Essential Histories
Byzantium at War
Routledge
lohn Haldon
Taylor &Franch-
Contents Introduction Chronology
19
Background to war
The political world of Byzantium
23
Warring sicks
Neighbours and enemies
29
Outbreak
Why and how did B p n t i u m fight wars?
36
The fighting
Crrganising for war
47
Portrait of a sald~er
Recruitment, discipline, and life on campaign
61
The w d d around war
War and peace
72
Portrajt of a civjlian
Metrios - a farmer
80
How the wars ended
Death of an empire
86
Conclusion and consequences
War; peace, and survival
90
Further reading
92
Byzantine rulers AD 527- 1 453
93
Index
94
Introduction The Byzantine empire was not called by that name In its own time, and indeed the term 'Byzantine' was used only to describe inhabitantsof Constanttnople, ancient Byzantion on the Bosphorus. The subjects of the emperor at Constantinople referred to themselves as Rhomaioi, Romans,kcause as far as they were concaned Constantinople, the clty of Constantine I, the flrst Christian ruler of the Roman empire, had become the capital of the Roman empire once Rome had lost its o m preeminent position, and it was the CMstian Roman empire that carried an the traditions of Roman civilisation. In turn, the latter was identified with civlIised society as such, and Orthodox Christianity was both the guiding religrow and spiritual force which defend4 and protected that world, but war also the guarantor ~f Gad's continuing support. Orthodoxy means, literally, correct belief, and this was what the Byzantines believed was essential to their own survival. Thus, from the modern historian's perspective, 'Byzantine' might be paraphrased by the more long-winded 'medievaleastern RomanJempire, for that is, in historical terms, what 'Bymntium' really meant. In its long history, from the later 5th century, when the last vestiges af the western hatf of the Roman emphe were absorbed into barbarian successor kingdoms, until the fall in battle of the last eastern Roman emperor, Constantine XI (1448-531, the empire was almost constantly at war.Its strategic situation in the southern B a b n s and Asia Minor made this inevitable. It was constantly challenged by its more or its less powerful neighbours - at first, the Persian empire in the east, later the various Islamic powers that arose in that region - and by its northern neighbaurs, the Shvs, the A m s (a Turkic people) in the 6th and 7th centuries, the Bulgars from the end of the 7th to early
1lth centuries and, in the later 1lth and 12th centuries, the Hungarians, later the Serbs and finally, after their conquests in Greece and the southern Bakans, the Ottoman Turks. Relations with the western powers which arose from what remalned of the western Roman empire during the 5th century were complicated and tense, not least because of the political competition between the papacy and the Constantinopolitan patriarchate, the two major sees - Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem were far less powerful after the 7th century Islamic conquests - in the Christian world. Byzantium survived so long partly because internally it was well-organised, with an efficient fiscal and military system; and partly because these advantages, rooted in its late R m a n past, lasted well into the 11th century. But as its western and northern neighbours grew in resources and political stability they were able
Gold nornosma of h s t m t i n e VI PO-797). R e m e Leo 111 (7 t 7-74 I), ConstantineV (74 1-775) and Leo IV ('775780),seated. (Courtesy of Barber In* of Fine h, University of Birmingham)
The Byzantine Imds The Byzantine, or medieval eastern Roman, empire was restricted for most af its existence to the wuthern Balkans P& M a Minor - very roughly modern Greecx and modern Turkey.In the d d d e of the 5th century, after the succes of the emperm Justlnian'szeconguaf 5 In the west, the empire had been much more extensive, including all of the north African coastal regions horn the Atlantic to Egypt, dong with south-eatem Spain, Italy and the Balkam up to the Danube. But by the later 6th century the Italian lands were already contested by the Lombard$, while the VisIgoths of Spain smn expelled the imperial administration from their lands. The near eastern provinces in Syria, Imq and the T r a m p d m region a h g with Egypt were all Zost to Islam by the early a, and north Afrtca followed suit by the 4%. In a half century of warfare, therefore, the empire last some of its wedtble3t regions and much of t h e revenue to sllpprt the govefmneht, ti-& mling elite and vftal nee& such as the army. . Much of the territory that remahed to the emme was mountainous or arid, M that the exploitable a m a wae really quite -4 in exrent. Neverthdw, an efficient (for times) fiscal administration @'tax rt!ghe mtraaed the mrs;rtfmum fn manp'wa bml @culmaI resaurces, whtie a heavy rdhnce on well-planned d p l o m q , an extensive network of ambassadors, emissaries and spies, a wikngness to play & neighborn and enemIes against one another, and to spend substantial sums on 'subsf[lies3
&em3 a f t r i d e t , 'MecUtemmm' type cUm&te, and were W the IT&& important saurce of EvenUeS fax the govement. me pattern of mkmmt war simm~ystrongy differentiafed mst tawm'md cities were concen-ted in the coastal regions, while the ~OWIWIUand plateaux were much mare q ~ & ysPttled S W mmi4eratioys applied to the Balka3hs, too, and in Wtb we this m a p h y a&ct@d mad s y s and ~ ~mmunlatiom. l k empi* nMed to take these fidm into account m &at@c planning and campaign arganisation, of C O ~ for , logistid considmtims - t h e sources d manpaver, faod and &dm, H W w k and weapons, h ~ f w D move thw @otmdJand how they were mmumed played a key role fa the mpW%ability to spwive kn the dlffleult skrategir: sftwtion in which it fauna iW. h m l e s , whether large or Small, and whether B-We or hostffe forces, faced m y pr6bIem when caarpaigntng in or actass Asia Minm, tn particular tfre low smtches of mad through relatively waterless and exposed counby, and the mgh motlntabous tetrain q M i i H n g masW
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region3 fram central pkmm The complex m a e wa ~ e ~ tMad l wtm c was partly rWded during the Byantlne period, but tbe empire af&t the.6thcentury devehpd a of military mum homer with r series of fortEed p s t s and military
baws-forth~samemte3~~~ FWQS of access and egress fordxab fme. Strategic needs dwqed, of qW3e, and so did~rOaasystm,wtOhmtes~tn and out of use. The Balkans pment a wged and fragmented landscape falling broadly into two m a :the coastal and riverhe plains (of Tbr;Pce, of T h S 6 d y ~d ~f die %nuth DanubEad am), which rnpmductfve and fairly densely -pied; aad the mountain mges that datlllnate the whole regf~nand represent about W W ' & of its a k a the Mmifc Alps inthe west, sWhbg-frdm north-east to south-wt; the southeply Pindus r q e with which they merge, ~d which together dominate w & m and m m a l Greece; and the Balltan chain ik&
-
r4q(A&&
oWtm in Constarttin* mkction)
(4th century).
I The east Roman empire in the middle of the 6th century
Introduction
The conquests of the empwnrJustiniw re-established the eastern Roman empire as the dominam power in the Mditerranean.
swtching from the Murava river as far as the Black Sea coast, with the Rhodope r a w forming an arc to the south, through Macedonia towards the plain of Thrace. The fragmented terrain has given dse ta a series of Wet geopolitical units wpated by ridges d highlands, fanning out along river valleys t o w & the coastal areas. A number of major routes served from andent times to give access to the interior of the B d h n ream or to pass through it from north to south or west to east, The Balkans are characterised by relatively narrow and oftenquite high, easily canbmlled passes, and this terrain was ideally suited to guerrilla strategy - tough campaigning wnditiana, arid dWicult access to some regions during the winter. The structure of commmcations and the effectiveness of Bymtlne political authority demonstrate this, for there were no obvious fDcal points in the ancient and medieval perid in the south Balkan region apaa from Thessalofild and Constantinople, both on the edge of the peninsula and its fragmented landscape. Geography aected Iand use in the Balkans as it did in Asia Minor. The uplands and mountains, dom,inated by forest and woodland, and the lower footbills by woodland, saub and rough pasturage, were suited to pastoral acdvlty only. Agriculture was limited to the plains, dver vallm and caa$tlands of Thessaly, Macedonla and the Danube. The sea played an Important role, since it surroundsthe Balkan peninsula apart h m dong the northern boundary, and acted, as it still d w s today, as w &dent means of communication dong the heavily Indented coastline and with more distant regions. The disadvantage of relatively easy seaborne access, however,w a s that it opened up tfie s o u t h B & m peninsula to Invasion. Otle of the factors that made the Roman m y so successful and effldent was the military road system, established for the most part between the end of.the 2nd cenhlv BC
II
and the mlddle of the 2nd century AD. The network also facilitated commerce, civilian trafac and the movement of information. But in the later 4th and 5th centuries the roads went Into decline a reflection of economic and soda1 changes across the empire m d the consequences of these for local g w e m m and town coundls. One result w a s a d d n e in the use of wheeled vehiclm, which could not use roads that were not properly maintained, and a corresponding increzsse in dependence on beasts of burden. After the 6th century a Wted number of key routes was kept up by means of compulsory burdens imposed on local communities.The fast post, consisting of pad-animals, relay hones and light carts, and the slow post, which provided ox-carts and heavy vehicles, were amalgamated Into a single system in the 6th or 7th century, and continued to operate until the last years of the empire. The imperial road systems in both the Balkans and Anatolia were less extensive than hitherto, but remained nevertheless effective. But the costs of maintenance and the probIem of supervising upkeep meant that many routes were hardly more than tracks or paths usable only by pack-animals, with paved or hard surfaces only near towns and fortresses, Travel and bansport by water was usually faster and much cheaper. This was espedally so in the case of the long-distance movement af bulk goods, such as grain, for example. The expense of feeding draught-oxen, drovers and carters, paying tolls, together with the slow rate of movement of ox-carts, added very considerably to the price of the goods being transported, generally well beyond the price of ordhary subjects of the emperors. It was really only the government and the army, and to a certain extent the Church and a few wealthy individuals, who could pay for this. In contrast, shipping was much more cost effective, shce large quantities of gods could be transported in a single vessel, handled by a small crew, ~elatiwly Inexpensively, once the capital investment in vessel and cargo had been made.
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and so forth. And geographical factors w e , of mucourse, r.umhnw~hlto w a h w and the strategic otganisation of the empire,
Introduction
adopted Orthodox Christianity in the last y e w of the 5th centuy in order to gain papal and imperial recognition and support for his rule, where he also claimed, at least nomWIy, to represent Roman rule. Roman emperors considered the west not as 'lostJ, but rather as temporarily outside direct Lmgmial authority. The emperor Justinian (527-65) used this as the justffication for a series of remarlable retonquats, aimed at restoring Rome's power as it had been at its height - north Afrim from the Vandals by 534, Italy from the Ostrogoths by 552. But the plan was too ambitious to have had army chance of permanent success. And while the emperor nevertheless came very close to achieving a major part of his ori@naIaims, the probkms that arose after his death illustrated the problems hb polides brought with them. Warfare with the Persfan empire in the east meant that resources were always stretched to the limit and there were never enough soldiers for all fronts. Upon his death in 565 Justlnlanleft a vastIy expanded but perlIously overstretchd empire, in bath financial and military terms. Hls successors were faced with the reality of dealing with new enemies, a lack of ready cash, and internaI discontent over high taxation and constant demands for soldiers and the necessities to supprt them. The Persian war was -new&, while in 568 the Germanic Iambad crossed &amtheir homeland along t h e western Danube and Dxava regson into Italy, in thet efforts to flee the approaching Avars, a Turkic nomadic power which was establishing a vast steppe empire. The Lombds soon overran Roman defensive positions in the north of the peninsula, found@ a number of independent chiefdoms in the centre and south, while the Avars established themselves as a major challenge to imperial power in the nwthern Balkan region. Between the mid-570sand the end of the reign of the emperor Maurice (582-602))the empire was able t o re-establish a precarious balance in the east and along the Danube. Maurice was deposed in 602 fDUawlng a muthy of the Danube force, and the
13
cenMon Phokas was raised to the throne. Phokas c602-10))popularly regarded in later Byzantine sources as a tyrant, ruled until he was overthrown In 610, when he was in turn replaced by Heraclius, the son of the military governor of Africa. Heraclius was crowned emperor and ruled until 641. But the emphe was unable to maintain its defences against external pressure. Withfn a few years the A m and Slws had overrun much of the Balkans, while the Persians occupied and set up thelr own provincial governments in Syria and Egypt between 614 and 618,and continued to push rnto Ask Minor. Italy was left to its own devices and became Increasingly autonomous. In spite of a great siege of Constantinople by a Persian and an A v a d l a v army in 626, Herachus proved an able strategist and by 628 had utterly destroyed the Persian armies in the east, restoring the situation at the end of Maurice's reign. The regional dominance of the Roman empire seemed assured. But w M e the Danube remained nominally the frontier, much of the Balkan region was no longer under irnmal authority, except when an army appeared. The financial situation d the empire, whose resources were quite exhaust& by the long wars, was desperate. The origins of Idam lie in the northern Arabian penlmula, where different farm of Christianity, Judaism and Indlgenws beliefs coexisted, in particular in the much-travelled trading and cgravan communities of Mecca and Medlna. Mohammed was hlmself a respected and established merchant who had several times accompanied the trade caravans north to Roman Syria. Syria and Palestine already had substantial papulatfom of Arabs, both farmers and herdsmen, as well as mercenary soldiers serving the empire as a buffer ag2llnst the Persians. Although Mohammed's preaching - a synthesis of his mhlfefs with Judaic and Chrhtlan ideas met initiaIly with stiff resistance fram his own clan, by 628-29 he had established his authority over much of the peninsula and begun to consider the future direction of the new IsIamic community.On his death (traditionally placed in 632) there followed a
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E s d l a l Histories
t?lpnilum at War
I s i n r R w a n t i r~m rnl~ t m tin Aria
Minnr
Chronology 4 7 4 4 7 5 &no emperor in east 4 7 5 4 7 6 Basiliscus usurps power in east
Last western Roman emperor, Rbrnulus Augustulus, dies 4 7 6 4 9 1 Zeno (restored) 491-518 Anastasios I emperor in east 493-526 Theoderic rules Ostmgothic kingdom of Italy c.503 Anastasios recognfses authority, as representathe of the Romans, of CIovis, king of the Franks 507-711 Kingdom of Visigaths in Spain
476
518-527 Justin I 527 Justhian I becomes emperor 533-534 Belisarius reconquers Africa (pacification campleted in 540s) 534 B e W u s begins reconquest of Italy (war lasts until 553) 537 Dedication of the new Church of the Holy Wisdom (Hagia Sophia) in Consiantinople Persian Wng Chosroes 1 takes Antioch 540 in Syria 542+ Plague in the Byzantine world 550+ Avars establish ruIe over Slavs north of Black Sea and Danube
552
Narses defeats ToHla and last Oshogothic resistance in Italy 553+ Reconquest of south-east Spain from Visigoths 558 Treaty with Avan and agreement to pay 'subsidies' 562 'Fifty-year peace' signed with Persia 564-591 Wars with Persia 566+ Shvs begin to infiltrate across Danube frontier; pressure on frontier fortresses from Avars 568+ hrnbardc driven westward from Danube, invade Italy. 572 Lombards besiege hvenna 577 Mafor invasion d Balkans led by Avars 584, 586 AvardIav attacks an Thessaloniki
591402 Gradual success in pushing Avars back aaoss Danube 2 Maurice overthrown, Phakas prodaimed emperor 603 War with Persia; situation in Balkans deteriorates 610 Phokas overthrown by Heraclius, son of exarch of Africa at Carthage 611420s Central and northern Balkans lost 61MX9 Pwslans m p y Syria, Palestine and Egypt 622 Mohammed leaves Mecca for Medina (the 'Hijra') 622-627 Heraclius campaigns in east against
Persians Combined AvarbSlav and Persian siege of Constantinople fails 626428 Heracllus defeats Persian farces in east 629 Peace with Persia 634+ Arabs begin raids into Palestine 634-646 Arab conquest and occupation of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt (636 - battle of Gabithaflarmuk) 644-t. Beginning of long-term raids and plundering expeditions against Byzantine Asia Minor 655 Sea battle of Phoenix, Byzantines defeated by Muslim fleet 662 Constans II leads expedition through Balkans into Italy, rakes up residence in Sicily 668 Constans assassinated; M i o i proclaimed emperor in Sfdly, but defeated by forces loyal to 626
Constantine IV 674-678 Arab blockade and yearly sieges of
Constantinople. First rem~deduse d 'liquid fw' (Greek fire), to destroy
