LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Susan B . Anders
Department of Accounting, St. Bonaventure University, USA
Christine C. Bauman
School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA
B. Anthony Billings
Department of Accounting, Wayne State University, USA
Tonya K. Flesher
Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi, USA
Sharon K. Ford
Department of Accountancy and Computer Information Systems, Delta State University, USA
Anna C. Fowler
Department of Accounting, University of Texas-Austin, USA
Gregory G. Geisler
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University of Missouri-St . Louis, USA
Daryl M. Guffey
School of Accountancy and Legal Studies, Clemson University, USA
Philip J. Harmelink
Department of Accounting, University of New Orleans, USA
Peggy A . Hite
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Indiana University, USA
Angela L . J. Hwang
Department of Accounting and Finance, Eastern Michigan University, USA Vii
LIST OF CONTRIBUTOR
Ernest R. Larkins
School of Accountancy, Georgia State University, USA
Daniel P. Murphy
Department of Acounting and Business Law, University of Tennessee, USA
Buagu Musazi
Department of Accounting, Virginia State University, USA
Claire Y Nash
Department of Accounting, Christian Brothers University, USA
Elizabeth Plummer
Department of Accounting, Southern Methodist University, USA
Dan L . Schisler
Department of Accounting, East Carolina University, USA
Douglas K. Schneider
Department of Accounting, East Carolina University, USA
Morris H. Stocks
Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi, USA
William M. VanDenburgh
Department of Accounting, Louisiana State University, USA
Ann Boyd Watts
Department of Accounting and Business Law, University of Tennessee, USA
W. Mark Wilder
Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi, USA
EDITORIAL BOARD EDITOR Thomas M . Porcano Miami University Kenneth Anderson University of Tennessee, USA
Suzanne M . Luttman Santa Clara University, USA
Caroline K . Craig Illinois State University, USA
Gary A . McGill University of Florida, USA
Anthony P . Curatola Drexel University, USA Ted D . Englebrecht Louisiana Tech University, USA Philip J . Harmelink University of New Orleans, USA D . John Hasseldine University of Nottingham, England Peggy A . Hite Indiana University-Bloomington, USA Beth B . Kern Indiana University-South Bend, USA
Daniel P . Murphy University of Tennessee, USA Charles E . Price Auburn University, USA William A. Raabe Capital University, USA Michael L . Roberts University of Alabama, USA David Ryan Temple University, USA Dan L. Schisler East Carolina University, USA Toby Stock Ohio University, USA
AD HOC REVIEWERS Richard C . Hatfield Drexel University, USA
Cherie J . O'Neil Colorado State University, USA
Herbert G . Hunt California State University, USA
Patrick J . Wilkie George Mason University, USA
Janet A . Meade University of Houston, USA
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE Advances in Taxation (AIT) is a refereed academic tax journal published annually . Academic articles on any aspect of federal, state, local, or international taxation will be considered . These include, but are not limited to, compliance, computer usage, education, law, planning, and policy . Interdisciplinary research involving : economics, finance, or other areas is also encouraged . Acceptable research methods include any analytical, behavioral, descriptive, legal, quantitative, survey, or theoretical approach appropriate for the project . Manuscripts should be readable, relevant, and reliable . To be readable, manuscripts must be understandable and concise . To be relevant, manuscripts must be directly related to problems inherent in the system of taxation . To be reliable, conclusions must follow logically from the evidence and arguments presented . Sound research design and execution are critical for empirical studies . Reasonable assumptions and logical development are essential for theoretical manuscripts . AIT welcomes comments from readers . Editorial correspondence pertaining to manuscripts should be forwarded to : Professor Thomas M . Porcano Department of Accountancy Richard T. Farmer School of Business Administration Miami University Oxford, Ohio 45056 Phone : 513 529 6221 Fax : 513 529 4740 E -mail : porcantm@muohio .ed u See http ://www.jaipress .com / for Guidelines and additional information regarding manuscript submissions . Professor Thomas M . Porcano Series Editor
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT ON WORK EFFORT Susan B . Anders
ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to further the examination of the effectiveness of the earned income tax credit (EITC) in meeting one of Congress' major objectives for the credit : increasing work incentives . Economic theory predicts a potential work incentive in the phase-in range of the credit and a potential work disincentive in the phase-out range . This study utilizes empirical analysis of individual tax return data to evaluate EITC participants' and comparable non-participants' wage income cross-sectionally and over time for indications of statistically significant changes . Observations are grouped into income classifications based on the income ranges of the credit : phase-in, plateau, and phase-out . The wages for EITC participants, as well as for non-participants, increased significantly over selected time windows during the 1979 to 1990 time period. Wage growth .for both participants and non-participants was greater in the phase-in range than in the phase-out range- The potential existence of significant differences in income growth between participants and non-participants is only indicated for the time period of the mid-1980s, before the major increase in the credit post-1986. Contrary to theory, the current study estimates a potential disincentive in the mid-1980s in
Advances in Taxation, Volume 14, pages 1-35 . Copyright 0 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0889-3
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SUSAN B . ANDERS
the phase-in range, as well as the phase-out range. However, after the post-1986 increase in the credit, the differences between the participants and non-participants are no longer statistically significant and a potential disincentive cannot be inferred.
INTRODUCTION The EITC was first enacted in 1975 to : (1) reduce the burden of the Social Security tax for the working poor, (2) increase the progressivity of the tax system overall, and (3) increase the incentives of low-income individuals to work (Pechman, 1987, pp . 112-113) . The EITC has become the major government support for many low-income families . The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2000) estimates for the years 2000 and 2001 predict federal government spending outlays for the EITC will exceed those for family support programs .' Estimated expenditures for 2000 are $23 billion for family support and $25 billion for EITC . For 2001, they are $29 billion for family support and $30 billion for EITC (CBO, 2000) . Welfare reforms that emphasize work requirements over guaranteed entitlements also have increased the importance of, and expenditures on, the ETTC 2 Welfare to work alternatives now place time limits on the receipt of transfer payments . Additionally, as further encouragement for work while receiving assistance, the receipt of EITC refunds no longer reduces transfer payment amounts . The EITC is a refundable credit, which means that eligible taxpayers may receive refunds if the amount of the credit exceeds their tax liability . Appendix A details the historical participation in the credit and average credit amounts from 1975 through 1998 . For 1998, approximately $27 billion was paid out in refunds and 83% of the claimants received a refund (Gish, 2001, p . 4) . Although the EITC has been in existence for more than 25 years, it is still the subject of some controversy, and changes to the credit are regularly proposed by supporters and opponents alike . The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 increases the beginning and ending points of the phase-out range of the EITC for married couples filing joint returns . Also in 2001, the Senate is considering a bill (S . 685) that would expand the credit for families with three or more children . On the other hand, a bill has been proposed in the House of Representatives (H . R . 1652) that would repeal the credit for taxpayers without children and reduce the amount of the credit for those still eligible . The current study adds to the literature examining the impact of tax incentives on the labor supply . Previous studies have examined the effect of a
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
3
Negative Income Tax (NIT) on the hours worked by a treatment group, who received a guaranteed grant, versus a control group, who received no grant (Robins, 1985, GAO, 1993) . Other studies have applied parameter estimates from NIT experiments to examine labor supply response, in terms of changes in hours worked or changes in earnings, to changes in the EITC (GAO, 1993 ; Holtzblatt et al ., 1994) . Further studies have simulated the effects of increases or decreases in the credit rate (and phase-out rate) on a "treatment group" only (Browning, 1995) . The most recent empirical studies utilize household survey data to compare changes in employment rates or hours worked by single women (Eissa & Liebman, 1996 ; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 1999 ; Ellwood, 2000) and married couples (Eissa & Hoynes, 1998) with and without children . These studies focus on differences between potential beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that may be related to the expansion of the EITC, and are discussed in more detail in the literature review section of the paper . This study contributes to a better understanding of the EITC by expanding the research method and by utilizing data from actual filed tax returns, rather than self-reported survey data . Using tax return data focuses the issue on whether the people who actually did claim the credit, rather than those who may have been eligible, were better off .' Additionally, widening the examination from single mothers to all actual claimants is important because of the purported "marriage penalty" effects on low-income married couples whose combined low incomes place them in or above the phase-out range . This study does not address compliance issues (i .e . whether or not taxpayers were eligible for the credit) . 4 Using a different data source provides the opportunity to triangulate the results of this study with other studies . For example, if the results of this study are similar to the simulation or household survey studies, confidence in all of the studies can be increased. On the other hand, if the results of the current study differ from prior studies, the need for additional research could be indicated . This study examines the growth or decline in wages (in constant dollars) over nine time windows which cover the time period 1979 through 1990, for a "treatment group" (i .e . EITC participants) and a "control group" (i .e . non-participants) . The chosen time windows take into account various changes in the credit during that time period . However, the focus is on differences between participants and non-participants that may be associated with an overriding incentive or disincentive of the EITC . This study also expands upon previous empirical studies by separating the tax returns into income groups based on the income ranges of the credit . The
4
SUSAN B . ANDERS
appearance of growth or decline in wages is examined separately for the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out income ranges . Examining the ranges separately is important because of the predicted differing effects on labor supply for each range (described below), which have been the source of much of the controversy surrounding the EITC . EITC participants are facing an upper limit on earnings that reduces their hourly wages in the phase-out range . If the EITC creates a disincentive to work, then participants in the phase-out income range would be expected to have a flatter distribution of earnings over time than non-participants in the phase-out income range . On the other hand, for participants in the phase-in range, the distribution of earnings over time would be expected to be steeper than for non-participants . Comparing the growth rates in earnings of EITC participants and non-participants with similar beginning levels of income allows the examination of differences in growth patterns that may indicate potential incentives or disincentives from the credit . The results of this study do not provide support for the idea that the EITC program influences the work efforts of recipients . In contrast to prior simulation studies, the results indicate that EITC participants exhibited positive wage growth (in constant dollars) in all income ranges, suggesting either that they worked more hours over time, or were more productive, or both . However, wage growth was significantly higher for EITC participants in the phase-in range, where the work incentive is positive, than for participants in the phase-out range, where the work incentive is negative . Importantly, the same pattern of wage growth is also exhibited by low-income workers who did not receive the EITC . This is in contrast to the results of previous empirical studies, which generally report an increased labor measure only for potential beneficiaries and not for potential nonbeneficiaries . The possible existence of significant differences in income growth between participants and non-participants is only indicated for the time period of the mid-1980s, before the major increase in the credit post-1986 . Contrary to theory, the current study estimates a potential disincentive in the mid-1980s in the phase-in range, as well as the phaseout range . However, after the post-1986 increase in the credit, the differences between the participants and non-participants are no longer statistically significant. The remainder of this article is organized as follows . First, the economic theory behind potential disincentives is briefly summarized . Second, a review of the related literature is presented . Third, the research design is developed . Finally, the results are presented, along with a discussion of the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research .
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
5
LITERATURE REVIEW Although the earned income tax credit is intended to provide an incentive for low-income taxpayers to work, some theoretical literature suggests that the credit may actually reduce work incentives . The effect on labor supply may depend on whether the taxpayer's income is in the "phase-in," "plateau," or "phase-out" ranges (Scholz, 1994 ; JCT, 1995) . In the "phase-in" range, the amount of credit increases as the taxpayer's earned income increases, so the credit acts as an earnings subsidy (Browning, 1995) . In the "plateau" range, the EITC acts as a lump-sum transfer since the amount of the credit is constant at the maximum amount, with no increase (or decrease) for additional earnings (Browning, 1995) . In the "phase-out" range, taxpayers lose a percentage of the credit for each additional dollar earned, similar to a negative income tax (Browning, 1995) . The operations of the "phase-in," "plateau," and "phase-out" ranges for the years of this study are depicted graphically in Fig . 1 . The overall effect of the EITC on work effort can be separated into a "substitution effect" and an "income effect ." The substitution effect derives from : (1) a positive credit rate, which increases the net wage, versus ; (2) an increase in the marginal tax rate (i.e. phase-out of the credit) which decreases the net wage (Browning, 1995) . In the phase-in range, the substitution effect provides a positive incentive to increase labor supply, because the higher after-tax wage makes leisure more expensive, and individuals may substitute work for leisure (Scholz, 1994 ; JCT, 1995) . In the "plateau" range, there is no substitution effect, since the credit does not increase or decrease . However, in the "phase-out" range, the decreasing after-tax wage makes leisure relatively less expensive, and individuals may choose to substitute leisure for work (Browning, 1995) . The "income effect" describes the potential for individuals to choose to work fewer hours, since their disposable money incomes have increased with receipt of the transfer (credit) (Scholz, 1994) . The negative direction of the income effect holds across all income ranges of the EITC . In the "phase-in" range, the substitution and income effects are in opposition to each other (JCT, 1995), although the positive substitution effect is expected to dominate the negative income effect and result in a net increase in the labor supply (Holtzblatt et al ., 1993 ; Scholz, 1994) . The income effect operates unopposed in the "plateau" range, although the strength of its effect is not clear (Holtzblatt et al ., 1994) . In the "phase-out" range, the substitution effect would be expected to reinforce the income effect for a net reduction in labor supply (JCT, 1995 ; Browning, 1995) . The theoretical development of the EITC has grown out of discussions of the negative income tax (NIT) . However, there are important differences
6
SUSAN B . ANDERS
1979 through 1984 : Maximum Credit $500 Phaseoat
Phasem 10% ooo~l $5,000 $0
s6,000
1985 through 1986 : Maximum Credit $550
1987 : Maximum Credit $851
Fig . 1 .
Earned Income Tax Credit Ranges .
$10,000
An Empirical Analysis of the Ellect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
7
between the EITC and an NIT (Alstott, 1994, p . 609 ; Cataldo, 1995, p. 59) . The NIT provides a guaranteed level of income, subsidizing individuals for the difference between their own incomes (which may be zero) and a minimum amount of income that is guaranteed to all individuals . The NIT subsidy decreases as the individual's own income increases . Thus, an NIT neither requires nor rewards work effort . In contrast, the EITC provides a wage subsidy as a percentage of earnings, which increases as taxpayers' earnings increase . The potential income effects and substitution effects associated with the NIT also apply to the EITC . However, analysis of the EITC cannot transfer directly from the NIT because the structure of the EITC is more complex . The EITC provides potential incentives as well as disincentives, due to the use of a phase-in range, plateau range, and phase-out range of income . The structure of the NIT utilizes only a phase-out range for determining the stipend . Thus, while it does not encourage participants to work, it may well discourage additional work for participants who are in the phase-out range . Prior studies on the effectiveness of the EITC in encouraging low-income individuals to work have produced disparate results . Simulation studies utilizing NIT estimates have supported the economic theory that taxpayers are discouraged from working in the plateau and phase-out ranges of the credit . On the other hand, empirical studies using household survey data have reported that potential beneficiaries of the credit increased their labor supply in comparison to potential non-beneficiaries . These studies are summarized in Tables 1 through 3 as follows . Simulation and empirical studies that have examined changes in hours worked are summarized in Table 1 . Simulation and modeling studies that analyzed changes in earnings are summarized in Table 2 . An empirical study that addressed changes in employment rates is summarized in Table 3 . The U .S . Department of Health and Human Services conducted four NIT experiments between 1968 and 1982 (Robins, 1985, pp . 567-568) . Some simulation studies of the effectiveness of the EITC utilized estimates from the largest and most comprehensive of the four experiments, sometimes referred to as the "Seattle/Denver" experiments, which were conducted between 1971 and 1977 . A treatment group received a guaranteed grant subject to a 50% or 70% phase-out based on income level . A control group received no grant (GAO, 1993) . Labor supply responses in terms of relative changes in hours worked by the treatment group are summarized in Panel A of Table 1, and indicate that husbands would reduce their hours worked by 12 .5%, wives by 23 .4%, and single heads of household by 20 .7% . The Government Accounting Office (1993) simulated the effects of the EITC on labor supply utilizing estimates of changes in hours worked by participants
8 Table 1 .
SUSAN B . ANDERS Summary of Labor Supply Responses : Changes in Hours Worked .
Panel A NIT experiments (GAO, 1993) GAO simulation (1993) Eissa and Liebman (1996) With children Without children Previously in workforce Eissa and Hoynes (1998) With 2 children With I child Without children Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) With children Without children Panel B GAO simulation (1993)
Husbands -12 .5% -1 .5%
Wives -23.4% -6.5%
Single Head of Household -20 .7% -0 .3% +1 .9% None None
+0 .3% -0 .6% -1 .3%
-2.6% -0.1% +1 .7% +6 .0% -1 .0%
Phase-in +4.1%
Plateau -2 .6%
Phase-out -4 .3%
Overall -2 .1%
in the Seattle/Denver NIT experiments . Regression coefficient estimates of income and substitution effects from the NIT experiments were applied to estimate the labor supply response of low-income workers to the 1988 EITC . The results are summarized in Panel A of Table 1, and indicate that husbands would reduce their hours worked by 1 .5%, wives by 6.5%, and single heads of household by 20 .7% . If analyzed by income ranges of the EITC, as shown in Panel B of Table 1, hours worked increased 4 .1% in the phase-in range, but fell 2 .1% overall . Holtzblatt, McCubbin and Gillette (1994) also simulated the response of eligible workers to changes in the EITC in OBRA90 and OBRA93, using parameters estimated in the Seattle/Denver NIT experiments to determine the change in aggregate labor supply of eligible wage earners already in the workforce . In response to the changes in OBRA90, overall gross earnings fell by 1 .7%, and in response to OBRA93, overall earnings fell an additional 0 .7% . The effects on earnings by credit range are summarized in Table 2 . Browning (1995) modeled the effects of the EITC on labor supply with particular emphasis on the phase-out range . He estimated income and substitution effects at different levels of earnings, utilizing wage elasticities of labor supply and income elasticities from prior studies . Browning calculated that families in the upper end of the phase-out range would reduce earnings (and therefore labor supply) by 0 .73% .
9
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit Table 2 .
Summary of Labor Supply Responses : Changes in Earnings . Phase-in
Holtzblatt et al. simulation (1994) OBRA90 OBRA93 Browning model (1995)
+1 .1% +1 .6%
Plateau
1 .6%
Phase-out
-2.0%
Overall
-L7% -0 .7%
0 .73%
Several recent studies have utilized data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is a monthly self-reported household survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census . The CPS data are collected by personal and telephone interviews of a recurring sample of 60,000 households . The studies utilizing CPS data analyzed changes in hours worked or employment rate, by populations that would potentially benefit from the credit, as an indication of the work incentive effects of the EITC . Eissa and Liebman (1996) utilized data from the March CPS to examine changes in the labor supply of single women with children, following the TRA86 expansions of the EITC . They compared the change in labor supply of single women with children, who were eligible for the EITC, to the change in labor supply of single women without children, who were not eligible for the EITC . They found that single women with children, who were not previously in the workforce, increased their labor force participation by 1 .9% . In contrast, they found no significant change in the number of hours worked by single women with children who were already in the workforce or by single women without children . Eissa and Hoynes (1998) utilized CPS data from 1985 to 1997 to compare labor supply responses of married couples with children and similar married couples without children, during a period of major expansions in the EITC . As summarized in Panel A of Table 1, they found that married men with children increased their labor supply (in terms of hours worked) relative to married men without children . In contrast, married women with children were more likely to decrease labor force participation . Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) analyzed CPS data from 1985 to 1997 to examine the effect of several social programs (including EITC) on the labor supply of single mothers in comparison to single women without children . They estimated that the EITC was responsible for over 60% of the increase in employment rates of single mothers during the full 1984 to 1996 period . During the 1992 to 1996 period, however, the EITC explained only 37% of the increase in single mothers' employment rates .
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SUSAN B . ANDERS
Table 3.
Summary of Labor Supply Responses : Changes in Employment Rates .
Ellwood (2000)
First Quartile
Second Quartile
Third Quartile
Fourth Quartile
Median earnings (1998) Women with children Unmarried Married Women without children Unmarried/married
$11,0110°
$15,000h
$20,000,
$30,100`
+21% +5%
+13% +11%
+8% +8%
+4% +6%
-1%/-2%
Notes: (a) Similar to plateau range ; (b) Similar to phase-out range; (c) Beyond phase-out range .
Ellwood (2000) utilized CPS data from 1975 to 1999 to separate women into four equal skill/wage groups . As summarized in Table 3, the employment rates for both married and unmarried women with children increased between 1986 and 1999 in all four wage groups. The greatest increase in employment occurred in the first quartile for unmarried women and in the second quartile for married women . There was no growth in employment for married or unmarried women without children . The current study contributes to the analysis of the work incentive effects of the EITC by using data from actual tax returns and by examining income growth in the different income ranges of the credit, which are predicted to have different incentive/disincentive effects . Using tax return data focuses the issue on whether the people who did claim the credit, rather than those who may have been eligible, were better off . Additionally, widening the examination from single mothers to all actual claimants is important because of the purported "marriage penalty" effects on low-income married couples.
RESEARCH DESIGN This study utilizes empirical analysis of actual individual income tax return data to evaluate EITC participants' and comparable non-participants' wages (in constant dollars) over time for indications of statistically significant increases or decreases . The wages of participants and a comparable sample of nonparticipants also are compared cross-sectionally for evidence of a statistically significant difference between the two groups over time . Comparisons are made over different time windows to take into account the expansion of credit eligibility and the increasing number of claimants between 1979 and 1990 .
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
II
Economic theory predicts a potential work incentive in the phase-in range and a potential work disincentive in the phase-out range, which calls for separate analyses by each income classification . This study examines a potential association between income growth (or decline) and the theoretical incentives (or disincentives) of the EITC . As an archival study, cause and effect between the credit and growth (or decline) in income cannot be inferred, and no implication of a causal relationship is intended . However, the use of panel data in this study may provide for the control of some omitted confounding variables if they are constant over time . If the EITC is effective in accomplishing the congressional objective of inducing low-income individuals to earn wages (or self-employment income), the incomes of EITC claimants would increase over a period of time as they enter the work force and develop work skills and experience . "Income" can obviously be defined by many different variables, and combinations of variables, in the tax return data . As a practical matter, the income variables chosen must be important to the EITC concept of income . Wages are used in this study as a proxy for "income," as approximately 93% of EITC claimants reported wages on their tax returns . Wage income also represented approximately 93% of total EITC earnings (IRS, Statistics of Income, 1975-1994) . Self-employment income is also eligible earned income for purposes of calculating the EITC . Out of all EITC claimants, approximately 15% reported self-employment earnings, although the amount of self-employment income accounted for only 7% of total EITC earnings (IRS, Statistics of Income, 1975-1994) . Net self-employment income also is examined as a subsidiary aspect of this study, although in the interest of simplicity, the following discussion focuses on wage income .'
Method
Means tests and regression analysis are used to examine the possible effectiveness of the EITC in encouraging low-income individuals to work . Comparisons of wages (in constant dollars) are made for the same taxpayers between a base year and a later year . Wage growth (decline) is analyzed separately for participants and non-participants . The two groups are then compared for indications of statistically significant differences . The means for wages for the same EITC recipients and a comparable group of the same non-recipients are calculated for each tax year, adjusted for inflation to 1990 dollars, and analyzed for differences over time (between the base year and a later year) . The means are analyzed for differences over time
12
SUSAN B . ANDERS
Table 4. Tax Year 1979-1984 1985-1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
EITC Credit Ranges for 1979 through 1990 .
Credit Rate
Maximum Phase-in Income
Plateau Range
Phase-out Range
Phase-out Rate
10% 11% 14% 14% 14% 14%
$5,000 $5,000 $6,080 $6,240 $6,500 $6,810
$5,001-6,000 $5,001-6,500 $6,081-6,920 $6,241-9,840 $6,501-10,240 $6,811-10,730
$6,001-10,000 $6,501-11,000 $6,921-15,432 $9,841-18,576 $10,241-19,340 $10,731-20,264
12 .5% 12,22% 10% 10% 10% 10%
for all participants and all non-participants over the entire income range, and separately for each credit range group . The comparisons are made over nine different time windows to take into account the expansion of credit eligibility and the increasing number of claimants between 1979 and 1990 . The EITC credit ranges for 1979 through 1990 are detailed in Table 4 . The base years chosen are 1979, 1983, and 1987 . 1979 is the first year available in the data set and is the closest to 1975, the year of inception of the EITC . As the first year available . 1979 also provides the largest time span between a base year and a later year. 1983 was chosen as the second base year as it is approximately mid-way through the nine-year period during which the maximum credit was constant . This was also the period during which inflation was eroding the value of the EITC . The average credit was at its lowest point during the period of 1982 through 1984, as detailed in Appendix A . 1983 was chosen over 1982 or 1984 because of a reduction of the number of tax returns available in the data for 1982 and 1984, due to cost saving measures on the part of the Internal Revenue Service . 1987 was chosen for the third base year as the first major increase since the inception of the credit took effect in 1987 . The percentage of tax returns claiming the credit increased more than two percentage points from 1986, and the dollar value of the credit also increased . The credit was also indexed for inflation beginning in 1987 . The base years were linked to the next year following the base year and also to the later years of 1983, 1987, and 1990 . For example, the same 1979 taxpayers were linked to 1980, to 1983, to 1987, and to 1990 . The years 1983 and 1987 were chosen as later years for the same reasons discussed above, and also to provide for equal multiples of four-year periods . 1990 was chosen as the final base year as it is the last year available in the data set . The time windows are summarized in Table 5 .
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit Table 5. Window
Time Period
1 2
1979 to 1980 1979 to 1983
3
1979 to 1987
4 5
1979 to 1990 1983 to 1984
6
1983 to 1987
7 8
1983 to 1990 1987 to 1988
9
1987 to 1990
13
Time Windows . Description
The first year available in this data set is 1979. The credit rate and income ranges were constant over this time period, although taxpayers were adversely affected by rising inflation. The first major increase in the credit and income ranges occurred in 1987, as indexing for inflation was incorporated. The last year currently available in this data set is 1990 . Base year 1983 is approximately midway between base year 1979 and the first major increase in the credit in 1987 . The credit rate and income ranges were moderately increased by the 1984 and 1986 tax acts, although probably not sufficiently to offset inflation . The last year currently available in this data set is 1990 . The first major increase in the credit and income ranges occurred in 1987, as indexing for inflation was incorporated. The credit and income ranges were steadily increased during this period . The last year currently available in this data set is 1990.
If the EITC is associated with work incentives, we would expect to find differential rates of growth in earnings over time of taxpayers who claim the credit and those who do not. This result would be expected whether the credit has a positive or negative association with work incentives . To analyze differences over time, the changes in incomes of EITC participants and non-participants are compared over the nine time windows using regression analyses . Data
The data set is selected from the IRS Panel of Individual Income Tax Returns provided by the University of Michigan Center for Tax Policy 6 The data are compiled by tax year and consist of actual individual income tax returns . They currently are available for 1979 through 1990 . The tax returns included in the IRS Panel of Individual Income Tax Returns were selected by a stratified random sample of tax returns filed each year to produce reliable estimates of the entire population of individual income tax returns (Slemrod, 1990) . Each year contains a subset of tax returns from a panel of taxpayers whose tax returns are included year after year, and therefore, can be followed through the study . The percentage of tax returns claiming the EITC in the IRS Panel of Individual
14
SUSAN B . ANDERS Table 6.
IRS Panel of Individual Income Tax Returns . Tax Reurns Claiming the EITC .
Tax Year
Number of Returns in Sample
Returns in Sample with EITC
Percentage of Sample with EITC
Percentage of All Returns with EITC
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
45,141 46,214 46,670 9,235 19,120 9,762 20,202 10,120 21,191 21,656 22,352 22,683
3,480 3,460 3,242 595 1,234 554 1,270 590 1,714 2,153 2,348 2,500
7 .71% 7 .49% 6 .95% 6 .43% 6 .45% 5 .68% 6 .29% 5 .83% 8 .09% 9 .94% 10 .50% 11 .02%
7 .70% 7 .41% 7 .04% 6.71% 6.51% 5 .65% 6.38% 5 .99% 8 .23% 9 .96% 10.43% 11 .04%
Income Tax Returns for 1979 through 1990 is representative of the percentage of the total population of tax returns claiming the EITC in those years, and is summarized in Table 6 . The data set used for this study contains variables taken directly from tax returns, as well as some amounts calculated by the IRS . The data are ideal for examining many tax policy issues, particularly when the constructs under analysis can be operationalized with tax return information. The data set does not permit the analysis of demographic factors, however, nor does it include economic and sociological data, such as participation in welfare programs, that are not reported on individual tax returns . Sample Selection From the panel data, all tax returns with EITC were selected for the participant group in each year to be examined . Tax returns were deleted if the returns were filed for the wrong year (e.g . 1978 tax returns filed with 1979 tax returns) . In addition, tax returns where the taxpayers were over the age of 65, or were claimedd as dependents on another return (i .e . children under 18), were deleted since these individuals are not the focus of the incentive policies of the EITC . Tax returns with negative adjusted gross incomes were deleted to make the results more interpretable and to eliminate tax returns with investment losses in excess of earned income. In order to limit the analyses in this study to those
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tar Credit
15
individuals who might appropriately be considered persistent "working poor," tax returns with changes in income of greater than plus or minus $20,000 were deleted from the samples for both the means tests and regression analyses . A non-participant group is used for comparison with EITC participants . The data set is as comparable as possible to the participant group, at least in terms of base year income levels (before EITC) and sources of income . The non-participant group was created by deleting, from the complete sample, those tax returns claiming the EITC . In addition to the adjustments mentioned in the prior paragraphs, tax returns with no earned income or with adjusted gross income in excess of the EITC ceiling were also deleted . Taxpayers who should have claimed the credit, but did not claim it, were properly included in the nonparticipant group, since they did not benefit from the credit .' Thus, the income patterns of the two groups are relatively similar, as portrayed in Fig . 2 . In order to increase the comparability of the participant and non-participant groups, both groups were further reduced by eliminating tax returns with interest income, dividend income, and capital gains or losses . Although low-income taxpayers may legitimately have investment income, Congress indicated its desire to limit EITC eligibility to taxpayers without significant investment income by placing a cap on interest income (in the years following the study period) . Taxpayers with itemized deductions were also deleted to reduce the samples to taxpayers in comparable standard deduction (zero bracket amount) positions .
