BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES SINCE 1974
BRITISH FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY Series Editor: Peter Catterall ISSN: 1467-...
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BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES SINCE 1974
BRITISH FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY Series Editor: Peter Catterall ISSN: 1467-5013
This series provides insights into both the background influences on and the course of policy-making towards Britain’s extensive overseas interests during the past 200 years. Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst (eds) Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement: The Liberal Party, 1919–1939, Richard S. Grayson British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind, Frank Heinlein Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC, edited by Oliver Daddow Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez, Orna Almog The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union, 1937–1939, Louise Grace Shaw Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War, Robert McNamara British Foreign Secretaries since 1974, edited by Kevin Theakston
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974
Edited by
Kevin Theakston University of Leeds
First published in 2004 by Routledge, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 In the collection, Routledge; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data British foreign secretaries since 1974. – (Cass series. British foreign and colonial policy) 1. Great Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2. Foreign ministers – Great Britain – Biography 3. Great Britain – Foreign relations – 1964–1979 4. Great Britain – Foreign relations – 1979–1997 5. Great Britain – Foreign relations – 1997– I. Theakston, Kevin, 1958– 327.4’1’00922
ISBN 0-203-31016-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-7146-65656-9 (Print Edition)
Contents
Notes on Contributors Series Editor’s Preface Preface List of Abbreviations 1 The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary Kevin Theakston 2 James Callaghan, 1974–76 David Allen 3 Anthony Crosland, 1976–77 Oliver J. Daddow 4 David Owen, 1977–79 Fergus Carr 5 Lord Carrington, 1979–82 Harry Bennett 6 Francis Pym, 1982–83 Mark Stuart 7 Geoffrey Howe, 1983–89 David Seawright 8 John Major, 1989 Damian Thwaites 9 Douglas Hurd, 1989–95 Mark Stuart 10 Malcolm Rifkind, 1995–97 Damian Thwaites 11 Robin Cook, 1997–2001 Rhiannon Vickers 12 British Foreign Secretaries from Callaghan to Cook David Hannay Index
vii viii xi xiii 1 47 67 93 117 141 157 183 195 231 247 268 277
Notes on Contributors
David Allen is Senior Lecturer in European Studies, University of Loughborough. Harry Bennett is Lecturer in History, University of Plymouth. Fergus Carr is Principal Lecturer in International Politics and head of the School of Social and Historical Studies, University of Portsmouth. Oliver J. Daddow is Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. David Hannay is a former UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Permanent Representative to the European Community, and now a member of the House of Lords (Lord Hannay of Chiswick). David Seawright is Lecturer in British Politics, University of Leeds. Mark Stuart is Associate Researcher, Centre for Legislative Studies, University of Hull. Kevin Theakston is Professor of British Government, University of Leeds. Damian Thwaites is at St Antony’s College, Oxford. Rhiannon Vickers is Lecturer in Politics, University of Sheffield.
Series Editor’s Preface
The leitmotif of Harold Macmillan’s tenure of the Foreign Office and the premiership in the 1950s and early 1960s, at least in his own mind, was the idea of interdependence. States, even including the USA, the principal target of Macmillan’s charm offensive, would benefit from cooperation (in weapons procurement, for instance) and attempting to work together to solve mutual problems. Most of all, perhaps, states had to collaborate to avert the disaster that nuclear weapons threatened a Cold War world with. Interdependence, however, does not make for a heroic foreignpolicy environment. And the constraints imposed by the Cold War – to operate through agreement with allies, especially the Americans, and within the parameters acceptable to them – continued to shape that environment well into the period covered by this volume. It was only in the 1980s, Paul Sharp has argued, that the room for manoeuvre for British diplomacy widened. Even if this is true, it is arguable that the main beneficiaries have been Prime Ministers, rather than their Foreign Secretaries. If anyone has played the Palmerston role it was Thatcher during the Falklands, or Blair over Kosovo, while their Foreign Secretaries seem to have had a more managerial part to play in the making and articulation of foreign policy. The Falklands and Kosovo, however, while important events, particularly for those directly concerned, hardly radically altered the overall direction of British foreign policy or the parameters within which it operated. Cold War or no, these have evinced considerable continuities. Foreign Secretaries have not generally been called on to articulate new visions of British interests and policy, even if they wanted to. Few, moreover, seem to have wished to. Conservative Foreign Secretaries emerge from this collection
Series Editor’s Preface
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as generally inclined to be ‘diplomats’, following their great nineteenth-century predecessor Lord Salisbury in fending off the periodic crises of international life while following broad and largely pre-set continuities. Labour Foreign Secretaries, at the rhetorical level at least, appear here to have hoped more to play the foreign-policy entrepreneur, culminating in the selective Wilsonianism of Cook and Blair. However, it is worth bearing in mind that it was the Labour government of James Callaghan that honoured the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaus¸escu while, as pointed out here, Geoffrey Howe went out of his way to demonstrate his sympathies with dissidents in eastern Europe. Though David Owen might have felt that he helped set Spain and Portugal on the road to membership of the European Community, it was Howe and Thatcher who set the seal on this process. They, in turn, were to call for a similar process vis-à-vis eastern Europe once circumstances permitted, though again it was not to be for many years before such hopes began to bear fruit, and under Labour. Whatever doubts Conservative ministers may have had about European federalism, the utility of Europeanisation in integrating former dictatorships, whether of the right or the left, politically and economically with the West was much less problematic. Deepening was unattractive for domestic reasons, widening correspondingly attractive for external ones. Party, in other words, may not be the key variable in determining foreign-policy choices. That, indeed, is the justification for studying the making of those choices instead primarily through the prism of personality. Foreign Secretaries after 1974 may rarely have been left by Prime Ministers to enjoy their own limelight. Carrington over Zimbabwe was arguably a rare example, but Mrs Thatcher certainly made up for her early foreign-policy reticence later on. They may not have enjoyed the degree of autonomy granted some of their predecessors. But this is not to argue that they did not have choices to make: over what to emphasise; what to leave; and how to handle the periodic problems that crossed their desks. Here personality does come into the equation. To take a very particular example, a good case is here made for the role of personality in Crosland’s handling of the Cod War. Similarly, personal chemistry will determine how successful or otherwise a Foreign Secretary is with his – Britain still awaits its first female Foreign Secretary – key international interlocutors, principal officials, Cabinet colleagues or, most crucially in Francis Pym’s case, the Prime Minister. While party dogma may shape the overall policy approach of a Labour or Conservative government, it rarely
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provides much guidance on how to handle the detail of foreignpolicy matters once a crisis breaks out in Sierra Leone or a treaty has to be negotiated over Hong Kong. Personality, in such circumstances, becomes a more important variable. It is on that basis that this book is to be valued: for the light it casts on the hitherto shadowy and understudied role of personality in international relations and, through these detailed chapters, on how ten very different personalities helped to shape the detail and the articulation of British foreign policy in the years 1974–2001. Peter Catterall Series Editor
Preface
This book originated in a symposium on British Foreign Secretaries since 1974, organised by the Centre for British Government at the University of Leeds, and held in April 2001. The aim of the symposium, and of this book, was to analyse the work of individual British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 in the context of the foreign-policy-making machinery, the changing environment of British foreign policy, and the internal and external political forces with which they had to contend. There are several high-quality studies of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and of foreign policy-making, but the unique claim of this book is to deal in detail with the changing role of the Foreign Secretary over the last 30 or so years, and to give detailed and systematic attention to the periods in office and the achievements of the individual Foreign Secretaries from both main parties who have served in that period. As is the case in an earlier book on British Foreign Secretaries from Ernest Bevin (1945–51) to Lord Home (1970–74) (Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries since 1945, Newton Abbott, London: David & Charles, 1977), we believe that the biographical case-study approach used here – examining the careers, personalities, policies and influence of successive Foreign Secretaries – can greatly increase our knowledge and understanding of the work of government. Our seminars at the symposium on Foreign Secretaries benefited greatly from the contributions of Dr Owen Hartley and Professor Geoffrey Fry (University of Leeds) and Dr Keith Hamilton (FCO Historians Department). Dr Peter Catterall’s comments and advice on the book have also been extremely useful. We are grateful to David Hannay (Lord Hannay of Chiswick), a distinguished former UK Permanent Representative to the United
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Nations and Permanent Representative to the European Community, for agreeing to contribute a chapter of personal reflections and views on Foreign Secretaries and foreign policy-making to wrap up this book, though it should be pointed out that he would not subscribe to a number of the judgements and views delivered in these pages, which are the responsibility of the authors. The same disclaimer would apply to the members of the diplomatic service (serving and retired) and to the Foreign Secretaries interviewed during the research for this book.
Abbreviations
ABM Treaty CAP CBI CHOGM CND CPRS CSCE DEA DOPC DSS EEC EEZ EMS EMU EPC ERM EU FCO GAC GATT GCHQ GLC IEA IGC IMF ISC MBFR MEPP
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Common Agricultural Policy Confederation of British Industry Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Central Policy Review Staff Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Department of Economic Affairs Defence and Overseas Policy Committee Department for Social Security European Economic Community exclusive economic zone European Monetary System European monetary union European political cooperation European Exchange Rate Mechanism European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office General Affairs Council General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Government Communications Headquarters Greater London Council Institute of Economic Affairs Inter-Governmental Conference International Monetary Fund Intelligence and Security Committee mutual and balanced force reduction Middle East peace process
xiv
MLF MPLA NATO NEC OECD
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974
multilateral force Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Executive Committee Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation PUS permanent under-secretary QMV qualified majority voting RRF Rapid Reaction Force RUSI Royal United Services Institute SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SDI Strategic Defence Initiative SDP Social Democratic Party SIS Secret Intelligence Service, MI6 TUC Trades Union Congress UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission WEU Western European Union
1
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary Kevin Theakston
To become British Foreign Secretary is to enter big-time politics. It is one of the great historic offices of state, held usually by a senior and ambitious politician. The incumbent works in the largest office of any Cabinet minister – it is larger than the Prime Minister’s office – and the other perks of the office include a grand official residence in Carlton Gardens, London, and a country house at Chevening in Kent (used for entertaining and for private meetings with visiting foreign ministers).1 As a globe-trotting statesman, the Foreign Secretary is regularly ‘door-stepped’ by the world’s media. He heads a department staffed by some of the cleverest and smoothest officials in Whitehall, and is at the hub of a worldwide diplomatic and intelligence apparatus, which is the envy of most of his foreign-minister colleagues in other countries. His days are filled with international travel and meetings with foreign statesmen, his in-tray with ‘flash’ telegrams on diplomatic crises and top-secret intelligence briefings. George Brown (Labour Foreign Secretary in the 1960s) said that, more than any other ministry he worked in, the Foreign Office brought home to him the exciting, but also the frightening, responsibility of power.2 This is ‘a job most politicians want’, says David Owen (Foreign Secretary, 1977–79).3 It is also a daunting job, with more pressing limitations and constraints than was the case in earlier periods. John Major (Foreign Secretary for four months in 1989) complained that it was an ‘impossible’ job: ‘There’s a world full of 150 countries, always exploding into bits and pieces, there are boxes full of stuff about places I’ve never heard of. And I am expected to take decisions
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British Foreign Secretaries since 1974
about that!’4 More than in any other department, Foreign Secretaries are at the mercy of outside events and face an intractable environment. It is also, day in and day out, one of the most demanding jobs in government, the Foreign Secretary being one of the most overburdened ministers. In the 1940s and 1950s, the post was still regarded as the number two position in the government – but the job of Chancellor of the Exchequer nowadays carries that status and clout. Prime Ministers have increasingly moved into foreign affairs, limiting the Foreign Secretary’s independence by taking charge of key policy areas, attending international summits and conducting one-to-one diplomacy with other heads of government. A Foreign Secretary can become merely ‘a bag carrier for the Prime Minister’, claims a former Cabinet minister.5 Furthermore, with Britain’s reduced power in the world, and locked into a system of shared decision-making in Europe, there is, it has been said, ‘less room – or need – for vision, and a greater need for tact, collegiality and the tolerance of compromise and disappointment’. Of all departments, it has been argued, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘is the least ideological, the least amenable to change and the least hospitable for a politician wanting to make his mark in Westminster’.6 The job of Foreign Secretary has changed in several ways over the last 30 or so years. ‘The single most important change … is obviously the European dimension and the increasing globalisation of diplomacy’, a former Foreign Secretary said in interview.7 The old restraints on travel have gone and the nature of foreign relations has changed – these used to be largely bilateral and dealt with by traditional means (ambassadors, telegrams and so on). That has changed fundamentally. The foreign ministers of the European Union (EU) states are now caught up in an almost constant process of collective discussion and coordination … It isn’t exactly a common foreign policy, but there is a high degree of collaboration and coordination. The changes have reached their highest extent in the EU, but if you add in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation], the WEU [Western European Union], the transatlantic angle and the far east too, Foreign Secretaries are really part of a global system of diplomacy.
A senior diplomat agreed in interview that British entry into the European Community had revolutionised the Foreign Secretary’s job: From 1973 onwards, the European dimension has completely transformed the life and work of the Foreign Secretary. His life because
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary
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he spends an enormous amount of time now at EU meetings – whether the monthly meetings of foreign ministers, the informal six-monthly foreign ministers’ weekends, the European Councils to which he goes with the Prime Minister, or the great network of bilateral meetings he has with colleagues, and all the third-country EU fixtures like the EU–Africa summit. So this has completely transformed the way their day is filled but it has also, of course, transformed the work they do because not only has it turned them back into actual negotiators – having to negotiate at meetings at which there are only ministers (such as the European Council or over lunch at the Foreign Affairs Council) – but it has also meant that they have a much greater say, responsibility and interest in a large number of subject areas which the Foreign Office of the 1950s and 1960s probably had very little to do with, like the environment or agriculture or trade policy or whatever it is. Not of course that the Foreign Secretary has become the lead in all of these, but because of the fact that you do many of these things on a European basis and he is definitely the leading minister, under the Prime Minister, who deals with Europe – with the possible exception of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his area. The Foreign Secretary necessarily becomes rather knowledgeable about trade policy, about the environment – which a Foreign Secretary of the 1950s would not have dreamed of doing.
Consultation and coordination, both at home (in Whitehall) and abroad, have become more important because of the EU angle and the changing content of foreign policy. International political, security and defence issues are still important, but the Foreign Secretary now also has to deal with a more wide-ranging, technical and complex policy agenda than before. Foreign and domestic policies increasingly interact and impact upon each other. As Lord Carrington once put it: ‘issues which can be classified as pure foreign policy, of no immediate interest to any other government department, are now the exception rather than the rule. On most important matters of policy, our decisions need to reflect the balance between international and domestic considerations … There has been a qualitative and I would guess permanent change in the extent to which a Foreign Minister needs to talk to, and listen to, his colleagues in other government departments in order to do his job.’8 The Foreign Secretary has thus been brought into wider fields of public policy, but at the same time can no longer claim a monopoly over his own field. In the days of the powerful Ernest Bevin (1945–51), other ministers were wary about infringing what one of them called ‘the Foreign Secretary’s three-mile
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territorial waters’.9 But nowadays, with foreign or external affairs impinging upon and affecting virtually all departments of government, Foreign Secretaries frequently ‘find themselves defending a broad foreign-policy picture against the special pleading of ministries in whose world external affairs are only one dimension’.10 In Brussels, in particular, policy issues cannot be handled in isolation, says David Owen, and the role of the Foreign Secretary in EU negotiations is to ‘horse-trade across issues’ and to know where to stand firm or give way in the pursuit of a balance of interests.11 The job of Foreign Secretary has become ‘much, much more hectic’ and pressured than it was 30 to 40 years ago, say veteran diplomats. Changes in the technologies and speed of communication and travel have intensified the demands on foreign-policy office-holders. The modern mass media add to the pressures. A senior diplomat described ‘the speed of events’ as a key change over recent decades, together with ‘the inability rarely now to have time to make an informed judgement – you’ve got to be seen to be instantly reacting, instantly active, and that wasn’t the case in the days of Selwyn Lloyd and Alec Home in the 1950s and early 1960s. They had time to be sure of their facts, to think about problems … and the media were less obtrusive and persistent’. Another former official agreed that ‘the presentational side has changed beyond all recognition – the amount of time the Foreign Secretary spends with the media now far surpasses anything that Selwyn Lloyd used to do, for example. And there’s a much greater need to be attuned to and responsive to public opinion.’ This chapter surveys the changing role and position of the Foreign Secretary in British government since 1974 in nine stages. First, it discusses the background, appointments and careers of foreign secretaries in this period. Next, it compares and contrasts Table 1.1: British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 James Callaghan Anthony Crosland David Owen Lord Carrington Francis Pym Geoffrey Howe John Major Douglas Hurd Malcolm Rifkind Robin Cook Jack Straw
March 1974–April 1976 April 1976–February 1977 February 1977–May 1979 May 1979–April 1982 April 1982–June 1983 June 1983–July 1989 July 1989–October 1989 October 1989–July 1995 July 1995–May 1997 May 1997–June 2001 June 2001–
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary
5
the foreign secretaryship with other ministerial positions before going on to analyse the heavy demands placed on the Foreign Secretary. The fourth section examines the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and officials in the Foreign Office, discussing also the assistance given to the Foreign Secretary by the junior ministers and special advisers appointed to the department. The role of the Foreign Secretary in relation to the security and intelligence services is the subject of the fifth section. The role and power of the Foreign Secretary can only be understood in the context of the relationship between him and the Prime Minister, and the ups and downs in that crucial relationship since 1974 are analysed in the next section of the chapter, leading in to a discussion of the Foreign Secretary’s position in the Cabinet. Before concluding, the chapter discusses the role of the Foreign Secretary in Parliament.
FOREIGN SECRETARIES: BACKGROUNDS, APPOINTMENTS AND CAREERS
The data in Table 1.2 show that Foreign Secretaries are, unsurprisingly, usually very experienced parliamentarians (it is worth noting that as a peer Lord Carrington had been politically active for nearly 30 years before appointment as Foreign Secretary, receiving his first junior ministerial job in 1951) and experienced ministers (having held, on average, four previous ministerial positions). John Major, David Owen and Robin Cook stand out from the norm – Major because of the way in which he was catapulted into the job after only ten years as an MP and service in low-profile and junior jobs (as a whip, a Social Security minister, and then Chief Secretary to the Treasury); Owen for being the youngest Foreign Secretary since Anthony Eden in the 1930s; and Cook for being the first Foreign Secretary since 1924 to have no prior ministerial experience at all (though he had served for 17 years on the opposition frontbench). Owen at least had some relevant international experience from having been minister for the Navy and a junior minister in the FCO, and Cook had spent three years as shadow Foreign Secretary, but Major had to start from scratch with, as one official put it, ‘a bundle of briefs in one hand and an atlas in the other’.12 Compared to their predecessors in the 1945–74 period, Foreign Secretaries since 1974 are slightly younger (average age on appointment, 1945–74, 59 years; since 1974, 54 years) and marginally less experienced in Parliament
6
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 Table 1.2: Foreign Secretaries’ career data
James Callaghan Anthony Crosland David Owen Lord Carrington Francis Pym Geoffrey Howe John Major Douglas Hurd Malcolm Rifkind Robin Cook Jack Straw
Age on appointment
Years as MP before appointment
Previous ministerial experience (years)
Prior service/ experience in the FCO?
62 57 38 60 60 56 46 59 49 51 54
29 22 11 – 21 15 10 15 21 23 22
10 8 5 14 9 8 6 10 16 0 4
no no yes yes no no no yes yes no no
(average of 20.3 years as MPs on appointment, 1945–74; since 1974, 18.9 years) and as ministers (average of 9.5 years’ prior ministerial experience, 1945–74, 8.1 years since 1974). Modern Foreign Secretaries conform to the established British ministerial pattern and are usually ministerial generalists, with only three (Owen, Hurd and Rifkind) having previously served as junior ministers in the FCO, while Carrington had been number two to ‘Rab’ Butler in the Foreign Office in 1963–64 while also serving as Leader of the House of Lords. Back in the 1940s Attlee had insisted that politicians with an economics background were needed at the Foreign Office: ‘specialization … is disastrous – look at Eden’.13 In that sense, Callaghan, Crosland, Howe, Major and (to some extent) Cook would earn the Attlee seal of approval. On the other hand, some observers feel that Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary since 2001) has been weakened by his lack of any previous frontbench experience (in opposition or government) of foreign affairs or defence policy. Calculating what proportion of the individual’s total frontbench (government and opposition) service had been spent in posts dealing with foreign policy, commonwealth affairs and defence before appointment as Foreign Secretary, Owen (71 per cent), Hurd (54 per cent), Carrington (50 per cent – including his time as High Commissioner to Australia in the 1950s) and Rifkind (41 per cent) stand out as ‘foreign affairs’ specialists in a broad sense. Of recent Foreign Secretaries, Hurd seemed to be ‘the professional par excellence’. With his 14 years as a career diplomat, gift for languages and deep background experience of the issues (together with extensive ministerial experience) it has been
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claimed that his ‘curriculum vitae matched the sort of profile a headhunter would have dreamed of’.14 But Hurd’s career was in this respect not a typical one for a British Foreign Secretary – though many French foreign ministers have careers like his. Officials admit that his background was an advantage in carrying out many aspects of the job, though some worried that there was also the disadvantage that he seemed patrician and not fully in touch with ordinary opinion (‘he had to deal with that’). Critics felt that he was too much like the senior diplomats: ‘a smooth firstclass professional machine should not be led by a mirror image of itself’.15 The traditional governing elite was surprisingly well represented among this group of modern Foreign Secretaries (for example, Pym and Hurd, both Eton and Cambridge; Carrington, Eton and Sandhurst). Four were Cambridge graduates (Owen, Pym, Howe and Hurd) and one Oxford (Crosland). Callaghan had authentic ‘Old Labour’ working-class and trade-union roots (like Ernest Bevin and George Brown in previous Labour governments) – the other Labour Foreign Secretaries represented different traditions in that party. The two Scots in this group, Rifkind and Cook, were both formidable debaters in their time at Edinburgh University. The process by which Foreign Secretaries are appointed is inevitably highly political, meaning a mixture of top-level political calculation and bargaining, accident and chance, and the game of ministerial musical chairs. D. C. Watt has complained that ‘the political processes by which foreign secretaries emerge bear only the remotest correlation with the virtues, skills, and characteristics which make up a good foreign secretary’; but the same could probably be said of any ministerial position in a British Cabinet.16 The reaction of a very senior and thoughtful diplomat when Watt’s argument was put to him in an interview is worth quoting at length: Prime Ministers, when they appoint Foreign Secretaries, know they can’t take many risks. There is immense scope for embarrassment in foreign affairs and PMs know that. They also know that they’ve got to appoint someone who can take a lot of physical punishment in terms of short nights, endless travel and that kind of thing. I’m not sure they make many mistakes. You’ve got to be a robust person – that’s the first quality if you’re going to survive successfully in that job. You’ve got to be highly intelligent … you’ve got very difficult dossiers to master. You’ve got – to be successful – to be a naturally courteous person. So much of a Foreign Secretary’s
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British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 life nowadays is dealing with, first of all, foreign minister colleagues in the European Union and other international gatherings and in travel around the world. Someone who is naturally abrasive or ill mannered is not going to be successful – it is remembered in that Foreign Ministers’ club … David Owen’s abrasiveness appeared more often inside the Foreign Office than outside – he was pretty skilful at handling foreigners … It is also an immense help if you’ve got some pretty fundamental knowledge of foreign affairs … I think John Major found it very daunting in his first weeks and months of office – he was just amazed by the agenda.
Looking at the gallery of British Foreign Secretaries, Lord Carrington once described them as a ‘rum lot’. ‘Quite a few of them do not seem to have been much interested in foreign affairs until they were made Foreign Secretary. After all, it is potluck whether you become Foreign Secretary or not. The appointment may depend more on the political balance in the party or the clash of personalities in the Cabinet than on anything else.’17 As a schoolboy at Eton, Douglas Hurd apparently dreamed of becoming Foreign Secretary,18 but three of the recent office-holders did not really want the job at all – Anthony Crosland, John Major and Robin Cook. For Crosland – whose background and main interests were in economic and domestic ministries – the FCO was a ‘waiting room for the Treasury’; and Callaghan intended that he would swap posts with Labour’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, after 18 months or so (a plan frustrated by Crosland’s sudden death after only ten months as Foreign Secretary).19 Major’s ambition was also to become Chancellor and the job of Foreign Secretary was the one for which he says he felt ‘least prepared’.20 Cook was unhappy at being shunted out of the trade and industry portfolio at Gordon Brown’s insistence in 1994 when Tony Blair became Labour leader (Brown wanting to remove a radical and rival influence over the direction of Labour’s economic policy), and it took him some time to become interested in his new brief when appointed shadow Foreign Secretary.21 Appointment to the job can come like a bolt out of the blue: when Cook’s successor, Jack Straw, called on the Prime Minister the day after the 2001 general election, he expected to move from the Home Office to the Transport ministry in Blair’s reshuffle, and was staggered to leave Number 10 as Foreign Secretary instead.22 Luck and the play of circumstances have a part in all political careers, as Carrington suggested. David Owen would not have become Foreign Secretary in 1977 but for Crosland’s death, Healey’s perceived indispensability at the Treasury and Callaghan
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wanting to avoid a big reshuffle – the Prime Minister thought that a fresh and young face might have presentational advantages but warned Owen that he might be moved if Healey was subsequently to be pulled out of the chancellorship.23 Francis Pym can thank General Galtieri for his appointment – Lord Carrington’s sudden resignation after the Falklands invasion meant that Mrs Thatcher felt constrained to appoint to the FCO a man she neither liked nor respected, and who as a Tory ‘wet’ was politically at odds with her, but whose parliamentary reputation helped to steady the Conservative Party and who, as Leader of the House of Commons, could be moved without the distraction of a big reshuffle in the middle of an international crisis. (The downside was that the Pym–Thatcher relationship was very poor and he was axed at the first chance, after the 1983 election – Pym was also not greatly interested in foreign policy.)24 Geoffrey Howe also ended up as Foreign Secretary by accident, Mrs Thatcher’s first choice for the job in 1983 being Cecil Parkinson – whose chances were scuppered when the PM learned about the looming public scandal concerning his affair with his former secretary, Sara Keays.25 Prime Ministers’ political calculations are central. Callaghan in 1976 had to balance Labour’s factions; he recognised that appointing the pro-European Roy Jenkins to the FCO would antagonise the left, choosing instead Crosland as a Euro-agnostic from the social democratic right of the party.26 Blair’s surprise move of Robin Cook from the Foreign Office in 2001 (demoting him to be Leader of the House of Commons) was reported to have been prompted by a desire to avoid well-leaked Cook–Gordon Brown clashes over policy on the euro damaging the Labour government as a decision loomed about a referendum on the issue; the new Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was (initially) more sceptical than Cook about the euro. In 1995, Major disappointed the Conservative Euro-sceptic right by making Malcolm Rifkind rather than Michael Howard Foreign Secretary. (Rifkind had coveted the job and had been making speeches designed to show that he was not a fanatical Europhile – the promotion of Michael Portillo to Defence provided some political balance to Major’s reshuffle.) Mrs Thatcher was determined to remove Howe in July 1989, did not want to appoint Nigel Lawson or Douglas Hurd, and settled on the junior figure of John Major because he was ‘untainted’ by any previous exposure to the FCO, because she saw him as a long-term successor to her, and because she wanted a dependant she could dominate on the central issues of policy (rather as Selwyn Lloyd had been
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Eden’s and then Macmillan’s ‘poodle’ at the Foreign Office in the 1950s). In October 1989, Hurd finally got his chance after Major moved to fill the gap at the Treasury left by Lawson’s resignation. Even then, it seems that Thatcher would have preferred to appoint someone else and had to swallow her doubts about Hurd’s proEuropeanism and background as a ‘Heath man’.27 In the event, none of her Foreign Secretaries was on ‘the wilder shores of Thatcherism’ (but then the Thatcherite ideological priorities were largely in the field of domestic politics).28 Owen and Major apart, Foreign Secretaries are usually party political heavyweights at the time of their appointment and sometimes rivals to the PM for the top job. Callaghan was a former Chancellor and Home Secretary and had an independent power base in the Labour Party. Callaghan had run against Wilson for the leadership, just as Hurd ran against Major. Cook had been a star performer in opposition and at least initially was one of the ‘big four’ New Labour ministers, though the political and personal battering he took in his first year or two in office substantially weakened his position in the government. Carrington was a senior Tory, from a different wing of the party to Mrs Thatcher, but someone whose appointment in 1979 made sense to her because he was a pragmatic and experienced expert in foreign affairs who, as a peer, posed no political threat to her position. Geoffrey Howe had been a close political ally of Mrs Thatcher in the role of Chancellor of the Exchequer (1979–83), owing his appointment as Foreign Secretary to his loyalty, reliability, industry and capacity for detailed negotiation – though Thatcher claims to have had doubts about his suitability and feared that he might ‘go native’ at the FCO, and later she became suspicious that Howe and Lawson were plotting against her.29 As it happens, the historical record suggests that Prime Ministers can largely rest assured that their Foreign Secretaries are not going to oust them and move into Number 10 Downing Street in their stead. In fact, the FCO is more likely to be a career pinnacle (or cul-de-sac) than a boost for an ambitious politician wanting to climb further up the ‘greasy pole’. To be sure, two of the post-1974 Foreign Secretaries went on to become Prime Minister (Callaghan and Major); but only one of the others left office at a time of his own choosing (Hurd); two were evicted by the electorate (Owen and Rifkind); one died in post (Crosland); and four others were in different ways abruptly and involuntarily removed from office (Carrington, Pym, Howe and Cook). Foreign Secretaries can go up or out, and it is mostly out. Taking a longer view, of the
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31 individuals serving as Foreign Secretary, 1900–97, only five went on to become Prime Minister, compared to nine of the 33 Chancellors of the Exchequer in the same period. Nine of the 20 twentiethcentury Prime Ministers had previously been Chancellor of the Exchequer, with only six passing through the Foreign Office (three – Macmillan, Callaghan and Major – serving in both those major offices of state, though Macmillan and Major were Foreign Secretary for only brief periods). Only Eden and Home, of postwar premiers, were foreign-affairs specialists by background and prior experience, and that was actually a disadvantage for both of them. The road to the top nowadays lies primarily in domestic and economic affairs. Modern Foreign Secretaries should enjoy their job while they can – it may be their last.
A UNIQUE JOB?
‘Being Foreign Secretary is different’, a former holder of that office told me in interview: In most areas of government policy, you can initiate a policy, implement it and see a conclusion while you are in office. Foreign policy is a conveyer belt – it’s moving along and you can influence it for only a limited time, and then you’re gone but it continues. As a domestic minister you can pull certain clear levers – the main ones are legislation and the use of your budget. But in the Foreign Office there’s no legislation and the resources involved are modest (and are spent on the means of policy – staff and so on – not the ends). So different skills are needed in a Foreign Secretary and a different temperament.
It has been said that ‘where other departments administrate the Foreign Office negotiates’ and that the job is primarily ‘one of reaction before action’.30 Certainly in her biography of Crosland, his wife records his difficult adjustment from the big-spending Department of the Environment: ‘in foreign, unlike domestic, policy one seldom has real effect on the human condition. A domestic minister has power, can pursue a policy objective and things will change … A Foreign Secretary is never sovereign – not just because Britain is diminished internationally … The most that can be done is manage relations between sovereign states: it’s all wheel and deal.’31 ‘It’s incremental’, agreed a senior diplomat, who went on to cite Lord Salisbury’s famous description of Castlereagh (written in 1862):
12
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 There is nothing dramatic in the success of a diplomatist. His victories are made up of a series of microscopic advantages: of a judicious suggestion here, or an opportune civility there: of a wise concession at one moment, and a far-sighted persistence at another; of sleepless tact, immovable calmness, and patience that no folly, no provocation, no blunders can shake.32
‘That was true about the 19th century when Britain was the leading power in the world’, he added. ‘So it’s even more true in spades now.’ Another official summarised the position this way: ‘First, you never see anything through because things are on a longer time-scale than you are likely to be there. Second, you can’t get anything done because the environment in which you are operating isn’t under your control – it requires other players to play your way. And third, British foreign policy is on the defensive.’ Compared to his previous domestic ministries, the Foreign Office ‘was more subject to surprise, bolts from the blue … [and] had more instant hazards’, recalled one minister. Geoffrey Howe felt that being Foreign Secretary was ‘a much less continuous life’ than being Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that the FCO made different demands of its ministers than the Treasury, the Treasury throwing up more intellectually challenging policy problems but the FCO suddenly presenting issues ‘where you’re required to absorb very quickly a great deal of information of a non-technical, but profoundly important, kind which is going to affect your judgement’.33 Harold Macmillan once said that the Foreign Secretary was a bit like the editor of a morning paper (with a few afternoon and evening editions thrown in as well), with information pouring in and decisions having to be taken on matters great and small with great rapidity. In contrast, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was more like the editor of a weekly or monthly journal – the problems were just as difficult as in the Foreign Office but there was more time for reflection.34 For a Foreign Secretary, it has been argued, all this means that ‘success is ninety per cent luck’. Another contrast with domestic ministries comes from the fact that foreign policy is not usually manifestodriven. As Malcolm Rifkind has said: ‘a very high proportion of what one does on, say, housing or education or local government, stems directly or indirectly from the Conservative or Labour philosophy of the particular government that is in office. I think that is much less true when you are talking about foreign policy, where your actions are governed by the national interest of the
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country as a whole, which does not necessarily change simply because governments have changed.’35 That said, in a pointed gesture, Jim Callaghan in 1974 handed out copies of the Labour Party’s manifesto to his FCO officials to emphasise the new government’s commitment to renegotiate the terms of British membership of the European Economic Community (EEC).36 Foreign Secretaries are mostly playing a complex game of small steps and tactical decisions, as a senior diplomat explained: ‘The Treasury has half a dozen big decisions a year … For the Foreign Office, every day of every week of every month of every year is filled with hundreds and hundreds of very small decisions which are like little bits of a mosaic but if you don’t get them in the right place and you don’t apply the right attention, you don’t get very good results. So masses and masses of tactical decisions have to be made: what instructions to send to an ambassador here, what to say to the minister of country X who’s coming to call on you, what exactly to say about country X when you go down to the House of Commons to answer foreign policy questions … If you are to be a successful Foreign Secretary, you have to try to shape those decisions to fit into an overall framework and policy you’re trying to follow. But at no point is there a great big lever which you pull which says, say, “policy on Zimbabwe”.’ One senior diplomat contrasted Owen (‘invariably got lost in the detail’) with Hurd (strong on ‘the wide view’) and Howe (‘a good combination of the two’). In EU business and negotiations in particular, a ‘broad brush’ approach will not work, insiders argue – ministers have to be on top of the dossiers and thoroughly understand the issues while still keeping the ‘big picture’ in mind.
OVERLOAD
Insiders agree that being Foreign Secretary is a ‘crushing job’. ‘You’re expected to devour enormous amounts of information and fly around in not always very attractive circumstances. If you believe that the Foreign Secretary can really have a private life, you become rapidly disillusioned – it’s not like that’, commented a senior diplomat. Early in the twentieth century, Sir Edward Grey complained that the work ‘follow[ed] him like his shadow’ and that his life as Foreign Secretary was a ‘succession of worries … one damned thing after another’.37 The burdens increased remorselessly over the succeeding decades. Eden felt in the 1950s
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that, with increased international meetings and conferences, the workload had doubled compared with pre-1939.38 His permanent under-secretary, Ivone Kirkpatrick, believed that there was ‘no more onerous job in the world than that of British Foreign Secretary’.39 It was a ‘cruel and gruelling position’, declared Harold Macmillan.40 To cope, suggested Lord Strang, a Foreign Secretary needed ‘the strength of a horse and the digestion of an ostrich’.41 Lord Home, in his second stint as Foreign Secretary, thought that the burdens had increased in the 1970s compared to the 1960s,42 and insiders now say that the pressures have increased still more since the 1970s and the job has become even more hectic. ‘The burden now carried by the conscientious Foreign Secretary is close to the intolerable’, according to the historian D. C. Watt.43 It is a heavier load, a tougher job and a bigger responsibility than most other ministerial posts except for the chancellorship and the premiership. ‘The job comes as a great shock to them, just the sheer amount of travelling, for example, and the enormous range of subject matter’, Sir John Coles, permanent under-secretary (PUS), 1994–97, has said. ‘A Foreign Secretary can be concerned at one moment about drugs in Thailand, the next moment about civil war in Sierra Leone, and on it goes … It is an extraordinarily disparate and wide agenda.’44 Even the self-confessed workaholic Geoffrey Howe found it ‘a formidably multi-dimensional job’.45 Thrown in at the deep end, John Major was frustrated by the time-consuming routine meetings with ambassadors; he disliked the pell-mell nature of the job, with multiple issues crowding in and limited time for dealing with the paperwork and briefing. The Foreign Secretary daily faces ‘on average twelve or fourteen overlapping diary items, all requiring a degree of briefing, and many requiring quick decisions’, explained Sir Patrick Wright, his PUS.46 Tony Crosland’s minister-as-intellectual approach had earlier troubled the department: he did not like to take decisions until he had thoroughly researched and thought through the issues. ‘That was perfectly possible in the nineteenth century and probably in the early part of the twentieth century’, argued one of his senior officials, ‘but the pressure of events and the speed with which things happen makes that rather difficult in the modern world.’ Crosland would also have liked to concentrate on one issue at a time but, as a former PUS pointed out, while prioritisation is important, ‘you can’t conduct foreign policy that way nowadays. You have to keep a lot of balls in the air simultaneously. And if you take your eye off them, one comes crashing to the ground.’ Faced
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with this exhausting treadmill-cum-juggling act – an existence divided up into 15-minute segments – Malcolm Rifkind maintains that ‘thinking time is important, otherwise you get bogged down in the very important but inevitably mundane detail’. He insisted on his diary secretary keeping an hour free each day that he would decide how to spend: whether doing his boxes, resting or walking round the park. The FCO was reportedly worried about leaving the minister with time on his hands – what might he get up to?47 Foreign Secretaries have to deal with what Lord Carrington once described as a ‘tidal wave of paper’.48 With his legendary stamina – he could exist on four hours sleep a night – and his appetite for detail, Geoffrey Howe simply devoured paperwork. Working through three boxes a night he claims to have processed 24 tons of paper in his six years in the job.49 Owen too consumed work and paper, and wanted as much as possible sent to him. Callaghan, in contrast, had a disciplined approach, and insisted on having just one red box each night. Hurd found that quite often in a busy day he had not done any of the paperwork and would tackle it late at night, after a dinner engagement, working quickly through the dossiers from 11.00 pm until 1.00 am. Carrington’s style was more laid back and he preferred talking through the issues with his advisers to reading lengthy and detailed submissions. With over 200 embassies and missions overseas feeding in masses of information to the FCO each day, the Secretary of State’s private office staff play a crucial sifting role, which has increased in importance. They must know the Foreign Secretary’s mind, know what he is interested in, and ensure that he sees what he really needs to see. Robin Cook’s remark, early in his tenure, that ‘you can be a successful Foreign Secretary if you focus on the big questions, not necessarily if you finish the paperwork’50 came back to haunt him during the arms-to-Sierra Leone affair when there was controversy over whether officials had deliberately kept ministers in the dark or whether ministers had neglected to do their homework and brief themselves properly. One of his Conservative predecessors privately criticised his ‘unwise posturing’ about red boxes, arguing that a Foreign Secretary needs ‘a stock of well-informed intuition for things that are going to come cropping up all around the wicket – which you only develop if you are burdening yourself with the trouble of being pretty well briefed on most things’. Nineteenth-century Foreign Secretaries hardly travelled at all – they mostly transacted business through letters or telegrams exchanged with British ambassadors abroad and via interviews
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with foreign ambassadors in London (‘nowadays ambassadors have really shrunk from the scene’, noted a recent Foreign Secretary). Asquith believed that no Foreign Secretary should leave the country – and Sir Edward Grey had been in office eight years before his first official visit abroad.51 But since 1945 travel has become an essential, inescapable and increasing part of the job (though disliked by Alec Douglas-Home, who believed in the traditional notion of managing foreign affairs from the Foreign Office).52 Harold Macmillan felt in the 1950s that Foreign Secretaries had become little more than ‘peripatetic salesmen’.53 There was still then a flavour of the old-style diplomacy with Selwyn Lloyd, for instance, spending eight weeks leading the British delegation at the Foreign Ministers’ conference at Geneva in 1959.54 In 1946, Bevin crossed the Atlantic by boat to spend six weeks at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, later travelling across Europe by train for seven weeks of negotiations in Moscow – all very different from the punishing schedules of modern jet-travel diplomacy. The Foreign Secretary’s job has speeded-up and intensified. He can be flown to New York for a meeting and then go back to London in the same day on Concorde.55 Geoffrey Howe calculated that he was airborne for ten hours a week, visited 75 countries and clocked up 700,000 miles of travel during his tenure of office. In his last 12 months as Foreign Secretary, he attended 23 meetings of European ministers, none of which lasted longer than 48 hours.56 Douglas Hurd travelled 130,000 miles in his first year as Foreign Secretary.57 Robin Cook was out of the UK for almost two in every five working days. In the year 2000 he spent 79 working days out of the country (26 of them on EU business). The week’s engagements shown in Table 1.3 – including his gruelling Middle East shuttle and two key EU meetings – involved 11 flights (totalling 7,500 miles) and more than 20 top-level meetings in six countries over six days. In the following week, Cook visited Italy (accompanying the Queen on her state visit) and then South Korea (for the ASEM summit). One overseas trip per month was about the average for Foreign Secretaries from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, with David Owen increasing the pace, and from the 1980s onwards ministers averaging almost one trip a week.58 Callaghan introduced the practice of taking groups of businessmen with him on some trips to open doors and help secure contracts, something continued by his successors.59 Fixed commitments include the monthly meetings of the EU General Affairs Council (GAC), other EU Foreign Ministers’ meetings and EU summits, the United Nations (one
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary Table 1.3: Robin Cook’s engagements diary, 9–14 October 2000 Monday 9 October General Affairs Council, Luxembourg 07.25 depart Biggin Hill 09.45 arrive Luxembourg GAC begins 13.00 Lunch GAC resumes Bilaterals with Moroccan Foreign Minister and Bulgarian Foreign Minister IGC Ministerial Meeting 18.30 depart Luxembourg 18.45 arrive Northolt Drop-by to UK–India Round Table Dinner Tuesday 10 October Constituency Day 09.00 depart Heathrow 10.15 arrive Edinburgh 10.45 arrive Constituency Office 11.15 West Calder High School 12.00 depart for Dalkeith 15.15 Meeting with web design company and Jim Devine [Constituency Office] 16.00 Telephone Interview with James Robbins, BBC 17.15 depart Edinburgh 18.30 arrive Heathrow Wednesday 11 October Visit to Middle East 07.00 depart Heathrow 13.00 arrive Tel Aviv, Israel depart by road for Jerusalem 14.00 Call on Israeli Foreign Minister 16.00 Call on Prime Minister Barak 17.00 British Press Briefing 17.15 Call on Israeli President 17.30 Call on Justice Minister 18.00 Press Conference 18.30 depart by road for Gaza 20.00 Dinner with President of Palestine Authority, Yasser Arafat Joint Press Event 22.00 depart by road for Tel Aviv 24.00 arrive Ambassador’s Residence, Tel Aviv Thursday 12 October Visit to Middle East 08.00 depart Tel Aviv 09.30 arrive Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt 09.45 Tête-à-tête with Egyptian Foreign Minister 10.00 Meeting with President Mubarak 11.00 depart Sharm el Sheikh
17
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Visit to Middle East (cont.) 12.45 arrive Damascus, Syria 13.15 Meeting with President Bashar 14.45 depart for airport 15.15 depart Damascus 16.15 arrive Amman, Jordan 17.15 Meeting with King Abdullah 18.15 depart Amman 19.15 arrive Tel Aviv, travel to Jerusalem 21.00 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 01.00 Yasser Arafat depart by road for Tel Aviv Friday 13 October Visit to Israel 08.30 UK Media 09.30 Visiting Press 10.30 Telephone Call with PM 13.30 Call on Israeli Foreign Minister 14.30 Call on Prime Minister Barak 15.30 depart for airport 16.00 depart Tel Aviv 21.15 arrive Biarritz, France Foreign Ministers’ dinner Saturday 14 October Special European Council, Biarritz 09.15 arrive Casino Municipal 09.30 Third Working Session 12.00 Press Conference 13.00 Lunch with Serbian President-elect Kostunica 15.00 depart Biarritz 15.55 arrive Heathrow Adapted from information supplied by Rt Hon. Robin Cook MP.