Arab fleet 679680 Arrival of Bulgars on Danube; defeat of Byzantine forces under Constantine IV
20
Essential Histories Byzantium at War
Third council of C o ~ ~ ~ e r p l e (sixth ecumenical mundl) 685-692 Truce between raBphate an'd am Bymntium (Arab civil war) 860 5 9 1 4 2 QuhWxt w Tmhn council at Constant:inople 863 693 -tine defeat at Sebastoujmlis 698 Carthage falls to Arabs; final lass of *a 866 717-718 Siege af Constanthople; ko, gerreml of Anatolikofl, power and aowned ills Lea IU 726730 Sku rwn&n& iconocIastk views af same bishops Beginnings of
-81
iconoclast conboersy
739-740 Leo m d Constantine defeat Arab
column at AlEtoinon Earthquake hits Carrstanthopie ArtabWrrs, Leu's son-in-law, rebels against C o n s m e V and s e b s Corlstanthople 743-744 Artabasdos defeated 746+ Plague in Constanlhople 750 Ab&d revolution, removaI of Umaypads ham power, capital of Caliphate moved to Baghd~d 75&3-77& Cmstmtjlne launch@ major expeditions against Bdgars and Arabs 792 Byzantines mder Canstantine VI defeated by B u m at Markdlai 797 Constantine V I deposed by mother Irene; Minded and dies 800 Coronation of Char1emagne by pope in St Petm, Rome tK)2 I ~ n de-d e by chief finance nllnister Nikephorm (Nikaphoms T) 811 N3kephbms defeated and Wed by forces under Khan Kmm after initially successful campaign In Bulgaria 813 Bulga~victories over Byzantine forces 815 Leo V convenes q m d at Corwantinople; i c o n ~ a s m reintroduced as of8'dal palley 821-&2J k W o n of Thomag 'the Slav' 8% Bq&mhg of Arab canquest of Sicily and of Crete M B Arab invasion of Asia Minor; siege and sack of Amorion 843 Council held id Constantinople to reaffirm acts of seventh ecumenical
739 741
council; empress regent Thewloxa and chief courtiers restme images; end of offlrif iconqdasm M a r y actfviry in B-a RW' a!wA on Constantinaplei
~~~
MQ r O~ cbiWS~fst~ Matot B p n t h e victory over Arabs at
P m n in b t o l i a
Conversion of B d g x Khan and leaders. Council convoked by B a i l I at Constantinaple to 'settle Phschism: Phstias deposed, Igmttos, hfs p d e c e s m ~relnwed. ~ Bulpria placed under CanstanWpolttan ecclesiastical jwisdiction (contrary to papal demands) !&O+ Anal lms of Sicily; 3ulgar expansionism under Tsar Symmn; war wlth Byzantina 917 B u I p victory at river Achelo 922 Peace wWi Bulgars 923-944 Byzantine ranqua&afid erastward e x ~ i o led n by general J o h ICourkouas 96861 Recovery of Crete under general Nikephorw PhaW 96% Major Eyzmtine offmsiws in east, creation of new frontref reghm %5 Nikephorm I1 captures Tarsus and Cyprus 969 Nikephoms I1 captures Akppa and Anti& 96411576 Re* of John I Tdrrrhkes. Continuation of eastern expansion; defeat of B u l w with help of RIB' allies under Svyatoslav: defeat of Rm' at Silistra P7I) 975 JohnI invades Palestine, takes several t o m s and fortresses, but withdraws 985+ B u e r resistance in westBalkans leach to growth of Bulgarian emplre under Tsar Samuel 989 Conversion af Vladimfr of Kiev to Chlstbnity 9S1019 B a a II m s h a Bu@ redstance; Bulgaria ~incorp0ma&d into emplre, Danube new frontier in north 1022 Armeniarm territories annexed to empire 1034-1041 Michael l V takes first step in
debasement of gold mfmcy
Chronology
1054 Schism with papacy 1055 Seljuks take Baghdad; Norman power in southern Italy expanding 1071 R o m o s IV defeated and caprured at Mantzlkert by Seljuks; begIdng of Turk occupation of cenwal Anatolia; Normans take Bari 107& Major Petcheneg advances Into Balkans; civil war within emplre 1081 Aldm Kamnenos rebels and defeab Mkephmos UI and is crowned empror 10821084 Norman invasion of western Balkan provinces 1091 SeIjuk-PWbeneg siege of ConstantinopIe; defeat of Petchenegs 1097+ First crusade; Seljulcs defeated 109&1099 ]&em c a w ; laLatin plbdpalities and Kingdom of Jerlmlm mtabkhed inP a l m e and Syria 1108 Alexios defeats Normans under Bohemund 1111 Commercial privileges granted to Pisa 1130s Alllance with German empire against Normans of southern Italy 1138-1142 Byzantine confrontation with Crusader principality of Antloch 1143-1 180 Manuel I Komnenos: pro-western politics becofne major factor in Byzantine foreign policy 114G1148 Second crusade 1153 Treaty of Constam between Prederidc I (Barbarossa) and papacy against Byzantium 11551157 Successfd imperial campaign in Italy; cammerdial and politlcaI negotiations with Genoa 1158-1 159 I m m a l forces march against Antloch 1160+ success^ imperial political involvement In Italy against German imperial interests; Manuel defeats Hungarians and Serbs hBalkans and rPaffinns immd pre-emlnence 1169-1170 C o m m treaties ~ with Pisa and Oenoa 1171+ Byzantlnc-Venetian hosoluties inaease 1175-1176 Manuel plans crusade in east 1176 Defeat of imperial forces under Manuel by Seljuk Suitan Kilidj M a n at Myrlokephalan
21
1180 Manuel dies; strong anti-western sentiment. in Cbnstantinople 1182 Massacre of westemers, especially Itallan merchants and their dependents, in Constantinople 1185 Normans sack Thessaloniki; Andronhs Kornnenos deplsed 118h Rebellion fn Bulgaria, defeat of local Byzantine troops, establishment of second Bulgarian empire 1187 Defeat ofthird crusade at battle of Horns of Hattln; Jerusalemretaken by saladin 1192 ' h a t i e s with Genoa and Pisa 1203-1204 Fourth crusade, with Venetian financial and naval support, marches against Canstanthople; after the caphw and sack of the city in 1204, the W n empire is established, along with several prlndpafltles atid other tmitories under Latin or Venetlan rule 1334-1205 Successor states in Nicaea, Epirus and Trebkond established 1205 Latin emperor Baldwin I defeated by Bulgrus 1259 Michael VIII succeeds to throne ln empire of Nicaea; Nlcaean army defeats combined Latin and Eplrot army at battle of Pelagonia; fortress town of Mlstra handed over to Byzantines (Nicaea) 1261 During absence of main Latin auny Nlcalean forces enter and seize Constantimple 1265 Pope invites Charles of Artjou, brother of Louis I X of Frame, to support M m mllitarlly against Manfred of Sidly and the Hohenstaufen power in Italy 1266 Manfred of Skily defeated at battle of Benevento by Charles of Anjou; AngwIn p a , supporn P P ~ ~ Y J evolve to Invade and conquer the Byzarrtine empire 1274 Gregory X summons smnd council of Lyons; qmentatlves ofByrantiae Church present; union of the Churches agreed, under threat af papally-apprwed invasion led by
1 3 B 1&kivmwmdwi@~stnd V ~ ~ r n ~ 1 a ~ s w & W * m r n ~ 1%) Battle d XOSOVQ:,SerWB&d t~ WZ~IXIW m-s, sifi~ mp* en&; ~$Icm%$ima of s a y a t I l393 'IWcs.apt~~ m~qi h i t i l t l a Tmmof BWm empire idem$ 13% ~ 0 f H ~ . &&& a*% t3tfamm thxWEbut b &if&atm Bt m p 1 4 3 139:$-14& &ay&l I UI*s Cmshntbp&, bat am"qfWtWr.as?aa w ~ ~ d & e a ~ 9
ImWofaffC~ 2WrW2 Mmd ;ltams R m p to elisit lnuhty2N f3atuxM BWabGr t W h e W ~ & a ~ of HEWW in wndm I* M m t a l*9l+',m msfarlrne la3 Gavmof ofw w bW4d of J&n WI?Jh m b the &y *@I ta
*
venew 1430 ?lwWiMH-.*
<*&sudhd mv-rn
J r m w
@tWnrnWmM 18B C&III& &fWr&b & ffm&iidChrcMfhMEy~?dby m f a h VtH, w t &C 1444 H-caZsd W l&d tg WadMav ofR m a n d :P a ~ d , ~ & ' r l i b w k d r b a m a ; ~ WMfaW* 1'm vm &&; m b B ~ -CmStadm,w t ofthe Mom, mw&b -11X4$rn wmmtiw Mfstra in 1449 a451 ngI1 bemrna SdW 14% UTrlm of p r o e l m & At 6 a m m g k I W M-LI1ap-w -ndm@ie;ie;zP W I J ~~~~~~~t Woman m y tb enter diy; C s m r z n e %Ilthe l amp&br8 d@d in &&Qhm& m d WpW awes ideatifled. $460 ~ ~ t o t h e T r z ~ 1461 73-w fahto tb@ mi$
au*
~
~
Background to war
The political world of Byzantium The w$tbq %man shk was a h c t u t e d 9s a M m W y qf qdmtmistrative lemh at the t p w &E emperor,u n m m@+S regxemWve, wmmded by a p&w md hw&%id appat&aI 'tbe#nW. of W m @ V m @ h r&d -Ybs't. a&l~d £Id goV&llmf was Mt?gatd fwm the erntu the w&MktnpwfMs, whose p!&&Ur%~WHE -1 WtCllfd
*
&ums@p@bnsta the $bW @arbpr-e ~ ~
~
-bL1CiB~fsfscal~w Wd d& ,d8ocese MI di.yidm& pmvhcf* a pvinm, x e t t l ' t W wi% of mB judicial admlnlstratki. T h m were fuitha divi&d into self-governing pieis or dvituth, the! cities, each wkth its or
~~~
h1nkdmd @hi&
mtglxx ,k m m or leas
e&miv@ according to pgraphkd,
dwmqmphic and nther fbor~). BWAIpr~ductiad a t e d t h e @cMcqBylbW the dt&3wtm the hams of $ UWaC $lit@ of lambma. mal stanTs was b g d y dekm&ed by m e 5 aeEati~nshlpto ~
~
~
~
~
whetker m e hrad held m.W* pdst in t%e imperial b w e a u a ~and , at what bQ and so forth, although d @onat vatiatlom were i mwkd. iffe C M .@the kheo~ogid s p s w it reprented @amthe late 4th
mwv me Offietal r&@on#the batan &ate) pByed a QntFal mle In the ewkornp
afth~K&rnanw~-~w~amaji?r la landowner as well 21s SEi k@dal Influencing the moral and &Ma1 qshmd the* world, a d in & c t l q I m p i a l wti@?xswliq. pmmg* was f b t
-
m
~
14
Essential Histories Bpntium at War
the emperor was chosen by W, that he had to be Qrthadox, slnd that his mle was to
defend the hterests of OrthoRoxy and the Nman i.e. CMstlan o i h @ (the inhabited, dhrillsed - R o m a n world). The p m impbtions were such that heresy was construed as treason, and opposition to the (Orthodox) emperor d d effectiwly be treated as. heresy. The late Roman state was thus 0 cmnpla bureauQaq, rooted h'iand imposed u p a series ofoverlapping mill fcrrmatllcns strudmed by local variatiorms on ess&tidly the same social rehtbns of production across the whole central and east Mediterranean and h h n world. Wal and political tensions were exacerbated by religious divhions, local economic cmdidons, Imperial ~ H t i c s and , the burden placed upon the tax-payingpophtEcm as a result ofthe State's needs in respect d ib s a t i v e apparatus and, in partkular,
-
Itsarmies. These structures wwe radically tran5f~rmed&en the Later 6th and early 9th centuries, and w the malt ofa number of facton, the single must Imprtant being the Islamic conquests, By 642 all df Egypt
and the middle-=stem proW&s had k e n lost, Arab farces had penmated deep into Asia Minor and Libya, and imperial form had been withdrawn Into A s h mar, to be^ settled a m s the p v h c e s of the region as tbe only available means of supporting them. Within a period of w m 12 years, therefore, the ern* Im sorneehhg over half its t s a and three-quartersd iW remums - a drastic 1- for an imperial $tats which still had to mafntah and equip a considerable army and an effective administrative bureaucracy if it was to s h v e at all. While many of the dwelnpments which led to thfs transfomatton were W tWn long &fort the Jthanturg crisis, it: was this crnluflrture that m&to bxing Wngs to a head and promote the structural m p o w that followd. The changes that accompanied the develqmmts of the 7th century affected all area of s d a l , cultufal and e~nqmirlife.
There ~ c u m e da 'rur&sation' of sodety, a result of the devastation, abandonment, shrinkage or displacement of many dties in M a mar as a &t of invasions and raids. The defensive pmperties of 'urbantsites, their dhect relevance to militaryI administrative or ecclesiastical needs, and sa on, pfayed the key role fr~whether a city wvived or nQt.Constantlnople became the pse-emirrmt city ofthe empire. The -a1 eUte w a s tramfomed as 'new men' selected by the emperors on a mute obviuusly rneritw~aticbasis increased in number, and who were fni* heavily dependent on the emperor and an imperially spsn~redpositions. Yet as a wsult of its inmasing gdp an state pasitions a n d the lands it accrued through the &wards attached to such service, this elite m n turned fnta m arkmaw,during the 8th and 9th centuries still very dependent on the state, during the 10th and espchI1y the 1lth inae&@y fndependent. The state had to compete &ectIy with a &a1 grwp whose enormous landed wealth and e n m c k d pasition in the appaatum of the state meant that It p e d a real threat to central corrml of fMaI T P S D ~ . The events of the 7th century dso produced a reassertion of central state power over late Roman tendencia to decentrahthn. The state was both limited, and in Its turn partly defined, by the name af key economic relatimaships. T h i s i s exemplified in the issue and circulation of coin, the basic mechanism through which the state converted agricuItura1 produce Into transferable dtscal resources. Coin was Issued chiefly to oil the whe@ of the state machinery, and w d t h was appropriated and wnsurnd through a tedisblbutive flscd mechanism: the state issued gold in the farm of salaries and h r g w e to bureaucracy -and armies, who exchanged a substantial portlon thereof for goods and services In r n a i n t m g themselva. The state could thus collect much of the coin it put into circulation through tax, the more >sosince fiscal policy pnemlly demanded tax in gold and offered Gbange in bmze.
Background to war
I
1
I
There were perids when this system was constrained by circumstances, resulting in the ad hoe arrangements for supplying soldiers and raising tax in kind, for example (ain the 7th century), and it also varied by region. But in a &ety in which soda1 status and advancement (including the self-identity of the aristocracy) were c o n n e d with the state, these arrangements considerably hindered economic activity not dhectly connected with the state's activities. For the continued power and attraction of the imperial establishment at ConstmtinopIe, with its court and hietarchigal system of precedence, as well as the highly centralised fiscal administrative structure, consumed the whole attention of the Byzantine elite, hindering the evolution of a more localised aristocracy which might otherwise have invested in the economy and m e t y of its own localifies and towns, rather than in the imperial system.
25
Church of the
at &phi, Greece ( 1 Ith mhry).Wc ~ i f ~ i o(AKG, n . Min)
The growth in the powa of the elite was stimulatd by two dmIopments. In fhe ffrst place, there took place an incrtasfng subordination of the p.easmtxy to both private landtords and to holders of gxants of state revenue. In the second place the state conceded from the later 11th century the right ta receive the rwenues from certain public (Le. fiscal, ax taxed) dtsMcts or of certain imperial estates with their tenants, encouraging a pwcess of very gradual allenation of the state's fiscal and jmidfc;tl rlghts. By q l d t r n g the award by the emperors of fiscal exemptions of varying sorts, landlords -both secular and monastic - were able to k q a larger proption of the revenues extracted from their peaant pmducers for themselves, as xent, while the government's hold on the remaining -1 land of the empire was constantly
P m e w x ~~kdpaec ~ f II f8%~29j and CbkW@% T h e m M ~imIsarbiw , Inam af fine Am.Unmsiw
Warring sides
Neighbours and enemies We have already referred to the strategically very awkward situation of the Byzantine state, with enemies or ptenthl enemies on M y every front and with a constant need to fight wan on more than one front at a tlme. In the north and west the situation
was especially complex as a result of the variety af neighbowing states and pohtlcal powers. From its establishment in the 680s, the Bulgar Khanate rapidly grew in power, and until its extinction at the hands of the emperor B a d LI, known as the 'Bulw-slayer' (976-10251, represented a constant threat to the security of imperia1 territory in the Balkans. Throughout the 8th and 9th centuries and into the early 10th century, Bulgar power and Influence grew, in spite of successful counter-attacks undw the empaor fhnstantlne V in the 760s and 770s. The nadir of Byzantine fortunes was probably the year 811, when the Khan K m defeated and destroyed an imperial army, kiMng the emperor Nikephoros I. Conversion to Christianity of elements of the r u h g elite in the 860s was Intended to stabilise the situation in favour of Byzantium; but the gradual Byzantinisation of this elite only contributed to the growth of an imperialistic BuIgar politics which hoped to bring the two states together under a Bulgar dynasty. But Bulgar successes under the Christian Tsar Symeon in the first 15 years of the 10th century were as &ngerous; while the reassertion of 3u@r imperial ideology under Tsar Samuel inaugurated a conflict - after a relatiwiy peaceful period In the middle d the 10th century - and led finally to the eradication of Bulgar independence and the recovery of much of the W h up to the Danube in the early I lth century. In spite of occasional rebellions, the region remained firmly in Byzantine hands until just before
the fourth crusade in 1203-1204.The Latin division of the empire after 12U4 resulted in the rapid growth of local Balkan cultural independence and the evolution of new states the Serbian empire of Stefan m a n
-
being perhaps the most remarkable. Only the arrlval of the Ottomans in the 14th century put an end to this development. Relations with Italy and the west were similarly mrnplicated.As we have noted already, Italy, north Africa and the southeastern comer of the Iberfan peninsula had been reconquered under Justinian, at e n o m s cost, bm the Ostrogotks, Vandals and Visigaths respectively. But the a p p m c e of the Lambards In Italy (pursued by the Avars, at Byzantine requat) soon resulted h the fragmentationof imperial pasasions into a number of distinct regions under Wtaq commanders or duces. Impwfal tenitory In the north-east and central regions was represented by the exarch,an officer with military and civil authority. But distance from ~ t a n t i r r o p l elocal , cultural differentiation and political conditions, together with the spiritual and politid power of the Popes in Rome soon led to the gradual but inevitable dimhution of imperial power. The &&ion of the exarchate with the capture of Ravenna, its capital at the hands af the Lombards in 751; increased papal dependence on the Fmnks for support against the Lombards, and hcreashgly autonomous and mutually competing I d polities in the Italian peninsula had led to the reduction of imperial power to the regions of Calabria, Brufflum and Sicily by the early 9th century. Other political centres such as Naples remained technically Bymnttne, but were in pxactrce quite independent. Venice, which grew in importance from the early 9th century, likewise remained nominally an imperial tenitory.
