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BRITAIN ANDTHE (lUESTIO EASTERN Missolonghi to Gallipoli
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T}IE LONDON HISTORY STUDIES r. Tte-tl€nch Revolution a, asx loxsg sir,rrr, r.e. 2. Thc A.aencrtr War ol Ind€Fadence PETEB WEIJ!
IT.A.
ISBN 0 840 00760 4 Boad3 ISBN 0 840 0A760 8 Prp€t ISBN o 84) 0oo4s 2 Bo$r& ISBN o 810 ofo54 0 Pspc!
8. The Sbuggle for Supt€orcy in th€ Bsltic 100G.I725 JII]L tlax
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4. R€ligion i! Englsdd 1568-1682 rr. 6. Arrx ND&BM|A. 6, The TudorPs
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ISBN 0 84o (}77?5 5 Bosds ISBN o 8() 07726 8 Psp€t ISBN o 8{o o8ot2 8 Bo€rds IfIBN o 84o o8{Yr87 PaF!
6. Ihe First Boubon Century in Ffi,nce rf. 3. BBOWNrr.]r. 7. The IndustriBl Revolution r7fl>185{) BOBIN Ii. E,EEYE U.A.
ISBN 0 84O 07847 O Papet ISBN 0 84() 0€'861 6 Bosldt IIIBN o 840 06852 I Psper
8. Britain drld the East€rn Qu€stion: Missolong[i to Cslipoli ISBN 0 8ro 0784E I o. D. cI.AYmN X.r.
EENE&II,
EDfIOE A. BEN JO!T'6
PBP€r
ADVISORY PANEL W. G. BeI. u.a. College,Oxford Exeter History, in Modem and Tutor Fellow of Oxford University History, Lecturer in Modem Alun Davies !d.A of Swsnsea' College Professorof Modem Ilistory, Univelsity M. R. D. Foot l[,a. !.Lrrt. Prcfessorof Modem llistory, ltctoria University of Manchester C. P. Ilill M.a. Senior Lecturer in Ealucation, Unive$ity of Exeter Marjone Reevesu,l. ra.o, St Anne's Coll€ge,Oxfod History, in Modem Fellow and Tuto? Lecturer in Modern Ilistory, University of Oxford O. A. Williams u.r. Ps.u. Professolof Ilistory, UniYersity of York
Britain and xHl,lt006mEtI the EasternQuestion: Missolonghi to Gallipoli G. D. CLAYTON ar.a.
UNIVEESITY
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CONTEN T S
TNTRODUCTIOI( _ TIIII EASTDNN QUESTION r\ND BIrITAIN TI{E EASTIIRN QUESTION UP TO r82r 1. nrkey's Decline 2 The Interests ofthe Powers: hinciPal E ents ttltssia Austr;a - pran t-,trrain Reading up to 1821 Further fr\RT
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ISBN O 8{0 07348 I Ftust published1971 Copyright O 1971C. D. Clayton An rights res€rved.No palt o{ this publication may be r€pmducedor t.ansmitt€d in my folm or by any means, electmnicor mechanical,includingphotocopy, recording, o. any infomation stomge snd retriclal systcm, without permission in writing from the publish€r' University of London PressLtd St Paul's House, Warwick Lsne, London ECaP aAH P tcd in Grat Bribin by Ilszetl Watson & Viney Ltd, Aylesbry, Buckg
I
22
CANNING AND THE GRDEK WAR I,ABT II OI INDEPNNDENCII 3. Ceneral Considelatiolts Rsised by the lyar 4. Greet I'ower Rcactions, l8?r 5 5. The Wor Itself, to 1825 0. Caning's Policy, 1825-? 7. Nava no, tle Russo-Turlish \Yar and rhe Trcaty ol Ad anople 8. Uniinished Business' :!nd PointeN to the Future Pri cipal Events,l82r io PAIIIERSTON, UNIIIAR PATI'I III 'T'HE STRAITS CONYENTION
SIIELESSI AND
!. I'aimerston's Ttisk, and the Conpletion of Greck Indcpend€nce 10. Tire Egyptien Advence end Ilnkiar Skclessi 1r. tsrit in's Stntegic Int€rests in the llediterranean during the Palmerston DIs 12 The New Polmclston Policy toweds Turkey, snd Increasing British Involv€ment in the Middle E&st 13.'Ihe 1839-41 Crisis 14. The Straits Convention Principal Events, 1880-41
I'ART IV PALIIERSTON AND THE CNI}IEA 15. Genersltractors,and British Ecoromic Intercsts 16. Turkish Refom, and Stratford CaMing 1?. British Relations$ith Franceand Russia,r84l-54 r8. The Iloly Places,and the Russo-TurkishWsr 19. The crimean IVar 20. The TrcstY of Paris I'rincipal EveDts,1841-56 Futher Rcading
8S
CONTENTS
PART V CLADSTONE, DISRAEI,I AND TIIE BALKANS TO TE?6 2r. DevelopmentB,1856-75 22. The Crisis, 18?6-E: 1815- 1818- 1877- 18?828. The Clisisat Home: ?& quen and,Disrazli - DerW - Disraaw - Aadsttnz Aadrlzry Principal Events, 1856-78 Furthe! R€ading
tzl
PART VI SALISBURY, TIIE AI]LIANCE SYSTEMS. AND GERMANYiS DRIYE TO THE EAST r68 24. The Esstern Question after 1878 25, Britsin erd the Continentsl A.lliances 26. Eg}-I't 97, Th€ Sudan 2S.Afghanistan 29. The Medit€nanan Agreements 80. I'he Armenians, end Sslisbuy's New Line on the Straits 81. The Bagdad nailway 82. Anglo-JapaneseAlliance end Frenco-BritbhEnterte Itincipal Events, 1878-1907 Furth€r Rading PART VII TEE ANGLO,RUSSIAN ENTENTE ANI) ITS LIMITATIONS, 1907-r4 84, Ceneral Fscto$ 84. The Anglo-Russian Entent€ 86. The Bosnisn Crbis, r9o8-9 86. Mscedonie and the Balkan IVaIs 87. Sarsjevo and the Dritt to We! Principal Eventu, 1907-14 PART VIII THE GREAT WAR AND AFTERWARDS 88. British War Airl3 and t}te Middle East 89, the Dardme[6 Bnd Gellipoli 40. Psrtition SchemesaI. Pslestine snd Meeopotsmb 41. Pe8cellesties and Msndhtes 44. Chsnek snd Lau$nne 44. Afterthoughts PrinciFl Events, 1914-28 tr\sther Reading
MAPS The Middle East ir 1821 The GreeL War o{ hd€pendence Eg}?t ond Sl'Tie, r881--ar The Crimean Wa,r The 1876-8 Balksn Clbis Anglo-Russian Rivslry: The Cdticsl Ares, 1870-1907 After the Bslkan Wars, 1912-18 Psltition Schemes,1915Fr7 Savles, anil the B tish and Frcnch MaDdates Constantinople, the St$its snd the Lsusanne Chang€s
40 60 6a llt 141 189 214 228 247 242
199
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The autho! alld publishe$ wish to thaDk Routledge and Kegatr Paul Ltd, Mscmillstr ard co Ltd; Ginn and Co, and Eyle and Spottiswood€ Ltd for FunissioD to quota copyrtht mat€riel.
INTRODUCTION The Eastern Question and Britain
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'lhe Eastem Question becameone of the gr€&t diplomatic prcoccupationsof the nineteeEthcentury. Eminent statesmenof all the g"eat pow€rswerefascinsted, honiffed, infiristed by it. Not only wes the ploblem ine6capa.ble,it was also apparently insoluble. Even some historians - anil siuilents - have r€g&rded jt as an impenetrable tangle of unlikely and far-ofr events, baffiing, ard yet somehow impo*ant. Ihe Balkan area, with its seethingdiscontents,has thus been seenas 'Europe's powder keg', e 'diplomatic time-bomb', myst€riousand da[gerow. Yet the r€ality is Iessfomidable. The possibility of baffem€nt drisessimply becausethe Eastem Questionwas, in a sense,'openended'. It meant difreEnt things to different powels at different pedods of the nineteenth century; but the heart of the problem rcmained unchanging.The decline and pmbable collap8eof the Turkish empire was a diplomatic co[st€nt throughout the period. It had a)ready provoked rivel embitions smong the powels by 1821 (the opening of the Gle€k IndependenceWar). It was still e ms.jorsourceof dispute whenthe Creat War opeded in 1914.Doubts there were&lwaysabout the mte of declirc t,obe cxpected, and sbout whether ffnol collepseshould be hastetred or deLayed.But the eventual diseppealanceof Tbkey's empire, if not of ethnical Turkey itself, wss generally a foregoDeconclusion - cheerfully admitt€d by some powers and. ffercely denied by othe$, eccordingto their pr€vsiling interests, The difficulty was that the decline of Turkey openedup too many possibilities ol advanteg€to too meny powers.It thereforc becemea matter of precisecalculation for esch power to decide
lo
INTNODUCTION
whether the sltineial preservation of Turkey might not be more advantageous than a total colls.pse - in *hich all povcrs would goin something, but none would gain enough to satisfy its 'minimal' needs. Thmughout thc area of Turkcy's empire, the Bdtish, French, Russians,Aust ans werc developingimportant nilitary, political and commerci&linterests by 1821; and th€se intercsts were basically incompatible. The appearance of German and even Italian interest in the alea by the end of the century incrcasedthe possibility of disagreement.Always ther€ was the dangcr of a najor war if any one power seemedto be gaining exclusive advantages from Turkey's decline. The Crimean War wss fought to pre\rent just such an increase in Russion po{'er, The Middle East. over most of which the Turks still nrled in 1821, was, anal is stitl, an area of great strategic and cconomic importance. While the Turkish empire still existed, the powers could happily 1rie with each other in exploiting its wcakness; political iniuence, minor tenitorial gains, ffnancial profft were thei$ more or lcss for the taking Collapse of the Sultan's sutho iy, ho$ever, would m€an a total disintegrstion of the 'was strong enough to dsrc to take it empirc, for no one power over complete. The inevitable result must be an orderly - or more probably disorderly - partition of its lanils among intcrcsted psrties; but dis&ppointment and war seemedthe only ccfiain 'scnmble'. So ffnal a solurewards of any such Midalle Eastern tion, not surprisingly therefore, the powers were rcluctant to press. Mutual fcars and suspicionkept their ambitions secuely in check; and the Turkish empire eventually survived into tlte twentieth century Iargely because it *'as allowed to. Though admittedty sick, it \vas more convenient alive than dead. The Easten Question produced a number of quite distinct quarels betw€en the powcrs over particulsr areas of the Turkish empirc. Dsch one of these is almost an Eastem Question in its own right, 1\4ren Sir John Maniott wrote ir 101?, it very much s€emedto him thax the major issuewas the removal ftom Europe's 'an slien substa.nce . . . soil of a forcign body, or, as he put it, cmbeddedin the fle6hofEurope'- th€ Asietic Turk. The concept of the Turks as eastern barbarians wrongly occupying a corner
'IHE EASTERN QUASTION AND BRITAIN
1l
of Europe was still stmryly held - especially since the Turks wcre, by 1917,open enemiesof the B tish. Crusading spirit hed not quite been forgotten; indeed Gladstonehad done his best to ensure its tdumphant survival. But the nther more prosaic rcality in south-eastem Eurcpe (the Balkan rcgion) was the basic struggle between Russians and Aust ans for control of the lorver Danube anal the Aegean coastline. Ttis continued throughout the period from 1821to the Greot War.Interludes ofeppsEnt cooperation betreen Russia and Austria vere actually forced upon them by their need to combine against Polish or Hungodan or, more sigrificantly in the second half of the period, Bs.lkan nationalism. Balkan nationalists werc prcsumptuous enough to want the Balkans forthemselves, folloving the expectedTurkish retreat. They found to their cheedn thtrt Russia end Aushia \r'erc quite willing to ect together in 1876-7, say, and 1912-14, to disappoint theirhopes ond to ensue that real decision-making rcsted with the great polvers still. Nevcrtheless, this AustmItussian padnership was an afrair ofconvenience,not love. 'I'heAustro-Russianconflict in the Balkans was one ofthemore obvious aspectsoftbe Eastem Question. It lvas sometimeseven of special intercst to the British, vhenev€r thcy lelt the need to l{}nd support to the Austrians or to keep thc Russians out of Constantinople.Of rather morc real intercst to B tain, however, was the conflict with France over North Africa, especiallythe NiIc valley and the Suez isthmus. Navsl strstegy and control of trade mutes were at issue here. The }feditenancan and the Red Sca (or the Euph€tes Persian Gulf alt€rnative) Fovided the 'short rcute to India'. about which so mDch B tish concern wa.6 cxpressedduring the nineteenth century (and cven until 1947). Fears for the safety of this route also bmught the British into conflict with the French - and with Russians and finally Germans too - in the area of Turkey-in-Asia, particularly Sltia, Armenia, tr{esopotamio.After the B tish occupied Egl pt in 1889, the future of Turkey-in-Asis was their only scrious interest. \Yhat for long ye&rs seemcd the crucial issue, however, especialty in Arglo-Russisn relations, was the question of who should control Constantinople.This geat city was both Turkish capital
t2
INTRODUCTION
and gnaralienofthe nar?ow se&route between th€ Black Seaand the Mediternnean. Controlling Constantinople might simply gaining influence over the Sultsn's government; it might fmean also mean expelling the Sultan and taking po$ession of the 1 I Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardoneltcs). \Yhcthcr or not the Su.ltsnrcmained at Constentinople,both Britsin And Russia felt ir the nineteenth century thot they rnust be oblc to control the passageoI wa$hips and merchent ships through thc Stroits; or et the verv least each felt it must DrevcDt thc othcr from geining such control, This was partly e rnntter of guanntceing the freedom of trade routes ; it wos rather nrore a mattcr of bcing able to epply diplomatic prcssure by thc usc of coercion at a the lugular vein' or 'Achillcs hecl' $pproach. decisive point The Bleck Seaformed a sort of natural arcna rvhcrc Britain and Russia could most conyeniently wage their power strugglcs.The B tish wsnted to get their warships in, and to stop the Russians getting out. The Russians wanted to get their wa.rships out ond to stop the British getting in. By controlling the passsgcof thc Straits, the Black Seacould bemsde eithelinto an €xtcndcdpart of the Mediterranean or irlto an enclosedinland lake, $hichever best suited the neeals of the successful po\r€r. It v.os al$ays a great dis&dvantageto the British, Lowevcr, that Constantinople, r the ossumedkey to this magic predominance,was built on the inslcadof on. say. lhc A\;al ic I eulopeanshor. of the Bosphorus. I bhore of the Dardanelles.Jf onlv Constantine had cho*en I difrerently, the Sultan's capital miiht then have bee,n so much t--fess rrnnerable to Russien atteck, and so much more accessible to British influence. It was partly this sad faci ol histoly - or geogaphy - which p€rsuaded the British at last to modify their attitude to Russia over Constantinople.By the end of the nineteenth century, the fate of the Sultan's capilal no longer aroused great passionsin London. By 1915, Constantinople lvas being offered by the B tish (who did not yet possessitl) to Russia. In addition to the strategic conflicts in European, Asiatic aDd Aflican provinces of the Turkish cmpire, the ninet€enth centuy s&w a growing intemational ivalry therc prcvoked by economic imperialism. Dade was groving with the empirc itself, cnd there
'IHD E.4.STERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN
l8
was, too, en expanding tlsde which passed through it en route for eastern Europe, Centrsl Asia, Persia, India, China. Goode from the Far East and eastem Europe (including Russia) also passed via trgypt or Mesopotamia or the StEits to westem Iturope, The British werc determined to hold on to, and perhaps extend, the major shsrc they hed aheedy securedin this tDde, in spite of possible Frcnch or German - or erren Austria or llussian - competition. They were equally prepared to join in the msh to exploit the investment possibilitiesin the Ttrkish empire, an aspect of economic impedalism that developed especiallyin the second hslf of the nineteenth century. Besides lending money to the govemment, opportunity for forcign ba.nkers snd construction lirms could make exciting proffts out of nilway, canel, industrilrl snd shipping developments. Only in the last twenty yesrs of the century, when the B tish were losing faith in Turkey's ability to survive at all, did they allow the initi&tive in iDvestment to fill to their chicf rivals, the Frcnch and the Germans. The e.onomic clem.nt in the East m Qucstion was probably never uppemost in the calculations of the geat powels. Strategic intcrcsts, thc military exploitation ofland and searoutes through thc Middle East, genenlly predominated. Yet it is hard, perbaps impossible,to assessprecisely the relative importance ofall the factors - military, political, commercial, religious, nationalist \\.hich influenced the goyemments oi the gr€at powers from time to time in making their d€cisions on the Eastem Question. Whs,t is certain is tbat intercst in tmde and military mutes ws.s very closcly linked. The British, for example, lyanted to control t,lre short route to India both becawe it gave them a decisive military advantage over oth€r poweN, and also because continued tnde Nith India was thought vital to British prosperity. The decline of the Turkish empire would clearly have aroused far less concem but fo} the culious geogEphy of the Middb Aast. fhe Darmw $€terways - the Aegean Sea, the Stmits, the PeNian (:ull and the Euphmtes, the Real Sea and the Suez Canal - weft ,)f cmciel interest to a seapowcr.If the Bdtish wished both to kcepthe cosstsof Europe under closesupervision(the distinctive nrilitary threat on $hich much of tlrcir diplomatic weight really
J I
l I
14
INTNODUCTION
depended)and to eafeguard accesst,o India, then, it was essum€d, they must control these $'eterways. Th€ use of steam ships made this even more imperative - since sailing vessels had not s.lways been able to make use of them in conditions ol contmry wind or curent. Whjle there are nenow waterways in the Middle Eost, there are also narrow land-bridges, which must be of spccial interest to major land powers like France, and especially, Russia and G€rmany. A seapower'scommunicationsin the Middle East depend on its ability to keep such land-bridges in friendly hands. This explains why there was so much British interest in the Suez isthmus (even before the building of the canal), in S]'ria (between the M€diterranesn and the Duphrat€s) and in Armenia (betweer the Black Seaand the Euphratcs). Strong, and generallysuccessful, efforts were made in 1840, 18?8 1907 and 1914-18 to keep exactly these areas out of Fr€nch, Russian or German contrcl. Besides geographical factors, racial and religious issues w€re also important in the decline of Turkey, palticularly in the B&lkans. In thi6 r€spectRussiahad a quite specialposition, since many of Turkey's Belkan subjects were, like the Russians, of Slav mce, and most of them were also Orthodox Christians !r'ho expected 'Iloly' Russia to fulfil her spiritusl mi$ion a.nd frce them from rule by Itloslem Turks, Consbntinople was not only the Sultan's capital, it was still, conveniently, the Holy City of the Orthodox Chureh. Even the French had rediscovered spiritual duties in the Middle East, where the Latin monks in Palestine and the Christian Arabs of the Lebanon looked for Fr€nch support. The British, horvever, had no very obvious racial or religious connections to provide the necessary spur. Itey did, nevertheless,decide - suddenly, in 1914 - that'the noble Arab' end not 'the good old Turk' was the proper reprcsentative of the Moslem faith, and that the Ara.bs of Syria and Mesopotsmia oughi therefore to be freed fiom Turkish lule. Awareness of Old Testarnent lorecasting also pe$uaded them - fs.irly suddenly, in lgu - thst the Jews ought to have a British-iNpired home itr Palesiine, Ther€ was never sny indication ftom the Arabs of Sltia and Mesopotamia, or the returning Je\,vsin Palestine, that they were hoping to enjoy the benetits of Bdtish nrle once the Tmks had
THE EASTERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN
beenexpelled. Nor did the Orthodox Slavs in the Balksns look forwerd to the day when they could sewe Russian, instead ol Turkish,mssters.Yet that is what happenedto A-rabsand Jews in 1920,end to the Balkan peopl€s,aft€r 1945particularly. Ilscial and religiousfactors were of €specialv&lue to Russiein her drive towerds the Straits, IIer position es e Black Seapo$,er with no assuredsccessto the Medit€naneangaveher, also,stmng military and economicmotives for 'lvishingto end l\rkey's rule ovcr Constartinople. Yet the Russianspreferred to sees *eak, and preferably dependent,Turkey suryivc there,mther than have anotherpower- Britain, say, or Germany- establisha Middle East€rn suprcmacy following the disappearence of Turkey. Clearly, the Eastem Question could not be solved until all the powers could agreeamong themselveson what they lsanted to seercplacing the Turkish empire; and such agreement proved quite impossibleto reach,excepttempom ly in 1919 20. The C meanlvar, the 1878Congressol Berlin and, in part, the Creat War of 1914-18a[ illustrutedifferentpowers'attemptsto settle the Eestem Questionon their o1'1rr terms. None ofthem had any lasting success,and th€ Middle East power struggle is still going on - though the Turkish empire itself cameto an end in 1920. I'or B tain, as for othels,there wereobviouslymsny'Eastem Questions'during the nineteenth century; and at any one time there could be severaldifferent interpretationEof what Turkey's dccline might mean to Bdtsin. In these circumstances,policymaking was often reduced to a sort of inspircd guess-vrorkin decidingbetweenvariouspossiblecoursesof action. Successive statesmenafter 1821produc€da diversity ol (temporory)solutions, varying from alliance with Russia against Turkey to alliance with Turkey agsinst Russia.Canningprefcrred a careful policyoflimited coopemtionwith the Russians againstthe Trrks which was meant to weaken lurkey (by helping the creeks) without strengtheningRtrssia. Welington, however, could proposenothing beyond a sort of apprehensiveneutrality. Both Palmerston and Disr&eli committed themselvesto s policy of contsining Russia, and both were prepared to lend conditional
r 16
INTRODUCTION
support to Turkey to achieve this. Gladstone wantcd to use the Eastem Question to produce a new quality of common pupose emong the povers, basedupon (his own) higher moral principles, which would be strongly criticat of Turkish (anti-Christian) barbadties. Salisbury and his successors wcre prcpared to be coldly realistic, and to begin a cautious discngagement from any profftless responsibilities in the Middle East, while ot the samc time vigorously pursuing 1That they su1vas truer Bdtish interests there. This might well me&n (and did) that Britain rnust make limited agreements with other powers, allorving them to take t€rito al or economic compensstion for the Bdtish gains ir EglTt, the Sudan and the Persian Culf. Ilventually, the collapse ofTurkey, Germany, Austria and Russia, and the near-collapse of France, in the Great War (together'lvith U.S. isolationism) alowed the B tish s, freel hand in the 0na1 partition than the rildest dreamer in the Salisbury period could possibly have hoped, Changingconditions diplomatic,military, technical also entailed considerableshifts of emphasisin policy. The problems of Palmerston's day, for exemple, rver€ in several respects quite differcnt fmm those faced by Salisbury. The relative strengths of the powers hsd chenged markedly between, say, 1850 and 1890. Technical adyancesin land and seatraDsport and in navel and militsly wespons had greatly altcred both the prospect of war-making and the patt€m of intemational trading; but thc initial difficulty often wss to peNuade ministeN and public to accept these fsct6 and to avoid providing yesterday's answels to today's questions. Two fairly constant attitudes csn be idcntified, ho\vever,in the British vicw of the Eastem Questionthroughout the pedod from the Revolutionary War to 192a. Th€ first is eoncern for the maintenance of a balance of power in [urope. The second is concern for the safety of India. If &ny one pow€r France or Russia in the early nineteenth becamc centuy, Russia or Germany in the early twentieth msster of Turkey, then its strength as s Europ€an state might increase beyond Britain's power to control, even with allies The B tish answer to this d&nger between 1798 and 1833 was n&vol conttol of the eastem Meditenanean, based on posscssion
AHE EASTERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN
l7
of Malta and the Ionian islands. th€ answer alt€r 1888, and until about 1806, was naval contml plus friendship with Turkey, in an attempt to slow down the rat€ of Turkish decline. Bet\reen 1815 and 1907, the gre&te6t single threat to the Eumpean balance appear€dto be Russia. To deny Russia possessionof Constant! nople, and a safe passage into the Meditenanean, seemed to be the eesiest way open to Britain of rest cting Russian expansion. But by 1896, it wss accepted that the fleet on its own was no longer able to keep the Russiansout ol Constantinople,and thst the Turks, wilfully unreformed and barbarcus still, were unworthy of British friendship. In any case, Russian expansion in Centml Asia snd the Far East was now arousing far more concem, New policies had to be adopted theEfore, the more so as Cermen contrcl of Turkey also became increasingly apparent. The answer agreed to by Salisbury was to withdraw fmm involvement in the affeirs of th€ Balknns and the Straits, to eccept the inevitebility (cven desilability) ofe Turkish collapse, and meanwhile to occupy those parts of Turkey which controlled the routes to Inalie, Paradoxicaly, by 1900it wasBritain's Asietic 16le- her possession of India - which seemed to give her most stetus as a European power, and so helped her to naintain a Euopean balance, Defence of Indi& in the fust half of the nineteenth centurv v.a6 .hiefly a matler of ensuring tbat the sca routes to it were 6afe ftom attack. In the second halt with India,s importance to Bdtsin increasing, and with Russian forces moving mpidly into CeDtral Asia, it was also a matter oi guarding the Indis[ frontiels fmm lendward attacks which might be launched through persia and Afghanistan. After the 1820s, naval conhol of the trfediterranean was not only concemed with the Eumpean balance. The development ol steamships and lail.lvays meant that the Meditermnean and the Red Sea and Persian Gulf also became the chief routes to India fiom Bdtain. The opening of the Suez Canel in 1869 emphasized this importsnce. Tbe policy of preser-ving a friendly Turkey seemedto Palmerston the best means of pueranteeing thF ssfety of thoserouLes.So Britain !cfed aeainsfFrance rnd Mehemet Ali in 1840(as she had against Bonap;rrc in rZ98). ond against Russia in 1854, 6. Disraeli, still ffghting Palmerstonian
d=
l8
INTRODUCTION
battles, opposedRussia again in 1878; but by this time, others in Britain were beginning to accept that Herat, in northern Afghanistan, and not Constantinople,was thc ncw'key to India'. After this, B tish policy on thc Eastern Questionwas increosingly a matter of seeling off othcr powels' land routes to India by assumins responsibility for the defence of Turkish Armenia (tempola ly), Palcstine and Mesopotamia.Occupation ol Eg}?t in 1882 1vss perhrps th€ biggest single reeson for Britoin's diminished concern in the fate of Constantinople. Practical coDtrol of the SuezCem.lgaveBritishforcesaflexibilityposs€ssed by no otLer powcr. TIrerc seemealflrr less puryose in pursuing a doubtful stntegic advantege st the Straits now thrt such :L massive one had been goined in Egypt, There was. as has bcen said earlier. an obvious economic interest (in addition to political and strat€gic conccms) bchind B tain's involvement in thc Eostem Question. The rout€s to Indio wer€ tradc rcutes, as well as routes for warships and armies ; and the expanding China trade followcd the samc route through the Midtlle East. In addition, there was a valuable trade between Bdtain and the 'I'urkish empire itself (establishcdin 1553, but basically a nineteenth-centuy development) which the collapsc of the empire might well end. llany British goods bould for eastern and central Europe passedvia Constantinople into thc Danube. Political upheavals in the trIiddle East were not good for hade, nor dial they make for sound investments - and British investment in the Turkish empire declined siglriffcgntly in the leter yeers of the nineteenth centuly. In the twertieth century, however, oil from the PeNisn Gulf provided an important ne]Y rceson why Britain wished to keep other powers out of the area. Oil was not only profitable to refine analsell, it also providcd the bosic tucI of th€ Royil Navy efter 1912. Technical and militery developments,it has been indicated, helpcd greatly to change the nature of the Easteln Question du ng thc nineteenth century. The appe&nnce ofmass conscript armies, and the building of the Suez Canal, stret€gic raihvays and steam-driven iron-hull€d varships altercd the balaDce of forces available in thc Middle East, IfcontraN winds and currents,
THE EASTERN QUESTlON AND BRITAIN
19
for exsmple, were no longer a considemtion in forcing a passage of the Dardanelles, torpedoes and mines soon were. Again, conscript armies vere something Britsin could compete*'ith only by bringing trcops from India via the SuezCanal. By the end of the century completely nerl' vie$s of naval ancl troop movements in the tr{iddlc Erst htrd to be sccepted. British policy had to be constantly adjusted to meet these j clrnging circumstances.It could not be both static and successful but it was for ovcr fffty y€ars tumly weddcd to the belief that Russian contrcl of Constantinople must always be prcvented. An exaggcratcdfear of Russia !r'asst the root ofmany ofBritain's decisionson theEastemQuestionoverthelengthy period between 1891 and 1907; and the Anglo-Russian clash came to dominate all other intcmational rivalrics produccd by Turkey's decline, Russiawas fearedeveryx hereand for everything; as the oppressor of Poland, as an anti-liberal autoqacy, as an insatiably expaniionist power in Central Asia and the Far East as well as Turkey. It cost the Libenl party much heart-searchingfls late ss 1914 to eccept th&t Britain should fight alongsideRussia and against Germany in the Great War. Yet, the British troops in Galliloli ilr 1915 were fighting against Germans and Turks ]argely for the benefit of Russis - in order to give her Consiantinolle. And hen Lod Blron died st Missolonghi in 18?4, he and other British volunteers vere fighting ,with Russie'6 approval to free Greeks fmm Turkish nrle, NevertLel€ss, the involvement of Britain in the Eastem Question meant a century of Anglo-Russiar hostility, ftom lfissolonghi to Galipoli, punctuated by only short pe ods of coopcmtion. Wherc cooperation did occur, it ?s usuelly the rcsnlt of n Russian initiative. For the sad truth is that the East€m QuestjonitsclfmigLt lvell have beenrcsolvcd even bclore 1850 by means of an agr€ed and realistic partition of Turkey if only Russian suggcstions to Britain had not met with an almost automatic reiection. In the end, thc B tish did take what the Russianshad earlier been rccommcnding; by her occupstion of Cyprus and Egypt, it g'as Britain herselfvho really begenthe fin€|, piecemealpartition of Turkey. The progressof her &mries
20
INTRODUCTION
in Palestine and lfesopotamia during the Cr€ot War - 6nd the remarkable, though temporary, absencc of serious rivals ensuredan almost total B tish control of the Middle East by the time the Turkish empire ]trasdissolvedin 1920. Russia,following her rcvolutions and defeat in the var, did not gain eveDCoDstsntinople. Much has been writte[ on the various aspects of the Eestern Question, but only two major works in English try to cover mole or les6 the whole story, Sir John trIarriott's ?r, Ea,stzrnQuestion: an Histpri,cal Studg ifu Ewopan Diplamacg, publisLcd in t9l7, deals at length with the Turkish problem from its bcginnings iD the fourtecnth and ffftcenth centuries through to the Greot War. M. S. Arrderson's balanccd and autho tative book The Ea$tetn Qaestrion,published in 1966, begins with the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 ana continues as far as the Lausanne tr€aty of 1023. Apart from these two genenl works, th€re is s lerge number of works on spccializcd themes, dealing with individu&l pe ods or problems. Biographical stat€smen and pafiicdar studies of Canning, Palm€rston, Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury can be of much value in clarifying different approaches to the Eastem Question. trIajor works like H. W. V. Temperley's on ihe pre'C mean Wsr period, or B. H. Sumner's on the 1870s are immensely useful; so are the appropriate sections in recent studies ol British foreign policy such as C. J. L owe's The Reluctant lrnperialists (1a7a 1902) and D. C. M. PLrLtt\ Finance, Tmdz and, Poriticr (1815-1914),and sectionsin the older works of Temperley and Penson and R. W. Seton-Watson. Ceneral diplomatic histories, A. J. P, Taylor's Thc Struggh Jor Maslerg in Europe and the two W. L, Langer volumes, for €xample, prcvide a detailed an8.lysisof the forces motivating all the powers in dealing with the Eastem Question, and help to s€t the B tish 16l€ in its proper perspective. Special studies of sea-porver, Suez, oil, economic impedalism, Middle Eastern nationalisn, and succinct investigations into Britain's activities in the l{iddle East - like those of Sir Reader Bullad, Elizabeth l{onroe, Ann Willians are extremcly worthrvhile aids to understanding. Relevant
THE EASTERN QUDSTION AND BRITAIN
chapters in the 'New Cambridge Modem History' sre always worth reading. J. C. Hurewitz has provided a most illumiDating collection of documcnts in Diplamatg in lhe Near and Midd,le tair, cove ng the period 1585-1956,while M. S, Anderson has now published a shotef collcction i^ Ihe Great Pouen anil thc Neat East, 1774-1923. St'teral useful articles in learned journals are not included in the recommended reading lists, simply because such lists c:ln easily become unleslistically long. Itefercnce to them c6n certeinly be found, hovevcr, in the excellent biblio$aphies contained in e number of the books that are listed. The Eastern Questionhad already beenadiplomotic issueolsome importance in the eighteenth ccntury. Turkey's decline haal become apprrent as early os the treaty ol Carlorvitz in 1699. Though Britnin's concem in the Eastem Question wa6 slight bcfore 1798 (the battle of the Nile), the Austrians and Russisns had aheady by then fought Turkey with $eat success and had lrrcn important terdtorics and privileges from her in the Block Seasrea and the Balkans. Part I in this book vill briefly exsmine the condition of th€ Turkish cmpire before the Greek Independence War - in ordcr, primarily, to demonstrate the nature of British. Russian. French and Austrian interests in the Middle East up to that point. The attitudes adopted by thc powe$ before 1821 v€ry largely governed their policies &fterwards - by which time thc Eastern Question had becomea subject of major concern in internationsl afisirs,
7 TURKE!'S
PART I The Eastern Ouestion up to 1821
[1]
TURKEY' S
DECLINE
The decline of Turkey in the eightcenth century was mrde apparent by her regular fs.ilure to win wars against Austria and lossofher EuroRussia;and defeo.fiD rvarmeanta progrcssive pean ter tory. The aggrcssivcnilitary spirit of the Turks had twice broughtthem to the gotcsoi Vienna,the secondtime as recently as 1688;but they advancedno further. By 1718the Ilabsburgs had becn able to cxtend their po\ter from Austria eastwsrds acmss Hungary and Transylvania. The treaty of Carlowitzin 169$markcd the tust Habsburg advancesjthat of Psssurowitzin 1718contumedtheir captureof vast areasof Turkey-in-Europc. The Russians, meanwhile, had bcgun a grodual progresstowards Constantinopleand the Meditcranean. Men Azov was captured by Peter the Great in 1696,Turkey's control o{the Black Scacoastalregionswasaheadythreatened. Thoughthe Turks rccapturcdAzov in 1?ll, it rvasrcstorcdto Russiaat the €nd of yet anothe war ir 1739. The pftttcm wasnow established.In two morc wals later in the century, Turkcy's lorces could achieve no more than gallsnt retreats. Further stretchesof her European lands passealinevitably into Russianor Austrian coDtml.By the important Kutchuk Kainardi treoty of u74, Russia.scquir€d s lengthy Black Sea coost,rnd won useft ly impreciserights to protect Chlistians
I
DECLINE
within the Sultan's dominions. So confiilcnt were the Russians and Austrians of ultimate success that Tsarina Catherine and Joseph II were able, in 1782, to prcpose a complete partition .-, plan for the Turkish empiF. The Crimca bccamc Rus\ian in l783. ( But &lready it was app&rent thrt too much Austrc'Russian successmight well produce friction betwcen the tllo padners. The ddngcr would particulsrly arise when the future status of tle Dsnube delta and of routes through to the Aegean csme to be settl€d. The Turks quickly rcalizcd that their best hopes for surviv!.1 lay in playing off their enemies.Such tactics served them wetl throughout the nineteenth ccntury. Double-dealing and infuristing obstinacy beeame the esscntial chamcte stics of their diplomacy. For most of the eighteenth century, and particr arly bet'iveen 1740and 1798,the only power on whom the Turks could generally rely for diplomatic support wes France. From France, too, they rcceived much-needed military advice, thougb there was never any direct military assistance.Bonaparte's invasion of Dg)?t in 1798 broke these ties, howev€r, and Turkey for a time found herselftoking part in the Revolutionary War as an ally ofRussia rnd Austria against France, But her loyalties inevitobly wavered, and by 1806, she was once more at war (unsuccessfully)sgainst Russia. \Vhen thc treaty of Bucharcst was signed in 18u,--l / Bcssarabia pessedfrom Tukey to Russia - lvhich meant that v RussianBlack Seatcrritory now stretched as far as the mouth of I the Danube. Serbia also became autonomou By this time, however, the Turks had acquired a new (though as yet somewhat undecjded) supporter, in the form of Britain. Whereas in 1??0 the B tish activcly encouraged a Russian victory ov€r Turkey's fleet, by 1791, Wiliam Pitt had beguDto worry about the exteDt of Russian anrbition in the Black Sea aree. In l?99 and agein in 1809, the British bound themseh'es (temporarily) to defend Turkey from France, In 1798, when defeating a Frcnch fleet in the battle of tLe Nile, the B tish ndvy had won control of the eastem trIedi tenancan ; and Britain rias now able, therefore, to ioin Russia, Austria and France in dcciding the future of the Turkish empirc. Thc morc interest
24
TUAKEY'S DECLINE
THE EASTDRN QUESTION UP TO T82T
that France end Russia,particularly, norv took in scizingTurkish liend6,the more likely was it that B tain might lcnd military a66istanceto Turkey - in order to ftstrain thc continent poweN. By the beginning ofthe nineteenth century, tllen, thc continued diminution of Turkish tenitory was perhsps o littl€ lessincvitable then it had seemed. In the decline of Turkey, extcrnal prcssurcs werc oLviously a decisive factor. Intelnal wes.kness,however, ensurcd th&t she could not rcsist her enemiesmore effectively. In thc nineteenth ce$tury, much hung on whether this int€mal weakness were permanent, or whether it could be removcd by a vigorcusly refoming Sllltrn. Eighteenth-century Turkey was in the grip of a total conscrvatism- political, spiritual and military. Sultans and their Gland VizieN wer€oftenthe merepuppets of€ntr€nched fsctions. Zealous trIoslemsin the rcligious hierarchy felt it thcir duty to rcsist all forms of change. The Janissaries, a powerful clique in the army originally mude up of capturcd Ch stians, {ere quite rcady to rcmove a Sultan, or any of his ministc$, who dared to propose reforms. Both the army and th€ lravy, not surprisingly, began to fall far behind the new standards of elfrciency pmctised by the European powen. Complacency, conuption and place-seeking were the distinguishing leatures of Turkish s.dministration. Selim III, Sultnn ftom 1787 to 1807, began a deliberate reforming programme, holv€ver, designed to increase his control over the provinccs of the empirc and to bring Turkey idto iine with European standards of government. For his intempemnce, he was deposedand murdered by conservative opponents. His cousin trIahmud II (r8o8-39) beganmore cautiously.Ile did not presume to introduce his oun reforms until he hsd org&nized the murdcr ofat lcast 5,000 Janissaircsin 1826. With e little foreign advicc for such a promising Sultan, horvevcr, it was apparent that Turkey might yet be modemized and taught to rcsist her €xtemal enemiesmore successfrly. Such was the hopc of Lod PalmeNton aft€r 1833; but it was a major difficulty still to txy to ensure that Turkey could control her outlying provinces,and
I
l I
i
to encoura.ge the Turks to discover o method of disciplining their lray$r's,rd Christian subjccts oth€r than the traditional periodic massacre. To the annoyance of the Turks, their Sultans increasingly became the puppcts, not of Turkish factions, but of one or other of the great powers, who chosc to educate, or exploit, or intimidate, as the occasiondemanded. The growth of separatist feeling in all perts of the Ttrrkish empire was another sfnptom of general decline during the eighteenth century, The sheer size of the empire and the diversity of its subjects had always made centralized administration diflicult; but by the 1780s,large areas had already obtained, or vished to obtsin, practical indepcndenccftom Constantinople. Whelever therc was a sepamtist movement, and a minimum of cont.ol by the Sultan, the way was also open to int€rvention by an interested Eurcpean power. In North Afiica, Algier6, Tunis snd Tripoli were sutonomous, and th€ Manluk beys were running Egypt. In sll those areas, France hoped to establish her influence. Bonaparte's attsck on Egrut \vas thc beginning of the process, ond Algiers was eventually occupied in 1840 and Ttrnis in 1881. The strategic importance of Egypt, however, meant that French hopes there werc continually countcred by the Bdtish, who backed the Msmluk beys unsuccessfully against the ftench puppet Mehemet Ali (1804 r0), but ev€ntually occupicd the country in 1882, having already tamed lfehcmet Ali in 1840. In Durcpe, the Rumanians ol Moldavia and Wallachia very lareely lan their own afrails ulder a Greek Eospoderj but the Russians obtain€d special protective rights therc in 17?4, and thetu armics occupied these two Principalities six times b€tween 1774 and 1878, The Selbs, too, Ivon autonomy - with general diplomatic support from Russia-by 1812.In their case,lreedon vus gained by ffghiing the Turks; snd, ir spite of fierce rivalry betn'e€n the two lcading families (Kars George and Obrenovich), Serbia remaincd autonomous until 1878.In that year, when the llussians had once agoin defeated Turkey, Serbia became nominally independentj but she rcmained until 1914 a satellite of either the Habsbugs or tlle Russians.Other Selbs living ir llosniu ruere a.iu"lly under Hsh.burg conlrol frcm 1878
7 2B
TIIE EASTERN QUESTION UP TO IA2I
to 1918 - as a rcward for their rebellior agoinst Turkey in t475. The fiIst of all Turkey's Buropean subjects to win complete independencewere the Crceks.Rich, well-organized,with a large mcrchant fleet a.nda prominent palt in the Sultan's government, teading Greeks rverc ready to press for frccdom in the u90s' Ho$'cm, tbe Greeknationalist society(Prild[, Zrkidd)foundcd in 1814,was basedin Russia, not Greecc,and the Rtssians were only too willirg to support tlte Grcek determination to recapture Constantjnoplc for the Orthodox Church; but the geogroPhical position of Greccc meant tlDt Russia could not tske all the responsibility forfrecing Greeksfrom Turks. F€nce and Britain, who could bring sea po{er to bcar, were also involved; ond Creecevery taxgelyo{ed her completeindependence,as opposed to autonomy, to the fact that she did Dot foll neatly into any onc po{'er's assumed sphere of influence. Indeed, by the time the Gr.eekIndepcndence War began in 1821, the British werc already det€rmincd to lemit no turthel ext€nsions of Russian thc Turks could not hold had bctter bccome power, $lnt inrlependent,espcciallyif it had Mcditerranean s€acoasts\r'hich could provide the Russians with naval bases. Future losscs of terdtory by Turkcy v'ere evidently going to be thc rcsult, not of isolated \var6 and trcaties, but of carefully balsnced adjustments {Lgreedupon by the pow€rs. Turkey's declin€ might not necessarily be helted, but at least it would no longer bc un' controlled,
[2] THE INTERESTS OF TIIE POWERS Rrusia Gcogr:Lphy and a sense of spidtual destiny explain Russia's involvement in the Eastem Question during the eighteenth ccntury. In 1700, Russia tas still virtualy a landlocked state. IIcr Arctic coast was frozen for over half the year; and her toe_
TIIE INTERESTS
OF TI{E POWERS
27
hold on th€ Seaof Azov did not give her occessto the Black Ser, since the Turks still held the Strsits ol Kcrch. Peter the Creat wtrs detennined to traDsform Russia into a maritime tr&ding nation, however. His successs.gainstthe Sweaesallowed him to sain a Boltic coast and to build St Pcte$burg as a pod as well as & new capital. Yet the Baltic also frcezcs.Uninterrupted access to the oceans of the $orld could only come by gaini g control of the Bleck Sca and the rcute tluough to the Mediterraneen, Not until th€ secondhalf of the eighteenth centuly did Russia 'Ihe developmake significant progressin this direction, hov'ever. ment of grain cxports from thc Ukraine after 1772:rnd the foundDti(n! of Od€ssain u9{ then gnve an economicjustification for h€r pressureegainst TurLey. IIcr mcrchant ships could sail on thc Black Se:Lafter Kutchuk Kainardji, It wss important to ensure that thcy could always pass through the Bosphorus and the Dards.nclles into the trIcditermnean, After 1783, she also kcpt wa$hips on the Black Sca; but these the Turks would not allow to pass through the Stnits, eicept es a temponry measue during the allisnce against France in 17sg. Unlll-Russian warsl,ipslvercable to usat he Strairsfreely.il,cy.ould nol p)ayafull po"i ii' ;nt.-rnurion,rtivars or dip)omacy, Equ" y imporlrnl, to Russiarvas lhe dcs'trabilityof keeping lhe ivanlrips of other por-eri oui of ihe BLc[ Sea. Russian control of Constantinolle could then be either a cciuld achiive boih otjects. fhtsar:'its iaffi-iorf oi iin
28
THE EASTI]RN QUESTION UP TO T82T
of 'IlolyRussia' had to be brought intoplay. Judiciouspaltitions, and a system ol control via satellite Ch stian states v'os the proposed solutio$ which Cathedne urged Joseph II to agree to in 1782. The fact that Constantinople was the lloly City of Orthodox Rumanians,Bulgariansand Greeks,aswellas Russians, wss wo lerfully convedent. Cathe ne proposeals new, united Rumania under her Javourite, Potemkin, and a revived Greek €mpire ba6ed on Constantinople to be ruled by her grandson, who had oheody been suitably ch stened Constentine. It was not so di{Ter€ntfronr the Belksn position eventually estsblished by Russis after l9{5, \lhen Communism had taken the place of Orthodox Ch stienity ss the moral justification. It is hard to cstablish exs.ctly how far the spiritual duty ot removing thc Turks from Constantinople wes taken se ously by Russia's rulcrs in thc eightecnth century, that is, the extent to which thcy bcliel'ed ir their own propagande, The same mey be said both of the Pensl&vist sentiment made use of in the nineteenth ccntury, and of Communism itself, of course. But to be fair, the Russians wcrc putting forward plans for the oveF thrcw of Turkcy and the reestriblishment of ByzsDtine power long before thcy had rny economic or strstegic reason for so doing. Ihere was an elcmcnt of g€nuine rcligious €nthusiasm in the Russian plans for the reconquest o{ the Balkans in the sir(teenth century. Russian Tsars maintained the splendours of Byzantine pogeantry in their coronation ceremonies right to the end; and their claim to be the rcol heirs of Romor Caesars, first made in 1480,was given extre force by the Hebsbwgr' ebandonment of the lloly Roman Empire in 1804. Belief in e divinely inspired destiny is a familiar enough illusion in an ambitious geai power; but the speciDl nature of Russia's destiny did give her e uniquely privileged position in dealing with Turkey, and the msgnitucle of her claims was reason enough for Britain to fear her by 1821, if B t{Lin wished to prevent the rise of a new dominant continental Dower.
TIIE INTERESTS
OF TI{E POWERS
Austrid In the cighteenth century, the Habsburgs' tcritorial ambitions in south-eastem Europe were concemed with delence rather than with simple land-hunger or even tmiling hopes. Not until the ninetirenth century did the Danube really become important to them as a trade artery, snd it I'as only in the early twentieth ccntury that control of a railway route through to Salonika began to seem vital. Austfia never had any claim to rule in Constantinople such as Russia could advance. She never became a naval power'lyhose possible control ofthe Straits could appear dangerous to Britain. Yet the Ilabsburgs, because of the two Turkish attacks on Vienna in l5?9 and 1684, achieved the status of defenders of Christendom from th€ Asiotic hordes. It wss they who begar the process of throwing back the Turks; and the senseof uprcoting an alien conqueror from European soil was strong jn them, as indeed it beceme among the Ru6sis.ns. Ilabsburg control of ule lower Danubc, and the Dlave and Save river valleys, rvas designed to guarantee Yi€nna's safety from furth€r Turkish attacks. Similorly, Joseph II's willingness to tske both Turkish and Polish tcnitory later in the century was largely defensive in origin; onty by this time he was as much concern€d to ke€p his ovcr-mighty Russian partn€r at a distance as he was to chcck the Turks. Thc prospect ol Russian influence in the two hincipalities - and therefore at the mouth of the DaDubc - was never welcomc to the Austrians. When€ver Aushia acted with Russia on the Turkish issue, she did so to keep an eye on a dangerous rival, rather than to help a friend. Yct, defensive though Habsburg stmt€gy primarily was, there *'as a minor element of aggression too; and this was chiefly a matter of compensetionfor disappointmentselsewherc.By 1648, the Habsburgs' claim to mastery of Germany was gtowing thin. Conquest of Hungary and Ttansylvania provided some degree of consolation. The end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1804 further emphasizcal the limit&tions of l{absburg power in ccntral Europe. Defeet by France (1850)end Prussie (1866)left Austfia only one area in which she could hope to schieve a dominant
f 30
TIIE INTERESTS
TIIE EASTERN QUESTION UP TO T82!
position. Thc urge to controt Serbia, Bosnia snd western llfacedonia lvas at its strongest betveen 1866 and 1914. Interestingly, Serbia and Bosnia rvcre abeady alotted to her in the abortive padition prcposalsof1782; nnd shewes plunningthe annexation of tbe two Principalitirs during the Crnncan War - not only to block the Ilussiansbut also to ensurcthc obedienceof Rumadsns she already ruled in Transylvania. Uilitarily, bowever, Austria had $-onall her spectacularsucccsses beforc 1718.Such advsD(es as she made after 1866 she was alowed to makc by B tain, or Gelmany, and this only becausc she provided a convenient alternative to Russia in the westem Balkans. Neith the help of friends nor the cforts of her own governm€nts, horvevcr, could rcmowethe basicweaknessof Aust a, that is, the ncial tensions within her cosmopolitan population. The morc tsalkan tcnitory she took, the morc problems she gave herself. In the end, Balkan nationalism destroyed not only the Turkish but the Austrian €mpire ss vell.
Fraru:e Fnnce, alonc among the powels, lm"dfollo$ed a policy ofiriendship with Turkcy since the early sixt€enth century. The Catholic Frcnch wcrc rviling enough to sacriffce their consciences and make an ally of a Moslem Sultan agsinst the Catholic absburgs. Indeed, France's defensiye stratcgy was laryely based on the nced to keep the Habsburgs busy on thcir Dorthern and eastern frontiers-which explains the ftiendshipswith Pol&ndsnd S]{.eden as rvell as Turkey. Poland and Swedenrverevisibly in decline at thc opcning of the eighteenth century, but of Turkey the French still had high hopes, Existing political and tmding links were thereforc stftngthened in 17{0; and rvhen,aftcr 1756rFrence and the H{bsburgs were allied, it was against Russia (the destrcyer of Sveden and Pol{nd) that the French wished to use the Turks. Grcat wl:lstheir disappointment - and surprise whcn the Turks coukl not b€at the Russiansin the war of 1768 74. This dcfeat, rDd the lirst partition of Poland, thxew lrcnch policy into
I
I
I
OF THE POWERS
3l
disarray, but they still hung on to whet rcmained, their trading privileges and th€ir rights in the IIoly Places. Frcnch tuade $ith Turkey dat€d from 1535.During the eighteenth century it developed so happily that Turkey was virrualy a colony of Fmnce in the commercisl field. \Vhile French merchants prcspercd, their English rivals in the llcditcnanean languished miserably. The English Levent Company entered upon a sad declinc.In 1740,too, the Frcnchextendcd theturjehts - as representatives of the Pope - to supervise the Christian sh nes end the priests and pilgdms in the Holy Land. The whole of Sy & (including Pslestine) was regarded as a French sphere of influence.Sy a eventually becamea French mandate in 1920. However, Russian ghts, containcd in the Kutchuk Kainardji treaty, cut acrcss the French position after U74; and the seeds of thc Iloly Places' con{lict rvhich preceded the C mean War werc already sown. Irrance had gained much , at least economically - by friendship rvith Turkey; but in the heyday of her military prcdominance under Napoleon there was a new note ofindecisionin hcrapproach to the question ofTurkey's survival. Certainly the French wanted Eg$t, with or without the Sultan's spproval, but in 1800, Napoleon was considering a compl€te shoriDg-out ol the Turkish empire between France and Russia. By 1806,howevcr, his mind had changed and he wanted, as he rrote to Talle]'r'and, ,to strengthen snd consolidetethis great empirc, and use it, as it is, against Russia'. This view both echoedChoiseulin lz68 and also anticipsted Napoleon III in 1853-4. Basicaly, the tr'renchcould always seethat Turkey's existencevas a useful check on Russian expansion; but with the arival of the British in the eastern lledit€nanean alter 1798 thcy could no longer be surc thet the 'furks would continue to accept Frcnch guidance. Control of Ilgypt, however, might be a means of breaking fre€ from the stmnglehold of British seapower, and even of launching attscks on British India. The successofthe French puppet MehemefAli in tahing over Eg}?t suggested thet France might in future promot€ an Eg]?tian empire in th€ Middle East as a replacement lor l\rkcy's. This indced she tried to do, especiallybetweenr8S0
/
a2
THI] EASTERN QUESTION UP TO T82T
and 1840; and Fmnc€ coDtinued to have o dominatiDg influence in Eg}?t until the B tish occupationof 1882.Frorn a commercial stsndpoint, France had less and less to lose by dcscrting the Turks, for the British took over her position as Turkey's chiel tlading patncr. Yet Ifrance contirued to invest in the Turkish empire during the nineteenth century. She was still the largest singl€ forcign investor in 1914,. The clue to the apparent inconsistenciesin French policy is partly to be found in the nature ol Bdtain's position. After hafalgar, the Frcnch dored not meet Britain head-on in the Mediten:Lnean arca, nor could they competc with B tish manufactued goods in the Turkish msrket; but while Britain was dedicated to ensuring Turkcy's survival, and there *'as thereforc a Turkey to invest in, the ftench were quite haply to invest there. Their hopes of a dominating military presencein the Middle East could never be fully rcalizcd, however, although largc French armies appesred ther€ tcmpomxily in 1798 and during the Crimean War. L:rcking B tain's advantage of insub.r immunity lrom attack, they had to keep most of their army at home to defend the Rhine frontier for much of the nineteerth century. This vas precisely the rcasonwhy, at the c cial points in 1840 and 188?, the Frcnch could not act decisively over Egypt, snil had to yield the initietive there to Britain,
Britain The British in the eighteenthcenturytendedto view Turkey's declinc lr'ith genclal approval. Russia's triumphs in Turkey, and over Sweden snal Poland, lvere all set-backs for the ftench; and as D. B. Eorn has emphasized, (in GrcaLBrilain anil, Ewope itu lhe Eighkenlh CentwA) the urge to restnin and weaken France an1'where and everywhere had become a Bdtish obsession. Russia, a supplier of naval stores and a possible supplier of mercenary soldicrs, w{Ls generally regerded as e natunl Bitish olly against Fmnce. l\{oreover, tlrc morc th€ Russians became interestcd in the Black Sea. area, the less likely were they to concentrate on thc Baltic, iyherc, ir the deys of Peter the Creat,
.THE INTERESTS
OF TIIE POWERS
Russian na.val strength had begun to disturb the British, As for the eastem MeditenaneaL British trade there was small and becoming smallel, snd no British rvrrships wer€ to b€ seen.The only practicable route to Indir, via the Cape, rvas fairly salely in Britain's hands. Only in the $'estem Mediterranean did the British llave strategic interests; nnd thc function of the basesat Cibrultsr and llinorca was simply to contoin tr}ance. This lack of involvement in Turkey's ofitrirs persisted$?11into thc 1780s. The concern Britain fclt in thc futurc of Turkey by 182r, thcreforc, was of fatuly rcccnt o gin. It lyss the Frcnch move to EglTt in 1798 which frst made Britsin into an eastem llediterlanean power, and pe$uaded hcr to tske Malta as a base for infiuencing affeirs in the L€vant. However, by thc time the British pursucd Bonopart€ into the Sultan's dominions, there ll'as also appee ng in London a llelv, lessoptimistic vi€w of Russia. Although Britain was three times allied with Russiabetween 1799 and 1815,it ws.sbeginDingto be doubted whethcr Russiawas actually lcssdangerousas a potentiAlly dominating continental power than ftance. French motives jn going to Egypt - the opcning up ofnew rcutes to Indis - made the British think sc ously for the ffrst tim€ about the possibility ofan ovcrland attack on India dclivcr€d by o continental power, By 1815, the British wcrc wenting to see Turkey survive in order to frustute the hopes of both Russio and Fmfte. The ffrst ststesman to sound a lvsming not€ on the matter of Russi& was lvilliem Pitt in 1701. The cepture by Russia of Octurkov from Turkey s€em€d to him to hemld Russisn control of both Turkey and Poland. IIe 1y&sready to fight Russie to preserve the balonce in the Blsck Ser-Ukmine area; but his Cabinet colleagues,his \41lig opponeDts,the ne{spapeN, even the navy were unenthusiestic, not to say hostile, When the PrussiaDsr€fused to act {ls a]lies (tlle Prussians would never rgree to 6ght Russia - urtil 1914) Pitt had to climb down and withdraw his ultimatum, The final partitions of Polend in u93 ^nd 1795 secmcd to lend substanceto his fears. however. arrd his premeture Palme$ton-Disraeli outlook became increasingly rrspcctable.Poland'saisappearance,reemphasizedby the Yierns
r 34
;1 I ' I
THE EASTERN QI]ESTION UP TO 1A9I
s€ttlement of l8l4-15, ls.y b€hind much of the moral condemnation of Russia thot was voiced by British mdicals after 1815. It s€emedan obvious prcof ol the brutelity and oppressiveness of Tsarist eutocracy. Csstlereogh, Foreign Senetsry from l8l2 to 1822, was ha.dly a snpporter ot popular liberalism ot home. Yet the groundswcll of British hostility to continentsl despotism made its impect on him; and his decisionin 1815 not to join Tss.r Alexander's Holy Allisnce already identiffed Britein as the champion of constitutional monarchy. An ideological rift wss epp€aring behveen Bdtain and Russia which was to be delibeBtely widened by Canning and Palmerston ; end, though the Sult&n's regime hedly qualilied os e constitutional monorchy, there wes some logic in the argll]nent that one must delend Turkey in order to restrict the sprcad of Russi&n autocracy. The tendency to alignment against Russia (on Turkish' as on any other matters) 'was also made more likely by the fact thst France, &fter 1815, was, at le&st nominslly, a constitutional state, ftom whom gencml support might be expected. Even leaving eside the ideological a.spect,howevel, the military rcalities in Euope alter 1815 werc alone sufficient to produce apprchensiol in both Britain and France. It was mod€ quite obvious, loloving the defest of Napoleon, that the Russisn ermy, by sheer size, was the dominating force on the continent. Its Presence in Paris seemedto mark the beginning of a new, unhealthy era. The B tish wer€ bound to think of ways in which sea-po*'er might be used to tame the Russions. Sueh thoughts werc bound to concentrate on the use that could be made, defensively and offensively, of the Ttukish Stlaits. The same narrov stretch of water (the DadRnelles is l,t'ell under two miles wide ot the narowest point) was becoming the focus ol str&t€gic planning in both Russia and Britain, In 1809. the British had become t}Ie fust netion to extract from Turkey o general stst€ment regarding the use ol the Streits by warships, The principle then acceptedwas the same es that ogrccd on in the Straits Convention of 1841. The Straits were to be closed to thc \r'arships of all nations rvhile Turkey was et peace'
TTIE INTERESTS OIT THE POWERS
35
This simple rule wEs of enormous advantag€ to Britain in her dealings with Russia, for it mcant that Russian warships eould not, in normal times, enter the eastem Meditermnean except via the Atlantic and Gibraltar; and convelsely, so long as Turkey r{as associsted with Britain in any Anglo-Russian con8ict, British rvarsliips could cnter the Black Seato coerce the Rlrssians. By this argumcnt, British friendship \vith Turkey was vital to the successfulrestraininc of Russia. Commercial factors, too, underlined the lvisdom of AngloTurkish fricndship. I'ollowing the trro treaties of 1799and 1809, British trade with 'l\rkey increaseddramatically. The LevaDt Company suddenly enj{)yed the most suceessfulperiod in its lristory. British exports to }leilit€rranean countries rose by four times behreen 1805 and 1811. Nerv mal*ets outsidc west€rn Iiurope beeamein$easiryly neccssaryto BritRin a{ter 1815.The 'Iurkish ernpire, like South America and China, ryas $'cu x'o h cxnloitins. 8y 1821, then, tlte r6lc of B tain in thc Eastem Qucstion v'as I I'e,''minq rntl,.r chnrcr. T!rkcy's sunivol did not s.cm ro \ damage British intcrcsts and might weu be of positivc value- ,! The British did not threater to take large strctches of Turkish tcrfitory - ns did Russia, Aust a and even France. Island bases (the loDian islands *'ere kept in 1815 as rvell as l{alta) rvould srtisfy Briiish requirements, although they $'ould be happy to sec a pro'British, rather than a pro-French, govelnment in Egypt. l'hc rcstriction of Russian porver where it rvas at the sdme time most ambitious and most vulnerable necessitateda friendly state in control of Const, ntirlople.* All Uresethings Ti€re apparent in l8rl, Iaor t€n years after$ards, ho$er.er, the 'l contDrl vierv Bas exp.es*d by Wilti3D ltton. o diplomrt famili$ rvillr Rusriln thinkn,s, in 1307,Ilc org{cd thot lhlrs lvastr aufii.ied 'situit naist@*' t! 6ntrol Rnssidn i.ll,Fn.e in rlr e&ten N€rlit€nan€an. rl RGsi! glin.d te..itory tL€E, slE *ould actually b€ morc cxpored to Bntish seapowe. tlDn slr {$ whilc coDlircd to thc Bkk Sca, 'Russi., h po*$sion of Comt$ntinopl€, the ihan sl€ is !t Dlrdanell$, rrd .ven lll CEee, vorld b€ more at our nd.t p.eB€nt,' llis view is s..th rem&ling if only to emphasizc thlt the pre\ailing llrltish Er,titude to RE!i. lnd the cronstintinople questio! iq tlt nbeteentlr @trtury ws not tlE only posiblc one. S irbury's privstc opinion, !! 1306, tlut it did not.edlt hatter lftlrc nussi.ns Rre t. s.h Const.nti.oplc, r'as not so
I 36
THE I4ASTERN QUESTION UP TO 1827
questionof Greekindependence,arousingas it did condemnation of Turkey and a measureof sympsthy for Russia' prevented thc working out of clearpoliciesbas€don theseconsiderations.It wos Palmerston, rather than Canning, who wes able to att€mpt delinitions snal becomepro_Turk in order to be sntiRussian and anti-French.Palmerston'sdecisions,of cou$e, werc based on the assumption that Turkey might be persusdedto endure had to be unmade,\ihen indefinitely.By the 1890s,his decisions it appcaredthat Britsin, not Turkey, would hovc to uphold B tish intercsts in the Middle East.
