominent in his source in favor of more general references to immortality beyond death (although the idea of resurrection is not entirely absent; see commentary on 18:17–19). The author shares with Wisdom of Solomon the conviction that immortality is the result of following God’s Law and pursuing the virtues it nurtures (see Wis 6:17–20). Suffering “on account of God” (9:8), or, as elsewhere, on account of piety or the Law, indicates that the brothers have completely identified their cause with the cause of God, so that they could say with the psalmist, “It is for your sake that I have borne reproach, that shame has covered my face. . . . The insults of those who insult you have fallen on me” (Ps 68:8, 10). Because of this, they can also look forward confidently to the vindication of their own honor when God vindicates his honor against the scorn of Antiochus and all who despise God’s Law. This assurance is logically connected with the martyrs’ opening declaration that death is preferable to violation of the Torah, a connection seen even more explicitly in the death of Taxo and his seven sons in Testament of Moses 9:6–7: “let us die rather than transgress the commandments of the Lord of Lords, the God of our fathers. For if we do this, and do die, our blood will be avenged before the Lord.” Giving oneself up in fidelity to God’s Law was the act of complete

174

COMMENTARY

trust in the Divine Patron that would activate both God’s promises of reward and vindication. The specific anticipation of the punishment of a tyrant after death is also a commonplace in Roman literature (see Seneca, Herc. Fur. 731–746 on the judgement and sentences pronounced upon tyrants in the afterlife, and the eternal court in Hades, and the incentive this should give to modest and humanitarian rule; see also Lucian, Tyrant 25–28). In light of the afterlife that awaits human beings, then, the noble course of action is also the beneficial or advantageous one. Antiochus, together with the Jew who favors seeking advancement and security through assimilation, is wrong to consider departure from the Torah to be in line with “the principle of advantage” (τὴv τoῦ συμφέρovτoς ἀλήθειαv, 5:11). The brothers will now be given the opportunity to display the level of their commitment to their ideals, as the tyrant will indeed “keep on testing” them (9:7). 9:10–25

The First Brother’s Contest

The brothers’ response provokes Antiochus’s anger, just as he had warned (8:9). In light of his “generous” offer, Antiochus might well have expected the brothers to respond with gratitude rather than its opposite. Seneca expresses the general expectation of the Greek and Roman world in this regard: “Not to return gratitude for benefits is a disgrace, and the whole world counts it as such” (De beneficiis 3.1.1). By lightly esteeming Antiochus’s gifts, the brothers have insulted Antiochus himself, turning his desire to benefit them into a desire to get satisfaction upon them (see Aristotle, Rh. 2.2.1, 8). They could not, however, do otherwise in view of the response of gratitude they owe their Divine Patron, who “gave them their lives” (13:13; 16:18–19) and calls for obedience to the covenant as the appropriate response. A similar situation emerges in 3 Maccabees, where Ptolemy describes the Jews’ refusal to accept assimilation under his patronage as a display of ingratitude, responding to them accordingly (3 Macc 3:21–23). These authors touch on a facet of the anti-Judaism with which they and their audiences must contend: not valuing what the nonJews value, such as enfranchisement in the life of the Greek city, makes the Torah-observant Jew suspect, even contemptuous, in the sight of his or her neighbors. Even if his anger is explicable, Antiochus is still seen as a slave to his passions while his “barbarian” victims maintain their self-control under fear and torture. Indeed, the tortures themselves stem from Antiochus’s

4 MACCABEES 9:10–25

175

rage (8:2; 9:10) and excess of passion (Moore and Anderson 1998:253–54). The dynamics of Leukippe are again an instructive parallel. The wellbred heroine, though made a slave and subjected to torture for not giving her body to her master, maintains her self-control and virtue while the governor, in charge of the coercive punishments, falls into a rage (Shaw 1996:272). The image of the subject woman exhibiting greater self-mastery than the male governor overturns “the time worn polarity between ‘male’ self-control and its opposite, a convulsive violence, associated with a ‘womanish’ lack of self restraint” (Brown 1988:12). In 4 Maccabees, the “time worn polarity” is being used to subvert the power structures of the dominant culture and assert the worth and honor of the subjugated people (eventually introducing and subverting the gender roles as well, with the woman who was “more manly than men”). In the scenes of torture and execution that dominate 9:11–11:27, the author displays his mastery of the rhetorical technique of “vivid description” (ekphrasis). So successful is he that many readers in the modern period have difficulty with this section of his book. The author intends for this section to be difficult for his audience to endure, as he will explicitly acknowledge (14:9a), only to remind the squeamish that Judeans actually had to experience such atrocities and not merely listen to the stories (14:9b). Even though he embellishes his source material considerably (compare the relatively brief accounts of the tortures in 2 Macc 7:3–5, 7–8, after which specific details disappear), and even though the historicity of the deaths of these brothers might itself be called into question, the fact that Jews endured grief, torment, and death on behalf of Torah-observance during this period in Judea (and later periods elsewhere, as in Alexandria under Caligula) remains. The author wishes to involve the audience, then, in a close consideration of such contests to remind them both that their way of life was worth preserving to the death, and that the challenges they faced in their day-to-day life under Roman domination were not insuperable. The oldest brother is treated in a manner directly reminiscent of Eleazar, who is also stripped, bound, and scourged (6:2–3; 9:11–12). Also like Eleazar, he endures more lashes than the guards can dispense (6:10; 9:12), thus recalling the manner in which the “victim” can become the “victor,” namely through superior endurance (Seneca, Constant. 9.4; Philo, Prob. 26–27; see commentary on 6:10). He is taken to the wheel, upon which his joints are dislocated and his limbs broken (πᾶv μέλoς κλώμεvoς, suggesting that some kind of smashing of the limbs with clubs or maces – the τρoχαvτῆρας – was involved, as in the Medieval counterpart).

176

COMMENTARY

It is common to depict sages and other heroes speaking out from their torments (see, for example, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 9.26–28, 58–59), a feature some readers find implausible. Townshend (1913:676) recalls the example of Latimer and Ridley, martyrs of somewhat more recent memory, who gave expression to the meaning of their deaths in the midst of the flames. We should not underestimate the importance, for those dying for a cause, of giving voice to that cause in the midst of suffering. Indeed, it may reveal something of the psychology of endurance. The victims’ minds are so fixed on the meaning of their agony and loss, the meaning that ultimately enables the agony to be borne, that when speech bursts forth from them it is naturally related to the core issues and rationales that sustain them. The young man charges the tyrant with acting unjustly, inflicting punishments proper for a murderer upon one whose only crime is to “shield” his ancestral law, thus keeping faith with the God who gave it (9:15). He knew that he was suffering unjustly, and that the physical punishments reflected not his own criminal behavior but rather the tyrant’s viciousness. This recalls the fundamental issue in Plato’s Gorgias, namely whether it is worse to suffer unjustly or to act unjustly (Gorg. 469B), Socrates arguing cogently that the one who does the injustice, though physically unscathed, is much worse off in the long run since injustice mars the soul and endangers one’s eternal well-being. The young man accepts no ascription of dishonor from the physical assaults, since he, like Seneca’s sage, examines himself, confirms that he has done nothing unjust, and declares his integrity: “Both schools [i.e., Stoic and Epicurean] urge you to scorn injuries (contemnere iniurias) and, what I may call the shadows and suggestions of injuries, insults (contumelias). And one does not need to be a wise man to despise these (quas despiciendas), but merely a man of sense – one who can say to himself: ‘Do I, or do I not, deserve that these things befall me? If I do deserve them, there is no insult – it is justice; if I do not deserve them, he who does the injustice is the one to blush’ ” (Constant. 16.3–4).

Here we see the member of the minority culture refusing to accept the labels and status (i.e., “deviant criminal”) that the dominant culture would attach by means of the degrading treatment, in stark contrast to the attitude seen in the hypothetical speech of 8:16–26 (see commentary). He makes his death a vocal witness to the injustice of Antiochus’s imperialism. The author of 1 Peter would employ similar rhetoric as a means of helping members of the Christian culture maintain their sense

4 MACCABEES 9:10–25

177

of integrity and self-respect against the shaming techniques of the dominant culture (see 1 Pet 2:19–20; 4:14–16). Given another opportunity by the guards to yield to the king’s demands and be released from the tortures (see Heb 11:35b, which more directly reflects this scenario than anything found in 2 Maccabees), the first brother again asserts the freedom of the sage. This freedom could only be enjoyed by the person who, with Epictetus, was willing not to cling to life itself when confronted with a tyrant’s coercive threats: “The man over whom pleasure has no power, nor evil, nor fame, nor wealth, and who, whenever it seems good to him, can spit his whole paltry body into some oppressor’s face and depart from this life – whose slave can he any longer be, whose subject?” (Diss. 3.24.71; see also 4.1.60, 70, 87). The “logic of tyranny” is that one can gain power over a subject’s mind by exercising one’s power over his or her property, family, or very body. The challenge for the subject who would be free, then, is not to allow the body to become a means of access to the will, to the integrity of the inner person. This becomes a common topic in Greek philosophical discourse, where the democratic ideal of freedom undergirds the philosophical absolutization of freedom. Thus Indian philosophers were able to resist Alexander, saying: “you can carry our bodies from place to place, but you cannot compel our souls to do what we do not wish” (Pearson 1973:214). Similarly, Diogenes Laertius would remember the ways in which Zeno and Anaxarchus disowned their bodies, in effect, so as to keep their freedom intact: “The tyrant seized you and crushed you in a mortar – no, not you, your body” (Vit. 9.28); “‘Just pound the bag of Anaxarchus, you do not pound himself ’” (9.59). A verse omitted from the Sinaiticus text of 4 Maccabees but present in Alexandrinus expresses this sentiment even more clearly: “With regard to these things, if you have any torture, employ it on my body: for you are unable to touch my soul, though you might wish” (4 Macc 10:4). The brothers’ “upright reason” (ὀρθòς λoγισμός, 1:15; 6:7) cannot be bent through assaults on the body. Armed with the freedom of the sage, the first brother challenges the tyrants’ guards to do their worst to his body in a manner again reminiscent of Eleazar (see 5:32 and commentary). By enduring whatever they can dream up, he will demonstrate that the Jewish people “alone” are invincible (ἀvίκητoι, 9:18) where virtue is concerned. In 2 Macc 11:13, ἀvίκητoι is used in its more common military sense to refer to the success of Judas Maccabaeus and his forces. In 4 Maccabees, however, the invincibility that interests our author is the invincibility of the virtuous

178

COMMENTARY

person, whose moral purpose and commitment to God remain untouched by the assaults of the passions (9:18; 11:21, 27). Seneca, for example, would write that “if I go to the stake, I shall go unbeaten (invictus),” regarding as a desirable and good thing not to be burned by the fire, but not to be overcome by it (Ep. 67.16). The author of 4 Maccabees similarly ennobles the martyrs as people whose moral purpose was so strong that it could not be overcome by physical coercion. The first brother, indeed, is depicted as being empowered by understanding the tortures not as an experience of degradation, but as an opportunity in fact to prove his worth. Again this evokes the topic of gaining victory in the athletic contests by enduring more than the opponent can inflict, the only means by which the person “on the bottom” can come out “on top” (see note on 1:11). The exclusive claim made here on behalf of the “children of the Hebrews” is in keeping with the author’s protreptic goal of promoting strict, committed observance of the Torah as the means – the only means – by which to realize the ideals that even the enlightened Greek philosophers value. It also helps to account for the author’s refusal to use any non-Jewish philosophers as examples or paradigms, whether within the narrative or within his reflections on the narrative, even though his near-contemporary (and kindred spirit) Philo had no difficulty showing that Zeno and Anaxagorus were equally valuable models for imitation as Jewish heroes (Prob. 105–109). The first brother is put to further abuse following this outburst, during which he exhibits Spartan courage as he refuses even to “groan.” One recalls the story of the Spartan boy who allowed a fox he had stolen to chew through his body without crying out, lest the crime be discovered and he be disgraced (Plutarch, Apoph. lac. 35 [Mor. 234A]). Spartans, when injured, sought to hide the fact so that the enemy might not be emboldened, seeing any weakness in them (Plutarch, Instituta laconica 24 [Mor. 238F]). Plutarch (An vit. 2 [Mor. 498E]) elsewhere bears witness to other attempts to show exemplary courage by remaining silent in intense pain: “Many are silent under mutilation and endure scourging and being tortured by the wedge at the hands of masters and tyrants without uttering a cry, whenever by the application of reason the soul abates the pain and by main force, as it were, checks and represses it.” The highest Greek ideal of courage, then, was embodied by this “child of Abraham.” Based on the critical text of 9:21, which describes the first brother as “Abrahamic,” Seim (2001:30) could make the valid observation that the author of 4 Maccabees moves from genetic or kinship terms to terms

4 MACCABEES 9:10–25

179

more reflective of embodying what was characteristic of Abraham, making Abraham more of an archetype to be imitated than a focus of kinship networks. Sinaiticus will preserve this movement in 18:20, when the mother is called an “Abrahamite” (Αβρααμίτις) rather than, strictly speaking, a “daughter of Abraham” (as in the NRSV; see Seim 2001:31), but here provides the reading Αβρααμ υἵoς, “a son of Abraham,” rather than Αβραμιαῖoς. Sinaiticus, then, would be seen to invoke the kinship relations in his praise of the first brother, resonating with the concern expressed earlier by the brothers that they should not put their forebears – of whom Abraham would be foremost – to shame by their lack of fortitude for piety’s sake in the face of grief and pain. Abraham, of course, will be invoked throughout 4 Maccabees in connection with his willingness to sacrifice his own son Isaac rather than disobey God, a paradigm that will become especially important as the mother’s particular contest with her emotions takes center stage (see 13:12; 14:20; 15:28; 16:20). The first brother endures the torments with his mind fixed on the life beyond death, the harbor on the other side of this raging storm (9:22, possibly alluding to the Stoic notion of the purification and renewing of all beings by means of fire; Dupont-Sommer 1939:124). He encourages his surviving family to hold to the path he has pioneered (9:23–24). Providing a noble example for imitation was a concern for Eleazar (6:19); the oldest brother has now lived up to the measure set by his “instructor” (9:6) and summons his brothers to rise to the same level of moral commitment. He uses military metaphors in his charge (λειπoτακτήσατε, στρατείαv στρατεύσασθε; O’Hagan 1974:97) that strategically recast the experience of torture and degradation as the thick of the battle against the tyrant. As with the use of athletic imagery, the military/ agonistic imagery is a means by which to focus attention on resistance as the courageous path to a victory (“fighting the noble and sacred battle for piety,” 9:24; cf 2 Tim 4:7) and a praiseworthy remembrance – in stark contrast to how Antiochus intends these tortures and executions to be understood. In light of this, the translation given above follows Rahlfs (ἀγῶvα) rather than the original text of Sinaiticus (αἰῶvα, “age, epoch”) in rendering 9:23. The reading of Sinaiticus could make sense if it is understood as the first brother referring to the challenges of the time in which the brothers find themselves. “Contest” or “struggle,” however, makes far better sense in light of the military and agonistic language in this and the following verse, the scribe of Sinaiticus (or the scribe of his exemplar) having mistaken the gamma for an iota.

180

COMMENTARY

The courageous and good citizen kept his assigned post in battle (see Sophocles, Ant. 666–671). The Spartans again displayed the extreme commitment to this principle at Thermopylae, as Leonidas dismissed other soldiers but “considered it unbecoming for him or his Spartans to abandon the post that had been entrusted to them to guard” (Herodotus, Hist. 7.220). Philosophers had already applied this image and its attendant logic to their own “battle” for virtue. Socrates, for example, regarded himself to be standing his ground at the post at which his daimon had stationed him (Plato, Apol. 28D–E). Seneca writes of the sage who holds fast his or her moral resolve under the fire of insults and physical assaults that it would be a disgrace to retreat from the “post that Nature assigned you,” which he calls “the post of a real man” (viri; Constant. 19.4). In keeping with the philosophical transformation of the martial code, each brother will show himself virtuous (δίκαιov κἀγαθóv in Sophocles, Ant. 671) as he carries on the battle from that post where they all enlisted to fight side-by-side. The third and fourth brothers will explicitly respond to their eldest brother’s exhortation not to renounce their noble fraternal ties (9:23; 10:3, 15; Dupont-Sommer 1939:124). The translation of 9:23 given above (“nor abjure the courageous brotherhood you share with me”) represents an attempt to preserve the first person pronoun this brother uses, for he is emphasizing their continued connection with him as he dies, not merely with one another as most translations imply. The ties that bind them together as a family – bonds that are forged by their mutual commitment to the way of life taught them by their parents (10:2) – become the mark that the surviving brothers must live up to. The audience, caught between the measure of nobility as the Hellenistic culture defined and embodied it (the measure that Jason tried to attain through apostasy) and the measure of nobility defined by their own heritage (modeled by the brothers), is directly engaged by such exhortations, reaching out beyond the martyr’s immediate family to the extensive kinship group of the Jewish ethnos. With his dying words, the young man gives voice to the hope that their display of obedience and loyalty to the covenant – their “battle on behalf of piety” – will arouse God’s merciful disposition again toward the nation and against the nation’s enemies (9:24; see Deut 30:1–3; 32:36–43). This verse, although frequently overlooked in favor of 6:27–29 and 17:21–22, is thus also relevant to the discussion of atonement in 4 Maccabees, especially highlighting the Deuteronomistic theodicy that undergirds the author’s theology of atonement. Dying while maintaining a right-

4 MACCABEES 9:26–32

181

eous stance toward God and the covenant, the first brother has defeated the tyrant’s designs for him and emerged into eternity unscathed. 9:26–32

The Second Brother’s Contest

The oldest brother has changed the atmosphere in the arena, as a sense of admiration for the bravery of these Judeans begins to arise. Eleazar’s identification of capitulation as the path to ridicule by the imperial forces (5:27–28) is confirmed here by its opposite. The end result of the martyrdoms will be the vindication of the Judeans as a heroic people worthy of emulation (see 1:11; 17:17, 23–24), a reputation they would forfeit through breaking faith with Torah and yielding to the tyrant. Ironically, even accepting his offer of patronage and administrative offices would not have resulted in gaining honor: a rise in social status would have been accompanied by a loss of respect. It is with this admiration in the air that the second brother is brought forward, now perhaps more to see if he is “made of the same stuff ” rather than to engage in a status-degradation ritual. After refusing the offer of release if he would eat the defiling food (the author refers to this obliquely but poignantly merely as “his noble decision,” the content of which the audience would already have known), the youth is bound to a catapult (reading the καί in 9:26 as epexegetical, it being difficult to picture what two torture devices could work simultaneously). There he is subjected to being flayed by the guards with their iron claws (a torture that continued well into the Medieval period, as with the infamous “cat’s paw,” a set of four four-inch hooks used to strip victims’ bones of their flesh) and having his face and scalp ripped away (the availability of the additional verb εἴλκυσαv at the opening of 9:28, a verb found only in Sinaiticus, simplifies the structure of this sentence considerably). The representatives of the dominant culture have thus sunk to the level of beasts, acting like savage animals (9:28) rather than human(e) beings. In the midst of such horrors, the second brother exclaims “How sweet is any kind of death for the religion of our ancestors!” (9:29), recalling Horace’s maxim, “It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s fatherland” (dulce et decorum est pro patria mori; Odes 3.2.13). The Iliad and Athenian funeral orations lauded death in defense of one’s country (see Iliad 15.496–497); the author of 4 Maccabees replaces the object of such dedication with the Torah, “the religion of our fathers,” that gives the Jewish nation its distinctive identity and essential character.

182

COMMENTARY

The young man taunts the tyrant with suffering more internally than the youth does physically on two counts. First, the tyrant, not the youth, is suffering defeat in this arena, since he is unable to compel these freeminded souls to submit to his decrees (see commentary on 9:17–18). “The arrogant logic of tyranny” (9:30) – coercive tortures – cannot prevail over “pious reason” (here, “endurance for the sake of piety”). Second, there is a certain pleasure that inheres in virtue, while there is an unavoidable pain that inheres in vice. Again the connection with Platonic ethical philosophy is unmistakable. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that virtue alone is the cause of happiness, while vice alone brings wretchedness (470E-471A; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 5.51–67). According to Plato, “the temperate man, being just and brave and pious, is the perfection of the good man, and a good man fares well however he fares and is blessed and happy, while the wicked man or evil-doer is wretched” (Gorg. 507B; see also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 5.73–82, whose discussion of the “happiness” of the wise person even under torture is especially apt here). Here in 4 Maccabees, the young man sets against his pains the comfort that comes from having maintained his integrity and self-respect, as well as the knowledge that one who remains true to God will partake of the eternal joy which God prepares for the pious. Antiochus, whose degree of injustice makes him “most depraved” (μιαρώτατε, 9:32; Antiochus’s injustice is denounced also in 11:4–6; 12:11–14), already suffers the internal torments of the threats of the divine judgment that awaits him, and will surely overtake him, after death (see 9:9, 32; 10:11, 21; 11:3; 12:11–14). Plutarch (An vit. 2 [Mor. 498C–E]) would also assert that vice inflicts worse pain than torture: “Vice makes all men completely miserable. . . . Whereas despots, when they desire to make miserable those whom they punish, maintain executioners and torturers, or devise branding-irons and wedges; vice, without any apparatus, when it has joined itself to the soul, crushes and overthrows it, and fills the man with grief and lamentation.”

10:1–11

The Third Brother’s Contest

The author continues to highlight the honorable nature of these deaths: the first brother won admiration; the second similarly died a death “worthy to be recounted in song” (ἀoίδιμoς), the death of a hero. There is almost a sense of desperation in the room, as a chorus of interested parties attempt to persuade obedience to the king (interested in the sense that the honor and the power of the dominant culture has been successfully

4 MACCABEES 10:1–11

183

called into question and now hangs precariously in the balance). The first two brothers, however, have now established the mark that the others must live up to. The idea of living up to the achievements of one’s family members is well-attested, especially in speeches inciting courageous action. Josephus (B.J. 3.10.2 §§482–83) provides a fine example of this in Titus’s address to his troops: “For myself, I believe that in this hour my father and I and you are all on trial; it will be seen whether he is really worthy of his past successes, whether I am worthy to be his son, and you to be my soldiers. Victory to him is habitual; how could I dare return to him if defeated?” The third brother uses common topics about the harmony and likeness of brothers as the starting point of his rationale for refusing to obey. Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 8.12.3 1161b30–35) speaks of brothers’ connection with one another stemming from “being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of ‘the same blood,’ ‘the same stock,’ and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though separate individuals.” “Common upbringing” is an important factor in the unanimity of brothers as well. Xenophon (Cyr. 8.7, 14) also stresses the combination of nature and nurture that unites brothers, who are “from the same seed, nurtured by the same mother, grown up in the same house, loved by the same parents.” The youth understands that his honor comes from being of such stock as those two brothers, so welltrained in the values inculcated by their parents (10:2), and so will not act in a way that will shatter the connection. There is no sense that he discounts the value of belonging to his family and to the extended family of Abraham, thinking it to be a greater honor to join himself to a foreign administration (like Jason, and like many Jews for whom the promises of Hellenization were worth relinquishing their ancestral way of life). The author subtly leads the audience to ask themselves no longer “how can I achieve honor in the eyes of the dominant culture,” but “how can I prove myself worthy of kinship with the ‘offspring of Abraham’” (18:1; see Byron 2004:52–53 on the importance of nobility of lineage in 4 Maccabees). Sinaiticus is uncharacteristically redundant in 10:3 with its reading τὴv εὐγεvῆ τῆς ἀδελφότητoς εὐγέv[ε]ιαv. It is likely that Alexandrinus preserves the original reading in συγγέvειαv (preferred by Rahlfs), whereas the scribe of Sinaiticus could have read the initial sigma in συγγέvειαv as an epsilon, an easy mistake especially in light of the proximity of εὐγεvῆ, hence the appearance of εὐγέvειαv. Nevertheless, the redundancy serves to highlight the nobility of these Jews’ birth – by

184

COMMENTARY

virtue of being born faithful Jews of faithful parents – and thus the equation of the honorable course of action with their decision to remain faithful to their bonds of family loyalty, showing a unanimous front against Antiochus’s compulsions. Like Eleazar and his brothers, though here mentioned explicitly for the first time, this youth has exercised “frank speech” (παρρησία, 10:5). This was an ideal of Greek democracy and the essence of the exercise of “freedom,” as well as a virtue prized among friends who depended upon honest reflections of themselves from their friends in order to avoid self-deception (see Philodemus, “On Frank Criticism” [περὶ παρρησίας]). παρρησία took on a special importance where democracy was threatened by, or replaced by, monarchy or tyranny. In the words of Momigliano (1973:26), “παρρησία signified a courageous behavior towards tyrants and emperors. It was not a revival of the republican or democratic meaning of παρρησία, but rather the reaction of philosophically educated men to the flattery and moral degradation inherent in tyranny.” The special connection of “frank speech” with the situation of tyranny is attested in the writing of Dio Chrysostom. Speaking of the impossible situation of living under a tyrant, he says: “If you talk with him [the tyrant] boldly, he is angered and fears your frankness (παρρησίαv); if you converse with him meekly and deferentially, he suspects your meekness” (Or. 6.57). Similarly, he describes the tyrant as one whose “ears are stopped, affording no entrance to words of fairness, but with them flattery and deception prevail” (Or. 32.26), contrasting this with the wellconstituted democracy which is “disposed to accept frankness of speech (παρρησίας).” Michel Foucault’s observation that παρρησία involves speaking about the truth in a way critical of those in power (but potentially reformative), and thus at some degree of risk or danger to oneself, is certainly apropros in the case of the martyrs (Foucault 2001:19–20). But in making use of παρρησία, the third brother remains true to himself (rather than becoming a “living being who is false to himself ” [Foucault 2001:17; cited in Jack 2004:130]) and, in so doing, gives Antiochus and his court another opportunity to reform their view of Judeans and the political value of torture and coercion. He acts courageously, rejecting “the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken” (Foucault 2001:17; cited in Jack 2004:130) in favor of a noble consistency between his principles, his speech, and his actions; he remains thus a free person, even in the midst of the tyrant’s ad hoc torture chamber. The guards react, however, in the manner of those accustomed to

4 MACCABEES 10:1–11

185

tyranny, and attempt to silence him and overcome his position through torture. They first apply the ἀρθρέμβoλα and δακτυλήθραι (all of which are small enough to be portable and to be laid aside after use), both disjointing the extremities and crushing the bones of each segment (perhaps the clubs and maces assist in the latter; perhaps the ἀρθρέμβoλα were equipped for both tasks). Since the young man maintains his resolve in the face of these assaults on his limbs, they turn to his head (10:7). Herodotus (Hist. 4.64.3) documents the Scythian practice of scalping a victim by “cutting around the skull above the ears and shaking until the skull falls out.” Though the process in view seems to be different here (the soldiers using their own fingernails to detach the scalp from the skull), the author’s goal is to associate the representatives of the dominant, Greek culture with the Schythians, noted for “barbaric” cruelty (see 2 Macc 4:47 and 3 Macc 7:5; van Henten 1997:109). Once again, the member of the subject people enacts a Greek ideal (“frank speech”) while the members of the dominant culture embody the essence of “barbarism.” Death finally comes as a result of being ripped apart (he had already been disjointed) on the wheel. His last words assert the nobility of his and his brothers’ deaths as the result of their commitment to God-inspired education (παιδεία) and moral excellence (ἀρετή, 10:10). The reason for the martyrs’ suffering is quite different here than in 2 Macc 7:33. Here, the martyrs are suffering because they have been well shaped by their formative education in the Torah to endure for the sake of virtue. Indeed, suffering is almost distinctively seen as “probative” in this book, proving the moral formation of the Jewish people as represented by the martyrs (see 11:12). Epictetus had advised that a person regard whatever hardship (περίστασις) he or she encountered as an opportunity “to show whether we are educated (πεπαιδεύμεθα)” (Diss. 1.29.33; see discussion in Croy 1998:158–159). The fact that the martyrs can endure so much horror and yet not act against their moral principles shows the quality of the “education” that living by the Torah provides. In 2 Maccabees, the suffering is clearly and explicitly punitive, the result of the nation’s sin. The latter element is not absent from 4 Maccabees (see, e.g., 4:21), which makes its replacement by the probative emphasis throughout the torture of the seven brothers all the more striking and intentional a development, thoroughly in keeping with the author’s use of these stories as historical proofs for his thesis (1:7–8). Like his brothers, he affirms that Antiochus’s impiety (since he opposes the One God and that God’s faithful ones) and bloodlust will result in eternal punishment (10:11; see 9:9, 24, 32; 10:15, 21; 11:3; 12:11–14, 18).

186

COMMENTARY

10:12–21

The Fourth Brother’s Contest

The new standard of living up to the measure of one’s brothers returns in the author’s comment that the third brother died ἀδελφoπρεπῶς, in a manner “befitting a brother” (10:12). He has kept his honor intact by exercising commitment to the same values to the same degree, and the fourth brother will similarly hold onto his own nobility only through maintaining his family ties (10:15b; see 9:23; 10:3). The audience is thus reminded to consider whether or not they will live in a manner befitting members of that extended family of Abraham, and thus to find their honor and self-respect in their preservation of their noble, ancestral way of life. The fourth is now brought forward and cajoled into yielding to the king. The guards’ assessment of the brothers’ actions thus far repeats and extends Antiochus’s assessment of Eleazar in his address to all seven brothers: μὴ μαvῇς . . . τὴv αὐτὴv μαvίαv (10:13) μὴ μαvῖvαι τὴv αὐτὴv . . . μαvίαv (8:5).

This youth, like his brothers, refuses to accept the dominant culture’s assessment of their commitments and actions, judging them to lack the necessary information about the values that Torah inculcates and the nobility of life that it molds to make a valid estimation of the Judeans. While a corrector has changed the dative pronoun at the beginning of 10:14 from singular to plural to match more accurately the number of the guards that were taunting the brother, the original reading in Sinaiticus (represented in the translation above) functions to keep the contest focused between each brother and Antiochus, who ultimately stands behind the guards’ cajoling. The brother responds to Antiochus’s assessment of his brothers’ end, refracted through his lackeys, as μαvίαv (10:13) with an assertion that their passing was in fact μακάριov (10:15): μὴ μαvῇς . . . τoῖς ἀδελφoῖς σoυ τὴv αὐτὴv μαvίαv (10:13) μὰ τòv μακάριov τῶv ἀδελφῶv μoυ θάvατov (10:15)

His elder brothers’ deaths were not the result of madness or stupidity, but rather were the result of virtue and sound reasoning, with the result that they exhibited a “blessed death” worthy of imitation now by him in his turn. Just as the fourth brother refuses the dominant culture’s evaluation of the Jewish way of life, the audience, too, is presented with the possibility of insulating themselves against the pressures of the prejudice and

4 MACCABEES 10:12–21

187

contempt that they could otherwise escape through increasing degrees of assimilation. Once again, this is made possible as they, like the fourth brother, keep in mind the greater court of opinion in which God judges choices and actions, whose verdicts have considerably more lasting consequences (“eternal destruction” and “endless life,” 10:15). He repeats the first brother’s assertion that his moral choice cannot be accessed through the application of tortures to his body (10:14; see 9:17a and commentary), showing the same commitment to courage and even challenging Antiochus to apply his inventiveness and craft more completely so as to prove what this youth is made of (again paralleling the oldest brother’s challenge in 9:17b–18). Here, as again in 11:23 and 18:20, the author evokes the common topic that tyrants are clever inventors of cruel punishments (see, for example, Lucian, Tyrant 26; also the mock-defense in Phalaris 11–12), by means of which they compensate (through fear) for their lack of legitimate authority. Antiochus’s tyrannical character is further confirmed by his inability to hear the frank speech (παρρησία is again evident, though the word is not explicitly used). His “ears are stopped, affording no entrance to words of fairness” (Dio Chrysostom, Or. 32.26). As a result, he orders his guards to “proceed to cut out” the young man’s tongue. The translation seeks to capture the present tense of Sinaiticus (ἐκτεμvεῖv), as opposed to the aorist infinitive preferred in Rahlfs’s critical text (ἐκτεμεῖv). The treatment of the body, however, cannot penetrate and impact the reasoning faculty: the young man asserts that his moral choice will remain eloquent, just as the wheel could not touch the reason of the first brother (9:17) nor the scourging cause Eleazar’s reason to bend, though his body fell (6:7). Nor will such treatment interrupt the connection the young man enjoys with his Divine Patron (10:18), for his commitment to God is evident in his intentions and deeds as well as his speech. Therefore he can boldly challenge the tyrant to “cut it off,” just as the first brother challenged the guards to “cut” his members (τέμvε, 10:19; τέμvετε, 9:17), knowing that he will nevertheless retain his integrity. Further, because Antiochus is not punishing a deviant subject, but rather assaulting a faithful client of God – specifically attacking a part of his body that had been used piously to give God his due worship – the young man affirms confidently that Antiochus will suffer divine vengeance (10:21). Antiochus is not merely acting unreasonably; he is acting in ways that invite suffering and pain upon himself by the inevitable laws of the divine order, which is in essence how vice works to destroy those who indulge in it.

