Aid to Africa: Redeemer or Coloniser?

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Aid to Africa Redeemer or Coloniser?

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Pambazuka Press - www.pambaz ukapress .org

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Formerly known as Fahamu Books, we arc a pan-African publisher o f progressive books that aim to s timul
Pambazuka News - www.pambazuka.org

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We also publish the prize-winning weekly electronic newsletter Pambazuka Ne ws. With over 1,400 contributors and an estimated 500,000 readers, Pambazu ka News is the au t horitative pan-African electroni c weekly newslette r and platform for socia l justice in Africa, pro viding cutting-edge commentary and in-d epth analysis on politi CS and current affairs, d evelopme nt, human rights, refugees, gender issues and cu lture in Afric
AFRODAD - www.afrodad.o rg AF RODA D is a research-based pan-African organisation working on economic justice issues and seekin g in particular to influence policy changes on debt, aid
Fahamu - www.fahamu.o rg

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Fa hamu supports the strengthening of human rights and social justi ce movements by promoting innovative use of mformatJon a nd comm UnicatIons technologIes; s timu lating debate, discu ssion a nd ana lyses; p ublishing news and inform
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Aid to Africa

Redeemer or Coloniser?

Edited by Hakima Abbas and Yves Niyiragira

Pambazuka Press

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Publis hed 2009 by Pambazuka Press Cape Town, Daka r, Nairobi and Oxford www. pam bazukapress.org www.pambazu ka.org and African Forum and Network on lA:bt and Developmen t (AFRODA D) Harare www.a frodad .org Pa mbazu k
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Contents Preface

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Hakima Abbas About the con tributors

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Aid colonisation and t he promise of Afri can conti nental integration Tim Muri rhi 2

Th e f ut ure of aid in North-South rel ations Bernard Fou nou Tchuigoua

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Aid from a fem inist perspective AwinoOkech

26

4

Africa battles aid and development finance

42

Patrick Bond and Kho dija Shari(e S

Aid fo r developm ent

59

Samir Amin 6

Aid and rep arat ionS" power in t h e development d iscourse Hakimo Abbas with Nona Ndeda

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Post-9/ 11 aid, security agenda and t he African state Shastry Njeru

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Africa: official development assistance and the Millennium Oevelopment Goals Demba Moussa Dembe.Je

106

Aid effectiveness and t he question of mutual account ability

121

9

Charles Mutase 10 The European Development Fu nd or the illusion of assistance 132 Mouhamer Lamine Ndiaye 11 Africa's new deve lopment partners: China and In dia challenging t he status q uo? Sanusha Naidu and Hayley Herman

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12 Internal displacement, humanitarianism and t he state: the politics of resettlement in Kenya post-2007 Lyn Gssome

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Index

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Copyrighted material

Preface Hakima Abbas W h ile Africa is the biggest reci pie nt o f aid globally, the te rms, conditio ns and principles upo n which aid is conceived and delivered are not defined by the people o f Africa for whom, at least rhetorically, this aid is supposed to create positive change. In global p ol itics, aid is o ften flaunted as a golden carrot to African s tates by established and eme rging global powers alike. Lofty pledges are pronounced during crises or when political clo ut is being wielded. Yet the effects on African peoples' lives has been limi ted. Aid in itself has created
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

s imply address the mainstream discou rse on how to make aid more effective and just - they problcmatise the politics and the very foundation o f aid and developmen t. Offering a number of sol utions to address these phenomena, the book p rovides a distinctly African perspective and analysis of the international aid architecture w hile providing alternatives for Africa's development. Shi ning the li ght on 'traditional' donors or former colonial powers in Africa, Tim Murithi coins the term 'aid colonialism' in a n attempt to highlight the politi cal manipula tion, control and coe rcion of the aid system in Africa. He offers continental integration as the key to remedy this re-colonisatio n a nd posits that Africa must overcome aid dependence by using the continent's own resources to 'operationa lise and fund an indigenous recovery, reconstruction and devc\opmcnt programme'. Si milarly, H a kima Abbas suggests that 'just as colonia l rhetoric maintai ned that Africans were not fi t to govern themse lves so the current aid discourse, co mp lete wi th political conditionality and favour, cloaks the self-in terest of donor coun tries and underlines the co nt inued lack of self-determination of Africans'. Noting that repara tion and aid have been co n fl ated in international d iscourse, the au thor underlines the powe r pa radigm at the foundation of aid, highlighting the origi n of this dynamic in the exploitation of Africa and Africans during colon ialism, apartheid and sl a very. She further posits that reparation is an interna tional obliga tion which Africans must not only demand from Western powers but themselves instigate in an attempt to 'restore dign ity and rep utation' as part of redress. Indeed, reparatio n sho uld not mere ly be a demand to right wrongs but also to redress the power parad igm of inequitable relations between Africa and the rest of the world including aid. The autho r conclu des tha t t he current global economic and financial crisis presents an imperative for Africa to reshape the polities and power at the very foundation of aid and that one such alternative framework for Africa's development would be a systematic a nd co ncerted demand for reparation by states and corporations that benefi ted from the international crimes of coloniali sm, s lavery and apartheid. Understanding aid within the wider development en terprise, Awino Okech offers a n insight in to the po litiCS of aid pa rticula rly as it relates to women's co-option into the p rocess. Prov iding a viii

PREFACE

detailed fram e for understanding aid a nd development from an African feminist perspective, the autho r discomposes the assumptio n that the abundant mention of women in development disco u rse has any significant impac t on the lives of African women, positing that the power and politics of gend er co ntinue to be ignored. She coins the phrase, 'the "and women" phenomenon', to d esc ribe the 'developmen t- isation' a nd hence de-politicisat ion of the gender agenda, and concludes that 'the emergence of autonomous, African led, unapologetically femin ist funding bodies on the continent arc a significant step in rectifying aid imbalances and reshaping the thinking, targets and accou ntabil ity mechan isms with regard to shifting the agenda on women's rights'. Tracin g the history of deve lopment aid to the Ru ssian Revolu tion, Bernard Founou Tchuigoua provides a histo ri c and eco nomic framework for anal ysing aid to Africa. Within this model, the author explores the principles of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the Millennium Developmen t Goals and charts the futur e of development aid, conclud ing that 'the future of developme nt aid will depend on the inte rnal d ynamics in develo ped countries, as weI! as the emerging Southern nations and the forma tion of a Sou th-South alliance'. While Samir Amin argues that a nalysis of d evelo pme nt cannot be reduced to economics but must also co nside r the soc ial dimensions, he challenges the current defini tion of aid and its composites in international development discourse. The author no tes that 'genera l conditionality, defined by the alignmen t to the principles of liberal global isatio n, is o m nipresent' and ex poses the rhetoric intended to mask this and other assumptions to the benefit of 'triad' nations (US-Ca nada-Austra li a, Europe and Japan). The author provides a detailed outline for an alternative fram ework for aid and development. Meanwhi le Patrick Bond and Khadija Sharife take a critical look at the 2008 world financial meltdown and concl ude that its roots lie in the neoliberal export-model and, more Significantly, in 35 years of stagna tio n and volatil ity in the capitalist world, w hi ch have led to a dis-eq uilibration of financial flows and ampli fi ed uneven development in Africa. The paper, however, considers the opportunity 'to contest financia l system orthodoxy' and therefore to ad vance altern ative sources of finance in Africa, w hi ch may ix

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emerge from newer dono rs su ch as Chi na and Venezuela, from a light industrialisation as well as from 'pressure from below' . The aut hors provide concrete models from Latin Ame rican of breaking with the Western aid and debt establishmen t while conclud ing that 'with the fi nancial a.nd co mmercial ci rcuits of global ca pital in extre me retreat, it is time for Afri ca n economics to take the ga p'. Demba Moussa Dembele no tes that, while Africa wi ll not achieve most o f the Millennium Deve lop men t Goals, the European Union is transforming developmen t assistance into an instrument for tra de liberaJisation likely to fur the r unde rde velop African s tates. He lays out a de tai led altern ative paradigm for aid to Africa and outlines the key reqUirement s for implementing this development 'revolution' De mbclc makes note in his essay that a large proportion of aid to Africa from the United States is now mi litarised under the framework of the African Command (AF RJCOM), an argument which Shastry NJeru takes up in his essay on aid and security. Arguing for a sh ift from sta te security to human security in Africa, Njeru notes that Africa n states mu st strengthen their capacity to maintai n the secu rity of thei r citizens - a precond ition for development and peace. Echoing the ca ll for continen tal integratio n and unity made by seve ral of the authors, Njeru proposes de mocratisation, regiona lism and capacity developme nt as key to achieving security in Africa and concludes th at w hen these conditions are fulfilled, even the redefi nition o f aid by the West 'will have little impact on the focused and united African continent' . Cha rles Muta sa, taki ng the curre nt aid arc hi tecture as p rescribed, argues for effective parli amentary a nd civil society participation to e nh ance aid effe ctiveness and mutual accoun tability o f both 'recipie nt' and 'donor'. The autho r furt he r unde rlines the need for debt sli stain abili ty a nd ma nageme nt wh ile suggesting tha t emerging donors may be important in shi ftin g the inequities associated with aid. in the same vein, Lamine Nd iaye foc uses on Europea n aid to Africa and argues th at ' aid fo r trad e is not ch arity' w hile und e rl inin g the negative impact that Economi c Partnership A greemen ts, which the European Un ion seeks to s ign wi th African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, will have on Africa's developme nt. The author co ncludes tha t s timulating

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PREFACE

socio-economic grow th 'requires holistic economic po licies and the poli tical s pace and financial means to implement them'. While many authors make mention of Sou th- Sou th coo peration and aid from emerging donors as alternatives to the continent's aid dilemma, autho rs Sanusha Naidu and Hayley Herman, taking a close look a t China a.nd India's patterns of aid and coopera tion, warn that the nuances of developmen t assistance from these powers do no t disp lay new sets of behaviours but that Africa must itself capitalise on the leverage offered by new sets of players in the internatio nal aid scene to shift the conti nent's position from recipien t to strategic partner. Lastly, Lyn Ossome ex pl ores the collaboration between state and dono r agencies in regard to humanitarian assistance, a nd problematises state accountabi li ty in relation to the international community. Explori ng the specific case study of resettlement of displaced persons in Kenya after the 2007 post-election violence, s he argues that interests and relationships between the state and the internatio nal humani tarian aid regi me 'detracts the sta te from ac ting in the interests of the marginalised, soci ally excluded and disempowered members of society, by limiting its policy options and choices'.

Acknowledgments Fahamu and AFRODA D extend their sincere thanks to the authors and contributors of this volume for sha ring their insights, which provide a range of perspectives of aid in Africa. Th is publication was made possible with the help of grants from Trocaire and EED (Develo p ment Church Services-Cermany), to whom we extend our ap preciation.

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About the contributors Hakim a Abbas is d e puty d irector of Fahamu, based in Nairobi, and is co-editor of the A U Monitor. Samir A min has been director of IDEr (the Un ited Nations African institute for Plan ning) a nd of the Thi rd World Forum in Dakar, SenegaL and is the co- founder of the World Forum for Alterna tives. Patrick Bo nd is a Development St ud ies professor a t the Un iversity of KwaZulu-Natal and director of the Centre fo r Civ il Society. Bond's many books on po li tical economy include Lootillg Africa (Zed Books, 2006). D e mba Moussa D embe le is an econo m ist a nd the director of the African Forum on Alterna tives, based in Dakar, SenegaL Hayley H e rman is research manager at the Cen tre for Chinese Studies a t Stcllcnbosch Universit y, Sou th Africa. Tim Murithi is a senior resea rch fellow a t the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK.

Charles Mutasa is the executive director of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Develo pment (A FRODA D). Sanus ha N aidu is research d irector of Fahamu's Afr ica-Chi na project. N ana N deda is a Faha mu in tern and MA stu dent of international relations a t the United Sta tes International University in Nairobi. M o uh,lme t Lamine Ndiaye is the pan-Africa head of econom ic justice (01) at Oxfam G B, Wes t Afr ica Regiona l Management Centre in Dakar, Senegal. Yves Niyiragit.l is a Fahamu fel low a nd co-editor of the AU Monitor. Shastry Nje ru is based at the Midlan ds State Universi ty, Gweru, Zimbabwe. Aw ino Okech is a Kenyan feminis t researcher a nd acti vis t. Lyn O ssom e is a fe m inist activist a nd gender expert. Khadij a Sharite is a visiti ng sc holar at the Centre for Civil Society, So uth Africa, currently working on her first book, Africa: Policy Profiteering aud tJIC Washingto/J Consenslls. Bernard Founou Tchuigoua is head of research of the Th ird Wo rld Forum.

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Aid colonisation and the promise of African continental integration Tim Murit hi

Introduction This chapte r will assess the p henomenon of aid colo nisation and examine how it is manifest in Africa. The chapter will s uggest tha t one way to remedy the de facto fe-colon isation of Africa through aid is to accelerate and deepen continental integration. African con tine ntal integration is not yet a concrete reality; and it re mains a p romise to be fulfill ed. This chapte r will not argue that all fo rms of aid are synony mous with co lonisation, rathe r it will suggest that aid which imposes cond itio nalities that are not in the best inte rests of the target populations in Africa is the fun ctional equivale nt of colonisa tion . The cha pte r w ill begin with an assess me nt o f the phenome non of underdevelo pment, the n di scuss the notion of aid colonisation. It will also explore some of the argume nts that the donor commun ity might make against the no tio n of aid colonisatio n. The chapter will assess the promise of continental integration and developme nt initiati ves that ha ve been cham pio ned by the African Union (AU ). [t will conclud e with recommendations of how e thical aid, based on a genuine partnership rather than patronage between the do nor co mmunity a nd African societies, can overcome Afri ca's impoverishme nt and und e rdevelo pment.

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AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

The persistence of underdevelopment in Africa Walte r Ro dney defi ned development at the level of the ind i\' idual as ' increased skill a nd capacity, greater freedom, creati vity, sel f-di scipline, responsibility, and mate rial well-being' (Rod ney 1981, p. 3). Societal developme nt is 'the p rogress all peop les make thro ughou t their existe nce in de velo pi ng social str uctures, regulati ng both inte rnal a nd ex te rnal relationships a nd worki ng to wa rd s economic and other improveme nts in thei r li ves' (Ad i a nd She rwood 2003, p. 165). Rodney (1 981, p . 3) also defi nes 'und erdeve lo pment' as the disru p tio n of this natura l and on goin g process of de velo p men t. In this co nte xt, Euro pean coloniali sm had the net effect o f promoti ng developme nt in Europe a nd foste ring und e rdevelo pme nt in Afri ca as well as othe r colo nised regions of the world. This logic o f develop me nt and unde rde velopmen t re p licates itself with the onset o f the 21 " cen tury. The exploitative relati ons hip ho wever is couched in mu ch more soph isti cated te rms a nd pe rpetu ated by ' legal' inte rn a tio nal in sti tutio ns like the Inte rna tional Mo ne tary Fund (lMF), w hich, through its i\ld efin ed poliCies, has ge nerated a nd propaga ted und e rdevelopment in Africa a nd elsewhe re. The IM F, like t he World Bank, is co ntrolled by the wo rld's wea lth iest nations a nd voting o n poli cy imple mentatio n is weighted according to the cap ital shares tha t each cou ntry owns. For exam ple, the so-called Crou p of Eight (G8) cou ntries contro l al most half of the votes whe n it comes to [M F decisio n ma king . As a conseque nce, one shou ld no t be s urp rised whe n the representatives o f these wealthy countries use their in flu e nce to make poliCies that meet the needs of rich co u ntri es at the expe nse of poo r o nes . The TMF has e xpa nded its power and infl ue nce o ver poli cy ma king in ma ny African countries. Some IMF po licies use a system of incentives and pe nal ties in their loan agreeme nts to coerce Afri can coun tries into adop ting trade liberaJi sat ion whi le lea ving the subsidies e mbedded in Western economies untou ched. The IMf, through its lnte rn al Audit Unit, admitted that the wa y it hand led the mone tary crisis in Arge ntina 'deepened a recession that thre w m illions in to pove rty and spa r ked political chaos' (Blustein 2004, p . 7). A simi la r a udi t is reqUired fo r all Bre tto n Wood s program mes in Africa becau se these so-called 'exper ts' are still promoti ng policies that 2 ngntea IT

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are gene rating poverty and unde rmine development. The issue is that the world 's poo rer coun tries do not have the o ption of igno rin g IMF malpractice, pa rti cularly if they rely on the aid - despite its conditionaliti es - to bal a nce their natio nal bud gets. Underdevelo pme nt al so persists in Africa becau se its member s tates arc constantly com pe ting among themselves for the li mited access to inte rnati onal markets rathe r than work ing in concert to dictate to the global eco nomy. Corruption wi thin the extracti ve indu stries (oil, timber and mine rals) in co ll usio n wi th unde mocratic Afri can governme nts also d e prives Afr ica of vita l resources that can fund d e velopme nt. Profit mad e by trans nat ional corporations in these indu stries is ex po r ted fr om the contine nt, and the corporate taxes gene rated are u sed to develop the global North at the expense of local African peo ple. Modern-day developme ntal pate rnali sm is more sophi sticated and dresses itself up as a kind a nd gentle help ing hand with beni gn a nd bene vo le nt inte ntions. In reality it seeks to maintai n a ' master-servant' relationshi p a nd d oes not e nvis age the genu ine e m powerme nt and inde pe nde nce of tho ught in Africa. The ne t effect o f th is is to disempowe r Afri cans from decidi ng for the m selves the best way to dea l with the problems a nd issues they are faCing. So-called inte rna tional d e velopme nt 'expe rts' are availa bl e at every turn, flauntin g their de velopme nt fund s to compel Af ricans to ad opt their id eas. Some of these 'id eas' may be de trime ntal to the well-being of the Africa n co ntine nt. The fund s they flaunt beco me legalised tools for leve rage, coe rcio n and ultimate d om inion. A form of colonialism is the refo re s till taking place in Africa, albeit wit h a mu ch mo re co ncealed and in sidio us face.

What is aid colonisation? The rea li ty in Afri ca is that ai d to a la rge ex tent is synonymous with influence peddlin g, which is in effect a hidden form of manipu latio n, co ntrol and coerci on - or coloni sation. Aid colonis ation ! is therefor e the premeditated util is ation of aid to manipulate, control and coerce the reci pie nt into fulfillin g the dono r's age nda . The persistent po li tics of superio rity o f nation s and races re produ ces itself in the 21 "' ce n tury, albei t couched in the lang uage o f fi scal disci pline, trad e a nd eco nomic li be ralisatio n and 3

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

ultimately aid d isbursement, in a manner tha t clearly benefi ts a minority of powerful countries at the expense of the poore r ma jority. The logic of a new form of 21 " century colonia lism or neocolonialism is implicit in these relationships. in her revealing book Tile Whitelless of Power: Racism ill Tllird World Developmell t and Aid, Paulette Goudge a rgues that, far fro m co ntributing to the ge nuine p rosperity of recip ient countries, most aid to develop ing co u ntries mere ly serves to maintain the globa l power relations of domination a nd subordination. Goudge maintains tha t some of these relationsh ips a rc mai ntained by an unconscious (and occas ionally conscio us) racist attitude of s upe riori ty, which echoes the co lonial ism of the 20th cen tury (Goud ge 2003).

Th e infect ion of aid addicti o n The converse of aid colon isa tion is aid add iction. The re are African governments that are in effect ad dicted to donor fund s and wo uld not be able to fina n ce their own domestic budgets without an infusion o f cash from ex te rnal actors. Aid has a power{ttl effect on s ta.te institutio ns in Africa.. Aid ca n the refore become addictive and infect the autonomy of governments. Economic sovereign ty in Afri ca has become co-opted because a signifi can t number of go\'e rnmen ts rely o n foreign officia l development assistance (ODA) to finance their annual bud gets. f or example, in 2005 the Uganda Revenue Authority collected about 57 per cen t of the taxes due (Murithi 2005). Clearly the state tax administration is dysfunctional, co rru pt, or both . The problem is that donors are willin g to make up the budget shortfall thro ugh aid. This mean s that the state has limited incen tive to improve its tax collection. Ai d sustains several African cou ntries but in do ing so it deprives the m of the autonomy necessa ry to make decisions tha t are genuinely in the interests of thei r people. This gives d ono rs the powe r and leverage to direct key aspects of the government's economi c and political agenda. This means that Afri can governments are effectively s urre nde ring economic poli cy to in te rnatio nal dono rs and fin anci al institutions. In s uch insta nces, these African gove rnments ca n be seen as willing partiCipan ts in the aid colonisation process, o r addicted to aid. In this co ntext, African leaders are more responSive and accommodating of the doctrines and

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paradigms of bilateral and multHa teral lending insti tu tions than they arc to the needs of their own people. It is on this basis that Oswaldo De Ri vero's book s uggests that we are in fact dealing wi th 'the myth of development' (De Rivero 2001). Development is presented as a 'huma ni tarian crusade' in which the kind, righteo us and charitable of the world come together to help the poo r. The real ity is tha t, in many instances, development is more a product of self-interest rather t han genuine moral commi tment. Business interests and rapid ca pital accumulation, as discussed above, have often driven offic bl development assistance agend as. Aid packages tend to be filled w ith condi tionalities that perpetuate a kind of paternalism towards the recipient and undermine its autonomy.

The donor argument against aid colonisation Some sections of the donor community, which is obviously not a homogenous groupi ng, would probably argue tha t aid is intrins ica lly a good thing. For this school o f tho ught, aid co lonisation would be a misnomer. Such donors wou ld argue that perhaps focus s hould be on making aid more effective rather than discussing its effects. But the two are intertwined and we cannot discuss aid efficacy without assessi ng how it has impacted upon African societies. The statistics do not lie. Africa has witnessed a net decrease in a range of developmental indica to rs. Statistics show that instead of positive development, there has in fa ct been a marked increase in underdevelopmen t in most soc ieties in Africa. In 1999, 27 per cent of the world's poor, defined by those w ho live on less than one US dollar a day, were based in Africa. By 2015 it is estimated that 50 per cen t of the world's poor will live in Africa (Seria 2004 ). World Bank data analysed by the South African Institute for Race Relations demonstrated that poverty in Africa will increase and that more than 400 million Africans arc expected to live on less than one dollar a day by 2015. In Africa, 44 million children cannot go to school and millions die as a result of hunger. On this basis, Africa is far from achievi ng the UN Mi llenn ium Develop ment Goals adopted at the General Assembly summit of September 2000. According to analysts, based on current trends, Africa is more likely to achieve the Millenn ium Development Coals by 2165 rat her than the target 5

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

d a te of 2015 (Seria 2004 ). The in stHute's stud y showed that the lack of trans parent and accountable gove rnme nts coupled wi th the debt trap, and corrosi ve economic plan s imposed on the contine nt have all contributed to this situa tion. As an illustra tion, Equ a torial Guinea increased oil production and a ugme nted its gross domestic product (G OP) fro m $164 million in 1995 to $794 mill ion in 2001 , but the re was no s ignificant improveme nt in the living standards of the people. 1n thi s case, massive cor ru ptio n a nd bad governa nce have robbed the peop le of resources tha t could have been used to develop their socie ties. Oth er d onors ex plici tly recogni se that aid is a foreign po licy instrume nt that has to be wielded like a big stic k to bea t the recipie nt countries into the required sha pe. In this co ntex t, the do nor is utilising aid as the fun ctio nal equivale nt of colonisation. Aid beco mes a co lo ni sin g age nt wh en it is : • Used to peddle influe nce wi th the recipient government in orde r to achieve a pa rti cu lar d ono r agend a. Very fe w do nor co untries can honestly cla im not to ha ve used aid to exte nd their sp here of influe nce over countries th at they claimed to be 'helping' . The dono r co mmunity the refo re need s to unde rta ke a critical self-reflectio n of this fa ct. • O ccasio na ll y linked to military procure me nt, whe n a do no r pled ges to deliver aid in re tu rn for the reCipie nt go vernmen t purchasin g its a rma me nts. This is de trime ntal to co mmunities that need clinics, schools and road s mo re tha n armies • Used to p rovide markets fo r do nors to e xport their good s, suc h as dono rs co mmittin g fu nds for HIV/ATDS p rogram mes in a reCip ie nt country and it em e rging that most of these fund s arc going to subsidise pharmaceutical companies in the do nor co untry. • Used to prov ide e mploy ment to citizens of the do nor country. • Used to affect influ ence a nd impose a model of governme nt in a recipie nt country.

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A remedy to aid colonisation The most effective way to avoid aid colonisation is for the African con tinent to overcome aid de pendence, and this cannot be achieved without continental integration. The re are enough resources within the African continent to ope rationalise and fu nd an ind igenous recovery, reconstru ction and developmen t program me . However, these resources cannot be managed and d isbu rsed to fund d evelop ment exclusively on a national le vel, as they currently are; they would need to be harnessed thro ugh a framework of continental integration to which African cou ntries \'oluntarily agree and subscribe. Continental integration in and of itself will not assure an indigenously drive n developme nt programme; it has to be premised and buttressed by a commitment from African governments and societies to a number of p rinciples, norms and poliCies. Primarily, these would incl ude econo mic trans pare ncy and democratic governance. A lack of tran sparency in democratic governance means that Africa's reso urces have sys tema ti cally been mismanaged because dictators, o li garchs and pse ud o- democra ts, who te nd to igno re human rights, the ru le of law and citi zen participa tio n in pol itical affai rs, te nd to hoard the nationa I weal th o f their countries . Whi le there is a role fo r external actors in encouraging coun tries to make the transition to more o pe n an d de mocratic societies, genuine chan ge can o nly be bro ught about when domestic, sub-regional and pan-Afr ican institutions, like the AU and its actors, make it their persona l responsibility to e ntrench transpare ncy. The lack of trans pare ncy in democratic govern ance gives rise to a host of sid e effec ts inclu d ing an inad equate ability to collect and manage tax, which could be a natura l sou rce of developmental fun d s. It also leads to a closing down of political space for associations, civil SOciety, ed ucational ins titu tions and think tanks to contribute to national and continental policy development, du e to the su pp ression of thei r abili ty to highlight the p rob le ms afflicting their communities and t o map out pote ntial solution s. A lack of democratic governa nce can also unde rm ine the rule of law by co-opti ng the judiciary a nd constraining the freedom of the legislature to keep the execu ti ve branch of government in check. Under the cloak of darkness foste red by undemocratic 7

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

ru le, fi nancial corruption and economic mismanagement flour ish and developme nt is d eterred. Pa radoxicall y, when aid is injected in to s uch a situat ion it ca n sometimes postpone the attain ment of ge nuine democratic reforms. In terms of remedying the effects of undemocratic ru le in Africa and an addi ction to aid, deepe r continental integration would p rovide the means to establish a nd consolidate co ntine nt-wide p rocesses to e nsure the self-moni toring o f co nditio ns o f governance within coun tries. Continental integration as discussed above has to be premised o n principles, no rms and policies negotiated wi th the African peo ple . African p residents, prime mini ste rs, gove rnmen ts and societies the n have to commit to uphol d these principles and eleva te the standa rds o f democratic governa nce so that the p romise of continental integration can be fu lfilled. It is only o n this basis that the resources necessary to develop Africa can be harnessed for the benefi t of the con tine nt and for aid co lonisation to become less of a reality in Africa .

Is NEPAD a form of aid colonisation? The AU's New Partne rship for Africa's Development (N EPAD) was conceived as a means to enable Africa to accelerate its active participation on equal terms in the international economic sphere (Doghey 2001, p. 40). Key objectives include develop ing a viable pan-African market economy th rough infrastructure developmen t and promoti ng in tra-African trade. At the AU's assembly in 2002, held in Durban, the declaration on the implementation of NEPAD was adopted, which i.ncluded a more specific declaration on democracy, political economic and corporate governance. Within this latter declaration, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established. The objectives of the APRM a re to enhance African ow nership of its develo pment and governance agenda, to identify, evaluate and disseminate best practices as well as to monitor progress toward s agreed goals. Member states are invited to vol untarily join the A PRM for the purpose of participating in a self-monitoring programme with a clear ti me frame for achieving certain standards of inclusive governance. The APRM, which is a positive element of NEPAD, is a comm itment to self-monitoring and accountability for promoting inclusive 8 ngntea IT

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governance and constitutional government by relying upon peer pressure in which governments moni tor each other (N EPA D 2003). However, it has beco me clea r that, since its inception in 2001, NE PAD is facing a crisis o f credibility and some of its key supporters are questioning whether any real progress has been made to transform the \'ision into reality. Critics of NEPAD argue that the programme relies heavily on a neoli be ral market eco nomy framework which, an alysts argue, keeps Africa from developing and is therefore part o f the problem. Programmes that co mpel govern me nts to repay their u n susta inable and odious debts instead of investin g in the health care and education of their people will only serve to reinforce Africa's dependency and underdevelopment (Monbiot 2002). NEPAD, while a welcome initiative in terms of its pan-African scope, cannot fu lfil its objectives because it is w ritten largely in the language of neoli be ral economics. In this regard it may only fulfil the objec tive of making Africa more pliant to the plundering o f its resources, albei t under the guise of aid and development. In th is regard it would contribute to, rather than militate agai nst, aid colonisation. For NE PAD to overcome this perception, it will need to strengthen local African industries and make them globally competitive as well as e nhance intra-African trade by enco u raging the free flow of labour across the continent, which means establi shi ng greater freedom of movement for African ci ti ze ns.

Financing for development The United Nations lnternationa l Conference on Financing for Developmen t, held in Monterrey, Mexico, from 18-22 March 2002, committed the interna tional community ' to promo ting international trade as an engine for development, increasing internationa l financial and technica l cooperation for development, s ustainable debt finan cing and external debt relief, and enh ancing the coherence and consistency of the inte rna tional monetary, financial and trading systems' (Uni ted Nations 2002, p. 2). The report of this conference, wh ich is a lso known as the Mon te rrey Consensus, commi tted th e international community to remain 'fully engaged , natio nally, regionally and internationally, to e nsuring proper fo llow-up to the implementation of agreements and 9

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

co mmitments reache d' at the co nfere nce (Unite d Na tio ns 2002, p. 15). Esse ntia lly; the Mo nte rre y Conse nsu s recognised the lin k be tween the finan cing of develo pme nt and atta in in g inte rnatio na lly agreed deve lo p ment goals . Ye t, the 2008 Doha Declaration o n Fina ncing fo r Development, whi ch sou g ht to fo llo w u p a nd revie w the implem enta tio n of the Mo nte rrey Co nsens us, no ted that ' inequa lity has w ide ne d' and 'underline d the impo rtance of accele rating susta ina ble broad -based e co nomic grow th, whi ch is pivo ta l to bringing Africa into the m ai ns trea m of the global eco no m y' (United N ati ons 20OS, p. 3). The Do ha Decl a ration furth e r no ted that as fa r a s trade wa s concerned ' many develo ping countries, in pa rticu lar the le ast de ve lo pe d coun tries, have re m a ine d a t the m a rgins o f these de ve lopme nts a nd their trad e capacity need s to be enhanced to enable them to e xploit mo re effectivel y the po te nt ial of trade to s up port thei r develo pme nt' (Uni te d Na tions 2008, p . 9). Esse n tially, the Do ha De clarati o n recognised tha t, si nce the Mo nte rrey Co nsensu s, the re had no t been much prog ress in e xtracting Afri can countries from their reli ance o n aid, and re placing this w ith t rade. In this regard , co nti ne ntal integratio n wi ll serve as a necessary ve hicle for enhan cin g Africa's ca pacity to trade w ith the globaJised econom y. The Third Hi g hLe ve l Fo rum o n Aid Effectiveness, co nve ned in Accr a, Cha na, on 4 Septe mbe r 2008, bro ug ht togethe r m inisters of develo pi ng and d ono r cou ntries responSible fo r p romotin g de ve lopm en t to assess progress to d a te. The meeting no te d that the progress of makin g a id e ffective w as ' too slow' and that 'furthe r refo rm and faster a ction' was necessa ry in orde r to meet the benchmarks set fo r improvi ng the quality and e ffectivene ss of aid (Thi rd Hi gh-Level Fo ru m o n Aid Effectiveness 2008, p . 6) . The key questi on re mains w hy ha ve these a g reeme nts no t been fu lfilled ? It is clear that the re is no incentive amo ng the majority of ex ternal acto rs to facilitate the economi c g ro wth of the African co ntinen t to the point w he re it begins to com pete as an equal partne r in the glo ba l econo m y. To a large exte nt, the co ntinuin g g rowth and developme nt of the markets of these exte rnal a cto rs d epend o n their abili ty to co n bn ue plu nde ring and exp loi ting Africa's natural a nd hu man resources. The re fore, a id colo nisation remains a necessa ry tactic a nd instrume nt fo r m a intainin g Africa in its cond itio n of und e rd evelo pment. 10 ngntea IT

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Conclusion: towards an ethical aid paradigm This cha pter has argued that there is evidence to suggest and demonstrate that aid colonisation is a rea lity in Africa. The deploymen t of aid to manipulate, control <md coerce governments and societies of recipient countries in Africa cannot be understated. Far from uplifting African people from poverty a nd overseeing develo pment, aid co lo nisation consigns African societies to a perpetual phase of underdevelopment. The transition towards ethical aid is vital to restore the confid ence and legitimacy of aid to Africa. In ord er to avoid aid co lonisation, certain princip les need to be upheld. The principles of aid integrity, transparency a nd democratic governan ce have to be upheld so that aid d oes not remain synonymous with infl uence peddling, which is in e ffect a hidden form of ma ni pulation, co ntrol and coercion - or colonisation. The princi p le of being m indful of loca l concerns a nd need s is vital, w hic h means th at internationa l development consu ltants need to become less selfrighteous in imparting their imported doctrines. The principle of aid consulta tion for ums has to be established , beyond the u sual govern men t level and urban eli te, to include grassroo ts populations. This is necessary to ensure that there is local buyin and an indigenous needs assessmen t prior to the designing and deployment of aid. Ethical aid must proceed on the basis of communi ty cons ultati on prior to the design of aid ini tiatives and transparency in the disbursement and management of fund s. All ethical aid packages s hould include university-based educatio n programmes for citi ze ns of the reCipie nt co un tries as we ll as grassroots capaci ty -d eve lop ment training programmes to ensure that there is knowledge and skills tra nsfer concerning the management of the aid projects and their sustenance over the long te rm. A sit ua tion in which ethical aid prevails will not emerge or be sustained wi thout a renewed commi tment to do so. The most effective way to avoid ai d co lonisation is for the African co ntinent to overcome aid dependence. However, this can not be achieved without con tinental integration. Continental integration shoul d be premised and driven by the recognition that no African country is an island unto itself. This is not the prevailing reality on the 11 ngntea IT

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African con ti nent at this time and the refore co ntinental integration, which is necessary to overcome aid co lonisation, rcmaills a p ro mise to be fulf illed.

Note 1. This ph rase was developed through dis<: ussions with Bonnie Berkowitz.

Referen ces Adi, H. and Sherwood, M. (2003) Pan-Africal! History: PolitiCld Figll~s from Africa al!d IIII' Diaspora sil!CI' 1787, Lo ndon, Routledge Blustein, P. (2004) ·IMF made Argentinian crisis worse', Guardia" Weekly, &-12 August Dc Rivero, O . (2001) Till' Myth ofDeve/opmo' l, London, Zed Books Doghey, G. (2001) 'Toward s a strategic vision for a continent in di stres s', in O. Adesid a and A.O. Oteh (cds) Africml Voias. Africml Visions, Stockholm, Nord ic Africa Insti tute Goudge, P. (2003) The WhIteness of Power: Racism ill TIIird World Deve/opment and Aid, London, Law rence ~nd Wis hart Monbiot, G. (2002) 'Africa is forced to take the blame for the d evastation inflicted on it by the ric h world', The Guardian, 25 June Murit hi, T. (2005) The Africa" Union: Pan-African ism, Peacc/mildi"S mId Development, Aldershot, Ashga te New Part nership for Africa's Development (2003) The Africal! Peer Review Mechanism, March Rodney, W. (1981) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House Seria, N . (2004) 'Poverty set to worsen significantly by 2015', Business Day Soulh Africa, 3 November Third H igh-Level Forum on Aid Effecti veness (2008) Arcra Agenda for Actiou, Accra, Gha na, 2-4 September Uni tcd N~tion s (2002), Report oftl,e lutema/ioIlIlICouferelleeouFina •• ciligfor Dwe/opmeut, A/Conf.198n 1. Monte rrey, Mexico, 18-22 Ma r<: h Uni ted Nations (2008) Doha Declaration on Financing for Develop ment: Outcome Document of the Follow- u p Interna tional Conference on Financing fo r Development to Review the Implcment~ tion of the Monterrey Consens us, NCo nf.212JL.l /Rev.l , Doha, Q
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The future of aid in North-South relations Bernard Fo un ou T chuig oua In inte rnatio nal politics, fo reig n aid refers to support given by a s tate or a coali tion to a less e ndowed o ne in o rde r for it to meet certain need s, be they po li tical, mi litary, cultur<11 or economic. The roots of these relatio nships lie in the or igins o f s tate formation. In thi s paper I w ill argue tha t the concep t of foreign aid stems from the notions of human progress that developed in 18 th -centu ry Europe. The id e<1 e m e rge d from the context of the development of theories of unegual d evelop me nt at a time whe n North Atl anti c Europe was already positioned at the apex of the global d evelopment hie rarchy that had been developi ng s ince the 16th century. When discussi ng co ntemporary notions of developmen t, one mu st ta ke into account history as well as the intrinsic logic of glo bal capitalism, the socialist experiences and the stru ggles of the Third World, as witnessed in the course of the 20 th centu ry (H obsbaw m 1995). Rel atio ns between Africa, the West and Japan, and China will be a key reference point.

Development aid, a Soviet innovation

Aid as ext ern al support The conce pt of 'develo pment aid' is probably among the most ambiguo us. In th is pilper, I will use the term to refer to il system of external support, tak ing mu ltiple forms, that assists a reCipient govern ment in achieving its in tegrated developmen t plan. The integra ted developme nt plan consists of three fundamental processes: an accelerated industriali siltion d rive that supports the modernisation of farm ing and rura l development - which in itself helps to 13

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? s te m the flo w of rural- urban migratio n; an e ducatio n system tha t providcs lite racy and pro fessio nal training aimed at meeting the research and de ve lo pme nt need s of the co untry; and a syste m of commu nica tio n tha t stre ng the ns syne rgies be tween a nd w ithin sec to rs. Today, de ve lopme nt presu p poses tapping the real po te ntial a nd usc of ICT as morc than a fa shio n accessory; as lo ng as it fo rms part o f a glo bal de vel o pme nt strategy. In o ther wo rd s, de ve lo pme nt a id exte nded by an industrialised to a no n-ind ustrialised cou ntry seeks to ensure that the two partners a re able to e rad icate risk facto rs, bo th natilral and man-mad e. Develo pment aid also seeks to transfo rm the relationship into o ne of mutu a l assistance between equa l partne rs, w he re the equ ality may no t necessaril y refer to po we r relatio ns but a pplies in term s of living standa rds and econo mic and technological capacity. The g ro wth and expansio n of an e ntre prene urial class with rea l political and econo mi c influ e nce is a hallmark of the success of any develo pme nt strategy, whether o r no t this is a product of external assistance. Th us, GDP gro w th rates have no real meaning in the ir relatio nship wi th the structure. With in our analytical fram e wo rk, q uantifyin g finan cia l inflo w s o r bal ances of pay me nt and de bt cance ll atio n are very impo rtan t fac to rs within the conte xt of a rea l partne rship. In sub-Saha ran African co untri es m o re th a n elsewhe re, the e du catio n syste m s and in stitutio ns linked to the d evelo pme nt process are key resources, a nd should ta ke up to 15 per cent of GDP in the fir st d ecad es. The s ta te can cut do wn o n ex penses t hat do no t im pact direc tly u pon natio na l se curity and eco nomic g ro wth. Edu ca tio n contribu tes directl y to growth whe n the econo my takes o n a techno-scie ntifi c be nt by offe ring mo re higher-paying ,obs. Pa re nts a re the re fore increaSingly willing to sacrifice immed iate consumptio n to secure the ir childre n's future . Be tween 1960 a nd 1980, Co te d ' ivoire and South Ko re a had co m pa rable g row th rates in te rms of per cap ita incom e, but the la tte r soon de velo pe d into a n aid do no r, a nd the fo rmer, a reCipie nt. This is be ca use in South Ko re a eco no m ic g rowth was based o n technologica l and scie nti fic ad van ces, whi le in Co te d'lvoire it was based o n the exploita tion of na tura l resou rces - basica lly a continuatio n of the colo nial sy ste m. In additio n to this, Cote d ' ivoire was mo vin g fro m an o ra l culture to a w ritte n o ne, fro m a traditio na l and ethni c colle ct ive to a natio na l o ne . These are huge 14

2 THE FUTURE OF AID IN NORTH -SO UTH RELATIONS

challenges that the Koreans had overcome centuries earlier. This is why the spli tting o f the origi nal Korea into two countries was seen as a big traged y, while lvorians attach little importance to the s hi ft ing boundaries of thei r own country that was formed at the end of the 19'1'1 century by European powers. Limiting the definition of development to its economic cha racter is not to be strictly economist, bu t to avoid mea ningless and divisive debates. Development disadvan tages certain interests, wh ile favouring o thers. For in stance, the promotio n of local autonomous entrepreneursh ip nega tively im pacts upon those whose business depends on partial processing and importation of components, etc. Generally speaking, groups that stand to lose purchasin g power from pa rtnerships are likely to oppose the revolutio nary measures implied in development. But what arc the origi ns of development, and how has it evol ved ?

Th e orig in s of aid Reference is often made to the Marshall Plan as the origin of aid for reconstruction and development. 1 do not conCltf. Arnerican aid for the reconst ruction of Europe and for the development of Korea was inspired by the experiences of the Russian Revolu tion. The Communist Party brought together the former colonies of the Russian empire as independent states in a Union of Sov iet Socialist Re p ublics. In these new republics, Bolshevism destroyed the exploitative p rimordia l rela tions and deposed the ruling classes who had li nks to the Tsarist system. This is where the notion of development aid was conceived with the aim of establishing equality between the member states o f the union . This ex pe rience caused ripples outside the Soviet Union - in Eastern and Southern Asia - where resistance movements were inspired to combine the anti-imperialist drive with the destruction of feudal social relations as a means to achieve accelerated develo pment and industrialisation. Development aid was therefore a means to he lp Ru ssia's ex -colonies become repub licS, to transform the rela tions and systems of production and encourage the growth of thei r domestic markets. lnstead of relying on this experience in the aftermath of the Second World War, th e capitalis t world developed and set in p lace a system of polarised developmen t based on collective imperia lism und er the hegemony of the United Sta tes. 15

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

Establis hing coll ective im periali sm A new concept develo ped after the victory of imperia li st democracies o \'er imperialist dictntors hips in 1945, when Ja pa n and the Western powers decided to do away with war as a m ean s of resolving disputes; however, they reta ined this option in the West- East and used it in North-South relations. The United States played a pivotal rolc in the estab lishment of collective imperialism (0) (A min 1991). [t succeeded in turning its vanquished enemies in to allies agai nst the in terna l thre at of communism, and the former co lonial powers i.nto allies in the fi ght against the e mancipato ry project of the radical li beration movements . The new collec tive imperia list g ro u p, mil itarily and eco no mi ca lly powerful, very deftly used the notion of universal humani ty to its benefit . It succeeded in stripping the UN General Assembly of any real power, consigning the United Na tio ns Eco no mic and Soci a l Counci l to the simple role of collecti ng inform ation an d holding deba tes, and giving the Securi ty Council the Singul ar responsibility of preventi ng nuclear war. in terms of North- South relations, the Western powers took contro l of the Bretto n Woods institu tio ns, where the vote is proportio nal to the contribu tions of member sta tes, as is the case with private corporations. The hidden aim was and remains to prevent the peoples of the periphery from developing technologically and economically to the poi nt w here they could cha lle nge the centre. Are there any grou nds to ho nestly assume that the Millennium Develo pment Goals (MDGs), o r even the Paris Declaration, in any way mark a d eparture from this Western concept of developme nt a id ?

The Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declaration

A critical analys is The fact tha t the OEC D and the Wo rld Trade Organisation have agreed to coll abora te o n the indicato rs is al so seen as a major innovation. But is it really? The Paris Declaration is touted as a mechanism for the realisation of the Mi ll enn ium Develo pment Goals. The volume o f aid to 16 ngntea IT

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2 THE FUTURE OF AID IN NORTH -SO UTH RELAT IONS the least developed countries ( LDCs) was projected to increase by 60 per cent (an additional $50 billion) by the year 2010. The in crease in a id volume will not necessari ly red uce poverty levels if the quality of aid does not improve. The participation of LDCs in the Paris Declaration marks an unprecedented unity of purpose and collective will to reform aid into a more effective weapon against world poverty. The au thors of the decla ration insist that the OECD was represented by its secreta ry-general, the Wo rld Bank by its preSident, UN DP by its executive director, and Asian and African Development Banks and the Euro pean Bank for Reco nstructio n and Developmen t by their presidents, etc. The authors of two influential reports (GECD 2006, 2007) assert that the Pa ri s Declaration ma rks a departure from previous accords (read the Yaounde Convention, followed by the Lome Accord and Cotonou Agreement) in four respects: ownership, align ment and harmonisation, outcom es-based management, and mutual responsibili ty. The princip le of ownership ensues from the acknowledgement by the participants from the South that no alternative strategy exists for reducin g poverty by 50 per cent as envisioned by the 2000 summi t that resulted in the MDGs. Recip rocally, aid donors co nform to this ownership strategy and harmo nise their aid conditions as far as possible with the needs of reci pient countries. The principle of alignment and harmoni sation takes into account the reality that some of the aid recipient cou ntries do not have the capacity to ap ply the principle of ow nership. In these cases, the donor coun tries w il l go as far as setting in place joint pla nning and fi nancing and implementation programmes (paragraph 32). The principle of outcomes-based management arises from the need to measure progress towards achiev ing the set objectives (paragraph 43-46), based on a li st of 12 indicators, none of which has anything to do with the level of indu stria li sa tion. The fo ur principles are articulated in the form of an Efficiency Pyramid, with ownershi p and mutual responsibility as the twin lynchpin s. Owne rship is not seen as a techno-politica l and social process. It is for this reason, on the one hand, that the Paris High- Level Forum was p receded by working-group meetings held III Honduras, Kirghizstan, Tanzania and Saudi Arabia, as well as a d ialogue and informatio n session bringing together 17

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

representa tives of about 50 NGOs 'from all over the world' in Fe bru ary, also in Paris. On the other hand, the recipient commits to present to its pa rliamen t a well-conceived provisiona l budget tha t includes donor commitments. Donors are asked to provide the recipients with precise deadlines and disbursement dates. Ownership and mutual accountability that requires transparency a nd full disclosure are seen as two pillars of good aid governance.

