China's Policies on Its Borderlands and the International Implications

CHINAS POLICIES ON ITS

BORDERLANDS AND THE

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CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS

BORDERLANDS AND THE

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS

BORDERLANDS AND THE

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Edited by

Yufan Hao Bill K P Chou University of Macau, China

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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LONDON

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SINGAPORE

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BEIJING

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SHANGHAI

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HONG KONG

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TA I P E I

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CHENNAI

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

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CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS BORDERLANDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Copyright © 2011 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

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Acknowledgements We would like to express our gratitude to the University of Macau for funding the conference, “China’s Policies towards Its Borderlands and Their International Implications,” held on 11–12 March, 2010. The conference allowed us to invite many scholars, with profound knowledge on the theme of this book, from the United States, Australia, Germany, Canada, France, Singapore and China. We would also like to extend our thanks to their contribution to paper presentation and revision as well as the lively debates. Finally, we would like to thank Ms. Miranda Lei, Ms. Yuting Wang, Ms. Kathy Chen, Ms. Jianping Zong, Ms. Xiaojie Wang, and Ms. Lanyan Xia for their administrative and editorial assistance. Yufan Hao Bill K.P. Chou Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities University of Macau 20 May 2010

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Contents

Acknowledgements

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List of Editors and Contributors

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Chapter 1.

China’s Borderlands and Their International Implications: An Overview

1

Yufan Hao and Bill K.P. Chou Chapter 2.

The Disturbances in the Tibetan Areas and Ürümqi 2008–2009: Implications for China’s International Relations

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Colin Mackerras Chapter 3.

Peaceful Rise from the Border: Chinese Practice of Diplomatic Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Weiqing Song

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Chapter 4.

China and Its Central Asian Neighbour

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Gudrun Wacker Chapter 5.

Facing Russia and Outer Mongolia: Border City Hulunbeier in the 1960s and the 2000s

93

TJ Cheng Chapter 6.

Prelude to the Diaoyutai Dispute: Chinese–Japanese Controversy Over the Liuqiu Islands as Seen from an International System-Change Perspective

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Edwin Pak-wah Leung Chapter 7.

China’s Northeast Water Frontiers, East China Sea Disputes and Co-Management Approach

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Quansheng Zhao Chapter 8.

The Evolution of Beijing’s Military Strategy Toward Taiwan

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You Ji Chapter 9.

Theorizing Language Rationalisation in Greater China: Political Transition, Self-Governance and Language Outcomes in Post-Handover Hong Kong Jean-François Dupré

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Chapter 10. Local Autonomy Matters: One-Country Two-System Policy in Macao and Its Implications for China’s Policies on Its Borderlands

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Bill K.P. Chou Chapter 11. China’s Myanmar Policy: Challenges and Adjustments

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Hong Zhao Index

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List of Editors and Contributors

EDITORS HAO Yufan is a Professor of Political Sciences and Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Macau. He obtained his MA and PhD from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1984 and 1989 respectively and was a McArthur Fellow at Harvard University Center for International Affairs from 1988–1989. He was Robert Ho Professor of Chinese Studies at Colgate University and visiting professor to Beijing University (1999–2000), Tsinghua University (2003), Renmin University of China (2003) and is currently a jianzhi professor at Fudan University, Shanghai University of International Studies and Chinese Foreign Affairs University (Beijing). He has published widely on Chinese politics, Chinese foreign relations, and US–China relations in journals such as Asian Survey, Asian Perspective, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Contemporary China, the China Quarterly, Issues and Studies, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Korea and the World, Chinese Social Science Quarterly, etc. His latest books include Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization and the Next World Power (University Press of Kentucky, 2009); Chinese Foreign Policy Making: Societal Forces in Chinese American Policy xi

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Making, (Ashgate, London, co-edited, 2005). He is a regular contributor to China Newsweek and Global Times in China, and is chief editor of the Series of “Focusing Sino–American Relations” under the auspices of the Xinhua Press in Beijing. Bill K.P. CHOU is an Assistant Professor of Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau. He earned his BA and MPhil from the City University of Hong Kong, and PhD in Politics and Public Administration from The University of Hong Kong. He has taken visiting positions at the National University of Singapore, the City University of Hong Kong and the Asian Development Bank Institute. He is the author of Government and Policy-Making Reform in China: The Implications of Governing Capacity (NY and Oxon: Routledge, 2009). His publications have appeared in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, and China Information.

CONTRIBUTORS T.J. CHENG has recently retired from the Department of Sociology, University of Macau. He earned his BA in English language from Inner Mongolia Normal University; MA in World Economy and Politics from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and PhD of Sociology from SUNY. His research interest includes social transformation in rural society; household registration (hukou) system; ethnic minority; sociology of gambling; youth indicator system, and new immigrants in Macao. He has co-authored several books, including Macao Youth Indicator System, Chinese New Immigrants in Macao, Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia, and Introduction to Sociology of Gambling. He is also the author of over 100 journal and newspaper articles in Mainland China, USA, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Jean-François DUPRÉ is a postgraduate research student in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong. He holds an MSc in Nationalism Studies from the University of Edinburgh, and a BA in East Asian Studies and Comparative Politics from McGill University. He is currently undertaking a

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project on recent developments in the Taiwanization and language revival movement in Taiwan. Edwin Pak-wah LEUNG is a Professor of Asian Studies and Chairman of the Department of Asian Studies at Seton Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey, USA. His areas of academic interests include Chinese politics and diplomacy as well as modern Asian history. He has published over twenty books and numerous academic articles written both in English and Chinese. As an internationally known scholar, he has affiliated with many world-class universities such as the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles, the University of Michigan, Princeton University, Columbia University, The University of Hong Kong, Peking University, Zhejiang University, and Wuhan University. Professor Emeritus Colin MACKERRAS AO worked at Griffith University, Queensland, Australia, from 1974 until his retirement in 2004, and also taught on several occasions at the Beijing Foreign Studies University in China. He has authored and edited numerous books and written many articles on China’s ethnic minorities, Chinese theatre, Western images of China, and Australia–China relations, including a focus on both historical and contemporary questions. His most important books on minorities are China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1994) and China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003). In 2007, he was appointed an Officer in the Order of Australia for services to Asian studies and Australia–China relations. SONG Weiqing is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the Department of Government and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, the University of Macau, Macau. He attained a PhD in Political Science, with specialization in Comparative European Politics, at the University of Siena, Italy, in 2008. He teaches politics and international relations at the Department and has research interests in European politics, external

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aspects of the European Union, theory of European integration, global governance, and Chinese foreign relations, particularly with Europe. His publications have appeared in journals such as Policy and Politics, Asia-Europe Journal and Chinese Journal of European Studies. Gudrun WACKER is, at present, a Senior Fellow in the Research Division Asia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. She studied Sinology in Berlin, Tuebingen and Taipei. Her research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, especially EU–China relations, Sino–Russian and Sino–Central Asian relations; China in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of the United States; Chinese domestic development and minority policy. YOU Ji is a Reader at the School of Social Science, the University of New South Wales. He is an author of three books and numerous articles. The most recent ones include: “Friends in Needs or Comrades in Arms: Dilemma in Sino–Russo Weapons Business,” in Andrew Tan (ed.), Global Arms Trade (Routledge, 2010); “The Soviet Military Model and the Breakdown of the Sino–USSR Alliance,” in Thomas Bernstein and Hua-yu Li (eds.), The Soviet Influence on China in the 1950s (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); “Politics as the Foundation for Health Balance of Power,” Asia Policy, No. 8, 2009; “The 17th Party Congress and the CCP’s Changing Elite Politics,” in Dali Yang and Zhao Litao (eds.), China’s Reform at 30 (World Scientific, 2009). ZHAO Hong is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow of the East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore. He obtained his Bachelor of Economics from the University of International Business and Economics, Master of Economics and PhD from Xiamen University, China. Before joining EAI, he was a professor of the Research School of Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University where he taught The International Political Economy. His latest publications include The Expansion of Outward FDI: A Comparative Study of China & India (2010); An Energy Comparison of the Asian Giants: China and India (2009); China and India: Competing for

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Good Relations with Myanmar (2008); China’s Oil Venture in Africa (2007), and India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia? (2007). His current research interests are focused on issues of China– ASEAN Economic Integration, China–India Energy Cooperation and East Asian Economic Community. Quansheng ZHAO is a Professor of International Relations and Director of Center for Asian Studies at American University in Washington, DC. From 1993–2009, he was a Research Associate at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research of Harvard University, and from 1999–2008, he was Division Director of Comparative and Regional Studies at American University. A specialist in international relations and comparative politics focusing on East Asia, Dr. Zhao is the author of Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, winner of the Best Academic Book Award by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Korea), and Japanese Policymaking (Oxford University Press/Praeger, selected as “Outstanding Academic Book” by Choice). His most recent edited book is Managing the China Challenge: Perspectives from the Globe (2009). His books have been translated into Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. He received his BA from Beijing University, and his MA and PhD from the University of California at Berkeley. He has also testified at the US Congress on China’s high-speed railway system, and served as a consultant for the United Nations.

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Chapter

1 China’s Borderlands and Their International Implications: An Overview Yufan Hao and Bill K.P. Chou Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau

THE LINKS OF BORDERLANDS WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The rise of China is undoubtedly one of the most salient features of international relations in the 21st century. With its spectacular growth rate of close to ten percent annually over the last three decades, China is expected to surpass Japan to become the second largest economy in the world in 2010.1 Within the span of a single generation, China has moved from an almost isolated state to a hub of a globalized economy, from an obsolete and bloated army to a much more professional force possessing a certain degree of hightech excellence, and from a hostile attitude towards global institutions to active participation in multilateral organizations. The rise of China has led many to wonder what kind of international stance an increasingly powerful China may take in the 1

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foreseeable future. Some scholars suggest that, based on western experiences, a country’s internal dynamism will inevitably create external ambitions. Will growing power eventually lead Chinese leadership to challenge the existing international norms, rules and institutions? Or will China’s integration with the international economy, its growing middle class, and its increasing participation in international institutions lead to a continuing “status quo” power as China currently appears to be? Conservatives with a realist understanding of international relations believe that China will become assertive and expansive, and may eventually dominate and dictate over the region. Power theorists focus on China’s power and highlight the need to contain a rising China because they believe that China’s desire to alter the rules of the game will grow as China’s capabilities and needs increase. Others feel that China’s reform and growing economic integration with the world will make China more open and pluralistic, which may lead to a more predictable behavior. This view sees the importance of China’s growing interdependence with the rest of the world and argues for engaging China further. In fact, there is an increasingly popular belief among observers of China that growing economic interdependence may gradually create a context, both on international and domestic levels, within which constraints will be placed on Chinese foreign behavior and make it more cooperative and less destabilizing. Both views reveal a deep concern about the future role of Chinese foreign policy in the region and in world affairs. The rising China obviously concerns Asian countries most, particularly those countries neighbouring China. How should they respond to this newly emerged great power? What would they expect from a powerful China? There has been increasing concerns among Southeast Asian countries that China may be creating its own sphere of influence in Asia, forming tributary relationship with some neighbouring states. With a 18,000-kilometer temperate coastline providing many good harbours, China has a blessed geography, being both a land power and a sea power. Yet, standing at the hub of the geopolitics may not always be a positive position. It could be a nightmare if its

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external environment becomes hostile. The PRC faced direct threats to its security from almost all directions in the first four decades since 1949: from the United States and Taiwan to the east, the former Soviet Union to the north and northwest, Vietnam to the south and India to the southwest. As Harry Harding once stated, “few other major powers have felt as threatened for such a long period of time, and by such powerful adversaries as China has.”2 With the end of the Cold War and improved relationships with the United States and other major powers, China’s security situation has substantially improved. Yet, with 14 countries as its neighbours, many of whom have territorial disputes with China, Beijing leadership has never lost their apprehension about the safety of China’s surrounding environment. China today is consolidating its land borders and beginning to turn outward.3 As Kaplan argued, China’s action abroad is different from that of the United States. China does not take a missionary approach to the world affairs, as moral progress is not China’s concern. The need to secure energy and raw materials in order to support the rising living standard of Chinese population is the primary motivation of Chinese outward-looking foreign policy strategy. To accomplish this task, China has pursued an omni-dimensional foreign relations strategy, not only to secure its relationships with major world powers, but also to improve its relations with all neighbouring countries including former rivals. Creating a peaceful external environment and gaining maximum economic benefits have become main concerns for Chinese leaders. Internally, China has also tried to change its policy towards its borderlands, making sure that borderland provinces help to secure a stable relationship with neighbouring states and also benefit from the inter-regional economic interaction. The neoclassical realist approach of international relations theory underscores the role of domestic factors (such as political institutions, political culture, and state-society relationship) in affecting foreign policy decisions.4 Within the boundary, the borderlands are most relevant to the structure of China’s foreign policy. First of all, the overspill effects of the central government’s policies on these regions can benefit or harm the international community due to these

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regions’ geographical proximity to foreign countries. To name a few examples, the thirst for timbers in Yunnan province to fuel its economic development results in extensive logging and environmental degradation in Myanmar.5 China’s roaring economy led to the mushrooming of legal and illegal casinos in neighbouring countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar and China’s newest special administrative region, Macao. The thriving gambling and the associated problems of drug, prostitution, and AIDS provided opportunities for the growth of criminal syndicates and caused numerous social problems such as problem gambling, drug addiction, loan sharking, and human trafficking within and outside of China’s borderlands.6 The concern for food security and loss of domestic farmland motivated the Chinese government and investors to develop the farmland in Laos, the Philippines and Cambodia. Without the consent of villagers, the Chinese government and investors were accused by human rights organizations of collaborating with host countries to seize the villagers’ land and disrupt their livelihoods.7 Second, the borderlands have profound implications for China’s sovereignty. The borderlands have high exposure to global forces. Economic globalization has primarily linked China’s coastal regions with Western countries and the countries to the east of China. To secure their investment against predation of local governments and discriminatory practice, foreign investors and the governments of their home countries negotiate with the Chinese government for a more market-friendly trade and investment regime, culminated by the China’s accession to WTO in 2001. With increasing internationalization of human rights since the 1990s, Tibet and Xinjiang, in which foreign businesspeople are disinclined to invest, has come under the close watch of human rights observers. Since the US is the leading international force over these issues, the dynamics of US–China relations often incur China’s borderland issues. The borderlands’ exposure to international forces highlights, to Chinese leaders, their vulnerability to international forces and the likelihood of compromising their sovereignty over these regions. Third, the unclear demarcation of boundaries between China and over a dozen countries’ borderlands has caused numerous territorial

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disputes.8 Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, China has participated in more than 20 territorial disputes with neighbouring countries. Among them, the most complicated one is Russia and its predecessor, the USSR, which shares an extremely long border with China. In most of the territorial disputes, China displayed the willingness to make concessions to settle the conflict. The restraint from using force stemmed from the political leadership’s desire for quick dispute settlement in the face of looming internal threats.9 After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the internal threats that challenged Communist rule and its social control were perceived as less imminent: The institutionalization of political succession and decision-making reduced the possibility of a bloody power struggle that characterized Cultural Revolution. The speedy suppression of the rebellions in Tibetan inhabited regions in 2008 and the Xinjiang riot in 2009 testified the effective state control. With many of the internal threats removed, whether China will be inclined to use force when dealing with other territorial disputes merits attention. The fourth reason lies in the strong presence of ethnic minorities in the borderlands. While most of the ethnic minorities are identified with the Chinese, others may not. Certain Uyghur groups in the northwest are more directly involved in the countries to China’s west, as well as the secessionist forces in these countries. China was prompted to form a loose alliance with Central Asian countries to deal with the Uyghur groups. Under the stewardship of the Dalai Lama, who is extremely popular in Western countries, the Tibetan issue has been more internationalized and globalized since the 1989 Tibetan Uprising and the Dalai Lama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize.10 Ethnically, Hong Kong Chinese are of no difference from the political elites in Beijing. Having been ruled by the UK for over a century, however, many Hong Kong people have embraced Western values of respecting the rule of law and individual civic liberty. This marks them as different from the political elites’ emphasis on the collective well-being defined by the state. The conflicts of values underline the disputes on the democratic reform and the rule of law in Hong Kong.11

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Fifth, several key considerations in China’s foreign policy and even core national interests are relevant to borderland issues, and vice versa: Most of the perceived threats to China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty can be traced to the peripheral regions of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong which are closely inter-connected with international influence. The war against terrorism was primarily worked out in Xinjiang domestically and Central Asia internationally. Energy concerns brings the Chinese leaders’ attention to the land borderlands of China’s northwest and the water borders in the East Sea. Beijing’s policies on minorities’ language and religious practices on the borderlands, from time to time, has aroused the concern of Western governments and NGOs on China’s human rights record and has affected the perceptions of other countries’ electorate towards China’s rising. Through a democratic mechanism, these perceptions may be translated into the Western governments’ policies of engagement and containment of China in global politics and economy. In spite of their inter-connectedness, the study of China’s borderlands in relation to its foreign policy implications has so far received inadequate academic attention. The purpose of this book aims to explore China’s policies towards its borderlands and their international implications. So far, not much has been written or documented about this domestic dimension of Chinese foreign relations. In fact, this topic has been largely neglected in the study of Chinese foreign policy because of the traditional view that China’s internal policies belong to internal politics. Internal influence and external behaviour in the study of China is still one of the frontiers where the fields of international relations and comparative politics meet. With a view to bridge the two areas of study, we designed this book project, which we hope that some elements can be generalized to understand how Chinese leaders view their borderlands and how they respond to the challenges in the borderlands in the backdrop of the changing political, economic, social and cultural dynamics shaped by global, regional and local forces. While there can be no doubt that in explaining Chinese foreign policy behaviour, there may be numerous factors worth exploring, this book suggests that China’s policies towards its borderlands are becoming

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an important component in our understanding of Chinese foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. The questions this book addresses include the following: What interests, both internal and external, does Beijing have in each of the borderland provinces? How has Beijing pursued and protected these interests? Is Beijing’s current approach yielding the result it anticipated? What implications do Beijing’s policies have toward borderlands on neighbouring countries?