188 11:1–12

COMMENTARY The Fifth Brother’s Contest

The momentum builds as the fifth brother, not waiting to be escorted by the guards, comes forward on his own. A growing eagerness is indicated here, and in the seventh brother’s self-immolation, to engage the tyrant and, “besting” him by enduring, to secure the noble verdict that death for piety’s sake brings. By showing the initiative, he can even claim to have come ἀπ’ ἐμαυτoῦ, as though to make the contest one between equals who compete voluntarily to discover who is the stronger. This is another blow to the tyrant’s authority, as subjects engage him increasingly as an equal and discover ways to breach the imbalance of power. Further, the brother is motivated by a desire to give the tyrant the opportunity to commit yet more injustices, so that Divine Vengeance will have an even greater claim upon his life. The expression δoῦvαι τιμωρίαv τισι (11:3) is an idiom for “give someone the right to punish” (LSJ 1794). In so doing, the brother has found a way to take control of his situation, to step out of the role of passive victim and actively manoeuver the tyrant closer to his downfall. At this point, the author places upon the young man’s lips one of the more extended criticisms of Antiochus and, indirectly in his person, of those Gentiles who are hostile toward the Jewish people. Addressing the tyrant as μισάvθρωπε (11:4), the fifth brother throws back at the dominant culture the term of reproach they apply to Jews, namely hatred of the human race (μισαvθρωπία) or, alternatively, hatred of non-Jews (μισoξεvία). Diodorus of Sicily, for example, relates how Jews were accused of regarding “all men as enemies,” following a law organized around the principle of “hatred of humankind,” Moses having introduced “misanthropic customs” (Bib. Hist. 34.1.1–3). Indeed, he explains Antiochus IV’s suppression of Judaism as a direct result of his horror at “such hatred directed against all humankind” (Bib. Hist. 34.1.3; see also the criticisms recorded in Tacitus, Hist. 5.5.1; Philostratus, Vit. Apol. 5.33; Josephus, Ap. 2.121, 258). But, the author avers, it was in fact Antiochus who was showing “hatred of the human race” through his brutality, his inhumane cruelty, and his arrogant dismissal of the Jewish way of life as inferior and suppressible. The fifth brother, like the first (see 9:15 and commentary), accuses the tyrant of acting unjustly. Antiochus does not understand what acts are virtuous and worthy of honor and what acts are vicious and worthy of punishment (11:6; see also Sophocles, Ant. 692–699, where Haemon contrasts Creon’s treatment of Antigone with the popular judgment that

4 MACCABEES 11:1–12

189

her actions “deserve . . . to be honored with a golden prize” rather than with execution). He is ignorant in those matters in which it is most contemptible not to have knowledge, namely what constitutes a virtuous life and, therefore, happiness: “there’s nothing more admirable than knowledge and nothing more contemptible than ignorance” of this kind (Plato, Gorg. 472C), miring Antiochus in the serious psychological defects of “injustice, ignorance, and the like” (Gorg. 477B). Antiochus is put in the position of the person who is, according to the philosophical definition, a slave. Dio Chrysostom defines “freedom as the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is allowed and what is not. According to this definition, there is nothing to prevent the Great King, while wearing a very tall tiara upon his head, from being a slave and not being allowed to do anything that he does; for every act that he performs will bring a penalty and be unprofitable” (Or. 14.18). Of course, Jewish tradition is also not silent about the folly and disgrace of the judge who condemns the righteous (see LXX Prov 17:15, 26). In part, the fifth brother asserts once again that the brothers are suffering unjustly, which is less shameful than to act unjustly (Plato, Gorg. 508C–E; Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.123; Seneca, Constant. 16.4). He goes further, however, claiming that Antiochus (and, with him, all non-Jews who harbor suspicion or contempt for Jews whose exclusive devotion to the One God and God’s Law they fail to understand) cannot form a true judgment about what should be praised and what punished. Why, then, should the Jew be concerned about the opinion such a person holds of him or her, let alone be pressured into giving up facets of his or her ancestral, divinely-appointed way of life because of the opinion of nonJews? On the contrary, the Gentile’s failure to understand the Jew’s piety confirms the former’s alienation from God (see 11:7–8, verses probably representing a secondary addition to the text in A and other witnesses) and thus the latter’s privileged position. If members of the audience have experienced insult or marginalization, they are invited to regard it as a sign of their neighbors’ lack of insight into what is noble and not a true reflection on themselves (as in Epictetus, Diss. 1.29.50–54). As he dies upon the catapult (see comment on 8:13 on its workings; the translation attempts here to make sense of Sinaiticus reading περὶ τòv τράχηλov rather than περὶ τòv τρoχόv, “around the wheel,” as in Rahlfs), Antiochus’s offer of patronage is realized in an unexpected and ironic manner. The brothers had rejected the favor which Antiochus proffered at the price of capitulation (8:5–7), but now accept from his hand these

190

COMMENTARY

“fine gifts,” the opportunities to prove their complete dedication to God’s law and their own virtue – to make it “real” in deeds rather than merely affirmed in thought and word. Seneca wrote that “the invulnerable thing is not that which is not struck, but that which is not hurt; by this mark I shall show you the wise man. Is there any doubt that the strength that cannot be overcome is a truer sort than that which is unassailed, seeing that untested powers are dubious, whereas the stability that repels all assaults is rightly deemed most genuine?” (Constant. 3.4; see also 9.3, where the wise person is said to “count even injury profitable” as “a means of putting himself to the proof and makes trial of his virtue”). The conviction that the only real virtue is that which has been tested and proven, which incidentally turns the experience of hardship from a misfortune to an opportunity, is common in both Greco-Roman philosophical and Jewish literature (Seneca, Prov. 5.10: “fire tests gold, misfortune brave men”; see also Epictetus, Diss. 1.6.37; Prov 17:3; Sir 2:5; Wis 3:5–6; 1 Pet 1:6–7). The young man thus greets his death as the means by which his training comes to fruition, the talk about virtue becomes virtue-in-action. This would embolden the hearers as well to regard the pressures or challenges they encounter as a result of their commitment to observe the Torah as opportunities to prove the genuineness of their piety, thus transforming circumstances that threaten to undermine selfrespect into occasions for confirming their personal virtue and honor. The sufferings themselves can be aptly labeled “noble” (11:12) since they derive not from just punishment for vice but rather from the brothers’ unwillingness to participate in vice (idolatry, betrayal of the ancestral law, unfaithfulness to kinship ties and to God). Antiochus, although desiring to win them over to his way of life, actually grants them the blessing of a “noble death,” a death chosen for the sake of virtue and in the state of freedom. Dying nobly was also accounted a “favor” by Eleazar in the first exhortation to suicide at Masada: “it is God who has granted us this favour (χάρις), that we have it in our power to die nobly and in freedom” ( Josephus, B.J. 7.8.6 §325). 11:13–27

The Sixth Brother’s Contest

This episode opens with the now all-too-familiar pattern of the individual being brought forward, the tyrant (here personally, elsewhere his representative) presenting the ultimatum, and the youth declaring his commitment not to yield. The translation adopts the corrector’s emendation of the end of 11:13 with the deletion of ὁ δὲ prior to the quotation

4 MACCABEES 11:13–27

191

in 11:14. The text appears to have been corrupted at some point, with the relative clause opened by ὃς being interrupted and cut short by the ὁ δὲ in Sinaiticus as it stands. Rahlfs retains the problematic wording of Sinaiticus, but every translation has had to smooth this out in some way (most often by reading the nominative relative pronoun as an accusative and taking it as the object of πυvθαvoμέvoυ, though this is also awkward). A literal translation of the original hand of Sinaiticus would be “who, the tyrant asking if he might want to be released after eating, but he said. . . .” The sixth brother, whose age does not do justice to the maturity of his reasoning faculty (11:14), appeals to the family’s common training in the Torah, refusing to abandon that training now (11:15). Living and dying for the Torah (the principles of piety that inform the youth’s “understanding” referred to with ταὐτά) is the purpose inherent in their birth and upbringing. Indeed, for them, to walk in the way of Torah is to “live according to nature,” for it means fulfilling the purpose inherent in their constitution. Yielding to the tyrant’s demands to eat unclean meat (and meat from an animal offered to an idol at that) would be an unnatural deviation from the course of his life, a breach of his integrity. So he will do what he has been destined to do from birth, keeping faith with his parents by remaining true to their training, and he invites the tyrant to do what seems right to him (even though the audience already knows that the tyrant lacks true knowledge of what is right and wrong, 11:4–6), namely to “go on torturing.” Sinaiticus reads this last verb (βασαvίζειv) as an infinitive, understanding ὥστε to introduce a result clause, whereas the corrector and Rahlfs prefer βασάvιζε, taking ὥστε as a conjunction introducing an imperative. Since the action contemplated in this verse still lies in the future from the perspective of the speaker, the corrector has probably introduced a valid emendation. This brother is subjected to the wheel, the workings of which are now too well known to the reader, and to torture by fire (here through heated skewers). The translation follows the reading διέκαιov in Rahlfs at 11:19. The reading διίκεov in Sinaiticus is untranslatable unless it is construed as an aberrant 3rd plural aorist active indicative of the deponent verb διικvέoμαι (aorist stem διικ-, and also deponent), which would plausibly mean “they penetrated.” The sixth brother will finally be killed in a λέβης (12:1), employed for the first time since it was introduced (8:13). The sixth brother interprets the torments as a “contest well-suited to holiness” (11:20), proceeding to bring athletic imagery to the fore. The first translation of ἱερoπρεπής offered in LSJ (822) is “fitting for a sacred

192

COMMENTARY

place,” an option rarely considered in connection with this verse. Such a sense would suggest that the author envisions the martyrdoms taking place somewhere in the Temple precincts. The (defiled) Temple would have been the logical place for the pagan sacrifices that are assumed to have immediately preceded the scene, and which provided the εἰδωλoθύτα (5:2). Images from the realm of athletics had already been introduced by the narrator to describe Eleazar’s ability to defeat the torturers by being able to endure more blows than they could inflict, “like a noble athlete” (καθάπερ γεvvαῖoς ἀθλητὴς, 6:10), by the brothers to name the “prizes” that would be theirs for their persistence in virtue (τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλα, 9:8), and by the oldest brother to describe his sufferings as a “contest” (τòv ἀγῶvα, 9:23). It will continue to be employed throughout the remainder of the oration (see 12:11, 14; 13:13, 15; 16:16), coming to a crescendo in the extended athletic metaphor of 17:11–16. In 4 Maccabees, the particular competition (ἀγώv) in view is the boxing or wrestling match (see especially 6:10; 17:11–16 and commentary), in which the Judean is pitted against the Greek (or the Greek team of torturers) in one-on-one combat to test which one is the stronger. This is especially apt for the situation of the martyrs, where the tyrant’s power to inflict pain is matched precisely with the martyr’s power to hold onto his or her moral determination. Greco-Roman philosophers, as well as spokespersons for other minority cultures, found athletic imagery to be very useful for orienting their audiences toward hardships in general and toward the resistance they would encounter from non-group members in particular (see discussions in Pfitzner 1967; Croy 1998:43–76; deSilva 2000b:361–64). Success in athletic competitions was, then as now, a path to fame and occasionally fortune. But the path to success and honor involved steady and rigorous training, obedience to the trainer rather than concern for the opinion of others, pain and physical abuse (e.g., from other athletes in training exercises or in actual bouts), and pressing on for the sake of the prize in spite of jeers and insults from the spectators. The points of potential connection with the life of the philosopher are many. Dio Chrysostom provides one of the most extended uses of athletic analogies to describe the philosopher’s life in his Eighth Oration, “On Virtue.” Here, Diogenes the Cynic is depicted haranguing visitors on their way to see the Isthmian games, calling them to see a real and greater contest in his own person, as he struggles to master hardships and pleasures. He regards “hunger, exile, and loss of reputation” to be his

4 MACCABEES 11:13–27

193

“antagonists” (Or. 8.16), as well as those pleasures that weaken the soul’s constitution (Or. 8.20, 26). He engages them bravely and head-on, gaining the upper hand by not shrinking from them (Or. 8.17–18), and he fights them not for the temporal prizes offered in the games but for the greater prize of virtue and happiness (Or. 8.15). Epictetus also favors athletic imagery, emboldening his pupils to face hardships and otherwise potentially degrading circumstances by considering them to be wrestling partners specifically chosen for them by Zeus, to train them where they are weakest and shore up their moral fortitude where most lacking. All this prepares the sage for the victory of a moral life well and nobly lived (Diss. 1.24.1–2; 3.20.9; 3.22.56; see also Seneca, Prov. 2.2–4). Able to endure the loss of reputation and even physical well-being, able also not to be distracted by the praise of the uninitiated, the philosopher presses on to become an “invincible athlete” (ὁ ἀvίκητoς ἀθλητής, Diss. 1.18.21; see the repetition of ἀvίκητoς here in 4 Macc 11:20, 21, 27). Athletic imagery thus transformed the experiences of disgrace, marginalization, and even physical abuse with which the devotee of philosophy met into opportunities for honorable victory and, therefore, respect in the eyes of the wise (as well as for self-respect). More particularly, the image of the wrestling match (the ἀγώv, 11:20; see 9:23; 16:16) transforms the martyrs’ experience from a passive victimization to an active resistance, more amenable to topics of courage and the noble death (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.6.8–9 1115a30–33). In this particular arena, the brothers have run a gauntlet of sufferings (taking γυμvασία in the more active and primary sense of “training exercise” than the local sense of “arena” commonly found in translations of this verse; see LSJ 362, which reserves the local use for the neuter noun γυμvασίov). Though physically destroyed, the sixth brother can claim to remain, along with his preceding brothers, undefeated (11:20b), for they have not yielded under the blows of the tyrant (their antagonist in the “wrestling match”). The same invincibility was displayed by Stilbo, the philosopher brought before the “conquering” tyrant Demetrius: “He himself was not only unconquered but unharmed. For he had with him his possessions [i.e., virtue], upon which no hand could be laid, while the property that was being scattered and pillaged and plundered he counted not his own” (Seneca, Constant. 5.6–7). The young Judean has “armed himself ” for this contest, the military image of putting on armor (καθωπλισμέvoς, 11:22) blending seamlessly into the atheltic imagery of 11:20–21. O’Hagan (1974:96–97) attributes

194

COMMENTARY

this blending not to the author’s failure to keep distinct metaphors separate, but to “certain real cultural elements such as the warlike background to certain sports” and to the “physical struggle . . . and often bloodshed” in both spheres. The rise of gladiatorial sports in the Roman period, indeed, would promote this mixing even further. The effect here is to further empower and ennoble the youth’s experience of torture, transforming him into a soldier or gladiator who takes on the tyrant Antiochus (whose inventiveness in regard to tortures, 11:23, makes him a wily adversary) in single combat. His choice of armor is καλoκἀγαθία, rendered here in both its constituent parts as “nobility and goodness,” a term that graces one who resisted Hellenization where fidelity to the Judean way of life was at stake with the title of greatest honor in the Greek world (see commentary on 1:10). This brother’s declaration that the “fire is cold,” and so forth, is sometimes mistakenly read to imply that the martyrs do not actually feel the pains (e.g., Aune 1994:137). Against this view, O’Hagan (1974:101) correctly observes that the author “does not slip into the Stoic philosophic extreme of insensitivity and complete indifference: the technical terms ἀπάθεια and ἀvαισθησία never occur in 4 Maccabees, and the other two great Stoic words ἐγκράτεια (5:34) and ἀταραξία (8:26) only once each with greatly diminished impact.” The narrator’s voice, however, is even more definitive on this point. He asserts that the fifth brother was in fact “in anguish of body” (11:11), and returns in his encomium to underscore the brothers’ actual experience of the sufferings, and of the most intense kinds at that (14:9–10), in contrast to the hearers’ mere experience of the report about those sufferings. His descriptions of the mother’s struggle also make it absolutely clear that she intensely feels love for her children and the pain that brings as they are tortured in her sight (and, feeling, hears the voices of nature and maternal affection in 15:25, that is, feels the inward pressure of these passions). The victory of pious reason lies in its ability to equip the will to withstand the very real flood of pain and other emotions/sensations. In light of this, the taunt of the sixth brother that the tyrant’s “fire is cold” and “catapults painless” is best heard as a hyperbolic expression of the tyrant’s powerlessness to compel them to act against their will (11:24–25), not as a report about the lack of sensation the martyrs feel. Their “endurance” is praiseworthy because the intense experience of pain did not pervert their reason, not because they were able to suppress their sensation of pain in the body. Destroying or overthrowing

4 MACCABEES 11:13–27

195

tyranny is featured prominently in the exordium and peroration of 4 Maccabees (1:11; 17:9–10), as elsewhere in the Greek world that prized more representative forms of polity (see commentary on 1:11). κατάλυσις and its cognate verb (11:24–25) are specifically used in conjunction with a tyrant also in Diodorus Siculus, Bib. Hist. 9.4.2; 14.64.4; 14.67.1 (BDAG 521–22). Where military action or other venues for coercive resistance (e.g., economic embargoes) are unavailable, the battle against totalitarian regimes must often be fought and won in the bodies of those who would resist. These martyrs become a precedent and a symbol that resistance of this kind is no less effective for loosening and unraveling the cords of tyranny than the other kinds. The brothers have been able to walk in line with their moral compass in the face of such extreme and unimaginable horrors because they look beyond the “tyrant’s guards” who were inflicting the tortures and trying to compel obedience to the tyrant, looking instead to the “guards of the divine law” set over them (11:27). This image carries an element of compulsion as well (recall 5:16), as the “spear-bearers” (literally) of the Torah have sharp points as well (the dangers that await those who prove disloyal to God are explicitly invoked as a motive for endurance in 13:15). But the image also conveys a sense of protection and strength, the Torah having trained these young men to choose the path of virtue and piety in every circumstance and, through that life-long training, having equipped them to withstand even the rigorous contest in which they find themselves here. The image is a classic statement of the philosophical topic of looking beyond the pressures of the moment to the divine “court of opinion” where the long-term perspective on choices becomes transparently clear (see again Plato, Gorg. 526C–527A; Epictetus, Diss. 1.30.1; 4.10.14; deSilva 2000b:171–174). This is, in part, why it is specifically “pious” reason (1:1; here, “pious knowledge,” 11:21) that masters the passions, and that can “remain undefeated” (11:27) even in situations of extreme duress. This invincible reason was also the goal of the popular philosophers: “If I go to the stake, I shall go unbeaten. Why should I not regard this as desirable – not because the fire burns me, but because it does not overcome me?” (Seneca, Ep. 67.16; see also Constant. 5.6–7). Like the fifth brother, this youth anticipates these “guards of the divine Law” being unleashed upon the tyrant as well, and indeed sees himself as an active force moving the Divine Avenger (μέγαv ἀλάστoρα, 11:23) to punish Antiochus.

196 12:1–19

COMMENTARY The Seventh Brother’s Contest

The sixth brother is finally dispatched by being subjected either to boiling or roasting in a λέβης, one of the “cauldrons” brought forward in 8:13. The term is often, though not always, used for a kind of vessel containing water and could be small (e.g., a basin for washing the feet or for cleansing the hands before a meal) or large (e.g., a bathtub), which would suggest boiling here. Sinaiticus uses an intensifier (αὐτòς) in 12:1, highlighting the fact that the sixth brother had himself achieved the noble mark set by his predecessors; Rahlfs reads oὗτoς, “this one,” here as the subject of the temporal clause with similar, though slightly less, effect. The sight of the seventh brother elicits compassion from Antiochus, even after the adversarial nature of his earlier encounter with the seven (9:1–11) and the first six brothers’ open defiance of the tyrant and his tools of compulsion. The author is a master of irony as he describes the tyrant as having been “terribly abused” by the six brothers. Who is the real victim in these scenes? Who is truly beaten down and defeated? The author reminds the hearers that the martyrs were, in a sense, “giving as good as they received” from the perspective of their resistance to the tyrant and their deconstruction of his authority over their lives. Antiochus’s “encouragement” to the last brother echoes his earlier address to all seven, in which he pointed to the “madness” (μαvία) of Eleazar, revealed in the end result of his stubborn refusal to obey, and offers the enjoyment of “his friendship” (τῆς ἐμῆς . . . φιλίας) as a winsome alternative to a brutal death (see comment on 8:5–7). The antithetical parallelism of 12:4–5 (εἰ μὲv μὴ πεισθείης . . . πεισθεὶς δὲ) effectively brings out the starkness of the alternatives, particularly in the labels Antiochus applies to the same youth seen taking each course (τάλας, “miserable wretch,” taking the adjective as a substantive nominative of address with Dupont-Sommer 1939:131, versus φίλoς, “friend”). The tyrant’s offer to the youngest brother of “friendship” and a share in the oversight of the affairs of the kingdom (φίλoς ἔσῃ καὶ τῶv ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἀφηγήσῃ πραγμάτωv) is especially reminiscent of the account of the same in 2 Macc 7:24 (φίλov ἕξειv καὶ χρείας ἐμπιστεύσειv). Antiochus is seen to persist in his estimation of the course of unyielding fidelity to the Jewish way of life as “madness,” being removed from one’s right mind (ἀπo-voία), identifying the cause of the brothers’ death as ἀπιστία (“failure to trust,” “faithlessness”), a reading unique to Sinaiticus (R reads ἀπείθειαv, following Alexandrinus). Sinaiticus brings the brothers’ rejection of Antiochus’s patronage and refusal to “trust”

4 MACCABEES 12:1–19

197

him (8:7) into more prominent focus here, in keeping with the text’s emphasis elsewhere on Antiochus’s fury being due not merely to disobedience, but to ingratitude (9:10). The author keeps in view the difference in perspective between the Gentile authority and the community of the faithful Jews: in the eyes of the former, Torah observance appears to be a rejection of offers of patronage and benevolence (as also in 3 Macc 3:19–22), hence the recalcitrant “die on account of faithlessness,” or an attitude of stubborn disobedience on the part of an arrogant people (as in 3 Macc 3:18–19), hence they “die on account of disobedience” (the alternative reading in Alexandrinus et al., seen also in 4 Macc 8:6, 9; 9:10). The author energetically keeps in the readers’ ears the fact that, in the eyes of the community of the faithful, these martyrs “die on account of piety” (4 Macc 5:31; 6:22; 7:16; 9:6–7, 29–30; 11:20; 12:14; 13:27; 14:6; 15:12; 16:13, 17; 17:7; 18:3), keeping “faith” with God and their ancestral people and laws (5:29, 33; 9:2; 15:24; 16:16, 22; 17:2). This difference in perspective, at an admittedly less dramatic level, was part of the daily challenge which Jews had to face and resolve if they were to remain consistent in their observance of Torah’s regulations. The encomiastic elements of 4 Maccabees, including the censorious portrait of Antiochus, all contribute to the audience’s resolution of the tension in favor of valuing the opinion of the ancestors, the faithful, and ultimately God more than the negative evaluation formed in the minds of Gentiles and apostate Jews. It is a tension, moreover, well-known among Greek authors. Sophocles, for example, presents a heroine who would insist that she has lived and died in accordance with immortal virtues (significantly, for “having revered piety,” τὴv εὐσεβίαv σεβίσασα, like the martyrs), even though she is being executed as a criminal (Ant. 940–943). Rather than accept disgrace from her death, she insists to the contrary that her death should make the “public” look differently at the king who sentenced her: “See . . . what things I am suffering, and from what men.” In order to heighten the effectiveness of his “last chance” to persuade one of these brothers, Antiochus brings the mother forward as well. This verse has some significant textual difficulties. According to Sinaiticus, Antiochus believes that the mother would soften and take pity on herself (ἐλεήσασα; the corrector’s emendation of αὐτὴv to ἑαυτὴv is necessary for this reading), given the opportunity to save her last son (DupontSommer 1939:131 and Klauck 1989a:734 favor this reading). This differs significantly from the reading in Alexandrinus, adopted by Rahlfs and by Hadas (1953:206–207), according to which Antiochus is the one “taking

198

COMMENTARY

pity” (ἐλεήσας) on the mother (αὐτὴv) by giving her this opportunity. The reading in Sinaiticus accords well with the emphasis in 14:11–16:25 on the mother’s mastery of her own passions of maternal love, the episode in 12:6 providing a moment in which her mastery would have been severely and explicitly tested. Would she, in fact, weaken at this last moment, or would she continue in the course of piety steadfastly through this last storm? In 2 Maccabees, the author gives the content of the mother’s speech to the last surviving son at this point. The author of 4 Maccabees reserves all the material relevant to the mother for one place, namely his extensive treatment of her contest and her contribution to the fidelity of her family (14:11–17:1; 18:6–19), and so promises to provide the content “a little later” (12:7). When he returns to the mother’s exhortation, however, he presents it not as her words to this son at this point in the story, but transposes it earlier, depicting the mother as addressing all seven of her sons immediately following Eleazar’s death (16:15, 24). The mother’s second speech (18:6–19) is also addressed to a plurality of sons (note the plural ὑμᾶς in 18:10, 14 and ὑμῖv in 18:11, 12, 15, 16). The mother speaks in Hebrew, although no reason is offered here as in 2 Macc 7:27 (where it is a means by which to keep Antiochus from understanding her true intent; see Dupont-Sommer 1939:131). Speaking the indigenous language may provide a form of resistance against the dominant, Greek-speaking culture, the mother’s choice of language reinforcing the ideology she espouses – one that looks to the (Hebrew) heritage for models for noble action in the present contest (16:16–23), bringing consistency of language and thought as she calls her boys to remember who they are and whence they came. Having listened both to Antiochus in words we know and his mother in words not given, the boy requests for a moment in which to address the king and all those “friends” whose company he was invited to join (12:5), who may indeed have, sometime in the past, similarly sold their integrity for the sake of comfort and advancement. The torturers and authorities would understandably “relish” the prospect of the boy’s acquiescence. One success here would make up for the seven conspicuous defeats already suffered by Antiochus (heightened by the sixth brother’s explicit declaration of victory in 11:24–25) – a fact, however, that would make the youngest son’s betrayal of his family and nation all the more heinous. Dashing their hopes to the ground, the brother uses the moment to take control of his fate into his own hands and recover what freedom was possible under the circumstances, positioning himself beside a

4 MACCABEES 12:1–19

199

brazier that is presumably raging with a fire from which there could be no timely extraction. From that position, the last brother indicts Antiochus for injustice on two counts, these charges being presented in an artful parallelism (oὐκ ᾐδέσθης παρὰ τoῦ θεoῦ λαβὼv . . . // oὐκ ᾐδέσθης ἄvθρωπoς ὤv . . .). Both his duty toward God (“having received [benefits] from God”) and his duty toward other human beings (“being a human being” himself) should have provided sufficient moral constraint, if Antiochus were truly sensible of morality and disposed to be ashamed of injustice, against the excesses that have dominated the story thus far. All creatures are recipients of the gifts of God. This is a commonplace of Greco-Roman ethics (see Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.14.4 1163b15–18; Seneca, Ben. 7.31.2–4), Hellenistic Jewish literature (see Let. Aris. 190, 210, 281), and early Christian tradition (see, e.g., Matt 5:45). On this basis alone, human being owe the gods, or God, “all the regard that they can” give (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.14.4 1163b18). Kings, however, are the special beneficiaries of God, who “apportions fame and great wealth to kings” (Let. Aris. 224), “has authority over the rule of human beings, giving it to whom he thinks right” (Dan 4:25), and is the ultimate source of all human authority, even local officials (see, e.g., John 19:11). Therefore, kings and other officials should especially seek to serve the interests of their Divine Patron by means of their offices, using their station to promote God’s interests and care for God’s pious ones (the Torah-observant Jews being the foremost in this class). The portrayal of Ptolemy II Philadelphus in Letter of Aristeas provides a positive model of a Gentile king acting virtuously and justly toward God and God’s people, and thus a foil for Antiochus in 4 Maccabees. When Ptolemy asked how he might show gratitude to God for the safety of his kingdom, he is advised to use his authority to free the Judeans taken as slaves during the reign of his father, since their God also gave Ptolemy his rule (Let. Aris. 15–16; cf. also 19; 37). Ptolemy looks for an opportunity to use his position to offer appropriate “thank offerings” to God (Let. Aris. 19, 37). Antiochus, however, has acted like an ungrateful and base client, using the power given him by God to abuse God’s loyal clients – the very people he ought to have been protecting and assisting. Because of these gross injustices, Divine “Justice” must certainly punish Antiochus “more bitterly” and over a more extended period of time (12:12). Through his savage actions against the Judeans, Antiochus has also violated the boundaries that humane fellow-feeling ought to have engendered. This translation reads βασαvίζει in 12:13 Sinaiticus as a

200

COMMENTARY

present active infinitive with the terminal nu omitted; the corrector’s emendation to an aorist infinitive, adopted by R, shows that readers expect some infinitive form here, but the present infinitive suggested (defectively) by Sinaiticus draws attention to the protracted, excessive nature of the torments appointed by Antiochus. Epictetus would also adjure rulers to exercise authority in keeping with the principle that they are human beings made in every respect like those over whom they rule: “Slave, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus as his progenitor and is, as it were, a son born of the same seed as yourself and of the same sowing from above; but if you have been stationed in a like position above others, will you forthwith set yourself up as a tyrant? Do you not remember what you are, and over whom you rule – that they are kinsmen, that they are brothers by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?” (Diss. 1.13.3–5). A positive model is also expressed in Wis 7:1–6, where “Solomon” tempers his lofty earthly status with the fact that his origin, his nurture, and his death are all shared in common by all people, king or subject. The turn of the era produced a climate, then, in which the essential oneness of humanity was being promoted to the relativization of national, ethnic, or hierarchical divisions (see also Acts 14:15; Heb 2:11; Jas 5:9; Ignatius, Trall. 10; Dupont-Sommer 1939:132). Antiochus, however, enters the scene as a backwards, unenlightened tyrant. Moreover, in failing to be humane, he has ceased to be human (becoming “most beastlike,” θηριωδέστατε). The seventh brother, therefore, calls down shame on the head of Antiochus: in perpetrating such injustices against his elder brothers, it is the tyrant and not the victims who “ought to blush” (compare Seneca, Constant. 16.3–4). Since he has failed to feel shame (in its positive sense as regard for established norms that must not be violated) now, he will certainly wallow in his disgrace beyond death (12:14; see Wis 5:1–13 for a dramatic depiction of such a post-mortem lament). The contrast between the shame of the tyrant and the nobility of the martyrs is underscored once again by artistic parallelism (oἱ μὲv εὐγεvῶς . . . // σὺ δὲ κακῶς . . .), as well as by the portrayal of the latter as “athletes of piety” and “contestants for virtue” (12:11, 15; see comments on 11:20–21 concerning the use of athletic imagery in 4 Maccabees and other minority cultural literature). The label “athlete of piety” (ἀσκητὴς τῆς εὐσεβείας, 12:11) is paralleled throughout Philo, who uses the term ἀσκητής to describe Essenes (“athletes of virtue,” Prob. 88) and Therapeutae (“athletes of philosophy,” Contempl. 69), and at over one-hundred other points in his philosophical writings in connection with wisdom, piety, prudence, and

4 MACCABEES 12:1–19

201

philosophy (Klauck 1989a:735; Dupont-Sommer 1939:132). “Contestants” for some virtue or other are also attested in Philo (see Dupont-Sommer 1939:132, who points to Somn. 1.59 as an example). In 12:11–14, the author tosses back at Gentile authorities, in the person of Antiochus IV, the two charges that dominate anti-Jewish propaganda in the centuries around the turn of the era. Those who fail to honor the one God are the ones guilty of impiety and ingratitude, not the Jews (falsely accused of atheism, since they disdain the gods represented by idols); those who mistreat the Jews because of their differences in practice are guilty of misoxenia, of violating the essential oneness of humanity, by not extending toleration to human beings like themselves. In his final words, the seventh brother declares his solidarity with his family in a manner reminiscent of several of the preceding brothers (12:16; see 10:3, 15; 11:22), even though there is some confusion in the manuscripts about the actual wording at this point. Alexandrinus reads μαρτυρίας in place of ἀριστείας, the scribe calling attention to the “witness” that the preceding brothers have given with their blood, and that would become so prominent in Christian martyrology (DupontSommer 1939:132 helpfully points out the use of this term in Mart. Poly. 1.1; 13.2; 17.1). This is more likely to be an intrusion of Christian interests into the text, with Sinaiticus therefore preserving the more original reading. Both the corrector of Sinaiticus and other manuscripts read “of the brothers” or “of my brothers” in place of “of the children.” It would indeed be inappropriate for the last brother to refer to his elder siblings as “the children,” though, if the author allowed his perspective to intrude upon the youngest brother’s speech at that point, Sinaiticus might indeed preserve the original (if less winsome) reading. Also reminiscent of the speech of other martyrs is this brother’s prayer that God would become merciful toward the Judean nation (4 Macc 12:17 is remarkably close to 2 Macc 7:37 at this point, which reads ἐπικαλoύμεvoς τòv θεòv ἵλεως ταχὺ τῷ ἔθvει γεvέσθαι). Eleazar had offered such a prayer at greater length (see comments on 6:28–29), the eldest brother had suggested that their striving for piety unto death might arouse God’s mercy (9:24), and the author himself would reflect upon the significance of the martyrs’ deaths in similar terms (see comments on 17:20–22). This is another point at which the obedience that leads to death becomes a sacrificial offering on the basis of which the martyr can invoke God’s mercy on behalf of others. The pattern of this particular martyr, who first offers the prayer and then performs the burnt offering by his own agency, as it were, is especially appropriate to reading the

202

COMMENTARY

deaths as sacrificial rites. The martyr’s final words, cast out like an imprecatory prayer against Antiochus (κατευξάμεvoς, 12:19), invoke God’s justice upon the tyrant, again a natural counterpart to the supplicatory prayer for God’s mercy on behalf of the nation (see also the connection in 9:24; 17:21). The death of the martyrs is connected causally to the former as much as to the latter (see 11:3, 22–23). The verb ἀπέδωκεv that concludes this episode (12:19) begs for the object supplied by the corrector, namely τò πvεῦμα (i.e., “he gave up his spirit”), but its sense here is clear even without the emendation. In 2 Maccabees, the fate of the youngest brother is to be handled more cruelly than his brothers were (2 Macc 7:39); the author of 4 Maccabees prefers another kind of climax, namely self-immolation rather than more (and worse) of the same. It is not the case that the author of 2 Maccabees has a negative view of suicide, possibly changing the story found in Jason of Cyrene’s narrative (the suicide being retained independently by the author of 4 Maccabees), since he features the suicide of Razis (under similar constraints, where the choice was to take one’s own life or be taken by the enemy) prominently in 14:41–46 (so rightly Dupont-Sommer 1939:133, against the view of Freudenthal). Suicide was regarded by both the authors of 2 and 4 Maccabees as a noble death, as an opportunity to rob an enemy of the chance to dishonor and degrade one (as in Saul’s suicide in 1 Sam 31:4, and explicitly in the mother’s suicide in 4 Macc 17:1). The author of 4 Maccabees is the one taking license with the story, creating a climax of a different kind – one in which the zeal of the youth for Torah is so great that he would effect his own martyrdom, the freedom of the sage so complete that he can in fact “spit his whole paltry body” into the face of the tyrant (to borrow an image from Epictetus, Diss. 3.24.71). Moreover, the self-immolation of Indian philosophers was highly regarded as the sign of their mastery of the passions and their self-control (see Lucian, Peregr. 23–25, 39, though there without the high regard), such that their achievement is here harnessed in the service of the virtue and self-mastery provided by those trained by the Torah. 13:1–14:10

Resumption of Thesis and Encomium on the Seven Brothers

After the death of the last brother, the author returns to affirm his philosophical thesis. Dupont-Sommer (1939:133) thinks it likely that 13:1–5 is an interpolation, as he had concluded more decisively about 6:31–35. The passage is, in his opinion, stylistically deficient (“strikingly

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

203

redundant, deductive, and pedantic”), unnecessary (one could read directly from 12:20 to 13:6 without seam or gap), and full of text-critical problems (which he takes as a sign that the passage was not original, though, of course, no manuscript omits part or all of these verses). Once again (see comment on 6:31–35), however, we are reminded that the author has prepared us for such an “intrusion” by introducing the martyr stories as historical examples that will provide evidence in support of his thesis that the reasoning faculty that is bolstered by Jewish piety masters every passion (see 1:7–9) and has presented the entire narrative component of 4 Maccabees as a “demonstration” of the same (3:19). Even though the martyr stories are used for far more than furnishing dry proofs for the ethical thesis, the author keeps in view that they do accomplish at least that much by means of the refrains encountered in 6:31–35; 13:1–5; 16:1–2; 18:2 (what Klauck 1989a:717 has equated with the “Q.E.D.” of logical and mathematical proofs). Before resorting to the mode of editor, readers should also give attention to the thoughtful parallel structure and stylistic elements the author has given to these reflections on the martyrdoms. Each contains a statement relating the stories to the ethical thesis to be “proven” (6:31–35; 13:1–5; 16:1–2), apostrophes amplifying the achievement and praiseworthiness of the exemplars of the thesis (7:6–10, 15; 14:2–7; 15:1, 13, 16–20, 29–32), and some discussion of the peculiar struggles that had to be overcome by each martyr, given his or her place in life (Eleazar’s time of life, 7:13–14; the brothers’ affection for one another, 13:19–14:1; the mother’s love for her children, 14:13–20; 15:4–12). Even if the first of these elements appeals less to modern tastes than the others, it is as clearly woven into the fabric of each reflection as the more dramatic and lively elements. Dupont-Sommer (1939:133) is correct, however, to speak of this section, like 6:31–35 and, indeed, like the opening paragraphs of the speech itself, as redundant and pedantic. Indeed, 13:1–3 even displays the same pattern of statement of the thesis, argument from the contrary (using a mixed contrafactual conditional sentence), and reassertion of the thesis as was observed in 6:31–33. The triumph of the youths over pains affords incontrovertible proof that devout reason can master the passions (13:1, 4–5), or enable “selfmastery” in regard to the passions. The argument from the contrary posits that, if they had been “enslaved to their passions” (here, the fear of pain caricatured in 8:16–26, the actual experience of pain, and also the yearnings of brotherly affection discussed below), they would have acquiesced to the tyrant’s demands and departed from virtue. Instead,

204

COMMENTARY

they exemplify the complete freedom of the philosopher (see 14:2). Such metaphorical use of the images of freedom and slavery is common in philosophical discourse, Philo providing an especially helpful example: Slavery, then, is of two kinds; slavery of the soul and slavery of the body. Now, of our bodies, men are masters; but over our souls, wickedness and the passions have the dominion. And we may speak of freedom in the same manner. For one kind of freedom gives fearlessness of body in respect of any dangers which can come upon it from men of still more powerful body; while the other produces peace to the mind, by putting a check on the authority of the passions (Prob. 17).

