Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy (Routledge Canada Blanch Studies in Contemporary Spain, 9)

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Catalan Nationalism

The death of Franco in 1975 signalled the transition of Catalan nationalism from a clandestine resistance movement to a movement demanding selfgovernment for Catalonia. This book offers a fresh socio-political analysis of Catalan nationalism during the Francoist regime (1939–1975) and the Spanish transition to democracy. Are the Catalans content with the outcome of the Spanish transition to democracy? Is there a future for Catalan nationalism within the EU? How does globalization impact upon the survival and development of nations without states such as Catalonia? Will increasing numbers of immigrants transform regional identities? Has devolution fostered secessionism in Catalonia? These are some of the key questions discussed in this book. Catalan Nationalism considers whether a nation without a state, such as Catalonia, is able to survive within larger political institutions such as Spain and the European Union. The author examines the different ‘images’ of Catalonia presented by the main Catalan political parties. The book also provides a study of the role of intellectuals in the construction of nationalism and national identity in nations without states in the global era. The key questions addressed in this book are highly relevant for the study of devolution and its consequences, transitions to democracy and globalization and national identity. Based on a successful combination of theory and innovative empirical research, the scope and depth of the book’s analysis will make it essential reading for students and academics in the fields of sociology, history, European studies and politics. Montserrat Guibernau is a Reader in Politics at the Open University. She has previously taught at the universities of Cambridge, Warwick and Barcelona. Her publications include Nationalisms (1996), The Ethnicity Reader (1997) with John Rex, Nations Without States (1999), Governing European Diversity (2001), The Conditions of Diversity in Multinational Democracies (2003) with Alain Gagnon and François Rocher and, with John Hutchinson, Understanding Nationalism (2001) and History and National Destiny (2004).

Routledge/Cañada Blanch Studies on Contemporary Spain Series editors Paul Preston and Sebastian Balfour Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies, London

1 Spain 1914–1918 Between war and revolution Francisco J. Romero Salvadó 2 Spaniards in the Holocaust Mauthausen, horror on the Danube David Wingeate Pike 3 Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War The brainwashing of Francisco Franco Herbert R. Southworth 4 Red Barcelona Social protest and labour mobilisation in the twentieth century Edited by Angel Smith 5 British Women and the Spanish Civil War Angela Jackson 6 Women and Spanish Fascism The women’s section of the Falange 1934–59 Kathleen Richmond 7 Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona Chris Ealham 8 Anarchism and the Spanish Civil War Julián Casanova 9 Catalan Nationalism Francoism, transition and democracy Montserrat Guibernau 10 British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War The British Battalion in the International Brigade, 1936–1939 Richard Baxell 11 The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War Hilari Raguer Also published in association with the Cañada Blanch Centre: Spain and the Great Powers Edited by Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston

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Catalan Nationalism Francoism, transition and democracy

Montserrat Guibernau

First published 2004 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. Originally published in Catalan as Nacionalisme Català: franquisme, transició i democràcia by Pòrtic Editorial, Barcelona, 2002 © In this translation 2004 Montserrat Guibernau All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-30025-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-33927-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32240–5 (Print Edition)

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To Joan Manel

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Contents

Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix xi

Introduction

1

State, nation and nationalism 7 Nations without states 9 Objectives and structure 12 1

Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states: the Catalan case

15

Intellectuals and nationalism 15 Intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states 21 Intellectuals and Catalan nationalism 24 Summary 32 2

Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism

34

The Falange 36 The Army 38 Social support 38 The Catholic church 39 National Catholicism as an ideology 42 The creation of a surveillance state 45 Against internal diversity 49 3

The re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Francoism Confronting images 50 The different stages of early Francoism 52 The break with silence 55 The great conspiracy 65 Immigrants 67

50

viii 4

Contents Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

70

The 1978 Constitution 72 The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 76 The main political parties of Catalan origin 79 5

Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

85

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 85 Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)-Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) 95 Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC (PSC-PSOE)) 105 6

Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC

120

Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) 120 Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) 133 The nationalist thought of Jordi Pujol 141 Conclusion

152

Globalization and national identity 152 Survival and development of nations without states 158 For a cosmopolitan Catalanism 161 Appendix: National position of the main political parties of Catalan origin

166

Notes Bibliography Index

172 188 196

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank those who have supported me while writing and thinking about this book. Salvador Giner, Àngel Castiñeira, Josep M. Vallès, Francesc X. Puig Rovira and Maria del Mar Serrano read parts of previous drafts and offered their comments and criticism. My gratitude also goes to a long list of people related to the different political parties and institutions considered in this book, including the Generalitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia, CDC’s Institut de Formació, the Campalans Foundation, the Pi i Sunyer Foundation, the Centre d’Estudis de Temes Contemporanis, the Nous Horitzons Foundation, the PSC (Socialist Party of Catalonia), CpC (Citizens for Change), ERC (Catalonia’s Republican Left), ICV (Initiative for Catalonia-Greens), CDC (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) and UDC (Democratic Union of Catalonia). A research grant from the One Europe or Several? programme of the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) funded the research project ‘Regional identity and European citizenship’, of which I was co-director, and permitted me to enjoy a sabbatical period in which to write this book. During that time, the European Institute of the London School of Economics invited me as Visiting Fellow. Among my colleagues there I would like to thank Anthony D. Smith, Howard Machin, Paul Preston and Sebastian Balfour. I would also like to thank Helen Wallace, Director of the One Europe or Several? programme of the ESRC. At the Open University, I have greatly appreciated Grahame Thompson’s support and advice. I also would like to thank Marilyn Denman and Fran Ford. The translation of this book into English was financed by the Open University Department of Government and Politics Research Fund to which I would like to express my gratitude. I would also like to thank Donna Gregory, Lorraine Ryan, Richard Pike and Sue Edwards for their work on the preparation of the manuscript. At Routledge, I wish to thank Joe Whiting, Angie Doran and Amrit Bangard. Finally, particular thanks are due to my parents, Antoni and Maria Dolors, for their constant encouragement, and to my nephew Joan Guibernau-Pujol, for the joy that he has brought us.

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Abbreviations

AP BNG CC CDC CiU CNT CpC Crida, La EDC ENE EPP ERC ETA EU EUiA FAI FECEA FET y de las JONS FJCC FNC FNEC FOC FRAP FSC FUC HOAC IC ICV IU JOC LOAPA

Alianza Popular Bloque Nacionalista Galego (a) Centristes de Catalunya (b) Crist Catalunya Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya Convergència i Unió Confederació Nacional de Treballadors Ciutadans pel Canvi Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalana Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra European People’s Party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna European Union Esquerra Unida i Alternativa Federación Anarquista Ibérica Fundació Empresa, Catalunya, Europa i América Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista Federació de Joves Cristians de Catalunya Front Nacional de Catalunya Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya Front Obrer de Catalunya Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico Federació Socialista de Catalunya Front Universitari de Catalunya Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica Iniciativa per Catalunya Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds Izquierda Unida Joventut Obrera Catòlica Ley orgánica para la armonización del proceso autonómico

xii

Abbreviations

MSC NATO NE NEI NEU OJE PAM PCC PCE PCI PCP PI PNV POUM PP PRD PSC PSC (C) PSC (R) PSOE PSUC-IC PSUC-ICV SDEUB SEU UCD UDC UN UNESCO USC USSR

Moviment Socialista de Catalunya North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nacionalistes d’Esquerra Nouvelles Équipes Internationales Nova Esquerra Universitària Organización de Juventudes Españolas Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya Partido Comunista de España Communist Party of Italy Partit Català Proletari Partit per la Independència Partido Nacionalista Vasco Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista Partido Popular Partido Reformista Democrático Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Congrès) Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Reagrupament) Partido Socialista Obrero Español Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya-Iniciativa per Catalunya Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya-Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitario Unión del Centro Democrático Unió Democràtica de Catalunya United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Unió Socialista de Catalunya Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

Is there any future for Catalan nationalism? How does globalization influence the survival and development of small nations without their own sovereign state such as Catalonia? How will the growing numbers of immigrants affect national identities? How will the political integration and the enlargement of the European Union impact upon a country like Catalonia? These and other questions lead us to reflect on Catalan nationalism during the period which includes Francoism and the transition to democracy. Over this period, Catalonia as a country has been affected by a series of factors that have left an indelible mark on the evolution of its national identity. The triumph of the insurrectionists in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) represented the almost complete annihilation of the autonomous Catalan institutions (although some continued in exile) and the proscription of the country’s language and culture. At state level, Francoism stopped the clock that would have incorporated Spain’s destiny into that of the other Western democracies. Francoism put an end to democracy and the party system, and involved the imposition of centralism, the establishment of Castilian culture and language, the promotion of a conservative version of Catholicism and the closing of the borders with Europe. Different stages can be identified throughout the long years of Francoism; there is a stark contrast between the early situation of the Catalan nationalist movement, almost disintegrated after the defeat of the legitimate government of the Second Republic (1939), and that of later years when the nationalist movement began to re-emerge. The advent of democracy marked the transition from a clandestine Catalanism of resistance to a Catalanism that demanded greater autonomy within the framework of the Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. During the transition to democracy we can establish a distinction between different attitudes towards both Catalanism and Catalonia adopted by the Spanish government. In general, without going into detail, and on summarizing the aspects that are developed in the coming chapters, it is possible to distinguish four historical moments. 1 After the death of Francisco Franco (1975) and the decision to proceed with the democratic reform of the Spanish state (1976), the Spanish political

2 Introduction forces considered that it was necessary to grant some kind of political recognition to the Catalan specificity defended by a powerful social movement of a democratic and nationalist nature involving resistance to Francoism, which had intensified at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. This recognition, which would be expressed in the re-establishment of the Generalitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia, the return of its president in exile, Josep Tarradellas (1977), and in the subsequent ratification of the new Statute of Autonomy (1979), would at least serve to legitimize the new image of a democratic Spain that wished to join NATO and what was then called the European Economic Community. 2 Many Catalans were progressively disappointed by insufficient autonomous funding and a slow and costly process of transferring powers from the central government to the autonomous institutions, accentuated as a result of the attempted coup d’état in February 1981. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the constant political demands of Catalan nationalism led some state political forces to become alienated, and to fail to understand, the Catalan position. On the other hand, the majority governments of the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD), and later of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), left political Catalanism with little room for manoeuvre.1 3 The political, economic and social changes taking place in the new Spain which was beginning to embrace democracy modified the balance of forces in Madrid. The period of governments with absolute majorities ended, and suddenly, in this new political scenario, the votes of the Catalan nationalist coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) became ‘useful’ for the central governments, first the PSOE (1993–1996) and later the Partido Popular (PP) (1996–2000). The CiU nationalists obtained certain ‘concessions’ in return for their contribution to the governability of Spain, and Catalan autonomy benefited from this. Meanwhile, an electoral dynamics established itself in Catalonia which, to date, has allowed the PSC (PSC-PSOE) to win in the general elections, as well as the CiU coalition in the autonomous elections, a dynamics that has also maintained the PSC in Barcelona City Council and CiU in the Generalitat. 4 Since March 2000, the majority government of the PP no longer requires the support of CiU or of any other political party to govern, given the extent of its overwhelming victory which radically altered the balance of political forces at state level and also in Catalonia. It is this fourth historical moment which defines the present and prompts the need to reconsider Catalanism, for three main reasons: a

The absolute majority obtained by the PP, among other things, has undermined the bargaining power of the CiU government, which has lost its privileged position arising from its status as a ‘necessary’

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b

c

source of support for Spanish governments needing its votes to rule the country. The exhaustion of the different versions of a type of Catalanism mainly designed to oppose Francoism and elaborated by people who spent most of their life during the dictatorship. This requires a generational change to include people educated in the democratic period, new generations capable of contributing to the development of a new Catalanism ready to respond to challenges and questions that did not exist just thirty years ago. For instance, after over twenty years of autonomy, what model of self-determination and of Catalan society should be built; what consequences might the enlargement of the European Union (EU) have for Catalonia; what new possibilities will the Catalans have out of the progressive political integration of the EU; what kind of reactions and what consequences may arise out of an uncontrolled increase in the number of immigrants from outside Spain and often from outside the EU; how could the technological revolutions be confronted without losing national identity; and, finally, how could democracy be ‘democratized’ and new forms of civil participation be created with a capacity to engage the citizens? The transformation and consolidation of a new Spanish identity, unlike that promoted by Francoism, and against which a large part of the Catalanism of the time, which still exists today, was created.

If all nationalisms construct their specificity starting from what differentiates them from others, and in general the term ‘others’ is not abstract but refers to a very specific ‘other’ with which there is often a close relationship, then what happens when the ‘other’ changes? Quite simply, it is necessary to reconsider one’s own ideas to avoid a useless and paralysing discourse, which does not respond to the challenges generated by the new situation. Over the last twenty years or so, Spanish identity has been transformed radically, and the image of Spain perceived from outside is nothing like Franco’s Spain. However, in my opinion, Catalan nationalism has not reacted to this change. Identities act as mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion, creating imaginary limits between those who belong and those who do not belong to specific communities. Identities are often strengthened by referring to the existence of a common enemy capable of bringing people together and reinforcing a feeling of community among them. During the Francoist period, and also in some other periods of Catalonia’s history, Castile – or sometimes Spain used as a synonym of Castile – has been used as that external element against which the Catalans have often fought. In other words, from a Castilian perspective, Spain was defined as an inflexible square within which it was not possible to fit triangular, conical or rhomboidal pieces which irremediably collided with the limits, defined as immovable, of a state made to suit just a few. If we were to concentrate on the Francoist period, it could be

4

Introduction

Table I.1 Identities of Spain and Catalonia during the Francoist period Spain (dominated and defined by Castile) (nation-state)

Catalonia (nation without state)

Authoritarian (dictatorship) Catholic Centralist Traditional Rudimentary welfare system Late industrialization Mistrust/rejection of Europe Predominance of Castilian language and culture

Democratic Catholic/important secular sectors Decentralization of the state Progressive Rudimentary welfare system Industrialized Pro-European Proscribed Catalan language and culture

argued that, for a long time, Spain was defined as a conservative, Catholic, centralist and traditional nation-state, with a rudimentary welfare system, a late industrialization and an attitude of mistrust and rejection towards Europe. During this same period, Catalonia did not fit in with this image of Spain dominated by a Castile whose ideal type was based on that ‘timehonoured Castilian gentleman’ that the regime’s ideologist José Pemartín described in the initial years of Francoism.2 Catalonia, despite its traditional sectors, defined itself as progressive, pro-democracy, pro-European, industrialized, in favour of the decentralization of the state, and included important sectors made up of left-wing Catholics and secular humanist groups. But what is the situation after twenty years of political autonomy and after the accomplishment of the Spanish transition to democracy? At present this well-defined contrast between Spain (defined by Castile) and Catalonia, which clearly delimited the symbolic borders between them while contributing to the definition of both identities, has become more tenuous. The PSOE’s victory in the 1982 general election initiated a dramatic transformation of the traditional definition of Spanish identity inherited from Francoism. This process was completed after the PP’s landslide victory in 2000. But what principles define post-Franco Spain? Does Castile maintain its prominence when it comes to defining the state, its culture and its language? Spain is now an established democratic, modern, progressive (no less progressive than other European countries) nation-state, which is also decentralized, prosperous, industrialized and secular, enjoying a welfare system that is still weak (when compared with northern European countries), but which has been substantially improved over the last twenty years, and displays a clearly pro-European attitude. In spite of this, it could be argued that Spanish identity still includes some hindrances from the past, such as the passion for centralism and the predominance of Castile; however, no-one could deny that ‘Spain is not what it was’ and that it has managed to successfully transform its image.

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Table I.2 Spanish identity in 2002 Spain (nation-state) Democratic Secular state Decentralized Modern Welfare system following EU model Industrialized Pro-European The predominance of Castilian language and culture continues

But what has happened to Catalonia? Is Catalan identity affected by this new definition of Spain? As a result of the transformation of Spanish identity, Catalan identity is being forced to reconsider its relationship with Spain, and is above all compelled to review the argument that there is a radical contrast between Catalonia and Spain, now that the definition of Spain generated in the Francoist period no longer matches the current situation, although, as I have just mentioned, some centralist and conservative Castilian attitudes still persist. This prompts the need to reconsider the Catalan nationalist discourse in order to adapt it to the present circumstances. It also requires an effort to base the specific nature of Catalonia on its culture, its language and, above all, on its citizens’ wish to decide their own political future as a nation. At present, both Catalan and Spanish identities stand for democracy, decentralization, the secular nature of the state, economic prosperity and a commitment to Europe. So, where are the differences? Should we conclude that the current idea of Spain fulfils the aspirations of Catalans, but also of Basques, Galicians, Andalusians and the other peoples of Spain? Should the present political scenario be defined as a harmonious setting in which the constituent parts of the state consider themselves to be fully represented and identify with the definition of Spain? If we compare the characteristics of the new Spanish identity with the characteristics I have attributed to Catalonia during the Francoist period, it is possible to argue that, in many respects, Catalonia and Spain are now closer, and theoretically this should favour the coexistence of the two. Notwithstanding this, the definition of twenty-first-century Spain should acknowledge that Catalonia is enclosed within the borders of Spain and that there is a power relation between the two which often involves a centralist and Castilian view of Spain, present in the main political parties that have ruled the country during its transition to democracy (UCD, PSOE and PP). Thus, regarding Catalonia, the Spanish central government has the capacity to decide on its optimal or advisable degree of autonomy, its adequate level

6

Introduction

of funding, the nature of the cultural and linguistic policies to be developed within the framework of the constitution, and the character and degree of Catalonia’s role as a political player in the EU and other supranational institutions. It is within this practical arena that the nature of Catalan identity and the relationship between Catalonia and Spain should be discussed. The key point of this relationship between two identities that have become closer is to establish to what extent Catalonia is entitled to fulfil its desire for self-determination. It is also a question of knowing what type of selfdetermination the citizens of Catalonia are aiming for and under what conditions they are willing to develop multiple identities as Catalans, Spaniards and Europeans. In my view, it will be possible to harmonize these three levels of identity if two conditions are met. These are that people are not compelled to choose among them, so that identification with one of these groups automatically excludes them from the possibility of identifying with the other two, and that none of these identities are defined or perceived as limiting acceptance of the other two. Indeed, multiple identities are only possible if they are not exclusive; that is, if they are defined in accordance with democratic principles, which favour their compatibility. If one of the identities, for instance the Castilian one, does not recognize the difference represented by Catalonia as a nation with its own language and culture, and insists on not accepting the multinational character of Spain then it is unlikely, if not impossible, that Catalans will fully accept their Spanish condition, as in that case, instead of perceiving being Spanish as an asset, they will only regard it as a limitation. In my view, we are likely to witness a radicalization of Catalan nationalism in the near future. Such a reaction will be closely connected with current transformations affecting the nation-state. A phenomenon which is already prompting Spain to radicalise its traditional centralist rhetoric based on the pre-eminence of Castile, centralism and the linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the State. A return to Francoism is completely impossible, among other reasons due to Spain’s new role as a member of NATO and, especially, of the EU. However, if the PP continues to accentuate its conservative, pro-Castilian rhetoric, and restricts the construction of a new democratic and plural Spain, we are likely to witness a rise in pro-Catalan feelings which may well result in the updating of a Catalan nationalist discourse originally intended to confront past situations. At present, a revival of centralism and conservatism prevails within significant sectors of the central government, which tend to underestimate the complexity and strength of pro-Catalan sentiments. This could trigger the revival of a brand of Catalan nationalism originally designed to fight Francoism. In my view, it is important to understand that the present cannot be compared with previous political periods. The main difference between the Francoist era and the current situation is that, while international public opinion recognized to a certain extent the totalitarian character of Francoism and the legitimacy of Catalan demands, currently the Spanish state and its

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government in Madrid legitimately invoke their democratic credentials and refer to the Autonomous Communities System as a model of how to respond to peripheral nationalisms. Within this new context it is easier to dismiss any further Catalan demands and brand Catalan nationalism as a retrograde movement threatening the unity and harmony of a democratic and decentralized state such as Spain. The partial media manipulation of some unfortunate linguistic conflicts (some real and others invented) between Catalan and non-Catalan speakers and of some shameful scenes with immigrants provide further arguments to those seeking to disqualify any form of Catalan nationalism. Catalonia runs the risk of constantly having to prove the democratic nature of its political demands and the legitimacy of its people’s will to develop and to promote its language and culture. The democratic nature of the Spanish state is unquestionable; however, it should be stressed that democracy is a process in continuous evolution and not a sort of parapet against change. The new democratic Spain is not a monopoly in the hands of a particular group, but rather the result of the plurality of all its peoples. In order to concentrate on the analysis of Catalan nationalism as a social movement, I shall begin by offering a theoretical approach to the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. I will then introduce the concept of a ‘nation without a state’ and discuss some of the reasons for its resurgence over the last ten to fifteen years.

State, nation and nationalism The nation has become one of the most contested concepts of our times. Many of the existing definitions of the nation focus on cultural, political, psychological, territorial, ethnic and sociological principles depending on the various scholars and politicians willing to define such a controversial term. The lack of agreement on a single definition raises considerable difficulty when it comes to dealing with so complex a phenomenon. The crux of the matter is closely related to the link established between nation and state, and to the common practice of using the nation as a source of political legitimacy. The recognition of a community as a nation entails specific rights, because being a nation tends to imply a link to a particular territory, sharing a common culture and history and demanding the right to self-determination. Defining a specific community as a nation implies a more or less explicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the state that claims to represent it. However, if the nation does not possess its own state, then it involves an implicit recognition of the right of this nation to selfdetermination, which does not necessarily have to result in a demand for independence. The nation, however, cannot be considered in isolation. I argue that a clearcut distinction needs to be drawn between three main concepts: ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. By ‘state’, taking Max Weber’s definition, I refer

8

Introduction

to ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’,3 although not all states have successfully accomplished this, and some of them have not even aspired to accomplish it. By ‘nation’, I refer to a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical. By ‘nationalism’, I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny.4 But still another term needs to be defined and distinguished from the ones I have just mentioned – the nation-state. The nation-state is a modern institution, characterized by the formation of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural homogenization. Nation, state and nationalism form a triad defined by constant tension between its three components. Hence, changes in the definition of one of the constituents have the capacity to influence and, to some extent, even alter the definitions of the other two. For instance, if belonging to a nation is defined in terms of common blood, the definition of the state and with it that of citizenship, as an attribute conferred upon its members, will have to include blood as a sine qua non for membership. Consequently, any nationalist movement emerging in these specific circumstances will focus upon common blood as a requisite for exclusion and inclusion in the nation that they want to defend and promote. In other cases where common ancestry is replaced by territory or by the will to be a member of a particular nation as the primary condition for membership of a particular state, the definition of the nation and the character of nationalism are altered accordingly. This example refers to conditions for membership, that is, to elements which are considered to be indispensable to establishing a distinction between those who belong and those who do not belong to the nation. But alterations in the definitions of nation, state and nationalism are not restricted to conditions for belonging or criteria for membership. The state’s self-definition as a unitary, a federal or even a multinational political institution holds significant consequences for the peoples living within its boundaries. Once one of these self-definitions is adopted by a specific state, it has the capacity to influence the definition of the nation. This is particularly evident in the case of being confronted with a state that declares itself to be multinational, thus assuming the coexistence of more than one nation within its territory. Such a position entails an automatic distinction between nation and state which challenges the commonly accepted coincidence between the two. A multinational state explicitly acknowledges its internal diversity and, in so doing, it influences the diverse

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definitions of nationalism that may emerge within its territory. First, in these cases, the nationalism instilled by the state will necessarily involve the acceptance of the various nations included within its borders. This type of nationalism tends to focus on shared constitutional rights and principles as elements able to hold together an otherwise diverse citizenry. Second, the nationalism emerging from some of the national minorities included within the state is strongly influenced by the state’s recognition of their status as nations. The minorities’ nationalism is bound to focus upon demands for greater power and resources which will allow them to further the degree of self-government they enjoy – assuming that they are already entitled to some political autonomy. In a similar way, alterations in the definition of nationalism also have the power to impact upon the definitions of both the state and the nation. Therefore, a nationalist discourse based upon the rejection, dehumanization and portrayal of those who do not belong to the nation as ‘enemies’ and as a ‘threat’ will feed xenophobia and ethnic hatred. This type of nationalism is likely to foster a narrow definition of the nation based upon the exclusion of the different and the belief in the superiority of one’s own nation above all others. A state endorsing this sort of nationalism is likely to base its policy on the marginalization, or sometimes even the elimination, of ‘others’ within its territory and/or the pursuit of a consistent assimilation policy. This type of state often engages in conflicts with other states as a result of an aggressive economic and/or territorial expansionist policy. So far I have offered some examples illustrating the close interrelation between the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationalism’. A further consideration suggests that different definitions of the three elements of the triad coexist simultaneously in different parts of the world, thus complicating even more their theoretical analysis and adding a further difficulty to the formulation of a general theory.

Nations without states By ‘nations without states’ I refer to those territorial communities with their own identity and a desire for self-determination included within the boundaries of one or more states, with which, by and large, they do not identify. In nations without states, the feeling of identity is generally based on their own common culture and history (which often goes back to a time prior to the foundation of the nation-state), the attachment to a particular territory and an explicit desire for self-determination. A nation without state is defined by the lack of its own state and by an impossibility to act as a political institution on the international scene. A nation without state is based on the existence of a community with a stable but dynamic core containing a set of factors which have generated the emergence of a specific identity. It should be added, however, that nations are not unique, eternal or unalterable, and that throughout history there are many examples both of the disintegration

10 Introduction of some nations that have played an important role during a certain period and of the rise of new nations. There are also several examples of nations that have had their own state in the past and which, for various reasons, have become stateless nations; this is the case of Catalonia and Scotland. Self-determination, sometimes defined as political autonomy, does not always involve outright independence although it often includes the right to secession. Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flanders represent only a few nations without states currently demanding the right to self-determination, although with different nuances in each case. It could be argued that some of these nations do have some kind of state of their own and could be considered as ‘quasi-states’, since a substantial number of powers have been devolved or are in the process of being devolved to their regional parliaments. However, in all these cases, the powers transferred exclude foreign and economic policy, defence and constitutional matters. The ‘quasistate’ that these communities enjoy is, as the term indicates, incomplete. This explains why it is still meaningful to refer to them as nations without states. The revitalization of nationalist movements in nations without states is closely related to two interconnected factors: the intensification of globalization processes and the transformations currently affecting the nation-state. The prevailing forms of democratic nationalism emerging in a considerable number of nations without states stand as a social movement defending the right of peoples to decide upon their own political destiny. The strength of these movements and the character of their demands are not homogeneous and depend on each particular case. All these movements, however, seem to share a will to promote their specific culture and language and a desire to feel represented by the political institutions deciding upon their future. The number of people involved in the movement measures the strength of this type of nationalism. Thus, a massive following is more difficult to ignore if the state wants to maintain its credibility as a democratic institution. The nationalism of nations without states tends to employ two main arguments to legitimize its discourse. First, a political argument stemming from the French Revolution (1789) and the War of American Independence (1776). This concerns the endorsement of democracy and popular sovereignty as leading principles to legitimize the construction of the modern state. In late eighteenth-century France, sovereignty was taken away from the king and the aristocracy and placed in the hands of the nation, which was understood to include the ‘whole people’, although, in the first instance, it was assumed that the most educated and enlightened citizens would have to guide the people and introduce them gradually to political life. Second, a cultural argument, closely related to the principles endorsed by Romantic nationalism. This refers to the value of cultural and linguistic diversity together with the relevance of the different identities which now attain a new and unprecedented salience. The nationalism of nations without states often encounters ignorance, incomprehension and neglect on the part

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of those ruling the state which includes them. Isaiah Berlin defines nationalism as ‘the result of the wounds inflicted by someone or something, on the natural feelings of a society, or of artificial barriers to its normal development’.5 In the nationalist discourses of nations without states currently seeking recognition, it is common to find a detailed description and a list of grievances against the state. As Berlin points out: ‘Nationalism springs, as often as not, from a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the desire for recognition.’6 The struggle for recognition entails the desire to be regarded and treated as an equal – as someone who has a voice and is able to participate in the political processes affecting his or her future. Recognition involves many dimensions which sometimes overlap. There are moral, social, political and even economic consequences for a state which decides to acknowledge the existence of different nations within its territory. In the process of recognition, pride and moral feelings prevail over economic compensation. Berlin writes: Recognition is demanded by individuals, by groups, by classes, by nations, by States, by vast conglomerations of mankind united by a common feeling of grievance against those who (they rightly or wrongly suppose) have wounded or humiliated them, have denied them the minimum demanded by human dignity, have caused, or tried to cause them to fall in their own estimation in a manner that they cannot tolerate. The nationalism of the last two hundred years is shot through with this feeling.7 The nationalism of nations without states seeks to halt a relationship with the state which is often marked by: (1) political dependence (sometimes also involving economic dependence); (2) limited or frequently inexistent access to powers and resources; (3) restricted or even absent financial powers; and (4) in many cases, a restrained capacity to develop and promote one’s own culture and language. Nations without states claim the right to be recognized as political actors and have a say in different fora, entrance to which has been up to now restricted to nation-states. Some may argue that the recognition of nations without states adds a further complexity to current international structures; they may add that this might lead to increasing fragmentation and is opposed to the advancement of internationalism. I argue that such positions ignore the right of peoples to preserve and develop their cultures and decide on their political future. Contemporary democratic nationalist movements in nations without states invoke the right to self-determination, a principle advanced by Woodrow Wilson after 1918. It involved, at first, ‘equating the popular principle of sovereignty with the attack on the remaining dynastic empires in Europe, and later with anti-colonialism generally. Secondly, it involved abandoning the constitutional mode of settling disputed claims in favour of political

12 Introduction settlements’. In Mayall’s view, the historical fate of the principle of national self-determination is doubly ironic: it has tended to legitimize the state and only the state, and it has elevated and institutionalized the progressive view of human affairs by attempting to freeze the political map in a way which has never been previously attempted.8 He points at two major challenges to the internal order: irredentism as the main essentialist challenge, and secession as the main rationalist challenge. Irredentism, in modern political usage, has come to mean any territorial claim generally based on historical and/or ethnic arguments made by a sovereign state to lands within another. Secession refers to the creation of an independent state out of a territory previously included within another state from which it has now separated. The term is also often employed to describe unsuccessful separatist rebellions against the state, which may or may not involve the use of violence. In my view, the recognition of nations without states as global political actors does not necessarily involve them becoming independent. My argument is that, while some nations without states may secede, most of them are likely to achieve greater political autonomy within the political institutions which are currently being developed. For instance, there are strong chances that further European integration will favour a greater presence of nations without states, such as Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flanders.

Objectives and structure This book offers a socio-political analysis of Catalan nationalism during Francoism and the transition to democracy. The book is centred around three main issues: (1) whether nations without states such as Catalonia will be able to survive and develop in the foreseeable future; (2) the study of the different ‘images’ of Catalonia presented by the main Catalan political parties; and (3) the analysis of the new mechanisms for the construction of national identity emerging in the global era. The book is divided into six chapters. While the first chapter and the conclusion include theoretical reflections on the main issues considered throughout the book, the central chapters are devoted to an empirical study of the Catalan case. In so doing they offer an analytical approach to a very specific type of nationalism, that of Western European nations without states. Chapter 1 offers a critical analysis of the theories of Elie Kedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith concerning the role of intellectuals in the construction of nationalism. The relevance of their theories in dealing with the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states is questioned, and an alternative and original theoretical framework is constructed. This chapter also includes a study of the different rational and emotional arguments often employed by Catalan intellectuals when constructing and seeking legitimacy for their nationalist discourses.

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Chapter 2 examines Francoism and the type of conservative and centralist nationalism defined in national Catholicism. The idea of Spain promoted by Francoism is contrasted with the national demands advanced by other peoples of Spain, in particular Catalonia. The chapter goes on to consider the consequences of the defeat of the Second Republic and the establishment of the Franco regime in 1939 for Catalonia and Catalan nationalism. Chapter 3 refers to the different stages of Francoism and studies the processes that culminated in the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, it offers a typology of the different resistance actions carried out during this period. This includes a distinction between ‘symbolic actions’, ‘interference actions’, ‘elite actions’ and ‘solidarity actions’, while focusing upon the various agents involved in each type of action as well as on their objectives and recipients. Chapter 4 briefly analyses the process initiated by the transition to democracy. It studies the new idea of Spain and considers the nature of the Autonomous Communities System established by the 1978 Constitution. It then offers an in-depth analysis of the different sections of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, which defines Catalonia, its language, culture, institutions and symbols, and of the possible relations with other Catalan-speaking territories, and offers a definition of who is to be considered as a Catalan. The chapter concludes with an overview of Catalan electoral behaviour in the various regional elections since 1980. Chapter 5 initiates the study of the views of the main Catalan political parties by examining their positions regarding five specific issues – their definitions of Catalan identity, nationalism, immigration, the relationship between Catalonia and Spain and that between Catalonia and the European Union – which exemplify their different versions of Catalanism. The political parties considered in this chapter are: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, or Catalonia’s Republican Left), PSUC-ICV (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, or Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, later integrated in Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, or Initiative for Catalonia-Greens) and PSC (PSC-PSOE) (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, or Socialist Party of Catalonia, which is federated with the PSOE). Chapter 6 continues the analysis of the main political parties of Catalonia with a study of CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, or Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) and UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, or Democratic Union of Catalonia). It also includes a section on the work of Jordi Pujol, president of the Generalitat during the transition to democracy. Chapters 5 and 6 have been completed by examining various internal and external party documents and publications. They also include references to books, articles, talks and declarations by their political leaders. The Conclusion begins with a careful analysis of the mechanisms and strategies employed in the creation and maintenance of national identity in the globalization age. It then moves on to discuss the possibilities of survival for nations without states and concludes by proposing a set of measures which

14 Introduction should contribute to updating Catalan nationalism in order to face the new political and socio-economic challenges it has to confront at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Appendix contains a comparison in table form of the positions of the various political parties studied.

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1

Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states The Catalan case

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in Western nations without states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco’s dictatorship. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyses how the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism is tackled in the work of Elie Kedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith. The second part considers the specific context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. It concentrates on the study of the role of Catalan intellectuals in protecting their vernacular language and culture during Franco’s regime together with the processes which, in the 1960s and 1970s, turned Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement. In this part I also discuss the reasons why many intellectuals felt attracted to nationalism, and some of the rational and emotional arguments often employed as mobilizing agents within Catalan nationalism.

Intellectuals and nationalism When considering the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism, I shall be following Anthony D. Smith’s definition of intellectuals as those who create artistic works and produce ideas. In so doing, I shall distinguish them from the ‘wider intelligentsia or professionals who transmit and disseminate those ideas and creations and from a still wider educated public that “consumes” ideas and works of art’,1 although in practice, the same individual may fulfil all these different roles. I will begin this part with a review of the theories of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith, since they have all devoted some sections of their work to the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and intellectuals. But it should be stressed that their theories do not address the specific role of intellectuals in nations without states. On the contrary, they neglect the need to establish a clear-cut distinction between those intellectuals operating within the nation-state and contributing to the creation of ‘state nationalism’, and those evolving within nations lacking a state of their own.

16 Nationalism and intellectuals An exception to this is represented by Kedourie’s analysis of intellectuals in colonial societies. Elie Kedourie: on ‘marginalized men’ I began to rebel against the glory I could not be associated with. (E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p. 88)

Kedourie sustains a hostile attitude towards nationalism and defines it as a sort of politics which is not concerned with reality; rather, ‘its solitary object is an inner world and its end is the abolition of all politics’.2 He sees nationalism as a disease which originated in the West and then spread to other parts of the world. In his view, intellectuals are to be blamed for the generation of a doctrine based on the assumption that nations are obvious and natural divisions of the human race as history, anthropology and linguistics prove. According to Kedourie, alienated and restless intellectuals marginalized from politics under the impact of Enlightenment rationalism turned to Romanticism and generated nationalism as a doctrine that would have the capacity to grant them a major role within society.3 Kedourie is extremely critical of Romantic intellectuals, such as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and fully identifies nationalism with Romanticism. Kedourie focuses on the role of intellectuals in colonial societies. He describes how some Western-educated indigenous people became completely alienated from their traditional societies and identified with the culture and manners of the colonizers, only to discover that indigenous elites were excluded from positions of honour and responsibility reserved for the white colonizers. Kedourie writes: An Indian could be admitted to the civil service only if he had become so completely Europeanized as to be really and practically on the footing and imbued with the character of an English highly educated gentleman. But it did not prove to be the case that an Indian who had become ‘imbued’ with such a character would be easily or automatically treated like an English gentleman.4 In fact, what Kedourie writes about indigenous elites in colonial societies is highly relevant to the analysis of some indigenous elites in nations without states, specially where some specific regional affiliation acts as a barrier for promotion within the state’s socio-political and economic structure. One of the main objections to Kedourie’s theory is that it fails to account for the nationalism defended and generated by ‘official’ intellectuals who have already secured honour and status within the state. In so doing, he ignores the nationalism espoused by the colonizers, which included their own intellectuals and political leaders. It could be argued that the colonizers’

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nationalism was to be blamed for the exclusion experienced by indigenous elites who, in spite of being culturally homogenized and integrated, were never viewed as ‘belonging’ to the colonizer’s nation. Kedourie’s theory presumes a wide gap between active intellectual elites and inert and disoriented masses. In his view, the only way to persuade the people to support the nationalist movement is through propaganda and control over education. To mobilize the people, elites must appeal to the indigenous beliefs and practices, invoke the dark gods and their rites, and transform purely religious motifs and figures into political and national symbols and heroes – which is all part of the ‘ethnicization’ and nationalization of previously universal and transhistorical religions.5 Kedourie concedes that an elite of intellectuals captures the main injustices endured by the mass of the population and constructs a nationalist doctrine whose aim is to eliminate the unjust situation shared by all those belonging to the same nation, thus uniting elites and masses under a single banner. But, for him, the objective of these intellectuals goes well beyond the wish to end the unjust situation that their fellow countrymen and women are enduring. The intellectuals’ objective is to gain power in society and halt their alienation and exclusion from positions of honour and privilege. Tom Nairn: the people’s mobilizers The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood. (T. Nairn, The break-up of Britain, p. 340)

Nairn approaches the study of nationalism from a Marxist perspective. He considers nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon, which can be derived from the class consequences of the uneven diffusion of capitalism.6 Nationalism generates and, at the same time, requires the exploitation of peripheries whose deprived elites have no alternative but to turn to the masses and engage them in the nationalist project. In this context, nationalism’s main objective is to fight against a concrete form of ‘progress’ promoted by the colonial capitalist, while at the same time embracing a distinctive idea of progress generated by the intellectuals capable of leading the struggle against capitalist oppression.7 Nairn explains the emergence of nationalism in deprived areas as a reaction against the uneven spread of capitalism. But he also acknowledges the existence of some exceptions to the connection he establishes between nationalism, backwardness and periphery. To mobilize the masses and gain their support for the nationalist cause, the new intellectual elites have to work towards the construction of a ‘militant inter-class community’ sharing a common identity even if, as Nairn

18 Nationalism and intellectuals stresses, they only share this identity in a mythical way. Nairn, as well as Miroslav Hroch and Peter Worsley, envisages a chronological progression in the spread of nationalism from elite into mass involvement. In Nairn’s theory, the support of the masses is crucial if a nationalist movement is to succeed. But what are the implications of turning to the people? He points at three main implications: (1) speaking their language; (2) taking a more kind view of their general ‘culture’, which had been relegated by the Enlightenment; and (3) coming to terms with the enormous and still irreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life.8 John Breuilly: the creators of ideology Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society. ( J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, p. 349)

Breuilly understands nationalism as a form of politics, principally opposition politics. In his view, ‘the term “nationalism” is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments’.9 Breuilly, in line with Kedourie and Nairn, stresses the ability of nationalism to attain mass support and confers a pre-eminent role on intellectuals and members of the professions as key figures in the construction of nationalist ideologies. But, according to him, ‘nationalism cannot be seen as the politics of any particular social class . . . [and] neither can it be regarded as the politics of intellectuals’,10 although most nationalist leaders are drawn from the professions. In Breuilly’s view, the idea that ‘nationalism should be seen primarily as the search for identity and power on the part of displaced intellectuals is a gross exaggeration, even if that is what it means to many intellectuals in nationalist movements’.11 Breuilly admits, however, that the exclusion from expected positions suffered by some intellectuals and members of the professions may contribute to their support for nationalism as an ideology able to provide a new identity containing ‘images of an ideal state and an ideal society’ in which they will have a secure, respected and leading position.12 Breuilly points at two sets of arguments to explain the intellectuals’ attraction to nationalism. First, although he portrays nationalist intellectuals as unsuccessful professionals, he argues that their failure is relative, since it involves both failing to obtain certain positions, and not attaining the financial and social status expected from the position attained. Here the argument echoes that of Elie Kedourie’s theory about indigenous intellectuals being excluded from top positions in colonial societies and how this made them turn to nationalism. Second, Breuilly argues that the excessive number of intellectuals produced by some societies, and the inability to ‘absorb’ them, may also contribute to explain why some intellectuals turn to nationalism.

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He perceives nationalist politics as elite politics in politically fragile states, or as a form of politics which can arouse mass support without having to tie itself too closely to the specific concerns of that support. The compelling character of the nationalist ideology stems from the connection between the intellectuals’ portrayal of the nation and the common beliefs and often widespread political grievances shared by large sectors of the population. Breuilly argues that symbols and ceremonies award nationalist ideas a definite shape and force in two major ways: they project certain images of the nation, and they enable people to come together expressing some type of national solidarity. Anthony D. Smith: ‘in search of identity’ There is, in fact, an ‘elective affinity’ between the adapted model of a civic, territorial nation and the status, needs and interests of the professionals (and to a lesser extent of the commercial bourgeoisie). (A.D. Smith, National identity, p. 121)

In his early work, Smith confers pre-eminence on political and religious, rather than social and cultural, factors in the emergence of what he refers to as ethnic nationalism. He argues that the modern era is characterized by the rise of what he calls the ‘scientific state’; that is, ‘a state whose efficacy depends on its ability to harness science and technology for collective purposes’.13 In his view, the emergence of the ‘scientific state’ challenges the legitimacy of religious explanations and favours situations of ‘dual legitimation’, in which rival grounds of authority dispute for the allegiance of humanity. Intellectuals, as the equivalent of pre-modern priests, are particularly affected by this dispute. According to Smith, the rise of a secular intelligentsia within the framework of the ‘scientific state’ has encountered several obstacles, including the overproduction of highly qualified personnel, the opposition on the part of entrenched hierarchical bureaucrats to the critical rationalism of the intelligentsia, and the use of ethnic or other cultural grounds for discrimination in admitting sections of the intelligentsia to public high-status positions. Smith emphasizes the crucial role of intellectuals as generators of ideology and leaders of the nationalist movement in its early stages, although he is more sceptical about their function once the nationalist movement develops. He rejects those who define intellectuals as fanatical power-seeking individuals, though he accepts that, in some instances, it is possible to point at some excluded and resentful intellectuals, especially in colonial societies. Smith concludes that the beneficiaries of nationalism are the members of the mobilized ethnie at large, since nationalism favours both the activation of the masses and the end of their role as passive objects of external domination, and the elevation of popular culture into literary ‘high’ culture performed by intellectuals. Against those who stress the invented nature of nations and

20 Nationalism and intellectuals nationalism,14 Smith highlights the ‘ethnic origins’ of most of the cultural elements selected by intellectuals in the construction of modern nationalism. To explain the attraction that many intellectuals in different parts of the world have felt for nationalism and their influential imprint on the ideology and language of nationalism, Smith invokes the ‘identity crisis’ experienced by people in general and the intellectuals in particular, stemming from the challenges posed to traditional religion and society by the ‘scientific state’. He argues that the ‘nationalist solution’ allows individuals to draw their own identity from the collective identity of the nation. In so doing, ‘she or he becomes a citizen, that is, a recognized and rightful member of a political community that is, simultaneously a cultural “community of history and destiny”’.15 Here Smith stresses the relation between national identity and citizenship, thus emphasizing the cultural and political aspects of nationalism. Similarities and differences The writings of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith firmly place intellectuals as the generators of nationalism. In so doing, these scholars coincide in defining nationalism as a modern political ideology, which, to be successful, requires the support of the masses; however, they regard the relationship between intellectuals and the masses in very different ways. Kedourie underlines the wide gap between intellectual elites and the masses. In contrast, Nairn accents the need to create an inter-class community united by a common objective, and Breuilly describes what we could refer to as an ‘interactive’ relationship between intellectual elites and the masses. Smith highlights the shared character of national identity among members of the same nation. Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the significance of mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. They also emphasize the power of culture, language, symbols and ceremonials as key constituents of nationalism. What is lacking from their analysis is a specific theory considering whether the task of intellectuals in nations without states is different and, if so, to what extent, from the task of intellectuals in nation-states. Apart from Kedourie, who studies the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in colonial societies, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith do not specify the context within which the intellectuals they analyse live and develop their theories. There is considerable literature on the role of intellectuals in oppositional nationalisms; however, most of it concerns the study of underdeveloped countries (Hobsbawm,16 Gouldner,17 Kautsky18). An exception to the considerable literature devoted to the study of nationalism and intellectuals in colonial societies is exemplified by the work of Pinard and Hamilton, who study the participation of intellectuals in Quebec nationalism.19 On the other hand, the cultural history book Els intel.lectuals i el poder a Catalunya (1808–1975),

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coordinated by Jordi Casassas,20 represents a magnificent contribution to the study of the role of intellectuals in a specific nation without state. But Casassas’ book, which is primarily empirical and of great historical value, fails to provide a theoretical framework for the sociological study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states. In what follows, I address this particular task.

Intellectuals and nationalism in nations without states First of all I shall analyse the specific context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. The socio-political context The study of nationalism in nations without states requires a specific approach which should take into account two key factors. First, that sub-state nationalism emerges within already established nation-states, and, second, the need for an ‘alternative elite’ ready to challenge the state, construct a nationalist ideology and lead the nationalist movement. The nationalism of nations without states emerges within already established nation-states endowed with their own national education system, a specific media system, a constituted power elite and a set of institutions forming the state and defining its territorial, political, social and economic framework. Nation-states embody a cluster of institutions which both define and govern the country, while nations without states may or may not enjoy some kind of cultural or political autonomy as a result of the state’s decision. Often, more than one nation live under the umbrella of a single state. Almost invariably, one nation prevails over the others and plays a leading role in the governance of the country and also in defining its identity through the promotion of a specific culture and language, which generally involves the marginalization of minority cultures and languages. In Spain, Castile turned out to be the dominant nation to the detriment of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. In the United Kingdom, England became the dominant nation. The mere existence of a community which considers itself to be a nation other than the one the state seeks to promote poses a threat to, and questions, the legitimacy of the state wherever it is defined as a unitary political institution. Democratic states recognize internal diversity; however, they are often reluctant to employ the term ‘nation’ when referring to their national minorities since the political consequences which this may entail, for instance the recognition of a nation’s right to self-determination, are usually quite problematic. For this reason, the state tends to regard minority nationalisms as dangerous, or at least as an uncomfortable phenomenon to deal with.

22 Nationalism and intellectuals The ways in which the state responds to the demands of the national minorities included within its territory depend upon the state’s own nature, the specific character of the nationalist movement and the international support this is able to secure. The emergence of a nationalist movement in a nation without state requires the existence of some intellectuals prepared to build up a nationalist discourse different from, and often opposed to, that of the state. On the other hand, the intellectuals who fully represent the nation-state or who identify with it develop their work within already established frameworks created and supported by the state. As the nation-state was in the process of being created, intellectual discourse was structured by the culture and language employed in the homogenization of its citizenry and the simultaneous marginalization of regional languages and cultures. As a result, such intellectuals are often critical and even dismissive of regional nationalist movements. The ‘potential elite’ Crucial to the development of nationalism in nations without states is the existence and position occupied by the ‘potential elite’. By this I refer to those educated individuals who, if the nationalist movement succeeds, are likely to become its leaders. The potential elite includes: 1

2

3

Individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state’s treatment of their community. The degree and strength of their dissatisfaction may vary. In some cases, it is connected to the intensity of the state’s repressive and discriminatory measures which may range from cultural and sociopolitical measures to the use of force. Catalan intellectuals who engaged in resistance activities against Franco’s regime are a case in point. Individuals who have been excluded from the state’s ‘official elite’ because of their regional origin. In such cases, individuals are unable to develop their work within the state’s circles of power and influence, and have to circumscribe their activities to their region. This could be exemplified by the widespread Castilian adverse attitude towards Catalans, which led to their exclusion from influential positions in the Spanish economic and political power structure during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. Individuals who decide to prioritize their allegiance to the nation without state instead of aspiring to be integrated within the state’s official elite. This involves their commitment to the advancement of a national cause opposed to that of the state, which often translates itself into their automatic exclusion from the state’s selected elite. In these cases, it is the individual’s choice rather than the state’s systematic exclusion of some people because of their regional origin which leads to the inclusion of these individuals in the category of potential elite.

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In contemporary democratic Spain, the decision of some Catalan intellectuals to develop their work exclusively in Catalan automatically excludes them from Spanish-speaking intellectual circles, unless their work is translated into Spanish. It has been argued that this is a strategy by means of which some educated people who would otherwise be unlikely to achieve a prominent position within the state’s elite – because of fierce competition – would easily obtain a prominent position within a nation which is smaller and where competition is bound to be less intense. This argument emphasizes the self-interest of some individuals in promoting regional forms of nationalism in order to gain access to privileged positions. There are also, however, those intellectuals who play the pro-Spanish card in Catalonia and who thus become representatives of the state ‘culture’ within Catalan society. The same argument referring to an ulterior motive could be applied in this case on arguing that the defence of a minority position in Catalonia which suits the state, and not one’s own merit, is what contributes to the renown and status of those intellectuals who generally receive the support of the intellectual circles at state level, but who often only work in Catalonia. In any case, we will always find a significant number of intellectuals who act out of their own principles, without ‘servitude’ and without giving priority to their own personal promotion and interest. In my view, although self-interest may in some cases play a substantial part in explaining why some intellectuals support sub-state forms of nationalism, it is misleading to explain all nationalist allegiances through economic motivation and the desire for power. A genuine love for the nation and a desire for its flourishing inspires many nationalists, especially in those cases where the nation feels culturally, politically or economically oppressed. Devoting one’s life to the defence and enhancement of the specific character of one’s own nation may act as a potent force. It provides meaning to the individual’s life, while setting a concrete and clear-cut objective for his or her actions. Because individuals usually embark upon nationalist projects as part of a group, they are bound to experience some kind of moral support and solidarity as members of a movement with a common goal. The sense of belonging to a nation can somehow be lived through the experience of comradeship arising within the nationalist movement or party. In spite of this, differences among nationalist leaders are not to be ignored, since fierce confrontation between them is a common phenomenon. Jealousy and competition among intellectuals are also commonplace. They struggle to become more influential, be paid a higher salary, obtain more recognition or be offered a better job. Having made these general considerations of the conditions in which the relationship between nationalism and the intellectuals of nations without states evolves, I shall now initiate the study of the Catalan case.