week each autumn in New York with a crowded timetable of General Assembly sessions and bilaterals with other ministers – Douglas Hurd has described this as an intense ‘diplomatic fair’60), NATO, the G8, the Commonwealth and so on. Most are day-return trips (particularly the EU ones) or overnight only. Even with the amenities of the ‘flying foreign office’ (the ministerial VC10 aircraft) and the VIP treatment, questions can be asked about the cumulative impact of all this on politicians’ health and judgement. ‘There is too much travel now’, argues one recent Foreign Secretary. ‘It is almost too easy, so ministers can contemplate a programme that would not have been possible earlier.’ However, Lord Carrington enjoyed the constant travel, believing that a Foreign Secretary can only benefit from face-to-face meetings with
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his opposite numbers, seeing situations at first hand, and picking up himself the mood and the atmosphere.61 But the fact that the Foreign Secretary is now only rarely in the UK for a week at a stretch has an effect on policy-making and means that he can himself deal only with the broad outline of foreign policy, giving detailed attention only to a few key priority or crisis issues. As an FCO official commented in interview: ‘it is very difficult to get a politician’s interest in or engagement with a subject – let alone anything like action or a decision – without a great effort, a great campaign to get attention. The key is getting the private secretary’s attention. But there is so much travel that ministers are out of a lot of policy-making. It’s almost as if on a big issue, when you need a ministerial decision (“what is the minister’s policy?”), that one simply doesn’t know until the last 24 hours, when they finally focus on it.’ The EU has undoubtedly added to the burdens, with the regular trips to Brussels for GAC meetings and the marathon negotiating sessions (accompanying the Prime Minister) at European Councils and Inter-Governmental Conferences, along with bilateral discussions with other EU foreign ministers. Nowadays the Foreign Secretary will probably see more of his EU counterparts than he will of his British Cabinet colleagues. The work typically proceeds on several levels, with the formal meetings of ministers (Rifkind recalls ‘hours round the table with a stodgy dialogue and little real exchange of views’62), informal bilateral haggling and exchanges in the corridors (‘pull-asides’ in FCO jargon), and further bargaining and deal-making over a working lunch. The EU Foreign Ministers lunch privately together (most speak English). As Douglas Hurd described it: ‘over the meal ministers, deprived of their advisers, could be driven to concentrate on what they really wanted, forgetting the finer points in their written briefs. One had to eat, speak, listen and remember, all at the same time.’63 ‘Lunch has become a device by which we can talk frankly’, according to Robin Cook. In the EU, he says, ‘diplomacy is inseparable from gastronomy’.64 John Major was more a man for the take-away McDonald’s™ and he disliked this aspect of the job, but Hurd argues that ‘decision-taking in a union of nation states will always be difficult. Speeches, meals and concerts help the process along.’65 The modern mass media add an extra dimension that earlier Foreign Secretaries, in the 1950s for instance, did not have to face. ‘Today’s ceaseless activity takes place under an intense media spotlight’, Geoffrey Howe notes. ‘Ministers are catapulted from
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their airplanes into their conference seats; they switch on their microphones, plough through their overcrowded agendas and within moments they are straight out before the world’s press, recounting the day’s events.’66 ‘You are now playing to a public gallery and undertaking diplomacy simultaneously, and that doesn’t help’, admitted one former Foreign Secretary in interview. To some extent, Douglas Hurd suggests, ministers have to wrestle with the trade-off between domestic media pressures (the media looking for British ‘victories’ in EU ‘battles’) and maintaining influence with their foreign colleagues. He also argues that ministers are now ‘required to take within hours, often more or less in public, decisions which their predecessors were able to mull over for weeks in private’.67 But ‘the CNN factor’68 – this intense media coverage of foreign affairs and pressure for a quick response – may increase the danger of taking decisions on the basis of incomplete information in a rapidly changing situation. Added to that, there is now a constant media search for gaffes (Robin Cook getting a very much rougher ride from the media than, say, Lord Home 30 years previously).69 Dealing with the media and with news management as an integral part of decisiontaking and policy-making has become since the1980s one of the most important claimants on ministerial time, and a significant factor in ‘overload’, for all government ministers. That the Foreign Secretary must operate under an international media searchlight is a further complication he must handle.
RUNNING THE FOREIGN OFFICE
‘Political control over the Foreign Office is far from complete’, according to Ian Gilmour (writing before he served in the FCO as a minister). ‘No Foreign Secretary can keep abreast of more than a small minority of major issues at any one time. Very often the officials have extensive knowledge of a question, which it is impossible for the minister to check, and until an ambassador makes a crashing mistake his telegraphed advice is likely to be given great weight. For most of the time the Foreign Secretary does what he is advised.’70 That advice comes from one of Whitehall’s most powerful departments, one with a strong culture and elitist ethos. The fabled ‘Rolls Royce’ diplomatic machine is said by its critics to pursue its own policy and aims to make the Foreign Secretary its mouthpiece. ‘Of course the Foreign Office
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wants to make the Foreign Secretary their creature – sometimes it succeeds’, says Lord Renwick, a former UK ambassador to Washington.71 Until Callaghan’s time in office, it had been the normal practice for the PUS to accompany the Foreign Secretary on his international trips, but that changed in the mid-1970s with the PUS tending to stay behind to run the department. Successive Foreign Secretaries in the 1980s and 1990s said that they wanted the PUS to be their top policy adviser but found that he was primarily a manager and administrator of the bureaucratic machine (though in this period Sir Michael Palliser, PUS 1975–82, and Sir John Kerr, 1997–2001, were influential policy advisers).72 The Foreign Secretary and the PUS have a regular meeting (usually weekly) – according to an insider, ‘some Foreign Secretaries like to relax at that meeting, have a cup of tea, discuss all sorts of things; others were busier people, liked to get through an agenda, get on with other things’. Cook tried to get the specialist junior desk officers to brief him directly rather than having advice filtered through the hierarchy. The principal private secretary is, however, acknowledged to be the linchpin of the system, a succession of high-flyers occupying this key post.73 ‘On the whole, the Foreign Office likes to get on well with its Foreign Secretary’, explained a senior diplomat in interview. ‘It likes a Foreign Secretary who provides leadership. The idea that civil servants are like Sir Humphrey and want a Foreign Secretary they can manipulate is complete nonsense. They like Foreign Secretaries who win – who win in Cabinet and win when they go to Brussels or wherever it is … It’s agony having to conduct something as complex as foreign policy with a Foreign Secretary who’s not really on top of the game.’ The diplomats are said to respect a Foreign Secretary who is clear about what he wants. ‘If a man knows what he wants to do, he can usually get the apparatus to do it’, an FCO official told Geoffrey Moorhouse. ‘Our difficulties arise when he doesn’t quite know what he wants to do.’74 ‘The relationship between members of the diplomatic service and the Foreign Secretary is much closer than in the normal civil service’, argued a senior official. ‘After all the Foreign Secretary stays in the houses of ambassadors and meets them across the breakfast table in a way that a minister doesn’t in the normal civil service.’ However, both Callaghan and Major seem to have been initially wary of the FCO as much for social reasons as any; and Cook too was reported to be suspicious of the establishment culture of the diplomatic service (setting in train changes to
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‘modernise’ the department and make it ‘less stuffy’). But, with the exception of Owen and Cook, Foreign Secretaries in this period do not seem to have had serious problems in establishing good working relations with their officials. ‘Owen couldn’t reach a decision without having a row’, was how an official summarised it. He had a radical, questioning and challenging approach and was brash, abrasive and rough on the people around him. Although pro-European, he complained – like Mrs Thatcher later – that diplomats lacked ‘backbone’, had an ‘appeasement’ mentality and did not fight hard enough for British interests in Europe:75 Here was a very determined department [he recalled] which thought that its view was the right view … they seemed to want to carry on conducting foreign policy on the lines that they thought were right, irrespective of what ministers wanted. That did lead to quite a number of clashes … Some officials … would fight the implementation of a decision taken by the Secretary of State.76
Twenty years later, relations between Cook and his officials were also (at least in his first year or two) strained. Part of the problem was his prickly and impatient personal style, and some officials were privately pleased to see him damaged by the revelations about his private life and the political storm over claims that he had considered replacing his ousted diary secretary with his mistress. Claims that the FCO was up in arms about the much-trumpeted ‘ethical dimension’ in foreign policy are exaggerated, however, though morale plummeted during the arms-toSierra Leone controversy, when Cook appeared to blame officials for not keeping him properly informed and distanced himself from staff failures and administrative mistakes. There were problems with particular disgruntled diplomats (such as Sir David Gore-Booth, the former high commissioner to India, who hit out at Cook for allegedly ‘losing the trust’ of senior officials), but little reliable evidence of determined institutional resistance or obstruction within the FCO to Cook’s policies.77 Geoffrey Moorhouse was not quite right to argue that ‘political control [of the Foreign Office] depends on a powerful amount of attention, energy and willpower vested in one man’.78 Lord Carrington was supported by a second Cabinet minister based in the FCO, 1979–82: Ian Gilmour and then Humphrey Atkins, who formally held the post of Lord Privy Seal. The main reason for this was to provide a senior Cabinet-level spokesman for the FCO in the House of Commons. In 1979 there was no repetition of the
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criticism heard in 1960 when Lord Home had been appointed Foreign Secretary and Hugh Gaitskell had denounced the move as ‘constitutionally objectionable’; though, as John Dickie suggests, it is arguable that the Falklands crisis proved once and for all that the Foreign Secretary must be directly answerable in and to the House of Commons.79 On a number of occasions in the 1960s and 1970s there had been a second Foreign Office Cabinet minister to handle successive EEC application negotiations (Edward Heath, George Thomson and Geoffrey Rippon taking on that specific job in different governments). Carrington and Gilmour worked well together in 1979–81 – and Mrs Thatcher would have sacked Gilmour as a leading ‘wet’ and internal critic of her economic policies sooner but for Carrington’s intervention.80 But a former senior diplomat set out some of the pros and cons of this ‘doublebanking’: Theoretically, it’s an advantage to a department to have two Cabinet ministers. But you find, when they’re both in Cabinet, the more ‘junior’ won’t open his mouth on foreign policy – he feels the Secretary of State should speak on that – so it does not enhance the Cabinet system. But you do have a senior minister available for the Commons (especially useful when the Secretary of State is in the Lords) and a lot of high-level responsible work which is ‘above’ that normally given to junior ministers. He can conduct meetings with visiting Foreign Secretaries and so on – though there’s an ambivalence there as the Foreign Secretary has the prestige and they may want to see him and ask for him. So in practice it’s a difficult role to perform.
Like other Cabinet ministers, the Foreign Secretary nowadays runs a department staffed with a team of junior ministers – currently four in number (three ministers of state and one parliamentary under-secretary). The relationship between the ministerial ‘top dog’ and his juniors can be problematic. Foreign Secretaries may have, at best, only a limited say in who their junior ministers are to be. In 1997, for instance, the Prime Minister vetoed Robin Cook’s choice for the minister for Europe slot and installed his own nominee (Doug Henderson) together with, as parliamentary under-secretary, a close ally whom he had ennobled (Baroness Symons), though Cook was allowed to retain two of his opposition team (Derek Fatchett and Tony Lloyd).81 Formally, responsibilities are parcelled out on a geographical/regional basis and the junior ministers share the burden of ‘representational’ work (visits, receptions, conferences and so on). Every week to ten days, it is
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British Foreign Secretaries since 1974
the practice to hold a ‘prayer’ meeting with the junior ministers, parliamentary private secretaries and special advisers (though there were few such meetings under Callaghan). In practice, the scope and authority of junior ministers varies. The Foreign Secretary will have to get involved in any issue going to Cabinet, or where a strong parliamentary head of steam has built up, or where relations with other countries or international organisations are significantly engaged. Visiting foreign ministers, dignitaries and ambassadors from other states will want to see the Foreign Secretary himself wherever possible – and his diary secretary faces a constant struggle to juggle these demands on his limited time. ‘The Foreign Secretary cannot handle day-to-day relations with large parts of the world’, explained a former junior minister. ‘If, as a minister of state, you have the Foreign Secretary’s confidence, you can do a lot. On Europe, the Foreign Secretary was in charge and I carried out his policy. But on, say, Eastern European policy or sub-Saharan Africa, in effect I ran the policy. On the big issues – on the USSR and dealing with Gorbachev – the Foreign Secretary was involved. But relations with Poland or Hungary were left to me.’ Much also depends on the Foreign Secretary’s own style as a minister. ‘Some want to delegate, want to give their junior ministers a pretty full role’, recalled a former permanent undersecretary. ‘Others were very nervous about delegation and really wanted to control most of it themselves.’ Workaholics like David Owen and Geoffrey Howe pulled to themselves a mass of detailed decision-making and issues. Succeeding Howe, John Major decided to concentrate chiefly on Europe and devolved a lot of the other business to his junior ministers.82 As a junior minister in the early 1980s, Douglas Hurd had been given his head by Lord Carrington and was a particularly influential and active number two to Francis Pym in 1982–83. In turn, when he became Foreign Secretary, his regime was less centralised than Howe’s and he pushed a lot on to able and ambitious ministers of state like William Waldegrave and Francis Maude.83 After 1997, the Labour team struggled to get the official machine to filter more business through the ministers of states’ offices, and there was apparently some resistance from certain FCO departments, with officials uneasy about the Foreign Secretary seeming to turn his back on some issues and having to proceed just with the approval of the Minister of State. Derek Fatchett was a long-time Cook ally and the diplomats found that the Foreign Secretary would invariably back up the position he had taken.84
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Officials routinely say that there are too many junior ministers, but the politicians tend to disagree. At one stage, the Conservatives tried to do without a parliamentary under-secretary, but brought one back after a while. ‘There’s the travel burdens, the need to be MPs too’, explained one Foreign Secretary. ‘If you have too few ministers you lose opportunities to seek to influence backbenchers and parliament, and other countries.’ The Foreign Secretary’s political advisers provide extra political eyes and ears and hands. They work on drafts of speeches, liaise with the party and with backbench MPs, comment on civil service submissions, feed in their own papers, and occasionally undertake ‘back door’ low-profile diplomatic contacts. They can provide a useful alternative source of advice as well as links to outside organisations, and can have a ‘mine-detector’ role, alerting the Foreign Secretary to possible party trouble or sensitivities about certain issues or decisions (offering ‘a public relations/political insight into what the hazards were’, as one Foreign Secretary put it in interview). Jim Callaghan’s adviser, Tom McNally, was particularly influential and he had access to all FCO telegrams except those marked ‘Top Secret: Intelligence’.85 David Owen looked to his part-time adviser, Michael Stewart, for economics briefings so that he could participate more effectively in wider Cabinet discussions.86 Geoffrey Howe also wanted to remain engaged with the domestic debate and maintain his general political profile, and his special advisers planned and managed his regular travel and speech-making trips around the regions of the UK.87 Robin Cook brought with him into Whitehall two special advisers from his opposition staff (for a while, a third was funded by the Labour Party) and these were influential figures, one of them, for instance, selling to Cook the idea of an FCO ‘mission statement’.88 Jack Straw also has two special advisers. FCO officials seem to have come to accept and understand the presence of these politically appointed special advisers.89 A former FCO permanent under-secretary thought that the political adviser system is a very good one and works well … One could post difficult submissions to them and say ‘what do you think?’ And if he could put a flyer on it, saying ‘Secretary of State, I’ve looked at this and I think it’s on the right lines’, it helped get it through. If it came in with the Foreign Office advice and the political adviser’s advice, and the two coincided, it was likely to get through. Departments get out of touch with political opinion and they need to be kept in touch with party thinking.
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British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 THE SECRET WORLD
Only in 1994, with the Intelligence Services Act, was the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) officially acknowledged. Both are answerable to the Foreign Secretary (as the Security Service, or MI5, is to the Home Secretary), with the Prime Minister having overall responsibility for the country’s intelligence and security services. Robin Cook set out the formal position, namely that the Foreign Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the actions of SIS and GCHQ and is responsible for ensuring that they act within the law.90 Since the 1994 Act, the Foreign Secretary’s role in providing for public accountability has extended to appearing as a witness before the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of senior parliamentarians, and in November 1998, for the first time, Parliament debated an ISC report, with the Foreign and Home Secretaries making ministerial speeches and answering questions. The Foreign Secretary must authorise warrants for intercepts and give specific clearance for sensitive operations (with the Security Service commissioner reviewing the minister’s exercise of statutory powers in this field). ‘As Secretary of State, I have the right to know what is done under my authority and I am responsible for scrutinizing applications and for signing warrants’, Cook insisted, saying that ‘there are robust processes for ensuring that [ministers] … are … kept informed about important things that we need to know’. Back in the 1970s David Owen had initially been sceptical about the system for referring intelligence cases with a political content to the Foreign Secretary, but after a review of six months’ referrals was satisfied that the right sort of cases and issues were being sent to him for approval. ‘The Foreign Secretary, unless there is a need to know, steers clear of operations’, recalled Owen.91 The officials who run and coordinate the work of the intelligence and security agencies prefer to keep ministers at arm’s length, though Douglas Hurd in 1994 claimed that ‘there has been increasing consultation of the Secretary of State when operations are proposed that are sensitive – that could cause difficulty … [and on] controversial matters’.92 The Foreign Secretary has regular meetings with ‘C’, the head of SIS, and with the director of GCHQ. ‘My job, Secretary of State, is to bring you unwelcome news’, Sir Maurice Oldfield (then chief of SIS) told Jim Callaghan in 1974.93 A paper ‘feed’ is provided by the Weekly Summary of Intelligence – the ‘Red Book’
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– of intelligence reports and assessments, which is sent to the Foreign Secretary and other senior ministers. In practice, ministers vary in their interest in and appetite for intelligence. ‘Some ministers do not want to know … others want to know a great deal about what is going on’, Jim Callaghan once said.94 Some have had extensive experience of dealings with the secret world, such as Douglas Hurd (with his background as a diplomat and as Northern Ireland Secretary and Home Secretary before moving to the FCO); Robin Cook, on the other hand, had ‘further to travel than his predecessors’ in coming to terms with his responsibilities in this area (a critic of the security services in opposition, he became a strong public champion in office).95 On the record, Foreign Secretaries tend to play down the significance of secret information. Geoffrey Howe has said: ‘In my early days I was naive enough to get excited about intelligence reports. Many look, at first sight, to be important and interesting, and significant and then when we check them, they are not even straws in the wind. They are cornflakes in the wind.’ Douglas Hurd has cautioned that ‘there is nothing particularly truthful about a report simply because it is a secret one. People sometimes get excited because a report is secret and they think that, therefore, it has some particular validity. It is not always so in my experience.’96 But, Hurd admits, ‘intelligence reports are on some occasions valuable, and on some occasions crucial. They supply just some missing piece in the jigsaw of other people’s intentions that you want to know.’97 David Owen, for instance, says that he grew to respect the work of MI6, particularly on southern Africa, where they provided him with a lot of intelligence.98 He was, however, doubtful of the propriety of spying on the UK’s European partners to aid the Foreign Secretary when negotiating in Brussels (earlier, in the 1960s, GCHQ was routinely intercepting cables in and out of the French embassy in London to gather intelligence on de Gaulle’s reaction to Britain’s EEC application)99. During the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia, the various delegations attending the talks had their phones tapped and hotel rooms bugged, and Lord Carrington was provided each morning with intelligence briefings based on this material.100 Robin Cook has described how SIS intelligence on the degree of Liberian involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone was used at a General Affairs Council meeting to convince other EU countries to take a tougher line with Liberia.101 Overall, the contribution and usefulness of intelligence in decision-taking is clearly variable, both the Franks Report on the Falklands and the Scott Inquiry on arms-to-Iraq
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documenting serious shortcomings in Whitehall’s handling of intelligence reports. Many of the failings identified in those episodes were bureaucratic and institutional, but Foreign Secretaries cannot shirk their personal responsibility for understanding and using secret intelligence and for maintaining the accountability of SIS and GCHQ.
PRIME MINISTER–FOREIGN SECRETARY RELATIONS
‘The Prime Minister–Chancellor of the Exchequer relationship is the most important relationship in modern governments, but the Prime Minister–Foreign Secretary relationship is the next most important’, commented a former Foreign Secretary in interview. It is a crucial relationship. ‘There is nothing so difficult or delicate in the management of a government as the relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary’, Harold Macmillan once argued. ‘They must really be like brothers in a partnership … Both sides of Downing Street must work in complete harmony if confusion and something worse are to be avoided.’102 Historically, it has been a variable relationship with some highly effective partnerships (for example, Attlee–Bevin, Macmillan–Home) and some famously poor or tense ones (for example, Lloyd George– Curzon).103 There has occasionally been more an element of sibling rivalry than the harmony described by Macmillan, and in the modern period the Thatcher–Howe relationship was sometimes described as like a dysfunctional marriage.104 All Foreign Secretaries must now accept the inevitability of a major Prime Ministerial foreign-policy role. No modern Prime Minister could adopt Baldwin’s hands-off role. (‘I hope that you will not bother me with foreign affairs during the next three months’, he once told his astonished Foreign Secretary.)105 Whatever their level of personal interest in foreign affairs (which usually increases over their tenure), Prime Ministers are nowadays institutionally obliged to be deeply and continuously involved – they chair the Cabinet’s main foreign and defence policy committee (see below), have to deal directly with other heads of government, travel abroad almost as frequently as the Foreign Secretary and are caught up in the ceaseless round of international and EU summitry. Modern PMs are estimated to spend more than half their time on external relations (perhaps 80 per cent in the later Thatcher years).106 The increasing inter-
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connectedness of foreign (and particularly EU) policy with domestic policy generates trade-offs and throws up issues which cannot be handled by the Foreign Secretary alone and have to be resolved at prime ministerial level. Equally, Foreign Secretaries recognise (as Howe put it) that ultimately in the EU ‘it is only at the highest level of national authority that crucial concessions can be made or bargains be struck’.107 The Prime Minister in contemporary conditions is inescapably a sort of ‘super-Foreign Secretary’.108 A great deal of important business is handled in regular bilateral meetings between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. These are normally weekly and last an hour or so, subject to the availability of each of the principals. A sign that things were going wrong in the Howe–Thatcher relationship was when these meetings started to disappear from the diary or lasted a perfunctory half-hour (Mrs Thatcher then closeting herself with her key foreign-policy aide Charles Powell to work through the issues in detail). The Number 10 private office and the Foreign Secretary’s private office are usually in constant contact through the working day and for the bilaterals they liaise to put together an agenda of perhaps four or five issues that one or the other minister wants to raise (the PM’s private secretary sits in on the meeting to take notes).109 ‘They tended to concentrate on issues of the moment – there wasn’t much long-term thinking at these meetings’, commented an insider. Sometimes, indeed, it was simply a talk about the general situation, helping keep the two on the same wavelength and their thinking in line. Any Foreign Secretary knows that if he and the Prime Minister are united, he will carry great weight in the Cabinet. The two are interdependent. Douglas Hurd described the working relationship in his time in terms of a mutual veto: the Prime Minister could block a decision of the Foreign Secretary, and equally the Foreign Secretary could say ‘no’ to a proposal coming from Number 10 (for example, Mrs Thatcher could reject nominations for senior ambassadorships, but could not impose a nomination of her own on the FCO).110 Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers sometimes operate in tandem, travelling together on overseas visits and sitting alongside each other at European Council meetings, for instance. Senior diplomats claim to detect a certain edginess here, Sir Nicholas Henderson writing of Foreign Secretaries’ ‘customary ill humour when accompanying the PM on visits abroad, which is nevertheless nothing compared to their mood if there is any suggestion of
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their being left behind!’111 Howe admits that he never relished travelling as Mrs Thatcher’s number two, and it was not easy to be her coadjutor at summit meetings. (‘In the last resort, I could hardly wrestle with the Prime Minister for control of the British microphone’, he notes wryly.)112 A successful foreign policy is built on a close understanding and collaboration between a Prime Minister and a Foreign Secretary. The two must either work closely together or tread on each other’s feet, as Michael Stewart (Labour Foreign Secretary in the 1960s) once said.113 It will sooner or later end in tears if their policies or objectives diverge or if the personal chemistry is wrong (or goes wrong). ‘The toughest negotiations any Foreign Secretary has are always with his own Prime Minister’, says Lord (Robin) Renwick, former ambassador to the USA. For the Foreign Secretary to be effective, he has to have the backing of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues, otherwise he’s ineffective. And the worst thing any Foreign Secretary can do really is to say to his other [foreign minister] colleagues, ‘well of course I agree with you, but she – meaning Mrs Thatcher – won’t or alternatively some other Prime Minister won’t …’.114
The perception of the divergence between Thatcher and Francis Pym, for instance, apparently led the US government to discount the latter.115 Sir Nicholas Henderson has testified to a ‘built-in friction’ in the Prime Minister–Foreign Secretary relationship.116 To be sure, a Foreign Secretary cannot expect the Prime Minister not to intervene in foreign affairs. The Foreign Office ‘cannot be in a water-tight compartment’, as Balfour put it – but he exaggerated when he declared that it was ‘the rarest thing when the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister don’t clash’.117 As a very senior FCO official commented in interview: ‘It is true that the relationship is a tricky one with a capacity to go off the rails, but it’s not correctly described as a tendency let alone a probability of going off the rails.’ A former PUS said: the picture of a sort of constantly charged relationship simply isn’t borne out by my experience. There were clashes between Mrs Thatcher and her Foreign Secretaries, but they were no different and no more frequent than between her and her domestic ministers – a lot of that came from her personality. The true picture is one of a sort of latent tension which from time to time does develop into a serious argument – but not all that often. It depends terribly on the personalities of the incumbents.
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Reviewing these relations in the period since 1974, the middle– late Thatcher years (1982–89), marked by poor relations across Downing Street and clashes with the Foreign Secretary, stand out as untypical – Prime Minister–Foreign Secretary relations have more usually been perfectly workable and good. Wilson, for instance, largely gave Callaghan a free hand and full support. The two of them had regular meetings tête-à-tête with Callaghan brought into and carrying a lot of weight on parliamentary, party and domestic political issues across the board. In turn, Callaghan was active on the international scene as PM and his authority over the general course of foreign policy was clear, but he handled David Owen – who was obviously politically dependent on him – well, took care to keep his Foreign Secretary apprised of his views and thinking, and generally backed him up.118 Thatcher and Carrington formed an effective partnership, helped by the fact that as a peer he was not a competitor or personal rival. They had their disagreements and sometimes argued fiercely, but he put a lot of effort into managing the relationship. Against her instincts, she was gradually won round to support his Rhodesia policy and, with bad grace, she accepted the settlement he negotiated on the UK’s EEC budget contribution (Carrington and his deputy, Gilmour, cleverly outmanoeuvring her by briefing the press that the agreement was a great triumph for Mrs Thatcher).119 By contrast, the Thatcher–Pym relationship was poor – ‘she thinks nothing of him whatsoever’, her aides reported – and, following the Falklands victory, was bound to be short-lived as she was obviously going to remove him as soon as she could (as happened in 1983).120 By that time, Thatcher had come to be increasingly suspicious and critical of the Foreign Office as an institution, feeling that it did not stand up strongly enough for British interests in Europe, that it was too ‘wet’ and too interested in ‘good relations’ with other countries. This was bound to strain her relations with her Foreign Secretary – though the Thatcher–Howe relationship was satisfactory enough at first. Howe’s strength was as a steady, safe manager of foreign policy. In some ways he could act as a counterweight to Thatcher’s impetuosity and bloody-mindedness and, initially, restrain her anti-Europeanism. But their relationship became increasingly tense – she would bully and harangue him even in front of officials – and in a key area, the EU, their differences became unbridgeably wide.121 A senior official gives a ringside view: Thatcher–Howe was extremely abrasive. She used to rough him up. But basically the main objective of the exercise was to cut him and
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British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 the FCO out of the act – and it was done at both levels: of rather contemptuous treatment of Geoffrey personally and Charles Powell [Thatcher’s powerful foreign affairs private secretary] making sure that the FCO didn’t actually get its hands on anything very much. So there was contempt on one side of Downing Street and resentment on the other. And that pervaded the system up and down. Geoffrey was not a man to say anything improper about the PM, and he just reconciled himself and got on with what he could. But the effect of this, particularly with Reagan in the White House, was to ensure that the transmission belt of policy between Washington and London was conducted on anything that was even half way important on the White House–Number 10 net – the Foreign Office really didn’t get its hands on it at all … It meant that the ambassador – who was a friend of Charles [Powell] – played that game too and dealt primarily with Number 10.
Douglas Hurd never found his relations with Thatcher to be impossible and they worked together reasonably well (significantly, both Major and Hurd established good relations with Charles Powell).122 They differed on the issue of German unification and over Britain’s entry into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – where the PM had to give way in the face of the axis forged between Hurd and Major as Chancellor of the Exchequer, being politically weakened after Nigel Lawson’s resignation and isolated in the Cabinet. Hurd and Major went on to maintain a close and trusting relationship during 1990–95, with Hurd acting as a behind-the-scenes confidant to his Prime Minister. Their most significant difference was over the issue of qualified majority voting in the EU. Major left most foreign-policy issues to Hurd, though the PM was very active on East–West relations and Ireland as well as (inevitably) on the EU.123 As a senior diplomat put it: ‘Major–Hurd was a civilised relationship between colleagues. There wasn’t conflict. John Major was not a man to grab power – he wasn’t trying to usurp the role of the Foreign Office, and he didn’t have a private secretary who played it that way either.’ Robin Cook had never been politically close to Tony Blair, but his personal reputation and political status took such a battering in his first year or so in office that he became increasingly dependent on prime ministerial goodwill, limiting his scope to pursue an independent policy. Number 10 disliked his Foreign Office ‘mission statement’ and was irritated by his ‘ethical’ foreign policy – Blair’s influential chief of staff, Jonathan Powell (a former diplomat and a key foreign-policy adviser), thought Cook’s approach naive and simplistic. On several crucial occasions, Blair
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sided with the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade and Industry and refused to back Cook on restricting arms sales and export licences. The Foreign Secretary was also locked out of the crucial inner debate on the euro (dominated by the PM and the Chancellor) in a way that would have been inconceivable in Hurd’s day.124 Blair has become particularly active in foreign policy, and not just because of ‘September 11’. When Cook was replaced in June 2001, a government source was reported as commenting: ‘Tony Blair has basically taken over as Foreign Secretary. He will call the shots.’125 In the seven months after the 2001 election, the Prime Minister visited 22 countries on official business in 31 days abroad.126 Blair has built up his Downing Street foreign-policy staff apparatus with senior and influential figures such as Sir David Manning, the foreign-affairs adviser, who is something like a US President’s national security adviser, and Sir Stephen Wall, the PM’s European adviser. He also uses unofficial personal envoys on delicate missions, such as Lord Levy on the Middle East, an area of policy where there seem to have been tensions between Downing Street and the Foreign Office. All this has created an impression that the FCO and the Foreign Secretary have been bypassed or marginalised on the big foreign-policy issues, something compounded by Jack Straw’s rather hesitant and uncertain performance in his first year in the job.127
POSITION IN CABINET
The Prime Minister–Foreign Secretary axis normally dominates on foreign affairs: other ministers and the Cabinet have only a limited involvement. At Cabinet meetings the Foreign Secretary gives a regular verbal report on international developments, a brief tour d’horizon.128 ‘The Foreign Secretary would say a few things about maybe three items on his mind’, recalled one insider. (In the Conservative government there was also a separate European Affairs Cabinet agenda item, but Blair subsumed that under ‘Current Events’, covering items of report on home and EU business.) Nigel Lawson complained that the Foreign Secretary’s Cabinet briefing ‘seldom revealed anything that was not already well known to the attentive newspaper reader’.129 It is in fact carefully orchestrated with the PM. As a former Foreign Secretary put it in interview: ‘I would not raise a matter in Cabinet which I
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had not told the Prime Minister I was going to raise, and equally I wouldn’t expect the Prime Minister to raise a foreign-affairs matter which I hadn’t been warned of.’ A senior official believed that this Cabinet item could be ‘fairly tiresome for Foreign Secretaries because every member of the Cabinet probably thinks he’s got an opinion on foreign policy and is liable to fire it out. But it depends on the authority the Foreign Secretary has and the closeness of his relationship with the PM. If the Foreign Secretary and the PM are handling foreign policy in really close cohesion, nobody else is going to put their head far above the parapet in Cabinet, frankly.’ In practice, therefore, there may be brief questions and answers but not usually much discussion. ‘It was to keep Cabinet in the picture for the most part’, recalled one Foreign Secretary; ‘it was very much a reporting activity. If a serious issue was going to arise, one would almost always have pre-cooked it … But it was important to keep them informed, get their reactions to difficult questions, issues that were seriously fraught like Northern Ireland and Hong Kong – issues where you needed to canvass other people’s opinions and engage and secure their commitment.’ Back in the 1960s Richard Crossman argued that ‘a Cabinet consisting of busy departmental Ministers can’t make much impact on how foreign policy is conducted’, and that has remained the case.130 ‘The idea of the Cabinet taking some grand strategic decision on foreign policy just doesn’t happen’, concluded a senior official with experience of Number 10 and the FCO. In a fast-moving international environment the need for speedy decisions also makes extensive Cabinet involvement impracticable. ‘Major issues will appear on the agenda and be seriously debated if the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary want them to or feel that the issue is too important for the Cabinet to be circumvented.’131 Under Mrs Thatcher in the 1980s there were significant Cabinet discussions of the EU budget, the Rhodesia settlement, Hong Kong and the Anglo-Irish agreement. In the Major years, on the EU and on Bosnia, the Cabinet was used by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary acting together to carefully edge policy forward, win over doubters and carry ministerial colleagues along. The Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister are inevitably the key players on Cabinet committees in foreign affairs. ‘DOPC [the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee] used to be an important committee’, argued a former senior FCO official, ‘but my feeling is that that sort of formalised structure has been on the decline.’
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For much of the 1964–70 Labour government, OPD (as Harold Wilson’s committee was known) had weekly meetings, though by 1969–70 Richard Crossman was complaining that ‘OPD hardly meets and when it does it’s on secondary issues and whenever Harold arbitrarily chooses to call it rather than because it’s got a regular job of work … We only get foreign policy discussed in OPD or Cabinet when there is disagreement between Harold and the Foreign Secretary. As long as those two get on we don’t have serious Cabinet control.’132 By the 1980s, meetings of OPD were, Geoffrey Howe admits, ‘relatively few’.133 An official described it as having ‘a limited role: it was there to sort out issues on which departments couldn’t agree, such as resolving disputes over arms sales – its role is not formulating foreign policy’. Thatcher in any case preferred to operate through small ad hoc groups of ministers and advisers.134 Under Major there was a six-hour OPD meeting in August 1992, discussing both Bosnia and Iraq.135 Major was more collegiate than Thatcher though even his OPD committee did not meet on a regular basis but on an ‘as required’ basis, to deal with particular issues. However, OPD(E), the ministerial subcommittee on European questions, chaired by the Foreign Secretary and with the UK permanent representative to the EU in attendance, was a key committee under Major. It played a crucial role in balancing the different views and emphases within the Conservative Cabinet, papering over cracks, and involving different ministers and departments in the formulation of the UK negotiating position before European summits. Major’s OPD system included a number of subcommittees (on nuclear defence policy, European security, Eastern Europe, Hong Kong, and terrorism – the Foreign Secretary a member of them all). Blair discontinued them, though he added (E)DOP(T) to the network – the subcommittee on European trade issues, chaired by the Foreign Secretary (who also chaired the Blair government’s main (E)DOP ministerial committee on European issues). OPD/DOP has been described as consistently being ‘a purely reactive body, in general confirming the line already agreed by its senior members’.136 The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer are the core members and their interrelationship can be intricate. A Foreign Secretary described in interview how he operated in close liaison with the Defence Secretary at all times to make sure that they were taking the same view of things before they went to Number 10, particularly over European defence issues: ‘I headed-off problems by
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working closely with the Defence Secretary – a lot of OPD work was done in that setting and then cleared with Number 10, and once we’d got that right the Chancellor didn’t really have any direct involvement. And you only needed to consult other ministers if you were, say, handling a DTI-related thing … So OPD didn’t have a very strong need to be involved a great deal.’ A significant amount of collective business is in fact transacted by ministerial correspondence and the exchange of minutes, notes and drafts between OPD ministers and their private offices. (The same goes for the Committee on the Intelligence Services, which apparently last met in 1995, instead doing its work by correspondence between ministers.)
FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND PARLIAMENT
His frequent absence overseas helps explain why Robin Cook was reported in February 2000 as voting in only 5 per cent of House of Commons divisions, tying with the Prime Minister for the worst voting record of Labour Cabinet ministers.137 The Foreign Secretary may not be on the premises very often, but the impact of Parliament on the conduct of foreign policy and the behaviour of FCO ministers should not be underestimated. ‘There’s no clear House of Commons foreign-policy function’, as a senior official noted, there being relatively little FCO legislation and limited parliamentary debate on FCO expenditure. Parliament’s direct role in the making of UK foreign policy is normally limited. Nevertheless, Foreign Secretaries usually pay a lot of attention to the House of Commons. Douglas Hurd has admitted that as a minister he never lost his ‘wholesome respect, even fear, of the House of Commons. I felt it was always there behind my shoulder.’ There is the regular monthly appearance at foreign affairs question time, requiring extensive preparations and briefings. As Hurd recalled: You get pinned down partly by people who are advocates of a particular cause, who are passionate Zionists or passionately pro-Palestine, pro-Greek, pro-Turkish, pro-Pakistani, pro-Indian. You may not care for them, because they are one-sided, but they know about that side. They will know exactly what has happened and who has said what, and they can be formidable. What you cannot afford to do is to ignore them.138
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There are usually three or four regular parliamentary debates a year on foreign affairs, including a wide-ranging Queen’s Speech debate and a debate before each European Council meeting, and if a crisis erupts the Foreign Secretary may be forced to go before MPs and make a statement (the row over Sierra Leone took a lot of Robin Cook’s time, for instance, with the opposition baying for his blood). FCO ministers were obliged to clock up many hours on the front bench during the passage of EU-related bills in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the legislation giving force to the Single European Act and ratifying the Maastricht Treaty (the Conservatives’ civil war over Europe producing huge problems of party management in the latter case). The Foreign Secretary is also regularly grilled in public by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, sometimes in front of the television cameras; Robin Cook appeared before it four times in 2000. Before every European summit, the Select Committee cross-examines the Foreign Secretary at length and in detail about British policy and other issues likely to come up in the negotiations. These can be testing encounters: MPs on the committee are shrewd and knowledgeable. There is also a ‘behind the scenes’ dimension to the Foreign Secretary’s role in and accountability to Parliament. Managing relations with the opposition is one aspect here. ‘It isn’t in the interests of either side to emphasise this’, said a former Foreign Secretary in interview, ‘but actually at critical moments the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and his Shadow can be very important.’ During the Gulf War, for instance, Douglas Hurd worked closely with Labour’s Gerald Kaufman, consulting over the timing of debates and other tactical questions to ensure a bipartisan approach in Parliament.139 There are occasional confidential briefings of the opposition leaders on ‘Privy Council terms’. ‘It requires work on that relationship, but it’s in the interests of a Foreign Secretary to get that relationship going and to see give and take in the House of Commons’, recalled a former minister. The Foreign Secretary will also want to keep in touch with backbench opinion in his own party (Geoffrey Howe took a lot of trouble over this, using his special advisers to liaise and maintain contacts), and particularly with the backbench party foreign affairs committee. ‘Things can go badly wrong if you lose all contact with your own backbenchers or if you fail to give reasonable access to groups of MPs who are interested in a particular subject’, argued a senior diplomat. If necessary, Conservative Foreign Secretaries would drop everything and see
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the chairman of the party’s backbench foreign affairs committee at an hour’s notice, it is claimed – this group ‘had the power to make his life extremely difficult on the floor of the House if he did not carry it with him’.140 It was strong criticism from backbenchers at the Conservative Party 1922 Committee that convinced Lord Carrington that he had no option but to resign following the Falklands invasion in 1982 (earlier, Tory backbenchers had helped to scupper junior minister Nick Ridley’s ‘leaseback’ proposal). ‘Single issue’ MPs from the myriad of all-party groups and committees, often with close ties to lobbyists, ‘will want to see you, in groups or individually’, recalled a former Foreign Secretary, adding that ‘it was a struggle to get them to see a minister of state’. Parliament thus impinges on the life and work of the Foreign Secretary in important ways and, although foreign policy-making is primarily an executive function (resting on Crown prerogative powers), MPs do scrutinise, call ministers to account and have some influence – often indirect and via anticipated reactions. Successful Foreign Secretaries need sensitive parliamentary antennae.
CONCLUSIONS
Search the world over, hunt history from beginning to end, and you will conclude as a result of your labours that the great Foreign Minister is almost the rarest bird that flies.141
The job of Foreign Secretary ‘has changed and diminished’, it has been argued. ‘Forty years ago it appeared secure, defined and powerful. Since then, the Foreign Office has lost some of its functions, much of its independence and most of the mandarin mystique … [One] must wonder whether [the] office still has the weight, visibility and rewards it once offered an ambitious politician.’142 It is a frustrating and onerous job. With public opinion not particularly interested in foreign affairs except when there is a crisis, the post may not play to people’s political ambitions very much and actually be one in which political reputations are more easily lost than gained. As a veteran diplomat mused: It’s a very difficult job to do partly because you never get clear-cut successes. So it’s a rather thankless task for an ambitious politician because if you think that you’re going to project yourself on the
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world stage as Mr Fixit, you’re sure to come in for a nasty surprise, partly because it’s very difficult to fix things, partly because things that get fixed nowadays usually get fixed by a team of people which doesn’t involve you, and partly because the subject matter of foreign policy is not usually of very great interest to most of the voters of this country. So it’s actually a difficult job, and particularly a difficult job if you’re a ferociously ambitious Foreign Secretary who wants to get to the top – he is going to find quite a lot of tension between his ambitions and how to do the job, which is why in my view some of the people who have not felt like that, like Douglas Hurd, never really aspired to be PM … It’s [a job] better done by people who aren’t devoured by that ambition to get to the top.
In the context of European policy, in particular, the Foreign Secretary may be in a politically damaging ‘no-win’ position, as Douglas Hurd suggests: ‘regarded by their interlocutors as particularly cunning and well-briefed, but by their fellow countrymen as hopelessly outclassed and consistently outmanoeuvred’.143 At the same time, there is still a lustre attached to the post of Foreign Secretary144 and, in all governments, some jockeying for position among rivals and would-be successors can always be detected. Doing something with the office – rather than simply being Foreign Secretary – is the challenge. The modern Foreign Secretary is undoubtedly chronically overloaded. There is a mass of detailed paperwork to stay on top of. And there is too much travel – it is an open question whether, with instant communications to other capitals and a highly professional diplomatic corps, all the trips made by a Foreign Secretary are absolutely necessary. Cutting down on the air miles would allow more time to be devoted to policy-planning and decision-taking on foreign policy in conjunction with FCO officials.145 Douglas Hurd has argued that there are too many international institutions, each trying to do too much, and too many international meetings: ‘heads of government and ministers are beset by minor proposals that should either be settled at working level or abandoned. There is much frantic discussion of detail, too little leisurely development of personal trust and analysis of fundamentals.’146 The problems of overload and overflow are compounded by the effects of rapid rotation in office – six of the Foreign Secretaries in office since 1974 were in post for less than three years, and some of them faced very steep learning curves. As a senior FCO official commented in interview: ‘It’s one of those jobs where longevity brings enormous benefits: you get known on the circuit, get to know the ins and outs of so
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many problems, you become someone to whom other people turn as being someone with accumulated knowledge and wisdom. The British political system makes it almost impossible to stay as long as it is desirable as Foreign Secretary. The chances that we shall have a Foreign Secretary too long are minimal. The chances that we shall have a Foreign Secretary for too short a time are rather strong.’ All this has a direct bearing on the enduring criticism that the British foreign-policy process is too preoccupied with the short-term pragmatic management of overseas relations, and gives too little time and resources to thinking and looking ahead, and to medium- or long-term strategic planning.147 In the final analysis, few individual Foreign Secretaries make more than a marginal difference to the long-run course of British foreign policy. As Sir Michael Palliser, a former PUS, has commented: ‘it is always difficult to ascribe success (or failure) to a Foreign Secretary, because foreign policy is essentially a continuum. There is a tendency for one man … to start something and for it to be carried forward, not always to a conclusion, by his successor, whether of the same or another political party’.148 Limited tenure is a factor here, of course: ‘a minister is in for two acts of a five-act play’, commented one diplomat. But this is also due to the nature of the policy problems and instruments available. ‘The business of foreign policy is essentially an almost unceasing number of very small initiatives, ideas, developments which add to the great stream of historical events that are working their passage in any event’, says Malcolm Rifkind.149 Taking a broad view, Anthony Seldon argues that ‘of the many Foreign Secretaries … since 1868, few have left much noticeable mark on the conduct of foreign affairs. Those who have influenced the nation’s foreign policy are men who knew a great deal about international affairs (many did not), had an ability to read and digest vast quantities of material, were decisive (many were not), enjoyed time in office of at least three years (over two-thirds have served for less), and usually served during a time of crisis. A command of overseas languages and a liking for foreigners scarcely count.’150 At most, says Douglas Hurd, a new Foreign Secretary is able to ‘alter the compass by a few degrees’. Foreign policy is now largely about marginal adjustments, multilateral bargaining and coordination, and incremental steps, and only rarely about dramatic initiatives and big leaps forward. In the end, the realistic view is that ‘no British Foreign Secretary any longer has the chance to be as good as he claims or as bad as his opponents charge’.151
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary
41
NOTES 1. Anthony Seldon, The Foreign Office: An Illustrated History of the Place and its People (London: HarperCollins, 2000). 2. George Brown, In My Way (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 119. 3. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. 4. Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), p. 88. 5. Edmund Dell and Lord Hunt of Tanworth, ‘The Failings of Cabinet Government in the Mid to Late 1970s’, Contemporary Record, 8, 3 (1994), p. 457. 6. ‘Cook’s Empire’, The Times, 31 January 1998. 7. This chapter includes material gathered in interviews with ministers and senior civil servants, quoted on a ‘not for personal attribution’ basis. 8. Lord Carrington, ‘My Job’, in Lectures on the Occasion of the Bicentenary of the Office of Foreign Secretary 1782–1982 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1982), p. 27. 9. Bernard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 466. 10. Michael Clarke, British External Policy-making in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1992). 11. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. 12. John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992), p. 125. 13. Christopher Mayhew, Time to Explain: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 96. 14. John Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus: The Media and Travelling Diplomacy (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1997), p. 167. 15. Ruth Dudley Edwards, True Brits: Inside the Foreign Office (London: BBC, 1994), p. 33. 16. D. C. Watt, ‘Foreign Secretaries as Diplomats’, in Roger Bullen (ed.), The Foreign Office 1782–1982 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), p. 110. 17. Carrington, ‘My Job’, p. 25. 18. Mark Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1998), p. 31. 19. Kevin Jefferys, Anthony Crosland: A New Biography (London: Richard Cohen Books, 1999), p. 198. 20. John Major, The Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 111. 21. John Kampfner, Robin Cook (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), pp. 103–4. 22. James Naughtie, The Rivals (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), p. 114. 23. James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Glasgow: Collins, 1987), pp. 447–8; David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p. 256. 24. Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, p. 140; Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Pan, 1990), pp. 266–7. 25. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 310. 26. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 196–7. 27. Seldon, Major, pp. 85–7, 100, 588. 28. Jeremy Paxman, Friends in High Places (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 151. 29. Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 241; Young, One of Us, p. 333; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 309. 30. D. R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 195. 31. Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), pp. 338–9. 32. Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 701. 33. Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman, With Respect, Ambassador (London: BBC, 1985), p. 99. 34. House of Commons Debates, 28 July 1960, cols. 1993–4. 35. Jenkins and Sloman, With Respect, Ambassador, pp. 100–1. 36. Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 413–14. 37. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty Five Years, vol. I (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), p. 141; Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 254. 38. David Dutton, Anthony Eden (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 325.
42 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.
80. 81. 82. 83. 84.
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 258. House of Commons Debates, 28 July 1960, col. 1994. Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: André Deutsch, 1956), p. 298. Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries since 1945 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1977), pp. 156–7. Watt, ‘Foreign Secretaries as Diplomats’, p. 110. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 314, 595. Major, The Autobiography, p. 117; Seldon, Major, p. 90. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Carrington, ‘My Job’, p. 27. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 568. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (London: Longmans, Green, 1937), p. 69. D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), pp. 214–15, 411, 430. Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1894–1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 359–60. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pp. 291–3. Interview with Alastair Newton, deputy head of FCO policy planning staff, 24 July 1997, ‘Diplomacy in the Information Age’ website, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC (www.csis.org/ics/dia). Lord Howe of Aberavon, ‘Diplomacy: A Diet of Diversity’, speech at Warwick University, February 1997, p. 4; Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 397, 568. Seldon, The Foreign Office, p. 131. Sir Geoffrey Jackson, Concorde Diplomacy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981), pp. 53–4. Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, pp. 94–5, 128, 162. Douglas Hurd, The Search for Peace (London: Warner Books, 1997), pp. 163–4. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past (London: Collins, 1988), p. 327–8, 332. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Hurd, The Search for Peace, p. 162. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Douglas Hurd, ‘On the High Wire’, TLS, 12 November 1999, p. 7. Howe, ‘Diplomacy: A Diet of Diversity’, p. 4 Hurd, The Search for Peace, pp. 165–7. Interview with Alastair Newton, deputy head of FCO policy planning staff, 24 July 1997, ‘Diplomacy in the Information Age’ website, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC (www.csis.org/ics/dia). Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, p. 37. Ian Gilmour, The Body Politic (London: Hutchinson, 1971), p. 199. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. John Coles, Making Foreign Policy (London: John Murray, 2000), p. 135. Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, pp. 61–3. Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats (London: Cape, 1977), p. 154. D. Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), pp. 246–9, 260–5. Jenkins and Sloman, With Respect, Ambassador, p. 103. Kevin Theakston, ‘New Labour and the Foreign Office’, in Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds), New Labour’s Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 154. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 88; Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, pp. 123–4; House of Commons Debates, 28 July 1960, col. 1983. James Callaghan has argued that ‘Foreign Secretaries in the Lords are not a success when trouble blows up’; see Nicholas Henderson, The Private Office Revisited (London: Profile Books, 2001), p. 180. Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 50. Kampfner, Robin Cook, pp. 127–9. Seldon, Major, p. 91; Major, The Autobiography, pp. 115–16. Stuart, Douglas Hurd, pp. 117, 451. Kevin Theakston, ‘Junior Ministers in the 1990s’, Parliamentary Affairs, 52, 2 (1999), p. 239.
The Changing Role of the British Foreign Secretary 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.
94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.
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Moorhouse, The Diplomats, pp. 145–6; Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, pp. 66–7. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 263. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 398. Kampfner, Robin Cook, pp. 130–1, 133. Henderson, The Private Office Revisited, p. 180. House of Commons Debates, 22 June 2000, cols. 541–2. Owen, Time to Declare, pp. 343, 347. House of Commons Debates, 22 February 1994, col. 158. Peter Hennessay, ‘The Itch after the Amputation? The Purposes of British Intelligence as the Century Turns: An Historical Perspective and a Forward Look’, in K. G. Roberstson (ed.), War, Resistance and Intelligence: Essays in Honour of M. R. D. Foot (London: Leo Cooper, 1999), p. 239. Stephen Dorril, The Silent Conspiracy: Inside the Intelligence Services in the 1990s (London: Heinemann, 1993), p. 172. Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 800. Richard Norton-Taylor, Truth is a Difficult Concept: Inside the Scott Inquiry (London: Fourth Estate, 1995), p. 100. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 343. Peter Wright, Spycatcher (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), pp. 110–12. Dorril, The Silent Conspiracy, p. 42. House of Commons Debates, 22 June 2000, col. 545. Harold Macmillan, The Past Masters (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 136. House of Lords Debates, 25 January 1989, col. 702 (Lord Jenkins). Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 570, 581. Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45 (London: Cape, 1986), p. 126. J. M. Lee, ‘The Prime Minister and International Relations’, in Donald Shell and Richard Hodder-Williams (eds), The British Prime Ministership since 1945 (London: Hurst, 1995), p. 200. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 454. David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 54. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 394; Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, pp. 270–1; Coles, Making Foreign Policy, p. 94. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 285. Nicholas Henderson, The Private Office (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), p. 114. See also Denis Greenhill, More by Accident (York: Wilton 65, 1992), p. 106. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 305–6, 394. House of Lords Debates, 25 January 1989, col. 757. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 394. Henderson, The Private Office, p. 114. Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London: Hutchinson, 1936), pp. 292–3. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 409, 506, 588–9; Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 300; Owen, Time to Declare, pp. 261–2. Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy; Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma, p. 295. Young, One of Us, pp. 266–7, 272. Nigel Ashford, ‘Thank you for Being There, Sir Geoffrey’, Independent, 29 July 1989. Stuart, Douglas Hurd, p. 235. Seldon, Major, pp. 452–4; Seldon, The Foreign Office, p. 131. Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2000), pp. 22, 58, 76, 169–70. ‘The sacrifice’, Observer, 10 June 2001. ‘Blair Comes under Fire for Global Wanderlust’, The Times, 10 January 2002. ‘The Lost Straw’, Guardian, 4 January 2002. Though it is claimed that, in the mid-1980s, Geoffrey Howe was sometimes encouraged to give lengthy reports of up to 30–45 minutes in order to eat up time and stop
44
129. 130. 131. 132.
133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 Cabinet meetings ending embarrassingly early. John Barnes, ‘Clarke on Cabinet Government’, LSE Magazine, Winter 1999, p. 10. Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11 (London: Bantam Press, 1992), pp. 125–6. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. I: Minister of Housing 1964–66 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 189. Simon James, British Cabinet Government, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 145. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. II: Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966–68 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 108; Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. III: Secretary of State for Social Services 1968–1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1977), pp. 402, 787. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 397–8. Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 10. Seldon, Major, p. 306. James, British Cabinet Government, pp. 145–6. Guardian, 17 February 2000. Douglas Hurd, ‘The Present Usefulness of the House of Commons’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 3, 3 (1997), pp. 3–4. Stuart, Douglas Hurd, p. 243. Clarke, British External Policy-making in the 1990s, pp. 121–2. F. S. Oliver, The Endless Adventure, quoted in Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 86. ‘Cook’s Empire’, The Times, 31 January 1998. Hurd, The Search for Peace, p. 166. Moorhouse, The Diplomats, pp. 162–3. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, pp. 314–15; Dickie, The Boys on the Bongo Bus, p. x. Hurd, The Search for Peace, p. 171. Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, p. 267; Coles, Making Foreign Policy. Michael Palliser, ‘Foreign Secretary’, in Dick Leonard (ed.), Crosland and New Labour (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 101. How To Be Foreign Secretary, BBC, 4 January 1998. Seldon, The Foreign Office, p. 110. Peter Riddell, ‘Cook’s Hubris is the Real Source of All His Troubles’, The Times, 21 May 1998.
2
James Callaghan: Foreign Secretary 1974–76 David Allen
BACKGROUND
James Callaghan was lucky to have a formidable experience to draw upon when he became Foreign Secretary in March of 1974 following Labour’s surprise success in the general election that had been prematurely called by Edward Heath. In March of 1974 Callaghan had held the position of shadow Foreign Secretary for two years following the reshuffle that had been caused by Roy Jenkins’s resignation in 1972 over the Labour Party’s stance on the EEC. During this time Callaghan travelled extensively to the USA, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Far East and the Middle East, renewing old acquaintances and making many new ones.1 Until then Callaghan had been shadow Home Secretary but Wilson’s decision to replace Jenkins with Healey as shadow Chancellor meant that probably only Callaghan could be given the vacant foreign-policy portfolio. Callaghan was therefore reasonably well informed about the most important foreign-policy issues of the day when he took office. Far more important though was his long career at the centre of British politics, which had begun with his election to Parliament as the MP for Cardiff South in 1945. Callaghan was immediately appointed to the Attlee government as parliamentary private secretary to John Parker, the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, but resigned shortly afterwards remaining on the back benches until he was made Parliamentary Secretary for Transport in 1947; in 1950 he was moved sideways to a similar position at the Admiralty. From 1951 onwards Callaghan was elected to the
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shadow Cabinet every year that Labour was in opposition, and when Labour was returned to power in 1964 he held the other two great offices of state: as Chancellor of the Exchequer until the humiliating 1967 devaluation and then Home Secretary until Labour was defeated in 1970. Thus, when he became Foreign Secretary, Callaghan had held either shadow or real Cabinet office continuously for 23 years; a formidable and effective apprenticeship for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). To Callaghan’s experience of high office must also be added his considerable role within the Labour Party over the preceding years.2 He was elected to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party every year from 1955 with the exception of 1962, and after 1967 held the posts first of all of treasurer and then chairman of the party – a formidable power base that served him well as both Foreign Secretary and eventually as Prime Minister. As well as governmental experience and a Labour Party power base Callaghan also bought some more specific experience to bear on his new post. First of all he had been a formidable trade union negotiator for the Inland Revenue Staff Association before the war. Secondly, despite his humble upbringing in Portsmouth, he had during the war been singled out for a commission in the Royal Navy rising to the rank of lieutenant within naval intelligence. He was to make full use of both his negotiating experience and his interest in and knowledge of naval power during his time at the FCO. Furthermore Callaghan had direct experience of the problems of international relations. From 1956 until he became shadow Chancellor in 1961 he was shadow Colonial Secretary,3 a portfolio that enabled him to pursue, with the enthusiastic backing of the Labour Party, the cause of decolonisation. During this period Callaghan got to know well a number of black African leaders who were to come to power in the 1960s and whose friendship proved invaluable when he made the advancement of Commonwealth affairs one of the objectives of his time at the FCO. Like many other Labour politicians of his generation Callaghan also developed a wide range of contacts through the Socialist International such that he knew personally many of the social democrats who found themselves in power in European states when he was Foreign Secretary. As we shall see, Callaghan’s contribution to events in the Middle East, in Africa and in many parts of western Europe depended heavily on the contacts that he had made in the period before he became Foreign Secretary. His experience as Chancellor in particular gave him a string of contacts in the USA and even led to him nearly absenting himself
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from British politics when, during his period in opposition after the 1970 defeat, he was offered but eventually declined, the post of managing director of the International Monetary Fund. It is perhaps understandable that Callaghan might have considered a change of direction after Labour’s 1970 election defeat. He was then 58 and four years older than Harold Wilson who showed, at that time, no sign of seeking an early retirement. Callaghan might have calculated that Labour would be out of office for at least four and possibly five years with no guarantee then of either a return to power or, for Callaghan, further advancement from the lofty heights that he had already attained. Morgan records Callaghan’s own dissatisfaction with his record in office between 1964 and 1970, spoilt as it was for him by the humiliation of the 1967 devaluation of sterling.4 During the period in opposition Callaghan consolidated his financial position, became a farmer in Sussex and survived a prostate operation. His decision to carry on in politics was perhaps initially influenced by the fact that Harold Wilson was damaged by the election defeat, and the danger that Callaghan too might be seen as ‘yesterday’s man’ was lessened by his changed status in the Labour Party brought about by the divisions over Europe, which saw the end of Roy Jenkins’s leadership ambitions. It was Jenkins’s decision to resign over the Labour Party’s negative attitude towards EEC membership that opened the way for Callaghan to become shadow Foreign Secretary at a time when the fate of the Labour Party depended on the way that the major foreign-policy issue of the EEC was handled. Nevertheless while Callaghan’s previous career certainly prepared him well for the challenge of becoming Foreign Secretary it still required a spectacular miscalculation by Edward Heath to actually get him into the FCO. If Heath had not called an election in early 1974 but had held on for another 18 months then he might well have stayed in office, in which case Callaghan would presumably have given up on ever returning to power and would have become neither Foreign Secretary nor, eventually, Prime Minister – no wonder that he called his autobiography Time and Chance.5
PERSONAL STYLE
Callaghan came to the FCO with a mixture of respect and suspicion for the institution but, from the beginning his previous experience of government, ensured that he was never overawed in the way
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that George Brown6 and Michael Stewart had been. While Callaghan himself refers to the FCO as ‘this Rolls Royce of Departments’7 he was also believed to have said on his first day in office that he supposed the FCO to be pro-Arab, pro-Catholic and pro-European.8 Callaghan came to trust the FCO and he clearly developed excellent relations with his senior officials9 but he was also careful not to rely exclusively upon them. Moorhouse records that he always chose to take problems away and to consult outside the FCO when faced with difficult decisions.10 Callaghan himself, in a Fabian pamphlet that he published at the end of 1975, makes much of the fact that he ‘tried to secure full and open debate about the general direction of our foreign policy. Problems such as peace and war … should not and can not be left as sole prerogative of a few foreign policy experts … Foreign policy is not an idol to be hidden in the temple untouched by profane hands.’11 To this end and ever anxious to protect his domestic back, Callaghan sought regular consultations with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) International Committee, the Labour Party International Committee (although he often found these meetings both irritating and tedious) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) – a reminder of a time when British government was perceived to be increasingly corporatist. Callaghan also encouraged British missions abroad to make visiting trade unionists as welcome as they did industrialists and argued that this was a useful two-way education process.12 This determination to seek advice outside the FCO was also connected to Callaghan’s sensitivity to the domestic context of the foreign policy that he was seeking to pursue. He was, of course, concerned about his position in the Labour Party in general and among the Labour hierarchy in particular. It is not clear exactly when Callaghan knew of Wilson’s determination to retire in March 1976; in his autobiography Callaghan recalls being told of this by Harold Lever at the end of 1975,13 but others believe that he probably knew earlier. For instance Nicholas Henderson records in his diary14 that Michael Palliser, who worked closely with Callaghan first as Britain’s ambassador to the EC and then (1975) as permanent under-secretary of the FCO and head of the diplomatic service, informed him when Callaghan first became Foreign Secretary that Wilson’s departure was imminent. Henderson also recorded his very strong impression that Harold Wilson was, by 1974, a man living in the past with little sense of his own role in the future.15 Whether he knew or not of the strong possibility of succeeding him, Callaghan enjoyed an extremely good relationship with Harold Wilson during his time at the FCO.
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Wilson himself was much more relaxed, some would say tired, during his second period in office and he did not appear to see Callaghan as any sort of rival. On the contrary, he clearly came to regard Callaghan as his preferred successor and trusted confidant. At the end of the gruelling EEC negotiations in Dublin in 1975 Wilson summed up the relationship when he announced: ‘We have the great advantage that Jim and I are a complete partnership. We pass the ball from one to another and break through the opposition.’16 For his part Callaghan could and would talk to Wilson most days and would regularly cross the road to visit him in Downing Street to discuss both FCO and other government and Labour Party business. For two years they acted as a most effective and mutually reinforcing team: Wilson provided full support for his Foreign Secretary and only really sought to be kept fully informed on matters related to his long-held interest in South Africa and Israel. Callaghan probably enjoyed better relations with the Prime Minister than any other Foreign Secretary in recent times. In line with his determination not to rely exclusively on the FCO, Callaghan made some significant appointments both to his ministerial team and to his private office. Wilson seems to have indulged him when it came to the ministerial appointments, sending Goronwy Roberts, who had lost his seat at the election, to represent the FCO in the Lords at Callaghan’s behest and giving him David Ennals and Roy Hattersley as his effective and supportive ministers of state. Hattersley, who was strongly in favour of the EEC, did much of the donkey work on the renegotiation portfolio, while Jack Cunningham, then ‘a rising star in the Labour Party’,17 skilfully ensured that Callaghan was kept in touch with thinking in the party. Joan Lester was appointed by Callaghan as ‘his conscience’18 but she was soon replaced by the more compliant Ted Rowlands.19 Callaghan also made some impact with the appointments that he made to his private office. As well as Cunningham, he appointed Tom McNally, who had been his main adviser when in opposition but who had also been Labour’s international secretary. McNally, who was given the title of political adviser, was one of the first of Labour’s ‘spin doctors’ and Callaghan arranged for him to have sight of all incoming telegrams other than those that related to intelligence matters. McNally played a significant role during Callaghan’s period at the FCO, acting as his personal emissary with Lord Greenhill on a trip to Rhodesia and persuading the FCO to revive its interest in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. Dickie credits McNally and Cunningham with persuading Callaghan to stand firm on Belize
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when the FCO was inclined to concede matters to the USA.20 McNally also became Callaghan’s main speech-writer although this did not stop him wishing to emulate his friend Henry Kissinger by insisting that the Foreign Office also provide him with a team of speech-writers – as Dickie reports the FCO could not manage a whole team but Callaghan was given the services of just one official (Christopher Meyer) who was transferred to the planning staff in order to carry out this function.21 More controversially Callaghan refused to accept a diplomat as his press officer (head of news department) but appointed instead Tom McCaffrey who had carried out this function for him at the Home Office. Callaghan liked and respected his FCO advisers but there was no way that he was going to allow them to completely embrace him. Callaghan also initiated the practice of taking his private office (and the British press corps!) with him on his travels. To this end he made use of a converted RAF VC10 as a ‘flying foreign office’ enabling him, for instance, to visit six African countries in just eight days in a trip at the end of 1974, which has been described as ‘meet the people’ diplomacy.22 The epic journey was brilliantly stage-managed and organised to achieve the maximum positive publicity back home for the Foreign Secretary. Callaghan also used his flying office for his celebrated mission to rescue Denis Hills from the clutches of Idi Amin in July 1975.23 Callaghan brought a very distinct style to his time at the FCO; he made good but nevertheless wary use of the expertise offered him, and he was always able to act in the knowledge that he had the full support of the Prime Minister. He was an effective negotiator who drew on his union experience and who liked to hit his opponents with strong positions late in the day. He came into the FCO with a reputation as a fixer and as a very hard but judicious worker. (Callaghan would attend to his paperwork but he would insist on taking only one box per night home with him.) He put considerable store on the extensive personal relationships and acquaintanceships that he had cultivated over his many years as a senior and well-travelled British socialist politician and he used his position to develop new ones, such as the close and lasting relationship he came to have with Henry Kissinger. He came to the FCO with strong views about the need to counter what he saw as the Heath government’s excessive pandering to the EEC and he was determined to restore both the special relationship with the USA and with the Commonwealth.24 This was not, however, to be at the expense of Britain’s role in an integrated Europe. Over the EEC, as we shall see, Callaghan demonstrated his talents as a
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clever and calm negotiator and his pragmatic flexibility as he accepted the reality of UK membership of an EEC that he had little enthusiasm for. His realistic appraisal of Britain’s relatively weak position led him to demonstrate great caution and a determination never to act without the full support of the USA. He was also skilful in managing his party during a period when its divisions had the potential to inflict real damage on the government’s external policies. Callaghan knew which buttons to push to get the Labour Party to work for rather than against his foreign policy, and in so doing he managed to retain the respect and admiration of both his party colleagues and his FCO officials – no mean feat in the 1970s. The only time when the FCO had serious cause to doubt Callaghan’s intentions came when he instructed the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), under the direction of Kenneth Berrill, to conduct yet another review of Britain’s overseas representation.25 The FCO did not like the terms of reference, which looked as if the FCO was the target26 and it liked even less the eventual proposal that the diplomatic service and the home civil service be merged. Had Callaghan still been Foreign Secretary when the report was published in 1977 then he might have accepted some of its more controversial proposals, but as it turned out he was now Prime Minister and was not inclined to add to his troubles by further antagonising an outraged diplomatic service.27 Callaghan came to the FCO at a significant time for both the country and the Labour Party. His most important and immediate task was to stage-manage the renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s EEC membership, but as we shall see below he was also to be tested by a number of other equally serious issues that arose during his stewardship of British foreign policy.
CONTEXT
In an ideal world Jim Callaghan would have placed a very low priority indeed on the EEC as a subject for his attention as Foreign Secretary. He would most certainly have preferred to devote his time to improving Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union and the USA and to enhancing the role of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations. Circumstance, however, dictated that the first year of his two in the FCO had to be devoted to the renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s membership of the EEC so that the referendum on Britain’s continued membership of the EEC, which
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Labour had promised while in opposition, could be held. Callaghan had always been sceptical about the advantages of EEC membership and, as Labour’s position had hardened, he had spoken out against it. After the 1970 defeat the issue, which came to the fore once again as Heath sought and looked like achieving EEC entry, threatened to seriously divide the Labour Party. In the key vote on the European Communities Bill in 1972, 69 Labour MPs defied a three-line whip to vote with the Heath government; 20 Labour MPs abstained; and Roy Jenkins had resigned as deputy leader of the party following its decision to support a referendum on the issue.28 Wilson’s strategy, which was supported by Callaghan, was to avoid further discussion of the principle of membership by focusing on the inadequacy of the terms of membership that Heath had accepted. In this way and by promising a referendum after renegotiating the terms Wilson and Callaghan hoped to avoid a potentially fatal split in the party. The strategy as laid out by Wilson had one serious flaw: it was based on the assumption that it would not be put to the test in the near future because the downfall of the Heath administration was not anticipated. When Heath lost the election that he himself had called in early 1974 Wilson found himself back in power committed to renegotiating the terms and then putting them, with a governmental recommendation, to the British people in a referendum. It fell to Callaghan as the new Foreign Secretary to shoulder this task. Wilson supported him throughout and made a number of important interventions but he left most of the detailed negotiation,29 both with the EEC and its member states and within the Labour Party at home, to Callaghan and Hattersley.30 Callaghan embarked on the EEC negotiations with no apparent desire to see them succeed. The parameters of his brief had been laid out in Harold Wilson’s speech to the 1972 Labour Party conference and then in the Labour Party election manifesto.31 It was to improve access for Commonwealth agricultural products, to reduce Britain’s budget contributions, to retain the freedom to fix exchange rates (by rejecting proposals to create an economic and monetary union), to prevent VAT being imposed on ‘necessities’, to retain the power to pursue fiscal, regional and industrial policies and to initiate policies designed to help developing countries. At the beginning Callaghan was of the opinion that achievement of these objectives would require alterations to the EEC Treaties and to the European Communities Act, but he was soon disabused of this notion by the FCO32 who understood that the changes sought had little real substance given the way that the EEC had evolved – European Monetary Union (EMU) was not a
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credible option, the agricultural demands could be met without fundamentally changing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the proposed Lome Convention gave Britain what it wanted with regard to assisting developing countries. The only real sticking point was the question of the budgetary contributions and even here, once Britain accepted the inviolable nature of the principle that the EEC should dispose of its own resources (albeit by deciding to return some to Britain), the problem boiled down to one of political will on the part of the other EEC member states. Far more difficult than reaching agreement with the rest of the EEC was the problem of keeping the Labour Party and Cabinet together, and Callaghan’s aggressive opening stance at a meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 1 April 1974 was primarily designed to take the wind out of the sails of the antimarketeers at home. He had warmed up for this supposed confrontation with a meeting in the FCO attended by Britain’s ambassadors to the EEC states.33 At this meeting Callaghan presented his ambassadors with the Labour Party manifesto and suggested that they regard it as his negotiating brief. He also made it clear to those who could understand the delicacy of his position that, while he intended to ‘negotiate to succeed’, his major problem probably lay at home rather than with the EEC and that this would require him to demonstrate to his Cabinet colleagues that he was firmly resistant to the blandishments of the ‘elitist, pro-European attitudes of the Foreign Office’. Callaghan was right to focus his concerns on the domestic front. Wilson estimated that when Labour came to power his Cabinet was split 12 to nine against continued EEC membership, with Wilson and Callaghan agnostic.34 It was a measure of their successful tactics that by the time the same Cabinet voted on the renegotiated terms in 1975 the split was 16 to seven in favour of staying in: meaning that Fred Peart, John Morris, Merlyn Rees, Lord Shepherd and Reg Prentice had been persuaded to change their views, leaving just Michael Foot, Barbara Castle, Eric Varley, Willie Ross, Tony Benn, Peter Shore and John Silken opposed. This was where the real success lay rather than the acquiescence of the other EEC member states to the insignificant changes to the workings of the EEC that had been agreed. This is not to say that the negotiations in Brussels and in the various national capitals were not long and hard, although they were probably made easier by the changes of personnel that occurred shortly after Labour came to power: Helmut Schmidt replacing Willy Brandt and Valerie Giscard D’Estaing replacing
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the deceased Georges Pompidou. Schmidt in particular proved to be supportive of Callaghan (even most effectively addressing the Labour Party conference on the issue in late 197435 when Callaghan introduced him not as a head of government but as a fraternal delegate from the socialist party of Germany); and Giscard, for all his self-importance and pomposity, was less wedded to the terms agreed with Heath than Pompidou would have been. Callaghan engaged vigorously in an essentially theological argument with the others about the importance and relevance of the concept of political union, which he was fundamentally opposed to and on which he suspected his fellow foreign ministers to be essentially hypocritical. In 1975, in a classic statement of traditional British pragmatism on the issue, Callaghan wrote that ‘I have always felt uneasy about some of the political rhetoric used about the future of Europe and the willingness to set objectives (such as EMU and political union) and adopt unrealistic dates before anyone knows they can be reached.’36 Callaghan’s negotiating position was eased once Labour had won the second election in 1974 because the other EEC countries then knew that they would have to deal with the Labour government for the foreseeable future. Callaghan certainly softened his attitude towards the EEC as the endgame approached, and he and Wilson gave assurances to both Schmidt and Giscard that, if concessions were made towards the British position, they would personally advocate acceptance of the new terms. Callaghan was never enthusiastic about the EEC but he did come to quite like the European Political Cooperation procedure for coordinating EEC member state foreign policies. The Cyprus crisis in particular (see below) made Callaghan think hard about Britain’s ability to act alone without the support of the USA, such that a bit of European solidarity began to look quite attractive. The deal was finally struck with some assistance from M. Ortoli, the French President of the Commission at the Dublin European Council meeting in the spring of 1975. This laid the path clear for the referendum which Callaghan had supported, albeit not very enthusiastically. He saw it as making the best of a bad job, having early on correctly recognised that it represented a life raft for both sides of the EEC debate. Wilson suspended collective Cabinet responsibility for the duration of the campaign, but the result was never seriously in doubt with two-thirds of the electorate giving a two-to-one majority for acceptance of the renegotiated terms. The whole campaign had been a great success for Callaghan personally. Wilson was content to ‘leave it to Jim’ and Callaghan was
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able to practise statesmanship and enhance his popularity in a party that fundamentally wanted to put the issue behind it as soon as possible. He emerged in a strong position vis-à-vis the other potential leadership candidates and he certainly gained the respect of the FCO for the way that he had handled not just his EEC interlocutors but also the potentially explosive domestic scene. The successful renegotiation was important for British politics and British foreign policy, but Callaghan was probably right in his sceptical assessment that membership of the EEC would make little real difference to the enormous economic problems that Britain was to face in the rest of the 1970s. In the summer of 1974, with the EEC negotiations only just under way, Callaghan faced a major crisis when the Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios was overthrown by a Greek junta-inspired coup leading to a Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island.37 Britain found itself at the centre of events mainly because, along with Greece and Turkey, it was a guarantee power charged with preserving the independence of Cyprus, but also because it had several military installations on the island and because a large number of British tourists were trapped in what potentially was a full-scale war zone. While the EEC negotiations had supported the view that ‘Jim could fix it’ the Cyprus conflict suggested that even his powers of persuasion were limited especially, as proved to be the case, when he could not rely on the support of the USA and his friend Henry Kissinger. American support would always have been problematic, partly because Kissinger did not share Britain’s enthusiasm for Makarios, because the Cypriot leader had requested Soviet help in his bid to keep his country independent, and partly because the USA had tacitly supported the Greek military regime, which was behind the overthrow of Makarios, in a bid to keep Greece within the NATO fold. However, matters were made considerably worse by the situation in Washington where the Nixon presidency was coming to its end as a result of the Watergate scandal. At vital moments Kissinger was distracted by events at home, and he records in his memoirs that he was often unable to receive diplomatic material at the western White House in California because of the volume of Watergate-related traffic.38 Callaghan too records that things were made much more difficult for him because of his inability to talk directly to Kissinger at critical moments in the crisis.39 Callaghan, like almost every British Foreign Secretary since Suez, knew better than to seek to go it alone in a military crisis without the full support of the USA.