Philosophers routinely touted slavery to the passions to be more disgraceful than the political condition of slavery, which was an external matter and not a sign of one’s character. The seven brothers, like Eleazar, had no such disgraceful flaw, as the author hopes his hearers would also find to be true among themselves as they recommitted themselves to their ancestral way of life. The restatement of the thesis, which describes self-mastering reason as a faculty “praised in the sight of God,” reintroduces that alternative court of opinion that will figure so prominently in the brothers’ deliberations (see 13:13–17). The author is leading the hearers to evaluate themselves more and more on the basis of their commitment to virtue (rather than actual political status, 13:2) and their acceptability before God (rather than enfranchisement in the dominant culture, 13:3, 13–17). This is not done with a view to promoting a marginal existence vis-a-vis Greek culture, though such might be the result, but rather with a view to elevating the value of fidelity to the Jewish way of life above the value of temporal advancement and advantage. Dupont-Sommer (1939:134) and Hadas (1953:210) suggest that 13:5 is incomplete, which would be a view in keeping with the idea that it is textually corrupt and possibly an interpolation, on the basis of the appearance of μὲv without its corresponding δέ. However, μὲv could be understood here simply as emphatic, which would be appropriate enough as the author concludes his re-assertion of his thesis, eliminating the need for conjecture about the original ending of the verse. Returning to images employed in the encomium of Eleazar (see commentary on 7:3, 5), the author compares the reason of the seven brothers to a fortified harbor bearing the onslaught of the waves of the ocean of passions, making a safe haven for their virtue. The image of a multiplicity of stone pillars creating a single safe haven – indeed, being necessary for the preservation of piety in its harbor – introduces what

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

205

will become a prominent feature of these brothers’ achievement, namely the importance of their corporate harmony, solidarity, and mutual support for the ability of each individually to resist the onslaught of the dominant culture (and the passions it stimulates, whether pleasurable or painful) and remain faithful to the Jewish way of life. This feature emerges immediately as the author invites the hearers into the exhortations of the brothers to one another (13:8–18). This aspect of their contest was already present in 2 Macc 7:5–6, but is here greatly expanded (all the more if one considers separately the mother’s exhortations to her sons, 16:16–23; 18:6–19). The metaphor of the “chorus,” the familiar group of persons speaking with a single voice and acting as a single character in Greek tragedy and comedy alike, aptly captures the harmony and the unity of mind that the author wishes to attribute to the seven. Unity, harmony, being of one mind, and “fellowfeeling” were highly valued virtues among fellow citizens, making for an honorable and virtuous community (see Dio, Or. 48). These were also treasured qualities among friends, friendship among noble people being built upon a common commitment to shared virtues (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.3.6 1156b6–7; 8.8.4 1159b1–7). As might be expected, these qualities were expected among siblings, the closest of friends, who are also compared in general to “a harmonious choir” (ἐμμελὴς χoρóς; cf. 4 Macc 13:8) that will “neither do nor say, nor think, anything discordant” in the household that is whole and flourishing (Plutarch, Frat. amor. 2 [Mor. 479A]). An especially important facet of this kind of harmony is the way it invests the community’s values with a sense of absoluteness, as all the members of the community unite “in conferring both censure and praise, bearing for both classes, the good and the bad, a testimony in which each can have confidence” (Dio, Or. 48.6). This is precisely what the brothers, through their common nurture in the Torah, are able to provide for one another. While individually the flood of fear and pain might have easily caused them to lose sight of the inviolability of piety as the Jewish way of life defines it, the availability of one another as a vocal reference group reinforcing their threatened value system sustains each one’s commitment to those values, and thus, ultimately, the persistence of that very way of life (4 Macc 18:4–5). One can readily see the importance of “harmony” on the part of this alternative group. For the group to speak with different voices would be to replicate the confusion within the individual, and thus fail to provide the external, objectivizing support required for resistance to the “passions.” The social dynamics being described here could easily

206

COMMENTARY

become oppressive if the individual forgets that he or she does in fact have a choice (see, e.g., the discussion of alienation in Berger 1967:81– 101); it can be empowering insofar as it reminds the individual facing the seemingly irresistible coercive measures of the dominant culture that he or she has a choice. It is most suitable, then, that those who hope to “die like brothers” (13:9) would look first to a group of people facing a similar trial, like the three youths in Assyria (Daniel 3), rather than to an individual, like Daniel in the lion’s den (Daniel 6, featured elsewhere in 4 Maccabees). Daniel 3 is a prototype, another story of resisting the impious demands of a tyrant and his coercive measures. Rather than violate the prohibition against idolatry and bowing down to foreign gods, the three bravely face the prospect of a fiery death. The three display the solidarity and unity of purpose that came to be required of the seven, as well as the boldness of speech before a “tyrant” that characterized the seven brothers, collectively in 9:1–9 and individually each in their turn: “If our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the furnace of blazing fire and out of your hand, O king, let him deliver us. But if not, be it known to you, O king, that we will not serve your gods and we will not worship the golden statue that you have set up” (Dan 3:17–18 NRSV). Just as the resolve of these three did not depend on the prospect of deliverance but rather on their absolute loyalty, so the resolve of the seven brothers was built on their commitment to virtue and to remain loyal to God. Indeed, the latter do not even anticipate deliverance on this side of death, looking only to the rewards for the pious in eternity. The description of the trial faced by the three in 13:9 poses serious difficulties for interpretation, even once the textual problems are resolved. The original hand of Sinaiticus requires the reader to understand καιoμέvης as a substantive participle, which the corrector resolves by changing to the noun καμίvoυ, substituting a word that (a) sounds very much like the participle, suggesting that the corrector regarded καιoμέvης to be an error of hearing, (b) well suits the context of the trial faced by the three youths in Assyria, and (c) brings Sinaiticus in line here with other known textual traditions (e.g., Alexandrinus). It is an improvement, though perhaps not a necessary one. The question of how the adjective ἰσoπoλίτιδoς (the correction here was grammatically necessary) fits in remains difficult. The LSJ supplement adds the reference to 4 Macc 13:9 under ἰσoπoλῖτις with the simply annotation, “sense unclear.” Hadas (1953:211) and the NRSV treat it as “same ordeal,” based, presumably, on an emendation to a form of ἰσoπαλής (see Klauck 1989a:737).

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

207

In light of the importance of Diaspora Jews’ struggles for “equal citizenship” (ἰσoπoλιτεία) in Greek cities (see Josephus, A.J. 12.3.1–2 §§119–128; 19.5.2 §§278–85), not to mention the anti-Jewish pogroms that sometimes erupted as a response to Jews’ attempts to gain equal citizenship, it would be appropriate to read this verse as a kind of response to this situation and to the ambition that undergirded it. The “equal citizenship rights” that ought to be prized, for which one ought to endure significant struggles, and in which one ought to invest oneself fully, are those shared among citizens of the Mosaic covenant, those binding together the heroes of the book of Daniel, the martyrs of the Hellenization crisis, and the audience of 4 Maccabees. Indeed, for the first two groups, the fiery struggles set before the citizens of the covenant also led to their enjoyment of “equal political rights” in God’s realm for eternity. The exhortations in 13:10–11 continue to vocalize the group’s censure of one path (yielding to Antiochus at the cost of violating piety) and approval of the other path (i.e., through affirming and encouraging the individuals as they persist down that difficult road). Rather than “prove worthy” of advancement in Antiochus’s world, the brothers are urged by one of their number to prove worthy of their ancestor, Abraham, whence they came. Hadas (1953:211) cites Isa 51:1–2 as another example of appealing to descent from Abraham in an exhortation. In that text, Abraham is also archetypal for the audience, this time as an assurance that the righteous hearers will experience the same kind of blessing and help from God. Just as the patriarch Isaac proved himself worthy to be Abraham’s son by being willing to give up his life if obedience to God required it (13:12), so the brothers are now challenged to do the same. The author refers, of course, to the story of the Aqedah in Genesis 22, relying on later developments of that story that emphasize Isaac’s informed consent (e.g., Pseudo-Philo, LAB 32.2–3), which would make him an archetype of the (potential) martyr. The exhortation in 13:12 will remind the audience as well that they are challenged not to live up to the expectations of non-Jews, but to the models of piety among their own ancestry. In the context of the brothers’ pledging of themselves to a noble death (13:13), the author has recontextualed the phrase ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας from Deut 6:5, the Shema, in which the covenant people are told that their obligation to the Divine Patron involves “loving Yahweh” – being loyal to Yahweh and diligent in the performance of his service – “from your whole heart, from your whole soul, from your whole strength.” The threshold of the torments becomes the opportunity for

208

COMMENTARY

these brothers to renew their covenant with God, and to enact it truly from their whole being, loving God and diligently performing their covenant obligations (“in the interest of the Law”) to the point of giving up their temporal, bodily existence. Such dedication is appropriate and, indeed, necessary in light of the debt that the brothers understand themselves to owe God as the giver of life itself, the supreme Patron to whom the highest level of loyalty and gratitude is due. Since God has given the brothers their “souls” (see Klauck 1989a:738, whose observation of the contrast between ψυχὰς and σώματα in 13:13 makes “souls” preferable to “lives” here), and has given them the privilege of “a share in this world” (16:18–19), they owe God inviolable loyalty, honor, and service. Seneca indicated the scope of gratitude among people who understand virtue: “if you wish to make a return for a favour, you must be willing to go into exile, or to pour forth your blood, or to undergo poverty, or, . . . even to let your very innocence be stained and exposed to shameful slanders” (Ep. 81.27). So intense was the bond of loyalty between patron and client that one must be willing to remain faithful no matter what that entailed for one’s well-being. Thus the brothers were willing to use their “bodies” to defend God’s honor and to preserve their loyalty to their Patron, even as their mother would also advise them that, in light of God’s gift of life, they “ought to endure any suffering for the sake of God” (16:19). Even though it may entail fearful consequences in this life, loyalty to God would be exponentially rewarded and disloyalty would merit worse consequences than any found in this temporary life. In light of this, the brothers may counsel one another not to respond out of fear of Antiochus, who is described as “the one thinking to kill” (13:14), in part drawing on the tradition that no true injury can befall the sage at the hands of the tyrant, in part drawing on the more immediate consideration that the end of this life is not the end of existence. One still has to answer to God for one’s choices and actions (see the strikingly similar logic in Susanna 22–23 and 2 Macc 6:26). Hence the saying of Jesus: “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt 10:28). Such considerations would become central to Christian martyrs, as in Mart. Poly. 11: “You threaten with the fire that burns for a time and, after a short while, is quenched, but you are ignorant of the fire of the future judgement and eternal punishment reserved for the ungodly.” The brothers thus remind each other that to have a higher regard for the authority of a human being to command obedience than for the authority

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

209

of the God of creation to command obedience is to make a fantastically foolish choice. Such a choice would challenge God’s honor, a challenge that would be answered in post-mortem judgment and the satisfaction of God’s honor upon the offending soul. The Greco-Roman world is also familiar with, and ready to praise, people who hold the divine law more inviolable than human laws. Sophocles’ Antigone also chooses to revere the law of God above any human law. When Creon commands transgression of the former, the former must be obeyed in the face of even the extreme compulsion: “I did not intend to pay the penalty among the gods for fear of any mortal’s pride” (Ant. 459–60). The ideological weight that such “piety” brings to the moment of decision is evident here as the brothers set their immediate situation (facing Antiochus and his coercive tortures) and its possible agendas (surviving intact, working out some compromise, and the like) in the context of the “real” crisis of the moment, the “contest of the soul” that is waged between faithfulness to Torah and transgression of God’s Law (see, very similarly, 4 Ezra 7:127–129), the latter path promising far greater loss than anything Antiochus could inflict. The brothers are seen at work comparing respective advantages and disadvantages, which is a topic of wisdom (Rhet. Her. 3.3.4). The comparison of two courses is a fundamental element of deliberative rhetoric: one must be prepared to show that the course one advocates will result in greater safety and honor than the opposing course (see Rhet. Her. 3.2.3; 3.3.4; Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.33). The belief in an afterlife allows for death itself to be viewed as more advantageous than life, if by such a death one can secure a blessed eternity. While capitulation to the Gentile society would bring release from the tensions, pressures, and hostilities, and gain the advantages of full participation in the Greek world, it would alienate their Divine Patron and incur eternal torment (13:15). Honoring God through obedience, even unto death, carries the promise of greater advantage, and so becomes the preferred course. One important reason to prefer being found worthy of Abraham and the patriarchs (13:12) to playing to the dominant culture is that the opinion of the ancestors is eternal. The brothers, in a manner reminiscent of Eleazar’s own expectation of being warmly received by his ancestors (see comment on 5:37; see also 18:23), look ahead to the praise they will receive from “Abraham and Isaac and Jacob” and “all the fathers” (13:17; similar conceptions of afterlife emerge in Luke 16:22–23). To barter such eternal renown for transitory acceptance by the ignorant and vice-ridden Antiochus becomes unthinkable. Once again, 4 Maccabees bears striking similarities to Sophocles’ Antigone

210

COMMENTARY

(Ant. 72–77), who also decides to choose piety with death over capitulation to a tyrant’s law with life, “for there will be a longer span of time for me to please those below than there will be to please those here.” Living up to being a descendant of Abraham (13:12) and to the mark set by all the fathers is extended to include living up to the expectations of the circle of brothers. The values instilled in them from birth will be the basis on which each proves honorable or brings shame on the family (13:18a). Moreover, the surviving brothers are challenged to live up to the mark of each brother that has died (13:18b), whose costly achievement would be betrayed and undone were any surviving brother to desert their family’s values and yield to Antiochus. The audience might well once again hear these words as being addressed to them, calling them so to live as to preserve the honor of such martyrs, whose death would have little meaning if, only a few generations later, their descendants, whose faith they preserved at such cost to themselves, would relinquish the precious Torah under far less pressure. From 13:19 to 14:1, the author focuses very specifically on the topic of “fraternal affection,” the love that sisters and brothers share with one another, a topic naturally flowing from the logic of 13:18 by explaining the origins of that attachment that would lead a person to value remaining spiritually connected and true to one’s dead siblings more than life itself. Several classical and post-classical discussions of φιλαδελφία have survived, most notably Plutarch’s complete treatise De fraterno amore (Mor. 478A–492D) and a brief discussion by Aristotle in his Nicomachian Ethics (8.12.3–4 1161b30–1162a2; 8.12.6 1162a9–15), where he treats sibling love as a type of friendship. Nearly every detail of the discussion of “the affection of brotherhood” in 4 Macc 13:19–14:1 is represented also in these and other non-Jewish texts, showing on the one hand how fully the author has learned from and accepted the findings of non-Jewish sources and, on the other hand, making the point at which this author’s treatment departs from the customary scope of the discussion stand out all the more clearly. The numerous συv- compounds running throughout the whole passage (vv. 21, 22 [bis], 23 [bis], 24, 27 [bis]; see Klauck 1990:153) underscore the interconnections between “shared” experiences and “fellow” feeling. The opening verses (13:19–21) focus on the biological foundations for affection and friendship among brothers. The dual focus on the father’s generative seed and the mother’s nurturing womb as two sources from which brotherly and sisterly affection grows is found much earlier in Xenophon: “Those springing up from the same seed, nurtured by the

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

211

same mother, growing up in the same house, loved by the same parents . . . how would these not be most intimate of all?” (Cyr. 8.7, 14). Aristotle, for whom “likeness” is the essential basis of friendship, also underscores the common “stock” and “blood” that unites brothers and makes them “like” one another as the source of their uncommon friendship: “Brothers love each other as being from the same source [i.e., the same parents], since the identity of their relations to that source identifies them with each other, which is why we speak of ‘being of the same blood,’ or ‘of the same stock,’ or the like; brothers are therefore in a manner the same being, though embodied in separate persons” (Eth. Nic. 8.12.3–4 1161b30–34) The mother is an especially important focal point for providing brothers and sisters with the shared experiences and shared resources that foster “identity” with one another (13:20–21). Being formed in the same womb, and fed by the same nourishing blood before birth and nursing from the same springs thereafter (the translation above attempts to strike a balance between the active but problematically transitive sense of Sinaticus’s original reading and the corrector’s necessary emendation), channels the brothers’ affection toward a more closely-knit bond. Sinaiticus describes this process as a “compacting together” of the brothers, which is actually much more appropriate to the topics of fraternal unity, harmony, and solidarity that will be invoked so heavily by the author than the more neutral “they were nursed together” favored in Rahlfs’s critical text. The disproportionate space assigned to the mother vis-a-vis the father here in nurturing brotherly and sisterly love anticipates the mother’s importance in the brothers’ martyrdoms, where she again provides a focal point and a source of strength for their commitment to resistance against the tyrant. She will keep them mindful of the values on which they were nurtured and in accordance with which their character took shape (16:16–23; 18:6–19), helping them to continue now to walk in line with those virtues maintaining a united front (see especially 10:2; 11:15). Alongside nature, nurture contributes significantly to the growth of affection among siblings (13:22), a topic also well attested in non-Jewish Greek literature. Aristotle observes that “friendship between brothers is also greatly fostered by their common upbringing (τò σύvτρoφov),” reflected in the maxim “familiarity breeds fellowship” (Eth. Nic. 8.12.3–4 1161b34–36 LCL), attributing the greater affection that exists between siblings than between other friends to the fact that siblings “have been brought up together and educated alike,” and are thus “more alike in

212

COMMENTARY

character” (Eth. Nic. 8.12.6 1162a12–15 LCL). Similarly Plutarch affirms the role that sharing “with each other their studies and recreations and games” plays in uniting the souls of siblings, though separated in body (Frat. amor. 5 [Mor. 480B–C]), and the way that “common nurture (συvτρoφίας) and common life together (συvηθείας)” binds them together (Frat. amor. 7 [Mor. 481B]; cf the language used in 4 Macc 13:22). In 4 Maccabees, it is specifically their formative education (παιδεία) in the Torah and shared practice of the Jewish way of life that contributes to their sense of solidarity with one another, or being “like” in a way that they could never be with non-Jews. It is telling that, at this point, the author has involved himself and his hearers in this “practice in God’s Law” (13:22), qualifying it as τῆς ἡμετέρας . . . ἀσκήσεως. The hearers’ “identity” with the brothers through their shared formation reminds them that they do, in fact, belong to a larger “band of brothers and sisters” who are called to realize the love and duties of kinship toward one another as these seven brothers did – encouraging one another on to honorable, if costly, behavior within the context of the covenant. The third stage of the brothers’ formation as “friends” among whom “brotherly love” was brought to perfection involved their shared excellence of character (13:23–26). Aristotle recognized that “the perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue” (Eth. Nic. 8.3.6 1156b7–8 LCL). Virtuous people, in “being true to themselves, also remain true to each other” (Eth. Nic. 8.8.5 1159b2–7 LCL). Commitment to the same virtues and goals will ensure that such friends will not drift away from one another in different directions, nor pull a friend in a direction contrary to his or her values, but rather will cooperate as they move, ethically speaking, in the same direction. The author of 4 Maccabees underscores the pursuit and formation of virtue that cements and augments these brothers’ friendship, pointing to their practice of “the same moral excellences” (τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρετὰς), their formation in “the just life” (τῷ δικαίῳ βίῳ), their “common zeal for nobility and goodness” (ἡ ὁμoζηλία τῆς καλoκἀγαθίας, notably invoking one of the loftiest Greek expressions of virtue), and, finally, their “piety” (εὐσεβείᾳ). Once again, it is their formation in line with the Jewish Torah that has made it possible for these brothers to achieve the ideals of friendship and sibling love treasured by Greek ethicists. Shared essence, shared experience, and shared values (see 13:27a) endow the seven brothers with “goodwill” and “harmony” toward one another (εὔvoια καὶ ὁμόvoια, 13:25). Plutarch’s treatise is thoroughly suffused with these values (on ὁμόvoια, see Frat. amor. 479A, 483D, 490E–F;

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

213

on εὔvoια, 479D, 480E, 481C, 482B–E, 483C, 487E–F, 491A–B, E; citations from Klauck 1990:153). The brothers have exhibited, and continue to exhibit, the ὁμόvoια violated by the innovators in 3:20–21. Continuing to be governed by the Law after the destruction of the Judean polity, they contribute directly to its restoration. Since ὁμόvoια is both a civic and a familial virtue, and since the Jewish people could think of itself both as a nation and as a family, this becomes another point at which the audience would be drawn in to see the seven brothers as a pattern for their imitation, and to hear their challenges to one another as challenges to them as well to remain loyal to – and help one another remain loyal to – their ancestral way of life and the Law that binds them together as family. The climax and purpose of the author’s digression on fraternal affection comes in 13:27–14:1. Seeing their brothers maltreated, tortured, and killed put a tremendous strain on the commitment of the seven, making their feelings for one another a peculiar challenge to reason’s mastery in this situation. Klauck (1990:155) suggests that “for the sake of brotherly love the seven brothers would have had to save their lives for one another’s sake by eating meat offered to idols.” They would have spared each other the pain of seeing them die, and acted so as to be spared the same pain – pains that two sisters in Plutarch’s treatise “On the Bravery of Women” would agree were “more grievous than death” (Mulier. virt. 15 [Mor. 253D– E]). Not only did they overcome their own feelings enough to watch one another die, however; they did so to such an extent that they were able to encourage one another to submit to death by torture rather than violate the values which had been implanted and which bound their family together (14:1). In so doing, they perfect the particular species of friendship called fraternal love, since friends “actually restrain each other from evil: since good men neither err themselves nor permit their friends to err” (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.8.5 1159b2–7 LCL). They place a higher premium on piety and fidelity, using their brotherly ties to hold each other to the course of justice toward God, courage in the face of coercive pains, and honor for themselves and their nation. Such examples of bravery among siblings is far from unknown in Greek literature. Plutarch tells the story of two daughters of a deposed tyrant who are allowed to commit suicide rather than be raped and murdered by the soldiers. The elder daughter encourages the junior to accept the course that is necessary for the preservation of honor, and even agrees to die last so that she can help her sister hang herself and bear the pain of watching a sister die herself (Mulier. virt. 15 [Mor. 253D–E]). Such actions

214

COMMENTARY

require, however, that the natural affections of siblings be restrained for the sake of providing the required moral support for one’s siblings that the moment requires. Part of the genius of the Jewish philosophy is its efficacy in training people consistently to put virtue ahead of natural affections (or the opposite; see 2:10–14). Having come to the point of their achievement, their mastery of fraternal affection, the author bursts out into apostrophe, moving more fully into an encomiastic mode in 14:2–10. He begins by addressing the brothers’ reasoning faculties (plural) using the familiar topic of the freedom of the sage (see, e.g., Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.152) and the kingship of the sage (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 7.122; Stobaeus, Eth. 2.222). The sage is “freer than free persons” because he or she has “put a check on the authority of the passions,” not allowing them to enslave him or her (see Philo, Prob. 17; 4 Macc 13:2). The author of 4 Maccabees would agree with Philo that only the person “who has God for a leader” (Prob. 20) truly attains freedom, since it is regard for God that ultimately allowed the brothers to rise above the dictates of the passions (13:14–15). This emphasis on freedom, incidentally, clues in the reader to the driving interest behind the discussion of mastery of the passions, namely securing the dignity of the human being who cannot be driven to degrading action either by his or her own less worthy drives from within or by coercive measures from without. Returning to topics more particularly connected to the ethos of brothers and sisters, the author praises their “harmony” (συμφωvία), or perhaps praises them as a holy “orchestra” (another well-attested, less abstract use of the noun) well-tuned in regard to piety. Plutarch especially stresses the agreement, harmony, and solidarity of siblings, speaking of their working out of their practical affairs as analogous to one soul making use of the various members of the body (Frat. amor. 1 [Mor. 478C– D]). Their separateness from one another is meant for better co-operation, like the fingers of a hand, rather than opposition (Frat. amor. 2 [Mor. 478E]). The author of 4 Maccabees uses the same image of the several limbs of the human body moved by a single mind to express the agreement of the seven brothers in their commitment to piety (14:6). Plutarch also shares with our author an affinity for musical similes for the ideal relationship of siblings. The “concord of brothers” unites a household “like an harmonious choir” (ὡς ἐμμελὴς χoρóς; see 4 Macc 13:8), in which they “neither do nor say, nor think, anything discordant” (Frat. amor. 2 [Mor. 479A]). It is telling, in this regard, that in both the brothers’ hypothetical speech and their real speech the author takes it as

4 MACCABEES 13:1–14:10

215

a given that, whichever way they go, the one impossibility is that they would disagree with one another (e.g., some opting for life as Greeks, others for death as Jews). The sources of the brothers’ remarkable unity have been explored by the author in 13:19–26; here it merely remains for him to celebrate their complete achievement of the Greco-Roman ideal. The success of each individual brother in resisting the compulsions and enticements of the dominant culture’s representatives depends in large measure upon their mutual support and encouragement (14:7–8). It is their solidarity and the way in which they are able to strengthen one another’s resolve that allows them to “run the course toward immortality” (14:5), an image that becomes a favorite among New Testament authors linked with the Pauline circle (Phil 3:12–14; Heb 12:1; 2 Tim 4:7). Specifically, the brothers become the reference group in this situation that keeps the Jewish world view (e.g., the belief in an afterlife and the conviction that fidelity to the group’s way of life now leads to blessedness then) “real” and “plausible” for each individual brother (in the face of competing, grossly coercive reference groups that deny the viability of the same), and hence make the investment of endurance and the sacrifice of life itself remain the “advantageous” and even “necessary” course of action. The brothers’ solidarity becomes the model for the Jewish community/ies hearing/reading this text, as the audience is challenged to display the same laudable harmony and, on the basis of those shared values, to reinforce each member’s commitment to continue in those values. The NRSV removes the difficulty the modern reader would encounter with the numerology of 13:8 by reading “the seven” (τὴv ἑβδoμάδα) as a modifier of “fear” (τòv . . . φόβov), yielding “the sevenfold fear,” despite the lack of grammatical agreement. The author’s meaning, however, is to be sought rather in the special veneration given to the number seven. Philo (Opif. 90–128) celebrates at length the mathematical, musical, geometrical, astronomical, physiological, and human-developmental virtues of the number seven, taking his starting point from the story of creation, just as the author of 4 Maccabees does (14:7b). The points at which Philo’s excursus touch most closely upon 4 Maccabees are in his discussions of music and astronomy. In the former (Opif. 95–96, 107), Philo stresses the relationship of the number seven to the various harmonies that are the most basic to Greek music (i.e., the octave, the double-octave, and the third); in the latter (Opif. 112–117), Philo emphasizes the “natural sympathy” that exists between the movements of the seven planets and the natural processes of the earth (e.g., tides, agricultural seasons, and so

216

COMMENTARY

forth). He even brings the two realms together in his discussion of the seven-stringed lyre (Opif. 126), speaking of the “admirable harmonies” produced by the instrument thus in tune, as it were, with the cosmic seven. Against this background, we may hear the author of 4 Maccabees most appropriately harnessing the associations of the number seven with “harmony” and “sympathy” for his celebration of the ways in which the seven brothers enacted fraternal love, unified in their commitment to God and God’s Law, feeling natural sympathy for one another but not expressing this in ways contrary to God’s ordering of their lives by the Torah. The author concludes his reflection and encomium on the seven brothers with a topic of amplification in 14:9–10. If the hearers have been disturbed by the mere narration of the brothers’ trials and tortures, how much more agonizing must they imagine the brothers’ experience to have been, who were at the scene to hear the dire threats (and thus have to master quite justifiable fear) and to experience the sufferings steadfastly (and thus have to master the physical pains). As a secondary level of amplification, the author dwells on the peculiarly acute pain inflicted by fire (a prominent feature of many of the martyrdoms) as a way to further heighten the audience’s appreciation of the martyrs’ selfmastery in the face of such agonies. These verses help modern readers understand why the author must develop the scenes of torture in such gruesome detail, so distasteful to many. It is specifically to allow the audience to understand that there is in fact no passion, no pain, no fear that the pious-minded person cannot overcome if he or she keeps the eyes fixed on his or her duty to God and on God’s promise to the faithful. These verses are also an important corrective against the notion that the martyrs have suppressed the experience of pain rather than actually experiencing it (see comment on 11:24–25). The lengthy narration of the brothers’ martyrdoms and the author’s reflection upon their achievement in their death has the potential to impact the audience quite strongly. As part of a larger kinship group themselves, bound together and “like one another” insofar as they share a common descent from Abraham, a common heritage, and a common way of life, the Jewish audience could perceive the attitudes, solidarity, and mutual encouragement of the brothers (their representative nature already signaled by the symbolic nature of the number seven) as the expression of their own obligations to one another. The descendants of Abraham are invited to rediscover the “harmony” proper to sisters and brothers (3:21; 13:25; 14:3–8) in renewed commitment to their training in

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

217

the Torah, and to enact the ideal of friendship as they encourage one another to remain steadfast in their piety (i.e., commitment to Torah) and help one another avoid vice (i.e., capitulation to the dominant culture at the cost of maintaining the covenant inviolable). Finally, the example of the brothers’ commitment in the face of the most extreme emotional and physical pain will put their (almost always) lesser contests in perspective, assuring them that there is no desire or sensation or feeling to which they will be exposed that they cannot endure for the sake of God. 14:11–15:32

Reason Masters Parental Affection

The steadfastness of the mother of the seven brothers provides the climactic inductive proof in the author’s “narrative demonstration.” The author’s source also singled out the mother for special admiration (2 Macc 7:20–23), drawing attention both to the firmness of her own convictions and to her words of encouragement to her sons to die for the sake of loyalty to God. The author of 4 Maccabees expands both facets as he creates a complete encomium for her endurance and commitment to virtue. Not all writers believed it appropriate to speak openly about women, even in praise. Thucydides, for example, concluded his report of Pericles’ funeral oration with the following words about female virtue: “great is her glory of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame” (Hist. 45.2). The author of 4 Maccabees, however, aligns more closely with Plutarch, who favored “the Roman custom, which publicly renders to women, as to men, a fitting commemoration after the end of their life,” specifically in contrast with the Thucydidean school (Mul. Virt. Introduction [Mor. 242F]). The virtues of men and women were, in Plutarch’s view, identical (Mor. 243A), such that the study of how virtue manifested itself in both genders led to clearer understanding of virtue tout court (Mor. 243C). While upholding traditional, domestic virtues for women (see 18:6–9), the author of 4 Maccabees is not reticent to explore how a woman perfected virtues normally associated with males (especially “courage” as “manliness,” ἀvδρεία; see 15:30). It is likely, however, that several factors are at work in his decision to dwell on the mother’s mastery of her passions, not least of which is the deeply-rooted prejudice that the female is more disposed to be led astray by the passions, possessing a less effective reasoning faculty than the male (see Aristotle, Pol. 1.13 1260a12–14). This prejudice persists in post-classical authors, among

218

COMMENTARY

whom the male continues to represent the mind or reasoning faculty, the female the lesser faculties of perception (as in Philo, Leg. 2.44–50) that are the more susceptible to be led astray by pleasure and other passions. The hierarchy of the household becomes the model for the internal hierarchy of the faculties of each human being: where the male faculty (“reason”) rules the female faculties (“sense perception” and the like), the person retains virtuous integrity; where the reverse happens, the person falls into the disarray of vice. The author capitalizes on this view of the genders in order to support his thesis: it should not amaze us that “reason” had such command “over these males” (τῶv ἀvδρῶv), since “even a woman’s mind (καὶ γυvαικòς voῦς) was able to master more diverse agonies” (14:11). The crowning achievement of the Jewish way of life is the way it provides such discipline that “even a woman’s mind” (by implication, “and we know that this is naturally less suited to the ideal of self-mastery”), shored up by the defenses of piety, can master the passions. The author amplifies the force of “love of offspring,” especially as this manifests itself in mothers (see 14:13–19; 15:4–10), in order to show why her trial was even more severe than that of each of her sons (14:12), even though she was never physically tortured herself. Maternal love is presented as the most powerful of emotions, and so the story of its mastery will provide the climactic demonstration of the thesis (16:1–2). Once again, the author shares much material in common with Plutarch, notably his treatise De amore prolis (“On Affection For Offspring”) 1–3 (Mor. 493B-4896A; see also Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.12.2–3 1161b17–29). 4 Maccabbes 14:13–19 introduces lessons from the animal world about the innate drive to protect one’s young (archetypally, from the birds and the bees). Popular philosophy looked to Nature to learn what it meant to “live according to Nature” in regard to particular questions: “For in dumb animals Nature preserves their special characteristics pure and unmixed and simple, but in men, through reason and habit, they have been modified by many opinions and adventitious judgements so that they have lost their proper form” (Plutarch, Am. prol. 1 [Mor. 493C]). This tendency is reflected also in Wis 7:20, which sets out the study of the “natures of animals and the passions of beasts” as part of the education of the philosopher-king (Dupont-Sommer 1939:138), presumably not for an interest in zoology for its own sake as much as for what the animal kingdom can teach about the just and effective governance of human kingdoms. The correspondences with Plutarch’s discussion of the love of parents

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

219

for offspring are quite close. Both feature birds as especially instructive examples of parental love at work in the natural world, Plutarch also using them as examples of parents building the optimal nests for protecting young (Am. prol. 2 [Mor. 494A–B]; cf. 4 Macc 14:15–16) and putting themselves in harm’s way to save their young when a predator approaches (Am. prol. 2 [Mor. 494E–F]; cf. 4 Macc 14:17). Both include the mention of bees in this conversation, though only the author of 4 Maccabees develops them as examples of natural love for offspring (again, striving to protect their young to the death; 14:19; see Am. prol. 2 [Mor. 494A], where Plutarch seems to dismiss the “bee” as an all too familiar topic in “natural ethical philosophy,” looking instead to the more exotic and often overlooked examples). The examples from nature highlight what the mother’s natural inclinations would be, namely to protect and to save her children from the threat to their well being by any means necessary. She would yearn to take their place, to attract the assaults of the torturers to herself if that would spare them; failing that, all her natural instincts would scream at her to counsel her sons to secure their safety and wholeness at any price, including capitulation to the tyrant’s demands. The author wants to emphasize that these yearnings come from deep within a mother, involving her whole body in the agonies of parental love when offspring are in danger or in pain (14:13). The biological basis for this deep feeling will emerge throughout 15:1–16:13, involving the womb that carries the children, the birth pangs racking the whole abdomen and genitalia, the nurturing breasts (15:6–7; 16:7–8), biological factors that are also not lost on Plutarch (Am. prol. 3 [Mor. 495D–496C]; Lib. ed. 5 [Mor. 3D]). What is astounding in her case, then, is that she rises above these instincts for the sake of the moral integrity of her sons and, indeed, for the sake of their preservation for eternity. Indeed, it is specifically the latter that, the author asserts, enabled her to master her deep yearnings to save her children (15:2–3, 8). The author therefore describes her as “like-souled with Abraham” (14:20; see also the invocations of Abraham’s example in 13:12; 15:28; and 16:20), the patriarch who also did not allow compassion and affection for his son to move him to disobedience against God, whose determination and piety the mother now embodies (Seim 2001:32). Appropriate to the encomiastic tenor of his reflections on each of the episodes of martyrdom, the author interjects his first apostrophe into his praise of the mother’s achievement as well (15:1; see also 15:13, 16–20, 29–32; for the apostrophe to Eleazar, see 7:6–7, 9–10, 15; to the

220

COMMENTARY

brothers, see 14:2–3, 7). Dupont-Sommer (1939:139) suggests that the first line (ὦ λoγισμὲ τέκvωv παθῶv τύραvvε) is out of place as it stands, since it interrupts the reflection on the mother’s achievement with an ejaculation in praise of the brothers’ achievement. He suggests that the word τέκvωv (which he would further emend to φιλoτέκvωv; so also Breitenstein 1978:194) be taken as a modifier of παθῶv, yielding “O reason, tyrant of the emotions felt toward the children” (or, emended, “tyrant of the emotions of affection for children”). This suggestion has in its favor the parallelism that would result with the following phrase, in which εὐσέβεια stands absolute as well. Against it is the contrived reading of τέκvωv (or, worse, the need to emend the text). The literary problem Dupont-Sommer observed is eliminated if we understand the children’s achievement to be part of the mother’s achievement: the steadfastness of their reason is the result of her godly training and her model of putting piety ahead of all other considerations (15:17 would explicitly support such an interpretation). The author is especially interested in the internal deliberations going on within the mind of the mother as she considers the “two options lying before her” (15:2) or, later, which of the two ballots she is to cast (15:26). The topic is only introduced in 15:2–3, returning in 15:8, 25–28. Prominent in these deliberations is the weighing of advantages and disadvantages in connection with the consequences of two courses of action (urging her sons to hold fast versus imploring them to yield to Antiochus). Weighing the respective advantages of two possible courses of action, both in terms of what makes for safety (providing “some plan or other for ensuring the avoidance of a present or imminent danger”) and what leads to honor, is central to deliberation in classical rhetoric (see Rhet. Her. 3.2.3; Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.33), and is a primary arena in which the virtue of “wisdom” manifests itself (Rhet. Her. 3.3.4). The author of 4 Maccabees calls attention to the focal point of the mother’s deliberation being the “temporary” versus the “eternal” advantage that distinguishes the two options (as in 4 Macc 13:14–15). The value of the “deliverance” she might effect for her children by urging capitulation is qualified as merely “temporary” (σωτηρίας πρoσκαίρoυ, 15:2; τὴv πρόσκαιρov σωτηρίαv, 15:8) or lasting “for a short time” (πρòς ὀλίγov χρόvov σωτηρίαv, 15:27). Their death now in line with piety, however, would lead to “eternal life” (εἰς αἰωvίαv ζωὴv, 15:3) “by the favor of God” (See LSJ 883 col. 2 for this sense of κατά when followed by a divinity in the accusative case). In choosing the latter course of action, she is able to “give rebirth for immortality to each of her sons” (16:13). She properly models both “fear of God” in that she will not provoke God

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

221

by treating Antiochus as more weighty and worthy of obedience than the Almighty (15:8; see 13:14–15 for similar reasoning), in which she replicates the piety of “godfearing Abraham” (15:28), and “faith/fulness toward God” (15:24), trusting God’s promises of life for the righteous (15:3; see the catena in the mother’s second speech, 18:11–19) and resolving to act loyally toward the Divine Patron for the sake both of past and future graces (see 16:18–19, 22). Orators would be sensitive to contrasting short-term gain before longterm pain with its converse; it would fall mainly to philosophers (like Plato at the conclusion of the Gorgias) and to speakers in the Jewish and Christian minority cultures to transpose this to an otherworldly venue in which one might choose hardship in this life for the sake of security in the life of the world to come, or the afterlife (see, for example, Susanna 22–23; 2 Macc 6:26; 2 Cor 4:16–18; Heb 11:24–26). Such logic would be especially well fleshed out in Stobaeus, Ethica 2.420 (attributed to Eusebius; quoted in Townshend 1913: 674): We ought not therefore for the sake of a brief, uncertain, and transitory pleasure to choose great evils which endure for all time, and, in a life which is of the briefest, injure the after-life which is immensely long, nor yet, fearing a short pain, should we loose hold on great blessings which endure for all time and on the happiness of the immensely long life which comes after this world.