30
Essent~alH~siories Byzant~umat War
The camnation by the p o p ofCSJIC~B
- &S ( k k a ) W a n emperor fn Rome in 8 B set the sml on the p o I W arrd cultural separation OF east Borne and the west. Cuttusal ~ ~ c eexprmd s , in prtimlar tbmgh eel-1mdcsa9 the W g l C W W m Frmh, Byantlnes and the papacy for bmkTim@,tnthe tmml and Msm &Bans, becam Wreakixtglp a p p a h c~mplleatedby dvdry within the Church. Despite vmious ,attempas at marriage aUuces between the Byzmtlne anrt ParEaae$ m e mC O ~ I p~U&zal, cultural md.a4Uprmgth of the wm world w ~ ~ I i m any d miow remation af Roman Imperial Iin the cmW W t e m h n bash, Rpni3ne infhence Was s h ~ akfutthtx blow by the h s d Sicily to Islamic h
the mat:-ad-
during the 9th aatuq. The wwkmiq $ we empi& in t~r4mi ww I I I I ~ ~ mdJW 11th efpflqand t L growth &f the e m rdwemt mhe~compli~lilwt m r m : mritatum -em itrrogae a d ignomme am one4de were matched by equally inaccurate artmims ofByzandne ttwcherpmd effe@nmm the other.
Mthmgh the r m m EMmder K a n ~ t ~ ~ d y ndu&rg w y the 11th afid IZth b w i m m W a rappfckkment p 1 b & , including the ckwfeprryentof a *oq p w e m hmn at atstantinoplc
(p-ted by the e m p m Manuel I (1143-&)), the c?@icf h#ven imperial b m t s h cytwl&xg tradg a d ~ rn ~1alm . mEr&ant ~ e~X E M n $ ~ r n , emqded W I ~ ~ S c l r a l 5 u $ apnd I ~V&&l p ~ U & a l h3kigue and appoimhm, resulted Pn the laundhing of the cnrsade?fhe sack of ChnstmtinopIe, and the partition of tb ewem empire htea number sf Lath kingdoms and pdndpazittw.
Warring sides
I Major Byzantine mutes in the Balkans
31
Warring sides -
33
-
century had established an independent state of their own, and who invaded the Balkans from Italy during the reign of Alexios I in the 1090s and early 12th century. EvenWy defeated on this front, they nwertheiess went on to establish one ofthe most powerful states in the central Mediterranean, the Nonaan kingdom of Sicily, and presented a major threat to Byzantine interests throughaut the century. Yei it was not the Nonnans who played the key role in divethe fourth avsade in 1203-1204 from ib offginal targets in the M u s h east to Byzantium, but rather the republic of Venice, and it was Venetian interests that dictated the form taken by the p H t i c a l fragmentation of the empire in the period Immediately thereafter. Until the extindon of the Sassanid empire by the IsIamic armies in the 630s and early 640s, the Pmian state had been the main opponent of the Roman empire in the east. Thereafter, the Umayyad (661-750)and then Abbasid (751-1258)Caliphates posed a
constant threat to the empire. But this complex history falls into several phases: 650+720s, when ArabIslamic invasions wee a regular phenomenon aimed at the destructlm of the east Roman state; 120s-750s, when a modus yivermdf had been established, but in which Muslim attacks remained a constant source of mnomlc and political, dislmation; and thereafter until the middle of the 1lth century, when the collapse and fragmentation of Abbasid authority made it possible for the empire to re-establish a military and political preeminence In the region. The inmasingly important role of Wkic slave and mercenary soldiers in the Caliphate from the 84% and the eventual arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the 105[k, was to alter this picture drasticdly. A combtnatlon of internal polltlcal dfssenslon and a relatively minor military defeat at the hands of the Seljuk Sultan Alp Aslan in General view of the monaFtmy at Daphni, Greece ( I I tR century). (Authoh collection)
The e m ~ i r ec. AD 600
m T h 9 h b r d Wq d M y in %&and the Slav I m m W h into the Balkans d ~ d r dbw d
Ramm pww inhtRem
~~
s p m , fm It m,0x1 Q i p h q ,
etstsand th!!qm€@W,afidW&t th% emplre dqen&&,But when these iW, as they *fkn did, it nmw an amp, a # r s & e : ~ a w f e ~ t h e ~ * ~ ~ & ~aiiminedand how tiley fought, that Is the ofthi his^,
I
Outbreak
Why and how did Byzantium fight wars? B-ne gmeraIsa d rulers were generally fully aware of the m W m M p the
~~
allocation and Pedi~Wm ofmuEEles soldiers, q @ m , qulpmtrnt, U m t m k and w bfib and the ability af the empire to wmd OHhwtk d t a r y acftEan or M sMk at Sb enemies. Wif;rmy Wbw& md~drrtmgfr'o~tfIeBthto~e 11th ~rrtad@!4 make it apparent that a 2 t i m b h m in resources b -n ~ ~ i u and Its emmi= was mogrt3sed G e n d s were exhart* not to give battle in ~ r w ~ a ~mllditi~ns, 1 . e bou* w might lead to wasWaf Me and rwwxes; &deed the domimm matif in these wow is that it wa&the B p i a n t h e b who w a k mm@d to -lwfeI B use ddayhg tZL&cs, to employ mbwhes and a h stcawms to wen the odds stacked agabst them; but that it was quite clm1ya main war a h POwin w i t h u t hat4 ftght a dWBw bat&. W&oq,cc.nlM k achieved fhbt&~a m-m of &laying wttia, rniatelllgent eqlofWbh of memy weah&&s, the h d s t a p e , sesdnsfl factof$, 2md diplomg~y. Wars wew c o s t l ~and for a state whose W c hwom@d d v d horn a @ d h m I groduffdon, and which remained relative& StPlbh a$ well srs M q milnd1e to bptb natrnal and man-mMe dlsastm, they w e to be avoid& ifat all pasale. Another, clcbly reIate~,fadtor in in.pda1 mt&c tbhkhg was manpower: from a Byzantine perspxtls$ they we~e&ways 0 ~ t and strategy n ~ as MfeU ~ a5 ~ diplod e d to takthis actor Into mmmt ki dealing with ~ n e m i aOne . way af mnang the balance was tu r-ce enemy nurnTSer8: delay tKe memy &~KW mtiJ they could na longer stay in khrfield, d & q ~ n g or removi@ m y passfble smms af psmMws and mpplies, h r example, misleading them with Wse information
-
about BymIthe intentiom., @ e $ are ~ alI wtoals w w tlre m~~~ recommend, Amiding WE, which was a keymne pf - h e s t r a t , wmld dm W&&etbe p&sWlity that e t e y host mi##t be &'up38 by l k e h , run aut of water a n d supplb, and su on. Defence HIIS. had to be the primary canof B-dm rulm and gene& m B y a n t h e mifit- EUsp~itbmwere aciministetedupon a wn&tmt and -HE@' ~&XM&ferdm$, Wd ~~h mais piupme w a s t a s ~ ~ ~ofV a l t?~empite by d@a@g the ~t~ r&m@sawllable to the best effect. They were, neessarlly, Menaive la orimtatbn, a pint noted quite dearIy by the mid-1WauhuyV M PfMm ~ Italy, rhe ambassador Ciutprmd af Cfemana, with r w r d to the p ~ ~ taken m @sware ~onmrttinop~% gt nig~, m w e on an u a a p x a memy-attack. The em&& p h x d by +tine writem and p m m n t s on &e&ve md intelligent diplonacy is nat just a qwWm of wlmrd pa&emce informed by a C M W n &taste fox the sheddiq of blot& to the comary, the mnt2nued ed~te~ce d the mte d q m W upm the d q b p m t of a ~WphisticaWdiplomatic: arsenal The whole history of Byantfnc foreign r&tiom and both the t l m q and pr&ice of manine dipfonraq reflect this. Mplaro~teyhad . b ~ r n f a r y edge, of muw: goad reIarr,w wtth the variDu?J pwp1a of # l steppe we# essential to E ~ n t i r w inteEHs in We WWs and C%@SS, becw&a weapbrfi mi$lt thereby be mated that cauld be tum.ed an theenemies of the empire. Such Contacts were alsa an ~~W source of ~ o ~ d c xof nmum, , ant3 much effort was
q e n d e d in gathering idamatim that might k bedwmt IQ the mp&eJsW m m .
Outbreak
Gomg to war was thus rarely the result of a planned chdce made by emperors or their advisers, for the empire was perpetually threatened from m e quarter or another, and was thus in a constant state ofmilitary preparedness. The Werence between war and peace in the frontier area$ became a matter, not of the state of the empire as a whole in relation to a par&uh neighbouring powq but rather of the part of the emplre in which one fwnd oneself. While -very of former tenitories was permanently on the ideological agenda, efforts to impIement it reflected an ad hac reaction to an unforeseen advantage gained through victories in baffle and the exploitation of favourable circumstances. In
37
red terms, the potential for the reconquest and restoration of lost territories was werely limited. Strategy was determined by the interplay khwen resources and poIitical beliefsftempered by ideological pragmatism: most Byzantine warfare was fought not on the trash of delivering a h o c k a t blow to the enemy, but on that of attempting to reach or maintain a state of parity or equilibrium, though awtion, raid and cou11ter-raicI, and destruction of the enemy's short-twm potential. Members of the gowmment and imperial court may have shared common Street in IstanbuVCnnstarrtinople wrth traditional houses. (Author's colleaion)
Outbreak
within Byzantine state and swkty, and at the same time they also demonstrate particubdy c h d y the m t to which the forelgn policies and military strategy of a state can teflect power relattons within the soriety as a whole. Warfare for ideological reasons alone was vety rare. Clearly, all defensive warfare could be jusrifled on a range of such grounds - the threat to the empire's territory and
population, the challenge to Orthodox rule and God's appointed ruler, the ernperm at Constanthople, challenges to Roman sweretgnty, and so forth. Offensive or aggressive warfare was, in the CMsttan Roman empire, a little more difficult to Iustlfy, but I t was readily accomplished. But there is no doubt thai the domlnant element in Byzantine military thinking throughout the long history of the empire was defensive, and necessarfly so in view of its strategic situation. Byzantium sunived as long as it did because it was able to defend itself, intelligently exploit natural frontiers or boundaries in the crisis years of the 7th and 8th centuries, and diplomatic and political r&tionshi$ thereafter. And whatever the specific details of the proms of its political-historical withering away after 1204, the gradual demise of the Byzantine empire went hand-in-handwith its declining ability to muster the resources necessary to defend itseIf. Strategy was, in practical terms, a matter of pragmatic reaction to events in the world around the empire, onIy loosely informed by the political-ldeoiogicd imperatives af the Christian Roman empire. In this respect, the political and strategic conditions of existence of the east Roman or Bpzantine state rendered a grand strategy in the narrower sense irrelevant - the sbategy of the empire was based on maintaining the conditions appropriate to political, cultural and ideological survival.
Defensive warfare Wars tan, crudely speaking, thus be divided Into two broad categories, defensive and ofknsive, although ii must k said at the
39
outset that pre-ernpdve attacks c d d a u n t as both,and were kequently su justified.
Dtrfenslve fighting tmk several forms: guerrilla tackia against enemy invaders; major confrontations between field a m i s ' often following a protracted period of manoeuvring in which each side tried to outwit the other; or a combhation of the two. The defensive campaigns fought against the first lslamic armies took this m,with the imperial forces struggling to match the mobility and speed of the Arab raiders, who were able ta deprive the Roman commanders of the Wtiatlve not simply by W e of their
fast-moving, hard-hi* tactla, but alSO because the t y p of warfm they prxtisd made any notion of a reguIar front untmable. The Arab Islamic conquests radically altered the strategic and political geography of the whole east Mediterranean region. The complete failure of attempts to meet and drive back the invaders in open battle induced a major shift in strategy whereby open co~ontationswith the Muslim armies were avoided. The field armies were withdrawn &st to north Syria-and Mesopotamia, and shortly thereafter back to the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges. By the mid-640sthe m i e s which had operated in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia had been withdrawn into AnatoHa. The regions across which they were based were determined by the ability of these districts to provide for the soldiers In terms of supplies and other requirements. The field forces thus came to be quartered across Asia M i n s r and Thrace, where they were now referred to by the Greek term for these districts, fhmata or 'themes'. This distribution was intended both t~ meet logistical demands by providing each arrny with an adequate hinterland from which it muid lx supported and to meet the strategic n & of defence. But it was a very defensive strategy, and it meant that the econamlc hinterland of the frontier incurred substantial damage,subject as it was to regular devastation. There resulted the appearance by the 700s of a 'no-man's Iand' between the settled and economically safer
40
By-wMium at War
MH'Wmies
The d m t and m e d i d fortrrss at h c w i n t h ,&EX& wtrbffhg&tqra the Rkponneze. ( A W h c P l l M )
ems mt both side&Tbe nav~arrangmmtir did pevent the &ztbHshm@nt~ ttre of -anent base$ h &id Wndr itkelf. The rhmm at themes were at w mdy groupings ofptWnceS a m a vrhm ~~t armies were b a d . $7d m ~ ~ e athey ~ m t acquired s a clear gef&bgmpW Mwtlv;and by the later gtb c m w y s m e a #f w a w& as mWary ~ i ~ t r $ t i wem: o n $et up On a thematic bzW, shthugh the Kate Raman provfncks mathx~.ed td W&t. The number ofthmata -and& as the empire% economk and pli.fical bituation Improved, partly though the original large a l t a y W i ~ beclag s %@lit up hm difkent 'pmMaI' wd partly thrmgh the m e mi y e w sr,f # e m mtury and the &mpQslti0&d rmpetPd a u t M y DVH h&d inthe ~ t h m Eawn5. ' h e W s a t i o n af r d m t and f l t q ideutitim whl& resulted fmm these m ~ ~ led ~ tota &sKin&ian , $ between me -ma MI-time S O I ~ F-~ Wld thP:l q s wmpetent or Well-~plW
-
mill€b&eelmmts h each theme @a. In the 76th a mall elite fotre,bown as the famumIdtheregimen&')m~estamhea uader QnsTa~tInP V (741-251,which qtmly WQlvPCI IW theEt1lte w fiivtEian fm cAmpaign p q w ~It. better pay and &dplim than Wth the r q p h axid the part-time provbndal units, and this was the first step in a tendency t~ recruit mercenary fo~aes,both &reign and ~ ~ o u rn fa# % , qmAl unit% and tp serve f a th@ outatron of 8m m b r ~rnplalgn@ gmup of-@?gm. As irnpmial power rerowred in tt~& 9131 and 10th cenhuies, the ernpire &&&edits militarystreih thg &st, and fie tole and the proprtldn of such full-timed t s bcarne ewer more lmp~rkmt. ~ ~ detcmhsd by v sepml &mmtS. To be$& m~twqg faces were tawheld and hratadlwkqtttte WIUS and &~%BuwS.~SS&, W l 5 & ~ r -I@. Where tMs poky d m W g and fqtllsing hos& attacks at the bantier did not work, i d forces woutd haas the iamders, kwplng'trrrckof every m m w t and the loca~arrofeac?agirrtp or group, N ~w w t and fp-wahg ~ the maj~mm,m~at~~sk watltbns whew mppIie3 mi*. Be rn& a
Outbreak
well as by the frontier p s e s through which enemy forces had to pass, reinforced the 1-1 Wp.Although exposed to enemy action, these posts were a constant threat to any invading force. In addition, a series of bontler districts was set up In the 8th and 9th cenMes as independent commands along the frontier, complementing the annies of the themes. Known as kleimmrchies (kleisowarchiar),they emphasis& the highly l o d k d pattern of defence. The empire suffered many defeats, especially in the earner period, but it abo wimessed some major successes, particularly where the invaders could be shadowed and the imperial armies brought together at the right time and place. Thew enmuntea showed that the strategy operated by the imperial forces could succeed, when the almies were well led and adequate intelligence of enemy movements was available. But the war in the east was largely a struggle between two equal pawers, with the imperial side having the advantage of geography and cornmunlcatlons tb offset the superior numbers on the side of the Caliphate. Only in the 10th century, when the empire went over fully ta the offensive, does this picture change. These defensive arrangements were progressively allowed to fall into disuse gs the empire went onto the offensive after t?xmiddle of the 10th century. And when the empire's situation changed for the worse, as a resuIt of the appearance from the 1040s and afkmva~dsof a host of new enemies, the lack of an effeetive, deep defensive sbucture pemltted the Selfuk Turks to conquer and permanently occupy central Asia Minor a h the battle of Matin 1071 with virtually no opposition. The empire was never %ah able to re-establish its power in the region.