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Once Makarios had fled the island and found his way to Britain, Callaghan’s main objective was to deter a Turkish invasion, which seemed likely given the situation of the besieged Turkish Cypriot population. He tried to invoke the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, which required the guaranteeing powers to take action to maintain or restore the sovereign integrity of Cyprus, but neither the Greeks nor the Turks were prepared to enter negotiations with each other or with the British. Instead the Turks demanded that Britain offer direct assistance through its military bases to Turkish forces seeking to protect the Turkish Cypriot population. Callaghan could not go along with this, but he needed the USA to put more pressure than it was prepared to on the Greek government to withdraw its support for the rebels in Cyprus if he was to hold the Turks at bay. The US government was less concerned than the British for the fate of a Commonwealth country and just wanted to keep the two sides apart and the Soviets out. It was also less keen than the British to see the end of the Greek military regime for it feared that the new government would be Sovietinclined, and so Kissinger did not give Callaghan the help that his diplomatic strategy required. Worse, when the Greek government did fall, Kissinger’s brand of realpolitik led him to give tacit support to the Turks as they invaded and then refused to leave Cyprus. As Callaghan, first of all in London and then in Geneva, tried to negotiate a return to the status quo he received little assistance from the USA and was, as a result, able to achieve nothing other than avoid British involvement in military hostilities. Nearly 30 years after the crisis the situation remains much as it was when the immediate threat of war between Greece and Turkey or between Britain and Turkey was dealt with by an acceptance of an effective division of the island and thus the failure of the Treaty of Guarantee. Callaghan was severely criticised at the time for his apparent reluctance to take action either to deter the initial coup or the subsequent Turkish invasion. He was given a difficult time in 1976 in front of a House of Commons select committee, which he initially refused to attend40 and at which he then stonewalled. The result was a critical report that complained about Callaghan’s unhelpful attitude and which criticised his actions, claiming that they reflected either a lack of information or initiative or both. Kellner and Hitchens suggest that Callaghan, recognising the limited options that he had, preferred to be accused of ignorance rather than collusion with US indifference to the fate of a Britishprotected Commonwealth country.41 It was not a happy episode in Callaghan’s career although it did not do him significant damage
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because war was avoided, British tourists were returned safely and the Greek military government, which was so disliked by many in the Labour Party, fell. Despite the seriousness of the situation, the Cyprus crisis did have its comic moments. Callaghan records the fact that he first knew of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus when Kissinger phoned him at home in the middle of the night.42 When the FCO car failed to arrive Callaghan hailed a passing Homepride bread delivery van and hitched a ride into work.43 Callaghan’s memoirs also contain an interesting discussion of the use of the telephone (which he disliked as a poor replacement for face-to-face contact) in a crisis which is illustrated by the reproduction of his phone log for Sunday 21 July during which he had no fewer than ten separate phone conversations with Kissinger alone.44 However, despite all the phone calls, Callaghan’s Cyprus experience tended to confirm what he already believed: the special relationship with the USA was vital but, however carefully it was nurtured, it had its limitations. No wonder that Callaghan became relatively enthusiastic about the development of EEC foreign-policy cooperation. Callaghan had much greater success when it came to dealing with the situation that arose in Portugal after 1974.45 Once again he found himself in greater agreement with his EEC colleagues than with the USA – indeed his great triumph was to ‘educate’ the Americans into a more subtle understanding of the significance of Portugal’s admittedly controversial return to democracy. In 1974, fed up with the costly colonial wars being waged in Africa by Salazar’s equally dictatorial successor Caetano, the Portuguese military staged a military coup and established a Marxist junta that looked as if it was capable of taking Portugal directly from fascism to communism missing out liberal democracy. While the USA was inclined to leave the military junta to do its worst in Portugal, in the belief that this would be a salutary lesson to the rest of western Europe, Callaghan sought to give his support to the Portuguese socialist party led by Mario Soares. He had known Soares for years through the Socialist International and, when the armed forces movement was invited to Moscow, Callaghan ensured that Soares was invited to London. Callaghan saw the opportunity that the Portuguese revolution offered to democratic forces and, while the Labour Party built on its links with the Portuguese socialists, Callaghan also used Tom McNally to encourage the British Conservatives to establish their own links with Portugal’s right-of-centre democratic parties. While the Americans raged on the sidelines, Callaghan and
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Wilson also exploited their links with the Soviets both in Moscow and on the margins of the CSCE conference in Helsinki. In effect they called on the Soviets to leave Portugal alone, arguing that this would be seen as a show of good faith that could be rewarded with a successful CSCE conference, which is what the Soviets most desired.46 Callaghan also orchestrated the other European socialists, and he and Wilson played a leading role in a meeting of socialist heads of government which was convened in Stockholm just after the Helsinki conference. At this meeting such luminaries as Palme, Brandt, Schmidt, Mitterrand, Kreisky, Craxi and Rabin all pledged their support for Soares,47 and eventually were rewarded by his electoral triumph – a striking rebuttal of the US view that nothing could be done to prevent a communist Portugal and that this would be a good thing as it would ‘vaccinate the rest of Europe’ against similar experiments. Callaghan deserves great credit for his part in the ‘rescue’ of democratic Portugal. When Callaghan first became Foreign Secretary he made it clear that he wished to improve Britain’s relations with both superpowers and that he wished to assist the developing process of détente wherever possible. At a time when the USA was showing little interest in the substance of the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Callaghan recognised its importance to the Soviet Union and its potential to improve relations across the European continent. He rejected the traditional FCO argument that the Soviets wished to use the CSCE to divide western Europe from the USA, and he took steps to engage the Soviet Union. He invited Gromyko to London and set up a return visit to Moscow for Harold Wilson and himself. He showed considerably more sensitivity in his handling of yet another spy case than had his Conservative predecessors.48 Callaghan was responsible for setting up an annual Anglo-Soviet meeting under the auspices of Chatham House along the lines of the Konisgwinter conferences that had done so much to bring the Anglo-German elites together since the end of the war. Kissinger came to value Callaghan’s ‘take’ on the Russians because he understood that, in his dealings with them, Callaghan never deviated from his basic position as an unshakeable ally of the USA. Callaghan reached a significant agreement with the Soviets about a mutual non-interference in the affairs of Yugoslavia in the event of the death of Tito, and he would claim that his ‘quiet diplomacy’ within the margins of the CSCE produced results not just with regard to Portugal but also in relation to the regular release of Soviet dissidents that he privately identified. Callaghan believed
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with some justification that, unlike one or two of his predecessors, he knew how to deal with the Russians. In later years Callaghan was critical of Mrs Thatcher for allowing the Falklands situation to develop as it did in the early 1980s. He was faced with regular demands from the Ministry of Defence to save money by withdrawing HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic, but he understood the symbolic importance of its presence49 (he was in any case an enormous enthusiast for the demonstration of sea power). Similarly he would claim that he too was faced with the problem of the Falkland Islands’ steady economic decline and the British public’s apparent uninterest in paying any price to retain the islands. Like Mrs Thatcher he was prepared to consider negotiating with the Argentinians but he would claim that, unlike her, he never ‘took his eye off the ball’ but remained vigilant and determined to send the Argentinians no false signals. His aim was to cooperate with Argentina but to deter via preventive diplomacy any thoughts of an Argentinian takeover of the Falklands. In 1975 Callaghan was sufficiently concerned about the need to be careful over this issue that he sent Wilson a 17-page memo on the subject. In retrospect Callaghan perhaps had grounds to be as critical as he was of the Thatcher government’s policy prior to the Argentinian invasion because it seemed to break all the rules he had so carefully laid down. Callaghan himself compared his experience with his Conservative successor by stating that ‘we kept the peace but the Tories won the war’.50 If Callaghan saw himself as the peacemaker over the Falklands then he has to be seen as warmonger, albeit on a near farcical scale, when one considers his curious prosecution of the third Cod War with Iceland in late 1975. When Iceland declared a 50-mile limit and sought to restrict the rights of British fishermen within the excluded area Callaghan took enormous offence at what he saw as unjustified unilateral action. He instructed the Royal Navy to intervene should the Icelandic fishery patrols seek to cut the nets of offending British trawlers. At the time Iceland relied on fishing for 81 per cent of its export earnings while Britain relied on it for 0.2 per cent of its export earnings! It remains a mystery why Callaghan chose to make a fight of this; some say that he had little regard for Iceland where he was based for a short time during the war; others argue that British foreign policy on this issue was essentially ‘captured’ by Fred Peart, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; and others say that he just could not resist the flexing of a little naval muscle. In any event he was given short shrift by Kissinger when he complained to him about
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Iceland’s behaviour. Morgan excuses him by seeking to lay the blame at Hattersley’s door,51 but the ultimate irony is that, when Britain eventually gave in, as it was bound to do, the job of negotiating the climbdown fell to Callaghan’s successor, Anthony Crosland, who had the great misfortune to be the MP for the fishing port of Grimsby. Finally we should make some mention of Callaghan’s African exploits. Here he tried to work with Kissinger as a source of wise counsel and as trusted friend of a number of African leaders. He did his best to make progress on Rhodesia without any real success, but he did successfully influence Kissinger over Angola once the US policy of supporting UNITA had failed and the Soviet– Cuban-backed MPLA prevailed. Callaghan enjoyed a great deal of goodwill in Africa because of his time supporting decolonisation while he was the shadow Colonial Secretary. His major tour of Africa in 1974–75 was something of a triumph because it was the first visit by a senior British government member since Macmillan had given his ‘winds of change’ speech at the start of the 1960s. Callaghan’s enthusiasm for developing a progressive stance on Africa52 was related to his wider ambition to enhance the role of the Commonwealth: this was partly informed by a desire to ensure that Britain continued to enjoy wide support from Commonwealth countries at the United Nations. Callaghan never really achieved very much in Africa other than to rescue a rather seedy British adventurer Denis Hills from the clutches of Idi Amin, although this took considerable personal courage on Callaghan’s part and it is to his great credit that he makes no reference to it in his autobiography.
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
Callaghan was Foreign Secretary for only two years before becoming Prime Minister following the resignation of Harold Wilson. Although he earned the respect of many senior members of the diplomatic service his relationship with the FCO remained a wary and ambiguous one. While Callaghan admired much about the FCO he was still prepared to shake up the institution, first by controversially appointing David Owen as Foreign Secretary and then by agreeing to send his son-in-law, Peter Jay, to run the great diplomatic prize of the Washington embassy. Some might say that he saved the FCO from the proposed ravages of the CPRS report,
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but others would remember that it was Callaghan who set the think tank to work in the first place. His great policy success is usually said to be the successful renegotiation of the relationship with the EEC, although this is probably best seen as more of a domestic than an external triumph. There was little significant substance to the renegotiated terms but they did lead to a successful referendum, and this in turn began the process of Britain’s adjustment to a European vocation. Heath certainly failed to either explain the EEC to the British or the British to the EEC, and Callaghan’s cool evaluation of the significance of EEC membership for Britain based the relationship on more realistic lines. With hindsight, however, it might be argued that Callaghan’s policies only temporarily patched over Labour’s difficulties with the EEC and that they re-emerged with a disastrous impact once Labour lost office in the 1980s. Despite the time that he had to spend on the EEC, Callaghan probably did achieve his objective of ‘cultivating the rest of the world once more’.53 Despite the major problem over Cyprus and the minor one over Belize54 Callaghan did a great deal to repair the damage that Heath had done to the special relationship with the USA: this was recognised by Kissinger himself.55 Kissinger liked and respected Callaghan and clearly valued his advice and his evaluation of the individuals that Kissinger was doing business with. In the Middle East, in Africa and in western and Eastern Europe, US policy was to some extent tempered by a British input and Callaghan deserves credit for achieving this. It is no use having a Rolls Royce of a Diplomatic Service if no one listens to it and Callaghan made sure that Kissinger was at least aware of the British view. He can count changes to US views on the Portuguese revolution and the CSCE as notable successes. Nevertheless the relationship remained a one-sided one and, while Kissinger was personally very helpful to Callaghan (in particular by attending the ceremony when Callaghan was given the freedom of Cardiff in 1975),56 it is hard to find examples of direct US assistance being given to any of Callaghan’s chosen policies. Kissinger did give Callaghan support over the EEC negotiations, making it clear that he would enjoy the support of the USA regardless of the outcome, but the main advantage he bestowed on Callaghan was to listen to him and to make sure that others knew that he listened to him. Callaghan also deserves credit for acknowledging and acting upon a growing Soviet interest in détente. It was important to the Europeans and the Soviets that the CSCE was taken seriously, and Callaghan ensured both that it was and that the EEC members got
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their collective act together in the face of US indifference. In the end one has to conclude that Callaghan was fortunate to be Foreign Secretary at a time when he could rely on the unquestioning support of a powerful but no longer ambitious Prime Minister. Callaghan himself acknowledged his debt to Wilson when he commented that ‘I got used to him being there to shoulder the final responsibility, to feeling able to turn to him naturally for a second opinion and well informed advice.’57 Callaghan’s confidence in the post was further boosted by his senior position within the Labour Party and his long experience of government at Cabinet level. For most of the time that he was Foreign Secretary he was also regarded as the most likely successor to Harold Wilson: this obviously impacted favourably on his relations with other senior members of the government. The need to renegotiate EEC membership was not nearly the poisoned chalice that it might have been because it enabled Callaghan to be seen as statesmanlike and tough on the EEC in comparison to his predecessors while at the same time consolidating his role in the Labour Party as the ultimate fixer after Harold Wilson. His experience at the FCO between 1974 and 1976 stood him in good stead when, like most Prime Ministers, he eventually tired of domestic matters and sought solace in his international dealings.
NOTES 1. Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 373–407, covers this period in Callaghan’s life. 2. Peter Kellner and Christopher Hitchens, Callaghan: The Road to Number Ten (London: Cassell, 1975), p. 30 and pp. 87–8. 3. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 136–68, covers in some detail Callaghan’s time as Shadow Colonial Secretary. 4. Ibid., p. 369. 5. James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Glasgow: Collins, 1987). 6. John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992), p. 101. 7. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 294. 8. Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London: Cape, 1997), p. 155. 9. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 410–11. 10. Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 168. 11. Jim Callaghan, Challenges and Opportunities for British Foreign Policy, Fabian tract 439 (London: Fabian Society, 1975), p. 1. 12. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 320. 13. Ibid., p. 386. 14. Nicholas Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador 1969–1982 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), p. 72. 15. Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 71–2. 16. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 324. 17. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 80.
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18. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 294. 19. The Callaghan ‘team’ at the FCO is discussed in some detail in Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 410–12. 20. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 81. 21. Ibid., p. 257. 22. Ibid., p. 82. 23. For an account of this episode, which Callaghan modestly does not mention in his own memoirs, see Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 456–7. 24. Henderson saw the new government as ‘bent on reversing the foreign policy of its predecessor’: Henderson, Mandarin, p. 59. 25. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, pp. 65–6. 26. See David Allen, ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Adapting to the European Union within a Transformed World’, in David Spence and Brian Hocking (eds), European Foreign Ministries: Integrating Diplomats (London: Palgrave, 2002) and ‘The United Kingdom: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Flexible, Responsive and Proactive’, in B. Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 207–25 for a discussion of the CPRS report and reaction to it. 27. See Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 126–8 for a good example of a traditional diplomat’s reaction to the CPRS investigations. 28. Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government 1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 51. 29. Henderson records that Wilson seemed to have little interest in the details of the EEC deliberations: Henderson, Mandarin, p. 79. 30. See Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 408–34; Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 297–326; and Wilson, Final term, pp. 51–65 and 83–109 for a full account of the EEC renegotiation and subsequent referendum. 31. Wilson, Final Term, pp. 52–3. 32. Henderson, Mandarin, p. 63. 33. Ibid., pp. 61–3 for an account of Callaghan’s briefing for UK ambassadors. 34. Wilson, Final Term, p. 103. 35. Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 76–7; Morgan, Callaghan, p. 421. 36. Callaghan, Challenges and Opportunities, p. 13. 37. For full details of this episode see Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 331–57; Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 444–50; and Peter Kellner and Christopher Hitchens, Callaghan: The Road to Number Ten (London: Cassell, 1976), pp. 136–42. 38. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 1187–93. 39. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 339. 40. Kellner and Hitchens, Callaghan , pp. 139–42. 41. Ibid., p. 142. 42. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 342. 43. See Moorhouse, The Diplomats, pp. 124–5 for an account of the Cyprus crisis decisionmaking arrangements inside the FCO. 44. Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 344–6. 45. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 431–4 on Callaghan and Portugal. 46. Ibid., p. 362. 47. Ibid., p. 43. 48. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 365; Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 450–4 deals more generally with Callaghan’s policy towards the Soviet Union. 49. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 460–2. 50. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 370. 51. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 430–1. 52. Ibid., pp. 454–60. 53. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 296. 54. Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 443–4; Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 378. 55. Henry Kissinger, ‘Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, 58, 4 (1982). 56. Morgan, Callaghan, p. 442. 57. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 392.
3
Anthony Crosland: Foreign Secretary, 1976–771 Oliver J. Daddow
Anthony Crosland’s career as Foreign Secretary has generally received peremptory attention, inviting comparison with one of his Labour predecessors, Herbert Morrison.2 This should not surprise us for a number of reasons. It reflects first of all Crosland’s own political agenda which, like Morrison’s, was geared more to the development of socialist ideology and Labour’s economic policy, most notably through his 1956 publication The Future of Socialism and follow-ups The Conservative Enemy and Socialism Now.3 Writing at the time of his death, his close friend Dick Leonard observed that ‘it is almost certainly as a thinker and writer that Crosland will be most remembered’,4 an opinion that over 20 years on has been upheld in a populist newspaper article that labels him ‘one of the great socialist intellectuals of his generation’.5 Second, and again like Morrison, Crosland had little time to make his mark at the Foreign Office, but whereas the former was the victim of an electoral swing to conservatism the latter was unluckier, dying from a stroke. Finally, he was not at the helm during a period of crisis or revolution in Britain’s external relations, either of which would have sparked historiographic interest in his policy. In this respect, he differed from Morrison who is forever connected with Britain’s policy towards the Schuman Plan and European unity. Crosland, by contrast, took office just after one of the most divisive issues in British foreign policy, the European referendum, had been resolved at enormous costs to the long-term cohesion of the Labour Party.6 Furthermore, the Vietnam War had ended; ‘PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party] v. quiet on Foreign Affairs’, noted
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one adviser,7 and the decision on membership of the European Monetary System (EMS) had yet to hit the Whitehall agenda. The key issues with which he wrestled were, significantly, domestic: the Labour government suffered from the traumas of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan negotiations and the country was beset by union militancy and strike action, which would soon culminate in the ‘winter of discontent’. This chapter argues that the dearth of attention to Crosland’s stint at the Foreign Office does not do justice to the insights it provides into his personality in particular and post-war political history in general, especially the ultimately irreconcilable divisions over Europe in the Labour Party that led to the split in 1981 and the constraints on foreign policy-making in an era of growing interdependence in the international political economy of the 1970s. It analyses his tenure in four parts: the first briefly recaps his pre-Foreign Office career; the second examines his personal style; the third explores the international context into which he was thrown; and the final part assesses and concludes. It does so with the caveats that his short period in the job makes firm conclusions difficult to draw and that there is a severe deficiency of sources. The official record will not be available in the Public Record Office until the years 2007–08; the Crosland Papers in the London School of Economics Library contain only limited insights; and, as previously mentioned, his contemporaries tend to focus on achievements before he became Foreign Secretary. Whitehall’s official history of British foreign policy now extends to 1976, but concentrates almost exclusively on the Cold War environment.8 Nonetheless, it can be established that it is insufficient to see Crosland primarily as an intellectual who brought little or nothing to the Foreign Office, as his resolution of the Cod War, his setting up of the Geneva conference on Rhodesia and his conduct of European policy all demonstrate.
CAREER
Inside government, before being appointed Foreign Secretary, Crosland’s ministerial career had largely been on the domestic side. He was Minister of State at the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in Harold Wilson’s first Labour government from October 1964. During a Cabinet reshuffle instigated by Patrick Gordon Walker’s loss of the Leyton by-election and subsequent
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removal from government in January 1965, Crosland moved to become Secretary of State for Education and Science. He remained there until August 1967 when he became President of the Board of Trade, a post that gave him prominent opportunities to indulge his interests in international trade and economics. In October 1969 he became Secretary of State in the newly created Department of Local Government and Regional Planning, where he stayed until Labour’s general election defeat in June 1970. By that time he was already being tagged a ‘talented yet unpredictable force never quite living up to his potential’.9 When Labour returned to power in March 1974 Crosland was made Secretary of State for the Environment and took over from James Callaghan as Foreign Secretary in April 1976. Before entering politics, Crosland fought in the Second World War, serving in the Royal Fusiliers, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the Parachute Regiment, where he saw action in North Africa, Italy, France and Austria. He was educated at Oxford University, where he was president of the Union in 1946 and chairman of the Oxford University Democratic Socialist Club. In 1947–50 he was employed as a fellow and lecturer in economics at Trinity College.
PERSONAL STYLE
That Crosland stirred contrasting and ambiguous emotions in people is well captured by Roy Jenkins’s comment that: ‘Although there had been many contretemps and mutual irritations in our political relationship of the previous ten years, he remained … the most exciting friend of my life’.10 To his second wife, Susan Crosland, whose biography has been described as ‘possibly the finest memoir of a British politician ever written’,11 he was clearly devoted, settling down in 1964 after a youthfulness of what can only be described as ‘laddish’ or, to use the language of his time, ‘raffish’, behaviour.12 A ‘clever, handsome, irreverent husband’, she later recalled.13 What she called ‘irreverence’, others, including his friends, have interpreted as his ‘legendary rudeness’, a ‘lofty arrogance’ that could make him a prickly person to deal with,14 a characteristic that would come to cause him problems when it came to establishing a base within the Labour Party. A trait that also manifested itself early in his career, but which had fewer long-term ramifications, was his enthusiasm for socialising, an anti-puritanical streak that seems to have developed in reaction to
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his strict Brethren upbringing. A letter from A. J. P. Taylor in 1951 illustrates this point: ‘You might … be a junior Minister by now; and would have been if it wasn’t for drinking too much.’15 Crosland himself, in The Future of Socialism, voiced his hedonism openly: ‘Total abstinence and a good filing system are not now the right signposts to the socialist Utopia: or at least, if they are, some of us will fall by the wayside.’16 Socialism as he saw it did not preclude people from being able to choose how they enjoyed themselves, indeed it was an essential prerequisite. One of the main aims of his project was the ‘broadening of cultural opportunities’.17 His foreign secretaryship was, however, to be more memorable for two other features of his personality. First, his antipathy to formal dress – stemming back to his school days – which, observes Kevin Jefferys, ‘became obsessive, causing him particular problems when he became Foreign Secretary’.18 Photographs of him waiting to greet the French President at Victoria Station, dressed in a lounge suit rather than tails, together with wearing a black, not white, tie at a reception for the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh hosted by the American President in Washington, are likely to linger in the popular memory longer than, say, the detail of what he achieved in Rhodesia or even the Cod War (discussed below). In diplomacy, where tone, images and perceptions of foreign policy are at least as important variables in the decision-making process as the objective reality of foreign policy itself,19 the public image and status of the Foreign Secretary was surely damaged, both at home and abroad, certainly, if the number of letters he received about his dress is any indication of the significance attached to this aspect of his job.20 Second, his ‘feeling of inadequacy until he had mastered the groundwork’ had more practical and immediate effects on his foreign secretaryship, raising as it did doubts about his suitability to the post.21 Jenkins is scathing: ‘The disadvantage of Crosland’s impressively ratiocinative progress towards a view was that when the three days had gone and he had come out of the dark, the issue had often resolved itself. He had not so much taken a more rational decision as lost the opportunity to take one at all.’22 David Owen, Minister of State and successor to Crosland at the Foreign Office, has likewise highlighted the dangers posed by Crosland’s preference for thought over practical application of policy: ‘he was in danger of being judged as doing too little’.23 Owen is referring to the Rhodesian question on which Crosland was low-key, a decision that would seem to be in line with his natural cautiousness in the face of less than all the facts. An alternative explanation of
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why Crosland took such a tortuous route to decisions is that he intentionally played on his need to think as a way of distracting attention from the real issue which, according to the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was that ‘he could master the subject. I didn’t know if he wanted to.’24 This crucial insight, from someone with whom he worked closely on Rhodesia, raises serious doubts about the Jenkins and Owen line that Crosland’s personality was inadvertently to blame for his low profile as Foreign Secretary. Maybe it was a deliberate ploy not to make high-profile gaffes or blunders, thereby keeping him in the running for the job of Chancellor – or even leader of the Labour Party – when the occasion arose. Looking back on Crosland’s personality, mind, intellectual ability, socialising, manner, tone and mores, one can clearly discern threads that run through his life, and which have come to colour – and taint – conventional assessments that he was ‘only a partial success’.25 Kissinger’s judgement – true or not – sheds light on another leading thread of Crosland’s foreign secretaryship: his association not with the Foreign Office but the Treasury. It is no secret that Crosland was distraught when Jenkins beat him to the chancellorship in 1967.26 The word was, ten years later, that his dream was about to be fulfilled,27 Callaghan apparently being on the verge of swapping him with Denis Healey, putting them in what were considered to be their ‘natural’ government homes.28 Even when he was appointed, a congratulatory letter from his parliamentary private secretary Christopher Price pointed to ‘the hope of higher economic things to lead you on’;29 and in office his chief adviser David Lipsey consistently urged Crosland to consider his long-term future vis-à-vis the Treasury.30 His ‘promotion’ seemed even more certain at the time of his death, The Economist mourning the loss of ‘the strong personality who was to have become Britain’s next chancellor of the exchequer next July’.31 Coincidentally, however, Crosland was at the heart of the Cabinet during another in the series of economic crises that befell the Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s. In the autumn of 1976 Chancellor Healey applied to the IMF for assistance to the British economy, leading to a split in Cabinet over the deflationary conditions attached to an IMF loan, Britain eventually agreeing to a cut in the public sector borrowing requirement of £1,500 million in 1977–78 and expenditure cuts of £1,000 million for each of the next two years.32 The IMF saga has a bearing on Crosland’s reputation as Foreign Secretary in four ways, all of which have
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helped sustain the view that he ultimately saw the Foreign Office as a staging post on his way to the Treasury. Most obviously, it diverted his attention from foreign to economic policy: ‘for months’, he moaned in 1976, ‘I’ve not had time to think properly about economics. God, I wish I didn’t have to be away so much.’33 Second, it focused Cabinet and country attention on Crosland, who led the faction in Cabinet opposed to the initial IMF proposals, and who disputed where the cuts should hit hardest. His opinion that they should be made in defence rather than housing moved Tony Benn to make the cynical observation that this was ‘the first time Crosland had admitted there were foreign affairs for a long time’.34 Third, the more damaging aspect of this stance was that it could hardly have endeared Crosland to his Foreign Office officials: one has been quoted as saying that ‘He made no bones about the fact that he felt things had changed and we needed to protect our economy more’, an opinion that went against the Foreign Office line that foreign policy transcended party barriers and that this was clearly an occasion on which Crosland should go with his officials not his instincts.35 Finally, concerning the issue of his wider political reputation, he has been sharply rebuked for his decision on 1 December to support Callaghan in accepting the IMF terms. Paymaster-General Edmund Dell, for instance, trumpeted: ‘The truth was that he had been out-argued by Healey and demolished by the facts.’36 The IMF crisis came at a bad time not just for the Labour Party but for Crosland when, by all accounts, he was trying hard to throw himself into his new job.37 Not only did it shift his and others’ attention onto the British economy, it further undermined his reputation within the Labour Party. So the signs were that, on coming to office, Crosland would not enjoy good relations with his civil servants. First of all, he was not seen as a ‘natural’ Foreign Secretary. Of particular relevance is the observation that, unlike his predecessor Callaghan, he had not shadowed the post, giving more than a little credence to the impression that he was ‘dropped from the skies into the FO’.38 The change of environment, the workload, the speed with which international events move, would have been daunting for any individual, let alone Crosland, for whom ratiocination was the best way to decide on a course of action. In sum it is questionable whether he ever appeared, or felt, ‘quite at home there’.39 The second reason why problems were thought likely to occur was Crosland’s eccentricity over protocol because it added to the picture of an untypical Foreign Secretary.
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The dress code was not his only problem: He in turn struggled to conceal his dislike of what he considered to be endless, time-wasting meetings and functions with foreign ambassadors. ‘What’s the point’, he asked his wife rhetorically on one occasion, ‘when I don’t know what to say to him or understand what he’s saying to me?’40
His principal private secretary Ewen Fergusson confirmed that he viewed ambassadors with a ‘jaundiced eye’, held European ministers in low esteem because they could not engage intellectually and intensely disliked meeting people ‘who were sometimes stupid, boring, self-important, but who had to be seen willy-nilly’.41 One story will suffice to illustrate the potential he had to annoy his civil servants and international partners. At an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, May 1976, Crosland was said by Kissinger to have been insulting and unconventional, so that the meeting ended in half an hour as opposed to the usual two hours. He was, concluded Kissinger, ‘a colossal pain in the neck’.42 His personality combined with discomfort in the methods of international diplomacy and negotiation to shocking effect. The civil service flinched when he brought in his own diary secretary, Margaret Turner and a team of advisers, headed by Lipsey and, later, Michael Stewart, in preference to relying on official briefs.43 ‘Except with D. Lip. [sic] and Margaret’, commented his wife, ‘he drew a boundary round himself which the sophisticates of Private Office were very hesitant to cross.’44 His reliance on the economist Stewart probably hurt the Foreign Office most deeply, such are the clear lines of demarcation between the Foreign Office and Treasury. Clearly, though, his successor found the move beneficial: ‘As a result I felt more confident participating in domestic Cabinet economic discussions and in the mysteries of international economics.’45 Inadvertently, therefore, Crosland’s highly personal move may have helped diminish the historic rivalry between the two key departments of state, promoting a more cooperative approach to the making of foreign and economic policy in Britain.46 The third reason why one might have expected Crosland to receive a cool reception from the Foreign Office was over the issue of Europe. Of all the wrangles in the Labour Party in the Wilson and Callaghan years, Europe was perhaps the most divisive; it has particular resonance in terms of how Crosland is judged as a
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person and a politician. Based on Crosland’s notes and jottings on the subject, Jefferys describes him as ‘mildly though not fanatically pro-European’ at the time of Britain’s first application to join the EEC in 1961–63. His ‘agnostic approach’ even brought him into conflict with his mentor, Hugh Gaitskell, who led Labour’s opposition to Harold Macmillan’s membership bid.47 Explaining Crosland’s brand of Europeanism, his wife points to his ‘internationalism’ that put him ‘emotionally in favour of entry’; Jefferys highlights a more sophisticated approach concentrating on the ‘political need for Britain to readjust to the loss of Empire’.48 The crux for Labour, and for Crosland, came with Edward Heath’s push for British entry in 1971. Crosland’s view, expressed in a conversation with Guardian deputy editor John Cole and editor Alastair Hetherington, that ‘he was sceptically pro-EEC’,49 made him, by the standards of The Economist and the Jenkinsites on the centre-right of his party, an ‘unenthusiastic European’.50 What was critical in terms of his reputation was, therefore, not his approach per se, but the way in which it led him to fall out with both the left and right of the Labour Party in the early 1970s. He thought ‘Labour unity more important than the common market’.51 This led him to abstain in the crucial House of Commons division in October, a move he justified by saying a ‘yes’ vote would have been tacit support for ‘the Conservative enemy’, while a ‘no’ risked splitting Labour. By the right of the party he was seen as ‘back sliding’, going back on what they saw as his instinctive preference for entry during the 1960s; by the left he was portrayed as a traitor. ‘I don’t care terribly enough about it’, he complained.52 The problem was the rest of the party and Whitehall did. Crosland was also accused of using Europe for personal advancement: by abstaining he was loosening ties with Jenkins in a bid to advance his position within the upper echelons of the Labour leadership and on the NEC.53 This diversion into the legacy of the European debate impinges directly on consideration of his relationship with the Foreign Office. A generally Europhile department,54 headed by permanent secretary Sir Michael Palliser, son-in-law of one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the EEC, Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak, one might have expected a frosty reception for Crosland. With Britain’s presidency of the EEC due to begin in 1977, preparations were already underway in Whitehall when Crosland was appointed. But what was expected of the relationship was quite different from what actually came to pass between Crosland and the Foreign Office. As the final section shows, too much can be made of his alleged
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lack of interest in foreign affairs, the problems he had with protocol and dress, his thoughtfulness and potential for dispute on a range of issues such as Europe. A closer examination of the issues he tackled and what he achieved in ten months suggests, again, that the conventional wisdom about his reputation has obscured the fact that he came to terms with the job more quickly and with more verve than one might imagine.
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Crosland’s epitaph for himself is most apt in terms of clarifying the main issues he confronted during his time as Foreign Secretary: ‘When I pop off and they cut open my heart, it will be engraved “Fish” and “Rhodesia”.’55 The opening of the official British archives for this era in 2007–08 will undoubtedly enrich the ability with which contemporary historians reconstruct the way in which foreign policy was developed under Crosland. It will also present the opportunity to scrutinise more closely other areas of British foreign policy, notably its fostering of détente with Russia through what the official historians describe as Britain’s role as ‘Cassandra to the Western Alliance’ in the ongoing talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in central Europe,56 the decision to break off diplomatic relations with Idi Amin’s Uganda (the first time Britain officially broke relations with a Commonwealth country), and the escalating Falklands crisis. Events that have barely been touched upon in existing literature await further scrutiny.57 Nonetheless, one can discern a pattern to policymaking and execution that show a man interested in foreign affairs and who had a good rapport with key officials that gives the lie to reports of possible rifts between minister and department. Even in this first draft of history it is possible to begin questioning the tired assumption that he was interested only in economics and social equality. In 1950 Crosland was a member of the British delegation to the Council of Europe, continuing an interest in European unity that flowed from a paper he co-wrote on federal union in 1939.58 In his time at the Council of Europe he was concerned with questions of German rearmament, and in 1957 attended a Princeton University ‘special seminar’ on defence looking at broader issues of NATO’s deterrence of Russia.59 The growing importance of the European question in British foreign policy was reflected in his 1960s
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musings on Britain’s attitude to the continent; he followed up with notes on the multilateral force (MLF), British nuclear weapons and the independent deterrent.60 It is problematic to deduce a simple cause and effect here: jottings and notes are hardly the evidence of a thorough immersion in the field of foreign affairs, and it would have been hard for any MP at the time of the Korean War and Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of Britain’s membership of the European Communities not to show at least some interest. However, in the light of this evidence, one can certainly go further than some conventional characterisations of Labour’s foreign policy under Crosland as being wholly inspired and guided by Callaghan’s Atlanticism and affinity for the Commonwealth.61 Cod War The first issue Crosland had to deal with was the latest ‘Cod War’ between Britain and Iceland, evidence of broader difficulties the EEC was encountering in framing a common fisheries policy since the 200-mile exclusion barrier agreed at the UN conferences on the Laws of the Sea in the middle of 1974,62 and also earlier disputes between the countries over fishing limits.63 This was the third such conflict since the Second World War: in 1952 Iceland extended its limit from three to four miles, in 1958 from four to 12 miles and in 1972 from 12 to 50 miles.64 The most recent quarrel had broken over Iceland’s decision in November 1975 to announce its authority over the ocean up to 200 miles from its coastline. Britain refused to acknowledge Iceland’s authority in this matter and so continued fishing up to the old limit.65 Representing Grimsby, with its huge fishing industry, the matter was of particular prescience to Crosland, and he was well aware of the interests at stake; Grimsby was also one of the two ports in Britain, along with Hull, that took to blockading Icelandic fishing catches from landing in their ports. One letter from the British Trawlers’ Federation in April 1976 rammed home the point that, even putting aside the Cod War, unless financial assistance was forthcoming from the British government, ‘many of your own constituents will be made redundant’.66 On 1 June 1976, Crosland accepted an EU compromise keeping British fishermen outside Iceland’s 200-mile exclusion zone without specific agreements. The Economist represented the widely held view in Britain by labelling it an ‘ignominious but inevitable defeat’ for Britain.67 The former ambassador to Iceland, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, added to the sense of malaise, pointing to Britain’s
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already ‘diminished stature’ on the world stage since Suez that blighted London’s ability to settle the dispute on its own terms.68 An assessment of three major influences on Crosland’s decision reveal that such judgements about the seeming inevitability of the outcome of the last Cod War are not without substance. First, Iceland was home to Keflavik, an important observation post used by the Americans in the Cold War. Iceland’s government cleverly used this as a bargaining chip: the Foreign Minister, Einur Ágústsson ‘made it known at NATO headquarters that he could not guarantee what would happen to the base and Iceland’s NATO membership if nothing were done to defend Iceland’s vital interests’.69 With such fears permeating Washington’s decisionmaking circles, it is no surprise that Keflavik has been seen as ‘a key factor in the failure of the British attempt to win their confrontation with Iceland’. Gilchrist advised, therefore, that ‘Any action which put at risk the NATO (really American) base in Iceland would undoubtedly be ill-regarded, and must therefore be excluded from British consideration.’70 His second consideration was that international opinion had already begun to shift in favour of wider limits, a move that the British government had not resisted. At the United Nations Sea Bed Committee preparations for the New York Law of the Sea conference in 1973, London agreed to the concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as a means of gaining control over gas and oil reserves. ‘It was accepted that such an EEZ would inevitably encompass a 200-mile fishery zone, and that traditional distant water fishing was eventually doomed.’ It was a situation that Crosland and even the British trawler owners had come to accept.71 Whitehall policy-makers must have realised that they had little chance of coming out on top in this conflict when to continue fighting the trawler owners’ case not only threatened the cohesion of the Western alliance but also would have meant them having to swim against the tide of international opinion and probable UN laws against distant water fishing. The final influence on Crosland’s decision was the more practical one that Britain’s membership of the EEC ruled out a bilateral deal with Iceland. Any such deal would need to be worked out in advance with the EEC, which would not only lessen its impact but detract substantially from the benefits to Britain, since any gains accruing to it would have to be shared with its EEC partners.72 On balance, Crosland’s settlement, if one can even put it down to him, seems more or less a done deal. As the Royal Naval Staff History summarises: ‘most people inside and outside the
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industry had believed for some time that such an outcome was likely, and it was generally accepted that realism and commonsense had prevailed’.73 ‘What were the alternatives?’ Crosland asked members of Parliament in his explanation to Parliament on 7 June. ‘I regard it as a concession only to common sense.’74 Given that the terms of the settlement were so favourable to the Icelandic government and its fishermen, it is perhaps natural that they warmed to Crosland during the Cod War. But according to the words of Britain’s permanent representative at NATO, John Killick, the Foreign Secretary also carried himself and presented British policy in a manner that made him both an able negotiator and a likeable person: what a very good impression you had made on the Icelanders. This was clearly not meant to imply that they had found you a ‘soft option’ but that they had quickly hoisted in that you meant business and were seriously interested in a settlement.75
Rhodesia and the Cold War The second issue Crosland had to deal with was Rhodesia. Crisis had erupted when, on 11 November 1965, during Wilson’s first administration, Prime Minister Ian Smith announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.76 That a solution had not been found in over ten years prior to Crosland’s appointment, and that it involved the race issue, made this a potentially explosive situation, and as Owen has pointed out: ‘Rhodesia had already proved to be a political graveyard for British Ministers and diplomats.’77 The crux of the problem from the British perspective was that it had no intention of imposing a constitutional settlement on Rhodesia and was intent instead on seeking a negotiated agreement which could only take place with the cooperation of Smith’s uncooperative white ruling minority. This, writes Paul Moorcraft, was a ‘long, sad, haggling odyssey to civil war’,78 and the new British Foreign Secretary could scarcely be expected in a ten-month period to single-handedly resolve the dispute between Britain and the Smith regime on the one hand and the Smith regime and the black nationalist leaders on the other. Nonetheless, one can discern three features of his approach to the Rhodesian crisis that suggest a bold attempt to grasp the key issues and a willingness to work with the Foreign Office and internationally to find a solution. First of all, Crosland, like the Foreign Office, was well aware of the interplay between Rhodesia and broader Cold War politics. It
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is no coincidence that, four days after Smith’s speech and Wilson’s response, the Soviet government issued a statement reminding the world of its continued support for the right to self-determination of ‘African peoples’ in Southern Rhodesia and claiming that British actions were ‘only an attempt to whitewash its actual policy’ of neocolonialism.79 Like so many events between 1945 and 1989,80 Rhodesia was just another to become entangled in superpower rivalry, which had been heightening in the region over Soviet military assistance to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the presence in Angola of Soviet-backed Cuban forces.81 It is hard, without access to the official record, to assess the degree to which the Foreign Office was leading Crosland’s thinking, or vice-versa, though the former interpretation might be nearer the mark. Compared to his predecessor, who ‘seemed determined to assume a more positive attitude towards the East’, Crosland fell quite quickly behind the harder official line. His advisers do not seem to have been at all perturbed when Crosland became ‘somewhat disenchanted’ with the development of AngloRussian relations.82 It is evident that Crosland was planning a major foreign-policy speech on the Cold War and détente in September 1976; over Christmas he cogitated on communism in Italy and the threat it posed to the Atlantic alliance and stability in France, Spain and Portugal.83 This was not a Foreign Secretary who focused solely on economics. The Cold War dimension inevitably meant American interest, particularly in the wake of the involvement in the Angolan civil war by communist Cuban forces. As Kissinger put it: ‘this whole enterprise after all only makes sense as a firebreak to African radicalism and Soviet intervention’.84 When Kissinger first came to London on 23 April 1976 for a briefing on Rhodesia, Crosland was away on constituency business in Grimsby. Having followed him there, Kissinger was disappointed to find that ‘the Foreign Secretary appeared to know nothing about foreign policy except for the Cod Wars’.85 However: ‘It became a unique relationship’, remarked Kissinger, ‘not because we agreed or disagreed, but because we were on the same wavelength.’86 ‘In less than a year’, Crosland reciprocated, ‘we have established an intimate, constructive, and rewarding friendship’, adding ‘gaiety and wit to the sometimes bleak world of foreign affairs’.87 Much has been made in the historiography of their shared sense of humour, evidenced by their awarding to each other of ‘points’ for ‘a wide variety of idiosyncracies’.88 They would often open crucial foreign-policy discussions in this way: ‘Dear Henry, You get one point for your
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originality in phoning London from Zurich via Washington, thus ensuring total secrecy via total inaudibility.’89 Close personal friendship appears to have alleviated the prospect of a serious rupture in Anglo-American relations over Kissinger’s handling of the Rhodesian crisis. This was a happy coincidence, because Kissinger habitually went further than Britain in putting pressure on Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa and Smith to agree on the workings of interim government in Southern Rhodesia.90 Crosland maintained that British policy remained set along the lines laid down by Callaghan in March 1976, centrally concerning Britain’s reluctance to send a governor to the country to oversee the transfer of power. Kissinger’s representation to Vorster and Smith of British discussion documents as official policy ‘may not be nice’, but, Crosland admitted, ‘We remain most anxious not to cramp your style or restrict your room for manoeuvre.’91 The third theme of Crosland’s Rhodesian policy was his low profile, the most obvious example being his non-attendance at the October 1976 Geneva conference on Rhodesia, charged with settling the structure and functions of interim government, how long the transfer of power should take and who should control Rhodesia’s armed forces as the country progressed to majority rule. He sent in his place Ivor Richard, Britain’s UN ambassador, along with Ted Rowlands, Minister of State for African Affairs. When the conference collapsed, it was Richard, not Crosland, who undertook a tour of Africa to sell Britain’s proposals.92 His wife justifies his actions by arguing that he preferred to step in if things went badly.93 The Economist, by contrast, believed Crosland was abdicating his responsibilities as Foreign Secretary: ‘If Mr Crosland feels he is incapable of the task, what else can he do as Britain’s voice in the world? Why have a foreign secretary at all?’ it asked.94 Owen’s view, put forward in his memoirs, is that the Foreign Secretary was wary of associating himself too publicly with Rhodesia: policy failure could damage his chances of achieving higher office.95 All interpretations of Crosland’s motives in not heading the Geneva conference or the subsequent tour of Africa are necessarily partial. To his wife’s justification, one might reply that he did not step in, allowing the conference to end after seven weeks. To The Economist critique, one might reply that the end of the conference and the Richard tour coincided with Britain’s presidency of the EEC – could Crosland have juggled his commitments so he could attend to both? Owen’s criticism has more weight, judged in terms of the volume of notes on Crosland’s leadership aspirations. It is questionable, though, how far Crosland was
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different from the norm. Was it not natural that high-profile ministers would intermittently take soundings on their popularity within the party? Crosland’s ambition to reform society along socialist egalitarian lines would, of course, have been best served by his becoming party leader. Perhaps Crosland’s low profile is best explained by another of Owen’s comments, made in 1977, that ‘on her own Britain cannot bring peace to Rhodesia’.96 By the time Crosland came to the Foreign Office, it was becoming clear that the solution to the Rhodesian problem lay not in bilateral exchanges between London and Salisbury, but in a multilateral context. That the solution was gradually taken out of Britain’s hands in the 1970s is shown in Moorcraft’s comment: ‘After 1972 the British did not come close to solving the crisis.’97 Smith’s policy was more and more governed not by British diplomatic initiatives, or lack of them, but by internal political developments; the biting of international sanctions; his internal war with guerilla forces; increased European migration from Rhodesia; and externally by Rhodesian relations with Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and, crucially, South Africa, leading Victor de Waal to the conclusion that ‘Ian Smith’s defeat on the issue of black majority rule came not at the hands of Britain or America … but at those of South Africa’.98 Add to this Britain’s ‘overriding concern with her economic crisis’, burgeoning American interest in southern Africa, and by 1974, notes Elaine Windrich, ‘the real decisions were being taken elsewhere’, making Britain ‘an interested, but detached party’. Thus, although Kissinger ‘consulted’ with Crosland before his peace missions,99 Moorcraft is convinced that in reality ‘the Americans would provide the diplomatic thrust while politely calling everything an “Anglo-American initiative”. Rhodesia was, after all, still a British colony.’100 The subtler judgement that Britain was neither the key player nor focal point of international diplomacy during the Cod Wars or the Rhodesian crisis is borne out in the context of European policy, Crosland’s third main area of responsibility while at the Foreign Office. European unity The third, less well remembered dimension of Crosland’s foreign policy concerned his approach to Europe, vital considering that in January 1977 Britain assumed the presidency of the EEC, four years after acceding to the Community. Holding the presidency of the EEC could be seen as an opportunity to impose national
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interests onto the Community agenda. In practice, scholars of the European Union have noted, scope for such ambition is limited by the rolling work programmes at supranational level and the multiple links among national and European civil servants.101 This was well recognised at the time: ‘Community cognoscenti claim that trying to steer the mass of community [sic] business going on all the time in any particular direction in six short months is a bit like trying to budge an elephant.’102 The problem forecast by contemporary critics was that Crosland, described by The Economist as ‘an unenthusiastic foreign minister and an unenthusiastic European’, did not have even this limited ambition,103 a prediction confounded by two realities. First, it overlooked the extent to which Whitehall had prepared for the presidency. Beginning in earnest in September 1976, the Foreign Office instituted structural reform, creating a ‘presidency secretariat’ to work with the Cabinet Office European Unit, and began looking at key issues to be dealt with in the months ahead, notably fisheries policy and direct elections to the European Parliament.104 Thus, however limited Crosland’s enthusiasm for European integration was perceived to be, (‘lukewarm’ is how Hattersley describes it),105 the fact was that the agenda of Britain’s presidency had been set well in advance by existing Community programmes and by the Europhiles in the civil service. Perhaps this explains the second reality that Crosland’s attitude to the EEC proved to be relatively constructive. In his opening speech to the European Parliament, Crosland avoided bold idealistic statements about the ultimate goals of the European project, limiting himself to commenting on what could be achieved immediately ‘to make the Community work as effectively as possible, thereby demonstrating that it exists politically as well as economically, even if the emergence of a new political structure is for tomorrow and not for today’.106 Very few British statements on Europe met with the approval of The Economist, and it was, predictably, critical: ‘not exactly the stuff European dreams are made of’.107 Yet Crosland had gone no more nor less far than his predecessors had done or successors would do. Incrementalism, pragmatism and a focus on the economic not political dimensions of unity are classic yet accurate representations of the British approach to Europe since the Second World War. Broad continuity across Labour and the Conservatives since 1945, in substance if not tone, suggests both a thin dividing line between the parties on the central questions of integration, characterised by as much intra- as inter-party debate, and consensus between the
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government and civil service on how to handle the European debate.108 When Jenkins describes Crosland as ‘an active Foreign Secretary of the country which held the presidency of the Council of Ministers’,109 this reflects the limits on what he could have achieved as well as the symbolic not substantive functions of the Community presidency.
