An Ethics of the Pre-individual

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An Ethics of the Pre-individual

by

Aislinn

O'Donnell

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Continental Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy June 2001

Contents Contents Acknowledgements Abstract

1 iv V

Introduction 1. ii. iii. iv. V. Vi. vii. viii.

disequilibriurn technophobia and nature thinking otherwise than being activating concepts: philosophy and resistance singular transformations the engendering of the virtual the pre-individual as state of excess the appropriation of difference

4 6 12 16 17 19 23

Chapter One Diffe rence and Diversity

26

1.1. I. ii. I. iii. I. N-. Lvi. Lvii.

26 27 30 38 43 48

philosophical underpinnings relevant or relative theory and practice difference, chversity and division racism and raciology the essence of essentialism

Chapter Two Embracing Difference: Capitalism and Philosophy

51

51 potentia versus Potestas 54 the disciplinary apparatus 11.111.the end of ideology 58 11.1-, 62 -. creeping capitalism and aspects of assemblages II. N-. managing the diverse; modulations of control 64 II. N-1. hybridity and difference; a new world order? 71 ILN-11. the end of history, the demise of becon-ungs: claustrophobic capital

ll. ix.

the changng,, -,-Iiole of the face of capitahsm mechanism or machinism?

75 79 86

Chapter Three Spinoza: The God-Intoxicated

Man

111-1.

90

ethics and immanence III. 11. natural right and power III. iii. rights, duties and powers 111.1v.'bolshevik' versus 'fascist': the Badiou/Deleuze encounter III. v. univocity, eminence, analogy III. VI. a degree of power III. Vii. Benechctus,Malechctus III. viii. Spinoza's heresy IILIX. the active essence III. X. confrontation and sacrilege;contesting Morahty III. Xi. the art of inamersion III. Xii. decentering the human III. xiii. transitions III. XiV. the disparate and the possible - toward the pre-individual

90 91 93 97 104 107 110 ill 117 119 125 129 132 134

Chapter Four Simondon's Crystalline Becomings

135

IV. 1. paradox IV. ii. thinking With the grain IV. 111.snapshots IV. iv. multiplicitous beings lV. v. revolutionary states IV. v1. mediators IV. vii. difference affirmed IV. viii. crystalline visions lV. ix. an ethics of the pre-individual IV. x. flashing intensities

135 137 139 142 144 146 148 152 153 159

Chapter Five A Nomadic Image of Thought

16-5

V. i. V. ii. V. iii. V. iv. V. V. V.vi. V. vii. V. viii. V. ix. V. X. V. xi.

165 168 173 175 177 182 185 187 193 194 200

the radical thought of empiricism idealism or immanence the art of creating concepts restoring the rights of immanence the possible of the possible: a revolutionary becoming doxology and the State the State versus the nomad: counterposing multiplicities the idiot an encounter with Proust swimming and thinking culpable, complicit, co-opted?: philosophy versus capital

Chapter Six: Conclusion An Ethics of the Pre-Individual V1.1. VI. ii. VI. iii. VI. iv. VI. N'. VI. vi.

lily-hvered liberals freedom a critical pragmatics and incorporeals before the subject subjectivity processesof emergence an ethics of the pre-individual

Bibliography

204 104 207 208 211 214 218 222

Acknowledgements Lots of people have hurled innovative and exciting ideas my way in the course of researching and writing this thesis, opening worlds I never realised existed. I want to especially thank the members of the Philosophy Graduate Department who continue to frequent that corner of the Arts Centre. Special thanks are due to Judy Purdom and Rachel Jones for those long chats full of support, ideas and encouragement. I am also grateful for all those Wednesday evenings spent with the stalwarts of the Feminist Philosophy Society. I am extremely grateful for my Warwick Award and the AHRB funding that made this time of writing possible. Thanks also to Professor Keith Ansell Pearson for the wealth of boundless enthusiasm and jubilation that propelled me into action each time my energies waned. His love supervision, patience, careful comments, provocative questions and of philosophy were much needed and appreciated; to those Warwick lecturers whose courses I attended; to Professor Richard Kearney for insisting I apply to Warwick in the first place; to my other friends who I have both neglected and bored with incessant and obsessive conversations about my thesis; and to Catherine Hoskyns and all her household for connected with providing such a supportive for environment much of my work. Dr. Hisham Sharabi set me off on this philosophical journey. I want to thank him warmly for being a most extraordinary teacher, for his for ideas, tentative and philosophical unreserved encouragement of my hope down bringing I that the critical and to earth. philosophy always his ideas of and practical engagements pervade this constructive spirit thesis. I have no idea where I would be had I not attended his courses at Georgetown, but I am sure it would be far away from the place I am. Finally thank you to my family for always being challenging and never letting me get complacent about my ideas. More importantly, thank you for being a wonderful, exciting, vibrant and loving bunch of people. I for better family. for And Paul thanks to not a could not ask house for landed his 'complete' I to a short visit at complaining when his for Without assiduous copy-editing, proofa year. and stayed intellectual engagement, philosophical critique, and emotional reading, been have task this a more undoubtedly of writiirl-g would support less enjoyable endeavour. arduous, more protracted and

IN

ABSTRACT

Deleuze opposes ethics to Morality. He claims that an ethics develops immanent criteria to evaluate modes of existence,while a Morality imposes transcendent principles. This thesis explores the question of ethics, and I invcstigate the possibilities of an ethics of the pre-individual. Consequently this enterprise involves the development of an alternative ontology of becoming corresponding to a philosophy of difference. By taking this trajectory, I seekto show that an anti-human human-ismis possible and demonstrate ho\"this might work. Deleuze and Guattarl always emphasise the practical and concrete nature of philosophyl therefore, in order to situate their concepts I begin the thesis with an examination of different theoretical approaches to the question of difference. However, I suggest that difference and heterogeneity cannot be simply affirmed in and of themselves since ne,,-%forms of domination also affirm difference. Mv next chapter follows up on this idea bN interrogating the allegation that philosophies of difference have made a political covenant with global capitalism. I draw on a distinction between power (Potentia) and Power (Potestas)in order to explain how different modes of social organisation and domination can minimise the creative and transformational capacities of humans. By analysing a number of theoretical accounts of capitalism I demonstrate how and why it differs from other social formations. Nonetheless, I conclude that philosophy can indeed be distinguished from capitalism. Philosophy, as the art of inventing concepts, develops the conditions for real experimentation and new ways of thinking, being and existing. By turning to Spinoza's Ethics I propose that by thinking about the human differeiitiallý', as a part of nature, we can develop an immanent ethics. I explain how Spinoza's ontology operates especially in terms of its renovated conception of the human. In generating an ontology that is not centred on the individuated individual but grasps instead the individual as both relational and a degree of power, the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the human are emphasised and she is opened up to her non-human becomings. Simondon's account of metastable being explores this in greater detail. He argues that we ha\,e tended to extrapolate from the individuated individual in order to try to understand its conditions of existence. Alternatively, we have relied upon a principle of individuation that pre-exists the process of individuation. By intertwining his focus on the process of his being that idea is more than unity, more than identity and individuation with fundamentally incompatible with itself, I present SiMondon's account of an ontology of becoming and his correlative conception of a pre-individual field. Residing at the core of his endeavour is a theory of difference and disparateness that understands identity to be derivative. emergent, partial, relative and

Repetition. I Simondon's emphasison disparatenessrecurs in Deleuze's work Difference and distinguish between to this idea in order a createdpossible and a realisable mobilise distinction. The this the to implications concept of ethico-political possible, and elucidate of the 'image of thought' that rests on a series of non-philosophical pre-suppositions helps us to critique dominant modes of thinking and acting. In addition to critique, I seek focus Once I thinking again to construct other ,vays of and existing. upon the prehuman I dimensions the transindividual in chapter of my concluding vvlien individual and different the conceptions of ethics and subjectivitý,that emerge once we transform m,ap An ethics of the pre-individual relies on ii-ni-nanent ontology. our understanding of does fetishise human, for the and ultimatelýnot evaluating modes of existence, criteria being things othetwise. constructs the possibilitý,of

Introduction

IXTRODUCTION

i.

disequilibrium

The process of hominisation "takes" in us, the way a crystal undergoes a phase change and solidifies: does becoming human consist of forever unbinding so as to be elsewhere and otherwise? Nfichel Serres,The NlafuralContract.(1992: 101).

We need to have a contract With the world. The incessantpollution, technological mastery, and expropriation of the resources of the earth have left a vold that responsibility must fill. Such is Michel Serres' diagnosis. We need a natural contract of symbiosis and reciprocity, rather than continuing to exist parasitically; fact, "In the the Earth speaks to us in terms of forces, vampires upon earth. bonds and interactions, and that's enough to make a contract" (Serres,1992: 39). Economists create their models to assessresource management using models of timeless, competitive equilibrium, and forget to factor in the indeterrmnac)-of the future (Ormerod, 1994: 75-6). They conclude all is fine with the world. Threehumanity hovers quarters of on the verge of starvation; the rest hover on the humanity. An ' false 'enlightened that atmosphere of cynicism verge of is an consciousness' (Sloterchjk, 1987: 5) pervades the domains of those who need to behaviours A their alter and values. stranglehold of exploitation shacklesthe rest. The system may teeter on faulty foundations but no-one will rock the boat. Serres thinks that perhaps more than even a morality, this calls for a religion to attach (refigare)us to this world, so radical and tumultuous is the necessity for the fabrication of a new series of relations with all beings, animate and inert, face In to global essence,we need a global philosophy microcosmic and cosmic.

"Like the tail of a comet, throwbacks or continuations of an ancient objective necesslt\ both diseases, hunger, linger third the and and and new residual, ravaging misery, still fourth worlds, growing exponentially. And those who should be held accountable - those livim, in the brilliant head of the comet, leavinL, this abject misery in their \\ake and is I This (and ing it them) this the am of a one who seek ones \ý isdom. are ery \ rnultiplý issuing frorn the results of our conditions second responsibility. a neN\ obligation, more 1990: (Serres, blo\\ latest the to the the of collective narcissism wealthy nations" actions 176).

l'NTRODUCTIO\'

dangers.

Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humankind has known that it holds the power to destroy itself From that time, sciencehas dominated other spheresof knowledge. But science knows too little of culture. Philosophy, for Serres,is a constructive enterprise; by inventing the conditions of invention (Serresand Latour, 1990: 86), it asks questions about everything. However, he is concerned that we are hurtling toward an era which is centred increasingly on domination and mastery which we ourselves cannot master.

Imperialistic thinking imposes a single method upon any problem. By employing does local to try a meta-language, it not approach and singular problems with methods that are re-cast each time. That would be an exercisein composition that gets close to the singularities that are its material. For Serres,substantivesand the be to verb violently impose their presence with regularm,, erasing these different him. Their horrifies "Sterile, texts singularities. constant recurrence in facile. There is nothing new under such a sun. In such a way the atomic bomb hills (93). Diverse the plain over which it explodes" and multiple rolling vitrifies him; (93). that to is pluralism appeal A vectorial operation of thinking that does not seek to dissolve but to create A Serres It movement. proposes. seizesand sustains relations or rapportsis what describe (substance) such processes of cannot effect or verb or substantive becoming, he claims, so another understanding of relations is called for. Invoking brimming basin, with relations and the image of a glacial river's percolating he freeze, fluctuate suggests that this turbulence and and networks that fluctuation interspersed with crystallisation and the carving of corridors or difficult (105). these ideas passages is a more adequate manner of thinking Greek PlOrmesis, pra.%7'S combinations of improvisational and 1ýletis,the ancient his foreshadow the maritime map where every of example cunning, and action fragihtýbe this traverses and vulnerability absolute an while invented route must spaceof risk.

INTRODUCTION

As we know, his method of abstracting no longer relies on the substantivC or N,erb, such asfteedomand beiq. (104). Instead it begins with the relation, a relation in movement, like a x-ector or a diagonal, that is not captured at any point. Likewise, the billowing and metastabihty of the flame evades capture and 'existence' by always remaining far from equilibrium (105). A tWe-position ('toward', 'between' or 'With', for example) resists capture, gliding, dancing and tracing relations in flux rather than fixing them. Instead of solid perception these notions operate in a realm of liquid or gaseousperception. Solidity emergesfrom a temporary coagulation or viscosity in this play of relations. Bergson and Lucretius catapulted us into movement and turbulence. Different fade forth, become Time throws relations criss-cross, surge possible and away. We thus avoid the imposition of spatiality that a everything out of equilibrium. beings like 'network' "Relations phrase spawn objects, and acts, not carries with it. dance! body, So Like the the Mind needs run, move, stand jump, vice versa. up, (107). movement, especiallysubtle and complex movement" Concepts are often used to totalise, demarcate, and obfuscate, argues Serres.He worries about philosophers taking on the role of public prosecutor, criticising, has kind This a of enclosure of concepts judging, tripping up and catching out. law and geometry since it presupposes the permanence particular relation with fiXity of values in the ascribed attributes and and stability of an outline and a fluctuation. This fuzziness Serres and wants to create concepts in properties. At but they remain rigorous. stake is the invention of a makes them anexact for 'inventions the of possible conditions transcendental space which opens up Serres We future (117). then says,to cast off equipped, as the are Michel Serres expresseswith evocative poetic (and scientific) imagery a number does he follow Not kcýtranstTnt that only to the that chapters the themes are of becon-nng, as opposed to a metaphysics of the movements of a philosophy of Jarnes William demonstrates he that, but as a thought of external relations solids,

3

INTRODUCTION

(1912) emphasises,remain irreducible to their terms. Serres' differs work greatly from what follows in this thesis, but as a 'shortcut', it communicates q#&-filely some of the concepts that we will explore. His resolute status as bntvlelff, gathering diverse materials to assemble and invent concepts, displays an irreverence found in Deleuze's and Guattari's works. His wandering relations and vagabond essenceshave echoesof Spinoza.

ii.

technophobia

and nature

Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. Gflles Deleuze and F61lx Guattarl, ll,"hat I'SPhilosoply?(1991 a: 96).

What is it to be human in this world? Is there an ineffable essenceof the human, human Can look behaviourists, for to or a nature? we geneticists, psychologists a human do human How set of characteristics? abstract rights affect concrete human existence?Can we construct an ethics without a theory of the essenceof human nature? We will not forget the human; humans are at once the things most harmful Spinoza But to one another, as useful and most once said. employing an fetish little 'human' the tells is a abstract category of about the and us very possibilities of

the human. Is it possible to pull the human from its

bomo This to to is the its place as return it natura? anthropomorphic pedestal has before Only that is set an urgency that is unsurpassed; now it challenge us. have Spinoza imagined. could not one that We will seek to situate the human within complex settings of relations, examining humans 2 different the processes of subjectification that shape the image of what humans We (and think thcy will talk of a N-arietyof ways in which others) are. di-versity, difference arguing in turn that Nveneed to and articulate questions of

I in this thesis I do not examinealternativetheoriesof the subject.Subjectivitý. for Guattarl. is is to the not confined object and that and subject ontologically prior entails a process Simondon's is It boundaries to the accountsof processesof closer subject. of \N'ithin the in be This my conclusion. clear made Nvill individuation.

4

INTRODUCTION

think býtbreand beyoildthe human condition in order to understand the emergence, and the potentials, of humans. Rather than delimiting a frame that would capture the essenceof the human, -\x-cwill develop a theory of affectivity and an ed-Ucsof singularities that displace the centrality and unity of the human by showing how this is the ýffeaof a power take-over3. Nature and artifice together name the process of production of the real. A from humanity narcissistic and anthropocentric separation of nature will no longer hold water, and appeals to the sanctity and uniqueness of buviati consciousnesswill be challenged. SamuelButler remarks, 'Plants [ ] show no sign of interesting themselves in human affairs. We shall ... never get a rose to understand that five times seven are thirty-five, and there is fluctuations in the price of stocks. Hence we say talking to no use an oak about that the oak and the rose are unintelligent, and on finding they do not business do But their that they own. our understand conclude not understand know intelligence? in Which talks this about what can a creature who way ' intelligence? He, the shows greater signs of or rose and oak? Samuel Butler, Erewhon(1872: 170).

Although contemplations upon consciousness will be largely implicit in this helps hilariously Butler's thesis, us to re-consider the controversial passage bring to any examination of the question of subjectivitV. presuppositions we Significantly his 'Book of the Machines' announces that Man is a machinate far (160). limbs his away on the earth, some near and some mammal, scattering Technology is not a tool but part of a machine (or assemblage)that modifies the human (which is another element of this assemblage).His Witty and remarkable descriptions of prosthetic devices herald the birth of the cyborg and are He Artificial Intelligence. notes suggestive of many contemporarý- approaches to lots 'extra-corporeal members', placing of that as one grows older one utihses ines' (160). brandishing 'see-en 91 one)smemorý- in a pocket-book and With Butler, sLiblectivity undergoes a radical twist. His writings generate a strange 26-7). 19722a. Guattari ( Deleuze See this, to and -1 related

5

INTRODUCTION

idea of subjectivity and the human that no longer focuses steadfastly on interhuman relations. Instead, we need to human that come up with other ideas of the longer no prioritise the integritý, and self-identity of the organism to the exclusion of all else. Deleuze saysin his seminars that he and Guattari never imagined that the organism would become defunct. The point is to consider both the varied and complex conditions that constitute certain patterrungs and sedimentations of relations, and to create other forms of relationality. They reiterate that we are all Humans must no longer beheve themselvesto groupuscules, we are all multiplicities. , be cut off from the world, transcendent and isolated. A new ethics must rest upon an anti-human humanism.

iii.

thinking

otherwise than being

This non-human pre-personal part of subjectivity is crucial since it is from this that its heterogenesis can develop. It would be to misjudge Deleuze and Foucault - who emphasised the non-human part of subjectivity to suspect them of taking anti-humanist positions! F6hx Guattarl, Cbaosmosis. (1992a: 9).

One always has to make a strategic decision when writing about Deleuze; his philosophical repertoire is vast. The rhizomorpl-iic nature of his philosophising lose focus his to the trails makes it easy one's chasing of concepts through the labyrinthine wanderings of both his own work, and those texts written with Guattari. By trying to cover everything, one can end up sayingvery little. Deleuze develop Guattari They to think that philosophy is a practical philosophy. and aim the art of inventing concepts. In the spirit of their enterprise, I seek to stage between productive encounters a number of their concepts and those of Simondon and Spinoza; Deleuze and Guattan call this process one of crhizomatising' concepts, bringing different concepts together in unexpected how Mýto show an in-imarient ethics of the pre-individual ultimate aim is wa),s. it I this think to of ethics in Nxay. readilýmight operate, and whý- is necessary develop have been taken to these ideas, such as admit that other trajectories might through

I-eibniz. Trý-ing to negotiate between critical commentar)- and 6

INTRODUCTION

constructive concrete philosophy is a precipitous path to follow, fraught with risk.

Critical commentaries have focused on Deleuze's work on Nietzsche, on the idea literature, of a minor on the concept of 'becoming-woman, and a renaissanceof Bergson has also been precipitated, in part, through Deleuze's readings of Bergson. However, Deleuze's relation to the Spinoza/ Simondon axis remains a severely neglected area of study (as does Simondon's own work). In fact, Deleuze's reading of SiMondon only warrants a few scattered pages in the entire literature both English for have French. It I secondary in this reason that and is concentrated on these thinkers. This focus makes this thesis a novel and original one. The theme of the pre-individual is central to the philosophies of Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon and Spinoza. I show why addressing this theme constitutes The idea of an ethics of the an important critical and constructive endeavour. difference. Deleuze's pre-individual is closely interwoven with own philosophy of Therefore, I begin my first chapter by discussing some contemporary approaches difference. difference However, the to the problem of and capitalist embrace of diversity highlights the fact that difference cannot be positivised in and of itself. Understanding the relation of capitalism and philosophy has to be of vital for anyone trying to provide a concrete philosophical account of importance I ethics. continue to examine this theme throughout the thesis, while providing a positive account of an immanent ethics of the pre-individual through the work Simondon. Spinoza and of By critiquing the assumed centrality of the individuated individual that pervades human 'an displace I the as a conception of many philosophical accounts, seek to helps The to the only us not pre-indivIdual of concept empire within an empire'. but the provides a also individual, of the relationahtýembedded understand becoming. The and critical of philosophy of a account rigorous and svsternatic demonstrated dimension I forma tiona of this ethics of the pre-individual is trans 'disparate' Thought' I 'Image the 5 the ideas of as explore of in chapter on the

7

INTRODUCTION

and the 'treatedpossible'. If we presuppose an identity, rather than understanding it as emergent and contested, we set up what Deleuze and Guattari call an disjunction; locked An exclusive an identinin on itself individual is,never closed on itself

Its pre-individual and transindi-vidual dimensions constitute key

dimensions of its realin-, opening it to diverse registers of alterin-, alloN-v-ing it to dissensus. affirm

"We cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the sociUs,correlative to a resingularisation of subjectivity, without a new way of conceiving pohtical and democracies that respect cultural differences - without multiple economic molecular revolutions" (Guattari, 1992a. 20-21). In certain respects Deleuze and Guattari's pro)ect reactivates Marxist problematics, especially in the context of their critique of capitahsm. However, they challenge a conception of the human human 'Master Universe, the that the as of proposing instead is a part of nature. They explore the non-human becorMngs of the human that constitute its for human The transformation. is not presupposedin their accounts. potential Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Frankfurt

Man14 was symptomatic of the impasse that the

School arrived at. Its futile turn to aesthetics in order to disrupt the

became forced It gesture. capitalist movement of generalised equivalence was a difficult to see how a quahtati'\Tetransformation of modes of existence might be Frankfurt Like the effected.

School, Deleuze and Guattari develop an ethico-

however, focuses their that immanent processes of creation; on aesthetic paradigm brimming disparate with and system is always at odds with itself, metastable, dis)unctions disparities The that to task inclusive produce is ethical potentials. but "There to a only is return nature, transversal no connections. open up political problem of the collective soul, the connections of ý,x-hich a society is

4 At those tirnes that I use the term 'rnan' and 'he' to stand in for all humans in this thesis it is because I arn paraphrasing the words of other philosophers. Although a critique of the is different this a constitute would necessary. authors of assumptions sexist and ethnocentric in be how the decided have their itself. I ser%ice of in to activated can concepts see thesis both critical and transformational strategies, rather than revealing their own shortcomings. illustrate ho, the to This is, of course, a shortcoming in rný own Nvork, ýNever.in order forced decision it I in detail, idual to make. the was a \\as pre-indi\ of ethics an of necessitý 8

INTRODUCTION

capable, the flows it supports, invents, leavesalone, or does a,,ý-ayNvith" (Deleuze, 1993a: 52). 1 will continue to explore these idcas throughout the rest of this introduction.

From his earliest works, Deleuze was keen to construct a philosophy purged of transcendence. Arguing from a Spinozistic perspective, he indicates that only a philosophy of immanence can serve to put ethics on a new footing, but this requires another way of thinking about the subject, or more specifically about processes of subjectification. The reason this seemsnecessaryto him is because by forms of the sad passions and ressentiment induced of social organisation and existence which serve to stifle a "logic of multiple affirmation and therefore a logic of pure affirmation and a corresponding ethic of joy" (1962: 17). This thesis explores the difficulties engenderedby this philosophy of im-manence. Deleuze and Guattarl have been accusedof philosophical idealism' and it is easy to see why this Might be the case.Their philosophy rhapsodises about nomads, becoming, singularities, forces, abstract machines, haecceities; a vast array of fabulations. It also seemsto operate at a level and in a domain verý, philosophical far

removed

from

people's everyday experiences and

cornmon-sense

understandings of themselves. It is sometimes as though the actuality of the has been dissolved favour fluxes, flows forces. The ' in of endless world and framework the the subject and of a systern of morality vanish solidity of left forces discourses. and with is a play of vanquished, and all we are apparently Ethics consequently appears impossible. Such readings fail to grasp the radicahtý, Guattari's I Deleuze's of ethics and subjectivity. understanding will show and of the critical, concrete and constructivist nature of their philosophy in chapter 5.

5 See Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 185-9) and Franqois Laruelle (1986: 58-9). 6 These kinds of readings are so wide-ranging it is impossible to indicate all the authors. They range fi-om introductory texts on so-called 'post-i-nodernism' to Judith Butler (1987: '10ý-217) to anything written by Terry Eagleton. This kind of interpretation appears to hedonistic, 'desire' Anti-Oedipils from as erotic. in of a particular reading emerge spontaneistic and primordial. 71 do not include Keith Ansell Pearson's and Franqois Laruelle's assiduous critiques in this cateoorv.

9

INTRODUCTION

Like Serres,Deleuze strives to oust the donunance be'. 'to He the thinks of verb philosophy has remained rooted in the problem of being IS and wants to reflect on conjunctions and relations (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 56-7) By supplanting 'to be' with an ontology of becoming, alternative logics and physics bodies of and relations become possible. This philosophy, like that of Serres,is a logic of multiplicities (Deleuze 1990a: 147; Deleuze Parnet, 1977: This and viii). logic of multiplicities does not rest on a formula, or set of principles; it is not reductionist. It does not try to dissolve heterogeneity but operates through symbiosis or sympathy. Its syntheses are not unified: they gather clusters of differenciated8 relations. This is not a philosophy of fragmentation but of fragility. Serres claims that the mechanics of materials teach us that a philosophy of fragments would be conservative (1990: 120). By shattering an object into tiny fragments ý-oucreate tiny localities that are incredibly resistant. "So a philosophy of fragments is hyperdefensive; it is the result of hypercriticism, of polemics, of battle, of hatred" (120). Some of the philosophers we will draw upon have been accusedof this hyper-fragmentation; a fragmentation that shatters the subject so much that becomes ethics impossible. On the contrary I want to emphasisethat terms like 'partial objects' do not imply division or fragmentation. Instead they develop ways of thinking about how new be fostered and new syntheses and symbioses connections and relations can different A hyper-differenciation that the proliferation of encourages emerge. groups, each appealing to an essentialistand eternal identity, will not create ncN-, being. A diversity seeksto capitalist appropriation of connections and modes of limits, differences valorising them in accordanceN6th within relative contain those how discover \Vc these ideas work throughout the will its (mlý-universal: moneý-. different how demonstrating tlicýof can provide a Nx-aýrest of this thesis, thinking about ethics.

8 Deleuze's concept of different ciation is explained on p 144 of m.\ thesis.

INTRODUCTION

Deleuze's philosophy of difference rests, according to Franýois'Laruelle, upon a thought of the inclusive disjunction - the relation of the non-relation (1986: _13). This inclusive disjunction is at the core of Deleuze's claims to be at once a philosopher of immanence, a thinker of unrs,, ocity, and a pluralist, empiricist and Deleuze advocate of polyphony and dissensus.One of the Nvaysin -\,, and -hich Guattari express this is through the concept of the assemblage. Sometimes this concept is interpreted as a temporary and static clustering of heterogeneous elements. It may be that Brian I\fassUMI's (1987) translation of 'assemblage' has dynamism has the this term qgencement as meant and activity of lost its impetus in English. It is for this reason important to emphasisethat the concept of assemblageentails a way of thinking about an active relationality that is not simply the affirmation of an aggregateof distinct terms. Instead terms can be how do, the theý, they in a given only understood in context of work, what Spinoza. The This becomes the chapter on ethical assemblage. especiallyclear in dual has technology problem of always emphasised the importance of the use have be In things to other words, a part of assemblagethat the technology is to be understood in their milieu rather than in abstraction. And the addition of another element may entirely transform the nature of the assemblage. To state what a 'thing' is is to speak of it in abstraction, as though it existed A set of properties is thus ascribed, and isolated, immutable and self-identical. possibilities of

existence and transformation

delimited and ordered. are

Furthermore, the genesis of its being, as well as the historical and social formations and geological sedimentations of power that mould it, are ignored. (Foucault taught us that power is diffuse and operatesin networks of relations of forces.)

Deleuze denounces Hegel for ridiculing pluralism as a naive consciousnesssaying depending has 'thing' Fvery 4). (1962: here, on 'this, that, multiple senses no,\x-' destructions these that the or aff1hations in and what relations it is caught up

INTRODUCTION

relations bring. Every 'thing' is a multiplicityý I explore this thought of multiplicIty, a thought that is, unsurprisingly, irreduciblv complex. I Nvantto see what the implications of such a thought are for ethics and for subjectivity. The draw I function concepts on are a of this problematic. Consequently the conjunction AND

keýplays a role in the theory of

assemblages,)ust as the prefix 'pre-' provides us with a way of thinking about the dimensions humanity. It does tl-lis by decentering the human from non-human of the heart of its investigations, by no longer presupposing the human as the origin or telosof these investigations, in order to think all the better the potentials of humans.

A logic of multiplicities displaces the centrality and primacy of individual terms It is in order to grasp the reality of relations, a reality that is no longer elposten*ofi. longer the thought the grounded in multiple is no of a multiplicity in which an but longer With One this the adjective a substantive. is no concept of multiplicity but into Multiple, to the terms opposed multiple enter a symbiotic relation that imposition Guattari, 42). (Deleuze 1972a: the resists unification or of identity and By focusing on this logic of multiplicities we can explore many of Deleuze and Guattarl's concepts ranging from the concept of 'difference-in-its elf' to those of logic This 'virtual' 'assemblage'. the the of multiplicities critiques the image and that thought gives to itself of what it is to think; it constructs a thought without image.

iv.

activating

Thinking

is

concepts:

philosophy

and resistance

interpreting

but

always experiencing, experimenting, not is always actuality, with, experiment experimenting and what we experience, histon, Without being, taking into shape what's new, what's what's coming the experiments would remain indeterminate [ ...1.

Gilles Deleuze, A'(gotiations(1990a: 106).

Donna Hara,,N-aN-says that "A comn-ntment to mobfle positioning and to I

-)

INTRODUCTION

passionate detachment is dependent on the impossibility of innocent 'identity' politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated in order to seewell" (1991: 192). This shift in perspective is evident in Deleuze's work. He admits in his televised inter-, Claire Parnet (1994-5) -lc,\x-swith that all his works have tried to discover the nature of the event, since such a concept could undermine the domination of the verb 'to be'. I have indicated the ethico-political

implications

of

such a move throughout

this introduction.

Haraway warns us that to see from below is a problem; it is not an innocent position, even though 'subjugated' standpoints are to be preferred (191). Even an attempt to 'see well' still blinds Deleuze to his own ideolog 1cal position as a "f ir stworld

intellectual

masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the

oppressed speak for themselves", according to Gayatri Spivak (1988: 292).

Spivak's hostile reading of Deleuze (and Foucault) presents them as thinkers who consistently ignore both "the episten-nc violence of imperialism and the international division of labour" (289). She accuses them of constructing a homogeneous Other (of third-worldism) (288-9). Because these philosophers have no truck with the concept of ideology, she feels they do not consider the desire, relation of power, subjectivity and cannot therefore articulate a theory of interests (273).

She is, of course, correct to note that Deleuze and Guattan eschew the concept Guattari, Peleuze 1972a: 104). They of ideology and argue that when the masses because but illusion their they to interests, it is own not act against are subject an from the position of the they make concerns rather unconscious investments desire. This is not the same as speaking of a subject wbodesires.Their renovated differentl)desire, to theories power, subjecti-,7-itA, and interests operates relation of but does It the it identities speaksof, exanuinesthe not presuppose of ideologý-desire (for for the inN-estments of emergence of certain collective conditions be by fascism, simply explained an appeal to which cannot example the case of ideologý)-

13

INTRODUCTION

Like Spinoza, they simultaneously affirm that 911i en the seriesof causesthat havc produced any given reality it is as perfect as it can be - even if that means populations are at the lowest ebb of their activity - and strive to transform that reality through an etl-iics of liberation. These positions are not contradictory bUt rest on a Bergsonian critique of the retrospective illusion of the 'possible' (Bergson, 1889). The realisablepossible extrapolates the future from a present condition. The future then seemsto pre-exist as a ready-made solution to a givcn problem. Deleuze introduces the concept of the 'virtual' to avoid the mechanism of resemblance that we perceive in the 'possible-real' relation. The virtual is but to the opposed actual is absolutely real.In this context, the virtual operates as the real condition for the creation of new modes of existenceas a t-reatedpossible. These do not pre-exist their actualisation in the guise of models or plans. Their from to the their idea of the virtual as a resistance notion of ideology stems logic the possible it is as conjoined with conception of pluralism and of t-reated discussed that multiplicities earlier. we Creating is a form of resisting, claim Deleuze and Guattarl. Their clusters and dominant They the thinking. orders of oppose a networks of concepts challenge hierarchical thought to thought and rhizomatic an arborescent which is fashion A the rhizome operates in of a network without any representational. dWre Its is to seek connections, raison unifying point or organisational principle. been have be thresholds quahtatively transformed once certain immanent and to life This is as experimentation. reached. The arborescent image of thought (Deleuze, 1968a: 129-167) not only has a describes but a principle of organisation, what terms, philosophical importance A thought that rests upon concepts or values are privileged, NNhatis exclude& differences, reducing them to its categories, cannot and assimilates U11lVersals All been has Everything that in advance. set out already singularities. grasp becomings, "belongs to a thought without image - nomadism, the xvar-macl-: iine, languages or nuptials against nature, capture and thefts, interregnums, minor -)eleuze denounced Ian as a nuisance" and 11 crushed etc. guage, of -s stammering 14

INTRODUCTION

and Parnet, 1977: 14). The art of creating taxonomi*esand classifications will not shudder to an early end if principles of universahn- are not made to bear down upon them, but will operate differently, finding new relations of non- subsumptive commonality.

Spinoza explains with joy the importance of composing different relatiions and finding the relations and activities that suit you, as well as the ways that these are expressed.His understanding of a philosophy (and ethics) of immanence as one force (puz*ssamelpotenfiq) of and not of properties or propositions is absolutely crucial to Deleuze's argument that Being is univocal. It also helps us to further ic of multiplicities. Deleuze says, "Human forces our understanding of a lo 91 1 (having an understanding, a will, an imagination, and so on) have to combinewith forces: form from other an overall this combination, but everything arises depends on the nature of the other forces with which the human forces become linked" (1990a: 117).

Deleuze and Guattari invent new ways of

understanding processes of

subjectification and singularisation. In tandem with this is the blossoming of kind another of ethics. Throughout their works they draw upon the conception field of a pre-individual, pre-personal of singularities in order to grasp a dimension of being (becoming) that is no longer individual nor personal nor This is important not just to trace the genesis of the individual, a universal. has that the individuated being as its telos,but to comprehend the movement domain of

transformation that cannot be designated in energetico-spatio-

temporal terms. This domain does not fulfil the criterion of being a condition of but for for the the invention of the new. offers possibility experience, conditions This transformation of the waý-that we think about the individual feeds into our being. The kind 'subject' thought the that and of subject, understanding of Deleuze and Guattari talk about (on the occasions they use the word) concerns longer that personal. are no processes of subjectification and singtdarisation Reahtv is dvnarnic, processLialand creative and thev create mobile concepts in accordance with this. 15

1'-', ýTRODUCTION

V.

singular transformations

A singularity is a threshold point; the moment N-, -here everyd-iing is transformed. These transformations make a bistog but the event is the imperceptible and critical point of transformation. Deleuze quotes P6guy, Events have critical points just as temperature has critical points points of fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation, coagulation and crystallization. And even within the event there are states of surfeit which are precipitated, crystallized, and determined only by the introduction of a fragment of a future event. Charles P6guy quoted in Gilles Deleuze, TI)eLouic of Sense.(1969: 53).

I want to concentrate on the incorporeal, transformational and critical aspect of This denigrate disn-niss history (and this thesis. to in an event is not or memory)l This be ludicrous (and as unimportant. would unhveable).If to create is to resist, as Deleuze and Guattari assert, it is to create from a situation with a set of limitations. They length 'assemblages' 'machines' talk materials and at about and (the Feudal machine, the Capitalist machine ) that produce different kinds of ... formations, subjectivity, power modes of existence and relationality. "If you tie him be 'Express friend', he to the someone up and say most able to yourself, will he doesn't be 96). (Deleuze 1977: In Parnet, that to tied is say want up" and being they to tap into, and create, other ways of and capacities of essence, want expression. A singularity is a bifurcation point. Things are no longer as they used to be... Our language is filled with expressionsspeaking of these states- 'I'm cracking up'... 'It

9 Deleuze writes a great deal on memory. His book Bergsonism (I 966a) explored this theme in depth. His chapter on 'Repetition' in Difference and Repetition (I 968a) explores different kinds of tirne and memory (and the constitution of different selves) from the passive Bergson habits that makes time pass, and the to the of virtual memory present, of contractile future. is LThe 1101, In Cinema the Nietzschean that of the a repetition CI)IC171return eternal . It?7age (1983) he draws upon this Bergsonian image of the virtual \vhole and describes an he Guattari, (1972a) In Anti-Oedipus ical mobilises with conception of mernory. ontolo,, Nietzsche's theatre of cruelt\ to discuss a memory embedded in the flesh that marks a collective rnernorisation.

16

INTRODUCTION

has reached breaking point...

'under pressure'... 'enough is enough'. These

phrases express an intolerable situation, the point where something has to give. 'I'l-iis may take place on the grand-scale imagine a society arrives at such a supersaturated state that a minor incident triggers a revolution (or a war). The aftermath of the assassinationof Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a nineteen year idified and routinised existence can also be utterlýold student illustrates this. Ri91 transformed by the addition of a new, apparentlý, banal element to one's existence. Suddenly everything changesand possible worlds are actuahsed.11' Guattari. spent a great deal of time figuring this out when working with schizophrenics in La Borde chnic." If creation is resistance,,it attempts to transform concrete conditions and to create a space for other modes of valonsation and existence.If a rhizome is an anti-memory it is becauseit escapes don-unantmodes of identification and invents new connections and relations.12

vi.

the engendering

of the virtual

Deleuze explains how this strange ontolog), that we have been exploring might function by developing a difficult but revelatory theory of difference in Dý1, 1ýrent, e . Repelition (1968a). his From 1956 essay on 'Bergson's Conception of and Difference' Deleuze had tried to show the necessity for developing a concept of 'difference -in-its elf'. I will argue in chapter 5 that there is not Just a philosophical for but this motivation exercise an ethico-political one."

10This idea has resonanceswith contemporary researchesinto chaos theory that speak of the famed 'butterfly effect'. See also Prigogine and Stengers, (1988). Entre le temps et VýIcrnitj. Librairie Arth&me Fayard. '' Guattari worked at La Borde clinic with Jean Oury and Franqois Tosquelles (who himself for long Fanon Frantz time). a worked with I) See Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 223-4) on history and politics in relation to the event. 13Like Paul Gilroy, I try to hold together ethics and politics in order to set out a practical beyond He that to need get argues we nationalism in order to reevaluate the philosophy. significance of the modern nation state, and to examine closely political and economic information in the the the politics of relationship of and the practices of context of relations He goes on to say "Its effects underpin more recounisably political accumulation. capitalist h like transnational throu, the centrality of ecological movements which. growing changes -, their insistence on the association of sustainabilivy and justice, do so much to shift the moral built" the modern separation of politics and ethics on was which and scientific precepts (1993): 7). See also Paul Patton (2-1000)and Ian McKenzie (1997) for sorne ideas of ho\\ I -/

INTRODUCTION

Deleuze was fascinated with the concept 'becoming'. He revelled 'in the ,-,-a)of that this notion eluded all Plato's attempts to capture and contain it Alice getting bigger (than she was) and smaller (than be) The she will simultaneously. slippery nature of such an idea resounds with the notions of intensitýyand singularity that we will examine in detail in chapter 4. A temperature, redness, a wind, to run, a laugh... all of these transmit his idea of becoming because they and intensity be cannot captured, identified and delimited. They are pre-personal and preindividual.

We saw earlier the importance of symbiotic relations in Deleuze's and Guattarl's thought. The concept of symbiosis is connected to the idea of a becoming because it gives reality to the relation between two terms in a way that does not make it simply an effect of the encounter of those terms. In that encounter there is a qualitative transformation. Butler showed us how humans are modified býtheir prostheses. We will see how this kind of idea relates to concepts of becoming and intensity in chapter 6. Deleuze mobilises and 'synaesthesises'all of these ideas in order to articulate his conception of a pre-individual transcendental field in 'Immanence: A Life...' (1995). Here, he demonstrates clearly that this idea of transcendental philosophy does not signify a quest to map the conditions of possibility of experience, but is for the production of reality and the invention of the concerned with conditions the new In this vein of thought, he remarked of the will to power that, if it constitutes a superior empiricism, this is because it is an essentially plastic is it that than no wider conditions, that changes itself with the principle what determines itself in each case along with what it determines. conditioned and The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions. Philosopý)),. Gilles Deleuze, A'ielýsche (1962: 50). and

Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts might impact upon political theory and the field of political philosophy.

18

INTRODUCTION

Earlier we looked briefly at the concept of the virtual in relation to the conditions for the production of the new When we come to speak further of the role of the virtual in this philosophy in relation to a 'transcendental empiricism', the circuitous nature of a kind of 'autocatalytic' feedback between it and the actual be borne must in mind. There are many virtuals operating in Deleuze's philosophy]4 but I want to suggest a couple of points of contmonahty between them. The virtual never operates in a transcendent manner; it always names a spaceof potential or transformation, whether it be the diagonal Ariadnean thread that makes the Whole open in Cinema/: TheMovementImage(1983), the field of potential of DýJýrenteand Repetition(1968a) or the event of 11"bat1SP&losopl! y? (1991a). The aspects of the virtual that I want to concentrate upon relate to my how Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophies of inunanence work. to concern show The virtual/actual relation so key to DýJýren(-e Repetition does Alain and not, as Badiou (1997) would have us believe, imply a Platonism of the virtua115.Instead it forces us to think of the possibilities that can be unleashedwithin a system, the donuinant that subjective and affective relations emerge once we rupture a image difference In thought that to, it of conjoins identity. subsumes under, or effect, it from 'common-sense' to move exhorts us a understanding of reality, that thinks in accordance with a representational model of thought and operates in accordance with a principle of recognition, to the thought of a pre-individual field. T I-Lisopens up a space for a politics of transfiguration, and an ethics 16 that invent modes can new of existence. premised upon immanent criteria

vii.

the pre-individual

as state of excess

Gilbert Simondon haunts all of Deleuze's work right until his final article 'Immanence: a Life...'. His understanding of protvsSes of individuation rests on the

14See Keith Ansell-Pearson (forthcoming) for meditations on this theme. Neither does it correspond directIN NvItha sensiblelintelligible dichotomy. Gilroy (1993a: 37) takes this term from Seyla Benhabib as he asks ho%vutopias are concei\ ed.

19

IXTRODUCTION

initial articulation of a transcendental field harbounng pre-individual singulanties. Writing just after the publication of Prigogine's groundbreaking "vork on dissipative systems, he is attuned to many of Prigogine's ideas. He blended physics, biology, chemistry, sociology, technology and philosophy into a fantastic concoction. This absolutely captivated Deleuze,',, and Simondon's theoretical apparatus would be key to Deleuze's enterprise of constructing a transcendental empiricism refreshingly and resolutely bereft of appeals to any transcendent realm.

SiMondon claimed that by solely focusing on the individual or group we linger on the verges of an impoverished reality. With this observation he strikes close to the heart of Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophical adventures. He explains that we fail do pr&, to to the need understand of individuation and we will so if we trý, esses to explain the genesisand becoming of the individual by extrapolating from traits being, by the or characteristics of or appealing to principles already individuated hylomorphism He introduces the concept of individuation such as or atomism. be field describe 'zone' the to that pre-individual in order cannot explained a of by appealsto categoriespren-nsedupon a pre-existing subject or object. This understanding of pre-individual singularities, married with the differential how by Guattarl, Deleuze to these ideas are reveals us and ontology proposed fundamental to re-thinking subjectivity and ethics. Indeed Etienne Bahbar couples SiMondon and Spinoza and argues that Spinoza, contrary to Hegel's claims, is 4,1 In prot-esses seek to show chapter of individuation. only ever thinking about how all these themes resonate by clarifying further the concepts of the preSpinozist. Simondon believes, Bahbar make a individual and transindividual that, SIpinoza, like Sffnondon, will be revealed to be a philosopher of immanence and force. He proposed an understanding of the individual and relationahtý- that is heretical dynamic the of understanding an concealing collective, and processual, relationships

of

bodv, and individual mind and

17Scc Deletize (1969: 104-5,1344 n.3) and (I 968a: 146). -

Nature. His theorv of and

1

INTRODUCTION

affectivjtý, and philosophy of force are central to our task of re-imagining ctliics (and subjectivity).

Spinozaunderstandsthe imagination to be impressionistic.It revealsthe stateof body (and mind) as it is affected by other bodies (and minds). An abstract our phrase or imagewill evoke different imagesdependingon how a body has been by shaped the relations it has enteredinto. Spinozasaysthat a soldier who sees the tracks of a horse will think of the rider and of war, while a peasantwill think of a plough and a field JI. pr.18. sch.). This is a passiveand reactivc mode of existencethat indicatesthe stateof our bodiesrather than cultivating relationsof com.monality that enhanceour powers of existing, helping us to discover our thresholds.Only through an ethicsof experimentationcan we learn what is good for us. Abstraction as generalisationerasesthe specificityof different bodiesand An minds. essentialismthat can neither cope with those specificities,nor engage bodies diverse formations their in with activitiesand and compositions,provides fertile for a ground reactive stereotypingand prejudice, or in-group claims to superiority. Spinoza's conception of essenceis nod-iing other than such a dynamical and relational activity. He calls it conatusJIL pr.7), which relates it to his philosophy of 34). 3 learn how (Potentia) J. In Spinoza's power pr. chapter we will ethics is one both 'network' terms the terms power in of singularities, expressed in of of and This "' of relations with other existing modes. conception of reality as processual for fluid longer taxonomies, premised upon principles of no and relational calls homology, but (SiMondon the resemblance or on commonality of singularities. beautiful for logic the that grasps and passageson need a new writes some ) Spinoza differences. 'transduction'. Finally, He calls it volunteers a comprehends foster (Poteslas). Power Power their to capacities strips individuals of critique of by denuding them, imposing an abstract image multiple affects and connections,

181 realise I arn introducing sorne unfamiliar terms here, terms I will explain later. but I do indi\ idual. be It draw the the to this to this of concept of may radical re-working attention that such a teri-n is no longer appropriate.

21

INTRODUCTION

that servesto deny and block diversity and movement.

I will examine Spinoza'sEMICsin some detail and show how he thinks about a praxiology of liberation that rests on new forms of association.In chapter 61 fuse these ideas with Deleuze's and Guattarl's complex theories of will relationahtyand emergence.Their ethologIcaland musicalmotifs lead us toward a philosophy of praxis that seeks to compose new relations and invent new possibilitiesof existing.By displacingthe centralityof the human they accentuate the reality of a non-human nature that traverseshumanity and makes ethics possible.I try to tl-iink, along with Nietzsche,beyond the human condition and to suggestother ways of d-tinkingabout subjectivity,relationahty,and consequently ethics. This pre-occupation with the question of difference led Deleuze to cultivate, in his own writings and his work with Guattari, a veritable bestiary of concepts clustering about this idea of 'difference-in-itself'. Maný- of these concepts are unfamiliar, counter-intuitive (or intuitive if you are a Bergsoman) and force a radical shift in the ways we think about the emergence of subjectivity. Vincent Descombes (1991: 120) says that the penchant for critiquing the subject and subjectivity amongst French philosophers remained limited to critiquing the T Guattari Deleuze the to that of subject and subjectivity. t'oncepts want show and futile does have the agree element of is would critique if it not as its correlate transformation and construction of new possibilities of thinking and being. We favour displaced the in are swept into an atmosphere in which of subject is further detail. processesof singularisation, an idea we will explore in It is sometimes difficult to understand why Deleuze and Guattarl make frequent 'assemblages' (qgenivments), 'abstract monstrous concepts such as machines' use of feeble do These 'transversal neologisms not constitute a communication'. and desire for obscurantism but are an integral part of their understanding of v,-hat does Philosophy not seek to expose an underlying reahty or to philosophy is. The It thinks in, concepts. nonrepresent and mediate experience. invents, and

INTRODUCTION

philosophical presuppositions that shape the dominant image of thought of a society are laid bare in order to create new possibilities of thinking (and consequently of acting). Deleuze ah,,,ays insisted that thought and existence were restricted by the prevailing dogmatic image of thought and continued to expand on this theme until the end of his life. 19 Although Deleuze seldom speaksof ethics at length, an ethics rumbles along the cracked surface of all his writings. Moreover, despite the fact that his specific allusions to a new thought of subjectivity remain somewhat guarded and (although this is always animplicit motivation in all of his writing) the sporadic, proliferation of concepts he introduces - haecceities, singularities, desiringmachines...- are all implicated in this different understanding of the potentials of subjectivity. Guattari also develops a conception of processual subjectivity and an his Again how this operatesin our ethics of singularities in own work. we will see final chapter. viii.

the appropriation

of difference

We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of becoming the prevents of subjected peoples. capitalism, which Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, Wl'hatis Philosoply?(1991a: 108).

In the meantime, however, I want to ground my theoretical apparatus. I am full flight Marx launch the and into of philosophical abstraction when reticent to Engels' scathing remarks echo to the present day. In The GermanIdeolqV(1932) they comment with disdain upon the way that philosophers attempt the 'liberation' of 'man' through abstract phraseology, ignoring the real struggle of first This I liberation two chapters is \N-hy want to spend rny in the real world. real has debate difference, debate that real a concerning the question of situating this ethico-political implications.

19See Deletize (1962 and 1968a).