Principal Events up to 1821 1458. Turkish cspture of Coilstantinople 1529. Turks fail to ceptule Vienna 1 5 3 5 . French allowed to tlade in TurkeY 1 5 5 4 . Enslish allowed to tlode in Tu.key 1 5 8 1 . Enslish Levsnt Compsny fouDded
r688. Turks again fail to cspturc YienIIs r690. Russions captule Azov from Turkey 1099.Trcaty of Carlowitz 1711.RussiaN lose Azov l7ra. B tain rcteins Gibraltar sDd inorcs by the Ubeclrt trea,ty r?18. Tresty ol P&ssaro$itz - Austria in contrcl of Hungary 8nd Tlgnsylvanis r79r. Ttecty of Nystadt - Russiadomn)antin PolandaDdthe Baltic 1739. Treoty of tselgrsde - Russis regsins Azov, following s fouryear war with Turkey. Russis, not Austis, becoming the Turks' major enemy 1740. New commercial and friendship treaty betwe€n Tu*ey and rIsnce 1788. Outbreak of Ene\ved Rutso-Turkish $'ar r?70. Russian naval yictory over the hrks at Chesm6 l?74. Tresty of KutchuL Kainardji 1782. Ausfio'Russiar psrtition plan for hrkey 1783. tlussia snnexesthe ftimea. Sebastopolbecomes3 n8vsl base t747. Outbreak of turther Russo-Turkish wor 1788. Russians capturc Ochakoy from lurkey 1 7 9 1 . OchakoYcdsis t7sz. te8ty of Jassy 1794. Odessafomded 1795. Final partition of Poland 1798. French sttack on Eg:Dt. Battle o{ the Nile iAboukir Bsy) 1799. Allisnce between Britsin, Turkey snd Russis agsinst Fmnce 1800. Malt8 tsken by Britein 1809. Dsidsnelles treaty - Inglo-Turkish ag€€ment, following 3 two-ye$ sar r8r2, terty of Bucharest- followings six-yearRusso'Turkishwar. Lnnitcd autonomygrantcd to Serbia,conlirmcdin 1817
88
THE EAST$RN QUESTION UP TO I EzI
1814. Pr.ilike Hdddtio lotl')'de,d 1815. VierDa settlenent - Britfuh prot€ctolate over Ionian islsnds and possesciorlof Malts. New Polish lingdom under Russian control, Holy Alliance of Russis, Austris and Prussia- opposed by Britain 1820. Britsin assuming dcfensire rcsponsibilities in Persia and the PeNisn GUU
FURTIIER
READING
a0
Furthn Readdng J. A, R. Msriott, fh. Eastalk Q errdo,r,Oxford Univ€rsity PI€rs (London,1917;ath ed. 1040). M. S. Arderson, 2rp drtrn, qrrrrdor. Ma.millsn (London, 1966). M. S. Anderson, fhe heal Po$e.s anl hz Neat Easl, 1714-1923, Amold (I-ondon, reTo). M. S. Ande$on, Brilrirr's Ditcouerg ol Ru.ssia,15,53-18-li.Maamilon (London, re58). J. C.]Jure, itz, D;plonaq tn th. Neat annMiAdle Eost: A Doclh*Nnry B.cord,,2 \ols, r5a6-tgt4 snd 1014-56.Vsn Nootrand (Plinceton,
rs56), A. Sorcl, La Quest;,o,L d'Oried au XVIII, silcL. English tBnslation: Methuen (Irndon, 1898). W. Miller, fi, Otloman Erryire ann &t Suacettors, 1801-IW. Cambridge University Prtss (Csmbridg€, 4th €d., 1086), P, Cnle6, Thz Otlorut L Impact on &ropc. Thurnes and Hu&on (London,1068). Si! nerder Bulbld, Britain ann u MiddL Eaa - fron thz Ea ica I&tw to 1963. IJ.utcbjnson (I,ondo& 8d ed., 196r). D. B, Ifom, Gfeat Brita,n anl Europe in thg EiEht anrh Cetdw, Chapter 13, 'Great Britsin, Turkey snd the Egstcm Question'. Oxfod Unive$ity Pless (Inndon, !967). A. T. Mahan, fhe hfl,&tac oJ S.d Powr 1rpotuEistnA, 1660-1f83. (Boston,Mass.,1890;leksu€d,Methueq l.ondon, lS65), 'New Cemblidg€ Modem Eistory', Vol. V (1648-88), Chspter XXI, 'The Ottorn n Empire und€r ltlebmed IV' by A. N. Kullat, 'New CambridgeModem gistory', Vol. VI (1088-1725),Chstter XIX, 'The R€treat of the Turks, 1088-1780' by A. N, Ku$t ard J. S. Bmmley. 'N€w Camblidg€ Modern History'. Vol. VIU (u68-98), Chapter IX, 'European Diplomstic Relstiom, 1783-1790'by M. S, Arderson, MsEiott's and And€rson'swolks on the E$tem Question continuc to b€ weful reading throughout the period cove.ed by this book, gs do Sir Reader Bullsrd's vslwble outline, the documents assembl€dby Uurewitz, snd Miller'3 survey of Balkan dcv€lopm€nts.
q :
PART II Canning and the Greek War of Independence
rn R *i;
-olAN
E F E
[3] GENERAI CONSIDERATIONS RAISDD BY THE WAR :1&.-
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\ The Greek War of Indnpendenoeopenrd in 1821. By 1897, the \ Insin stflrggle\aasovcr. althoughcr.cce had to wait untit lsAZ \ \ before the Sultan $anted full independence. This Greek insurrection, however, was far mor€ than an intem&l struggle *'ithin the Turkish cmpire. Because it threaten€d the stability of postVienna Europe, and bccause it apparcntly herslded the total collapse of Turkish rule in the Balkens, the Creek war made the Eastem Question for the first time into a majo! intemationat problem. Middle Dasteln allairs hencefo{h occupied e place in the forcfront of great power diplomacy. Although the poweN held back lrom opcn commitment for the frmt four years of thc stNggle, Russia, Brit€in and Fmnce bccamc intimately involved from 1825 until the linal settlement in 1832, Only Aust a and Prussia were able to 6tand somewbat doof - end this, in Mettemich's case,not fmm want of interest but from strict p nciple and celculation. The fuct thst Greeceis o peninsulajutting out into the trIediter, rancan rnade seapo*'er a vital fuctor in dctermining the eventual (,utcomeof rhe rebellion. Turkey could not prevent Britein end Imnce ftom interfering if they so chose. Nor could Turkey , xpcct Orthodox Russians,with all their histo c and geographical chims, to close their eyes to Greek afrairs. Turkish forcescould
CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE
not simultsneonsly suppress a revolt in the Mor€a, defend the Danube ftontier a;d cLallenge an Anglo-French fleet The crucial issucwas whether the powers would comid€r it in their interests to allow Grcece to become frcc (either by her o1\'n cfrorts or with their h€lp) or whether they wcre Prepared to seeTurkey suppres! the revii and emergc nev'ly strcngthened, n'ith a ffrmer grip ov€r the lfiddle East. Might a successful and deffant Turkey not uDset their own calculations about ftrhre spheresof influcnce in the area?In the end, their on'n mutual suspicionsforced them to declaretheir hand, once the Grceks,from 1825, seemedabout to be dcfcot€d. Not for the last time, a te$itorisl adjustment within Turkey's empire became the \Yay to keep the pe''ce betvecn themselves. From the B ti6h point of view, the chief matter was to decjde whethcr the loss of Grcece would make Turkcy any less able to rcsist Russian expansion; and whether a Greccefree of Turkey would automatically become a Russian satellite The danger was that freedom for the trIofta might be a prclude to Grcek occupation (under Russian suNeill&nce) of Macedonia, Thrace and Constontinople itself. This would clearly trc inimical to Britain's nerv control ofthe eastem trIeditenanean $'on in 17s8 at the Nile' Perhaps an autonomous Greeceultaler nominal Turkish suzerainty (the siiuation which obtained in Serbia after 1812) $ight be the answcr. In any case, Greece' Iike Spain and Italy, was very exposcd to British naval action. If the trIoree alone became a R;ssian srteltitc stat€, this would not necessadlybring Russian contrcI of the StEits :LnY n€arer. Iluch has ahvays bcen made of the general difrcrence in outlook between Castlercaghand Canning; but by t8'1, Castlcrcagh-$as already highly suspicioft of lloly Alliance prctensions, and on ttt" G"""k'wr", "na indeeal on the East€m Question in gsnersl' t11o thcre was a remarkable similarity of view betrve€n the for.eien secreta es. Castlcreagh \r'as det€rmin€d to preserve stnct B ti:h neutnlity in the Greek afrair. Any great power involvement, he felt, {ould allo!. the Cre€k rebellion to open up other exjsting Russo-Turkish quauels. But British insction might well nreveni Russia from taking advantage of Turkey's embarr&ss'
GDNERAL CONSIDI]RATIONS
{3
ment. Castlereagh ther€fore wanted a conference at which the Ts3r could be persuadedto aercc to e policy of non-intcrvention. 'l cannot . . . reconcile it to my scnseof duty to cmbark in a schcmefor ncw modclling thc position of thc Crcck population in those count es, at the hazard of all the destructive conf sion and disunion rvhich such an attempt may leed to, not only {'ithin Turkey but in Europe,' So *'rotc Castlereaghjn 1821 to the British ambassadorin St Petersburg. Above all, Castlereaghbefore his death in 1822, and Canning afterwards, were onxious to preser'r.eTurkey as a bastion against t/ Russian expansion.As lote 6s 18t5, the British position had not been so clear as this. By l8?1, ho{ever, contsinment of Russia ves considered u major need. The loss of Gmece might not in itself seriously \yeekenTurkey; but Russion inten'ention on the Greek side almost certainly would. Canning directed Britjsh policy from 1822to 1827; but he had already been concernedwith Turkey's problems beforc this. As foreign secretary from 1807 to 180e, he had considcred taking Clete as a British base - in plefelence to Egl?t, !,vhichwas also under consideration to watch France and Russia in the eastern !{editerranean. In 1809, he rvas responsible lor the AngloTurkish 'Dsrdanelles' treaty - in which he had caftfully ?efused unbrella gualantees to Turkey 'which e\'ents might not enable us to fulfil'. IIis cousin Strs.tford Canning had hebed to bdng about the Bucharesttlesty between Russia and Turkey in 1812. CanniDg had no love for the Turks, and no special affection for Greeknationalists, but he stronglymistrustcdRussianintentions. By 1825, he had worked out a neiv policy to safeguardBritsin's L€vant int€rests, namety, action $ith Russia in order to control her. It proved impossible to prcvent Russia fiom h€\,ing tlte C.eeks and it 1{ss equully impossible lbr Britsin to act lvith Turkey in suppressingthe Grceks. Joint action by B tsin and Russia, ho{ever, could produce s. new stability in the Middle !)ast in r*hich Russia gsined no exclusive advantsges. Such was Canning's hope.
I GREAl' POWI'R REACl'IONS
[ 4 ] G R E A T P o W E R R E A C T T O N S r, 8 2 l - 5 I-I r
ffr" *.y nature of the Greek rebellion invit€d Russian intervention, In the ffrst plece, thc prospectofan Orthodox Chdstian people struggling against Itloslem Tuks wls bound to excite ir"""lr'" "y"iptttty; and in any case the Gre€ks conffdertly expecte
a5
of a6sisting rebels against their lawful nder. He was too convinced a suppoder of Mettemich's policy lor that. Therefore, in 1821, Al€xarder rcpudieted Ypsilantis and rctused any Russian 'lVallachia) or in assisteDcein the Principalities {l(oldavia and GreeceitseH. As for Mettemich, he r€garded thc Greek reyoli as a dangerous nuisance,a 'fircbrond', as he called it, vhich ought to be swiftly extinguished for the soke of Eurcpean order. It must certainly not be allowed to destroy thc -{usim"Russian h8rmony on which he believedlegitimatemonarchydepended.Therefore,throughout the war, end e1'en in 1827 at Nava no, Austrian {eight was throln on the Turkish rather than the Greek side - in order. simply, to end the rcvolt as quickly as possible.A great power conflict was not what Mcttemich wanted 'Iegitimist' \\hile Alexander and Mcttemich thought in the6e snti-revolutionary terms,it wascasyfor British foreigDsecretaries to rvork for a peaceful s€ttlement. It was also easy for the \\tigs to rctain their complacent indifrerence to the likelihood of Russian exponsion. I,ord Crcy was able to write to Lod Holland in 1821thst 'the dangerrrising from the extensionof the Russian po\yer and influence on thst side is so rcmote and contingent as to bear no degreeof comparison with the certain evil of th€ cxistence of the Turkish empire'. Suspicion of Russia.wes still a Tory, nota Wrig, tendency in 182r. But Grey's opinion in 1821 makes an interesting comps son $ith the view he expr€ssed in 1888; 'with the influence which Russia is likely to obtain in the new govemment of Greece - with that which events seem likely to givc hcr in Turkey, the danger of her power in that quarter of the world is not remote'. l'rom 1821 to 1825.Britain. Rrrssia.I'rance and Austria were from tinre to time engagedin discussionsor abortive conferences desisnedto b ng the Greek war to an cnd without any military action by the grcat powers. Castlercagh instructed Strangford, the British ambassadorin Constantinople,to follow a cautiously reutralline and to curb his pro-Turkish tendencies.But suspicion of Russion intcntions mounted, as Alexander made pmposals for autonomous principalities in Grcece as well as trIoldavia and
46
CANNTNG AND GREEK INDEPENDI'NC9
Wallachia; s.nd by Is24, Alexanclerwas convinced thst B tain was bcing delibenttely uncoop€rative.He belieYedthat Canning had €ngineered the foilure of the St Pctelsburg conference in that year and it wos felt th&t Britain, whilc rcfusing to aid Russia in ncgotiations lor a frce Greece, $os still hoping to intedcre unilatelally for her own benefit. In 1823,Britain had recognized the Greeks os bellig€rents - i e' had decided to rcgard them not as rebels but as equals of the Turks. But this was no gestur€ of hostility to Turkcy. It wss not even a sign of B tish s]'rnpathy vith the Greek cause' It was indccd no more than e statement of the rcality, and a move to prcvent further attacks by Grcek pirates on British trade. Canning had 'within the bounds of civilized war a cont€st intendcd to bdng which had beenmarked at the outset on both sidesby diseusting barba ty'. Here was equal condemnation of both parties and a refusal to give ossistanceto either. The only real concem appeared to be protection of B tish mercharts in the ama. EvcDts made this passiverale increosingly difrcult to sustain, howevcr. lly 1825, Canning had acquired an iDternational rcputation as the defender of opprcssedpcoples, tbe supporter of libcralism against autocracy. In this respect he rms already a conspicuousopponent of Alexander and lletternich. And it wss a mantle that he could not easily wriggle out of. The man who championed a constitutioual rCgim€ in Portugol and recognized the indepcndenceof South American colonies could not simultaneously deny the gLt of the Greek nation to frce itself from a dcspotic monarch. The Grccks themsclves certainly expected him to live up to his pdnciples and in 1825 openly asked to be put undcr British protcction. Thcir rcquest l{as rcfused, of coruse. - A seconal complicating factor x'as the grorvth of philhellenc feeling in Britain and thrcughout westem Europe. Admi€tion . for classicalG*ece rvas widespreadamong the educated ruling I classes, and the gallant strugglc of nineteenth-ce tury Grceks lh' ir I sgsinst Trirkcy could too "eqily be se.n os:1 rcpelitiun of j f.*b**'wDrs trgainstPenia. The Grcels n'u\t relive tfic triard Salamis, if nccessary \ith outsidc of llorrthon umDhs
THE WAN ITSELF.
TO T825
47
help. Volunt€€r forces were soon fo*hcoming, and the essistance of Lord Blton, the romantic idol of liteEry Europe, gave the \yar the atmosphereof a moral crusade.His death (from fever) at Missolonghiin 1824senctifiedthe csuse.Culturat and religious plessur€, and sympethy for a cruelly persecuted underdog produced a fever of public ercitemcnt. Prc-Oreek committees collectedmoney, snd a loan to the Fovisional Greek govenrment was raised in London. In the end tlough, voluntary effort was not enough, and it was not chivahy or high principle that forced Canning to act iD 1825 so much es determination to contml Russia. Cannins's morsl f.rvout alwayshsd a highly prscticalside.Two developments in 1825, the use of Eeyptian forces by the Sultan and thc desrh of Alexsnder, forced him to drop neutrality as s. policy. In its place he must substitute diplomstic action aiming at limited freedom (at leost) for the Cre€ks,
[5] THE WAR rTSEL]., TO r825 l\rhile there wos a chance that the creeks (plus volunte€r help) might win freedom by their own efforts, it was possibl€to rvoid open British commitment. Certoinly, ol all Balkan peoples,the Grccks were the most likely to bresk free of the Sultan,s control. The Serbs, fol example, lacked international conrcctions and hrd no tum programmc aiming at independence.But the development of Creek merchant shipping in the MeditclraDean and the Illack S€ahad given the Creekscontact with Russia,France and Ilritain. Merchant communities in the msjor ports of France, Italy, Egypt and Russia were the medium by which modern political ideas and military methods reachedGreecc.Wealth and , ',rganizingability weroavril€biein phnty. The Philike tletairia I trim,d at thc crestion of a oompletely independentBalkan state I xnder Greekrule; and broncles ofthis societyflourishcd throughrut Greeceand in all the major merchant colonies,In the Morea,
CANNINC AND CREEK INDEPENDENCE
the Turks collected tsxes from the isolated Greek towlships' but had little sctusl authority beyond this. Each community had its oral armed band and by 1820 arms were beirg supplied to them by the Greeksofthe islsnds. So far, there was no evidenceofthe ' intemecine quenels among the armed bands which later began to damsee the Grcek cause. Ali Pasha, an Albanian bandit leader, had often in the past fouEht the Oreeks, but in 1820 he quanelled with Sultan tr{ahmud and was obliged to defend himself He oppealed for help to the Greeks, who cored tittle lor him; but his rebellion gave them the conditions they wanted. Turkish forces were alrcedy tied down in deating with AIi Pasha, and Ypsilantis was therefore urged to take edvantsge of this opportunity. Thc invasion of lrloldavir by Ypsilantis's &Imy folowed in March 1821. , Thi" -o.r" *u. , q.,ite disastrous failure. Ypsilsntis had only a small anny, snd got no suppod from the Rum&nians an'l no coopemtion from the S€rbian l€ader, Il{ilosh Obrenovich Both Rumania and Serbia were for the prcsent sstisfied i\ith the limited autonomy they had alrcady rl'on. The invade$ were defeated by e Turkish force, the Philike Hetairia collapsed, and Ypsilentis, disowned by Tsnr Alexsnder. fl(d to Austria wltcre \,he wasimnrisoned.But in theMorea hisinvasionotltr,ldsviawas the signal-for a popular rebellion which gathered rapid momentum 1 and at first caried all beforc it. By 1s22, slmost the whole ofthe Morea was lost to the Turks, i I'-iirthe Greek islands were triumphantly ftee and Athens itself *'as rebel hsnds. Aheady thc bittemess ol the conflict h8.d been emphasized by the murder of the Gmek Patriarch in Constantinople and by massacres of Gfteks in Asia Minor and of Turks in th; Morea. The Greek popullltion of the wealthy Aegean island ofChios waselmosttotally wiped out. By 18?3,factional struggles wem appearing amoDg th€ Greeks, but still the Sultan could make no headwayagainst them. In 1824,therefore,Mahmud in despera' tion appe&Ied for help to Mehemet Ali, Pssh& of Egmt. HaviDg won contrcI of Egl?t by 1811, Mehemet Ali had moderniz€d the country under French guidance and hsd gone on to build up s formidable army ond navy and to conquer the
CANNING'S POLICY
49
Ilejaz (iacluding Mecca and Medina) and the Sudan. This Albanian adventurer, now a powerfi vassel of the Sultan, had already suppressed :r Grcek rising in Crete, and in 18?4 was promised the SIorca in rctum for his servjces.IIe s€nt his son, Ibrohim Pasha, \dth an army to the llorea ir February 1825. By Septemb€r,it was clear that the Greek revolt would collarrse unlc.s help from the grcat powers were forthcoming. But sti Canning would do nothing. Ife ofrercd the Grceks mediation, but no assistance.He had not evcn sent a rcpresentativ€ to the St PeteNburg conference where Alexander made a final effort to get the powers to end the war. But if lbrahim's successdid not in itself move Canning, Russia's r€action to it did. In August 1825, Nessehodc, the foreign minister, Iflotc that in tutule 'Russia will follow hcr o$'n vie{s exclusively and wil be govemed by her own interests'. In December, A.lexander died, and hisJ brolher Nicholas made no secret of his determination to act alone on behalf of the Greeks, if no other po\per would cooperet€. Canning decided to cooperate; and the British public, appalled ut Ibrahim's cruelties in th€ Morea, heertily agreed.
[6] CANNING'S POLICY, r825_? Canning'snew policy ofacting with Russiain order to conhol her $.ss thereforc laryely forced on him by thc Egyptian inteNention and by the policy of the new Russian Tsor. Nicholas did hsve som€ of the brooding, mystical attachment to autocracy which , l,is brother hrd felt; he had no specialliking for Crecksor fo| rebcls in geneml; but lte was more than willing to use the Greek . t situation to Russia's advant"agc, &nd to act while the Grcek ] rebcllionwus 61ill alive. Cdnningsensedthc probability thst,unless restrained, Nicholas might make war on Tulkey, portty to save the Greeks from IbBhim, but more perticularly to advance Russia's bounilaries and influence in the Bslkans and Caucasus rcgions. Il Russie declared war, C&nning felt, .she woutd gobble up Greeceat one mouthful &nd Turkcy at the next,.
r 50
CANNINC
AND GREEI'
]NDEPENDENCD
Early in 1826, there?ore,Canning sent lus cousitr, Stratford Canning,to be ambassadorat Constsntinople,analsent the Duke of Wellington on a tempolary missionto St Petersbug. Wellington's task was to construct a joint Anglo-Russianpolicy lor the future of Creece,and also, if possible,to ftconcile Russo'Tulkish differenceson other matters. It was maalecleur by Wellington thst Britein was preparcd to use force, in coniunction with Russia, to compel the Sultan's acceptanceof &n &utonomoug Grecce.After s,ll, naval power eould effectively cut ofi Ibrahim from his base in EglTt. Stratfod Canning's job at Constsntinople, meanwhile, wa.sto persus.dethe Sultan to make peace vrith the CreeLsand a.lsoto try to prevent the outbreak of a. priYate Russo-Turkrshwar. Wellington succeededin achieving an Anglo-Russian agreement on Greece.He quit€ failed, howeYer,to impmve relations between Russia and Turkey, for NichoLas was unvilling t'o permit any British int€rference in that querter. The AngloRussian a.grcement, howevel was s develolment of great significance.It mes.ntthat B tain wss prepared to joiD Bussia in making 1ifa}on Turkey. It meent that Bdtain, suspiciousas she was of Russien motives, was still not prcpared to preserye T\ukish integrity ageinst all comels. Automatic support fo! Turkey did not yet seemthe only meanBof rest cting Russisn expansion. Canning was now pursuing a alaxingand complex policy which succeededuntil his death, or mther until Navsdno' but rvhich the events of 1828-9, and the l&ck ol stotesmanship of his successo$,made more diftcult to maintain. agreementwascontoinedin what is called The Anglo-Russian the St Pete$burg Prctocot of April 1826.By this, Greecewas to becomean autonomousstate, with freedom to manageher own affairs while still paying tdbute to th€ Sultan and still being technically part of the Turkish empire Britain wg.sto offer to mediate betrveenCreeksand Turks; but failing medi&tion, both powers claim€d the ight to ect, sepalg,telyor together, to force Turkish occeptanceof these terms. The potentislly dangerous aspectof this Protocol,as Caming immediatelytalized, was th6t Russia had rets.ined the right to act separately against
CANNING'S POLICY
Turkey. It was impoltsnt, thereforc, to pe$uade the other thrce porvers to join Bdtein and Russie in enforcing the hotocol. Etrorts to this end fsiled to bring in Austria ond I,Iussie. Mettcmich would not aid rebels, or weaken Turkey, or coDtribute to the sprcad of Russion influenee in the Balkans; and Prussia \tould not act against Austde's wishes, Fodunately, France wss lYilling to participate. Charles X, anxious to raise his own, and I'rance's, pr€stige, joined Britain and Russia in mahilg the trea.ty of London in July 1827. By this time, for over a year since the signing of the St PeteNburg Prctocol, the Sultan had steadfastly refused to make an armistice with the Cre€k rebels. Th€ London treaty \1?s the tual, 'frrm' pronouncement of thc powers on the matter of ending the wer, end it led directly to thc battle of Navarino, to victory for the Greeks and an end to Egwtian po$er ir the Morea. It wes the consummation of Canning's policy on the E&stem Question end it left Britain in a commanding position in the east€m Mediterlenean with Russia closely tied to hcr two partn€rs. But it also l€ft many details ol the ew Grcck state unresolved, and it ollowed the possibility ol Russia's wriggling free ftom B tain and &ance should a future British govemment adopt a more openly pro-Turk policy. By the terms ol the treaty, the three porversmade it clear that if 'the Porte do not accept the armistice. . . they intend to exert ell the means which circumstancesmay suggestto their pxudence to obtain the immediate effect of the armistice , . , without, ho{ever, tsking any part in the hostilities lbetween Turkey and Greecel" It was this vaguely worded threat which &ctually led to the i)attle of Navarino. British. French and Russian fleets were sent to thc Levant to enforce the Inndon tr€aty, but there ws6 aJI obvious rcluctance, on the part of th€ British and French governments et s.ny rate, to make war on the Turks. TIre prcsence of the fleets and the threat of blockade were meant to be a su{frcient waming. Indeed, the alliecl admirals were not at all cleer on the action they should t&ke if Turkey did Ietuse the rrrnistice. The trcety of London stands as something of a monu-
r
CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE
ment, then, to thc det€rmined but yet ambiguous r6le that Britain was plafng in the Levant, lYhile suspicious of Russia, she was yet unwilling to aid Turkey' but at the sam€time was anxious not to w€akcn Turkey. Although she *'anted some degree of lleedom for the Creeks, this must com€ without destmying the unity of the Turkish empire. The . Greek insunection must certainly Dot sct a precedent for future Balkan }evolts; but if Britain did not force Turkey to accept Creek autonomy, then Russia.would do so on her own; a.nd such indcpendent Bussionaction Canningwas unwilling to allow. The ' siening of the treaty at London, of course, is also a further indication of thc new importance of B tain in the tr{iddle East, ond of ihe ncw importance that the Middle East held ir British diplomatic thinking. On the question of existing (non'Greek) disputes between Russia and Turkey, Britain wes as f*r as ever from bcing able to prcvent wo.r bet\r'een thc tIYo count es. In fact, lvhile Wellington was actually in St Petc$burg, thc Russisns sent an ultimatum to th€ Sultan threatening war unless Tutkey upheld the heaty of Bucharest and agreed to discuss other rcmaining dillcrences The consequence of this was the p vate Russo-Turkish treaty of Akkermen sigied jn October 1826. The Turks gave r1ay at €very point. They ?mmised to cany out the Bucharest terms lelating to Serbia and the Principalities, and to recognize Russian gains on the eastern shoresof the Black Seaend in the Caucasuslegion. Actine entirely on her own, Russia had forccd the Turks to negotiat€ and to accept her t€r[ls' It was not a pleesing development to Canning, but all that he could do was to urge the Sriltan to be conciliatory and hope ther€by to pr€vent the outbr€ak of a Russo-Turkish war. In this, at s.nyrate, he was tempora ly successful.But Turkey's unwillingness to ca.my out the Akkcrman agreement lcd dtuectly to her war of 1828-9 {ith Russia,, e $'ar which largcly destroyed Canning's hopes. He himself had died in August 1827, but the British govemment ol the dey, under the Duke of Wellington, $'as reduccd to the I6lc of a h€lplessspectator.
[7] NAVARINO, THE RUSSO.TURKISH WA& AND THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE The battle of Navarino also took plece aft€r Canning's denth, but this at least I(as generally in accordonce with his policy on the Dastern Question. The actual dcsbuction of the Turkish end Egwtian flcets was not pa ofhis intention; but tlre maintenance of Britain's initiative in the Levant and the acting with Russia over the Greck issue, in order to stop her acting indcpendently, rvas simply a continuation of the policy behind the London treaty. Canning was detcrmined that Britain and Russia, with France, must force the Turks to accept a cease-firc in Creece. I{e had hoped not to havc to use actuel military force for this pupose. Admiml Co&ington, the commander of the British fleet in the Lel.ant. could sec no altrmative. however. If the Turks and Egntians attcmpted to break the allied blockade of the Morca, he $ould feel obliged to open ffre. Otherwise the blogkade could not be enforcrd. By September 1S2?, the Sultan was rtilJ refusing to sign sn ormistice, though Capodist as, the newly elected Presialent of Grcece, had just done so and the time limit expired on the sevelth I of the month. A fleet of Turkish and Egyptian warships lay in the l harbour of Nsvarino. From 12 September, Cofuington cruised I outsid€ the harbour, and was joined by a French fleet unaler I de Rigny later in the month, and by a. Russisn under Heyden i early in October. On 20 October the allied fleets entered ihe i harbour, not in b$ttle formetion, but with the ships clearcd for 1 " rclion. in.csc it should be necessary. Tbereis little doubt that the allicd commanders intended to force a battle. Bsttle duly commenced,once a small boet, soiling under flag oi truce, was 6red on by thc Egyptians. At the €nd of the day the Turkish and Eg'?tian fleets werc alnost totally destrcyed.
Navarino was a critica,l, cven seminal,event in th€ history of l the Eastem Question. It produced great sa.tisfaction in St Petersburg, but e good deal of doubt and heert-searching in l London.Joint action with Russiowasnot meant to includethe i
I 54
CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE
destruction of Turkey ss a bastion age,inst her. But if Bdtain rcfused to cooperetc with Russia any further, this might well have the eficct of encouaging Russia,to make war alone on Turkey in oder both to settle the Creek afrair and also to carry out her ow1l long-standing aims. The death of Cenning appsrcrtly depdved Britain oftbe only statesman sble st the same time to cooperate with Russia and to prot€ct Turkey. Under Wellington, feer of Russio drove Brit&in into a more openly pro-Turk position which i in itselfhelped to bring about the Russo-Turkish war of 1828 9. had called Navarino 'a fiighttul catastrophe'. iI€ttcrnich George IV, in lis specch fiom the throne in January 1828, ,,"regrcttcd what Welington described as an 'untoward event'. Wellington was Prime Minister fiom January 1828 until November 1830,during whichtimeBritain's previouslydominalt rdle in the Middle East was almost entirciy abandoned. In the light of Navarino, the Duke could not at first bring himself to weaken Turkey further even by forcing her to give up Grcece; neither but would he act agsinst Russiewhen her forcesthreatened Turkey's cepital ir September 1829. In the two years ir fact, while discussionsabout the size of &n autonomous Greecewcre proc€€ding and Russie wss winning h€r greatest succds€s yet in the Balkans, the only decisive British action was once again thc responsibility of Codringtonj nomely, an agreement in August 1828 with Mehemet Ali lor th€ retum ofhis iroops fron Greece to EglTt. At least Bitish sea power had shorvn, as it did again in 18{0, that Eg}?tian forces could not play s firll part in the lliddle East if their communicstions were thrcatened by a hostile navy, Wellington in 1828 did not encourage the Sultan, as Canning hsd in 1826, to appease the Russians. Russia wes very reedy for a war, but it wss Turkey who sctually opened the war by lepudiating the Akkerman tresty. Once the wsl ltod .tarted in Apdl 1818, the Russian aim was a lpeedy march oD Constsntinople and a dictated settlement of the Grcek and other mattels befole any other pow€rs could intervene. I! th€ evert, the Russians progressed slowly and not until September 1829 were th€ir lorces within reach of the Straits, ond even then they were not present
NAI/ARINO AND THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR
in overwhelmingnumbersand were hard hit by disease.Turkish forceswere always morc difficult to dislodgcthan the Russiansand others - anticipated. Tsar Nicholas, indeed,was glad enough to make pesce at Adrianople on 14 Septemb€r, though the exhaustedRussianswere still able to obtain entir€ly favourable As this war took its course,the Wellingtoncabinet,horifiedbut impotent, observed ftom afar, made wonied declarations, but took no €fiectivestepseitherto restmin Russia,or to bolsterup Turkey. British foreign policy had rcached the barren interim stagebetweencooperstionwith Russiaand supportfor Turkey. C. Ww'Crawley i\ The Quesliono:f Gfteh Ind4tenden e seesthe yeam 1828to 1888as the rcsl turning pornt in Anglo-Russian relstions.Wellington,lor example,announcedthst the existence of Turkey was vital to the bal&nceof power,but did nothingto ensure that existence.Gordon, the Britkh ambassadorin Constantinople (who had tempom ly rcplaced Stratford Canning) rrent so far as to join his French colleaguein asking the Sultan to allow a British and French fleet into the Dadanellcs to protect Constantinopl€jbut no naval movementsresulted&nd Bussie madepeaceas and whensh€chose. The treaty of Adrianople was another major advance for Russia, though it had been harder won than obscrversrealized and Russia was quite ready for a lengthy breathing-spaceaft€rwards. Indeed, Russiawas by no meansthe irresistible and overwhelming force that sheseemedto be for much of the nineteenth century;and Turkey had not beenquite 60nearcollapsein 1829 the terms ofthe A&ianople as Gordonhad fearcd.Neyertheless, I reaiy gaveRu\siacompletecontrclolthe Danubedeltaandalso exteBsivegeins to the esst of the Black Sea. In padicular, Georgiawas fully fully &bsorbedand Russio.claimed control of - a claimwhich.tive yearslat.r and agoinnearerthe \ Circassia CrimeanWar,aroused Britishconcem. Moldaviaand Wallachial alsobecam€autonomousand wereplacedunder a virtual Russian protectorate. Russien merchants and merchant ships had renewedrights thrcughout the Sultan's tenitories, And ffnally, the Sultan wasmadeto &cceptthe 1827treaty of London ; that is,
56
CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE
it rfss indepenilentRussi&amilitory action, Bther than Canning's pressureor the battle of Navarino, which in the endforcedTurkey to make peacewith the Creeks;and rhich also madepossiblethe establishment of an autonomous, or even totslly independent, Grcekstate.
[8] UNFINISHED BUSINESS,AND POINTERS TO THE FUTURE Bdtsin had, a.tlesst, during the Russo-Turkishwar, beentaking part in futher discusssionson the Greekproblem.Wellington had decid€d thot it was impossible for T[rkey to rctain control of Grceceand that sincethe new stst€ would almost certainly be a Russian sat€llit€, it must not be a large one - perhs.psno mor€ than the trIoma.Abedeen, his ForeignSecrctary,quite ageed with this view. At first Wellington and Aberdeenhsd rvontedonly autonomy for Greece.Still fearing to *'eaken Turkey, they would not tske part evenin the ffnal freeingof the Mor€ai and would do no morc than give permissionlor Frenchtrcops to occupythe area and mop up rcmeiningEg}?tians there. Their policy aroused opposition from Peel, the Home Secretary, $'ho thought that a fully independentCreecervould be freer from Russiancontrcl ; and from Palmerston, who, as a.good Conningite, regretted the refusal to sct $'rth, snd thus control, Russia. So, in 1828,of the three po$'e$ who signedthe London trcaty in 1827,Russiawas at war with Turlcy in the Balkans and the Caucasus,Francehad troops contmlling the Moree, and B tain was, militadly, a bystander. But in March 1820,the thfte por ersagreedto a pmtocol, establishingen autonomousGreel stste under their ioint protection, with a boundery to th€ south of the CuUsof Arta and VoIo. r.. In 1829,however,Wellington and Ab€rdeendecided,rcgretI fuUy, ttrat TurLey's total collopse was imminent and that the I new Greecehad better be tully independent.The result of their changeof mind was a new protocol of I'ebruary 1880,in which Britain, Russia and trbance proposed to meke Greeceinto sn I independentmonarchy,and suggestedLeopoldoJ Ssxe-Coburgas
UNr.INISHED
BUSINESS
81
the first king. But Capodistrias, President of the Greek republi I since 1827,disrgrred and persuadedLeopold to rcject the idca. And this was th€ position in Greece erhen Wellington's governmeat resigned in November 1880 (though the murder of Capodistrias in the following ye&! mede it e$ier then to establish e suitable monarch). No final settlement had been achievecl. Greece was still a republic under nominal Turkish suzeminty, and her northem boundary left her sm&ll and militarily indefensible. It was the tssk of th€ Canningite Palmenton to create o stmnger, monarchicel Greek 6tste alrd to stdve at the same time not to make a permanent enemy of l\Ekcy. But by 1881, the Grcek War of Independence had sewed to bfing into the open the realities in the Middle East, and to expose ure motives and clarify the attitudes of the great poweN. It had shown that Turkcy, urness aided by an ally (in this case one of the Sultsn's vassals) could not subdue a rebellion within her own empirc; end that her contml of the whole Balkans area was likely to lapse in the near luture udess it was artificially buttftssed by outsid€ powels. Further, the war of 1828 I suggested that th€ next time Russia and Turkey fought, Russian armies \yould rcach Constantinople urlless, again, outsiale powers took steps to prcvent this. Certainly, vhile Nic.holes wa6 Tsar, it appe8.recl that Russia \r'ould be able and willing to act alone egainst Turkey, but that, if pressed, she was prepared also to coopeEte with other powers in finding diplomatic solutions to Middle Eastem problems. Austri& under Mett€rnich wos clcar\ anxious to msintsin Tu*ish power in the Balkans - unless she could be sure that sny Russian gains there would be balanced by her own. (The Adrisnople tr€sty Mett mieh consider€d a 'disaster'.) She was even re&dy to give limited assistance to Turkey provided that this did not bring sn open cla.shwith Rtrssia. Fmnce under the last Bourbon king was again asserting a leading r6le in the lliddle East and had clearly sbandoned her automstic chsmpionship of Tulkey of the p!e-1798 kindi she had even joined in coercion of Mehemet Ali (her prctdgd in Egypt) in h€r anxiety not to be exclucled flom the decision-making over Greece. And the readiness of F€nce to break up the Sultatr's empire was
r 58
CANNING AND CREEI{ INDEPENDENCE
emphasiz€dby the occupation of Algiers in the last d&ys of CharlesX's reign. Britain in 1830had rc&ched6 stsgeof cmcial indecision.fn the last ten yeels, her govemmentsha;l leamed to fear Russia end wish for the survival of Turkey, but they could not openly support the Turks, especially if the result would merely be a Russian puppet rdgime in Creece, Thele \Fas stiil too much distaste for Turkey's religion, governmental inefficiency and military barb& sm to allow s British govemment to rcgard the Sultan as a 'natural ally', Wellington's principal immediate conc€m in 1829 hsd simply been to hold on to vhat Britain already had, her protectorate over the Ionian islsnds, From an economic vi€vpoint, too, the choice wa6 difficult. Though Britain's trade with Turkey was expanding quickly and her exports to Baltic cor:ntries,including Russia,vrerenot rising, a war 'lvith Russia would still be more hantul to British merchants than a war with T\uLcy. In 1827, for instance, Britain's exports to Russia weft thrce times greater thar her exports to Turkey and Greece,whereasby 1850th€ position was almost rev€rsed,The change-overhere did not come until thc 1840s;and though economicmotives were never, on their own, decisive, they were a poweful secondary argument against adopting an outright support for Turkey against Russie during the Greek war. But at leastit wa.sobvious by 1830that the Europeanbalance of powe! rFasgoing to be as much afrect€d by events in the Turkish empire as it was by eventsin Spain, Portugal, Italy and South Amedca, If Russia held the Black Ses,it must not be the Black Sea with the Straits and the Balkans. The time wh€n Russia could make her own sepamte tems with Turkey, as at Kutchuk Ka,inardji, Jassy, Bucherest and now Aclrianople,was perhaps alm$ing to a close. Alres.dy, it was a three-power conferenceat London in 1897 which olficially gave the Greeks their freedom, and which th€refoE presided over the delibeBte amputstion of a Tutkish province. Turkey's cordition was becoming a general nuropean responsibility; tro longer was it simply a standinginducementto RussianiDvasion.
Principal EYents,1821-50 r8?r. Opening of the Grcek reb€]lion 1s22. D€sth of Castl€reagh- replacedasFortigr Secretgryby Canning 1824. Byron's d€eth at Missolonghi 1825, EgWtiaD intervention in Greece.Accessionof Tssr Nicholas I 1826. Apdl. St PetersburgProto@l October. Treoty of Akkermsn - between Russis a d Turkev 1827. July. Trcsty of Irndon August, Death of Canning October, Bsttl€ of Navsrino 1828. Jsnuary. WeUington Prime Minist€r April. Opening of Rtxso-Tukish wsr 1s29. Msrch. Autonomy for Greeceby three-power Protocol September. T*aty of Adrianople - betweenRussb and Turkev. Nev Russian policy (of non-aggression) towards Turkev adopted. Autonomy for Moldsvie sDd Wallachis r8s0. Febnary. New three-power Pmtocol pmvides for Greek independence March. Mehemet Ali requests a Bdtish alliance - in a'ain November. WelUngton resignsas Prime trIinister, and Pslmers' ton becomestr'orcign Secret.ry. Polish rebellion a$inst Russis (till September r88r)
#x*" Yg,Sarf
TEE OB'E(
WAN, OF IND4PDNDENCE
PART III Palmerston,Unkiar Skelessi and the StraitsConvention [9] PALMNRSTON'STASK, AND THE C O M P L E T I O NO F G R E E K I N D E P E N D E N C E The formation of f.ord Grey's govemment in Novembe. 1880 brought P&lmerstoninto office as Foleign Secretary for the ffrst time. This disciple of Canning and critic of Wellington was now freeto develophis own boistcrouspoliciesin delenceof Britain's ovcrseasinterests, both in the Meditenanean and elsewher€. But, by the time Palm€rston anived at the Foreign Office, Russian policy torflards Turkey had undergone a signiffcant change,and the pmblem of checking Russianambitions \yasnot so clear-cut a,ft€r 1840as it had recently seemed.Certainly, the questionof Greekindependencercmained unresolved,snd 1Yasto occupy Palme$ton intermittently until August 1832; but the dangerofdirect Russianaggression againstTurkey hsd receded. 'Iwo day6 after the treaty of Adrianople x'as signed, a Bpecial committee rcpolted to NichoLesthet Ru3sian intercsts s.t the Strsits \rould best be served not by $eizureof t€nitory in war but by sllowing the inevitable decline of Turkey to continue unhindered (or unassisted),Nicholas adopted his experts' advice and {ollowed it closely, at least until 1841.In the new Russian view, Turkish contml of Conatantinopletrould gapse in time $ithout outside pressure,but if Russia took the offensive,the other powe$ would demand equivalent gaiDs, In a Turkish partition, it was now anticipated, Constantinoplewould become a free city, giving Britain unrestrictedaccessto the Bleck Se6,
62
PALlltERSTON'S POLICY
and Austria would gain Bosnia, Albania end Montenegro, while Flance took EgFt, and Britain Crete and the Aegean islands, Th€ continued existenceof Turkey's empire,thereforc,guarsnteed the safety of Russis's Black See shores fmm British naval bombs!dment. It wss, then, a n€r,sRussian policy with which Palmcrston had to deal; snd this goes some rvay to explaining the relatively fumbling nature of Palnerston's own policy in the Middle East up to 1833, and his slownessafterwsrds to adopt that outright protcction of Turkey with which he is usually associated. On Grcek independence, at any rate, Palme$ton had clear and precise aims. As soon as he took ofnce,instructions were sent to th€ British reprcsentative to delay Greek evacuation of arcas north of the Gulf of Co nth. The truncated Greece which Wellington had sccepted in February 1830 rFssto be enlargedso that the new 6tst€ should be militarily defensible end therefore truly indepeDdent. It should also become a monarchy, with an acceptable imported d]'nasty. A weak Gleece with a merely sutonomous status could too eaeily be dependent on Russian 'potection'. Polm€rston therefore pressedfor a northern Greek tuontier running ftom th€ GuU of Arte in the west to the GuIf ol Volo in the east, and lor the inclusion of Euboea and the Cyclaalesunder Greek rule. This was achieved. In July 1882,the Tulks were incluced to acc€pt the British pmposels, in return for expected British help against Ibrahirn Pashr'6 inyssion of Syrie. A]rcsdy, itr trIay 1832,byjointBritish, Frcnclr and Russian agreement, ihe Grcekg lrad learned the identity of their ffr6t king, Pdncc Otto of Bevade; and this May convcntion makes it clear that Canning's policy of cooperation with Russia, in oder to secure a Grecce independent of Russian control, had not been abandoned. Britain was still in tbe position of persuading 'Iurkey to c€de temitory as the p ce to be p&id for Russian cooperation. But Palmerston rtras oble to report enthusiastically to the Commons in August 1832 that 'the intelests of civilization, the interests of commerceend the interests of political independence are all the interests of England, and oll have been signally prcmoted by the emaDcipation of Grcece'
AHE I'GYPTIAN
ADVANCE AND UNKIAR
SKELESSI
68
The achievement ol Crcek ind€peDdence had been gained, however, at a time when Palme$ton.was preoccupiedwith what appeared to him more vital issues. His involvement in thc tselgien crisis s.nd in the struggle to maintain constitutionol rdgimes in Spain and Podugal suggests that even the Fnnce of Louis Philippe remained, to him, a strong potential thleat to British irtelests. It was a common assumption in Britain at this time that European order was most likely to be overthrown by the two 'expansionist' pow€rs, France and Russia, possibly in corDbination. The 1830 revolution in Fmnce had lessenedthe d&nger of such a combinationi but Palmerston's anxiety to controt l,ouis Philippe's foreign ventures contrasts significnntty with his permissive attitude towards Russian actions in poland. Negotiations for Greck independence h&d been overshadowed in l8S2 by another factor involving FIarce - this time in the eastem MeditcEenean - the Eg}?tian invasion of S1tia. This new phase in the Eastern Question found Palrneffton unprcpared, urcertain and inept, even. His determination to check Flsnce in Ivestem Europe hed committed British resources too completely. As a result, not only 'was lbrahim Pasha &ble to advance into Asia Minor, but Russia was allowed as free a hsnd at Constsntinople as she had enjoyed in the suppression of the poles.
I T O ]T H E E C Y P T I A N A D V A N C E A N D UNKIAR SKEI,ESSI 'I1r€ sequenc€ of events le&ding up to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessireveals a seriousmiscalculation on palmeEton's Dart ss jl aflcrwardsse.medto him. It \as a mtt€ke hc fu y ad;ilred and intended never to repeat. 'There is nothingthathss happencd since I have been ilr office $hich I r€gret so much es that trcmendous blunder of the English government, he v?ot€ to Lamb in 1888. To llollend in 1840 he said ,No British csbinet at any period . , . ever made so great a mjstak€ in re€ard to foreign afrairs'.
6t
PALMERSTON'S POLICY
Mehemet Ali had, since 1827, been inqeasingly unwilling to aecept hi6 status as s vassal, refusing a request from the Porte for trcops to fight the nussiansin 1829.In November18sl he declaredwaronSultan Mahmurl,and Ibrahirn beganbisl'rctolious advance thrcugh Palestine and S]'io. Before the declerstion, Mehemethad carefully soundedout opinion in both Britsin snd France, hoping to pelsuade at least one power to support his ambitions. Tmditional ties betweenMehemetand France msde a Frcnch allience more likely; but France had d€cided ir 1880 to act without Egmtian cooperationin Algeria, and an Egl?tian tske-over of the Turkish empire seemed&t tlis iime to ofre! no specialguamnt€eol French advancemeDtin north Atica. Fr€nch s).rnpathy, therefore, he received,but no offfcial French military support, The extent of this s,'rnpathy was not entirely cle&r in Britain, however; many officels of the EglTtian army were of Frcnch natioDa.Iity, &nalsubsequentmovements of the French fleet suggestedthst s].lpathy might easily be extended into ective assistance,Eg!'pt was r€adily seenas a trlench pmtCg6, anil indeed it ha6 been suggestealthat PalmeNton was perhapg half willing to &llow a Fnnco-Egyptian advance in the Middle E&st to balance B tain's blocking of Frcnch hopesin Belgium and Portugal. If tbis ffas so in 1882,it was clear that by 1889, French activity in the Turkish €mpire was as unwelcome to Britain as ws.sRussien. But in 1882Palmerston had not m&de up his mind, MehemetAli's appealto Bdtain for an sllisnce fell on deafe&Is. IIis suggestionin Msrch I8S0 that with B tish support he could take over the Sult€,tr'sdomains and provide a lar more eflcctive barrier to Russian expansion, did not moYe lberdeen. Even Ibrahim Pasha's victories in 1842, {hich, after the bettle of Konieh, brought hin v ithin striking disiance of Constantinople, left Palmerstonunresolved.The Sultan's acceptsncc(refened to above) of the Crcek independencetems in July 1882was given in the hope of ottracting British support sgeinst Ibmhim, but such support was not fofthcoming. Shatford Cenning, without autho zation from Londo4 had s$ured Mahmud thet an Egntian attack on Constantinople would be blocked by the
THE EGYPTIAN
ADVANCE AND UNKIAR, SKELESSI
65
Bdtish fleet ; and this assurance had raised Britain's iafluence at the Port€ to unprecedented 1evel6. But Palmerston would not support hi6 ambassador. Reasons are not lacking lor Pslmerston's inactivity, and his willingness to allow the initiative to fau to Russia. There was, to begin with, a major distraction at home. The Parliarnentary Reform crisis had dominated govemment thinking during the first half of 1889; indeed when the Egl?tia.n attack on Acre was launched, Grey's government was, for the moment, not even in oflice, Grey himself afterwards ftfelled to Ibrahim's enterpdse as a temotcandpmblematicslint€rest',notematterofimmediat€ concern to his government compared, say, to Belgium or Portugal. tr{oreover, Britain's involvement in thosc two areas \vas in itself reason enough !r'hy PalmeNtorr could not take a strong lirc in the the ea6tern Metlitenanesn. There was a limit even to Britain's sea power, and the Ileet was already deployed ofr the Belgian and Poduguese coasts. No ships could b€ spar€d for a demonstration of B tish nsval strength off Alexandria or in thc Straits. At the crucial time, therc could be no British 'presence'. Nor did it 6eem possible for Palmercton to seek the assistance of an ally, or attempt a geneHl settlement by the poweN in concert. Austria was certainly an int€r€sted pa y and, on the surface, a natural ally ageinst possiblc Russian or Frcnch ambitions in Turkey. Mctt€mich did indeed propose io Janusry 1833 that Brits,in should joir Aushia, Llussia end Russia in an attempt to saf€guad the Turktuh empire by diplomotic measures. But his overtures were rebuffed. Partly this was because Palmerston was unvilling to add to lrlettemich's steture in Europe, end partly it was because Austria's views on Belgium and Portugsl ran counter to Britain's. Furthemorc, Mett€rnich had been, and probably still w&s, too closely associatedwith Tsa st autocracy for Palmerston's liking. IIe preferred a subsewicnt and 'constitutional' suppoder, as Louis Philippe might be, if caretully handled und controlled, Finally, it may well be that Palme$ton considered lbrahim brsically a lesserthrest to Tulkish integdty than Russia was. 'l'wo lacts support this argument. Firstly, if Egypt were allowed
oo
PALMERSTON'S POLICY
to acquire Slti&, this would not necessarily threaten Britsin's overland rcute to India via the Euphmtes and the Pelsiar Gulf. 'Turkey is a good This route could rernsin in Turkish hands, and occupier of the loute to India'. Secondly, if Ibrahim did show signs of annexing more than S}?ia and thereby thtatening the EuphDtes rcute, he was far morc 1'uln€rable to sea-borne attack then was Russia. The fleet could land B tish troops in Palestine to attack his lines of communication, and Alexendria could be bombarded. However, there are also three funilamentsl 1veak_ nessesin the s.rgument.Fimtly, there wss no certainty ss to the ultimate intertions of ihe Dg}?tians. The adYance towards Constantinople might be no more than a show of shength, designedto compel the Sultan's agreementto Ecyptian indcpendence; or it might have the limited aim of annexing Sl'da. But there was also a strong possibility that a, triumphant Ibrahim might depose the Su]tar a.nil proclaim a complete Egyptian takeover of the Turkish empire. The Euphmtes route would hardly be assured then, Secondly, it was possible that lUehemct, rejected by France snal B tain, might ally with Russia, giving her influence not onty at the Straits but throughout the Middle East, Thirdly, of cou$e, Britain did not have the ships available to rcstrain lblehim. Such, then, are the consideBtions underlying British policy in the 1831-s c sis. Not until the middle of 1888, apparerfly, was PalmeNton s.ware of the full implications a.nd possibilities of the Egyptian adv:Lnce, By then it was too latc for B tain either to gain any ailvantage, or even to defend h€r interests The Russians had, fortunately, ignored the ides of an alliance with Egmt ; and byNovemberl832, they werc leady to sendshils to the Bosphorus whenev€r the Sultan should ask for them, By January 1843, it became known that B tsin could not supply the ships that Stratford Canning had promiseal six months earlier. In February 1833, Ilahmud took the momentous steP of asking hi6 chief enemy for help; 80,000Ru$ian tmops, foul ships of the line ard foul frigates vere asked for, The Russien ships anived in the Bosphorus befor€ the end of the month. l\oops landed north of Colstantinople at the beginning of April, and more arrived two
'IIIII EGYPTIAN ADVANCE AND UNKIAR SKELESSI 67
weeks later. The Eglatian advance halted 150 mile6 east of the Straits. In May, peace was agreed on betwe€n the Sultan and Ibrahim. The Egptians got S]' s aad Adsna; but Asia }Iinor, Constantinople and the Straits had been saved, and the sedit was almost entirely due to Russia. For the one time in her history, Russia. had achieved srmed occupation of Constantinople, and, incredibly, at Turkey's invitation. There would almost certainly be a price to pay. Negotiations for a new RussoTrrkish t&aty began immediately. The treaty of Unkier Skelessi was signed in July 1884. Orlov, the chief Russian negotietor, had received instructions from his Foreig'n Minister, Nesselrode, to conclude o defensive alliance Nith Turkey; the object of the alliance being to rcduce AngloFrench influenee st the Porte, and to give Russia cxclusive control over Turkey's future. Under the tEaty, Turkey agreeal to a permanert alliance, and undedook, in a notodous secret article, to closc the Straits to forcign warships when€ver Russia asked. Th€ sedet soon became lcrown, but Nicholas had gained his reward. It is possible (it has been done, notably by Temperley and, recently, by M. S. Ande$on) to minimize the efrects of the seoet article and to suggest that Palme$ton came to exaggerete the e{telrt of the control Russia thereby gained ove! the Straits. But the fact remeins that, 'whenevel Russia was at war with Britain, she nolv knew thst her Black Sea coast was sale from British bombardment. This wes a guamnteed immunity that she h8d never previously enjoyed. And one advsntsge could easily lead to another. Palnerston was afraid thst, as the T6er's influence trt Constantinople incree6ed, Russia might in futue gain the ght to send her o*ar weNlrips through the Struits, so endangering Britain's control of the Meittelranean, It was not only Turkey who had pai
j
68
P.{LMERSTON'S POLICY
IbrahLrm;they were al6o ready to open fire on ttre French ships which had appeared &t the entrance to ihe Dardanelles, The smal Bdtish contingent, which shortly sfte]wa]ds joined the French, faced th€ same tbrest. Russis intended to be Turk€y's
BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS
69
which govemed Britain's attitude to Turkey for the next fifty years. ff Britain hoped to undelmhe Russia's position at Constantinople,she\fould have to follow Ru-ssia'sexa,mple,end hope that a ne\p opportunity $ould arisewhich rnight allow her to defend the Su]tan and gain his gratitude. A major difliculty, howevel, was thet B t&in could never finally decide whethel Turkey wss alive or dead. But at least she now began to hope th&t therc was life in the body still.
edane. !'ib .
[ 1I] BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE IIEDITERRANEAN DURING THE PALMERSTON ERA
Y.,xr
MEDl lEfu&ANEAN
fq= ,Y
Acra
1'oBa:ra(tursian Gulr, l,ooomtlesJtutfl Suez
Sltez---
A R A B I A
\ss EGYPT AND SYBIAJ 1831_41
1 sole prot€ctor. NichoLagwas by no meanssure that the Turkish empirecoutd be preserved-'I Iqek the power to give life to s corpse'he said; but Unkisr Skelessihad giveD Russiathe exclu, sive ght to postporc the funerel indefinitely, and to disposeof " the efrects once the annorncement of de&th lvas mede. In the secondplace, Unkiar Skelessimarks an important tuming point in British }fiddle Esstem policy. Decisions were no\y taken
It is not surprising that Palme$ton hed not made any ffrm decisionsabout Turkey before 1833,The ex&ctnsture of Britain's strategic intercsts in the Mediterranean had not yei b€en fully examined,nor had all the possibilities of the victory at Trafalga.r been fully exploited. No statesman beforc Pelme$ton had realized, and no stetesman afLer him couLl enjoy, the grs.Dd wodd r6le that Bdtain's complete naval predomiqs,qceafforded her in the first half of the nineteenth century{ CanningDadindeed useclthe fleet to rcstEin France in 1828aDdtuprcdcci Podugal. \ But Canning, like both Pitts before him, had seen Blitein ; primarily &s a colonial and maritime powel ouls^ilc E:jJope, 1 interestitrgherselfjl Duropeodly when forcedfo by thF needs I on the otherhand,hodwishpdBritain of6elf-defence. Castleresgh, : to play a full par+ 6itbitu Europe, combining her diplomstic *.-. weight vith that of oth€r powersto maint&in an orderly Eumpe th€r€by, ofaourse,maintaining a 'balance'and pres€rvingB tain fiom coirtin€ntal aggression.It was Palmerstonwho ffrst und€rstoodthat, sfter I8o5 (of perhapsafter 1815),Britain couldplay both r6les, dominating both the continent and the oce&nsof the world. Shc could never hope to domidete Europe militarily by a liand force such as France, or afterwards G€rmany or Russia, coulclraise, but neval pover could ensurcthat her opinion must be consult€d and her appmval gained before any ilecisions
70
PALMDRSTON'S POLICY
affecting Europe were taken. She could certainly be Europe's 'srbiter'. No British stat€sman after Palme$ton wes ever in this happy position, except perhapsDisrocli, briefly, in r878; butPalmenton had the good fortune to control Britain's foreigr policy at a time *'hen her industrial power was, relative to other count es, at its greatest, ancl when Fmnce had at lsst passed her zenith, and Germany (in l9l4 and 1942), and Russia (by 1945), had yet to reach thciN. From 1815 to 1864 there was a power vacuum on the continent. To t&ke full advantage of this lull, Britain must attain obsolute cotrtrcl of the Mediterraflean and of the routes to India. Control of the Meditenanean allowed her to dominate Europe; control ol the rcut€s to India allowed her to dominete the world - or at least the IndiaD and Pacific oceans. And of course, the two aims werc inextdcably conneet€d; the lfediterranean was already becoming the main route to Indis,. Control ol the Medit€ranean, especially the eastem Mediterrunesn, was the key to contrcl of Europe because the hvo greatest continental po\vers, Fmnce and Russis., were both vulnerable there. It was especially in the t\ukish empire that they were susceptible to British prssur€, Aven Austria had interests there which could be seriously thrcatened by British hostility. If B tain could seal ofr the Dardanclles, the Red See, and the Persian Gulf as she had done the Cibraltar stmits, she had a, stranglehold on much of the commerce ond on the major fleet movements of all thrce powers. Franc€ retained a large economic intetest in the Turkish empire. Austria was still pimarily interested in Germany (and ilr thst respect was of little concem to Britain because, in effect, she guarsnteed continued Germsn disunity) but one quarter of her foreign trade passed through Tlieste or, via the Danube, through the Straits. From the time of Joseph II, she rpas grsdually rediscovering Balkan ambitions which could be frustrst€d by a hostile Turkey under Bdtish p.tmnage. FinaIIy, Russia had an entirely speci6l position. Though much ofher impot trade vra6 carrieil on via the Baltic and St Pet€rsburg, Odesss and the Bla.ck Sea mute via the Straits were Ispidly incrteasing in importance for her exports,
BRITAIN'S
STRATEGIC INTERESTS
especiallywh€at exports from the Ukaine; and the Black Sea, unlike the Baltic, doesnot freezein winter. Now Russia iLd not need to contrcl the Straits to ensurethat her merchantship6couldpsssthroughthem in peacetime; but if she did not control them in time of war, then Britain, or a Tulkey under British petronage, cor d completely block her southem hacle rcute. Furthermor€, Russie, unlike any other power, had strong Bcial and religious links with the Balkan subject mcesof the Turks. For her, Consta[tinople was the Holy City, and rebellious Serbs or Bulgariens were oppressealcoreligionists and blood-brcthels. This gaveher s.built-in advantage in atlowing her to intefere in TurLish intemal affairs. At the sametime, it could be a crucial dissdvantage,if Russia vanted to play the $le of chief protector to Turk€y. She could defend the Sultan ftom rebelliousE$?tians. Shecould hardly help him to suppressrevolts of Balkan Christians. Britain, though by no meansable to condoneill-treatmeDt of CMstians, could at least appearto the Turks as somethingof a disinterestedoutsider, by conparison with Russia. Then ther€ is the question of entry of Bdtish B'arshipsinto the Black S€a. With the Sh&its open to Bdtain and closedto Russia,British attacks could be leunched with impunity, Prcvided Turkey wasBritain's ally in any disputc $ith Russia,Russie'sBlack Seacoastwasopen to the persuasive sound of British naval guntue. Bitish conhol of the MediterEnean 'would only be complete when the Black Ses could be xegaded by Bdtish nav{Llcaptains as palt of the lueditenonean, Commandof the eastem Meditensnean, and especiallyof the Straits, would give B tain the meansofcontrclling and induencing thlee great porrcrs,then, IIer navel predominancehad given her a unique mobility of armed power with which to Einforce her diplomatic voicein any quarter ofthe globe.It oDly remained to ensl]Ilethe ftee psssageof her wa.rshipsilr all waters. This was a, prinsry reason vhy Bdtsin becamemore interested in the Eastem Question after 1888. Her methods of contml and influence wer€ three-fold; by blockade of enemy commerce; by bombardmentof enemyports, ns\ral besessnd forbesses; analby 'pin-prick' landings of trcops. Ftance, Belgium, Holland, Spein,
a PALMERSTON'S POLICY
Portugel, Denmalk, Sweden,Aushia (ir Italy and Istde), Eg}J,t end the Turkish empire, and the U.S.A. were aheady exposedto this kinal of presBure.But Russis $as not, ODly h€r Baltic trade and coastline\r€resofar opento British attack; and the Admirolty was &lweys r€luctant to }i6k Bhipsfor bombardment or tmoplandings deep inside the Bsltic, (T'his was the main reasonwhy hussia, with her limited for€ign tmde, was difficult for B tain to contrcl,) OnceBritain had control of the Streits, though (by befricnding Turkey, as she hed previously befriended Arstda and then the Belgians in order to control the Belgian coastline), Russia would be totally exposed, Such, then, were Bitain's shategic inter€sts in the Medit€rlanean; and suchare the chi€f motives determining Palmerston's policy after Unkiar Skelessi.Ife sawnow how much ground had beenlost by B tain's inability to ss,v€Consta.ntinople in 1832. }'uture policy must aim at a drastic rcvision of Unkiar Skelessi, and for the time being, Britain must thercfore se€kto become chief prctector and controlling influence at Constantinople. It wa6 norir that Bdtain adopted the policy ol upholding Turkey end developingeconomiclinks with her empire, a policy which she followcd for the next h&lf century. Wh€thero! not Turkey wasthe 'wronghome'in 1854,or 1878, sh€seemedthe only one to back in the 1830s.It has beensaid that B tain becsmepro-Turk only becauseshewasenti-Russian; and that sh€opposedRussia at the Straits becauseof opposition to her on other grounds- e.g. Poland, Tsarist autocracy,fearsof Russian expansionin Ceatral Asia and the Far East. But it is clear that Palmerston opposed Russia in the period 1833 41 chiefly becauseshe comnanded Constantinople, ancl whoever commanded Constantinople eommandedthe Eastem MediteF raneen, the Turkish empire and the shod routes to India,. Constentinople, aft€r all, was not only the guadian of the Straits, it was elso the se&t of the Sultsn's government and th€ centre of a vast empirc which straddled the meeting-point of Europe, Asia end Africe. It wes 'the ffr6t strategic position in the world, snd no Greet Power could allow another to Dossessit'
PALMERSTON'S NEW TUn'KEY POLICY
(Temperley), Russie'sBlack Seatrade end Britsin's wish to be able to 6end we$hips through the Straits sre special considemtions; but, apert frcm these, Russianoccupotion of Constantinople wasin itself no more,and no less,dangercusto Britain thsn waspossibleFlench or, loter, C€rmanoccupation. Indeed in 1840 Palmerston fiustrated trYenchaims es hesrtily as Russian; and $hen Britain yielded pride of place in hukey to cerrnany aft€r 1890,it was not only becauseshe had developeda conscience about Balkan nationalism, nor becausecontrol of Eg!?t aDd Suezmadecontml of the Straits unnecessary ; it wa6 slsobecause Cermany, of all the powers, was leest susceptible to Blitish pre8sure.