24 Nationalism and intellectuals

Intellectuals and Catalan nationalism I am aware of the existence of substantial differences between the role of intellectuals at the birth and the re-emergence of a nationalist movement that has been dismantled. In the first case, it is necessary to awaken the national conscience and to construct a previously non-existent nationalist discourse. In the second case, it is a question of invoking feelings and arguments already expressed in previous nationalist discourse. In these circumstances, the causes of national dismantling should be analysed and the nationalist discourse reformulated. The resurgence of Catalan nationalism during the Francoist dictatorship took place within a context marked by the devastating effects of the regime on Catalan language and culture.21 It was a historical moment in which just small circles of intellectuals and clandestine political activists fought against the attempt to destroy the central components of Catalan identity, devoting all their effort to the cultivation of Catalan culture. During Franco’s regime, the Catalan intellectual elite was divided between those who supported Francoism and those who stood against it and took upon themselves the task of maintaining the vernacular language and culture. Yet, while some of the former were incorporated into the mainstream Spanish elite, the latter were automatically excluded and often persecuted by the regime. When considering the initiatives to protect Catalan culture and language that rose during that period, I shall distinguish between initiatives rising from particular individuals and groups, and those emerging from some sectors of two powerful institutions: the Catholic church and the University. These initiatives will be studied in detail in Chapter 3. Think Catalonia As a result of the Civil War and the imposition of the Franco regime, a selected group of Catalan intellectuals published a substantial number of books and articles considering the nature of the country, its history and its inhabitants’ character. These publications appeared between 1939 and 1960 and shared a reconciliatory nature aimed at reconstructing and recovering a democratic, self-governed, modern Catalonia. The contributions of Jaume Vicens i Vives, Notícia de Catalunya (1954), and of Josep Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana (1944), stand out from among a considerable number of books written during this period.22 The aim of Jaume Vicens i Vives on writing Notícia de Catalunya was to search for the characteristics of Catalan identity. It was a question of knowing ‘who we have been and who we are if we want to construct an acceptable building within the great framework of western society to which we have belonged by direct filiation since Carolingian times’.23 The author encourages the Catalans to cultivate a historical conscience in order to understand the ‘own, differentiated’ mentality of each people.

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Vicens describes the Catalan as a man of the ‘March’, that is to say coming from the Spanish March, the trans-Pyrenean part of the Carolingian European redoubt, ‘a geohistorical corridor [. . .] between two diverse geographic and cultural worlds’.24 As such, the Catalans are ‘incongruous and paradoxical [. . .]. We are the result of different yeasts and, therefore, a good part of the country belongs to a biology and to a culture of crossbreeding’.25 But as Catalans, ‘we are also the result of a sea–mountain polarity, the conservatism of the mountains and coastal activism [. . .], the Pyrenean feudal mentality and the capitalist mentality of the coast’.26 A further characteristic defining Catalans is the fusion of home and family, individual and group work. However, the most important defining trait of the Catalan character, according to Vicens, is pactism, that is the idea that a pact with sovereignty should regulate all the human and political order of the group. This has an inescapable feudal origin; from seeing feudalism which connected people to people, not people to the land.27 Jaume Sobrequés, in his book El pactisme a Catalunya (1982), highlights the establishment of pactism in the Catalan mentality and its application to all kinds of social relations. Josep Ferrater Mora, in Les formes de la vida catalana (1944), describes the traits that, according to him, define the Catalan personality as an ideal that each Catalan approaches without ever attaining it,28 thus following the model of the ‘ideal types’ used by Max Weber. The four characteristics that define the Catalan character, and that are never expressed in their pure state, are: continuity, common sense (seny), moderation and irony. Ferrater points out, however, that it is necessary to study these four ‘virtues’ without forgetting ‘the defects and the vices’, some of which arise from an exaggerated exaltation of the virtues which may lead the Catalans to close in on themselves and to scorn any other reality. From among ‘the motives which transform an open life into a closed life’, Ferrater pays special attention to resentment, as a defect or vice which ‘destroys the root of existence and dries up the sap of life’.29 For Ferrater, continuity is the most important characteristic of the Catalan character, because ‘to aspire to the continuity of life fundamentally means wanting life to have meaning, that is that every action can be understood in accordance with the whole of life’.30 Hence the importance of history. Salvador Giner, Lluis Flaquer, Jordi Busquet and Núria Bultà, while reflecting on Ferrater Mora, write that ‘Catalonia is substantially traditionalist, if we understand traditionalism not to be a doctrine, but a way of life, that is a way of respecting the past as such and wanting for it to last.’31 Continuity is revealed in the Catalans’ love and respect for work, and for work well done, ‘which means that the way of working in Catalonia is almost always a tradition and that any job, even the least manual of all, imperceptibly

26 Nationalism and intellectuals adopts the manner of the artisans’.32 In his view, work ‘in actual fact, represents the withdrawal of the country into its essential refuge, the work that buries disappointments and awakens new hopes’.33 Common sense (seny) is not the most important and even less the most decisive attribute of the Catalan character.34 For Ferrater, common sense is the expression of the soul’s health and of the strength of the spirit. ‘True seny means pursuing what is fair, proper and correct, even if this pursuit is sometimes the most senseless action that can be imagined.’35 For the Catalan, to talk of seny reveals ‘the possession of an experience, and this means, first, that Catalan life is not at all a puritan existence’,36 although it is regulated by moderation. On this particular point, and when comparing Ferrater’s views with those of Vicens, it is relevant to note that Vicens refers to two essential traits of the Catalan character – common sense (seny) and sudden enthusiastic fervour (rauxa) – as the two inscrutable poles of the Catalan historical character. Vicens points out that ‘sudden enthusiastic fervour (rauxa) is, however, temporary. What lasts is common sense (seny).’37 Moderation is an individual virtue, ‘indeed, there are no moderate peoples’.38 All Catalans are not always and necessarily moderate. Moderation is at the same time limited and prolific. ‘If I shun excess, it is because I want the surveyed land and the action accomplished to truly attain what excess can almost never attain: efficiency.’39 Ferrater mentions as an example of moderation the sardana dance (the Catalan national dance). The sardana, a ‘mystical ring’, as the poet Joan Maragall said, is truly profound, because it is the expression of the very root and heart of a people. Through the sardana we discover those same forms that we have tried to describe [. . .] but if any one stands out and excels, it is precisely moderation.40 Irony is a purification, a cleansing of experience that separates individuals from things. The Catalan, as an individualist person, wants to maintain the possibility of making the decision to indulge in something. Therefore, Ferrater argues, irony emerges in a natural and spontaneous manner when he or she is offered anything that does not deserve complete dedication.41 Irony generally arises at times of crisis, which does not mean that people cannot be ironic on other occasions. However, the predominance of irony at those times shows that its function is to conceal the desperation that is emphasized at these moments, and therefore an ironic man is always, in a certain way, a desperate man.42 The vigilant conscience of Catalans leads them to live in crisis during all the moments of their history and not just in those moments which tend to be considered particularly critical. As Giner writes,

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by conserving the critical spirit and a desperate condition, irony makes it possible for life to continue rowing in a sea of pain and of conscience. It prevents one from getting lost due to an excessive trust in oneself, and it eliminates arrogance and pride. The irony that overcomes the crisis and at the same time conserves it is a revealing irony.43 Attitudes towards Catalan culture The analysis presented by Ferrater and Vicens leads the way into the study of the different attitudes of contemporary Catalan citizens, especially of intellectuals and politicians, towards what is considered to be the ‘core’ of Catalan cultural tradition. These attitudes vary greatly and are often spread among the different groups that form the social structure of Catalonia.44 Following Salvador Giner’s model, I shall distinguish between four ‘ideal types’, which allow for a high number of qualifications. The four types are essentialism, pactism, españolismo, or ‘pro-Spanishness’, and cosmopolitanism. Essentialism consists of conceiving the Catalan nation as a natural, eternal and unalterable being whose purity must be preserved, and which should be protected from all contamination. The biggest danger to which Catalonia is exposed, according to the essentialists, is the threat of ‘denationalization’, that is, the loss of the core defining its very identity as a unique nation. This attitude generally rejects the dynamic character of identity, and the possibility of enriching the indigenous culture as a result of contact with different cultures. For this reason, essentialists tend to adopt a defensive attitude and are often associated with a tendency to feel victimized, having been persuaded that Catalonia is constantly subject to unjustified attacks and assaults. Although in principle the essentialist attitude consists of a sort of emotional reaction excluding scientific analysis, [. . .] it is possible for some versions of essentialism instilled with varying degrees of rationality and enriched with a calm and lucid reflection on reality to exist.45 I would like to add that, as Àngel Castiñeira writes, often essentialism should be understood as a reaction against external aggressions suffered at specific historical moments or periods.46 Pactism is one of the characteristic traits of Catalans that go back to the beginning of feudalism. Pactism arises from a recognition of one’s own limitations in the face of the adversary, but such an apparent weakness can become a positive force allowing individuals to take advantage of certain situations. In practice, pactism represents a willingness to negotiate under all circumstances in order to save everything that it is possible to save, avoiding positions of intransigence and of sudden enthusiastic fervour (rauxa). The whole Catalan political class, both right- and left-wing, whether it preaches moderate nationalism or autonomous federalism, exhibits very high levels of a pactist spirit.47

28 Nationalism and intellectuals Pro-Spanishness (españolismo) represents a rejection of Catalonia as a nation and a reduction of Catalan culture to a more or less folkloric variety of a unitary Spanish culture. The pro-Spanish attitude defends a single Spanish nation. Within ‘pro-Spanishness’, Giner distinguishes what he refers to as an ‘essentialist’ position, which does not accept either dialogue between the different Hispanic cultures, or the possibility that the concept of Spanishness is subject to a process of transformation as a result of the changes triggered by the creation of the Autonomous Communities System, and a ‘pactist’ position, which exemplifies a more open attitude towards the redefinition of Spain following its transition to democracy. In my view, it is necessary to add three versions of pro-Spanishness – one right-wing and two left-wing. The first, professed above all by large sectors of the Catalan upper middle class and by the managers of those companies which serve a state-wide market, considers the Spanish upper class to be the social group to which they belong, or at least their reference group. The second, exemplified by broad sectors of the working class opposed to a dominant class, united above its regional affiliations, is best defended by strong trade unions at state level. The third version is a pro-Spanishness of the Jacobin left with a strongly centralist conception of Spain and hostile to any federalist idea or redefinition of Spain as a multinational state. Right-wing pro-Spanishness and the Jacobin left have often formed political alliances in order to prevent initiatives aimed at recognizing the national diversity of the Spanish state. Cosmopolitanism is a minority attitude, more diffused in the social structure, with a historical precedent in libertarian proletarian internationalism – very important in Catalonia in the period preceding and during the Civil War. Cosmopolitanism is a primarily intellectual attitude that defends a view of the world in which ethnic, linguistic and national differences cease to act as barriers to human communication and cooperation. Currently, at least two different groups defending cosmopolitanism can be identified. The first is formed by those who define themselves as ‘world citizens’, are hostile to any kind of Catalanism, and who often conceal a centralist pro-Spanishness. The second includes a somehow curious mixture of a universalist vision of world culture and a radical Catalan nationalism. Rational and emotional arguments as mobilizing agents in contemporary Catalan nationalism Rational and emotional arguments become intertwined when intellectuals seek to awaken the nation and generate a mass nationalist movement. Rationality stems from the objective reasons invoked by nationalists when defending their case. Independence or greater autonomy may mean a better economy by encouraging regional development and the right to retain regionally generated wealth; a higher quality of life; freedom from a series of constraints imposed by the state; and even a deepening of democracy by favouring decentralization and self-determination.

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Emotions are aroused when the nation is presented as a community which transcends the limited lives of particular individuals, while providing them with a collective sense of identity.48 Belonging to a nation, which is real in the minds of its members, confers on them a sense of continuity grounded upon the sentiment of being part of a group portrayed as an extended family. Individuals are born into particular families in the same way as they are placed within specific nations which act as major socializing agents. Individuals are brought up within particular cultures which define the way in which they relate to themselves, others and nature. The use of a particular language increases the sentiment of belonging to a community sharing a common history and a common set of values and practices. As in a family, membership of the nation implies a certain solidarity – in this case with fellow nationals. It also demands sacrifices and generates sentiments of love and affection which generally become more prominent when the well-being of the group is under threat. Rational arguments During Franco’s regime, the key objective was to restore democracy and, with it, the right of Catalonia to develop its language and culture, and recover its autonomous political institutions. These were rational demands capable of arousing intense emotional reactions. Now that over twenty years have passed since the Generalitat was re-established, what rational arguments do nationalist intellectuals and politicians invoke? The main nationalist current defends Catalonia’s need to enjoy increasing levels of self-government, to be granted an individualized model of funding which would allow it to fully develop its distinct identity and to prosper as a nation – this would include a review of inter-territorial solidarity criteria and mechanisms – and to be recognized as a nation within the Spanish state. A significantly smaller current stands in favour of secession. In their view, Catalonia will only thrive culturally and economically and become a fully fledged political actor if it becomes independent. I distinguish three main rational arguments destined to convince not only those who share a strong sense of national identity, but also those who are solely interested in supporting Catalan nationalism in so far as it proves capable of improving their quality of life, deepening democracy and/or dynamizing civil society: 1

Catalonia’s contribution to the Spanish coffers heavily outweighs the income it receives from the central government. This is excessively unfavourable, even on the assumption that Catalonia has to contribute more than other areas of the state and has to show solidarity with the rest of Spain. Solving this grievance would automatically increase the Generalitat’s spending power and improve the Catalans’ quality of life.

30 Nationalism and intellectuals 2

3

Political decentralization tends to strengthen democracy in as much as it brings decision-making processes closer to the people. Problems are identified, analysed and resolved where they emerge. Regional politicians usually display greater awareness of the needs and aspirations of their electorates; thus, the argument follows, greater devolved powers for Catalonia should result in greater efficiency at solving the problems of the community. The devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the re-allocation of resources to facilitate discrete policies and regional budget planning. These processes, in turn, contribute to the revitalization of civil society, encouraging local and regional initiatives, which include cultural, economic and social projects.

Emotional arguments In Catalan nationalism, emotional arguments emphasize the sentiment of belonging to a cultural and territorial community which has suffered and rejoiced together throughout time. Emotional arguments evolve around five major clusters: language, culture, history, territory and art. For instance, a considerable number of people who suffered under Francoism still hold live images of either their own or their loved one’s experiences, which may include torture, imprisonment, exile, proscription and lack of freedom to cultivate their vernacular language and culture. Memories of oppression under Franco are connected with a long list of grievances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to eradicate Catalan language, culture and political institutions. Key historical events, invested with particular meaning and capable of arousing an emotional response when Catalans ‘tell their history’, include: (1) the War of the Reapers (Guerra dels Segadors, 1640–1652), consisting of a Catalan secessionist uprising against the Spanish monarchy, mainly because of the fiscal pressure exerted by the crown;49 (2) the Eleventh of September 1714, when, after a massive Franco-Spanish attack, Barcelona surrendered – an event which imposed the dissolution of the autonomous political institutions of the Principality and the subjection of Catalonia to a regime of occupation defined by the rigidly centralist and authoritarian monarchy of Philip V, when Catalan was forbidden and Castilian proclaimed as the official language.50 More recent historical memories include the suppression of the autonomous government of the Catalan Mancomunitat (1913–1923) after the coup d’état perpetrated by General Miguel Primo de Rivera. Autonomy was briefly re-established during the Second Republic – at that time Catalonia enjoyed a Statute of Autonomy and Autonomous Government (Generalitat). Both were abolished by Franco in April 1938. The territory of Catalonia also leads to emotional references and differences between those who limit it to the territory of today’s Catalonia (the Catalan autonomous community) and those who defend a broader concept

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of the Catalan nation, often expressed with the term Països Catalans (Catalan Countries). These include the Principality of Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and North Catalonia (part of France north of the Pyrenees up to Perpignan and Salses), incorporated over the feudal era into the domains of the count-king of Barcelona, and which for this reason share a common cultural and linguistic heritage. Particular landscapes are emotionally charged and portrayed as embodying Catalan traditions, history and culture. The monasteries of Ripoll, Poblet, Montserrat and Cuixà (France); the mountains of Montserrat, the Canigó (France) and Montseny; or urban landscapes, such as the Plaça de Sant Jaume and the Fossar de les Moreres in Barcelona, are among them. It is worth remarking on the great importance of territory in all nationalist movements, not only for the cultural and historical reasons that we have just mentioned, but also because territory is the nation’s ‘continent’. Territory provides resources and is where people build their homes and create their towns and cities. Territory unites them with their ancestors, who were born, lived, worked, fought and died there, and it is precisely in this respect that territory evokes the continuity of the nation and becomes a sacred bastion: The landscape is full of places which embody the experience and the aspirations of people. They are places which become centres of meaning; symbols which express various feelings, ideas and emotions. Some of them evoke a marked feeling of belonging to a certain group which we consider to be an identifying mark. They become true symbols of a clearly nationalist character.51 For these reasons it is possible to establish a connection between the meaning of territory and the resolution to preserve it present in nationalist theory, and the concerns of various environmental groups defending the preservation and purity of the habitat.52 Certain selected works of art and artists turned into symbols of Catalan identity are often portrayed as part of a corpus of Catalan high culture which has received international recognition. The work of Joan Miró, Salvador Dalí, Antoni Gaudí, Antoni Tàpies and Pau Casals, among others, stands side by side with fine examples of Romanesque art, such as the churches of the Boí valley, and other outstanding architectural works of art, such as the cathedral and the gothic area of Barcelona. The elements forming Catalan identity also include displays of popular and traditional culture, such as the sardana, human towers (castells), traditional festivities such as the Patum in Berga, Carnival in Vilanova and the Dansa de la Mort in Verges, together with a large number of traditional dances, songs, music and instruments. A further and powerful symbol of Catalan identity which somehow escapes the above typology concerns sport, football in particular. During Francoism, the Barcelona Football Club (Barça) was portrayed as a representative

32 Nationalism and intellectuals of the Catalan nation and exemplified resistance against the dictatorship. Whenever Barça and Real Madrid played each other, the significance of the match went well beyond sport. At present, the symbolic content of the campaigns to create a Catalan football team and a Catalan Olympic committee, together with the pledge for Catalonia to be allowed to compete in international contests, like the Scottish or Welsh teams do, should not be underestimated. This movement has galvanized a very large section of the Catalan population and is putting pressure on Madrid to reverse its initial negative response. The way in which people identify with, and relate to, language, culture, history, territory and art, but also to popular traditions and to those other elements that have become symbols of a country, contributes to defining the community to which they belong. It is important to emphasize that symbols are effective because they are imprecise and conceal the heterogeneity of the nation. Symbols transform difference into the appearance of similarity, thus allowing people to invest the ‘community’ with ideological integrity. This accounts for the ability of nationalism to bind together people from different cultural levels and social backgrounds. The power of emotional arguments stems from their capacity to appeal to individuals who share the same culture, feel attached to a specific land and have the experience of a common past and a project for the future. Intellectuals and political leaders (in some cases religious leaders should also be included) select and promote the key elements which conform national identity, and they also re-create and generate occasions in which all that unites those belonging to the nation is emphasized. These moments include various commemorations, national days, traditional festivities, sports contests and a series of public events. The emotional dimension of nationalism springs from the feeling of belonging to a particular group and from sentiments of solidarity towards fellow countrymen and women with whom the individual shares his or her love for the nation.

Summary On the one hand, intellectuals act as architects of the nationalist movement by providing cultural, historical, political and economic arguments to sustain the distinctive character of the nation and to legitimize its will to decide upon its political future. On the other hand, intellectuals are subversive and construct a discourse which undermines the legitimacy of the current order of things. They denounce the nation’s present situation within the state and offer an alternative to it by promoting the conditions and processes of conflict. Intellectuals are to be considered as formulators of the nationalist ideology. However, their task does not end here, since many of them also act as agitators and mobilizers of the nationalist movement. Valentí Almirall (1841–1904), Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917), Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1882–1949) and, currently, Josep Benet and Jordi Pujol, represent but a

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few examples of key ideologists of Catalan nationalism who have turned into extremely influential political leaders. I have argued that two main factors define the socio-political context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. First, sub-state nationalism emerges within already established nation-states with their own elites, culture and language, education and media systems and international recognition as political institutions. Second, to be successful, sub-state nationalism requires the existence of an alternative elite able to construct a discourse critical of the current status quo. Let me attempt, in conclusion, a summary of the themes of this chapter. A combination of factors explains why intellectuals turn to nationalism in nations without states. Against those who, like Kedourie, insist that intellectuals turn to nationalism for mere self-interest, I agree with Breuilly that, although this may sometimes be the case, such an assertion represents a gross exaggeration. Altruism and the genuine desire for freedom for one’s own country often account for the intellectuals’ fascination with nationalism. For instance, in the early stages of a nationalist movement, a certain degree of altruism and love of country act as potent forces informing the intellectuals’ actions. These sentiments are bound to emerge with even greater intensity wherever, as the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco’s regime shows, a national minority lives under repression. In such circumstances, endorsing the minority’s nationalism often involves not only the radical exclusion from the state’s elite, but a considerable risk to one’s own life. Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the great relevance of mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. During Francoism, as I will analyse in detail in Chapter 3, the greatest threat to the survival of the core components of Catalan identity was the widening gap between an intellectual elite cultivating Catalan high culture and the mass of the population more vulnerable to the homogenizing policies of Franco’s regime. In addition to this, the large number of Castilian-speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain coming to Catalonia – a movement favoured by the state and combined with an absolute lack of political and economic resources and Catalan institutions to deal with it – contributed to the weakening of a then proscribed Catalan language and culture. Catalonia received 1,400,000 Castilian-speaking immigrants between 1950 and 1975, and during that period Catalonia’s total population shifted from 3,240,313 to 5,663,125. I will analyse immigration and its consequences for Catalonia later on in the book.

2

Portrait of a dictatorship Francoism

The Franco regime halted and even reversed the process of democratization, modernization and decentralization of Spain initiated during the Second Republic. Indeed, the main objective of the Franco regime was to end the Spanish transformation process threatening the monopoly of power that the Castilian, conservative, land-owning oligarchy, nostalgic of the empire, had exerted for centuries. Once the last colonies had been lost (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898), the Castilian oligarchy concentrated on guaranteeing its control over the peninsula. In this context, the expansion of socialist and anarchist ideas and the threat of separatism, which in Catalonia was revealed on 14 April 1931 with the proclamation of the Catalan Republic by Francesc Macià, at that time President of the Generalitat, exemplified the dangers most greatly feared by an oligarchy willing to hold on to power at all costs. In this chapter I consider the key features of Francoism and the immediate consequences of the imposition of this new totalitarian regime. I begin by reviewing the main supporters of the new regime: the Falange, the Army, the Catholic church and conservative sectors of the bourgeoisie and landowners. I then move on to study national Catholicism as an ideology constructed to grant legitimacy to the new regime, and analyse the ‘surveillance state’ created immediately after the victory of the ‘nationals’. In the final part of the chapter I set forth the position of the Franco regime in relation to Spain’s internal diversity. The Franco regime was the result of a violent confrontation that broke out on 18 July 1936, when some sectors of the Army revolted against the legitimate government of the Second Republic. The uprising rejected democracy, the party system, the separation of the church and the state, the autonomy of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, and the freedom and civil rights of the Spanish people. The fundamental objective of the insurrectionists, who immediately called themselves ‘nationals’, consisted of re-establishing ‘order’ and eliminating all signs of communism and anarchism, then quite strong in some parts of Spain. The ‘nationals’ wanted to eradicate what they considered to be ‘red Spain’ (la España roja). In this context, the end of the Republic was presented as a necessity. On 30 September 1936, the bishop of Salamanca, Enrique Pla y Deniel, published

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a pastoral letter entitled The two cities, in which he described the Civil War as a ‘crusade’. Until then, no ecclesiastic hierarchy had so explicitly expressed its support for the insurrectionist army. The point of reference of this pastoral letter was the blessing by Pope Pius XI of the Spanish exiles in Castelgandolfo (14 September 1936). On that occasion he had established a distinction between the Christian heroism of the ‘nationals’ and the barbarity of the ‘Republicans’. Pla y Deniel quoted Saint Augustine to justify the distinction between the ‘earthly city’ (the Republican zone), dominated by hatred, anarchy and communism, and the ‘celestial city’ (the national zone), where the love of God, heroism and martyrdom were the norm.1 This implied a distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ in the conflict, but even more important was the fact that it provided the emerging regime with ideological legitimacy. The ‘nationals’, who boasted that they had the blessing of God, fought against the ‘reds’, the ‘infidels’, and declared that they were undertaking a war of liberation, a crusade. This proclamation became one of the pillars in the construction of the new Francoist state. On describing the Civil War as a religious crusade, Franco succeeded in presenting himself as the defender not just of Spain, but also of universal faith. As Paul Preston points out, this ability to give the war a religious nature was taken advantage of to attract international support for the rebel cause. ‘Many British Conservative MPs, for instance, intensified their support for Franco after he began to stress Christian rather than fascist credentials.’2 The religious argument permitted the Fascist character of the insurrectionists to take second place. Franco established himself as the head of the ‘National Uprising’ after the fortuitous disappearance of some of the other insurrectionist leaders and thanks to his skill at removing and marginalizing the rest. The Galician general was invested as head of state on 1 October 1936, and immediately began a propaganda campaign to consolidate his leadership, which was still weak. All the newspapers in the ‘national’ zone had to include on their front page the inscription ‘One Motherland, One State, One Caudillo’ (Una Patria, Un Estado, Un Caudillo), reminiscent of the Nazi expression used by Hitler, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer.3 It was at this time that Franco adopted the title Caudillo, a term that was intended to link him to the warrior leaders of Castile in the Middle Ages. Franco, like the heroes of the Reconquest of Spain, defined himself as a ‘warrior of God against the infidels who threatened to destroy the faith and culture of Spain’; to be more precise one would have to say Castilian culture and language. When the Civil War ended (1939), Franco implemented a strong ‘nationalization’ policy, employing all the resources available to him – both physical and psychological repression, control of the media, education, the elites and the bureaucracy – to create what could be called a ‘surveillance state’. Francoism exemplified the rise, for the first time in the history of Spain, of a powerful modern state equipped with the necessary tools to embark upon

36 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism the cultural and linguistic homogenization of the country. The new regime was based on the exploitation of the ‘national’ victory and the defeat suffered by the Republicans. The authoritarianism, the extreme and backward conservatism, the end of the freedom of expression, the international isolation and the promotion of an ultraconservative Catholicism in favour of the regime had to be endured by all the citizens of Spain who identified with democracy. Francoism defeated them all. In this context, the working classes faced complete misery. In Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, there was an additional element to the feeling of defeat shared with the other Spaniards. It arose from the Francoist attempt to eliminate the cultural and linguistic differences of these peoples. Indeed, the implacable repressive policy implemented by the new regime would only exacerbate the nationalist feelings of the national minorities, in particular Catalans, Basques and Galicians. The especially harsh treatment received by the Basques and the Catalans encouraged the formation of a firm feeling of belonging in these communities – as a result the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was accentuated even further. The measures imposed by the regime in order to homogenize the population deepened the abyss between the official public sphere and the private one.4 One of the unintended consequences that often arise whenever the state seeks to undermine non-state national identities is that they become stronger. Shared external threats, conflict and the experience of repression tend to generate internal cohesion and mobilization. They can also succeed in uniting different social classes and interest groups, which have little in common or which even have antagonistic objectives. In similar situations, oppositional nationalisms receive legitimacy and justify their existence by appealing to the aggression suffered by the people they represent. The pillars of Francoism can be found in the support of the Falange, the Army, the Catholic church, the landowning class and important sectors of the bourgeoisie.

The Falange José Antonio Primo de Rivera founded the Falange in 1933 and became its main leader. The Falange originally combined traditional patriotism with modern authoritarianism. Its objective was to create a National Socialist state free from class struggle. The Falange was mainly inspired by Italian fascism and defended the ideal of creating a bigger Spain through territorial expansion in the north of Africa and, above all, the recovery of strategic Gibraltar. The Falangists respected the Catholic church, but demonized Marxism and capitalism. At the same time, they pressed for the introduction of land reform and for the nationalization of the banks and railways. José Antonio was arrested in Madrid by the Republicans and transferred to Alicante prison (14 March 1936). Given his political relevance, it was not unthinkable to consider his liberation as a result of an exchange or agree-

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ment between Republicans and nationals, but this did not occur because Franco needed the Falange as a tool to mobilize the civil population and as a mechanism to allow identification with the fascist ideals of his German and Italian allies. It has been suggested that Franco feared that the return of José Antonio, a charismatic person and the unquestionable leader of the Falange, would be an insurmountable obstacle to his intended manipulation of the Falange. Moreover, José Antonio had always been sceptical about collaborating too closely with the Army, since, in his views, this could limit the Falange’s role to that of acting as the ideology justifying a regime dominated by ‘a group of generals of depressing political mediocrity, committed to a series of political clichés, supported by old-style intransigent Carlism, the lazy and short-sighted conservative classes with their vested interests and agrarian and finance capitalism’.5 José Antonio Primo de Rivera was executed in Alicante prison on 20 November 1936. Although the news appeared in the Republican and French press, Franco refused to acknowledge the death of the Falangist leader until two years later. During this period, José Antonio became ‘the Missing Person’ (El Ausente) and Manuel Hedilla, who accepted Franco’s version of events, became the temporary leader of the Falange. However, his leadership did not last long because, in April 1937, he was imprisoned and sentenced to death, but not executed. At the same time, some of José Antonio’s writings were banned by Franco – a fact which did not prevent the new regime from raising him up as a martyr while considering him to be a quasi-saint.6 Franco imposed the unification of the Falangists and the Carlists ‘from above’ with the Unification Decree of April 1937, thus creating the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS). This merger did not eliminate the tensions and divergences between Falangists and Carlists, and Franco took advantage of these tensions to impose his leadership. The social radicalism of the Falange was toned down, while Franco achieved indisputable control over what from then on would be known as the ‘National Movement’ (Movimiento Nacional ). Franco employed a substantial part of the ideology of the Falange to construct the ‘Movement’ and exploited nationalist rhetoric to distract the people’s attention from the country’s serious economic problems. Above all, though, Franco employed Falangism as a very useful tool to control the monarchist, with whom he played along in order to counteract the Falangist influence. The FET y de las JONS defined itself as the pillar of the new Spanish state and assigned itself ‘the role of giving Spain the profound feeling of an indestructible unity of destiny and faith resulting from its Catholic and imperial mission as a protagonist of history’.7 It also aspired to establish an economic system capable of exceeding both individual and group or class interests, and of multiplying wealth. Article 12 of the new Falangist statute proclaimed Francisco Franco as its national head: the leader of a historical period in which Spain could fulfil its historical destiny and attain the objectives of the ‘Movement’. Franco, the leader, was only to be accountable

38 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism to ‘God and history’. This confirmed his power over the Falange and the impunity of his government.

The Army The military uprising of 18 July 1936 divided the Army between the defenders of the legitimate government of the Republic and those who supported the coup d’état. The Army was the main guarantor of the Francoist dictatorship. In his book ¿Qué es lo nuevo?, José Pemartín, one of the regime’s ideologists, wrote: ‘In what is truly military there is a superhuman essence of idealism. Self-denial, discipline, honour: these are the main three military virtues’, adding that, ‘the intense definition of Spain for me is a “Religiousmilitary monarchy”. Outside this, there is “the Iberian land”, but there is no Spain’.8 The words of Pemartín echo those of the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke, who in his political writings attributed a sacred character to war and noted its positive effects. Treitschke emphasized the attitudes that were personified in the army and gave them a supreme nature. His doctrine offered a valid model for the creation of totalitarian regimes such as Francoism. Although the ideologists of the Spanish regime did not refer to him directly as their source of inspiration, Treitschke’s influence had filtered through from German fascism and exerted a strong impact on the initial stages of Francoism.9 A considerable section of the Army was monarchist and saw Franco as a transitional figure who would re-establish the Spanish monarchy. Various contacts with Don Juan de Borbón, son of King Alfonso XIII, revealed the political differences between Franco and the heir to the throne. Finally, in 1954, Franco and Don Juan agreed, under pressure from the former, to bring up Juan Carlos, Don Juan’s son, as the dictator’s possible successor. This agreement meant that Juan Carlos, on Franco’s insistence, would be educated in Spain, attending the military academies of the three forces and university. On 21 July 1969 Franco, who did not have a male heir, after a period of doubts and of considering various possibilities, announced to the Council of Ministers his decision to appoint Juan Carlos de Borbón as Prince of Spain and his future successor. The restoration of the monarchy was sealed.10

Social support Franco had the support of the landowning class, and to a certain extent the moderate support of the so-called grandes de España or ‘grandees of Spain’, who were mostly monarchist. The new regime also achieved the approval of the industrial bourgeoisie, which, after a period of considerable convulsion, could now re-initiate its economic activities11 thanks to the re-establishment of social order and the elimination of all revolutionary and reformist movements. Two main factors account for the bourgeoisie’s attitude in favour of

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the dictatorship. The first and foremost was the replacement of the Republican labour legislation by a conservative legislation which gave preference to obedience over efficiency as the most valuable quality of any worker. The second factor was the compulsory membership of the so-called ‘vertical unions’. Many sectors of the bourgeoisie, including those from the Republican zone, ended up supporting Franco and his conservative policies, more as a result of seeking social and economic stability than out of political and ideological conviction. With a few exceptions, the Basque and Catalan bourgeoisie supported the new regime. Their class interests were placed above other factors, such as national identity. Borja de Riquer and Joan B. Culla emphasize the constant and overall support of the Catalan bourgeoisie for the dictatorship and explain it as a tactical reinforcement of the social situation created by the Francoist victory, since, in their opinion, their ideological support for the principles of the new state should be ruled out.12

The Catholic church The main figures of the 18 July 1936 uprising were military conspirators without any explicit religious motives. The idea of a ‘holy war’ or ‘crusade’ only emerged after the failure of what had been planned as a quick coup d’état. Defining the Civil War as a ‘crusade’ reveals the position adopted by the most conservative Spanish ecclesiastic hierarchy, with the exception of the Basque Country and certain sectors of Catalonia, on endorsing the military uprising. A dogmatic and conservative version of Catholicism granted the ‘nationals’ a very powerful legitimation of their regime, since neither the Falange nor Carlist traditionalism could offer solid enough ideological support to sustain it. Franco and the church agreed on the rejection of rationalism, the masons, liberalism, socialism and communism. Most of Spanish society was traditionalist and Catholic and, in general, they respected priests and the members of the religious orders who had considerable social influence. It is true that the Republic had eliminated most of their privileges and that the clergy were the first to suffer the harsh religious persecution undertaken by the ‘Republicans’, but, in a predominantly rural society such as Spain, the power of the church was deeply rooted in the people’s mentality. Several attempts had been made to reduce ecclesiastic privileges in the past, but, after each attempt, the church had succeeded in recovering its influence and in retaining considerable power. In addition, people did not disregard the link between God and church; no-one wanted to be ‘damned’, and the church was the only institution claiming the power to ‘save, forgive and damn’ in the name of God. These factors explain the great significance attributed to the support of the official church enjoyed by the new regime. A further element to be considered concerns the wide gap between the mentality of the inhabitants of cities, such as Barcelona and Madrid, and the

40 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism rural population. Indeed, communism and anarchism had their main strongholds in the cities. It should be stressed, however, that in Catalan rural areas being left-wing did not necessarily represent a lack of respect for the church. The pre-eminent role of the Catholic church was useful both for the ‘nationals’, who could argue that ‘God was on their side’, and for the church itself, which acquired great influence over the political and social life of the new regime. Franco constantly insisted on this point: In accordance with our historical destiny, on 18 July 1936 we were again the protagonists of an enterprise of supranational importance. A great struggle then began on our land to save the fundamental values of Christian civilization [. . .] thanks to its religious content and spiritual symbol, thanks to the explicit desire to work in favour of what Christianity is and represents, it was officially designated a Crusade, a just war par excellence.13 The regime had the blessing not only of the Spanish church, but also of the Vatican. Thus, on celebrating victory in the Civil War in May 1939, Pope Pius XII sent a radio message to the new Spain: It is with great joy that I speak to you, dearest children of Catholic Spain, to express our paternal congratulations on the grace of peace and victory with which God has deigned to crown the heroism of your faith and charity, demonstrated through so many, so generous sufferings.14 On 20 May 1939, in a religious ceremony held in the Madrid church of Santa Bárbara, Franco received the blessing of monsignor Isidro Gomá y Tomás, archbishop of Toledo and primate cardinal of Spain. At the end of the ceremony, the Caudillo drew his sword in triumphant manner and handed it to the cardinal, who placed it on the altar, while Franco declared: Lord, please accept the effort of this people, always Yours, which, with me, and in Your Name, has heroically defeated the enemy of Truth in this age. Lord God, in whose hand is all Right and all Power, lend me Your assistance to lead this people to the full freedom of the Empire by Your glory and that of Your Church.15 There are two important points to be noted in these words: the tacit public and official recognition of the crucial role played by the church in the new state and the pre-eminence of symbols and rituals in a political regime that took advantage of its religious nature. These elements were fundamental for the defence of the state nationalism imposed by the dictatorship. In its first agreement with the Vatican (1941), the Francoist state obtained the confirmation of the right of presentation (proposal of candidates) for

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episcopal appointments. This frustrated Franco’s expectations, as he anticipated more concessions from the Vatican. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Vatican was pleased with the new values guiding Spanish politics – these primarily consisted of using the regime’s Catholic faith to distance it from German and Italian fascism. This is probably why, during the period of ostracism endured by the regime after the Second World War, the Vatican never discouraged Spanish prelates or Catholics in general from reaffirming their support for Franco. But the relationship of the Franco regime with the Catholic church was, of course, influenced by the international context. In 1945, at the Potsdam summit, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Britain condemned the Spanish regime because it was established with the support of the Axis powers. In the same year, the United Nations conference in San Francisco approved a resolution which refused Spain entry to this organization. This situation was to change gradually from 1948 onwards. In fact the beginning of the cold war and the ‘witch hunt’ against communists undertaken by the United States led to a reassessment of the anti-communist nature of Francoism. Spain and the United States exchanged ambassadors in 1951; in 1952 Spain was accepted as a member of UNESCO; in 1953 it signed the Concordat with the Vatican and the Madrid Pact with the United States; and in December 1955 Spain was accepted into the United Nations. The exaltation of the Catholic nature of the regime is illustrated by the following examples. On 30 September 1945, Spain’s most influential Catholic newspaper, Ya, was published with the following headline: ‘Tomorrow Caudillo Day: A Catholic Head of State. Franco, servant of the Holy Catholic, and apostolic, Roman church.’ The article stated that ‘his life, his doctrine and his work are in accordance with the principles and rules of the church. This has just been solemnly declared by the Catholic hierarchy.’16 On 2 April 1946, on the commemoration of the ‘Glorious Victory’, the Falangist newspaper Arriba published on its front page: ‘The Catholic victory of Franco. Magnificent religious unity of the people. The Catholic voice is heard loud and free. Growing vitality and progress towards the fulfilment of a wholly Catholic life.’17 The conservative policies of Pope Pius XII, who in 1949 had excommunicated the communists, were a useful ally for Franco. As already mentioned, Spain signed the Concordat with the Vatican in 1953, one year after the International Eucharistic Congress held in Barcelona – an event portrayed as a guarantee of Spanish loyalty to the Holy See. The Concordat implied the Holy See’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of Francoism, in exchange for important concessions to the Spanish church in tax and legal matters, the right to control education and the right to censor the media, publications and public events. The support of the church was not homogeneous and, among others, some sectors of the clergy in the Basque Country and Catalonia questioned its

42 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism endorsement of the Franco regime. Both communities had traditionally enjoyed strong links between nationalism and very important sectors of the church. In the Basque Country, the predominantly Catholic Basque people’s support of the Republican cause and the Catholic nature of the Basque autonomous government, led by José Aguirre y Lekube, prevented the execution or assassination of the clergy and the destruction of sacred places during the Civil War, while in other parts of Spain they faced havoc and persecution.18 It is worth noting that the Francoists executed fourteen Basque priests in the autumn of 1936 because of their nationalist beliefs and, after the fall of the Basque Country in the summer of 1937, hundreds of laypeople and clergy suffered from exile, imprisonment and deportation to other areas of Spain.19 In Catalonia, nationalism reappeared a few years later under the protection of progressive sectors of the church opposed to the official message of national Catholicism. The festivities for the exaltation of the Mare de Déu de Montserrat, organized by Catalan nationalist Catholics in April 1947, constituted the first major public gathering with clear Catalan nationalist connotations since the end of the war (almost a hundred thousand people assembled at the Monastery of Montserrat). For the first time a few words were spoken publicly in Catalan. This concession cost the civil governor of Barcelona, Bartolomé Barba, his position, removed from office because of his ‘excessive tolerance’ towards the Catalans. A feeling of indignation was progressively spreading among a good number of Catholic laypeople and priests, critical of the notable differences existing between the working classes and those devoted to the regime and favoured with a higher status. Critical sectors within the church questioned the legitimacy of its alliance with the regime. The idea that the church should free itself from all relations with the regime was circulated among the groups most concerned with social problems, in particular Acció Catòlica and the Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica (HOAC).

National Catholicism as an ideology The connection between the Catholic faith and the Spanish nationalism defended by the regime had become very close. The definition of Spain as conservative, Catholic, Castilian and homogeneous was at the core of Francoist ideology. The desire for the political and cultural recognition of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia was not only disregarded but proscribed. Franco adopted Catholicism as the defining trait of the Spanish character: ‘Our state must be a Catholic state, both from the social and from the cultural point of view, as the true Spain always has been, is now and always will be deeply Catholic.’20 The Catholic character of Spain was tied up to its special mission as the defender of Christian values, a mission which, according to Franco, could only be carried out by a nation with the ‘special blessing of God’.

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The Catholic nationalization of culture implied a rejection of all European cultural, political and social movements – considered as anti-Spanish – and a return to the traditional values of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Luis de Araujo-Costa and Ramiro de Maeztu were the main representatives of this trend, which was inspired by the works of Juan Donoso Cortés, Jaume Balmes and, in particular, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo. As Raúl Morodo points out, ‘Catholic unity’ and ‘national unity’ were employed by the regime to justify certain historical events and as a source of political legitimacy. The version of Spanish history defended by the regime began in the fifteenth century with the Catholic Monarchs (Reyes Católicos) and the expulsion of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, the establishment of the Inquisition and the persecution of Jews. Defence of religious unity coincided with defence of state national unity.21 This approach offered a providentialist view of history which did not explain the decline of Spain either as depending on its failure to modernise in line with other democratic and industrialized European countries, or as a consequence of a malfunction affecting its socio-economic system, but rather attributed Spain’s backwardness and all of its problems to a deviation from its national spirit, that is, to a weakening of religious moral unity, an abandonment of its providential mission and a break with traditional values. Two basic elements account for the differences among the various forms of fascism adopted in Spain, Germany and Italy. These concern the strategy followed to attain political power and the role attributed to religion. In the early phases of fascism, the differences can be found not so much in the political tendencies of the new regimes as in the methods used to attain political power. Franco was not the charismatic leader of a mass party like Hitler or Mussolini, but rather came to power in a coup d’état supported by some sections of the Army. The Catholicization of fascism adopted by Francoism was an original aspect that disassociated it from other forms of this ideology. The main representatives of what Morodo calls ‘Catholic fascism’22 include Borja de Quiroga, marquis of Eliseda, Jorge Vigón, Eugenio Montes and José Pemartín. Pemartín was a distinguished member of the group formed around the magazine Acción Española, who made a significant contribution to Francoist ideology. In 1938 Pemartín claimed that the Italian and German fascists had not created a new ideology. In his view, Spain was already fascist in the sixteenth century, when it was Una, Grande y Libre (United, Great and Free), and when the nation and the state were identified with the eternal Catholic ideal. At that time, Spain had become the ‘Model Nation, the Alma Mater of Christian and Western Civilization’.23 He considered that the new regime should be based on traditionalist principles in order to be genuinely national, that is, Spanish. Pemartín did not have any doubt that ‘The Spanish Nation, if it exists, is Catholic’.24 Spain was identified fully with Castile. Spanish history was reduced to the events in which Castile played a leading part. The public presence of all the

44 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism languages spoken in the state (obviously with the exception of Castilian) was banned, and the cultures of the national minorities were proscribed. The prototype of Spanish man circulated by the regime was a traditional, Catholic, Castilian labourer. In this context, Manuel García Morente, an influential intellectual who joined the Francoists at the beginning of the 1940s, published Ideas para la filosofía de la historia de España, a book in which he set forth the doctrine of the ‘Christian knight’, exalted the Middle Ages and stressed the trio Spain–Catholicism–Traditionalism. Three key ideas attained a superior status in the national Catholic doctrine: motherland, unity and empire. In the national Catholic discourse, the idea of the motherland (Patria) acquired a traditionalist meaning which constituted a link to the past. Franco employed the term ‘motherland’ almost constantly to refer to the Spanish nation, a single nation which rejected the national character of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. In national Catholicism, the motherland became an element of supreme political value. The term ‘motherland’, charged with a powerful emotional content, sought to reproduce the intimate ‘mother–child’ relationship and to extend it to the political arena. Just as a well-behaved child would never endanger or dare to offend his or her mother, so the Spaniards had to unite in their loyalty to the motherland. In this context, the Catalans, Basques and Galicians who aspired to independence or to autonomy exemplified the most execrable sin, a separatism that involved questioning or rejecting the (imposed) motherland. In his speech delivered in Madrid on 18 July 1943 on celebrating the ‘National Uprising’ (Alzamiento Nacional), Franco declared: The motherland is not just a geographic space through which our life passes or all the goods of which the nation consists, including spiritual and cultural goods; the motherland is all this and much more; it is the historical influence of our nation in the world; therefore our idea of the motherland does not allow for disintegrating particularisms; its spiritual unity, its social unity and its historical unity form a single unity of destiny.25 Closely related to the idea of the motherland is the constant appeal to the unity (Unidad) of Spain, already emphasized in the above quotation. Unity was defended at all levels – national, religious, social and political; it was necessary to prevent ‘the others’ from usurping the benefits arising from the long-lasting continuity of Spain. This explains why Francoism and the Spanish right demonized class struggle and peripheral nationalisms. Franco insisted that ‘In politics we represent unity, we are not right or left wing, we are Spanish because we have come to lift up Spain’:26 So that no-one can misappropriate the fruits of this efficient continuity, a base that is and always will be essential: Unity; national unity, religious unity, social unity and political unity; a unity felt, defended and

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put into practice; not just proclaimed as a tactical supposition from which to operate with impunity outside or against those postulates on which this unity is rightly based and which were definitively established in the Fundamental Laws of the National Movement.27 The idea of empire (Imperio) arose from the ideals of grandeur and supremacy of the country in relation to others, and was also implied in Italian and especially German fascist doctrine. At the same time, fascism was firmly committed to nationalism as a means to link different populations. Imperial references disappeared from Franco’s speeches after the defeat of Germany and Italy in the Second World War. However, with the well-known ‘myth of Spanishness’, an idea proposed by intellectuals from Acción Española, such as Emilio Vizcarra, Ramiro de Maeztu and Isidro Gomà, an attempt was made to recover some kind of Spanish cultural empire embracing Latin America and founded on Catholicism and the use of Castilian. The regime established the 12 October, the day on which Christopher Columbus landed in America for the first time, as the Día de la Raza (Day of the Race),28 later to become the Día de la Hispanidad (Spanishness Day), to commemorate and celebrate Spain’s relationship with Latin America (the 12 October is still an official bank holiday in Spain).

The creation of a surveillance state The most sinister aspect of the Franco regime is revealed in the reaction of the former head of the Legión, appointed by Franco as the regime’s press and propaganda chief officer, General José Millán Astray, to Miguel de Unamuno’s criticisms of the glorification of repression and war. These events took place on 12 October 1936 at the University of Salamanca in an official function to commemorate the Día de la Raza. After a series of speeches stressing the importance of Spain’s imperial past and, in particular, after the words of Francisco Maldonado de Guevara, who described the Civil War as a struggle between eternal, traditional Spanish values and the anti-Spain of the ‘reds’, the Basques and the Catalans, a Legionnaire shouted out ‘Long live death!’ (Viva la Muerte!), the battle cry of the Legión. Millán Astray intervened, proclaiming the triple Nationalist chant of España! (Spain!), to which those present ritually replied: Una!, Grande! and Libre! (United! Great! Free!). In this environment, the seventy-two-year-old philosopher and novelist Unamuno, in his talk, branded the Civil War as uncivil, adding that ‘to win was not the same as to convince’ (vencer no es convencer), and stressing that the Catalans and the Basques were no more anti-Spanish than those present in that function. An indignant Millán Astray interrupted Unamuno and furiously shouted out: ‘Down with intelligence! Long live death!’ Among pushing and shoving, and in a situation of great tension, Doña Carmen Polo de Franco, the dictator’s wife, took hold of the writer’s arm and accompanied him home.29

46 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism During the religious persecution of the Civil War, 6,832 priests and members of religious orders lost their life in Spain.30 This meant that almost all the clergy supported the ‘nationals’ and that after the war such persecution was invoked to legitimize the violence exercised against the Republicans. Violence was also resorted to in order to secure the position of the ‘victors’. Repression became a recurring characteristic of a regime based on fear. The British journalist A.V. Philips reports that in 1940 in Madrid approximately a thousand death sentences were issued each month. Between March 1939 and March 1940, about 100,000 Republicans were executed in Madrid.31 According to Max Gallo, almost 4,000 people were executed between 1938 and 1953 in Catalonia.32 According to Borja de Riquer and Joan B. Culla, between a minimum of 130,000 and an estimated maximum of 150,000 people disappeared from Catalonia, due to death and exile. This represents over 4.5 per cent of the Catalan population in 1936.33 The proximity of the French border and the fact that Barcelona was one of the last Republican enclaves to surrender permitted the majority of the most active opponents of Franco to go into exile, escaping death or imprisonment, before the arrival of the ‘nationals’. Stanley G. Payne indicates that in some places during the first few weeks of the Civil War the executions were transformed into public spectacles. Referring to the ‘national’ zone, Payne writes that, on 25 September 1936, the Valladolid newspaper El Norte de Castilla protested because children were allowed to witness these scenes. On 15 November, the pro-national bishop of Pamplona, Marcelino Olaechea, delivered a sermon entitled ‘No more blood!’, demanding an end to executions outside the formal legal process (although in ‘national’ Spain these processes were limited to drumhead court-martials). Even the nazis and the Italian fascists who occasionally visited Spain were shocked by the intense degree of repression, and some even suggested that such an extreme level of violence could be counterproductive.34 The ‘state of war’ decreed in July 1936 remained in force until 1948. The regime branded its political opponents as criminals and employed exemplary punishments to dissuade people from acting against the new state. Repression was omnipresent and indiscriminate. The Catholic church contributed to the legitimation of the repressive actions, describing political opponents as ‘sinners’ who deserved punishment. In spite of this, as demonstrated by Hilari Raguer, the Catholic support for the Spanish right was neither pervasive nor constant.35 At the beginning of the cold war the Western powers viewed the establishment of a dictatorship in Spain favourably, preferring it to the restoration of democracy and the possibility of a left-wing government coming to power. Franco took advantage of the anti-communist obsession of the United States and presented his regime as an effective antidote to Soviet expansionism:

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The true Spain is fighting against red Russia and its satellites . . . . It is the resurrection of a whole nation opposed to foreign invasion with exalted patriotism.36 [. . .] Our victory embodies the salvation of Spain and prevents it from becoming a Soviet colony. It embodies a restoration of the national unity threatened by separatist traitors.37 Franco interpreted the Civil War as a struggle to free Spain from communism, and to legitimize this statement he continuously denounced the Soviet Union’s support for the Republic. It is well known, however, that Franco enjoyed the support of Hitler and of Mussolini, and benefited from the nonintervention agreement signed by Britain and France in August 1936. This agreement ended up favouring the ‘nationals’ and harming the Republic. A clearer attitude by the European powers in favour of the legitimate Spanish government would have made it much more difficult for the Italians and the Germans to support Franco. It should be remembered that, after the Second World War, Italy and the part of Germany not dominated by the Soviet Union joined the Western bloc in its obsession against communism, led by the United States, while the Soviet Union (Yalta was by now forgotten) became the enemy par excellence. Borja de Riquer notes the dramatic persistence of the repression exerted by the regime and distinguishes between various stages. In his opinion, until 1944 there was a very generalized and intense repression. This was followed by less harsh periods, alternating with others in which intransigence reappeared (1948–1953 and 1958–1963).38 The executions of the communist Julià Grimau García (1963), of the anarchists Francisco Granados Gata and Joaquín Delgado Martínez (1963), of the anarchist Salvador Puig Antich (1974) and of five activists from ETA and the FRAP (Frente Revolucionaro Antifascista y Patriótico) (September 1975) epitomize the culminating points of the violence exercised during the Francoist period many years after the end of the Civil War. The repression continued until the 1960s, at times when the opposition, still disorganized, was formed by small groups. Yet, a slow process by means of which the international community was pushing the regime to abandon its totalitarian nature, in return for its acceptance by the democratic Western nation-states, had begun. In Catalonia and the Basque Country people lived with intense fear partly justified by the existence of a repressive police apparatus. The police and the Falangists held information on the citizens and supervised the issuing of permits, passports, safe-conducts and all kinds of documents. A bureaucratic machinery was created to control the movements of the population. Apart from the accumulation of files on ‘controlled’ and ‘recorded’ people, this surveillance involved a direct control and intensified police action. During the early post-war years, it was not uncommon for groups of Falangists to burst into ballrooms, cinemas and train stations, stopping everything and forcing everyone to stand up, hold up their right arm and sing the Falangist

48 Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism anthem Cara al sol. In addition to the constant and systematic repression and surveillance, there was a wave of accusations and of denunciations of ‘reds’ incited by the regime.39 A further dimension of this surveillance state refers to the purging of public employees regulated by the 10 February 1939 law. This law ordered all those affected to take the oath of allegiance to the ‘Movement’ within a period of eight days and to answer a questionnaire on their political and trade union activities both before and after 18 July 1936. The trial judges confirmed the truth of the answers with political reports elaborated by the police, the Guardia Civil, the Falange and sometimes the Military Information Service. The purge was exhaustive and severe in Catalonia. On 17 February 1939, the Diputació of Barcelona announced the dismissal of all civil servants and other employees of the abolished Generalitat, some 15,860 people, a number which does not include forces of law and order.40 The purging of civil servants was intended to punish those who did not support the regime and to guarantee the presence of a loyal, indoctrinated, although intimidated, bureaucracy throughout the state. The purging also affected the private sector. It is well known that several purging commissions forced some members of the Barcelona Bar Association and the Medical Association to resign. Journalists were also subject to a rigorous purge. As for industrial and commercial companies, the purge followed an order regulating the procedures to dismiss and sanction employees. Employers had to submit to the Prefectura Superior de Policia and to the Delegación Provincial de Trabajo a list of the employees that they wanted to dismiss or to sanction, and these institutions had to approve it. Some employers used the purges to dismiss some of their employees without having to compensate them. Borja de Riquer mentions that in Barcelona even the staff of restaurants, cafes and hotels had to present a request to the police if they wanted to keep their job or obtain a new one. The purges, and above all the dismissals, benefited those loyal to the regime, who occupied most of the positions made vacant as a result of the law of 25 August 1939. According to this law, 80 per cent of the positions in public organizations should be reserved for disabled veterans, former combatants, former prisoners and orphans and relatives of ‘national’ soldiers who had died in service. At the Barcelona City Council, for example, the first hundred jobs in the local police force were offered to former combatants, thirty of whom were disabled.41 Maintaining the regime’s repressive apparatus required a considerable budget. In 1946, 62 per cent of the annual expenses were reserved for military purposes.42 Apart from this, in the 1940s the economic policy implemented by the regime was totally inadequate in dealing with the extreme poverty faced by the country. Thus, while it took most of the Western countries which had participated in the Second World War between five and eight years to recover the income and production levels and the standard of living they enjoyed in 1939, Spain had to wait over fifteen years after the end of

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the Civil War to reach the levels of 1935.43 In 1939, infant mortality was 40 per cent higher than in 1935. Poverty, fear and the struggle for survival were the main concerns of most of the population. Franco and his supporters created a totalitarian state under the protection of a reactionary version of Catholicism and a fundamentalist version of state nationalism; both elements were artificially imposed upon an impoverished population. The opposition expected the defeat of nazism and fascism to favour an external intervention aimed at overthrowing the dictator, but the allied powers never intervened to change the destiny of the Spaniards, preferring a diplomatic blockade of the new state, which in turn led Franco to slacken the pace of social and cultural change.