Social revolution stifled A critical reading of the MDGs and the Paris Declaration gives the impression that the authors are dow nplaying the social revolution that has taken place in the post-colonial era. In the 30 years of independence preceding the Millennium Declaration, African societies ha ve undergone massive modern isation in the soci al s phere. All countries have experienced rapid growth in literacy levels and a marked reduction in the use of traditional medicines in the face of an upta ke of modern scie ntific medicine and the use of rnodern pharmaceutica ls - and thi s within the context of accelerated urbanisation that has produced piped potable water and electrifi catio n at a rate unimaginable during colonial times. The demand for education and modern medicines has taken on a life of its own, far outstripp ing t he p roductive poten tia l that has not grown concomitantly. While school-goers and their parents use the West as a model, the eco nomy remains hamstrung by an agrarian system that can on ly feed rural peasants while food dependence persists. Development aid was in fact more impo rtant in the face of growth in the poli ti cal power of the Third Wo rld and the concrete str uggles taking place in East Asia and Cuba for a socialist alterna tive to capitalis m and global monopolies that were protected by the imperial powers. The problem is that thi s soda ! revolution not only remains unattainable bu t is stifled for two reasons. In the logic and history of Western capitalism, economic revolution precedes social p rogress. In Africa, post-co lonial social transformation was comple tely detached from the economic, technological and mental progress that wou ld have eqUipped the state to meet the demands of growth and be competitive on the global stage (Tandon 2008, Mende 1975, Hayter 1971). 18 ngntea IT

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The MDGs and the Paris Declaration propose accelerating the modern isation process by increasing and improving aid management without reference to an eco nomic revolution. ' n the case of Niger, it became clear that a stra tegy for economic growth had to include the exploitation of uranium and other raw materials, thus posi tioning the country at the foot of the production chain for the d evelopment of nuclear e nergy. Abdou Moumou ni Dioffo (1998), a physicist from Niger, unsuccessfully proposed including so lar energy as a n importan t resource for developmen t. Niger is one of the few countries o n the continent possessing \'ast coal deposits. Today; coal is used to generate the electricity required for uranium processing, and this has enabled France to generate up to 25 per cent of its energy needs from nuclear power and position itself as one of the leading na tions in term s of constructio n and industry. Niger, on the other hand, is threatened by the e ncroa ching Sahara desert as a result of the destruction of its forests for the charcoal used for cooking, heating and artisan jewellery production. A proper developmen t strategy imp lies an industriali sation that advances and improves the livelihoods o f rura l societies and allows for manageable resource mobility. The current resource exodus does not allow for this. In the current scenario, the growth of regional economic blocs able to speak with one voice o n the world stage is indispensab le. The Maghreb countries did not shy away from supporting regionalist movements in the north of the continent. The new partners hip d oes not p ropose anything new in this rega rd. It is unfortunate that the leaders of the Econom ic Com mu nity of West African States (ECOWAS) and the riparian states of the River Niger use these organisations to serve themselves rathe r than to promote s ustainability and autonomy for their respective co untries. The Niger example goes to illustrate tha t one of the key functions of the MDGs and the Paris Declaration is to devalue the importance of the African peoples' stru ggle for independence while masking a sinister anti-ind ustrial policy. In fact, the MDGs do not talk about the need for aid to foste r the development o f industrial capi tali sm within 25 years, the time it took Korea to industrialise with massive amounts of aid from the US and Japan. It ca lls into question wha t the real ac hieveme nts will be for those co un tries that will have attai ned 19

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

the MDGs between 1990 and 2015 if they are not industrial ised by the n. O ther than setting up per m anent military bases in Ko rea, the USA also set in place a process o f agricultural reform for small-scale farming. South Korea and Taiwan indicate that the problem of aid effectiveness in Africa is not due to ignorance on the part of the West. The fact that social challenges arc mitigated by political stability is due to the fact that these two countries are industria li sed . Suffice it to say that the history of Sou th Korea and Taiwan places them on a better footing than African countries. For one, they both had a tradition of a wri tten language as old as the West's, which made education easier. This co ntrasts with su b-Saharan Africa, characterised by a multiplicity of indigenous languages and the domination of the languages of the colonisers.

The future of development aid The future of development aid wi ll depend on the internal dynamics in develo ped cou ntries, as wel! as the eme rging Southern nations and the formation of a So uth- So uth alliance.

Th e future of Western aid It is likely that the US will maintain its hegemony wi thin the co llective imperi alist structure, as evidenced by the growth of multilateral aid in comparison with th at of b ilateral assistance. How is this likely to affect the Western perception of relations with the Third World, fo r whom the notion of structural equality is required? During the Co ld War, the US supported the capita li st revolution in Third World countries as a mean of keeping communism at bay. The development crisis and the fall o f socialism in the 1980s provided mul tinational corporations the space for sel fregulation and autonomy from the state and civi l society where they operated . In Africa, the consequence o f this has been the impoverishment of close to 90 per cent of the population, coupled with rea l or latent poli tical chaos. This self-regulation assumed that public aid to the Third World did not ma ke sense since liberal marke t policies and mechanisms would assu re access to intern ational financial resources, either through loans or direc t investments. The staff changes at USA ID clearly demonstrate the diminished importance of development aid as a tool of foreign policy. The 20 ,eo IT

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2 THE FUTURE OF AID IN NORTH -SO UTH RELAT IONS

change in staff numbers betwee n 1975 and 2007 was as fo llo ws: 1975, 4, 300; 1985, 3, 600; 1995, 3, 000; and 2007, 2,200. In 2008, the o rgcmi s
Lessons from t he Soviet experience It is instru ctive to revert to the exa mple of the forme r Sovie t re pub-

li cs. The difficulties that the So vie t Unio n faced in imple mentin g mod el for develo pme nt aid s till provi de li S with valuable lessons, eve n afte r its co lla pse. The ideologica l aim of de velopme nt aid was to create a syste m of mutual assistance that would lead to a harmo nisation o f econom ic s tructures and the mate rial well being of the partn er countries. Gra nted, it was easy to
21

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

midd le class for the socialis t agend a a nd in terna tional sol id a rity und er a commu nist party; and 2) in contrast to ca pitalist socie ties wh ere the acc umu lation of capital allo ws multin ationa ls to ove rtly o r covertl y influe nce the political syste m, in socialist econo mies public o wne rship of the means of p roduction implies transp are ncy and d e mocracy which te nd s to fr ustra te their effor ts. Mo re p reci sely, the concentrati on of ca p ital gives mult ina tio nals (and not the ma rke t) a huge advantage over inte rn al social a nd econo mic forces for social developme nt and democracy. These co rpo rations have, accord ing to Holly (2003), m a naged to influe nce the policies and direction of the majo r UN age ncies to their ad vantage . The alte rnative globalisa tio n ca mpaigne rs have a n egalita ria n vision of the world and socie ties that a nima te revolutionaries . However, the y need to place more emphasis on de mocracy, sove reignty an d the chall e nges in m anagi ng the compe tin g forces of equality o n the o ne ha nd, a nd libe rty o n the othe r,

How far can cooper ation with Ch in a go? The strengthe nin g of Chi nese ties in the So uth is e vide nt, at a symbo lic level, for insta nce throu gh the China- Africa summit of 2006, as well as at a more co ncre te level through agreeme nts with \'arious gove rnme nts. C hina p refe rs to refe r to its increa sin g, com p lex partne rships o n the con tinent as eco nomic ra the r tha n devel opme nt coo peration, which it sees as p ate rnalis tic and deceptive . C hina does not ma ke the d istinction between development aid and fi nanci al a nd non-finan ci al inflo ws (Weste rn co untries, by co ntrast label any resource tra nsfe r as aid if it does no t consist o f more tha n 75 per ce nt in inte rest-ea rni ng loa ns) . A ccording to Chinese princip les, everythi ng is ope n to negotiatio n, including aid conditio ns. C hin a- Afri ca relations are based o n fo ur key principl es; equality, non-inte rfe rence, mu tual benefi t a nd non-politici sed hum anita rian assis tance. All p artne rs are equ al, regard less of po sitio n. Chin a refu ses to get involved in the intern al o r inter-African po li tiCS o f its partne rs. Ln accordance wit h the princi ple of mutua l be nefit, eac h partner has the right to negoti a te in the best in te rests of the s tate and its peo ple . As rega rds t he principle o f non-politicised hu ma nitarian assista nce, China does not concern itself with the

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2 THE FUTURE OF AID IN NORTH -SO UTH RELATIONS political causes of humanitarian crises. Fo r the leaders of postMaoist China, reciprocal benefit s upersedes all o ther ideological a nd po litical considerations. In reality, however, China does apply an im p lici t condi tionality because it only signs important agreements w ith cou ntries that do not recogn ise Taiwan as an inde pendent state. On a prac tical level, China is faced with the new phenomenon of a Third World of pub licly funded and apolitica l nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). It created the China- Africa Business Council (CA BC), a jO int p roject between the United Na tions Development Programme (UN DP) and the Ministry of Trade. This is a NCO whose m ission is to suppo rt Chinese investment in Africa and to facilitate Sino-Afri can trade ties (China- Africa Business Counci l 2008, p . 35). The scope of the CABC includes South- South relatio ns, since one of its objective missio ns ' is establishing an enduring pu blic private partnership and providing a mechanism whereby the Chinese governmen t and the private sector may meet to discu ss ways in which Chi na and African cou ntries ma y be further st rengthe ned'. The CA BC ma ndate covers the whole of Africa, which p laces it within the scope of Bandung H, if a little to the righ t. Sud a n provides an ideal window into Chinese cooperation in Africa. The partnership is structured around the ex plora tion, production and processi ng o f petroleum by the C hina Na tional Pe trol eu m Corporation (eN PC), which began its o pera tion the re in 1995, while Western petroleum compa nies left as the co untry was on the brink of beco ming a major producer. Toda y the CN PC is the major (40 per cen t) sta ke holder in a multinational corporation tha t includes Malaysia Petroleum (30 per cent), Ca nada SPC (25 per cent) and Sudan Nationa l O il Corpora tion (5 per cent). CN PC's in vest me nts in Su dan were va lu ed at $7.143 bi ll ion in 2007. in China's view, the CN PC helps reduce poverty th rough urban and rural electrification, the build ing o f several hospitals, and the creation of places for an additional 65,000 p upils attending schoo ls bui lt by the com pany. China has also engaged in technology transfer in the area of hydrocarbons. 'Afte r more th
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? Su danese key employees and engineers are now ava ilable for annual train ing from China with the opportunity for fu rther educa tion' (see Chin
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the formation of a system that offe rs national or regional development options. Currently, it seems to us that C hina is more amenable to sup porting na tional develop ment than the West, w ithout necessari ly cl ai ming a position of dominance. This notwi thstanding, China, too, places e m p hasis on tied aid.

References American Academy of Diplomacy (200S) Tile Frmign Affai"" Budget for the Future Fixing tile Crisis in the Diplom a/ic Readiness. Resources for llS Global Engagement, Washington DC: American Aca d em y of Diplomacy Amin, S. (1991) L'Emplre dll Chaos , Paris , I' Har matt an China- Afr ica Business Cou ncil (200S) Corporate Africa, III, p. 35 Hobsbawm, E.J. (1995) The Ag,. ofExlreme5: A History of lh e World, 1914-1991, New York, Pantheon B<.>Oks Hayter, T. (1971) Aid as Imperialism , Lon don, Pengu in Books Holl y, D.A. (2003) ONU. Le Systeme Polilique lnlerna/ional et /a Polrtique Internationale, Pari s, I'Harma tta n Mende, T. (1975) De /' Aide ci la Rec%nisation, Paris, Se u il Moumouni Dioffo, A. (1998) L'Edlica /iolJ ell Afrique, Paris, Presence Africa ine OECD (2006) Repartition Giograpiliqlle ae~ Re.ssollrces Fillanciere Allow~es tWX Fays ell Dive/oppemenllOO1---{)6, Paris, OECD DECO (2007) Revue Cooperalion pOllr Ie Deve/oppcmenl, Paris, DECO Tandon, Y. (200s) Ending Aid Dr.pelldencc, Oxford and Ge neva, Fahamu Books and South Centre

25

Aid from a feminist perspective Aw ino Okech

Setting the parameters There are currently two key processes that are shaping the ways in which financial aid from the North is channelled to the global South for development. These are the Aid Effectiveness and the Fin ancing for Development processes. The Aid Effectiveness agenda is grounded on the Pari s Declaration. It was instituted and is facili tated by the Developmen t Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC). The Financing for Development agenda on the other hand, falls under the a uspices of the United Nation.s and is based on the Mon ter rey Conse ns us. The concept of development aid and its effectiveness has acquired grow ing importance in internationa l discussions in the last two decades. The impetus toward s exploring the effi cacy of aid stems from, among other things, the failure of the structural adjustment programmes pu shed for by the Bretton Woods institutions in Africa in the ea rly 1990s. [t comprises neolibera[ macroeconomic policies, such as those currently being pursued under the Economic Partne rship Agreements under negotiation with African, Caribbean and Pacific Cou ntries, the increaSing phenomenon of tied aid, as currently witnessed through the A FRJCOM (Africa Command)l debacle, as well as a n increasing vigilance on the part of civil society o rganisations to ensure that 'developmen t' partnerships and attendant aid promotes change in real terms. This paper has, as its point of departure, an awareness that a discussion a bout aid cannot be abstracted from the development

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3 AID FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE en terp rise and as s uch an understand ing of the dynamics of the latter is instrumental to understandi ng the fo rmer. It also takes cognisance of the fact thai mu ch ha s been w ritte n with regard

to aid from a women-cen tred perspective. A significant amount of thi s material has been developed by AW ID (Association for Women's Rights in DC\'cio pmcnt), which has provi ded fairly d etai led an al ysis of what women's rights o rga n isatio n s expect

from both the aid effectiveness and the financing for development processes. These in sum mary include: Clear mechani~ms of consultation and contribution to the process arc established ; resources at"{' a llocated to ensure diverse and inclusive partiCipation w ith capacity to influence the

process; a clear mechani sm of accountability tha t shows how contributions made by women's o rg
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

inclu sion in develop me nt sets the found ati on for unde rstandin g what I have previously noted as a resurging debate w hen it comes to the question of wo me n's ri ghts and aid effective ness, or lack the reo f. This pa pe r w ill not go in to grea t le ngth to historicise the larger aid debate, as this will be cove red by o the r components of th is publication.

Some definitions O ver fi ve decades o f the existen ce of feminism as an ideological fra mework a nd as a moveme nt, the te rm co ntinues to evoke a ra nge of fairly strong reactions.3 A political choice has been made to u se the te rm 'fe minist' and this could be based o n a ra nge of facto rs; one bei ng that a fe minist a nalysis offe rs something diffe re nt fro m a ge ne ric developme ntal wome n's ri ghts o r ge nd er a nalysis o r it is a recognition of the watered -d own a nd d e po liticiscd 'gende r' agenda and seeks to reclaim the term and h ence its po litics. As a result, I w ill revisit a broad definitio n o f fe minism, the ideological basis hom w hich anal ysis in this piece will be conducted. J will also loo k at wha t is po pula rly referred to as gender analysis bu t within that examine the emergence of gend e r as a tool of analysis th ro u gh the his tory of wome n within d e velopme nt as a trope and subseque ntly highli ght the ro le ai d has played in sha ping that.

Fem ini sm Fe minism is a criti cal theory that refuses the masculine bias of mainstream thinking on the bas is that this bias re nde rs women invisible and marginal (Beasley 2005, p. 16). Feminism takes its critical stance as a criti que o n misogy ny, the assum ption of male supe riority and centrality (Beasle y 2005, p. 17). It seeks to decons tru ct the fal sely un iversalised man, who is su pposed to re present us ai L can not acknowled ge its gend e r s pecifi city or its masculine pa rti cula rity. Fe minism not o niy d e-centres the usual ass umptio ns about what is central and what is at the ma rgins bu t also shifts the subjec t of analys is, in that the notion of woman is placed centre st age (Beas ley 2005, p. 16). Fe minist scholars assert that before fe min ist inte rve ntions, kno wledge a nd knowledge production was inattentive to gender, and to the inhe re ntly gendered 28

3 AID FROM A FEMINI ST PERSPECTIVE co nsequences of the ph ilosop hies and paradigms . Feminist scholars began poin ting o ut the ins titu tional and intellectu al ' blind ness' and m o re recently 'deafness' to the fac t of soc iill re ali ties be ing structu red by gender d iffere nces a nd inequality, and the silenci ng and invisibilisa tio n of women (Be nne tt 1999). Pereira argues that: The do minant view of femini sm was that it was 'un-African' and 'a lien'. It is clear, however, th at the epithet of 'alien' is quite selectively ap plied in the do main of knowledge production, practice and politics. The generalised acceptance (until rela-

tive ly recently) of other ' alien' phenomena, such as 'modernisation', ra ises the question of wha t lies behind the widespread resistance to fe minism. Changes in the dominant perceptions of femini sm are slow to come about, even amongst ac ti vi ~ t s clearly working to furth er gend er equit y. (Pe rei ra 2002, p. 9)

Gender analysis The now well-kno w n a nd popu la rly u sed concept of gend e r

analysis arose from what was seen as the need to mainstream wom e n's interests into the deve lo pme nt age nda. 11 was a rgued that there was a realisation that wo me n's needs were be tter und erstood when viewed in re latio n to m en's need s and roles and to thei r social, cultura l, political, and econo mic contex t. Gender anal ysis thus ta kes into account women's ro les in product io n, rep rod Uction, and management of co mmuni ty a nd other activities. Gender a nalysis is seen as central to the formulation of co untry econom ic mem oranda, country sector strategies, structural adjustme nt, country po rtfolio man agement, poverty assess ments, e nviro nme ntal assess me nt, and in secto r-specific proJect planning, monitoring, and evalua tio n ; thus, many variants of policy and secto r-speci fic gender analysis too ls are available (Wo rld Bank 1996) . There is a general assum pbon that a feminist analysis is ina ttentive to gende r w ith an emp hasis on wom e n. Ye t, gende r analYSiS, an a nalysis of the socia l co nstruction o f fe mi ninity and ma sculinity and the atte ndant power re lations an d im plications, is a fundamental basis of a fe m inist fram ework of analysis. At face value the two d efinit io ns a bove speak to the sam e things

29

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

but the praxis o f this has shi fte d s ignificantly in the last three d ecades. I will now tu rn to a brief interroga tio n of w hy a gende r anal ysis tod ay, as p ractised from a develo pme ntal pers pecti ve, is seen as distinctly differe nt fro m that which takes as its basis, fe minist e pi stemology. It is my pos itio n that the very te rms on which wome n became invo lved in the d evelopme nt arena, pa rticularl y w it hin an Africa n co n text, we re skewed and already driven by exte rnal fo rces. The challe nges we fa ce tod ay with regard to securing commitment fro m governme nts and seekin g the necessary financ ial accountabi lity from both No rthern dono rs and So ut he rn go ve rnme nts is de rivat ive of a h isto ry of w hy this investme nt in women was so ugh t in the first place. It is equa lly d e rivative o f a wa te ring down o f the goals pursued by activists that were a tte ntive to the skewed ge nd er relatio nships through the ado ption o f de velopme nt po lici es with unclear ta rgets s uch as those pu rsued by mainstreaming p rocesses.

Tracing a trajectory: WID and GAD Prior to the e me rgence of postmodernis t fe minism, the de ba te amo ng international organi sa tions ove r wo me n (a nd subsequently gender by implication), m any (largely Weste rn fe m inists) qu estioned the rationality of de velopme nt practi ces that ig nored a signifi cant part, if not the majo rity, of the popu latio n invo lved in agricultural p roduction. This led to the e me rgence of Women in Developme nt (WI D). WID is popularly associated with a wide range o f activ ities co nce rning wo me n in the developme nt do main with whi ch donor agencies, governme nts and NGOs have become involved since the 1970s. W ID was coined in the early 1970s by a Washingto n-based network of fe male developme nt pro fessio nals (Ti nker 1990, p. 30). On the basis of their own expe rie nces in ove rseas missions they began to challe nge trickle-d own theories of developme nt, arguing that m od e rn isa tion was impacting di ffe rentl y on me n and women . Instead of improving wome n's rights a nd stat us, the developme nt process appeared to be contributi ng to a de terio ration o f their position (Ti nker 1990, p.31). The second major influe nce on W ID was the emerging body of resea rch on wome n in developin g coun tries, and the work of the Dan is h econo mist, Es ter Bo serup, was most influ e ntial. From the 30 ngntea IT

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perspecti ve of the WID movement, the importance of Boserup's WO/llCII'S Role ill Economic Development (1970) was that it challe n ged the assumptions of the welfa re app ro ach and highlighted

women's importance to the agricultural economy. Sub-Sa haran Africa was charac terised as the grea t globa l area of female farm ing syste m s in which women, using traditio n al hoe techno logy; assumed a substan tia l responsibility fo r food production (Mill er and Razavi 1995, p. 11). Moreove r, Boserup posi ted a positive co rrelation between the role women played in agricultura l prod uction and their status vis-a-vis m e n (Miller and Raz avi 1995, p. 11 ). Boser up's critiqu e of colo nial and post-colo nial ag ricultural poli cies was that through their prod uctivity-enh anci ng interventions and dominant Western notions about what constituted appro priate female tasks, they had facilita ted me n's monopoly over new technologies and cash crops and u nde rmined women's traditional ro les in agriculture, thereby heralding the d emise of the female farmin g syste ms (Mi ller and Razavi 1995, p. 11 ). This, accordin g to Boserup, was creating a dichotomy in the Afri can countrysi de w here me n were associated with the modern, cash-cro pping sec tor and women w ith traditionaL subsiste nce agricu lture. Relega ted to the subsistence sector, women lost income, status and power relative to men. More impo rtantly, their essential contribution to agri cultural production beca me invisible. One reason why Boserup's work was taken up so enthusiastica lly by WID advocates was that it legi timised efforts to infl uence d e velopment policy with a combined argument for justice and efficiency (Tinker 1990, p. 30). If, as Boseru p su ggested, women had in the past enjoyed a position of rel ative equali ty with men in agricu ltural prodUction, then it was both appropriate and feasi ble for development assistance directed towards women to remove inequal ities (Jaquetle 1990, p. 61). Furthermore, by suggesting th at in the recent past women were not o nly equa l in s tatus to men, bu t also equall y productive, Boserup challenged the conven tional wisdom that women were less p rod uctive and the refore not e ntitled to a share of scarce de velo pment resources (Jaquet te 1990, p. 61). Fin ally, the argument that African women had recently been equal to African men mean t tha t the claim that women s ho uld have mo re equal access to reso urces could not be di smi ssed as a Western or feminist import (Jaqu etle 1990, p. 59) . 31

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

W ID advocates' e mpha sis o n wo me n's p roductive roles mea nt that wo men's subo rdinatio n (an d by implicatio n, ove rco min g that s ubo rdin atio n) wa s seen within a n e cono m ic fram e work. By ex pl ain ing the diffe re nce in statu s and po wer between me n and wome n in terms of the ir rela tive econo m ic contri butio ns, the o rigin o f wome n's s ubo rdinatio n was linked to the ir e xclusio n fro m the marke t place (Jaqu e tte 1990, p. 59). 11 wa s the re fo re a rg ued tha t if wome n we re bro u g ht into the productive sphe re mo re fu lly, no t o nly wo uld they make a positive contribu tio n to d e ve lopme nt, bu t they would also be able to im prove their sta tus vis-a-vis me n (Jaque tte 1990, p. 60) . Desp ite criti cism s of Boserup's research a nd the way in whi ch WID advocates have take n it up, e ff icie ncy arg ume nts are s till central to the wo me n and deve lopme nt disco u rse. While bureaucrati c resista nce to ge nder re d istr ibuti ve po licies m a y ha ve necessitate d efficie ncy-based arg ume nts by WID advocates, the s trategy has been proble matic. A s Goetz pOints o u t, de mo nstra ting the e fficienc y divide nds of investing in wo m en me ant tha t WfD ad vocates shifte d the e m ph asi s awa y fro m wome n's needs a nd inte rests in de ve lo pme nt, to calculati ng w hat de ve lo pmen t need s fro m wo men (Goetz 1994, p. 30). In o the r wo rd s wo m e n as a social g rou p a re targeted by pla nne rs as a means thro ugh wh ich prio riti sed de velo pment goals ca n be rea lised, w hich may or m ay not be in the direct inte rest of w o m en (Mi lle r a nd Ra zav i ] 995, p . 9). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the deve lop me nt deba te was giving re cog nitio n to the need fo r ex plicit pro -poor strategies in res po nse to the s u pposed failure of the g rowth orthodo xy. These sh ifts in m a instream develo pme nt thinking provide d WID advocates w ith an o ppo r tunity to sho w ho w wo m en co uld serve d e ve lopme nt. The e mphasis o n poor wo men and, by im plicatio n, poo r m e n, pro vide d an o penin g fo r m a kin g the fe mi nist agenda less threate ning to male bureau crats and progra mme imp le me nte rs (Bm 'inic 1983, p. 26). Similarly, the focu s on fe male-headed ho use hold s as the poorest of the poor d id not raise intra-ho usehold re d istributi ve questio ns . In gene ra l, wome n's poverty was not suffi ciently linked to the d yn a mi cs of m a le- fem ale relatio ns, the reby circumve nti ng the need to raise intra-ho usehold gend e r redistribu tive iss ues (Buvi nic 1983, p. 26). Ano the r feature of WI D ad vocacy w as tha t it was selective in wha t it ad o pted fro m the 32 ngntea IT

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dominant development paradigm, focus ing for the most part on the p roducti ve work of poor women (productive employment), and plac in g less e mp h asis on ot her ite m s on the basic needs agenda that related to welfare issues. 1n turning to development issues, attention was paid to women's p roductive labour, ra ther than thei r social welfare and rep roduc tive concerns (M ille r and Raz avi 1995, p. 9). W h ile the latte r concerns re mai ned central to the wo men's movement in many Northern countries, in developing countries WID gave primacy to women's productive ro les and integration into the economy as a means of improving their status (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 9) . A further outcome of this approach has been a tendency to make exaggerated and unfounded claims about women's usefu lness to development. The cure for Africa's food crisis, ch ild welfare, environmenta l degrad ation, and the fa ilure of structu ral adjustment po licies are all sought in women (more recently, in gend er ) (Miller and Razavi 1995, p .I O). Wh ile this has given women a highe r profile in policy d iscourse, the danger is that women are now expected to co mpensate for p ublic provisions, wh ich for a variety of reasons, among them s tri ngent fisca l policies a nd mismanagemen t of resources, may no t be forth com ing . As Kandiyoti (1988) and Goetz (1994) have pointed out, this can mean an intensificat ion of women's workload s as the onu s shifts to them to ex tend their unpaid work as feeders, healers, and teachers of children to inclu de the provision of basic servi ces to the community. By the late 1970s, some of those workin g in the field o f develo pme nt were questioning the adequacy of focusing on wo men in iso la tion, which seemed to be a dominant feature of the W ID approach . The work that was under way within variou s social science diSciplines suggested the importance of power, co nfl ict a nd gende r relations in unde rstandin g women's subo rdi nation (Miller a nd Razav i 1995, p. 11). Viewed from this pe rspective, the shift from W ID to Gender and Development (GA D) can be inte rpre ted as a way of disposing of women and equity, two issues presumably most likely to meet a wa ll of resistance from poli cy ma kers primarily interested in talking economics (Lazreg 2002, p. 125). By neglecting the concrete rel
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

and in the di visio n o f res po nsibilities between them (Lazreg 2002, p. 125). By refusing to ask questio ns about why resources arc so u nevenly di str ibuted between the gend e rs in the first place, the issue of power lop-sided ness is effectively brushed aside (Miller and Razavi 1995, p.ll).

Difficult choices Fe min ist engage me nt wit h developm en t ha s reqUi red th e e mbrace of s im plifica tions in o r de r to make strategiC alliances and some inroads in the intensely pol itical arena of policy makin g (S ubrahma nian 2004, p. 89). A key concern remains w hat the ter m 'gender equ ity' means to differe nt stakeho lders. Fo r some, tak ing on a commitme nt to thi s goal m ay mean no more tha n the adoption of an equal oppo rtuniti es policy. Fo r others it mea ns ta rgeting women as beneficiaries in development interventions (El Bushrn 2000, p. 55). Where 'gender' comes to be represented in the g uise of approaches, tools, frameworks and mechanis ms, these instruments become a subst itute for deep changes in o bjecti ves and outcomes (Cornwall et al2004, p. 4). Consequently, in seeking to present the understanding o f women/gender as requiring the acquisition of specialised know ledge, a latent resistance g rew among male d evelop me nt practit io ne rs in inte rnational o rga nisations that made the need fo r gender experts an even greate r necessity (Lazreg 2002, p. 131). The professionalisa tion o f gender has resulted in 'recipes' and ' technical fixes' some of which p resen t the m selves in the form of 'bite-sized messages' for training and lobbying purposes, which lead s to com plex issues of lustice and equality being reduced to slogans: 'Two-th irds of the world's work is done by women' (U N 1985) is a typ ical example which EI Bushra (2000, p. 57) a rg ues is a statisti cal a verage, abstracted fro m the d ifferent contexts in which development practice takes p lace. Gender and developm ent resea rchers have also questioned an apparent consensus around the objec tives of gende r equality and social tra nsform ation, which exists between very different types of development organisa tions. They have fou nd that this common professio nal lan g uage cloaks a wide range of ideo logical sta ndpOints (EI Bushra 2000, p. 57). Radical messages abo ut gende r equity have been translated into policies wi th mo re conservative 34 ngntea IT

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3 AID FROM A FEMINI ST PERSPECTIVE ra tio nales and goa ls; a n o bvio us e xamp le is the w id espread use o f the term 'em powe rme nt' by fe min ist acti vists and mu lti la teral aid s agencies alike (El Bu shra 2000, p. 57). Whe n gend e r agend as a re ta ke n up by in terna tio na l in s titu tion s, w hich has been impo rtant in terms of ra ising the profile of wo men's concern s, the co unter effect has been the ca libration o f extremely comple x issues and societies into vast stati stics and slogans d esig ned mere ly to respo nd to competin g inte rests on the glo bal stage. Sm ith reinforces thi s po int w hen she sta tes that: De velop me nt theory has produced a whole discourse, which ca rries its ow n lang u age, schools, p rofessio nals a nd in stitu-

tions. The d iscourse imprisons those located within it into a tightly regulated perception of reality and a tightl y reg ula ted set of relations defined by the inte rnational marketplace and foreign aid . An y view th at regar ds the forma tio n of subjects on their own te rms is regarded il S dangerou s not so much because it threatens large blocs of powe r but because it sets up confront ations w ith the everyda y privileges that, in m any cases, ju stify the labour of the develo pment \....o rkers and her sen se of po we r. (Sm ith 1997, p. 229) The purpose of traCing this trajectory and the vario us shifts in the deve lo pme nt aid d iscourse and wo me n's rights is to draw attention to the fact tha t the questio n of re al co mmitme nt, which eme rges in the sectio n be low, continues to rem ain a t the crux of inclu sio n of wom e n's rights o rg a nisa tio ns in areas su ch as aid effecti veness and finan cing for develo pme nt processes . Eve n w hen some le ve l of co mmitme n t is mad e, this is not tran sla ted into act ual resources and re le va nt accountability mechanisms as we s hall see belo w. The questio n of who drives the agend a, w hethe r a t an inte rna tional o r na tio nal level, re m ai ns ce ntraL

Monterrey. Paris and Accra The Monte rrey Co nsensus of the Inte rnatio nal Confe re nce o n Fin ancing fo r De ve lo pmen t was reac hed in March 2002, with the Millenn ium Develo pment Goa ls as the core focus. The Mo nter rey d ocume nt is hailed as w ide r anging and focu ses o n more than ai d modalities, which is the cru x of the Pa ris Decla rat io n. 35

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

Fem inist activi sts have argued t hat, unlike the Paris Decla ration where gender is mentio ned once,1 the re are severa l references to gend er in the Monterrey document. Budlende r (2007) e nume rates these when she refers to paragraph 8 that notes a 'ho listi c approach to the interconnected, n ational and systemic challenges for financing for developme nt - sustainable, gende r sensitive, peop le centred development' (Bud le nder 2007, p. 7). Paragraph 9 of the Monter rey docume nt also call s for soc ial and gender budget po licies. The Monterrey d ocument has been argued to be too ambitious, leaving little room for effective monitorin g and accountability to whic h the Paris Declara tion pays atte ntion but with inatten tiveness to gen de r as a variab le (except on the one occasion). The outco me document from Accra, the Accra Agenda for Action, also reite rated that 'gend er equality, respect for h uman rights, and e nvironme nta l s usta inabil ity a re corne rsto nes for ac hiev ing e nduring impact on the lives and the potenti al of poor women' (Kinoti 2008). The two key documents that have been critical in sha ping the aid d ebate re presen t for me what I refer to as the 'and women' p he nome non. This phe nome no n, I argue, has its roo ts in the 'development-isation' and hence de-po liticisation of the initial po litical gender agenda that was hitherto pursued th rough a grounded femi nist analysis as I have elu cid ated ea rlier in the trajectory. These d ocuments are evi de nce o f the fa ct that mere mention is not enough to ensu re financ ing. monito rin g and actual implementation of gender-related processes. New aid modalities adopted in the Paris Declaration include Budget Sup port, Secto r Wide Ap proaches (SWAps), Poverty Reduction Strategy Pape rs (PRSPs), Basket Funding an d JOint Assis tance Strategies; w hile they come in the contex t of a scalin g up of aid flo ws gene rally, they te nd to result in a sca ling down of s pec ific fin anci ng for women's rig ht s a nd gende r equ ality. The prima ry reason for this is that these modalities are not en-gendered and there is a lack of political will to e nsure gender equality is one of the main p illars of develop ment (Alema ny e t al 2008, p. 2). It is clear that, without a well thought -out analysis that is nuanced and sophistica ted, the inc reasi ng trend within development circles has remained the rehashing of broad statistics, the reite ra tio n of rhetoric and the redu ction of gender as an analytical tool to mea n adding 'a nd women' . 36 ngntea IT

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Women's rights activists have equa ll y noted that in monito ring the progress of the impleme ntation of the Paris Declaration, emp h asis h as been laid on the implementation of the aid moda li -

ties rather than on their linkages with development outcomes (see AWID Primer No.4, n.d.). As a result the abil ity to invest in the right places, track resources a nd ta rget the right constituencies is defeated. Instead we are increasin g ly witnessing a si tuation

where arguments are levelled that a focus on wo men needs to be checked through the a morphous gender mainstreaming tha t has come to mcan dc-emphaSiSing t he need to emancipa te women. Yet, femi n ist an alysis and tren d s continue to show th at the 'male-

s tream' nature of the thi nking th at d rives development has been maintained. Resources under the guise of gender mainstreami ng are increasingly being red irected at projec ts targeted at men, to the detrime nt of women -s pecific projects that are much needed.

Shifting tactics In trying to recti fy the historical imba lances that have shaped the

aid relationship between the globa l South and North, both processes5 have fa il ed to remedy the historical p reju dices with which women in the South, and in this instance women in Africa, were brought to the development table. The fact tha t women's righ ts work continues to be significan tly shaped by the d ynamics of funding agencies has determined the work we do, how we do it and the energies we dedicate to p a rticular s ubjec ts. A series of tools, methodologies and tactics con tinue to be deployed haphazardly in an a ttempt to pay a ttentio n to gender as a variable and women as a group wi thout due concern for meaningful results, hence the male involvement effor ts: they a re easier to reach hence easier to report on. The fact that fun ding for specific women's rights work and prolects has decreased significan tl y since these debates is a painter to the fact tha t women continue to be unacco un ted for, largely beca use foc us remains on the very micro and macro, leaving out w hat has been termed the 'missing middle' - for instance, a focus on m icro-fi na nce and then the setting u p of funding within nationa l minis tries, yet most governmen t min istries remain inaccessible to the majority. There is a range of options th a t can and are being p ursued and 37

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

some of these have been adopted by mainstream developmen t insti tutions. Sti ck with the tried and tested · • Micro finance initiatives for access to rural poo r - where is the 'missing middle'? Reform orie ntated strategies w ith regard to the policy arena the 'and women' phenomenon • Ge nd er and development strategies designed to bri ng women in and often on a welfare orienta ted basis. No su bstantive shi fts • The 'let us go back to trad ition' brigade: recla im Africa's lost tradition - same structures differen t faces • Con ti nue to add ress gender as abstrac ted from social, economic and political facto rs. In essence, addreSSi ng gender means pull ing it o ut a nd dea lin g with it separate ly. Alternatively; think through: What we need to understand about gender inequalities today th at will present us with cutting-edge responses • What are the ways in which gai ns ha ve been eroded? What analysis are we conducti ng w ith regard to these trend s? Who are the critical actors in this discourse and how can they be effectively mobi lised? • Who are the old ac tors, are they sti ll relevan t ac tors and if they are releva nt and have fall en off the wagon, why a nd how do we get them back on boa rd? The emergence of autonomous, African led, unapologetica tly feminist fundin g bod ies 6 on the continent is a significan t step in rec tifying aid imbalances a nd reshaping the thinking, targets and accountability mec han isms with regard to shifti ng the agenda on women's rights. While the Aid Effectiveness and Financing for Develo pment p rocesses must be monito red closely by women's rights institutio ns, effective inclu sion and impact withi n this conte xt cannot be mea ni ngfully achieved w ithout rectifyin g the origi nal rules of en gagement. The development a nd aid architecture, as it substan tively engages with women's rights concerns, reqUires its own set of processes to shift thinkin g and effectively destabilise the perpetual ' and wo me n' phe nome non that pertains. 38 ngntea IT

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Note s I. This is " proJect by the Bush "dmin j $tr~tion th,,' is "rgued to be gCiHcd tOlVilrds 'ensuring sox urity ;md interve ntio ns to prevent WM ~nd confli cts, which full opcril tion should hil VC militilfY bast'S ucross 53 countries

il'

in Africa. This pos iti o n has however been co n tested with many scho lars argu ing thai is ye t ano ther stra tegy by America to lI SC military po w e r a gains t sta tes that "threa te n the US nati o nill sec u ri ty" w ith AFRI COM o perati ng

with little oversight from Congress or international bodies like th e United N a tio ns' (see N unu Kidane 2008). 2. Terminologies used here to refe r to w o m en 's rig h ts frame w o rk ind ud e gender an"l yS iS and g e nder ma ins tre<1ming with fe min is m be ing th e le ast favourite of alL

3. Comm on reac tions include references to feminists as men naters, extrem ists, and as unbalanced in tnei r positions amongst o thers_ 4_ See AWI D Pri mer No. 5 2003, p. 4, that not es tnat out of tne 50 paragra phs of the Paris Decla rati on, gender equality is mentioned once, in langu age th at can best be d escrib(:d as wenk. 5. The lI id Effec tiveness ilnd Finilncing for Develo pment Agenda. 6. African Women's Develop ment Fund (AW DF) ilnd Urgent Ac tion Fund Africa are notable in this rega rd.

Bib liography Aleman y, C. et al (2003) ' Making women's rights and gender equali ty a priority in the aid effectiven ess agen da', AWI D and WIDE htt p://www. i!wid.org!eng/!ss ues-ilnd -Anal ysislLi brarylPrimers-on-A id-Effccliveness, accessed 19 January 2009 Alexander, J. ilnd Mohanty, C. (eds) (1997) Femillis! Genealogies, C%llial Legacies, Democratic Futures, New Yo rk, Ro utledge AWID Primer No.3 (n. d.) 'Civil society's engilgement in the ilid cff(:c tiven css agenda: the para llel process, key concern s and recommenda tions', Aid Effectiveness mId Women's Rights Series, hltp: //lVww.awid.org/cngllss uesand -Anal ys is/Li brary/Prime rs-on-Aid-Effecti veness, accessed 19 Jan uary 2009 AWID Primer 1\,' 0 . 4 (n. d.) ' Monitoring and evalu ati on o f tn e Pari s Declaration implementation', Aid Ijfectivrlll'S5 and Women's Rights Series, hltp:lIl\'ww.aw id .orglengllssucs-and -AnalysislLibr
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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? http://web. uct.ac.za/orglagi/pubs/newsletters/voI5/ind vIS.htm. accessed 19 January 2009 Boserup, E. (1970) WOlllell'$ Role ill Economic Dcvdopmenl , New York,St Martin's Press Bud lend er, D. (2007) 'Fina ncing for develop ment: aid effcctiw ness and gender responsive budge ts', bac kgr ound paper prepared for the Commo nwe"lth 5I.:cret
40 ngntea IT

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3 AID FROM A FEMINI ST PERSPECTIVE Tinker, I. (ed) (1990) Persistenl !»equa/ilies, Oxfo rd , Oxford University Press UN (1985) Unitrd Nafions Decade for Women 1976-1985; 'Really only a begimling ',New York, Un ited N ~ ti on s Publi cations. World Bank (1996) World Bank Participation Sourcebook, http://www. worldbank.orglwbi/sourcebookfsb h ome.htm, accessed 19 January 2009

41

Africa battles aid and development finance Patri ck Bond and Khadija Shari fe

Aid trends The world economic crisis surfaced in 2008 but actually began about three decades earlier - as Africans know from their experience on the suffering sid e nearly the w ho le time. Official aid o ffers a ti ny compe nsatio n to the mass of the conti nent's residents, whose insertion into world financial circuits is based largely on extreme exploi tation. From a bird's eye view, No rth- South foreign aid fi gures appear to have increased . Official develop men t assistance (ODA ) totalled $103.7 bi llion in 2007, with $38.7 billio n (37 per cent of total aid, up from 26.7 per cen t in 2000) tagged for the African continent, including debt relief gran ts, according to the Organisation fo r Eco nomic Cooperation and Development (O EeD) (2008) . Bu t th is rep resented a real decrease o f 18 per cent, ' mos tly due to exceptional debt relief for Nigeria in 2006'; yet even that debt relief came with a catch, namely Nigeria's emp tying o f $12.4 bill io n in reserves as a down pa yment (BB e 2006). O DA is defined by the OEeD as 'flows to develop ing countries and multilateral institutions provided by offi cia l agencies, including govern ments'. The OEC D's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is made up of 27 h igh-income dono r countries and three upper, middle-i ncome countries. The re are no African co untries present on the counci l. The Stockholm Insti tu te (2008) reports that in 2007 there was a 6 per cent rise in a rms expend iture while industrialised dono r governments lowered aid by 8.4 per cent. World military s pending is about 13 times higher than overseas development assistance. 42 ngntea IT

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Donor countries su ch as the Ne therlands, Denmark, Norway; and especially Sweden have exceeded the aid target of 0.7 per ce nt of gross na tional income, yet of t he 22 tallied donor countries, 18 s till fall short o f the target set by the UN and agreed to over 38 years ago (OEe D 2008). Other disbursements include m ultilateral aid and concessional loans from e ntities such as UNI CEF, UNDP, as well as the Wo rl d Bank. It cou ld be assumed that Wo rld Bank lending is driven by s hareholder in te rests - the US a nd G8 holding 17 per cent, and 40 per cen t of the shares respectively. A US Treasury report (2008, p. 59) describes the presence of t he US in the World Bank Group using the fo llowing words: nle policies and programmes of the World Ban k Grou p have been consistent with US interests. This is particularly true in terms of country allocation questions and sensitive policy issues. nle ch aracter of the Bank, its corporate and voting structure, ensures consistenc y with the economic and politica l oblectives of the US. The move to ' local ownership' o f aid stipulated in the Paris Decla ration legitimises recipient governments alone, margina lising democratic institutions, civi l SOCiety and reci pient nations; thi s despite the lack o f transparency preva le nt in the governmen ts of many develo ping countries In such cases, mutual accountability, a key Paris Declaration obJective, seems surreal. Global Financial Integrity (CFI)(2005) asserts that $900 billion is siphoned from underdeveloped sta tes each year, with $20-28 billion of this figure embezzled from Africa in illici t financial fl ows. According to C H 's Raymond Baker, 'Measured against the flow of ODA in 2006, poor countries, in aggregate, arc losing close to $10 for every $1 they receive', lead ing the World Bank's (2005, p. 56) Global Developmc/lt Fi/la/lcc report to acknowledge, ' Developing countries are net lenders to developed countries'.

Diverting aid back home Corporate tax avoidance accounts fOf 60 pef cent of the total outflow, with multinationals mispricing internal transfers, di ver ting capital to tax have ns. 'The re is a great d ivision of interest 43

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

between the South and the OEeD countries (dono rs) on the issue of co rpo rate taxation', says John Christensen (2009) of the Tax Justice Co mmittee. ' H ydroca rbon cont racts in particular are highly secre tive, and it is ve ry difficult to get evide nce of payments. Multinationals prefer weak governments who are anxious to secure investment, and despotic governments ,' 'Tax avoidance is a culture deepl y e mbedded in the heart of o ur global econom y', sa id Christensen, 'underminin g democratic and legal institutions as well as much- needed revenues for developing countries' . The flow o f funds indicates that developing co untri es - and especi ally Afri ca - are net cred itors to developed coun tri es. ' Politi cal ly a nd econo m ica lly the majority of tax havens are intimately linked to major O ECD sta tes,' he sa id. ' The City of London is a tax have n and a major offshore financial centre'. In fact, more than quarte r of all tax havens and offshore centres are British Crown de pendencies. An official in Britain's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) alleged ly told Christen sen, 'tax havens are li ttle mo re than booking centres. I've seen transactions where all the decisio ns are made in London, but booked in havens.' According to the annual book series Reality of A id (2008), fo reign aid has failed to delive r real progress for the bulk of the poor. The grou p cites Worl d Bank data revealing that ' the proportion o f donor aid considered to be ti ed 10 purchases in the donor's country is 58 per cen t whil e the proportion of aid ti ed to purchases is 32 per cent'. Tied aid refe rs to aid that must be used to buy prod ucts and services from the donor country, ofte n exorbitan tly priced . In 2007, the inte rna tion al hu m anitarian group CA RE rejected a $45 million annual food aid pa ckage fr om the US government, citing the dangerous structural exte rnalities of monetised a nd tied food aid. Each year, the US go\'ernment allocates a budge t of $2 bi llion for food aid , pri marily derived fr om the subsi di sed surplu s of America n agribusiness multinatio nals. EU governments and the US annua lly su bsidise agribusiness to the tune of $360 bill ion, or a little und er $1 billion a day, with tied fo od aid estimated to cost 40 per ce nt more than food procured on the ope n market . Yet, if food ai d is more expensi ve, wh y does it resu lt in cheap 'dumped' imports unde rmining loca l farmers and economies? The answe r lies in subs idies and the poli cies dri ving mone tised food aid o r s urp lus and s ubsidised food so ld at a specific price .