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
One shall never know what Crosland could have achieved had he lived longer, rendering all speculation about whether he was ‘lost leader’ or ‘lost Chancellor’ somewhat redundant. There are four conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of Crosland as British Foreign Secretary. The first is that the most damaging accusation one can level is that he never paid serious enough attention to establishing a political base within the party from which he could launch a credible bid for the leadership, a position that would have given him the leverage to promote social reform at home and internationalism abroad. Minister for Health and Social Security in Wilson’s 1974–76 government, Barbara Castle, confided this characteristically caustic judgement to her diary shortly before the leadership election: ‘Despite the endless build-up he gets in the press, he isn’t a serious contender at all.’110 This was not due to any lack of ambition on Crosland’s part, but disdain for the machinations of British political life, the courting of colleagues and contemporaries for the sake of it, rather than for some higher political, social or intellectual end. Nor was his profile helped by his dislike for television appearances and disdain for the press which, he felt, ‘favoured brief summaries over elaborate argument’.111 Contrary to the retrospective judgement of The Economist that ‘He was not all that ambitious’,112 contemporaries maintain that he was pursuing the chancellorship and the leadership of the Labour Party.113 Two points are worth mentioning in response to these contradictory positions. One is that, on the evidence of his personal papers, there is much weight behind Owen’s assessment that he was ‘never as uninterested as he pretended to be in jockeying for position as a potential Leader of the Labour Party’.114 That he stood for deputy leader and leader in 1972 and 1976 respectively, and several times for the constituency section of the NEC, would seem to support the view that he was keenly
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jockeying for greater influence within the Labour Party.115 The other is that his conspicuous lack of success on all these fronts has surely damaged his reputation. Coming last in the battle to succeed Wilson was especially hurtful; being made Foreign Secretary just weeks later might have been compensation but surely added fuel to the argument that he was ‘only a partial success’ as a politician. The second conclusion to be drawn is that the variety of interpretations placed upon Crosland’s appointment as Foreign Secretary so soon after failing to win the leadership of the Labour Party sheds light on the personal and factional in-fighting within the Labour Party that simmered throughout the Wilson and Callaghan governments and which would soon result in the breakaway by a Jenkins-led group of Europhiles to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Roy Hattersley, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, captures the significance to the Labour Party of the European debate in the 1960s and 1970s as follows: When, almost ten years later, the Social Democratic Party was formed, three of the Labour dissidents who were its founding fathers were men who had left the Opposition front-bench rather than continually vote against the Bill that took Britain into the European Community.116
Jenkins thus remarks that, with the dust of battle barely settled over the parliamentary vote in 1971 and the European referendum in 1975, it would have been hard for Callaghan to appoint him Foreign Secretary. ‘Crosland’s record made him better equipped to carry through those decisions that would inevitably bind Britain more closely to the European Community’, he recalled in words remarkably reminiscent of Callaghan’s own.117 Leaving aside longer-term considerations of his move to the chancellorship, Crosland was the ideal choice to appease the ‘antis’ in the Labour Party. From its inception, Crosland’s secretaryship bears testament to the importance of personal connection and party unity over intellectual merit or suitability to high office in the British two-party system of government. The role of the civil service in providing overall strategic direction to British foreign policy has thus been significant. The captain may change, but there is always a ‘hidden hand’ on the tiller. The third conclusion is that Crosland’s approach to key issues such as Europe suggests he was one of the last of the wartime generation of Labour politicians committed to party unity at almost any cost as a way of keeping the Conservatives out of office
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and enacting social reform at home through higher public spending. His greatest asset, notes Hattersley, was his ‘absolute and total confidence in the superiority of egalitarian socialism over all other philosophies’.118 Wilson and Callaghan, despite their critics, managed to hold Labour together through deeply troubling times for both the left and right of the party over Vietnam, withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’, Rhodesia, Europe and economic policy (especially sterling and labour relations). The term ‘pragmatic’ has subsequently taken on pejorative connotations,119 but in the context of Labour politicking in the 1960s and 1970s, and the small parliamentary majorities Labour commonly held, such an approach was not without its rationale.120 Critics, notably Europhiles, might argue that Prime Ministers lacked ideology or scruples for changing positions on issues of fundamental concern to them, but this was symptomatic of differing attitudes to the ultimate aims of the Labour Party. For Crosland in particular, ‘a middle-class intellectual who wanted to do the right thing by working people’,121 no debate was important enough to rupture the Labour Party. The strong rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of Thatcherism and Labour Party in-fighting in the 1980s might even be seen as a direct reaction to what Cole describes as ‘the last fling of the old post-war consensus’ under Wilson and Callaghan, and of which Crosland was a prominent actor.122 The fourth conclusion is that, when judging the record of a Foreign Secretary, one needs to look not only at what he did but, crucially, at the limits upon him. Clydeside Labour leader Jimmy Maxton’s maxim that ‘nobody should come into politics without realising that he could only be as good as he was allowed to be’ bears out this argument vis-à-vis Crosland for personal as well as political reasons.123 ‘[If] the foreign secretary were to achieve a significant and lasting reorientation in the central direction of British foreign policy he would need to remain in office for a substantial period of time’, notes Shlaim.124 Crosland’s sudden death necessarily cut short his ability to impose himself on British foreign policy. But this chapter also serves to throw into sharper focus the generic constraints on foreign policy-making manifesting themselves in the 1970s. In 1977, The Times observed ruefully that: It would almost certainly be a mistake to hold the historic view of the Foreign Secretaryship as one of the genuinely cardinal offices of state nowadays. As new forces are felt in the world and new groupings take place, the importance … attached to the post has declined, and has only relatively been enhanced by United Kingdom entry to the EEC.125
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Crosland’s predecessor, Callaghan, eloquently draws attention in his memoirs to the weight of history, civil service tradition, existing policy frameworks and the reactiveness of British foreign policy: Foreign policy is a mixture of the old and the new. We may initiate but we also inherit; we may vote at the ballot box for changes in policy and personalities, but on acquiring office governments inherit an international situation on which the footprints of the past are heavily marked. We cannot legislate about the actions of others, we cannot wipe the slate completely clean.126
Crosland was in situ at a time when changing global forces were severely hampering attempts by middle-ranking powers such as Britain to forge an independent foreign policy. Certainly this was how it appeared to former Treasury civil servant Sir Edwin Plowden, who remarked wryly on hearing of his appointment, ‘I do not know how interesting it is these days – at best it should provide travel to some pleasant places.’127 Indeed, through the 1960s and 1970s the question was not what Britain wanted to do, but how it could do it. Locked into an increasingly interdependent international political economy, Crosland had severely limited room for manoeuvre. Whether any other potential Labour Foreign Secretary in 1976–77 would have pursued a different policy, even on Europe, or one that led to lasting change in other areas, such as Rhodesia, is seriously open to doubt. A Foreign Secretary’s legacy is made of more than policy alone. Perceptions of what was achieved develop not from the objective reality of foreign policy, but from the more obvious images and memories that flow from personality, political status and the organisational context of Whitehall. Nevertheless, it is too easy to confuse reputation with reality. ‘None of his colleagues could analyse a problem with greater precision, was more likely to propose a distinctive solution, or could express his thoughts with greater elegance’, mourned The Times.128 Beneath the typically hagiographic blandishments of the obituary pages lurks an important final conclusion. Crosland was not simply an economist who had no interest in foreign affairs. He ultimately wanted to head the Treasury, that much is certain, but his foreign policy was no less sophisticated for it. In large part this was due to his meeting of minds with leading officials on the core issues, the mechanics of which will be further elucidated by the release of government papers in the coming years. But the way he handled the Cod War, the relationship he developed with Kissinger and his
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thoughtful approach to Europe must not be overlooked. Crosland may not be remembered as Foreign Secretary, but that is not to say there is nothing to remember.
NOTES 1. I would like to thank Richard Aldrich, Alex Bellamy and Kevin Theakston for their comments on earlier drafts. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this chapter are mine and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the UK Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. 2. Labour Foreign Secretary between March and October 1951. See B. Donoghue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), pp. 479–514. 3. C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), The Conservative Enemy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962) and Socialism Now (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974). For more on the enormous impact that Crosland’s economic writing had within the Labour Party and the political establishment in Britain, see the biographies by K. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland: A New Biography (London: Richard Cohen, 1999) and S. Crosland, Tony Crosland (London: Coronet, 1983). An insightful account by someone close to key Labour Party players in his time at the Guardian in the 1960s and 1970s can be located in J. Cole, As It Seemed to Me: Political Memoirs (London: Phoenix, 1996), especially p. 165. For the details of Crosland’s ideas, see D. Reisman, Crosland’s Future: Opportunity and Outcome (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 4. The Economist, 19 February 1977, p. 13. See also The Times, 21 February 1977, pp. 1 and 11. 5. Daily Mail Weekend, 10 March 2001, pp. 14–15, at p. 15. Roy Jenkins, a close friend of Crosland, writes that he was ‘very much an intellectual in politics’. See R. Jenkins, Twentieth Century Portraits (London: David & Charles, 1988), p. 64. 6. On the European referendum in particular, see P. Goodhart, Full-hearted Consent: The Story of the Referendum Campaign (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976); D. Butler and U. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976). For the view of the Foreign Secretary who led the negotiations see, J. Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), pp. 297–330. See also Cole, As It Seemed to Me, chs 13–26. 7. Anthony Crosland Papers (hereafter ACP), 5/12/21, Lipsey note on conversation with McNally, 27 April 1976. 8. G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas Series 3, vol. III: Détente in Europe 1972–1976 (London: Whitehall History Publishing in Association with Frank Cass, 2001). Hereafter DBPO 3, 3. 9. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 145. 10. R. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Papermac, 1991), p. 457. See also Jenkins, Twentieth Century Portraits, p. 67, where he describes Crosland as being capable of ‘dazzling charm’. 11. Review of Crosland, Tony Crosland, The Economist, 5 June 1982, pp. 91–2, at p. 91. On his early years, see this biography, pp. 1–71, echoed in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 1–63. 12. The Times, 21 February 1977, p. 11. 13. Daily Mail Weekend, 10 March 2001, p. 15. For a sympathetic account of his personal qualities, see also E. Short, Whip to Wilson: The Crucial Years of Labour Government (London: Macdonald, 1989), p. 108. 14. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 400; The Economist, 5 June 1982, p. 91. See also Leonard’s obituary in The Economist, 19 February 1977, p. 15; Cole, As It Seemed to Me, p. 24. 15. ACP, 4/2/3, letter from Taylor to Crosland, 27 May 1951. See also ACP, 4/2/2, letter from Boothby to Crosland, 27 May 1951. 16. Quoted in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 59. 17. Ibid., p. 29.
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18. Ibid., p. 5. See also p. 201 and Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 340. 19. For further discussion of the relationship between perception and reality in the field of foreign policy-making, see A. Shlaim, P. Jones and K. Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries since 1945 (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1977), p. 16; J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 458; S. Smith and M. Smith, ‘The Analytical Background: Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy’, in M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White (eds), British Foreign Policy: Transition, Change and Transformation (London: Hyman, 1988), pp. 3–23. R. Hattersley, Fifty Years On: A Prejudiced History of Britain since the War (London: Abacus, 1997), p. 262, makes a similar observation: ‘History is often made by vague impression, rather than by hard evidence.’ 20. A plethora of letters of rebuke from the general public can be found in ACP, 8/13. That letters on general foreign-policy questions have not been kept – presuming there were some – necessitates cautious judgement, however. 21. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 339. 22. Jenkins, A Life, p. 218. 23. D. Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p. 254. 24. Quoted in Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 326. My emphasis. Later, on p. 323, his wife agrees that ‘he seemed uninterested in getting to grips with the job’. 25. The Economist, 5 June 1982, p. 91. 26. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 187; B. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1974–76 (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 30 (no date, linking section on 1974 general election). 27. See also Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 205 and 216. 28. A speculative article which accurately reflects government thinking on the subject is to be found in The Economist, 13 November 1976, p. 30. 29. ACP, 5/11/84, letter from Price to Crosland, April 1976. 30. See for example ACP, 5/13/19, note by Lipsey on priorities for 1977. 31. The Economist, 19 February 1977, p. 13. 32. For more details on the background to and resolution of the IMF crisis, see Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 422–43; Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 209–16; D. Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 213–15; Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 192–3. 33. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 342. 34. Quoted in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 212. 35. Quoted in Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 382. 36. Quoted in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 215. 37. The Economist, 13 November 1976, p. 30. See also Crosland, Anthony Crosland, pp. 355–6. 38. Quoted in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 200. 39. The Times, 21 February 1977, p. 11. 40. The verdict of one of his advisers, Bill McCarthy, quoted in Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 200–1. 41. Taken from Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 338–9. 42. Quoted in ibid., p. 337. 43. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 200. Then Minister of State at the Foreign Office Roy Hattersley described them as ‘occasional gurus’: see Hattersley, Fifty Years On, p. 181. 44. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 323; see also p. 383. 45. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 263. 46. As William Wallace points out: ‘The separation of foreign economic policy from the traditional concerns of foreign policy has been deeply embedded in British policy and practice’: W. Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, 2nd edn (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 156. See also M. Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy: A Study in British Administrative Experience 1947–59 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), pp. 23–4. 47. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 201 and 80. 48. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 111; Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 153. 49. Hetherington Papers (hereafter HP), 20/38/2, ‘Points from a lunch with Anthony Crosland on Monday December 4 1972’. 50. The Economist, 27 November 1976, p. 67. For further discussion of the development of
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51. 52. 53. 54.
55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
62.
63.
64.
65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.
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the paper’s attitude to European unity after 1945, see Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographic Perspectives on Unification (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). The Economist, 5 June 1982, p. 91. Quoted in Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 227. On the Europe episode and its aftermath, see Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, pp. 153–61; Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 224–30. Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 201. As the writing on British European policy in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrates, the Foreign Office was the motor force behind Britain’s turn to the Community. Key texts include J. W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945–99 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); H. Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). See also G. Wilkes (ed.), Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Economic Community 1961–63: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997); O. J. Daddow (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration (London: Frank Cass, 2002). Quoted in Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 339. DBPO 3, 3, preface p. 15. There is a fleeting allusion to it in ibid., pp. 351–2 and 378. ACP, 2/19/4, C. A. R. Crosland, G. Stent and K. Illsey, ‘Federal Union: The Truth’. ACP, 4/1, notes and programme from Princeton University conference on NATO, 19–29 June 1957. ACP, 4/9/23; ACP, 4/9/26-33. See for example D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 248–51; Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 305–6. We should not underestimate the extent to which the realities of negotiation amended Callaghan’s attitude towards the EEC. See Hattersley, Fifty Years On, p. 231. John Cole writes: ‘Politically, Callaghan decided that Europe was not developing at an alarming speed; and economically, he began to see that Britain had little alternative.’ Cole, As It Seemed to Me, p. 124. Discussions can be traced in The Economist, from the middle of 1976. A neat summary article highlighting key issues appears on 28 August 1976, pp. 45–50. For more on the outcome of the UN conferences and the Royal Navy’s account of events, see Naval Staff History, BR 1736 (57), The Cod War: Naval Operations off Iceland in Support of the British Fishing Industry (1958–76) (London: HMSO, 1990). The fishing limit claimed by a country is ‘the zone in which it is entitled to make and to enforce regulations for the catching of fish in the sea’. This is taken from the account of the former British ambassador to Iceland, Sir A. Gilchrist, Cod Wars and How to Lose Them (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), p. 53. Tensions were exacerbated in 1952 when Iceland also refused to submit its grievance with Britain to the Hague Court. For a history of the quarrel back to the turn of the century, see H. Jónsson, Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea (London: C. Hurst, 1982). For a succinct summary of the history and details of these contretemps, see also ‘TED [Trade and Environment Database] Case Study: Iceland Cod War’, www.american. edu/ted/icefish.htm. ACP, 7/13/4, letter from British Trawlers’ Federation to Crosland, 2 April 1976. The Economist, 5 June 1976, p. 80; The Economist, 29 May 1976, p. 51. See also Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, pp. 181–2. Gilchrist, Cod Wars, p. 106. See also preface, p. 7. Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 174. Ibid., pp. 47 and 70. Naval Staff History, The Cod War, pp. 97 and 102. Gilchrist, Cod Wars, p. 106. Naval Staff History, The Cod War, p. 161. His speech is reproduced in Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, pp. 181–2. ACP, 5/13/6, letter from Killick to Crosland, 8 June 1976. Jefferys agrees with this sympathetic version of events in Anthony Crosland, pp. 201–2. For the text of his speech, Wilson’s and Wilson’s response see ‘Modern History Sourcebook: Rhodesia: Unilateral Declaration of Independence Documents, 1965’,
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77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.
100. 101. 102.
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1965Rhodesia-UDI.html, pp. 1–5. Robert Blake’s imperious volume, A History of Rhodesia (London: Eyre Methuen, 1977), is a good starting point from which to understand events, though inevitably it is thinner on events in the 1960s and 1970s than on earlier periods. For an insightful diplomatic history, written during the unfolding of events, see E. Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978). See also R. C. Good, U.D.I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London: Faber and Faber, 1973); L. A. Sobel (ed.), Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 1971–77 (New York: Facts on File, 1978), especially pp. 61–109. Rhodesia features prominently in Wilson’s anodyne memoirs: The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971) and Final Term: The Labour Government 1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979). Owen, Time to Declare, p. 271. P. L. Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia’s Rebellion (Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1980), p. 17. ‘Modern History Sourcebook: Rhodesia’, pp. 6–7. According to Wilson, Rohodesia was the ‘most complicated issue which any government of this country has had to face in this century’: quoted in Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 11. Note, for example, the perceptions of obstructionism caused by Russia’s disagreement with the EEC’s fisheries policy, The Economist, 5 February 1977, pp. 15–16. DBPO 3, 3, preface p. 25. Ibid., preface p. 20; and Cartledge, quoted ibid., preface p. 26. For details, see Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 389–90; ACP, 5/13/21-8, Lipsey note on role at Foreign Office and priorities for next year, 22 December 1976. ACP, 5/14/31, letter from Kissinger to Crosland, undated but circa 22 September 1976. See also Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 259–60. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 325. Quoted in Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 328. ACP, 5/14/23 and 27, letters from Crosland to Kissinger, 14 and 17 January 1977. ACP, 5/14/7, Susan Crosland notes on Crosland–Kissinger telegrams, undated. ACP, 5/14/26, telegram 234 to Washington, 14 September 1976. What has become known as the Annex C saga bears this out. See The Economist, 16 October 1976, pp. 73–4 and Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 361–70. The Economist, 16 October 1976, p. 73; ACP, 5/14/28, telegram from Crosland to Kissinger, 16 September 1976. For more on Kissinger’s peace initiatives, see Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 262–74. For the details of the tour, see The Economist, 8 January 1977, pp. 13–14; 15 January 1977, pp. 59–60; 27 January 1977, p. 63; and 29 January 1977, pp. 13–14. Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 375. The Economist, 23 October 1976, p. 10. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 179. Quoted in Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 274. Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years, p. 29. V. de Waal, The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe’s First Decade (London: Hurst, 1990), p. 32. See also Blake, A History, p. 406. E. Windrich, ‘Rhodesia: The Road from Luanda to Geneva’, The World Today, 33 (March 1977), pp. 101–11, at p. 101; Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 245, 258 and 262: Moorcraft makes the same point that Smith’s willingness to negotiate in 1976 signified that ‘the tempo of pressure had mounted from all directions’ in recent months: Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years, p. 5. See also Blake, A History, p. 393: ‘it was in effect the threat of South African pressure along with the closing of the Mozambique frontier which made Mr Smith do his deal with Dr Kissinger’. Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years, p. 36. Elsewhere he was blunter, asserting that Kissinger was merely ‘pretending to ask Britain for advice’, see p. 41. N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 127–8. The Economist, 18 September 1976, pp. 73–4, at p. 73. See also its remark that ‘Presidency really means being impartial arbiter of ministerial, and dozens of
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103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.
109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115.
116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.
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committee, meetings each month to keep community [sic] business going’, The Economist, 1 January 1977, pp. 8–9, at p. 8. The Economist, 27 November 1976, p. 67. The Economist, 18 September 1976, p. 74. See also The Economist, 27 November 1976, p. 67. R. Hattersley, ‘Crosland Died 25 Years Ago’, Guardian, 18 February 2002, http:// politics.guardian.co.uk/columnist/story/0,9321,652072,00.html. Quoted in ibid. The Economist, 15 January 1977, pp. 49–50, at p. 50. ‘Consensus’, Kavanagh and Morris note, ‘does not mean absence of conflict’ between parties. ‘It is more appropriate to think of it as a set of parameters which bounded the set of policy options regarded by senior politicians and civil servants.’ D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, Consensus Politics from Attlee to Major, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 13. (Emphasis in original.) See also D. Dutton, British Politics since 1945: The Rise and Fall of Consensus (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 35–7 and S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 112–14. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p. 457. Castle, The Castle Diaries, p. 705 (25 March 1976). Jefferys, Anthony Crosland, p. 195. For further discussion of his attitude to television appearances see Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 153–4. The Economist, 5 June 1982, p. 91. Owen, Time to Declare, pp. 178–9. Ibid., p. 179. See, for instance, files 5/14 and 6/4 both of which provide evidence that Crosland and his supporters, mainly Lipsey, were concerned about his standing on the backbenches and in Cabinet. In the deputy leadership election, Ted Short won, Michael Foot came second and Crosland was last with 61 votes. In the leadership election, eventually won by Callaghan, Crosland was eliminated after the first ballot with a mere 17 votes. In the NEC elections he was eighth in 1970, ninth in 1971, holding that position in 1973 only to fall to twelfth in 1975. Hattersley, Fifty Years On, p. 226. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p. 196; Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 399. Hattersley, Fifty Years On, p. 180. See for example P. Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). The Labour majority was four in 1964, rising to 96 in 1966. In 1974 it was back to three. The Conservatives were not immune: Heath held a majority of only 30 in 1970. Cole, As it Seemed to Me, p. 165. Ibid., p. 158. Paraphrased in ibid., p. 75. Shlaim et al., British Foreign Secretaries since 1945, pp. 20–1. The Times, 21 February 1977, p. 1. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 331. ACP, 5/11/23, letter from Plowden to Crosland, 21 April 1976. The Times, 21 February 1977, p. 1.
4
David Owen: Foreign Secretary, 1977–79 Fergus Carr
CAREER
Following the death of Anthony Crosland in February 1977, Jim Callaghan appointed David Owen as Foreign Secretary. Callaghan reports that Owen went ‘visibly pale’ at the news of his promotion.1 As Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Owen had hoped, at best, to be placed in temporary charge until the budget after which he expected Denis Healey to become Foreign Secretary.2 Callaghan’s motives were not just to surprise Owen: ‘we were going through a difficult time electorally, and the thought came into my mind that it would do the Government no harm if I surprised the press and others who were already picking Tony’s successor by bringing in someone entirely fresh and young whom they had not thought of’.3 David Owen entered politics as Labour MP for Plymouth Sutton in 1966, a seat he represented until the new constituency of Plymouth Devonport was created in 1974. In 1967 he was made parliamentary private secretary to Gerry Reynolds in the Ministry of Defence. Promotion followed to Under-Secretary of State for the Royal Navy in 1968–70. When Labour lost office, Owen became opposition junior defence spokesman. In 1974 his appointment as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health brought a brief change of policy responsibility before a return to the world of external affairs followed in 1976 as Minister of State in the Foreign Office. At 38, Owen was the youngest Foreign Secretary since Eden, and as the ‘matinée idol’4 of the Labour Party certain to cut a dash.
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David Owen’s style in running the Foreign Office has been criticised.5 Owen accepts that he was ‘not above reproach and at times I left myself open to justified criticism for I was too brash and abrasive’.6 He admits that his ‘impatience was too often on display’ and now ‘wiser, older, I would now handle myself differently’.7 In his defence Owen states that the ‘exuberance and the irrepressibility of youth’ meant that the ‘issues I tackled then I would probably shirk now’.8 Europe was the policy area in which Owen principally clashed with his officials. The problem, Owen believed, was that ‘too many of the Euro-diplomats were reluctant to embark on any course which put us at serious loggerheads with the majority of Community members’.9 The biggest source of friction I had to contend with at the Foreign Office was a relatively small number of senior diplomats who had got used to having a campaigning role over the European Community and had built up strong links with journalists sympathetic to Europe. Over the years they had been given more political licence by Conservative and Labour politicians than is normal for officials. In the process some of them had become zealots for the European Community and all its works, and were none too keen to accept political control.10
In 1977 Owen believed the Euro-diplomats were still in the ‘first flush of post-referendum euphoria and were very reluctant to sound warnings about the manifest unfairness of the British budgetary contribution’.11 Criticism of the negotiated terms was for some officials seen as a ‘personal slight’12 and Owen believed it would have been wiser to have a new team of diplomats to deal with Europe after entry.13 As Foreign Secretary, Owen vowed to ‘shift the whole emphasis of the Foreign Office to a more selfconfident, assertive stance towards the Community’.14 Owen looked for change but did not embrace the Berrill Report in August 1977 resulting from the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) examination of the diplomatic service. Berrill made radical proposals: the abolition of the diplomatic service as a separate entity and a significant reduction in representation overseas. The proposals had been leaked in advance of publication as the diplomatic service mobilised to defend itself15 in a manner that Owen suggests would ‘long be admired by connoisseurs of Yes
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Minister’.16 The government duly rejected the integration of the diplomatic service and the home civil service. Its white paper, The United Kingdom’s Overseas Representation published in 1978, stressed Britain’s global interests and stated that ‘in principle there is now a greater not lesser need for effective overseas representation’.17 Owen supported the retention of a separate diplomatic service and ‘blue water diplomacy’. He looked for reform by the promotion of quality officials, an ‘up and out system’.18 He believed by the 1990s this had been achieved and the ‘new generation of diplomats are less effete and more realistic’. 19 Owen’s relationship with his Prime Minister, James Callaghan was crucial to his role as Foreign Secretary. Owen reports, ‘relations between Jim Callaghan and I, and between No 10 and the Foreign Office, were exceptionally good for two-and-aquarter years’.20 Callaghan’s support was important to Owen in the Foreign Office, in policy development and in the Cabinet. Owen reports that the ‘advantage to me, within the Foreign Office, of being seen to have the ear of the Prime Minister was immense’.21 Owen states he had considerable freedom in policy, he did not feel ‘curbed’ by Callaghan and has contrasted the growth of prime ministerial intervention in foreign affairs affecting his successors with his own experience.22 Constraints were set though and with, regard to Israel, Callaghan repeated Harold Wilson’s warning to him that he would have his full support, right or wrong, with one exception, Israel. Owen understood the warning, not to get the government isolated on Israel.23 He has reported that Callaghan ‘had a very clever, subtle way of letting me know if he didn’t approve of some policy’.24 At the same time he ‘was amazed how Jim consciously chose not to interfere’.25 Travel with the Prime Minister afforded Owen the opportunity to learn his ‘inner thinking’ and both looked to keep foreign policy close to that of the USA.26 In terms of leading the Cabinet, Callaghan’s style has been described as consultative and collegial.27 Owen believes that one of Callaghan’s ‘strengths was that in Cabinet he concentrated his efforts on a few specific issues and did not waste political capital by using his weight on others, being content to act as an impartial chairman’.28 This did not of course stop the Prime Minister acting outside the Cabinet. Owen cites the government’s decision to join the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 as a typical example of Callaghan’s skill in securing Cabinet approval by prior work with himself, Denis Healey and Peter Shore.29 Callaghan managed his ministers by ensuring they did not disagree without each other
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knowing and, as Owen recalls, informing them when he could not support them in Cabinet.30 Callaghan’s political skills were needed not just for managing Cabinet government but ensuring the survival of a government that soon lost its majority. Without the ‘Lib–Lab Pact’ it might not have survived Conservative censure and Owen could have left office after 32 days. In practice, Owen was to remain Foreign Secretary until Labour lost power in 1979.
CONTEXT
David Owen’s tenure as Foreign Secretary was contextualised by an international system on the eve of a ‘Second Cold War’.31 In Europe, arms control was found wanting as a new generation of theatre nuclear weapons was deployed. In the wake of the Soviet SS20 missile deployment, Chancellor Schmidt questioned the credibility of the US strategy of ‘extended deterrence’. The West German leader saw in the emergent regional imbalance of theatre nuclear forces a potential for ‘decoupling’ the deterrent threat of Washington’s strategic forces from Europe. Revolution and conflict from the Horn of Africa to Iran appeared to erode the West’s position in the Third World and underline the limitations of détente. At the same time President Carter’s human-rights policy became part of a deteriorating superpower relationship. On the economic front the news was better: the traumas of the 1976 sterling crisis eased and there were signs of recovery by the autumn of 1977. The absence of a majority in the house, however, was clearly a constraint for policy-makers including the Foreign Secretary. Yet aspects of foreign policy, particularly with regard to southern Africa and human rights, were quite radical. Under David Owen, British policy rejected internal settlements and sought majority rule for Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Human rights also became an important part of Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union. The Labour government’s capacity to sustain such policies was, as we shall see, critically affected by the quality of its relationship with Washington. On other fronts – nuclear deterrence, arms control, the Falklands and not least Europe – there were challenges. It is to these areas that we now turn, seeking to establish British policy and David Owen’s contribution.