Pre-em~tiveattacks Part of the impenla1 defensive strategy entailed launching preemptive strikes against the enemy, partly aimed at
41
containment, partly at the reasseaion of Roman idmlagtcd power. Some of these attacks were successful, some lew so. Among the bleakest episodes in the history of the empire is the attack Iaunched against the Bulgm by the emperor Nkphoros I in 81 1, which ended in both the death of the empror and a crushing defeat. Nikephoros, who had been the chief finance offlw of the empress Eirene, came to the throne In 802 and appears to have wished to defeat the Bulgars so ramprehensively that the Bulgar khanate could be recovered for the emplre. A n expedition in 809 had reached the BQar capital at Pliska In north-eastBulgaria, and sacked it. The expedition of 811 was intended to establish a more permanent RQman presence in the region. Nikepboros ~rderedthe assembly of a large force made up from contingents from the Asia Minor armies supplemented by troops horn the European m t a and the Imperial guards units, the tugmata. There was a ceremonfal aspect to the whole affair, since the mperor took victory for granted after the easy win in 809,and as well as the soldiers a large number of courtiers and palace officials also accompanied the expedition, k t the imperial troops were eventually drawn into an ambush, where during a night attack they were utterly routed, The defeat was one of the blackest days of imperial history, no less of a catastrophe than the battle of Adrianople in 378 at which the emperor Valens had died fighting the Goths. The Bulgar khan became the mast dangerous enemy the empire had to face for the next few years, and was able to lay siege to Constantinople Itself in 813.
Offensive warfare Given the empire's strategic problems noted already, most fighting could be justified in some way or other as 'defensive', even where it was clearly aggmsively motivated. Such were the wars waged In the later 10th and early 11th centuries against the BuIgars and the Rus', far example, when the justification
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Balkans up to the Danube, was peace re-established, and the Balkans k c m e once more an entirely Roman - from the point of view of pnlltical and military contrd - t&to~y. A major shift in strategy followed these successes as w d as successes against Islamic powers In the east The establishmentof a system of alliances m buffer state made the d m a n c e of expensive standing forces, wbich constituted a great dm411an the b'easury, less necessary. F m u m k and cultural M w c e could be mployd in addittan ta the threat of military action to maintain peace along the Darmbe, and similar polides were applied in the east The emperors pursued a foreign poIicy which
placed W t e r reliance on vassals and neighbowing powers supplying troops, thus hmlting the demand on the empire's own resources. But in the 1040s and afterwards thisstrategy broke down, largely because the balance between diplomacy and military strength was damaged by civil war and provindal rebellion, in turn a reflection of important shifts in the social and polltical structure of the empire. The provincial ar thematlc mllitlas had been neglected in favour of full-time, regionally recruited tngmnta, better suited to the sort of offensive warfare the empire had been waglng since the 950s; while reductions in the military
budget encouraged a greater dependence on foreign mercenary troops, especially of western Mghts - Franks, Germans and k m m . In 1071 such an ariny of rnixd Byimtine and foreign troops under the emperor Romano$ IV suffered a defeat at the hands of the Invading SeIjuk %ks near the
~WXSS of M ~ n m m ifl
A aiaor m t a g m t ~ e r f r o m a mmtary ~ y pmpedive. Yet the dvtl war and h t d disruptran that hllawgd &we the ~w~ Rwks a hand in m t m t Asfa Mlnar, which was nwer again fully recwered. Emfmm Mas 1onward s p t the Wod ftrnn lhe 1until the 1180s attempthg to rerover the Wttm but, tn the end, witbout sums. The wars of the
-
p c d o d - w t v westem tacbicsand p o p l y , but wirh
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elements of a sHLl dearly Byzantine or east Roman tactical organkition - contemparia wntinue ta Fernark on the order, wh&on and disdpllne with which the muluahnlc and colourful Byzantine a w e s still fought. Byzantfum went to war for many masons In practh1 t e r m - perceived military threats ta the hntkr, respnses to irchral invasion and miding ham hostik nelghbours, as well M IdfSOIoCJIcdlyd
v i t e d wars in which
jwstlficatb dqended on notions of what terrltoria used ta be Roman and could be
legitlnmely Feewered,and on fdms abut IdeoIoglcaA chatleto the C I w m n Roman world W.The wars of remnquest
lrlthe1ater1Mhcmhuywerefngm motivated and jW p d on the latter grounds, for example, even though in Byzmtium no notion af 'holy war' as such wer r a y ew~lved.
The fighting
Organising for war
m a mm p m c l m n p in tactical stmchmes o m the perlod b n the 6th to the 11th century* and a@tn h m the later 11th to the 1% C m M e s and beyond. Vdts of the mfddk?of the 6th p n q ~ ~ m ew a d~ M y theit m m ~ l ot&anlsaWn.The old& I M m en@ aukflW foscen.cmMnued to mikt thmugh the 3rd md 4th mhlrim, divided into a k d ~ ~ ~~ o r f l ~ dt trkmmllg y , of BQO and 1;oOo' man mpecthlyr dthough under Constantine I (3ZQ3?), new WwW wsa d ~ 1 1 m4en r e p l a d we
em% ~~' llW&5W, dW Wiea cWWd ~ $ @ the 2nd m4 drdkmmxfes, M tb& numk MWa150 th h* applied to the od*al l ~ # W a ~ ? h e 4 tcentur)t,~partfrwn h these pWrs units clled w~lntiones,0OrlgtpaIly detachmentsfropa dw d t s fwmed fw B
pd-.wn m w the p a C* I M 1 wHch had been tumM'im pmnWMt units inthelr own &ht: M ' a tenq, wxWtbn, ww ap#ed in -the $ t r 9 ~ ~ ~ d ~ n ~ ~ , x w & d at tkm. Ntha~ghsame pf The& -4 &ffWWm Y @ IlW d th 6thIC&W$the p e t a l mfm most Wt$ u(casby*a thewOrdtn#mmswikiGre& quimhit, aldthos m Which shpky m a t 'unit' # "numbea' (ofd&w), Bpantltle tactia,and strategy had h .adeptquickly ta h a s'iption@i~ow&tg the &ab conquwts the d d I e of the 7th ,mtuty.hrmh alongmW Mtm ate m ~ h d W ~ M l W b m 'bt- -CL - sII6-g Wt U&t' EairaW had tome w dodnate the ,warfateof the
v
penid, mu@ of whlch imtqlved s&ni&g
and M t ~ d - r ~rd&. n But wMLe hzfantrqr -&ued to b n e e d , and played an inr-t prt inmany mmpQ?x, their vahe a p w dmly ta have d&lhed, sotlle'e%tat r e t l m i q &a1 factors, since thq wme dram mostly from the porest of the pfopindarl soldiery. The development & infan* tacth after the p e r i dof the &st Islamic cwqtle$@,d m Wlth the h i e pro& of mounted -re, therefore, MeCtecl the &~tLglc~ f t t l a t i vjll~ wM& ~ the
imgw f m i d itself. Dmig the paidW m the later 7th to the 9th or m1y 10th tenmrfgs, the difkrenm wtrlch once d s t d 'btween the differ& types of klfmlq ma were subject to a general I m l h g aut of the difkrent am,into Ii&t amhy and inbu. Only tiie tqpmt~at Cmtanlin~glleseem to bwe prwldal a hewf ldirvalq Ebro. It seems: to haw b&n the f & p d U t yd Inca BfflWs In the pmvhces td wthb&h field u n i t s a d to a m them as each spedfk owmion requird. The sizes &units on the battlefield varied according to Pactid M there s m s m have bwn no fixed aumber f a thedi£&mt fomtWm,withQpres recommend& for the mallet iFlf&nt.yWts, the &&a, far eXanrplE1rarlging from a3 few as 15Q ta $5
y as dm, SEveral i?ourrm1W d & p p an cmipatgn a a single la@&Won,far &le, i3r *"m W%. M&t Wemea had two m
h B f w ~ 01 5 &* but thb &a nat mean that they the same &e w could muster the m e n u m b d soldiers. TRe p d n d armies w e orgm&l into what we would P&& a@ as dsvEslons, brigade and r#$rnmts - @ m i ,#mwgpl and &&. The first- and last were alsa'&rlcts Qfthetr &ma,w millmy region. Each W m had a heifdqmms6 r base in a fortified town or hrktess. Each t a a k h r was identified wkth a particular locality fram which ib sp)I&n were recruited. &h m u m + @ &m m m a n d a of a muma, was aq impwant figwe in tke military adminimnt@nof hh themeJrqwmmk for the f a m e 5 and Of t
s t r ~ ~ I t r ~ & @ i c & a s W ~ a S ~ # e of the h a 1 pptltatian and th& g ~ M and s rhamls. HiS most Imp-t r q m i h i i i t y before the rnfddie of the 1Pth C H w i ,~QW~!W>, Ckdhg wi.th sai& into his territory a n d ihhmhig his
wperbn o f ~ e n e w m m ~ . Ilrumimkt man-pt ofthe kIktwy~jt+m%ykm (1 Ith c m r y ) , foL3+.The Michel It m e h s i r i f o W f i M *outs and sp& +hkr O m > o f Thoma the %. Bblioteca Naciand,Madrid)
The fighting
During the course af the 10th century the army evolved a much more offensive tactical structure, the main causes being the need to recruit more profeNslona1 soldiers, and the need to operate effectively on campaigns which demanded more than the seasonally available theme armies. The main changes were the htrodudon of a corps of heavy cavalry armed with lances and maces, which could operate effectively alongside infanq, and which substantially enhanced the aggressive power of the Byantine cavalry, together with the rwlval of a corps of disciplined, effective heavy infantry, able to stand flrm in the line of battle, confront enemy fnfanb?yand cavalry, much long distances and function as garrison troops away from their home territory an a permanent bask. At the same tfme,the army leadership developed new battlefield tactics, so that c o a d e r s had a flexble yet hard-hlttingforce at theh disposal that could respond appmprhtely to a range of different situations. The remarbbte successes achieved by Byzantine annies in the smmd half a£the 10th century in particular, under a series of very able commanders, and described in the historical accounts of the period, camborate the evidence of the tackIcal beatises. In one tract a new formation of infantry soldiers is d e l b e d , consisting of troops wielding thick-stocked, long-necked javelins or pikes, whose task it was to face and turn back enemy heavy cavalry attacks. Twenty years later the tactic had evolved further, so that there were in each major infantry unlt of 1,000 men 1W soldiers so equipped, integrated with 400 ordinary spearmen, 300 ruchea and 200 light infantry (withslings and javelins). This important change in the role of infantry was reflected in the changed poli.tlcal and military situation of the 10th century. In the late 6th century cavalry began to achieve a certain pre-eminence in military organisatlon and tactia, whereas the 10th-century texts give infanq formations equal or even preferential treatment. Infantry became once more a key element in
49
the army, both in terms of numbers as well as tactics, a dear contrast to the situation in the preceding centuries. The new tactics were embodied in a new formation, in
which infantry and cavalry worked together, essenthlly a hollow square ar rectangle, depending on the terrain, designed to cope with encircling movements from hostile cavalry, & a refuge for Byzantine mounted units when forced to retreat, and as a means of strengthening infantry cohesiveness and morde. Infantry were no long= drawn up in a deep line with a largely defensive role, hut actively integrated into the offensive heavy cavalry tactics of the period. And a very important a s p 3 of the change was a focus an the recrultmnt of good infantty from war-like peoples within the empire, especially Armenians. The demand for uniformity in tactical function and therefore equipment and weaponry meant that the Bpntlne infantry of this periad w e e more like their classical Roman predecessors than anything in the intervening period. New farmations bf cavalry appear, heady m o u r e d troops armed from head to foot In IampUar, mail and quilting, whose horses were likewise protected. Face, neck, flanks and forequarters were all to be covered with amour to prevent enemy missiles and blows from injuring the cavalryman's mount. Known as kafaphraktol or kl&mpRomi, they were relatively few in number due ta the expense of rnaintaMng them, and wwe the elite strike force In each field army, drawn up in a broad-nosed wedge with their only function to smash through the enemy heavy mvlllry or infantry line, disrupt his formatlan, and open it up to permit Supporting horse- and foot-soldiersto exploit the situation,Coaternporary writers, h t h Byzantine and Arab, comment on the effects of this fotrnatlon on their foes. The imperial armies achieved a powerful reputation, to the extent that by the 1030s the mere threat of an imperial army marching inta northern Syria was enough to keep the lmal Muslim emirs in check. Yet white these successes were the result of a combination of good organisation and logistics,intelligent tactics,
we&-gmed, traiaed am$disdphed mldIwX gprd good morale, ~e key always re@abW the &mpetence and efftxWmes6 of f i e ~ ~ bA r I ~l y i ~ ~~ l ~ a ds g c d as its kadetshlp, howem, m-d dthw* tactid oFder and trahing mainly p Byanthe armies through much ofthe empire's &tory an obvious advantage, iarompeknt-offimewqe rhe ~ D f t h e ~ : d ~ c e o a t 4 e
cbkaua,a d inteltfgente eE fts leadm *as m e of the mnst ~~~t~~ w e a k n a 03 the imprial mw m r n attfie~levleI.~the~ddled the 11th renturpI and in a context uf shm+ted Shtqgc p m ancl internal plitlm3 qmllict, this pFodw€ed SerbRs psobiemsandledtotkk~~oft-he ~ ~ e n e s s d b o t h ~ W ~ . a i d the p ~ ~ As the demands of offensive M a r e required tlw employment ofwer #maker nudwzs of profedmf,mmmaq mfdiem,
.
~
~
32
hmial His&$
&pmlmat War
had only m e @ needed to coaffont it themselves. Most of the Narfare they had ~ Winv~lved I in since the IOHkbad been -st light-arm&, WhIy mobiie enemies such as 'kuh and Pechenep. And whereas the Bpmtine heavy cavalry of the later 10th century had been m e d with lama and m a w , they had advmced at a trat, not a t the charge, with the aim of simply rolling over the enemy fswe facing them.
In spite of efforts under the emperors of tbe bComnenr3s dynasty, many
lodigenam units were re-equipped end bained In western style, so that the result was an m y no different from any other multi-~thnic,polyglot mercenary army in it$ tactics and fbrmathns. The differenw lay in the superior order and tactkal dispositions of the imperial m p s , when these were properly exploited by an able
LEFT Marchingorder for field amy in enemy territov late 1 0th century. (Aud-ds collection) Kf? (a) advance xauts @I v a n g M (c I) mwlry centre dmsaon (cl) d r y right wing (d)w r y I& wing (el)cavalry c e ~ s e c o r i dl i e (d I)infamy centre (d2) infantry ri& mng (d3) infa* left wing (dl) infantry
(4 bww*'train
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margud mpemr & b u s e h ~ u w Ch) outridedank scouts
s
m-g oms, and thfs is m mdmt on mdsim~irl the kter pears of thk 12th an-. By theomid& &f the 28* ~rntuty~ and fo'iImhgthe fall of CanstanthmpIe ta the amleg of the hwth atmde, W ~ ~yzantl~e C tedwiw term$, titles; and m e 3 fur Q p s of unit mmuP3 to be employ& frl the shrhhhg Rrtltorks of h e empire, W C s , m u r md mpnry were no ~ ~ n t f m Wm e BftM surroundin&cultures and with whom & ByWfines were &mWdp itt @ace and war.