Ir2] THE NEW PALMERSTON POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY, AND INCREASING BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST Tluee days after the tmaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed, and befor€ its implications wcre fully knorvn, Patmerston made clesl Britain's poljcy for the futrue of Turkey. In a speech to the Commons on 11 July 1884, he announced 'It is of the utmost importanee for the interest of England, that the terito es and provinces forming the Ottoman Empire should be an independent stote'. Any Russian conquestsin Turkey would lead to partition of th€ empire, he felt; snd sny such sttempt at partition must be rcsisted by B tain. 'I'he integrity and independence of thc Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tmnquillity, the lib€rty and the balance of power in the rest of Eumpe.' His concern to remove the new Russian protectoBte over Turkey was reinforced by news of the M{inch€ngrltz sgreement bctween Mcholas end Mettemich in September 1888. At tr{itnc[engr:itz, Russie snd Aushia agreed on future eonsultation and i:oopention on Turkish problems. This seemedto Palm$ston to leave the initiative st the Stroits more thsn ever in Russia's
74
PALMERSTON'S POLICY
hsnds. He saw Austri& in future possessionof Serbia,Macedonia and Thrace, while Russia took Constantinople, leaving Britain as a bystander, unabl€ to intederc. The pedod between 1883 and 1838 was certainly one o? suspicion and mistr'ust or armed peace - in Anglo-Russian relations. Palmerston did indeed adopt a fumly sntiRussian outlook at this tim€. But it is important to rccognize that he was markedly less s1'rnpethetic to Turkey &nd less militant towsrds Russia than were B tish agents on the spot. In his view Turkey wes not yet, if indeed she ever could be, milita ly stmng emugh to be a completely reliable British ally. And, hora'ever much Palmerston encoureged anti-Russian emotion among the British public, he never lost the hope rat Unkiar Skelessi might be undone by diplomatic manoeuvre, involving negotiation, not war, with Russia. The Csnning policy of cooperation with Russiawas not to be lightly discsrded,especially while France remained a doubtful partner - fo} the so-called Anglo-Frenoh eDtente was being seen by Frcnch opinion as a scheme for the rclegation of Frsnce to second-cless stetus. TIle opporhmity to gain the Sultan's gratitude and to outmanoeur.'re Russia came in the second Egyptian c sis of 1889 41. Before the crisis broke, however, developments had taken plsce giving Britain a very much ercater stake in the trIiddle East tl€n she had seemedto havc in 1832. B tain norv had a new ambassador in Turkey, Lord Ponsonby, who worked stmngly (and often over-enthusiastically) to regain for Britain hcr ptace of influence at Constantinople. IIe swiftly became to the Sultan as necessary a confidant and as valued an adviser as Stratfod Canning had beenup to July 183r. Pomonby was given (temporarily) in January 1834, the po1ler to csll the British fleet to the Straits withoui consulting Londoq if ever it seemed to him that the Russians were likely to increase their hold on CoNtantinople. IIe lost this pover during the brief Peel-Wellington ministry of 1884-5, but it was partialy restorcd to him in 18SOby PalmeF ston, (IIe then had the dght to act only if help rffere rcquested by the Sultan), Ponsonby was all for a renewal of the Tulcongyptian struggle end for war between Britain and Russia ower
PAL]ItERSTON'SNEW Tt'NKEY POLICY
75
Circassia.Both thesewild propositions were rejected by Palmerston, who always consideredthreats of wsr to be more efrective than war itself. Indeed, in SeptemberrS84, the Bdtish flect actually receivedordersftom PalmentoD to prev€nt any possible attack by Ttrkish warships on Egypt, Ponsonby,shopes of a challengeto Russisover Circassiain 1894would have involved sendingB tish wsrships into the Black Sea- to support Circassiansin their strugglefor independencefrom Russia.But this was not PalmeHton'r way of undoing Unkiar Skelessi,and nottrring comeof the prcposal.Nor did Pelme$tonrespondin 1886when the British sbip Tiaef \vasanested by the Russianslor illegally tmding in Circossia.Her sailing there was largely the work of the Turcophil David Uryuhart, ltrho with Ponsonby had hoped to lorce Palmerstoninto anti-Russianectiod.Despitethese6etbacksto his schemes,however,Ponsonby,sinfluenceat Constant! nople gTe\tr. In 1893, Urquhart had been sent, largely &t Palmerston,s instigation, to revi€w the commercial possibitities for British traders in the Turkish empire. This young anti-Russian lenatic disturbed Palme$totr by the wildness of his political schemes; but the repo*s he sentback in 1884end l88S helpedto lay the foundation of an important expansion in Britain,s Midtlle Esstem tnde, Economic motives were never uppermost among the reasonsfor British intercst in the Eastem Qu€stion.St$tegic considerations- the use of the fleet to uphold Britain's position as arbiter in Europe, and concern for the safety of routes to hdia - always took prec€dence.But ths.t is not to say that-l economic motives were unimportsnt. Palmerston hardly ever I spoke of the T\rrkish empire without mentioning Britain's conmercial interests there. New malkets wcre certainly needed lor B tsin's expanding indushial production at a time when i Eulopenn countrieswere raising taritrs to protect their dwn I infant industries.fic Ttrrkiqhempire,alongwith SouthAmerica rl ancl China, ofrereda new market. In 1888,Britain's ttsding iuterest in Turkey was still rel&tively smsll. Alter 1838,it grew lapidly. In 1887,Britain came fflth (behindGreece,Sardinio,Aust a and Russie)in numberof shios
/
7$
PALMERSTON'S POLICY
calling at Constantinoplc {a mcrc 86,253 tons). In 1856, tLe British tonmgc had ris€n to 898,753,and thc number of ships from 432 to 2,504. In 1837, Britain aheady had the higbest number of shipscalling st Smyrna, the port at wlich many goods rvcrc landcd for ovcrland tDnsport to thc l4uphrates and Persi$. In 1838, the dccisivc Anglo-l'urkish tladilrg convention wss signed which gavc Britain'most favourcd nation'temrs in the r 'Shirts for thc Moslern rvorld' nov provided i'I'urkish crnpirc. lwork lor Lancaslire's cotton mills. Not only did tbis tres.ty lincreasc Britanr's cxportsi it also grcatly pleased the Sultan, worked against lguarantccd Ponsonby'splace in his councils,and'I\rkish governDgmt, whosc tradc was hit by the removal of rrcnt monopolies. Mchemet Ali vas obliged to accept the privilcgcs of British traders in Syria and Dgypt under the 1838 trcaty; but this did not incrcasehis devotion to Bdtain, nor makc hinr a willing guardian of hcr Rcd Seaand Penian Culfroutes to India. The 1838bcaty thus hclpcd to commit B tain to that outr;ght antagonism to Mchcmct Ali rvhich she displayed in 18.10. A turthcr rcason rrhy n tain firmly assisted Turkey in th€ 1839 41 crisis is to bc found in the signs of revival n'ithin the Turkish empirc. If the empi.e !r'as to be saved ftom partition aDd Russian tutelage, it had better reform and modemize itseu. This at least would givc it an outward appearanceo1 life and rvould contradict Mcholas's:rssumptionthat it would fall 'a little carlier or a littlc latcr'. Palmc$ton in particular would be much happier to support a going c,:,ncern.Successivellritish ministers through much of the ninetcenth centuy rcfused to abandon the hope that one or other Sultan could be persuaded to halt the decline in Turkish powcr. 'Ihey were rcpeatedly disappointed. Ho$ever, after I 834,Mahmud II seemedanxiousio overhaulthe edmiristration, strengthen the amry and develop ed cation on theEuropean model. Palmerstonhad no illusioDsabout the extent of improvements that could be expected. Turkey was not going to turn overnight into another 'liberal-constitutionol' Bdtish ally. But if her army and nsvy could be strengthened,at least she would be a better prospect in the future. 'As to the Turkish crnPire,il rvecon procur€ f(ir it ten years ofpeace under the joint
PAI,MI]RSTON'S NEIV TUITKDY POLICY
77
protcction of thc ffve Porvers, and il those ycols are profitably ernploycdiD rcorganizingthe intemal systemofthe empire,thcre is no rcasor whfltcvcr why it should not becorncagr.in a respcctrHe po$'cr.' British army oficers "e.e sent in 1839 to help in r.corganization. Joint naval cxcrciseswere held in 1838 by ll tislr and Turkish lleets in thc Mcditcrrunesn. The visiting ollicers in hct achicvcd littlc; but thcir prcscnceis important cvidenceof urc new linc in Ilritish policy. The British conmitmcnt to thc dcfcncc of the Turldsh cmpirc \r'asmuch greater in 1830 thrn it had bccn in 1832. Finally, by 1839, therc was a much cle€.rerutrdcNtanding in Britain about hcr routcs to India, rld the means o{ defending thcsc. Thc daDgerofRussian cncmachncnt in Persia was rheady knorvn. Since1828Russiahad beenthc dominant influcncc tlrere; and it v.as believedthat the Pe$ian att:rck or Herat in -A.f{hanistan, in 1837, war made with RussiaD conniunce. Ccrtrinly Hcrat, an iDportant fortress in thc fonvard defencesof India, was saved in 1837 by.rr English oflicer. From 1835, delibcrate attcmlts were made lry the British to suNcy the RupluatesPc$inn Gulf mute and to comparc its potcntial llith thc Red Sca route. The Euphmkrs route rvas thc shorter of the two in terms ofdist$nce; but tlds d;rcctness!r'asa rcduccd ossetbccause of thc longer overlrnd section to be covercd.Thc overlsnd section at Sucz lvas negligible hy comparison, but it and the Red Se{ lnssagc lvere eDtirely urder trgypt's control. By 1838, ho{'ever, thcrc rvas also sn Egj'ptian threat to the Pc$ian Gulf. Mehemet's forceshad (mssed the Ambiandesert and werc mcnacinlrBahrcin - adjacent to tr{uscat,which was already undcr Britjsh protcction. In Nov€mbcr 1838, Palr eBton made it clear to Mehcmct u)rt Bitish-Indian forces uould defend Bahrein. if it came undcr Egyptian attack. The rapid growth in stcamship trafiic, also, madc thc Sucz-Red Sca rcute morc attractive by the cnd ofthe t83os and it is Dot suryrising thflt, in 1837, a Britjsh plan was pui fornfad for thc construction of a milway across the Suezisthmus. (l'he railway ri'as not in tuct completcd until 1858, oneyear belore work beganon the canal.)But the ts tishschenes mct setbacks in both Xgypt and Penia; and thc source of
7A
PALMITRSTON'S POLICY
opposjtion in each casewas France. The Frcnch consul at Basm in Mesopotarniatried to p€rsuadethe Ambs to block thc river to prevent the passagcof llritish sruvey ships. Frcnch in0uencc irl Eeypt causedthc tcmporary ebandonmcnt of the Suezr{ilwat' project, British suspicionsabout French sympatbies ir r832 wcrc amply justilicd. Clcarly Russiawas not thc only sturnbling-Hock b Britrin's hopcs in the Middle E.rst. Therc \''as no doubt in PDlmcrston'smiDd nolv thst Mehemct Ali was not the horse to be backcd. He rqasthe tsent of Frcnch arnbitioDs,and Irrench ambitions $'cre host;le to Britain's com' merce ald imperial coDnections.Egypt's hold over thc Rcd Sca mutc nust be ryeakenedat the fiIst opportunitl, snd thcrc could bc no question of allorving Ibrahim to conquer further tcnitory i[ Syria, Arabia or thc PcNian Culf area. In 1838 ]tehemet un{'iscly issuedthreats to the Sulten ofAdcn. Bdtish b bery of the Sultan followed and, in 1839,Aden becsmc a British protectomte. Patmerstonhad challengedthe F$nco-Egyptian position and ganred an invaluable coaling-station guading the exit from thc Red Sea. Now, if the routes to Indi,r vcre to be safegusrdcd, not only mllst Russia be checked and Turkey defended, but Fmnce anal Mchemet must also be contained. These $'crc Prlme$ton's aim6 when the 1889-41crisis broke. It might be objected - as it was by Chrcndon in 1840 - that PatnerstoD missed the opportunity in 1831 or again in 1838 to back Mehcmct, and not the Sr tan, as Brita;n's rgent in the llirldlc East. He certainly oppeals an altcnative horsc rtt lirst sight. A Mehcmet under British patronage could pcrhaPs have occupicd Constantinoplc and the Straits, as wcll as controlling thc trvo rcutes to India. But the reality is more complcx. In the {ilst place, French influence in Eeypt - both political and commercial - ahcady went too dcep. In the second lhcc, Palmerston Lad serious doubts about Il,rahim's abiliiy to hold 'Iurkish dominions, Iio$evcr succcssfr his initial do"'n the ligbtnine conqucsts.treypt's military potcntial wasnot unliniied, I thc thira phce, and perhaps most crucial, therc \L'asno doubt that British backing for lrrr Eg]'ptian conquerer 'lYould allow lhrssii to :Lssurnefull rcsponsibility Ii)r the dcfencc of Turkey;
'IHE 1830 4t CITISIS
79
and the Russians could reach Constantinople before €ither Ibrahim cotld cross Asia ifinor or the British fleet could force the Dardane.lles.Anglo-EglTtian control ol thc rout{:s ro India scemed inadequate conpensation for Russian control of the Strrits. (Sixty years lrter, of cotlrse,this vierv \vas to be almost completely revcrsed.) Palme$ton apporentty had tit e choice, thcn, in 1839.
[13]THE t8Be-4rCRISIS 'l'he 1839 41 crisis lras lbreshrdowed by Xfehemct's abortive dedamtion ofindepcndence in May r838. This n,et total opposition from all the pov.crs,:r remarkaLle sign ofthc rnanimity that cnution and nutual srspicion can often prcdrce in a divided group. No power as ].ct vAs ready to seethc strtus quo chsnged. Mehenct \tithdrew his deelantion jn July 1888. But rhis prclilrlira.ry oisis gavc son,€ indication of thc parten of tuture cvcnts. Palmcnton spoke out ftom a position of streng r ard involvemcnt quite diftcrcnt from his 18BZstandpoint. IfMchenret wcrc to dcty the Sultan, he *'rote in August, ,the past1amust cxpcct to find Grcat Britain taking part with re Sultan . . . for thc turpose of preventing th€ dismcmbemrent of the Turkislr elrlpire'. Beiwccn August and Octobcr, PAlmc$toD attemptcd, rusuccesstuuy, to hring about a fivc-po$r:r agrcernent $,lich \yould destroy Russia.'sexclusive rights xon at Unki{r Skelessi. ln Octobcr, he wrotc to Britain's rrnbassadorin ttussia thur rc alTai$ of tl,e Turhish empire could no tonger be settled ,by the sinsle, indcpcndent :lnd self rcgutrted intcrference of uny one pow.r'. Thc exclusivc Russian protectoratc over 'Iurkey must bc bmught to an end: but Dot, it is imporrant to note, Ily sinelehanded British rction. A European Conccrt i{ss to be the mstrunx,nt. Canning'spolicy still hcld good. In Apr;l 1839, Nlahmud orrlered thc Turkish anny ro march illto Syrir to rcconquer the tenitory lost to Egypt in 188s. Repcated warnings from London, and a comptetc rcjection by I'Nlncrston ot an Anglo-Turldsh oltensivc attiance,had faitcd ro
80
PALMERSl'ON'S
POLICY
convincc th€ Sult&n. An ageing and sick ruler, he was det mined before he died to tcach trfehemet a lesson anil restore Turkish mastery in his o\yn dominions. IIe could not believe that B tain and/or Russia$ouldfail to suppodhim oncc hehad takenoction. The l83s 4l crisis, therclorc, rvas precDitated by Turkish' not f,eyptian, aggression, Vnntever their wishes' hovcver, the powers were compelled to rcspond. In June 1839, rt Nizib, the Turkish army sustained:r humiliatine dcfeat at tLe hands of the ngt?tians. Evcn the lresence of tr{oltkc, attached as an adviscr' wirh thc rank ofCaptain, to the Turkish army, could not prevent the catastrophe. l{oltke's advice rvns ignored by tbe Turkish !.elerals, and Ibrahim won a victory as decisivc as KoDieb. It sccmed tlEt the events of 1832-3 \Ycrc about to be repeot€d. Following the battle at Mzib, Ibrahim "as retrdy to resumc lis march on Constantinoplc.The Turkish fleet rnutinied and sailed to Alcxandria. llahmud died, Foreign assistenccwas despemtcly nccded now if 'ft1rkey was to survive. II€re, apparently, was Palmerston's hoped-for opportunity. At the end of June, the British fleet was ordcred into action. It \il'as to cut ofr communications by sea bet!'leen Egpt and S!'ria, and to appeur,es a gestuc of warning, offAlexandria; and also, in thc middle of July, it was to entcr the Dardanelles imnediatcly Ponsonbyreportcd the appeamnceofRussion ships at Const{ntinople. A watchful cye vrs clearly being kcpt on Frcnch and Russian moves. But, as anticipated, it was a fivepover ogrccment, not independcnt British actio , *'hich soved 'I'urkey in 1839.And, to his rcgret, P$lnr€rstonllad to vield the diplomrtic initiative to IUettcmich Tb. Collectivc Note of 27 July was vorked out at Vienna, not London, belorc it was prcsentcd to the nei{ Sultan and his ministcrs. By tle Note, the poweN bounal thcmsclres to act in Conced on the Dastem .iras u'orkcd out, but Question. No Turco-Dgyptian settlcment the Note was sutlicicnt to dcter the Egrutiams, and Ibraltim did not advsncc into Asia Minor. IloweYer, this was not the end, but the beginning, for Palme$ton. I{is oim was to rcmove thc Eg$tians entircly from Syria and it rarridlq becaue clcor that such a removal was unacceptable
THE t8S9 4r CRISIS
8l
to the Frcnch. Immcdist€ly aftcr the presentation of the Note, France bcgan to move awsy from her four pa nels. IIer fundament&l intcrcsts in EgWt *ould not aUo$,hcr to take part in outdght anti-Egyptian ection. Opinion in thc Fftnch prcss becrxre openly lrostile to British policics; and, $.ittr the slackcning ofthe Anglo-Fftneh entente, France $ss voluntarily moving iDto diplomotic isol{rtion.Pulmerstonnowhadthe chancetomake a ncw tr{iddle Erstem scttlement in Brit;sh int€rcsts rvhich, by defcnding Turkcy, lvould both deprive Russio of hcr posirion at the Stnits and also makc Egypt a lcss attractivc prospect for Frcnch exploitatior. All this could bc achieved provided Russia $'aswitling to bc drawn into asettlemcnt of Palmcrston,smakins. .\l lh. d.i.isi\.cr,,orn,nt, Russiawas morethan wi irrr. Tl rouel,nurlh. periudS, tt.n,l" . 1839lo Juty 1s 10.It,.re was intensc diplomatic activity at London. The initiati.i,c for this, surprisingly enough came fr.om Russia. Nicllolas could see thc prorycct of a brcach in Anglo-F.ench relations $.hictr corld be widencd by a Rdtish rgreemcnt {ith the thrce 'eastem' powen Russia, I'russia &nd Austria. His detemrimtiotr to undeDnine Loui! Philippe was as vigorous as his dcsire to .prctect' Turkey. Then, of course, thc ugreemcntsof Unkiar Skelessi\i.cre due to t)rpire in 1841, so a new treaty vould have to be negotiated in any case. In addition, shortage of moncy obliged the TsAr to follow a pcacetul course.I{e could not afford to ligLt Britain, so partnership $ith hcr was the only altemetive. There limitstio s ott Itussia's freedomol nunoeuvrc gsve Palme$ton aA open Iietd. Negotiations p$ceedcd in London betneen I'almerston and the Russian and Austri&n cnvoys, Brunnov. and Ncumann. Ar the discussionscontinued, the French attitude hardencd. In tlie :ruturm of 1839, Louis Philippe and his Prime t{inister, Soult, refused to contemplate auied military action to compel the Ilgyptians to cvscuat€ Syris. In March tS4.0,Soult \ras replaced by Thiers, and the anti-British fcclinE in I'oris wss intensiff€d. Thiers lyas seenringly convinced tl)ot Ibrahim was a .new llcxander' lvho could not ersily bc dislodgedby Brirish action. Palme$ton, however, considered the Eg}?tian .sn ;erorant Lffb:uian' and Lis po.wcr'the arlantcst humbus,.
82
I'AL[IERSTON'S
?OLICY
By July 1840, Pslmerston .|{'asreody to bring iD a ne\t lburpover treaty. Russian initiative had steded the t€lks in the previous Septemberbut, since then, discussionstrad gonc almost entirely Britni s way. Indeed, the toughest opposition Palmer' ston nret wes from some ofhis orvn Cabinet colleagues,{'ho were alarmed by the thought of a complete break rvith l'ranrc. On l5 July, B toin, llussis, Austria and Prussin laid down their temrs for a Turco-trgyptien settlement.1'heaglcemcntwas sigred ilr Lol<1on,and France was not consulted.TLe tcnns themse]ves were not impossible, Mellemct Ali was to rulc S1'ria untiJ his death, trturr $'hich it should rcvcrt to the SultaDi but UgYPt could rcmain a heredit€.ry tosscssion of his lamily indefinitely. M€hcmet was gi!'en tcr days to accept or fticct the ofier. If he htrd not accepted within twenty days, not even Egypt 1r'ould remain his. In addition to tbe EgyPtian provisions, the treoty obligcd thc Sultan to close the Stroits to other than Turkish warships while fttkey was at peace,Unkiar Skclcssiwas already half undone, and Frrncc rlaB alore in o hostile wirld. But the French were still adanunt. Faccd by a hostile four'I fe power challenge, Thiers was able to ivrite on 16 July nothing. lVe shrll frce anytbjng.' Palmerston, holev'er, spoke out even more conffdently, {nd lvith greater iustificatic'n. He kncw that British sca power would almost ccrtairly deter Fmnce from going to extrcmes. IIe also lcrclv that, if lrran.e did eo to x'ar. the Cerman states lr'ouid be rcad!' to attacl( her easten ftontier. Becker's 'rrr deutschcRhein' \\as ptoving very popular 'she \{'ill to a in Germany. If France rvere to bcgin a !var, theo certainty lose hcr ships, colonies and commerce before she sccs thc end of it . . , and Mehenet Ali 'llill iust be chucked into the Nile'. So wfote Palmerston to thc Britisb ambasssdor iD Paris, rvho ${s $uthorized to convcy the message, courtcousty, to Thjers, The impassecontinued into Septembel, t,ut, thereofter, military sction in the L€vent itself decided the outcome. Russi{L may hsve tnken the original diplomatic jnitiative in Septcmhr 1839,It wasB taiD who took themilitary initiative in September r84o srd thcreby gained the ght to dictate thc final terms. Mehclnet's authority in Syria had alreudy been challengedby
IllE
t8A0 {t
Clt I SIS
83
a revolt $l,n,h broke out in the Lebanon in June 1840. It rl?s supprcssedNjth dit{iculty nr July. Palmerston norv encoruagcd Admiral Stopford to use his ships to take advaltage of Lebancse unrcst. On 11 September,fifty,eight days after the sigl)ingofthe four-power trcaty (MeLemet and France had hrd rathcr more than thcir t$'cnty days'gfnce), thc Brit;sh fleet opcned fire on Bcirut. B tish and AustriaDtroops tandedin supportofaTurhish fi)rce. Thc Sultatr formally deposed tr{ehemetAli. In October, Adnriral Napicr def€$tedIbrahim at Beit-Ilannis and Bejmt "'as capturcd. In Noveml)er,the flcct bombarded Acre, and the town fell. Ibrahnr and his army wcrc lorced to retum to Esypt. In !-rancc, Thiers had becn pc$urded by Louis Philippe to rcsigu on 21 October, and the nery Soult Cuizot ministry was making conciliatory gcstures.Mehem€t,ur€refore, h:td Do option but to submit. On ,7 November, he and Napier signedan agreerr,rt by which he should retain ltgpt, but abandon S1-riaand all('w the Turkish flcet to retum to Constrntimople.It ryssNapier, a British naval ofiiccr, rcpresentingtbc pou.€rsith real ruthority ()lr the spot, "'Lo nude the ogreement in Alexanthin. It was Ponsonl)t, thc British anbassador at Constantinoplc, who co nselkrdthc Sultan ilr his suLsequentncgotiatioDslvith Mchemet Ali. Paln,e8to 's discussionsup to July, and his firm stand aftenvirds, rogcthcr I'ith the elYectivc usc of the ltcet ftom Scpter$er to Nol.cmLer, hrd lirrn for Brit.r.in in 1840 complete dom;narrceof ihc iddlc East. She had done far morc than any othcrpo$erto uphold the Sult{n's authority, out-flanking Russia rnd httnriliating I'rancc in the process.It was e \,'lstty differcnt story frrr the siiuation in 1832 39. It norv remained to anange a final sctU€mcnt Lctween the Srrltar and Mehernct; and thel to dmrv a ohastcncdFrc.nc€into r iive-po11?r,grcemcDt, guart|nteeillgthc ncw alrangeurcntsand fullillirg British aims in thc trIiddle Uast. In Jrme 18, , sfter prctnctcd Degotiationslasling sir months, the Sultan at lssr rgccd tlut trIeLemctand his descendantsshould retain Eg]?t, the successiongoing by primogeniture, and that he shoula pay a. lixcd annual trilmte. tr{chemetundctook to rcspect the Sultftn's rulc h Syr;r td lrabia, promiscd to li it thc siz(i,,Ihis ah,y,
84
PAI,i{IIRSl ON'S POLTCY
and to build ro wanhips without the Sultan's permirision. Mehemct's ambition now ceasedto be a major causeof friction in the Ircvant. France, meanthile, had a$eed to participate in discussionsleading to a trcaty bctr'€en the grcat powers; ond thc five-polYera$eement,to$?rds which Palmerston had workcd, was signed, also in June 1841. This *'as that Straits Convcntion which \{as to bc the basis of so much debatc and dissensionfor the remainder of the njneteenth centurJ'.
I I 4 ] T H E S T R A I T SC O N V E N T I O N The terms of the Conl'cntion {'erc not remarkablc in themselves, Broadty, they were A rcpetition of thc four-po$er agrcementsof Juty 1s10. The traditionat rule of thc Straits *as rcaflirrned, as indecd it had been by the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1809; i.c. no for€ign waNhips wcre allo\,redto pass through thc Strajts i{hilc Trrrkcy he$elf !i'asat peace.But the reaffirr ation of the rule at this time and in this manner \r':rscxtrcmely important, particularly for Brit{rin. In the first placc, there had ncYcr beforc bccn ,i gcneral intcmational ogccment on the usc of the Straits. lf Russia ever in future tried to gain posscssionof Constantinople or independcnt use ofthe Straits, she r ould invite tbe lrostility of the other foul porvers;aDa this collective secu ty was chiefly ofbene6t to B tain. PalmcNton had in eff€ctcrcated an alliance, not against Russia herself at the tjite, but agajnst known o! potential Russian ambitions for the futurc. In the secondplac€, Nicholas had decidedto abandon thc spccialPosition Russiahad achi€ved at Constantinoplein 1833 in thc hope of brcaking the Anglo-Frcnch ententc. This \Ttrsclearly a mistaken hopc. In spite ofthe SpanishrnArriages'afrair, Anglo-I'rench relationsgradually this bcing largely due to Aberdeen - to tbe porDt irlprcvcd rvherc Britrin and FraAce fought together against Russia.in the Crimcon War. Thc Straits Convention did n,)t ntrkc Bdt'in any morc pro-Russian or anti-tr'rench.
THD STRAI'IS CONVENTION
85
In the third llace, the traditional rule ol thc Straits now operated ver]' largely in llritairr's falorLr. Unkitrr Skelcssihad given llussia the right to cbse the Strs.itsto foreign (i.e. largely British) {alshl,s in any future Anglo-Russianconfiict, whether Turkey tas $t Isr or not. The Straits Convcntion deprived ber of tlris ght. The position after 1841, as it had been before Unkiar Skelessj,wlls tllllt Turkey coulaauow forcign (agajn,they lvould be largely British) $arships to pass through the Straits rvhcn Turkcy hcrself was at !var. But in 1841 it lrrs cleor thtrt B tainwould almost ccrtainly bc the Sultan'schiefally whenevcr Turkey was at xrf in the future; and it was again becoliing cquallyclcar that, \lhcncvcr Turkcy lvas &t war, it would lrlmost ccrtainly be against Russia. This I'1rs the measure of Britain's military assistanceto Turkey in 18.10,rvbiehnou oversludos'cd that of ltussia in 1833. The Straits Convcntion thcrelorr madc more likcly thc prcspect of British $a$hips erltering the Blsck Scato dclcnd Turkcy anathe routcs to Indi{ bybombardiig Russian shores.Nicholas certainlycameto realizethis likclihood, and pressedahead rvith efforts to strengthen the grert naval base of Scbastopolasr matter ol urge cy. In the fourth llace, tLc Straits Convention is a impotant turning point in Russian policy. Thc post-Adlianoph line of cooFration vith Turkey $lls &oppcd after 184r.'l'he Russians decided that Rritain, in prrticulftr, r-ould not ollo$' the gentle decljne of Turkey to continuc if this tleclinc mealt a Russi&ntak€-over at Constantinople.Fron the Ilussion point of view, there $'ss thcrclorc nottring to bc gained by continued friendshD with Turkcy. The ncw linc adopted by Nichohs $'us a partition policy - pa ition of Turkcy's cmpirc by gereral agreemert arnong the po\r'ers.He wrs to find thrt this had no greater appeAlto Bfitain thrn had thc discardcd Russian 'prot€ctorate' over Turkcy. From 1841, Britain had in lact assumedreslonsibility for the rnaintcnanceof the Turkish cmpirc. This was a burdcn shc v.as obliged to shoulder,whcthcr shc wished to or not, so long as she had nimctl to brcak Russia's hold on the Straits won by Unkiar Skclcssi. The Russian position had bcen won as a reward for dcfcnding thc Sultan iD a crisis. The only way to undcrmi e the
66
PALMNRSTON'SPOLICY
Russisn position wasfor otllers to defeod the Sultgn in anothe! crisis. Whea the new cd6isbloke in 1889,only Britain - or Russia - cotrld defend the Sult&D.Frence wss committed to Mehemet, while Prussis and Austris lack€d the will and the incertive to give large-scelemilitary help. The actionsof Stopford snd Napier oblig€d Britsin to remain Tulkey's chief military support for the indefinite future. Or y in this way, it appearcd, could Russi,an contrcl, or genenl partition, be evoided.Ihe only substitute for o Russian 'protectorete' wss a Briti6h 'protectorate'. , Pslmerston, and Unkiar Skele$i therefore, had prcduced s revolution in Bdtish attitudes. In 1829. Britain had b€etr e pessiveobserve!of Russiia's&dvanceto Adrianople. In 1841,she wsi the chief gua.rdisDend gusBntor of Turkfuh security.
Principal Events, 1850-4,1 la3l. 1882.
1888.
Nov€mber. Mehemet Ali declsr$ *ar on the Sultrn Ituy. Otto appointed King of ere€ce July. Turkey ffnally accepts Gr€ek independence December.EgDtisn victory at Konieh Febnar.J, Sultsn ask6 Russisnsfor prctection Msy. Itftsien intervention forces Eg}?tians to mske pesce July. Treaty of Unkigr Skelessib€tw€€nRussis and Turkey September. Mnnchengretz egr€€meDtbetw€en Russis and
la88-5. Urquhrt on tlsde miAsion in Tukish emphe r837. Unsucce$tuI propossl for a Suezrailway 1838. Anglo-Turkishuadeconvention,JointAnslo-Turkishnaval ex€rcises.Mehemei Ali issues,eDd withdBws, a declsBtion of independeDce l8ag. January. Aden a B tioh protectoBte April. Sulbn declares\i/sr on MehemetAli June. Egyptian victory st Nizib JuneJdy. British fleet in s.ction in eestem Meditenanesn July. Five-power Note waming Egwtians 1839-40,Fou.-power discussions{minus Fmnce) l€adins to a senelal Middle E&st settlement 1840. June, Revolt against Egyptiens in Lebenon July. roulpower trcaty taying down terms to Eg$tians Sept€mber.British fleet bombards Beirut Octob€r. Beirut captur€d November. Acrc bombard€d and cspturcd, M€hernet Ali makes pe8ce. Hatti-sh€rif of Ghulan4 (T\Ikish lefolrning €dict) Peninsule ond Oriental Steon6hip Co. incorporat€d 1641. June. Straits Convention
r
PART IV Palmerston and the Crimea
I T 6 ] G E N E R A L F A C T O R S ,A N D B R I T I S H E C O N O M I CI N T E R E S T S The Straits CoDventionof 1841wa,sfollo\*ed by twelve yeers of compautive calm in the Middle East. But, Ilom the controversiesand mrnor criseswhich did &ris€ during thfu p€riod, it wa6 clear that s ffllal settlement had not yet been achieved ther€. Ther€ w&s still no celtsinty that the TurkiEh empirc would survive, or that the poweN had securedtheir mein goab in the ar€a,.Britoin rrmained sensitiveto any thr€at eithe! to he! $ut€s to India o! to the balanceof power in the esstem Meditermtrea.n. And the hostility of th€ British public to Russiena,utoqscy and supposed expsnsionism continued unsbst€d efte! tlle 1880s, Ru,6sis,b&ckedby Austria end Prussia,still helil eastemEurope in the grip of Iloly Alliance tlespotism; but she had not yet achievealher sun of becoming a Medit€Foneaa power. Tsar Mcholas was still determined to wesk€n and oppose trlence (Louis Napoleonvas a. distsst€ful to him as Louis PbilipPe) and il possible to bring sbout s fnsl mpture in the Anglo-French entente. Austria wss worried about Danub€navigstioE. By 1854, the suspicionsand underlying rivalnes succlededin producing a. nrsior war, in which Britain and Fronce lought to saveTurkey flom Ruseia; and in which Austria, though offcially Deutral, abaEdonedher partnership with Russis. Ihe Dastem Question by 1854,then, had served to blgak up the balancesand subtle undelstendings of post-Vienna Europe and to ca.usethe only seriousgl€st power conflict betwee! l8l5 snd 1914'
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PALMERSTON AND TIIE CRIMEA
Yct, in maDy respects,the Crimean War was an unnecessary accidcnr.th. productot m;sund.rstanding ond prmr: and ir .rvs not even dccisive in its efrccts on the Easten euestion. But it also stands as the supreureexar4rle olBritistr military rcsistance to Russian pressureand as thc obvious consequenceol palmcrston's protcction ofTurkeyin 18a0,1.To \'. J. puryear howcver, the \''ar was the rcsult of a direct (lash bct$.ceD R tish and Russian cconomic intcrcsts, and as such rvas not aJrespecially surprising dcvelopDrcnt. Irr his t$'o hc'oks Inrff tltional l)conomics awl, Diplomaxy in tlrc Near East a]fld lt4lanrl,, Ru,ssia and, lhc Straits Qlu$tion, Puryear argues that ccorornjc advantage obliged Brit{in to suppod Turkey and to oppose Russia. A willing frcc-tmde partner $as vorth heepingalive, wt,ilc &protec, tionist rival w.rs rvorth defeating. PurJ'ear's idcas are gcnerfltty rcgsrded as st;nrulating if somctimcs unrdiabtc; and, certainly, tbe der.clopn,ent of Brjtish tradc and sLipping in the M;ddle East ras a principal featurc of tLe period t84t-5,1, Ifollorving the Anglo-Turkish trade treaty ol l8s8, the volume of B tish expots to Turkey incrcased greatl]'. Turkey was virtually an ol)en nrarket f{)r B tain's manufacturcd goods,and a new tariff negotiated in 1850 m.rde selling evcn casier. It is tme that, comparcd \vith her tradc \rith the rest of the vorld, Britain's stake in Turkey *'as at lilst a relatively smatt mattcr. Yet thc Middle Dast !r'::r.s s growiDgmarket, and Turkcy becanre Britai s third best customer. l'urkcy's empire could also begin to providc soBe ofthc inrpolts that Britain needed,pa icularly of graiD alter the rcpcal of Ure Corn Law ir 1846. And the balance of trade $as in Britain's favour, $.hich it ri':rsnot in the case of Anel(,-ltussian trade. Pahrcrston, in the llousc of Cornmonsin 1849, Dradcit clesr that cconomic notives rverc of real significance.'If, in a political poinf ol view, thc indefendencc of Turkey is of gftiot importarce, ir a commercial sense,it is of no less importance to this country. It is quite tme th!.t with no other country is our tlade so liberally permitt€d and carried on as with Turkey.' After 1816,Bdtein began to toke grsin regularly fron Turkey itself, and from EgWt snd the trvo Principalities, as well as from
GENERA',
FACTORS
91
her trsditional suppliers, Russia and Prussia. tr{oldavia und Wallachia, and tbe D.r.nubcarea generuly, began to receive tbe full attentions of British rncrchants. In 1843, lor examde, only ? ships left the P ncipalitics li)r B trin ; but in I 84s, the number lr1rdr;sen to 128. In 1853, Itussell estimatcd, between ore-fffth and one-third o{ all Damrbe shippine (considerine valuc, not numbcls) ]l.rs British; and British goods were lenetrating, ria thc Damrbe, as far ns Vienna - anrl also to Leipzig. Il Britain's trade il| the Bhck Sca rcgior rvrs devek pnrg, so, 'lhe Opiunr \l'ar and too, $'os hcr interest iD tlie rcutcs to India. the rcquisition of llong Kons mcant 1l still grft.ter flo\\' of goods betwccD Britain anrl Asia; and in 1813, .{berdeen (Forcign Secretary under P€el) rcvivcd pressutefor a mil{'ay across the Suez isthnus. The Peninsuler and Oriental Stea r Navigation Compar)]'was ircorporated in 1840 and its activities both in the Medit€uanean snd also east of Suezincreasedrapidly dr-uingthe 1840s.Although British enginccrs remained sceptical nbout the Ieasibility of a Suez cenal, the raihi'ay project (under the guidance of Robert Stephenson) at last succeeded,l1nd the Alexandris to Cairo scction \\'as completed in 1854, and the remaining Cu.iroto Suezsection in 1858. TLe existenceof Turkey's empire, thercfor€, ap?catd by 1854 to b€ o guarantce of chcap corn supplies,of easy salesfor B tish goods in the Middle Esst and also of s&fe passagefor British goods through into the Danube arca of Europe rnd into the Indian Oce&n.The break-up of the empirc could destrcy a very profitablc pattem ol tmde. Moreover, during the same period, Russia had erected a high tarifl borricr which progressively excludcd Ilritish goods ftom Russi:! itself and also from Centrol Asia. Russia lias becoming a sort of ideological .nemy of the free-trading spirit; a fact {4ich gavc British rudicols - olre8dy critical of Russian despotism - a new excuse for righteous jndjgnation. And the Russian t€xtile industry, Iacking s. sound home market (becauseof the poverty of the serfs and the inadequacy of intem&l tmnspod) was hoping to sell its own goods in the Tulkish empire and the Far East, snd t'as therefore a direct competitor of Lancashire. There vele certainly good
92
PALMERSTON AND THE CRI}IEA
econonric reasons by 1853 rvhy B taill should back l\rkey rather lhan Ru5siaif the two \rrt to $xr.
[ 16] IURKrSH REFOR]r, AND S T I T A T F O R DC A N N I N G The period t84l-53 olso gave sonlc indication tllllt the relorning activity of SultaD NI{hmud might bc maiDtaired after iris death snd that (as Bdtish miristels continucd to hope) Turkey might keep herself alivc by her own exertions. It was never the irrtention, even ofPalmerston, that Turkcy s)roulddepend cntire)y for herexistencc on British support. In 1840,forexanple, hc rcfuscd to considcr a full alliance betrvccn Turkcy and Rritain, though the projcct lDd the support of Stntford Cannine. Hc wantcd reform to come from \1.ithin, mthcr than h{rve it imposed by an outsidc ogency. Nevetheless, thc sd truth "'as that rcfonn in l\rkcy during tiris period dcpended on two facto$; Iirst, thc desircofTurkish minisiers to attroctBritish support, and sccond, the massive influenceof Stratlord Cannurs. It vas appare t, to all those !r4rorLishedto sce, that entlmsitrsm for refonn in 'ftrkey flourished strongly whcn Turke]' r-os mennced by Russia or by Mehemet AIi, and that, rvher the emergcncy passed,and British synpoth]' had becn eficctively arouscd,the good intentions lvcle forgotten, conuption rctumed and onti-Ch stian barba tics *'ere rcsumed. 'I'hus Ure cris;s of 1839-40 produced the dccrec or h{tti-sherif of chuland, aiming at western Duropean stnndards of administration and justice; but, by 1841, it was largely a dead letter. 'flrc Crimean War produced the hatti-humayun of l85B; and yct Sultsns vere stilt . being urged to institute reforms ss late as 1876, and again in : 1801. Conupt omcials, inclncient ,inancial management, bletant inequalities before the law - these problems continucd to plague Turkev right thmugh to the revolution of 1908. Even Reschid I'asha, the primc mover behind relonn in thc ycars 1899,59,was
D I'ANNINC T T ' I IK I S I I R E F O I I 1 I A N D S ' T I I A ' T } ' O R
9A
himself guilty of secret conuption. He owed his positiol v€ry lorgcly to the influenceofStratford Cannine,and \rhcn Stntford was abscnt from Const$ntinoplc,Resclid hims€lflost his hold on pr:rrver.And, ho*'ever willing the Sultrn was to carry out reform undcr StEtford's instnctions, in thc ffnal issue,the Turks }ere convinccd that Rritsjn would be forced to protccf their empire frcm Russia whether it $'as rcformed or not. Stratford Canning \r'as British ambassadorat ConstantiDople during t\r'o main perjods, from 1826 to 1882 and frcm 1842 to 1857,IIe was not always Lappy about his task thcre, and thcrc $cre som€ lcngthy interruptions in his periods of 6ervicc- from 1829 to 1831, and 1846 to 1848. Ncvcrthcless,Strotford built up tor himselfan cxtraordinarily dc'minant outh.'rity h the Turkish capital. By 1844, he was thc'grcat Elchi', at whos€ *'ord tlle Sultan qunilcd, and ministcrs wcrc madc and uDmade.The nature of his influcnce on Turkish policy in the criticat ye:f of 1853hss arcusedgreat controv€rsy among British ard foreigJrListo ans. Certainly, his prcsenccgav€ dccisive weight to Bdtsjn's policics in the Lcvant. IIe was much fcared and distrusted by the Russians.In 1852, he \t'as crcatcd Viscount Stratford de Redclifie. Rut evcn Stratford, Russophobethat hc was, h.rd no profound belicf in tLc abitity of the Turkish cmpirc to survive. Though he forcefrrlly urged modernization on thc Sultan, he remained sccptical about the prcspect oI acllicving Iasting success.He felt that his 'as vcry much a Lolding operation, mer€ly putting ofi the inevitsble. At critical points in Turkey's history, in 1800, 1821, 1832 and agajn in 1852, StHtford's letters and reports cxpressa tundameltal pessimismatlout the fufure of the empir€. Alrvays he was consciousof tlie basic stumbling-block to good .{ngkFTurkis\ rclations, the $illinencss of zerlous lurks to persecute and murder Ch stians. Aft€r 1856, in spite oi thc dcfe ce of Turkey i the CritncanWar, British nriDiste$ beganto bc lessss.lrguincthan they had been, rnd to take a nrore cynical vie{ - that Turkey $rculd perhaps have to bc suppoflcd so long as she cristcd, but thot thcrc was not a great dc$l thrt Brit;sh governnents could do to fome hcl to stay alive. Ilecurrent
94
PALM!]RSTON AND THD CRIMEA
financial weakncssin thc end carne to be a, bettcr cxcuse *)r forcign interucntionir Turkey's sffairs than dclencc ofChristinns hld bccn, And in t],e l^st resoft, Britain was at least as willing to profft from Turkcy's \\'caknessas she v'as to ensurehcr survivrl. Thus, exhortations frcm London continued to rccommend thc same mcdicine, namely reforn, but with an air of increasing - and cvcn somctimesiDdilter€nce- ss the century hopelessness progrcsscd.Disracli rvas,in this respectas in othcrs ro doubt, th€
Ir7] BRTTTSH RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA, r841-54 Thc conduct ofBritish forejg[ policy betrvcen1841and 18541ras largely in the hands of Palmerston and Aberdeen. Palmerston ccasedto be Foreign Secretnry$ben the electjon oft84t brought in Peel and the Conservatives.The rsther more pacific, and also somewhat indecisive, AberdeeD $ss then at the Foreign Oflice until 1846, after whiclr Palmerston took over until the Queen dismissed him in 1851. And, elthough Palmelftton 1l'rs merely Home Secretary in the 1859-5 Al,erdeengovenm€nt, his sdvice 1i,asfrequently sought by Clarcndon, the Foreign trIi ster ftonr 1853 oDl(lrds, as indecd it had becn by Malmcsbury, Foreign Secretary during the bricf Derby administmtion of 1852. As far as the pastem Qucstion is concemcd,the crucial issucsin British foreign policy du ng this thirtcen-ycar period conccln th€ nature of Britisl, r.lnlion. \eilh Frcnceand Ru.sia. The Anglo'Frcnch relationship had a spccinl quality of ambiguity iD tLc Louis Philippe and I-otis Napoleon era. British governmcnts rcgarded I'rance with a curious mixture of condesce sioD and ttar, secing her now as a subserrie t lsrtner, now as a daDgerousrival. The old eighteenth-century rttitude based on fear of invgsion - had not totally disappeared,nor had the fear of rcvolutionary Ilonapaltisnr. Louis Napolcon's
BRITAIN. FRANCE AND RUSSIA
95
principal aim, after all, sppeared to be a revision of the t8ts settlcmcnt and the final smashing of any remaining four?o\i'cr leaguc against F6nc€. And ]rt, after 1830, Frarrce stood as a 'rcnstitution*l' state, defying the despotismol the Holy Alliance; rnd this placcd h€r in direci opposition to the Russia of Tsar Nicholas. Thc positiou of Louis Napoleon as a revotutionary ruler, morc especially alter 1851, errphasized the gap Letween Russia and Frarce. Therc wrre, th€refore, obvious reosons why Britain sloulduork with lrllrnce incontaining Rr$sian amhitions iD the trIiddlc East. l'hroughout the pe od, indeed, there existed an unde$tanding, amountilrg to an cnt€nte, betrveen them; yet therc n€re also times $her the rclationship 1!?s so strained thot even $'ar scemcdpossible. No doubt Ps.lme$ton overplayed his hand comlletely Ll^(ki'rg Louis PJ,ilipps hot.s in Belgium and in Slri& and Egypt. Conlrolling a semidcpendent ally $.as one thjng; defeating and humiliating him rvas going too far - st least for Frcnch tempcrs. His ruthless exploitation ol Orleanist veakness Dised in France a. permonent fund of resentment against Briti$h amgance. And when Aberdeen tried to smooth over the dilficulties - and relations c€rtainly did improve in the 1841 i period thcre {ere still signs of continuing estrang€meDt,even ttrough Guizot rvas generally prepared to coopcr.rte \r;th Aberdeen. ts tain and Francc, for exarrrple,backcd rival parties in the Lebanesecivil war of 1841-5, \Ylien Aberdecn csme to his notorious understanding with Tsor Mcholas in 1844, oDe ol the fdctors that guided him was fcar of the French army, nnd s wish stiu to be abic to use Russia to ftstmin Fmnce if necessary.In 1818, Palmerston was preparcd to let Louis Philippe lose his throre, ana th€n see whcther Inuis NalDleon might not be a more willing puppet. In 1851, he congr$tulatcd the French President on his colrp; and yet in 1852 *'arned trIalmesbury to be$'areof llcnch {ims in the Middlc Eost. $here. with refercnce to Turkey, Britain and Ifrance \l.ere 'like two men in love with the same rvoman'. \ilten the Cdmcsn War approached, it wos Fmnce who rrade the carly mnning in the Holy Placesrow, but it rvas llritain who
96
PALMERSTON AND THE CITIMEA
dragged a half-reluctant Francc into tull-scale w&r, snal insisted on the capture ol Scbastopol, And when the wor '!r's.s won Iargcly by French trcops - thcre was {car of u Fmnco-Russian alliance, :Lnd fcar of thc tcchnicttl advoncement of the French nary. Clearly, even by 1856, Bdtain had not lino y decided whethcr Russia or France was her ultinute enemy in Europc and thc ltiddtc East. Ideally, she $rculd eviden y keep all options opcn, and ally indiscrininatcly {'ith one against the other as thc need arcse. There was no doubt that a btrsiceinl of Ts$r Nicholas. honever. wtrs to sepuBte Briteilr from Frarce - and to do so even by making an sllianc€ with Britain over the Turkish problem. Nicholas had geat faith in the value ofhis own pe$oral diplornacy s.ndin his o.bility to conclude r gentlenLen'sogreementwith Britain, IIe'ivas dso convinced thot Turkey 1rss dyiirg, and said so on evcry possible occasion; and he could not believe that Britain would willingly 'niss the chance to ssfegusrd her trIiddle Easter[ intercsts by making some provisional :rnangementsfor the disposal of Turkish tenitory. This $ould s\rrely be better than to be csught una'waresin a free-for-all, once the Turkish empire did collapse, He found, hovever, tLat Brits;n vould neither accept a binding :rlliuncewitL Russis, nor publicly admit that the Turkish empire coulal not endure indefiuitely. The Canningite {ish to keep free from alliaDce commitments still influenced British policy; and Brit8.in was not yet a consciously imperial po$er desiring to amass terlitory in order to safeguard other teritory. If Turkey's etistence provided the safeglards, then lJdtain was llappy to see Turkey surviver sssurning of coursethat her suFival was guarsntecd by all the powers- as in 1841 - and that Britain herseu hod to do no more than lend occasionalaidtomrintain tlre stotus quo.In fact, Britsilv'rnted as lar as possibleto fr€ezethe trtiddlc East situation as it existed in 18411;she was ahvays rcsdy to seeothe$ doing her work for her that is, Turkey Oot B tain) rcsisting Russion €xpansion, ond the other four powcrs (as well as Britain) protecting Turlrcy. So, in 1840, Palmcrston fimny rejectcd Nicholas's offcrs of an
BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND RUSSIA
allieDce - even a 'clear understanding' would have satislied the Tss.r - by insistiDg that he could not meke sn srnngement 'which bound England to toke up arms in a continecncy which might happen at an unccrtoin time, and in circumstanceswhich could not as vet be foreseen'.Moreover - and this tas alvays a convenient excusc to avoid commitments - in llritain's ParliaDentary system, wherc govemments chang€d fiequently, any such undertaking by one govemment 'might bc disavowed by But Nicholas did not abandon hope. At his own initiative, be visited England for nine days in June 1844, nnd found, he thought, a sympathetic listener in Aberde€n. IIc came urging the nced for Britoin and Russia to eoopcratc in naintaining Turkey's empire for as long as possible(s reasonableprcposition in itself) and stressingthc volue of Anglo-Russiancooperationin the event of an una\'oidable Turkish collapse. Underlying his suggestions$'as the implication that, if Britain ard Russia did not act together, then Fmnce would be able to seizc the initiative and donrinate the Middle East. Russia €.heady had her undeF standing with Aushie on the 'ftukish prcblem (achieved at Mijnchengretz in l83S) and if B tain joined Russia, the thr.ee powers together would be able to restrain France in the Uiddle East anal elsewheE. At a time when lYance was at loggerheads with B tain over Taliti, and wh€n French intcrest in Aleeria and tr{orocco *'as gmwing (Frcnch warships bombarded l'argiers in August 1844) Aberdeen was glad enough to list€n to comforting words from the Tsor, But st the same time, hc *'ould not admit the inevitability of Turkey's collapse (though he oppears not to have voiced his disa$eement to the Tsar) and $ished to avr.ridgiving any specificplcdgessbout luturc action. Horvcver he neverthelessmanagedto give the imprcssion to the Russiansthat Britain was willing to consult St Pete$burg and sct with Russia in any futue Turkish crisis. No doubt Aberdeen appeared to conccale moft th{tn he int€ndcd, but in any event, Nicholas \r'cnt a$?y lecling thet Britain had been drawn into the Russian orbit in maltcr\ con..ming th. EasterrrQrreslion.
c8
PAI,IfERS?ON
AND TIID CRIMEA
Controversy hls Hged, aurong diplomais and historians, over the naturc analcxtrnt of Aberaleen'scommitmeDt to Russia,'Ihe understeuding ras certainly an infonnal and verbal one in June 1844 and there werc no det$iled pa ition rnangemeDts firr the future of Tukcy's empire. But, ftom then until 1854, Nicholas believedthat Britain would no loager opposcRussia and thnt she \rould not take independcnt action to defend Turkey, His confideDcc ?s shaken by Palmerston'! actions in support of Turkey in 1849; but he 1vasstill renewingltis offers ofrssociation with Britain as lste as 1853. Fwthermore, the Russianstricd to t;e Abcrdccn dol'n to undertakings on paper to reinforce thc verbrl contacts. Nessehode, the Russian Chsncellor, fisited Ihghnd in September 18.1.t and prcs€ntcd a mernorandurn summing up the earlier conve$ations and outlining joint AngloRussian policy towrrds Turkey. In January 1845,Aberdeenin a lett€r to St Petersburgmceptealthc menorandum as sn accurate r6sumd of the June tslks; but his tone was, as flrr as it could be, ciutious, va$e, non-committal. In fact, thc temporary c sis in Anglo-Urench rclations h&d pesscd, And Bdtain $'as once $goin rcady to assumeher 'non-aligncd' r6le. But the 1844 Anglo-Russian exchangcs left belinal them a sitrution of dsngerous uncdtainty, with thc Russians reading far more into them tlan British gor'€rnmcnts were prepAred, as it later tuned out, to admit. To a considcrable ert€nt, this Russian misundeNts.n
AT'ITAIN, }'IIANCE AND RUSSIA
c9
nians 1{'erein fact more aDti-Russian than anti-Turkish; ure}' Nere rcbelling against RussiD'srights of int€rvention os cont€.ined ir the treaties of Akkermar and ldrianople. But Palmerston $anted no change h the Middle East balance,and hc believed, ghtly, that Russian troops $'ould be l{ithdrawn oncc the revolt was ovcr. Ag.rin, in May 1840, he suppofted Russia's military intervention in IIungary, \ihich led to the deleat of Hunsarian reb€lsby August ot that yesr. He wsnted Aust a to survive ss a gcat po$?I - to maiDtain the balanc.ein south-eastcmEruope; aDd, it NicLolas wishcd to aid s. fello$-emperor in distress, Palmc$ton was quite agrccable,since the coirtiDuedprcscnceof thc Austrian cmpirc on the D rube wfls a.n important banier against Rr$sian expansion.By 1854,as ithalpened, the Russians had reason to regret thcir earlicr assistalcc to ArNtria, rvhcn thc lattcr adopted a line hostile to Russ in the Crirneancrisis. But it was in 1849, as part ol tLe altermath of the I{ungarian sins, that I'almeFton lound himsclf supporfing Turkey in oppositior to ltussia, IVar might r'ell havc come tLen, instead of five yeals latcr. Nicholas rvould have been wise to rcmembcr the line takcn by Ilritain during this 1849 c sis. IIe might not then have so rlnf,rrtunately misjudged the probabilitics in 1854. The 1849 crisis slowed Ilritain for the fiIst time caught up in the consequences of her defence of the Sultan in 1840-1. Much as her Forcion Secreta es might $ish to keep free of permanent obligatioDs, the fact {..rs thdt since r84O r Britain could no longcr stand by and $rtch Turke]' be destroyed by Russia or by anybody elss. There Nere certainly no guaranteeson paper, but the anival ol the B t;sh fleet outside the Dardanellesthe momcnt th€re \ras a serious tlrcat to Turkish int€grity of the rnost t)re(tictaLl{:reuctions ir international diploma.cy! The theat to Turkish irtegrity in 1849concemedthe prcsence {.ithin Lcr borde$ of Hungu an and Polish refugees{iDcluding Kossutl himself) from the lecent rising in l{ungary. Aust a and Russia dcmanded thcir rctum. TL€ Sultan rcfused, objecting strongly to this denial ofhis sovereignrights. I{e was given every encoungcment in his stand by St$tf{)rd Canrringand by Aupick,
100
I'ALITT'RSTON AND THD CRI
EA
the !'rench ambassador.Stratford askedfor the assistanceofthc Ilediterrarrean squnclron.Palmerston and the rest ofthe C8.binct decided on Iirm support for Turkey, and ordered the fleet undcr Admiral Parkcr to Besika Bay (just outside the Dardanelles). But, as on other occasions,Pulmerston did not intend actually to use the flect and so sta tr lfar, but merely to display it and so prevent nar. Thc flcct was to proccedto the Dardanelles,rcady to te clrllcd up to Constantinopl€ if necessary,but Stutford nust only do this ifthe eorergency$'ereextreme, Palmcrstondid 'with a little not want to brcak the 184I Stnits ConveDtion; manly tumncss $e shall successlullyget through this maitcr', he vrote to Lord.Iohn Ilussell; ard to Stmtford Canning hc wrote 'In ttris affair \ye are trying to catch two grcat ffsh' - Russiaand Austri.r - 'and {'e must \'!ind the reel very gently and dexterously not to brcak our line'. In the cnd, larsely as a result of the naval movcmcnts and of the cvident enthusiosmfor Turkey sho'n by thc British public, the Russian eovernment v'ithdrc\y its demands and came to an amicablc settlement $ith the special l\rkish rcpresentative in St Pctc$burg, Fuad Pasha. Aust a like$ise climbed do*'n. The Turks *'ere fully consciors of the debt they orvcdto B tain - and to tr-rance,whose tr{cditcllanean fleet had also sailed for the Dardanelles. thouph it anived too late to influence evcnts. The stock of Stratford Canningrosestill higher; and therc is no doubt ttut the afrajr of 1849 hclped to convincc the Turks during the c sis of 1853-4 that Britain and France rvould never allo$'them to be dictated to by Russia. Ard ccrtaiDl]', Louis Napolcon's decisior to sendthc French fleet to join Britain's in 1849secmed to suggest futurc Anglo'l'rench cooperation on the Eastcm Question-A.,I. P. Tal.lor indeed dcclaresthat'the Anglo'French alliance of thc trirneaD W"r '$'asborn in October 1819'. But, \!hcn the maiD cr;sis t'as already over, two eve ts occuncd, thc 6rst ofwhich undcrlincd the fundemertal antagonism bctiycen Ilritain and Russia over the Stnrits, analthe seconal of which reveded the continuing frailty of Anglo-French cooperation. When Adnriral Parker decided to move his ships du ng November l84s trvcnty miles into the StBits, he did
IIRITAIN.