Against internal diversity One of the main problems of Spain, since its establishment as a single state in the eighteenth century, concerns the treatment of its national minorities. Throughout time, various attempts were made to solve this problem, but the state was too weak to impose a lasting, effective policy. Spain was an underdeveloped country, with very high levels of illiteracy, and this made it difficult to impose a single language and a culture other than the local one of each region. Franco and his regime perpetrated the first serious attempt to culturally and linguistically homogenize the peoples of Spain. After the war, most of the population was immersed in a climate of political passiveness. Francoism had achieved its objective of neutralizing a population now almost exclusively concerned with its own survival. In Catalonia and the Basque Country, the imposition of national Catholicism involved a policy of homogenization that deliberately rejected the specific identity of these two nations. Francoism sought to impose the way in which society should see itself and rejected the alternative images that both the Catalans and the Basques had formed, over time, of their own communities. The elements constituting the Catalan and Basque nations included a well-defined territory, a specific language and culture, a shared history and the memory of their political institutions – now dissolved – in addition to a wish to decide their own common political destiny. Francoism pursued the annihilation of such alternative images deeply rooted in broad sectors of the population, which ran counter to the image of Spain advanced by the dictatorship. This opened up a deep rift between the communities that had enjoyed the social and political recognition of their difference during the Republic and a regime obsessed with the construction of a homogeneous, centralized Spain. The confrontation between two radically opposed views of Spain could only be reconciled by establishing a clear-cut separation between the official public sphere controlled by the regime and a civil society almost completely reduced to the sphere of private life. The official image that occupied the public space had no legitimacy. And the private image of the community had no power.

3

The re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Francoism

In this chapter I study the processes of cultural resistance which contributed to the survival of Catalan identity during the Franco regime. To begin with, I offer a brief analysis of three periods corresponding to the first stage of Francoism, and I then discuss the various actions that led to the reemergence of Catalan nationalism after the Civil War. The chapter focuses on the following key periods of Catalan resistance to the dictatorship: (1) initial reactions to the Republican defeat and the desire for the new regime to be short-lived; (2) the acceptance of an increasing consolidation of Francoism, together with the rise of a new generation opposed to the dictatorship; and (3) the unity of the Catalan resistance in its defence of democracy and the right to political autonomy within the context of a decaying dictatorship. In the last part of this chapter, I examine some of the consequences of Castilian-speaking mass immigration from other parts of Spain into Catalonia.

Confronting images Two opposing ideas of nation and state came into play in the Civil War. The Francoists offered an extremely centralized and uniform image of Spain. In contrast, the Republicans defended a moderately diffuse image of a state that would allow the historical nations, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, to enjoy a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy. It should be noted, however, that the centralist view of the Spanish state was never exclusive to the Spanish extreme right, but rather a feature shared by most of the political spectrum. The main difference between Spanish political forces lay in their attitude towards internal diversity: while democratic parties accepted it, fascists rejected it.1 Franco’s victory led to the suppression of Catalan political institutions, the banning of Catalan and the proscription of all the symbolic elements of Catalan identity, from the flag (the senyera) to the national anthem (Els Segadors).2 The Francoists, who called themselves ‘nationals’, professed a conservative form of state nationalism unwilling to accept Spain’s national diversity, since

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they saw Spain as a homogeneous country. For them, the unity of the Spanish nation was a non-negotiable principle. Their nationalism was the result of a reaction against modern ideologies, such as socialism and anarchism, and also a rejection of the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist movements, regarded as a threat to the traditional socio-political structure of Spain. The Republic had introduced progressive policies and tried to build a state in which the historical nations were recognized and received a substantial degree of cultural and political autonomy. The right-wing nationalism of the Francoists reacted by calling a halt to the modernization of the country and by choosing to maintain the traditional structures defended by broad sectors of conservative Catholics. The closed image of Spain imposed by the regime contrasted with the image of a plural Spain (mainly defended by the Catalans, Basques and Galicians) capable of recognizing and celebrating the wealth of its linguistic and cultural heritage. The opposition between the authoritarian nationalism of Francoism and the nationalism of the Catalans, Basques and Galicians, willing to lay claim to their difference, was evident. On studying the relationship between these two types of nationalism it is essential to bear in mind that, while the regime enjoyed the power and the resources necessary to impose its vision of Spain, the peripheral nationalisms were dismembered and condemned to secrecy. Indeed, after the Civil War, the majority of the most important representatives of the democratic political parties banned by the regime went into exile, or were imprisoned or executed. The relationship between the ‘victors’ and the ‘defeated’ left no room for dialogue. The authoritarian state designed by Franco did not accept difference, and had conferred on itself, by force, the power to decide on the status of the historical nations included within its territory. The regime’s aim was their complete annihilation as nations. Faced with a repression which pervaded all daily activities, most, although not all, Catalans responded with passive resistance. They had been defeated, their country had been destroyed and they now lived in precarious conditions. They had to confront the presence of an army which defended the dictatorship as well as an imported and imposed bureaucracy which only spoke and wanted to be addressed in Castilian. The same efforts that the ‘nationals’ made to suppress any differential aspect increased the distinction between ‘us’, the Catalans, and ‘them’, the Francoists (identified with Castilian culture and language, conservatism, centralism and conservative Catholicism), although not all Catalans were nationalist, democratic and anti-Franco, and not all Castilians were supporters of the Franco regime. The submission of Catalan society in the public sphere encouraged a ‘tacit agreement’ and fostered a specific feeling of solidarity among Catalans – sharing a situation of danger and collective oppression. Most Catalans, irrespective of their social class, regarded the Franco regime and its officials as a common enemy, not least because the mere fact of being ‘Catalan’ was sufficient to generate the suspicion and hostility of the regime’s

52 Catalan nationalism during Francoism agents. Only certain sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie received the Francoist victory with relief and showed their support for the new fascist ideology committed to protecting their economic interests. Catalan identity was preserved thanks to the dynamic and engaged action of a very small intellectual elite, but above all thanks to family circles within which Catalan was spoken and the most traditional and popular Catalan culture was maintained.

The different stages of early Francoism Three different stages can be distinguished between the end of the Civil War in 1939 and 1950. 1939–1944 The dictatorship was fully consolidated between 1939 to 1944. During that period, many Spaniards thought that the future of Franco’s authoritarian regime depended on the outcome of the Second World War. Most of the Spanish Army did not participate in this world conflict. Only the Blue Division, formed by volunteers, fought on the Axis’s side. Franco resisted Hitler’s pressure to full engagement in the Second World War, arguing that Spain had just experienced a devastating war and could not embark upon another one. Even so, Franco supported the fascists until their defeat seemed inevitable. From then on, Franco declared neutrality and adopted the tactic of rapprochement with the allied countries, especially the United States. In the early months of 1939 almost all Catalan Republican leaders were in exile, and it was precisely in exile where an intense debate about Catalonia’s future arose between those who maintained that it was still possible to recover the Republic and the 1932 Statute of Autonomy, and those who defended the independence of Catalonia from a position of radical nationalism. The former supported some form of Catalan autonomy within the Spanish state. In contrast, the latter revealed a strong anti-Spanish attitude and subscribed to the theory that nothing good can be expected from Spain, or from the Spanish, given that all possible forms of coexistence have been exhausted; the only valid political alternative for Catalonia is the struggle for independence.3 Joan Casanovas, from Unió Catalanista, or the Catalan Union, wrote that Catalonia will not want to risk its peace and well-being, honour and life any more due to inland problems that should not affect it. Catalonia will want to be an independent nation, master of its destiny and responsible for its own actions.4

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In February 1939, the institutions of the Generalitat went into exile. Ten months had passed since the abolition of the Statute of Autonomy and the suspension of the Generalitat, decreed by Franco on 5 April 1938. Once established in Paris, the President of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, no longer assembled his government.5 On 18 April 1940, Companys formed the Consell Nacional de Catalunya, or National Council of Catalonia, the action of which was almost non-existent due to the German invasion of France, which dispersed its members, many of whom found refuge in Britain and Latin America. A few months later, on 13 September 1940, the Gestapo arrested Companys and handed him over to the Spanish authorities. The President of the Generalitat was initially transferred to Madrid, where he was interrogated and tortured, and subsequently taken to Barcelona, where he was court-martialled. Sentenced to death, Lluís Companys was executed in Montjuïc castle on 15 October 1940. On 29 July 1940, on the initiative of the leader of ERC, Carles Pi i Sunyer, a new National Council of Catalonia was created in London, and was later extended to include representatives of the Catalans exiled in Latin America. The new National Council defended the continuity of the Republic and selfdetermination for Catalonia within a federal Spain. As political parties disintegrated in Spain as a result of the repression exercised by the new regime, the contacts and communication between the opposition groups inside Spain and those in exile became increasingly difficult. In the winter of 1939–1940, the FNC (Front Nacional de Catalunya, or National Front of Catalonia) was founded in Paris. Although its ideology was not very clearly defined, its main supporters sought to transform the FNC into an organization uniting all the Catalan anti-Franco organizations. The FNC was in favour of preserving Catalonia’s right to selfdetermination, and it supported the London National Council of Catalonia created by Pi i Sunyer. The FNC organized numerous resistance activities on both sides of the border. After the dissolution of the London National Council of Catalonia (1945), the FNC lost influence and decided to join the Consell Nacional de Democràcia Catalana, or National Council of Catalan Democracy.6 1945–1947 The victory of the allies in the Second World War was celebrated by the opponents of Francoism, who expected a rapid intervention by the allied forces to overthrow the dictatorship and to restore democracy in Spain. This idea led to the reorganization of the governments of the Republic and of the Generalitat in exile. All political parties increased their activity.7 In 1945, after a sector of ERC had opposed the initiative of Josep Irla, President of the Generalitat in exile, to reorganize the National Council of Catalonia, Carles Pi i Sunyer dissolved it. Josep Tarradellas, General Secretary of ERC, defended the creation of a new movement, Solidaritat Catalana, which would

54 Catalan nationalism during Francoism bring together all Catalan political and civil forces. The objective of this movement was to coordinate the anti-Franco struggle and to re-establish the institutions of the Republic. It moreover defended a political alternative overcoming the limitations imposed by the 1931 Constitution and the 1932 Statute of Autonomy.8 But the allied countries did not take any action to overthrow the Francoist dictatorship,9 with the exception of two United Nations resolutions. The first (12 December 1946) recommended withdrawing ambassadors from Spain, and the second (17 November 1947) denounced the Franco regime, arguing that it had been created with the collaboration of the Axis powers. The disappointment of the Catalan resistance emphasized the political discrepancies between the firm defenders of the re-establishment of the Republic – ERC and the PSUC – and those in favour of initiating a provisional period of reflection to discuss the future organization of the state and the status of Catalonia.10 1948–1950 The threat of a foreign intervention to restore democracy in Spain had evaporated and very soon Franco received economic support from the United States (1951) and signed the Concordat with the Vatican (1953). As I have already mentioned, Franco took advantage of the cold war to present his regime as an instrument against the expansion of communism, a strategy destined to attain a more favourable international attitude towards the dictatorship. On 4 November 1950, the United Nations revoked the 1946 resolution and from 1955 onwards Spain would be present in all the international institutions sponsored by the UN. These events led to a very important internal crisis among the anti-Franco opposition and forced it to consider new strategies. The government of the Generalitat was dissolved on 24 January 1948, although Josep Irla continued to hold the presidency until 1954, the year in which Josep Tarradellas was elected President of the Generalitat after a very controversial process.11 The first Tarradellas government would be constituted over twenty years later, within the framework of a new democratic Spain. The anti-Franco opposition failed in its attempt to overthrow the regime, not just because of the persistent and brutally repressive policies of the Francoist state and the passive and tolerant attitude towards the dictatorship adopted by Western countries, but also because of its own weaknesses and political mistakes.12 First, I argue that the opponents of the dictatorship were incapable of designing a unitary political alternative to Francoism. The personal and group rivalries, arising from attitudes and actions which did not always coincide, and the contradictions between the resistance in exile and inside Catalonia encouraged subjective and emotional behaviour, which made a common

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strategy impossible. Second, opposition forces were convinced that, after the Second World War, the allies would immediately intervene against the Francoists, and this led them to focus their strategy on what turned out to be a mistaken assumption. Third, the opposition was too insensitive to the moral and material situation of the working classes in Catalonia and elsewhere. Not only did triumphalist analyses of the end of Francoism predominate in most of the editorials of the clandestine press, but they also underestimated the nature of and the social support for the dictatorship. Finally, the opposition made a further mistake by ignoring the complexity of the regime, and by neglecting an urgent and deeper reflection on the situation created by Francoism and its specific characteristics. The combination of all these factors made it impossible to plan an effective policy of resistance.

The break with silence From 1959, with the awareness that the future of Francoism was guaranteed, a widening gap between large sectors of Catalan society and the regime emerged. Only those members of the bourgeoisie who had renounced their national identity to protect their status and defend their class interests were still satisfied.13 In this new stage, the homogenizing policies imposed by the dictatorship encountered the opposition of those who wanted to recover democracy and protect Catalan identity. As a threatened national minority, the Catalans devised several kinds of counter-strategies aimed at rejecting the uniformity dictated by the regime. In what follows, I examine armed struggle and cultural resistance as strategies employed to combat Francoism. In doing so, I advance an original typology, which embraces various types of actions aimed at strengthening the cultural resistance led by the Catalans during this period. Armed struggle did not take root among the anti-Franco opposition in Catalonia, which preferred using non-violent tactics. The only exception was the maquis, approximately 12,000 armed men who operated mainly in the Pyrenees.14 The actions of the maquis were not very well organized due to the absence of a prior agreement between the communist and anarchist political tendencies that they represented. The activities of the maquis intensified between 1944 and 1950. From then on, only isolated groups, and sometimes even guerrillas operating almost alone, carried out scattered actions around Catalonia. The last maquis to die in a direct confrontation with the forces of law and order were Josep Lluís Faceries (1957), ‘Quico’ Sabater (1960) and Ramon Vila ‘Caracremada’ (1963).15 Cultural resistance, that is, the use of all kinds of symbols of Catalan identity in both the public and the private sphere, evolved from the performance of isolated risky actions to the achievement of numerous activities enlisting mass support. Displaying the Catalan flag or writing graffiti in Catalan were actions aimed at questioning the regime. These actions symbolically broke the control of the public sphere wielded by the ‘others’ and confirmed the

56 Catalan nationalism during Francoism existence of opposition to the Francoist image of Spain. In the private sphere, resistance took place within family circles and among friends.16 Within the public sphere, four types of opposition actions can be distinguished, some of which became more consolidated over time, while others were only feasible in the later stages of Francoism. I shall distinguish between symbolic, interference, elite and solidarity actions. 1 By symbolic action, I refer to a single, normally isolated action executed by a small group or even a single person. The main objective of a symbolic action is to break the regime’s control of the public space. This category includes, among others, painting graffiti, displaying flags and, in the Catalan context, floral tributes where once stood monuments dedicated to illustrious or heroic Catalans that the regime had demolished. In Catalonia, symbolic actions were normally conducted in the street and in other public spaces, and were aimed at all possible witnesses who might be present. 2 By interference actions, I refer to isolated actions performed by small groups during public events organized by the regime. The aim of these actions was to challenge the regime at its core by disturbing the rituals and ceremonies that were precisely intended to demonstrate that homogeneity and control had been successfully imposed. Interference actions involved a high degree of risk, as in these cases considerable security measures were taken to prevent any kind of disturbance. Interference actions were aimed at those attending the public event, but also sought to attract the attention of external observers, such as the international press or foreign representatives, informing them of the situation suffered by Catalonia, and by Spain in general. There are numerous examples of interference actions on the long path which finally led the country to democracy in 1978.17 The most noteworthy is perhaps the one performed in 1960, during a visit by Franco to Barcelona. On this occasion, and to commemorate the centenary of the Catalan poet Joan Maragall, a concert was organized in the Palau de la Música Catalana. Franco did not attend, but four members of his cabinet were present. The programme included El cant de la senyera, with lyrics by Joan Maragall, which has nationalist connotations. It was removed from the programme at the last minute, but almost two hundred Catalan nationalists, above all members of the Academy of Catalan Language and of the parapolitical group Crist Catalunya (CC), demanded its performance and, in the end, sang it themselves.18 3 I define elite actions as actions executed by a small, but fervent, group of intellectuals. In Catalonia, the objective of these actions was to cultivate Catalan language and culture. The activities of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans, or Institute of Catalan Studies, dismantled in 1939 and reorganized by Josep Puig i Cadafalch and Ramon Aramon i Serra in 1942, belong to this category of action. The Institute was concerned with publishing books and

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articles on medicine, science and other subjects in Catalan. In 1942 the Institute resumed its teaching activity, limited to linguistics and the history of Catalan literature, rendered possible due to the financial support of Fèlix Millet i Maristany, former FJCC (Federació de Joves Cristians de Catalunya) member who led the patronage group Benèfica Minerva, which disappeared with the creation of Òmnium Cultural. Another example of elite actions were indeed the activities of Òmnium Cultural, an institution created in 1961 and legally recognized in 1967. The teaching of Catalan to small groups and the sponsorship of the Premi d’Honor de les Lletres Catalanes, were some of its most distinguished actions.19 In the last stages of the dictatorship, Òmnium Cultural experienced a dramatic increase in membership, rising from 639 members in 1968 to 11,000 in 1971. The first book legally published in Catalan since the Civil War came out in 1942. It was a religious publication produced under the auspices of the Catholic church. Between 1939 and 1946, publishing in Catalan was a very risky and difficult activity, which required the use of ingenious strategies to avoid persecution and imprisonment. For example, changing the date and place of publication, limiting the number of pages as, according to the law, if a book had fewer than thirty-two pages, it was only censored by the local delegation, without having to send it to Madrid, or publishing completely clandestine books, such as those of Edicions de la Sirena (1943–1946) and Edicions de la Negra Nit (1945).20 The organization of clandestine cultural groups, such as Amics de la Poesia, Estudi and Miramar, and literary competitions, such as the literary festival of the Nit de Santa Llúcia and the Cantonigròs Awards, were among the most important elite actions. The first clandestine Catalan classes go back to 1944, and involved only three or four people at a time. Later on, these activities received support from various cultural and religious institutions. The number of Catalan courses and students increased considerably in the 1960s, but Castilian continued to be ‘the language of the Empire’, the language of authority and power, which had to be used in public. Catalan, restricted to domestic life and almost clandestine circles, was the language of freedom and resistance. As Joan Triadú indicated, choosing Catalan instead of Castilian meant going underground and rejecting the possibility of personal promotion.21 The effect of the omnipresent and constant cultural repression imposed on all signs and symbols of Catalan identity favoured an increasing separation between an elitist Catalan high culture, of restricted access, and a weakened popular Catalan culture. The authoritarian state’s monopoly of the press, radio, television and the film industry accelerated the disintegration of a Catalan culture predominantly produced and consumed by the elites. To illustrate the magnitude and nature of elite actions, I offer a separate study of the actions led by two highly influential elite institutions, the Catholic church and the university.

58 Catalan nationalism during Francoism The Catholic church The position adopted by the Catalan Catholic church in relation to the regime was not homogeneous. Although some ecclesiastic sectors supported it fully, others were critical, to different degrees, of the Francoist ideology and methods. The latter sectors defended the long-standing role played by the church in the development and promotion of Catalan culture and language over the centuries. The cultural activities of monasteries such as Montserrat, Poblet and Cuixà illustrate this. In addition, the work of bishop Josep Torras i Bages had established an intrinsic link between Catholicism and Catalan identity captured in the idea that ‘Catalonia will be Christian or will not exist’.22 On studying the Catalan church during the Civil War it is important to mention the sector led by Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, bishop of Tarragona, which positioned itself within the Republican legality, by deciding to defend Catalan culture. Vidal i Barraquer did not sign the collective letter from the Spanish bishops (Barcelona, 1937) in favour of the Alzamiento Nacional. Among those who adopted a position of neutrality in relation to the armed conflict were the theologian Joan Baptista Manyà, Carles Cardó, author of Les dues tradicions (1943), and Josep Armengou, author of Justificació de Catalunya (1958). Other people more committed to the Republican Generalitat were the Jesuit Joan Vilar i Costa and Josep Maria Tarragó i Ballús, founder of the Unió de Treballadors Cristians de Catalunya, or Union of Christian Workers of Catalonia. Among those who evolved towards pro-Spanish, right-wing and fascist positions, Jordi Casassas mentions Llorenç Riber i Campins, Enric Pla i Deniel, Isidre Gomà i Tomàs and Joan Tusquets.23 For its part, and deliberately disregarding the socio-religious situation in Catalonia, the regime sought to place people it could fully trust at the top of the ecclesiastic hierarchy of the country. Two main factors contributed to the emergence of a rift between some sectors of the Catalan church and the official defenders of the regime. First, some Catalan prelates and laypeople rejected a version of Catholicism imposed from the outside and which offered a much more conservative outlook than that existing in Catalonia prior to the Civil War. The increasing influence of French progressive Catholicism and the dissemination of the works of Emmanuel Mounier, Charles Péguy, Jacques Maritain, Georges Bernanos, Gilbert K. Chesterton and Henri de Lubac, among others, advanced a renewed image of Christianity, opposed to the conservative version promoted by the Franco regime.24 Second, some Catalan Catholics could not accept the regime’s flagrant rejection of everything which had a Catalan origin. The extreme conservatism and the visceral rejection of Catalan language and culture incited some sectors of the Catalan church to voice a critical attitude towards a regime that defined itself as Catholic and that presented its leader as Caudillo por la gracia de Dios (Caudillo by the grace of God).

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The Catalan church played a remarkable role in preserving Catalan, not just through its use in sermons and religious education, but also as an instrument of culture and communication. The abbey of Montserrat contributed to the cultivation of Catalan through publications such as l’Infantil, Serra d’Or and Qüestions de vida cristiana, and through its patronage of both religious and non-religious books. In 1958, a group of Catholics concerned with debates about the future of the church in modern societies, the need to overcome national Catholicism and the role of laypeople within the church, founded Editorial Estela (Estela Press) with the aim of promoting religious books written in Catalan.25 The publishing house Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat (PAM) was officially created in 1971.26 Starting from its fourth issue, the journal Qüestions de vida cristiana was published by Editorial Estela, which favoured contact between the Benedictine monks of Montserrat and the publishing team, mainly personified in Jaume Lorés, one of the most outstanding Catholic thinkers of the time. In the late 1940s, Catalan progressive Catholicism split into two sectors, those granting priority to the social question and those that placed the national recovery of Catalonia in the foreground. Thus, the former established Catholic associations, such as the HOAC, Joventut Obrera Catòlica ( JOC) and Acció Catòlica, with the aim of improving the living conditions of the working class, while simultaneously challenging the hegemony of the regime’s vertical unions. The activities of the Institut Catòlic d’Estudis Socials de Barcelona, or Catholic Institute of Social Studies of Barcelona, and of the magazine El Ciervo were at the forefront of social Catholicism.27 The latter sector of the Catalan church led numerous and varied activities aimed at protecting Catalan language and culture. The most active associations included the Congregacions Marianes, the Virtèlia School and its Confraria de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat, Franciscàlia and the Torras i Bages group. Faith, culture, Catalan nationalism and modernity were the main guiding principles of the Study Section of the Lliga Espiritual de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat (1959), which would later give rise to the Centre d’Estudis Francesc Eiximenis. From the 1950s onwards, the Scout movement, created in the image of the movement founded in England by Robert Baden-Powell, enjoyed the protection of the church. In Catalonia, the Scout movement acquired considerable nationalist connotations, arising from its emphasis on patriotism and love for the country, thus promoting meetings and trips to the countryside which were used as a cover for parapolitical activities of opposition to Francoism.28 The OJE (Organización de Juventudes Españolas, or Spanish Youth Organization), created by the regime, stood in opposition to the Scout movement. A group of Catholic nationalists assembled around the CC movement, established in 1954 after a meeting of young leaders of religious associations from the city of Barcelona convened by the Abbot of Montserrat,

60 Catalan nationalism during Francoism Aureli Maria Escarré.29 In its founding text, written by Raimon Galí, the CC denounced the defeat of the Catalan people by the ‘nationals’ and described Catalonia as a destroyed country, a country that had lost its bearings and that could only begin its reconstruction by reflecting on the reasons for its defeat.30 According to Jordi Pujol, who was one of the early leaders of CC and who would be elected as president of Catalonia in 1980, intellectualism, culturalism and a lack of solidarity were the main negative factors in Catalonia before the Civil War.31 Xavier Muñoz, leader of CC from 1956 to 1961, stressed CC’s desire to distance itself from Francoism by denouncing the regime’s misappropriation of the Catholic doctrine. In so doing, CC sought to separate religion from Francoism, thus stripping the regime of its moral legitimacy.32 The university In the first decade of the Franco regime, the official organization of student life revolved around the SEU (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitario, or University Students’ Union) under the control of pro-regime individuals. The SEU existed until the 1960s, when it was pushed out by the action of the anti-Franco university movement, which culminated in the creation of the SDEUB (Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona, or Democratic Students’ Union of the University of Barcelona) in 1966. The FUC (Front Universitari de Catalunya, or University Front of Catalonia) was founded in November 1944 in Montserrat, bringing together students from different tendencies and origins who shared a commitment to the defence of Catalonia and the struggle against fascism. In its first congress, after analysing Catalan politics prior to the Civil War, the FUC expressed the need to reconstruct Catalonia politically: ‘Without a national mystique it is not possible to redress a people. National mystique, apart from a religious ideal, is the only element capable of awakening the people’s will.’33 Their conviction, as well as what they regarded as their responsibility to rebuild the nation, are spelled out in the following paragraph: His [Enric Prat de la Riba’s] life tells us that students must be interested in politics, but that politics is not about shouting and demonstrating; Catalan politics is about building. And to build we are the ones with the best means at hand to become leaders prepared to guide the Catalan motherland. All those of us who love Catalonia should receive political training.34 The social policy of the FUC was dominated by the cross-class approaches stemming from the Catholic church’s social doctrine. The FUC wished to unite the so-called Països Catalans politically. The essentialist vision of the FUC led it to state: ‘We consider any backing down and renunciation in the struggle for a greater Catalonia to contradict the will of God and to be an act of betrayal to the land.’35 The actions of the Generalitat in exile received

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the support of the FUC until after 1947, when the Front almost completely disappeared. The university branch of the FNC had a more political character and concentrated on what I have labelled ‘symbolic actions’. It should be highlighted that the FNC collaborated with the French resistance during the Second World War. In 1946, the FNEC (Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya, or National Federation of Students of Catalonia) led an attempt to unite efforts in order to openly confront the SEU and the Falangists. The FNEC’s main objective was to create a Catalan university within a free Catalonia enjoying the right to self-determination. The activities of the FNEC were mainly aimed at the Catalanization and democratization of the university. In the mid-1950s, the anti-Franco university movement regained momentum and became a problem for the regime. The University of Madrid was closed for the first time in February 1956, and the University of Barcelona in November of the same year, as a reaction prompted by the vociferous student protest against events in Hungary. Solidaritat Universitària (1955– 1956), which later would give rise to a union of socialist groups, advanced the first alternative curriculum to the Francoist university. The new university would have to be autonomous, Catalan and democratic. The NEU ( Nova Esquerra Universitària, or New University Left) was one of the numerous associations founded at the end of the 1950s, a period during which the FNEC experienced a process of revitalization. The Comité de Coordinació Universitària, or University Coordination Committee (1958–1959), a unifying body with representatives from the PSUC, NEU, MSC (Moviment Socialista de Catalunya) and sometimes the CC, granted priority to social issues above national ones. University groups were involved in numerous solidarity actions which became decisive in arousing the social and political passion, which, in the 1970s, favoured the transition to democracy and the return to a party system in Spain. Between 1960 and 1961, the university opposition movement promoted three elite actions which achieved massive public support: the campaign in favour of the creation of chairs of Catalan language and culture within the university; the campaign against the increasing influence of Opus Dei; and the demand for amnesty for political prisoners and exiles. At this point, I would like to examine two specific examples of elite actions, the former organized within the university sphere and known as the Caputxinada, and the latter led by a group of priests. Both actions took place in Barcelona in the mid-1960s, when the decline of the regime was beginning to be felt and the opposition was becoming stronger. In February 1965, a group of approximately 400 students and intellectuals gathered in the monastery of the Caputxins de Sarrià to create the SDEUB. They demanded freedom of expression, of association and of research, and defended the cultural and linguistic pluralism of Spain, which they defined as a multinational society. A few hours after the meeting began, the police besieged

62 Catalan nationalism during Francoism the venue, but did not enter, respecting the immunity of religious buildings granted by the state to the church. The police maintained the siege for three days. The Caputxinada led to the spontaneous condemnation of the regime by various sectors of Catalan society and immediate solidarity among various anti-Franco circles. The ‘demonstration of the priests’ on 11 May 1966 in Barcelona was another example of an elite action. On this occasion, 130 priests were involved in a peaceful and silent march to the police headquarters on Via Laietana (a centrally located Barcelona boulevard), where they sought to deliver a letter of protest against torture inflicted upon the student Joaquim Boix. But, to the amazement of passers-by, the forces of law and order violently dispersed and pursued the priests, causing commotion because, in general, the clergy was considered to be one of the pillars of the regime. This action led to the immediate repression of the most progressive sectors of the church. From then on the reaction of the Catholic hierarchy faithful to the regime undermined the strength of the Christian progressive movement in Catalonia. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the influence of the 1968 student uprisings in France and the ‘Prague Spring’ favoured the proliferation of radical organizations within the university. The nationalist groups, however, disappeared from the university arena, which at that time perceived nationalist demands as bourgeois. It was not until after Franco’s death (1975) that nationalist groups re-emerged within the university. 4 The final stages of the regime witnessed an increase in the number of what I have called ‘solidarity actions’. By solidarity action I mean an action that is usually instilled by a small elite but whose aim is to attain mass mobilization. The objective of a ‘solidarity action’ is to show the opposition’s strength by focusing upon a particular demand and presenting it as undeniable given the massive support it receives. I identify a basic difference in relation to the context in which solidarity actions, symbolic actions and interference actions are executed. While the last two intend to break the regime’s control of the public space at a time characterized by a high degree of repression, solidarity actions are only feasible in an environment marked by a relative attenuation of the oppressive nature of the regime. Solidarity actions are primarily aimed at the regime’s officials, who have no alternative but to recognize the power of those who are ‘different’, but they are also intended to attract the attention of the media and foreign observers. As an example, I shall mention just two of the frequent solidarity actions that proliferated in the last few years of the regime. These are the so-called ‘Galinsoga affair’ and the demonstration of 11 September 1977 in Barcelona, two years after Franco’s death. On 21 June 1959, Luis Martínez de Galinsoga, Chief Editor of La Vanguardia, the main newspaper published in Catalonia,

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and a well-known anti-Catalan, attended mass in the Barcelona parish of Sant Ildefons. When the sermon began, Galinsoga addressed the sacristy to protest because the mass was in Catalan. Galinsoga left the parish church muttering that todos los catalanes son una mierda (all Catalans are shits). This incident spread within Barcelona and, at the end of November 1959, a group of people decided to launch a campaign against Galinsoga. They organized public sessions tearing up copies of La Vanguardia and circulated leaflets demanding that people stop buying the newspaper. They also wrote to the newspaper’s advertisers, asking them to withdraw their publicity. The end of the campaign consisted of breaking the windows of the La Vanguardia building and of ripping up copies of the newspaper at the Barcelona football club stadium after Sunday’s match. In this solidarity action, a small group succeeded in mobilizing a broad section of the population in defence of a specific demand: the resignation of Galinsoga. He was finally removed from office in February 1960. A few days later a leaflet entitled ‘Victory for Catalonia’ was circulated. It declared: Above all this campaign has been of great value: it has shown to everyone, natives and foreigners, that Catalonia is alive, that Catalonia is standing up again, that Catalonia is conscious again, that Catalonia will once again be a strong country.36 In the 11 September 1977 demonstration, a million people gathered to demand a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. Franco was already dead and the political reform proposed by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister of Spain, had been ratified by an overwhelming majority. Even so, the status that Catalonia would achieve within the new democratic Spain had yet to be decided. The Catalans, through this display of strength, manifested their outright rejection of a simple administrative decentralization of the state and demanded political autonomy. Cultural resistance in the private arena was exercised, above all, by the middle classes and some sectors of the bourgeoisie critical of Francoism. Among the working class and the rural population, maintaining the Catalan language and culture was not the result of a systematic resistance strategy, as was the case among the middle class. Most of the working class, rural and urban, did not have access to the clandestine circulation of Catalan literature, news about the creation of Catalan literary awards and the more or less clandestine teaching of Catalan. They spoke in Catalan because they always had done, it was the language they had learned from their parents and at school and it was normal to use it in everyday life. Catalan was employed to express their most intimate emotions and feelings. Castilian was compulsory at work, at school and in dealing with state agencies. All official documents had to be written in Castilian as it was the dominant language in public life; Catalan was limited to the private sphere. Thus, when Catalans repeated the words

64 Catalan nationalism during Francoism of the ‘others’, they always used Castilian, the language of the ‘outsider’, the language of power. In any case, no-one is capable of completely controlling the thoughts of others. Languages are not given naturally and are not eternal, but they can be perceived as such because a language not only transcends the life of individuals in space and in time, but also gives them the opportunity to define themselves, to relate to each other, to express their feelings and to distinguish themselves from others and from nature. The main questions concerning identity are: Who am I? Who are we? But, without a language, it is not possible to answer them. Identity speaks in a specific language for each individual; language generates a feeling of integration, a feeling of community among all its speakers and becomes a symbol of ‘belonging’ to a specific group, generating the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Language allows the past to be recorded and shared memories to be evoked, and it is an instrument of social reproduction. The immediate identification and categorization of people according to the subtlest differences in how they speak a particular language – as members of a social class, a specific region or even a people – is an example of the close connection established between identity and language, and the complex mechanisms employed when we endeavour to identify the ‘other’. In Catalonia, language is the distinguishing and most important element of Catalan identity; hence the obsession of the Franco regime, and many others before it, to reduce the Catalan language to a philological curiosity without any social use. The weakening of Catalan would irremediably mark the disappearance of the most original (and irreplaceable, once lost) feature of Catalan identity. To understand this reasoning, I would like to stress the great relevance that Spanish institutions confer upon the promotion of Castilian, both inside and outside the state boundaries. It would be almost unthinkable to conceive of a Spain in which Castilian was not spoken and cultivated, just as it would be for a large number of Catalans to imagine a Catalonia in which Catalan, their own language, was not spoken. Even so, language is not an essential factor of national identity, as illustrated, for example, by the persistence of Scottish identity, despite the loss of Gaelic. Demands for the restoration of the Catalan language regained momentum with the Nova Cançó (New Folk Song), a movement that emerged in the 1960s. According to Salvador Giner,37 the Nova Cançó was able to encapsulate the confrontation between different generations. It also embodied ideas stemming from the Western pacifist and ‘protest’ movements, anti-fascism, the resurgence of nationalism and pan-Catalanism. The Nova Cançó was originally founded by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singers and soon developed into an entirely popular phenomenon. ‘Protest songs’ and classical or modern poetry turned into lyrics enjoyed an extraordinary success in all social segments of the Catalan-speaking territories. The more Catalan singers were banned from the media and their concerts prohibited, the more popular they became. As Joan Triadú wrote,

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the Nova Cançó represented the arrival of youth and the conversion to Catalan, in public, of waves of dispersed youth, originating from the most decatalanized nursery due to the neutral years of Francoism [. . .] the Nova Cançó rehabilitated a culture.38

The great conspiracy39 Nationalism is based upon a political discourse capable of embracing different political ideologies. It has been appropriated by Marxism, liberalism, conservatism and right-wing and fascist ideologies, among others. One should conclude that nationalism is insufficient as a programme for political action since the ideology to which nationalism is linked decides how the nation will be constructed, and what social, political and economic policies will be pursued in its name. In a stateless nation subordinated to a state engaged in a firm homogenizing process which disregards national minorities, a certain degree of cooperation and of solidarity among opposition forces generally emerges. The Assembly of Catalonia, founded in 1971, exemplifies the capacity of Catalan nationalism to overcome, at a given moment, its internal ideological divisions.40 Although the Franco regime underwent various modifications throughout its existence, for example changes to the laws regulating the restrictions applied to the publication of books in Catalan (from some 450 a year from 1970 to 1972, to 513 in 1973 and 611 in 197541), the Catalan language was not officially accepted as an optional subject in public schools until May 1975. As for the radio, Catalan stations, unable to compete with the monopoly of Radio Nacional de España, had to restrict the use of Catalan to folkloric programmes. From 1974 to 1975, television broadcasting in Catalan was limited to two hours per week. In addition, up to the end of Francoism, newspapers published in Catalonia were solely written in Castilian. The new Press and Printing Law came into force in March 1966. Prepared by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, then Minister of Information and Tourism, it represented a timid attempt to liberalize the regime. This law replaced the previous, compulsory censorship by a ‘voluntary consultation’ with the authorities and allowed press editors to be appointed freely. This pseudo-liberalization process was paralysed by the state of emergency declared on 24 January 1969 under the pretext of combating ‘the student subversion’ – ‘the orgy of nihilism, of anarchism and of disobedience’ – that prevailed in universities. This triggered a new wave of indiscriminate repression against the opposition.42 The creation of the Taula Rodona, or Round Table, in 1966 stood as the first serious attempt to organize a united action of opposition to the regime. It was in this context that the Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya, or Political Forces of Catalonia Coordinating Commission, was set up in 1969, formed by the PSUC, UDC, ERC and MSC. In the same year, the regime intensified its repressive activities with the appointment of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister.

66 Catalan nationalism during Francoism In 1970 the toughening of the regime was illustrated by the persecution of Basque nationalism, which culminated in the court-martial held in Burgos of sixteen ETA members, six of whom were sentenced to death. In Catalonia, the opposition called for the mobilization of the citizens and about 300 intellectuals locked themselves in the monastery of Montserrat for three days (from 12 to 14 December 1970) to protest against these sentences. The ‘sit-in’ led to the constitution of the Assemblea Permanent d’Intel.lectuals, or Permanent Assembly of Intellectuals, which drafted a manifesto against the regime that had international echoes. This undoubtedly influenced Franco’s decision to commute the death sentences dictated against the six ETA members convicted in Burgos. On 7 November 1971 about 300 people, representing different political, social and professional sectors of Catalonia, founded the Assembly of Catalonia, a clandestine organization which soon became the broadest and most important unitary Catalan movement since the Civil War. No similar unitary movement, in view of its scope and its relevance, was created in any other part of Spain. According to Josep Benet, a member of the Assembly, ‘without the mobilizing power of the Assembly and its prestige, the Suárez government and even some Spanish democrats would hardly have taken the Catalan national demands into account’.43 The Assembly, initially founded by the socialists and, in particular, the communists, received the economic support of the group led by Jordi Pujol which subsequently joined it.44 The MSC and the PSUC won over the support of significant sectors of the working class and of a high number of Castilian-speaking immigrants. They all voiced the need to bring together democracy, left-wing policies and autonomy for Catalonia. The main aims shared by the Assembly members were: ‘achieving a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles’, ‘the upholding of the fundamental democratic rights: freedom of assembly, of speech and of association – including trade unions, of demonstration and the right to strike, which guarantee the effective access of the people to economic and political power’, ‘the provisional re-establishment of the institutions and of the principles embodied in the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, as a clear expression of the right to self-determination’, and ‘the coordination of all peninsular peoples in fighting for democracy’.45 Its motto was: ‘Freedom, Amnesty and Statute of Autonomy’. The Assembly worked tirelessly to circulate these demands, in particular among immigrants. Two campaigns were organized in 1972 and 1973 which obtained strong popular support: ‘Why the 1932 Statute?’ and ‘In Catalan, everywhere and all levels’. Various bodies, cultural and religious groups, as well as leading figures from Catalan society, gradually joined this movement. The mobilizing action of the Assembly continued until the first democratic parliamentary election held on 15 June 1977. From then on, the recently legalized political parties became the new political actors. The unity of the opposition did not last long and was replaced by competition between

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the ‘images’that the Catalans had of their country and of the status that Catalonia should have within Spain, depending on their loyalties and on the political interests of the different parties.

Immigrants From the 1950s and up to 1975, Catalonia experienced a dramatic increase in its population. In 1950, the population of Catalonia was 3,240,313 and in 1975 it had risen to 5,663,125.46 Such a spectacular increase was largely due to the arrival of 1,400,000 immigrants from other parts of Spain. The high percentage of immigrant population and the complete absence of Catalan institutions with the political and financial means to respond to this phenomenon transformed immigration into a serious threat for the survival of Catalan identity. The immigrants were mainly young Castilianspeaking people, generally not very well educated, from different areas of Spain and ignorant of the national, cultural and linguistic diversity of a Spain presented by the regime as homogeneous. Most of these immigrants joined the unskilled industrial workforce concentrated in the industrial belt around Barcelona.47 By holding more than one job and by working long hours, most immigrants achieved a higher standard of living than the one that they had in their place of origin. Thus, in 1967, in the province of Barcelona the per capita income was 62,615 pesetas a year, while in Seville, the richest part of Andalusia, the income was 33,841 pesetas and in Jaén it was less than 23,000.48 In the 1960s, immigration and its impact on Catalan identity gave rise to a lively intellectual and political debate exemplified in the book Els altres catalans (1964), in which Francesc Candel i Tortajada denounced the precarious living conditions endured by immigrants. Four main positions concerning immigration can be identified. The first was represented by Jordi Pujol, the author of Immigració i integració (1958), for whom ‘anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be Catalan is a Catalan’.49 This definition focused on social identity and not on ethnicity. Being Catalan was thus a question of choice, a free decision. Pujol recognized the difficult conditions in which immigrants lived and defended their integration in a Catalan society which, in his opinion, should not change its historical identity. For Pujol, immigrants have rights, but they also have the duty to respect and accept the identity of the community that receives them. The second position was spelled out in the booklet by Manuel Cruells, Els no catalans i nosaltres (1965), in which Cruells stressed the progressive distance between the two communities, the Catalan community and that of immigrant origin. In so doing, he revealed the resistance to, and the rejection of, the Catalan language and culture by Castilian-speaking people.

68 Catalan nationalism during Francoism The third position was represented by a left-wing approach, situated between social Catholicism and Marxism. According to this view, theories of assimilation and integration of immigrants should be rejected. Some authors identified Catalan nationalism with the bourgeoisie, and neglected the strong anti-Franco and democratic component of Catalan nationalism. This position conferred absolute priority to class struggle and relegated the national question to the background.50 A fourth, also left-wing, position was defended by the PSUC, which demanded the right of Catalonia to self-determination and the recognition of Catalan as an official language. As Fernando Claudín said at the I PSUC Congress: ‘The non-Catalan comrades who have a role of responsibility in the PSUC should strive to understand and speak Catalan. This would help them to merge more closely with the Catalan people.’51 By defending Catalan as the language of all the citizens of Catalonia, cutting across class boundaries, and stressing that freedom for Catalonia as a nation could not be dissociated from social demands, the PSUC succeeded in raising the awareness of large sectors of the immigrant population. In so doing, the PSUC made a crucial contribution to Catalonia’s social cohesion. As Katherine Woolard points out, in Catalonia language is a key symbol of identity. Speaking in Catalan is a sign of assimilation and at the same time is associated with incorporation into a network of Catalan friendships. Acceptance of the language is connected with recognition of some cultural traits, such as hard work and personal commitment, which the Catalans appreciate and describe as one of their defining features.52 For his part, the American sociologist Hans Johnston maintains that immigration in Catalonia was favoured by Catalan industrialization, rather than by a Spanish industry organized by the state according to an internal colonial model. In his view, this placed the control of economic resources in the hands of Catalan people, a fact which contributed to increasing the value of Catalan culture in the eyes of the immigrants. Johnston also indicates that the main workers’ organizations supported nationalist demands during the anti-Franco mobilization. Although Johnston is correct in pointing at the Catalan bourgeoisie’s control of industry within Catalonia, in my view he is wrong to assume that, as a result of this, Catalan culture acquired greater prestige among most immigrants. Johnston not only describes an exaggerated level of integration of immigrants, but also idealizes their attitude towards Catalan language and culture. Johnston argues that ‘most observers attribute the high status granted to the Catalan language to the higher economic status of the native population’.53 The following three objections can, however, be made to Johnston’s theory. First, Johnston completely ignores the importance acquired in Catalonia by a very significant and relatively powerful segment of Castilian-speaking immigrants acting as the regime’s representatives. This group occupied key positions in the administration, the Army and the church, and formed

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a closed elite only accessed by some members of the pro-Franco Catalan bourgeoisie. During the dictatorship, a Castilian-speaking bureaucracy administered Catalonia and I argue that this provides a potent argument capable of questioning the prestigious status that Johnston attributes to Catalan, unless he is referring to the last years of Francoism and the beginning of the transition to democracy. Catalan only began to enjoy a relevant status, capable of overcoming the confinement to which it had been condemned, in the 1970s. Second, Johnston’s assessment of the main workers’ organizations’ support for nationalist demands during the anti-Franco mobilization could lead us to some mistaken conclusions, both in relation to the analysis presented and to the conclusions that he draws from it. In a context of repression, in which the political parties and the unions acted in secrecy and were constantly controlled by the regime, there were very few militants. Indeed, the strength of these organizations would only become clear in the 1970s, when they achieved mass following. Johnston’s analysis does not establish any distinction between the changing contexts of Catalan society during the different stages of Francoism and the influence of the regime on the various attitudes adopted by immigrants towards accepting Catalan identity. His version corresponds to the years of the Assembly of Catalonia and to the process that culminated in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, but cannot be accepted as an accurate description of the attitude of immigrants towards Catalan culture over the Francoist period. Third, any study of the immigration received by Catalonia during Francoism cannot ignore the negative attitude adopted by some sectors of the immigrant population who identified with Francoism, accepted the idea of a centralized Spain and only spoke, or wanted to speak, in Castilian. The Franco regime favoured Castilian-speaking immigration in Catalonia as a further strategy aimed at eradicating Catalan identity, although most immigrants were probably not aware of this. In addition, a distinction should be made between an initial wave of immigration, which favoured Civil War veterans who had fought on Franco’s side, and the immigration of the 1960s and 1970s, which included people from a younger generation. As established by a weighty literature which describes and analyses Francoism, during the years of the regime and in particular in its early stages, all signs and symbols of Catalan identity were banned, and the Catalans were subject to contemptuous comments concerning their language and their status. This favoured the emergence of feelings of superiority among some sectors of immigrants, fully identified with the single culture and language imposed by the regime. This attitude was widespread in the administration and in the Army, although not restricted to those spheres, and it only began to change under the pressure of the anti-Franco opposition once the process for political reform had been initiated in 1976.