Strategy Strategic dispositions evolved to meet the needs of the moment. In the 6th cmtury and up to the period of the Arab invasions the units estabIished la garrisons along and behind the frontier were called limitrmei, frontier soldiers, usually comprised of the
M E $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ GE" A I V E A ~ &&&
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on was its &dive lqisttcal admlnistzation. Theroadsystem,~ghbothpatIy redwd in srope and m d e d fn quality when eompaxad witb &at of the Brwnrtn p e d o d , ~ l a n ~ t ~ . l n addition, the a d u l l p m9ha&ed-1 s)%Wnwas . M y #& into the w d k d +he a m $ and althwgh the exact a d r n ~ l s t t a ~ and oqpnwti~ld stmmlfawolved aver the mod ln questton, the amngmmb for suppIy9q h e mldien in efther p d m e ,w lnarwereeffedtw. ~ ~ m ~ ~ 1 l a E v e in either money at in W, dqpadhg u p f i a numbscrfmtfhbla whet& theatg89 in q u m m str#prw,en0q#l market whether the agricuhtml or bther mswces'
~ b y t h e i n n y ~ ~ k e a n d could be what the prtkuk needs of the m y a't that point in Sad were; md how many &lien md mhgb nqkd tu kfedand h ~ m e r w h a t I ; ~ h d t i d e . T B e ~ d m a m ~ m U r e ~ d ~ f i s *€ion WER wEU W i d e r s W r d ,am
w@k?kwrfttmsa3nu;esof~epeEiQd ~ O tb ~ ~R m t m mSariot w
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to keep ~ c e ~ t i u Q f bqps m for tm 1on B y a n f i n e mitory wd desdpmft~ af what happeaed whim tl& advice was not mowed. When a cam* was @armedi h d &cal d c i a l s IbW with the mtrd authorities a& the a t m y m a d s deprtmmt ~lt Cmmmttnopl~so that the right amount
&pcMly w m the emperof and W h w h o 1 d were oa the q x d i t i , ~ nF,a& of fhe q i o M t h m g h which the anmy had to put aside adequate supplies aFe;rahI meat (usually m ttte hwf) ,andail or wine for the r q w numw of Ermps. Large
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Wimq wM& w a d @netally be divided hta several smaller m d ~ o f ~ ~ e s y % I t e ~ d e d ~ columns, t h e eaehtakbga w a r e mte and rims invozm. Tbe outlay w.9 o m Pay Beading fara pmama$dfindemous m the h m i e r -number'& as many as 20,DOr)of heavy, m d actaunts from the 10#h wWy more, and vety mx&onaIly as many as show ju9t how heavy the burden mdd be, Y
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30,m; but the average theme fom might be na more tim 3 , 0 0 0 4 , ~often , far fewer, eonfmnting armies af the same giaR, or shadowing larger forces until they a u l d I x ambushed or taken m h a full-sde battle. Providing mums for such armies involved a mmidmble mgmhational effort. In addition to fwd, hand pack-anid had to be provided, w q x m s and other Items of mllltary quipment repiaced and, for eqxdium imaded to take enemy smngholds, wa$ons or caas carrying siege mrrchery and artillery. While food and suppues were genemfly providd by the distrlctr through whi& the army p a w , weapons md other equipmant, as well as mQunts and pack-mimdsI might come hum mote cWmt pmvSnm. In a
latb-cenhrry account, for example, detailing m e ofthe pqmatiom for an eqediton by sea, some pmvinas wwe c o n m i s h e d to produce a certain number of weapons: the region of T h d a n i k i was ordered to & h e r 200,000a m , 3,800 havy infanby spears and 'as many W s ar psibIe'; the region ofHellas was asked to @uw. 1,QOO heavy infanby spews; while the governor of Eurlpp~$fn Greece, and the m-ets of the themes of N i k q m h and of the Peloponnese all undertook to prwride ~ , 0 0 atrows 0 aad 3,000 heavy infantry spears. The same doamwit sp&fteg a b that other $crvemarsor offim were cotnmissioned to levy thous;urds of nails and similar itfrom their pmvincm for ship c o m a i o n ,
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Portrait of a soldier
Recruitment, discipline, and life on campargn Soldiers There is n& doubt that the majority of ardinary soldiers in the m y throughout the Nstory of the empire were of fakly humble status. The 'bgtter-off' mdhary soldiers among the thematic m d e s in the 9th and 10th centuries appear to have held a relatively high position in their communities, however, partly~oftheirspecialfkmIandlegal status: they were exempt h m exSa taxatlon and a range of state fmposltions in t e r m s of labour service or providing housing and supplies for other soldiers, officers orm iw offldals, to which the ordinary population was always subject; and they could bestow thdr p q w t y without having to adhere strictly to Rcrman inheritance law about the division of property among heirs. Tfifs gave sotdim of ail type, even when they were nat especially well paid, an enhanced social prest@, set them apmt somewhat from the otdiraary ppulation, and gave them a sense of group Identi9 and solidarity. The sources for recruitment and length of service for the p e r i d after the mlddle to the end of the 6th century are not very informative. Before that m e , it seems that the baditional Roman regulations probably applied, with a minimum recruitment age of 18 years and a minimum height requirement of about five feet six inches. There i s reason to believe that the -mum age far recruibnent in the 9th and 10th centuries was still 18 and the maximum 40. Service beyond the age of 48 was not unusual, however,and several examples of soldiers who served beyond that age are h o w n . Some sources suggest that many officers stayed on long after their useful carer was over, as a result, adversely affecting the military effectiveness d their unit.
There were important differences between the requirements applied to recruits to 'professi~nal'units, such as the tagmatn, and the provincial or thematic armies, with many of the regulations governing admission to the first group being wtaiDed from the late Roman legislation, whereas thematic soIdiers were required merely to appear at the regular muster parade appr~priatdyequipped with mount, provisions for a certain number of days, shield and spear. Some restrictions on recruihnent also existed, prohibitions on the enlisbnent of heretics were applied, at least In theory. Priests and monks were forbidden ro join the army, while those convicted of adultery or similar crimes, those who had already been dishonourably discharged, and so forth, were technically disqualified from eniisting. But it is impossible t~lulow to what extent such regulations were observed. It i s most likely that in the situation that developed from the middle of the 7th century most of the forma1 regulations of the Raman perid had become irrelevant. The application of ofsuch regulations was in any went not possible for forefgn units, especially Muslims, Franks and others outside the sphere of Byzantine religious-political authority, nor to others, such as Armenians, who may have belonged to aan-Orthodox communities. The further away from Constantinople, the more M y such regulations are to have been ignored. By the 10th century the greater diversity in origins, military value and contexts in which soldiers for different types of unit were recruited must have led to an equal diversity in their conditions of enlistment and servfce, not just between simple thematic soldiers and saIdim of the imperial tagmfa but between foreign units and the mercenary soldiers re&ted for specific campaigns.
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and of his faith while serving the emperor. The numbers entering monasteries among the officers of €he provinces was substantial enough for an Arab historian to remark on the fact, and to note that those who pursued this life forfeited the continuation of their cash salary, to which they were otherwise entitled as bearers of an Imperial title.
There was no 'officer corps' in the Byzantine army, although it is clear that the rnafortty of men who commanded units beyond the level of a squad or troop came fram the wealthier elements in society, whether tn the prwlnces or ln Constantlnople, and that swvice at eourt in one of the palace units functioned as a sort of training school. The sources tell us quite a lot about the middle and upper levels of officers, and unffl the 12th cemry it is clear that there was always a substantial meritacc8tic element in advanemerit. Sorial background and education pIayed a role, but It was PWfectly possible far an able and competent soldier or lower-ranking officer to rise to high position. In all aspects of Byzantine society social connections and kinship always pIayed an important role too, and t r W g and ability were generaIIy mediated through personal ties; for example, an df~cermfghf advance h4 career through service iniWIy in the retinue of an important officer, from where he might receive a junior appointment in a local regiment, rising through the variom grades, or being transferred to a senlor position elsewhere. Some careers developed within f a r d i e s serving in the same unit there are s e w d examples of offlmsfsans entering their father's unit as U p l e coopers or soldlcrs before being promoted to junior and then more senior officergrade; In other cases, we hear of privileged young prwlndal men sent to Constantinople where, with the
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Gold hyperpymn of Alexi& 1 ( 1 08 1 - 1 1 1 8). standing figure of the emperor: (Barber Insthk of R e Universrty of B*mingham)
help of an influential relative or patron, they were appointed to a junior post in the pards before further promotion. In one case, which was probably not untypfral, a young man was appointed &st ta a mall corps af elite guards In the palace, before receiving a junior command at the capital, then a middling pravinaiaI post, More being promafed to a senior position, all h the course of some 10 years or so. By the middle of the 1lth century the growth of a powerful provincial alstucracy had brought some changes to this stntcture. The pm4ncigI elite itself prvvidgd a major wurce of recruits to the middle and sentor offlea' posts In the empire, and during the lam !Jthand 18th centuries came to monopiise most key provincial miiitary commands. The inmasing use of mercenaries reduced at the =me time the importarnee and status of the provin&l, thematic soldiery, who blended back into the mass of the peasanby barn which they were drawn, thereby losing their dlstinctive social position.
Discipline and training The Byantine army, at least as represented in the m a t i v e histories and In the military t r e a W , prided itself on its order and dlscfpiine. Life in the army involved a wry different mrt of daily routine from life In
clmntexts or from that in l a disciphed and organid n-uring armies. 14 6thantury military handbwk makes abundqntly clw.M ' Bpxduse~ but few brave m a , whereas care and mining make effuAmt sddim,' not& the author. Lev& of Wciplne varied and were a major cameof conkern to mmmders and to thk authors a f d the militarg treatises. 'Chere are plenty of cases of mutiny and unresZ among the prcwindal armies and the mamples d trmp pazidchg when the mmmanrfe~ was thought to have been killed ax injured bevidence of the variable p s y c h ~ l ~ @ d cbndmon of the troops. The extent to which proper diidplfne was acmalIy enfarted is not rtey clear in the limited sounzes. Usually it was the m& able commanders who were most Uely to apply military dkipline effectively, partly a dection of tb& prwnd eh~facterand ability m inspire confidenea among the saldia4 - a pioint PSo remgfikd in the military treati$es.Financial pemsiy, dtlltt~on the p;lrt of h divlmMdunandas or ~EIkea,or the government,was a &a1 ingredient in enroumghg w 1 d b to follow ordm and accept the disclplbe necfot e m v e IQhting. Dfscipllne also v&& accwdhg ta the. categories of mops. A s y e t M e certaifily prevailed In elite unI@such as the imperial tagmi3 aad in mi^ wMrh had a pwkicular
loyalty t6 th& commanding offica One story mounts the tale of an M k e r who was upbraidd by the emperor himself for hid unkempt appearance while a t his p s t in the palace. Dbdpline was probably least effective h the militia-like thematic forces+but d e t competent offims it to haw e n &ectivw maintained. There efisted an offtcial d e of military discipline which is frequently Included in the military h a d b w b , and effective leaders seem m t h e whak to have appUed it, Niltepbms I1 is q m r b d to haw awarded pmMmmt to a soldier for drapp5ng his M c 3 because he was too tked to mntinue wrying it, When his m e r Igrtrjred the osder, he too. w8s punished severely, on the pun& that t h e Mt had e n d m his comrades as well as himsdf,
wbik the latter had compounded the crime and h k 3 m d m g a d the well-being of the M e force. CanV in the 8th century, Mkphorrrs II,JohnI T W s k q Basil U in the late 10th c e w and Rmnmm IV in later 1were all regarded wlth ilpprm as strfct dhckp~rians,as was Alexios I in the late 11th centuq. Yet discipline often broke d m There an? some hi& in the mums a b u t the exercise$ carried out by t h e mtdiers, descriptions,com&fatetI by account3 of similar m s e s in the tWal manuals md lmaAdWphrs. Ntkepttms Phokas pat on a series of military g a s and mock battles in the hippdrorne at Cmstantinople fn the 964b - they were so realistic and frightthat a panic a c m d which claimed many H m . But whatever the tefctbo~hxlidabout the value o£such exercises, sensible corrmmafldm appear generally to have been aware of tbe limitations erf the different som d troops under their command. The treatkw on warfate often include quite simple, easily xianapi tactical manmuwe$ for the great bulk ofthe thematic Mmq, who were on the whole not well equippi and pkntlally uareliabIe. In.contrast the W-trained llnd wellquipped heavy cavalq and elite units were e x e e d tu imp1ern@ntquite complex rnanaeums, frequently under enemy attack, on the battlefieId Skills and mining, discipline and morale went hand in hand. The sort of exercise in pmirular skills which cavalry trmpers had to aut b Nuseated Fn a la@ 6th-&ntury m a t l a
me
tmapf] shottld s k t rapidly, mount@ti an his kame and at a mr&, to f i e front, to the mr, to right stf$ %i IF@; he &mld pm3se leaping ~ n t ahis horse. Whm rnumkd 4 at a catttw he muld s h o t one q two e r w s rczn'idly ~ n put d the smmg bow in Ib case ... rurd then tuk the lance which he -c Wt hi$ baeit, With tke simng bow i n its tase he shoulftl hold the Isncc in hi3 b i d , tRm quickly replace it on
hi3 back and h k the bow. As well as these Individual s k i b wftb bow, lance or ward, the troops were drilled in
Portrait of a soldier
forrnakian, so that, in larger or smallet badies, they could be wheeled, moved from column into h e and back again, form a square against heavy r r a w attack, form into a wedge to break through an enemy formation, and so forth. Success on the battlefield often depended on the &ctiven@ss with whWl such manoeuvres might be carded out, although it was also admitted that things should be kept as simple as possible to avoid confusion or being caught unpreprd mid-way t?mugh a manoeuvre there are examples of batties in which one of the reasons for the collapse of the imperid forces appears to be due to such errors.
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Life on campaign As we haw seen, life as a soldier In the
Byzantine army must have varied enormously from century to century as the empire's fortunes changed, and depending on the commanding officers, the type of unit, and so forth. We have very little evidence about individual soldiers, but there is a good deal of information that can be gleaned £ r ~ m the wide range of written sources about what the life of an ordinary soldier must have been like. In what follows, therefore, I will illustrate some of the issues by inventing a 'typical' soldier.Although thew is no text concerning our hypothetica1 soldier, we can build up a picture of some events in his life k m several sources, so that in the a m t below, all the things that happened to him, the actions ascribed to him or to others, the duties he carried out and the fighting in which he was Involved, can be found In medieval sources of the period from the 7th to the 12th centuries, and are all perfea1y compatible with the actual htstorlcal context in which I will situate Mm. In this -on we will follow the daily routine of a typical cavalry b o p r on campaign under the geneml Bar& Skim h the Balkans in 971. The soldier's name was Theodore, a fairly common and p q d a r name, and o m shared by one a£the most famous
65
soldia mints of the eastern Christian world, St Theodore the recruit, one of the four patron saints of soldim along with saints Ikmetrim, Merkourios and George. Theodore same from the village of kitholmmi near tfie b t m s town of Teourorallon in Tbmce. ' I h d r e was the mn ofa saldier himself, and the w s land was subjea to the ,-s the milimy semi& due from those enrolled an the thematic m i U t q senrice register. H s family was not well off,but their neighbows, who were aIso hbIe to rditary service, were pmitkd to contdmte jointly to annlng and equipping a sfngle mvaIry soldier. Theodore's skills M brought hlm intu a unit of Iancers, medium cav* armed also with bows and mace& where he held the rank of aMmhos, commander of a troop of 10 men, in a h d o n or squadron of SO soldim. He sem& e M v e l y on a full-tlme rather than a seasonal basis and a camoffered hlm the chance of a promotion, phaps to second-in-#mmand of hls squadron. In the spring of 970 the empire faced an invasion from a large RuS' force deep into imperial territory in Thrace, where they took the lscal garrisons by surprise and were able to sack the fortress of Philippoupolis (mad. Plovdiv), before advancing along the road to Constantinople. Since the emperor John had most of his effective field units in the east, where they were campaigning near Antiach, he appointed Bareias Skleraa, together with the paa-ikios Peter, both experienced commanders, to take a medium-sized force - numbering wme 10,000- and scout the enemy dispositions in the occupied territories. As a secondary objective they were to exercise the troop and prevent enemy raiders committing further depredations. At the same time, spies - disguised in Bulgarian and Rus' cwhlrne - were sent into enemy-held territory to learn as much as they could about the Rus' commander Svyatoslav's moments. Svyatoslav soon learned of the actvandng imperial column, and in response despatched a force of both Rus' and Bulgar troops, with a supporting detachment of Petchenegs wIth whom he was tempamily allied, to drive the Romans off.