$12,000 $10,000 $8,000 -
9
5
$6,000
-
$4,000
-
$2,000
-
79
Non-participants
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
Year Fig. 2 .
Average Base Year Wages in 1990 Dollars .
88
89
90
16
SUSAN B . ANDERS
Taxpayers who were employed in the base year, but who retired before or during the later comparison year, are outside the scope of policy incentives . These individuals experience a decrease in earned income that is not potentially influenced by EITC policy . In order to control for this situation, observations where the taxpayer is 65 or older in the later comparison year were deleted for both means tests and regression analyses . Another potential source of change in income that is outside the scope of the EITC is a change in marital (or filing) status . In the regression analyses, change in marital status is included as a control variable . For the means tests, observations where the taxpayer's marital (filing) status differed between the base year and the later comparison year were deleted to control for change in marital status . Table 7 details the final sample selection of participants for the means tests and regression analyses . Table 8 details the final sample of comparable non-participants . The EITC participant and non-participant groups were further separated into sub-groups based on the portion of the credit range into which their incomes fall in the base years . For example, in 1979, the phase-in group consists of those with incomes up to $5,000 . The plateau group consists of those with incomes between $5,001 and $6,000 . The phase-out group consists of those with incomes between $6,001 and $10,000 . The EITC credit ranges for 1979 through 1990 are detailed in Table 4 . Hypotheses The first hypothesis compares the mean wages for EITC participants in a base year to the mean wages for the same taxpayers in a later year . If the credit encourages additional work effort among participants, this should be evidenced by increased wages over time . The comparison is made through a paired t-test of the difference between the later year and base year . The first hypothesis (in the null form) is : HI : There is no difference in the means (in constant dollars) of EITC claimants' wages for a base year (e.g . 1979) and a later year (e .g . 1980) . Different results should be observed depending on whether taxpayers are in the phase-in, plateau, or phase-out ranges . Examining wage growth (or decline) in the separate ranges precludes the possibility of disincentives offsetting incentives in the overall picture . The second hypothesis compares the mean growth (or decline) in wages for EITC participants in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges, between the base year and a later year.
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit 0
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SUSAN B . ANDERS
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An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
19
H2 : There is no difference in the means (in constant dollars) of EITC claimants' wages between the base year and a later year for participants in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges . If the EITC provides an incentive or disincentive to eligible low-income workers, it should have no influence on the non-participants who did not benefit from the credit . A foundational test of non-participants is needed to provide a basic comparison . The third hypothesis also tests for differences in the change in means between the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges . H3A : There is no difference in the means (in constant dollars) of nonparticipants' wages for a base year and a later year . H3B : There is no difference in the means (in constant dollars) of nonparticipants' wages between the base year and a later year for non-participants in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges . According to economic theory, we would expect to see more growth in wages for participants than non-participants in the phase-in range . We also might expect less growth for participants than non-participants in the phase-out range (and also potentially in the plateau range) . H4: There is no difference in the change in means of participants' and nonparticipants' wages in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges . If the EITC is associated with work incentives, we would expect to find differential rates of growth in earnings over time of taxpayers who claim the credit and those who do not . This result would be expected whether the credit has a positive or negative association with work incentives . To analyze differences over time, the incomes of EITC participants and non-participants are compared at fixed intervals over time. The fifth hypothesis is tested for differences in income growth over time using regression analysis . H5 : There is no difference over time in the wages of EITC participants and non-participants (in constant dollars) .
RESULTS Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis asks whether taxpayers who receive the EITC in the "base year" exhibit significant wage growth in subsequent years, as would be expected if the credit encourages recipients to work more hours . Consistent with
20
SUSAN B . ANDERS
expectations, participants' wage income increased significantly over all nine time windows . Statistically significant increases were exhibited by all three income groups (phase-in, plateau, and phase-out) in each time frame analyzed, as reported in Table 9 . These results are in contrast to prior simulation studies, which predict decreases in the plateau and phase-out ranges . Hypothesis Two The results reported in Table 9 also provide support for expected differences between the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges . In the phase-in range of the EITC, the credit increases with wages, thus providing an incentive for participants to earn more . In the phase-out range, in contrast, the credit decreases with wages, reducing the marginal benefits of additional earnings . Accordingly, hypothesis two suggests that wage growth should be higher for EITC participants with base year incomes in the phase-in range relative to their counterparts with base year incomes in the phase-out range . Similarly, wage growth should be higher for participants in the phase-in range than in the plateau range, where the credit is unaffected by additional compensation . As indicated in Table 9, the results are consistent with expectations . For all time periods studied, wage growth was significantly higher for EITC participants in the phase-in range than for those in either of the other income groups . No significant differences were observed between the plateau and phase-out income groups . Hypothesis Three While the results to this point imply that the EITC may have a positive impact on the work effort of participants, analysis of the results for hypothesis three gives cause to question this conclusion . The null hypothesis that nonparticipants' wages would not reflect growth over time is rejected . In contrast to prior studies, non-participants' wage income increased significantly over all nine time windows . The null hypothesis that non-participants' wages would not reflect differences in growth between the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges is also rejected . For all time periods studied, wage growth was higher for non-participants in the phase-in group than for those in the plateau and phase-out groups . As indicated in Table 10, the same growth patterns seen for participants are exhibited by non-participants with comparable base year levels of income . In contrast to participants, wage growth for non-participants in the plateau range was significantly higher than for those in the phase-out range . This may
21
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
Table 9. Hl : Wages (Yr 1) = Later Year
Participants' Results . All Groups
Phase-in
Plateau
Phase-out
1979 to 1980: Sample size 2,030 Mean change in wages $758* 112 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in=Phase-out
626 $1,876*
263 $620** *(l)
1,141 $177 n.s . *(2)
1979 to 1983 : Sample size 636 Mean change in wages $2,200* H2 : Phase-in =Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
189 $3,611*
76 $1,746**
374 $1,575* *(2)
503 1979 to 1987 : Sample size Mean change in wages $3,276* 112 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
**(1) 151
55
297
$4,464*
$2,312** ***(1)
$2,850**(2)
1979 to 1990: Sample size 445 Mean change in wages $3,498* H2 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
137 $4,683*
51 $2,084** **(1)
257 $3,146* **(2)
1983 to 1984 : Sample size 307 Mean change in wages $1,762* 112- Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
110 $3,365*
35 $954 n .s . *(1)
162 $849** *(2)
1983 to 1987 : Sample size 479 Mean change in wages $3,837* 112 : Phase-in =Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
168 $5,054*
51 $3,211* **(1)
260 $3,174* *(2)
1983 to 1990 : Sample size 400 Mean change in wages $4,022* 112 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
131 $5,581*
45 $4,584* n .s .(1)
224 $2,999* *(2)
1987 to 1988: Sample size Mean change in wages
247 $2,445*
54 $L953* n .s . (I)
626 $595* *(2)
200 $4,062*
51 $1,856** **(1)
517 $1,209* *(2)
927 $1,167*
112 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out 1987 to 1990 : Sample size 768 Mean change in wages $1,995* H2 : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
Notes : *p<0 .01, **p<0 .05, ***p<0 .10, n .s . = not significant (1) Phase-in compared to plateau (2) Phase-in compared to phase-out
be a result of the larger sample size of non-participants than participants . The greater income growth for non-participants in the plateau range versus the phase-out range appears to be reflected in the means tests between participants and non-participants, but not in the regression analysis .
22
SUSAN B . ANDERS Table 10.
H3A :
Wages (Yr 1) = Later Year
Non-participants' Results . All Groups
Phase-in
Plateau
Phase-out
1979 to 1980 : Sample size 6,878 Mean change in wages $1,338* H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
4,022
657
$2,145*
$677*
1979 to 1983 : Sample size 1,781 Mean change in wages $3,467 H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
1,085
162
534
$5,085*
$2,035*
$613**
*(1)
*(2)
1979 to 1987 : Sample size 1,168 Mean change in wages $5,444* H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
688
ill
369
$7,095*
$4,596*
$2,622*
*(1)
*(2)
1979 to 1990 : Sample size 989 $5,200* Mean change in wages H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
556
97
336
$7,060*
$4,420*
$2,349*
*(1)
*(2)
to 1984 : Sample size 964 Mean change in wages $2,536* H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
574
90
300
$3,366*
$2,242*
$1,038*
**(1)
*(2)
1,366 1983 to 1987 : Sample size $5,411* Mean change in wages H3B : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
854
113
399
$6,347*
$5,238*
$3,455*
**(1)
*(2)
1,008 1983 to 1990 : Sample size $5,907* Mean change in wages H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
599
91
318
$7,333*
$5,024*
$3,475*
*(1)
*(2)
1,846 1987 to 1988 : Sample size $1,525* Mean change in wages H3B: Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
694
130
1,022
$2,556*
$2,011*
$762*
n .s . (1)
*(2)
1,471 1987 to 1990 : Sample size $2,810* Mean change in wages H3B : Phase-in = Plateau and Phase-in = Phase-out
566
101
804
$4,699*
$3,463*
$1,397*
**(1)
*(2)
1983
Notes :
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, ***p < 0 .10,
*(1)
2,199 $58
n .s .
*(2)
n .s . = not significant
(1) Phase-in compared to plateau (2) Phase-in compared to phase-out
Hypothesis Four A stronger test of the relationship between the EITC and participants' work efforts is provided by comparison of the rates of wage growth of participants
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
23
versus non-participants with comparable base year income . Overall wage growth was significantly higher for non-participants in all nine time windows . This may be a result of the larger sample size of non-participants than participants . However, an analysis by the separate income groups (phase-in, plateau, and phase-out) reflects a general lack of significant differences in the directions predicted by theory . Thus, the null hypothesis that participants' and nonparticipants' wage growth is not significantly different is not rejected . As summarized in Table 11, these results suggest that the EITC appears to have had no measurable impact on work efforts, at least in the intended directions . Indeed, wage growth during this period was higher for taxpayers in the phase-in group who did not claim the credit than for those who did . The higher wage growth for non-participants in the phase-in and plateau ranges generally occurs in the time windows during which the credit was stagnant and being eroded by inflation . For the time windows beginning in 1987, after the major increase in the credit post-1986, non-participant wage growth was still higher, but not statistically different from participants . Wage growth was higher for participants than non-participants in the phase-out range for the time windows with 1979 as the base year, although only 1979 to 1983 was significant. For the time windows beginning in 1983 and 1987, wage growth for participants and non-participants in the phase-out range are not statistically distinguishable . Analysis of variance results are similar to the t-tests results and are not reported . These results are in marked contrast to those reported by studies utilizing CPS data (see Table 1), which report increases in the employment measures for potential EITC beneficiaries, but not for non-beneficiaries . In the current study, the importance of a separate analysis by income group can be seen in a lack of significant differences between participants and non-participants, with comparable base year wages, for many time windows . Where statistically significant differences do appear, they do not necessarily work in the directions predicted by economic theory . One reason may be slightly lower base year wages (in the phase-in range) reported by non-participants, revealed by descriptive analysis, providing them with greater growth potential . Alternatively, the results may reflect differences in family circumstances ; during the study period, EITC participants had children while nonparticipants did not . As a result, non-participants potentially may have more flexibility in working more hours to increase their earnings . Additionally, the stagnant income ranges in the years through 1986 (see Table 4) may have created disincentives, or may have forced former participants into the non-participant category if their wages increased even moderately to keep up with inflation .
24
SUSAN B . ANDERS Table 11 .
114: Participants' Change in Wages = Non-participants'
Change in Wages .
All Groups
Growth in Wages Plateau Phase-in
Phase-out
1979 to 1980 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$758 $1,337 *
$1,876 $2,147 n.s .
$620 $677 n .s .
$177 $58 n .s .
1979 to 1983 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$2,200 $3,467 *
$3,610 $5,085 *
$1,746 $2,035 n .s .
$1,575 $613 **
1979 to 1987 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$3,276 $5,444 *
$4,465 $7,095 *
$2,312 $4,596 ***
$2,849 $2,622 n .s .
1979 to 1990 Participants Non-participants Difference
$3,498 $5,200 *
$4,683 $7,060 *
$2,084 $4,420 ***
$3,146 $2,348 n .s .
1983 to 1984 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$1,762 $2,536 **
$3,365 $3,366 n.s.
$954 $2,242 n .s .
$849 $1,037 n .s .
1983 to 1987 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$3,837 $5,411 *
$5,054 $6,347 **
$3,211 $5,238 ***
$3,174 $3,455 n .s .
1983 to 1990 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$4,023 $5,907 *
$5,581 $7,333 *
$4,584 $5,024 n .s .
$2,999 $3,475 n .s .
1987 to 1988 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$1,167 $1,525 ***
$2,445 $2,556 n .s .
$1,954 $2,011 n .s .
$595 $762 n .s .
1987 to 1990 : Participants Non-participants Difference
$1,995 $2,810 **
$4,062 $4,699 n .s .
$1,856 $3,463 u .s .
$1,208 $1,397 n .s .
Notes: * p < 0.01, **p < 0 .05, ***p < 0.10, n .s .=not significant ; where participants' mean
compared to non-participant mean .
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
25
Hypothesis Five Regression analysis is used to test the fifth hypothesis, which posits that EITC participants will exhibit greater wage growth over time than non-participants . The regression model takes the following form in order to control for variables known to impact earnings potential : WAGES,
-WAGES a+(3 I WAGES,+(32 M1+(3 3 M2+
R, M3 + (35 ADEP + (3 6 EITC, + (3,WAGES * EITC, + where : t=base year (e .g . 1979), t+n = test year (e .g . 1980), Ml =change in marital (filing) status from married to single (not married), M2 = change in marital (filing) status from single (not married) to married, M3 = marital (filing) status is single (not married) in both years, XDEP=change in number of dependent children, and EITC, = categorical (0,1) variable representing participation in the EITC program in the base year . Separate regression models are estimated for the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out income groups . In this model, change in wages is stipulated to be a function of beginning wages, change in marital status (if any), change in the number of dependents, and participation in the EITC program . The intercept represents change in wages for non-participants after controlling for these factors . The model controls for differences in the beginning wage level, since that variable proxies both for beginning labor market skills and the potential for wage growth . As such, the coefficient on (3, represents rate of growth . Change in marital status is expected to be positively correlated with wage growth . Taxpayers getting married generally should exhibit positive wage growth after combining two spouses' earnings . In contrast, divorce would be expected to reduce wage growth for most taxpayers . Similarly, an increase in the number of dependents would be expected to decrease wage growth for single parents, as the flexibility to work additional hours conflicts with additional child care commitments . It may decrease growth for married taxpayers, as well, if one spouse curtails labor force participation to stay at home and care for the additional children . The primary focus of the model is the EITC variable, which represents the greater or lesser wage growth for participants . The model also includes an
26
SUSAN B . ANDERS
interaction term to capture any interaction between EITC participation and base year wages, which represents the marginal rate of growth for participants . Coefficients on both variables are expected to be positive and significant if the credit is associated with a higher rate of growth in earnings for EITC participants . Table 12 summarizes the estimates from the regression model for growth in income over time . For growth in wages, the coefficient for claiming the EITC in the base year of the comparison shows indications of statistical significance for the 1979 to 1987, 1983 to 1987, and 1983 to 1990 time windows, for the phase-in group . In correspondence to the means test for hypothesis four, the wage growth was higher (in the phase-in range) for non-participants versus participants, which is opposite to the direction predicted by theory . Wage growth for participants in the phase-in range does not exceed that for non-participants until the 1979 to 1990 and 1987 to 1990 time windows ; however, the EITC coefficients are not statistically significant . For most of the phase-in range time windows, the combined dummy and interaction terms reflect a net reduction in the marginal rate of wage growth in comparison to non-participants . This corresponds with the t-tests under hypothesis four and may be reflective of the high inflation in the general economy that occurred during the 1980s before the credit rate and income ranges were adjusted for inflation . However, the rate coefficient is only significant for the 1987 to 1990 phase-in range . The comparison of wage growth between participants and non-participants in the plateau range indicates, in contrast to the means tests in hypothesis four, no significant differences in any of the time windows . Analysis of the phase-out range reveals that wage growth was lower for participants than for non-participants, as predicted by theory, in the 1979 to 1990 time window ; however, the difference is not significant . The only time windows with significant differences for the 1983 base year are 1983 to 1984 and 1983 to 1990 . For the two time windows for the 1987 base year, that occur entirely after the major increases in the credit in 1986, the negative EITC coefficient is not significant. In the overview, the regression analyses seems to reflect potential disincentives of the EITC in the phase-in range, contrary to the predictions of economic theory, for the time windows beginning in 1983 and linked to 1987 and 1990 . The differences in wage growth in the plateau range are not significant . The differences in the phase-out range are only significant for the 1983 base years . The base years beginning in 1979 and 1987 generally do not reflect significant differences . Thus, the null hypothesis that participants' and non-participants' wage growth is not significantly different over time is not rejected .
An Empirical Analysis
of the
P
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27
Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
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28
SUSAN B . ANDERS
The existence of a potential disincentive appears to be most evident for the time windows beginning in 1983 . The significant differences in wage growth between participants and non-participants are not reflected in the 1987 base year analyses . This could be the result of many different factors, but it is possible that the post-1986 increases in the credit produced a small "incentive" that served to offset the disincentives that appeared in the 1983 base year time windows . An alternative no-intercept model was developed utilizing six dummy variables to separately represent participants and non-participants in each of the income ranges . The six dummy variables, representing amount of wage growth, generally were significant for each of the time windows . Tests of linear combinations of coefficients, comparing participants and non-participants, were significant at the p = 0 .10 level only for exactly the same time windows and income ranges discussed above . The results are similar to the simpler model discussed above, and are therefore not presented . Self-Employment Income All of the analyses performed on the wage variable were duplicated for net self-employment income . Earnings from self-employment would seem to offer the greatest potential for manipulation . Taxpayers could be influenced by two contrasting objectives : (1) maximize self-employment income reported in order to maximize the EITC, versus; (2) minimize self-employment income in order to minimize self-employment and income tax liabilities . The current study does not provide any substantive insights into selfemployment income . Overall, the net increases or decreases in self-employment income were fairly small in dollar amounts . Most comparisons were not statistically significant on either the complete sample, or on a sample reduced to only those tax returns with self-employment income . Selected results are presented in Appendix B . The regression analysis does indicate a potential disincentive in the phase-out range of the credit for the 1987 to 1988 and 1987 to 1990 time windows, following the major increase in the credit . Further examination of self-employment income is a topic for future research. A different approach may be required to analyze self-employment income . Limitations The tax return data do not include economic and sociological data that are not reported on individual tax returns . The data set does not permit the analysis of
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
29
demographic factors, such as geographical variations in demand for workers, the locality, and the health of the worker, which may influence income. These factors may have been randomized out to the extent that growth in income varies across the sample of tax returns . Subdivisions of the sample into credit range groups also may provide a surrogate approach to addressing differences between unskilled and skilled workers, as well as between new workers and those who already have been in the workforce . Another potentially important omitted variable that is not available in the tax return data is the potential receipt of transfer payments . Eligibility for transfer payments decreases as the taxpayer's earned income increases, which could provide a disincentive to work . As mentioned above, the receipt of an EITC refund is no longer counted in a welfare recipient's earned income, which may mitigate some of the conflict between working and eligibility for transfer benefits . Great care has been taken to create a non-participant group from the data set that is as comparable as possible to the participant group, at least in terms of base year income levels . However, some dissimilarities probably still exist between the two groups that are in some part responsible for differences in income growth . Divergence may exist between the two groups regarding stage of the working life cycle, education, receipt of transfer payments, and earning potential . These demographic factors are not available on archival tax return data and therefore cannot be analyzed from this data set . Based on descriptive statistics, non-participants, as a group, appear to be similar to participants, as a group ; however, they are not individually matched by common characteristics, which could affect the results . The differences in sample sizes between the participants and non-participants also may affect the analyses . Finally, the results of this study are only potentially generalizable for the taxpayers included in the samples - specifically, those without interest income, dividend income, capital gains and losses, or itemized deductions . Utilizing different sample selection criteria may generate different results from those reported in the current study .
FUTURE RESEARCH The results of the current study, including those that run contrary to theory and prior research, demonstrate the need for future research into issues raised by the debate surrounding the EITC . An examination of whether participants remain in their original income ranges, migrate out of the phase-in and plateau ranges into the phase-out range, or migrate back and forth, would provide greater insight into the behaviors and circumstances of low-income individuals, and
30
SUSAN B . ANDERS
could have potential tax policy implications . The construction of the samples may impact the results of any analysis of the EITC . Future research could attempt a more exact matching of the treatment and control groups by pairing individual taxpayers based on characteristics such as state of residence, the presence of interest, dividend, or capital gain income, and the use of the standard deduction or itemization . Further research also could address self-employment income by comparing taxpayers with self-employment income only to those with wages or wages and self-employment income . Finally, participants and non-participants could be individually matched .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the earned income tax credit (EITC) in meeting Congress' objective of increasing the participation of low-income taxpayers in the workforce through the use of an economic incentive . Although the credit is intended to provide an incentive for low-income taxpayers to work, some theoretical literature suggests that the credit may actually reduce work incentives, because in the "phase-out" range taxpayers lose a percentage of the credit for each additional dollar earned . Recent empirical studies utilizing household survey data have concluded that increases in employment rates or hours worked by individuals eligible for the credit indicate positive work incentive effects . The current study uses individual tax return data to compare the changes in wages over time for taxpayers who actually claimed the EITC (participants) and taxpayers who did not (non-participants) . Prior empirical studies have found increases in their labor measurement for potential beneficiaries only . This study reveals that incomes for both groups are found to have increased significantly over the selected time windows during the 1979 to 1990 time period . Income growth for both participants and non-participants was also greater in the phase-in range than in the phase-out range . The potential existence of significant differences in income growth between participants and non-participants is only indicated for the time period of the mid-1980s, before the major increase in the credit post-1986 . The current study estimates a potential disincentive in the phase-in range for that time period, which is contrary to theory. However, after the post-1986 increase in the credit, the differences between the participants and non-participants are no longer statistically significant . Theoretical literature suggests a disincentive effect in the phase-out range of the credit, which is only borne out by the regression analysis of this study for the mid-1980s time period . The differences in income growth between
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
31
participants and non-participants in the phase-out range generally are not statistically significant in the means tests, and in the regression analysis after the post-1986 credit increase . In contrast to previous simulation studies which estimate reductions in hours worked or in earnings in the plateau and phase-out ranges, an association of the credit with a disincentive in the phase-out range after 1986 cannot be inferred from this study . In summary, income growth patterns for taxpayers who claimed the EITC and those who did not were very similar for 1979 through 1990, which could indicate that the EITC did not have significant incentive or disincentive effects during that period . A potential disincentive appears in both the phase-in and phase-out ranges, contrary to theory, in the mid-1980s . After major increases in the credit in 1986, there are no longer significant differences between taxpayers who claimed the credit and those who did not . This could be the result of many different factors, but it is possible that the post-1986 increases in the credit produced a small "incentive" that served to offset the disincentives that appeared prior to 1987 .
NOTES 1. Family support programs include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Family Support, Emergency Assistance, Child Care Entitlements to States, Children's Research and Technical Assistance, and Child Support Enforcement . 2 . Specifically, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) . 3 . Under complex eligibility requirements, mothers with children may or may not have been eligible for the EITC . 4 . This study does not address the interaction of the EITC and the "marriage penalty," but instead refers the reader to Counts and White (1999) and Lav (1999) . Liebman (2000) discusses EITC compliance problems, which are generally due to the complexity of filing status and eligible child requirements . Many low-income taxpayers who were ineligible pre-1990 would have met the liberalized post-1990 requirements . 5 . All analyses performed on wages are also performed on self-employment income . Overall, the results for self-employment earnings generally do not reflect statistically significant differences, or any discemable pattern . The statistically significant results are included in Appendix B . The remainder of the paper will focus on wage income, with the caveat that self-employment income warrants further study . 6 . This data source is also referred to as the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) Panel of Individual Returns . 7 . The number of tax returns was reduced after 1981 due to budget constraints . 8 . The participation rate in the EITC has been high relative to other low-income programs (Scholz, 1990, p . 5) . Using private data compiled by the Census Bureau matched with Survey of Income and Program Participation data, Scholz (1994, pp . 64-65) estimates that the participation rate in 1990 was 80 to 86% . Scholz (1994, p . 79) finds
32
SUSAN B . ANDERS
that non-participation by eligible individuals is correlated with those who are entitled to a smaller credit, have higher self-employment income, live in states without income taxes, work as household employees, and have higher levels of education . Non-participation does not appear to be correlated with lack of knowledge about ETT C .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper
is
based on the author's dissertation at Texas Tech University . The
author wishes to thank her dissertation chairperson, Robert Ricketts, and committee members : Ronald Bremer, Mary Sue Gately, and Thomas Steinmeier . The author also would like to thank Carol Fischer, David Hulse, members
of
the St . Bonaventure University research colloquiums, the editor, and two
anonymous reviewers .
REFERENCES Alstott, A . L . (1994) . The Earned Income Tax Credit and Some Fundamental Institutional Dilemmas of Tax-Transfer Integration . National Tax Journal, 47(September), 609-619 . Browning, E . K . (1995) . Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Income and Welfare . National Tax Journal, 48(March), 23-43 . Cataldo, A . J . II. (1995). The Earned Income Credit: Historical Predecessors and Contemporary Evolution. Accounting Historians Journal, 22(June), 57-79 . Congressional Budget Office (CBO) . (2000) . Federal Spending on the Elderly and Children (Other Documents) . http ://www .cbo.go v Counts, R. W ., & White, C . G . (1999) . Accounting Professors Look at Marriage Penalty `Fix' and Lower Income Families . Tax Notes (May 17), 1063-1070 . Eissa, N ., & Liebman, J . B . (1996). Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91(May), 605-637 . Eissa, N., & Hoynes, H . W . (1998) . The Earned Income Credit and the Labor Supply of Married Couples . National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 6856 . Ellwood, D. T . (2000). The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements . National Tax Journal, 53(December), 1063-1105 . Gish, M . (2001). The Earned Income Tax Credit: Current Issues and Benefit Amounts . Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (2001ARD 112-3), May 13, 2001 . Holtzblatt, J ., McCubbin, J ., & Gillette, R . (1994). Promoting Work Through the EITC . National Tax Journal, 47 (September), 591-607 . Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) . (1995) . A Staff Description of Present Law and Issues Relating to Earned Income Tax Credit (JCX-27-95), June 14, 1995 . Lav, I . J . (1999) . Extending Marriage Penalty Relief to Working Poor and Near Poor Families . Center on Budget Policy and Priorities (June 10). http .://www, cbpr.org Liebman, J . B . (2000). Who Are the Ineligible EITC Recipients? National Tax Journal, 53 (December), 1165-1185 . Meyer, B . D ., & Rosenbaum, D . T. (1999) . Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers . National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7363 .
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect
of the
Earned Income Tax Credit
33
Pechman, J . (1987) . Federal Tax Policy . Washington, D .C . : The Brookings Institution . Robins, P . K. (1985) . A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative Income Tax Experiments. The Journal of Human Resources, 20(4), 567-582. Scholz, J. K . (1990). The Participation Rate of the Earned Income Tax Credit . Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 928-90, 1-33 . Scholz, J . K . (1994) . The Earned Income Tax Credit : Participation, Compliance, and Anti-poverty Effectiveness . National Tax Journal, 47(March), 63-87 . Slemrod, J. (1990) . Notes on the 1979-1986 panel of individual income tax returns . Mimeo (July 18) . U .S . General Accounting Office (GAO) . (1993) . Earned Income Tax Credit : Design and Administration Could Be Improved . (GAO/GGD-93-145), Washington, D .C . U .S . Internal Revenue Service (IRS) . (1975-1996) . Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns. Washington, D .C . : Government Printing Office.
APPENDIX A: HISTORICAL DATA Tax Year
Total No . of Returns
Number with EITC
Percentage with ETTC
Total$EITC (thousands)
Average Avg . Credit Min . Wage Credit (2000 $) (2000 $)
82,229,332 1975 1976 84,670,389 1977 86,634,640 1978 89,771,551 1979 92,694,302 1980 93,902,469 1981 95,396,123 1982 95,337,432 96,321,310 1983 1984 99,438,708 1985 101,660,287 1986 103,045,170 1987 106,996,270 1988 109,708,280 1989 112,135,673 1990 113,717,138 1991 114,730,123 1992 113,604,503 1993 114,601,819 1994 115,943,131 1995 118,218,327 1996 120,351,208 1997 122,421,991 1998 124,770,662
6,214,533 6,472,633 5,626,938 5,191,834 7,134,756 6,953,621 6,717,177 6,395,032 6,274,532 5,615,085 6,483,291 6,180,259 8,801,288 10,925,590 11,695,876 12,554,681 13 .664,555 14,096,575 15,117,389 19,017,357 19,334,397 19,463,836 19,391,179 19,704,707
7 .56% 7.64% 6.50% 5 .78% 7 .70% 7 .41% 7 .04% 6.71% 6.51% 5 .65% 6 .38% 5 .99% 8.23% 9.96% 10 .43% 11 .04% 11 .91% 12.41% 13 .19% 16 .40% 16 .35% 16.17% 15 .84% 15 .79%
$1,249,962 $1,294,830 $1,126,555 $1,048,303 $2,051,945 $1,985,996 $1,911,632 $1,775,339 $1,793,766 $1,635,644 $2,087,655 $2,007,050 $3,930,528 $5,896,447 $6,595,387 $7,542,230 $11,104,993 $13,027,917 $15,536,762 $21,105,158 $25,995,575 $28,825,258 $30,388,532 $31,591,789
$201 $200 $200 $202 $288 $286 $285 $278 $286 $291 $322 $324 $446 $540 $564 $600 $813 $924 $1,028 $1,110 $1,345 $1,481 $1,567 $1,603
Adapted from Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income . Relative value of minimum wage data is from Bureau of Labor Statistics .