TRANCI1 AND RUSSIA
l0l
6l) to improve his anchorage during stormy weather, and also becausehe nnd Stratfoftl had been convinccd by Calvcrt, tle B tish consul at thc Dardanelles, tlnt no bre{rch of the Sbaits Convention was thereby involved, so long as the ships remained outside the 'narro*'s'. Neverthelcss,the effect, ond probebly the intcntion, rvasto &lam1and initstc Russia. Ten \lterley \it Ineland aniL the Near ltast: l,ir Crimcd) entirely absolves Stratford from any blame over this internp€rate ond provocative $ction, though othc$ hav€ suggestedtllllt the $'hole ofair 1xas part of the ambassador'sdeliberute nnd continuous anti-Russian campajgn. 'I'hc ships were withdrawn aftcr a fortniglrt, but Palmerston was obliged to send a humble apology to St Petersburg; and Ncssel' rode, in his reply, drew &ttcntion to lltNsia's ability to move her Illack Sea squadron into the Bosphorus (dircctly threotening Conltantinople) ifthe British fleet felt it could pass the Dardanelles. Clearly, whether thc Straits Convention wcr€ going to be uphcld or not, it would be r great advantqge to Britain if Russia had no Black Ses.squadrcn. Thc secondevent also concerncdParker' whoseshipsn'ereused in 1850, on their \ray back to ifalta from the Straits, to support Don Pacifico's clsim ags.instthe Greek government. The ethics of this lomous cuse,rnd Palmerston's defenceof his actions in Parliament, sre not the main concem here.Il'hat is olsigrilicancc is thc ftaction ofthe Russian, and especiullythc tr'rench,governmcnts to this high-handcd use of British sea-Po$'er.They protested not only at the use of over{helming force bttt slso et the lact that they, :Lsleltow guarantoN (with Britain) o{ Greek integrity should not have been consulted. The Ftench actually withdrew th€ir ambassadorftom London. Obviously, if Britain continued to ignore French ghts and interssts in the Lcvant, shewould losc herrecent psrtner and bc left to fsce Russiaal{tre. But, for the time being, therc was no daneer of war with Russia. Tsar Nicholas was 6ti1t hophg to bind Bitain to her supposed184{ undertakings, The coming to power of Aberdeen in 1852 inspired him to make o turiher attempt to dlaw Britsin into an alliance, or at least into a pDrtition agreement,over the Turkish problcn. this final cfrort of a persist€Dtbut misguidcd
to:
PAI,}IERS?ON
AND TIID CRIITEA
nd(]r blought him Dothing but disappointment, aDd Ncssetrcdc had wLrned him ag.rinst rnaking ii. Nicholas put forirard his l'uegcstions du ng coDversationslvitlr thc British ambassador, Seymour, at St l,etcrsturg in Jariuary 1853. His p ncipal Dressage $as rhe familiar oDe;that Turkey was bound to collapse Hnd that Brit.rin and Rus!ia must cooperute over the prot,lcms that this \r'ould bring. Ilut this time, he also wcnt further, :!nd outlincd the kind of portition {'hich rnight rcsult. Co stantinople, he insisted, mrst not become Russi.ur, or British, or l'rench, or evcn Grcek (he Lad given up Cathcrhe II's:r l,;tnrs); it must bccorne o free city. lloldavia and Wallactrir must go under llussian pmtecti('r, and DritaiD could take Egypt and probebly Crete too, ilshe \t'isLed.If, h the event, Russianfc'rccs should have to occupy CoDstantinople,the].would do so only rs temporary 'tcnants', not cs 'proprietors' of thc city. Seymour displaycd no enthusiasm at thcsc proposals, rd when they $'ere tHnsmitted to London, Russcll (I'oreign Secretory until Fcbruary 1853) rejected, as usuai, any plans tor contingenciesrvhich might not $ise, and questioncd thc rvisdorr of any changein the status ofConstontinode. Nicholas,horvcver, did not take the coolncssofthe British responseas a rcbufi, and still felt tl,ot he had somctling ot o gentlernefs undcrstanding \vith Bdtsin. In fact, Nichohs l,ad not revea.ledthe lull cxtcnt of his flssurnptionsabout thc rcsults of a Tukish collapse.His private Dotesindieate that hc thouglrt Crete mieht go to }.]ra cc, not BritaiD, tlut M.rldovia, Wallachia trnd northem llulgaria should becoire whotty Itussian, and thrt Austris should take tllc Adriatic co.rst. IIe also assumcd thot the Stroits mieht havc to be closcd agsiDstBritain and France and thst this could be done if Russia garriso ed the Bosphorusand Austria the Dardanclles. At this stage in 1853, Nicholas was alreudy in dispute rvith France in the Uoly Places'controversy; end he rvas still plainly oonvinccd that ,{ustrio was a loyal subordinste of Russia. Ilis dcsirc to isolate the new)y-styled Napoleon III blinded him to thc uncasiDess ryhichhis Turkishpartitionproposals Nould arouse in both B tain and ^ustria. Whcn the British govemment l)ublishcd Nirholas's schemesat thc outbreak ol the (r.imean
TIIE TIOLY PLACES
l0a
War, tllc effect was to contum the B tish public in its suspicion of Russi.r'sinsatiablc ambitions. And to an Aushia $'ho wished to controt the Danube dclta - and thcrcfore to keep Wallachia out of ltussio's hands - thc proposals appcarcd menecing and danserous. Certainly, Nicholas had not int€ndcd ony l)ad-andfast padition plans in his coDvcrsationswith Scymour. Rather he v'as thinking rlond, or at most, flying a kite. But he too easily eave the wrons impression. He was, as G. B. Henderson (in Cri.mtan War Dipl.oma4) says, not a 'plotter', but a 'blunderer'.
IT8] THE HOI,Y PLACES, AND THE R U S S O - T U R K I S HW A R Thc Russo-Turkish war of1853 began becausethe Sultan refused a Russian dcmand to have permaneDtprotective rights over his tg'elve million Ch stian subjects. This demand wes itself the outcome oftwo precealingepisodes;the lloly Places' dispute between Russia and Frnnce. und a successfulAustrian intervention against Turkey in Montenegro, In none of these affaiN did Bdtain havc ony direct concem. And yet the Russo-Tulkish dispute became by 1854 a wsr in the Crimea Largely because Britain insisted on maLins it so. Once the Russians and Turks were at wo\ the opportunity to in{Iict a decisive defeet on Russia might as well be taken - to stifle, if pos6ible,Russia's lfediteuonean ambitions once snd for all, But it vould be urjiNt to imply that BdtaiD hed so coherent a policy as the two preceding sentences suggest.In fact, the Aberdeen govenment wanted peace,rather than war, during most of the nunoeuvring before lIerch 1854. But, divided as it was, it put itself in such e position that war $as the only result, if Britain was not to look absurd, and if Napolcon jvas not to go it alone, or Russia utterly to d€feat the Turks. The Iloly Places' dispute arose chiefly because Napoleon rvishedto rally clcrical support in Flsnce and becausehe wanted
101
PALMERSTON AND TII.& CRIMEA
to r€assert Frcnch power in the Mediterranean, Bold, spectecular action was expcctcd of him by a }\ench netion which had been stan-ed of glory since 1815. llance, representing Cstholicism, hod won privileges for the Christian churches in Jerusalem, llethlehem and Nazarcth as far back as 1535 and 1740. The Russian claim to protect Christiansand Christian churchesjlt the 'I'urkish empire dated only fmm the vagare and gene$lized concessionsin the Kutchuk Ks.insrdji treaty of u74, But, since then, the number of Orthodox (psrticul.rrly Russian) pilgrims to the Iloly Placeshad jncreas€drapidly and by the l84os, th€y far out'[rmbered (by 500 to 1) Cdtholic pilgrims. At t]re same time, Cotholic monks were progressivetyexcluded by Orthodox monks from €ntry to some of the holiest shrines. Napolcon dccided in 1850 to support the cluims of C&tholic monks to posscssionof the Holy Places,This lvos r popular move in Francc, but it $'as interpreted in Russis $s a direct chalenge to thc Tsar. Thcrc ensued two years of diplom.:itic conflict in which French and Russisn rcprcsentativcs sought to penuade the Sultan of the rightness of their ceusc. Th€ Sultrn fcarcd the Russians, but he learncd also to fear th€ tr}ench, u'hcn in 1852 they sent to Constantinople a screw" driven, 90'gun battleship, the Cha.rkmaEne.Thi6 lvas o clear brcach of th€ Straits Convention, though the Itench insisted that since it canied theit ambassador,Lavalette, no brcrch had occuned. But it was,as it was intended to be, an efrectivedisplay of force, and it rvasfollo$ed by snother, later in th€ yerr, lr,hcn a l're ch fleet threatened to bornburd Tripoli. In DcccmLer, the Sultan decided to grant the Cstholjcs what they most $anted, the keys of the inner end outer churchesat Bethlehem. Nicholss :rnd the Orthodor Church ht|d sustaineda notable dcfcat. But the Tsar had no intention of letting mattcrs rcst there. l'rench infiucncc ovcr Turkey must be brokcn, especially since tlrcrc w.rs now a prospcct (in vie$' ol the CharlemaEne episode) of FKnch warships making th€ir way into the Black Ses.Therefore, early in 1853, \icirolas deliberutely insult€d the recently1rr,x'laimedf'rench emperor, by retusing to recognizcNapolcon rr'brcthcr'a titlc be reserved only for legitimate monarch.
THE HOLY PLACES
105
He also held his conversations with Seymour, partly ilr an attempt to r,','inBritish support against France. And in February, he sent Prince Men$hikov to Constantinople with ordeN to extract fmm the Turl$ o pronise to maintain the ghts of Orthodox monks. By May, Menshikov had enlarged this demand to include the ght of Russiato 6upeFisethe welfareolall Orthodox Cluistians, Iay as well as ecclesiastical,within the Turkish empire. This would luve given Russia unplecedented pov'er to interferc in 'Iurkcy's internal afrairs. The FrcDch example of 1852 and the Aust en succcssin the Montetegro question suggested to Nicholas that o forceful approach would ovelcome Turkish resistance. But, as it cmcrged, the Menshikov mission served not so much to overawe thc Tuks as to slam the B tish, snd to mske more likely a grcat power war in d€fenc€ of Turkey. The question of Montenegro concems a rcvolt in Bosnia, supprcss€din 1850 by Omer Paslu, and an attack in 1852 3 by Omcr upon Mont€negro. Austda, anrious to keep Montenego independent and €vell rnore anxious to prevent the afair leading to a genelal sing of Serbs in Bosnie snd Selbia, sent an ultimatum to Constantinople in January 1853. Count Leiningen, representing Austria, demanded an end to the 1va! snd the removal of Omer as govcrnor of Bosnia. IIe was wonderfully succ'essful, sincehis demands $'crc backed by a tlrreat of mititary action if the Turks refuscd. And not only would Austrian forces have made war on Turkey; the Russian army was also resdy to move at a word fmm the Tsar. Aft€r this, Nicholaswas thomuehly convinced that the 'l\uks would always yield to pressure. The Turks, for theix part, however, had sutrered obout as much inlerference by foreign powers in their intemal affails as they ilere prepared to take. The attitudes of th6 Sultan, his ministers, of Turkish religiousleadersand slso of the mob in Constontinople wcre hardening. M€nshikov would hsve s more difficult job than Nicholas supposed. Events bet$een Momh 1859end }Ialch t854make itclearthat neither Aberdeen, nor Napoleon, nor Nicholas wanted a greet Iiorver \yar; but the pattem of thust and counter-tlrust which developcdbetweenthem produced a situation in which considera"
t06
PALMERSTON AND THE CRIIIEA
tions of prestige made o military solution the only possibleone, Pslme$ton 1vesquite open in his criticism ofthe British govemment's behaviour - 'Russir was led on step by step by the spl,arent tin,idity otthe govcrnment ofEngland'. Uad lberdeen imposed anything like unity on his Cabinet, had he made clcar to the RussiansBritaiD's intention to maintain Turkish independence by force if necessary, had even British and Frcnch ministers b€en fully opcn with cach other, it is possibletllat lvar might stilt hrve bcen avoided. Butallparties idulged in displays of military strength to givc weight to their diplomatic movesand, once the ficcts and armi€s werc in position, retreat $'rs difiicult. Even vhen hostilitics opcncd, bowever,Britain and France were by no means clear on their \r?r aims. In March 1858,thc British C:rbinetrefusedto send tle fleet to the Dardanelles, as requ€sted by Rose,the chargCd'effair€s at Constantinople, but the Frcnch fleet nevertheless proceeded to Sslamis. France was cvidently still leading the vay, and Britsin still felt no grcat concem in the Holy Places' contmver6y. Not until Lod Stmtford retumed to Constantinople in April (he thouglrt his tcrm ol duty there had finished in 1852) was a strong€r British innucnce felt. But it is norv gercmlly accepted thet Stmtford, throughoui the negotiations of the ncxt year, acted as a rcstraint on the Turkish moves - and €ven on thc movemcnts of the B tish fleet, and that he $'s.s not the kind of in{tammatory influence that the RNsisns thought him ot thc time. Menshikov spoke of 'the infemol dictatonhip of this Redclilfe'. I{orvever, in spite of Stratfod's cautionings, the Turks entirely rejectedluenshikov'sdemandsin May, and in that month diplomatic relations bet$.een Turkey anil Russia were broken off, Now, in June, as a g€stureof warning to ltussia, the British fieet did movc - to Besika Bay as in 1849; and the Frcncll fleet follox'ed. Home Secrctary Palme$ton had already dcmanded 'a bold, lirm course' from his colleagues.IIe regarded the sendirg of the fleet in June as the moment when Britain rictutrlly 'crosscdthe Rubicon', as he put it. llut Nicholes was not v'iliing to accept the Turkish rcbufr or to l,o inltucnccd by the naval mol'ements; and in a delibcntcly
'I'III) IIOLY
PLAC!)S
107
cocrcive gesture he s€nt Russian troops to occupy the Principalitics. At this, Palmelston $.Assll for sending the fleet into the lllack Sea, but he rvas, not surprisingly, overruled by the rest of the Cabinct; and even Napoleon was norv looking for a peacetul xay out ofthe inpasse.'Ihe rcsult $'trsthe Yicnnu corferenceof August li'herc Austria, Prussi:i, Britoin and France actually dgreedon n formuh to satisfy, as thcy hoped, both Russiansand Turks on ths quesLion of super-r'isionof Turkey's Chistilrn population. This Yienna Note might well have preventcd both the Russo-Turkish and Crimean lVars; it was acceptcd by Russia; but (and again it is now agreedthat Lod Stntford .tlas not responsible)it ]v[s rejected by Turkey, on thc grounds that it still implied an inftingcmcnt of the Sultrn's sovereignty and that Turkey had had no part in ttre druwing-up of the Note. With the British and Frcnch fleets just outside the llardanelles, of coulse, the Turks kllew that tLey could aIlord to be diflicult, since the ssfety ol Constontinoplei'$s assured. Thc situetion was now extremely conftrsed.Althoruh tire Bdtish press \*as outspokcnly hostil€ to Russia (and it was to become even more so altcr November snd the batile ol SinoDe) \icl,ohs still l,elievedthrt Ab.rJ.rn wu'id nnt g" r,' *u.. n"a that thc influence of the i{anchester frce-trAde pacilists, partirularly B eht, would be decisive. Thc Russian people wonted a victory for the Orthodox Church; but RussialAckedthe linancisl sttength for a prolonged "'ar *'ith the grcat porvers, rnd in uny case, Nicholas counted on Austrjan support. Nrpolcon, for his part, was anxious for { spectacular diplomatic success,but did not \rant to go to $'ar to achieveit; yet he did rot ivish to Ioschis ossociation with B tain and, since he thought B tain $'as preparing for \l'ar, Lc slso adopted a stronger linc than hc {,ould have wished. In the British Cabinet, there 11?s a division bct$een Aberdccn on the on€ er.treme,and Russell and Palmcrston on the other, xith Clarelrdonholding the balance somcwhcrc in bet*'een. But all wcre convinced that Napoleon interded a r{'ar,to crowrhis victory in the Iloly Places'dispute,and that he must not be all{)wed to :Lct on his own lest Bdtish authority slrffcr. Aust $. too. rvas anxious to avoid s v'ar with Russia
l08
PAI,MERSTON AND THE CRI}II'A
i
which might finally break up the conservative alliance of the trIett mich em; yet she was wor ed by the Russian oc(upation of thc Principalities, $'hich threatened her Danube trade, and she was equaly wonied that a rrariYith Flancc would lead to her loss ol Lombardy ond Venetia, Au'ctria'swos the strongest voice pleading for a peacefulsettlement; hcr For€ign Secret€.ry,Buol, strcve hard to schicve this. In ony case, Austria could not financially afrordb x'ar. Shewas al|rlostbankrupted by ber eflorts merely to keep her army partially mobilized during the Crimean l'he impassewas largely broken by the Turks, who, ss on so many occasionsin the past, decidedto force the issueby dcclaring lvar on Russia. The declamtion came at tle beginning ol October. On thc 4th of the month, Lord Stratford $as told to call the fleet up to Constentinoplc. He did not do so until the 2lst, hoping to b ng the Turks to their sensesmeanwhile. But once th€ {lcet was on the move, therc was no holding thc Turks. Omer Pasho crossedthe Danube and ffred on the Russianson the 27th. By the middle of November, the B tish snd French fleets were in the Bosphorus, It wss the dcfeat (or'massacre') ofa small Turkish flcet by the Russians at Si ope on 30 November that virtually msde a seneral war inevitable. This naval cncounter produccd a lan1ttical denunciation of Russia in the British press,and a good deal of pressullc on Aberdeen to take decisive action. I'almerston ectualy resigned,but Ivithdrcw his rcsignstion oftcr ten days. Eventuslly, on 22 Decetrlber, the British and Frcnch govenrments ordercd their fleets into thc Black Sea, e!.ch goYemment believing that the other would act independeDtlyif joint action were not forthcoming. In fact, if left to its€lf, neither govelnment would have made the move. But once thc fleets were there, some purpose must be found for them. The Russians were told, early in February, that thc ships {ere ther€ to koep the two sides apad, to stop Turkey attacking Russia, to stop Russian troop movements by s€s, and to blockade Russinn ships in Sebastopol. 'Ihe Russianstook thi6 as tantlmount to a declaration of war. Alrtady, nr JaJtx$ry, thcy had rejected & joint B tish, French,
TIIE CRIIIEAN
IVAR
109
Aust an and Prussian request to evacuate the Principalities as a prcliminary to a peaceconference.On t2 trIarch, Bdtain and hancc signcd a defensivetreaty with Turkey; on 28 March, they declaredwar on Russia; on 10 Ap l, they signed an alliance with each othcr. Austria, meanwhile, to the intensedissppointment of Nicholas, rcmained neutral.
LI 9 ] T H E C I I I M E A N W A R
I
In so far as she had clear and irnmediate motives, Britain *.as going to war bccausethe Russians wcre illegally and deffnntly orcupying the Prircipalities, becausc,by the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, Russia was clairning special rights of interfercnce in Turkey's intemal affeirs, and becauseTurkey, having declared $ar on llussia, secmedlikely to sufrer yet another defcat. In a speech in the Commons on 31 March, Russell explained the arguments which hrd guided the govemment; 'unless $e are content to submit to the luture aggrandizcment of that Po$'er lRussia] &nd, possibly to the destruction of Turkey - whose integrity and independerce have been so olten declared essential to the stability of the system ol Europc - we have no choice left us I'ut to int€rpose by arms'. It was impossible to majntain Turhish integrity and independerce 'if Russia was alloved unchecked and uninterupted to impose her owlr terms upon Turkey'. It $as some months, how€ver, before the allies decided what kjnd of wsr they werc going to Iiglrt. Russia,as Nepoleon I had found in l8r?, rras physica.Uya ds.untingpropositionj th€reforc thc most they could exp€ct to achievelras suflicient succ€ssin e linitcd nrilitary operation to justify a firm stand in the subsequent confe&nce. Indeed, thrcughout the war, diplomatic noves remained more meaDingfi than the actual military opemtions. At fhst, it 1vas assumed that Bdtish and tr'rcnch Ii,rccs rvould be used to deal with thc noDrinal casus belli, thc
110
PALMEBSTON AND THE CRI}IEA
Russian occupation of thc P ncipalities. But, in July, this ground rvas cut fmm under them by a Russian agreement(undcr Aust an pressure)to evacuatethe Principalities. By Au$st, thc Russians hed gom, and Aust an troops (as purely tcmporary guarahansof the area) had taken fheir pleee. Oncc this had halpened, it was unlikely that either Austriu or Prussia {'ould be wilting to join thc allied ranks, sincethe only purely Gcnnan i ter€st in the strugglc, the freedom of the fJs.nubeand its delta, had been assurcd.If the 1rar were to continue, thc British and Frencl would also have to find somewhercelsc to Iiqht. In July, ot lcast, a clearer purpose to the 1vtrrhad bccn outliic(l t,y the l-our Points which rcsulted fron) Austro-Frcnch talhs hcld in Paris, th(,ugh B tsin only agrccd to acceptthcm as rvar aims with extreme reluctance. Thc poiDts vere; filst, intcnational rather than purely Russian protcction for tlc hincipalities and S€rbia; second,freedom of navigation on thc Danube; third, a revisioD of the l84l Straits ConveDtionfor the sake ofthe Erropean btrlancc; and fourth, removal olthe exclusive Russjan rishts of prot€ction tor Ch stians in the Turkish cmpire. It qreedily becameobvious that the third ofthcse points x'as much the most irnpofiant in British eycs. By thc cnd of ,{u$st, the princDAl British $'ar aim had becomcthc removal oI ItussiaD 1\'anhipsand naval iDstallations from thc lllack Sea. lf this vrre done, it $rculd not mattcr much \ricther the Straits were open to \ra$hips or not, assuming that Turkey was still friendly towards B tain. Thcrcfore, in September,it was decidedthat peace\r'ould not be madc until Sebastopol,the chief Russian naval base in the Blsck Sca, 'thc eyc tooth of the bear', rvas caplured. This rvas vcry much a British, in pa.rticular an, .dmiralty, decisnrn, nrther than a l'rench one. The idea of fight;ng o {:ir on the C mea rcflects a sea-power'sfondnessfor military operationson peninsulas,where land forces co'nd easily be supported lry the navy. And so, from Septenber 1854 to September 1855,British French, Turkish and leter also Piedmontcsetroops strugglcd to c{rpture one to{n, an exercise that had becn expected to takc pcrhaps six $ceks, Public dismay ot thc dcvastating sio{ncss of
THE CRIIIDAN
}YAN
ltt
rllied progrcss brought down the Abe.aleen sovcrninent in .,rruary 1855 end led to Palnr.rston. appojntm"nLas ltimc Itlinister. Unccnrored lFtters from the troopr and thc disoakhcs ,,f W. H. Russcl, the corrcspondcntof ?ir "izrs, mrae iU rtre
oL_-_JP_-:P___:P_-730 o
j..tr LEs
too 20o 3@ 'too r.)||
TEE CRIMEAN WAA
best-reported war in history so far, and allo\r,ed the British public to savour fully the ircepacity ot Lord Raglan (rhe B tish commander-in-chief), the hopcless inadequacy of the supply organization, and the hormls of dysentery and chotem. The disoppointmentsof civilians at home werc the qrcater becauseof rl'o high bopesand 'rnfcssnncble confidence that hsa chara.terized the war fever of 185$--tt; ,we havc pmved we have hcarts itr n cause, we ere noble still' wrotc Lord Tennyson in Mard. The nriti"l, trool'! had becn regarrlodas Ure finesr .rncdirionarv lirrcc er.er to leave the country.
112
PAL]ITIIRSTON AND THE CRIMEA
It was the \f,iDter ol185{-5 which resDy brought to light the incompetence in British army organizatior and in commanders on the spot, In fact, Sebastopolhad very near\ been captured gbt arvay, in Sept€mber 1854, and might have been but for disagreements between Raglan and Saint_Arnaud, the French commander. The British then had lsnded 26,000 men, the French 80,000, to oppos€ the 40,000 Russians bett€en them and Sebestopol.The Russienswere beat€n off irl the battle of the river Alma; but Sebastopolwas not attacked, simPly subjected to a siegc,which developedso slowly th&t Todleben,thc Russian commander of the town, was able to complete his very impressive del€nccryorks.The British army succeededin defeatingtllo Russian assaultson its positions, et Balaclava in Octobcr and at Inkermrn in November, but no maior attack was made on Sebastopoluntil the following Junc, and not until Septcmberdid the Russi{rns evacuate the town, by which time, Raglsn IYas dead. Even then, it wos the French capture of thc Malakhov redoubt which settled the issue,the British having failed at the R€dan. Palmerston was arvare tlDt, even as Pnme trIinister, he had not been sble to achieve a notable successA more vigorous conduct of the war he had stdven to provide; a tram*'ay h&d been conshuct€d at Bsleclavo to improve transpod a ang€ments behveen thc harbour and the British base, and Florence Nightingale had been able to get her o\Yn\{ay at Scutari; yet the '!var was ending too soon. The militery glory had gone to France; in the autumn of 1855,Palmerston pressedhard for an extension ofthe war in the Bsltic and in Circassiaand Georgia (an alliance rvas signed with Sweden in November), but Napoleon wanted peace, and Britain lackcd the troops to ffght the w&r alone. Only if Palmerston had be€n prepared to consider fighting to establish a free Poland or to transfer Finland ftom Russia to Sweden, lvould Napoleon hove been willine to carry on But Palmerston 'war of nations.liti€s', and so, when Russia did not want e accept€d en Aust an ultimatum, s g€neral peace was agreed rrpor on I February 1858, The war had not only been a distinct blow to B tish military prcstige, it bsd also }evealed a continuing mistrust bet$'een
THE CRIMEAN WAR
118
BritsiD and Frurl(€. By the end of the {ar, Ft&nc€ had 800,000 troops in the Crimea, 6s against the Bdtish S6,000. To ofrset this humilisting imbalance, Britain had desperately sought to rais€ recruits in Germany, and had, ffIst in April 1854, and then (successfrnly) in January 1855, persuaded Piedmont to 6end 15,000 troops to the Crimea. It ltras with diIficulty that the British persuaded Napoleon to abandon his plan to take cornmsnd himself in the Crimea. Ihe dispatch of the Piedmont€se troops lvas also designed to calm Aust.ian fears about her Itslian lanals and to bring Austria into the war il possible.BuoI would have been rdlling to join, and in lact Austria did sign an alliance with Britain and Francc in November 1855, but Austrien eenemls realized that a war with Russia in Galicia wor-rld be much more harmful to Austria than wer in the Crimea could be to Britain and Fr&nce. So Aushis promoted negotiations - a conference involving Rusian as well as British, French and Austrian representatives actually met at Vienna from March to June 1855 - but not until Novcmber 1855 werc the Aust ans induced to threaten wILrunless Russia accepted their ultimatum. In the €vent, the Russians wcrc very ready for peace. The death of Nicholas in March 1855 brcught to the throne his son, Alexander II, rvho was lar more willing to come to terns, even terms gravely damaging to Russia's Black Sea int€rests. The Russian casualties in the wa.r were trdcc as heavy as those ol Britain and France, her armies were at tull str€tch, vith large detachments in Poland, the Baltic provinces, Galicia and the Caucasus, as well as the Crimea, her people were in rebellious mood, and hcr ffnances would not stand a longer war. In fact, the Russians did win one small success in November 1865 in the Caucasus rcgion, when they c&ptued Kors, an important Turkish fortress guarding rcutes thmugh to the Euphrates and India. Kars was, not surprisingly, defended partly by British officcrs - under Colonel Williams - as vell as by Turks. Thig solitary echievemcnt gave the Rursions some hope that they rnight be able to make a reesonablebargain when ure peace (o)rlcrenccmet at Paris on 25 Februrry 1856.
THE TRSATY
[20] THE TREATY OF PARIS In ar atmosphere ol Anglo-French suspicion, and of FrancoBussian cooperation almost, peac€ terms were filslly h&mmered out. The Principalities of lloldavio and Wallachia did not become Aushi&n, as Viema had once hoped, but *'erc put under the general supen'rsion of the great powers, as also was Serbia. Russia lost her control of the mouths of thc Danube when southem Bessarebis. was giv€n up to Moldevia ; Turkey's empire, and her Christien subj€cts, werc given the protection ol all the great powers, anil Turkey hersell was admitted to the European Concert - the tegal and diplomatic system of the great po*ers. Ai Britain's insistence,Kars was restored to Turkeyj and also the Aaland islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland w€re to be demilitarized; which was some compensationto Britain for her lack of achievement in the Baltic, where the fleet, even {'hen attempting to bomberd Kronstadt, had hed little success. Finatly, and much the most impofiant, the Black Sea was neutralizeil. No warships, not even Tutkish or Russian, werc to sail thereon, and Russian fortiffcations were to be demolished. On the face of things, this Black Sca clause rivas a notable victory for B tain. Such enforced demilitarization was unprecedenteal and was (as Gladstone actually considered it at the time) a deliberete anil perhaps unwise humiliation of Russi&' PalmeNton c€rtainly believed that the war had not been fought 'satisfactory in vain. Its results were, if not spectaculsr, at least for the presert', as he put it. Russian ombitions had been checked, her boasted military predominance had been successfully challenged, and hcr hold on eastem Europe, via the Iloly Alliance rclationship with Austria, had been brcken. The balance of po$'er in Eurcpe at large, es well as in the Levant, had thelefore been restorcd. And while the StBits were closed ond the Bts.ck Ses.neutralized, the nearest Russian warships to the Black Sea were in the Baltic, but the ne:Lrest Blitish warships rv€re at Malta and might even be et Besika Bay $hen required. The war had preserved Turkey, and talk of Partitions
OF PARIS
115
now seemed unncccssery, Indeed Britain hod already, in 1854 snd 1855, grantcd e loan to the Turkish governnent, a sure sign of confidence in the survival ol the empire, especially since Ure secondloan was actually gualanteed by tLc British govemmcnt. TIie lar had also impove shed Russia - and Austria, rvho took no military part in it; and the Frcnch govcmment lnd had to float a large loan. But Britoin had financedthe war easily,out of taxation. In mony respects,then, Britain appesred, in the cnd, to have done well out of the i{ar. Ilut the most important of all the clauses,the n€utralization of the Black Sea,dependedon a paper promise, and thcrcfore on Russian goodwill, since Britain herself could not kecp walships oD the Sea. If Russi:rever choseto dcnouncethis clause,it was by no meaDs sure that Britajn $ould fcel capable of sendiDg troops into the Bleck Sea again, unless France $ere certainlv williDg to do the seme.And it now apperrcd that Napoleon rY:ls more intcrcstcd in an entente rflith Russia than in making rvar on her. Thc rcsults of the Crimean ll'ar might stand, then, only as long as Russia ellowed them to. Only if Russia regarded the v'ar as a pcrmanent rvaming, and voluntarill' abandoncd hcr ambitions tu the Middle East, and only if the Ttrrkish empirc endured indeffnit€ly, could the rvar be said to show decisivc rcsults. In fact, it soon becanc clcar that the Russiansrcgaded the trcaty of Psrjs simply as a tcmpoDry set-back. And bcforc twcnty yeals had passed it was appannt that Balkan national, ism - with Russia as a Slav champion - nas going to causeas much difficulty for Turkey as the problern of Christian privileges had reccntlv done.
I PNINCIPAL EVENTS
Principal Events,1841-56 August. Pe€l b€comes hime Minister, with Abeldeen as For€ign Secr€tary l84l-5. Itben€3e civil wa! 1a44, June. Tsrr Nicholas visits Britsin. ConveNstions with Aberd€€n Septemb€r.N€€selmdememorandum, summing up supposed Anglo-Russian agr€ement 1846. Palmerston agsitr Fo*ign SeGetsry, following Peel'g r€3igrBtion 184E, Russian tloops suppr€ssr€volt in Moldavia snd Wsllachia 16{9. Msy. Russian t&ops suppressrevolt in Ilungary October. ftisis ove! Kossuth's preseocein Turkey. B tbh fleet to B€€ik8 B3y 1650. Don Paciffco 6ffoi! lESo-z. Iloly Pla.es' c.ontuoversy rE52-'5, AbedeeD hiloe Minister, with Palme$ton as Ilome Secretsry 1858. Jsiusry, Nicholas'! conv€rsationswith Setmour Febru.ary-Moy. Menshikov mission to Comtantinople Jun6. British neet to B€sika Boy July. Bussisn tmops into Mot&vis end Wsllochis August. Vienna Not€ October.Tutks declsrewar on Rursia November. Battle of Sinope' betu'een Russbn 8nd Turkisb fleets December.tsritish snd Fr€nch fleeLsinto Black Ses 1854. Jamrary, Russians rcject ftquest to evacuate Moldevis snd Wellschia February, Anglo-Frcnch wsrning to Russis Matlh, Anglo-French elliance with Ttrkey snd dealaution of wsr on Russis July, The Four Points August. Russians evscuat€ Moldaviu and Wslls.hia Septenb€r. Lsndings on the Crimea, b8ttle of Alme and sieg€of Sebsstopol October. Bsttle of Bshclava Novemb€r. Bsttle of Inkenan
1855.
1841.
1858.
1I7
Jsnusry. Aberdcen rcsigat. PsLd€Bton bccomes hime Minist€r. Piedmontae tloops to the Crimee March, Accessionof Ts6r Alexcnder II Sept€nbe!. Russisns evacuate Sebestopol November, Austrisn sliance ]rith Britain and Flance, 3nd diimatum to Russis, Rusli*n captut€ of Kars February. Pesceagr€ed Ms$h. Parb tleaty. ft iple (British-F&nch-Austdan) declsration oI suppolt for Ttrkey, Eatti-hums''ux (Trnkish teloming €dict)
r18
PAI,I{ERSTON AND ?HE CRI}TI'A
Further Read,ing (ID addition to the vorks by Merriott, Ande$on, Bullard, Ilurewitz snd Miller alreadysussestcd.) C. W. Crawley, The Qustion of Creek Indzpendcne, 1821-1593. c8Dbridg€ Unive$ity Prcss (Cambidse, 1e80). C. . Woodhouse, rhe Greek Wat oJ Independenxe.]J]otahi'rsotl (Lodon, r95?). lV. H. Y, Temperley, The toreign Poti.v oI Canning, 1A2Z-7. BcIl (Inndon, 1e25). P. J, Y, Plolo, Canning. Macmillan (London, re05). H. C.F, Bell, Lord Palnrrston, 2 vol, Iongmans (London,t9B6). C. F. Webster, "ne -OolsignP.,Iicg of Palrnerston, 18J0 tI, z !o\s.l1eII (London,r95l). D. Soutlsste, fli€ Mor, English Minister. The potictzsend poLitics of Pah zrstan. \facmill^n (LoDdon, 1066). J. P"idley, Lard Palmerston Constable(London, re70). ts. K. Matrtin, The I'riury)h of Lod Palnentm (s study of public opinion in England beforc the Crimean Wor,) Allen and Unwin (London,1924;ncw edition, t96B). EII. W. Y. Temperle]', England, and, rha Near East, The Crimea. Lorsmans(London,re36);rcissued,Frank Csss(London,re6a). \ . J . PnryellJ, Inttnational E.ononics and Diplomaq ,intheNcar East, 7834 53 (a study of British commercialpoticy in the L€vsnt.) Starford Unive$ity I'r€ss (PaloAlto, California,1ss5). Y. J. Puryear, En4hnn, Russi(' antl tha Stvtits euestion, t81e-56. Unive6ity of Ca.lifornia{Berkeley, Cstifornia, test). J. H. Glea,sol1, Ihe Genesisof R"/trsophobia in Great bitain, 18ti-41. Harvard University Press (Cainbridse, Nl,s., re5o). H. L. Hoskins,B?rtsn Routesto Indid. Lons& trs(London,r9?8). C. J . BxtIett, Grrat Britain and SeaPauer, 1815-53.Oxford Univ€rsity I'ress (London,re68). T. E. Ma$ton, ,,.r,ain'r Imp.riat R6Iein rheRedSeaArea, 1800-1818. Bsiley Rros.(London,reot). J,B. IJ.c1)y. Btitai n aadthePprciar GulI.l7C5 -I 88r. OxfordUniversity Prcss(London.le68). J. lfarlowe. Aaglo-Egap!;an R?lationt, 1800-IqSJ. Cresserkess --' (London,re53). G. S. Grahe.m,fl,,,,,,Polt,t csof N aMI Suptanaclt. CombridgeUnii€$iry Press(Canh dse, 1e65).
FURTHER
RDADINA
119
G. S. Grehsm, Gtea,Brt ain in th. Indian Ocean(s study of maritime ente+rise, 18ro-"50).Oxford University Press(London,1967). G. B. Henderson, Crt'nzan War Dtplomaey. Jackeon(Glasgow,rsaz). H.lv. Y. Toperley end L.\1.Pe soa,Fountu ionr of British Foreign r938). Policg,1792 l9A2.CambridgeUnive$ityP.€ss(Cambridge, R, lv. Seton-I-stson, bitain in nurope, 1789-1914. Cambridse UniveNity Press(Canbridgc,rs37). D. C. M. Platt, -l'inarid, Trude and.Politics. B|itish Forcign Poicy, l8l5 1974.Oxfod Unive$ity Press(London,1908). 'New Csmbridge ltudern Eistory', Vol Ix (17e3 1880),Chapter xlx, 'The Nerr East and th€ Ottoman Empire, 1798-1880'byC, W. Cravley. 'New CambridgeModem Eistory', Yol X (1830-70),Chapte.xVI, 'The Meditenanean'by C. w' Crawley.Chapter XYIII, 'The Crime8n War' by Asatha RaiDm.
PART V Gladstone, Disraeli and the Balkans to 1878
[2r] DEVELOPMENTS, r856-75 The treaty of Psris had tro perttrsdent efiects. Within fourt€en years Russia, had repucliated Bleck Sea neutralization, and France had lost the diplomatic msstery she seemedto enjoy in 1856.As fo! Turkey, shestiU gave no sign of any g€nuinedesir€ to lean how to control the Balksns. By 1875, Britsin w€,sno longer a convincedsupporter of Turkish rule in the Middle Ea6t. 04 that eccount, aDd pafily becsuseit hsil seemedto stsrt accidentally, the Crimesn War hes often been dismissed ss beiug both rmlecess&ry aDd urproductive. Yet in lasting for fouteen years, the Paris tresty comperesfsvourably with any other postwar tEs,ty of the lBtt thr€e centuries, War has never ploalucod& pemanent mestery for tbe victor& or a permanetrt subiection for the defeatrd, that would not have appeard enyway, 'with or without the wa,!, The Crimeaa War was no more unnecessaryor unprcductive thsn aay other. As a limiteil condict designedto Estlict, but not br€sL (becsusetro orc could) Russia'sautlority, it could even be said to have be€nlx suelly su€lessfid. Old prcblems still r€lrained in the lliddle Eest, of course. Turkish alecline\f,ss ch€ckedbut llot hslted, And new pr.oblems uqeq)ectedly deyclop€d, to girc herh catre for gEat powet involvement there. Yet not until 1878alid it sgaiD sppesr likely th&t greet poreelsirould actuolly gg to wsr over the question of
t22
CLADSTONE, DISRAELI AND THE BALKANS
I'utkey's survival. Partly this was because Turkey's irmediate tuturc scemcd less in doubt following the triple declaration of suppod for her giveD by BritsiD, France and Austrb in Apdl 1856. Partly, too, it was the rcsult of conc€ntrstion by the powels on more pmssing concems: Italian and Germ&n unilicstion, for example, and scrfs and Poles, in the case of Russia. The Ilritish, too, found th€ir sttention wandering fmm Con6tantinople. Napolcon III'S ambitious plans in westem Europe were an important disimction. Pelmc$ton, for his last nine yeats, found himself more worried by Frsn€e than by Russis, for Russia did not thrcatcn the sccurity of th€ British Isles. The manifest failurc of the Turks to establish c{Iective rcforms, especiallyamong their Christian subjects,porveduly cont but€d to the withdrartsal ol B tish intcrest. It became clcar th:Lt the corruption and entrenched rcligious prcjudice survidng in Turkey were not going to be wished away by an occasional burst of forejgn-inspired enlightenment, such as the llatti-Iluma}'un of 1856, Far from guaranteeing equal civil rights to Chdstians, the Sultan 6 reforms merely contributed to a rising anger among tr{oslem Turks against all tlaes of foreign intedeftncc. The supposeally friendly British tutelage was especially resented. Grcwing Tttkish nationalism was reflected in the formetion of a Young Ottoman Association. By 1875, B tish govemm€nts, of whatever party, had tacitly abandoned the hopc that a new Turkish concern for Ch stians might rcmovc Russia's p ncipal excuse for Balkan intervention. In any case, Russia had now found an even beiter excuse. in the form of Panslavism. Increasing British indiffercnce to Turkey's conditior was aided by the obvious mismanag€ment of Turkish ffmnces and by growing doubts about the security of investments therc. The Sultan's tendency to delault on the ftpayment of loans, culminating in a suspension ol pa)'rnents in 1876, produced a distinct cooling of British enthusiasm. Greater loreign control became inevitable, and the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt wss set up in 1881. Sales of British goods in Turkey (ineluding the Belksns) continued to expand, so that by 1875 Britain \yas supplying over one-third of Turkey's imports; she also built
DEVELOI'IIEN1.S,
I856 ?5
r2t
railways from the Black Sea to the Danube in the 1860s.Yet later railways were constructed not by the British, but b]' the French or Gcrmans ; and, slthough the importont Ottoman I3onk liad a *'holly EDglish bood of directoN at its inception in 1856, seven years lat€r it had become a joint Angto-French col(:ern, nnd by the 1890sits position as the chief backer of cafitatist cnteryrise in l\rkcy wes being seriously challenged by the Gernran Deutsche Bank. The pmportion of British boldi gs of Turkish govemment bonds declined stcadily through the period lrom 1881to 1914. trIuch ol the money borrowcd by Turkey rfter 1854 *'as spent oJr the re-equipment of hei emy and navy. Yet her Davy, British built and cornmandedby a retired Britistr admiral, vhile it held control of the Black Sea,could still not prevent a Il.ussian victory in the x€r of l8Z 8. The ermy could delay a Russian advance on Constsntinople,but it could not stop it. In spite of both advic€ and loans, Turkey could not stand on hcr o\vn as a. bastion against Russia. As a. morket for British goods she rvas still useful, but as a market for safe investment, and as a state capable of def€nding hcrsclf, th€re was much less to bc said for hcr. Once the Russians hod begun their advances in Oentral Asia (towards Afghanistan) and had rcnounced the Black Sea clauses,Turkey's existenc€ bccame progressively less relevant to the underlying issuesof Anglo-Rus6iRnrivalry. The gmdual s{itch in British interest from ConstantiDoplc to 'Iurkcy-in-Asia (especiallyatfi rst Almenia)andto Dg],?tbecomes ast king feature ofthe period 1856-75.In spite ofthe apparcntly rene$'ed obs€ssion l,\,ith Constantinople end the Straits in 1878, the prcccss of change continucd aftcrwsrds, so that, by 1885, automatic Brilish support for tllc Sultar wa6 gone. The chief advaDtag€ of his survival indeed was simply that it allowed l:l tain to construct aD unolicial empire, still apparently under Turkish rule, and to keep out othei powers, where her strategic interests were most closely involved, Here begins the policy, openly avowcd in 1010, of establishing British-dominated AIab strtes across the Middle East, lor the protcction of India and
124
(]LADSTONE, DISRAELI
AND THD BALKANS
Eg,?t athacted attentioD, especis.lly following the American Civil War, as a source of m,[ cotton for Loncashir€. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 excited fu.r deeper concem ; for, though its construction hs.d been assiduously opposed, espccially by PalmeBton (ascreeting a new 'Stnits' situation, and dangelously enlarging Frcnch influence in the Middle East) the canal's stRtegic and economic importance to Britain rapidly became spparent. Gladstone turneil down the opportunity to buy Khedive Ismail's shsrcs in 1870. for the canal was not then making a profit; but, by the time Disneli complet€d his spectac" ular purchase (for 94 million, hestily borowed ftom the Rothschilds) in 1875, well over hslf the ships using the canal were British, and the possibility ol using Indian troops in the MeditelHnean had been wonderfully increased, Of course, cont?ol of the company did not in itself guerantee uninte upted use of the canal. Only an occupying force could do that, as the efrects of .'the British army's ar val in 1882 and departure in 1954-5 demonstrated; and the British govemment, with seven-sixteenths of the shares, never had a controlling interest. But as the biggest single shareholder it had a decisive say in determining the level ol dues charged; &nd, though Disraeli himself seems not to have been intending the abandonnent of Constsntinople in favour of Egmt (he had not quit€ ell the forcsight with which he is sometimes crcdited), the use of the canal to facilitate speedy troop movements (in either direction) was vital to a sea power, in sn age when shategic railway building was beginning to threaten the safety of Indie. Iler delibeEte construction of strategic railwa]re was the most worrying aspect of Russia's thmst into Centml Asia. By 1868 Russian forces were in conhol ol Tashkent and Samarhnd, and rajl*'ays constructed through Turkestar soon pointed mcnacingly fiom Bokluro and MeN tolvards Penjdeh and even to Herat in Afghanistsn. The British public's Russophobia, $hich had reachedits tust hystericel crisis in 185H, was rcawakenednow by a splendid outpoudng of alarmist lite$ture, prominent in *lrich was Sir IIenLv Rawlinson's ,ngralrd az d Ru"csiain thz Easl, publishcd in 1875. A 'forl\'ard' British policy was essentisl, he
DEVELOPIIENTS.
T85O-?5
125
argued; and Herat was now dignified as 'the pivot of the whole Eastcrn Question'. On the Russian side, prcpaganda similarly fiourished, Tercntyey's Eussia and,England, in Cmtrul .Asia, also published in r 875,threat€ned a Russian descent upon India \r.henever Britain and Russia should be st war over env issue. Ironically, jusl, when Constantinople wa6 ceasing to te the ,key to India', Anglo-Russian antagonism in C€ntral Asia prohibited mutual trust and the possible settling of differcnces in th€ Black Sea Straits ar€a. Britain's disenchantment with Turkey in this period w&s also palt ofa growirg irdtetion a,t the waywardness of Middle Eastern peoples in general, They lacked the decert standards of business ethics and politicel reliability that the British expected to find in those whom they \yere prepared to guide and befriend. Lord Stanley, echoing Canning's sentiments of forty years earlier, s'rcte, in some exesperation, of Crceks and Turks in 186Z that 'ir point ofcivilization ther€ islittle to choose'.Ofcourse, Britain bas always produced her fair sharc of colourtul eccentdcs, those adventurous souls who are prcpared to abandon insularity and throw themselves into a love of Turks, or of Balkan ox Arab peoples; but the geneml mood of resentment was the strongcr force, and helps to explain the non-involv€ment views of Cobden and Bright, the cool disintercsteilnessof Stanley (loyally maintained by him even when he became Disraeli's Foreign Secretary) and most of all, the fierce Turcophobia of Cladstone. The sense ot p&Iti€ipating in unle\rarding turmoils was widespread in diplomutic and businesscircles, es well as in Parliament. Even Disraeli, though naturally morc sympathetic than most to the un-English ways of the Middle Eest, was no out ght supporter of the Turks. British, not Turkish interests were what matter€d to him in 1878. IIe was pelfectly prcpsled to seenot only Russia and Austria-Hungery but also Britain destrcyiry Turkish integ ty by the seizure of terdtory snd zones of inlluence. Thc events of l8?0 in Europe strcngly affect€d B tish thinking on the Eastem Question, The defeat oi France wss accompanied by Russia's renurcietion of the Black Sea cleuses anil the rtrrnstruction, undcr German dircction, ofthe old Iloty Alliance
126
CLADSTONE, DISRAELI
AND T}1E BALKANS
grouping (as the Dreikaiselbund). These unr,r€lcome developments both stimulated fear of Russis.and olso increased Britain's involuntary isolation from continent&l aflairs. It is opptrIent norv that the lasting hostility betwccn Bdtaiu and Russiawas basedon a quite umeal lear in cach of the other's supposed aggressive intentions. In fa.ct the capacity ol Britain to harm Russia in the Black Sea region was as sevcrelylimited as was Russia's ability to threaten the British routes to India, In thc nineteenth century at any !ate, Britain's shortage of hoops and Russia's shortage of money prcvented either from evcr gaiDing a decisive advsntage over the other. The ultimate absurdity appeared in February 1878 when the Russian army at San Stefano and the British fleet aDchoredoff thc P nces' i Islands faced each other in msjestic impotence, euch powerless I to halm the other, though each was lesdy to move to Constanti* nople immediately the other seemed to threaten the city, In the end, neither made the move, Constantinople was not violoted. No Anglo'Russian war took place. Russia's declaration in October 1870 that she v€s no longer prcpared to ftcognize thc neutrality of the Black Sea removed in an instant B tain's principal gain lrorn the Crimean War. Yet without France, her 'Crimcan ally', Britain could do little, cspecially since Russis. vcry evidently had Bismarck's backing. In any event, since Gladstone $'As Prime Ministcr, and he not only disapproved of single-handed B tish action, Irut had evcn bcen exp€cting this Russian move €ver since 1856,the most that was likcly to foltow was a st€rn pronouncement of molal dis" pleasue. Yet morc did follow. To erforce rcspcct for intemational beetie6, Gladstone called a confercnce at London jn 1871 which was first to condemn Russia's action end then sanctify it by giving it the seal of ereat power appmval, The powers dutilully attcnded and ehdstonc bravcly sought to 'develop and mature the action of a common, or public, or Eurcpe&n opinion'. This was not quitc the face-seving, stable-door-bolting exercise thtrt it secmcd to the Consereatives et the time. The Russians did aglee that, in futue, treaties could be a.brogated oDly by the poli'cls in conced (a useful argument to use &gainst
DEVELOP
ENTS, t856_75
Ssn Stelano in 1878); snd th€ T\Dks were permitt€d to allow friendly (for example B tish) warships to use th€ Straits even in tim€ of pesce, if such naval demonstrations 1fferethought necessary for the maintenancc of the sts.tus quo; in other wods, the Stmits Convention had been modiffed, to Il tain,s advsntage. Panslavism, the harnessing of ninet€enth-century nationalist idcas to the ceuse of Russia's 'mission', prcvided yet another cxcue lbr Anglo-Russian ftiction. A literary dream, encompassing thc union of all Slavs under (inevitabty, as potes and ('zerh\ fearcd)Russianprotcction. PanslcvisnrnF\.r .aplured lhe 5upps11ofl T6ar Nexander II, or of mo"t of his minister.,'' including the influentiat Gorcht'kov (who succeeded Nesselrode ] as Foreign Minister in 1856 snd becam€ Chancellor in t86z)i i Lui it alarm.d lhe British. ehpeciallybicause it had found.' po\erfuL !).mpot-hizelsin Russian court and church cirnlcs,and becauseN. P. Ignatiev, thc Russi€n ambassadorat Constanri" ropl., suw his hsk thete as the fulfil,ingof Panslavbop.s in ihe Balkans. Hc was prepated to work quite independcntty of St Pete$burg ifnecessary. In 1878,indeed,it was the lmolficial, l Russisn foreign policy oflgnatiev which Disraeli stm1,eto counteract, rather than the 'ofliciel' one of Gordhakov - {.ho in the cnd was quitc prepsred to disown lgnaticv. Fear of Psnslavist Russian policies was not, hox€ver, the most powerlul motive behind Dismeli's ections in I87S. Bismarck's formation of the cermsn Empirc in ts?r and of re Dreikaiserbund in 18?2had stiU further reduced Britain,s status (aheady falling since 1864)as s Uurcpean po$.er.A Russiaunder Cerman dicction waseven,11 orsethan th€ oldRussian-dominated Iloly Alliance, Determination to recovo the $le of arbirer, by smashing the Dreikaiserbund, was fundamental to Disracli's thinking, IIis interventiotr in the Wsr Scare of 1825, by enthusiastically joining Russie,against Bismarck, in support ol France, helped to open a rift between Bismarck and Gorchakov which lad not by any means closed in 1878. Austro,Hungarian fcars "r'Hrrssia, strongly felt still by her Magyar lor,.;sn Ninisrer Audmssy, could also bc usefully exploited, As it happened, I
128
GLADSTONE, DISRAELI
AND THE BALKANS
c sis involving th€ security of Coftt$Itinople, where 6ea Power could be decisively applied, was ideal for the resrmection of B tish suthodty. The 1878 crisis wos too good an opportunity to miss, especially sirce Austlia-IluDgary had been antsgonized by Rus6io, and Bismarck was desPeratelystruggling to Nmain neutral. Policy making is never so cleaFcut, of course, as historians can only too easily make it app€sr. Th€ fact is that between 1858 and 1878 at least, consistent snd identifiable policies or the Eastem Question wele harder to discover than they had been' in Bdtain, Russiaand Austria'I{ungary ; and domesticuncertainties and contradictions merely increesed int€mational tension. I'he divergence b€tween Gorchakov and Ignatiev is typical. Hesita_ tions end second thoughts wer€ evident in Vienna too, where Andrassy found himself in complete disogre€ment rith his country's anny chiefs on the question ol annexation of Bosnia. In B tain, the conflict of opinion iD 1853-4 bctween Aberdeen and Palmerston paled by compsrison with the stormy quanels of Gladstone and Disraeli; ond, even within Disraeli's cabinet, fundamentsl differences of outlook existed between Derby, Sslisbuy and the Prime Minister himsef' The 1875J crisis was initiat€d by the Balkan peoplesthemselves, €ven if, in the end, they suffercd most snd gained least fi.om it, The rapid growth of their ombitions is a decisive fector in the post-1856period.Rumania, with French, snd evenRussisn, blessing (but vith no more than lukewam approval from the British) had gain€d practical independencein 1886. Togethe. with Grecce, trtontene$o and the Bulgarians, she joined in optimistic Serbian schemes for th€ eiection of the Turks, and & total partition of the Balkan peninsula. only mrtu&l jealousies' such as appeareil over }ival claims to Macedonia and over Bulgerian demands for atr exarchate independent of Creek control (granted in l87o) seemed likely to prolong T\-rrkey's nominal rule there. Official British policy did not yet promis€ support for Batkon nationalism. It would t{Lke more murders ol ltalkan Christians to bring that' Nor rvas Austria-Hungary' or trt least Andlassy, snxious to seethe demise of the Turk, But
'tEll
cRIsls
l8?5-8
129
with Bulgs.riaspringiDgto self-awarmess,pmmpted by Ignatiev and by studentvisits to Russia,it wasdifficult for the Russisns, Ch stians and Slavs ss they were, to ignore the rightful claims of a peoplewhoseland not only controlled the route to ConstantiIl,.rple,but alsogaveacccssto the Aegean.
L22lTHE CRISIS, r 875-8 lbr two yea$, the military aspect of the Balksn crisjs was conffned to the clash between Turkey and hel subject peoples, lmile Serb6 and then Bulgarians fought for their ind(penderce, and while Turkish forccs fought to suppress them, the great powers struggled to ayoid any sedous enlargemetrt of the conflict and indeed sought to end it as soon as possible.Diplomscy lvus their weapon until 1877; discussions, manoeuvrings, suggestions, accusations and advrce 6lled the diplometic air. Joint action was, or was said to be, the oim, Not until Russia in 1877 decided to break the deaiUock by h€r attack on Turkey did th€ crisis come to a head. And meanwhile, in Brita.in, dissgreements within the Cabinct and conflicting enthusiasms among the public took the country back very much to the uncertain days of the 1828-80 Wclington govemment, when policy *'avered or was nonexistent, and distaste for the Turks made tum opposition to Russian moves alrnost impossible. And yet, despite the h€sitations, it was British action, or lack of action, which was held (by Russia, Ilrincipelly) to bc rcsponsiblefor the deepeningofthe crisis.And, ri'hile the Balkan pot boiled, the splcndid indignation ofcladston€' tlre elaborate and urbane sarcasm of Dislaeli, and the 1vild urgings of the Queen combined to produce a ferment in intemal politics the like of \rhich had not been seenin B tsin 6incethe Com Law clashes of 1846, Apsrt fiom anything else, the Bolkan crisis of 1875-8 served to mak€ foreign lolicy a burning issue rgain in the minds ofthe Bdtish people; but the sound snd tury lrroduced Iittle pr&ctical efiect. It vas the still, smell voice of
190
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AND THE BALKANS
S&lisbury,&lmostalone emong his collesguesiD offering retiotral of Brit&in's intercsts and capabilities, which in the s66essments enclvery la.rgelydictated the Berlin settlement. In order to clarily what is a fairly complex pattem of events, it will be simplest to deal first with the main ilevelopments of the three-year crisis, and then to look more closely at the rcpercussionsin Britain - the clashesof opinion, that is, and the slov. moulding of policy.
i
RUSsIA AUsTR
-H UN GARY
SERAIA
B U iGAR!.A
i.nuil-J1tr
1875 The revolt in Helzegovina was very much a spontaneousoutbust by Ch stien Serbsagainst MoslemTukish n]le, provoked meinly by opprcssiyetaxation end by the difficulty of purchasing land. The initial aim seemsto have beenan improvement in the quality of Turkish ruIe, rsth€r than independence,or union with Aushia-Hungary, or membership of a new Slev state. But the rcvolt was undoubtedly encouragedby a tour of neighbouring Dalmatia und€rteken by the Austrian Emperor Fnncis Joseph in the spfig of 18?5; and the Emperor himself, together with his army chiefs, Il?s very ready to use the revolt as an excuse for Austrian absorytion of both l{eEegovina and Bosnia.Equally, the r€volt €xcited the active sFnpathy of Penslav enthusissts thmughout the Balkans snd in Russia. Whether the rcbels wished it or not, theil cause rras certain to b€ teken up by outside interested parties, Alrcady there \r'es s.very real darg€r of a[ Austro-Russisn war, Herz€govinsrcbelled in July 18?5;by December,the Serbsof Bosnia had joined the rcvolt, &nd in the lrincipalities of Montenegro s,nd Selbie there was open public suppod for the rebels. Analrassy, meanwhile, was determined that AustdaHungary should not sufer by the rcvolt, and to his mind the best guamntee of this wa6 e speedysettlem€nt, brcught about il possibleby the joint action of the greot powers.In this way might the danger of seporat€ Serbian and Russian s.ction be forcstalled. Thc cnlargcmentof Serbiaby the inclusion of Bosnia and HeMegovina,and the subsequent$owth of Russianinfluence
z.
Btg Bulta.rla Bowdary gf the Sah Ste_fano - ---- Botrrdarizs Ef Buliarid. and. Eastetrl Rua.Ita accofding to the Berlin tleatl
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rtrtary Salfled.byM ontenegm,serbtd., Rumafiiaend.
&ussl.a (DobrudjatoRumaftia, Southem Bessambiato Russidjfum Rurnanld) Bostlia, Hrn govtna and.tln Sozjah t Novlbaza,?, occupiedby Austria-Hungqry TIIE I875J
BALEAN c
sls
132
GLADSTONE, DISR,AELI AND TIJE BALKANS
in the westrn Balkans must at all costs be ayoided. A multinational state like Aust a-Hungary could not possibly approve of SLav nationalism. AndEssy's conclusion *'as that Bosnia and Eerzegovina should remain Turkish, and that the integrity of -lturkey's empire must be preselved. 'If Bosnia and II€rzegovina should go to Serbi:r or ll{ontenegro, or if a new state should be formed there . . . then wc should be ruined and should ourselves assume the role of the "Sick tr{an".' Andrassy feared Balkan nationalists, and, because he wished to preserye Turkey, would agrce to Aushian ocaupation of Bosnia and Hezcgovina only il the alternative were a new, large Slav state. Therefore in August, by an unsuccessful consular mission, and in December, by the issue of the so'called AndEssy Note, the Austro,IfungeriaD Foreign tr{inister mused the greet powels to action. IIe did so by nrcrking tustly on the Dreikaiserbund grouping, and then by drawing into it the remaining porrers, Frsnce, Britain and ltaly. All six geve their support to thc Andrsssy Note; but, in th€ case of Britain, the a.pproval $'as €xtremely leluctantly given. Frcm 1875 until 1877 indeed, there was a general tendency in Disraeli's govemment to sit back and watch, and hope that the Turks v'ould manage to solve their ov.rl problems. Only when ther€ was a direct Russian threat to the secudty of Conskntinople and the Strsits could ominous rumblirgs be hearrl from London. fltlat happened to the Serbs was apparently not a vital matter, and wllat happencd to the Bulgerians was made morc impodant only by the fact that they lived nearel to the Straits. But Disneli was nevefihelesscompetled to follow Andrassy's lead, ffrstly becsuse thc Turks accepted the Andmssy Note and requested Britain to do so (snd 'we can't be more Turkish than the Sultan') &nd secondlybccause Britain could not let the Dreikaiserbund seem to have the total initiative - \Dless ve go out of our way to ect with the Nodhem PowcN, they can act without us, which is not agreeablcfor a state like Dngland'. So thc Andressy Note vas presentedand acc€pted.It proposed rcforms in religion, taxation and land'holding and suggested the sctting up of a mixed comrnissionof Moslems srrd Christians to
fllri cRIsIs 18?5-8
l8a
supervise the refonns. Austria-Hungary was now attempting vhat B tain had oftcn tried alrcady, to persuade the Turks to reforn their adninistration of the Balkans as s m€ans of prcsering thetu rule therc. By 1875, it was no doubt something of r forlom hope, and indeed, events in 1876 shattercd thc cxpectation that a Balkan crisis could be so eosilv solved.
1876 Itbecame clear that the Turks had no rcnl int€ntion of carrying out the reforms of the Andrassy Note, and that in sny case they lacked sufficient contrcl ov€r thc two ftbellious pm\rinces to put any such changes into elfect. In Bosnia and Heucgovina themselves, the Serbs (prompted by unodicial Russian and Panslav agents) refused to stop 6ghting; and this intransigence,coupled *'ith grorving hatred of foreign intedcrence, amused stronger nationalist sentiments among the Turks. Their IlTsth was tumed against .4,bdul Aziz himself (and his Grand Vizier) and also against Serbia and Montenegro and foreigners in gcncml At the beginning ol I[ay, a Salonika mob murdercd the French and Cerman consuls; on A0 May, Abdul Aziz was deposed and ffve days later he committed suicide.His mentslly unstable successor, trlurad V. qa. elluweda reign of only thrce mLrnths.It wai apparent that Turkey, when under pressure, was a conlused and ., dangerous animal. To add to the disenchantment which ma.ny British people felt $ith'the good old Turk', April 1876 had seen R total su\pension by the Turkish gov(mmcnt of payment of foreigrr debts. But wolse w&s to come. The se of Turkish nctionalism was accompsniedby a similar rise in popular enthusiasm for the Slav cause within Russis. tr{oney und voluntccr forces found their $'ay into the Balkans, llnd the swelling tide of public prcssurewas inoeasingly di{ncult for tL€ Ts.rr to ienorc. Alexander ond Gorchekov could not nEintrin a modtlate linc indefinitcly unless it vas seen to bring quick succcss.All the signs were thet both the Tsar and the Sultin rvould be forced by their subjccts to adopt more active and warlike policies.