23

INTRODUCTION

The invocation of so maný,difficult be and unfamiliar terms can only Justified if they serve to break existing habits of thought that limit possibilities of thinking and existing. These operate, like most sanctions, as an invisible and inaudible realm that springs to life in the face of transgression. The sedimentation of ical structures, or NvaN-s being, social, political, cultural, economic and psycholo91 of 1 be cannot considered without an understanding of power relations. In my first I chapter want to explore some of the ways that difference, in the broadest sense, has been silenced and also the ways that it has come to voice. I want to positivise difference, dissensus and diversity, but not in a way that ignores the specific realities of different power formations, and not in a way that appeals to essentialismin any absolutist (and particularist) manner. I believe Deleuze and Guattari's critique and invention of concepts rests to a large extent upon an opposition to what bell hooks calls White Capitalist Patriarchy. In my first chapter I will examine some of the ways that people haN-e articulated their thoughts, concerns and ideas about 'difference'. This is not simply to contextuahse my own problematic but also serves to communicate the concrete nature of the philosophising I am engagedin. In chapter 2,1 contend that a fruitful way to grasp the radical nature of Deleuze's Guattari's responses to these questions is to situate their work in the context and Although I recognise both the limited (and polemical) nature of global capitalism. feel I bone this that that this of my exposition of area, it is clear of was a major for both After 'Capitalism thinkers. they two contention all, wrote volumes on fact, Schizophrenia'. have In Deleuze "I Guattan F6hx I think and once said, and different but both Marxists, You two in remained our seewe of us. ways,perhaps, think that aný-political phflosophý-must turn on the analysisof capitalism and the developed" 171). has (1990b: waý-sit Guattaris

final book

ChaoswoSIS (1992a)

was written in exphclt opposition to what

lic understood to be the mass-mediatisation of society and the restricted and '14

IXTRODUCTION

deformed nature of capitalist subjectivitýýSubjectivi i i ity for Guattari, 1 is never prebut existent is produced. Deleuze also pinpointed a shift in the machination,s of from 'societies of discipline' to 'societies of control' (1990c); the latter societies signifies a mutation of capitalism into a society of communication based on labour Antonio Negri immaterial and modulating operations of power. and Michael Hardt take up this analysis of global capitalism in their book Empire (2000). My analysis of this text is primarily concerned with the processes of flUldity fle ibility 'new' the that they the subJectification and 1 and xi of capitalism delineate. I also exarrunethe commodification of difference. I want to show wllýthe capitalist appropriation of difference and diversity does not signal a deathknell for an ethics of liberation. As I have indicated the rest of the thesis will seek to lay out a philosophical framework that emerges from these problems. I will conclude by showing how Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts opens up new ways of thinking about identity subjectivity,

for by and ethics showing not only the necessitý-

be Serres but how these transformational praxes, says,cast composed and, as can off

25

Chapter One

Difference

Diversity and

DIFFERENCE

I.i.

AND DIVERSITY

philosophical underpinnings

What follows is not pure philosophy. (What philosophy ever isý Contan-unation and symbioses are enriching.) It gravitates about two central themes - subjectIvAN, These familiar, discourse. and ethics. themes are even well-worn, in philosophical My aim is not one of synopsis, overview or criticism of these fields. That would be hubn's.Rather I engage in a positive and constructive endeavour, trying to extract the ethico-political ramifications of a certain series of philosophical foreign My concepts. presentation of ethics may seem since I will seek to show how the thought of an emergent and partial subjectivity necessitatesputting aside philosophical approaches that rest on a presupposition of either subject or object (phenomenology, positivism ). ... However, rather than rushing headlong into the minutiae of the strange ontology that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate,it is important to situate their problematic. If does fantastical, this the philosophy is invention, shot through with an element of banish It to is also a pragmatics, concerned with transformations it idealism. not Such a pragmatics requires, as we will see,an understanding of of social practices. the virtual, the potentialof transformation. Franýois Laruelle believes that all of Deleuze's work is a 'prodigious' variation on difference For Laruelle, (1986: 7). Nietzschean the one theme of a concept of Difference problematic

(La Dýffýren(-e)names a constellation of thinkers and a particular (15) arising from nowhere to fight a battle on several fronts,

has dialectical Difference contradiction. including those of phenomenology and dominated the philosophy of the twentieth century (17). It concerns a distinctive waý- of

articulating

Difference

philosophical

language by expressing the autonomy

of

from the principles of Being and Unin-, raising it, in the case of

Deleuze and Nietzsche, to the po-\x-cr of a principle

(18). As a philosophical

decision, not onlý- is it a sN-ntax,but it expresses a particular understanding of the (16). Laruelle the takes the issue NX-1th real of experience certain a real, and is also I (39), thinking shall this something mode of of circularity and presuppositions

26

DIFFERENCE

AND DIA'ERSITY

return to later. I think, however, that in the above insights he offers an acute diagnosis (and critique) of the symptom difference. of The question of

difference constitutes an implicit starting point for this

exploration of subjectivity and ethics. A philosophy that can think 'difference-initself',

rather than always situating difference in relation to "forms

of

representation which reduce it to the Same [ ]" (Deleuze, 1968a:xix) finds itself ... more capable of comprehending emergence, process and the invention of new modes of existence.

relevant or relative Paul Patton (2000) reminds us that Deleuze does not write political philosoph) but shows instead how philosophy is inherently political. Dý)ýrent'e Repe io zfi and 11is . not simply a philosophical treatise on the interrelations of difference and repetition but contains the lagged beauty of untamed thought that vies with formahsm. in order to give birth to a possibility of thinking and being otherwise. Deleuze, as Laruelle intimates, posits difference as a principle and gives it a primacy over identityý Previously the concept of difference had been reduced to cmerely'a conceptual difference (difference-ftom). This giddy affirmation of difference and intensities provokes a whole new way of thinking about the subject. This is a world of pre-personal singularities and nondiluted but that personal individuations is not into an elusive spiritualism is thrown instead into practice. It is an exciting doubling in philosophy that explores the interrelation of virtual and actual. The detective work of tracing these future that awaits creation. concepts takes place in a But another question foflo,,xs in these tracks that asks what the illicit preit the that shape understanding of what is to think philosopl-ýcal presuppositions (and what can be thought) are. The dominant and dogmatic image of thought hinges upon a modcl of recognition that seeks to assirmlate difference to the llý Ii 'on ý) 1968a: Iti I analogy and oppos' e eLzc, xv). catcgorlcs ()f identitv, slMllaritv,

DIFFf'REINCE

AND DIVERSITY

This addressesmany of the questions about representationalism and universalism that traditional political theorists refuse to acknowledge.

Deleuze's work interrogates a philosophit'al difference, concept of N-etit shares many of the concernsand criticisms of those thinkers whosewritings we will be A Nietzscheamsm Deleuze's through examining shortly. subversive runs oeuvre that endeavoursto re-evaluateall values.The upheavalsthat trail in the "X-ake of his thought do not stem from a postmodern obduracy on his part, but from a refusalto submit to conventionalwaysof seeingand questioning. Deleuze never tried to get rid of the concepts of identity and samenessbut "was forms how it identity is constituted, and what concerned with the question of from 29). (Patton, 2000: He the mechanisms of a to takes" escape sought burrowing through its architectonics to create new structure of representation, logic his kernel I of entry points and exits. will argue that this ambition is at the This this. of multiplicities and will show the ethico-political implications of Power to that the seal off attempt of organisations argument with an constitutes fundamentally that challenge their modus operandi. thoughts and practices Otherwise variation and invention are only permitted within certain limits. Guattari's Deleuze In addition, we will consider the striking situatedness and of We the their in context of the read collaborations must political. philosophy of do They to the critique and create challenge off shrug not global capitalism. labyrinthal from flight' 'lines the of neointerspersals of or escape-routes Uncannily, 'deterritorialisations' and capitalism(s). of relative archaisms and disconcertinglý- for some, they summarily refuse to approach the question of the human in accordance with traditional (or even contemporarý-) norms as when The\the "Human market with manNon coexist can axioms. are rights theN-claim, are the property, which of security those concerning other axioms, notably (1991a: [ ]" them theýthan contradict them more even suspend or unaware of ... 107). Is this an indifference to the fate of humanity, satisfying their critics that an desired their the of cocoon in NN-omb-hke immersion was thesc two philosophers 28

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSM7

own desiring- flows

Contrary to appearances,at stake here is not the assumption of an anti-human stance that repudiates humanity. Remarkably enough, the opposite is true. Let us take an example to show where their real concerns he. Democracies are majorities, say Deleuze and Guattari (1991a), so we need to ask about the democracy elements of a that elude its grasp; its 'becomings-tn.noritanan'. The material and incorporeal universes that strip humans of dignitý- create a zone of intoleration - the threshold point that we came across in our introduction - and potentially the transformation of a miheu. By discovering and inventing 'problematics' which result from a disparateness,a tension in a sN,, stem, they construct their inunanent philosophy of the political. But this philosophy is one founded in critique. As Eric Alliez stresses,their philosophy is an etho-ontology (1997: 85).

Spinoza's Ethics rests upon at least one negative (i.e. empty) though fundamental human far We to that proposition the crux of about nature. could go so say as Spinoza's ethical theory is located in the proposition that humans are nomhere born free and are everywhere in chains. Ethics for him is a ceaselessprocess of liberation. Liberalism, that posits a discrete or atomistic individual, and by Spinoza's 'common that con-imunitarianism, abstracts a good', are challenged he believes (though too that complex account of individuation and relationality democratic forms of organisation and association best nourish the potentials of humans).

Deleuze and Guattarl radicalise these ideas, mobilising his theory of affectivity in f',

I'%Tour

becomings and multiplicities. of a theory of assemblages,and accounts of

These terms are prior to form and structure, object and subject. Thcy displace the An centrality of the subject and re-imagine the question of subjectiITJty. eagerness to invent a new- conception of

domains from that travcrses subjectivity

basket-weaving to and ancient mythology to technology to poetry, quilt-making ecology, reveals the extraordinarily ambitious and unusual nature of their \x-()rk. i9

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

Like Michael Hardt (1993) and Paul Patton (2000), 1 believe Deleuze and Guattan are gesturing toward a radical democracy by proposing a concept of critical freedom. The radical nature of this democracy does not sImply address the question of inclusion. Tt is a mutant mosaic of figures from Alarx and \Lffl to Butler and Aristotle. Although Deleuze and Guattarl have coherent theoretical accounts of the emergence and operations of over-coding of the State, as well as a rigorous theory of capitalism, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these detail the they deserve.My work will concentrate on the 'utopianism' elements in by their trying to set out how this operates in the context of the of philosophy State and capitalism. In order to articulate the radicahty of their venture it is important to situate it alongside other theoretical approaches.

I. M.

theory and practice

A non-evaluative definition of democracy presents it as a "system of decisionmaking in which all those who are subject to the decision have equally effective determine to the political outcome of the decision-making" (Hyland, 1995: power 81). Although I can understand the concerns about 'moral imperialism' and 'relativism' that precipitate such a definition, the formalism of this account of democracy leaves something to be desired, even as it purports to include Athenian democracy previously excluded groups. is often posited as qualitatively democracies despite to its exclusion of much of the contemporary superior legendarily Aristotle had But postulated that no manwho needs to work populace. for a living could be an effective citizen. Does democracy in mass capitalist democracy Greek hijack to mask its own the qualitative superiority of societies democracy have face? do Or the to re-think question of -\N-e Solely quantitatwe altogether? Like many ferninist and post-colonial critics I Nvantto contend that the exclusions but dismissed be democracies ultimately as innocuous, unfortunate, cannot of

0

DIFI, ERENCE AND DIVERSITY

democracý. functioning The "11 incidental to the actual of a co-option of differences under the umbrella of universahsm still retains a thought of difference as deviation from a norm, refusing to re-imagine democracy through diversity. As Slavoj Zizek often surnUses,marginalised groups are 'included out'. Political theorists have consistently failed to interrogate the processes of has traditionally upheld as an invisible constant normalisation of a system which "aN-erage-white-heterosexual European-malethe speaking a standard or standard language [ I" (Deleuze and Guattan, 1980: 105). Humanism has an insidious ... by been has these tainted underbelly of racism, classism and sexism, and be This ignored. practices. cannot Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights. Gflles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, If"hal is Philosoply?(1991a: 107).

The final passagesof Fanon's The [Vrelthedqj' tl)e Eartl) decrý,the inhumanity of Europe's humanism. He says "Leave this Europe where theýýare never done The 311). (1961: 1" find [ Man, them talking of yet murder men everywhere they ... Africa b)be hypocrisy Europe a rewarded making are not to of recklessnessand be Fanon For Europe. to the this create a renovated opportunity could new ical humanity, one no longer shrivelled, amputated and enslaved bý- raciolo91 discourse and practice. The challenge is then not to oppose the whiteness of Europe with a reinvigorated blackness of Africa, but to invcnt a new concept of Ie for Man I "When the humanity. He remarks, stý, of in the technique and search Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of documented, been have The and (312). wellterrors modernity of murders" In been have the of spirit sustained. purported it to the universalisms challenges human. I the Fanon's work, seek to imagine other possibilities of differences arise from

specific constructing or understanding Some different of conceptions -avs. theorised v, in therefore problematics, and are Ways of

20'-,ee Carol Paternan (1988), GenevieNe Lloyd (1984) and Molra Gatens (I 996a).

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

difference even requirea theoretical position of 'ustification the discrin-uinatorv practices of racisms, for instance (Bahbar and Wallerstein, 1988: 19). By examining how difference is mobilised and articulated as a category, we NX-111 how difference can be mobilised as a principle and a force of consider transformation. Exploring texts relating to "race", gender, ethnicitv, culture and does nation not conflate these different zones but will, I hope, draw out the richness of relations and complexity between and within these domains, both 'in terms of critique and the constructions of new waý,s of being. The very category of the human needs to be re-thought. Humanism has been consolidated and tainted through a systematic inhumanity (Gilroy, 2000: 18).21AU of the critical work I discuss should be read as complementary to Deleuze and Guattarl's

own work,

although

much

of

it differs

insofar

as non-human

beconlings of the human constitute a major part of their particular 'utopian' .Q 22 pragmatics.

The well-being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs and Indians, and the yellow races. We have decided not to overlook this any longer. Frantz Fanon, The lf,"retchedof the Earth (1961: 96).

Straqe Mulfiplicio: Constitutionalismin an Ige of Diversio maps a critical and -,, highlights that constructive enterprise a number of the presuppositions and blindspots in the dominant constitutional traditions; i. e. nationalism, liberalism book, TuUN, 23 In James this negotiates the unstable and communitarianiSM.

I It is for this reason that Gilroy (2000) unearths the links between raciological thinking and hurnanism and emphasises the necessity to construct an anti-race humanism. Although the be thinking and practices are apparent and must not concrete realities of raciological ignored, this does not mean that ýve should not try to "free ourselves from the bonds of all had long before (2000: 15). Fanon in a novel and ambitious abolitionist project" raciology for black both de-hurnanisation that the and accompanies raciological categorisation, shown is humanism'. 'toward His a neýN, rallying cry white people. 22 See Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 99-100) on utopia and its relation to Sarnuel Butler's Ei-eii,hon. 2', The Lakota Sioux Elder, Luther Standing Bear saýs. "Did a kind, wise, helpful and bene\ olent conqueror bring this situation about? Can a real, true. genuinelý superior social had human American havoc? Did the of qualities worth possess not native order NNorksuch

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

territory of conflicting claims for cultural recognition in the context of Canada. Adopting a method of historical cultural critique, he identifies those presuppositions and conventions that haN-einformed the debate over recognition, but have not been explicitly examined. There has been an ambiguous relationship between pluralism and sameness. Diversity .,-cn and pluralism are often 91 1 lipservice by liberals, who then simultaneously announce that 'we are all the The same'. assumption of a labula rasa", or 'cultural neutrahtv', when investigating difference rrurrors uncomfortablý- the terra nullius proclamation that served to 'justify' the expropriation, extermination and enforced assimilation of indigenous peoples across the world. 25 Difficult

as many

conservative thinkers

in

the

main

traditions

of

constitutionalism find this, an adequate means of 'grasping' difference and diversity in all their entangled crossovers and distancings is an imperative, not an Despite the good intentions of Rawls and Habermas, their theoretical option. apparatuses prove hopelessly inadequate at valorising, and even recognising diversity (and embedded power differentials). Any attempt to reach cultural universal consensuson norms, principles and justice servesto filter out difference rather than trying to invent new forms of association. Antonio rather

Negri believes that the entire Rawlsian system appeals to a practical, than

metaphysical,

realm

of

convictions,

ignoring

initial

conflicts,

antagonisms or differences. An adherence to pluralism is thus vanquished by the idea that there is one sense of justice which is grounded in the institutions of a democratic regime. Stability is valued rather than social difference, and difference from to create a generic unity. Negri adds, "Postmodern is abstracted

liberal

tolerance is thus based not on the inclusion but actually the exclusion of social

the Caucasian but been able to discern and accept them; and did not an over\\eening sense blindness? in " bring (quoted Tully. 1995: 20). this about of superiorItN 2' See Gatens (1996: 4) as she explores the notion of tabula rasa in relation to gender theory. 25Genevieve Lloýd discusses the tenuous manner in which terra nullizis %\asinvoked. but being how, than an illusion, this notion constitutively constructed a social rather shows indigenous barbaric 31). (2000: the -Invisible' against peoples practices %\orld and justified -

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

difference" (Hardt and Negri, 1994: 235). Trý-ing to balance different inputs in becomes to order concoct a stable equilibrium pnMary, and anything that nught fall into the realm of difference from this norm is a personal affair. Raxx-ls's like deontolo does Hyland's, ical. It that account, is of 91 not propose aný-notion of the social good or teleological structure of the human subject. Feasibihtý-takes desirability. Negri believes, with Weber, that the essential precedence over ingredient in ensuring a stable equilibrium is the police. Weber notes that ...Every founded force' Trotsky Brest-Litovsk" (Weber, 1921: 78) adding state is on said at famously that the State "claims the monopolyof the legitimateuse q1'plySiCaljýrt'e within a given territory" (78). domination is invention European tool as a rational of and control, a and was initially applied to non-European peoples [ ... I Wherever Europeans and natives faced each other, terroristic practice was the colonizers' norm. It be should noted that neither the practice nor the theory which sanctioned and institutionalized it could have been sustained without the doctrine of European cultural and racial superiority -a doctrine implicitly or explicitly predicated on a view that placed Europe and the Europeans at the center of a world by backward, surrounded primitive cultures and peoples.

Terrorism,

(1987: 69). Hisham Sharabi,lVeopatharcly.

Deleuze (1988b) remarks that processual pluralism is replaced by a dualism that did from discourse though not rest within tries to separate violence violence, as discourse. Correspondingly James Tully argues that the historical drive of modernity

toward

uniformity

by was paralleled

horrifying

sNýstematic

from Canada Nations First the nineteenth century in cxtern-unations of the longer difference Their 21 it was as respected no autonomy was and onwardS. based 1664; Treaty' Wampum Row 'Two treaty on in a negotiated the was when by down boats the sameriver, side side, where neither travelling the image of two based least This theory, in in at the was, agreement to other. tries steer partN, friendship and respect. peace,

formalised. it thinking to once was Paul Gilroy discusses the added \ IrUlence raciological 31 (2000: scientised, nationalised and rationalised

3'4

DIFFERENCEAND

DIVERSITY

The conser%-ativeinterpretations of the traditions of nationalism, liberalism and communitarianism are stunningly indifferent to these traditions of pluralism, reciprocity and respect. Tufly notes that, 'ji]n each case,the demands [for cultural recognition] are seen to be a threat to the unity of a constitutional associationand the solution is to assimilate, integrate or transcend, rather than recognise and diversity" The left (1995: 44). 'solution' to affirm, cultural only remaining dissenterswould appear to be secession. There are more tolerant responses that seek to permit a fair accommodation of diversity, but their advocatesremain unconvinced that a true recognition cultural domain. Canada, diversity is In the the case of possible in of constitutional modern constitutionalism is pervaded with a masculine, western, individualist bias. This is not an adequatebasis for creating different modes of relationality in diverse, 94) "culturally (1994: post-imperial" country. a There are many critics of the dominant models of constitutionalism. Postmodern bias European, Tully of male and imperial claims, tend to stress the writers, They seek to undermine concepts such as identity and constitutionalism. have how these either exclude, or co-opt those who recognition to show how By from been identity the public sphere. showing excluded, previously from from both differs tool they of a provide useful others, itself and always believes downfall. He this However that approach their this is also critique. fragments society beyond recognition paradoxically creating a homogeneous differences dissolving that conservative of resembling paralysis and a of culture critics. Cultural

fet-ninists also emphasise the masculine bias of constitutional according

how do Tully, Nvomen can enter into they to not show

Nvith members

being marginahsed.

NTetultimatelv, dialogue

language

Finally, intercultural

of authoritarian

citizens

and writers,

Young, criticise the homogeneous n-iain traditions

traditions

without

hooks bell such as

conceptions

Marion Irl's and

of identitýT and association of the

liberator)the possibilities and are sceptical of

dcconstructive of

35

DIFFERENCE

post-modernism.

AND DIVERSITY

Nonetheless, despite demonstrating

the necessity for various

levels of self-rule, and the recognition that they are not )ust t-ollsfituted1)ý-their but by tbwarted their constitutional associations, their claims - in Tullvs cultures fall eyes - still prey to unexamined norms of uniformity such as Rawls' reasonable legal (1995: 55). pluralism or a uniform and political order

Tully identifies Charles Taylor's idea of 'deep diversity' as providing a fruitful image that portrays the many ways of participating in and identl(ying witli Canada. Unsurprisingly, actualising this image would require a constitutional deal to upheaval With pluralism and the politics of cultural recognition in an The propensity in modern constitutionalism is to propose a adequate manner. legal "legal This the political contrasts system. and with centralised and uniform 81). An law (1994: Europe" imaginarýpluralism and customary of pre-modern homogeneous belong to the to appeals a community of nation which all citizens The the modernity of the constitutional nation-state idea of political community. Such for titutionalism. modernity is proposed in modern cons is another requisite 'other'. 2ý Finally, the political identity at stake is a to the exotic contradistinction bounded and distinct unity. In what Tully calls a second wave of anti-imperialism, brought being biases to task. are all of these inherent Gatens and Lloyd (1999) traverse the worlds of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattarl, Negn and Tully. They do not understand Tully's work to be a quest to rehabilitate Instead (of they it as close see titutionalism) reforryusm. or of cons concepts old (and demonstrate Spinoza's the constitutive productive) power to own attempts to fear, fictions better than upon prerrused ones to social the create imagination of The transform (Power). to Potestas is move a such of aim superstition and being. institutions and collective practices of

27 Sharabi distinguishes betweeri modernity (structure). modernisation (process) and is a 20-21). (1988: as consciousness -[M]odernity construed (consciousness) modernism from the differentiating b) itself Europe itself recognised model through which modern longer heralded of no He 21). an age. that (1988: Other" modernitý argues (nont-nodern) dominant between subordinate and but centre a of opposition cultural interchange, Arab a marriage of the a result is Nvorld believes in socletý that neopatriarchal periphery, and (-I). imperialism patriarchý and of )6

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

Rather than imposing a modern constitutionalism, Tully believes that a premodern constitutionalism is better equipped to cope ý, N-ith these entangled demands and shifting intercultural relations, including the role of the women's movement. His work shows us that a majority is not necessarilya quantitative but homogeneity tendency toward superiority, concerns a and a standardmeasure, that is, a treatment of the variations of a society to create a constant. This is not but does illusion He organises reality in particular ways. an not engage in by Nor trying to the reformism confines of majoritarian standards. work within does he employ a quasi-transcendentalideal speech situation to harmonise the different voices. The difficulties he faces are augmented by the strangely Canadian multiplicitous nature of society. "When a minority creates models for itself, it's because it wants to become a be have (to has to, to survive or prosper a state, majority, and probably from But for it's its power comes NX-11at example). recognised, establish its rights, depend but doesn't managed to create which to some extent goes into the model, on it"

(Deleuze, 1990b: 173). Wallerstein endorses this understanding of

by long been has by "it analyststhat minorityhood is not noted stating, minorities degree based to the of social concept; it refers necessarily an arithmetically differences 82 Rather (1988: through we consensus, than reconciling power" -83). dual dissensus. We the of to nature explore continue to will affirm need becominglater discussion directing the toward idea of in chapters our minorities, n-unoritarian.

ýs Sharabi notes, many identities have been constructed through the antagonism icaflý, Only 91 they nostal differential endowed are afterwards relations. power of fictitious po%\, ct,. them emotive greater -8 giving origin a the of authenticity with

for forms 281 can understand why such essentialisms have emerged as strategic of resistance discusses of the (22000) affirmation Gilro\ of process historical reasons. political and the t-)c\ond thinking, criticises and racialised blackness but he argues that \\e must rno\c is Our to back. moýe been challenge has its indtistrý on that constructed multicultural I hurnanit\. this a ino\ernent call of beýond particularisms toward other understanding s larl commonahtý Of SingLI ties. '7

DIFFERENCE

X-',ýD DIVERSITY

Within the Canadian context the further splintering of identities and solidification of those fragments Might well lead to an exacerbatedmoblhsation of identities in the quest and competition for scarce resources. The task is, as Chantal Mouffe (1995) points out, to construct a 'we. Tully's understanding of the hberatonT i potential consonant Nxith embracing diversity resonates with Guattari's effilco-political lie concept of disseiisits '\ý-hich values above and against what he views as the infantilisation of thought in its drive toward consensus and uniformity. Guattari's writing is far more exphcltlv militant than that of Tully, and his understanding of subjectivity gravitates toward an anti-humanism that Tully might feel uncomfortable with. (His decision to map three ecologies - psyche, soclus,nature - is a provocative mutation of the age old philosophical concerns with Man, Society and Nature.) Yet their mutual enthusiasm to valorise difference and diversity conjoins them in indicating a new way of thinking about identities and subjectivity. My efforts to emphasise concrete struggles and dilemmas is inspired in part by Sharabl'squestion, "What is the point of namzý. ýUthe oppressed,the margInalized, " (1988: 123-124). the hurnihated, if the enterprise stops at an abstractgesture? Liv.

difference,

diversity

and division

The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realise, because it is clear that if humans had be to this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical were or experience would be possible, there would be only tasks to be done. Giorgio Agamben, The ComitiaCommuniý,.(1990: 43).

Given the nomadic nature of the thoughts that wil-I follow, I hesitate to celebrate 'difference', 'heterogcneity', 'mobil-ity' and the myriad of related terms in 'discovery' The the and capitahst enforced movcments of refugees, abstraction. botli by Paul documented (, exploitation of multicultural-ism, something well difference 'positivisation' hooks) bel-I that is of as well as the insidious Ilroy and 38

DIFFERFNCE

AND DIVERSITY

emblematised by the differentialist racism discussed by Pierre Taguieff and Etienne Babbar, are clear indications that 'difference' is a malleable term. The commodification

otherness is revealed in the ,,.-aN-differencc is- often I "fabricated in the interests of social control as -well as commoditN-innovation" 25)29 (Hal Foster quoted in hooks 1992: of

The following excerpt from M. Nourbese Philips' poem ODiscourse the Logic on Language"" of encapsulates my ambivalence and reticence to simply valonse difference over identity without

formations, dominant examining power

forth. It shows how Power can be consolidated by multiplying symbolics and so divisions and differences. English

EDICT

is my mother tongue.

Ereg oxnerqf slares

A mother tongue is not

sball,whereverpossible,

foreign Ian Ian lang not a

Mal his slares ensure

language I/anguish

beloii to asmanyethno,T lingmsfic, groiosas

anguish

ý( //)ý),can possible.

foreign anguish. -a

notspeakto eachother,

1

theycannottbenfomeni rebellionandrevolution N1. Nourbese Philips expresses the lack of identitý- and sense of dislocation described by Fanon by so acutely with induced slaverv and colonisation, one destiny has black he that is the and that man only one says rage when white-cold insidious her destiny. In the pohcýof relays she poem impossible an white; Babelotis by 'divide and rule' that tried to preclude communication proliferating a

don Kente 19 11 black 1960's gold black cloth, When ý'OI. rhetoric. mouth people Ing ith. hang folks the they diss the\ way hair expose dread out \N the their white and medallions, den\ ing, meaning, and these lntegritý political of signs meaningless corni-nodification strips As for their signs action. political concrete the possibilit-N that thev can ser\e as a catalyst Communities is diffused the\ cornmodified. are when to consciousness critical ignite power 3). 3 1992: (hooks by communities of consumption" of resistance are replaced A) M. NOUrbesePhilips (1993). 19

DII-FERENCE

AND Dn'ERSITY

multiplicity of tongues. She articulates a paradoxical state of being that, on the hand, one is at odds with the enforced majoritarian languageand strn-cs to make that language stutter, and on the other hand, percewes the necessitýyto find a common thread or language to articulate a common condition. We need to take this dichotomous condition seriously and examine fruitful conceptualisations of relationality premised upon difference, rather than searching for all-subsunung This universals. poem is a refusal to allow amnesia to dissolve the comprehension of the power- structures and formations that delimit possibilities of expression and existence. M. Nourbese Philips highlights the efforts of a hegemonic power to disintegrate what it perceives as 'other' and a threat, in order to then 'other' better this the consolidate all as a tool in the capitalist processes of exploitation and slavery. It is important to recall that the consolidation and composition of identitý-,rather than its fragmentation, are more often than not called for. As we will see in 2, heterogeneity be the most chapter radical re-appropriated in the era of can least have been The demanded by that is modern capitalism. groups who very oppressed and subjugated is a recognition of the identity and value of tbez'r difference. But as Paul Gilroy (1993a: 2-3) and bell hooks (1991: 29) point out this can easily slide into claims for an ethnic absolutism or apn'On'essentiahsm. CesarePoppi comments on some of these ideas in a piece called 'Wider Horizons The (1997). Globalization' Subjectivity, Ethnicity Details: Larger and with multiplication

'imagined that to the waning of of ethmcities corresponds

he Ethnicity, states, shares in common ,vith community' called the nation-state. A (285). nationalism a presumption of the universality of its shared subjectivity been has 'difference' 'locality' concomitant ,ý,-ith an and tendencN, to stress 'difference' 'locality' "yet the presuppose \-cry and globahsation, expansive devclopment of

dynamics of worldwide

institutional communication and

legitimation" (285).

Hic fragmentation of the subject promulgated in contemporary social theory "is 40

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

celebrated to the point of becoming the new, theoretical foundation of the concept" (285). However, the emergence of new ethnicities and subjectivities cannot be understood apart from the global dynamics in which they are embedded. Criticisms of master narratives highlight the ways in which radical power relations like "race" and gender tended, in the past, to be subsumed into a discourse on class.Now, a Hegelian 'immanent subjectivitý-' is counterposed with "celebration fluidity, a of subjectivity which stresses contingency, non-identitýy, 'fractal' creativity, individuality Subjectivity' posits itself

(286). Yet, problematically, this 'New

"relatively by as operating economic unfettered

determinafion, e' (287), whilst the processes of production and reproduction of free follow to their own internal logic, "free of constraints capital are similarly from the 'superstructural' " (287). So what precisely is going and impingements here? on

Poppi notes that the recent trend of what he calls the New Subjectivity determined behaviour 'qlla the the emphasises subjective, culturally of subject This kind (288). exchanger and consumer' of subjectivity seemsto present itself free-floating, deternunations. has faded from Production to as oblivious objective focus with the growth of the tertiary sector; it is instead an invisible dimension A Culture is a commodity. informing the construction of these subjectivities. fragmentation of societies into different movements, each claiming national, has become the primary object of now cultural, and ethnic autonomy, both lot'al does being How the theorisations of andgloW, ethnicity, as it is social. Subjectivity? New this sit with Ethnicity is a subjectively constructed phenomenon, and it is also a relational for býfinds 'Inventing' Each the reasons its a common existence group concept. historý-. Since the instance of production has been eschewed b)- theories of the New Subjectivist-n,"the result is that both the productive and the cultural aspects of

former become the relfied: as a non-negotiable, objective subjectiN-ity

fashion" be filled latter after a pick-and-choose as a container to constraint, the (290-1). This account gives a positivist, de fiitm understanchng of ethnlclt\-. 41

DIFFERE-NCE

AND DIVERSITY

Ethnicity is more than a subjective choice, however. The celebration of

'difference', as Poppi sees it, accompanies a cultural

homogenisation and "historical obliteration of 'diversity'

(291). A formalism

or cultural codification dictates what ,.vill be accepted as the representation of the identity of an 'ethnic group'. He believes that "what is needed to explain ethnicity is a tbeog of articulationbetween hitherto diversesociocultural systems turned into d#ferin gstems.Globalization, in turn, is the process by which the choice of ,g 'selected traits' [...] comes to cover a wider spectrum (292). It is through their similarities that such groups can be perceived as different. This has turned cultural niches into exchange-values rather than use-values. 'Diversity' then 'difference. Distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable mutates into has been for liberals. has been Tolerance traits cultural an exhausting process twisted into a legitimation of the propositions of a cultural racism that claims that ...different' peoples should indeed be allowed 'to pursue their own cultural values' for be (296). 1 that thrown the try to reason and should out of country" kinds difficulties these through my conceptualisation of an immanent address of ethics. In this essay, Poppi argues that it is the failure to understand that ethnic 'schismogenesis-'has a relational, social nature precipitated from a shared and globalised understanding of

'the nature of difference' that has led to a

'differentialist racism', a term I will discuss shortly. Differences are understood difference that organises, after the manner of an idealist quasi-Platonic model of difference Like them to making commensurable. gradates and compares claims Plato's suitorS31,many claimants are unsuccessful. Poppi's account discussesthe diversitv implications of this comparative model, concluding that it wipes out fi-om differs difference difference, that a replacing it with a commensurable Deleuze's It contention that this tendencN-to is, of course, something else. difference (positivist) difference that terms means of an empirical in understand

31In his discussion of the sirnulacrurn, Deleuze ( 1968a) argues that Plato's real concern was false image The bemeen the distinguish true the of the suitor illustrates this. copý. and to 42

DIFFERENCEAND

DIVERSFIA'

fail to grasp 'difference-M-itself'. I discuss his account of difference and its we ly ethico-political implications in chapter 5. In the meantiime, I wiill sit irnp sketch , loosely some traits of his philosophical perspective, before I examine this idea of 'differentialist racism' in further detail.

I.V.

racism and raciology

Postmodern theory that is not seeking to simply appropriate the experience of 'Otherness' to enhance the discourse or to be radically chic should not separate the 'politics of difference' from the 'politics of racism'. bell hooks, ý-Carningu: Race,Genderand Cultural Politics. (1991: 26).

Among the advocates of 'anti-essentialist' postmodern identity politics, for example, one often encounters the insistence that there is no 'woman in black there general', are only white middle-class women, single mothers, lesbians, and so on. One should reject such 'insights' as banalities unworthy of being objects of thought. The problem of philosophical thought lies precisely in how the universality of 'woman'emerges out of this endless multitude. Slavoj Zlzek, TheTicklisbSubject.(1999: 133).

Foucault once famously declared, "perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian" (1970: 165). He also volunteered this observation; "a lightning storm day be Deleuze: the new thought is given name of was produced which will one following Deleuze (196). the ventured possible; thought is again possible" him. He don't know Foucault I "I meant, never asked thoughts in response, what have I He that meant was the most naive may perhaps was a terrible joker. but better [... ] I the than more naive others, wasn't philosopher of our generation but bnit, kind the the to most most profound speak; not so art of a producing 88, " (1990a: "doing least felt (the the philosophy") guilt about one who innocent 89).

This 'nalve' conviction in the notions of plurahsm or empiricism sustains does "the He Deletize's philosophical enterprises. not explain abstract remarks, but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the 43

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

universal but to find the conditions under which something new is produced ((-reafiveness)" Peleuze and Parnet, 1977: vii). His condemnation of the Hegelian dismissal of pluralism as the stutterings of a naive consciousness 'this, chanting that, here, now' needs to be mobilised in face of Zizek's condescension. Though Zizek rightly condemns the injunction to 'be yourself' as one that leads to isolation and anornie (an extreme and horrifying individualism), in his tirade against the snuggling bedfellows of capitalism and postmodernism he fails to consider other possibilities, such as an ethics of singularities. What Zizek fails to understand is the profoundly Spinozistic gesture at the heart 32

of the anti- essentialist endeavour. He mocks, as Hegel mocked Spinoza, those dare who propose an etho-ontology. Deleuze and Guattari advocate an ethics of singularities and a new thought of

Attitudes that question commonality.

hierarchies and dominant modes of organisation can catapult those organisations into a qualitatively different mode of existenceas we saw with Tully. However a number of Zizek's comments are both provocative and insightful. Take for instance his claim that, Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist; he or she does not oppose to the Other the particular values of his or her own culture); none the less he or from this the position as privileged empty point of universality she retains depreciate) (and is to appreciate other particular cultures able which one for form is Other's the the of specificity very properly - multicultural respect asserting one's own superiority. Slavoj Zlzek, The Ticklisl) Subject.(1999: 216).

Paul Gilroy

discusses this slippery

concept

of

multiculturalism

detail. in

N'lulticulturahsm has been used as a means of interrogating the significance of

112 Like Christine Battersby (1998) 1 do not want to rernain caught in a position of antiin becomes This I Instead the to chapter essence. clear question of rethink want essentialism.

See Battersby's (1998) chapter on 'Essentialisms, Feminisms and Metaphysics' for a lucid and innovative re-working of the concept of essence.She maintains that it is necessarý fixed is fluid in that thought 'essence' of as a and static 'real" that not it -to think a Nýay,so is located in the body and merelý subýjectto historical and cultural variation" ( 1998: 22-3). 44

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

nationa -ty in this time of global capitalism. He adds that it may also mark an end to a European hegemony on ideas. Instead of automaticaUy chsn-u'ssingthis concept, as Zizek does, he seeksto understand how it does not just refer to the pressures on the nation-state but can be both an enriching concept and an ethical principle that helps bypass dichotirnising divisions. He admits, though, that corporate multiculturalism does plunder different identities. There is a great danger if an ossified notion of ethnic difference is mobilised "as a means to rationalize their own practices and Judgementsin a parody of pluralism which perversely endorses segregation (2000: 253). An example of such an essentialist way of thinking about identity is 'differentialist racism'. In what was called the New Racism the meshing of biology and culture served to differentiation justify on the basis of "race". Pure difference, whether claimed býone group or attributed to another, automatically transmutes into a pure identity and a consequent intolerance of difference within, or outside, a group. "When brought culture is into contact with 'race' it is transformed into a pseudobiological property of communal life" (Gilroy, 1993b: 24). Taguieff's work on the biological how "race" differentialist the acculturation of category of shows racism portrays itself as a defender of cultural identities. Differentialist racism is a brand of essentialismthat speaksof cultural identities from differing (allegedly In pure, pure identities. other equally valid) as cultural this way, rights of expression and existence are claimed to have been respected. However it is precisely the understanding of identity, culture, nation, "race", and fractured, homogeneous, forth, than rather vibrant and contested territories, so as from It that concerns me. posits a notion of self-identity which one assesses differences in a wholly negative fashion, despite the positive, liberal spin it hegemonic Its order within the group and assimilationism imposes a endorses. fit. do There those is no understanding of the complex and not expels who Instead through. that a presumption people operate in and partial identities fully predominates that individuals, groups and collectivities are already distinctive, quasi-primordial series of a scrics individuated and in possession of a 45

DIFFERENCE

-ýND

DIVERSUY

of characteristics, practices, cultural traits. Moreover, in order to retain these fundamental differences, distance and separation must exist between cultures. T he bounded and unified natures of the identities in question be to need interrogated When cultures are presented as homogeneous they are inevitablý Tafflicted with an low exceedingly immune system that cannot tolerate foreign bodies. These are seen as parasitical (in the pejorative sensethat has none of the sophistication of Nfichel Serres' analysis of this subject) rather than as symbiotic creating new relations and new possibilities. Etienne Balibar (Bahbar and Wallerstein, 1988) says that the universalisms of bourgeois ideology and humanism are not incompatible with a system of hierarchies and exclusions. He thinks that racism is organised around 'the stigmata of otherness, operating oftentimes on a micrological level, rather than in the more evident oppositional and disciplinary mode that is emblematic of Representations, discourses colonialism. practices, affects, and are all suffused New Racism. the with Bahbar emphasisesthe practices, the social nature of racism, and the organisation by These that of affects occurs. organise affects conferring a stereotype upon discourses 'subjects'. "It 'objects' this their their is combination of practices, and and representations in a network of affective stereotypeswhich enablesus to give 18). formation (1988: Racism the is a social of a racist community" an account of "race" he Furthermore, are interbound argues nation, ethnicity and relation. fictive the notion of concepts and any nationalism is premised upon a racism and Bahbar Stretching the this to statesthat neo-colonialism is a global scale, ethmcity. reality grounded in the assertion that constant conflict and wars clearlý-indicate humanity that three-quarters of are incapable of self-governance. In a similar fashion, by calling the killing of Iraqi citizens 'collateral damage' General Schwartzkopf dehumanised these non-\X'cstern citizens. Increasingly, have S. by U. to the no are its alhes expected and conducted interventions n-iiffitarv 46

DIFFERENCE

casualties (of

AND DIVERSITY

their own solchers). Howe,,-cr, since sanctions were imposed

thousands and thousands of Iraqi citizens have died. These are passed o,,-cr wordlesslý, by both the 'democratic' governments and the media (saN-ca few journahsts like John Pilger) of the West. The AIDS epidemic in Africa gained httle coverage until the recent battle with pharmaceutical companies. It has faded

once more from the spotlight. Whether your death will be newsworthy depends on where you are from. Deleuze and Guattan claim that racism operates by positing the only face as that of the "average, ordinary White Man [ ]" (1980: 178).11They characterisetraits ... that do not conform as degrees of deviance ftorn this norm, explanuinghoxv, sometimes these traits are allowed to subsist, sometimes they are erased."Racism detects the particles of the other; it propagates \xaves of samenessuntil never those who resist identification have been wiped out [ ]" (1980: 178). Racism, ... they suggest, is never really concerned with alterity or difference, demarcating instead those 'who should be the same as us' and assimilating or annihilating them.

White intellectuals who criticise 'essentialist' notions of identitv often do not question white identity and the way in which essentialisminforms representations of whiteness. Richard Dyer notes, "[a]s long as race is something only applied to long non-white peoples, as as white people are not racially seen and named, thcv/we function as a human norm" (Dyer 1997: 1). Since white people are be their to to particularity, see own unable whiteness needs made strange.

33

' Since Deleuze and Guattari only write sporadically about racism, it would be fruitful to link their writing on 'race' to that on taxonomies and systems of classification. Deleuze. through Spinoza, dernonstrates the often prejudicial nature of the abstract fictions that distinguish have draw As to classi(y and one another. many writers emphasised upon people is important have look forms it does It to the an unchanging meaning. at not various racism has adopted, why certain typologies emerged, roles did the state, capitalism and imperialism play and how social and political structures of behaviour and classification do. is Guattari Deleuze Although that their critiques of this not work and sedirriented. lineages and hierarchical orderings and their fa\OLiring of rhizomatic alliances is useful in has Paul Gilroý This to think trying is something picked about other modes of association. his diasporic identit\. discusses he the to rhizomorphous nature of up on good effect when

47

DIFFERI"\CE

I.A.

AND DB-ERSITY

the essence of essentialism

Valorising difference can lead to a discourse that fetishises otherness (N%-hiIc retaining a sense of self-identity or 'normalcy'), and consolidates different practices of social control and donUnation (bell hooks, 1989: 28-34). bell hooks seeks to construct social realities that affirm difference by making marginahtý-a site of resistance.Wary of fixating on one characteristic (of women for instance), focuses she instead upon the concrete conditions for each reality that is articulated, rather than diluting those differences. She does not deny that there is but commonality proposes a methodology and a logic that can retain both difference and commonality. This calls for a complex analysis that underlines multitudinous variables and prOCesses of subjectification. Gilroy's idea of 'diaspora' resonates with hooks' strategies of resistance. Like Deleuze and Guattarl's rhizome, this concept does not have its roots firrjýNTfixed in a soil and territory but skates along or beneath the surface. This kind of identity formation disrupts traditional forms of belonging; it is disperse. But dispersion, this than its movements are rather gathering, regulating and ordering lineage kinship Challenging traditional it seeksnew and organisation of affirmed. fragile but It the the and remains nation, coercive identity of alliances. resists disrupts It born time and temporary, of a webbed variety of connections. 'ex-centric terms communicative of its transforms space when viewed in (2000: diasporic 'changing hybridised Gilroy the this identity same' calls circuitry'. 127-9). It is continuously modulated without being relfied. Despite this, culture is lines, "conceived not as something intrinsically along ethnically absolute often ing, unstable and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups fluld, chan91 1 h,, field in which theNrencounter one another and -c out rather than as a relational 24). 1993b: (Gilroy historical relationships" social, . . pn Gatens Moira also seeks to avoid any understanding of essentialism as a 017 historical different thrOLIgh s-ociosedimented and than constructed rathcr 48

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

contexts (1996: 11). She shows how cultures and identities emerge through Genevieve Lloyd contestation in a political and historical context. Her N: ý,ork with emphasises the dangers of romantically wanting to be the 'Other's Other' and forces the admission that one is often complicit in relations of subjugation and domination

for (1999: 51). take something to which one needs responsibility -

Radical pohtics has remained rooted in liberalism and cannot articulate a politics and ethics of difference. By fostering collective imaginings that transform social practices and images, minds and bodies, resistance becomes the collective name freedom. Critiques of essentialism and universality are important, but so is the of possibility

of

constructing

and inventing

being other modes of and other

understandings of subjectivity. With Deleuze, Guattari and Spinoza, these authors understand that we must make use of fictions and abstractions, "but only so far as is necessary to get to a plane where we go from real being to real being and advance through the construction of concepts" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991a: 207).

This entangled relation of essentialismand power is unravelled b\- bell hooks. It is facile, she believes, to propose an essenceof 'woman', for example, on the bas's factors "race" such as and of common putative characteristics, ignoring other directly Not take part and class. all women are oppressed or exploited; many domination She in is opposed and exploitative practices. indirectly structures of to discourses such as Gilligan's (1982) 'ethics of care', or essentialistoppositions biologistic that presuppose a understanding of woman as of male/female black /dominated forth, /nature that many women emphasising and so passiVe Whiteness terrorising is and often as extremely violent. women white view Gilroy (1993a: 73) the the that ideals the of terror, notes in way in comphc1t I ýInhghtenmentreason are enthralled to terror. bell hooks argues that \Vhite Capitalist Patriarchy is hegemoluic. Rather than to term the most important is that thinks supremacy white racism, she had Fanon been F'rantz has because This showed internahsed. it is understand. hierarchies. the complicit nature of people of colour who uphold racial 49

DIFFERENCE

AND DIVERSITY

Assimýlation encourages a blackness negation of and absorption of white values. History, memory, colour and experience denied. hooks For then the critique are of essentiahsm must be sustained, focusing on, for example, the "multiple experiences of black identity that are the hved conditions which make diverse I cultural productions possible" (hooks 1991: 29). While my work focuses on a philosophical ethico-pohtical level that is more n-ucro than macro, Tully and Gatens and Lloyd (as well as, of course, all peoples for the recognition of their practices and values) create the conclitions appeahng for macrological and institutional change, even by virtue of tl)lnkin its possibility. ,g It is interesting that Tully persists with the constitutional tradition, re-activating law, he common as seeks to reconcile principles of belonging and freedom. I suggest that there are other ways of composing social relations that also seek to avoid a 'rootless cosmopolitanism' and a 'purified nationahsm.' Earlier we saw how Nhchel Serres furnished us with a philosophical series of concepts that difference, becoming. By encouraging us to to sought grasp relationality and understand processesof individuation and singularisation, Deleuze and Guattarl's machinic philosophy shifts our attention from those categories understood as already constituted - individuals and groups - in order to grasp relationality in terms of pre-inchvidual and transindividual dimensions that they call singular and transversal.

But does their espousal of difference-in-its elf lead it to imprisonment in the movements of an anonymous capitalism that revels in shifting and temporary fragments become diverse Does the tapestries of of subjectivity? subject a cspiritual automaton' in a reading of realiq, as creative continuumý

50

Chapter Two

Embracing Capitalism

Difference: Philosophy and

EMBRACING

11.i.

DIFFERENCE

potentia versus Potestas

My epilogue is: be aware of the strategy that governs what you do. Paul Shepheard,TheCultivated11"ilderness. (1997: 231).

Power has tended to be used by political theorists to describe kind a certain of action on others involving an element of ControJ34.It is also often described in zero sum terms and "conceived as something which is intimately connected -,-lth , domination authority, or exploitation" (Gatens, 1996: 63). This is akin to the discussedin my introduction. Deleuze and Guattari take issue concept of Potestas with the classic alternative of repression or ideology, arguing that power concerns processes of normalisation and modulation bearing on language, gestures, perception, desires, movements, and so on, proceeding bý- way of microassemblages (1980: 458). Power does not just constrain, but also produces different modes of acting and thinking. Operations of Power (Potestas) separate forces (Pui'ssanceslpotenfiae) from what they can do. In a breathtaking display of neologistic acrobatics, Deleuze and Guattari (1980) delineate, in their Betomiq plateau, the distinction between the plane of former The hidden the through plane immanence. of organisation and operates a dimension. just as that the principle, so plane only exists as a supplementary Spinoza refused to define substance as anything other than a tausaimmanensor Guattari Deleuze and are resolute when they maintain that any teleology, twtsaslli, from this ontological conception of plan or principle creates an abstraction beyond The it to transcendent it. plane of power a process, subjecting forms from but development the it gives rise inferred is not given organisation or immanence Conversely, but hidden It the plane of to. is makes e%-erything visible. hidden transcendence, or overt. neither implies nor involves

For a careful analysis of the concept of power in Deleuze's work, see Patton (2000: 4967). Also see Iris Marion Young for a critique of a distributionist or substantialist paradigm her (1990: to the the of ure question justice efforts reconfi., of context of power especially in

51

EMBRACING

DIPFFRENCE

Our first definition of Power as a hierarchical operation enablesus to distinguish relatively easily the plane of immanence (aspotentia)and the plane of Organisation (as Potestas).Still, it might seem that an overtly hierarchical operation of Power that curtails a populace is a far cry from these undulating modulations of capitalism; however, the two operations are connected in at least one respect. Power/force understood aspotentiadescribes an immanent mode of existence in body defined which a is in terms of its capacity to affect and to be affected. The Potestas (Power) can be found wherever thought and existence are operations of from their powers of acting. cut off Nonetheless) this second understanding of Power as the immanent modulation be first this of a system cannot conflated with operation. It corresponds to what deterritorialisation. Rather than cultivating their potentials, it we will call a relative bodies from The them permeates and minds entirely, shaping connections within. be fostered limited that can and relations are as they are normalised, and it is in It prevents bodies and minds from doing this way that it can be called Potestas. from becoming Once forces and all they can. more are separated what they can do, albeit through a different operation. A most pressing question in the context figuring Esm thus involves out in what sense the axiomatics of of global capl,? don-nnance be Potestas. Does the terms of the of capitalism can understood in hence capitalist mode of valorisation close off other modes of valorisation and the capacity to cultivate potentials? Or is philosophy enthralled to capitalism? Answering these questions requires an investigation of the operations of Power By both State the through and capitalism. understanding the predomiinant modes both that of organisation and thought of societies, we engender problematics for forms other modes of of organisation and open a space critique these existence. But on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its birth intensities, to to new give once again so as and possibilities of movements to animals and rocks. closer existence, of modes (1991a:74-5). G,ill cs Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, 11"hati'sPhilosopý)),?