IN THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST The book is divided according to the geographical location of the borderlands being studied. In Chapter 2, Colin Mackerras traced the roots of the riots in Tibet in 2008 and in Ürümqi of Xinjiang in 2009. He pointed out that China’s repeated rebuffs of foreign intervention failed to stop Western leaders from meeting with the Dalai Lama and concerns of the marginalization of Tibetan culture and people from the increasingly capitalist Tibetan economy. The riots in Tibet had the effect of worsening the China–India relationship and exacerbated Indian fear of China’s military expansion and aggression to the India-occupied territories around Tawang which was once ruled by China. The Uygur cause was low in the policy priorities of Western governments in comparison to the Tibetan issue. But China’s protest of the visit of Uygur leader Rebiya Kadeer to Australia for the Melbourne International Film Festival, which premiered a documentary about her life, The 10 Conditions of Love, earned the Uygur cause much sympathy while China came under a good deal of criticism. Mackerras argued that much of the difference in Western interests between the Tibetan and Uygur is rooted in religion: In the West, Tibetan Buddhism has the reputation of being peace-loving and Islam is associated with violence. The Dalai Lama is a much more charismatic leader than Kadeer, given that he is able to speak fluent English, leads a religion, and heads a government-inexile. Mackerras believed that the impact of the riots on the relations of China with the West is limited, given that both Tibet and Xinjiang were not the core issues in the relations. In addition, China’s rising in

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the global economy and its increasing role in major international affairs may induce the West to cooperate but not confront China. The riots in Tibet and Xinjiang underscored the limited success of Beijing’s dual strategies to these regions: economic incentives through rapid economic reform and coercion through the strong presence of the military/police. In Xinjiang, the Uygur’s secessionist movement spreads across several Central Asian countries which also face the challenges of militant Muslims. To crush the movement, China used multi-lateral diplomacy, a departure from bilateral diplomacy that China often used. The chapters by Weiqing Song and Gudrun Wacker on China’s engagement of Central Asian countries offer insightful analysis of China’s multi-lateral diplomacy under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As Song suggested, the establishment of the SCO and the use of multi-lateral diplomacy reflected the complexity of issues in Central Asia. Initially, the SCO provided a platform for China to discuss with five other Central Asian countries on the issues of state security. More recently, the issues of cooperation among SCO members extended to energy, education, tourism, scientific research, and cultural exchange. Wacker studied China’s relations with Central Asian countries from a geopolitical perspective. In addition to the common concern for Muslim separatism, the alarming colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia in 2005 prompted the Central Asian countries and China to seek mutual support. In return for its support to Uzbekistan for suppressing domestic rebellion and to Russia for the war in Chechnya, Beijing received their support on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Joint military exercises were held. The increasing presence of the US force in Central Asia in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks was perceived to be a threat to the state security of both Russia and China. The leaders of the two countries fostered closer ties to counteract the US influence. From the perspective of economic development, Chinese leaders considered Central Asia to be an opportunity for developing the economy of northwest China and stamping out extremism in that region. Infrastructure on cross-border transportation was improved; trade and investment in northwest

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China and other Central Asian countries were promoted. China’s investment in the energy sector of Central Asian countries helped Central Asian countries’ economies to recover from the financial tsunami. With oil and gas pipelines connecting export countries in Central Asia with China, China is able to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Straits, which are prone to terrorism and piracy, as a route of energy import. To the leaders of Central Asian countries, the increasing Chinese presence in their territories is a double-edged sword: China is a good leverage on which to balance the power of the traditional hegemony of Russia in the region and an important trading country. Nevertheless, China may also become the new regional hegemony which may affect the building of trust between China and other SCO members. In his chapter, “Facing Russia and Outer Mongolia: Border City Hulunbeier in the 1960s and the 2000s,” T.J. Cheng studied the transformation of Hulunbeier, a city of Inner Mongolia bordering Russia and Outer Mongolia. Benefiting from China’s economic boom, the city has been elevated from a dusty town to a magnet drawing in capital and traffic from Russia and Outer Mongolia. The capital, tourists, and businesspeople shaped the landscape of the city. The transformation has its own downsides, such as the overheating of the property market and the displacement of the people from nomadic life in their homeland. But the economic development contributes to regional stability by strengthening the trust among the three countries through foreign trade and investment relations.

IN THE EAST Many of the disputes between China and other Western countries originated from the conflicts of Westphalia and post-Westphalia concepts of sovereignty. To Chinese leaders, borderland issues are domestic affairs. The Chinese government has absolute sovereignty and autonomy over them. While the Chinese government tries to be a responsible stakeholder on international affairs by signing multilateral treaties on governing trade, investment, environment, and even human rights, it regarded unwelcomed foreign influence as a

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violation of China’s sovereignty and demanded other countries to keep it out.12 China’s wrath of foreign leaders’ reception of the Dalai Lama and consequential suspension of high-level official contacts are illustrative. Many Western scholars, NGOs and governments held contradictory opinions. The acceleration of globalization has challenged the once sharply demarcated borderlands. National governments find it difficult to control inter-country migration (both legal and illegal), drug trafficking, epidemic, and multi-national corporations. Scholte (1997) even claimed that the Westephalian concept of sovereignty was hardly operative.13 In the post-Westphalian era, major acts or policies of large countries such as China may cause a significant impact on other countries. On some occasions, these acts or policies may conflict with the values of liberty considered universal. As a result, Western leaders tend to believe that China’s autonomy over domestic policies is relative, not absolute. Such a conflict of values is not new: Edwin Pak-wah Leung’s analysis of the Sino–Japanese territorial disputes over Liuqiu (Ryukyu in Japanese and, nowadays the Okinawa Prefecture) in the 19th century provided a historical analogue for the contemporary conflict of values. Leung’s article traced the historical roots of the Sino–Japanese disputes over Diaoyu Island (or Senkaku in Japanese) which, Japan contended, was a part of the chain islands of Liuqiu. Liuqiu Kingdom was once a member of China’s dominating tributary state system. Japan challenged China’s suzerainty over Liuqiu by using the modern nation-state system concept on the basis of clarifying its political boundaries. The negotiations between China and Japan over Liuqiu reflected China’s realpolitik of allying with Japan to resist Western imperialist invasion. During the negotiations, Chinese negotiators upheld the traditional concept of the tributary system. Conversely, Japan made use of the concept of modern international law. The chapter underlined an important point that effective enforcement of international treaties required an arbitration system and expertise in international laws — the two domains of modern knowledge that China was unfamiliar with at that time. With the decline in its power and the geographical distance with Liuqiu, China gave in to

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the pressure of Japan and consented Japanese occupation of Liuqiu. The failure of China to protect its tributary states led to the breakdown of the tributary state system. Leung’s analysis offers us a glimpse on whether old or new values in the international system prevailed depended on the relative powers behind different values. The chapter of Leung, together with Zhao Quansheng’s article, is distinguished from the rest of the book in the sense that these two chapters focus on water borders. Zhao pointed out three motives behind the disputes among China, Japan, and Korea over water borders: The political motive is out of the concern for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The economic one is based on the energy reserve and fishery resources. The security consideration is to use Diaoyu Island as a springboard for national defense. Meanwhile, Zhao identified three approaches of the past several decades that Beijing adopted in handling its disputes with Japan over Diaoyu Island — history-embedded approach, national interest-driven approach and co-management approach. China’s belief of possessing Diaoyu Island until losing to Japan towards the end of the 19th century is an example of history-embedded approach. National interest-driven approach is one underscoring the national interests laid in the territories in disputes: The oil and gas reserves and the fishery resources around Diaoyu Island fitted well with China’s thirst for energy security to fuel its booming economy. The dispute over Diaoyu Island allows Chinese leaders to satisfy the Chinese people’s nationalistic sentiments. Since following the two approaches in dispute settlement could not bring any tangible results to China, Zhao proposed the third approach: co-management. This approach echoes China’s increasing use of multilateral diplomacy, such as the Six-Party talks over the North Korean crisis, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) over energy cooperation, trade relations and Muslim separatism in Central Asia. Through co-management, China and Japan may put aside the territorial disputes and discuss joint-exploration of the energy reserve and fishery resources. However, Zhao remained cautious about the effectiveness of co-management: China’s exploration of the Chunxiao Oil Fields in the disputed water territories in the East Sea

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revealed that neither China nor Japan sincerely embraced this approach.

IN THE SOUTH China’s borderlands can be classified into inner periphery and outer periphery, depending on the capacity of the Chinese in exercising real sovereignty. The central issues of outer periphery (Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao during the colonial era) are democratization, sovereignty, strategic and security relations, economic interdependence, and international legal relations, all pertinent to federalist issues underscoring autonomy.14 After the UK and Portugal handed over the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999, Taiwan is the only external periphery. Among all borderlands, Taiwan is subject to foreign (US) influence the most and China has the most difficulty in exerting sovereignty. You Ji offered a thoughtful analysis on Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan. Acknowledging that the US will use force to defend Taiwan against China’s occupation, Chinese leaders have changed its objective of reunifying Taiwan into preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence which was aggressively sought by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party when it was in power between 2000 and 2008. To attain the objective requires a healthy balance: US, China and Taiwan all are willing to use political but not military means to avoid war. You Ji argued that the Obama administration is more able than its predecessor in striking such a healthy balance by relying on its allies and engaging China to maintain regional security and status quo. Beijing has become more willing to cooperate with Taiwan and use a soft approach after Kuomintang, which opposed independence, came to power in 2008. Closer economic integration is fostered through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Taiwan avoids provoking China by asserting the Three No-ism (no independence, no reunification and no provocation of conflict). The alleviation of the Cross-Strait tension presents a significant implication to China’s national defense: The new challenges in Xinjiang and Tibet call for immediate counter measures through more force deployments.

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Decombatification in the Taiwan Strait offered a golden chance to redirect parts of the military strength along coastal China to the northwest and the west. Hong Kong and Macao are special areas of China’s borderlands. Their economies are the best developed in China. Their rule-of-law tradition and colonial cultural heritages enable them to connect with the global economy and familiarize themselves with the Western style of life and business. Before retrocession to China, Hong Kong people took pride in their successful economy, thriving pop culture, and good governance practices.15 Consequently, Hong Kong may be considered as an example of strong territorial centres which are built up on economic success and a pragmatic value system, and are particularly resistant to national integration during the process of state formation.16 Beijing–Hong Kong disputes over Hong Kong’s judicial independence and democratization are illustrative. The chapter by Jean-François Dupré discusses the Hong Kong government’s promotion of Chinese language (Putonghua and Cantonese) education which has the implications for cultivating a Chinese identity, easing the national integration, and assimilating Hong Kong people who are culturally different from the majority in China. Going against public wishes for more extensive English language education, the posthandover Hong Kong government designated most of the high schools to use Chinese (Putonghua and Cantonese) as an instruction medium. While the government argued that the policy change was motivated by the concern for quality education, some observers believed that the policy is akin to the cultural assimilation that has happened in other parts of the borderlands. Macao had been eclipsed by Hong Kong since Hong Kong became a trading port under the British rule in 1842. In contrast with Hong Kong, Macao could hardly foster a strong sense of local identity due to the lack of state-sanctioned history school curriculum, public discontentment with the weak governance and maladministration, and its position as a political backwater with unimpressive economic growth.17 The similarity in the post-colonial constitutional arrangement led to the assumption that Beijing’s policies towards the two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) are the same. In his

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chapter about Macao’s relations with Beijing, Bill K.P. Chou explored the peculiarity of Beijing–Macao relations and drew lessons that may be applied to the rule of borderlands. Based on the literature of political geography on autonomy, Chou proposed three indicators to evaluate the extent of the autonomy of local entities: the autonomy of carrying out rightful duties, the autonomy to act without the fear of oversight from higher authorities, and the autonomy of using local ways and identities in public administration. Chou highlighted the role of the third type of autonomy in explaining the good Beijing–Macao relations: Unlike Chinese rule of other parts of the borderlands (and to certain extent in Hong Kong), local culture and identity were not suppressed. All Macao political elites except the Chief Executive are allowed to keep their Portuguese passports inherited from the colonial era. Schools are able to freely choose the instruction language and school curriculum, depending on the traditions of the schools and the market needs. All the Portuguese laws effective in Macao before the handover continued valid. Portuguese lawyers and judges are allowed to practice law. Portuguese languages remain a working language of the administration. The Chief Executive must be a Macao citizen elected by the Election Committee composed of local people. In spite of the high autonomy, Beijing maintained its leverage over the newest member of the country by its control on the Election Committee, the candidates running in the election of the Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly, and smart cooptation policy. At the end of his paper, Chou argued that the “Macao model” of high autonomy may be extended to the unsettling borderlands which rebuff the current type of central control and demand more respect for local culture and customs.

IN THE SOUTHWEST Zhao Hong’s investigation into China–Myanmar relations demonstrates the intensification of the inter-connectedness of China’s borderlands and its international relations as well as the challenges arising out of the increasing inter-connectedness. To China, Myanmar is an ideal place for diversifying the sources of oil supplies

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due to its geographical proximity as well as presenting cheaper and safer oil transportation. Meanwhile, Myanmar provides China’s navy with an access to a deep water port at Kyaukpyu which allows China to extend its military presence to Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. China has vested interests to support the Myanmar military junta. From the perspective of Myanmar, China’s growing presence in the region is much welcomed: China may provide the capital, market, and technical know-how to develop its economy badly hurt by Western investment and trade sanctions against the military junta’s dismal human rights record. Therefore, in recent years, bilateral trade has increased remarkably. Land transportation between the two countries has improved. Chinese companies are encouraged to invest in Myanmar. Being the province bordering Myanmar, Yunnan is able to take advantage of China’s strategic consideration: Its exports accounted for half of the trade volume of China to Myanmar. The border-crossing day trips may generate up to one third of the total revenue of certain bordering counties in Yunnan. Meanwhile, Yunnan may also hurt the China–Myanmar relations. Certain Yunnan-based companies ignored Myanmar’s ban and signed contracts with ethnic groups in Myanmar to explore the natural resources located in the special regions which Myanmar government could not effectively govern. Chinese leaders also frown upon the various casinos and drugs in Myanmar that affect Yunnan the most.

NOTES 1. Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash 2008 — A Geopolitical Setback for the West”, Foreign Affairs, 88 (1), 2009, p. 11. 2. Harry Harding, “China’s Changing Role in the Contemporary World,” in China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s, Harry Harding, (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 210. 3. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, 89 (3), 2010, pp. 22–41. 4. Yufan Hao and Ying Hou, “Chinese Foreign Policy Making: A Comparative Perspective,” Public Administration Review, 69 (1), 2009, p. 137; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical

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5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13.

14.

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Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” Security Studies, 15 (3), 2006, pp. 461–495; Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security, 29 (2), 2004, pp. 159–201. Chenyang Li and Liang-fook Lye, “China’s Policies towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?” China: An International Journal, 7 (2), 2009, pp. 255–287. Shiu-hing Lo, The Politics of Cross-border Crime in Greater China: Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), pp. 18–69. “ASIA: Land Grabs Threaten Food Security,” IRIN, http://www. irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=84785. Luke T. Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes: A Manuscript, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1982); Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 5. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 12. Sonny shiu-hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010; Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: Sate, Political Society, and Civil Society, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 15–16. Jan A. Scholte, “The Globalization off World Politics,” In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, John Baylis and Steve Smith, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 21. Pitman B. Potter, “Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Periphery in Contemporary China,” In The Chinese State at the Borders, Diana Lary, (eds.), Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007, pp. 240–270.

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15. Gordon Mathews, Eric Kit-wai Ma and Tai-lok Lui, Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation, London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 16. Stein Rokkan, State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works, edited by Peter Flora with Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 145–147. 17. Bill K.P. Chou, “Building National Identity in Hong Kong and Macao,” East Asian Policy, 2 (2), 2010, pp. 73–80.

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2 The Disturbances in the Tibetan Areas and Ürümqi 2008–2009: Implications for China’s International Relations Colin Mackerras Department of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith University Nathan, Queensland, Australia

ABSTRACT In March 2008, there were disturbances all over the Tibetan areas of China, and in July 2009, there were large-scale riots in the Xinjiang capital, Ürümqi. Both cases affected China’s international relations. There were similarities and differences between the two periods of disturbance. One of the differences was that the coming Olympic Games (August 2008) had overshadowed the Tibetan disturbances, while the Games were already in the past by the time of the 2009 riots in Ürümqi. China has suffered persistent criticism for its policies on Tibet and Xinjiang. Nevertheless, this paper argues that, from a long-term point of 19

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view, there were also some benefits for China’s foreign affairs reflected in the two sets of disturbances. In particular, reaction to China’s suppression of the Ürümqi riots was much less harsh than had been the case the year before over Tibet. Although Tibet was part of the reason for the 2010 decline in Sino–American relations, China was able to extract some concessions from several other major world powers over Tibet. In foreign relations, the two sets of disturbances worsened China’s image but, in world power terms, both reflected and increased China’s rising global influence.

INTRODUCTION This chapter aims to analyze the effects on China’s international relations of both the disturbances in the Tibetan areas of China in March and April 2008 and the riots in Xinjiang in July 2009. In particular, it examines how these events affected China’s policy towards selected relevant countries and vice versa. The chapter will focus on the area of state policy, but will not ignore issues like public opinion altogether, especially since popular images are often very different from government attitudes as expressed in statements. Certain countries are important as far as both sets of disturbances are concerned, especially the United States. India and Western countries like Britain and France were much more interested in the Tibetan events than in those of Xinjiang, whereas people in Islamic countries such as Turkey and Iran were more inclined to express opinions about China’s handling of the Xinjiang riots. The focus of the chapter will be the period between March 2008, when the main disturbances took place in the Tibetan areas, and the beginning of 2010, when this chapter was completed. A very brief discussion of the riots themselves and the few years leading up to them in the Tibetan areas and in Xinjiang will provide a useful background. Since this chapter is primarily about international relations, it will be necessary also to give a brief history of China’s international relations in the twenty-first century, especially regarding Tibet and Xinjiang.