Portrat of a soldier
with their baggage, were more than a mfle along the side, with a v-shaped trench some six to dght feet in depth. Theodore's unit, like all units, had to set up its own rotating watch within the ramp; but the cammanding oRcer also needed to set up a watch for the camp as a whole. Each unit dong the perimeter provided soldiers for tMs pabol, called the k e r h , and
through the use of a regularly changed password had camptetete authority aver access to and egress from the camp. Other units had to b9 sent out to forage for supplies m d foddw for the hams, and they were in turn accompaniNl by supporting troops for protection - it was important to pitch camp and secure the immediate area before sunset so that supplies could be got in as quickly as possible. Leaving camp after sunset was usually prohibited, except far the outer line of pickets, groups of four men sent out to cover the major approaches ta the camp when it was clear that no enemy was yet in the immediate vicinity. The men were organised in tent-groups of eight, called kmtoubmia, sharing a hand-mill and basic cooking utensils as well as a mall trwp of pack-animals. Soldiers were h e d with two main varieties of bread: simple baked loaves, and double-baked 'hard tack', referrd to in late Roman times as bucellatum and by the Byzantine as paximadion or paximatian. In camconditions, It was norrrially the soldiers themselves who milled and baked this. The hard tack was more easily preserved over a l o n p period, was easy to produce, and demanded fairly simple milling and baking skills. Hard tack could be baked in field ovens - klibunol - ar simply laid In the ashes of camp Ares, an advantage when speed was essential, and this was the case during this expedition - although the soldiers much preferred the best such bread, baked in thin ova1 loaves cooked h a field-oven, and h e n dried in the sun. The rafion ger diem Included two ia three pounds of bread and either dried meat or cheese; wine was also Iswed, but it Is not clear how often or in what circumstances. The amount of meat
67
relative to the rest of the diet was often minhal or absent aItagether, but would still provide a reasonable amount of nutrition, since andent strains of wheat and barley had considerably w e t protein content than modern strains, and it has been shown that the bread ration of ancient and medieval soldiers provided adequate nutrition for the dur~ltionof a campaign season wen without much meat. The camp mutine was marked by the trumpet signah for the evening me&, Iights out and reveille; trumpet signals were also employed to issue commands to the various d t s and divisions to strike camp, assemble in marching order and begin the march. Leaving camp was always a dangerous time, far as the troop5 defiled through the main entmnres they were far a while a p e d to archers or wen a rapid hit-and-run charge from enemy horsemen. A particular order for exiting camps was laid down and followed, and once the army was out of the entrenched area It would be drawn up for a whlle in a defensive formation until the troops fell into tho rnarchlng order for the day. The speed at which armies moved varied according to terrain, weather and the number and types of troops. Unaccompanied mounted troops could covu distances of up to 40 or 50 miles per day, provided the horses were fegdar1y rested and wdl nourishad and watered. Small wit3 generally maved more rapidly than large divisions, wen up to 30 miles per day for infantry in some contexts. Average marching speeds were much slower: three miles per hour for infantry on even terrain, two and a half on brokenlhIUy ground. Mixed forces moved at the speed of the slowest dement; but speed also depended on the conditions of the roads ot.tracks f6llowed, the breadth of the column, and its length. The longer the c a l m , the longer it toak for the rearmost files to start moving off,which wouid thus arrive at the next camp later than the foremost groups, the delay between first and last units belng proportional to the length and breadth of the column. Thus a division of 5,00[1 infanby, which is what Batdas
Illummnated m r i p t ofthe M t W y 0fId-dSwm (I ltfi cmtuw],fsL l @ a T h e W W $ , a w a W h b m e r frwn the: Wponmese,baing&d in her
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m l y had at I& dispml, rnmhing at the st#Wanw r;ate of about three miles gmund, ordered me per muf ever ~~BRcl~eashmwmpy4lga (minimat) !xammefteswmid dm& o w a b&dlcmetre distance. There would be a gap of at 'khe very l a &but$3 minutes8if notmqre, betwwmtbefmutdrear elements. T h ~ s - marched ~ m WeF a b r w ;tIQ% the na-I w w tr-s &Ikmeii by Wpe:tbl mgs on 'ttira cwnpaign, anPlm dMsim d ~,m aw~w~tlla bisveetmdgd w newly J x mW, d the whole army same 14 dmThe m o s t units wmM b! well met one hour bhknd the van. H m h g J e f t t i ~ emmp Theadme%unit was
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p i a ~ i n t h e v a n ~ n , ~ a ~ af stoups deplapd wEP abed of t h d~u r n , aiid ahead of the mahimnthgmt c5f &vaW a d I&intq The baggage Want to which a group of unit?#war rm@ed oh.a mtaHnna1 b d s fox ptectiun, was placed fn the centme, unit8 patKded at some d k n w , anti w h e t h e remain dowwldon eltlm Qn6)mmBI~in@mlym~themy cmtd march a m &WuaakrfrantIn a g&w numbers in the wemy fox%he mmged m lure the e m m y but oftheir fomamn that auld& rapW'depioyed mcampmtand withdraw fnag&dmdeq illto battle o* and far pasing tlimgh narrow pms or acrosk Bvm another e m i l g w g m m and ~ E C &tbe enmy to pursue but, on the Wumprion that t h formatzonwas 6.mplqd. Byzantine t z q s were indeed lcaing, without Gs the march p g r e w d some &'hearty dear plan ofo f k ox atder, It must $mutsrmmedtQWmnthegenqalWt haw peerad as though th 6 u m m h r d the emmy-was mt far aw*, near the f&xss WZ&~R$. m,whkb -@ Mth t@wndf ArWidupOIb (mad. LWlmqazJ. difWdty to a v d be@ caqletely The thrd diwfsimswere given separate fasb; -two wen2 conmaied fn the Mug& wub and ,-lts w& dmmled. Y& W p h b J mining and l&rship td& and Skhos w m d d terrain through which fke tMck led finally &ml the prearranged qnd to k in the &&im of the enemy, while he took given fur the w h k h m to fall back ammmd uf the W d s w d m &the army M m h & T h w k I s d t , OW of tke t w MmseIf. laving the hpa divisim in corps that lap in ambush, p q a d its& the ambush with dminstrar&m,he h ~ e l f order was given tb m m m absoLute1p s h , led a Bebx aad mmSm4 charge amst to place all SupWnumetarj.baggage mimb the faremost memy mW%,made up Of with t b i r WdanYS W M the rear, tu Pesheneg r h o m t d abchm, h Spae of
Portrait of a soldier
check their weapons, and to deploy into a battle order approplate to the terrain. One of the priests who accompanted the force offered up a quick prayer - a standard practice More battle. A5 the van division approached, drew level with and then withdrew beyond them, a single trumpet-call ordered them to break cover and cfiarge into the flank of the unsuspetbq enemy. Caught inthe open In dose cmbat, the Bachmegs, a war-Ue W C p p l e fxom the Eurasian steppe, had no chance ta &play at a distance suitable fof the use of their arehery and, aftet hing brought to a haIt - at which paint the van d m i o n about-faced and counter-attackedin its turn - they mmed and fled. me Rus' and B*m maps, manwhile, who had bees hurrying to catch them up, on the assumption that the
69
Romans had been routed, suddenly huud themselves caught up in the panic. As €he rout Mame general and the Roman forces pushed home their advantage, heavy casualties were hfllaed on the £ eehg I enemy mops. A contemporarpsource remark that the Romans last some 550 men and many woundad, as well as a large number of horn, a dhect result of the fearsome archery of the Pectrenegs. The combined enemy force, homer, lost several thousand. The short encounter wan an hnpartant breathing space for the emperor John, furnishing hlm also wlth vital inbnnatiun about the rompwition, QhtIng abilities and morale of the enemy. After any mmmter with the memy the mmmmding offlm held a muster to establish casualties. Special* detailed S~ICE~TS
The world around war
War and peace The medieval e a s t m ~Roman world was a wriefy In which the virtues of peace were exMled and war was condemned. Fighting was M be avoided at dl a x . Yet the 3yzaaW ernplre neverthelw inherited the military adminlsrratke s t r u ~ and, s in many ways, the m3lftarlstlc ideolugy of the non-Christiau Roman em* at its height. The tm&m which these tradimns generated were resolved 4 a palitidreligious ideology or warid v i m which melded Christian Ideals on the one hand, with the jtfiaification of war as a ne%esary evil on the other, waged primarily h defence of the Raman world and OrhodIitetdly
Since Gad has put in QW kn& &s hphl ... we believe that &ere is nothi% h i g h w gre@terthat we can do than to p w r n in judgearmt strd justice and that thm we m y be m d by His dmighty hand with v&ary uw OW mmks (which b a thing rnm preckw and k~)mwable thm thz diadem which authorliy
...
wewear)sndtkus t ~ r n a y ...k ~
Byzantine emperors muid jlustiv their wars on the basis that they were fighting to preserve peace, to extmd the territory of the Christian world, and to defend God's Chosen
-
People for in Cbrlstian R m a n terms, the mantle sf the Chosen People had been
transferred to the C h r h k with the coming af Christ. There was always a tension &tween the pacfim of early Christianity, however, md the imperial Roman, but Christian, need to fight to defwd the empire%&mitorialintegrity, ar to recover
'lost' Christian lands.and peoples. Christianity never evolved an ideologid obligation to wage war against 'infidels' presented in the t m s of Christian theology, even if, at tima, and an m hd hoc basis, individual.?.have smken md acted as though such a justification could be made. The 13th canbn afSt Barrll spxWEaUy states that those who tmk lLfe in warfare should abstaln from communion far a period As Christianity spread aaass the empire during the 2nd and 3rd centmi&, p a p a t i s m often won the day?and if seems that comidaable numbers of ChrktIans served in the imperial d m at t#s titxie. This muM not banish prblltllar conflicts of interest, however - military s&ce required acceptance of the emperor cult, that h,the emperor a$ a W - and a whok m g e of pagan traditions and rmats. The result is that the histmy of the fir$tthree centuries of Wstianity, and the 3rd century in particular, is MI af tales of penemtion and martydam, as individual M t s refusxi to conform to the cerernonlal and rimd observances amciated with life in the army. As a compromise sol.uttm,the 3rd-cenhry Chrlstran thinker O@en argued that Christians formed a special type of m y that did not fight wafs fpr the emperor physically, But instead prayed for the success of the gate, which made possible their mntinued existence and the expansion of their community. This compromise was developed G a response to the csilkisms made by pagan mmmmtatoa about. Christian Wrnmudtia and their pacifism. In the end,
The world amund war
it was the argument about the cantimed existence of the Rornan state being the
necessary condition for the survival and expansion of Christianity which won the day, and led to the more pragmatic compromise noted already. The favour shown to Christianityby the emperor Constantine I, and his deathkd baptism, however, led during the course of the 4th century to a substantive r@formuhtionof imperial polftlcaI ideology, and this changed the W t l o n dramatically. The ChrdsWsatfan of the emperar cult solved one of the most difficult issues at a blow &I earthly emperor selected by G d to lead the Christians, now consonant with the Roman people - was clearly acceptable, whems an emperor who was s u p w d to be a divinity was not. TWOperspective$ evolved horn this sltuatlon. The &st was the offidally
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73
sanctianed view which encouraged suppart for the state, as pmnified by the orthadox emwtor, and all its undertakings. Lading churchmen, wMIe a p r d n g their hope tbat violent conOict could be avoided and that bloodshed would not be n v ,went on to state clearly that it was p&wwo&y for a W t i a n to take up arms against the enemies of the state. The Chrhtkmhticm of sadety developed rapidIy thereafter, and as the government became domlnatd by Christians, x, by the end sf the 4th centmy tt became impossible to obtain a government p t without being a Christian. The assodation between warfare and CMstiartity, the struggle for survival of the 'chosen people', led by the emperor chosen
The walls d G&mtimpte (5th c m t u ~ ] . (
W
s
d W 6 )
bp Gad, a t the bead of Ms m d m e quite WUdt*m W W t was thug alwut Wading ChWiantv and the ChrlWm empire- M the same time a Wrrt!h r peace, and a reget that War should be necessary, were constant motifs in imperiaI and Church I~WIOW, TIWE w t castant ~ L t a qC T ~ a e h ~ a ~ e n ls yp p n r t w W B y z a n ~ t u m i a &md. SmmdSM warfare without W ' s help w&$hqmsibIe. A Me 6iMentu~ytext nates *at:
... W
i
?
W g~ m d~ thathis must
i m p m t a n f m & We l m o f W m d jktiw buTM1q an W e , he dwuld s W e fa ulcln errS fmoYGad, without which il fs impass&le
ib~aurarryplm,howwwelE~it m a y s e e t r r , w w ~ Q however ~ y ~ ~ w&khe~bd#l~l@.