The strength of the mother’s rational faculty, fortified by considerations of piety, is amplified by further consideration of the weight of nature pressing down upon her in regard to the feelings of maternal love it has implanted deep within her. This is in part due to the “likeness” to oneself that parents imprint upon a child, “likeness” being the essence of affection and friendship according to Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 8.8.5 1159b2–3). The author echoes the Stoic observation that children resemble their parents not only physically, but morally and psychologically as well. Thus Cleanthes asserts that “we become like our parents not only according to the body but also according to the soul, in the passions, in the habits, and in the dispositions” (SVF 1.518, translation mine), while Pseudo-Plutarch reports that Stoics “maintain that seed derives from the entire body and from the soul and that likeness in form and character is molded from the same origins, appearing to the beholder like an image painted with the same colors” (Plac. Philos. 5.11.3, as translated in Hadas 1953:220; also SVF 2.749). Such “likeness” makes both fathers and mothers cherish their offspring, but maternal love is the greater of the pair. The translation

222

COMMENTARY

above follows Rahlfs, reading πατέρωv (attested in Venetus) in place of the second τῶv παθῶv in Sinaiticus 15:4, which makes no sense here. In favor of the former reading is the commonplace that mothers love children even more tenderly than fathers on account of having carried them for nine months, having that additional and intimate time to become attached to their offspring (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.12.3 1161b20–28; see also Euripides, Frag. 1015: “The mother, however, always loves the children more than the father”), and on account of the labor pains they suffer, which is clearly what the author intends to invoke in this verse (taking the first τῶv παθῶv in 15:4 as a genitive of source). The emphasis here on the natural process of pregnancy and gestation as nature’s means of implanting “maternal affection” is quite in keeping with Xenophon’s connection of the natural nurturing role of the mother with her greater affection for the children. This affection was divinely implanted, presumably to insure that she would in fact fulfill that natural function: “God, knowing that He had implanted in the woman and imposed upon her the nurture of newborn babies, endowed her with the larger share of affection for the newborn child than He bestowed upon man” (Xenophon, Oec. 7.24). Plutarch’s views on the subject, centuries later, remain quite similar (Am. prol. 3 [Mor. 496A]: the biological apparatus would by itself benefit the child nothing “if Nature had not implanted in mothers affection and care for their offspring”). Surprising, in light of so many other correspondences, is the reticence of the author of 4 Maccabees to link breast-feeding to the cultivation of the same (compare Plutarch, Lib. ed. 5 [Mor. 3D]), though he by no means avoids the subject (see 4 Macc 16:7). The author advances fresh material in his assertion that a mother’s love is not diminished by having many children (as if the same love is being parceled out among many), but actually augmented. Commentators often find the placement of ἀσθεvέστεραι problematic, taking it as a concessive clause meant to stand prior to the ὅσῳ clause (as in DupontSommer 1939:140; Hadas 1953:221). The author, however, intentionally links the two comparative adjectives with a pair of conjunctives (καὶ . . . καὶ . . .) when it would have been quite easy for him to set the first apart with some marker of concession. He may, therefore, be drawing attention to what he perceives to be a link between the constitution of a mother as she endures increasing numbers of pregnancies and deliveries. Since these were indeed times of great danger to the health and life of a mother (indeed, in the West until quite recently, and still in many preindustrial cultures), it seems reasonable to take the author’s sense at face

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

223

value here. The more of their own life and strength they pour into multiple births – i.e., the more they invest their own life into the production of children – the more love they feel toward all their offspring. By such arithmetic, the mother of seven sons would surely qualify, then, as among the most loving of mothers on the face of the Mediterranean. In addition, the author calls attention to the character formation of the sons, which would only endear them further to their mother. Here again the author graces the sons with an association with καλoκἀγαθία (15:9), a highly honorific description of character (see note on 1:8). They exhibit the cardinal virtues (three are mentioned in 15:10), as well as proper devotion to one another and to their mother (presumably also to their father, before his death). Dupont-Sommer (1939:141) observes that the terms φιλάδελφoι and φιλoμήτoρες reappear frequently in Jewish funerary inscriptions of the period, showing the high esteem in which Jews held these familial sentiments (citing CIJ 1.125, 152, 321, 363). To this one might add notice of the throne names of various Ptolemies (Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ptolemy IV Philopator, Ptolemy VI Philometor, Ptolemy VI Neos Philopator) calling attention to their filial or fraternal devotion, and attesting further to the esteem in which these qualities were held. The author thus develops maternal love in the same way he had developed fraternal affection, moving from the natural basis for such love to the moral basis. While the author might have in mind that the mother had opportunity to observe these qualities in her sons throughout their lives, we should also consider that the foregoing narration has set up the audience to consider how they manifested these traits – indeed, perfected these traits – at the end of their lives, since it is then that their obedience to their mother (specifically “guarding what was lawful to the death,” 15:10) is fully realized. The author has already given evidence of their justice, shown in the loyalty and gratitude they maintain toward the God who gave them life (13:13), their self-control in regard to the prospect of advancement and comfort (8:5–7, 23), their courage in the face of fearsome tortures and death (passim), their magnanimity in putting virtuous principles ahead of bodily well-being (e.g., 9:2, 6; 13:13), and their perfection of brotherly love (13:27–14:1); here he adds their love for their mother, such that they also continue to walk in line with the instruction she has instilled in them (15:10; 16:16–23; anticipated in 10:2, 15). The object of the amplification of this mother’s love for her offspring in 15:4–7, 9–10 is to heighten the audience’s appreciation of her resolve

224

COMMENTARY

not to yield to the clamor of her natural and moral love for the seven (15:11, 23, 32; 16:4), a self-mastery so complete that she was able to urge them on to death “for the sake of piety” (reading τῆς εὐσεβείας as an objective genitive with a verbal noun, viz., “dying for piety”) in the interest of maintaining their moral integrity to the end (15:12, as did the brothers in their perfection of fraternal affection, 13:27–14:1). In turn, this will heighten the audience’s appreciation for the way in which their ancestral way of life equips the pious devotee for victory over the most frenzied assaults of the passions (16:1–2). After another apostrophe in 15:13, which makes it clear that the feelings of maternal affection are in every way necessary and admirable (unlike many other passions), the amplification continues by means of ekphrasis (“vivid description”) in 15:14–22, one of the more macabre passages of the entire book. The author verbally assaults the audience with the series of images and impressions that struck the mother visually and audibly as she witnessed the deaths of her boys. The accumulations of images – together with the accumulation of body parts and corpses – brings the horror of the seven discrete episodes of the brothers’ martyrdoms together into a single event, which is exactly how the author wants the audience to understand the mother’s magnified struggle. The staccato rhythms of 15:18, in which the pace of the serial slaying of the sons is quickened, reproduces the waves of agony that the mother endured, rousing the cries of maternal love to a feverish pitch, but also reminds the hearers that she could have changed her mind after witnessing the horror of any one of those experiences to save her remaining sons. It is not, therefore, simply that she endured seeing her seven sons tortured and killed; her passion was augmented in that she witnessed it happening to them one by one, and continued steadfast in her course knowing what had befallen the older sons and anticipating the pain of seeing it befall the younger sons. The details of 15:19 artfully and succinctly capture the personal connection that the mother had with each child as she attended to their eyes and facial expressions, experiencing the agony with them through their eyes (staring “bull-like,” a classical expression for a fixed and intense gaze; Dupont-Sommer 1939:142, citing Aristophanes, Ran. 804 and Plato, Phaedrus 1176), as it were. Some significant textual difficulties occur in 15:20, the verse in which the rhetorical device of accumulation reaches its peak. Where Rahlfs simply reads “the place” (τò χωρίov; the corrector of Sinaiticus essentially agrees, using the diminutive form χoρίδιov [sc. for χωρίδιov]) to describe

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

225

the scene viewed by the mother, Sinaiticus reads “afterbirth” (χόριov). If this is not an error on the part of the scribe of Sinaiticus, it would be a poignant image given the descriptions of biological waste laying around the site. The mother has witnessed her children being turned into the dead waste matter of pregnancy by Antiochus’s soldiers. It is also possible to read Sinaiticus as χoρεῖov by itacismus (as does LSJ 1998 col. 1), suggesting that their “dancing place” (in keeping with the choral imagery used in association with the brothers in 13:8; 14:3, 7; so Townshend 1913:681) has become a place of death. Dupont-Sommer (1939:142) and Hadas (1953:223) read πoλυάvδριov (also in 15:20) as “a place where many people assemble” (LSJ 1436 col. 2), hence “when you saw the place crowded with people on account of the tortures of the children” (translation mine). This word, however, can also be read as identical with πoλυαvδρεῖov (LSJ 1436 col. 2; itacismus would make it indistinguishable in Sinaiticus in any case; so, rightly, Klauck 1989a:745), “mass grave,” a sense that is certainly more in keeping with the emphasis on carnage (especially “corpse upon corpse,” ἐπὶ vεκρoῖς vεκρoὺς) in the preceding phrases (see also the use of the word in the author’s source, 2 Macc 9:4). Given this author’s lack of reserve when it comes to sparing his audience’s sensibilities, I would be inclined to read the Sinaiticus text as inviting the hearers to perceive the space, with the mother, as a place where her children have been transformed into their own afterbirths (i.e., biological waste matter) and the place transformed into their mass grave (even though it would not be their final resting place). The final element of this period of ekphrasis calls attention to the auditory experiences of the mother, listening to her sons screaming out in pain and, quite probably, crying out specifically to her (15:21). The image of sirens, most familiar from the story of Odysseus’s encounter with them (Homer, Od. 12.158–200), underscores the attentiveness of the mother to the experience of her sons (attentive here in listening, as she was in observing in 15:19). Swans make their most melodious song while dying (whence a final performance comes to be called a “swan song”), capturing thus the pathos of the moment as the mother holds in her ears the last sounds her children will make. Fourth Maccabees 15:23–24 returns to the point of these amplifications: as emotionally gripping and internally ripping as the experience was for the mother, her foundation in piety gave her the strength by which to stay her course. Though seeing the various and extreme torments “applied to the children” (reading the second τέκvωv in 15:24 as an objective genitive), she did not yield to her natural maternal

226

COMMENTARY

inclinations. The problems of gender were not lost on the author’s source, who similarly asserts that “she fired her woman’s reasoning (τòv θῆλυv λoγισμòv) with a man’s courage (ἄρσεvι θυμῷ)” (2 Macc 7:21). Here, it is “pious reason” (of course) that makes manly (ἀvδρειώσας) here inner parts (τὰ σπλάγχvα αὐτῆς). The σπλάγχvα are indeed consistently the “center of the emotions” (Klauck 1989a:745), but we have already seen why the focus on the anatomical involvement of a mother’s feelings would be so appropriate and so highly charged. Moore and Anderson (1998:267–268) bring Gospel of Thomas 114 and Philo, QE 1.8 into the discussion of the significance of the mother’s “manliness.” In the first, Mary will be saved by being made male under Jesus’ tutelage, “for every woman who makes herself male will enter the kingdom of heaven.” In the second, “progress [toward virtue] is indeed nothing else than the giving up of the female gender by changing into the male, since the female gender is material, passive, corporeal, and senseperceptible, while the male is active, rational, incorporeal, and more akin to mind and thought.” These texts illumine the praise of the mother in 4 Maccabees, but in a sense each of the martyrs has had to give up his or her female nature (cf. Eleazar’s refusal to give in to “being of an effeminate disposition” in 6:17) in terms of refusing to passively yield to Antiochus and even losing their corporeality as their bodies are stripped away from them. It remains true, however, that “the topos denigrates women’s biology and constructs female gender negatively” (Moore and Anderson 1998:269). Nevertheless, relinquishing that part of the pysche that represents “the female gender” in favor of “the male gender” (in Philo’s psychology) is also a challenge that equally faces men and women in this arena of sufferings. Exhibiting “manliness” in an exemplary way, and in this regard at least becoming more praiseworthy than males for having perfected the virtues appropriate not only for her sex (18:6–9) but for theirs as well (note the striking pun in 15:30, where the mother is more “courageous,” i.e., “manly” [ἀvδρειωτέρα] than “males” [ἀvδρῶv]), the mother disregards her “temporal love for her children.” Translators tend to read πρόσκαιρov in τὴv πρόσκαιρov φιλoτεκvίαv adverbially, e.g., “for the time being” (thus RSV and NRSV). In light of the importance of the word πρόσκαιρov in the discussions of the mother’s evaluation of alternatives throughout this passage, as well as the fact that it is given as a modifier of the noun φιλoτεκvία rather than the verb παριδεῖv, it would be more appropriate to interpret it here as qualifying that noun. It was the temporal side of her love for her children – the aspects that nature had implanted – that

4 MACCABEES 14:11–15:32

227

she had to set aside in order to love them with an eternal love, the love that would give them over to God so as to receive them back again in the presence of God (16:13). The author dramatizes the mother’s internal struggle using the familiar image of the council chamber. Among the orators pressing their case, “Nature,” the guiding principle of the Stoics (and the ultimate authority to which Antiochus appeals in 5:8–9), is found ultimately to be a less reliable guide to virtue than the God-given Law (15:25). Led by Nature, the mother would have been moved to violate piety and slacken courage. Redditt (1983:256) distinguishes between meanings of φύσις in discussions of fraternal and parental affection from its meaning in chapter five as a “structure in harmony with which men [sic] ought to live.” But it is the same φύσις that implants φιλoστoργία and φιλαδελφία into people’s hearts. Redditt’s distinction, then, misses the significance of linking these meanings with regard to the claim being made in 4 Maccabees that nature itself is an insufficient guide to virtue. It leads one to compromise virtue if it gains the upper hand, as it threatened to do here in the otherwise positive emotions of the parental and fraternal love which φύσις implants (as in Plutarch, Am. prol. 3 [Mor. 496A]) and for which it pleads. The author shifts his metaphor from the place of deliberations (the proper activity ἐv βoυλευτηρίῳ) to the law court (where the fates of individuals was decided), placing in her hand two imaginary ballots, probably referring to the white and black stones used to cast votes for life (acquittal) or death (a verdict of guilty), as in Plato, Apology 25 (36A–B). Hadas (1953:224) also cites Aeschylus, Ag. 815–816, even though the method of rendering the decision is somewhat different there (there is only one kind of ballot, the distinction being into which vessel the ballot is placed – the “urn of blood” against Troy, or its opposite urn). In the case of the mother, there is no corresponding sense of guilt or innocence, but only the “sentence.” As before, the sentence of “death” in this world is actually the avenue to “life” for eternity. The mixed metaphor is actually quite appropriate to the scene: on the one hand, the mother must deliberate concerning consequences and advantage, as is typical in the council chamber where policy is decided; on the other, the lives of specific individuals hangs in the balance of her decision, as is typical in the courtroom. Following the dictates of piety and duty toward God rather than Nature, the mother overcomes the “love charms” (φίλτρα; 15:13) of natural affection like Abraham, who also “was fully strengthened to

228

COMMENTARY

conquer all the names and love-charms of family ties,” being “mastered by his love for God” (Philo, Abr. 170). Abraham, well known for his own mastery of paternal affection and attachment for the sake of obedience to God (Genesis 22), naturally rises to prominence in this speech as the archetype for the mother’s endurance (15:28). The mother’s mastery of so many and such great passions, all springing from that most powerful emotion of maternal affection, makes her the “mother of the nation, avenger of the law, and shield-bearer of piety” (15:29). As such, she is the benefactor of the audience as well, since the preservation of their religion is due to her firmness, as well as a maternal figure who unites the whole nation of Jews into one family. The author reinforces at this point his message that the audience should embody the seven brothers’ unity, mutual encouragement in piety, and “ready obedience to the Law” (15:9). The mother as ὑπερασπίστρια, “shield-bearer” for piety, stands in stark contrast to the many times the audience has encountered oἱ δoρυφόρoι, the “spear-bearers” of Antiochus, who have been responsible for the tortures (5:2; 6:1, 8, 23; 8:13; 9:16, 26; 11:9, 27; 17:1). The mother emerges as an important force behind the seven brothers that has empowered their resistance, warding off the many soldiers’ attempts to destroy Jewish piety itself in the person of Eleazar and the seven sons. The author also briefly invokes the athletic imagery that he has previously introduced (see commentary on 11:20) and will develop further in his peroration (see the extended metaphor in 17:11–16), calling the mother the “prizewinner” in this arena of sufferings. The author turns to the story of Noah’s ark (Gen 6:5–8:22), which “bore the world in the universal flood” (15:31; so also Wis 14:6), as a fitting image for the mother’s trial and victory. He has thus rooted the familiar Greco-Roman image of the ship steering straight through the raging seas, used previously in the encomium on Eleazar (7:1–3), in the particular cultural heritage of Judaism. Philo also read the story of Noah’s ark as an allegory of the soul’s struggle for virtue: “And this is truly a great flood when the streams of the mind are opened by folly, madness, insatiable desire, wrongdoing, senselessness, recklessness, and impiety; and when the fountains of the body are opened by sensual pleasure, desire, drunkenness, gourmandism, and licentiousness with kin and sisters and by incurable vices” (QG 2.18; LCL). In the same way, the author applies the story to the mother’s reason, which “endured the waves” of the emotions and passions, preserving the religion of the nation. Enduring becomes salvific, just as the ark’s endurance of the great deluge meant deliverance for Noah and his descendants, and thus the persistence of the race itself.

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6 16:1–17:6

229

The Mother’s Praiseworthy Response and Counsel

The author returns once again to his philosophical thesis (see commentary on 1:1), now using the achievement of the mother as his final proof that a lifetime of training in Torah effects the self-mastery he promises in the same manner as he had previously employed his recollection of the achievements of Eleazar (6:31–35) and the seven brothers (13:1–5). Dupont-Sommer (1939:144) observes that 16:1–4 lacks the scholastic dryness of its predecessors, and therefore finds no need to explain its presence as an interpolation. This argument betrays, however, the subjective basis for Dupont-Sommer’s excision of the earlier passages (perceived inferiority of style only, not coherence of thought; see commentary on 6:31–35; 13:1–5). If one such return to the philosophical thesis be allowed – and one that only applies to the mother rather than looking back to all the martyrs together in retrospect – it becomes all the more likely that all these reaffirmations of the thesis, each falling at the conclusion of the particular martyr story upon which the restatements explicitly reflect, be taken as integral to the oration (see commentary on 1:7–9). Indeed, it may have been the pedantic and overworked nature of the first two affirmations of the thesis (6:31–35; 13:1–5, both following the same pattern of thesis, argument from the contrary, restatement in the positive) that led the author to be briefer and more rhetorically ornate at this point. 16:1, for example, offers a rhetorical “climax” or gradatio (γυvὴ καὶ γερεὰ καὶ . . . μήτηρ; Dupont-Sommer 1939:144), while 16:3 incorporates allusions to historical examples as a means of amplifying the mother’s accomplishment. Daniel and the three young men are very prominent exempla in this text (see also 13:9; 16:21; 18:12–13), their situations being paradigmatic for the challenges faced by the martyrs (the one having been thrown into the lion’s den on account of his piety, the others having faced execution by fire on account of their refusal to accommodate to pagan religion). Their presence in Scripture makes them praiseworthy examples of noble conduct, conduct that is approved by God and therefore to be imitated in the face of new manifestations of exile, enforced apostasy, and persecution, even though the temporal outcome would not be the same. The mother, however, faced trials more grievous than theirs, and still did not yield. Sinaiticus, reading the intensifying pronoun αὐτήv in 16:3, places even more emphasis on the mother’s experience in her own “furnace of fire.” A corrector (followed by R) changes this to αὐτῆς, “her sons,”

230

COMMENTARY

somewhat diminishing the rhetorical force of the verse. Once again “nature” (φύσις, here rendered as “natural bent”) would have compromised virtue and yielded to the passions in this case, making itself a secondary but not ultimate guide to right living (see also 15:13, 25). The author again asserts the value of reasoning in accordance with piety over nature in this regard (16:4) In a manner entirely comparable to his treatment of the seven sons – indeed, even using very similar language to introduce both scenes (δειλόψυχoς εἰ ἡ γυvὴ, 16:5; εἰ δειλόψυχoί τιvες ἦσαv, 8:16) – the author heightens the audience’s appreciation of the mother’s display of courage and resolve by suggesting an alternative response that a weaker person might have offered (16:5–11). The phrase “although being a mother” has occasioned some discussion. Hadas (1953:227) softens his translation to neutralize the concessive nature of καίπερ, turning the woman’s maternity more into a rationale for why she might have indeed proven fainthearted (“being, as she was, a mother”). Such a sense, though clearly contrary to the Greek conjunction, might be defended by pointing to the particular vulnerability to which motherhood exposes women, who are weakest where their offspring are threatened (as indeed the parallels from classical literature to follow show). However, Deissmann (1900:172), taking the καίπερ in its natural sense, argued that the author would not expect a mother to be fainthearted. Dupont-Sommer (1939:145) counters that the author has already called women “weak-spirited” in 15:5, but we have argued above that this is not a pejorative judgment of the moral fibre of women or mothers, but rather a physiological observation. This is made all the more evident in Sinaiticus, which describes mothers as “weaker” (ἀσθεvέστεραv, 15:5), not “weak-souled” (ἀσθεvόψυχoι, as in Rahlfs, the reading also preferred by Dupont-Sommer). Deissmann’s reading remains the best solution: having faced and survived childbirth, any woman who is a mother has already proven an undeniable measure of courage. The fictive lament again shows how deeply immersed in classical literature the author was, since it may be compared point for point with similar laments placed on the lips of mothers in Euripides’s tragedies, especially The Trojan Women. After the Greeks announce their decision to execute Astyanax, the little son of the Trojan hero Hector, his mother Andromache cries out: “In vain and all in vain this breast . . . hath nurtured thee. Vainly I travailed and was spent with toils!” (Tro. 758–760), a lament Cassandra proleptically echoes as she anticipates Achaean parents lingering “in lonely halls without sons, whom for

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

231

nought they nurtured,” Tro. 380–381). The mother is especially comparable to Hecuba, Priam’s widow and reputed mother of fifty sons, who similarly laments the reversal from having many children to having none: “I became a mother of princely sons . . . Yet these I saw by Hellene spears laid low, and shore these tresses at my dead sons’ graves. . . . No hope have I of being seen of them, no, nor of seeing them for evermore” (Tro. 473–488, 503–505; cf. 4 Macc 16:10). The mother’s potential lament that none of her sons would be available to perform their filial duty for her by burying her (16:11) is also prominent in these Greek laments. Hecuba, whose fifty sons were all killed in the war and whose remaining daughters have all been apportioned out as spoils to be taken away by the Greek victors, laments: “Neither son nor daughter, none remains to help the wretched mother, of all born to her” (Tro. 504–505). Once again Cassandra had predicted that, for those Achaeans deprived of their children, “none remain to spill earth’s blood-gift [i.e., pour libations] at their tombs” (Tro. 382). As another, smaller sign of the author’s enculturation in the Greek world, 4 Maccabees, against the explicit “nine months” of its source (2 Macc 7:27), refers to the more Hellenistic “ten months” (Wis 7:2; Virgil, Eclogue 4.61) as the period for gestation (16:7; Dupont-Sommer 1939:145). That a parent’s survival of a child was as bitter then as now is attested also by a Jewish inscription from Rome, in which a mother laments having to give her own son the rites which she desired from him: “A mother did for her sweetest son what he ought to have done for me” (CIJ 1.68; DupontSommer 1939:146). The mother of the seven did not even have the consolation of grandchildren, a source of comfort to which Seneca points in his Consolatio ad Marciam 16.7–9 (Klauck 1989a:748). Yet, the author avers, she did not break down in the face of such loss. The author does not condemn grief as such, nor does he at any point suggest that the mother failed to feel deeply the pains of her children and a mother’s sorrow for their plight. Indeed, she felt those pains deeply (15:6–7, 9, 16, 21, 32), perhaps even more deeply than most (15:6). What, then, would be particularly “fainthearted” were this mother to have lamented with the words of 16:6–11, such that the author finds the dirge unacceptable? The answer is to be found in the way in which the lament denies the value of giving birth, nursing, and raising the children in the first place, with them coming to such an end. Dying for the sake of piety is not an end of life that renders prior investments in that life “profitless”; rather, such a death is ultimately full of profit both for the sons and their mother,

232

COMMENTARY

since she is gaining them, in effect, for eternity (16:13). The mother grieves, but not “as others do who have no hope” (1 Thess 4:13), who do not remain confident of God’s power and favor toward those who die out of loyalty to God. She, like Eleazar, is fully convinced that “those who die for the sake of God live to God” (16:25; cf. 7:19), and therefore does not grieve as if over the lost, betraying her conviction that loyalty to God is in fact always the advantageous course. Her example will challenge the hearers to take a similar stance toward the exponentially less grievous experiences of loss that living in line with Torah would entail in the Greek world, trusting that perceived temporal losses are in fact a small price to pay for the eternal advantages that were accruing. Depicting the mother’s contest, watching her sons die one-by-one, as the onset of a more bitter experience of labor pains (15:16) leads naturally to the image of a new birth, here a “rebirth for immortality” (16:13). The idea of death for the sake of religious commitment as a new birth will become characteristic of Christian martyrology (see Ignatius, Rom. 6.1: “The pangs of a new birth are upon me”; Mart. Poly. 18: “the birthday of [Polycarp’s] martyrdom” is celebrated in the communities reading this text). The image of giving birth anew to her sons also shows that the mother’s attitude was not a violation of parental love, but rather its perfection. She did not try to keep them from the harm to their bodies, but she did strive to defend and preserve them against the assaults of the attackers for eternity. The author returns to his portrayal of the actual response of the mother, using familiar images from the celebration of female courage in antiquity. Plutarch has collected these stories most conveniently in his treatise “On the Bravery of Women” (Mulierum virtutes, Mor. 240C–263C), though he is not the only (male) voice to record extraordinary (female) examples of bravery. Like the women of Chios (Plutarch, Mulier. virt. 3 [Mor. 245A]), who urged their husbands on to continued resistance rather than surrender dishonorably, the mother is depicted as vocally exhorting her children to continue resisting the tyrant rather than incur shame for yielding under compulsion (16:13). Specifically accepting the death of her children for the sake of the values upon which they were raised reflects the attitude of Lacaena, a Spartan mother, who responds to news about her son’s death in battle: “To that end . . . had I borne him, to be a man who should not hesitate to meet death for his country” (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.102; LCL). Like the women of Argos, who took up arms themselves when their men were depleted to the amazement of the enemy and the defeat of the attacking kings (Plutarch, Mulier. virt. 4 [Mor. 245D–E]), the mother

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

233

is portrayed as a “soldier” – and here in Sinaiticus as a commander in the midst of her troops (16:14) – similarly credited with repulsing an invader. Most striking are the similarities between the mother of the seven and the mother Megisto, heroine of Elis (Plutarch, Mulier. virt. 15 [Mor. 252A-C]). The tyrant Aristotimus seeks to undermine an attack by the men exiled from Elis by coercing their wives, whom he imprisoned, to plead with their husbands through letters to abort their purpose. If they refused to comply, he threatened them all with torture and death after killing their children before their eyes. Megisto refused, thinking it proper for the men to put their country’s freedom from tyranny ahead of the lives of their women and children. “Aristotimus . . . ordered her young child to be brought, as if intending to kill him in her sight. As the servants sought for him mingled among the other children playing and wrestling, his mother, calling him by name, said, ‘Come here, child, and before you can realize and think, be delivered from this bitter despotism; since for me it is more grievous to look upon your undeserved slavery than your death’.” The mother of the seven shows the same spirit, urging her children on to death herself just as Megisto summoned her own child, reinterpreting death as an opportunity from God (see 16:16), being willing to endure the sight of the death of her children, and not weakening her resolve in order to spare their lives. Both embody the essence of courage, namely enduring fearful things “for the sake of what is noble” (Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 3.7.2 1115b12). As the women in Plutarch’s work often show themselves more daring than the males in the stories, so the mother demonstrates herself “stronger than a male” (16:14). Once again the author uses the topic of “in deeds and in words,” as in 5:38 and 7:9, to illustrate both the scope of her prowess and the consistency of speech and action. The mother, then, who in no way falls short of the Greek culture’s bravest female heroes – who, indeed, surpasses their achievement in remarkable ways – now addresses her sons “in the Hebrew language” (16:15). Language, especially in a situation of cultural and political hegemony, represents group boundaries, group ideology, and even signals resistance. Under the circumstances, the mother will not even deign to use the language of the oppressive regime, asserting her ideology of resistence in the very choice of language (and most appropriately, since the course of action she promotes is wholly concerned with the preservation of the distinctively Jewish identity and commitments of her sons). The image of the “contest” (ἀγώv), as with the use of athletic imagery

234

COMMENTARY

in minority cultural discourse in general (see commentary on 11:20), transforms the experience of degradation into a struggle to maintain personal integrity and honor, as well as to maintain the honor of the nation whose dedication to piety the brothers represent. Indeed, the mother’s designation of this contest as “noble” suggests that the difficult competition before them is in fact a gracious opportunity provided for them by God. Honor can be won from the experience, if one proves oneself thereby to be a person of virtue. Such usage is thoroughly consonant with the Greek philosophers (who, however, rarely have occasion to apply it to experiences of torture unto death). Plato, for example, writes: “Great is the contest at stake, whether a person is to prove noble or base” (Resp. 10.8 608b). Even closer is the use of the image in Gorg. 526D–E, in which Socrates explicitly renounces “the honors at which the world aims,” seeking to excel only in that “great contest” (ἀγώv) for proving oneself virtuous. The brothers have also renounced the promise of worldly honors that would have made more radical Hellenizers salivate (8:5–7; 12:5), seeking instead to prove noble in the eyes of God and in the eyes of the faithful Jews who have run their course before (e.g., Eleazar, Abraham, Isaac, and all the forerunners in faith; 13:17). The mother’s speech also brings forensic imagery (O’Hagan 1974:95) into her strategic interpretation of the moment. The sons are called to bring forward evidence on behalf of the nation, the author using a technical term from the Attic law courts (διαμαρτυρία). It may be too refined to press the precise nuance of this term, “evidence given to prevent a case from coming to trial” (LSJ 403 col. 1), into this discourse. At the very least, the language shows that more than the martyrs’ own lives are on trial. The martyrs’ actions will testify to the nation’s character and, in particular, to its covenant relationship with God. In this regard, and only in this regard, might the full sense of διαμαρτυρία be appropriate: the martyrs’ faithfulness would prevent a covenant law suit in which God declares the covenant null and void on account of Israel’s disobedience. Their obedience now would bring sufficient “evidence” to the contrary. The discourse has hitherto presented the Jewish heroes as the ideal wise persons or as philosophical sages. As it moves more explicitly into the language of martyrdom, however, it does not depart from this first sphere. Epictetus, for example, also regarded the philosopher as “a witness (μάρτυς) summoned by God,” who will consistently show indifference with regard to external things rather than lament piteously if he or she falls into hard straits or disrepute. Thus the philosopher bears witness to God, that the latter has in fact placed all things good and evil

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

235

within the realm of every person’s individual control. For Epictetus, then, the challenge is not “to disgrace the call (καταισχύvειv τὴv κλῆσιv)” with which God graced the philosopher, proving instead worthy of the honor of such a high calling (Diss. 1.29.44–49). The dynamics here are very similar. The mother sets before her sons’ eyes God’s summons to them as witnesses and as contestants, urging them to rise to the challenges of the moment so that they will prove worthy of the nation, and prove the nation worthy of honor as its representatives as well. The mother’s reasoning is strikingly reminiscent of the arguments the brothers used to encourage one another to face the tortures (13:9–17) and to refuse Antiochus’s offer (9:1–9), suggesting perhaps that she was the source of their pious reasoning and courageous resolve (her speech is placed chronologically prior to theirs). She presents the endurance of Eleazar as the first reason that her sons should “contend eagerly” as well, using logic previously invoked by the seven (see commentary on 9:6–7). Her second supporting proof develops further the argument already observed in 13:13. Those who receive gifts in the ancient world receive at the same time an inviolable obligation to the giver. Gratitude entailed showing honor toward a benefactor (certainly never acting so as to bring him or her into disgrace), remaining loyal to the benefactor (certainly not deserting him or her and siding with those inimical to him or her), and offering the benefactor any services required (see, further, deSilva 2000a:109–119). Ingratitude was universally considered a disgrace (Seneca, Ben. 3.1.1), especially toward virtuous benefactors – and what benefactor could be more deserving of gratitude than God, to whom a person owed existence itself? Aristotle speaks for popular sentiment when he writes “requital in accordance with desert is in fact sometimes impossible, for instance in honoring the gods, or one’s parents: no one could ever render them the honor they deserve, and people are deemed virtuous if they pay them all the regard they can” (Eth. Nic. 8.14.4 1163b15– 18). The duty of gratitude towards benefactors in general, and the gods in particular, was a common topic of justice, with “neither reward nor favour nor peril nor animosity” providing adequate excuse for violating that sacred bond of gratitude (Rhet. ad Her. 3.3.4). The mother explicitly calls to mind her sons’ debt to God, namely that they have received life (16:18). The reciprocity being called for by the mother is represented by the repetition of διὰ τòv θεόv in 16:18 and 16:19. “On account of God” (or “thanks to God”; see LSJ 389 col. 1 on διά followed by a person in the accusative case) the sons enjoyed life; they must now give back their lives “on account of God” (i.e., when loyalty to the latter requires it). Dupont-Sommer (1939:147) suggests that we hear here an

236

COMMENTARY

echo of 8:23, where the brothers (in their hypothetical speech) express reservations about banishing themselves from this present life. The significance of such an echo, of course, is that one cannot rightly enjoy the pleasures of life while showing disloyalty to the Giver of life. The author of 4 Maccabees is thus much more explicit than his source (cf. 2 Macc 7:28) about the debt owed God for life itself as an incentive to fidelity even in the face of extreme deprivation. Greek funeral orations (with which 4 Maccabees has many points in common) would commend the fallen soldiers for having “paid back the fatherland for their nurture” (S. K. Williams 1975:191, citing Lysias, Epitaphios 70); the author here indirectly commends the brothers for paying back God for their existence (as also in 13:13). The mother invokes the examples of Abraham, Isaac, Daniel, and the three young men (cf. 13:9, 12, where the brothers also return to several of these specific stories), presenting each as a model of the fidelity toward the Divine Benefactor that the seven sons are called to have (16:20, 22). Sinaiticus makes the logical connection between Abraham’s nearsacrifice of Issac (see especially Gen 22:10, 12) and the obligations of gratitude more evident. Reading the relative clause at the beginning of 16:20 as “on account of which” (rather than “on account of whom,” as does Rahlfs) focuses attention on these obligations, extending even to substantial sacrifice, as the rationale for Abraham’s willingness to kill Isaac if obedience to God so required. This might weigh against Turid Seim’s affirmation that the emphasis here is not on Abraham’s faith and obedience, but on “unflinching fortitude” in the face of loss and death (Seim 2001:31); the emphasis would rather combine faithfulness, obedience, and fortitude as equal components of the response of piety. Intertestamental Jewish tradition about the near-sacrifice of Issac, the “prototype of the willing victim” (O’Hagan 1974:115), may contribute to nurturing an environment in which the deaths of the martyrs will be understood as an act that brings benefit to Israel in terms of the relationship between Israel and God (see Grappe 2000:345–46). The nearsacrifice of Isaac is understood to have beneficial effects for the people of Israel. In Pseudo-Philo (LAB 18.5), Abraham’s willingness to give God the life of his son results in God’s election of Israel. The same text (LAB 32.2–3) also shows that the sacrifice of Isaac was understood in some sense as a superior sacrifice to the sacrifices of animals. In Targum Neofiti Gen 22:14, Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac (indeed, referred to simply as a “sacrifice” tout court) is presented in a prayer to God as a basis for God’s favorable disposition toward Israel in later periods: “And now, when his

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

237

children find themselves in a time of distress, remember Thou the sacrifice of Isaac their father, and listen to the voice of their supplication. Hear them and deliver them from all tribulation.” The choice of the example of Isaac, like the choice of the three young men in the furnace (see below), may support the discourse at several levels – both as examples of pious loyalty to the Divine Patron and as precedents for understanding an obedient death as an act of atonement (see further the commentary on 6:28–29; 17:20–22). Daniel and his three companions appear yet again (16:21; see 13:9; 16:3–4; 18:12–13) as examples of how to fulfill one’s obligations to God. Daniel did not alter his practice of piety for the sake of a human king’s decrees; so committed to piety was he that he braved death at the mouths and claws of lions (Dan 6:1–28). Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael would not capitulate to idolatry at a human king’s command, refusing to allow even the prospect of being burned alive to sway them (Dan 3:1–30). Especially appropriate to the brothers’ situation is the resolve shown by the three young men, whose resolve did not depend upon a belief that God would rescue them from the flames (Dan 3:16–18). Fidelity to God was an inviolable absolute in their stories, and so it is to be in the brothers’ stories as well. As with the story of the Aqedah, so intertestamental developments of the Daniel cycle also move in the direction of interpreting the obedient death of the righteous as an act that reconciles the people to God. Such a move appears in Prayer of Azariah 15–17, which is certainly early enough to be part of the tradition that would conceivably come to mind for the hearers when the example of the three young men in the furnace is invoked. When the Temple service is interrupted (Grappe [2001:348] rightly observes the commonality here between Pr Azar and 4 Macc 4:19–20), the martyrs pray that they would be accepted as with a plethora of whole-burnt offerings, and that their sacrifice – i.e., their deaths in the furnace – might service an expiatory role (Old Greek ἐξιλάσαι; Theodotion uses ἐκτελέσθαι). The author does not make such associations explicit, but they may nevertheless support his own assertions regarding the deaths of the martyrs on behalf of the nation, effecting reconciliation between them and God. J. W. van Henten observes the role that “illustrious ancestors” play in Athenian funeral orations, providing a point of reference in regard to virtue that both ennobles the descendants of such heroes and sets the mark to which those descendants must measure up. Attention to heroes of the past connects the achievements of recently fallen heroes with “a

238

COMMENTARY

long, glorious tradition which showed the extraordinary character of the citizens of Athens” (van Henten 1995:308). The frequent references by the author of 4 Maccabees to heroes from the Jewish nation can be seen, then, as an attempt to affirm that Judaism falls short of the Greek heritage in no regard, and that each individual act of piety continues, and connects with, a long and glorious tradition of loyalty to the God who called Israel out to its special destiny among the nations. The mother thus presents these examples as setting the mark that her sons must attain in terms of πίστις πρòς τòv θεόv (16:22). The NRSV translates this as “faith in God,” but πίστις can denote the other aspect of a faith-based relationship, namely faithfulness toward God (Pfitzner 1967:64–65). 16:18–19, in which the brothers are reminded of their obligations of gratitude toward their Divine Benefactor, establishes a context in which the attitudes of Abraham, Daniel, and the three will be heard as appropriate responses of loyalty and obedience to God, the same attitude of faithfulness now being called for in the brothers (16:22). “Faith” here thus continues to evoke topics of justice in line with the call to honor God in 16:18–19: “We shall be using the topics of Justice . . . if we urge that faith (fidem) ought zealously to be kept; . . . if we contend that alliances and friendships should scrupulously be honored” (Rhet. ad Her. 3.3.4). πίστις should be understood here, therefore, as “a synonym of the more often used word εὐσέβεια,” which “expresses the loyalty of the martyrs to God and his law” (van Henten 1997:131–132; see also van Henten 1993:125–126; 1997:132). Further, the brothers are urged to “cease to be embittered,” as if at the supposed unfairness of the circumstances. The mother also refused to grieve in this sense, believing that the joys of virtue and rewards of loyalty toward God far outweigh the loss and pain suffered in this life at the hands of the ungodly (see 2 Cor 4:16–18). Instead, they are to be grateful for what they have been able to enjoy of life as a gift from God’s hands, and to discharge through steadfast obedience to God’s Law their obligation to God. The plural participle εἰδότες introduces a second motive that drives the sons to engage the contest bravely, undergirding all the mother’s reasoning as well. Alongside her call not to fall short of the firmness displayed by Eleazar and the faithful heroes of the Jewish Scriptures, the brothers know that life lies on the other side of death for them (see also 7:18–19; 9:7–9; 10:15; 13:17; 14:5). Deissmann (1900:173) and Townshend (1913:682) observe that the nominative form εἰδότες, which does not fit grammatically (one would expect εἰδότας, to agree in case with the

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

239

collective ἕvα ἕκαστov τῶv υἱῶv), is a typical anacolouthon (see, e.g., Rom 13:11 and 2 Cor 1:7). There is therefore no grammatical reason to excise the verse (Dupont-Sommer 1939:148, against Freudenthal 1869:123–124). Josephus describes this conviction as a basic premise of late Second Temple period Judaism: the pious Jew believes with “the firm security God himself affords such a one” that “God hath made this grant to those that observe these laws, even though they be obliged readily to die for them, that they shall come into being again, and at a certain revolution of things receive a better life than they had enjoyed before” (Ap. 2.217–218). The mother’s stirring speech cannot fail to have an impact on the audience as well. She who has already been called “the mother of the nation” (15:29), thus enabled to address the audience as her extended family, challenges all her children to exhibit the faithfulness toward God that God’s beneficence merits. Looking back with gratitude upon God’s gift of life and looking ahead to the hope of eternal life with God for those who remain faithful, the audience is challenge to chart its course through the waters of the Greco-Roman world using these two compass points as their constant reference. Even if they experience some measure of loss or deprivation on account of their adherence to the Jewish way of life, the audience is also “not to be grieved,” for the rewards of covenant loyalty far outweigh any disadvantages they might experience here. In this version of the story, the mother takes her own life so as to avoid being touched by the soldiers (17:1). Dupont-Sommer (1939:148) suggests that the author attributes the report to “some of the guards” because he does not want to attest to its truthfulness himself. His source, 2 Maccabees, gives no specific information about how the mother died, even though that author was not hesitant to portray a suicide as a praiseworthy death (as in 2 Macc 14:41–46). The mother’s suicide is probably the invention of the author of 4 Maccabees, a detail by which he enhances the audience’s perception of her honor (and appreciation of her high-minded concern for her own honor). From a literary point of view, it completes her depiction as a noble, tragic heroine, like Hecuba (whom the mother bested in so many ways; see 16:5–11) who also would have preferred to have thrown herself upon the fiery heaps of Troy rather than live disgracefully as a Grecian’s slave (Euripides, Tro. 1282–1283), or like Evadne, who casts herself onto the pyre of her lover (Suppl. 1012–1071; helpfully cited by Klauck 1989a:749). More importantly, however, it provides her with a way to keep her honor – especially her honor as a woman – intact.