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BACKGROUND There are 55 ethnic minorities in China recognized by the state. The 2005 sample census accounted them for 9.44 percent of China’s total population of 1.30628 billion,1 not including Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, which comes to a bit over 123 million people. The remaining 90.56 percent accounts for the dominant Han people, the group most readily associated with the Chinese. However, although making up only a small proportion of the population, the minorities inhabit nearly two-thirds of China’s territory, most of it being in the border regions to the west. China’s policy on its ethnic minorities states that they are entitled to a small degree of autonomy, but their territories are integral parts of Chinese territory. Autonomy means the right to have the government, though not necessarily the Party, headed by a member of the relevant ethnic minority, as well as the ability to maintain their own culture and language, and preferential policies (youhui zhengce). These include exemption from the limitation to one child per couple and affirmative action in government employment and, in certain circumstances, in higher education entrance. The insistence that all ethnic minority areas are integral parts of China means that the state will not tolerate separatism in any form. For most of the ethnic minorities, relations with the state, each other and with the Han are good in the sense that interethnic relations are generally no worse than within ethnic groups or within the Han. In a large part, China’s ethnic policies work reasonably satisfactorily. Expressions of resurgence of ethnic consciousness throughout China have mostly been reasonably peaceful. In a few cases, however, interethnic relations have caused tensions, which occasionally become extreme and violent.2

THE TIBETANS AND UYGURS The prime cases showing ethnic identity in sharp, and sometimes violent, conflict with the Han or the Chinese state are the Tibetans and Uygurs. Apart from isolated groups in Beijing and elsewhere, the

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Tibetans live in the southwest of China. This includes the Tibet Autonomous Region itself, all of Qinghai, though with smaller proportions of the population in the province’s northeast, and especially the capital Xining, than elsewhere, some of western Sichuan, and small areas of Yunnan and Gansu. According to the 2005 sample census, the total number of Tibetans in China was 7,379,071, among whom a total of 7,239,386, or 98.1 percent, lived in Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan. Almost all of China’s Uygurs live in Xinjiang. The 2005 sample census showed a total of 9,661,422 Uygurs in the whole country, with 9,576,950, that is about 99 percent, living in Xinjiang.3 The Tibetans have a very distinctive culture, which includes belief in a characteristic form of Buddhism. This religion has gained a major reputation worldwide, especially through the activities of its leader the 14th Dalai Lama. Following the defeat of an uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, he fled Tibet and has lived in Dharamsala, India, ever since. Becoming known as an advocate of peace, he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, an achievement that greatly angered the Chinese. Meanwhile, independence demonstrations have flared in 1987, 1988 and 1989, all of them suppressed by Chinese authorities. The last of these disturbances marked the thirtieth anniversary of the major 1959 revolt against Chinese rule. In March 1989, then Tibet CCP Secretary Hu Jintao, who was in 2002 to become the national CCP general secretary, had martial law declared in Lhasa, which lasted until 1 May 1990. The Uygurs are similar to the Tibetans in having a culture very different from the Chinese and in being religiously dedicated. However, they are ethnically Turkic, which means that they are Muslims and their arts and lifestyle have many similarities with Turkic peoples further west. An uprising in 1990 in Baren Township in the southwest of Xinjiang was suppressed, but led on to many disturbances in the twentieth century, the most serious being in Yining in north-western Xinjiang near the border of Kazakhstan, in 1997.

THE DISTURBANCES The situation in Tibet seemed relatively calm following the 1990 lifting of martial law. Although a controversy erupted over the

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identification of the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995, major anniversaries passed without incident, such as the fiftieth anniversary of the 1959 revolt. Following a demonstration by monks, a major riot flared in Lhasa on 14 March 2008, in which Tibetans clashed with the Han and Hui, with many casualties and destruction of property. Unlike previous crises, this one saw disturbances and riots erupting not only in Lhasa, but also over all the other Tibetan areas of China.4 The Dalai Lama and his followers blamed the disturbances on Chinese repression, but the Chinese authorities put responsibility on the “Dalai clique,” which they claimed was trying to stir up trouble in the leadup to the August 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. In Xinjiang, the first years of the twenty-first century were also comparatively quiet. The Chinese authorities took advantage of the September 11 incidents in New York and Washington (2001) to intensify a crackdown they had already begun some years earlier against Islamist terrorism in Xinjiang.5 Several serious incidents took place just before and during the Olympic Games, apparently using the occasion to protest against Chinese rule. The incidents of July 2009 saw ethnic rioting initially of Uygurs against the Han and Hui, but later with the Han counterattacking. It amounted to the most serious violence based on ethnicity the PRC had seen since the Cultural Revolution, and possibly in its entire history, with 197 people killed, mostly Han, and over 1,600 injured, according to official Chinese sources.6 Unlike their Tibetan counterparts, these disturbances were confined to one city, the Xinjiang capital, Ürümqi. Again, Uygur diasporic sources put the disturbances firmly at the door of Chinese repressive rule, while the Chinese government blamed the World Uyghur Congress, and especially its president, Rebiya Kadeer, which will be discussed in more detail later.

CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET AND XINJIANG The overall trend in China’s international relations in the twenty-first century shows China as a rising power that expects to exert more

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impact in its own region and even in the world as a whole. As Wang and Zheng (2008) stated: “Today, the once-reclusive country is knocking on the doors of the league of Great Powers.”7 As China has grown economically, most members of the international community have expected it to exert more weight in the world. During the global financial crisis which unfolded towards the end of 2008, world leaders wanted China to contribute much more than they had in the past in pulling the world out of an economic slump. Its role in the December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen disappointed environmentalists, among many others, but displayed its growing authority in the world. China’s influence has continued to expand greatly not only in East Asia, but also in Central Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Along with this trend has come a rise in Chinese nationalism.8 However, there are many different forms of Chinese nationalism. Two of such relevance to this chapter are the nationalism that affects the way China projects itself to the outside world and the nationalism that impacts relations between the ethnic majority and minorities. For the former, both the state and the people are generally more or less at one in striving for China’s rise and taking pride in it, even though the state might, on occasion, disagree with particular expressions of popular nationalism. For the latter, the rise of ethnic identity makes for a form of ethnic nationalism that is not necessarily in harmony with China’s overall national interests and, in particular, not favourable to ethnic relations. This chapter focuses on two expressions of ethnic nationalism that are deleterious to China’s national interests, in that they harm China’s projection of itself to the outside world and pose some challenge, even if only on a small-scale, to China’s concept of its own sovereignty. Writing even before the riots of 2008 and 2009, Zheng (2008) wrote of Tibet and Xinjiang: “In both cases, two opposite nationalisms, namely Han inclusive nationalism and minority exclusive nationalism, seem to have been on a collision course.”9 On the whole, China and the United States have enjoyed unstable but dominantly positive relations over the last couple of decades. There have, however, been divisive issues. One of them is human rights, flowing from the suppression of the student protests in 1989

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and from problems in Tibet, exacerbated by the Dalai Lama’s winning the Nobel Peace Prize towards the end of 1989. To China’s anger, the Dalai Lama travelled widely throughout the world from his home in India, frequently meeting with government and state leaders, including US presidents. Although the September 11 incidents shifted the focus of American attention away from Tibet and towards the Muslim area of Xinjiang, lobby groups continued to press the American administration to offer support to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan diasporic groups. His diplomatic successes reached a high point in 2007. Despite China’s vehement protests, the leaders of Canada, Austria, Germany and Australia held public meetings with him. The crowning triumph came on 17 October 2007, when George W. Bush “awarded him the Congressional Gold Medal, the country’s highest civilian honour, during a high-profile ceremony in Washington.”10 One development in China’s foreign relations, of particular importance for this chapter, lies in its role in the successor states of the Soviet Union. In 1996, the presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai to discuss mutual problems. This group, known as the Shanghai Five, continued to meet annually, and in June 2001, formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from the five countries already mentioned plus Uzbekistan. China’s main goals in helping form this grouping were to foster good security, economic and other relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia, as well as to solve border problems with them and to combat terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.11 These notions referred mainly to terrorism due to Islamic extremism and the pressures on separating Xinjiang from China, which the government attributes, at least in part, to militant Islam and the terrorism it may generate. It is notable that these developments preceded the September 11 incidents. Separatism had been of concern both in Tibet and Xinjiang, especially since the late 1980s in the former case and since 1990 in the latter. One writer claims that “the floodgates of Islamic revival” opened in Central Asia in 1989,12 the year the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, with the rise of Islamism and Islamist

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terrorism following not very long afterwards. In 1994, the newly formed militant Islamist movement, the Taliban, actually took control of the Afghanistan capital Kabul and, though briefly expelled, reseized it in 1996, shortly afterwards launching an offensive that yielded them control of some 90 percent of the country. By September 11 2001, Islamist movements were already strong in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid claims that in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most popular and widespread underground movement was the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party for Islamic Freedom),13 the platform on which they sought to set up an Islamic state in a united Central Asia and Xinjiang, and eventually among all Muslims. China supported the war against terrorism that George W. Bush declared immediately after the September 11 incidents. It was glad to see the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and their replacement by a government headed by the pro-American Hamid Karzai in December 2001. The next month, China’s Information Office of the State Council presented a report castigating a number of groups that aimed to set up an independent state in Xinjiang under the name East Turkistan Republic. Among these groups, the main one was pointed out as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which the Information Office claimed was directed and supported materially and in other ways by al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.14 To China’s delight, the United States announced in August 2002 that it would freeze all of ETIM’s assets on the grounds that it was a terrorist organization. When the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003, the American and Chinese leaderships began to disagree over terrorism. As Sino–American relations over Xinjiang soured, the Chinese leadership moved to strengthen its role further in the SCO. One Chinese specialist argues that China can rely on the other members of the SCO to support it in its campaign against independence movements in Xinjiang.15 Another major development was the reorganisation and strengthening of Uygur diaspora groups hostile to China, which the American Administration appeared willing to assist. In April 2004, the American government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

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gave money to the Uyghur American Association (UAA), a fiercely anti-China Uygur diaspora body. It has continued providing grants, including one in 2009 for $249,000, which aims to promote human rights and religious freedom in Xinjiang and to document violations.16 A more important development was the formation of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) in Munich in 2004, based on a range of groups, all hostile to China but divided in precisely what to advocate for Xinjiang: independence, genuine autonomy or just cessation of human rights abuses, and how to achieve the aims, whether through violence or purely peaceful means. In July 2006, the NED gave its first grant to the WUC, and has continued doing so, including a grant of $186,000 in 2009.17 Because these bodies receive American government money, they have to be careful to frame their activities in democratic, human rights and non-violent terms, although, in fact, the members are deeply divided in their opinions and some are extremely radical. A key figure both in the UAA and WUC is Rebiya Kadeer. A very rich businesswoman, she was imprisoned in China in 1999 for stealing state secrets, but released in 2005 and allowed to go abroad on the condition that she did not engage in politics. Ignoring this condition, which she regarded as a Faustian bargain, she took up residence in Washington near the White House and has tried to emulate the Dalai Lama’s influence, becoming the UAA Board president in May 2006, along with the more important WUC presidency in November the same year. However, she is very different from the Dalai Lama. She lacks charisma and makes no pretence to heading a governmentin-exile or to being a religious leader.

THE DISTURBANCES IN THE TIBETAN AREAS: IMPACT ON CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS It is important to remember that the Tibetans disturbances took place shortly before the Beijing Olympics in August 2008. The Chinese leaders’ top concern was to make a good showing at the Olympics and present China and its history and society in a favourable light.

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The chief interest of China’s enemies, both domestic and international, was to use the upcoming Olympics to embarrass China or to extract concessions from it. In no issue were these concerns more relevant or obvious than that of Tibet.

The United States and the Western World The immediate reaction of Western countries to the Tibetan disturbances was to call for restraint, especially by China, and to avoid violating human rights. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put forward a typical Western reaction when she expressed deep concern, called on all sides to refrain from violence, and strongly urged China to exercise restraint in dealing with the protesters, respecting the fundamental right of all people to peacefully express their religious and political views. In a speech made in Chinese to the students of Peking University on 9 April 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said that “it is necessary to recognize there are significant human rights problems in Tibet” and “the current situation in Tibet is of concern to Australians.” He called on all parties to avoid violence and find a solution through dialogue.18 Meanwhile, among non-government spokespeople and the Western media in general, the dominant line was much more negative and condemnatory, a significant and fairly extreme example being the Democrat Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, who immediately visited Dharamsala to offer the Dalai Lama support. Pelosi also called on US President George W. Bush to boycott the Olympic Games and, in particular, the opening ceremony in protest against Chinese handling of the riots, an issue that was to loom large over the following months. Although Bush himself was among those who never had serious doubts about whether he would attend the opening ceremony, there was considerable political pressure in the US and elsewhere on this matter. Very soon after the 14 March riots in Lhasa, the Paris-based organization Reporters without Borders called for leaders to boycott the Olympic Games opening ceremony. French President Nicolas Sarkozy quickly offered support and announced that he might use his

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current presidency of the European Union for a boycott of the Olympics opening ceremony. As one reporter put it, this was among developments that “portend a steady drum roll of criticism of China” due to its handling of the Tibetan riots.19 Meanwhile, “meaningful dialogue” with the Dalai Lama, which apparently meant yielding some major points to him or his representatives, was an option Western leaders put forward as a means by which China could persuade them to attend the opening ceremony. Hundreds of millions of Chinese people throughout the world, including among those living in the West, were unimpressed with the Western attitude, and many were prepared to make their opinion known. Their view was that Tibet was definitely part of China and it was irresponsible to keep raising and supporting independence or quasi-independence; China had done a good job in raising the standard of living of the Tibetans and the almost automatic support for the rioters as against authorities was ignorant and irresponsible. In China itself, there was a brief boycott of the French retailing chain Carrefour in retaliation for Sarkozy’s threats. This wave of nationalism and the popular attitude in the West flared into the open when the Olympic Torch made its progress through twenty countries and many of the major cities of the world. In particular, Paris saw a scuffle between a Chinese paralympic athlete and a “free Tibet” activist, who tried to seize the torch from her. In London and San Francisco, Tibet activists jostled the athletes carrying the torch. Chinese reaction was furious. Chinese nationalists and authorities organized movements to defend the torch from Tibet activists and other supporters of the Dalai Lama’s cause. In Canberra, barricades ensured the Chinese athletes ran unobstructed, despite demonstrations both for and against the torch. Governments were generally keen to keep the torch relay smooth, but in Kathmandu, among other places, Tibet activists defied an official ban in an effort to disrupt progress. In Islamabad, Delhi and Indonesia, security concerns led the torch’s route to be cut short. Late in April, China announced it would reopen dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. Sarkozy was among the leaders to express his pleasure. With the arrival of the torch in China, where it

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visited over 100 cities, tensions eased, and it was brought to the opening ceremony exactly on time on 8 August. Sarkozy, Bush and Rudd were among the many national leaders in attendance. In November, the talks Chinese representatives were holding with those of the Dalai Lama collapsed, with China pouring scorn on the Tibetan proposals. Another matter resurfaced in the ongoing Tibetan controversy, namely whether foreign, and especially Western, leaders would risk angering the Chinese by meeting with the Dalai Lama. Although this controversy was nothing new, the tension flowing from the March disturbances certainly exacerbated it. When Nicolas Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in Poland in December, China retaliated by cancelling the annual European Union–China summit four days before it was due to open in Lyon. This issue is likely to be an on-going one. However, several countries have made concessions to China over Tibet since the Olympic Games. In view of Sarkozy’s prominence on the issue, we begin with France. When the G-20 summit took place in London, Sarkozy took the opportunity to meet Hu Jintao, resulting in a French–Chinese communiqué on 1 April 2009. This provided a significant place to discuss the issue of Tibet. Among other points it stated that: “France fully recognizes the importance and sensitivity of the Tibet issue and reaffirms its adherence to the one-China policy and the position that Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory.”20 Meanwhile, in October, Britain had revised its position, that Tibet was an “autonomous entity” in which China held a special position, to the acknowledgment that Tibet was a full part of China. In effect, Britain upgraded its recognition of China’s suzerainty in Tibet, which it had accepted in 1914, to the much stronger position of sovereignty.21 When the Dalai Lama visited Australia late in 2009, Prime Minister Rudd did not meet him. The attitude of the Obama Administration on the Tibet issue has been varied. Nancy Pelosi and other Democrats have consistently taken a strong pro-Dalai Lama line, but the Obama Administration initially tried to avoid provoking China over Tibet. One sign was that Obama declined to see the Dalai Lama before his November 2009 visit

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to China. The joint statement signed on 17 November 2009 does not mention Tibet, and while in China, Obama had explicitly acknowledged that Tibet was part of China. With the decline of Sino–American relations late in 2009, Obama took a harder line over meeting with the Dalai Lama. He ignored Chinese demands that he shun the Tibetan spiritual leader and welcomed him during his Washington visit of February 2010. The Tibet issue formed just one of a range of matters, all of them seeing the US take a different position from China. China’s profile over Tibet worsened as a result of the March and April 2008 disturbances and the saga of the Olympic torch relay. However, reactions by various countries in the aftermath of the Olympic Games suggest very different attitudes to China’s Tibet policy in different Western countries. China may have withstood the global financial crisis better than the US, but the latter seems to be in no hurry to see its position of world leader diminish. Meanwhile, most of the European countries appear ready to make concessions over Tibet. The main reason possibly lies in China’s increased economic standing, as displayed in its influence on the world during the global financial crisis. However, China’s strategic impact has also increased and most of the major powers have started to treat it as an equal, not as the inferior to which they have been accustomed.

Relations with India Contemporary realities demand that China and India should work with each other, and both sides know it. The 2009 Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change saw the formation of a new group, of which both China and India were members. According to one journalist, “China has built a strong alliance with three other major emerging economies, Brazil, South Africa and India. This group — known by the acronym Basic — has put out joint statements of opposition to the claims made by richer nations.”22 In the end, the Basic view prevailed over that of the rich nations. Nevertheless, the China–India relationship is inherently unstable. Both countries are home to major traditional cultures, both are growing

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rapidly economically, and, in a sense, it is very difficult for them to avoid being rivals. Although their border war of 1962 is now in the past, bitterness still remains, especially on the Indian side.23 The riots in Tibet had the effect of worsening this sensitive bilateral relationship. There are several reasons for this. First, the fact that India has given asylum to the Dalai Lama and his many followers has always angered the Chinese. The Chinese leaders blamed him for the disturbances and India’s defensiveness concerning him irritated them greatly. In fact, India tried to handle the Tibetan anti-China activities carefully. In March 2008, Tibetan groups in India began a march as part of a Tibetan People’s Uprising; they planned for it to go to Lhasa, with the very specific aim of embarrassing China in the lead-up to the Olympic Games. The Indian government prohibited the march and it was the Indian police who actually blocked the route of the protestors. Yet the fact that it was on Indian soil that this uprising and march were organised could not help but annoy the Chinese. A second reason is that the Tibetan disturbances exacerbated an already strong Indian fear of China. “To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India’s rise as a serious challenge to Beijing’s influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India’s 1962 war with China.”24 At the time of the disturbances, China increased its military presence in Tibet. Almost certainly, these troops were aimed at strengthening its control of the situation in Tibet itself, and were not directed against India. However, given the circumstances, it would not be surprising that the Indians found these troops threatening. This fear of China appeared to have worsened in the following months. In a widely publicized essay in July 2009, Indian Defence Review editor Bharat Verma predicted that China would “launch an attack on India before 2012.” Due to economic and other crises, he believed the Chinese communists would “need a military victory to unite the disillusioned citizenry behind them.”25 Of course, there are many who realise that China’s concerns are far more domestic and, in international terms, the US and several other countries loom larger than India. Yet Verma’s predictions and point of view garnered quite a following in India, however fanciful the suggestion of a Chinese invasion of India may appear.