me i a k repeated throughout the Byzmlir~sppW. Roman defeats were sean the result nf G M ' F with ~ the mInam, the wpk,*,were being punished ~ Q Kth& sins. 0dx when €heWmms rewmd W tbe path af tQ&teimn& and ~ ~ ~ t h & ~ h ~ W ~ k d d ~ d ~
aWmd Roman-anns, aid this idea underlies much of the thhichg in thwachm of PndMdds and groups in Byzantine politid
&tory and pW themy. Thm w thus nu notion a f Holy W a as
~OmeWng ,@s
t~
b@ waged
under
against pmhlar e m m l e a The Bpgantlne Setf* was me of a M v M CM*n state 6ghting t f k f W e s ofd%rb&xFwith- fmagainst w h m it h d w ~ ~ ~ t n k a n i ~ ~ a & t o evblvea w b k panoply of defensive twMtquw, amwhich M a w was &p one demmt, and by no mmnewm-ily s&c'~st-
t k e m g s t w ~ . @ t h f s ~ ~ ~ f
argue that &war I wsrs 'holy wal,sincwlilll enmy action tl-mhtw'edthe &mi Mi& of *the R~m21o~. mew were &%kSbinswhen the natian that sbldiers who fell inbattle might bp r-ed h hmwn, a notiun & $ ~ ~ ~ eat l h the ded~~pment of sfdamfc nottom ef Jihad, af wM& ~ A E 3 y a were qpie wm. ThttS in t b 10th f ~ example, r tilg s o l d i & - a p x O r NWph~rnSII - hmwn bJr tsoe somewhat chllbg ep1thWas 'the white death af the k a w ' , hgg&ed that this m?@& be ae appmprfate way to emmmqp wldi~ersto fight. h t the idea was rejected hy the Church and was never @ally x & e d . It map h m ken dement d fa& Wefraf raurm but it W q cwtainlJ n w @en inp o f f i a -@Ition. A payer to b~ said b e e tha saldim mardied intb combat is &ardd in two 1Qth-mrtury texts,and It ~ gives t t ! a ig to d g idea & of Ulis c o r n d m of IZhxisftan with wu& rn-
Loid JqusCkuhtRow W, haw mercy C
~
~
~
'
~
~
~
-
us. ~
wW@ #o@t#&e &ai%fbrotrrfEriSh &Bur &othH$, W$&nW awfi a d our
and
C
~
The w&M,m&uuar
bw w b k bwry, the mighty Lord or Wes, &mu@ &e h m s s ~ o neftha immacuj@ Mother of God, TRY MotWt and N4l Ir safrtts. h
m,
There t$ a mau of evidence, thmfom, from the 4th century up to the very Iat ym8 of the empireI for the pubtfc and uffidal wmptance by both Church an$ COW, as well as by the ordinary population, d the wed to wage wslr; for the fact of divine support for such warfge; and for the need to malntain and rely an heavenly aid In waging war.kthwgh the notion af 'holy war' inthe .sense under6W by the Crusaders, or by nan~Muslimsas typical of Islam, €kicker& Mefly lnta life fn the Byzantine world, espedal1y fn the context:ofthe aggcesslve fighung of the 10th century, It newt. dedoped beyand this. The ways h whfch &are on behalf d the CMstlan Roman state w m u m k n t d dfdgo tbmugh m b iW ~ U ~fO$ Q# ~ & a, p w wt &@ J3y=nXtna were alwayk com&uu6of the ne&
da-
75
fote$lWteW&ww,ariw!d~
gmwlIy became more p a in a tfme of piartkal and m 3 1 l t q mpasionhm such as B e Ztlth centmy W e warhe c d d h. therefor$, loss of life MI the Rmm ddewsfn~dar~bewoi~~)r minhi~ed,if at &U mibh. The eaperof CPnHwtbe V'cIwamtiged ZE'noble" M s wnpa£gqinto Bul@tb~in 772-73 h t l s e no Wman WWFS died; whlh by the time he w;krglM hjo military ,handbookor term C-900,the emperor Leo Vt clearly expr-, *eida that wsu has to' he justiped fn ~ r ~wlfhc O aeo d t q and the mtfnwd &pt%nce df ththa W m n wte. k rong as m m fm, hmem &me&, were at sub, then 'WWWAS w p h b b and lust. War with o t h a ' ~ a b CMstms x WAS, U wUwr to be avoided. Butmen this W be fulittffdif the: &IW~@; rtrd dth~~mam,wmat~w~jwttoa~& by the d$@ded rulers of such Im&
76
kentiat Hiaorier
Beantrum at War
Warfare and east Roman society Warfare was fm much of the Bpandue world, throughit much of its htstoty, t h e
nostate of affairs. Its effect3 were manifested in a number af ways. R,begin with* the ofdlnary population of the m p h was directly affected by hostile activity In U s e areas most e x p o d to enemy attack, they suffered t h e dc&~~ctfon of 'their aaps and dwangs, the theft or s h g h t a of thelr livPSfmk, and H they were themselves caught, posible &a# or enslavement. There survive same short bur wmSiVe inscriptiom fKlm the fiantier regions of Asla Minor, dating to the middle Bpnkhe period, which cammemorate hdividuah who died of their wounds following a battle or rai4 other accounts tell of relatives carried off tnta captivity w l W i n t h e ~ a n d a n enemy attack and never seen Again. And the litmte elite was ju$t as aware of these aspects: w a r b e imposed its& upon many facets of Byzadtim Iltmary dture, in saints' lives, in speeches in praise of emperors, in funeral mtions, in sermons and homilies to church congregations, in private letters addressed to individuaIs. Themes such as death, loss of p q m y and so forth frequently, and in some cases the temr inspired by a stlddm enemy raid is graphidly portrayed. Letters often bewail the eff- of warfare, Mth teffermces to the tears of q b e d children and widowed mothers, the destruction of craps, h a m s , mmmttc mzx~munities,the enslavemeat or death of populations, drivlrlg off of Uvstock and se ferth. The presence of Byzantine troaps was no less aneraus, hmwer. The very existence of an arrny brought with it the need to supply and provision it, to supply mataids w d h s t o ~ for k it when it was on cam-, to pavide kdgings and billets for officers and w1&&, and so on. There were m i v e and burdensome logWcai demands wherever an army ww present, not fustn question .of dmmn&i made by the army on I d populations, but a h the fad that govmment inmention into the local
economy often affected the eroflamic equlllbrlwn of the a & e d dktrlcts. This cauld either rake the form of f h h g artifidally law prices for the sale of p l a c e to the army, thus harming the producersrar of by sudden heavy demand for c&ain pduce, thus driving up prim for tho$e in the private sector. The c i v h n rnuktlon might also be compelled ta bake b&ad arid biscuits far the troops as well as providing other supplies and, In addition, they were subjected to the plundehg and W n g of +he La well- disciplined demenb af the army. Quite apart horn this was the potential f a conflict betwen soldiers and civtllans, for the outcome was seldom famuable to the l a m Additional levies in @ a h were para-1.y onemus, and there are kequent cornplaints in the M t t e a dmmkntatian concerning this and rklated burdens, u$uaIIy a result of either special requirements for ptlcular cmpaigns ar the normal opratlrmd demands made by the tmops in a particuh region. h addition to these demands, provincial populations had to provide remum and manpower for the maintenance af the public pmt, the dromos, with Its system d postirhg 3tatlons and stables, stud ffums and breeding ranches, mule-trahs and moclated requiremmts. The pasta1 system served the nee& of both the rnfitary and the fiscal administration of the state. It helped with the movement of mflitaty suppUes, was r e s p n s i e for the rapid trmsit of courlea and impaial offids Of all kin&, as well a$ important foreigners diplomatic officials w prisoners of war, far exarnpIe. The households that were obligated to carry out certain dutie for the past were, like househol& that had to supprt a ~oldler, released fmm the e x t r a m h a y S a t e impositions, and this was imprtmt aspect af the smooth running of the pmdurial postal system. The nature of the burden which the pmvincjf populaiion bore in suppart of the army can be seen particularly clearly in a seEfes d documents af the later lDth and g ~ i d the y I ltb centurp. It Consists of Imprid grants of exemp~onh r n the
The world around war
billeting of saldiers,the provision of supplies for various categories of troops in transit, the provision of horses, mules and wagons for the army, and the deuvery of charcoal and
timber far military purposes. Same accounts in chronicles detail the sort of requirements needed to mount major military expedltlons - large numbers of draught-animals,wagons and foodstuffs, for example, and increases in demands for supplies of all h d s ; all were pravided by requisitions from the local
77
peasantry who suffered considerably from this form of indirect taxation. Economic and demographic dlsruptlon affected not just the people who lived in the provinces or towns that suffered during periods of fighting. It also directly threatened the government's control over its resources and the ability ofthe Chuxh to maintain Its A S t h i e w r y mosaic from Argos, showing agrmhral labour in September and October: (A~rthdscollection)
The world around war
79
emperor Miqhoms II Phoh. Other members ofthe c u h d and galitid elite composed letters in prabse aftheemprofs The nega#ve a s p A was to some extent deeds inwlu, w Wt the gl~ISflatim of balnnced by an a1tmmti.e set ofvim, military deeds $lid of Wvidupl leadm or hoWpulat approval and enthusiasm %I emwas part af the mple production af war could be mmuraged, and the e m~ g o ~ i n ~ a n d ~ . & a n aphted murt c m m d at C a m h n q L vnfmtumteM~meansofachi~ s p m i d g to t m d. m~a pmwlwls, l a divinely a p p d end, warfare could thus bg acimqmiedby dssplaysof w a n d given a very p i t l v e @w. Such views wen? pimners, hymns of m v i n g , the not necessarily shared by the many thwmds acdamdbfls reminding the mpems (and rhe ofpasants and towqmp14 who suffered aatvd who were h earshot] of their C M s w over the c e r l ~ . duty to defhd Qftbodbqand the empire, dl Ttle degree to whkh warfare was were dmWd to achieve a p a r h b eon^^ fundamental to the fabric DE late Roman and atout w e and the mperrar'sduty m Bpmtine society and hfstoilcal Mend orthdaxy. Poets wae ~ i m ~ deveIopment is evident in bur sources. The to write and declaim verse accounts ofthe physical appearance of the Byzantine em-s camge s m e g k s t l l and Wmy counhyside, social vatues, cultrual att3tuda, a&wmen& the p e t George of FWb thus government &caI and administrative compawda ~ ~ o f h u r 9 a t o r y ~ i r t t h e orgmhlon, themes In Mmtmand ail 620s anla 630s a b u t tbe victories d the thew dlffmnt asp% of cultural and m ~ ~ u 5 ~ A v a r s r n d matma1 ~ , life were directly Irrfhmkedby the whlle in the 10th cenhuyTheod9s6w,tbe beleaguered slttaafim of the medieval wt m n slmilarly p h dthe R6state and it9 need to 0ght wars, of the
Portrait of a civilian
Metrios - a farmer which we often @me&s qutte a lot of Infurmatian,~areawxygmd~up ~ t ~ m d t b e ~ m to ~ ~ ra* e. U n W M y , less 9 m y~Inftlis rm lxw thlm* d l m t l e v f b c e about W-wwp e r C w Nld chrillans, aid so we will ntwmmilp rely on a war ha= a b d y been allwied b-inadiff c&&n amount ofhypothesisin thh chapter. O m of the pWems of I3y-m A$ we saw in the prambus chapter, it is history k the that the writktin evidence, Upan W h k h hl~k&aIl$ h v @ to T* fOr clelrthatfbp!p~~euf~waS~y, hawEedqe of pple's opinions and a W d c If ever, w e ~ r n ea, c q t gmMp when a was nearIya€Wqsprodue& by D 3 m b 9 wf m m m m oj the 1mJpopdation at ttge rehklvely p r i smid ~ strata. ~ we thus m'wffahg directly from memy attacks, V g ~ e r y ~ @ W a f w R X t t . ~ Whether the was e w In &hting the a m y ar not, wwhdg mmrinunlties or p p k3 n ! x b n X S * aa%m, s i m p 1 e ~m - ug ~ lit ~ h u t their Mhiduals Wt s W at the hands of wdrld.Of~,wecan@yto~ u m l y w pmrly disciplined mFdfm. In the through the writiu@ of the e d m M 10th c q , mmberssda dmonastic s ~ m ~ o f t h e v i w v s a n d ~ a f t b e cornmmlpon the island of non-literate,m at b t mn-wrMqpart of Gpmpd@eston in #e &&?ark were farced smkIy, a n d w e e m a h workwtthrough the b abmcba Wr h a @ lxm& bf the 4elztrrr: ( ' r e q u i s i t l ~af ) their a ~ ~ t a k e n ~ ~ ~ p s a k o m Frequent i n tima of what they thought and a n i r r r a l m m d ~ p s b y p ~ ~ i the ng~~f why. PM maple, while W n g for a IlmiW imperial fib&. T k r e are plnty of 8 t h ~ emmple?xA t m e saldlers, fm mame, md u e & i &mdenhip, hi?Prim- Anna CanlmBa, wriearly in the 12th centmy, n~toflous(at last h the view of the Greek premts a graphic description of the of $uunmHmtheir W & dlsdpMe 8 n d w r warfare on the pravinca inthe yqrs Wre kbavlauq were e&pWt.Ltyfeared by the her father, the e f n p 3 M Al*s I, bad rn,heK ardlnaq of the ~g~nWsi&; 3nd an dew)wwed the mplre from its Wbles! llth-c&hxymurce mountsthe tale d a l d @I "ha had Wen rabW by a unit of Armenen troops passing &tough. Bymn&e C~~ wSp&olt& k&m@d, #lithe writers tbemelves &en remaxked ran & fact tem'tnrksorRmne wm shined with Wtuni. $one SIdmhaabb pimeti by maw or 1that Raman i E m p B ewld p o d y others were dndnm @m their b m a or c d dimipbed a d men tatrage lru-l Wtnrpt of= p h s of wrrr .,. m t d XWon trill as 691 W supplies w4en W e w e e nat ar th~ugtitm k Wdquafk. t h q 8 u ~ ~ s e e k r q ? g e ~ i ~f~~ ~ di%m in m m & M md ma One wmnerhfiimr'umsup the g e d attitude to sdldiefi w M he makes reference TWe they W l yW n i M W Frt@ of their ff&& ... m a s a n k a 0f&trs ~ ~ ~ ~t@?Vdpto %hetl:ouBles~rntpresence of soldiers'. theit,d"g&m ... In h s e dqs no waik Ogfifi" In the late 11th centmy theMbishop was SpaEd its f,?an d - I a m m i o n . Theophylact-of O W in the Bymatine propinas of Bulgaria amplahed in the B b k u e they tended to a& in large $*met terns a b u t & sppmsive wight groups and Inspxific dmunstenc& abput af the state demarrds on march tenants, He The e f k b o f w a ' k md fighting an
individuals
am,
an l ~ r x l m m u nati ~
Portrait of a civilian
was especially concerned with the labour demanded for the repair, maintenance or construction of forWcations, but he was equally vehement about speciaI ConscrIptians for the army, wMch took men away from an already weakened local population. The oppressive demands af the imperial fiscal officials was often such that Theophylact remarks an the fllght of considerable numbers of W e r s to the forests, in order to escape such oppression. While the situation seems to have worsened -in the Iater 1lth century and afterwards, these requisitions and demands and the hardship they caused remained a major burden on the rural population of the Byzantine empire until its Iast years. As in the eatlier chapter wMch portrayed the life of a 'typical' soldier, therefore, I will look at the dally We of an ordinary Byzantine through t h e eyes and experimces of an invented individual, based on a composite derived &oma range of wusms combined tagether to generate an impressionistic account: all the events described in what follows can be found in medieval sources of the periml from the 7th to the 12th centuries. In this case, our subject is called Metrios - there is a short 10th-cenh~ryaccount of a peasant farmer of this name from Paphlagonia. We will assume that he was a farmer of some means In his community, the village of Katoryab in Paphlagonia, and the time is the middle of the 9th centmy. Although his village is situated only three days' travel h m the large coastal fartress town of Anmstrls, the villagers rarely undertake t h i s journey, partly because the road$ are not pzticulslrIy safe there were always small bands d refugees moving northwards from the most exposed frontier zones and, whlk many of them settled down inand around the smaller toms and fortresses of the w o n , there were always a few who fell into a life of banditry and brigandage. There was also the fact that Metrios could provide Iittle from his land that mages much nearer the town could not prduce, and so Ms markets would have tended to be Imated much closer to his
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81
home v i l l g . In spite of the distance from the nearest active front, Katoryalta was regularly aEfectedby the war, lying on one of the major routes rn from Dorylaion and Constantinople, a r a t e frequently used by the army. This meant that the vflhgexs would regularly have had ta provide acmfnrnodaidon and h a r d for officers and Imperial &kials fiscal, rniIitary and others - who would fresuently p through while carqbq out their duties. AIthough the dbdmtages of havlng to put up such people was the cause of frequent -bung, it a h meant that the m g ewas never short of news,since inevitably the attendants of the official5 in question would be willing to pass on gossip ta those with whom ti~eycame iato -tact in the of their duties. We enmuter Metrios at the beginning af ad Important week. In the first place, it k the feast ofthe patron saint of the village, St Moados, and the villagers traditionally have a fair, with a market and a great deal of few* culminating in a liturgical celebration irl the village church conducted by the local bishop, who has tnvelled down specially for the occasion. The fair attracts a g o d number of villagers from the neighbowing cemmuniiies who come both to join in the festivities and to help any relatives they map have many of the village gfrls marry young men fmm neighbouing settlements as welI as a sizeable numtrer of traders and meKhants who came, often considerable distances, wirh their traezS of pad-mules to sell their wares ar buy g d s that cannot be found elsewhere. It is P good time for the Pillagers. They can buy goods from the traders whom they only rarely see in their Village, in Spite of its location on a ,, major route; they can exchange gossip and n m ; there i s the chance for the youngsters to expand their social horlmm, and for t h e y m g men and women to eye me another up! By far the most interesting vlsitors to the fair for most villagers are the baden, especially those from far away, distant provinces within the empire bringing the luxury products of those regions - Puntic cloths ham the won around Trebizond far
-
-
-
M ~ W ~ & h t h e ~ , s memd€~e--pwae o ~ hWe6n, ~ n g ~ I t d i d a t t h e t ~ t a e d ~ d ~ d i k y ~ r e t h e * ~ t h * * ~ ~ ~ m e . arldh&wtse.~~~-hi~sonbad ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m a, P l l~ s bi m e d~ = ii m ~ ka m ~ e ~ = ~ w b t t r e ~ ~ t o t b ~e~ ~ i n ? o b i s ! o w ~ h g u w m t h e -~*~tPdenaquldabaak &s¶dedthewihge-~&eoMm 'mWwm0rQ-M~ ~anda@roff@agBPm~oheElsual,@ unf-a~, thff krrx in oi afwfaerrndhmdshowedkimfoh~~ Chb,Waa W m n d m s a pr13culady p a a r t l e t s . m t w o ~ t 5 w ~ ~ ~ f l l l m t s o t t , andmadealotofema the ou.th~u$e Wch '-,as a $m&ouse ~ ~ l n t e r m s O f ~ ~ 9 n d ' $ i f t sand ' W#jhdtef for the muIes. ~ ~ e ~ . ~ ~ m -5m k thetoElrc3et i seemed ~ a pIe858nt escortand theilddfatonalpmmceofa , m s o t t o i w ~ hoaded*wktw o f ~ - g s P - w ~ U I R hls~,~to~re11efofMetrfas~ vibge, the WMtanB had W e optfoa to his m y parHdarly the m e t :the w'adgetthgrid of the of8t.lal in qmtatlon O f d d m I andOBicer9ftl q4eSmsi w as pBlbLe. rnatably, be WMed to,prs1snghis stay to w u d e
rn-,
-
thehh.
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Portrait of a civilian
Gold hyperpym of Isaac I1 { I 185-1 195).F h w s e the emperor with the Archangel Michad. ( W e r Institute of Frne A*, Un~versityof B~m~ngham)
maintain its awn machinery and the m y . But in Metrios's time that was still a century or so In the fume. There were many other trades and occupations, of course - the merchants and baders we have already noted, the vrUage craftsmen such as the smith, the prrtter and the leathemorken, the townspeople of the larger cities who had trades ranging from gald- and silversmithlng to butcher, baker, clothiers, fullers and dyers, cobblers, silk importers and exporters, dairy traders, and every other provider of f d s t u f f s , flnfshed goo& and services we might expect to find in a large town. UntJI the economic boom of the later 10th and 1lth centuries, however, such urban activity was limlted on the whoIe to a few majar cities such as Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Trebizond on the south-east coast of the Black Sea, or AttaIeia on the
85
southern coast of the Asia Minor peninsula. Yet a11 these developments were affected in fundamental ways by the fact that war was a normal state of affairs for inhabitants of much of the Byzantine world, and for much of the time. The presence of soldiers as fighters, as peacekeepers, as oppressors and as liberators was a part of this, and the demands made by the army and the government for its soldiers were, as we have seen, the central pillar of the state's financial system. Everything was based on the need to recruit, supply, equip and organise soldiers, and both the economy of the state - the issue of gold coin, for example - and the Iocal economies which comprised the empire were directly affected by this fundamental fact. The invented example of MeMos the farmer gives some idea of the day-to-day existence of the rural population of the empire and the ways in which war or aspects ofthe need to organise for war had become an integral part of M y existence in Byzantiurn.