$643 $605 $568 $534 $683 $598 $540 $496 $494 $482 $515 $509 $676 $786 $783 $79t $1,028 $1,134 $1,225 $1,290 $1,520 $1,625 $1,681 $1,720
$6 .72 $6.96 $6.54 $7.00 $6.88 $6 .48 $6.35 $5 .98 $5 .79 $5 .55 $5 .36 $5 .26 $5 .08 $4.88 $4.65 $5 .01 $5 .37 $5 .22 $5 .06 $4.94 $4 .80 $5 .21 $5 .53 $5.44
34
SUSAN B . ANDERS
APPENDIX B : ANALYSIS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME Table Bl .
H4 : Participants' Change in Self-Employment Earnings = Non-participants' Change
All Groups
Growth in Self-Employment Earnings Phase-in Plateau Phase-out
1979 to 1983 : Participants Non-participants Difference
($43) $124 **
($64) $90 n .s .
$312 ($88) n .s .
$102 $257 **
1979 to 1990 : Participants Non-participants Difference
($69) $308 **
($144) $402 **
($202) ($60) n .s .
($3) $258 n.s.
Notes. * p < 0 .01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.10, n.s. = not significant ; where participants' mean
compared to non-participants' mean .
See also Table B2 on next page .
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35
THE EXPANDED TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE : A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF IRC SECTION 7525 Christine C . Bauman and Anna C . Fowler
ABSTRACT For taxpayer communications made after July 21, 1998, IRC Section 7525 extends a confidentiality privilege to tax advice furnished in non-criminal proceedings by certified public accountants and other federally authorized tax practitioners to the extent such communication would be privileged if it took place between a taxpayer and an attorney . However, subsequent to the enactment of the statute, concerns have been raised about the scope and usefulness of the accountant-client privilege . This article presents an examination of the historical development, statutory provisions, and limitations of IRC Section 7525 . It also evaluates, through the use of survey responses, the impact of the privilege on the accounting profession . This study is valuable because it is one of the first to examine the confidentiality privilege by using feedback (via a survey) from the accounting profession .
Advances in Taxation, Volume 14, pages 37-64 . Copyright O 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0889-3 37
38
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
INTRODUCTION The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA, 1998) added IRC Section 7525 (Confidentiality Privilege) to provide uniform confidentiality protection to all taxpayers, regardless of the professional affiliation of their tax advisor .' This section creates a new taxpayer confidentiality privilege for communications with "federally authorized tax practitioners (FATPs)" - certified public accountants (CPAs), attorneys, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries - with respect to the rendering of tax advice . In essence, the Confidentiality Privilege extends the common law attorney-client privilege to CPAs and other FATPs, but only with respect to tax advice . Subsequent to the enactment of the Confidentiality Privilege, concerns have been raised about the scope and usefulness of the privilege . The purpose of this study is to examine the historical development and statutory provisions of IRC Section 7525 and to assess, through the use of survey responses, the impact of the Confidentiality Privilege on the accounting profession . This study is valuable because it is one of the first to examine how the Confidentiality Privilege has affected practice by using feedback (via a survey) from accounting practitioners . Gaining feedback is especially relevant because of the importance to the AICPA of this statutory change . The first section of the article provides background information on the Confidentiality Privilege . The next section contains a description of the attorneyclient privilege, an understanding of which is essential for comprehending the Confidentiality Privilege . The third section contains a discussion of the implications for the accounting profession . The fourth section provides an overview of other implications of the Privilege . The next section of the article contains a presentation of the results of a survey conducted to assess the impact of the Confidentiality Privilege on the accounting profession and to learn about practitioners' experiences with the Privilege . The final section offers conclusions .
BACKGROUND Historical Development Prior to the 1998 legislation, Federal confidentiality protection did not exist for tax communications between accountants and their clients . Two Supreme Court cases addressed this issue . In Couch v . United States, 409 U .S . 322 (1973), the Supreme Court held that an accountant-client privilege is not recognized by Federal law. In United States v . Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S . 805 (1984), the
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
39
Court reversed the Second Circuit's conclusion that the work-product privilege prevented the IRS from obtaining a CPA's tax accrual workpapers . The Court refused to extend confidentiality protections, citing principally the differences in the roles legal counsel and auditors play . It also concluded that in light of
Couch, the Second Circuit's creation of a work-product privilege was misplaced . Subsequent to the Arthur Young & Co . decision, the AICPA helped form a coalition that sponsored legislation to create an accountant-client privilege in tax matters before the IRS . The AICPA wanted to "level the playing field" so taxpayers would be able to engage an accountant to represent them in tax planning and before the IRS with the same expectation of confidentiality as taxpayers that hire a lawyer to provide tax services . The AICPA argued that small taxpayers and small businesses (as well as large taxpayers) might find it duplicative, expensive, and time consuming to engage lawyers solely to gain protection for their communications (Friedman & Mendelson, 1996) . In a 1999 interview, attorney Pamela F . Olson concurred that the Confidentiality Privilege evolved from the AICPA's lobbying efforts subsequent to the Arthur Young & Co . decision (August, 1999) . She further stated that after the Arthur Young & Co . case, the IRS declined to grant accountants an administrative privilege similar to the attorney-client privilege . The IRS agreed, however, to request accountants' tax accrual workpapers only in "unusual circumstances" in which the examining agent obtained approval from the Chief of the IRS's Examination Division . As a result of disparate treatment of lawyers and CPAs with respect to communications, the AICPA sought legislative remedies . According to Mendelson et al . (1998), because most taxpayers are represented before the IRS by CPAs and enrolled agents, "taxpayer privacy interests dictated a need for CPAs and their clients to seek confidential protection similar to the attorney-client privilege ." The rules governing tax practice before the IRS in Treasury Department Circular No . 230 grant parity to CPAs, lawyers, and enrolled agents practicing before the Service . Therefore, the AICPA believed that all groups (not just attorneys) should enjoy privileged communication with clients . In 1996, an AICPA working group expressed concern about financial status audit techniques the IRS employed to identify unreported income (Raymon et al ., 1996) . The techniques included requesting taxpayers to complete a form on which they listed their estimated personal and family expenses . The AICPA provided guidance to CPAs who had clients undergoing a financial status audit . Suggestions included advising the client about the lack of a CPA-client privilege.
40
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
In testimony to Congress concerning the proposed legislation for the Confidentiality Privilege (Section 3411 of H . R . 2676), the AICPA indicated that advisors become privy to much private information about their clients in the course of arriving at recommendations. Clients expect privacy and confidentiality in discussing tax matters with their advisors . In the case of individual clients, CPAs may learn information about clients' lifestyle, family relationships, and habits . For business clients, information may include trade secrets and competitive factors, among other information . The recommendations or tax advice given to clients may be based in part on such private information . The AICPA's position was that as a matter of public policy, a taxpayer has the right to expect that if he selects a tax advisor who can practice before the IRS, all information the advisor obtains regarding the taxpayer's tax matters will be granted the same level of privacy protection, no matter in which profession his advisor practices (AICPA, 1997) . The Confidentiality Privilege has received negative comments, including being described as both limited and vague . In addition, because it does not apply in the criminal area, it has been "hypothesized" that the IRS may tend to classify more investigations as criminal so that IRC Section 7525 will not apply (Geer, 1999) . Law professor Louis F . Lobenhofer conjectures the Privilege "probably does more harm than good ." Among the problems about which he expressed concerns are inadvertently waiving the privilege by failing to take appropriate measures to protect it (Lobenhofer, 1999) . For example, Lobenhofer observes the largest accounting firms will face severe conflicts between the obligation of their tax advisors to keep the confidences of their corporate clients and the obligation of their accountants who audit publicly held corporations to disclose the material transactions of their clients . In the Senate Debate on RRA 98 (H . R . 2676) on July 8, 1998, Senator Moynihan, (Dem . NY) indicated that "the expansion of the privilege of confidentiality to tax advice furnished by accountants is certain to cause confusion and lead to additional litigation with the IRS . Since the privilege does not apply to communications regarding tax shelters, the privilege grants a right that most taxpayers will never be eligible to assert, and many will be surprised to learn about its limitations ." Former Treasury Secretary Rubin (1998), in his letter expressing the Treasury's views on the major issues of the IRS restructuring bills, indicated that : the Administration believes that creating a new evidentiary privilege for communications between accountants and other tax advisors . . . and their clients would be unwise and unwarranted . The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation view the creation of this privilege as an impediment to the prosecution and investigation of fraud matters,
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
41
and the existence of the privilege will inhibit the investigation of the types of civil tax matters that often lead to criminal tax referrals . In addition, this proposal could also dramatically increase the courts' burden with summons-related and fact-intensive litigation over whether the privilege applies . . . . The Administration strongly urges Congress to strike the provision . . . and to request a study of the accountant-client privilege provision to determine the potential impact on law enforcement . Statutory Provisions For taxpayer communications made after July 21, 1998 (the enactment date of RRA, 1998), IRC Section 7525 extends a confidentiality privilege to tax advice furnished by FATPs in non-criminal proceedings to the extent such communication would be privileged if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney .4 IRC Section 7525(a)(3)(B) defines tax advice as "advice given by an individual with respect to a matter which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice," as defined in Federal regulations under section 330 of Title 31, United States Code . Section 10 .2(e) of Treasury Department Circular No . 230 defines practice before the IRS as "all matters connected with a presentation to the IRS or any of its officers or employees relating to a client's rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or regulations administered by the IRS . Such presentations include preparing and filing necessary documents, corresponding and communicating with the IRS, and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings ." In a last minute change, Congress added language that removed confidentiality protection for written communications related to the promotion of corporate tax shelters . According to IRC Section 7525(b), the Confidentiality Privilege does not apply to "any written communication between a FATP and a director, shareholder, officer or employee, agent, or representative of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of such corporation in any tax shelter (as defined in IRC Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)) ." In this context, a tax shelter is any partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of income tax . Tax shelters that are required to be registered as confidential corporate tax shelter arrangements under IRC Section 6111(d) definitely fall within the scope of the tax shelter exception . Because of the broad, subjective "a significant purpose" language, it is difficult to know exactly which written communications will be ineligible for the privilege . In the Conference Committee Report (H . R . Conf. Rep . No . 105-599), Conferees indicated that they understood that the promotion of tax shelters was not part of a routine relationship between a practitioner and a client . Therefore, they did not anticipate that the tax shelter limitation would adversely affect such routine relationships .'
42
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C. FOWLER
According to MacDonald (1998), ambiguities concerning the scope of the tax shelter carve out sparked "widespread confusion" among the Big Five accounting and consulting firms in 1998 . At that time, some of the accounting firms complained to Congress about the provision . Senator Connie Mack (R., FL.), apparently sympathizing with their concerns, stated, "the entire purpose of the taxpayer confidentiality act is to protect taxpayers and the advice they receive from their tax advisors . Because `tax shelter' is defined so broadly in the bill, we must make sure that tax-shelter exception is clarified so it does not minimize the benefit to the taxpayer ." 6 To date, however, clarification has not happened . Because of the relative newness of IRC Section 7525, little case law has evolved to interpret its language . However, on April 15, 1999, the Seventh Circuit in Frederick, 182 F3d 496, commented in dicta on the Confidentiality Privilege . In Frederick, the advisor (both a lawyer and accountant) provided legal representation to, and prepared the tax returns of, his clients and their company . The IRS summonsed numerous documents, most of which Frederick created in connection with the tax return preparation . Judge Posner ruled that dual-purpose documents (i .e . documents prepared for use in preparing tax returns and for use in litigation) are not protected . He elaborated that while the case occurred prior to the effective date of IRC Section 7525, the section would have had no effect on the Court's analysis in the case . Judge Posner made it clear that tax return preparation, whether by attorneys or accountants, is not protected communication . He also held that IRC Section 7525 "does not protect work product," and that "[n]othing in the new statute . . . suggests that . . . non-lawyer practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing other than lawyers' work . . . ." I He discussed services provided in connection with an IRS audit and stated that a tax advisor who is assisting with interpreting the statute or case law is performing lawyer's work. On the other hand, merely verifying the accuracy of a return in an IRS audit is "accountant's work" regardless of whether performed by an attorney or accountant . Many argue that if other courts follow the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, IRC Section 7525 will provide only a limited benefit to taxpayers and accountants (Schnee, 2000) . According to John D . Piper, National Director of Appeals in 1998, IRC Section 7525 contains significant interpretative issues . However, Piper notes that the Confidentiality Privilege rarely applies in the appeals process . The Privilege is more likely to be asserted during examination of a return because the examination function involves findings of facts and provides for summonsing authority for the IRS .' About 40 states recognize some form of accountant-client privilege, which they do not restrict to the tax arena . IRC Section 7525, on the other hand, does
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
43
not afford confidentiality protection to advice on state and local tax matters . Thus, the accountant-client privilege is not uniform for Federal versus state and local contexts . Other Confidentiality Privileges The "work-product doctrine," which can be asserted by any professional, also can maintain confidentiality for a client." Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codifies the work-product doctrine for documents prepared by an attorney or other representative "in anticipation of litigation or for trial ." The work-product doctrine, however, does not apply to protect an accountant's tax accrual workpapers prepared during a financial statement audit . United States v. Arthur Young & Co ., 465 U .S . 805 (1984) . Communications to and from an accountant are subject to the attorney-client privilege if the client's attorney or in-house counsel engages the accountant to assist in providing legal services for the client. United States v. Kovel, 296 F .2d 918 (2d Cir ., 1961) . In tax practice, the attorney and accountant can enter into a Kovel agreement describing the scope of the accountant's role and clarifying that the accountant is under the direction of the attorney .
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE In order to understand the Confidentiality Privilege of IRC Section 7525, an appreciation of the rules, procedures and limitations of the attorney-client privilege is necessary because the Confidentiality Privilege is based upon this common law protection . The attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between attorneys and their clients and is intended to encourage "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice ." Swidler & Berlin v . United States, 66 U .S .L. W . 4538 (S . Ct ., 1998), quoting Upjohn Co . v. United States, 449 U .S . 383 (1981) . The privilege belongs to the client, but the attorney can assert it on the client's behalf. Several requirements must be met for the privilege to apply . The client must make written or oral communications for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services and make the communications in confidence ."' To preserve the attorney-client privilege, an attorney is forbidden from disclosing (without client approval) confidential communications obtained from the client in the course of professional consultations ." Either a voluntary or an inadvertent act can waive the attorney-client privilege . For example, disclosure of the privileged information (by the client
44
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
or the attorney) to a third party, such as a financial institution, may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege . The courts have reached mixed decisions about whether disclosure outside a selective group of close advisors constitutes a total waiver of the privilege .' According to Padwe et al . (1998), for tax advice to be considered legal advice, it generally must include "a communication applying the Internal Revenue Code to specific client facts to render an opinion ." For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, tax advice - as distinguished from tax preparation - generally qualifies as legal advice . Tax advice includes "tax planning memoranda, oral and written communications involving legal risk assessments, and analyses of whether an item is capital or ordinary, should be amortized or deducted, or similar issues ." Padwe et al . caution that not all "tax services" qualify as tax advice . For example, tax return preparation is not legal advice, and not covered by the Privilege, even if an attorney prepares the return . This is a very important point because the scope of IRC Section 7525 extends only to communications that would have been protected by the attorney client privilege, had an attorney sent or received the communications . The recent Pomerantz case illustrates well the subtlety of the scope of the attorney client privilege . G. Pomerantz, DC Fla ., 2001 U .S . Dist . LEXIS 7591, Case No . 00-6777-CIV-MOORE, May 22, 2001 . In Pomerantz the government sought various records from two accounting firms retained by the attorney . The court held that certain general ledgers were prepared at the direction of the attorney for his use in divorce litigation and were protected . On the other hand, a tax return and supporting analysis of deposits were held not associated with the divorce case and not protected . Other records were pro-forma amended tax returns that were not filed but rather were prepared by a different accountant at the direction of the divorce lawyer to assist him in determining the client's income for the divorce proceeding . The court held that these items were protected by the attorney client privilege .
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION Shortly after the enactment of IRC Section 7525, practitioners suggested that uncertainty exists within both the public and private sector about the bounds of the Confidentiality Privilege . It is unclear, for example, exactly what constitutes tax advice and what types of documents are protected . To date, no Treasury Regulations, either proposed or temporary, offer guidance . To assist tax practitioners in maintaining the Confidentiality Privilege, several commentators (Lobenhofer, 1999 ; Mendelson et al ., 1998) have offered tax
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
45
practice suggestions and encouraged practitioners to change office procedures . Appendix A offers a summary of procedures they recommended . Among the suggestions are preparing a separate engagement letter for tax matters within the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege . In its Tax Practice Guides, the AICPA has included a sample "confidentiality privilege engagement letter," which is included as Appendix B . The sample letter describes the privilege and cautions the client about waiving the privilege . Prior to the tabulation and reporting of our survey results, very little was known about the extent to which accounting firms have changed their office procedures as a result of the Confidentiality Privilege . According to Armstrong (1999), some accountants use tax planning letters that bear the stamped cautionary message : "Privileged and confidential tax advice under section 7525 ." They also educate their clients about the privilege. One of the tax managers interviewed by Armstrong stated that accounting firms are keeping privileged communications in separate files from other client correspondence . According to one interviewee, "if you mix your privileged tax advice with all of the other correspondence, you may have inadvertently waived privilege by making it available to a third party or non-certified tax practitioner ." Armstrong cautions about the need to take safeguards to protect the privilege . According to Hamilton (1998), Phil Brand, director of IRS tax controversy services for KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, stated at the annual UCLA Tax Controversy Institute that firms are handling the privilege "very gingerly ." He indicated that KPMG is not making the Confidentiality Privilege "a major marketing ploy" for the firm but stated that KPMG would try to use the privilege to advantage during an IRS examination . He noted, however, that KPMG functions as an accounting firm . He further commented that "because of the uncertainty about how the privilege applies in many situations, if it looked as though the case were entering criminal territory, they would err on the side of being conservative and work this process through a law firm ." As a result, Brand concluded that, in reality, "the privilege is sort of a mixed blessing ."
OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE Auditor Independence The Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Proposed Rule (section III.D .I .b .xi) issued in 1999, and still in place during the time of our survey, indicated that it would not affect tax-related services provided by auditors to their audit clients . The SEC's Proposed Rule stated, "Tax services are unique,
46
CHRISTINE C. BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
not only because there are detailed tax laws that must be consistently applied, but also because the IRS has discretion to audit any tax return." The Proposed Rule elaborated that the SEC does not think that the requirement of an independent audit is thwarted when an accountant renders "traditional tax preparation services to an audit client or an affiliate of an audit client ." The language "traditional tax preparation services" is worrisome ; tax practitioners became concerned that tax-planning services could be viewed differently from tax preparation services . Because of the controversy over the independence issue, our survey addressed the issue in the context of tax services . On September 18, 2000, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt indicated that the Proposed Rule does not restrict tax compliance and planning services, nor does the proposed rule restrict general business advice . Nevertheless, the AICPA was still concerned that although the SEC stated that its proposed rule "would not affect tax-related services" provided to audit clients, it would ban acting as an advocate for an audit client . According to the AICPA, the rule reserves to the SEC authority to prohibit the provision of whatever non-audit services it considers to constitute a "mutuality of interest" with, or "advocacy" for, an audit client using a "facts and circumstances," appearance-based catch all . Because of this catch-all approach, accounting firms would have no basis for predicting whether the SEC would challenge a particular non-audit service, such as appearing before the IRS as an advocate for an audit client (AICPA, 2000) . In November 2000, the SEC issued a final rule "Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements" effective February 5, 2001 (17 CFR Parts 210 and 240) that alters independence requirements for accounting firms that audit SEC registrants . The rule sets forth general principles concerning when an auditor is not independent . The final rules include more lenient positions for audit firms providing tax-related services to audit clients . The SEC retained the language regarding advocacy work, but moved the advocacy language to a preliminary note in the rule and designated it as one of four principles to consider in evaluating independence . These changes provide no guidance on the specific types of tax advocacy that might lead to impairment of independence . On January 16, 2001, the SEC released interpretative guidance in a question and answer format ( www .sec .gov/info/accountants/audindep/audinfa q . Into) . The answers provided to question 15 (concerning whether the restrictions on the independent accountant providing legal services to an audit client apply only to litigation services) seem to indicate that traditional litigation support engagements where the CPA's work becomes part of the attorney's work product should not cause independence problems . This position supports the use of Kovel agreements . For a complete discussion see Purcell and Lifson (2001) .
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
47
Multidisciplinary Practices
According to some commentators, the Confidentiality Privilege is "the product of pressure from accounting firms that have long desired an accountant-client privilege so that they can take over the tax work that is currently being performed by lawyers" (Rice, 1998) . Others would argue accountants want to increase their collaboration with lawyers (Huefner & Kellogg, 1999) . The Proposed Rule provides that an accountant fails the independence test "if the accountant provides any service to the audit client or its affiliates, that, in the jurisdiction in which the service is provided, may be provided only by someone licensed to practice law ." In 1999, the SEC staff wrote to the American Bar Association (ABA) and its Commission on Multidisciplinary Practices (ABA Commission) and argued that auditor independence is impaired when a firm provides both audit and legal services to a client that must file audited financial statements with the SEC . In its final report in July 2000, the ABA Commission adopted the SEC's viewpoint that it is incompatible for a single firm to provide both legal and attest services for a client . After two years of research and debate, the ABA voted in July 2000 to reject a proposal that would have allowed lawyers to form multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) . As part of that vote, the ABA discharged the ABA Commission, thereby signaling the finality of its decision concerning MDPs . The main arguments against MDPs are that such practices would make it difficult to avoid conflicts of interest and to preserve client confidentiality . It could be argued that IRC Section 7525 represented one step toward addressing the client confidentiality issue, an important part of the MDP debate .
SURVEY RESULTS In order to assess the impact of IRC Section 7525 on the accounting profession, a survey of tax professionals and educators was conducted . The survey instrument (see Appendix C) was completed by tax professionals and educators attending four professional accounting conferences . The conferences include the 2000 AICPA National Conference on Federal Taxes, the 2000 Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants (PICPA) Accounting Educators Conference, the 63rd Annual Tax Conference of the Wisconsin Institute of Certified Public Accountants (WICPA), and the 2001 Western Pennsylvania Tax Conference sponsored by the PICPA . The first page of the survey instrument is designed to gain general insights regarding client service matters, limitations of the Confidentiality Privilege, practice changes, marketing initiatives, multidisciplinary practice issues, and
48
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
auditor independence concerns . The top section of page two of the survey requests input about the number of times that the practitioners have asserted the Confidentiality Privilege in financial status audits as well as other tax audits . Questions are also posed to quantify the approximate number of times the work-product doctrine agreement and Kovel arrangement have been used. The bottom section of page two of the survey is designed to obtain information about changes in office administration, client communication, training, and billing . The last page of the survey gathers demographic information . The survey closes by soliciting open-ended comments about the Confidentiality Privilege . Response rates (Panel A) and demographic information (Panel B) are presented in Table 1 . The results for the two PICPA conferences are combined in the tables . The overall response rate for the four conferences is 5 .60% . Because 75% of the respondents are associated with accounting firms and Section 7525 extends a privilege earlier available to attorneys to CPAs (and other FATPs), results are reported only for persons in accounting practice . Of the respondents, 86% have over 15 years of experience in the tax area . Although participants in the AICPA conference were from a variety of jurisdictions, 34% of the respondents were from the Third Circuit (which includes Pennsylvania) and the Seventh Circuit (which includes Wisconsin) . As reported in Table 1, 73% of the respondents are associated with local CPA firms and 65% have partner status . Table 2 summarizes responses regarding the technical issues associated with IRC Section 7525 . Most respondents are neutral as to whether Section 7525 has enhanced their ability to service clients (47 .73% - question 1) or allowed practice growth (59 .09% - question 2) . Only 9 .09% answered that the addition of the section has helped them to "grow their practice ." Interesting opposing views exist as to whether the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege is limited due to its inapplicability to written communication in connection with the promotion of participation in any tax shelter (question 3) . About 43% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that the Confidentiality Privilege has been limited because of this provision and will apply infrequently in their practice . On the other hand, 25% of respondents either disagree or strongly disagree that the tax shelter limitation provision in Section 7525 has diminished the Confidentiality Privilege . No particular group accounted for the responses in either extreme . Perhaps the 25% who responded this way do not believe that their own corporate clients tend to be involved with tax shelters (despite the broad definition of tax shelter) . For question number five, approximately 20% of the respondents indicate that they have changed office practices subsequent to the enactment of the Confidentiality Privilege . The results for question six show less than 20% describe the Confidentiality Privilege in firm brochures and other firm literature .
49
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege Table 1 .
Survey Results - Descriptive Statistics .
Panel A : Response Rates Industry
AICPA
PICPA
WICPA
Total
Accounting Law Industry, Government, Education
15 5 3
14 4 0
15 2 2
44 11 5
Total
23
IS
19
60
450 5 .11%
323 5 .57%
299 6.35%
1,072 5 .60%
Number of Attendees Response Rate
Panel B : Descriptive Statistics (Respondents with Accounting Affiliation Only) Demographic Information AICPA PICPA WICPA Total Work Experience 0-15 years 16-20 years 21-25 years 26-30 years 30+ years Judicial Circuit First Second Third Fourth or Dist . of Col . Sixth Seventh Ninth Eleventh Accounting Firm Type Big 5 Regional Local Partner Status Yes No
0 6
2
1 5
1 1 4 4
2 14 2 2 15
0 3 12
I 9
15 0
6 8
6 11 6 9 12
13 .64 25 .00 13 .64 20 .45 27 .27
2 1 15 2 2 16 3
4 .55 2 .27 34 .09 4 .55 4 .55 36 .36 6 .52 6 .82
1
8
10 32
4 .55 22 .73 72 .72
29 15
65 .91 34 .09
A hypothetical question (number 7) regarding multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) was included in the survey . Interestingly, about 43% of the respondents agreed that the Confidentiality Privilege would become more valuable if MDPs are authorized in the United States . Only 14% of respondents disagreed with the statement .
50
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
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52
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
The respondents were evenly divided in question eight about a perceived conflict between the advocacy role of the tax advisor protected under the Confidentiality Privilege and the advocacy role being discussed in the SEC's focus on auditor independence . Approximately 30% of the accounting respondents perceived a conflict while 30% did not perceive a conflict . The responses for the first three questions from the second page of the survey, summarized in Table 3, indicate that few practitioners (less that 7%) in the sample have asserted the new Confidentiality Privilege in any of the three scenarios listed (financial status audits, Information Document Requests, and other tax audit contexts) . The scant use could be due in part to declining audit rates in general . On the other hand, almost 41 % of the respondents have asserted the long-standing Work Product doctrine at least once during their career (question 4) ; the number of times exerted ranges from 1 to 15 . The responses to questions five through seven indicate that some staff training about the Confidentiality Privilege is occurring, but very little. The responses to questions eight are very revealing . Over half of the respondents prefer to be retained and work under the direction of the client's legal counsel to establish the confidentiality privilege for clients . The number of times respondents have used this arrangement ranged from 1 to 12 times . The responses reported in Table 4 examine how accountants have implemented the provisions of Section 7525 in terms of office practices . The most widely-used practice, as shown in question four, is that over 60% of the respondents prepare separate engagement letters for tax preparation versus other engagements (such as tax planning) . Approximately 32% (question 1) of the respondents maintain separate files for tax preparation versus tax planning, risk assessment, and tax research documents . Less than 20% of the respondents mark documents as "privileged" (question 2), explain the privilege to clients (question 3), identify in engagement letters when the privilege does or does not apply (question 5), explicitly discuss the privilege with clients (question 6), or provide separate billing statements for charges related to privileged matters (question 7) . Several respondents with an accounting firm affiliation offered detailed comments about the Confidentiality Privilege . These comments are summarized in Table 5 . One comment indicates that the law is too young to have resulted in changes at a small firm . Another comment offers a detailed analysis about the privilege in Florida . Although responses from persons in law practice are not included in the reported results, several written responses from respondents with a law firm affiliation are noteworthy . One respondent wrote, "The playing field should not be leveled . CPA's should not be practicing law . If you want the traditional
53
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
Survey Results - Practice Issues (N=44-Accounting Affiliation Only) .
Table 3.
Yes
of Total Responses No Response No
Range No . of Times
Question
6 .82
84.09
9 .09
2
I . At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Privilege of Section 7525 in financial status ("lifestyle") audits .
2 .27
88 .64
9 .09
No Response
2 . At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Privilege of Section 7525 to refuse IRS Information Document Requests (tDRs) .
2 .27
88 .64
9 .09
No Response
3 . At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Privilege of Section 7525 in other tax audit contexts .
40 .91
56.82
2.27
1-15
36 .36
59 .09
4 .55
I-4
5 . 1 have provided my staff - both audit and tax - with continuing education regarding the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege .
13 .64
79.55
6.82
1-3
6 . 1 have provided only my tax staff with continuing education regarding the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege .
25 .00
72.73
2 .27
2-20+
7 . 1 have provided my clients with information regarding the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege .
54 .55
40 .91
4.55
1-12
8 . To establish the confidentiality privilege for my clients, I prefer to be retained and work under the direction of my client's legal counsel .
20 .45
79.55
0 .00
I-10
9. Subsequent to the Arthur Young Supreme Court case, the IRS has requested audit or tax accrual workpapers from me/my firm.
4 . 1 have exerted the Work-Product doctrine (protection of documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation," not necessarily by an attorney) during my career .
54
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
Survey Results - Implementation Issues (N = 44 - Accounting Affiliation Only) .
Table 4.
Yes
% of Total Responses No No Response
Question
31 .82
63.64
4.55
1 . Separate files are maintained for tax preparation versus tax planning, risk assessment, and tax research documents.
18 .18
81.82
0 .00
2. All documents and files not associated directly with the tax return are marked "privileged" or something similar.
13 .64
84.09
2.27
3 . My clients are provided a full explanation of the Confidentiality Privilege, and only if my client so requests are separate files maintained and marked "privileged ."
61 .36
38 .64
0.00
4 . Separate engagement letters are sent for tax preparation versus other engagements (such as tax planning) .
11 .36
84.09
4.55
5 . All engagement letters reference the Confidentiality Privilege as to when it does or does not apply .
4.55
95 .45
0.00
6 . In meeting with prospective clients, the Confidentiality Privilege is explicitly discussed .
13 .64
84 .09
0 .00
7 . Billing statements separately list charges for tax advice under the Confidentiality Privilege from charges for other client services .
Table 5.
Comments from Respondents with Accounting Affiliation .
• The State of Florida has a privilege law for accountants which I have seen used in cases that I was an expert witness in for the FDIC . I have drafted a similar law for State of [name of state deleted] using the Florida law. It has been approved by all committees but our executive committee refuses to introduce the bill as they fear attorneys will lobby against the bill . The attorneys I work for in these legal cases would like their expert witnesses to have privilege . I do not see privilege as a means for an accountant performing an attorney's function . We have a much more valuable role of preparing expert reports, surviving the depositions, testifying in court, and clearly explaining to the Judge the complex issues so that he can make an informed decision.
• The law is too young to have implemented changes for a small firm . • IRS does not recognize Section 7525 for financial status audits!
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
55
privilege you should go to law school and pass the bar . Many of us are now dual practitioners ." Another attorney writes "As an attorney, I try to engage all clients under legal representation to avoid problems the IRS Confidentiality Privilege can create ."
CONCLUSIONS It is premature to conclude whether the accountant-client privilege has proved valuable to CPAs . Based upon the survey responses, the accounting practitioner respondents have not made major changes to their office practices and procedures in response to the new Confidentiality Privilege . In addition, they are not asserting the Privilege often . Moreover, the majority do not believe that the addition of this statutory provision has enhanced their firm's ability to "grow its practice" by leveling the playing field between accountants and attorneys . In contrast to the respondents, CPAs, in general, may have made more modifications to their office practices and procedures and may believe that the new Privilege has proven beneficial for their firm . The responses from the profession are consistent with informal discussions with IRS representatives . The IRS has seldom experienced an assertion of the Confidentiality Privilege . On occasion, the National office of the IRS has received inquiries from IRS field agents about how the Privilege applies . In most cases, attempts to use the Privilege have related to years prior to the effective date of Section 7525 . Most attempts to make use of the Privilege have involved Kovel arrangements, not situations arguably addressed by Section 7525 . Future regulatory guidance, judicial decisions, and perhaps even SEC rules will shape the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege . Guidance is needed from the Treasury to clarify the meaning of the language "tax advice" or "communications." For example, does the Confidentiality Privilege apply to personal discussions, letters, memoranda, notes, reports, interpretations, opinions, mental processes, thoughts, and tax positions? A legal panel points out that every element of the Confidentiality Privilege is ripe for interpretive dispute (Stratton, 1998) . Because of the exclusion for written communications regarding corporate tax shelters, there is concern over the potentially narrow scope of the privilege, given the broad, subjective statutory definition of tax shelters . Critics of the Confidentiality Privilege argue that because the provision applies just to non-criminal proceedings before the IRS, IRC Section 7525 may encourage the IRS to increase criminal investigations and proceedings and its
56
CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C. FOWLER
use of third-party summonses . Others argue that malpractice suits against accountants will rise . These contentions offer avenues for future research .
NOTES 1 . Public Law 105-206. 2 . At time of quote, Pamela F . Olson was a partner in the Washington, D . C . office of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP . Ms . Olson was formerly Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service and currently is Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy . 3 . See Mendelson et al . (1998) . Mr. Mendelson was a member of the AICPA Tax Division Responsibilities in Tax Practice Committee, and chaired the AICPA Executive Committee working group on parity in tax practice before the IRS . 4 . The Confidentiality Privilege cannot be used to prevent disclosure to any body other than the IRS . Thus, the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies to compel information in an administrative or court proceeding remains unchanged by the provisions of IRC Section 7525 . 5 . When the corporate tax shelter provision was added to the legislation, Olivia Kirtley (then Chair of the AICPA Board of Directors) commented that she had hoped for more in the taxpayer confidentiality privilege and thought it unfortunate that taxpayers have to worry about confidentiality (Koreto, 1998) . 6 . Quote included in Wall Street Journal article by MacDonald, July 16, 1998 . 7 . The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Frederick on February 22, 2000 . 120 S. Ct. 1157 . 8 . See IRS Memorandum dated September 29, 1998, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service . 9 . See United States v. Adlman, 134 F .3d 1194 (2d Cir., 1998) (Adlman 11) ; Hodges, Grant & Kaufman v. United States, 768 F.2d 719 (5th Cir., 1985). 10 . See United States v . American Telephone & Telegraph, 86 F . R . D . 603, 612 (D . D . C ., 1979) and Fisher v . United States, 425 U .S . 391 (1976) . 11 . See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir ., 1989), cent. denied, 112 S . Ct. 55 (1991) . 12 . See United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F .3d 681 (1st Cir ., 1997), Diversified Indus ., Inc. v . Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir ., 1978).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the Wisconsin Institute of Certified Public Accountants in allowing and facilitating distribution of our research survey . The authors thank leaders within the AICPA's Tax Division for their helpful comments on the survey instrument. In addition, the authors express appreciation to the participants in the legal papers session at the 2001 American Taxation Association Mid-year Meeting for their questions and suggestions .
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
57
REFERENCES American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2000) . Highlights of the SEC's proposed rule governing auditor independence, http ://www .aicpa.org/belt/sec/sumtnary .htm. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1997) . Planned testimony before the national commission on restructuring the IRS . Tax Division Newsletter (February), 7. Armstrong, D . (1999) . New accountant-client privilege not a cure all, but a good start . Care must be taken so as not to inadvertently void confidentiality . Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (October 24), 3. August, J . D. (1999) . Jerald David August interviews Pamela F. Olson: Extension of confidential communications privilege to tax practitioners . Business Entities (September/October), 34 . Friedman, R . E., & Mendelson, D . L . (1996) . The need for CPA-client privilege in federal tax matters . The Tar Adviser (March) . 154-157 . Geer, C . T . (1999). How much can you tell your accountant? Fortune (Much 15), 212 . Hamilton, A . (1998) . IRS official suggests open forum on accountant-client privilege . Tax Notes (November 9), 686. Huefner, R . J ., & Kellogg, S . (1999) . Balancing the interests of both professions - Attorneys and CPAs : cooperation or confrontation'? The CPA Journal, (June) . Koreto, R . J . (1998). A yea to unify . Journal of Accountancy (December), 74-75 . Levitt. A. L . (2000) . Speech by SEC Chairman Levitt - "A profession at the crossroads" at the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, Boston, Massachusetts (September 1 9) . Lobenhofer, L . F . (1999) . The new tax practitioner privilege : limited privilege and significant disruption . Tax Notes ( June 14), 1619 . MacDonald, E. (1998) . Congress is seeking added protection from IRS for firms . Wall Street Journal (July 16), C15 . Mendelson, D . L ., Herskovitz, D . L., & Einhorn, A . R . (1998) . The new CPA-client confidentiality privilege. The Tax Adviser (October), 676-683 . Padwe, G . W., Ely, M . H., & Friedman, R . E. (1998) . The AICPA experts' taxpayer confidentiality privilege videocourse . Course code 353500. Purcell, T ., & Lifson, D . (2001) . Auditor independence and tax practitioners . Journal of Accountancy, New York, (June), 71-74 . Raymon, J . L ., Coustan, H . L ., Knight, M . J ., Mendelson, D . L., & Primoff, W . M . (AICPA Financial Status Audit Working Group) . (1996) . What should CPAs do? Journal of Accountancy (May), 45-47 . Rice, P . R . (1998). The tax practitioner privilege: a sheep in wolf's clothing . Tax Practice & Controversies (August 10), 172 . Rubin, R . (1998) . Letter to Ways and Means Committee Chairman Archer and attached Summary of Treasury Views on Major Issues in IRS Restructuring Bills (June 2) . Schnee, E . J . (2000) . Accountant/client privilege. Journal of Accountancy (March), 78 . Securities and Exchange Commission (2000) . Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Proposed Rule, 65 Fed . Reg. 43, 148 . Stratton, S . (1998) . ALI-ABA panel points out problems, pitfalls of tax adviser privilege . Tax Notes (November 9), 684. Treasury Department Circular No . 230. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, and Appraisers before the Internal Revenue Service : Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations, Subtitle A, Part 10, revised as of July 1, 1994.
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CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER
APPENDIX A Tax Practice Suggestions for Maintaining Confidentiality Privilege
• Maintain a separate, secure client tax file that contains all tax advice documents for access and retention by the client and make separate arrangements for computerized information that may be privileged .
• Maintain dual file systems for privileged and non-privileged communications . • Label files, databases, and tax advice documents as "Privileged and Confidential Tax Advice Under IRC Section 7525 and Work-Product Doctrine ." This includes incoming items from clients, outgoing items to clients, fax cover sheets and email .
• Prepare a separate engagement letter addressing tax matters covered by the Confidentiality Privilege .
• Advise clients to notify you if the IRS requests information from them . • Counsel clients and office staff about the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege and provide guidance on who can assert the Confidentiality Privilege and how it can be waived (voluntarily or inadvertently) .
• Bill for tax advice in a separate billing statement . • Include language in employment agreements with office staff that requires them to keep client information confidential .
• Take precautions to preserve confidentiality . For example, be sure that no nonclients are in the room when consulting with clients .
• Obtain confidentiality agreements and emphasize the responsibility to maintain confidentiality in exit interviews with staff leaving the firm . Sources : Both of the articles below recommend the tax practice suggestions noted above . 1 . Lobenhofer, L. F . (1999) . The new tax practitioner privilege : limited privilege and significant disruption . Tax Notes (June 14), 1619 . 2 . Mendelson, D . L ., Herskovitz, D . L., & Einhom, A . R . (1998) . The new CPA-client confidentiality privilege . The Tax Adviser (October), 676-683 .
The Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege
59
APPENDIX B CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE ENGAGEMENT LETTER Dear Client : The Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, provides for CPA-client privileged communications for tax advice provided to you . In order to ensure that all communications resulting from tax advice is under the privilege umbrella of the Act, we are asking you to confirm the following arrangements : We will provide tax advice as needed or requested to meet specific objectives or generally to meet long-term tax related goals and objectives . You have the right to review and/or be supplied with copies of any and all tax planning or research memos and workpapers prepared by our firm related to such tax advice . Tax advice includes, but is not limited to, the following :
• Researching the income tax reporting of a particular transaction . We will review these situations with you and resolve issues in your favor whenever possible . • Providing business tax and consulting to you, throughout 2001, for consideration in making tax related decisions . • Providing services related to the expected outcome of future tax decisions . Privileged tax advice does not include communications associated with the preparation of tax returns, tax accrual workpapers associated with a financial audit or other financial statement engagement, or in providing general business or accounting recommendations or, other non-tax engagements . You may assert the confidentiality privilege in any non-criminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service or any proceeding in Federal Court brought by or against the United States . We will not disclose any advice provided under the scope of this engagement letter to the Internal Revenue Service or third parties unless you provide us written consent to do so . Any disclosure of confidential information by you or us to the IRS or third parties may cause the Confidentiality Privilege to be waived . Caution must be taken by both parties to not inadvertently waive the privilege.
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You should notify us of any requests by the Internal Revenue Service for information about any tax advice or tax advice documents provided by us to you . If you advise us to assert the Confidentiality Privilege on your behalf you agree to hold **FIRM NAME** harmless and indemnify us for any attorney fees and any other costs and expenses (including penalties) incurred by us in defending the confidential communication. Very truly yours, Accepted By : Title : Date : Source :
AICPA Tax Practice Guides 2000 .
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APPENDIX C Survey Regarding LRC Section 7525, Confidentiality Privilege November 2000 Dear Conference Participant : As you recall, 1998 legislation added IRC Section 7525 to provide a new privilege of confidentiality (Confidentiality Privilege) to certain communications between CPAs and other Federally authorized tax practitioners and their clients . Professors Christine C . Bauman (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) and Anna C . Fowler (University of Texas at Austin) are conducting the survey on the attached pages to assess the impact of the Confidentiality Privilege on the accounting profession and practitioners' experiences with the new Code section . Both Dr . Bauman and Dr . Fowler teach tax research, practice and procedures in graduate tax programs . Participants in this survey are tax professionals or educators who are expected to have a professional interest in, and insights about, this issue and who registered for the conference . The results of the survey will be reported in a study that critically analyzes the impact of this recent legislation . Participation in this survey is voluntary ; if you participate (and we hope you will), you may decide not to answer certain questions . A decision not to participate will not affect your current or future relationships with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee or the University of Texas at Austin . Your responses will be kept confidential and used for research purposes only . No one, not even the researchers, will be able to link your responses with your name . You may keep a copy of this cover letter . If you have questions about this survey or its findings, you may communicate with one or both of us at : cbauman@uwm .edu or anna.fowler@bus .utexas .ed u . The survey should take approximately 10 minutes to complete . If some of the questions do not apply to you because you are not in public accounting, please leave them blank . We thank you in advance for your time and assistance . Please turn in your completed surve forms to the Re istration Desk. Sincerely,
Christine C . Bauman and Anna C . Fowler
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CHRISTINE C . BAUMAN AND ANNA C . FOWLER Survey Regarding LRC Section 7525, Confidentiality Privilege November; 2000
Instructions: Please answer the following questions by circling the letter that best describes your opinion, SA for strongly agree, A_ for agree, N for neutral, D for disagree, SD for strongly disagree, and N1Q for no opinion . Please circle your response .
SA A
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The enactment of Section 7525 (Confidentiality Privilege) has enhanced my/my firm's ability to serve clients . The enactment of Section 7525 has enhanced my/my firm's ability to "grow its practice" by leveling the playing field between accountants and attorneys . Due to the provision that Section 7525 does not apply to written communication in connection with the promotion of participation in any tax shelter, I believe the scope of the privilege is greatly limited and, thus, will apply infrequently in the part of my practice dealing with corporate clients. (Tax shelter is defined as "a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such Partnership . . . is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax .") Prior to July 22, 1998 (the effective date of Section 7525), some of my clients were the subject of financial status ("lifestyle") audits, and if the Confidentiality Privilege had been available, I would have exercised the privilege in many of these audits. Subsequent to the enactment of the Confidentiality Privilege, I (my firm) have changed office practices and procedures. The Confidentiality Privilege is described in my fin's brochures and other fin literature . If multidisciplinary practices (viewed here as the same firm providing both CPA and legal services) are authorized in the United States, having the Confidentiality Privilege will become more valuable. I do not perceive a conflict between the advocacy role of the tax advisor protected under the Confidentiality Privilege and the advocacy role being discussed in the SEC's focus on auditor independence .
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Instructions: For each of the following statements, please answer yes or no and fill in the blanks concerning number of times . If, however, some of the questions do not apply to you because you are not in public accounting, please leave them blank . Yes No At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Approx, no . of times Privilege of Section 7525 in financial status ("lifestyle") audits . Yes No At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Approx, no. of times Privilege of Section 7525 to refuse IRS Information Document Requests (IDRs) . Yes - No _ At the request of my client, I have exerted the Confidentiality Approx . no . of times Privilege of Section 7525 in other tax audit contexts. Yes No I have exerted the Work-Product doctrine (protection of documents Approx. no . of times prepared "in anticipation of litigation," not necessarily by an attorney) during my career. Yes No _ I have provided my staff - both audit and tax - with continuing Approx . no, of times education regarding the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege . Yes - No _ I have provided only my tax staff with continuing education Approx . no . of times regarding the scope of the Confidentiality Privilege . Yes - No I have provided my clients with information regarding the scope Approx . no . of times of the Confidentiality Privilege . Yes No To establish the confidentiality privilege for my clients, I prefer Approx . no . of times to be retained and work under the direction of my client's legal counsel . Yes , No Subsequent to the Arthur Young Supreme Court case, the IRS Approx . no . of times has requested audit or tax accrual workpapers from me/my firm.
Instructions: For each of the following statements, please answer yes or no based upon your firm's office practices subsequent to the enactment of Section 7525, Confidentiality Privilege . Yes No Separate files are maintained for tax preparation versus tax planning, risk assessment, and tax research documents . Yes No ^ All documents and files not associated directly with the tax return are marked "privileged" or something similar. Yes No _ My clients are provided a full explanation of the Confidentiality Privilege, and only if my client so requests are separate files maintained and marked "privileged ." Yes No Separate engagement letters are sent for tax preparation versus other engagements (such as tax planning) . Yes No _ All engagement letters reference the Confidentiality Privilege as to when it does or does not apply . Yes - No In meeting with prospective clients, the Confidentiality Privilege is explicitly discussed. Yes No _ Billing statements separately list charges for tax advice under the Confidentiality Privilege from charges for other client services .
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Demographic Information : Please complete the following ; use check marks and enter numbers where called for . Response 1 . Number of years of work experience in the fields of accounting and/or law . 2 . My primary office is located in : First Circuit (ME, MA, NH, PR, RI) Second Circuit (CT, NY, VT) Third Circuit (DE, NJ, PA, VI) Fourth Circuit (MD, NC, SC, VA, WV) QR D. C . Circuit Fifth Circuit (LA, MS, TX) Sixth Circuit (KY, MI, OH, TN) Seventh Circuit (IL, IN, WI) Eighth Circuit (AR, IA, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD) Ninth Circuit (AK, AZ, CA, Guam, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA) Tenth Circuit (CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY) Eleventh Circuit (AL, FL, GA) 3 . I am affiliated with a : Big 5 Accounting Firm National Accounting Firm National Law Firm Regional Accounting Firm (number of employees ) Regional Law Firm (number of employees ) Local Accounting Firm (number of employees _, Local Law Firm (number of employees ) Industry, Government or Educational Institution 4 . If you work for a public accounting or law firm, please indicate whether you are a partner . YES NO Comments: Please offer any comments about the Confidentiality Privilege .
Thank you very much for your participation!!! Please return your completed surveys to the REGISTRATION DESK .
THE EFFECT OF INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGY AND COGNITIVE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT ON TAX KNOWLEDGE AND APPLICATION Sharon K . Ford and Tonya K . Flesher
ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of instructional strategies on how students learn and apply tax knowledge . Accounting students participated in an experiment to determine whether the choice of a procedural or conceptual instructional method enhanced the students' ability to solve problems . Further, the effect of cognitive level of development and success in answering questions was investigated . Results show that the method of instruction was instrumental in solving routine problems but not in solving novel problems . Students with a high (formal) level of cognitive development were better able to solve both routine and novel problems than students of medium (transitional) and low (concrete) cognitive development .
INTRODUCTION Accounting education has been criticized for its emphasis on passing the CPA exam rather than on preparing students to develop the skills necessary for professional practice (Bedford Committee, 1986) . Although a thorough Advances in Taxation, Volume 14, pages 65-84 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN : 0-7623-0889-3 65
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knowledge of laws and concepts is important, the current emphasis on accounting education stresses the need for critical thinking and reasoning skills, the ability to apply knowledge to real-world problems, and creativity in analyzing and solving problems (The Accounting Education Change Commission, 1990 ; Perspectives paper, 1989) . The AICPA board of examiners plans to hold question-writer workshops to develop questions on the CPA exams that emphasize higher level skills, such as critical thinking, and technology (Booker et al ., 1998) . The question of how these capabilities should be developed and nourished has not been clearly defined nor universally accepted . These concerns are especially important in the area of tax education because the laws are extensive, are changed frequently and are often vague or inconclusive .
THEORY Typically, tax courses have been designed to cover extensive amounts of material and the lecture method is the most efficient means by which to teach laws and concepts . This method tends to focus on learning the laws and finding the correct answers to problems that are closely related to the material and examples presented during class (Hite & Parry, 1993) . When educators dispense knowledge primarily through lectures, the result is that many students do not develop higher-order-thinking skills (Young, 1992) . However, educators are often reluctant to change their teaching methods . May et al . (1995) found that only 44% of educators surveyed agree that the traditional approach (textbook-centered, rule-intensive, lecture/problem-solving) should not survive as the primaryinstructional method in accounting courses . The lecture method of instruction fits well with the learning style of accounting students who generally prefer a well-structured environment . Wolk and Cates (1994) used Kirton's Adaptor-Innovator Theory (Kirton, 1976) to compare the problem-solving style of accounting students to that of other business students. The majority (77%) of accounting majors tested were adaptors (prefer structured, well-established situations ; concentrate on resolving problems rather than finding them ; and conform to the rules) . Geary and Rooney (1993) used the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to assess four bi-polar dimensions of psychological type . According to this assessment, the majority (71 .5%) of accounting students are sensate, rather than intuitive, thinkers (prefer facts, patterns, rules, and procedures that emphasize highly-structured problems with specific solutions) . Personality studies show that accountants tend to prefer ordered, systematic manipulation of data and tend to avoid ambiguous,
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exploratory or unstructured situations (Tuckman & Orefice, 1973 ; Holland, 1973 ; Aranya et al ., 1978 ; Amernic et al ., 1979) . These studies show that, in general, accounting students are reluctant to accept a low-structured approach to learning ; yet, today's tax professionals need more than knowledge of the laws. Educators need to provide opportunities for students to become intuitive thinkers (focus on new possibilities and unstructured problems, understand reality through abstractions and complex formulations) so they can develop the necessary skills for the successful resolution of complex unstructured problems (Geary & Rooney, 1993) . In response to the teaching objectives promulgated by the Accounting Education Change Commission (1990), textbook authors have incorporated a more conceptual approach to teaching taxes as an alternative to the traditional rule-based method . The authors also include thought-provoking questions and problems to encourage students to use critical thinking skills . Teaching techniques should promote the skills necessary for students to acquire, retain, recall, and apply tax knowledge in a variety of situations . In practice, issues and solutions rarely are well defined or well structured, and the laws do not cover all possible circumstances . In ambiguous areas, the tax professional must identify the facts and issues and then rely on laws, legal precedent, and judgment to arrive at an appropriate solution . Reasoning is a key ingredient in this process . Students who possess a thorough knowledge of tax laws, planning strategies, and problem-solving skills are better prepared to cope with a variety of situations . The means by which students organize tax information for retention and recall is a key element in determining which instructional strategy will be most effective (Limberg et al ., 1995) . They found that the procedural approach is successful in learning rules or tax laws, but the conceptual approach is preferred in situations where judgment skills are needed . Anderson et al . (1989) found that the ability to apply laws was enhanced by using an examples approach, but the use of cases and concepts was superior in factor identification . This study includes two instructional methods - procedural and conceptual . The first treatment featured a procedural method in which examples were provided to illustrate tax laws . The second treatment followed a conceptual method in which court cases were discussed and the court's reasoning was provided . For this study, routine questions are defined as structured questions that deal with a knowledge base gleaned through instruction of tax laws in which examples are presented and problems can be solved with this knowledge . Since routine problems should be resolved by following the laws (which were
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identical to both groups), there should be no significant difference between the two treatment groups in the number of routine problems solved correctly . The first hypothesis (stated in the null form) was used to determine whether the method of instruction had an effect on the successful resolution of routine problems . Hypothesis 1 : There is no statistically significant difference between treatment levels in the mean number of correct responses to routine questions . Teaching/instructional cases provide opportunities for students to share ideas and provide insight into the rationale supporting various arguments . Use of hypothetical case studies can help students identify the facts of the case, the issues involved and the applicable Code sections . Actual court case studies are particularly useful in analyzing real-world situations because the laws must be interpreted in light of the existing situation . Court cases are used extensively in law schools and Subotnik (1987) suggests that accounting students would be better equipped to deal with atypical situations if they learned to focus more on interpretation of the laws rather than on technical aspects . Analysis of court cases can be used to determine the appropriate tax law and legal precedent to apply when there are no clearly defined rules . A tax debate (Schnee, 1980), journal entries (Fry & Fry, 1988), mental models (Marchant et al ., 1989), student-generated elaboration (Schadewald & Limberg, 1990 ; Hermanson, 1994), the falsification theory (Hite & Parry, Jr ., 1993), and pictorial models (Schadewald & Limberg, 1992) are other approaches that have been successful in promoting conceptual skills . If students understand the logic behind the interpretation of the laws in court decisions, then they should be able to apply the concepts to similar situations . Since students in treatment group two were given more detailed information about the issues and reasoning involved in the cases, they should perform better than the students in treatment group one who were given the solution but no explanation . For this study, novel questions are unstructured questions that deal with new or unique types of situations in which the tax laws do not specifically address the issue . Hypothesis 2 (stated in the null form) was developed to test whether there is a difference in the procedural and conceptual methods of instruction in the resolution of novel problems . Hypothesis 2 : Students in treatment two (court cases) will correctly solve more novel problems than students in treatment one (examples) . One challenge facing educators is to implement a learning environment that will emphasize the development and use of cognitive skills to enable students to interpret and analyze tax laws in various situations . Cognitive level of
The Effect of Instructional Strategy and Cognitive Level of Development
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development for this study is represented by three categories : (1) concrete thinkers require strategies and techniques that provide clear examples and concrete experiences to structure their thinking and to achieve understanding ; (2) transitional thinkers use a systematic approach to a problem with some use of abstractions and inferences but the performance is quite inconsistent; and (3) formal thinkers can draw inferences, can hypothesize, predict, and can generalize from their experiences to formulate general rules or principles . They can reconstruct their knowledge when new situations are encountered (Arlin, 1987) . Students' cognitive level of development is a key to the choice of an appropriate strategy because the students will not perform well if the method of instruction is beyond their cognitive ability (Reilly & Lewis, 1983) . For example, if the instruction method requires formal reasoning skills but the student is a concrete thinker, the student will have difficulty grasping the concept (Arlin, 1987) . The degree of structure in the learning environment has a significant impact on the ability of students to develop the skills they need to perform their duties as tax professionals . Hunter and Hunter (1984) stated that cognitive abilities are the single best predictor of job performance because they allow for innovation in novel situations . Memorization of tax laws limits students in the application of the laws. If students understand the concepts underlying the laws and can use critical thinking to analyze and interpret the laws, then they should be able to apply tax laws to numerous situations that vary from the stated laws . Bloom (1956) classified cognitive skills in a sequence of steps from the lowest level to the highest level of development. Higher-order-thinking skills consist of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation . Segovia and Bloom (1988) believe that these skills must be developed in an unstructured environment . Inhelder and Piaget (1958) identified four sequential stages of developmental thinking in children and adolescents, and the highest level of cognitive development (formal operational) should occur during adolescence . Most college students should have reached the highest level of cognitive development, but if educators fail to provide a learning environment conducive to cognitive growth, students may not rise above the lower levels of development . Cognitive ability will continue to develop as long as there is support and challenge in the environment (Hatfield & Hatfield, 1992 ; Revsine, 1970) . Shute (1979) found that there are certain thinking skills (formal operations) that are qualitatively different from those defined as intelligence . This conclusion supported the work of Perry (1970), who found that university students in the same year with comparable intelligence were at different points along the conceptual level continuum .
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Sander and Reding (1993) used the Arlin Test of Formal Reasoning (Arlin, 1984) to measure the cognitive abilities of entry-level accountants . They found that 96 .6% scored at the formal-operational (highest) level . This suggests that accounting graduates have the cognitive abilities needed for active learning even though they may not be required to use their abilities in accounting courses . According to Amernic and Beechy (1984), Tuckman and Orefice (1973), and Shute (1979), students of high cognitive ability perform better than students of low cognitive ability on novel questions, but students tend to perform equally well on routine questions regardless of their cognitive or conceptual level. The following hypotheses (stated in the null form) were tested to obtain evidence as to the effect of cognitive development on the ability to solve routine and novel questions . Hypothesis 3 : There is no statistically significant relationship between cognitive level of development and treatment level for the number of routine questions answered correctly . Hypothesis 4 : There is no statistically significant relationship between cognitive level of development and treatment level for the number of novel questions answered correctly .