52

FNIBRACING

DIFFERENCE

Drawing on Bovillus, Hardt and Negri claim that an enriched humanity could be called "Imilohomo, humanity squared" (2000: 72). This is echoed in Spinoza's heretical cry Dells sh)e Xatitra to a"vaýan impassioned chase exhortation fear superstition and as the organising principles of society, and to question not only the existence of an anthropomorphic

God but to dispel a faith in any other

form of transcendence. For Spinoza, the sage's meditation is a meditation on life death. His ontology/ethics and not on

follows the movements and becomings of

nature. Indeed the entire philosophical movement of the Ethh's shies away from finalism develop to mechanism and the singular potentials of

a processual

ontology.

The tragic upshot of the flowering of art, science and humanity during the Renaissance was, according to Hardt and Negri, a collapse into war and a relativisation of values as a new transcendent order imposed itself i\Iodernity henceforth operated through command and authority. A conflict between the forces of modernity and a transcendent order that tempers creative ii-nmanent Amin, Citing Samir " these they claim that at this and curbs ambitions ensued. born belief Eurocentrism Europeans that the that moment a cultivated could was fostering Rather their the than impose civilisation across commonality, world. decision dominate the to singularity and community, and expropriate other became defining European the traits modernity. of populations some of cruel Born of crisis, modernitý, continued to be rocked by crises. "Subjective assemblages [...] pose a vision of democracy as in an absolutely horizontal social plane on which social bodies are set loose to destroy the discover forms their own ends, invent their and strictures of predetermined social 1994: 288). Negn, (Hardt and mx-ii constitution"

35 Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept of the apparatus of capture with the aid of Sarnir Arnin (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 436-7). See Sarnir Amin (1976).

53'

EMBRACING

II. H.

the disciplinary

DIFFERENCE

apparatus

In the context of the modern nation-state, capacitiesto innovate, create and resist were strictly curtailed by the operation of a 'sovereignty machine'. Rather than cultivating the creative prowesses of the multitude, it orders and regulates these bodies into an aggregateor mass.In fact, Hardt and Negri go so far as to say that eventually the sovereign stateprodittessociety." Correspondingly, Etienne Bahbar claims that a necessarilycomplicitous triad of race, nation and culture that existed at that time (and continues to exist) meant that society was produced as an imagined community on the basis of a fictive ethnicity." The production and ordering of the people gradually became a more and more important role for the State. With the shift from a transcendent ordering function, a transcendent function command emerged, according to Foucault. This social formation is 'society discipline. the called of Expanding on these insights, Patton (2000) notes some primary features of the State-machine. It tends to create milieux of interiority in order to rule more effectively. Gridding or striating social space, its operations mimic that of a divisions distinctions. It Moreover metrical or numerical multiphcityý creates and kinds flows it operates as an apparatus of capture, capturing all of such as money, from flows Extraction the people, commodities. rich of the socius is the modus States. operandiof all When James Tully criticised various forms of constitutional theory, he did so by displayed their thcýimposed on a population which indicating the uniformity diversity. in Interestingly Patton to similar cope with writes utter incapacity fashion that, "jtjhe

operation of capture always involves two things: the

constitution of a general spaceof comparison and the establishment of a centre

36Sce Michael Hardt (1995). 37See 1983)). Anderson Benedict ( also

54

F-MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

of appropriation" (1994: 162). This comparative method is also integral to the workings of capitalism which functions on the basis of quantiýring differential fluxes.

The society of sovereignty encapsulatedin the era of Absolutist Monarchy must be distinguished from the sovereignty-machine of the modern nation-state, according to Hardt and Negri. "The realisation of modern sovereignty is the birth of blopower" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 69). The answer to the question 'How does power function?' hes in an examination of the forces of the social field. The development of Foucault's idea of a disciplinary society challenged theoretical approachesthat emphasisedrepression and ideology. The notion of blopower is an important one. Fanon demonstrates the operation blopolitics of

biopower and in raciological and colonial practices. Although

different to the colonial machine, NEchel FoucaUlt'S38explication of the workings of

he disciplinary what called a

'illuminating'. society may prove

Foucault

invented the concept of the apparatus (dispositi4 to show how customs, habits and productive practices were not only regulated but produced (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). This is comprised of "a set of techniques for the exercise of power bodies" 1994: (Patton, 160). 39 De Landa over explains Foucault's analysis of by focusing power on three main elements "systematic spatial partitioning, ceaseless inspection, and permanent registration"

(1997: 159). Individuals were

thus assigned to categories and marked in terms of deviation from a norm. Societies began to be mapped systematically. However, this story does not just formahsation the concern

of

but processes and policies also the informal

different hosts (160). through that institutional practices spread contagiously

A society of discipline names a particular exercise of Power that cuts people off,

38My commentary on Foucault's work is derived primarily from Deleuze's and Hardt and Negri's observations. This is because it is their understanding of the relation of capitalism. State and the social field that is at the centre of my analysis. q behaNiours bodies the to in the attempt and make regulate it concerns -, case of sexualitý docile.

55

EMBRACI', ýG DIFFERENCF

once more, from their capacities to act. The disciplinary diagram both traverses and is an effect of the social field. Power is not substantial, it is not a property to be possessedbut is exercised; it is a strategy. And it always throws up counterstrategiesof resistance.Deleuze notes that this kind of societý-is characterisedby AS operations of allocation, classification, composition, normahsation (1986: -98). a technology it produces a particular kind of reahtyýIt concerns a particular vvaýbodies, brief, "In homogeneous but of acting on on a multiplicity. power is not be defined by the particular points through which it passes" (25). can only Correlating to our concept of Potestas, Foucault notes that "[d]isciphne increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)" (1975: 138). Instead of existing solely through spectaculardisplays of violence and domination, power began to operate body the through processesof normahsation. According to De Landa, from on the eighteenth century European nation-states began to digest their minorities (162). Hechter (1975) calls this 4internal colonialism. Government Acts that transformed the status of English into an official language can be seen as one instance of this process of normalisation, or to twist the concept signmificantlýT ,a beconling-major of a language. Different institutions are, in Foucault's example, traversed by a disciplinary diagram (what Deleuze and Guattarl call an abstract machine). This is in itself for discipline these unqualified yet it connects imposing varying mechanisms and boundaries inclusion setting up of and exclusion such as schools, asylums and differences between There these two concepts, prisons. are nonetheless desire. their to power and understanding of specificall), in relation Deleuze (and Guattari) felt ill at easewith a description of microsystems in terms desire. Rather the to talk than a they about assembling of prefer of power, "[s])-stems of negatwe resistance,

be thus power -\vould components of

But assen-iblages.

assemblages would

detertitorialisation"

J)eleuze, 1994). PoNN-crwould be one component or

also comprise points

(ýoilites) of

56

EMBRACIXG

DIFFERENCE

dimension amongst many others in a collective assemblage.Still, Patton suggests that Foucault's concept of apparatus is akin in many respects to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the assemblage(1994: 158). Their description of desire is, however, close to the concept of potentiathat xNill be developed throughout this thesis.

Deleuze and Guattari's theory of assemblagescan be read, according to Patton, as a theory of power, but only if power is treated in this verNI specific sense as potentia.Patton tells us that this is where Deleuze and Guattan remove themselves from the remit of Foucault (1994: 159). With an approach that neither resembles structuralism (becauseit does not refer to a common structure or a series of analogies that would underlie these domain for (the statements), nor positions one instance) in a economic detern-uningrelation with regard to all other domains as Marxists do, Deleuze and Guattari expand upon their machinic conception of society.They invoke the idea but that is not qualified, rather indicates a new way of of an abstract machine kbstract machines extract; theN,traverse ordering or regulating a population. different levels and give or do not give these levels an existence (Guattari 1992a: 35). Unlike structuralism which remains rooted in an identity induced by its static An hook different registers. abstract machine can relations, abstract machines up delimit the maximum possibilities of innovation of a group and the maximum of deterritorialisation. Systemsof power are understood, in this context, as a diffuse heterogeneousmultiplicity of microsystems at play in the social field-411 GraduaHy the State became the immanent reahsation of the ax1omaticsof capital. It functions by over-coding of the surplus fluxes of money and labour rather than regimenting and centrahsing a cluster of groups through over-coding their becomes Rather ever more constitutive of than normahsing, power codes. different modes of subjectification. 40 In a seminar, philosopher Nick Land once asked 'what abstract machine selected the hurnan"' In terms of our anti-hurnan humanism such humilitý is %\ell placed to position us better in qualifý ing anthropocentric assumptions.

5T

E'MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

11-iii. the end of ideology There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neocapitalism by nature. It invents its eastern face and western face, and reshapes them both - all for the

worst. Gflles Deleuze and F6HxGuattarl, A Thousand Plateaus.(1980:

220).

Like an eavesdropper who catches one phrase, Gayatri Spivak launches a rather basis between Deleuze Foucault the vitriolic attack on and on of a conversation them. This attack is instructive because it asks some necessaryquestions about their understanding of capitalism on the global scale. Instead she asks whether the subaltern can indeed speak and knowtheir conditions as Deleuze and Foucault would seem to imply.. Spivak criticises the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari try to re-think questions favour believes distMss She the critical concept of ideology in they of subjectivity. Speak? ' Subaltern 'Can desire. libidinal Her the theory was paper entitled of of a 271). (1988: Interest' 'Power, Desire, initially called A published conversation between Deleuze and Foucault called 'Intellectuals and Power' (1972) constitutes her main battering ram. As I indicated in my "Western that, intellectual production is, in many ways, introduction she argues It (271). Western is this side of international econon-ucinterests" complicit With I Derrida) her (rather that than the argument own analysis and affihation with focus to on. want Spivak contends that the West's critical discourse on the subject preserves, beneath the surface of subject-effects, the West's pre-eminence as subject of knowledge. Therefore what initially appears as a critique of the sovereign subject In 'Subject'. birth fact, the context of conversation a the she calls of what is, in these activist philosophers do not cover their ideolo ical tracks as well as they from Firstly, draws do. She their m-() main points conversation. might othenNise 58

EIMBRACING

DIFFERENCE

the "networks of power/de sire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive [...]" (272); instead an ongoing critique is necessary.Secondly, "intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society's Other" (272). Deleuze and Foucault ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual production. She criticises their homogenisation of categories such as Maoists and -\x-orkers feels kowtoN-, Deleuze they the that specify intellectuals, while names of and -s to the notion of the workers' struggle. By referring to the workers' struggle in such a broad manner, Spivak claims that Deleuze ignores the mechanisms of global capitalism and the core-periphery relationship, articulating the workers' struggle desire. leftover desire She terms that in of is a machine producing a states desiring subject (273), wilfully ignoring the Spinozistic impetus for the concept of desire that Deleuze and Guattari develop. They try to understand processesof develop desire, rather than situating emergence and a pre-personal conception of themselves on one side or other of a subject/object divide. Desire is not a determining interest. SIpivak accusesthem of failing to consider the relationship of desire, power and her view, an incapacity to articulate a theory subjectivity, the result of wl-i-ichis, in focuses Given the the above relationship constituted one of primary of interests. Admittedly, Deleuze to make. of ,'Infi-0edipus,this appears a strange conjecture Guattari's conclusion is a provocative one: they claim that there is no and ideology. What she understands to be a romanticisation of the oppressed irritates Spivak kno\', - their tremendously, and the suggestion that the subaltern (ý(wspeak and form but ludicrous her of neoas an insichous not only as conditions strikes The the toolbox in that theory is read not is a idea a provocative conservatism. but becomes Guattari that phrase, Nx-rotc which with n-dlitancy spirit of labour for to tools so as manual of about grubbing intellectual emblematic of an Spi In ivak ites snippets, % -ri x telling ot juxtaposition a authentic. more appear 59

EMBR--ýCl-',ýG DIFFERENCE

(allegedly citing Deleuze) "Because"the person who speaks and acts...is ahk-aysa multiplicity", no "theorizing intellectual [or] party or [...] union" can represciit ... "those who act and struggle" "(275). This distortion is important, not onINbecause it indicates a deliberate act of sabotage on the part of Spivak, but because it deals with the questions of the micropohtics of grassroots organisations that concerned Deleuze and (especially)Guattan. I want to discuss the Spivak cut-up and the original text in a moment; however, let us first contextuahse this debate through Deleuze's preface to Guattarl's book (1972). et transversalitý The intermingling and interferences of a militant and a psychoanalyst in one person is pretty unusual; such a rarity was Guattan. Instead of concerning himself with debates about the unity of the self, Guattari announced 'we are an grolpst, ule.ý, referring both to the group and the individual. Subjugatedgroups are by hierarchical form epiton'nsed a and pyramidical of organisation which preý-cnts certain statements and whose identity is founded on the exclusion of others. It operates through stereotypes and is both cut off subjectivity.

Subject-groups,

conversely,

make

from the real and from transversal

connections

hierarchise ical and to totalise them. They are praxiolo 91 confounding attempts and create their own agendas in a pragmatic way operating horizontally rather than Such by feminist the modes of organising were publicised vertically. movement key democratic and are seen as a move for many grassroots and single-issue To Spivak to the the groups. respond point is subaltern can speak not whether know fate, but how forms domination their the that preclude effective and can of be This is an ethical challenge that organisations of group-subjects challenged. Spivak does not rise to. A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or longer Those are no who act and struggle representative consciousness. by a group or a union that appropriates their right to stand either represented, as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even "groupuscules". All the and acts. of us are who speaks person within Gilles Deleuze, Intellectuals and Po,,,,-cr'. (1972: 206).

The causal connections that Spivak attributes to Deleuze have vanished. In their 60

EMBRACING

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place is an ethical call to reconsider modes of social organisation and actiVis-m.In Repetifim, I Dcleuze the my reading of Dý)ýrent-e question of why and will address 'conflates' the two sensesof representation (rorstellenand darstelleti)by exan-uining his critique of a philosophy of representation. It is a deliberate ploy on his part. Spivak arguesthat running these two concepts together "especially in order to Say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and knowjýr Mepiselbes, leads to an essentialist utopian politics" (276). Throughout this thesis I will argue that is precisely by lifting the veil of false consciousnessthat we can think about domains. forms different that traverse of collective subjectivity and practices new This obviously involves a change in both material and incorporeal Universes. Surely acting under the aegis of an intellectual's 'superior' (though impractical) knowledge mirrors

accounts of

being Western to send aid money used

technology experts to Africa in order to teach communities living in the middle desert how be Sahara to the carpenters. of If, as Spivak seemsto suggest,Deleuze's (and Foucault's) conception of 'women' were a monolithic one, portraying women as oppressed 'with an unfractured "same for themselves against a monolithic subjectivity that allows them to speak 1 (278), would agree that their ideas were impoverished and ineffectual. system" However it is the spetiji(io of differences and power formations that theý-strive to for hold-all ready-made solution articulate, as well as the idea that there is no but (279) desire Power evaluative are not totalising and political struggles. She do maintains essentialism. that restore subjective clandestinely not concepts that by positioning themselves as transparent in this relaý-,intellectuals abnegate declares Furthermore, that thcy solidify she their responsibility to the oppressed. kind Other Europe Other of in a the of as of conception a and niý-sti(y from Deleuze's far This enthusiasm a crýme as strikes imperialism. intellectual Other developed he has he the as a he of concept thinks a that says when Guattan Deleuze Indeed, World). Third (not of some centre and a possible world European direct ethnocentrism. critique of their core concepts in Although Spivak, as an important post-colonial and non-Western theorist, could 61

ENIBRACI"ýG

DIFFERENCE

have an important role in pointing out the bhndspots of the \Ncstern tradition, difficult find her fashion. It to is in she goes about this in a negative account anv Sp1Vak terms ethico-political value in of an impact on social practices. states "[t]he subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with cwoman) as a pious item. Representation has not Xvithered away. The female has disowli task intellectual intellectual as a circumscribed which she must not flourish" Guattari (308). Deleuze 'what prevents the subaltern and ask with a from speaking and how can this be changed?' If this is what SpiVak caUs a dangerous utoplanism then so be it.

ll. iv.

creeping capitalism and aspects of assemblages

Lewis Mumford's term 'megamachine' becomes a vital concept in Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual apparatus. Although their machinism is often read as a Social this machines produce subjectivitV is what it is not. metaphor, 6ategon'6-aIjI health, through institutions such as education and as well as through the massCollective different form These the constellations called media. social machines Equipments. (Guattari, 1992c: 104). Similarly technology and information invest human subjectivity "not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its 4). (1992a: sensibihty, affects and unconscious mechanisms"

Deleuze and Guattari (in conjunction with Foucault and others) introduced this kinds different discuss Equipment' 'Collective of social to in order of concept formations. These Collective Equipments bear a special relationship to capitalism, the in the anti-production of element since they are non-productive, constituting Guattari's Deleuze This of conception to and make important is aspect socius. Although it also traditional identities, shatter can tenable. capitalism capitalism 'docile' the of service in is placed to production ensure subjects to needs produce capitalism

and

not

revolution.

It

only

ever operates as a relative

deterritorialisation. It Guattar, bNý Delcuze frequcntly and Deterritoriahsation is a word uscd destruction traditions, territories, social old the of concerns, in this context, 62

EMBRACING

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identities, values and practices through the expansive movements of capitalism, literally 'leaving a territory'. However this process is always tempered by a draws that corresponding reterritorialisation up identities and traditions ane-\vin the most artificial of manners. Decoded flows that the State is unable to contain are keý-to the axiomatics of The capitalism. encounter of the abstract essenceof wealth combined with the labour decoded flows, i. e. capitalism. abstract essenceof createsall axiomatic of This is one of generalised equivalence and constitutes a deterritorialisation that the State cannot compete with. Concerned solely with a set of formal relations, "the axiomatic deals directlywith purely functional elements and relations whose domains highly varied nature is not specified, and which are realized in domains finds The [ ] the in it moves through so immediately. ... immanentaxiomatk The 454). Guattarl, 1980: (Deleuze termed and many models, modelsof realiýalion distinguish but here 'axiomatic' to term is introduced is not used as a metaphor from the movements of capitalism operations of coding and over-coding. Axiomatics considers relations and elements in a purely functional manner, not as qualified elements. There is an isomorphy between States,social formations and capitalism, because homogenisation Rather than a convergence toward a capitalism is an axiomatic. States formations heterogeneous to cease coexist. can the social of world market, become but the H'=anent the an overcoding transcendent paradigms of exist as flows. "It decoded for to thus proper is an axiomatic of models of realisation State deterritorialization to moderate the superior deterritonialization of capital Because (455). latter with compensatory reterritorializations" and to provide the limits laws, the that think only not e should N-,, irnmanent its own capitalism obeys displaces Capitalism limits its and confronts the the of universe. it confronts are by limits appropriate. as axioms subtracting and adding own because it Guattarl argues that the State is a part of the capitahst axiornatics become fluxes Othcnvisc threshold and in a certa pass alwavs reterritonahses. 63

E".\IBRACING

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revolutionary. This axiomatics will take up aný, archaism and re-invent it. Reterritorialisation is a neo-territoriahsation, it is not just the resurrection of old archaisms (Deleuze, 15/2/72).

managing the diverse; modulations of control In an interview with Deleuze, Negri explores his suggestion that wc exan-uinein detail three kinds of power; "sovereign power, disciplinary power, and the control of

"communication"

that's on the way to becoming hegemonic"

Deleuze, 1990b: 174). This ultimate proposition

(Negri 'in

backbone for his the serves as

book with Nfichael Hardt, Empire. To suggest that sovereignty has a new form, the form of Empire, is a contentious proposition. It is not within the scope of this thesis to assessthe empirical validity of such an assertion; however, I want to investigate some of the claims they make. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire does not resemble imperialism. Although the United States has a privileged role, the movements

of

Empire

deterritorialising are

decentralising; and unlike

imperialism, the accumulation of populations and territories is not a motivational force

for

its

expansionism.

Precipitated

by

the

resistance struggles of

decololUsation, this new form of sovereignty brings with it a New World Order. It designates a shift in sovereignty from

the nation-state to supranational

For Hardt 'logic henceforth rule'. of operate under a single organisations which between Empire fundamental Negri, thus the and the creative is opposition and force of the multitude.

Instead of picking a path through the tricky claims about Empire that they are diagnosis I the their and capitalism of global to on concentrate making, want the on rotates mode of valorisation whose subjectivltý T capitalist production of "Who become has Capitalism the truly is controlling global. axis of profit. lesser The to extclit, a stock market, multinationals, and capitalist chaos todayý " (Guattari, decerebrated For the most part organizations! the powers of the state! 1992d: 265). disciplinary Hardt Negri that Foucault, Deletize, Guattari, all contend and 64

E'.\IBRACING

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beginning time the around societies reached a point of crisis some of the twentieth century. The sites of confinement that týPified societies of discipline, like the family and the prison, are now breaking down. What they are being replaced with is perhaps a more terriýving and all-consuming mode of longer hylomorphic fashion, but organisation that no moulds people in a infiltrates them through and through, taking life as its object. This is called modulation. The concept of modulation is taken from SiMondon's work which further 4. In tl-iis context it refers to an operation of in we will examine chapter diffuse that power is entirely pervading the interiority of the system. The arrlT%-al of

bring television interactive convenience and specialised will not only

but habits develop prograrfirrung, it will a profile of our viewing and purchasing discrete household be to profile of each enabling a created, and a corresponding be living to the room. unique marketing campaign waged in In disciplinary societies, the social space was striated; it was segmented and Its factory is The regimented. a prime example of mechanisms of enclosure. been In have to this new society of pulp. a smoothed now crumbled and walls factory has logic the the spread investing the entirety of of striation and control One level fissureS. 41 but the of the micro of on a regulations operate space, social disciplinary institutions, the prison, is increasingly a privatised and ultimate corporatised affair providing an abundant source of cheap, indeed practically The is labour growth whose work paraded as an exercisein rehabilitation. unpaid, has S. U. two to million surely not a solely peripheral prisons over of occupancy in been has African-American (The as man young relation to this phenomenon. disproportionately representedin prisons as on death-row)

I heterogeneous is and Evidently the organisation of work throughout the globe extremely does This other mean not the of capitalism. operations in a shift arn indicating one aspect of labour Slave been have still are forms child and supplanted. of exploitation capitalisms and has frighteninglý prevalent. In addition the enormous power of transnational corporations the ýNorld. throughout of disciplined much en-vironments ill-paid and created even more labour the to so-called exclusive not is of Nonetheless the ghettoisation and marginalisation the 'dernocratic' when especially nations, Third World but rumbles under the seams of all by their marginal though maintaining, exploited, presence of these non-citizens is Hunored, for huge these economies. ii-nmitrants illegal re\enue a providing and precarious status as

05

EMBRACING

DIFFERENCE

Social relationships and management have changed tremendously with the introduction of new forms of technology. The worker has become a cyborg in a before. Organising disciplining labour is no than more pervasive manner and longer a main focus of capitalism. Labour is becoming self-organising. Rather than simply regulating life from without, power invests life from \-Ithin. , For Hardt and Negri this alteration of the workings of capitalism names a transformation in its relation to labour. Previously labour wasjbrmaýlysubsumed As 258). Alhez (1994: Eric under capital, now it is realjl subsumed explains, rather than a capitalism of production there is a capitalism of circulation and longer Such there the same relation to an is no communication. a change means For enclosed workspace or product. example, work is increasingly carried out in the home. The practice of domination is now that of "a purely immanent social 3 by (Nvith the control universal marketing in continuous variation and modulation M's ruling the supposed New International Order: 1\1oney,Media and Military)" (1997: 86).

Marx's influence on Deleuze and Guattari's theory of capitalism is a sustained his reference to capitalism as an immanent systemthat constantlý-comes up affaff; "because limits, them to more once come against only against and overcomes its its fundamental limit is Capital itself" (Deleuze 1990b: 171) guides their own by "produces This a surplus is, they argue, a system that theory of capitalism. labour, flows decoded money, of means of the axiomatic conjugation of This 7). 2000: (Patton axiomatic information" increasingly, and commodities force For the of example, to axiom. another include manages systern always beginning the t-\x-cntieth labour the of threatened at that capitahsm organised become has States) UfUted (as trade brutaNy a the or in century was either crushed sustaining of the process managerial todaN-, of that part is, union movement productivity. (and F,ugene Holland (1999) explains that the social organ,saton of capitalism does from distinguishing production) feature social of modes other it this is the 66

EMBRAO'NG

not

DIFFERENCE

operate through coding or over-coding; in other words quahtative

distinctions. Capitalism \,mrks through comparisons of quantitative fluxes, such labour, Axiomatic as goods and money. organisation is meaningless; it mereINflows have been Capitalist that conjoins quantified. subjectivity is produced on a laminated, Guattari grand scale. calls it a mass-mediatisedand reduced sub'ectivin loses (1992b: 51). its singularity which The real subsumption of society means that the State becomes immanent to the Ansell draws Keith Pearson capitalist process. our attention to the generalised from "'striated' that machinic enslavement occurs when capitalism moves capital (effected by modern state apparatuses) [to] 'smooth' capital (effected by the lamenting 219). 'take-oN, Rather (1999: than a er' multinationals and globalization)" for Ansell Pearson this the implications of a explores some of of the machines, machinic subjectivity, remarking that within

the movements of

capitalist

He (220). production machinic subjectivity is itself rhizomatic and unpredictable Correctly 'post-human' noting that this ethics. uses these insights to elucidate a does not involve a disappearanceof the human, he explores the possibilities of does Deleuze's Ansell Pearson human. Importantly, rhizomatics the argues that 'creative but history to them evolution', a opens and politics, not negate " these questions. reconfiguring MassUM1 says that the capitalist relation "[.. ] consists of four dense points This 132). (1992: [ ]" real subsumption commodity/ consumer, worker/ capitalist ... limits both expanding and its against pushing constantly in,,-oh-es capitalism "This geographically.

[is] a neo-colonialist

movement imposing the capitalist

But (1-32). [ ]" the the of world ... nations all on relation of unequal exchange becomes does space private of there, colonisation internal stop not colon1sation but fair constitutes game not onl)ý

the intensive expansion of

capitalism.

formation It s on forth trans incorporeal Capitalism does not burst effects e.%-iiil)ilo.

both he thinking 41 Ansell Pearson (1999) weds etholo, \ and ethics as a way of explains -, Sirnondon's of'the conceptions His human. with before and bevond the account resonates this of the nature helping concrete to understand us transindkidual and pre-indkidual human. becornings the of the non-hurnan that examines enterprise 67

EMBRACING

DIFFERENCE

bodies factoring them into a relationship But its of generahsed eqwl%-alence. functioning is not as an absolute cause. It has a parasitical relation to the ()ther operative in the social field and works on these pre-existing arrangements.Th-is relation is what Massurni calls a 'quasi-cause'.

institutions

I expressed a concern in the last chapter that postmodernism may be just a form of neo-conservatism. This concern is also articulated by "Massumiand Guattari different on occasions.Postmodernity occurs, Nlassumiicontends, once the soclus has reached a saturation point with capitalism (133). The problem is that human has become identity now effectively commodified. Subcodes or subtexts of subcultures are targeted by media and marketing companies. The battles for recognition by diverse groups are configured into categories or uniformised as subjects. Under capitalism, the "denizen of the neoconservative transnation-state" (134) can cut and paste identities and social codes as quickly as he or she can purchase the accessories.Images float through the ether plucked out by the ready and Although waiting consumer.

there is something liberating about such a

transformation in modes of thinking, bell hooks points out that a critical and political edge is annihilated at the very time when resistance to increasing The commodification and colonisation of affects is most important. surfaces forth be by know boundaries to ranged operated on capitalism of endo- or no But this liberatory. What is innocuous, or exo-skeleton. can, will. not Bateson once said that there was an ecology of bad ideas just as there was an The by Guattari drawn This in upon provocative image was ecology of weeds. T17ree Etvloaies(1989b) when he expressed the necessitý-for an ecosophý-to deal differences Although may with the pollutions of psý-che, socius and nature. for difficult becomes this to occur in increasingly proliferate under capitalism, it bar economic values. relation to ariv mode of valonsation If, as NlassurfU believes, subjecti-6ty has become isomorphic to capital, its cutting 68

EMBRACING

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edges or mutational capacities are co-opted. Like body-snatchers or rephcants, subliminal messaging and modification prevent not the discovery 'who ()f "ve really are' but the proliferation of modes of valorisation outside the axiomatics of capitalism. The deterritorialisations and post-human morphings of the body are simply recuperated into the capitalist framework. An all-pervas'Ve cYnic'sm accompanies this real subsumption of existenceby capitalism. Lukics' (1922) contemplations on the relfication of second nature seem relevant in this context. The glaciiation of the capitahst has 1 process created a glaze that blinds people to the possibility of things being otherwise. His reading of Nature also presents a social Nature that appears immutable and ahistorical. Time and space are suspended, and a cyclical movement provides the prospect of the inevitability of more of the same.All this in spite of the ctire situation that much humanity finds itself in. Bodies are sý,stematically excluded from a politics of of experimentation. Affects are for sale. The pre-personal is a fashion item. The has been forgotten. collective A line can be drawn around a piece of territory, and all the things inside the line described and remembered. What happens when the territory is so big it covers the world? Paul Shepheard, The Cultivaled 11"ilderness. (1997: 27).

Like Deleuze and Guattan, Hardt and Negri understand capitalism to be antifoundational and anti-essentialist."Circulation, mobility, diversitv, and nuxture are its very conditions of possibility" (2000: 64) and this proliferation of difference is heart The has declined the the importance of at of capitalism. nation-state as it has increasingly become complicit in fulfilling the demands of the global market29). 1989b: (Guattari, trial complexes place and militar y-indus Marketing seeks out Unique Selling Points in order to create a vast array of differences amongst the consumer market so that it might tar(,ct them all the better. The new mode of management is 'diversity manageinciit'. Capitalism then for an etemal appears as a creative continuum caught up in an intert'rUnable quest 09

E.MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

production of the new It is in this context that a celebration of difference must be tempered. Difference, hvbriditv, heterogeneity are not good in and of themselves. Rhizomatic

connections are emblematic of

the new 'flat'

deal that to organisations are multiplying, seeking more efficiently with change: 'To go with the flow all the more'. Perhaps you could even say that contemporary culture is so universalized that backyards in in tourists are all countries our own we our own - moving about homes, by our own even, aspirated prejudice and sentiment - but even so, tourists! Who has any sympathy for them? They don't go looking for looking have they to their preconceptions confirmed. They go experience, go because leaves in. Explorers and that's the that state prejudice you unprepared, know be flexible. this to adventurers and go prepared Paul Shepheard, The Cultirated It"ilderness.(1997: 64).

Although in disciplinary societies life was taken as an object, power-relations shift diffuse. become Power to is effected chrectlýeven more in societies of control life. daily Working brains bodies throughout in a call centre makes the and onto brain-database coupling a key ingredient for transmission of information.

a successful and smooth

The movements of the body are observed,

frightening It the of is an assembly-line regularity. monitored and compared with home, Close circuit television cameras track the movement of the worker soul. býý house by the is greeted into entrance are noted, route en smart-card purchases her direct the large to of to nuances appeal tailor-made mail custornised pile of a becomes The documented CN-cr subjectivity tastes. of production personal well and affective. more Mtense Deleuze worries about the multiplication of chch6s in mass-mediatisedsocien-. These effect sensori-motor responses that operate in a manner similar to deal They in stereotypes and 'Spinoza's conception of the passive imagination. Tas Guattari said once the singular. and abstract than grasping abstractions rather dismay fashion] this [No changiig des at in dc vagues-,juste just aN-c,,, vogues' ,-,, face of social organisation.

7(l

EMBRACING

DIFFERENCE

In this mass-mediatisedera where the globe is underlaid with cables,overlaid with by i the crackling of messages win ging satellite communication and waylaid through the air with Blue Chip technologies and mobile communications to,,vers, the notion of a pre-existent territory loses some of its pull. All territories are by "From this produced artificially capitalist machine. all this results the bjper-sqgre (Guattarl, gation and generafiýed -ation" paradoxical cocktail of tommutilt , 1985b: 124). The lack of response and mobilisation to factors such as banalisation degradation, poverty, of the media, and ongoing environmental from Guattari. We an ecological crisis, a pollution are suffering conflicts astounds kind How of can we re-activate another of our minds, collectivities and nature. because 'processual' Guattan it calls subjectivity in this context, a subjectivity does What its it own existence through a process of singularisation? produces differently? What learn to the will the nature of a new political take to see world be? praxis Hardt and Negri argue that although institutions are everywhere in crisis this only difference divested been has inside of of any terrain the that entire social means immaterial by This of nature the qualitative, affective, is mirrored and outside. labour that impacts upon both mental and corporeal reah-ns.

ll. vi.

hybriditY and difference;

a new world order?

been lost the belief in world, it's the world, we've quite What we most lack is a however in believe the world you precipitate events, taken from us. If you however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, Our to resist It's ability pietas. call you what their surface or volume. small level be the has every it, our of to at to assessed control, or our submission both We people. a and creativity need move. 176). (1990b: Becoming'. 'Control and Gilles Deleuze in inter-,,lc\-,-,%vithAntonio Negri,

71

EMBRACING

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The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault(1986: 106). Your nationality is an idea your ancestors had, invested and reinvested for generations until it seems huge and real. Do you have roots? Are you a tree or human? Can you carry your nation with you when you go? a Paul Shepheard,TheCultivated11"ilderness. (1997: 87).

Let us examine some of the implications of this idea that capitalism now feeds off, manages,and cultivates differences in the context of our previous chapter. This focused on the oppressive manner in which differences had been contained and nullified, or conversely exaggeratedto the point of contradiction. Different theorists professed a desire to positivise difference and divcrsity and we explored some of their strategies for doing so. We saw how these thinkers grappled with the aftermath of colonial regimes. In Empire, Hardt and Negri also discuss the question of colonialism. Theý-agree Gilroy "the has from that the beginning had an intimatc with crisis of modernity relation to racial subordination and colonlzation" (2000: 114) and suggest that European identity was constructed on the negative foundation of its Other, not but The psychologically. only economically glamorisation and exoticisation of Otherness can find its sordid roots in this territory. Fanon explained \-ery clearly the dialectical nature of this infernal colonial machine that created racial difference. It createsa Manichaelstic universe. It goes so far as to dehumanisethe colorlised. Although "[r]eahty always presents proliferating multiplicities" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 128), colonialism organises and produces a dialectical relation of reahty.In function dravvs to relation mic in a negative the it categories Lip other words, Thc colonial ciicounter is not an encounter of mo segments of a another. dichotomous Nvorld- the Fluropean and the Other. These are categoriesproduced (I'his is one of the rcasons through the colonial machine and are not pre-existent. beyond t1i'mi Gilroy thinking rather raciahscd to move need claims we why

E-MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

essentialising and positivising the category of "race". ) The segregatedsubject of the European coloniser identifies her/himself as essentiallybetter than the others from whom s/he is segregated.This fixed senseof identity precludes any notion diasporic of and nomadic

subjeCtiNqtý,.

43

Hardt and Negri state that racisms have intensified and, far from waning, are on the increase. Instead of proposing a difference in kind between "races", "races" distinguished by difference degree (from a norm). Racism then appearsas are in the result of mechanisms of differential inclusion. It is in reaction to this that have to emerged. various claims essentialistidentities Still, they claim that despite enormous suffering and bloodshed, the increase In communication and intensification of movements of that era of colonialism lingering them the traces of a utoplanism that would carry carried within humanity to a higher power. They still see the birth of a globalised humanity, localism, as a rather than one stuck in exclusionary crevices of particularism and birth to be nourished. Ambiguity can be found in thinkers like Las Casas,who did Toussaint (as (116) believed "humankind that is oneand equal' controversially L'Ouverture

failed However Marx). to conceive of a thinkers these and

humankind that is one andmany. Gilroy and hooks both warned us of the con-imodification of difference in global becomes Negri's Hardt It especially that critique this and junction is at capitalism. have Postmodernism they quite announce, postcolonialism, and interesting. domination forms backwards looking By of at old the enemy. wrong got simply from Power different failed have and a shift organisation of to notice a they csocietiesof discipline' to 'societies of control'. how Po%x-cr Negn Hardt mutated It is this shift of paradigm that concerns and hybrid hierarchies "differential the and of become the through to a rule fragmentary sub*ectiivities 11 that these theorists celebrate

43,See Deleuze and Guattari (I 971a: 10-3-5).

(138) so that the

E]MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

forms domination) ies (to "unwittingly strate91 of resistance of old

the reinforce

diversity ies " (138). PositiVising new strate91 of rule! and revealing the racism and 1 dorrunation sexism inherent in supposedly neutral systems of were N-1taltools of fragmentation Similarly the critique. of identity challenged the hierarchical nature in the imposition entailed

both These of a sovereignty of subject and state.

first Hardt Negri the tradition of modernity, that critiques centre on what and call free hybridities They "[t]he Enlightenment. the the play of say affirmation of and however, differences boundaries, liberatory is onlý, in a context \-,-here of across divisions, binary hierarchy power poses exclusively through essential identities, and stable oppositions"

(142). A pick n' mix attitude toward identity buys right

liberation The the into strategies of new capitalism.

that are proposed are

face in the impotent of this new order of rule.

The New Racism that we discussedin chapter 1 then becomes paradigmatic of 'societies I Negri Hardt of this shift to what call imperial society and call and distinctions. difference The coagulates into cultural mutability of control'. Segregation and separation are maintained, though the hierarchies dissipate. Racism then becomes a matter of differential inclusion. It is 'interestingto note does, 42-3) (2000: Gilroy do the Negri Hardt investigate as that not, and formulate biotechnology theory their of they as genetics and in innovations have that the He emerged technologies self of the to new points racism. imperial Foucauldian he doing In enriches a so through various new methods of imaging. Foucault body, inscribing never the something and conception of reading displaycd has Gilroy As "race". modernity out, points the of context exan-unedin trying knit when especially superstition, together scienceand an uncanny ability to be Yet 53). (2000: "race" differentiation also it may that is to justify the active longer the refrains complex of rendition differential adequate an racism is no that basis distinguish the of on groups in population genetics that oncc again biological difference.

74

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ll. vii. the end of history, the demise of becomings:

claustrophobic

capital Capital smashes all other modes of valorisation. [ ] There is an ethical choice ... in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporealises and deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation. F6hx Guattarl, Chaosmosis. (1992a: 29).

There's no democratic state that's not compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery. What's so shameful is that we've no sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves. Gilles Deleuze in interview with Antonio Negri, 'Control and Beconling'. (I 990b: 173).

Hardt and Negri's analysisdraws heavfly upon Deleuze and Guattari's work. They for for them their materialism, praise undertaking an ontology of production and but criticise them for being "able to conceive positively only the tendencies toward continuous movement and absolute flows, and thus in their thought, too, the creative elements and radical ontology of the social remain insubstantial and impotent" (2000: 28). This philosophy of production remains as a consequence by horizon "as the marked a chaotic indetern-unate superficial and ephemeral have Guattari (28). Deleuze a sophisticatedunderstanding and ungraspable event" brush Negri Hardt past in their eagernessto contend that and of capitalism that difficult latters' discussion Age The Empire. have concepts of of entered the we In such as the virtual, singulanties and e-,-cnt is weak. an eagernessto remain strict boats burned havc Negri Hardt their in advance of sailing. may and materialists, B\- refusing to take seriously the pre-individual nature of concepts like singularlt\-, In They becomings. historN-, the too actual. rooted in are they sidc with not with living iance to their their alle91 in anaIN-sis; thcy anthropocentric remain addition labour means thcý- cannot comprehend Deleuze and Guattari's unnatural and labour; h,, This it the to importance of -Ing is question not rhizomorphic concepts. different waý, transvcrsally. is rather to approach it in a

75

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Traditional oppositional class divisions have collapsed. The labour market is traversed by all sorts of divisions and the tertiary sector has become ever more dominant. The fragility and insecurity that permeates the mass of society is especially pronounced in the caseof groups like the unemployed, the satis-p7pier, ý, contract

or

temporary

workers, enslaved workers and the chronically

marginalised. Guattari agrees that we need a n-unimurn social guarantee (1985b: 128), but he goes further. Rather than solely focusing on living labour he develops the concept of the machine. Machines produce heterogeneousum-, -crses of references,resisting the homogenesis of capitalist subjectwit\'. For Guattari it is precisely through this idea of a constructed, productive and desire that is pre-personal and machinic that we can create a 'way out'. artificial He says "Desire appears to me as a processq1' siqulan.sah.on, as a point of proliferation and creation of the possible in the heart of a constituted system. These processes can pass through the stages of marginality, of becon-ungsthat disengage "becoMings-Minor" (1985b: 128). the are nucleus of singularity" which This event surges,imperceptible, an atmospheric mutation, changing the field of discussed Life. Earlier I the prnnacy given to the external possibility, subjectivity, does has Deleuze's that the not relation a reality of its own relation in work; depend on pre-existing terms. It engenders terms. This is the process that Guattari articulates. By describing the mechanisms of societies of control, Hardt and Negri inspire both vigilance and wariness when confronted with the plea to simply affirm difference. The temptation to automatically attribute a revolutionary status to by heterogeneity that the thwarted the awareness is rhizome or as concepts such This how universal transmutation or this is precisely societies of control operate. fan-fflN-, that brings werc army and school, as together such arenas, modulation directed Capitalism toward communication is increasingly separated. previously "The the integrate industries communications technologies. and lnt-()rmation fabric, blopolitical them putting merely not the imaginary and the sý,mbohc within functioning" but them its into N-erýintegrating actually power the of sei-N-ice at 76

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(2000: 15). It invests He from Nvithin. But a constant reminder of the ed-lical failure of this system is that "capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos" (Deleuze, 1990b: 181). There is a myth of Me market that is universal amongst neo-hberal theorists. In fact there are many markets in sustained concordance through power formations. Other modes of valorisation are dominated by ffie economic mode of valorisation and production for the sakeof production. Hardt and Negri are inconclusive once they feel compelled to suggest how new modes of subjectification can be generated in the era of global capitalism. By depriving themselves of an Outside, they flounder in hope that Empire's crises will proffer more spacesof resistance,more vacuoles in a suffocating infusion of capitalism into the entirety of the social space. This disappearance of an Outside, the possible of the possible, makes it difficult how Hardt and Negri's sporadic examplescan offer any to extremely see Empire, dialectic "The to resistance or global integrated capitalism. modern of has been by degrees intensities, inside and outside play replaced a of and of hybridity and artificiality" (2000: 187-8). However, the radicality of a philosophy but is the notion of an immanent movement of immanence not just centred on fuel Gathering the of intensive concerns the immanence qJ' immanence. discontent will not blast through the remit of capitalism in the manner they has After the unnatural capacity to always include all, if capitalism suggest. And draws it this is within it the point where it is challengedmost. another axiom, folds It their philosophy and capitalism account. what worries me the most about blurred becoming deterritorialisation, the two onto one another as movements of Spinoza's What the thq call concept mysticism of and \-lrtuaU)-indistinguishable. from differentiates factor fact bealitudo that phflosophý. the vcrýcapitalism is in of Capitalism is a relative deterritorialisation, while philosophy is an absolute deterritoriahsation. t

EMBRACING

DIFFEREMT

There is an implicit eN-olutionismand ethnocentrism in Hardt and Negri's account partially because thq see the progress through historý- as one of increasing improvements in the lot of humankind (even if these are not immediately evident), and partially because a residual Marxist teleology gives them an faith that the contradictions of the system will resolve themseh-es unwarranted eventually all for the best. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari they do not have a conception of metastability that, contrary to the notion of a realifablepossible, develops the conception of a field of potentiality engendering a disparity in a system, opening up other possibilities that may be actualised. There was no inevitability to the path of history that led us to our present situation, and nor is a better future guaranteed.It must be constructed. Although I agree that diversity and difference are superficially celebrated býcapitalism, this is no cause to abandon a positivisation of difference. I want to reconfigure the question in order to consider not Just human difference and diversity but a philosophical conception of difference that will enable us to think the pre-individual and transindividual; in other words, the non-human becomings develop human. Whilst the they to a conception of the cyborg or of attempt human/machine coupling, Hardt and Negri do not sufficiently explore this aspect important humanism. Finally I 'anti-human to their address one more want of from This feet Guattarl. laid be Deleuze the comes and at of criticism that can Alain Badiou.

7

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DIFFERENCE

11-viii. the changing whole of the face of capitalism As converter and capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it reimparts absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are a part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment [ ...] Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus.(1980: 387).

When Bachou criticises Deleuze's 'Bergsonian' philosophy his underlying concern is, I believe, his suspicion of a complicitous relationship between capitalism and philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari are aware of the risks of this ethics of difference, 'smooth (or the that experimentation and show in above quote space' heterogeneity for that matter) cannot be automatically valorised. rhizomes, and One has to examine the specific conditions of the functioning of different hooks bell 1 The In allegation of complicity is a serious one. chapter assemblages. difference. Given Deleuze Gilroy Paul the commodification of warned us of and he functionalist his touts a understanding of philosophy is practical maintains by his ' 'does own ideas not only captured it work? - are philosophy asking always but do they consolidate its potent reigný the movements of capitalism, Deleuze and Badiou both try to think the event. The event, as we know, is coIt Deleuze's marks a work. tern-unous with a space of transformation in from, yet paradoxically subsisting qualitative change in a system escaping from from derives Badiou's Event history. the than theory, rather set alongside, differential calculus Deleuze is so fond of Like Das Diiia,it is the Unnameable or be It Undecidable. made coherent in retrospect and it marks a can only the laugh' 'A The French 44 is definite rupture in a sý-stem eN-ent. is an revolution . banality Deleuze's despite the Yet, of conception the of apparent certainly not.

44See the thoughful article entitled 'Stellar Void or Cosmic Animal' bN Raý Brassier on the Badiou Delcuze relation and the Badioudian concept of the e\ ent as rupture79

E,'MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

event, this concept can, as we will see, be put to radical work.

Badiou describes Deleuze as a philosopher of the Onevirtual; a thinker of the All. The B ergson-inspired concept of virtual multiplicity different recurs in guises throughout Deleuze's and Guattari's work. In Cinema1: TbejAlovement-lmq 83) (19 e ,g Deleuze develops a concept of the Whole as Relation, as the Open. The \N,'hole does not attempt to unify fragments, it does not totalise, "if the Nvholeis not giveable it is becauseit is the Open, and becauseits nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new, in short, to endure" (1983: 9). The almost kaleidoscopic ever-changing continuum of Deleuze's philosophy appears,at first glance, to resemble the movements of capitalism. The open system of capitalism seems to replace the relatively closed system of the State where unity was imposed. But a closer examination reveals that all is not as it seems. In the logic of sets an element is either included or it is not. A logic of virtual delineation fuzzy. A virtual multiplicm, as an c\-cnt or multiplicities makes such I haecceity then bears a peculiar relationship to the actual; as incorporeal it is eternal and singular, yet irreversible. Badiou seemsto wonder whether Deleuze's concept of the event leavesus bereft like No the system. event can enter a void slicing of any possibility of rupturing through social reality tn=*'cking a Luclo Fontana painting, providing an absolute Anish beginning Deleuze's event resembles rather all at once. end and absolute Kapoor's extraordinary blue void sculpture entrapping the eye, confounding Deleuze In this way, works with the concept of virtual space and time, seducing. for figure from Bergson, key to try to out the conditions inheritance multiplicity, a distortion however, Badiou, this is a the production of the new would argue that One-AH. Deleuze, the philosopher of of Brassier's reading of the Deleuze/Badiou encounter arrivcs at a damning Deleuze's He that pHosophising su&gests conclusion.

disgwses a pohtical

2()-); Capital" (2000: "transcendent an of the sox-creignty global with covenant 80

E-MBRACIXG

DIFFEREXCE

allegation I made with regard to Hardt and '-,,,egn. He asks whether an ethics of amorjýfi, mimicking the self-affirmation of the One, can preclude resistanceto the processes of deterritorialisation of global integrated capitahsmý Moreover, ho-\-\, can a 'relative' deterritoriahsation of Capital be distinguished from the 'absolute' deterritorialisation of philosophyý "Does Capital merely mime the lo 91 ic of 1 nomadic distribution or does nomadic distribution in fact mime the logic of Capital?" (Brassier, 2000: 208-9). The ascesisof the purified automaton may in fact be participating in th-isgeneralisedmachinic enslavement.An apologia for the status quo appears embedded in this reading of Deleuze. Equivocal plurality be to appears sacrificed on the altar of univocitNý In A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze and Guattari describe a multiplicity as rhizomatic flat. defined by deterritorialisation line flight. But It and is or a of what marks the difference between multiplicity and capitalism? Is not capitalism the multiplic'Mý , differences, spreading its tentacles and creating par excellence, cross-feeding do Guattari Deleuze Why the throughout continue to and globe? connections ferocity given it is the very exerciseof the operations resist capitalism with such fall Guattari's Deleuze Does deterritorialisation that they applaud? and work of fighting the wrong enemy? the trap into of

Although

Hardt

Negri and

form the that new argue

of

domination,

do 'societies they not of control', operates in a smooth space, corresponding to by Deleuze different and readings of smooth space suggested explore the An-nin Samir draw Guattari Deleuze Negri, Hardt in Guattari. Like upon and and 'ecumenical develop itself spreading organisation' their an idea of to order does This formations. diverse not ecumenical organisation through a set of social but the homogenise, the of takes consistenc\totahse, it on or progressively diverse. However, this movement also spawnsits own marginal groups, what the)45

'Nvar machineS'. call

A homogetusation of The objection that international capitalism tends toward a

I-ýA concept affiliated to the idea of the nomos that I will discuss later.