4

Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

The transition to democracy can be regarded as an attempt by the Francoist political class to adjust its institutions to the requirements of modern society. In the 1970s, a growing dislocation between the social and the political sphere turned into a source of great concern for a regime forced to confront the numerous problems affecting Spanish society. Francoism, in spite of various attempts to adapt itself to a changing domestic and international environment, remained ill-suited to rule a country experiencing continuous and deep transformations of far-reaching consequences – a country which had evolved from a rural into an industrial society and whose wealthier and more industrialized areas were Catalonia and the Basque Country. The dramatic demographic revolution of the 1960s included substantial internal migrations which led to accelerated growth in urban areas. A new middle class and some sectors of the bourgeoisie, which had initially supported the regime, were now pressing for reform. Faced with an economy characterized by a predominantly isolationist orientation, these new sectors saw the importance of widening Spain’s outlook; in particular, they called for Spain to be integrated within the European Union (then the European Community). In 1975, with a million people unemployed and an inflation rate of 30 per cent, the deficiencies of Francoism and the need for change were evident.1 Illiteracy had decreased considerably, from the 50 per cent recorded in 1931 to 10.98 per cent for women and 10.44 per cent for men, in the late stages of Francoism.2 Moreover, Catholicism, which had been the main legitimizing force of the Franco regime, entered an unprecedented crisis, while witnessing the emergence of a new secular society. All these changes should be considered in the context of a new international political scenario, within which Spain could only be fully accepted if it joined the Western democracies and, in order to do so, it was essential to create a new political system capable of changing the imposed image of a homogeneous, conservative Spain ruled by a totalitarian regime. It was urgent to replace the Spanish archetype created by national Catholicism. The forced isolation endured by Spanish society since the Civil War had gradually diminished. The impact of the new technologies, communications and industrialization made it impossible

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to silence the increasingly numerous voices calling for democratic reform. New values and lifestyles emerged that questioned obsolete political and social structures. The convergence of these factors stood as a sign of the growing disillusionment of many sectors of society with Francoism and this, in turn, generated a crisis of authority. It was difficult for the regime to silence and confront the democratic demands of trade unions and political parties that were still illegal. Change became inevitable. Breakdown or reform were the two options faced by Spanish people on the death of Franco in 1975. The political elite opted for reform but, as José Luis Cebrián indicates, the outcome implied a democratic break with the past.3 While initially remaining faithful to Francoist legislation, the regime committed historical suicide on opening up the path to democracy. The breakdown of the system was induced from the top, and this created a peculiar situation: while the dictatorship disappeared with the death of the dictator, the public administration and the state institutions remained intact. In this respect, Jordi Solé Tura maintains that the transition to democracy was possible due to a combination of three factors:4 (1) the institutional stability deriving from the important role played by King Juan Carlos I in supporting political change; (2) the attitude of dialogue adopted by the various political parties committed to reaching a consensus on key issues crucial to a successful transition to democracy – a reaction which followed the overwhelming support given by Spaniards to the 1976 political reform project and the first democratic election in 1977; and (3) the active mobilization of broad sectors of the population in favour of the democratization of Spain, in contrast to the circumspect attitude adopted by the church and the Army. This process broke with the Francoist legacy expressed in the famous phrase todo está atado y bien atado (there are no loose ends). Probably the most dangerous legacy of Francoism was the need for a democratic response to the demands of the historical nations, which had endured years of repression topped by repeated attempts at their annihilation. It was necessary to overcome the reservations of conservative centralist politicians committed to the defence of a united and homogeneous image of Spain. We only need to recall the words of José Ortega y Gasset, ‘Spain is a thing built by Castile’ and ‘Castile built Spain and Castile broke it up’, on interpreting Medieval history. From this perspective, Spain was portrayed as the result of a process of incorporation imposed by Castile on the periphery because Castile ‘knew how to command’. Another author from the same generation, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, wrote, ‘Castile built Spain and Spain broke Castile up’, and Ramón Menéndez Pidal considered the periphery (that is, what was opposed to the central state) to be ‘dispersive and the product of decadence’.5 As Javier Tusell points out, these approaches can be found at the origin of the intellectual tradition of Spanish liberalism and contrast with a plural vision of Spanish reality and culture.6 After almost forty years of confrontation and resentment between the ‘victors’ and the ‘vanquished’ of the Civil War, the transition to democracy

72 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain required what the left and some progressive Catholic groups referred to as ‘national reconciliation’. It was imperative to replace the ‘culture of resistance’ by a ‘culture for democracy’.7

The 1978 Constitution The 1978 Constitution resulted from the consensus reached by the main political parties elected in the first democratic election after the Civil War. The need to obtain the support of both Francoist reformists and anti-Francoist groups generated continuous arguments while drafting the Constitution. Such discrepancies were reflected in the lack of precision and coherence evident in some parts of the constitutional text. It should be noted that, for the first time, Spain had a Constitution that was not the outcome of the opposition of a single political party to the others and which, in spite of some limitations and defects, offered a political model that ‘was not exclusive or divisive, but integrative’.8 The radically conservative character of the brand of Spanish nationalism promoted by the Franco regime was questioned by the 1978 Constitution, which not only aspired to transform Spain into a democratic state, but also recognized the existence of nationalities and regions within its territory. The preamble to the Constitution proclaims the desire of the Spanish nation to ‘Protect all Spaniards and the peoples of Spain on exercising their human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions.’9 Article 2, probably the most controversial, reveals the tension between defending the unity of Spain and the social pressure for the historical nationalities of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country to be recognized: The Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions forming it and solidarity between all of them.10 Even more important, though, is the outright rejection of the centralist model imposed by Francoism embodied in this Article, which at the same time endeavours to reconcile the two ideas of the Spanish nation at stake during the Civil War. Article 2 declares that ‘unity’ has to be preserved, although it could be argued that ‘unity’ is somehow questioned by the recognition of ‘nationalities and regions’ at the heart of Spain. As Colomer states, this involves the recognition of ‘differentiated group consciousnesses’ formed historically.11 According to Solé Tura, it is very controversial and legally ambiguous to emphasize the unity of a ‘nation’ while recognizing the existence of ‘nationalities’ within it.12 In this context, the reference to the ‘Spanish nation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seems implicitly compatible with the existence of other ‘small patrias’ such as Catalonia and the Basque Country.

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The right to autonomy for the nationalities and regions forming Spain prompted the creation of the Autonomous Communities System. However, although Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, which during the Second Republic had held plebiscites in favour of their own statutes of autonomy, and which in 1978 were enjoying recently restored provisional autonomous regimes, immediately gained ‘full autonomy’, other communities had to undergo a five-year period of ‘restricted autonomy’ before doing so (Article 143 versus Article 151 of the Constitution). Once full autonomy has been achieved, however, the Constitution makes no distinction between the different communities; rather, it places nationalities with a strong feeling of identity embedded in a common culture, language and past on the same level as artificially created ‘communities’, lacking any previous sense of identity (Articles 143 and 144). According to Enric Fossas, the Constitution limits itself to establishing principles and procedures leading to a territorial reorganization of power which could result in different political models. In his opinion, the so-called ‘autonomous model’ is a ‘pre-constitutional’ model, because the ‘provisional’ regimes of autonomy granted to various ‘communities’ prior to the Constitution determined its own drafting and its subsequent development. And it is also ‘sub-constitutional’, because the Constitution did not create the Autonomous Communities System – it did not create the autonomous communities, nor did it define their territories, determine their organization, or set up their powers. The Magna Carta restricts itself to determining ‘procedures’ in which the key figures are local representatives, who have to declare their desire for autonomy, and central state institutions, in particular the parliament, through the development of the so-called ‘Constitutional block’ (including statutes of autonomy and laws delimiting their devolved powers) and the Constitutional Court, as the supreme interpreter of the constitutional text through its jurisprudence. Fossas stresses the singular nature of the 1978 Constitution, according to which the construction of the Autonomous Communities System is ruled by the so-called principio dispositivo. This establishes that the territorial restructuring of the country must not be directed from the centre, but stem from the will of the various territories and their representatives, to which the Constitution offers several routes to political autonomy.13 The creation of the Autonomous Communities System endeavoured to respond to the nationalist demands of the Basque Country and Catalonia. Both communities believed that they were entitled to self-determination, and that they had the power to press for a political solution to their claims. However, what some saw as a fair demand was regarded by others as a threat to the unity of the ‘Spanish nation’. Large conservative sections of the Army and the civil service, as well as former Francoists, were hostile to the recognition of nationalities within Spain. Even today there is no agreement concerning the meaning of the term ‘nationality’. In fact, most politicians belonging to these ‘nationalities’ refer to them as ‘nations’ and use the expression ‘Spanish state’ to avoid employing the term ‘Spanish nation’.

74 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain Once the Constitution had been ratified, there was a matter of implementing it. At the time, it was not clear whether the Constitution would lead to a simple administrative decentralization of the state or whether, on the contrary, it would symbolize a true recognition of the cultural and political aspirations of the national minorities. In the words of Isidre Molas, granting them self-determination was quite equivocal, because it was not yet clear how much real power would be devolved to Catalonia and how self-determination would be defined.14 Joan Reventós, at the time leader of the PSC, feared that the recognition of political autonomy for the nationalities and regions would be reduced to mere rhetoric, thus posing a serious threat to the future stability of Spain.15 The Constitution laid the foundations for a new territorial organization of the Spanish state, divided into seventeen autonomous communities. The relations between some autonomous communities and the central government have had their high and low points since 1978. The Constitution sought to reconcile the territorial integrity of the state with a considerable degree of cultural and political autonomy for the nationalities and regions included in it. This inevitably led to the rise of some tensions and problems between two entities, the central state and the historical nationalities, seeking the same objective; that is, the creation and promotion of the nation, but a nation filled with a different content in each case. The Spanish state endeavoured to consolidate the Spanish nation, in order to obtain legitimacy and to avoid having to reduce its relations with the citizens to a simple political form of interaction defined by the concept of citizenship. From a position of Spanish nationalism, J. Ramón Parada argues that ‘preaching the differential aspect of [peripheral] nationalisms seems to be a political propaganda operation’, and defends the theory that, to maintain the unity of Spain, ‘an agreement between the Spanish-wide political parties [this excludes regional parities] is necessary and should be complemented with the impetus and guarantee of the Crown’.16 Along the same lines and from supposedly progressive positions, Roberto L. Blanco Valdés describes regional nationalist arguments as ‘constitutionally unsustainable’ and ‘politically unacceptable’. He rejects Catalonia and the Basque Country’s status as ‘nations’ and considers peripheral nationalisms as a threat to the unity of the state. At the same time he speaks in favour of a ‘re-establishment of the prestige of the state project and of the acceptance of the Spanish historical and cultural community’, from which a new agreement among state-wide political parties should emerge.17 In many respects, the Generalitat acts as a quasi-state, since its devolved powers include the right to introduce socio-cultural policies aimed at regenerating the Catalan nation. In this process, the opposition between ‘us’ (the Catalans) and ‘them’ (the Spanish state, in general equivalent to Castile) tends to be stressed. This inevitably results in a (potential or real) conflict if the following conditions are not met: first, the definition of Spain as a plurinational state and the acceptance of the political, economic, cultural and moral consequences arising from this fact and, second, the Catalans’ commit-

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ment not to stir up radical nationalism leading to secession. These two conditions would foster mutual trust between a central state – defining itself as plurinational – and Catalonia – as a nation included within a state that recognizes it as such. If that were to be the case, national differences within Spain would result in the harmonious and mutually enriching coexistence of multiple identities within a single state. A further layer of identity could be added as a result of identification with the European Union. Unfortunately, the two conditions mentioned above have yet to be met in full. It should be stressed that the Autonomous Communities System has evolved from an initial ‘differentiating’ interpretation, which granted a special regime to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia (Transitional Provision 2, in relation to Article 152 of the Constitution), unlike that of the rest of the autonomous communities, towards a ‘homogenizing’ interpretation, resulting from the first Autonomous Agreements (1981) and the second Autonomous Agreements (1992), the objective of which was to reduce the scope of the principio dispositivo.18 Twenty-five years after ratifying the 1978 Constitution, the key debate on the Autonomous Communities System revolves around whether it could develop into an asymmetrical model. The argument behind such a wish is based on the assumption that the de facto asymmetry implicit in the plurinational composition of the state could lead eventually to a de jure asymmetry.19 According to Fossas, the open nature of the constitutional provisions and the validity of the principio dispositivo, have enabled the autonomous model to combine autonomy and asymmetry with some flexibility, in an attempt to reconcile the decentralization of power with the organization of a plurinational state. This de jure asymmetry present in the Autonomous Communities System is above all clear in the different level of powers devolved to the autonomous communities, in their internal organization, in their funding system and in the regulation of regional official languages, but not in other aspects such as their representation in the Senate, constitutional reform and the composition of the Constitutional Court, which does not have a federal structure.20 Thus, in Fossas’s view, the limitations of the autonomous model on reflecting the plurinational nature of Spain do not stem from the Constitution but from its subsequent development, which has involved: 1

2

Eliminating the constitutional recognition of the plurinational nature of Spain, something which has diluted the initial distinction between ‘nationalities and regions’, as a mechanism designed to recognize the specific nature of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia within the Autonomous Communities System. Granting Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia a considerably lower level of autonomy than that which could have been obtained on applying a more generous reading of the Constitution. This has generated constant demands from the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the Basque

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Country, led by nationalist parties. Such demands have encouraged those of other autonomous communities and this has forced the central government to extend to all communities the same powers that it had initially granted only to the historical nationalities. Reducing the asymmetrical potential contained in the principio dispositivo – frowned upon by state parties – which has generated dissatisfaction among nationalist parties demanding a special status for the nationalities they represent. The lack of instruments facilitating the integration and participation of the historical nationalities in central state institutions.21

The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia22 Continuity over time and differentiation from others are the defining criteria of identity. Both elements are stressed in the Statute of Autonomy. Continuity is emphasized in the first line of the preamble: ‘In the process of regaining their democratic freedom, the people of Catalonia recover their institutions of self-government.’23 The introduction to the version of the Statute published by the Generalitat in 1986 indicates: The Generalitat, however, is not a newly created institution. It was established by the Catalan Parliament which met in Cervera in 1359 in the reign of Peter III the Ceremonious (1336–1387), as an associated body delegated to by the Catalan Parliament itself. And continues: In the fifteenth century the Generalitat was already carrying out executive functions, not only in judicial and financial matters, but also in politics. Therefore, when on 29 September 1977 a Royal Decree provisionally re-established the Generalitat of Catalonia, before the ratification of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, its nature as an age-old institution in which the Catalan people saw the symbol and the acknowledgement of their historical personality was invoked.24 But continuity is not reduced to looking back. For Catalonia it also requires filling the gap between past and present. The Franco regime represented a ‘black hole’ – a parenthesis of silence in the cultural and political life of Catalonia. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy had to recognize this fact and redress the historical imbalance prompted by Francoism. In so doing, it sought to activate a shared project for the future of Catalonia – one that would strengthen the Catalans’ sentiment of forming a particular community:

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The collective freedom of Catalonia finds in the institutions of the Generalitat a link with a long history of emphasis on and respect for the fundamental rights and the public freedoms of individuals and of peoples; a history which the people of Catalonia wish to continue, in order to permit the creation of a forward-looking democratic society.25 The defining criteria of identity are continuity over time and differentiation from others – both fundamental elements of national identity. Continuity springs from the conception of the nation as a historically rooted entity that projects into the future. Individuals perceive this continuity through a set of experiences that spread out across time and are united by a common meaning, which is something that only ‘insiders’ can grasp. Differentiation stems from the consciousness of forming a community with a shared culture, attached to a particular territory, both elements leading to the distinction between members and ‘strangers’, ‘the rest’, those who are ‘different’. The preamble to the Statute is very clear on this point: ‘This Statute is the expression of the collective identity of Catalonia.’26 Further on, the text refers to the ‘collective life’ and to the ‘collective freedom’ of Catalonia. The Statute offers a particular image of Catalonia and its relationship with the rest of Spain. It defines its institutions as well as its relationship with the state ‘within a framework of free solidarity with the other nationalities and regions of Spain. This solidarity is the guarantee of the genuine unity of all the peoples of Spain.’27 Consequently, and in accordance with the Statute, Catalans have their collective identity recognized within the state, but they are also constrained by the framework set up by the Statute and the Constitution. They cannot aspire to independence unless the Constitution is changed. For this reason, and at least theoretically, it is assumed that Catalan nationalism should ‘reject’ the ideal of ‘one nation, one state’. However, such an ideal is currently being defended by some Catalan political forces which stand for outright independence to be achieved by peaceful and democratic means. The Preliminary Section of the Statute defines Catalonia as a nationality which ‘in order to accede to self-government, constitutes itself as a SelfGoverning Community in accordance with the Constitution and with this Statute’ (Article 1.1) (it should be underlined that the sovereignty of Catalonia is implied in this declaration) and the Generalitat as ‘the institution around which the self-government of Catalonia is politically organized’ (Article 1.2). The powers of the Generalitat ‘emanate from the Constitution, this Statute and the people’ (Article 1.3). According to these provisions, the Constitution defines the extent and number of devolved powers. ‘The people’ (the Catalans) stand in third place. This point stresses the existence of a single sovereign demos in Spanish democracy, constituted by all Spaniards, including the Catalans, who, on ratifying the Constitution, allowed for Catalonia’s autonomy. This interpretation considers the Catalan people to be a ‘sub-group’ of the demos formed by all the citizens of Spain. We could

78 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain infer, in accordance with this reasoning present in the Constitution and in the Statute, that access to political power (kratos) by the Catalan people is determined by a demos of which the Catalan people form a part, and not by the specific free will of the Catalan people constituted as a ‘sovereign demos’.28 Article 2 of the Preliminary Section of the Statute limits the territory of Catalonia to the areas constituting the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. By circumscribing the territory of Catalonia to these four provinces, the Statute ignores the claims of some Catalan nationalists in favour of the reunification of the Països Catalans.29 Article 5 of the Preliminary Section of the Statute grants the Generalitat the right to decide upon the territorial organization of Catalonia ‘without prejudicing the organization of the province as the local unit and a territorial division for implementing the activities of the state’. At the same time it preserves the structure of the diputaciones provinciales (provincial councils), in spite of a certain overlapping between the latter and the territorial organization established by the Autonomous Communities System. Another controversial issue concerns the explicit rejection of a possible federation of autonomous communities as contemplated by Article 145 of the Constitution. This is a very important issue for those Catalan nationalists who demand the restoration of a formal link between the Països Catalans. According to the Statute, ‘cultural exchanges with other Self-Governing Communities and Provinces shall be encouraged and special attention given to all those with which Catalonia has had particular historical, cultural or commercial links’ (Additional Provision Five). The Statute recognizes that ‘the Catalan language is the heritage of other territories and communities’ (Section One, Article 27.4) and, referring to Article 145.2 of the Constitution,30 provides that: [T]he Generalitat may request the Government to conclude, and refer, if need be, to the Cortes Generales, for authorization, such treaties or agreements as shall permit the establishment of cultural relations with the states where such territories are located and such communities reside. (Section One, Article 27.4) It should be stressed that no reference is made to political relations. After considering the territory of Catalonia, the Preliminary Section turns its attention to the language and symbols of Catalonia. Catalan is ‘the language proper to Catalonia’ and ‘is the official language of Catalonia, as is Castilian, the official language of the whole of the Spanish state’ (Preliminary Section, Articles 3.1 and 3.2). This favours bilingualism since the Statute indicates that: The Generalitat shall guarantee normal and official use of both languages, adopting all measures necessary to ensure they are known, and creating

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those conditions which shall permit their full equality with regard to the duties and rights of the citizens of Catalonia. (Preliminary Section, Article 3.3) The text moves on to consider the Catalan flag. Here too it refers to continuity embodied in tradition: ‘The Catalan flag is the traditional one of four red stripes on a yellow background’ (Preliminary Section, Article 4).31 This flag is already present in fourteenth-century paintings of the Catalan fleet in the Mediterranean. The Statute grants a privileged status to the flag. As is well known, the Spanish and the Catalan flag share the same colours, but not the same number of stripes. A foreign observer, ignorant of the symbolic value of the flag, would be amazed at the intensity of feelings which could be aroused by adding or suppressing some red or yellow stripes. The symbolic content of the flag is passionately felt by the members of a community who have turned it into their own, that is, into a symbol of their people. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy refers to Catalonia’s territory, history, culture, language, symbols and a shared future project. It also includes direct references to the Catalans’ consciousness of forming a differentiated community. This emphasizes the five dimensions – territorial, historical, cultural, psychological and political – that I attribute to the nation.32 But yet another question arises: Who should be considered as a Catalan? According to the Statute, ‘the political status of Catalans shall be granted to all Spanish citizens who, in accordance with the general laws of the state, are legally resident in any of the municipalities of Catalonia’ (Preliminary Section, Article 6.1). This provision rejects racial or ethnic elements and restates the declaration that appears in the preamble of the Statute, according to which the ‘Catalan people’ is identified with ‘all those who live and work in Catalonia’.

The main political parties of Catalan origin To conclude this chapter, I offer an overview of the results obtained by the main political parties originating from Catalonia – CiU, PSC (PSC-PSOE), PSUC-ICV and ERC – in the seven elections to the Catalan parliament held in the new democratic period. I also include some data about their performance in national elections. In the first election to the Catalan Parliament (1980), the coalition CiU, formed in 1978 by CDC and UDC, obtained forty-three seats and became the main Catalan political force33 in direct competition with the PSC which would win in the national elections. Jordi Pujol, once President of the Generalitat, focused his political strategy on the achievement of a rapid transfer of powers from the central government to the autonomous institutions, a process that to a great extent was facilitated by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister of Spain and one of the main figures in the transition to democracy. This took place at a time when Suárez’s

80 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain party, UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático, or Union of the Democratic Centre), needed CiU’s support to secure a majority in the Spanish parliament. The 1981 attempted coup d’état prompted a U-turn in central Government policies. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, under pressure from the conservatives, halted to any further devolution of powers to the autonomous communities. Meanwhile, all democratic political parties focused their efforts on consolidating the still weak emerging democracy, threatened by the attempted coup. At that point, as Miquel Caminal argues, ‘all parties became prisoners of the worst type of censorship, that is selfcensorship regarding what could or could not be done [. . .] responsibly’.34 The new centralist policies culminated in the ratification of the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomous Process (Ley orgánica para la armonización del proceso autonómico (LOAPA)), passed with the votes of the governing party, UCD, and those of the PSOE. Only the CiU parliamentary group dared to oppose the LOAPA. The PSC’s decision not to submit the amendments ratified by the party’s executive committee led to the dismissal of Ernest Lluch as its parliamentary spokesperson and the resignation of two members of the PSC’s executive committee, Eduard Martín Toval and Joan Prats Català.35 The silence of the Catalan Socialists sparked off an internal party crisis, and also contributed to the deterioration of the pro-Catalan image of the PSC (PSC-PSOE) in Catalonia, since their silence had emphasized its dependence on the PSOE. In the 1980 autonomous election, the PSC received 22.3 per cent of the vote, compared with 29.2 per cent obtained by CiU. This caused great disappointment among the Catalan Socialists, who were convinced of their victory. Pujol, CiU’s leader, invited the PSC to enter into a coalition government with his party. He repeated this offer twice, during the night of the election and in his appointment speech, but the PSC rejected it – a decision which has resulted in the PSC’s exclusion from the Catalan government for over twenty years. In the 1982 general election, the Catalan Socialists obtained a majority in Catalonia with 45.2 per cent of the vote. However, in the 1984 election to the Catalan parliament, they only received 30 per cent, while CiU, which had obtained 22.2 per cent of the vote in the general election, now obtained 46.6 per cent. Such electoral behaviour set up a pattern of political support according to which Catalans have voted for the socialists in general elections, but have opted for CiU in the autonomous ones. This called into question the left’s belief, generated during the Francoist period, that only they could fly the nationalist flag, but never a centrist coalition such as CiU. Following the 1984 election to the Catalan Parliament, the PSC experienced a slight fall, as from 29.8 per cent of the vote obtained in 1988 it dropped to 27.6 per cent in 1992 and 24.9 per cent in 1995. In the 1999 election, the PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC (Ciutadans pel Canvi, or Citizens for Change), led by Pasqual Maragall, achieved a spectacular recovery on obtaining 37.9 per cent of the vote, giving it 52 seats, compared with 37.7 per cent achieved by

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CiU, which obtained 56 seats. It should be noted that the number of votes per seat varies in the different Catalan constituencies according to whether a particular area is more or less populated. In the 16 November 2003 election, the PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC lost 10 seats and obtained 42 seats, corresponding to 31.17 per cent of the vote. Against all predictions, the CiU, with its new leader Artur Mas, managed to obtain 30.93 per cent of the vote, which corresponded to 46 seats. As well as the PSC, it had also lost 10 seats when compared to 1999, but the CiU still managed to win the election for a seventh time. The PSUC obtained 18.7 per cent of the vote in the first autonomous election (1980), but suffered a serious setback in 1984, when its support declined spectacularly, only obtaining 5.6 per cent of the vote. This collapse was due to the internal crisis arising from the conclusion of the V PSUC Congress (January 1981), which approved the reference to Marxism-Leninism in the General Secretary’s report, while at the same time rejecting its inclusion in the ‘political clauses’ (tesis polítiques). The division between core leaders was illustrated by the antagonism between the sector led by Pere Ardiaca, in favour of the Soviet experience and against the Moncloa Pacts and the constitutional consensus destined to preserve the incipient Spanish democracy, and the sector led by Jordi Solé Tura and Jordi Borja, critical of the USSR and in favour of constitutional consensus among Spanish political forces. These divisions culminated in the expulsion, in March 1982, of the PSUC President, Pere Ardiaca i Martín, and thirty members of the central committee (who subsequently formed the PCC (Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya, or Communist Party of Catalonia)). In the June 1982 Extraordinary Congress, Antoni Gutiérrez i Díaz and Gregorio López i Raimundo were respectively re-elected as General Secretary and President of the PSUC. But this crisis had broken into pieces the ideological unity of the party, causing an irreparable erosion of the PSUC’s image as a party capable of accepting internal plurality. The outcome involved a considerable number of party members abandoning the PSUC and many of them joining the new PCC. In the 1986 general election the PSUC, then in coalition with the Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, (NE) or Left-wing Nationalists, and under the name Unió de l’Esquerra Catalana, or Union of the Catalan Left, continued its decline and obtained less than 4 per cent of the vote. Its electoral failure led to the resignation of Gutiérrez i Díaz, to be replaced by Rafael Ribó i Massó. In 1988 the PSUC, now in the federation IC (Iniciativa per Catalunya, or Initiative for Catalonia), obtained 7.8 per cent of the vote, but, in the 1992 autonomous election, the PSUC-IC only achieved 6.5 per cent. This new decline was to a great extent influenced by the events of 1989 in the former Soviet Union and by the general crisis of communism. In the 1995 autonomous election, ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, or Initiative for Catalonia-Greens) obtained 3 per cent of the vote, and in the 1999 election a new decline gave the party led by Rafael Ribó only five seats, corresponding

82 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain to 2.5 per cent of the vote. In the 2003 election ICV, lead by Joan Saura, achieved a spectacular recovery, obtaining 9 seats corresponding to 7.3 per cent of the vote. In May 1998, following the split between IC and IU (Izquierda Unida, or United Left), EUiA (Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, or United and Alternative Left) was formed as a federation of various parties and groupings in favour of creating a Catalan version of IU. ERC, the hegemonic party in Catalonia during the Second Republic, obtained 8.9 per cent of the vote in 1980, 4.4 per cent in 1984 and 4.1 per cent in 1988. This scaling down in the number of votes can be attributed to ERC’s support of Pujol in the Banca Catalana case as well as to its subordinate collaboration with CiU in the period 1980–1984, during which Heribert Barrera was elected Speaker of the Catalan Parliament (10 April 1980). Following the 1984 defeat, some ERC members joined the PSC. Meanwhile, the ERC Executive Committee (which Joan Hortalà i Arau joined) took a U-turn to seek the support of a more radical Catalan nationalism. Two influential political forces joined ERC: a sector of La Crida (Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalana, or Call for Solidarity in Defence of the Catalan Language, Culture and Nation), and ENE (Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, or Agreement of Left-wing Nationalists). The predominance of these new political forces pushed ERC towards a secessionist position. Thus, in the 1988 Congress, Heribert Barrera i Costa, the historical leader of the party, and ERC’s General Secretary, was elected President of the party and Joan Hortalà was replaced by Àngel Colom. The apparently irreversible decline of ERC came to a halt in 1992, when it obtained 8 per cent of the vote. It thus went from being the fifth parliamentary force in Catalonia to being third, behind CiU and the PSC. ERC’s new impetus can be attributed to the election of Àngel Colom, from La Crida, committed to the independence of Catalonia and the unification of the Països Catalans by peaceful means. ERC’s secessionism attracted former members of Terra Lliure, or Free Land, who joined ERC in 1991, and also the party Acció Catalana, or Catalan Action (1997). This expanded the rank and file of ERC and at the same time confirmed a generational renewal initiated by Àngel Colom and Pilar Rahola. In the 1995 autonomous elections, ERC continued to rise and achieved 9.5 per cent of the vote. The internal crisis opened up by the sanctioning proceedings initiated by Colom against Carles Bonet and Jaume Rodríguez in April 1996 culminated in the ‘Manifesto of the 229’, signed by over 220 ERC elected officials, against the proceedings. The outcome of the crisis was a split led by Àngel Colom and Pilar Rahola in 1996, who together with other members of the Executive Committee created the PI (Partit per la Independència, or Independence Party), which was short-lived. In the November 1996 election to the ERC National Council, the list led by Jordi Carbonell, Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira and Joan Puigcercós was elected. Carbonell took over the presidency of the party and Carod-Rovira became General Secretary. The split had been overcome, but the party was weakened, as it lost support in both

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parliamentary and municipal elections, and inherited a negative financial situation. In the 1999 election, ERC obtained 8.7 per cent of the vote and was again the third political force in Catalonia, now with the same number of seats as the conservative PP,36 which also obtained twelve seats. In 2003, ERC managed to double its 1999 results. It obtained a record 23 seats corresponding to 16.47 per cent of the vote. ERC became consolidated as the third political force in Catalonia, one with the capacity to play a key role in the constitution of a future government since neither the CiU nor the PSC had achieved the majority. The PP obtained 15 seats, 3 more than in 1999. CiU, the PSC (PSC-PSOE), the PSUC-IC and ERC were the main political parties in Catalonia during the transition to democracy. These parties offer different interpretations of Catalan nationalism and present dissimilar ‘images’ of Catalonia and of its relationship with the rest of Spain, while proposing alternative future projects for the country. The unity existing between the clandestine Catalan political forces during Francoism vanished with the arrival of democracy and the urge to compete for power. Generally speaking, it can be argued that the cooperation and solidarity between nationalist parties representing national minorities, subject to considerable repression from the state that includes them, quickly disintegrate whenever this state guarantees them a certain degree of autonomy. As soon as political parties are allowed to participate in free elections, they have the opportunity to obtain political power and to implement their political programmes and it is in their own interest to highlight the features which differentiate them from other political formations. It should be recognized, however, as demonstrated on numerous occasions, for example during Francoism, that nationalism has the capacity to foster the emergence of political platforms, where socialists, communists, Christian democrats or republicans can converge. In my view, this reinforces my argument that nationalism, on its own, lacks a doctrine capable of shaping political action. Nationalism is not sufficient to determine the policy of a party, except for short periods of time when a nation is subject to repression and finds itself involved in a constant struggle to survive. Nationalism can adopt many different faces according to the political ideology of the party embracing it. Nationalism is the shape; socialism, social democracy, republicanism, liberalism or fascism are the colours that can be used to create contrasting images of the nationalist message. CiU, the PSC (PSC-PSOE), the PSUC-ICV and ERC hold different positions concerning the future of Catalonia. The socialists and communists foresee a development of the Autonomous Communities System turning Spain into a federal state. There are some differences between the PSC and the PSUC-ICV which primarily concern the degree of autonomy that Catalonia should aim for, and the emphasis placed by them on the protection of Catalan national identity. Both parties are engaged with the integration of immigrants into Catalan society and consider that Catalan culture has to merge its indigenous elements with those of immigrant origin,

84 Catalonia within the new democratic Spain in order to give rise to a new differentiated identity. For its part, and due to its defence of secession and the creation of a Catalan Republic by peaceful means, ERC is different from the other political options and poses fundamental challenges both to the Constitution and to the Statute of Autonomy. Finally, CiU has formulated a nationalist discourse aimed at protecting Catalan identity within the framework of the Spanish state. CiU’s nationalism stresses the distinct nature of Catalonia in relation to the rest of Spain and demands higher levels of self-government for the Catalan nation. The following two chapters consider the ideological content of these political formations, paying particular attention to their thinking on five basic aspects: (1) their definition of Catalan identity; (2) their definition of Catalan nationalism (or Catalanism); (3) their views on immigration; (4) the relationship between Catalonia and Spain; and (5) the relations between Catalonia and the European Union. The study of each political formation combines an analysis of internal party documents and statements, articles and books written by their leaders. Chapter 5 focuses upon the ideological content of ERC, the PSUC-ICV and the PSC (PSC-PSOE), and Chapter 6 considers CDC and UDC. The final section of Chapter 6 is devoted to Jordi Pujol’s nationalist works. This decision is justified, I believe, by his position as the most important ideologist of Catalan nationalism in the transition to democracy and the most influential politician as President of the Generalitat of Catalonia since 1980. Chapter 5 studies the Catalan left according to the chronological order in the formation of the political parties considered, and Chapter 6 analyses the Catalan centre-right, beginning with CDC as the most influential component of the CiU coalition (now a federation).

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Images of Catalonia I ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC

In this chapter I study the main left-wing Catalan political parties – ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC (PSC-PSOE). I first offer a short historical background to each of them, followed by an ideological definition, according to their documents and statutes. The main part of each section consists of a detailed analysis of their view on five key aspects – Catalan identity, Catalan nationalism/Catalanism, immigration, the relationship between Catalonia and Spain and the relations between Catalonia and the European Union.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) ERC, the hegemonic party in Catalonia during the Second Republic, gave the Generalitat its first two Presidents, Francesc Macià (1931–1933) and Lluís Companys (1933–1940). ERC defines itself as a left-wing Catalan political organization, independent from any political party outside Catalonia. In its 1993 Ideological Declaration, ERC is defined as a blend of various political traditions that include: secessionism represented by Francesc Macià’s Estat Català, or Catalan State Party; Lluís Companys’ Partit Republicà Català, or Catalan Republican Party; the federal republicanism present in many Catalan areas; the socializing group of l’Opinió; and the working-class movement of libertarian influences. ERC takes on ‘the whole nation’, in reference to the Països Catalans, as its direct area of action. Independence is its political objective. The reduction in numbers suffered by ERC after the Civil War (a quarter of its 70,000 activists died or were imprisoned and half had to go into exile) signalled the irreversible decline of the party, which would not recover its strength until 1977.1 ERC maintained a separatist attitude at the beginning of the transition to democracy, refusing to participate in the Comissió dels Nou (February 1977). Such an attitude was due to its objective not to mix Spanish demands with specifically Catalan ones. The re-establishment of the Generalitat and the appointment of Josep Tarradellas as its President (1977) exemplified ERC’s strategy and the determination of its President. ERC, although not yet legalized as a party, ran in the 1977 parliamentary election in the Esquerra de Catalunya, or Catalan Left coalition (with the

86 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC Partido del Trabajo de España, or Spanish Workers’ Party, and the Associació Catalana de la Dona, or Catalan Women’s Association). ERC’s lack of resources, the dismemberment of the party under Franco and the diversity of trends coexisting within it account for the poor electoral results obtained at the beginning of the transition to democracy. One of ERC’s main assets before the war was its leader and President of the Generalitat, Francesc Macià, whose charisma remained even after his death. As already mentioned, ERC’s programme became more radical after 1992, on incorporating activists from the secessionist organization La Crida,2 including Àngel Colom, leader of La Crida between 1983 and 1986, and subsequently ERC’s General Secretary (1989). Catalan identity ERC’s former leader and ideologist, Àngel Colom, argues that the ideas and values of Catalan identity, which favoured the economic and political resistance of Catalonia during the Franco regime, are currently devalued because, ‘apparently, they do not fit in with the new economic and social conditions created by the transformations of recent years’.3 In Colom’s view, appeals to a genetic theory of the Catalan character and references to the theory of the Volksgeist, or spirit of the people, are no longer valid to explain nationalism. Colom puts forward an intellectual approach to nationalism which rejects the essentialist and naturalistic theories discredited by science4 and proposes re-examining the different scientific disciplines which deal with the relations between the psychology of individuals and their societies, in order to find a scientific base from which to reconstruct a theory of national identity.5 He points at the socialization process of children, during which they learn a language, basic attitudes and value systems, and argues that ‘language is not fixed in the chromosomes, and is not independent from those that speak it, but rather everyone thinks and sees themselves in a certain language’. Language creates ‘a natural solidarity among those that speak it. Language alone is only a part of a child’s learning, but expresses and conditions all other forms of learning’.6 Colom refers to the behavioural guidelines that children learn early on in their lives and stresses the role of the family. He considers that, rather than unifying the behaviour of individuals, value systems make it converge according to basic guidelines followed by most people. Hence, a value system shared by a community contributes to account for its distinctive character when compared with that of other communities. Colom stresses the role of culture, language and territory, and indicates that ‘a whole set of structures allows a system of shared values and a common identity to be maintained in a territory inhabited by thousands of people, prior to the establishment of modern states’.7 For Colom, the construction of a new nationalist theory requires the existence of a ‘national factor understood as the generational transmission of

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guidelines for behaviour and values’. He rejects supernatural arguments and considers national identity as ‘a social phenomenon analogous to language’.8 In his view, a cultural theory of national identity implies assuming that the nation is not eternal. Even more importantly, in stark contrast with Jordi Pujol’s approach, but also against the positions sustained by the other Catalan political parties, for which Catalan identity is compatible with Spanish identity, Colom argues that ‘under the current conditions of our civilization, a nation without state is doomed to disappear’. According to him, national identity is optional, not imposed: ‘each person should decide whether to identify or not with a collective project’.9 In the Països Catalans, people should choose between Catalan and Spanish identity, being well aware of what that choice entails.10 ERC observes that both the Constitution and the Statute treat Catalonia as a ‘linguistic minority’, because the Constitution establishes the territorial nature of Castilian or Spanish in the whole territory [of Spain], all citizens being obliged to know it and entitled to use it. On the contrary, the use of Catalan is voluntary, as corresponds to a linguistic minority.11 ERC declares itself to be in favour of an ‘egalitarian multilingualism’, which would involve the establishment of a legal framework within which all languages would enjoy the same rights and duties. Such an arrangement would reflect the egalitarian official nature of the four languages [Castilian, Catalan, Basque and Galician] throughout the territory of the quadrilingual state . . . the pre-eminent official nature of each language within its linguistic domain would be guaranteed and the right to the active personal use of each individual’s language preserved.12 According to ERC, the state should promote such an alternative linguistic framework and contribute to its funding in order to make egalitarian multilingualism effective. Catalan nationalism/Catalanism ERC’s Ideological Declaration defines the nation as ‘a community of people conscious of being linked by territory, history, tradition, culture, language, economy, and sharing the will to affirm such links and for them to be respected’.13 This Declaration emphasizes the pre-eminence of the nation and the need to combine individual and collective rights to create a fully democratic society. The Ideological Declaration proposes a set of national rights, led by the right to self-determination, defined as

88 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC the right of any nation to freely decide on its political future, and to stand in equal terms with the rest of the nations of the world, by means of the creation of a state or any other legal and political structure of its own.14 Other national rights include: • • • • • • • • •

•

the right to life, existence and collective identity; the right to the territory which has been the specific geographic framework of its historical development until the present time; the right to the use and to the promotion of the nation’s own language in all spheres of social life; the right to safeguard its cultural traditions and its way of life; the right to communicate freely and unhindered; the right to the natural resources and to the benefits of their exploitation, as well as the right to reinvest them in situ; the right to live and to work in one’s own country and to regulate migratory movements; the right to market protection; the right to establish the political, cultural and economic decisionmaking centre within the nation’s territory and the rejection of dependence from any external organization whose sovereignty had not been previously recognised; and the right to its own collective defence system.15

ERC’s objective is to achieve the independence of the Catalan nation within the European Union through peaceful and democratic means. Only the attainment of an independent Republic can lead to the international recognition of Catalonia, since international law only acknowledges sovereign states.16 The Blueprint for the National Statute of Catalonia prepared by ERC proposes the constitution of the ‘Free state of Catalonia associated with the Kingdom of Spain’.17 ERC’s message is targeted at the ten million inhabitants of the Països Catalans, not as the imposition of a historical law or as a genetic legacy, but as a choice. The construction of a Catalan Republic is presented as an ‘ethical imperative’ for Catalans aware of their collective responsibility.18 It is also presented as a ‘civic imperative’ stemming from the need to fight against the radical transformations which are currently threatening the survival of Catalonia as an advanced country.19 Colom argues that a nation cannot survive without its own state. In his view, the Spanish state has become obsolete, inasmuch as it lacks a history or a value system to unite the different nationalities forming it. He considers that the current reshaping of international politics and the novel meaning acquired by self-determination as a result of post-1989 events taking place in Eastern Europe has contributed to a further development of nationalism. Colom

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signals the need to offer a complete national reconstruction project to the younger generations, which run the risk of adopting a contemptuous individualist and sceptical attitude due to the cynicism, deterioration and corruption that dominate the world of politics.20 In Colom’s discourse, the Catalan Republic does not just involve independence, but also a new model of state. The Republic ‘is not against the king, but against the Kingdom of Spain’.21 Carod-Rovira, ERC’s current leader, establishes a distinction between a dangerous, xenophobic, reactionary, aggressive, authoritarian, expansionist, racist type of nationalism incompatible with diversity, and a nationalism of liberation which seeks to protect the nation against military, economic, cultural or political aggression. The type of nationalism defended by ERC and defined by Carod-Rovira does not therefore have an ethnic, but rather a democratic and integrative basis, as, far from wishing to impose any national form of life beyond its borders, it uses strictly peaceful and political means to obtain its objectives.22 It is a democratic and progressive type of nationalism, which has to emerge as a positive and constructive element, as a factor of social progress and civil cohesion, affecting all the citizens of the nation. Carod-Rovira indicates that a modification of the Spanish institutional framework in order to achieve full political sovereignty has so far proven to be impossible and utopian. In his view the only way forward is to obtain a pro-independence majority in the autonomous election and from there begin to create a Catalan state. He even declares a preference for the uncertainty of some yet undetermined free state status for Catalonia, maybe in a federation with other European peoples, to the certainty of a future with no horizon as an autonomous community within the kingdom of Spain. Immigration Àngel Colom is very cautious on presenting ERC’s political project, and seeks to confront the possible resistance arising from some people of immigrant origin who live in Catalonia. To do so, Colom strongly asserts his position against xenophobia and racism. In his view, ‘modern states should be extremely respectful of the identity of individuals [. . .]. They should recognize the right to difference and the rights of minorities.’23 He declares that, in order to reconcile respect for difference with the creation of a shared value system, the state and the political system should renounce patriotic rhetoric and concentrate on solving the problems of all citizens.24 In ERC’s nationalist project, independence becomes the means to turn Catalonia into one of the most advanced countries of Europe. Carod-Rovira stands in favour of halting the paternalistic discourse on immigration whose only effect, so far, has been the perpetuation of their condition as immigrants for second- and third-generation Catalans. According to Carod-Rovira:

90 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC To deny that the descendants of immigrants of [non-Catalan] origin are Catalans is to marginalize them and to condemn them to always being strangers in this land, to enclose them in a monolingual Castilian ghetto impervious to Catalan, to deny them the right to be as Catalan as anyone else and, often, even more than some others.25 On addressing the subject of immigration, ERC defines it as a social issue concerning civil rights, but also as a cultural and political issue. ERC denounces the inadequacy of the current Catalan legal framework, which leaves fundamental rights and public freedoms – civil and political rights – in the hands of the state. Catalonia requires cultural and social policies to confront this social phenomenon. ERC insists on the rights and duties of immigrants and asserts that social integration is not equivalent to the assimilation or elimination of the cultural, religious and ethnic differences characteristic of the immigrants’ countries of origin, but rather it involves emphasizing respect for and recognition of these differences, which become one more asset of our own culture. To fully achieve this integrative function, as members of society we must be aware of this role and eliminate from our subconscious any racist feelings that may still remain.26 At the same time, ERC spells out the duty of immigrants, above all nonEU immigrants, to make an effort to participate in the social life of the country or municipality in which they live, so that religious or cultural elements do not represent an insurmountable obstacle to comply with our society’s conventions and rules of coexistence,27 while bearing in mind that a secular society such as ours which guarantees religious freedom, should not be expected to make exceptions to the educational syllabi which could run against other fundamental rights, such as the principle of equality.28 ERC advocates an active presence of the Generalitat on the Consejo Superior de Política de Integración, or Spanish Council for Integration Policy, in order to guarantee an adequate coordination between the various levels of public administration with powers concerning the integration of immigrants, especially when establishing criteria on the number and destination of new immigrants coming into Spain. In the Framework programme for the 2000 general election, ERC takes into account the right to asylum and to refugee status, and recognizes the need to establish specific criteria on these issues.

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Catalonia and Spain According to ERC, Catalonia’s problems arise from its submission to Spain.29 The historical antagonism between the political and economic structures of Spain and those of the Països Catalans mirrors two national identities that have remained divergent over time. In ERC’s view, Spain’s centralism and backwardness have not been overcome. The main differences between Catalan and Spanish structures concern the territorial distribution of the population and their differing productive frameworks. In Colom’s view Catalonia’s outstanding position originates from its larger working population and its higher levels of productivity when compared with the rest of Spain. A further difference arises from the antagonistic industrial models applied by the Catalans and the Spaniards. Yet, while Catalan industry is based on indigenous individual initiative and, above all, on the fabric formed by small- and medium-sized companies, Spain basically depends on major international investments to create big industries.30 The disparities between Spain and Catalonia are not limited to the economic sphere, but also affect their antagonistic views on democracy and the state. Colom emphasizes that ‘the kingdom of Spain enjoys all the formal institutions of a democratic state. [. . .] It recognizes the existence of nationalities within its territory, but denies them the right to self-determination.’31 Furthermore he argues that, despite its liberal ways, the Spanish state has a very undemocratic basis, because it maintains the political and administrative structures shaped by moderate liberals in the second third of the last [nineteenth] century. There are some basic ideas more akin to the despotism of the Enlightenment than to the sovereignty and power of the citizens.32 According to Colom, this is explained by appealing to various reasons: (1) the state’s will to pervade the life of its citizenry without leaving any space for action by other institutions, such as local government; (2) the need for a strong central administration acting throughout the Spanish territory and monopolizing numerous functions; (3) the omnipresence of the state; and (4) its objective of creating a single nation.33 In Colom’s view, the idea of Spain as a nation-state only emerged after the Napoleonic wars, when the Crown lost the Castilian colonies in America and its domains were reduced to the Iberian Peninsula, with the exception of Portugal, Gibraltar, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands and a few small colonies in America and Africa. From then on, the Kingdom of Spain changed its name and became known as Spain. This reduction in size coincided with the modern creation of the Spanish state and the will to forge a Spanish nation. The most illustrative example of this concerns the attempt to create a Spanish language, converting Castilian into Spanish. This took place in 1922, when the Royal Academy of the Castilian Language became

92 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language.34 In other words, the integrity of the Catalan identity, which was easy to maintain while the Spanish state was weak and reduced its activities to little more than the collection of taxes, became threatened by the unstoppable transformation of Spain into a modern nation-state. For Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira, one of the most important problems in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain within the present legal framework concerns the inadequacy of autonomous funding, coupled with low public investment by the state in Catalonia. Both these factors damage the material well-being of Catalans, curb economic growth and hinder the unequivocal vitality of Catalan enterprise. According to Carod-Rovira, ‘Catalonia naturally finances Europe, but also Spain’.35 He adds: The Catalan tax burden is so colossal that, while 70 pesetas out of every 100 are returned to a citizen from here, 115 are returned to a citizen of Spain. [. . .] Catalonia contributes 26 per cent more tax than the Spanish average and what the state returns to us is 24 per cent below average.36 He also argues that ‘the Spanish welfare state was built on the debt and the effort of Catalonia’.37 In its Framework programme for the March 2000 general election, ERC describes the current situation as the final stage in a historical period which requires the renewal of an exhausted model of state.38 In its view, it is essential to change the fundamental attitudes of the citizens of Catalonia, ‘immersed in conformism because “everything is alright” and in defeatism because “there’s nothing we can do about it” ’.39 In this context, ERC considers that it is necessary to: (1) become aware of the seriousness of the current threats faced by the Catalan nation; (2) recover confidence in progress and combat the fatalism that has currently taken the form of economic determinism; and (3) recover confidence in political parties as essential instruments for the transformation of society. ERC’s strategy therefore involves broadening the base of Catalan republicanism and raising the ‘democratic tension’ in Catalonia and the Països Catalans, so that the legitimacy of the whole regime and of its idea of the state are called into question.40 In the medium term ERC, which defines itself as a party of government and not as a purely testimonial or subordinate party or one holding the balance of power, proposes the creation of a federal Republic as a first step ‘on the democratic path to independence, which requires the support of the majority of the people expressed freely in the polls’.41 This same Framework programme adds: The attempt to assimilate the Catalan nation perpetrated by the Spanish state since 1714, which became an attempted genocide under the military regime of General Franco, has generated in the most nationally conscious part of the Catalan people an understandable hatred of all signs

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of Spanishness. This hatred refers to the state and not to the Spanish people, which has endured the same oppression from the oligarchy that controls them.42 On analysing the relations between Catalonia and Spain a key aspect refers to the position and assessment of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. Heribert Barrera, former General Secretary of ERC, urged the electorate to vote for the ratification of this Statute of Autonomy, in spite of pointing at its limitations. In his view, the Statute stood as the first stage in the recovery of Catalan national identity. On the occasion of the first election to the Catalan Parliament in 1980, Barrera bemoaned the precarious and abstract nature of Catalan autonomy. For Barrera, designing a nationalist policy required specifying its key objectives: In addition to the ultimate, permanent objective of full sovereignty, which is the final horizon of the struggle, in our current precarious situation we have another more immediate, urgent, pressing objective, that of ensuring our national survival.43 Barrera argued that the Generalitat would fail if it was itself restricted to being a simple administrative device. The Catalan government required greater self-government, and had to establish the target of re-Catalanizing Catalonia and of turning it into a model of efficiency and modernity. These same objectives reflect the most serious problems that Catalan society was facing at the beginning of the transition to democracy – an identity crisis, an incongruity with the modern world and an economic crisis which, according to Barrera’s discourse, stemmed from the abnormal situation of Catalonia as a nation lacking state structures.44 Heribert Barrera, when asked whether the Catalans should be grateful to the ‘fathers’ of the Constitution over twenty years after its ratification, replied: Not at all! The fathers of the Constitution led the country to this situation, to this mediocrity and, as for Catalonia, to a disastrous situation with a very dark future. Grateful for anything to the fathers of the Constitution? I didn’t vote for the Constitution and – as President Tarradellas said to me one day – that is the greatest honour of my political career.45 For his part, Barrera argues that the ERC’s objective is not a reform of the Statute as a means to broaden the powers of the Generalitat, but rather gaining direct access to sovereignty and rejecting an Autonomous Communities System, which, in his view, stands as ‘the superposition of new institutions on the pre-existent central administration’.46 Àngel Colom denounces the historical oppression suffered by the Catalans and observes that the 1979 Statute did not eliminate it.47 He criticizes the

94 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC Statute because it is opposed to the points that were agreed in the Assembly of Catalonia.48 On assessing ten years of the Statute of Autonomy and after denouncing the inadequacy of autonomous funding, Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira focuses his criticisms on three aspects. In his view, the 1979 Statute: (1) renounces control over public order, a power that had been included in the 1932 Statute of Autonomy abolished by Franco; (2) does not include – unlike what the Constitution established for Castilian – the duty to know Catalan, an omission that allows, despite its status as an official language of Catalonia, the aberrant right not to know Catalan in practice; and (3) does not guarantee political autonomy, but reinforces Catalan collective dependence.49 ERC criticizes the Statute of Autonomy and the 1978 Constitution which, in its view, have reduced Catalan autonomy to administrative selfgovernment. In this respect, the Catalan nationalist parties would be the representatives not of a nation but of a national minority, a minority in its own historical territory and an endangered phenomenon, in the face of the onrush of the new technologies and the media controlled from Madrid.50 Catalonia and the European Union ERC considers the consolidation of the European Union as a necessary alternative to the policy of the so-called ‘new world order’. Its objective is for the Catalan nation, once independent, to become a member state of the European Union. In the meantime, and in order to guarantee Catalonia’s participation in EU decision-making bodies, whenever they discuss matters concerning Catalonia’s devolved powers or specific interest, as foreseen in other countries, Catalonia should have its own representatives in the EU. On assessing the present situation, Carod-Rovira is sceptical towards the EU which, in his view, does not respect the rights of peoples and is guided by the objectives of the states forming it. ERC’s leader defends the need for a direct Catalan presence in European organizations, which to date does not exist. He writes: But we should not deceive ourselves; the Europe of the regions, whether or not the driving force of anything, is a great Utopia. Without denying the help that unofficial bodies such as the AER can offer – above all if they propose to act as a lobby – the real situation is different.51 ERC supports the idea of creating a European Constitution, transferring more power to the European Parliament and to the European Court of Human Rights. For ERC, the European Union should grant more power to the citizens of Europe, so that the Europe of states is replaced by a Confederation

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of peoples. The European Constitution should guarantee individual rights and also the collective rights of historical nations lacking their own states and establish the legal mechanisms necessary for them to exercise their right to self-determination.52

Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)-Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) The PSUC defines itself as a popular national party whose policies are grounded on the recognition of Catalonia’s right to self-determination, while bringing to the fore the relationship between class struggle and the defence of national identity. The PSUC endorses a policy closely linked to the fight for, and development of, democracy in Spain with the support of the working class.53 The PSUC, an essentially communist organization, gradually transformed over the years, first becoming federated with other political parties to form Iniciativa per Catalunya, or Initiative for Catalonia (IC) (1987), and later through its almost complete disappearance due to the merger within this federation, which opted to run in coalition with the ecologist party Els Verds or Greens (1993). The ‘fundamental and unrenounceable’ objective of the PSUC is the socialist transformation of society, in order to eliminate all forms of exploitation and oppression. The method of achieving this aim is to intensify and consolidate democracy. The PSUC fights for the interests and aspirations of the workers of Catalonia and of all the social sectors that suffer from any kind of exploitation, oppression or exclusion, as well as for the affirmation and expression of the national personality of Catalonia within the overall peoples of Spain.54 The essential aims of the PSUC include a desire to contribute democratically to Catalan and Spanish politics. The PSUC was formed on 23 July 1936, a few days after the Civil War broke out, as a result of the integration of four Catalan-wide political organizations: the Federació Catalana del PSOE, or Catalan Federation of the PSOE, the PCC, the USC (Unió Socialista de Catalunya, or Socialist Union of Catalonia) and the PCP (Partit Català Proletari, or Catalan Proletarian Party). The creation of the PSUC, although precipitated by the 18 July military uprising, responded to a series of previously initiated contacts between these parties. The USC was the most well-established party, and its leader, Joan Comorera, became the first General Secretary of the newly created PSUC. The incorporation of the PSUC into the Executive Council of the Generalitat alongside ERC was crucial for the subsequent development of the party. During the Civil War, the PSUC granted priority to winning

96 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC the war and to restoring the Republic, and this approach came up against the objectives of other working-class organizations, such as the trade union CNT (Confederació Nacional de Treballadors, or National Workers’ Confederation) and the political organization POUM (Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista, or Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification), for which the conflict was a revolutionary war which required social transformation as a precondition for military victory. These differences culminated in the tragic confrontation known as the May 1937 events between the government of the Generalitat, formed by ERC and the PSUC, and the FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibèrica, or Iberian Anarchist Federation) and the POUM. The latter were defeated, but the deaths and the subsequent political repression weighed heavily on the PSUC, which for decades endured the rejection of all collaboration by the heirs of the POUM and the Catalan Socialists. During Franco’s regime, the PSUC became the main and the best organized clandestine political party in Catalonia. In this context the PSUC, which maintained its independence from the PCE (Partido Comunista de España, or Spanish Communist Party), adopted an identity that combined communism, the struggle for democracy and Catalanism, and that was capable of attracting the support of various sectors of society beyond the strictly communist sector. The PSUC played a key role in the process of social and cultural integration of the thousands of immigrants who came to Catalonia in the 1960s, which avoided Lerrouxist phenomena such as those that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century. The PSUC was also important as an instigator of the Assembly of Catalonia in 1971. The advent of democracy imposed the need to abandon plural unitary platforms and to replace them with more precise definitions of each political formation. In this new period, the PSUC began a complex process which, finally, led to its dismemberment. Trouble was initiated when the ‘Eurocommunist’ sector, which followed the trend of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) since 1973 under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer and linked to the Eurocommunism defended by Santiago Carrillo, leader of the PCE, stood up against the ‘legitimist’ sector, which considered unitary democratic strategies as a stage en route towards a self-styled USSRtype revolution. This confrontation culminated in the 1978 PCE Congress when Carrillo attributed the lack of electoral support received by the party to the need to make further progress with Eurocommunism and proposed, among other symbolic measures, the suppression of any references to Lenin and Leninism in the statutes of the party. This also led to a crisis in the PSUC, which materialized in its V Congress, as already mentioned in Chapter 4. IC was founded in 1987 as a federation of parties whose objective was to promote a national left-wing alternative. The federation originally consisted of three parties: the PSUC, the PCC and the EN. IC was a federation, rather than a coalition, and from the start it sought the support of independent

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people. IC formed its own governing bodies and a protocol, although very considerable power was given to the founding parties. In 1989, as a result of a different position adopted on terrorism in a vote in the Catalan Parliament, the two representatives of the PCC were excluded from the IC parliamentary group and, at that point, the PCC announced that it no longer formed part of IC. IC’s III Assembly (Barcelona, 1993) meant the organizational consolidation and definitive social launch of the project for the renewal of the left led by the PSUC and represented by IC. The period that began in 1993 is characterized by the increasing importance of environmentalism, which culminated in IC’s alliance with Els Verds. The Statutes of the PSUC, approved in 1997, specify the objectives of this party in post-Franco Spain: the defence of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and its development and progressive transformation within the framework of the peaceful coexistence of Spaniards, the defence and extension of individual and collective freedoms and the consolidation and intensification of a genuinely representative democracy both at the institutional level and at that of the people’s participation; the national reconstruction of Catalonia, its self-government, the consolidation and progressive development of the Statute of Autonomy and of the institutions to be formed on the road to self-determination; the attainment of the objectives corresponding to the interests and the aspirations of workers and of popular sectors.55 In Article 8, Section Two of the Statutes (1997), the PSUC designates IC as the sole instrument for militancy and political action, and adds that the PSUC carries out all its political and social mediation through ICV, defined as ‘a political formation whose fundamental values are freedom, justice, equality, solidarity, national rights and the defence and preservation of the environment’.56 The terms that define ICV are: left-wing, democratic, national, transforming, caring, pacifist, egalitarian, feminist and environmentalist. ICV describes itself as a new type of political formation which intends to articulate the transforming left, going beyond the limits of traditional political parties. It should be noted that communism is absent from this definition, in sharp contrast with initial formulations of the PSUC’s ideology. In the following sections I establish a distinction between the position defended by the PSUC, which mainly corresponds to the beginning of the transition to democracy, and the position of ICV as a new political formation which took over from the PSUC and became consolidated after the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, involving the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, which deeply affected communist and socialist parties around the world, with a few notable exceptions, such as Cuba and China.