134
CLADSTONE. DISRAI]LI
AND TIIE BALKANS
The failure of the Andrassy Note had brought an AustroRussian conflict nearcr. To encourage Gorchakov and the modemtcs while there w.Ls still time, Andrassy urged another diplomatic initiative. A meeting bctween him and thc Rrssian Chancellor prcduced, on 13 llay, the Berlin lfemorandum. By this, an armistice in Bosnia and Herzegovinarvasto be arranged, so thnt the proposatsin the Andrassy Note could be actcd upon. Once again, a move initiated by the Dreikaiserbund rvas submitted for lormal approvsl to the other three powers. But the llcrlin Memorandum achiel'ed nothing, ffrstly because thc chaos in the Turkish government made it obsolcte and unnorkablc, and secondlyb€causcBritain completely rejected it. The motives sunounding Britain's actions at this time have been much debat€d and her pursuit ofan isolated and for a time uncommitted policy have brought forth both praise end blame. Undoubt€dly there $.as an eleme t of hostility to the Dreikaiserbund in Disraeli's stand, an unwillingness to accept solutions produccd by the Noltheln Courts without B tain's participation, trngland ms being treated'as ifshe were Montcncgro or Bosnia'. There rvas also fear ofthcir int€ntions towards Turkey sincethe memorandunr contained a veiled threat of military sction against Turkey (apparcntly inscrtcd at corclDkov's insistence) ilshe failcd to come to terms rvith the rcbels. England was b€ing s.sked'to sanction them putting a knife to the tbroat of Turkey, $hether we like it or rrot'. There I'as much suspicionof thc dark schemes of Bismurck; both Disraeli and Derby, his Forcign Minister, sow iDtricste Bismarckian plotsinalmosteveryproposal that emonatcd fmm the Dreikaiserbund. And then therc $'as Derby's fundanental isolationism and rcluctance to accept a Iixed policy; and lirrally, the crc"'ning insult, the Memo.andum was submittcd lor the British govemment's immediate approval at the *'eek-cnd, when British diplomatic and ministerial minds wele at their customary and inviolable rest. Three days latet on 16 May, Disraeli lct it be known that the lllemorandum was unocceptable. Quit€ openly, Bdtain had now rejectedjoint diplomatic action by thc porversas the means to settle tbe Balkan c sis. She wlrs
TIIE CRISIS T875_8
t35
bcnt on preserving complete fre€dom ol manoeuvre and lvas det€rmined to prove that the Drcikaiserbund could not settlc all problems by its own exclusive autho ty. Fa! from acting with the powers, Disraeli took the fsmilior pre-Crimesr War step of sending the fleet to Besiks Bay. Whatever elsethi6 deffant move achieved, it certsinly rcduccd the cffectiveness of Andmssy's diplomscy, inturiated Gorchakov, analboth amused s.ndp€rturbed llismarck. It also gave the Ttrrks then, and in the following two l.eals, the psrtly false hopc that Britain woulil always be obliged to stand by them, ho$?vcr 1wll or bsdly they treeted thcir nakan subjects. As in 1858, this hope allo{ed them to be even more obstructive and obstinatc than usual in their dealings with the other polvels. But by June in this chaotic year o11876, yet snother difficulty uas appeering which prcduced almost complete paralysis in Britain's Xliddle Eastcmpolicy. Rebellion had brcken out among the BulgArians in April In desperation, beiDg sholt of money and rcgutar troops, the Turks brought in inegular Bashi"Bazouks :rnd Circassiens to terlo ze and hurnilitate the whole Bulgarian population. In this, they $'ere honibly successtul, but by the middle of the yeor nports were leaking out of th€ slaughter and torture rvhich the Bulgarians were suffering snd, once th€ repofis rvere veriffcd, British policy could never be quite th€ same again. Such crucltics to Christian people could not be ignorcd, much though Disraeli might rvish the deecls Undone, In fact, quit€ suddcnly, ftom this point until the end of the Be in Congess, Bulga :L had become the crux of the Balken crisis. Whether the Bulgarian rebel leaders were in Rus6i&'s contml or not (and it lat€r bccamc clear that they werc not, since Bulgarians did not wish merely to exchange Turkish nrle for Russian), Britain was now obliged to accept some degree ol independence lor at least some ol the Bulgads.ns ; and, if this came about thmugh unilaten l Russien sction, there was little that Britain could object to, provided that Constantinople snd the Shaits 'wer€ left untouched. Whot apparently remainecl now rpas to see if ard when Ilussi& would act and how far she would dxrc to go; and olso vhst effect such Russian action would have on Andressv and
146
GLADSTONE, DISITADLI AND TIIE BAI,KANS
his f€ars of Serbian aggandizement. The Russians at any mtc knew that Britain's discomffture over the Bulgarian atrocitics had freed their hands, and they $'ere pedcctly pmparcd to make an accommodation with Ausiria-Hungary about the prcblem of Bosnia. The British fleet, meanwhilc, could only sit and watch at the entrence to the Dardanelles while the decisive events werc played out on land. The decision of Montenego and Serbia to declare rvar on T\Dkey at the end of June in many ways made it easier for Russia &nd Austrie-Ilungary to remain on good tems, though it was a development which Andrassy had tried to prevent. Though their srrny \ras commanded by a Russian general, Chemiaev, the Serbs were bsdly besten and only a stern Russian lwarning prevented the Turks from overrunning Serbia entirely , (which was still t€chnicslly Turkish tefritory, of course) and occupying Belgrade by the Nol,ember. The main efrect of Serbia'6 defeat was that Panslav and Russian popular sympathy we6 norr c€ntr€d almost exclusively on Bulgsris; the Russiansrvere r far more prepared now to &bandon Serbia and cert€.inly BosDia ' and Herzegovina to Vi€nntr, as an Austdsn sphere of influerce. Already, at Reichst&dt in July, Gorchakov snd Andrassy had come to a verbal understanding on the nature of the tenitorial adjustments that could be e).?ected in the Balkulls - Corchskov, moderate still, ond resisting wilder Panslav demands,sppe&rcd to want only the rccovery of southern Bessarabia. But by Novembel 1876, Gorchakov's contml was slipping, and the Tsar rvas preparing for Russian military action south of thc Danube. 160,000trcops werc mobilized and it secmcdvcry likcly that the Bulgadans were about to be saved by a Russian army. Now, at last, with Disneli much troubled, ond British officels hurriedly surveying the defences of thc Dard&nelles, Bdtejn made a cautious diplomatic suggestion. Derby proposed a conference ol the powers at Constantinople. The initiative was at fir6t successful, since the powers egeed to cooperate, dthough both DisDeli and the Sultan needed much persuasion beforc they gave their approval. (Disracli would have prefened to achieve an alliance lvith Austria-Hungary ffrst, and so have been
TIIE CRISIS T875-8
able to speak from a position of milita.ry as well as naval strength. The Sultan had to b€ told bluntly by Derby that B tsin would abandon Turkey to Ler fDte if he rcjected the conference.) The confercnce ind€€d made some progr€ss during December. The British rcpr€sentative was Lod Salisbury, the Secrctary foa India ; and Salisbury found that he was s.bleto work unexpectedly clusely vith l$aticv. Sin.e S"lisbury, uDJike lhc Brilish ambassador Elliott, had no illusions about Turk€y, he !r'es able to acc€pt the ialee of eventual independ€nce for thc Balkan peoples. Th€ confercnce 'wa6 thercfore s.ble to agee on a union of Bosnia and Hesegovine under nominal Turkish nrle, en increase in terIitory for Serbia and Montenegro, anal sutonomy. for Bulga e, But this ageement did not mean that Salisbury was indifferent to the matter of Russisninfluencein theBalkans. Onthecontmry, while accepting th€ suggested autoromy for Bulgaria, he successfully insisted that the new state must not have (as Ignatiev had intended it to have) an AegeanSea coast. I-Ie also ' forccd tluough a scheme to divide Bulgaria into two parts by a north-south boundary acrcss the Balkan mountains. At least, ho$'ever, Sslisbury was not obsessed by the Russian 'bogy'. IIe was prepared to be accommodating in discussions with Ignatiev because he rvas fairly surc thai the Russians genuinely wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis. Such sv€et reasonablenesswas shortiived, howevcr. The confercncebrcke up in inconclusivedisorder on 20 January 1877, because Sultan Abdul llamid made it clear that he $ould not accept its pmposals. In the middle of its deliberations, on 23 Dccember, a new Turkish constitution was prcclaimed, by which tull liberties wele guaEnt€€d to all thc Sultan's subjects; thcrcfolc, in the Turkish view, any suggestions put folwad by the po\{crs were now superfluous, There ll'as no doubt that the new constitution \raa & mere manoeuvre, another airy promise of reform, which {ould not be fulfilled. But the Turks' obstinste r.fussl to tsk€ note of the confercnce proposals quit€ disconcerted the powe$. There is no doubt that one reason for the Turks' ,rrvkwardnesswas their faith in the inevitability of B tish
138
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AND T}IE BALKANS
support.Already,it wasclearthat possiblyDisracliandcertainly Elliott did not shareSalisbury'sviewsonthe future of the Blrlksns. T'he Constantinople confercnc€, then' which was Derby's only notoble contribution to the settlemert of the cdsis, achieved nothinE.
1877 B tain now rcturned very much to her prcyious l6le as sn interested but uninvolved sp€ctstor, the root c:luseof her diseDgagement being Cabinet disunity sti[. But Russia $'ss not prepared '$'ould act similarly to opt out. If the powe$ would not act, she on their behau (as Gladstone himself hoped she would). A last €fiort was made at concerted sction when Ignatiev toured the major capitals during March 1877i he produced yet another plan for Turkish refoxm and again this was acccPtedby the powers (it becameknovn as the London Protocol); but on 9 April it was rejected by the Sultan. I{eanvhile tL€ Russians had carefully prepared the ground for independent rnilittry action. On 15 January and 18}Ierch, two agreem€ntswcrc made wjth AustriaHungary, by which the latter was to rcmain neutral in tbe €vcnt of a Russo-Tukish War.Indrassy drovc a hard bargain, forcing f-the Russians to allow an ^ustrian anncxation of Bosnia and Ilerzegovine in the €vent of a Russian victory, while Russia was merely to reco\'er southem Bessarabia. (In fact thc two 1877 ' agreements werc xeally an ampliffcation of that made at Reichstadt in the previous Jlrly.) Ominously, however, trothing was - said about Asiatic Turkey, or about Bulga a; anal it was the San Stefano anangcments lor Bulea a that allo{ed AustriaHungary to act fteely against Russia in 1878. On 2{ Ap l, claiming (quite unjustifiably, since hc had rcceived no such mandate) to be acting on behalf of Ourope, Tsar Alexander declarcd war on Turkey. Balkan Chdstians, and Butgarians in particula& $cre about to b€ rescued. Ignatiev r8.s delighted. Britain, mearrwhile,remaineil neutral. Il the Turks exp€cted solid support on the CrimeanWarpattcm, they \tere disappoint€d.
'r'IIll cRISIS r8?5-8
It9
ts tish public opinion was not r€ady for that yet, nor was the Cabinet. The Bulgarian massacresivere too lecent a memory; and in any casethe flcct 11?sstilt held in resdinessin the Aegean to pmtect wital Brjtish interests (and British interests, Disraeli rcpcatcdly stressed,were the only intcrcsts hc was concemed $,ith). The Russians also assured all and sundry of thcir good intentions. In particular, they p.omised to rcspcct the existing st{tus of Constantinopleand the Straits, and to rnake no move that might thrcaten Egypt and the Suez Canal. So Britain w.rtched, though it was perfectly clcar to a[ obscNc]s, oncetl)e Ruslian agreementsrl'ercmadc x'ith Austria-Hungory, ond once the Russo'Turkish war {'as under $ay, that the rcal, underlying antaeonism was still, as it had been for the last fifty years, between Russia and Britain. They were the tllo p ncipals still, though o}le of them nright be temporarily inactivc. Accoding to QueenVictoria, 'it is not a qucstion of upholdiDg Turkey; it is a question of Russian or B tish supremaclr in the world'. B;snurck, rvhosemain objective 1vasto kcep the pcace in the lliddle nast and therefore in Europe, thought that thc $hole lltstem Question could be immediotel)' solved if only Bdtain l)ehavedopenly and took rvhat she reaJly1ranted,namcly Ee}?t (md Russia, F$nce lind Austrja-IIung:rry took such scraps of Turkey as might sstisfy them). Egmt and Rritain were the heart o{ thc matter, he felt, not Rulga}ia. But Bismarck, desperately thro"'ing out helpful suggestions,found no take$ yet. If B tain Mntcd to occupy Egpt, she did not, said Dismeli, require'the suggcstionor permissionof P nce Bism$ck', Thc Russo-Turkishwar followed the, by now, fa ilier pattem of a Russtun assault in the Caucasusregion snd a msjor thrust though thc Rumanian bottlcneck (this time $ithout the threat of an Austrian count€r-attack) acloss the Danube and through tlulsaria to$'ards Constantinople. On this occasion, ol course, Bulgaria was not mercly a stage on thc route to thc Turkish capital, it was the nominal raison d'Chc of the wholc cxercise. But yet, Constsntinople still seemedto be the ultimatc destinatjon, and it was thc danger of a Russian occupation ol thc Bosphonls which most agitated Disraeli's Cabinet thmughout
t,t0
t.
(;LADSTONE, DISRAELI AND THE BALKANS
1877. Robert Blake, in his recent biogaphy, has convincingly ' shown thst Disneli rvas not delibeBtely planning a \r'ar against Russia at this stage; but hc did want firm action, to rcmind the Russians of the risks th€y were running, he did {aDt to break the Dreikaiscrbund, and he did l'ish to undermine Ignutiev s.nd the Panslavists. Above all, p€rheps, he wished to re€tore Bdtain's prestige and to &ct as Europe's arbiter, A clear werning was - therelorc dispatched to Russia on 6 trIay to the e{Iect that the trcaties of 1841 and 1856 efiecting the Straits must rot be violet€d. Further thsn this, however, Disraeli could not go, for aU the Queen's urgiDgs and his own preference for en occupetio! of ttle Gallipoli peninsula and an attack on Asiatic Russia fmm Indh. The British n&tion and its Cabinet *ere too divided still. In April, howcrrer, he hsd replaced Elliott as ambassador at Constantinople by Layard, another acloo\trledged Russophobe. In July, too, it was decided to inform the Russians that they must not occupy Constsntinople unless they had made plans for an immediat€ evscuation ; and thst the fleet was ready to move up to the Bosphorus to meet any sudden emergency. But this was as much as the Pdme llinister could persuade his reluctant colleagues to sccept, Ilelp for Disneli was at hand, however, in the form of Turkish ga.llantry in the defence of Plevna. The Russiens had never found invasion of I\rrkey an especially eesy task. Always they had m€t unexpectedly stubbom resistance, Now, indecd, they suffercd a decidedly humiliating delay in their advs.nce, which quit€ alt€rcd the diplomatic pictue. The fortress of Ple\ara, south of the Danube, was defended brilliantly by Osman Pasha. The Russians arrived there on 20 July, Not until 11 December did they capture it, and then they had had to bring in Todlcben, the vetcran defender of Sebastopol, and to persuade the Rumanians to join the war and to send 35,000troops to assist in the assault. The British public was now frce to indulge in one of its complete changes of mood, fhich Salisbury, for one, lound quit€ exasperating, PleraE had suddenly transformed the Turk6 fr.om iDhuman bullies (ss they had seemedafter the Bulgarien massucres) i[to hercic underdogs. Even Disraeli's sceptical colleaguescould now look on Turkey
THE CRISIS TE75-8
r41
as a state worth defending for a little longer. lvhcn the Russians rcsumed their advance in December and January to Sofia and Ad anople (they rcached tLe latter on 20 January) the Briti6h nation was oncc again ready to face var with thc Tsar. lve've fought th€ Bear before, and while we,re B tons true, The Russians shall not hav€ Constantinople. So lan the le6s often quot€d third and fourth lines of the famoN 'By Jingo' Music lfel song.
187I While the war fever roseand the Panslal,ists*ere condemnedin an atmosphereofhysterical jingoism, Derby and Calnalvon (the ColonialSecretary)still favourl'da spcciesofpcssire rerrraint; but thc period of hesitation was gradually drawing to a close, On 23 Jaruary (1878)the fleet $'ss odered throuEh the Dardenclle. and into thc Sea of Marn,ora.Ludi.rousty. houev.r, the order xrascountermandedat the requestof the Sultan, and Dcrby and Camarvon were able to rvithdraw the resignations they had icndeted. British ironcl&dsbecamethe laughing-stock of Durope fora while, as the Russiansprcssedon ro the Turkishcapital. But on 31 January, an almigtic€ bet$een Russia and Turkev rvas bigncd.Tb. RLrs(ians had voluntarily rclrainedlrom attackine Con\tantinopleand lo lhat extent Briri\h fFar6(ex..pt thosooi thc Queen, p€rhsps) were allayed; but it ftms.ined to be seen rphat sort ol terms the Russians lvould press upon Turkey, and Disraeli therefore wanted no slackening of effort. At the besinning of February. Parliament ac.ordingJy ogreed to gr6nt f6 million for military preparations, and on t2 February, Admiral Eomby s.t last rcceived orders to take the British flcet uD to . ( onst€ntinopie. He arrivcd off the Princcs' lslands on rS t'ebrucry. I'or two months therealter, there was a clear likelihood of war betweenB tsin and Russia.Much hingcd on the outcome ot the Russo-Turkish negotietions and on the Russian troop movern.ntsin ll,en4ighbourhood ofConstantinol,le. Sofar,tl reRus.i0ns
14..1
CLADSTONE, DISRAELI
AND TIII]] BALKANS
had tresitated, in the face of ccrtain British aDd Probrble European-wide opposition, to storm the city. But it ryas very difficult to calculat€ sccurstely the aims of Russian Policy at this - Alexonder. &t least. had nade clear the Russisn attitude to 'ChristiaDs oI Bulgaria in his prcclamation of June 1877. Bulga a,' hc said, 'you are passingthrough a memolable period. The hour of dcliverancefrom Mussulmandepotism has at length struck. . . gather closelyunder the shadowofthe RussiaDllajl . . . obey thc Russianauthoritics. F'ollow,their directions faithfi ly. Therein lics your strcngth and your safety,' But Alexander's intentions for the future of Constantinoplewere by no mea s so clear. The 'I!ar, of course, had far more direct personal control -' ovcr policy decisiols than hed any other of the cro$ned heads of Europe, but he v'as notoriously pmne to be swayed by the opinions of those rvho surrounded him at any given moment; and Gorchakov had cedainly lost his influence for the time being, whilc that of Ignaticv seemedto be prramount. lloreover, the Russians had so fsr done no more than they had openly intendcd to do when they declarcd war, whercasBritain, in sending the fleet through the Straits, had introduced a ncw element into the situation. lbe fleet was sent without any invitation ftom the Sultan. and rvas even odered to fir€ on Turkish shore fods if it m€t rcsistance. Clearly, it had broken the rulc of thc Stmits, and 'ftrkish equally clcarly, its p mary aim was not th€ dcfcnce of intcrcsts. Everything now dependedon the naturc of the Russian The Icsponse was to senal10,000trcops to thc town of San Stefano, on the coast of the Sea of Marmora, about eieht miles fmm Constantinople.gere, on 3 March, the peacetrcatybetween Russia and Turkcy rvas signed. It $as very much the \rork of Ignaticv, and was quickly condemnedas unwise by Gorchakov and by Shuvalov, Russia's able and eminently restraincd ambassaclor in London (from 1874 to 1879). It confirmcd Disraeli's wolst lears about Russian domination of thc Balkan peninsula anal it was soon condemned ss unacceptablc by the Austro-IlungArian and British governmenk. So thc d$nger of
THE CRISIS T8?5,8
143
$'sr remained; but Bitain had no ally, and Aushia-Hungary, as she had consist€ntly done 6ince 1876, refused to consider a military alliance against Russia. Russia, horvevcr, was €xhausted financially end, though victorious over th€ Turks, militarily too. On this single fact ot Russian exhaustion rests the whole of Disraeli's subsequent triumph. The Russian victory had been too costly in time, men flnil money; and, hrd it not been so, there would luve been no virtue in kee?ing the flcet ('a n&11/ of museum pieces' A, J. P. Taylor has called it) in the See of trfarmora or in catling up the reserves or summoning 7,000 Indian tmops to Msltur, as wss done dur;ng Apfil. It is now fairly sure that Disraeli knew he would not tlsve to fight a war and that he had no intention of fightirq one. The elaborate and ostent{tious military build-up of April aDd tr{sy 1l'as something of a chsrede designea to indicote the purposeful and serious intcnt of the British government, and nothing more. Dismeli's intention was quite patently to undo the trcaty of San Stefano and to do so in a $ay which would raise his own and Britain's prestige to a peak in Europe, The San St€lano trcaty rvas Iirmly based on the terms of the January armistice betwecn Russie and Turkey. By far its most important feature was the creation of a new large Bulgadsn stete, larger than thst of th€ 1876-7 Constantinople Confercnce,aDd possessingsn Aegean Sca coast (though {ithout a worthwhile port). The rew Bulgada was to be autonomous,with an elected Pdncc (the stetus which Rumania, for example, had enjoyed up to 1878); but clesrly the country r€s expected to be a Russian -, satellite (it was to enjoy a Russian army ol occupation for two vears) and its sheer size would make it an enormously valuable one, since its eastern boundary was a mere 50 miles from Constantinople, andits $'estern boundory reached beyond }locedonia to Albania, Ignstiev had achieved a remarkable success lor Panslavism,or for Panslavism'sassumedaims. In addition, San Stefano proposed an increase in tenitory for llontenegro and for Serbia, which was also to becometotally independent,as was llumania. Rumania rr.llsto cede southem Bessanbia to Russis, :Lndto receive in compensation the Dobrudja region. In Asia,
144
GLADSTONE, DISRA'JLI
AND 'IIIE BALKANS
Kars, Batum, Ardahan and Bayazid were to becomeRussian; and Turkey wa.sto poy a large indeDnity. Such was Ignetiev's San Stefano treaty. It was the climax of his diplomrtic career' ' Shuvalov was outsPokenin hi6 criticism. San Stefanorvas,he seid, 'the greatestact of stupidity we could have committed ' ' ' Ignatiev's Bulgaria is aonscnse'.And the British Cabinet, in a its memorandum issued at the beginning of May, outlined '1. that it three basicslly; werc objectionsto the tre&ty. Th€se ealmits a new naval power to the coast of the Aegeen;2' th&t it threstrns with extinction the non_Slav populations of the '. Bslkan peninsula; 3. that it plsces the Porte so much at the ll*"""v of Russia ths.t it is no longcr able to discherge lvith ' it d"p"rtd"n"" political tunctions which are stilt essignedto it' and rvhich deeplyinter€st other nstions'. Both Austria-Ilungary antl Britain werc now prcssingfor a lunalamentalrcvision of San . . Stefano, ond in Britein's case there was a clear waming that war might foltow unlessthe Russi€.nsagreedto a conferenceat which the trcaty could be discussed.At the end of Iuarch' Derby anclCarnexYonhsalfinally resigned,end the Foreign Olffce,under ttre caoabledirection of Salisbury, had taken on a new, decisive air. And while there wss clear thinking and resolution in Lon'lon now' in St Petersburga.ll was confusion.Ignetiev, by May, had i virtually lost his influ€nee, having quit€ faileil to make an accommoalstionwith Andrassy; Gorchakov, old aIId resentful, would not give e clear leed; the Tsar had rccalled his brother, the Grand Duke Ncholas, ftom the theatrc of war and replacedhim as commenaler'in-chiefby the more energetic Todleben,only to ' firrd thut Todl"b"o ."commendeda withilrawal of Russianforces to AchienoDle.The Tsar did not wish, for the sake of his own \ th€ British challenge; i;opulority, to appear rveak in the facc of irit tft" fu"t *"" ttt"t uny war betweenBritain and Russiewould be (in thc nstult of {'ars betweena seapower and a land powet) a long one, snd Russia could not afrord even a short war' trlore_ over, he had to acceptthat any alteration in the stetus of I\rkey was in 1878a matter lor genenl Europeenconcem in a \tay that it had not beenjr, say,1829 Clcarly,theremust bea confercnc€' The temponry power Yacuumin St Pete$bury $'as filled by
lflllt
CRISIS I E75-E
145
Shuvalov. llt wes his suggestion that the situation could be settled by direct negotiations befiryeen Russia and Britain; and it was he and Sulisbury who during ilay made the decisions that $ere form€rly ratified by the Conglessof Berlin. Disrseli left sI the detailed arr&ngements to his Foreign Secrets.ry; Ss.lisbury had already impressed Enrope by the quality of the circular *'hich he llad produced st the beginning of Ap l setting forth B tain's objectioN to Ssn Stefano. IIe nol{ [egotiated petiently but insistfntly to schieve his ends (aDd often enough it vrss Disraeli and the Queenwho had to be convinced),IIe still had no speci&l sympathy for the Turks end a good deal of sympethy lor the Balkan nations, as he had shown du ng the Constantinople conference ; but he now slso had an rmshskable determination to keep the Russians away from Constantinople, the Stnits, the Aegeen and the cdtical region of eastern Asia Minor (Armenia). By 90 May, the outstanding differences bet$reen Britain and Russiahad been resolved.With the exceptionof cert€in boundary dehils it remained only for the Berlin Confercnce to record publicly what had already been settled by private diplomecy. Similarly, by 6 June, Ilritain and Austrie-Ilungary mede a prelimidary agreement concerning the ne\v Bulgalio end the Austrian position in Bosnia. But it \ras clear thst AndBssy was interested only in the westem Balkans and in keeping the way open for luture advancement towards Salonika. Common ground behrcen B tain and Austria-Ilungary was limited to Tulkey-innurope. The B tish could expect no AustriaD suppo* on the question of Turkey-in-Asia, which was no$' beginning to command special attention in London. Thelefore, on 4 June, a sepsrate agr€ement $'as also signed between Britai[ snd Turkey, the Cyprus Convention, whose object was speciffcally the containlrent of Russia in Armenia (and thereforc, too, in trIesopotamia and Persia). For over a yesr now, the British had been cssting round to find a suitable base irl the esst€m Medit€nsnesn, Occupation ol Gallipoli, or even ol both sides of the Struits had bcen considered; but C,?rus s.nd the port of Alexandrctts. were the only two sedouspossibilities, ond eventually, by April/Itay 1878,the island was decided upon as being easierto defend end
146
GLADSTONE, DISRADLI
AND THE BALKANS
l€ss provocative to the oth€r powels. (ftance particularly would have objected to sny encroachment upon S}'Iia.) It was also conveniently placed for the launching of military er.peditions to the Armenian rcgion. So, under compulsion lrom London, the Sultan relustontly agreed to British occupatior of the islaDd, though Turkey was still to retain lolitical sovereignty over it. After a month of hectic diplomotic activity, then, all was norv ready for thc oflicial d€libentions at Berlin. I'he Congrcss of Berlin lasted from 13 June to la July. Berlin had been decided upon as the venu€, rather against Bismar.ck's rvish€s(although he had made his 'honest broker' specchin the February of 1878), because of prcssure from the Russians. Gorchakov felt thst Russian int€rests {ould sufrer less at e conlercnce held in the Cerman capital; the Dreikaiscrbund, and faith in the old Russo-Prussian friendship, still counted for something at St PeteNbrug. In the cnd, his conffdencewas badly shaken, for Bismarck, though trying despentely to prcvent a breach betrveen Aushia"Ilungary and Russia, was bound to lean tovads the former in any clash of loyalties. The Russiansdid not lose all theil Ssn Stefano achievements at Berlin, but they lost what Ignatiev prized most highly, the'Big Bulgaria'with the Aege&n Sea coast. The Congress wes the last of the splendid diplomatic festivals held by the grent powers. It was the great powers who msde all r "the decisions; no represent&tives of Sexbia, Montenegro or Rumania wele allowed to &ttend and even the Bulgaxisns wele . entixely represented by Russia. In this wsy, quick and str&ight. fonvard solutions wer€ rived at and imposed on the Balkan nationalities (evelt the Tiukish representative vas treated ivith scant respect); but this left a fund ofrcsenbment ir the Balkans r which ilr the end meant that the Berlil settlement cou]d not 'be a ffnal one. However, for the time being, the gteat povers held sway. Gorchakov, now aged 80, haxdly added to his reputation at the conference, but Bisma.rck proved to be a brisk and efficient chairnan who wor the xesp€ct even of Disneli (who had previ ously found him an initoting nuisance). In fsct, thc two men, coch xomantic, traditionalist, fond of the grand gesture $nd
THE CRISIS 1875,8
147
hating Gladstone, found that they had much in common and got on remarkably well together, There is no doubt, of course, th€.t it was Disraeli who was 'the lion of the Congess', in Sumner's phrase. IIc got all his own wey, was th€ constant centre of ettention and very much appeared to dominate both Europe onil the world. lt lyas thc climax of his career. IIe had, though briefly as it emerged,madc Britsin more completely the arbiter ol Europe than evcr Palme$ton had. But the Prime tr{inister remained esscntially the grand ligure-head. All the detailed $'ork rvas in the hands of Salisbury still, and most successtullyhe , arriad it oul. Bulgariq was much the rnost important single item on the agcrrda; zind Salisbury achieved all the British aims. The new statc was to be autonomous end confined to the north of the,' Balkan mountains (to give the Turks a defensible frontier). South of this range, the district of Eastern Rumelia (largely an artiffcial and British creation) \r'as to becomc a special province of the Turkish €mpire with a Christian govexnor,and e south€m boundary along the Rhodope mountains (a good 60 miles north of tlc Aegcan Sea coast). The rcst of 'Big Ilulga a', th€ region of Maccdonia, that is, !r'as to return to full Turkish sovereignty. Ior th€ xcst, the San Stefano settlement in the BalkoDs ws.s largely allo\a'ed to stanal. Montenegro, Serbia and Rumsnia all gained tcnitory, though Rumenis did lose southem Bess&rabie to the Russians i snd Serbis snd Rumania \yere recognized, along with }fonten€gro, as fully independent stat€s. MoDtenegro, hoi€ver, nust not allov foreign (i.e. Russian)v'arshipstouse her new port ofAntivari es a base in the Meditenanean. And to the Russians' intense chagrin, Austria-Ilungary was allowed to occupy but not annex - Bosnia, Ilerzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar. In the end, \aithout taking any part in the tighting,- ) Austria-Ilungary had actually increased her influence in the I Balkans more efrectir-ely than had Russia, whose tmops had I dieal in the Slav cause As for the Stmits, B.rit&in's position had suddenly (since the rovement olthe fleet to the Princes' klands in February)becomc very flexible. There $'as no longer ary absolutc desirc to main-
148
CLADSTOh_lt, DISRAIILI
AND TIID BALKANS
tain the old rule about closurc, and lairly obviously B tsin wisLed to xegard the Dadenelles and the Bosphorus as open sea now. It was likely that in future th€ British would feel free to send thc fleetto Constantinopleand into the BLackSeawhenever the Sultan osked (whether in peace or in war, thst is) and also even jf he did not ask, or positively tefused permission. There was no point in keeping the Stmits closed vhile Russia had no Black Sea fleet, \yhich she did not have until sfter 1886. A declaxation of Britsin's attitude was attgched to the Berlin Trcaty, though it wss not fomally accepted by the other poweN, and indeed Russia produced her o$n rcfuts.tion of it. Finally, Russia's gains in Asia were carefully rcduced. Kars, Batum, and Antahan she was allowed to keep, but Bayazid rctumed io Turkish rule and thus the Trebizond-ErzerumTsb z cemvan loute was kept out of her hsnds. Plans were already bcing made for an increase in British supervision of this wLole area! th€ Sultan promised to reform his govemmcnt of Asia Minor, with psrticular saleguards for Christian Armclians. And so, \r'eary, ill, but triumphont, Disraeli retuned to England bdnging 'pcace rvith honour'. Hc received the Garter from the Queen and the cheers of Russophobe Londorr cmwds. How long his Berlin successes would enrlure is a matter for the next chapter. For the time being, the Conservativeparty and B tish diplomacy wcre o the crest of a wave.
[ 2 3 ] T H D C R I S T SA T H O M E The effect of the 18?5 8 Balkan crisis on intemal B tish politics and tbe eftect of political divisions on the government's ections arc msjor subj€ctsin their own ligltt. It is possiblehere only to indicate b efly some of the outstanding contmversies snd to suggest some of thc {ays in which differcnces of opinion hampcred the working out of clesr policies. In this connection, there \l{olthy of note; they are five major ffgutes whose attitudes are ere the Quccn, Disrseli, Derby, Salisbury and Gladstone,
TIIE CRISIS AT HOMD
149
The Qwem and,Di,waeli It was this three-year pe od that ffnelly established the Queen's afle(tior for Dis$€li and her antipathy towards Gltrdstone.The 'Bulgsrian Ilorlors' pomphlet and the question of RussiaD cncroachments on the routes to Indis were fundamentsl to her feelings.Always it x'as her emotions which cortrolled her views, IIer lctters, espftially those to Disrseli, €.:reeloquent testimony of her anxiety to play e part in formine foreign policy, to her urge to defend her countty's interests, and to her willingness to sirnilar resolution. By the dote on any statesman who possessed €nd of 1877,Gladstonewas €xtremely concemcdat the constitutional da.ngers undcrking Dismeli's apparcnt ascendancy over the Queen, With the Queen demending wsr against Russia and th?eatening to abdicate unless she was obeyed, he had reason enough to worry. It wa6 not until the summer of 1876 that the Balkan crisis roused any great int€rtcst emong the British public; and, until then, therc were no major squsbblesamong leading statesmen, Dismeli had encounteled little opposition to his purchase of the Khedive's Suez Canal shares in the previous Novernber. Gladstone mcrely condemnedit ss s bad busin€ssproposition. But therc has been a t€ndeneyto supposethat Disraeli in buying the sharcs was acting according to a far'secing plan by which Turkey end the Straits shou.ld eventualy be ebandoned to Russia while B tain took l-lg}?t. This is quit€ untrue. It is hard erroughto ffnd Disraeli pu$uing &ny consistent policy until late in 18?7, but st any rate he msde his ottitude to the stat[s of Constantinople quite plein in an inter-view with Lord Barrington in October 1876. 'If the Russians had Constantinople, they could at aDy time msrch theb army through Sylia to the mouth of the Nile, and then what would b€ the use ofou! holding Egypt. Colrltantinople is the Key of India, and not Egylt and the Suez Crna.l.' Disraeli's knowledge of Middle Esstern geography was lrot especially good ; such a march would be a formidabl€ undertaking for Russia; but he was merely adopting, in his statcmcnt, the tmditional, sanctified-by-habit view of thc importance ol the
150
GI,ADSTONFJ, DISRAELI
AND THE BAI,KANS
Straits.Already,Salisburywasthinkingmuchmoreradically than this aboutBdtish Btr&tegy.But it was not Salisburvbut Derby who contrclledthe ForeignOmce&t this time. Derby Disracli had had an especially close political relations\ip both rvith the then EarI of Derby and with his father. But, even in 1874-5, there ]vas a. growing coolness between th€m, and the Balkan crisis served to trarsform this into a complete break. Derby resigned in March 1878 over the Cabinet decision to bring trcops from India. By 1880 he had resigncd from the Conserr€tive Party, and actually gave his support to Gladstonc duriDg the election campaign of that year. It $ould be wrcng to dismisshis attitudes while Forcign Secretary as merely indecisive and apathctic, Lowever.He ditrered from Disraelionrvhathe regsrded as pdnciple. IIe did not like foreign policy to be conducted for publicity pruposes ; wh€re there must bc int€r.\'ention in Europe, it should be undertaken with discrction and not for the purpose of prestige and public acclaim. r,Vhat appears as insctivity and casualnessin his conduct of afrairs during 1876 end 1877'ivss often deliberate obstructionism, the aim being to r€strain whst he felt rvas Disraeli's dangerous impetuosity. In a letter to Sslisbury in December 1877, Derby expressedhis anxiety quite openly. '. . . I am lully convinced not indecd that he [Disraeli] wants a 11€r - but that he has made up his mind to large military prepsrations, to an extremely vwarlikc speech, to sn agiiation in favoE of amed inteFention . . . but his vie\l,s !.re difrerent from mine where such mattc$ aft concemed, not in detoil but in principle. IIe believesthoroughly in "prestige" as all forrignen do, and rvould think it (quitc sincerely) in the interestsof the countxy to spend200millions on a war i{ the result was to meke foreign ststes think more highly of us os a military As a cool diplomst, Derby had readily est{rbtished close reLations with a man of very similar tempcr, thc Russiannmbassador Shuvalov. Such a mlationship might lvell have been fruitirl in
THE CRISIS AT IIOME
15t
prcducing Anglo-Russian accord, but by the end of 1877, Disraelluas quile convinc.d that suchcloseness uas pernicious. The chief culprit appeers to hav€ been Lady Derby, but at any rlrte, it seemsthat very full detAils of Cabinet discussions{€re being regularly communicatcd to St Petersburg. The Shul'alovDerby contact rl?s a major tatking-point in diplomatic andcourt cir<:les;and the Quecnurged Disraeli to put a stop to dangerous krakages.What particulorly concemedDisraeli in the mstter wus the probability that thc Tsar knew too much about the Cabinet's divisions and that it would thcrcfor€ be impossible to convince him tlut B tain had eny steadfostnessof purpose. By norv Disraeli was trying hard to give an imprcssion of firmness on the matter ofthe security of Constantinople.His policy depended on the ltussians bclicving that Bitain rerlly would go to war if thcy took the city. And h€ {'as fully convincedthat rnore B tish {irmncssin 1858would hav€ preverrtedtheCdmeanWar. Aheady, the Bulga an atrocities agitation llld giren the Russians an assuranccthat B tain could not ffght to save Turkish int€grity. D€rby must not allowthem to think that Britain rvould not ffght in any circumstances.The msignation of Derby in }Iarch was somcthing ol a relief to the Prime Xlinister obviously; it is abundantly clear that Dcrby had remained in oflice from thc .Ianuary (whcn he fiIst rcsisncd) until Narch only in ord€r to act as a bmke on Dislacli.
Disradi By the beginning of 1878, thcn, Disracli rvished to restmin Russia by convincingly thrcatening to makc war on hcr; but it had takcn him ovcr two years to anive at so lirm a line. He al*'ays rcgarded foreign alfairs as the chief business of politics, and so ftom the outset in 1874 was prepared to be an 'active' Pdme trIinistcr in that field; but early 1876 still found him in a quandary. Britain (and Disraeli)must play a major r6le in Eurcpe, but to v'hat purpose and by ,what methods? Various schemes rvere tricd and dropped, and evelr so skilful an observer as Shuvalov found it difffcult to see any consistencyin DisBeli's
152
CLADSTONE. DISRA&LI
AND THE BALKANS
activities. 'Hesitating, tortuous, but not werlike' wasShuvalov's comment on Bdtish policy in June 1870. Dulitrg tha.t month, indeed, Disraeli had made suprisingly tuiendly apprcach$ to the Russian ambassador,but the purposeof them was obscure. A1l that emergedrirasthat Britain had no particular s''rnpathy either with the Turks or vith the rebellious Serbs. Dvidetrtly, Disraeli was an opportunist, waiting for something signiffcant to happen.Even the earlier rejection ol the Berlin Memorandum (which both Lord Odo Russell,the ambassadorin Berlin, and the aged Stmtford de Redcliffe thought should have beenacc€pted) did not seem to indicate any clear tnderstanding of British ilrterests. It wa6 undoubtedly the Bulgarian atncities agitation which stung Di$eeli into taking o morc obviously prc-Turk line; but even then nothing really csme ol this until 1878. Throughout the secondhalf of 1878 and the whole of 1877, spasmodic attemph were made to estnblish closerclatiolrs with Germany andAustlie-Ilungary. OtIepupose of theseattempts wascertainly to detach the two German empires from Russio (e.nalso smash the Dreikaiserbund).But another purposewas to provide Britain with the continentel auy without whom she tlsrcd not threaten wsr on s land pow€I like Russia. France, 'shamming dead', as A. J. P. Toylor says, after 1871,wes un&vailable,Au6triaHungary was the likelier of the remaining powe$, but Andrassy (wenting peace)and the Austrian generals(many of whom still hated tbe P!$sians more than Russia)wouldnot play. Until they did, or until Russia exhausted herself in a wer with Turkey, Disraeli could not take a threatening line on his own. Ilis, as much es Derby's restraint and the stat€ of public opinion, was the reason why B tain made no seriouswar pr€psr&tionsuntil 1878, It would be wrong to essume,as n-. W. S€ton-Watsontends to ir\ Di$add, Glalslme anl the EaatErn Q&rstian that Disneli &ctively planned for war against Russia.IIe very much wanted status without ffghtiry for it. But it is true, as emerg€sfmm the other great EDglishwork on this period, B. H. Sumner'sSzssia and theBalkans,1870-1880,that Disraeli wasa staunchopponent
THE CRISIS AT EOME
r58
of Panslavfut policies when they seemedto dominote Ru$ian thinking during 1877-8.llere is a turther Eason rtrhy his hostility to\Farck Russia ahalDot crystsllize urtil towsd.s the end of the clisis. But in any case,Disraeli made hi6 position fairly plair in the famous eccount of C.abinetdivisions he sent to the Qu€enon 3 November 1877.He distinguished, emongthe twelve membe$ of the C&binet,sevendifrerentparties- 1. 'the war party pure end simple'i 2. 'the party which is pEpaftd to go to we! if 'the Russiawill not engegenot to occupyConstontinople';3. party that is plepartd to go to wal if, after the signature of pe8.ce, the Russians would not evacuate Constantinople. Thi6 pa.rty consistsof the Marquisof Salisbury';4, 'the party of "peaceat any price" representedby the Esrl of Defby'; 5. 'the pa y which disapprovesof eny policy avowedy rcsting on what ar€ called "Bitish inter€sts"which tu considercd"a selfishpolicy" '; 6. Iord Cemawon, who believed thst 'Constsntinople should be permanentlyacquircdby Russis';7. the Que€n'sand Dismeli's policy, that Russia must not count on British neutrality unless she gave a written promise not to occupy Constantinopleor the Daralanelle3. Such ws.sthe state ol the C.abinetat the time when Disraeli wss trying to convince Russia of Britain's frmness. It is not surp sing thrlt, es late as 14February 1878,Shuvalovv'aswriting to Gorchakov that Bdtish policy was in a state of general,total, absoluteconfusion. Glad.atonc The biggest single caus€of contusion (from the highest possible motives of course)was Cledstone.His decisionin the summ€rof 1876to rc-enter active politics by condemningthe Bulga an abocities had ffve principal efrecls. It completed the estmng€ment betwe€nhimself and Disraeli (and betweenhimself and the Queen)by making it quite impossiblefor Disraeli to go to war in defenceof Turkey even if he wished to. It intrcduced a note of unusual bittemess into public life, It swoke in the minds of his countrymen s €ense of speciul involvement in the Eastem question. It elcouraged the comidemtion of moml values as an
15!'
GLADSAONE, DISRAELI AND THE BALKANS
important element in foftign policy, It paved the way for his ol*'n retum to leade$hip ol th€ Liberal Party, Disneli had unwisely chosen to play dorrr lhe Dai.Ig Nats rcport of Bulgarian sufferings when it was published on 28 June 1876.The newspaperwas lostile to him anywoy, and he preferred to rely on inforrration received from the ambassador,Elliott, Whcn, in July, he denied that the Turks had used torture snd rcfcrled to reports of the atrccities as 'coffee house babble' he was laying up trouble lor himselL It emerged that Elliott had been misled into thinking the reports exaggemted, and that he had also deliberately suppressed sto es of the worst honors in his despatchesto London. Walter Ba ng, sent out by Disneli to escertain the truth, r€port€d in August thet at least 12,000 Bulgarians had beenslaughtered.Disneli's displeasureon ffnding that Elliott had deceivedhim was considersble.He had allowed himselfto be put into an extremely vulnemble position. Dcfending himselfin the Commonsin the face of Cladstone'sbombardment was no easy task. All he could do, in his final speech beforc going to thc Lords ss Earl of Beaconsfield, was to insist that he held no specialbrieffor the Turks, and to argue that'ourduty. .. at this c tical moment is to maintain the Empire of England'. *-- When Cladstone developed his attack by publishing the i pamphlet'The Bulgarisn Horrors snd the Question ofthe East' ' on 6 Sept€mbcr, public emotions were in a, ferm€nt. 20O,00O , copies of the pamphlet lr'ere sold by the end of the month. I Anti-Turkish leeling reachcd a new height. Dismeli, aghsst at I the efiect such an agitation would have on his freedom of action, found time to condemn Gladstone as 'worse than any of those . Bulgsrian ahocities which now occupy sttention'. What Di aeli Iound so insupportable was cladstone's aseumption of divine righteousness in everything he wrote, and the deliberately sensational tone of his pamphlet - 'vindictive snd ill-written', he called it. But Gladstone had solid intentions too. \Yhat he {'anted 'was common action by the powels, snd, eventually, complete national independencefor the Balkan peoples. It is quite unfair to &ccusehim ofblindness to Russian expansionism, or to call him, ss the Duke of Suthelland did, a n-ussianeqent.
THE CRISIS A1' HOME
'i
55
Disroeli, he felt, wes deliberately destrpying thc Concert ol I)urope just at the time $'h€n it was most needed. And thereforc, if Russia were to act glone on behalf of the Concert, Gladstone "Go on and prosper" '; was ready to say '. , , in the name of God, 'as und if RNsia should succced, alr Englishman I shau hide my head, but as a men I sholl rcjoice'. Two things ought to b€ said al,out the pamphlet, Firstly, it i'us designednot so nruch forits effect on loreign policy rs for its usefulncssos o porty wcapon at home; ond secondly,it t{as not Gladstone's wish to see the Turkish edlpire in Europe collapse immediately, as is somctimesassomedfrom his 'bag and baggage' statement, ll'hat he was urging rvas the removal ol Turkish odministmtion from the province where the atrccities had becn committed. But even this was enough to prcvoke from Disraeli a tough and basicalty alti-Russian line in his Guildhall speech of I Novernb€r. The moft anti"l'urk GladstoDe became, the more hostilc to Russia were Dismeli's statements. The t\'!'o worked on each other; as Earcourt wrote to Dilke, 'Gladston€ and Dizzy seem to cap one another in lolly and imprudence'. In London, and in polit€ society, Gladstone rvas shunned,and by 1878 \r'&s having his windows broken by the London mob. But in the north of England, particularly, he was look€d tpon with rcverence enal awe. IIe had succcssfully divided the country indeed. AntiJervish feeling had been aroused, and even scholars and public rnen desccndedto unusual depths ol hatred and pettiness when attacking one or other of the two vals, .Both antagonistshad to be restrained by their colleagues, Disraeli by Salisbury and Derby, and Gladstone by Hartington and Granvill€, Hartington, the Liberai leader in the Commons since 1875, actually told Granville that if Gladstone went much further, he would divide and brcsk up the Liberal pa y. Moreover, Ilartington was closely aware of the curious position that Gladstone's spectaculal reemergence hsd pleced him in. 'If, as he has done since the autumn,'he wlote in Moy 1877, 'he takes the leod, he i, the leader.' Clear\ Gladstone hod found an issueto rcawoken his politicel &mbitions, end it x'as very much hatr€d of Disraeli thrt now drcve him on, The hostilitv continued
156
GLADSTONE. DISRAELI
AND THE BALKANS
until 1878(whenCledstonecolled the Cyprus Convention'insane . . . sn act ofduplicity') and,of course,until Disreeli'sretirement end death. Sali$wy Meanwhile,amid the hurly-burly of insult and lecrimin-ation(the Queenchoseto call Gladstonee 'mischiefmakerand ffre-brand'), Salisburywaspatientlyassessing the n&tur€ofBritain's interests, psrticulerly es rcgards the Stmits. By 1877, he hsd recognized that the 1856 Triple (Anglo-tr'rerch-Aushian) guarantee of Turkish iltegrity w6s valuelessas a wes.por!to be used in the cunent Belkan crisis and thst an,.wsy support for Turkey was by no rneansso clearly in Britain's inter€st as it might have been in 1854. He distmst€d public opinion, and the sort of public csmpeign thet Cladstone hsd arous€d.He felt that it was only becauseof public opinion that Britsin had to be so sensitive sbout Constentinople,and yet public opinion, in the aftemath ofthe Bulgarian horrors, \rould not ellow Turk€y to be prctected. This sort of contr&diction was the lesult of too much open discussion; even too much Cebinet discussionof foreign policy pmducedinedia and'purposeless vacillstion'. The aimless ddft in forcign policy in 1876-? pa icularly alarmed him, 'English policy is to float lazily downstrcam, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boat-hook to avoid colli6ions', he wrote in Merch 1877. His ofln position during the Constantinople Conferenc€wss difficult enough, Fith Eliott working hald to convince the Turks that he, nther than Salisbury, rcpresented the British govelnment's opinions. Elliott's behaviour ceused such an outcry at home that Disraeli was virtually obliged to remove him and leplace him by Layaril, though the Prime Minister absudly tried to put a bold face on it by accusingElliott of being insufiiciently pro-nrrkish (the very oppositewasthe ca6e), By the time San Stefano had been signed, Salisbury was suf&ciently closeto Dislaeli to b€ able to ofrer detsiled sdvice on the coulse to be followed. 'In view of English opinion', he did not think it possibleto reiect SanStefanototslly (in other lrords
l'HE CITISIS AT HOME
167
many British peoplewanted to seesomeform of Bulga renstate); but those sectionsof the tleaty which ftduced Turkey to vassalageand thercfore threstened 'the free passegeof the Straits' and other English int€rests - such as TurLish rule in Amenia aDd Eglat - we shouldinsist on elt€ring. Salisburywas 'not a believer in the possibility of setting the Turkish govemment on its legs again, as a genuine,rcliable porrer'; snd h€ theFfore suggested that Britsin should in$easingly take oyer rcsponsibitity for defendingher ov,'ninterets, both at the StEits and in Asia, As ForeignSecrctaryduring April snd May 1878,he pressedthe idea of an agreemmt with the Sulton wher€by British werihips should be allowed to pa6s into the Blsck Sea whenevel they wished(but the Sultan did not agree).He alsoadvocat€dstrcngly the acquisition of Ct?rus ard the supervisionby British agerts of the administBtion and defencesof Asia Minor (proposall vhich wereaccepted). His wholeobjectwasto prclongTurkey's existencefor long enoughto allow Britain to assumecontml of the defencesof Armenia - and the \rhole Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan area. IIe hoped to build up 'a wall acrcssthe peninsula of the Balksns and acloss Armenia which shall give lespite to Turkey for twenty or thirty years', And Layard had hopesthat in the meantime,Britain couldbuild railwaysacross from Asia lt{inor to India thet woulcl enable her to move her tmops with decisivespeedthroughout this crucial ar€a, Salisbury was very largely responsiblefor the shift in emphasis in British policy from the Stlaits per se to Turkey"in-Asia.He wanted to restrict Russisn influence to the north of the Balkan mountains so that the Stnits were s€cure;but the chief reason for saleguardingthe Straits Ess to ensureth&t British warships could enter the Blsck Seato attack Russiain the Ukraine,the Crimes and the Transcaucasiaregion (as s means of deferding ArmeDia).Salisburyachievedmost of his eim6 at Berlin. It remains to be seen wheth€r the Turks w€re really willing to accept British tutelage in Asia Minor and British pmgmatism at the Stnits. It wasnow more obviousthan ever that B tein was making use ofthe Sultan's empire merely to defend her own
PRINCTPAL EVANTS
Principal Events, 1856-28
Slav w€lfsre .lmmittee, Moscori, Cai$ to Su€z lsilwsy opens (Alexandri.e to Csiro 6ection, 1854) 186(F1. LebsDee r€volt, lBding to sutonomy r860-E. Prcj€cted - but 5boltive - paltition of lemsinde! of thrLeyin-Duope (und€! Serbhn dircction) 1862, King Otto of Cleece rephaed by King G€orge 1863, Britsin hsnds ovet lonian islands to Creece,Polish lebellion, clushed by Ru.ssia.Ottornan BBnk organiz€d und€r Anglotr'r€nch bosrd 1s66. Unity lrd srtonomy for Mol&vie and Itrallschh (Rumsnis) rEo6-S. Cr€tan levolt, but no union with Greece 1867-8, Slar. congrerse,sat Moscowsnd haSue 1808. Tashkent and Samarkend elready ebsolbed by Ru€is 1869. Suezcsnal opens 1870. Bulgarisn Exslchate Rwsia r€nouncesBlack Seaneutraliza' tion, rstiff€d by London conf€renc€,1871 1872. Dr€ikaiserbundformed 18?4. Glsdstone leplsced as Prime llinister by Disreeli 18?5, April-MsY. Wsr Sctre July. Bevolt in Ifer"rgovina, sPresding to BosDia by D€c€mber Novemb€r. British govelnment purchrse of Suez ce,Dalco. 1857. rE58.
18?6
December.AndrassY Notc Apdl.Tu*eysuspendsinterestpslElentsonlo4ns.Bulgrriaas Iebel - leports of rnassacleceppearing by July May. Berlin Memomndum - rejected by Britain. Abdul Aziz deposed,British fleet to Besih BaY June. MoDt€negmsDd Scrbis ot war vith Turkey July. Rei€hltsdt sgeement between Russia and AUNstIir Utrors Wt ptlict Sept4mb€r,Clsdstone" B{r,rgaNian defesteil Selbia Novemb€r. Decemb€r.Constantinopleconfer€nce.N€w Tulkish constitu' tion
1877.
1878,
159
Janu8ry. Constadinople codfe!€ncc sbsndon€d. AustrcRussiglr sgteemeot on T\Ikish territorial chsng$ (coErpleted in Mct3h) Msrch. Ignstiev tour, and London Protocol April. Russian declaration of war on Turkey Mey and July, Bdtish walDings to Ruasis July-Decenber, Siegeol Plevns Janualy. Russi.sntrcops reach outskilts of Co$tsntinopl€, th€tr Russo-Tlrkirh snDietice. F€bruary. British fe€t to Bosphorirs. Cftdit vote fo! wsr Msrch. Satr Stefsno h€Ety April, Salisbury Foreign Secr€tsry.Briiish r€servesmobiliz€d, Indian troop€ to Malta May. British lfemorsndum condenning Ssn St€fsno MayJune, Anglo-Bussion, Anglo-Austrisn and AngloTurkish agr€ements JuneJuly. Con$ess of B€rlin Au€ust. Anglo-Fr€nch Condominium in Egypt
160
(;LADSTONE, DTSRAELI AND THD BALKANS
I'mthzr Rcading (Ir addition to works by the foltowingsuthors, which havc stleady b€en sugg€stcd:Marliott, Alde$on, Eurewitr, Itiller, Bell, Southeaie, Ridley, Hoskins,Ma$ton, Narlowe, Seton'lTatsoD,Platt, Bullsrd, Tenperley and Penson) J.\lorley, Lifc of W. F. Clad6t,',",8 vols.Mecnillan (London,reoa). P. Magnw]us, GIaNone:A Biagraphg.JotnMvrsy (London,re5a). W. F. Monypenny snd G, E. tlrckte, Tlt Life oJ Baianin Disrarli, Ea oJBea.onsjeld,6 vols.John Munsy (Inndon, rero-e0). It. Bbkc, ,rvd"ti. Eyre and Spottis\roode(Londo , 1966). Vi.toria, Seco d Series, c. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII. Buckle (Ed.J, The I'eltzrs of Q1t'?.en 1862-80,B vols. John }lurray ilandon, 1026). Lady Gwendoline C€cil, Life of nobert, Merquis of Salisl)urlJ,a Yots. Hodder a Stoughton(London,I92ri2). lV. tr. ossc, Thz RtJe and t'all of the Crinean S'Jsttm, 1855-f1. oc ,iltan (London,1968). R. IV. Seton-W5tson, Distuli, Cllldxtonoand ttu Ea*t?m Quctlion, Mac illan (Lotrdon,le35). B. fl. Sumncr, nu,rsia.nn the Balka s,787, 8r. oxlbrd Univ.xsity Press(InndoD, 1937;reissued,Archon Books, ls62). D. ]J'\tis, Brilain md the BulgarianHarrors oJ 1876.Universily of ChicagoPrcss(Chicago,1039). R. T, Shsnnon, Glzdrrrne and the B lgatian Agiration, T3T6 Nelson (London,re63). W. N. Medticott, ?i." Co Cressof Berlin and AJtzr. ethuen (London, r9B8). D,n.Lee, Gmr Br;tain and thzCyprut Cowention HaIvaIdUnive$ity Pl€ss(Camb.idse, a-ss.,r!8a). G. Wirtlrrvein, BritaitL dnll tha Balhan Crisis, 1875-78. Columbia UDivcrsityPEss (Ncw York, re35). w- L. Langcr, Euopean Alliancesand Alignments,187190. Knopt (New York, 1931;2nd ed. 1950) ,\. J. P. Taylor, afh, StrlIEAIeIor MarW in ELrope, 1848-1918. Oxfod UniveBity Press(I-ondon,I95a). A. F. P.ibram, .oigia'd and thc lntenatiatult PoticV oI the E trcpean $JoId Univenity Press(Inndon, 10Bl). Pauers,1871-1914. D. A. Fsrnic, Edst and Westof Suu,1854-1956. Oxfod Universitv Press(London,leoe).
FURTHER rtEADIN(;
tot
C. lV. Eallb€.9, "n"S?z€zCanal,Its H^tory and,Dipkhnatic IDtp(ntame (New York, le31), Lord KiDros, Belucen Tbo Sed.t. fhe C.reationaI the Suez CanaL John Mmst' (Iondon, le08). r). S. Land6, Bankus and Pashas. hllcmqtianal l\indt1ce and Etonom;cImpertahsmi'l Xgy?r.Heinemaru (London, 1958). H. Seton-Watson,Ttu Dcclinc of Inptial lh!{'sid, 1855-1911. Methuen(London,r952). 'New CrmbridgeMod€rn Uistory', V.'1.XI {1870-98),ChnprerXU, 'Austria'Hungory,Tu.key and the tsalkrns' by ly. N. Medlicott. Chopter XX, 'Irternotional Relotions'by A. J. P. Tsytor. ChnpterXXI, 'Rivalriesir the llcditerrsnean,the }Iiddle nast and Egypt' by A. P. Tho.nton.
PART VI Salisbury,the Alliance Systems, and Germany's Drive to the East [24] THE EASTERN QUESTION AFTER 1878 The full meetiBgof the poweF at the Bedin Congresswasevidence of the Eupremeimportance that the Eastem Question had Dow assumedin intemetion&l diplomecy. Fmm 1878 uatil the outbr€ak of the 1914-18wer, the Eastern Question wss &t the root of met}y of the contrrove$ieBsnd mony of the alliances and alignments involving the gr€st po'wer6.And, now that lliddle Eastem issues h&d b€come Bo critical, it was impossible for Germeny, even for Bismsrck's Cermeny up to 1800,to coDtract out of rcsponsibilities there - much though Bismarck might contend that the afr&ils of the Belkans were not worth the loss of 'one Pomerania[ grnsdier'. The diplometic menoeuvressft€r 1878,it is truc, had somethingof the cheract€r of ndth€matical or psycholqical €x€r'cises,pursued out of habit, or, as wss cynicslly suggesttrd,in order to provide occupationsfor Europe's &dstocr&ts. Pelh&ps their somewhat arid aBd abstroct nsture helps to explsin why there wss qo war betweeBthe great powers for thirty-six year€ oflter the Berlin settlement, At any rate, while Gerrnanywa8becomingplogressivelymore hvolved in the problems of the Eastem Question, the tend€ncy in Bdtain was rather the rcverse,taking the Eost€rn Questionin its traditional
164
SALISBURY'S POLICY
B.itish sens€of defenceof Turkish independencctrnd ht€grity, and the sec rity of the Stnits. In the pe od 1878-1914,the att ntion ofBritish govcmments, and of the British public too, was directed away from ConstantiDople to other, rnore inrmediatcly pressing concems. Navll strength, jruperialisDl,tlre strugglc for tcuitory and influcncc in Africa and Chnia, and the defenceof Indi8, prcdomin.rted; but domestic issuesalso communded seriousnoticc. Tradc unionisnr and socialism snd above rll, pcrh^ps, Ircland, pushed thc problems ol T rkey i:rto the l,acksround.Gladstonc,in particular, found l{iddle Esstem afrairs trD initating distraction whilc hc sousht to settlc Irish problems after 1880. Only thc Armcnian massacresof 1894 and 1896 ftally roused thc Bdtish Fople to something like the involvem€nt thcy lrad fclt in Turkish allairs in 187+8. 'l'his is not to say that Britair byanymeansabandoncd hcr intercst in the l{iddle East: t,ut thst, instrad of automatically protccting Sultan Abdul Ilamid, she concentntcd oD hcr real objective in the aren, the defenceof India. this led her, in fact, into oc(upation of Egypt in 1882 and into confmntation with Russia over Russian advancesin Ccntnl Asia. It produced clasheswith Imnce (over Egypt $nd thc Nilc valley) as well as {'ith Russia; it led to tenu}rary association with Itdy and Aust a-Hungaty in the l{editerranean agrcements.Ultimately, conccm for the safety of India pmduccd increasing British suspicion of Germany's thrust to{'ards the Persian Gulf. Above all, defending India now meant doiDg jobs in the Middle East that Turkey could not, or $ould not, do on Britain's bchalf; and, as l\rkey becamemore snd more obviously a uselessand objectionable ally, this meunt that she }\as morc anal more 'Eastem abandoned to her oNn devic€s. For Ilitain. thc Question' $as acqriring new meanings. Ily 1878.tlre declirre.l Turk.y had be"nre u ntajor i.suc irt internationsl diplomacy. It is not $,itlin the scopeol this book, howev€r, to present & diplomAtic history of the latc nincteenth century (A. J. P. Taylor's ,sr'&gglefor Maskrg in Europe aDd. the two books by W. L. Lrng$ do this most fuly). Therefore, thc prrsent chapter must bc highly selective when dcaling with
BRITAIN Ar*D TIIn CONTINIINTAL ALLL\NCnS
105
those aspscts of tlle East€rn Question ths.t particulerly concemed th€ continent{ powersnther than Britain. The conditions which produccd the secondDreikaiserbund, Bismarck's Triple Alliance' the Russo-GermonReinsurancetreaty, and the Franco-Russian Dual Allisnce rnust bc observedchicflv fot theireflccts on British policy and actions. Atftrntion i havc to be focused principally on Egypt, the new British attitudes to tsulg3ria snd Turkey-inAsia, the balance of naval power in the Meditenancan, the struggle for Afghanistan and Persia, and those factors which, iD the eAd, persuaded Britain to make entent€s with her two traditional rivats in the Middle East, t'rance and Russia.