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A third factor is that there is still some 90,000 square kilometres of territory disputed between India and China. One observer wrote in October 2009: “Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress towards settling the border dispute has stalled.”26 Tensions have grown considerably, with India claiming numerous border violations and China rejecting the accusations.27 But there is no doubt about the strength of feeling on both sides over the disputed territory and that the Tibetan disturbances only sharpened any ill-feelings that have festered due to such disagreements. One particular place that has been a cause of dissension between the two countries is Tawang, currently in Arunachal Pradesh in India, but disputed by China. It is extremely near China, and belonged traditionally to Tibet, and thus, for the Chinese, to China. However, in 1914, the Tibetan authorities ceded it to British India, which is why it is currently in India. Although very small in population, it is the site of a large and ancient Tibetan Buddhist monastery. The Dalai Lama passed through Tawang when he fled Tibet in 1959 and has visited it several times since then. In November 2009, he went back once again to the town, receiving a rapturous welcome there. This time, however, the Chinese government announced its opposition to the Dalai Lama’s visiting Tawang, the 2008 disturbances in Tibet having made the Dalai Lama’s presence in the disputed town very sensitive. The Indian government’s response was that he was free to go anywhere in the country. Arunachal Chief Minister Dorjee Khandu and other ministers welcomed him at Tawang’s helipad when the Dalai Lama landed there.28 It is not only in Western countries that the Dalai Lama’s actions and visits cause concern to Chinese leaders and not the only places in which they expect government leaders to shun him.

CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE XINJIANG RIOTS We now move from the Tibetan areas to discussing the international implications of the riots further north, in the capital of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Ürümqi.

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The United States and the Western Countries The profile of Western reaction to the Xinjiang riots was strikingly low. The day after the riots erupted, Obama commented from Moscow that he was concerned about them and added: “We call on all in Xinjiang to exercise restraint.”29 Western governments followed the Obama Administration in asking all sides for restraint, expressing concern over human rights. Admittedly, they were not supporting China, which was blaming Rebiya Kadeer and the WUC, but nor were they following the WUC line, which pinned responsibility on the Chinese and their repressive rule. Totally lacking were any demands that China should hold dialogue with the diasporic Uygur community, as had happened in the case of Tibet.30 Barack Obama’s November 2009 China visit may have been low-key on Tibet and human rights but it was even more so on the issue of the Uygurs and Xinjiang. Also striking was the fact that his visit followed closely on death sentences handed down to some of the leading July rioters. Apart from factors highlighted above in the section on Tibet, it is notable that Obama was in the throes of a decision on sending more troops to Afghanistan. Cooperation with China to thwart the resurgence of the Taliban was of concern to him. Although Rebiya Kadeer lived in Washington, and Obama had not stopped American funds from going towards her office and cause, it was not something likely to loom large amid the major issues of mutual concern to both Obama and Hu Jintao. The Uygur cause was very low in the American and other Western scale of priorities in comparison with the Tibetan. The closure of Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, which Barack Obama promised to take place within a year of his assuming the US presidency in January 2009, did involve a few Uygurs. After the US invaded Afghanistan in November 2001 as part of George W. Bush’s war on terror, American authorities sent some Uygurs captured along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border to Guantanamo Bay. China continued to demand their release, but the US consistently refused, fearing that they would suffer persecution. Although it proved extremely difficult to find other countries willing to accept them, almost all of

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Guantanamo’s Uygur prisoners eventually found homes in Albania, Palau and Bermuda, with two going to Switzerland. The issue is relevant to Sino–American relations, but not to the Xinjiang riots, for which reason I do not cover it in detail here. One matter relating to the July 2009 riots that did impact China’s relations with Western countries was the Rebiya Kadeer issue, the country most immediately affected being Australia. The very month after the riots in Ürümqi, Kadeer visited Australia for the Melbourne International Film Festival, which premiered The 10 Conditions of Love, a documentary about her life and anti-China struggle, and which expressed her view points. The Chinese consulate in Melbourne asked the festival director Richard Moore to withdraw the film, due to Kadeer’s anti-China activities and responsibility for the riots. When Moore refused, the Chinese pulled out several of their own films and, in one report, “inundated” the festival with e-mails which Moore described as “vile.”31 Evidence that either these withdrawals or the emails were at the behest of authorities was lacking, which did not prevent the suspicion gaining widespread currency. In the event, the film drew much more attention than would have been the case had there been no attempt to have it withdrawn, and all showings subsequently sold out. Richard Moore claimed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) local Melbourne radio that documentary programmers all over the world had approached him with interest in the film. On the other hand, producer John Lewis expressed disappointment through the same programme that neither of Australia’s public broadcasters, the ABC and the Special Broadcasting Service had been willing to screen the film.32 The documentary was short and designed as a television programme, not a full-length film. During her stay in Australia, Rebiya Kadeer also gave a speech at the National Press Club in Canberra. Chinese authorities criticized the Australian government for allowing Rebiya Kadeer to visit, charging that she was a terrorist. The Australian government authorities, however, responded that they had looked into her case and found no evidence for the Chinese charge, believing, therefore, they had no choice but to grant her a visa.

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No senior leader met with her, and her reception was entirely on a non-governmental basis. The visit had two results. One was the expansion of the reputation of Rebiya Kadeer. Very few people in Australia knew her name before this controversy, but the media gave her a good deal of attention, almost all of it favourable. At the same time, the Chinese consulate in Melbourne and the Chinese in general came under a good deal of criticism for trying to have the film pulled from the Festival and for withdrawing their own films when the director made clear his intention of going ahead with 10 Conditions of Love. At the same time, the controversy did temporary damage to Australia–China relations, along with a range of other factors. The Chinese, both at official and popular levels, could not understand why a country claiming to be a friend would allow in an enemy they believed to be a terrorist. The Chinese government suspended a ministerial visit as a result. However, in October, Vice-Premier Li Keqiang led a very positive visit to Australia, which did much to improve relations between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith gave a wide-ranging speech canvassing the issues that had troubled Australia–China relations. The speech included the following passage, which by its conciliatory tone, appeared to function as almost an apology for allowing Rebiya Kadeer to visit the country. Another prominent issue has been the visit of Rebiya Kadeer. This was a private visit, yet very controversial from China’s perspective. The Australian Government explained that we fully understood China’s concerns over the recent violence in Xinjiang, and threats to its territorial integrity. We also made clear the fact of Ms Kadeer’s visit did not imply endorsement of her political views.33

Rebiya Kadeer has continued to travel abroad, despite opposition from China to any country that might allow her entry. However, some authorities have become more cautious about the film 10 Conditions of Love. One example is the Kaohsiung Film Festival in Taiwan, which had planned to include the film. Because of Chinese protest, the film was pulled from the Festival, being shown instead

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beforehand. One could hardly account it a victory for the Chinese, since the film was still presented. But its withdrawal from the Festival was seen as a nod to Chinese opposition.

Impact on Relations with the Muslim World In Muslim-majority countries, China’s popular image suffered due to the riots, with the press taking a critical view of the way authorities handled them. In general, the Islamic clergy was either silent or very condemnatory of China’s ill treatment of Muslims. On the other hand, most governments were very low-key in their reaction. One Indian commentator noted that “reactions from West Asian countries have been surprisingly muted.”34 It is striking that there was absolutely no sign of any reaction remotely similar to that given to the cartoons of Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten (Morning Newspaper, Jutland Post) in 2005, which triggered furious demonstrations across the Muslim world, and with Danish embassies set on fire and riots resulting in some 100 deaths. “Where are the fatwas? The angry marches in front of embassies, the indignant speeches?” “In short, what does China have that Denmark did not?,” asked the editor-inchief of Washington’s Foreign Policy.35 We begin with reaction from ordinary Muslim people. In Indonesia, there were demonstrations, but they were not on a large scale. Uygurs themselves were the main protestors in several demonstrations in Turkey, Germany, Norway and Holland, which included the burning of Chinese flags outside Chinese consular buildings. Support from local non-Uygur or Islamic communities was sparse. Several Islamic associations and groups in Indonesia made critical statements of China’s policies towards the Uygurs and its handling of the riots. Among these, the most important came from the Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association (PITI), which has taken a major interest in the Xinjiang affairs and contributed to good relations between Xinjiang’s Muslims and Indonesia. One report stated that the PITI “criticized China’s brutality against the Uighur Muslim

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minority, and regretted the silence of Muslim nations” over “the group’s decades of suffering, discrimination and persecution,”36 In Iran, Muslim leaders were vociferous in their condemnations of China, and in particular, Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, one of the most important leaders of Shi’a Islam.37 By far the most important of the non-government reactions was from al-Qaida. In the months following the July riots, there were two threats from bodies claiming links with al-Qaida and another from a body with very similar views. The first surfaced in mid-July when the Algerian-based Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb issued a call for reprisals against the 50,000 Chinese workers in Algeria and Chinese projects and personnel across north-western Africa. In a video posted on an Islamist website on 7 October 2009, prominent al-Qaida militant Abu Yahya al-Libi called on the Uygurs to make a “true return” to their religion as well as “serious preparations for jihad in the path of God the Almighty and to carry weapons ....” In August, the leader of the self-styled Turkistan Islamic Party called on Muslims to attack Chinese interests all over the world.38 Most governments in Muslim-majority countries either stayed silent or recognized China’s right to suppress ethnic rioting. Syria’s Ambassador to China Khalaf Al-Jarad made a statement of support for China’s defence of law and order, recognizing Xinjiang as an integral part of China and adding that “the threatening of Xinjiang’s safety, stability and public order will only harm China’s development and progress, and is toxic to national unity.”39 Despite inflammatory comments by Islamic clerics, the government of Iran was noticeably silent, among other reasons because it was still embroiled in trouble over the June 2009 presidential elections, which had renewed Ahmadinejad in office but also caused major protests among the Iranian people. The governments of Central Asia were at one with China in wanting to suppress separatism and disturbances of any kind, let alone those involving ethnic rioting. Kazakhstan asked China to suspend cross-border travel, but only to stop the rioting from spreading.40 Pakistan had always enjoyed good relations with China and was not keen to upset their relationship through negative comments on the riots.

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The country with the most complex reaction to the riots was Turkey.41 Not only are the Uygurs closely related to the Turks ethnically and culturally, but quite a few Uygurs have migrated to Turkey over the years to escape from Xinjiang after the CCP came to power. However, it is worth adding that the number had decreased over the last few years. As one reporter notes, “Turkey once had an open-door policy toward its Uighur brethren,” but this is no longer the case, because “Ankara has become increasingly wary of antagonizing Beijing.”42 Turkey has expanded economic and other relations with China. Just a month before the riots, Turkish President Abdullah Gul presided over the signing of a substantial economic deal with China and expressed that he was very impressed by his visit to Xinjiang, commenting in Ürümqi that this “amazing city will resume its luster as a pivotal transition point in the Silk Road.”43 When the riots erupted just a few days after he had spoken in this way, the Turkish leaders were obviously very taken aback. Several government spokespeople made comments condemning Chinese suppression of the disturbances. In particular, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey’s Islamist-based government described the action as “a genocide.” He moved to have the UN Security Council debate the issue, but China blocked his attempt. One reporter says that he “is well-known for speaking first and thinking only later,” which means that his outburst “will quickly be forgotten as just another gaffe.”44 Nevertheless, it upset the Chinese; a newspaper commentary appeared immediately after, which concluded that Turkey should “stop standing behind those mobs and separatists, stop being an axis of evil!”45 I suspect that Erdogan’s intemperate words will be only temporarily damaging to Sino–Turkish relations. Its own problems with Kurdish separatists give it a common cause with China’s reaction to Xinjiang secessionism. What stands out from the above account is not the severity of overall Muslim reaction to the riots and China’s handling of them, but its mildness. The reasons differ from country to country. However, there are a couple of themes that are probably relevant across the board. One is China’s growing economic ties with these countries for their markets, and, in particular, as a source of the

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energy China so badly needs, with examples being Saudi Arabia and Iran. The other is China’s growing strategic influence across the Muslim regions of the world. It is not in the interests of the Muslimmajority countries to make China an enemy.46

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK In terms of China’s international relations, the disturbances in Tibet in March and April 2008 and the riots in Ürümqi in July 2009 have much in common. Both took place in China’s borderlands. Both saw religiously dedicated ethnic minorities with strong identities in violent conflict with the majority Han and the Chinese state. Both apparently took the authorities by surprise. In both cases, the Chinese government placed the blame on a member of the relevant ethnic minority holding major influence in a diasporic organization or group of organizations; in the former case, the Dalai Lama heading the “Dalai clique,” in the latter, Rebiya Kadeer, president of the World Uyghur Congress and leader of other associations. There were, however, some important differences. In the case of the Tibetans, the religion involved is Tibetan Buddhism, which, at least in the West has the reputation for being peace-loving, but in that of the Uygurs, it is Islam, which many in the West account as tending towards violence. The Tibetan disturbances took place in the shadow of the Olympic Games, while by the time of the Uygur riots, this event was in the past, which meant that the threat of using it to embarrass China was no longer available. The countries most closely involved in reaction to the Tibetan disturbances were those of the West and India, all of which tend to strongly support the Dalai Lama against China. On the other hand, the Western countries took much less interest in the Ürümqi riots, and their reaction was quite low-key, the lack of the Olympic Games factor making it even weaker than it might otherwise have been. The countries taking most interest in the Ürümqi riots were the Muslim-majority countries, especially those near China. Other than Turkey their governments tended to ignore the riots or side with China, while Muslim clerics and ordinary people were generally much more critical of China.

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There is strong contrast also between the two leading figures. The Dalai Lama’s international reputation is incomparably higher, better and of longer standing than Rebiya Kadeer’s. He speaks English, and leads not only a well-regarded religion but also a government, albeit one in exile. On the other hand, Kadeer does not speak good functional English, has no government of any kind behind her and makes no pretence to religious leadership status. So how can one evaluate the Chinese handling of the two events as far as international relations was concerned? To me, the Chinese authorities appear to have made a big and unnecessary mistake in the way they had allowed Rebiya Kadeer to heighten her profile and reputation through the film about her which had premiered not long after the riots. On the other hand, with the Olympic Games over, several major Western powers gave concessions over Tibet, indicating successful Chinese diplomacy. A major factor is that China’s standing in the world rose over the years 2008 and 2009. Several events both contributed to and reflected this trend. These included China’s good hosting of the August 2008 Olympic Games, its relative success in handling the global financial crisis, and its ability to project its influence during the Copenhagen summit on climate change. Images of China in the West and a few other countries may not have improved over the period, indeed, it may have got worse in some ways. The furore over the Chinese execution of the mentally ill Briton Akmal Shaikh at the end of 2009 illustrates this point. However, the global balance of power and influence tended to shift towards China’s favour. And, more importantly, the shift during this short period may be symptomatic of a longer-term and larger change likely to affect the world over the coming decades.

NOTES 1. “Population Hits 1.30756 Bln by 2005: Survey,” People’s Daily Online, 17 March 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200603/17/ eng20060317_251506.html. 2. See also Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 37–55.

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3. See State Council National 1 percent Sample Population Survey Leadership Group Office and National Bureau of Statistics Population and Employment Statistics Section, 2005 nian quanguo 1% renkou chouxiang diaocha ziliao (Materials from the 2005 1 percent Population Sample Survey), Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007. 4. For an excellent analysis of these disturbances see Robert Barnett, “The Tibet Protests of Spring, 2008, Conflict between the Nation and the State,” China Perspectives, 3, 2009, pp. 6–23. 5. For example, see discussion in Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang and the War Against Terrorism,” in China and Antiterrorism, Simon Shen, (ed.), New York: Nova Science, 2007, pp. 103–108. 6. See Xinhua, “Innocent Civilians Make Up 156 in Urumqi Riot Death Toll,” China View, 5 August 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009-08/05/content_11831350.htm. For a good discussion of the riots see Wei Shan and Gang Chen, “The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang,” East Asian Policy, 1 (3), 2009, pp. 14–22. 7. Gungwu Wang and Yongnian Zheng, “Introduction,” in China and the New International Order, Gungwu Wang and Yongnian Zheng, (eds.), London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 2. 8. There is a significant and growing literature on this topic. For instance, see Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2004. 9. Yongnian Zheng, “Nationalism: Dynamics of Domestic Transformation and International Relations in China,” in China and the New International Order, Wang and Zheng, (eds.), London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 45. 10. Mark O’Neill, “Double Trouble,” South China Morning Post, 29 November 2007, http://archive.scmp.com/showarticles.php. 11. Guang Pan, “China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” In China and the New International Order, Wang and Zheng, (eds.), p. 238. 12. Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism? London and New Jersey: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 244. 13. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 115. 14. Information Office of the State Council, “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” Beijing Review, 45 (5), 31 January, 2002, p. 19.