98 Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC Catalan identity Antoni Gutiérrez, former General Secretary of the PSUC, argues that there is a Catalonia different from that exemplified by conservative nationalism. Gutiérrez is aware that the PSUC is pursuing a new idea of Catalonia, in harmony with the working class.57 In his view, Catalonia is a national community with a millennial culture, language and history, although he recognizes, and this is crucial in the Catalan communist discourse, that 40 per cent of the Catalan population originates from other parts of Spain.58 The ‘image’ of Catalonia defended by the communists rejects the idea of an immutable and eternal nation. In their view, Catalonia has a territorial basis, a history, a language, specific features, culture and traditions that lie at the heart of its identity. Today’s Catalonia is the outcome of the actions and the projects of its citizens. Therefore, the national reconstruction of Catalonia should be understood as the reconstruction of a common homeland for all the people who live in Catalonia, irrespective of their origin, language or culture.59 According to the PSUC, to consider the Catalan nationality solely as a product of the bourgeoisie is as wrong as to reduce it to its popular elements. The features that have created the modern Catalan nationality are: (1) the establishment of an economic space which is different from that of the rest of Spain, where the industrial revolution took place a century later than in Catalonia; (2) the persistence of a popular culture based on a language and a collective psychology arising from a historical past which became stronger due to the differences in the development of economic structures; and (3) the relationship between some sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie and a centralist and bureaucratic Spanish state, able to guarantee the repression against the increasingly political opposition embodied by some sections of the Catalan working class.60 Rafael Ribó, currently IC’s leader, acknowledges the existence of a series of linguistic, cultural and historical factors common to the Països Catalans: a shared history as members of the Crown of Aragon ruled by the Count-King of Barcelona; a common language and culture; socio-economic factors, in particular the problems stemming from the policies applied by the Spanish centralist state; and the possibility of developing a collective consciousness despite the lack of common political projects.61 The areas forming the Països Catalans currently enjoy different degrees of cultural and linguistic consciousness. Ribó believes that it is necessary to work towards a ‘programme of collective awakening’ for the Països Catalans and that the first step should consist of the elaboration of a common political programme.62 For the PSUC, the cultural and socio-economic heritage shared by the Països Catalans represents an important legacy that should be enriched and protected.63 ICV defines the Catalan nation as a framework of social, economic, historical and cultural specificity, which, like any nation, is constantly transforming itself. ICV argues that, ultimately, it is for the citizens of Catalonia

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to hold the instruments capable of determining their individual and collective life. For ICV, Catalonia is its people, irrespective of their geographic and cultural origin and the language they use.64 ICV defends a plural Catalan identity and insists that ‘Catalonia is a single people’ which should not be subjected to any kind of division by way of language. Everyone is entitled to express themselves in the language of their choice and not to be discriminated against for this reason. In this context, ICV invokes the idea that Catalan culture has always been the product of a ‘mixture’ of many social ingredients without losing its own specificity. As we shall see later on, this idea is somehow related to the concept of Catalan culture as a ‘melting pot’ used by the PSC. ICV’s aim is to construct a society that ‘integrates the different cultural contributions of its components, having Catalan as its specific heritage, irrespective of the language that each person prefers to use’.65 Catalan nationalism/Catalanism The PSUC distinguishes between two types of Catalanism – one it defines as ‘conservative and folkloric’ and the other as ‘popular Catalanism’. The PSUC central committee considers Catalanism as a historically popular movement with a proven ability to integrate the working class, while endeavouring to seek unity with the other peoples of Spain – a Catalanism that has fought for the transformation of Spain into a democratic federation. Popular Catalanism assumes that Catalans will be the main actors in Catalan politics. The PSUC insists that mass Catalanism – it never uses the expression ‘nationalism’ – can only be a left-wing popular Catalanism, based on its capacity to integrate, and on its universalism and solidarity. Popular Catalanism cannot be compared with the traditional Catalan culture intended for the working class, but rather seeks to turn the working class into the main actor of cultural development.66 In the framework paper of the VIII Congress, the PSUC declares that: ‘In a situation such as ours, with a state consisting of several nationalities, the struggle for emancipation and social transformation is combined with the struggle for national rights.’67 This paper reflects the PSUC’s concern for a Catalonia which, in its view, is losing influence and direct control over its industrial and financial sectors, lacks sufficient power and is subjected to expressions of cultural standardization. It argues that: ‘We could be reduced to the expression of nationality as a synonym of language and culture. Although such a restrictive vision would encourage essentialist debates (are we or are we not a nation?), without adequate political power we would not even be able to maintain that identity.’68 ICV defends a plurinational idea of Spain which should fully recognize the historical nationalities. The document Sobirania i Solidaritat. Cap a l’Estat Federal (November 1994) argues:

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC The full recognition of the plurinational nature of the Spanish state has to involve the possibility to exercise the right to self-determination understood as the free ability of peoples to make their own decisions. This right is not, however, necessarily identified either with independence, although this is one of the possible solutions, or with sanctioning a text in a single act, such as a constitutional or statutory referendum.69

According to Miquel Caminal, a distinctive trait of ICV in relation to selfgovernment refers to its insistence on the defence of a unitary strategy, inherited from the PSUC and from the Assembly of Catalonia.70 Indeed, Ribó argues that Catalonia’s self-government has only advanced under the auspices of political unitary consensus among Catalan political parties, a policy never fostered by the CiU government. In his view, ‘one of the essential points that should define a feasible alternative programme for social, political and progressive change should involve a reflection on selfgovernment by all political forces’.71 ICV rejects the politically successful appropriation of the image of Catalonia and its symbols that, in their view, CiU and Pujolism have carried out for so long,72 and supports the idea of a plural Catalan identity. ICV considers that there are different types of Catalan nationalism and stands for the sovereignty of the Catalan nation in a context within which the popular sectors take central stage. For ICV, national freedoms should be closely connected to individual democratic freedoms and social achievements: ‘The political power currently enjoyed by Catalonia within the framework of the Statute of Autonomy and any further demands for greater selfgovernment should primarily be employed to the benefit of the popular sectors.’73 ICV’s demands greater self-government by observing and developing the Statute, advocating a constitutional reform including the modification of the Senate, invigorating the Catalan Parliament by bringing it closer to the citizens, as well as setting up a funding system based on solidarity among regions, including a fair and sufficient and financial autonomy for Catalonia, joint tax responsibility and inter-territorial solidarity.74 In point 6 of ICV’s programme for the 12 March 2000 general election, they proposed the following objectives for the Catalan language: 1 2 3

recover full normality in the use of Catalan as the language proper to Catalonia in all spheres of society; achieve recognition and full respect for the plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic reality of the Spanish state; and foster the external promotion of the Catalan language in all spheres.

In addition to these objectives, they wish to promote the regular presence of ‘the four official languages of the state in day-to-day life in conditions of equality, both in official use and in the socio-economic sphere’.

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Immigration In this section, it is again necessary to highlight the crucial role played by the PSUC during the Franco regime and the early years of the transition to democracy, when the word ‘immigrant’ solely referred to people from other parts of Spain. However, at the beginning of this new century, most immigrants originate from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; such a change is radically transforming the socio-cultural and political parameters once employed to analyse the Spanish-speaking immigration received by Catalonia in the 1960s. The term ‘immigrant’ therefore has a different meaning in these two historical periods. The PSUC argues that its main contribution to Catalonia’s national reconstruction consists of the connection it managed to establish between Catalonia’s native working class and that from other areas of Spain, uniting them in the struggle against exploitation and for the national liberation of Catalonia.75 Rafael Ribó observes that with ‘the struggle for freedom, with the struggle for rights as a distinct community, the historical tradition of this century continues’.76 Ribó considers that the progressive abandonment by the Catalan left of its nationalist demands and its inability to confront Spanish centralism are the main reasons for its electoral defeats.77 In contrast with Marx’s well-known statement, ‘the working men have no country’,78 Ribó writes that ‘the working class itself is national, in so far as it operates and develops in a certain historical setting, that is within a national structure that characterizes the social formation’.79 From the PSUC’s perspective, the reconstruction of Catalonia should combine the recovery of the essence of Catalan peculiarities and traditions with the promotion of an open project in which all Catalan citizens could take part.80 In this context, Catalan culture should be enriched by the various contributions of the immigrant population.81 The idea of an ‘immutable Catalan culture’ is rejected, and it is argued that the reconstruction of Catalonia should be based on the defence of the working class; the normalization of the Catalan language; a rejection of the idea that two opposing cultures, the Catalan and the immigrant, coexist in Catalonia; and the consolidation of democracy and of the Autonomous Communities System.82 The final objective is to transform Catalonia into the homeland of all of its citizens.83 It should be stressed that as early as the VIII Congress (1988), the PSUC predicted the increasing complexity that was to affect Catalonia’s social composition, the reason being the rising number of non-Spanish immigrants, prepared to do those jobs rejected by indigenous workers because of their poor economic or social status.84 In the PSUC’s view, it is of vital importance to recover a dynamic civil society, capable of engendering popular movements, something that can only be attained if all Catalan workers unite.85 It is imperative to avoid antagonism between the two communities based on language and ethnic origin by all means.86 Being a Catalan, as Jordi Borja argues, means belonging to a community and accepting that this involves enjoying full rights to

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participate in the construction of its collective future. The marginalization of Catalans born in other areas of Spain would be critical and would create a serious social fracture.87 In its 1993 general election programme, ICV refers to non-Spanish immigration as a new challenge that Catalan society needs to confront. In 2003, during the writing of this book, immigration has become one of the most pressing and controversial issues facing Catalonia, the rest of Spain and the European Union. According to ICV, Catalonia needs to construct a society enriched by the coexistence of people from different cultures and origins. It is essential to counteract any outbreak of racism and xenophobia and to prevent the emergence of a dividing line making social sectors or classes coincide with particular ethnic groups. It is also necessary to prevent this division from being sanctioned by laws leading to the marginalization and discrimination of the political and social rights of people residing in the same place because of their origin. In its 2000 general election programme, ICV advanced a series of measures destined to favour the social integration of immigrants and pointed at diversity as ‘a necessary condition for the viability of urban industrial societies such as ours’.88 ICV criticizes the different models of integration applied by the United States, France and Great Britain because, according to this party, all three have failed, in part, in not recognizing that a large number of coexistence conflicts arise from social asymmetries and not from cultural differences. According to ICV, social integration is only possible whenever adequate legal integration measures are in place. For ICV, cultural integration is impossible if minimum levels of socio-economic integration and the disappearance of inequalities are not successfully achieved. ICV is in favour of extending European citizenship to all those who have lived in the European Union for at least three years as a strategy aimed at guaranteeing the right to free movement, voting rights and the right to settle in any member state.89 It should be added that, in ICV’s view, it would be utopian to consider that an idyllic view of multiculturalism can be achieved, ‘as there will always be a certain threshold of conflict in the coexistence of groups which set themselves apart from each other’.90 Catalonia and Spain The PSUC’s discourse defines Catalonia as a nation integrated in the Spanish state. According to Ribó: Throughout its history, the Spanish state has used the idea of a single nation [. . .] to reproduce ideologically an abstract equality and uniformity which hinders the free expression of the different communities.91 Ribó condemns the strong centralist component present in the construction of the Spanish state, a centralism that in most periods has been accompanied

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by political authoritarianism,92 invoked by very different political tendencies which share a strong Spanish nationalism.93 In 1990, IC defined Spain as a multinational state and pointed to the recognition of sovereignty and national trends as preconditions for democratic advancement towards a federal union. In its view, the Autonomous Communities System represents one of the first steps in the process that should lead to federalism.94 The PSUC supported the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. Josep Benet, the historical leader of the Catalan left, requested a mass positive response to the referendum on the Statute, because he considered that this would increase the power of Catalonia on negotiating with the Spanish state. For Benet, the Statute was the means to make Spanish centralism disappear.95 Another element to be found in the communist discourse refers to the idea that Catalonia should contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Spain.96 Although the Catalan communists defend the idea of a federal democratic republic for Catalonia, they accept the monarchy in so far as it is capable of constitutionally guaranteeing a true democracy, which recognizes the sovereignty of the Parliament and does not hinder social and political democracy.97 The PSUC demands self-determination for all the peoples of Spain,98 and postulates a reform of the Constitution aimed at the creation of a federal state reflecting the multicultural nature of Spain.99 According to the PSUC, federalism is a means to go beyond the current model of state and it should be applied not just to Spain, but also to the EU.100 The resolution of the ‘national issue’ lies in the self-determination of the nationalities included within the Spanish state. For the PSUC, Catalonia’s self-determination responds to a demand for sovereignty without which cooperation with Spain on an equal level is impossible. Sovereignty is also essential to guarantee Catalonia’s presence within the European Union.101 Equality between the languages, cultures and nations forming Spain should be achieved within a context of solidarity. The Catalan communists defend self-determination for Catalonia as an effective tool to strengthen its national character, its language and culture, while simultaneously improving the living conditions of its citizens. The PSUC argues that Catalonia, as a historical nation, is entitled to assert its viewpoint and to establish relations within its national sphere, and that this would encourage cooperation among the Països Catalans.102 For its part, in its Fifth National Assembly (1998), ICV considered that ‘if the Spanish state does not advance decisively in its self-definition as a plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic reality, organized freely in a federal manner, this will turn into a serious obstacle for the well-being and development of its peoples and citizens’.103 Article 2.4 of the Principles and ideology of ICV stresses that, as a result of the autonomous process, Catalonia is not a sovereign body, because the only constituent subject is the Spanish nation, and because the Spanish state has been created taking the national sovereignty of the Spanish people as a starting point, while a federal

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state would originate from an agreement between pre-existing sovereign communities. ICV concludes that ‘the Spanish state is a plurinational reality with a territorial basis and asymmetric federalism is the formula which would allow unity to be reconciled with the recognition of internal diversity’. This type of federalism, that ICV also describes as ‘asymmetric plurinational’, involves: The recognition of differential powers in areas such as language, culture, media, internal security and others that may arise from national particularities applied in such a way that the use of these powers does not entail economic privileges for one autonomous community or benefits for its dominant social groups. The process of federalization requires a funding system based on the principles of sufficient financial autonomy, joint tax responsibility and solidarity; it also involves recognizing selfdetermination as a means of exercising the sovereignty of peoples.104 The process towards asymmetric federalism should have two phases. The first should involve a boost to political autonomy and the development of the potentialities of the Constitution, while the second phase should include a reform of the Constitution and the establishment of a broad agreement among the different political parties, significant institutions and the citizens. While acknowledging that over twenty years of enjoying the 1978 Constitution has resulted in a very substantial degree of decentralization and a considerable devolution of powers and resources to the autonomous communities, ICV stresses that the Spanish constitutional framework contains some ‘limitations, insufficiencies and contradictions which should lead to its reform’. They also note that a constitutional amendment is essential to advancing asymmetric federalism, to attaining an effective recognition of the plurinational nature of Spain, to modifying the concept of sovereignty and to expanding rights and solidarity.105 At the same time, it would be necessary to bear in mind the changes caused by the progressive political integration of the European Union and new migration flows. Catalonia and the European Union In this section I distinguish between the PSUC’s position before Spain joined the European Union and subsequent statements by ICV, corresponding to a different political context marked by membership of the EU. In the document Europa comunitària: una proposta del PSUC (1987), published just before the first election to the European Parliament that took place in Spain in June 1987, the PSUC expressed its support for Spain’s membership of the EU (then the European Community). The PSUC considered its struggle for a united Europe, with its peoples and citizens as the main actors, to be an important part of the democratic advance towards socialism. As early as 1987, the PSUC demanded the status of European electoral district for Catalonia, and stood for a Europe aspiring to ‘break up

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geographic limitations and corporatist selfishness, while respecting national and regional characteristics’. The PSUC supported the consolidation of an autonomous Europe, to which it proposed to contribute through its collaboration with other left-wing European political forces. The text mentions the PSUC’s coincidence with the PCE regarding this particular matter. ICV stands in favour of the economic, political and social unity of the European Union forging ahead with the setting up of a federal structure capable of promoting both the whole and each of its parts as a shared heritage.106 According to ICV, the ability to attain social and environmental quality exemplifies one of the main challenges currently faced by the left, which should also prove its critical and innovative competence in tackling this issue. A positive outcome would only be possible through transnational collaboration among left-wing organizations. From this perspective, the EU represents a strategic option for the European left, which wants to advance in the development of transformation policies. This is why the European Union, in ICV’s view, should not be restricted to monetary integration, but rather should evolve in matters concerning labour strategies, safety regulations, social cohesion and the coordination of macroeconomic policies. ICV is in favour of a progressive, prosperous, social, educated, environmentally friendly and caring EU, but also of an EU capable of democratizing its own institutions and accepting the challenge posed by its enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Article 2.5 of the Principles and ideology of ICV says: We want the European Union to be the instrument to overcome the limitations of traditional states, to strengthen the interrelation between its peoples, to ensure the peace and well-being of all its members.

Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC (PSC-PSOE)) The PSC (PSC-PSOE) stresses the plural nature of the origin of political Catalanism and defines its own type of Catalanism (it rejects the expression ‘Catalan nationalism’ to define its discourse) as based upon an idea of the nation and of society in which the citizens play the main role.107 Federalism is considered as a decisive aspect of the PSC’s progressive Catalanism, which rejects the dichotomy between Catalans and Spaniards as well as references to the Spanish state as an ‘external enemy’. The PSC’s aim is to create a classless society, free from exploitation, domination, discrimination and oppression. In its IV Congress (November 1984), the party accepted Marxism as a method of analysis and as a tool for the transformation of reality. It also accepted all the contributions made throughout history, and from different schools of thought, with the aim of overthrowing the capitalist system. The key elements that characterize the model of society advocated by the PSC

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The collapse of Soviet communism, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), had a considerable impact on European socialism and communism. In the framework paper of its VII Congress (1994), the PSC echoed this general feeling among the left: The balance of the communist regimes, beyond the totalitarian tragedies, is truly pathetic: it shows no advantage in relation to the results obtained by the European social states, either in the field of economic productivity or in the field of social justice; quite the opposite.109 This position signalled the disappearance of the term ‘Marxism’ from PSC documents. In 1994, the socialists already defined full democracy as their main objective, and recognized ‘the need for a profound renewal of the transformation project of the left’, while rejecting both the ‘old model of the left’ and the emerging neo-liberalism.110 The IX Congress (June 2000) identified the party’s objectives for political action as ‘social justice, equality of rights and the strengthening of the Catalan national situation, thus consolidating its plural identity within Spain in the context of a changing world’.111 The method aimed at fulfilling these objectives should mainly focus on four points: (1) widening democracy, selfgovernment and federalism; (2) favouring economic progress for everyone, by promoting new opportunities within a general framework of sustainability; (3) strengthening social cohesion and the welfare state; and (4) the will to boost global progress for the whole of humanity.112 The main objectives of the Catalan Socialists are the promotion of the Catalan nation, understood as a merger of historical Catalan culture with the culture of the immigrant population, and the consolidation of the democratic Spanish state with the support of all of its nationalities and regions. In the political declaration of the VI Congress, Article 4 (October 1990) refers directly to the relations between Catalonia and Spain: As followers of the socialist movement and of progressive Catalanism, the Catalan Socialists regard the struggle for socialism and national freedom for Catalonia as inseparable objectives of our political project. We carry out this fight as a sovereign party, federally united with the PSOE, convinced that the construction of socialism in Catalonia and the construction of Catalonia as a nation cannot be isolated from the construction of socialism in the general sphere and from the construction of a democratic Spain, as a federal community of peoples.113

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In the documents defining the ideology of the Catalan Socialists there is an explicit absence of references to the right to self-determination. This derives from their gradualist and federalizing idea of the Autonomous Communities System; however, the document Per Catalunya. Ara un nou federalisme (For Catalonia. Now a new federalism) refers to the people of Catalonia’s desire for self-government as a central element of political Catalanism.114 Even so, it is not the same to aspire to self-determination, that is to the right of a nation to decide on how it wants to rule itself, as to aspire to self-government, which means that a nation wishes to be ruled by its own people, a statement which does not necessarily involve the right to decide on ‘how’ and by which institutions a nation should be ruled. The PSC (PSC-PSOE) originated from the unification of the PSC (C) (Congress), the FSC (PSOE) (Federació Socialista de Catalunya, or Socialist Federation of Catalonia) and the PSC (R) (Regrouping). The process for the unification of the three parties took place in the Unification Congress or I PSC (PSC-PSOE) Congress on 16 July 1978, after holding the respective PSC (C), PSC (R) and FSC (PSOE) dissolution congresses the previous day. The differences existing at the time of unification are clearly illustrated by the ‘Unity Protocols’ of each party. For instance, on the question of sovereignty, the PSC (R) considered the new PSC to be a sovereign party with its own representation in the Socialist International. In the final document, the new party only maintained sovereignty in the sphere of Catalonia and from then on the PSOE would be the only representative in international organizations.115 Indeed, in its point 4, the Unity Protocol (the foundational document of the new party) explains: The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE) will have full sovereignty in those domains that the socialists of Catalonia require for the political organization of our country, in accordance with the constitutional framework approved in its programme by the socialists of the whole state. There were tense moments during the unification process, both in Joan Reventós’s PSC (C) and in Josep Pallach’s PSC (R). In the PSC (C), the tensions were mainly due to the so-called ‘II Congress tendency’, which was more pro-Catalan and which expressed differences of opinion concerning the surrender of sovereignty by the new party to the PSOE. Further tension arose from the relationship with the PSOE and from trade union options. The PSC (R)’s decision to merge with the PSC (C) and the FSC (PSOE) caused an internal split in this party; one sector joined CDC, and another ERC. The sharp tension experienced in the PSC (R) Congress on 8 January 1977 culminated in the death, on 11 January, of Josep Pallach, its indisputable leader.116 The PSC (R) was the party that lost most members in the process of creating the PSC (PSC-PSOE), and this was reflected in the representation it obtained within the executive committee of the new party, within which the PSC (C),

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led by Joan Reventós, and the FSC (PSOE), led by Josep Maria Triginer, had eleven members, while the PSC (R), under Josep Verde i Aldea, who had replaced Pallach, only had three. Two divergent ideas of socialism came together in the PSC. On the one hand, the tradition originating from the PSC (C) finds its historical roots in Catalanism, anarcho-syndicalism and the cooperative movement; it is anti-centralist, anti-state and self-governing, with strong influences from social Christianity. On the other hand, the PSOE’s socialism represents a state, secular socialism of working-class tradition. It could be argued that ‘within the general framework of socialism, the socialist tradition of the PSOE stems from a “statist” conception; while that of the PSC (C), on the contrary, arises from a “societal” conception’.117 These two traditions have somehow survived at the heart of the PSC and have been responsible for some discrepancies within the party. Since its constitution, two internal crises have threatened the stability of the PSC. The first took place at the II Congress of the party (Barcelona, 1980), following the defeat suffered in the first election to the Catalan Parliament and the discrepancies on preparing the lists of candidates, in which those in favour of maintaining separate representatives for each party (as agreed on merging) came up against Raimon Obiols’ ‘unitarian’ stream. This prompted a confrontation between the working-class sector from the FSC (PSOE), led by Carlos Cigarràn and convinced that socialism is not nationalist; the ‘unitarians’ led by Obiols who attributed their electoral defeat to the PSC’s inability to present itself as a progressive, pro-Catalan party; and the ‘critics’, a minority sector in favour of positioning the party further to the left, and who ended up giving their support to the sector led by Obiols regarding national and internal organization matters. The party managed to overcome the crisis after the PSOE’s intervention. Joan Reventós endeavoured, although unsuccessfully (the working-class sector refused), to reconstruct the lost unity. Obiols, with the support of Josep M. Sala, was entrusted with re-structuring and re-organizing the party from the executive. In any case, the II PSC Congress led to the complete abandonment of separate representation of the founding parties through quotas. The second internal crisis took place after the attempted coup d’état in February 1981, and was caused by the agreement between UCD and the PSOE on the regulation of autonomous communities and the subsequent sanctioning of the LOAPA, as mentioned above. Years later, Joan Reventós reflected on these events during his intervention in a course organized by the Centre for International Historical Studies at the University of Barcelona. He said:

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I believe that the agreement with the PSOE was positive, but too often we, the Catalan Socialists, have had to swallow tough things that the PSOE has done and that we did not like. [. . .] At one time we were about to split up because of the LOAPA. And I was responsible for the PSC, united with the PSOE and absorbed in the Catalan PSOE, not splitting, because I thought that, despite everything, it was better to swallow the unpleasant LOAPA, than to break what had taken so much to achieve, that was the unity of Catalan socialism.118 This crisis caused by the LOAPA was mitigated by the PSOE victory in the 28 October 1982 general election. The presence of PSC ministers in the central government (Narcís Serra, Ernest Lluch and, subsequently, Joan Majó and Jordi Solé Tura) and the consolidation of the socialists as the leading political party in Spain, with a further election victory in 1986 and the victories in the local elections of 1983 and 1987, contributed to stabilizing the party, now led by Raimon Obiols, General Secretary between 1983 and 1996. Narcís Serra became General Secretary in the VIII Congress (1996) and Pasqual Maragall was the PSC’s candidate to the presidency of the Generalitat of Catalonia in the 1999 and the 2003 autonomous election. Catalan identity Isidre Molas, a key socialist ideologist, asserts the historical character of the nation, as the social basis of the state, and refuses to conceive it as a static, immutable entity.119 In his view, the social classes coexisting within the same nationality offer different national projects. The Catalan Socialists understand Catalonia as a ‘nation to be remade, reconstructed, invigorated’120 and which ‘should be respected’.121 Joan Reventós refers to Catalonia as a ‘single national community – “a single people”, as proclaimed recently in a different tone – not just because of its history and specific features, but also, and above all, because we accept the historical need for a national project for the working people’.122 The PSC Manifesto (1999) propounds federal Catalanism as a model through which Catalonia can have its specificity recognized: Catalonia expresses its national character through its history, language, culture, law and politics. The indispensable recognition of its distinctiveness should also mean that the citizens of Catalonia can fully exercise the rights that arise from it.123 In the document Per Catalunya. Ara un nou federalisme, Catalonia is defined as a nation, in line with Ernest Renan’s well-known idea that the nation is the result of a daily plebiscite:

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC We are a nation because here and now we the citizens of Catalonia want to be and this leads to our aspiration to self-government through our own institutions. This means having the ambition to expand as far as possible our capacity to decide for ourselves in the different fields of public activity and to strengthen the identification of the people of Catalonia with its institutions of self-government.124

The same document recognizes that: The nation is self-government, the collective will to be; but it is also a set of intangible symbols and elements with which we identify to a greater or lesser degree [. . .]. And there is no people, country, or nation, without signs of national identity that unite them, draw them together, give them an overview, allow them to be strong in the world, to be worth something and to be something. [. . .] What we must do is to prevent them from being elements of exclusion and segregation and to convert them into factors of synthesis and of aggregation.125 From this perspective, the PSC encourages all segments of society to participate in the process of devoting themselves, with no regrets, to the recreation of the collective identity of Catalonia, to ‘the reactivation of the old Catalan melting pot’, which should have as its basic prerequisites the guarantee that the process is truly open to diversity, without restrictions, including linguistic diversity and freedom as a present and future value and, moreover, the guarantee that Catalan, the language proper to the country, will be saved, will become a common cause for all citizens.126 In the 1999 autonomous election, the PSC ran with the new independent platform, CpC, established in 1998 and promoted by Pasqual Maragall. CpC, chaired by Josep Maria Vallés, former vice-chancellor of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, sought an alternative form of politics, outside conventional party political structures. CpC was created as a civic movement in support of Maragall’s candidature to the presidency of the Generalitat. Its objectives were determined by its will to bring politics closer to the citizens and to add prestige to public life; the struggle against all kinds of social exclusion; and a defence of a progressive, caring and integrative Catalanism that promotes self-government and contributes, from Catalonia, to the construction of a federal Spain.127 In the 1999 election, CpC obtained 15 seats in the Catalan Parliament, forming part of the PSC-CpC parliamentary group. In their Programa de govern (Manifesto) for the 1999 autonomous election, the PSC and CpC undertook to promote a linguistic policy based on a wide

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social consensus, involving a positive perception of Catalan by all citizens and extending its social use, while avoiding regulatory and unilateral actions.128 The Catalan Socialists sought to promote a common policy for the Catalan linguistic domain, either through a multilateral consensus of the autonomous communities, or through the Spanish government, acting as a driving force.129 They also undertook to establish a platform for the international promotion of Catalan language and culture. The PSC and CpC consider ‘Castilian to be an expression of the cultural wealth of Catalonia and, therefore, also as a common legacy of the Catalans’.130 Catalan nationalism/Catalanism The socialists of Catalonia identify a predominantly democratic and progressive, reforming and modernizing component in the conservative Catalanism of Enric Prat de la Riba and the left-wing Catalanism represented by Francesc Macià and Lluís Companys. The PSC considers itself to be heir to the federal movement, to Josep Rovira and Josep Pallach’s Front de la Llibertat, or Freedom Front, to the democratic movement and to the working-class movement. Catalanism as a mass movement was historically born from the struggle against the dictatorship and from the working-class, the national and cultural resistance of the MSC, the FOC [Front Obrer de Catalunya] and the historical FC-PSOE [Federació Catalana del PSOE].131 Molas argues that Catalan nationalism is the common heritage of all Catalan political parties.132 This idea is echoed in the PSC’s documents, which state that ‘Political Catalanism has been a plural movement just as Catalonia has been and remains plural’.133 One of the most important challenges faced by the PSC consists of combining national and social interests. Solé Tura argues that ‘the left cannot be nationalist, but must be profoundly national’, while González Casanova endeavours to synthesize the components of what he calls ‘left-wing Catalan nationalism’. According to Solé Tura, the left cannot succumb to the ambiguities of nationalism in relation to the current Spanish state model, and should not cultivate the dichotomy between ‘us’, Catalonia, and ‘them’, Spain. He also insists, however, that the left cannot neglect the ‘national question’ or become a simple instrument for the implementation of the central government’s decisions. He maintains that ‘the left should be profoundly national and at the same time show considerable solidarity with all the nationalities and regions of Spain’.134 But ‘the left should have deep roots in the community,

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express the sentiments and the aspirations of all popular sectors, and reflect the concerns and expectations of the majority of the population’.135 Solé Tura condemns the tendency of some Catalan and Basque nationalists to promote ‘particularisms’ and to raise sporting, cultural or political rivalries up to the category of symbols that define the essence of the nation, the overall result being a relationship with the ‘central power’ in which conflict precedes negotiation and agreement, and stands up above all other issues.136 Solé Tura maintains that ‘officially Spain is not and cannot be a federal state unless the Constitution is modified’. Even so, he argues that ‘what is important is not the name but the object. What is important is that in the end the Spanish state operates as a federal state’, adding that ‘this is perfectly possible within the current constitutional text’.137 According to Solé Tura, the left should perform an integrative and unifying function within each nationality or region, without succumbing to isolation due to victimization, and should work towards the construction of a true Autonomous Communities System. For Josep Antoni González Casanova, the Spanish federalism of Francesc Pi i Margall and the Marxism of the first Catalan communists constitute the historical roots of Catalan nationalism. In his view, the two core ideas guiding left-wing nationalist strategy are the conviction that the Catalan nationalist cause is closely connected to the democratization of Spain, and that the struggle for Catalan self-government can only prosper if Catalan workers play a more prominent role and receive support and solidarity from other Spanish workers.138 He argues that a reciprocal integration of the cultures that coexist in Catalonia, free from confrontation, hegemonies and discrimination, would contribute to the construction of a Spanish state including different ‘political nations’ and, for Gonzalez Casanova, the promising task of building up the state must necessarily involve the autonomous communities.139 Antoni Castells is concerned with the left’s political commitment to Catalan society, and argues that the left’s political project will not be fulfilled if credibility and initiative regarding the ‘Catalan question’ are not recovered. In his view the left should express ‘with adequate clarity the reasonable fears relative to the fact that the Autonomous Communities System, as it is being built, will not resolve Catalonia’s historical dispute with the Spanish state’.140 According to Pasqual Maragall, President of the PSC, nationalism is a generic position [. . .] which in most countries of the world is identified with chauvinism and conservatism. It is a heterogeneous tendency, made up of very diverse ingredients, the sole shared point consisting of being or feeling as victims of an external force.

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In contrast: Catalanism represents adherence to the identity of a specific homeland, this one, my own. Nationalism and Catalanism are two different formulations, although historically they have overlapped and been used legitimately in an indiscriminate or equivalent manner. [. . .] We should speak decidedly on behalf of a Catalonia that goes beyond classical nationalism, understood as mere survival and mere defence.141 Point 2 of the Resolució sobre catalanisme i municipalisme (Resolution on Catalanism and municipalism), approved by the VII PSC Congress (1994), specifies the ‘basic characteristics of a strategic reorientation of Catalanism’, which would have to include the following points: (1) development of a strategy with great creative freedom, with big spaces for social prominence, within which the appeal to civil society is not a rhetorical figure; a strategy with few rules, but binding; (2) coexistence and social cohesion; (3) competitiveness; (4) an appropriate territorial strategy; and (5) the open and generous implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, in addition to the gradual federalization of the institutional organizational model, both within Catalonia and at state level, and also as regards the European federal pyramid.142 When discussing social cohesion, the Resolució sobre catalanisme i municipalisme mentions culture and language. According to point 2.10, the main danger for Catalan culture is not Castilian or Anglo-Saxon culture as some may argue. We should make sure that we get the right enemy; the true danger is decadence; internal decadence or the decadence of the European project. In a decadent Catalonia, without cohesion, without a national will arising from the plural nature of the people, Catalan would have no future. Only within a blooming Catalonia, again a pioneer of the best causes, will the Catalan language become a factor of unity, in short, a common cause. The text goes on to highlight the fundamental importance of the Catalan language in protecting the country’s identity and stands for ‘the full recovery of the language until it is transformed into Catalonia’s proper language’.143 A constant aspect of the socialist discourse is the insistence on the need to protect and develop the welfare state. At his ESADE (Escola Superior d’Aministració d’Empreses) business school speech (28 May 2001), Maragall reaffirmed the need to maintain the welfare state by increasing contributions in order to make the system sustainable, and spoke against reducing services and benefits: ‘For us social cohesion is a basic value to be preserved; moreover, it is essential to guarantee the competitiveness and the sustained growth of any territory.’144 Three pillars support the policy of equity and

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social cohesion proposed by Maragall: ‘Priority for education, the development of social services to help families and dignifying the districts of our cities.’145 Immigration A further recurrent theme in the discourse of the Catalan Socialists concerns the emphasis on the need to involve immigrants in the creation of a united Catalan society.146 Isidre Molas argues that the historical success of Catalanism depends on avoiding having citizens who do not feel Catalan.147 For Raimon Obiols, ‘the unity and equality of all the citizens of Catalonia’ are the basic ideas of the socialist discourse.148 The following paragraph clearly spells out the PSC and CpC’s position regarding the model of Catalonia that they want to promote more than twenty years after the reestablishment of the Generalitat: A Catalanism based only on linguistic and cultural aspects runs the risk of excluding from its approach a considerable part of Catalan society, whose first language is not Catalan. To say that to be a Catalanist it is necessary to express oneself in Catalan and to be immersed in Catalan culture means, at present, to exclude 50 per cent of the population. Hence, it is to weaken the cause that it is intended to defend. Our selfgovernment will be strengthened when the citizens of Catalonia, who do not express themselves in Catalan but who see self-government as a way to exercise their rights and to defend their interests, are in favour of it and see it as theirs (and therefore participate in electoral processes). For this reason, it is important to underline two aspects of the close connection between Catalanism and self-government. On the one hand, self-government allows the interests of all Catalans to be defended, irrespective of their cultural origin. On the other, it offers the possibility to develop a common project for the country, in which cultural identity is constructed day by day, as a result of social dynamics and ambition, and has the will to guarantee the continuity of the linguistic and cultural elements that history has bequeathed us.149 The PSC and CpC are in favour of respectful exchanges with neighbouring, and even distant, cultures from the standpoint of a Catalan cultural space.150 In this context, the Catalan Socialists undertake to defend the civic and social rights of all Catalans and also to contribute to defending their cultural rights, which include ‘the right to an identity which does not reject difference’. They state that ‘all culture created and produced in Catalonia will form a part of Catalan culture’.151 In his talk, Immigració. Oportunitat i repte per a Catalunya (Immigration. Opportunity and challenge for Catalonia), given at the Auditorium of the

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Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona on 4 April 2001, Maragall interpreted the rising number of foreigners coming to Catalonia as a great opportunity to reconsider Catalan identity. Maragall declared that: I think that as a people with an open and progressive mentality we should believe and argue that multiculturalism is possible. And work to make it viable. Not a multiculturalism based on a relativism implying that everything is the same, or that nothing is worth defending. Of course we recognize that we have our own, millennial culture, but it has been formed gradually and enriched through contact with external influences. Culture cannot be something static, or sacred, which is recorded and remains forever more. Culture is created by the people who form a country, who live and work in it, who know and respect the legacy of their ancestors, but who know how to transform it through their own life. Culture is dynamic, and the more dynamic it is, the more plural, lively and the more democratic it will be.152 Catalonia and Spain Spain is defined in the 1999 Manifesto as a ‘culturally plural reality with four languages and four basic cultures: Castilian, Catalan, Galician and Basque’; added is the statement that ‘Spain must recognize and assume this plurality’.153 The PSC proposes a federal deployment of the Constitution, permitting the current transformation of the Autonomous Communities System and the process of European unity to be deepened. According to the political paper 5.1 of the IX Congress (June 2000): Catalonia has to lead the process of transformation of Spain. Catalonia is stronger when its arguments are understood and shared by the other peoples of Spain, and we advance together in the same direction. In their V Congress (1987), the Catalan Socialists had already argued in favour of making progress with the federal formulation of the Autonomous Communities System through the accomplishment of the federalist potential contained in the Constitution.154 In their opinion, the Autonomous Communities System has not completely solved the problem of the historical nationalities, and has even created new problems arising from the overlapping of different administrative models. In addition, while the Autonomous Communities System was being created, a parallel historical revision of the concept of Spain, clearly expressing its plurinational composition, was not undertaken.155 This fact, according to the Catalan Socialists, has generated serious misunderstanding and mistrust between the state and the historical autonomous

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communities. For the socialists, the federalization of the state would solve such problems through the construction of a ‘real Spain of nationalities in opposition to both a uniform Spain and a Spain of cantonalism’.156 The PSC’s federalist proposal involves five points: 1 2 3 4 5

Federalism as a mechanism to distribute powers between the state and the autonomous communities. In-depth reform of the state administration affecting both central and peripheral services. In-depth reform of the Senate to transform it into a chamber of territorial representation reflecting the multinational character of Spain. A new autonomous funding model based on the principles of autonomy and financial sufficiency, joint fiscal responsibility and inter-regional solidarity. Strengthening the role of local corporations in the new structure of territorial power.157

Raimon Obiols defends the federalist proposal of the PSC, but at the same time recognizes that within Spanish socialism there is a tension between federalist and centralist tendencies, and that the latter is greatly influenced by the Jacobin and statist ethics impregnating the culture of the French left.158 In this respect, the PSC’s federalist proposal prompted hostile reactions from some PSOE members. Alfonso Guerra, former Deputy Prime Minister of Spain and PSOE Vice-secretary, stated that ‘the 1978 Constitution does not favour the configuration of Spain as a federal state’.159 Gregorio Peces Barba, one of the most outstanding figures of the PSOE elite, stressed that ‘federalism assumes the prior existence of sovereign states which decide to unite in order to create a single state. This is not the case in Spain given the absence of these prior sovereign states.’160 Some further objections originated from those arguing that to turn Spain into a federation would require a reform of the Constitution. A further sector of opposition to the federalist project emerged from Catalan nationalist formations, such as CiU, which argue that federalism would place all the autonomous communities on the same footing. In line with such arguments, Juan José Laborda, former Speaker of the Senate, indicated that the Catalan and Basque nationalisms were reluctant to accept federalism because they want to have an exclusive bilateral relationship with the state.161 On assessing the possible obstacles to the federal project, Jordi Solé Tura mentions the technocratic neocentralism of the Spanish state and the political hegemony of nationalism in the autonomous communities. He argues that both elements reflect the persistence of the conflict defining the relationship between the state and the nationalities and regions, as well as the perpetuation of a certain ambiguity when outlining the concept of the nation and the territorial framework of the state.162

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As Miquel Caminal argues, ‘just as it is difficult to find the term “selfdetermination” in PSC texts and when found it is almost always awkwardly used, so “asymmetry” is an inconvenient concept’.163 The PSC does not accept this term as such, but rather subsumes it in the expression ‘differential federalism’. According to Caminal, all the federalisms of the PSC (democratic, dual, cooperative, autonomist, municipalist, differential) end up coming together in the cooperative method which essentially identifies it, but which needs to complement it with the principle of subsidiarity on facing centralizing tendencies, and with the differential aspect when facing standardizing tendencies.164 The Catalan Socialists offer a positive assessment of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy.165 As Eduardo Martín Toval wrote during the referendum campaign on the 1979 Statute, ‘it may not be the ideal Statute’, but what really matters is its capacity to attain the political objectives that the Catalans are pursuing in this specific period.166 Joan Reventós indicated, in declarations to El País, that the 1979 Statute was an element capable of contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Spain.167 Raimon Obiols considered both the 1978 Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy to be ‘satisfactory’,168 but, during the commemoration in the Catalan Parliament of the tenth anniversary of the Statute, he concluded that the autonomous process had not been completed and that it required ‘a new impulse to further self-government’. He also acknowledged the existence of ‘centralizing tendencies’ within the central administration – a clear reference to his counterparts in the PSOE.169 It should be recalled that, to solve the national question, the socialists of the PSOE had suggested granting ‘autonomous community’ status to all Spanish regions, and not just to the ‘historical’ nationalities.170 The PSC and CpC 1999 Manifesto assesses the transition to democracy, during which Catalonia was generous and yielded more than it demanded, because we all knew that the consolidation of democracy in Spain was the priority. The outcome was the calculated ambiguity of the 1978 Constitution, which did not dare to define which languages are spoken in Spain and should be accepted by the state as their own. After twenty years, it is fair to expect explicit recognition as a nation, resulting in a categorical acceptance of the historical nationalities, in the drafting and application of basic laws, in the modus operandi of the democratic state, in major strategic options and in the decisive assumption of linguistic and cultural diversity.171 On presenting his assessment of the devolution process in a talk given at the Club Siglo XXI in Madrid, Pasqual Maragall argued that:

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Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC It could be said that sacrificing the expression of difference and of the national plurality of Spain was the price paid by Catalonia and the Basque Country to permit the construction and the consolidation of Spanish democracy.

Referring to the future, he added that: Nowadays, the core of the new constitutional agreement would have to mean that the historical nationalities – Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia – accept the generalization of autonomous communities, equality of powers and a balanced model, in exchange for the other communities recognizing the plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic diversity of Spain and, consequently, the political expressions of its differential aspects.172 In his talk at ESADE (28 May 2001), Maragall stated that: Catalonia should offer Spain a new agreement: federalism and subsidiarity are the political concepts that should encourage us to advance in a joint venture with the peoples of Spain and improve Catalonia’s leadership capacity.173 Catalonia and the European Union The PSC defines itself as ‘a party with a European vocation’,174 committed to boosting its integration in Europe and to promoting the European debate. The PSC’s objective is for ‘Catalonia to be perfectly integrated in European politics, economics, society and culture with a guarantee for its identity. [. . .] We must be aware that our future is Europe.’175 Maragall observes that: We need to find a balance between growth and equality, between competitiveness and cohesion. In our Europe, only a strong, united society is in a position to achieve continuous, stable growth, and only with stable and continuous growth will we be in a position to implement the necessary welfare policies.176 The Declaration of the Party of European Socialists (The Hague, November 1992) exhibits the commitment of European socialists and social democrats to the process of European integration. In the framework paper of the VII Congress, the socialists stand in favour of the organization of Europe as a market, but also as a political power. In their view, ‘Europe can only be perceived as a plurinational political reality.’177 The Catalan Socialists emphasize the importance of two fundamental criteria when considering European integration – federalism and the principle of subsidiarity. Federalism is defined as a criterion for social and political organization. The principle

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of subsidiarity, from a federalist perspective, incorporates both the principle of the majority and civil freedom, and the principle of the diffusion and the balance of powers. This principle, understood as political decentralization, should allow regions and municipalities to develop policies with the aim of improving the daily quality of life of their citizens. Subsidiarity, in conjunction with the federal principle, is at the core of the PSC’s European project, which defines the European dimension as the space where Catalonia can develop all its potential: The autonomous governments should take an active part in the European construction process and should be present in European decision-making bodies, especially in so far as these bodies intervene in areas whose responsibility has been devolved to the autonomous communities.178 The document Per Catalunya. Ara, un nou federalisme recalls that ‘Spain is, due to its influence, a magnificent gateway to Europe. We must know how to take advantage of this but, above all, we must want to take advantage of it.’ However, on analysing the means through which Catalonia should be integrated in the European Union, it mentions ‘the indirect relations offered by the state – and the direct relations already provided, although only in an incipient manner, by the institutionalized European regional movement’.179 A later document produced by the main political parties of the Catalan left, PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC, ICV and ERC, demands that Catalonia should be granted the right to have an institutional presence within the EU, by at least enjoying the status of EU electoral constituency;180 a point subscribed by the PSC and included in its draft programme for the 2003 Catalan election. It should be noted, however, that, in the Spanish Parliament on 13 May 2003, the PSOE, with which the PSC is federated, together with the PP and IU, rejected the proposal for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia to be considered as electoral constituencies in the forthcoming EU election.181

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Images of Catalonia II CDC and UDC

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I analyse the ideological content of CDC, along the same lines as the other political parties considered so far. The second section looks at the ideological content of UDC. And in the third section I examine the nationalist thinking of Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat since 1980. I have decided to distinguish between the official position of CDC and the specific ideology of its leader, expressed in his extensive written work, because it would be difficult to incorporate his nationalist theory in full into the corpus of a political party. I devote a section to Pujolism in view of the extremely influential role played by Jordi Pujol as President of the Generalitat of Catalonia for more than twenty years, encompassing the whole transition to democracy.

Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) CDC defines itself as a Catalan nationalist (non-secessionist), democratic, humanist and progressive party, with a political philosophy resulting from a synthesis or ‘convergence’ of social democrat, progressive, liberal and Christian democrat thinking, mainly aimed at the service and welfare of the people. It refers to itself as a profoundly pro-European political formation.1 CDC rejects both neoliberal and uniformist ideas2 and seeks ‘to occupy the centre-left space more clearly and with greater determination’,3 although, as Miquel Caminal writes, a mobile centrism in relation to left and right, which shifted to the right in the 1980s and 1990s, affecting all other political forces of the liberal parliamentary spectrum, is the definition that best describes CDC’s political action.4 CDC was created in the 1960s as a political movement in line with the Catalan Catholic tradition. CDC’s objective was the reconstruction of Catalonia (‘to make a country’). It was formally established in November 1974 under the leadership of Jordi Pujol and supported by UDC.5 Pujol’s aim was to create a party that would achieve the social integration of all the people of Catalonia, although from the outset the struggle remained between prioritizing national consciousness above class consciousness. When UDC broke off and some social democrat sectors left to join the PSC (R), the

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composition of CDC was reduced to two main sectors led by Jordi Pujol and Miquel Roca, respectively. CDC became a political party on 28 March 1976, with Jordi Pujol as General Secretary and Miquel Roca as Deputy General Secretary. Defined as a centre-left pro-Catalan formation, CDC stood for the first democratic election in 1977 as a member of the coalition Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya, or Democratic Pact for Catalonia, together with EDC (Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya, or Democratic Left of Catalonia), PSC (R) and FNC. The results were not very satisfactory (16.8 per cent of the vote) and CDC initiated a period of reflection that would culminate in the V Congress (April 1978), in which CDC declared itself to be a social democrat, Catalan, nationalist and progressive party, indisputably led by Jordi Pujol. The first step towards the formation of what was initially conceived as the Partit Nacionalista Català, or Catalan Nationalist Party, as the sole party of the centre left, was taken on 27 June 1978 when CDC merged with EDC, and its leader Ramón Trias Fargas became the new President of CDC. Trias Fargas brought a liberal democrat tradition to CDC, which he described as ‘humanist left-wing social liberalism’.6 The desire to create a Catalan Nationalist Party was frustrated by the foundation of the PSC, by ERC’s refusal to enter into a coalition with CDC and by the formation of CC (Centristes de Catalunya, or Catalan Moderates)-UCD. It was also in the summer of 1978 (19 September) that UDC and CDC signed a stable electoral agreement for government, in order to express ‘the will to organize and organically integrate the Catalan centre left’, thus forming the coalition CiU.7 In the months prior to the first election to the re-established Catalan Parliament, a victory of the left was expected. In the words of Joan B. Culla, such expectations responded ‘not only to the political and cultural hegemonies of the end of Francoism and the first transition to democracy, but also to the results of the constituent, general and municipal elections held between June 1977 and April 1979’.8 However, the election results caused great surprise on granting a relative majority to CiU. Pujol himself confessed that ‘we have obtained 43 seats when we were expecting 25’.9 After the rejection by the Catalan Socialists, still shocked by their unexpected electoral defeat, of Pujol’s offer to join a CiU-PSC (PSC-PSOE) coalition government, CiU ended up forming a minority government with the support of ERC and the CC-UCD. In turn UCD, led by Adolfo Suárez, then Prime Minister of Spain, which did not hold the absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament either, benefited from the support of CiU in Madrid. Over the next four years, Pujol consolidated his leadership and CDC did not evolve towards the creation of a Catalan Nationalist Party, as initially planned, but instead became the leader of a social movement going beyond the limits of the party itself. As mentioned in Chapter 4, CiU’s rejection of the LOAPA, sanctioned with the votes of UCD and PSOE, contributed to an increasing identification between CiU and the Generalitat, but was also exploited to emphasize the dependency of the PSC on the PSOE.

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The victory of the PSOE in the 28 October 1982 general election, accompanied by the major triumph of the PSC in Catalonia, radically transformed the Spanish political scenario. Even so, CiU managed to increase its number of seats in the Spanish Parliament, from eight obtained in 1979 to twelve in 1982. Two years later, CiU obtained an overwhelming victory in the 29 April 1984 Catalan election (46.6 per cent of the vote). These results confirmed the consolidation of Pujolism as a hegemonic force in Catalonia, where over the years it managed to develop a polyhedral image, allowing it, depending on the moment and the audience, to emphasize its character as nationalist, confessional, conservative in economics and progressive in some of its social policies. It should also be mentioned that these results, as indicated by Joaquim Colomines, confirmed the beginning of two major patterns in the electoral behaviour of the Catalans – dual voting and differential abstention – which signalled the beginning of a new stage in Catalan political life.10 Joan B. Culla refers to the decade 1984–1993 as ‘the years of plenitude’ for CiU and for its leader Jordi Pujol. It is worth taking into account that the consolidation of CiU took place within a political framework defined by the weakness of ERC, the crisis of the PSUC, the disappearance of CC-UCD and the pre-eminence of the PSOE at state level, which determined the political strategy of the dependent PSC. In 1984, during the interval between the election day in which CiU obtained a landslide victory and the re-appointment of Jordi Pujol as President, the Catalan political climate turned very sour when Pujol and a further twenty-four former board members of Banca Catalana were charged for presumed financial irregularities, of which they would all be subsequently acquitted, Pujol in 1986 and the rest of those charged in 1988. Pujol interpreted the lawsuit as a contemptible action of revenge by the PSOE and the central government, and it was easy for him to present it as an attack on Catalonia. In 1986, CDC sponsored the so-called ‘Reformist Operation’, which placed Miquel Roca i Junyent at the head of what would become a state-wide party aiming to challenge both the PSOE and the AP (Alianza Popular, or Popular Alliance). Roca himself wrote, in 1982: ‘The proposals formulated from political Catalanism can achieve greater acceptance within Spanish society.’ He added: Despite all the difficulties always involved in the struggle, from a position of reason, against the demagogy and the visceral arousal of anti-Catalanism, the historical line of political Catalanism should be maintained. That is, to extend its action to the whole of Spanish politics, with the will to transform, change and reform the structures that prevent the full deployment of the creative freedom of society. It must be possible to obtain the agreement of different, heterogeneous sectors of Spanish political life in a proposal of this kind.11

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Roca wrote: ‘To be viable, the autonomy of Catalonia requires a profound reform of the state; it requires the transformation of the state to define and achieve a modern Spain.’12 He recognized, in a perverse way announcing his own failure as the head of the Reformist Operation, that ‘political Catalanism has almost always, if not always, failed on this path’.13 Pujol, with whom Miquel Roca maintained a conflictive relationship based on discrepancies concerning both ideological and political strategy, in his introduction to Roca’s book Per què no? . . . , wrote: And in this respect Roca’s book has another, what we could call, inconvenience. And this is that Catalanist proposals for the whole of Spain generate fear. They frighten important sectors of the Spanish establishment. Because they are proposals for change. While we remain in the Catalan fold, uninterested in Spain’s problems, we are easy to fight against, and, in any case, we raise issues that can be limited and branded as particularist or even lacking in solidarity. But when political Catalanism demands not just the vindication of real autonomy and full recognition of our personality as a people, but also all those measures aimed at transforming Spain into a modern state and administration, how can they be confronted? They can only be confronted with silence and distortion.14 Despite Miquel Roca’s pertinent ideas to modernize and democratize Spain, its institutions and society, integrating it within the European framework, it proved a mammoth task for the General Secretary of a Catalan nationalist party acting as leader of a state-wide political party such as the PRD (Partido Reformista Democrático, or Democratic Reformist Party) to aspire to transform the Spanish centre right. It was even more difficult to expect him to win the trust of voters, many of whom perceived, and still perceive, Catalanism as a threat to the unity of the state that Roca legitimately aspired to transform. The failure of the Reformist Operation was spectacular, but served to grant credibility to the autonomous, non-secessionist, ambitions of CiU, which improved its results in the June 1986 and October 1989 general elections. Jordi Pujol’s second term in office (1984–1988) consolidated and emphasized a presidential style based on his personal charisma, his political skills and a constant and intense work-pattern, which, among other things, involved systematic weekend visits to all corners of Catalonia. This was complemented by a remarkable international presence, aimed at contributing to the external promotion of Catalonia, an idea that has always been highly valued by Pujol in determining the priorities of his long political career. In his third term in office (1988–1992), within the framework of the VIII Congress (27–29 January 1989), Pujol resigned from the position of General Secretary and Miquel Roca took over CDC’s presidency. At the end of the year, under the influence of the dismemberment of the USSR and of the

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transformation of some former Soviet republics into independent nationstates, the nationalist declarations of CiU were accentuated. The Catalan Parliament passed a resolution, supported by CiU, stating that ‘respect for the current institutional framework [. . .] does not imply the relinquishment of the right to self-determination by the Catalan people’.15 During this period, more radical nationalist declarations alternated with moderate, pactist declarations, in which Pujol himself rejected independence and also the reform of the Constitution and of the Statute. Amidst such a political climate, Miquel Sellarés, a historical and heterodox member of CiU, voiced strong criticism against the ‘shift to the right’ and the ‘exhaustion’ of Pujolism. Sellarés was expelled from CDC in January 1990, having influenced a significant sector of the party.16 The divergences between Pujol and Roca became more acute from 1990. While Roca favoured a potential participation in a coalition government with the PSOE at state level, Pujol displayed a much more cautious and reluctant attitude. At the same time, Roca considered his future as the successor of Pujol, who was still too young and in too good form to be replaced. Roca’s refusal to run as CiU’s candidate for Mayor of Barcelona (1991) against Pasqual Maragall, and the differences with UDC, opened an even deeper gulf between Roca and Pujol, which led the latter to regain leadership responsibilities within CDC. CiU won its fourth term at the Generalitat (1992–1995) with excellent results obtained in the March 1992 election, when Barcelona, and the whole of Catalonia, was preparing to hold the Olympic Games, which transformed the city, brought excitement to the citizens and favoured the charismatic Mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall. In the IX CDC Congress (October 1992), differences arose regarding CDC’s alliance policy and direct intervention in Spanish politics. Three different sectors emerged. The first, led by Miquel Roca, was in favour of intervention or influence in Spanish politics, in line with some formulations of classical Catalanism. The second sector, led by Jordi Pujol, was in favour of signing agreements with other parties to contribute to the governability of the state, but was careful to preserve the independence of CiU’s leader to decide its timetable, terms and conditions. And the third sector, led by Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, President of UDC’s steering committee, defended the Christian democrat identity of its political formation, for which it demanded greater prominence at the heart of a coalition until then dominated by CDC. The divergences regarding the degree of CiU’s involvement with an eventual state government returned to the fore when the PSOE lost its absolute majority in the 6 June 1993 general election. This took place at a time when CiU’s good results placed it in an ideal position to become the political ally of the PSOE, in need of CiU’s seventeen seats to obtain an absolute majority in the Madrid Parliament. Pujol finally agreed to contribute to the governability of Spain by supporting the PSOE, but decided not to enter the new

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socialist government. For Roca, this was a perfect occasion to gain access to the state government and to influence the modernization and transformation of Spain, for which he was so eager and which he saw as the objective of political Catalanism, but Pujol’s option prevailed. It should be added that CiU’s support of the PSOE government took effect within a climate fraught with various economic scandals, corruption and state terrorism, which finally eroded PSOE’s support and led to its defeat in the March 1996 early election. Roca remained as CDC’s General Secretary, although his candidature for Mayor of Barcelona in 1995 led him to abandon his parliamentary tasks in Madrid, where Joaquim Molins replaced him. Two new Deputy General Secretaries, Ramon Camp and Pere Esteve, were appointed in this period. Roca’s new defeat, this time as candidate for Mayor of Barcelona, together with new tensions arising with UDC, induced him to resign as CDC’s General Secretary on 17 December 1995. Pere Esteve took over as General Secretary and was confirmed in his position in the X Congress (November 1996), as were Jordi Pujol in the presidency of the party and Felip Puig as Organization Secretary. CiU lost its absolute majority in the 1995 Catalan election and began its fifth term in office with a minority government, in an atmosphere tainted by the PSOE crisis. This crisis resulted in an increase in the number of votes obtained by the conservative PP, which succeeded in winning the 1996 general election, although without obtaining an absolute majority. Despite the reservations of important sectors of CiU, the coalition offered its support to the PP. CiU’s votes were once again crucial in Madrid, undoubtedly increasing its bargaining capacity. In 1997, the high price of the agreement with the PP and the discrepancies with UDC led to tensions at the heart of the coalition. Such tensions were aggravated by the process culminating in the enactment of a new law on linguistic policy by the Generalitat. Partly to counteract the effects of the agreement with the PP, Pere Esteve, as CDC’s General Secretary, promoted a debate on the document Towards a new horizon for Catalonia, which defended ‘shared sovereignty’ within the framework of the Spanish state. It was precisely this new, resolute approach in favour of the recognition of the plural nature of the state and the establishment of a confederal model that brought CDC (and also UDC), the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, or Basque Nationalist Party) and the BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, or Galician Nationalist Coalition) closer together. Esteve promoted a so-called prosovereignty stream that culminated in the signing of the Barcelona Declaration of 16 July 1998. The Declaration requested a re-definition of Spain as a multicultural, multinational and multilingual nation, and the recognition of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia as nations. Both the PSOE and the PP rejected the Barcelona Declaration. CiU suffered a significant setback in the 1999 municipal election. In October of the same year, CDC won the Catalan election by a slim margin.

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Pasqual Maragall, leader of PSC-CpC, obtained the largest number of votes, but Pujol won more seats. CiU’s sixth term in office (from 1999) has been defined by a loss of influence in the state government prompted by the PP’s overwhelming majority achieved in the 12 March 2000 general election. CiU, which had again formed a minority government in the Catalan Parliament following the October 1999 election, chose to pact with the PP, which was now powerful and in a position to impose conditions instead of accepting them. The debate on the renewal of CiU, the tension between its pro-sovereignty and its pro-autonomy streams, with more moderate objectives, and the replacement of Jordi Pujol, who announced that he would not stand in the 2003 election, led to the appointment of Artur Mas, until then Minister of Finance, as Chief Minister and future candidate to the Presidency of the Generalitat. In the XI Congress (10–12 November 2001), Artur Mas was appointed General Secretary of CDC, replacing Pere Esteve. Felip Puig, former Organization Secretary, had joined the Catalan government a few months earlier as Minister of the Environment, and Lluís M. Corominas i Díaz became Organization Secretary. The process to establish the future succession of Jordi Pujol added an additional strain to the relations with UDC and its leader, Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, who also aspired to take over from Pujol. Differences between the two parties have been, at least temporarily, put aside with the decision to form a federation between CDC and UDC, aimed at sealing their commitment to collaborate in the future and to replace the long-lasting coalition between the two parties. The protocol containing the conditions for the federation of CiU was agreed in March 2001, the official function being held in Castelldefels on 17 July of the same year. Catalan identity Catalonia is defined as a nation with its own cultural, historical, linguistic, symbolic and institutional background, which has to be reconciled with the changes generated by globalization and the technological revolution in order to become a functional and valuable legacy for future generations. The identity of the Catalan people should be framed within the common cultural and linguistic area formed by the Països Catalans.17 The Report by the first nationalist strategy commission on the future of the self-government of Catalonia (VIII Congress CDC, 1989) declares: Catalonia, as a nation, is fundamentally a will to exist, rooted in its language, in its culture, in its history and in its institutions. There is a differential aspect that defines us as a nation.18 The future of Catalonia as a nation involves

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a political action free from non-Catalan determining factors, the institutional development of autonomy, the efficiency of its governing bodies, economic renewal, social equilibrium, the commitment to modernity and progress, the capacity to influence the world that surrounds us and, above all, it involves the linguistic normalization and the consolidation of a single national culture.19 Catalan nationalism/Catalanism ‘Nationalism is freedom. Freedom for Catalonia; freedom to act as a nation, to attain national plenitude.’ This is how CDC defined nationalism in 1989. Pujol, in the paper ‘La hora del diálogo sin reservas’ (‘The time for dialogue without reservations’), presented on 21 October 1996 at the Real Alcázar in Seville, asked: ‘What does it mean to be a Catalan nationalist? It means considering Catalonia to be a nation and Spain to be plurinational.’20 CDC seeks to give nationalism a new boost as the political expression of Catalonia’s secular will to exist and of the dynamism of Catalan society. CDC understands its nationalism as the safest way to guarantee the national, political, economic, social, cultural and civic progress of the Catalans.21 As Miquel Caminal writes: ‘CDC’s convergence does not originate in the past, but rather in the future, it does not stem from a specific political ideology or option, but from convergence in democracy and Catalanism.’22 The personalist nationalism of CDC brings together the political inheritance founded by the precursors of Catalanism in the mid-nineteenth century, established by Prat de la Riba at the beginning of the twentieth century in the texts and actions of the government of the Mancomunitat, extended and implemented by Presidents Macià and Companys during the Republican period, maintained institutionally by the Presidents in exile, Irla and Tarradellas, and currently developed, modernized and implemented by President Pujol.23 CDC defines this Catalan nationalist legacy, which it places at the centre of the political project for nationalist reconstruction, as profoundly democratic and progressive. In this context, progress is defined as innovation and modernity, but also as social and territorial equilibrium, social welfare and protection of the environment. On referring to Catalonia, CDC states that ‘this nation exists, [and] is not subordinated to anything or to anyone, and in any case it should be treated respecting and recognizing that it is the nation of the Catalan people, our inalienable reality’.24 In the words of Pujol: It should first be said that all peoples are entitled to self-determination. And that a majority demand for independence may legitimately arise from self-determination. The legitimacy of a democratic secessionist

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Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC approach is therefore clear. But there is also a brand of nationalism that does not renounce the right to self-determination but which has chosen to work towards a progressive increase in political power and institutional recognition within the framework of the Spanish state and the European Union.25

CDC defines being Catalan in accordance with cultural, rather than ethnic characteristics. It involves the will to be considered Catalan: ‘a Catalan is anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be Catalan’. In this respect, CDC argues that it has always fought for everyone who lives and works in Catalonia, irrespective of their origin and condition, to feel that this is their country. CiU therefore proposes promoting the teaching of Catalan language and culture, and of its traditions and history, providing specific support for invigorating cultural groups, associations, organizations, etc., engaged in the promotion of our culture everywhere. Catalan identity belongs to all those of us who live, work and feel attached to and rooted in Catalonia.26 CDC specifically seeks ‘to generate a common consciousness’ among the citizens of Catalonia, ‘not just of thought but also of action: we want the citizens of Catalonia not only to be convinced that this is a nation but also that it is worth mobilizing themselves to defend it’.27 The nationalism of CIU declares that it is capable of accepting differences without losing its own roots and principles, ‘offering our culture, customs, freedoms and lifestyle in order to achieve a politically viable country, civically, nationally and economically strong, to transform Catalonia into an internationally recognized country, with a presence in Europe and in the world’.28 An immediate objective of CDC is therefore the defence, protection and strengthening of the national identity of Catalonia, obtaining the highest possible degree of political freedom and of self-government by means of a democratic, modernizing nationalism with a will to regenerate Spain. CDC claims responsibility for having increased the ‘distinct aspect’ ( fet diferencial) of the country’s most political dimension, providing it with a strong majority of exclusively Catalan roots, free from alien interests and groups. In the words of Jordi Pujol, CDC postulates the nationalization of Catalonia and, according to him, in this process, language is a crucial element because it is the soul of the nation. But our defence of the language is insufficient. We could also defend it while respecting all the rules of coexistence that we need to safeguard in this country. Coexistence is even more important than language – I have always said so –, but we could achieve this perfectly well, if we were more consistent.29

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Other basic elements of Catalan identity, crucial to the theoretical formulation of Pujol’s nationalism and adopted by CDC are: history, culture, heritage, the feeling of a homeland – ‘Without the feeling of a homeland, without loving the Country, rationally and even sensually, no country in the world has made any progress’ –, the psychological stability of the country – ‘We therefore need this balance, this stability; to strengthen the reality, the interests and the important sentiments in the country, and everything that unites people’ –, and sensitivity or social justice. CDC acknowledges the dynamic nature of its own nationalism in order to adapt it to a changing environment. It is CDC’s aim to offer Catalonia the necessary tools to position itself in Europe and in the world beyond the strict framework of the Spanish state which, in its opinion, represents an insufficient vantage point from which to guarantee the development of Catalan society. On defining the territory of the Catalan nation, CDC reiterates that ‘the Països Catalans shape the common cultural and linguistic sphere which frames our identity as a people’. It should be recalled that the CDC’s 1974 founding communiqué already referred to the Països Catalans and supported the restoration of their cultural and symbolic dimension and also the recovery of a framework of political and institutional relations between them.30 Immigration CDC offers a national project including all the citizens of Catalonia and its objective is to integrate immigrants: While reaffirming our identity and respecting the differences of those who want to be among us, we will work for the insertion of immigrants into our society’s socio-economic and labour system.31 CDC accepts, as an important challenge for democratic nationalisms with a civic base such as that of Catalan nationalism, ‘the need to express the growing internal plurality of any nation like Catalonia in an increasingly permeable world, while protecting its own identity’. The following statement underlines this point: ‘For Catalonia, a non-integrative nationalism is either a suicide or an irresponsibility. The final recipients of our project are and have to be all the citizens of Catalonia.’32 CDC believes that the devolution of all powers concerning immigration is crucial for the stable development of Catalan society, so that the Generalitat can establish immigration quotas. CDC believes that it is necessary for immigrants to enjoy the same rights and obligations that the Constitution recognizes for foreigners, and is in favour of creating the necessary conditions for immigrants to integrate, without losing their roots, to respect the laws, culture and traditions of the host

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CDC also recognizes that Catalan society is the result of a permanent and prodigious process of integration of people from different origins, but instead of emphasizing the character of Catalonia as a ‘melting pot’, as the socialists do, CDC highlights the process of integration of newcomers rather than their different contributions: Catalonia is historically the result of the integration of people from very different origins. If this capacity was lost, Catalonia would release a very significant part of its strength as a nation. This means that we must be pro-active concerning integration, as a value in itself, as a part of the country’s identity, so that people from other cultures can be included in our society.34 Yet, CDC stresses that it is necessary ‘to be patient and allow sufficient time for the new generations to become fully integrated’.35 CDC, like the rest of the political parties studied in this book, rejects all the different forms of racism and xenophobia, in order to foster pluralism and cultural diversity as the main principles of a democratic open society. Catalonia and Spain CDC stands in line with the Catalan tradition expressing a desire to participate actively in politics at state level. In 1982, Miquel Roca i Junyent wrote: We should make the reform of the state and the political expression of Catalanism inseparable. We should explain that, at present, only the forces that truly question the continuity of a centralist, interventionist, controlling, welfare and corporatist state, can be involved in an in-depth reform of this state. If until now we have sent a message explaining our defence of the national personality of Catalonia, we now need to explain political Catalanism’s overall proposal for Spain. The acceptance of this proposal should allow for a peaceful, stable redistribution of the state’s power and, at the same time, this redistribution should render the action of Catalan self-government more efficient. Two approaches to the same problem.36 Despite this, Pujol’s decision not to enter formally into any coalition government at state level has determined CDC’s degree of influence in Spanish politics and has limited the impact of some of its most distinguished politicians, such as Miquel Roca. The gradualist and pragmatic Catalanism of Jordi Pujol has concentrated its efforts on the construction of the country. The nation-building strategy promoted by the quasi-state represented by the Generalitat of Catalonia has been CDC’s main task. In this respect, CDC has

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consolidated its efforts on becoming a pal de paller. This is a very diverse and very open, but also very ambiguous, political force, willing to attract people from a broad political spectrum who are united by their support for Catalanism and democracy. CDC wishes to become more than a conventional political party and act as a social movement able to mobilize democratic Catalanism. CDC’s nationalist discourse has become more radical since 1996, this being reflected in the paper ‘El nacionalisme català als inicis del segle XXI’ (‘Catalan nationalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century’) presented at the X Congress (8–10 November 1996). This paper referred to the need to turn a new leaf in the national reconstruction of Catalonia, the new stage being defined by a recognition of the Catalan nation endowed with its own sovereignty. This paper proposed a ‘state agreement’ recognizing Catalonia as a nation and Spain as a plurinational state. The agreement defended an increase in the political power of Catalonia by means of extending its self-government, that is, granting Catalonia a real legislative capacity and financial autonomy. As already mentioned, the nationalist radicalization of CDC, far from the pragmatism characteristic of the stage in which Miquel Roca was General Secretary of the party, culminated in the Barcelona Declaration. The Declaration proposed going beyond the autonomous formula established by the Constitution and based on the definition of Spain as a single nation, and stated that: The Spanish state is, at the same time, the institution that denies the sovereignty that belongs to us as nations and the political space within which to conquer national freedom, by means of a joint action to form a plurinational, confederal state.37 Jordi Pujol’s talk at ESADE (1 March 1999), ‘Poder polític de Catalunya: un instrument al servei dels ciutadans’ (‘Catalonia’s political power: an instrument in the service of the citizens’), redresses and clarifies CDC’s view and the future political orientation of the CiU government. In this talk, Pujol recalls that Section Eight of the Constitution, which refers to the autonomies and to the structure of the state, was intended to respond to the specific national demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country, and denounces the unsatisfactory nature of the institutional framework within which Catalonia is forced to evolve: This framework does not respond sufficiently to either the nature or the intensity of our identity, or to the needs and the challenges of a society like ours [. . .]; it does not permit the development of Catalonia’s full potential and poses a threat to the brilliant present of our country.38 Pujol denounces that in Spain there is a widespread attitude against the recognition of the specific character of Catalonia and the political consequences deriving from it. In his view,

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Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC the dominant idea in Spain is usually, and I repeat usually, a homogenizing idea, at times by means of blatant centralism, on other occasions by means of a federalism which, in practice, is unifying and homogenizing.39

In this talk, Pujol warned that backing a reform of the Constitution could be ‘inefficient and frustrating’, although it should not be renounced forever, and that ‘more realistic and acceptable’ proposals should be made.40 Pujol stands in favour of an ‘institutional agreement for self-government’ destined to increase Catalonia’s political power and autonomous funding. The first step would include a rereading of both the Constitution and the Statute, which could lead, in a second step, to a reform of the Statute of Autonomy. However, he added: ‘I am aware of one thing that prevents me from making a categorical statement, and this is that reforming the Statute requires not total consensus, but very broad and diversified social and political support, plus the votes of more that two thirds of the Parliament of Catalonia. It requires time and dialogue.’41 One of the novelties of this talk was the demand for ‘strong and widespread political will and consensus in Catalonia’, with the aim of giving our claim a consistent foundation so that it could generate political strength and moral authority, to raise this issue with the political forces and the whole of Spanish society.42 Within the framework of its XI Congress (10–12 November 2001), CDC highlighted its contribution to the governability and modernization of the Spanish state and demanded, once again, Spain’s re-definition as a plurinational and plurilingual country. Within the new European framework, CDC seeks to attain ‘the appropriate level of self-government to which it is entitled by way of its historical rights and which becomes indispensible if we are to be present in the European Union as an equal partner’.43 To make progress with these demands, CDC defends a set of initial measures to be implemented in various spheres: symbolic, linguistic and cultural, institutional, devolved powers and funding, concerning both state and international levels. CDC is committed to using the framework of the Constitution and the Statute as an instrument to further the self-government of Catalonia. Notwithstanding this, it also clearly states: On the assumption that the state-wide political formations continue to deny Catalonia the right to attain the self-government to which it is entitled as a nation, CDC will promote a review of the Constitution and a new Statute of Autonomy, with the support of the majority of the people of Catalonia, and with the intention of overcoming the failings of the current legal system.44

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CDC’s VIII Congress (1989) already held that ‘[t]he Generalitat is part of the state, and its condition as such is denied when it is treated with mistrust and suspicion. Loyalty to the Constitution and the Statute is a two-way process. This loyalty cannot be demanded just from the Generalitat and its government, but should also be expected from the central government.’45 Catalonia and the European Union CDC considers Europe as ‘the natural political framework of the Catalan nation’.46 Catalonia’s European dimension and its desire to participate actively in the construction of the EU require Catalonia to have its own, direct representatives, without intermediaries, in the European Parliament. [. . .] Such representatives symbolize the specific personality and the political identity of Catalonia and should give rise to a subsequent greater participation and interrelation between Catalan institutions and the European institutions.47 CDC’s electoral programmes and congresses always demand the recognition of Catalonia as a European electoral constituency. CDC stands in favour of the consolidation and enlargement of the EU, and defends the principle of unity in diversity, also believing that it is essential for Catalonia to eliminate its current tax deficit with the EU. CDC supports the idea of a Europe of nations resulting in a greater presence of Catalonia, and of all other European regions and nations without states, at the highest-level decision-making bodies of the EU. In CDC’s view, Catalan government representatives should have a say whenever the Spanish state is to take any decisions destined to implement EU legislation in areas which have already been devolved to the autonomous government. It also suggests that Catalan authorities should maintain direct official relations with EU institutions concerning information on all those subjects that might affect Catalonia, and ensure that Catalonia participates in all community policies and projects.48 Back in 1989, CDC already stood for the promotion of a positive feeling towards European citizenship and for such a feeling to be fostered among the Catalan population.49 In addition, in paper 1 of the XI Congress (March 2001), CDC declared that ‘Catalonia will work, through the European institutions framework, to stop the identity of the territories of North Catalonia from being eroded and for them to recover the national freedom they had once lost’.50

Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) Nationalism, personalist humanism and social justice are the central ideas of UDC, a Christian democrat party, which, like ERC, was founded in 1931 and which during Francoism contributed decisively to the construction,

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configuration and activity of various unitary democratic platforms, particularly the Consell de Forces Polítiques (Council of Political Forces, 1969) and the Assemblea de Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia, 1971). UDC is defined as a nationalist party, which considers Catalonia as its natural framework of action and its raison d’être. UDC’s objective is for Catalonia to be able to fully exercise its sovereignty. According to Hilari Raguer, the creation of UDC is rather the end of a process of evolution of Catalan Catholicism which, for some time, had been seeking to free itself from intellectually reactionary influences by moving towards modernization, and by distancing itself from the monarchist and pro-Spanish parties that until then were regarded as the compulsory choice for all good Catholics.51 UDC received its ideology (leaving to one side the very remote precedent of Jaume Balmes) from Josep Torras i Bages and, above all, Joan Maragall, to whom Raguer attributes a profound religious nature, not at all conventional, acting as a powerful dissolvent of entrenched traditionalism.52 UDC was ideologically influenced by the theories of Gilbert K. Chesterton, Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, and also by the thinking of Enric Prat de la Riba and the social doctrine of the Catholic church.53 The manifesto that gave rise to UDC, drafted by Josep Cirera i Soler and including contributions by the canons Dr Carles Cardó and Dr Josep Maria Llovera, was published in the newspaper El Matí, on 7 November 1931. This document positioned nationalism, a reaffirmation of spiritual values, democracy and social justice as the distinguishing features of the new political party. The central triumvirate of the founders of UDC was formed by Lluís Vila d’Abadal, Joan B. Roca i Caball and Pau Romeva i Ferrer. Pau Romeva, in his speech at the official launch of the party, argued, distancing himself from both the Catalan and Spanish right: UDC is not a Catholic political association, but rather an association formed by Catholics; it does not want to link its Catholicism to its support of the Republic, but it does not want to work with those who link its Catholicism to another form of government either.54 UDC brought together people from Catalan Carlism (Joan B. Roca i Caball, Josep Cirera i Soler and Josep M. Trias Peitx) and from Catholic Catalanism without previous membership of any political party (Pau Romeva and Maurici Serrahima), in addition to various leaders from Acció Catalana Republicana, or Republican Catalan Action (Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera and Miquel Coll i Alentorn), and even some important figures from ERC (Félix Duran i Canyameres). The leader of UDC until the Civil War was Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera, executed in Burgos by the Francoists in February 1939.

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The members of UDC remained (critically) loyal to the Republic and to the Generalitat in the face of the National Uprising (1936), and tried to mitigate the religious persecution. From 1937, they worked with the Basque Nationalist Party to achieve a reconciliation between the Republican regime and the Catholic church. These activities and the various attempts to obtain a negotiated outcome to the Civil War led to the banning and condemnation of UDC in the Franco regime’s Law on Political Responsibilities. During the first stage of Francoism, the members of UDC acted in secrecy under circumstantial names, such as Creus de Sang, or Crosses of Blood (1940), or supported broader platforms, such as the FUC (1944–1948), the Grups Nacionals de Resistència, or National Resistance Groups (1945–1947), or the Joventut Catalana Democràtica, or Democratic Catalan Youth (1943–1946), achieving a notable presence in the universities, where they managed to attract new activists, such as Anton Canyellas and Joan Sansa.55 Before 1960 UDC, then led by Miquel Coll i Alentorn, Joan B. Roca i Caball and Pau Romeva, decided to revitalize the party and resume activities which included producing clandestine publications such as Diàleg (1962–1967), Testimoniatge (1963–1964), Determini (1966–1968 and 1972– 1974) and Força Nova (1965–1967). On the international stage, UDC developed contacts with the French, Italian and Chilean Christian democrats, among others, and in 1950 applied for admission to the NEI (Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, or New International Groups), which from 1965 to 1966 became Unió Europea Demòcrata Cristiana, or Christian Democrat European Union. As a prerequisite to obtaining this international recognition, UDC had to be integrated within a sort of federation of parties called Equip Demòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol, or Christian Democrat Group of the Spanish State, including other Spanish Christian democrat parties.56 In 1976,57 UDC held its V Congress in Barcelona, in which the team formed by Antón Canyellas, Josep Miró i Ardèvol and Albert Vila strengthened its control over the party. Under the leadership of this new triumvirate, UDC moved towards more conservative positions and reiterated its commitment to the Equip Demòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol (formed by UDC, PNV, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez’s Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana, or Christian Democrat Left, and José María Gil-Robles’ Democracia Social Cristiana, or Christian Social Democracy). UDC was shocked by the weak support it received in the 15 June 1977 election, in which the party ran as a member of the coalition Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya, or Union of the Centre and Christian Democracy of Catalonia. Such electoral poor results, together with the failure of the Spanish Christian democracy lead by Gil-Robles and Ruiz Giménez, prompted UDC to rethink its strategy and choose between joining Adolfo Suárez’s UCD, more pro-Spanish and right-wing, and Jordi Pujol’s nationalist CDC, which defined itself as centre left. The majority of the party decided to form a coalition with CDC. In October 1977 just a few leaders (Miró i Ardèvol, Albert Vila and Simeó Miquel) chose to split and join Suárez’s UCD.

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As already mentioned, UDC and CDC formed the coalition CiU in 1978. The relations between the two parties have not, however, always been easy. Indeed, the document Political strategy of UDC mentions the difficulties that the party experienced when CiU was first created, and when UDC ‘was almost in a subordinate position within the coalition’.58 Once CiU was established, and especially from 1980, differences arose at the heart of UDC between a sector closer to CDC, committed to the coalition government and to the UDC-CDC agreement (Joan Rigol, Joaquim Xicoy, Agustí Bassols, Llibert Cuatrecases and Joaquim Pibernat), and another sector, which defended the independence and the Christian democrat nature of the party and which, in spite of being critical of the coalition, did not wish to abandon it ( Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, Concepció Ferrer and Josep Ignasi Thió). The tension between them was resolved with the agreement between the sectors led by Joan Rigol and Josep A. Duran i Lleida within the framework of the XVI Congress (November 1987). Rigol took over the presidency of the party, and Duran i Lleida the presidency of the executive committee. From then on, Duran i Lleida led a renewal of the party which saw it grow and open up to new, not necessarily Christian democrat, sectors of society, something that generated some uneasiness at the heart of the party. Duran i Lleida’s main objective was to redefine UDC’s personality and to differentiate it from CDC without breaking the agreement. Indeed, UDC’s Political strategy document explains that the party, although having reasons which could justify a review of some aspects of the Coalition, continues to consider it as a valid and effective instrument to shape a nationalist, open and centre political space, and to continue holding the responsibilities of government and of representation granted by our electors.59 In addition, UDC increased its presence in business spheres through the creation or inspiration of specific structures such as the FECEA (Fundació Empresa, Catalunya, Europa i América, or Foundation for Business in Catalonia, Europe and America). Catalan identity UDC’s nationalism has a cultural and community character. From this point of view, language is considered to be the main element of expression of Catalan society and the one that has given it historical continuity. For this reason, UDC proposes the defence, protection and promotion of the elements that make up the Catalan nation and, in particular, emphasizes the need to normalize its language, that is, to spread its use in society. Joan Rigol, UDC President, in his talk ‘Criteris per a una política cultural’ (‘Criteria for a cultural policy’) (16 March 1999), said:

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Anyone who lives or works here and wants to be identified as a Catalan, and has things to say on Culture, forms a part of our culture. The Castilian language is also a form of expression and of projection of our society.60 UDC proclaims the unity of all variants of the Catalan language, ‘from Salses to Guardamar and from Fraga to Maó’.61 It describes the territory of the Països Catalans as a linguistic and cultural unity, with a shared history, organized politically in institutions of a confederal type. UDC respects the collective will of the Catalan-speaking peoples and proposes working to reform the current Article 145.1 of the Constitution, which prevents autonomous communities with historical, cultural or linguistic links from forming a federation. The personalism that defines UDC’s nationalism understands the nation as a ‘natural’ political community par excellence, forming the ideal environment within which individuals can achieve their complete human and social growth. UCD’s approach considers the defence of the Catalan language and culture as equivalent to the defence of the dignity of individuals, allowing the identities of others to be understood, respected and defended.62 Joan Rigol writes: Our fundamental political model is ‘bottom up’. We must come closer with respect, but with a desire to construct a community, to all that exemplifies the creativity of the individual regarding its most immediate, most genuine environment. Let’s focus on the trio already mentioned: family–work–culture.63 UDC admits the dynamic nature of both the nation and nationalism, and considers that global cultural uniformity and the existence of various cultural minorities in each territory are producing, and will continue to produce, a situation of progressive dissolution of the classical factors of cultural identity. UDC considers that political nationalism should promote, ‘on the basis of its foundations, and starting from that diversity and plurality, a permanent process of expansion and strengthening of the community’s sentiment of national consciousness’. Such assertions reveal, at least, a certain contrast with essentialist statements on Catalan identity, such as those expressed in the document La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional (The sovereignty of Catalonia and the plurinational state) (1997), which argues that our rights as a nation precede any state or political organization, which are contingent and accidental. Our condition as Catalans comes earlier: it is a spontaneous and natural declaration. We are Catalans by nature.64

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Catalan nationalism/Catalanism UDC stands in favour of an ‘open and integrative, plural and evolving [nationalism], in the image of Catalonia, our national community’,65 while emphasizing that Catalan nationalism represents an attitude of defence in the face of ‘another expansionist and unifying nationalism – Spanish nationalism – which has the power of the state’.66 According to UDC, the Catalan national project requires an exemplary performance from the Catalan authorities. This, together with its own political representation mechanisms, with an electoral system that encourages more participation and a greater identification between the people and the bodies representing them, should stimulate citizens to feel proud of their country and increase their national consciousness. UDC stands in favour of obtaining the consensus of all Catalan political forces, or at least most of them, in order to find some common denominators capable of defining and boosting a process allowing Catalonia to recover the sovereignty that was taken away from it by force. For UDC, Catalonia requires sovereignty to guarantee its future as a nation: Without more political and economic power we cannot confront all the challenges posed by the present and, even more, the future, and ensure the national identification of the members of our community. Without forgetting or leaving in second place the need to strengthen cultural sovereignty, it is imperative to prioritize political sovereignty so that it confers to the national institutions of Catalonia sufficient political instruments and sufficient financial capacity, to implement policies destined to strengthen their national identification of Catalan citizens.67 Immigration For UDC, and with the aim of constructing a sentiment of collective loyalty including different groups, it is indispensable to build on diversity and respect for different lifestyles and cultural traditions, providing channels for integration and avoiding all kinds of discrimination, while protecting and promoting the cultural characteristics of Catalonia. Here, a slight difference between CDC and UDC can be identified. While the former observes the need for integration, respect for the cultures of origin and the ‘patience’ necessary to allow the integration of immigrants, the latter stresses the need to assimilate ‘those traits of alien cultures which enrich our own and permit a better integration’.68 The references to essentialism, with declarations such as ‘we are Catalans by nature’, present in the document La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional (National Council, 1997), are absent from these more recent formulations. UDC clarifies: No-one can dispute Catalonia’s fundamental and original right to protect its identity. Furthermore, there is a moral and democratic obligation to

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strengthen the social and personal ties that define our community. The specific language, customs, tradition and spirit of our people will continue to be extremely powerful elements uniting the citizens. Moreover, respect for other cultures does not at all imply a renunciation or limitation of one’s own culture which, faithful to its history, has to form the core element of our evolution. But we must go even further. In an increasingly mobile and plural society, we cannot trust that minorities will automatically accept our national specificity if we are not willing to accept that Catalonia is and must be open and dynamic, constantly evolving in its integration.69 Catalonia and Spain UDC points out the effort that Catalan nationalism has made in different historical periods to contribute to the governability, modernization, Europeanization and regeneration of Spain, an effort to which this party has always subscribed. But it also regrets that such an effort has not been conducive to a favourable reaction on behalf of the state, as might have been expected. In this context, UDC asserts that, once the problem of how Catalonia fits in with the rest of the state has been satisfactorily solved, ‘it would be willing to consider the possibility of participating in the government of Spain’.70 But what would be the specific conditions giving the green light to UDC’s eventual participation in a Spanish government? It mentions the need to share a common programme with the other political party or parties with which it could form a government. Such a programme should defend and respect the ‘plurinational character of the state and the Catalan national distinctiveness, primarily founded upon its culture and language, and never assume an organic subordination in the organizational sphere, or even in the parliamentary group’.71 According to UDC: The recognition of plurinationality should come about through dialogue and a subsequent agreement between the nationalists and the state, involving all political parties, both nationalist and state-wide [. . .]. And this recognition should be translated in the sphere of devolved powers concerning each territory, in its symbols and in its political organization.72 UDC is against the homogenization that has come about in the development of the Autonomous Communities System. In spite of this, it acknowledges the higher degree of development of the 1979 Statute when compared with that in place during the Republican Generalitat. In UDC’s view, it is mandatory to reconsider the plural nature of Spain through the elaboration of a new ‘state agreement’, which, in time, should be incorporated into the Spanish Constitution. UDC recalls and proclaims the constitutional right to reform the Constitution.73

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The new state agreement proposed by UDC should recognize Catalonia’s right to self-determination and emphasize that ‘it is not sufficient to have rights; it must be possible to exercise them’.74 The basic elements of the state agreement should be as follows: 1

2 3

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‘confederal structure concerning all aspects related to Catalonia’s identity and that of the other nationalities [. . .]. Catalonia, as a nation, should be sovereign and have true exclusive power in the regulation of its own culture, language and law’; at state level, sovereignty should involve ‘complete and exclusive powers; power to legislate, to develop and execute regulations’; at the international level, sovereignty means ‘that it is not for the central government but for the Generalitat to defend Catalonia’s position regarding cultural matters in the European Union and its Council of Ministers, in UNESCO and in other international organizations which perform similar activities’; Catalonia should have its own foreign policy; and with regards to the economy, UDC defends a federal structure, so that each territory contributes to the definition of a common policy. Catalonia should enjoy financial autonomy to exercise its powers.75

UDC’s objective is to achieve a plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic state, with a Senate acting as a chamber of territorial representation.76 In this context, UDC claims that the nation is the ‘first and original political community’, and considers the shared, central state as a simple instrument justified in so far as it is useful to its members and beneficial for the general interest of society. Therefore, the structure of the state should be shaped according to its national realities and cannot continue to be understood as a centralist and unifying power.77 UDC remarks that: If, despite the declared political will of the Convergència i Unió Coalition to participate, intervene and ensure governability within the framework of the state, this state is not now ruled by a configuration of Spain as a genuinely plurinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic state recognizing the different nations forming it, we would be compelled to change our political strategy.78 Catalonia and the European Union UDC stands in favour of a European Union including not just an economic, but also a political, cultural and social union, with respect for diversity, especially cultural diversity, which, in its view, constitutes Europe’s greatest asset.