How the wars ended
Death of an empire Tbe Bpintfne mpim stmived formme 5W~~aPoutQOOina~whl& g w in-gly away from its kwWmn
In't-&-mm-m had fcadtberwlves bmMy int&btW to the V m M , who had hired them the $Wps and ~ Y k t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m apr&dr rsomey of the needed far the submmhl changes in ItsgqppMrfcalmt, eqEaiml.Tfmel+rl&anshadbeenlw~ iM3utirnal~ g ~ a ~ Ana-sl d foranoppa~tyto~einfhe Inmdex i t ~ a i n e d u n t f l t h e a r I y l 3 t h ~ ~ & e c m f u d sittlaaon at Cmslanttna~le ta mmlidiltEtheir tradfng prmqgcs mct r&o@b&ledwegdmt of the -eastem Roman W h ~ l d c l v e r t h bf e t~h e e 9 3 m mpire#JteWan.By*mWeofthe hWfkmna. The presem? at Venice of Ilsh caw,M W ,w2 intmmii,rml ~ ~ ~ ~ m w t a f f h AMim e W h @ m , a pretender to,the imperial Xmcen~-in~~Zrhad,thEtexd,to *one, rendered the task of the Ven& in survive---to changein waysthat ~aquWng s &a&n t~ danstmlhqdefa&@ set up sulxtm'itiai c h d h g a to the empire and, e q ,In 1203 the w d e r army arrived b&ze mwe i m m 7to the ways in wMh it the wdIlS of the Byaniine capital wid witbina slim3 t h e had s u m fn A l e m r k d ~ ~ a b l eqtmon d . ~ ~ t u m l ~ s m d a n nV~ &~w enm pg m with his blind fithaIhat d i i ~ t h e G m k ~ If,whmhfsm&Pll~amtmd~, and whb had been brought out of p h n after Medrterranem and south Balkan world, an the one hand, and the ~ ~ t Ian& e thedlatter fled the city Once hW&, Alevf central and western Europe had h m e W found ft im@k to pay the p m i m i inmasingly &ed across the 8th 9th .and r-ds M Ia the S W W n wupsen+ be 10th cmtufia. The fmtron w~~ as fnund hinuelf Imfw@ly IsolW Ear1yln wastern economk m q t h and p o w WXI l2W he was and mumiwd by Alex&$ I h w b s (M-s b t rhtg M y exack*w TPiIttary ~~n &gan to be x:s~*riou ~.t h r x l g hthe new e m p m ~ e m f o r t k m e d l e v a l m t m a n m k h the prcrt>m t h e ~ l l ~ m t U r y , w l t h ~ m m mmengthenedthp dekmes dw" ahIe ta t h e m e hand md theGerman wnpem~oh resWaninitkdcr~tsaderattask,theoiryfellcnn the othw p~~~ serious threats to 12April.Thebwtytakenwasiwmme-an Bpmtlne p N t I c a l aufkoriq*~ l xaud ~ l eyewitness merbthat sp much bmty fmm a ~ h t h e ~ ~ a n d ~ s h t& c h r i . t ~y h a~d n ~~b @gn ~ ~ w t I t e ~~e3awaf t h wddThedtys ~ fullof p r d ~ u s chauwmm--ismEtaZran crlmpnmdal cmtm such a Vmke mil ~bjwts, ltflugmarid caenmdd Wlw. The crusadirig wgvem&nt,#&ern v&smm~ and &je&sl wWh M new& MQIY fallen. to violent assault, was rnercikdy sacked pseiudik& a u t Greek M y and & W e s s , and the expamian &the &ljuk emlrBtes fn aradpillaedEortlmedap.M u c h ~ M a Minor, transf~rmd&enadon and occwpd, with hnumerabk artefacts ckmqed suspicion into o p c m f k L and p&w$ metal abj- d L d down or --me bf the nmst s p e c k a h b b j a ~ r r a l t h r e a t n w ~ e n ~ l ~ h m stdm u t h e M d c P \ a p r l d t a the ear, btfipmtl$ ~anWbesenitlV~e~.Thec&ptw Christian wwl, and the Iht anlw#iV$ of QmtarrtiWQk in IzW atid the bdicatian of the cbn@ Make of payet esxab-t of a tatin ern@& halls4 the c&reinxhef~dt~Courth~ee split between H B ~ w q for Latin
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I The empire in its last years -
-
How the wars ended
was Thrace around Chnstantln~pk,a small dbbict ar~und ThWanild (smmmdedby Wbian tenitory),and its lands in the PeIoponnese and the northern Aegean isles. Each region functioned as a mote or less automous province, so that B)aantlm was
an empire in name and by tradition alone. The civil wan had wredred the economy of these districts, whi& could M y afford the minimal taxe the e m p r s demanded. Galata, the G e m trading centre on the other side ofthe Gotdm Ham from &nstanIinople, had an annual revenue seven times as great as that of the impzrial dty iW. Durjng the dvil wars, and as a result of their f~&tingfor Kantakawenos, the Ottomans hgan permanently to establish t h d m In Europe. By the b@ning of the 15th century, and with the exception of some limlbxl areas inthe Peloponnese and a few Aegean islands, there remained no imperial possessions in Greece. The advance of the Ottomans in Europe led to the ultimate extlnction of Byzantium. KivQ defeated and subjugated bath Serbs and Bulgars by the end of the 14th century, the Ottoman advance caused considerable anxiety In IW west. A ausade was organbed under the leadership of the Hungarian kin.& Sigismund, but in 1396 at the battle of Nicapalis his army was W v e l y defeated. The Bymntines attempted to play the different elements off against one another, supporthg h t the western powers and then the Ottomans. Some Byzantines espoused a possible sohtion by arguing for a union of the eastern and westem Churches, which would bring with it the subadhation of Canstantinople to m e . But the monasteries and the ma1 population were Mtteriy hmtik to such a compromise. It was @ven argued by some that subjdon to the WIGwas preferable to union with the hated tatins. Neither party was able to assert itrelf @ff&Wrely w l W the empire, with the result that tRe western powers remained on the whoIe apathetic to the plight of 'the Greek'. In 1M1the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid began preparations for the siege of CanstanrinopIe, but the empire was wved at the last minute by the appearance of Mongol forces under
89
T I W(Timur Lenk,h w n in Englfsh as %rnburlanel), who invaded Asla Mhor and crushed the Ottoman farces at the battle of Ankara in 1402. The Byzantines w d the opportunity to strengthen their control in the
Peloponnw, but the respite was of short duration. Tirnur died soon after his victory aver Bayellid, his empire broke up in Internecine conflict, and Ottoman power revived. The S u b s mns~lldated their control In h t o l i a , and set about expanding their control of the B a I k a . The Byzantine emperor JohnVUI travelled widely in Empe In a vain attempt to gather support against the Islamic threat. He even accepted the union with the western Church at the councii of Florence in 1439; and a last efbrt on the part of the ernperor led to the m a d e wMch ended in disaster at the battle of Varna in Bulgaria In 1444. tn 1453 Mehmet II set about the siege of Constantinople. The defences of the city, although suffering from lack of maintenance, remained both impressive and powerful, and it took several weeks of siege before the Ot-toman forces, equipped with heavy a w e r y , Including camon, were able to effect some serious breaches and challenge the small gamlson. In spite of a valiant effort on the part of the impertal troops and th& western allies, who were mmiwly outnumbered, the walk were finally breached by the elite Janunits on 29 May 1453. The hst emperor, Constantine XI,died fighting on the ramp- wWe leading a counter-attack. His body was rimer found. Later, Greek legend had it that, like King Arthur of Britlsh legend, he had not &dl and would one day return to lead hls people to victory. Constantinop1e, under ih Turkidsed name Istanbul (from the Greek eii; tln polin inthe city) became the new Ottoman capital. The Aegean IsIands that remained to the empire were soon absorbed under Ottoman rule. The Byzantine principality in the southern Peloponnese, the despotate of M o m , fell in 1460,and Ttebfiond, seat of the Grand Komnenoi, felI to a Turkish army in 1461. The east Roman empire - Wntium was no more.
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Conclusion and cansequences
men whose W t y , amgame or ignaana?led them to throw the lives d their sddiers away In futile attacks m illcansidered actions. And it seems often to have been the case that these were the leadm who paid least attention to the fundamental prinuples ofmnnaglng soldiers, tl&pUne, Scohesion and spit de corps,For with god lademhip usually came good morale and W-cmfid@nm- crucial ingredients fw succ& £ightin&& p W l y in afl:emiwwatike. Even with wdlequtppd, dsciplhed and well-baed traops, the r a t ofn battle in the medieval periodl as well a at other times, was, in the end, unpredictable.The dtlmate arbiter was a mmbmtlon of rhe soldiers' mode and Aghting W,the qqraalIty of the IeaWsMp, and gaod luck But as the aqmor Leo VI points mi in his military handbook or m&u, in the early 10th cmlmyI the d I f f e m between the good general anri f i e bad p r a l was that the good general understood this, acted in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, and made sure that Ua dqmiti0ns cuuld cope with sudden sulprlses or changes in the con&tt~maf battle. Anow writer, this dme the son d a famous Byzantine general, noted at the end af the 1lth century that he h d never h o r n a diligent and alert man wha had not been able to make his own good fortune on the battlefield. And M e it would be inmmct ta suggest that 3yimthe defeats were due only to the Incompetmte ar arrogance of commanding of&mI thb did I l e ~ e f i e l pby e ~ ~ hllpCWlIYt ~ d e . The Byzantine world has attracted western papular and srhoIarly attentlan, not only
91
because I t stood at the (3~&sroads of east and wt,bridging very diverse cultures, but
because it evoked a romantic lP6t medieval Christian world which was bath wtem in its forms yet western in Its cultural significance. For some, it had been a bastian sf Christianity against Uam; for others, espdaUy h the 16th and 17th centuries, it was a source of politically relevant information a b u t the Ottomans who threatened E w e at that m e . And it was to Byzantine authors and texts that Iater generations directed their attention in the cantex3 d ~ ~ I national n g self-awareness as interest g t w in the pre-Renaissance and ealp medieval antecedents ofthe formerly Byzantine kinds, And while both mediwal &lam and the Byimtlne world served tc transmit the heritage of classical and Roman dvilisation to the Renaissance and beyond, it was in pmkuIar through collections of Bpanttne manuscripts and books that many texts were preserved, influencing in this way the evolution and content of modern classical scholarship. Bymntium w w in a s e w always at war, for as we have saen, it always had an enmy or a potential memy nn one h t or mother, This situation necm* infkted the &ole history of the ernpire and determined inpart at least its swhl s b u c t m and the way in which the state as well as the @tical system cwld evolve. Byantiurn made war against its enmdes wer a perM of some 709 y w , from the 7th to the 14th and 15th cenhlritx In this sensel we might also asmt that war made B y m t i m what it was.
Byzantine rulers
AD 527-1453 Justidan I Justinian I1 Tiberius I1 Constantine Maurice
Phokas HeracHus Constanthe In and Heraclonas Constans I1 Constantine IV Justinian II Leontios Tiberios m Justhian 1l (restored) PhiIippikas Bardanes Anastasios I1 Theodosios 111 Leo 111 Constantine V Artabasdos Leow Constantine VI Eirene Nikephoros I Staurakios Michael I Leov Michael I1 Theophilos Michael III Basil I Leo VI
Alexander Constanthe VII Romanos lI Nikephoros II Phokas John I Tzimiskes Basil I1 Constamhe VIII Romanos 111 Argyrm Michael I V the Paphlagonian Michael V Kalaphates Zoe and Theodora Constantine IX Monomachos
Theodora (again) Michael VI Stratiotikos Isaac I Kamnenos Constantine X Doukas Eudakia Romanos IV Diogenes Eudakia (again) Michael VII Doukas Nikephoros III Botaneiates Alexios I Komnenos
JohnIl K~mnenos Manuel 1 Komnenos Alexios U Komnenos Andronikos I Komnenos Isaac 11 AngeIos Alexios I11 Angelos Isaac I1 (restored) and AIexios W Angelos Alexios V Mourtzouphlos Constantine (XI) hskafis Theodore I Laskaris John III Doukas Vatatzes
1203-1204 1204 1204 Wicaea) 1204-22 (Nicaea) 1222-54
(Nicaea) Theodore I1 Laskaris John I V Laskaris Michael VIII Palaiologos Andrordkos I1 PalaioIagos Michael IX Palaiologos Andronikos 111 Palaiologos John V Palaiologos JohnVl Kantakomenos Andronikas IV Alaiologos John VII PalaidIogos Manuel II PaIaiologos JohnVIII Palafologos Constantine X I (XlI) Palaiologos
1254-58 (Nicaea) 1258-61 (Nicaea) 1259-82 1282-28 1294-1320 1328-41 1341-91 1341-54 1376-79 1390 1391-1425 1425-48 1448-53
The Grand Kornnenoi of Tmb'md (1203-1461) or the semi-autonomousrulers of the Despotate of Epkos (1205-1318) are not included.
94
Esswltial Histofins
Byrarrtium at War
Index
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~
Index
skylatzes %, %,47,48, 8,1,54-5,
mstory of*
5&9,66,6%9,7Q-1
Hmios Lwkas monastery 30 Hungary 32
95
Ottomans see Turks, Ottcmran
pdktn 72-3 ppav 29,% 88
Pechenegs 32,43,44,65,68,69
Persians 13,33 ideology, and w e 98-9, %, 72-5 inheritan- law 61 Isaac I Komnenos, Byzantine empwor &5 Isaac Il, 3yzantine e m p r 85,M Islam Byzantine view of Mudim 38 origins and history 13-14 see also W i d Caliphate; Arab Islamic armies;
nlm
Jstanbd see Canstanttnople Italy 13,29-30,32
John 1T,Bpntine emperor 44,64,65,69 John11, Bymnttne emperor 17,43 JohnVI Kantaaouzenos, Byzantine empmr 88 Johnmu,Byantine emperor 89 Justinlan, Byzantine emperor 13,16,29 Kalojan, B u I g a r h tFar 87 kahyhruktd 49
klelsoularchies 41 kIIbmqhoroi 49 IColoneia 12 Komnenw dynasty 26-8,JO, 87 Krum, Bulgar khan 29 land ownership 24,Z.S-6, 27-8, 62 Lam empire 86-8 L m Ill, Byzantine anperor 7, 14, 72 Leo IV,ByzmtLne empemr 7 Leo V, Byzantine empemr 26,46 Leo VI, Bymntine emperor 53,75,91 Limn05 78 literarue 76,79
-
Liutprand of Cremona 8,36 L b m M I3,29 32
~ ~ o f 88 S i ~ manpower 36 ManWert, battle of (1071) 34,41, 45-6 Manuel I, Byzantine emperor 17,30,32,43,70 Maurice, -tine emperor 13 medldne, battlefield 69-71 Mehmet Il, Ottoman sultan 16, 89 rnemmark 16,31,40,45,51,55,62,63 Mercenary Catalan Grand Company 88 11, Byzantine ernperor 27,48 Michael Ym, m n t i n e empetor 88 Michael Attitleiam 5 1 Michael Autorehm 87 Mohammed, founder of Idam 13-14
~~
rnmwteries 62-3
Mongols 88, 89 Mopswestia 5%9 Nicaea, empire of 87,88 Nimplis, battie of (1396) 89 Nikephom I, 3yzantlne em15,29,41 Nikephom ll Phokas, Byzantine emperor 4 2 4 4 , &, 74,79
PhWpptrptir 44,65 Phokas, Byantine emperor 13 PlRvcuv see PhflippupolIs postal system 76
b 29 religion emperor 32-3 see a h Christianitv; Islam roads and routes 9,11,18,31 Roman empire, eastem see Byzantine e m p h Rornan emplre, western 29-30 Ram05 W, Byzantine em16,27,45,51,64 rurilI lffe 81-5 'ruralisatfm' 24 RUS' 31,41-4,65,68-9 Samuel, Bulgar tsar 29,44 Sebfdarahlsar Koloneia Seljuks see k k s , Lljuk 2R88 IS, 30,32-3,55
Siw
SQismund, king d Hungary 89 Stefan Umh IV Dushm, Serbian ruler 88 Svyaaav, RtLs' prlnce 43,44,65 Symeon, BuQu b r 29 tagmab 40,41,45,61
Tamburlane 89 taxation s& fiscal system fhpnaata
chmderisti~ and establishment 39,40,42,48, 61,6Z,64 neglect and W e 45,51,55 Thecddc 12 Thedore I, Nicaean empwor 87 Theodore, St 45,65 Theododus?.he I)eacon 79 Thaophylact, archbishop of OMd 80-1 Thomas the Slav 47,48, 50 Thrace 39, 42, 44, 88 Timur Lenk 89 toamnai 48 Qade 81-2 transpoa I1 IRebIzond, empire of 87,89 kbmhets 5 5 9 bumpets 55
Turks attornan 16, 17,34,88,89 Mjuk 16,33-4, 41, 43, 45, 88 Valens, Aqueduct of 8 9 Varanglanguard 31,51 m a , baffle of (1444) 89 v€!nI~e8,29,30,32,33,86,87,88 wxil111tim 47
warfare defensive 3941
e f f m on sod* 76 oHmdm 41-6 pre-emsbikes 41 pmPaI@a
79
reasons and justifications 36-9, 724