81

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DIFFERENCE

social formations is responded to by Deleuze and Guattan in the following manner: insofar as capitalism constitutes an axiomatic (in terms of production for the market) States and all other social formations tend to become "I*SOvioiph1*( in their capacity as models of realization

(1980: 436). However, isomorphy is

not the same as homogeneity. Capitalism always surpassesthe State in terms of its sheer power to tolerate (and encourage)a process of deterritorialisation. States"in capitalism, are not cancelled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a world-wide axiomatic that exceeds them" (454). The State moderates the deterritorialisation of capital. Contemporary features of power direct our attention to the micro-operations that modulate and normalise language, desire, movement, and so on. The birth of 'societies of control' does not alleviate but aggravates the intensity of these operations of subjection and enslavement. However, becausecapitalism operates basis does kind the the on of an axiomatics, it not occupy of smooth space that Hardt and Negri argue it does. An axiomatics is a way of ordering and stemming lines of flight and mastering the flows of the soclus; this is why Deleuze and Guattari call capitalism a 'relative deterritorialisation'.

"Capitalism confronts its own limits and simultaneouslydisplacesthem" (Deleuze by The 1980: 463). Guattarl, exertion of pressure consumerand progressive and least led (at has to the nominal) inclusion of an ethical/environmental movements However the pressuresof pollution, water scarcity and axiom in recent years. over-population may prove irrecuperablein the next century. Axioms operate by containing and centralising the living flows of the soclus, however these flows also escape to the periphery and present irresolvable fought be battles This the for at two one must is the why axiomatic. problems level of the axioms as different groups look for recognition and representation, to transform this thesis) (the seeks in which most that us concerns one and one do develop that pre-existent rest on not existence of modes ncN-, qualitatively and lead to The the conclude reader the not should on second emphasis identities.

E-'\IBR. -kCl-",,, 'G DII, 1ýFRENCE

that struggles for recognition of identities are peripheral or passý.As Deleuze and Guattari would say, these are concerned Nvithhiston-, but the latter are concerned with becomings. However, we are only ever presented with mixtures. It is not a matter of choosing one at the expenseof the other. "Our age is becoming the age of minorities" (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 469). A minority is not numerically less than a majority, but reveals a disparity or gap with a norm. One can envisage a situation where the numerical majority of a population could be marginalised and disenfranchised (as occurred during the South African era of apartheid) and hence be a minority. Minorities have a special relationship With the notion

of

becoming, because minorities promote

compositions that elude the grasp of both capitalist economy and State. The), be to refuse put in their place. Deleuze and Guattari reiterate that a struggle on the level of the axioms is important for women, regional economies or oppressed but few to minorities, name a examples. However, when minorities express demands that cannot be met on the level of the axioms then the disparity with a becomes It taut tense. majoritarian standard more and creates a metastability; a situation

of

disequilibrium.

In chapter 5, we will

learn how a becoming-

hVing flows bound Nhnorities that are n-linoritarian is up with a ('reatedpossible. escape the axiomatic of capital.

The conditions for a worldwide movement are to be found in the minorities fuzzy These they multiplicities, are minorities are non-denumerable; everywhere. It the majoritarian standards. is not sufficient to add axioms, always escaping although tactically this is important in terms of women's rights, rights of asylum The in not just consists the challenge so on. and unemployed rights of seekers, disparlt\-, but this occurs and gap, a a in opening up the system, majority opposing (471). formulate their problems own when people articulate and Deleuze and Guattarl contend that it is this disparity, this tension, that is 'nunontarian by that new engender the capital of axiornatics created paradoxically denumerable "dorrunant destroying by It the the of eqwhbnum is aggregates'. 83

E'MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

sets" (472) that a mass becomes revolutionam This power of the nondenumerable is specific to the minority. In this way the minority, regardless of how many members it has, is always a multiplicity. The system creates its own outside' by multiplying the lines of flight which create transversal links bem-een singular problems. This is the Undecidable that forms part of every system of axiomatics. In What is Philosophj?Deleuze and Guattari emphasise,in a way they had not done before, the relation between resistance and becoming (1991a: 10910). Here creation is understood as resistance. They argue that the notion of minority is very complex with all sorts of resonancessuch as political, musical and literary. A majority holds the standard of measure and assumespower and domination. Majority appearstwice: once in the from Deleuze the the constant, and once in it extracts variable constant. which Guattari Nobody, it and view as an abstract standard, always while rMnonty is the becoming of everybody, "everyone's potential becoming to the extent that one deviates from the model" (1980: 105). Specifying these distinctions further they describe the majoritarian standard as a constant and homogeneous system (aswe becomingTully's work) and minorities are subsystems, whereas a saw in So beconuing" (106). is "potential, although creative and created, mi*notitan'an a be definable, "they be have must also identities and objectively minorities may becoming thought of as seeds,crystals of whose value is to trigger uncontrollable Because (106). deterritorializations the mean or majonty" of movements and logic develop of a minorities encourage new transversal connections, they also Domination. Power the and realm of multiplicities, of potenlia,that challenges but different the gathering of A logic of multiplicities concerns multiplicities, heterogeneous components into an assemblageoften involves a specific type of be This cannot multiplicitIT multiplicim the or virtual intensive multiphcmý; The initial impetus divided or add another element without changing in nature. Although from Bergson. beheN-e, I in for such a philosophical construct comes, Bergson If-'ill 1ýree Tilll(, with concerned speaking, is, strictly and the context of 'nk th' thi ill" to about instructive is it still this concept, psychology -,N-henmapping 84

EMBRACING

DIFFEREENCE

fuzzy multiplicity as he does. Emotions be divided, heated cannot a anger cannot be halved into a moderate annoyance. This is ,x-hat he calls a quahtative multiplicity.

It

is chfferential, consistent and irreducible. In terms of deterritorialisation, this marks a qualitative transformation of a given situation/ assemblage. On the other hand, one can cut up a square of cardboard, compare parts and put it back together without changing the nature of that

multiplicity. With sheer simplicity Guattari provides the comparison of a heap of stones (a numerical or quantitative multiplicity) and a dry stone wall (that as it is organised both selects and discriminates, excludes and includes) wl-lich he would qualify as a heterogeneous multiplicity hooking up With A sorts of other components (farn-Aand,ramblers, domestic animals,weeds ). Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy can be synopsised as a logic of multiplicities. The concepts of numerical and virtual multiplicities are scattered throughout all the corners of their works. In A ThousatidPlateausthey distinguish between smooth and striated space. The gridding and division of space effected by the State is counterposed to the nomad war machine such as that of the Mongol hordes which does not divide spacebut distributes itself in space,cropping up as from Operations if nowhere. of standardisation and umforn-usation are by becoMings-nunor. A don-unant language beset unravelled or official is alwaý-s by subterranean dialects, patois and literary innovations. This distinction between the continuous variation of a virtual multiplicity and the relative standardisation of the numerical multiplicity is then instructive ethico-politically. Their concept of the assemblagerelates to that of a virtual multiplicity since it difference, held heterogeneous together their in not as a components concerns The but their their through symbioses. abstract relations; set of elements, different modes of association and alliance is an ethico-political possibilities of This other understanding of power as question, constituting an etho-ontology. for potentiacompounds our capacities existing and thinking in a relational manner.

85

EMBRACING

ll. ix.

mechanism

DIFFERENCE

or machinism?

The implications of Deleuze's machinic philosophy are serious. For Badiou, they mean we can, at no time, be the source of what -,N-cthink or what we do, but everything always comes from afar, from the infinite and inhuman reservoir of the One (1997: 9-13). The Deleuzean automaton is, according to Badiou, traversed by the power of this inorganic life and the most pure choice is henceforth the most automatic one, the one where we are stripped of our individuality and humanity when faced with this Outside. We are chosen. We do fate, not choose our as in philosophies of representation (11). This idea of the purified automaton is found, according to Bachou,in Deleuze's his (1985a), second cinema book on the TheTime-Ima this reading is in ge and vie-\x-, , much closer to Deleuze's true perspective than the desiring machines of 1968. To think is thus no longer a personal capacity. (And ethics appears to constitute nothing other than radical passivity.) If we read the chapter entitled 'Thought and Cnema' carefully we discover that this idea of the spiritual automaton (inspired initially by Spinoza) is primarily concerned with the contention that thinking is a have begun Heidegger, 'we Paraphrasing to think'. not yet shock. This automaton is presented by Badiou as a sIMUlacrum without any relation to 'outside' from Although the external world, a more profound cut off others. The 128). 1997: (Badiou, principle animating the automaton is nothing animates it forced We force, think. to the this are always than outside. of element other Yet contrary to Badiou's understanding of the spiritual automaton, tl-lis notion does not mean we are necessarily passive. It constructs a conception of the hurnan that is open to its non-human becomings. The human is thus refrom than reality, and parv abstracted rather iialitrae, and relational as conceived dominatorial. This is an ethics as experimentation, that invents the potentials and Deleuze fires fuel humans. Foisting the becon-nngsof repeatsthe critics, on the ()f his latest his from kind to earliest of a that constitutes ethics einiorfiiii an notion 86

F-MBRACING

DIFFERENCE

works.

In the 'Twenty- first series of the Event', Deleuze contemplates the -,toic concept of the event in detail, arguing that this is a "question of becoming a citizen of the (1969: 148). Ethics means nothing other than "not to be un,,vorthy ot world" happens to us" (149). If we blame someone or something else for our what misfortunes and sufferings, we slip into ressentiment. Instead we need to xvill the event in order to release its eternal truth. We then affirm something in that which We occurs. must counter-actualise or counter-effectuate the event, making it our 46 own.

In his final book with Guattari, Deleuze reiterates "There is no other ethic than the amorfi7fi of philosophy" (1991a: 159). Again ethics is equated vvith beconuing equal to the event, and againJoe Bousquet is quoted, "my wound existed before born I to embody it" (159). Extracting the virtual from a state of affairs me; was is to counter- effectuate the event by isolating its concept. lines deny these to the superficial reading of seem would possibility of N-cry .\ An etl-iics. unguarded cruelty appears to persist in Deleuze's words, as though be however to though must subrratted suffering and affirmed, not challenged, Taking Spinoza through such a reading is simplistic. our journey and through Simondon and Deleuze, we find that this ethics does not entail a radical passivity, but rather an openness toward the future and a practice of constructivism. This love of fate is not an acceptanceof a predetermined natural and moral order, but is concerned with cultivating the capacity to work with the materials and be, distasteful they in order to create other modes of may as circumstances, existence. I agreethat if we abstract the above lines from the overall pro)ect embarked upon bv Delcuzc (including his Nvorkwith Guattari) it may ,vell appear that all Nvecan 46 For some thinkers the logical conclusion of this is that the conditions of thought are hopes be byPersonal the effecti%elý put can concerns, needs and purified and sober. Ieton Ea,,,, by Badiou is least (at the this amongst others). and suggestion ayside

87

E2\IBRACING

DIFFERENCE

do is accept our fate as pregiven and predestined. Our only hope would be to make contact with the impersonal Life (and impossible Death) that constitutes being. But such a reading would be in bad faith. ,Jmor.lýiti entails affirming our something in that which happens to us, not affirming cverything that happens to It us. also involves creating the conditions for the production of the ne-\N-;a Repetition. repetition of the different, as Deleuze arguesin Dý#ýren('e and "To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought: 'something possible, otherwise I will suffocate... (1985a: 170). The modern fact is, for Deleuze, that we no longer believe in this "it looks like bad film" Serres (171). Like the to is world; world which says, us a this link with the world has been broken and we need a faith to attach (reliaare)us to the world once more. The distinction between absolute and relative deterritorialisation then becomes a difference between It 'hnuit' the involves crucial one. a conceptual and the 'threshold'. "Mhe

limit

designates the penultimate marking a necessary

rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 438). Absolute deterritorialisation expresses a different ftom (509). Relative that is qlialitalhely relative movement movement deterritoralisation is a movement that is alwaysblocked or curtailed. Deleuze and Guattari repeat that absolute deterritorialisation brings about the creation of a 99), 'utopia' 510,1991a: (1980: to the of the suggesting it is close new earth Frankfurt School, and Adorno's 'negative dialectic' (1991a: 99).

Since capitahsm operates through an immanent axiomatic movement of dcterritorialisation, and since Deleuze's subject of ethics is a spiritual automaton happens it, in to the onIN ption might appear that ýg111everything affirming 1-0 by be adopting a stance of to surrender to this inevitable movement either to Yet, jubilant tempered a is always capitahsm immersion. or enfightened cynicism for fosters Marx's (as the potential theorý) inadvertently in proccss, and it 88

FMM--ýCIXG

DIFFERENCE

resistance because it needs to create minimal spacesof liberty and creativit-\' to prevent it from becorrung entropic. The difficulty facing us is to harness the forces of deterritorialisation of capitalism in fields such as science, technology and the media in order to develop different forms of struggle against the repressions and material bondage that accompany capitalism. This involves a revaluation of values. These resistancesmust be constructed - they will not spring forth e-x-liiklo. The qualitative transformation that accompanies passing a threshold is thus distinguished from the relative displacement of the limits of capitalism. Spinoza wrote during a burgeoning era of capitalism in Holland, but he could not be expected to foresee the mutations of finance capitalism and the prospect of his liberation Does integrated world capitalism. ethics of inadvertently collude in this movement of relative deterritorialisation or does it indeed prON-idethe for the production of novelty and the unforeseeable?This question conditions Or the this thesis: the informs rest of can philosophy escape clutches of capital? does it meander in a creative continuum reinforcing and affirming rather than rupturing the movements of capitalism?

89

Chapter Three

Spinoza: The God-Intoxicated

Man

SPINOZA:

IIIJ.

THE GOD-INTOXICATEDMAN

ethics and immanence

It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion [ ] ... D eleuze and Guattarl, If"hat is Philosoply?(1991a: 75).

It may come as some surprise to find the word 'transcendence' used in an accusatory manner in the next few pages, whilst immanence is presented as having be Why this the case?Nietzsche said, intrinsic verging on an value. should "Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist" (1889: §1,55). Deleuze and Guattan likewise say that believe be forms to this to the need in we of world, urging us aware of transcendence (often of theological origin) that shape our lives and thoughts. They go on to make an ontological claim concerning this idea of immanence, based know. The 'pure than rather ontology' a critical claim upon what we can that they delineate can also be called an ethics (Deleuze, 2/12/80). This ethics is described as a way of evaluating (and not judging) immanentmodes 'increase that terms of effectuating compositions of relations of existence in in hand, hence *oy). MorahtN-, (and the is presented on other powers of activity terms of an absolutism that pays no attention to the singular essencesof the humans it compels to obedience.47Spinoza's systemis not basedupon a model of dualism. With finds an anti-Cartesian a resonancein mind/body obedience which flourish Spinoza assertsthat the mind does not subjugate the body. The mind is but the idea of the body. The opposition between ethics and Nlorahtý-explicitly few the chapters. next and implicitly informs Obeying requires one to imagine a body more powerful than oneself Obedience

47Pierre Bourdieu asks *who has an interest in the universaIT (1990: 3 1). By explaining the longer fields, in different forms the the universal no of universal genesis or emergence of dedicated Nietzsche's to formal recritical philosophy was olýjective. and appears neutral, Genealogv 1foralitY On (1887). for See, thc qf example, eNraluating all values. .

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SPINOZA: THE GOD-I-NTOXICATED

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thus rests upon impotence.411The sovereign state is a machine to produce obedience. Drawing on Antonio Negri (1981), 1 Nvant to continue to use a working distinction between potentia and Potestaj49 to illustrate the difference between tl-iis conception of an absolute in-imanent movement and that of an order that is superposed. The assemblagesthat we are a part of can diminish our capacities for acting or enhance them. This idea is key to Spinoza's EMit's. The hylomorphic operation transmits a sense that matter is not active, not selforganising with emergent properties, and to this extent it fits in well with our distinction between Potestasand potenfia.The former case refers to the way in which a power (ýotenfia)can be separatedfrom its capacitý-to act. Spinoza differs hugely from Hobbes in this regard since he does not seethe political arrangement as one of command and obedience but one, rather, of facilitation of natural rights.50Differences between beings are then quantitative in terms of power, and qualitative in terms of modes of existence. Yet, as Lloyd and Gatens remind us, we also need to create better collective forms do that imaginings of of social organisation not stifle the potentl.aor power We Tully's 1. this of people. saw an example of in work in chapter

natural right and power Rather than idealising humans, Spinoza develops a relational conception of humans as they are betýomin from building hi He is g. a political realist s philosophy , these flawed materials. But if, as Spinoza suggests,we do not even know what a body can do, how can we possibly invent (not fulfil in an Aristotelian manner)

48See Etienne Balibar (1985). 491 find it a useful and strategic distinction in this context, although I disagree with Negri's idea Potestas links the that of NvIthan organisational role of the attributes, a role argument fie contends is dispensed of NvhenSpinoza begins writing the second half of the Ethics. For a Pierre Macherey The ý(n, Negri's (1982-3). see ageAnomaly good critique of 50Given the critiques of theories of rights initiated by Henry Shue who calls for a correlatiý,e duty or responsibility. and my own criticisms of the Rawlsian theory of rights, it is important to stress that Spinoza's theory of right is expressly framed in terms of power as for describe I this the our ideas about relationallt, %throughout of ramifications potentia. Nvill this chapter.

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SPINOZA- THE GOD-INTOXICATED

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modes of existence that increase our powers of acting, of affecting and being affected? With Spinoza, ethics regains an Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean resonance emphasising practices and modes of h\-ing. The principles of the good life cannot, however, be demarcatedin ad\-ance. Spinoza has read Hobbes, Hobbesian

proposition

he and constructs

his idea of natural right from

the

that things are not defined by their essence or obligations,

but instead by their power. Hobbes

says that this means we have the right to do

all that we are able to in this dog-eat-dog world (homo homi*nibous est). These rights are curtailed brutish

because life under such conditions

The and short. purpose

would

of the social contract

be solitary, poor, nastN', is to temper our \-lolent

propensities.

Unlike Lee Rice, I contend that Spinoza does not fit the category of possessive individualist and nor is he a precursor of libertarianism, the harbinger of a radical individualism (1990: 274).51 As Nietzsche rightly points out, Spinoza is nonegoistic; moreover he does not believe someone could want something for herself Without wanting it for others. For Spinoza, a social contract does not entail curbing natural rights but fostering them. The tint that Spinoza places upon the idea of power as t-onatiis paints a very different picture to that of Hobbes. It is entirely stripped of the will to donuinate, or a paranolacal compulsion to conserve power. It is an expression of openness. In Spinoza's view, man is a god for man (hominemhomini'Deumesse)(IN'. pr. 35. homine (homo ), (IN". to than man man sch. and nothing is more useful nihil iltifiils) he by desires Amazingly, 18. ). that if is pr. claims one governed reason, one sch. for another what one desiresfor oneself However, he warns correspondingly that harmful If to than they are subject to passions, man. man nothing is more humans neither agree with themselves nor with one another. Hatred erupts in

iI In a thoughtful discussion on this matter. Gatens and Lloyd (1999: 20-22) also challenue Antonio Negri Etienne Balibar Spinoza. Theý individualist turn to to and reading of an dynamic account of the relation of indi\ idual and collective whereb\ unit\ more articulate a 126). ( than thought opposed viewpoints rather as reciprocal of are and multiplicity 92

SPINOZA:

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MAN

particular when they are isolated. According to Deleuze (3/5/77), the relationship between Ontology and political for key Spinoza, Spinoza's Moreover, Machiavelli to philosophy was work. unlike Hobbes, and ethics and politics were not altogether separated. (Politics is onlý he because needed, says, people are not Wise.) Deleuze argues that philosopl-ýies One be from hierarchy One the tend to that the of imposing moves emanative, a to Being and then to beings. A pure ontology, on the other hand, repudiates hierarchy. It is not difficult to perceive a political motivation here. This world of degrees beings have immanence is one in which all of power. an intrinsic value, as The way Spinoza's naturalist philosophy develops this concept of power (in terms different potentia) introduces a very of way of understanding the individual and the how I this operates in the context of process of individuation. WiH show Spinoza's Ethks later in this chapter. III. iii. rights, duties and powers A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of life and not of death. Homo liber de nulld re minus,qu,ým de motietqgilat, eý-ýiiis sapentianon modis,sei viltie medilatioest. Baruch Spinoza, Elbics.(IV pr. 67).

different begin I At this juncture, to weave together a number of will Badiou, I to First sketch the to want of criticisms in response of all, problematics. being idea faithful Deleuze and'\vIi)the to of univocal that is the reasons some of hierarchical this is important. Deleuze is warý- of any attempts to introduce a His degraded leave Beings shadow. this mere a world that would order of difference. described distmictive terms of in one, is a univocity understanding of has before difference difference It His concept of difference is the q/'difference, bccn subordinated to comparative categories such as resemblance and identity.

SP1\0ZA:

THE GOD - INTO-',, - ICATED

ý -NIA-N,

Difference is affirmation, and as the difference q1-difference it is relational-, Deleuze calls it an intensive quantity. In the next two chapters I will explicate these concepts in greater detail, and show how they link with Spinoza's philosophy of power (poletitia)which is also described in terms of intensive quantities.

Deleuze says, "With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and be: being difference" Difference the that must it is is in it is said of which sense (1968a: 39). When Spinoza's substance is read as sirnply self-identical and blinkered dynamic I to immobile, we are its and creative nature. want to argue, through Deleuze's writings and seminars and the work of Pierre Macherq, that Spinoza's philosophy is one that can account for processesof individuation and by Through Simondon, Deleuze this project, singularisation. will radicalise developing a conception of immanence that rests upon the idea of metastability, a Spinoza's disequilibrium. In this immanent cause and the system of way Naturata Natura (Natured Naturans Nature) Natura (Naturing and relationship of Nature)

linked be 29) to the idea of a transcendental revitalised and pr. will

empiricism. But what has all this to do with ethics? By developing an alternative account of from bad. distin ishing good gul the individual, we also map another way of Centuries after Spinoza's death, Nietzsche would proclaim excitedly in a postcard have I "I Overbeck, friend Franz his a to am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted. five but [... ] knew Spinoza hardly I the main in pir, 71r, precursor! a and what m-, loneliest thinker doctrine I his this and most unusual myself; recognise points of freedom denies he the the will, of these matters: M to precisely me is closest 1, 189 20 July (Letter of teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil" ftec Spinoza's 105). terms 1989b: of Yovel, in ethics of conception quoted in Fran-uing difficult an ethics (libera idea. important and is a liet,essitas) necessM, ftankly to many, nonsensical seem could or evil good of \x,itliout an\, conception butt Nietzsche's Spinoza of but not to Nietzsche. Nonetheless, still remains the God 'shado, keeping him transcendent the a Nietzsche of \ý-s' of accuses poleirlics. 94

ýPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

MAN

ahve.52 Unlike Kant and Hegel, Spinoza does not feel compel-ledto make his philosophý human centred and anti-naturahstic (Yovel, 1989b: 7). It for this reason that his is ethics remains anomalous. Indeed -Virimiyahu Yovel arguesthat anior_ptiis a term invented by Nietzsche in "a polemical transformation of Spinoza's a)vor dei I.ntellectualis[...]" (104). Ethical liberation is contemplated in terms of power and activity. 53 Power is identical to essence. It is always in action and it alwaý-s corresponds to an ability to be affected (potere). The Ethit's is a heretical and provocative text, one I want to explore over the course of this chapter in the context of our investigation into ethics and subjectivity. However Spinoza's necessitarianismhas led many to believe that this love of fate, or love of necessity,entails nothing other than submitting passively to whatever befalls us. As we read Spinoza we will learn that it is an ethics of joy. Conscious of the incessantly changing nature of reality, it seeks to help us to cultivate joy and minimise sadness (which is correlative with passivity). His account of sadness,together with a Hobbesian understanding of the human in terms of power (potenfia),is repeated throughout Marx's theory of alienation as an account of secularredemption (Yovel 1989b: 97).54 When Deleuze and Guattari controversially said that human rights were just I 52- Against Spinoza's eminently rational, law-governed nature-God Nietzsche thus opposes flux in logical a world everlasting never self-identical, never at rest, never attaining equilibrium (by which it would be captured and defined) or a fixed final state, a world being becoming but between both" (Yovel, nor pure always wavering which is neither pure 1989b: 123). This static reading of Spinoza fails to examine the dynamism of concepts such Natul-a Natin-ans, conatus and potentia. I will respond to this kind of reading in 111yown interpretations. Spinoza Macherey's Deleuze's through especially and presentation of 53Andr6 Tosel thinks that recently far more credence has been set by the idea that Spinoza is liberation. of processes concerned with he is Spinoza Marx's , Fhe than thought admits. Borges wrote -5-1 impact of more pervasive on be imaginary, b" he book QuiXote Don to that an reproduced considers a storN about a real be ho Borges He Menard, Pierre to considers real. says the texts are \\, imaginary author. identical but Menard's is infinitely richer (Deleuze. 1968a: xxii). In a similar fashion. Marx itical bý log I Karl Heinrich Marx. Freatise' Theo 'Spinoza's 1co-Po entitled a manuscript Berlin 1841. This was. as Yo\-el (I 989b: 78) emphasises, a perfect act of plagiarism since Marx had sirnph, copied frorn that text and rearranged it. adding no thoughts of his own.

95

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED'NIAN

another axiom added to the market, they echoed a sentiment that Spinoza expresses when he tells us that formal democracy is a constitutional illusion if powerless people possessrights they cannot exercise.The right of the farmer in Malawi to demand a fair price for his/her products constitutes nothing other than baying into the wind if international finance markets for the set prices cash crops and supermarkets can head off to a cheaper supplier. By articulating this discourse in terms of power, and immanent rather than ideal modes of existence, not only can a critical stancebe taken on such questions, but a constructivist one premised upon the singularity of casescan be adopted. I do draw not want to introduce a debate about rights and duties, but simply N,, to -ant attention to the way that (rightly or wrongly) Deleuze and Guattan place a premium on real, situated modes of existenceand the capacity for action, thought and expression correlative with these instances, rather than speaking about the abstract (and often flawed) ideals of human rights. Spinoza does not provide

an account of ideology; ideology is necessarily

comparative, measuring something that exists against something that does not 55 just exist.

like Bergson, Spinoza has little

time for a retrospective

(and

fisempowering) illusion future. He the toward turned the possible. of is (:

As a diagnostician, Spinoza indicates the ways that we can engagein a cntical and be New modes of existence must clinical evaluation of our modes of existence. hke Guattari's Deleuze and plane of immanence constructed and invented, and do Tbrough their their combined theories of the), creation. not pre-exist becomings. Such humans their is are opened up to non-human affectivity, Spinoza's ethics: immanent, situated, embodied, and capable of affirn-ung It liberation dissensus. His is a constructivist one. is no ethics of chsparitý-and Guattari Deleuze that call a plane of immanence alternatWelya plane and accident of consistency or composition.

i:l See Arnelia Oskenber, Rorty (1990). -,

96

SPINOZA:

THE GOD- INTOXICATED

'MAN

But before examining this kind discuss of ethics in further detail, I N-ý-ant to some of the themes I have introduced by returning to an important critic of Deleuze Alain Badiou. The issues I will address prIn-larfly concern the notion of unIvoc1tY so they refer equally to Spinoza. Through this debate, I seek to indicate some of the ways in which Deleuze reconciles his status as philosopher of difference and thinker of univocity. We have already come across the idea that a degreeof power is an intensive quantitý-; this is something we will look at in detail in the next few chapters. However I also want to demonstrate that these abstract concepts, such as univocity, must be explained concretely.

IlLiv. 'bolshevik'

versus 'fascist':

the Badiou/Deleuze

encounter

In short we end up with Deleuze as the joyous thinker of the world's confusion. Alain Badiou, Deleuýe:the Clamour qf Beitiu(1997: 9).

Alain Badiou did not enamour himself to readersof Deleuze when he circulated a little pamphlet entitled 'Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien', a leaflet that accused 'deleuzians' of evangelism, discipledom and a profound misunderstanding of the Master. 51 He presents himself as the only person thus far to treat their words of Deleuze's work in a philosophical rather than evangelicalmanner. In contrast with many commentators, Badiou asserts that, like Spinoza, Deleuze is an

ascetiC57

thinker of the One-AH. The questions of ontology and ethics are

56 See Futui- 4nt&ieur (no. 43,1998, Ed. Syllepse) for the "deleuzians' - (Jos6 Gil and Arnaud Villani) defence of Deleuze in the wake of the publication of Badiou's Delelize: The Clamout- of Being Badiou will respond to this article at a number of intervals including in his 'Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien' and 'Un, multiple, multiplicit6s' in 1fultitildes (no. 1 . Mars 2000). 57 This strikes me as peculiar given the importance of Nietzsche for Deleuze. Deleuze ideal does life The the the "What of ascetic man want? one who repudiates is also rernarks, the one Nvhowants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power forces 1962: 96). These ( the triumph triumph, contagion of and reactive sentiments are and have ideal but had Philosopky. He ! Vicl: "We throughout adds, no other 7. yche und expressed the ascetic ideal. We have opposed knowledge to life in order to judge life, in order to make is ('15). Similarly Spinoza blameworthy, or erroneous" responsible understood it something and affiri-nation, not an ascetic philosopher. as a philosopher of

97

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATEDNL-ýN

inextricably linked in this contention. Rather than a philosopher of difference, Deleuze is presented as a Platonist of the for thinker virtual; a \-,-hom the actual is a mere effect, by implication denigrated and peripheral to the overall movement of the virtual. Can this philosopher of proliferating

differences and singularities

be reconciled with the advocacy of a philosophy of One-All that Badiou argues is key to the Deleuzian enterpriseý

Badiou begin is his short text on Deleuze in polemical vein. A degreeof intimacy is I established as he describes the personal and political antagonisms, and even a he felt between himself times, peculiar closeness at and Deleuze. Despite this, no founded; Spinoza, their real commonality was even point of convergence, constitutes a bone of contention. Badiou muses over his utter lack of comprehension of the Deleuzian creation. Stringing together anecdotes, Badiou (stating his maoist and bolshevik credentials) accusesDeleuze of fascism and of One-All These (1997: 2). Life the the philosoph ýTof glorifying and accusations for be dismissed bitter direct They protagonist. must not as those of a us, dangers to the instance, of an effusive, quasi-spiritualistic notion of primordial Nature.

The points scattered through the first pages of the introduction are not follows they that the provide a philosophical critique much as unimportant. -\s Deleuze's but incisive, commentary on the ethico-pohtical implications of veiled, from distin ishes Badiou Although the political event philosophical 9W philosophy. I ýfter he the the two intimates. that separated as as are clear it is not eternity, . from Badiou's least Fold The Deleuze's there is a rapprochement, at publication of lines Deleuze's This the philosopliy of is a paradoxical entente along perspective. for between letters A divergence. them a 'while; passes of series of series and firmINDeleuze due however closes the to a sequence of unforeseeable events, discourse.

Bachou's The philosophy of the multiple that informs ontology is written vis-A-vis (arumal) bet-ween he distinction The the paradi,ýgm of Deletize. vital seesit, is, as 98

SPINOZA: THE GOD- I\TOXIC-NTED

MAN

MLIltipliCIties that one discovers in the trajectory from Bergson, and a theory of sets.Though both are concerned with the question of ontology, virtual Totalin- or chaosmosis are anathema to Badiou. These words lav bare the fundamental proposition of the ontology of the One-All inforrmng Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze is a metaphysician of a renovated Onc and it is precisely his fidehtý- to this particular understanding of univocity that Badiou grapples with, and challenges.

Far from being an egalitarian, Badiou claims that Deleuze is a profoundl) aristocratic thinker. Thought only exists in a hierarchalised space where the individual is seized by its pre-individual determination (11-12). Although Being is neutral and equal, one must always find out whether a thing can go to the limit of its power and things are consequently considered from the point of view of their power, again according to a hierarchy (32-3). The only anarchy Deleuze wants is a (anarchie crowned anarchy (wlronýe). All that matters, on Badiou's reading, is that a fundamental asceticismis imposed factors the intellectual, social and sentimental associatedwith the whereby all of favour 'states 'lived' things' the of this power adualio of of and are renounced in to exceed one's limit, in favour of bifbn*s.Badiou adjudges this to be a philosophý, dissipation death, I that am, of my actuality, into a purified automaton. of all of a This assessmentseems bolstered by Deleuze's fondness for Maunice Blanchot's death. writings on it is perhaps the proliferation of dualisms, combined with the inevitable Badiou that term when most irks over another, qualitative privileging of one for Constantly Deleuze's terms two one are introduced, onlyJ philosophy. reading difference For foundational be is privileged above instance, and superior. to made 2000: (Badiou identity, affirmation over negation, movement over immobility lived (states Real Similarly, 197). of affairs and the virtual is while the actual It to tl-ý,, propensitýattribute an is a simulacrum. an effect, is merely experience) icallN lo ically, especially most and Y chronolo the to virtual, antetiority 191 191

SPINOZA: THE GOD

NTOXICATEDNIAN -I

ically, that leads him to call Deleuze a 'Platonist of the virtual'. ontolo 91 Badiou therefore asks why Being needs two names if it is said in one and the same sense of all beings. These names are said of the unity of the power of production and the actualisation of the multiplicity of divergent simulacra. Such a move, according to Badiou, re-introduces transcendence into this system. Moreover, it demonstrates Deleuze's Bergsonism as he compulsively multiplies dualisms at every turn. (Deleuze will respond that it is what happens between the two that matters.) The virtual is the principal name of Being in Bachou'sN-lew. Ray Brassier (2000) elaborates these ideas further. He claims that, for Deleuze, Being is an inclusive disjunction that constitutes a unilateral asý-Mmetrý,.Being i's Being becomes It the said of virtual and actual, so is naming of equivocal. therefore transcendent. The inclusive disjunction is an excess over virtual and actual, marking a political covenant with the global sovereignty of capitalism. According to Brassier, Badiou effectively asks whether the nomadic distribution logic the mimes of capital creating an indiscernibility of capital and philosophy.

Resistance to the sovereignty of capital requires a rupture, not an ontology Badiou Consequently, than rather process, premised upon a creative continuum. An The Vold. the the is emphasis on system excess of stresses subtraction. be throughout this offset chapter must production, constructivism and process bolstering this is another instance of philosophy against the question of whether be This implicitly addressedthrough the movements of capitalism. allegation will the dyad of Potestas and potenfia. Ba(:hou has a further ethico-political point to raise. The impersonal One re\-cals Deleuze's Stoicism by invoking what Badiou calls a purified automaton in the The to that treads near occurs of all of necessity affirmation place of the subject. for to ia and novelty sacrifice moreover the appears, and quo, status an apolo91 2000: (Brassier, plurality on the altar of univocity -206-9).

SPINOZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATED'MAN ,

According to Badiou, Deleuze proposes a rene, One. While the the ývedconcept of confusion of the world resists taming by a stable classification or a direction of history, the multiplicity of the world is nonetheless subject to a qualitative subsumption by the One. Badiou argues that this manoeuvre is consistent with Deleuze's overall project whereby a static opposition is resolved as one term effects a qualitative takeover. To consolidate his contention that Deleuze is in fact i DýlPrenceand a thinker of the One, he draws our attention to statements in . Repetitionand The Lgic of Sense Deleuze where appeals to an idea of one clamour Being for beings. His has freeing Deleuze of that all conclusion is no interest in the multiple but is concerned with folding it back onto this renewed concept of the One.

There is no doubt that univocity is an important concept for Deleuze, but we must examine the way he reworks this concept, especially in relation to Spinoza described Univocity potentia the is and in terms of the as a iv'se-%-istendi. concept of differences of differences in Dý§ýrence Repetition and is invoked in order to rally and against philosophies of emanationism and eminence with the express aim of constructing a philosophy of radical immanentism. Badiou knows that univocal Being is neither numerically one nor even unified. He beings is One (Puissante) that the its are multiple and tells us that the power of divergent produced by a disjunctive synthesis. In the sameway, substanceis, for Spinoza, immediately expressedby an infinity of attributes, although there is no Being. Individuating division of ontological

differences are intensities or

inflexions of power and are mobile and singular. This 'virtual totality' has different names such as inorganic Life and the One-All Being Badiou. is thought as po,,ver (ýIII'Slfam-e) (,Spinozist substance), according to between distinction Naturing Nature Although Life. there is no ontological or as distribution binarv Nature, its Natured either accentuates there \N-hich is a and As discm (1997: this r 'inatter' xe will actuahsation its or immediate -')-) Macherey, relates to whether a particular or a global view to distinction, according I

SPINOZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATED-MAN

of things is taken. Deleuze explains this notion further in his seminars,which we will turn to later in this chapter The difference of beings is thus only formal; their ontological identity is Being. Conversely, Badiou argues that what is required is a thought of the actuality of Being in terms of its 'pure dispersion-multiple'; an immanence excluding the all. Countering a logic of multiplicities, this logit,of the multiple dominates Badiou's philosophical enterprise. This is becausea logic of multiplicities is anachronistic and pre-Cantor (Badiou, 2000: 199). By drawing upon set theory Badiou proposes determination a univocal of the multiple -Without-one (199). In a (pre-emptive) backlash, Deleuze and Guattan themselves accuse Badiou of transcendence. They contend that his conception of the emptý- set or the vold floats that implies philosophý' in an empty transcendence,as the unconditioned concept (1991a: 152). In their view, this is why at least two multiplicities are because happens bet)Peeen back These the two. to multiplicity is what needed are back (and not hierarchically superposed)as in the relation of statesof affairs and events. Firmly convinced of the value of the multiple of set theory, in contradistinction to Deleuze's logic of multiplicities, Badiou does not investigate thoroughly enough the concept of the plane of immanence and the idea of the inclusl\, e disjunction. In my view, Deleuze's work with Guattari is set to one side in what, for Badiou, is an uncustomarily weakly argued fashion. For Deleuze, univocal Being is the differences of differences communicating through their differences, disparate. These distributive, It is One-All is open and not unifying. and the decision Guattari. Badiou's to the themes recur in \-arious guises in -\vork with different Deleuze's to trajectory very multiplicitous oeuvre on a ignore this sets Guattari be the the one it would xas included. work with on if I'hcre are some points of agreement, however. Badiou understands that a contemporarN, metaphysics w

must

be a theon,

of

mul tiiphciItiies and grasp

I

() -',

SPINOZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATEDNIAN .

singularitics. Of

necessity this initiates a critique of insidious forms of

transcendence \,,-hether they be overtly reh91 ious or cloistered. In addition, the 1 lingering traces of religion mean that univocal Being must be posited (2()()():196). He concurs with Deleuze that every true thought is a thought of singularity, but for Deleuze, actual multiplicities are purely formal modalities. It is that, argues this necessity to appeal analogically to the intuition of the virtual that reintroduces transcendence.

In sum, for Badiou, Deleuze ends up with a virtual, 'horizontal' transcendence(as 'vertical' to transcendenceof the One) that misrecognisesthe intrinsic opposed a resources of the multiple by presupposing a chaotic power of the One, and býmaking analogies of the modes of actualisation rather than grasping them in their Deleuze singularity. is a natural mystic (2000: 211). It would be facile to deny that Deleuze makes the statementsthat Badiou quotes, or to claim they were anomalies,at odds with his overall philosophy of difference. Instead we need to understand in what way Deleuze is a thinker of the One-All indeed him In to take trajectory. motivates and what such a contradistinction to a 'democracy of desire' (1997: 10) Badiou believes Deleuze's machini'sm leads to an because abnegation of choice and of will of the emphasis placed upon the A One. Our Alliez Life, Fric the impersonal concept of of points challenge, as "ontological to to try the the is out, grasp complexity of proposition of the thesis Being (Alhez, 2000: the pragmatic affirmation of multiplicities" and of univocal 192).

It is therefore acutely important to understand both the nature of the ontology of becon-ung that Deleuze is proposing, and how it relates to his philosophy of difference. We need to figure out why Deleuze takes issue NX-1th an image of does ifficit that thought pre-philosophical presuppositions. not reflect upon its GIN-cli the discomfort

felt by different philosophers with notions of an

fact Nature, Spinoz.,, Naturing Life the Nvemust ask whether in or i's impersonal becoming force and abnegatesany responsibility to allegiance to a phi-losophy of 103

SPINOZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATED

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actuality and to ethics. Is it as though the individual is dissolved into the inchvisible substancein v.-hich all inchviduality lacks reahty? This kind of ob)ection is also effectively made by Tern- Eagleton in a revie-W (2000: 9) where he argues that philosophy is still enamoured with religious fervour. He claims that the invocation of an impersonal, vitalistic Life traversing the universe is found in concepts like 'difference' and 'desire'. A privileging of an inhuman, impersonal force dissolves the reality of the actual human. A similar kind of allegation is made by Antonio Negri in reference to Part V of Spinoza's Etbics which, in Negri's view, slips into a d-iinly veiled mysticism through the introduction of the third kind of knowledge amordei'which Spinoza calls beatitildo. Moreover, for different reasons that we will discover shortly, Laruelle will call Deleuze's (and Nietzsche's) philosophy an idealistit,one premised upon a force. particular conception of Perhaps, on the other hand, we will be able to draw upon these attempts to think process and movement to rethink the questions of difference and relationality, and reconsider the question of ediics. Him.

univocity,

eminence,

analogy

We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh: it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema2: The Time-lmqe. (1985a: 173).

In a seminar on 'Scholasticism and Spinoza' (14/l/74)51, Deleuze situates the difficult)- of the question of the nature of being and distinguishes bet-,-,-ccn he Equivocity, saý-s,is a problem of utterances-, cquivocity, analogy and univocity. know to whether a table is said in the same senseas an animal, or a man we need Being59 God. Equivocal the means that there are several in same sense of as

i'NAll quotations are taken from the seminar in discussion unless otherwise noted. These found hence lack the are only online, of page numbers. and serninars are not published 59In order to distinguish 'ýtrc' and '6tant' I \NIII retain a (Heidegger nuanced) distinction of 104

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senses of being and that these different senses of the word Being are without common measure. Curiously, this could lead to heresv since some would prefer to say that 'God is not, rather than say 'God is' in the same \vay that a chair is. At least the former could be interpreted as meaning that God is superior to Being. Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly declare an allegiance to a philosophy of immanence. This is distinguished from the stepped universe ('unh,ers en est'alier) that is emblematic of platonic, neo-platofflc and mediaeval traditions (Deleuze, 1985b: 79). This universe was suspended from the One which operated as a transcendent principle, proceeding through "a series of emanations and hierarchical conversions" (79). "Plotinus reproached Plato for having seen participation ftorn its lesser side" (Deleuze, 1968b: 170). "What is participated remains in itself [and does not enter into what participates in it]; it is participated insofar as it produces, and produces but has no need to leave itself to give or produce" (170). If the insofar as it gives, One is above its products (and its gifts), this is emanation. The effect produced does not remain in the cause,it exists by coming out from the cause, and it is this movement from an (empty) cause that determines this as an emanative movement. The One is superior, not only to its effect, but to what beyond It Being beyond (172). Beings the is gives effect. and substance are hierarchically ranked in terms of their distance from this first cause and have more or less reality, more or less being."' On the other hand, univocal Being means that "Beiti basonjl onesense and is saidin 'g I) it is (Deleuze, 14/01/74). Deleuze's the qfevetytbiq and same sellse ql-ivbl*(. said" oile famous example of this is that God is said in the same senseas a tick. "There is

Being and being. This distinction should not be read as proposing any relation between these ideas and those of Heidegger. 60Remarkably enough Spinoza's substance is often read in an emanationist fashion in which the modes follow from the attributes which follow from substance; this partlNrcorresponds to Hegel's reading. For another such reading see Paul Eisenberu ( 1990).

105

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longer no a remote cause: the rock, the lilv, the animal, and the human cquall) I sing the glory of God in a kind of crowned an-archy" (1985b: 79). Like Hardt and Negri, Deleuze argues that these waves of immanence surged forth against transcendencethroughout the Renaissanceera (79). Immanence is then no longer 'irnmanence to' and participation can no longer be thought of in terms of 'participation in'. Like an emanative cause, the immanent does leave however, its effects remain in the cause. There is no cause itself, not degradation. Pure m-imanencemeans that beings are not ranked hierarchically in distance from their causebut immediately participate in Being. Finally, the analogical conception of Being was mapped out by St Thomas through Aristotelian philosophy. Being is said in severalsensesof that of wl-lich it is said. However, in this case, these are governed by analogy. Deleuze remarks that the categories, which are concepts denoting every possible object of fashion. Philosophies of representation work experience, operate in an analogical through analogical principles of mediation, something we will discover more about in chapter 5. But are these not just pedantic, obscurantist arguments emblematic of mediaeval times, irrelevant to the present day? People were tortured and burned for saying that Being is univocal. The fear of condemnation as a heretic and pantheist meant that Duns Scotus only managed to think univocal Being and not to affirm it. The from dangerous Being the world. transcendence idea, expelling is a univocity of Not only is God said in the same senseas a tick, but in a strange way the tick is God. But in this casehow can there be differences of beings, if we no longer have Aristotelian categories or differences of formý There are differences between beings becausedifference is thought solelý-on the level of degreesof power, not bý-form or genus or species. Ahmed Alarni sLiqgests that although these kinds of debates appear f ar from ,q 80). (1997: huge have ethical and political implications concrete concerns they 106

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Citing Guattari's celebrated aphorism 'Before Being there is Politics', he claims that by battling against an equivocal conception of Being, Deleuze, Duns Scotus and Spinoza demonstrate that that notion implies "a political hierarchy and an impen*ahpati .um which operates through transcendenceand verticality as it appeals to a celestial bureaucracy" (80). Univocal Being, however, implies a "polifical forces that extensi'on advancesand progresses through the immanent extension of life, of and through the creation of spacesof liberty immanent to singularities that are real and effective" (80).

Interpreting this in ethico-political terms, Alarm argues that the Anstotelian method proceeding through mediation mirrors the political mediation that subjugates the powers of the masses. Conversely, "[t]he

univocity

being is of

direajl and immediately different the said of singularities of multiple and essences, that is of the effective and real forces of the masses" (80). Unlike Badiou's selective reading of univocity", Being is affirmation and not difference becoming It In is and not identity, and not resemblance. neutrality. turn, singularities are only neutral insofar as they are the potential of ever), developing By (80). this understanding of univocity we possible individuation has the that to idea philosophy made a political covenant challenge shall continue Capital. with global

HIM. a degree of power There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power - assuming that life itself is the will to power. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. (1901: §55,37).

62

"So between a table, a little bov, a little gIr1, a locomotive, a cmv, a god, the I

in degree the the same realisation and power of one of of is one solely chfference

61Citing The Logic of Sciisc Badiou claims that Being is neutral (1997: 53). Alaml explains how univocal Being is affirmation and becoming. 62Because these notes have been rearranged a number of times, I cite the date \N-henthe first her his b\ Nietzsche's is edition of in collectke works. sister volurne published 107

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being" (Deleuze, 14/1/74). Beings are understood in terms of assemblages the ways theýýare capable of affecting and being affected. For d-iis reason, Deleuze will argue that a draft horse is closer to an ox than to a race horse, becauseit can enter into similar assemblages. This is Spinoza's great innovation; he sees everything in terms of differences of degrees of power and to each degree of power there corresponds a capacity of being affected. Spinoza invents a new taxonomy, closer to that of ethologists than traditional classifications. Hence the ethical challenge:of what affects are you capableý Degrees of power are called intensities and unlike the Aristotelian idea of potential, they are not separated from activity and are necessarily fulfilled. "[t]be affea i's the mannerin wbi(h a de:, oreeofpower is necessari# attualisedas ajuntfion oy'tbe 14/1/74). Spinoza's (Deleuze, the the tbiý assembla gesinto wbkb individualor eillerý' :g , depend Our world is a world of continuous variation. affects on the affections that we have, and if we are sad, this is becauseour power of acting is dimiMshed. An example of this might be the factory worker forced to work extremely long hours in poor conditions. When multinational companies become virtual branding, line their enterprises concentrating on and sub-contract manufacturing to other firms who themselves sub-contract, workers (especially young women) find themselves drawn into an exceedingly brutal capitalist subjectivity that does CI./ live, to them and works them to the point of exhaustion. enough not pay Something that systematically curtails our power of acting we will continue, for Potestas. Guattan to also critiques the infantihsation and call present purposes, different insight into the workings of mass-mediatisation of society, giving us a Poteslas. He argues that television is hypnotic inducing passivity in the viewer, and more importantly, the cultivation of a capitalist subjectivity means that other modes of valonsation are erased. "The powers-that-be are fundamentally institutions built to affect you with sadlic"',

[thev] only keep hold on us by affecting us, which is to sav bv

fulfilling

being affected 'with sad affects, and undoubtedly our p(),\vcr of

Power In doing (14/01/74). to t" this cxl,-, order exercisc thousands of ways of 108

SPINOZA:

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MAN

these powers-that-be must inspire sad passions, and take away the capacity for acting.

This is Spinoza's ethical and political problem. In the last chapter we came across the idea of Collective Equipments which, according to Deleuze and Guattarl, were effectively machines for producing affects. In order to have Power over us, they need to diminish our capacities of acting (and this includes thinking, since thinking is, for Spinoza, an activity). Deleuze (15/2/77) argues that once there is an apparatus of power, there is an abstract machine and vice versa. In his little book on Spinoza, Deleuze writes that Spinoza, the atheist, devalued favour (1981a: 25). describes His tripartite sad passions in the man of )oy scheme saddenedby the human condition (the priest), the man who exploits sad passions to establish power (the tyrant) and the man with sad passions (the slave). Denouncing transcendent values he assessesthat through the imposition of an forced the the thing to submit external norm, is annihilated as it is singularity of to a comparative model that rids it of its difference. Sp inoza resembles Nietzsche greatly in his analysis of this situation since he says that there are two scourges; hatred and remorse. This sentiment echoes the bad Nietzschean idea of ressentiment Deleuze Powers that the and calls tvnstzentv. like distinguishes 'powers-that-be', Negri the and stunt our powers of activity between Power (Pouvoir)and power (puissance). No doubt inspired by Hobbes, Spinoza defines the individual in terms of power (potentia),but unlike Hobbes his idea of power is one of constitutive openness dominate does It to others to preserve its not seek rather than self-regulation. being, but is concerned with inventing new modes of association and existence. In chapter 5, we Nvill see how the Image of Thought operates to diminish our degree This to our essenceas a of poN-, runs counter -cr capacities of thinking. (polewi(i)not insofar as it is any less perfect given the affections it has, but because 109

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it operates near its minimal threshold of activity. Someone striving to feed herself evcry day will find it near impossible to cultivate other aspects of being. Simone Weil's year working in a factory is a tale of ho,,-,- long hours and exhaustion prevent the ability to think or to be. Her conclusion, like Deleuze's, is that sadnessmakes no one intelligent. We will now turn to Deleuze's and 'Macherey's readings of Spinoza's philosophy to further our understanding of some of these ideas concerning univocal being.