RESEARCH METHOD Subjects A total of 214 volunteer students participated in the experiment from six colleges and universities located in Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, and Wyoming . Two schools are private and four are public . Participating students were accounting majors that included 20 graduate students, 105 seniors, 86 juniors, and three sophomores . Materials and Procedures The test items included three components and required approximately 50 minutes for completion . The cognitive test was completed first . The test used was the Arlin Test of Formal Reasoning (ATFR) . This test includes 32 multiple-choice questions, and each question has four response options . The ATFR was designed to assess the thinking skills or the processes by which an answer was obtained . This test is applicable to adults and can be administered easily in large group settings . The second item included a brief pretest and an experimentation packet consisting of general depreciation rules, a treatment, and
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a posttest . The third handout contained a request for demographic information, an answer sheet for the cognitive test, and an answer sheet for the pretest and posttest . Demographic information requested included age, gender, year in school, grade point average, grade in the first upper-division Financial Accounting course (Intermediate Accounting I in most universities), and ACT or SAT score . A pretest was given to all subjects to determine their level of pretreatment knowledge of depreciation and to assess pretreatment equivalence of the students in the treatment groups . Students had some prior knowledge of depreciation from introductory accounting courses and should have been familiar with the financial accounting rules regarding depreciation . The pretest consisted of a narrative describing a general business situation . Four multiple-choice questions were presented : two questions required knowledge of general depreciation rules and two questions required reasoning ability . Experiment
The first part of the experiment included a written narrative explaining the general tax laws for depreciation and reasons for the laws . The description included the general concepts underlying depreciation and several instances of specific laws regarding tax deductibility . The narrative was identical for both treatment levels . The second part of the experiment concerned the learning experience (treatment) through information presented in two different formats (examples and court cases) . The information provided in the treatments was issue specific for three different situations in which depreciation may or may not be allowed . The concepts were applicable to related topics . The information provided in the treatments contained facts from actual court cases (see Appendix A for a listing of court cases) . The cases for the treatments and the scenarios were selected from a large pool of cases involving depreciation . The cases chosen for inclusion in this experiment involved situations in which the solution was not readily apparent from preexisting knowledge because the general tax laws, as such, did not specifically address the issues involved . There were gray areas for which the laws could be interpreted in different ways . Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment levels . Treatment level one had written information using the procedural approach in the form of examples that illustrated specific depreciation laws and their application . The three examples were contained on one page . Following a presentation of the facts, a statement was made that indicated whether depreciation was or was not
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allowed, and a brief explanation was provided . Treatment level two was given written information using the conceptual approach presented in the form of court cases . The facts presented in the examples and court cases were identical . The court cases also included identification and discussion of the issues that were directly involved, the opinion of the court, and the reason for the court's decision . By analyzing the logic and legal interpretation used in court cases, students should be able to transfer the concepts to similar situations . The court cases were presented on two pages . Copies of the two treatments are available at http ://home .olemiss .edu/actonya/recent .htm . The third part of the experiment was a posttest that included four scenarios, and each scenario contained two descriptive situations . Using information from actual court cases prevented any bias from entering into the facts, and students had an opportunity to study and evaluate real-world situations . Each scenario included three multiple-choice questions and each question had four response options . The response options were based on the arguments posed by the Internal Revenue Service and by the taxpayer to the extent possible . In several instances, considerations expressed by the judge were used as response options . If a sufficient number of arguments was not presented in a court case, then response options were included that were appropriate for the topic . The questions required knowledge of the tax laws that were presented in the general depreciation information and the ability to apply concepts to a variety of tax contexts in which reasoning and judgment were necessary to interpret the laws . Although college students cannot be expected to fully understand the intricate nature of the tax laws or the many possibilities that exist in court arguments, the challenge facing them was to interpret their knowledge of the laws to justify their choice of answer . Computation of dollar amounts was not required . There were 12 questions in the posttest - six routine and six novel . As discussed earlier, routine questions are defined as structured questions that deal with a knowledge base gained through instruction of tax laws in which examples are presented and problems can be solved with this knowledge. Novel questions are unstructured questions that deal with new or different types of situations in which the tax laws do not specifically address the issue in question . The question structures appeared randomly throughout the post-test scenarios . Each correct answer was coded as one and each incorrect answer was coded as zero . The correct answer was the one that was in conformity with the decision of the court. Each correct answer was worth one point . Two scores were recorded for each subject : the first score was the total number of correct answers (0 to 6) for the routine questions and the second score was the total number of correct answers (0 to 6) for the novel questions .
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Variables
This experiment included five variables for hypothesis testing . The two dependent variables were the number of routine questions answered correctly (routine score) and the number of novel questions answered correctly (novel score) . The independent variables were treatment level, question structure, and cognitive level of development . Treatment level one employed a procedural (examples) instructional strategy and treatment level two employed a conceptual (court cases) instructional strategy . Treatment level was the only variable manipulated .
RESULTS A one-way ANOVA (not reported) was used to test for statistically significant differences between the two treatment levels based on the pretest . The results of the pretest showed that students in treatment one performed slightly better than students in treatment two on all of the pretest questions, but the difference was not significant . Additional comparisons were made for each of the demographic variables, and for the different universities involved . No significant differences were found in any of these comparisons . Hypothesis I states that there is no statistically significant difference between treatment levels for the number of routine questions answered correctly . Table I contains the one-way ANOVA used as the statistical test . The results show Table 1 .
Effect of Instructional Strategy Routine Score - Hypothesis 1 .
A . Mean and Standard Deviation for routine score:
ROUTINE B . ANOVA Results : Source
SS
Treatment I Mean SD
Treatment 2 Mean SD
3 .10
3 .65 1 .31
1 .41
df
Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
392 .08
1 l 1 212
Total
408 .35
213
16 .27 16 .27 16 .27
Note: * = significant at p < 0 .05 .
MS
F
16 .27 16 .27 16 .27 1 .85
8 .80 8 .80 8 .80
1 .92
Prob . > F 0 .003 0 .003* 0 .003
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SHARON K. FORD AND TONYA K. FLESHER
that there was a statistically significant difference (p = 0 .003) between treatment levels for total correct responses to routine questions . The mean number of correct responses for treatment one was 3 .10 and the mean number of correct responses for treatment two was 3 .65 . Students in treatment two (court cases) performed significantly better than students in treatment one even though both levels had identical information regarding the basic laws . Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported . Results of Hypothesis I revealed that the method of instruction had a significant effect for solving routine questions . The additional information included with the court cases, with a more detailed discussion of the issues and the court's decision, may have provided insight that supplemented the students' knowledge of the general laws for solving routine problems . Since students in treatment two were given information about the issues considered by the court and the logic used to determine a conclusion, they may have noticed the similarities between the court case and the given problem . Students in treatment one relied solely on their knowledge of the laws and their interpretation of the brief example that was provided . It may have been more difficult for them to transfer that knowledge to a similar situation . Hypothesis 2 predicts that students in treatment two (court cases) would perform significantly better than students in treatment one (examples) in solving novel problems . Treatment two students had access to more detailed information in the experiment regarding the issues involved and the reasoning for the court's decision ; thus, they would be able to transfer the logic and concepts to similar situations . A one-way ANOVA was used as the statistical test for Hypothesis 2 and the results are presented in Table 2 . The mean number of correct responses to novel questions for treatment one was 2 .22 and the mean number of correct responses for treatment two was 2 .12 . There was no statistically significant difference (p = 0 .571) between treatment levels for correct responses to novel questions . Surprisingly, the students in treatment one outperformed the students in treatment two . Therefore, the results do not support Hypothesis 2 . The results relative to Hypothesis 2 were a complete surprise . Students in treatment two should have performed better than students in treatment one on novel questions since they were exposed to a discussion of the issues involved and the reasons for the court's decision . Instead, students in treatment one correctly solved a larger mean number of novel problems . One possible explanation is that students lack experience in rule interpretation and in analyzing court cases and they may not be able to find the connection between issues and reasoning in complex situations . The second possible explanation is that the students in treatment one had a higher level of cognitive ability and were better able to resolve unstructured
The Effect
of Instructional
Table 2 .
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Strategy and Cognitive Level of Development
Effect of Instructional Strategy Novel Score - Hypothesis 2 .
A . Mean and Standard Deviation for novel score:
NOVEL B . ANOVA Results: Source
Treatment I Mean SD
Treatment 2 Mean SD
2.22
2 .12
SS
1 .28
1 .32
df
MS
F 0 .33 0 .33 0 .33
Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
0 .57 0.57 0 .57 360 .04
212
0.57 0.57 0 .57 1 .70
Total
360.61
213
.69 1
Prob . > F 0 .571 0.571 0 .571
Note: * = significant at p < 0 .05 .
problems even with less detailed information . Treatment one students had a mean cognitive score of 20 .29, whereas treatment two students had a mean cognitive score of 19 .68 (the difference in the scores was not statistically significant) . A 2 x 3 factorial design with two main-effect terms (treatment level and cognitive level of development), one dependent term (routine score) and one interaction term (treatment by cognitive development) was used to test Hypothesis 3 . Subjects were randomly assigned to one treatment level and were classified in one level of cognitive development according to the total number of correct responses on the cognitive test. The three categories of cognitive Table 3.
Effect of Treatment and Cognitive Level of Development Routine Score - Hypothesis 3 .
Source
SS
df
MS
F
2 way interaction TREATMENT x CLD Explained Residual
8 .84 6 .56 2 .57 1 .44 1 .44 20.38 387 .96
2 2 2 5 208
2.95 6.56 1 .29 0.72 0 .72 4.08 L87
1 .58 3 .52 0 .69 0 .39 0 .39 0 .19
Total
408.34
213
1 .92
Main Effect TREATMENT CLD
Note: CLD = Cognitive Level of Development.
Prob . > F 0 .196 0 .062 0 .503 0 .681 0 .681 0 .057
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SHARON K. FORD AND TONYA K . FLESHER
development were concrete (0-14 correct responses), transitional (15-17 correct responses) and formal (18-32 correct responses) . Concrete thinkers require specific strategies and techniques that provide clear examples and concrete experiences to structure their thinking and to achieve understanding. Transitional thinkers use a systematic approach to a problem with some use of abstractions and inferences but the performance is quite inconsistent . Formal thinkers can draw inferences, hypothesize, predict, and generalize from their experiences to formulate general rules or principles . They can reconstruct their knowledge when new situations are encountered (Arlin, 1987) . Results show no statistically significant interaction between treatment level and cognitive level of development (p = 0 .681) . The results were then analyzed for main effect differences . The main effect of treatment revealed a statistically significant difference at the formal level, but there were no significant differences at the transitional and concrete levels . At the formal level, students in treatment level two performed significantly better than students in treatment level one . Results are provided in Table 4 . The main effect of cognitive level of development (Table 5) revealed no significant differences among the three levels in the number of correct responses to routine questions . This result agrees with conclusions reached by Amemic and Beechy (1984), Tuckman and Orefice (1973) and Shute (1979) who found that students perform equally well on routine questions regardless of their cognitive or conceptual level . Students classified in the formal level did not score significantly better than students classified in the transitional and concrete categories . Since there was a significant difference at the formal level for the main effect of treatment, Hypothesis 3 was not supported . A 2 x 3 factorial design with two main-effect terms (treatment level and cognitive level of development), one dependent term (novel score) and one interaction term (treatment by cognitive development) was used to test Hypothesis 4 . Subjects were randomly assigned to one treatment level and were classified in one level of cognitive development according to the total number of correct responses on the cognitive test . Results show no statistically significant interaction between treatment level and cognitive level of development (p = 0 .449) . The results were then analyzed for main effect differences . The main effect of treatment level did not have a significant impact (p = 0 .966) on the number of novel questions answered correctly at each level of cognitive development (Table 7) . The main effect of cognitive level of development shows a significant difference (p = 0 .000) in the number of novel questions answered correctly among the levels of cognitive ability (Table 8) . Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported .
77
The Effect of Instructional Strategy and Cognitive Level of Development Table 4.
Main Effect - Treatment Routine Score .
A . Mean and Standard Deviation for novel score : Treatment I Mean SD Concrete Transitional Formal
3 .11 (9) 3 .05 (22) 3 .12 (76)
Treatment 2 Mean SD
136 . .33 1 .45 1
3 .53 (15) 3 .39 (23) 3,77 (69)
1 .25 1 .27 1 .34
B . ANOVA Results : Source
SS
df
MS
F
0 .60 0 .60 0 .60
0 .446 0 .446 0 .446
080 . 0 .80 0 .80
0 .377 0 .377 0.377
7 .79 7 .79 7 .79
0 .006 0 .006 0 .006
1 . CONCRETE* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
.00 .00 .00 36.62
I 1 1 22
1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1 .67
Total
37 .62
23
1 .64
2. TRANSITIONAL* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
1 .35 1 .35 1 .35 72.43
I I I 43
1 .35 1 .35 1 .35 .68 1
Total
73 .78
44
1 .68
3 . FORMAL* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
15 .27 15 .27 15 .27 280.22
1 I 1 143
15 .27 15 .27 15 .27 1 .96
Total
295.49
144
2 .05
Prob . > F
* = Concrete - use of a systematic approach to problems but unable to form a general rule or abstraction from the problems . Transitional - use of a systematic approach to problems and some use of abstractions and inferences but the performance is inconsistent . Formal - capable of abstractions and making inferences by drawing on previous experiences .
Special Tests Since there were three levels of cognitive development, a Student NewmanKuels test was conducted to determine differences between all possible pairs of means . The mean scores on novel questions for the three levels (concrete, transitional, formal) were 1 .50, 1 .74, and 2 .42, respectively . Results of the
SHARON K . FORD AND TONYA K. FLESHER
78
Table 5.
Main Effect - Cognitive Level of Development Routine Score .
Source
SS
df
MS
F 0.53 0 .53 0 .53
Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
2 .04 2 .04 2 .04 406 .30
2 2 2 211
1 .02 1 .02 1 .02 1 .93
Total
408 .34
213
1 .92
Table 6.
Prob . > F 0.590 0 .590 0 .590
Effect of Treatment and Cognitive Level of Development Novel Score - Hypothesis 4 .
Source
SS
df
MS
F
Prob . > F
5 .80 0 .00 8 .50 0.80 0.80 3 .94
0.001 0.966 0 .000* 0 .449 0.449 0 .002
Main Effect TREATMENT CLD 2 way interaction TREATMENT x CLD Explained Residual
7 .54 0 .00 26 .92 2 .55 2 .55 31 .20 329 .40
3 1 2 2 2 5 208
9 .18 0 .00 13 .46 1 .27 1 .27 6.24 1 .58
Total
360 .60
213
1 .69
Note: CLD = Cognitive Level of Development ; * = significant at p < 0 .05 .
Student Newman-Kuels procedure indicated statistically significant differences in mean novel score between transitional and formal and between concrete and formal . There was no significant difference between transitional and concrete . A paired-samples t-test was used to evaluate the results for simple effect differences between routine score and novel score within each treatment level . The paired samples were routine score and novel score and results are presented in Table 9 . The results of this evaluation show that there was a statistically significant difference (t = 0 .000) in question structure for treatment level one and that there was a statistically significant difference (t = 0 .000) in question structure for treatment level two . As expected, the novel problems were more difficult to solve for both treatment groups . The overall results indicate that students in both treatment levels had a higher mean number of correct responses on routine questions than on novel questions . This result was expected since accounting
The Effect of Instructional Strategy and Cognitive Level of Development
Table 7.
79
Main Effect - Treatment Novel Score.
A. Mean and Standard Deviation for novel score : Treatment / Mean SD Concrete Transitional Formal B . ANOVA Results : Source
1 .67 (9) 1 .55 (22) 2.49 (76)
SS
Treatment 2 Mean SD
1 .32 0.91 1 .29
1 40 (15) . 1 .96 (23) 2 .33 (69)
1.12 1 .30 1 .32
df
MS
F
0.28 0 .28 0 .28
0 .603 0 .603 0 .603
1 .50 1 .50 1 .50
0 .227 0 .227 0 .227
0 .50 0 .50 0 .50
0 .481 0 .481 0 .481
1 . CONCRETE* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
0.40 0 .40 0.40 31.60
1 1 1 22
0.40 0.40 0.40 1 .44
Total
32.00
23
1 .39
2 . TRANSITIONAL* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
1 .90 1 .90 1 .90 54.41
I I I 43
1 .90 1 .90 1 .90 1 .27
Total
56 .31
44
1 .28
3 . FORMAL* Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
0.85 0 .85 0 .85 244.32
I I I 143
0.85 0 .85 0.85 1 .71
Total
245 .17
144
1 .70
Prob . > F
= Concrete - use of a systematic approach to problems but unable to form a general rule or abstraction from the problems . Transitional - use of a systematic approach to problems and some use of abstractions and inferences but the performance is inconsistent . Formal - capable of abstractions and making inferences by drawing on previous experiences .
students are exposed to routine problem solving in most courses, but are given few opportunities to exercise analytical skills needed for novel problem solving . (Eleven subjects scored a perfect six points on the routine questions and three subjects scored zero points on the routine questions . One person scored a perfect six points on the novel questions and 21 subjects scored zero points on the novel questions .)
SHARON K . FORD AND TONYA K . FLESHER
80 Table 8.
Main Effect - Cognitive Level of Development Novel Score . SS
Source
df
MS
F 9 .08 9 .08 9 .08
Main Effect TREATMENT Explained Residual
28 .57 28 .57 28 .57 332 .03
2 2 2 211
14 .29 14.29 14.29 1 .57
Total
360 .60
213
1 .69
Table 9.
t Corr .
Value
107
0 .21
3 .10 -5 .37 2.22
A . TREATMENT 1 : Routine Novel Paired difference : B . TREATMENT 2 : Routine Novel Paired difference :
0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
Paired Samples T-test .
Number of pairs
107
Prob . > F
0.24
3 .65 -9.74 2.12
2 tail significant
Mean
1 .41 0 .00* 1 .28 -0 .88
-1 .20
SD
1 .31 0 .00* 1 .32 -1 .53
1 .63
Note: * = significance at p < 0 .05 .
CONCLUSION This study has several limitations that affect its generalizability . First, volunteer students may not be a representative sample of the students enrolled in the selected courses . This effect was mitigated somewhat because all students in the designated classes were tested for more than three-fourths of the total number of subjects . Secondly, the experiment includes only one tax issue (depreciation) with pre-existing knowledge. The results may not be generalizable to other tax issues or to tax issues with no pre-existing knowledge . Also, faculty members may use different approaches to teach depreciation that may also limit the generalizability of this topic . Thirdly, the testing process consisted of multiple-choice responses, so it is difficult to determine if the response selected
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of Instructional
Strategy and Cognitive Level of Development
81
was based on knowledge or if the choice was strictly a good guess . Students who guessed correctly may have scored very well even though they may not have learned, or understood, the material presented . A different question structure may have led to different results . Multiple-choice answers may have generated bias since the choices are more closely linked to routine situations that call for a correct answer . Answers that required a written solution to justify the response would have been more applicable in the novel situations . Thus, all conclusions are stated within these limitations . The results of this study show that information gained through evaluation of court cases helped students solve routine problems, but the additional information provided little assistance in solving novel problems . Although students at the formal level correctly solved more problems than students in the concrete and transitional levels, the difference was not significant . This lends support to the theory that knowledge and application does not require a high level of cognitive ability for successful resolution of a structured situation . Students in the formal level of cognitive development performed significantly better than students at the concrete and transitional levels in solving novel problems . This result was not unusual since students at a higher level of cognitive development should have more highly-developed logic and critical thinking skills . The novel problems were more difficult to solve than routine problems at all levels of cognitive development . This result emphasizes the fact that students need to have opportunities to develop their higher-order thinking processes so they are prepared to deal with unstructured situations in practice . Educators must be supportive of a learning environment in which thoughtprovoking exercises and problems are introduced on a regular basis . One of the difficulties facing educators is how to include situations that require higher-order thinking skills that are appropriate for the cognitive levels of all students . In most tax classes, there will be a few students who function at the low level of cognitive development and they will likely have difficulty in analyzing complex situations . The most logical course of action is to start with situations that involve only one issue . As students develop skill and confidence in their ability to reason and consider various possibilities, the problems can become more complex later in the semester . If students become active learners and creative thinkers, then they are more likely to remember the concepts and implications applicable to the laws and how they can synthesize and evaluate information . Textbook authors provide numerous situations that are designed to stimulate and enhance conceptual abilities and educators should use some or all of these techniques in their classroom . Future study in the use of different instructional strategies might include a topic other than depreciation . Another possibility is that there could be some
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or all open-ended questions where students must justify their responses . Finally, a similar study could be done using a different cognitive test or students from different universities .
REFERENCES Accounting Education Change Commission (1990) . Objectives of Education for Accountants : Position Statement Number One . Issues in Accounting Education, 5(2), 307-312 . American Accounting Association Committee on the Future Structure, Content, and Scope of Accounting Education (The Bedford Committee) (1986), Future Accounting Education : Preparing for the Expanding Profession . Issues in Accounting Education, 1, 168-195 . Amenic, J . H., & Beechy, T . H . (1984) . Accounting Students Performance and Cognitive Complexity : Some Empirical Evidence . The Accounting Review, LIX(2), 300-313 . Amernic, J. H ., Arrays, N ., & Pollock, J . (1979) . Is There a Generally Accepted Standard Accountant. CA Magazine (October), 34-42 . Andersen, A ., & Co ., Young, A ., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Ernst & Whinny, Peat Marwick, Main & Co ., Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross (The Big Eight) . (1989) . Perspectives on Education : Capabilities for Success in the Accounting Profession . Anderson, U., Marchant, G ., & Robinson, J . (1989). Instructional Strategies and the Development of Tax Expertise . The Journal of the American Taxation Association (Spring), 7-23. Arrays, N ., Men, E . I ., & Bar-Ilan, A. (1978) . An Empirical Examination of the Stereotype Accountant Based on Holland's Theory . Journal of Occupational Psychology, 5](2), 139-145 . Arlin, P . K. (1984) . Arlin Test of Formal Reasoning . New York: Slosson Education Publications, Inc . Arlin, P . K . (1987) . Teaching for Thinking . New York : Slosson Educational Publications, Inc. Bloom, B . S . (Ed .) (1956) . Taxonomy of Educational Objectives Handbook 1 Cognitive Domain . New York : David McKay Company, Inc . Booker, Q ., Brenner, V . C ., & Blum, J . D . (1998). Brave New World for the CPA Exam. Journal of Accountancy (January), 61-64 . Fry, N . E., & Fry, E. H. (1988). How Journal Entries Aid the Teaching of Taxation. Journal of Accounting Education, 6, 149-157 . Geary, W . T., & Rooney, C . J . (1993) . Designing Accounting Education to Achieve Balanced Intellectual Development . Issues in Accounting Education, 8(l), 60-70. Hatfield, T ., & Hatfield, S. R . (1992) . As if Your Life Depended on it : Promoting Cognitive Development to Promote Wellness . Journal of Counseling and Development, 7](2), 164-167 . Hermanson, D . (1994) . The Effect of Self-Generated Elaboration on Students' Recall of Tax and . Issues in Accounting Education (Fall), 301-318 . Accounting Material : Further Evidence Hite, P . A., & Parry, R . W., Jr. (1993) . An Investigation of How Incorrect Examples Can Enhance Tax Rule Comprehension . Journal of Accounting Education, 11, 227 241 . Holland, J . L. (1973) . Making Vocational Choices : A Theory of Careers . Upper Saddle River : Prentice Hall . Hunter, J . E ., & Hunter, R. F. (1984) . Validity and the Utility of Alternative Predictors of Job Performance . Psychological Bulletin, 96, 72-98 . Inhelder, B ., & Piaget, J . (1958) . The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence . New York : Basic Books, Inc.
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Kitten, M . . 1 (1976) . Adaptors and Innovators: A Description and Measure . Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 622-629 . Limberg, S . T., Schadewald, M. S ., & Spilker, B . C . (1995). Organizing Tax Instruction : Evidence Regarding How Students Organize Tax Knowledge . Journal ofAccounting Education, 13(1) . 45-58 . Marchant, G., Robinson, 1 ., Anderson, U ., & Schadewald, M . S . (1989) . A Cognitive Model of Tax Problem Solving . Advances in Taxation, 2, 1-20 . May, G . S ., Winds], F . W., & Sylvestre, J . (1995). The Need for Change in Accounting Education : An Educator Survey . Journal of Accounting Education, 13(1), 21-43 . Perry, W . G ., Jr . (1970) . Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years . Fort Worth : Holt, Rinehart and Winston . Reilly, R. R ., & Lewis, E . L . (1983) . Educational Psychology: Applications for Classroom Learning and Instruction . New York : Macmillan Publishing, Revsine, L . (1970) . Data Expansion and Conceptual Structure . The Accounting Review, XLV(4) . 704-711 . Sander 1 . F ., & Reding, K. F . (1993) . An Empirical Investigation of Entry-level Accountants' Cognitive Abilities . Accounting Educator's Journal, 5(I), 42-54 . Schadewald, M . S ., & Limberg, S . T . (1992) . Using Pictorial Models to Teach Complex Tax Rules : An Experimental Investigation . Journal of Accounting Education, 10, 133-149 . Schadewald, M . S ., & Limberg, S . T . (1990) . Instructor-Provided Versus Student-Generated Explanations of Tax Rules : Effect on Recall . Issues in Accounting Education, 5(l), 30-40 . Schnee, E . 1 . (1980) . An Alternative Final Examination - A Tax Debate, The Journal of the American Taxation Association (Summer), 29-31 . Segovia, J . J ., & Bloom, R . (1988) . A Cognitive Approach to Accounting Instruction : An Application to The Introductory Course . Accounting Educator's Journal (Spring), 118-128 . Shute, G . E . (1979) . Accounting Students and Abstract Reasoning : An Exploratory Study. Sarasota : American Accounting Association . Subotnik, D . (1987). What Accounting can learn from Legal Education . Issues in Accounting Education, 2(2), 313-324 . Tuckman, B . W . . & Orefice . D . S . (1973) . Personality Structure, Instructional Outcomes, and Instructional Preferences . Interchange, 4, 43-48 . Welk, C . M ., & Cates, T . A . (1994) . Problem-Solving Styles of Accounting Students : Are Expectations of Innovators Reasonable. Journal of Accounting Education, 12(4), 269-281 . Young, L. (1992) . Critical Thinking Skills : Definitions, Implication for Implementation . NASSP Bulletin, 76, 47-54 .
APPENDIX A Court Cases
49 AFTR 491, 231 F .2d 635, 56-1 U .S .TC 19441 . Ekberg v. U .S., 5 AFTR 2d 979, 60-1 U .S .TC 19332 . Johnson, Jr . v . U.S ., 7 AFTR 2d 793, 61-1 U .S .TC 19278 . Alexis M. Hawkins and Rosemary K. Hawkins, 713 F .2d 347, 44 TCM 715 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Doyle,
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Keith C. Nickisch and Teresa J. Nickisch v. Commissioner, T . C . Memo . 1984-275 . Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologists, P . C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 46 TCM 613, TC Memo . 1983-380. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 TC 912 . (1962) . J. J. Sexton, 42 TC 1094 . (1964) . Paul P. Slawek and Susan C. Slawek v. Commissioner, T. C . Memo 1987-438 .
MARGINAL TAX RATES ON FOREIGN PROFITS OF U .S . MULTINATIONALS Gregory G. Geisler and Ernest R . Larkins
ABSTRACT Many studies find that taxes influence capital location, income shifting, and capital structure decisions of multinational companies . So, reasonably estimating the marginal tax effect of international business decisions is important. However, simple marginal tax rate (MTR) proxies, such as a foreign country's top statutory rate or a rate that assumes remittance of all foreign profits as current dividends, fail to capture many tax law complexities. This article develops an algebraic "mixed remittance" model for calculating a U.S. company's MTR on its foreign subsidiary's profits . In contrast to the simpler proxies, the mixed remittance model allows foreign profits to be remitted in different forms (i .e . not just as dividends) and across varying time periods (i.e . not just the current period) . Also, the mixed remittance model considers withholding taxes, tax deferrals from postponed dividends, and foreign tax credit positions . Paired t-tests show that the resulting MTR measure often differs significantly from the two simpler MTR proxies.