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15. Pan, “China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” p. 251. 16. National Endowment for Democracy, “Grants, National Endowment for Democracy Support for Uyghur Human Rights and Prodemocracy Groups in Exile,” http://www.ned.org/grants/uyghur_factsheet.html. 17. National Endowment for Democracy, “Grants, National Endowment for Democracy Support for Uyghur Human Rights and Prodemocracy Groups in Exile.” 18. Kevin Rudd, “A Conversation with China’s Youth on the Future, 9 April 2008, Peking University,” http://www.conferenceworks.net.au/ asaa/080409.Peking%20University%20Speech.English.doc. 19. Howard French, “Growing Gulf Divides China and Old Foe,” New York Times, 29 March 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/world/ asia/29china.html?scp=1&sq=Gulf%20Divides%20China%20and%20Ol d%20Foe&st=cse[accessed 20 December 2009]. 20. Xinhua, “Press Communiqué between China and France,” China View, 2 April, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/02/ content_11116339.htm. 21. See also Robert Barnett’s op-ed “Did Britain Just Sell Tibet?” New York Times, 25 November 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/ opinion/25barnett.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Did%20Britain%20Just%20S ell%20Tibet?&st=cse which gives a brief but excellent analysis. 22. Jonathan Watts, “China Transforms Balance of Power in Copenhagen’s Negotiating Halls,” The Guardian, 17 December 2009, http://www. guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/17/china-copehagen-climatechange. 23. For an overall analysis of China’s relations with India see Pokhama Bhawna, India–China Relations, Dimensions and Perspectives, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009. And for the function of Tibet in Sino–Indian relations, see especially, Willem van Kemenade, Détente between China and India, The Delicate Balance of Geopolitics in Asia, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2008, pp. 55–83. 24. Jeremy Kahn, “Why India Fears China,” Newsweek, 154 (16), 19 October 2009, p. 30. 25. Bharat Verma, “Nervous China May Attack India by 2012,” Sifynews, 12 July 2009, http://sify.com/news/nervous-china-may-attack-indiaby-2012-news-features-jhmqlGgeaia.html.

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26. Kahn, “Why India Fears China,” p. 28. 27. For instance see Xinhua, “China Rejects India’s Allegation of Border Crossing Incidents,” People’s Daily Online, 11 June 2009, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6676788.html. 28. Press Trust Of India, “Dalai Lama Gets Rousing Reception in Tawang,” Hindustan Times, 8 November 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/ Dalai-Lama-gets-rousing-reception-in-Tawang/H1-Article1-474070. aspx. 29. United Press International, “Obama Decries Chinese Violence,” 6 July 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/07/06/Obama-decriesChinese-violence/UPI-76251246915264/. 30. See also Jonathan Eyal, “Xinjiang Mars China’s Traditional Foreign Ties,” The Straits Times, 13 July 2009. 31. Irene Young, “The 10 Conditions of Love Controversy at the Melbourne Film Festival,” Alt Film Guide, Thinking Film, 27 July 2009, http://www.altfg.com/blog/censorship/the-10-conditions-oflove-melbourne-festival/. 32. “10 Conditions of Love screens at Melbourne International Film Festival,” Arts and Entertainment on ABC Melbourne, 27 July 2009, http://blogs.abc.net.au/victoria/2009/07/10-conditions-of-lovescreens-at-melbourne-international-film-festival.html. A later report suggests that the ABC is open to screening the film. Rowan Callick, “ABC Boss Denies Caving in to China on Uighur Documentary,” The Australian, 10 February 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ nation/abc-boss-denies-caving-in-to-china-on-uighur-documentary/ story-e6frg6nf-1225828491235. The documentary was actually broadcast on ABC television in May 2010, the Chinese raising no protest. 33. The Hon Stephen Smith MP, “Australia–China Relations, A Long-term View,” 26 October 2009, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/ 2009/091026_aus_china.html. 34. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “Why Uighurs Did Not Get Support from West Asia?,” IDSA Strategic Comments, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi, 24 July 2009, http://www.idsa.in/publications/ stratcomments/PrasantaPradhan240709.htm.

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35. Moisés Naím, “Mute Muslims, Why Doesn’t the Islamic World Speak Up About the Uighurs?” FP Foreign Policy, 13 July 2009, at http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/13/mute_muslims. 36. Ary Hermawan, “Muslim Nations Told to Help Uighurs,” The Jakarta Post, 10 July 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/ 10/muslim-nations-told-help-uighurs.html. 37. Pradhan, “Why Uighurs Did Not Get Support from West Asia?” 38. “Al-Qaida Threatens to Attack China,” China Daily, 8 October 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-10/08/content_8767743. htm. 39. Pradhan, “Why Uighurs Did Not Get Support from West Asia?”. 40. Eyal, “Xinjiang Mars China’s Traditional Foreign Ties.” 41. For a detailed treatment of Sino–Turkish relations with respect to the Uygurs see Yitzhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino–Turkish Relations, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2009. 42. Pelin Turgut, “Turkey No Longer a Safe Haven for Chinese Uighurs,” Time, 27 July 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0, 8599,1912653,00.html?xid=rss-world. 43. David Gosset, “Xinjiang Serves as Pan-Asian Pivot,” AsiaTimes online, 19 August 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH19Ad01. html. 44. Eyal, “Xinjiang Mars China’s Traditional Foreign Ties.” 45. Lingjiao Mo, “Turkey, Another Axis of Evil!?” Global Times, 10 July 2009, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2009-07/445195. html. 46. See also Pradhan, “Why Uighurs Did Not Get Support from West Asia?”

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3 Peaceful Rise from the Border: Chinese Practice of Diplomatic Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Weiqing Song Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau

ABSTRACT Founded at the beginning of the new century, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a regional organisation in Central Asia, with members including China, Russia, and the four smaller Central Asian States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It is generally believed that the SCO was initiated and led by China. This indeed marks a remarkable shift of Chinese foreign policy simply because China’s active involvement in the SCO process breaks away from its long tradition of bilateral diplomacy. The Chinese participation and, in fact, leadership in the SCO has drawn wide attention from academics and policy analysts alike. The chapter focuses on the leadership role of China in the SCO by 47

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detailing the specific practice that China has adopted in the process, including its use of structural power, negotiating skills and intellectual innovations. It is concluded that the leading role of China in the SCO is substantial, but sometimes awkward. The Chinese practice through the SCO is in conformity with its overall foreign strategy. The Chinese policies in the process are adaptable due to the changeable circumstances and complicated relationship among the SCO members.

INTRODUCTION Since the late 1990s, a paradigmatic shift has been taking shape regarding the general orientation of Chinese foreign policymaking. While they are more accustomed to traditional bilateral diplomacy, Chinese foreign policy elites are increasingly interested in the multilateral approach towards international affairs.1 This fundamental change is confirmed by several instances. First, China has become more interested in international organisations. Second, China is beginning to be more active in participating in international activities. In addition, China is seeking regional cooperation,2 in particular, with its neighbours.3 The trend of Chinese involvement in multilateral diplomacy is nowhere more obvious than its role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional organisation with members including China, Russia and four smaller states in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.4 The origin of the SCO traces back to the so-called ‘Shanghai Five,’ when China joined with all SCO members except Uzbekistan in the early 1990s for negotiations on a settlement of the borders between them. In June 2001, with the addition of Uzbekistan, the original ‘Shanghai Five’ was formally upgraded into a new regional international organisation known as the SCO. Many analysts believe that the SCO is largely a Chinese initiative. China is the ‘major impetus’ behind the formation of the SCO as a multilateral security cooperation in Central Asia.5 A long-time SCO specialist remarks that ‘China’s enthusiasm for helping to establish,

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develop, and structure this regional multi-lateral organisation is obvious.’6 Chung (2006) observes that China has been persistent in taking ‘a leading role’ in the establishment and institutionalisation of the ‘Shanghai Five,’ then the SCO, and desires to continue this trend. It is true that the SCO process is the first time that China has taken an active role and, in fact, the leading role in initiating, constructing and consolidating a formal regional organisation which is not exclusively economic in nature. This observation is agreed by Chinese scholars and policy advisors.7 In particular, Pang (2008) admits that China plays a driving role in the SCO, largely in three areas: formulating the theoretical guidelines, driving forward institutionalisation, and giving direct support to major projects. At the same time, the SCO has been interpreted in a number of ways. Western observers generally believe that the regional organisation is an anti-West block of authoritarian states. Similarly, others argue that the SCO is a Chinese and Russian attempt to countervail the US influence in the region. The SCO is also interpreted by some as a Central Asian States’ strategy to have two major powers, China and Russia, in a mutual containment game. It is not strange that there is a number of interpretations of the organisation simply because states, as rational actors, may have a variety of interests and motivations. Multilateral organisations are used by participants as vehicles for the fulfillment of their interests, whether convergent or divergent. The Chinese enthusiasm towards the SCO lies in the manifold interests in the region. In general, observers agree that China’s active behavior in the SCO process stems from its strong self-interest in Central Asia.8 First, China is most concerned with the regional stability of its borderlands in the Northwest, namely, the Xingjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. With the SCO platform, it is able to ‘weed out separatist activities on its western front.’9 Second, China is also interested in energy resources in Central Asia. Not incidentally, the Chinese concern about the increasing US influence in the region explains partially its instrumentalist approach toward SCO as a way to counter the US and, to a lesser extent, Russian influence. Last, but not least, China takes the SCO as a good opportunity for ‘its emergence

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as a Central Asian regionalist.’10 This motivation corresponds to its ambition of peacefully and responsibly rising to great power. From the Chinese perspective, the SCO is truly of strategic significance.11 The SCO has promoted confidence building and mutual trust between China and its SCO partners. The SCO serves as a good platform for China to cooperate closely with its partners in tackling the so-called ‘three evil forces’ (referring to terrorism, extremism, separatism) and various other cross-border criminal forces. The Chinese scholar also admits that the SCO provides an opportunity for economic cooperation, directly conducive to China’s ‘Grand West Development’ program, particularly as Central Asia’s potential for easily accessible provision of energy resources. Overall, the SCO is believed to ‘create a favourable neighbourhood and international environment for China’s peaceful development.’ However, the first priority for China’s interests in the SCO derives from its concern about the ‘horizontal constitutionality’ problem.12 China has a number of peripheral regions, including Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, and Xinjiang. These regions are vulnerable to international manipulation and, therefore, may challenge its territorial integrity. The SCO is perceived by China to be a potentially effective means to consolidate its control of one of the peripheral regions of Xinjiang. In particular, China clearly realizes the strategic importance of its neighbourhoods. It is worthwhile to have an in-depth study on the Chinese role in the SCO process. As SCO is the first regional organisation, initiated and promoted by China, a systematic study of this ‘experiment’ may help us better understand the Chinese practice of diplomatic leadership. How to conceptualize diplomatic leadership, however, is problematic. Most of the existing research on political leadership focuses on domestic politics and general governmental organisations. Very rarely can research be found regarding international organisations and diplomacy. Jia proposes that ‘leadership is a process by which a person or an actor manages an organisation or influences others to take action.’13 He further suggests that effective leadership in international diplomacy entails ‘vision, will, resources and skills.’

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In fact, Oran Young has conducted the most systematic conceptualisation of diplomatic leadership in negotiations, more specifically, leading to regime creation. He argues that diplomatic leadership can be categorised into three types: ‘structural leadership,’ ‘entrepreneurial leadership,’ and ‘intellectual leadership.’14 Structural leadership is about the ability of ‘devising effective ways to bring structural power (power based on material resources) to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interaction.’ Entrepreneurial leadership is about the ability of ‘making use of negotiating skill to influence the manner in which issues are presented and to fashion mutually acceptable deals.’ Intellectual leadership is about the ‘power of ideas to shape the way in which participants understand the issues at stake and to orient thinking about options available.’ Young suggests (1991) that structural and entrepreneurial leaderships apply either to collective actors such as states or individual diplomats. However, intellectual leadership is almost exclusively applicable to individuals. It can be argued that all three types of diplomatic leadership can comfortably apply to collective actors as well. In particular, evidence suggests that the SCO has largely been achieved through an elite-driven model of regional cooperation.15 Therefore, the process is largely being driven by political elites including leaders and diplomats rather than social forces. Although political elites are individuals, they act in their capacity as state representatives. Thus, it is not essential to distinguish strictly between individuals and collective actors.

PRACTICE OF BARGAINING LEVERAGE The ability of an actor, very often a state, to exercise its bargaining leverage usually derives from its structural power vis-à-vis other participants or stakeholders in a process of negotiations. In reality, this means that there exist ‘asymmetries’ among the participants.16 The asymmetries can exist in terms of power, resources or knowledge. If we compare among the SCO partners, it is evident that China enjoys structural power vis-à-vis the Central Asian SCO members, and even to a less extent, Russia. Table 1 lists the major statistics regarding the SCO members’ natural, economic and military capabilities.

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GDP per capita (PPP)

Foreign reserve (31/12/2008 est.)

Military expenditure (% of GDP, 2005/2006 est.)

9,596,961 17,098,242 2,724,900 447,400 199,951 143,100

1,338,612,968 140,041,247 15,399,437 27,606,007 5,431,747 7,349,145

$7.992 trillion $2.271 trillion $176.2 billion $71.84 billion $11.64 billion $13.19 billion

$6,000 $16,100 $11,500 $2,600 $2,200 $1,800

$1.955 trillion $427.1 billion $19.87 billion $10.15 billion $1.225 billion $195 million

4.3 3.9 0.9 2 1.4 3.9

Source: The World Fact book, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed 23 January, 2010.

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Economies of SCO members.

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China and Russia are obviously the two giants, compared with the other SCO members. Whether in terms of natural, economic and military strength, there is huge capability gap between them. In particular, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan account for a tiny faction of Chinese and Russian area, population, economy and military power. Indeed, the landlocked states of Central Asia face a variety of overlapping foreign policy challenges.17 They have serious problems of an undeveloped economy, unemployment, social poverty, and political instability. There is a clear asymmetry of economic and military capabilities among the SCO member states. Between China and Russia, there is a rough symmetry in power. However, China takes an advantageous position with Russia in terms of population, economy in aggregation. Russia may have comparative advantage in possession of natural resources and military capabilities. However, China makes use of its manufacturing capabilities and tremendous foreign reserves in exchange of Russian natural resources. Russia may have more advanced weaponry due to its Soviet legacies. However, the military gap between the two countries has been decreasing over the recent years. In fact, Russia relies partially on Chinese imports of its weapons as well as natural resources. It allows China to exercise its structural power in Central Asia, with the end of Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and improvement in Russia–China relations.18 China understands quite well the problems and challenges that Central Asian states face after their independence. These new states are in desperate need of help to protect their national security and to realise domestic and regional stability. Because of their suspicion of the Russian influence, they find China can be a much welcomed newcomer into this region. The Central Asian states, for example, do not have enough capability and impetus to build security regimes on their own despite common security concerns.19 The obstacles to security cooperation were tremendous: the Central Asian states were not able to provide enough resources into security regime creation; furthermore, the governments were suspicious of Russian influence and were thus insecure about their post-Soviet identities and sovereignty. They were worried that their independence would be overshadowed permanently by the persistent

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Russian dominance in the region. Because of the ever-increasing Chinese power, the Central Asian states hoped that by inviting Chinese presence into the region, the Russian dominance could be curtailed and the smaller Central Asian states might benefit from the possible Russian–Chinese competition, if not rivalry in the region. Furthermore, the Central Asian countries had other motivations for banding together. With more international involvement, including membership of international organisations, the Central Asian leaders hoped that their new states could gain more ‘international attention and recognition.’20 Indeed, leaders of the regional governments feared that their countries would be marginalised as the region as a whole was almost forgotten before the Afghanistan war in 2001. The SCO may not only help them with fighting against local Islamist terrorism, it may also help them in their economic development. The leaders hoped that the SCO could be a stepping stone to strengthen economic and trade ties between them and China. The Chinese market and capital are appealing to these isolated landlocked states. China, indeed, arrives at the right place and the right time. Actors with structural leadership are usually ‘experts in translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage.’21 However, China is a green hand in multilateral diplomacy, particularly, in initiating and leading an international organisation. Furthermore, China is not the only and most powerful hegemon in the region. This largely constrains Chinese practice of its structural power. Of the two options usually available for a hegemon in international negotiations, China takes the persuasion approach, rather than the coercion approach. This is simply because the coercion approach is not feasible, given the existence of US and Russian power. The instrument that China can use to persuade the Central Asian states into regime creation is offering side-payments (or ‘arm-twisting’ and ‘bribery’). China has more to gain than others from the successful conclusion of institutional creation of the SCO. It has both willingness and the ability to provide more immediate benefits to Central Asian states. Because of its economic strength relative to the other five SCO member states, China has granted substantial direct assistance to the Central Asian states as well as major SCO projects. At the

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SCO summit in 2004, China offered $900 million in loans on preferential terms to the Central Asian SCO members. China’s new willingness to seek a compromise with the SCO partners and its burgeoning economy and potential as a trade partner (particularly as a stable buyer of energy) have all contributed to an accumulation of Chinese political capital as a trustworthy and great power in the region. China gives support to the Central Asian states when deemed necessary. In May 2005, the Uzbekistani government suppressed the oppositions in the city of Andijan. This led to a crisis to the Karimov regime as it faced strong condemnations from the West. China helped President Karimov elude the possibility of international isolation. The SCO secretary Mr Zhang Deguang, a veteran Chinese diplomat, gave moral support by claiming the incident to be ‘an attack carried out by armed religious extremists.’ China became the first country receiving President Karimov on a state visit to Beijing. During the visit, China signed an energy agreement with Uzbekistan, worth $600 million.22 After the Andijan crisis, Uzbekistan changed its attitudes towards the SCO. It was no longer a half-hearted participant, but had participated in the SCO activities more actively. Surely, the Uzbekistani leadership had found the utility of this regional organisation, particularly, when it received support from China in its confrontation with the US and other Western countries. China’s use of its structural power had consolidated the credibility of the SCO. Structural leadership is also in part a matter of the ability to make use of timing to deploy one’s power and promote cooperation in ways that are both carefully crafted and credible.23 Shortly after the establishment of the SCO in July 2001, the 9/11 event occurred and later the Afghanistan war broke out. The war on terrorism opened the door for US direct military presence in the region. China was concerned about this changed situation as it was quite uneasy with US military bases located in its immediate neighbourhood. Three days after 9/11, on 14 September 2001, at a meeting of SCO prime ministers in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji stressed that the work of drafting the SCO Charter should accelerate and that the SCO anti-terrorist mechanism should begin to operate

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as soon as possible.24 The next year, the SCO charter was approved at the Chinese initiative and insistence at the St. Petersburg SCO Summit in Russia. What further complicated the SCO process is that there are two more or less equal hegemons, namely, China and Russia. The Central Asian region is the traditional Russian sphere of influence. The increase of Chinese influence in the region is against the wishes of Russia. SCO is considered by Russian leaders as a Chinese instrument to make its mark on this land, which was part of the former Soviet territories. China was believed to have benefited most from the consolidation and development of the SCO. This was why Russia was passive about the creation of the organisation. In fact, immediately after the establishment of the SCO, Russia persuaded the Central Asian states to create the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In this way, Russian leaders hoped that its traditional ties in the region would not be undermined by the increasing Chinese influence. For China, it has the difficult job of reassuring Russia that the SCO could be beneficial to all the partners, including Russia. In a situation where two or more parties possess substantial, though not necessarily equal, structural power, the prospects for success in institutional bargaining require the ability of these parties to make use of bargaining leverage to foster agreement on the provisions of mutually acceptable terms.25 China could not understand that at the beginning, Russia displayed quite a cooperative attitude towards the US presence in Central Asia. Though the US war in Afghanistan is, in the short run, beneficial to the Chinese interests, the Chinese leadership was worried that the US would take this opportunity to find a permanent footing in the region. China tried to raise this issue with Russia because it believed that the permanent US military presence would be unacceptable to Russia. China tried hard to convince the Russian leaders at the beginning. Later developments in the former Soviet sphere, inter alia, the ‘Colour Revolution’ have made Russia more determined to support the SCO as a balancing instrument against the US influence in Central Asia. It turned out that countervailing against the US influence in Central Asia has bound Russia and China together in the SCO.