Ill. vii. Benedictus,

Maledictus

Spinoza The Jew's translucent hands Shape the crystals in the twilight And the dying evening is all fear and chill (In the evenings, evenings are the same). His hands and the hyacinth's space Paling at the purview of the ghetto Are almost inexistent for the quiet man Dreaming a clear labyrinth Fame does not perturb him, that reflection Of dreams in another kind of dream, Nor the girls'fearful love. Free of metaphor, free of myth He shapes a rigid crystal: the infinite Map of the One that is All Its stars. Jorge Luis Borges, translated by YIrimiyahu Yovel (1989b).

Ontology- Ethics: a profound coupling that resounds with the radical nature of Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. Spinoza's unspoken pledge to purge the him him hated feared. Calling the transcendence ridiculed, saw and world of far has Deleuze that in thinking contends no one gone so prince of philosophers, have hardly begun to immanence, no one remains as misunderstood, and we his bewildering In Deleuze tells us a story philosophý-a seminar comprehend finally he E. Mics Goethe Goethe. the read and re-read exclaimed that until about him. It the time is this paradoxicaflý-constitutive opennessof each wliole escaped Spinoza's philosophy that Will be our concern as Nveseek to understand how Spinoza can propose an ethics without aný-conception of Good and FIvil.and v,-hy

SPINOZA:

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MAN

SIpinoza's ethicsis inseparableftom his ontology. 111-viii.Spinoza's heresy

One of the primary objections to philosophies like that of Spinoza's is that they dissolve individuahtý, into the Whole: a kind of night -\xhereall cows are black. When Hegel remarked with a certain glee that "Spinoza died on the 21st of February, 1677, in the forty-fourth year of his age. The cause of his death was from he had long been harmony consumption, this which a sufferer; was in with his system of philosophy, according to which all particularitý- and individuality in pass away the one substance" (Hegel quoted in Negri, 1981: 141), he bolstered the beliefs of many who saw Spinoza's system as immobile (das Starre), an 63 unmoved Un1ty. From Hegel's perspective, Spinoza constituted an important moment in thinking the immanent totality of the Absolute but it was up to Hegel himself to make this SubstanceSubject; to make it move. For Hegel, Spinoza's substancewas abstract he for Orient, the this and undifferenciated, echoing and could see no necessity Being Still, to plenitudinous affirmative produce its effects. according to poet Heinrich Heine, "All our contemporary philosophers, perhaps without knowing looking in Baruch Spinoza (quoted through the that polished" it, are eyeglasses Yovel, 1989b: 52). Because Hegel takes Spinoza's conception of tvusa 1711 asa defiMtion

beginning, he (understandably) cannot concerning an absolute

begin initial Why to produce the this moment. would substance understand 64 dimension Are tacked the attributes a supplementary onto substance? modes?

63Yirimiyahu Yovel says, in the context of a discussion of conatus as self-preservation and Spinoza's relation to Nietzsche, that -Spinoza's insistence on self-preservation is in [ ]" 113). 1 (1989b: his take and permanence of self-identity metaphysics with accordance ... issue with both this conception of substanceand understanding of conatus. 6' The role of the attributes in Spinoza have been the subject of much heated debate and disagreement. In his expressionist reading, Deleuze (1968b) (strangely given his overall Israel) Jacob different (like likens them to and of the same names therne of expression) MachereN for (1934) Wolfson emphasises account. subjectivist a strongi-, ar-ues referent. that the use of percipere (rather than cmicipere: to conceive) means that we perceive the intellect. hand, On hence the the theý other are no construction of attributes passivek. Gueroult (1968a) interprets Spinoza as sayinu each attribute is a substance. Finalb, Negri

SPINOZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATED

-NL-ýN

Indeed -hat would shake substancefrom such immediate ecstasyof Beingý ,,, Not onlý- does Hegel think that Spinoza's philosophy is immobile, he thinks that it has no relation to an Other. Consequently that \x-hich lays claim to absolute he devoid Since fact, reality is entirely of reality and is, in entirely abstract. understands substance to be self-identical, he believes it lacks the movement of negation that could make it determinate. Hegel fl-tinks the relationship betkveen substance, the attributes and the modes is a hierarchical and serial one. Consequently, for him, the movement from the unitv of substance to diN-ersity be false learn But, Spinoza's could only and abstract. systemis a sN, stem as we wiU far from equilibrium. From the Marrano tradition, Sephardic Jews who had been initially forced to Christianity fled Spain Portugal to then convert and escaping the tyrannous and purgings that began with Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, Spinoza was used to an deployed dissimulation that in order to communicate atmosphere ambiguity and forbidden thoughts. Undoubtedly an atheist, Spinoza masks this heresy by using the name God. " But Spinoza's God in no way resembles the God of the find Etbit's faiths. look de Deo, 1 If a part of the we at monotheistic we take a close

(1981) just obliterates them, saying they were a symptom of Spinoza's idealistic phase before he became a full blown materialist. He justifies such a reading by telling us how the Ethics was written over two periods, and the attributes are no longer mentioned once the I in itself is has This thesis topic a and minefield a commenced. second period of writing for the present. to my contact with want avoid prolonging However, I want to briefly refer to Etienne Balibar's very interesting reading of the role of the attributes in order to situate my own problematic. He maintains that the attribute makes the 'passage' of substance to the modes intelligible, while still retaining the idea that do in infinity They be not appear as a mediation of of ways. comprehended an substance can 67). (1990: is immediately but that the given as a unity of contraries modes, substance and Spinoza states that there is an infinity of attributes of which we know two, Thought and Extension. He also says that the attributes are the essenceof substance.A rather simple way but level God, begin, be the the to example this with of at speculative not would of grasping different be body human expressions or aspects of a understood as and mind can whose of a Spinoza two than negotiates substances. a composite or a union of single individual, rather idea I the idealism this of neither. understand the camps of slotting into and materialism, individual in terms of a qualitative multiplicity in which aný change results in a qualitative transformation of the whole. 0ý' I will refer to God as 'he' becausethis is how the Latin has been translated. I realise that God ironic. is that hand the of this images of anthropomorphic criticism the given one on follow. but it also serves to show Spinoza's capacities to mask and dissimulate. I 12

SPIXOZA:

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from dynamic far complex and cry conception of substance,a substancethat is a a container or even from the unmoved unity of Being. Throughout

the Ethics, there is a sustained, though veiled, critique of

God that rests on a vulgar conception of anthropomorphic conceptions of fickle Potestas free (11. 3. God ). When monarchy as pr. sch. and is presented as a law, Spinoza that ruler retorts that can will anything into existence and obeys no God cannot produce tl-iings in any other way or order to the way they have been free A thing exists through the necessity of its own nature j. d.7). God produced. by hence he determined ., to exist is tausasui is not constrained or any external final himself has fixed (ab He (ifl Nature thing is rather in alio). no goal and all se). figments human God the to act with an end causesare of imagination, since were he lack J. ) in Niew, would necessarily something app. Elaborating on this insight, Macherey argues that we must make a distinction between agere and operan*(1992: 72). God acts, exercising an infinite power (potentia),but God is nothing other than the nature of things. He certainly does have the power to constrain, in the manner of an autocrat that operates not (operan)or works on a reality that is exterior to him. Such a model would involve be And God dimension nothing other such a would of reality. a supplementary human; God Man. the the image of made in than a caricatured image of SIpinoza)s conception of God rests on a conception of potentia,what he can do be 66The he 34) to essenceof is able affected. pr. and potestas,the infinity of ways God is activc in that he develops his nature by producing effects in it. The logic (cause this all that escapes of production process means itselo the of sill' of t-allsa

66Potestas frorn potere also rneans -to be able to' and Deleuze emphasises this capacity to be affected that potestas communicates. As I have done throughout this thesis, I capitallse does Spinoza does (and it, Negri to an illustrate occasionally) as using poicstas when Spinoza, be diminishes to Poýver affected. that and affect others' capacity operation of in God's he this that he this power says understanding when way though uses potestas in distinction. Deleuze's keep does the this it to of is likening use to not vulgar monarchy. NNaý English , Potestas this .r the coupling. potentia sense of pair pia .ss(mcv p0111,01communicates distinction draw I the to of *power' does not communicate this nuance so will continue upon (and sometimes 'force') and Po\\er.

SPINOZA:

THE GOD- INTOXICATED'MAN

determination. God is absolutely infinite, absolute affirmation and external without negativity or lack (I. pr. 15. sch.), existing through the sole necessitý-of his d. his J. 1), nature. This nature implies (invoh)ere) e-istence essenceis xi moreover existence. Ibis conception of essencemeans that it is neither a possible nor does it pre-exist. It is an aduosa essentia(11. pr. 3. sch.) and God exists and acts necessarily. Liberty and necessity are not opposed. Freedom consists of existing by and acting virtue of one's own nature. Only God is ftee J. d.7 and pr. 17) because,unlike the finite modes, he is not a constrained thing. Spinoza flattens God onto the Real in the first pages of the Ethzi'f. God is revealed as the immanent movement of the Real, a dynamic and tendencial design. Any determination teleology movement without or injects the external possible, and hence a lack, or an overdetermination, into this absolute This immanence. implies God is somehow lacking and limited; however, for this to occur, there would have be an external cause J. pr. 11. proof 2.). God exists because be To He is infinitely necessarily infinite. unable to exist is impotence, be to and able to exist is power (potentia).

In proposition 18 of De DeoSpinozadistinguishesbetweenthe Milmanentcause Albiac Gabriel (6, (,,allsai'mmanens) tranfiens). the transitive suggests and cause ausa that this use of Spinoza'sadoption of this distinction stemmedfrom the Suirzian According Adrian 127). (1997: Heerebord to the through tradition, manual of Machereythis is a direct refutation of creationism,becauseit showshow God is 82). (1992: his (PUISSan6-e) that the manifests power action immediatelyat one with There is one reality, not a hierarchicalgradationof realitiescomprisedof greater (fibera being. lesser Free is opposedto acting in terms of neteffitas) necessitýand free decreeor externalends." formal (a (a In other words, if Nx-c cause)and a goal imagine that there is a model final cause), wc posit an cxternal reahty independent of diVine nature. Such a

67 See Spinoza's letters 57 and 58 to Tschirnhaus and Schuller respectlýel,,,, on free necessity. 114

SPINOZA:

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hylomorphic conception of God's power would resemble that of kings and queens that impose their power on the populace-" By attributing an arbitrary free God, to the response of the people could only be obedience. This kind of will be power would irrational.

Pierre Macherey observes that it is because we are accustomed to reasoning from the part to the whole (under the aegis of the imagination) that we find it difficult to install ourselves in this totality that the modes depend upon. The nature of Being is nothing other than the reality or nature of the things gathered to this The substantial principle. relation of substance to the modes is donuinated by productivity

God does (potenfia). himself to produce power and not come out of

does God but he Naturing Nature to and act. not want acts. is simultaneously Natured Nature and these two are perfectly adequate. To separate them would hierarchical flouting Spinoza's innovation of the immanent introduce a causality cause.

Macherey explains how to comprehend the relation of NaturMg Nature and Natured Nature. He saysin the former casewe look at things in terms of infim, determine latter how In them the things one case, we examine seizing globally. In their this way we can understand that this reciprocally in particularity. another from different (1998: 164). Nature the points of view conceived is one and same The only distinction between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature arises from free 1992: 105). We knowledge (Macherey, lack through an are not of our but through the constitutive and positive capacity to act that is impossible ideal Senitllte living, De his In exposition of the rules of practical our effective power. I llilll(wa, Spinoza explains that to be ignorant of the causesof things is sen-itude The essence of humans is nothing other than their varied powcrs of

68 In rn% view it \vill be Badiou's inability to grasp the notion of the immanent cause that leads him to allege that actual and multiple lives are flooded and submerged in the for immanent. how is Life flows Life, the the than name perceiving rather of impersonal from its I is inseparable Nature inventk that productions. will e movement of processual and return to this theme shortlý .

115

SPINOZA:

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activity and capacities for association. Even impotence indicates an affirmatiN-e affective movement that is a power of being. Nonetheless, external forces can alienate this power from its capacity to act This a#ir1nath)ej1. is the natural state of humans according to Spinoza, since theý find themselves sub'ected to forces whose effects they passively undergo. To be passive is a necessarypart of our finitude, but to be human means that one can behave in such a way as to be the adequate cause of one's actions JV. pr-2. By detaching the prooý. understanding conditions of our servitude and not from liberation. Nature, the to ourselves means our we can understand Marx tells us in his early Writings that an ethical problematic ariseswhen humans are systematically curtailed and constrained from acting and thinking, when theý foster Gatens cannot and invent new potentials of existing. and Lloyd argue that better imaginings to that can cultivate, rather than overinvent we need collective determine, diversitýýand difference. Consequently, the notion of the individual cannot be thought of in an ato=stic fashion. It is the result of a combination of bodies JI. pr. 13. and pr. 14) As we but (Potestas) does Power learn, is over others not involve accumulating ethics will concerned with

finding composing relations,

out what agrees with

us,

constructing new modes of association and organisation that increase our dynarmc This be (potentia). is a and concrete affected capacities to affect and but 'human on the nature' process that is not premised upon abstractions such as Spinoza's This bodies the ethics, insight is core of and minds. agreement of detail further throughout this chapter. something we will explore in

116

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IlLix. the active essence '[E]ssence' does not refer to a general idea of humanity, an abstract concept under which all individuals are subsumed and their differences neutralised. On the contrary it refers to the power that singularises each individual, conferring him upon a unique destiny. Etienne Bahbar, Spinoýawid Politics.(1985: 107)

Deleuze remarks (15/2/77) that he does not see that life is possible without like bodies that though molar wholes, is without individuated, complex, organisms. In no way can we postulate a world of abstract intensities (15/2/77). An intensive quantity is never abstracted from the extensive quantity it correlates to. "The question is to know if an intensity agrees with someone and he can tolerate it. An intensity is bad, really bad, if it exceedsthe power of someone that beautiful An the things. it, if is intensity is always in most of undergoes even it relation With other intensities" (15/2/77). An essenceis not an abstract view on a thing; indeed Spinoza tries strenuously to 1). An human (or (11. essenceis the acting ax. essence nature) avoid speaking of a be be the thing thing, that the or conceived. cannot principle of without which Conversely, an essencecannot be conceived outside of the thing of which it is the hierarchy There 10. ). JI. is no of essenceover existence, and an pr. sch. essence before being have does the status of it is the essenceof an a possible not essence be d. is 2). JI. It to thing subsumed an affirmation, not something actually existing JI. 1). ax. under an abstract universal Modes are not inherently passive. Once they exist they have a power of acting (actual This be their attualis essentia is their tonatus, affected. and a capacity to Insofar God's (potentia) to as theýexist. power essence)and it is an expression of by beings finite hn-ýted to they other modes and are exist are caused and are They hmi'ted, part of a complex network of relations. constrained and necessarilNbut (operan) their power of reality on this operating of existing power exploit Nature. God Naturing (iolwtlls) the as poNx -er of means theý-participate in acting This idea draws close to what Guattari calls processual emergent subjectivin-, and 11-1

SPINOZA: ,

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

MAN

Sch6rer what names 'subjectivity without a subject'. The idea of t-onatilsopens up ways of thinking about how things invest themselves both mentally and corporeally, and to what extent theý7are acting at the minimum or maximum level of their thresholds of intensM-, the former relating to a pole of extreme passivity and the latter, a pole of extreme activin, (Macherey, 1995: 24, and 111.pr. 6,7 and 8). All things are equal in that they are identically inhabited býthe same force to persevere in their being. This refers to the way that a thing is always in action and in movement, rather than being propelled into movement by something exterior to it (Macherey, 1995: 85) and "[flrom this perspective, 'nature (natura)and 'power' (potentia)are one and the same thing" (87). God's power is a power that is nature (potentiabot,estnatura) ýH- pr. 7) whose essenceit is to exist and act. If we recall the distinction between agereand operan*we can affirm that a particular thing acts in a detern-unateway since it is limited by other things. It does not act because limited is but because 'acts' this thing in it positive instead in it, it way a 4operates'in a determinate way in coexistence and reciprocal linuitation with other things (Macherey 1992: 87). Again this emphasisesthe necessityto grasp the two from points of view which we can conceive of the thing, in order to grasp that the operation is a part of the action of the thing, and not an autonomous both God' Deo) Theýý Things 'in God' Deo) 'of (I. 26). (a (Ili pr. procedure. are and from free, depending look them a on whether we at are at once constrained and global perspective or a particular, situated perspective. Part IV of the F./bl't'sis entitled De SerfivituteHumand.It examines the idea of the d-8). Vittus (especially is closely tied, even virtue in terms of ethical principles Virtue potentia. the is power, and vice versa. idea of interchangeable with Macherey is tempted to call virtue the sense of the possible that projects each individual toward existence, and coincides with its effort to realise its nature (199,1b:45). Hc tells us that "virtue, which is the ethical principle par excellence, from far a subn-ussionto a transcendent rule that establishes the connection is 118

SPINOZA:

between absolute values that

THE GOD-INTOXICATEDMAN

would impose themselvesregardlessof the nature of

the individual toward which they orient their activities; it consists on the contrary in doing all that one can to be and act in conformity with one's nature, and doing this to the maximum, finding an immanent clý-narnicwhose orientations are fundamentally positive and affirmative" (45). To desire to be autonomous would be contrary to one's nature and would be impotence. Given the affections we have, we are as perfect as we can be JI. d.6). But if we lack nothing at any given i how instant can we speak of ethics?

11U. confrontation

and sacrilege; contesting

Morality

A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as a "tree as it ought to be". Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe 11"illto Power(1901: §332,181).

Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: Man ought to be such and such! Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms [ ]. ... Friedrich Nietzsche, TmilýTljtof Me Idols. (1889: §6,46).

Spinoza's ethics is an ethology. 19 It is concerned with modes of Being, whereas 'something' Being. Morality, according to that there to morality implies is superior Deleuze, Judges Being (2/12/80)

This to it idea since appeals essencesand values.

be has been that to that is realised. realised, of essence implies something not yet Morality is a systern of Judgement comparing beings with an abstract essence that they are supposed to reahse. One does not behave ethically through a conception because desire but judged duty things are good we of or universal principles, them.

By opposing

'what Deleuze Nforahty, that ethics asks argues tmi we ethics and

do?', while Nforahtv asks 'what sbouldwe do?' Ethics asks 'to what extent arc \vc A from tý-pology of immanent modes of our powers of actlngý' separated

119

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

MAN

existence operating through principles of natural right is opposed to duty-based morality that refers to transcendent values which demands adherence to them. The moral Law is an imperative that makes nothing knm, and at worst prevents ý-n knowledge (Deleuze, 1981a: 24). Any norm is an abstract and empty figure which presents itself as absolute JV.

By ). taking a transcendent vie,\X-point, ax.

is (Deleuze, 1990a: 146). "Processes are becomings, and movement arrested be judged by some final result but by the way they proceed and their to aren)t power to continue, as With animal becomings, or nonsubjective individuations There are no universals, only singularities" (146). The immoralist beyond good and evil, Spinoza does not disavow good and bad. He adopts a perspectival approach. What is good is when the relations of one's body are composed with the relations of another body in such a -,,a)- that our , power of acting increases.What is bad is when the bodý-'srelation is decomposed since the relation of the other body combines with (but does not agreewith) our essence.Ethics is a practice of organising encounters in such a waýTthat one's for being "while capacities affecting and affected are compounded, preserving or respecting the other's own relations and world [...]" (Deleuze, 1981a: 126). This is dynamic idea pren-usedupon the notion of the composition of power. However a Spinoza does not adopt an egoistic or individualistic stance, for reasons I have has figure how One live to to explained. out well With others. In his seminars on Spinoza, Deleuze develops his idea of the individual. He does by kinds knowledge found EtIV, (imagination, the three the paralleling in so of 's love God) kinds (affection-ideas, the three intellectual reason and of of ideas with notion-ideas and essence-ideas). \N,'c are born into ignorance and operate through the mechanisms of the defines "as Spinoza Macherey the that mind a machine to says imagination. 248). The (1997a: imagination is understood in terms imagine and nothing else" of the traces

body, M other N-vordsthe v,-ay that of images imprinted on a

69See Deleuze (1981 a) especialk chapter six "Spinoza and Us". 1 '-l()

THE GOD-INTOXICATED'MAN 'SPINOZA:

body a is affected by another body. The imagination conditions our relation with the world and others. Hence the problem is how to adapt ourselves to reality in such a waý, that we can maximise our powers of acting. How can vvc lessen the pressure put on us by external causeswhich enslave us in situations and alienate (212). usý

Every individual is complex, made of an infinity of parts. These have different relations of speeds and slownesses. By using the term 111ditidullm,Spinoza demonstrates this complexity

since this is said of that which is indivisible

Nacherey, 1997a: 36-7). What Spinoza appears to be saying is that singular things from dynamic bodies, result therefore, were they to be a assemblage of other divided this could not occur without them changing in nature. The conclusion Spinoza draws from this is that if the relations that constitute our body change in such a way that our characteristic relation is destroyed, we die.

It is in the interest of humans to multiply the relations they have with their milieu life, of maximising their powers, thresholds and capabilities. To be human is not be isolated but to multiply relations. Deleuze elaborates a conception of an intensive multiplicity that seeksto explore the thresholds of this 'ufflity in plurality' by cultivating transversal relations with all kinds of things. These kinds of operations are called 'becoMings' since they open spacesof transmutation while retaining a consistency of their own. The 'self as multiplicity is an emergent and complex self, constituted through defmed bodies kinds thresholds of relations with all of other and ideas, with from just "Urnty as the is precisely what is missing multiplicity, existence. Transcendence from (1990a: 146). ("it's raining")" cvents subject's what's n-ussing 'unity the in plurahty' is is an operation that relies upon abstraction, so understood in the same senseas the machinic assemblage,as a grasping together of

heterogeneous components in such a way that they maintain their

The individual is emergent, not primary. independence.

121

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-I'-', ýTOXICATEDMAN

Affections are the effects of the image of a thing on me. This makes no claim about the nature of the object. Increasing the affections of -\ý-hich"ý-eare capable increasespower. Prejudging the limitations of affections decreasespower, in that part of my power becomes inactive. .ýffections (afttio) are the dimension of instantaneity.

Each affection envelops a passageor transition that is called an affect (q&dlls). This is similar to Bergson's idea of duration. It refers to a passage that is It irreducible. is an idea of an affection of the body corresponding to an increase decrease or in its power of acting. The relations which are composed or decomposed relate to affects. We either become more or less active. If we are this from passive means we are cut off our powers of acting. Edwin Curley criticises Spinoza for a lack of normative content in his philosophy. Like Blyenbergh he asks - how can we condemn a tyrannical government or an distinguish between from letters How The evil actý can we exchanged vice virtue? Blyenbergh and Spinoza touch upon these themes. Willem van Blyenbergh first himself Spinoza 1665. He to in as a was a grain merchant who presents wrote him, delighted Spinoza the truth. to is of course saying correspond with seeker of "For I believe that such a loving friendship affords us a serenity surpassinganý, letters begin boon (Ep. 19: 132) the on in the whole wide world" and so other Evil (Ep. 18-24, Ep. 27). I only want to touch on a few points in these letters as they relate to the themes in this chapter. In the first letter, Spinoza takes issue with an anthropomorphic conception of God. He explains that the Holy Scripture tries to present things to humans in a Adam However, to the not to eat command given way that they can understand. did God by God that the apple was poisonous. not the apple was a revelation depl()ý-a moral prohibition but revealed the natural consequencesof eating the for bad but There 1' 19: (Flp. that me. in itself only which is is no eN-11 )5). apple HaN-Ingreceived Blyenbergh's lengthý-, detailed and furious response Spinoza he but little haN-e to continues write. thc\, in common, realises I

-)-)

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

MAN

He admits that he does not understand the Holy Scripture and believes that God communicates, not through the Holy Scripture, but through the natural understanding given to us. He states that God's nature is not the same as the nature of man (Ep. 21). Spinoza also chastisesBlyenbergh for not understanding the nature of the dependence of things on God, saying "If you had apprehended by pure intellect the meaning of dependence on God, you would certainly not think that things, in so far as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and has dared (Who basely to imperfect. ever speak so of the supremely perfect Being?)" (Ep.21: 156).

Spinoza confessesthat he is astonished at Blyenbergh's suggestionthat if God did life from leaping into a not punish wrongdoing nothing could stop us all of crime. If it is only the fear of punishment that stops us from doing such things, we do because from love himself does He these it is acts not act or virtue. not commit love from his lead him the and particular nature, and would astray opposed to knowledge of God (Ep.21: 156). Blyenbergh writes back, hurt at Spinoza's be directed bringing to that might also reproofs up a number of questions Spinoza by critics today. They are summarisedby Spinoza as follows: 1. Is murder as pleasing to God as almsgiving? 2. Is stealing, in relation to God, as good as righteousness? 3. If there were a mind to whose particular nature the pursuit of pleasure have but any agreeable, could it and villainy was not repugnant, 23: (Ep. do good and avoid evil? virtuous motive that must move it to 167)

In response to the first question, Spinoza points out that God is not a perfect Neither by he the righteous man nor is not pleased one thing or another. man so displeasure. Nonetheless God men are not equally pleasure or the t1ilef can cause The is wliether question gives alms. and one murders if one perfect and good be (though they may in their execution). these actions are equally perfect L, -1)

SPINOZA.

THE GOD-INTO'X-ICATED

MAN

To elucidate this point, let us take the response to question I presupposes a contradiction,

This question

Spinoza, says since you might as well ask him

"whether, if it accorded better with a man's nature that he should hang himself, there would be any reason why he should not hang himself However, suppose it possible that there could be such a nature. Then I saý-(whether I grant free will or he live better his that that if not) anyone sees the than can on gallows at own table, he would be very foolish not to go and hang himself'

(Ep. 23: 168).

Likewise if a more perfect life and better essence could be attained through be foolish villainy, a person would not to take that route. In effect, such ideas go Spinoza has human the against everything the written about essence of as tonattls, as we will see.

God is the cause of cverything that has essence.However c6l, error and villainy do not consist in anything that expressesessence.The difference between Nero's Orestes's devoid 'ungrateful, Nero that matricide is and was of compassion and because his Orestes mother obedience', while committed an act of sacredrevenge killed his father Agamemnon. Both acts were the same,both intentions were the however the association of the image of the action with the image of the same, thing was not the same. Orestes associated his act not with the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, but direct father. There his composition of relations, and an was a murdered with laws by Obviously decomposition the of sacred abiding of relations. 1. ndirea he day but is saying is that no in essence,what revenge is not appropriate in our 36). bad Deleuze 1981a: (Deleuze, action considered in itself alone is good or (13/1/81) sun-imarisesthis saying that every action must be considered ftom two do, bo& bodý7, can what a perspectives: the image of the act as a power of the bears. The the thing relation of upon -\N-hich act and the image of the associated between these t,\N-o. association is What is bad is NN-lien an act is associated ,vith the image of a thing whose relation 124

SPINOZA:

THE GOD- INTOXI CATED MAN

decomposed bý the act. If I raise my arm and move is

downwards

force tli

this expressesthe power of my body. If I am hitting another person, I decompose a relation and this is bad, if 1 am harrunering a protruding nafl, I compound a relation and this is good. Good and bad is not a question of -\x-hatsuits me, but what agreeswith me (Deleuze, 1981a: 35). This correspondence is cut off by Spinoza, most likely becausehe feels it would be dangerous to communicate with Blyenbergh any further, rather than due to an inabihty to respond to Blyenbergh's questionS.70

111. xi. the art of immersion Composing relations is like swimming, says Deleuze (14/5/73). It is a kind of savoirfiýire.If we think of it in terms of rhythms, this becomes more clear. If body I to that is swimming an art of composing relations, need ensure my enters knocking down the the a relation with me wave, without wave submerging me or drowning body I to the me. need and modify movements of my in accordance This the the rhythms requires improvisation, experimentation and of with wave. knowledge It theoretical is useless. is apbronesi's. cunning and objective or Similarly, common notions are not subject to the imagination since they deal with 38). These JI. that pr. are not just an objects are non-existent in nature; relations body. The the the common notions are adequate ideas. affections of effect of They are not just opinions or the sensori-motor images that are cliches. They have no universal claim but are good in function of the usageto which they are put, concerning the relations of singular things. Macherey (1997a: 360-1) explains that adequate knowledge involves a gradual

70 Blyenbergh's

long booklet Spinoza to an extremely on ý\Ith write a short response was title The knowlecige ol'God and his service affirmed against the outrages of athel .sts, in has God demonstrat that created and rei-caled ed with clear and natural reasons which it is be in that thc God this to and with religion, accordance that served wishes also a religloi7, Christian religion corresponds not onli, to the religion revealed bY God, but also to our be Spinoza to Clearl, cautious. correct was I'LUS017. I.1117(IIL' 'r

SPINOZA: THE GOD XICATED -INTO

-.\IAN

transition, rather than a rupture, from the regime of the imagination. It is like a fish in water since adequate knowledge of the infinite God and eternal essence of exists as a condition making possible movements and modes of being. Imagining C) C) is inadequate because it is a privation, cut off from reaht\-. We develop our potentialities by incorporating more and more things, but this requires a specific mental attitude which involves understanding our relation with other things. It is interests that we find better ways of living together (405-6) in our

Having adequate ideas does not mean that the mind affirms a greater power of control over the body. It is to comprehend more things and increase a power of thinking, while also developing "a body capable of the greatestnumber of things" (quicorpusad aptumplun"Mahabet)(V. pr. 39). When I act, I do not decide everything in advance and set down a series of rules in relation to which I gauge a situation. For instance, rather than condemning Le Pen's supporters as reactionary, xenophobic and fascist, Guattari asks why are large portions of the French population, especially workers, embracing this do lose hope If ideology. of not engage in a pragmatic response we all we 'rhizomatising' that component. Guattarl calls this dissensus. The individual is a singular essence,that is, a degree of power, and a characteristic body) differential (of the relations of movement and rest constituting its relation for being We both to to this are a capacity affected. essenceand corresponds but the source of our affections, we are passiveif we submit and active if we are former happens In to the case our powers of acting are react to whatever us. lowest latter What the pertains to an ebb. increased, and in we operate at our essenceis a state or an affection insofar as it expressesan absolute quantity of 39). 1981a: (Deleuze, reality An essence is an intensive quantity. It is inseparable from a threshold. Spinoza

but individuation, This callsit aparf potentiae. involves a quantitativeconceptionof but It the is a special same as an extensive part, this quantity is an intensity. is not 126

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATEDMAN

part./' In a letter to iMeyer(Ep.12: 105), Spinozadescribesa peculiar conception of infinity. He draws two non-concentric circles, one within the other. The sum of the inequalitiesof the spacebetweenthesecirclesexceedany number, likeNvise the variation in the speedof matter moving in that area.This '\-, be -ould the case regardlessof the sizeof the portion we took. It is infinite and limited. There is a maximum and a minimum. There is a limit and a threshold. Similarlv, a degree of power is the difference between this maximum and minimum. It is therefore, Deleuze (20/01/81) tells us, a difference in itself As a degreeof power has latitude. In it a chapter 5,1 want to draw upon this idea of the unequal in how to the disparate is a key moment in thinking difference-in-Its elf. order show Deleuze makes a link here between the idea of intensiVe quantities and that of differential calculus (ashe does in Differen(vandRepetitim). Things are powers for Spinoza. They do not bavepower but they are power, and force. ýn intensive quantitý- replaces the idea of an power is a quantity of The defines An longer the thing. intensive essence. quantity essence is no described qualitatively (Man is a rational animal', 'NIan is a featherlessbiped') but be terms the to is understood in of capacities affect and affected of singular things.

John Rawls does not look at these capacities when he formulates his effectively distributive model of justice. A formal definition of powers and rights can have farmer, formal Like Malawian the rights must no effects since it remains abstract. be backed up by an effective power to act, otherwise these concepts are simply hp definition We this this of concrete aspect of service. need to concentrate on power. We find a remarkable extension of this reading of Spinoza in //I ThousalidPlateaus. Becomm Becomuý Inserted in the 1750: Becomnigo-bilense, ýg -An'IN/al, 'T-Imperceptible... 71 1 xvill explain this distinction between intensive quantit,,,,.and extensity and quality in difference. his develops how Deleuze b\ 5. of philosophy showing chapter I

-)-,

SPINOZA: THE GOD- INTOXI CATED '\I-NN

plateau, Memories

of a Spinozist,

1. discusses the idea of longitude: the

differential relations of movement and rest, speedsand slownessesthat constitute the characteristic relation of the individual. The simple bodies that constitute a limit point are only distin gul'shed in terms of movement and rest, slowness and I speed. They have no form or function. These always come in greater or Icsser infinities. In this way we can understand that every individual is an infinite multiplicity.

Things are distinguished from one another in terms of these

differential relations of speed and slowness. They call this the Ion91 itude of the individual. "It is a question not of organization but of composition

(Deleuze

Guattari, 1980: 255). and Memories of a Spinozist, H. informs us that to each relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness grouped in an infinity, there corresponds a degree of The latitude degree the power or potential. is of an individual of power that differential It these to correlates relations. is an intensive part and concerns the be Guattari Deleuze to the capacity individual. affected of and give Von Uexkuu's light has by The the tick. tick three so it affects; it is attracted example of branch; drops to the it is sensitive on a manoeuvres onto a smell of mammals and find. burrows hairy bit Until that the a mammal passes;it into most of skin it can fasts; 'pessimal' When this threshold. the tick is its a mammal passes, waits and degree dies; by, feasts 'optimal' Its threshold. this then is its it mammal comes and limits. limits These are not contours, of power is a quantum that operates within but the intensities or affects of which something is capable (257). Deleuze and Guattari. say that you are an haecceity "You are longitude and latitude, a set of between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified speeds and slownesses (262). affects" Etienne Bahbar argues that the object of Spinozist ontoloPT is individuation, "or But this difference, which is nothing but the Me ýi#ýrellivqfadi'Piý,ftom It is immediately movement of its own production, is also an originaty umty. 'practical"' (Bahbar, 1990: 58). The individual is conceived as both t,s,ý-elltvand effect. 12

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-IN'FO'-", 'ICATEI)

MA', ý

The individual is thought synthetically in Spinoza. Consequentl\-, mechanistic fall accounts to communicate his subtle account of processes of 1ndiv1duation. Indeed my argument with Negri, that I alluded to in the last chapter, is that Negri fails to think the processof individuation, settling for a description of the interactions of actualised and individuated beings in terms of tendencial action (Negri, 1981: 146). His 'real' concept of potentiaas a tension internal to being is fleshed not out thoroughly (44).

111. xii. decentering

the human

What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things. Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e lf"'ill to Pomer(190 1: §12B, 14).

Finalism is an illusion for Spinoza. Nature has no ends set beyond it, as though its later Centuries Darwinism put paid to a to only purpose was arrive at a goal. human centred conception of Nature, but its legacy remains. The Appendix that the first part of the Etbicsends with is a baffle-cry against such illusions. Heretical, vibrant, scathing-,this Appendix is an extraordinary read, especially Deleuze the passages. claims that cool, systematicpreceding when compared with but Etbics; first the there are three moves through the moregeomeftito, the second is Spinoza's last V full (the is part when of whirlwinds and surprises magical, develops his idea of beafitudo).Spinoza's rousing attack on the anthropomorphic heretical humans God today. the even appear of would and vanity of conception Humanitýyis ripped from its pedestal and put in its place as a part of nature. Many by draws he today environmentalists and upon are used of the arguments humans face to the rights of the of claims of unabated in activists progressivist (as dominate nature well as one another) with abandon. exploit and Mere are three illusions of consciousnessaccorchng to Deleuzeý-the illusion of 20). Such (1981a: freedom iflusion finahtv, the a and the theological illusion of 129

SPINOZA:

THE GOD INTO--',,-I CATED MAN -

typical human prejudice is the attribution of final causes to things. Humans assume that since they act in terms of an end, so too do all natural things- Spinoza notes that they even think that God rules with a given end in mind, and imagine that God made humans to honour him. His response to the claim that humans have free will is well known and so the stone rolling down the hill believes it free rolls of its accord. People are born ignorant of the causes of things, but theY all look for what is useful to them. Since they are conscious of their \,ohtions and appetites, they believe themselves free. However they ignore the causesdisposing them to such They appetites. act in terms of utility and are simply obsessedwith attributing final causes to things. All around there are plenty of things that are useful to them; eyes to see, teeth to chew, plants and animals to eat..., so they think that these things have been put there for them. Things are means to their ends. -And for these things there them? God. Responding in this manner ignores who put the embedded and situated relational reality that humans are a part of, as a part of design humanity). Nature (and themselves, nature imposing instead a grand on Nature has no final end prescribed to it, becauseit lacks nothing. Falling prey to fear and superstition, constructs of the imagination, people search for meanings and signs of God's will in the world. Spinoza gives an example of the person who is hit and killed by a stone falling off a roof. By instigating a blow did 'why? ' (why the at potentially infinitely regressive series of asking wind that moment? why did this person happen to be passing the house just thený) This fallacious God's that this is the conclusion was will. people arrive at the be demonstrates how Ium ignorance and stupidity can used asý, of ignorance, and to argue for and maintain authority. By not understanding the li(itllre of things, humans imagine things, and affirm nothing in things. Theý- behc\-e there is a This things. the just reflects a nature of created order without understanding human disposition and preference for order. Humans have madc themselves abstractions, bhnkered to the complex nature of 130

SPINOZA:

THE GOD- I\TOXICATED

NIAN

their bodies and minds and the ways they are affected. This practical attitude of led for, has seeking out what is useful to, and hence %,, to an -hat is good us instrumental attitude toward real-ity. This tendency to isolate things from their context as though things were predisposed to play a role as ends for hurnans, compounds a conception of final causesin which there is an objecti\-e reahty, or teleology. Becausehumans are conscious of their actions, theýýbelieve themselves free and set themselves above the laws of Nature. His immanent phi-losophy chaflenges the invocation of any transcendent principles with the remarkable phrase 'God, that is, Nature' (DeussiveNatura). "Our understanding of responsibility is restrained by thinking individuals as bordered territories, firmly separatedfrom others in such a way that the issue of hes where responsibility is always in principle determinable. Spinoza's treatment of

individuality

-

especially that

aspect of

it

which

Bahbar terms

'transindividuahty'- gives insight into the nexus between individual and collective identity" (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 74). All acts are inscribed within a network of pre-estabhshed relations (Macherey, 1992: 137). Responsibility, then, must be thought in terms of our embedded relationships in a collective that may be presently enjoying the comforts that derive from historically reprehensible acts. Spinoza's ethics is an ethics of liberation that frees us relativelý-from the bondage born does for It that into. is a search not rest and ignorance we are commonality dynamical fictions It and ossified essences. is a philosophy of upon abstract being equilibrium that moves us toward greater powers of acting, thinking and from It Nature. is a philosophy that impels us to without abstracting ourselves To believes finitude act is eternity is not the same as immortality. and accept do His danger, but lives analytic is one no other. in we can perilous, putting our Such for displaý, the mechanisms an realising ethical transition. that serN, es to learn but does on trying to what you are capable of, not rest on abstraction, ethics lived life Rather In-nits It than it the affects, overcoming edge. on is are. your wliat is,a rationaht), of the affects.

131

SPINO/A:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

NL\N

"Spinoza always thinks of the individual sý-nthetically,as the result of a movement of totalisation which began before it and continues beyond its own timit'S" (Niacherey, 1992: 121). The individual is a part of nature. This is not to say that it be definition decomposed, Such . . . tanqiiam cannot that it exists a i.mpenI/M I./11mpeno. be definition. finds its Instead, would an analytic it principle of existence in the belongs from be to whole(s) which it and separatedin a relatl\-e which it can only manner. Nature is not made of parts isolable one from the other. The conception body be but bodies limit Rather of a simple is must an abstraction, it is a point. thought of in terms of their differential relations, their speeds and slownesses, movements and rest. Humans need to learn to see themselves as a part of nature (parsnaturae)subject, like God, to the laws of Nature. The use of the term God is not just a practice of for but difficult Spinoza the process of reconcerns subterfuge and camouflage dynamical By Spinoza thinking as a situating crucial philosophical problems. philosopher of process we can perhaps avoid the temptation to prioritise one term (substance) above the other (the modes) and understand that Naturing Nature is a causality that invests the whole field of reality. Such a move does not liberation how but human liberty, is an sImphTshows close off the possibility of finite, complex and ongoing activity that accepts and embraces our existence as be Spinoza's this beings. It called an antiphilosophy can is in way that relational human humanism.

By no longer seeing ourselves apart from nature, we can begin to understand freedom. We no longer fetishise ourselves and other things. Necessity is an by does freedom. But dimension to this our nature run contran, not of essential force. It hniitatl'\T the that is not individual means understanding C a as operating but embedded in a complex network of relations. isolated,

III.Xiii.

transitions

feel Spinoza LthiCs, last and experience In the astonishing saysthat Nve part of the his has he led has This to on reneged say some phrase that we are eternal. 13

2

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTOXICATED

MAN

immanent philosophy accusing him of talking about the immortality

of the soul,

others see it as a lapse into mysticism. But what is this beatitudothat is the third kind of knowledge (V. pr. 32. corr. ) that he says is a knowledge sub jpe6-ie aetertlitalas (\ T. pr-29)ý It is not an abstract thought of a never-ending duration, a long linear time but something more similar to Bergson's concept of duration. It is a very based from the that concrete experience, in present, comes a practice that strives to see things globally.

The imagination

always grasps things as past and

but this affirmation of necessity is a love of the present, an amor_pficontingent, We are both finite and a part of nature. Spinoza is saying that we cannot loving understand without and this moment is a synthesis of the rational and the affective.

In my next chapters, I want to explore how Deleuze takes and transforms Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. At times especiallyin the seminars,Deleuze drops tasty morsels into his narrative that seem to align Spinoza with the he he himself (20/1/81) difference For says philosophy of articulates. example, that a degree of power is always an intensive quantity, a difference of difference. Unfortunately at this point the transcript indicates that the tape ends, so I do not know how he might have expanded on this theme. Although Spinoza's is undoubtedly a philosophy of force, power, becoming and direction further be developed the of a in transformation, these ideas can SiMondon's Through concept of metastability, the transcendental empiricism. but This longer through intimated idea is real. possible a non-realised is no virtual however, .a the reality of a tense and potenti the idea that is a power in act; draw day. I Spinoza's difficult have been to conceive in would system metastable Spinoza brings he Bahbar bý, Etienne together in which upon a useful short piece links thinkers. Simondon these of to potential some exan-une and Any system or individual, for Simondon, is more than identitv and more than Image Deleuze the of I calls the of what in context this proposition unity. situate

been has difference here thought in itself and that not I-Iought. Deleuze argues 133

SPINOZA:

THE GOD-INTO-NICATED

MAX

endeavours to develop a series of concepts to do so. I argue that his concept ()f chfference-in-itself as disparate enables us to retain a philosophy of immanence developing while a more expansive account of processes of inchviduation and singularisation through the notion of the pre-individual field or the problematic. This propels the notion of continuous variation into an arena where divergence be can affirmed.

Ill. xiv. the disparate and the possible toward the pre-individual In my next chapter I want to follow up on some of the many ideas and concepts that surround the 'image of thought' chapter in DOeremeand Repelifion,a theme I Through 5. to these two chapters I shall explicate the return in chapter will difference disparate, the concepts of intensity, individuation, and pre-in-its elf, individual singularity. Using these concepts I will show how the idea of nomos becoming, demonstrate, to the relates concept of and will utdising the work of Etienne Bahbar, the role of the pre-individual and transindividual in Spinoza's work. There is a link between thought and individuation. Individuation does not fields fluid determination "It through intensive of of species. involves proceed a factors which no more take the form of an I than of a Self [ ] It is inseparable ... from a pure ground that it brings to the surface and trails with it" (1968a: 152). This field coexists with the individual though the individual is unilaterally distinguished from it 'like lightning across a dark sky'. What relation does the Untimely have to the actual?Through the concept of a pre-individual field, I will his how Deleuze Laruelle's is a philosophical idealist, showing claim that counter I Finally, fidelity betray does difference to immanence. will a not concept of further ethico-political implications of this approach. exan-une

134

Chapter Four

Simondon's

Crystalline

Becomings

SlMO\DO-N'S

IV.i.

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

paradox

The same terms are used to describe ice deserts as sand deserts: there is no line separating earth and sky; there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour; visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology that relies not on points or objects, but rather on haecceities, on sets of (winds, relations undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the creaking of ice, the tactile qualities of both). It is a tactile space, or rather "haptic", a sonorous much more than a visible space. Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus.(1980: 382).

In an English collection of her work entitled Powerand Inrention: Sihlafiý:g S(,i'ence, Isabelle Stengers examines the question of relevance, and the notion

of a

domain 11ya In the problem, in a piece originally written with concrete of science. Prigogine, she explores 'The Reenchantment of the World'. They argue that while for It this to is understand it. science is the art of manipulating nature, it also tries reason that it occupied a territory writings.

"Like

concerned with

between epistemeand tec'bnein Aristotle's

ýristotle's gods, the simple machines of dynamics are only have They themselves. nothing

have learn; they to rather

They lose from the to simulate an ideal that outside. any contact with everything 72 35). (1979: ývnamlt, the ýystem will actualize" 1

"The foederafali are replaced by the foederanaturae,which, as Serres emphasizes, designate both the "laws" of nature - local, singular, historical relations between law for battle A (49). "alliance", perennial things - and an a contract with nature" bv that turbulent can embrace singulantv. science a is subverted and masten, be Deleuze's logic, FIxtending this called a philosophy cannot we can surrMsethat kind but Kantian of a term, the constitutes the of sense in critical philosophy, he "I As remake make, says, the problems. posing of is art critical ontology which decentered from horizon, alwavs an moving a along concepts my and unmake differenciates them displaced from and repeats which peripherýan alwa)-s centre,

72These simple machines are those like the cannonball in a \acuum and the ideal pendulum 135

SINIONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

(1968a: xxi). The subject is no longer an active subject "endow-ed with projects, intentions, and Nvill [ ]" (Pngogine and Stengers,1979: 56), but a Ian-al self. ... In the next chapter, I will suggestthat Deleuze's philosophy can be understood in terms of a radicalisation of pbronesi's. Michel Serres, according to Prigogine and Stengers, also evoked the intelligence of peasants and seafarers in order to describe an intelligence premised upon respect for the world in which they live. As humans, we incessantly modify the By world. cultivating a 'respect' for nature, we also ceaseJudgiq other knowledges and practices, opting instead to interbreed , with them, creating novel communications and unnatural nuptials. This approach epitonlises what Guattarl calls a 'meta-modehsation' or a 'schizo-modehsation', which refuses the judgements of a 'definitive' model of thinking. "This world that seems to have renounced the security of stable, permanent norms is clearly a dangerous and uncertain world" (58). This is the time for the new alliances. Paradox, not doxology. Our relation with the world is not, and be, harmonious cannot a pacified and one. It remains fraught with, and dependent upon, dissonance and disparity. What would reason be capable of if "liberated from the disciplinary models that normalize it (Stengers, 1989: 130)? For William James this IS pragmatism; philosophy pursuing its adventures (1907: 101). Like NEchel Serres, James focuses on conjunctive relations, like 'With' and 'through', to explain this radical empiricism which he prepositions describesas a 'mosaic philosophy'. In Gilbert Simondon's work we find a processualphilosophy that takesissuewith the propensity to abstract and isolate the individual. As a critique of a model of being, premised upon the notion of the individual, it is superb; as an exposition being it for the of another model of as metastable, opens up possibibty us of inchvidual dimensions (a thanthe term \vC \611 showing moreof aný-individual for Drawing the to continue sake of convenience). out the non-human use only beconUngsof the human is part of the process of reinventing the human. Tracing a subjectiviq that is not the property of the individuated subject tli\varts a 136

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECO-MINGS

subJect-object opposition, grasping subjectivity as a process, or a hetero 's,that geiiesi , transverses different domains. The ethico-pohtical implications of tl-ýs will be made clear in the final chapter. We are no longer ourselves. Beconuingsare not solely esoteric conceptual inventions, but help us to understand our non-human and pre-human dimensions. It is the individual human that is an abstraction. For this reason, Sirnondon continues with Spinoza's enterprise of understanding the human as a part of nature.

IV.ii. thinking with the grain Everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think of things which are created and a thing which creates, as we habitually do. Henri Bergson, CrealiveEvolution. (1911: 26 1).