Advances in Taxation, Volume 14, pages 85-116 . Copyright 0 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0889-3 85
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GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
INTRODUCTION Many studies provide evidence that taxes influence capital location and income shifting behavior of multinational companies (e .g . Altshuler & Newlon, 1993 ; Harris, 1993 ; Klassen et al ., 1993 ; Wilson, 1993 ; Jacob, 1996 ; Mills & Newberry, 2001 ; Vines & Moore, 1996 ; Collins et al ., 1998 ; Collins & Shackelford, 1998 ; Kemsley, 1998) .' Other studies find that tax law changes affect capital structure decisions of multinationals (e .g . Collins & Shackelford, 1992 ; Smith, 1997 ; Newberry, 1998) . Thus, reasonably estimating the marginal tax effect of any international business decision is important . Since tax rates differ across countries, marginal tax rates (MTRs) on foreign direct investments vary across countries . Scholes et al . (2002, p . 139) observe that since a multinational company "is composed of distinct legal entities, its left pocket is often taxed differently from its right pocket ." One tax planning principle is to shift income so it is taxed in the "lower-taxed pocket." Thus, understanding MTRs and their calculations is essential for a taxpaying entity's evaluation of "in-place" or proposed direct investments abroad and the corresponding effects on the entity's profits . This article develops a mixed remittance model for calculating a U .S . multinational corporation's MTR from a foreign subsidiary earning and remitting foreign profits .' The model is flexible enough to consider a variety of remittance strategies (i .e. dividends, interest, and royalties) that cover both current and future years and is termed "mixed" since any combination of remittance forms can be included in the model . After-tax foreign profits are a function of foreign profits and taxes . Taxes depend on the MTR ; this article focuses on MTRs . 3 An MTR is the present value of additional tax on an incremental (i .e. marginal) amount of foreign profits divided by the incremental foreign profits . The additional tax in the MTR's numerator includes both tax paid currently and the present value of any tax paid in the future . The decision context in this article involves a firm's foreign direct investment or, more specifically, a U .S . multinational's operation of a foreign subsidiary . Thus, the denominator is the foreign subsidiary's foreign profits, while the numerator includes foreign income tax, foreign withholding taxes on remittances (i .e . repatriation of foreign profits), and U .S . income tax attributable to the foreign profits . Modeling and calculating MTRs for direct investments abroad are more complex than for domestic investments due to additional layers of tax and the limitations on credits for foreign taxes paid . Depending on the foreign jurisdiction and its laws, foreign profits are generally subject to foreign income tax, and profit remittances may be subject to withholding taxes . Withholding
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U .S. Multinationals
87
tax rates may vary depending on the remittance form (e .g . dividends versus interest)" Also, modeling and calculating MTRs requires knowledge of the home country's foreign tax credit rules and their impact on a given remittance decision.' Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a, b) estimate a firm's MTR on an additional $1 of worldwide income but do not address this article's decision context . For example, Shevlin (1990, p . 59) states that his MTR "assumes all income, both domestic and foreign, is subject to" tax at the U .S . statutory rate . This assumption is valid only when all foreign profits are subject to foreign income tax at rates not exceeding the U .S . statutory rate, all profits remaining after foreign income tax are repatriated in the current year, and the taxpayer has no foreign tax credit position . In contrast, we estimate the MTR on a foreign subsidiary's profit that is remitted in a variety of forms, over one or more years, and to a U .S . parent with an existing foreign tax credit position . The MTR measure we develop in this article, using the mixed remittance MTR model, incorporates tax planning procedures . It differs significantly from two measures academicians and practitioners sometimes use to proxy for MTRs : (1) the foreign country's top statutory tax rate (e.g . Gordon & Jun, 1993 ; Smith, 1997 ; Zahlander, 1992) ; and (2) a tax rate based on the assumption that all foreign profits are currently remitted as dividends (e .g . Eskinazi, 1994 ; Larkins, 2000) . Our mixed remittance MTR model permits more accurate estimates of MTRs than either of these other two measures since it allows for both remittances in different forms and deferral of dividends . Stated more broadly, our mixed remittance model captures much more of the "richness" contained in U .S . and foreign taxation rules . MTRs are important to several groups including tax planners, academic researchers, policy analysts, and policy makers . Tax planning involves making investment and financing decisions to maximize the present value of risk-adjusted, after-tax returns . A key input for determining the after-tax return from a given decision is the MTR, which tax planners apply to expected before-tax returns . The process of modeling MTRs highlights, and often leads to a clearer intuitive understanding of, the relevant tax factors and their interactions . Government tax policy analysts and academic researchers must understand the economic incentives the tax laws create to explain and predict behavioral reactions to tax legislation . For example, a simple comparison of U .S . and foreign statutory income tax rates might not provide sufficient insight into where multinationals are expected to shift income in reaction to new tax legislation . One reason for the insufficiency is that withholding tax rates are also important determinants since ultimately profits must be remitted to the home
88
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
country . If the foreign tax law is structured such that most multinationals attempt to remit profits in deductible forms and few constraints exist to such a strategy under the host country tax law, any analysis that ignores withholding taxes might lead to both prediction and measurement errors . Specifically, a withholding tax rate applies to such profits in lieu of the host country's income tax rate and the two rates often differ significantly . Reasonably accurate predictions of behavioral reactions to tax law changes (i .e. shifts in multinational investment and remittance patterns) lead to better estimates of the tax revenue effects . Anticipating the pattern of behavioral reactions before legislative proposals become law allows government policy makers to either reverse or modify legislation to preclude or mollify unintended firm behavior . Thus, determining MTRs on foreign profits is important for policy analysts who must project tax revenues, policy makers concerned with reactions to tax laws, and academic researchers seeking to explain behavioral responses of multinational companies .' The first section defines the MTR concept and explains some overall assumptions underlying the model . As a basis for the examples and model that follow, Section 2 presents a brief review of the foreign tax credit . Section 3 provides examples with a combination of remittance forms to calculate MTRs for direct investments abroad in both high- and low-tax foreign countries . Section 4 develops the MTR model . In Section 5, we calculate a U .S . multinational's MTRs for foreign subsidiaries in a variety of countries . We demonstrate that the estimates from the mixed remittance MTR model often differ from both statutory tax rates and tax rates based on remittance of all after-tax profits as dividends each year . Section 6 provides concluding observations.
1. MTR DEFINITION, USE, AND ASSUMPTIONS A company's MTR on foreign profits generally is equal to the present value of its current and future income tax liability resulting from a foreign business decision divided by the incremental income from the same decision? The MTR's numerator includes incremental federal and foreign tax liabilities, where the latter includes both foreign income and withholding taxes .' The foreign income tax rates include all national and local taxes based on income .9 The MTR's denominator is the incremental U .S . taxable income from foreign business operations . MTRs are useful for making many types of decisions relating to direct investments abroad . 10 Common decisions include :
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• whether to shift income between two countries (e.g . through changing transfer pricing policies) ; • whether a U .S . multinational should establish a foreign subsidiary to conduct business abroad and, if so, in which foreign country to establish it ; • how to remit foreign profits back to the home country (e .g . as interest, royalties, current dividends, future dividends, or some combination) ; and • where to obtain debt financing .
The MTR model developed assumes the following : both the United States and the foreign country similarly measure the taxable income resulting from a foreign direct investment, after-tax profits equal earnings and profits (E&P) (i .e . no book/tax differences), all tax rates are stable over time, and multinationals are subject to the maximum statutory rate in the relevant countries .'' The home country is assumed to be the United States . 12 Finally, the models focus on fundamental tax strategies for earning and remitting foreign profits from foreign subsidiaries . 13
2. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN TAX CREDIT RULES Since the foreign tax credit (FTC) mitigates the effect of double taxation, it is an integral part of our MTR models . The FTC provisions appear in I.R .C . Sections 901 through 908 . The first four sections contain the fundamental rules . 14 I .R .C. Section 901 allows a FTC for foreign income taxes paid or accrued directly to a foreign country . Such taxes are known as creditable taxes or levies . I .R .C . Section 902 grants a FTC to U .S . corporations receiving dividends from their foreign subsidiaries based on income taxes the latter pay ." I .R.C . Section 903 permits a FTC for any tax substituting for a foreign income tax such as withholding taxes on profits remitted as dividends, interest, and royalties . I .R .C . Section 904 limits the FTC allowed under I .R .C . Sections 901 through 903 to the U .S . tax imposed on foreign source income . Deemed Paid Credit
While I .R .C . Sections 901 and 903 permit a FTC for taxes directly paid or withheld, I .R .C . Section 902 allows a FTC for creditable taxes deemed paid . To qualify for a deemed paid credit (DPC), a U .S . corporation must receive a dividend from a ten percent-owned foreign subsidiary . 16 In effect, the U .S . corporation is treated as though it paid the foreign income taxes that its foreign subsidiary actually paid . However, the attribution of the foreign income taxes to the U .S . company occurs only as it receives dividends from its foreign
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GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
subsidiary . In other words, the dividends bring with them creditable taxes . The proportion of the foreign subsidiary's earnings and profits (E&P) that it remits as a dividend determines the percentage of the foreign subsidiary's foreign income taxes attributable to the U .S . parent . The U .S . corporation claims a DPC for all or some portion of the foreign subsidiary's foreign income taxes and reports the dividends as gross income . The DPC concept can be summarized as follows : Dividend Received from Foreign Subsidiary Section 902 DPC = E & P of Foreign Subsidiary (1) x Tax Foreign Subsidiary Paid I.R .C . Section 78 requires the U .S . company to "gross up" the dividend, which means increasing its gross income by the DPC . In substance, I.R .C . Sections 78 and 902 combine to treat the foreign subsidiary as though it transferred funds necessary to pay its foreign income tax to its U .S . parent company, and the latter paid such taxes directly . To illustrate, assume a U .S . corporation organizes a wholly-owned subsidiary in a foreign country . During its first year, the subsidiary earns before-tax profits of $1,000, pays foreign income tax of $200, and has $800 of E&P. At year end, the subsidiary pays a $720 dividend to its parent company (90% x $800 E&P) . The U .S . corporation is entitled to a DPC of $180 (90% x $200 foreign income tax) and must include $900 in its gross income ($720 dividend received + $180 DPC) . Note that the $900 inclusion in gross income is 90% of the before-tax profits . FTC Baskets Foreign levies that qualify for the FTC are called "creditable" taxes . The creditable taxes for a given U .S . company consist of directly paid taxes under I .R .C . Section 901, "in lieu of' taxes under I .R .C . Section 903, and deemed paid taxes under I .R.C. Section 902 . I .R.C . Section 904 separates creditable taxes into "baskets" based on the type of income taxed ." For example, one basket includes only passive income . However, the only basket we consider in our analysis is the "residual income" basket, also known as the "general" basket . This basket includes general business profits, management fees, business royalty income, some export profits, and passive income received from a subsidiary's
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U .S. Multinationals
91
underlying business profits . We only analyze the residual income basket because our focus is entirely on foreign business profit - approximately 75% of most U .S . multinationals' foreign income according to the U .S . Department of the Treasury (1993, 20) ." I .R .C . Section 904(d)(3) changes the way creditable taxes are segregated into baskets when a U .S . company receives certain passive income from a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) . A CFC is a foreign corporation of which U .S . shareholders own more than 50% of either stock value or voting power . When a CFC pays dividends, interest, rents, or royalties to its U .S . parent company, the foreign withholding tax is not automatically placed in the passive income basket . Instead, a "look-through" rule applies so that creditable taxes are apportioned among baskets based on the CFC's underlying income . For example, if the CFC's income for the year consists entirely of business profits, any withholding tax on dividends the CFC remits to its U .S . parent company is placed in the residual income basket, not the passive basket . If instead the CFC's underlying income is 80% from business operations and 20% from passive investments, only 80% of any withholding tax on dividends from the CFC to its U .S . parent is placed in the residual basket. The other 20% portion goes into the passive basket . Similarly, 80% of the dividend income is included in the numerator of the residual basket's limitation formula that will be discussed below . Only 20% of the dividend income is included in the numerator of the passive basket's limitation formula. FTC Limitations
In addition to defining baskets, I .R .C. Section 904 establishes a formula approach that identifies the maximum FTC allowed in each basket . The limitation formula is equal to a ratio multiplied by the U .S . tax on the company's worldwide income . Foreign source taxable income appears in the ratio's numerator, while its denominator includes worldwide taxable income . A simplified version of the limitation formula, often a reasonable approximation, is equal to foreign source income multiplied by the highest U .S . tax rate ."' The equations below summarize this concept :
Section 904 Limit on FTC = Foreign Source Taxable Income Worldwide Taxable income (2) x U .S . Tax Before FTC
92
GREGORY G. GEISLER AND ERNEST R . LARKINS Foreign Source Taxable Income Worldwide Taxable Income
(3)
x (Worldwide Taxable Income x U .S Tax Rates)
= Foreign Source Taxable Income x Top U .S . Tax Rate
(4)
To illustrate the FTC limit, assume a U .S . multinational has foreign business income of $120 and U .S . business income of $80 . Assume the company pays a foreign income tax of $48 on its foreign profits (i .e . the average foreign tax rate is $48/$120 or 40%) . Assuming a 35% U .S . tax rate, the U .S . tax on worldwide income is $70 (35% x ($120 +$80)). The ratio of foreign source to worldwide income is 60% ($120/($120 + $80)) . So, the limitation formula for the residual income basket yields a maximum allowed credit of $42 (60% x $70 or $120 x 35%) . Of the $48 creditable tax, only $42 is allowed as a FTC in the current year. Thus, the company has an excess credit of $6 ($48 - $42) . In effect, I .R .C . Section 904 limits the amount of creditable tax in each basket allowed as a FTC to the U .S . tax imposed on foreign source income for the same basket . Stated another way, the FTC derived from a given basket is the lesser of the basket's creditable tax or the U .S . tax on the basket's foreign source income . Thus, all creditable taxes are not allowed as a FTC on the U .S . tax return when the average foreign tax rate exceeds the average U .S . tax rate . The U .S . company that cannot credit all its foreign income taxes has an "excess credit ." This means, effectively, that two different jurisdictions are imposing tax in the current year on part of the same income stream . U .S . multinationals with excess credits in one or more baskets generally engage in tax planning to relieve this "double taxation problem ." I .R .C . Section 904 allows taxpayers to carry excess credits back two years and forward five years . Excess credits not absorbed during this carryover period are lost . 20 Companies claiming a FTC for all their creditable tax are in an "excess limit" position (i .e. they have no double taxation problem) . Excess limits occur when the effective foreign tax rate is lower than the effective U .S . tax rate. U .S . multinationals conducting business primarily in high-tax (low-tax) foreign countries often have excess credits (limits) in their residual income baskets .
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U .S. Multinationals
93
3. MARGINAL TAX RATE EXAMPLES MTRs on foreign profits are a function of foreign income tax rates, foreign withholding tax rates, U .S . income tax rates, and the U .S . multinational's FTC position . In addition, MTRs depend on how and when foreign profits are remitted from the foreign subsidiary to the U .S . multinational . All of these factors must be considered to accurately estimate MTRs . For several reasons, multinationals usually cannot return all profits to the home country in the one form that minimizes the MTR . First, the host country's tax or commercial law may contain specific restrictions on the amount that can be deducted or legally remitted in particular forms . For example, tax laws in many countries contain thin capitalization rules that limit debt and, thus, interest payments . Also, central banks in some countries restrict the amount that can be remitted as interest and royalties . Second, debt, royalty, and management or technical service agreements are written before the subsidiary's foreign profits available to remit are known for the year . Thus, the opportunity to remit profits in these forms is based on prior year financing, investment, and human resource choices . Modifying such agreements from one year to the next in response to anticipated changes in foreign profits involves many potential costs . Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that all profits each year can be returned to the home country in the form incurring the lowest tax burden . Using a combination of remittance forms that, together, lower the MTR below a benchmark is a practical strategy ." The examples below use a combination of remittance forms .
Foreign Country with Low Tax Rate Suppose a foreign subsidiary expects $100 of foreign profits before any contractual agreements with its U .S . parent and wishes to remit 20% as a royalty, 30% as a current dividend, and the remainder of current E&P as a dividend in five years . Assume the following :
• foreign and U .S . income tax rates of 20% and 35%, respectively ; • foreign withholding rates on royalties and dividends of 15% and 10%, respectively ;
• U .S . parent company expects $2 and $1 excess credit in years zero and five, respectively, before considering the foreign subsidiary's $100 profit ; and
• discount rate for future taxes of 10% .
94
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R . LARKINS
Deducting the royalty reduces the subsidiary's taxable income to $80 ($100 $20), making the foreign income tax $16 ($80 x 20%) . Thus, the E&P are $64 ($80 - $16) . The current year dividend is $30, so it results in $34 of retained earnings ($64 - $30) . The withholding tax on the $20 royalty is $3 ($20 x 15%), and the withholding tax on the $30 dividend also is $3 ($30 x 10%) . The U .S . parent company reports the pre-withholding $30 dividend and $20 royalty as gross income . The I .R .C . Section 78 gross up is $7 .50 (percent of E&P paid as a current dividend ($30/ $64) x $16 foreign income tax) . Thus, the parent company's U .S . taxable income is $57 .50 ($30 + $20 + $7 .50) . The U .S . tax before credits is $20 .13 ($57 .50 x 35%) . The FTC is $15 .50 ($7 .50 DPC, which is always the same as the I .R .C . Section 78 gross up, + $3 dividend withholding + $3 royalty withholding + $2 excess credits) . Thus, the U .S . tax liability is $4 .63 ($20 .13 tax - $15 .50 FTC) . Panel A in Fig . 1 summarizes these calculations (i .e . what has occurred in year zero) . Panel B captures the implications in year five when the remaining $34 E&P are remitted as a dividend to the U .S . multinational. The subsidiary pays a $3 .40 dividend withholding tax ($34 x 10%) . The U .S . parent reports $42 .50 as gross income - the $34 pre-withholding dividend and the I .R .C . Section 78 gross up of $8 .50 (percent of E&P paid as a dividend in year five ($34/$64) x $16 foreign income tax paid in year zero) ." Thus, the U .S . tax liability before credits in year five is $14 .88 ($42.50 x 35%) . The FTC is $12 .90 ($3 .40 dividend withholding tax + $8 .50 DPC + $1 excess credit), and the U .S . tax liability in year five is $1 .98 ($14 .88 - $12 .90) . The remittance pattern in this example causes the MTR to be 29 .97%, as shown at the bottom of Fig . 1 . The numerator consists of the four taxes accrued or withheld in the first year plus the present value of the two taxes in year five . As is generally the case when conducting business in low-tax countries, the deductible royalty payment does not reduce the MTR 24 In contrast, paying a deductible royalty in a high-tax country, as in the following example, reduces the MTR significantly . Foreign Country with High Tax Rate Assume the same facts except that the foreign income tax rate is 40% instead of 20% and the excess credits are now excess limits . 25 The subsidiary's foreign income tax is now doubled or $32 ($80 x 40%) . Of the remaining $48 ($80 $32), $30 is again distributed as a dividend to the U.S . multinational . Thus, $18 is retained until year five ($48 - $30) . The U .S . parent company has gross income of $70 ($30 dividend + $20 royalty + $20 I.R .C . Section 78 gross up ($30/$48 x $32 foreign income tax)) .
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U.S. Multinationals
95
Panel A: Low-Tax Country In Year 0
U.S. Corporation Dividend Withholding Royalty Withholding Net Receipt
$30 -3 20
100%l
$44
Controlled
Dividend Gross Up Royalty Taxable Income
$30.00 7.50 jMOO $57 .50
Foreign Profit Royalty Taxable Incom e Foreign Tax EUP
$100 _ _ma $ 80
I
Foreign Corporation
14 $ 64
Taxable Income $57.50 U .S. Tax Rate X AS Pre-FTC Tax $20.13 FTC (Year 0) -13 .50 Excess Credit _;Em U .S . Tax $4 .63
E&P $ 64 Dividend _;IB Retained Earnings $ 34
Panel B : Same Country In Year 5
U .S. Corporation r Dividend Withholding Net Receipt
$34 .00 -3 .40
)Do%,
Dividend $34 .00 Taxable Income Gross UP 8 .50 U .S. Tax Rate Taxable Income $42 .50 Pre-FTC Tax FTC (Year 5) Excess Credit U .S . Tax
$42 .50 x.35 $14 .88 -11 .90 -1 .00 $ 1 .98
$30.60 Controlled Foreign Corporation
M•dg m
$16 + $3 + $3 + $4 .63 + (S3 40 +S1 .981/161nci
=2991%
$100
Assumptions.
• The foreign income tax rate in the low-tax country is 20% . The foreign withholding tax rate on dividends (royalties) Is 10% (15%) . The U.S . Inane tax rate Is 35%. • The CFC pays a $30 ($34) dividend In year zero (five) . • The U.S . corporation has a $2 ($1) excess credit in year zero (five) . • The discount rate Is 10% on tax payments in year 5 (i.e., 1 .61051 - (1+ .1) 5 ) .
Fig . 1 .
MTR on Mixed Remittances in Low-Tax Country .
The parent's U .S . tax before credits is $24 .50 ($70 x 35%) . The FTC is $26 ($20 DPC + $3 dividend withholding + $3 royalty withholding) . Since the FTC is $1 .50 more than the U .S . tax before credits ($26 - $24 .50), the excess is carried back against the $2 excess limit from prior years . Thus, the U .S . parent receives a $1 .50 tax refund. Panel A in Fig . 2 displays these calculations (i .e . what has occurred in year zero) .
96
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R . LARKINS Panel A : High-Tax Country In Year 0
U.S. Corporation Dividend Wlthholdag Royalty Wlhhdding Net Recalpt
$30 -3 20 _j, $44
Dividend Gross Up Royalty Taxable Income
$30.00 20.00 20.00 $70.00
1
Taxable Income U.S. Tax Rate Pre-FTC Tax FTC (Year 0) U.S. Refund
$70.00 x .35 $24 .50
$ 7 .50
100% i
Controlled Foreign Corporation
Foreign Profit Royalty Taxable Income Foreign Tax ESP
$100
:ZSI $ 80 , $ 48
ESP $ 48 Di nd Retained Earnings $ 18
~u
Panel 8 : Same Country in Year 0
U .S . Corporation $18 .00 Dividend Withholding -7 .80 Net Receipt $16 .20
Dividend $18.00 Taxable Income Gross Up 12_00 U .S. Tax Rate Taxable Income $30 .00 Pre-FTC Tax FTC (Year 5) U .S . Refund
$30.00 x .35 $10.50 -11 .50 $1 .00
too%[
Controlled Foreign Corporation
MTR- 197 + 33 + $9-$1 .50 + ($1 .R0-511/1 .61051 $100
=370&A
Assumption&
• The foreign Income tax rate In the low-tax country Is 40% . The foreign withholding tax rate on dividends (royalties) Is 10% (15%) . The U .S. Income tax rate Is 35%. • The CFC pays a $30 ($18) dividend in year zero (f") . • The U .S. corporation has a $2 ($1) excess limit in year zero (five) . • The discount rate to 10% on tax payments In year 5 (I .e ., 1 .61051 - (1 a .1) 5 ) .
Fig. 2 .
MTR on Mixed Remittances in High-Tax Country .
Panel B shows the results in year five . The subsidiary distributes the remaining $18 as a dividend, resulting in a $1 .80 withholding tax ($18 x 10%) . The parent company reports $30 of gross income ($18 dividend + $12 I .R.C . Section 78 gross up ($18/$48 x $32 foreign income tax paid in year zero)) 26 The U .S . tax before credits is $10 .50 ($30 x 35%) . Of the $12 foreign income tax paid in year zero for which a FTC has not yet been claimed, only $11 .50
97
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U .S. Multinationals
is allowed in year five ($10 .50 U .S . tax before credits + $1 excess limit) . Thus, the U .S . tax refund in year five is $1 . The MTR is 37 .00% as the calculation at the bottom of Fig . 2 shows . In contrast to the low-tax country example in Fig . l, the royalty payment does reduce the MTR in the high-tax country . Without the $20 royalty, the MTR would be 42 .24% - an increase of more than five percentage points 2 7 The lower 37% MTR occurs from averaging high-taxed income (i .e . foreign profits remitted as nondeductible dividends) and low-taxed income (i .e . foreign profits remitted as deductible royalties) . Thus, remitting foreign profits in deductible forms (i .e. not as dividends) generally reduces the MTR when conducting business abroad in high-tax countries .
4. MODEL DEVELOPMENT The examples in Figs 1 and 2 provide some guidance in formulating a model to determine MTRs. In both examples, the numerator includes all income taxes paid or withheld . 2% More specifically, the numerator includes all foreign income, foreign withholding, and U .S . income tax (after the foreign tax credit) paid in the current year on current foreign profits . In addition, the numerator includes the present value of all foreign withholding tax and U .S . income tax (after the foreign tax credit) paid in future years on the current foreign profits . The denominator contains foreign profits . Following the MTR examples in the previous section, the model can be expressed as follows :
FOIT + DIV + INT + ROY nO
USIT o - FTC,) + °
DIV + USIT - FTC y y (1+d)v
PRFT () where : tm = marginal tax rate on foreign profits earned in the current year, FOIT = foreign income tax paid, DIV = withholding tax on dividends remitted to parent, INT = withholding tax on interest remitted to parent, ROY = withholding tax on royalties remitted to parent, USIT = U .S . tax liability (refund) before the FTC, FTC = foreign tax credit (including carryovers), PRFT = pre-remittance, pre-tax foreign profits, 0 = current year (i .e . year zero),
(5)
98
GREGORY 0 . GEISLER AND ERNEST R . LARKINS y d
= future year (i .e . when current year retained earnings are remitted as dividends), and = discount rate .
In the following equations, the various components in the model above are defined more precisely to derive a more generalizable model . As a result, the model derived later (i.e . Eq . (15)) will have more easily identified inputs since it will rely on tax rates rather than computed tax amounts . Equation (6) defines the current foreign income tax liability (FOIT .) appearing in Eq . (5) as the foreign income tax rate applicable to foreign profits (after deducting interest and royalty remittances) multiplied by foreign profits : FOIT. = (1 - pi., - P,oy) (tf ) PRFT.
(6)
where : pj ~ t =
percentage of PRFT O currently remitted to U .S . parent company as interest, p ,t,y = percentage of PRFTO currently remitted to U .S . parent company as royalties, and = foreign income tax rate on PRFT.. Equation (7) defines the current withholding taxes on dividends (DIV .), interest (INT.), and royalties (ROY .) appearing in Eq. (5) . The equation yields the percentage of foreign profits remitted as dividends, interest, and royalties multiplied by the respective withholding tax rates, which, after summing together, are multiplied by foreign profits : DIV . + INT. + ROY. =
( Pdit,
td,,
+
P,m t, M + Proy t,o) PRFT.
(7)
where : percentage of PRFT O currently remitted to U .S . parent company as dividends, = foreign withholding tax rate on interest, tut troy = foreign withholding tax rate on royalties, and tdiv = foreign withholding tax rate on dividends . 29 Pdm =
The current year's deemed paid credit (DPC.), though not appearing as a separate component in equation (5), is defined next since it is an important
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U.S. Multinationals
99
factor in Eqs (9), (10), and (12) that follow . The deemed paid credit in Eq . (8) is equal to the percentage of after-tax foreign profits remitted as a dividend multiplied by the foreign income tax rate paid on the before-tax foreign profits multiplied by foreign profits :
DPC0 -
(1 ( 1 - Pint -
ProY)(1 - t, )
Pint -
Pr) ) (tI.) PRFT0 (8)
PrIV tf
I - ti
PRFT~
Equation (9) yields the current year's U .S . tax before FTC (USIT 0) as the product of the U .S . income tax rate, the percentage of foreign profits included in gross income from foreign operations, and foreign profits . The gross income includes profits the U .S . parent company receives as dividends, interest, and royalties as well as the I .R .C. Section 78 gross-up, which is the same as the deemed paid credit : US ITO
=
(P, + P int
+
p, + DPC0) (tn, ) PRFP 0
(9)
where t = U .S . income tax rate. The current year's foreign tax credit (FPC 0) is the lesser of: (a) the I .R .C . Section 904 limitation formula (i .e . portion of Eq . (10) below preceding the comma multiplied by foreign profits) ; or (b) creditable foreign taxes (i .e . portion of equation (10) below following comma multiplied by foreign profits) . Regarding (a), the I .R .C . Section 904 limit is generally equal to the U .S . income tax rate multiplied by foreign source income (i,e . all foreign remittances and the I .R .C . Section 78 gross-up) as illustrated earlier in the FTC Limitations subsection . Generally, the I .R .C . Section 904 limit is less than creditable foreign taxes when the U .S . company is conducting business abroad in high-tax countries . In such cases, if the U .S . company has an unused excess limit from the prior two years, the foreign tax credit is increased since the current excess credit from high-tax countries can be carried back against the prior year unused excess limit . Regarding (b) above, creditable foreign taxes (i .e . the second part of Eq. (10) below) are equal to the applicable foreign tax rates multiplied by foreign source income (i .e. all foreign remittances and the I .R .C . Section 78 gross-up) . Generally, creditable foreign taxes are less than the I .R .C . Section 904 limit when the U .S . company is conducting business abroad in low-tax
100
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
countries . In such cases, the unused excess credit from the prior five years increases the foreign tax credit in the current year. Equation (10) summarizes these provisions : 3o
FTCoO
min{
U SITO PRFT0
+ x'~O
J
+ xlimo' b .01
+ DPCO + INTO + ROYO PRFT0
PRFTO
where xijmQ = ratio of unused excess limitation from two years preceding the current year to the current year's foreign profits, and x,reo = ratio of unused excess credits from five years preceding the current year to the current year's foreign profits . Equation (11) provides the dividend withholding tax applicable to dividends paid in a future year (DIV Y ) . Foreign profits remaining after the interest and royalty deductions are multiplied by one minus the foreign income tax rate to determine the foreign E&P available for dividends . Current dividends are subtracted to determine the portion of foreign profits retained for future dividend payments, all of which are remitted as dividends in year y (i .e. the foreign subsidiary retains no E&P after year y) . The future dividends multiplied by the dividend withholding rate multiplied by foreign profits yields the withholding tax on dividends distributed in year y : DIVY = [(1 - Rm - P my )(1 - tf) - PawI (tdjv) PRFTO
(11)
Equation (12) determines the deemed paid credit in the future year (DPC Y) when the U .S . company receives the future dividend . Any foreign income tax not resulting in a DPC in the current year is treated as a DPC in the later year when the remaining foreign profits are distributed as dividends . Thus, DPC Y equals the foreign income tax on foreign profits in the current year less the DPC in the current year. DPC Y appears in Eqs (13) and (14) : DPCY = FOITO - DPC O
(12)
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U .S . Multinationals
101
Equation (13) defines the U .S . tax liability in the future year before considering the foreign tax credit. The U .S . tax is the product of the U .S . tax rate, dividends received in the future year, and foreign profits . The future dividends equal the current year foreign profits after reduction for foreign income tax and dividends paid in the current year but increased for the I .R .C . Section 78 gross-up in the future year (i .e. DPC,,) : DPC USIT= (1 - P, M -P,~Y)(1-t,)-Pa,,+PRFT ](t,,,)PRF"l'„ a
(13)
Equation (14) provides the future year foreign tax credit . Other than the different year involved, it is similar to the calculation for FTC, (i .e . Eq . (10)) . However, Eq. (14) does not contain variables for withholding taxes on interest and royalties since any such payments in year y do not affect the MTR for the current year (i .e. tn „) : 31 USIT° DIVr + DPC Y + x FTC =min { + xr, m } PRFT O PRFT, ' v PRFT, r where xi . .. . Y = ratio of unused excess limitation from two years preceding year y to the current year's foreign profits and = ratio of unused excess credits from five years preceding year y to the current year's foreign profits ." Now, the separate equations will be combined into the "mixed remittance model." Substituting Eqs (6) through (14) into Eq . (5) and combining like terms results in Eq . (15) . In effect, the concepts in Eq . (5) have been converted into variables that are more easily identifiable . Thus, the model in Eq . (15), though a bit more cumbersome than Eq . (5), is more useful for analysis since it is based on tax rates and percentages of foreign profits rather than dollar amounts ." This mixed remittance model computes the MTR (t m ) on foreign profits for a variety of remittance patterns ." Only country-specific tax rates, the discount rate, the U .S . parent's FTC position, and how and when the foreign subsidiary remits such profits to its U .S . parent are needed as model inputs :"
102
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
tm = (I
-
Pint -
Pray) tf
+ max {Pdiv tdiv + Pint tint + Proy
(Pdiv \1-If
+ max
+ Pmt +
f
Pray
t
-
Pd, t f 1 If -
tray - x
lim0'
reo
[(1 - Pint - Proy) (I - td - Pdiv) td, (1+d)y
Pdiv tf (1 - Pdi v - 1 t - Pant - Pray) tus - (1 - Pim -
Pray ) t
Pdiv tf f + 1 - C.