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PRACTICE OF NEGOTIATING SKILLS Apart from the possession of structural power, diplomatic leadership also lies in the actor’s ability to use an array of its negotiating skills. An actor with effective negotiating skills may serve as an agenda setter, a popularizer, an inventor, and a broker.26 Agenda setters shape the way issues are presented for consideration at the international level. Popularizers highlight the importance of the issues at stake. Inventors formulate innovative policy options to overcome bargaining impediments. Brokers strike deals and garner support for salient options. In the SCO process, it is shown that China has played some of the roles on a number of occasions. It is no doubt that China sets most of the agenda in the SCO process. In fact, the creation of the SCO itself resulted from the Chinese initiative to upgrade the original ‘the Shanghai Five,’ the confidence building forum, to a formal regional organisation. After the solving of the border issue in the early 1990s, China promoted the process of formalisation of a regional organisation which could manage its partners’ interests in terms of security, economic exchange, and cultural interpretation.27 After the so-called Colour Revolutions, in which there was suspected American involvement or at least support, it is believed that China, along with Russia, tried to initiate the SCO process to oust the American influence. The Astana Declaration in 2005, requiring the US withdrawal from its military bases in Uzbekistan is generally believed to have been endorsed by China and Russia. A state with entrepreneurial leadership should also exhibit negotiating skills in timely seizing the opportunity to put the issue on the agenda. At the beginning of the SCO process, the other SCO partners had reserved attitudes on the progress of the SCO process. For example, its members had different views on the creation of a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan responded a little positively to the Chinese proposal. Kazakhstan showed no interest and Russia was rather reluctant, with suspicion of Chinese intention. As mentioned in the above section, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, China took the opportunity to raise the urgency of the issue.

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The Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s call at the SCO summit in 2001 on speeding up the institutionalisation process of the SCO shows that negotiating skills include this ability of seizing opportunities. Most importantly, of course, the first priority for China concerns border stability and territorial integrity. Therefore, China has persistently called for cooperation in counter-terrorism as its central activity in the SCO process. As a popularizer, China stresses that transnational terrorism is an issue of common challenge to the national stability of all the SCO partners as well as to the stability of the region as a whole. China actively promoted the joint military exercises through the SCO process. This is quite unusual if one considers the non-alliance principle long held by the Chinese government. Of course, supporting joint anti-terrorism exercises does not mean that China has changed its non-alliance policy and in fact, all the SCO members deny the possibility of alliance formation of the organisation. The Chinese support on joint military exercise is more out of its wish to demonstrate to the outside world the joint determination of the SCO members on anti-terrorism and the strength of the SCO itself. In August 2003, the SCO conducted its first multilateral joint military exercise termed “Cooperation 2003.” It is the first-ever joint military exercise on Chinese soil. In June 2004, the SCO opened a counterterrorist centre, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (or RATS), in Tashkent, institutionalising their anti-terrorism focus. China has worked as the leader for most of the major efforts and institutionalisation behind the SCO, including the SCO’s secretariat in Beijing and the RATS in Tashkent. China also plays the role of inventor in the SCO process. Realising the diversity and lack of knowledge among China and other SCO members, China initiates cultural cooperation among the SCO partners. In June 2001, China proposed that there should be regular meetings of cultural ministers of the SCO member states. Chinese leaders, including President Hu has stressed the need for cooperation in the fields of education, culture, sports, tourism, and the like, through the SCO framework. Premier Wen Jiabao called for promoting more enhanced cooperation in cultural, educational, scientific, tourist and sports fields. Through the SCO framework, such as the

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cultural ministerial meetings and SCO Secretariat, China has tried to strengthen cultural exchanges. It has set up the Chinese cultural centre in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, organized cultural days or festivals, and sponsored performances and exhibitions. Educational cooperation has also been strengthened in the SCO framework. China stated that, since October 2005, college students of SCO member states (largely from Central Asia) have been given scholarships to study in Chinese universities. However, cooperation in these areas has also met with some difficulties. Activities, for example, are largely dominated by governments, without much participation of the civil society. Central Asian states lack sufficient financial means to support cultural and educational exchanges. Cultural diversity is another challenge for the Chinese initiative to further cooperation in these areas. China works hard as a broker in solving deadlocks in the SCO process. China, for example, has stressed the role of trade development as an essential component of its Central Asian policy, both in terms of energy supplies and in other goods.28 However, the Chinese initiative on economic and trade cooperation through the SCO process did not have much feedback from the SCO partners. Russia does not like the increase of the Chinese economic influence in the region. It perceives that this would undermine its traditional status as the Central Asian states would turn to China for help and decrease their reliance on Russia. On the other hand, the Central Asian states were afraid of a possible dumping of Chinese goods on their market if there is closer cooperation agreement on trade and economic issues such as an FTA. Given the huge asymmetry between China and themselves, the Central Asian states were reluctant to the Chinese call on economic cooperation. In fact, Kazakhstan once proposed that Central Asian states should rely on themselves economically and establish closer regional economic cooperation among themselves. As Young suggests, a state with entrepreneurial leadership should have the ability to reap joint gains by coordinating their behavior in a mutually agreeable fashion.29 The difficulty that China faced to expand the SCO into the economic field indicates that it still lacked sufficient abilities and resources. Without substantial progress in the multilateral SCO framework, China instead tried to promote trade

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and economic relations, inter alia, energy cooperation on the bilateral basis. A state actor, with negotiating leadership, relies on skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals.30 China chose energy sector as the start. There is a good match in this area. China has been in need of energy after its economic takeoff while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are, at the same time, eager to find a foreign market for their oil and gas. The cooperation on energy between China and the two SCO partners has been positive. At a meeting on September 23 2003, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, proposed the long-term establishment of an SCO-wide free trade area designed to improve the flow of goods in the region by easing trade restrictions, such as tariffs. China has also placed a heavy emphasis on energy projects, including the exploration of new hydrocarbon reserves, joint use of hydro power resources, and water works development.31 The two smallest members, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are not only poor states, but generally lack important energy resources of oil and gas. They have potential hydro-power energy, but are unable to develop themselves due to a lack of capital and technology. China has skillfully proposed that an economic and trade agreement can be coupled with Chinese help in these areas.

PRACTICE OF INTELLECTUAL INNOVATIONS An actor with diplomatic leadership may also be productive in ‘intellectual capital’ or in ‘generative systems of thought.’ The perspectives of the participants in the process of negotiations may be shaped or at least strongly influenced by the produced ‘intellectual capital’ or ‘systems of thought.’32 Ideas matter when they can engender persuasive power to participants in processes of international negotiations and appeals to outsiders. In the SCO process, China spares no efforts to generate and promote ideas and concepts. As Pang summarizes, regarding Chinese contributions to the SCO, China formulated the theoretical guidelines, collectively known as ‘the Shanghai spirit.’ It includes ‘mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect to different civilizations

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and common prosperity.’33 The Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed at the SCO Shanghai summit in June 2006 that the region should be constructed to be a perpetual peace and co-prosperous area. To that end, China applies firstly to Central Asia the concepts of new security and new regional cooperation based on the ‘Shanghai Spirit.’34 It is clear that China acted as an intellectual leader by providing new concepts which serve as guiding principles for the new regional organisation. Compared with its SCO partners, China stands out in terms of its ability in this regard. Thus, China has made great efforts to promote norms in the process of international institutional building. It is obvious that the philosophy of the ‘Shanghai Spirit,’ espoused by China, is akin to the traditional principles of mutual respects between different sovereignty states. In fact, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ reminds us of the age-old ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ to which China is one of the initiators in the early 1950s. However, what is interesting is that China shows its ability in framing old principles in innovative way of conceptualisation. Though ‘old wine in new bottle,’ the concept of ‘Shanghai Spirit’ in general works well to its purpose. First of all, the underlying philosophy is shared among the SCO partners. There is consensus among the leadership of the member states that ‘the Shanghai Spirit sets out a map of cooperation based on a set of ideas and principles of how relations should be conducted within and outside the SCO.’35 In particular, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ stresses the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the SCO partners and thereby reassures the leaderships of the smaller Central Asian member states that their authority is not only protected but also further strengthened by their SCO membership. Furthermore, with stronger powers of China and Russia as their partners, they would be better able to withhold external and internal pressures and threats challenging their rules. In fact, the Chinese promotion of various concepts such as the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ has been interpreted in the West as the joint efforts deliberately made by the SCO members to promote the Authoritarian norms and, therefore, impede the democratisation process.36 The authoritarian regimes establish and consolidate the SCO to protect, through consultation and coordination, their own governments from

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regime change. The SCO members, particularly China, make instrumental use of the SCO to promote norms which cannot be refuted easily by the Western states. Policies such as supporting regime change in other countries can be perceived as illegitimate as they would be violating principles of non-interference in state sovereignty. China, in this sense, is a critical state which is the key in this process of authoritarian norm promotion. It serves as the engine for the creation of the regional organisation of the SCO and is influential in shaping the regional organisation’s values and principles. In their most basic definition, state sovereignty, non-interference, diversity and stability can be understood, as associated with constancy and the absence of change.37 It seems that this statement has largely been confirmed by their joint responses to the ‘Colour Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan Crisis in Uzbekistan. Similarly, China initiates and promotes the concept of comprehensive security. It is argued that comprehensive security can be understood as an overall and multilevel concept, covering a variety of issue areas.38 In terms of category, it includes traditional security which covers state sovereignty, territorial integrity, military capabilities, arms and arm control. It also includes non-traditional security, for example, economic, ecological, social, informational, cultural security. In terms of practice, comprehensive security may be achieved through political, military, economic, and diplomatic means to protect international actors from domestic and external threats. By promoting this concept, China tries to legitimise its attempts at multi-issue cooperation through the SCO process. The instrumental use of intellectual innovation helps its issue linkage tactic. The concept of harmonious society was established first for domestic reasons as the Chinese government tried to resolve social conflicts in the era of social upheavals and transformation. However, the concept has quickly been applied to its foreign policy. The Chinese government promoted the concept of ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie) at the international level when President Hu first adopted the concept at the SCO summit, as a regional approach to building a harmonious world. The SCO has again become a testing

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ground for its experiment of norm promotion of the ‘harmonious world.’ At the 2007 SCO summit in Bishkek, the SCO leaders signed the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Treaty on Longterm Good Neighbourly, Friendship and Cooperation.’ Pang remarked that the speed with which the treaty was prepared reflects the high degree of consensus shared by the signatory states.39 While it is unsure of how much the idea is shared by its SCO partners, China was effective in the provision of intellectual ideas into the process as long as these ideas are not detrimental to the interests of the individual member states. The role of intellectual leadership helps, at least, the maintenance of the regional organisation with some ‘sustainable nutrients.’

CONCLUSION The Chinese role in the establishment and development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation marked a beginning of a new phase of Chinese diplomacy and foreign strategy. ‘The SCO process, with its successful practice and evolution, symbolises the transformation of Chinese diplomacy from its traditional focus on bilateral relations, towards the growing embrace of multilateral interactions.’40 More importantly, a paradigmatic shift is taking shape with the SCO process. Instead of sticking to traditional bilateral diplomacy, China has begun to adopt multilateralism. It is shifting from its longtime passive response to international situations to active participation in international affairs. In addition to becoming more involved in existing institutions, it has also begun to initiate and lead the construction of international organisations and cooperation frameworks. China’s Central Asian policy in general and its involvement in the SCO process are formulated in accordance with its overall foreign policy planning and strategic orientation. It is in conformity with general concepts of peaceful development and a harmonious world.41 The adjustment of the Chinese foreign policy strategy towards more active participation in multilateralism reflects the relative distribution of power in China’s favour. To better benefit from globalisation, in particular, and in the economic field, China has to redefine its

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international position and global role. A more active approach should be more helpful to this end. Since the later 1990s, China has claimed to be a ‘responsible great power’ on the world stage. This suggests that China would be willing to cooperate with existing international norms and institutions, participate in international cooperation and maintain world and regional stability. Its policy towards the SCO and the Central Asia region is a concrete attempt made by China to act as a ‘responsible great power’ and even as a leader of regional cooperation framework. It is usually the case that international negotiations take place ‘under a veil of uncertainty.’ Therefore, none of the stakeholders will be sure about the benefits from various alternative options regarding the proposed institutional building and its further development.42 In the SCO process, the Chinese experience holds true of the proposition. Because of uncertainty, China takes an approach of ‘crossing the river by feeling for the stones’ (Mo Zhe Shitou Guohe).43 Since the inception of the SCO, China has tried to stress different functional aspects of the organisation. At the outset, Chinese officials appreciated the SCO as a forum for joint action against transnational terrorism. With the US military presence after the Afghanistan War in 2001, China attempts at countervailing, if not ousting, US influence. When the issue of energy supply became demanding, it has given full attention to the SCO as a stepping stone for oil and gas supply in the region. It seems that China does not have a ‘grand strategy’ in the process, but evolves with changing circumstances over time.44 However, adaptation itself is a feasible and often effective strategy when policymakers and strategists act in a situation of uncertainty. Therefore, the Chinese trial approach is practical toward more mature leadership in multilateral diplomacy, though it sometimes seems awkward.

NOTES 1. Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 159–200.

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2. Emilian Kavalski, (ed.), China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009. 3. Shaun Breslin, “Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities, and Implications,” International Affairs, 85 (4), 2009, pp. 817–835. 4. The region of Central Asia also includes Turkmenistan. However, the leadership of the State decided to pursue a “positive neutrality” in its foreign policy, which is even enshrined in its constitution. As the result, Turkmenistan leaves outside most of the international and regional organisations. 5. Marc Lanteigne, “In Medias Res: The Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a Security Community,” Pacific Affairs, 79 (4), 2007, p. 607. 6. Chien-peng Chung, “China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Problems of Post-Communism, 53 (5), 2006, p. 5. 7. Qingguo Jia, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: China’s Experiment in Multilateral Leadership,” In Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and its Eastern Edge, Iwashita Akihiro, (ed.), Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007, pp. 113–123; Guang Pang, “A New Diplomatic Model: A Chinese Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Washington Journal of Modern China, 9 (1), 2008, pp. 55–72. 8. David Kerr and Laura C. Swinton, “China, Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security of Central Asia,” Critical Asian Studies, 40(1), 2008, pp. 113–142. Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, 24 (4), 2005, pp. 425–439. Kevin Sheives, “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia,” Pacific Affairs, 79 (2), 2006, pp. 205–224. 9. Ong, “China’s security interests in Central Asia,” p. 435. 10. Kerr, “China, Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security of Central Asia,” p. 136. 11. Pang, “A New Diplomatic Model,” pp. 55–56. 12. David Kerr, “Central Asia and Russian Perspectives on China’s Strategic Emergence,” International Affairs, 86 (10), 2010, pp. 128–129. 13. Jia, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” p. 114.

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14. Oran R Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” International Organisation, 45 (3), 1991, p. 288. 15. Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: ‘Tackling the Three Evils.’ A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?” Europe-Asia Studies, 61 (3), 2009, p. 471. 16. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” p. 289. 17. Ruslan Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Central Asian Perspective,” a SIPRI Paper, August 2006, p. 1. 18. Robert Sutter, “Durability in China’s Strategy toward Central Asia — Reasons for Optimism,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, 6 (1), 2008, p. 6. 19. Lanteigne, “In Medias Res,” p. 607. 20. Chung, “China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” p. 9. 21. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 288. 22. Chung, “China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” p. 11. 23. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 290. 24. Pang, “A New Diplomatic Model.” pp. 55–72. 25. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 290. 26. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 294. 27. Kerr, “Central Asia and Russian Perspectives on China’s Strategic Emergence,” p. 129. 28. Lanteigne, “In Medias Res: The Development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation as a Security Community,” p. 619. 29. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 293. 30. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 293. 31. Ariel Cohen, “After the G-8 Summit: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, 4 (3), 2006, p. 53. 32. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 298. 33. Pang, “A New Diplomatic Model,” p. 59.

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34. Huashen Zhao, “Zhongguo zhongya waijiao de lilun he shijian” (Theory and Practice of China’s Central Asian Policy), Guojiwenti yanjiu (Studies of International Affairs), 4, 2007, p. 20. 35. Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: ‘Tackling the Three Evils.’ A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?” Europe-Asia Studies, 61 (3), 2009, p. 479. 36. Thomas Ambrosio, “Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60 (8), 2008, pp. 1321–1344. 37. Ambrosio, “Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’,” p. 1329. 38. It seems that the concept draws inspiration from the Copenhagen School’s concept of security including military, political, economic, society, and environmental aspects. Xiaoyu Wang and Tao Xu, “Lun Shanghai hezuo zuzhi jincheng zhong de Zonghe anquan linian” (The Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Process of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), Eluosi Zhongya don gou yanjiu (Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European Studies), 5 (53), 2003, p. 53. 39. Guang Pang, “Bishkek: SCO’s Success in the Hinterland of Eurasia,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, 5 (4) 2007, p. 3. 40. Pang, “A New Diplomatic Model,” p. 59. 41. Zhao, “Zhongguo zhongya waijiao de lilun he shijian,” p. 19. 42. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 288. 43. Jia, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” p. 118. 44. Jia, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” p. 118; Huasheng Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy,” Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p. 137.