Gilbert Simondon is a little known French philosopher of science.In fact, much him has been sparked off through Deleuze's references to his the of interest in His work. writing on technology has been the cause of renewed debate and discussion; however, it is his account of individuation I want to concentrate on. Interestingly, SiMondon dedicated Lindividu et sa enýse Iq ique to th e physit'o-b' 10 T ,g memory of Maurice Nlerleau-Ponty. Toward the end of his life Nlerleau-Ponty had begun to interrogate the idea of 'pre-objective being. Perhaps Simondon here felt he had found a kindred spirit in his effort to move beyond both phenomenology and positivism. In the posthumously published The Visible and the Invisible (Follom)ed by 11'orkiq Notes),Merleau-Ponty saN, s that we need to revise our ontology in order to talk hidden 21). (1964: We that interrogate about conditionings escapeus or remain learn how to it opens us to that ,x-hich is not ourselves our experience in order being umvilling to (159). Seeking to aN-oidinvoking transcendent principles, -\N-hile level 'Flesh' Nlerleau-Pontý`s the the individuated empirical, remain at of "N-as waýbeing,, \x-hilerefusing of articulating a conception of an anonymous, pre-individual to admit a pre-constituted \x-()rld. He calls it a "pregnancý- of possibles" (250). 137

SlINIONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

This common knot, beyond the point of N-leN-, - of the subject and the object, is the modulation of being in the world. For Nlerleau-Ponty too, the possible is not a simple pre-formed reservoir accompanied by a principle of choice. He argues that actualism must be eliminated (since it is not true that everything is actual), proposing in its place a being of be6'omzq actual - that is, an actuality of the possible. As Henri Nfichaux has lyrically observed, by breaking the skin of things we learn how things become things, and the world becomesworld. Originally written as a doctoral thesis, Simondon's two books, LIndiridu et sa *A pbýysico-b venýse i zooTiqueand LIndh)iduafionp ýytbiqueet tolle(-five, constitute part of the same project. They endeavour to grasp the process of individuation in its vety becoming, rather than re-constituting it from already individuated elements. In a footnote to TheLoTh,qf Sense, Deleuze expresseshis belief that LIndividu et Sagenese has a special importance becauseit presents the "first thought-out pbysit'o-bioloTique theory of impersonal and pre-individual singularities" (1969: 344, n.3) providing a new conception of the transcendentalfield.73 Simondon proposes an overall critique of the tools and models that we have used to approach concepts. In agreement with Bergson, he thinks the concepts we have developed onlý7present us with snapshots of the world; we stumble before Zeno's paradox, unsure of how to take another step. Individuals are not so many potential immobilities.

Becoming is, for Simondon, infinitely

varied; the

dimension of being that opens up the possibilities of the world. Our banal and static way of viewing the world is thrown into movement. Not onlý- is the individual grasped as part of a wider reality, a part of nature, but its own reaht,\becomes partial, relative and brims Nxithpotentials. For these reasons,the process

73,This idea of the transcendental field is a important very one, one ýýhich I cannot do justice to within the confines of this thesis. I haNetried to show that although Deleuze develops a philosophN he calls transcendental empiricism. this does not involve transcendence.A fuller engagernent directed solelý toward this theme would also examine Kant and Kantian detail. in great philosophy

l, ')'8

SIMONDOVS

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMIN-GS

of individuation rather than the state of the individual is the focal point of our enquiries.

Simondon asks two fundamental questions in relation to individuation: why do we assume that individuated being is the most interesting or e\-en the most be to essentialreality explained?Why do we also imagine that indi\-lduation has a principle that is both prior to the process of individuation and which could formation the explain of the singular indi\-idual?

IV.iii. snapshots

But things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions. Henri Bergson, CreafireEvolution. (1911: 26 1).

Atomism and hylomorphism make the same mistake. Theý- think being in accordance with the model of the one, and they presuppose the existenceof the individual. According to Simondon, these have been the two primary ways of approaching the reality of an individual being.,4Were we to pohticise these points, we could suggest that liberal individualism effectively atormisessocietý-, since it portrays it as a conglomeration of egoistic, possessiveindividuals that preexist the relations they enter into. Moreover, the pressures of a communitarian bears down position upon the singularities of a populace. The individual is made to fit the group. SiMondon implores us to distinguish being as beiq' from being as for but for Individuation philosophical, I.11(lim'(111al. also ethico-political reasons as his thesis testifies, needs to be thought as a process. Like the second volume of Spinoza, he tries to navigate between the traditions of idealism and materialism, but he also dc\-clops a unique conception of the individual that disrupts the discourses of both communitarianism and liberal individualism. While not

II do not continue with the Heideggerian distinction of Being and being here because the focuses because is deliberate I Sirriondon this think throughout 'ýtre'. it is a move uses ord ill Being. Fie in being that term than terms argue a %ý catch-all rather processes of singular on being. frorn pre-indi\ idual Subject and obýjectcmerge 139

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

lose he the the to the wanting singularity of individual, specificity or also wants to being, develop that to underscore and it is necessarilya relational a conception of he becoming. What its essenceas calls the pre-individual and the transindividual Guattari Deleuze beconlings to that the relate and christen which non-human of the human.

Substantialist atomism provides us with a classic monism. It posits being as that which consists in its unity, resisting that which it is not. Impermeable, impassive, both in Resonances itself and unengendered. indifferent, it is grounded of this discourse the of rights-based theory; the integrity of the approach remain within her individual is often assumed and relations With others are supplementat), distributive For John Rawls' than paradigm of justice rather example, constitutive. both presupposes and obscures these relations as it focuses on the individual (I.M. Young, 1990: 20). For these kinds of reasons, Henry Shue (1980) criticises this approach, appealing for a theory of rights and duties that acceptsand affirms hand, for Hylomorphism, the the other. paints a other on responsibility to and individual dynamic the through emerges as the encounter which slightly more has TullýT James form However, shown us and matter. product of the meeting of how the scored specificity of the individual, the venl different'e of the individual, be planed and smoothed over with top-down theories that seek to assimilate can differences. In addition, the dogmatic image of thought that Deleuze identifies has resonances with a hylomorphic operation, resting on a will to identity. Differences are denied in both communitarianism and possessiveindividualism, becauseof the resolute focus on the unity and identity of the individual, or of the for heterogeneity Such multiplicity. and real space no provides a unity group. being is By complacently assurmng that the individuated, given, and constituted be but to that the needs one also around, not on1v the most interesting reahtý, 21), trajectorý. 1964particular (Simondon, a on off ourselves set we explained Hylomorphism and atomism both imagine that there is a pn'ntipleof individuation found be reality in a this can principle and itself, anterior to the individuation

140

Sl-'\10--\DO\'S .

prior to

CRYSTALLI'-ý,: E BECOMINGS

-5 For this reason, theNIbegin '\vith the e process of individuation.

constituted individual, and try to detect from its presence the conditions of its if Yet existence.

the constituted individual is given an ontological (and

explanatory) privilege, then the individual is torn and abstracted from the processesof individuation and the system of reality that it is a part of We need to develop a thought without image, a thought that can trace movements in their becorMngs singular without assimilating them to an identitarian model. A thought that can grasp difference. Sffnondon says that if "Individuation

does not only produce the individual,

xe

would not seek to move so quickly through the stage of individuation to arrive at the final reality that is the individual

]" (22). Instead, we would try "to know the ... dii)iduation ditidiiation * * * dipidilaP (22). This throiý than throughthe in I.ndividual gh in in rather , he before The the is challenge sets implications of this approach are radical. us.

It is no longer a question of imposing a form upon a matter but of elaborating an increasingly rich and consistent material, the better to tap increasingly intense forces. What makes a material increasingly rich is the same as what holds heterogeneities together without their ceasing to be heterogeneous. ThousandPlateaus.(1980: 329). Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattarl, --I

A technological approach to individuation envisagesthe sculptor chiselling stone, The the activity of these artisans is viewed as the carpenter carving wood. or Yet form this the the materials. passive matter of upon skilled imposition of a Aný' fabrication. far from form the reality of artisanal cry and matter is a abstract be brimi-ningwith prepared in potentials and singularities; often it must material is If advance. ý'()Llcut a piece of expensive wood against the grain it may split and from is Guattari Deleuze that royal science inseparable argue and it. ruln ýýouwill life from less derives than hylomorph-ic technology and that it this model, saying law "It 369). (1980: the from a society of governing and governed is the idea of

important is individuated the realit,, most believe this presumption that realitý Deleuze (like HoNNever, denigrates Deleuze the that actual. Badiou's contention precipitates iduation indi\ (of is and singularisation). Sirnondon) more concerned with processes

7ýI

141

SEMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECO. 'MINGS

that assures the model's coherence, since laws are what submit matter to this or that form, and, conversely, reahze in matter a given property deduced from the form" (408).

Stmondon explains that the technological operation involves an encounter of two realities of heterogeneous domains) an encounter that institutes a mediation. Matter is actively plastic, harbouring potentials, and is not in the least passive. Take the example of moulding clay. A whole factors5 chain of relations and operations come into play in this process. These include the workplace, the worker, and the microphysical chemical reactions that occur in the claý- at a molecular level. (Deleuze and Guattaris term 'assemblage' communicates the complex operations at play that far surpassa simple form-matter dichotomy.) The Jýrm of the mould has no role but to Hn-dtand stabilise.

IV.iv. multiplicitous

beings

We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied. Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus.(1980: 3).

Traditional models of being have, according to SIMondon, rested upon the conception of an ideal state of stable equilibrium. Becoming is thus presented as the becoming of an already individuated being. Being is portrayed as substance.76 All its potentials extinguished, such a being lays exhausted at its lowest ebb, further transformations. For this reason, individuation has not been incapable of A this being thought. adequately reliance upon conception of was understandable has been since only relatively recently a conception of metastable equilibrium developed. The mcapacitý-to think of a system that could be more than unitý- and be both itself and other than itself, prohibited more than identitý-, that could further. The from being Ancients, the taken entire intuitions such as those of has been, Simondon's Occidental tradition of in philosophy N-lew,a substantiahst

Un I ike Spinoza's substance which xNas, as Nvesaw. a dýnamIcal and actke being.

142

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

one since it has never seized the real individual in its genesis. It has accepted it Deleuze's (90). gratefully as a given reality conception of a o-eatedpossible that precipitates a disparity or problematic develops some of the intuitions of a transformational pragmatics. But -\-v-hat ontology accompaniesthese intuitions-r What if, however, being was no longer itself_ýWhat if being and becoming were longer but dimensions opposed, of one system? Simondon's name for this no being. This being thought state of affairs is metastable is a of as more than unitýboth Since Simondon than identity. it is and more one and not-one, calls it preindividual being. We no longer need to flail about in search of a pfintiple of individuation, since the individuated term is neither presupposed nor privileged. In this system, becoming is a dimension of being and it corresponds to the býbeing be to to resolve itself moving out of phase with itself and capacity of through phases. Becoming is the dimension of being that constitutes "the mode 13), (1989: that is rich in potentials" of resolution of an initial incompatibility being framework Individuation than through is the moves. rather a which a field being. Being that is rich in potentials; these is a movement through phasesof Being dimensions. is heterogeneous from only as it the incompatibility of result bet, omes. We can only understand individuation if we grasp being as a supersaturated be being Such the the through excluded of principle accessed cannot a system. to onlýthese applýl principles since identity, the of principle middle and discover Consequentl), being (13-14). that is commonlýwhat we individuated the being Midividual it is than abstraction; impoverished an other is nothing called be longer No to from a world the stranger a individual will its milieu. separated 28). (1964: confronting it be to knowii a relative reality, The individual through individuation reveals itself "The two senses, ie thus in relative is individual system. part of a \vider re191Mor being from because in which it a state of becauseit is not A being, and it results did not exist either as individual or as principle of in&-viduation"

For this 143

,,

CRYSTALLI'-', ýE BECOMI'N'GS

I,-\IO\DON'S

does 'individual' the term reason, not adequately convey the complex relation of 'indi-,,-idual-milieu' that emerges.A milieu is associatedwith the individual through the process of individuation. This term 'miheu' replaces the old sense ()f matter, like toward that is metastable as it gestures a matter a supersaturated solution Such awaiting its crystalline germ. a system is the synthetic grouping of differing do scalesof reality which not communicate prior to individuation (1989: 66). What is this pre-individual being? Is it simply a domain relative to the individual, does And be "a to it consist in its own reality? or why is individuation understood harbouring partial and relative resolution which manifests itself in a system potentials and containing a certain incompatibility in relation to itself, an by forces býthe impossibility of tensions incompatibility produced or as well as kinds dimensions" (12)? '\, Vhat between terms the of of its extreme any interaction being, be to and adequate this concept of pre-individual ethics and politics will the additional concept of the transindividual? A new thought of relationality is required.

IV.v.

revolutionary

states

Pre-1ndividual being is described by Simondon as homogeneous, concrete and he description This places on is n-usleading given the emphasis without phase. disparateness (disparafion). Disparateness designates a tension or incompatibility between two elements of a situation which results in the invention of a new individuation. distinction

Pre-individual being can be better understood through Deleuze's

differentiation of

differenciation. and

The former refers to a non-

field potenfials pre-individual or of real virtuality though absolutely actuahsed -a latter through individLiatioti the actualisation to of processes the singularities - and be former the The without posited differenciation cannot of this reality. and latter. SiMondon joins Deleuze and Bergson in seeking to avoid a conception of a a inject that nuight He ', concept to anNimport is reluctant rt,ellisal)k possible.

in\ol\'Cs it he an thinks for 77 fie is \\ary of the concept of the vIrtual this reason as His the be of has idea of use to realised. that designates yet possible a and enteh,clicia dimension the a as Deleuze's \irtual of to understanding ho\\ever, \erý close potential is. 144

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECO-MINGS

teleological direction. For this reason he develops the idea of potential enerpPotential energy is related to the capacity for transformation of a system. I)Cleuzc calls it the energy of the pure event (1969: 103). SImondon argues that the idea of potential energy allows us to understand a system that could not be grasped through formalism or through quantification, in other words a metastable wstem. Through it we can trace real transformations in that system. There is a critical moment where potential energy is at its maximum; however, it is not something that exists independently. It is a part of a system and expressesthe dissymmetrý of that system. In my introduction,

I discussed P6guy's conception of the event. The c\-ent

dissymmetry, involved a indicating a state of affairs was 'out of joint'. S111gularities described or critical points irreversible states that sparkled and hissed. Deleuze remarks

that

"Singularities

are turning

points

and points

of

inflection,

bottlenecks, knots, foyers and centres; points of fusion, condensation and boiling. points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points" (1969: 52). This

singular or critical point

is remarkable; it is a point

of

transformation. This point is pre-individual as it is anterior to anN,individuation, law. 'notbe It because through is it cannot a general and it is singular, captured both believed 'always P6guy that yet' and -already'.

history

and event are

inseparable from these singular points (53). They delineate a problematic that is irreducible to a subjective perspective indicating, rather, an objective or real state ideas These length by StMondon. described being. It of at is this tension that is of be understood readily if we potential energy, metastability and singular points can cxamine a supersaturated system.

A suinple example of a supersaturated system is a glass of ,vater dosed with F, becomes The it sugar. x-cntually vith supersaturated water spoonfuls ()f sugar. , form. taking the operation of immanent to a sNstern. "As a corollary. the energetic theory of [ ], as does understood potential, the of virtualitý notion use not which we present, ... and its because state is the a metastable of reahtý it expresses ival. potential ener,-,ý, 68). 1989: (Simondon, energetic situation"

145

SENIONDON'S CRYSTALLINE

BECO. NIINGS

wiU take only the tirdest addition of sugar to trigger a process of cp-stallisation which engenders a crystal. This genesis of the crystal occurs at its exterior lirrut and the crystal is permanently ex-centric and peripheral to itself. Another example of a kind of metastable state might be a stand-off between not A police and protesters. minor incident, or the n-usinterpretation of a movement, lead to a transformation of that situation into a pitched battle. '\ [etastability may entails conflict and uncertainty. Simondon notes that a pre-revolutionary stateis a state of supersaturation (1989: 63). SiMondon does not propose a difference in kind between physical beings and beings. latter He because has thinks the organic are more complex a phase shift become fact, he In them to theatre themselves. enabled a of individuation like that this supersaturatedsolution, and this is surmises reality is primitively )ust different it manifests itself in why ways as wave or particle, as matter or energy (24).

N. A. mediators

There is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as in it. the such, enwound other which expresses Gilles Deleuze, Differenceand Repetition.(1968a: 26 1).

DcN-eloping this idea further, SiMondon argues that we need to grasp disparate least) (at two orders of magnitude. individuation as a mediation of Individuation resolves a tension that surges in a metastable system rich in between however, Initiafly, these of orders there is communication no potentials. language, Deleuze's to the In proccss of this prior is a virtual magnitude. between disparity A flower infrai-nolecular an the a resolution of is actu,,ihsation. to nutrientsthat correspond magnitude of order cosn-uc a and order of magnitude flo'\k-cr living As is thing, neN-cr a a the photosynthesis. process of in the soil and

146

Sl-'\IO\DON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

fully individuated or it would be dead. It is not simply the result of a process of "in but theatre individuation of individuation: it exists a more complete agent and that requires permanent communication, and maintains regime of internalresonance life" (1964: 25). It the that metastability is condition of continues to modiý- its a but does In it its milieu, it relation with as so modifies itself other words, it level be future that the of potential carries with it a certain can source of transformations and new individuations. This is the pre-individual nature of the living being being, The It is an inventive resolution. is a problematic individual. (1989: 20). to inferior superior and unity For Deleuze, "Mediators are fundamental. Creation's all about mediators. Without them nod-iing happens. [ ]I need my mediators to express myself, and ... in a group, they'd never express themselves without me: you're always working it's F6hx be And to apparent: still more when on your own. even when you seem Guattari and I are one another's mediators" (1990a: 125). INIediatorsconnect heterogeneous domains, they make worlds collide and they open us up to our We by becorrUngs this a precall indetermination. zone of a creating non-human lack field. Incommunicability, of mediators to create transversal a individual communications,

Intelhgence is is a sure sign of a state of ahenation and isolation.

but of inventing them, creating a possible. not the art of solving problems

A pre-individual field is both pre-subject and pre-object. When Deleuze he Ego, Transtendent-e The by the Sartre was discovered a small piece of called Sartre impersonal an In of to account an provide text this endeavoured thrilled. bore field to empirical that resemblance no transcendental and pre-individual does "It not fields, and which could not be determined as that of a consciousness. another foundation is also it matter that is it another the suffice to say of This 99). 1969: (Deleuze, being another world" geographý,, without form the form the both ()f field the and general the of excludes transcendental singularities. developing the pre-individual of idea their place in indn-idual, 'fourth to commumicatc singtilar' Ferlinghetti's person the Deleu/e used image of "OnlýDeleuze when that (102). maintains this idea of a pre-individual singularity 147

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECO-MINGS

the world, teeming with anonymous and nomadiC, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental"

(103).This is the opening forced by Sirnondon. IV.vii. difference

affirmed

As a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the extent that their difference is denied, suppressed from within [ ] To be sure, the identity ... here is not that of indifference, but it is generally through identity that opposites are affirmed at the same time [ ...] We speak, on the contrary, of an operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed through their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of simultaneous affirmation only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself affirmative. Gilles Deleuze, The4ýgic of Sense.(1969: 172).

Since classical logic cannot grasp pre-individual being, Simondon introduces die Transduction transduction. idea of

is an operation through wl-ýich an acti6ty

domain, directions from Think of the modulates a extending in multiple a centre. bifurcation that reaches a point and effectuates a supersaturated water solution liquid from This the resulted sugar-water. a primitive tension and crystallisation of incompatibility.

SiMondon,

Bergson, echoing calls transduction

'intuition':

a

becoming. being follow the movements of as capacity to

Through transduction, Simondon wants to map out another way of thinking. Infinitesimal dissection and the search for an ultimate commonality, are equally This the by to tries comprehend method the transductive method. shunned different and heterogeneous realities constituting the individual. Transduction is, Serres' or vectorially thinking occur that must to idea this similar regard, quite in being. It domains phronesis, heterogeneous hooking is a of transversalIv, up hox An tcHs %ve thought us of image improvisational and experimentational. It directions is not march. should thought, \vc in what in should orient ourseh-cs but position we \vInch upon coordinates of system a whole only a method, 1990a: Fundamentafly, ýDclcu/c, the concepts of creation it guides ourselves. 148). 148

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BECOMINGS

Like Bergson, Simondon remarks that humans havc a need to individuate objects to recognise and find themselves in things. Bergson had postulated that humans feel more at home amongst inanimate objects (especially solids) although he also remarked, "In vain, we force the living into this or that one of our moulds. All the moulds crack. They are too narrow, too rigid, for what N-, -e try to put into them" (1911: x). These two thinkers both question the privilege of natural perception and the subordination of movement to static shots of reality. "Bergson himself, who made a remarkable effort to think the individual falling without into the traps of mental habits imported from psychology by a spirit accustomed to treating other problems, remained too close to pragmatism" (Simondon, 1989: 148). Bergson concentrated too much, in Simondon's view, on intra-individual dynamism to the detriment of intra-individual structural realities. We cannot know individuation. "We can only individuate, individuate ourselves be and individuated" (1964: 34). It is not just being but thought too that proceeds by individuations. To grasp the individuation of the real exterior to the subject we need an individuation of the knowledge of the subject (34). Another manner of thinking is required. The concepts we have may be perfectly adequate for an individuated world, but not for a pre-individual one. concept is neither apnon but because posten'on' praesenti, nor a a it is an informative and interactlN-e communication between that which is greater and that which is lesser than the individual" (Simondon, 1989: 66). If we classify things in an arbitrary and abstract way through speciesand genera, we take absolutely no account of the specificity We their of genesis. need to understand them from the perspective of a prefield is It that individual reality is never a matter of studying a of potentials. but individuation in general, rather of examining singular individuations. Such an lo * acentered gic means you make VOUr own connections invent your own Simondon deternuined pre-exists. is not to permit communications and nothing his he idea of transduction: a thought that can maps out any transcendence as by An I-, Deleuze. this is offercd example of xplainiiig cope with singularities. Guattarni'sidea of aagroupuscule, Deleuze shows ho-\v it descn

i tion I Unifica 149

SINIONDON'S

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BECOMINGS

that operates transversaHv,across a multiphcin-, in such a way that it does not crush that multiphcity (1972: vii). Deduction tries to impose a principle on domain being. Transduction, a of however, does not seek a principle from elsewhere in order to resolve the problems of a domain. Induction, while analysing the character of terms of reality, only conserves what is common between terms, eliminating whatever is singular (Sitnondon, 1964: 32). Transduction discovers the dimension of the system which make terms communicate. It does not search for terms that are identical to one another, but it looks for that which makes them disparate. A little piece of knowledge can make an entire system metastable,and call the old way of thinking into question. When Stephen Lawrence was murdered, his parents set up a campaign appealing against racism in the Metropolitan Police force. The evidence put forward about the case called into question the machinations of that police force, identifying an institutional racism embeddedin it. It created a metastable situation that had to be resolved. A gradual resolution dissipation and of tension occurred, though not necessarily one that fully implications disparity. Those are the moments when the that addressed of initial things can never be the 'same' again. "R]ransduction is characterised by the fact that the result of this operation is a concrete web that contains all the initial terms

(32). It applies to operations

that are physical, biological, mental and social (30). An operation is the Combes (28). Muriel to conversion of one structure another structure gives us a from formula It Marx. Marx's of the nice example of such conversions. comes delineated initially the a market nature of capitalist relation of money and goods buying C-M-C (commochties-moncý-to in order sell: operation premised upon bound Two together in this acts of purchasing and selling are commodities). buy form Its to of selling in order chain. corresponding

(moneý--

beconuing-capital formulation This the constitutes second commodities-money). from Simondon 29). (1998: calls this interest in changes of statcs of iiioncý150

SIMO\DONý'S

CRY'S)TALLINE BECO-'\11-'\'GS

structure to operation, or conversely from operation to structure, 'allagmatics'.

We are accustomed to thinking in terms of common genera and specific differences, and they seem to be natural classifications for us (Simondon, 1964: 87). 1 will discuss this proposition in the context of Deleuze's critique of the 'n-nage identitarian of thought' in the next chapter. Meanwhile, Simondon also wants to introduce another way of thinking. Returning to the example of the he how it involves an operation through which it structures itself, crystal, shows being both cause and consequence of the polarisation of the matter N-6thout The singularity, or the germ, is the sugar crystal that which it would not exist. different Hence the makes orders of magnitude communicate. its structure is distinct from but this The the crystal. properties of the crystal germ is not ret,eh)ed discontinuity This (in than the growth elementary are relational rather substantial. discontinuous SI-Mondon the that the is prirnarý, in contends, of crystal) means, Ibis Laruelle (94). to the to is close what called the relation of relation continuous disjunction'. 'inclusive Deleuze the the non-relation and named Relations have a real claim to being in Simondon. A relation is not just the "ýIt the two terms. internal of the is an aspect of juxtaposition of consequence This (27). it is a part of the state of a system" e oJ'a ýystemoj'indizýduafion; resonant, being than that one's is greater individuation part of an involves participation harboured being the potentials reality, the pre-mdividual through of charge own by the individual. A relation is a modality of being. The essenceof a reality cannot by be James (as Bergson and told us over and over) re-composed extrapolating a being have All between are and of class terms. a relations pre-existent relation the ensure. terms ýT the existence to whose regard with simultaneous being that eiqiiders Rather than adhering to the model of substance, metastable declaring By being. the on a "var %,,, -hich Nve call substance - individuated highlights a as Simondon to treat relations tendency the substantiahst tradition, By These sLibstances. already thought as of terms are terms. rapportof pre-existing land] being, being, a "a of relation a in relation the as individual understanding 151

CRY-STALLINE

SIMONDON'S

BECO. MINGS

being being becomes [ ]" (30), that itself way of as is understood through which ... knowledge S=iilarh-, creating connections. is not a simple relation of t-\X-o I but be "a betiveeli two relationr,one in to substances, it needs conceived as relatioli the domain of the object and the other in the domain of the subject" (81).

Like Spinoza, SiMondon thinks that something is an object only insofar as it is being by other objects in a s\-stem.He saysthat capable of affecting and affected there is "a virtual reciprocity of actions between the terms of a system" (66). A but born by does link terms, is pre-existent relation not constituting terms formula 34). Twisting Combes 1998: Hegel's (Combes, themselves as relations does A (35). "What relation is real is relational, and what is relational is real" says, 126). This being, but 1964: (SiMondon, idea of it constitutes it not express disjunctive diversity. being that to the is a notion relation introduces us

IV.viii.

crystalline visions Mine is no callous shell, I have instant conductors all over me whether I pass or, stop, They seize every object and lead it harmlessly through me. Walt W'hitman, 'Song of Myself', Leavesof Grass.(1855: 90).

SIMondon's propelled

theory

knowledge of

by the problematic

does not extrapolate

from

but is sensation

Deleuze being. In a seminar on music, of metastable

designate do lines lines that describes the crystalline not simply of an assemblage, Deleuze and Guattan' call a refrain

but trace glittering a set of states,

movements.

"crystal a prism, a

(1980: 348). It acts on that which surrounds it,

extracting

of space-time"

light and vibrations.

a natural affmity,

But it also catalyses, hooking up elements without

These between them. crystalline transversal relation creating a

becomings. hiStor)T lines have their own and open up new

a as not situation, concrete We need to understand the subject in a real and heterogeneous but a being, with reatity fully a as individuated un-ified and 15i

SINIONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECONIING'ý

multitude of desires, passions and interests. The perceiving subject is part of a dynamic system that is over-determined and super-saturated and perception modifies both the subject and object. The individual is a transductive reality that is neither an element, nor a pure relation (rappod).It is the reahtý-of a metastable relation. "[A]n intensiVe diversity [ ] exists Nx-l-iich makes the subJect-worldsystem ... comparable to a supersaturatedsolution" (Simondon, 1989: 91). There are many different kinds of individuations; subject-type individuations (that's me that's you ), event-type individuations that do (a not rely on a subject ... ... battle, a wind ) Peleuze, 1990a: 115). But the does ha-,, subject not -c any identitY. ... Subjectification constitutes both a personal or collective individuation (115), so we need to ask in what ways can we constitute ourselves as selves?Someone into walks a room and the atmosphere changesimperceptibly. This is becausethe person is, as Spinoza told us, a set of intensities. Individuations do not have to be personal. Deleuze observes, "Hlix and 1, and manN-others like us, don't feel Nve (141). are persons exactly. Our individuahty is rather that of events Mix.

an ethics

of the pre-individual

The individual is an activity, condensing information, transporting it, and modulating it in a new milieu which it is instrumental in inventing. The processof individuation is an operation of communication. (Simondon, 1964: 229). For a being to be a living being, there must be a polarisation and an asymmetrical This through tendency idea of qualification which an orientation or emerges. birth by to the of the asym.metry is explored cosmologists seeking explain drawn have Big Bang, by our attention to and geneticists who universe after the the asymmetry of the DNA strand. We came across it in our example of the flower that mediates different orders of magnitude. Deleuze calls this the Unequal be live To 'problematic'. like Simondon, to is agent, milieu and names it a and, Y, ). 1989: (Simondon, element of individuation has being, "the Nfalebranche Simondon quotes that e-,-cr\who noted once by documented This further" (144). activity is \x-cU movement to always go 153

Sl.'\10-\DO-\"S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

Spinoza. When he chronicled his story of the individual as ý-,a potelitia t-oliatu, perpetually engagedin activities whereby it was both affected and affecting, he described that pre-individual zone of beingswhich is the part of 11ature effectively associatedwith individuals. From this zone, emergesthe new. We called this an asymmetrical system, comprised in part of a pre-individual charge that accompaniesindividuals. The future bearsupon the present,informing it. Let us seewhy this is important for an ethics. Ethics occurs in a network of acts, acts that resonate with each another, modulating and transforn-ung one another. Any act is always becoming in the becoming (242). It is centred but infinite, and its value is its capacity middle of its for transductive shifts liberating new potentials and effectuating transformations. No act that is isolated, consisting only in itself, or operating'With an end in view, breaks from dominating Cutting this off is ethical in sense. oneself off or others this communication. An ethical act is radiant, radiating, more than unity and more deny Rather than trying to than identity, creating new relations and connections. by becoming, "Ed-iics is that it embraces it. which the subject remains a its domain become to of reahtN,,a an absolute individual, a closed subject, refusing detached singularity; it is that by which the subject remains in a perpetually tense (245-46). [ ]" problematic, internally and externally ... In an essay entitled 'Spinoza: From individuality to transindividuality', Etienne Bahbar explores the eccentric nature of SpMoza's theory of individuation. According to Gatens and Lloyd, "Bahbar has offered a reading of Spinoza's both to classical theory of individuation as a relational ontology that is opposed leads formalism Spinoza's 121). (1999: to antipathy individualism and organicism" him, as we have seen, to counter a philosophy of attribution with one concerned be definitions cannot and concepts in which one with process and networks; definition the the of essence of the real to and context indifferently employed be The individual cannot human is not encapsulated in any single proposition. Bahbar others. with communication constant and than relation in thought other first Spinoza's that the alleges to \x-ork; takes issue ,vith m-o common objections 154

SBIONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

he has no theory of subjectivity; and the second claims that the individual's autonomy is denied, immersed in the impersonal and undifferenciated entity that God. The conception of inclividuality developed býT Spinoza is one that is emphasises the individual's necessaryrelationahty with others since singularities 'network' 'system' (1997: 9). The ontology proposed interconnected are in a or a is therefore a relationalone and Balibar calls it a general theory of Communication. It is with obvious dehght that Bahbar tells us of his chscoveryof SiMondon who, despite his pedestrian and conventional criticisms of Spinoza, is himself a true Spinozist. Bahbar argues that metastable equihbna require an elevation of form the potential energy in of a polarity of individual and environment. Adaptation to changing environments is not reactive but involves the invention of new structures and modes of existence. Neither reductioMst nor vitalist, a (11). Individuahty Spinoza natural philosophy prevails in operates as a transindividuality, or rather a transIndividual process of individuation, that is being decomposed hohstic. Individuals to avoid neither individualistic nor want so they engage in an active process of exchange with the environment and Freedom their is the power. cultivate a multitude of relationships which increase dimension the of the individual. active expression of With regard to Simondon, Bahbar asserts that, "His key idea is that -tnýdependent, pre-indiz4diial the on in metastable equilibrium, a remains individuation "structurings" from or through potential successive which the individual emerged "distanciations from the environment". Therefore the existence of an individual is always "problematic" or tense" (22, n.25). By creating a collectivity, a new The to emerges. individuals that internal or external is neither entity metastable impels the individual reality of that is a non-individuated prc-individual charge "Spinoza's is immanence as relation of concept toward others. this movement (33). best described by the term "transindividuality"

Spinoza's conception of the individual as the relative and changing reality of a set the SIMondon's dissimilar ()f understanding differential to ()-\x-n is not relations of 155

SBI()'\ýDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGIS

individual. Simondon agreesthat the individual must be graspedas "Me R*ný, giilar poi*nIq1-an openhýfiniýyq1'relationZ'(1989: 254), adding, "the individual is not a being like substantial an element,nor is it a pure relation, but it is the reahtý-of ,t metastablerelation" (79-80).And like Spinoza'sindividual who dies slowly and graduallyasit can no longer sustainso many affects,SiMondon'sindividual "loses its plasticity bit by bit, along with its capacityto create metastablesituationsand to make of them problems With multiple solutions" (80). For each of these thinkers, individuation is a voyage that takes place in relation to thresholdsof intensity. Muriel Combes notes that Spinoza, like Simondon, comprehends the subject of ethics as the place of a perpetual variation in its power of acting that is its capacitV to affect other subjects, and be affected, transforming itself. Ethical difference liberatory concerns a movement from servitude. Consciousnessvaries in relation to affective life and the forces surrounding the subject. Modifications in these result in modifications of the individual. As a result the subject is nc\-er fully (1998: 54). both It constituted is individual and otherthan individual. We call this being that traverses the individual the transindividual. The excessof being that is the pre-individual nature of an individuated being is lived as a tension. The presence of a 'more- than-individual' dimension makes itself felt as a from disparity, A it reveals that which is more than individual. a sign. sign stems This sign results in a de-individuation of the individual, liberating its nonfrom The that in us that is not us. transindividual emerges individuated potential. It is the limit of exteriority and interiority; a fold of an outside that constitutes an limits Subjectivity (71). the is not contained -\x-ithin inside that is not an interiority A in a new engage individuals the emerges when collective individual. ()f the just terms, pre-existent of rapport is just a relation not as a individuation. that does is oup the gr into a the individual of entnT not constitute transindividual bct-\N-een dis i i Guatta When subjectanguished a ri individuals. other an aggregate of . he the oup gr a idea of (a explored group, sub'ugated a and groupuscule) group 1ý lie Instead, that was not simply a conglomeration or meeting of individuals. 156

SINIONDUX'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECONll\'GS

hierarchical to the sought express possibility of a nongroup that could express develop and itself through singular ideas, actions and relations. This would be an ongoing process of invention.

If the individual enters an already constituted group, the leeway for change and limited. The culture of these groups can become ossified and ngid, innovation is unable to adapt to change, closed to the world. Ireland's Roman Catholic doctrinaire has that community is an example of a group seen its members dwindle rapidly in recent years, partially because of its own intransigence. Through the transindividual, humans are opened to their non-human becomings "To the extent that the transindividual takesroot in this zone of us and potentials. like (71). to the that is exterior individual, it swells in us an outside" SlMondon

begins thus to reconceive the relation of individual

and society,

human The 179). (1989: stressing the reality of the social as a system of relations being endowed with an abstract essence and generahsable is not an exceptional Individuals nature.

enter a collective through the potentials of a real t-reated

"The subjective transindividual names, therefore, the effects in a subject possible. herself her discovery is which in zone a of the more of of -than-individuality, 82). For 1998: (Combes, this reason, common" and pre-personal as revealed Combes extracts a phrase meant for Leopardi and written býTNegri which calls human A (85). ]" death [ for "a humanism after the is an essentiak of man ... herselfý beyond for have What being. going potentials can she incomplete

form \Ve 'transversal'. Deleuze and Guattari call these aparal-lelcommunications in ith that a \x-ay such 1 deterritotialisitý by others Wi connections creating g, rhizomes disrupted to modifications. new itself opens and the is self the territorialitý- of level be intensity. the of on These transformations can only understood thought d-icy their rhizomatic on elaborate Appeating to this idea of transduction, In hierarchical thought. of image and to arborescent an the)oppose which develop system, acentcred latter's an they system, centred the to contrast (1980.17). by moment given "defined a their at state only individuals are only 157

SIMONDON',

S CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

This operation is the transduction of intensive states (17). Anything that nught from high uniýy it on is subtracted, hence the formula 'n- F. The relation of being to itself is much richer than identity. Substantial being is because one it is stable consisting in itself and for itself. However, the original being state of is pre-individual, surpassing its coherence with itself It is metastable and potentialised. Any structure rests at a stable equilibrium only within certain magnitudes and limits. It is defined within thresholds. A new interaction

Berate can

masked potentials leading to an abrupt change. Ontogenesis is no longer directed toward the individuated individual but

designatesinstead the character of becoming of being, a character that is neither mechanistic nor teleological. What is striking in this account is SlMondon's conviction that the world is not already there, structured and existing as a system of reference that is ulltt,-Irýýand fact, objective; in it is precisely this conviction that leads him to criticise both Lamarck and Darwin. The closest philosophical account to this is Bergson in his late work CreafiieEi)olufion.Being is understood as a problematic that contains a These differenciated different tendencies. number of virtual split and are into The through týT paths actuahsations an inventive process of unforeseeablenovel . 'simple this of virtual' constitute resolutions that are novel inventions of a Similarly, did problematic that not pre-exist their invention as realisablepossibles. Spinoza's condemnation of a teleological conception of Nature mocked the have bet-ause We have to eyes and in see we eyes in order see. notion that we Bergson's view, sight is the resolution of a problematic. how difficult to If all the potentials in a s),stem are already actual-isedit is see I for It be that thýisreason cobbled together. was transformational strategiescan dedication limited to Negri's their a Hardt the and virtual of use and criticised hope false the the of system in contradictions that placed rather rigid materialism Guattarl"s Deleuze constructiVism and throwing up a new mode of reality. by immanence the of that plane emphasising always challenged this approach 1

8 -5

ST-NIONDON'S CRYSTALLINF

BECONIINGS

does not pre-exist. Simondon does not exphcldy align himself with a (Deleuzean) 'created possible' but this is implicit in his texts. It his novel shines through in thought of pre-individual and problematic being. IV. x.

flashing

intensities

Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by Ný-hichthe given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse. 968a: Repetition. (I Gilles Deleuze, Dffference and It seems to us that Gilbert Simondon's conception can be compared to a theon, difference. intensive because is in itself intensive of quantities; quantity each (1966b). Gilles Deleuze, Review of L'ilidii4dil el,ý-ti,, aenýsepý)ysit-o-hi'oloaiqlle.

Yet all is not guaranteed. We came across Deleuze's 'Postscript on Control Societies' in chapter 2. In this piece, Deleuze argues that controls operate through modulation,

a transmutation

from that changes one moment

to the next.

\N'e are Businesses try to create even greater competitions within the workplace. longer In continuouslN, this societ\-, N, ()u no each in competition with ourselves. factory "business, from training military and to school start over as you move of sort a being modulation, single a of states coexisting metastable service A 179). (1990b: and [dormatim]" openness of pretence universal transmutation limited feigned business. It and is a disparity is quickly co-opted in the service of how last to invent a chapter, is disparateness. The real problem, as we saw in the problematic.

Alberto Gualandi thinks that Sffnondon's theon, of individuation played a N-cn In 64). the (1998: cr1tiquC the of context Deleuze's philosophy important role in last by Deleuze no"v will the chapter, difference in \X-c offered of conceptual Simondon's theory difference witli in conjunction develop his positive account of of individuation. but by God calculating, the world made Deleuze that fashion, tells us In dramatic I ý, )

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECOMINGS

his calculations are never exact Vuste).This leads to an irreducible inequality that forms the conditions of the world. Evenphenomenon is conditioned bN-an inequahty and 'je]verý- phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system" (1968a:2-22). Paraphrasing SiMondon, Deleuze notes that insofar as a system is constituted blleast heterogeneous disparate two at series or orders capable of entering into communication, we call it a signal and "[t]he phenomenon that flashes acrossthis bringing system, about the communication between disparate series, is a sign" (222). Every intensity is already difference in itself It is already a coupling. Intensities comprehend the unequal or different and open onto divergent series. "We call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity di.prio. Disparity in other words, difference or intensity (Chfference of intensm-) the is sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears" (222). Deleuze concludes his first paragraph of chapter V 'The Asymmetric Synthesis of the Sensible' by claiming that, "The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears,is not spaceand time but the Unequal in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference" (222-23). These are difficult thoughts but we should already be familiar with a number of them through SiMondon. If we recall Simondon's own approach to individuation, first foremost being that it emphasised is not substantial. It is at odds with and It than than itself, incompatible, more identity. is this intuition unity and more that Deleuze picks up on to amplify his theme of disparate and heterogeneous he develops Through this a real and genetic account of a orders of magnitude. difference that is not subordinated to an identitanan image of thought. In notable distinction to his earlier 1956 essayon difference, Deleuze no longer begins with a Bergsonian distinction between differences in kind or nature (quality), and differences in degree (extensity). Though this distinction remains, it deny difference but difference, "Intensity tends to this or to is is secondary. Repetilion 0ý#ýi-ente (223). and cancel itself out in extensity and underneath quality" those the approaches of to throw shackles off attempt a constitutes veritable 160

SI-NIONDON'S CRYSTALLINE

BECUMINGS

which remained limited to a consideration of empirical difference. Throughout this thesis, I have tried to show x,-hN,this is an important endeavour, , indeed) Simondon's critique of the constituted individual provides, perhaps, the greatest impetus for this renewed theory of individuation. If we only know difference "as already developed within an extensity, and as covered over by qualities [ ]" (223) then we will strive in vain to understand the ... conditions or genesis of reality. The postulates that structured the image of thought are Implicit and complicit In the development of a seriesof philosophical concepts. The old adage is transformed as we are asked to think with the grain, with the singularities of the matter. Good sense distributes, and in this distribution it tries to banish difference, cancelling it out (224). The explication of difference is a process of identification difference. Good sense tries to bring things back to a calm senseof stable of equilibrium. Deleuze, in a moment of penmanship worthy of Nfarx says,"Good senseis the ideology of the middle classeswho recognise themselvesin equality dreams less It with an abstract product. of acting than of constituting a natural milieu [...]" (225). Instead of negating difference, it recognisesit just enough to dissipate tension and ensure that difference negatesitself However, this systemis by difference learned how We this intensity it itself created of as explicates has Simondon's Still "difference occurred in account of crystallisation. nc\-er be be to to implicated in itself even while it is explicated outside in itself, ceased itself' (228). CIommon sense is defined, on the other hand, by facing a supposedlý-identical Self With a supposedly identical object. This static approach has nothing of the dynamism of Simondon who, according to Deleuze, maintains that 'JolbJects arc divided up in and by fields of individuation, as are Selves" (1968a:226). Thought has not gone so far as to dare think that bý-which the given is (,,, lN-cn. Intensity has three characteristics, Deleuze tells us. It includes the unequal in 161

SENIONDON'S CRYSTALLINE

BECONIINGS

itself, representing a difference in quantity that cannot be cancelledin quantitý-.In is belonging Because this Nxaýthe to it quality quantity. it is alreadý-difference in difference. As difference, intensity already refers to a series of itself, it affirms differences that it affirms by affirnung itself This becomes clear if N-e other , remember Simondon's explanation of the incompatibility or difference of orders of magi-Atude that creates a state of metastabihtý-.Difference is not, hoxvever, Again drawing Simondon, Deleuze elucidates this contention. A negation. on field of forces refers to a potential energy, and opposition refers to a 'deeper' disparateness.These oppositions are resolved only insofar as disparate orders of have magnitude invented an order of communication. Intensity can be distin gui'shed in the following way: as a really implicated and diffirence, distante (236). enveloping and as an implicated and enveloped a -\s like Deleuze that consequence, claims intensity is neither indivisible quality, and divisible be like formula Flourishing that repeated at will nor is it quantity. a length throughout A Tl)ollsalid Plateaushe states, "An intensive quantity may be divided, but not without changing its nature. In a sense, it is therefore indivisible, but only because no part exists prior to its division and no part retains the same division" nature after multiplicity.

(237). This is, of course, his classic definition of a N-irtual

SiMondon and Spinoza are therefore reN-ealedto haN-econstructed

due in part to theories of virtual multiplicities as intensive quantities, and this is love formalisation, for the their to of in part and and their antipathy abstraction singular and concrete.

heart Deleuze's disparate the of The idea of the unequal or the is at be This differences. not the should of unequal primacy understanding of It hierarchy. the to of justification an opening akin more is of understood as a brimming that needs one albeit potentials, with possible, a world without identiq, has t, principles: "The onlýý be quantities intensive of \N-() ethics to constructed. (244). (too do lowest, much)" oneself explicate not the affirm even by Deleuze fine a means of xvhat cleschption Stmonclon's metastable state is a I-

16-

SIMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINT

BECO'MINGS

problematic. Deleuze sometimes calls this non-being, in the -,-aN-that SiMondon , stressesit is pre-individual: both involve a conception of being that is more than unity and more than identitý-. The disparatenessof tl-iis being is, resolved by a germ, or 'dark precursor', that integrates "the elements of the disparatenessinto a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance" (246). The pre-individual half of the individual is the reservoir of singularities from xvluch new transformations can emerge. Deleuze believes that individuation is essentially intensive and that "the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field made up of differential relations" (246). Bergson told us that the most difficult thing is to invent good problems. Inventing or constructing a problematic forces a si-stem into a state of disparateness. Metastable being requires a distinction between singularity and individuality; the pre-individual field is not individuated, although "it is filled with singularities which correspond to the existence and distribution of potentials" (Deleuze, 1966b: 116). Deleuze underlines this idea that the state of the pre-individual field is singular without being individual. And what encourageshim in Simondon is that this state is one of "difference, disparity, disparateness"(116). Disparitýyis the first moment of being, and all the other states that we commonly associatewith being like opposition, integration, unification, are secondary. This idea of potential energy is a more profound idea than a field of forces (116). The disparate by these orders of magnitude problematic resolves organising a new dimension. This is not a dialectical resolution but an invention. Deleuze's sole from Simondon's the pre-individual to the that ethics moves reservation about transindividual

through individuation

form the is that it Might restore of a Self

he disparitýHowever his (118). banished himself had Simondon theory of in that beheves that Simondon has developed new concepts that transform the classical how Deleuze Throughout the next chapter NveNxill see problems of philosophy. himself mobihses these ideas as he constructs a thought without image.

like difference, by the If thought only thinks it needs a rcvolution means of "This from the is aim a to of abstraction. took representation that art revolution 16')

SLMONDON'S

CRYSTALLINE

BECO]MINGS

theory of thought without image" (1968a: 276). This would be a -,x-orld of pre-

individual singularitiesand non-personalindividuations. A world of dissensus,not consensus.A world of disparateness,not identitv. A dissolved is This the the individual pre-individual celebrated. and world where be Guattan indeed. a strangeworld calls it'chaosmosis'. world would

164

Chapter Five

A Nomadic

Image of Thought

AXOM-ýDIC

V. L

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

the radical thought of empiricism

The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of formulation, as "false", as "self-contradictory". Knowledge and becoming exclude one another. Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e 11"illto Power.(1901: ý517, '8())-

What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present and make them convincing. Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e if-'ill to Power (1901: §409,220).

In a letter-preface to jean Clet Martin's book Vanafions,Deleuze confesseshe has little use for the concept of the simulacrum aný-longer, despite the fact that this Tbe Difýrente Repefifion This Lo throughout is concept recurs and git,qj'Sense. and Badiou less because 'mere than it intimates something real, a effect' as perhaps he been has Instead Deleuze trying to think of philosophy claims might suggest. feels has he heterogenesis, be This not somettýng a system must as a system. double before. There been turning away that installs a radical tried is a really dedication his line In to the concept of multiphcity, as revealed with immanence. he Guattari, Plateaus Thousand A the to idea of explore seeks with in spectacularly I Throughout the this nature of explore chapter -\vill transcendental empiricism. this 'transcendental empiricism'. beyond (-\vhich between the transcendent appealsto principles Kant distin guiished (Nvhich the within principles immanent are experience) and the transcendental bN looselv, distinction This is adhered to, albeit hn-lits of possible experience). Deleuze. While the Kantian transcendental is concerned with the waý-sthat \%-c for real the Deleuze's conditions know concerns transcendental objects, can for 'the Adorno's force of possibility It cry the of experimentation. resounds xvith being otheiNvisc'. tl'Ungs kccp and to the (and concrete Martin (Act rcturrUng jean to us) Deleuze implorcs 165

A'NOMADIC

IMAGE

OFTHOUGHT

not to give one concept a primacy over all others. This effort to th,,vart a totalising model or image of thought is also found in Guattari's Nvork on metamodelisation. The challenge is to proliferate possibilities of being and creatc networks and rhizomes to escapeanN-given sN-stem of modelisation. The importance of distinguishing between transcendence and immanence was made clear in chapter 3 in relation to the thesis on umvocity. Here another term is introduced: the transcendental. It is important for Deleuze since he -\X-antsto retain a commitment to pluralism and empiricism, while not facilely positivising , all that IS.His philosophy of difference is developed in the hope of inventing a wild or radical empiricism-,8 that can think becomings (relations, difference, process...), Without abstracting and extrapolating from things that already are (individuated). We learned about this project in the last chapter when I discussed Simondon's motivation for his theory of protesses of individuation. It is this impetus, combined with an allegiance to an immanent ethics, that enables us to Deleuze understand why seeks the conditions for the invention of the new. Bergson's CreativeEvolillioli sought to eliminate teleology and mechanism from by evolutionary accounts emphasising the production of radical and itýilbreseeable he Deleuze It this that picks on intuition as seeksto reconfigure the up novelty. is conception of the transcendental. Transcendental philosophy, for Kant, sought to avold extrapolating the from (the the empirical; its status \vas transcendental conditions of possibility) He le islate faculty to criticised that could 91 apn'OrlWith regard experience. that of a to the that conditioned required reference of conditions tautological account a

" Wahl discusses the idea of a radical empiricism in relation to Whitehead (1932: 219). He between (rapports) their terms between the is and the relations adds that the problern is theory this He theme not a of this to empiricism saying (i-elations). returns relations it intervals Wahl to Deleuze Hume and seerns (127). at like ýarious praises that of sensations idea James's bý William inspired a empiricism. Wahl of radical he both were that and rne bN frorn exploring a relational radical empiricism Jarnes distinguished ordinarý empiricism \\ahl Relations themsel%es a part of experience. are actiNitý. of conception and empirical be the to abstract James task explain must the that of philosophy Whitehead and agrees Nvith dear. Yio\\e\ holds the DeleLize iction abstract must. in er 334), also (1 con\ a the concrete not kind is lover Deleuze of ofanother a be generalising. of this context. understood as a mode abstraction. 106

A NO. MADIC

INIAGE OFTHOUGHT

(the aposlen'on).Undoubtedly Deleuze is indebted to a Kantian conception of the transcendental. He argues nonetheless that Kant fell into his own trap by extrapolating the conditions of possibility of the transcendental from the empirical itself. In response, Deleuze maintains that the transcendental must be explored on its own account and only this kind of exercise will enable us to discover multiplicities and the exercise of thought. As Daniel SM1'thsavs, the conditions of possible experience become the genetic conditions of real 29). expenence(1996:

Instead of being transtmdentprinciples of mere conditions, Deleuze develops a transcendental philosophy of internal genesis (1962: 91). He maintains that Kant failed in his project of immanent critique since his "[t]ranscendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned" (91). Deleuze's antipathy toward the ilhcit invocation of transcendent principles must be Todd Maý' When transcendental principles. not negation of confused with a takes issue with readings of Deleuze that present him as a philosopher of difference (that is, a thinker who privileges difference), he arguesthat difference this, Without Deleuze's the philosophy surface. and unity are intertwined at "'Me 44). He (1994: be antitranscendentalpath says rendered incoherent would difference him has Deleuze to the at the primacy of trodden requires reject that falls (44). May he to comprehend the that of primacy un1ty" rejects same moment 'One=Nlultiple' formulations Deleuze's concern a specific such as that but One, the e inclusiN, as as nor unified, the as numerical, not of understanding disjunction of the differences of differences. Rather than examining an hnnself May difference, cal an epistemolo ical with contents of ontolo 91 account 10 discourses (39). difference (and critical) claim that is a means to contest unifý'ing back folding it onto a This waters down the radicahtý- of this enterprise difference "a thotight is at not a pure thought of that Hegelianism xhich claims for Deleuze ises lightly the 1 nature misunderstanding May In ti (46). chas sum, all" think thought being for of pure to try a and as his nalve so own project and of difference. 10-

NO' MADIC

I"\LAGE OF THOUGHT

In the preface to the English edition of Dýýerent-e Repefilim, Deleuze clairns aiid that everythlng he has tried to do since has been connected Nviththis text, the first he 'does' one in which philosophy. His problems were the concepts of difference and repetition.