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The model of a federal [European Union] made up of peoples and nations and not of states, having the principle of subsidiarity as the criterion defining devolved powers and the exercise of these powers, and forming an organization endowed with a soul equipped with political will and not a mere mechanism to organize the economic policies and the production of member states79 is at the core of UDC’s view. The constitution of the Committee of the Regions is presented as a first step in regional recognition within the EU. In his Luxembourg speech (7 November 1988) to mark the conclusion of the VII Congress of the European parliamentary group European People’s Party (EPP), Duran i Lleida said: The European project of the Christian democrats should continue to have man as its centre of gravity. This is why the cultural dimension should be introduced with energy. [. . .] European culture includes all mankind’s work. And it is through a Europe of culture, which respects and protects the pluricultural mosaic of its geography, that a feeling of belonging to the same community can be engendered.80

The nationalist thought of Jordi Pujol From among the various scholars and politicians who have made significant contributions to Catalan nationalism during Francoism and the transition to democracy, including Heribert Barrera, Josep Benet, Joan Raventós, Josep Pallach, Raimon Obiols, Rafael Ribó, Miquel Roca i Junyent, Ramón Trias Fargas, Jordi Solé Tura, Antoni Gutiérrez Díaz and Pasqual Maragall, among others, I have decided to devote a section to the Catalanism of Jordi Pujol, who, as President of the Generalitat for over twenty years, has been in a privileged position to disseminate his ideas and turn them into political action. I do not set out to study his work in chronological order, but rather by considering the key themes forming the backbone of his nationalist discourse. I begin by analysing three key concepts of his theory: ‘nationalism’, ‘identity’ and ‘history’. I then discuss two features which, in my opinion, define Pujolism – the idea of nationalism as a shared project for the future, ‘to build up Catalonia’, and the defence of what I refer to as ‘welfare nationalism’. Both offer ‘rational arguments’, as defined in Chapter 1, to attract those who, in principle, would not endorse a nationalist option based on essentialism and emotional arguments. Pujolism’s main challenge has been to attract not just the ‘sentimental’ nationalists, and I do not use this term in a pejorative manner since I am aware of the strong emotional component present in any nationalism, but also those who may feel enticed to a project seeking to build

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up a country endowed with a generous welfare state, such as that advocated by Pujol. Finally, I examine Pujol’s ideas on the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Personalist nationalism Jordi Pujol defines nationalism as ‘the will to be’, as ‘the will to have one’s own character’ and as ‘the possibility to build up one’s own country’.81 This definition excludes ethnic or racial factors and focuses on a free act of will. In Pujol’s view, nationalism represents a country’s attempt to strengthen its identity, and should be understood as a positive asset, that is, nationalism should be constructed without excluding others or seeking salvation through isolation. Competitiveness and social and economic development are the two elements that nationalism should encourage.82 At the end of the 1960s, aware that the national rights of other peoples had been recognized, Pujol wrote: For us, on the other hand, threatened by the loss of a sense of cohesion and of the deep-rooted individual and collective identity, subjected to an alienating situation as a people and, consequently, as individuals, for us it is absolutely essential to be nationalist. Because before anything else what is imperative is to be and to have the will to be.83 Pujol defines a people by its mentality and its language, by its sentiments and its history, and by its spiritual ethnie and its will. During Francoism, Pujol insisted on the need to build up the country, taking three main ideas as a point of reference: ‘a clear national affirmation, the demand for social and economic justice, and the democratic organization of the whole of social life’. He urged everyone, regardless of their ideology, to accept these fundamental objectives and to fight together to attain them.84 Early Pujolism was influenced by the communitarist personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, the work of Charles Péguy and Henri Bergson.85 Jordi Pujol, a former member of the parapolitical group, CC (Crist Catalunya or Christ Catalonia), promoted by Raimon Galí, and initially greatly influenced by French progressive Catholicism, postulates what he calls ‘personalist nationalism’. This type of nationalism emerges from the idea that individuals need collective frameworks within which to develop. In so doing, he supports a welfare state in the service of individuals, and defends the sentimental dimension of personalism. For Pujol, ‘like nationalism and patriotism, personalism should also be a sentiment. The individual to be served has feelings, and cannot be served without emotion.’86 Personalist nationalism involves the will to create a new socio-economic programme for Catalonia, based upon an open and generous attitude towards immigrants, and committed to further promoting the individual. According to Pujol,

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the nation gives man a basic element of his being, a sense of communication with other men, but this is not sufficient: just this would cut man off. He must be given a possibility for promotion, an opening to more distant horizons.87 Pujol refers to two constant elements in Catalan nationalism: the demand for the institutional, political and cultural recognition of Catalonia as a distinctive people, and the reform of the Spanish state, involving both its modernization and Europeanization, as well as the creation of an internal pluralist structure.88 Pujol emphasizes the strength of Catalan nationalism on uniting people from different social classes, and to support this argument writes: Pierre Vilar, to whom I refer so often, argues that one of the things that surprises him most is that the identity of Catalonia was defended in 1873 by anarchic Republicanism, from 1890 to 1917 by a bourgeoisie in search of a state, and later on by a whole set of middle classes converging, sometimes in a purely tactical or circumstantial manner, but ultimately converging with the working-class sectors, with the popular sectors of the country.89 Here we should recall that Pujol never enjoyed the support of influential people from the Catalan economy, with the exception of the few occasions on which Pujolism has favoured the interests of Catalan capital.90 Caminal analyses this point: Pujolist patriotism is uncomfortable to businessmen who do not have a homeland. Business cannot be subjected to nationalism; quite the reverse. This is what they think from a materialist, bourgeois, instrumental and not at all sentimental idea of nationalism. In short, this is a ‘useful nationalism’. It is used when convenient and scorned when not of interest. This illustrates the past and present position of many of our bourgeois and their instrumental relationship with Catalonia. They also exist in CDC, in the so-called business sector, including some names which have enjoyed great influence in government policies.91 The nationalist discourse always encompasses the idea that the nation has to be ‘awake’ and become ‘aware’ of its potential. The patriotic and religious mysticism, present in Pujol’s early works, projects a certain degree of messianism, as pointed out by Colomer.92 In his Escrits de presó (Writings from prison, 1961–1962), Pujol states that ‘What we demand is a great deed to restore cohesion and the national sentiment [. . .], what we need are true virtues. What we need are strong individualities’, which ‘will awaken hundreds and hundreds of thousands of lethargic men and will make hundreds and hundreds of distrustful and dispersed men rediscover a sense of

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community; [. . .] once again they will make a people out of a group’.93 His sense of mission is still clearer in a later publication, where he argues that from time to time there is a generation, even a few men from a generation, who play a particularly important role. [. . .] Our generation will have to be one of these generations that stand up.94 He goes on to argue that ‘for this political shaping of Catalonia, our youth must be willing to give up a lot, even their life’.95 As President of the Catalan government, Pujol appeals for mobilization in a very different context to that of the 1960s, when he himself had undertaken to create counter-strategies to oppose the Franco regime. As Catalans we now have the possibility to construct our nation. Pujol writes that now it would be really positive for Catalonia to begin a new awarenessraising process which cannot just be carried out from above, or just from politics. The political and institutional consolidation of Catalonia requires this process to be both deep and wide-ranging, involving the minorities and the whole country.96 He requests ‘a collective effort of reflection, definition and a project to help us to adequately respond to the current challenges’.97 Identity Pujol’s nationalist discourse revolves around the idea that ‘Catalonia has a very distinctive identity [. . .] based on a particular language and culture, social cohesion, a collective consciousness, a community project and pride in the country.’98 In his view, it is crucial for Catalonia to maintain and develop its specific identity, which goes back to the Middle Ages. He believes that language is a distinctive element: Our identity as a country and our desire to be one, our future prospects depend on us conserving our language, because it forms an essential part of our identity, and if we lose our identity we will be nothing.99 Pujol writes: ‘I therefore believe that Catalan, although not the usual language of all Catalans, is the heritage of everyone.’100 In his view, the continuity of Catalonia as a nation depends on the possibility to preserve the Catalan language.101 Pujol proposes making it compulsory for people who live in Catalonia to understand and express themselves in Catalan102 and requests Castilian-speaking Catalans to make a bigger effort to use Catalan socially. In 1991, Pujol highlighted Catalonia’s positive atmosphere and insisted that it was up to everyone who lived in Catalonia to protect its personality and to strengthen the Catalan language and culture:

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It would be bad if there were Castilian-speaking Catalans who feel set upon. Who really feel it: I do not mean a few anti-Catalans who try to stir things up by claiming that they are set upon. This should be avoided for the sake of efficiency, justice and coexistence. And for the sake of efficiency, justice and coexistence we must also request Castilian speakers to make a greater effort to use Catalan socially.103 Identity is connected to language, to culture, to the experience of our history and to the collective sentiment of being Catalans. [. . .] It is also connected to a more or less conscious conviction that Catalonia has a role to play, has something to say in Spain and in Europe.104 For Pujol, European integration and the process of internationalization pose a challenge that can only be met if people recognize their need for identity: The model of country that we want and can offer is linked to our identity. [. . .] It is not, therefore, a question of sacrificing our Catalan-ness, modernity and competitiveness. Indeed, I am convinced that if we were to lose our collective personality, we would lose in all respects the capacity and the will for initiative, and therefore competitiveness.105 Identity and progress are closely connected. This is an original statement, absent from the classical formulations of nationalism and worth highlighting. Pujol’s nationalist discourse argues that, if the nation can be restored, by recovering and strengthening its identity, then individuals will feel more motivated and their actions will involve greater initiative and achievement. Pujol promotes an image of a prosperous Catalonia, capable of combining ‘two very strong trends in the present-day world, one leading to a global lifestyle and the other strengthening one’s own cultural identity’.106 He argues that ‘our concept of identity intrinsically involves projection. Projection in all senses, [. . .] towards the major intellectual and spiritual trends of the time.’107 According to Pujol’s nationalism, Catalonia must have a presence in the world with the aim of obtaining a minimal recognition of its culture, to do business and to learn from other countries. History Pujol turns to history to locate the origins of Catalan identity and of its difference in relation to the rest of Spain, and also of what he calls Catalonia’s ‘European vocation’. He writes: ‘A people is the work of generations, something that is built up gradually’108 and adds that a people ‘cannot exist if it breaks with tradition’.109 Continuity over time is a key concept of his nationalist discourse. The role of identity acquires a new dimension when Pujol

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analyses its origins and concludes that it is greatly indebted to historical events: ‘Everyone is entitled to see in History not only a few reference points or knowledge, but also an explanation of the present and an understanding of their own personality.’110 Pujol examines the historical origins of Catalonia and invokes them to legitimize the distinction between Catalans and the other peoples of Spain. Hence, in the Middle Ages, Catalonia arose as a southern bastion of the Carolingian empire, the Spanish March. In Pujol’s words, ‘the idea inspiring the birth of Catalonia is not peninsular, not Hispanic, but rather Carolingian, from the north, and its objective – I repeat – is not the Reconquest; at least this is not its main objective or its raison d’être’.111 Catalonia has a different origin from that of the rest of Spain which was occupied by the Moors for seven centuries. In 1985, during a visit to the city of Aachen, the former capital of the Carolingian empire, Pujol said: ‘For us, coming to Aachen is not going abroad, it is returning to our origins’ and joining the European Community ‘will be like going home for Catalonia’.112 Back in 1964, Pujol had already written that ‘Catalan nationalism should be a specific form of European nationalism’.113 Pujol’s current discourse stresses Catalonia’s need to modernize itself and to reach the level of other European Union countries if it wants to participate fully in the process of European integration.114 Pujol argues that Catalonia’s contribution to Europe stems from its ability to ‘offer a new concept of European nation, one based on culture and quality of life, with a strong sense of identity and, at the same time, capable of living within a larger political framework’.115 In his view, elaborating this new concept of the European nation and proving its viability is one of the most urgent challenges faced by the European Union. Pujol emphasizes the differences existing between Catalonia and the rest of Spain on referring to the positive attitude of seventeenth-century Catalans towards European ideas – industrialization, agrarian reforms and mercantilism – as ideas welcomed in Catalonia, but not widely accepted in other parts of Spain.116 He also points at the innovation and modernization introduced by Charles III in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Pujol’s speech to commemorate the bicentenary of Charles III, he argued that Spain did not react positively to the modernizing message of the despot king, and that, after his death, ‘the line of progress only continued in Catalonia’. The main reasons for this can be found in the existence of a civil society, a relatively high level of social cohesion, much higher than in the rest of the state, and a strong sense of belonging among Catalan people.117 The overall result was an industrial revolution that prospered in Catalonia and separated it even further from the rest of the Spanish state.118 On examining the historical roots of Catalonia, Pujol establishes a distinction between what he refers to as the three historical vocations of the Catalans: The European vocation, with its Carolingian root, at the heart of our millennial history and which we have always kept alive. The Mediterranean

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vocation, more intermittent than the one connecting us to the central European nucleus, but still very real. And the Hispanic vocation, which we incorporated later than the European one and into which we have not been successfully integrated, but which also stands, in all respects, as an undeniable reality.119 A common project: to build up Catalonia Jordi Pujol’s objective is to achieve a socially coherent Catalan society by means of a shared project to build up the country, a project open to the participation of all the citizens of Catalonia.120 In his opinion, Catalonia can only be re-established by collective work and effort, which should lead to the construction of a country of quality. Once achieved, quality will bring collective and individual respect, self-esteem and freedom. Quality should be introduced into all spheres.121 Identity, competitiveness, a sense of community and projection are the four main ideas that Pujol seeks to employ in order to build up Catalonia. Identity, as mentioned above, is essential and, in Pujol’s view, is a prior condition for the existence of Catalonia as a country, and it is also linked to the mentality that has been formed over history, especially in the last 300 years. It is also connected to the more or less conscious conviction that Catalonia has a role to play, has something to say in Spain and in Europe.122 Competitiveness is imperative if Catalonia wants to continue to be successful economically and to be among the most dynamic regions of Europe. However, Pujol warns that competitiveness can result in an inhuman society if key values are ignored.123 For him, a country needs a spiritual, not necessarily religious, definition. What he designates as a spirituality refers in the broadest sense, to the origins of generosity, a sense of honour, a desire to serve, noble ambition, magnanimity and a recognition that one does not constitute a supreme value; rather there are many higher things above oneself.124 He insists on the need to create a collective mystique embracing the social and the economic spheres.125 Pujol heightens the importance of the individual in the individual–society–nation trilogy.126 He invokes what he defines as ‘the serene, constructive force of Catalonia’, stemming from the Catalan’s collective consciousness and from the peaceful defence, by civil society, of Catalonia’s rights as a nation.127 He goes on to argue that ‘you cannot climb to the summit without a great deal of initiative, without pleasure for a well-done job, without an open spirit and mentality, without the ability to innovate, without a constructive pedagogy [. . .] or without love for one’s own country’.128

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The sense of community, the feeling of having ‘our’ own shared identity, is crucial to any nationalist discourse. The use of images and metaphors with a high pedagogical value have become a distinctive aspect of Jordi Pujol’s written work and speeches. He is keen to highlight their role in the construction of a shared sense of community. For example, he compares the country with a fleet and writes, ‘we must all reach the port’, emphasizing the need for an overall development of Catalonia that ‘must not abandon the people who cannot keep up’.129 In his early writings, Pujol shows an explicit social concern by pointing at the urgency to encourage the human promotion of the working class,130 and stresses the idea that ‘any national movement, which by definition means a movement that is intended to embody the yearnings of a whole people, must necessarily be popular and social’.131 He adds that ‘we cannot aspire to rebuild Catalonia fully, if the working class does not participate in this construction. [. . .] Of all the sectors that make up Catalonia, the most defeated and annihilated after 1939 was the working class’,132 and he even asserts that ‘Catalonia will not exist fully until the moment when the working class comes to power’.133 Later on, Pujol replaced these ideas with more conservative ones. The explicit references to the working class, present in his writings in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reflected a strong Marxist influence, which materialized in his insistence on social cohesion, as a sine qua non to create a prosperous society within which ‘modest people think that they can better themselves, because they see that in practice this is possible’.134 Once again we should recall the great influence of the fall of communism and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, as a factor that has, for the time being, transformed and banished the terminology and ideology associated with different forms of Marxism and socialism predominant in the 1960s and 1970s. The projection of Catalonia should occur in all respects: ‘Towards the future, towards all the physical, human, cultural, economic and political geography of the world, towards the major intellectual and spiritual tendencies of our time.’135 The objective of this projection is to turn Catalonia into one of the most dynamic regions of Europe and into an international actor. Welfare nationalism Pujol has always admired the ‘Swedish welfare state model’, a subject that receives renewed attention in his most recent writings. According to Pujol, maintaining the welfare state, which, in his view, poses a major challenge to all Western governments at the turn of the century,136 is an important tool for generating feelings of loyalty towards the institutions that are responsible for it. I argue that there is a notion of ‘welfare nationalism’ within Pujolism, aimed at attracting those who are not particularly sensitive to sentimental, historical or cultural arguments, but who may be sensitive to institutions, to a country or to a nationalism that offers them a good quality of

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life within a democratic and prosperous environment. In my view, it is decisive to acknowledge this ‘functional’ component of Pujol’s nationalism, which aspires to reach the whole Catalan population and seeks to draw it together by using a combination of sentimental and rational arguments, such as those that I have just set out when discussing the components of Catalan identity and analysing welfare nationalism. According to Pujol, the establishment of a welfare state managed and designed to respond to the aspirations of Catalan society requires a further devolution of powers to the Generalitat and adequate funding for Catalan autonomy. In the 15 November 1999 ‘Debate on the programme and vote of confidence’, which opened Pujol’s sixth term as President of the Generalitat, he evoked President Francesc Macià’s objective of creating a ‘prosperous country’: A socially just country. A country designed for all of its citizens, based on fairness and granting priority to people, and therefore with a welfare state comparable to the most advanced of Europe. A country that promotes individuals and grants them equal opportunities. A country that integrates and is inclusive, enjoying social cohesion and coexistence. And therefore [a country] with the will and the might to devote a priority effort to the creation and consolidation of such a fair society. [. . .] A politically free country. A democratic country whose identity is respected and recognized. A country with its own power, having a final say on fundamental aspects of its personality as a people and also concerning what a country is obliged to provide its citizens with for their welfare, their security, their promotion. [. . .] a spiritually glorious country. That is, a country of freedom and respect, with a high civic level, selfdemanding, generous, educated and sensitive.137 Catalonia and Spain Even in his early writings, Pujol rejected the idea of Spain as a unitary state and came out in favour of a solution that granted Catalonia a sufficient degree of autonomy to establish formal relations with the other Catalanspeaking countries.138 In addition, he believes that Catalan parties represent Catalonia’s interests far better than their Spanish counterparts, and argues that Catalan parties should adopt a positive attitude and contribute to the construction of a Spain within which Catalonia could be perfectly accommodated.139 Pujol condemns the lack of confidence, knowledge and understanding between Catalonia and the rest of Spain,140 and attributes this rift to the various historical processes followed by both entities. Some ambivalence is revealed in Pujol’s assessment of how Catalonia fits in within the Autonomous Communities System. He recognizes that Catalonia has never before enjoyed such a degree of autonomy, but at the

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same time he indicates that, in the initial phases of the transition to democracy, the Catalan question was not considered with sufficient conviction because of the fragility of the new political scenario and the Catalans’ sense of historical responsibility. From his point of view, a generalized Autonomous Communities System, which did not respond to the Spanish or to the Catalan situation, was accepted with the aim of preserving a still incipient democracy. Furthermore, according to Pujol, ‘the problem of Catalonia remains unresolved and now we are and we will be forced to continue to demand greater autonomy when it would appear that the time to do so has passed’.141 He regrets that the level of autonomy attained is well below the levels that he, his party, and the Catalan people in general envisaged in the initial stages of the transition to democracy.142 Pujol argues that Catalan self-government has not prospered sufficiently because the Autonomous Communities System regulates it employing a homogenizing logic, which does not establish a distinction between historical communities with national characteristics and the rest. The problem between Catalonia and the central government cannot be limited to the tensions generated by a slow transfer of powers to the Generalitat. Insufficient funding for Catalan autonomy is, according to Pujol, one of the most serious problems concerning the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish state. Pujol accepts that Catalonia has to continue declaring its solidarity with other communities, by transferring some income to them, but he considers that the difference between Catalonia’s contribution to Spanish coffers and the revenue it receives from them is excessively detrimental to Catalonia. This tax deficit affects the provision of public services and has a very high social cost for the Catalans. In 1999, in his talk at ESADE, Pujol declared: It is clear that there is a great lack of autonomous and political sensitivity. It leaves a very bad taste in the mouth. And it is also obvious that the system, as it is now, does not work. This is not to say that it has not produced any results for years. It has given some. But it will not give any more.143 And he regrets that ‘There is a very widespread attitude in Spain that does not want to truly recognize the distinct aspect of Catalonia’,144 although, in his view, no-one has had such a strong sense of state over the last ten, twenty or twenty-five years as us, as Catalonia, and no-one has taken on as many risks or as many responsibilities (in the corresponding sphere, of course) as we have done to make possible the great transformation that Spain has experienced over recent years, or for Spain to be integrated in Europe, or for the emergence of a new political culture concerning many aspects, obviously including the autonomous one.145

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Jordi Pujol’s speech to the National Council of CDC (23 July 2000) reveals some of the consequences arising from the new Spanish political scenario prompted by the PP’s landslide victory in the March 2000 election. Pujol emphasizes: Not only does the PP have a majority in Spain, but also there is a euphoria and pressure from a unitarianist pro-Spanishness of traditional roots. I do not mean that this pro-Spanishness is traditional in the sense of turning its back on modernity, but rather in the sense of being inspired by the values of the political and ideological tradition dominant in Spain since the sixteenth century. In this respect, we are experiencing a period of regression. In addition to this, we are faced with a difficult situation in the Catalan Parliament and we have the prospect of having to resolve the definitive structure of CiU in the not too distant future.146 Pujol’s nationalism does not foresee the creation of an independent Catalan state. He argues that Catalonia should collaborate with Spain but, at the same time, he maintains that: Spain cannot be built without granting Catalonia the place, the role, the possibilities, the right to hope, the status and the respect that it deserves. Unless the idea of an incomplete and handicapped Spain is accepted, of a Spain capable of rejecting a significant part of the numerous and challenging possibilities confronting it at this historical moment.147 The tension between the acceptance of Catalonia as a constituent part of Spain and the desire for greater autonomy lie at the core of Pujol’s nationalist discourse. He defines Catalonia as a nation, but he does not question the unity of a Spain which he considers to be a multinational state.148

Conclusion

To conclude I would like to address the questions raised at the beginning of this book, these being: (1) how does globalization affect the strategies employed in the construction of national identity; (2) what are the possibilities for survival of nations without states; and (3) what should be the aims of Catalan nationalism at the turn of the century.

Globalization and national identity National identity is currently one of the most powerful forms of collective identity. National identity is based upon the sentiment of belonging to a specific nation, endowed with its own symbols, traditions, sacred places, ceremonies, heroes, history, culture and territory. Two major implications derive from this. First, a common national identity favours the creation of solidarity bonds among the members of a given community and allows them to imagine the community they belong to as separate and distinct from others. Second, individuals who enter a culture emotionally charge certain symbols, values, beliefs and customs by internalizing them and conceiving them as part of themselves. This emotional charge is crucial because it builds up their identity and facilitates the spread of the nationalist sentiment. There is also a political dimension to national identity. It refers to the wish of those sharing a common national identity to have the right and the power to decide upon the political destiny of the community to which they belong. Classical nation-states have invariably sought to homogenize their populations and instil in them a sense of common national identity. Wherever the nation-state encountered resistance to its objective, it did not hesitate to apply tough measures, ranging from forced assimilation to repression, discrimination, or even mass deportations of people and genocide. Its objective was the annihilation of internal cultural difference. Throughout time, varying degrees of state power, access to resources and commitment to different political ideologies have determined the success and methods employed by different states in their quest for cultural homogenization. Among the main strategies generally implemented by the state in its pursuit of a single national identity capable of uniting its citizens are:

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•

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•

•

The construction and dissemination of a certain image of the ‘nation’, often based upon the dominant nation or ethnic group living within the state’s boundaries and comprising a common history, a shared culture and a demarcated territory. The creation and spread of a set of symbols and rituals charged with the mission of reinforcing a sense of community among citizens. The advancement of citizenship, involving a well-defined set of civil, legal, political and socio-economic rights and duties. The state, by conferring rights upon its members, favours the rise of sentiments of loyalty towards itself. It also establishes a crucial distinction between those included and those excluded from the community of citizens, that is, between those entitled to rights of citizenship and those deprived of them, despite living within the boundaries of the state. The creation of new enemies. The prosecution of war has proven decisive to the emergence and consolidation of a sense of community among citizens united against an external threat, be it imminent, potential or invented. The progressive consolidation of national education and media systems as key instruments in the dissemination of a particular ‘image’ of the nation with a clear-cut definition of how a ‘good citizen’ should be defined.

Significant changes in the context within which these strategies are carried out have been registered in the last twenty years or so. Most of these changes are closely connected to the intensification of globalization processes and the emergence of the post-traditional state.1 But what are these changes? How can we best understand them? What new challenges do they pose to traditional conceptions of national identity? This is an ambitious task which cannot be fully accomplished within the limited scope of this chapter. For this reason, in what follows I am only able to sketch some of the major transformations affecting the manner in which national identity is already being constructed by the post-traditional nation-state.2 Challenges to a homogeneous national identity At present, demands for political autonomy or independence are often grounded in the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. Such claims hold the potential to seriously subvert the idea of a homogeneous national identity which generally ignores intra-state diversity. By advancing their own distinctive identities, nations without states challenge the statecreated myth of a culturally homogeneous people living within its territory, a myth adopted and sought after with varying degrees of intensity and success by different nation-states. It could be argued, however, that social movements pressing for the rights of national minorities existed well before the

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era of globalization. Nevertheless, globalization has added very distinctive features to these movements by providing, to those who can afford it, potent means to promote their own languages and cultures, denounce unfair situations, create virtual resistance networks and organize political action where co-presence is not a necessary condition. Globalization has radically transformed the fashion in which information and culture can be created and disseminated. In addition, globalization has added visibility to the ways in which nationstates conduct politics and deal with their national and ethnic minorities. Visibility contributes to the denunciation of unjust situations but, so far, it has not proved very efficient in halting repression and changing them. The visibility associated with globalization has placed greater pressure upon nation-states to present themselves as democratic by either genuinely democratizing their functioning and structure or by skilfully seeking to hide their non-democratic practices, something which is becoming increasingly difficult. As analysed in this book, the Spanish transition to democracy illustrates how increasing visibility of the democratic claims for recognition advanced by Catalans and Basques, together with the desire of the Government and of some dominant classes, contributed to the transformation of the Franco regime and to the subsequent acceptance of Spain as a member of Western supranational institutions such as the European Union and NATO. This prompted a fundamental re-definition of Spain. Such a re-definition involved changes in the Spanish state structure and, to some extent, Spanish national identity. During the Francoist regime, the state imposed an image of Spain defined by centralism, conservatism, Catholicism and the pre-eminence of Castilian culture. The 1978 Constitution transformed the nature of Spain. Democracy forced the Spanish state to recognize the differences that existed within it. To accommodate national diversity, the Spanish state decided to confer the status of autonomous community upon Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in the first instance, and later upon the other autonomous communities (some with a certain historical basis, others invented), hence proceeding to a radical modification of the Spanish model of state. Democratic Catalan nationalism, which became a social movement at the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, played a key role in the Spanish transition to democracy. The common sense and goodwill invested in the drafting of the Constitution, once the Law for Political Reform had been passed (15 December 1976) and accepted by a broad spectrum of political actors, enabled a peaceful break with Francoism. At present, respect and recognition of internal diversity appear to have been somehow abandoned by some influential sectors of the state, which seem to undervalue the wealth of a harmonious and dialogic coexistence among the peoples of Spain. In the new democratic Spain, the creative role the state plays in relation

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to nationalism in the interconnection between Catalonia and Spain applies reflexively. The very definition of Spain is at stake here: by defining itself as a nation, Catalonia challenges the model of a homogeneous Spanish national identity defended not only by Francoism but also by some Conservative rightwing and Jacobin left-wing sectors. Cultural confrontation, competition and dialogue Although nation-states are still capable of generating and disseminating common symbols and reproducing rituals destined to enhance a sense of community among their citizens, they can no longer count on their exclusive capacity to exert cultural control over their territories. The new technologies associated with globalization have loosened the state’s ability to impose a single culture upon its population and rendered homogenization difficult. Yet, this assertion has to be qualified because, as already mentioned, never before has the nation-state had such potent technology at its disposal to impose a single culture upon all of its population. There is great tension between these two consequences of globalization. The post-traditional state seeks to present its national symbols and rituals in isolation from those belonging to other cultures and peoples. But, instead of cultural isolation, we are witnessing increasing interdependence, which manifests itself through cultural confrontation, competition and dialogue. Of course, this is not an even phenomenon which affects all nations equally, but it stands as a constantly expanding feature in the age of globalization. The situation is further complicated on recognizing that not all nation-states have the same power and resources to become ‘global actors’, and that neither all external information nor all cultural flows share the same possibilities to reach the majority of the world’s population. Nations without states are even more affected by globalization, and generally have fewer resources and less power to become globalizing nuclei. They often act as recipients of global cultural flows, rendering their survival even more difficult. It is essential to bear in mind that the status and social class of citizens determine the variety and quality of the information they can access. A very high number of citizens are still greatly influenced by the state-dominated education system and media. A key question when discussing the impact of globalization on culture is whether we are moving towards a global unitary culture or whether, on the contrary, globalization will strengthen the power and contribute to the progress of some cultures to the detriment of others. At the same time globalization applied to culture acts as a mechanism that favours and limits its development. It favours it by generating unforeseen possibilities for the dissemination and reproduction of specific cultures, owing to the development of new technologies. And it limits it as a result of the undeniable differences in the access to resources within the reach of different cultures.

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National identity and citizenship The whole process of translating the ideas of popular sovereignty into universal adult suffrage required a long and hard struggle, during which Enlightenment ideas began a slow but compelling process and permeated in varying degrees first the educated classes and then the masses of various European countries. The achievement of citizenship rights was by no means a smooth process which could be taken for granted, since there is a contrast between its defence among certain intellectual circles and the strong resistance to it on the part of the more privileged sectors of society.3 Citizenship established a clear-cut distinction between those entitled to direct engagement in governance processes and those excluded from them. In the West, the concession of further rights to citizens grew quickly after the Second World War. Since then, and due to the impact of globalization upon the proliferation of international and supranational institutions, the nation-state’s traditional role as a rights-giver par excellence has been challenged by institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union. For this reason, some scholars argue that a ‘post-national’ type of citizenship may be emerging in the EU. At this stage, it is not clear how potent and widespread this new model will become. Over the last fifty years, greater emphasis has been placed on Human Rights as defined and, to a certain degree, guaranteed by the United Nations. The definition of specific rights to be conferred upon European Union citizens is much more recent. It represents a major step in so far as it breaks the nation-state’s unique status as rights-guarantor within its territory. So far, the nation-state’s status as guarantor of its citizens’ rights has contributed to reinforcing its ability to instil a sense of common national identity among them. However, the progressive supersession of this traditional role of the state and its, so far, partial replacement by supranational institutions holds the potential to weaken its own citizens’ loyalty. If, further to this and within the EU, the principle of subsidiarity, understood as a mechanism destined to grant more political power to the European ‘regions’, is implemented, we could witness a strengthening of ‘regional’ identity, accompanied by the emergence of a still weak and uncertain European identity. Consciousness of forming a group with a shared history, culture and territory plays a fundamental part in the construction of national identity and it is unlikely that such a potent emotional attachment could be easily replaced by membership of larger political institutions, as demonstrated by the persistence of well-defined identities in some nations without states. The crux of the matter resides in the characteristics and methods employed to generate other levels of identity. Resistance to some nation-states’ homogenizing policies has, to a large extent, varied according to the nature of the different methods employed by the nation-state to achieve cultural and political uniformity within its territory. So far, the use of force and coercion has been commonplace. In this respect, if EU building processes are firmly grounded

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on democracy and respect for diversity, the response of nations without states, but also of nation-states and ethnic minorities, may be a positive one and EU citizens may feel compelled to embrace the development of a European identity, desired but not imposed. But this argument should not underestimate the fact that not all citizens feel with the same intensity the emotional bond which connects them to their nation-states. In this respect, the intensity of the emotional attachment of Scots, Welsh, Irish (in Northern Ireland), Catalans, Basques, Flemish, Quebecers, Corsicans and Bretons to their respective nation-states would require careful attention. For instance, it might be worth considering whether greater devolution to nations without states such as Catalonia or Scotland, combined with the consolidation of European citizenship, could eventually contribute to weakening the nation-state’s capacity to infuse a single national identity among its citizens. Further to this, one could question to what extent the strengthening of the EU could affect the relationship between different levels of local, regional, national and supranational identity. Finding new common enemies An essential strategy in the generation of national identity consists of uniting people against a common enemy. Since their foundational period, nationstates have been engaged almost continually in the fighting of war. Territorial, religious, ethnic, political and economic arguments have been employed to justify fighting against a wide range of external enemies. Wars have contributed to the dissemination of the idea of the nation as a community of fate. Besides, they have generated sentiments of solidarity towards fellow citizens and loyalty to the nation-state. Yet, while in some parts of the world conventional war continues to operate as a practical tool in dealing with enemies and contributing to the generation of a strong sense of national identity, in the West the absence of war poses some questions about how national identity can be constructed in peacetime. A possible response to this question points to the emergence of new kinds of external and internal enemies. The former include more ‘abstract’ enemies, such as the threat of international terrorism, fundamentalism, organized crime or ecological disasters. The latter may include some national and ethnic minorities, immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers as groups, which, for various reasons, represent what is ‘alien’ and ‘different’, and which generally prompt the reinforcement of the state’s national identity. In selected cases, some of these ‘alien’ groups are portrayed as holding a potential threat to the stability, order, prosperity and/or well-being of the nation-state. Some political parties and associations employ this type of argument to justify their stand against immigrants and refugees, while at the same time displaying a negative attitude towards devolution and the decentralization of the state. Arguments for exclusion grounded in ethnic and national differences can lead to hostility whenever racist or xenophobic ideas are added

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to them. Whenever these demonstrations of hostility or mistrust towards immigrants occur in the territory of a nation without state, they tend to be taken advantage of by the state, which frequently refers to them as ‘evidence’ of the discrimination or of the hidden or declared racism repeatedly attributed to minority nationalisms, even if the latter are democratic and openly in favour of diversity. Media and education The role of the media, in general and other types of elections and referenda, has proven decisive in determining the fate of contending political parties and providing legitimacy to state actions and policies. Even more important, education continues to play a fundamental part in defining the national community and supplying a sense of continuity and purpose to the very existence of the nation-state. Education, as Ernest Gellner demonstrated,4 equips individuals with the language and culture which will allow them to live and work within a given society. The importance of controlling the national curricula becomes apparent when the nation-state decides on such vital issues as: • • • •

the content of national history; whether or not to include the languages and cultures of minority nations and ethnic groups as forming a part of the national culture; what religions, if any, should be taught to students; and how other countries, peoples and cultures are to be presented.

Survival and development of nations without states The question about the survival and development of nations without states refers to whether or not they can continue to exist in the age of globalization, but it also relates to the endurance of national identities lacking their own state. Concerns about the survival of particular nations are motivated by the anxiety felt by some individuals troubled by the finite character of their lives. The absence of a future and the idea that their own life will not be transcended, either by their heirs, their business, their work or their country, emotionally affects many human beings. This type of anxiety is quite legitimate in individuals, like us, used to introspection and with a desire for eternity or at least transcendence. But the question about the survival of nations without states has to consider the specific transformations and elements which define the present, that is: •

in an increasingly interdependent world, within which cultures are in constant contact and within which some cultures and languages have become dominant;

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• • •

in a world within which powerful countries with a desire to impose their values, lifestyles and language, do not hesitate to sweep the board culturally and linguistically; in a new socio-political and economic environment generated by the consolidation of the EU, created and governed by the states forming it; and at a historical moment marked by the profound re-cast of the nationstate as the main political institution and also, at least at present, by the radicalization of a firm state nationalism aiming to impose internal homogeneity to counterbalance, among other reasons, the cultural and political demands of the national and ethnic minorities that it contains.

What real possibilities exist to argue in favour of, or against, the survival of nations without states? Before addressing this question, I offer some general reflections on diverse aspects of the context within which nations without states evolve in the age of globalization. It should be borne in mind, however, that nations are not eternal and immutable, and that this concerns both nation-states and nations without states. 1 The dynamism of the democratic nationalist movements that have reemerged over the past twenty or thirty years in Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, Flanders, the Basque Country and Wales, to name but a few cases, draws its support from the principles of popular sovereignty, democracy and collective rights. This grants them an unprecedented legitimacy and makes it much more difficult to disregard their claims. The combination of cultural and political arguments in the democratic nationalism of nations without states consolidates them as social movements, beyond the rigid structures of political parties. 2 In the setting up of political, academic, business and other types of networks between different nations without states, some initiatives have already been taken, especially in Europe, and also in Quebec, which represent a decisive step in the mutual knowledge among nations without states able to contrast their political status and learn from each other’s experiences, thus building up a solid comparative model. Such exchanges could lead to the formulation of joint demands, crucial on promoting relations both at an institutional level and within civil society. 3 The transformation of the nation-state, prompted by the recognition of its relative weakness in a world where international and multinational organizations and transnational institutions, such as the EU, NATO and the UN, proliferate, could force the state to reduce its scope to the dominant national group in its territory (England in Great Britain, Castile in Spain), or to engage in decentralization processes. The latter would have to foresee the recognition of greater sovereignty than that currently enjoyed by Scotland,

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Catalonia and the Basque Country, while recognizing the divergences existing between these three communities, and stop short of secession. This would occur at a time when the sovereignty of the nation-state is also being redefined. But the state’s capacity to reinvent itself and to maintain its power should not be underestimated. 4 The extension of the principle of subsidiarity, as foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, could foster a political scenario within which, for example, Scotland, Wales, England, Catalonia and Castile, among others, could sit down at the same table and enjoy a similar degree of political autonomy – legitimized by economic prosperity, a shared national identity and a desire to live in peace. In this, up to now, utopian scenario, a large number of policies would be determined by a democratically elected European Parliament within which all EU peoples should feel represented. In my view, nation-states will strongly resist turning a Europe of states into a Europe of peoples, and only very powerful economic and political interests could prompt a change of attitude resulting in greater prominence for nations without states in the EU. 5 The extraordinary value granted to difference and to genuine diversity contrasts with the emergence of a world with a tendency towards linguistic homogenization – a world which has adopted English as the lingua franca and is moving towards the Americanization of culture. In this context, the danger lies in the temptation to reduce difference to a magnificent, valuable museum piece – to a fossil with an astronomical value but which, being a fossil, is dead. 6 The human need for emotional closeness to others is expressed by searching for forms of both individual and collective identity, and through the attempt to recreate a sentiment of community. Although the nationstate has not always succeeded in generating this sentiment, a sense of community has survived in a very important number of nations without states, and it never ceases to surprise us on reappearing in nations thought to have disappeared long ago. The highly competitive and individualist society fostered by capitalism and the social fragmentation of the latest phases of modernity, have encouraged individuals to identify themselves with the nation, understood as the most important source of identity, one acting as mediator between the autonomous, but relatively weak, individual, and complex, powerful, global forces. It would appear that, at times when traditional sources of identity, such as class, are receding, national identity seizes an unexpected and powerful significance. Nationalist movements in nations without states seek to generate a common consciousness among the members of the nation and, at the same time, try to re-establish what they perceive as a threatened sentiment of

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community. The nation, portrayed as a community that transcends the life of single individuals, fosters an emotional link among its members and favours the emergence of solidarity bonds between them. It is worth noting that most nationalist movements in Western nations without states, such as Catalonia, advocate modernization, and stand for democracy and the construction of an open society, as the key elements informing their nationalist discourses. Only in so far as they are committed to these principles and values can they be referred to as new progressive social movements. 7 The transformation of the concept of citizenship to include multiple identities allows for and recognizes the existence of identities corresponding to national and ethnic minorities sharing a single citizenship. An example would be the compatibility between Scottish, English or Welsh identity and a single British citizenship. Another example would concern a European citizenship capable of containing a considerable number of national identities, including those of nation-states as well as those of stateless nations and ethnic groups. Having mentioned these points, I am now in a position to answer the question raised at the start of this section regarding the possibilities for survival of nations without states. In my opinion, it is not feasible to offer a conclusive answer, applicable to all cases. What we can assert is that not all nations without states will survive. I argue that only those with the capacity to maintain a firm sense of identity, able to engender social cohesion and enjoying economic viability, will survive. Further to this, for any nationalist movement to prosper, it is essential that it attains mass support. A minority elite is sufficient to initiate a nationalist movement, but to steer it into a social movement it is imperative to mobilize a large number of people from a broad social spectrum. Currently, some nations without states are faced with unprecedented prospects for their unfolding, if the nationalist movements leading them obtain sufficient resources and are skilful and determined enough to defend their communities by democratic means. These movements have to accept that nations are not immutable and foster attitudes and structures allowing for the peaceful coexistence of diversity within their own nations.

For a cosmopolitan Catalanism Catalan nationalism is constituted by a rich legacy accumulated over time, one which includes contributions from various political ideologies ranging from liberalism to socialism, social democracy, republicanism, Christian democracy and communism, to name but a few. At the beginning of the new millennium, and taking into account the dramatic transformations experienced by Catalonia and by the Catalan nationalist movement during Francoism and the transition to democracy, how could Catalan nationalism

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be modernized and adapted to the present socio-political scenario? Or, in other words, what should be the objectives of the Catalan nationalist movement over the next twenty-five or so years? I will respond to these questions in two stages. First, I shall identify the main challenges faced by Catalan society and the Catalan nationalism which aspires to represent it. Second, I shall advance a series of measures destined to go beyond the present situation and to improve the living conditions of the Catalans, while promoting Catalonia as an open, dynamic society. In my opinion, the most important challenges facing Catalan society are: 1 Insufficient autonomous funding. This is an essential point as it constrains the Generalitat’s scope for action. It also prevents the full operation of the autonomous institutions and, in so doing, limits the quality of life and the welfare that all the citizens of Catalonia can enjoy. An additional problem arises from the indirect but real incidence of insufficient funding, and therefore of deficient public services, on constructing and strengthening identity bonds between the citizens and the institutions representing them. 2 Lack of cultural and political recognition of the Catalan nation. Catalonia is not recognized as a nation, either within Spain or within the EU, and obviously not in the international sphere. Consequently, the cultural, political, legal and economic rights of Catalonia as a nation are not recognized, although, as we have seen, the main Catalan political parties define it as such. This situation confines Catalan society, condemns it to dependence and, to a certain extent, prevents it from deciding its own future. A further limitation arises from the situation of inferiority and of automatic exclusion experienced by Catalonia, in so far as it lacks a voice in international fora, such as the EU, the UN and NATO. 3 The rapid development of new technologies which systematically neglect the use of Catalan (and also of Castilian, although to a lesser extent) and which require a good level of English. These new technologies are not within reach of everyone and while, on the one hand, they threaten to contribute to marginalizing minority cultures, on the other, they accentuate social divisions as, in general, only a limited number of middle- and upper-class people have access to them. 4 The increasing number of immigrants, legal and illegal, arriving in Catalonia. The lack of economic resources and legal powers of the Catalan government to adequately deal with immigration can have negative consequences both for the immigrants themselves and for Catalan society. The Generalitat does not currently enjoy sufficient resources to welcome the immigrants, regulate their number and formulate policies destined to favour their social and economic integration. For these reasons, the present situation is unsustainable.

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5 The need to make decisive progress in the development of the Catalan culture and language from a position of respect for difference. Such progress should foster and invigorate the production of a quality Catalan culture within reach of all citizens – a feature which should contribute to their personal and creative development. In this context, special attention should be paid to education; this should involve the curricula as well as the organization of teaching in public and private schools and universities. The challenges faced by Catalan society are by no means exhausted by those mentioned above, but, in my view, it is important to set up some limits and to prioritize those questions which require more urgent and continuous attention. The proposals to overcome such challenges are also limited, although each of them can be divided into different parts and requires a thorough development of all the aspects involved. First, I argue that a cross-party agreement involving the main political forces with a Catalanist tradition is essential in promoting a common project for Catalonia. In my view, it is immoral for them to place particular party interests above the more general interests of the Catalan society they seek to represent. This cross-party agreement would have to cover at least the following aspects: • • • •

•

Proposal of a sufficient and fair funding budget for Catalonia. Recognition of Catalonia’s status as a nation. This should be reflected in the Spanish Constitution and in the Statute of Autonomy. Greater devolved powers for Catalonia within the framework of a Spain that defines itself as plurinational, plurilingual and pluricultural. Acceptance of Catalonia as a European electoral district, and of the right and duty of Catalan government representatives to participate in EU decision-making bodies, whenever matters directly concerning Catalonia are to be discussed. Agreement for the promotion of Catalan culture and language in Catalonia, Spain and the European Union, using all available resources to do so at the regional, national and European level.

Second, I propose the construction of what I refer to as a ‘cosmopolitan Catalanism’. It is not a contradiction to speak of cosmopolitan nationalism, however I feel that its meaning should be explained. We should be aware that cosmopolitanism, that is, world citizenship free from national prejudices, can only emerge under the following conditions: 1 2

The establishment of democratic constitutions in all nation-states as a guarantee of respect for freedom, equality before the law, and national, ethnic, cultural and gender diversity. The predominance of democracy as the principle governing international relations, which should involve a relationship of equality between

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Conclusion nations. This would also include the establishment of an ‘International Civic Constitution’ to regulate international relations and disputes, coupled with a democratic ‘International Court of Justice’, which should not remain in the hands of the economically and politically strongest countries. The key objective of this Court would be to prevent war. Such an institution would require its own army to enforce its resolutions. It would have to be financed by the nation-states, which would contribute in proportion to their resources. No state government would have the power to interrupt or to reduce their contribution to the maintenance of the ‘International Court of Justice’. The enactment of a ‘cosmopolitan law’, emanating from the International Civic Constitution, which would provide for what Immanuel Kant called ‘universal hospitality’, that is, the right of any foreigner – not a citizen of the specific state – to be treated without hostility in the country of arrival, supposing that he or she behaves peacefully.5

To exercise cosmopolitanism, the above three conditions should be complied with, since their fulfilment would be sufficient to eradicate the discrimination, repression and attempted annihilation suffered by some nations and ethnic groups throughout history. It is not ethically sound to demand from a nation engaged in a struggle for its own cultural and political survival to declare itself ‘cosmopolitan’ (kosmos polites), simply because to be able to do so this nation should be free, and freedom is not available to it while there are states that threaten or deny its own right to exist and to form a part of this ‘cosmos’. But, what all nation-states and nations without states should be encouraged to do is to contribute to setting up the conditions which would favour the emergence of cosmopolitanism, and this is why Catalanism must become cosmopolitan. Although cosmopolitanism can be branded utopian, I am convinced that the political agenda for the future of Catalonia should include not only specific policy aspects, but also the commitment to cosmopolitan ideals and values capable of informing political action. Democratic nationalism is legitimate. It defends the right of nations to exist and develop while recognizing and respecting internal diversity. It rejects the territorial expansion of nations and shows a commitment to increasing the morality of the nations’ citizens. Only by being committed to these principles can democratic nationalism become cosmopolitan. In short, by taking care of and valuing one’s own homeland, one becomes a citizen of the world. In this respect, Catalan society and, in particular, its institutions, its politicians, its intellectuals and its businessmen and women have a moral duty to work towards the construction of a democratic, open country, and to promote the civic values that favour social cohesion and harmony. Catalanism needs to take the country forward and contribute to the social well-being of the citizens through efficiency, responsibility and transparent management, and also by endorsing ethical values promoting the development of Catalan society as a whole. Catalanism should not be a

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modus vivendi, an excuse for political inaction, or a reason to maintain or generate social inequalities, but rather a progressive ideology, a tool for the social integration and the cultural, ethical and political regeneration of the country.

Appendix National position of the main political parties of Catalan origin

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Table A.1 Catalan identity Position

Objectives

ERC

– Nations without states are condemned to disappear – Identity is formed by territory, history, tradition, culture, language, economy, country consciousness and will – Optional, not ethnic – The Constitution treats Catalonia as a linguistic minority

– Recognition of Catalonia as a nation

PSUC-ICV

– Catalonia has a shared history, culture and language, but as a nation it is not eternal or immutable – The nation is constantly changing – 40 per cent of the inhabitants of Catalonia are of non-Catalan origin – Need to reconstruct a common homeland for all Catalans – Stands for popular culture – Recognizes that the Països Catalans share a common culture – Catalan identity is plural

– Creation of a society that integrates different cultural contributions from all those who live in Catalonia

PSC (PSC-PSOE)

– Catalonia as a non-static nation – ‘We are a nation because the citizens here and now want to be one’ – Collective will to be

– Self-government of Catalonia

CDC

– Catalonia, a nation with its own – Development of full cultural, historical, linguistic, national sovereignty and symbolic and institutional heritage promotion of Catalan – Catalonia, a nation placed within identity the cultural and linguistic framework of the Països Catalans – The ‘distinct aspect’ defines Catalonia as a nation

UDC

– Based on language, customs, tradition and territory – Països Catalans defined by their linguistic unity, their history and cultural tradition – Emphasizes the dynamic nature of the nation and nationalism

– Recognition of Catalonia as a nation and promotion of the Catalan language

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Table A.2 Nationalism Position

Objectives

ERC

– In favour of the right of peoples to – Independence of Catalonia self-determination within the EU to be – Stands for the Països Catalans achieved by peaceful and democratic means

PSUC-ICV

– Existence of various types of Catalan nationalism: conservative and popular – Proposes integrating workers in a Catalan nationalist project – Defends popular left-wing Catalanism

PSC (PSC-PSOE)

– Prefers the term ‘Catalanism’ to – Transformation of Spain into ‘Catalan nationalism’ a federal state – Catalanism is expressed in both Catalan and Castilian – Does not mention the concept of sovereignty – In favour of self-government – In favour of diversity and linguistic freedom in Catalonia – Defends Catalanism as the shared heritage of all Catalans

CDC

– Personalist, democratic and progressive nationalism – Integrative nationalism free from external dependence – Action to mobilize, educate and raise the national consciousness of the Catalan people

– The nationalization of Catalonia – Catalonia’s right to selfdetermination

UDC

– Community nationalism – Wants Catalonia to be able to exercise full sovereignty – Considers language as a key element and proposes normalizing it and extending its use – In favour of consensus between all political parties

– Reform of the Constitution allowing the federation of autonomous communities with historical, linguistic and cultural links

– Creation of a unitary strategy to reform the Constitution and achieve adequate funding for Catalonia – Spain to be defined as a plurinational, plurilinguistic and pluricultural state

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Table A.3 Immigration Position

Objectives

ERC

– Against xenophobia and racism – Catalonia has insufficient powers to tackle immigration – Proposes respect for and recognition of difference – Supports the rights and duties of immigrants – Immigrants have a duty to participate in the social life of the host country – Establishes a distinction between integration and assimilation

– Creation of cultural and social immigration policies

PSUC-ICV

– Against xenophobia and racism – Its main contribution to the national reconstruction of Catalonia has been to establish a link between Catalanism and the working class, in particular among those sectors of immigrant origin

– Social, legal and socioeconomic integration of immigrants

PSC (PSC-PSOE)

– Against xenophobia and racism – All culture created and produced in Catalonia is Catalan culture.

– All the citizens of Catalonia, regardless of their origin, should be invited to recreate the collective identity of Catalonia, the ‘Catalan melting pot’

CDC

– Against xenophobia and racism – In favour of the integration of immigrants into the socio-economic and labour system – Need to articulate plurality while protecting national identity – Need to have immigration powers devolved to the Generalitat

– Integration of immigrants who, without losing their own roots, should respect the laws, culture and traditions of the host country, in this case Catalonia

UDC

– Against xenophobia and racism – Proposes respect for difference

– Against the discrimination of immigrants and in favour of the preservation and promotion of Catalonia’s cultural traits

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Table A.4 Catalonia and Spain Position

Objectives

ERC

– Catalonia’s main problem is its submission to Spain – Catalonia and Spain have opposing national identities – Denounces the insufficient funding received by Catalonia – Questions the legitimacy of the concept of the Spanish state

– Creation of a Federal Republic as a step towards a Catalan Republic

PSUC-ICV

– Spain is a multinational, pluricultural and plurilinguistic state – Catalonia should contribute to democratizing Spain – In favour of transforming Spain into an asymmetric federal state

– Self-determination for all the peoples of Spain

PSC (PSC-PSOE)

– Spain is a culturally plural reality with four basic languages – In favour of a federal development of the Constitution – Tension between pro-Catalan and pro-Spanish sectors of the PSOE

– Creation of a federal state – Acceptance of the pluricultural, plurilinguistic and plurinational diversity of Catalonia

CDC

– Emphasizes its contribution to the governability and modernization of Spain – Spain should recognize its pluricultural, plurinational and plurilinguistic character

– Recognition of the Catalan national specificity by Spain – Greater self-government for Catalonia

UDC

– Highlights the effort made by Catalan nationalism to contribute to the governability of Spain, to its modernization, Europeanization and regeneration – So far, Spain has not responded positively to this collaboration by Catalan nationalism – UDC is willing to participate in the government of Spain if it accepts the plural nature of the state and the Catalan national specificity

– New state agreement acknowledging Catalonia’s right to self-determination and also the pluricultural, plurilingual and plurinational nature of Spain

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Table A.5 Catalonia and the European Union Position

Objectives

ERC

– The EU does not respect the rights of peoples – Catalonia should have its own, direct representation in the EU and, as a first step, should become a European electoral constituency – In favour of proclaiming a European Constitution that respects individual and collective rights

– Independent Catalonia within the EU

PSUC-ICV

– In favour of an EU with a federal structure

– European electoral constituency for Catalonia

PSC (PSC-PSOE)

– In favour of the presence of autonomous governments in European decision-making bodies – Supports the indirect relations with the EU through Spain, and direct relations through the European regional movement

– Creation of a federal Europe based on the principle of subsidiarity

CDC

– Europe as Catalonia’s natural political framework – Catalonia should enjoy its own, direct representation in the EU – In favour of a Europe of the nations

– European electoral constituency for Catalonia

UDC

– In favour of the consolidation of the EU – Requests the EU to respect its internal diversity – In favour of a federal Europe and of the principle of subsidiarity – Proposes expanding a sentiment of being European together with Catalan national consciousness

– Construction of a Europe of the peoples and the nations, and not of the states

Notes

Introduction 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

According to Miquel Caminal, ‘the word Catalanism has a great virtue and a possible pitfall: it expresses an identity and a desire for self-determination without using the term nationalism’ (M. Caminal, ‘Els catalanismes i l’Espanya plurinacional’, in N. Bilbeny and À. Pes, El nou catalanisme, Ariel, Barcelona, 2001, p. 141. For Caminal, ‘Catalanism has been absorbed by nationalism throughout the 20th century’ (ibid. p. 143). Agustí Colomines writes that ‘political Catalanism corresponds to the name given to the movement defending Catalan national claims, that is, the nationalist movement’ (A. Colomines, ‘Catalanisme és nacionalisme’, in A. Colomines, Testimoni públic. Política, cultura i nacionalisme, Catarroja/Barcelona/ Palma, Afers, 2001, p. 34). In my opinion, the term nationalism meticulously describes the different political projects for Catalonia studied in this book. It should be borne in mind that nationalism, characterized by an impressive flexibility with regard to its definition, is capable of accommodating very different political proposals, some of which are aimed at obtaining cultural recognition, political autonomy, federation and even national independence. In my view, nationalism expresses the feeling of belonging to a specific nation that demands the right to decide its own political future, which does not always have to be independence. I am aware that these statements go against an existing current in Catalonia which avoids using the word ‘nationalism’ and prefers using the word ‘Catalanism’, while maintaining that Catalonia is a nation. Rather than embarking on endless discussions on this subject, I consider it more practical to acknowledge the complexity of nationalism, and accept its polysemic nature, as defended by an important and well-documented literature on this subject. See E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; A.D. Smith, Nationalism and modernism, Routledge, London, 1998; and M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. J. Pemartin, ¿Qué es lo nuevo? Consideraciones sobre el momento español presente, 2nd edn, Cultura Española, Santander, 1938. M. Weber, From Max Weber. Essays in sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 78. M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., pp. 47–48. I. Berlin, The sense of reality. Studies in ideas and their history, Pimlico, London, 1996, p. 248. Ibid., p. 252. Ibid., p. 256. J. Mayall, Nationalism and international society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 50.

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1

Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states: the Catalan case

1 A.D. Smith, National identity, Penguin Books, London, 1991, p. 93. 2 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson, London, 1986, p. 85. 3 See also T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in colonial Africa, Muller, London, 1956; H. Trevor-Roper, Jewish and other nationalisms, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1962; and H. Kohn, The idea of nationalism, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967. 4 E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1971, p. 84. 5 Ibid., p. 113. 6 T. Nairn, The break-up of Britain, NLB, London, 1977, pp. 98–99. 7 Ibid., p. 339. 8 Ibid., p. 101. 9 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1982, p. 3. 10 Ibid., p. 332. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 329. 13 A.D. Smith, Nationalism and modernism, op. cit., p. 189. 14 E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The invention of tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 15 A.D. Smith, National identity, op. cit., p. 97. 16 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 17 A.W. Gouldner, The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class, Macmillan, London, 1979. 18 J.H. Kautsky, Political change in underdeveloped countries. Nationalism and communism, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, New York, 1976. 19 M. Pinard and R. Hamilton, ‘The class bases of the Quebec independence movement. Conjecture and evidence’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 17–54. 20 J. Casassas (ed.), Els intel.lectuals i el poder a Catalunya (1808–1975), Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1999. 21 J. Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, Edicions Catalanes de París, Paris, 1973. 22 From among these writings, Salvador Giner, Lluis Flaquer, Jordi Busquet and Núria Bultà in their book La cultura catalana: el sagrat i el profà, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1996, highlight the following: 1940, Carles Cardó, La moral de la desfeta; 1941, Carles Pi i Sunyer, Grandesa i misèria del sentiment nacional; 1943, Jordi Arquer, El futur de Catalunya i els deures polítics de l’emigració catalana; 1944, Josep Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana; 1944, Joan Comorera, La nació en la nova etapa històrica; 1944, Domènec Guansé, Cataluña y el imperialismo castellano; 1945, Pere Bosch Gimpera, La formación de los pueblos de España; 1946, Josep Trueta, The spirit of Catalonia; 1946, Carles Cardó, Histoire spirituelle des Espagnes. Étude historicopsychologique du peuple espagnol ; 1949, Joan Estelrich, La falsa paz; 1954, Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, El dret català; 1954, Jaume Vicens i Vives, Notícia de Catalunya; 1959, Miquel Batllori, Vuit segles de cultura catalana a Europa. 23 J. Vicens i Vives, Notícia de Catalunya, Columna/Proa, Barcelona, 1999 [1954], p. 9. 24 Ibid., p. 20. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p. 24. 27 Ibid., p. 88. 28 J. Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana, Columna/Proa, Barcelona, 1999 [1944], p. 9. 29 Ibid., p. 16.