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4 China and Its Central Asian Neighbour Gudrun Wacker Asia Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Berlin, Germany

ABSTRACT China’s policies vis-à-vis the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have evolved dynamically after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Security and economic interests have been priorities on China’s agenda in the region. After border issues had been successfully resolved, the stability of China’s north-western periphery and the fight against separatism dominated the agenda. Economic development in the restive Autonomous Region Xinjiang-Uyghur has been seen by the Chinese leadership as a means to contribute to stability. Opening up the borders for trade was part of this strategy. In recent years, oil and gas supplies from Central Asia have become a prominent part of China’s energy security. China pursues its interests in Central Asia bilaterally by cultivating friendly relations with each country and offering aid and soft 69

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loans. At the same time, China has also pushed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a multilateral regional framework. In sum, China’s approach has been quite successful over the last two decades. Despite potential friction with Russia over influence in the region, open conflict has been successfully avoided.

INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BACK China and Central Asia have been linked over many centuries in history through trade routes as well as ethnic and religious connections. Up to the 15th century, the Silk Road passed through Central Asia and through China’s north-western periphery — the one which, today, is called the “Autonomous Region Xinjiang-Uyghur” (AR Xinjiang). This region was not a firmly integrated part of the Chinese empire, and it was not until the 18th and 19th century that it was officially claimed by China under the name Xinjiang, i.e. “new frontier.” During the 19th and even the 20th century, China’s authority in this region was challenged several times, by local uprisings (efforts to establish an independent entity of “East Turkistan”) as well as by foreign (mainly Russian) encroachment. After 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) re-asserted its authority over Xinjiang. Traditional cross-border connections between China’s north-west and Central Asia were cut off in the early 1960s and the borders were closed due to the ideological rift between the Soviet Union and China. Basically, all contact came to a halt except for a large number of refugees fleeing from China over the Soviet border as a reaction to collectivisation and the Cultural Revolution in China. In the second half of the 1980s, China and the Soviet Union were able to normalise their relationship step by step. This was made possible by Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He addressed China’s conditions for such a process in his speech in Vladivostok in 1986. Within the context of Sino–Soviet rapprochement, small scale trade between Xinjiang and the Soviet Republics in Central Asia, which share a direct border with China,1 was made possible again.

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Immediately after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the PRC recognized all successor states, established diplomatic relations and sent a first official delegation to the newly independent Central Asian republics. In this early phase, security interests were Beijing’s central motive for such a fast response: The Chinese leadership was concerned that the independence of the neighbours could have a destabilising effect on its own north-western periphery. Like in the Central Asian states, the population of the AR Xinjiang are predominantly Muslim peoples.2 Consequently, political stability and — as a precondition for this — economic development have been consistently the top priorities on the agenda of Chinese policies vis-à-vis the Central Asian neighbours ever since their independence. China has been pursuing its interests not only bilaterally, but also within a multilateral framework, the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” (SCO).3 With all five Central Asian republics, Beijing maintains economic and trade relations as well as political and military contacts. Over the last twenty years, bilateral relationships with the five countries have developed differently in scope and intensity. However, the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual non-interference into domestic affairs provided the ideological basis of China’s foreign policy. These principles have been guiding relations with the Central Asian states as well as within the SCO. This has been limiting China’s room to manoeuvre: A direct intervention in the neighbouring region is hard to imagine and would be difficult to justify. Therefore China tries to support stability in Central Asia in other ways. It is important to note that “stability,” from Beijing’s perspective, usually implies stability of the political order. In the following, we will focus on the relations between China and its five Central Asian neighbours in the period since 1991. How did relations develop over the last two decades in different policy fields? What characterises China’s main interests? What are the main instruments and means used by Beijing to pursue these interests? What implications do China’s activities in Central Asia have for other actors, namely for Russia, the United States and Europe?

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SECURITY INTERESTS When China diplomatically recognised the newly independent states, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, including the Central Asian republics, one reason was to prevent Taiwan from moving first and using the opportunity of the USSR’s disintegration for gaining diplomatic recognition. All the Central Asian states had to recognise that Taiwan was an integral part of the Chinese territory and committed themselves to a one-China policy. This was, from China’s perspective, the precondition and basis for establishing normal interstate relations with the young republics. Another high priority for China after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was security at the borders with the new neighbouring states. Two issues were relevant in this respect: First, the massive militarisation of the borders between China and the former Soviet Union4 and second, the unclear and disputed boundary line which was a heritage of Tsarist times and had persisted through the Soviet era. While a basic agreement on the general principles of border delimitation at the eastern section of the Sino–Soviet border had been reached at the end of the 1980s briefly before the Soviet Union had split up, there had been no negotiations concerning the western sections of the border. During the 1990s, China, on the one side, and its direct former Soviet neighbours on the other side, namely Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, held talks in the so-called 4 + 1 format over a settlement of the border issues. As a result of these talks, solutions were found step by step. The principle followed in these negotiations was to sign bi- or sometimes, in the case of tri-border regions, trilateral agreements, even if these did not cover the entire length of the border. For the still contested areas, the sides committed themselves to finding a solution later by peaceful means. In some, but not all, cases China was willing to compromise and abandon some of its territorial claims. As for the borders with the three Central Asian republics, agreements were reached during the 1990s. However, in some cases, the solutions met with resistance on the Central Asian side.5

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Two more agreements were reached during the 1990s which for all parties involved meant an easing of the burden in terms of military and security policy: 1. In April 1996, the first summit meeting between the heads of state of the 4 + 1 countries took place in Shanghai. They signed a document on Confidence Building Measures along the common borders.6 2. One year later in Moscow, a second document followed on demilitarisation and troop reductions within an area of 100 km along the borders.7 Both agreements had wider and more significant implications for the Sino–Russian border in the east than for China’s borders with Central Asia, but nevertheless they were signed by all involved states. Thus, the 4 + 1 talks became the foundation of the “Shanghai Five” (S-5), and what has been frequently cited as the “Shanghai spirit” refers to the first summit between the five states in 1996. The two documents of 1996 and 1997 were presented by the states involved as a new type of security agreement which no longer reflected the “old thinking” of the Cold War or the “obsolete pattern” of traditional military alliances. This was an explicit distinction of two other changes in security arrangements discussed at the time: the eastward expansion of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the renewal of the US–Japan security alliance. Both were seen by the S-5 as remnants of the Cold War. The S-5 existed for five years and held summit meetings on an annual basis. In September 2001, the loose organisation re-grouped as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” (SCO) and accepted Uzbekistan as a full member. In the following years, the SCO gave itself a charter (2002) and expanded cooperation into other areas.8 It is important to note that the two agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 have no implications for the relations between the Central Asian states, since confidence-building measures and troop reductions only concern their respective borders with China. The border problem was not the only security issue from the perspective of the Chinese leadership. Another important aspect of

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relations with the Central Asian neighbours was that China requested the governments of these new republics not to allow any “antiChinese” activities on their territories. This was supposed to prevent the Uyghur population in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (estimated at 3–400,000) from organising themselves. China was concerned that such groups would try to give spiritual and/or material support to their ethnic and religious brethren living across the border in China. Against this danger of a spill-over of the independence “virus” to Xinjiang, China took measures in the north-western region itself, but also tried to enlist and co-opt the support of the political leaders in Central Asia. This issue was included in the joint declarations between China and the Central Asian states, and in the period of the 1990s, several Uyghur organisations were banned in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Preventing and combating separatist movements in Xinjiang was one of the top priorities for Beijing in the region. In the late 1990s, the struggle against the “three evil forces” of separatism, terrorism and (religious) extremism was included in the agenda of the Shanghai group.9 Members of the S-5 identified Afghanistan as the most important external source of destabilisation. This country did not at that time receive anything close to the international attention that came with September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. However, activities of the SCO grouping of states remained mainly declaratory, i.e. the problem of Afghanistan was raised in the joint declarations issued at the end of the summit meetings, but no concrete action was taken. The statements did not lead to increased co-operation between China, the Central Asian states and Russia, for example in the form of information exchange or joint border controls. Even after the events of September 11 (which struck the organisation completely unprepared), it took the SCO years of discussion to establish a joint centre to fight terrorism, namely the “Regional anti-terrorist structure” (RATS) in Tashkent. It was officially opened in 2004. Even now, years after it began operating, it remains unclear how deep concrete cooperation and exchange of information gathered by the security services really goes. Judging from experiences in other parts of the world, such exchanges of sensitive information

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are not easy to bring about. And in light of persistent mistrust not only between China and Russia, but also between the Central Asian states, one can doubt that in-depth cooperation is really taking place. However, the centre has set up a data base, offers training courses for practitioners, and keeps contact with international organisations, etc. The SCO also founded an “Afghanistan contact group.” Almost nothing is known about what this group has been doing, but Afghanistan’s president Hamid Karzai attended the SCO summit meetings on a relatively regular basis as a special guest.10 The instable situation in Afghanistan concerns all Central Asian states as well as Russia and China, since all of them have become transit countries for smuggling arms and drugs, with the latter mainly intended for markets in Eastern and Western Europe. This drug smuggling does not only affect the states in terms of corruption, but is also responsible for growing numbers of drug addicts as well as people infected with HIV. In March 2009, the SCO (together with the “Collective Security Treaty Organisation”)11 held a first international Afghanistan conference in Moscow which particularly focused on the issue of drug smuggling. Representatives of the US and NATO also attended this meeting. Several documents were signed at this conference.12 Later in the same year, the SCO members at their summit in Yekaterinburg signed the “SCO Counter-Terrorism Convention,” “which cements the legal base for counter-terrorism interaction in the SCO framework and its potential cooperation in this field was taken to a new level.”13 In sum, one can note that stability — meaning regime stability — is a vital interest shared by the political elites of Central Asia, Russia and China. Therefore, all members of the SCO reacted with concern to the so-called colour revolutions in some of the Soviet successor states (Ukraine, Georgia). These were seen by SCO members, including China, as the result of Western (namely US) support if not direct control of opposition movements, mainly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). When similar developments occurred in Central Asia in the year 2005, China did not officially interfere, but made its position very clear. During the events in Kyrgyzstan, which became known as the “tulip revolution” and resulted in then Kyrgyz

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president and his family going into exile, member states of the SCO including China reportedly even discussed a possible intervention, but in the end they accepted the situation and the new government. When Uzbekistan’s president Karimov used force to suppress demonstrations in Andijan in May 2005, China expressly supported Karimov’s actions and welcomed him ostentatiously briefly after the events in Beijing for a state visit. Mutual support for measures taken to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity in case of domestic unrest has been a feature of the S-5 and SCO from the beginning: China’s leaders supported not only Karimov’s handling of Andijan, but also backed Russia’s stance on Chechnya. In turn, Beijing received support on the issues of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. When, in 2009, demonstrations in Urumqi turned violent, SCO members approved of China’s response. Over the years, China also strengthened military relations with the Central Asian states, bilaterally as well as within the framework of the SCO. Some of China’s Central Asian neighbours received military supplies, including, for example, equipment for night vision, etc. More importantly, China held military exercises in various constellations with Central Asian states and Russia. These are normally called anti-terrorist drills, although observers in some cases doubted this purpose based on the number and type of troops and arms involved.14 It is important to note that China’s army has not been involved in any real combat since the “punitive” campaign against Vietnam in 1979. Military exercises, not only with the Central Asian states and Russia, but also with other countries — among them search and rescue missions — have to be understood as means of gaining practice and experience.15 The SCO provides a common framework for such exercises, but nevertheless it has definitely not developed into a military block (“NATO of the East”). China has been quite careful not to openly interfere with the pursuit of a “multi-vector” foreign policy of the Central Asian states. Despite the fact that China as well as Russia, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, took sides with the United States, and that Russia had approved the establishment of military bases in Central Asia for the UN-mandated mission of the US and NATO allies in

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Afghanistan, at least some in the Chinese leadership see US military presence in the region with concern and as part of a potential effort to encircle China. The joint declaration of the SCO summit in 2005 contained a passage requesting the United States to name a date for leaving the bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. China was widely suspected to be the main driving force behind this initiative. However, the Central Asian states in question most likely had their own motives for including this passage — Uzbekistan was tired of US and Western criticism because of Andijan — for example, to renegotiate and get more money out of the landing rights may have been another reason. In any case, we can assume that for geopolitical reasons long-term military presence of the United States in the region is not in China’s interest. It is hard to say to what degree security and military relations between China and the Central Asian republics or the joint military exercises have contributed to the stabilisation of the region in the last ten years. Also unclear is the scope of cooperation among SCO member states in the regional anti-terrorism centre. The centre itself claims in its annual reports that cooperation and exchange of information have successfully prevented a series of incidents.16 With respect to the “three evil forces” of separatism, terrorism and extremism, the SCO member states are each confronted with a different situation. China has definitely been the main driver of the SCO as a regional organisation, but doubts remain whether this has fostered more cooperation between the Central Asian countries,17 especially on security issues. Diverging interests between China, the Central Asian states and Russia can also be identified in the realm of economic relations.

ECONOMIC AND ENERGY INTERESTS Trade Relations As mentioned in the introduction, trade between China and the Central Asian republics was reopened even before the end of the Soviet Union. This became possible due to the normalisation process

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between the two big Socialist countries during the second half of the 1980s. Trade delegations from Central Asia visited the north-western region of Xinjiang. On the Chinese side, the motivation behind re-admitting crossborder trade and economic relations cannot be explained by purely economic interests. China’s development process after 1979 was based on “reform and opening up” (without fundamental changes in the political system). During the 1980s, only the coastal provinces in the east and south were allowed to trade overseas and attract foreign direct investment in the designated Special Economic Zones. The central provinces as well as the regions at the south-western, western and northern peripheries with their closed land borders did not have the same options and, over time, fell behind in economic development. Therefore, the opening of the borders between the AR Xinjiang and Central Asia presented an opportunity to narrow the economic gap to the rich coastal provinces.18 Beijing also saw economic development as a remedy against dissatisfaction and unrest, especially in the regions populated by minorities like Xinjiang. One can question whether this strategy has really worked in the end: New economic opportunities have brought more Han Chinese to these parts of China. The Han also tend to get more qualified jobs with better payment. Under these conditions, minorities might feel not only discriminated against, but also marginalised.19 This can, in turn, fan unrest. After the demise of the Soviet Union, opening borders with Central Asia was considered by the Chinese leaders as an opportunity and as a security risk at the same time. Despite the perceived dangers for the stability of Xinjiang, China decided not only to keep the borders open, but also to improve the links between China and Central Asia by investing in trans-border infrastructure, through the building of roads, border crossings, telecommunication lines, and railways. With the concept of a “new Silk Road,” China tried to resurrect the positive image of the former thriving network of trading routes in the form of modern communication lines. In recent years, a railway connection from Kashgar (in the southwest of the AR Xinjiang) to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and a network of fast trains through

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Central Asia with connections to South Asia and Europe has been under consideration, but construction has not started yet.20 China’s leaders have also often stressed that they consider economic development in the Central Asian Republics, fighting poverty and raising living standards as main preconditions with which the “root causes” of extremism can be addressed. Therefore, Chinese economic activities in Central Asia — investment, trade, and soft loans — are also seen as a contribution to the stability in China’s direct neighbourhood. In the course of the last two decades, economic and trade relations between China and its Central Asian neighbours have been developing rather unevenly.21 Since Kazakhstan is presently the only one of the five countries directly linked with China via railroad22 and has been doing better economically than the other states in the region, it comes as no surprise that bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan developed quite strongly from the beginning (Table 1 and Figure 1). Kyrgyzstan ranks second among China’s trading partners in Central Asia. However, trade between China and Kyrgyzstan has developed very lopsidedly, since there are almost no goods exported from Kyrgyzstan to China. While China, during the 1990s, had at times a negative trade balance, especially with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it has been running a surplus with all Central Asian states in 2008 and 2009 (Table 2). For some of the Central Asian states, China has become an important trading partner over the years, although Russia, for historical

Table 1.

Development of trade volume China — Central Asia, 1992–2009*.

Trade volume 1992 1996

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2009*

(US$ million) Kazakhstan 363.4 459.7 1,557.0 1,955.8 4,498.2 8,358.7 17,545.8 13,938.6 Kyrgyzstan 15.6 105.7 177.6 201.9 602.3 2,225.8 9,335.1 7,773.2 Tajikistan 2.8 11.7 17.2 12.4 69.0 323.7 1,499.9 1,565.4 Turkmenistan 4.5 11.5 16.2 87.5 98.7 178.5 831.4 1,066.9 Uzbekistan 52.2 187.3 51.5 131.6 575.5 972.0 1,607.8 1,917.6 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2010. *M1–M11 annualised

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US$ bn; goods only Kasachstan

Kyrgyz Republic

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1992

Figure 1.

1996

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2009*

Trade volume, China with Central Asian states, 1992–2009*.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2010. *M1–M11 annualised

Table 2. China’s balance of trade with Central Asian states, 1992–2009*. Trade balance

1992

1996

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2009*

(US$ million) Kazakhstan 81.5 −269.3 359.4 −753.6 −74.3 1,144.4 2,093.4 1,610.1 Kyrgyz Republic 4.1 32.1 42.7 90.4 383.2 2,000.2 9,092.6 7,641.7 Tajikistan 1.2 3.6 −3.6 0.6 38.2 287.7 1,459.5 1,287.9 Turkmenistan 3.6 5.4 8.0 86.0 71.0 146.4 774.5 989.5 Uzbekistan 24.9 −111.0 27.4 76.8 −230.6 −159.8 947.0 1.248.6 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2010. *M1–11 annualised

reasons, has been the key economic partner for Central Asia. Conversely, trade with Central Asia only constitutes a small fraction of China’s overall foreign trade. However, this does not mean that the neighbours in Central Asia are irrelevant as trading partners from the Chinese perspective: They are important for Xinjiang’s foreign trade and the economic “opening up” of the AR. China’s leaders obviously see this as an indispensable process and, therefore, show no

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sign of reversing the decision. The structure of goods traded between China with the individual Central Asian states is very similar: China’s imports from its neighbours are mostly minerals, metals and energy (cf. below), while more than 90 percent of China’s exports to the region are finished goods23 (textiles, shoes, consumer goods, electrical appliances).