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Subsid ised food aid produced in donor coun tries is purchased with the fu nds allocated towa rds a id fo r recipient cou ntries. Th is le ad s to structural dependency, d escri bed by CA RE's (2006) Whi te Paper 0/1 Food Aid PolicH as motivated by 'the export and su rplus disposal objectives of the exporting coun try'. According to the Interna tional Relations Center (2005), US charity organisations s uch as World Vision, CA RE and Cat ho li c Relief Services (C RS) deliver fo ur-fifths of food aid, provided by s ubsidi sed agro-expo rters such as Cargill and ADM. Western agricultural subsidies ensure that the US receives a profit o n food aid, due to the effects of artificially depressed market prices, compounded by the artific ially inflated costs of food aid. Ai d organisations a re then d irectly contracted by government to use aid fund s in purchasing monetiscd food aid . Michael Maren, author of TIle Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid, and ex-CRS official said, 'food shortages are poli ti cal p roblems. Seventy to 80 per cen t o f all aid money stays in the US. It goes to sala ries, to US corpor ations; that's w hat it's about.' Paradoxically, the hungriest in Africa a re the rural poor, mainly su bsistence farmers, constituting 60 per cen t of the labour force. Of this fi gure, 70 per cent are woma n. The structur
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

directly linked to some o f the poorest d eveloping coun tries in the world, via the exp loitation o f natural resources. This privatisation p ush is facilita ted in part by the OECD's Export Credit Agenc ies (ECAs), which are publicly-guaranteed insti tutions such as the UK's Expo rt Credits Guaran tee Department. According to the World Bank, these enti ties provided 80 per cent of capital market financing. fi n
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developing coun tries, w ith the US taking fir st place as the leading ex porter with 52 per cent o f deliveries, followed by Russia and the UK. In the case of the $3.7 billion multilateral loan (or the C hadCameroon pipeline, financed by the World Bank in co-o rdination with Exxon-Mobil and Chevron, arms acquisition bolstering the rule of lifetime Presid e nt Idriss De by, served to fuel the ongoing war in South Chad, the location o f the Doba oil fi elds. The megaproject resul ted in the loss o f thousands of farms and severe disruption of Chad's colton belt, situated in the south of the country. The pipeli ne also cut through m ore than 100 villages, contami nati ng water sources. The country is ranked by the World Food Programme as the fifth poorest in the world. Foreign aid destined for Africa derived from philanthropic charities, such as the Gates Fou nda tion endowed by the wea lth of M icrosoft's Bi!1 Gates, often represent bittersweet realities. Whi le the Gates Foundation has targeted polio, malaria, TB and HI V/ Ai d s - the former to the tune of $3 billion - the investmen t portfolios include the very multinationals responsible for the sp read of such illnesses as malaria - bred in stagnant oi l boreholes; industrially polluted rivers - sp reading di seases s uch as cholera; and gas flarin g - contaminating the atmosphere wi th heavy metals and other tox ic by-products.

Questioning the aid/debt dependency model If the 2008 world financia l meltdown has its roots in the neoliberal export model (dominant in Africa since the Berg Repo rt and onset of structural adjustment during the early 1980s) and, e ven more deeply, in 35 years of stagnatio n and volatility in the ca p italist world, then South Cent re d irector (and Ugandan pol itica l economist) Yash Tandon (2008a, p. 1) is correc t to argue: 'The fir st lesson, surely, is that co ntrary to mainstream thinking. the ma rket does not have a self-correcti ve mechan ism.' Such disequ ilibralion means that Africa receives somet imes too much and often too li ttle in the way of financial flows, and the inexorable result during periods of turbu lence is in tensely amplified uneven development (Nabud ere 1990, Bond 1998). Africa has always suffered a disproportionate share of pressure from the

47

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

world economy, especia lly in the sphere of debt and financia l ou tfl ows (Rodney 1972, Bond 2006). But for those African countries wh ich ma de the mselves excessively vul ne rable to global finan cial fl ows during the neoliberal e ra, the meltdow n had a severe, adverse impac t. In Africa's largest na tional economy, fo r example, So uth Africa n fin ance mini ster Trevo r Manu el had presided over the s tea dy erosion of exchange co ntrols (with 26 consec utive relaxations from 1995 to 2008, accordi ng to the Reserve Bank 2008) and the emergence of a massive curre nt account deficit: - 9 pe r cent in 2008, second worst in the world. The latter was in large part due to a stea dy ou tflow of profits and dividends to co rpo rations formerly based at the Joha nnesburg Stock Exchange bu t which rclistcd in Britain, the US o r Austra li a durin g the 1990s (A nglo American, DeBeers, Old Mutual, Didata, Mondt Libe rty Life, BHP Bil li ton). In the second week of O ctober 2008, Sou th Africa's s tock marke t crashed 10 per cent (on the worst day, s hares wo rth $35 billion went up in smoke) and the currency decl ined by 9 pe r cent, wh ile the second week witnessed a furthe r 10 per cent crash. The specula tive real esta te market had already begu n a decline that migh t yet reach those of othe r hard-hit property secto rs li ke the US, De nmark and Ireland, because South Africa's ea rl y 2000s housing price ri se far outstripped even these casino markets (200 per cen t from 1997- 2004, com pared wi th 60 per cent in the US). On the other hand, the cost of market fail ure co uld at least be offset, somewh at, by ideo logica l adva nce. The main gains so far were in delegitimising the eco nomic liberalisa tion philosophy adopted during the 1994- 2008 governme nts of Nelso n Mandela and Thabo Mbeki (presided over by Manuel). Indeed, Mbeki's dramatic Sep tember 2008 de parture occ urred partly beca use of su bstantially worsened inequali ty and unemp loyment since 1994, which in turn was responsible for thousands o f social protests each year. Whe n Manuel's solidarity le tter, resigning from Mbeki's governme nt on its pe nultimate d ay, was released to the press (by Mbeki) on 23 September, the stock and currency markets imposed a $6 billion puni shment within an ho ur. The crash reqUired incomi ng ca re taker president Kgalema Motlan the to immediately reappoint Manu el with g rea t fanf are. 48 ngntea IT

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In the same sp irit, Mbeki's replacemen t as ruling party president, Jacob Zu ma, had visi ted Davos and paid tribute to Merrill Lynch and Cit ibank in 2007--8 (ironically th e latter two institu tions insisted on h aving their jitters calmed) . Zuma assured international fi n anciers that Manuel's econ omic policy wou ld n ot change. Hence the open ing of ideological space to con test neoliberali sm in practice became a cruci al str u ggle for the trade unions and SA Communist Party, which in mid-October held an Alliance Economic Summit that suggested Manuel make only marginal shifts a t the edges of ncoliberali sm. However, as the financia l me ltdown unfo lded in the US and Europe, the merits of South Africa's residual capital contro ls became dearer. As a leading official o f the central bank, Brian Kahn (2008, p.1), explai ned: The interbank market is fun ctioning norma lly and the Rese rve Bank has not had to make any special liquidity provision. We have a relatively sophisticated and well-developed banking sector, and the question then is, what has saved us? (This may

be tempting fate, so perhaps I should say what has saved us so far?) This all raises the old question whether or not exchange controls work. The conventional wisdom is that they do not, particularly when you need them to work. We seem to have been exception to this rule _ It tu ms out that we were protected to some extent by prudent regulation by the Bank regulators, bu t more importantly, and perhaps ironica lly, from controls on capital movements of banks. Despite strong p ressure to liberalise exchange controls completely, the Treasury has adopted a policy of gradua l reb xation over the years. Controls on non-residents were lifted completely in 1996, but controls on reSidents, including banks and other institutions, were lifted gradually, mainly through raising li mits over time. With respect to banks, there are restrictions in te r m~ o f the exchange control act, on the types of assets or asset classes they may get involved in (cross-border). These indude leveraged products and certain hedging and derivative instruments. For exam ple banks cannot hedge transactions that are not SA lin ked. Effectively, it meant that our banks could not get involved in the toxic assets floating that oth e rs were scrambling into. They would h ave needed exch ange control approval wh ich would not have been granted, as they did not satisfy cert"in criteria.

49

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? The regulators were often criticised fo r being behind the times, while others have argued that they don't understand the products, but it seems there may be advantages to that! Our banks are finding it more difficult to access foreign funds and we have ~een some spikes in overnight foreign exchange rates at times. But generally everything seems 'normal' on the banking front Our insurance companies and institutional investors were also protected to some extent, in that there is a prudential limit on how much they can invest abroad (15 per cent of assets), and the regu lator in this instance (the Financial Services Board) places constraints on the types of find s or products they can invest in. (Generally it appears that exotics arc excluded.) One large South Africa institu tion, Old Mutual, moved its prim ary listing to the UK a few years back (when controls were re laxed), and the pic has had fa irly significant exposure in the US. As for the rest of Africa, sim ilar opportu niti es to contest financ ial system orthodoxy now arise. At this stage, it is practically imposs ib le for sta ff from the most powerfu l external force in African economic po licy, the International Monetary Fund (1M F), to advise elites wi th any credibility. The lMFs October 2006 (pp. l , 2, 26, 36) Global Fi uau ciai Stability Report, after ail, claimed that glo bal bankers had shown 'resilience through severa l market correc tions, with exceptio nally low marke t volatility'. Moreover, global econom ic growth 'continued to become more balanced, provid ing a broad underpinning for financia l markets'. Beca use financial markets always price risk correctly, according to IMF dogma, investors could relax: ' ID]efauh risk in the financ ial and insurance sectors remains relatively low, and credit derivatives markets do not ind icate any particular fin ancial stabi lity concerns.' The derivatives and in particular mortgage-backed seCllrities 'have been developed and successfully implemented in US and UK markets. They all ow global investors to obtai n broad er credit exposures, while targeting their desired risk- reward tradeoff. ' As for the rise of credi t default swaps (the $56 trillion house of cards bringing d own one bank after the other), the IMF was not worried, because 'the widening of the credit default swaps s preads [i.e. the pricing in of higher risk] across mature markets was gradual and mild, and spreads remain near historic lows.' Fast fo rward to the April 2008 launch of the IM F's 'Regional 50 ngntea IT

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4 AFRICA BATTLES AID AND DEVELOPMENT FINAN CE

economic ou tlook for su b-Saharan Africa' study. IMF Africa s taffer John Wakeman-Li nn's (2008, p. 18) slideshow, 'Private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa: financial globa lisation's final fron tier?', concluded that the vast rush of finance is genera lly good for Africa, but policies would have to be changed - making Africa more vulnerable to the international financial system - in orde r to take fu ll advantage of the flow: • More transparency and conSistency: exchange contro ls in su bSaharan Africa co mplex and difficult to implement • Gradua l and well-sequenced liberalisation st rategy can help limit risks associa ted with capita l inflows • Accelerated liberalisation in the face of large inflows may help their mo nitoring (e.g. Tanzan ia); selective libcralisation of ou tflows ma y help relieve infla t ion a nd app reciatio n pressures, but fu rther work needed on modalities. The IMF procla imed the merits of liberalisation and rising finan cia l flows to Africa, especially portfolio fund ing (i.e. s hort-term hot money in the forms of stoc ks, shares and securities issued by compa nies and government in loca l cur rencies but readily co nvertible). Such ' hot mo ney' - speculative posi tions by privatesector investo rs - flowed especially in to So uth Africa's stock exchange, and also to a lesser extent in to share markets in Ghana, Kenya, Gabon, Togo, and the Seychell es. However, fi nancial ou tflows co ntinue apace. A report on capital fl ight by Leonce Ndikuma na of the Econo mic Commission for Africa and James Boyce of the University of Massachusetts shows that tha nks to corruption and the demise of most African countries' exc hange con trols, the estimated capi tal fl ight from 40 subSa haran African countries in 1970- 2004 was at least $420 billion (in 2004 dollars). The external d eb t owed by the same countries in 2004 was $227 bill ion. Using an impu ted interest rate to calculate the rcal impact of flight capita l, the accum ula ted stock rises to $607 billion. According to Nd iku mana and Boyce (2008, p. 5): Adding to the irony of SSA's position as net credi tor is the fact that a substantial fraction of the money tha t fl owed out of the country as capital flight appea rs to have come to the subcon51

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? tinent via external borrowing. Part of the proceeds of loans to African governments from official creditors and private banks has been diverted into private pockets - and foreign bank accounts - via bribes, kickbacks, contracts awarded to political cronies at infl ated prices, and o utright theft. Some African rulers, like Co ngo's Mobutu and Nigeri
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4 AFRICA BATTLES AID AND DEVELOPMENT FINAN CE

odious debt. It is all t(Xl little and t(Xl late ... Even afte r the debt relid already granted under HIPC and MDRI, 47 countries need 100 per cent debt cancellation on this ba sis and a further 34 to 58 need partia l cancellation, amounting to $334 to $501 bill ion in net present value te rms, if they are to get to a point where debt service does not seriously affect ba sic hum an rights. He nce the syste m of d ebt peona ge remains, and the o nly p rospect for its relief is the weake ning of Washingto n's power, alo ng with the overhauling of the aid syste m which is so closely co nnected to debt (fo r the richest set o f recomme ndations, see Tandon 2008b). The Accra Agenda for Actio n (A AA) co nfe re nce in Se pte mber 2008 prov ided an o pportuni ty to address the proble ms of dono rl financie r cross-conditionality, 'phantom aid' (including tied aid ), co rruption, waste, economic di s tortio ns and poli tical manipulatio n, as wel l as to add the South 's de mand fo r re payme nt o f the No rth's eco logica l debt to the so u th. But the oppo rtun ity was lost, and even mi ld-mannered NGOs reali sed they we re wasti ng their time, as a staffe r at Civicus, Nas tasya Tay (2008, p.l ), re vealed: A colleague from a major inte rnational NCO gave an excellent summary of the whole High Level Forum process: 'Why should I attend interminably long meetings, to passionatel y lobby for rdorm, when countries like the US and Japal1 arc rdusing to sign 0 11 becau se of some "lanb'U age issues" with the AAA? In the end, we w ill have worked incredibly hard to, if we're lucky, change a few words. And it's ju st another document.'

Ways out of the foreign aid and finance trap Fo r some Afri can countries, the so lu tio n lies in an alte rnative source of hard curre ncy finance . Not o nly does Ch ina provide co nditi on-free loans to several of Afri ca's most authoritarian regimes, but, mo re hopefu lly, Ven ezuela is considering a pro posa l to replace and d isplace the IMF, as happened in Argentinn in 2006, in which case early re payme nt o f the IMF, or even defaulting, wou ld be feasible . [n othe r African countries, p rogressive social mo ve men ts have argued fo r debt re pudi a tio n and are co ncerned about any further financi al infl o ws beyond those required for trade finan cing of essentia l inputs. Thi s would also e ntail inward53

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? orien tated light industrialisation orientated to basic needs (and not to lux ury goods, a major p roblem that e m erged in Africa's sett le r colonial economies duri ng the 1960s- 70s). The crucial ingred ient for establishing an alternative African financing strategy from the left is pressure from below. This means the strengthen ing, coordination and increased militancy of two kinds of civi l society: those forces devo ted to the debt relief cause, which have often come from w hat might be termed an excesSively po lite, civilised society based in internationally-linked NGOs which rarely if ever used 'tree shaking' in o rder to do ' jam m aking'; and those fo rces which react via short-term ' TMF Riots' against the system, in a manner best understood as uncivilised society" The IMF Rio ts that shoo k Africa n countries during the 1980s90s often, unfor tunately, rose up in fury a nd even shoo k loose some governments' hold on power. When these, however, contri buted to the fall of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia (one o f many examples), the man w ho replaced him as president in 1991, former trade unionist Frederick Ch iluba, imposed even mo re decisive IMF policies. Most an ti -I M F protest si m ply could not be sustained (Seddon 2002). In con trast, the former organisa ti ons are increasingly networked, especially in the wake of the 2005 activities associated wi th the Global Call to Action Agai nst Poverty (GCA r ), which gene rated (failed ) strategies to support the Mi llennium Development Goa ls partly through w hite-headband consciousness raising, through appealing to na tional African eli tes and through joining a na"ive appea l to the G8 G leneagles meet ing (Bond 2006). Si nce then, networks tightened and became more substantive through two Nairobi events: the January 2007 Wo rld Social Forum and Au gust 2008 launch of Jubilee South's Afr ica network These networks could return to the cul-de-sac of GCAP's 'reformist reforms' - i.e. to recall Andre Gorz's (1964) p hrase, making demands squarely within the logic of the ex isting neoliberal system and its geopolitical power rela tio ns, in a manner that d isem powers activists if they gain sligh t margin al ch anges. Or they could embark upon 'non-reformist refo rm' challenges, by identifying sites where the logic of fi nance can be turned u pside down. The most striking case might have been the South Africa n 'bond boycott' campa ign of the early 19905, w herein 54 ngntea IT

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activists in dozens of tow nshi ps offered each o the r solidarity when collective refusal to repay ho using mo rtgage bonds was the o nly logica l reactio n . This forewarned the 1995-6 ' El Bar LOn' ('the yoke') strategy of more than a mil li on Mexicans who were in debt when interest rates soa red from 14 to 120 per cent over a few days in ea rly 1995: they simply sa id, 'can't pa y; won't pay' . That slogan was al so heard in Argenti na in early 2002, follow ing the evictions of four preSidents in a single week due to popular pro test. The ongOing pressure from belo w compelled the government to default on $140 billion in foreign debt so as to maintain some of the social wage, the largest su ch default in hi story.

Follow latin America to financial and aid delinking For Afri can na tional e lites who w o uld aim to sha ke off the power politics o f aid and debt, the re arc now several impo rtan t s trategic options . So me follow the 'delinking' and 'deglobalisation' argu ments o f Sam ir Am in (1989) and Walde n Be llo (2002), which have been pioneered in rece nt years by Latin Ame r icans who have broken with the Western aid/d ebt establi shment. Conside r some ex amples: • Ecuado r's governme nt raised the ca ll fo r the North 's payment of 'ecological debt' as a resou rce curse anti do te, by pro posing in August 2007 to ' leave the oil in the soil' in the Yasuni Nationa l Park, de mandin g payment of roughly $5 billio n in compe nsation. Ecuado r also hosted a 'debt au dit' and, upo n rele ase of findings o f exte nsive corruption associate d with past debt, defaulte d o n payme nts due in Janu ary 2009 on foreign debt wo rth $10 billion, on g ro unds tha t the inhe ri ted de bt was 'obvio usly immo ral and illegi timate'. • Venez ue la imposed ca pita l contro ls in 2004 and thu s solved a major ca p ital flight prob lem associated with an unpatriotic bourgeoiSie (following a lead by Mal aysia in 1998 whose capital controls aimed to halt ex te rnal speculative tradin g in the ringgit). 55

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? • Venezuela called for the closure of the Wo r ld Bank and International Monetary Fu nd in October 20OS. • Vene z uela provided dra m atic fun di ng increases fo r thousa nds of alternative communal banks whose purpose is providing credit 'for popular power' . Ecuador had already expelled the World Bank resident representa tive in 2007 on grou nds of the institution's interference with the country's o il refo rms two years earlier. • Argentina made an early repayment of fM F de bt in 2005, fol lowed by many o ther m iddle-inco me bo rro wers so that by Septem be r 2008 the IMF was so unpop ul ar it wa s ca lled t he 'Turkish Monetary Fun d ' (in ho nour of the fund's only majo r middle-income client). Brazil provided financia l support for the launch of the Bank of the So uth . • The preSid e nts of Braz il, Ve nezuela, Paraguay, Ecuador and Bolivia met w ith the World Socia l Forum in January 2009 at Belem, which re fl ected a new development in a lli anceformation that holds g reat po te nt ial for futu re linkages be tween the left ho lding state power and the left applying po pular pressure fro m below. Regrettably, most Africa n countries, elites and civi l societies have been s low to take advantage of the ne w contex t. That context allo ws an aggreSSive posture towards both d onors - w ho are cu tting back in a ny case - as well as financiers . With the financia l and com m e rcial circuits of global capita l in e xtreme retreat, it is time for African eco nomies to bridge t he gap.

Bib liography Amin, s. (1989) De/inkillg, London, Zed Books BBC (2006) 'Nigeria settles Paris Club d ebt', http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ busincss/4926966.stm, 21 April, i"lccessed 23 Febru ary 2009 Bello, W. (2002) DeS/oba/isalio/! , London, Zo::d Books Bello, W. (2009) 'A pri mcr on Wa ll Street's crisis', MRzi/!e, 3 CXtobcr Bond, P. (\998) Ullevell Zimbabwe.· A Slwly 0/ Finalla, Devdopmm l mId Ullderdr.velopmclIl , Tre nton, Africa Worl d Press Bond, P. (2006) Looling A/rica: The Ecollomir.~ ojExp/oitalion, Lond on, Zed Books CARE (2006) WhIte Paper 011 Food Aid PoliCH, Lo nd on

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4 AFRICA BATT LES AID AND DEVELOPMENT FI NA NCE Christensen, J. (2009) In terv iew with Khad ija Sharife, 2S February Global Financial Integ rity (20OS) Press Release, November, Lo nd on Gon :, A. (1964) A Strategy for Laboy, Bos ton, Beacon Press Gw in, C. (1994) US Rdations with ti,e World Bank, Washington DC, Broo kings Instit ution Hass, A . (2009) 'A mnesty Internat ional urges freeze on arms sales to Israel' , http;{/www.haarctz.com/hasen/spagcs/1066231.htmt ilcccssed 26 February 2009 In tern ational MonctilTy Fund (2006) Global Flmlllcial Stability Report, Washin gton DC, IMF In tern atio nal Monetary Fund (2008) Africa ECOIlOmic Outlook, Wash ington DC, IM F, April Intern ational Relations Ce nter (2005) Congress Rejects rood Aid for Local Deueiopmeut, London, IRe Jubilee Research (20OS) ' Debt relief as if justice ma ttered: A framewor k for a comp rehensive appro.1ch to debt relief that works', Lond on, htt p:// \\"\' \\,.jubi lecrcsearch.o rglnews/debt%20rdief%20as%20if%20Justice%20 mattered.pdf, access(."d 15 October 2008 Kahn, B. (2008) 'Pers pective from South Africa', wrres pondence, 15 October. Make Poverty History. ' Foreign Aid Levels Drop in 2001' htt p ://www. ma kepovertyhistory.ca/enlbloglforeign -a id -levels-d rop-2007, accessed 25 February 2009 Mitta!. A. (2001) ' Land loss, poverty and hunger ', Intemational Forum on Globalisation, 21 December Monbiot, G. (2005) 'Afri ca's new best friends', The Guardian,S July Nabudere, D. (1990) n,c Rise Qnd Fall of Money Capital, London, Afri ca in Transition Trust Ndikuma na, L. a nd Boyce, J. (2008) 'Capital flig ht from sub-Saharan Africa', "lax IllS/lei! Focus, vol. 4, no. 1 Organisation for Ewnomic Cooperatio n and Development (OECD) (2008) 'Climate chan ge and Afr ica ', www.oo:."(d.orgld~ taoccd/63/17/41 656352 . pdf. acccssl...od 25 February 2009 Rea li ty of Aid (2008) 'Aid fails to deli ver real prog rl.."ss for RP, other poor countries', 12 December, hltp:llwww.realityofa id .o rglnews.php?id a41, acce5sed 30 Marc h 2009 Ri ch, B. (2007) A Game as Old as Empire, San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler I' ublis hers Rodney, W. (1972) How Ellrope Underdeveloped Afnca, Dar cs Salaam, Tanzania Publis hing House, and London, Bogle L"Ouverture Publicatio ns Seddon, D. (2002) 'Popular protest and class struggle in Africa ', in Zeilig, L. (cd.) Class StY"ggie lind Resislmla in Africa, Bristol. New Clar ion Press Stockh olm Interna tional Peace Rescuch Institute (SIP RI) (20OS) http://www. sipri ,org/co ntents/miJap/mi lex/mex_ trend s. html, accessed 27 February 2009 Stohl, R. (2007) 'Uni ted States re -emerges as leadi ng arms sup plier to developing worl d', Center for Defen se Information, http://www.cd i.

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AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? o rglfr ie nd lyversio n! printve rsi o n.dm ?d oc um entlJ)-4116, accessed 27 Fe bruary 2009 Tandon, Y. (2008a ) 'Glo bal finan cia l mel td own and lessons fo r the South' , 5011111 Blllletin, vo l. 24, no. 1, O cto ber Ta ndo n, Y. (200s b) Eliding Aid Dependence, Oxfo rd, f ah a mu a nd Geneva, So u th Ce ntre Til Y, N . (2008 ) Ralc/,i/,s th(' Summit? Aid I"effectiw"e~s, Jo h;mnesbu rg, C ivicllS, 7 Septem ber US Trcilsury (2008) US Pilrticipation in Mul tilntc ml Develo pme nt Banks, Wils hin glo n OC, US Trea s ury Wake man -Li nn , j. (2008) 'Pri va te capita l flows 10 s ub-Saharan Africa: finan cial globalisali o n's fina l fro ntie r?', p rese nted as part of the Sp rin g 2008 Regio nill Eco no m ic O utl ook fo r Sub-Sa haran A frica, A frican Depart m e nt, Inte rna tio nal Mo netary f und, Wash ing to n OC Wo rld Ba nk (2005) Glob~1 Development F,nallce, Was hing to n OC, World Ban k. World Bank (2006) Where is the Wealth of Nations?, Was hin g ton IX, Wo rl d Bank

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Aid for development Samir Ami n

Aid for what development? A di scu ssion o f a id, regardless of the do no r, mu st begin with lu cid con sid e ration o f the d e v e lo pme n t v is io n and strategy adop ted by the reci pie n t s tate in question. Durin g the 1981 G7

s u mm it in Cancu n, Western po wers, through Pres ident Reagan and s uppo rted by hi s Eu ro pe a n colleagues, p roclaime d that they k ne w be tte r than the co un tries o f the So u th th e m selves what needed to be do ne. The Wa shington Consens us a nd stru ctu ral adj ust ment progra mmes ha ve tra nsla ted this position into ac tion tha t co ntinues to this d ay, essen ti ally Sig nallin g a return to co lon isatio n . Despite the pro fo und econo mi c cri sis, w hi ch sh o uld, wi thou t it dou b t, call into q uestion the global visio n of liberal globa lisa tio n, tha t is no t the case. Development cannot be disti lled to a m e re eco no mic d im ensio n - the g ro wth of g ross do m estic pro d uct and the ex pan sio n of ma rkets fo r ex por ts a nd interna l trade. Instead a ny a nal ysis mu st take into consideration its soci al dimensio ns, e.g. the ex tent of ine quitable incom e di stributio n and access to com m una l goods s uch as hea lth and e du catio n. 'Develop me nt' is a holistic p rocess tha t im pl ies the defi nition of its political objecti ves and their a rticulatio n such as the de mocra tisa tio n of society and the emancip atio n of individuals, affirmatio n of the ' natio n' as well a s power a nd au tono m y o f these in t he glo bal syste m . The choice a nd the definition of its object ives are a t the heart o f o p posing d ebates in the lo ng-ter m visio n as we ll as the strategy and actio ns p ro p osed fo r develo p me nt, incl udin g a id. Impo rtantl y, ' the de m ise of develo pme nt' is gene ral, like

59

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

tha t o f aid, since depende nce in creases with ti me. The search for a positive alte rnative (,anothe r aid is possible', 'in the service o f ano the r, equall y possible, developme nt') sho uld be at the heart of the deba te.

From Paris to Accra The aid de ba te is co nfined to a tight frame work defi ned in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), whi ch was writte n by the O rgan isatio n for Economi c Coo peration and Development (OECD) and 'endorsed by' (read : imposed on) be nefi ciary co untries. Weste rn powers a nd internationa l institutions s uch as the Wo rld Bank, throu gh the Accra A gend a for Action (2008), expect to imple me nt the principles tha t they themselves have unilate rally defi ned .

Legitim acy if, as is professed, there are two ' pa rtne rs' in aid - in princip le equal - the dono r and reCipie nt states, the architecture of the sys te m sho uld ha ve bee n negot iated be tween these two 'partners'. Ye t, the initiative has been un ilateral with the Developme nt Assista nce Committee (DAC) - a de partme nt of the OECD - ta king sole responsibility for the drnfting of the Paris Declara tio n Like the Mille nnium Declara tio n, drafted by the State De pa rtme nt of the Un ited Sta tes to be read by the sec re tary gene ral o f the United Natio ns (UN ) at the UN Ge neral Assembly, the Paris Declaratio n did not engage the inte rnatio nal community. In fa ct, 'non-Weste rn ' co untries that are no t recipie nts of po te ntial aid, a nd in particul ar those that a re the mselves dono rs, have, with abso lute legitimacy, refused to associa te the mselves with the ' d ono rs' club' pro posed by the decla ration . To truly e ngage the inte rnational co mm unity, a UN commissio n o n 'a id' would have to have been created that would have been inclusive from the beginning a nd truly p ut each sta te o n an equal footing . Howeve r, the p rocess has been inscribed by the triad (the US- Ca nadaAu s trali a, Europe and Japan) as part of a s trategy to diminish the UN a nd s ubstitu te the latte r with the G7 a nd its instrume nts, which falsely quali fies itself as the ' inte rna tional community' .

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What const itutes aid? The DAC definition of what constitutes international aid (official development assistance or ODA) is disputable , The definition is itself a product of a politica l strategy, that of 'liberal globa lisation', established by dominant powers in the globa l system (the triad) and is fraught with ambiguity and contradictio n, s ince, on the one hand , the definition proclaims some impo rtant principles, in pa rticular the right of coun tries to appropriate aid (defined in terms of ownershi p) and that of ' part nership', But o n the other hand it details modalities that render e nforcement of these p rinciples infeasible Genera l conditionality; defin ed by the alignment to the princi ples of liberal globali sa tion, is omnipresent: at times with ex plicit reference to giving preference to hberalisation, open markets and becoming 'attractive' to private foreign investors; at other times, through indirect expression s uch as 'res pecting the rules of the Wo rld Trade Organisation (WTO )'. With in this fram ework, the Paris Declaration is retrogressive as compared with the practices of the 'development decades' (1960-70) when the principle of free choice by Sou thern cou ntries regarding their system and their economic and social poliCies was acknowledged. The asymmetriC relationship between donors and recipien ts is reinforced by the insistence on ' harmonisation' of donor poli cies. This a ppealing term is in reality a ca ll for alignment to the 'Washington Consensus' and the 'post-Washington Consensus' (barely different), that is to say sti ll with in the framework of libe ral globalisation. This harmonisation (the donors' club, integra ting the World Bank, theOEC D, the European Union, etc.) reduces the margin of gai ns afforded Southern countries during the development decades. Some Scandinavian countries, however, courageously decided not to support the programme of centralised development and to support the estab lishment of autonomous think tanks in the Sou th mandated to freely develop alte rnative development models. Rathe r than 'partne rship', the curre nt aid and development architecture 'strengthens the con trol exercised by the collectivity of triad states on reCipient st ates. Again, this is a regreSSion, 61

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

compared with the achievements made during the Bandung e ra. The term 'partnership' has been used precisely because that is not what is wanted. As George Orwell no tes, diplomacy prefers to talk of peace when it is preparing war - it is more effective. The Paris and Accra Declarations certainly, as an a ttemp t to compensa te for the co ntradictions between declared p rinciples a nd strategies for implementation, focu s on what the South Centre accurately calls the ' litany of false problems', among them: The capaci ty of absorption: The 'volume' of global aid doesn't depend on this capacity, w hi ch is impossible to define. Rathe r, it depends on the political objectives of the tri ad. When the budget of a co untry is 25 or 50 per cent dependent on external aid, that country no longe r has the means to 'negotiate' its pa rticipation in the global system. It is no lo nger truly independ ent, analogous to the semi-colonies of the 19th century, thus, extravagant volumes of aid are usefu l, perhaps necessary. Shou ld global aid volumes be increased or reduced? The endless debate on the 1 pe r cent become 0.7 per cent defines the terms of this false question. The volume of useful aid is that, associated with adequate strategies, which allows gmdu al reduction un til aid is no longer needed. The terms of the false debate elude the true question focusing instead on doubtful and ineffective terrain regarding mora lity and charity. • Aid performance: The princi ple crite ri a for aid performance can only be the appreci ation of resu lts. Has aid enabled growth, employment, imp roved income, strengthened the autonomy of the productive system nationally wi th regards to external p ressures? H as the aid itself e nabled its own redundancy? Instead of these criteria, the Paris and Accra Declarations have created a ju ngle of 12 (illegible) performance matri ces and a ratin g system inspired by that used for the solvability of banks. This procedure is no doubt a ttractive to bureaucrats but it is certainly useless for the rest of us. The decl arations reinforced the means of poli tical control of the triad by the adjunction of genera l economic and political conditionality of libera l globalisa tion: respect for human rights, electoral and plural democracy, good governance, amongst others.

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De mocratisation of societies is a long and diffi cul t process, p roduced by social and poli tical stru ggles with in the country itself. This struggle cannot be re placed by sermons from the he roes of good ca uses, na tional and II fortiori forei gn, or by ' d iplomatic' pressure. The decl arations atte mpt to ease the gra vity of the conseque nces of the strategies o f structural adjustme nt and liberal globalisatio n by creating a new d isco urse: th at of ' pove rty' and 'po verty redu ction', to whi ch aid shou ld give priority.

The weak rhetoric of the dominant aid discourse The do min ant d iscourse defines the objective of aid to be the reduction (pe rhaps eradica tion in the most 'radical' d iscourse) of poverty, by supporting 'civil SOcie ty' and re placi ng gove rn ance that is deemed 'bad ' by 'good governance' . The wo rd 'pove rty' co mes fro m the o ld language of cha rity (religious and othe rwise). This In ngu age belo ngs to the pas t, not the present, le t al one the futu re. It is antithe tical to the langua ge d e veloped by modern social philoso phe rs, loo king to be scie ntific, tha t is to discove r mechanisms t ha t e ngende r a n observable and obse rved pheno me non. The way it is proposed, the 'civil socie ty' that is called to assis t aligns with the consensus that: 1) the re is no alte rnative to the ' market economy' (a v ul ga r express ion to s ubsti tute analys is of ' real and existing capitalis m'); and 2) there is no alte rna tive to re presenta tive de mocracy fo unded on an elec to ral multi party sys te m (co nceived as ' de mocracy') subs ti tutin g the de mocratisatio n of society, which is a constant process. Civil socie ty is therefore the com b ination of neighbourhood collectives, o f 'communities' (the conce pt being inseparable from the ideology of commun itari sm ), of local ' inte rests' (schooL hospital and ope n spaces) the mselves insepa ra ble from the segme nts of cru m bling ideologies, separated one from the othe r (' gender ' unde rstood in a restrictive se nse, respec t for nature, equally instituted in objecti ves sepa rable from the othe rs) . Eve n if the de mands of these assem blies tha t co nsti tute the claimed 'civil SOCie ty' is perfectly legitima te (a nd it is), the absence, w hether desired or not, o f their integration in a united social vision implies the accession

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to the dogma of consensu s. In other words, even if these demands were met, nothing would change. This ideology comes from across the Atla ntic and is not de ri ved from the historical political cultu res of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Desp ite their varying d egrees of difference, these polit ical cultures are those of recognised co nflicts of social interests, attribu table to creative democracy and the power to imagine alternatives, not merely altern ations in the exerc ise of unchanged patterns of power. In their place, the fa shionable and dominant d iscourse gives e minence to NGOs and sees the state as the adversnry. In the ' Third Wo rld ', favoured NGOs are often GONGOs (governmental NCOs) or MNCOs (NCOs operating like mafias) o r TNCOs (NGOs car rying ou t donor politics), e tc. 'Governance' was im'e nted as n substitute for ' power' . The clash between good and bad gove rn a nce is re min iscent of M anichaeism a nd mora lism, substitutin g scientific analysis of reality. Again, this framework co mes from the US, where ser mons have ofte n dom inated political disco urse . 'Good governance' im plies that the ' decision ma ker' be 'ju st', 'objective' (has the 'best solution'), 'neu tral' (accepti ng symmetrica l presenta tions of arguments), and above all 'honest' (includ ing, of co urse, in the financi al sense of the word) . Read ing the World Bank litera ture is like re-reading gri eva nces w ritten by me n (and few women) of religion and/or of law in the a ncient Orient to the just despot (no more e nlighte ned ). The inherent visible ideology is e mployed to evade the real qu estion: What soci al in terest does the power that be re present or defend? How do we transform power so that it progressively becomes the instrument o f the majori ty, in pa rticular, the victims of the syste m? Within this fram ework, the multiparty electoral recipe ha s proved its li mits.

Geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic aid Ai d policies, the choice of be neficia ries, the forms of intervention, their immedia te apparent objectives are inseparable from geopolitical o bjectives. Sub-Saharan Africa is perfectly integrated into the global system, and in no way 'mnrgi naJised' as is too o ften clai med : fo reign trade represents 45 per cent o f its GO P, compared 64 ngntea IT

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5 AID FOR DEVELO PMENT with 30 per cen t for Asia and La tin America and 15 per cent fo r each of the three regions o f the triad. Africa is therefore q uantita tively mo re, not less, integrated , bu t the contine nt is integrated differently into the system. The gea-economy of the region rests on two decisive sets of production in the m aking of its structures and the definition o f its pla ce in the global system: 1) 'Tro pica l' agric ult ural expo rt p roduction: coffee, cocoa, cotton, peanuts, fru it, palm oil, etc; and 2) Hydrocarbo ns and mining production: copper, rare metals, diamonds. The first are su rvival me an s, beyond the food prod uctio n for auto-consumption of farmers, which finance the g raft o f the state on the loca l economy and, beginning w ith public s pe nd ing., the reprod uction of the middle classes. The te rm 'ba nana republic' respo nd s, beyond the conte m ptuous me aning that it ca rries, to the reality of the status tha t dominant powers give to the geoeconomy of the regio n. These prod uctio ns interest local ruling classes more than they do dom in ant economies . However, wha t greatl y in terests the latte r are the natural resources of the continent. Today, hydrocarbons and rare minerals, to m o rrow, the reserves for development of agrofu els, the s un (when long-distance transportation of solar energy w ill be possib le), and, in a few deca des, water (when d irect o r indirect expo rt wil l be possible). The race to rural territories destined to be co nverted for the ex pansion of agrofuels has begun in La tin Am erica . Africa offers, in thi s regard, a gig<mtic possibi lity. Madagasca r has in iti ated the movement and a lread y conceded important a reas in the west of the country. The im plementa tion of the Congolese rural code (2008), insp ired by Be lgium cooperation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) w ill, witho ut a doubt, allow agri business to seize lar ge tracts o f agricultural land to exp loit the m, as the Mining Code permitted the pill age of mining resources fro m the colo ny som e time ago. Farmers, considered 'useless', w ill pay the price; the aggrava te d mi sery th at awaits them will perhaps interest the humanitarian aid of tomorrow - the aid programmes for poverty reduction. Indeed in the 1970s, an old co lonial d ream for the Sa hel was to expel its popu latio n (the useless) to cre a te ranches (Texas-style ) fo r widespread li vestock 65

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

farmin g for expo rt. This new phase of his tory is characterised by the in tensification of conflicts for access to the natural resources of the planet. The triad expects to reserve exclusive access to ' useful' Africa (that of na tural resource reserves) and prohibit access to 'emerging' countries whose need s in this regard are already considerable and will increase . The guara ntee of this exclusive access requires political contro l a nd the reduction of African countries to the sta tus of 'client' states. Foreign aid fulfil s a n important role in the main tenance of s tates as client states. It is therefore not excessive to argue that the objective of aid is to 'corrupt' the ruling classes. Beyond the financial drain (unfo rtunately we ll known and wh ich donors pretend they can't help!), aid has become 'ind ispensable' (since it has become an important source of financing for na tional budgets) and fo r that reason full of politica l interest. It is therefore impo rtant tha t aid be reserved exclusively and integrally to the classes in charge, in 'government'. Aid must also equally interest the 'op positio n' capable of succeeding the government. The role of civil society and of certain NCOs finds its place here. To be trul y poli tically effective, aid must equally contribute to maintaining the insertion of farmers in this global system, while feed ing the other source of revenue of the state. Aid is therefore equ al ly interested in the 'modernisation' of export cultures and fa cilita ting access to common goods (education, health and housing) of the middle classes and factions (primarily urban) o f popular classes. The client state's political functi oning depends, to a large ex ten t, on these conditions. Nevertheless there will always be pro,ects that will escape these criteria of global po litical effectiveness, expressed herei n with lucidity (that others will call cyniCism). Aid that Scandinavian cou ntries (Sweden in particu lar) provided, during the Ba ndung e ra, to radical and cri tical thi nking and action bears witness to the positive reali ty of this type of aid. During the Bandung era and the decades of development, Asia and Africa began countergeopol itics, defined by Southern states, to pu sh back the geopolitics of the triad. The conditions of the e ra - military bipolarity, global boom and the growing demand for Southern exports - allowed this counter-offensive to flourish, constraining the triad to make minor and major concessions in pa rticular instances. Speci fica lly, the

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military bipolarity p rohibited the United States a nd its associates in the trind to strengthe n thei r geopolitical power throu gh a geos trategy found ed on the pe rmane nt threat of military inte rve ntion. The pages of this e ra having tu rned , the geo politics of the triad, at the servi ce of its geo-eco nomy, find s itself stre ngthened by the d e ploymen t of its geostrategy, w hich is why the UN had to be marginalised and re p laced, w ith cynicism, by NATO - the ar med branch of the tri ad . This expl ains w hy the d iscourse a rou nd external security of the triad has take n centre stage. The ' war on te rro r' a nd on ' rogue states' attem pts to legitimi se the geostrategy of the triad and he nce take p romine nce.

The contours of an aid alternative

An abrupt rupture An abrupt ru pture from the cu rrent aid a rchitecture is, alas, not desirable. [t wo uld signal a decl a ration of war, aim ing to destabilise the powers that be and ma ybe eve n, beyond that, the destruc-

tio n of the state. This strategy ha s in fact been, and is, used (the b lockades on Cuba a nd Zimba bwe a re good exam ples). The choice is not between aid as it is or no aid at all . The battle m u st be waged fo r radi cal transfo r mation of the co ncepts rega rding the fun ction of ai d, as the Sou th Ce ntre a rgues . This is p rimarily an intellectual ba ttle, which s hou ld not have boundaries . This struggle is relevant to all those that propose the construction of a nothe r world (bette r), anothe r globalisat ion, a n authenti cally polycentric wo rl d sys te m, respectful of the free (a nd d iffere nt) cho ice of states, natio ns and peoples on the pla ne t. Le t us leave the mo nopoly o n the produ ction of recipes for all to the Wo rld Bank and the a rrogant tec hnocrats of the ' North' to impose . The moral a rgume nts in fa vo ur of debt in the North with respect to the Sou th, giving all its legitimacy to the principle of ' aid' (becoming therefore 'so li darity') are not without va lue . More co nvincin g, and politically grounded, are argume nts related to the solid ari ty of peoples fa ced w ith the challe nges of the fu ture. 1n particular, the consequences of climate change. The p roject to create a convention on climate cha nge (the United Na tions Fra mewor k Conventio n on Climate Chan ge, UNFCCC) 67

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

is an acceptable starting point to envision financing from opu lent co untries (responsible in the first instance for the deterio ration of the global e nvironment) for programmes that benefit all of the peoples of the planet, and in particular those that are most vulnerable. But precisely because th is initiative began within the UN, Western diplomats seck, at the very least, to impede (if not sabotage) its d evelopment. The elabora tion of a global vision of aid cannot be delegated to the OECD, the World Bank or the European Union. This responsibili ty is tha t of the UN alone. That this organisation is, by its very nature, limited by the monopoly of sta tes, supposedl y representing their peop le, is what it is. Strengthening more direct presence of peoples alongSide states deserves attention, bu t this presence must be co nceived to reinforce the UN a nd is not replaceable by NCO participation (pu lled out of a hat) at conferences conceived and managed by the North (and man ipulated by Northern diplomats). I would therefore give priority of support to initi atives ta ken by ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council of the United Na tions) in 2005 for the creatio n of a Developmen t Cooperation Forum (DCF). This initiative began the constructio n of authentic p
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s hould not fi gure under the rubric of 'aid' . Instead and as a legitima te response, not only morally, to this issue, an audit shou ld be co nd ucted of the d ebt in question (p rivate and public, fro m the s ide of the recip ient and the donor). Debts that are recognised as immoral (for instance those t hat are associated with corru pt operations in one way or another), illegitimate (for instance those which thinl y disguise pol itical support, as was the case for the aparthei d regime of South Africa), or usurious (by their inte rest ra tes, decided upon unila te rally by 'marke ts', by the full repayment of their ca pital and beyond it), shou ld be cancelled, and their victi ms (debt-ow ing countries) compensated as a resu lt for wha t has been paid beyond wh a t was owed . A UN Co mmission s hould be created to elaborate the international right, worthy of the name. O f course, the triad diplomats do not want to hear any pro posal to this effect .