240

COMMENTARY

Suicide is not considered unethical either by Jews or by most GrecoRoman philosophical schools when it is the only means by which to escape outrage and to preserve the dignity of the person (Droge and Tabor 1992:22, 42–44). From Saul’s suicide in 1 Sam 31:4 to the suicide of Razis in 2 Macc 14:41–46 to the suicide speech of Eleazar ben Yair in Josephus’s Jewish War (7.8.6 §§324–34; 7.8.7 §377), death at one’s own hands was far preferable to degrading mistreatment at the hands of sporting enemies (including, in the last example, the dispatching of wives and children to save them from the degradations of rape and slavery). Plutarch (Mulier. virt. 15 [Mor. 253D–E]) relates how two daughters of a deposed tyrant are allowed to commit suicide rather than be raped and murdered by the soldiers, preferring suicide as a means of avoiding ending their lives “in any humiliating way, unworthy of ourselves.” The last example begins to touch on what is of primary concern for this mother, namely preserving her chastity (and even to be handled by these soldiers would have been an assault on the honor of her body). Even though she is lauded for her courage and “manliness,” the mother’s chastity is indispensable to her virtue as a woman (thus the testimony of 18:6–9), which the author thus affords her. The author returns to the device of apostrophe (17:2–6) in his transition from the praise of the mother to the lengthy peroration (17:7–18:24) in which he will laud the achievements of all the martyrs together and exhort the audience directly to rededicate themselves to such rigor in their observance of the Torah that they will achieve similar self-mastery in regard to the passions. In this final apostrophe directed toward the mother alone, the author emphasizes the “glorious solidarity” (DupontSommer 1939:148) of the mother with her seven sons. They were united in their resistance to the tyrant, effecting his downfall (note the return of the topic of “destroying tyranny” in 17:2; see commentary on 1:11); they are now united inseparably beyond death and beyond ordinary space (17:5). The strength that came from such solidarity is well captured in the image of the roof set on seven pillars withstanding the assaults of an earthquake, an image comparable in every way to the coastal metaphors of cliffs or the towers and pylons of a harbor bearing up against the pounding surf (used of Eleazar in 7:5 and the seven brothers in 13:6–7). The seven sons, indeed, reprise their role as πύργoι (towers, 13:6), appearing here as the pillars (στύλoι, 17:3) supporting the roof. At first the image seems to betray the mother’s role in her sons’ torment, providing them with a source of strength, support, and encouragement.

4 MACCABEES 16:1–17:6

241

But in an earthquake, a well-constructed marble roof also braces its supporting pillars, giving them stability and pressing down upon them to keep them from toppling. Architectural observations notwithstanding, we should not overlook the note of mutuality that this image introduces: she was supported in her resolve by the “nobility of her sons and their ready obedience to the law” (15:9–10) and by the fearlessness with which her sons faced their own torture unto death (“gazing bull-like,” 15:19). From his vantage point, from which he is able to “see” the end result of their contest, the author addresses the mother as if still facing her contest, encouraging her to maintain her hope toward God unwaveringly (17:4; compare the strikingly similar language in Heb 3:6, 14). The language of 17:5 confirms the reliability of the mother’s hope, depicting her reunited with her sons in an unshakable eternity. The vindication of her hope is meant to fortify the resolve of the audience as well so that they, reminded of the reality of God’s promise (in part by how much their predecessors were willing to invest in it), may heed her exhortations in their own context as well. The repetition of oὐχ oὕτως in 17:5 could easily be dismissed as an obvious dittography (as the corrector read it). As it stands, however, the repetition would have the effect of assisting the evocation of pathos in the hearers (particularly, admiration) as the author gives voice to the exaltation of the mother and her sons above the heavenly bodies themselves. The imagery in 17:5 is similar to Jewish apocalyptic texts comparing the glory of the righteous to stars at their manifestation beyond death (see Dan 12:3; 4 Ezra 7:97; 1 En. 104:2). J. W. van Henten (1997:183–184) suggests a further correspondence here with Greek views about astral immortality, according to which the stars themselves are living souls (Plato, Tim. 39E; Philo, Gig. 2.8), among whom the noble dead find a welcome: “every good soldier knows that souls set free from the flesh on the battlefield by the sword are given a welcome by the purest element, ether, and set among the stars, and that as friendly spirits and gentle heroes they appear to their own descendants” ( Josephus, B.J. 6.1.5 §47, cited by Klauck 1989a:750). The author makes no claims about the relation of the martyrs’ souls to the stars, of course, using these images rather as a means of affirming the honor and the glory that they now enjoy, having been received in the presence of the God for whom they endured so nobly. This is the court of opinion that truly counts, for its verdicts are accurate (unlike the opinion of representatives of the dominant culture, like Antiochus, who contemns the Jewish philosophy as “foolishness” unworthy of the name, 5:7, 9–11; 8:5;

242

COMMENTARY

12:3) and eternal. By facing extreme deprivation as a “noble contest” in which to prove themselves loyal to God, the martyrs gained an honor in God’s sight that cannot be assaulted again (17:5; see deSilva 1995a:112– 115, 126–27, 276–84). In the very process of delivering this oration, the author brings the “eternal” evaluation to life among his hearers, pushing them toward evaluating their own life choices in light of God’s court and nurturing an environment in which they will keep those valuations before each other’s eyes as well. In opening up a window, as it were, into the situations and spaces beyond this life (enjoying honor in God’s realm, 17:5), he redirects the hearers’ attention to live with a view to securing their future in that space (i.e., to weigh choices as the brothers explicitly did in 13:13–17). In this way, they might find that their parentage is also “from father Abraham,” like that of the seven sons (17:6). The author suggests that mere descent from Abraham is not the same thing as, nor of comparable nobility to, enjoying the spiritual connection with the patriarch that only comes as his faithfulness toward God is enacted in new situations. It was, in a sense, the sons’ “rebirth for immortality” (16:13) that confirmed their Abrahamic lineage (Dupont-Sommer 1939:149). 17:7–18:5 Peroration I: Enumeration of the Martyrs’ Achievement and Exhortation to the Hearers The peroration of a speech is an opportunity for the orator to let “all the streams of eloquence” pour out (Quintilian, Inst. 6.1.51). It is frequently an opportunity for appeals to the emotions of the hearers, for a summary of the main points of a speech, for accumulations of images designed to make a strong parting impression, and for closing shots at opponents or appeals to one’s own reliability (ēthos), if appropriate and necessary. These general observations account well for the contents of 17:7–18:24, especially the rapid-fire succession of images trying to capture the contest of the martyrs (the portrait, 17:7; the inscription for an epitaph, 17:8–10; the extended athletic image with the crowning of the fallen, 17:11–16), the enumeratio of the accomplishments of the martyrs in both religious and political terms (17:20–22; 18:4–5), the attention given to rousing both pity and admiration throughout (e.g., 17:7, 16; 18:20–21). Many of these elements are well-known to a Hellenized audience from honorary inscriptions and from the epitaphios logos (see Lebram 1974:82, 84–85; van Henten 1994:58–59; 1997:64–65). Commending the way of life exemplified

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

243

by the fallen to the survivors is a special topic of perorations of encomia (see commentary on 18:1). The author transitions to his peroration with an indirect invitation to the hearers to place the scene again before their eyes, imagining its details (17:7). Quintilian, although not approving the practice, testifies to the rhetorical impact of “bringing into court a picture of the crime painted on wood or canvas, that the judge might be stirred to fury by the horror of the sight” (Inst. 6.1.32). While he himself cannot “paint the history” of the martyr’s piety as might an artist, he nevertheless impresses upon the hearers the emotional impact of such a portrait. Hadas (1953:233) cites the elaborate graphic representations from the synagogue in Dura as evidence that the second commandment was not understood to preclude all pictorial representation in Diaspora Judaism, so that the author does not demur from producing such a painting for this reason. The use of ἐξόv here, however, suggests some scruples about the very production of such a graphic depiction, whether this should be attributed to good taste (i.e., in line with Quintilian’s censure of the practice) or merely the author’s admission that he lacks the skill to produce such a portrait (and, indeed, not even depictions of the scene by skilled artists like Gustav Doré or Schnorr von Carolsfeld begin to do justice to the horror). Although he cannot use the medium of the canvas, the author has indeed used skillfully the medium of “vivid description” (ekphrasis) throughout the speech to achieve this same end. He has painted the history of their piety before the eyes of the audience and has made them shudder (14:9; 17:7) at the martyrs’ suffering, which sets the mark of endurance for the Torah far beyond the moderate disadvantage or marginalization which was the upper limit of the suffering of most diaspora Jews for the sake of piety. The endurance of these nine for the sake of God should embolden the audience to continue their loyalty to their Jewish heritage and also shame those who think too high the more moderate costs they must bear. The author juxtaposes another literary device, namely the epitaph for the fallen (17:8–10). Sinaiticus preserves what is for van Henten (1997:65– 66) the preferred reading (ἐπ’ αὐτoῦ τoῦ ἐπιταφίoυ), directing our attention not to the grave itself (as in the reading ἐπ’ αὐτoῦ τoῦ τάφoυ) but to the memorial inscription written on a plaque near or above the tomb, or inscribed on the door that seals the tomb. The formula ἐvταῦθα . . . ἐγκεκήδευvται (17:9) closely resembles other Jewish inscriptions

244

COMMENTARY

(with the verb in the simple, uncompounded form, however; van Henten 1994:54), suggesting that the author is shaping his in line with known conventions in his locale (see Introduction). The proposition of an epitaph is a common feature of commemorative speeches both actual (as in Demosthenes, Or. 60.1, a real commemorative address from 338 BC for those who fell at Chaeronea) and literary (cf. Lysias, Or. 2.1, regarded as a rhetorical exercise, possibly not even by Lysias). In Euripides’s Trojan Women (1188–1191), Hecuba mourns the execution of Astyanax, the baby son of Hector, with a proposed inscription: “what word shall poet inscribe of thee upon thy tomb? ‘This child the Argives murdered in times past, dreading him’ – an inscription disgracing Greece!” Hecuba’s proposed epitaph was not real, but rhetorical, devised for its impact on the implied audience (the Greek soldiers, who should be ashamed of carrying out the deed). The listing of the tyrant’s victims as the weaker elements of the enemy population (“an old man, an old woman, and seven children,” 4 Macc 17:8–9) may achieve a similar goal, diminishing the “victory” of the tyrant at the same time that the author lauds the nobility of the victims (Hadas 1953:234). The inscription highlights Antiochus’s threat to the nation, the “polity” of the Judeans, and thus the political liberation effected by the martyrs who, in a manner completely comparable to the warrior heroes of Greek city-states, successfully defended their city/nation from a foreign invader. Again it was their particular piety, which led them to “fix their gaze on God” in the sense of letting themselves be guided by considerations of duty to God, to the covenant, and to the heritage of their nation (5:18, 29, 37; 9:2), that enabled their steadfast resistance (their “endurance”; see commentary on 1:11). Looking to the divine other as a means of holding onto the values of the minority group that believes itself to serve this divine other in a particularly enlightened manner is a common and effective device for negating any “drift” away from those values (see especially Epictetus, Diss. 1.30.1; Heb 12:2, which again displays particularly close wording). The sacrifice made by these nine martyrs for the “vindication of the nation” should make the audience more reluctant to betray that same nation through willful apostasy or through reluctance to remain steadfast in the face of lesser hardships. Indeed, they will shortly be called to carry on the battle left to them by the martyrs to continue to confirm the credibility of the Jewish philosophy in the face of its critics (18:1–2). In 17:11–16, the hearers encounter the most extended athletic metaphor, providing a climax to the many instances of athletic imagery

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

245

used throughout the oration (6:10; 9:8, 23–24; 11:20–23; 12:14; 13:13, 15; 16:14, 16; 18:23; see Pfitzner 1967:57–64; deSilva 1998:92–93). After again affirming the honorific nature of the martyrs’ struggle (“divine,” 17:11; “noble,” 16:16), the author lays out all the particulars of the contest. Each of the martyrs competed in turn, Antiochus (and his coercive measures) being the antagonist – the opponent, as in a wrestling match – of each. It is significant that the author places “virtue” or “moral excellence” (ἀρετὴ, 7:12) as the judge of the competition (serving in the role of ἀθλoθέτης). The norm to which one looks as the standard by which to measure one’s life greatly affects the shape that life will take. It is part of the nobility of the martyrs that they looked to “virtue” for that standard, rather than temporal advantages (like pleasure, safety, or advancement, all of which could have belonged to the martyrs instead of death by torture). The same life experiences would be “judged” differently by different “judges.” Had the martyrs looked to any other judge, however, the results would have been disastrous for the Jewish people. By saving their own lives, they would have further weakened the nation’s commitment to the covenant and further eroded any rallying point against the tyrant. Because they put a concern for virtue ahead of anything else (making “endurance,” then, the substance of the contest), they effected the greatest good for the whole nation. Victory in this contest, the author asserts, led to the experience of the incorruptibility that inheres in virtue itself (the pronoun αὐτῆς in Sinaiticus refers back to “virtue”). The corrector found this Greek expression awkward in the extreme, changing εἰς ἀφθαρσίαv αὐτῆς to, simply, ἀφθαρσίαv. Scholars have critiqued the qualification of this incorruptibility as ἐv ζωῇ πoλυχρovίῳ as “weak” (Dupont-Sommer 1939: 150), reading it as a gloss mistakenly incorporated into the text. However, by setting “immortality” in a “life of long duration” as the prize in this contest, 4 Maccabees effectively rescues the Deuteronomistic world view from being disconfirmed by the shameful death of the righteous. According to the promises of Deuteronomy 28–29, the righteous would have blessing and a long life, while the impious would be cut off and cursed. The martyrs, however, died early and disgracefully because they remained righteous. According to 4 Maccabees, the promises have not failed: the martyrs enjoy this “long life” and “length of days” (Deut 30:20; 4 Macc 18:19) beyond the reach of death, having received immortality from God. As with any athletic event, there must be spectators. This was a common feature of athletic imagery in Greco-Roman philosophical writings. A

246

COMMENTARY

“brave person matched against ill-fortune” is “a spectacle worthy of the regard of God” (Seneca, Prov. 2.9). Similarly, Diogenes thought his own struggle with a fever a worthier spectacle than the Olympic games (Epictetus, Diss. 3.22.59). The specific language here suggests that, alongside the “world,” it was not merely “humanity” that was watching, but the “manner of life of people.” The contest of the martyrs, faced with giving up their manner of living or dying for it, would prove whose way of life was superior – that of Antiochus or that of the Jews rounded up by him to be compelled to renounce Judaism. It is also in this sense that the martyrs were called to give a witness on behalf of their nation (16:17), just as Epictetus’s Stoic was summoned to witness to the truth of what his or her philosophy promises (Diss. 1.29.44–49). By their steadfast endurance for the sake of piety, the martyrs demonstrated the claim that the Jewish way of life thoroughly inculcated the cardinal virtues in its adherents. The audience is called to give the same witness, though very seldom would it be the witness of blood, before the spectators in their own arena, keeping their eyes similarly fixed on the crown which virtue bestows in the presence of God if they bear faithful witness and compete nobly (17:5, 15). Dupont-Sommer (1939:151) calls attention to a Jewish funerary decoration depicting the winged Victory familiar from Greek and Roman iconography crowning a naked youth (CIJ 1.121), which he suggests may represent the allegorical crowning of an athlete of Torah (rather than an actual victor in Greek games). The availability of such iconographic data suggests that the audience might have received impetus in this direction from many sources beyond 4 Maccabees. Two rhetorical questions in 17:16 contribute to heightening the audience’s pathos, specifically the feeling of admiration for, and emulation of, the martyrs. The author claims that even Antiochus and his court eventually join the circle of admiring viewers (17:17), the former going so far as to hold the martyrs before his soldiers as examples for their own endurance, to promote courageous resolve in his army (17:23–24). Here the author’s transformation of the martyrs’ experience is complete. Aristotle had denied the possibility of true courage being shown by “a bold face when about to undergo a flogging” (Eth. Nic. 3.6.5 1115a24–25), i.e., when about to suffer punishment for disobedience to some law. Yet this is precisely the situation within which the martyrs can show courage, since they bear the punishments voluntarily, in effect, for having chosen not to disobey higher laws, enduring for the sake of piety (“for the sake of what is noble,” Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.6.8 1115b12–13). To have Antiochus acknowledge this in the end confirms Eleazar’s perception that Antiochus,

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

247

despite appearances, would not be “proud” of him or the seven brothers for caving in to his demands or yielding to his arguments and enticements (especially under the circumstances, where the final arguments are fear and pain), but would in fact despise them for their weakness (5:27–28). The author’s judgment has been questioned at this point on several grounds. First, Dupont-Sommer (1939:152), who would (not surprisingly) excise 17:23–24 as an interpolation, found these verses to contradict the expectation created throughout the narrative that the martyrs’ executions would lead not to the tyrant’s military successes but to his death and punishment (9:9, 24, 32; 10:11, 21; 11:3; 12:12, 14, 18; 18:5). Deissmann attempts to bridge the perceived gap by suggesting that the tyrant’s eventual fall after even more successes would make the fall more terrible, but this is appropriately rejected as “too refined” an explanation (DupontSommer 1939:152). Second, scholars have also objected that it is highly unlikely that the historical Antiochus would use the Jewish martyrs as an example to rouse his troops. Focusing on the rhetorical impact of these verses, however, eliminates the problem. Winning admiration from one’s enemies is considered a great good. Josephus (B.J. 7.8.7 §388), for example, included this prospect in Eleazar ben Yair’s speech at Masada in favor of suicide: “Haste we then to leave them [the Romans], instead of their hoped – for enjoyment at securing us, amazement at our death and admiration of our fortitude.” The author wishes to affirm that the martyrs rose to such a height of virtue that even their enemies could not fail to recognize and, in the end, acknowledge. It serves the author’s goal of promoting strict Torah observance as ultimately the best way to “impress the gentiles” ( J. J. Collins 1983:190), at least a more likely venue than showing oneself to be more concerned about temporal advantage than the virtues of piety, duty to one’s ancestral law and nation, and the like. With regard to the historical question, Townshend (1913:684) correctly observes that Antiochus did in fact “after leaving Jerusalem conquer Armenia and no small part of Persia” before his death there. The author, then, might be seen to harness known historical realities in the service of the exaltation of the martyrs, attributing whatever victories Antiochus did go on to enjoy to their inspiration. Moreover, of all the historical implausibilities in the book, this one is among the less problematic, both given other expectations that people would derive profitable examples even from among their enemies (as in the Josephus text) and given the fact that using the martyrs as examples need not presuppose a complete volte face on the part of Antiochus vis-a-vis the Jewish people. Antiochus

248

COMMENTARY

would not have to be a “convert,” as it were, to shame his flagging troops into action, perhaps speaking something like the following: “If the children and women of the Judeans, that barbaric and subjugated people, could show such courage and endurance, how much more should you, the elite armies of the ruling power, show courage and face dangers bravely and unyieldingly!” While admiration by one’s enemies is a possible eventuality (if not in this life, certainly transposed to the life beyond, as in Wis 5:1–8), the loyalty of the devout Jew does not depend on Gentiles’ recognition of his or her worth, or admiration of his or her way of life, but on God’s. The ultimate consideration is the honor in which they are held (17:5) as they “stand before the divine throne” (17:18), an image that appears again in Rev 7:15 (notably also after martyrdom; Klauck 1989a:752), a book which also develops strongly the ideology of the martyr, who overcomes by not yielding to the pressures of the dominant culture to accommodate, sacrificing the exclusive loyalty called for by the One God of JudaeoChristian confession. The seemingly sudden shift to language about “consecration” or “sanctification” in 17:19–20 (ἡγιασμέvoι, ἁγιασθέvτες) is actually a smooth and easy transition. The death of the martyrs, which is seen to give them access to God’s presence, marks their consecration, their passage from the realm of the profane and ordinary to the realm of the sacred and holy (Grappe 2000:349). In Pseudo-Philo (LAB 32.2–3), Abraham’s pronouncement that Isaac would be sacrificed is heard by Isaac as an invitation to enter into eternal life; in Josephus (A.J. 1.13.3 §§230–31), Abraham understands that he will send Isaac to God by means of the law of sacrifice (Grappe 2000: 352). Further, it prepares for the full-blown introduction of sacrificial and mediatory language in 17:21–22, a text that has occasioned much discussion in light of similar language being applied to the death of Jesus in the New Testament. “Standing before God” is commonly associated with priestly service (Deut 10:8; 18:5, 7; 21:5). The author of Hebrews extends this emphasis on priests “standing” to minister, contrasted with Jesus as High Priest “sitting” beside God as a sign that his priestly work is accomplished once and for all, to the divine realm itself (Heb 10:11–14). Understanding the martyrs’ deaths as their movement from this realm to the divine realm facilitates their deaths being understood as sacrifice, the action of transfer to the divine realm par excellence. Fourth Maccabees 17:19 recites a line from LXX Deut 33:3 as a piece of evidence from ancient authority for the author’s claims concerning the destiny and current location of the martyrs (17:5, 18). Being located

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

249

“under (ὑπό) God’s hands” (or “in God’s hands,” in the Hebrew text) is an image of protection (Dupont-Sommer 1939:151; Hadas 1953:236). The author of Deuteronomy 33 wrote these words as part of a remembrance of God’s leadership and protection of the Hebrews through their wilderness journey. The author of 4 Maccabees, however, reads this typologically as an indication of God’s protection of God’s faithful ones – those who consecrate themselves to God through obedience to Torah, such as the martyrs – on their journey to their eternal home in God’s presence and as an affirmation of their arrival there in God’s presence. In other words, he reads the text much more in keeping with the sentiments of Wis 3:1 (“the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God”; Grimm 1853:362; Klauck 1989:752) than with the original story of the exodus generation. Having passed into glory in God’s realm is counted an “honor,” but the author also draws attention to the other “honors” that came to the martyrs because of the political results of their deaths (17:20–21). These deaths, though intended to be degrading in the extreme, are ennobled insofar as they brought benefit to others (see Rhet. Her. 3.7.14; Quintilian, Inst. 3.7.10–18). Being productive of great goods (such as the destruction of tyranny and restoration of the lawful ordering of the state under its own laws, 17:20; 18:4), their deaths can be lauded as “honorable and divine” (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1.12.7 1102a2–4). The Jews “had their own glorious heroes who could measure up to the pagan liberators from tyranny or other illustrious persons who sacrificed their lives for their people” (van Henten 1994:69). The fact that the martyrs achieved these noble ends specifically by refusing to compromise their obedience to the Torah confirms that way of life as almost automatically productive of virtue, commending it to the hearers as their own path to virtue and honor (as will be done explicitly in 18:1–2). Dying for the sake of others (which we still call a “sacrificial” act) lends itself naturally to the cultic, sacrificial language that the author employs to draw out the significance of the martyrs’ deaths in 17:20–22 (see also commentary on 6:27–29). Likening the expulsion of the tyrant, his forces, and his influence to the removal of defilements from the land (“the homeland was cleansed,” καθαρισθῆvαι), also moves the author toward categories of ritual purification for understanding these deaths. The beneficial results derive not merely “because of them” (δι’ αὐτoὺς, 17:20), but “because of their having become a life-in-exchange for the sin of the nation” (δι’ αὐτoὺς . . . ἀvτίψυχov γεγovότας, 17:20–21). The noun ἀvτίψυχoς recalls the ἀvτὶ τῆς ψυχῆς of Lev 17:11 (“For the life of the

250

COMMENTARY

flesh is in the blood. This blood I myself have given you to perform the rite of atonement for your lives at the altar; for it is blood that atones for a life”), while the dynamics of offering up living beings in order to cleanse the nation of its sins recalls most clearly the rites of the Day of Atonement (O’Hagan 1974:118; see further the commentary on 6:27–29). The translation of the key word ἱλαστήριov in the following verse (τoῦ ἱλαστηρίoυ τoῦ θαvάτoυ αὐτῶv) has been a matter of substantial debate, more so because of longstanding theological interest in the meaning of the same term in Rom 3:25, which is seen to be illuminated by this verse (e.g., S. K. Williams 1975; van Henten 1993; Bailey 1999 argues against this connection). The reading in Alexandrinus and Venetus, τoῦ ἱλαστηρίoυ θαvάτoυ αὐτῶv, is less problematic, since ἱλαστήριov is there conceived of as an adjective modifying θάvατoς, hence, “their propitiatory death.” Klauck (1989a:753) and van Henten (1993:123) favor this reading. Rahlfs follows Sinaiticus in placing an article between these words (the lectio difficilior), making it necessary to take ἱλαστήριov as a substantive. The principal question concerns whether to read this, then, as the kappōreṯ, the golden lid covering the ark of the covenant and providing the place for encountering God on the Day of Atonement (and perhaps, then, by extension as a “atoning sacrifice,” as in the NRSV, or “means of atonement,” represented in German literature on the ἱλαστήριov by Sühneort and Sühnemittel), or as a “propitiatory offering” similar to monuments erected and gifts offered to offended deities so as to turn their anger into a favorable disposition. Several factors argue in favor of the former proposition. First, ἱλαστήριov would be familiar to the Jewish author and his audience as the technical term assigned to the “mercy seat” by the translators of the Septuagint. Second, the author’s explicit mention of the “blood of those pious ones” (Sinaiticus reads τῆς τoῦ αἵματoς, the initial τῆς being an obvious error, perhaps due to the scribe’s just having copied τῆς τoῦ ἔθvoυς ἁμαρτίας at the close of the preceding verse) prior to “the ἱλαστήριov of their deaths” as part of the “means” by which Providence was reconciled to Israel (taking both genitives as genitives of source) disposes one to continue reading this verse as an exposition of the martyrs’ deaths as a substitute for the Day of Atonement rites, a reading begun in 17:20. Mentioning blood and the “mercy seat” together recalls the sprinkling of blood upon the cover of the ark as the ritual act which the high priest secured atonement for the people before God. The author would then be seen to use the cultic language of the Day of Atonement

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

251

ritual to describe the significance and effect of deaths that take place outside of a cultic environment and, indeed, are nowhere prescribed in the Torah. This background has been recently challenged by Daniel Bailey, who is certainly correct in questioning the adequacy of the NRSV’s “atoning sacrifice” as a translation of the text as it stands in Rahlfs (and in Sinaiticus). That is an interpretative paraphrase (forcing the monovalent connection with the Day of Atonement) at best. Bailey reviews the evidence for ἱλαστήριov as a “propitiatory offering” or “votive offering” in Hellenistic Greek (following LSJ, 828, s.v. ἱλαστήριoς II 2), which is impressive indeed (1999:31–75). Dedicatory inscriptions as well as literary references speak of ἱλαστήρια being offered in order to propitiate an offended deity (such as Herod’s monument in Josephus, A.J. 16.7.1 §182 or the Trojan Horse according to Dio Chrysostom, Or. 11.121 and several scholia and commentaries on Od. 8.509) or in order to secure specific favors (such as votive offerings dedicated “for the σωτηρία” of one emperor or another, as in Inscr. Cos 81 and BMIR 3:14 no. 11). Bailey concludes that the meaning of the deaths of the martyrs is to be sought against this non-sacrificial background, in which their lives are given to God as a propitiatory offering or votive gift (the former would be appropriate in view of the need for reconciliation between God and Israel, the latter with a view to God’s future deliverance of Israel). He thus reaffirms the position of Peter Stuhlmacher that the martyrs are never actually said to be an “atoning sacrifice” (Bailey 1999:133; Stuhlmacher 1975:328). The effect of the propitiatory gift is, however, fundamentally the same as the sacrifice of atonement: on the basis of the martyrs’ loyalty to God unto death, God’s anger turns away from Israel, and God turns again to Israel with a favorable disposition so as to deliver her from her enemies (as also in 2 Macc 7:37–38; 8:5). The gain of the reading of ἱλαστήριov as “propitiatory offering” is the connection between the martyrs’ deaths and their continuing, durable existence in the realm of God (Bailey 1999:134–135). Sacrifices are, in a sense, destroyed (though they can be understood to be transferred to God through burning), but the votive or propitiatory gift, though “lost” to the uses of this world, has an obvious, ongoing existence in the divine spaces of earthly temples, as do the martyrs in the divine spaces beyond the visible sphere (17:18 is most significant, being in close proximity). This reading is also fully consonant with the significance of the language of “consecration” in 17:19–20 and

252

COMMENTARY

the author’s interpretation of Deut 33:3 as an indication of God’s postmortem possession and protection of the consecrated souls in God’s space. Several scholars show discomfort with such a ritual interpretation of the deaths of human beings. S. K. Williams, for example, wants to guard carefully against any ex opere operatum interpretation of the death of a human being as an act of atonement here, primarily in the service of Christian soteriology. That is, he wishes to avoid any undue emphasis on the blood of the martyr (or of Jesus) itself as some kind of magical detergent, and place the emphasis where it properly belongs, namely on the obedience and loyalty to God that leads to such a death: “the author may not be saying that the martyrs are sacrificial victims slain or ransoms paid. Rather, in light of the extraordinary faith in which they offer their lives for the sake of the Law, God accepts that supreme offering as He accepts a perfect sacrifice” (S. K. Williams 1975:179). The attention given so far to the Jewish sacrificial system as a background to the martyrs’ deaths might, if taken alone, obscure the heroics of their deaths as the author celebrates them. In the latter regard, the author appears to draw on traditions of Aaron and Phinehas rushing into the thick of the action and turning aside God’s wrath (Num 16:41–50; see commentary on 7:11–12; Num 25:11), and even Greco-Roman portrayals of heroic deaths of people devoting themselves to the gods. Decius Mus’s act of devotio in Livy 8.9.1–4 may be quite illuminating in this regard (van Henten and Avemarie 2002:38). Decius, having devoted himself and the enemy forces to the gods “for the benefit of the state and the army, the legions and the auxiliary troops” (8.9.8), rushes into the thick of battle, appearing “more august than humans, like someone sent from heaven as a sin-offering expiating all the anger of the gods and averting the plague from his own people by transferring it to the enemy” (8.9.10). The result is that the rest of the army is “freed from the fear of divine wrath” (8.9.13) and attacks with renewed confidence. Because they are not merely sacrificial animals, but human beings capable of will and resolve, the martyrs resemble Decius, Aaron, and Phinehas as they enter the arena, boldly consecrating themselves to God (13:13) for the sake of the nation’s reconciliation with God and deliverance by him. It is this heroic resolve that ennobles their transformation, by the end of the day, into the semblance of the carcasses of the sacrificial animals. Both the philosophical demonstration and the encomium arrive together at their goal in 18:1–2, the exhortation to the audience to take up the way of life promoted throughout the book as the way to attain the

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

253

ideal of self-mastery in regard to the passions. That the philosophical thesis has really served throughout as a cipher for commitment to the Torah and the God of Israel in the encounter with (and, often, contest against) the non-Jewish world is seen in the transformation of the very Greek-sounding “I urge you therefore to pay earnest attention to philosophy” (1:1) into the very Jewish “O children of Israel, offspring of Abraham, obey this law in every way!” (18:1). The opening of 18:1 could be heard as yet another apostrophe to the martyrs (“O Israelites, children descended from the seed of Abraham”), but the imperative surprises the audience with a direct address to them, asking them to identify themselves with the way of life exemplified by those other “children descended from the seed of Abraham.” Dupont-Sommer (1939:152), regarding 18:1–5a as redundant, suggests that it might be another interpolation (indeed, for him the original conclusion did not need to contain more than 17:7–22; possibly 18:3–5a, a point on which he wavers; and 18:20–24). Such a position misses the rhetorical unity of the whole, and here especially the tendency for encomia to conclude with an exhortation to embody the virtues of the examples celebrated (and for protreptic discourses to urge the hearers to take to heart and apply the philosophical precept presented). Thucydides concludes Pericles’s funeral oration (War 2.43.1–4) with an exhortation to the hearers to allow themselves to be inspired by the greatness of the city for which the soldiers died, and by the awareness that such greatness is only won and sustained by people of deep virtue and duty, to “make these men [i.e., the dead soldiers] your examples.” Dio Chrysostom closes his eulogy for the boxer Melancomas (Or 29.21) with an exhortation to the hearers to seek the same distinction: “Come then, train zealously and toil hard, the younger men in the belief that this man’s place has been left to them, the older in a way that befits their own achievements.” The praise lavished upon the deceased in each and every case is intended to rouse the hearers to emulation, encouraging them that the same commitment to the same virtues will lead, in the end, to the same honorable remembrance, “the praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of sepulchers, . . . in which their glory survives in everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occasion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation” (Thucydides, War 2.43.3). The author’s philosophical demonstration supplies the proof that the Jewish way of life cultivates the virtues and ideals constitutive of “nobility” even in terms that should be self-evident to members of the dominant culture. His encomium for the martyrs supplies the living