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Europe The issue of Europe had divided the country and the Labour Party. In 1970 all three main parties had pledged to take Britain into Europe if acceptable terms could be found. In the Labour Party there were significant divisions that gradually came to the fore in 1971. Roy Jenkins, deputy leader of the party, led the promarketeers. On 28 October 1971, 69 Labour MPs, including Owen, defied their party and voted with the Conservative government to establish the principle of entry to the Community. The Labour Party’s conference and National Executive had rejected the ‘Tory terms’ and looked to the parliamentary party to follow the party line. Owen, with other pro-marketeers, heeded the party call at the second reading of the European Communities Bill, ‘the worst vote I have ever cast in Parliament and the one of which I am most ashamed’.32 When Labour went further and embraced the principle of a consultative referendum upon Community membership, Roy Jenkins resigned followed by George Thomson and Harold Lever from the shadow Cabinet. David Owen and Bill Rodgers, along with others holding shadow portfolios, also resigned. When Labour returned to power in 1974, ‘renegotiation’ and then the referendum became the means to sustain party unity. Renegotiation of the terms was ‘part real, part cosmetic’,33 but sufficient for Callaghan to recommend that the UK remained part of the Community. The referendum could not hide the divisions in the Labour Cabinet or the party’s ranks, but the left were ‘appeased by the fact of the referendum, the right by its result’.34 In 1976 David Owen was invited to replace Roy Hattersley as Tony Crosland’s deputy in the Foreign Office. Owen, a committed European, soon became convinced that ‘the UK really did have a lousy deal’.35 The Agricultural Policy, which we had always known worked against our interests, was out of control – big surpluses were building up in milk products, olive oil and wine and costs were soaring. It was also clear that in a few years’ time the UK budgetary contribution would rise so much that we were quite likely to find ourselves the nation making the largest contribution. We also had to cope with a fishing policy which had been cobbled up by the original six members on the eve of the Community’s expansion and which could hardly have been more unhelpful to UK fishing interests.36
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The Minister of State, sought to develop a tough negotiating stance37 and Owen looked to the French Foreign Office as a model, ‘they talk European and think France’.38 In contrast he saw too many British diplomats as Euro-federalists who believed in an ‘eventual United States of Europe and do think this is a higher calling than the more mundane task of fighting the British corner’.39 David Owen had not renounced his faith in Europe but differed with officials over ‘what sort of European Community the UK had joined in 1973, and what its future shape should be’.40 Owen looked for a more robust defence of national interests and rejected Euro-federalism. He believed his resignation in 1972 had misled senior officials that he shared Roy Jenkins’s views on Europe. Owen argued that the ‘skill is to voluntarily surrender and pool such sovereignty as is necessary to maintain the coherence of the Community, but to still retain the sinews of nationhood’.41 Britain’s destiny was ‘to resist tides of Euro-Federalism, hopefully in combination with other nations. But, if necessary, we must do it alone, confidently insisting on retaining the essentials of nationhood within the Community.’42 Beyond the Foreign Office, Owen faced other problems in managing policy towards Europe. The referendum had not healed all the divisions in the Cabinet, Parliamentary Labour Party or Labour Party as a whole. Chairing the European Cabinet committee was difficult for Owen as the key anti-Europeans – Peter Shore, John Silkin, Stan Orme, Tony Benn and Albert Booth – regularly attended while the pro-Community ministers – Shirley Williams, Roy Hattersley, Bill Rodgers and Edmund Dell – often sent their junior ministers who were less enthusiastic.43 The scale of negative opinion towards the Community affected issues such as the direct election of representatives to the European Parliament and participation in the EMS. In 1977 the Community looked to adopt direct elections to the European Parliament. David Steel had sought to make a commitment to direct elections under a system of proportional representation, a condition of the Lib–Lab Pact. Callaghan had concurred with the principle of direct elections even though a majority of his Cabinet (including Owen) favoured continuation of the indirect system but warned ‘proportional representation was an animal of a very different colour, for the party was against it and so was I’.44 Michael Foot and Tony Benn opposed the principle of direct elections for the potential erosion of Westminster’s authority. Owen, however, believed that he had convinced the majority of the Cabinet that Britain had to honour its treaty obligations and that a system of
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proportional representation based upon regional lists would favour Labour.45 In the end Callaghan agreed to free votes on the principle of direct elections and the method to be utilised. On the EMS, Owen has ‘inferred’ that Callaghan was ‘not prepared to risk the row in the Labour Party that would undoubtably come if we were to join the European Monetary System before the election’.46 Callaghan confirms this impression reporting that ‘many people in the Labour Party remained suspicious of what they thought was too close an entanglement with Europe’.47 Owen was also sceptical and his scepticism was economically based. He did not think that Britain was in the right phase of the economic cycle to join.48 Callaghan was further concerned about the EMS ‘pulling up’ sterling and deflating the economy.49 Owen had success in carrying his colleagues with the policy of Community enlargement to Spain, Portugal and Greece. The idea had been floated in May 1977 among EC Foreign Ministers and was accepted by the special Cabinet meeting on Europe in July. Owen used the ‘emotional key’ of Spain to unlock the ‘Left’s suspicion and hostility to the Community’.50 The opportunity to consolidate democracy in post-Franco Spain was too great to pass up for many of the party. At the Brighton Labour Party conference in October 1977, Michael Foot’s speech balanced critique of the Community with proposals for reform and a strident endorsement of enlargement to Greece, Portugal and Spain.51 This speech, with the Prime Minister’s letter to the National Executive Committee, carried policy forward in the party. While reform of the Community was less contentious at home it was more difficult to resolve in Brussels. Owen did secure agreement from the Commission for a zero farm price rise by the spring of 1979 after progressive reductions, but did not resolve Britain’s budgetary contribution. The problem was that Britain was the largest net contributor to the budget except for Germany. It had been one of the main issues in the Wilson renegotiation and had surfaced again under Callaghan in 1978–79. Jenkins soon came to think of it as the ‘Bloody British Question’52 and Labour’s pursuit of change was concluded under the Thatcher administration in 1979. Human rights In 1978 the Foreign Secretary published his book on human rights.53 David Owen did not believe ‘that a country can operate in the world without trying to project abroad its own ethical values,
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its own moral principles’.54 He did not, however, seek absolute consistency with the principle of ethical values and admitted to the possibility of a ‘very great deal of inconsistency in policy’.55 Owen embraced the belief that certain rights are inalienable, guaranteeing the integrity of the person and the right to life itself. He further argued that ‘the abuse of human rights is the legitimate subject of international concern; and that the enforcement of human rights can no longer be left to national governments alone’.56 This conviction was shared by the Carter administration and became part of an Anglo-American approach to foreign policy. Britain was to promote greater respect for human rights in its bilateral relations where there was cause for concern. Owen did not see this as an ‘ideal or a sufficient way of going about things, requiring as it does a balance between the need for a consistent moral position, on the one hand, and on the other, a hard headed but necessary calculation of national interest of the likely effectiveness or otherwise of any action which we may take, and of the strength of public feeling at home’.57 In this respect arms sales to countries such as Indonesia and Iran were particular challenges. The human-rights implications had to be balanced against the consequences of non-supply and the pressure of allies. The Callaghan government, however, was the first to support a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa and warned British companies to review their profile of investments in the republic.58 Owen further saw some rights in the economic and social sphere being long-term goals because their attainment may be beyond the capacity of governments. Conversely he did not accept that the primary responsibility of government to ensure basic political freedoms and civil rights could be denied on economic grounds. He declared ‘it is not justification for apartheid that in South Africa the black population enjoys a higher standard of living than elsewhere in Africa’.59 He set a challenge for the Labour government: which, as a matter of conviction and policy, is implacably opposed to racialism in all its forms, is to point the way unswervingly to where the future of Africa must lie. This is not only a moral obligation, it is the assertion of our national interest. We must make it unequivocally clear that we are now committed to doing everything possible to enable Africans to win their legitimate rights in Southern Africa.60
In light of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa, Owen warned ‘it would be an error to portray the continent’s conflicts in exclusively East–West terms. It plays straight into the hands of the
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Soviets’ because ‘they will then be able, convincingly, to depict the West as morally bankrupt and supporters of apartheid’.61 With regard to the Soviet Union, Owen welcomed détente but saw its first stage as over, leaving issues which are ‘more complex, more contentious and far more intractable’.62 He saw détente as having a ‘Jekyll and Hyde nature’ of competition and cooperation. While the Russians sought to limit détente to relations between governments, Owen believed it should include free competition between the two ways of life. Human rights were seen as integral to this competition: There is no going back on the human rights commitment. It is here to stay. Unless the Soviet leadership recognizes that genuine public concern for human rights is a major determinator of Western foreign policy, the future of détente will be in doubt.63
At the same time Owen underlined the complexity of East–West relations in which human rights were only ‘one strand’ and ‘it is no part of our policy to promote campaigns of denunciation’.64 He reminded the public that governments have to take this complexity into account, that this was not ‘an excuse for dodging the issue: it is the means by which we try to draw the fine line between measures that stand a chance of being effective, and those which will spark counter-productive reaction’.65 Africa David Owen’s strategy in southern Africa firmly embraced the principle of human rights: Over Namibia and Rhodesia and South Africa itself, there was a choice to make and I was determined we would make it. Majority rule and soon, was where both principle and interest now lay.66
Owen believed ‘Britain’s trading interests, as well as our political interests, lay in ensuring that we were not identified with sustaining racial discrimination or minority rule.’67 He argued he was not advocating a ‘starry eyed policy divorced from self interests’ but ‘on the contrary, I believed that Britain had to curb and put its large financial interests in South Africa at risk in the medium term in order to be able to secure them in the long term’.68 In policy terms the consequences of Owen’s stance were to reject ‘internal settlements’, qualified or limited franchise proposals and adopt sanctions. It was also fundamental to work with the USA to develop a joint approach to avoid British
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isolation and prevent domestic divisions in Westminster constraining policy. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Andy Young, looked to bring mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Owen and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, also saw pressure on South Africa as essential to any initiative on Rhodesia and Namibia. The importance of sanctions was not just to encourage a process of constitutional change in South Africa, but to secure pressure from Pretoria on Smith’s white-minority Rhodesian regime. Owen states, ‘I was determined to bring UDI to an end and ensure majority rule for Zimbabwe.’69 Resistance to sanctions in Britain was not, however, insignificant. Owen reports that within the Labour Cabinet there was a powerful group of ministers – Edmund Dell, Denis Healey and Harold Lever – who were opposed to sanctions because of their potential damage to exports,70 and ‘within Whitehall it was virtually a forbidden subject’.71 Owen’s strategy was to make the Cabinet and Whitehall aware that the USA was heading towards sanctions and to ‘say that Britain would use our veto against economic sanctions on our own was unrealistic’.72 The Cabinet Office was asked to analyse the comparative balance of economic advantage between trade with Black Africa and South Africa. The paper ‘gratuitously introduced the familiar arguments of principle against sanctions and issued grave warnings about their dangers’.73 Much to the Foreign Secretary’s displeasure his representatives had signed the paper: ‘this was a central test of political control’.74 ‘I worked on the simple principle that the Foreign Office should speak in Departmental Committees with the same voice that I spoke in Cabinet.’75 Owen identified the problem as coming from those dealing with economic and trading questions, and found it unacceptable that ‘after officials had had the opportunity to put their viewpoint, they should go to interdepartmental committees and try to undermine my decision’.76 As Owen tried to win the case for sanctions, it emerged that the government was sitting on a major scandal – ‘Oilgate’, the breaking of oil sanctions against Rhodesia by British companies with government knowledge.77 An investigation by Thomas Bingham QC resulted in a formal report in September 1978. The report detailed arrangements by which BP and Shell ‘swapped’ oil with the French company Total to supply Rhodesia. In 1968 the oil companies admitted to Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson details of the ‘swap’ and as a consequence ‘sanctions busting’ but within the law. Thomson claimed he reported to the
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Prime Minister,78 but Harold Wilson denied knowledge of the swap.79 After 1971 the swap arrangement ceased and Shell Mozambique handled Shell and BP supplies for Rhodesia.80 For Owen the fact that neither politicians nor civil servants involved in sanction-breaking were held to account was deeply unsatisfactory, but the evidence assembled for Bingham ‘helped me break Whitehall’s resistance to contemplating sanctions against South Africa’.81 The tragic death of Steven Biko further changed the mood of the Cabinet leaving Owen with ‘little difficulty in obtaining authorization to apply UN mandatory sanctions against South Africa in relation to all arms supplies’.82 With the Gleneagles Agreement severing Commonwealth sporting links with South Africa, and the Foreign Secretary’s warning to British companies about their investment profiles in South Africa, pressure was steadily built up. In April 1977, Owen visited southern Africa to ‘win acceptance to opening discussions about a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe – to get the South Africans to put pressure on Smith and persuade the Front Line Presidents to put pressure on the Patriotic Front of Nkomo and Mugabe’.83 The Foreign Secretary’s strategy was based upon Anglo-American proposals, agreed in March, for a constitutional conference. The proposals differed from the preceding Kissinger initiative, which had looked to setting up an interim government, that would work out the details of an independence constitution by concentrating first on devising an independence constitution.84 As Owen put it: I wanted to turn the earlier strategy upside down. Instead of attempting to establish an all-party interim government and then taking 18 months to produce a constitution, we, with the US, would produce a draft constitution by the summer and hold an all-party constitutional conference to discuss it.85
The Carter administration prioritised southern Africa and strongly endorsed British policies towards Rhodesia.86 Owen was also to establish a good working relationship and friendship with Cyrus Vance, ‘as close … as I suspect has ever existed between a US Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary’.87 This relationship would prove critical to the implementation of Owen’s policy. In the Commons, Owen’s policy was attacked by the Conservatives, and in the media the Sunday Express mounted a virulent campaign of opposition. Without a majority, US support was vital and it undercut the Conservatives who held back from an assault on Washington. While the Tories may not have liked the
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policies of the Carter administration, they were not prepared to challenge US leadership. At the same time the Liberal Party endorsed Owen’s policy as did the left and right wings of the Labour Party. By this process Owen could pursue a radical policy, endorsing majority rule buttressed by sanctions, despite the opposition of the Tory right wing.88 The Anglo-American initiative at first produced optimism, but both the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith soon eroded hopes of an easy settlement. A joint Anglo-American consultative group was established, led by John Graham a senior Foreign Office official, and the US ambassador to Lusaka, Stephen Low. The issues were ‘one-man one-vote’, the future of the Rhodesian security forces, and the future role of the guerilla forces. The Anglo-American plan was for a ceasefire to be maintained by a United Nations force as the British Cabinet had rejected the idea of a Commonwealth force. Britain would, however, assume responsibility for governing Rhodesia and, during a period of no longer than six months, there would be free elections on a one-man one-vote basis. All executive and legislative powers would be vested in a resident commissioner who would also be commander-in-chief of the Rhodesian armed forces and the forces of the Patriotic Front. Owen asked Field Marshall Lord Carver to take on the role of resident commissioner, and secured United Nations support. He failed though to secure Smith’s support, who turned to an ‘internal agreement’ with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau. The Patriotic Front in turn wanted to control the interim administration and rejected the British role. As the momentum towards a settlement faltered, the guerilla war in Rhodesia intensified. Owen felt under pressure to convene a Lancaster House conference. He was personally tempted to outflank Conservative opposition and meet growing demands in Britain and the USA for a settlement. He was advised by Sir Anthony Duff and Lord Carver, however, not to convene a conference as it would fail: They also went as close as was decent in saying that before a conference could be successful, not only would the internal settlement have to be seen to fail, as they were both certain it would, but also a general election in Britain would have to take place in order that a new British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, would have authority to convene it and over-rule Smith.89
Once Owen had ‘accepted this hard fact’, the task was to kill off an early conference. In Whitehall, Duff was important and Cledwyn Hughes, a former Commonwealth minister, was appointed by
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Callaghan to investigate the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement. Hughes reported that there was little prospect of a conference succeeding: ‘Smith was not ready to face the inevitable, and up to the present, circumstances had not forced him to do so.’90 British policy was now to wait for the power struggle in Rhodesia to move forward: While we had been at pains to ensure that no party had a veto on our Anglo-American proposals, we could never escape the fact that as long as either the Patriotic Front or the Rhodesian armed forces, or both, were prepared to continue the war there could be no peaceful transition.91
When the Lancaster House settlement was finally reached under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, following the Lusaka Commonwealth conference, its key features were clearly consistent with the policy line set by David Owen and in accord with the Anglo-American proposals. Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union David Owen and Jim Callaghan clearly valued the British relationship with the USA. In a number of policy areas London and Washington adopted a similar policy line or stance. This was particularly the case in Africa but also evident in Middle East policy, and on issues such as nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation. Owen saw the strength of the special relationship as lying in ‘actions often taken quickly, informally and in an atmosphere of trust’.92 His relationship with Vance was mirrored by Carter’s relationship with Callaghan, creating a positive bond between the two leaderships.93 In this context, Owen made the proposal to replace the British ambassador in Washington with Peter Jay. This was a contentious step because Jay was married to the Prime Minister’s daughter. The matter was made more controversial by the timing of the announcement of the departure of the then incumbent, Peter Ramsbotham, to a new post and his replacement with Jay. Callaghan reports that Owen wanted an ambassador more in tune with his ideas. The Prime Minister refused at first because ‘he was my son-in-law’ but then relented to the appointment.94 Owen has reflected on Jay’s ‘excellent job in Washington’: he ‘established a personal relationship with the President, but more important, he crossed the ring fence which Carter’s Georgian mafia had put up around themselves’.95 At the same time
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the Foreign Secretary had strengthened his grip on the Foreign Office. By making a political appointment to Washington he gained a line of information that could break the ‘closed circuit of Foreign Office internal communications’.96 London and Washington found rapport in a number of policy areas. President Carter’s Camp David initiative was strongly supported by the Labour government. Britain supported this approach to the Arab–Israeli dispute and sought to facilitate the American-led peace process. It became British policy to ensure European Community support for Camp David despite French desires for a more comprehensive settlement.97 Israel did not therefore become a divisive issue in the Labour Party. On East–West relations Britain endorsed US policies. Soviet– American relations were strained in 1977 with disagreements over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II and the Horn of Africa. Owen believed Moscow saw the British as a useful avenue to Carter on arms control, but Gromyko was ‘perplexed about the emphasis that was being given to human rights’.98 The Foreign Secretary felt in a ‘cleft stick’: All my instincts sympathized with Carter’s wish to elevate human rights and I was not afraid of embarrassing the Soviet Union, but I also wanted, as did Vance, substantive progress on arms control. Up to a point, we could aspire to both, but even though there was no explicit linkage implicitly we did face choices. If forced to choose, I was more concerned then about the troubling build-up of nuclear weapons.99
Owen also had to curb his feelings toward the Soviet elite. He has admitted that he ‘had to deal with these people within the diplomatic niceties but I despised and mistrusted them’.100 While Owen believed that any Soviet concessions on human rights were made out of cynicism, as a means of securing a better press in the UK, the overall effect of the Western campaign, he thought, was critical to the transformation of Eastern Europe in 1989. The issue of theatre nuclear weapons complicated Western Alliance relationships and deepened divisions with the East. In 1977 Chancellor Schmidt drew attention to the way in which SALT could neutralise superpower strategic nuclear capabilities and ‘in Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear, tactical and conventional weapons’.101 The focus of Schmidt’s comments was the new Soviet SS20 missile, but his argument prompted a review of the overall NATO–Warsaw Pact regional balance of power. One possible Western response to
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rectify the perceived imbalance of power was the deployment of the neutron bomb or ‘reduced blast/enhanced radiation’ weapon which was denounced by the Soviet Union as the ultimate ‘capitalist weapon’, killing people not buildings. Protests over the weapons grew in western Europe with Schmidt under particular pressure from sections of his party, the SPD, as well as popular protests. The Ministry of Defence in Britain was in favour of the neutron bomb but Owen was not. He went along with the military, however, because both Callaghan and NATO endorsed the decision. As the European leaderships acquiesced to deployment of the new weapon despite domestic opposition, President Carter announced on 7 April 1978 that he had decided to defer its production. The cancellation at this point raised fundamental questions about the cohesion of the Alliance and reliability of US leadership. In order to restore credibility, Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing met at Guadaloupe in January 1979. The summit discussed the modernisation of Western theatre nuclear weapons while pursuing parallel arms control initiatives. An equally difficult issue was the question of a future inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in one comprehensive SALT III agreement.102 Guadaloupe set NATO on the road to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles while the arms control track first faltered and then was aborted in detoriating East–West relations. At the strategic level the SALT process succumbed to the same fate. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the US refusal to ratify the SALT II treaty. The future of the British deterrent force was at the same time a major issue. Nuclear decisions were made by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Defence Secretary.103 The key challenge for the Labour ‘four’ was the future of the Polaris strategic force. In the late 1960s the Soviet Union began to develop anti-ballistic missile defences, which led British governments to consider how to ensure the effectiveness of Polaris. Heath’s Conservative administration endorsed a programme of warhead modernisation codenamed ‘Chevaline’. The Chevaline project soon quadrupled in cost and in 1977 the Labour Cabinet four met to consider cancellation. The decision was not to cancel; in retrospect, a mistake for Denis Healey as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had limited the Soviet defence system to Moscow.104 For Owen:
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Owen also advocated exploration of Cruise missiles as a relatively cheap replacement for Polaris missiles in contrast to the purchase of Trident, the new American submarine-launched strategic missile. He reports the ‘Ministry of Defence were strongly against this, wanting the best available, irrespective of cost, which was undoubtedly Trident’.106 Owen began to feel that the financial costs of more sophisticated systems were too great for Britain, but lost the argument. Owen never doubted that Britain should retain its independent nuclear deterrent but the debate was never developed because ‘none of us ever felt able to go out and argue the case positively to the Parliamentary Party, let alone the Party in the country’.107 The issue was too divisive and the Labour Party of the 1970s inhibited discussion of nuclear weapons and made the leadership too secretive, preferring to stifle debate.108 The Falkland Islands Both Owen and Callaghan have contrasted the Labour government’s handling of relations with Argentina over the Falklands in the late 1970s with Mrs Thatcher’s failure to deter war in 1982. For Callaghan, ‘the verdict of history must be that the Labour Government kept the peace and the Conservative Government won the war’.109 For David Owen, a critical factor was the use of intelligence. ‘The 1977 record shows that intelligence served as a tool for Ministerial decisions. The 1982 records show intelligence was ignored.’110 The Labour case was that, in the context of strained relations with Argentina, the importance of maintaining HMS Endurance on station, reviewing intelligence reports, sending the ‘right’ diplomatic signals and deploying naval forces helped prevent conflict. For Owen the ‘inescapable conclusion is that the Falklands war was an avoidable war and that the events of 1977 should have given us the knowledge and experience to have prevented the 1982 invasion’.111 In 1977 Owen was concerned that any withdrawal of the Royal Navy’s patrol ship HMS Endurance would signal weakness to the
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Argentinians and a lack of determination to defend British interests. As relations with Argentina deteriorated and intelligence pointed to a number of factors – including the growing militancy of the Argentine navy, frustration with London’s apparent stalling tactics; and the occupation of Southern Thule – contingency plans were adopted. It was believed that, if negotiations broke down, Buenos Aires may take more direct action. David Owen sought additional naval deployments to protect British shipping and the Falkland Islands. The Foreign Secretary advocated an SSN (nuclearpowered submarine) be dispatched to the area. Ministers agreed and in addition two frigates were deployed 1,000 miles out in the Atlantic. The deployment pattern was agreed ‘as it would not be visible, and therefore not provocative to the negotiations’.112 Disagreement over the deterrent value of this force has emerged in the Callaghan and Owen accounts. In Callaghan’s speech to the Commons in 1982 he described how naval forces were assembled in support of HMS Endurance ‘and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity a diplomatic solution followed’.113 In his autobiography Callaghan made less strident claims: We made no formal communication to Argentina of these precautionary moves, but I informed the Head of MI6 of our plans before the ships sailed and it is possible, as I hoped, some information reached the Argentinian armed forces.114
Owen disagrees with Callaghan and does not believe MI6 would have disclosed the naval deployment without instructions. For Owen, ‘our naval deployment was an insurance policy, it did not of itself deter’.115 Owen has stressed that he made ‘every effort to ensure that the operation was covert’.116 He did not believe that the Argentinians knew but has seen this as a ‘side issue that has often tended to draw attention away from the real significance of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine below the surface so as to be in a position to intervene if matters deteriorated’.117 The Franks Committee Report has recorded that the objective of the 1977 deployment was to ‘buttress the government’s negotiating position by deploying a force of sufficient strength, available if necessary, to convince the Argentines that military action by them would meet resistance’.118 As Owen has revealed, detailed rules of engagement were drawn up that empowered the submarine to open fire ‘if Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent’.119 Franks concluded that such a force would not be able to deal with
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‘a determined Argentine attack, but it would be able to respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression’.120 It was deemed, as Callaghan has reported, ‘appropriate’ by the then chief of defence staff.121 While the Franks Report contrasts circumstances in 1977 and suggests that they were different from those leading up to the February talks in 1982, the Labour government did, nonetheless, take contingency measures, which the Conservatives failed to match. Labour did retain HMS Endurance, did discern its relationship with Argentina as deteriorating and did dispatch a naval force.
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
David Owen’s tenure as Foreign Secretary covered a period rich in policy challenges. The normal difficulties of developing and sustaining a coherent foreign policy were compounded by the absence of a majority in the House of Commons. Dependence on the Lib–Lab Pact and others in the Commons left the government in a vulnerable position. Divisions in the Labour Party over Europe and nuclear weapons further constrained policy-making. It is against this domestic context as well as the nature of particular issues in the external realm that Owen’s record should be judged. On European policy it was clear that the referendum had not resolved matters in the Labour Party. Owen was committed to Europe but was not a federalist. He endorsed Gaitskell’s view that Britain should not be ‘a province – a mere Texas or a California’.122 Owen sought to retain membership of the Community but also to seek reform. In practice, but not without difficulty, this together with a commitment to enlargement was to become policy. As we have seen the support of the Carter administration and Cy Vance in particular was integral to Labour’s strategy on southern Africa. It is to Owen’s credit, however, that he initiated a fresh approach and was prepared to fight within the British administration for a radical policy. He was opposed to racism, sought majority rule as the basis for settlements and was prepared to adopt sanctions to facilitate solutions. Owen’s policy was sustained despite opposition at home and in Africa. He regards his decision not to convene a premature Lancaster House conference a major success of his period in office.123 It demonstrated resolve, the capacity to stick with a policy and see it through in a consistent
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manner, even if it meant its objectives would not be immediately realised. Owen and Callaghan adopted a trans-Atlantic basis for British foreign policy. This was not only true in Africa but with regard to human rights, East–West relations in general and the Middle East. Owen saw the special relationship as important to Europe as well as to Britain, with NATO the key institution. He saw the working of the special relationship as dependent upon personal relations at senior executive levels. His own relationship with Cy Vance was to be particularly strong, making for an effective Anglo-American partnership. Working with Washington became fundamental to Britain’s diplomacy. The Carter administration’s promotion of human rights was matched by the Labour government’s. Owen’s commitment to human rights dated back to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the repression of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a long-standing opposition to apartheid.124 It became a priority area for his period in office but not the exclusive focus of policy. Owen recognised that the price for championing human rights is a ‘little inconsistency’ and later said ‘for a little read a lot’.125 The honesty of this analysis was underlined by the pull of realpolitik in Soviet relations and the problems of suspending arms sales. Inconsistency would concern the Labour left with regard for example to Britain’s relations with Iran but the overall principles of the approach found support in the party. Indeed, apart from the challenge of Europe, Owen’s initiatives did not risk party unity, a critical factor for a government without Commons majority. Though we should note divisions in Labour’s ranks on nuclear weapons clearly contributed to the curtailment of a more open debate on the future of the British deterrent. Looking back David Owen has identified three major successes of his tenure.126 The first was enlargement of the EC to Spain and Portugal in addition to Greece. The second was keeping the USA focused and broadly in line with British policy on Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. The third was raising the profile of human rights, in particular rejecting the Soviet argument that post-Helsinki the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union and laying the foundation for greater freedom in Soviet-influenced countries in Eastern Europe. To this we should add a fourth: the determination to sustain a policy despite opposition and little likelihood of immediate success, which was exemplified in southern Africa.
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.
James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 448. David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p. 256. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 448. Marcia Falkender, Downing Street in Perspective (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 234. Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 458. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 265. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 246. Ibid., p. 248. Ibid., p. 262. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 247. Peter Hennessy et al., Routine Punctuated by Orgies: The Central Policy Review Staff 1970–1983 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1985), p. 59. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 264. The United Kingdom’s Overseas Representation, 1978, Cmnd 7308, p. 11. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 266. Ibid., p. 265. Ibid., p. 261. Ibid., p. 262. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Ibid. Ibid. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 261. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 395. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 321. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Ibid. See Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1989). Owen, Time to Declare, p. 188. Roy Hattersley, Who Goes Home? (London: Warner, 1998), p. 149. Alan Sked and Chris Cook, Post-war Britain (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p. 305. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 245. Ibid., p. 246. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 247. Ibid., p. 331. Ibid., p. 797. Ibid., p. 268. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 456. Owen, Time to Declare, pp. 275–6. Ibid., p. 367. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 493. Author’s correspondence with Lord Owen, 9 May 2001. Philip Stevens, Politics and the Pound (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 6. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 331. Report of the Seventy-sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Brighton, 1977), pp. 257–9. Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991) p. 491.
David Owen, 1977–79 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.
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David Owen, Human Rights (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978). Ibid., p. 2. Ibid. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. Author’s correspondence with Lord Owen, 9 May 2001. Owen, Human Rights, p. 33. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 52. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 272. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 291. Ibid., p. 292. Ibid., p. 286. Ibid. Ibid., p. 292. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See Martin Bailey, Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal (London: Coronet, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989). Ibid., p. 198. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 296. Bailey, Oilgate, p. 226. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 297. Ibid. Ibid., p. 301. Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan, 1980), p. 297. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 273. Meredith, The Past is Another Country, p. 296. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 283. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 315. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 531. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 316. Ibid., p. 798. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 448. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 324. Ibid. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 336. Ibid. Ibid., p. 337. Helmut Schmidt, ‘Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture’, 28 October 1977, quoted in Guido Vigeveno, The Bomb and European Security (London: Hurst, 1983), p. 44. Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 541–51. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 380. Healey, The Time of my Life, p. 455. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 381. Ibid. Ibid., p. 382. Author’s correspondence with Lord Owen, 9 May 2001.
114 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.
British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 370. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 343. Ibid., p. 361. Ibid., p. 360. House of Commons Debates, 30 March 1982, p. 94. Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 375. Owen, Time to Declare, p. 350. House of Commons Debates, 25 January 1983, p. 418. Ibid. War in the Falklands 1982 (London: Stationery Office, 2001), p. 52. House of Commons Debates, 25 January 1983, p. 419. War in the Falklands 1982, p. 52. House of Commons Debates, 25 January 1983, p. 484. Author’s interview with Lord Owen, 16 May 2001. Ibid. Author’s correspondence with Lord Owen, 9 May 2001. Ibid. Ibid.
5
Lord Carrington: Foreign Secretary, 1979–821 Harry Bennett
Lord (Peter) Carrington’s tenure of the Foreign Office from 1979 to 1982 saw significant achievements in British foreign policy but they were to be entirely eclipsed in the public mind by the manner of Carrington’s departure from the Foreign Office. Carrington has not enjoyed the reputation that he perhaps deserves. To many he remains ‘a trimmer’ (second only to ‘appeaser’ as a term of political abuse), prepared to sacrifice British interests for the sake of the quick fix. Yet the adjustment of Britain’s foreign policy to its material resources and standing has been an ongoing task for the British Foreign Secretary since the end of the First World War. Rather than trimming too far, he was ultimately undone by a wider failure of the Thatcher administration over the future of the Falkland Islands to reconcile British interests and foreign policy with the defence policy of the government. The publication of his memoirs in 1988 did little to redress the balance as the noble lord pulled many of his punches, and preferred to attack his critics by not mentioning them rather than by engaging in a public slanging match. Throughout his career Carrington was the consummate politician constantly seeking to advance the interests of the Conservative Party.
CAREER
Born into a distinguished aristocratic family in 1919 Peter Carrington was educated at Eton before entering the Royal
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Military College, Sandhurst. An officer in the Grenadier Guards, inheriting his father’s title in 1938 at the age of 19, he saw service during the Second World War in the Guards Armoured Division. The experience of commanding and living with soldiers drawn from the working classes reinforced the Tory paternalism of his aristocratic upbringing. In 1946 he entered the House of Lords as a Conservative peer on the opposition benches. He was a good speaker, intelligent and competent: qualities that made him a hard man for the Conservative Party to ignore. In 1951 with Churchill’s return to Number 10 Downing Street he was appointed parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture. He very quickly found himself embroiled in the controversy of the Crichel Down affair. In the public enquiry into the maladministration of the affair at the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture, Carrington escaped with mild rebuke while the minister was forced to resign and civil servants were heavily censured. Carrington offered his resignation but Churchill refused to accept it. Instead Carrington found himself appointed as parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Defence. In 1956 at the age of 37 he moved on to become British High Commissioner in Australia. Three years later in October 1959 he returned to England as the new First Lord of the Admiralty. Carrington’s tenure at the Admiralty was disturbed in 1962 when a Russian spy was identified within his department. When the spy was unmasked, eventually being sentenced for spying in October 1962, the press reacted with fury. Carrington, along with Thomas Galbraith who had previously been Civil Lord of the Admiralty, were attacked for not unmasking the spy earlier. As Lord Hailsham would later recall, both ministers ‘were absolutely spotless and horribly maligned’.2 Throughout the case, despite calls for his resignation, Carrington gave a forthright defence of his position. As he told the House of Lords on 31 October 1962: ‘No blame can be attached to anybody for the existence in my Department of an individual who was willing to become a spy. The issue of blame, if there is to be blame, is whether he should have been caught sooner.’ In the ensuing public enquiry Carrington was exonerated and two of the journalists who had attacked him were jailed for failure to disclose the sources of their information. After another flirtation with political disaster Carrington’s career continued to progress and with the election of a Labour government in 1964 he became leader of the Conservatives in the House of Lords. This provided a useful platform for him to progress within the party: in 1970 he became Secretary of State for Defence, and in 1972 chairman of the
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Conservative Party. From January to February 1974 he was Secretary of State for Energy. With the fall of the Heath government he relinquished the chairmanship of the party. He had been one of the chief proponents of an early election and was identified as a ‘Heath man’.3 He had also been rather too dynamic and forceful a party chairman for some sections of the party.4 With the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1975 Carrington thought his career might well be over, but the iron lady warmed to him. Thatcher recognised his personal qualities and also his experience of government. On election night in 1979 Carrington was confident that he would be the next Foreign Secretary. The Conservatives were ahead in the polls and he was amply fitted for the job. His inclusion in the Cabinet was assured if Mrs Thatcher wished to see it representative of all the social and ideological strands within the Conservative Party. She also needed his powerful voice in the House of Lords. Although his appointment was expected it did not meet with universal approval. Philip Whitehead, writing in the New Statesman in September 1979, commented: ‘There are perhaps few better indicators of the steady decline of our politics that Carrington, amid the sleepwalkers, eccentrics and would-be ideologues of the Thatcher administration, bears the appearance to many people of a master-statesman.’5
CONTEXT
The diplomatic issues facing Britain in 1979 were varied and complex. Britain, because of its imperial history and membership of NATO, the European Economic Community and the United Nations, faced worldwide problems without the economic, military and political capacity to play a worldwide role. In the continuing search for a role in the international arena there remained considerable tension between those policy-makers, politicians and members of the public who saw Britain’s future as a leading power within the European Community and those who continued to hanker after the special relationship. There were points of common ground between the two camps: Britain was paying too much in the form of subsidy payments for its membership of the European Community, and the special relationship was necessary to present an effective international front against communist expansion in the continuing Cold War.
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The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, had been a reminder of former fears about the expansionist nature of communist regimes. The Russian military build-up continued under the, at times, unpredictable rule of Leonid Brezhnev. The Carter administration in the USA looked increasingly unwilling to meet communist expansion with a forceful response, especially with the President facing re-election in November 1980. Fortunately, Carrington struck up an immediately good working relationship with Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State since 1977. American support, or at least acquiesence, in British foreign policy was also necessary if Britain was to make progress on a number of longstanding imperial problems. Gibraltar remained a difficult issue in the Anglo-Spanish relationship and Hong Kong created similar problems in Sino-British relations. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the USA in January 1979 meant that Britain possessed a friend who could act as intermediary over the future of Hong Kong. The problem of Hong Kong, however, was eclipsed by the continuing situation in Rhodesia. The illegal regime of Ian Smith continued to search for international respectability that would facilitate the granting of independence. The Salisbury government had held an election in April 1979 that was condemned in many quarters because the black leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe were able to play no part in it, even though they were now free from prison. The Rhodesian issue was particularly thorny for a Conservative Foreign Secretary, given the pro-white sympathies of a majority within the Conservative Party. Many on the right of the Conservative Party pressed Carrington to accept the result of the April election and to grant Rhodesia independence. The issue was debilitating because by comparison to issues such as Middle Eastern peace it was unimportant, but on an emotional and political level it demanded that considerable attention be given to it. The war in Rhodesia between government and anti-government forces produced human tragedy after human tragedy, leaving no family in Rhodesia unaffected. Because of the emotionally charged nature of the Rhodesian problem other issues received less attention than they deserved. In his memoirs Carrington confirmed that Rhodesia had had a ‘distracting effect’ on the conduct of British foreign policy.6 That effect helped to obscure that at various other points around the globe Britain faced issues that might flare into fire quite rapidly. In terms of British interests and global responsibilities such flash points might come
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low down on the Foreign Office’s list of priorities, but they might be rather higher on the diplomatic agenda for the local regimes involved. Beyond the specific issues facing Carrington in 1979 lay a much greater concern. Could the decline of Britain be arrested or reversed? A consensus existed between politicians, academics and others that Britain had been in steady decline since the end of the Second World War. The signs of economic decline were widespread and, for a majority of the British electorate, the labour disputes of the ‘winter of discontent’ represented national humiliation. Inevitably economic decline had international implications. Britain could no longer afford the armed forces necessary to execute the expansive foreign policy that had marked an earlier period. Many inside the Conservative Party, Carrington included, felt that foreign and defence policies had to march in step. It was dangerous for Britain’s international commitments to exceed military capabilities. Such a situation called for the two to be reconciled either by reducing commitments, or by increasing the capabilities of the armed forces. The economic policy of the Thatcher government, founded on tax cuts and a slimmed-down state sector, scarcely counted in favour of the latter. Thatcher wanted to make Britain great again and to restore Britannia to international significance, but in order to do this she considered that the country had to be transformed economically. However, she, along with a broad section of the Conservative Party, was emotionally unwilling to make the short-term sacrifices necessary to keep foreign and defence policies in harmony. Britain would continue to play a major international role at, or beyond, the limits of its defence capabilities. On this all-encompassing issue Thatcher and Carrington had differing attitudes.
PERSONAL STYLE
Facing such issues was a considerable challenge to any Foreign Secretary, but Lord Carrington had a number of personal strengths on which to draw. He was an intellectual by nature and had considerable experience as a minister and as a politician. He knew Whitehall and he knew the party. Carrington’s business background was another source of strength. As a director of Rio Tinto Zinc he had spent a considerable amount of time travelling around the world, coming into contact with many important figures in
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Asia and Africa. As Foreign Secretary he would continue to travel the world, being a great believer in seeing conditions on the ground, and meeting the significant diplomatic players, rather than relying on ambassadorial reports. In his control of the Foreign Office and conduct of diplomacy his aristocratic upbringing was a considerable strength. He was a gentleman, mindful of the lives of those with whom he came into contact. Personally he was very hard working, rising at 6 am to work through the day’s red boxes, yet he would not let this result in any display of bad temper that might colour his relationship with subordinates. Whatever his private thoughts, Carrington’s geniality remained constant. Despite his background Carrington was never pompous and his tendency towards mild self-deprecation meant that it was extremely difficult not to like him. As Bernard Ingham, who had worked under him at the Department of Energy, was to recall: ‘He was a joy to work for – a good humoured, slightly self-mocking general who, having agreed the approach, left his staff … to get on with it.’7 Carrington had the humility and the good sense to know that he was not always right on particular issues and was always prepared to recognise that fact in his dealing with people. He was also a pragmatist measuring the day’s work not in terms of great leaps forward but in terms of inching forward with particular problems. Yet within this pragmatism lay the guiding principle that even on the most difficult issue one really had to try to make a difference, and that at times maintaining the status quo was the best one could hope for. Carrington was a principled realist. Within Whitehall he was a known entity and the staff of the Foreign Office welcomed his appointment. They also rather liked his style as Foreign Secretary, and in his use of his own country house at Bledlow, rather than Chevening, the Foreign Secretary’s official country residence, he seemed to hark back to more patrician days. (When stories about government waste began to circulate in the press, Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, helped assuage the situation with his use of Chevening during the process of planning the 1982 budget.) It was important that on the international stage Carrington acted as a foil to Mrs Thatcher: the pragmatist to her idealism; the Tory grandee to the grocer’s daughter from Grantham; the gentleman to the lady ready to give out a good hand-bagging. Carrington played a vital role in introducing Thatcher to the maledominated world stage, even down to giving advice on points of diplomatic protocol. One foreign leader asked Carrington how to address the Prime Minister, to which he replied: ‘“Prime Minister”
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the first three times, then no appellation for a while and finally “Margaret”.’8 On diplomatic issues there was a considerable closeness between Carrington and Thatcher, and in that sphere the Foreign Secretary possessed considerable ability to influence her thinking and conduct. The same was not, however, true in the sphere of domestic politics. Carrington was perceived as a Heath man and on economic issues he was part of the ‘wet’ camp. Along with Cabinet members Sir Ian Gilmour, Jim Prior and Peter Walker, Carrington in some quarters was seen as the enemy within to the Thatcherite revolution. Their approach towards the economy was essentially pragmatic while that of Thatcher and the ‘drys’ was almost dogmatic. As unemployment grew after 1979 the division between ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ became ever more sharply drawn. This had repercussions on the relationships, which had the capacity to effect the conduct of foreign policy. Nicholas Ridley, a ‘dry’ who would serve as a minister under Carrington at the Foreign Office, gave full vent to his distaste of the ‘wets’ including his master. In his memoirs he wrote: With experience of running large estates or large companies people like these had always managed to cushion their tenants and employees from the worst effects of a depression, and also to provide for them in sickness or old age over and above that which the State could do. They never could see that the Government too, unlike them, has to deal with inflation and to put pressure on industry to improve efficiency.9
Ridley and others blamed Carrington’s generation for failing to take hard choices over the economy back in the 1960s and early 1970s He also felt that Carrington ‘never felt confident in his own economic judgement’.10 With Ian Gilmour, as Lord Privy Seal, acting as a second-in-command at the Foreign Office there was some suspicion that Carrington was in control of an antiThatcherite bastion within Whitehall. Gilmour was more forceful than Carrington in expressing his opposition to government economic policy, and some had the impression that Gilmour in effect was speaking for them both. One possible side effect of the divisions in Cabinet was that Carrington displayed a marked lack of zeal for bringing Foreign Office questions before his ministerial colleagues.11 The power balance in the relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary has fluctuated considerably over the past 200 years, yet it has always been a vital determinant of the success or failure of British foreign policy. From 1979 to 1982 the relationship
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between Carrington and Thatcher saw great differences of opinion. At times both exhibited frustration with each other and their difficulties over economic policies led some to think that they were further apart than they actually were. Within Westminster rumours about the relationship between the two circulated on a regular basis. As the debate on government economic policy grew increasingly sharp, especially over the 1981 budget, Carrington was rumoured to state regularly: ‘She’ll be out by Christmas!’12 In late 1980 rumours of a Cabinet coup against Mrs Thatcher were circulating in Westminster. In one scenario Carrington would become Prime Minister of a ‘wet-look’ administration that might include Ted Heath.13 However, the smoke and heat of political combat hid a sound working relationship. Differences might occur between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary but, as Peter Walker later remarked, Carrington ‘usually won her over’.14 He quickly realised that he could say anything to her in the course of a frank exchange of views and that she was invariably well briefed. The relationship was more than simply professional. As one diplomat wrote: ‘She was also sympathetic towards him personally – understanding [him] in a very human fashion … In talks with me, or rather in frequent asides, Carrington paid tribute to her courage. He told me that he liked her very much as a person. He had not always done so; and it had not been easy to begin with because after all he was a Heath-man. But he thought that she was very nice as a human being.’15 The differences between the two over economic policy were not allowed to reach a head because Carrington’s frequent overseas trips meant that he was often abroad at key moments of combat. Such was the nature of the relationship between Carrington and Thatcher that Geoffrey Howe late mused that on one diplomatic overnight flight they reminded him of ‘Dorothy Lamour and Bob Hope’.16
FOREIGN-POLICY ISSUES
Maintaining the status quo On a considerable number of issues Carrington could hope to make little progress other than maintaining the status quo. The Anglo-American alliance and the containment of Russia were maintained with a united front being presented against the Russian
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occupation of Afghanistan. In part the Anglo-American relationship was fostered by close personal trans-Atlantic relationships but also through Britain’s support for US policy in other areas. For example, the British played an important role in getting the European Community to impose economic sanctions on Iran in May 1980 over the continued detention of the US embassy staff in Tehran.17 The Americans also valued British involvement in the affairs of the Middle East. Britain continued to work for a settlement of the Palestinian issue, although British influence in the region could be disturbed by events outside the control of the government. The screening on British commercial television of ‘Death of a Princess’ on 9 April caused grave offence to the authorities in Saudi Arabia and a cooling of relations that even Carrington’s considerable charm could not prevent.18 Rhodesia/Zimbabwe The early phase of Carrington’s tenure of the Foreign Office was dominated by the issue of Rhodesia. Carrington wanted it settled for two reasons. First because of the intrinsic importance in human terms of the issues at stake, and second because Rhodesia obscured the horizons of British foreign policy. In the April 1979 elections a 64.45 per cent turnout had produced a victory for the African National Congress, and on 1 May Bishop Abel Muzorewa became Prime Minister. However, the administration remained dominated by whites. Black nationalists Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe denounced it as a sham. Carrington refused to accept that the election had produced a truly satisfactory settlement of the issue, and said that he would carry on searching for a solution that would result in the widest possible recognition of an independent Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Lord Harlech was swiftly dispatched to southern Africa to consult with the various parties in the dispute to see whether there was any chance of a settlement. Carrington was determined to pave the way for a conference to bring the various parties together into a settlement. Economic sanctions on Rhodesia were still in force, which created pressure on the government in Salisbury, but to bring pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe was a rather more difficult matter. Thus Carrington turned to the Commonwealth in which sat black African states neighbouring Rhodesia that acted as the sponsors of Mugabe and Nkomo. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was particularly keen for a settlement because the presence of Nkomo’s forces on Zambian soil was causing internal difficulties.