Alte rn ative aid and alternative developm ent Alterna tive ai d is inseparable fro m the conceptu alisatio n of alte rnative develo pme nt. Although this is not the subject of o ur thesis here, it is neverthe less useful and necessary to reflect on some importan t p rincip les of develop m ent so as to give clarity to the p roposals for aite rn<1live aid that follow. It is to these important principl es that Lwill now turn.

A diversified system of production Development de mands a diversified system o f prod u ction, which in the fi rst instance e ngages on the road to industrialisation. The te nacious refusal to recognise thi s necessity in sub-tropi ca l Africa is remarkable. How else can one com p re hend the in sane industrial drift that s hould be la ughable (which country in Africa is curre ntl y 'over-i ndu striali sed'?), unfor tunately taken up by people in the altern ative globalisa tio n movement who are unaware of the real impact of the Bandung era? I suspect, actua lly, some racism for the peop les in question, within this proposal. On the co ntrary, is it not pl ain that it is precisely those co untries engaged on t he 'insane' path who are tod ay 'emergi ng' cou ntries (China, Ko rea, and others)? The incontrovertible industrial perspective does no t exclude

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the call to inte rnational capital. Com plex and diverse partnership formulae between state and local private capi tal (when it exists) o r foreign capita l are certain ly admissibl e, inevit able, probably. But, it on ly makes sense w he n liberalism is excluded, as it reduces the crea tion of 'attractive conditions for transna tional companies' as the WTO and aid agencies recomme nd. Real partnershi p in strategic d ecision making. con trol of re-ex ported p rofits, must accompany industriali sa ti on strategies. Diversifi cati on (inclu ding industrialisation ) inco ntrovertibly d e mands the con struction of infrastructures tha t do not exist in these count ries. Th is has beco me ind ispensable for the survival of these coun tries .

Social infrastructures There is no develop me nt without quali ty ed ucatio n, from the base to the s ummit, and without a population in good heal th . Here the re is potential for financial an d technical ai d that is indispu tably positive, manifestin g solidarity. The eradication of pandemics, of AIDS, are evi de nt exam p les .

Regional cooperation Di versifi cation and industri alisa tion will de mand the constructio n o f forms of adequ ate regio nal cooperation. Conti ne ntal co untries can without a do ubt do withou t it but those of 'medium' pop ulation size (from 50 million upwards) can initiate the process alone, know ing that they wi ll ra pi dly reach terrain that they will o nly pass thro ugh with regio nal coo pe ratio n. The form that regional coope ra tion takes must reinvent itself to be coheren t with the objectives of the type of developmen t s pel t ou t here . Regional 'common marke ts', wh ich dominate the institutions in p la ce curren tly (whe n they exist and fun ction) are not in line with this d evelopme n t, as they are conceived as blocs co nstitutive of liberal globaJisati on (Am in 2005) .

Agriculture at the centre of alternative development Rural and agricultural developme nt mus t be at the centre of the d efinition of a strategy for a not he r develop me nt, not just p rese ntly but even more strongly in a long succession of advanced phases of developme nt. 70 ngntea IT

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5 AID FOR DEVELO PMENT It is not enough here to proclaim the priority of agriculture as many do. The type of agriculture must also be defined. Coherent alternat ive develop me n t with diversification as its objective imposes the translation of some grand prin ciples in to conc rete policy, such as giving priority to food producers wi thin food sovereignty (as defined by Via Cam pesi na) and not food security frameworks. The food securi ty approach, p romoted by the World Bank and retained by the Pa ris and Accra Decla ratio ns, is the origin of the ongoing food crisis. Thi s approach imp lies not only that fa rmers produce more to first feed t hem selves (the majority of und e r-nou rished peop le are rural), but also to produce the excess necessary to sati sfy the urban dema nd. This is obviously part of a 'mode rnisation' policy certai nly different from the models of modern isa tion to whic h far mers of the developed world today were submitted.

Agricultural policy founded on the maintenance of rural populations As equal access as possible to la nd a nd the correct means to e xplo it it, comma nd s this concep tion of far mer agriculture. Th is im plies agrarian reform, strengthe ning of coo pe ration, adequ a te macroeconomic poli cies (c redi t, provision of inpu t location, commercialisa tio n o f products). These measures are different to those put in place histo rically by capitalism in Europe and No rth America, w hi ch was founded on the app rop riatio n of b nd , its reduction into a merchandise, a rapid social di fferen tiation of peasantry and the rapid expulsion o f 'useless' rural surplus. The o ptio n recommended by the dominant sys tem, not put into question by the Paris and Accra Declarations, is situa ted at the an tipodes of ad vanced principles. Founded on fin ancial profitabili ty, short-te rm produc ti vity (rapidly increasing production at the cost of accele rated ex pulsion o f farmers in s urplus), it respond s certain ly well to tran s-n ational interests of agribusiness and o f an associa ted new class of fa rmers, but not to that of popular classes and the nation.

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Question ing the globalisation of produ ction On these im portant questions, we can only refer to Jacques Berthelot's remarkable work, w h ich provides the best analysis of the catastrophes that Iiberalisa tion has produced, and conti n ues to produce, the best arguments notably concerning the fu ndamenta l asymmetries that characterise the Cotonou Agreement, the so-called projects of economic p a rtnership, the debates on the subvention of exports fro m the North a nd more genera lly the nego tia tions a t the heart of the WTO. The rebirth of farmers' movemen ts in francophone West A frica, organised within the Network of Farmers' and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa, a stakeholder in our debates, bea rs witness that the option for the farmers' path is necessarily in confli ct with the dominant p roductivist options in the circuit organised by the OEC D, the WTO and the EU. The alternative passes by national policy of conslruction/reconstruclion of national stabilisation funds and support for the concerned products through the implementa tion of common in ternationa l funds for base products, permitting an effec tive alternative reorganisation of international ma rkets of agricultural products . I wou ld also refer here to the proposi tio ns made by Jean Pierre Boris.

Unders tanding external rela tions The a lternati ve development framewor k provided here imposes a true mastering of economic relations with the ex te rior, amongst them the abandonment of the ' free trade' system claimed as 'regu lation of the market', to the benefit of national a nd regional systems of control of rates of fore ign excha nge. Beyo nd the impossible reform of the IM F, the answers to the challenges invite one to imagine the putting in p lace of regional moneta ry funds, articula ted in regards to a new system of global monetary regulatio n, which the current crisis m a kes more necessa ry than ever. 'Reform' of the lM:F doesn't respond to these necessities. In a more ge neral sense, the understanding of externa l relations, which isn't self-sufficient, defi nes the contours of what I have quali fied as the ' d e lin king', to be a constitu tive element, incontrovertibly o f the emergence of a nego tiated globa lisation. This development equally dem ands control of national na tural resources. Alternative

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development is founded on the principle of priority given to nationa l a nd regional internal markets and in this framework to the markets that respo nd in the first instance to the ex pansion of the demand s of the popular classes, no t to the globa l market. This is wha t [ ca [[ an auto-centred development.

An inventory of aid We should , takin g as a poin t o f d e parture the criteri a in the preceding section, do a n inve ntory of the aid that countries receive. Fi rst, the p rincip le of international solid':lTity of peoples, which r defend, legitimises support for struggles for the democratisation of societies, associated with social progress and effo rts of cri tical radical reflection. Does aid currently inscribe itself within th is perspective? Aid prov ided to 'NCOs' thai accept su bmiss ion to dominant conceptions regarding 'democracy' that is reduced to multipartyism, d issocia ted from social progress and even associated with social regression produced by liberalism, certai nl y does not . But it is not impossi ble that movements in rea l struggles for democratic and social progress can benefit from material suppo rt ex pressing moral and political solidarity. Second, an important fraction of aid to NCOs is insc ribed wi thin a strategy of substituting the state for 'civil society' in regards to meeting the essential needs of public services. The danger is obvious: this form of 'aid' entails the 'destru ction of the state'. The Moza mbican example is a well-researched case. Wha t is necessary is a transfer of this aid towards the reconst r uction of the state and its capaci ty to fulfil its functions (public service in education, health, wate r and electri city provision, public transpo rta tion, social housing, social security) and which neither private (who wou ld reserve for themselves the o nly pro fitable ma rgins), nor the associative (even benevo lent) can respond to correctly. Lastly; there will always remain a zone of intervention in the name of unive rsal human solidarity that is perfectly legitimate. Assistance to victims of natura l disasters, to refugees p roduced ell masse by war, can never wait. It wou ld be crimina l to refuse aid under the pretex t that nothing has been established to avoid the deterioration o f the underlying causes of these catastrophes (notably wars). However, unacceptable political ex ploitation of 73

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

'humanitarian' si tuations neverthe less poses a danger. Numerous examples exist. On the othe r hand, immed iate assistance doesn't exclu de the openi ng of the fil e regarding the causes of the ca tastro phe. On the co ntrary, cri ti cal independent reflection of these problems a nd e nga geme nt in the necessa ry social struggles needed to redress these deteriora ted stru ggles mu st be sup ported beyond the im mediate 'humanitarian' inter ven tion .

Renewing South - South cooperation No rth-South cooperation is no t exclusive. South-So uth coopera tio n ex isted during the Bandung era and d emonstrated its effectiveness within the condition s o f the e ra. Suppo rt by the nonaligned move me nt, the O rganisatio n o f African Uni ty (OA U), China, the Soviet Union a nd Cuba, for the libera tion movemen ts of Portuguese co lonies, in Zimbabwe and Sou th Africa, was important and at times decisive. At the time, cooperation o f triad co untries was absent othe r than from Sweden and some o ther Sca ndinav ian countries, as their diplomatic priority was to NATO (which incl udes Portugal ) and support o f apartheid. Today ample opportunities exist to renew Sou th- Sou th coope ra tion. The So uth has the means to break the monopo ly upon wh ich the s upremacy of the tri ad rests. Certa in countries of the Sou th have hccome not o nly capable o f assimila ting the technologies that the North seeks to protect (precisely because they are nevertheless vu lnerable) but also to d evelop these themselves. If they wish to put these towards a different model of development, more apt to the needs of the South, th is could o pe n a large fi eld in So uth- So uth coo pe ra tion. Countries of the South could equally give prio rity of access to the natura l reso urces that they control, to the strengthen ing of their own indu stri alisation and to that of their partners wi thin South-South cooperation. Certain So uthe rn countries have fi nancial reso urces that in stead of bei ng placed o n the financial markets and und er the monetary co ntrol of the tri ad, themselves co ll apsi ng, could shatter the monopoly o f the North in this domain and the bri be ry of aid that accompan ies it. These propositio ns are not romantic. Diplomats o f the triad ha ve taken menacing measures in aligning themselves 74 ngntea IT

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5 AID FOR DEVELOPMENT with the insane project of 'mili tary control of the planet', which ne\'e rthcless becomes necessary to perpetuate the supremacy of the ir eco no mi es in crisis. The South can do without the North, the reverse is not true. But for tha t, the elites of the South must liberate the m selves from their inte rnalised dependency thinking. They mus t sto p thinking that aid is a condition for developmen t of thei r societies. The South Centre insists, with reason, o n this major poin t of debate regarding the future of development.

Refe rence Amin, S. (2005) 'Afriq ue, excl usion p rogrammee ou renaissance?', Pa ris, Maisonneuve et Larose

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Aid and reparations: power in the development discourse Hakima Abbas with Nana Ndeda In Octo ber 2007, the d escend a nts of Ge rm a n offi cer Lothar vo n Tro th 'l, who ordered mass killings of the He rero peo ple o f Nami bia, visite d the comm unity to offer the ir apology fo r the gross violations of human rig hts pe rpetrate d by thei r antecede nt. The process of ackno w led gem ent, apology a nd recog nitio n o f gross viola tions o f huma n r ights is co nside red part of the repara tion due to s urvivo rs <md victims of these crimes . Whi le the vo n Trotha fa mily e xte nded the ir apology to the H e rero peo p le, the Ge rman sta te has itself refu sed to officially a po logise fo r its role a nd responsibil ity in the crimes pe rpe trated in their fo rmer co lony of Namibia (the n South West Afri ca), w hi ch incl uded mass killin g, a rbitrary de te ntio n, ex tra-jud ic ial e xecutio ns, fo rced disp lacem ent, ra pe a nd torture. The Ge rm an government has ex pressed 'regret' at the killings, and a visiting mini ster apologised in 2004 in gene ra l term s, bu t she avoided specifically sa ying sorry fo r the massacres ... the German govemment fee ls that a fo rma l apology might bring new demands fo r reparations, and says its obligations to N amibia are fu lfilled by its current role as Namibia's main aid dOllor. (1313C News 2007) This pape r exa m ines the relatio ns hip be tween repara tio n and aid in Africa, a nd a rgues tha t aid canno t be co nsidered a co unte rvail ing co urse for red ress gi ve n that it is fo unded 0 11 the ve ry principles of po w er and economi c inequ ity between a ' do no r' and ' re cipient' that e ntrench, rather than level, the glo ba l d yna miC that the cri mes o f coloniali sm, a pa rthe id and sla very crea ted. 76 ngntea IT

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It is for these very crimes and their effects that Afri can peoples arc due reparation. The paper will foc us on aid by 'traditiona l' Western powers rathe r th an a ttempt to e ncompass e me rging globa l donors.

The aid illusion As Afri ca victoriously emerged ou t of colo nialism, the task of re building an Afr ican economy based on sel f-s ustainability and grow th was dauntin g in the face of multip le internal and external co nt radict ions. African countries inherited a colon ial econo mic system that for cent uries had produced little apart from the raw materials demanded for the d evelop me nt of coloni al countries in Europe and the United States (Nkrumah 1970). While exploitatio n of Africa's peoples and resources, inclu d ing land, was the economic impera tive of Eu ropean and US ex pansionism and industria l growth, her ow n eco nomic develo pment was stunted by colonial rule and the self-interest of the colon ial powe rs to minimise investment in Africa's developme nt so as to maxim ise profits for the European co lonising country. For African peoples, co lonialism and slave ry created poli ti cal su bjugation, social devastatio n and economic regression . In 1947, the United States c reated the European Recovery Programme (also known as the Marshall Plan) to rebu ild Europe after t he Second Wo rld War. The $13 billion in econo mic and tec hnical aid was coordinated by the newly es tabli shed Orga nisation fo r European Economic Cooperation (later ca lled the Organisation for Economic Coope ration a nd Development, O ECD). The Marshall Plan laid the fo undatio ns and framework for what is today unde rstood as the global aid syste m, incl ud ing birthin g the shortcomi ngs of aid decried 10 this day by 'recipie nt' countries and peoples: tied aid, po li tical conditio nality and aid in the form of interest-bea ring loans. While Western European s tates used the Marshall Pl an for developme nt following the war, the Union of Soviet Soci alist Republics (USS R) rejected the plan because of the political conditions imposed and instead de ma nded compensation from 'Axis' allies, obtaining these from cou ntries such as Fin land, Hungary; Romania, a nd East Germa ny. The reaft er, the United Nations' two d ecades of developme nt (19605 a nd 1970s) created the fabric for 77

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

the development stra tegy and ai d template (see United Nations 1970) along the same lines, though arguably more progressive, of which development and aid conti nue to be based. Concurrently to the European Recovery P rogramme, Africa's li beration movements were gaining momentum in their call to end colonialism and apartheid, for human rights and scl fdetermination, o n the continent and in the diaspora. Social movements, trade unions, political parties and leaders emerged with a resounding anti-co lonial call, which was even tually headed by European powers after long and brutal political and ac tu al wa rs. With ind ependence, however, came the con undrum of the 'revolutionary' to dismantle the colonial state or insert itself into the same structures, includ ing nationa l borders that the colonialists had buil t over centuries. Negotiations between colonial states and independence leaders created framewor ks for bila teral economic relations between the states concerned . The concessions made by African leaders over trade and land redistribution, and the terms for foreign co rporations, maintained a lewl of patronage entrenched to this day. While Africa n ind e pendence leaders recognised the need for unity based on their shared history of oppression a nd collective desire for libe ration, the formation of the Organisation of African Uni ty (OAU), fou nd ed in 1963, focused on ensuring po litical liberatio n across the continent and co ncentrated, following a co mp romise of main p layers, on the individual s tate-building process rather than collective political and socio-economic development As political and economic instabi lity reigned for the years succeeding official independence, African nations sought fo reign assistance, in various forms, for development as well as for military growth. Meanwhile, in many African sta tes, civil wars eru pted that were either instigated or supported by forei gn forces. Within the context of the unfolding Cold War between the US and the USSR, Africa became the playground for proxy wars fought for global infl ue nce by the two emergi ng su perpowers. Desp ite initial attemp ts at non-alignmen t, governments, and other politi ca l and military forces, began to align themselves along the Cold War frontlines, seeking aid from either side in ostenSibly ideologica l wars tha t furth er plunged mu ch of the continent into instability and insecurity or entrenched po litical dicta torship 78 ngntea IT

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with unaccountable and corrupt lead ership . Former Zambian president, Ken ne th Kaunda, portrayed Africa's dilemma: ' In most cases, we like to think in terms of getting ai d from various sources - that is, from both the East and West - hoping against hope that this wi ll be a shield against interference from either. In fact we end up with a mixture of various ex plosive gasses in one bottle, a nd inevitably, explosions fol low' (Kaunda 1966). Africa today conti nues to be a pawn rather than a player in global power games. Aid in the form of humanitarian assistance, for military expans ion or for developme nt, continues to support the poli tical interests of forme r colonial sta tes (donors) and the self-interests of Africa's political elite at the expense of Africa's longterm, sustainable, people-centred development. Since independe nce in the 1960s, Europe and the United States have contributed bill ions of dollars in aid to Afri ca, yet Africa conti nues to be the poorest continent in the world, with a conti nuously decl ining total gross domestic product (GOP), and her people the poorest peoples. Paradoxically; African coun tries with the lowest C OPs, who have received bi ll ions of US dollars in aid during the period 1975-2000, being up to 50 per cent aid dependent, show an ann ual per cap ita decline of 0.59 per cent during the same period (Nkosi 2006). With the advent of the Was hington Consensus and its Bretton Wood s institutions, including the World Ban k and the Internat ional Monetary Fund, politica l cond itional ity a nd aid dependence have marred Africa's independ en t development and eco nomic selfd etermination. Im posed econom ic and political programmes and structures that serve the econom ic interests of Eu rope and the United Sta tes, coupled with a staggering aid depende nce for most African countries, continue to retrench Africa systematica lly in the vi cious cycle of political and economic regreSSion a nd depend e nce . O ver the past five decad es, foreign emergency assistance has helped to relieve cataclysm ic disaste r for many vulnerable gro ups in Africa, bu t it has fa iled to pro mote the economic developme nt to prevent such disasters from re-occurring . During the Gleneagles summ it in 2005, G8 countries pl edged, with much fanfare, to dou ble aid to Africa by 2010 (NJo roge 2008). Yet, like the World Ba nk's s tructural adjustment programmes before it, it is not clea r ho w an ad ditional $5 billion for the next five years 79

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will lift mi llio ns out o f poverty and build a self-re lia nt Afri can econo my. Si gnificantl y, a la rge p ro po rti on of aid pled ges to Africa re main unfulfi lled whi le ano the r large pro po rtio n of aid se rves to contribute to the do no r na tion, be ing tied to se rvices and products provid ed from compa nies in do no r countries . Most foreign aid has been provide d in the fo rm o f loans, bea rin g hig h rate s of inte rest and cre ating debt unparalle le d in o the r regio ns of the wo rl d. Over ti me, the re pay me nt of these loan s has co ntribute d to the unde rde ve lop m e nt o f African eco no m ies, w ith Africa tod ay paying mo re in de bt servicing than it re cei ves as aid fro m Weste rn co untries and blocs . Wh ile Afri ca receives le ss tha n $13 billio n in aid a nnua lly, it s pe nd s an estim ated $15 bill ion annually o n debt re payme nts. Fo r e ve ry do llar that an Afri can co untry receives in g rants, it pay s $13 in interest o n debt. Indeed, debt re lief is a necessary mo ral and practical co ndi tio n fo r Africa 's develo pme nt, but, like aid more broadly, it is not sufficie nt to redress the cond itio ns tha t maintain the levels of po verty in Africa des pite the co n tine nt being o ne o f the riche st in ra w mate ria ls . The current aid and d ebt crisi s in Afri ca is a refl e ction of the historical a nd p resent relatio nship that Eu rope and the Unite d Sta tes maintain with the acqUiescence and collabo ratio n of Africans the m sel ves. Thi s is a relationship based o n de pe nde nce and expl o itati o n (Go ud ge 2003) - what Tim Murithi in th is vo lu me te rms ' aid colo nia li sm'. The pate rnal istic re la tio nship between dono r and recipient is re miniscen t of colonial rhe to ric w here the eco no mic self-inte rest of the colonial s tate was m asked by the claim tha t Africans we re u n fit to govern the m selves. Yet the d e bt fo r slavery and colo ni ali sm owed Africa by the sa me sta tes in Eu rope a nd the United States has ne ithe r been syste mati ca lly claime d no r p ro \'ide d.

The reparation obligation That a wrong done to an individual mu st be redressed by the offende r himself o r by someone e lse again st who m the sanction of the community m ay be direc ted is one of those time less axio ms of justice without which social life is unthinkable (Ju stice Guha Roy 1961)

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The ri ght to reparation for gross viola tions of human rights has been enshrined as a fundamenta l principle o f inte rnationa l legal norms and recogn ised in inte rna tional treaties and charters as well as in customary la w. Indeed, the right to reparation has been an integral part of the establishment of the in ternational human rights system since the framing of the Unive rsal Declaration on H uman Rights.! In 1989, the United Nations commissioned a 'study concernin g the ri ght to restitution, compe nsation and rehabi li tation for victim s of gross violations of human rights and fun damenta l freed o ms' . The re port, known as the van Bove n repo rt afte r its au thor, concluded that every state 'has a duty to make repara tion in case of a breach of the ob liga tio n under international law to respect and to e nsure resp ect for human rights and funda mental freedoms' (van Boven 1993) and formed the basis for the drafting of the 'Basi c principles and guidelines o n the ri ght to a remedy and re para tion for victims o f violations of interna tional human rights and humanitarian law' (Bassiouni 2000). In internatio nal law, states have a du ty to res pect, e nforce and e nsure res pect for inte rnational hum an rights obligations. The obliga tion for repara tion to victims o r su rvivors of human rights abuses lies wi th the state whose agents, actin g in an official or quasi -official capaci ty, are respo nSible for the viola tion. State responsibility 'arises fro m an internationa lly wrongfu l act of a Sta te' (van Boven 1993) including an act or o mission or a breach of an internatio nal obligatio n such as an internatio nal crime including violations of the right to self-determination of peoples and 'on a wides pread sca le of an inte rnati o na l obli gation of essential importance fo r safeguarding the human being. 2 sti ch as those prohibiting s lavery, genocide and apartheid' (United National International Law Commission 1993). Victims o f an internatio nal crime have the p rocedural ri ght to due process, the substantive righ t to reparation a nd to access factual info rmation concerning the violation. 3 The right to repara tion applies to vio lations that are no t crimina lised unde r national law at the time they are pe rpetrated bu t violate jus cogel1s principles of international law. 4 The vio la tions must be sanctioned and remed ied, and s uccessive governments are bound by the responsibility for viola tio ns of huma n rig hts not redressed by p revio us governmen ts, indeed, 'statutes of lim itations shall not appl y for prosecuting viola tions of inte rnational h uman rights 81

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and humanitarian law norms tha t constitute crimes under international law' (Bassiouni 2000). In cases whe re the perpetrator is a third party; for instance a co rporation or a pe rson acting in their pe rsonal ca pacity, e tc, the s tate has a n obligation to protect whi ch exte nds to the obli gation to pro vide remedy to the survivor or \' ictim. The ' injured subject to whom the re paratio n is due may be a State directl y injured, a collectivity of States - in particular in the case of breach o f obligations ersn Oil/li es - and/o r a n individ ual person o r group of pe rsons who are victim s o f breaches of inte rnationally recognised human rig hts' (van Bove n 1993) . Indeed, a victim is co nside red to e xte nd not only to the individual whose rights ha ve been violated bu t also to thi rd party ind ividuals or grou ps of people whe n the v ictim is deceased or the conseque nces of the violatio n ex tend to othe r pcrsons.5 Reparation for human rights violations has the purpose of relieving the suffering of and affording justice to victim s by removing or redressing to the extent possible the conseq uences of the wrongful acts and by p reventing and deterring viola tions. (van Boven 1993) Though the crimes o f forcible transfe r o f popu latio n, forced di sappearance, s lavery; acts of genocide, fo rced labour, summary a nd arbitrary executions, sex ual and gende r-ba sed viole nce including wi despread ra pe used as a weapon of war, and system atic discrimination based on race and gende r we re not necessarily crirn inalised unde r national law in Afri ca and the di aspora durin g co lonial is m,6 apartheid and s la ve ry, these crimes a re inte rnatio nally recognised as gross viola ti o ns of huma n rights for w hich reparatio n is a n obliga tio n. Some survivors of these crimes a re seeking re paration for the crimes pe rpetrated by agents of the coloni al and apartheid sta tes or by corpo ratio ns and o th er third parties. For ins tance, in Nove mber 2002, a n inte rnatio nal court action against banks and businesses tha t supported the apartheid s tate was bro ught on be half of 91 victims o f a partheid. The 'Khu lumani complaint' as it has become kno wn, seeks re paratio n fro m these e ntities for aiding and abetting crimes aga inst hum an ity d u ring ap artheid. Anothe r case, at its nascent stage at the time of writing.. is a representati ve s uit fil ed by the Ke nya Human Rights

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Commission in the British H igh Court on behalf of the su rv ivors of the Mau Mau struggle seeking rep a ration for atroci ties committed during the state of e mergency in Ke nya between 1952 and 1960. During the armed independence struggle, a trocities were perpetrated by agents o f the British s tate against members of the Mau Mau anti -colonia l mo vemen t and the African communities that supported them, including preventive dete ntion, syste mati c denial of due process, summary killings, torture, rape, forced labour, destruction of property and forced evictions. Briti sh and s uccessive Ke nyan govern ments h ave neither acknowledged nor provided compensation for these gross vio lations of human ri ghts. Simila rly important cases have been filed in the diaspora and on the continent bu t, while these are critical, few efforts have been made to provide reparation at the continental level - by a 'co ll ectivity of states', or even by Africans as a targeted group of victims or victimised communi ties - for the crimes of colo nial ism,? apartheid and slavery a nd the 'consequen ces of the violation' on Africa's development, her peo ple and her resources.3 The case for African reparation can be clearly mad e using international law if Africans chose to use this framework (understanding that Africa was not a s ubstan tive contributor to the norms developed). According to the van Boven re po rt, repara tion consists of res titu tio n,9 co mpe nsa tion, 10 reh abi Iitation ll and satisfaction and guarantees o f non-repetitionP If the obligation for resti tution had been appropria tely fu lfilled afte r colonialis m in Africa, the syste ms of governance o f the colonial state would have been d ismantled, th us alleviating the post-colonial realities which have entrenched cl ass and ethnic divisions within Africa's arti fi cial borders . Moreover, land red istribution and th e na tion alisation of industries are fo rms o f restitution. W here full res titutio n or rectification is no lo nger poss ible, 'adeq uate' co mpen sat io n is required . States, co rpo ra tions an d p rivate persons w ho have benefited from the th eft and exploitation o f African lands, peop les and resources are obligated to compe nsate communities and peoples - including Africa as a co!1ec tivity of states - fo r the viola tions and their conseq u e nces.13 While it is clearly d ifficul t to quantify the psychological, socia-economic, politica l and cul tural damage caused by colonialism, apartheid and slavery, the re exists precedent within a number of internationa l bodies 83

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for the quantification of the 'immeasurable' damage of international crimes. Africans, perhaps under the rubric of the African Un ion (AU), could certainly create a framework for compensation tha t would elaborate t he modalities including quantity and di stribution. The pr£valence of compensation as a r£medy shou ld not d imin ish consideration of the need for other kinds of redress. When rights arc violated, the abi lity of the victim to pursue selfdetermination is impaired and it is not justifiable generall y to assume th at compensation restores the moral balance ex ante. A morally adequate response addresses itself in the first instance to restoring what was taken. (Shelton 2001) African schola rs from the conti ne n! and the diaspora, such as Walter Rodney (1 981), have lain bare the economic and political impact of European colonialism and slavery o n Africa's d evelopment (Adejo 2008). indeed, while the call for reparation o ften focuses deservedly o n h istoric cr imes against humanity and gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Europe and the United States on African peoples, co nte mporary discourses of power and develop ment also p laya Significant role in ma intaining, rather than restori ng, the conditions created by past wrongs and ongoing violations. Reparation discourse therefore becomes a broader attempt to redress the historica l and conte mporary power paradigm between Africa, her peoples and the rest of the world (Adejo 2008). The stru ggle for African repara tio n shou ld not, as Dr Adejo co ntends, be based on Western guilt but on Weste rn responsibility. Professor Mazrui (1993) further argues that reparation s hould be paid not for the negative impact of Europe on Afri ca, but ra ther for Africa's positive impact on Europe, i.e. how Africa d eveloped Europe. Thus repara tion shou ld be underta ken not only as atonement fo r previo us wrongdoing, but as Just reward fo r a long-term and o n-gOi ng contribution to th e modern world (Mazrui 2002). Winston C hurchill acknowled ged this contributio n to British development when he stated, in 1939, that: Our possession of the West ind ies ... gave us the st rength, the support, but espeCially the capital, the wealth, at a time when no other European nation possessed sHch a rese rve, which 84 ngntea IT

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enabled us to come through the great struggle of the Napoleonic Wars, the keen competition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and enabled us ... to la y the foundation of that commerc ial and financial leadership which ... enabled us to make our grea t position in the world. (h yer 1993) Reparation for Africa n peoples g lobally must begin with an acknowledgment that the slave trade, colonialism and apartheid represented crimes against humanity whose consequences continu e to shape the world today, and that an apology is required from those states and third parties, su ch as corporations, that upheld, legitimised and benefited from these injustices (Africa Action 2001). However, Africa ca nno t simply wait for others to ac knowledge these crimes, it is also importan t that Africans in all s p heres unashamed ly acknowledge, publicly denounce, actively seek re medy for and recognise, in public ed ucatio n, throu gh historic monuments, with the use o f the med ia etc., the victims and s urvivors of these cri mes. Remedies seek to provide the psychological and social rehabil itation of su rvivors and victims including the resto ration of 'd igni ty and reputation' (van Boven 1993) . The indign ities and humi liation s uffe red by African peoples to this day by systematic, institutionalised and ind ivi dual discrimination based on race and gender can be remed ied only after Africa with a single voice is able to demand and reclaim her dues, her resources and her politi ca l <md econo mic self-d etermi nation. The begging bowl of aid, with its accompanied chari table savio urs in the form of development and humanitarian workers (and sometimes e ven mUSiCians), on ly entrenc hes the image globally and internally o f Africa as u nable to address the need s of he r people and land - her digni ty and repu tation not having been recovered. In con nection with d evelopment di scourse, the United Nations secrctary-general's report o n the inte rnationa l dimensions of the ri ght to development as a hum~n ri ght unde rl ined, amo ng the e th ica l aspects of development, a moral duty of reparation by former colonial powers, while noting that acceptance of stich a duty is not yet universal. However, reparation is again framed not as an obli gation bu t as a 'good deed' that Western powers sho uld impart as part of their moral conscience to Africa, thus removing the agency; a nd therefore powe r, o f Africa and Africa ns in the 85

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? process . The purpose of reparation is indeed lost if the p rocess itsel f victimises the victim. In 1998, the OA U created the Inte rnational Panel of Em inent Pe rsonali ties to Investi ga te the 1994 Genocide in Rwa nd a and the Surrounding Eve nts.14 The unp recedented report whi ch e nsued d e manded re paratio n to Rwanda by the countries that failed to pre ve nt th e genocid e of 1994, nam ing, in particular, the US and France, along wi th the UN Security Counci l as a whole. The re po rt noted that: 'apo logies alone are not adequa te. Ln the na me of both justi ce and accoun tability, re paratio ns arc owed to Rwanda by actors in the inte rnational co mmunity fo r their ro les befo re, du ring, and since the genocide'. Th e OAU sought the establi shme nt of a UN commission to set out the m odalities for repara tion including the cancellation of all Rwanda's 'one ro us' debt, compensation to assist in the immediate infrastructural and social service needs of the co untry a nd contri bution to the Rwa nd a n government's Survivor's Fund by the interna tio nal community. While the OA U sou ght re paration on be half of a s ingle African country in the case of Rwanda, fe w co ncerted and Sli stained efforts ha ve been mad e a t the contine ntal level to claim reparatio ns fr om Eu ro pe an d the US for gross viola tio ns of human rights during colonialism, sla ve ry a nd apa rtheid, and to lay th e frame work for Africans the mselves to also re med y the conseque nces of these crimes . One effo rt at the pa n-African level highli ghts, however, the co ntrad iction of the d evelopme nt di sco urse with the re pa rations purpose. Durin g a Natio nal Assembly debate in Ke nya on 12June 2007, The Hon. Njoki Ndun gu stated: I am hoping PAP [the Pa n-African Parliamentl will be a little bit more aggreSSive and less afraid. Since we come from different countries whose democracies are at different leve ls, sometimes it appears that some Members from othe r countries are afraid to talk about certain issues and accept cerlain criticisms. Most of all, I think the PAP should be a place whe re we need to discu ss issues such as rcpnration. Africn hns been the bra in bnsket of the West for a long time. Wh y can we not aggreSSively start to ask for what they took back? For example, Britain should gi ve reparations to Kenya and Zimbabwe. Namibia should be able to get reparations from Ge rmany. Congo shou ld get repa rations from Belgium. I think it is time that we have a braver 86 ngntea IT

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facc. I hope in the next PAp, the Kenyan delegation will be able to articulate those issues and continue to gi ve leadership that is unafraid. That year, she sough t to introduce a motio n before the Pan-African Parliament, an organ of the Afri can Union (AU), for reparations by forme r European colo nial sta tes to African states. Rather than being me t wi th the due process of parliamentary affairs, the mo tion was rejected by the Bureau of the Pan-African Parliament, thwarting deba te o f the motion and possi ble ado ption by this advisory body to the AU. IS A possible exp lanation for this derision of parliame ntary process is the fact th a t PAP had just submitted a large grant proposal to the Department fo r Ln ternatio nal Develo pme nt, the United Ki ngdom's main aid donor agency, and did not want to derail potential fundin g opportuni ties by introducing a motion and instiga ting a debate that might lead to a parliamentary decis ion that European states may view as con tentious. Once again, the dependence on donor aid su rpassed the impera tive to claim our reparations in the paradoxical power paradi gm that Africa fa ces within the development fra me work. Reparation is not just about money: it is not even mostly about money; in fact, money is not even one per cent of what reparation is abou t. Reparation is mostly about making repairs. Sel f-made repairs, on ourselves: mental repai rs, psychologica l repairs, cultural repairs, organ isationa l repairs, social repairs, institutional repairs, technological repilirs, economic repairs, political repairs, educilt iona l repairs, repairs of every type that we need in order to recreate su stain able black societies. (Chinweizu 1993)

Conclusion Just as co lonial rhetoric mainta ined that Africans were not fit to govern themselves, so the current aid d iscourse, comp lete with politi cal conditionality and favour, cloa ks the self-inte rest of donor countries and unde rlines the continued lack o f selfd e terminati on of Africa ns. Reparations are not merely a demand to right w rongs bu t also to redress the power pa radigm inheren t in aid, a nd other ineqUitable relations between Africa and the 87

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rest of the world (incl u ding trade and d ebt) and inhe rited by the crimes for which Africans seek repara tion. While the inequitable relati ons that premise ai d are not uniqu e to th is p rocess, the mask of benevolence provides a particularly egregious framework making demands for aid reform merely performatory in the genuine quest for African develo pment . A ny claim, therefore, tha t aid is a just su bstitute for repa ration fail s to accurately recognise the nature of both, in much the sam e way as 'welfare' as a form of repara tion for Afri can descendants in the diaspora is a preposterous equivalence. In the current global context of 'economic crisis', where capi talism furt her seeks to en trench the hegemony o f globa l powers, it befalls Africa to renegoti ate no t only the terms of aid, its effe cti veness and its conditions, but to reshape the politicS and powe r at the very fou ndatio n o f aid. One way to shi ft the discourse and provide an alterna ti ve framework for Africa's development wou ld be for Africans to demand payment of the repa ra tion due to the continent by s tates and corpora tions that benefited from in ternational crimes commi tted during coloni alism, sl a very and apartheid and their continued effects on Afri can peo ples' and d evelopment. It is hi gh time that African peop les throu gho ut the co ntinen t and the d iaspora concerted ly and systematically mad e a su stai ned de mand for re para tion fo r these gross vio lat ions of h uman rights . But, cri tical to successfully remedying the cr imes perpetrated against Africa and he r peop les is not only m aking the d e mand of perpetra tors to fulfil their obligations, b ut also instigati ng the process of ta king repa ration at every level ourselves - no longer waiting for othe rs to heed our ca ll s or 'aid' in ou r emancipation (or even our development). Our cnlsade for reparations would be com pleted only when we achieve a global order without negrophobia, without alien hegemony over any part of the Black World, and without the possibility of holocaust. (Chinweizu 1993)

Notes !. The International Covenant on C ivil an d Pol itical Righ ts, Internation
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6 A ID AN D REPA RATI O NS as the A fri.::an C harter on Human and Peoples' Rights, .::reates a general duty to make app rop riate reparations for violations of human righ ts. 2. The van Boven report states tha i: 'In inkrna tio nallaw State respo nsibility arises from an internat io nally w rongful act of a State. The elements of s u.:: h intern ationally wrongfu l act are: (a) conduct .::onsisting of an action o r o mi ssion that is attributable to the State under international law, and (b) condu.::t that constitutes a brea.::h of an inicrn ationill o bliga ti on of the State. 201 The Inicrn ational L...lw Comm ission, in further describing a breach of:m internationa l obli ga ti o n, d istingu ish<:.x! bctw <:."Cn internationa l .::rimes and international d elids. An internatio nal crime is the brea.::h of an in ternational obliga tio n so essential for the protection of fundamental interes ts of th e internatio nal community that it is recog ni sed as a crime by tha t community as a whole. To th is category belo ng, inter aliil, serio us breaches of international o bligations of essential importa nce with regard 10 the maintena nce of international peace and sec urity, the ri g ht to selfdetermination of peoples, the safeguarding and p reservation of the human environment and, mos t relevant in the context of the presen t stud y, serious breuch<:.'S '·o n a wid<:."Spread scal e of un internationa l obliga tion of essential impo rtance for safegua rdin g the human being, s uc h as those prohibiting sla very, genOC ide and apartheid". 21/ An international delict is any internatio nally wrongful ac t w hic h is not an internationa l .::rime.' 3. The Unive rsa l Declara tion of I-lumMI Rights provides und er ar ticle S that everyone has 'the right to an effective re med y by th e compete nt natio nal tribunals for act~ violating the fundamental rights g ranted him by the .::onstitu tion o r laws' . The Basic Principles state that: 'Rem ed ies for violatio ns of inte rna ti o nal human rights and humanitarian law include the victim's right to: (a) A.::cess justice; (b) Repara tion for harm s uffered; and (.::) Ac.::ess the fa.::tual informati o n con.::erning the v iolations' . 4. These are principles of interna tiona l law whic h have a pe rem pto ry .:: harac ter from w hic h no d erogation is ever permitted . They include the prohi bition of tortu re, sluvery and genOCi de, amo ngst others . 5. The European Commission on J-[um:;ln Rights ddin<:..,j the 'vic ti m' as including 'not on ly the direc t vi.:: tim or vi.:: tims of the alleged viola tion, but al so any person w ho would indirec tly s uffer prej udice as a result of s u.:: h viola tion o r who wo uld have a valid personal interes t in Sff uring the .::essation of s uc h violatio n'. 6. In fact, many .::rimes again~t African peoples in the d iaspora and o n Ih e .::ontinent were sa ncti o ned under national law by, among ot he r tactics, .::od ing African ind ividuals and peoples as p roperty or less than a full person. 7. The van Boven report st~ tes tha i: ' It .::annot be denied that both indi " idu ~1 5 and collec tivi ti <:.'S arc often viclimis<:.-d a.s a r<:."Sul t of gross violntions of human rights. Most of the g ross violations listed in the previous paragraph inherently affect rights of individual s a nd rights of collectivit ies. This was also ass umed in s ub-Commission resolution 1989/13 wh ich proVided som e useful g uidelines wit h respect to the question of who is en titled to

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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? reparation. In this regard th e resolution mentions in its first preambular paragraph ·'individuals, g rou ps and comm uniti es" . In the next part of th is SIXtion, which will d ea l wi th some spedal iss ues of interest and atte ntion, the individua l and cot\ective as pects of victimised persons and groups arc in many instances closely inte rrelated. This coincidence of indiv id ual a nd coUective as pects is particularly manifest with regard to the rights of ind igenous p(:oples. Agilinsl thi s bac kgrou nd it is the refore nCCt"Ssilry that, in ud di tio n to individuuI means of repnration,
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6 AID AND REPARATIONS 5irleaf, current President of Liberia; J-l odne Djoud i, Algerian Senato r; P. N. Bhagw ati, fo rmer Chief Justi ce of the In d ian Su preme Cour t; and Step hen Lew is, form er United Na tions Spedal Envoy for J-l iV/A IDS in Afr ica. 15. The Pan·African Parliament is ye t to tra nsitio n into a fu ll y legislative bod y, remaini ng an advisory bod y of the African Unio n.

Bibliography Ad ejo, A. M. (2008) Reparations to Africa: hI Argument For Equity And Alternative Finallr.lllg Strategy ill Q Competitive World, Dakar, CODES RIA, ht tp;llw ww. codes ria.org/Links/confere nccs/Nepad/Adcjo%20Armstrilong.

pd' Africa Action on the Wo rld Confere nce Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenop hobia and Re lated Intolerance (WC AR) (200 1) Support for weAR alld a Call to Fight ATDS alld Global Aparilleid, http:// www.afri caa cti on. orgldes k/wcar01 OS.htm Ake, C. (1996) Democracy alld Developlllt:!!t in Africa, Washington, DC, Brookings Institut ion Press Bassiou ni, M.e. (Special Rapporteur) (2000). 'The right to res titu tion, compensa tion and reha bili tation for victims of gross violations of human ri ghts ilnd fu ndilm enta l fH:cdo ms ·, EjCN A/2000/62, l S )il nua ry, fina l repo rt to Comm ission on H uman Rights, submitted in accord an ce w it h Comm ission resoluti on 1999/33

BBC News (2007) 'German fam il y's Na mi bia apology', 7 October, h ttp:// news.bbc .co.u k/2/h i/africaI7033042.s tm Chinw eizu, 0 .). (1990) ' Repa rations to the black worl d : and how not to get th em ', paper prese nted to the World Conference on [{('parations 10 Afr ica and Africans in the d iaspora, N IlA, Lagos, Oc.::emher Chin we izu, 0 .). (1993) ' Reparati ons iU1 ( ] a new global ord er: a com para ti ve ove rview·, p~ pcr rC
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AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? refl ~ti on s', paper delivered at the First Pan-African Conference o n Repara tio ns, Abuja, Apri l Ma zrui, A. (2002) 'Black repara ti ons in the era of globali za ti on', Institute of Global Cul tural Studies, 1 June Moo rehead, M. (2005) 'Afri ca's d ebt crisis cal ls for reparations', Workers World, 15 July Nkosi, R. (2006) 'Trad e not aid ', paper p resented ilt the 4th lntermod" l Africil Conference in Swakopmund, Namibia, 2- 3 Februnry. Nkrumah, K. (1970) CIQSS Qnd Class Struggle, London, P.:lnaf Boo ks. Njoroge, W. (2008) 'Trnde not ai d for Africa' , Post Global, 10 Jul y, http://newswee k.wa shingtonpos tgloba l.m m/pos tgloballnjoroge_ wachai/2008/07/trad e_not_ai d_for_afri ca.html Rodn ey, W. (1981) How Europe Underdeveloped Afnca, Harare, Zi mbabwe I>ublis hing House Roy, G. (1% 1) 'Is the law of responsibility of stat es for injuries to ali ens a part of un iversal in tern ational law?' , A merican Journal of lnlen/alional t aw, vol. 5.'i, p. 863 Shel ton, D. (2001) Remedies in International HI/man Rig!.!s t aw, Oxford, Oxford Universit y Press Uni ted N ations International Law Commission (1993) The International Law Commission's Draft A rti cles on State Re5ponsibili ty : Part 1, Articles 1-35, compiled by S. Rosenne Uni ted Nations (1970) Genera l Assemb ly Resolution 2626 (XXV), Interna tional Develop men t Strategy for the Second Uni ted Na tions Development ~ade (A/8 124 and Add. I ) htlp://da ccess-ods.un.orgl a ccess .nsf/Get ?Open &DS~A!RF.5/2626( X XV)& La ng~E&Area

-RESOLUTION van Boven, T. (1993) 'Study co ncerning the righ t to res ti tut io n, compe nsa tion and rehabilitatio n for victims of gross vio lations of human rights and fundamental freed oms', E/CN AjSub.2j1993/8, final report for the Comm ission on I-luman Rights, Sub-Commission o n Prev enti on o f Disc rimin.:ltion nnd Protection of Minori ties Wo\ters, D. (1993) 'Reparotions and the impera ti ve of Piln-Afri cil nism', poper presenled at 11'11.' First Pan-African Conference o n Re parations, Abup, April

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Post-9/ll aid, security agenda and the African state Shastry Njeru The nexus between aid, security and development is now beyond doubt. In fact, security is a precondition for development. The often ci ted 'no development wi t hout security, no security wi thout develop ment' captures this interconnec tivity (Dac has 2007). iraq, despite a huge avalanche of aid for reconstruction, is a good example of the importance of security. Sad ly, aid has become one of the casualties in the 'war on terror'. It has been rapid ly sec uritised. Self-interest and politica l m otives determine the priorities of aid. Since the start o f the 'war on terror', when United States President Bush claimed that one w as either a friend or an e nemy, aid has become o ne of the weapons in the US arsenal. The war on te rror has bro ugh t back the state as the so le referent in security. International aid as known today originated during the Cold War at a time when the US felt that the whole continent of Eu ro pe wou ld be converted into a socialist ca mp and pumped billions of dollars through the Marsha ll Pl an to jumpstart the war-damaged economics. Enter 9/11, the good intentions of a id were set aside for political p riori ties and self-interes t US President Geo rge Bush sa id on 20 September 2001: 'We will direct every resource a t our command to the disruption of the glo bal te rror nehvork'. Relief became a reward for u seful intelli gence information. Aid w as no t only a weapon on the battlefield but a lso used in diploma tic negotiations with poor countries. In 2003, the US threatened UN Security Council members like Angola, Cameroon and Guinea w ith a reduction of interna tional aid if they d id not acqu iesce to US political demand s. In the post-9/1] era, Africa does not have 'capable and intelligent s tates'

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(Kauzya 2007) able to provide much-needed security which is a precondition for develo pment a nd peace. Yet, Africa continues to need sec u rity and ai d to overcome its 'treme ndo us eco nomic, social and politica l' challenges (Mohiddin 2007). Any form of aid creates an asymmetrical relationship between the donor and the recipient vitiating the spi rit and letter of the Pari s Declaration. Thi s relationship foste rs ineffective aid. In fact, it does harm by feeding into existing conflicts, t he reby perpetuati ng conditions of insecurity that hinder meeting the Mille nn ium Development Goals (MDGs). This chapte r explores the post-9/1 1 aid and security agenda and the exten t to which Africa has benefited in terms of peace and security. It posits tha t Africa needs to redefine its aid reqUirements within a homegrown secu rity arrangement and known inte rnational instrume nts like the Pa ri s Declaration. Reali si ng that the threa t of exte rnal aggreSSion i s grea tly redu ced, African states need to concentrate on elimin ating wants and fears by providin g human security rather than amassing weapons of war to protect the st ate. Further, Afri ca need s to stre ngthen its capacity to moni tor and har monise aid and even contro l the dono r agend a. The peace dividend can be achieved.