[25] I]RITAIN AND TIIE CONTINENTAL A L L I A N C ES Disra€li bsd used the Eastem Question vcry largely as a mcans to an end, the end being a spectacr sr asscrtion of British pov'er in Europe. His successo$ never hsd thc same opportunity; Gtadstone, from 1880 to 1885, found his concept of s Britishinspired Concert ol Europe over-bome by a more rigid system of alliancescertrcd on Berlin; end Salisbury,his schemesfor Bdtish control of Turkey-in-Asia collapsing by I88r, cut Britsin off frorn rcal eutho ty in Durcpe when he becan\e Pdmc }finister by keeping out of the Bismorckian alliancesand relying instead on od hoc agrcements to prescNe Britajn's position in the Medit€nancan and the tr{iddl€ Eest. The resl centre of decisionmlLking on the Eastern Question remained, after 1878, Berlin. London, St Petelsbure, Paris and fienna, and €ven Corulentinople and Cairo, merely rcspondedto the initiativcs thst flo$'ed lrom Bismarck. And. aft€r Bismarck's fall in 1890, it was tlic drnmatic gestures o{ William II, the growth ol Pangerman ambitions, and tire close links betwecn Gcmany and Abdul Ilamid (and tLe Young l'urks aft€r 1908)that provided the chief stimrhrs to Middlc Eastem sctioD. It was not Bismarck's airn that Germany should dominatc the
166
SAI,ISBI]RY'S
PO',ICY
trIiddlc East, liatbcr ]is objecfs ri'€rc to isolate Flance and to remain on good terms $'ith Russia.But, becou6ethe l{iddle East was the point \rierc France, Rlssia, Britain and Austri&Hungary aU had se ous interests and commitments, the Eastem Qucstion was bound to Iigure targely in his arTangements. Certainly Bismarck constructed the Du:rl AlliaDce {ith AustrinHungury in 1879 partly to be a substitut€ 'Greater Gennany' and partly as an insumfte policyagainst future Russianhostitity (the Russians, especiolly the Panslavs, could not easily forgct their dcfeat at the Bcrlin Congress);but Bismarck also had two other airDs in allying with ,r\ustria-Hungary, He rantcd to prcvent luture conflict with Russia by being uble to restrict Austro-Hungarian ambitions i the Balkans; and he \mnted to force Austris-Ilungary to absndon any thought of an alliance with Britain (from {hich cermany might be cxcluded) lest this produce a nerv 'Crimean coulition' directcd agsinst Russia, and including, of course,Fralce. Germany, and not B tain, must be Austria-Ilungary's real purher ag&inst Russia, if ever shc must hav€ such a partncr. The renewedDreikaiserbund of 188r, or thc face of it an extraodinsry sucressfor Bismarck in again combining together the two Balkan rivals Austria-Ilungary and Russia, was rcslly made possibleby Russia'sne€d of assistunceagainst B tain, Not only did ihe three powels promisc to consult each other on future devclopmentsin ihe Balkons, they ntsoreaffirmed thc closure ofthc Streits. Thst the Straits should remain closcd to British waxhips, in spite of the obvious Bdtish desire to bc able to enter the Black Seafor coercionpurposcs,\l'osthe dearest object of Russian policy, It !r'as largely fear of British naval bombadment in the Black Sea that drove thc RussiaDsto accclclate their push towards Afgbonist{rn. An ovcrland threat to the security of India was thcir only meansof exc ing pressure on Briiain snd thereby keeping her I'arships out of the Bleck Sea. Conversely,lhe British felt th&t they must be abl€ to pess wa$hips through the Straits in order to prevent Russirn incursionsinto Afghsristan. Such werc the sad ebsurdities oi stratogy based on mutual fear. In spite of the new Dreikaiscrbund, the interests of Aultlic-
BRITAIN
AND'IIIE
CONTINENTAL
ALLIANCES
167
Hungary and Russia in the Balkans rcmajned ftmdamentally opposed.Austria-Hungary had establishedherself as the dotrinant power in thc wcstcm Belkans and Russia seemedto dominate the eastern arca; but there r€mained thc t€uitolies of Albania. Ms.cedonia,Thrace and Eastern Rumclia (vhich $'cre still in Turkish Lands) to causeluture dissension.And AustriaHungary N'as os hostile to Slov nationalism as evcr, lr'hilc Russia, even though her new Tsar Alexandcr III, vns lcss dispos€dthan his father to take accourt ofPublic opinion, could ncver abandon all Balkan Slavs to Gennan or trIagyar rule. (Before his accessior in 1881, Alexander had been a known Pansllrv sympathizer.) Halt the populetion of Austria-Hungary was Slav; and the ne$ly occrtpied provinces of Bosnia and Eerzegovina were inhabitcd by Slav Scrbs who lvere generally lrnxious to unite lvith thc Scrbs ofthe independentp ncipalities of Serbiaand l{ontenegro. If Austris-Hungary ever acklowledged the prhcide of Slav nationalism, sh€ signed her o$'n dcathwanant. In 1878,Austro-Hungrirjan troops had occupicd Novibazar prccisely to keep Serbia and Montenegro apart, and to prcserwea possibtethrough route ftom liiennll to Salonika. In 1881, a secret trcaty signed lvith Princc Uilan of Scrbia (I(ing aftcr 1882) rradc Scrbia.a virtual dcpendency o{ Vienna; but this arranltement was as frsgil€ as the bold of MilaD (of the Obrenovich family) and his son Alcxander on the Scrbian throne. From 1008, $4rcn.{€xander was murdered and rcplaced by Kirtg Pet€r (,1the Kara Georgefamily) Scrbia was rcady to move back into the Russian orbit, I{eanrvhile, it wqs quitc clear that tLe nervsnrall Bulgaria ofPrince Alexander oI Battcnbdg sas tnder firm Russian direction. evcn after the withdraval of Russisn troops ir August 1879. It would rcquire all Bismarck's skill to preserve harmony bet{ecn Aust a-Hungury and Russiaunderthese circumstances. Indeedthe Dual Alli$nce and the D&ikaiserbund were at bottom incomp:rtible with eachother, a point made appalent by the signing of a secret ageement between Cermany, Austria_Hungary $nd Rumani[ in 1888. T'he Runranians had retained s strong sense of grievance sincc 1878 follorYing Russia'$ seizure of
188
SALISBURY'S
POLICY
Southem Bessarabia (in spite o? the rnititery assistance Rumania had giyen to Russia during the attock on Turkey). I'his dir.ision of inlluenc€ in the Balkans, so vjtal s factor in the approaches to the war of lgl4 t8, also had its effectson B tish Dolicv in the 1880sand l8S0s, While the basic rivalry of Austria-I{ungary and Russia remained,and while thc thought ofa Russiandcsc€ntonConstantinople still aroused horlor in London, the likctihood s,as that a close rclstionship \vould persist between Aust s-Llungary and Britain. Such w&s the case until 1806! and the relationshiD recciv.d lh" bl.ssingof Bismsrck.so tong as Britain rcmnined at odds with France -:rs her occups.tion of Eg}?t in 1882 ensuredthat shc \r.ould.But, once thc security ofConshntinoDle beganlo 'naltcr l.ss t.Ilrilnin, and rhe chullenr"ofGrrmrnv in the Niddte EJst bFganto in.resse. rnn the say,,u" op"n io " gradual move arvay fmm Austria-Ilungary, and for a gradual move rowdrdsrn understandinrwittr Russia. llhe formation ofBismarck's Triple Alliancc in 1882,bv drawing ILlrly into thc existing cerman-Austm-Ilungerian alliance, was &n object ofspecial intercst to Britain, since Iraly, ofall the po!ve$, was most exposed to British naval pressurc and was pedorce (though also by incliDrtion) a. usetul ftiend to Britian in the }feditcrmnean. If Italy werc to form purt of a grouping. hostile to Britain, then the position of the B tish flect st Malta and in the Aeg€an would become uDtenable, assuminq that it wxs albo alLmpfing to k.ep a watct,fuleyc on rhe Frnnchat Toulon and the Bussiansat the Straits. Britain could not afford to be on bad tcrms with Italy, Fnnce and Russia at the samc time I if she wcre, her contrcl of the Medit€manean, and thereforc of the short rcutes to Indis, would be lost. This fact had an importart influence on her foreign policy thmughout thc period up io the 1914-18 war. Italy, of course, had her own ambitions in the trIiddle East area. For the time being, these seemedcompatible with British friendship. Tunis stre had wanted and to her dismay had been dcpriv.d of by the Frenchonnexationin lssl. But iriDoti {like Tunis,nominallypert ofthe Tu*ish.mpire) shehopedr,,acrquire.
BRITAIN
AND TITE CONTINENTAL
ALLIANCES
169
and shealso hoped to cstablish hfIlself on the 11est€mcosst olthe Rrd Sea. In both thcse regions, her ambitions brought her into conflict with Franccj and here, since Britain did not {.ish to antagonize Ik y, was a further rcason, in addition ro the clash over Egpt, f.,r an increrse in Anglo-French hostility after 1882. The llulg.r. an crisis of 1885 z cmphasizedthe dillicdty facing Bismarck in trying to preservegood &lations with both AustriaHuneery and Russia. The union of Ilastern Rumelia with Bulgaria in 1888$ngercd Russia (",ho had by t88s iound prince Alcxonder an unruly puppet) but r€ceivedsupport from Austria_ Ilungary. Bisorarck's answer to the problem \yas to pacify Russio by making a scparat€ Reinsursnc€treaty $ith her, and to satisfy Austrio-Ilungary's needs by encouBgjng an antiItussian combinstion under apparent B tish, mrhcr than Gcrman, leadcfthip - the }fediterranean Agreementof December 1887.As part of the complex Ilismarckian machinery, British suspicionofRussia \l.asbcing usedasoprop to Ausrria-Hungary's pr$tig€ at a time when c€rmany must still sc€m to bc welldisposed towads Russia. This, ol course, is not auitc how it look.d fr,,m tl,^ Brilirh point of vhs. as we shr seehter. But the elaborate conju ng trick was not entir€ly successfut. Ciers, Gon:hakov's srrccessorin Russia, l,as anxious enoush to mainlrin lhe link uith C..rmrny. pnr y as a w.apnn ro use against int€mal Panslav opponents.Butby t89O,r,hen ltismarck was dismissed, prepsrations were well in hand for an alliance bet*'ecn rcpublican France and Tsarist Russis.. It w&s l"ianc€, not cclmany, \rho supplied the loans and armaments lr,hich Russia needed after 1887. And, when the cermans, under the influcnce o{ Ilolstcin (the ncw eminenc€ grjse bchind cr:rmen lbrcign policy), rcfusedto rcncw the ReinsruanceTrcaty in 1890, Russia had to begin to look to Fnnce for potitical support too. The formal alliance rvas eventually signed in 1894. It js importsnt to rcalize, however, that the Franco-Russian Dual Allionc€ vas not form€d primsrily out of lear of Cermsny. After the fall ofBoulaoger in 1889, Frcnchmen rverc losing their: zcal for a war to r'{icoverAlsace LoDaine, though they wcre glad cnough to have oll castern ally in case of a fut rc German
170
SALISBUIIY'S
POLICY
attack on Fmnce. Similarly, the Russians were not solely intcrcsted in using the Dual Alliance (with its threat of a $ar on trvo ftonts) as a counterweight to the Gcrman-Austro-Hungarian link. The chief object of the alliance whcn it $as lormed ilas to restrain not Germsny, but B tein. By 1894, both FBnce and Russia stil had seriousquarrcls with Bdtain, most of which involvcd the East€rn Qucstion. france particulsrly $anted to scc an cnd to the British militarl occupation of Egypt; not that shc wished to send in her owlr troops, but that exclusive phl'sical cortrcI by Britain ol au area in $hich there was so much Frcnch investment and lrench cultural irterest w|rs an unacceptoble impudence. trIoreover, from Napolcon'sexpcditionin Egnlt in u98, andthe occupation of Aleeria in 1830,the French had liked to think that the ryhole of the North African coastline, and its hinterland including the deselt and the Nile va ey, werc potentially and by right a French sphere of infiuence. An ev€ntual French occupation of Tunis, aft€r all, had been discrcctly accepted by Britain (and l.ry Germany, but not by Italy) at thc Berlin Congress.AngloFrench discord nlso includcd a rcmote threat to the secu ty of IDdia from the south-east(and Indian sccu ty was fast becoming the only 'Eastem Question' as far as B tain \ras concerned). The annexation of Upper Burma by Britain in 1885 6 incrcasedthe likelihood of clashesin Siam as the Frcnch established themselves more limly in Indo-China. Support fiom Russia in this area would be highly valual'lc to France. Russia, nfter 1878, and cspccially after the fresh Bulgarian disappointment in 1885-7,conccntratcdher energicsincreasingly on advancement ir C€ntral Asia and thc Far East. IIer attitude on tL€ question of the Balkans and thc Straits bec:lme,until at lcast 1s08, €ssentially dcfcnsive. She rcquircd protection from British attaaks on her Black Sea coasts, and if the Dreikaiserbund could not alllzys be relied upon to provide this, then the assistance of France, a fustdass Mediterranean naval power, *'ould be most welcome.The rcstraining presenceof the Toulon llcct would limit British ambitions at the StBits snd indeed throughout thc Lcvant arca. It might also have the indircct
I]RITAIN
AND TIID CONTINENTAI,
ALLIANCDS
I?I
eflect of checking what the Russianssaw as B tish exparrsionism in Pcrsia, Afghanistan aDd China. So, for the first ten ycars otits life at any rste, thc Fnnco-Russian Dual Alliance, which is bcst knovn lor its opposition to cermany in thc t0t4-t8 war, acted chiefly as o dcliberate control on Britsirls frecdom of action on the Eostem Question. It was the possibility, ond then the actuolity, of a Franco" Russian allirnce which caused most agitation in the Adrniralty slter 1887. The feeliDgwas strong ths.t Britain's cxisteDceas a great power dependedon her contml of the llcditcnancaD; aDd the resourcesof the navy would be stretchcd to the ljnit by a simultaneous olert in the Aegean, the 1r'estemllcalitensnean aDd the Channel. Even the good will of the Italian naq|would not sufficeto restore the balance.The rgitation ectually r€rched an early crisis point in 1888, the year of the Frcnch invasioD scare, $'hcn it 1{asrcalized how quickly tr'rancccould get trcops to hcr Clnnnel ports and acmss to England $'hile at the same time her battleships would outnumber those of BdhiD in th€ lfediterraneun by fiftecn to eight. The results of this were thc Naval Dcfence Act ol 188S,with the adoption of the ,TrvoPower Standard', ana a rcdisposition ol the fleet, based on Gibraltar and Multa, with a major squadron kcpt $ithin fortyejght hours' sniling time of Besika Bay. But thcse ansrvers,and a ludher nrval bujlding prcgramme in 1893, failed to rcmo\.e the mair problem; it $'as clesr by 1895 (rvhcn France began to use Bizcrta in Tunisia as a n^val bnse)th3t thc British fleetcould not pass through the Straits fo coerce Itussia unless Turkey rvas friendly and France *'as neutral. Neitho of these conditions applicd du ng the ninc years after 1895; snd the visit of a Russian srluadronlrom the Btrltic to Toulon in ISes had alrcady suggestcd that Russia could become a lfediterrarean naval powcr without moving her vsrships out of the Black Sca. Britain's attitude to the rule of the Straits might rvell havc to be changedagain, thcre{ore. It might be better, frcm th€ British as wcll as frcm the Russian point of vicw, if the Straits rrcre kept closed to all ll?Iships. It is commoD to assume that thc biggest threat to Bdtish
SALISBIIRY'S
POI,ICY
navsl supremacy was presented by Germany after 1898, and more pu*icularly after t006, But clearly, the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance, \!ith the strunglehold it had on British policy in the trIeditenanean and the whole Eastem Question, ecusedvery grelt concem in London, It {os responsible(together with the rapidly incre$ing cost ot building warships) for a rise in British nayal cstimates from trg millior in 1888 to f27 Diillior in 1000. It was also rcsponsiblefor Britain's retirenrent bet'iveen1896ond 1904 into a diplomatic no-man's-land (bct$?en the t{'o rival olliance systems) vlich was falsely digniffed by the tclm 'splendid isolation'. The Dual Alliancc *'as by design lLostilcto B tain. Frcm 1896, coDplete disilusionment vith Turkey, and resentrnent of Geman activity in thc Brtkans and Asie Minor prevented any real continuance of British association with the Tliple Alliance. B tain rvas thc strongest singlc naval powcr in the lleditelranean and the Indian Ocean, and shc htrd a small but respectable army occupying EgWt, but thcse ]['ere dangerously thin resourceswith which to defend her contrcl of thc Middlc Dast from attack by either Triple or Dual Allioncc. In tnnc of war, the AdmiBlty concluded, thc Suez Canrl might wcl have to be closed and the Mediterrancan abandoncd.
[26] EGYPT The General Election of 1880 was very laryely fought on foreign policy issues. Gladstone's MidlothiAn Campaign particularly emphasizedthc dilltrcnces bet{een the pedies on the Turkish and Afghan questions.And yet, by 1886,it h4d becomeapparent that in practice, Liberal and Conservativepolicieson the Dastem Question had becomercmarkably sinilar. Even Gladstone,once he h&d becone Prime Minister in 1880,spoke of the desirability of maintahirg a degree of continuity in foreign policy. The military consuls wbom Salisbury had established in Aria lrtinor in 1879-80 xere with&a$n by Gladstone in l8ij1-?, nnrcl) tr)
EGYPT
l7a
Salisbury'sappamnt indignntion atthe time. Butin fect, det€riorating relations bctweenBritain and Turkey would have bmught about their removal even had Salisbury still been in oftice. By 1886,&nd again in 1802,it was bcine noted by forcign obseryers that Lord Rosebery's foreign policy wus indistinguishable from Salisbury's. After 1880, the Eastern Question was ceosingeithcr to excit€ popr ar passionsor to pmduce polemicsand oises of consciencc among statesmen. Hartington and Bdght in 1882 and Inrd liaDdolph Cliurchill in 188c made diflifl tics for their rcspectivc lcadcls over attitudcs to Egmt, but such examplesrtrcrebecoming mrcr. It rra6 Ircland which now aroused the sort of Dartv dirisionsan,l individ,r,ltl,carr+earching.rhar had a""ompanicd the Balkan crisis in 1876-8. Nevefihcless, though it arousedno grcat storm at the time, the occupation of Egnt, which in the end lastcd for some seventy years, tumed out to be one of thc decisive cvcnts of British history. Sultan Abdut llamid had resentedthe cavalier treotment that Turkey had received at Bdtish hands in 1828. The takiDA of Oylrus and the int€nded establishmentof a British overlordship in A5in N inor suqBc.teda cynierl disrcgarrlfor'Iurkish !ovcrcisn risl,tr. 'l'he r.fu
17\
SALISBURY'S POLICY
home or abroad, and thc refusal to declare a firnr prctectorate o\.er the area.gave an impression both of deceitfulnessand of indecision. In 1876,Khedive Ismail announccdtbat he ]^'asba.nhrlrptand could no longer hopc to pay his debts. By 1878, tsrit$.in and l'rance, the two mrjor invcstors, had establisheda Condomittium, by rvhich they exercisedr joint control over Egypt;an govemmcnt finances.This gave thcm in effect a political &uthority, since the Khedivc could do nothing which involved the expenditure of money \rithout their approval. (lvhether it was sctually necessaryfor Britain to act vitll lrmnce jn order to contml her has been much debatcd. The fact was that at the time, it very nmch secmcd that to leave l.rance in sole linancial control of Egypi would givc her absolute autho ty ovcr movements of British ships in thc SuezCanal.) In 1879,when Ismail objected to liaving an Englishman and a l,'reDchmanin his Cabinet, the two poners pcNuaded the Sultan to deposehim and replace him by his morc amenableson, Te$fik. Duriry 1880 and 1881,financial stringency imposed by ,{ngb-Frencl, a.dvisersarouscd hostility cspecially among Dgyptian srmy oflicers trnd, by the bcgiDniry of 1i182,thcre existed o full scal€Egyptian nationalist movcmcnt hcaded by .,\.rabi PasM. Te{'lik's govcmmcnt fcll vcry much uDdcr -{rabi's control, und as a e€sturcof support for the Khcdivc Bdtish and !'rench naval squa&ons {crc scnt to Alexand a. Thc stage was row set for mititary controntation. There is no doubt that Gladstone was a non-intervcntionist. that 'Egypt for thc Egyptians' *'as his aim, and that he $ished to end both Turkish and Anglo-Frcnch authority in Egypt. But tressure of circumstances,his oivn concf,ntration on Irish affairs, ard the arsuments of Cabinct collcaguesconbined to prodrrce rvhat was for hirn a highly uncharacte stic actiLrn.TLc AnglG l'rench squudronsarrivcd olf Alexandria in lfay. In June, a mob in the to$n murdcred some fody lJuropeans.At the beg;nning ol July the commanderof the British squadron,Admiral Seyrtour, (going nther beyond the instructions he rcceived ftom the Csbinet) ordcred the srrrender of new fortificstions beirg built to guard thc town. Non-compli{inceil'os followed on 11 Juty by
EG YPl'
175
a vigomus naval bombardment, from which the Frcnch souaahon rotslly dissociaied itsFlf by sailingawa1. Hortington.supported by Dilke and Joseph Chamberlain, now prcssedfor troop landmgs as a matt€I of ugency to guard the Suez Canal from the nationalists $'ho by this time appesred to contrcl Egypt. Gladstone was ready to act merely to protect the Canrl, but he did not want any supprcssionof the nationalists, lnuch as he disliked the military ttranny ol Arabi, or ony British control c,vcr Egypt as a whole; nor did he llish to act $ithout Fflrncc. (Even Italy was asked for assistance,ilr oder to lend an jntcrnational air to tl)e operation.) In thc end, ho{€ver, it hlrd to be a unilateral affdir. Italy rcfused to act othcr than throuEh thc ('on\rinl;noplc ronf.ren,c, $t,ir.h was eurrenrty {and rFry in. cflcctively) mccting to discuss the Egptian problem. And in Irance, though the Prime Mirrister, Frcycinet, was grudgingly cooperative, the Chamber of Deputics rt the end of Juty votcd lirmly against sendinga fteDch expedition to Eg}?t. cladstonc \'rs obljged to oct alone, although, it must be noted, he had the cvirlent approvul of Bisnarck. In August, a British expedition, comnanded by General \(olsclcy, lnnded at Alexandria. On r9 Septcmber,in the battle of Ttt-cl-Kcbir, the B tish complctcly defeated Arabi pesha,s Itgyptian army. ililita ly $nd potitically, the countN had suddcnly fallen into B tish brnds. How long it *,ould remain so wasnot immcdiately clcar. clsdstone was resolutethat flr€ object \t'ls to rctire rs soon as possible, having converted Eg-"i,?tfrom 'rnarchy and conflict to peace and order'. The dimculty x,asthat it provcd impossible (perhsps conveniently impossible) to .stablish a stable and pro-Bdtish government {ithout the t)r.sence of Bdtish troops. And so the occupation continucd nrdelinitely, in spite of frcqucnt declarations of rcadiness to cvacuate. No fe$'er than $ixty-six such declarations,it l){s been culculated, rvere made between 1882 and 1022. Fmnl l88B onwards, particulorly under ihe Consul-General Sir Evelpr Buing (later Lord Cromer), Eg}?t acquired an efficient Bdtishrun Administration rvhich succecdedin putting the country,s linrnces on a reasonablysound footing. The fact was that Bdtain
170
SALISBURY'S POLICY
had physically t&ken over the country, and that she had done so nominally to potect the interests ofEurcpeen bond sndsharcholders (which Cromer faithfully did) and ectuslly to prctect the Suez Canal both ftom Egyptian nationalists ard from potentially hostile Euopean powers. She had undertaken thcse rcsponsibilities in a huIlry and s.ithout sny prcper forcthought, but the only voice of protest was that of Bright, who rcsigned ftom 'o manifest violaGladstone's govcmmcnt r&ther thsn support tion of intemotionol law'. 'l'he effects of the Egntian occupation are cle.rr cnough. The B tish action completed Sultan Abdul Harnid's hatred of Gladstone and contumed his view that the British \r'erc rcady to portition his empir€ for their o*t benefit. B tain's prescnce in Eglpt helped to reduce her already declining int rest in Balkan controversies, and gave her a position of immcns€ strat€gic importonce, ss well as greatly (and perhaps falsely) incrcasing her military prestige, It confirmed her hold on EgjDtian forcign traale, over 60 per cent ol which she controlled. It also inevitably involved her in the afrai$ of Egypt's dcpendency, the Sudan; and the unilat€ral natur of the British action produced a bitterncss in Anglo-French relotions that lasted for ov€r twenty yeors.
[27] THE SUDAN Gladston€found Arabi Pasha'snationalismperniciousand uDnationalismunder the leadershipof the lawtul; but Sudanese Itlahdi was a dilTerentmatter. S)'rnp8thy for a nstion struggling to be free \yascombinedv"'ith a desireto curb Eg!?tian expenditure, It wasclear, especis.nyafter the defe8,tof an E$?tian army under a Bitish of6cer, Eicks, in 1888,that a rcconqueatof the Sudan would b€ costly in money and lives. DglAt coulalnot, and B tsin should not, pey such a price in Cb.dstone'sview. Ther€foft, acting on the advice ol Hartington, Granvi e, Northbrook ond Dilke, Clodstoneagreedto the dispatch of GeneralGodon
'T'III] SUDAN
177
in Jenuary 1884 on $ fact-ffnding mission, designedto discover how l,est to withdraw Eg$tian garlisons, The choice of cordon was unwise, in view ofhis charaeter and his previous cxperience as GoverDor of the Sudan from t8?? to 1879. Public opinion t€ndcd to oerec with Queen Victoria rvhen she ssserted that ,We havc taken a good denl ol responsibility upon u3 in Egypt - but not cnough . . .'rnd, lrhen cladstone r€lused to nrscuehis asent "n(r l,^ l,ud gol hi'n'(lf bcscig.din Klarroum, it $as evident u)at the country :rdnrired Gordon's courage and was rcrdy for o fbn{ard policy in the Sudan. Clsdstone eventually bowed to pressue, but thc hte arrival ofthe reliefcxpedition and Cordon,s dcath in 1885 lcft the imprcssion abroad and at home that Britain under eladstone did not know what 6h€ ll,anted in the Nile vallcy. In fact, renewed Russian pressure upon Afghanistan Iorced th€ British to ebandon the Sualan in any case. Not until 1896did an Anglo-Egyptian lorce (under Kitchener) agaiDmake its way up the Nile ; and rhen, following thc victory olomdurman in 1898, Khartoum was reoccupied, the British found thenselves Jace to foce witir FBnce. The Fashoda incident ended in e diplom$tic victory for Britain when France recognizedBdtaiD's suprcmacy in the Sudan (March 1899).Britain had at last won rnilitary control otthe NiIe and the westcm coast ofthc Red Sea in spite of trrcnch hostility. But the legacy of cladstonc lingercd on. Not until 1914 did Britain assumean open prot€ctorate over Dg:?t, and her control of the country Fas hampered fiom 1885 by the fact that a new loan wes guarantced not by Britain alone, rs it n eht haYcbeen if Baring's advice trad been heeded,but by the six po\yers.This meant that Egwt,s financesand hergovemnrcnt's freedom of action could be int€rfered with by aU the pox'crs, and that, in view of habitual French and Russian {,pFisition, Britain was obligcd to rely a grear deal on German gord-rvill to achievc her ends in Egypt. Eartier hesitations over the attitude to beadopt€dtownrds Turkey had now beensucceeded lly an equally haphszsrd attitude towards the B tish position in Nodh-Eost Africa.
AFCII
[28] AFGHANISTAN In defending the North-West fiontier o{ India from Russisn encroachment,however, ftther more vigour and detcrmination rverc displayed, thouglr evcn here thcrc lrere two conflicting schoolsof thought as to the most elfective form ofdefence. The spread of Russian irlfluence into Persia and Afehanistan Lad becomevery much the core of the Eastem Questionin the 1880s; urc more so sinceoccupstion of ngypt and the abandonment ol Salisbury's Asia llinor schemesmhalethe sun'ival of Turkey's cmpirc a inatter of declining importance to Britain. Prcssurc ftom the Eovcmmcnt of India and ftom the India Omc€ in London now played a major part in dcciding Eastem Qucstion policy. Lytton, Curzon, Robcfis, Lansdo$ne and Salisbury lim'fon'ard' school, !r'hobelievedthat self *'erc all supportersof the the frorticrs of India must bc extendcd to tire river Oxus in oder to keep Russia penned back in Central isia. Their oPponcnts, Northl,rcok, Ripon, Hartington and \'lblseley beklnged to the 'buflcr' school.In theh vicw, the rivcr Indus should mark India's boundary, and Afghanistan should bc left :ls an indepcndent buffer stlrtc. One of thc diflicultics in dealing with Russian moves in this area {as that Russian prcvincial govcrnors and army lcade$ 'fonvard' poticiesin deffanceofinstrucoften followcd thejr on n tions fron St Petetsburg. lvith Lod Lytton as Viceroy and General Robcrts as ttre lcading military ligure, the British 'forwdrd' school had aheady brought about the Afghan war of 1879 80 in oder to estrblish a pro-British regime at Kabul {hich might rcsist incrcasing ltussian pressurcs. But in 1880, Gladstonc ana the ncw Viceroy Lord Ripon bmught about an evacuation of British trcops (which Disracli had also been contcmplating) and medc a trcaty with the ncrv Amir, Abdur Rahman. bv which he retained futl control over domestic aflain' but allorved Britain to control his for.eignpolicy in rctum for a promise ol protection and a subsidy. l'his scttlement \,!'orkcdsuccessfultyuntil thc Penjdch ilcident of 1885. Russi$n anncxation of tr{clv in 188{ and thc advonce
i l
I
NISTAN
170
towards Iferat created a panic in thc India Ofice. Rapid construction of trcop-csrrying railways seemcdnecesssryto prot€ct thc northcm frontie$ of Afghaniston and Persia; but an additional difticulty was that these ftontie$ hsd not yet been clearly dcfined. The Russians'defeat ol an Afghan force at Penjdeh in Marcb 1885 brcught the whole problem into the open and rllowcd Gladstoneto clsrify his attitude to$.ards Russian expansi<,:r.the rcsolution with rvhich he acted (he pcrsuaded the (ilmmons to vot€ a special credit of f,ll million and &chieved o respcctablc compromise settlement with thc Russians)sa\,'ed Afgh{Lnistan- and Indis's defenees and provcd thst bebreen $Dservativc and Liberal policies in Afghanistan therc \vas norv little rca] ditrercncf,. The old Russophil Gladstonc, so evident in 1876 7, llad vanishcd. Disillusioned about ltussia's good inten, lions, he had cven allov'cd Grmville and Northbrook to make plans for naval demonstrutioDsin the lhr East and the Black Sea. Sadly, thc Penjdehhcident ulso revealssomcthing more ofrlle hollownessof Anglo-Russisn suspicions.Although the Russians rrere imprcssedby Glsdstone's warlikc moYcs,the fact $as that Bismarck 1valnedBdtain against allowing her wsrships to forcc the Straits aDd cnt€r the Rlack Sea.Ttre Drcikaiserbund $orhcd in 1885. Thc spccialform of coercionrvhich Salisbrrry had cnvisagedin 1878could not be employed. Whilc Britain vas isolatcdin Ituropc hcr wa$hips could not pass thc Stnits. And rdren tlrc Itussians rcalizcd tl,at G€nnan friendship could protect tlleir I}lack Sea coasts, their pressurein Penjdch rchxcd, Ildeed, it has been suggcstcdthrt the pressurehad actualty been applicd ir ^fghanistan at this particular timc prccisely to provokc a tcst of rvill {Lt the Stnits, in \rhich casethe Russiansprobably never ;ntended thcir moves towards India to be more than a meansof r:oercing Britain €lsewhere.The situation in the Afghanistrn rcgion was stabilizcd aft€r 1885 as Ilussia concentratcd on her thrust to{'ards northcm China, But as late as 1899, Tsa! Nicholas II was still able to say '. . . to immobilizc British policy all over the world, it is only necessaryto telcgaph the order for mobilization of Russian lorces in Turkestar .
TIIE MEDITEBRANEAN
[29] THE MEDITERRANEAN A GR E E M E N T S R€alizotion ofthe daneersin B tain's isolation in 1885 was on€ of the rasons why Satisbury was willing to make thc I{editer" nnean agreementsin 1887. But the agreementsalso aroseout of a new Balkan crisisthich brought Britain end Russiafaceto face again over the question of Constantinople and its hintcrland. The Bulgarian crisis of 1885 7 allo$'ed Salisbury to adopt whal rvas for him the agr€cable$le of support€r of Balkan nationalism, though at first he had assumed thtrt he would have to support the 18?8settlement. SinceAlexaniler ofBattenberg and most of the Bulga an6rvcre now conspicuouslyanti-Russionand sinc€ th€ Turks hed failed to defend thet Balkan mountains frontier - which the British in 1878 had planned that they should - there need be no British opposition to a personalunic'n of Bulgaria and Esstem Rumelia under Prince Alexander. This is what Salisbury succcsstullyproposed in 1886, after the two areas sholred their determinstion to unite any\say. Sali6bur)' was becoming convinced that the creation of stable nationstates in the Bslkans urculd produce a lar more rcliable barrier to Russia's southerly expan6ion than the Turkish ernPire had done, Russia's fierce opposition to the new Bulgarian developments and the kidnapping and deposition of Alexander ('poor San&o' the Queer ctrlled him) by Russian sg€nts in 1886 streDgthenedthe argument for supporting Bslk$n notionalism. A big Bulgario with anti-Russian tendenciescould actually hclp to keep the vit€.t Stmits area in Turkish hands as well as denying Russi& overlaDd a.ccessto tlle Aegean. Iloth Britain and Bussia, thereforc, had srvung rcund to adopt, on the Bulgnrian issuc, attitudes entirely opposit€ to the onesthey had prcssedin 1878. Salisbury, in encoumging a big Bulgaria, was actually undoing what had seemedhis and Disraeli's major achieYementat the Berlin Coneress. Ev€rl4hing depend€d, however, on the Bulgarians' remaining anti-Russian. Their choice of Ferdinand of Coburg es a successor to Alexender in July 1887 scemedto conffrm their rcjection of
AGREDMENTS
181
Russian tutelage, but also made mole likely what had elready been thrcatening, a Russian militsry intewention. Throughout the second half of 1886, Salisbury hed been hampered in his cfforts to present a ffrm front towerds the Russians by the o{,tivities of his Chancellor ol thc Exchequer, Lord Rondolph Churchill. Churchill insisted thst B tain should come to t€rms with Russia over thc Straits and Asia Minor, and evcn obandon them to her, in order to be free to strcngthcn the British position in EgWt. Churchill's resignation in December 1886 gave Salistiury the opportunity to act more 6rmly against Russia,and the rcsult was the conclusionof the tr{editeran€an ageements. There is little doubt that Bismarck, rather than Salisbury, rfas thc primc mover in organizing the agreements; but Salisbury was glad enough to enter into associationswhich would buttress BriLlin's position both in Egypt snd at the Shaits. They did provide clear beneffts ftom the British point of view, much though they also sstis{ied Bismarck. Each agreement took the form of an exchangEof rotes, rather than e folmal tresty. They were as vaguely worded as Sslisbury could make them. IIe rcfus€d to commit futurc Bdtish governments to military obligations. IIe did not reged them as binding alliances,and he emphasized thot they were not preperations for rpsr agsiDst cither Russia or trYance, and were simply designed to prcserve the status quo. But, though Salisbury played down the seriousness of the agreemenb, he had come nesrcr to making an allionce in peacctimc than had any previous Bdtish statesman in the nineteenth century. The ententes eventually made with Frsnce and Russia ir fS04 and 1907 werc e good deal less formal. The tust ogreement, signed with Italy in February and with Aust a-Hungary in March 1887,involved expressionsof mutual support in Egypt, Tripoli, the Aegeanand the BLechS€8.It lyas intended as a vague gcsture of waming to both France und Russia. lVith these two powcls, at thet particular juncture, Britain had no specific quanel, though thele was plenty of underlying distrust. the failure in May of Drumrnond-Wolff 's negotiation8 with the Sultan ovet an evacuetion of Egnt - a lailure due to Russian and French pressurc - snd the morc
142
SALISBURY'S
POLICY
ominous Russian attitude towarils Bulgada lrom July on1vards made an extension of th€ 6rst agreement increasingly desirable. In Dccember, thercforc, there was a further et change of not€s bet$cen the three powers.This secondagreement,while rcamrming cooperation in the areas specified in Februsry/March, added more precise reference to Bulgaria and Asia Minor, wherc the thr€e powers undertook to preserve Turkish suzeninty fmm 'illegal Russian enterp ses'. (Thrkey he$elf $ras not a party to the agreement,largely becauseGoschenthreatened a Cabinct rer olt if Salisburyincluded the Turks.) And so, as so often before, Britain was using associated powe$ to keep the Russi!.ns away from the Dlcditenanean - though Turkey was not no$ sllowed aDy say even in her own preservation. Th€ safeguading of Bulgarian freedom was something on which all thrce, Britain, Italy and Austria-Ilungary could agrce with equal lervoru; but the relerence to Asia Minor {'as a purely Bdtish inclusion rvhich had to be forced on the other two po\rers. And, from the Bitish point of view, there was s further advantage in the agr€ement. Wbile Austda-Hungary $a-s being suppo ed in her anti-Russian stand over Bulgaria, there wes a good chance of ffnally breaking the great bugbeer of British for€ign ministers, the DEikaiserbund, With the conclusion of the seconalMeditenanean egreemcnt, the Bulgarian crisis gradually melted awsy, In trIarch 1888, the Russians, supported by Germany and Franc€, peNuaded the Sultan to depose Ferdins.nd. TLe deposition was grandly announced, and no one took any steps to put it into efrect. Their pride rcstored, and their real objects entirely def€ated, the Russians forgot Bulgaria for a time, and tulned to the Far East. lleanwhile Britain, by her association with Italy and Aust aIlungary, had goined useful supporteN, should she need them, against Russia.and France. (TLe December agreement rcmained in force until 1802.) Association betwe€n Britain and Germany might even have followed, had Bismarck €ver been willing to ollow the eelman army to be r]sed on Britain's behalf against Russia. But Bismarck was far too wily to become Britain's continental ally on those terms, cspecia y as Britain was unwill-
THE AR}IENIANS
184
ing to suppo* another German wsr sgainst Flance, And the cvents ofthe 1890sin the Middle East made it fairly ce ain that Anglo-German friendship was going to become less mther than nore likely.
[30] THE ARIIENIANS, AND SALISBURY'S NEW LINE ON THE STRAITS TIre Armenian massacr€sand the Graeco-Turkish war over Crete complctcd the cstmngement between Britain and Sult€n Abdul Eamid. At the sametime, Austro-Germsn economrcpenetBtion of thc T\ukish empirc, spearheaded by railway building, alamed not only Bdtain, but also Russia and France. All three were apprehensiveabout the efiects of increaseddiplomatic, as well as economic, cooperatioD between Berlin, Vienna anal Constrntinople. Britain fear€d the sprescl of German gooals throughout the trIiddle East, snd the sppearanceof rail-bome German troops on the Persian GuIf. Russis was afraid that the new milways might be used to tft.nspolt Austrc-German and Turkish troops to Armenia and Northenr Pe$ia. and tha.t, with Austm-Gerrnan support for Turkey, there wss little hope of an eventual Russian occupation of Constantinople. trlance fearcd for the safety of her investments throughout the Turkish empire. In these conditions, the wsy was open in the mid-1890s for a radical reassessmentof Bdtain'B attitude tow&rds Russia and the Straits. It ha,s usually been thought that Salisbuly, who said tllat $e had 'bscked the I{mng holse' in the Crimean War, was responsible lor Britain's abandonment of Constantinoplein the 1895-7 crisis. But to acknowledge Salisbury's low opinion of Abdul Il&mid is not to assumethat he was therefore immediately ready to &bandonthe StBits to Russie. J. A. S. Crenville has emphasized,,it Lord, Salisburg and.Foreign Policy, Lbat Solisbury himself was onxious even to follow a P&lmerstonian line: in 1892 and
184
SALISBURY'S
POLICY
1895 he was most concemed to prevent a Russian descent upon the Bosphorus; but e change of mitrd was forced upon him by the attitudes of other powels, by the pressurc oi his Cabinet colleaguesand, most of all, by thc opinion of the Admiralty that the fleet could not in fsct force the Streits. IfBdtish battlcships could not gct through the Dardanelles (becauseof the much improved delcnccs, and because ol thc Franco-Russian alliance) then Britain could not prevent a Russian seizure ol Constantinople, Was theft, ther€fore, sny point in continuing to assumc that the defence of India depended on Turkish possessionof the Straits, particularly since the 1\rks \r'ere Dow so patently urueliable, so subjcct to other, i.e. German, influence, and so momlly iepugnant (following their slaughter of Armenians)? 'We src lish', Salisbury said. The British fleet could not climb l{ount Ararat. And where the fleet could not go, Britain's diplomatic voice was small. Eventuslly, by 1897, Salisbury in private adopt€d the view that a collapse ol the Sultan's power ivas imminent and that, after such a collapse,a Russian occupation of thc Straits was pmbably inevitable. By 1897, this prospect did not unduly worry him, since B tain could foirly easily str€ngthen her position in Egypt bylvay of compensation.But in public, onthe other htrnd, Salisbury still felt obliged to support the tmditional policy of keeping Russia away ftom the Stmits, partly because the British people expected it and partly because Britain's intemational preslige would be damaged by too sudd€n an acceptanceof Russien ambitions. The massacresof Armenians, follolving a revolt in 1894, and a bomb attack on the Ottoman Bank in Constantinoplein 1896, amused for a time all the anti-Turkish fcrvour thet the British people had eraressed in 1876. Gladstone was rcused from rctirement to condemn the Turks ilr his Iast greot public speech at Liverpool in September 1896. The government must take some ection, but both Salisbury and Rosebery (now leading th€ Liberal Opposition) vere convinced that Britain must llot act alorre, There appeared,in 1895,to be & good chance of combining with Russie &nd I'r6nce to lorce reforms on the Sultan for the sske of
'ItID ARMENIANS
t85
the sufrcring Armenians. RoEeb€ry hsd r€cently achieved a scttlement on the thony problem of Afghanistan,s boundaries in the region of the Pa,mir mountains. If a rcally cordial atmos" lrlrcrecould be created between Britain and Russia, the way was llow open for a ffral, lealistic settlement ol the whole Eastem Qucstion. But while the Russians woutd condemn the Turks vcrlJrily, they would not agree to join Britain in using force rgainst the Sultan. There were two re&aonsfor their attitude. l'irstly, they *'ere in disput€ with Britain in the Far East over Ilxi oitcrmath of the Shro-Japanesewar; and secondly, they did not ot this time wish to bdng about I\rkey,s colapse, pa ly l)ccousethey had Armenians under their o\rn mle and par y lxrause they did not }'ish to encowsge any scheme which miqht liring thc Brirish R.et up to the Bo6phorus. Solisbuy, st this stage, was equally determined to plev€nt a sudden Russian descent upon Constantinople, jrhich the general confusion might make possible. UDwiIIing to trust the Russians (rrmpletely, he still felt at the end of 1895 drat the tBditional llolicy ol keeping them away fiom the Straits could not be liglrtly abandoned.As he wrote to coschen in December, ,I am rx)t at all a bigot to the poticy of keeping Russi&out of ConstantiIople. On th€ contBry, I think the English statesmen who l,rought on th€ Crimean War made a mistak€, But th€ keeping ,,f Consfu.ntinople out ol Russian hand6 has now for nearly half a ccntury, if not more, been rnade a vital article of our political r'rced. . , our lame and prestige sre tied up with it: that when it ,rils, the blov will be trem€ndous.' He urq€d the Cabinet to ,r'nsidcrnaval dcmonstrations. and to grrnt the British ambossr(L'r, Curie, the powel to call the fleet up to Constantinople nt his o$'n discr€tion. But the C.abinetwoutd not ag"ee.In some rl'snray, he wrote again to Goschen,who was Filst Lord of the A(lDriralty, 'the {hole world and everybodyexcept the Admiralty lx licves that the Shaits can eosily be forced,, Disappointed I'v tlie lack of suppod from his colleagues, by tbe timidity of t l r novy and by the collapse of Anglo-Russian-French cooperalrtrr, he gradually began to feel his way towards a new policy ,lrrflne1896.
186
SALISBURY'S POLICY
The situation by December 1E95 had, after sll, reached a complete impasse.Russia rvould not join Britain in helping the Armenians partly because she want€d to keep the British fle€t out of the Shait6. Salisbury wanted to be eble to send the fle€t into the St$.its in order to stop the Russians helping the Arm€nians by sttacking Corgtantinople on their own. The Cabinet, on the advice of the Admiralty, lyould not consider allowing the fleet to enter the Straits, Public opinion in Britain demandedhelp for the Armenians. And Satisbury dared not act alone to help them, for fear of uniting ffve powers against Britain - in defenc€ of Turkish integrity. The French would certainly follow Russia in suspecting Britlin's motivcs. The Cermans and Austria-Ilungary refused cven to condenrn the Armenian massacms. In such a position, Salisbury $.as almost bound to seek an accommodation with Russia. IIis opportunity came during the Tsa}'s visit to B tain in September 1896. The convsNations between Salisbury end Nicholas II at Balmoral are a straDEe echo of those beiwcen Aberdcen and Nicholas I in 1844. When Salisbury urged common action by th€ powers against the Sultan, the Tsar brought up the question of the Stmits. In his replies, Salisbury madc it quitc clear that the former British dgidity had been succeeded by a more flcxiblc rcalism. 'Th€ intercst of England in the matter '!r'as not so Lrryc as that of otbers, and *'as purely maritime' - that is, 6he hail no tenitorial ambition, no wish to hold Constsntinople or Gallipoli. 'The theory that Tu*ish ruIe at Const&ntinople was a bulwark to our Indian empire could not be ms.intsin€d' that is, perhaps even Russia, in the aftermath of a Turkish collapsc, could €v€ntually take Constanthople. S&lisbury did not sugg€st that he rsanted an immediate Turkish partition, and ncither did Nichotas ; but the Prime tr{inister indicated thet, if tbe status quo could not be preserved, then Russis. might have the Shaits, and Austria"Ilungary must have compensstion, while Britain must fonnally take over Eg]?t. Nicholas wa.seven more tentative. IIe did not wish for any fudher tenitory, but he must h&ve 'the key to the door' of his house - that is, freedom of sccessthrouoh the Straits.
'IHE ARIIENIANS
r87
The discussionsended inconclusively. Yet, though no agreemcnt emerged, Salisbury had prepared the ground for a very
188
SALISBURY'S
POLICY
Russia was achieved in spite of the Balmoral conv€rsationg ; the day of Anglo-Russian friendship had not yet drwned; and the Armenians were lcft to endure their suffe ngs as best th€y could. Nevedbeless, the geat powers, together, Il'erc able to agree on s settlement in 1897 of the Grseco-Tulkish war, which had broken out over a rcbellion on the island of Crcte. None of the powe$ was willing to act stmngly against the Ttrrks, thoueh the settlement imposed did rath€r fevour the Greeks (whose Prince Gcorge was allowed to become Govemor of the island under nominal Turkish suzerainty). Germany and Aust a-Hungary took no pe in peBuading the Turks to make a settlemcnt. But the whole aff&ir indicsted that th€ powers were not at that tim€ preparcd to allow the prcblems of Turkey to cause a m8jor crisis between them; and the most signiffcant event of 1897 was the agreement signed in May betwecn Russis snd Austria,Ilungary to preserve the status quo in the trIiddle East and, as it is said, to put thc Eastern Question on ice. From the British point of view, this agreement canre dangercusly close to recreating the Dreikaiserbund. This was the more worrying as rclations betwecr Britain and Russia over China ivere det€dorating, wbile C*rman ambitions in Turkey were becoming rapidly more obvious.
[BI] THE BAODAD RAILWAY It is eesy to exagg€rate the impotance of Anglo-Gcrman, economic rivalry in Turkey, though the strat€gic riyslry did have quitc serious implications. The fsct was that no geat po$,er depended on it6 ecodomic links with Turkey for more than a, smoll ftrction of its overall wealth. Neverthelcss,os in thc case of China, it rvas the potentialitics for trading exp&nsionwhich \r'ere stresscd, and which caused governments to thil* ol trying to excludc rivals. Britain was still Turkey's main trading partner in 1914, but the speed with which Cerm&ny was catching up alter l90O gave ceusefor some concern.By 1914, the G€rman holding of Turkish govemmcnt bonds had gm$'n to 20 pcl cent ftom
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190
S.{LISBUNY'S
POLICY
4.Tpcrcentin 1884.AswithPsnslavism, itwasnotthepmfessional rcalism ofstatesmen, but the optimistic schemesof the amateurs, joumalists and scholers - and in this case speculato$ too - which caught the public's notice, and in B tain, amused anti,celmsn excitcment, Pangerman dreams, and the cstablishment of a military and commercial 'llfitteleurcpa', did seem to threateB British (and FleDch) economic and financial intercsts in the Middle East. The British public $as very ready to assume that German and Austro-Ilunga :rn domin"lnce of ttre Bslkans, Asia MinorandMesopotamiawasanalarminganddange$uspossibility. What most attract€d ett€ntion $'as the 6cheme to build a railway to Bagtlad. By 1888, a rail link had been completed from Vicnna through Serbi,a to Bulgaria, lvhich gave AustriaI{ungary the power to dominate the Balkans commercially. And, becauseof the close diplomatic ties betwcen Aust a-Hungsry and Germany, it was increasingly assumed in Bdtain that AustrcIlungarian moves werc mercly a preludc to a far bigger Cerman economic tbrust. In the struggle to gain milway and otLer concessions, the Germans, and the Deutsche Bank, began to forge ahead. German companies built a line from the Bosphorus to Ankam by 1802.In 1899, a preliminary concession\r-asgranted to allow the Germans io conshuct a linc through to Bagdad snd Ba$a neer the head of the Persian Grnf. In 1909, a complaisant Sultan agrced to a tuller and rnorc formal concession. The Bagdad railway, slowly constructcd and incomplete in 1914, became for msny in Bdtain a powerful symbol of cerman commercial and military aggressivencss. B€cause it suggested Geman mastery at Constentinople, Ir'here once British influence had been parsmount, and becauseit provided & secureland route outflanking Suez and British seapowcr, it rvas loohed upon as a special sofi of affront to Britisb dignity. And yet the sense of outrage in Parliament and the newspapers was .v-ery largely urjustified by the rcalities of the situation. \l']ren the compsny Eas rcsdy to begin conshuction of the line in 1903,the hope was that part of the rcquircd cepital might be nised in London. There w&s certainly no intention in Oermsny of k'.€ting thc vcniur underexclusiveGermanffnancialeontroi.
' I H E T ] A GD A D R A I L W A Y
191
At the time, Balfour and Lansdo\yDe, respectively Prime trIinister ond Foreign S€cretary, favoured th€ idee of Bdtish financial participation. They regarded the lailway as a usefirl anti-Russian device, and they rere not especiallyconcernedabout the effccts of G€rman €conomicpenetration - which seemedmorc a matter of cepital investment than of selling goods, whereas Britsin's cconornic interest in Turkey {'as mther th€ reyerse. (Since the l87os, the Bdtish desireto sellgoodsin Turkey had predominated ovcr the dcsire to invest capital). Although the Ba.Uour Lsnsdowne view $ss overborne by the pressure ofParliamentary, press and ffnancier opinion, British governments generally remaincd lcss hostile to thc railws.y project than did the Russian and Frcnch govemments. In 1918-14, Britain concluded ogreemeDts with both Turkey and Germany on the u6e and cxtent of the line, and obtained guaDntees for British shjpping on the Tigris and Euphrates and for British control of the Persian Aulf, including the oil-bearingrcgions, The economicaspectsof trIiddle llastem Dilwsy schemesIvere evidently not a mrior causcotthe Crcat War in 1914. D1.enRussio (in 1911)and France (in 1Ol4) rcach€d egreement $'ith Gemany on separate spheres olinfluence for railway building. Whrt did srouse more serious spprehension among British nrjnisters $_erethe stntcgic possibilities o{ Ce}man"built railwoys. New land-routes bcyond the contrcl of British flcets were ah'ays viewed with suspicion, Yet even here fears werc cxeated lllrsely by the tactless public utterances of tlre Kaiser and by overbearingGerman actions in other areasthan the Middle East. WiJliam II's well-publicizcd visits to Constantinoplein 1889and 1898,and his auouncemcnt dudne the secondvisit that he $as lLc 'friend' of threc hundred million lloslems, sussestcd tllat (lrrmany was pu$uing a much more calculated policy than was ir) fact the casc.And, even so, the British \ycrc abte to make local rgrecments which could ctrectively nullily any hypothctic&l (;crman advances. The main object up to 1S00 \yas to ke€p ( icrmany - and Russi& too - awuy from the shores of the Persiar (;ulf (prctcction of India still being the main motive). After 1909 (wlicn thc Anglo-Pe$ian Oil Company rvasloundcd)the secuing
192
SALISBURY'S T'OLICY
of oil fields became equelly importent. Itr 1809, even beloE the preliminary agreement fol the Bagdail railway, Lord Curzon forced the Sheikh of Kuwait and the Sulten of Oman to acceDt Brilish guidance on the mat l.€r of loreign conce<sionswithin their tenitories. Curzon, as Vicercy, was clearly acting to protect the west€m approaches to Indi&, No C€lman (or Russian) milwoys or harbour installations were going to appesr on the shores of the Culf, if the govemment of India had its way, It remained British policy right though to l9t4 to keep other powe$ &wsy from the Persisn Gulf. In 1903, howeve!, wben the Bagdad milway became a distinct pmbability, British thinking on the Eastem Question hed reached another of the regular crises of ind€cision - in which the problem was to distinguish the real enemy. For, at the time when German activity was becoming more obviow - if not alarming - in the Middl€ East, relations with Ru$ia were et a particularly low ebb. In the end, it w&s German military and naval activity in westem Europe which helped to magnify the eelman menace in the Middle East in British eyes. And so slso with Russia; it was fear of Russian activity in northem China whieh prevented an easy accommodation with her et the Shaits and in Persia. The Middle East was becoming the focus of great powcl rivahies which oft€n had their true oriqin anal substance elsewhere.
[32] ANGLO-JAPANESEALLIANCE AND FRANCO-BRITISII ENTENTE By 1897, Britsin's atta.Lment to the old policy of bolstering up Trukey had almost gone, Even the need to close the Stmits to Russian wsrships was no longer self-evident. Yet, just at the time lvhen an a.ccommodation with Russia seemed the logicsl stlrp, Russiar embitions in Manchuria reawakened and strengthencd all the old Russophobia which the B tish had felt on caflicr occasions du ng the nincteenth century. The Anglo-
ANGLO-JAPANDSE ALLIANCE
193
Jspanese alliance of 1902 was the ody alliancc entered into by the B tish betweeD1815and 1914,aped from the Anglo-French partnership during the C mean Wax. Both slliances, that of 1854and that of 1902,wcre directed against Russis. Even when Russie was no longer active at the Stmits, even when Britain's occupetion of Egt?t had given her rcal securiry in the tfiddle Dast, the tredition of fear and distmst died had. What Britain wanted in 1902,ofcourse, was rnilitary assistancein the Far East to prcvent Russisn cncroachments on the British trading positioD ;r northem China. She also wanted to prevent a possible Russo&panese agreement directed against her. (Japan was negotiating withbothB tain and Russiain the autumn of I90t.) But snother Dajor objective, ,ivhich11asnot achieved ir 1902, thouqh it was in 190i, was a Japan.seunderrskingto hctp ro defc;d India from Russia. Defence of India, by now the core of the Eastem Question in the Bdtish view, still dominated Blitain's foleien and sbategicpo,icies. The Anglo-Japanese alliance pleased the eemsns, who wanted to scethe continuanceof Anglo-Russianhostitity; but it wor ed the French desperately, since they could see themselves beins ,lrrwn thereby intu an Anglo-Russian$ar on the sido of their Itussian ally. The alliance .was therefor€ one ol the chief lactoN in bringing about the Fmnco-British Entcnte of 1904: for the French wete anxious to 6ettle their colonial quarels with Bdtain ond to be ftce to ex€rcise a restraining influcnce on both Russian :rnd British policy. As it happened, rhe chicf survivins coloniat ,tuJrrclsbetw.en Britain and Frcnce uerc con.emed with the lisstem Question , the status of the tll,o powe$ h ltgwt and :\lorocco, in fact. And so, onc principal effccr ot the Angto.l.pancse alliance \r'as an accommodstion bctween Britain and I,'r'rncein the llcditerraneaD, freeing the British of tl)eir fear ,,l Franco-Russiannai.al predominance there. Thc Entente did t'ot prcveDt Britain's helping Japan during the Russo-Japanese $!lr of 1904-5 (by keeping Russia's Black Sea fleet bottted ul) Itrlind the StEits); nor did it prevent the Russiansftom resarding the Japanesc as mere ps.wns of the British. But it did , r'c.'uragea peaceffrlsolution to the Dogger Bank episode(when
194
SALlSBURY'S
POLICY
the RussianBaltic fleet filed on British ffshingboats by mistake), a crisis which the Germaa6thought we6 bouEd to produce an Anglo-Russianwar. The day ol possible Anglo-Gennan cooperation was passing now. In 1901,the Germanshad onceagain refusedto ofrer help to Britain sgainstIlussia(or/erMenchuria).In 1905,with Russia decisively checkedin the Far East by Britain's new ally, and 'with Anglo-French quarrels in North Africs, settled, the B tish no longer neecledGermsn or Austro-Ilungarian help against Russiain the MiddleEast. Already,in 1903,an Admimltyrcport had suggested that the openingof the Shaits to Russia'sBlack \roulal Sea wa$hips not materially afrect the balance of seapo\rer in the Mediterroneen, I? Russie by 1905 was no longer feared either in China or at the Stnits, the $ay was open to a settl€mentin the onercmainingercaof dispute,i.e. Persia. Finally, a little more must be said of the Franco-British Entente as it concemed the Eastern Question. Although an understanding ws.smore earnesUy sought by Flance than by Britsin, the Entente did bdng distinct advantagesto Britain both in Egypt s.nd in the westem llealiteEenean. Britain's militery contml of the Nile valley had been ensured by the settlement which followcd Fashoda,but there still rcmained the problem of ftench obstructivenessover Egypt's ffnsnces.The 1904 Entente rcmoved this prcblem, con3idel&bly lightening Cromer's task, anal at the 6sme time freeillg Britsitr ftom her depeDdenceon Cerman good-\trill over Egypt. Over Morocco, Bdts.in's main concern was to prot€ct Giblalter and her warships'psssegethmugh the Cibraltsr straits by ensuringthet the l\Iorccca.r coastline r€m&ined unfortiffed. This the Frcnch freely promised,in retun for British acceptanceof predominant French influ€nce in Morccco. The Entente thus considerobly gtrengthenedB tain's naval position in the Meditenanean. By endingwonies about the wcst€rnholfofthe s€a,it pmvided much greatel fr€€dom of action in the eastern half; and therefore removed what had beenthe most imiteting aspectof the FrancoRussianDual Alliance. The 1904 Untente was not in itself a responseto Celman
ANGLO-JAPANDSE
ALLIANCE
moves in the Middle East or elsewhcrc i but it freed Britain from dcpendence on Germany, and by apparertly setUing Morocco's future, it cnsured that Britain would ect against cermany vhen the Kaiser began to display his owr interest in this crucial stmtegic region, German railway-building in T\ukey might not on its olr'n have been enough to arouse B ti6h enmity but, when jt was accompanied by hefty German naval prcgrammes and by German interest in Tsngier and the entrance to tlle Mediteranean, then Eastern Question factors do begin to expl&iq at least in part, why Britain act€d es she did in August 1914. Very much the same factom werc still at work in 1941.