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On 1 August 1979 the Commonwealth conference opened in Lusaka and Carrington and Thatcher, who had reluctantly embraced the Rhodesian issue, secured for Britain the role of mediating in the situation. Two weeks later, on 14 August, the British government extended invitations to talks to Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front. They met at Lancaster House on 10 September, and by 21 December all the parties had reached an agreement. No timetable was established for the talks but the negotiations proceeded in the following order: agreeing on a constitution; transitional arrangements, new elections and then a ceasefire. In the Lancaster House talks Carrington acted as a mediator, only taking a lead when the negotiations got into difficulty. As the British Foreign Secretary, Carrington carried considerable power in his role as mediator. However, what mattered more was the mandate Britain had received to deal with the problem from the Commonwealth. The Patriotic Front could denounce the British but not the Commonwealth that comprised their political backers. In negotiating the settlement Carrington talked first to the Rhodesians and then to the leaders of the Patriotic Front who had insisted that they would not talk to the Rhodesian government. In this way Carrington was able to dominate the proceedings of the conference manipulating the different parties under the guise of mediation. Fresh elections were held 27–9 February and on 17 April Zimbabwean independence was formally sanctioned. Even so, the settlement was less than perfect. After the settlement black and white continued to live largely separate lives. The key issue of land had not been solved, which stored up trouble for the future. What was significant, however, was that the Rhodesian issue had been removed from the agenda of British politics. A burden of considerable weight had been lifted from the country’s diplomatic agenda. Carrington was hailed by both the press and his own Prime Minister for a remarkable achievement. The contemporary verdict has been shared by historians such as Paul Sharp: The Rhodesian settlement was, indeed, a triumph for Carrington aided by the Foreign Office. By a combination of persuasion, bluff and the appearance on occasions of ruthless indifference, he had managed to manipulate the fears and needs of all the parties involved to the point where he had convinced them that they dare not be left out of any agreement. As such it was a textbook case of classical diplomacy, indeed of British diplomacy, for the very paucity of the material resources committed to the policy – a governor, his staff, and a little money, in the best traditions of
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empire on the cheap – pointed clearly to its authorship. If an example is required of the way in which a foreign service can procure more influence for its country than its economic and military strength would seem to warrant, then it is hard to think of a better one than this.19
However, a broad section of the Conservative right was furious that Carrington had not done more to support the interests of the white minority in Rhodesia. They were convinced that it was in the interests of ‘our people’ to have recognised the Muzorewa government and the April elections. At the 1979 ‘Party conference, a huge meeting organised by the Monday Club displayed “Hang Carrington” banners. As he walked down the street people even shook fists at him.’20 For Carrington foreign policy was not carried out in a party political vacuum. To his opponents Carrington was just a short-term fixer willing to sell out long-term British interests for the sake of short-term gain. European Union His concern for the party political as well as the national interest also extended to his handling of the relationship between Britain and the European Union. Carrington, despite his time in Australia, firmly believed in the value of Britain’s membership of the European Union. He was not on the Euro-sceptic side of the Conservative Party. However, he and many pro-Europeans believed that Britain had joined the Community at too high a price. Britain paid far more to the Community (a net figure of £1,000 million was projected for 1980) than it received back in subsidy and other payments. Failure to reduce Britain’s payments to the European Union threatened to ignite anti-European, pro-empire, sentiment within the Conservative Party that was antagonised by the settlement of the Rhodesian issue. Moreover, Carrington feared that difficulties over payments to the EEC would leave Britain relegated to a lesser position in Europe as the French and Germans pressed ahead with closer ties. To some extent Carrington was a subordinate player in the diplomatic battle to reduce Britain’s payments to the EEC. Much of the discussion was carried out in the European Council, which was Margaret Thatcher’s arena. As Carrington noted in his memoirs, Thatcher ‘was no bad hand at conducting rows, and on several occasions … the Prime Minister made herself exceptionally unpopular, bluntly saying, “I want my money back”, language which sent shudders down many a continental spine’.21 Again, though, what was
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important was the combined effects of Thatcher’s Euro-sceptic hand-bagging and Carrington’s pro-European, aristocratic, soothings. Eventually the matter was left to the Foreign Ministers of the EEC nations to decide and, in June 1980, after a marathon meeting, ceilings on Britain’s payments were set at £370 million in 1980 and £440 million in 1981 producing a massive rebate for the British Exchequer. The foreign-policy implications of the negotiation of the rebate were important – it considerably eased tensions within the European Community. But more significant were the implications for domestic British politics. Full-scale hostilities in the Conservative Party between the pro- and antiEuropean factions were postponed and extra funds were available to the Exchequer as the economic downturn of the early 1980s accelerated. Carrington continued to work for closer European ties throughout his tenure of office, and indeed after it. The reestablishment of direct communications between Spain and Gibraltar in April 1980 was one further small step towards European harmony. As he told the House of Commons on 10 November 1981: ‘The Community is central not just to our wider political and economic interests but to all of us in our daily lives. This fact is reflected in the Government’s priorities in foreign policy.’22
1982
By the start of 1982 Carrington had confronted, with some success, most of the issues that had confronted him at the time of his appointment. Renegotiation of Britain’s grant to the European Economic Community and the settlement of the Rhodesian issue were major achievements, and Britain stood shoulder to shoulder with the USA against Russia in a special relationship that had found new life in the chemistry between Thatcher and Reagan. And yet by 5 April Carrington had resigned amid considerable criticism of him personally and the Foreign Office. The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces on 2 April and the surrender of the British garrison are what prompted his resignation, but the politics of it were particularly intriguing. What produced his resignation was not the mishandling of foreign policy but the internal battles that raged within the Conservative Party before and after the Argentine invasion. This is a critical point in trying to assess Carrington’s record as Foreign Secretary, and his resignation
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continues to cast a lengthy shadow over the achievements of his tenure of the Foreign Office. In the public mind Carrington is still associated with an episode of British history that is best forgotten, and it is perhaps time that he was rehabilitated. The Falkland Islands By the end of 1981 negotiations over the Falkland Islands had reached an impasse. Sovereignty over the islands – discovered by the British in 1592, settled by the British, Spanish and French in the eighteenth century, uninhabited in the early nineteenth century – was claimed by both Britain and Argentina. During the early nineteenth century control of the islands passed backwards and forwards between the two countries until Britain established a settlement and de facto sovereignty. Attempts to resolve the sovereignty issue proved fruitless. But by the 1970s, as is revealed in Chapter 4 of this volume, the Argentine government was becoming increasingly restless. By early 1982 Carrington had tried to find different methods of resolving the issue, but the positions of the various parties were simply too entrenched. An attempt by Carrington to negotiate a leaseback arrangement for the Falklands, whereby Argentine sovereignty would be recognised but Britain allowed to lease the islands, had foundered on the opposition of the islanders and powerful voices in the Conservative Party. At the same time, with the Ministry of Defence looking to cut its budget by large cuts in the surface fleet of the Royal Navy, Britain seemed to be losing the capacity to influence events in the South Atlantic. Thus in early 1982 the Argentine military junta decided to use force to resolve the issue in Argentina’s favour. It was true that Carrington was momentarily busy with the Middle East, but with the failure of his efforts to resolve the Falklands problem he could do little more than continue to maintain the status quo. Although it was noted that the Argentine navy was making extensive preparations for sea there was every likelihood that the military junta was yet again engaged in sabre-rattling. In the absence of concrete intelligence he could scarcely make threats against Argentina not to invade. They might be preposterous and they might only inflame the situation. Military preparations, such as the sending of a nuclearpowered submarine to the South Atlantic might have had a deterrent effect but that responsibility rested with the Ministry of Defence. In addition it would take time for a nuclear submarine to arrive in the theatre of operations. With the absence of significant
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naval forces in the vicinity and with the inability to quickly reinforce the Falklands by air or sea, it was a potentially dangerous move to take steps that might lead the Argentine government into a precipitate move. When the invasion came it was a real shock, especially to the Cabinet where discussions about the Falklands ‘had not featured strongly’.23 On 8 April, after Carrington had resigned, Margaret Thatcher announced the setting up of an enquiry into the events leading to the Falklands debacle. The precise nature of the enquiry, its composition and terms of enquiry, was to be left open for a later date. As eventually finalised, the enquiry was to be conducted by a committee of privy counsellors chaired by Lord Franks. Its work began on 26 July and concluded five months later as Margaret Thatcher received its report. The report, which recognised that various factors had seriously limited Carrington’s room for manoeuvre over the Falklands, was released to the public on 18 January 1983. It largely absolved Carrington of blame, which many had assumed given his resignation. The Franks Committee concluded that ‘the invasion on 2 April 1982 could not have been foreseen’ and that ‘the British Government … had [had] to act within the constraints imposed by the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, which had a moral force of their own as well as the political support of an influential body of Parliamentary opinion’. This had meant that Carrington’s ‘room for policy manoeuvre was limited’.24 Resignation In the relief of victory in the South Atlantic and the triumphalist wave that followed it, carrying Thatcher to victory in the 1983 general election, the Franks Report made little impact on the public mind. Carrington’s resignation was, and still is, commonly seen as amounting to an admission of guilt on his part. What the public has not appreciated are the political and personal forces at work in his resignation. On 2 April the invasion of the Falklands was met with public uproar. The newspapers demanded the resignations of Carrington, Nott and Thatcher: there were calls for Parliament to be recalled. On 3 April Parliament held its first Saturday sitting since the Suez crisis of 1956. As the House of Commons sat in emergency session, the government faced a serious threat to its survival. British territory had been subject to invasion by a foreign power and British citizens faced an uncertain future in the hands of a military
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dictatorship internationally renowned for human-rights abuses. To the concerns generated by a faltering economy, rising unemployment and inner-city rioting had been added the anger of a nation outraged at what was widely perceived to have been government mismanagement of Great Britain’s diplomatic and military affairs. From the left wing of British politics came concerns about the future of the Falkland Islanders under the Galtieri dictatorship, and concerns that Margaret Thatcher might pursue a military adventure to take the public’s attention away from mounting domestic problems. From the right wing came outrage that the government had failed to protect British interests. Julian Amery, no doubt mindful of his father’s role in the Norway debate in 1940, argued: The third naval power in the world, and the second in NATO, has suffered a humiliating defeat. It is always painful in a state of war to criticise a Government, particularly a Government of one’s own friends, but the purpose of recrimination at a time like this is to prevent the repetition of error. On television yesterday my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary said that diplomacy was the only instrument that the Government had to hand. I fear that my noble Friend on this occasion, as on others, confuses diplomacy with foreign policy. Diplomacy is the day-to-day handling of conferences and international relations. Foreign policy involves having a clear aim and making sure that one has the means to carry out that aim.25
Amery was joined by Patrick Cormack (Conservative, Staffordshire South-West) who again singled out Lord Carrington for attack: Someone has blundered. I do not know who and I do not know how, but I have my suspicions, and they are directed inevitably – and regretfully – at both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary. It was not right that the Foreign Secretary should have been absent from the United Kingdom during this week – a time when it was becoming increasingly and abundantly plain that we were on the brink of a grave international crisis.26
As well as the personal attacks on Carrington, who at one point was accused of ‘weasel words’ over the Falklands, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was singled out for abuse by a number of backbenchers.27 Teddy Taylor, the Conservative member for Southend East, claimed: ‘The Foreign Office was not working for
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Britain.’28 Douglas Jay, the Labour member for Battersea North, picking up some of the echoes of the Second World War and the policies that led to it, argued: ‘The Foreign Office is a bit too much saturated with the spirit of appeasement. I hope that … the Foreign Office will now examine its conscience, if it has one.’29 The temper of the house was increasing even as the debate drew to a rather artificial close. John Nott, winding up the debate for the government, managed to sound both defeatist and entirely convinced that the government had followed the only policy possible in the circumstances. Nott’s speech was interrupted frequently, and was punctuated by cries of ‘resign’. While Carrington had carried the Lords with him, open revolt threatened on the Conservative back benches in the House of Commons. The debate in the Commons had concluded just as Conservative members were getting into their collective nationalistic stride. In an attempt to clear the atmosphere, and maintain a united party behind the government, a meeting of Conservative backbenchers was organised for that evening. Carrington and Nott were to be summoned before them. Whitelaw broke the news to Carrington: I told him that the mood of our back-benchers in the House of Commons was very bad and that they were out for blood. I felt that he must come, together with John Nott, to a Conservative back-bench meeting which had been summoned for that evening. He accepted my advice and said that I would endeavour to rally vocal support for him at the meeting.30
Lord Carrington’s memoirs draw a discrete veil over what happened next: ‘On Friday 2 April Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. On Monday 5 April I surrendered to the Queen at Windsor my seals of office.’31 It is to other sources that one must turn for accounts of the meeting of Conservative backbenchers on the evening of 3 April. They too are veiled and somewhat confused. But their discretion and confusion tells its own story. Some of those present remembered the meeting as a gathering of the 1922 Committee; others, like Kenneth Baker, remember a meeting of the ‘party’s Defence Committee’.32 Many simply refer to a meeting of backbenchers. Peter Brooke, who was in the whips’ office from 1979 to 1983, provides the definitive answer to the nature of the meeting. He remembers a ‘joint meeting … of the backbench Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the Parliamentary Party … [which] was extremely well attended to an extent that it was effectively the 1922 Committee’.33 Despite their careful use of diplomatic language various memoirists still manage to convey
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the venomous attacks that were made on Carringon and Nott during the course of the meeting. As Baker relates: ‘the backbenchers made it very clear to them that they thought the whole episode was a shambles and a national disgrace’.34 Carrington in particular seemed completely surprised by the response of the backbenchers. As Cecil Parkinson was told: Peter Carrington had misjudged the mood of the meeting and had been savaged by a number of well known 1922 protagonists. Peter, having spent his political life in the more polite House of Lords, did not know how to cope with our own side being rude to him.35
The vehemence of the attack on Carrington probably owed little to his supposed misjudgement of the temper of the meeting. Certain backbenchers were determined to vent their spleen not just over the Falklands issue, but over the whole course of British foreign policy since 1979. Carrington had come into office with the reputation of ‘a trimmer’ – an appeaser who preferred to sacrifice British interests to avoid conflict. The Rhodesian settlement had confirmed the suspicions of some on the Conservative right that Carrington would not die in the last ditch to defend what remained of the empire. To the fears of those on the right were added suspicions that Carrington had ‘gone native’ and that he was a creature of the Foreign Office, itself the object of considerable suspicion in some quarters. Antagonism towards Carrington had bubbled quietly beneath the surface for some considerable time, although it had not been identified by the whips’ office as constituting a major problem, perhaps because the significance of many domestic issues propelled it into the background. However, the invasion of the Falklands ignited the suspicions that had been developing over a lengthy period. Carrington ‘was shattered’ by the hostility of so many Conservative backbenchers. The meeting had been rough but not without precedent in the history of the 1922 Committee. As Kenneth Clarke, MP and future Chancellor of the Exchequer, recalled: ‘As someone who had already had long experience of the 1922 Committee in previous years, I did not get the impression that it was particularly worse than a number of similar outbursts on various subjects that had occurred at that august body from time to time over the previous decade.’36 However, Carrington was a deeply honourable man who had perhaps been surprised that some of his own party could regard him as ‘out of touch with backbench opinion in the House of Commons’. The vehemence of the attack on him is difficult to judge from the surviving evidence,
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but the strength of opinion felt in some parts of the party was illustrated to me when one backbench Conservative MP chose to respond anonymously to my letter to him. Simply annotating my original letter he responded with the scrawled comment ‘Wet and trecherous [sic]’ to the question ‘How was Lord Carrington perceived by the right wing of the Conservative Party?’37 Such strength of feeling at the time probably convinced Carrington that he had to go. He wanted to resign that evening but was persuaded from doing so. William Whitelaw was probably the key player in convincing him to stay his hand. The consequences of his resignation at that moment were difficult to calculate and Whitelaw for one hoped that the festering boil of backbench discontent had been lanced. However, press reaction to the debate and its aftermath only added to the pressure on Carrington. Whitelaw was one of the first to appreciate that Carrington’s resignation was inevitable. A sacrifice would have to be made. It would help to bring the country together and Carrington wished to go: At Dorneywood on the Sunday I read the Press reports with dismay. In the afternoon Peter Carrington rang up and said that he would come over to see me. He arrived in the afternoon and we had long discussions, as befits old friends who had been through many political dramas together. I argued passionately against his proposal to resign, which still today I regard as a loss to the nation of an outstanding statesman and personally a delightful companion. I knew I was losing the argument but at least I persuaded him to go and talk to Alec Home before he finally decided.38
Whitelaw and the chief whip, Michael Jopling, managed to persuade Carrington to delay his decision to resign until he had seen the newspapers. When the Foreign Secretary saw them on Monday 5 April he set off to Windsor to hand over his seals of office. Reaction to Carrington’s resignation was mixed and there was a widespread feeling that the Foreign Secretary had acted both honourably and for the best interests of the Conservative Party. Ian Gilmour mused: ‘On the day after Carrington’s resignation, an NOP poll found that 60 per cent believed Mrs Thatcher was responsible for the invasion. She was certainly more so than he was.’39 The public considered that the blame for such a calamity went beyond a single minister and ministry. On the evening of 5 April Carrington went on the BBC’s ‘Panorama’ programme to explain his resignation. Carrington appeared to accept that he had been wrong to underestimate the Argentinians. Despite the general perception that an honourable man had taken an
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honourable course there were some who felt a certain satisfaction in his going; Westminster was alive with rumours about his resignation. Tony Benn was told that Carrington had resigned because he did not agree with government policy and that the primary concern of some sections of the Parliamentary Conservative Party was British investments in Argentina valued at £5 billion. Benn was sufficiently intrigued to question Norman St John Stevas about Carrington’s resignation to be told that the real reason was ‘that he couldn’t stand “that woman” a moment longer’.40 Press reaction also varied. The Times applauded Carrington’s noble action. At the same time it continued to regard him as the man who had bungled. In their eyes his resignation ‘by implication’ involved an acceptance of ‘at least partial responsibility’.41 In the diplomatic service there was consternation at the amount of criticism directed at the Foreign Office that had led to the resignation of Carrington and the rest of the ministerial team at the department. Sir Archibald Hamilton MP was not the only person to feel that ‘the resignation business was being somewhat overdone’.42 Others considered that the wrong man had resigned. Peter Viggers MP felt that the Ministry of Defence had been guilty of ‘sending the wrong signal to Argentina rather than the Foreign Office’.43 Sir Nicholas Henderson, the British ambassador to Washington, reflected on the cruelty of fate: Until a few days ago Peter had been almost universally accepted as the star of the government, as carrying more weight in Cabinet than anyone else and as an outstanding Foreign Secretary. Then whoops, within a few days, down in the pit of party … And all because of the Falklands – because he had not foreseen the totally irrational and irresponsible actions of the Argentine military junta.44
Carrington’s own musings on his resignation were unusually candid: It was not a sense of culpability that led me to resign – a subjective judgement of course … The logic of my resignation was different, and I had two principal reasons, one general and one more particular. The general reason was my sympathetic understanding that the whole of our country felt angry and humiliated. I felt the same myself. … The disgrace must be purged. The person to purge it should be the minister in charge. That was me. I was also aware that my membership of the House of Lords was at that moment an embarrassment to the Prime Minister, and a weakness … When there’s a real political crisis it is in the House of Commons that the
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ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
In his reflections on his resignation, Carrington reveals precisely what lay at the heart of his foreign secretaryship, which colours any assessment of his achievement and legacy. Carrington was first and foremost a politician rather than a statesman. He had defended British interests across a range of issues from Rhodesia, British payments to the European Economic Community through to maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance against communist expansion. Inevitably the achievements were less than permanent: the Rhodesian settlement would steadily come unpicked over the next 20 years and the trans-Atlantic alliance would weaken with the end of the Cold War. However, what really mattered was the impact of Carrington’s foreign secretaryship on domestic politics. Renegotiation of Britain’s payments to the European Community postponed internal party struggles over membership of the Community. His settlement of the Rhodesian issue largely removed it from the national and internal party agendas. He played an important influence in moderating the Thatcher revolution and, even though he disagreed with her, he was very loyal to the Prime Minister. When party political difficulties threatened over the invasion of the Falklands he sacrificed himself even though he was plainly less to blame than some others. His resignation burst the bubble of indignation within the party and the country as a whole. It allowed the government to organise an effective response to the Argentine invasion. In turn, the decision of this former chairman of the party facilitated Conservative victory in the 1983 general election, as support for the Conservative Party reached a high-water mark that would allow it to remain in office until 1997. Within the party there was a recognition that Carrington had acted both nobly and in the best interests of the
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party. Michael Ancram, a future chairman of the party, would note that resignation was ‘a sensible and pragmatic course which enhanced Peter Carrington’s reputation’.46 On policy grounds he deserved the accolades of his peers: ‘An outstanding Foreign Secretary’47 and ‘a first-rate Foreign Secretary’.48 As Foreign Secretary he had scarcely put a foot wrong. As a Conservative politician and fixer his actions had been absolutely flawless. NOTES 1. I am considerably in the debt of a large number of people who provided information and opinion for the writing of this chapter and I would like to express my thanks to the following: Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, QC, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Richard Body, MP; Rt Hon. Peter Brooke, MP; Lord Carrington; Rt Hon. Sir Sydney Chapman, MP; Rt Hon. Kenneth Clarke, QC, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Patrick Cormack, FSA, MP; Lord Cranborne; Rt Hon. Stephen Dorrell, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Peter Emery, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Archibald Hamilton, MP; Rt Hon. Michael Heseltine, CH, MP; Rt Hon. Douglas Hogg, QC, MP; Rt Hon. Tom King, CH, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Peter Lloyd, MP; Rt Hon. Michael Mates, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith, DL, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Peter Tapsell, MP; Rt Hon. Sir Teddy Taylor, MP; Rt Hon. Peter Viggers, MP; Sir Raymond Whitney, OBE, MP. I am also indebted to friends and colleagues such as Dr Jonathan Wood, Dr Nick Smart, Dr Kevin Jefferys, Dr Richard Williams and Dr Robert Hole. 2. Lord Hailsham, A Sparrow’s Flight: The Memoirs of Lord Hailsham of Marylebone (London: Fontana, 1995), p. 332. For the Vassall affair, see Public Record Office Documents TS 58; ADM 1 28028; ADM 116 6385; BD 52 1 9; CAB 21 6076; DEFE 13 261. 3. See James Prior, A Balance of Power (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 91. 4. See Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 176ff. 5. Philip Whitehead, ‘The Character of a Trimmer’, New Statesman, 14 September 1979, pp. 366–7. 6. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: Collins, 1988), p. 287. 7. Bernard Ingham, Kill the Messenger (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 133–4. 8. Nicholas Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador 1969–1982 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), p. 269. 9. Nicholas Ridley, My Style of Government (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 173. 10. Ibid., p. 175. 11. Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 101. 12. John Ranelagh, Thatcher’s People: An Insider’s Account of Politics, the Power and the Personalities (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 157. 13. Benn Diary entry for 24 August 1980 in Ruth Winstone (ed.), Tony Benn: The End of an Era – Diaries 1980–90 (London: Arrow, 1992), p. 25. In private correspondence the Rt Hon. Ted Heath confirmed that there was nothing to this rumour, which was quite preposterous given the difficulties that Carrington would have faced in leading a government from the House of Lords. 14. Peter Walker, Staying Power (London: Bloomsbury, 1991), p. 232. 15. Henderson, Mandarin, p. 316. 16. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Pan Books, 1995), p. 137. 17. See speech by Carrington, House of Lords Debates, 19 May 1980, cols. 551–3. 18. House of Lords Debates, 24 April 1980, cols. 889–91. 19. Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 41. 20. Andrew Davies, We, the Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power (London, Little, Brown, 1996), p. 360.
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21. Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 319. 22. House of Lords Debates, 10 November 1981, col. 107. 23. Norman Fowler, Ministers Decide: A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years (London: Chapmans, 1991), p. 155. 24. Lord Franks, The Franks Report: Falkland Islands Review (London: Pimlico, 1983), p. 89. 25. Julian Amery, House of Commons Debates, 3 April 1982, cols. 647–8. 26. Patrick Cormack, House of Commons Debates, 3 April 1982, col. 652. 27. See for example: Bernard Braine, House of Commons Debates, 3 April 1982, col. 660. 28. Teddy Taylor, House of Commons Debates, 3 April 1982, col. 653. 29. Douglas Jay, House of Commons debates, 3 April 1982, col. 658. 30. William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Headline, 1990), pp. 265–6. 31. Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 368. 32. Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years: My Life in Politics (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), p. 68. 33. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Peter Brooke, MP, 20 June 2000. 34. Baker, The Turbulent Years, p. 68. 35. Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992), p. 191. 36. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Kenneth Clarke, MP, QC, 3 July 2000. 37. Anonymous. 38. Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs, pp. 266–7. 39. Ian Gilmour, Whatever Happened to the Tories: The Conservative Party since 1945 (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 317. 40. Winstone, Tony Benn: The End of An Era, pp. 205–6. 41. The Times, 6 April 1982, p. 2. 42. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Sir Archibald Hamilton, MP, 21 June 2000. 43. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Peter Viggers, MP, 26 June 2000. 44. Henderson, Mandarin, p. 450. 45. Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, pp. 370–1. 46. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, QC, MP, 20 June 2000. 47. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Michael Mates, MP, 20 June 2000. 48. Private correspondence with Rt Hon. Sir Peter Tapsell, MP, 19 June 2000.
6
Francis Pym: Foreign Secretary, 1982–83 Mark Stuart
CAREER
Francis Leslie Pym was born in Penpergwm, near Abergavenny, in Wales on 13 February 1922, the son of a landowner who became Conservative MP for Monmouth in 1942. Leslie Ruthven Pym became a whip, but his period in the House of Commons was brief: he was defeated in the Labour landslide of 1945. Francis was educated at Eton and Magdalene College, Cambridge. During the Second World War, he was awarded the Military Cross, having served in north Africa and Italy as a captain in the 9th Lancers. After the war, he became general manager for Lewis’s in Birmingham and Liverpool, before taking over the running of a small business in Hereford, where he became a councillor in 1958. Having unsuccessfully contested the Labour stronghold of Rhondda West in 1959, he was elected member of Parliament for Cambridgeshire in March 1961, where he served until 1983, when his seat, as a result of boundary changes, became Cambridgeshire South-East. In 1987, Pym retired from the House of Commons, and was subsequently elevated to the peerage as Baron Pym in the County of Bedfordshire. In 1962, Pym became parliamentary private secretary to Reginald Maudling, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. His talents were recognised when he was made an assistant government whip in the same year. His career as a whip progressed steadily during Harold Wilson’s first two administrations: opposition whip from 1964 to 1967, rising to deputy chief whip for the opposition, serving under William Whitelaw, a post he held until
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the 1970 general election, when Heath rewarded his service with the post of chief whip. It was in the whips’ office that Pym established his reputation as a House of Commons man. According to Norton, he adopted neither the disciplinarian approach of predecessors like Captain Margesson (from 1931 to 1940) nor the friendly approach of chief whips such as William Whitelaw (from 1964 to 1970), but operated through a combination of ‘charm and persistence’.1 He maintained good relationships with most backbenchers, including prominent dissenters, placing great emphasis on personal relationships between members and whips.2 Campbell believes that Pym prevented Heath from demanding an even greater level of loyalty from his backbenchers that would have resulted in a higher level of dissent.3 During the European Communities Bill, he was widely credited, first, with delaying a vote on the terms of entry in July 1971 when the government might have lost, and, second, with persuading a deeply reluctant Edward Heath to allow a free vote on the terms of entry on 28 October 1971. The free vote undoubtedly persuaded more Labour MPs – 69 in all – to defy their own party’s three-line whip, than if the government side had been whipped.4 A comfortable majority of 112 was thereby achieved.5 However, Heath, himself a former chief whip, tended to discount Pym’s advice, unless it was backed by senior ministers.6 In December 1973, Pym succeeded William Whitelaw as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. He tried to keep alive the power-sharing executive newly created by the Sunningdale Agreement, but served only 12 weeks in the post before Heath called a general election in February 1974.7 After Heath’s defeat, Pym was made opposition spokesperson jointly on Northern Ireland and agriculture, a job he continued under Mrs Thatcher, although he had to temporarily give up his portfolio on health grounds. He returned to the Conservative front bench in January 1976, when he took on the whole of the agriculture, fisheries and food portfolio. Shortly afterwards, he was made Conservative spokesman on House of Commons affairs and devolution in March of that year. He adopted a more pro-devolutionist line than Mrs Thatcher, trying to make Harold Wilson’s devolution plans ‘workable’.8 Despite these early differences over policy, Pym recalled that Mrs Thatcher was an extremely good leader of the opposition and an excellent Minister of Education.9 In 1978, Mrs Thatcher appointed Pym spokesman on foreign and Commonwealth affairs when John Davies, after a disastrous Conservative Party conference performance, was discovered to
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have been suffering from a brain tumour.10 During the 1979 general election campaign, Labour opponents savaged Pym on the BBC’s ‘Panorama’ programme. So shaken was he by the experience that, on leaving the studio, he asked the chief Tory publicity adviser, Gordon Reece, whether he had just lost the election.11 After Mrs Thatcher’s election victory in May 1979, Pym was denied the foreign secretaryship, and instead was made Secretary of State for Defence. There, he proved to be a resolute defender of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, ordering Trident as a replacement to the Polaris missile system.12 Although the Conservatives had pledged in 1979, in accordance with NATO policy, to increase defence spending by 3 per cent a year, in 1980 Mrs Thatcher demanded £500 million in savings from the overall size of the defence budget. Pym mounted a rearguard action to reduce the size of the savings from £500 million to £200 million, and would certainly have resigned in mid-November 1980 had he not got his way.13 But Mrs Thatcher took her revenge six weeks later – replacing Pym as Defence Secretary with the more prudent and cost-cutting mind of John Nott.14 Pym was sidelined as Leader of the House of Commons – initially as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster-General – and, from September 1981, as Lord President of the Council, where his role included the overall responsibility for the coordination and presentation of government policy.
PERSONAL STYLE
Even before he became Foreign Secretary, Pym’s tendency to gloomy, disarming honesty got him into trouble with the Prime Minister on several occasions. At a speech to the Allied Brewery Trades Association in February 1982, for example, he claimed that Britain was experiencing a second, painful industrial revolution and warned against ‘an early return to full or nearly full employment, or an early improvement in living standards generally’.15 His main sin in the eyes of Mrs Thatcher was that he approved the press release issued by Conservative Central Office of extracts of his speech that made little of the good news and much of the bad.16 It was little wonder that the Conservative right had viewed his appointment to direct the government’s publicity machine as ‘akin to making Cassandra the PR girl for Troy’.17
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Pym’s outburst of realism was based on a belief that the electorate appreciated plain speaking, and that it was foolish for the government, in a period of economic recession, to claim too much credit for the tough measures that it was pursuing. He took the view that the Conservative Party would suffer at the hands of the electorate if people perceived that the government was being insensitive in the face of long-term high unemployment. In his view, the oil price hikes of 1979 had ‘changed both the politics and the economics of what was sensible to attempt’.18 As such, his criticisms were much more as a party politician, a job at which he excelled, rather than as an economic strategist, a role at which he did not. After the 1981 budget, he protested alongside James Prior, the Secretary of State for Employment, about the lack of Cabinet discussion over the Treasury’s economic plans. However, he was always too gentlemanly to pick an open fight with the Prime Minister. Covert criticism was preferred over open rebellion in Cabinet.19 Rather than engaging in vigorous argument with her, he brooded: ‘Francis doesn’t argue back’, said one observer, ‘he just goes pink.’20 Pym became one of the most prominent ‘wets’, espousing the Disraelian view of politics, characterised by the term ‘one nation Conservatism’: anathema to Mrs Thatcher. At the time, she characterised his views on industrial policy as ‘the kind of neocorporatist incantation which signified total rejection of the economic strategy’.21 Moreover, Pym was seen by the Prime Minister as a political rival to be viewed with the utmost suspicion. She regarded him as ‘the quintessential old style Tory: a country gentleman and a soldier, a good tactician, but no strategist’.22 He exemplified everything that she wanted to get rid of in the Conservative Party. He was heard to remark privately of her, ‘The trouble is we’ve got a corporal at the top, not a cavalry officer.’ When Mrs Thatcher heard the comment, her reply exposed the class differences between them: ‘Francis is just a snob.’23 She was also exasperated by his private indecision. On one occasion, she demanded of Pym, ‘Will you make up your mind, or will Clive [Whitmore, principal private secretary] and I have to make it up for you?’24 Following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, Peter Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary, as did Humphrey Atkins, the Deputy Foreign Secretary and Richard Luce, the Minister of State. Mrs Thatcher appointed Pym as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, not out of choice, but out of necessity. Unsure whether she would survive the crisis, she
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ignored her gut instincts in favour of Julian Amery,25 and took the advice of the whips that she needed someone of political experience in the post, having lost someone of the stature of Peter Carrington. Pym was seen as the man to reunite the Conservative Party.26 Moreover, he was the only experienced senior politician without a vital portfolio who could be moved from his job without causing a potentially destabilising Cabinet reshuffle.27 Early on, Pym relied heavily on Douglas Hurd, effectively his number two at the Foreign Office.28 Hurd was the main point of continuity and, given Pym’s lack of experience in foreign affairs, and his early preoccupation with the Falklands, Hurd’s responsibilities grew in size and importance in this period. Even after the Falklands, he became Deputy Foreign Secretary in all but name.29 Hurd found Pym lacked the self-assurance of Peter Carrington and frequently noted in his diary Pym’s tendency to be morose about everything.30 In his memoirs, Nigel Lawson describes him as ‘quite the gloomiest politician I have ever met’.31
THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
Pym was part of the small War Cabinet, known as OD (SA), alongside John Nott, William Whitelaw and Cecil Parkinson.32 Mrs Thatcher rapidly lost confidence in her Foreign Secretary’s ability to hold his ground in the negotiations with Argentina being conducted via Alexander Haig, the US Secretary of State. In his memoirs, Haig recalled the growing tension between Pym and Thatcher. During one discussion, Pym remarked, ‘Maybe we should ask the Falklanders how they feel about the war.’ Mrs Thatcher replied testily, ‘Aggressors classically try to intimidate those against whom they aggress, saying things far worse than the aggression itself could happen.’33 On 21 April, Pym stumbled in the House of Commons when, during a reply to Dick Douglas, a Labour backbencher, he ruled out the use of force so long as negotiations were in play.34 His remarks were interpreted as ruling out an attack on the island of South Georgia, which the Argentinians had also captured. Pym was forced to make a supplementary statement a few moments later to correct his words and to state that the use of force could not be ruled out.35 Pym’s early mistake added to the Prime Minister’s suspicion, along with much of the Tory right, that the
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Foreign Office was overly enthusiastic in pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. On 23 April, a US peace plan was agreed in principle between Pym and Alexander Haig, the US Secretary of State. The plan called for the withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the islands and the halting of the task force steaming towards the South Atlantic. After this phase, the Americans would supervise joint control of the islands, and negotiations would start on the islands’ future status, with the wishes of the islanders to be guaranteed for five years. However, Mrs Thatcher later revealed in her memoirs that she believed the Haig proposals to be ‘totally unacceptable’, and that she was ‘at loggerheads’ with Pym over the issue, adding, ‘Did Francis realise how much he had signed away?’36 Haig’s plan was put to a meeting of the War Cabinet, where Pym urged acceptance, but the Thatcher–Nott view prevailed.37 It is clear that the Prime Minister would have resigned had the War Cabinet accepted the Haig draft.38 In any event, the Argentinians rejected the plan. With the failure of the first Haig initiative, Britain launched a series of air strikes on the airport at Port Stanley. On 2 May, the British nuclear-powered submarine Conquerer sank the Argentinian battle cruiser General Belgrano well outside the British-imposed exclusion zone, provoking a diplomatic incident. The United Nations Secretary-General Sr Javier Perez de Cuellar and representatives of several European Community countries expressed concern at the loss of life, especially the Spanish government, which warned that further military action would be a ‘grave historical error’.39 On 4 May, Pym praised the actions of the British forces while expressing deep regret at the Argentinian casualties.40 Later that same day, an Exocet missile fired from an Argentinian Super Etendard aircraft sank HMS Sheffield. At this point in the hostilities, Pym argued in the War Cabinet that it would be damaging to reject a joint American–Peruvian peace plan. The new plan, under the aegis of President Belaunde of Peru, involved the complete withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, matched by the withdrawal of British forces from the South Atlantic, supervised by representatives from a small group of countries acceptable to both sides. These representatives would undertake an interim administration of the islands in consultation with islanders’ representatives, and facilitate a negotiated settlement on the islands’ future status, although the two sides would still be able to ‘acknowledge the difference that exists between them over the status of the islands’.41
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Finally, the exclusion zone around the Falklands would be suspended and economic sanctions against Argentina lifted. The plan was effectively another draft proposal from the Americans, who were putting intense pressure on Britain to agree to a deal.42 Again, the Prime Minister was disappointed in Pym for continuing ‘to pursue a weaker line than I did’.43 Pym told the House of Commons on 7 May that a ceasefire had to be firmly linked to the beginning of an Argentinian withdrawal from the islands.44 The conflict escalated later that day when the British exclusion zone was extended to a line 12 miles from the Argentinian coast. Despite the arrival of the task force in the area, Pym defended his continued search for a negotiated settlement in the House of Commons on 13 May. During the adjournment debate, Enoch Powell indirectly invited Pym to resign in order to ‘maintain the unity of the Government’.45 The former Prime Minister, Edward Heath came to the defence of Pym, advising the Foreign Secretary not to be swayed by cries of ‘sell-out’,46 but several other Conservative backbenchers gave Pym a torrid time. This belligerent mood spread into the 1922 Committee meeting later that day, when Julian Amery was among around 40 right-wing Conservatives warning against withdrawal of the task force without achieving Britain’s objectives.47 Pym’s subsequent remarks on the ‘Weekend World’ programme that, in the end, no matter what casualties were involved, negotiations would have to take place with the Argentinian junta, angered Conservative MPs. Egged on by Enoch Powell, the Prime Minister became increasingly suspicious of the Foreign Office, which she regarded as spineless and appeasing. At the same time, her self-confidence was greatly boosted by the Falklands victory, meaning that she was much more willing to interfere in foreign affairs than the tentative Prime Minister who had appointed Carrington in 1979. This new confidence in foreign affairs was illustrated by her appointment of her own foreign-policy adviser, Sir Anthony Parsons, whom she greatly admired for his handling of the Falklands crisis in New York as Britain’s permanent representative at the United Nations.48 Such a post had not existed before. The irony is that Parsons was a Foreign Office man, but in the words of Mrs Thatcher, ‘I don’t consider you to be one of them.’49 Fortunately, Parsons’s considerable diplomatic skill reduced the number of major bust-ups with Number 10. According to Young, he ‘interpreted the Foreign Office to the Prime Minister rather than communicating her demands to them’.50 However, from the
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end of the Falklands War, until his dismissal in June 1983, the relationship between Pym and Thatcher rapidly deteriorated.
PYM’S WORLDVIEW
In the early months of his foreign secretaryship, Pym had been so busy with the Falklands crisis that he did not have the opportunity to enunciate his world vision for British foreign policy. In the year that followed, he closely followed the long-term Conservative view of Britain’s role in the world that had been pursued since Harold Macmillan: favouring free trade over protectionism, maintaining a good relationship with the USA, adopting a robust stance in the face of the Soviet Union, pursuing a gradual policy of closer relations with the EEC, and favouring the Palestinians slightly more than the Israelis in the Middle East conflict. It was essentially a pragmatic approach, approved by the Foreign Office. The west Siberian gas pipeline dispute The special relationship experienced one of its periodic fallingsout when the EEC disagreed openly with the USA in a dispute over the Soviet Union’s decision to build the west Siberian gas pipeline. On 16 June 1982, the Reagan administration announced a package of measures designed to punish the Soviets for the imposition of martial law in Poland a year earlier. The Americans imposed a ban on the supply of high-technology equipment not only by American companies, but also by their foreign subsidiaries and to foreign firms manufacturing American-products under licence or using American components. The ban was made without consulting EEC governments. Throughout the dispute, Pym took the view that the Community’s case would be infinitely stronger if the members acted with one voice.51 All EEC countries believed that the USA had no right to extend its legislation beyond the borders of its own country. It was also significant that on this issue, Mrs Thatcher, despite her gut Atlanticism, thought that the USA had been wrong to prevent existing European contracts from being fulfilled.52 In a key speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on 27 September 1982, Pym tried to distinguish between the defence and trade relationships with the Soviet Union, calling for
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the establishment of a framework of trading between East and West. Assuming the role of peacemaker, he tried to arrange a meeting between the ‘Big Four’ – Britain, West Germany, Italy and France – and George Shultz, the new US Secretary of State, to settle the dispute, but came up against French resistance. The French government wished to preserve its traditional policy of offering cheap credit to other countries, including the Soviet Union, as part of its overall trading policy. In November 1982, the EEC stance was vindicated when the USA lifted the sanctions. East–West relations Despite accusations of being too flexible and ready to compromise, Pym espoused robust, mainstream Conservative views over defence.53 He steadfastly refused to include Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent in the negotiations that were going on in Geneva between the Soviets and the Americans over intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and strongly supported NATO’s decision to station Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in western Europe. He also rejected the Soviet advocacy of a joint ‘no first use’ declaration on nuclear weapons, believing it would weaken Western deterrence. However, he later regretted the lack of progress on arms-control talks. After his dismissal, he revealed that he had unsuccessfully urged President Reagan to hold a summit meeting with the newly installed Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, on the death of President Brezhnev in November 1982.54 In a sense, the Howe–Thatcher policy of ‘opening up to the East’ (see Chapter 7) began with Pym. Howe acknowledges that his predecessor held similar views on East–West relations,55 while Young credits him with arranging a post-election seminar designed to review the future of East–West relations.56 Relations with the EEC Pym believed that Britain’s membership of the EEC was ‘an essential complement to the Atlantic Alliance’.57 He saw in Europe an opportunity to remove barriers to trade and liberalise services, and supported the establishment of an Internal Market Council during the German presidency, which was the genesis for the formation of the European single market. However, Pym’s short period as Foreign Secretary was clouded by the continuing dispute with the Community over Britain’s budgetary contributions. In May 1982, Pym negotiated a makeshift
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one-year budget contributions deal with the EEC, extending the formula worked out two years before by which Britain received a rebate of at least two-thirds of its total payments. The Foreign Office did not wish to be seen as inflexible at a time when it was canvassing for support from other EEC countries for sanctions against Argentina. (On 24 May, seven of the ten member states of the EEC agreed to continue indefinitely on a voluntary basis the economic sanctions, including a one-month ban on all imports from Argentina that had been imposed on a Community-wide basis on 16 April.)58 An extension of the 1980 budgetary agreement had been agreed, but the stopgap deal was only achieved by setting aside the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. In other words, the normal unanimity procedure in the Council of Ministers was disregarded, and majority voting used instead at the relevant agriculture council on 18 May. Speaking in the House of Commons on 26 May, Pym stated that he believed the 1982 budget settlement to be acceptable, bearing in mind that the rebates in the two previous years had worked out higher than expected. However, he regarded the unexpectedly high rebates of 1980 and 1981 as historical accidents, and that it would be wrong for the other EEC countries to reduce the level of rebates in 1982 and beyond. During the debate on the European Community, Pym voiced his disapproval of the abandonment of the unanimity principle at the Council of Agriculture Ministers meeting on 18 May, calling it ‘a major departure’ from the way in which Community business had been conducted previously. In his view, it was an example of the Community at its worst, in contrast with the solidarity that the Community had showed over the Falklands.59 The short-term nature of the 1982 deal reflected a failure to agree a new, long-term deal, both on the budget, and on farm prices, leaving Geoffrey Howe to clinch a more lasting agreement at the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984. During 1982 and 1983, the main day-to-day preoccupation on European affairs was the proposed enlargement of the European Community to encompass Spain and Portugal. The major obstacle in the negotiations was the question of Spanish restrictions on the border with Gibraltar. Pym insisted at meetings of foreign ministers during 1982 that, before Spain joined, it would have to lift these restrictions. Talks between the two countries were twice postponed during the course of 1982 because of Spanish insensitivities over the Falklands.60 Despite these obstacles, Britain saw the political benefits of bolstering democracy in both the Iberian countries after
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they had emerged from a period of fascist dictatorships. The biggest potential prize of Spanish accession to the EEC, however, was to make it more likely that its people would vote in favour of joining NATO’s political structure. The Middle East The British government officially supported the principles of the EEC Venice Declaration of June 1980, which backed Palestinian rights to self-determination, while recognising Israel’s right to exist. However, Mrs Thatcher’s pro-Israeli stance often caused problems with the Foreign Office. Given the large number of Jewish people in her constituency, the Foreign Office had to contend with what became known as ‘the Finchley factor’. Francis Pym and Douglas Hurd spent a great deal of time persuading the Prime Minister to let Hurd meet with the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) political department, Farouk Kaddoumi, ostensibly the PLO’s Foreign Minister-in-waiting. In a move to reassure Mrs Thatcher, Hurd saw Kaddoumi in July 1982 as part of a wider Arab League delegation led by the Prime Minister of Bahrain. Hurd described the meeting with Kaddoumi in his diaries as ‘a shift in policy, only dragged out of a reluctant Prime Minister’.61 The advances made over enhancing the rights of Palestinians were greatly compromised by the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon on 7 June 1982. On that day, Douglas Hurd noted in his diary, ‘He [Pym] is as usual, very gloomy about everything, especially the Anglo-American relationship.’62 Britain responded by supporting the EEC’s communiqués and the United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning the Israeli invasion, and later deployed troops as part of the multinational force comprising British, French, Dutch and US military personnel. In October 1983, after Pym’s departure from the Foreign Office, a suicide bomber killed 170 US and French troops leading to the withdrawal of the whole operation.