- x
cmy
(1+d)y The model's first term (i .e. everything preceding the first max expression) is the foreign income tax contribution to the MTR, the second term (i .e . the first max expression) is the greater of the current year's withholding tax or the current U .S . tax contribution, and the last term (i .e . the second max expression) is the total contribution to the MTR from dividends paid in subsequent years . The second and last terms, each equal to the greater of two parts (i .e . maximum of foreign withholding taxes or incremental U .S . tax), depend on whether the foreign subsidiary is subject to low or high foreign taxation . In low-tax countries, the second part within each term (i .e . incremental U.S . tax, which appears after the commas) is the greater amount and, thus, increases the MTR . In high-tax countries, the MTR increase comes from the first part within each term (i .e . foreign withholding taxes, which precede the commas) . Equation (15) simplifies when certain assumptions hold . For example, assume that all after-tax foreign profits are remitted as dividends in a later year and no foreign profits are remitted in deductible forms (i .e . pint , pray, and Pdiv are all zero) . As a result, Eq . (15) simplifies to Eq . (16), which we will call the "future dividend model" : max I tdiv (1 - If ) - xlim tns y, t n, = tf + (1+d)y
(16)
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits
of U.S.
Multinationals
1 03
Continuing with the assumptions underlying equation (16) but adding the further assumption that all after-tax foreign profits are remitted as dividends in the current year, Eq . (16) simplifies to Eq . (17), which we will call the "current dividend model" : t = max { tt+ tdiv (1 - t t) - x r.mu , tu , - x o , t, 1 36
(17)
5. PROXIES FOR MARGINAL TAX RATE As mentioned earlier, the mixed remittance model in Eq . (15) may yield an MTR that differs substantially from two rates that are sometimes used to proxy for the MTR - a country's top statutory tax rate or a tax rate based on the current dividend model in Eq . (17) . Statutory rates may understate MTRs since they ignore the impact of dividend and other withholding taxes . On the other hand, using a current dividend model generally overstates the MTR since it ignores tax savings that may be available through deferring dividends or remitting earnings as interest or royalties . Tax planners and tax policy analysts relying on either proxy as reasonable approximations of the MTR could reach inappropriate conclusions . Also, academic researchers using either proxy as an explanatory or control variable might develop better specified models using MTRs based on the mixed remittance model. The mixed remittance model arguably yields a richer MTR measure than either top statutory tax rates or the current dividend model . Thus, the MTR from the mixed remittance model may provide a more appropriate rate for either tax planning by practitioners or explaining corporate behavior by academics and tax policy analysts . To illustrate the differences in the MTR proxies, we selected ten countries with the highest U .S . foreign direct investment (FDI) from each of three major geographical regions (U .S . Dept. of Commerce, 1999) . Table 1 presents the top statutory tax rates for these 30 countries as well as the withholding tax rates on dividends, interest, and royalties on remittances to a U .S . parent company . 37 To incorporate the tax planning behavior of multinationals, we use the mixed remittance model in Eq . (15) and assume that 30% of foreign profits are remitted as either interest or royalties, whichever remittance form has the lower withholding rate ." We also assume after-tax profits not remitted in deductible forms are distributed as dividends in year five, using a 10% discount rate ." Interest and royalty remittances generally reduce tax liabilities in countries with high
GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R. LARKINS
104
Table 1 .
Foreign Income and Withholding Tax Rates in Regional Countries with Highest U .S . Direct Investment . Top Statutory Tax Rate
Dividend Withholding Rate
Interest Withholding Rate
Royalty Withholding Rate
Asia and Pacific Australia China Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia New Zealand Singapore Thailand Regional Mean
36 .00% 33 .00% 16 .00% 30 .00% 42 .05% 30 .80% 28 .00% 33 .00% 26 .00% 30 .00% 30.49%
15 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 10 .00% 10 .00% 11 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 10 .00% 5 .60%
10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 13 .20% 15 .00% 10 .00% 15 .00% 15 .00% 10 .82%
10 .00% 10.00% 1 .60% 10 .00% 10 .00% 16 .50% 10 .00% 10.00% 15 .00% 15 .00% 10.81%
Europe Belgium France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom Regional Mean
40 .17% 40 .00% 43 .51% 32 .00% 37 .00% 37 .45% 35 .00% 35 .00% 25 .10% 31 .00% 35.62%
5 .00% 5 .00% 5 .00% 0 .00% 5 .00% 5 .00% 5 .00% 10 .00% 5 .00% 0 .00% 4.50%
15 .00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 5 .00% 0.00% 4.25%
0 .00% 5 .00% 0 .00% 0.00% 10 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 10 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 2.50%
Latin America Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Mexico Panama Peru Venezuela Regional Mean
35 .00% 34 .00% 15 .00% 35 .00% 30.00% 25 .00% 35 .00% 30 .00% 30.00% 34 .00% 30 .30%
0 .00% 0 .00% 23 .53% 7 .00% 15 .00% 0 .00% 5 .00% 10 .00% 0.00% 0 .00% 6.05%
35.00% 15 .00% 35 .00% 0.00% 15 .00% 33 .00% 15 .00% 6.00% 30 .00% 10.00% 19.40%
28 .00% 15 .00% 30 .00% 39 .55% 25 .00% 33 .00% 10 .00% 30 .00% 30 .00% 10 .00% 25.06%
Combined Regions Mean
32.14%
5.38%
11 .49%
12.79%
Primary Sources: Deloitte Troche Tohmatsu (1999), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (1999) .
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1 05
statutory tax rates since such remittances are deductible and, thus, escape foreign income tax . However, as discussed earlier in the "Foreign Country with Low Tax Rate" subsection, interest and royalty payments may actually increase tax liabilities in some low-tax countries . Since we assume the U .S . multinational adopts a remittance strategy to minimize the MTR, the MTR from the mixed remittance model is compared with the MTRs from both the current and future dividend models, and the least of these three rates is our "tax planning MTR ." Table 2 illustrates the general approach to calculating the various MTR measures for two countries - Malaysia and Spain .40 A visual inspection of the 30 foreign countries in Table I reveals that statutory income tax rates and the withholding rates on dividends, interest, and royalties vary widely not only across countries but also across regions of the world . Table 2 illustrates how the mixed remittance model can result in a very different estimate of the MTR than either of two simpler MTR measures - the top foreign statutory income tax rate and a MTR based on the current dividend model . Admittedly, if Table 2 had examined countries other than Spain and Malaysia, the differences between our tax planning MTR and the two benchmark MTRs might have been very small . So, testing whether our tax planning MTR differs significantly from the two benchmarks (either often or rarely) is important . If differences are rarely significant, one might make an argument that despite the increased richness of the tax planning MTR measure, it is not very useful since the simpler MTR proxies provide estimates that are "close enough" to the "richer" tax planning MTR measure . To provide evidence on this question, Table 3 compares the tax planning MTR with statutory tax rates (Panel A) and the current dividend MTR (Panel B) . Using a paired t-test for each of the 30 countries in Table 1, we test for significant differences between these rates within each region (i .e . the three regions containing ten countries each) and worldwide (i .e . all 30 countries) . In each panel, we allow the FTC position of the U .S . parent company to vary from an excess credit equal to 10% of current year's foreign profits to an excess limit of the same magnitude . The excess credit (limit) results from operating in high- (low-) tax countries in the prior five (two) years . In Panel A, the tax planning MTR exceeds the statutory rate in each region and in the combined regions when no FTC history is assumed . The mean differences range from 1 .43% in Europe to 4 .18% in the Asia/Pacific region 4 1 The paired t-test indicates that the two rates are significantly different in the Asia/Pacific region (p < 0 .01), Latin America (p < 0 .025), and the combined regions (p < 0 .01) . When the U .S . parent has an excess limit of 10% from prior years, the tax planning MTR exceeds the statutory rate in the Asia/Pacific region and Latin America region, but not in Europe . The paired t-test is not significant
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Table
2.
Illustration of Differences between MTR Measures . Sources of Information
Variables in MTR Models' U .S. tax rate (toy) Internal Revenue Code Foreign income tax rate (t f) Table 1 Withholding rate for : Dividends (ta ,„) Table I Interest ( .m) Table I Royalties ftTable 1 Percent of profits remitted as: Varies^ Current dividends (p i ) Interest (pias) Varies' Royalties (p,%,) Varies° User's choice Discount rate (d) Years deferred (y) User's choice Marginal Tax Rate Models Top statutory rate Mixed remittance model° Future dividend model' Current dividend model• Tax planning MTR Lesser :
Same as t r above Equation (15) Equation (16) Equation (17) Equations (15), (16), (17)
Differences in MTR Measures Tax planning MTR less Top statutory tax rate (as benchmark) Tax planning MTR less Current dividend MTR (as benchmark)
Malaysia
Spain
35 .00% 28 .00%
35 .00% 35.00%
0 .00% 15 .00% 10 .00%
10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
10 .00% 5
10.00% 5
28 .00% 33 .14% 32 .35% 35 .00% 32.35%
35 .00% 37.83% 39.04% 41 .50% 37 .83%
+4 .35% -2.65%
+2.83% -3 .67%
We assume no prior, current, or future FTC positions for the company . Thus, x iim,,, x ,,md , x,,my , and x, all equal zero . The timing and percentage of profits remitted depends on the MTR model . Consistent with the assumptions in the PROXIES FOR MARGINAL TAX RATE section, the mixed remittance MTR assumes that 30% of the foreign profits are remitted as either interest or royalties - whichever is subject to a lower withholding tax rate . After-tax profits not remitted during the current year as interest or royalties are assumed to be remitted at the end of y years as a dividend (i .e . future dividend) . d The model assumes that p .m, proy , and pdi „ are zero since all after-tax profits are remitted as dividends at the end of year y . `The model assumes that p.,,, and p, are zero and that p , ,, a is 100% since all after-tax profits are remitted as current year dividends . a
at the 0 .025 level in any region . Assuming that the U .S . parent has excess credits causes the tax planning MTR to drop below the statutory rate in each region . Given a 10% excess credit, the paired t-tests are significant in the Asia/Pacific region (p < 0.01), Europe (p < 0 .01), and in the combined regions (p < 0 .01) .
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Table 3 .
107
Paired t-Tests' : Comparison of Tax Planning MTR' with Two Benchmarks . Three Regions of Ten Countries Each , Asia/ Latin Pacific Europe America
Panel A : Tax Planning MTR Less Top Statutory Tax Rate (as Benchmark)' Assuming Excess FTC of 10% ** ** (Mean Difference)' (-4 .19%) (-8 .44%) (-2.08%) Assuming Excess FTC of 5% ** (Mean Difference) (-1 .44%) (-3 .95%) (-0.20%) Assuming No FTC History ** (Mean Difference) (4 .18%) (1 .43%) (3 .68%) Assuming Excess Limit of 5% * (Mean Difference) (3 .13%) (-0 .43%) (2 .95%) Assuming Excess Limit of 10% (Mean Difference) (2 .71%) (-1 .13%) (2 .92%) Panel B : Tax Planning MTR Less Current Dividend MTR (as Benchmark)' ** ** ** Assuming Excess FTC of 10% (Mean Difference)s (-8 .79%) (-1130%) (-0 .61%) ** ** ** Assuming Excess FTC of 5% (Mean Difference) (-7 .14%) (-6 .92%) (-5 .23%) ** ** ** Assuming No FTC History (Mean Difference) (-3 .43%) (-2 .74%) (-2.55%) ** ** * Assuming Excess Limit of 5% (Mean Difference) (-2 .73%) (-1 .28%) (-1 .80%) ** * Assuming Excess Limit of 10% (Mean Difference) (-2.15%) (-0.64%) (-1 .78%)
All Countries in Combined Regions
(-4.90%) (-1 .86%) (3 .10%) * (1 .88%) (1 .50%)
** (-8.90%) ** (-6 .43%) ** (-2 .91%) ** (-1 .94%) ** (-152%)
** p-value significant at the (1.01 level . * p-value significant at the 0.025 level . 'All p-values are based on paired t-tests . Ten pairs exist in each of the three regions, and the combined regions include 30 pairs . The p-values are not based on a r-test of the mean difference between the region's average tax planning MTR and the region's average benchmark rate . s Using the mixed remittance model, 30% of foreign profits are remitted as either interest or royalties, whichever incurs the lower withholding tax rate . Residual profits are remitted as dividends after five years . The resulting MTR is compared to the MTRs from both the current and future dividend models. The tax planning MTR is the lower of the three results . `See Table 1 for the ten specific countries in each of the three regions . All p-values in Panel A are two-sided . Mean difference in Panel A is the region's average tax planning MTR less the region's average foreign statutory income tax rate . Mean difference is presented only for descriptive purposes . ' All p-values in Panel B are one-sided since, by definition, the tax planning MTR never exceeds the current dividend MTR . s Mean difference in Panel B is the region's average tax planning MTR less the region's average current dividend MTR . Mean difference is presented only for descriptive purposes .
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Panel B presents the results when the tax planning MTR is compared with the current dividend MTR . By definition, the tax planning MTR cannot exceed the current dividend MTR . The mean differences in Panel B are significant (p < 0 .01) in almost all regions regardless of the parent company's FTC position in prior years . The mean differences increase (decrease) as the parent's excess credit (limit) position increases . Thus, the current dividend MTR and the tax planning MTR for any country are usually the closest (farthest) when the parent company has an excess limit (credit) position of 10% . Overall, Table 3 confirms the notion that the mixed remittance MTR is often significantly different from the two other MTR proxies, supporting its use over simpler proxies ."
6. CONCLUSION Using the top statutory foreign income tax rates as a proxy for the MTR or computing an MTR based on the assumption that all after-tax foreign profits are remitted currently as dividends can cause significant measurement error vis-a-vis estimating MTRs using our mixed remittance model . The mixed remittance model provides a richer MTR estimate since it incorporates more of the factors that influence a U .S . multinational's MTR . Unlike statutory tax rates, the mixed remittance model takes into account that, sooner or later, profits are remitted to the home country, and the remittance has tax consequences . Unlike current dividend MTRs, the mixed remittance model allows foreign profits to be remitted to the home country through deductible remittances in the current year and dividends in future years . Thus, the mixed remittance model provides more realistic estimates of the MTR on foreign profits . This article develops an MTR measure for multinational companies that incorporates an economic approach in its mathematical modeling . Unlike other MTR proxies, our MTR measure varies with the tax rate incentives from operating in a particular foreign country (e.g . incentive to remit profits via interest payments if the interest withholding tax rate is low or zero) . This provides heterogeneity in the MTR measure that is absent from other MTR proxies, such as the top statutory tax rate and the MTR derived from the current dividend model . Since it allows reasonable tax planning assumptions, the mixed remittance model permits more accurate measures of MTRs applicable to foreign profits in many decision contexts . Where to locate foreign subsidiaries, whether to shift income between countries, where to obtain debt financing, and how and when to remit foreign profits are some examples of decision contexts in which the MTR is an important factor. The mixed remittance MTR model yields useful estimates for tax planners, academic researchers, and policy analysts and makers ." Though large multinationals
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109
may retain in-house tax professionals or use sophisticated international tax planning software to estimate MTRs, smaller companies, particularly those going global or with relatively small investments abroad, often do not have access to these resources . For these smaller companies, the mixed remittance model can provide reasonable estimates and, thus, useful inputs into the decisions mentioned above . The lack of company-specific data is one reason prior academic studies of foreign decisions have omitted MTR measures as independent variables or have proxied for such measures with statutory tax rates (e .g. see Gordon & Jun, 1993) . However, our MTR model relies primarily on country-specific data that are readily available . For U .S . companies going global, only country-specific data and the discount rate are needed to estimate MTRs since such companies have no FTC history . For companies with existing multinational operations, researchers need one more piece of information - a proxy for FTC position (e.g . see Smith, 1997 ; Kemsley, 1998) 44 Our MTR model also provides estimates for testing countrylevel hypotheses as, for example, in Kemsley (1998) . Like academic researchers, policy analysts and makers can use MTR estimates to predict income-shifting behavior or to help project revenue effects from tax rate changes .
NOTES I . As these studies indicate, taxes are often significant factors affecting international business decisions. However, Porcano (1993), Rolfe and White (1992), and Single (1999) document that taxes generally are not dominant factors . 2 . Except where otherwise indicated, "foreign profits" are pre-remittance, pre-tax foreign profits . 3 . Foreign profits for the same investment can vary across countries and, thus, can impact the decision of where to invest . To illustrate, assume that a given investment is expected to yield a $100 profit in country A where the MTR is 33% and a $120 profit in country B where the MTR is 40% . Applying the MTR to anticipated foreign profits provides the expected investment return after taxes for a given investor. Returning to the example, the after-tax profits from countries A and B are $67 and $72, respectively . Ceteris paribus, the investor should invest in country B even though the MTR is higher for investments in that location . In this article, we ignore company managers' estimates of before-tax profits for each country under consideration (i .e . $100 in country A and $120 in country B) so that we can focus on computing MTRs . 4 . Scholes et al . (2002, p . 279) state, "different forms of repatriation . . . may be subject to different levels of withholding tax, which makes the repatriation alternatives even less perfect substitutes for one another ." 5 . The foreign tax credit rules can add complexity to the MTR model since operation in some countries can affect the MTR in other countries and vice versa . 6 . Professors also can use the MTR analysis as a teaching tool for students . International tax textbooks typically do not synthesize statutory and regulatory rules to
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emphasize how a decision affects a company economically . Following a textbook's lead, professors teaching international taxation often only teach the topic from a legal perspective, so students have little choice but to learn the material in the same way . For example, classroom instruction of the complex foreign tax credit provisions typically involves only a legal perspective without elaboration on how the results apply in decision-making contexts . Though the legal perspective is vital, an understanding of how results from applying the legal rules become inputs into businesses' decision-making contexts also is important. Such applications equip students to move beyond tax compliance skills and become "tax planning problem solvers ." Specifically, the analytical abilities to compute MTRs and understand the effect of various factors on MTRs are important decisionmaking skills since MTRs significantly affect the after-tax profits of foreign investment projects . The AICPA (1999) asserts that "individuals entering the accounting profession should display effective problem solving and decision-making skills, good insight and judgment, as well as innovative and creative thinking ." Tax professionals who are proficient in identifying the MTRs of alternative investments and determining the impact of changes to the relevant factors affecting MTRs develop such traits and are better prepared to serve their clients or employers and, thus, excel in their careers . 7 . MTRs differ fundamentally from statutory tax rates (STRs) and effective tax rates (ETRs) . STRs are based on the tax rate schedule specified in a country's tax laws . An ETR is an average rate of tax that measures a company's overall tax burden . Generally, the ETR is defined as total tax divided by total net income for a given company (Scholes et al., 2002, p . 161) . Since this article focuses on a U .S . multinational's incremental decisions about a foreign subsidiary's profits and their remittance to a U .S . multinational, MTR is the appropriate concept for focusing on the marginal income and taxes related to these decisions . Both STRs and ETRs can differ significantly from MTRs . Use of any measure other than MTR may not provide a reasonable estimate of the present value of expected tax resulting from a given decision. 8 . We did not incorporate U .S . state and local taxes in the MTR model . Healy and Boucher (2000) indicate that hardly any state allows a foreign tax credit (FTC) to offset the state tax liability . Instead, some permit a state tax deduction for the federal FTC, others permit a state tax deduction only if the taxpayer deducts its foreign taxes rather than claiming a FTC on its federal return, and still others permit no tax benefit at all . Thus, we decided against incorporating state and local taxes in our U .S . income tax measure because of the inconsistency among states in the treatment of the federal FTC . If desired, the impact of state and local taxes can be reasonably estimated and either separately modeled or incorporated into the calculations on an ad hoc basis . 9 . The foreign income tax includes the following : national foreign income tax ; any national surtax - which countries generally base on either foreign income or the foreign income tax ; and any state, provincial, or other local foreign income tax - adjusted for whether it is deductible at the national level . We incorporate the above taxes into the foreign income tax measures since U .S . law treats them as creditable taxes for FTC purposes . On a separate issue, the foreign income tax rate in some countries varies depending on the taxpayer's industry or business activity . For example, Canadian income tax rates vary across provinces and also are generally lower for companies involved in manufacturing or processing activities . 10 . MTRs are not the only important factors in foreign investment decisions . For example, when choosing a foreign location for manufacturing activities, other significant factors might include labor rates, labor supply, work force education levels,
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U.S . Multinationals
IlI
transportation costs, market proximity, legal protections for intellectual property rights, expropriation and political risks, financial services, and infrastructure reliability . Thus, the MTR impact of foreign location decisions is one of many potentially important factors . 11 . The presence of operating losses in some years can increase the complexity of determining a firm's MTR. Our article focuses on the current year profits of a U .S . corporation's foreign subsidiary and, thus, makes no assumptions about the pattern of profits and losses over time . An appropriate MTR, in the presence of loss years, should consider the past and future pattern of a company's profit and losses . For a discussion of these and other relevant issues, see Shevlin (1990), Graham (1996a, b), and Plesko (1999) . Also, we do not focus on alternative minimum tax (AMT) issues for two reasons . First, AMT represents principally a timing issue . Though the spread between the AMT rate and the top U .S . statutory rate seems large, the present value differences over time are much smaller . Second, the AMT affects relatively few companies today vis-a-vis the number of corporations affected a decade ago . Since 1990, and with the easing of the AMT rules in 1997, not more than one or 2% of corporations pay the AMT each year . The U.S . Treasury (2001) reports that the minimum tax credit on all 1998 corporate income tax returns totaled $3 .4 billion while the total income tax before credits totaled $231 .4 billion . These minimum tax credits, which offset the regular income tax, could have been generated any time over the last decade . 12 . Many capital-exporting countries (e .g . Japan and the United Kingdom) have tax systems containing FTC provisions similar to those under U .S . law . Thus, much of this article's analyses are generalizable to multinationals based in such countries . 13 . Rather than organizing a foreign subsidiary, a U .S . corporation might establish a foreign partnership, branch, or similar structure . These alternatives involve a different MTR model than the one we develop in this article since such structures do not permit tax deferrals. Of course, one reason such structures are unpopular is their potential legal liability exposure . As another alternative, U .S . multinationals can use the check-the-box regulations to establish hybrid entities (i .e . partnerships under U .S . law and corporations under foreign law) . Hybrid entities might be used to either flow through foreign losses or avoid the foreign tax credit restrictions when the U .S . parent company receives dividends from noncontrolled section 902 corporations (see I .R .C. Section 904(d)(1)(E)) . A U .S . multinational's MTR for a hybrid entity would not involve tax deferrals since hybrid entities flow through foreign profits and foreign income taxes . 14 . The last four sections do not directly relate to our models . Briefly, I .R .C . Section 905 permits cash-basis taxpayers to claim the FTC on an accrual basis, I .R .C. Section 906 explains the conditions under which foreign persons can claim the FTC, I .R .C . Section 907 clarifies the FTC allowed for oil and gas extraction taxes, and I .R .C. Section 908 reduces the FTC for taxpayers participating or cooperating in an international boycott . Thus, in developing our MTR model, we reasonably assume that the U .S . parent corporation is an accrual basis taxpayer that does not engage in the oil and gas extraction business and does not participate in an international boycott. 15 . Similar in application, I .R.C . Section 960 permits a FTC for taxes foreign subsidiaries constructively, rather than actually, pay . 16 . The U .S . corporation also is entitled to a DPC for foreign income taxes that a second-tier foreign subsidiary pays if: (1) the second-tier entity pays a dividend to the first-tier entity that, in turn, pays a dividend to the U .S . parent, (2) the U .S . corporation owns at least 10% in its first-tier subsidiary, (3) the first-tier subsidiary owns at least 10% in the second-tier subsidiary, and (4) the U .S . corporation indirectly owns at least
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GREGORY G . GEISLER AND ERNEST R . LARKINS
5% of its second-tier subsidiary. The 5% indirect threshold is tested by multiplying the U .S . corporation's direct ownership percentage in the first-tier subsidiary by the first-tier subsidiary's direct ownership percentage in the second-tier subsidiary . A similar ownership test applies for determining whether the U .S . corporation is entitled to a DPC from third-tier through sixth-tier foreign subsidiaries . Consider a U.S . corporation that owns 40% of a foreign subsidiary's voting stock . This first-tier entity, in turn, owns 20% of a second-tier foreign company's voting stock . Thus, the direct ownership is at least 10% at each level and the indirect ownership is at least 5% (0 .4 x 0.2=8%o) . Depending on the portion of E&P remitted as dividends, the U .S . parent is entitled to a DPC for some of the foreign income tax that the second-tier entity pays . A change of the facts illustrates a situation when a DPC is not allowed . Suppose the first-tier subsidiary owns only 10% in the second-tier entity rather than 20% . In this case, the indirect ownership is less than 5% (0 .4 x 0.1 = 4%) . Thus, the U .S . company is not allowed a FTC for foreign income tax that the second-tier entity pays . 17 . As discussed in the next section, U .S . law segregates creditable taxes into baskets to make it more difficult for taxpayers to average high-taxed foreign income against low-taxed foreign income and, thus, increase their FTC . The country where income is earned does not affect the basket placement of creditable taxes or foreign income . For example, German income tax on business profits and Japanese income tax on business profits are placed in the residual basket . 18 . The model we develop in this article applies to foreign business profits, which constitute the bulk of foreign income for most foreign subsidiaries . The majority of other foreign income consists of passive amounts . In many cases, these passive amounts constitute Subpart F income that the U .S . multinational currently recognizes as a constructive dividend . Thus, unlike the model we develop, a MTR model for passive income would not include a term allowing U.S . income tax to be deferred. 19 . Under the U .S . statutory tax rate schedule, the average tax rate on taxable income above $335,000 is always between 34 and 35% . Thus, using 35% (i .e . the top U .S . Lax rate) instead of U .S . tax before the FTC in computing the I .R .C. Section 904 limitation almost always results in a reasonable approximation . 20 . If the corporation expects to use the current year's excess credit during the carryover period (e .g. it has foreign operations in a low-tax country that it expects to turn profitable next year), the incentive to engage in tax planning to relieve the double taxation is lessened . However, many taxpayers with excess credits can expect, without tax planning, to have excess credits in future years also . In these cases, the excess credits will expire after the five-year carryforward period. Thus, excess credit situations often create strong incentives to engage in tax planning to relieve the double taxation problem . 21 . For example, an MTR based on returning all after-tax profits to the home country as dividends during the year earned (i .e . a current dividend strategy) might be a reasonable benchmark . 22 . Excess credits from prior years reduce the current year MTR from operating in a low-tax foreign country since the current year excess limit can absorb at least a portion of the prior year excess credits . In contrast, excess limits from prior years generally would not reduce the MTR from operating in a low-tax country . So, we assumed excess credits since they impact the MTR in this example . 23 . Note that the DPC in years zero and five ($7 .50 + $8 .50) sum to the total foreign income tax paid in year zero ($16). Also, summing the taxable income in years zero and five ($57 .50 + $42 .50) yields the total foreign profits earned in year zero ($100) .
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24 . In effect, the $4 foreign income tax savings in year zero from paying a deductible royalty ($20 x 20%) is more than offset by the $3 royalty withholding tax in year zero ($20 x 15%) plus the change in U .S . income tax in years zero and five attributable to the royalty . So, the royalty payment in this example actually causes the MTR to increase from 28 .83 to 29 .97% . To derive the 28 .83%, the numerator would be : $20 + $3 + $ .625 + [($5 + $3 .375)/1 .61051] . 25 . Excess limits reduce the MTR from operating in a high-tax foreign country by allowing the U .S . multinational to claim a FTC for some current year foreign income tax that otherwise would have to be carried over . In contrast, excess credits from prior years generally would not reduce the MTR from operating in a high-tax country . So, we assumed excess limits since they impact the MTR in this example . 26 . As in Fig. 1, the DPC in years zero and five ($20 + $12) sum to the total foreign income tax paid in year zero ($32) . Also, as in Fig . 1, summing the taxable income in years zero and five ($70 + $30) yields the total foreign profits earned in year zero ($100) . 27 . To derive the 42 .24%, the numerator would be: $40+$3-$2+[($3-$1)/ .61051] . 1 28 . Appropriately, our model does not incorporate taxes based on something other than income. Thus, property taxes, value-added taxes, and other taxes based on asset values or consumption are not model inputs . Of course, such taxes should be considered in the calculation of the expected before-tax foreign profits to which the MTR is applied . 29 . Applicable withholding rates may differ from those existing in the tax laws of the foreign host country or a treaty between the host and home countries since large multinationals often reduce withholding taxes through remittance treaty shopping (e .g . see Collins & Shackelford, 1998) . Thus, as appropriate, the model inputs should be the lower rates from routing remittances through a different country (or countries) with more favorable treaty provisions . 30 . In estimating domestic MTRs, Shevlin (1990) treated current net operating losses (NOLs) as tax benefits affecting the current MTR based on estimates of when the loss was expected to be absorbed in the future . The MTR model in this article considers a different tax benefit - a firm's foreign tax credit position . We must consider the effect that excess credits or limits from current year operations have on the current year's MTR . The absorption period is much shorter than the absorption period of an NOL. Also, an excess credit is absorbed through future excess limits that often depend on international tax planning such as generating foreign income taxed at relatively low rates . So, for tractability, we assume any excess credit (limit) from current year operations has no impact on the MTR if the company has prior unused excess credits (limits) . In effect, we assume the current and prior excess credits (limits) are carried over and expire unused . In contrast, if the company has unused excess credits (limits) from prior years and an excess limit (credit) in the current year, the MTR is affected . Such a situation occurs in both illustrations in the "Marginal Tax Rate Examples" section . 31 . Interest and royalties might be paid in year y, but, if so, they do not affect the MTR in year 0; instead, they are treated as paid from year y foreign profits and affect the MTR calculation for year y . 32 . Difficulty in projecting a firm's FTC position in some future year might suggest that x and x, 1 ,,,, should be input as zero .