254

COMMENTARY

proof that commitment to that way of life leads to a praiseworthy remembrance. Together these combine to motivate renewed commitment to “being Jewish” in the midst of a world that often marginalizes the same. Tacitus’s words of regret over Antiochus’s failure to “reform” the Jewish people (Hist. 5.8.2) show that each new generation of Jews would need to confirm the credibility of their way of life in the face of vocal detractors and find ways to reaffirm their own commitment and self-respect. Like the audience of Pericles’s or Dio’s funeral orations, the audience of 4 Maccabees is similarly challenged by the author to preserve the achievements of their ancestors and of the martyred dead by their own commitment to their way of life, defending it even unto death if circumstances should arise (and so defending it all the more when the loss for so doing is not nearly as great). To confirm that the actions he recommends lead to greater honor than loss, the author returns in 18:3–5 to the honor that accrued to the martyrs in the eyes of human beings (17:16–17, 23–24) and in the eyes of God (17:5; 18:23), who granted them immortality (the substance of the “divine inheritance,” a share in the endless life of God). Summarizing the benefits their deaths brought to the nation, the author introduces an apt inclusio with 3:20–21. Both 3:20 and 18:4–5 feature forms of εἰρήvη and εὐvoμία: the martyrs, by their obedience to God unto death, restore the state of peace and Torah-obedience that preceded the crisis (S. K. Williams 1975:170), the state broken by the disregard for Torah that proved itself to be not advantageous or progressive, but revolution against the common good (3:21). In connection with 18:4, Townshend (1913:684) and S. K. Williams (1975:171) attempt to identify the subject of the final verb (ἐκπεπόρθηκαv) not with the people represented by the pronoun αὐτoὺς (the martyrs) but with the collective noun “nation” (τò ἔθvoς), and, more particularly, with Judas and his forces, who restored “right observance of the Law” with the rededication of the Temple. The principal difficulty appears to be understanding how martyrs can be said to “ravage” the enemy hosts (S. K. Williams 1975:171). Since it is indeed natural to suppose that Judas and his armies would come to mind at this point, the author’s lack of any direct and clear reference to them is the more striking. The author focuses solely on the martyrs as the “first cause” of the nation’s victory over Antiochus IV and foreign domination, reflecting much more forthrightly the role the martyrs were said to have played in enabling the Maccabean Revolt to succeed in 2 Macc 7:37–8:5. Given the obvious role that Judas played in

4 MACCABEES 17:7–18:5

255

driving out Antiochus and his forces, it is all the more apparent from the author’s reticence to name him that he does not want anyone to share the glory with the martyrs, whose endurance and loyalty alone win the day (Dupont-Sommer 1939:150; Seeley 1990:93; O’Hagan 1974:111–112). This may be due to the particular response to the cultural imperialism of Hellenism that the author seeks to promote, which is not armed resistance but fidelity to the Torah, even in the face of hostility. This is the example set by Eleazar for the young (6:19), the example replicated by the brothers and set by each in turn for the younger (9:23–24), and the pattern replicated throughout Judea (the revival of Torah-observance, εὐvoμία) as a consequence of their demonstration of the value of their way of life (18:4). It is this that creates “an implacable barrier to Antiochus’s efforts, sending him finally on his way” (Seeley 1990:93), and proves therefore to be an effective means of resistance and of preservation of a minority culture’s identity in the face of cultural hegemony. Regarding the alleged inappropriateness of speaking of martyrs as “ravaging” the enemy, this is entirely consonant with the author’s delight in the irony of the martyrs’ and Antiochus’s situation throughout the oration. As early as 1:11, the author speaks of the martyrs as “having conquered” the tyrant; the second brother taunts the tyrant as being “tortured more” than he (9:30); the author speaks of Antiochus as being “grievously mistreated” by the brothers (12:2), an astounding moment of irony given the grievous mistreatment he has inflicted upon the martyrs; the sixth brother exclaims that he and his family have “nullified” Antiochus’s tyranny, their resistance signaling, indeed constituting, his downfall (11:24–25). The claim, then, that these martyrs “ravaged” the enemy continues a reversal of perspective that has pervaded the text from the outset, and is thoroughly in keeping with the military and other agonistic imagery the author has applied to them throughout his presentation (e.g., 9:24; 15:29; 16:14, 16; 17:11–16). Just as the author has confirmed the good destiny of the martyrs, anticipated throughout their own trials (9:8; 10:15; 13:17; 14:5; 15:3; 16:13), so in 18:5 he confirms the anticipated just retribution that befell the tyrant as well (9:9, 24, 32; 10:11, 15, 21; 11:3, 23; 12:12, 14, 18). His failure in Jerusalem begins the process. The original reading in Sinaiticus 18:5, ἐκζητηθῆvαι, is rather awkward here, since the martyrs were in fact required to “give an account” of their way of life and did so rather well. The corrector is right to emend this to ἐκδιαιτηθῆvαι, “to be made to change their ancestral habits,” in which Antiochus did suffer failure. The known facts of his Persian campaign, which began well but eventually led

256

COMMENTARY

to his violent death, completed his “being punished on earth” and made him available for divine vengeance after death. In this way, the author can indeed “have it both ways”: the martyrs’ example is so awesome, it inspires even their enemies (though not to their long-lasting good); the martyrs’ achievement also effects the defeat and downfall of the tyrant in their homeland and drives him on to his eventual death far from his own home. Plutarch evinces a similar interest in “having it both ways.” In Mulier. virt. 4 (Mor. 245D–E), the women of Argos “under the lead of Telesilla took up arms, and, taking their stand by the battlements, manned the walls all round, so that the enemy were amazed. The result was that Cleomenes they repulsed with great loss, and the other king, Demaratus, who managed to get inside . . . they drove out.” Rousing admiration and eventuating defeat can go hand in hand, both working together to amplify the achievement of the “soldiers.” 18:6–24

Peroration II: The Mother’s Second Speech and the Conclusion

In 18:6–9, the mother is given a second opportunity to address her sons. The abruptness of the transition to this section, and the fact that it is not integrated into the flow of the narrative in any way (compare 16:15, which clearly locates the mother’s first speech in the course of the story), give strongest support to the view that the passage is a later interpolation (Freudenthal 1869:155–156; Deissmann 1900:175; DupontSommer 1939:152–54; L. Rost 1971:81). It may have value as a “naive and charming” window into the ēthos of the Jewish family (Dupont-Sommer 1939:154), but an impressive array of scholars deny it value as an integral part of the author’s speech (and, therefore, rhetorical purpose). Other arguments that have been advanced in favor of regarding the paragraph as an interpolation are less convincing. Freudenthal (1869:155) points to the alleged inferiority of its Greek, its propensity to cite the Jewish Scriptures, and the author’s lack of interest elsewhere in domestic life as evidence against the integrity of 18:6–9. Deissmann (1900:175), however, has rightly countered the first two criticisms, noting that the language is not inferior, and that the first part of the discourse incorporates many specific references to the Scriptures (especially in chapters 2 and 3; see also 17:19), as well as allusions to the stories of Isaac, Daniel, and the three young men throughout the martyr narratives (which appear again in 18:6–19 and give thematic coherence to the whole). Deissmann would prefer to solve the problem by having 18:6–19 follow directly the mother’s earlier speech in 16:16–23 (though this would, in turn, introduce a

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

257

problem of redundancy, since both speeches refer to many of the same examples). Despite this tendency to divorce 18:6–9 from its context, it nevertheless fills an appropriate role in the peroration as it stands. First, the outstanding example of the Athenian commemorative address (Pericles’s Funeral Oration in Thucydides, War 2.35–44), also rather abruptly and as something of an afterthought, concludes the praise of the fallen Athenian soldiers with a few words of exhortation to Athenian women. The advice given there coheres remarkably well with the model of feminine virtue upheld in 4 Macc 18:6–8. Second, reproducing the seven brothers’ catechesis at the feet of their father allows the author to remind the audience of the lessons of their own heritage, which would provide further motivation to them to heed the exhortation in 18:1. The Old Testament examples and quotations cited have been selected and crafted in a manner particularly appropriate to the contest faced by the brothers, and remain apt guidance for the audience as it struggles with remaining steadfast in a Greek world. Both factors mitigate the perceived dislocation of 18:6–9. The mother’s testimony about herself connects her suicide in 17:1 with a longer story of absolute commitment to modesty and chastity, keeping her body in every way from the touch of men other than her husband (Young 1991:79). She who was “manlier than males” (15:30) and lauded for courage and endurance cannot be seen to have fallen short of properly “female” virtues in any way. In this regard, the portrayal of the mother recalls the tensions in the portrayal of Judith, who cannot sacrifice her feminine honor in the course of trying to win the more masculine honor of killing the enemy (see deSilva 2002:101). The mother’s second speech reflects, then, the more traditional virtues of women, who for the sake of modesty and chastity remained within the private spaces appropriate for women (“not transgressing the boundary of her father’s house”). The classical ideal is articulated by Euripedes’s Andromache (Tro. 645–653), who sought all her fame “beneath Hector’s roof,” avoiding the ill fame that comes “if [the woman] abide not in the home.” Philo (Spec. 3.169) maintains this ideal among first-century Alexandrian Jews, stating explicitly that “women are best suited to the indoor life which never strays from the house, within which the middle door is taken by the maidens as their boundary, and the outer door by those who have reached full womanhood” (cited in Hadas 1953:239). In addition to remaining within the proper domestic spaces, the mother fulfills the two requirements of the Julian laws enacted by Augustus: she

258

COMMENTARY

guards herself against adultery, and she remains with a man during the time of her fertility (incidentally fulfilling the ideal of the univira as well, 18:9a; D’Angelo 2003:156). The mother’s profession to guard “the rib that was being built up” (τὴv oἰκoδoμoυμέvηv πλευράv, 18:7) recontextualizes three words that take the reader unmistakably to LXX Gen 2:22: “And the LORD God built up (ᾠκoδόμησεv) the side (τὴv πλευράv) which he took from Adam into a woman/wife” (Schaller 1990:329; D’Angelo 2003:152). The present tense participle oἰκoδoμoυμέvηv in Sinaiticus (Rahlfs has ᾠκoδoμημέvηv, “which had been built up”) conveys more of a dynamic sense that, as the young woman was growing to maturity, she was “becoming” more and more that helpmate for which God first removed the rib from Adam’s side. As a corollary of her completely cooperating in fulfilling her destiny as the wife made to be helpmate for her future husband, she heeded the cautions of the Torah concerning the seducer who might destroy her chastity. 4 Maccabees 18:8 recalls the case recorded in Deut 22:25–27, recontextualizing the phrase ἐv πεδίῳ and describing rather clearly the same circumstances (being accosted and raped in a deserted place). By remaining in the private spaces of her father’s house, she took the necessary precautions against this eventuality. What follows is an interesting reading of the Fall of Eve and the activity of the serpent in the garden. The language of Eve’s defense in Gen 3:13, “the serpent beguiled (ἠπάτησεv) me,” is the same language of seduction found in Exod 22:16 (ἀπατήσῃ), which describes a case similar to the one covered in Deut 22:25–27. The author of 4 Maccabees makes this same connection when he refers to “the deceitful (ἀπάτης) serpent,” suggesting that Satan is particularly interested in corrupting women through the extramarital advances of males. Paul in 2 Cor 11:2–3 evokes the same suggestive overtones of Satan’s activity as seduction (here, though, away from “fidelity” to Christ, the bridegroom of the Church). The mother’s vigilance against any assault contributes not only to her own honor, but also to the honor of the seven brothers, affirming the legitimacy of their birth. The mother’s attestation to her own virtue quickly yields to a summary of the relevant lessons the sons learned from their deceased father, who was spared the pains that the mother had to endure (Euripides’s Suppliants provides an emotionally-charged example of how a father could grieve the loss of his children, matching the more common dirges of the mothers in his plays). M. R. D’Angelo (2003:156) reads with perhaps too sharp a hermeneutic of suspicion when she concludes that 18:9–19 “demotes the mother from teacher of her sons to student of her husband.” The mother

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

259

is never explicitly depicted as learning her piety from her husband (as are the Roman women praised by Pliny and Plutarch in the texts that she cites), but rather recalls for her children the lessons he taught them, lessons that fall in line with her own exhortation in 16:16–23. In so doing, she adds his authority to her own and shows the essential harmony and concord of the training the children received in the household, both parents agreeing. The text is vocal in regard to the father’s tutelage of his sons, but silent in regard to his alleged tutelage of his wife, their mother. D’Angelo thus seems to be domesticating the author of 4 Maccabees to the cultural expectations of his period, rather than the author of 4 Maccabees domesticating the mother with the soul of Abraham. The father of the seven sons fulfilled the injunctions of Deuteronomy (see Deut 4:9; 6:7; 11:19; Hadas 1953:240), teaching his children the commandments of God and the meaningfulness of the covenant, and teaching them by paradigm as well (O’Hagan 1974:100). Each paradigm and Scriptural lesson that the mother recalls for the sons has immediate relevance for their situation. The significance of each story is not explicated, but can readily be discerned. Abel (see Gen 4:1–6, especially 4:8) is a model of piety, doing what is pleasing in God’s sight; Cain models impiety, for which reason his sacrifices were not acceptable to God. The story becomes a paradigm, then, of the hostility experienced by those who please God at the hands of those who do not please God, especially the Gentiles whose sacrifices to idols are in no way acceptable to God. The story would brace the pious Jew to expect hostility, and also prepare him or her to understand that whatever they suffer is not a mark of their own unworthiness, but of the other’s alienation from God and virtue. The significance of the example of Isaac in the Aqedah (Gen 22:1–19, esp. 22:2, 13) has already been explored (see commentary on 13:12; 16:20). 4 Maccabees does not show signs of accepting a tradition that Isaac was in fact killed. The use of the present participle ὁλoκαρπoύμεvov rather than the perfect (or perhaps the aorist) is significant: “He read to you about . . . Isaac as he was in the process of being offered as a burnt offering.” The story of Joseph (Gen 39:7–23, esp. 39:20 and 40:3) recalls the model of a man who refused to violate a particular commandment of God (the prohibition of adultery) even though doing so would save him from intense marginalization (prison). The brothers learned from him to imitate his willingness to suffer deprivation rather than choose what might seem the easier path of transgressing one of God’s commands. The three examples of Abel, Isaac, and Joseph taken together teach that pious

260

COMMENTARY

commitment to God, far from being insurance against pain and hardship, can lead directly to the experience of deprivation and death. The example of the “zeal of Phinehas” (18:12; see Num 25:6–13) may seem strangely out of place in 4 Maccabees. He was, after all, celebrated as the archetype of the militant Maccabean revolution (see 1 Macc 2:24– 26, 54). Nevertheless, the author invites the audience to consider an alternative way that faithful Jews might embody Phinehas’s zeal other than violent resistance. The essence of Phinehas’s accomplishment was to stem the tide of idolatry and assimilation among the Hebrews. The brothers displayed the same vigilance (if not vigilantism) among themselves by keeping one another faithful (13:9–18) and each of the martyrs contributed to the renewal of covenant loyalty among each other and the people (6:19; 9:23–24; 13:9–18; 16:16–23; 18:4). Phinehas’s act of zeal for God and God’s Law propitiated an angry God offended by the disobedience of the people as a collective (Num 25:11): “Phinehas son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the Israelites by manifesting such zeal among them on my behalf that in my jealousy I did not consume the Israelites.” Such a paradigm teaches that remarkable acts of covenant loyalty could have atoning benefits for the people as a whole, a paradigm on which the martyrs clearly rely (e.g., 6:37–39; 9:24; 12:17). The honors that God heaps upon Phinehas after his display of zeal also foreshadow the post-zeal (post-mortem) honors that grace the martyrs (17:5; 18:23). On the relevance of the examples of Hananiah and his companions (18:12; Dan 3:1–30, esp. 3:24) and Daniel in the lion’s den (18:13; Dan 6:1– 28), see commentary on 13:9; 16:3, 21. It is significant that 4 Maccabees refers explicitly to both the stories of Phinehas and the three young men in the furnace (together in 18:12, as part of the seven brothers’ religious and ethical heritage from their parents), the martyrs’ deaths bringing together elements of both (zeal for the law, solidarity with one another, willingness to die out of loyalty to God irrespective of the expectation of temporal deliverance). At this point, the speech moves from a list of paradigms to a chain of scriptural quotations. The order of the quotations appears to be not haphazard but highly significant, as the author builds up a “case” on the strength of written authorities that would support a person facing, and choosing, endurance of hardship for the sake of covenant loyalty. First, the author recites LXX Isa 43:2 in a slightly abbreviated fashion. Isaiah 43:2 reads καὶ ἐὰν διέλθῃς διὰ πυρóς οὐ μὴ κατακαυθῇς φλòξ οὐ κατακαύσει σὲ. The author has omitted οὐ μὴ κατακαυθῇς and trans-

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

261

posed διέλθῃς διὰ πυρóς, perhaps to emphasize the “fire” that has been so prominent in the scenes of torture by placing it first. The verse might also have been suggested to the author as a starting point for his catena of Scriptural citations by the invocation yet again of the example of the three young men “in the fire” (18:12; cf. 13:9; 16:3, 21). They indeed passed through the fire and were not consumed. This fact points to a tension in the tradition that has already been solved by the time the author of 2 Maccabees placed such a strong emphasis on the resurrection of the bodies of the martyrs: why were not these martyrs also preserved from the flames? The author of 4 Maccabees anticipates the answer that would be provided by later Christian theologians: the three young men were saved from the fire; the Maccabean martyrs were saved through the fire and preserved for eternal life in God’s presence. Isaiah 43:1–4 is part of a larger passage that had detailed the people’s disobedience and God’s chastisement of Israel (see 42:18–25). It is thus highly appropriate to the martyrs as the author has constructed their situation. The leaders of Jerusalem had led the way toward rebellion against God’s covenant, resulting in the pouring out of God’s anger upon them (see 4 Macc 4:15–26; cf. Isa 42:25). The martyrs, however, who stand fast by piety in the midst of the flood and fire that has been let loose upon them, receive God’s assurance that they will indeed be redeemed by God and not utterly overwhelmed by the flood or consumed by the fire. Dupont-Sommer (1939:155) finds the order of this and the following recitations problematic, preferring to see them follow canonical order. However, the recitations are skillfully placed in the current sequence by the author to construct a certain movement that is salient to the subject matter. The catena, then, begins with a verse that acknowledges the reality of the fiery trials that come even upon the faithful, but also gives assurance that, in some sense, those fiery trials do not threaten the ultimate integrity of the faithful person’s being, which is kept by God. This is followed by a recitation of Ps 34:20 in 18:15. Departing from the syntax of 18:14 (but ultimately depending on it to give clear sense to what follows), the author uses metonymy in this and the following verses, referring to the author for the text produced by the author (“He sang to you the hymn-writer David” rather than “he sang to you the hymn written by David”). The five Greek words recited by the author merely attest to the fact that those who would remain “just” in regard to keeping faith with God and God’s Law will encounter many trials or afflictions in the course of life in a world opposed to God (in this book, a world where passions rather than reason often gain the upper hand, exemplified in

262

COMMENTARY

the violence of Antiochus IV). As such, the recitation provides a maxim, a generalized truth, reflected already in the stories of Abel, Joseph, the three young men, and Daniel (and, from another vantage point, Isaac, in a story where the source of the trial was not the vicious passions dominating the unrighteous but rather God’s desire to prove the genuineness of Abraham’s loyalty). This has the effect of preparing the righteous person to expect affliction, so that the negative experiences they encounter will not disconfirm their world view (according to which observance of the covenant means enjoying God’s favor and the promise of ultimate reward) nor undermine their confidence that they are in fact walking in line with God’s good pleasure. (Similar “advance preparation” for hostility, so as to disarm its power to erode confidence and commitment, can be seen at work in 1 Thess 3:1–4.) However, a person familiar with the psalm (and I understand the Psalms to have been among the most familiar parts of Scripture to pious Jews, given their regular use in public worship) would be able mentally to supply the remainder of the verse: “and out of them all he [God] delivers them [the righteous people].” Indeed, this is a refrain throughout the Psalm, moving from the psalmist’s own experience of deliverance to his generalization from his own experience to the “way God works” on behalf of all the righteous: ἐκ πασῶν τῶν παροικιῶν μου ἐρρύστó με (LXX Ps 33:5; Alexandrinus reads θλίψεων) ἐκ πασῶν τῶν θλίψεων αὐτοῦ ἔσωσεν αὐτóν (LXX Ps 33:7; still selfreferential) ἐκ πασῶν τῶν θλίψεων αὐτῶν ἐρρύσατο αὐτούς (LXX Ps 33:18) ἐκ πασῶν αὐτῶν (namely, αἱ θλίψεις τῶν δικαίων) ῥύσεται αὐτούς (LXX Ps 33:20)

These repetitive statements of God’s rescue establish a clear expectation of temporal sequence: the righteous are afflicted; the Lord takes notice; the Lord delivers them. By invoking this psalm with a brief recitation, the author has also created the possibility – indeed the probability – that the reader/hearer will bring the inner logic of the psalm into his or her experience of the text. This logic leads the listener to firmly anticipate God’s rescue of the righteous in one form (temporal safety) or another (reward beyond death), explicating God as the source of the guarantee made by Isaiah (the rescue from fire) and thereby focusing attention on maintaining one’s relationship with God inviolable as the path to deliverance.

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

263

The psalm’s veracity is clearly threatened at one point by the experience of the martyrs. Claiming that “The Lord guards all their bones; not one of them will be broken” clearly runs counter to the experience of these martyrs whose bones are directly targeted throughout the drama. The author’s ability to invoke LXX Ps 33:20 without fear that LXX Ps 33:21 will cast doubt upon his emerging argument from Scripture shows how completely he and his audience have accepted that the fulfillment of such promises may be naturally transferred from this life and the well-being of this physical body to the life beyond death. Again the author refers to “the saying of Solomon” simply as “Solomon,” another instance of metonymy, reciting in 18:16 the first part of LXX Prov 3:18 (ξύλον ζωῆς ἐστι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀντεχουένοις αὐτῆς) with some variation in the second part. Proverbs 3:18 speaks of Wisdom as a “tree of life for those remaining loyal to her.” The author has altered the second half, perhaps influenced by the wording of Prov 1:7 (also Ps 110:10), ἀρχὴ σοφίας φóβος θεοῦ σύνεσις δὲ ἀγαθὴ πᾶσι τοῖς ποιοῦσιν αὐτήν (i.e., σοφίαν). “Doing wisdom” and “holding fast to (remaining loyal to) Wisdom” are both interpreted by the author of 4 Maccabees as “doing God’s will,” that is, as revealed in God’s commandments which have figured so prominently throughout this oration. Such an interpretation of the proverb is entirely consonant with Ben Sira’s identification of “Wisdom” with the keeping of the Torah (Sir 1:26; 19:20; 24:23). By altering the second half of the proverb to τoῖς πoιoῦσιv αὐτoῦ τò θέλημα, the author has made a change in the implied subject of the sentence. It is likely that the audience will hear “God” (the “he” of “his will”) rather than “Wisdom” as the subject of the verb ἐστιv (DupontSommer 1939:156; Hadas 1953:241; Klauck 1989:755). Alternatively, it would also be possible to read this ἐστιv simply as “there is [a tree of life],” and therefore, “those who do God’s will have a tree of life.” However one resolves the question of the subject, the argumentative force is clear. In the midst of the “many trials” that afflict the righteous and threaten their well-being, God provides a “tree,” an image of stability and safety, that moreover provides assurance of deliverance and survival (“life”), even if this will not take the form of continued enjoyment of the goods of this life. This is suggested by the obvious connection of this image with the Garden of Eden in Gen 3:22, in which the fruit of the tree of life meant immortality, the reward held before the eyes of the Torah-observant in 4 Maccabees as well (e.g., at 17:12). It is also suggested by the emphasis on access to the tree of life in at least one vision of the renewal of creation (i.e. Rev 2:7; 22:1–2).

264

COMMENTARY

The mother goes on to recall how her husband had “rendered credible the [question of ] Ezekiel,” reciting Ezek 37:3 (εἰ ζήσεται τὰ ὀστᾶ ταῦτα) with the addition of the detail that the bones were ξηρὰ, “dry,” from Ezek 37:2 (18:18). (This is, incidentally, the only point at which the author comes close to making room for the resurrection of the dead in his discourse, which is even muted here in deference to the author’s predilection for speaking instead of the immortality of the soul.) This recitation is indeed appropriate in the aftermath of the tortures, for the audience looks out, as it were, on a courtyard full of dismembered corpses and is left to wonder, with Ezekiel, if there will be any future for these individuals. By bringing in this quotation, the author has clarified the meaning of the Scriptures previously recited, showing that the Scriptural tradition taken as a whole leads its adherents to expect that the “many trials” that face those who would remain “just” toward God could indeed lead to death. Thus the promise that the “fire will not consume” the faithful is not disconfirmed when the faithful are in fact burned to their very bones, as was Eleazar (4 Macc 6:26). The ability of the fire to consume the flesh of the faithful does not signal its ability to consume the faithful themselves, for God is able to keep their lives into eternity, as the climactic verse in this catena will conclude. The final link in the catena is a reference to the Song of Moses in Deuteronomy (cf. 4 Macc 18:18 with LXX Deut 31:30), which the author offers as the evidence (γάρ) by means of which the father confirmed the truth of Ezekiel’s vision of dead bones receiving new life from God. The Song of Moses is an important song in other texts reflective of high tension between group and society, as in Rev 15:1–8, and as a whole is singularly appropriate to the narrative of 4 Maccabees. The Song speaks of God punishing Israel for turning to idols (32:15–25), presumably through using their Gentile enemies as agents of punishment (32:21, 27). God, however, vindicates Israel before bringing them to complete destruction and has “compassion on his servants” (32:36–43). To this vindication and vengeance upon Israel’s enemies, the final verse adds the note that God purifies the land for God’s people (32:43c). This is, in effect, the template for 4 Maccabees, with the martyrs serving as the turning point between wrath and compassion/vindication, and the medium for purification. The first half of this recitation comes from Deut 32:39. The word order in this particular quote is highly significant, being read by the author as a temporal sequence rather than merely as a balanced expression of God’s power to give life and take away life: “I kill and [then] I make alive”

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

265

becomes support for the belief in the resurrection of the martyred faithful. This is how, indeed, the martyr can pass through the fire (cf. Isa 43:2, recited in 18:14), suffer the utter consumption of his or her body, and yet not in fact be “consumed” in any ultimate sense. This is how the martyr, as the “just person” who will not break faith with God, can face the “many trials” (LXX Ps 33:20) and still anticipate the deliverance that provides the steady pulse of the repetitive texture of Psalm 33 (34). The second part of the quotation is a blending of LXX Deut 32:47 with LXX Deut 30:20, two verses that are substantially paraphrases of one another. The first reads αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν καὶ ἕνεκεν τοῦ λóγου τούτου μακροημερεύσετε, the second τοῦτο ἡ ζωή σου καὶ ἡ μακρóτης τῶν ἡμερῶν σου. The author of 4 Maccabees has combined these, reciting αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν verbatim from Deut 32:47 and καὶ ἡ μακρότης τῶν ἡμερῶν verbatim from Deut 30:20. Deuteronomy 30:20 identifies the source of this life to be loving God, obeying God, and holding fast to God; Deut 32:47 connects this life more explicitly with the performance of the words of the law in the lives of the Hebrews. Most appropriately for the setting in 4 Maccabees 18, this latter text enjoins upon the hearers to teach the words of the law to their children, that they might also “guard and do all these words,” the very thing that the father of the seven is remembered to have done (18:10). Doing the Law and contributing to the preservation of the Jewish way of life, then, is clearly envisioned as the path to the life that stretches beyond death. In 4 Maccabees, “life and length of days” is no longer limited to “living in the land” located across the Jordan (as explicitly named in Deut 32:47, the land sworn to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in Deut 30:20), but transferred to immortal life in the presence of God. The final (carefully crafted) recitation, then, affirms that God is able to give life even to the dead, and that God is ultimately the one who allots “life and length of days,” whether in this life or the life beyond. Aligning oneself with God, then, by honoring and diligently obeying God’s Law is the prudent course of action in the face of any trial that might present itself, even if that trial is lifethreatening in a temporal sense (as it certainly was for the martyrs). The author resumes an elevated style as he brings his oration to a close. Using the rhetorical figure of “correction,” he exclaims that the day of the martyrdoms was “bitter – and not bitter,” the latter correcting first impressions about the carnage and horror with a reminder of the praiseworthy remembrance and the eternal honor and life granted to the martyrs as a result of that day. The figure of “correction” was used specifically to highlight the appropriateness of the second expression

266

COMMENTARY

(Rhet. Her. 4.26.36), here drawing the audience’s attention to the need continually to lift the eyes away from temporal appearances and to evaluate choices and outcomes sub specie aeternitatis. Using “bitter” for a third time, the author speaks of the ʼΕλλήvωv τύραvvoς, the “tyrant of the Greeks,” jolting the audience with the irony of that situation. Greeks had prided themselves on freedom and openness of speech, and now they are characterized as the subjects of a tyrant and the bearers of tyranny into Judea. This elevated opening, playing on the word πικρòς, leads to an accumulation of images by which the author seeks to impress upon the audience one more time the horrors of the scene and the endurance of the martyrs (18:20b-21). The original scribe of Sinaiticus presented a text with a seemingly mixed metaphor that the corrector could not allow, changing “quenching fire with fire” to “kindling fire,” bringing the Sinaiticus text in line with Alexandrinus. The original reading in Sinaiticus, however, presents a more dynamic and striking image, with the tyrant “putting out” spent fires, as it were, not in such a way as to end the torments, but with renewed supplies of fires to continue the incessant torments against the lined-up martyrs. Such an image is fitting for the elevated tone and pathos of the conclusion of the oration, and coheres well with the remaining images in 18:20, also suggestive of the protracted and unrelenting torments as the martyrs are led from instrument to instrument. Pupil-piercing was not mentioned anywhere in the narratives of the martyrdoms (18:21), and so it comes as something of a surprise here (where the catapults, cauldrons, and cutting out of tongues are reminiscent of specific instruments or tortures applied in the narrative itself ). The oration closes with an affirmation of the ongoing punishment of Antiochus even in the time during and subsequent to the delivery of the oration (18:22), and the present enjoyment of life beyond death by the martyrs (18:23), making the historical narrative strangely contemporary for the audience. Sinaiticus preserves readings here that differ substantially from the critical edition of Rahlfs: the martyrs “are being nobly announced to [R: gathered together into] the chorus of the ancestors, having received pure and victorious [R: immortal] souls.” Sinaiticus creates a far more vivid picture of the triumph of the martyrs, bearing the prizes of their contest as their victory is “announced” to the ancestral spectators of their struggle, just as winners are announced and given recognition at the end of games in Greco-Roman cities. Once

4 MACCABEES 18:6–24

267

again, the author is able to confirm the plausibility of the martyrs’ hopes (see, notably, 13:17) by narrating, as it were, their post-mortem activity and destiny. As in Philo and Wisdom of Solomon, immortality of the soul replaces resurrection of the body (which had been explicitly endorsed in 2 Macc 7:9, 11, 14, 22–23; Anderson 1985a:539; cf. 4 Macc 9:22; 14:5–6; 16:13; 17:12; 18:23). There is some question about the meaning of the martyrs’ receiving “pure souls” from God. Did this happen prior to their birth, as in Wis 8:19 (Townshend 1913:685), such that the author shows some appreciation for the Pythagorean doctrine of the pre-existence of souls (Dupont-Sommer 1939:44, 136)? There is very little in the text upon which to base a definite answer, all the more as the author may be using the image of receiving a soul simply as a figure of speech for receiving immortality, leaving behind corporeal existence and entering the existence of the divine realm. Seim (2001:30) has observed that the author of 4 Maccabees moves from genetic or kinship terms to terms more reflective of embodying what was characteristic of Abraham. Thus in 9:21 the first brother is described as “a great-souled and Abrahamic young man”; in 18:20 the mother is called an “Abrahamite” (Αβρααμίτις); in 18:23 the seven brothers are called “Abrahamic sons.” She cautions readers not to eliminate the distinctions by simply converting these into kinship terms (e.g., “daughter of Abraham,” “sons of Abraham,” as in the NRSV). She argues that “Abraham is significant as an archetype rather than as an ancestor,” the children being named “Abrahamic” on the basis of their possession of the virtues that Abraham exhibited, and not merely on the basis of lineage (Seim 2001:31, 33). This is a subtle lexical shift, but the ready availability of expressions like υἱòς Αβρααμ and θυγάτηρ Αβρααμ suggests that the author’s choice of the more remote Αβρααμιαῖoι and Αβρααμίτις is meant to avoid the obvious connotations of the more common expressions. If this is correct, the audience will be subtly challenged to prove their lineage (“offspring of the seed of Abraham,” 18:1), as it were, by embodying the way of life and the virtues of their noble ancestor, and thus be further disposed to take up the author’s explicit challenge to show piety toward God by obeying Torah “in every way” (18:1). The concluding doxology (18:24) bears a remarkable similarity to the doxologies in Heb 13:21 and 2 Tim 4:18, a fact that has suggested to Peter Staples (1966:221) that 4 Maccabees was well-known in the early church. Although there are several impressive points of contact between certain New Testament texts and 4 Maccabees at the level of verbal

268

COMMENTARY

correspondence (see deSilva 1998:143–149), the doxologies provide slender additional evidence since these similarities may be due to completely independent formulation (given the limitations on the form of the doxology, some coincidences are inevitable) or dependence on common liturgical usage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

269

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY SOURCES Aeschylus. 2 vols. Translated by H. W. Smyth. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1922–1926. The Apostolic Fathers. 2 vols. Translated by Kirsopp Lake. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1912–1913. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by J. H. Freese. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1926. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1926. Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1957. [Cicero,] Rhetorica ad Herennium. Translated by H. Caplan. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1954. Cicero, Tusculun Disputations. Translated by J. E. King. LCL. London: Heinemann Ltd., and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1927. Dio Chrysostom, [Orations.] 5 vols. Translated by J. W. Cohoon and H. L. Crosby. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1932–51. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 2 vols. Translated by R. D. Hicks. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1925. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 7 vols. Translated by Earnest Cary. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1937–1950. Epictetus, The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments. 2 vols. Translated by W. A. Oldfather. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1925, 1928. Euripides, [Tragedies]. 4 vols. Translated by A. S. Way. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1912. Eusebius, The History of the Church. Translated by G. A. Williamson. New York: Penguin, 1965. Josephus, The Jewish War. 2 vols. Translated by H. St. John Thackeray. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1927–28. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities. 5 vols. Translated by H. St. John Thackeray, Ralph Marcus and Allen Wikgren. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1930–63. Josephus, The Works of Josephus. Translated by W. Whiston. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987. Lucian, [Works.] Vols. 1 and 5. Translated by A. M. Harmon. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1913. Lysias, Orations. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1930. Origen, An Exhortation to Martyrdom, et al. Translated by R. A. Greer. New York: Paulist Press, 1979. Philo, [Works.] 12 vols. Translated by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, and Ralph Marcus. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1929–53. Philo, The Works of Philo. Translated by C. D. Yonge. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993. Philodemus, On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, et al. Texts and Translations 43; Greco-Roman Series 13. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998.

270

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Plato, The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. With “The Seventh Letter.” Translated by J. Harvard. Chicago: William Benton, 1952. Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. Translated by H. N. Fowler. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1914. Plato, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge: Harvard, 1925. Pliny the Younger, Letters and Panegyricus. 2 vols. Translated by B. Radice. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge: Harvard, 1969. Plutarch, Moralia. 15 vols. Various translators. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1927–76. Quintilian, [Institutes.] Vol. 1. Translated by H. E. Butler. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge: Harvard, 1921. Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. 3 vols. Translated by R. M. Gummere. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1917–25. Seneca, Moral Essays. 3 vols. Translated by J. W. Basore. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1928–35. Sophocles, [Tragedies]. 3 vols. Translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1994–96. Suetonius, [The Twelve Caesars.] 2 vols. Translated by J. H. Rolfe. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1914. Tacitus, The Histories. Translated by K. Wellesley. New York: Penguin, 1964. Thucydides, [Histories.] 4 vols. Translated by C. F. Smith. LCL. London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1919–23.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SECONDARY SOURCES An up-to-date and comprehensive bibliography of works treating 4 Maccabees, with a special bibliography on martyrdom, can be found in Lorenzo DiTommaso, A Bibliography of Pseudepigrapha Research (JSPSS 39; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 693–716. A slightly more dated and much less complete bibliography is provided in Andreas Lenhardt, “Bibliographe zu den Jüdischen Schriften aus hellenistischrömischer Zeit,” pp. 279–283 in H. Lichtenberger and G. S. Oegema, Jüdischen Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit. Band VI. Supplementa (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshuas, 1999). Adkins, A. W. H. 1972. Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (London: Chatto and Windus). Amir, Y. 1971. “Maccabees, Fourth Book of,” pp. 11.661–662 in Cecil B. Roth (ed.), Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House). Anderson, H. 1985a. “4 Maccabees (First Century A.D.). A New Translation and Introduction,” pp. 2.531–564 in J. H. Charlesworth (ed.), The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (2 vols.; Garden City, NY: Doubleday). ——. 1985b. “Third and Fourth Maccabees and Jewish Apologetics,” pp. 173–179 in La Littérature Intertestamentaire. Colloque de Strasbourg (17–19 octobre 1983) (Paris: Presses Universaires de France). ——. 1992. “Maccabees, Books of: Fourth Maccabees,” pp. 4.452–453 in D. N. Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: Doubleday). Aune, D. C. 1994. “Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity,” pp. 125–158 in Wendy Helleman (ed.), Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America). Bailey, Daniel P. 1999. Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul’s Use of Hilasterion in Romans 3:25 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge); forthcoming as Jesus as the Mercy Seat: Paul’s Use of Hilasterion in Romans 3:25 with an Analysis of 4 Maccabees 17:22 and Patristic Interpretation (WUNT 2. Reihe; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Bammel, Ernst 1953. “Zum jüdischen Märtyrerkult,” TLZ 78: 119–126. Barclay, J. M. G. 1991. Obeying the Truth (Minneapolis: Fortress Press). Bensly, R. L., and W. E. Barnes. 1895. The Fourth Book of Maccabees and Kindred Documents in Syriac (Cambridge: Cambridge University). Berger, P. L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday). Berve, H. 1967. Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (2 vols. Munich: Beck). Bickerman, E. J. 1976a. “The Date of Fourth Maccabees,” pp. 1.275–281 in Studies in Jewish and Christian History (Leiden: E. J. Brill). ——. 1976b. “The Maccabean Uprising: An Interpretation,” pp. 66–86 in Judah Goldin (ed.), The Jewish Expression (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press). ——. 1979. The God of the Maccabees. Studies on the Meaning and Origin of the Maccabean Revolt (Studies in Judaism and Late Antiquity; Leiden: Brill). Boissevain, J. 1974. Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions (New York: St. Martin’s). Breitenstein, U. 1978. Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut des Vierten Makkabäerbuchs (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe).