DISMISSAL
At the first Conservative press conference of the 1983 general election campaign, Pym again succumbed to his tendency to make realistic, but gaffe-prone remarks that irritated the Prime Minister. On this occasion, he implied that the future of the Falklands might
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be negotiated with Argentina if it renounced the use of force to settle the dispute. Mrs Thatcher interrupted Pym to make it clear that, while Britain would negotiate on commercial and diplomatic links, the issue of sovereignty was not negotiable.63 Margaret Thatcher finally dismissed Pym after the June 1983 general election for commenting on BBC’s ‘Question Time’ that ‘landslides on the whole don’t produce successful governments’.64 Although he qualified the remark with a cautious rider that a majority between 50 and 100 would be about right, the damage had been done. As Mrs Thatcher bluntly put it, she began her reshuffle ‘by dropping one would-be pilot whose sense of direction had on several occasions proved faulty’.65 Pym later recalled that his meeting with Mrs Thatcher on the evening of Friday 10 June was brief and to the point: ‘Francis’, she said, ‘I want a new Foreign Secretary.’66 In the run-up to the election, she had leaked against him, putting it about that he might become the Speaker of the House of Commons. On dismissing Pym, she pressed him to accept the position of Speaker, but such an offer was not in the Prime Minister’s gift (as she well knew): MPs were, and are, jealous of their rights in this matter. Mrs Thatcher had used her election victory not only to crush the opposition, but also to neuter someone whom she regarded as a threat to her leadership. But, with the benefit of hindsight and in view of Pym’s incompetence, the Prime Minister seems to have been overreacting to the threat posed by her Foreign Secretary. After his dismissal, Pym gave a series of speeches attacking Mrs Thatcher’s inflexible leadership style, and criticised the dangerously high level of unemployment that he believed was ‘a threat to national unity and social cohesion’.67 In May 1985, he formed a ginger group called Conservative Centre Forward, the aim of which was to ensure ‘that the flag of traditional Conservatism is kept flying … so that one day a standard bearer can pick it up and put it back at the centre of affairs, where it belongs’.68 However, after a flurry of coverage lasting about a week, the organisation sank without a trace. Pym also participated in a number of Conservative backbench rebellions, opposing the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC), rate-capping and cuts in the overseas aid budget introduced by his successor, Geoffrey Howe. Although his criticism of the policies and style of the Prime Minister became more vocal and less coded than when he had been a Cabinet minister – crystallising in his treatise, The Politics of Consent – Pym’s gentlemanly character and lack of ruthlessness prevented him from rising above the status of an
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ineffectual irritant to Mrs Thatcher. Once she had dismissed him from Cabinet, Pym was relegated to a life of comparative political obscurity, where he remained. As with all the ‘wets’, it was remarkable that, while they all felt they had a God-given right to govern and thought her policies were damaging to the social cohesion of the British nation, none emerged in the early Thatcher period to mount a serious challenge.
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
Cautious, pragmatic and a typical establishment figure hailing from the pre-Thatcher mainstream of the Conservative Party, Pym largely succeeded in keeping the basic thrust of British foreign policy along the lines pursued by successive post-war Conservative governments, despite sharp differences with Number 10. However, Pym lacked the self-assurance of a Peter Carrington or a Douglas Hurd. Neither was he able to charm Mrs Thatcher in the way that Carrington did. Despite their many differences, Mrs Thatcher had not felt threatened by Carrington because he was a hereditary peer who had no desire to become leader. Pym most definitely did. But, like Hurd, Pym was far too gentlemanly to challenge seriously for the Conservative leadership. His high intelligence led him to reject seeing politics in clear black-and-white terms; there were shades of grey like the suits he wore. But his natural honesty, mixed with a realism bordering on the gloomy, showed itself in far too many ill-judged public remarks, for which he paid dearly. Francis Pym’s short tenure in the Foreign Office was not only due to his tendency to make gloomy gaffes, but also to Mrs Thatcher’s desire to remove him as a threat to her leadership, to replace him with people who thought like her; and it resulted from her growing tendency, especially after the Falklands War, to interfere in the conduct of foreign policy. More fundamentally, Pym was dismissed because he and the Prime Minister disagreed on almost everything: ‘on the direction of policy, in our approach to government and indeed about life in general’.69
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1. Julian Critchley, ‘The Unknown Whip’, Illustrated London News, October 1971, p. 27, quoted in Philip Norton, Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1970–74 (London: Temple Smith, 1978), p. 169. 2. Ibid., p. 170. 3. John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), pp. 401 and 503. 4. William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Aurum Press, 1989), p. 74; Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 515. 5. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, p. 70. 6. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, pp. 174 and 222; Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 514. 7. In May 1974, the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed because of a Protestant workers’ strike. Both William Whitelaw and Pym were opposed to the calling of an early general election from a Northern Ireland perspective, believing that it would undermine the agreement because Brian Faulkner’s pro-Sunningdale Unionists would be replaced by diehards at the election. Whitelaw, Memoirs, p. 121; Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 579. 8. Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 326. 9. Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Pan Books, revised paperback edn, 1993), p. 101; Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 386. 10. John Davies died later that year. 11. The Times Portrait, ‘Why Pym’s No. 1 on the Hit List’, The Times, 27 May 1983. 12. Although Britain subsequently shifted to the Trident II missile system. 13. Kenneth Harris, Thatcher (London: Fontana paperback edn, 1989), p. 157; Young, One of Us, pp. 210–11. 14. Even had the savings of £500 million been implemented, the government would still have met its 3 per cent commitment to NATO. Indeed, in every year between 1979 and 1985 that promise was kept. John Nott’s proposed defence review failed to be implemented after the outbreak of the Falklands War. 15. The Times, 2 February 1982. 16. In 1981, Pym had succeeded in re-establishing the ‘liaison committee’, through which Conservative Central Office and ministers were supposed to coordinate the government’s message: Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollins paperback, 1995), p. 149. 17. Peter Stothard, ‘Pym’s Game: The Stakes are Raised’, The Times, 3 February 1982. 18. Young, One of Us, p. 267. 19. Harris, Thatcher, pp. 148–9; Young, One of Us, p. 267. 20. The Times Portrait, ‘Why Pym’s No. 1 on the Hit List’, The Times, 27 May 1983. 21. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 150. 22. Ibid., p. 187. 23. Young, One of Us, p. 331. 24. Young, One of Us, p. 165. 25. Alan Clark, Diaries (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), p. 97. 26. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 187. 27. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 246–7; Harris, Thatcher, p. 180; Young, One of Us, p. 266. 28. Douglas Hurd was in the number two spot ahead of fellow Ministers of State, Lord Belstead, Cranley Onslow and Neil Marten (and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Malcolm Rifkind) because, with the exception of Marten at Overseas Development, he was the only minister left after the ministerial resignations on the outbreak of the hostilities in the Falklands. 29. Even though Mrs Thatcher saw no need for him to be in the Cabinet, as Humphrey Atkins had been, because of Peter Carrington being in the House of Lords. On the reshuffle therefore, the Cabinet’s size fell from 23 to 22. 30. Mark Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1998), p. 117. 31. Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, 2nd edn (London: Corgi Books, 1993), p. 425. See also Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years: My Life in Politics (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), p. 59.
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32. Paymaster-General and chairman of the Conservative Party from 1981 to 1983. 33. Alexander Haig, Caveat (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), p. 280. Geoffrey Howe also later commented on Mrs Thatcher’s despair during their Sunday evening chats at Pym’s ‘intrinsically hopeless’ attempts to secure a settlement with the Argentinians: Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 246–7. 34. House of Commons Debates, 21 April 1982, col. 278. 35. House of Commons Debates, 21 April 1982, col. 280. 36. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 206–7. 37. John Nott suggested that no comment should be made on the Haig draft until the US Secretary of State had first put it to the Argentinians. 38. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 207. 39. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 31711. 40. House of Commons Debates, 4 May 1982, col. 19. 41. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 31711. 42. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 217. 43. Ibid., p. 220. 44. House of Commons Debates, 7 May 1982, col. 395. 45. House of Commons Debates, 13 May 1982, col. 968. 46. House of Commons Debates, 13 May 1982, col. 978. 47. The Times, 14 May 1982. 48. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 182, 218, 232. 49. Young, One of Us, p. 380. 50. Ibid. 51. House of Commons Debates, 20 October 1982, col. 351. 52. House of Commons Debates, 1 July 1982, cols. 1043–4. A British company, John Brown Engineering, was heavily affected by the ban, having been contracted to provide pump equipment for the gas pipeline project: Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 253. 53. See Francis Pym, ‘Defence and Disarmament’, The Politics of Consent (London: Sphere Books, 1985), ch. 4. 54. The Times, 17 January 1984. 55. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 319. 56. Young, One of Us, p. 390. 57. Francis Pym, ‘The EEC must be our Future’, The Times, 10 January 1983. 58. Ireland and Italy refused to continue with the sanctions, but agreed not to allow their countries to be used to circumvent the embargo, while the Danish government reserved its position pending legislation in its national parliament: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 31713. 59. House of Commons Debates, 28 May 1982, cols. 936–43. 60. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 31833. 61. 8 July 1982. Diary Readings with Douglas Hurd, 17 December 1996. (On Diary Readings, see Stuart, Douglas Hurd.) 62. Diary Readings with Douglas Hurd, 17 December 1996. 63. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 293–4. 64. Ibid., p. 294. 65. Ibid., p. 306. 66. Francis Pym, Introduction to 2nd edn, The Politics of Consent, p. ix. 67. Francis Pym, ‘Jobs: The Case for Compassion’, The Times, 1 December 1983; see also Francis Pym, ‘Miners: Now for the Human Touch’, The Times, 19 September 1984. 68. Pym, The Politics of Consent, p. xi. 69. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 306.
7
Geoffrey Howe: Foreign Secretary, 1983–89 David Seawright
CAREER
Whether one admires or abhors the ‘Thatcher years’ there is no denying their centrality to any analysis of contemporary British politics, particularly that of foreign policy. Likewise, one cannot gainsay the pivotal role of Geoffrey Howe in this putative Thatcherite revolution. Howe was her ‘right-hand man’ as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1979–83 and the longest serving Foreign Secretary, from 1983 to 1989, since Ernest Bevin in the immediate post-war years. He then went on to serve as Lord President and Leader of the House (Deputy Prime Minister) until 1 November 1990, but by that time Mrs Thatcher had him firmly located ‘on her immediate left’.1 Unfortunately, posterity may recall Geoffrey Howe more for his role in the eventual demise of Mrs Thatcher, particularly for his devastating resignation speech on 13 November 1990, than for any notable achievement at the Foreign Office or even at the Exchequer. However, this chapter sets out to examine and assess not only the personality and style of Howe as Foreign Secretary but more importantly the contemporary foreign-policy issues that he faced when in office. We begin by examining Howe’s formative background: it will be shown that his early life is very relevant in any explanation of his personality, style and what may be termed his ‘classical liberal’ approach to foreign affairs. The formative influences on Geoffrey Howe, even his childhood, are important in understanding his eventual approach to foreign relations. Indeed, in his memoirs he asks the question:
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‘Why should this English-speaking, London-living, Winchesterand Cambridge-educated and apparently uncymric Conservative trouble to trace his roots back to a grimy Welsh township …?’2 But his roots in this Cymric climate helped shape a view of national identity, a view which underpinned his approach to European integration and his opinion that sovereignty need not be inimical to supranationalist, overlapping and multidimensional structures of partnership and participation. He states, ‘if I am asked my nationality, I should often, if not always, reply not “British” but “Welsh”. When I speak of my identity, my sense of belonging, of my cultural community, I claim not one but two nationalities, British and Welsh. Very often in Cardiff, I am proud to be British, fed up with the parochialism of the Welsh. But get me to Paddington, and I am proud to be Welsh and fed up with the patronising attitudes of the English.’3 For Howe, holding this dual, or even multi-, position on national identity showed that parochial nationalism as a policy stance was shallow and deficient, while supranational organisations need not undermine the ‘identity’ of the individual. While commenting on the proposed trades union ban at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Howe could use such sentiments to suggest that Thatcher’s parochial nationalism led to ‘an inability to appreciate, still less accommodate, somebody else’s patriotism’. He went on: A great patriot herself, with an enormous instinctive loyalty, she found it hard to respect or sympathize with the sense of loyalty of others, or even with the idea of a wider or different loyalty for herself. Even Welshness, I sometimes felt, she regarded as somehow beyond some unspoken pale – still more Irishness. It was the perception of this kind of instinct, I believe, that led to the progressive disenchantment of the Scottish people with her leadership, and, in the end, to her inability to reconcile the idea of European Union with the concept of national patriotism.4
Howe was born in Aberavon, Wales, in 1926 and the first stamp on his nascent Welshness was a strong non-conformist legacy with Presbyterianism and Calvinistic Methodism being found on his maternal and paternal sides respectively. This non-conformist background included the almost obligatory association with Liberalism, with his grandfather and great uncle serving on Glamorgan County Council for the Liberal Party; as Howe points out ‘Wales in those days was almost a one-party state.’5 His mother was the avowed Conservative in the family but, while training for the Signals Regiment at the end of the war in Exeter, Howe
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supported the Liberal candidate for that seat at the 1945 election. Although he cannot recall the reason for this allegiance, he said that with only 12 Liberal MPs getting elected the result ‘was not calculated to boost a young man’s confidence in the future of the party’.6 The ‘British’ half of Howe’s duality of identity was shaped very firmly by his educational experiences at such elitist institutions as Winchester and Cambridge. Indeed, for those analysts looking for evidence that policy-making is predicated upon the educational and social homogeneity of elites,7 Howe’s memoirs offer some valuable evidence. This work is littered with references to such ‘old boy networks’ assuming competence, efficiency and rectitude by virtue of association to Winchester, Oxbridge or the ‘silk’ profession. For example, when referring to dealings with the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, he poses the question: ‘What on earth would William of Wykeham [‘manners makyth man’] have thought of such a villain being so fêted by three representatives of the Wykehamist tradition’;8 three of Thatcher’s ministers no less. Moreover, at Winchester, along with fellow student Robert Sheaf, he was to develop a lifelong interest and affection for the ‘distributist’ ideas of G. K. Chesterton.9 Chesterton was very much a Liberal by inheritance and as such the ‘Chesterbelloc’ political doctrine, inter alia, ‘constituted a potent form of Liberal anticollectivism … a hostility to the contemporary growth in the power of the state and expressed instead the cause of the free individual’.10 Once again, we find a connection with liberalism and liberal ideas playing a significant role in that early formative period.11 While still a law student at Cambridge in the early 1950s he outlined his pro-Europeanism in an exchange of ideas with Robert Sheaf over the 1950 Schuman Plan. Howe thought the argument that Britain could stand on its own feet unduly optimistic; thus, active British leadership in some form of European union was essential politically. This was the ‘commitment’ that Howe took with him into his political career, and the opportunity to act on this commitment presented itself in Heath’s administration of 1970–74. He was as enthusiastic as Heath for early entry into Europe and played a vital role as Solicitor-General in helping to pilot the European Communities Bill through Parliament. With such staunch views on the European issue it may have been salutary for Thatcher to have actually given it ‘much thought at the time’.12 Nevertheless, as a committed classical liberal on fiscal and monetary policy Thatcher was at ease appointing him to the
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Treasury when taking office in 1979. Here he was to gain a feel for international summitry through such meetings as the IMF and G7, international meetings that would be the life-blood of his stay at the Foreign Office. For some decades now academics have commentated on the blurring of the boundaries between the foreign and domestic spheres, but Howe was probably the first Chancellor who had to deal with a qualitative rise in the number of such international meetings which bridged and straddled these spheres in an interdependent world.13 Interestingly, during the Falklands conflict Mrs Thatcher heeded the advice of Harold Macmillan and kept the Treasury at arm’s length from the war, so as not to have financial concerns undermine its full prosecution. One may surmise that Howe felt aggrieved at being excluded from the important decisions on this issue but ironically this was a period when Thatcher and Howe were probably closest, utilising the connecting door between Numbers 10 and 11 Downing Street to have cosy fireside chats on most topics.14
PERSONAL STYLE
The phlegmatic, almost soporific style of Geoffrey Howe is now legendary. His character is that of a lawyer who revels in the minutiae of documents; not one liable to ‘light up’ a room on entry. He is said to have the ability to ‘make dullness an art form’.15 Indeed, in their biography of Howe, Hillman and Clarke view such a style as having distinct advantages for a Foreign Secretary, as the lack of drama that may soothe people to sleep can also defuse over-emotional and potentially dangerous situations.16 Of course, his colleagues could also utilise such talents for the more prosaic situations of low politics. Ken Clarke gives a rather humorous example of this when describing the ‘problems’ of Cabinet government under Thatcher: The problem was how to keep cabinet going because the press would begin to get scornful if we walked out an hour after starting the only full meeting of the week. The result was that Geoffrey Howe was always encouraged to give an extremely long account of the current state of play in foreign affairs. Sometimes it would take the first half to three-quarters of an hour. My problem was that Geoffrey does speak in a very low voice and the cabinet room is quite large. Given that I started right at the end of the cabinet table, he was virtually inaudible. David Young, who sat next to me,
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explained that it didn’t matter. This was a matter of using up time, otherwise the cabinet would end too quickly.17
It is clear that Thatcher possessed an ambivalent attitude towards Howe from the earliest days, from becoming leader of the party in 1975. She praised his economic policies and was particularly laudatory of his achievements when in the office of Chancellor, where he ‘never flinched’ in challenging the Keynesian corporatist orthodoxy of that time. In her estimation he was a fine Chancellor who was a ‘tower of strength’, in stark contrast to the damp colleagues and even to some of the ‘fair-weather monetarists’ of her first Cabinet. Yet, she seriously considered Keith Joseph for the position of shadow Chancellor in 1975.18 Of greater import was the fact that Howe was not her first choice for the post of Foreign Secretary in 1983 either; this was earmarked for Cecil Parkinson. She believed that Parkinson was much more in tune with her own thoughts on foreign policy – ‘that Britain’s interests must come first in foreign policy’. In retrospect she expressed doubts over Howe’s suitability for the post: Geoffrey was, indeed, very good at the business of negotiation of a text line by line, for which his training as a lawyer and his experience at the Treasury fitted him. He was a perfect right-hand man for the European Councils I attended. But he fell under the spell of the Foreign Office where compromise and negotiation were ends in themselves. This magnified his faults and smothered his virtues. In his new department he fell into the habits which the Foreign Office seems to cultivate – a reluctance to subordinate tactics to the national interest … To the extent that Geoffrey did have a cause to guide him in foreign affairs it was one on which we were far apart, though I did not give this much thought at the time.19
Howe believed this simplistic view of the Foreign Office to be rather puerile but he does concede that, if Parkinson had become Foreign Secretary, ‘British foreign policy, towards Europe in particular, might have been pressed much earlier and more decisively in the wrong direction’.20 Of course, Europe is one of the dominant and most divisive issues of modern British politics21 and this was the fulcrum around which other foreign-policy disagreements between Howe and Thatcher crystallised. Yet, as we shall see, divisions ran much deeper and were more fundamental between the two than just those of European policy. If Thatcher and Howe became so far apart on foreign policy and if the relationship was so marred on this issue by dissension and discord then it is certainly quite legitimate for us to ask why? Why
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did a relationship that had included cosy fireside chats end in irreparable estrangement; a split that began in the mid-1980s? Why did Thatcher keep Geoffrey Howe in this office after their dissension was so evident? Why did Howe voluntarily remain in place for so long? There are certainly no clear and simple answers to such conundrums but this chapter offers an insight into the tempestuous relationship and an explanation of why there was a fundamental division in foreign policy between the two. First, in short, Geoffrey Howe was very much more in the mould of a classical liberal and as such was an economic and fiscal ‘soulmate’ of Thatcher. Freedom of choice for the individual in a free-enterprise market economy was an early guiding political principle. He boasts that his early pamphlets, for example Lifeblood of Liberty, 1954, chimed with the views found later in the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), founded in 1957; and thus his economic liberalism was very much a core commitment. Indeed, Howe attended meetings of the famous ‘liberal’ Mont Pèlerin Society.22 Moreover, he points out that it was he who cautiously recommended Thatcher to the IEA in 1969, some time before the advent of what we call Thatcherism.23 But that is where Mrs Thatcher’s classical liberalism stops. On foreign policy she was very much the ‘combative Tory’ while Geoffrey Howe retained a fundamental ‘idealist liberal’ approach to such issues.24 Whereas Thatcher was a Tory whose visceral instincts were ‘my country right or wrong’, Howe’s instinctive thought process or Weltanschauung was firmly located within the liberal idealist paradigm. It may be stretching it too far to claim, as Thatcher did, that compromise and negotiation were ends in themselves for Howe but there is no doubt, in the words of Hillman and Clarke, that the key to his ‘approach to foreign affairs lies in dialogue and contact. It is a value in itself, he believes, for understanding and confidence building’.25 Second, their differences on the European issue and foreign policy per se were exacerbated by their diametrically opposed positions on the Atlanticist–European divide within the Conservative Party. As we shall see, Mrs Thatcher’s firmly held conviction that the special relationship with the USA was the first tenet of Conservative foreign policy was equally matched by Howe’s, just as strongly held, conviction that it should be one of European Union. He was in that sense much more like Heath. Such was the strength of this conviction for Howe that it led him to support the collectivist, state interventionist candidate, Michael Heseltine, against Thatcher’s leadership in 1990, in face of a lifetime’s fight against such ‘wet’ ideas in the Conservative Party. This
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conviction is quite evident in one instance where Howe states: ‘how far are we, will we in the future be, wise to base our security on a transatlantic or on a European foundation? … There was always a distinction between Margaret’s instinctive reaction to these questions and my own. Yet the difference was never, as far as I was concerned, an absolute one.’26 Maybe not, but as we shall see it was very much towards the absolute end of any spectrum; and, more importantly, this ‘West–West’ divide was to increasingly colour a competing discourse, a discourse remarkable between a Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary. We see this remarkable approach, or more specifically approaches, to foreign policy by Howe and Thatcher set out below in different vistas of their foreign policy. In other words ‘the long series of events’ in major foreign-policy areas are critically examined and underpin the claim that a Liberal–combative Tory divide, in conjunction with an Atlanticist–European divide, fundamentally shaped the foreign-policy approach and style of Geoffrey Howe. This approach would end finally in bitter recriminations between himself and Thatcher, and would eventually overshadow not only Howe’s tenure at the Foreign Office but his time in Thatcher’s government as a whole.
CONTEXT AND POLICIES
The West–West vista John Dickie, when describing the actual physical characteristics of the Foreign Office, mentions the five huge murals by Sir Sigismund Goetze completed in 1919. These depict Britannia in various labours, but one in particular – with imagery of handsacross-the-sea that reach out to that great ‘republic of liberty’, America – symbolises the long-standing special relationship between the United Kingdom and the USA.27 With such a theme in mind Mrs Thatcher offered five tenets of Conservative foreign policy, the first of these principles being collective security; security, by not only recognising the American ‘hegemon’ but by enthusiastically welcoming it, along with Britain’s special place beside this hegemonic superpower. Of course, she stated that such ‘American leadership’ would be resented by other powers and by emerging powers, not to mention hypersensitive Europeans, but the special relationship should never be allowed to cool to near freezing
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point.28 Aughey points out that this has been a recurring theme of British foreign policy and, in particular, official Conservative policy has consistently supported the value of the special relationship and the unique quality of the connection and its importance for Britain’s role in the world.29 However, Geoffrey Howe’s view, in line with Heath’s, did not accept this first tenet. Howe states, when setting out his foreign-policy agenda: ‘One perennial item was the management of the UK’s position within the Western alliance – the balance between our special (I tried never to use the word) relationship with the United States and our place in the European Community. I had long regarded this last as the key to all our wider relationships.’30 Events for Howe, almost immediately on taking office in 1983, merely reinforced for him his alternative viewpoint. He faced a baptism of fire with the US invasion of Grenada, in conjunction with the developments inside GCHQ over unionisation, along with heated exchanges over the demand for a British rebate from the European budget and the shooting down of the South Korean passenger KAL007 flight by the Soviets. Howe personally, and on behalf of the government, felt humiliated by events in Grenada. He believed Britain to be a mere pawn in the middle of a US interdepartmental power struggle, between the Pentagon and the State Department. But, whatever the underlying explanation for the US invasion, he suggests that both he and Thatcher were dumbfounded at such a decision: ‘What on earth were we to make of a relationship, special or otherwise, in which a message requesting the benefit of our advice was so quickly succeeded by another which made it brutally clear that that advice was being treated as of no consequence whatsoever?’31 Although an ex-British colony, Grenada was conspicuously within the American sphere of interest and thus the USA was extremely sensitive to Cuban involvement in this area. As reports circulated about the coup, which saw the death of the Marxist leader Maurice Bishop, Howe informed the Commons that he knew of no intention by the Americans to intervene, and the fact that he felt misled by the Americans on this left a bitter aftertaste.32 Indeed, the very night the decision to invade was taken, Monday 24 October 1983, he had addressed the American Bankers’ Association, to whom he intimated just how struck he was ‘by the extraordinary closeness of the relationship between our two countries’.33 Either such sentiments were the sometimes necessary disingenuous platitudes of diplomatic speeches or indeed that aftertaste was in fact a defining moment in his worldview, particularly on West–West relations. We should therefore be wary
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of the retrospective justification of memoirs which by their very nature offer us a coherence to thought which was most probably lacking, or at least less defined, at the time. Whatever the timing of Howe’s circumspection on the relationship with the USA there is no doubting its continuity and its hardening in the aftermath of Grenada. Thatcher, of course, took the contrasting line that short-term difficulties should not be allowed to undermine the long-term alliance, and for her Grenada was explained away as an overreaction to the American disaster in Lebanon, when 242 US servicemen lost their lives. Although US intervention in Lebanon was a failure against terrorism, she retrospectively viewed their intervention in Grenada as a success with the restoration of democracy for the people of Grenada.34 An American dimension was also present in what at first sight may appear a quintessentially domestic problem, the role of unions at GCHQ. This was not only in the sense that a polygraph lie detector had been introduced to this establishment in the wake of the Geoffrey Prime case. Prime, a linguist, had been spying for the Soviet Union and was embarrassingly convicted on the eve of the 1983 general election. In January 1984 a policy was introduced to ban trade unions at GCHQ and over 90 per cent of the workforce had accepted the loss of union rights in the cause of national security. But there was a committed minority who would not accept the £1,000 on offer to forego their union rights; the enduring saga of the perceived persecution of this minority degenerated into such a debacle that Howe was nearly forced to resign over it. Howe wanted a compromise that would allow for union membership, ‘the card in the pocket solution’, which would also protect against any withdrawal of labour or disruption by the unions, but Thatcher would have none of it. It was strongly suggested that the whole affair was in some way due to US pressure because the Americans had lost confidence in the poor performance of GCHQ’s intelligence-gathering role. Rightly, the Americans were worried about intelligence and the damage to this that industrial conflict could rend, but Howe categorically states that the UK needed no urging from the USA on this matter.35 However, the government knew it had a reputation to restore, with Afghanistan and Poland being just two examples of where GCHQ fell far short of what was expected in this area, and the Foreign Secretary could not deny this vital intelligence partnership with the USA.36 But the Foreign Secretary could demur from the American perceived need for a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). To Thatcher’s chagrin Howe consistently raised objections and created difficulties
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over the issue of ‘star wars’. When addressing the US Congress in February 1985, Thatcher took the opportunity to give strong public support for SDI but regarded private candour to be the quid pro quo of this support; in private she raised reservations about SDI. However, she was of the opinion that this candour could only be best employed by the absence of her Foreign Secretary Howe and Defence Secretary Heseltine; in any future private dealings with Washington both these ministers would be left out of the loop,37 particularly after Charles Powell became, in effect, her ‘national security adviser’. In fact, Howe was more inclined to ally any ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ with the French. One month later Howe took the opportunity of a speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to make the private reservations public. His basic argument was that the Americans were in danger of stimulating a new arms race rather than curbing it or enhancing deterrence. To add insult to injury for Thatcher the Foreign Office rated his speech a striking and pathfinding contribution to the debate while right-wing Americans were supposedly infuriated by it. Indeed, Richard Perle merely thought it proved an old axiom of geometry that length was no substitute for depth. Three weeks after the RUSI speech Howe was startled to find that Radio Prague had broadcast the text of the speech in full and he positively revelled in the idea that he was seen on both sides of the Iron Curtain as an independent participant in the East–West debate.38 Of course this idea of Howe as an independent participant sat very uneasily with Thatcher’s view on the special relationship, with the USA as Britain’s most loyal ally. Indeed, in Howe’s first year as Foreign Secretary he attended an intimate ceremony where the Queen conferred an honorary knighthood on Caspar Weinberger, the US Defence Secretary, for the ‘quite exceptional services he had rendered to promote the safety of British soldiers, sailors and airmen during the Falklands conflict’.39 The East–West vista It would be stretching the point too far to declare Geoffrey Howe the last Cold War Foreign Secretary but there is no doubt that he was the incumbent, and an influential player for the government, when the substantive thaw took place. Although, as late as 1987, he was not expecting the Soviets to dismantle their system40 he did indeed help smooth the path to better relations between the USSR and the UK. Howe played a part in the important East–West dialogue leading up to the Iron Curtain’s eventual demise and he
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must be credited for his consistent and tenacious advocacy of human rights when dealing with the East. In his dealings with the Soviet authorities Howe had a distinct advantage with his access to the intelligence secrets supplied by Oleg Gordievski, the KGB’s number two at the USSR embassy in London. From the information gleaned from this source, Howe was initially struck by the fact that the Soviets actually believed their own rhetoric; it was not merely propaganda that they knew to be false. He argues that the West’s rhetoric, particularly in the first years of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, was counterproductive and merely reinforced the siege mentality of the Soviets. He gives, as an explicit example of this, the Soviet reaction to the rhetoric in the wake of the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL 007 in September 1983. ‘It took the Soviets several days to be sure that their blundering was the cause of this tragedy. But blundering it was. Yet within hours the American authorities, at almost every level, were proclaiming it a piece of deliberately calculated, cold-blooded Soviet wickedness. The principal effect of this simplistic overreaction came near to convincing Moscow, Andropov included, that the whole incident had somehow been contrived, as a cunning trap, by the CIA.’41 But this understanding of Soviet fears did not in the least attenuate his robust defence of liberal democratic values and human rights. The old Soviet state, one may even say the ‘evil empire’, was symbolised by Foreign Minister Gromyko’s 27 years in that position. For Howe, Gromyko epitomised the unyielding and intractable side of Soviet diplomacy. Howe doggedly raised human-rights concerns with him, but on many occasions Gromyko pointedly ignored them or dismissed them out of hand. On a third occasion within a matter of months in 1984, at the New York General Assembly in September of that year, Howe ‘raised the same human-rights names with him as we left the table to take our coffee when no one else was within earshot. His reply was just as prompt and even more brutal: “Sakharov”, he said, taking up one of my names apparently at random, “Sakharov. That is Russian for sugar. No thank you. I don’t take sugar with my coffee.” He was grinning dismissively. As far as he was concerned that was it.’42 This forceful and principled commitment to human rights was a constant in Howe’s relations with Eastern Europe. So much so in fact that he was prepared to ruffle the feathers of the communist authorities on his visits behind the Iron Curtain, to the extent of engaging in machinations with dissidents. After having consulted with East German Protestants and a Czech cardinal he socialised
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with his Czechoslovak hosts in March 1985, singing in a tavern, while his Foreign Office officials kept a secret rendezvous with the dissidents of Charter 77 to discuss abuses of human rights. A few nights later he was to attend the grave of Father Jerzy Popieluszko in Poland, a moving ceremony that was viewed as a calculated snub to the authorities and a symbolic act of freedom. As Hillman and Clarke put it: Le Monde summed up his trip as affecting the case for human rights in ‘a spectacular fashion’. Meanwhile the London Times’ main leader column declared that it was the first time a British Foreign Secretary, let alone a European foreign minister, had made it abundantly clear that any serious improvement in arms control and economic development with the Soviet bloc depended fundamentally on advances in human freedoms within that system.43
The intractable and unyielding Soviet façade was about to experience a qualitative change with the deaths in quick succession of the old Soviet stalwarts, Andropov and Chernenko. And the British were to play a vital part in identifying the future leader of the new era and establishing contact with him. Working on information from the Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and intelligence from Gordievski, Gorbachev, as the most promising candidate, was invited to Britain on the ingenious pretext that the Conservative House of Commons foreign affairs party committee had invited him: this was because of Gorbachev’s position as chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s foreign affairs committee. Howe had strongly intimated that Gorbachev could meet the Prime Minister if he were to accept the invitation. Contact was duly made and in December 1984 it was quickly established that Gorbachev was ‘a man to do business with’; ‘four hours of conversation that changed the shape of our world’.44 When Chernenko finally passed away the British now had a head start in a communicative channel to the new Soviet leader. When Eduard Shevardnadze replaced Gromyko, the outlook for UK–Soviet relations was considerably rosier. There were of course the frequent occasions when friction would arise over security matters, like the time when Gordievski was found to be a British spy and was smuggled out of the Soviet Union in July 1985 with the inevitable tit-for-tat expulsions that followed. But, all in all, the new Soviet leadership was more responsive to arguments on human rights and more willing to do business on arms, which led directly to the historic Gorbachev–Reagan agreement on the substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons in December 1987. And moreover,
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along with the perceptible melting of the ice in East–West relations, the prospect for a better and safer future was firmly put in place. An African punchball Both Thatcher and Howe took Gordievski’s reports about his Soviet masters extremely seriously. Howe stresses that each found opportunities to warn allies and friends of the genuineness of Soviet fears. One of these opportunities was the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in November 1983 in New Delhi. Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere made an emphatic point that it was when the powerful were frightened that the world really felt nervous; he gave a Swahili proverb about the grass suffering when the elephants fight. Thatcher joined in to express the sentiments that any hope of influencing others was only likely through the medium of contact. Howe adds: ‘It was a useful coalescing of ideas, for which the Commonwealth offered unique opportunities. What a pity it is, I mused then and thereafter, that American leaders have no opportunity to enjoy such relaxed exchanges.’45 Later events were to prove anything but relaxed and added to the tensions between the Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary. The rift between Britain and her Commonwealth partners over further sanctions towards South Africa was matched in intensity by the rift between Howe and Thatcher themselves on the issue. Howe believed that Thatcher’s absolutist views on such issues undermined the British position. She failed, in his eyes, to understand or empathise with such groups as black people in Soweto, Palestinians in the Gaza strip and nationalists in the Bogside. It was wrong to negatively colour one’s view of these groups because of terrorist campaigns, as Thatcher, in his eyes, had done.46 He was of the opinion that this militated against Thatcher reading the strident signals now emanating from their Commonwealth colleagues. An example of this was the press conference held by Thatcher after some form of consensus had been reached at the CHOGM in Bermuda in October 1985. It was agreed not to extend sanctions in any fundamental way until a group of Commonwealth eminent persons had conducted an investigative and mediatory mission to South Africa and reported back. But Thatcher, in the press conference immediately after the summit, with the provocative imagery of her thumb and forefinger a fraction of an inch apart, stated she had moved ‘only a little bit’. For Howe, ‘with four little words she had at one and the same time humiliated three dozen heads
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of government, devalued the policy on which they had just agreed – and demeaned herself’.47 But Howe did not directly challenge her as he sat alongside her facing the press or indeed on the way back from Bermuda or even later back home in Britain. Time and tiredness seemed to be the retrospective justification for no challenge.48 Indeed, Mrs Thatcher subsequently tried to persuade Howe to become one of those ‘eminent persons’, and she readily admits to being a touch insensitive in suggesting that she could cope with both their jobs while he was in Africa as an eminent person.49 But in June 1985 at the European Council in the Hague, it was agreed, notwithstanding his extreme reluctance, to send Howe, as a sort of lone eminent person to Africa to press for reform. His reluctance was more than justified, as he was to face a barrage of abuse and hostility from both black and white politicians alike. Howe’s character, it has been suggested, is ideally suited for such thankless tasks. Hillman and Clarke describe him as a ‘wellbalanced buoy, which remains upright whatever the height, strength and power of the waves’.50 And he was certainly buffeted by the waves of indignation he faced in Africa, especially from Zambia’s President Kaunda who lectured him in front of the television cameras as if he were ‘a petty thief before a pompous magistrate’.51 He faced a similar humiliation, thankfully in private, from Botha of South Africa. Where others would have walked out in face of such provocation Howe’s character led him to stick with it whatever the battering and usually his style was more towards ‘soothing people to sleep’ in such volatile situations. This liberal idealist viewpoint is markedly clear in a post-diplomatic session press conference held in Pretoria: ‘I represent not just twelve governments [Britain had the European presidency at the time], but values that have been forged in the fires of two world wars: reconciliation, not conflict; consent, not coercion; justice and freedom, not domination … All I can say to every side is that talking can solve many problems however difficult, and violence few.’52 Indeed, Paul Sharp utilised Howe’s phrase to stress the British approach at the time, that South Africa would reform, sooner rather than later, because it was confronted by ‘the overwhelming weight of commonsense’ and not because it was faced by threats.53 But such an approach and style did not always impress his leader. Thatcher did not easily accept concession as a diplomatic strategy. Even over the ‘successful’ negotiations on Hong Kong, Thatcher baulked at the advice from Howe and the Foreign
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Office that she should ‘concede early in the talks that British administration would not continue’.54 Ming vase relations One notable success for Howe as Foreign Secretary was his benchmark agreement with China over the future of Hong Kong post-1997 when the vast bulk of the colonial territory was to revert to Chinese control. Indeed, while later commenting on this, he seemed particularly struck by Deng Xiaoping’s apt aphorism of ‘one country, two systems’ as a final summary of the arrangements: ‘It is astonishing how the key to a negotiation can be found in four words like that – one country, China, two systems, communism and capitalism. Once you are taught the value of a four word slogan of that kind you find yourself using the same technique on far too many occasions.’55 Hong Kong, for Howe, was one more of those colonial problems that was left over from history. When Howe took office in 1983 the 1997 deadline, when the colony would revert back to Chinese control, was looming large on the horizon. And there was not much to bargain with. Britain had just 8 per cent of the colony in perpetuity but water and other supplies could so easily be cut off by the Chinese to this part of the territory. This, then, was the hand that Howe had been dealt and was expected to negotiate with in his dealings with the Chinese. It may be suggested that Howe’s character, personality and skills were entirely suited for this sort of negotiation, where there was no real alternative on offer. In 1984 he informed the people of Hong Kong that there could be no realistic possibility of continued British administration after 1997. But he first had to convince Thatcher herself of the realities of the situation. Howe states that his team did prepare with massive thoroughness and care for the forensic approach needed for such negotiations with the Chinese. To diminish the confrontational atmosphere implicit in this forensic approach he ‘designed a series of metaphors which might serve to range us all on the same side’. He further stated: In my opening talk with Wu [Foreign Minister], for example, I likened Hong Kong to a Ming vase – an object of priceless value, which we were engaged in handing over just like the baton in a relay race. If we were not to risk the disaster of dropping the vase, we simply had to get our thinking in line with each other. So at the first banquet I asked Wu the age of a particularly striking candelabra on the table. ‘Not more than three hundred years old’, he answered.
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The negotiations with the Chinese throughout 1984 were extremely arduous and progress was painstakingly slow. His meetings with the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, were fraught with that ‘forensic atmosphere’ and Howe had the House of Commons as well as Hong Kong legislature to report back to on any initiatives raised or any progress that developed. The solution of course was to be based on the Chinese idea of ‘one country, two systems’; the final agreement was a joint declaration announced by Howe in October 1984: and the deal was signed by Thatcher in December 1984: ‘We have agreed … the framework and key issues of an agreement which will preserve Hong Kong’s unique economic system and way of life … Hong Kong’s economic and social systems, its distinctive way of life and its position as a financial and industrial centre will be secured.’57 Deng, it should be noted, had a much different view of the status of certain nations, like the USA, in the international pecking order: ‘He [Deng] was full of enthusiasm for the Joint Declaration. Continued investment into Hong Kong would continue, he said, since the Americans and Japanese governments had assured him of that – “so there’s no need to bother about all the other less important countries, Indians and people like that”.’58 The joint declaration was seen as Howe’s greatest a