Security Before the Cold War, securi ty was in te rpreted in militaristi c terms as defence of the state involving s tructured violence mani fest in s tate warfare (Fourie and Schon teich 2004). Security was the ability of the state to defend na tional interests against both national and ex ternal e ne mies (A FRODA D 2005). This traditional notion of security was concerned with 'security o f terri tory fro m exte rnal aggression, or as p rotectio n of national inte rests in foreig n poli cy' (UN DP 1994a). Beca use it concentrated on the nation-state and attac hed 'disproportionate a tten tio n to securi ty o f the state' (Regehr and Whelan 2004), 'legitimate concerns o f ordinary people w ho sought securi ty in their daily li ves' (UNDP 1994a) were overlooked. At the end of the Cold Wa r, non-mil itary threa ts became conspicuo us, confUSing and mudd ling the adversary (Jareg 2005). In this regard the concept of deterrence ceased to app ly. The 94 ngntea IT

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Westphalian concepts of s tate security and s tatism were su blima ted by g]ob;:ll isation, creating what is called 'networked governance', 'new multilateralism', 'decentred governance' or ' p oly-

centrism' (Scholte 2004) outside the realm o f the traditional state authority. As the world entered into the 'twiligh t of sovereign ty' (Wriston 1992) or 'beyond sovereignty' (Soros 1986), the irrelevance of the state as the sale referent in security matters brought to the fore the individual as vital for peace (AFRODAD 2005). The 1994 human development report of the United Nations Developm ent Programme (UN DP) officially coined the human security concep t, staling that the intentio n of human security is 'to capture the post-Cold War peace dividend and redirect those resources towards the development agenda' (Axworthy 1999, p. 2). With hindsi gh t, the global community increasingly focused o n the fate of people in conflict si tuations: vic tims, women, children, child soldiers, refugees, epidemics, etc. H uman security has become a call on nation sta tes to remember that sovereignty s ho uld not be viewed as control but responsibility to 'protect indi viduals and provide their welfare' so that they have 'secure ex istence in life and dignity' (Wa llensteen 2007). Despite the US's attempt afte r 9/1 1 to recapture the concept of security, human security still dom inates the security parad igm and cap tures ' d isease, hunger, unem p loym ent, crime, social confl icts, political repression, and envi ronmental hazards' (UN DP 1994b). In the ex tended form, such security includes widening the range of people's choices and the ability for people to exercise these choices freely and safe ly. The UND P report provides a schema of va lues of security which are summed up as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, commu nity and political secu rity (UN DP 1994b). Any failure to meet these needs may lead to insecurity.

Security threats A cursory view of the African sec urity agenda reveals a variety of threats ranging from climate chan ge, HIV and AJDS, s mall arms and crim inality, and human trafficking to civ il wars. The threat of external aggreSSion has significantly diminished with the cnd of the cold war. For the majority of African states even the terro rist threat remains a speculative issue, strategically remo te and 95

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

li nked to particu lar grieva nces and conflicts (Regeh r and Whelan 2004 ). The immediate and attending th reats are those affecting the hum an pe rson. One of the pro found securi ty th rea ts in Africa is climate change. The phenomenon has been vie wed as the 'driver of human conflict' (Brown, Hammil and Mc Lem an 2007). Since global warming is a 'threat to internati onal peace and security' (Bro w n et al 2007) it cannot be ignored. As such, clima te change has been regarded as the mother of al! security prob lem s threate ning water, food security and increasing forced mjgration, triggering co nflicts. The magnitud e of the threa t forced the Pe ntago n to institute scenario s tud ies to consider the abru pt imp lications o f cli mate change on inte rnational security. Further, the British governmen t has branded clima te change a greater threat than in ternational terrorism to the extent that the n-foreign secre tary Margare t Beckett mad e 'climate security' a central plank in Britain's forei gn policy. In sp ite of the threat of terrorism, the US has concei ved cli ma te change as a 'threa t multipl ier' m aking existing foo d insecurity and wate r scarcity mo re comp lex and intractable. At the African Union summi t in 2007, Ugand an President Museveni ca lled climate change 'a n ac t of aggression ' by the develo ping world and de manded compensation . Kaire Mbuende resonated the sen timent whe n he said that greenho use e mi ssio n is tantamount 'to low in tenSi ty bio logica l and c hemica l warfa re'. Even the UN Security Council has co me to accept the threa t cau sed by climate change and agreed that even the Darfur crisis was a product of climate change and e nvironme nt al degradatio n. H IV and AIDS are also real secu rity threa ts to Afri ca (Jareg 2005). Hadingham (2000) argues that HI V/ AlDS poses a 'pervas ive and no n viole nt threat to the ex istence of individual s, as the virli S s ign ificantl y shortens life ex pectancy' . Hrv/ A IDS ha s direct and ind irect human secu rity implications, 'so immense that they d o not co nstitute one human security issue among many, but rank amongst the gravest human senuity challenges the twenty fi rst century confronts' (Elbe 2006). The pande mi c callses ' at the si mplest level premature and unnecessary loss o f life' becoming 'perh
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affecting eco nom ic security, food security, perso na l security, political securi ty and health security. Using the threats posed by the global A IDS pande mi c a s a case stu dy, the analytical breadth of the human security concept 'e m e rges not so much as a liability, but on the co ntrary, as a distinctive asset over the narrowe r conception of nationa l security' (Elbc 2006). Co nnected to climate change and H JV/ AIDS is the p ro ble m of food secu rity. Climate change affects the p roductivity of land as aridity affects crops due to depletion of water bud gets. HlV /AIDS affects not onl y the productio n o f agricultural goods, but can furthe r s kew the access of certain individuals and g ro ups to food - as ofte n food security is a chall e nge of 'access' ra ther than a ma tter of availability. Cou pled with these t w in prob le ms o f climate cha nge and HIV/AIDS is the use of cereals fo r the prod uction of biofucl s leadin g to artificial food sho rtages wor ldwid e.

The African state The African state is unable to meet the evolvi ng need s of its peo-

ple, fai li ng to adopt or ada pt to scientifi c or technologica l changes, new ideas, organ isatio nal and management principles, experie nces and relevant best p ractices. In some cases, constitutionalism has been bloc ked and rul e o f law made anathema. De mocracy and social justice, acco untability and transpa re ncy, inclu siveness and empowerment of peo ple so that they can pa rticipate full y in public affairs have not been achieved in some African s tates. The virus of brutality of bi g govern ments has destroyed the sensitivity of good governance. The African sta te is facing twin challenges affecting its capacity to manage aid and offe r sec urity to its citizens. These challe nges are domestic and globaL Mo hiddin (2007) notes several capacity challenges that have weake ned the state, asserting tha t the African state is unable to promote 'sustainable human development including m eeting MDGs, promo tio n of peace, security and s tability, combatting H JV/ AIDS pa nd em ic, malaria, susta ining popular e lectora l participatory democracy, and e nsu ring thriving p rivate secto r' on the d omes tic front and unable to 'prom ote regio nal economi c and political in tegra tion' on the glo bal front. The lack of capacity in hibits 'con tinuo us supply of ap propriate 97

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

legal, institu tional, human and materi al resources' necessary to meet the ever changing challenges'. 9/11 has had varying im pacts on the security, official devel opment aid and relationship between African states a nd their Western coun ter parts. The incident has led to the redefi nition of aid at least from the Western perspectives . US President George W. Bu sh stated on 20 Sep tember 2001: 'We wi ll di rect every resource at our command to the disruption of the g loba l terror network'. Aid was inclu ded in their arsenal to fight terrorism. By o \'ertaking officia l development assista nce (O DA) with nation -state secu rity and the cou nte r- te rrorism agend a and orienta ti ng O DA towards the security interests of the donor ra ther than the develo pment interests of the reCipient sta tes, the basic develo p ment and poverty erad ication objec tives were lost. The little ai d t hat trickled into Africa was con strai ned by ODA s pending targets, which were eaSily achieved through increased security spending (Regehr and W hel an 2004) ra ther than spending on develop ment and pO\'cr ty erad ica tion . While terrorism is not gene rall y caused by u nderdevelopmen t, co ndi tions of economic underdevelopment are a soil in w hi ch terrorism is li kely to take root. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (2003) concurs tha t terrorists a re 'often motiva ted by, and justify thei r actions with reference to econo mic injustice and exploitation'. Reduced ODA in Africa p rogressed the co ntinent toward s its vu lnerabi lity and attend ing conflic ts. The state fail u re and rise in the Al-Q aida cells in Somalia are attributable to historic, faile d econom ic policies, the desi re to capture the state as a rent-granting insti tution by different competing groups and the drying up of official development assistance. Beca use there is no sta te to s peak of, Somalia is an example of the horrors of postmodern failed s tatehood a nd stand s as a perpe tu al secu rity threat to the region. As reports show, the lack of statehood in Somalia has left the Gu lf vu lnerab le to mari ti me pirates ex tortin g ca rgo ships and even ru nning contraband u nchecked, to the detriment of the security envelope for the con tinent (SA Be International 2008). Lack of effective policing in the troubled area is felt in the Great Lakes regio n as weapons of cho ice fi nd themselves cheap ly in the hands of confli ct e ntrepreneurs. Most of the sec urity th reats in sub-Sa haran Africa fit G altung's

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7 POST-9/ ll AID d escriptio n: 'when human be ings are being influenced so that their achlai somatic and mental realisations arc below their po tential reali satio n' (Weigert 1993). Gallung further dist ingu ishes between direct threats, like the existence of private security forces, ba nditry, warlord ism, internal wars and ethnic violence, and structural violence, such as lack of food, water and d isease. Fo r Africa to address the pressi n g peace and security iss ues and to contro l aid, there are several avenues that can be taken. First, Africa needs to improve its state capaci ty. Second, the co ntinen t needs to rcconcc ptua lisc its security. Th ird, there is need to d e moc rati se gove rnance system s . Fina lly, the African state needs to work as part of a regional archi tectu re not in a disparate form.

Capacity improvement as security The preoccupation with consolid ation of power and the military coups that characterise so me states in sub-Saharan Africa d o not sufficiently e m power citizens to effectively participate in the economi c, social and political activities of their states. In fact, ' the

process of mobilising the people, the one party governance systems and authoritarian regimes that characte rised many African political systems undermi ned and destroyed the growth and d evelopment of independently o rgan ised poli tical groups and other criti cs in the ci vil society' (Moh iddin 2007). This preoccupation with power and control had other consequences: institu tio nal capacity bUilding was neglected, not considered a priority, and the re ~id ual but weak in ~ ti tuti ona l capacity bequeathed by the colonial rulers was severely undermined. In some instances, the legislatu res were allowed to deca}~ w ith their capacities to check and balance the execu tive Virtuall y destroyed. There were no means by which the people cou ld effectively air their grievances, a rticulate particular interests or, in general, call their governments to account. (Mohiddin 2007) The buildin g blocks that wo uld co nsti tute the capacity to maintain and s ustai n polit ical o rder and the economic institutions needed to produce good s and services were severely neglected. Beyond the general ex pansion of educa tio n and training. supp lemented by foreign aid and expertise in improvin g technical capaci ties in

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selected ministries, ver y li ttle thought has been given or action taken to strengthen the a ppropriate capabi li ties of the s tate for the fu lfil me nt of postcolo nial developmen t object ives. Capacity has now been accepted as the missing link in the development and democratisation effo rt in Africa. To address this need fo r strengthened capacity, the African Union established the New Partne rship for Africa's Develop ment (NE PA D) with many African countries voluntari ly acceding to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Mohiddin 2007). The overarchi ng obJectives of NEPA D arc the promotion of s ustainable human develo pment; the e rad ication o f poverty; con tinental economic a nd political integration; and the e nhancement of globa l competitiveness. A PRM is the mechanism to promote the politi cal, social and economic objectives of NEPA D, a nd to e nsure that the participati ng co untries observe the princi ples and practices needed to achieve its ob,ectives . Capacity building is a perpetua l and complex process tha t requ ires poliCies, stra tegies and their im plementation, human, fin a ncial and materi al resou rces, as well as good leadership. It is an issue of empowerment: providing peo ple with the capabilities and expanding their range of cho ices and opportunities for co nsultations a nd partnerships, as well as the availabili ty and utilisation of resources. It is not s im ply an issue of the a vai lability of professionals but those who ha ve the ap pro priate specialisation and experience needed for specific functions, as well as the creation of appropriate working cond itions. With improved capaci ty, it is possi bl e for Africa n states to hand le co m p lex issues attached to thei r interaction wi th changing O DA and conditionalities the refore dealing with the complex security threats tha t directly mobi li se to threaten the existence of the state, a nd the challenges of governance.

Redefinition of security African states need to moralise security by viewing it as the protection of human bei ngs rathe r than the p rotection of sovereign ty. Recentl y a regional issue was rai sed w hen Zimbabwe a ttempted to import a shipload of weapons via South Afri ca and civil society instit utions pu t pressure on the South Afri ca n go vernment 100 ngntea IT

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not to allow the passage of the ' ca rgo o f d ea th' as it came to be ca lled. It is pOi nted o ut that militarisa tion of social and political life is in itse lf a potenti al lhreat to human freed o m (Baj pai 2000) . The threats in Zimbabwe cou ld not be su rmoun ted by the use of force. In fact security policies need to closely integrate w ith stra tegies fo r promoting human rights, d em ocracy and develo pment. P re paratio n for war w hen a cou n try is th re ate ned by H JV/ AIDS, food crisis, arrested development a nd fl agrant violation of human rights can have social effec ts with consequences for individu al safety. A ga rrison s tate where the specialists in violence and their socia l prefere n ces co me to d o m in ate is a dange rou s p lace from the poin t of view of safety and freed om . The mora li sation of security means Sincerely dea ling with the problem of underdevelo pme nt as a threat to perso nal sa fety and freed om. Low per capi ta inco m es, low econo m ic growth rates, inflation, unemploy m en t, econom ic inequ ality, demographic change and poverty affect the prospects o f human cho ices and freedoms. Therefore elites need to de libe ra tely grad uate from their rea list defin itio n of secu rity and ' repa ir ' it w ith hu man secu rity theory. This assists in putting the person a t the cen tre of security poliCies rathe r than the agen t of the last resort. This also brings the m oral ity to the definit io n of security.

Democratisation as security The re is a strong belief that democracies do not fight each othe r, bringing to the fore that at least these nations are safe from each other and others on ly threa te ned with less de mocratic nations. In a post-9/11 report by COl (2003) the re is an admissio n that even democratic natio ns can still be threatened fro m many fronts and international terrorism can be combatted by correcti ng hom e land and internationa l factors. It is al so sta ted that good governa nce can do the tri ck fo r security. Fo r the state to discharge its legitimate functions, fo r civil society to fl ourish, and for the pri vate secto r to function properly, a syste m of good governance is reqU ired that allows stakeho lders in these sectors to p lay their respective roles to their full pote ntial. Good go ve rnance is also required to e ns ure that the country's social and econo mi c priorities a re based o n the needs o f society 101

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

as a w hole, and that broad-based sta ke ho lde rs' participation IS faci lita ted in the economic and political affairs of the coun try. Good governa nce call s fo r th e ability o f a sta te to anticipate challe nges an d p rov ide co re services to its peop le. Coupled with d e mocrati sation o f the political sp ace, constitu tio nalism, rule of law, observance a nd protectio n of human rights, the security of a state can be guaranteed by its ow n ci ti ze ns. Democra tisa tio n will allow w hat Martin (2004) has te r med social defe nce in w hic h the society takes upon itsel f to defend the socia l fabric and eve n the s ta te w ith undue usc of weapons of war. It is only in an e mpowe red socie ty; w he re peop le can make in fo rmed choices freely and interact mean ingfull y with their leaders, tha t the e le men ts of suspicion a nd mistrus t can be alla yed both in the citizenry and the el ite. Thi s is deficie nt in the majority o f African states, therefo re the re exis ts an acrimo niou s relati onshi p between the governed a nd thei r ru le rs.

Regionalism as security It is also noted that ind ivid ual African states lack the capacity to o ffe r security for the mselves and their citizens. Most o f the co untries in s ub-Sa haran African have chro nic sho rtages of food, lack the ca pacity to deli ver health care, to protect ci tize ns from o rd ina ry crime, the sop his tica tio n to deal with trans-bo unda ry o rga nised criminals, and the military stre ngth to manage even inte rnal rebellion . The rou te for the region is collec tive security in w h ich nations mutually agree to pool resources in orde r to fig ht co mmon problems. But firs t, the co untries need to agree on w ha t they shou ld call common prob le ms and ma ke strong commi tme nts to fund the atte nding costs. Regio nal blocs like the Sou the rn Africa n Develo pmen t Community, Common Marke t fo r Easte rn a nd So uthe rn Africa, Inte rgove rnme ntal Authority on Development and the Economic Community o f West Afri can States provide the starting poi nt for the regional secu ri ty e nvelope, b ut me mber states can only s tre ngthen the blocs by acceptin g inte rnal criticis m in wha t can be called peer revie w mec hanism s. Security is also s trong when regional blocs are allowed to carry out pre ve nta tive inte rventio ns should they feel that the security of a me m ber state is 102 ngntea IT

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7 POST-gil l AID

compromised. The antiquated argument behind the sancti ty of sovereignty as protecting abusive nation states should not hold back concerned nation slates from carryin g o ut the mo ra l duty to p rotect citizens from their leaders. Regional arrangements may be u sed to mobilise resources in the case of food shortages, increasing rates of HIV infections, p roblems of refugees, droughts, controlling the flow of

s mall arms, human trafficking and money laundering. Without a regional a pproach and with po rous bo rders due to globalisalio n, sub-Saharan African coun tries can be assured o f continued threats. Region al ea rl y -warni ng information centres n eed to be established for information gathering, dialoguing and crafting of poliCies for the African states. These institu tions need to be s taffed wi th officials who arc both 'cra ft literate and cra ft compete nt' to read and understand the complex nature of the security paradigms and implemen t efficiently the po licies that can help to reduce Africa's condition of vu lnerability.

Conclusion The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA led to drastic policy change in the Western world, which has had an impact on the sub-Saharan Africa security envelope. The c hange of policy has left Africa ex posed to security challe nges, which it has no capaci ty to manage as a result of historical, domesti c and global structural issues. Unless capacity is addressed in Africa, the re will be continued vulnerability since the continent ca nnot con trol the type of aDA that it receives nor demand the strict observance of the 1994 Paris Decla ration on the operation of aid. In search of that capacity, sub-Saharan Africa need s to deliberately redefine its security and ra ise the mo ral plank to ad dress the threats that are affecting its citizens in an era of dimi ni shed externa l aggreSSion. Africa needs to be persuaded by the virtues of human security rather than sta te security. This paper proposes democratisation, regionalism and ca pacity developmen t as key to t he attainment of security. When all these a re achieved, even the redefinition of ODA by the West will have little impact on the focused and united African continent and the goals for the con tinent w ill remain in full view.

103

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

Bib liography AFRODAD (2005) 'Reillity of ~id', in Foc"5 on Conflic/, Security and Development il! Africa, H and Strategies, Herghof H andbook D ia logue Seri es, http://ww\\'.be rgh o f-ha nd book.n e t Bo nn InternMi o nal Centre fo r Cotl\'e rsion (2003) COllver.,ion Sl Mo hiddin, A. (2007) 'Rei nforcing capacity towards buil d in g the capa.ble stil te: concept pilper', Africa Govemance Review: Forging Ihe Capable Siale ill Afrira, New Yo rk, UNECA Muloongo, K., Kibasombil, R. a nd Kilriri, J.N. (eds) (2005) The MallY Faces of

104 ngntea IT

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7 POST-gil l AID Humall Security Case Studies ofSevol CoU/llries in SOl
105

,.,

Africa: official development assistance and the Millennium Development Goals Demba Mou ssa Dembele The re is an inte rnatio nal co nsens u s that African co untri es will not a ch ieve most o f the Mill e nn ium Deve lo pme n t G o a ls (M DGs) . One of the reaso ns is the lack of resources resulting from the fa ilure of d eve loped countries to follow th ro u gh the ir commitme nts m ad e a t the Monte rrey Co nfere nce o n Fi na ncing for Develo pme nt and in o the r summits . The curre nt eco no mic and financia l cri s is is likely to ma ke achiev ing the MDGs even more pro ble m a ti c. The glo bal economic do wn turn will hit Afri ca n co untries ha rd, as d e mand for raw m ate ria ls w ill s harply d ecline, furthe r pu shin g d own co mmodity prices . Weste rn countries, conf ro nted w ith the worst economi c cri sis over deca d es, a re not di sposed to p rovi de mo re resources to African cou ntries, desp ite pled ges made in Accra (Ghana) and in Doha (Qatar).

Brief overview of the MDGs In Septe mber 2000, world leade rs - from d o no r and recip ie nt countries - and re presentatives of inter na tional in stitutio ns ado pted the Millennium Developm e nt Go als. Draw n from key co mmitmen ts m ade at high-level Uni ted Natio ns confe rences h eld during the 1990s, the MDGs aim to im p ro ve living conditions fo r people livi ng mostl y in co untries of the So uth by puttin g ' po ve rty re d uction' a t the to p o f the inte rn atio na l de ve lo pme nt agenda. The MDGs summa rise all develo pme nt initiati ves tha t took place in vario us m ee tings and ini tiatives by the ' internatio nal community' . 106 ngntea IT

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8 DEVELOPM ENT ASS ISTA NCE AND THE MDGS

Many critics see two major flaw s that m ake the MDGs ano ther initiative that wil l not solve the structural pro blems of poverty and underd evelopme nt. The first is that they a re fra me d within the neolibe ral paradigm. The seco nd, and m ore damaging p roblem, is their link to the Po ve rty Redu ction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which arc the new po licies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Africa. MDGs are PRSPs in disgu ise anothe r reason why Afri can countries will not achieve them. The MDGs have eight goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators. The e ight goals a re: • Eradi cate extreme poverty and h unger • Achieve u niversal primary cd ucation Promote gender equality and e mpower wo men • Red uce chi ld mo rta lity • Imp rove materna l health • Combat HI V/AI DS, malaria and o ther diseases Ensure e nvironmental su stain ability • De velop a globa l partnership fo r develo pme nt.

External sources of financing for the MDGs The issue of financing for the MDGs and other international goa ls was discussed during a UN Conferen ce in March 2002 in Mo nterrey (Mexico). The Conference on Financing fo r Develop me nt (FfD) identified three exte rna l sources of fi nancing: official development assista nce (ODA); debt ' relief; and foreign direct inves tments (FDl s) - and o ne inte rnal source: do mestic resources. This sectio n will analyse aDA and debt relief and assess their poten tial for financi n g the MDGs in Africa.

Offic ial development ass is tan ce (ODA) The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development stressed the nee d for develo pe d co untries to continue providing fin ancial aid in co nfor m ity w ith Goal 8 of the MDGs . In respo nse to the UN ca ll, several in itiatives and in ternati onal meeti ngs have been launched or held over the last few years. In 2005, the then Bri ti sh prime minister, Tony Blair, estab107

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

li shed a Co mmissio n for Africa in the run-up to the G8 summit in Scotland tha t s ame year. The commissio n made two key reco m me ndatio ns o n resource mobili satio n: a doubli ng of ' aid' to Africa to $50 billion by 2010, a nd the cancell ation of 100 per cent of the d ebt o f some countries w ithin the Heavily Ind ebted Poor Coun tries (H IrC) Initia tive (Com mi ssion for Africa 2005). At the same ti me, Gordon Bro wn, the n Chancellor of the Exchequ e r, p ro posed a n in te rn ation al Fina n cial Faci li ty (IF F), which wo uld sell bonds issued by indu strialised coun tries with a vie w to raising ad ditiona l money to fi nance the MDGs. He even refe rred to a ' mode rn Marsha ll Plan' for Afri ca (De mbe U' 2005). The two key recomme nd ati ons we re d iscussed by the GS s ummit in Ju ly 2005 and adopted. The G8 lead ers decided the cancellatio n of 100 per cent o f the mu lti la teral debt 'o wed ' to the IMF, the Wo rld Ban k and the African Devel opme nt Bank by 18 co untries, incl uding 14 Afri can co untries, while still leaving the d oor open to more co untries in the future . This decision is known as the Multila tera l Debt Relief In itiative (MDRI), which is part of the ' d ebt relief' sc he mes imple me nted by the inte rn ational fina ncial insti tutions (IFIs) . Appare ntly, these effo rts seem to ha ve increased ODA fl ows to d e veloping countries . Acco rdi ng to the Develop ment Assistance Comm ittee (DA C) of the Organ isation for Econo mic Coope ration a nd De velopme nt (DEC O), me mber countri es alloca te currently about 0.3 per cent of their gross d omestic product (GOP) to ODA, s till far short o f the UN target of 0.7 pe r ce nt. Howeve r, in a recent d oc ume nt, the EU: strongly reaffirms its commitment to achie ve a collective aDA target of 0.56 per cent GN I by 2010 and 0.7 per cent GN ! by 2015 and to channel at least 50 pe r cent of collective aid increases to Africa The EU is willing, in the context of the above mentioned overall aDA commitments, to meet collectively the target to provide 0.15 per cent to 0.20 per cent GNP to LDCs . as sci out in the ' Bru ssels Progra mme of action' for the LDCs for the decade 2001- 201 O. (EU 2008) The appa rent increase in O DA seems to have be nefited Africa, wh ose sh a re is esti mated at between 35 pe r cent and 40 pe r ce nt of o ffi ci al fl ows to develo ping cou ntries (Table Sol ). In reality, a lO B

8 DEVELOPM ENT ASS ISTA NCE AND THE MDGS

Table 8.1: aDA flows (1980-2006) 200 1

Total flows·

S2.4

Afr ica·· Sub-Saharan African (%)

(35 .0)

2002

2003

2004

2005§

2006§

2007

58.3

69. 1

79.4

107.1

104.4

103.5

2 1.4

26.8

29.3

3').2

43.4

38.7

(36.7 )

(38.9)

(36.9)

(32.9)

(41.6)

(37.0)

"Fi9u res in billions of S for all countries "Flows to a ll African co untries §Fig ure \ exceptionally high because of 'debt relie f' for Iraq , Nigeria, among others Source: OECD Statistics (Decembe r 2008)

greater part of the figures in this table is composed of emergency relief for natural disasters (floods and droughts), humanitarian assistance (refugees and displaced persons), as well as 'debt relief' within the HIPe Initiative and tlle MDRI. For instance, the 2005 and 2006 figures included a la rge proportion of debt 'relief' for

Nigeria and lraq. So, in reality, what could qualify as real 'development assistance' is much smaller. According to some so urces, Africa needs $25 billion a year in additi on to already a vailable resources to ac hieve the MDGs (ECA 2008). This is a tall order, indeed . This is why the UN secretary general and UN agencies called on 'donors' to transfer more resources to Africa to help achieve some of the MDGs. This concern was di scussed in two fo ll ow-up meetings on resource mobilisation for developing countries. One of these was the Accra H igh Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in September 2008 as a follow-up to the Paris Conference o f 2005. The second meeting was held in December 2008 in Doha (Qata r) as a follow -up to the Monterrey Conference, in each o f them, new commitments were made and previous co mmitments reiterated. But the reality is that the va lue of those com mitments is question able given past experience, the structu ral fl aws of 'aid' policies and the ongoing financial crisis.

109

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

Structural flaws of aDA The deba te on 'aid effective ness', laun ched in Paris in 2005 a nd followed up in Accra in 200B, is a symptom of the failur e of de velo pme nt assistan ce . The growing gap between ri ch and 'poor' coun tries is just one exam ple o f that fail u re. It is a fa ct tha t for yea rs, Western coun tri es have cond itioned their 'aid ' o n recip ient coun tries' obli gation to buy do nor co un tries' goods and services. Given the un equ al po wer relatio ns, d onors te nd to ove rprice their good s and ser vices or sell obsole te equ ipmen t tha t d eveloping countries do not need. These conditions p revent recipient countries from buying locally made good s o r services a t chea pe r prices . As a res ult, tied aid ca rries hu ge costs for recip ient co untries, estimated a t be tween $5 billion and $7 b illion a year, Fo r Afri ca n cou ntries, the costs o f tied aid are esti mated at $1.6 billion a year. Despite numerous pled ges to eli minate tied aid by O ECD co untries, in 2002, 45 pe r ce nt of bilate ral aid was still tied (UNCTAD 2006). As a result of ti ed aid, mu ch of the aid tha t Africa receives is te rmed fictitio us. A re port published in 2005 by Action Aid revea led that onl y a thi rd of ai d promi sed by O EC D co untries was real aid, while the remaining two-th ird s retu rned to do nor co untries. Fro m the United Sta tes, 90 per cent of aid received was fi ctitious (Action Aid 2005) . Anothe r fla w of aid is the gap between commitments and ac tu al de livery. A good illu strat ion of thi s gap is the Eu ropean Developme nt Fu nd (EDF), the finan ci al ar m of the Euro pean Comm ission, dealing with the African, Caribbean and Paci fi c ( ACP) co untries. According to Ox fam Internatio nal (2006), since 1975, the EDF has ne ver d isbursed more than 43 per cent of the ' aid ' pro mi sed to ACP countri es. In recent years, the ra tio has been even lo we r, with abo ut 28 per cent for the 2000--07 EDF. These stru ctural probl e ms explain the failure of ' aid' policies a nd make peo ple more cautious of new p rom ises, For instance, the promise mad e by the GB leaders to double 'aid ' to Africa by 201 0 is not li kely to be fulfill ed, because some countries have not lived up to their commitme nts, accordin g to Oxfam Inte rnational (O xfam Interna tiona l 2007).

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Aid f or trade In line with its neoliberal agenda towards Africa, the European Union is insidiously transform ing ODA into an instrument for trade liberalisation under the disguise of 'aid for trade'. In a document published in the run-up to the Doha Conference In December 2008 (EU 2008), one can read the following: Trade liberalisation is an opportunity for developing countries. TIle EU recalls its aid for trade commitments as outlined in the EU Aid for Trade Strategy and calls on all donors to increase the volume and quality of their aid for trade It supports regional integration initia tives, including bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in accordance with WTO ru les, together with broader efforts to strengthen regional stability and management of common issues ... It reaffirms its commitment to reach its target for raising Trade Related Assistance to (2 billion annua lly by 2010; in the range of 50 per cent of the increase will be available for needs priori tised by African, Caribbean and Pacific (AC P) countries. As outlined in the EU Aid for Trade Strategy, the EU will also st rive to increase its total aid fo r trade, in coherence with the gradual increases in Official Development ASSistance, including in support of traderelated infrastmcture and productive capacities. This quote clearly indicates a sh ift in European aid policies. It is the strong belief in the 'virtues' of 'free trade' that drives the overall European policy towards Africa, as illu strated by the campai gn to impose the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) on African co untries at a ny cost. Trade-related policies are becoming a leadi ng factor in determining the level a nd direction of 'aid' allocations by the EU. The EU, the United States and mu ltilateral institutions share the belief that the road to 'salva tion' for Africa is more trad e-orien tated policies through 'free trade' agreeme nts in compliance with WTO ru les and the implementation of ex port-led growth stra tegies.

Mili tari sation of 'aid ' Ai d from the United States is moving towards an even more sinister twist, in light of the launch of Africa Command (AFRICOM). III ngntea IT

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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

A substantial part of 'aid' to Africa from the United States will inc reasingly be militarised as a result of the sec uri ty and geos trategic concerns of the Un ited States. In a meeting with nongovern me ntal organisations, on 22 December 2008, the US Agency for International Development CUSAID), the ma in financial arm of the Uni ted States government in its relations with cou ntries of the So uth, emphatica lly stated that it would closely cooperate wi th the Pe ntagon in delivering aid . It unveiled a p lan, titled 'Civ ilian-M il itary Cooperatio n Policy', which ind ica tes that ' USAID will cooperate with the De partment of Defence in jO int plannin g. assessme nt and evaluation, trai nin g. impleme ntat ion, and communica tion in all aspects o f foreign assistance activ ities where both o rganisations are opera ting. a nd where civilian- military coopera tion will advance US fo reign pol icy'. This state me nt is crysta l clear: from now o n, the USA rD will give priority to security-related projects over civilian projects. This means that funds for the M DGs o r other developmen t projects will have a low prio rity from the United Sta tes The forego in g ove rview shows why ODA fro m Western countries cannot be a relia ble source of fina ncing for the MDGs.

Debt 'relief' from the IFl s African countries burdened by an illegi tima te d ebt - that ha s been paid many times over - know from experie nce that resources from 'debt relief' by the IM F and the Worl d Bank d o not provide much-needed ad d itional reso urces. Most o f tha t debt wo uld neve r be paid anyway a nd the costs of IFTs' conditionalities are much higher than wha t they lent to African countries. These costs are devasta ting neolibe ral policies, such as trad e libe ralisation, d e regulation of financia l and labo ur markets, and privatisation of s tate-owned enterprises and public services. In additio n, governments were forced to curtail s pe n ding on basic social services and scale down their role in econo mi c activi ties . A ll these poliCies translated i nto heavy eco nomic and social costs that are mu ch higher than w hat Africa 'owes' to these institutions. For instance, according to Christi an Aid (2005), trade li berali sati on in the 1980s and 1990s has cost African co untries a s tagge ring $272 billion over a 20-year pe riod. Trade libe ralisa-

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tion is in large part responsible fo r the huge terms of trade losses incurred by African countries and their increasing dependence on ex ternal financing. According to UNCTA D (2003), the purchasing power of African exports declined by 37 per cent between 1980 a nd 1990, while real commodity prices, exclu ding o il, fell by more than 45 per cent during the sam e period and by 25 per cent between 1997 and 1999. Betwee n 1997 and 2001, African commodities lost mo re than half of their purchasing power in terms of manufactured goods. In o ther wo rds, African exporters would have to double thei r export vo lu mes in order to main ta in their foreign exchange income at 1997 levels. As a result, Africa's share in wo rld exports fell from about 6 per cent in 1981 to 2 per cent in 2002, while its s hare in world imports fe ll from 4.6 pe f cent to 2.1 per cent during the same period. Findin gs by UNCTAD (2001) show that if Africa's terms of trade had remained a t their 1980 level: 1) its share in world trade wou ld have been double its current share; 2) the annual growth rate would have been 1.4 per cent higher than the average growth ac hieved between 1980 and 2000; and 3) the per capita Income wou ld have been 50 per cent higher than its 2000 level. TI,ese policies hilve not chilnged, even ilfter the fililed ilnd discredited St ructural Adjustment Program mes (SA Ps) were renamed PRSPs (UNCTAD 2002, Dembele 2003). The IMF through its Poverty Reduction ilnd Growth Striltegy (PRGF) is still ildvocilting stringent fiscil l ilnd monct
11 3

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

In summary, ODA a nd ' debt relief' a re d efin ed within the parame ters o f the neoliberal agenda o f Western countries and TFls. The refore, their d elive ry will d epe nd on the imple me ntatio n of crippling condi tiona li ties, such as trade liberali sa tion, priva ti sa tio n, fi sca l a uste rity and state re tre nchme nt, the costs of which arc much highe r than any exte rnal 'assistance' provid ed by Weste rn co untries and the IFls.

Alternative sources of financing Even if so me kind of aid could be helpfu l, Afr ican leade rs sho uld have learned from hi story a nd e xperie nce that they cannot rely o n exte rnal assistance to finan ce their co untries' de velo pme nt. The only viable option fo r Africa is to explore othe r so urces o f finan ci ng.

Forge a new mindset Professor Yash Tandon (2008), executive directo r o f the South Centre, argues that in o rd er for Afri can countries to end exte rnal d e pe nde nce and move to new developme nt strategies, they need to adop t a natio nal project, grou nded in a self-reli ant developme nt stra tegy, which gives p rio rity to the recove ry of national digni ty and sove reignty over resources and po liCies . He also calls fo r soli da rity and m utual s upport among countries o f the So uth . It is a s tru ggle that should mobilise leade rs and citize ns a t all levels in orde r to meet the ch a!le nges of overcoming multiple forms of resista nce from the do minant syste m. One of the critical fa ctors in establishing a natio nal projec t is to forge a ne w mindset by e man cipating the mind s o f leaders and citizens from the d omina nt ideo logy that makes the m believe and even accept tha t Africa's de velopme nt 'de pe nds o n foreign aid' and foreign direct investme nts.

Discred it the m ainstr eam discourse on 'aid' The forging of a ne w mindset requires discrediting the do minant discourse o n ' aid ' . In addi tio n to w hat has been said above about it as a politi cal instrume nt fo r ' d ono rs', 'ai d' is like a drop in the ocean whe n it is compa red with the hu ge outfl ows from Africa, 114 ngntea IT

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Table 8.2: Net f lows from South to North (b ill ions of 5) 1995

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

1995·2006

5.9

15.6

-27.7

-6.7

-35.0

·96.3

-1 44. 2

SSA*

(7 . S)

(12 .1)

(2.8)

(s.:n

(4.5)

(- 10.1)

(n.])

latin Ame rica

.1.7

44 .3

·1. 6

-3 1. 6

·80.0

-12 3.1

-233.7

As ia

41.9

·106 .4

-31. 3

-52 .0

-149.8

-317.6

-6 15.4

Total South

+46. 1

-49.7

·60.6

-90 .2

-264.8

-537.2

·933.2

COuntrie s

(- 2.7)

(3. 6)

(-49.4)

(-26 .1)

(-54.6)

(-Il S. I )

(-255.2)

TOTA L 2

+4 3.4

-43.1

· 11 0

· 1 16.3

·3 19.4

-662.3

· 11 88 1.4

Memo:

(11.8)

(1 2.5 )

(5.7)

(7. 1)

(SA)

(-4. 3)

Africa

;" tra ns it io n

LDC, " Exduding South Africa and Nigeria

Source: On iz (2007)

in the form of repay ments of the ill egi timate debt, cap ita l fl ight, tax evasion, profit repatriation, transfer pricing and so forth. In rea li ty, it is Africa and the res t of the Sou th that are transferring an immense wea lth to the No r th (Table 8.2). 'Aid' cannot be separated from trade and financial policies associa ted with the global neo liberal system and from the uneq ua l po wer relations existing in the world. They are the main so urce of Africa's depend e nce on fo reign 'aid' . For instan ce, subs idies by OECD countries - the main 'donors' - which cost more than six times w hat they s pe nd o n ' aid' to poor co untries, have increased A fri ca's food deficit a nd de pe nde nce (UNDP 2003) . By fl oodi ng Africa n markets with cheap, subs id ised food, ind ustrialised countries destroy do mestic food production an d increase African co untries' de pendence on food imports, which a re paid for by new loans o r 'aid' from the sa me countries o r inte rnational fin ancial insti tutions . On the other hand, one shall ld co ntrast the broken prom ises of 'aid' to the 'poor' w ith developed countries' mobili sa tio n of trillions o f do llars in a matte r of weeks to bail ou t the ir fin a ncial 11 5

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

insti tutions and banks or to rescue their corporatio ns. It is estima ted that the Uni ted Sta tes and the European Un ion have mobi lised more than $4 trillion in just a fe w weeks to rescue their econo mies (Oxfa m lnte rna tional 2008).

Mobi li se domesti c resourc es Africa n co untries have an e no rm ous po tential fo r do mesti c resource mobilisa tion but neoliberal policies have prevented a more effective mobilisa tion. They need to cha nge their policies by rejecting the race to the botto m, gi\'ing tax breaks a nd o the r ince ntives to so-called fo reig n investors. A repo rt by Chr istian Aid (2008, pp. 4-6) shows how mu ltinational corpora tions a re explo iti ng the weakness o f African states to pay lo w royalty ra tes a nd avoid paying taxes throug h legal and illegal means. Th is is costin g billi ons of do ll ars in lo st fi scal re ve nu es, espec iall y in the mining secto r, to cou ntries li ke the De mocrati c Rep ublic of Congo, Zambia, Angola a nd Nigeri a, among othe rs. Low royalty ra tes and tax evasions co ntribute not o nl y to the agg ravatio n of 'ai d ' de pend e nce but they
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Better use of re mi ttances Estimates pu t re mittance s by African expatriates at 2.5 per cent of G OP (U NCTA D 2007a ). Remitta nces thro u gh official cha nnels ha ve increased fro m an average of $4.5 billio n a yea r d uring ] 998-2001 to an average of $6.8 bill ion annually over 2002-5 (ECA 2008, Table 4 .4, p. 147). But this is an a ve rage at the continental level . In se \'e ral countries, this ratio is m uch higher and remitta nces outpace official ' develo pme nt assistance' . In addi tion, remitta nces thro ug h informal channe ls are often higher than those reco rded o ff icially. So, remittances a rc pote ntial! y a very impo rtan t so u rce o f fin a nci ng. Howeve r, to make remittances a genu ine sou rce of d evelopment finance, it wou ld be necessary fo r the A frican banking and financial sector to take m easures that could help make a greater part of remi ttances prod ucti\'c investments . The African Deve lo pment Bank (AD B) and African Centra l Banks sho uld work together to p ro pose a fram ework that could stimula te remi ttances and cha nnel them to prod uctive investments.

Repat ri ati o n of resou rces held ab road Even the Co mmission for Afri ca acknow ledges that tens o f billi ons of do llars have been stolen fro m A frica w ith the complicity of the Weste rn banking and finan ci al system. A repo r t by UNCTA D (1998) had ind icated tha t if the wealth illega lly held abroad were repa triated, gross capital fo rma tio n in Africa wo uld have been th ree times higher than its curre nt level. This m eans that the repa triatio n of that wealth would Significantly limi t o r e ven el im ina te African count ries' need for fore ig n ' a id'. This is another major struggle tha t requires focus, deter mi na tio n, solidari ty and unity in Afri ca and a strong support from abroad, espe cia ll y fro m the South

Illegi ti mat e deb t The de bt tra p has been used to d eepe n ' aid ' depe nd ency th ro ug h new loans to repay old ones and cond itio nali ties that crippled African countries and made them even m o re de pende nt o n fo re ign 'assistance' . So, debt ca nce ll ation for a ll African co u ntries is

11 7

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

one of the precondi tions for weakening and eventua lly end ing 'aid ' dependence and giving more freedom to African countries to des ign thei r ow n policies.

Develop and strengthen South-South cooperation [n recent years, new powers fr o m the South have e merged as ma jor players in the world econo m y. These countries a re deepening thei r economic and financ ial lin ks w ith Africa. This is the case for China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, lran as well as Culf states and other co untries in the Middle East. In many ways, their coo pe ratio n with Africa is diffe re nt fro m Weste rn countries' cooperat ion. It does not have the ideological and politi ca l cond itionali ties attached to the old type o f coopera tion . This is an op po rtunity that Africa should use to its advantage. So, Afr ica sho uld give priority to So uth- South coopera t ion, which offers several altern ati ves, both in trade and finance. South-South cooperation may not only provide soft loans for long- term investmen ts bu t also d irect investments and jOint ventures in several areas. So, African cou ntries should use the Cll rrent f"vourable internatio n"l contex t to forge closer ties wi th rising powers in the South and move away from old neocolonial relationsh ips and from lFls' grip on their eco nomic policies.

Conclu sion This paper has argued that 'aid' from Western countries and international financial insti tutions ca nnot be a reliable source to fin ance the MDGs. Most of the pro mi ses made s ince the Millennium Declara tion and the Mo nterrey Conference have not been fulfill ed. Given the current state of affairs, the co mmitment to double 'aid ' to Africa by 2010 will not be honoured either. African cou ntries continu e to trans fer more resources to Western co untri es tha n all the 'aid' they receive from them . Therefore, while s till acce pting that some form s o f assis tance could be help fu l, Africa shou ld count o n its own resources to finance its development. [t is ti me for Africa n co untries to rega in the po li cy s pace lost to international financial institu tions and recover their sove reig nty ove r their developmen t process . African governmen ts should also take advan tage o f the ri sc of II B ngntea IT

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powerful countries from the South able and willing to cooperate with Africa on the basis o f solidarity and the promotion o f mutual interests.