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33 . Note that foreign profits (i .e . PRFTQ) drops out of Eq . (15) since it appears in the denominator of Eq . (5) and appears in the equations we substituted into the numerator of Eq . (5) . 34 . If desired, Eq . (15) can be expanded to include other remittance forms such as the payment of technical fees to the parent company . 35 . Though Eq. (15) captures much of the complexities involved in determining MTRs on foreign profits, the authors grant that it does not deal with all intricacies (e .g . for tractability, the model does not consider the I.R .C . Section 864(e) interest apportionment rules) . 36 . Tax practitioners sometimes use the current dividend model, but omit the FTC variables (i .e . x1 n.0 and x ,,o), to approximate the MTR applicable to a foreign direct investment. 37 . Statutory tax rates and withholding rates are obtained from PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1999) . Any differences between these reference sources are reconciled through other resources . On request, the authors will share their Excel spreadsheet of statutory and withholding tax rates . 38 . Collins and Shackelford (1998) found evidence that the remittance forms multinationals select are negatively related to the respective withholding tax rates, which suggests the type of tax planning incorporated into the mixed remittance model . 39 . Of course, multinationals can remit foreign profits as dividends after more or less years than five . In fact, it is common to defer dividends until earnings can be distributed without incurring additional U .S . tax . Our model accommodates any assumption about when and what percentage of foreign profits are remitted as dividends . Our assumption that dividends are paid after five years is simply to illustrate the potential differences between MTR measures . 40 . To illustrate the calculation of our MTR measure and its differences from two benchmark MTR proxies, we selected one low-tax and one high-tax country . Malaysia's income tax rate (28%) falls well below the U .S . income tax rate (35%) . Spain's 35% income tax rate, when combined with its 10% withholding tax rates, causes it to be a high-tax country . These countries illustrate how the tax planning MTR can differ from both benchmark MTRs - the top statutory rate and current dividend MTR . 41 . Since even single percentage point shifts in tax rates can mean sizeable changes in tax liabilities, these differences also are significant from an economic perspective . 42 . On request, the authors will share their Excel spreadsheet that includes the MTR models . 43 . Professors also can use our MTR models to assist students in synthesizing many complex tax law provisions affecting international business activities . One pedagogical strategy we recommend is to progress from easy illustrations (using diagrams similar to Figs I and 2 with many simplifying assumptions) to more complex situations (using the same diagrams but gradually relaxing time period, remittance, and FTC assumptions) . Following each increasingly complex illustration, the professor might demonstrate how a MTR model provides a quicker and easier way to determine MTRs than using the diagrams . Specifically, the professor might estimate the MTR initially assuming that the foreign subsidiary remits all profits as current dividends and the U .S . parent company has no prior FTC position . The current dividend model in Eq . (17) could be used to confirm the diagram results . Second, the professor might relax the current dividend assumption, follow the diagram approach to calculate the MTR assuming foreign profits are not immediately remitted, and use the future dividend model in Eq . (16) to confirm
Marginal Tax Rates on Foreign Profits of U.S. Multinationals
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the MTR result . Third, the professor can illustrate the MTR change from implementing other remittance strategies (i .e . interest and royalties) and verify the analysis using the mixed remittance model in Eq . (15) . Fourth, the professor can return to the initial diagram, but relax the assumption that the U .S . parent company has no prior FTC position, and use Eq . (15) to verify the resulting MTR . 44 . For researchers with access to actual tax return data (e .g . see Plesko, 1997 and Mills & Newberry, 2001), details on companies' FTC positions can be derived directly from the data rather than using proxies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Ernest Larkins acknowledges financial
support
for this project from the J . Mack
Robinson College of Business's Research Program at Georgia State University . Gregory Geisler performed much of this work while on the Georgia State University faculty and appreciates research release time received . Gregory Geisler completed this work while a visiting assistant professor at Indiana University . The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Michael Calegari, two anonymous reviewers, and the editor, Tom Porcano .
REFERENCES Altshuler, R ., & Newton, T. S . (1993) . The effects of U .S . tax policy on the income repatriation patterns of U .S . multinational corporations . In : A . Giovannini, R . G . Hubbard & J . Slemrod (Eds), Studies in International Taxation (pp . 77-115). National Bureau of Economic Research . Chicago : University of Chicago Press . American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1999) . The AICPA Core Competency Framework for Entry into the Accounting Profession . New York: AICPA . Collins, J ., Kemstey, D ., & Lang, M . (1998). Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and earnings valuation . Journal of Accounting Research, 36(Autumn), 209-229 . Collins, 1 ., & Shackelford, D . A . (1992) . Foreign tax credit limitations and preferred stock issuances . Journal of Accounting Research, 30(Supplement), 103-124 . Collins, J ., & Shackelford, D . A . (1998) . Global organizations and taxes : An analysis of the dividend, interest, royalty, and management tee payments between U .S . multinationals' foreign affiliates . Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(December), 151-173 . Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1999) . Corporate and Withholding Tax Rates . New York : Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu . Eskinazi, R . (1994) . South Africa proceeds cautiously to win foreign investors . Journal of International Taxation, 5(September), 404-409 . Gordon, R. H ., & Jun, J . (1993) . Taxes and the form of ownership of foreign corporate equity . In : A. Giovannini, R . G. Hubbard & J . Slemrod (Eds), Studies in International Taxation (pp . 13-46), National Bureau of Economic Research . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Graham, J. R . (1996a) . Debt and the marginal tax rate. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(May), 41-73 .
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Graham, J . R . (1996b) . Proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate . Journal of Financial Economics, 42(October), 187-221 . Hams, D . G. (1993) . The impact of U .S . tax law revision on multinational corporations' capital location and income-shifting decisions . Journal of Accounting Research, 31(Supplement), 111-140 . Healy, J . C., & Boucher, K. J . (2000) . Multistate Corporate Tax Guide . Gaithersburg . MD : Aspen Publishers . Jacob, J . (1996) . Taxes and transfer pricing : Income shifting and the volume of intrafirm transfers . Journal of Accounting Research, 34(Autumn), 301-312 . Kemsley, D. (1998) . The effect of taxes on production location . Journal of Accounting Research, 36(Autumn), 321-341 . Klassen, K ., Lang, M ., & Wolfson, M. (1993). Geographic income shifting by multinational corporations in response to tax rate changes . Journal of Accounting Research, 31(Supplement), 141-173 . Larkins, E . R. (2000) . Business taxation in Latin America : Similarities, trends, and strategies . Journal of International Taxation, 11 (November), 22-37 . Mills, L . F ., & Newberry, K. J . (2001) . Do worldwide tax incentives affect the income reporting and debt policy of foreign-controlled U .S . corporations? Working paper, University of Arizona . Newberry, K. J . (1998) . Foreign tax credit limitations and capital structure decisions . Journal of Accounting Research, 36(Spring), 157-166 . Plesko, G . A. (1999) . An evaluation of alternative measures of corporate tax rates . Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology . Porcano, T . M. (1993) . Factors affecting the foreign direct investment decision of firms from and into major industrialized countries . Multinational Business Review, 1(Fall), 26-36 . Pricewaterhouse Coopers (1999) . Corporate Taxes 1999-2000 : Worldwide Summaries . New York: John Wiley & Sons . Rolfe, R. J ., & White, R. A . (1992) . Investors' assessment of the importance of tax incentives in locating foreign export-oriented investment: An exploratory study. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 14(Spring), 39-57 . Scholes, M. S ., Wolfson, M . A., Erickson, M ., Maydew, E. L., & Shevlin, T. (2002) . Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall . Shevlin, T. (1990) . Estimating corporate marginal tax rates with asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses . Journal of the American Taxation Association, II(Spring), 51-67 . Single, L . E . (1999) . Tax holidays and firms' subsidiary location decisions . Journal of the American Taxation Association, 21(Fall), 17-34 . Smith, J . K . (1997). The effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the capital structure of foreign subsidiaries . Journal of the American Taxation Association, /9(Fall), 1-18 . U .S. Department of Commerce . Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999) . International accounts data : U.S. direct investment abroad. Retrieved (n .d .) from beadata .bea .doc.gov/bea/di/dia-ctry .ht m . U .S . Department of the Treasury (2001) . Statistics of Income. Returns of Active Corporations . Vines, C . C ., & Moore, M . L . (1996) . U .S . tax policy and the location of R&D . Journal of the American Taxation Association, 18(Fall), 74-88 . Wilson, G . P . (1993). The role of taxes in location and sourcing decisions . In : A. Giovannini, R . G . Hubbard & J. Slemrod (Eds), Studies in International Taxation (pp. 195-234), National Bureau of Economic Research . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press . Zahlander, H . (1992) . Sweden reduces taxes while nearly doubling its tax base . Journal of International Taxation, 3(July/August), 115-116 .
DO FIRMS HAVE A TAX INCENTIVE FOR STOCK BUYBACKS? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION Daryl M . Guffey, Dan L . Schisler and Douglas K . Schneider
ABSTRACT This study examines whether there is a tax incentive for firms to engage in stock buybacks . Using methods previously established by Manzon (1994) and Scholes and Wolfson (1989), the results show that firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely to announce stock buybacks than firms with low marginal tax rates . Additionally, firms that announce stock buybacks have lower debt-equity ratios than firms that do not announce buybacks . Tax considerations do not appear to be a factor in the acquisition technique used, open market or tender offer. However, the tax motive and limited investment alternatives appear to he the major explanatory variables in the stock buyback decision.
INTRODUCTION During the 1990s, a large number of publicly-traded companies acquired their own stock . In 1998, for instance, 1,879 companies announced $208 billion of share buybacks . In addition, 1,289 firms announced share buybacks worth $181 billion in 1997 (Standard & Poor's, 1999) . Treasury stock can be purchased Advances in Taxation, Volume 14, pages 117-136 . Copyright O 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN : 0-7623-0889-3 117
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either on the open market or through tender offer repurchases from shareholders . Various hypotheses exist to explain why firms repurchase their shares, including : (1) to meet employee stock compensation contracts ; (2) to increase earnings per share by reducing outstanding shares and/or to increase return on equity ; (3) to convey management's positive private information about the firm's future prospects to market participants ; (4) to reduce a firm's agency costs by returning excess funds back to the shareholders ; (5) to guard against take-over attempts, and ; (6) to increase stock prices . Firms use two dominant techniques to repurchase their shares : open market share repurchases and tender offer share repurchases . In both instances, stock buyback reduces the amount of the firm's assets and stockholders' equity by the amount of cash expended to execute the stock buyback . Regardless of the method used to account for stock buybacks (cost method or par value method), total stockholders' equity is reduced by the cost to repurchase the shares of stock . Thus, the decision to repurchase stock is also a capital structure decision because it increases the proportion of a firm's debt, thereby increasing a firm's leverage. Various factors contribute to a firm's capital structure decision . The motives for stock buybacks cited earlier are all noted non-tax reasons for a firm to reacquire its stock . Scholes and Wolfson (1989) suggest that capital structure decisions are based on both tax and non-tax factors . Other prior studies have examined capital structure decisions in light of a firm choosing to issue either additional debt or equity securities (Mackie-Mason, 1990 ; Dhaliwal et al., 1992 ; Manzon, 1994 ; Carter & Manzon, 1995) . These studies conclude that tax considerations do affect the proportion of debt the firm carries such that firms with higher tax costs tend to have a greater proportion of debt than do firms with lower tax costs . Mackie-Mason (1990) found that firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely to issue debt than firms with low marginal tax rates . However, when firms cannot make efficient use of tax shields, they prefer to issue equity securities instead of debt . Dhaliwal et al . (1992) concluded that firms with higher investment-related tax shields use less debt in their capital structure because of the tendency under U .S . tax laws for investment-related tax shields to lead to the loss of the deductibility of debt-related tax shields . Manzon's (1994) results suggest that firms with low marginal tax rates that retire debt tend to reduce their firms' leverage to a greater degree than do firms with high marginal tax rates . Carter and Manzon (1995) found that firms with low marginal tax rates were more likely to issue equity than debt as compared to firms with high marginal tax rates . These studies provide evidence that tax consequences are a consideration in capital structure decisions .
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If a company has extra cash for investment, the buyback of stock makes tax sense. First, the buyback is preferable to debt retirement because the debt produces a tax interest deduction where dividends do not . This suggestion supports the findings of Manzon (1994) and Carter and Manzon (1995) . Second, the buyback of stock may be an attractive investment opportunity for firms with high MTRs . If a firm is able to purchase treasury stock at a low market price and then resale the stock at a higher price, a company benefits from a tax-free investment in its own stock on which it has considerable knowledge and control . The buyback itself may actually increase the stock price in and of itself .' Finally, another possible tax motivation for a stock buyback may be the increased use of stock in employee compensation packages . If a company purchases treasury stock at a low price, then subsequently reissues the stock as compensation to employees, a deduction is allowed for the fair market value of the stock issued. The company receives a cash-free tax deduction for any appreciation of the stock since the repurchase . We investigate the treasury stock buyback decision to determine if the MTR is a factor in the decision . The tax influence is investigated in conjunction with other factors . One such variable is the investment opportunities of a company . If a company's investment opportunities are limited, it may be more inclined to acquire its own stock, especially since any `gain' from subsequent re-issuance at a higher price will not be taxed. Thus, a measure of a company's investment opportunities (approximation of Tobin's q as developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994)) will be added to the analysis . Firms use two common methods for purchasing treasury stock - open market purchases and tender offers . Typically, tender offers involve a firm making a public announcement, such as an advertisment in The Wall Street Journal, of an offer to repurchase shares at a stipulated price during a stated time period . For holders of the firm's stock to participate in the stock buyback, they must "tender" or submit their shares for repurchase . When a firm uses a tender offer, the offer is usually for a larger number of shares and requires advance notice and preparation . It is hypothesized later in this study that firms using tender offers are more likely than firms using open market repurchases to have non-tax reasons for acquiring their own stock . Hence, firms using open market purchases are more likely to have one of the tax motivations discussed above for acquiring their stock . The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows . First, stock reacquisition techniques are briefly discussed . Second, the proxies used for the marginal tax rate (MTR) and Tobin's q are presented . Then, the hypotheses, research method, results, and conclusions are presented, respectively .
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STOCK REACQUISTION TECHNIQUES A stock buyback, or treasury stock, is a transaction requiring a cash outflow by the acquiring firm . In some instances, the dollar amounts are in the billions of dollars . Typically, firms purchase treasury stock through either the open market technique or through the tender offer technique . The differences between these two techniques are not limited to just the mechanics of the transaction . Open market repurchases are by far the more frequently used technique. According to Securities Data Company, Inc ., in 1996, a time period covered in this study, 723 firms announced open market buybacks while only 50 firms announced tender offer buybacks . 2 Although tender offers were less frequent during this time period, the average size of tender offers tended to be larger than the average open market repurchase . The sample of firms in this study includes both open market and tender-offer firms . The firms in our sample are coded according to their respective buyback technique . The tests conducted in this study, discussed later, compare open market and tender offer firms with each other and with a control group of firms that did not make stock buyback announcements . These comparisons provide additional insights into the motives for stock buybacks .
MARGINAL TAX RATES - A PROXY FOR TAX COSTS In this study, marginal tax rate (MTR) is used as a tax cost proxy . This measure was developed by Manzon (1994) . MTR reflects the present value of explicit taxes on additional income while taking into account net operating loss carryovers (NOL) . MTR is calculated as follows :
MTR =
($1) (1+r)"
(1)
NOL, n = EFA,_
(2)
where : r n
= a non-firm specific discount rate ; = number of periods the firms will have NOLs available to offset taxable income ; NOL,_ i = net operating loss available at period t-1 to offset taxable income (Compustat Data Item 52) ;
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EFAI,_ = market value of equity multiplied by discount rate r at period t- I (Compustat data item 25 multiplied by item 199) . The tax rate is removed from the formula because the formula assumes that all of the firms in the sample are subject to the maximum statutory tax rate .' The above formula is based on equation (4) from Manzon (1994) . MTR does not represent the actual or estimated firm marginal tax rate, but, rather is a relative measure of the marginal tax rate for a firm that allows comparison between firms . The MTR formula requires the choice of a discount rate . A discount rate of 10% is used in the equation, which is the same rate used by Manzon (1994) . Manzon noted that the discount rate should be equal to the rate applied to future income used by investors to price equity . However, this rate is not observable. Rates of 5% and 20% also were used, and they did not significantly change the final test results used in this study . MTR has certain limitations, as noted by Manzon (1994) . Kinney and Swanson (1993) reported that errors exist in the Compustat NOL data . Specifically, Compustat often reports NOLs available to offset book income instead of taxable income, which can reduce the accuracy of the MTR measure . Another concern with MTR is the assumption that firms without NOLs have a tax rate equal to the maximum rate . MTR fails to take into account the possibility of a firm generating losses in the future that could be carried back and offset against current income . Despite these limitations, Manzon (1994) provides evidence that the MTR measure is a reasonable estimate of the tax cost of a firm . Accordingly, MTR is used as an independent variable in this study . More specifically, it is used to examine any difference in the marginal tax rates of firms that repurchase their stock from those that do not . In addition, MTR is used to measure any difference in the marginal tax rates between buyback firms that use the open market repurchase technique versus those that use the tender offer technique . The results of these tests provide a basis for making an inference with respect to the possible tax motive for firms to repurchase their shares .
TOBIN'S Q - A PROXY FOR INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES Tobin's q is the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets to the replacement cost of those assets . A value greater than one indicates that the going-concern value of a firm exceeds the current cost of the assets necessary to generate the cash flow
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opportunities, a market value greater than replacement value indicates that the firm has positive net-present-value projects . A q less than one indicate that the firm's current projects, and perhaps also its future growth opportunities, have negative net-present-values . In general, firms with higher Tobin's q values have better investment opportunities than those with lower q values . We use the Chung and Pruitt (1994) approximation of q (C-P Q) as a proxy for investment opportunities . C-P Q does not require an estimate of the market values of debt and preferred stock, and approximates the replacement value of assets as its book value. Thus, C-P Q alleviates the need to gather bond and preferred yield data, and increases sample sizes dramatically (Lee & Tompkins, 1999, p . 23) . The Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure is : C- P Q = [MV (CS) + BV (PS) +BV (LTD) (3) + BV (CL)-BV (CA)]/BV (TA) where : MV (CS) = the market value of common stock ; BV (TA) = the book values of total assets ; BV (LTD) = the book values of long-term debt ; BV (CL) = the book values of current liabilities ; BV (CA) = the book values of current assets ; BV (PS) = is the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, if available, or the book value of preferred stock if the liquidating value is not available . The last two terms in the numerator reflect the value of a firm's short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets .
HYPOTHESES The research issues discussed above are developed into testable hypotheses . The first hypothesis addresses the possible tax motive for stock buybacks . An ex ante expectation is that firms that announce stock buybacks have higher marginal tax rates (MTRs) than do firms that do not announce stock buybacks . As mentioned earlier, several potential tax motives exist for the purchase of treasury stock . Although which tax motive influences the repurchase decision is not directly tested, one purpose of this article is to establish evidence that repurchase firms do indeed have higher tax costs . Thus, the investment opportunity in one's own
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stock and the increased use of stock and stock options as compensation, as well as the notion of high tax cost firms being less likely to reduce debt, are all potential tax motives for repurchases . Internal Revenue Code QRC) Section 1032 states that a company is never taxed on the issuance of its own stock . Thus, a firm can acquire its own stock and subsequently resell the stock at a higher share price and not be taxed on the "gain ." A firm may be in a favorable position to acquire its own stock and then subsequently re-issue it at a higher price because the management of the firm may have access to information and strategic plans poor to the market . The use of treasury stock as compensation to employees presents another possible tax motive. A company is allowed a deduction for the fair market value of the treasury stock even if the stock has appreciated in value over the company's cost (Revenue Ruling 62-217, 1962-2 CB 59) . According to IRC Section 1032, the company is not taxed on the appreciation of the stock while held as treasury stock . Thus, a company can receive a tax deduction with no current outlay of cash (no outlay for the appreciation of the stock) . While none of these tax-related reasons for stock buybacks are directly tested in this research, they underscore the appeal of buybacks to firms with high marginal tax rates . Hypothesis one (in the alternative form) is : HI : Firms with higher MTRs will be more likely to announce stock buybacks than will firms with lower MTRs . As mentioned earlier, firms can repurchase their stock either on the open market or through tender offers to shareholders . Firms using tender offers to acquire their stock tend to purchase larger quantities than do firms purchasing their stock in the open market as demonstrated in Table 2, column 9. (Table 2 will be discussed in greater detail later.) This tendency suggests that firms using tender offers are more likely to have non-tax motives than are firms engaging in open market repurchases (such as increasing earning per share or fending off a corporate take-over or poor alternative investment opportunities) . Because of the ease of purchase, a firm's use of the open market to buy back shares is more likely because of the tax savings . If firms use treasury stock as an investment, the use of the open market is more likely because of the ability to quickly invest idle cash as a short-term investment . The use of the open market would allow a firm to take tax-free advantage of short-term shifts in their stock price. Thus, hypothesis two is : H2 : The MTRs of firms buying their own stock on the open market will be higher than the MTRs for firms issuing tender offers .
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Hypotheses one and two deal primarily with tax motives . However, the treasury stock buyback decision also encompasses many possible non-tax considerations, such as investment alternatives and existing debt structure . Consequently, hypotheses three and four focus on these two testable non-tax characteristics . It is hypothesized above that firms acquiring their stock by tender offer are likely to have specific reasons (other than a tax motivation) to repurchase their shares related to the strategic objectives of the firm . In other words, given the relative ease of repurchasing shares using the open market technique, a firm would likely have a specific reason to make a tender offer that is more unusual than a desire to have a tax-free investment . Accordingly, the third hypothesis is : H3 : Outside investment alternatives for firms buying back stock by open market repurchases will be better than the outside investment alternatives for firms issuing tender offers . Earlier it was discussed that stock buybacks result in a firm's capital structure having an increased proportion of debt to equity. Firms that already are highly leveraged would be less likely to repurchase their shares because further increases in their debt-equity ratio may carry unacceptable costs to the firm, such as violation of debt covenants or decreases in credit ratings . In contrast, firms with lower debt-equity levels would appear better positioned to absorb the impact of a stock buyback . Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis tested in this study is that firms repurchasing their own stock will have lower debt-equity ratios than those firms not repurchasing their stock . H4 : Firms repurchasing their own stock will have lower debt levels than non-repurchasing firms . Each of these hypotheses is tested using the data, models, and statistical tests discussed below.
RESEARCH METHOD This section discusses the collection of data and the development of the model . Subsequent sections discuss the results, limitations and conclusions . Data
A sample of firms announcing share buybacks was acquired from Securities Data Co . The data collected is for U .S . firms from January 1994 through December 1996 . Further screening was conducted, shown in Panel C of Table 1, to eliminate duplications (i .e . firms with multiple announcements from 1994
Do Firms Have a Tax Incentive for Stock Buybacks?
125
through 1996) and to eliminate all firms not listed in the industrial file of the Compustat database . Only those observations identified by Securities Data Co . as tender offers or open market repurchases were used . Deleted from the sample were announcements that indicated privately negotiated placements or firms that used more than one stock repurchase technique in combination with another repurchase technique. This allows a comparison not only of firms that engage in stock repurchase activities with those that did not, but also a comparison between those that used tender offers as opposed to those that used open market repurchases . Next, all observations indicating banking or financial service firms (SIC codes 6000 - 6999) were deleted from the sample . The final sample contains 482 firms that announced open market repurchases and 32 firms that announced tender offers . Table 1, Panel A, presents the distribution of the sample by year and mode of repurchase . Open market repurchases account for 94% of all repurchases . Table l, Panel B, shows the distribution of the sample by the number of shares to he repurchased in the announcement . Table 2, Panel C, provides detail on the number of firms deleted from the original sample and the reason for the deletion . A control sample of non-repurchasing firms with the same four-digit SIC industry groupings was selected from Compustat . The use of the four-digit Table 1 .
Share Repurchase by Year and Number of Shares .
Panel A: Distibution of Share Repurchases by Year and Mode Year
Open Market Repurchases
Tender Offer Repurchases
1994 1995 1996
192 139 151
10 8 14
202 147 165
Totals
482
32
514
Total
Panel B : Frequency Distribution of Share Repurchases by Size of Repurchase. Number of Shares
Open Market Repurchases
Tender Offer Repurchases
Total
0-249,999 250,000 - 499,999 500,000 - 999,999 1 .000,000 - 2,499,999 2,500,000 - 4,999,999 5,000,000 or more
66 74 92 126 47 77
1 3 2 8 7 11
67 77 94 134 54 88
Totals
482
32
514
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DARYL M . GUFFEY ET AL.
Table].
Continued .
Panel C : Sample of Buyback Firms .
All share announcements from Securities Data Company Eliminations : Firms making more than one announcement per year Firms with no ticker symbols in Compustat* Total firms downloaded from Compustat Eliminations : Firms in the banking industry (SIC codes 6000-6999) Firms which did not have sufficient data for variables in the model Firms using private negotiation or combination of techniques** Net number of firms used in statistical tests
1994
1995
1996
Total
1,147
1,223
600
3,970
(109)
(391)
(730)
(1,230)
(265)
(249)
(304)
(818)
773
583
566
1922
(288)
(193)
(152)
(633)
(157)
(122)
(129)
(408)
(126)
(121)
(120)
(367)
202
147
165
514
* The process of uploading ticker symbols into Compustat generates a file of all ticker symbols accepted by Compustat and a separate file for those rejected . Compustat does not contain all incorporated firms and does not contain privately-held firms, thus some firms from Securities Data Company do not appear on Compustat. In addition, the process of uploading ticker symbols into Compustat automatically eliminates duplicate ticker symbols . The uploaded file creates a Compustat "set" with no ticker symbol appearing more than once. Therefore, when the data are downloaded for that set the ticker symbols appear only once. ** A categorical variable was used to identify the buyback technique . If a firm used a private negotiation technique or a combination of techniques such that a single technique was not used, then such firms were eliminated .
SIC industry groupings minimizes any industry or sample selection biases . This control sample also was screened to eliminate any firms that had announced repurchases during 1994 through 1996 . All firms with SIC codes of 6000 to 6999 were deleted . The control sample contains 7,697 observations .
Models The purpose of this study is to determine whether a firm's choice to repurchase shares depends on a firm's marginal tax rate, in addition to other variables . To address the hypotheses of this study, several logistic regression models were
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developed to analyze stock repurchases from 1994 through 1996 . The general form of the model is presented as follows : Dep . V ar. _ (3,+ (3 i MTR + (3 2 TOBINSQ + (3, DEBTEQ + R, LOGTA + R, PER + s
(4)
where : Dependent Variable = 0 or 1, specific for each model ; MTR = marginal tax rate ; TOBINSQ = approximation of Tobin's q as a proxy for investment opportunity as established by Chung and Pruitt (1994) ; DEBTEQ = total debt divided by total equity ; LOGTA = natural logarithm of total assets ; PER = approximate percentage of stock repurchased . At least two models were calculated . The first compares the repurchase firms with a control sample of like firms, and the second compares open-market repurchasers with tender offer repurchasers . The main variables of interest are MTR and TOBINSQ . TOBINSQ is a widely-accepted measure of a firm's investment alternatives . The other variables in the model have been shown in other studies to affect the stock repurchase decision and are included for control purposes . Smith et al . (2001) classify repurchase motives into four categories . One motive is that stock buybacks provide companies with a means of adjusting their capital structure. A second major motivation is to eliminate a company's free cash flow, the excess cash that cannot be profitably reinvested in the business and that is likely to be wasted if left on the balance sheet . A third motive is that stock buybacks provide a more flexible and tax-advantaged substitute for dividend payments . The fourth common motive for stock buybacks is to "signal" - and, in many cases, to profit from - a perceived undervaluation of the firm . The first two categories are included in our models by including the debt to equity ratio and Tobin's q . The third motive focuses on the tax advantages to stockholders of receiving excess cash in the form of repurchases in lieu of dividends, an issue that does not pertain to this study . The fourth motive involves traditional event study methodology . That is, the market response to announcements and is not relevant to this study . To further control for extraneous factors we include a proxy measure for both firm size (LOGTA) and industry (4-digit SIC codes) .
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Assuming that each individual hypothesis is important, univariate t-