272

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, Peter 1988. The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press). Butts, J. R. 1986. The Progymnasmata of Theon. A New Text with Translation and Commentary (Ph.D. Diss., Claremont Graduate School). Byron, John 2004. “Noble Lineage as a Response to Enslavement in the Testament of Naphtali 1.9–12,” JJS 55: 45–57. Campbell, D. A. 1992. “Appendix 3: The Date of 4 Maccabees,” pp. 219–228 in D. A. Campbell, The Rhetoric of Righteousness in Romans 3.21–26 ( JSNTSS 65; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press). Charlesworth, J. H. 1981. The New Discoveries in St. Catherine’s Monastery: A Preliminary Report on the Manuscripts, with G. T. Zervos. Foreword by D. N. Freedman (ASORMS 3; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns). Cohen, Gerson D. 1953. “The Story of Hannah and Her Seven Sons in Hebrew Literature,” pp. 109–122 in Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America). Collins, J. J. 1983. Between Athens and Jerusalem (New York: Crossroad). ——. 1981. Daniel, First Maccabees, Second Maccabees with an Excursus on the Apocalyptic Genre (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier). Crossan, J. D. 1991. The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper Collins). Croy, N. Clayton 1998. Endurance in Suffering: Hebrews 12:1–13 in its rhetorical, religious, and philosophical contents (SNTSMS 98; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Daly, Robert J. 1988. “The Soteriological Significance of the Sacrifice of Isaac,” CBQ 39: 45–75. Danby, H. 1933. The Mishnah, translated from the Hebrew with Introduction and Brief Explanatory Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press). D’Angelo, M. R. 2003. “Eusebeia: Roman Imperial Family Values and the Sexual Politics of 4 Maccabees and the Pastorals,” Biblical Interpretation 11:139–165. Danker, F. W. 1982. Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field (St. Louis, MO: Clayton Publishing House). Dehandschutter, B. 1989. “Martyrium und Agon: Über die Wurzeln der Vorstellung vom ἀγώv in vierten Makkabäerbuch,” pp. 215–219 in J. W. van Henten (ed.), Die Entstehung der jüdischen Martyrologie (Studia Post-Biblica 38; Leiden: Brill). Deissmann, A. 1900. “Das vierte Makkabäerbuch,” pp. 2.149–176 in E. Kautzsch (ed.), Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments (Hildesheim: Georg Olms). de Jonge, M. 1991a. Jesus, the Servant Messiah (New Haven: Yale University Press). ——. 1991b. “Jesus’ Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs,” pp. 125–134 in M. de Jonge, Jewish Eschatology, Early Christian Christology and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: Collected Essays (Leiden: Brill). ——. 1988. “Jesus’ Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs,” pp. 142– 151 in T. Baarda, et al. (eds.), Text and Testimony. Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in honor of A. J. F. Klijn (Kampen:Uitgeversmaatschappij J. H. Kok). Del Verme, Mercello. 1976. “L’apocrifo giudaico IV Maccabei e gli atti dei martiri cristiani del II secolo,” Asp 23:287–302. deSilva, David A. 1995a. Despising Shame: Honor Discourse and Community Maintenance in the Epistle to the Hebrews (SBLDS 152; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press). ——. 1995b. “The Noble Contest: Honor, Shame, and the Rhetorical Strategy of 4 Maccabees,” JSP 13: 31–57. ——. 1996a. “Exchanging Favor for Wrath: Apostasy in Hebrews and Patron-Client Relations,” JBL 115: 91–116. ——. 1996b. “The Wisdom of Ben Sira: Honor, Shame, and the Maintenance of the Values of a Minority Culture,” CBQ 58: 433–455. ——. 1998. 4 Maccabees. (Guides to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

273

——. 2000a. Honor, Patronage, Kinship, and Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press). ——. 2000b. Perseverance in Gratitude: A Socio-rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle “to the Hebrews” (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans). ——. 2002. Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic). ——. 2003. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 888–901 in J. D. G. Dunn and J. W. Rogerson (eds.), Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans). de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1954. “Suffragium: From Vote to Patronage,” British Journal of Sociology 5: 33–48. Doran, Robert. 2000. “Martyrdom of Habbib the Deacon,” pp. 413–423 in Richard Valantasis (ed.), Religions of Late Antiquity in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University). Dörrie, H. 1937. Die Stellung der vier Makkabäerbücher im Kanon der griechischen Bibel (Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissentschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse V, Neue Folge 1.2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). ——. 1938. Passio SS Machabaeorum, die antike lateinische Übersetzung des IV. Makkabäerbuches (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen; Philologisch-Historische Klasse III, Folge 22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). Droge, A. J., and J. D. Tabor. 1992. A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity (San Francisco: Harper). Dupont-Sommer, A. 1939. Le Quatrième Livre des Machabées (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion). Elliott, J. H. 1994. “The Evil Eye and the Sermon on the Mount.” Biblical Interpretation 2/1:51–84. Emmet, C. W. 1918. The Fourth Book of Maccabees (Translations of Early Documents, Series II: Hellenistic-Jewish Texts 6; London: SPCK). Feldman, Louis H. 1993. Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian (Princeton: Princeton University). Feldman, Louis H., and Meyer Reinhold. 1996. Jewish Life and Thought Among Greeks and Romans: Primary Readings (Minneapolis: Fortress). Fischer, U. 1978. Eschatologie und Jenseitserwartung im hellenistischen Diaspora-Judentum (BZNW 44; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter). Foucault, Michel. 2001. Fearless Speech (edited by J. Pearson; Boston: Semiotext(e)). Frend, W. H. C. 1967. Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus (New York: New York University Press). Freudenthal, J. 1869. Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift über die Herrschaft der Vernunft (IV Makkabäerbuch), eine Predigt aus dem ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert (Breslau). Gager, J. 1983. The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press). Gilbert, M. 1984. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 316–319 in M. E. Stone (ed.), Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period (Assen: Van Gorcum, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press). Goldstein, J. 1976 I Maccabees. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 41; Garden City, NY: Doubleday). ——. 1983 II Maccabees. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 41A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday). Grappe, Christian. 2000. “De l’intérèt de 4 Maccabées 17.18–22 (et 16.20–21) pour la christologie du NT,” NTS 46: 342–357. Grimm, C. L. W. 1857. Viertes Buch der Maccabaër, pp. 283–370 in Kunzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen des Alten Testaments (Leipzig: S. Hirzel). Gutman, Y. 1949. “The Story of the Mother and her Seven Sons in the Agadah and in II and IV Maccabees” (in Hebrew), pp. 25–37 in Commentationes Iudaico-Hellenisticae in Memorian I. Levy (Jerusalem: Magnes).

274

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hadas, M. 1951. Aristeas to Philocrates (New York: Harper). ——. 1953. The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New York: Harper). Hadas, Moses, and M. Smith. 1965. Heroes and Gods (New York: Harper and Row). Hall, E. 1989. Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon). Harrington, D. J. 1988. The Maccabean Revolt: Anatomy of a Biblical Revolution (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier). ——. 1999. Invitation to the Apocrypha (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans). Hartmans, Lars. 1995. “Guiding the Knowing Vessel of Your Heart,” pp. 19–36 in Peder Borgen and Søren Giversen (eds.), The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997]). Hay, David M. 1989. “Pistis as ‘Ground for Faith’ in Hellenized Judaism and Paul,” JBL 108: 461–476. Heinemann, Isaak. 1894–1963. “Makkabäerbücher (IV.), PW 14.1.800–805. Heininger, B. 1989. “Der böse Antiochus: Eine Studie zur Erzähltechnik des 4. Makkabäerbuchs,” BZ NF 33: 43–59. Hengel, M. 1974. Judaism and Hellenism (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress Press). ——. 1980. Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians. Aspects of the Hellenization of Judaism in the preChristian Period (Philadelphia: Fortress Press). Hilhorst, Ton. 2000. “Fourth Maccabees in Christian Martyrdom Texts,” pp. 107–121 in Caroline Kroon and Daan den Hengst (eds.), Ultima Aetas: Time, Tense and Transience in the Ancient World (Amsterdam: VU University Press). Hock, R. F., and E. N. O’Neil. 1986. The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Volume 1. The Progymnasmata (Atlanta: Scholars Press). Jack, Gavin. 2004. “On Speech, Critique and Protection,” ephemera 4/2:121–134. Jefford, Clayton N. 2000. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 424–440 in Richard Valantasis (ed.), Religions of Late Antiquity in Practice (Princeton Readings in Religion; Princeton: Princeton University Press). Jensen, H. J. L. 1988. “Die Pervertierung der Küche und die Dialektik der Aufklärung. Eine strukturell-exegetische Meditation über das Martyrium der Juden im 2. Und 4. Makkabäerbuch,” Hermes 24: 39–54. Johnson, Sherman E. 1979. “Greek and Jewish Heroes: Fourth Maccabees and the Gospel of Mark,” pp. 155–175 in William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (eds.), Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: In honorem Robert M. Grant (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne). Johnson, S. E., and John Breck. 1991. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 341–361 (AP) in B. M. Metzger and R. E. Murphy (eds.), The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version (New York: Oxford University Press). Kennedy, G. A. 1984. New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press). Klauck, H.-J. 1989a. 4 Makkabäerbuch (Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit 3.6.; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn). ——. 1989b. “Hellenistiche Rhetorik im Diasporajudentum: Das Exordium des vierten Makkabäerbuchs (4 Makk 1.1–12),” NTS 35: 451–65. ——. 1990. “Brotherly Love in Plutarch and in 4 Maccabees,” pp. 144–156 in D. L. Balch, E. Ferguson, and W. A. Meeks (eds.), Greeks, Romans, Christians (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press). Koester, Helmut. 1968. “Nomos Physeōs: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought,” pp. 521–541 in J. Neusner (ed.), Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of E. F. Goodenough (Leiden: Brill). Kraus Reggiani, C. 1992. 4 Maccabei (Commentario storico ed esegetico all’ Antico e al Nuovo Testamento, Supp. 1; Genova: Marietti). Kundert, L. 1998. “Isaak im 4. Makkabäerbuch,” pp. 169–172 in L. Kundert (ed.), Die Opferung/Bindung Isaaks. Bd. 1: Gen 22, 1–19 im Alten Testament, in Frühjudentum und im Neuen Testament (WMANT 78; Neukirchen-Vluyn).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

275

Lake, Helen and Kirsopp. 1911–1922. Codex Sinaiticus Petropolitanus (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon). Lauer, S. 1955. “Eusebes Logismos in IV Macc,” JJS 6: 170–71. Lausberg, H. 1973. Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft (2nd edition; Munich). Lebram, J. C. H. 1974. “Die literarische Form des vierten Makkabäerbuches,” VC 28: 81–96. Lopez-Salva, M. 1982–87. “Libro cuarto de los Macabeos,” pp. 3.121–166 in A. Diez Macho (ed.), Apocrifos del antiguo testamento (5 vols.; Madrid: Christiandad). Lucchesi, Enzo. 1981. “Découverte d’une traduction copte du quatrième livre des Maccabées (BHG 1006),” AnBoll 99: 302. ——. 1983. “Encore trois feuillets coptes du Quatrième Livre des Maccabées,” pp. 21–22 in Écriture et traductions dans la littérature copte. Journée d’études coptes, Strasbourg, 28 mai 1982 (Cahiers Bibliotèque Copte 1. Louvain). Mack, B. L. 1990. Rhetoric and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press). Mack, B. L., and V. K. Robbins. 1989. Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press). Malina, B. J., and J. H. Neyrey. 1991. “Conflict in Luke-Acts: Labelling and Deviance Theory,” in J. H. Neyrey (ed.), The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation (Peabody: Hendrickson). Marchel, Witold. 1956. “De resurrectione et de retributione statim post mortem secundum 2 mach comparandum cach,” VD 34: 327–341. Marrou, H. I. 1956. A History of Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheed & Ward). McHugh, M. (tr.). 1972. Saint Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works (Fathers of the Church 65; Washington: Catholic University Press). Metcalfe, W. 1921. “Origen’s Exhortation to Martyrdom and 4 Maccabees,” JTS 22: 268–269. Metzger, B. M. 1981. Manuscripts of the Greek Bible (Oxford and New York: Oxford University). Milne, H. J. M., and T. C. Skeat. 1951. The Codex Sinaiticus and the Codex Alexandrinus (London: Trustees of the British Museum). Momigliano, A. 1973–74. “Freedom of Speech in Antiquity,” pp. 2.252.263 in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), The Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons). Moore, S. D., and J. C. Anderson. 1998. “Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” JBL 117: 249–273. Morin, Germain. 1914. “L’opuscule perdu du soi-disant Hégésippe syr les Maccabées,” RBén 31: 83–91. Nauroy, G. 1990. “Du combat de la piété à la confession du sang. Ambrose de Milan lecteur critique du Ive Livre des Maccabées,” RHPR 70: 49–68. Newsome, J. D. 1992. Greeks, Romans, Jews. Currents of Culture and Belief in the New Testament World (Philadelphia: Trinity Press). Nickelsburg, G. W. E. 1981. Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Fortress Press). Norden, E. 1923. Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner). O’Hagan, A. 1974. “The Martyr in the Fourth Book of Maccabees,” SBFLA 24: 94–120. Obermann, J. 1931. “The Sepulchre of the Maccabean Martyrs,” JBL 50: 250–265. Osiek, Carolyn. 2003. “Pietas In and Out Of the Frying Pan,” Biblical Interpretation 11: 166–171. Pearson, A. C. 1973. The fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes (New York, Arno Press). Perler, O. 1949. Das vierte Makkabäerbuch, Ignatius von Antiochien und die ältesten Martyrerberichte, RAC 25: 47–72. Pfeiffer, R. H. 1949. History of New Testament Times, with an Introduction to the Apocrypha (New York: Harper & Brothers).

276

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pfitzner, V. C. 1967. Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature (Leiden: E. J. Brill). Politis, L. 1980. “Nouveau manuscripts grec découverts au mount Sinaï,” Scriptorium 34: 5–17. Pomeroy, S. B. 1994. Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary with a New English Translation (Oxford: Clarendon). Rahlfs, A. 1935. Septuaginta (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft). Redditt, P. D. 1983. “The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees,” CBQ 45: 249–70. Renaud, B. 1961. “La loi et les lois dans les livres des Maccabées,” RB 68: 39–67. Rendel, Harris. 1920/21. “Some Notes on 4 Maccabees,” ExpTim 2: 183–185. Renehan, R. 1972. “The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 115: 223–38. Reuther, O. 1914–72. “Tympanum,” PW 2. Series 7.2.1749–1754. Robbins, V. K. 1993. “Rhetoric and Culture: Exploring Types of Cultural Rhetoric in a Text,” pp. 447–467 in S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht (eds.), Rhetoric and the New Testament (JSNTSS 90; Sheffield: JSOT). Rost, L. 1971. Einleitung in die alttestamentlichen Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen (Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer). Russell, D. S. 1972. Between the Testaments (Philadelphia: Fortress Press). Saller, R. P. 1982. Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Schaller, B. 1990. “Das 4. Makkabäerbuch als Textzeuge der Septuaginta,” pp. 323–331 in D. Fraenkel, U. Quast, and J. W. Wevers (eds.), Studien zur Septuaginta – Robert Hanhart zu Ehren (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). Schatkin, M. 1974. “The Maccbean Martyrs,” VC 28: 97–113. Schürer, E. 1986. The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135). A new English version, edited by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Martin Goodman. Vol. 3, Div. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark). Seeley, D. 1990. The Noble Death. Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul’s Concept of Salvation (JSNTSS 28; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press). Seim, Turid Karlsen. 2001. “Abraham, Ancestor or Archetype? A Comparison of Abraham-Language in 4 Maccabees and Luke-Acts,” pp. 27–42 in Adela Yarbro Collins and Margaret M. Mitchell (eds.), Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religions and Philosophy Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Shaw, B. D. 1996. “Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4: 269–312. Smallwood, M. 1981. The Jews Under Roman Rule (Leiden: Brill). Staniforth, M. 1964. Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Harmondsworth: Penguin). ——. 1968. Early Christian Writings: The Apostolic Fathers (New York: Penguin). Staples, P. 1966. “The Unused Lever? A Study on the Possible Literary Influence of the Greek Maccabean Literature in the New Testament,” Modern Churchman 9:218– 224. Stowers, Stanley K. 2000. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 844–855 in James L. Mays (ed.), The HarperCollins Bible Commentary (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco). Stuhlmacher, Peter. 1975. “Zur neueren Exegese von Röm. 3,24–26.” pp. 315–333 in E. Earle Ellis and Erich Gräßer (eds.), Jesus und Paulus: Festchrift für G. W. Kümmel zum 70. Geburtstag (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). Swete, H. B. 1894. The Old Testament in Greek. Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Tcherikover, V. 1961. Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society). Thyen, H. 1955. Der Stil der jüdische-hellenistichen Homilie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

277

Torrey, C. C. 1945. The Apocryphal Literature: A Brief Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press). Townshend, R. B. 1913. “The Fourth Book of Maccabees,” pp. 2.653–685 in R. H. Charles (ed.), The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon). Valantasis, Richard (ed.). 2000. Religions of Late Antiquity in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press). van Henten, J. W. 1986. “Datierung und Herkunft des Vierten Makkabäerbuches,” pp. 136–149 in J. W. van Henten, H. J. de Jonge, et al. (eds.), Tradition and Re-interpretation in Jewish and Early Christian Literature (Leiden: Brill). ——. 1993. “The Tradition-Historical Background of Romans 3.25: A Search for Pagan and Jewish Parallels,” pp. 101–128 in M. C. De Boer (ed.), From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology in Honor of Marinus de Jonge (JSNTSS 84; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press). ——. 1994. “A Jewish Epitaph in a Literary Text: 4 Macc 17:8–10,” pp. 44–69 in J. W. van Henten and P. W. van der Horst (eds.), Studies in Early Jewish Epigraphy (AGJv 21; Leiden: Brill). ——. 1995. “The Martyrs as Heroes of the Christian People,” pp. 303–322 in M. Lamberigts and P. van Deun (eds.), Martyrium in Multidisciplinary Perspective (Leuven: Leuven University Press). ——. 1997. The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviors of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 & 4 Maccabees (Leiden: Brill). van Henten, J. W., and Friedrich Avemarie. 2002. Martyrdom and Noble Death: Selected texts from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and Christian Antiquity (London and New York: Routledge). von Gemünden, P. 1997. “La femme passionelle et l’homme rationnel? Un chapître de psychologie historique,” Bib 78: 457–480. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew (ed.). 1989. Patronage in Ancient Society (London: Routledge). Walters, Jonathan. 1991. “ ‘No More Than a Boy’: The Shifting Construction of Masculinity from Ancient Greece to the Middle Ages,” Gender and History 5: 20–33. Weber, R. 1991. “Eusebeia und Logismos. Zum philosophischen Hintergrund von 4. Makkabäer,” JSJ 22: 212–234. Williams, D. S. 1987. Josephus and the Authorship of IV Maccabees: A Critical Investigation (Ph.D. Dissertation, Hebrew Union College). ——. 1992. Stylometric Authorship Studies in Flavius Josephus and Related Literature (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press). Williams, S. K. 1975. Jesus’ Death as Saving Event: The Background and Origin of a Concept (HTRDS 2; Missoula, MN: Scholars Press). Winslow, D. F. 1974. “The Maccabean Martyrs: Early Christian Attitudes,” Judaism 23: 78–86. Young, R. D. 1991. “The ‘Woman with the Soul of Abraham’: Traditions about the Mother of the Maccabean Martyrs,” pp. 67–81 in A.-J. Levine (ed.), ‘Women like This’: New Perspectives on Jewish Women in the Greco-Roman World (SBLEJL 1; Atlanta: Scholars Press). Young, R. D. 1998. “4 Maccabees,” pp. 330–334 in C. A. Newsome and S. H. Ringe (eds.), Women’s Bible Commentary. Expanded Version (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press).

278

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

279

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS Adkins, A. W. H. 111 Amir, Y. xxiv Anderson, H. xii, xiv, xix, xxv, 133, 267 Anderson, J. C. 69, 79, 83, 145, 158, 175, 226 Aune, D. C. xxxviii, 88, 194 Avemarie, F. xxii, xxxi, xxxii, 83, 125, 252

Feldman, Louis H. xix Foucault, Michel 184 Freudenthal, J. xvii, xxi, xxii, xxx, 116, 202, 239, 256

Bailey, Daniel P. 250, 251 Barclay, J. M. G. xxxii Berger, P. L. 206 Berve, H. 125 Bickerman, E. J. xv Breitenstein, U. xii, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xxvii, 77, 88, 111, 220 Brown, Peter 175 Butts, J. R. 153 Byron, John 183

Hadas, M. xiv, xviii, xxi, xxiv, xxv, xxx, 69, 78, 80, 84, 86, 94, 98, 103, 110, 111, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 141, 152, 161, 167, 169, 197, 204, 206, 207, 221, 222, 225, 227, 230, 243, 244, 249, 257, 259, 263 Hall, E. 158 Hanhart, Robert xi Heininger, B. xix, 125, 126, 127, 159, 162 Hengel, M. xvii, xviii, xx, 113, 115, 120 Hilhorst, Ton xxxvii, xxxviii, 125

Collins, J. J. xv, xxiv, 110, 247 Croy, Clayton 185, 192 D’Angelo, M. R. 135, 136, 258, 259 Danker, F. W. 79, 123 Deissmann, A. xxi, xxiv, xxx, 167, 230, 238, 247, 256 de Jonge, M. xxxii deSilva, David A. xiv, xvii, xix, xxvi, xxxii, xxxiii, 90, 96, 114, 128, 130, 140, 147, 150, 160, 192, 195, 235, 242, 245, 257, 268 Doran, Robert xxxvii Droge, A. J. xxx, 148, 240 Dupont-Sommer, A. xii, xiv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxx, 69, 78, 85, 88, 90, 94, 98, 106, 107, 110, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 130, 134, 135, 143, 149, 155, 163, 167, 179, 180, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 218, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 229, 230, 231, 235, 239, 240, 242, 245, 246, 247, 249, 253, 255, 256, 261, 263, 267 Elliott, J. H.

90

Gilbert, M. xxiii Graape, Christian 236, 237, 248 Grimm, C. L. W. xvii, 89, 118, 134, 136, 143, 155, 249

Jack, Gavin

184

Klauck, H.-J. xi, xii, xiii, xv, xviii, xxiii, xxx, 69, 80, 84, 85, 88, 101, 105, 108, 109, 111, 118, 124, 128, 131, 143, 149, 151, 152, 157, 159, 163, 165, 167, 197, 201, 203, 206, 208, 210, 213, 225, 226, 231, 239, 241, 248, 249, 250, 263 Koester, Helmut 136 Lauer, S. 79 Lausberg, H. xxiii Lebram, J. C. H. xxi, xxii, xxvii, xxviii, 78, 242 Malina, B. J. 142 McHugh, M. xxxviii Metzger, B.M. xxxviii Milne, H. J. M. xxxviii Momigliano, A. 184 Moore, S. D. 69, 79, 83, 145, 158, 175, 226

280

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Neyrey, J. H. 142 Norden, E. xviii, xxi O’Hagan, A. xv, 79, 147, 193, 194, 234, 236, 250, 255, 259 Pearson, A. C. 69, 85, 104, 177, 179 Perler, O. xxxviii Pfeiffer, R. H. xvii, 133, 148 Pfitzner, V. C. 69, 192, 238, 245 Pomeroy, S. B. 158 Redditt, P. D. xxii, 85, 133, 137, 155, 156, 227 Reinhold, Meyer xix Renehan, R. xiii, xvi, 77, 85, 93, 133 Rost, L. 256 Saller, R. P. 160 Schaller, B. 98, 258 Schatkin, M. xviii, 122, 125 Schürer, E. xiii Seeley, David 148, 149, 255 Seim, Turid Karlsen xliii, 146, 178, 179, 219, 236, 267 Shaw, B. D. xxxvii, 69, 83, 84, 139, 175 Skeat, T. C. xxxviii Staples, P. xxxiii, xxxiv, 267

Stowers, S. xii, xxi, xxiii, xxviii, 77, 92, 137 Stulhmacher, Peter 251 Tabor, J. D. xxx, 148, 240 Tcherikover, V. xix Thyen, H. xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv Torrey, C. C. 141 Townsend, R. B. xii, xv, xvii, xxiv, xxv, 69, 82, 84, 85, 90, 103, 119, 133, 134, 149, 154, 176, 221, 225, 238, 247, 254, 267 van Henten, J. W. xii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxviii, xxxi, xxxii, 83, 107, 111, 112, 123, 125, 135, 138, 147, 148, 157, 185, 237, 238, 241, 242, 243, 244, 249, 250, 252 Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew 160 Walters, Jonathan 145 Williams, D. S. xii Williams, S. K. xxxii, 148, 236, 250, 252, 254 Winslow, D. F. xxxv, xxxviii Young, R. D.

xxiv, 110, 257

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 1. CLASSICAL SOURCES Aeschylus Agamemnon 815–816 920–925 943–947

227 109 109

Aetius Placit. philos. 1.2

85

Anaximenes of Lampsacus Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1.1421b21–1422b12 132, 160, 164 1.1421b21–1422b12 129 1421b37–1422a2 130 Aristophanes Ranae 804

224

Aristotle Athenian Constitution 18.4

126

De virtutibus et vitiis 4.4 5.1 5.2 6.5–6 Ethica eudemia 1.5, 1216b Ethica nichomachea 1.12.7, 1102a2–4 2.2.9, 1104b1–2 2.3.7, 1104b31–32 2.5.2, 1105b21–24 2.8.1, 1108b10–15 3.1.4, 1110a5–9 3.1.7, 1110a20–22 3.1.7, 1110a23–25 3.1.8, 1110a25–28 3.5, 1112b

81, 82, 145, 171 92, 140 132, 135, 138 166

3.5.7, 1113b24–29 3.6.5, 1115a24–25 3.6.8–9, 1115a30–33 3.6.8, 1115b12–13 3.6.10, 1115a33–35 3.7.2, 1115b12 3.8.9, 1116b19–22 5.1.8, 1129a31–1129b1 5.1.15, 1129b30–34 7.12.5, 1153a22–24 7.13.2, 1153b8–18 7.14.1–2, 1154a7–21 8.1.4, 1155a23 8.3.6, 1156b6–7 8.3.6, 1156b7–8 8.8.4, 1159b1–7 8.8.5, 1159b2–7 8.8.5, 1159b2–3 8.12.2–3, 1161b17–29 8.12.3–4, 1161b30–1162b2 8.12.3–4, 1161b30–34 8.12.3–4, 1161b34–36 8.12.3, 1161b20–28 8.12.3, 1161b30–35 8.12.6, 1162a9–15 8.12.6, 1162a12–15 8.14.4, 1163b15–18 8.14.4, 1163b18 9.6.2–3, 1167b3–9

131, 164 246 193 246 74 81, 156, 233 145, 171 74 74 89 89 89 169 205 212 205 212, 213 221 218 210 211 211 222 183 210 212 199, 235 199 169

Magna Moralia 1.34.1, 1196b

85

Poetics 9.3, 1451b7–10

111

Politica 1.13, 1260a12–14

217

Rhetorica 1.2.3–6 1.9.35–36 1.9.38–39 1.9.40 1.10.3

127 81 153 78 164

111 249 135 129, 160 87 89 138 81 131 132 111

282 2.1–11 2.1.8 2.11.1 2.12–17 2.12 2.12.3 2.12.5 2.12.11–12 2.12.9 2.12.13 2.13.5 2.13.7–9 2.13.9 2.2.1–2 2.2.1, 8 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.8 2.7.5 2.20.8 3.14

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 87 87 81 94 157 94, 157 157 154 171 172 154 138 154 88 174 74 74, 101 161 160 78 67

Arius Didymus Epitome 110

133

Cicero De finibus 5.13.36

77

Paradoxa 3.1.20 5.1.34

133 140

Tusculun Disputations 1.102 2.22.52 2.22.53 2.52 3.22 4.10–11 4.26.57 4.57 4.84 4.9–22 4.9.22 4.26.57 4.37.79 5.27.76 5.51–67 5.60 5.73–82 5.80–81 5.81

232 125 69 126 77 68 85 77 68 88 92 91 90 149 182 126, 127 182 140 164

Cyprian De bono patientiae 21–24

xxxvii

Demosthenes Orationes 60 60.1

xxii 244

Dio Cassius Roman History 67.14.2

168

Dio Chrysostom Orationes 6.57 8.15 8.16 8.17–18 8.18 8.20 8.26 11.121 14.18 29.21 32.26 48 48.15–16 48.6 62.1 66 80.5–7

184 193 193 193 143 193 193 251 130, 189 xxii, 81, 253 184, 187 169, 205 114 205 158 90 130

Diodorus of Sicily Historical Library (Bibl. Hist.) 9.4.2 195 14.64.4 195 14.67.1 195 34/35.1.1 100 34/35.1.2 100 34/35.1.4 100 34.1–4 xix, 168 34.1.1–3 188 34.1.3 188 40.3.4 xix, 168 Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.85 137 7.110 69, 88 7.120 133 7.122 104, 214 9.26–28 125, 176 9.26 126

283

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 9.28 9.58–60 9.58–59 9.59 10.131 10.135 10.144

177 126 125, 176 177 168 168 168

Dionysius of Halicarnassus Roman Antiquities 1.3.5 135 4.41.2 127 Epictetus Diatribai (Dissertationes) 1.1.23–24 1.6.37 1.13.3–5 1.13.5 1.18.17 1.18.21 1.24.1–2 1.25.21 1.29.5–8 1.29.18 1.29.33 1.29.44–49 1.29.50–54 1.30.1 2.2.15 2.8.13–14 3.11.6 3.12.7–11 3.20.4–6 3.20.9 3.22 3.22.56 3.22.59 3.23.21 3.24.71 4.1.1 4.1.60–87 4.1.60 4.1.70 4.1.87 4.1.123 4.1.152 4.1.163–165 4.1.168–169 4.8.12 4.10.14

152 190 200 130 165 193 193 133, 140 152, 165 172 185 70, 235, 246 161, 189 70, 195, 244 172 70 132 93, 97 139, 146, 154 193 xxiii 193 246 172 133, 140, 177, 202 133, 140 140 133, 177 133, 177 133, 177 189 214 139 146 85, 142 70, 195

Enchiridion 18 22 53.4

152 138 172

Euripides Frag. 1015

222

Heraclidae 529–534

148

Iphigenia at Aulis 1553–1556

148

Phoenician Women 997–998 1013–1014

148 148

Supplices 1012–1071

239

Syleus Frag. 2

139

Troades 380–381 382 473–488 503–505 504–505 645–653 758–760 1188–1191 1282–1283

231 231 231 231 231 257 230 244 239

Galen De usu partium 14.781 15.8

163 163

Herodotus Historiae 4.64.3 7.220 8.35–38

185 180 117

Homer Iliad 15.496–497

181

Odyssey 8.509 12.158–200

251 225

284

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

Horace Odes 3.2.13

181

Satirae 1.3.120–121

133

Hyperides Orationes 6 6.38–40

xxii xxii, 83

Iamblichus Vita Pythagorae 215–222 Inscriptions BMIR 3:14 no. 11

Juvenal Satirae 14.98–99 14.100–104

126 126 187

Lucian of Samosata The Downward Journey (The Tyrant) 11 127 25–28 174 26 126, 187 Lysias Epitaphios 70

236

Orations 2 2.1 2.21 2.41 2.57 2.59 2.81

xxii 244 xxii, 83 xxii, 83 xxii, 83 xxii, 83 81

Philostratus Vita Apollonii 5.33

188

Plato Apology 18 (30C) 25 (36A–B) 28D–E

172 227 180

Gorgias 469B 470E–471A 472C 477B 485D 491 491D 504D 507B 507C 508C–E 523D–525A 526–527 526C–527A 526D–527A 526D–527B 526D–E 527A–B 527C–D 527E

176 182 189 189 161 69 158 104 136, 182 92 189 142 70 195 173 171 234 173 161 140

125

251

Corpus inscriptionum iudaicarum (CIJ) 1.68 231 1.121 246 1.125 223 1.152 223 1.321 223 1.363 223 Inscr. Cos 81

Phalaris 1–2 1.3 11–12

251

92, 129 xix

Livy 8.9.1–4 8.9.8 8.9.10 8.9.13

252 252 252 252

Lucian De morte Peregrini 23–25 39

202 202

Diologi mortuorum 9.4

157

Tyrannicide 4 5 10

83 126 126, 127

285

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS Menexenus 236E 239D–240A 239D–240A

81 xxii 83

Phaedo 42 (93E) 93–94

85 67

Phaedrus 1176

224

Republic 10.8, 608B 431A

234 69

Timaeus 39E

7 (Mor. 481C) 8 (Mor. 482B–E) 11 (Mor. 483C) 11 (Mor. 483D) 17 (Mor. 487E–F) 20 (Mor. 490E–F) 20 (Mor. 491A–B) 21 (Mor. 491E)

213 213 213 212 213 212 213 213

De liberis educandis 5 (Mor. 3D)

219, 222

De superstitione 8 (Mor. 169C)

xix, 129

De tranquillitate animi 17 (Mor. 475E)

172

De virtute morali 1 (Mor. 440D) 2 (Mor. 441A) 3 (Mor. 441C) 4 (Mor. 442C) 4 (Mor. 443D) 6 (Mor. 445B–C) 12 (Mor. 451C)

67 72 68 77 72, 77 140 91

Instituta laconica 24 (Mor. 238F)

178

Mulierum virtutes Proem. (Mor. 242F) Proem. (Mor. 243A) Proem. (Mor. 243C) 3 (Mor. 245A) 4 (Mor. 245D–E) 15 (Mor. 252A–C) 15 (Mor. 253D–E) 19 (Mor. 256D)

217 217 217 232 232, 256 233 213, 240 162

241

Pliny the Younger Epistulae 10.96

166

Plutarch Alexander 42.3–6

109

An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat 2 (Mor. 498C–E) 182 2 (Mor. 498E) 178 Apophthegmata laconica 35 (Mor. 234A)

178

Brutus 27

157

De amore prolis 1–3 (Mor. 493B–4896A) 1 (Mor. 493C) 2 (Mor. 494A–B) 2 (Mor. 494A) 2 (Mor. 494E–F) 3 (Mor. 495D–496C) 3 (Mor. 496A)

218 218 219 219 219 219 222, 227

De fraterno amore 1 (Mor. 478C–D) 2 (Mor. 478E) 2 (Mor. 479A) 2 (Mor. 479A) 3 (Mor. 479D) 5 (Mor. 480B–C) 6 (Mor. 480E) 7 (Mor. 481B)

214 214 205, 214 212 213 212 213 212

Praecepta gerendae rei publicae 83 10 (Mor. 804E–F) Quaestionum convivialum libri IX 129 5.1 (Mor. 669E–F) Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 8 (Mor. 26E) 101 Pseudo-Cicero Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.2.3–3.3.5 3.2.3 3.3.4

87 71, 73, 74, 135, 209, 220 70, 130, 132,

286

3.3.5 3.4.7–8 3.7.14 4.26.36 4.43.56–4.44.57

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 138, 170, 209, 220, 235, 238 170 81 249 266 76

Pseudo-Isocrates To Demonicus 43

145

Pseudo-Plutarch De placita philosophorum 5.11.3

221

Quintillian Institutio oratoria 3.5.8 3.7.10–18 3.7.10 3.7.28 3.8.33 4.1.5 6.1.25–26 6.1.26 6.1.32 6.1.51 9.2.29–30 Seneca Consolatio ad Marciam 16.7–9

xxi 249 153 81 209, 220 67 124 124 243 242 124

231

De beneficiis 1.2.3 3.1.1 3.15.4 4.49.3 7.31.2–4

160 174, 235 160 160 199

De Constantia sapientis 2.1 2.3 3.4 3.5 5.6–6.8 5.6–7 6.4 6.8 8.3 9.3 9.4 10.4

172 172 190 151 140 165, 193, 195 151 151 156 190 83, 144, 175 140

13.2 16.3–4 16.4 19.4

161 176, 200 189 180

De ira 2.23.1 2.23.1ff

126 127

De providentia 2.2–4 2.9 5.10

193 246 190

Epistulae morales 11.1 24.4 67.4 67.6 67.16 81.27 89.5 116.1

105 146 84 84 178, 195 208 85 77

Hercules Furens 731–746

174

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Grammaticos 252

111

Sophocles Antigone 58–68 72–77 459–60 470 666–671 671 692–699 940–943 994–995 1347–1352