Bibli og raphy Action Aid (2005) Real Aid. An Agenda for Making Aid Work, London, Action Aid Center for Global Develop ment (CIX;) (2007) Does Ihe IMF COllstrain Health Spending in Poor Countries' Evidence and a,l Agenda for Action, Washington IX, CIx. Christian A id (2005) TIre Economics of Failure: Tile Real Costs of 'Free Trade' for Poor Countries, Lond on, ChristiJn A id Christian Aid (2003) Death and Taxes: Ti,e Tme Toll of Tax Dodging, Lond on, Christian Aid Comm ission for Afrie .. (2005) Orrr Common [llterest, London, Commission for Africa Dcmbele, D.M. (2003) 'The myths and dangers of PRSPs', Third World Economics: Trends and Analysis, no. 314, 1- 15 (ktober, Pe nang DcmbeJe, D.M. (2005) 'Is aid th e answer?', Alliance Maga:;ine, September Econo mic Comm ission for Africa (ECA) (2008) Africa Economic R.eport 2008, New York, ECA Europe•.lJl Un ion (EU) (2008) 'Draft Council Conclusions on Guidelines for EU p;nticipation in the International Conference o n Financing for Development', Doha, 29 November- 2 December 2008, Brussels, 3 Novembe r Cu ptJ, S" Powell, R. and Yongzheng, Y. (2006) Macroeconomic Challenges of Scali ng Up Aid to Africa. A Checklist for Pra ctitio ners. Wash ingto n IX, IM F Huffington Post (20U8) 'PotentiJ lly letha l: increased relationShip between m ili tary and aid: a meeting this mo nth in Kabul turn ed ac rimon io us w he n USAID and Department of Defense (000) officials briefed inte rnJti o n~1 Jid ~gencies on the new policy of the US governmen t', 22 Dt....::cmber Orti z, I. (2007) 'Pu tti ng financ ing for d evelopment in pers pec ti ve: th e Sou th fimnces the North', unpublished Oxfam International (2006) 'Unequal partners: how EU-AC P Economic PJ rtnershi p Agreements (EPAs) co uld harm the d evelopmen t prospects of mnn)' of th e world's poorest countri es', Oxfam Briefing Paper, Lond on, September Oxfam Internati onal (2007) 'The world is still wa iting . Broken G8 promises are costing m illions of li ves', Oxfam Brirjing Papa, Lond on, May O xfJm In ternational (2008) 'If not now, when ?', Oxfam Briefing Note, London, November TJ ndon, Y. (2008) Ending Aid Dependence, Oxford and Ge neva, l'ahamu Boo ks and Sou th Centre

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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? UNCTAD (1998) Tr~ d e ~nd Developmen t Report 1998. ~ond part: African Development in ~ Comp~ra t i ve Pers pe<:tive, New Yor k and Geneva, United N~ t ions UNCTAD (2001) Economic Developme nt in Africa : Performance, Prospects and Policy Issu es, New York and Geneva, United Nations UNCTAD (2002) Economic Development in Africa: From Adj ustment to Pove rty Rt..>d uction: Wh"t is New?, New York and Genev", Un ited Nations UNCTAD (2003) Trade and DeVelopment Report 2003, New York nnd Geneva, United Na tions UNCTAD (2005) Economic Develop ment in Afr ica : Doubling Ai d: Make the 'Big Push' Work, New York and Ge neva, Un ited N~ ti on s UNCTAD (2006) Economic Development in Africa. Rethinki ng the Role of Foreign Investments, New Yor k and Geneva, United Nations UNCTAD (2007a) Economic Developm ent in Africa. Reclaiming Policy Sp~ce: Domesti c Resource Mobilisation an d Developmental States, New York and Geneva, United Natio ns UNCTflD (2007b) World Investment Report 2007, New York and Geneva, United Na tions UNDP (2003), MaHng Global Trade Work for the Poor, Lond on, E~rthScan Publica tions

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Aid effectiveness and the question of mutual accountability Charles Mutasa Development cooperation, especially aid, can be traced back to United Natio n s Resolution 2626 of 1970 from the internat io nal

development strategy for the second United Nations development decade, where rich countries pl edged to give 0.7 per cen t of their gross nationa l products as development assistance, after recognising the role tha t a id cou ld pl ay in foste ring development

in developing countries. The next 30 years saw aid being manipulated and used to meet political end s such as recruiting and reward ing Southe rn allies during the Cold War. The question of aid for development was al a lull in Ihis period and o nly s urfaced

again after the signing of the Mi llennium Declara tion. The fin a ncing for development conference that followed, held in Monterrey in 2002, sought to examine the internationally agreed d evelopment goals adopted during the development decade, and the Mi llennium Development Goals (MDGs) that originated from the 2000 Millennium Declaration, for their financial implications, and to ind icate ways of mobilisi n g the fi nancial resources needed to achieve them. The outco me of the conference o n fi nanci ng for development was a turning poin t in interna tional econo mic coopera tion. The adoptio n of the Monterrey Consensu s at the su mmit level on 22 March 2002 not only signalled a new partnership in international economic rela tions bu t al so reaffi rmed the advantages of the new approach toward s consensus building taken by the international community. In Febru ary 2003, leaders of the major multil a teral developme nt banks, international and b ilateral organ isations as well as 12 1

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? donor and recipien t country re presentatives ga thered in Rome for a high level fo rum on harmo nisation. They committed to take action to improve the m anagement and effectiveness of aid and to take stock of concrete progress, before meeting again in early 2005. The high level fo rum concluding sta tement, the Rome Decla ration o n Harmon isatio n, sets ou t an ambitio us programme of activities, w hic h includes, am ong o ther things, agreeme nts to s tream line donor procedures and practices, to ensure that donor assistance is aligned with the development recipie nt's prio rities and, most importa ntly, to implement the good practices, principl es and stand ards formulated by the develo pme nt co mmunity as the foundation fo r harmonisation . The Paris Declaration of March 2005 is a landmark achievement that brought together a number of key pr inciples and co mmitme nts in a coherent way. It also includes a fr amewo rk for mu tua l accountability, a nd iden t ifies a number of indicators for tracking progress. There is a general recognition tha t the Paris Decla ration is a crucial compon e nt of a larger aid e ffectiveness agenda that coul d e ngage pa rli a me nt, gender groups, civil soci e ty actors, new le nde rs, global fun ds an d foun d a tion s in a more direct manne r. In the Pa ris Decla r ation, do nors
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The Paris Declaration The purpose of the Paris Declara tion on Aid Effectiveness (OEe D 2005) is to improve a id delivery in a way that best suppo rts the achievement of the MDGs by 2015. [t highlights the im po rtance of predictable, well-aligned, programmed, and coordinated aid to achieve results. One of its five key principles is mutual accountability, in which dono rs and developing countries pledged that they would hold each other mu tu ally accountable for development based on the other four principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation and management for results. The Paris Declara tion emphas ises accountabili ty in relation to parliamen t and other domestic s ta keholders, which can o nly be feasib le with e ffective st ructures for dialogue (Tjonneland 2006). Although these commitmen ts build on the content of previous agreements, notably those expressed in the Rome Declaration of February 2003, the Paris Declaration is more comprehensive and reflects a broader consensus. The Paris Declaration flags civil society organisations (CSOs) as potential participan ts in the identificatio n of priorities and the monitoring of developm ent programmes. However, it does not recognise CSOs as development actors in their own right, with the ir own priorities, programmes and partnershi p arrangements. By taking a narrow view of CSOs' roles, the Pa ris Decla ration fails to take into account the rich diverSity of socia l interveners in a democrati c society and fai ls to recognise the full range o f ro les played by CSOs as developmen t actors and change agents. CSOs are often particularly effective at reaching the poor and socia lly excluded, mobilising com mun ity effo rts, speakin g up for human ri ghts a nd gend er equality, and helping to em power particu lar co nstituencies. Their strength lies not in their re presentation of society as a whole, but in the ir very diversi ty and capacity for innovation, a nd in the differen t perspectives that they bring to the issues when engagin g in po li cy dialogue (OEC D 2008). CSOs operate on the basis of shared values, beliefs, and objectives with the people they serve o r represent. This responSiveness to d ifferent primary constituencies explains the extensive diversity of CSOs in te rms of values, goals, activities, and structure. It al so exp la ins the particular emphaSiS on human rights and socia l Justice, including women's, children's, and indigenous peoples' rights, w hi ch many 123

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

CSOs take as a starting poin t fo r their development wor k. As the Commission o f European Communities (2008) noted, civil society was the 'missi ng link' of the Paris Declaration. Civil society is a full y-fledged player in development, must be included in the process and su pported in its efforts to define its own principles of aid effectiveness. The sam e applies to parliament, loca l authorities, gend er groups and others who
Accountability and aid effectiveness Accountability is now a buzzword in con temporary development discourse. When accountabi lity works, citizens are able to make demands on powerful institutions and ensure that those d ema nds are met (IDS 2006). The concep t of accountability describes the rights and responsibilities that exist between peop le and the institutions that affect their lives, including governments, civi l society and market actors. Interna tional financial institutions and donors have been cons istently criticised for using aid to further thei r own interests. The current patterns of accountability in wh ich donor agencies hold recipients accountable, and are in turn accountable to their own taxpayers, must change. Donors continue to use unfair, undemocratic and inappropriate policy conditionality, in a way tha t skews recipient accountability away from the citizens of poor countries. The civil society message has been loud and clear that this 'one 124 ngntea IT

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way' accountability should be replaced by a system of genuine mutua l accountability, w hi ch balances the legitimate interests of dono rs, recipien ts and , most importantly; poor peop le. In this regard, civil society continues to monitor whether interna tional financial institutions and donors use aid for their own purposes or for primarily red u cing poverty and promo ting development If dono rs are serio u s about promoting accountability and dialogue and making an effective contribu tio n to the fi ght against poverty they must radically improve the quality of their aid. Failure to target aid at the poorest coun tries, runilway s pe ndin g on overpriced technical assistance from international consultants, tying aid to purchases from donor countries' own firms, cumbersome and ill coordina ted pla nning, implementation, m onitorin g and reporting requi rements, cxccssi\'e admin istra tive costs, late and partial d isbursements, do uble cou nting of debt relief, and aid s pending on immigration services all deflate the va lue of aid. While some tensions remain between the CSO community and governments, especially in the Sou th, we arc witnessing a steady shi ft in the attitudes of both the governme nt and civic groups. Each, at long last, is recognising the cri tical and indeed, legitima te role played by the other in achieving consistent, sustainable, long-term development. For the sake of accountabili ty, there is a growi ng rea lisation th at ci vi l society needs to engage government offici a ls, donors, poli ti ci an s and parliamentarians more determinedly. This reduces opposition and increases support a nd accountabili ty for national, regional and global policies; it works for greater burden shari ng of the policy costs and benefits. For effective aid deli very, o rd inary citizens have to be involved, not only at the implementation stages, but also at the initiating, evaluati ng. monitoring and insti tutionalisatio n stages. Inconsistent and incoherent pol icies o n the part of dono rs have to a large extent made policy d ia logue and accoun tabili ty di fficulty. Conditionalities stressed by donors, espeCially on governance matters, cau se reci pient cou ntries to account to them at the ex pense of accounting to their c iti zens (Reality of Aid Network 2007). Too much aid is project based, according to the donor's priorities rather than those of reCipients, and so o n. Aid quantity is insufficient wh ile its 'quality' is deficient and the transaction costs of aid are still too high. ln volving reciproca l obligations 125

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

over the long term as well as monitored relationships a nd commitments cou ld be a s ignificant new mechanism to improve the effectiveness o f aid and give ad ded confid e nce to the development relationship.

Mutual accountability and conditionality Mutual accountability is unlikely to functio n in a way tha t does not inclu de donors calling governments to acco unt over basic human rights violations. Accountability in aid effectiveness will not work if the framework used is restri cted to dono r/recip ie nt government relations w ithou t go ing furth e r to include other s takeholders a t national level (Uvin 2004). lmproving transpa re ncy and accountability on the use o f development resources is al so an important objective of the Paris Declarati on . Partner countries have a big challenge to e nsu re that in fo rmation and disaggrcgated data is accessible and transparentl y sha red with all s takeholders. Capacity buildi ng here becomes necessary for aid effectiveness. Strengthening the credibility of the budget as a too l

for governing the allocatio n a nd use of development resources can not only improve the align men t of donor support, but also permit parliame ntary scru tiny o f government poliCies on developme nt, which is key to deepe n ing ownership. Broadening and reinforcing CSO involvement in aid effective ness from inception o r design stage allows independent assessments of the adherence to the commitments und e r the Paris Declaration. Monitoring of p rogress by multi-stakeholders reinforces accountability. Dono rs wil l also need to improve the transparency a nd predictabil ity of aid fl ows by sharing timely and accurate info rmation on intended and actual disbursements with bud get au thorities. O wnership a nd conditio nality rep rese nt the core issues in aid effe ctiveness - as ownership is the defini ng issue in development, while dono r conditiona lity poses one of the gravest challenges to co un try owne rship. The p rocess o f deepening the unde rstanding of the develo pmen t partnership and advancing aid effectiveness refo rm req Uires further interrogation into the issue of ownership and co nditio nality from the Southe rn con text of development in addition to taking the circumstances and needs of the poor as the s tarting poi nt as well as the final destination or goal. Whi le 126 ngntea IT

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9 THE QUESTI ON OF MUTUA L ACCOU NTAB ILITY it is clear that po licy conditiona lities affec t ownership nega tive ly;

fiduciary conditio nalities also need to be refo rmed to pro m o te n ati o na l ownership and ali g nme nt.

In discussing mutual accountabili ty between develo pme nt and country partners, the problem of condi tionality is central. Var io us inte rnational agencies and institu tio ns im pose politi cal co nditio ns o n develo pme n t assistance tha t restrict ind ep e nd en ce o f actio n a nd lim it the right of each country to define and impl ement the public policies it deems most approp riate to safeguard the righ ts and well-being of its peo p le a nd the pr inciple of 'national owners h ip ' . Man y co nsultati o n s he ld in d evelo ping countries o ver the

last three years point ou t that co nditionali ties a re a ntitheti ca l to the Pari s Declar ation p rin ciple o f cou ntry ownership a nd accou ntability (DFID 2005). In instances of unrefo rmed, su pply-drive n technical assistance, aid effective ness has been patchy a nd piecemea L especially at the nationa l level. This co ntinued policy condi tio nal ity through tied aid undermines o wne rship. It is, the re fo re, impo rtan t if development partne rs are to build effective develo pme nt partnersh ips that increase the volume and maxim ise the poverty reduction impact of offi cia l deve lopm ent assistance (ODA) based o n the recognitio n of national le ade rs hip and o wnership by develo pin g countries to e nd all d o no r-im pose d po li cy con ditions. Thus national country ow ne rship s hould be interpreted as de mocratic o w ne rship consistent w ith count ries' obligations to inter na tional human rig hts law, core labou r standards, and internatio nal co mmitme nts on gende r equality a nd sustainabl e developme nt. Co nsideration should the re fo re be give n to the creation of an inde pe nde nt monito ring and evaluation syste m fo r aid at internationa l, nationa l and locallevcls. At the inte rnational le vel, ne w inde pe nde nt institutio ns will be need ed to p b y this role, in o rde r to hold donors to account for their overall performance. The e m ergence of new donors and cred itors, pu bli c and private, w ho a re co ntributing to financing fo r development, has brought in mo re reso urces and d iversi ty 10 the aid
AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? in achieving poverty reduction goa ls in developing countries . No n-D ECO donors bring u niq ue perspectives and contri butio ns to the developm ent agenda based on the ir own ex perience . Without proper manageme nt, non-DECO donor resources co uld prove ineffective at poverty red u ctio n and counterproductive to m a intaining the recent im provem ents in good governance, pa rticularl y w here institutiona l and technical capaci ty is wea k.

Recommendations In line w ith the d iscussions above, it is importa nt that regula r and systematiC spaces be provided for effective parl iamentary and civil society participation in po li cy dinlogue on nid nnd develo pment effectiveness in all stages of the development p rocess, and th at this be recognised as standard practice tha t needs to be a ctively pro moted at all levels. In thi s regard, it becomes vital to put in place structures, wor k frames and policies that govern the relations of these stakeholders w ith government a nd d o no rs. Much focus must be put on responsibilities and division of labour to avoid duplication and unnecessary con fli cts (OECD 2008). There is growing concern at t he decline in the levels of ODA in recent years . It is, therefore, necessary fo r Accra to call for a sharp inc rease in ODA by a number of do nor countries, and call u pon all do nors to hono ur thei r ODA commitments and to improve the e ffectiveness of D DA in suppo rt of natio nally owned development strategies. Emphasis he re is given to the special importance of co ntinued wo rk towards dur able solutions to the de bt sustainabili ty and manageme nt problems of developing co untri es. Demonstrating tangible changes in sustainin g the mo mentum and achievi ng p rogress in commitm e nt is key and inspirational for both development partners and reci p ient countries. Emerging lende rs s uch as China need to be engaged no t only with the view to win them to the DEC O fr amework, bu t fo r co here nce and consis tence in glo ba l partnerships and development cooperation . Besi des, there are a lso major do nors tha t need to be part and parcel of the loint assistance strategy at national levels. Accra and Do ha are importa nt s teps o n the road to e nhance development cooperation for the realisatio n of inte rnationalJy agreed development goals, including the MDGs, to prom ote 128 ngntea IT

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dialogue and find effective ways to support this process. There is need to put mechanisms and ind icators that work for medium to long-term results that go further than Accra. The challen ge now is to use the momentum of both Accra and Doha to implement the agreed global developmen t partnership, scaling up efforts on the part of d evelopi ng countries and the inte rnationa l community. Policy g uideli nes ema nating from both Accra a n d Doha will need to be transla ted into concrete ac tions. This is a techni cal as well as a po li tical task since the po licy instruments have to be identi fied in detail, in a n effort to ensure that they can become o perational as e ach country's circu m sta n ces warrants.

Bib li ography Action Aid (2005) 'Real aid - an agenda for making aid work', www. adionaid .orgl461!rea I_aid _report. h tml AFRODAD (2002) Reality of Aid."Does Africa Need Aidl. Har EURODAD (2008) 'Tu rning th e T.. blcs', Aid and Accountability under the Pa ris Frilmework, Brussels, EURODAD Fleming, S., Cox, M., Sen, K. an d Wrigh t-Revolledo, K (2007) Aid effectiveness making a d ifference to poor a nd excluded men and women: th e Paris Declaration i naud, N ., l{eisen, H. and Chen, X. (2006) The Rise of China alld 1l1dia: What's In ilfar Africa?, Pa r is, DECO He[mu t, R. (2007) 'Is China
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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? agenda', Paris, ISG Johnson, A., Marti n, M. and Bargawi, H . (2004) 'The effecti veness of ai d to Africa since the HIPC initiative: iss u es, evidence and possible areas for action', b.:!ckgrou nd pa per for the Com mission for Africa Kydland, F.E. and Prescott, E.e. (1977) 'Rules ra ther th an discretion: thc inconsistency of optima l plans ', / o!4Tnai of Political Economy , vol. 85, no. 3, pp.473-91 Mel ville, e. and Owen, O. (2005) 'Chinil and Africa: a ncw era of SouthSouth cooperation', Open Democracy, 8 July Naidoo, K. (2004) 'The end of blind fai t h? Civil society a nd the cha llenge of accountability, legi timac y and trans pa rency', AccoulI!ability Foyum, vol. 2, Su mmer, pp. 14-25 NGO statement (2008) ' Increasi ng internation~l financial and tcrhn ical cooperation for development', informal rev iew session on chapter IV, 15--16 Apri I http://www.afrodad.org/d ow nloads/publicatio ns/NGO%20 statement%200n%20FFDo/.,20chaptcr%204.pd f OECD (2005) Paris Declarati on on Ai d Effe<: ti ve ness, Ownership, H;umonis.. tion, Alignment, R(:sults and Mutuill Accoun tilbility, Paris, OECD DECO (2006) Integra ting Human Righ ts in to Develop ment: Donor Approaches, Experiences and Challenges, Paris, OECD DECO (2007) '2006 survey on monitoring the Paris Declara ti on, overview of the res ults', OECD loumal on Development , vol. 8, no. 2, Paris, OECD OECD (2008) Civil Society and Aid Effec tiveness: Synth esiS of l'indin gs and Recommendati ons, Paris, DECO O lu kos hi, A. (1996) 'The impact of re<:cnt reform efforts on th e state in Afri ca', in K. Havnevik and B. van Arkad ie (ed s) Domination or Dialog ue? Experiences and Prospects for Afri can Developmelll Cooperation . Uppsala, Nord ic Africa Institute Rea lit)' of Aid Network (2007) www. rea lityofa id. org Rogerson, I\. (2005) :Aid harmonisat ion and alignment; bridging th e ga ps between reality and th e Paris reform agenda', Development Policy Review, vol. 23, no. 5, September, pp. 53 1- 52 Tjon neland, E. (2006) 'SAOC and donors - ideals and practices; from Gaborone to Paris and Back', FOPRISA Report I, IHDrA, Gaborone Tonder, B. va n (2006), 'The effe<: ts of ex:t ractive indus tri es in sou thern Africa ', in O.A. Kwaramba (ed) Osisa, vol. 1, no. 4, IVww.osisa.orglnodeI2086 UN Secretary -Genera l (2005) In Luger Freedom: Towards Development, Se<:urity and Human Righ ts for All, New York, UN UNCTAD (2008) 'Draft Accra accord ', twelfth session, TD/ I.A14, Accra, Gh,ma, 25--30 Apr il UNIFEM (2005) Rcs ults-Bast-d Management in UNIFEM: Essential Guid e, New York, UN Il'EM Uvin, P. (2004) Humall Rights and Del1eiopmell/, Bloomfield, Kumarian Press WFUNA and NSI (2005) 'We the peoples; spedal repor t to the UN Millennium Declination and beyond·, Mobilizing for Chonge, Mess"gcs

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9 THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL ACCOU NTAB ILITY from Civil Society, New York, Nor th-5ou th Ins titute & Wo rld Federation of United Nation Associ
Ass/,:ssnlcn ts and Challenges Ahc"d, Wilshington DC, World Ban k Wrigh t, K., (2008) 'The foad toAce rn: implementing the Puris I)(..daration beyond Puris', ONTRAC, no. 38, Jan uuy Wrigh l-Revolledo, K. (2007) 'Diverse s ta te-society relations : the implications of implemen tin g the Paris Declaration across d is tinct country sellings', Polky Brirjing 12, JNTRAC

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The European Development Fund or the illusion of assistance Mou ham et Lam ine Ndiay e

Introduction Equitable and sustainable stru c tural transfo rmatio n of African economies is a pre requi site fo r im proving livelihoods across the co nti nen t. Despite decades of reform, ofte n le d und e r stru ctura l

adj ustme nt programmes, and a very high level of openness, most s ub-Saha ran African coun tries remain hig hly de pende nt o n a narrow range o f miner a l and a gr icu ltural commo d ities, w ith lo w levels of value-additio n and low p o te ntia l fo r job creatio n. Africa 's s ha re of wo rld trad e has declined fro m 5.5 per cen t in 1980 to 2 per ce nt in 2003, and of this trad e there is an o verwhelming de pe nde ncy o n trade w ith the Europe an Unio n (EU ). Stimul a ting g rowth that e nh ances we lfa re creates q ua lity e mployment, a nd fu lfi ls social a nd eco no mi c ri g hts tha t r eq uire ho li sti c economic policies and the po liti ca l space and finan cial m eans to impleme nt them at na tio nal and conti ne ntal levels. These policies need to re fl ect the as pirations a nd values of all secto rs of society and to fu r the r regio na l integration a nd a proce ss of sustainable agricu ltural reform a nd indu strialisatio n. As o ne o f Africa 's leading eco no mic partners, in te rms of trade and inves tme nt, a s well as wide r finan cial suppo rt th ro ug h ai d finance, the EU could play a n impo rta nt and sig ni ficant ro le in su ppo rting holistic and equitable econom ic transfo rmatio n a cross Africa.

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10 TH E EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Regional trade agreements Trad e policies have a critical role to play in suppo rting economic d e ve lopme nt across Africa. These policies arc incre asingly set thro ug h agreem e nts in internatio nal arenas . Whilst the Wo rld Trade Organisation has set trade rules tha t have imp lications fo r African countries, it is a new generatio n o f bilateral/regional trade and investment agreemen ts that will critically de termine the types o f trade and wider economic policies that governments can use to support develo p ment. The o ngoing negotiation of Econo m ic Partne rs hip Agree ments (EPAs) between A fri can, C aribbean and Pacific (ACP) co untries nnd the EU will have a decisive impact o n the trad e and econo mic poli cies of African co untri es. For most Africa n coun tries, the EU is the single most impo rtan t trade partne r and thus any agreement with the EU will have s ubstnntial implications. The EU's current EPA proposals are in danger of unde rmin ing the very pol icies that African countries re qui re to p romote regiona l integration a nd tran sformatio n of the ir econo mies. The re are widespread and justified fears that the config uratio n of the EPA negotiating b locs will und ermine rathe r than pro m ote aid effectiveness. Furthermore, the trade in goo d s co mpone nt of the agreemen ts re quires the libera li sa tio n of tariffs, which thre atens the via bility and livelihoods of existing rural produce rs and industry and has sombre implicat io ns fo r government budgets . Moreover, the cu rrent proposa ls wo uld enta il African governments fr eezing all remaining tariffs at zero, e ffective ly relinquishing the right to use tariff po licy as an instrume nt for development. The EU pro poses that these agreeme nt s should include ru les o n ser vices, investme nt, competition, in te ll ectu a l property and government procuremen t. As such, these proposed agreemen ts are far mo re than trad e agreements, and e nte r into areas of do mestic eco no m ic policy tha t have no t even been discusse d in man y African countries, let alone agreed at a regional o r co ntinen tal level. Whilst rules in all these areas are neede d fo r develo pment, it is impe rative that such ru les reflect the changing need s and prio riti es of the co untries co ncerned. Despite the EU's in sistence o n including these issues in any agreeme nt, it is not cle ar what African countries wou ld gaini yet the costs could be high. 1 33

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? Agreeing to these rules would require coun tries to consult the EU when they need to change them, thus unde rm ining national and regio nal policy fl exibility. Implementing an EPA w il l clearly be costly for ACP co untries in terms of losses in tariff revenue and employment. [n addition, im pact assessment studies show that for AC P countries to reap any benefits fro m increased market access provi ded unde r EPAs,l they first need to address the major su pply-side constra ints that impede competitive production. One study estimates conservati vely that to tal ' ad ju stmen t costs', s uch as compensa tio n for loss of tariff revenu e, employmen t, produc tion, and suppo rt for ex port development fo r ACP coun tries, cou ld be about £9.2 billion (Mil ne r 2006).

The illusion of aid The EU has a histo ry o f providing s u bstan ti al developmen t assistance to ACP co untries, covering areas s uch as health, educatio n, water and sanitation, and roads. This suppo rt is channelled

through the Eu ropean Develop ment Fun d (E DF) and disbursed in fi ve-year cycles. In response to ACP co ncerns about the costs of ErAs, the Europea n Commissio n (EC) has promised to increase the amou nt ple dged under the next EDF funding cycle (2008-13) to E22.? bi ll ion. 2 At firs t glance th is would seem to be su ffi cie nt to meet the EPA adju stment costs, but dee per scru tiny suggests that thi s assistance may be more illu s io n than re ality. The EC s uggests that funds to co mpensa te ACP count ries for the costs of imple m enting EPAs wo ul d come fro m the tenth EDF funding cycle . Ye t, even before EPAs came o nto the scene, it was estimated that €21.3 b ill ion wou ld be needed for the tenth EDF fund ing cycle, m erely to fund the costs of the EU's existin g aid portfolio and maintain EU con tr ibutio ns at 0.38 per cent of the EU's gross nationa l income (GN l) (Grynbcrg and Clarke 2006). If this is the case, the tenth ED F is me rely bu siness as usu al. Rather than provide ne w funds for EPAs, the EC will cover EPA adjustment costs from its ex isting a id budget d iverti ng mo ney away from o ther areas, such as heal th, ed ucation, and rural development. Even if ACP countries decide to use ex isting aid mo ney for EPA 134 ngntea IT

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10 THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND Table 10.1: Funds allocated and spent during each fi ve-year financing cycle (€ million) EDF as s is tan<:e pa<: kag e

4th EDF 5th EDF 6th EDF 7th EDF 8th EDF 9th EDF (1975-80) ( 1980-85) 11985-90) (1 990-95) (1995(2000-07)

Funds allocated during the five · year envelope (nominal va lue)

3 ,390

5,227

8,400

12,00014 ,625

15,200

Real value of env e lope (1975 base year)

2,696

2 ,586

3,264

3,514

3,463

3, 131

Disbursements in the fi ve years to whi<:h the e nve lope was allocated (nominal va lue)

1,454.5

2,041.0

3,34 1.6

4,417.9

2,92 1.6

4,239.0

Per<:entage of total a llo<:ation disbursed in the fi ve years to whkh it was allocated (neares t per cent)

43

"

40

37

20

28

'OOO)

So urc e: Grynbe rg and Clarke (2006)

adjustment costs, it migh t be ve ry slow in arriving. During the las t five year cycle (2001- 06), the EU promised €15 billio n in aid to ACP co untries. By the end of t he cycle, onl y 28 per cent of this mo ney had been disbu rsed. The record for the prev ious cycle was even worse. For 1995-2000, a promise o f €14.6 billio n was made. Fu nds only s tarted to be d isbursed in the third year, and by the e nd of the five yea rs only 20 per cen t had been paid out. Si nce AC P co untries will quickly feel the impact of EPAs on their economies, the EU's d isbursemen t mechan isms clearly need a major overhaul if EU assistance is really to make a diffe rence. AC P governme nts are wary o f the Ee's smoke and mirrors approac h to development assistance and have called for a separate and additional EPA

135

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? fin ancing facility,3 so that the EC can be held to its promises and fund s can be clearly tracked. To d ate, this has not been agreed and the promise of assistance remain s a mira ge.

Aid quantity In 2005, 15 European me mber states agreed to increase their aid to 0.7 per cent of GN I by 2015. As part of thi s agreement they set a series o f interim aid targets in 2006 and 20]0. Official fi gures released by the Organisation fo r Economic Cooperation and Develo pme nt (OECD) this yea r, showed that the EU 15 are on track and have met their collective aid target in 2006. However, almost one-third of EU aid - £13.5 billion - was artificially inflated du e to EU member s tates includ ing de bt cancellation and spending within Europe on refugees and foreign s tud ents' ed ucation as aid . If these non-a id items are d educted from officia l figures, EU member states missed their collective 2006 target of giving 0.39 per cent of GNI as aid, providing only 0.31 per cent. If EU membe r s tates continue to s ignificantly inflate their aid figures wit h these items, by 201 0 poor coun tries wi ll have received nearly €50 bi ll ion less than what they have been promised. Debt ca ncellation is vital for poverty red uction . However, poor people need aid and debt relief. G overnme nt s recognised this o ffi cially during the UN Financing for Development Summit in 2002 and the EU council reitera ted this poi nt in the Mo nterrey progress report of April 2006. Counting d ebt relief toward s the 0.7 per cent target effectivel y means that the valu e of debt is being offset by a red uction in ai d that wou ld otherwise be delivered in o rder to meet the target. In addition, rich countries count the full cost of the cancellation over a very sho rt period . However, the savings made by poor coun tries are spread over a much longer timeframe. Thi s means aid fi gu res a re infla ted by a p parently huge amounts, even when the actua l money avai lable to s pe nd fightin g poverty is far Jess. Further, Europe includes spend ing on ho using refugees in Europe and edu cating fo reign stude nts in Europe as ai d. Whilst these arc an important part of EU member sta tes' inte rna tional responsibilities, they do not d elive r new resources for poor co untries and are no t expenditures that citi zens consider to be 1 36 ngntea IT

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10 TH E EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

aid. EU member states must stop the practice of inflating their aid with non-aid items nnd genui nely increase their aid bud gets, setting year on yea r bind in g timetables to meet the their own aid targets.

Aid quality In orde r to fight poverty, the EU not only needs to provide more aid, it also needs to provide better quality aid. The EU has made some welcome commitments towards improving aid effec tiveness w hich must be met, including agreeing to meet the Pari s aid effectiveness targets and setting its ow n targets on joint analyses and multi annual stra tegic planning. [n addition the EU mu st also e ns ure that a greater percentage of aid goes to least d eveloped co untries (LDCs) w hich need it m ost. [t s hou ld also provide more aid on a long term and pred ictable basis. EU member states have committed to increasing ai d to Africa. Yet aid volumes to Africa, exclu di ng debt ca ncell ation, have been s tatic since 2004 and Africa is receiving a decreasing rather than

grow ing sha re of European aid resou rces. Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest regio n in the world, w ith 70 per cent of peo ple livin g on less than $2 per day. In 2004, a id to Africa w ithout debt cancellatio n amounted to 41 per cent of the global EU aid spend ing. In 2005, it amou nted to o nly 37 per cent. This trend must be reversed, with the EU increasin g the s hare of its aid provided to Africa.

Aid for trade Mu ch broader th an simple tech nical assistance o r training of trade negotia to rs, 'aid for trade' describes seve ral categories of trade-related assistance to Africa n countries. Its objectives include e nhancing worke r sk ills, modernising custom systems, building roads and ports, and improving agricultural productiv ity and export divers ifica tion. Aid for trad e aims to he lp African countries to adapt to the global trading e nvironment. However, aid has rarely been a simple transfer of resources fro m developed co un tries to aid recipient countries. Often, aid comes to African countries attached to a developmen t 'toolkit' in the form of aid conditionality. This toolkit involves trade policy prescriptions in the form

137

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

of structural adjustment programmes that are often a conceptu al expression of the political and econom ic ideology of the do nors rather tha n the develop ment priorities o f the receiving countries. The World Bank and the 1M F, in response to request from the G7 finance ministers and the GB in Gleneagles, join tly proposed an aid -far-trade package (IM F/World Ba nk 2005). The package is a pro posa l fo r provisions of fi nanc ial a nd techn ical assistance to developing countries for two related ob jecti ves: fi rst to ad dress supplY-Side constraints in develop ing countries ('maximisation of bencfit'); and second, to assist them in coping with the ad ju stment cost of trade iiberalisation, which is assu med to be transit ional (,minimisation of the cost'). The 33 African LDCs, acco rd ing to the World Bank and lM.F, have not been able to take fu ll advantage of the benefits o f the mul til ater<1l trade liberalisation because of limitat ions that invade on their tradi ng capaci ty or supply-side co nstraints. The maintenance of high unbound tariffs that, says the bank, create 'disincentives to en ter international markets'. The two Bretton Woods institutions entertai n the idea that trade liberalisation cou ld be realised if such limitations were mitigated through increased financial and technical assistance. n le LDCs have neither the surplus of exportable products nor the production capacity to take immedi<1te advan tage of new trade opportuni ties. They w ill n eed substantial investment and technical assistance in order to exp and thei r prod uction. (Kofi Annan, quoted in fillallciai Times, 5 March 2001, in the context of his responses to the Europea n Union's 'Everything but arms' initia tive) LDCs have been granted quota-free and du ty-free market access to the EU ma rket. In the con text of low productive capacity, poor infrastructure, limited access to research and technology and inadequate financia l markets, liberalised mar kets will not s timulate eco nomic growth nor add ress the structu ral issues of develop ment. To genUinely assist poor coun tries, aid for trade must not only be additiona l to developmen t aid and meet s tandards of aid effecti veness, such as those outlined in the CotonoL! Agreement, but they shoul d also complement a prodevelopmental round of trade

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10 THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

negoti ations t hat puts receiving countries' interests at the core of the negotiations. Fu ndame ntall y, aid for trade should not be u sed as a 'bargaini ng sword' in exchange for a one-si ze-fits -all trade liberalisation package.

Increase aid predictability Currently, there is still a hu ge difference between the fund s that d onors commit to give to Afri can co untri es within the fi scal year and the actual amoun t dis bursed. A recent survey by the OECD, for exa mple shows that Zambia was sc heduled to receive $930 mil lion in 2005, but dono rs o nly disbu rsed $696 million nearly one third less. The European Commission and all bi lateral European donors need to improve the predictability of their aid fl ows, not jus t wi thin the year, but also over longer periods in order to enable African cou ntries to plan and spend aid money marc effectively.

Budget or sector support The European Commission and the EU member states need to provide, when and where ap prop riate, aid d irectly to African countries' nahonal budgets, either centrally supporting a govern men t or supporting a particular sector such as health and edu ca tion. This is the best mea ns for suppor ti ng committed developing country governments to sca le up delivery of essential services, assisting the m w ith build ing effective and sustainable public health, education and water and sa nita tion systems w hich are accessible to all . It is, for example, one of the only ways of enabling aid money to be used to cover recur rent costs, like the salaries of much-needed education and health workers. Given the presen t 4.2 million mi ssing health workers and 1.9 million missing teachers, it is vital aid money that can pay for these importan t salaries. The European Commission has already signed up to providing 50 per cent of its aid via budget sup po rt. However, over 90 per cent of the addi tional EU aid flows will come via me mber states' bilateral aid . It is therefore impo r tant that EU membe r states also make the commitment to provide 50 per cent o f their bilateral aid via bu dget or sector support.

139

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

Provide more long term aid The EC and the EU member states should also move towards provid ing more of thei r aid on a lo ng-te rm basis and s hould stop the cu rre nt p ractice of attachin g economic poli cy conditions to their aid. With this regard, th e Ee's proposal for 'Millennium Development Goal (MDG) contracts', w hich would provide six years' budget s u pport and come wi th a reduced numbe r of conditio ns set around their attai nme nt, should be s upported by member states a nd pu t in p lace immed iately. Membe r states shou ld also move towards providing m ore lon g term aid (over six to te n years) and phase ou t attaching economic poli cy cond itions to their aid.

Fully untie aid Tying ai d to the purchase o f goods and services fro m d onor countries continues to be a serious problem affecting the quality of EU aid. Most European governments still tic their aid. Thi s practice results in an increase in the cost o f purchasing good s and services, mean in g that poor countries ca n afford to buy signi fica ntly less. It also acts as an expensive subsidy to dono r country industries and jobs, and can potentially damage poor country markets. Un tying aid wo uld increase the valu e of a id by up to 30 per cent.

Ensure greater policy coherence Despite the rhetoric and repeated commi tme nts, po licy cohere nce for development is in practice missing in many areas of EU policy. Even where EU policy is indeed coherent with development objectives, the implementation of those policies frequently lacks cohe rence with those objectives. Furthermore, the re continue to be institutiona l divisions within the EU commission, which ca use significa nt p roble ms to the co he re nce and consistency of aid p rogrammes. These revolve around the sp lit of development aid regiona l po licy and programming between the Ee's directo rates ge ne ral for development (ACP) and for ex ternal relatio ns (A LA, M EDA, e tc), with EUfopeA id und ertaki ng the contract issui ng and managemen t of the implementation of the commission's aid programmes. This division o f respon si bilities withi n the commission 140 ngntea IT

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10 TH E EUROPEAN DEV ELOP MENT FUND

and the gap between developmen t policy formul a tion and imp lementation p rompts conside rable concern about the possibil ity of ac hieving a co nsiste nt and coherent development policy.

Conclusion African countries do not need to be apologetic or even feel guilty abo ut needing aid to better benefit from trade. All d eveloped countries have be nefited from aid and heavy investment to increase production and trade capacity before e ngagin g fully in international trade. Aid for trad e is not charity. Besid es, implementing an EPA wi ll clearly be costly for AC P co untries. One study estimates conserva tively that to tal 'a djustment costs' such as compe nsation for loss of tariff revenue, emp loyment, production, and s upport for e xport development for AC P countries cou ld be about £9.2 bil lion. This conservati ve estimate clearly shows that the €2 billion ex tra which the EU has pledged to provide for trade-related assistance (o f w hich a 's ubstantial amount', but not all, would be d evoted to AC P countries) would not be enough. And there are legitimate concerns abou t how sp eedily any funds could be made available to ACP co untries, given the problems with delays in EDF disb urseme nts. Hence, AC P countries are correct to ask for clarity on what level of fund s will be available fo r trade-rela ted assis tance and EPA-related ad justme nt costs. Each ACP cou ntry already faces cha lle nges to meet the MDGs, fo r which current aid levels are already insufficient. So they are also correct to demand that these 'aid for trade' fund s must supplement existing development assistance. The EU should urgently p rovide clarity on how mu ch addition al funding ACP cou ntries can ex pec t to receive, for what s pecifi c activi ties, and how - and when - it w il l be made available to them . Also these additional fu n d s should not be cond itiona l on sign ing an EPA, nor sho uld they be linked to progress in the EPA negot iations .

Notes 1. See, for exa mp le, Kenya Institu te for Public Policy [{esea rch and Anal ys is (2004), Caribbean Polic y Developm ent Centre (2004) and Busse et al (2004).

141

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? 2. At Port Moresby ACP Council of Mi n isters, M~y 2006. 3. Nairobi Ded ~ration on Economi c P~rtnership Agree ments, conference of ministers of trade, April 2006.

A fr i c~n

Union

Bib liography Busse, M., Borr mann, A., Crobm~nn, 1-1. und Ju ng fern stieg. N. (2004) REPAs or RIP OFF: all inllial advocacy position of Ihe Caribbean refl'rcnce group on Ihe EPA ncgolialiOlls, Bridgetow n, Barbados Ca ribbean Policy Development Cent re (2004) Study oflhe Impad and SusMinabilily ojEPAs for the Economy of Uga nda, Harare, Cari bbean Pol icy Development Centre Crynberg, R. and Clarke, A. (2006) The European Development Fund and Economic Parlnfrsllip Agrecmenl.~, Commonweal th Secretariat, Economic Affairs Division, h tip :!lee .eu ropa .eu/co mm/devc1opment/bod yl(Otonoul sta lisli cs/st~ t 11_en.hlm IMI'/Worid Bank (2005) 'Doha develop ment agenda and ai d fo r trad e', 9 September, OC2005-0016 Kenya Instit ute for Public Policy I{eseMch and Ana lys is (2004) 'Agenda for development of negotiating pos ition und er Economic Part ners hip Agn:."ements: Kenya's agri cu ltu ral trade with the EU", draft report Mi lner, C. (2006) 'An assessment of the overall im plcmentiltion and ~djustment costs for the ACP co untries of Economic Partnership

Agreements wilh the EU', in Grynberg, R.

~nd CI~rke,

A. (cds) Thr

European Dfvelopmelll FUlllt alld Economir Partnership Agrumellls, Commonwealth Secretariat, Econom;':: Affa irs Division

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Africa's new development partners: China and India challenging the status quo? Sanusha Naidu and Hayley Herman 'Equality and mu tua l benefit' a re reflected today in Chinese leaders' frequent emphasis on aid as a partnership, not a oneway transfer of charity. (Deborah Brautigam, 2008, p. 2) India intends to be a partner in Africa's resurge nce. (Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, addreSSing the N igerian Nationa l Assembly, 2007, p. 3)

Introduction The rise of China and India has indeed created a new set of impu lses in the interna tiona l system. No t o nly are these two e merging giants making no table waves in the way that internatio nal finance, trade and investments aTe being shaped but also in the way thai the rules which govern the global go ve rnance regime are being influenced. Nowhere is th is more apparent than in the rea lm of the intcrna honal architecture o n aid e ffectiveness. While the deba te rages on as to whether China and India are new o r re-emerging donors in th e world today, their behaviour as development partners is certainly changing the global a id picture and most impo rtantly in Afri ca . Over the past several years, the politics o f aid has been an overarch ing issue in Africa's develop me nt debate. Si nce 2000, the Group of Eig ht ind ustrialised rich s tates (G8) have been promising to double aid to Africa. Unfo rt unately, these promises have la rgely been unfulfilled with the GS co untries opining th at aid money has been misused by African recipients, o r that African 14 3

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? governments are no t confor ming to the condi tionality of good governance and democra tic reform. From the African side the p rescriptive nature of trad itio nal donors' aid policy, thei r inertia and sh ifting of the goal posts around w hat constitutes thi s doubling of aid has been equally frustrating. While G8 and Develo pme nt Assistance Committee (DAC) members are stumblin g to find p r actical ways to e ns ure that ai d is being effectively used to promote sustainable development across the co ntinent, su btle changes are beginning to show wi th the inc reasi ng a nd deepening fo o tprint of China and india across the co nt inent . Their use of so ft power cou pl ed wi th genero us fin a ncial pac kages, notw ithstanding the rheto ric of Sou th- Sou th coope ra tion, has found traction amongst Afri can leaders. But wha t rea lly makes China and india a ttractive as developmen t partners fo r many African governments is the parochial view that Beiji ng and New De lhi understand Africa's developm en t needs and are not preoccup ied w ith setting high governance benchmarks that co uld undermine the del ivery of aid, prolo ng the imp lem e ntation of projects and weaken d e ve lo p m e nt. Welcomed by Afri can governments as a lternate sources of d evelopment finan ce and for the ir less cumbersome procedures, these two As ian partners have mod e lled thei r developm ent fin a nce o n a fram ework of concessionalloans and a id for reso urce security and infrastructure reconstruction . China's development assistance to Africa best illustra tes this. China's increasi ng penetratio n of the African mar ket and ro le as an alterna te develo pme nt partner has raised significant issues regard ing the impact this wi!] have for Africa. Will it see new forms of aid de pe ndency? Or does Beijing engender a more inclu sive and cooperative engagement wi th its African partners? W hat dynamics und erpin China's de ve lo pme nt assistance to Africa a nd are African governments m ore pragmatiC in their aid relations with China, drawing on the ir experie nce with tradi tional d o no rs? Fundamentally, is Chin a 's use o f develo pment assistance e ntrench ing Africa 's indebtedness, le ad ing to a new form of debt risk for Afri can governments? Fina lly is Chinese a id meeting the ex pecta tions of improving the liveli hoods of Africa's peop le? Balancing China's ro le in Africa is the increasing presence o f Ind ia in the continent. Si m ilar q uestions are bei ng aske d of Ind ia's 144 ngntea IT

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11 AFRICA'S NEW DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS development assistance. But perh aps a more s ignificant question is: who will be the better development partner for Africa? Seeming ly then, Ch ina and India a s Africa's ' new do nors' have certain ly sparked a debate amongst Western and African commentators ali ke. Much of the d ebate focuses around whether China and Ind ia d isbursc their aid differently and what implications th is has for ex isting Western donors in Africa. This is obviously moti vated by the fact that China and India are non-DAC dono rs and somehow represent a challenge to the stntus quo. Indeed China and Ind ia have become s ignificant development partners to most African countries, but their development assistance s till remains a negl igi ble proportion of that of the DAC and multilatera l donors who remain A frica's main development partne rs. Based o n the a bo\'e sct of considerations and questio ns, th is chapter will seek to interrogate how China and India conceptual ise their aid engagements in Africa. The paper w ill argue that both China and Indi a have valuable contributions to make towards Africa's develo p ment, which need to be understood in the context of the changing global aid arch itecture. While anal ysing how China and lndia are shaping these new impulses in the global politics o n aid, this will be assessed around whether it creates the s pace for Africa to take ownership of the process and redefine its relationship with traditiona l partners. Finally, the chapte r will co nclude by examining whether China and In dia can promote an alternate Sou thern pa rtne rship for aid effectiveness and how Africa ca n shape and influence this process towards aid hannoni sation. Thi s w ill also have signi fica nt ram ific ations for Chi na and Indi a's inclusion in global regimes on aid e ffectiveness and whether it is in the ir interests to do so.