TIURTIIDR READING
W
Princinal Events. 1878-1907 Fwther Bead,ing 187s. Austro-GermanDual Alliance 1879-€0.Alghan war 1879 81. British milibry consulsin Asia Minor 1880. Gladstone replacesDturaeli as Pdme Minister l88lSecEt treaty betweeDAustria'Hungaryand Selbia.French annexation of Tulk. Dreikaiserbund renewed. Ottoman Public Debt Administmtion sct up 1882. Bdtish occupation of Egpt. Triple Allianc€ (AustroGennan plus Italy) lEE3, Ausho-Gemsn-Rumanienagreement 1884 5, Gordonin the Sudan 1885. Six"powerloan to Egypt. Penjdehincident - British wsrships not sent into the Blatk Sea 1880. Salisbuy Pime lrlinister. Bitish support for union of Bulgsria and E&stem Rumelig 1687. MediteEaneenAgreements 1891. Flanco-RussianErtent€ 1893. RussianBaltic squadronvisits Toulon 1894. Franco'RussianDuel Alisnce 1894-0. Armenianmassacreg 18e6. TalLs between Salisbury and Tssr Nichohs II 1897. Gmeco-Turkish war over Cretc. Austrc'Russien aglecment on Turkey 1898. Battle otomdurman Kaiser'ss€condvisit to Constantinople. (sudan)snd Fashodac*is 1809. Pfelimin-ary sgreement for Bagdad milwsy 1900. Irnsdowne Forcign Secretary 1901. I{opes of Anglo German elliance against Ru$ia sbaDdoned 1002. alliance- directedsgainstRussia Anglo-Japanes€ 1003. Serbie now pro'Russian, Mitsteg progrartune (Al6troRussian) for Macedonis 1004. Funco-BritishErtente 1904 5. Russo-Japenesewar 1905. Revolution in Russis. I{omccan crisis. Grey Foreign Secretsry
(lTorks by the followins autho$, {'hich have already been suggested, continue to be relevsDt: Merdott, Ande$on, gurcwitz, Miller, Platt, Bullard, 'Iemp€rley Hoskins,Marloxe, Gmhem,Seton-IYatson, and Pcnson, Morley, Magnus, Cecil, Medlicott, Langer, Tsylor, Pribram, Fanie.) lY. N. M€dlicott, Bisnar&, ClaMatlc and thr Concst of Europe. Athlone hess (Lo don, 1956). C. J. Lose, The ncluctant Impdiali,s,s: Bri,tish Foreign Policy, 18787912.Routledge(London,1967). J. A, S. G.e ville, tol., Sarrsblrraand Foreign Poitcv. Athlone Press (London, 1964). G. Non9e\ I:he End of Isolation: Btiltuh Foreig PolicA, 1900-190f. Nelson(London,1063). 'lY. L Ianger, Th2 Dipl,onracsol Imperial.ism, 1890-1902. ]Ilr\,o,r<\ Unive$ity Press(Cambridge,Mass.,r95r). I. R, D. Foot, tri,isn TroreignPolics sin.ce1898.Ettchinson (London, r950). ,4..J. Mader, Bdrtst NanalPolicg, 1880-1905: TheAnalomVof Brithh Sea Pouer. Pfir-,rn (London, r94r). n. M. narle, Tulhcv, thc Great Powers dnl th? Ba$dad naibas. Macmillan(NewYork, 1923). K. M. Chapman,CreatBrila.;n and.the Daeda.lna;tua|, 1888-1914. Srnith Colleg€(Northsmpton,Mass.,1948). D. C. Blaisdell, European Finatnial Contral.in the Ottoman Enpire, ColumbjsUnivcrsity Press(Ncw York, 1e2e). II.f.ts, nunpe thelvarld'sBanker,1870-1914.voleUniversity Press (Newhsven,ConD,,reso), R. L. C.eaves, Pdl$ta and th! Delen.e af India, 1884 1892. Ltblone hess (London,le59). l|. Kazemzadeh, Il1$sia and Britai in Pdsia, aL1911, vsle University Prcss(New Ilaven, Conn.,1068). Afaf Lutff Al-SslTid, EgWt ld Cromer.A St d,! in Anglo-EgAptim I&lartor#.John Munay (London,1968) MattorJre, JCramerin D\ypt. nlek (London,1070).
lSa
SALISBURY'S POLICY
J . J , M^thews, EgWl ann tlv Fonnatiotl of lho Angla-Fwwh Enlmte. Unive$ity of PcrmsylvaDis Pr€$ (Philadelphia, rese). B. H. Surnner, ?sardrn. arrd Inwidi.tm in lhs Fot Eatt andMiddlt tad. Oxford Unive$ity Pr€Ns(London, reaz). I'or 'N€w CsEbridge Modem llistory', s€€ refercnces on pages 161 and 251.
PART VII The Anglo-RussianEntente and its Limitations, 1907-74 I B B ]G E N E R A L F A C T O R S It is convenient, but also misleadiug, to reg&rd tie yea!6 1007 to l9l4 ss a mete pElude to trle G!e&t Wa?, itr which ell diplomatic activity leads inevitably to the oDegr€&t catastrophe. It would be mor€ realistic, snil in the eail more helpfirl, to seetlre events of these seveDyear6 ss a cotrtiDustion of previous maDoeuvres among the powels, ent[ to r€gard the Grest Wer ss something of aD accidental interruption. Such e view wor d certsiEly be mole &pplopda.t€to s study of Blitain, Ru6si&and the Eastern Questiotr,for therc w&s no Bualdenworkitrg-out of solutions and settling of aliffer€ncesbefor€ 1014. British policy remained ss flexible and impreciee as ever, and much ArgloRussisn suspicionpersisted in spite of the 1go7 EDtente. Even if Germany hail becomea seriousdval of Britain in the trIi(Ae East by 19Ir, Bussi&had not yet b€comes true lliend. It tooL an enforcetl partae$hip tluring the war itself to bring sbout a more genuinesettlemetrtofAlglo-Bussien diq)ut€s, particula y over the StBit€ question. The tS07 Ent€lte alialnot mesn an immediate hsrdelring of aligDments - Triple Allierrce'verzus Triple Entente - or the creatioa of e ffrm Anglo.Russienberrier to Gerrna.ninfluencein Turkey, Whst especiallydistinguishesthi! seyeo-yesr,pr€.war period is the reiivsl of g!e6t powe! concentratioaon Balkan pmblems. These,Bther thaa aDy otier sspecfuof Turkfuh decline,beceme
200
THE ANGLO-IrUSSIAN
I]NTENTE
again the chicf focus of attention, as they had been in 1875-8 and 1885 7. A Bosnian cdsis in 1908 9, and Balkan wars in l9l2-13, alalmed the powels, ond the Creot lvar itsell arcseort of an Austro-Serb quarrel. But, by contrast with earlier p€riods of Balkan unrcst, the British r61enow was almost that of a dctached observer.Britain was v€ry much in thc position of s v'ell-meaning outsider, offe ng useful suggestionsdesigned to preserve the peace; in many respects,she had rcverted to her early eighteenth century r61e in Balkon affairs, \r.ith the important difrerence tha.t he! vastly incrcased internetional status gave to her propossls a comespondingly grester authority, Rcatly it was the Bismarckian lunction that Britain had taken over, now that, since 1890, the Cerman govcmment had cLosen to involve itself more directly in the tsalkans. B tain's well-meaning outsider r6le is perticula+ evidcnt during the Macedonian trorrbles of 1908 to 1909, duriDg the Balkan Wars, and in the l&st days of July 19t4. But in each of these cases,the issuesseemedremote ftom rcsl B tish interests. so far as the geneml public was concerned. Balken conflicts had become a sort of quaint music-hall joke. Dvcn fle {rssassinstion at Sarajevo scarcelymedted specialnoticc in the popular view. And in the Foreign Ofiice view, the chief busincss rvas to prcr,ent Balkan conflicts from lcading to s great power rvar. There was no other specilicslly B tish interc$t to defend. The 1904 Entente with France wes the basis o{ this attitude of benevolentdetachment. Renl security in Eg}?t and a favourable naval balanee in the Meditenanean weft both assured by the Ent€nte; and these allowcd Britain to view a possible dissolution of the Turkish empire in the Balkans without alarm. The only threats to this serenc confialence over lleditemnean affairs were provided by German activiti€s in Morocco. In fact, much of B tain's attention during thc seven pre-war years was tulnly directed towerds the danger of a cermen hegemony in Euope, espccially western Europe. The Crowe llemorandum of January 1907, an exontinition of Anglo-Frcnch and AngloGerman relations, stressedparticula.ly the menace of German ambition. The lact that Sultan Abdul Hamid before 1008. and
GDNERAL F,{CTORS
201
thc Young Turks aft€rwads (apad fiom a brief outburst of Anglophilhm) were stounchly prc-cerman pror-id€s a fur rcr reason for growing British indifference to Turkey's troubles in lIc Bslkans. On the Dastem Question, the one rcal concem that remaineil was to ensure the salety of the peNian Culf and Afshenistan: that is. tn ensue tb. rxclusioD of both Rursia und C""-orr., from lhese arcas.Until the signingot the Ig0? EntFntF,there $as no certainty as to .whether Russie or eermany posed the greater threet there, and some doubt rcmained even afterwards. On the Straits question, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office had now quietly &bandoned the assumption thai Russiu warships must be kept out of the eastern Mediteranean: but there was as yet no ffrm decision as to whether the Straits shoula remain Trrrkish, or should uitimately become Russian. It was still lelt difficult, as it had been for Salisburv in 1896 7. to dc.larepuhlicly thst Russiamjght as we Lcva Con.tantinopt., or evcn that her wenhips might Lavc rigtrl of prssugelhrough the Straits. This dimculty appearcd particutarly during the Rosnian crisis of 1908, when the previous ycar's nntente 1vas leFn to hsve liltlF meaningon lhis issue. Russia'8 intercsts at the Straits were really defensive still, rathcr ths.n aggressive.It is ineccurate to assumethat after her defeat by Japan, Russialost interest in the Far East and becsme exclusively active in the Bleck Sca region. She did, however, want effective contml over the Straits, though not necessarily sovercignty st Constsntinople. IIer objects rvere threefold. She vished to exclude foreign warships from the Black Sea; and, with thc St&its still ir Turkey's hands, the rvarships of a Turkish ally (such as Britain earlier, or perhaps Gennany norv) might b€ free to pass through from the lUeditensnean. Sccondlv. she wirhed to cnsurethe entry of her own Btack Sea warsl,i;s into lhe ltediterreneanand of her Battic $arshipsinlo the Bta;[ S.lr. Thirdly, she must safeguardthe passsgeof her merchant vessels into the ll€diterranean, carrying ss rlley did the expc{ts of wheat upon which Russio'slinancial stability - in paricular Ler lbility to rcpay foreign loans - depended.
202
TIIE ANGLO.RUSSIAN
ENTENTE
Outside the Black Sea regioD, Russia continued to hope for future aalvances.The completion of th€ Trans-Sibe sn railnay wes hasten€d, arrd in Persia, the Russians ivould clearly hsve liL€d an extensionof their teEitory ght through to the Gulf if possible. Commercialand political infilttation continueal,particularly in northern Persia and at the capital, Teherani but the Russiansl{erc realistic herc. Thcy rccognizedthat British power in the GuIf area was prealominant. They also felt ab.rm at the extension of Cerman influence via the Bagdad railrvay, particularly since it still seem€dthat the Germans and the British might act togethe} egsinst Russia. They were ther€fore willing enough to accept a partitioning of Persie into spheresof influencein the Entent€ ol 1907.
[34] THE ANGLO.RUSSIAN ENTENTE It is clear, both from the nature ofthe sgreement itself, and from subsequent events, that the Anglo-Russien Entente was of shictly limited scope, in the letter and in tlle spirit. After a ccntury of habitual distrust, there was little evidence of any new openness or goodwill in Anglo-Russian relations. The Entente was very much what Frcnch encour&gement, and subBequent German annoys.rce, made it. In itseu, it was no more than a settlement of colonial disputes, such as Britain had already achieved in 1899 and 1904 with Fmnce - and with Germeily in 1890 and 1898, The links ol both Britain and Russia with France, however, helped eventually to give the Entente greater Permanence. Russia hail a specis.l need of financial and diplomatic lollowing thc Japanese support from France (padicularly in 1905); and she was therefore the victory ond the revolution less able to *sist French pressurc when llsncc nanted to include B tain in a triple, anti-GermaD&ssociation.Russia.herself wos glad cnough to accept the existence of a Triple Entente after her humiliation in 1908-9. Such an associa.tion s€emed a
THE ANGLO.RUSSIAN
I]NTENTE
203
Decessary count€rweight to the Austm-Geman bloc efter Aushia-Ilungary's success in annexing Bosnia. But, in 1902, it was France (rather thaD Russia or Britsin) who really wished to creatc e Triple Entente. Therc was no coraliality bctween Britain snd Russi{i evcn eft€r 1909,only e certoin grim realism on both sideswhich kept drem together in casc German ambitions threatencd to set out of conlrut. Arglo-Russiun dilputes 'n Persia appeareJ again in 1911, in spite of the 1907 agreement. The 1905 rcvolution in Russia, and its brutal supprcssion, served to maint&in British hostility towalds Tselist autoclacy. Evelr the establishment of the Dums system in 1906 (a minimal parliamentary alemocmcy for Russia) fsiled to qeate a favourabl€ impression here. The Liberals (who rvere iD poerer in Britain from De.rmber Ig05 onwads) had absolutely abandoned the Gladstonian illusions of the 1870s. Russia was no longer respectetl as an especially 'Christian' power. The German menace rlid not suddenlv tEns" form her into an angcl ol mcrcy - as she bod brie8y scemedto Glsdstone in 1877. Palme$tonian attitudes were comins to the fore in mdi.ol Liberal quarters. whereby Russia was presented as a more funalamental tbreat to the European balance than ever Gcrmany could be. This view finds effective expression in C. p, Scolt'' Manxh.skr Gua ian edrk)rj^l oI I Aupust 1914. \{hite limly denying that lhc ba,ame ot power was s;mcient justification for Britain's entry into a general war, t]Ire Manchister Guardian is eqlrally frrlJ].tb&t, if the balance of power were e\'er to be endangcr€d, it \ras Russia and not Gemrany whom B tain should most fcar. 'If Russia wins [the forthcoming war], th€re $'ill be the greatest distrub&nce of the Balance of power that the world hes ever seen. the whole condition of our continueal existence ss an Asiatic Power will have to be revised, and over all the wo d, wherever we come into contact with Russia, we shall have a repetition of the self-efracement which we have witnessedin Persia.' Despite British misgivings, however, a settlement of AnsloRuslian colonial disputeshad been in t}e air 6ince t90s, tho;gh no actual progress had been msde before 1906. In thet vear.
204
'IHE ANGLO-RUSSIAN
ENTNNTE
Anglo-Russien support for France over Morccco (at the Alge_ ciras Confe.ence) provided an example of diplomatic coopeBtion rvhich lcd to ftuther negotiations; and British finance contributcd to the ereat Frcnch loan which helped to reestablish Nicholas II after the disaste$ of 1905. (This was the first such contdbution since the Crimeen lVar.) Grey, the Liberal Forcign Secretary, had been aware in 1906 that a B tish link $ith Russia might be a futwe means o{ restraining Gemany' But though his attention was increasingly occupied by the Gcrman 'useful'), he did not or.oblem fte found the Crowe Memorandum yet feel that a complete s.ssociation with Russia wss cither dcsirable or possible. ltere was thercforc a Dther tentetive, conditionat air about the British spproaches to nussia. The Entente was to be a settlement of diffcrences iust in cose future cooperation might be nece$ery. The aliscussions which produced the Entente rl€re conducted in St Petersburg by Sir tuthur Nicolson, who had been British rcpresentative at Algeciras and had already made contact with the Russians there. the chicf featue of the settlem€nt was a triDartite division of Persio, but therc ll'erc also agreements about th; shtus of Tibet and Afghanistan. In Tibet, the two powe$ agreed on a non-inten'ention policy, in spite of the promise of exclusive British influencc brought by the Younghusbsnd expedition of 1905. In Afghanistan, the existence of British paramountcy was rccognized by thc Russians, who pmmised to have no dealings with the Amir except thrcugh British agents. So, Tibet had become a neutral buff€r zone to protect Iirdia in the north'east (as Siam aheady was in the south-cast); and Afghanistan had bccome a bufrer-zone under British supervision in the north-west. Persia wss divided into three distinct areas, with o Russisn sphere ol influence in the north, a Bdtish sphere in thc southeast (contiguous to both Afghanistan and India) snd e neutnl zone - the buIler princiPle again - in the centre. Cul?on objected that the terms were unnecessadly generour, giving Russi& a much latger arca than B tain hrd, and contml of eleven out of twclvc Dajor Pe$ian to{'ns, including Tehcran But Nicolson's
TII& BOSNIAN CRISIS
205
aims had clearly been stmtegic rather th&D potitical. The neutral zone not only kept the Russisn and B tish spheresapart, it also penned back the Russianssome 200 milcs from the watcn ofthe Gulf. So long as the Russians remained landlocled in Persia, thcrc was evideDtly no immediste elarm at the prospect of Russian political intrigue in the north of th€ country (though both powers had ectually prumised to respect Persis's integrity and independ€nce), Such was the Entente in 1S07. It remains now to 6eewhat effcct subsequent events had on the strength of the AngloRussian rclatioNhip, Il th€ ogreementson P€rsia, Afghanistan and Tibet worked well, it very much appearedthat Britain had, by 1907, achievcd all hel ends ir the Middle East. A collepseof Turkish power in Syria, Palestine and llesopotamia could probably only add to her already securehold on India and the routes to it. This, of course, v.as before oil, in Persia and the Culf, came to have the commercial and mititary significance that it had acquired by 1914, It $'as diseovercd, in marketsble quantities, in southem Persio only in 1008.
[ 3 5 ] T H E B O S N I A N C R I S I S ,t 9 o 8 - e the Bosnian crisisaroseout of the continuing rrish in Vienna and St Petersburg to benefit ftom re supposedly inevitablc colapse of Turkey-in-Europe. While highlighting the problem of Balkan n&tionalism, the crisis also raised once more the question of Russia and the Straits, ard hclp€d to reveal the state of B tish thinkiDg on the matter. Eerly in 1908,a pmposal by Aerenthal, the Austro-Hunga an tr'oreign Minister, to survey a railway mute through the Sanjak of Novibazar aroused Russian apprchension.The Sanjak had been occupicd by Austden forcessince 1878, 1vith the express purpose ol separating Serbia from trIontenegro; and AeFnthel now intended, apparently, to run a rrihray through it to provide a continuous link between YienDa
206
THE ANGLO.RUSSIAN
EN'fENTE
and Salonika. Russi&n apprehension produced s counter-proposal from St Petersburg for a railway across the Balkans to the Adriatic; but Russian lears were especially concentruted on the thrcst to future Serbian unity which an Austrian link of Salonika would prcve, The lact was that since 1908, when the Kara Georye d]'nasty \{as restored, Serbirn policy had assumed an openly anti-Austien line, entl the Serbs no\ir looked conffdently to Russia for encouragement and support. It proved increasingly difficult for the Russians to accept a defeat of Scrb hopes {'itho$t thefiNclves suflering e al&ng€rousloss of prcstige. The situation was further complicated by the f$ct that, militarily, Russia was as yet in no condition to adopt forcetul policies, folordng the t9o5 ddback; and also by the existence,between 1906 and lgtl, 'Pig War') between Serbia' of a p vate ta ff war (known as the rf,es livestock, (Serbia's chief expo and Austria-Hungary, particularly pigs.) IlI these circumstances, the outbrcek of the Youlrlg Turk revolution ags.inst Abdti Eamid in JuIy 1908 caused both Aust a-Hungary and Russia to rcYiew their immediate needs in the Balkans. The revolution, a nationalist outburst among army officers, suggested that &ssumptions of continuing Turkish weakness might ho.vc to be abandoned. The controlled decline of Turkey's empire might bc at an cnd. Therefore, hoping to take what they wanted lr'hile therc w&s still tirne, Aerenthal and the Russien Foreign }linister, Isvolsky, met at Buchlau in September 1908. Therc they e.gr€ed (though their later accounts ol the shoulcl annex proce€dings differed) that Aust a'Ilungary of navigagained freedonr Bosnia and Ilezegovma while Russia tion thrcuelt thc Stmits. The Russisn line was very much IsvolsLy's own. IIe was preparcd to dash Serb hopes of a union betlv€en Serbia and Bosnia in rctum for a spech.cular Russian success at the Strsits. He found that his own hime Minister, Stol'?in, was markedly unenthusiastic. In fact, Isvolsky was a sort of lgnatiev, pu$uing a dramatic forwad policy which left Russia dangerously exposed and left himself open to ftpudiatior by his o]fn noste$ in St PeteNburg. It hos been alleged that his concern to open th€ Straits was absurd at a time, following
THE BOSNIAN CRISIS
207
Tsushima in 1905, when actual Russian Daval strength \eas sljght. But this ignores Russia,s increasing reliance or her grain exporls from Black Se, port6 (shipmcnts doublcd brtween lg08 ond I9l0). Guaranieedfreedom of passagefor m.rchant vpssel., uncter a system of Russian supervision, $.as the ultimete aim. ,nd nol mcrejy an cmendment of the rule about wrrships, Isvolsky, rvho had conduct€d the negotietrons *ith Nicolson in 1907, fully €xpected support on the Straits qu€stion from Britain and Frrnce. He was io be sadly djssppoint;d. 'll,e Aercnthal Isvolsky talks hed been .onduct,d in Ura spi t ol cooperation which had existed b€tween thetu twn countries since 1892. Russie had conditionally acccpted an eventual Austrian annexation oftsosnia as far back as 188r. But agreement suddenly tumed to c sis wLen, early in October, and without any fu.ther consultation, Aerenthal unexDecteillv annolncedthoi Bosniaand Horzegov:nahad beensrrncxed into lhc Ilabsburg empirc.This was a unittrtcrslbrFr.t, of ll,e l8i8 B.rlin a-mang.mentswhich Ieft Isvo)sky floundcring (hc wss on a soundng-out tour to London and parjs:rt itre iimc) and brcught Austro-Russian friendship to an end. No such immedi_ aie Austrien€ction had been anticipated by the Russjan Foreign Minister. All that fsvolsky could do now was to alemsnd a European conference to rcvierv the Austrian action, back up S.rLis s prnL.sls,and hopa to gain comnFnsation for ltus\ia at lh. Slrails. as providedby ihe Bu.hjau aqre.menr. Tl,e out.ome \as aD utter defeat for Rur"ia, Thcle was no confercnce, Aust a"Ilungary kept the tll o prcvinces, and Bussia qajncdnolhing at lhe Slmits. The Russiangovemment hsil io givc 1vay in 1909 belore a thrcat of rvar issued from Berlin. Th€ l-act was that, following initial initstion over the Austdan a(tion, Germany gave fuu support to her aly, wheress F$nce snd Britain gave alnost none to Russis. ihe Anglo-Russian nol yer brousht any fuDdamenrat cbange in rhe -Ei1:".t" l,d rirrr|sr| \'lew of tbe straits Droblem. Like Aberdeen in t8d4, c;ey had led the Russiansto hope that . he meant more than he actually said. In March rg07, he went so lirr as to declare that .good relations with Russia meant that our
208
THE ANCLO-RUSSIAN
ENTENTE
old policy of closing the Straits egainst her . . . must be abar'If negotiations [for the doned', But he had added, in l!hy, Ent€ntel now in prcgess lead to a satisfactory rcsult, the effect on British public opinion would be such as very much to facilitate s discussion of the Straits question if it came up leter on'. Therc was a gooal deol of the old, equivocal approach here; and 1908 was evidently thought too soon for aLiscussionof the Straits question to come up. Although the meeting of Edward !'II and Nicholas II at Reval in June 1908 gave an impression of cordiality, and agreement was reached on & rcform prc$arffne for Mecedonia, the Bitish view of the Straits question in October was that Russie must be preparetl to admit foreign wa$hips into thc Black Sea. if hels werc going to be free to leave it. The conditional, noncommittal balf-prcmises of 190? still left the British free to
IIACEDONIA
AND THE BALKAN
WARS
?,os
coinciding with the Austm-ceman triumph over Russia in 190s, a. quit€ sepamte Anglo-Geman conflict wa6 developing over the building of 'Dreadnought, classbattl€ships,
[36] MACEDONIA AND THE BALKAN WARS Until 1912, the Turks still contmlled a broad band of European territory stretching westwards from Constantinople across the Balkan peninsula to the Adriatic. This included Thrace in the east, lvith an Aeg€ar Seacoast, &nd Albenia in the $est, *,ith an Aildetic coast. T'he main bulk of the teEitory consistsd of Ilacedonia,on lhe southemcoa\t of whi.h stood ttre gr.ai port of Saloniks. The difficulty about l\facedonia was that it contained an €xtraordinary mixture of l[c€s - which werc. ss usual. jn.ompetenllygovem.d by th. Turks - snd that the surroundl ing Balkan states, and one great power, Austria,I{ungary, had teuitodal desigDs on the area. The Bulgarians want€d most of it, inchrding Salonike, as well as hoping for Thrace and even Constontinopl€. On racial grounds, they had the best case. The Grceks elso want€d it, together with Thrace and Constantinople. 'I'he Serbs wanled wcstern Macedonia, and more particuhrlv l p.d fo} Albania, which would gi\ e landtockedS.'riu an .*iL to the sea. Even Mont€negro had her own small ambitions. Austrie-Ilungary, though in gencral hoping for the su\,.ival of Turkish power in the area, wished to keep open the possibility of eventual Ilabsburg rule in Salonikn. She also wished to linit the c\pansion of Serbia. The British view of the }lacedonian problem was that the Turks ought to be compelled to govem the region fairly; and that, il they feiled to do so, the Balkan nationalists ousht to be .rllowed to reslize their ambitions. The Cladstonian teven Sr)isburian)principleof support for liberal nationeli*m in the Turhish empire, which had earlier sho$n itself in rel&tion to
210
T H E A N G L O . R U S S IA N E N T E N T E
Bulgaris.ns and Armenians, had at last become the open policy of the B tish goveulnent (though not yet for all Turkey's Asian and African provinces). In September 1908, following disturbanc€s in Macedonia, Loril Lansdowrre had put forward fairly radical proposals for the reform of Turkish administration therc - including the withdrawal of Tukish toops. IIis scheme recommendr' hottbern usedss the I'asisfor joint Auslro-Ruqsian the l'urk in the sllme put to tions the Miirzsteg programme year. But neither Austria-gungery nor Russia {as so rec'dy as britein to seethe Tulkish hold on Macedoniarclaxed'In practice, of the there was little improvement in the ailministrrtion suggesput forwad again province, ancl in l{arch 1908, B tain tions lor rcfom, amounting to greater supcNision of Macedonia by the poweN. By this time, Russi&and France were interested in cooperation with Britain and, at Revql in 1908, llardinge and Isvolsky produced a frcsh relorm scheme. But Austria-Eungary and Germany refuse
MACEDONIA AND THE BALKAN WARS
211
They were hopeful that expand€d ve$ions of Serbia and Bulg&rie might be linked tog€thu as Russiancli€nt-states to ensure Russian mastery of the Balkans - and to ensure AustrieHungary's €xclusionfrcm Balkrn afrairs. As so often previously, restraint at St Petersburg contmstcd sharply with the more active and provocative policies of Russian agents on the 6pot. In 1912,*ith Serbioffrmly pro-Russian, and with a prc-Russian cabinet contrclling the pro-ceman king (or Tsar) of Bulgaria, thcrc was some reason to expect th.llt the llartwig-Nckludov line might be successful, In Austria-Ilungory, therc werc ilivisions still between politicians and soldie$ over Balkan afairs, but both could agreethat the triumph of Balhan nationalism would only rnetLndisesterfor the multi-national Ilabsburg ernpire. While the politicians generally *ished to prclong Turkish rule, however, the soldiers {'erc rcady to seeTurkey collapse and Austria-Hrrngary establish authority over Serbia, Rumania anal Bulgaria. - even, pcrhaps, annexing the lirsi trno of these into the empire. The conflict bets'een ambitious Austrians and ambitious Russiansis obvious. The fomer, if successful,might expand the Habsbug state to include most of the Balkan peninsula.The latter, though rrcrking on the sat€llitc state pdnciple, wanted similar de f&cto control. Both powen, in recognition of their mutual hostility, maintained srmies in resdinesson the Calici&nfrontier thmushout the period of the Balkan wars. The 1912 Balkan Irs.gue was partly the lesult of intrigue by Hartwig and Nekludov snd partly the result of Italian victories over Turkey. The two Russian diplomsts brought Serbia and Bulgada tog€ther in an allianc€ in trIarch 1912.This temporary union of two Slav peoples,achievedin spite of th€ir rival claims to Macedonianter tory, was joined by Greeceand Monteneglo du ng the summer of 1912. But, while the Russians could hopefully regard the Scrb-Bulgsrian trcaty lrs an anti-Habsburg device, the subsequentalli&nee ol the foul Balksn ststes was far morc obviously anti-Turkish in airn, The ellect of ltaly's seizurcof Tripoli in hcr war againstTurkey (Iglt-tz) was to
THE ANCLO.RUSSIAN
ENTENTI'
suggest to the Balkan states that the timc had come to divide up Macedonia and
R U 5 5 I A
B LA I:1< SEA SOUTIIERN
sl
'vt F------7"
^'
?:?ffIY'* :-___",,ivl i'"'; (ttatian tet2)
tbane"!;'}Al i9t1):
m
Europeanterritory lost by rurkey1ntle Balkrnwars Ter .Lotyacquired()yButsaria
En
" Serb;o " Mont.neqro southern Dobrudja ocqsrrcd by Rumanidfronl Bulgaria, rgt3 " "
Austria Hungqry anflExedBoshiautd H.rzegovifla., t9o8,and deman.t. d th e craat ion o:fAI ba k i a, ry|J Bulgaria and Easterh&um.lia,united tEsJ-6 AFTEX, lllll
B-{LKAN WARS, 1912-13
2t4
TITF ANGLO.RUSSIAN
I'NTNNTN
still had grievances, In particular, Bulgarla, though shc had gained an AegeanSeocoast, had seenSalonika go to Greeceend much of $'estern Mucedoni& go to Serbis. Her rivalry with Serbia had increased,snd any Russian hopes o{ a SIav union in the Balkans werc ended. Indeed Bulgarir 1l'asnow pm Austrian in outlook. As for Serbia, though she was now the strongest of the Balk&n states, her hostility towards Aust a-IluDgsry hsd been intensiffed by the creation of on independent Albonie. The wars had produced as many prcblems as they htrd solved. creat porver relationships were equally unstable. Crey, vis the Inndon conference of ambassadors, had kept the pesce in 1913, but there {.ss e feeling th&t the ffnal settlement of Balkon issucs still lay in the future. Austria-Ilungary had won a halftiumph, in that hel presswe for the creation ofAlbania deprivcd Scrbia ol an Adriatic coast, but Scrbia's agg$ndiz€ment in Maccdonia left Austria-Hungsry morc determined than ever to teach the Serbs a lesson. Russia had at least helped to kccp Constantinople out of Bulgaxia's contrcl; but the strcngtlcning ol her ties with Serbiervaspoor compensationfor her progr€ssive loss of influence ir both Bulga a and Turkey (wherc Russian strategic interests vrere more heavily involved). Morcover, Grey had been impsrti$.l to the point ol being anti-Russian during the London discussions, favour:ing Austrilr-Hungary's line on Albanis. st tlie expensc of his Entente partner's hopcs there. Flance, on the othcl hand, though as reluctant as BritaiD to become involved in war over Balkan disputes, was more ready to support her Russian ally - even though her investments in Turkey might suffer as a result. (Her investments in Russia were eanwhile, Gcrmany's influbecoming even more important.) ence at Constantinople co[tinued to incr€ase, a fact made apparcnt by the appointment of Liman von Sandels to reorgonize the Turkish army. Russis. chose to regord this as a threat to hcr interests at the Straits, especially ]vhen von Senders was given command (temporaily) of tmops in the Constantinople ar.ea.By Janusry 1914, indced, the Russians ltrere coming to assume that their Ieal enemy in the Balkans was not Austria-
SARAJEYO AND TIIE DRIFTTO
WAR
215
llungary but G€rmany, a G€many now &cting in her own ght and not simply as the supporter of Austri&-Ilungary. Anglo-Russiun relations wete Unpromising enough, too. The Turkish fleet, for example, was being reoryanized by British advisersat the salne time that von Sand€rsw&s developing the smry. British support for Russia was lukewerm in all the 10lS controve$ies. The lgll crisis in Persia (over Russian opposition to the modemization of Pe$ian govemment by an Amedcen adviser, Shuster) bmught prctests from British radicals. Grey threatened to rcsign, and to abandon thc Entente. He geve no encouEgement to the attempts of Charykov (Russia'sambassador et Constantinople) to achieve a new settlement of the StDits question in 1911. erey was still 'ivollied by c€rmsn intentions in 19u, but he was no nearer en unconditionel friendshiD {.ith Russi, tl,an he had bc.n in t907. ThF Russians.for iheir part. howevel, 11eredespente to mske the Triple Ente[te meaningful, now that the Balkan wals had left so many issues unrcsolved. It was doubtful whether Grey could successfully go on being an uncommitted 'honest bmker' if another Balkan crisis arose in 1914.
1 3 7 ]S A R A J E V O A N D T H E D R I F T T O 1 V A R I'ranz Fcrdinand's assassinationin Bosnia lon 28 June t9l4) tecamc a Brlkan crisi( bccausrthe Austro-Hungariangovemment chosc to make it one, Thc Batkan crisis became a preat l&wer war LccauseRussia refused to be deflect.d by cerman threats ftom her detemination to prctect Serbia and to resist Austria-Ilungary's expsnsion. In the crucial days fiom 28 July to 1 August, it appeers to have bcen the German army chiefs, especi&lly Moltke, lrho forced the issues, and urged AustriaHungsry to continue her attack upon Serbia. Indeeil, by the bcginning of August, the c sis had become almost exclusively a Russo-German one. France and Britain werc left momentarily on the side-lin€s. Russia was unwilling to repeat her lg00
216
TIIE ANGLO.RUSSIAN
ENTSNTE
surrerd€r to the German threat. whether or not she hsd the support of Fmnce and Britain. Thes€ two v'erc drawn into the conflict largely by the nature of the Scl iefien plan - by which the German army could fight Russia only by first ftaking an attack through Belgium into northern France. In the last rcsort, the Frcnch nust have stood by their Russian a.lly, even without the promptings of the Scl iefren plan; but there is little doubt that BritaiD would not have entered the wer merely to save Russia from Germany - or even to help Russia to curb Gcrman influence in Turkey. the extent of anti-Russion sentimcnt in the country, and especially in the Libenl pady, would have pr€vented that. Grey took B tnin into the wa.r to try to prevent a cerman miliiary victory in v€stem Europe - which would undoubtedly have produced German mastery over the rvhole of the continent. And this could only be justiffedto the Cabinet and to his party by moral indignation ovcr Belgium. The lact that Russia was on the same side was, in a sense,accidental, and useful only in that Germany must now fight on two fronts. Ilostility to Germany vras e minority view still, in 1914 (it was lound more often among Conservatives than Liberals), in spite of widespread public concern over the 'Drcadnought' mce. The aryument that GermsDy was a geater menace to Brita.in ths.n was Russia 1{as confined to somc of the newer minds in the Foreign Office (ulriler Eyrc Crowe's influence), and was not ever fully shared by Crcy wLo w'as working with Lichnowsky, the eelman ambasss.dor, to solve Anglo-German disputes a6 l&te as June 1914.Ever by the end ol July 1914,there wer€ no practical military unde$tandings with Russia of the kind that had been arranged with FBnc€. It was only in April thtt Grey had s.greed, under lfrench pressure, to inform the Russians of the AngloFrerch arangements and to begin naval discussions y'ith Ru6sia. But therc i'€re no plans for joint Anglo-Russia.noperations in the Middle East ageinst Cermany. Indeed British bettleships had b€en yrithdm\rn flom the Mediterrenean in 1912, and the Frcnch left ss guardians of British interests there. In 'honest these circumstances, Grey was happy to resume his broker' r6le in the days following the issue of the ultimatum to
SARAJEVO AND THE DRIFT
TO WAR
217
Serbia. IIe urged submission on the Se$s until the Austrians lv€nt to war rith them; and then urgcd Austrians and Serbsto negotiate - perhaps using the London ambassadorialmachinery of the previous year. The Balkan wsl could be stopped if Cermany vould restmin Austrja-Ilungary, and a great powcr $ar could be prevented if France vnuld restrain Russia. U'hile the crisis remsined a Balksn one, cmy could cortinue to play the rvell-meaningoutsidcr, warning Russia Dot to ex?ect B tish assistanceand striving to act with Germeny s6 a joint mediator. Rut once CeInIan army prcssrrFetransformed the crisis and brought the powers thcmselves into conflict, Bdtain was no longer uncommitted. She must join the wor not to ftscue Serbs or Russians,but to keep the Channelcoastsour of cerman hands. And so, on 4 August, Britain went to \l?r against Cemany for rcssons which bad very little connection 1{ith the RussoGerman quarrel. But even reluctant partners must coopemte. Their common interest in defeating Gcrmany \vas bound to lead to a reappraisalby Britain and Russio of their own rcletionshiD.
Principal Events. 1907-14 1907. 190E.
l90E-9. 1909. 1911.
Cmlye emoEndum. Anglo-RussiaDnrterte - Persis the main subject matter Young Turk revolution. Aercnthel-Isvolsky talks at Bucblau, Annexation of Bosnia. Rcv&l a.greement(AngloRussien) on Mecedonia Bosnian crisis - Russia humilbted by Cerrnany Russo-Italian sgreement on Tripoli and the Stmils. AngloPersian Oil Co. fomed Momccan crisis. Renewed Anglo-nussion dispute orer Persia. Charykov's unsuccesstulpmpossls for s new Streits
l 9 l l 1 2 . Itslian war against Turkey - for possessiorof Tripoli 1912. Bslken Les$e. B tish battleships withd*',wn from the
Irleditermnesn BslksD wars - trcaties of London rnd Bucharest - AustroSerbt€nsionincreased 1 0 1 8 , 1 4 . Anglo-Turkish and Anelo-Germsn ogreements oD Bagdad railway snd Persion Gulf. British sovemment buys controt' ling intercstin Anglo-PersianOil Co. 1 9 1 , 1 . Assassination at Sarajcvo- Austuo'Serbquarr€l becomes a xorld war. Britsin not pro'Ru-6sian,but €nt€$ {ar to prevent s German victory over Flance. t9l?-la.
PART VIII The Great War and Afterwards
[38] BRITISH IVAR AIMS AND TIItr IIIDDLE EAST It has fairly often becn claimed, by non-British historians cspecially, that Britain dudne the last thrce centuries has delibentely mede use of continental waru to fulther L€r own colonial and trading alnbitions outside Europe; thot shehas used the opportunify of an enemy's preoccupation ryithin Europe to (apture his overseaspossessions. Even allies - the Frcnch durine the Great WAr :r.ndthe Ame cons between1941and 1045- have had their suspicionsabout Bdtair's real motivcs lor fighting. If this aryumcnt is spplied to thc Crest \!'ar, it can be seer that Brjtajn did conquer Germany's colonialempire, and thrt much of it was absorbed - undei the guise of mandatc rcsponsibiiity into the B tish empire in 1S19.But the areawhere Bdtain mrde the most spectacular edvances as o rcsult of the war was the Middle East. Here, Bdtish authodty , aganr in thc form of mandates - rvas established in all those regions of Turkey-inAstu.where oil or strategic int€rests msde it desirable; and from 1e18 to 1956 Britoin enjoyed what Eliz.rbeth llonroe has called hcl 'moment in thc Middle East'. Therc is, however. no evidence that the establishment of supremacy in thc trIiddle East, or even the captuie ol cerman colonies, rvere seen by Cabi[et ministers as the objects of the exercisewhen war *'as declared on Cermany in 1914. IDdeed, there secms tf, have beer a good deal of uncertainty, even bervildcrment, in the C.trbinet a.s to the nature of Britain's war
220
THD GII!]AT W R AND AFTERWARDS
rims during the early days. The freeing of Belgium and the prctection of ChaDnel coasts irdircctly the defence of the B tish Isles, that is - were the most obvious, and they remained paumount. Thc bulk of the army fought in I'landels, Artois and Picardy; the main strength of the lravy wos at Scnpa Flolr'. Gcrman colonies were captured as a matter of cours€ ; but control oftbe Middlc East lell into BritisL hands largely ss the rcsult of n seriesof happy accidents. In the fiIst place, it could be ussumedin 1914 thet a future B tish control ofthe Middle East dependedon the defeat olboth Germany and Russia.TIlaI this sctually happenedin 1918was a piece of impossible luck which could not be foreseensince tLe two count es vere fighting on opposit€ sides. The defeat, in addition, of Austria-Hungary and Turkey left Britain with ar almost ftce hand. Only Frcnch, s.nd to a lesse! extcnt ltslia.r and Greek, interests had to be tsken into consialerotionin the dividing up ol Turkish and Arab londs. In the second place, Turk€y's entry into the var on the side of the C€ntral powers, end the increasing British iDterest in oil, prcvided both the excuse and the justification for a nore ambitious policy in the Middle East than had seemedlikely in 1907. The willingness of Arab leaders to throw ofi Turkish rule and accept British assistence in the process gs.vepromise of an empirc of influence which was always cheaper end less worrying th&n an empire of annexations. It is a mistake to exaggelate the production or the sales pmspects of Middle EaEtern oil in this Pedod. But the navy had adopted the principle of oil'hrming in 1912, and the Persian ffelds, though their production was s.syet comparatively small, wcre regarded as the navy's normal sourceofsupply. The British govcrnment bought its contrclUns interest in the AngloPersirn Oil Company in.Iuly 1914.The Suezcanal was not only the life-line to Indie now, it was slso the route by which oil could most quickly reactr Bitain. The fact that Arabs were rcjccting the Sultan and thot the Jews wished for a nstional homc in regions bordeing the cdnsl gavc Britoin an uncxp€cted chance to elttablish ltiendly rCgimes in an afta where thc Turkish cmpire no longer ssfeguarded British iDtercsts. Disenchantment
THE DARDANELLES AND GALI,IPOLI
with Turk€y, vhich had been apparcnt eveD before 1878, had now run its full course. Turkey was not only in€ffective snd unreliable, she was an encmy, whose collapse might as well be cncoumged. In terms of maDpower involved snd expectstion of success, hon€ver, thc Middle East campaigns were always sideshows, even ilimpo arrt ones.The ext€nt to $hich B tish govemmerts, whether led by Asquith or Lloyd ceorge, dared to reduce their forces in Francc or theL naval strength in the North Sca, was limited. Therc lvas always a hope that the trIiddle East *,ar might yield a maxirnum Frofit for & minimum outlay; but when qu;ck results ll'erc not forthcoming in 1915, then the aryuments of 'west€Inels' $'ere dominant for the rcst of the war. To some, like Chwehill or T. E. Lawrence or the Indian governmeDt, Middle Esst campaigns lvere either a means of beating the GermuN by breaking the Western Front deadlock or were even $hat the war v.as really about. But in the overall sf$tegy of the $?r as seer from London, action in Prlestine or }lesopotamia rvas a matter of assisting local popul&tions to be s Duisance to iheir Turkish rulers - fmnL rvhieh entra, undelined advantases miglrt perhaps accrue; and action in the St&its area 1las a means of keeping the Russians in the war, since an eestern front secmed esscntialto the prospect of victory in the r';est.Not until thc end of 1917, or even early 1918, $'ith thc Rugsiancollipse and the succcssfulprogressotBritish-Anb forces,wss thcre a chancefor Bdtain to establish her own mastery over the Middlc East.
L s s lT H E D A R D A N E I L I I S A N D G A L L I P O L I 'lhe
l)ardancllcs canrpaign was vcry nruch a personal initiativc oD the p$rt of Winstor Churcbill, then tr'irst Lord ot dre Admir{lty, lvhich had to bc pressedupon u scepticut Cabinet. In the past century, B tish "arships had often enoughoppeorcdat the Straits, usuully as a sign of support for Turkey aerinst Russia. In 1878, Lorlevu, thcy llad st€au.d throuEh iDtu thc Sca of
AHE GREAT 1VAR AND AFTERIVARDS
trIarmor:rrvithout an invitatioD trom the Sulta:l, in order to issuc a quitc independentwaming to Russio.By 1890, ir anticipation ol Turkisb hostility to B toin in futurc \YaN, the Admirrltv decidcd th$t the Slraits could no longer bc folccd by trarships alonc, ard thrt troop landings would tlso be necessary.Now, in Jorruary 1915, llith Turkey undcr lirm German direction' the War Co[ncil detided that, aftcr a]1,thc nllvy shordd makc an attcmtt to brcak ttrrough to the Turkish cspital $rithout thc 'prcpate slpport of thc arnly. The Admiralty t'as instructed to for a naval c:pedition jn February to bonbard and take the Caltipoli peninsula fith Constantinoplc as its objcctivc'' The Straits $'er€ to be attacked in order to knock Turkey out of the war and brnrg succour to tllc Russians.It I'as aII iDtcrcsting lc\''crsal of nilrercerth'centruj' British attitudcs' Trukey ofiicially cntered the nar rYhenBritain, Francc, and Russia dec.laredrvnr on her at the beginning ol Noveubcr 191{ In pnctice, she bud atresdy fallen under Gcrman contrcl, and in October, a 1\rkish fleet, comrnandedbv Ge nans, attacked Odcssa,Scbastopoland Novorossisk.ThePrilcipal Tu}kish enemy rvrs clearly ltussia, but Turkish hostility to Britain had been nlparent ss early as August, \Yhenthe British government had vhich requisitioncd two battleships then building in Britain The Turks l,ad been paid for by t,rrl;lic subscription in Turkey. imrncdiatcly acceptcd,as compensation,fln olTerby thc Germans of the warshits Coeben and Brusldz. Thesc two ships, having eluded British pulsuels in the €ditdranean, had made their way to Constantinotle on the outbrcak of $'ar' - brcaking the rul,r of thc Stmits in so doing. B iish udvisers ir the Turkislr na1.y hr].d to bc $'irhdrr$n in SepteDrl.'er. They \{crc replaced by Gerrnrs. ID spit€ of thcsti indic.rtiolls, horvever,it {'as British policv to keel Turkey ncutrfll if possjblc. Iler rominal sovcrcigntl' over Itswt was one considention. The probable loyrltv of tr{oslcms in India to thc hrkish Crliphatc \Yasanother' Bot, bl' DcccDber 1914,the British had had to make up their minds to be rcalistic' A Tlrkey under Gennan control 1vas now a dangerous lisk to British secu ty. CyPrus $as thcreforc annexcd and a British
THE DARDANELLNS
I
AND GALLIPOLI
225
pmtectorate procLaimedover EgWt. B tish Indisn troops landed in Mesopotamia, At last, a genuine partition of the Turkish empire seemed to be beginning, The Russi.*N exprcssed deep sotisfaction. Nicholas I's aims rvere ffnally being reatized. Bismarck's advice was belatedly being follorvcd. It is not surp sine that tbe Russiins soon put forwad their own demands- frrr a British military effort aeainst the heart of Turkey, aDd for lr prorn;seof Constantinoplein lhe event ot success. Churchill had begun to think of c demonst$tion againsr Turkey even in Aueust 1914. Ily December,his arguments .$,ere gflinirgground. The l\dmiralty, includ;rg l'ishcr, the rcsunccted First Sca Lord, lvere incrcasingly hapty that Britain,s principal $eapon, her ficct, should be used in an aggessive capacity. If the annies wcrc already boggcd doivn on thc lvestem Front, then a dank attock on Germany's allies might prove to bc the mad to totalvictory. A despemtcRussianrcqucst for diversionsry attacks in Jamurry 1915 clinchcd the issuc. Aheady therc wlls danger of a Russinn collapse.A successfulstrike ag$inst l'urkcy, besidessccuring the lliddle Uast, might also kccp the trasten Front iD existcnce.By February, much was secn to hang on the successofthe Dardanellesexpcdition. The capture of Const*nt! nople would mcan o Turkish surrcnder, thc cnd of cermanTurkish moves aganrstthe Suezcanrl $nd to$'ards the Gulf, and the opcning up of a safe and casy supply routc to ltussia. It would also impress the lJalkan states, and make possible an alliancc of Bulgaria, Rumania and creece, with Serbia, against Aust a-Hungary. Unfortunately, an air of doubt and indecision, a lack of wholehearted commitmcnt, cha$ctedzea the cumpaign thmughout its life. Fisher turncd against it, and Kitahener, rvhcn the decision Nas madc to land troops on the calipoli peninsula, played an ambiguous l6le. Hc felt :r stern dutv towards thc allied commanders in l.Iance but, as a fomer I{igh Commissioner in Egypt, he was equally intercst€d in anlthing tllat would strengthen Ilritain's position in the Middle East. Nor did Cabinct ministers ever lose their misgivings about the \visdom of employing troops and ships at the Straits which might be nccded nearer at hand
22*
TIIII GREAT \YAN AND AFTF]RWARDS
eveDthough targe forccs llere already st{rtiored in EgWt, and an Anglo-Frcnch army rcmaiDed &t Saloniks fr.nn October 1915 till thc cnd of the war. Alter the fi$t failur(s, Churchill Lad to resien as l'irst Lord in May lrnd the Libeml govcrnntcnt collflpscd, to be replaccd by a coalition hendcd by Asquith' vith Bulfoul at the Adrrimlty. Uncertaint]'ot hornc11asrcflectcdi'r hesitrtion by corrDunders on the spot. Dt:q,ite assenrdiDg the most {onnidable {tect (in fire-po\r€r) that hod cver been scen in thc Mediterr$ncan, the navy foiled to pierc€thc Dardancllcs.BonLl,ndments in Fcbruary were nnlorvcd by a dctennint,d assault on 18 March. Turkish shore-lblts wcrc silenceaby gunlrc from tLe walslips but' wh;le 'naking a tcmporary withdralY{l, tiree obsolctc battlcshiPs (t$'o British and one Frenclt wert sunk, and Admir.rl dc Ia<;lleck (whosefl{gslip \Yasthc brand-Dclr'Qr?d', ,li:a}eli) dccided that he could not losc any more ot his ships. Hc de{ridcdto lvoit lbr hctp ftom the ormy- It afterwards becanrekno\l'Jrthat tlle sholcIorts had uscd tL€ last of their amnrunition for thc time being (in any cose their batteries hrd causedlittlc drmcge) and thrt the tbree ships had bcen sunk by mincs whidr hftd not been detccted on carlier sv'ceps.Hrd he decidcd to go on, de llobeck could ha1'e sailed into the tr{annora unim?cded Successtlorv dependcd on army tandings on tlLc Gall\:oti peninsula - which hsd otreody been suthorized bv the Wsr Cabinet on 15 March. Only with this peninsula i friendlv hands' it wss now felt, could the gr€rt shiPs sofely pass thc nalrolvs' lVars on peninsulas,and amphibious operations, had atr alnrost obsessivefascinatior in Lr)ndon since thc days of welli gton's exploits in Spain and the Cdnean \Yar. But the hndirtgs wcrc ineffectively organizrd and the lurks $'eft givcn ample time al*'ays to havc superior numbers writing to resist the nrvndc$ In February and llarch, therc *'ere scsrceiy $ny Turkisl troops on the peninsula. In April, when the allied lorccs landed (the B tish at Cspe Uelles, the Anzacs furthcr along the cosst to the north, and the French on the oppositeshore s.t Kum Kale) they rverc Lard prcssed cve'r to hold thcir Psitions on the coast' l|urthcr landirgs nt Suvla Bay in Au$st brought no geater
PARTITION
225
SCIIEMES
success,and in December the dccision wris takcn to sithdrow The Dardanellesrverestill firnJy in Turkcy's lrands nnd B tain's naval prestjge,and hcr standing in the lliddlc East, had suffer€d severreblows. Russia's army was stil pitifully short of supplics and, in October 1915,Bulgaria joined the Central PoIl'cIs. Scrbia was overrun in November. Whatever chancc tlcrc had bccn of bringing about Aushia-llungary's collapscbyraising thc Balhan strtes sgainst her and so fteeing RussiaD,British and l'rcrch forceslor the struggle agairNt Gcrmany, had disappearcd.
[40] PARTITION
SCHE]IES
ControveNy still remoins over the plarning and ofgnnization of the Dardanelles campajgn. The findings of a conmission of cnquiry have not beenthougbt conclusive,But the Britjsh c{Tolt to defeat Turhey in 1915 r''es a clear enoughfaihre, and it was notrep€ated, as leustmoton thut sctlle.Ner.ertheless,the llntcnt€ powe$ still went on sssurning that Turkey would be defeatcd and thrt tlley could make rnargenrents lor the djslnrsal of hcr tenitory. It \rus conveniert to be $ble to bribe poterrtial aliics by offering tltem slicesofthe Turkish empire, It was also rcassuring for the British, Fr€nch and Rrssiuns, vhile struggling vainly against the Germsnsin Europe, to he al,le to prorise tl,emsclves iuturc tcrdtorial gains in thc Middle East. Ot all thcse pr.,miscs, much thc most drematic wrs the B tish acccptrnce of Russia's ght to Constantinople. Russia'sdemand for poss€ssionoftle Turkishcapitsl marks tlrc reviv&l of a hope that htrd bcen quictly rbandoncd in the yeam belorc 1s14. Historic dcstiny suddcnly scemcit much nearer fulfilment in 1915. B tain's acquicsccnccmarks thc apl)ur.rnt end of a hundrcd ycars of policy. Thc $hccl llad tumcd rul circle since the days when Britain and Russia had bclpcd thc Grceks against the 'I'urks. Not only had B tain noll thrull'lr ovcr 'I'urke}., she had evcn agreed that Constantinople should bc a Russian,
224
,IHE GREAT WAR AND AFTERWARDS
nther thdn an iDtem{rional city. As carly as November 1914, George V hod told the Russian rmbassodor, Benckendod 'As far as Constantinotle is concemc(I,it is clear that the city shoukl be yours'. In negotiations during lfarch and Apdl 1915, the British accepted Sazanov's rcqucst for the *'hole of the coast frcm Constantinople to Gallipoli including teuitory ss {ar west as r l;ne fronr Enos to Midia, togcther rrith possessioDof the eastem shore opposite to Constantinople. If British forces had coptured Gallipoli and Bdtish *'arships had rccched the Bosphorus, the lruits of thcir victory would have been handed oler to Russia. Tlis much rvas agreedby.{squith and Grcy, in consultution with Bonar Law and Lansdorvne,the lead€rsofthc Opposit;on. Tl,e major Bdtish counter'dernond vas for posscssionof the neutml zoDc in Pcrsia (\vhere most of the oil-ficlds lay). Tltis Sazanol' grantcd, in retum for Russir's ght to asscrt full 'I'he butrer between British and RussiaD contr.rl over her o\{'lr zonc. territory Lad in practice gone. Indeed, th€re sccmcd in 1915 to be less doubt and suspicion tletween B tain and Russia than there \r'rs bct\,!'ccntrYancecnd Russia. It was at B tish irsistence, during thc March April negoti:rtiors, that l'rance had filrtrlly occcptcd Russia's ght to Constantinoplc.Russiastill had suspicionsol hcr own, ho$ever, 'with regard to Constantinople. She resolutcly resilted British pressurefor ercek padicipation in the Dadancllcs campaign. The Greckshadthcirown ambitions for the Tukish capital; and Russia was as dctcnnined to keep them out of it as she had been to r€strain the Bulgorians in 1912-13. If conccssionsto the Russianslvould persuadetltem to stsy in thc war agaiust CerlJluny, thcn Britain 'ivas happy enough to makc conccssions- especiallylyhcn it $as the Grecks or thc 'I'urks $'ho suffered by them, nther than Bdtain. It $as decided to keep Greecebenevolcntly neutral. Thc treatl. oflondon, of 26 Ap l1915, brought Italy into the existing Anglo-!'rench-Russi&n arrangements, Its aim .11.osto pcrsuade Italy to declnre war olr Aushia-Ilungary by prcmising hcr Ad atic, and Turkisll, tenitory. If the B tish flect had brokcn through the Dardancllcs in Uarch, it is possiblethat such
PARTITION
SCHEMES
prcmises, end the lialian entw into thc \r'ar, might not have been necess{ry. As it wos, the Italians lvcrc givcn to undc$tuind that part of Asilr llinor h the Adalia rcgio! - miglrt bc thcirs at the end of the rrar. (They already posscsscdtllc Dodec:rnese islands.) Tlnt this agrcc rcnt niglrt smflict {ith latlrcr nrore justilialle tlrcck Iiopcs in the arer did not troublc thc allics unduly in 1915. $IlDt the rrrungement did do, ho\\cvcr, $ns to stimulate Frcnclr rmbition lor territory in Syria, now that the futurc of Turkcy'in-Asia lccmcd to be under discussior. IVhile BritaiD was cntrcnching L€rscu in Cyprus, Ugypt and I'clsia, ^nd Russia was looking foN'ard to possessio of the Stnits, Francc had cnjoycd no such hrppy distmctions ftom the gloorr of the Wcstcm Frcnt. A spcci.rl British committee und.r Sir I{aurice dc Bunscn had bccn secretly discussine the futurc of Turkcy'in-Asia sincc Ap l 1915, Thc grolvth of Frcnch hopcs now lcd to thc Syhcs-Iricot agrcement of JaDuary 1910. Sir Mark Sykcs and GeorgcsPicot, sfter somemonrhs of confidcntial discussion,produccd a carcful pafition plan for those arcas of l'urkcy-in Asia which intemstcd thcir fwo corntdcs. Fouolrjng furthcl talks in Pctmg$d, Russia was drawn into thc agrcementin May, recciving a prorniseofArmenia and Kurdistan vhere her amics \l,crc akcady $'inning grcat successasainst the Turks. 'I'he *'hnc anangcmcnt rcmaincd sccr€t until erposcd and denouncedby the Russian Bolshcvik govcmnent tc'llox'ing ihe November rcvolution in 1917. Broadly, thc Frcnch \{'er.,to <:ontrolSyria and Cilicia, *'hilc Britain was to control Mesopo tamia rnd a band ofte$itory strctrliDg $est towards Dgvpt and the lfediterranean. In Cilicia and the coastal rcgions of Syri$ (including the Lebanon) hench rule rlas to be direct, and in the rcst of Syria a Frefth-dominated Arab statc would bc crcatcd. This division paruy corresponded to thc di\.ision bet$ccn Christian and Moslempeoplesthere. Similarly, llritish rrJ ein Iraq would bc direct, snd elsewherewouid be exercised at second hand thrcugL a noniral]' independentArab ruler. It vas agrecd that A.ab Arabia should be fully indclx,ndcnt, partly to guaranteethc Moslcm charactcr olMecc,r.ind Nedina, and paflly because strategic considcmtions wcrc not so prcssing rhere,
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Pslestine wss to be on internatioml zonc, but with exclusive Blitish contrcl of Haifa trnd Acrc. The 1vLoleSyk€s-Picot arlsngcmcnt reflectcd,and peryetuated, basic valries betweenthe Entcnte porrcIs. In particular, france had a histo c intcrcst in S]' a and the protection of Christitrns therc - togcthcr vith a more recent financial stoke. But tle difficulty was to decidc how big political Sy'ria, as d;stinct fror, geographical Syria, was to be. Stdctly, Palestjne was part of geographicalSyria, but the Rritish had no intention ol stlowing the french to establish themselves so close to thc Sucz canal. The intemational stah$ ofPalestine \1cstherefore A compromise proposal rltich deprived l.rance of an area she krd expectcd to receive. Diiliculties over Palestire 1'erc bJ' no mcans {inally resolved in 19t6. Agri\ the anangcrncnts for thc upper Euphmtes Tigris valle),s v€rc intendcd to put a Frcnch buffer zonebehveenBritish Iruq llnd RussianKurdistan. Anglo-Russian suspicionswere reviving in 1916, The last of the alied partition agreencnts was thc so'callcd Saint-JeandetrIsuriennetreatyoI l9l7. Vcrbal accod at a mect' ing at Saint-Jean in Ap l ($ith Lloyd Gcorge himscll present) was concluded by an exchange of lettcN in London in August. The object of the trcsty was to spccify more clearly the area of Italian territory in Asia Uinor, no$' that Italy had declared *.ar on Germany as well as on Austria-Ilungary. 1'he London tresty proposalsof 1915 were clarilicd in that Italy was now plomised the Sm)'rna region and tLe wholc of southern Asia Irtinor to the west of Cilicia. If this pmmise had ever been fulfilled, the postwsx Turkey would have been a tiny stlte centred on AnkaB, with a sho Bla.ckSeacoast, and an exit to the Aegea.nopposite the island of Mytilene (Lesbos).But in rgl9-20, the British 8.nd French chose to overlooh their promises to Ituly, sincc thc SaintJes.nagreement haalbeen conditional on Russinn:rpprcval, lvhich hud never been obtaincd.'Ihe coming to power ofLcnin, indccd, brought a complete change to the partition plans, since the nelf RussiaDgovernment nobly renounced its share in l'urkey and left Britain and FEnce \yith un open ffeld. British attitudes to the ConFrunist rdgime were equivocul cnough, $'ith half-herrted
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military intelventions in the north and in the Caucasusond Central Asi&; bLrtso far as the MiddleEast u'as coDcernedL€nin's se[-denying ordinance meant a huge simplilication of grcftt potr'errivalries for the ncxt geDcratioD,at lcast. But Britain hardly mllde the most ofRussia's liithdrolval, The Sykes-Picot sgreeme t had already laid up luturc di{liculties by overlooking vagne British promiscs prcviously givcn about AraLr rights in Palestine in a corrcspondcncc bctwecn Sir Henry trIcMrhon and the Sharil{usscin of Ucccr. Thc McMahon letters (tr{clfahon $as Iligh Comrnissioncrin Cairc) $crc design€dto pe$uade the ^rabs to entcr the $'ar agrinst Turkcy by encouragini: Ilussein's ambitions. Doublc-think alrout Palestine was complicated ludher by tbc issuc of thc Baltor dcclarntion in November 1917 by which Britain signilicd hcr approvrl olthe cstablishment of a Jervish National Holnc in Palestine. Tbe extent to which this outmged Arab opinion was hadly ont;cip.rted ir London, rvhcrethe principal motilc, apsrtfmmo.cedain Biblical ror lnticism, was plainly stratcgic. A decloution of suppod for intenrational Zionism would rally Ame csn Jewish opinion to the British cause, and pcrhaps prop up Kerensky's foiling rdgjme in Russia. But chielly it rlrcul
[41] PALUSTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA The war egainst tbe Turks in Mcsopotamiawas almost a p vate one, run by the go\,?rnment of B tisL India \rith the objcct of safcguarding oil-{iclds snd keeping Gcrman in{Iuence out ot Persia. Thcre was little question of {ighting to free the Arabs or evcn of using Aroh forcesas allies. By contrast, Bdtish pmgcss in Palestine was closcly bound up with undertakings to Arab leaders,particularly Sharif Ilussein; and Arab troops played {L usetul, though cxaggerated,palt in thc defeat of the Turks. EglTt $?s the p ncipal British basc in the tr{iddle E{6t. UDtil 1916, thc objcct of Brjtish forces there \ras esseDtiallydefence, the containmcnt ol Geman-Tnrkish thrusts tov'srals Suez and towards Aden. But in April 1914, thc Arft Abdullah, son of Sharif Ilusscin, had made approaches to Kitchener in Cairo about the possibility of British hclp lor an Arab rising against the Turks. Kitchener's noncommittal answer then was fotlo$'cd by a much morc decisive responsc in Novcrnber, once Britain and Turkey rvcre at wa.r,In a letter to llussein, Kitchener spok€ ol a new linc in British policy. 'Till now we have defendcd and befriended Islam in the person of thc Turks, llenceforwad it shall be th:Lt ofthe noble Arab.' Throughout r915 and early 1916, negotiations with Hussein procccdcd.Their general effect lvasto suggest Bdtish apprcvsl for a new Arab state rrnder thc Sllerif's authority, stretching from thc Hcjaz to nothem Slria. This, of course, cut across krown French hopes, and was also likely to meet opposition fton the Sy an Ambs. It \yas only in Syria so far that o conscious,organized, intellectual Arab netiomlism existed. Thc Sl.rians *'ould not especiallyrvetcomcthc nlle of a barbarian chicf like Hussein, as an alternative to rrlc by the Sultan. Arab unity \dould be dimc t to create, cvcn under British patronage. A division of opiniol betlvecn B tain aDd France would make it almost impossible. Ilussein's Arab rcvolt rgainst the Turhs began in Junc 1016, but it $-asnot until the Spring o11917thrt a sjgni6cant for{ard novement was made by a l3ritish cxpcditionary forcc fronr
232
TIIE GREAT WAIi AND AFTERWARDS
Eeypt. Thc principal spur to pro$ess 'was the splointment of Ilotd Gcoryc as Pdme Minister in Dec€mber 1916. Thc ncw prcmier so.,nsho$ed himsclf an enthusiasticsupportcr ofBritish advanccment in thc Miadle Uast. In p€.rticular, he was resolved thetaBritish I'alestinemust be createdand that thc Sykes Picot prcposal for an intemational z,onemust bc modified. A conquest by thc B tish army would settle many problcms. 'Once *'e are iD military possessionit rvi]l urake t great diffcrence.' It was a slow adi'ance at f st. Gcncml MuruLy failed to t{ke Gaza in l{arch and .{pril but, undcr Allcnby, B tish forces gained thc $'hole ol Palestine by the end of the year. A year latcr, by Novcmbcr 1918, they controllcd much ol the Syrjan coastdl region, and Hussenr's son, Feislll, had bc€n allorled to takc Damascus.Whatever the existing commitments to Fmnce, to Husscin or to international Zionism, dc facto possessionby Allcnby's army allowed Britain to spcak ftom a position of strength irhcn thc pcace setueinent came to be made. The armisticc, agrccd to by the Turks at Mudms at the end of Octobcr, was signed on bchaf of the allics by a llritish omcer' Admiral Calthoryc. In the end, only Britain, of all Turkey's cncmics, was actually responsiblefor her military defeat in 1918. Ttrc cont bution of the .{mbs under LaFTence, though gallant and dramatic at thc timc, is now generallyrcgarded as a mnrginal seryice only. Sabotagc behind enemy lines, and continual harrassment from thc desert, had considcHble value, but the essentialbusincssof pushing back tlle Turks ftom stronghold to stronghold lvas vcry mucb in tLe lunds ol Auenby's British The end result, with regard to a political settlement for P&lestineand Syda, $'asstill indoubt, howcver,€ven in Novenrber r9I8. And the dorbt $?s largely the result of continuing muddle in British policy-making. Not only ll'as there disagreemcnt bet{'eeD the Indian government ond London about the ght attitude to Ar$b nationalism (Nerv Delhi was strungly againsi conccssionsand prcmiscs of independcnce)!thete $as even {,onllict bets'e€n thc Forcign Oflice and Lloyd George'sbright young advisers in thc 'garden suburb'. The latter tcndcd to
PALESTINE
AND MESOPOTAMIA
284
press unhcsitatingly for the extension of Il tish rule, while the Foreign Oftce was far more concerned for conect procedure and the honouring of ageements with France. tr{oreover, while the Foreign OIficewas handling ncgotiations .with Hussein, thc Indio Omce I'as simultaneouslyencoumgingthe anbitions oflis chief val, Ibn Saud of Arabia. In Mesopotamia, :rt any rate, there $ere, for the fitst three ycus, clear aims and uncompromisingmethods. Thc govcmncnt of India hoped to seeIIaq, from Basla to Bagdad, becomepart of the B tish empire. Indian army troops werc conccntrated at Bahrein, in rcrdiness for a landing, even bclorc re n-!rr $,ith Turkey broke out. Once the war open€d,the landing 1vasnade, and the army fought its $'ay nodh against stiff Turkish opposilion. An as(ault on Bagdadin N*oventb.rt!' | 5 CF il, .t, r r,d c;;Frol l'ownshend's force had to surrender {rt Kut-el Amara in ^Dril 1916.By ]larch 1917.how.\er. Bcgdid ,,t:rri,rkcn.rnrl p,,tilicnl ofiiceN attachcd to the arnry began to organize thc adrnj istmtion of the native Amb population on the patelnat tines so familiar to thcm iD India. No mention had been madc of futurc independencc, and Sykcs-Picot had alresdy confirmed thc prcbability of direct Bdtish rule in Iraq. jty thc ti'ne thc tr{udrosarmisticc lias signed, British,Indian forces wcrc a merc tlirty miles south oftr{osul, wbich they thel promptly occupicd, thoqh it was well inside the French Syrian sphere. But again, by this time, the governmcnt at London \r'asbeginning to overrule Indian government views. In 1917, soon aftcr Bagdad's capture, it insisted on a prcclami.fion to the people of Mesopotamia which made relercncc to Sharif Husscin and to the ideal of Arab unity and independerce. And on S Novcmbcr 1918, partlyhaving inmind thc twclfth ofPrcsidcnt Witson's Fourteen Points ('other nations.litiesunder Turkish rulc to be atlowcd t., devclop indepcndence')the B tish snd Frcnch nade a {resh promise in a joint declHration to the Arabs. Ttrey lnlund U)crnselvcs to 'encourageand assist in the establishment of native govemments in Syri{ nnd Mcsopotar a'. Whcttrcr ttris cancelcd out the Sykes Picot padition and \\hether thcre would still be any ar€s6 of dircct British or Frcnch Iule rvas lcft unccrtain.