Difference

had tended to be subordinated to identitv,

resemblance, opposition and analogy; repetition was also thought in this way. By "putting into question" the traditional linage of thought, these themes could be re-addressed.

Deleuze suggeststhat the 'image of thought' chapter is the most important one in the book. He says"[i]t is therefore the third chapter which now seemsto me the most necessaryand most concrete

(1994/1968a: xvii). The image of thought

is not simply a question of thinking in accordance with a gl\-cn method, but it These detern-une ide the process of ttying rests on implicit presuppositions. gui and to think. We assume the good nature of the thinker and we take the process of faculties forms 'common the on a supposedlý recognition that a sense'conjoining These images that thought gives to itself of what it is to think same object. formally beyond the imprison thought, with ramifications that spread development The of the concept of a rhizomatic thought that philosophical stage. from in this research. thought stems is opposition to an arborescent

V. ii.

idealism or immanence

discusses he follows Laruelle the It seems that Franýois up on this thematic when 1)ýThis Decision. the made presuppositions concerns idea of a philosophical is Laruelle there that a argues character. own its philosophy concerning difference. He that that notes Decision of an autonomy expresses philosophical demonstrated decision the in are philosophical a of consequences some is strut), gic to anti-humanist an the -\vage necessity contemporary situation whereby human the of essence positive and specific a to recogruse conflated with a refusal

(1986: 10). displaced is the the thought of and I ffcrence contraries 1) of With the opposition 11, 168

A XOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

from difference linking Being the aporia, an aporia sterni-ning ontico -ontological to being, is positivised. The aporetic nature of this thought is revealed in a series 'One-NIultiple'. Difference is explicitly constructed in the of conjunctions such as opposition to presence and identity (though Laruelle remarks that such presence fffl difference the and identity essenceof with a punfied presenceand identity). In Deleuze's case the modusoperandiof this theory of mLixturesis to create a zone Couplings hierarchies of combat. and are affirmed over and above the terms in Differences forces. The combat. are understood as relations of immanence from This idealism Laruelle. the to celebrated is an idealist one, according stems Diverse of distances of forces and perspectives. Scission while reconciled is not longer designates The prion' the a spaceof the possible. concept of a no sublated. Instead, the apn*On'consistsof relations or non-relations as Indivisibles. The difficulties associated with the concept of the differential or problematic According Laruelle, thcN-are not unrelated to allegationsof a to themselves. reveal Idealism Deleuze's to thought. sen-c materialism and in pervasive idealism The idealism indicate the prioritisation of a supplement of either idea of matter. from be the Deleuze-s and to continuous then emerge thought seen could of . . differential the on apn S. synthetic nature of Me Problem Spznoýq Philosoply Nielýýwl)e qj'E%Pression and and Indeed, throughout and this thematic is ftequently invoked. Portrayed as the struggle of active and

differential forces, and themselves, activm, (passive) multiple and reactive life. (I'his dimension constituting an ethical becon-ung-activeare valorised as the form ) In Machiavellian of place sounds. initially it as is not so straight-forwardly force. Laruelle has this of the concept core that at being-able-to (ýowwh--M-e) is a this philosophising. of mode Undecidability in inherent contests the Contradiction derivative. the thell but is as seen Identity is not cxpurgated depths. Laruelle's In base from the Difference ved vie,, insidious underbcHy ()f 'hoN,, to questl()n greco-()ccidental the age-old of repetition vie-w, this is another 169

A \ONIADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

think duality-as-unity?' - that is, the unit\- of passage from one contran- to another. In the case of Deleuze (and Nietzsche), the pathos of distance traverses the analytic of the Will to Power. The reciprocal symmetry comprising the ic of this philosophy unstable equilibrium of passageis a continuous one. The lo 91 Difference of is to simultaneously purport to think the real as all (absolute) and Other. disjunction The difference conversely as of is seenas a mode of indivision: Difference Repetition unitý, in and is thus understood as the dorencesof ýi#ýI-ences differences. Being is definitively affected by the being through their communicating that it conditions (1986: 31). Laruelle calls this indivisible

disjunction inclusive or

that is a unifying

of

kind One the opposites a of neo-Platonism, whereby is a unifying unity in a transcendental rather than empirico-ideal sense. Difference is immediately as One. The One is not transcendent there is no exterior unity governing contraries , division One distribution, the the instead is of reign of and not a transcendent his Although Deleuze conception of univocity model of causality. would not call Neo-Platonism, a

Laruelle is correct in his assessment of the distributive rather

than collective power of Deleuze's 'One-All'.

A double turning away or double articulation can be understood as follows: Difference is interpreted as a function of disparity and multiphcltý- and as a ing Beiing i, 1 function of unity. We saw in chapter 3 how Badiou argued that 1)ý-gn I door, back thus the the and virtual in smuggled transcendence was two names I this the addressed actual. vis-A-vis superiority adopted the position of unilateral Laruelle, Spinoza's the býcause. immanent of conception explicating criticism legitimacýdraws Difference He different its however, makes a argues that point. distinction from itself. Difference, even if absolute and self-determMimig,retains a "the Lanielle This detern-uned. calls indicates what determining chiasm and of A 59). (1986: Difference" reciprocity ind continuous of absolute-idealist usage being. Being There here. and ()f co-determination a is governs t-c\-crsibiht-ýfcaturcs the this rc,, articulation ()f tl characterising the What then are some of 17()

A NONLXDIC I-MAGE OF TI IOUGHT

from other forms of orderingý Difference, as a philosophical decision, is not but transcendental. It is neither category nor Ideal. Laruelle diagnoses secondary the ontological proposition relating to Difference as follows, "Difference is Scission-immediatelý--as-L-nin-, Becoming-as-Being [ ]" (39)a ... Difference operates a genesisof empirical reality but it also attempts to re-unite the concepts of Being and One. Deleuze's non (?) being or the 'problematic' operates as a concrete principle, or even apn'on'emotion ()r sensibility, positivising nothingness, making it different and multiple thus allegedly (and only allegedly), says Laruelle, re-invigorating and re-vitalising philosophical thinking. This selfproclaimed jolt of Frankensteituan electricity aruimateswhat would be a dead world of structuralism or Hegehanism. Deleuze wanted to grasp the conditions of reality (of real experimentation) since he believed that Kant's approach was too broad, inad%-crtentlNniffiroring and from the empirical. In turn, Laruelle levels this critique at Dcleuze, generalising the apn'on elements are too abstract for Laruelle, since thcý-are too close to that from which theý, seek to escapeand risk falling into the facticity of the givcti"But the risk hes in confusing \vhat we must seek, their [that is, idealism and differential pn*on* and material materialism] esseil,, elements, with the rclative ý,as a hence J-aruelle, 1981: §27: this 1 ideal of structural version essence" necessarily and 105). Ideality is re-introduced into the concept if the differential elements are determining. they to reciprocally if are relative one another, or alternatively forces, key Deleuze's \rc to ideal the and continuous, so enterprise, of relations , hidden Is Real Awithat the idealism? is called in which simply indicative ()f a Oedipus another appellation for Being, giving (as Badiou fears) a primacy of differential 4 D()cs the the the character verý- relativity of ideality over the rcaP froin lead difference their terms their to independence and or entities relations of a complex intertwining of- idealism and materialism, ot continuity and cut, in the Laruelle's by to conclusion is stark and clear. sustain itself? attempt cach W

1-1

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGH-r

"By elevating it [Difference] in a circular fashion to the level where it becomes ('will to power'), the systemsof the self-producing, that is, to the state of tvllsa sili Difference make ideaht\- self-confirming and render any genesis of ideality or its forms impossible. From this point of view Nietzsche, Heidegger and all the founding Difference remain incapable of a genuinely immanent systems of longer becomingbecoming-'material' that thought is no materialism,, a of a beyond difference as a multiplicity continuity itself" continuous, or of realising (1981 §27,105)

Laruelle believes it is a transcendental illusion to claim that Difference determines the real. His own work attempts to display the presuppositions of philosophical thinking and to articulate the principles of non-philosophy, a philosophy of brooks One the the that is radical immanence in which condition of real critique, This One transcendence. is the transcendental unreflective experience or no donation (oo It immediate and non-thetic itself. is singular, autonomous and as does before The One Difference that is not recognise, such any universal. which (1986: 33). Laruelle it simultaneously requiring sees the inflexion of while Deleuze's fold, as is found in the concept of the 'difference of difference' (or Repefifion His transcendence. intensity) in Difference own work and as an instance of kind 'meta the presuppositions philosophy is a of and questioning of -philosophy, 'what is philosophy?, while staving off the trap of the philosophical asking decision.

I agreewith Laruelle that one can argue that a philosophical decision in favour of difference has been made in the case of Deleuze. However, Deleuze is himself function. He to the that in philosophy rests upon order presuppositions aware of beginning "there that true in philosophy, or rather that the true is no says beginning in philosophy, Difference, is in-itself already Repetition" (1968a: 129). 1 detail. difference he develops that in more want to explore this concept of Indeed, I suggestthat Deleuze's philosophy (like that of Spinoza) neither adheres to a supplement of the idea or of matter. Deleuze's primarý- concern is with the for delimits that the thought potentials imposition of a particular model of 172

A NML-ýDIC

1-NLAGEOF THOUGHT

begins Deleuze's LarueUe, Unlike thinking in advance. philosophy alxvays in the is Repetition. Difference hiteiwcýý-O: that alreadN nu*ddle, 11\.-,, A lengthy quote from Brassier synopsisesLaruelle's position. "For Laruelle, the fact that the univocity of Deleuzean immanence can be purchased only at the price of an irrecuperable excess of transcendenceis neither an accidental nor an feature Deleuze's thought; inconsistent aspect of of - it is a structurally necessary all philosophical attempts to conceptualise immanence; one, moreover, that feature That per the philosophical gesture of ultimately constitutes an invariant se. Deleuze is obliged to think immanence transcendentlv, or to think multiplicity under the auspices of an uncircumventable unity, is not a question of philosophical inconsistency, Laruelle argues; on the contrary, it merely indicates the rigorous consistency of Deleuzean thought insofar as its internal coherence is logic Decision" the the regulated in accordance with philosophical pernicious of (2000: 207, n. 16). It is through the attempt to conceptuahse immanence philosophically that logic becomes philosophical circular, presupposing that which it seeksto explain. While acknowledging this important criticism, Laruelle's critique operates at a formal axiomatic level whereas Deleuze's praclicalphilosophy is both critical and development To to the creative; integral of an immanent ethics. create a philosophical approach one must invent a problematic that informs the concepts that one develops. In this chapter, I will focus on the problematic of a 'thought without image'.

V.iii.

the art of creating concepts

By the time of writing 11"hati's Philosopýy?Deleuze seems more concerned with l beginning be in the necessity to 91 and to create concepts than with constructing a 1 Guattan both He that eliminates and objective and subjective presuppositions. be be "Planes must say, constructed and problems posed, Just as concepts must do have do but Philosophers best to too to the they they much can, created. kno,\x-\N-hetherit is the best, or even to bother with this question. Of course nc\x173

A NONLADIC 1,\LNGE OFTHOUGHT

history, to and above all, to our our concepts must relate to our problems, becomings" (1991a: 27). The 'image of thought' chapter remains important becauseit emphasisesthe \-aluesunderlying the image that thought gives itself of his Deleuze to think. in may not succeed eliminating own what it is he tries to invent a neighbourhood of concepts that might presuppositions when be called a 'thought without image', but this is not his primary goal.

The passageswe will read, and the quotations cited, show us that at an earlý-stage Deleuze, inspired by Nietzsche, is fired by the prospect of creating concepts, becomings. for His tone is that time Might prove useful our and our concepts because tempered by the time of writing What I'sPhilosophy?, rattler than perhaps down he Guattari business 'doing to the trN,to just getting pHosophy', and of have been doing lives? '. 'what is it we articulate all our This contemplation does not negate their previous endeavours to 'do philosophy', becausewhat they had been doing all along was nothing other than this "art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts" (1991a: 2). They say that philosophy from distinguished is (6). It is not reflection, communication or contemplation the other (equally valid) ways of thinking: art which thinks through affects and functions. Philosophy thinks through is not just a percepts, and science which has been frivolous However, it profoundly meaningless,indulgent and endeavour. has Critique "by the that replaced general movement with sales affected "This (10) that the is our concern, promotion" marketers and advertisers say, and " These (10). ideas the the inane rivals give creative ones, we are men! we are fit Guattarl, Deleuze to of the giggles which wipes philosophy, according and a They (philosophical) that the tears. say concept posits itself as it is away its friends Philosophers of the concept. created. are Reading Dý#ýrentvand Repefifionin light of IVY)a/IS Pbilosopbj?enables us to dogmatic he 'image Deleuze of thought'. calls a criticises what understand why This image of thought stifles the creation of concepts. However, the philosophers that he initially accusesof inventing 'a philosophy of representation' are portrayed 1-14

A NOMADIC

RNL-ýGEOF THOUGHT

longer latter It text. is subsequently no a matter of as conceptual personae in the deciding which one invented the best concepts - Hegel and Descartes have totally different ideas of what it is to begin - but of seeing how their concepts resonate depending If they the transmute on problems are a part of with one another, and be 'better' than a previous a concept makes us aware of new variations it may be Concepts light one. can always reactivated in of new problems.

V.iv.

restoring the rights of immanence

But deterritorialization is absolute when the earth passes away into the pure immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic [ ] does Deterritorialization movements. ... of such a plane not preclude but reterritorialization posits it as the creation of a future new earth. [ ...] There is always a way in which absolute deterritorialization takes over from a relative deterritorialization in a given field. Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattarl, If"hat is Pbilosoply?(1991a: 88).

back As Wl'hat1SPhilosqpýy? has his Deleuze that turned continues, we perceive not The difficult most on immanence.

problem

how remains -

to expel

transcendence?The plane of immanence is the non-thought within thought. They "Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think surmise THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, [ ]this that to think the thought it in outside and inside of which and way as ... be be thought thought the possibility of the impossible" cannot and yet must (59-60).

23. sch.) of the Ethit's, Spinoza wrote that we feel and experience In Book V (ýpr. kind This (sentimits third that we are eternal of expefimitrquenos aeternosesse). knowledge has often been presented as the thought of the pure cool geometrician It God the thought is as impassively comprehends and world. nature of whose though Spinoza sits on a pinnacle and gazes upon the world. Such a reading This 'forgets' the crucial words '-\x-efiel and e.%pelieli, that -e we are eternal'. 'knowledge' is not an abstract theoretical knowledge, but a real experience of a from the point through things as necessatýprescnt eternity, which Nveunderstand 175

A NOMADIC

INIAGE OF THOUGHT

beatitude It irreducible to a statc of view of eternity. is a concrete experience of Deleuze calls the event, and of spatio-temporal actuahný,resembling rather what I Ruyer names sunvl (an absolute and immanent survev without beginning or end). This is why it differs from the other affects for Spinoza. Guattari's Deleuze that propose and concept of the plane of immanence as deterritorialisation draws beatitudo. Spinoza's It to is the close concept of absolute liberation being from baggage thought the revolutionary of of inadequate and from The ((-onseius) ignorance. ideas, superstition and accompanying consciousness this experience is not a personalconsciousness,but is an understanding of oneself found (pars Eternity is on earth and not in the skies. as a part of nature naturae). We cannot understand without loving. The Joy felt when one operates at one's love. love God Spinoza's threshold transforms maximum into is a intellectual of love without object and without subject. "This is why it constitutes the perfect form of human liberty and happiness" (Macherey, 1994: 152). This joy has because do desire, it nothing to With satisfying a personal and egoistic "tendencially enlarges the perspective of the mind to the whole of nature" (154). In fact, Macherey claims that this love of God (amor Dei) confers upon us the feehng of an impersonal dimension existing within us. We do not cease to love, but love with a greater intensity because we are bound (169). 1 to other the am reconciled with nature of which we are a part humans through a network of concrete determinations that expressesthe infinite but hermit, love God. God Love the the affirms on is not power of of solitary of the contrary a solidarity with other humans. For Nfacherey, this constitutes the from love dimension love God, that comes a a political of the intellectual of tendencially collectivc practice (172). The agonistic relations that accompany the dissipate Even the tendency this. to the imagination relative machinations of from things a toward umN-ersahsationof the common notions which explain (tqnitio knowledge is Here, tl-ýings this a of singular gcneral point of N-icwvanish. death. fear lose We (q#itere). through ,N-hichNveare moved of our rel-11PI i-1*11ýglllantpi) 176

A NONL-ýDIC IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

An ethics of hberation has thus truly commenced. SIpinoza speaks of this programme of action in clinical and diagnostic terms, how explicating we need to perfect the corporeal and mental aptitudes of the liberates Freedom to the maximum the power of being of a tl-iing individual. (186). Virtue (iirtus) is no abstract or theoretical quality, the mark of an ascetic;it flourishing longer (a to corresponds a expansive movement eudaimonia,no theoretical, and without telos).It is with respect to De PotentiaIntellettils,seu de LibettateHumana,the last part of the Etbics,that Deleuze and Guattari say Spinoza knew that immanence was only immanent to itself They add that he "produced kind the to thought the third infinite and gave infinite speeds movements of in of knowledge. There he attains incredible speeds,with such lightening compressions that one can only speak of music, of tornadoes, of wind and strings" (1991a: 48). In his seminars, Deleuze asks us to imagine Spinoza stroffing around, hving line This kind (24/3/78). existence as a continuous melodic of of variation hovers deterritorialisation. It the threshold existence about awaits of an absolute distinction The takes its creation which always made place in a relative milieu. between perceiving things from a global perspective (Natura Naturans)and from a Naturata) here (Natura 3 in order to partial perspective in chapter is useful features distinction to this pertaining elucidate some of absolute and relative deterritorialisation, a theme I will return to at the close of this chapter.

V.v.

the possible of the possible: a revolutionary

becoming

Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the fascist return of a war-machine in general, why not think that a new type of kinds becoming is in that the of mutating, all course of possible, and revolution living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of World the the the and of organization undermines plane of consistency which States. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialovites.(1977: 147) [trans. modified].

Exhausted' 'The has Ctitkal Clill/Cal, Deleuze In 11ý', on a piece called wid fs(-as 177

IMAGE N 0, ', \L-ýDIC -ý

OF THOUGHT

Samuel Beckett (1993: 152--4). Written after the coRapseof the Berlin Wall, this discussed the theme theme throughout the the possible, a of essay returns to Dý#ýreiit-e Repefifim. Bergson Franýois texts in other such as and aiid works on Zourabichvih (1998) has written a very thoughtful commentary on this text. It is Finvoluntarisme le (de 'Deleuze en pohtique),. et possible called Zourabichvih reflects upon the proliferation of discourses proclairming the death free-market fall the the the the the reign of possible and in of aftermath of of the Berlin Wall. Thereafter, Fukuyama declared the End of History - in other words, the end of major ideological conflicts - and a number of thinkers proclaimed that democratic free-market 'liberal(A to capitalism' no alternatives could exist. wealth of single issue movements today sound together to voice a challenge to before, like Sounding Hegel ) these thinkers were many years such presumptions. horizons beyond to their see own so convinced were they that their place unable free-market, liberal democratic (of Idea the capitalism) come to and era embodied fruition. Similar to evolutionary theorists of the past, they believed that this declarations be future for Such the present would all societies. claustrophobic being Dialques, Deleuze 'the In to things possibility of otherwise'. sought paralyse had sighed, echoing 1'Cierkegaard'the possible, the possible, or I will suffocate'. Here he says "There is no longer any possible: a relentless (acharne)Spinozism" (1993a: 152). In light of the above discourses and Deleuze's own affection for SpMoza, Zourabichvih finds in this assertion a hint of sarcasm(1998: 336). Whilst Deleuze distinguishes between the exhausted and the tired, he is also "For Deleuze, think the that that is. it possible is not at all saying exhausting you discourses two apparently opposed coexist: to exhaust the possible/to create the have Bergson, Deleuze (337). Like to create the that contends you possible" have have do it until you not possible; it is not given to you in advance and you His found Spinoza. This ethics of in idea of creating the possible is also created it. liberation rests upon creating relations and compositions that do not pre-exist Guattari Philosoph, 11"hat Deleuze In reiterate the and their creation. 1S ),? addition, in limxby dimension the plane ()f showing of their philosophy constructivist 1-8

A NOMADIC

LIMAGE OFTHOUGHT

having Rather be than a rigid, segmented 'molar' immanence must constructed. laid in out in advance, they encourage mode of existence which possibilities are for that to seeks explore one's an ethics of experimentation capacities exist-Ingand thinking.

In this vein of thought, Zourabichvih adds that a revolution is not the reali.falionof but le b This (338). ig the the possi' openi*nýg oj' openin a possible

of the possible is

by Guattarl: "But Deleuze the event itself is uncoupled or in elaborated upon and bifurcation, deviation laws, to the rupture with causalities:it is a a with respect an field for (1984: 75). While Lacan that the opens of possibles" a new unstable state for Guattari "within Deleuze the the real everything is real is impossible, and possible, everything becomes possible" (1972a: 27). They say, "[t]here is only one kind of production, the production of the real" (32). How do these assertions sit Bergsonian illusion the the critique of retrospective of the possible, and with Deleuze's own distinctions between the virtual and the actual (which do not resemble one another) and the possible and the real (where the possible resembles the real)? Asking what this new field of possibles might be, Zourabichvili wonders if it is hoped for be that in a perhaps simply all can conceived, imagined, projected and demonstrates When Deleuze He this time. that the is not given soon case. described a mutation from a 'society of discipline' to a 'society of control' this but field Zourabichvih, the to of possibles an opening of a was not, according "series field domination. A of instigation of a new regime of of possibles is not a dynamic [ ] It the emergenceof the real and imaginary alternatives ... now concerns There (339). bergsonian Deleuze's It thought" is inspiration of political new. is the 96-7), 1966a: between (Deleuze, difference that and a is realised a possible a helps This that to show us why the axiomatics of is tTeated. insight possible deterritorialisation that remain a mode of capitalism constitute a relative domination. Uthough it tolerates (and encourages)the creation of new degreesof liberty, this is within strict limits. The emergence of a force that threatened its human Guattari be Deleuze that riglits tolerated. profess and axioms Nvouldnot 1-9

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

democracy "[-\x-lhat has bless iven them social the capitalism; not 91 will not make fire (1991a: 107). their territory to the of poor out or ghettoý" order come when The exercise of force and erection of barbed wire barriers to surround delegates O. W. T. the recent conferences are an example of the response to irrecuperable at differences and singularities. The fact that these singular movements act in definable representational umbrella that might commonality, whilst eluding a T'he them, them transversal relations that makes encompass unknown quantities. both them embrace commonality and singularity. unify The distinction between a realised possible and a created possible informs this Spinoza different just living, to chapter. as sought open up possibilities of Deleuze mobilises this concept of the possible to try to create spaceswhereby the future can act upon the present. As Zourabichvili remarks, the inventions of new life being This kind possibilities of is concern new ways of affected. a of patl)osin differential linked (puissance) the to possible is power and power concerns a which distribution of affects. A political event is a new distribution of affects, "a new circumscription of the 1968 May It moment intoleration. I.ntolerable". expressed a of was a collectivc form "the I the that took possible or will suffocate" as though phenomenon bear longer for (Deleuze its existenceany change" society could not and cried out Guattari, But 1984: 76). and what precipitates this moment? In chapter 3,1 explained why Spinoza denies a role to the realisablepossible. Rather than participating in the immanent movement of reality, this possible adds however, does This dimension that to reality. not mean, a supplementary Spinoza's system is arid and rigid. In fact, it concentrates upon the ways of liberation. It different is this through an ethics of modes of existence opening up Elthl*Cs. It drives being the otherwise that understanding of the possibihtý-of things does not rest upon a comparative model that measures different modes of Instead, it is necessaryto experiment, existence against one another abstractly. forms of association that cultivate the potentials of indn-iduals. and construct 180

A NO-MADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

This process is one of becoming-active.

By grasping the potentialitiesof an actual situation, we do not dra,\N-up a plan: dimension "In the is of a situation perceived. rather, concrete modes unactualised like the to possibilities offered of existence, we perceive us, so manv affectivc life these possibilities: possibilities of are the ways in which potentialities are distributed and condensed, in a given time and social field [ ] When, \,,-e grasp a ... situation as a pure possible, or in its potentiality, we evaluate these possibilities of life [ ]" (Zourabichvili, 1998: 343). This pure spaceof the possible was discussed ... in connection with Simondon's conception of the pre-individual. This possible is the virtual. It is not given in advance.Both Bergson and Spinoza critique the idea be Both that realised. can are interested in the conditions of real of a possible follow It I this to insight want experimentation. is up on through this chapter. The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations body, the time, sexuality, milieu, culture, work ) When a social mutation with ... appears, it is not enough to draw out its consequences and effects, following lines of economic and political causality. The society must be capable of forming collective assemblagesthat correspond to the new subjectivity, in such it is 'reconversion' That true that the a way wants mutation. a Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattarl, 'Mal 68 n'a pas eu heu'. Les Nouvelles, (3-9 mal 1984: 76).

In a section headed 'C&,hýs,orpolilit'sas onlypossiN e', Zourabichvih argues that part live, "Everything be be done to even we see,say, must I with chch6s. of this pro'ect feel, is always already recognised, carrying M advance the mark of imagine and It form 'd6JA-entendu"' (351). 'd6jA-vu' the is as though nothing recognition, of or like happens. The the chch6, is new, everyd-ling stays the same, nothing ever Kant Zourabichvih to take issue with this to returns possible, is pre-existent. He the claims that the transcendentalis pre-formed since possible. conception of BNtracing it maps out the conditions of possible experience, not realexperience. from field from the the the transcendental of the empirical, noveltý- is eN-acuated field of thought. A real experience is an encounter that forces us to think that be thought. which cannot 181

A NOMADIC

V.vi.

BIAGE'OFTHOUGHT

doxology and the State

In our thought the essential feature is fitting new material into old schemas ] making equal what is new. ... Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe If-illlo Pomer.(1901: ýý499,2773).

The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and directed knowledge but simplification not at at taking possession of things [ ...] Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e Villto Power.(1901: 'ýý503,274).

At the heart of Deleuze's critique of the image of thought hes a concept of the disparate. Deleuze's conception of a philosophy of immanence centres upon the developing By to than immanence qf immanence rather an immanence something. differences Deleuze the a philosophical account of univocity as oj'differences, hold both to out seeks an allegiance to a philosophy of immanence and a conception of a system that persists in a state of tension, a tension that is not force finds by force Badiou While of a impelled any exterior to the system. transformation and rupture in the stellarvoid,Deleuze's alterity is embeddedwithin the system. For this reason Laruelle is correct when he observes that this Laruelle both 'all' 'other'. However, the accuses real is as and conception of Deleuze of being a philosophical idealist because of his development of a I SiMondon, force. Spinoza Reading Deleuze challenge and philosophy of with dualism. how this these thinkers sidestep this assessment,showing Rather than figuring out if an idea is Just or correct Vilste),Deleuze and Parnet sa\between for different look the tx() idea so that something passes a we should (1977: 10). This is the encounter of thinking that takes one by surprise, opening how dictating has Philosophy one its own apparatuses of power, new worlds. be have has to able to to read in order thinks, what one can think, and whom one "The for (13). has The State-form thought cxercisc of think. provided a model dominant State, to the meanings thought thus conforms to the goals of the real 18"

A NO'\L-kDIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

(13). This the contention informs estabhshedorder" and to the requirements of developed Dý#ýrol,, Repefilim. 'iMage thought' the conception of the in e aiid of

Deleuze and Guattari sayif thought is not taken seriously and it is laughed at, this less "Because the that people take thought serioush-, the more is required. is all they think in conformity with what the State wants" (1980: 376). The destruction forces thought the and of thinking is the of a model of unleashing of other Repetition. Difference The Deleuze enterprise undertakes in and classical image of thought effects a striation of the mental space and it "aspires to universality" (379). A nomad thought challengesthis image and refuses to be bound by it. Opinions or doxashapewhat thinking is supposed to be. Differences are captured 3,1 In through and contained strategies of mediation. chapter outlined the his The being. In the primary points concerning admiring reviews of unlVocity of Lqgk of Sense Dýfferente Repefilion, "[t]he Foucault that surmises and and univocitý- of being, its singlenessof expression, is paradoxically the principle condition -\'A-1ich frees ftom difference dorrunation the to the it permits escape of identity, which law of the Same as a simple opposition within conceptual elements" (1970: 192). Difference is not organised and divided through the categories. As we learned in the last chapter, from his 1956 essayon Bergson Deleuze tried He difference-in-itself. develop to communicate the pressing need to a concept of between by distinguishing for Repetition Diffireme this in and clarifies the impetus Arguing difference. difference that to think that allows and a concept us empirical difference is always subordinated to identity, analogy, opposition or resemblance, he concludes that these are features of a representationalist philosophy. For be difference Aristotelian the the of through principle thought can only example, because difference Deleuze it is is pure says that specific excluded middle term. formal; intrinsic becauseit operates in the essence;and qualitative to the c-xtent that the genus designates essence.Difference is thus synthetic; a specification formal It cause. added to a genus, chviding the genus and producing species. is a lacking hierarchical, distributive being Aristotle's Since aný and is concept of 18")

No, M-\DIC -ý ý

E\L-ýGE OFTHOUGHT

being. from Spinoza's conception of univocal content, it chffers greatly The classification and division of difference is not just a matter for archlike The differences Linnaeus. taxonomists ordering and subordination of to The is, undeniably, an everyday occurrence. question of what general concepts difference fashion to that is replied in often a comparative or negative makes a 'difference A the thing. previous indicates state or another natural order -from' a differences. Spinoza to appears operate as we collate and categorise writes rather from distinctivc the that trait, creating a people extrapolate a way vitriolically of he Indeed morass of superstition and ignorance. eyesthe usageof the generalising fiction concept With some suspicion, understanding its utility as an abstract and focal point for common imaginings, but wary of the insidious prejudices which divide destroy and communities. can When Spinoza discussed the mechanisms of the imagination, he described the fit things into categories according to principles of recognition ways in which we by depends bodies This are affected on the ways in which our and association. dispositions formed bodies, the the of our reflect images nature and and other bodies. Though bodies than the rather we may collectively nature of other own for the sake of convemience,often the cluster images into similar categories Spinoza depend different on our own experiences. images evoked are very and differentially to think rather than through empty tries to encourage a capacity generahsing,and stereotypesand prejudices. hilarious Michel Foucault famously began The Order oj'Tbznýgs with a poetic and describes Borges Via7'olies (1944). from Borges's the categorisation of quote follows In Chinese that animals encyclopaedia. the passage animals in a certain belongilig from "a) to divided that tumble another one over into categories are brush" fine drawn "k) camelhair with a vety the Emperor" to "b) embalmed" to disturbing The 1966: (Foucault, broken xv). the water pitcher" to "m) having just dissolution the of a common ground whei-C oddness of the juxtapositions reveals No fantastical these is taming animals of meet. might and real creatures all these PS4

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

distinction "threaten bemeen collapse pernutted as they our with age-old the Sameand the Other" (xv). The wildness of their being overspills any classification Borges "does a,,vay with thesile, the within a common ground or excluded middle. for be (xvii). For to mute ground upon which it is possible entities juxtaposed" Foucault these unravelled sites are called beterotopi'as "since they make it impossible to name this and that

(xviii). Through what image of thought are

things ordered?

V.vii. the State versus the nomad: counterposing

multiplicities

On a superficial level at least, the distinction between the image of thought laid Different-e Repetition in out and and the idea of a new image of thought or a thought distinction to the without image, runs parallel of the two multiplicities, metrical Tbousand Plateaus Reading A Dorent'e Repetition the recurrence and virtual. with and Throughout Dorent-e and Repetition,Deleuze opposes a this theme of is striking. nomosof crowned anarchy to a representational identitarian image of thought. Similarly, in a more politicised environment, this duality occurs in 1227: TI)e TreatiseonNomadolqV The WlarMacbine. Spinoza's immanent philosophy countered the hierarchical Power of the State divides The State polis the the power of tiomos. or up space, it segments, with for things this reason it is called an apparatus classifiesand groups people and and distributes distributive the people in an power since it nomosis a of capture, while ])ýbeen has leap This They a adopted strategy can open space. up anywhere. decentralised protest movements who use the element of number of intensively The resonance of a number of singular surprise when mobilising resistance. difficult both finds to polis groups creates an acephalous movement; one the control and intensely threatening. (metrical TWO tVJ-)CS and virtual) the t-\N-o multiplicities of space isomorphic -with These discussed the the and the tionios space of this smooth plateau. are in are Guattan Deleuze III State. In Proposition and of the plateau, striated spaceof the hylomorpliic between distinguish a royal science, that \x-()rksthrough a seek to 18---)

-\

\O-MADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

"u-nplying both a form that organises matter model for the and matter prepared form (1980: 369), from a nomad science.A royal sciencecopics government divide to seeking and organise its populace or matter. It homogenises matter in Converselv, to treat order it. a nomad science is laden vvith singularities ind presupposesanother organisation of the social field. These models of science are named in the fashion of Plato's Titv(ielts.The first is called a Comparslland the second is called a Dispars.The first involves extracting constants in order to form laws. The second places variables in continuous variation. Unlike the earlier matter-form distinction this is a matter-force distinction. "They seize or determine singularities in the matter instead of form" (369). Such is the opposition of Igos and iiomos.The constituting a general distinction relates to the treatment of the play of forces. In the first case, there is a treatment of forces or potenliaeso that the space is homogenised striated, ordered, and made comparable. This kind of multiplicity is called metric, or arborescent, since it imposes its laws and dimensions indifferently regarcUessof the situation. The nomosor the dispars does not succumb to a Euclidean space; it is a hodological or haptic space. "A field, a heterogeneous smooth space,is wedded to a ven- particular type of multiphcm,: nonmetric, acentered, rhizomatic multiphc1ties that occupy space without 44counting"it [ ]" (371). This is a search for the singularities of a matter. It is ... concerned with the pre-individual or the event of non-personal individuations. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that these spaces or multiplicities operate as do (metrically) in Bergson, intelligence and intuition since intelligence employs a by formally "solve the problems posed intuition spatiahsedmethod to

(37/4).

11()'\vcver,flicy also ask whether thought can be extricated from the State niodcl. Rather than being gathered into an interior form, can thought become a slingshot?

79See Deleuze (1968a: 161-2) for a discussion on the \\aý that Euclid kept geometrY in line it from becoming identit\, the a geometrNof sufficient reason. preventing principle of with 186

A NO. \L-ýDIC INL-ýGE OF THOUGHT

Does the immanent axiomatic of capitalism imply that the concept of the 'image State-form, beginning At thought', the it premised as is upon of the is obsoleteý discusses Dialoýgues, Deleuze the relationship of philosophy and Power. He of borrows "thought from that its properly the state as argues philosophical image beautiful, substantial or subjective interiority" (1977: 13). The goal of beconuing language State Pure of an official a means that philosophy adheres to the (This Nietzsche's ) There Kant. is order. established criticism of are mechanisms fulfilled to that of exclusion ensure certain criteria are conforming to the agreed how have has been ideas. An to the this procedures of correct example of imposition of an official languageof the State that operates on a 'higher register' than all the dialects and minor languagesscattered throughout a society. It is this from has for itself, which in turn prevents it image that philosophy set up functioning, that Deleuze takes issue with. For him, it is a question of breaking ftee from the repressiverole of philosophy in order to invent his own approach.

So what matters with the image of thought is not whether the comparison with the State-form is legitimate, or whether there is a new image of thought but the ways in which thinking is accompanying the axiomatics of capitalism, delimited and we are forced (or succumb) to thinking in accordance with a At deHmited? delineated, How stake is striated and is thought particular model. but know that rather a Ný, -ay of everything would not an omniscient subject Thinking differentially. differently in accordancewith or thinking about thought (without thought image). this other recognIsedprinciples precludes

V.viii. the idiot demands The image of thought imposes a model of thinking correctly that "When le islation. Kant's This stop v. -C 91 to of philosophy is reference obedience. to State, God, continue us persuades and appears reason the parents, our obeying (I)eleuze because docile the being orders" it says to us: it is y()u who are giving Trinity "the deranged madness, terrible Otherwise of 1962: 92). stupid: or are y()u stupidity and malevolence

(1968a: 149) - those obstacles wher than error I

's

-

A NONLNDIC 1-'\L-ýGE OF THOUGHT

than the dogmatic image must overcome. How can one then articulate a nondeny How thought? the patently obvious? "[H]ow is s-tupiditý conformist can one (not error) possibleý" (151). The new idiot, saý-Deleuze and Guattarl, is a longer the persona conceptual who, unlike old idiot, no strives for indubitable truths. It is a thought that thinks against reason. "The new idiot will never accept the truths of history" (1991a: 63). 1 am no longer myself I is an Other. This is thought as the dice-throw. But in reality, we encounter the tyranny of good-will, the obligation to think "in common" with others, the domination of the pedagogical model, and most importantly, the exclusion of stupidity - the disreputable morality of thought whose function in our society is easy to decipher. We must liberate ourselves from these constraints; and in perverting this morality, philosophy itself is disoriented. Nfichel Foucault, 'Theatrum Philosophicum'. (1970.18 1).

Deleuze begins his chapter 'The Image of Thought' with a question on beginning. He says"Where to begin in philosophy has always rightly been regarded as a delicate for beginning problem, very means eliminating all presuppositions" (1968a: 129). Although

philosophers may strive to

eliminate objective

presuppositions, a series of subjective implicit presuppositions shapes their philosophy. 110Deleuze gives the example of Descartes' second meditation: Descartes did not want to define man as a rational animal since this presupposed the concepts of rationality and animality (129). In this way he could avoid defining humans through genera and specific differences. However Descartes's thought is laden with other presuppositions, that derive from opinion - "it is by knows, that self, presumed independently of concepts, what is meant evetyonc thinking, and being" (129). What appears to be a true beginning rests on figure from Rather to the than trying out what empirical. presuppositions wrested different be, beginning Deleuze takes trajectory, and this is \ý-hat might a a true He most interests us. asks what a subjective or implicit presuppositioti is,

80See for discussion Descartes' 3) 2 Philosol)hY9, this It'lica is of and especially chapters also he his as correlatiNe subjective presuppositions challenge to objective presuppositions and being 1. hat knows thinking, and mean. that \\ e\ er\ one assurnes 188

NO-MADIC

OF THOUGHT Iý\I_-ýGE

form "Evcn-bodv knows the surreptitious concluding that it comes under of That hint of sarcasm Zourabichvili spoke of earlier disparaged the presumption that the possible can no longer be created. Bý-making thinking function under the knows 'obvious' "everybody be" (130) the to think rule of to it means what and thought is imprisoned in a conservative world where the status quo is affirmed differential thought is severed in advance.This is thought as a natural order, and And this the consequencesof as opinion. image of thought are pervasive and have "Many in knows ing 'this', that that political. people an interest saYi everybody deny They this, that that. triumph easilý-so everybody recogn1ses or nobody can long as no surly interlocutor appears to reply that he does not wish to be represented, and that he denies or does not recognise those who speak in his for (131). Spivak I 'orstelllltýg When Deleuze narne" criticised conflating and Darstellun she did not grasp the ed-tico-political undercurrent of Deleuze's forms hes critique of representation which precisely in critiquing all of mediation that deny or assimilate difference. Thought is paralysed if everything is set out in advance. Spinoza's quest for knowledge was kept a relative secretbecausehe knew he would not last long if he The by found have 'differently', thought most to questioning common sense. was Deleuze, form and this is general of representation is common sense, argues A (131). "upright morality underlies the nature and good will" understood as an Of for Thinking truth. course, is presented as a quest image of what it is to think. Spinoza searched for true knowledge, but for him there was no model of what it liberation Etbics The of the activities of constituted a process of is to think. thinking and em-sting. Beyourselves- it being understood that this self must be that of others. As if we do themselves, long the problems control not as we would not remain slavesso in to do long to the and problems, a participation not possessa right so as we managementof the problems. 968a: 158). Repelition. (I Gilles Deleuze, Dýl -ence and

189

A,
I. \L-ýGE OF THOUGHT

If 'e%-erybodyknows...' and 'no-one can dený----'are utilised as weapons against happens does know to that thinking, person who what not critical or recognise the universality of the premises of what it is to think and to be? This is whNsubjective presuppositions are such an insidious method of oppression: by free that thought is a of objective presuppositions, it appears contending transparent, obvious and universal. This is how philosophy can claim to begin 'e-, knows'ý What thinks than if one other what -erybody without presuppositions. You used to be burned to death for it, now you can be detained or imprisoned, dismissed as insane or an agitator. By implicitly knowing what it means to think, label them stupid, cN-ilor mad. those thinking and one can mark out who are not knows, this indiN-idual If through ill will a person does not know what eN-erý-body "is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectiN-elybegins and (130). effectively repeats" A series of postulates, that is, implicit and pre-philosophical propositions, The from borrowed These thinking. common sense. are underscore philosophical has "thought that an affinity with the true; it image of common sense claims formally possessesthe true and materially wants the true" (131). In accordance Deleuze 'knows' think. to this calls this image of image everybody what it is with A (131). "dogmatic, philosophy without thought a orthodox or moral image" presuppositions would embark on a radical critique of this image of thought and from liberated begin Thought to think if the postulates it relies upon. could only It Truth is not just a case of is produced. this image and its postulates. designation. Thought has been conflated with recogn1tion. Indeed people seldom (echoing Thought forced the is a shock to through a shock. think, except when disjunction of the faculties that occurs in the K'antian sublime"). bý Uthough Kant nught have overturned the prevaihng image of thought did he for illusion did, he that ultimately error, of the of concept as substituting, forth. faith kno,, so and morahtv, vledge, the of presuppositions not renounce

81 This is discussed in Cinenta ?- The Fitne-Image. See also Deleuze"s discussion of the dissolution of the faculties (I 968a: 143) and his book on Kant.

190

A\O'\L-ýDIC

1--\L-ýGEOF THOUGHT

Deleuze concludes consequently that "Critique has even-thing -a tribunal of justices of the peace, a registration room, a register - except the poN,, -cr of a new (137). 112 the thought" overturn image politics which would of

Deleuze's battle is with an image of thought that remains upright as it follows a He "[s]uch hindrance to model of recognition. complains, an orientation is a The levels three philosophy. supposed -a

naturally upright thought, an in

principle natural common sense,and a transcendentalmodel of recognition - can figure This (134). Ur-do. the the ideal is orthodoxy" of %-a. constitute only an Thought for Deleuze is not about recognition, or rediscovering that which N,, -as latent. The image of that thought gives itself of what it is to think has been facts, from Kant's banal Even Recognition. the most of empirical extrapolated he disguise (135). tried to philosophy rests upon a psychologism which The intimate link between recognition and establishedvalues was condemned bNNietzsche in 'Schopenhauer as Educator'. One of the primarýl problems with the Nietzsche it that remarks is chsturbingly complacent. image of thought is from being be "a Truth which no more modest may seemthen to vitriohcally that disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy be to creature which is continually assuring the powers-that-be that no one needs knowledge.... "pure for least it is, after all, onlýý in the concerned on its account; (Nietzsche quoted in Deleuze 1968a: 135). The image of thought affirms difference: is The it new called establishedvalues rather than creating new values. from a terrain(,qgnitasprings , In Nieljýs-ýJ)eeiiid Philosophj, Deleuze

form the that only states

of critique

is 'to

first him, han-imer'. Kant the to philosopher was, according phflosophise, %vith a engage in a total, positive been a more

conciliatory

and i-mmanent critique. or respectful

total

However

critique"

"[tihere

(1962:

to

has never

89). By only

82It is not Nvithin the scope of this thesis to assessthe extent to NNhichDeleuze's critique of Second Cartesian the both is especial1% philosoph". the model of recognition a criticism of faculties, the to the harmonious eNaluate or Kantian of Meditation, and the exercise legitlrnacý of such a critique. 191

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

knowledge knowledge to truth, the and challenging t-laims values of and truth function unimpaired. Believing in that which it is criticising, this critique isConsequently Deleuze (quoting Nietzsche) asks: "Is this critique as justification. the announcement of the great politics?" (90).

Rather than measuring, judging and equalising life, thought must become the life, life be force the power of an active just as affirmative would active of knowledge legislates, thought becomes subjected to it. Instead (101). If thought Deleuze, with Nietzsche and Spinoza, calls for a thought that goes to the limits of do. "Thinking it discovefiq, ihmifiq, then can mean nmpossibilifiesq1 what would hfý' (101). Summarising the dogmatic image of thought, Deleuze says:we are told the thinker wants and loves truth, and thought, as thought, formally possesscs truth; we are diverted from the truth because of passions like the body and sensuous interests; thinking truthfully is a method through which we ward off forces ftom Truth (103). that the real is presented in abstraction apart error by be But thought. thought is an actlNlt-\,,an activity that can controlled engender forces Hence, the establishedorder and current to that remain external it. reactive values reign with impunity. Truth, as we learned through Spinoza, must be evaluated in terms of a pluralist It 'what We must ask use is philosophyý'. may typology of modes of existence. does however dominant if it not challengeits own image mý-stifications, critique be? does task not act against its time, what can its critical of thought, and if it Nietzsche and Deleuze say that philosophy is the Untimely. I refer the reader to detail I Spinoza's earlier. thought, a concept explained in the notion of conatusin This concept demonstrates the way that thought is an activin-, and never simph, facultý-. Nietzsche's that thought is thought is a the exercise of a natural disparate. "Truth difference diapbora. It the and is a thought of unequalisable: depends on an encounter with something -\k-hichforces us to think, and to seek 16). (1964: the truth" "betomes Samc Difference is crucified on the altar of the once it (m oý)Ieclol 19-

A NOMADIC

alivajsin representation

INIAGE OF THOUGHT

relation to a twit,eired identity, a jud ed analo, all IMI(ollied ,g 'D

. (138) . . It perrei /Z oil or a Ped similitude" opposi is alxvays mediated through recognition, distribution

(rýpartifion), reproduction

philosophy of the pre-individual

and

resemblance

(138). SIMondon's

sought to challenge these presuppositions by

developing another kind of thought and another kind of ethics. The postulate of leads recognition us to the predominance of a representational image of thought. Once an empirical figure is elevated to the status of the transcendental this is "at the risk of alloNVing the real structures of the transcendental to fall into the empirical"

(154). Under

the essential forms of representation the image is

hierarchalised. The imperatives of this kind of image are: compare, calculate, identify.

V.ix. an encounter with Proust Deleuze's short monograph on Proustand Signsis ostensibly a commentary on A , la Re6ýherrhe du TempsPerdit.Yet lurking in the pagesof this book is the genesisof a C. S. Like Peirce, Proust proliferated a senuioticsof signs." thought. new image of I want to concentrate on one particular aspect of the sign that shines through this text; the sign as disparate. This is an idea we are now familiar with. lnvoluntarýbut for does Deleuze, It memory is, not represent anything an example of a sign. Bergson the called this present. is instead something which is and coexists with "Real Proust 'virtual', Deleuze to the without explain it, quotes memory and being present, ideal Without being abstract" (1964: 57). With involuntary memorý in (without the the representation) mediation of immediately place ourselves we Zourabichvili's (as Involuntary examples)is effectuated through memory in past. a shock or an encounter: that is, a sign. The unstable opposition and qualitative transition that occurs in an encounter is 11,11(. Proust's becoming-other. figure transversals in establis, consists the Nvork of a 1, from leap that one -world to another without gathering the multiple into a unified (11-2). fragyn-ients bv affirmino, at once the unity of the multiphcltN' In all its wliole,

8-'Deleuze discusses these in great detail in his t\\o cinerna books.