133, 166 210 209 161 134, 180 180 188 197 150 86

Oedipus tyrannus 689–696 884–893 1528–30

150 115 154

Stobaeus Ethica 2.222 2.166 2.420

214 88 221

287

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS Suetonius Vespasianus 8.4 Tacitus Acricola 34

6.57.4 45.2

126 217

xv Unattributed Acts of the Alexandrians (Acts of Appianus, P. Oxy. 33) 125 145, 171

Histories 5.4.3 5.5 5.5.1 5.8.2

92, 129 xix, 100, 168 188 254

Theon Progymnasmata 9.47–48

153

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.21–22 124 2.35–44 257 2.35.2 81 2.42 154 2.42.4 145 2.43–46 xxii 2.43–44 xxii 2.43.1–4 81, 253 2.43.3 253 6.54.2–4 126

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 1.39 85, 104 1.224 133 1.518 221 2.35 85 2.749 221 3.617–619 104 Virgil Eclogue 4.61

231

Xenophon Cyropaedia 8.7 8.14

183, 211 183, 211

Memorabilia 4.6.12

127

Oeconomicus 7.24 21.12

222 158

2. JEWISH SCRIPTURES (TANAKH ORDER) Genesis 2:7–9 2:22 (LXX) 3:13 (LXX) 3:22 4:1–6 4:8 6:5–8:22 15:15 20:1–18 22 22:1–19 22:2 22:10 22:12 22:13 25:8 25:17 26:1–11 34

103 258 258 263 259 259 228 140 102 207, 228 259 259 236 236 259 140 140 102 101

34:30 35:29 39:7–23 39:7–12 39:20 40:3 49 49:7 49:33 49:49 Exodus 1:8 22 22:16 (LXX) 22:24 (LXX) 23:4–5 23:10–11 24:3 24:7

101 140 259 94 259 259 102 101, 102, 103 140 140 120 97 258 97 99, 100 98 132, 138 132, 138

288

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

Leviticus 11:4–8 11:9–12 11:13–23 11:41–44 17:11–14 17:11 (LXX) 19:9–10 19:10 20:22–26 25:8–17 25:36–37 (LXX)

93 93 93 93 108 147, 249 98 98 127 98 97

Numbers 12:3 15:22–31 15:22–30 16:1–35 16:15a 16:28–30 16:41–50 16:46 16:47 25:6–13 25:11

101 166 167 101 101 73 153, 252 153 154 260 252, 260

Deuteronomy 4:9 5:21 (LXX) 6:5 6:7 10:8 11:19 13:6–11 14:4–8 14:9–10 14:11–20 14:19 15:1–9 15:1 (LXX) 15:2 (LXX) 15:3 (LXX) 15:8–9 (LXX) 15:8 (LXX) 15:9 (LXX) 18:5 18:7 20:17 (LXX) 20:17 (MT) 20:19–20 20:19b 21:18–21 21:25

259 95 207 259 248 259 99 93 93 93 93 98 97 97 97 97 98 98 248 248 95 95 99, 100, 101 99 99 248

22:23–27 22:25–27 23:20–21 26:17 28–29 28–30 28:1–14 28:49–50 29 30:1–5 30:1–3 30:2–3 30:11 (LXX) 30:20 30:20 (LXX) 31:30 (LXX) 32:15–25 32:21 32:27 32:35 32:36–43 32:39 32:43c 32:47 (LXX) 33 33:3 33:3 (LXX)

167 258 97 xxxi 245 147 113 122 122 124 147, 180 124 96 245 265 264 264 264 264 73, 101 180, 264 264 264 265 249 252 248

Joshua 24:18b 24:21 24:24

138 138 138

1 Samuel 31:4

202, 240

2 Samuel 21:17 23:11b 23:13–17 23:13–14a 23:14b–15 23:16 23:17 23:19

106 106 xxxi, 106 110 107 110 108 109

Isaiah 42:18–25 42:25 43:1–4 43:2 (LXX) 51:1–2 52:13–53:12 (LXX)

261 261 261 260, 265 207 148

289

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 52:14 53:3 53:4–6 53:6b 53:8 53:10 53:10b–11 53:10b 53:12a 53:12b

148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148

Ezekiel 37:2 37:3

264 264

Psalms 28:2 33 (34) 33:5 (LXX) 33:7 (LXX) 33:18 (LXX) 33:20 (LXX) 33:21 (LXX) 34:20 39:5–7 (LXX) 39:12 40:6–8 (MT) 44:20 51:1–15 63:4 68:8 68:10 68:29 88:9 110:10 134:2 141:2 143:6

118 265 262 262 262 262, 263, 265 263 261 148 118 148 118 118 118 173 173 113 118 263 118 118 118

Proverbs 1:7 3:11 (LXX) 3:18 (LXX) 9:10 13:24 15:33 (LXX) 17:3 17:15 (LXX) 17:26 (LXX) 19:18 23:13–14 29:15 29:17

86, 263 86 263 86 98 86 190 189 189 98 98 98 98

Esther 13:4–5 (LXX)

xix

Daniel 3 3:1–30 3:16–18 3:17–18 3:19 3:24 4:25 6 6:1–28 12:3

206 237, 260 237 206 139 260 199 206 237, 260 241

1 Chronicles 11:13–14 11:13 11:15–19 11:15–16a 11:16b-17 11:18 11:19

106 106 xxxi, 106 110 107 110 108

3. OLD TESTAMENT APOCRYPHA 1 Maccabees 1:60–61 2:5 2:24–26 2:54 6:9–13 12:1–23

117 128 260 260 115 135

2 Maccabees 1:1–9 1:11–17

xiv 115

2:21 2:23

123 xxx

3 3–7 3:1–6:17 3:1–3 3:1 3:3 3:4–6:11 3:4–4:6

114 110 xxxi xxx 111 112 114 114

290

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

3:4–40 3:4 3:5 3:7–8 3:8–40 3:8 3:15–21 3:24–26 3:31–32

xxx 114 xv, xix 116 xxxi 116 117 117 119

4:1–6 4:7–17 4:8–9 4:9 4:11–15 4:12 4:13–15 4:16–17 4:18–6:17 4:47

114 xxx 120 120 121 xvii, 121 121 114, 122 123 185

5:1–26

xxx

6:1–11 6:1–5 6:10 6:12–23 6:17 6:18–7:42 6:18–31 6:18 6:19 6:20–21 6:21–22 6:23–25 6:26 6:27–28 6:28 6:28b 6:30

xxx 121 117 144 145 xvi, xxiii, xxxi, xxxiii, 78, 141 xxx xiv xxxiii 145 144 145 208, 221 145 xxxiii 141 141

7:1–42 7:1–2 7:2 7:3–5 7:5–6 7:7–8 7:7 7:9 7:11 7:14 7:20–23 7:21

xxx xxxiii, xxxvi 124, 157, 169 141, 175 205 175 xxxiii 173, 267 173, 267 173, 267 217 226

7:22–23 7:23 7:24 7:27 7:28 7:29 7:33 7:35 7:36 7:37–8:5 7:37–38 7:37 7:39

267 173 124, 196 198, 231 236 173 85, 185 132 173 254 xxiv, 251 201 141, 202

8:1–5 8:1 8:5

xxiv 123 148, 251

9:1–2 9:4 9:5 9:13–16

115 225 132 115

10:29

117

11:6–10 11:6 11:13

117 118 177

12:17–25

117

14:38 14:41–46

123 239, 240

3 Maccabees 1:3 1:8–2:24 1:16–29 1:16

xx 114 117 118

2:21

132

3:3–7 3:18–19 3:19–22 3:21–23

xix, 168 197 197 174

4:16

136

5:7 5:25

118 118

6

128

7:5

185

291

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 4 Ezra 3:12–17 7:92 7:97 7:127–129 4 Maccabees 1:1–12 1:1–8:7 1:1–6 1:1–3:18 1:1–2 1:1 1:2–4 1:2 1:3–6 1:3–4 1:3–4a 1:3 1:4b 1:5–6 1:5 1:6 1:7–12 1:7–9 1:7–8 1:7 1:8 1:9 1:10–11 1:10

1:11

1:11a 1:11b 1:12 1:13–30a 1:13 1:14 1:15–19 1:15–18

103 68 241 209 xxviii, 67 xxxviii xxiv xxi, xxvii, xxviii, 78, 84 xxi, 76 xxi, xxiii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 71, 195, 229, 253 86 xxi, 71, 73, 79, 87, 136 xxvii 72, 73, 76 91 xxxiii, 92, 96, 104 91 75, 76, 104 73, 76, 104, 155 xxxiii, 99, 105 xxviii 149, 150, 203, 229 xxv, xxviii, 185 69, 76, 78, 79, 155 xxviii, xl, xli, 79, 80, 84, 223 79 81 xviii, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxviii, 78, 79, 80, 84, 150, 155, 194 xiii, xvi, xxiv, xxv, xxviii, xxxiv, 82, 83, 135, 138, 145, 178, 181, 195, 240, 244, 255 81 81 xii, xxviii, xxxviii, 84 xxviii, 84 85 xxxviii, 69, 85, 87 84 91, 134

1:15–17 1:15 1:17 1:18 1:19 1:20–28 1:20 1:24 1:25–26 1:26–28 1:26–27 1:26 1:27 1:28–29 1:28 1:29–30a 1:29 1:30b–3:18 1:30b–2:23 1:30–31 1:30 1:30a 1:30b

xxvii xxxviii, 85, 177 79, 85 xxxiii, 72, 86, 87 136 84, 85 xl, 87, 89, 92, 105 88 100 105 87, 92 74, 97, 100 72, 96 87 92 85 85, 91, 94 xxviii, 87 91 xxxiii 72, 136 84 92

1:31–3:18 1:31–2:23 1:31–2:20 1:31–2:19 1:31–2:6 1:31–2:6a 1:31–2:5 1:31–35 1:31–32 1:31 1:32 1:33–3:18 1:33–34 1:34

134 73 xxvii 104 89, 149 73 101 xvii, xxx, xxxiii, xxxviii, 91, 137 xxxiii 92 92, 105 78 92, 94, 96, 97 85

2:1–6 2:1–5 2:1–4 2:1 2:3 2:4 2:5–6 2:5 2:6 2:6a-9a 2:6b-7 2:6b 2:7–14 2:7

xxxiii, xxxviii, 73 72 xxx 92 94 95 xxx, 85 95 72, 92, 95 73 96 96, 109 91 72, 96, 103

292

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

2:8–14 2:8–9 2:8 2:9 2:10–14 2:10 2:14 2:15–23 2:15–16 2:15 2:16–20 2:16–18 2:16 2:17 2:18 2:19–20 2:19 2:20 2:21–23 2:21–22 2:21 2:23 2:24–3:18 2:24–3:6 2:24–3:1 2:24

97 xxx, 100 97, 98 xl, 85, 98 214 79 99, 100 73 100 xl, xliii, 100 72 158 74, 100 xxx xl, 101 xxx 73, 101 101, 102 70, 77, 85, 92, 150 103 87 70, 79 104 75 76 xl, xli, 75, 104, 155

3:1b-2 3:1 3:2–18 3:2–5 3:2 3:3–4 3:3 3:4 3:5 3:6–18 3:7–8 3:7 3:8 3:8b 3:9 3:11 3:12 3:13 3:15 3:16 3:18 3:19–18:24 3:19–17:24 3:19–4:26 3:19

105 105 75, 76 106 xxxiii 105 105 xl 99 xxx, 105, 117 106 107 xl 110 110 xl, 106, 107 110 xl 107 108 79 xxvii, 78, 84 xxviii 110, 123 xviii, xxi, xxiii, xxviii, 110, 149, 203

3:20–4:26 3:20–21 3:20 3:21

xxviii xxx, 213, 254 111, 116, 122, 254 111, 112, 116, 216, 254

4:1–14 4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4 4:5 4:5–14 4:7 4:9 4:10 4:15–26 4:15–21 4:15–20 4:15 4:16 4:18 4:19–20 4:19 4:20 4:21–26 4:21–23 4:21 4:22–26 4:23 4:24–26 4:24 4:25 4:26

xxx, 113 xiv, 83, 112, 114, 121 xv, xvi, xix, xl 115 116 xvi, 83 xxxi 112, 115, 118 xl, xliii, 117 xl 261 147 xxx 112, 116, 126 121 121 113, 237 xv, 121 xvi, xvii, 83, 121 114 xxx 185 122, 123 133 xxx 112, 123, 131 117, 127 123, 125, 127

5:1–17:24 5:1–6:35 5:1–6:30 5:1–38 5:1–4 5:1 5:2 5:4 5:5–13 5:6–9 5:6 5:7

73 84 xxviii, xxx, 149, 150 xxvi, 124 xxviii 127, 159 127, 167, 192, 228 xiv, 71, 128 xxviii 93 159 xv, 129, 131, 134, 152, 241 123, 129, 130, 152, 160, 227 130 241 165

5:8–9 5:8 5:9–11 5:9–10

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 5:9 5:10 5:11–12 5:11 5:12 5:13 5:14–38 5:15 5:16–21 5:16 5:18 5:19 5:20 5:22–26 5:22–24 5:22 5:23–24 5:23 5:24–26 5:24 5:25–26 5:25 5:26 5:27–28 5:27b–28 5:27 5:28 5:29 5:31 5:32 5:33 5:34–36 5:34 5:35 5:36 5:37 5:38 6:1–30 6:1 6:2–3 6:2 6:4 6:5–6 6:5 6:7 6:8

xl, 134, 136, 137, 160 129, 130, 134, 136, 165 xxxv 129, 131, 134, 156, 174 138, 162 xv, xl, xli, 164 xxviii 132 132 132, 133, 172, 195 131, 132, 158, 170, 244 133, 172 133 130 73 138 xxvii, 72, 134, 135 xxxiii, xl, xlii, 134 130 xxxiii, 135 xvii, xxxiii, 93 136 137 181, 247 158 xl, xli, 127 138 xxxi, 131, 132, 170, 197, 244 xxxiii, 138, 154, 197 xxxv, 139, 177 138, 197 131 134, 140, 194 71, 158 128, 139 xxvi, 140, 170, 209, 244 133, 233 xxviii, 141 228 175 xxxiii 143 143 143 142, 143, 150, 177, 187 143, 228

6:9 6:10 6:12–23 6:14 6:17 6:18 6:19 6:22 6:23 6:24–27 6:24–26 6:25 6:26 6:27–29 6:27–28 6:27 6:28–29 6:28 6:29 6:30 6:31–7:23 6:31–35 6:31–33 6:31 6:32 6:33 6:34 6:35 6:37–39 7:1–23 7:1–15 7:1–3 7:1 7:3 7:4 7:5 7:6–10 7:6–7 7:6 7:7 7:8 7:9–10 7:9 7:11–12 7:11 7:12 7:13–14 7:14

293 xxxiii xxxiv, xxxvi, 175, 192, 245 xxxiii xl, xli, 144, 145 146, 226 145 179, 255, 260 xxviii, 146, 197 228 164 153 107 143, 264 154, 180, 249, 250 xxxii xxxvii, 147 122, 201, 237 147 xxxii, xxxiv, 147 149 xxviii, 149 xxi, xxvii, xxviii, 149, 155, 202, 203, 229 203 xxxiii, 79, 149 149 149 149 xl, 149 260 xxvii xxii, xxviii, 84 150, 228 141, 149 143, 150, 204 xxxiv, 151 151, 204, 240 203 219 152 152 152 219 xix, xxxiv, xl, 112, 131, 141, 146, 152, 233 252 153 245 154, 203 xl, xlii

294

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

7:15 7:16–14:1 7:16–23 7:16 7:17 7:18–19 7:18 7:19 7:20–23 7:20 7:21 7:22 7:23

203, 219 84 xxi, xxviii, 155 xxxiii, 149, 197 155 137, 238 xxxii, 155, 156 140, 155, 156, 232 158 156, 158 156 79, 156 156

8:1–17:1 8:1–12:19 8:1–9:9 8:1–14 8:1–2 8:1 8:2 8:3–14 8:3–5 8:3 8:4 8:5–7 8:5

xxx xxix 157 157 xxix 157 157, 158, 159, 175 xxvi, xxix 126, 129 159 159 189, 196, 223, 234 80, 157, 159, 160, 161, 186, 241 160, 162, 165, 197 160 xxxviii, xliii, 127, 160, 197 165 161, 162, 165, 174, 197 162, 165 165 74 162 191, 196, 228 157, 164, 165 164 xxix xxvii, 164, 165 xxvi, 89, 165, 171, 176, 203 165, 169, 230 165 165 165, 166 166 165 165, 166 165, 166

8:6 8:7–8 8:7 8:8 8:9 8:10 8:11 8:12–14 8:12–13 8:13 8:14 8:15–9:9 8:15–26 8:15 8:16–26 8:16 8:17 8:18–19 8:18 8:19 8:20 8:21 8:22

8:23 8:24–25 8:24 8:25 8:26 8:27–9:9 8:27 8:28 8:29

161, 165, 223, 236 164, 165 165, 166 166 166, 168, 194 xxix 168 xl, xli, 165 159, 169

9:1–11 9:1–9 9:1–2 9:1 9:2

196 xxvi, 165, 206, 235 131, 158, 169 xl, 169, 170 85, 170, 172, 197, 223, 244 171 171 146, 153 171 197, 235 xxxiii, 157, 171, 172, 179, 223 xxxv, 238 xxxiii, 172, 174 155, 171, 173 xxxiv, 79, 140, 169, 171, 172, 173, 192, 245, 255 xxxvii, 120, 182, 185, 247, 255 141 xxix, 174 158 xliii, 158, 161, 175, 197 175 175 xxxvi, 175 xl, 176, 188 xxxiii, 228 182 xxvii, 107, 187 187 187 xxviii, 79, 137, 177, 178 164 xl, xliii, 178, 267 140, 164, 179, 267 146, 159, 179, 245, 255, 260 xl, xlii, 179, 180, 186, 192, 193

9:3 9:4 9:5–6 9:5 9:6–7 9:6 9:7–9 9:7 9:8–9 9:8 9:9 9:10–11:27 9:10–25 9:10–11 9:10 9:11–11:27 9:11–12 9:12 9:15 9:16 9:17–18 9:17 9:17a 9:17b–18 9:18 9:19 9:21 9:22 9:23–24 9:23

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 9:24 9:26–32 9:26 9:28 9:29–30 9:29 9:30 9:31–32 9:31 9:32 9:32b 10:1–11 10:2 10:3 10:4 10:5 10:7 10:10–11 10:10 10:11 10:12–21 10:12 10:13 10:14 10:15 10:15b 10:16 10:17 10:18 10:19 10:21 11:1–12 11:1–2 11:2 11:3 11:4–6 11:4 11:6 11:7–8 11:9 11:10

xxviii, 120, 179, 180, 185, 201, 202, 247, 255, 260 xxix, 181 181, 228 xl, 181 197 xxxiii, 181 xxviii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 126, 182, 255 xxxv 79 xxxvii, 120, 182, 185, 247, 255 155 xxix, 182 170, 180, 183, 211, 223 xl, xli, 180, 183, 186, 201 177 158, 163, 184 185 xxxvii xxviii, 79, 85, 185 xxxv, 120, 155, 182, 185, 247, 255 xxix, 186 186 80, 186 xl, xli, 186, 187 120, 140, 155, 180, 185, 186, 187, 201, 223, 238, 255 186 126 xl, xli 187 187 120, 182, 185, 187, 247, 255 188 xxix xxviii, xl, 79 xl, 182, 185, 188, 202, 247, 255 182, 191 xl, 188 188 189 228 xl, xli, 164

11:11 11:12 11:13–27 11:13 11:14 11:15 11:19 11:20–23 11:20–21 11:20 11:20b 11:21 11:22–23 11:22 11:23 11:24–25 11:27 12:1–19 12:1 12:2 12:3 12:4–5 12:5 12:6 12:7 12:11–14 12:11–4 12:11 12:12 12:13 12:14 12:15 12:16 12:17 12:18 12:19 12:20 13:1–16:4 13:1–14:10 13:1–5 13:1–3 13:1

295 194 xxviii, xxxiv, 172, 185, 190 xxix, 190 190 191 xxviii, 191, 211 107, 191 245 xxvii, 193, 200 xxviii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 191, 193, 197, 228, 234 193 178, 193, 195 202 79, 193, 201 120, 187, 194, 195, 255 xxvii, 82, 194, 195, 198, 216, 255 xxvii, 178, 193, 195, 228 xxix, 196 xl, xli, 191, 196 255 xl, xliii, 242 196 127, 198, 234 xl, xlii, 198 198 120, 126, 182, 185, 201 182 xxxvi, xl, 192, 200 199, 247, 255 xl, xli, 199 xxxiii, xxxvi, 79, 192, 197, 200, 245, 247, 255 200 201 201, 260 120, 155, 185, 247, 255 202 203 xxvii xxix, 202 xxi, xxvii, xxix, 149, 202, 203, 229 203 79, 203

296 13:2 13:3 13:4–5 13:5 13:6–18 13:6–7 13:6 13:7 13:8–18

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

13:27a

204, 214 204 203 204 xxix 240 203, 240 xl, xli xxi, xxvi, 159, 169, 205 146, 159, 205, 214, 215, 225 260 235 xxx, 206, 229, 236, 237, 260, 261 207 xxx, xxxiii, 154, 179, 207, 209, 210, 219, 236, 259 204, 242 131 xxxvi, 70, 169, 174, 192, 207, 208, 223, 235, 236, 245, 252 xxxiii, 140, 155, 171 xxxi, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, 214, 220, 221 208 169 70, 192, 195, 209, 245 xxvi, 140, 170, 209, 234, 238, 255, 267 210 210 210 xxi, xxix, 99, 203, 210 215 210 210 211 xl, xlii, 210 85, 210, 211, 212 169, 212 210 80, 210 79, 212, 216 213, 223, 224 xxxiii, xxxvi, xl, xlii, 80, 137, 197, 210 212

14:1 14:2–10

159, 210, 213 xxii, xxix, 84, 214

13:8 13:9–18 13:9–17 13:9 13:10–11 13:12 13:13–17 13:13–15 13:13 13:14–17 13:14–15 13:14 13:15–17 13:15 13:17 13:18 13:18a 13:18b 13:19–14:1 13:19–26 13:19–21 13:19 13:20–21 13:21 13:22 13:23–26 13:23 13:24 13:25 13:27–14:1 13:27

14:2–7 14:2–3 14:2 14:3–8 14:3 14:5–6 14:5 14:6–8 14:6 14:7–8 14:7 14:7b 14:9–10 14:9b–10 14:9 14:9a 14:9b 14:10–17:6 14:11–17:6 14:11–17:1 14:11–16:25 14:11–15:32 14:11–12 14:11 14:12 14:13–15:10 14:13–20 14:13–19 14:13 14:15–16 14:17 14:19 14:20 14:41–46 15:1–16:13 15:1 15:2–8 15:2–4 15:2–3 15:2 15:3 15:4–12 15:4–10 15:4–7 15:4 15:5 15:6–7 15:6 15:8 15:9–10

203 220 204 216 xl, 225 267 140, 172, 215, 238, 255 169 197, 214 159, 215 xxxiii, 220, 225 215 194, 216 164 xxiii, xxvii, 141, 243 175 175 xxxvii xxix 84, 198 198 217 xxix xxiii, 218 218 xxix xxi, 99, 203 218 xxiii, 219 219 219 219 xxxi, 179, 219 202 219 xxxiii, 203, 219 xxxiii 155 xxi, 70, 140, 219, 220 220 xxxiii, xl, 220, 221, 255 203 xxi, 218 223 222 xl, xlii, 230 219, 231 231 xxi, 70, 219, 220, 221 223, 241

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 15:9 15:10 15:11–28 15:11 15:12 15:13 15:14–22 15:14 15:15 15:16–32 15:16–20 15:16–17 15:16 15:17 15:18–22 15:18 15:19 15:20 15:21 15:23–28 15:23–24 15:23 15:24 15:25–28 15:25 15:26 15:27 15:28 15:29–32 15:29 15:30 15:31 15:32 16:1–17:6 16:1–4 16:1–2 16:1 16:3–4 16:3 16:4 16:5–11 16:5 16:6–11 16:7–8 16:7 16:10 16:11 16:12–25

79, 223, 228, 231 223 xxix 224 197, 224 203, 219, 224, 227, 230 224 xxxiii, 107 141 84 203, 219 xxii xxxv, 231, 232 xxxiii, 220 141 224 224, 225, 241 xl, xli, 224, 225 225, 231 99 225 224 xl, 197, 221, 225 xxi, 220 137, 194, 227, 230 220 xxxiii, 70, 220 xxxi, 179, 219, 221, 228 xxii, xxix, 203, 219 228, 239, 255 xxxiv, 168, 217, 226, 257 xl, 228 224, 231 229 xxi, xxix, 229 149, 203, 218, 224 xxxiii, 229 237 xxx, xl, xlii, 229, 260, 261 xxi, 224, 230 xxvi, xxix, 89, 230, 239 xxiii, xliii, 230 231 219 222, 231 231 231 xxix

16:13 16:14 16:15–17 16:15 16:16–25 16:16–23 16:16 16:17 16:18–22 16:18–19 16:18 16:19 16:20–21 16:20 16:21 16:22 16:23 16:24 16:25 16:28 17:1 17:2–24 17:2–6 17:2 17:3 17:4 17:5 17:6 17:7–18:24 17:7–18:5 17:7–24 17:7–22 17:7 17:8–10 17:8–9 17:9–10 17:9 17:10

297 xxxv, xxxv, 140, 197, 220, 227, 232, 242, 255, 267 xxxiii, xl, xlii, 233, 245, 255 172 153, 198, 233, 256 xxi xxvi, xxxiv, 170, 198, 205, 211, 223, 256, 259, 260 xxxiii, xxxv, 131, 192, 193, 197, 233, 245, 255 xxxiii, 153, 172, 197, 246 xxxiii xxxvi, 70, 131, 174, 208, 221, 238 235 xxviii, 208, 235 xxx 154, 179, 219, 236, 259 229, 237, 260, 261 xxxiii, xliii, 197, 221, 236, 238 xxvii, xxxiii, xl, 155 xxviii, 198 xxxvii, 70, 140, 155, 156, 232 xxxv 202, 228, 239, 257 84 xxii, xxix, 240 197, 240 xxxiv, 240 xxxiii, xxxiv, 241 xxvi, xxxiii, xl, 155, 240, 241, 242, 246, 248, 254, 260 xxxi, 242 xxix, 240, 242 242 xxii, xxix 253 xxxiii, xli, 197, 242, 243 xviii, 242, 243 244 xviii, 82, 195 243 xxxiii

298 17:11–16 17:11 17:12 17:15 17:16–17 17:16 17:17 17:18 17:19–20 17:19 17:20–21 17:20–22 17:20 17:21–22 17:21 17:22 17:23–24 17:23 18:1–19 18:1–5a 18:1–2 18:1 18:2 18:3–5 18:3 18:4–5 18:4 18:5 18:6–24 18:6–19 18:6–9 18:6–8 18:7 18:8 18:9–19 18:9

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS xxxvi, 192, 228, 242, 244, 255 245 xxxiv, xxxv, 80, 155, 263, 267 xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, 246 254 xxxvi, 242, 246 xxxiv, xl, 138, 181, 246 xxxiv, 248, 251 248, 251 xxx, 248, 256 xxiv, 249 201, 237, 242, 249 249, 250 122, 147, 148, 180, 248 xvi, xxxii, xxxiv, 83, 202 xxxii, 124 135, 138, 181, 246, 247, 254 xxxiv, 80 xxvii 253 xxi, xxvi, xxix, 151, 171, 244, 249, 252 xix, xxii, xxiii, 79, 183, 243, 253, 257, 267 xxvii, 149, 203 xxix, 253, 254 xxxiii, 197 xiii, xxiv, 205, 242, 254 xxv, 82, 83, 112, 124, 127, 145, 249, 254, 255, 260 xl, 123, 125, 146, 247, 255 256 xxvi, xxix, 170, 198, 205, 211, 256 217, 226, 240, 256, 257 257 xl, xli, 258 258 258 xl

18:9a 18:10–19 18:10 18:11–19 18:11–18 18:11–13 18:11 18:12–13 18:12 18:13 18:14–19 18:14 18:15 18:16 18:17–19 18:18 18:19 18:20–24 18:20–21 18:20b–21 18:20 18:21 18:22 18:23 18:24

258 121 198, 265 221 86 xxx xxx, 154, 198 229, 237 198, 260, 261 260 xxx 198, 261, 265 198, 261 198, 263 173 264 245 xxix, 253 141, 242 266 xliii, 179, 187, 266, 267 266 266 xl, xlii, xliii, 209, 245, 254, 260, 266, 267 267

Judith 8:2–4

102

Prayer of Azariah 15–17

237

Susanna 22–23

208, 221

Wisdom of Ben Sira (Sir) 1:26 86, 263 2:5 190 3:8 152 15:1 86 18:20–25 153 18:21 153 18:22–23 154 18:22b 154 18:25 153 19:20 86, 263 24:23 263 45:6–22 153 50:1–23 111 50:1–21 153

299

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS Wisdom of Solomon (Wis) 1:16–5:23 173 3:1 249 3:5–6 190 5:1–13 200 5:1–8 248 6:17–20 86, 173 7:1–6 200

7:2 7:20 8:7 8:19 9:9 11:15–16 14:6

231 218 87 267 86 122 228

4. OLD TESTAMENT PSEUDEPIGRAPHA 1 Enoch 104:2

241

Letter of Aristeas 15–16 19 31 37 128–130 139 142 144–169 144–160 189 190 200 210 221 221–22 222

199 199 71 199 129 136 136 137 92 86 199 86 199 69 67 107

224 239–238 256 277 281

199 70 67 70 199

Psalms of Solomon 2.25–27

117

Testament of Job 27.3–5

83

Testament of Joseph 2.7–10.4

94

Testament of Levi 5 6.6–8

102 102

Testament of Moses 9:6–7

173

5. OTHER JEWISH SOURCES Josephus Bellum judaicum (BJ) 2.8.2–14 §§119–66 3.10.2 §§482–483 5.5.2 §194 6.1.5 §47 7.8.6 §§324–34 7.8.6 §325 7.8.7 §357 7.8.7 §377 7.8.7 §388

71 183 118 241 240 190 132 240 82, 247

Jewish Antiquities (AJ) 1.13.3 §§230–31 7.12.4 §§311–314 7.14.2 §341 12.3.1–2 §§119–128

248 106 112 207

12.3.3 §§138–142 12.4.10 §224 12.5.1 §239 16.7.1 §182 18.1.2–6 §§11–25 19.5.2 §§278–85 Against Apion 2.121 2.137 2.170–171 2.217–218 2.221–222 2.225–235 2.258

113, 121 xii 120 251 71 207 xix, 100, 168, 188 92, 129 136 156, 239 100 135 xix, 168, 188

300

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS

Mishnah, Talmud, and Related Writings Abot 2.1 134 4.1 78 b. Yeb 122a Lamentations Rabbah 1.16 H 1.16 I 1.16 N Sifra Kedoshim 11.93d

112 257 105 95 93, 137

De virtutibus 32 116–119 171

145 100 120

De vita contemplativa 69

200

De vita Mosis 1.29 1.31 2.215–216

152 xx 135

In Flaccum 95–96 121

128 132

Legatio ad Gaium 156 245

71 71

Legum allegoriae 1.17 1.43–55 1.47 2.44–50 3.118 3.129–132 3.223–224 3.233 3.241

87 103 91 218 104, 150 105 150 156 133

xxiv xxxi xxxi xxxii 94

Targum Neofiti Genesis 22:14

236

Philo De Abrahamo 170

228

De congressu eruditionis gratia 79 85 De confusione linguarum 2

De specialibus legibus 3.131 3.169 4.70 4.84 4.100

xx

De decalogo 142–143

95

De gigantibus 2.8

241

De migratione Abrahami 6 197 206

150 104 77, 105

Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum 1.8 226

De opificio mundi 30 90–128 95–96 107 112–117 126

104 215 215 215 215 216

De plantatione 28

84

De somniis 1.59

201

Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin 2.18 228 Quod deterius potiori insidari soleat 105 91 125 156 Quod omnis probus liber sit 17 204, 214 20 214 25 139, 140

301

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 26–27 27 30 60 80 88 97

83, 144, 175 144 133, 140 140 135 200 140

105–109 106–107 Pseudo-Philo LAB 18.5 32.2–3

178 125, 143

236 207, 236, 248

6. CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES Matthew 5:45 10:28 26:28

199 xxxvi, 208 xxxii

Mark 10:45

xxxii

2 Corinthians 1:7 4:16–18 10:4 11:2–3

239 221, 238 152 258

Galatians 2:11–14 2:19 5:1–6:10 5:16–25 5:16 5:24

144 155 xxxii 96 xxxii xxxii

Luke 4:16–30 16:22–23 20:37–38

xxii 209 155

John 11 19:11

128 199

Ephesians 1:7 5:2

xxxii xxxii

Acts 13:16–41 14:15 15:20

xxii 200 108

Philippians 2:5–11 3:12–14

xxxii 215

Romans 2:22 3:24 3:25 5:19 6:1 6:10 6:15 7:7–24 13:11 14:8

115 xxxii xxxii, 250 xxxii 75 155 75 96 239 155

Colossians 3:17

152

1 Thessalonians 3:1–4 4:13

262 232

1 Corinthians 6:12 8 10 12:7 15:35–36

131 128 128 131 75

1 Timothy 2:2 2:6 3:16 4:3–5 4:7–8 6:3–6 6:11 6:12

xxxiii xxxii xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii

2 Timothy 1:7 2:22

xxxiii xxxiii

302 3:5 3:6 4:7–8 4:7 4:18

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS xxxiii xxxiii xxxvi xxxiii, 179, 215 267

Titus 2:5 2:6 2:12 2:14 3:3

xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii xxxii xxxiii

Hebrews 2:11 3:6 3:14 5:7 6:4–8 6:12 9:1–10:18 9:12–14 10:5–10 10:11–14 10:23 10:29–31 10:39 11:6 11:24–27 11:24–26 11:32 11:35 11:35b 12:1–2 12:1–4 12:1 12:2 12:28 13:12 13:17 13:21

200 xxxiv, 241 xxxiv, 241 118 xxxiii xxxiii xxxii xxxii 148 248 xxxiv xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii 221 111 xxxiii xxxiii, 177 xxxiii xxxvi 215 xxxiii, 244 xxxiii xxxii xxxiii 267

James 1:14–16 4:1–3 5:9

95 95 200

1 Peter 1:2 1:6–7 1:19 2:19–20 2:21–25 4:14–16

xxxii 190 xxxii 177 148 177

1 John 1:7 3:18

xxxii 152

Revelation 1:5 1:9 2 2:2 2:3 2:7 2:10 2:11 2:13 2:17 2:19 2:26 3:5 3:12 3:21 6:9 7:14 7:15 11:3–12 12:11 13:10 15:1–8 15:2 22:1–2

xxxiv xxxiv 128 xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv, 263 xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv xxxii xxxiv, 248 xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv 264 xxxiv 263

7. OTHER CHRISTIAN SOURCES Ambrose De Iacob et vita beata CSEL 32.2 xxxviii Eusebius De martyribus Palaestinae 4.8 125

Ecclesiastical History 3.10.6 xi, xiii, xiv 5.1.18 xxxvi 5.1.19 xxxvi 5.1.36 xxxvi 5.1.38 xxxvi 5.1.41 xxxvi

303

INDEX OF ANCIENT CITATIONS 5.1.42 5.1.43 5.1.46 5.1.55

xxxvi xxxvi xxxvi xxxvii

De Maccabaeos homilae PG 50.617–28 xxxviii Origen An Exhortation to Martyrdom 4 xxxvi 22–27 125 23 xxxv 23.1 xxxvi 23.23 xxxvi 27–28 xxxvi 28 xxxvi

Shepherd of Hermas Mandate 1.2 2.6 3.5 4.2.4

155 155 155 155

Similitude 9.22.4 9.28.8 9.29.3

155 155 155

Pseudo-Chrysostom Panegyricum in Romanum martyrem 1 (PG 50.613) 125

Gregory Nazianzen Oration 15 (PG 35.913)

xiv

Tertullian On Patience 13

In Maccabaeorem Laudem PG 35.911–34

xxxviii

Ignatius To Polycarp 2.3 6.1

xxxiv, 147 xxxiv, 147

To the Ephesians 11.1 21.1

xxxiv xxxiv, 147

To the Romans 5.3 6.1

xxxv, 139 xxxv, 232

To the Smyrnaeans 10.2

xxxvii

Unattributed Acts of Tarachus and Probus 9 125 Didache 6:3

128

Gospel of Thomas 114

226

Martyrdom of Habbib the Deacon 19d xxxvii 19e xxxvii 36 xxxvii Martyrdom of Montanus and Lucius 16.3–4 xxxvii

xxxiv, 147

To the Trallians 10

200

Jerome De viris illustribus 13

xi, xiv

Dialogus adversus Pelagianos 2.6 xi, xxxviii John Chrysostom De Eleazaro et de septum pueris PG 63.523–30 xxxviii

Martyrdom of Polycarp 1 xxxv 1.1 201 9 xxxv, 131 11 xxxv, 208 13 xxxv 13.2 201 17 xxxv 17.1 201 18 xxxv, 232 20 xxxv Passion of Saints Perpetua and elicity 10.1–14 xxxvi 18.8–9 xxxvii