Defining China and India's development assistance At the very ou tset it must be s tressed tha t by not being DAC members, it is complex and perhaps impud e nt to measure Chi na and India's aid through the lens o f the DAC definition of overseas development assistance (ODA) with its main objectives of pro moting economic development and welfare a t concessional financial terms, and loans includi ng a minimum gr,lllt e le ment of 14 5

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

25 per cent. But since no othe r structure exists by which to gau ge C hina and India's behaviour as d onors, or until such time when both fo rmalise their own e valuation fra mewo rks, China and Ind ia will be measu red against the DAC consensus, In so doing there may be certain overl aps wi th the DAC definiti on of aDA, but for purposes of clarity a nd d isti ncti on we define China and India's aid as devel opme nt assistance mainly becau se of the controversy and sensitivities that surro und this topic and in keeping with how both coun tries perceive their behav iour. Wha t mnkes China and India interesting developing partners is that bo th of the m have u nti l fair ly recently been recip ie nts of la rge aDA disbursements, In the last three to four years this s ituation has altered with a sig nificant decli ne in their inward aid fl ows as a pe rcentage of G DP, which has been off set by their co nco mitant rise as developme nt partners.! But thi s does not s uggest that aDA fl ows have dr ied up altogeth er. Instead China and India con tinue to receive limited mu ltilateral and bil ate ral aid simp ly becau se their rising global economic status, middle in come profile and trans itio n fro m aid recipie nts to aid dono rs has raised the bar aroun d whether China a nd lnd ia continu e to qualify for furth er inte rn ational d evelopment assistance. To this e nd Weste rn donors are rev iewi ng their co untry assistance programmes to both countries ( Da vies 2007, p. 33). And this is becoming mo re e xplici t in the Chinese case. Th e UK's Departmen t for International De velopment (DFID) China o ffice recently had their programmes assessed in Lo ndon to determ ine thei r success and set out what the nex t sta ge o f thei r e ngageme nt with Beiji ng shou ld be as Chin a transitions into a fully-fledged aid d onor, Si milarl y, Japan, which is currently Chi na's largest bilateral dono r, has indicnted that they will be scaling down their aid programme to Beijing by the e nd of 2008. In Ind ia the si tuati on appea rs more comp lex . New De lhi seems to have take n on a more aggreSSive e ngageme nt with its donor partners by asserting that it wnnts to exert more co ntrol over its aid fl ows. An early a nnounceme nt in 2003, and following the 2004 Asian tsun ami di saster where lndi a refused hum anitarian assistance bu t instead provided di sas ter relief to its neighbours, signalled New Delhi's inte ntio ns to be inde pe ndent nnd mannge its o w n do mestic affairs without inte rfe re nce fro m Western d onors. 146 ngntea IT

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11 AFRICA'S NEW DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS W hile there remai ns some donor activity, it would appear that the Indian governme nt chose this sym bolic gesture to demonstrate to its developme nt partners tha t it sti ll re ma ins a sovereign state that must be respected (Price 2004; Jobelius 2007). Bo th C hina and India have very similar aid strategies. It is a mixture of both mo netary and non-monetary form s of assistance. Accord ing to McCorm ick: Moneta ry aid includes g rants a nd concessionary loans. Nonmonetary aid includes debt relief, ' free' or low-cost technica l a~s i stance, access to scholarsh ips or training program mes, tariff exem ptions an d outright gifts of buildings, equipment, or other capital goods. (2008, p. 79) C learly, Beijing a nd Delh i app ly bo th types o f aid in the ir development assistance packages to Africa . Based on this it can be concluded that there are som e broad correlations with the DA C ODA defini tion, parti cu larly where the promo tion of economic development and welfare are the main o bjectives in concessional fi na ncial te rms. To thi s e nd , C hi na a nd India conc ur that their developm ent assistance to the developing world is p recisely aimed at creating co nd u cive condi tions fo r econom ic self-sustainability and soci al d e ve lopment . In Africa this seem s to be the o fficial rhe to ric fo r di sbursi ng de ve lo pme nt assistan ce . While there may be some broad overlaps with the DAC definitio n as app lied by the traditiona l d onors, the re arc so me g rey areas as well. In 2007/8 the Centre fo r Chinese Studi es based in So uth Africa co nducted an assessment of C hi na's aid policy and practice to Africa whe re it became abundantly clear that no one approach can best encapsu late C hina's aid policy o r fo r that ma tte r whether there is an official aid policy (Davies, Edinger, Tay and Naidu 2008). According to the autho rs: In o rder to interpret China's aid policy, o ne can take va rious different approaches. One approach assumes th at the Chinese government defines aid according to two different fo rmats: 'coo peration' and 'ODA'. One respondent d ifferent iated between them by suggesting that 'cooperation' refers to FDI and contracts with Chinese companies, whi le 'ODA' refers to concessionary loans, debt relief and g rants. Trade concessio ns may 14 7

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

also fall into this category. However, there were confl icting views from ot he r respondents, who identified only the transfer of funds between governments (incl ud ing the funds involved in dona tions of aid in kind), as constituting 'aid'. These conflict ing definitions offered by both Chinese government and well positioned academic sources reflect the ambiguity in Chinese fore ign aid policy circles. There is clearly no official defi nition of aid at present. (2008, p. 2) On the other hand, India's development assistance involves a cross-sectoral provision of capacity bu ildi ng, skills develo pment, credit lines a nd scholarships. W hile Delhi's aid policy e ncompasses a broader range o f aid distribu tion, it is also more limited in scope as it does not look to provide grants-in-aid (Ind ian Technical and Economic Coo perntion Division 2006), as tradi tional defi ni tions would indica te. Rather it opts for develop ment of h uman resources and education, which again results in complexities surrounding the conceptualisation of India's aid pohcy. In sum, the provision of ai d by China 2 and India appear to align more closely with their rising global sta tus, e ndowed by their histo rical experiences and undersco red by the act of benevolence. Th is is ca ptured by the emerging logic of China and India's involvement in the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) and the idea that as Beijing a nd Delhi become prospero us they will be able to give bac k to the poorer cou ntries by assisting them to develop (Snow 1988, Glosny 2006). Nevertheless, trying to pigeon hole or com partmen talise the ai d policies of each coun try in to neatly defined boxes proves difficult, particularly as Chi na and India's donor activities in Africa are often inextricably viewed together with their commercial in terests and investment projects. Therefore, to develop some synergy w ith regard to how China and Ind ia interp ret their develop ment assistance, and to make the disti nctions less complex, especially in relation to the DAC ODA definition, McCormick's paradigm of monetary and nonmonetary fo r ms of aid is p robably better suited in assessing China and India's developmen t assistance activi ties across Africa.

14 8 ngntea IT

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11 AFRICA'S NEW DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Drivers of the aid system There are a variety of internal actors w hi ch shape C hina and India's aid system. In both countries this is reinforced by political imperatives and eco nomic considerations. Th at stated, his torical co nti nuity still remains one of the core foundations that influence their roles as development partners. In the case of China this is guided by Pre mier Zhou Enlai's eight principles of devc\opmcnt assistance (see Box 1) while for India it is s upported by Prime M inister Nehru's foreign policy idea ls of creating 'justice in the global order and promoting a new economic order' (Naidu 2008, p. 117). The primary bodies in vo lved in the decision ma kin g process on China's aid system are;

• • • • • •

The State Council Ministry of Finance Ministry of Commerce Ministry of Fo reign Affairs The Expo rt and Import Bank of China The embassi es and diplomatic mi ssions Other ministries.

While the Ministry of Commerce is the overall body responsible for aid, the Sta te Cou ncil provides oversight in this process. In this respect China's aid po licy forms a mix o f market measures and social spending. The rationale behind this approach is drawn from the fact that China is s till a develop ing co untry and faces si milar challenges and experiences to other developing countries. This is evident in the way China's development model is perceived by recipient coun tries as an opportunity to learn valuable lessons in addressi ng poverty and rea li Sing national development plan s. The latter is further augmented by China's non-invasive approach that creates the impression that all reCipie nt countries are of strategiC importance to Beijing. To this e nd Ch ina's aid policy can be characterised as follows' • Underpinning a historical alignment • Fostering market traction 14 9

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

• Strengthening the 'One Chi na' policy C reating equali ty amongst all • Engenderi ng ownership and self-reliance . The market-led approach is informed by the role that the China Export-I mport ( h im ) Bank pl ays in pro \'idi ng conccssional fin a nce fo r projects to be und e rtake n in recipient countries. The nature of such loa ns is based on requ ests from recipient co untries in discussion wi th the Chinese government. These are normally aligned to what the recipient coun tries id e ntify as natio nal priorities for developme nt. The Exim Bank is becoming a signi fi cant ac tor in this regard across Africa. Its financial support can be seen in turn key public infrastructure projects incl u ding roads, brid ges, stadiums and buildings. Accord ing to Jian-Ye Wang 'by the e nd of 2005 China him Bank had approved mo re than yuan 50 billion ($6 .5 billion) for projects in Africa, which accoun ted for close to 10 per cent of the bank's total a ppro\'als at the time (2007, p. 12). By m id -2006 it was estima ted that the Exim Bank had approved approxi mately $1 2.5 billion in loa ns for infrastructure projects in sub-Sa haran Africa while by the beginning of Septembe r 2006 there were abou t 259 Exim Bank projects in 36 Africa n co untries (Elli s 2007). Ellis al so estimates th at 79 per cent o f the bank's commitments were in Africa's in frastructure sec tor (2007) . However, the Exim Bank is not the only lender in the Afri can market. The Ba nk of China has been active in Africa s ince the cons tructio n of the Tazara railway in the late 1960s a nd Chinese autho rit ies recen tl y decided to expand the focus of the China Development Bank (C OB). Previously mandated to focus on China's domestic market, the C OB has been a uthorised to admi nister the ChinaAfrica Development Fu nd and potential exists fo r the In dustrial and Commercia l Bank of C hi na (ICBC) to engage in development fin ancing fol lo wing its recent entry onto the conti nent with a $5.46 billio n stake in Sou th Africa's Standard Ban k. The provision of India 's aid involves a number of govern me nt bodies. Lndia's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the main coordinating bod y of Ind ia's development assistance, while the Ministry of Finance admin isters the Export-I m po rt (him) Ban k of India loans. The MEA also fund s the Ind ia n Tec hn ical and 150 ngntea IT

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The eight principles gov erning China's aid fl ows The Chinese govemment always bases itse lf on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilate ral alms oot as something mutual. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strict ly respects the sovereignty of the recipien t count ries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privi leges. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or lowinterest loans and extends the time limit for repayment ......nen necessary so as to lighte n the burden of the recipient count ries as far as possible. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese gov· ernment is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help t hem emba rk step by step on the road to self-re liance and independen t economic development. The Chinese government tries its best to help the recipient countries build pro jects ......nich require less investment ......tlile yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governmen ts may increase t heir income and accumulate wea lth . The Chinese government provides the best quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and mate ria l provided by the Chinese government a re not up to t he agreed specifica tions and quality, the Chinese governmen t undertakes to replace them . In providing any technical assista nce, t he Chinese government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques . The experts dispatched by China to help in const ruction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not a llowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. Source: Speech by Prem ie r Zhou Enlai, Accra, Ghana , 15 January 1964

Economic Cooperation (ITEC) p rogramme (Agrawal 2007, p. 5). The !TEe programme as wel l as the Special Commonwea lth African Assistance Programme (SCAA P) d evelops capacity through training, study tours, project assistance a nd expe rtise to a select number of African countries 3 (Price 2004, p. 12). The provision o f bilateral aid to developing countries is coordinated 151

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER?

through the Department o f Economic Affairs in the M inistry of Fi nance. However, the Ministry of Trade also plays an important ro le in the administering of trade to cou ntries as part of the country's development assistance packages (Jobelius 2007, p. 7). Ind ia's assistance to Africa p lays to the streng ths of its competitive advantage in areas su ch as in fr astr ucture, p harmaceutica ls, health, infor mation technology (IT) and automotive industries (Price 2004, p . 10). However lines of credit are also utilised to fi nance projects involving Indian companies. The Techno-E conom ic App roach for A frica-I ndia Movement (Team-9) initi a tive 4 is an example of s uch a process where the Exi m Bank provided a $500 million line of credi t to several countries in West Africa. Furthermore, India sa id t hat it would provide d ebt relief to heavily indebted poor countr ies (HI PC') in 2003, w hile s uch ac tions were recorded with Moza m biq ue receivi ng a R90 million debt cancellation, Tanzania R174 m illion, Uganda R140 mi llion, Zambia R100 million and Ghana R50 million (Price 2004, p . 11 ). The la rgest recipients of aid, including credit lines a nd im'estment, are resource-rich co un tries. As Jobelius exp lains, 'Sudan, the reCipient of one of the largest volumes of Indian ODAoutside Sou th ASia, is also the most significant target country for Ind ian foreign di rect investment in Afr ica' (2007, p . 5). Aid to regional orga nisations complements Ihis bilatera l process, as India has p ledged $200 million to initiatives under the New Partnership fo r A fr ica's Develo p ment (N EPA D). A technica l coopera tion agreemen t set up between Ind ia a nd N EPA D has been initiated for financ ial services a nd traini ng, w hile six proposals totalling $122.77 mill ion to a number of African states has been approved within NE PAD (Tlte Hilldll 2007).

Institutionalising the development assistance framework The competing narra tive and focus a round whether C hina and India are new or re-emerging donors in Africa is a recen t phenomenon . In the case o f China, such publici ty soared fo llowi ng the 2006 Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing, whereas fo r India its involvement became evident after the ina ugura l Indi a- Africa Partnership summ it hosted in New 152 ngntea IT

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11 AFRICA'S NEW DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS Delhi in April 2008. It must be stressed, however, that both China and IndiJ have a long historical record of disbursing assistance to African countries. Much of this was ad hoc and in respo nse to China and India's increasing engagemen ts with newly independent African states and support for liberation movemen ts following colonial ru le and the Cold War polemiC. Compared w ith India, China's development assistance ha s had a much broad er profile, with the Tazara railway being its flagship project. While Beiji ng used suc h pol iti cal kudos to reward African countries for recognising the 'One China' policy and to offset Soviet in fl uence in the continent, In dia launched its ITEC programme to increase its leverage in the global South, fo llowing its bo rder di spute with China in 1962. The programme was geared particula rl y towards ex panding relations with African governments and liberation mo vements (Naidu 2008, pp. 116- 7). Nevertheless, both China a nd lnd ia engaged in a variety of projects across the co ntinent tha t saw Chinese medical teams, teachers, Indian techniCians, rice and agricultural projects and other technical assistance being d isbursed to Afri can countries. It ca n be surmised that hi sto ri cally the development assistance programmes of China a nd India were ideologically aligned to Mao's Thi rd World solidarity a nd independence and the ' theory of the intermediate zone' on the one hand, and Gandhi's ide alism and Nehru's non-ali gnment on the other. No twithstand ing this link to the past, China and India's cu rrent development assistance to Africa has taken on a new dimens io n that is concom itant with their spectacular eco nomic g rowth and domestic demands. Driven by the twin objectives o f resource security a nd domestic developmen t, Beijing and N ew Delhi have injected a mo re p ragmatic ou treach in their d evelo pme nt assistance packages to Africa. Thi s is found in the way that both have refocused their eng
AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? they structure their developmen t assistance pac kages under the FOCAC process in the case of China and through the newlyformed India- Africa Partnersh ip Program me. Both p rogrammes have been developed to embed and institu tionalise their respective ro les as aid givers to Africa. In fusing both mo netary and non-monetary forms of development assistance, this real ignmen t in their respective aid packages p rovides a mix of concessional finance together wi th tec hnical assistance, debt relief, training programmes, tariff redu ctions, gi ft s, and interest-free loans. This was ca ptured in the 2006 FOCAC commitments a nd the 2008 India- Africa summit pledges (see Boxes 2 and 3). This new trajectory has led to an increase in economic activity by Chi nese and Indian companies across the contine nt, and thi s is someth ing th at Ch inese and In dian officia ls a re not shy of admitting. Consider the following admissions : TIuough aid projects, China has received more business opportunities in African count ries. The ai d projects proVided by the Chinese have provided Chin ese compan ies opportunities to become involved in contractual construction and trade projects. (Lu 130, Ministry of Comme rce officia l, q uoted in Beck 2(07) The Sum mit w ill showcase the brand image of an economica ll y resurgent India in Africa. (An Indian official quoted in Africa Asia Confidelltial 2008)

Chinese a nd Ind ian trade with the co ntinent has increased subs tantially in the last severa l years, though Beiling eclipses Delhi. Bil atera l trade between China and A frica has grown fro m $6.5 billion in 1999 to $73 billion in 2007. In di a's trade wit h the co ntinent has been muc h less dynamic. In ]991 bilateral trade stood at $967 million. This rose to $25 bill ion for the period 2006- 7 and just over $30 bill ion fo r 2007-8. With Bei jing aiming to increase its trade with Africa to $100 bill ion by 2010, Ind ia is a lso gearing up to dou b le its trade with the conti ne nt. Based on these projec tio ns, Chi na and India's developmen t assista nce is clearly taking on a more commercial focus, which is increasingly being directed by loans, co ncession al fi na nce and ex po rt credits and less by grant assistance. This has already been noted through the number of li nes of 154

11 AFR ICA'S NEW DEVELOPME NT PARTN ERS

Commitments from the 2006 FOCAC summit in Beijing Double China's 2006 aid commitments to the continent by 2009. Provide $] billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in preferential buyer's credits over t he next three years. Set-up a China -Africa development fund that wi ll reach $5 biltion, which would encourage and support Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Cancel debt arising from all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic ties with China. Further open up the Chinese market to African products by increasing from 190 to 440 the number of export items to China receivin g zero-tariff t reatment from the least developed countries in Africa that have relations with China . Build a conference cent re fo r the African Union to support African countries in their efforts to strengthe n themse lves t hrough unity and to support the process of African integration . Train 15,000 African professionals . Send 100 senior agricultural experts to the continent . Set up ten specific agricu ltural technology demonstration centres in Africa. Build ]0 hospitals. Provide a ]00 million yuan grant for artemisinin* and fo r the const ruc tion of ]0 ma laria prevention and treatment cent res to figh t malaria in Africa. Dispatch ]00 youth volunteers to the continent. Build 100 schools across the continent. Increase t he number of Chinese government scho larships to African studen ts from the current 2,000 to 4,000 annua lly. • Dru g used for the treatm ent of mala ria.

cred it that each have exte nded to the contine nt. As of March 2006, ind ia's total active lines of credit were valued at $1 ,739 billion. Of this $552 million was d irected to the sub-Saharan African region, which constituted 32 pe r cent, fo llowed by North Africa to the va lue of $442 million o r 25 pe r ce nt o f Delhi's global sha re (see

15 5

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

Pledges from 2008 India-Africa summit Provide over $500 million in development grants to Africa over the next five to six years as part of the Aid to Africa budget of the Ministry of Extemal Affairs. Double India's line of credit from $2 billion in the last five years to $5.4 billion. Allow duty-free imports and preferentia l market access for primary and finished products , including cotton, cocoa , aluminium ore, copper ore, cashew nuts, cane sugar, clothing, fish fillets and gem diamonds from 50 least developed count ries including 34 in Africa. Double t rade from its current level of $25 billion to $50 billion by 20 11. Promote the development of small and medium-sca le enterprises towards effecting industrialisation in African count ries. Share experiences and capacity bui lding on policy and regulatory fra meworks in the financial sector including the microfinance sector. Support Africa's regional integration programme through the provision of financial support on mutually·agreed integration projects carried out by the African Union and the regional communities . Enhance ICT, science and technology, research and development, and trade through technical assistance and capacity-building programmes. Establish an India-Africa peace corps aimed at develo pment, especially in the area of public health. Increase educational scholarships and technica l training programmes for African students.

Figure 11 .1 ). Indi a had 52 opcratio nailines of credi t totalling US$2 bill ion in mo re than 30 Afr ica n countries in March 2008 (Eximius: Export Advanta ge 2008). The case of China is harde r to q uantify beca use of the paucity of data, which is made mo re diffi cu lt since the Chinese governmen t rarely releases figures . Nevertheless, Sroadman notes that, as of 2005, the Chinese Exim Bank had provided concessionai loans to the va lue o f $800 million in projects to Africa (2007, p. 274). Brautigam goes furth er to highlig ht that ' in 2007, China Exim Bank announced that it had authorised yu an 92.5 billion ($1 2.3 billion) 156 ngntea IT

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Figure 11.1: India 's active li nes of credit as of March 2006 (US$ m )

. . 218

•

•

Sub-Saharan Africa

•

North Africa

•

We5 t Asia

•

Asia South East Asia, Far East and Pacific

o D

Latin America and Carribean

D

Europe and CIS

442 Source: ExporHmport Bank of India Annual Report 2005- 6

in export credits and other loans to Africa between 1995 and 2006, for more than 259 projects (not all of this has been disbursed), a nd 'plan to increase this sharply, lending an average of just over $6 billion a yea.r over the next three years' (2008, p. 21).

What does this mean for Africa? So far this chap ter ha.s provided a broad interpretation of how China and India disburse their development assistance to Afri ca. Suffice it to say that this is by no means a conclusive analysis and merely alludes to salient issues in the existing literature, espeCially in respect of China. Whi le other analyses have largely focused on disaggregating China and, to a lesser degree, India's aid model, what preoccupies these authors is how China and India are shaping Africa's contemporary aid architecture. The answer(s) to this question and corresponding issues are found in two competing arguments. The first argument is more conventional and aligns closely to the view that China and Ind ia's development assistance is part of the broader 21"' century scramble for Africa's resources. It would be remiss to ignore that resource diplomacy, indeed, underpins their development assistance. And like previous 'scramblers', China and India have come to ply their leverage based on the s trategy of weaving and tying their development assistance to large scale infrastructural projects that are linked to rehabilitation 15 7

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

of roads and railways, the constructio n of new transport corridors and hydropower belts, all of which arc connected to ports. Most co mmentato rs would point to the 2004 Angolan oil -backed loan as a case in point, or more recently the $9 billion in frastructure for minerals loan to the Democrati c Republic o f Congo (ORe). A new World Bank study assessing China's infrastructure investments in Africa estimates that Beiji ng's funding for roads, railways and power projects peaked a t $7 billion in 2006 from just $1 bill ion in 2001-3 per year and $1.5 billion per year in 2004-5 but the n fell to $4.5 billion fo r 2007 (Foster, Butterfield, Chen and Pushak 2008, p. vii). The bu lk of the funding has been in the power (mai nly hydropower) and transport (main ly roads) sectors. The report also highlighted that 'China was not the only e mergi ng eco nomy financing infrastructure projects in Africa. In dia's Exim Bank and Arab d evelopment funds are doing the same although China is by far the largest' investor (EIIgi ,uerillg News 2008). China's investment in Africa's infrastructure has been oppo rtune, especially at a time when traditional donors have refocused their aid programmes towa rds soft issues like funding HNIAIDS prevention programmes and suppo rting p rojects that find resonance with the Millennium Development Coals (M DGs). With Africa requiring about $17- 22 billion over the next ten years to finance its in frastructure needs, China and India are definitely filling a void, which leads to the second argument. Whereas some officials in the Western donor circle see this as an importan t sou rce of new funds in ass isting Africa's development framework and as an alternative to the OECD consens us (Beck 2007), the prevailing view is that lndia, but more specifica lly China, undermines importan t governance and democratic reform initiatives by providing 'no-strings-attached' development assistance. That said, the issue of conditio nality remains the s ubject of controversy in Africa's aid landscape. The fact that each views developmen t assis tance as part of South- South cooperation enables them to esc hew 'conditionalities that could be interp reted as interference in the rec ipient's internal affairs' (McCormick 2008, p. 85). Yet such an approach masks more of the political and econo mic gains to be made, which mirrors the tied aid that both undeniably enjOin in their development assistance packages to African recipients. The fact that the 158 ngntea IT

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li nes of credit give preferen tial t rea tment to Chinese and Indian companies in the tendering process for projec ts in recipient countries and that export credits are generally linked to the purchase of Ch inese and Ind ian equipment, demonstrates that more su btle forms of conditionalities inform their aid disbursements. In the case of China, adherence to the 'One China' policy is non-negotiable as a policy req uirement to receiving develop ment assistance. For Africa this can have severa l implications. At a cursory level, Ch ina and India's develo pment assistance could be interpreted as embedding Africa's existing aid co nundrum: aid for development or aid for trade. Clearly, with China and India fa vouring a more market-centred app roach to the ir development assistance, this has created new trade and investmen t opportu nities for their co rporate and capital goods to penet rate African economics. Wh ile Beijing and China would argue that such d evelop ment is critical to Africa's needs, it is equally impo rtant to recognise that Africa remains at the margins o f the global economy as primary ex porters of raw materia ls and resou rces. The q uestion tha t remains is w het he r C hina and India's development assistance provides the necessary capital for Afri can governments to transform their economies into secondary and tertiary spheres of production. Ob\'iously the technical train ing assistance, scholarshi p programmes, Resea rch and Development centres, socia l welfare projects like schoo ls and hospitals, as well as the provision of healthcare captured under the FOCAC comm itme nts and noted in the India- Africa s ummi t, bodes well for upping the ante on Africa's development needs. Th is is particul arly relevant as the GS commitment of doubling aid to $25 billion seems to be failing and the Ma ke Pover ty His tory campaign appears to have reached a fork in the road. But the significant question to be considered is: What wi ll hap pe n when the resources a re depleted? To this e nd the onus rests with African governme nts to ensure that China and india's development assistance is not a repeat performance of its e ngagement with traditional Western donors Already the Chinese and In d ians are clai m ing that their development assistance is about promoti ng self-sufficiency and creating the necessary conditions conducive to achieving sustainable development and industria lisa tion . Consider India's e-- Pan Network for telemedicine and tele-education that w ill connect 15 9

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONI5ER? schools and hospi tals in Africa with India w he re va luable knowledge exchanges and important learning can take place. A pilot o f this p rogramme has alread y been set up in Ethio pia. Or fo r th at ma tter Ind ia's $1 million contribution to the Africa n Capacity Building Foundation and its p led ge recently that it wou ld like to e ngage in more p roduc tio n at source especia l1y in the d iamondcu tting industry in Africa. Such actions are noble but the critical issue is whether Afri can governme nts are ensuring that su ch commitme nts are d elivered upon, or more importan tly tha t the measures being announced are relevant to their needs. The $5 bil lion Chin a- Africa De velopme nt Fund (CA DF) is such a n example. Launched by the Chinese go ve rnme nt and admi nistered by the China Developme nt Bank, the Fund provides lines of cred it to C hinese compan ies to furthe r t heir 'go global' strategy. The 3-5 Special Eco nom ic Zones (SEZ) th a t were announced at the 2006 FOCAC su mmit provi de a platform for C hinese companies to take advantage of the fund and inve st in Africa. While the CA DF is primarily aimed at sup porting Chinese public and private firms to in vest in Africa, Africa n govern m ents attending the 2006 FOCAC s ummit did little to encou rage more [oint ve ntures with nascen t Afri can firms to encourage their d evelopment and global profile. Second is the vexing issue of debt su stainabihty and vulnerability thro ugh new concessiona l loa ns and lines of credit from China a nd lndia. Whi le this is not see n, at least by African political a nd eco nomi c elites, as a new model of risk, Africa's traditional d e velopme nt pa rtners and civil society have cautio ned against th is type of partnershi p. [t s hould be stressed tha t in as much as both China 5 a nd lnd ia have also remitted Afri can debt based on a model similar to that of O EC D cou ntries, targeting low income and least developed co untri es, t his must be viewed in relation to the new loa ns and concessio na! fina nce that is bei ng given to African co untries. The critical co nside ratio n is whether such d ebt ca ncella tio n is being offset by the new loans and co ncessiona! finance being given to African governme nts and, if so, w ha t happe ns w he n the resources a re de ple ted and the re a re no other forms of guarantees to underwrite the lo w interest ra tes that accompany su ch fi nan ce packages? The Jubilee Campaign in Z ambia is concerned about the nature of loa ns the Zambian governmen t is incu rri ng in respect of its co p per d eposits. For Weste rn 16 0 ngntea IT

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donors the red flag is more abou t China and to a lesser degree India 'free-riding' on the debt relief granted through bila teral (Paris Club) and multila tera l initia tives (n amely the Multi late ral Debt Relief and HlPC Initiatives). Third, as much as China and India have increased market access for African products, these must be jud ged in terms of their va lu e-added con tent. At p resent there is little information outlini ng what type of products wou ld be exported to the Chinese and Indian markets, how they might be affected by complicated domestic tariff regi mes (and other competitors) and whether s uch products could be a ca talyst for Africa's p roductive secto rs. Moreover with more opportunities opening up in African markets for Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs, this could indeed lead to a s ituation where it is these investors that would enjoy the benefits of such market access, thereby squeezi ng ou t the locals. Finally, the governance issue is signi fi cant. While China and india purport to respec t the integrity of sovereign states, this remains a conten tious issue es pecially w he n it means that regimes with little respect for human dignity and the ri ghts o f its citize ns are supported. It should be pointed ou t that self-sufficie ncy could only be achieved through a socia l contract between governmen ts and their people. The lack or absence of such a policy focus jettisons any prospects for development that is people-centred. Therefore, if China and Ind ia's techn ical assistance and training programmes are to have a mea ningful impact in creating economic self sustainabili ty, then the professionals that attend s uch program mes mu st be able to harness their skill s for the benefit of African societies a nd not become elites who perpetuate the cycle of the renlier state in Africa. Thi s is the responsibi lity o f both recipient governments and development partners.

Conclusion: towards an effective aid partnership? At the beginn ing of this chapter we asked a set of questions around what new impu lses China and India bring to Africa's aid landscape and how this sho uld be interpreted vis-a-vis the traditional development partners on the one hand and between Beijing and Delhi on the other hand. So far we h ave shown in this chapter 161

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that the nuances surrounding China and lndia's developmen t assistance does not necessarily exh ibit a new form of behaviour. What it does represent, however, is that new ac tors ha ve en tered Africa's aid a rchitecture, whose behaviour mimics that o f traditional donors in applying similar me thods o f p ri vileging their corporates when it comes to projects, tying expo rt credits to the li se of services and good s fro m d onor countries and bringing in large teams of consu ltan ts to advise on p rogrammes. Thus the s tatus quo has not changed. Instead what China and Ind ia's foot print as de \'clo pmen t partners has done is increase the leverage of African governments visa-vis their traditional donors. No longer are African govern men ts compelled to be junior partners in the relations hi p. But a t the same time it has not led to the realisation by African governments that they do not have to be muted partne rs with C hina and India. This is where African leaders need to find the right mix in their response to all of their development partners. There is no room for double standard s and differentiating modes of dip lomacy toward s existing and e me rging do nors . All develo pme nt partners must be held accountable to the same standards a nd rules. As much as China and India may be seen as alternate development partners for African governments and providing a muchneeded boost to their infrastru ctural need s, Africa need s to see its ro le in this rela tionship as less of a recipient and more of a s trategiC partner that has something tha t China a nd lndia want. As long as economic impcratives underwrite their aid policy to Africa, Africa cannot sit back a nd expect the aid to flow for the next twenty years. While China and India's demand for raw materials has pushed Africa into the globa l super-commodity price cycle, this is short te rm and not sustainable. As before, Africa runs the risk of falli ng into a simil a r web of relyi ng on ex po rt marke ts for revenue which ca n a t any ti me lead to a fall in the p rice o f raw ma terials and an increase in the price of impo rted goods, which will undoubtedly comprom ise social s pendi ng on povcrty and p ro-poor programmes. Therefore Africa needs to take ownership and management of the aid flow s it receives. The starting point sho uld be at a country level with the Joint Assistance Strategy group. At present Chi na and Ind ia are no t members ofthis group as they are not part of the 162 ngntea IT

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DAC consensus. But as Western donors seek more alignment with Ch ina, Ind ia and other emerging powers towards aid harmonisatio n, African govern ments, regiona l blocs and co ntinental institu tions like the African Union and NEPAD need to utilise these s trategic spaces so that they do not propagate the aid trap and instead foc us on promoti ng continental development projects. H av ing said this, the Paris Declara tion on Aid Effec tiveness offers the op portunity to do so. Th is is significant as C hina and Indi a are being courted by traditiona l donors to increase their voice in the implementation of a global regime on aid effectiveness. To th is e nd African govern ments can in sist that Chi na and India pu t their money where their mouth is as both of them are signato ries to the Paris Declaration and have experience as aid recipien ts. While China and India have sct in motion a new co m petition with existi ng donors scurrying to retain their t rad ition al spheres of influence and upping their own aid packages to Africa,6 continental regimes cannot become complacent and think that Beijing and Delhi will not continue to behave like sovereign states with nationa l interests. Thus if Africa, C hina and India wa nt to demonstrate that they have an effecbve development assistance relationship, Africa needs to d evelop its own set o f aid conditions promo ting a strategic Sou thern partnership. To do this Africa mu st recognise that its leverage ca n also be used against Chi na and lndia, first by being mo re open about China and In dia's development assistance transactions by making such info rmation more freely available. There is an e merging space where th is co uld become releva nt, as India see ms to be more open about its cred it lines and preferential buyers and export credi ts. Second, China must be held accountable to Premier Zhou Enlai's eight principles that sti ll underline Beijing's outward development assistance. And third, civi l socie ty networks mu st be enab led to ac t as shadow peer rev iew agen ts so that a broader monitoring policy environment can be developed. With this said, African governments and civil society acto rs need to recogni se that, despite a pe rceived focu s on South- South cooperation between Africa, China and Ind ia, the African continent's interests may no t always be rep resented by China and Indi a within mu ltila teral institutions, al though they may argue that s uch agencies can only be reformed from within. Th is is because 163

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? the So u th is a diffu se bloc of co mpeting inte res ts. This w ill m ean li ttle if Africa and its civil society groups d o no t take the lead in p ro mo ting Africa 's own inte rests. Pe rhaps the fi rst ste p toward s this is to disting uish th at Chi na a nd lndia a re becoming competitive powers in Africa a nd that ea ch will wan t to project their o wn inte res ts in diffe re nt ways . Such co nsideratio ns arc impo rtant as 'The All-Weather Frie nd' and 'Th e Resurgent El ephan t' re conci le the ir glo ba l p rofile s with an increasing need to become respon sib le internatio nal stake holders.

Notes I. Betwee n 1990 and 2003, China's a id as a percentage of GO P d eclined from 0.6 per cent to 0.1 per cent. During th e sam e period India's aid d ecre
Bib li ography Africa-Asia Confidenhal (2008) 'Delhi reach es o ut', vol. 1. no. 4 Agrawal. S. (2007) "Emcrging d onors in interna tional dcvelopmcnt assistancc: th e India casc", C m"dn, IORC B(."c k, L. (2007) 'Chinn factors chan ges rul cs of A fri cJ ni d gamc ', MIIII /llid Gllardil!ll, May 18 Bombay Chartered Acco llnl.~ Society Newslett a (2006) htlp://www. bcaso nline. org/webad min /Conte ntType/a tlached fil es/NIJul y06. pdf, accessed 10 Jul y 2008 Brau ti gam, O. (2008) 'China's African a id: transatlanli<: challenges', German Marsha ll fu nd (G MI' ) of Ihe Uni ted States, Washing ton IX, GMf (www. gmfu s.org) Broadm an, H. (2007) Afri ca's Silk Road . Chiltll a"d ["dia's New Economic Fmlttier, Washington OC, World Ba nk Davies, M, Edinger, H, Tay, N . and Naidu, S. (2008) How Cilina Delivers De.:elopmem Assis tan ce to Africa, Stellcnbosch, Centre for Chinese Studies Davies, P. (2007) China and the End of Poverty in Africa - Towards Mutual Bcnefit?" Swedcn. Diakonia

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11 AFRI CA 'S NEW DEVELOPMEN T PARTNERS Domain-B (2005) 'Ex-1m Bank extend s $30-million LoC to Bur kina Paso', 15 (k tober, h ttp:f/www.d omainb.com/fi na ncelban ks/Ex-Im_ban k/20051 015_ extends.html, accessed 10 July 2008 Ellis, J.L. (2007) 'China Exim Bank in Africa', China fnvironmCllt Forum, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars Engint>ering NCd 10 July 2008 Hhldu, The (200S) 'Ex·lm Bank ex ten d s SISm LoC to Equatori
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AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? Ind ian t~ hn i cal and economic cooperation (ITEC)', New Delhi Ministry of External Affairs, http://i t~ .ni c. in /about.htm, accessed 12 Jul y 2008 InfoDri ve India (n.d. ) http://www.infod rivcindia.com!Nolifi cations/EximBank-s-Line-of-17475.aspx, accessed 8 July 2008 Jobeli us, M. (2007) ' New powers for global cha nge? Challenges for the international d evelopment cooperation: The case of India', FES Briefing PQPcr, no. 5. M;;mning, R. (2006) ·Will '·emerging donors" change the face of interna tional cooperation?', Development Po/icy Review, vol. 24, no . 4, pp. 371-85 McCormick, D. (2008) 'China and India as Africa's new donors: The impact of aid on development' , Review of AJricall Political Ecmwmy, vol. 35, no. 1, pp.73-92 Naid u, S (2008): ' India 's grow ing A fric~n strategy', ReVlcw of African PolitiCQ/ Economy, vol. 35, no. 115, pp. 116- 28 Nigeria n Exim Ba nk (n.d.) hltp:llwww.nexi mba nk.com.nglNEXIM%20 Bank%20and %20Exim%20Bank%20India%20Sign%20Line%20of%20 Cred it.htm, accessed 10 July 2008 OECD (n.d.) http://www.occd .org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,0 O.htm!, accessed 10 Jul y 2008 Price, G . (2004) ' India's aid d ynam ics: From rcripien t to d onor?', As!a Prograrmne Working Papel; Chatham House R<::serve Bank of India, http: //www.rbi.org.in/ home.aspx,accessed 10 July 2008 Singh, M. (2007) Ad dress to the joi nt session of the Nigerian Na tional Assembl y, 14 November Snow, P. (1988) Tile Slart Raft· China's EnCOlln/er with Africa, London, Weidenfe1d and Nicholson 50mah/and Times, Tile (2007) ' India gives $20 mn funding for Djibou ti cement plant', 26 April, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sI/2007/275/4.shtm!. accessed 8 J lIly 2008 W~n& J.E (2007) 'What drives China's growi ng role in Africa?', lMF Working Paper WP/07/211, August Washington IX, IMF

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Internal displacement, humanitarianism and the state: the politics of resettlement in Kenya post-2007 Lyn Ossom e

Introduction Internal d isp lacement has been part of all the key political moments in Ke nya: the onset of multiparty politics in 1992; the ca mpaign for multiparty de mocracy that reached its heigh t in 2002; the constitution a l referendllm in 2005; a nd agai n followi n g the 2007 gene ral electio ns. Recent esti m ates set the internall ydisplaced popu lation in Kenya a t between 800,000 (official) a nd 1.5 million (uno fficial) (see Inte rnal Displacement Monito ring Centre 2007). Previo u s effo rts by governme n t to resett le internally displaced persons (lDPs) have not succeeded. In 1993, for instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), jOintly w ith the government of Kenya, created a reconciliation and reintegratio n programme for those d isp laced fro m 'ethnic' cl ashes.! The stated oblective of the proposed $20 million Programme for Displaced Persons was ' the reintegration of d isplaced populations into local communities, preven tion of re newed te nsio ns and p romotion of the p rocess of reconciliation' (Human Rights Wa tch 1997, pp. 5-1 2). The programme, which forma lly ended in November 1995, drew criticism a t many levels. Ultimate ly, the manne r in which it w as ad ministere d resu lted in the greatest a ttention bei ng placed on the least politica lly co ntroversia l part of the programme - the relief part - whi le the pro tection, human rights and long-term needs of displaced 167

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

persons, w hich would have required UNDP to adopt a more critical advocacy rolc in relation to thc Ke nyan governme nt, werc neglected (Human Ri ghts Watch 1997, p. 11 ). U NDP co ntinually d efl ected in te rnational and loca l criticism of the gove rnment's human rights record toward s the di spl aced people, inevitably creatin g suspicion, mis tru st and a ntagonism betwcen the state, humanitarian and civ il soci ety gro up s like no n-gove rnme ntal o rga nisations, faith -based organisations and p rofession al ne tworks, w hi ch docume nted and di sseminated the gross human rights viola tio ns occurring at the timc. This pape r will focus o n the atte mpt by the go ve rnme nt to address inte rnal disp laceme nt und e r the Operation Rud i Nyumba ni (ORN ) programme, meant to resettle persons displaced by the 2007 post-election violence. One of the most curre nt studies of this programme, by the Ke nya Huma n Ri ghts Comm ission,l d etails its im p le m e nta tion a nd argues that ORN has sim ilarly failed to meet the huma n ri ghts a nd humanitarian s tandard s stipulated in both the UN G uidin g Principles on lOPs and the TOP Protocols of the Inte rnational Confe re nce on the Grea t Lakes Region (lC/GLR).J The re port ind icts the go ve rnmen t for fail in g to safegua rd the human rights and security of lO Ps a nd discusses in de tail the human itarian inte rvention in collabo ration wi th the state. The gove rnme nt is ree ling from acc usatio ns of th is failure, a nd is respo nd ing defe nSively thro ugh coun ter-accusatio ns o f subve rsio n of the resettle men t activities by ci vil SOCiety; in particul ar by human rights gro ups. The te nsions he re recall conte mporary de bates among sc holars a nd pra ctitione rs a round issues of inte rn al displ aceme nt: w hile some have su ggested that humanitarian assista nce, ofte n carried out in the context of compl ex e me rgencies a nd fra gile livelihood s, has littl e chance of achi eving recovery and eventual developme nt (Ma nzou l 2008, p. 1), o the rs have focused o n the role of inte rnational aid a nd humani tari a n organisatio ns vis-Ii-vis the state durin g post-co nflict recons tructio n. Othe rs still have argued that prioriti es are set accord ing to focus areas a nd fi elds of spec iali sation of organisations that e merge d ue to harsh competition fo r d onor funds rathe r than in respo nse to the needs of the co nflictaffected po pulation. Collabo ration be tween state and donor agencies is also called into quest ion, as 'insti tutions o ri gina lly set up 168 ngntea IT

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by the aid agencies tend to support the approaches to repa triation and reintegratio n of ID Ps and refugees favoured by the donors, since it has been info rmed from the outset by the ways <md procedures applied by humanitarian and development organisations' (Grawert 2007). In the argument o f this paper, ORN presents itself as o ne s uch 'insti tution'. This paper th us proble mati ses the notion of 'state accoun tability' in rela tion to the international co mmunity, arguing that complex interests and relationships between the state and the humanitarian/ aid regime detract the state from acting in the interests of the margina lised, socially excl uded and disempowered members of society, by limiting its policy optio ns and choices. It seeks to investigate the emerging dilemmas und erlying the resettlement of displaced persons in Kenya, with particular emphasis o n the Operation Rudi Nyumba ni programme. The paper pays brief attention to civ il society to the extent that its ro le can be defined as a 'society in its relation with the s tate - in so far as it is in confronta tion with the s tate, or more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to breach and coun teract the si multaneo us totalisation unleashed by the state' (Bayart 1995, quoted in Owuoche and Jonyo 2002, pp. 71- 2). This confrontation with the s tate is analysed w ithin the paradigm of citizen rights and s tate obl igations, rai si ng questio ns suc h as which resources do citize ns s truggle over; what are the potential d angers of internal d isp lacement and how does the state respo nd to these? Finally, the paper probes the 'cost' of humanitari,m intervention fo llowing the postelect io n crisis of December 2007. This paper thus analyses the str ucture of humanitarian response to the post-election crisis. Informatio n is d rawn from primary sources includ ing inte rviews wi th re presentatives o f inte rnational aid and humanita ria n agenci es, civil society o rga nisatio ns as well as government o fficia ls and lDPs . in ternet self-representations of the organisa tions involved and secondary sources complement the materia l fo r a nalysis. A historical pe rspective has been app lied to investigate the interac tion between CSOs, human itari a n aid agencies and the Kenyan government, and on this baSiS, the dynamiCS of the resettlement exercise and the relations between the sta te, humanitarian o rganisations and civil society is provided and critically d iscussed. 169