193

A NOMADIC

A

sign is

fragment a

1'\L-kGE OF THOUGHT

that

is

a power

of

nonconu-nUnication and

incommensurability. It is the forcc of the unequal. Noncommunication and incommensurability are distances,but they are distancesthat are affirmed. "Time is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces,including the space of time" (115). It circumvents the whole. This idea of transversality allows the affirmation of distance in heterogeneitV. Rather than effecting a unifying operation, viewpoints communicate but "remain noncommunicating according to their own dimension" (149). The bumblebee is a profane transversal creature that causes "partitioned sexes to communicatc" (149). Difference is no longer suppressedwith this idea of transversality, and the distance of unnatural couplings is affirmed. This understanding of the 'disparateness' and distance of differences allows difference to be grasped as difference.

V.x.

swimming

and thinking

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of but fundamental recognition of a encounter. Gilles Deleuze, Differenceand Repetition.(1968a: 139).

Often when a speaker poses a problem, she already has the answer. Similarly an desired (and to agreeable)response on the part of a objection raised seeks elicit because discussions Deleuze Indeed thinks that the thinker. k-here never go any-, different things trying to reconcile others to their talking about everyone is always "Questions discussions. he for It al-C this reason was acutely warý-of views. was If like invented, anything else. you aren't allowed to invent ý-ourquestions \\-itli '1)()sc' from from to them if people the mind where, never place, all over elements 1). Indeed 19, -,: Parnet, (Deleuze havcii't and strong much to say" VOU)VOU lie "Fxciýhis found or pl-fflosopher runs awaý-',\-Ilcn in assertion that advice is 18'). 199 1 Guattarl, " (I)eleuze discuss "Let's hears a: this" and someone say she The act of interrogation relies on both good sciise and commoii sciisc.

194

A \'O-NLýDIC

EýLkGE OF THOUGHT

Problems need to be invented-, they do not exist ready-made.A problem is not from traced Deleuze a proposition. In IFI)at 1'SPbilosophy, just -, and Guattari underline that propositions always refer to a state of affairs, i. e. they are "The reallN referential. 7 great problems are posed only once they are soIved" (1968a: 159). The disparity that the problematic encapsulatcs is an immanent disparity engendered by the tension of material conditions. Bergson's question how do was always we invent good problems and distinguish true problems from those that are peripheral and insignificant: for example, 'whNýis there something rather than nothingý184 While crediting Kant With inventing the problematic of the Idea, Deleuze maintains that the Kantian critique did not escapefrom the dogmatic image of thought (161). Ideas or problems are the differential elements in thought. The example Deleuze gives of this is swimming. Taking the Leibnlzlan description of the idea of the sea,Deleuze explains that it is "a systemof liaisons or differential between degrees to the relations particulars and singularities corresponding of \-anation among these relations

(165). To learn to swim MN-oh-csconjugating

"the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea learning field" This Deleuze form (165). that is why says in order to a problematic takesplace in and through the unconscious. Let us recall the example of swimming presented in chapter 3. Deleuze, this time Spinoza, suggestedthat swimming was the art of composition of speaking about relations. It involves a graduated and continuous alteration of the relations of field differential This body is a problematic one's with those of the waves. It becausethere is a disparity, eN-erythingis not, nothing staN-s still. is a turbulent 'model' of continuous disequilibrium, or a continuity of the discontinuous. \()t but differential into the enters indwidual relations, the of a sct individual only is different sets of differential relations that are transformed by the threshold points of pre-individual sinoarities.

84Deleuze discusses this in his first chapter of Bci-gsotiism ( 1966a).

195

A NO'\L-ýDIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

Similarlv, "[,,v]e never know in advance how someone x-vil-llearn: by means of love becomes someone what good at Latin, what encounters make them a dictionaries learn to think" (165). We learn through theNT philosopher, or in what signs; not through copying someone else doing something, but through a heterogeneity of relation (1964: 22). This art of experimentation does not discoivr but inventsthe potentials of the body and mind. However, if individuals arc by ical prevented rigid pedago91 models or strict disciplinary apparatusesfrom even beginning this venture, thought slides back into a ruminating model of between Bergson's recognition, something cows and a memorýToperating through recognition. Our Conclusion wil-l investigate another processual subjectivity that by is not captured these models. In some ways Deleuze's work could be read as a radicalisation of the Aristotelian knowledge pbronesi's, concept of an improvisational, practical required in situations like sea-faring where chance could not be eliminated or mastered. Tet-hlie,the discusses, knowledge Aristotle is for that the concerned with name other practical domination, "sensitivity and mastery and while phronesis is concerned with Joseph 256). 1993: Detienne Vernant, (Dunne, to according and attunement" Dunne, develop this theme of cunning intelligence or metisin their work, arguing that "this whole field of intelligence was systematicallysuppressedin the official Because (257). by [ ]" Greek philosophers ... picture of the mind which was painted fall do heterogeneity these under not of materials and circumstancesat play of the knowledge body (259) of and indeed no systematic any techne or set of percepts It by bound These this is in rules. general them. instances are not encompass can kind "a be likened of activjty to a praxis in other words, way that phronesis can bem-ccil (262). 85With its there split is no phronesis it" is outside whose end not 'possession' and its capplication'. It is becausephronesis does not refer to an end that (good) ethics the that immanent its is end, action external to itself, and its 85Unfortunately it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore in more detail tile links I Deleuze's image*. *thought between these ideas of phronesis and praxis and without own for GI-olold Rough book Back a the to Dunne's Joseph to the excellent refer reader does Dunne not. both discussion of these ideas that is scholarl-, and thought provoking. lio\\ e\ er, suggest the connections I am making.

196

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THM-'GHT

be forth Reading SI. Simondon's critique of to seen echo with it. pinoza sets may hylomorphism and atomism in the context of Deleuze's image of thought helpsbrief discussion This this to clarify position. of phronesis as a knowledge that helps the situation modulates in accordance with us to understand one instance, Aristotle, 'thought in of a without Image'. In Proust and S':'gns,Deleuze called the model of recogntion an 'objectivism', least habitual (1964: 26). He saN-s, that this tendency is natural, or at suggesting "We recogi-11'se things, but we never know them" (26). The art of experimentation that explores encounters falls prey to the easy facility of recognitions - it is easier to respond through chch6. 'Objectivism' operates by grouping tendencies together, and it also relies on voluntary memory that "recalls things and not (28). Voluntary memory is a reconstitution of a present past. It is "relatiNc signs" to the present which it has been, but also to the present with regard to which it is (56). Voluntary memory is a mediated memory proceeding through now past" These Bergson's Nietzsche's ideas resemble idea of intelligence as snapshots. and an operation which strives to possess and control things. Through intelligence "we discover only what we have given ourselves,

derive from things only we

that wl-iich we have alread)Tput there" (1964: 94). It verifies our prejudices. On the other hand, a sign is pre-objective and pre-subjective. The something that gives rise to thought is "the being of the sensible.It is not the 140). It (1968a: but by is imperceptible, that the given is given" given which This eluding the grasp of recognition and the operations of natural perception. limit, found be and this engendersa at its sensed is sensibility which can only Joint. Thinking problem. is out of Plato's Repblit- distingw*shedbetween that which is an encounter, and that ,vhich Certain as Deleuze such obicas, through examples. of is recognised. a series runs Ho-wever, finger, be at what stage is solilcoma identified, and recognised. can bald, or when does something turn from hot to cold? It seems to me that the foriii found becoming Deleuze's in seedling is genesis of complex concept of V)-I

.A

NO. MADIC LMAGE OF THOUGHT

here. Becoming is a coexistence of contraries, it is not delimited but "the less i becoming" (141). M an unhmi ted qualitative coexistence of more and Something soft is harder than something softer. Recognition tries to contain this 4madbecoming' by measuring and limiting its quahtý-,relating it to something else (141).

Nonetheless, Deleuze questions whether this qualitative becoming is less a being becoming. He also doubts that the than of sensible simply a sensible reminiscence, something enveloped in the object (You are the image of ..) could be the object of a true encounter. Finally, the instance of a pure thought that can be form The thought is only also criticised. of real Identity or the Same informs this thought of 'Smallness that is nothing but small' and so on (142). In this Nx-aý, Plato paved the way for philosophies of representation and the dogmatic image of thought. This being qj'the sensible or that by which the giv i en is 1 bOliven is intensity, or pure difference in itself This is a difference that is not subordinate to the demandsof opposition, resemblance, identity and analogy, which remain only effects by difference. CommunIcation this produced is not then geared toward common differences disparates, but towards senseand consensus or a communication of differences, Simondon 'dark through called a precursor', or what of effected a Antonin Artaud here crystalline germ. is given as an example of an attempt to think somelIVIlgo, rather than striving to orient thought in accordancewith a model. "He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engenderedin thought. He knows that the problem is riot to direct or methodically apply a thought wl-Lich does that being bring but not to which into pre-exists in principle and in nature, first but To to createis think is to create - there is no other creation yet exist [...] (147). 'thinking'in thought" to of all engender Nietzsche told us that concepts do not fall ftom the sky, purified arid polished The idea that phflosophy is the creation of concepts is, as wc havc seen, one of learned 4 3 In Pbilosqpbyý 11"kil is ()f we chapters and the main themes of 198

A NO-NIADIC 1.\LAGE OF THOUGHT

Spinoza's m-imanent ethics and Simondon's conception of transduction, both attempts to create new, more adequate, vvavsof thinking and acting. DeIcLizc's dogmatic image of thought is another attempt to open up other critique of a Breaking thinking and existing. possibilities of with a model of recognition is because dictates the than thought philosophical problem a image of more what be bolstering (at By time thought the set of values ai giv en and place). can has thought the the image statits quo of ramifications beyond associated with immediate philosophical concerns. Remember how Tully critiques the main constitutional traditions for their conservatism, and their refusal to even think

about inventing another

longer difference, diversity that assimilate and constitutionalism would no and from dissensus. Imagining too is possibilities often a simple extrapolation quell the conditions of the present, constituting a supplement to that present through a been have been illusion (had things otherwise). retrospective of what might Creating the possible is, for Deleuze, gathering the forces of the unforeseeable future by opening up the possibility of things being otherwise. This is an ethics of the pre-individual. In IF"I)w I'SPhilosophy?,Deleuze and Guattan call the plane of immanence the bý"What They thought claims right, what it selects, is image of thought. say, infinite

movement

or

the

movement

of

the

infinite"

(37). However,

The have by due plane to thought right vaned greatlý-. understandings of what is is pre-philosophical of inunanence

because concepts refer to a non-conceptual

These are the internal conditions of philosophy since philosophý understanding. does not exist outside them (41). Creating concepts and constructing a plane of immanence is always an experimentation.

It is vvith Sartre's impersonal transcendental field that the rights of immanciice, an Subject a to longer which to a or immanence that is no an immanence something field of immanence is attributed, are restored. This idea of an impei-ý()nal hillmiliellic: S'ense L, The and recurs in ýgit,ql, transcendcntal field crops up initial-ly in 199

A NOMADIC

1'\L-ýGE OF THOUGHT

last The L#L. (Deleuze's idea that immanence is no longer piece of writing). a found Deleuze to that intriguing, combining as it something was one immanent did with his theses on ufnvocity. This field is, as -ý-csa\,,- in the last chapter, both , It He is thinks is pre-individual. pre-ob'ect. it a radical empiricis'ni pre-sub'ect and According Deleuze Guattarl, to and since it presents only events. only one has philosopher understood that immanence is only immanent to itself. Spinoza (48).

BecauseSpinoza did not compromise with transcendence,Deleuze and Guattan discovered freedom him "[h]e the prince of philosophers saying, exists only call Our beset by (1991: 48). is path constantly obstacles within immanence" from Maybe this. preventing us our propensity to simphýTreality understanding follow dom-inant Or thwarts this opinions maybe this thought is enterprise. and They (infirnte) that there number of illusions suggest are an simply intolerable. difficult from Four this thought. that prevent us of these illusions are grasping Spinoza. These last three them the are; in chapter on of named; we came across illusion illusion illusion the the of the eternal, of universals, of transcendence,the finally discursiveness (where illusion the propositions are confused with of and difficulties Given (49-50). it sometimesit seemsas though we can such concepts) (51). between transcendence and chaos only choose I have alluded to a number of the silent postulates at the heart of the dogmatic "crush the These that of is thought image which thought. an under image of Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to 1 (167). ]" [ difference waiit and repetition ... think and alienatesthe two powers of to return now to some of the ideas expressedin previous chapters.

V.xi.

culpable, complicit,

co-opted?:

philosophy versus capital

difference as In chapter 1,1 traced a series of examples of the -,vay in which be to divcnsitý) was assimilated to a model of the Same; a model that claimed liow 'ruuýjames showed by but postulates. silent a series of neutral was riven Diffcrcncc and Canadian constitutional-ism. these operated in the context of ,)(I()

.\

NOMADIC

IMAGE

OFTHOUGHT

diversitý-had been silenced by the 'neutral' idealised model of the homogeneou'S, Fanon He how to spoke of colonialism. us explained nation-state. the colonial dialectics, African manichean a whereby enterprise engendered colonial sublccts differing from the ideal-tý-pemodel of humanin-, but were not only presented as difference-fi-ovi (and the portrayed as absolute negative) tl-ýsmodel. The also were formed level postulates a subterranean series of of presuppositions that 'legitimised' a set of horrific practices.

In response, Gatens and Lloyd called for the invention of better collective do homogeneous that imaginings not presuppose an and self-identical nationThey be Spinoza taken. that responsibility must argue state. engagedin a critique heart he how the the to postulates at of of abstract universals, as sought show an He (41omorpbit) irnmanent ethics might operate. image of opposed a moralistic thought to an ethics of experimentation. By interrogating the pre-erninencegiven to the individuated individual, Simondon opened a space for us to think of the dimensions human, trans-individual the in other words, the pre-individual and of becorMngs human. Finally, the in this chapter we explored the non-human of dogmatic the the image of thought, and ramifications of postulates underlying difference disparity, dissensus to proffer a new and ventured into a realm of have I Does the the reiterated a number of possible. question understanding of falls Does prcý-to times throughout this thesis still overshadow us? philosophy the clutches of capital, legitimating its expansion?We can conclude that a thought without image, a rhizomatic, acentered, nomadic thought is not just a superb description of the mechanisms of global capitalism in the era of 'societies of but control', constitutes a transformation of modes of acting and thinking. kind that is the link as therefore, Modern philosophy's same of with capitalism, (ýf plane Greece: the absolute an of connection with of ancient philosophy immanence with a relative social milieu that also fiunctions through immanence. 98). '(1991: Philosoph),, 11'"bal Gilles Deleuze and Fclix Guattarl, I's

State forni of the The immanent realisation of the axiomatic of capitahsm in the ,)() I

A NOMADIC

IMAGE

OF THOUGHT

A 2. discussed books plethora of in chapter and articles examining the poNver was of multinational corporations over governments, and the close relations-hip different by these organisations, seems to empirically validate this enjoyed However, just "an philosophy is not contention. agreeable commerce of the have the concept, would its own commodity, or rather its mind, which with from hvel\disinterested the point which, of value exchange view of a sociability democratic Western conversation is able to 9enerate a consensusof opinion of (99). We do not need any more

and provide communication With an ethic

Societies filling of control centre upon communication. intensive space ,vith the do, however, We (108). of communication. crackles need resistance Earlier I discussed Spinoza's concept of beatitudo,suggesting that it relates to Deleuze

and

Guattari's

conception

of

philosophy

as

an

absolute

deterritonalisation. They say that it is philosophy that takes the relativc deterritorialisation of capital to the absolute (99). They argue that it is like becomcs Adorno's NegativeDialeai(ýs "[ ] this and at utopian moment .... philosophy Absolute highest (99). point" political and takes the criticism of its own time to its deterritorialisation corresponds to a critical point which connects it with a "present relative milieu and especiallywith the forces stifled by this milieu" (100). Zourabichvih's article names this critical point as the creation of the possible. A The Spinozistic ethics. correlative transformation of powers of activity relates to a begin over, as earlier strugglesare strugglesagainst capitalism must continuously betrayed (100). The

reterritoriahsation

that

accompanies this absolute

deterritorialisation is the reterritorialisation of philosophy on the concept. from Transformation Affirming the signs of the present is not sufficient. comes (the history diiparate. "Thought future: past), thinks its own the the signs of the fiiially be (the to but in order to free itself from what it thinks able present) and The philosophcl- cannot 'think otherwise' (the future)" (Deleuze, 1986: 119).81ý

86 Resistance to the spatialisatiOn of time is eýident in Bergson's work which seeks to to If relation III on]\ time duration is understood and qualitative change. imestigate tirne as ho\ý tirne pav-ý difficult can is to understand the present as present-past and present-future, it be captured in Moreover, as Deleuze will repeatedly tell us the time of the event cannot

A NML-MIC

BLkGE

OF THOUGHT

A people is created through intolerable circumstances.At this create a people. moment, a critical point is passed.This idea of a disparity or tension that leads to transformation was the central theme of the previous two chapters. TI-nsis- the 'problematic'.

SIpinoza's immanent ethics demonstrated a way of thinking about relationahtý-that between discourses liberalism the slipped of and communitarianism. By reading Spinoza with

Simondon, we

sought to

understand the processes of

hoatransformation that could lead to qualitative changesin existence.I shoN-, -cd the centrality of the individual human is displaced in favour of the conception of the human as a part of nature, a singular point in a nexus of forces. I also demonstrated through Simondon why we cannot presuppose an individual but subject must trace the complex lines of prot-esses of subjectification and individuation. One is always more and less than oneself Doubtless, there NN-. is all anthropocentrism in these accounts; this is inevitable. Let us now trý- to becomings human, the more the understand of non-human of exploring some of the traits of an ecosophy.

these categories. It is always already/not yet. The event of a battle cannot be located either spatially or temporally. Deleuze sometimes calls this time a dead or sterile time, pure reserve. This complication of the conceptions of time is key to understanding the concepts Deleuze's difference-in-itself This antiof of is part as a pre-individual singularity. phenomenology that seeks to undermine the centrality placed on processes of natural its locus. does have This the as perception. natural subject not new subjectivity

20

Chapter Six: Conclusion

An Ethics of the Pre-Individual

\N ETHICS OFTHE

PRE-INDIVIDUAL

VIA. lily-livered liberals

Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes. ) W-altWhitm,,in, 'Song of Myself', Leatesof Grass.(18-55:1223),

I resist anything better than my own diversity Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself', Leavesof Grass.(1855: 63).

Liberals often fall prey to the allegation that according to them 'anything goes. Rawls, for example, tries to subvert this by proposing a theory of JusticepreMi deliberate the that to proposition upon were reasonable persons under a x-ell of better how they to to weigh up ignorance, could arrive at an agreement as lifferent have Throughout I this thesis goods. sought to show that claims to (: by tainted neutrality and objective universality are always an initial set of (moral) key But that the postulates. maný-Might maintain question continues to remain label different how them cultural practices, and can we evaluate unanswered liberal A bad, tolerance is that it often good or moral or immoral? problem with deprives itself of a position to condemn atrocious practices, as it is sucked into be We to able to resist the sceptics' quagmire of cultural relativism. need develop be We forms able to need to patriarchal and racist of social organisation. denying the without that altenty, embrace and affirm processesof sIngularisation possibility of an ethical evaluation of immanent modes of existence. Spinoza. I difficult It was this on chapter my in that addressed question ethical An immanent ethics sounds like an oxymoron to many. Wliat kind of 'an ethic', dcontolo, cal 91 be stringent a without could it without principles and rules, or for iteria have ic cvaluýitiiig Spinoza's nI immanent that can 1 -\N-e conviction appr(),tch? Irfly 11cce,; asthe Ind, vjdUal of modes of existence rested upon an understanding he Against thought degree imperialistic an of power -a conatus. relational, wid as a

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIA'IDUAL

local and singular solutions to problems. Ethics is not just a process of sought deliberating about actions. It is a process of becoming-active. Eflucs, that is, ontology. I contend that the most fruitful way to develop an immanent ethics is to dimensions the transindividual pre-individual and understand of the midiN-idual, does Spinoza he if nothing else, certainly emphasisesthis point when lie and human Shifting debate from the individual that the is part the a of nature. asserts does this in manner not constitute semantic slippage,but engendersa critique of the postulates that provided a ground for that individual of ethics. Both deontological ethics and morality employ a conception of the human that is alreadyindividuated-87 Can embracing the complexity of humans, including their non-human becorrungs, for be the postmodern prochN-ity really considered another example of haN, learned differential by We that the individual is constituted abstraction? e degree Cotiatits to these. is essenceas relations and a of power corresponds fact, In Deleuze Before and activity. subject and object, we are all multiplicities. Guattari introduced the concept of multiplicity in an attempt to escape from A "alreadj to omposedq1' multiplicity is either subject or object. allegiances 249) betero [ ]"(1980: thresholds it is terms it passes and as geneous 1/1gmblOSI*S ... , transformed. We cannot understand individual identities if we presupposethem. Rather than presupposing sub'ect and object, we must trv to understand theiideveloping do We this through a theon- of affectwity. processesof emergence. Affects are pre-personal: they are becomings - passagesthat have a 1-c', ility that is becormng-actN-c The former inv()IN-cs process of irreducible to their or end states. fLil 1()\ active to maxinuse as so relations organising encounters and composing

87Peter Singer's large edited volume on Ethics does not. as far as I can see, contain so much Spinoza's of' thinking out is indicates that believe the I Spinoza. this waý as one reference to be to interesting would An project joint NNIththe dominant traditions on ethics. and useful it to makes \ýhat sho\\ to dominant and ethics approaches compare Spinoza's work with the do to I irnplicitlý often largely refer not incompatible ýNiththem. To some extent (and since do thesis. ha\e I this to tried mN in theorists) specific ethical

-ýN

ETHICS OF THE pRE-INDIVIDUAL

Since being, the is individual a necessarily relational affects. an cthics pren-ýiscd upon a strictly autonomous and independent individual is inoperable in this being Instead of classiý'ing a in advance and attributing context. properties

to it, a symbiotic

approach promotes

Ethics involves multiplying unexpected couplings. humans. An ethics of the pre-individual other

a set ()f

alliances, contagions and relations, and not just with

rails against the values of the

dominant image of thought. It creates new values and new modes of valonsatioll, heterogenesis homogenesis. tendency toward resisting a a

Spinoza shows us that an ethics need not employ abstract principles that compare definition Seedlings human Marx's of modes of existence. of essenceas ac6-,-ltN,, his be found E//VCS. That the text corresponding critique of alienation, can in and human, humans potentials to the the tearing of aspires create and cultivate aNN-, iNfrom abstract essences,and those inflated towering images of themseIN-csthat dream of Man occupying a site somewhere between profane nature and sacred God. Through loving and accepting our finitude, we find eternity on earth. Ethics involves developing inimanent criteria to evaluate different modes of does by It this examining whether an action Involves a relative existence. decomposition of relations, where a composition of relations might have been be This one of experimentation; it is a process is why an ethics must constructed. becoMIng-active. of The shame of being human... For Deleuze and Guattarl, "we also experience[this before the meannessand vulgarity of existence shame] in insignificant conditions, that haunts democracies, before the propagation of thesemodes of existenceand before our ()f opinions and the ideals, values, thought-for-the market, and of from life that \,,-c are offered appears time. The ignominy of the possibilities of but to undergo feel do We time continue our of ourselves outside not within. hax, I Throughout 108). thesis c this (1991a: shameful compromises with it" but ItN. the ncccs,,, the to present, -e emphasisedthe importance not only of a re,q'slall, As In-ing. to engage in a positivc endeavour to construct other possibilities ()f "m

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-1-NDIVIDUAL

Guattari, Deleuze from this and motivation with stems etl-ýico-pohticalconcerns the possibility of things bet-omi'ii otherwise. My account of processe's of ,g individuation challengesthe neo-liberal conception of the individual. Not ()IIIN-are Guattari Deleuze tell us, contemplations - contractions of air, ,vater and we, as disparateness the that is a part of our becoming means that no and minerals how idified, ri 91 matter ossified and absolute our existencesbecome, a singularitV may qualitatively transform these modes of existence.

VI.H. a critical freedom Haecceities are simply degrees of power which combine, to which correspond a power to affect and be affected, active or passive affects, intensities. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialooues.(1977.92).

It was SiMondon

(inadvertently who

drew key the themes perhaps) out some of

Etbics d-irough his Spinoza's theory of processes of individuation. in he neither began with the individual a philosophy

or with a principle of individuation,

force, Although potentia. of of

something

Deleuze

but With

Spinoza did not articulate a theory of

develop being, he did metastable a conception that make it relatively

Like Spinoza

differential of

draw his to philosophy easy

force relations and

Simondon, that to of close

becoming do his Parado. xicaHN-, in seminars. seemed to

becomes the model of being.

13ýhis Deleuze always professed allegiance to a philosophy of immanence. being than more itself, with that incompatible as presented positing an ontology Delcuze's SiMondon's work profoundly influenced unity and more than identity, develop him of difference, conception to a to continue philosophy of allowing dispantýý disparateness If (potentia). arc being and terms of power in univocal s\'stcm, any of part then is a constitutive to alterinidentity, primary in relation The lack. is the possible being possible ()f through with shot without that system Dclcuzc identity By dimension secondan-, as thus a understanding of aiiv systern. and transforming developed Guattari identities, ways, of circumventing and If bccorrungs. the disrupting them through the unnatural couplings theý-called

-AN

FTMCS

OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

pre-individual and the transindividualare key dimcnsionsof tilc individual (a term but an abstraction xvithout the invocation of these aspects) the which is for the production of the new can be activatedbv constructing a conditions by t-reafiqa possibleto issuea transformation. disparateness, In the critical literature terms like 'pre-individual singularities' and 'difference-inithout being introduced itself' are often 11 explained. It -\xwi as important to me to situate these concepts rather than relying on tautologies such as 'difference-indifferendates itself itself It was also crucial to show that the pre-individual is not 'pre-' relative to the individual (like the cells in our bodies, or our ancestors) Just but expresses the reality of the potential energy of a metastable being. Predisparateness the that is resolved through the inventive individual concerns process of individuation, a process that is itself alwaN-s relative. Deleuze calls this process - the actualisation of the 617tual.Singularities are intensive and are not localisable. The pre-individual and the transindividual are dimensions of humans that reveal the non-human beconUngsof the human. The human spills over into other worlds.

VI. iii. pragmatics

and incorporeals

In order to addressthe implications of an ethics of the pre-mdividual, I took issue difference and with an identitarian image of thought that could not affirm disparity. Here I tried to show that the image we have of what it is to think and to be may stifle the creation of other potential modes of existing and thinking. A hierarchical order that seeksto fit singularities into categoriesmaý-be toying with devcloping By for baggy an image of thought, their content. concepts that are too disparateness difference, singularitý-, or a thought without image, that could affirm force dissensus %ve concepts, uniform these ill-fitting into to ttying and without further our idea of an ethics of the pre-individual. Rather than an imperialistic local deal knowledges develop and siligular to with thinking, -\ve need to Deleuze's iilligc thought SiMondon's without problems. idei of transduction and prcor how the non-human ot this approach involves an in,,-cstigation show -,()S

\X ETI IICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

human world.

An example of how we might go about this is given in 'I Uolo-aild Plateaus. -,, Arguably, Deleuze and Guattari's conception of an image of thought is extendcd to their observations on the pragmatics of language.According to them, it is a language to the rniistake reduce economy to signifying linguistics. The grave of dominance of the signifier means that other serruotic fluxes have been silenced. 'sign manner of a-signifying machines' the are play at in construction of -kU from subjectivities genetic codes to sporting activities. Rather than concentrating formalistic language, Deleuze and Guattari draw out the nonaccount of on a discursive and implicit presuppositions that provide a ground for the functioning language. For 'I the of example words swear' undergo a continuous variation depending on whether they are spoken in the courtroom, bN-a teenager to her lover, boss. face? Are What Are to to too parents, a a about your earnest? N-ou ý-ou fidgeting? Do you gaze at the floor? All of these signs transform the statement made. The incorporeal transformations effected by the speech act depend on the collectiN-e assemblage of enunciation and the concrete machinic assemblage. Language is an anonymous murmur that speaks through us; this is wliýýthere is but only ever a collective assemblage of never an individual statement does This not just refer to a xvider social group enunciation. collective assemblage but to a multiphcity including technological, economic, social and cultural belies 'onlýý language dismissing Hence, \,.-()rds' as racist and sexist components. the sedimentation of practices and non-discursive presuppositions that giN-cs these words a real transformational power. Different traits such as the timbre of a from di-\-ergence a standardiscd N-oice,or the shape of a nose may indicate a in Guattan nhercnt 1 I racism there that is a universal thinks model of normality. face too Someone old, faciality 91). is (1979: too a xldelY, smiles white capitalist (Guattari the immediate features notes ()Ience unleashesN-, or a particular set of Jew, 'it's a arab, face an hostile a of the exclamations in response to a and often Rather than affiriTiing a multitude of difference,,, pre-personal singular 2)

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

forced traits are into categoriesof recognition. To remedy such prejudice, it 1s11 ot linguistic but to terms, simply alter sufficient one needs to explore those hiddci, factors that pervade the social practices and the image of thought of a socien-, bringing them to visibility. On the one hand, this involves a struggle on the level for 'molar' identities which seek recognition and this goes some way to ahcniig, of dominant On the way in which a the other hand, a disparateness order operates. be to created to effect a quahtative transformation in modes of existence.I needs 5. In this tl-iis way the capacity that an image of in operation chapter outhned thought has to impose identities regardless of context is weakened.The ctl-iicopolitical task is to invent creative instances that transgress pre-established schemas. Those kinds of statements indicate the sedimentations of practices that oftentimes rest upon unspoken prejudices and assumptions about the groups ()f This is Deleuze's to. they idea of the linage of thought is so refer people why dra\\but It to to never accept statementsat surface value important. exhorts us out the postulates that they rest on, especiallywhen those people \N-homake them for Our acting and existing are possibilities profess their neutrality and objectivity. limited by the image of thought of a given soclety. We need to develop iic\\Perhaps the acentred thought without linage. images of thought, or even a networks of the rhizome can provide ways of escapingan arborescentimage of thought by bringing new connections into play, providing instead an image of thought that can cope with differences and singularities. his Spinoza Simondon in Guattari reveals himself to be close to and fie transindlN-idual. the the and individual the pre-individual, understanding of did, Simondon that the develops these themes in a concrete way emphasising,as frorn this that its "non-human pre-personal part of subjectwitý-is crucial since it is by Subjectivity the confluctice 9). heterogenesiscan develop" (1992a: is produced be psycho-gclictic of forces, series to successlN-c a reduced and cannot of manN, idiial just the pre-IndIN know do -, ()f We ethic,, an as what we are. not stages. does thought ot another it enl(rendcr too the so individual, the of capsize,, stabihty -111)

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIA'IDUAL

in Heidegger's Unlike work, the singularit:y of A Life is not revc,, subjectivity. iled in the moment of dying. By thinking singularity aside from individuality in the lived becoming, be I of existence can process also affirmed. want to sho\x-no\vhow Guattari brings together these concerns as he develops his concept otprot,essualsubjectivity.

VI.iv. subjectivity before the subject I prefer a sense of progress that says 'what are the possibilities we can develop out of the presentT bell hooks in conversation with Paul Gilroy in Paul Gilroy, Small Ias. (1993b: 218). Subjectivity does not fall from the sky; it is not written in chromosomes that knowledge and work must end up with the atrocious segregations sectors of that humanity knows today. F6hx Guattari, Cartoura * analyliques.(1989a: phiessch1ý0 ,,

A retrospective appraisal of F6hx Guattan's life leads R6n6 Sch6rer to concludc that his thought is dominated by one constant - býýprocesses of subjcctification. His molecular revolution consisted of an appeal for a triple ecology that extended from the natural, to the social and the mental. This is called an ecosophý, (1994: 63).

Guattari's logic is one of becornIngsand multiplicities. Indeed, Sch6rerclaims that been has A (63). to mistake primary subjectification and multiplicity are a pair in the enclosed to subjectivity of an instance reduce a process of subjectification the Guattari Simondon, Like in exploring interested more is unity of the subject. t11: involves the 111 to -orld, ý, transductive relation that a , process of subjectification iN-ity Developing that ti I subjec I a viewing the subject in a static and identitarian way. his is philosopliy. does not rest on the ground of subject and substance the aim of Ratliet'minot'. This is integral]\- bound up with an ethics which privilel,,cs the he sulýe(-1ý11'ý-xlwi, of 'subject' to of speak t-oniponews prefers than speaking of the do These 36). not (1989b: less components on its each working more or 211

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

even necessarilypass through the inchvidual.

Nicolas Bourriaud also claims that the notion of subjectivity is centril to Guattari's enterprises. He says that the ultimate finaht\- of subjectivity is none other than an individuation that always remains to be conquered" (1994: 79). Guattan's work is a massive attempt to denaturalise subjec ivity. __\othing ti I i is less natural than subjectivity, nothing is more produced. "Subjectivity is the set of relations that are created between individuals and vectors of subjectification, be they individual or collective, human or non-human" (82). In chapter 2 we looked at some of the Nx-ays in which subjectivities were produced Our and modelled. ethical choice now is to either reiýy, reduce and scientise subjectivity, or to try to grasp its processualnature. Guattari describesthis choice "There faN-our terms; in clear is an ethical choice in of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporeatises and deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstanccs besiege for It processuality,irreversibility and significations which us. is a choice 29). (1991a: and resing-ularisation" Guattarl wants to create a conception of a subjectivity that traversesand connects different domains. The identity of this subjectivity can only be understood as boundaries know does that theories of identity the traditional partial, and it not have been prone to adopt. Donna Haraway's figure of the cyborg communicates Western features. Writing the cyborg of myths umity, origin against its some of kinship is machines and animals with place, where ironic occupies a partial and bct-%ý-ccii borderland feared. be Haraway the tries to a occupy to not something One, as illusion the she sees other, \-hich the and autonomous , of self, an fcNx-, but One frayed, t, boundap-, too \N-() "mu-Itiple, \x-ithout clear is insubstantial. 1 1: (199 too many" are

have boundary tried Negotiating this is something \x-c

for Hara\N-, danger call', do ty by identity. of purity of the myths to of showing Guattari trans\, Deleuze crsJ trcileratc and partial translations, and have abm-c Relations and becomings. over their reality ()\\-ii communications, or ?I -)

AN ETHICS OF THE PREANDIVIDUAL

their individuated terms.

But how is subjectivity produce& Guattari says this has do to nothing \x-Ith a return to traditional systemsof binary opposition like base-superstructuremodels. There is no fixed hierarchy of the sermotic re91 isters that come to produce 1 subjectivity. He points out that stock markets are very sensitive to changes in opinion, something made clear bNTthe recent col-lapsein the stocks of new technology and web companies. Subjectivities are susceptible to consen-atlN-c, reterritoriahsations which can have a massiveimpact on the subjectn,c economies of mflhons of people. Given archaismsand technological innovation can happflýhand hand, Guattari in thinks it is time "to forge a more transvcrsahst go conception of subjectivity, one which permits us to understand both its idiosyncratic territoriahsed couplings (Existential Territories) and its opening onto value systems ýncorporeal Universes) with their social and cultural implications" (1992a: 4).

For instance, the impact of the sennotic productions of the mass media on be Unfortunately, the to subjectivities is enormous. moment people appear at deadening does This (5). to the influence condemned a mass media of not mean however. believes Guattan technological that innovations, we should reject be for for better The to remedia need subjectivities can work or worse. bring be Other to possibles need to Lis created appropriated and re-singularised. toward a post-media era. In an interview with Olivier Zahm, Guattan stateshis belief that all societiesalm from "I He the idea that subjectivity is ak-ays to produce subjectivity. says start the result of collective assemblages,which also imph- not only a mulfiphcln- of but individuals, also a multiplicity of technological, machinic, economic Ictol's... 49(19921): factors which Nvecould call pre-personal sensations" 'i multipliciti, of 50). For Guattarl, processes of subjectification

delimited to thc are not just

bcconling'sbecomings ical -animal, anthropolo 91 sphere, since the), extend into field field, to and rich otheiand technological the vegetable, the social I21

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

heterogeneous domains. To try to contain these processes of subjectification field the social is alreadv reductionist. wltl-dn with

this approach he explicates a number of Simondon's intuitions. 'ITie both individual involves pre-individual and trans-individual dimensions NX-1,11ch modify and constitute it as they are modified in return. The human is not cut off from the mammals or microbes, from plants and minerals and rays of sunshine, from the technolo 91 'cal formations that shape her possibilities of beino,,fr()m the 11) incorporeal universes of music and poetry, from the workplace, from media Subjectivitýbe from these and many stereotypes. cannot understood in isolation factors. other Guattari emphasises the potential zones of resistance corresponding to a heterogenesisof subjectivitý-in contradistinction to the homogenesis()t capitalist find "can He asks, subjectivity, a subjectivity of generalisedequivalence. we not heterogenesis bet-ween the transversal connections practices of of the itidIN-IdLial life, undertaking an ethico-political subjectivity and a recomposition of social for political objectives, including planetary and ecological ones" responsibility (1992a: 153). We can recompose subjectiN-ityin matiy xx-ays;looking at the but television is important, also gazing at the stars at night, accepting one's finitude, through poetn- and music, and in a million and one other ways (154). Guattarl thinks that poetry is just as important as N-itaminC.

Vim. processes of emergence do, It's do to little has to rather, Indeed, I think subjectivation with any subject. through individuation field, taking place an with an electric or magnetic fields, individuated do it's to not with intensities (weak as well as strong ones), identities. persons or 9')). (199(),, Gilles Deleuze, "ýeoolialions. 1-.

(199-1v Witkiewic/ Guattari quoting, 'strangeness of being' eludes us, muses lic Stern, Daniel proposcs- ail a psychologist, 19). Drawing mi the xork of " 14

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

Psychoanalytic subjectivity. emergent approaches tended to centre on the effect family Obviously figures i the the on individual. of parental are IMPortant in the but the child, she is not positioned solely in relation to them. Initially world of her world is a pre-personal, pre-individual one rich in vibrations, deep reds, gasps laughter, bitter tastes,,and the child weavesthese elements rough surfaces of and herself herself together and into tapestries creating and patterning and the world feedback Rather transformation. than a unified self, in an ongoing of qualitative there is a multiplicity of larval selvescontracting sensationslike habits. This is an fit does Prior to the age of about two the emergent self not autopoletic creation. female. Its relation Nvith prepared categories such male or into as self and other, likened fusional. (Bergson the world the world is more complex, pathic and once to more or less contracted vibrations that connected the infra-cosrruc to the ) cosn-uc. Spinoza did not envisage Nature to be a pure, pristine wilderness; a prelapsarian Eden. Naturing Nature named an ontology of becoming, a process of production be human but Nature, Man did to a part of to that understood the not oppose does An in spheres individuated out the map not pre-individual of ethics nature. advance; constructing

between nature, culture and technology is oppositions

Indeed to and complexity the is grasp problem to analyses. our anathema fit them into preto heterogeneity in their movements rather than always trying This is the aim of a transcendental empiricism. existing categories.

Guattan developed an ecosophy that comprehends the psyche, the socIUS,and for on draws the singularisation He to struggles our attention the environment. to from to movements, the women's retired, the part of a wide variety of groups In the ecologies virtual addition, world. the underdeveloped oppressedworkers in by destroyed being danger capitahst of in of aesthetic practices are also have movements social death of his the prohferation Since seen we subjectivity. creative and concerns environmental with that combine social justice issues differences in acting xvhile to affirm These emblematise a capacity enterprises. for themselves. These speak grassroots movements concert. -'15

AN ETHICS OF TI IF PRE-INDIVIDUAL

Political, environmental and mental ecologies are not opposed to one another becausein order to address an environmental problem a nexý-universe of values be invented, and this means a new ediico-pohtical engagement.A -\vholc must be to incarnated, in order to support this uni'verse system of modehsation'8needs different (Guattan, 1996: 20). social and analytic practices of values, comprised of Rather than a totalitarian approach to identities, we need to affirm and respect heterogeneity and singularity. He says "Let's get out of consensual politics and from her difference; this ethical movement that the the alterity of other, accept Simondon (23). When the argued that Nve revives other something may emerge" need to comprehend the process of individuation rather than conceiving of a he discrete identities, made an ethico-pohtical reality comprised of individual and logic difference. favour dissensus Instead of exclusive of a of and move in disJunctions that can tell immediately who belongs in what categories,boundaries different fuzzy, "comprehend the articulation of allowing us to are made (26). biological, neurological, ecological, etc. strata" machinic, social, Symbiosesof different fluxes may be permitted to flourish once the individual is As Spinoza dehtnited, said - we classified, segregatedand isolated in advance. not do not even know what a body can do. "Furthermore, if we consider the plane of disparate the of things and signs move upon it: a most consistency we note that fragment rubs shoulders with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes semiotic hole black language, captures a genetic message,a crystallisation produces a into a 69). 1980: Guattarl, letter... " (Deleuze and a passion, the wasp and orchid cross a field forms beginning Instead of and contents, a pre-individual with individuated field is a of singularities. The conjunction AND brings together diverse fluxes like the ray of sunlight and docs Guattarl's forms. that processual subjectivltýthe soil inventing new n-nneralsin

88See Guattari (1989a) and (1992a) for an account of his concept of modelisation. Rather he to more a suggest dominant wants reality, modeling of than using a single manner or - depending tý different features draw models the of that pertinent upon can pragmatic approach thesis. See be ofthis to pl-36 also addressed. uponthe problematic 210

AN ETHICS OF THE pRE-INDIVIDUAL

have bý, Sitnondon'spro6, the its is mirrored not subject as end esses of individuation that view the unitý- and identity of the individual as but a limited phase in an from ongoing process of singularisation which individual and milieu emerge, but becoming What is realis the onl)- relativelý,. and not the "supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes" (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 2138). An inclusive disjunction makes a relation of the non-relation. It preserves heterogeneity. We create mutating existential territories that create cartographies dimensions. these of In the final chapter of his book CbaosmoS1*S Guattari turns to the idea of the ecosophic

object.

Through

telecommunications out

the

media,

biology,

computers

and

mental coordinates are being destabilised. The

being to the underdeveloped world continues suffer, environment is steadilý contaminated, and as President Bush made so clear recently when he rejected the IZ-yoto Protocol, the system is incapable and unwilling to construct a "social economy adapted to the new technologies" (Guattarl, 1991a: 119). Publicised "traced to a more general crisis of the social, political and ecological crises are do (119). image "[Hlow How thought? existential" can we invent another we of back how do to that change mentalities, would give we reinvent social practices for humanity - if it ever had it its own -a sense of responsibility, not only for but for future life the animal and of all on the planet, survival, equally likewise for incorporeal speciessuch as music, the arts, cinema, vegetable species, fusion feeling for love the the relation with time, at the of others, and compassion heart of the cosmos?" (119-20). Theories of ideology often ran up against the following objection - if the masses know do from 'false their own interests, thq not consciousness',if are suffering differently? Invoking they a revolutionary vanguard, or even act any why should kno,, to that N-what is claims an organic intelligentsia, imposes a top-down order best for the masses. Like Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari think that desirc is \Ve primary. are attracted to certain modes of existencc, and this shapes our Guattari interests. saysthat we need to understand the modelisations of existence 217

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

that different people invest in. We need to be able to affirm dissensusin order, 'rhizomatise' that other modelisation, such as the support for the to perhaps, BNP or Le Pen. If we engagein an ideological standoff each position becomes id By incommunicado. ossified3ri 91 and no means am I suggestingthat support for 1 the BNP is equally as valid as anti-racist action groups; however, the factors that lead people to support such groups are usually complex and often contradictory. Sometimes it is becausepeople feel alienated that they are attracted to these kinds What organisations. of causecan it serve to exacerbatethat alienation by isolating those supporters? Instead, we should try to understand, and potentially transform, those conditions that have led them to take such a position. As Lenny Bruce once liberals don't said, understand everything except people who understand them.

VIM. an ethics of the pre-individual

In the midst of this state of affairs, a shaft of meaning must be discovered, that impatience for through the other to adopt my point of view, and cuts my through the lack of good will in the attempt to bend the other to my desires. Not only must I accept this adversity, I must love it for its own sake: I must seek it out, communicate with it, delve into it, increase it. With it, responsibility emerges from the self in order to pass to the other. F6hx Guattari, 'Remaking Social Practices'. (1992d: 271-2)

An ethics of the pre-individual provides a different way of seeing,being in, and blind does It turn the a eye to oppressive practices, social making not world. formation, and the exercise of Power, but seeksto critique the manner in which these factors stifle potentia, the power to create transversal relations, and to enhance one's power of thinking and existing through multiplying relations and forming commonalities of singularities. ia by Deleuze and Guattarl. Old social formations are not viewed with nostal91 Their negative appraisal of capitalism does not mean they cannot see the 'reterritoriahses' by the nuclear on it as even its movements, potentials unleashed family and ethnic nation-state. The undecidability inherent to the capitalist for desire due to its unquenchable axiomatics,

innovation, means that -)I Q,

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INDIVIDUAL

crevolutionary fluxes' are both encouraged and contained. Opposing a capitalist homogenesis need not take place through a romantic mý-th of the local, or an family An to patriarchal system. a ethics of the pre-individual does not appeal fetishise the human but thinks before and beyond it to invent new possibilities of dimensions It human, through the impersonal the those preexistence. is of dimensions, transindividual that new singularities can be liberated, individual and rupturing the melancholia of the 'one-dimensional man. By understanding the human to be a part of nature we can affirm the non-human dimensions human. longer human. We the the of and pre-human no presuppose Different spacesand rhythms are no longer dimensions that the individual moves through but they constitute the non-human becon-ungsof the human, modifying be diminishing to abilities affect and affected, or increasing powers of existing An thinking. and

liberation ethics of comprehends these pre-individual

dimensions of the human, these components and factors that constitute the feelings dampen ill-designed just of individual. one's as an architectural spacecan for aesthetic pleasure and safety, one's contact with a community, a capacity like factors find the media, that many other possibilities of movement, we family biologies, financial technologies, music, markets, cultural practices, If we are relationships also serve as pre-individual vectors of subjectification. human-human develop relationships trying to an ethics it cannot just concern because humans involve so many other dimensions. The ontology developed from be throughout this thesis cannot an ethics. separated N4 first chapters concentrated heavily on the idea of Potestas; the \vays in which from to their capacities expanding relations and multiplying people are prevented think and exist, prohibiting

A commonality of their rights to singularity.

distributive like the commons. of the space smooth operates singularities Countering the allegation that philosophy is enthralled to capitalism, I tried to blocks, fashion, despite how co-opts operating in an immanent capitalism, show fundamental becomings threaten its that those and potentials and circumvents Value the than for other systems production's sake. premise of production 219

AN ETHICS OF THE pRE-INDB'11)U-AL

ic i 11 pursuit of profit and economi efficiency need to regulate human social actiiviities (Guattari, 1989b: 64). "What condemns the capitalist value system is that it is by flattens general equivalence, which characterized out all other forms of value, hegemony" (65). Patton them in its alienating argues that implicit in the Deleuzian ethic is a concept of critical freedom. This is characterisedby its focus "the conditions of change or transformation in the subject, and by its on indifference to the individual or collective nature of the subject" (2000: 83). Guattari wonders how we can speak of liberty in universes that do not know deliberating subjects. He asks what a machinic liberty might beý Like Spinoza, he thinks it is always a question of degree. First of all we need to accept that different assemblages,be they material, social or biological, are capable of 'machining' their own fate and creating complex and heterogeneous universes. We then need to nurture more unnatural couplings, since the subject and the from By longer 165-6). (1979: putting machine are no separable one another different codings from images and gestures to the social and political field into SIMondon just the emphasised real. as play, we embark on an experimentation on he de-individuated dimensions tried to explain the as our non-individuated or force of the concepts of the pre-individual and transindividual, ethico-political Guattarl contends that an ethics based on the individual ignores complexity and heterogeneity. Qualitative transformations in modes of existence and social does be that effected if we take a schizoanalytic approach organisation can only favour one theoretical approach, or system of modelisation, above all others. not This is why he strives to develop an ecosophy. Deleuze and Parnet tell us that there was never any question of opposing the State-form with a spontaneous dynarmc. A logic of multiplicities develops different ways of organismg or composing relations, creating symbioses and A There No are no external referenccs. identities are preserved. sympathies. There intrusion of an overarching solution to our ills. pragmatics precludes the Whitman's beyond democracy This even stretches radical are no eternal truths. honzons. 2-10

AN ETHICS OF THE PRE-INIAVIDUAL

I celebrate myself, and sing myself, And what I assume you shall assume, For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to

you.

Walt Whitman, cSongof Myself' Learesof Greiss.(1855: 6'). I.

We need to love, and not fear, the unknown. We need an ethics and politics of singularity, an ethics and politics of the pre-individual. Through dissensusand disparatenesswe can create other possibles; we can precipitate a sý-steminto a disequilibrium; state of we can challenge the statusq1to- the dominant image of thought. Philosophy involves both critique and construction. We cannot tear down edifices to be left standing amongst the ruins. When asked about ethics in a declared Jacques Dernda 'we are all Abrahams'. Rather than hovering seminar, have I that tried to engage the undecidability and risk involved in over abyss, ethics in a positive way. Instead of concentrating upon the aporetic deliberation involved in making ethical decision, I have argued that ethics concerns practices living. However, of an immanent ethics means that we need to develop different human. Undoubtedly has been the conceptions of my account anthropocentric, but I have removed the human from its pedestal.I ha%, c not argued that Microbes have as much a right to life as humans as radical ecologists sometimes do nature both destructions: involves symbiosesand our ethics is alwaysrelative to what is for Anything be good elsewould us. untenable. But this by no means constitutes an implicit recommendation of neo-hberahsm; the individual is not autonomous or independent but relational. Spinoza's ethics he be functional he would not if presupposed the individuality of the individual; limits, our emphasisesprocesses of emergence and creation, our thresholds and powers of existing and acting. Our ethics involves multiplying relations therebNfocus has been My increasing our joyous affects. centred upon the 1*1IdiI)idIIa1i_0, not human, but the of on the non-human, pre-indi6dual and transindiN-idual, Býbeconlings of humans those processesof fi'tigulan*s fion. to of make refusing a , the human an abstraction, I sought to sho\-,- how an ethics of the pre-indwidual is Our but anti-human a necessaryone. not onIN-an interesting and novel approach humanism brings the human back down to earth. -) -) I

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