174 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

2

Notes Ibid., p. 35. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 94. J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 36. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 96. J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 45. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 97. J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 50. J. Vicens i Vives, op. cit., pp. 169–171. J. Ferrater Mora, op. cit., p. 64. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., p. 92. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 102. For an excellent, and so far unique, sociological analysis of Catalan society, see S. Giner (ed.), La societat catalana, Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1998. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 62. À. Castiñeira, Catalunya com a projecte, Proa, Barcelona, 2001, p. 86. S. Giner et al., La cultura catalana, op. cit., p. 63. See X. Escura i Dalmau, Els sentiments i les raons de les nacions. Reflexions sobre l’anticatalanisme i d’altres sentiments i raons nacionals dins l’actual Estat espanyol, Signament, Barcelona, 2000. J.H. Elliott, The revolt of the Catalans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963. A. Balcells, Catalan nationalism, Macmillan, London, 1996, pp. 12–17. J. Nogué, Nacionalismo y territorio, Milenio, Lleida, 1998, p. 68. Ibid., pp. 87–94.

Portrait of a dictatorship: Francoism 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

P. Preston, Franco, Fontana Press, London, 1994, p. 185. Ibid., pp. 185–186. Ibid., p. 187. S. Giner and E. Sevilla Guzmán differentiate totalitarianism from what they call ‘reactionary despotism’ in the analysis that they carry out of the Franco regime. See S. Giner and E. Sevilla Guzmán, ‘From despotism to parliamentarism. Class domination and political order in the Spanish state’. Iberian Studies, vol. III, no. 2 (autumn 1979), pp. 69–83. P. Preston, Franco, op. cit., p. 197. See S.G. Payne, Falange, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1961, p. 190. M. Gallo, Historia de la España franquista, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris, 1969, p. 80. J. Pemartín, op. cit., pp. 11–16. M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., Ch. 1. P. Preston, Juan Carlos: el rey de un pueblo, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 2003. For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon in Catalonia, see C. Molinero and P. Ysàs, Els industrials catalans durant el franquisme, Eumo, Vic, 1991. On the same phenomenon in the Basque Country, see J.M. Lorenzo, Dictadura y dividendo. El discreto negocio de la burguesía vasca 1937–1950, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, 1989, and M. González Portilla and J.M. Garmendía, La posguerra en el País Vasco. Política, acumulación, miseria, Kriselu, San Sebastián, 1988. B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, ‘El franquisme i la transició democràtica (1939–1988)’, in P. Vilar (ed.), Història de Catalunya, 8 vols, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1989, vol. VII, p. 137.

Notes 175 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

13 ‘Speech on opening the seventh term of the Spanish parliament’, Madrid, 3 June 1961, in F. Franco, Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado 1960–1963, Dirección General de Información, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid, 1964, pp. 217–218. 14 M. Gallo, op. cit., p. 75. 15 Ibid., p. 76. 16 Ibid., p. 169. 17 Ibid., p. 179. 18 For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon in the Basque Country, see A. Gurruchaga, El código nacionalista vasco durante el franquismo, Anthropos, Barcelona, 1985. 19 P. Preston, ‘Introduction’, in H. Raguer, La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil Española (1936–1939), Península, Barcelona, 2001, p. 19. 20 Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, Franco i l’espanyolisme, Curial Edicions Catalanes, Barcelona, 1980, p. 107. 21 R. Morodo, Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo. Acción Española, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p. 145. 22 Ibid., p. 163. 23 J. Pemartín, op. cit., pp. 64–65. 24 Ibid., p. 45. 25 F. Franco, ‘Speech to the concentration of producers in Madrid, 18 July 1943’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 67. (The italics are mine.) 26 F. Franco, ‘Speech 1945’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 128. 27 F. Franco, ‘End-of-year message 1958’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 129. 28 Raza (Race) is also the title of a novel written by Franco between 1940 and 1941 and signed with the pseudonym ‘Jaime de Andrade’. The novel, later adapted as a film, has an autobiographical aspect and is a romanticized version of the life of a Galician family which took the Caudillo’s own family as its model. 29 See the description of these events in P. Preston, Franco, op. cit., pp. 191–192. 30 A. Gurruchaga, op. cit., p. 154. According to Max Gallo, 7,937 members of religious orders and priests were executed or assassinated in the Republican zone (including 12 bishops, 283 nuns and 192 monks). M. Gallo, op. cit. pp. 65–66. 31 Cited in M. Gallo, op. cit. 32 Ibid., p. 207. 33 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 24. 34 S.G. Payne, The Franco regime (1936–1975), The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1987, p. 213. 35 See H. Raguer, La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil Española (1936–1939), Península, Barcelona, 2001. 36 Franco was addressing foreign correspondents in Salamanca on 4 April 1937. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., 1980, p. 93. 37 Statements by Franco to W.P. Carney, from the New York Times, published on 26 December 1937. F. Franco, ‘Discurs 1945’. Cited in X. Arbós and A. Puigsec, op. cit., p. 93. 38 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 83. 39 In Terrassa, for example, there were 2,807 political denunciations against people just in the year 1939. The authorities received so many denunciations, many of them invented, that the provincial leadership of the Falange in Barcelona had to send an order to its activists warning that anyone who made false accusations would be severely penalized (ibid., p. 82). 40 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, ibid., p. 94. 41 Ibid., p. 98. 42 E.J. Hugues, Report from Spain, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1947, p. 149. 43 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 108.

176 3

Notes The re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Francoism

1 J. Llobera, ‘Catalan identity. The dialectics of past and present’. Critique of Anthropology, vol. X, nos. 2 and 3 (winter 1990), p. 16. 2 See J. Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, op. cit. 3 D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili (1939–1959), La Magrana, Barcelona, 1991, p. 30. 4 Ibid., p. 38. 5 For a detailed version of the activities of the Generalitat in exile illustrated with key documents from that period, see M. Ferré, La Generalitat de Catalunya a l’exili, Aymà, Barcelona, 1977. 6 D. Díaz Esculíes, El Front Nacional de Catalunya (1939–47), La Magrana, Barcelona, 1983, p. 120. 7 C. Molinero and P. Ysàs, L’oposició antifeixista a Catalunya (1939–50), La Magrana, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 161ff. 8 D. Díaz Esculíes, El Front Nacional de Catalunya 1939–1947, op. cit., p. 114. 9 D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili (1939–59), op. cit., pp. 129–135. 10 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 153. 11 For a detailed version, see D. Díaz Esculíes, El catalanisme polític a l’exili, op. cit., pp. 185ff. 12 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 171. 13 See I. Riera, Els catalans de Franco, Plaza y Janés, 1998; R. Aracil et al. Empresarios de la post-guerra. La Comisión de incorporación industrial y mercantil número 2, 1938–1942, Cambra Oficial de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1999 and F. Cabana, 37 anys de franquisme a Catalunya, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 2000. 14 See F. Sánchez Agustí, Maquis a Catalunya. De la invasió de la Vall d’Aran a la mort de Caracremada, Pagès, Lleida, 1999. 15 Ibid., pp. 160–165; E. Pons Prades, Guerrillas españolas (1936–1960), Planeta, Barcelona, 1977, and J.M. Solé Sabaté, ‘La lluita armada a la post-guerra’. L’Avenç, no. 3 (Barcelona, June 1977), p. 15. 16 See J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, Vint anys de resistència catalana (1939–1959), La Magrana, Barcelona, 1978; J. Colomines, El compromís de viure, Columna, Barcelona, 1999; P. Carbonell, Tres nadals empresonats (1939–1943), Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1999, and H. Raguer, Gaudeamus igitur, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1999. For a complete bibliography on Francoism, see A. Colomines, ‘Historiar el franquisme’. Afers, no. 23 (January–June 2001), pp. 92–94. 17 During the festivities of exaltation of the Mare de Déu de Montserrat in April 1947, a few words were pronounced publicly in Catalan at the monastery of Montserrat for the first time since 1939, and from the summit known as the ‘gorro frigi’ an immense Catalan flag was unfurled which the special police forces were unable to take down during the whole day ( J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, op. cit., p. 126). In July 1951, the warships of the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy arrived at Barcelona’s harbour. It was the first time that the American fleet in the Mediterranean had come to Barcelona and, to commemorate the event, the city decided to dedicate a gala performance at the Liceu to the marines. During the performance leaflets written in English were thrown from the upper levels. They denounced the Spanish regime to the Americans, telling them that Spain was under a dictatorship and not a democracy. (The previous year the United Nations had cancelled the measures taken against the Franco regime and the United States had granted Franco the first loans.) ( J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, op. cit., pp. 123–124.)

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18 For further details, see J. Crexell, Els fets del Palau i el consell de guerra de Jordi Pujol, La Magrana, Barcelona, 1982. Also see X. Muñoz, De dreta a esquerra: memòries polítiques, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1990, pp. 135–144. 19 B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 358. 20 Some publications were clearly political, such as, for example, L’Espurna (POUM, 1940), Treball (PSUC, 1941), Front de la Llibertat (1941–1944), La Humanitat (ERC, 1942), Per Catalunya (FNC, 1945), Endavant (MSC, 1944–1968) and Determini (UDC, 1966–1968). Others were more cultural: Catalunya, Poesia, Ariel, Dau al set, Germinàbit, Serra d’Or, Promos, Presència, etc. Apart from the journals and magazines published in Catalonia, Albert Manent has counted 180 Catalan journals published in exile between 1939 and 1976. Two thirds of these journals were published in France and Mexico: Quaderns de l’exili, La Nostra Revista and Pont Blau, are examples (cited in B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 243). 21 J. Triadú, Una cultura sense llibertat, Aymà, Barcelona, 1978, p. 15. 22 J. Torras i Bages, La tradició catalana, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1981. 23 J. Casassas, op. cit., p. 303. 24 J. Casañas, El progressisme catòlic a Catalunya (1940–1980), La Llar del Llibre, Barcelona, 1989, pp. 63–79. 25 See J. Massot i Muntaner, ‘Cristianisme i catalanisme’, in J. Termes et al., Catalanisme. Història, política i cultura, L’Avenç, Barcelona, 1986. 26 J. Faulí, ‘Un segle d’edicions montserratines’, Serra d’Or, no. 478, (1999), pp. 35–39. 27 An example of the differences existing between the more social sectors of the church and those more inclined to defend nationalist positions is the controversy which began in 1966 with the appointment of Marcelo González Martín as archbishop of Barcelona. This triggered a protest campaign which included, in addition to petitions, the slogan ‘We want Catalan bishops’. For the sector of the clergy defending social Catholicism, it was a question of saying ‘we want bishops for the people’, and, as Casañas points out, this illustrates ‘the lack of agreement and, at times, the tension, between nationalist Christianity and social Christianity, at the time both being described as “progressive” in view of the political situation’ ( J. Casañas, op. cit., p. 287). 28 H. Johnston, Tales of nationalism. Catalonia (1939–1979), Rutgers University Press, Newark, NJ, 1991, p. 61. 29 X. Muñoz, op. cit., p. 78. 30 R. Galí, ‘Problemes de la nostra generació, problemes del nostre temps’, pamphlet, 20 October 1955. 31 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, which appeared for the first time in a pamphlet in 1958; it is now published in J. Pujol, Construir Catalunya, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1980, p. 223. 32 X. Muñoz, op. cit., p. 72. 33 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Els estudiants de Barcelona sota el franquisme, Curial Edicions Catalanes, Barcelona, 1978, vol. I, p. 57. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. p. 58. 36 J. Fabré, J.M. Huertas and A. Ribas, op. cit., p. 251. 37 S. Giner, The social structure of Catalonia, The Anglo-Catalan Society, Sheffield, 1980, p. 59. 38 J. Triadú, op. cit., pp. 156–157. 39 This section takes its name from the most recent and faithful version of the activities of the Assembly of Catalonia: A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, La gran conspiració. Crònica de l’Assemblea de Catalunya, Empúries, Barcelona, 1991. 40 For a detailed version, see A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit. and also J.M. Colomer i Calsina, op. cit. For an assessment of the Assembly of Catalonia on the

178

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

4

Notes twentieth anniversary of its creation, see Debat Nacionalista, no. 16–17, (December 1991–February 1992), Barcelona. B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 407. Ibid. p. 387. J. Benet, Introduction, in A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit., p. 16. A. Balcells, Catalan nationalism, op. cit., p. 181. Communiqué of the ‘I Reunió de l’Assemblea de Catalunya’, 7 November 1972. Included as an appendix in A. Batista and J. Playà Maset, op. cit., pp. 301–302. J. Termes, La immigració a Catalunya. Política i cultura, Empúries, Barcelona, 1984. In 1975, 79.02 per cent of the Catalan population lived in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants. B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 183. Ibid., p. 337. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 20. B. de Riquer and J.B. Culla, op. cit., p. 340. R. Ribó, ‘L’empremta dels mots. El PSUC i la qüestió nacional’. L’Avenç, no. 95 (July–August 1986), p. 29. K.A. Woolard, Double talk. Bilingualism and the politics of ethnicity in Catalonia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1989. H. Johnston, op. cit. p. 117.

Catalonia within the new democratic Spain

1 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España. Autonomías, federalismo, autodeterminación, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p. 80. 2 J.F. Tezanos, ‘Modernización y cambio social en España’, in J.F. Tezanos, et al. (eds), La transición democrática española, Sistema, Madrid, 1989, p. 106. 3 J.L. Cebrián, ‘La experiencia del período constituyente’, in J.L. Cagigao et al., España (1975–1980). Conflictos y logros de la democracia, José Porrúa Turanzas, Madrid, 1982, pp. 13–24. 4 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 80. 5 Cited in J. Tusell, España, una angustia nacional, Espasa Fórum, Madrid, 1999, p. 67. 6 Ibid. 7 J.L. Abellán, ‘La función del pensamiento en la transición política’, in J.L. Cagigao et al., op. cit., p. 33. 8 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit. p. 84. 9 E. Fossas and J.L. Pérez Francesch, Lliçons de dret constitucional, Proa, Barcelona, 1994 (Biblioteca Universitària, 24), p. 194. 10 Ibid., p. 195. 11 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme. La idea de nació en el pensament polític català (1939–1979), L’Avenç, Barcelona, 1984, p. 351. 12 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 101. 13 E. Fossas, ‘Asimetria y plurinacionalidad en el Estado autonómico’ in E. Fossas and F. Requejo, Asimetria federal y estado plurinacional, Trotta, Madrid, 1999, pp. 282–283. 14 I. Molas, ‘Introduction’, in M. Gerpe Landín et al., Comentaris jurídics a l’Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1986, p. 16. 15 J. Reventós, ‘Comunidades Autónomas’, in Perspectivas de una España democrática y constitucionalizada (lecture series given in the Club Siglo XXI, 1978–1979), Unión Editorial, Madrid, vol. III, p. 53. 16 J.R. Parada, ‘España: ¿una o trina?’ Revista de Administración Pública, no. 141, 1996. Cited in E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 294. 17 R.L. Blanco Valdés, ‘Nacionalidades históricas y regiones sin historia’. Parlamento y Constitución, no. 1. Cited in E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 295.

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18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30

31 32 33 34 35 36

5

See E. Fossas, op. cit., p. 288. Ibid., p. 280. Ibid., p. 286. Ibid., p. 292. The Statute of Autonomy was approved in Catalonia by popular referendum on 25 October 1979 and ratified by the lower house of Parliament on 29 November and by the Senate on 12 December 1979. King Juan Carlos I sanctioned the Statute as an organic law of the state in the Palau Reial on 18 December 1979. The text was published in Catalan in the Diari Oficial de la Generalitat, no. 28, on 31 December 1979. L’Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1986, p. 7. (The italics are mine). Ibid., p. 3. (The italics are mine.) Ibid., p. 7. Ibid. (The italics are mine.) Ibid., p. 7. See F. Requejo, ‘Democràcia, partits i escenaris de futur’. Idées, no. 6 (April–June, 2000), pp. 108–114. Vinyet Panyella identifies Josep Carbonell i Gener as one of the first ideologists to define the Països Catalans concept. See V. Panyella, Josep Carbonell i Gener (Sitges: 1897–1979). Entre les avantguardes i l’humanisme, Edicions 62, (Biografies i memòries, 43), Barcelona, 2000, pp. 216–217. ‘The statutes may foresee the cases, requirements and terms according to which the autonomous communities may come to agreements among themselves in order to accomplish and provide services particular to them; and they may also foresee the character and the consequences of the corresponding notification to the Cortes Generales. In other cases, cooperation agreements between autonomous communities shall require the sanctioning of the Cortes Generales’, Constitución Española 1978, Article 145.2. The italics are mine. See M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., p. 47. The PSC (PSC-PSOE) was second with thirty-three seats and the PSUC third with twenty-five. M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, in J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller. Convergència democràtica de Catalunya (1974–2000), Pòrtic, Barcelona, 2001, p. 142. J. Lorés, La transició a Catalunya (1977–1984). El pujolisme i els altres, Empúries, Barcelona, 1985, p. 186. This study does not include an analysis of the ideology of the Partido Popular, as I concentrate on the parties of Catalan origin even if, as with the PSC which was founded in Catalonia, they are federated or associated with Spanish formations.

Images of Catalonia I: ERC, PSUC-ICV and PSC 1 Declaració ideològica, ERC, Barcelona, 1993, p. 1. 2 E. Monné and Ll. Selga, Història de la Crida a la Solidaritat, La Campana, Barcelona, 1991, p. 18. 3 J. Argelaguet et al., República catalana, Llibres de l’Índex, Barcelona, 1992, p. 28. 4 Ibid., p. 29. 5 Ibid., p. 32. 6 Ibid., p. 38. 7 Ibid., p. 41. 8 Ibid., p. 44.

180

Notes

9 Ibid., p. 46. 10 Ibid. 11 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001, p. 12. 12 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state, March 2000, p. 64. 13 Declaració ideològica, ERC, Barcelona, 1993, p. 13. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 14. 17 Blueprint for the National Statute of Catalonia, Mediterrània, Barcelona, 2001, p. 29. 18 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 69. 19 Ibid., p. 76. 20 Ibid., p. 69. 21 Ibid., p. 77. 22 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent. L’esquerra nacional cap al segle XXI, La Humanitat/Columna, Barcelona, 1997, p. 60. 23 Ibid., p. 82. 24 Ibid. 25 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Jubilar la transició, La Humanitat/Columna, Barcelona, 1998, p. 84. 26 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state, March 2000, p. 46. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 46. 30 Ibid., p. 48. 31 Ibid., p. 54. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., pp. 54–56. 34 Ibid., p. 78. 35 J.Ll. Carod-Rovira, Jubilar la transició, op. cit., p. 108. 36 Ibid., p. 109. 37 J.Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., p. 106. 38 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state, March 2000, p. 7. 39 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001, p. 20. 40 Ibid., p. 21. 41 Ibid., p. 22. 42 Ibid. 43 H. Barrera, ‘Les etapes cap a la plena sobirania’, in H. Barrera et al., El nacionalisme català a la fi del segle XX, Fundació Universitat de Vic/Eumo, Vic, 1987, p. 113. 44 Ibid., p. 115. 45 E. Vila, Què pensa Heribert Barrera, Proa/Dèria, Barcelona, 2001, p. 54. 46 H. Barrera, op. cit., p. 117. 47 J. Argelaguet et al., op. cit., p. 10. 48 Ibid., pp. 24–25. 49 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., pp. 30–32. 50 ERC, 23rd National Congress, ‘Political paper’, Tarragona, 17–18 March 2001, p. 11. 51 J. Ll. Carod-Rovira, Tornar amb la gent, op. cit., p. 74.

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52 ERC, Framework programme, elections to the lower and upper houses of the Spanish state, March 2000, p. 76. 53 PSUC, Per un catalanisme popular, Central Committee PSUC, 12 September 1982, p. 5. 54 PSUC, Statutes of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, approved in the IX Congress, Barcelona, 10 May 1997, p. 6. 55 PSUC, Statutes, op. cit., p. 6. 56 ICV, Principles and ideology, http://www.ic-v.org 57 El Correo Catalán (Barcelona, 8 March 1984). 58 Nous Horitzons (Barcelona, March–April, 1984). 59 PSUC V Congress, Central Committee, Draft theory, 1980, p. 27. 60 PSUC, Draft programme 1976, pp. 19–20. 61 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional. Catalunya, Països Catalans, Estat espanyol, L’Avenç, Barcelona, 1977, pp. 125–130. 62 Ibid., p. 132. 63 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 28. 64 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, Barcelona, November 1998, point 2.3. 65 Ibid. 66 PSUC, Per un catalanisme popular, op. cit., pp. 4–14. 67 PSUC VIII Congress (16–18 December 1988), chapter III, p. 71. 68 Ibid. 69 Cited in M. Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya, Empúries, Barcelona, 1998, p. 188. 70 Ibid., p. 190. 71 Nous Horitzons, no. 142 (October 1996). 72 ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.3. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 PSUC, III National conference. Faced with the national reconstruction of Catalonia, 7–9 December 1979, p. 66. 76 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional, op. cit., p. 81. 77 R. Ribó, Catalunya, nació d’esquerra, La Magrana/Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1988, p. 70. 78 Marx and Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’, in Basic writings on politics and philosophy, Feuer, L.S. (ed.), Collins/The Fontana Library, Glasgow, 1976 [1959], p. 65. 79 Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 319. 80 PSUC III National conference, op. cit., p. 53. 81 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 21. 82 PSUC III National conference, op. cit., pp. 55–65. 83 Ibid., p. 53. 84 PSUC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 72. 85 PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 27. 86 Ibid., p. 21. 87 Treball, Barcelona, 18 July 1979. 88 ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, p. 72. 89 Ibid., p. 73. 90 Ibid., p. 72. 91 R. Ribó, Sobre el fet nacional, op. cit., p. 19. 92 Ibid., p. 27. 93 Ibid., p. 30. 94 IC, Draft manifesto programme, Second National Assembly, 30 November– 1 December 1990, p. 104.

182 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136

Notes Treball (Barcelona, 19 September 1979). PSUC III National conference, op. cit., p. 19. Ibid., p. 51. PSUC V Congress, op. cit., p. 27. PSUC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 47. IC, Draft manifesto programme, op. cit., p. 43. Ibid., p. 103. Ibid., p. 104. ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.4. See also ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, pp. 58–66. ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.4. ICV, General election programme 12 March 2000, p. 58. ICV, Principles and ideology, 5th National Assembly, op. cit., point 2.5. PSC-PSOE, Per Catalunya. Ara un nou federalisme, 1999, p. 3. PSC (PSC-PSOE) IV Congress, 23–25 November 1984, point 15, p. 14. PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, 4–6 February 1994, ‘Framework paper’, point 1.4, p. 4. Ibid., p. 5. PSC (PSC-PSOE) IX Congress, 16–18 June 2000, point 5, p. 53. Ibid. PSC (PSC-PSOE) VI Congress, 12–14 October 1990, point 4. See also PSC (PSCPSOE) II Congress, 4–6 July 1980, points 8.5.1 and 8.5.2. PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., p. 11. See I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari de partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona, 2000, p. 291. See Mossèn J. Dalmau, La crisi del PSOE vista des del conflicte Pallach-Reventós, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1979. See I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari de partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), op. cit., p. 236. J. Reventós, ‘Participació al col.loqui’, in R. Aracil and A. Segura (eds), Memòria de la transició a Espanya i a Catalunya, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2000, p. 314. Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 316. Avui (Barcelona, 22 April 1984). L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 3 August 1979). Cited by J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 215. PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 12. PSC-PSOE, Per Catalunya. op. cit., p. 11. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 22. CpC, Programme bases, http://www.pelcanvi.com PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto 1999 p. 48. Ibid. Ibid. PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., p. 7, point 1.3. I. Molas, ‘Apunts sobre catalanisme’, in Ll. Armet et al., Federalisme i Estat de les autonomies, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1988, p. 15. See also Avui (Barcelona, 26 April 1984). PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 3. J. Solé Tura, ‘Una lectura autonomista i federal del model d’estat constitucional’, in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit., p. 154. Ibid., p. 178. Ibid.

Notes 183 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

137 J. Solé Tura, ‘Una lectura autonomista i federal del model d’Estat constitucional’, op. cit., p. 151. See also I. Molas, ‘Actualitat del federalisme’. Debat, no. 16, (September 1992, pp. 17–36). 138 J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i Catalanisme, op. cit., pp. 340–341. 139 Ibid., p. 341. 140 A. Castells, ‘Catalunya i l’Estat espanyol en la perspectiva de l’Estat autonòmic’, in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit., p. 201. 141 P. Maragall, ‘Referent Barcelona’ (1986). Cited in L. Maurí and L. Uría, La gota malaya. Pasqual Maragall, la obstinación y el poder, Bestselia (Booket), Barcelona, 1999, p. 447. 142 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., point 2. 143 Ibid. 144 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, talk given at ESADE (28 May 2001), p. 11. 145 Ibid. 146 L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 31 December 1979). 147 I. Molas, ‘Apunts sobre catalanisme’, op. cit., p. 16. 148 El Periódico (Barcelona, 27 April 1984). 149 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 16. 150 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 47. 151 Ibid., 1999, p. 48. 152 P. Maragall, ‘Immigració. Oportunitat i repte per a Catalunya’, talk given at the Auditorium of the Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona (4 April 2001). 153 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 15. 154 PSC (PSC-PSOE) V Congress, 11–13 December 1987. 155 PSC (PSC-PSOE) V Congress, 11–13 March 1987, point 1, p. 41. 156 Ibid. 157 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya. op. cit., 1999, pp. 34–35. 158 La Rosa (Barcelona, November 1991). 159 La Vanguardia (14 September 1987). 160 El País (Madrid, 30 August 1987). 161 El País (Madrid, 6 April 1992). 162 J. Solé Tura, Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España, op. cit., p. 15. 163 P. Maragall in the paper ‘El nuevo federalismo en España y Europa. La propuesta catalana para España’, presented on 8 February 2001 at the Club Siglo XXI in Madrid, stressed: ‘ “Asymmetry” is a concept that political scientists can use accurately, but that as politicians we should only use with great caution.’ 164 M. Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya, op. cit., p. 184. 165 L’Opinió Socialista (Barcelona, 3 August 1979). 166 Mundo Diario (Madrid, 20 September 1979). 167 El País (Madrid, 16 October 1979). 168 R. Obiols, ‘El federalisme, una proposta cap el futur’, in Ll. Armet et al., op. cit., p. 209. 169 Avui (Barcelona, 14 December 1989). 170 E. Lluch, ‘La reivindicació nacional’, in Joan Colomines et al., Per una resposta socialista, 7×7 Edicions, Barcelona, 1977, pp. 289–313. 171 PSC (PSC-PSOE) i CpC, Manifesto, 1999, p. 13. 172 P. Maragall, ‘El nuevo federalismo en España y Europa’, op. cit., p. 13. 173 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 6. 174 PSC (PSC-PSOE) IX Congress, op. cit., section 5.1. 175 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., p. 36. 176 P. Maragall, ‘El moment polític a Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 10. 177 PSC (PSC-PSOE) VII Congress, op. cit., point 3, p. 14.

184

Notes

178 Ibid., point 6.7, p. 40. 179 PSC (PSC-PSOE) Per Catalunya, op. cit., 1999, p. 36. 180 ICV, ERC, PSC-CpC, Comissió d’estudi per a l’aprofundiment de l’autogovern. Proposta d’Informe, Barcelona, 27 November 2001, point 4. 181 See Avui, 14 May 2003.

6

Images of Catalonia II: CDC and UDC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,175. Ibid., paper 2, points 370–375. Ibid., paper 3, point 1,325. M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., pp. 127–128. For an excellent analysis of CDC, see J.B. Culla (ed.), op. cit. See R. Trias Fargas, Nacionalisme i llibertat, Destino, Barcelona, 1979. Cited by C. Llorens, ‘CDC en el període constituent (1977–1979)’, in J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller . . . , op. cit., p.73. Also see J. Marcet, CDC. El partit i el moviment polític, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1984. J.B. Culla, ‘De la primera victòria al vintenni en el poder (1980–2000)’, in J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller . . . , op. cit., p. 75. Cited by J.B. Culla, ‘De la primera victòria al vintenni en el poder (1980–2000)’, op. cit., p. 77. J. Colomines i Ferran, ‘L’evolució electoral de CDC (1977–2000)’, in J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., p. 201. M. Roca i Junyent, Per què no? Una proposta catalana per a la modernització de l’estat, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1982, p. 35. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid. J. Pujol, ‘Prologue’, in M. Roca i Junyent, op. cit., p. III. Official Journal of the Catalan Parliament, 18 December 1989. Cited by J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., p. 87. J.B. Culla (ed.), El pal de paller, op. cit., pp. 87–88. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 690. CDC VIII Congress, 1 A party for Catalonia in the 1990s, 27–29 January 1989, p. 48. Ibid., p. 183. J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat, vol. XXX, January–December 1996, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1997, p. 317. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 65. M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., p. 128. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 150. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 182. J. Pujol, Tot compromís comporta un risc, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1977, p. 39. CDC XI Congress, paper 2, point 2,044. CDC XI Congress, paper 3, point 70. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 265. CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 256. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 690. CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 450. CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 53. CDC XI Congress, paper 2, point 515. Ibid., point 530. Ibid., point 532. M. Roca i Junyent, op. cit., p. 38. (The italics are mine.)

Notes 185 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

37 Declaració de Barcelona, (16–17 July 1998), p. 6. 38 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat, vol. XXX, January–December 1999, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2000, p. 91. 39 Ibid., pp. 91–92. 40 Ibid., p. 95. 41 Ibid., p. 104. 42 Ibid., p. 103. 43 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 745. 44 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, points 760–765. 45 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 51. 46 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,175. 47 CDC VIII Congress, op. cit., p. 75. 48 Ibid., pp. 67–68. 49 Ibid., p. 82. 50 CDC XI Congress, paper 1, point 1,245. 51 H. Raguer, La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939), Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1976, p. 80. 52 Ibid., pp. 84–85. 53 J.A. Duran i Lleida, Catalunya i l’Espanya plurinacional, Planeta, Barcelona, 1995, p. 130. 54 Cited in H. Raguer, La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939), op. cit., p. 257. 55 See J.B. Culla, ‘Unió Democràtica de Catalunya’, in I. Molas (ed.), Diccionari dels partits polítics de Catalunya (segle XX), Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona, 2000, p. 320. 56 See J.B. Culla, ‘Unió Democràtica de Catalunya’, op. cit., pp. 319–324. 57 For an analysis of the period 1976–1978, see Ò. Barberà, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (1976–1978), Mediterrània, Barcelona, 2000. 58 UDC, Estragègia política, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 2. 59 Ibid., p. 3. 60 J. Rigol, Criteris per a una política cultural, UDC, Barcelona, 1999, p. 38. 61 UDC, Unitat de la llengua, història comuna i simbols de catalanitat, http://www. uniodemocratica.org, p. 1. 62 Consult the UDC website, Catalunya com a raó d’ésser i marc d’actuació, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 1. 63 J. Rigol, Política i comunitat. El meu nacionalisme, Mediterrània, Barcelona, 1996, p. 128. 64 UDC, La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional, National Council of UDC, Sant Cugat, 31 May 1997, p. 33. 65 Consult the UDC website, Catalunya com a raó d’ésser i marc d’actuació, op. cit., p. 2. 66 Ibid., p. 1. 67 Ibid., p. 4. 68 Ibid., p. 2. 69 Ibid., p. 4. 70 UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, p. 6. 71 Ibid., p. 7. 72 Ibid. 73 Duran i Lleida himself suggests the need for a ‘refoundation of the state’ capable of guaranteeing its plurinational nature, in J.A. Duran i Lleida, Catalunya i l’Espanya plurinacional, op. cit., 1995, p. 41. 74 UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, op. cit., p. 8. 75 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

186 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

Notes UDC, La sobirania de Catalunya i l’Estat plurinacional, op. cit., p. 36. UDC, Espanya des del catalanisme d’Unió, op. cit., p. 11. Ibid., p. 12. UDC, L’objectiu europeu, http://www.uniodemocratica.org, pp. 1 and 3. J.A. Duran i Lleida, Voluntat de servei, Timun Mas, Barcelona, 1991, p. 222. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 22. J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1991, p. 22. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 277. Ibid., p. 271. In his Escrits de presó, Pujol also mentions the impact that reading the novel El Crist de nou crucificat by Nikos Kazandzakis had on him. J. Pujol, Speech of the President to the National Council of CDC, 23 July 2000. Typewritten text, CDC, p. 6. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 282. J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1991, p. 23. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències. Analitzar el passat per renovar el projecte, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1990, p. 77. See J. Antich, El virrei, Planeta, Barcelona, 1994. M. Caminal, ‘El pujolisme i la ideologia nacionalista de CDC’, op. cit., p. 159. J.M. Colomer i Calsina, Espanyolisme i catalanisme, op. cit., p. 255. Ibid. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 39. Ibid., p. 93. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 31. Ibid., p. 15. J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 18. Ibid., p. 35. J. Pujol, ‘Què representa la llengua a Catalunya?’, Palau de Congressos de Montjuic, 22 March 1995, in J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 1995, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1996, vol. XXVI, p. 175. According to the CIS report of March 2001, 97.3 per cent of the population of Catalonia understood Catalan, 78.4 per cent spoke it fluently, 85 per cent could read it and 46.3 per cent could write it correctly. In 1990, 90.3 per cent of the population of Catalonia understood Catalan, and 64 per cent spoke it. J. Colomines, La llengua nacional de Catalunya, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1992, p. 170. J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 34. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 40–41. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 39. Ibid., p. 28. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 12. J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 12. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 26. J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 121. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., pp. 36 and 80. J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 74. J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 37. Ibid., p. 18.

Notes 187 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

118 According to Fontana, in the mid-nineteenth century, 40 per cent of the industrialization of Spain was concentrated in Catalonia. J. Fontana, ‘La fi de l’antic règim i la industrialització (1787–1868)’, in P. Vilar (ed.), Història de Catalunya, 8 vols, Edicions 62, Barcelona, vol. V, p. 386. 119 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 42. 120 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat 1999, op. cit., p. 266. 121 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 82. 122 Ibid., p. 32. 123 Ibid., p. 38. 124 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 43. 125 Ibid., p. 51. 126 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 38. 127 Ibid., p. 67. 128 Ibid., pp. 74–75. 129 Ibid., pp. 39–40. 130 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 113. 131 Ibid., p. 115. 132 Ibid., p. 137. 133 Ibid., p. 138. 134 J. Pujol, Quatre conferències, op. cit., p. 46. 135 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 41. 136 J. Pujol, ‘Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. Què ha estat, què és, què volem que sigui’ (Teatre Tívoli, Barcelona, 17 June 1996), Secretaria d’organització, CDC, p. 20. 137 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat 1999, op. cit., pp. 352–353. 138 J. Pujol, ‘Fer poble, fer Catalunya’, op. cit., p. 91. 139 Ibid., pp. 75–77. 140 J. Pujol, La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 11. 141 Ibid., p. 28. 142 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 73. 143 J. Pujol, Paraules del president de la Generalitat de Catalunya 1999, op. cit., p. 108. 144 Ibid., p. 99. 145 Ibid., pp. 109–110. 146 J. Pujol, Speech of the President to the National Council of CDC, op. cit., p. 1. 147 J. Pujol, La força serena i constructiva de Catalunya, op. cit., p. 93. 148 La Vanguardia (Barcelona, 7 January 1990).

Conclusion 1 M. Guibernau, ‘Globalization and the nation-state’, in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, Understanding nationalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 242–268. 2 See M. Guibernau, Nations without states, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 150. 3 See M. Guibernau, Nationalisms, op. cit., Ch. 2. 4 E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, op. cit. 5 See I. Kant, Practical philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 329.

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1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

Index

Acció Catalana 82 Acció Catalana Republicana 134 Acció Catòlica 42, 59 Aguirre y Lekube, José 42 Agustí Colomines 172 Alfonso XIII, King 38 Almirall, Valentí 32 Alzamiento Nacional 44, 58 Amics de la Poesia 57 AP (Alianza Popular) 122 Aramon i Serra, Ramon 565 Araujo-Costa, Luis de 43 Ardiaca i Martín, Pere 81 Armengou, Josep 58 Arriba 41 Assemblea de Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia) 124 Assemblea Permanent d’Intel.lectuals 66 Associació Catalana de la Dona 86 Astray, General José Millán 45 Balmes, Jaume 43, 134 Banca Catalana 82, 122 Barba, Bartolomé 42 Barça (Barcelona Football Club) 31–32 Barrera, Heribert 82, 93, 141 Basque Country 10, 12, 21, 34, 36, 39, 41–42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75–76, 118, 119, 125, 131, 154, 159, 160, 174, 175 Bassols, Agustí 136 Benèfica Minerva 57 Benet, Josep 32, 66, 103, 141 Bergson, Henri 142 Berlin, Isaiah 11 Berlinguer, Enrico 96 Bernanos, Georges 58 Blanco Valdés, Roberto L. 74 BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) 125 Boix, Joaquim 62

Bonet, Carles 82 Borbón, Don Juan de 38 Borja, Jordi 81, 100 Breuilly, John 12, 15, 18–19, 20, 33 Busquet, Jordi 25 Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo 80 Caminal, Miquel 80, 100, 117, 120, 127, 143, 172 Camp, Ramon 125 Candel i Tortajada, Francesc 67 Cantonigròs Awards 57 Canyellas, Antón 135 Caputxinada 61–62 Caputxins de Sarrià 61 Carbonell, Jordi 83 Cardó, Dr Carles 58, 134, 173 Carlism 37, 134 Carod-Rovira, Josep Lluís 83, 89, 93, 94 Carolingian empire 146 Carrasco i Formiguera, Manuel 134 Carrero Blanco, Admiral Luis 65 Carrillo, Santiago 96 Casals, Pau 31 Casanovas, Joan 52 Casassas, Jordi 21, 58 Castells, Antoni 112 Castiñeira, Àngel 27 Catholic church 24, 34, 36, 39–42, 46, 57–58, 60, 134–135 CC (Crist Catalunya) 56, 59–61, 121, 142 CC-UCD (Centristes de Catalunya-Unión del Centro Democrático) 121–122 CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya) 13, 79, 84, 107, 120–138, 143, 151, 184 Cebrián, José Luís 71 Centre d’Estudis Francesc Eiximenis 59

Index 197 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona 115 Charles III, King 146 Chesterton, Gilbert K. 58, 134 Ciervo, El 59 Cigarràn, Carlos 108 Cirera i Soler, Josep 134 CiU (Convergència i Unió ) 2, 79–84, 100, 116, 121–126, 128, 131, 136, 151 Civil War 24, 33, 38, 40, 45–47, 50, 52, 71–72, 85, 95, 135 Claudín, Fernando 68 Club Siglo XXI 117 CNT (Confederació Nacional de Treballadors) 96 Coll i Alentorn, Miquel 134, 135 Colom, Àngel 82, 86–89, 91, 93–94 Colomines, Agustí 172 Colomines, Joaquim 122 Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya 65 Comissió dels Nou 85 Comitè de Coordinació Universitària 61 Comorera, Joan 95, 173 Companys, Lluís 53, 85, 111, 127 Confraria de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat 59 Congregacions Marianes 59 Consejo Superior de Política de Integración 90 Consell de Forces Polítiques 134 Consell Nacional de Catalunya 53 Consell Nacional de Democràcia Catalana 53 Constitution of 1978 13, 72–78, 94, 104, 117, 154 Corominas i Díaz, Lluis M. 126 Corts Catalanes 000 CpC (Ciutadans pel Canvi) 81, 110–111, 114, 117, 126 Creus de Sang 135 Crida (Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalana) 82, 86 Cruells, Manuel 67 Cuatrecases, Llibert 136 Cuixà, Monastery of 31, 58 Culla, Joan B. 39, 46, 121, 122, 177, 178 Dalí, Salvador 31 Delgado Martínez, Joaquín 47 Democracia Social Cristiana 135 Determini 135, 177 Día de la Hispanidad 45 Día de la Raza 45

Diàleg 133 Diputació de Barcelona 48 Donoso Cortés, Juan 43 Duran i Canyameres, Félix 134 Duran i Lleida, Josep Antoni 124, 126, 136, 141, 185 EDC (Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya) 121 Edicions de la Negra Nit 57 Edicions de la Sirena 57 Editorial Estela 59 ENE (Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra) 82 EPP (European People’s Party) 141 Equip Demòcrata Cristià de l’Estat Espanyol 135 ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) 13, 53–54, 65, 79, 82–84, 85–96, 108, 119, 121, 122 ESADE 113, 118, 131, 150 Escarré, Aureli Maria 60 españolismo 27, 28 essentialism 27, 138, 141 Esteve, Pere 125–126 Estudi 57 ETA 47, 66 EU (European Union) 3, 6, 94, 104, 105, 119, 133, 156, 157, 159, 162, 163 EUiA (Esquerra Unida i Alternativa) 82 Faceries, Josep Lluís 55 FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica) 96 Falange 34, 36–38, 39, 48, 175 FC-PSOE (Federació Catalana del PSOE) 111 FECEA (Fundació Empresa, Catalunya, Europa i América) 136 Federació Catalana del PSOE 95 Ferrater Mora, Josep 24, 25–27, 173 Ferrer, Concepció 136 FET y de las JONS (Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista) 37 FJCC 57 Flaquer, Lluis 25 FNC (Front Nacional de Catalunya) 53, 61, 121, 177 FNEC (Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya) 61 FOC (Front Obrer de Catalunya) 111 Força Nova 135 Fossas, Enric 73, 75 Fraga Iribarne, Manuel 65

198

Index

Franciscàlia 59 Franco, Carmen Polo de 45 Franco, Francisco 35–7, 39–41, 43, 62, 66, 175 FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico) 47 French Revolution 10 Front de la Llibertat 111, 177 FSC (PSOE) (Federació Socialista de Catalunya) 107 FUC (Front Universitari de Catalunya) 60–61, 135 Galí, Raimon 60, 142 Galinsoga affair 62 Galinsoga, Luis Martínez de 62, 63 García Morente, Manuel 44 Gaudí, Antoni 31 Gellner, Ernest 158, 172 Gil-Robles, José María 135 Giner, Salvador 25, 26, 27, 28, 64, 173, 174 Gomà i Tomàs, Isidre 58 González Casanova, Josep Lluís 111, 112 Gottfried von Herder, Johann 16 Gottlieb Fichte, Johann 16 Gouldner, Alvin 20 Granados Gata, Francisco 47 Grimau García, Julià 47 Grups Nacionals de Resistència 135 Guardia Civil 48 Guerra dels Segadors 30 Gutiérrez i Díaz, Antoni 81 Hedilla, Manuel 37 HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica) 42, 59 Hobsbawm, Eric 20 Hortalà i Arau, Joan 82 Hroch, Miroslav 18 IC (Iniciativa per Catalunya) 82, 95, 96–97, 100, 103, 104 ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds) 82, 95, 97, 98–100, 102, 103–105 immigration 13, 33, 50, 67, 68, 69, 85, 90, 102, 129, 162 Infantil, L’ 59 Institut Catòlic d’Estudis Socials de Barcelona 59 Institut d’Estudis Catalans 56 Irla, Josep 53, 54, 127 IU (Izquierda Unida) 82, 119 Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana 135

JOC ( Joventut Obrera Catòlica) 59 Joventut Catalana Democràtica 135 Juan Carlos I, King 70, 179 Kant, Immanuel 164 Kedourie, Elie 12, 15–17, 18, 20, 32 Laborda, Juan José 120 Legión 45 Lliga Espiritual de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat 59 Llovera, Dr Josep Maria 134 Lluch, Ernest 80, 109 LOAPA 80, 108–109, 121 López i Raimundo, Gregorio 81 Lorés, Jaume 59 Lubac, Henri de 58 Maastricht Treaty 160 Macià, Francesc 34, 85–86 Maeztu, Ramiro de 43, 45 Majó, Joan 109 Mancomunitat 30, 127 ‘Manifesto of the 229’ 82 Manyà, Joan Baptista 58 maquis 55 Maragall, Joan 26, 56, 134 Maragall, Pasqual 80, 109, 110, 112, 117, 124, 126, 141, 183 Maritain, Jacques 58, 134 Martín Toval, Eduard 80, 117 Mas, Artur 126 Matí, El 134 Mayall, James 12 Menéndez Pidal, Ramón 71 Menéndez y Pelayo, Marcelino 43 Millán Astray, General José 45 Millet i Maristany, Fèlix 57 Miquel, Simeó 135 Miramar 57 Miró i Ardèvol, Josep 135 Miró, Joan 31 Molas, Isidre 74, 109, 111, 114 Molins, Joaquim 125 Moncloa Pacts 81 Montes, Eugenio 43 Montjuïc 53 Montseny 31 Montserrat, Monastery of 31, 42, 58–60, 66 Moreres, Fossar de les 31 Morodo, Raúl 43 Mounier, Emmanuel 58, 134, 142

Index 199 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 5111

Movimiento Nacional 37 MSC (Moviment Socialista de Catalunya) 61, 65, 66, 111 Muñoz, Xavier 60 Nacionalistes d’Esquerra 81, 82 Nairn, Tom 13, 15, 17–18, 20, 33 national Catholicism 13, 34, 42, 44, 49 NATO 2, 6, 154, 159, 162 NEI (Nouvelles Équipes Internationales) 135 NEU (Nova Esquerra Universitària) 61 Nit de Santa Llúcia festival 57 Norte de Castilla, El 46 North Catalonia 31, 133 Nova Cançó 64, 65 Obiols, Raimon 108, 109, 114, 116, 117, 141 OJE (Organización de Juventudes Españolas) 59 Olaechea, Marcelino 46 Òmnium Cultural 000 Opinió, l’ 85 Ortega y Gasset, José 71 Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya 121 pactism 25, 27 País, El 117 Països Catalans 31, 60, 78, 82, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 98, 103, 126, 137 Palau de la Música Catalana 56 Pallach, Josep 107, 108, 111, 114 PAM (Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat) 59 Parada, J. Ramón 74 Partido del Trabajo de España 86 Partit Català Proletari 95 Partit Nacionalista Català 121 Partit Republicà Català 85 PCC (Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya) 81, 95, 96–97 PCE (Partido Comunista de Espan¯a) 96, 105 PCI (Italian Communist Party) 96 Peces Barba, Gregorio 116 Péguy, Charles 58, 142 Pemartín, José 4, 38, 43 Pere III el Cerimoniós 000 Perpignan 31 Philips, A.V. 46 PI (Partit per la Independència) 82 Pibernat, Joaquim 136 Pi i Margall, Francesc 112

Pi i Sunyer, Carles 53, 173 Pla i Deniel, Enric 58 PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) 125, 135 Poblet, Monastery of 31, 58 POUM (Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista) 96, 177 PP (Partido Popular) 2, 4, 5, 6, 83, 119, 125, 126, 151 Prat de la Riba, Enric 32, 60, 111, 134 Prats Català, Joan 80 PRD (Partido Reformista Democrático) 123 Premi d’Honor de les Lletres Catalanes 57 Preston, Paul 35 Primo de Rivera, General Miguel 30, 36–37 principio dispositivo 73, 76 PSC (PSC-PSOE) 83, 84, 105, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 116–19 PSC (PSC-PSOE)-CpC 110, 114–15, 117, 119, 126 PSC (C) (Congrés) 107, 108 PSC (R) (Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Reagrupament)) 107, 108 PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) 106–9, 116, 119, 121, 122, 124 PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya) 66, 68, 81–5, 95–105, 166–71 Puig, Felip 125, 126 Puig Antich, Salvador 47 Puigcercós, Joan 83 Puig i Cadafalch, Josep 56 Pujol, Jordi 13, 32, 60, 66, 67, 79–80, 84, 87, 120–126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 141–151, 185, 186 Qüestions de vida cristiana 59 Quiroga, Borja de 43 Raguer, Hilari 46, 134 Rahola, Pilar 82 rauxa 26, 27 Raventós, Joan 141 Real Madrid 32 Renan, Ernest 109 Reventós, Joan 74, 107, 108–109, 117 Reyes Católicos 43 Riber i Campins, Llorenç 58 Ribó i Massó, Rafael 81 Rigol, Joan 136, 137 Ripoll 31 Riquer, Borja de 39, 46, 47, 48

200

Index

Roca i Caball, Joan B. 134, 135 Roca i Junyent, Miquel 122, 130, 141 Rodríguez, Jaume 82 Romeva i Ferrer, Pau 134 Rovira, Josep 111 Rovira i Virgili, Antoni 32 Ruiz Giménez, Joaquín 135 Sabater, ‘Quico’ 55 Sala, Josep M. 108 Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio 71 Sansa, Joan 135 Sant Ildefons 63 sardana 26, 31 SDEUB (Sindicat Democràtic d’Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona) 60, 61 Second Republic 13, 30, 34, 72–73, 82, 85 Segadors, Els 50 Sellarés, Miquel 124 seny 25–26 senyera 50 Serra d’Or 59, 177 Serra, Narcís 109 Serrahima, Maurici 134 SEU (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitario) 60–61 Smith, Anthony D. 12, 15, 19–20, 33, 172 Sobrequés, Jaume 25 Solé Tura, Jordi 71, 72, 81, 109, 111–122, 116, 141 Solidaritat Catalana 53 Solidaritat Universitària 61 Statute of Autonomy (1932 and 1979) 13, 30, 52–54, 63, 66, 69, 79, 93–94, 97, 103, 116, 132, 163, 179 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 76 Suárez, Adolfo 62, 79–80, 121, 135 subsidiarity 113, 117, 118, 119, 141, 156, 160 Tàpies, Antoni 31 Tarradellas, Josep 2, 53, 54, 85, 127 Tarragó i Ballús, Josep Maria 58 Taula Rodona 65 Terra Lliure 82 Testimoniatge 135 Thió, Josep Ignasi 136 Torras i Bages, Josep 58, 134

Torras i Bages group 59 Treitschke, Heinrich von 38 Triadú, Joan 57, 62 Trias Fargas, Ramón 121, 141 Trias Peitx, Josep M. 134 Triginer, Josep Maria 108 Tusell, Javier 71 Tusquets, Joan 58 UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático) 2, 5, 80, 108, 121, 135–136 UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya) 13, 65, 79, 84, 120–121, 124–126, 133, 134–141 Unamuno, Miguel de 45 Unió Catalanista 52 Unió de l’Esquerra Catalana 81 Unió de Treballadors Cristians de Catalunya 58 Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya 135 Unió Europea Demòcrata Cristiana 135 UN (United Nations) 54 USC (Unió Socialista de Catalunya) 95 Vallés, Josep Maria 110 Vanguardia, La 62–63 Verde i Aldea, Josep 108 Verds, Els 95, 97 Vicens i Vives, Jaume 24 Vidal i Barraquer, Francesc 58 Vigón, Jorge 43 Vila, Albert 135 Vila, Ramon ‘Caracremada’ 55 Vila d’Abadal, Lluís 134 Vilar, Pierre 143 Vilar i Costa, Joan 58 Virtèlia school 59 Vizcarra, Emilio 45 Volksgeist 86 War of American Independence 10 Weber, Max 7, 25 Wilson, Woodrow 11 Woolard, Katherine 68 Worsley, Peter 18 Xicoy, Joaquim 136 Ya 41