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Contextualising internal displacement in Kenya Ale x de Waa l (1997) has asserted tha t the p rocesses of the 'huma nitarian in te rnational'4 are nega ti ve becau se they hind er the developme nt of the stro ng bond s between state and society necessary for the developme nt of democra tic good governan ce . He argues tha t an e xploration of the p rin ciples that d rive actually ex isting human itarianism re veals that its power is e xe rcised and its resources di spe nsed at the cost of weake ning the fo rm s o f political acco untability that, in juxtaposi ti o n of our a rgu me nt, und e rli e the preve ntio n of internal d ispl acement. 5 He fur the r a rgues that fam ine a nd othe r di saste rs do not occur in libe ral de mocratic socie ties becau se the e xplicit po litical contra ct ex istin g in all such socie ties ac tu ally wo rks to make governme nts responsible to their ci ti zens: famine w il l not occur beca use if i t does, the go ve rnme nt will lose powe r. By extensio n, other crises will no t occur beca use governme nts are legi timate : by their nature the rules of the contract are co nsensua l, so most peop le agree to be bound by them . instabil ity e nsues when a co ntract is in the process of a rticulation. O utsid e inte rvention inte rferes wi th this process instead o f haste ning or s tre ngthe ning it, a principle that can be applied in Ke nya to the Kofi Annan-led media tion res ultin g from the fai lure to hand le the resul ts o f the 2007 elections.6 Following th is a rgu ment, a nd in order to understa nd the dime nsions of humanita rianism in Ken ya, it is cru cial to trace the c haracte r of pa st confli ct-induced d isplaceme nt in the co untry, a nd to assess the nature of inte rventio ns at each o f these moments. ' Ethnic' clashes in Ke nya e rupted for the first time in O ctobe r 1991 in Na ndi Di strict on the bo rd e r of the Rift Val ley, Nyan za a nd Weste rn Provinces. At their peak, the clashes affected three out of eight p rovinces and nearly 20 o ut of Ke nya's 62 districts.? By Nove mbe r 1993, owr 1,500 peo ple had been killed and mo re than 300,000 d is pla ced (Human Ri ght s Watch 1993, p. 71 ). In 1992, prior to the first mu lti pa rty gene ral elections, clashes aga in dis torted the preva iling vote r dis tributio n patte rn across regions a nd, in the process, di se nfra nchised tho usand s of voters, mostly oppos iti on su p porte rs, due to large-scale internal d isp laceme nt. The inte rn al d isp laceme nt in 1992 became characte rised as largely symbolic of the de mocra tic stru ggle ra the r tha n a hu mani170 ngntea IT

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12 T HE POLIT ICS OF RESETTLEMENT IN KEN YA

ta ria n ca tastrophe - the weight of pluralism dimini shed the equally p rofound huma nitarian s ignificance of this mome nt. Civil society, as well as s tate reactio n to inte rn al di splace me nt the n was refl ective o f t he 'othering' of inte rnal ly d isplaced pe rsons: as a too l for po litical expedie nce, the ex is tence of ID Ps in 1992 actu ally s tre ngthened the incumbe nt's clai m to power, as the governme nt pe rsiste ntly de nied any compl icity in the clashes . The government skilfu!1 y li nked the opposi tion wit h mercena ry tac tics! and reduced civil socie ty activism to ' po litical medd ling', wit h President Moi allegi ng thilt me mbers of the opposition, journalists, ch urch lead e rs a nd ' ce rtain fo reign e mbassies' were stirrin g up tri bal ha tred . Anot her governme nt tactic was to restrict the flow of informa tion throu gh press ha rassment. Access to a reas, eve n those not in security o pe ra tion zo nes, was period ica lly d e nied to those atte mpti ng to assist the d is pl aced , or to journal ists reporti ng on the situation, at the w him of local go ve rnmen t offi cials (H uman Rights Watch 1997, p . 60). With the opposition thu s demob ilised, their de mand s for huma nitarian inte rvention o n be half of the di spla ced thousand s re m ained la rgely ineffect ive . Indeed, with a!1 the si deshows at the time, med ia, civil society and othe r pro-de mocracy groups pa id little a tte ntion to the in te rnally dis placed, and even less to the h umanitari a n impe rative durin g th is pe riod . Ul timately, the parti san political struggles und e rmined efforts to effectively add ress the hu man itarian crisis. The struggle fo r co nstitu tional reform, spearheaded by NGOs, faith-based organisations, professional associa tions and political pa rti es, gained mo me ntum in the pe riod leadin g up to t he second multipa rty elections in 1997, w hen na tion-wide violence again erupted. The context of the v iole nce was com plex, a nd reasons d iverse. 9 Again, tho ugh Sig nifi can t, the humani taria n cris is ca used by the massive inte rnal dis placeme nt and severely d isrupted livelihood s bare ly attracted any coo rdi na ted hu man ita ria n action to add ress in ternal displacement and liveli hood needs of the affected po pulations. As b efo re, the ' larger ' constitutional qu estion overshadowed th e huma nitarian im pera tive and need for lo ng-te rm resolutio n of the d isp lacemen t proble m. Arisin g from the Mt Elgon clashes iO a t the e nd of Octobe r 2008, the re we re over 72,000 d ispl aced pe rsons from the Che ptais, C he byu k, Tuikut, Ki mabole, Ko p si ro, Ka ptam a and Kapsa kwony 171

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? div isions, and m ore than 150 deaths (Kenya Red Cross repo rts) . Local residents s po ke of up to 500 people w ho had disappeared and were feared de ad. A h uge humanitarian crisis was precipi tate d. Accordin g to OCHA-Ke nya (lnte rnal Displacement Monito ring Centre 2007), the nature of the viole nce necessitated a two-pronged respo nse: delive ry of e me rgency humanitarian a ssistance as well as concerted effo rts to resto re peace and resolve the conflict. The Ke nya Red Cross led the re li ef effo rt, and o the r o rga nisatio ns like Mede cins sans Fro ntj,2res - Be lgium, Wo r ld Visio n Kenya, the United Nations Children's Fund and NCCK provid ed food, he alth care, wa te r and sanitation. Civil society acto rs incl uding the Interna tional Me di cal Lega l A ssocia tio n docume nted the cases of huma n ri ghts violatio ns. On 9 March 2008, the Ke nya Army launched a jOin t security o peratio n dubbed Okoa Maisha (Save Life ) targeti ng the Sabaot Land Defence Fo rces (SLDF) whi ch was accused of carrying o u t an increasing number of attacks o n vil lages, killing people, stealing cattle a nd destroying ho mes. Upon de ploym ent, t he military immediately sealed off Mt Elgo n from the media, the Ke nya Re d Cross and o the r humanitarian agencies and huma n rights o rganisatio ns (see Mars Group Kenya 2009). At present, the governme nt has banned all hum a nitari an assistance to the Mt Elgon regio n. In Mande ra, w he re the Kenya Re d Cross was working w ith the governmen t and various relief agencies to add ress p rob le m s facing those affecte d by fla sh fl oods and dan fightin g that displaced m o re than 9,600 people, humanitarian assistance has also been imped ed by insec urity, fo r ci ng most aid agenc ies to suspe nd their activities in the district (Office for the Coo rdination of Hum a nita rian Affairs 2009). Inte restingly, d espite docume ntary e vid ence by the Ke nya National Commissio n o n Human Rights (KN C HR) of serious violati o ns o f human rig hts by a joi nt military and pol ice security opera ti o n in the region dubbed 'Chunga Mpaka' (Guard the Bo rder ) in O ctobe r 2008, civilians the re accused civil society o f insincer ity. Reside nts say human rights activists s ho uld not o nly criticise the government, but should al so co nsi der innocent victims who h ave lost the ir lives as a result of militia attacks . Similarly, in Mt El gon, Okoa Maisha was largely we lco med by the local s des pite heavy cens ure fro m civil socie ty and human rights g ro ups alluding to arbitrary arrests and de te n172 ngntea IT

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12 THE POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT IN KENYA tion, systematic torture, killi ngs and other abuses o n a vast scale . IDPs' public denouncement of civil society is likely re tributive of the yea rs d uring w hich the plight of lDPs w as deeply submerged within the la rger land question, and the failure to address the group rights o f displaced persons. In all of these moments in Ke nyan his to ry, it is worth noti ng that t he resettle m e nt and rei ntegration of internally displaced persons as policy was never core to the objectives of state intervention, nor cha racte ristic of the humanitarian responses. Such s purio us enga gement of the sta te w ith past instances o f internal di splacement and humani ta rian c rises in a sense com pro mi sed its ability to wi thstand the scale of violence and need tha t resulted from the 2007 post-election violence.

Humanitarian response to the post-election violence ll W hile, the scale of humanitarian respo nse to the 2007 post-election viole nce was un precedented,12 that Operatio n Ru di Nyumban i (ailed is not surprising. given t he history outlined above. The s tate aga in app lied the tactic of mi litarising solu tions as seen in the deploym ent of security fo rces to areas affected by insecurity (Wagalla, M I Elgon, Kuresoi, Coast, Mandera, Kis umu ), subve rting the tru th, restricting the fl ow of and access to informa tion, ex tra -judicial torture and killings. State harassment of lOPs by local and provincial ad mini stratio n a nd state security agen ts was noted in 1993, in 1997 and a gain during the Opera tion Rudi Nyumbani in 2008. A ll these acts of state sabotage have im peded humanitari an initi atives in the past, and did so again during the post-election cri sis o f 2007. The remainder o f this paper looks at why the bu lk of humanitaria n assis tance followi ng the poste lectio n crisis d id not qualitatively m atch its promise to facili tate response, harness goodwill and e nsure sustainabil ity of the vario u s rescue initiatives. Applied di ffe re ntly and within the existin g po li cy co ntexts, lJ then, wo ul d the humanitariim assistance have made a significant d ifference in addressing the complex problem of interna l d isplacement in Kenya, a nd cou ld this have been provided w itho ut undermining the b roader politi cal objectives of the govern me nt and donors? 173

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? The total human itarian fun d bas ke t earmarke d for the postelectio n crisis (in the fo rm of commitments/co ntributio ns and pled ges) was approxim atel y $48.5 mi ll io n, an a m o unt m o re s ignificant tha n during a ny o the r confli ct-i ndu ced dis pl acem e nt period. Do no rs w ere also hig hly diverse/ 4 and cha nne lle d aid m a inly thro ug h the Internatio nal Committee o f the Red Cross (JCRC), Ke nya Red Cross, Med eci ns sans Fronti eres (MSF), Plan, Danis h Refu gee Co unci l, UN A gencies and non-gove rnme nta l o rga ni satio ns (N GOs), ME RLIN , CA RE, UN HC R, C AlUTAS, AM REF, OCH A, among othe rs . A lso include d here was bil ate ral channe ll in g of aid to the Ke nya n governme nt fro m France, Italy a nd Slovakia. Subseque nt aid ca m e in the fo rm of Ksh1 93 million fo r roofing sheets from C hina, wi th add itio nal finan cia l suppo rt of $1 m il lion fo r transpo rtatio n o f the sheets . l~ H umani ta rian aid wa s admin iste red throu g h the ' clu ste r a pproach' ,16 which itse lf had serious sho rtcomings. Some NGOs perceived it as a threa t to their p ositions and a tool with which to critici se their fai li ngs, and we re reluctant to assist with relie f. Oth ers feared th at beco m in g too closely associated w ith the UN wou ld jeo pardi se the ir inde pe nde nce: MSF and the [CRC, both integral to the re lief e ffo rt, are no t part ofthe cl uste r approach, but they do s hare info rmatio n abou t the ir activiti es . Ano the r proble m wa s the la ck of fit bet ween cl usters such as protectio n and camp coord ination/mana gement, a nd the government. Fa ilure of the UN to ta ke account of exi sti ng governme nt m echanism s of cr is is m a nage me nt, which do no t a lw ays fit natura lly w ith the Clus ter Ap pro ach , res ulted in paralle l ac tio ns, dup lication a nd confusio n (see Integrated Regional Info rma tio n Ne two rks (IRIN) 2009). La ck of coordinatio n be tween the age nCies the m selves, and be tween gove rnme nt and agenCies, resu lte d in g ross m isallocatio ns o f food and no n-food ite m s (NFls) t hro ug h the corrupt practices of volunteers,!7 co-op tion of fOP le ade rship to chec k cri tici sm, and pa tronage of relief by the Ministry of State fo r Special Prog rammes (M oSS P) . I~ The re is a lso a t present vicio us competition be tween the hum a nitarian agenc ie s, scrambling to bui ld s he lters fo r [DPs a nd com plete wi th o rganisa tio n logos, ye t very fe w quali ty shelter s have actuall y been put up, a fact of whi ch lOPs have ta ke n fu ll ad vantage to corruptly acq uire food a nd shelte r. Th ese pro ble m s, we ll d ocumented in the KHRC re port, 174 ngntea IT

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12 THE PO LITICS OF RESETT LEMENT IN KEN YA

'A tale o ff force, threats and lies', spi lled over into the ORN l9 programme . Poo r coordination and corruption; mismanagement of the lOP profiling process; excl usio n and sup pressio n of lOPs and other key stakeholders; insecuri ty, poo r in ter-co mmunal relations and failure to ensure safe return of lOPs; child and gender-based \'iolations; inadequate shelters and lack of compensation (p . 21) are all fea tures that heavily compromised the humanita rian and resettlement initiatives. Tha t funding is still being extended to the governmen t of Kenya, despite these obvious weaknesses, desef\'es questioning. The governme nt of Japan has just donated Ksh550 mi llion to the 10M for construction of 8,000 lOP shelters in the Rift Valley (TIle Stalldard, 2009, p. 8). After revising its earl ier lO P fi gures to 663,921 (Saturday Natio n 2009, p. 9), up from 350,000, the government is itself appealing for an additional Ks hl.5 billion to cater for these 'adjusted' numbers of lOPs. Upon what basis does the humanitarian regime now justify this willingness to fund resettlement, given that use of funds during the past year did not yield many positive results? Equa lly curio us is the rationale behind processes in formulation such as the Protection Working Group on lnternal Displacement (PWGIO), spear headed by the United Na tions NHCR. With the overall objective 'to contribute to the ca pacity of the Government of Kenya to address needs of rDPs th roughout Kenya, including capacity to prevent and m itigate displacement, coordi nate protection responses and conform to regional and interna tional commitments', the PWG ID is a transitional framework that places state at the centre of the sol utio n. Yet the government was never part o f its conceptualisation or formulatio n, neither did it participate directly in the earlier protection cluster that responded to the post -election emergency. Upon what basis, therefo re, shall the PWGID de mand accountability from the state, and how can such international assistance be increased in a responSible and effective way to assist Kenya's post-conflict recons truction process? Returnin g to de Waal's argume nt that humanitarian processes are negative in as far as they hinder the d evelopment of the strong bo nds between state and society necessary for the development of democratic good governance, the preceding analysis pO ints to a weakened humanitarian regi me that has created spaces and 175

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER?

opportunities for abuse and exploitation of civil ian populations by the sta te. A balancing act is ob\'iollsly necessa ry, since on the other hand, a s tilte so delegiti m ised by shifti ng loyalties to the huma nitarian regime enables a vicious cycle in which no meaningful reform is pOSSible, as policy is robbed of accountability mechanisms. Indeed, by the late 1990s a long-del ayed consensus emerged among develop me nt experts tha t aid thilt goes into poor policy envi ronmen ts does not work. The PWGlD arrangement, itself a form of aid, endorses government co m p lacence with regards to finding durable solutio ns for internal displacement. Though complete indepe n dence of hum an itariilnism from the state is u nrealistic and undesi rable, there is co ncern that government ownership, in the absence o f a clear a nd informed commitment to broad -based development, will lead to abuse and squilndering of resources.

Conclusion What the iss ues in this pa per point to a re an increasingly unaccountable state and a humanitarian aid regime tha t has uncritica lly tied up its agenda with tha t of the government. Such a reactionary brand of humilnitarianism, conceptualised as a relation o f governa nce and a form of com plicity (Duffield 2002, p. 83), portrays h umani tarian aid agenCies as co ll uding with repreSSive regimes to further marginalise and dispossess people to w hom aid is provided, in w h ich case humanitarian aid serves the politica l objectives of the government's end and no t the interests o f the peop le who are in need of assistance. The obvious d isconnect between the government of Kenya and the humanitari an regime during the post-election crisis, and the latter's willingness to downplay this distance, could be construed as having the larger purpose of improving the government's international image and paving the way fo r further aid - a means to get to 'bigger' things. In addi tion, as in the early 1990s when humanitarianism foc used on relief, the hu man ita rian cl uster remains captive to government interests, and thus relatively ineffectual as a policy architect of long-term resolu tion fo r issues suc h as the land questio n and o ther histo rical injustices that con tinue to p recipita te co nflict. In the context of sustained funding for resettlement, 176 ngntea IT

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12 THE POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT IN KENYA

therefore, the government and humanitarian agencies must reassess their positio ns and generate the kind of cooperation and synergy that has so far bee n lackin g. In Ke nya, whe re issues of la nd owne rship, acquisition o f la nd, unauthori sed p lot de marcations and settleme nt are critical to a s ustainable solutio n to the displaced problem, the government must actively see k to address the e xisting landho lding pa tte rns a nd stop playi ng pa tronage politi cs with the issue, as has been the practice to d ate.

Notes !. Internal displacement in Kenya began in 1991 after the Ken yan government was forced to concede to a multiparty system. In res ponse, President Daniel ara p Moi and his inn e r ci rcle ad opted a calculated polic y against ethni c groups associated w it h th e political opposition. In spite of Moi's p ronouncements, the violence wa s not a sponta neous reaction to the reintroduction o f multiparty p olitics. The government unleashed terror, provoked displacement and ex pelled certain ethnic gro ups (>/1 masse from their long -time ho mes and communities in Nyanza, Wes tern and Rift Vnlley Provinces for polilicnl and economic gain. 2. See the full report of a study cond ucted by the Keny
177

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? 5uh -Ioca tion 5, these form the basis of thc provi no::ial admini stration. 8. In March 1992, fo r instan ce, C until they recupture initintivc over th e political space 10. The Mt Elgon co nfl ict has 5imilar characteristics to 'ethn ic' d as hes referred to ea rl ier, w ith land-related o b jecti ves also explo iting pre-existing te nsio ns to further the political aim5 of certain local leaders. For a good overview of this history, sec Ke nya Lan d Allia nce (2007). Sec also Human Rights Watc h (2008, pp. 10- 17). 11.1 am grateful 10 Ke(fa Karuoya Magenyi, Orga nising Secretary of the IDP5 Network in Kenya for offe ring his detailed insig hts into thi s period. 12. The p05t-elcch on crisis led to ma ssive internal d isplacem en ts, a fig ure th e MoSSP now places at 663,921. In ;,dditio n, th e re was loss of p roperty worth billio ns of Kenyan shi llings and a hu ge 1055 of li ves. Ap prox im ately 1,400 li ves were l05t durin g the period. Certa in a reas like the slum s and arid and sem i-arid lands were WONe hit than o thers. 13. The nced to work on policy and lega l framcw o rks to respond to th e root causes a nd manifestations of internal d isplacemen t in Kenya is dearly und ers tood by all stakeholders. T his calls for enact m e nt of the Draft l
,m

17 8 ngntea IT

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12 THE PO LITICS OF RESETT LEMENT IN KEN YA early re<:overy, logistics, emergency shelter and so on. 17. There were numerous press reports of Kenya Red Cross Volunteers deman ding sex in exc han ge for food and non -food items from you ng girls and women in the c,l mps. 18. According to the KHRC report (2008, p. 22) the Ministry of Slate for Speda[ Progra mmes not only excluded h umanitarian agencies, but also sidelined oth er key ministries [ike the Ministry of State for Provincia l Administra tion and [ntern a[ Security, Ministry of Agricu lture, Ministry of Lands and the Kenya N:ltiona [ Commission on Human Rights, that wou ld otherwise have significantly added value to the implemen tation of the ORN p rogramme had it been JOintl y coordina ted by all of them. 19. It is im portant to note that the government had begun closing camps and compelling lOPs in Nairobi to retu rn to their homes as far back as February and March 2008, long before the offic ia l launch of the ORN programme in May 2008.

Bib liography de Waal, A. (1997) Fmnine Crimes: Polillcs alld tile Disa..~ter Relief fndustry in Africa, London, African Rights and the Intern ati ona[ African Institu te w ith Jam<:.'S Currey Duffield, M (2002), 'Aid
179

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? aid ', Asia Report no. 32, Bangkok/B ru ssels, 2 April Kenya Human Rights Comm ission (2008) 'A tale of force, Ihreats and lies: Operati on Ru di Nyu mba ni in pe rsp ecti ve', u np ublished report, Nairobi Kenya Land Alliance (2007) Land Update, vol. 5, no. 1, Ap ril- June, www. kenya la nda lliance.or. ke. Kenya Police Website (n.d .) hllp://ww\\'.kenyapolice.go.kelNews135.asp, acccssl..>d 9 Ja nu;:ny 2009 Kenya, Rep ubli c o f (2008) Report of th c Commission of Inquiry into Pos t Election Violence (C1PEV), Nairobi, Government Printer Mamd ani, M. (1996) Citiu" Qnd Subject: Cont emporary Africa and the Legacy of Late C%uialism, Kampal a, Fou ntain Publishers Man zo ul, A. (2008) 'Is il the fau lt of NGOs alone? Aid and depende ncy in Eastern Sudan', Sudarl Working Paper, e hr. Mkhclsen Instit ut e Mars Grou p Kenya (2009) htlp:/lblog.marsgrou p kenya. org{?p- 176, an:essed 18 January 2009 Moore D. (2000) 'Hu manitar i;m agendas, state reconstruction and democ rati zation p rocesses in war-to rn societies', Nell,! [ssues in Refugee Research, Working Paper no. 24, Ju ly Office for Ihe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009) htt p ://oc hagwapps l.unog.ch/rw/rwb. nsf/db900sid/MCOT-7KVEPF?OpenDocument, accessed 19 January 2009 Owuoche, 5. and Jonyo, F. (2002) Political Parties and Civil Society in Govcrna"ce and Deve/opment: A Syn thesi~, Nnirob i, Bird s Printers a nd Eq uipm ent Ltd Satllfday Nation (2009) 'Poll violence vic tims were 660,000', 24 Jan uary Standard. nrc (2009) 'Gove rn men t relea ses ID P lally', 24 January

180 ngntea IT

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Index AAA su Accra Agenda for Action

Abilcnil, Sani 52 accountab ility ix- xi, ~2L 121- 9,

lftt. 1Zl1.lli i l l Accra, High Level Forum on Aid Eff..,>c ti vcnl..'Ss, 2008 1Q,. f!L ZL

m

l..ll1.lli

Accra Age nd a for A ctio n (AAA) 3:2.. g2!1.~m 128-9 ACP sec Afric
134-3, Hll.1Al African Ce nt ral Banks liZ African Develop ment Bank (ADB) ill African Growt h and Oppor tun ity Ad (AGOA) 45. African Medical and Resea rch Found~tion (AMREF) 114. African Peer Revi ew Mec hanism (AP RM) 8,.lOIl African Union (A U) Lz..S. ~2li. lill!,.ill AFRICOM $CC Africa Comm
il.. i l l ngrofuels 63. a id defined 61-3

see also develop ment aid; et hi cal

aid; lied aid, etc aid coloni sation viii, 1- 12, 8ll Aid Effectiveness ~J&l.Q'1 12 1-9, ill 'aid fo r trad c' 111- 12,137- 9, 1Al

AJDS sec !-lTV/A IDS AI -Qaida cells, Somalia 2B. Algeria, industrialisa ti o n pro jects 21 Amnesty Intcrnillional 16.

A.c\4 REF see Africil n Med icnl and J{esea rch Fo unda tion Anglo.America n pic 4S Angola 93 116 apartheid Z& 82 85 A PRM see Afri can Peer Review Mcrhanism Argentina l.. ~ ~ 56. nrmaments 6. As i ~n :md Afric:m Development Iklnks 12 Assoc iati on for Wome n's Rights in Develop ment (AWID) 2Z A U sec Afri can Uni on Australia tiI.l 5 U ~Iso triad nati ons AW ID see Associat ion for Women's Rights in Development

Band un g Era 62,.66,.14. Bank of C hina lID. ' El Banon' strategy 55. Basket Fund ing 36. Belgium ~lZ1 Berg Report 4Z 13HP 13i!!iton 48. Blair, Tony i l l Boeing 4.5. Bolivia 56. Bolshevism 15.

181

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2003 28. Boris, Je~ n Pierre 72 Brazil ..2!L1lZ Bretton Woods ins titutions vii, 2,.16.~&Z2..13S

Brow n, Gordon 10& Budget Support 3Q..ill Bush, President George W.

21. 28.

CABC S/'e Chi na- Africa Business Cou ncil CADF see China-Africa Development Fund Ca meroon 1L 21 Ca nada 6fi see also triad nations Canada SPC 23 capacity development x, 11..73. 97-103, III mUfr..l1£. li!!.. i l l l5b. and d onor agenda 9d and Ind ia l1ill Keny.:! ill su also trade CA RE sa C hristian Action Iksearch and Education Cargill 15. CA RITAS lZ4. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 45. C DB see C hina Development Bank C had -Cameroon pipeline 4Z C hevron 4.Z child mort<1lity lill Chiluba, Frederick 5.1 C hina xi, 1J., 22-5, ,2;h 69,. 24..11& l1£. 143-64, iH China- Africa Business Council (CA BC) 2.1 China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) ~l1ill Chin a Develop ment Ban k (COB)

ml6ll

Chi na Export-Impor t (Exim) Bank

m136. Chin.:! N<1tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 23 C hris tian Action Research and Educ<1tion (CAR E)
!ll.lTh.l1& 161 and the slate Z. Zl 99-1 01, lQ.. 168-9 'Civilian- Mili tary Cooperation Policy' i l l di mate change 67-8,96-7 Cluster A p proac h i l l CNPC see China Nati onal Petroleum Corporation coal, N iger l\!: Coca-Cola fi Cold War llL 21 colle<:tive imperi<1lism (CI) lb. colonial ism viii, 2. 3,. 76--88 COMECOl\J 21 Com mission for Africa 108 11 7 Common Market for Easlcrn il nd Southern Africa lil2 Communist Parly l i compensation see reparations cond itionality L3.~1Jill..mllZ.. ill

18 2 ngntea IT

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INDEX and Accra Agend a for Ac tion 51 China and Inclia llliL 158-9 and liberal globalisntion ix, fil. 62 and Marsh a ll Plan 12 and mutunl accountability 126-7 policy 4.b.mlliHlLlM politica l vii, vii i, M1.Zl.Z2,.B1..

11ft and trade ll:h i l l Congo, Democratic Republic of ,}b &~lli..]jft

continentnl integratio n viii, x, 1. 7-8, lQ. 11- 12 Corpo rnte Counci l of Africa 45. corru phon 3-4, 8,..ll., ll.66,. 69. Ec uad or is. Eq uatorial Gu inea 6. Ic"ders 7!l vol unteers Cote d' ]voire 14-15

mm

C o to nou Agreement 1Z. l2,.l18. crimes against humanit y & 82-5, 'If;

C RS see Cat hol ic Hel ief Services CSOs see civil society o rga nisat io ns Cuba n., §L Z4. DAC see Develop ment Ass istance Committee Danis h Refu gee Council i l l Darfur crisis 26. OCF su Developmen t Cooperilho n Forum Oelkers .:lB. debt vii, 'L 86. reli ef 68-9, 107-8, 112-14,

an..

llL13Ji s ustainabi lity x, i2.. 12ft. l6fi Debt Sustainability Framework 52 Deby, Pres ident ldriss 4Z democ ratisation vii, x, ~ & ZJ.c91. 99-103, 15&

Denmark :'!ls. i l l Department for Inte rnatio n"l Development (DFID), United Kingdom (UK) B1,.lAii depend e ncy and C hi na and debt vii, 2,. 47- 53, 79--80, liZ and development 2n. Z5.. i l l food ~~ill and re parations az and self-reliance viii, L 11.. TIL

mill

ill... ill and trade liberalisa tion 113-18 deve lop ment viii, 1- 11, 106-7, ~

1!i2..1Z6. and repilriltions 76-88 and sec urity 93-103 s ustainability v ii, 24. 36. Z2, 'lL

lill1.!f!Z.lTI.. m H:h ill. and women 26-38 sec also accou ntability; Financi ng for Developm ent; Millennium Development Goals; partners hip d evelop ment aid ix, 13-25, 26.59-75, l.lZ. 121-9 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ~ '!L 6!168.lill!s.l1::h ill Development Coope ration Forum (OCF) 6S Dida ta 48. Dioffo, Abdou Moumouni 19. Doba oi l fields 4Z Doha Declara tion on Financing for Development, 2008 lQ.!ili!.. m 128-9 d o nors L !i.lQ.. 17- 18, :K!.. 42-{i, 5li non -Wes tern 2n. 127-8 Western ZLl'l.Bn. HZ.. 21. 2& 1Q2..1lL132 see also accou ntability; cond itionality; official

mU1..

183

,.,

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? develop ment assistance; partnership drough ts, region
mill ECOSOC see United Nations Economi c and Social Cou ncil ECOWAS $l.'e Economic Community of West Afr ican Sta tes Ecuad or &.. 56. EOF see European Development Fund ed ucation lL M.l1l,22.. 2Q. ZQ..1.1.

l!!.Z.. m llfi..l39. Egypt 21 46 electricity, pu blic services Z1 employment .6..TI.~mmlJ:L ill empower ment 3. JQ., ~ 22..lQl1 m 1QZ..ill environment n.. 3.6. 9.5. ~ 1QZ.. i l l EPAs sec Economic Partnership Agreements Equa torial Gui nea 6 ethical aid 1 11 - 12 85 Et hiopia lfill EU see Eu ropea n Union EU 15 (Europea n Union li m ember sta tes) 2005 136 Europe see triad nations

EuropeAid 14ll Europea n Bank for Reconstru cti on and Development 11 Europea n Comm ission (EC) m

mlAfi

Europea n Development Fund (EOF) 1lQ.. 132-41 European l{ecovery Prog ramm e see Marshall Plan European Uni on (EU) x, 6L~ i l l ~ 132- 7, liQ..lli Exi m Bank of Ind ia see ExportImport Bank of India exploitation viii, 2..lJ1li.11.. ~ Z1.

zz..m28.l16 Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) 4i Export Cn:di ts Guaran \<:.>c Departmen t (UK) 46 Export-Im port (Exim) Bank of Ind ia UQ.l51..13S see also China Export-Import Ba nk extra ctive indust ri es see minin g Exxon-Mobil :iZ FAO see Food and Agric ul ture Orga nisa ti on farming see agricultu re feminist pe rspecti ve see women Financi ng for Development (FID) 9- 10,26-7,35-6, 38.. 42-56, 106-7, 11Z.136 sec Qlso Doha; Mo nterrey; Paris Fi nl'md, an d USSR IT FOCAC see forum on Chi na- Africa Cooperation food ZL~~102 Food and Agricultu re O rganisntion (FAO) 6i foreign direc t in vestments (FOIs) lilZ Foru m on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) m~§mlJill

184 ngntea IT

na

INDEX France 19 174 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) i l l G7 5!l,.till,.1JS G8 see Group of Eight Gabon .ll GAD see Gender and Development Gates I;ound~tion 4.Z GCA P see Global Call to Ac tion Agains t Poverty gender ix, 29- 30, .n. Q;h i l l see also 1V0men Gender and Development (GAD)

JQ..ll genocid e g'l g2 g(j gco-c<:onomy see agricul tu re; mining GFI sce Global Fi nancia l lntcgri ty Ghana 51, i l l Gleneagles meeting, 2005 ,H..Z2..

1!lli..l1B. Global Call to Action Aga inst Poverty (GCAP) 3,1 g lobal c<:onomy vii, 3.l!!..ll, Hs. ~ :!§.. 2Q. ~ .8.B.lQQ. H2,.l52 Global Financial In tegrity (GFl) 43 g loha lisalion vii, xi, 5l.,. Tl.-Zl. 2i. Jill alternative/li beral ix, D...lb ~ (j1 - 3, QL 69. GONGOs (government al NGOs) M Great Lakes region, policing 2a Grimmett Report, 2007 46-7 Group of Eight (G8) 2,..43.lJ..Q. 14:1.

_ill

Gu inea 9.1 Gu lf stMes 1l.8. hea lth 66.lm..Ui.U2..l5ti and d ebt 2,,1l1 and d evelopment ,22,. ZQ..ll!Z. ll.6. and Ind ia 1.2J., l52 KenY
Mozambique Z1 and security <;§. 96-7 heav ily indebt<:.-d poor countries (Hlf-'C)

1!lli.. llliL li2..l6.l

High Level Forum o n Aid Eff. . "c tiveness ~el' Accra; Paris; Rome HIPC see heavily indebted poor countries HIVjAIDS .6. Zl19.5. 96-7, J..QL 1.!ll..

1.QL 158. Honduras, working-group meetings 11 Human Development Report, 2005

46 human rights 2'.-36. 32- 3, ii2. ZQ. Zll 81-4, BQ. 101- 2, 123-4, 126--7 Kenya 167-8,170- 2 humani l<1rian assistance xi, 22.!B..

sa.

Z2..lQ2.Hfi to Kenya 82- 3,167- 77 Hungary, and USSR Tl hyd rocarbons ;u.tu ICBC see Indus trial and Commercial Bank of China ICRC see InternM io nal Committee of the Red Cross ICTII T (informMi on and commu nic
185

,.,

AID TO AFRICA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? indus trialisation development x, 13-15, lL 19- 21 , 2<

and Ind ia ~ l l i local str,lIegies ;H. 69- 70, 1!L i l l indus tries, Africa 3.. 't.t!!1. ill ~

lfill Intergovernmental Authority o n Development 102 internall y disp laced persons (lDPs) 167-79 Intern ational Committee of th e I{ed Cross (lCRC) lZ:l In tern ational Conference on Financing for Development, 2002 3.5. Intern ational Conference on the Grea t l~lkes Region (IC/G LR)

Joh an nesburg Stock Exchange 4S Joint Assistance Strategi es ~ 11& ill Jubi lee Ca mpaign in Za mbia 11iIl Jubilee Sou th, Africa network 54. Kaunda, Kenneth aZ2 Kenya xi, 4.5,.5l.,.UBfi. 167- 77 Kenya Nat ional Com mission on Human Rights (KNC H R) 82- 3,

[email protected] Kenya Red C ross ill ' Khulumani complaint' 82 Kirghizs tan, workin g-g roup meeti ngs 11 KNC H R sce Kenya Na ti ona l Comm ission on Human Rig hts Korea 15.l!L.69.

,."

Intern ational Financ ial Facili ty (IFF) lilil international financia l institutions (IFIs) ~lll interna tional law 81- 2, S.1 Intern ational Medical Lega l Assoc iation ill International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2. 50-1, Z3. Z2.. .1.QL i l l ua. and d ebt 5b 56.lillL 112 unpopularity ,2;h,R,56.6B.Z1 In ternational Panel of Eminent Personalities to In vestiga te the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surroundin g Events 86. Iran llB. Iraq 'R.1!l2. Israel ~ Italy i l l ITEC see Indian Tec hn ic~ l an d Economic Cooperation Ja pa n l3..lli. QQ..liQ..lli sa also tria d nations

labour see em p loy ment LDCs see least developed countries least developed cou ntr ies (LDCs)

m

1L lillL ~ Liberty Life 4S Lome Accord s 11

DB.

Madagascar !ll Maghreb coun tries 12 Make Poverty History ca mpaign ill Mal ays ia .ll Mal aysia Petroleum 23 Mandela, Nelson 48. Marshall Plan 15.lZ.. 2.1 MauMau B.1 Mlx:ki, Thabo 48--9 Mbuende, Kaire 2li MDGs see Millennium Development Cools MDR I see Multilateral Debt Relief Initiati ve MEA see India, Ministry of E.xlernal Affairs

186 ngntea IT

na

INDEX MCded ns sans Frontieres (MSF)

mill M(:d ica! Emerge ncy Relief Interna tional (ME RLIN) i l l MERLIN see Medical Emergency Relief ! nternation ~1 Merr ill Lynch <:1.2. Mexico 5.5. Midd le East llB. migration H.. 2fi mili tary aid x, !i.l1.ll, 4Q.. Z2. 111 - 12 Mi llenni um Declaration M.. §!1ll&

zs.

111 Millenn ium Develop ment Goa ls (MOCs) ix, 2-.1fdL I8-2 1, M.. li2L 106--19, 112 see also Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness min ing 3.,.!i.l2.. 22-3, & ll.f!..L!.b. lli!...162 Mining Code Iii Ministry of State for Special Programm o::s (MoS5 P), Kenya

ill MNGOs (NGOs ope rating like mafias) 6:1 Mobutu, Sese Seko 52. Moi, Prt.'Si d en t Daniel arap i l l Mondi 0!8. money laundering .lll3. Monterrey Consensus 9- 10, ~ 35-6, .l!!!!...l.QZ, m ilL l36 MoSS P sce Ministry of State for Special Programmes Motlanthe, Kgalcm a 18. Mozambiq ue Z1.152 MSF l'i!e Mcdccins sans Fro ntieres Multi lateral Debt Relief Ini tiative (M DR!) mml6l mul ti na tional corpora tions 2.Q.. 22-4, 43--4,46--7, lUi Museve ni, Presid ent Yoweri 2li

Namibia Z6..B6. National Cou nci l of Ch u rches of Kenya (NCC K) i l l NATO see North Atlantic Treaty O rganisation natu ra! d isasters Z1.!Q2.. H!i.llfi natu ral resources lll.H.4Q.. 63-6,

ZV" NCCK see Nat io nal Coun cil of Churches of Kenya Nd ung u, The Hon. Njoki 86. N EPAD sce New Part nership for Africa's Development Netherlands 41 Ne twork of Farmers' and Agricultu ral Producers' O rganisntions of West Africa 12 New Partnership for Africa 's Development (NE PAD) 8-9, lQ!1 ll1. i l l NGOs see non-govern mental o rganisations Niger 19. Nigeria ~ lQ2..lli Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) ill non-gove rn mental orga nisa tions (NGOs) ~.Q}..ll..64...Z1.lZl.. ill North Atlantic Treaty Orga nisa tion (NATO) §L Z4. Norwa y 42 nuclear energy 19. OAU scc Orga nisation of African Uni ty OCHA ill ODA sce official d evelop ment assista nce OECD see Organisa tion for Economic Coopera tion and Develop ment offici al develop ment assistance

187

,.,

AID TO AFRI CA: REDEEMER OR COLONISER? (ODA)

4.:!l..6.L6S.~m

107-1 2, 1.li. 127-8 C hin~ ~nd I nd i ~ 145-8 oil 3....6. 41,. 55--6, lU.liB. O ld Mutual 4&50 O per;, ho n Ru d i Nyumb
zz..

Poverty Red ucti on and G row th Strategy (PRG F) i l l Povert y Red ucti on Strategy Pa pers (P RSPs) ~ PRG I: see Povert y Red uction and Grow th Strategy privatis
m

22- 3, Prog r~m m e

~l6O.

for Disp laced Persons

ill Protec tion Work ing G roup on Intern
lQ.lZfi Pan-Africa n Parliament (PAP) 86. PAP see Pa n-Afri can Parli<1ment Par;,glla y 5ii Par is C lub l6l Paris Dedaration on Ai d Effediveness ix, 16- 19, 26.. 35-7, i1 .~L60--2,

m

Zl. ~lQ1. 106--7,

122-4, 126--7, liQ.. 12lUfl1

femin is t perspec tive 35-7 food security Zl and M[X;s 16- 19, i l l p;,rtnershi p 8-9, 14-15, tl.. 60- 2, 6S. ZQ. ZL ~ lillUQL111., 121- 9 see also C hina; Economic P;,rtnershi p Agree ments; Eu ropean Un ion; In d ia; New Partn ers hip for A fri ca's Developme nt pMron
13Ji

PRSPs sa Poverty Red uctio n Strategy Papers PWD!G see Proh.."c ti on Working G roup on Internal Displacement raci sm 4.62 r.:l pe & 82 83 refu gees ZJ..1Q1.

m 11!i.. m lZZ..

192 remitta nces .1.1.!i.1lZ reparations v iii, 76-7, BQ.. hl.. 8.l..B.B. roads !i.1H.. m.LW..l58. Romania, a nd USSR II Rome Decla ration on Harmonisation,

2003 i l l 122 123 rule of la w l.'ll..lD1. rura l develo pment ll2i. ZQ. rn see also agri cu lt ure Ru ssia 4Z see also Soviet Union Russian Revoluti on l5,.24. Rwanda, genocide 8li Sabaot L.lne Defence Fo rces (SLDI' )

ill

188 ngntea IT

na

Sahara Desert, threat to N iger 12 sanit~ t ion

mmm

S~\ld i Arn bi~,

worki ng-group m ee tin gs 11 5CAA!' see Special Comm o nw ealth A fri ciln Ass istance Progrilmmc Scand innvia lZ.,~~~Z:l see also Denmark; hnland; No rw ay; Sweden Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps)

,.

seo;:urity 1Q.. 6Z. 93-1 03,

1J1..1±!..

Spedal Comm o nw ealth A frican Assisl<1n ce Progr<1mme (5CAA p)

ill Spec ial Economic Zo nes (SEZ) l6ll Standard Bank, So uth Africa l3Il Stoc kholm Instit ute 12 Stru ctural A d jus tm e nt Programmes (SA Ps) s ee Poverty I{ed uct io n Strat egy Pilpers Sudan 23-4 152 Sudan Na tio nill O il Corpo rati o n 23 s ustainability 7L lrr.. 1m., 112.. HL

Q1.l68.

lQQ..1ZZ

food 71 % 97 human vi i, x, 'lls. 22,.l.QQ., ~

economic vii, l.Q..l2.l:t 7L l.QQ.,

lJi& nillio n.:!1 x, H..9L211lill Security Council lQ..86.2.1 self-dete rminati o n vii, viii, Z8..Z2.

!:!1.M..a2.B.Z Serious Frau d O ffice (SFO) 44. Seychell es 51 SEZ su Special Econom ic Zones SFO see Serious Fraud O ffice Sie rra Leo ne ill slavclY viii, 76-7, 80-6, as. SLOF su Sa baot Lane Defence Forces Sl ov~ k i:l

ill

n

social ho usi ng social justice 'lls.1l1 social secu rity Z1 solar energy l2..6.3. So malia 2B. Sout h Afri ca 48- 50,55-6, Zi.1ilO. So uth Ce ntre ~6Z.Z3..ll4. So uth Koreil 11 So u th-Sout h coope ra tion ix, xi, 2Q 2l. 74-5, 11& l±l..l& l6.3 So uthern African Develop m ent Communi ty 101 Soviet Union l.5.. 21- 2, Z:l see also Russia

m!.£ 1frL i l l

esse ntial services l l i sec also debt; development; e nv ironme nt SWAps _~u Secto r Wi d e Ap proac ht-'S Sw (:den
ill te rro ri sm 2S tied aid 25-(;, 44-6, 117L ill!.. Hl1 LiS. limbe r 3. TNGOs (NGOs ca rrying out d o no r politics) M Togo 51 trade 2.1. '16. 64-5, !.ili. Z2. M. 132-4 and develop ment 8-10, 22..

m

za.

a

l1£

189

,.,

liberalisation x, 2.3. 111- 15, 138- 9 $<'(: also ilid for trilde; China; India; Tr
ua.rn

Uganda 4...151 Uganda Reven ue A uthori ty -1 UN see United Na tions unde rd evelopmen t 1,. 2- 3, 5.. 10--11, H.lli!..~lQLlQZ

UNDP ,~ee Un ited NMiona l Development Progrilmme UNFCCC see Un ited Na tions Framework Co nven tion on Climate Change UNHCR set' United Na tions Commissioner for Ikfugccs UNICEF see United Nations Children's l' u nd Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 15 21 77-8 Uni ted Nations (UN) 5.1§.. 2LJill.

[email protected] development strn tegy 'lL ZB...§l. !§.11Z see also nilmed UN agenciO::s below; Fina ncin g for Developmen t; Mi llennium Development Cools U nited Nations C hild ren's Fund (UNICEF) Uni ted Nations Commissioner for Refugees (U N HC R) lZi United Nations Development

urn

Prog ramme (UNDP)

1Z.. ~ 41.

2i. !£.16S Un ito:.'(\ Na tions Economic and Socia l Council (ECOSOC) 16 68 United Nations h amework Conven ti on on Climate Chilnge (UNFCCC) 67-8 United Nations International Conference on financing for Develop ment, Monterrey, 2002 _~(f Monterrey Consensus United Nations International Law Commission 1993 BJ. Un ited States development a s~ i s tance £1 ±t

1L!ill..6Z Millenn ium Develop ment Gools x,

1.1!1.llL 111.. 116.

North-50u th rela tions lilQ. 2Q reparilhons ZL 79-80, M.. an secu rity agenda 93---4 see also Ma rshall Plan; tri ad nat ions Un ited Staks Agency for International Development (USA ID) 20-1, 112 Un ivers.1 I Declara tion on Human Rights BJ. uranium, Niger 12 USA ID see Unit ed St
a

Washingto n Co nse nsus Zt. 6l,.1'l W
190 0;:-

ngntea IT

~nal

Women in Development (WID) 3D. World Bank 2.5.. 1L II 60-1, 6;l 67-8, ZLZ2.. 107-8, 112...l38. Chad-Camcroon pipeline .u and China l5B. Jnd Lltin Ameri <:a 5li World Food Programme .u World Social f or um 54..56. World Trade Organisation (WTO) .lli !il, @,Zl1Z2..illill

World Vision u1Zl WTO sa World Trade Organisation Yaounde Conventio n 11

mm

Zilmbiil .24.. ill.!l2.. l6Q Zhou Enlai, Premier M2.lS.L i l l Zimbabwe 6Z..a fu2.. 100--1 Zuma, Jaw b
191 ~nal

Copyrighted material

Aid to Africa: Redeemer or Coloniser? While Africa is the biggest recipient of aid globally, the terms, conditions and principles upo n which aid is delivered are rarely defined by the people of Africa - although it is for them that this aid, at least rhetorically, is meant

to create positive change. With the current global economic crisis and highlevel meetings on aid effectiveness, the debate on aid to Africa is resurgent. Coming from the diverse perspectives of African social commentators,

academics and activists including Demha Moussa DemheJe, Patrick Bond, Samir Amin and Charles Mutasil, this comprehensive volume explores the premise, history and foundation upon which the concept of aid is based. It considers aid's relationship to the broader development discourse in Africa, the politics and power dynamics of aid mechanisms and how the emergence of powers such as China and India are redefining the global aid architecture. Aid to Africa considers how to create a more Just aid system that contributes to Africa's development while also elaborating alternative approaches that understand the inherent inequity of aid. Critically, this book provides a framework not merely to render aid more effective, something which the current mainstream discourse is grappling to define, but to create an altemativeAfrican development paradigm from Pan- Africanist, feminist and other perspectives ISBN: 978-1-906387-48-8

II

fo.:h "

Pambazuka Press Cape Town. Dakar, Nairobi, Oxfo rd www.pamba:w kap re§§ .org www.fahamu.org

www.afrodad .o rg

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