2A1
TIIE GREAT WAR AND AFTERWARDS
ltrhtrt $'as cerhin was that British military success against Turkcy had given Lloyd G€orge the po{er to ovcrride French claims, if he eboseto ilo so, in the peacesettlcment.
[42] PEACE TREATIES AND MANDATES \{hen Clemenceau and Lloyd Ceorge met in London shodly beforc the opening of the Paris peaceconfercnce,the rcality of British contrcl in thc Middle East v'as immediately made apparent. In conversation, Lloyd Georgedemanded both Mosul 'You shall ard Palestine aDd, in each case, Clemenceaurcplied 'Iurkey-in-Asia have it'. Ilut a finst solution to the problcms of did not cmerge from this mceting, nor jndeed ftom the Paris conferencc. The conference did, ho*'ever, produce *hat was almost s. final settlement of the Balkans qucstion, now that 'Iurkey, Aust a-I{ungary and Russia had all been defeated in The collapseof Runani&, Iollowing her enhy inio the wal on the allied sidc (in August 1016), mcant th{t Balkan afrairs I'e}e pushed into thc backgrounal {or the rcst of thc war' The AngloFrench almy at Salonika was some 600,000strcng - about onebut it failcd to save Serlia and it had no third of it B tish positive succcssuntil the linal stagesof the w:LI when, in Septcmber 1018,it was responsiblelor the defes.tof Bulgaria. Greece joined thc alliesin July l9l7 but only after thrcc ycars of intemal power strugglesinvolving a prc-allied P me Minister, Yenizelos, and the prc-Gcrman king, Constantine.Under Venizelos,ea ier, Greecervould have joined th€ allies but for Russian objections. The struggle to keep Greece out of th€ Ceman orbit between rr15 and 19u involved visits to Salomis by an inglo-Frcnch fiect and thcn a comllete blockade ol Greece, bcfore Constartinc had prcved was forccd to abdicate. Benevolent neutnlity impossible to naintain by 1917. Th€ only way to restrict German influencein Greecewas to force her into the nar agoinst Germanv.
PEACT' TREATIDS
AND ]]I-{NDATI]S
245
The tenitorial scttlement in the Balkans was contained in four seportrt€ treatics, those of Ssint-cemrain (with Austria), tianon (with Ilungary), Ncuilly (rvirh Bulsaria) and Sducs (with Turkey). It rvasa settlencnt giving tutl recognirion to thc nationalist pfincide, ola kind that mightwcll have bccn possible in 1878 had itnotbeenfor the existcnceof Austria-IlunEarv. The inlcrnel.oltapscor Au\lris -ll uns:rry in let8 now mad;p;s.ibl" the union of peoples once ruled by l\rks with thcir mcial bmthers who had been under flabsburg rule. In this way, the Saint-Germain treaty allowed the S€rbs of Serbia and trtontcneero to unite q ilh lhe Serbsol Bosn;ain tt,cnrw slat" ofyucoslavja lu which s.re rlso rddFd Cr,,atic and prrr of the Brnrt of 'l'emesvar. By Ure T anon treaty, Rums.nians rvho had lived undcr }lungarian suthority in Transylvania v.cre united I,ith the RumarriansofMoldavia and WallacLiu. {uoth Saint-Cermrin and Trianon merely lcgalized rrnions rat alrcady taken place spontonteously.) The witLdrawal of Russia from DarticiDorion jn thcsc I'rocccdingsmcxnt t),st th. nrrv sralescouttl hope for e reasonably independent cristence, at least in the foresceabte future. Miror tcritorialdisputespersistcd, however,iD theBanet, Albania, Dobmdja end Bcssarabia. Bulgaria, as a.defeutedencmy state, Iost tenitory in Macedonia to Yugoslavia, and in Thrace to crccce. This second toss was part of a considerable reorganization of teEitory in the StraitsAegean area, in which Bulgaria lost her lgtB AeAean coast complctcly, and Croe,e. tcmporlrily. hcrrne mtrrcss of the Aegean - on behall of Britain a.nd France, 1!,ho for their o\rr1 interests thrust tllis reward upon her. (Venizelos, however, was happy enough to rcceive it.) Russia's withdrawal fmm the war ir l9u-18 was held bv the British and Frcnch to havc invetidated not only ihe l9I5 pronises to Russis but etso those to Italy contuinedin the London and Soint-Jeantreaties.ln ihe ncw situation, Crcece and not Italy wns to be the chief bcneliciary in this patt of 'he Tuikish lartition. The trcary of Stwns gave to Grcece the Adrienople region and the Callipoli peninsula, and also (on dubious ethnical grounds) Smyma and its hinterland. Th€ Sultan was allowed to retain ConstsntinoDle as his caDitsl
238
TIIE GREAT WAR AND AFTER'IVARDS
but apart, from this, the TurLish hold on Europe had gone So long us Grcccerernained11loyat sul,ordins.tr,British and l'rench warships !'!ould no$' hnvc little difflculty in passingthrcugh the Shaits. Thc lvat.rs of ttre Stmits v'erc also to be intern$tionalized and frec passage $as gtaranteed for the merchsnt ships and $arsltips ol all nations. tlo?es that the Americans might be persuAdcd to accept a mandrte for Constantinoplc and the Str$its (rnd for {n alrortive Arntenian state) were drshed by t}re refirsal of Congressto consiiler ltny such Middle East comlllitments. Britisl, Ircnch and Italian troops thcrefore remai ed in occLrptrtionofthe Stlaitscoastline and the Sultan'scapital. British conhol ofthe entrancc to the Bhck Ses.was now more complet€ than it had becn flt any tine erccpt during the Crimcan war; and the Sultan was nllo"'ed to keep ConstantinoPleonly becauseof the efitcts that his rcmoval Inight havc on l{oslem opinion in The chief British inteftst, howcver, 1lrasccntred on the partition of Tutkey's Arab lands, lr4richwas a$ced upon by a conferenc. rr SEn n^mo in Atr;l 1e20.TLe oulcun,awas an almo't complcte disreg:rrd ol Arab independencc hopes, a judicious ignoring of earlicr tromjses and an imposition of a modilied S1'kes Picot arrangcment - which nevcrtheless produced bitter disa$eemetrt tor a time bett'ccn Britain and France. The mrin area of conflict was Syria, rvhere, vith B tish oppmval, Feisal had already installcd himself as kjng. Angry Frcnch pmtests at this interfcrcncc in their aloted sphere were at fiIst brushed aside. But in the end, the Bitish abandoned Feisol, withdrew their troops and {'atched thc French take over. Lloyd George had decided to surender a position !r'onby ^ll€nby's almy and, by so doing, to cast aside plcclgesgiven to llusscin. IIe had two motives. Firstly, the American withdrawal from Europe suggested a necd to preserve Anglo-French harmony. Secondly, it was crpedicnt to give thc French their hcad in Syria sincethe Bdtish now intended to enforce direct rulc throughout thei own chosen arca. In effect, a new British }fiddle Eastem ernpire was set up between the tr{editeuanesn ond the Persian GuU Curzon, Foretn Secrekrry lrom 1919, even hoped to establish a ProtectoBte oYer
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WAII
AND AFTERWARDS
Pcrsia. It sccmed that the hopcs of Layard in 1878, for the establishment of a continuous zonc of British influcncc between Constantinopleand India, *'ere about to be ftalized. The new syst€m lrad to be a disguisedimperialism of course, in view of Arab, and more especially Amcrican' opinion llut the rmndates n'hich *'erc gmnted to Britain and France, vhite satisfying the ne$ international momlity (rcspectfor the principle of sclf'detcrminati.,n),alto*'ed full political and military authority to be exercised behind a fsqadc of nativc indep€ndeoce.Syda and the Lebanor (thc predominatrtly Christian coastt region of Syria) wcre trrdc a French rcsponsibility, under ultjmatc L€aqu€ of Nations controt. B tain goincd a sirnilar position in Palestnrc and Irdq (Mesopotamia),.rnd the important strdttgic and oil-bcaring region oI Mosul v?s included in Imq. Both Llovd Georgc and the Irdian govcmment had reason to feel satisfied. Rescntment among Arab nationalists and outbreaksofviolence against B tish troops and adrninistrators necessitateda minor adjustment, howcver, in the shapeofa further, mther mconingless gcsture torvards Arab ghts. In 1921, thc Colonial Office, under the Secrctaryship of Churchill, took ovcr responsibility from the India and Foreign Offices for the managemcnt of the two mandates. Clnrclill, h{wirg consulted T. B. La{Tcnce, beld r conferenceat Cairo and appoirtcd l-eisal to be King of Iraq and his brothcr Abdullah to be Amir of Transjordan, the latter region being carved out of the British mFndate areason the east ver' Pledgcsto llussein were being belatedlv bank ofthc Joda honouled, at lerst supedcially, in the granting of thrones to t!r'o of his sons. (He himscf was already recognizedas King of the Ilejaz.) Thc eastem boundaries of the Lebanon and Palestin€ confomed loosely to a division hinted ai in the McNahon correspondence.Both Iruq and Transjordan contained a large part of geogaphical S5.'ria, As for Palestine, the British happily set aside the Sykes-Picot plan for intemational rule and administereal the area themselves They tooL crre to seethat Palcstine, as wcl as Transiordan, had an outlet to the Red Seaon the Gulf of Aqab:r. But thc lirst seriouscloshesbctveen Jcws tnal Arsbs occurred in llav 1921i and, in 1922, the British had to make
CHANAK
AND LAUSANNE
239
clesr that the Balfour promise ofa National llome did not mean a Jewish state, They also had to announccthatJewishsettlement wes confined to the west banl of the Jordrn. In re very momcnt of Bdtain's tdumth in thc trfiddle East, rhe .acial/religious tensions were appearing which were ultimatcty to
[43] CHANAK AND I,AUSANNE Thn-San Remo sFrrt.mentoI Turk.y.s Arab lrnds undcrwenl mudrti.a.lronin t92t. Th. SAvrcstr^s1y \ign,d by the Suttrn in 1920 had lo l,c.ompl.tcty ahandoned.tind.r tr.ssurc trom a revived Turkish nationalist movement, the allies had to maLe a completely ncw treaty at Lausanne in tgzg. Thc nationalists, led by trfustaph Kcmoi, had t$o nlain objecrs, Thcy \ranted to remove the SuItaD (Mehmed IV) r,tro norv appe_arcil more than ever the lool of lor.ign infern\t"i cnd they wanrr ro d pre.eruc Turkish nrle in the whole of Asia trIinor, which meant sup'pressing rnoppendcnccmor.ments in Arm.nia.:rnd removing French, Italran.andespe.jallyCroek I roop" from thcir so'l. fn tU;stask, nemrr s chrclsupporterwobL.nin. snd Ii: ,,Li.fopponent Lloyd George. The sympathy of Communist Russia u.as one of t"hc principsl advanr€ga of the nc\r Turkcy. A( r sign of goodt(i , r.turnFd fo Trrrkcy Krr< cnd Ardatrrn wt,i.h \hc h8d trken jn 1878.Bui what r.:r y unitcd L.nin and Knrnrlwas not so much e common causeas a common suspicion olB tain. F-Ih xnd ,F atiaasLcssn ro.u heir to.scs durins ,^TI I92l by giving la.it rFcognitionro ih, Kcm!t govemmcr,t alArkara and by withdrarvingtl,.ir Lroop( frorn Asic Minor. l}rncr abandonFdCitj.ia and Iraty the Adstic rcgion, Th. llnl$h govcmm.nl. l,o$.ver, wss unwillingloseeLtrnadvanr:rgns oI SAfr." entilely t,\t, 1l,Fy did rrke pcrr in di\.ussions with ^emats reprascnfuri\-Fs. ond Curzon \eas bFAinninsto havF doubts about backing eithcr thc Sultan or thc Grecks. But Llovd
240
TIIE CREAA WAR AND AFTERWARDS
George was detcrmined to keep the Strsits open for British warships and to preserv€ Greek (or, by extension, British) mastery of tbe Aegean- which meant, if possible,ensudng the Greek hold on Sm]'ma. The position was a dimcult one, since the Grceks themselves $'crc no longer fs.ithful subordinates follo$ing the retuln of Constantine as king in 1920. In the end' decisionswere rnade by military nccessity.The Oreek army in . .sie llinor v$s routecl bv Kemal's forces lnd the Turks took Smymr. in S€ptcmber 1922. They then movcd on tolvards the Dartlsnellcs, rvhcrc British troops guarded the narolYs at Chanak. I'rench and Itali:m forces were withdrawD befol.e the Turks arrived. An Anelo-Turkish \{ar for control of thc Straits and Constantinopleseemedinunincnt. The Charuk crisis was, in a sensc,willed by Lloyd ecorge, It endedby bringing about his downfall. It rvasnot that he lvanted war, but that he \tishcd to rcstole his standing among th€ Coalition Conservativesby some grand intcmational coup. IIe must again oppear, as in 1919 20 at Paris, the master of events, the ercat arbihator, thc toueh dcfcnder of Bdtish interests But milit:rrily.lirrrnrialJy.rnurally.tl,. British nation wi. nor IFadv lor frcsh sacriiices and hemic deeds. The Dominions {ere unenthusiustic and even urcooperativc. And, at Chanak itself' the mititary position was unpromising. The commander therc, Sir CharlesIIa ngton,was ugcd to be forcetul intheprcsentation of an ultims.tum to thc Turks. Bcing a rcalist, he quietly refused to prcss the issue, un.t agreed to an armistice (signcd at tr{udania) rrhich the Turks veft etlrally happy to accept. One week later Lloyd Georye resigned as Prime Minister. His Conservative suDDort€rs saw him as recuess rather tlBn tough. A dangerously isolatc
CHANAK
AND LAUSANNII
241
recognition. The Smyrna region, and Tlrrace as frrr west ss Adrianople and the river trIaritzu, werc rcturned to Turkev. The Crpilujari,,nc- tl,e old .once:sion\ to forcign rratle anj rrr.rchonts- which had beendenouncedby Turkey in 1914,n€rc now formally abolished. Foreign manegement of the Ottoman Debt ceased.But Lausannei{as not without compensationsfor Britain. Curzon'sInassiveauthority and his increasingsympathy lor ure Kemal govemmcnt meont that the ne\v Stlaits settlcnent was a lavourable one. Russian hopcs wer€ defeated, and indeed the recent closenessbct$'ccn Russia and T\rrkey was fast disappearing. The departurc of Lloyd ceorgc meant that pbspects of a nerv Anglo-Turkish lriendship rvcre considerably improvcd. Russia'sr€presentativeat Lausannc, Chich€rin,lrld hopedto see the Straits rctuned to full Turkish control and the passageof rvarships forbidden. In Trotsky's vien, freedom of the Straits meelrt 'a military dictatorship of thc B]sck Seo for thc country possessing the biggestflcet', that is, Britsin. Thc Straits Convcntion as cventu.elly agrccd upon in Ji y l92g prcvided lor an Intemational Straits Commission (undcr thc auspices of the Leaguc) to be basedat Constantinoplc, The easternsnd westem shores of both the Dardaneltes and the Bosphorus were to be demilitarizcd, Freedom of passagefor all mcrchant ships was guarantccd; and finally, and most signincantly, warships of up to 10,000 tons were :rllowed to pass through, even vhil€ Turkey was at pcace, and without any need to consult Tut:key, The numbcr ol such ships sent into the Black Sea by one state lras not to excccd the total number kept there by the most po$,erful Blsck Sca stote, In practice, this gavc Bdtain, even with only one aJly,sry Frenc". or ltrly, or Turkcy her\elf. a hugeadvantage over Russia. She had now gained, for the first time a clear leeol rigl,t to demonstraieher naval power in ttre Btaek Ses,wirhor without the app&val ol Turkey.
B L A C K S E A
B U L G A R I A 'r
,_./J^tt--
*-..----)l-i.. -iAdrienogle )
G kj.E
cE r'
d 5EA OF MARMOR
(Mytilens)
AEGE,4^/'---
- - - --Boqnd.aries qf Grezce,'furkeyand Bulgaria (ilcluditlg the Greek islafids) :from 1923 0 CONSTAN'TNOPLT,
50 TIIE
too
t50 Kur
STNAITS AND TIIE
LAUAAN\E
CIIq\CE9
[44] AFTERTIIOUGHTS With the ending of Turkey's rule over Batkan peoples and Arobs, and the establishmentof a T[rkish nation,state in Asia lfinor, thc Eastern Question, in tlle form it had had since thc fou*eenth century, had been resolved.In tgZA, it was clear that the power which had finally gained most by thc collapsc of Turkey's cmpir" $as Britain. Thc Rus.ians,jusl cs they hcd been promised the grcat p ze - Constantinopleand the Straits had sufcred }evolution and defeat, and had retired into a dcfcnsive shell. The French had gained Sy'ria, but only becauscrhe llritish had allowed thcrll to have it, The ne$.Belkan states, and Turkey henelf, *'ere free from control by eith€r Russia or Germany. For *'ant of a bettcr tenant, the 'lurks had been allowed to stay in Constantinople, but the Stmits were internationalized in a rvay 'irhich cntirely suited British convcnience. Across ihe land-bridges from the Meditenanean to the persiaD CuU, British-controllcd rCgimeshad beencstabtishcd;and, parfly by dcsign and partly by shecr good luck, the Britjsh had their honds or almost all the points .where oil lvas to be found in the 1930s and 40s, British control of Persia proved unacceDtabte and ovrrcxpenrirn,nlrch to Curzon\ di.app,intn,er,1. B;r ,. Russianswithdrew the R€d Army from northem persia in I9z? and a Russo-Persian heaty gualantecd Persia.'s integrity - so little ra'aslost fmm the British point of view. In EgWt, although nationalist demands led to a grqnt of nominal independencein 1922 (which AUenby, then l{igh Commissioner,had to insist on). British foroaslemrinFd. to dcl".ndboth lhc Canrl and EglT,r. $nd B tish rule in the Sudan wa6 maintained. Yet, complete as was B taiD,s control in thc Middle Esst follorving the Great War, it was an illusory, a shod-term supremacy, I'he 1928 Straits settlement was altered considerablv_ ,nd in Russia'bfavour. by the MonrFux Con!.ntion of tO;6 (which still shnds); and Communism was soon to prove a fa.r morc efrectivc excuse for Russian intervention than ever Olthodoxy or Panslavism had been. The treatics of Brest Litovsk
244
TIIE GREAT WAR A)ID AFTENWARDS
(srith Russia) and Bucharest (rrith Rumania) in 1918 had shown what the German aims were in essternand south-esstemEurope; and the revival ol German military strength msde possible a second ellort to achieve them in l94l-3. Although the ltiddle East was kept out of German lDnds in 1..J42,Russia wss not defeated (or even outflanked, as ChurchiD hopcd) rlong {ith Germany in 1945, as she had been in 1918; and th€ revitalized Russia was beyond Britain's {insnci ad militfy po\Merto control, Suprcmacy in the Middle Eost might still have be€n maintained fairly cheaply h$d Britain rctaincd thc good i{iu of those on whosebchalf she claimed to bc ruling thc area. But the endless conflict of Je*' and .{rab !.nd the unwillingncss of Areb nationalists to obey British-backed Kings and Sheihsmeant that British rulc by consentbecarneirrpossiblc. Thc grant ofindcpendencc to India in r 947 left oil and thc contaimncnt of Communtum as the only scrious interests of B tain in thc Middle East. The failure of the Anglo-French attempt to kccp control of tlle oil rcutes in 1056 rthe SuezWar) has lelt thc U.S.A.with the taskor opportunity - of establishing an undcrstanding with Soviet Russja and ofachieving a $table balanceamong the Middle East peoples.One Easterll Question 1vesconcludedin 1923.Ther€is&s yet no dnsw€r to thc new one, Ol all the imprcssions lcft by a study of thc Eastem Qu€stion, pcrhaps the stmnecst is of the alvesomcly slcndcr grounds on which great powcrs rvcre obliged to base major policy dccisions, 'B tain', and ot the entirc inaccurs€y of using the terms 'Russia', 'Aust a', 'Fmnce', 'Cemany' io describe the two or three worried but hopetul men who usually took decisions in 'B tain decided to disthcir country's name. The ststemcnt 'The P me continue support for Turkey' might rea]ly mean Ilinister, persuaded by two slightly better informed Cabinct Ilinisters, a ne$'spaper pmp etor and an awkward Admimlty report, reluctantly agreed to abandon all that he had previously 'The Foreign Secr€tary, impressed stood lor' - or, altematively, by a memorandum from a young F.O. adviser, and by the alguments of a dcputation of Liverpool merchants, has informed the
AFTERTHOUGHTS
hime }linister that prcvious assumptidrs sbout British inteftsts had been false, and that nclv instructions must thercforc be sent to the ambassadorin Constsntinople'. Equally, the sttrtement 'B tain decided to continle support for Turkey' might mesn 'The P me lr{inister has becn unable to think out any better election-winner than to lcsunect tlLe poticy of one of his prcdcr:essors.He hopes public opinion, or at least the London mob, rvill be impresscd.' 'Ihoe is not much exaggemtion in lhese paraphrases. TLe decision-maknrgapparatusofall the grestpo\ren rvasexcccdingll' inlbrmal, flexible, and by design slnost, arnateudsh. the 't\'o or three men' 'wereoften in thc position of stmggling to mrke sensc of new situations, faced by conflictine advice llom thcir dblomatic, militsry and commeftiol cxpcrts, and unsure ol thc lottg-term, or even the short,tcrn, intcmsts of the;r own states. It is not surprising that they nomally tended to react according to fixedtreditions. To go on dcfending'the security of Constantinople'or demanding'thc ftccdom ofthc Straits'1vas easierthan to think out a brand-newattitudc. Nor is it remarkable that thers vas a grcat deal of doubt and misgivnrg in, for example, the British govemments $'ho lound themselves coi mitted to ]l?r iD 1854 or 1914. The possiblc benefits to be cxpected were not by any means clear-cut in eithcr casc. l\lrcn seDior statesmen floundercd, the influence of prcssurc goups or unomcial, greyeminencccon{idsnts could sometimcsbc dccisive.Especially was this so in Russia, $nd to a lessexextcnt in ecrmany ,rnd Austria, vhere thcoretically, and alanningly oftcn in practice, vital decisions *'ere left in the hands of i]l-cquipped Lereditsry It is salutary to recall, when looking at diplomatic history, thst thcrc is seldom such a thing as 'British' policy or 'RussiDn' policy. l'hcrc {ill be, perhaps,:r 'British gor,'cmmcnt'or'Russian goYernment' policy, but there will also bc, almost ccrtcinly, at l€ast one alternative policy being simuttancously put fon!'od by rr opposition politicsl group, or by a group of army ofiiccrs, or manufacturcrs, or raciul or religious enthusiasts. 'lhcrc rrrill o{ten be at lcast t}'o 'public opinions' lyithin one state, as thcrc
I 216
THE GREAT WAR AND AFTERIVARDS
were in the pro-cladstone North ond pm-Disraeli London of 1878; but the extent to which a leader feels obliged to listen to public opinion is in any caselikely to dependmore onhis standing among his own colleagues than upon his rcspect for popular lvisdom. Even mole st king is the frequency of policy disagrccmcnts to be found ?rirlrin a govemment during periods of diplomatic crisis, The disputes lvithin the Abedeen and Disracli cabinets arc only the most colourtul ex.lmples of a tendency that appears regularly in all thc geat powers during the nineteenth The degrce of influence wielded by men on the spot in prctclephonc, and even more so prc"telcgroph, days is also {'orth rcmembcring. British policy was vcry rruch being made by Admiral Co&ington at Nava noin 182?andbyAdnriral Seymour at Alexandria in 1882 rathcr thsn by ministe$ in London. It is as well to rccognize the cose with which admirals, conquering gcnerals and ambassadors could act in advance of. or in excess of, instructions from thcir home govemmcnts. No one can ever be sure how much of so-called British poticy towards Turkey \[ &s actually constructed during Stmtlord Canning's unrecorded tulks with the Sultan. Tcmperley can absolve Stratford from rcsponsibility for the Crimcan lvdr by reference to documentsry cvidence; but 'Britain', to the Turks in 1853,fairly clearly meant the opinions of the British amb&ssadoras cxpress€din his privste conversationswith Turkish leaders.Similarly, a Russianambsssador like Ignatiev, or Russian militaly commandels in Cenhal Asia, \rere extrsordinarily &ce to invent Russiaa policy on their own initiative, I'l'hether thcir policy would ever receive olficial acknowlcdgement in St Pctersburg depended portly on which of the Tser's edvisers was in the ascenclcncy, and partly on whether their policy had actually been succcssful. Study ofa problem lik€ tLe Eostem Questioncan all too easily suggestthat international diplomacy is a typc of nightmarc chess match, played amidst blinding fog, in which the pieces change shapc or melt a\r'ay, players myste ously translorm themselves, rulcs abruptly alter in mid-move, and no onc is quite sure what the prizes are. Yet this n€ed not discourage.It is the constent
i
I
A}.TERTIIOUGHTS
247
fluctuation, the infinit€ range of possibilities, that makc diplomatic history so stimriating a subject. This is its special excitemcnt, that it presentsproblems to which urere are many possiblc solutions and equally many ways of ardvine at those solutions. In the end, for exampte,the British, somc$'hat fo their surp se, gained more in the Middle East by ignornrg or opposing Turkey than thcy had by befriending hcr. Yct doubts c.rn ulways be cast on the value ol $hat *?s actually goined , lvhether it v?s necersaryto rule in Cyt)rus,EgWt, thc SudAn,AdeD, Pslestirrc, lYansjordan and Imq simply to maiDtain easj'contrct with India and obtain cheap suppliesof oil.
PRINCIPAL EVENTS
Principal Events, 191.t-25 1914.
t9t5.
1910.
1917.
1918.
August. Gorle, and .B/"rlar to Constsntinoplc. Turkey in allbnce with Gcmany ogainstRussio November-Deccmber. B tain, France, Russie dcclarc wsr on Turkey. CWIuS snnexed.Egypt a protectoEte. Landings in Mesopotamig January. Turkish attsck torvards Suezcaml I'eb ary-March. Nrlval sttacks at Dardanelies M6rch April. Britain and rrs,nceacccpt Russis'srigltt to Conshntinopte.Italy becomesparty to Turkish pa,rtition anongemcntsby treaty of London Ap l and August. ftoop Isndingsor csllipoli peninsda. Decisionto abandon,December Mey. Collapseof Asquith's Libcral gorerDment- rcplM€d by Coalition y.ith Asquith still as I'rime llinister October. Bulea lt joins Ccntral Powcrs. Anslo,french army lands at Salonika Novembcr. S€rbia overrun by Ccltral Powers Jsnuary. Sykes Picot sgreemcnt- bmsdened to include Russiain Mry April. Surrerderst Kut June. AIab revolt begins Augrst. Rumsnia joins alli.s Deccmber.Lloyd ceorge rcplacesAsquith as Prime Minist€! Uarch. Bagdad capturcd April aDd Au$st. Ssint JeaD de Mguienn€ trcsty defines future ltalian ter.itory in Asia Minor July. Grcccejoins allies Novenber. Bolfoul declemtion. Bolshel-ik rcvolution in Russia Decemb€r.Jcnsalem capturcd llsrch. Russiaand Gelmanymakcpcaceby trcaty ofBrestLitovsk Septembcr.Bulgari& defeetcd by Anglo-I.ench srmy fmm Sstonika October. Turkey nakes pescc - Mudms srmistice Novembcr.Anglo-F.enchdeclsrationto Ambs promising futurc indcpeDdence
245
1919. October.Cuvon replaccsBalfou as lorcign Sccretary t919 20. Trcatics of SaiDt-cefmain, lrianon, NeUIy ana Savres p.o.lucea Belkanssettlcment 1020. San nemo conterenceproduccsMardates sctttementfor Turk"l -ir-As;a.T.rrrc"ho, LFtJar,un 3r,tISJritri Brirrin has nalestinccr,d Iraq l9?1. cai.o confcrence- Feisal Kins of rEq, _{bdullahAnir of Tralsjordan. ClasLesbetw€enJcwssnd Arabsin polesrinc. Xemal goveDmcnt estatlishedat Ankar.! 1922. Ttlrks drive crccks ftom Sm).rnaregjon. Chanakcrisis_ endedby Mudsniaarmistice,Religil&tionof Ltoyd George. Norninal indepcndencefor Esypt t922 A, Lausanncconfercnce and rreary- adjustmentof Strres,and n w Strai(.ssettlemcnt.CspitutatioNendcd.R€cognitioD of Kemal'sgov€mmcnt
.150
TrrD eltrr-Al \Y^R AND A!-'IER\{]\RDS
Iturthct lleading (\i/orks by the followingauthon, s'tiich haveaheadyllecnsugg€sted, continue to be rele'anL: Maniott, ArdcrsoD, gure$itz, Xlillcr, tr{arlowe,Seton'lvatson,I'lal.t, Bullcrd, Taylor,Pribmm, Foot, Larle, ChapDrrn,Blaisdcll,lcis, Kazemzadch,Sumncr,Iarnic ) Elizabeth trronroc,B,ilain's Xlancnt in th. Mitldb llast, 191L56. Cliatto and t\inrdus (London,r003). Ann lvilliams, ,/ilai,'l dnd Frotc. in ttu lti rllle EasI atudN orlh Alriu , 1911-61.\lacrn;ltar (London, 1e08). of 1917.'Iofch Press R. P. churchiil, ?'rc ,.rrgla ItussianCan\enLiott (CcdarRspi.ls, Iowa, 1039). 11.Scl\n\iLt,'t'leA .n ration of Bosnia,1903 I fanbridgc Irnilcrsity I'rcss (Cambddse,1037). Jt. C. H.lmreich, ?rr ,i?tomaclt of tle Bdtkanlvarr. HaNard University Pr.ss (Csmbridge,I'll]ss.,l9iJ8). S. H. Longdeg,OiJtr tre Mindle nast: ils D;scolieryand Deulopment. Chalham[ouse/oxford UnivcrsjtyPress(I,ondon,3rd .d , 1e68). H. N. Hovard, Thc L'attition af Twkes, 1913 1923. UniYersityof Oklahona Pres (Norman,Oklahoma,usr). E. Kedorrie, Lngland and the Minle East: the D.structionof the andBoncs(Canbridge.1956). tsorves Ottonanllmp irc,1911-1927. Juklia. Nevakiri, B/?raiz , I.rancc and lheArub Xlitklle Ea\t, 1914-1924. Ai,hlonePre$ (London,r068). W. W. Gottlieb, Studiesin Sc,JrttDipla'ta.g duri g tlE First llorld, Ivdr. ]\lten and Un$jn (London.1e57). L. J. Stein, The Batfuur Declantian, \^Ilenti'ne, Irlitchcll (London, r96r). II . Tnrmpel\er, GcnnanganAtheOttamanEmpie, 1911-l918.Ptincetot L'ni\cNity Pre$/Oxford Unive$ity Prcss(London,1966). U. EI{.Curming, Itra co-Briti:]h Ri,^aIrAin the Paet-llt$ Ncar ENt. Oxford U ivc.sity I'ress (London,1038). P. L. Ellamlrna, Iritish Policlt in Pdlestittt. ,'\.nerican Council on Public Arairs (\YashingtoD,1ea2). J. C. fiurcwitz, ']'he StuEgLe Ior PalesLi'ne.Mcleod (New York, 1950):lcovclsthc ].cars1936 ,181. 7. N. ,adnc, The Stuggle for AMb I tl.r.ntcn e. I(hs)'st (Beirut, l9(n)).
I'UNTIIER
RDADING
251
J. \lsrlow., .haL Nqtionalis|n and Br;tish Inpedolirn. CressetPress (LoDdon, r961). U. N. Sachcr. 'l'h. Eneryen.e oJ IIE ]Ii.ldl( lltti., lru n24. A)lct\ Lr!e:1he l'crguni Press (l,ondon, r!70). B. Lrwls, TIt" Ent/gcLct of llodttl 7'u*.!. Oxlo lhrivcrsity Pr€ss (Londo , l!,ijs). Lord Knrross, Ar Iirk: rh! ]?el)i ]t of u Nartor. $'cidcnfetd aDd Nicolson (LondoD, l96a). IL Nicolson, Chr:,r: lfur ,asl -I,/kr.. Constable (LondoD, 19s,1). lI. A. J'.\a,\s, Rtif OutLin" of th" Ad,t?rirls in Mcs.?ataD.ia. Sitton Pracd (Lon.lon, 1920). n. B. G4r.dncr,llla?.li!l. Casscil (Lon.loD, 1065). R. R. Jancr, darlt2dlt.lJrlsliftt (London, 1905). Alsn Mooreh.sd, Cull?rlt. IlanrisL Il.milton (LoDdoD, lei6). 'Ncw Camb dgc }lodern llisrory', Yol XII (1s08 re.tj), Chaprcr X, 'The lliddle East, 1!100 rerrt' by lt_ Ledourie.
INDEX
sd Parrition scneDs I 1016 r?1. 2284l]| and wd in Pal€drine and trt.so-
Index Abdul Hcmid II, Sult.q (r342-1918), 147, l0!r 5, 173, 173, 143, 20O. Alrerdc.n, narl oI {173.1-1300), 56, er, 8.r,01, rrr 5, tZ lJ,l0l, 104, 1O5, a, 111,123, 146, 20?, 2ir(i Aeren !r, Count (13,j.!r012), ro5l Afgtrmiltm, r?, r 23 1, r57, 105-6! 1?l ) l?3 0, 145, 201, m4,5 Albanid, 02, r49, 167, 209. 214, 235 Alexuder I. l'sr (1??7-18!5), 34 ldd Cre.k i.dcpcndenft, .13-0 Ale$nder II,'Isr (r8r8 3r), rlB, 1 2 7 ,r 3 3 . t a a , 1 4 2 , 1 4 t , 1 5 r Alef,ander III,1lsa. (1845 94), 167 Aiex6nd.i.,65 6, 30, 33, 01, l7,t r, Algie.s (ud Algedo,) 25, 58, 0il,97, Alenbt', l'ield MaEhsl Lord (1361t9a6), 242, 246, 214 r\lnE, brrde or {l8i'r), lrP Andnssy, Cout (1323-90),127 33, lao4a p@iln,152 Anglo-F.eDch Dnterte (rr04), 3.c Frnnco-Bntish Dntente ,rlnglo-JrporeseAlli{r@ (1902),1s2-4 Anglo-RNsirn Dntenie {1007),r9r, Arabs,1:l-15, 123,220 1, rt7 33, Anenia, r1, r4, 18, r23, 14n 0, 1.t3, 157, 13&.3, 210, 22?, 23d, 23' Asquith, II. II, (r352-1023),:!1, 22:t, A!6tda (ud Itabslurgs and AustriaH u n g a r y J ,0 , r l , 2 r , 3 , 2 5 , 2 7 t 0 , 35, 45, 5t, 57, 62t 65, 70, 72,5, U\ rJ,86, 80, 97, 90-100, 102 3, lo5, 107-15, r22, 125, \2'11{]'8p6$itu, 152, 164, 166-70,131-3, 136-5, 190, ro.t,2o0,203,205 r7 P@!in, 22O, 224, 226, 229, 231-5,2'U lagdld, @d Bagdqd R!il$!y, 2O2.2AA
r90 2,
Bal8clova, battle oI(1354), r12 BArforr, A. J, (r8€ \gao), \9r,224, 23O,249 BalI& $'a$ (ror2 r8), ?rr 14 Bs.ing, Sir Evelln, Iid of C.omer (1341-1s17),1?5-?, 104
Bcsi}. Bat,lO0. 106, 114, 135,l7l BieDrDck,trr'nce (131598), 126 8, 13r!-5,1AS,146, 163-9,1?5, 179, Illmk SeaNutrality, 11O,114-15, t27, t23. t254 Donapsrte, Louis Nrpol€otr (130&73), al,40,0.F5, 100, 102-7, 112-14, trs,122 Bonrrartc, Napdleon {r?69-1321),17, 23, 25, Ar, 3A {, 109, t?0 Bosnia, 25, 30, 62, 1O5,123, 130 a, I45, 1.t7, 167, 2O3,205-3, 215, 245 Bospho(8, s?. Striit! lJ.ight, Jonn (1811 89), 107, 125, l?$, 176 Bril.iD, and geneDl inierest i. the nast€m Question, 11-21, 23-t, 42 11,{,7 0, ?t -4, a5-6, 00-2, s5-103,164, r43 4, r85 7, r09, md Creek independ€n@, 42-S, 457. 49-53, 61-4 rnd Mel)emet AIi, 6a t, 7? 3,t and Nedit€nmem stbtegy, 60 72 and ioercascd involvcmcnt in Tuand Tutkirh rcform, 7e-7, 02--4, r22 g and the Crim€an \l'.r, 103-116 ud lolicy (r3to l5), r2r 3 md policy (13?5-a),129 57 Md thc Sucz Canal, t3, 124, 149, 1f 'l-6, 22O, 22g ur, 243 4 and Medit€nanean naval b8hn@, ud sd md and
occupation oI Egr?i, 173-4 tle Srdr, 176 7, ?43 the Penjdeh inciddt, 178 I thc Medit€rmnem Agreements,
and abondonmcrt of T\fliey, 16-17, 09 -r, rfl-g, r25, 16$ rr,I73,lA87,zOO-t, 22O-l od Bg8dsd E,Eilwqy,r0o 2 and Jtrlanerc ,{Iimce, 102-4 and Entcnte nitl Ftulce, rsS-5 and Ent€nt€ fliil Ru$i8, 100-203, 215 and BaItaN (1007-14),20o-r, 204-10, 21?17 aDd Dardarelcs c6npsign, 121-5
and !4e treati$ (t0r0 20).23110 0d Cbcmk chis. 280-,[ ahd rl,€ lliddiellatfromr023.2!r3 -4 Bulg8ria (and Rulssri{nsl. 23. ri2. t 2 4 9 , 1 3 2 , t 3 5 - 4 ? ,t 4 9 , 1 5 9 ? . 165,167, 169-70, t30-2, r9o. 209-t1, 228, 225-A. 2M_5 ByroD, Lod (r?38 r32i), ro,.rz
254
Dilte, Sir Chories(1848-1olr), r56, DjsBel'. B.hjmjn (rBo:Lsr), r5, sr, r r t 1 2 4 j , t 2 ? - 5 i r ,t 6 5 , t 3 0 . 2 ! n , Drejkaire.iund. t26-t, lg2, tB.r-5. l.lo, t4o, 152, 165-7, l7O, 1?9, Dual Alisne
(dusttu-Cehan) O3?0), DFl,lttim@ (r,rmco.RNianl (rsc4,. 165, 109-?2,rat, r94
Canning.Goge (t??0-132?), rs, B.t, 40, .12--5n l,asin, C2,60, ?4. ?9.
nasten Rtrmelie, 1.!7, 16Z. 160. 130 e.onomic astectqofthe xa,rem euesc ring, Sintford, Vis@unr Strltnotr, t2 13, t8, 2?, 31 2, 36,44. 53.70-r, t5 6, Clr ?, t2.l-4. tord de Iildclifie 1t?36_1330).43. 173J,,, 7a3, laa-Oz, 2Ol-2, 22O, 50,64,66, orj, !io-10t. ro6-a. 152,216 Egtpt, rr. Ia,25, All,9i.48.4t-9. Crapodist.ias, Jolu (1776-188r ), .r4. 5A-4, 57, 62-?, 78. Z5 8!!. 00 t05,t02,t2i| 4, rAr,I40,157.164. CNtlereigh, Vjs.out (r?09-rBe2l, u4, t 6 3 ? 0 , 1 ? 3 ? , 1 a 1 ,r 3 4 . l a o . \9A4, 2CO,223, 227, 29t 2, i4A, Catl€rire Il, Tsrins (t?20-961,2C. 27 8. I02 Cent.al Asia (Anslo.Ru$ian rivahv itr), 12, 17, 10, 01, 128 5. td4.' Faho.la,177,104, 170, 178-9. 230. 2.16 trme, 11, 1!r, t6-17,2t. 25.30_4. ChM!erlai!, JGeph trur6-10r4). r7j 41 B, 45, 6r, 56 3, 62 ?O,?3, ?a. Chamk,240 a0 i, 3r),0,r-a, 100-15, rsl_8. Churchiu,Irrd nandobh tl8a, 0;). 1A,tl,752,rt{ 6, t6A 72.tt4 7. 1?9.laI t31,6, lgt, 10R 5. 20O,202_-1, ChutuhiU,Sir lvirsion (13?.Lr06s). 2ro' 2r4-r7' 2r*-20'222-0' 221,224 -t,2AA,2&t
ZtT
Codringtor, Admjrl (,no-ls5t ). 554,244 CoqetsDtiDoplc, securitv aDd sietud of. 1l-12, 14 15. l?-90, 26,3. 35. 42, 44. 5:t-5, 5?, 61, 6rt 0, ?t-4, 73 30, irt 5, tuo 2, ,04. r0o €. 129-i!, 126, r2a, la2, 135. lao-_42. l,ta-59, l6a, rA0, 134-7, r90.201. 209, 2t1 15, 222, 22t6, 2A5-8, Z'n4,245 C r c t € , 4 a , 4 r ' , 6 t ,1 0 2 ,t 8 g , t B 3 CrimeaDWa., r0. 80-2. 34. a9-e0. 921, 06, 9a, loo, r02+j ro5 l5. l 2 l , t 2 6 , t s 5 , l a a , 1 5 1 ,l a a . l a d . tsa, 2o1, 221, 296, 24A Cwor, Ma.quis (1359 1!]s5i. 102. 296 2Ae,247,ztA C]?ei, 10, 145-6, 166 ?, t?A, 222. 227.247 DodM€ll$, se, Streits De$y. htteenth Darl ot, fomerlv Lrd Stsnley (t326 SJr, 125, r28. la4, l86-a, 141, 144, 150 8, 155
I\ancGB.iti6h
Entente Oo04), tsa,5,
Gallipoli, 19, l.l0, 145, la6, 223--1.295 eeh,any, r i9,60-?0,?3.r13. 122_ a. 12t. l2?, r52, t6A-?2, 1?7, 1?0. la2-4! 186-05, 100-204,207_11. 2r4 17,ztr 26, 22tt,23t, 234, Cib4ltff,38,171, t9!t Gla&toue, W.E, (1309-03),ro, t5-16, 1 1 4 , 1 2 i r( r , 1 2 3 9 , t 8 a , 1 4 ? , 1 4 9 . r53{, t6!t 5, 172_9,18ir,203, Corcblkov! Prince (rzm-1888), 12?,1. lA3-0, l.!2, 1:r:1,ld6, 15a, 160 Godon, GeneE! Charl€s (r$a-85), C&at Arihi!, rde B.itsin c.eee {.rd Greeks), ?5--6, 23, 4t-58 6l-4, r0r 2,125, r23, lAa,
32::4'
220' 223,225-7' 231-6'
O..y, Da.l (173L1315), 45, 6r, 65
254
INDEX
cr.y, sir Edrard (1362-1033),20r, 90?+,2r2 17.2?6 Cuizot, F. (1737-13?r),33, 95
Lan$doBne,nh.qub of(1345 1027), 1?4,191,2rO,226 Ia*tcncc, T.It. (1a33-1945),221, 282,
8eeAutt.j. llabihras, IldrtinstoD, N.rquis of (l333-1003), I',t, r€, 1?5 6, l?a
Lebanon. aA, 05, 22?, %a Lctrnr, N.V.L (1370 192,t),22t-30, 239 L€vnnt Comt{nX,31,35 Llord Ceo.se,D. (1303 1t45),221' 22D. 2a2, 23t, 2BA4l Loxh Pl'iliFF,l{ng of tle f'rencl ( r 7 7 3 r 3 5 0 ) . 0 3 , r , 5 , N : . 3 3 . 4 0 , 0; 4
He.at, t3, ?7,12.1-5, 179 Ilc.regovnra, 130 2, 190 3, l.l?, 107, histo.isns refen€d to h the t€xt Dlake, R.N.W., 1!ro Crenville, J.]\,S- 134, )37 IlendeNon, G.R., r09 Naniott, J.A.R.,10 Monne, ItliabcttL, 2r, Seton-l'!'atson, ll.l1',, r52 Sumner, Il, ,,147, 152 Tavlo., A.J.P., 100, 143, l;2, 164 Temr,€ ey, Ii.1V.V., 0?, 79 3,101, Holy Alli$ce, 3.1,.12,39, 05, 114, I2i, Holy Ploccs.al, 05, 102 5, 107 ItrBhim Pashl {u80 1343),49, 021,
Mo@donia,30,.12,1ir, 128, r43, 147, 167, 200, 204 14, 235 Uahmud II, Sultan (r73,iF1830),24' 43, 6d, 66, 70, ?r'J-3o,02 trInlt& 17. $1,35, 11,1.lrt3,168,1?1, llc shon lette6, 230, ,93 rkhemet Ali (r760 1340),25,3r, 48 0,54,57, €,1{i. ?0 3rl, s2 nenshikov, Prince (rr3?-1369), ro5 {l q . ^ n t , o r 8 m i r r. r . 1 r , ? 0 , ? i . 1 4 5 .I 5 ? , rc0. ?05. 22jr, 227. 231, 233,2llri Mrttdnkl,, l\inm (1776 r3:;9),.11. 45 3, 51, 54, 57, 65, 73, 30. 103 Noldrvia, Prjncipality ot, 25, 27. 9930.44 5,43. 52,55,91,030, r02, Md \'!'all&Uia rde ziso Runlnh \Iont4legro, {j2, 1Oa.I05, r23, 13O, 136 ?, 113, 140 ?, 16?, 205,209, 211,245 lltora, tlre, 42,43 g, 51, 53, 66 Morocco,07,1t3 5, 200, 204
Ioati.v. Comt (1392 1003),127, 137-3. 1,10,142-4. 1,10,206, 246 Inrltu. aud d€l€ncc of nut€S to, 11 l.t, 17 19, 33, 6{J,?0, ?2,77 0, t6, Napi.r, Admhal (1736 r860), 33,36 91, t1$, 123-'5.14!. r57, 164.166, Navuino, lattlc of (18t7), 45, 5G-r, 1 0 8 , 1 7 0 ,1 7 3 9 , 1 3 4 , 1 4 6 .l 9 2 l J , 201-5, 222, 233' 2a6, 24tt1, 2't!l Ncsselr.de,Princc (l?80 13621!r9' 67, InLcmo, battle ot (1354),112 Ionim Islands, 17, 35' 5a Nichous I, asr (r7t0 1855),.10-50, lmq,227 9,233' 28a,247 5 5 , 5 ? , 6 t , 6 r J ,? 3 , ? 6 . a l , a 4 5 , Ismail, KL€iliw. {1330-95),t24, r?4 3 9 , 9 5 9 , 1 0 1 - ? ,r l 3 , 1 3 6 , 2 2 4 IsvolsLy A.P. (1356-rsrt), 206_?,210 Niclnhs II. Tsar (r363-10131'1?9, I t a l y , r 0 , 1 6 4 ,1 0 3 ? r , r 7 5 , 1 3 1 2 , 2 r r t2,22O, 220 7, 229, 2354. 219, 211 Nit!,laftle of (r$0), 30 Novibaar, 1r7, 1d?' 205 JaDan, 135, 102-4, 201 .Icis, 1i1-15,220, 230' 233-0. 244 Joseph II, Empercr {17i!r 90123, I(ds, D3-14, ! 44, 1113,230 r\.ruxl. Ilu\tir'h. (r331 lr'33), 23$-4r lirtrl."rr, rrLcldlI*.hsl Eotl 11350 1116),l7t, 223, 231 lioni.l. Ldlde of (1332),01
Ochalor disjs (170r). 2?, 33 Odca6a,27, /t1, 7o, 222 ojl, 13, 101 2, 205, 22O'226' 23O I, 2Ba,2&84, 247 Ottonm jtmpirc, s,. Turkey Prlesline, la, 20, €4, 66, 205. 220 32, 2a4. 288 5,247 Palnerslon, Viscounl {1?8,L1365)' 15-16, 24, Sr4, 56-7, 61-36
INDEX
passitn,()o,9t 101. 100-ta,ll1r . 1 , 1 2 2 ,r 2 4 , 1 2 3 ,r 4 7 , 2 0 3 Panslnvi.trr,28. r22. 127, rso, lB0, 140, 143r r53, rii(|, 160. 100,24:l Peel, Sir ltobcrt (1t33 r850),53. ?4, PenjdeL nniidctrt (1335,)r73 0 PcBia, md t eNisn Culf, u-r3, r ?-13, ri6, ?oj 76-s, 145! r57, 164-5. r7l. 1?4,$, raa, r90-2, 10.1,2ol-5, 2OA,2L5, 22O, 223. 226-3r, 23$. Pete.I, Tsr (1072 t?25),27, il2 PhiliLe Hctairia, 26, .lit, 4a Pitt. Williom, the Younger (175, Polstd (dDd Polcs),30, tt {, 63, 0t, Poftonby, Vicoutri (1770 1355), 7,! 6 Prires' Islan&, 126, rtl,l47 Pritrciprrnies, thc. seeRumaDi& and trIol.lavio and Wlllirhi2 Pn!$si!, 33, 51, 65. ?2,81 2. 86, a9, Itaelan, Lord (l?$-r355), rI-12 Rumni8 (ond Rumrnirns), 25, 28, 30, 44, 03 t, 123, 13910, r43, 146 7, t6t4,2rl t2, 22A,234 s r.e also t(oldr\.is rtrd \'!hllachi. Rusell, Lord John (1702-18?3),or, 94, 1O0,102, ro7, rot Russi4 .nd gendol interest nr thc Dastern Qu$tion, S 23, 32 {;, 61 2, 66-3, 71, ?7, ar, a5, 96,103, r29,207 2,2OIt 7 and Gre€k indep€ndere, 4l-5a, 02 and M.nemct Ali, 63-?, 30JJ and rhe Holy ?L1ces,103 5 snd the Crimcu ltu, 105 13 md Bluch Ser r.utality, 110, 11,r-15,126,7 and Centhl Asi{. l2!r-5, 1?3 0 .nd Prnslavicm, r27, 133. 13a, 1:rij, ond ur€ r3?5 3.risir, 130--57 .Dd Biemaeki.n allimces, 166 72 etd Bulsorin (1335 ?), r80 2 and Arh.njh mass.cr$, 133 ? and Eniente *itll Brjt ir, 199, and Bosnis (rs03 e), 205-3 und thc B.ll€ns (10r2-14),2r0-r? and the GE t $'or. 22tJ. 22510 md losition afte. r0r$,2r|9,241,
255 Solisbu}, Marqris ol (13tur r0iB), r0. l2a, lao, la7.3, l.to. I,t.t I. t,tz. r 5 0 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5? , r { r 5 ,t 7 2 J , t 7 a , Slloriko,2t, l33, r45, r07, 205, 20tr, sen Stelaro, RNsisn srdy at (rs?a), 126.142 SazHnov,S. (r4d6 10271,210. 220 scbasr.Irl, a5, 06, t03. 110 t2, r40. Se.iis (dd Serbs),23, 25 6, jro.4?J!. 5 2 , 7 4 ,r 0 5 , l r 0 , r t 4 , 1 2 a - ! . 136 7, 143, t46 7, 152, 16?. 100, zon,2O5 7,2OtJ r7.223,2At 5 s e J m u u rA , d ' n t r a l{ I a 2 r t 5 J . r ? 4 . 2 4 6 ScJmo". C,nsesatioro i13ijt), to2-3, S h u \ a r o vC . o u n t( r B 2 ? - 3 0 1t,4 2 , r 4 L Sinope,trRttleof(r3B),10? 8 rJmlna, 7i', 229, ':15, 240 St.lflrd. Aiimildl (rt63 tx!r), 33, sC Strib, tlr,lJnt'sh drd Russi{n inte.ert atrd a.tion ir', 11-12, lj. 17, 19, 27 3, 34 5, 4!1,5!r 5. 5a. ijr-z, 06 ?3, ?1J-10,3rt-5, 1o0 Z. 1 0 6 ,1 f t , r r 0 , 1 1 4 . 1 2 5 , 1 2 7 , 1 9 ! , r3i 6, 149-rt3,147 50. 153. 156,.7,166, 170-1, r70, 131, 13$ 7 , r 0 . 1 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 63 , 2 1 0 , ! 1 2 . 2 1 . t . 221 6,2A5 A.24n:t.215 Sudu, 49, 176 i, 2.13,2.17 Sucz,irttrhns and catrd, ll, 13,rir. 1 7 - 1 9 ,? 3 , 7 7 3 . 9 1 , r ? t , 1 a 9 , 1 4 U , I7?)VFA, 79O, 22O, 223, 229 AO, s l r i i , r r , 1 4 , 3 1 , 6 1 17 17 6 j 7 3 8 t j , 9 5 , 146, 149,2O5,227 9,23t_3,
Tel el Kctrir. battle ol (1332).1t:; Thic6, A, (1707 r3??), trj Todlcbeq E.L (1313 34), rrp, uo, ldrionolle (r8!!). 55,5? 8,61, 6?, Akk.tmon (18?6).52, dt, t|!) llerlin (137a),1S{r,tN5, 145 3, l17, lm, 16{r,r7o. rao, 2o7 B n d e r c s t ( 1 3 r 2 ) , 2 3 , : 1 3 1 ,5 2 , 5 a B u c h d . e s(tr 0 1 3 ) . 2 r , Buc\lou (11103),2067 Ca o{iu (r60c), :jii D.rdaDeles (1800),43, 34
r
1/ INDE:(
256
Kutchuk Ksi!&rdji (r7t4), 22, 27, 81, 104 t6usu€ (1028),20s-4r LoD.lon (18t7), 6r-2, 5d-6, 5a I4ndon (187r), 120-7 I-rdon Prot@I,.(r8t7), 133 I4td@ (1013),212-!, Lonilon {rgr6t 226-?, 220,245 Meilrt ru€&n fuEeEent8 (1887)' 164,160,l8N IltbcheMrAtz (I388)' 73, 07 N.uiUy {rsr0),286 P. s (1356),r14-16,121 Paddeqitz (r?18),22 Rd$utu@ (1884,165,r00 Sdrt"Cemsir (1010),236 6snt-J@ d. Mauieme (r0r7)' 229. 5 6t PetEbug Prct@l (1826),s(Ll Su Remo (1920),236-9 Ssn St€Islo (r8?8), 127,188, l'9-7, 166 Sa\a {1920),235,,80 Shstt! iloo6ntioD (1341),8!6. 80, 100-1, lO4, I lO, ll?, ltlto' l'l2l SyLe+Picot (1016),,2?-40, 284. 200,2aa l\isnon, (1020),28d Urldd SLel@i (1333),68,67J, 72--A,75,70, At-?, 464 vier$ Not (1858),107 Vt.iu Conie@ce{1856),rr8 triple AIls@ (1382),166,168,172' tiple Ent lte (1907),190,202-3, T r i D o l i , 2 s1, 6 8 r, 8 I , 2 r 1 , 2 Tu;i!, 25, 168,r7o-I 1\fk v. doclift of. ,2-4 Int€iists of the powr in, o-2r' ?.@4 ed Grt€L bilependen@,4r-42
to dd Gci Dorer Fetlos M;h€Eet Ali, 04-86 dd irt€hal sfolm, 24-5, 76-7,
?l24, rzr-a, ra2-4,la7 snil the crim..n wd, 00-ut
(1866-?8), dd Balko Etronelim 124-AA .ad the qbb ol 18?7-8, 1$-44 cnd ol Bdtilh 3upport for, r6-t7, 08-a, 122J, 126, 168-4, l7a, 183-?, 200-r, 220-l (1882), 173-4 md Emt .nd B-uiir.riir ( lsds-?), 180-2 and GerAd ii8uence in, 16!-4, l8a. la7-94, 216 ed BsUos (r0O8-14), 206-14 dd tbo CMt War, 21944 sd od ol empiF (roto),28!o ud Elubuc ud.r K€msl, 28s2 'Arkev-itr-Asl6, Bntbh inteF i in, rl, lia. 19a, 145, l8?, 165, 1?2, lal2, mo, 22f, 2U, 2464 Urquhrd, DAvid (1806-?7),?6 U,S-.A-(md Amei6m), 16,210,286' 2AA,2U Victo.ic, Queen (1319 1001),rto' r8Hr, r45, 148-0, r58, 177, r3O Walla.hi6, Principality oI, 25, 2t.298o, !tL6, 52, 56, 01, 08-0. ro2, 107-10, lt'!, 245 ,a d&o Moldsvis dd Ru@i. Wellinqton, Duke of (r?09-136r), 50, 62. 54-A, 6L-2,71, 129 lFltlam II, Ka,lser (166t-194r! 165, 187. lgl. 106 (1888Wolcley, cenera.l ViM6t l9r8), u6, 178 ALruder Yn€iLntid. -
e-5,4a
(u02-r8$),