Energy Interests Only three of the five Central Asian states are rich in fossil energy resources, namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. When efforts to intensify economic relations between China and its neighbours got underway during the 1990s, the construction of oil and gas pipelines was among the topics under consideration from the beginning. However, even though China’s energy demand was growing at the time and it had become a net importer of oil as early as 1993, the issue was not considered of utmost importance. Due to the restructuring of the state sector and other measures in the 1990s, consumption of energy was growing at a slower speed than the overall economy.24 It was only after the turn of the century that the question of securing China’s growing energy demand became more pressing and its energy supply started to be perceived as not only an economic, but also a security problem. Several factors came into play here: China’s domestic oil production had surpassed its peak. Moreover, oil shipments from Africa and the Middle East were seen as vulnerable to disruption or blockade, since the United States wields considerable control over the shipping lanes.25 As a consequence, China commenced efforts to become more energy-efficient and to diversify its energy mix as well as the sources of supply. Due to their geographical proximity, the Central Asian neighbours as well as Russia can be considered “natural” partners for China’s energy needs, even though putting the necessary infrastructure in place requires huge investments, and the estimated supply from Central Asia and Russia will only marginally reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East and Africa in the longer run.26 While negotiations with Russia turned out to be difficult and tedious, China

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was able to reach an agreement with Kazakhstan in 1997. At that time, this deal made international headlines, since it was the first major oil contract of a Chinese company abroad. Its total volume was estimated at $9.5 billion which included a share in the Kazakh company, Aktomunaigaz, exploitation rights in some Kazakh fields as well as the construction of a pipeline running from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. For some years, this latter part of the deal was not taking shape, and oil was transported over the border via train. The pipeline was finally built in three stages and came into operation in December 2005. At its full capacity (expected in 2010), it is supposed to carry 20 million tons of crude annually, which would be about 18 percent of China’s oil imports. Another big contract that had been under discussion for many years took a more concrete shape in recent years: A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China.27 This project was more complicated due to several factors: First, Turkmenistan, under its autocratic President Niyazov (the “Turkmenbashi”), never showed any interest in joining a regional organisation, including the SCO. Gas exports were exclusively going to Russia and, from there, mainly to Ukraine. Second, the envisaged pipeline to China had to go through Uzbek and Kazakh territory — and cooperation between Central Asian states was not strongly developed. Moreover, China first had to build a gas pipeline connecting Western China with the big urban centres in the East. This West-East pipeline was built from 2002–2004. High global energy prices and growing Chinese demand for gas28 made the project with Turkmenistan more feasible. In 2006, the late President Niyazov and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a framework agreement, which was then followed up by his successor after Niyazov had passed away. The problems with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could finally be resolved and the project, which had looked very unlikely only a few years back, went forward. For the valve opening ceremony, the presidents of all four countries gathered in Samandepe in Turkmenistan. The pipeline is supposed to reach full capacity a few years from now and Turkmenistan will then supply 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually with an additional 10 bcm coming from Kazakhstan through another branch (agreed in 2007).29

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China has also made some smaller investments in the energy sector in Central Asia. The global financial and economic crisis which hit the Central Asian states pretty hard (lower energy demand in Europe, shrinking remittances from migrant workers in Russia and other countries) opened a window of opportunity for China: With its huge foreign currency reserves, it was able to offer package deals in the form of soft loans to be repaid in the form of energy or mineral resources.30 Fossil fuels are not the only field in which China shows an interest in cooperating with Central Asia. China has been negotiating the possibility of cooperating on hydro-power generation with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Resources and energy have, in one case, also led to friction between China and Central Asia: The utilization of trans-border rivers, Irtysh and Ili, between China and Kazakhstan has been a problem which also affects Russia. However, this issue has not been dealt with within the SCO and not even trilaterally between the three involved sides.31 China seems to prefer bilateral negotiations with Kazakhstan, but these have not led to a solution yet.

CHINESE APPROACHES: A MIX OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL China has been pursuing its interests in Central Asia with a mix of bilateral and multi- or mini-lateral policies within the framework of the SCO. Nurturing strong bilateral ties with all five Central Asian states established a sound foundation for cooperation: China has signed bilateral agreements with the different states not only in the economic and political realm, but also on cooperation and exchanges on culture, sports, education, health, etc. Beijing provides scholarships for a number of students from the Central Asian countries each year. On the bilateral level, it also extends aid to Central Asia, mainly in the form of soft loans. This form of assistance had started in the early 1990s when China did not, by far, have the financial reserves which are at its disposal today. Usually, loans and grants were provided to buy Chinese consumer goods — from the Chinese perspective, a “win-win” situation. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, for

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example, have become quite dependent on aid coming from China which has helped finance the reconstruction of highways, transmission lines, telecommunication, hospitals, schools, etc.32 and, after the financial and economic crisis during which China also offered aid packages to Central Asia. While relations between China and the political leaders in the Central Asian states have developed quite smoothly, not least due to the shared interests of regime stability, China’s image among the general public, especially in the countries which share a direct border with it, has not been quite so favourable. The perceived asymmetries in economic and demographic developments have created concern and mistrust.33 Although there is no hard evidence that migrants from China are making inroads into Central Asia, the fear of being slowly outnumbered and “sinicised” or drawn into the Chinese orbit seems to be fairly widespread.34 This issue of negative attitudes vis-àvis China among the publics in neighbouring (and other) countries is a more general problem. China has been pursuing “good-neighbourly relations” mainly, though not exclusively, on the state–to–state level. To address this issue, China has been establishing Confucius Institutes (including in Central Asia) and decided in 2009 to make a major public diplomacy effort by strengthening its media presence abroad. However, even among the political elites in Central Asia, mistrust might exist with respect to China’s ultimate goals and ambitions in the region. For the political leaders in these countries, it is, therefore, important to keep their foreign policy options open in all directions and, especially, to balance the two big powers, China and Russia. In terms of functional cooperation, the SCO might not be a very effective organisation. The budget for the Secretariat as well as the RATS is very limited and decisions are made by the Council of the members. However, the SCO provides a common roof under which the political leaders can meet on a regular basis, and, over time, a web of regular dialogues has been created between the Prime Ministers, the Foreign Ministers, Communication/Transport Ministers, Heads of Customs Services and other government institutions. This might not, in each case, lead to closer cooperation, but may create a path to

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better coordination and better mutual understanding. In a way, the SCO is China’s first effort in creating and developing a regional organisation from scratch, an organisation where Beijing had been able to invent and shape the rules from the beginning. Within the SCO, it is possible to meet and cooperate in differing constellations and formations (e.g. military exercises have been taking place with varying participation). But the main benefit of the SCO framework has been to avoid conflict between Russia and China. Potentially, both countries are competing for influence in the region. Russia has been reluctant to give up its predominant position and still tends to consider Central Asia as “near abroad” or a sphere of special interest. It is not eager to push for regional integration that would include China. While Moscow promotes its own regional projects within the post-Soviet space — for security, the CSTO, and for economic issues, the Euro — Asian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in which China is not a member — China has more ambitious and far-reaching plans for the SCO, seeking closer economic integration by establishing a Free Trade Area, setting up a regional equivalent to the Asian Development Bank, etc. On the other hand, Russia would like to promote the SCO as an “energy club” to link the supply and demand side in a coordinated manner.35 Despite these different visions, China has been careful not to challenge Russia’s special role in the region directly. Beijing is not too eager to shoulder more responsibility and become more directly involved. In any case, China and Russia both share the interest of limiting the presence of other actors — e.g. the United States — in the region, albeit without turning the SCO into an anti-Western block and without trying to control the development of foreign policy of the Central Asian states. It has been explicitly included in the documents of the SCO that each state is free to enter agreements with states outside the organisation as long as such an agreement is not directed against any of the other members. Another aspect of the SCO which makes it relevant from the Chinese point of view is that it has an impact beyond the Central Asian region. For one, an expanding group of observers (Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran) and dialogue partners (Belarus and Sri Lanka)

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has come into being over time. Moreover, other regional organisations like ASEAN have attended summits of the SCO in the last few years. In this way, the organisation contributes to strengthening China’s image as a responsible regional, if not great, power. It is important to underline again, however, that China has, at the same time, been fostering relations bilaterally through high-level visits, cooperation, exchange agreements and loans.

CONCLUSION China’s basic interest in the stability of Central Asia, as an important factor in the stability of its own periphery in the Far West, has not changed over the last two decades. Beijing will most likely continue to pursue a mix of bilateral and mini- or multilateral approaches in its relations with the Central Asian neighbours in the future. Even though the SCO lacks functional substance and deep institutionalisation, it provides a useful framework for China. And since China has been the main driving force behind it, it will not be given up lightly. The SCO might not be so much anti-Western (or anti-US) as non-Western. The principles of sovereignty and noninterference are shared by all members. China will also continue to push for stronger integration of its western periphery with the Chinese heartland and, at the same time, with the neighbouring states via communication infrastructures. The security risks involved in opening the borders have so far been outweighed by the economic and political benefits. How much this approach can contribute to the long-term stability inside Xinjiang and across the border is hard to tell. On the energy issue, China’s activities are perceived by Russia, the US and Europe in terms of a zero-sum game: If Turkmenistan, for example, supplies gas to China, there might not be enough for alternative projects like Nabucco and the South Stream favoured by the EU and Russia respectively. However, Moscow might see gas deliveries from Turkmenistan to China as less threatening to its own interests than an alternative energy link to Europe (Nabucco) which circumvents Russian territory.36

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One problem with China’s strategy is that it is state-centric, linked to the ruling regimes in Central Asia and, therefore, supports the political status quo. This was demonstrated by the events in Andijan in 2005: China’s implicit support for President Karimov’s actions made European and American criticism and calls for an independent investigation more difficult to sustain. This might correspond with the general interests of Russia, but not with the interests of the United States and the European Union. US interests in the region have primarily been shaped by the situation after September 11, 2001. Trade and economic relations have been quite weak between the US and all Central Asian states, with the exception of US interests in the energy sector and especially the routing of pipelines. Longer-term geopolitical considerations (the rise of China) might also play a role for Washington. The EU issued a Central Asia strategy paper37 for the first time in 2007 which also focuses on strengthening human rights and the rule of law. European ideas of empowering civil society in Central Asian countries are diametrically opposed to the Chinese concept of top-down stability. However, there are also shared views between Europe and China which could serve as starting points for cooperation (e.g. sustainable development).

NOTES 1. From north to south: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia also shares a short border with Xinjiang in the Northwest. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not share borders with China. 2. All ten Muslim minorities of China are living in Xinjiang, with Uyghurs (still) the majority. With the exception of Turkmens, the titular nations of the Central Asian Republics are also present in Xinjiang; Kazakhs with over a million representing the biggest group. 3. The SCO was established in 2001 as a successor of the informal grouping of the “Shanghai Five.” 4. Due to geographical conditions, this was a bigger problem at the more than 3,500 km long eastern border between China and Russia than at the western border with Central Asia.

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5. For example, the parliament in Kyrgyzstan refused to ratify a border agreement since from their perspective, the government had given away too much of Kyrgyzstan’s territory. Cf. Eurasia Insight, May 20, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org. 6. “Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military field in the Border Area,” April 25, 1996, Shanghai. 7. “Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions,” April 24, 1997, Moscow. 8. The official website can be found at http://www.sectsco.org. More information on the website is available in Chinese and Russian languages than in English. 9. The fourth summit meeting in Bishkek in 1999 had been overshadowed by attacks and hostage-taking of insurgent Muslim fighters, who had crossed over the border into Kyrgyzstan from neighbouring Tajikistan. 10. In contrast to Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan does not have the status of an observer country. Belarus and Sri Lanka became “dialogue partners” in 2009. 11. This is the security organisation of the CIS, mainly supported by Russia. 12. Cf. the following documents: “Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan Convened under the Auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” March 27, 2009, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show. asp?id=98; “Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime,” March 27, 2009, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=100; and “Plan of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime,” March 27, 2009, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/ show.asp?id=99. 13. Cf. “Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” June 16, 2009, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=88. 14. One such example was the large-scale military exercise held between Russia and China in the year 2005.

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15. China also has been increasing its engagement in UN mandated peacekeeping missions and has become the biggest provider of personnel of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. See Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping, Prospects and Policy Implications, SIPRI Policy Paper 25, November, 2009, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP25.pdf, accessed April 3, 2010; and International Crisis Group: China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia Report (166) April 17, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup. org/library/documents/asia/north_east_asia/166_chinas_growing_role_ in_un_peacekeeping.pdf, accessed April 21, 2009. 16. See Information and Press Department, Russian Foreign Ministry: “Doklad Soveta Regional’noj antiterroristicheskoj struktury Shanchajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva Sovetu glav gosudarstv — chlenov Shanchajskoj organisacii sotrudnichestva o dejatel’nosti Regional’noj antiterroristicheskoj struktury Shanchajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva v 2004 godu” [Report of the Council of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO to the Council of Heads of State of SCO member states on activities of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO in the year 2004], July 5, 2005, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/2005/20050705_sco_06.html [accessed Nov. 3, 2006]. 17. Because of the lack of cooperation between the Central Asian states, some scholars speak of “regionalism without a region” or “virtual regionalism.” David Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China’s Strategic Emergence,” International Affairs, 86 (1), 2010, p. 143. For a Chinese view, see Yang Shu, “Reassessing the SCO’s Internal Difficulties: A Chinese Point of View,” China and Eurasia Forum, 7 (3), 2009, pp. 17–23. 18. On this aspect, see also Michael Clarke: “China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a ‘Silk Road’ to Great Power Status?” China and Eurasia Forum, 6 (2), 2008, pp. 89–111. 19. The uprisings in Lhasa in 2008 and in Urumqi in 2009 can, in part, be explained by wide-spread frustration among the young members of ethnic minorities who feel alienated from their traditions and cultural heritage and, at the same time, are cut off from the new economic opportunities. 20. Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12 February, 2010. China, during the 1990s, also invested in the railways in Xinjiang and extended the

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21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

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main line from Lanzhou to Ürümqi and across the border to Kazakhstan by going South through the Tianshan and then all the way around the desert Taklamakan to Kashgar. On the development of trade see also Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksey Strokov, Economic Involvement of Russia and China in Central Asia, (Central Asian Series 07/12 (E), May 2007, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom). The “Second Eurasian Land-bridge” which theoretically runs from Lianyungang at the Chinese east coast all the way to Rotterdam in Europe, was completed even before the end of the Soviet Union. This alternative route to the Trans-Siberian Railroad was started to be built in the 1950s, but not finished due to the Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s. When China and the Soviet Union started their slow rapprochement under Gorbachev’s rule, trade was re-opened at the borders between Xinjiang and Central Asia and the decision was made to complete the rail trans-border connection. Sébastien Peyrouse, Central Asia’s Growing Partnership with China, EUCAM Working Paper 04, October, 2009, http://www.eucentralasia. eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Working_Papers/WP4-EN.pdf. However, from 2003 onwards, China’s energy demand grew faster than the economy. China fears a blockade, for example, in case of a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. China’s dependence from the Middle East is predicted to be growing from 55 percent now to around 70 percent in ten years. See e.g. Kang Wu, China’s Deepening Energy Import Dependence and the Middle East, Paper presented at The 46th ISA Annual Convention Honolulu, Hawaii, 1–5 March, 2005, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/ p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/1/1/7/pages71179/p71179–1. Jan Šír and Slavomír Horák, “China as an emerging superpower in Central Asia: The view from Ashkhabad,” China and Eurasia Forum, 6 (2), 2008, pp. 75–88. Gas has not played a big role in China’s energy mix in the past (around 3 percent), but Beijing plans to increase its share to 10 percent. Before the pipeline from Turkmenistan became operative, China received basically all its gas imports in the form of LNG, mainly from Southeast Asia, Australia and Qatar.

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29. See Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 December, 2009; MK Bhadrakumar, “China resets terms of engagement in Central Asia,” Asia Times, 24 December, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_ Asia/KL24Ag04.html. On the history of the pipeline, see also Cladimir Matveev, “China’s gas policy in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, 5 (53), 2008, pp. 77–88. 30. See Nargis Kassenova, “China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,” Russie.Nei.Visions, (36), January 2009. China made a similar deal involving a 25 billion $ loan with Russia. See Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 (135), July 15, 2009. 31. Lifan Li, “Competition for water resources in Central Asia and its impact on China,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 7 (4), 2009, pp. 23–31. 32. Kassenova, “China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.” Specifically on Tajikistan, see Kurshed Dodikhudoev, “The Chinese vector in Tajikistan’s foreign policy,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2 (56), 2009, pp. 119–129. 33. The same is true in Russia, especially in Siberia and the Russian Far East. 34. Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China’s strategic emergence,” especially opinion poll cited on p. 137; and Peyrouse, Central Asia’s Growing Partnership with China, p. 10. 35. Maxim Krans, “SCO Energy Club: What Will It Be Like?” The Central Web Portal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 28 October, 2009, http://infoshos.ru/en/?idn=5040. 36. This argument is made by M K Bhadrakumar, “China resets terms of engagement in Central Asia.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 52, December 28, 2009. 37. “European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership,” Council of the European Union, 9 October, 2007, http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf.

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5 Facing Russia and Outer Mongolia: Border City Hulunbeier in the 1960s and the 2000s TJ Cheng Department of Sociology, University of Macau, China

ABSTRACT This research explores my three field studies in this border city. In 1967, I was stationed there as a reporter for the Inner Mongolia Daily News during the Cultural Revolution (CR). In 2003 and 2006, I conducted field research for China’s Urbanisation Project which was organised and financed by the Chinese Economics Scholars in USA (CES). The introduction about this border city in the 1960s will be rather brief because data was not collected efficiently due to the political situation and many restrictions on what we could read. However, the part stemming from the 2000s is much richer with both statistical data and photos. Along with the rapid economic 93

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development and border trading between China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia, we were able to freely contact Han Chinese, Mongolian Chinese, and foreigners, including foreign Mongolians, and Russian residents as well as tourists and business people. Generally, after three decades of economic reform and marketisation, China has quickly surpassed Russia, and especially Outer Mongolia, in terms of industrialisation and urbanisation (housing construction). However, compared to these two neighbouring countries, China’s economic development weighs too heavily on environmental degradation both in China and Russia, and therefore cannot be sustained for too long. Pollution and deforestation occurring in both China and Russia will cause more environmental problems in the regions of Northeast Asia and the Pacific. On the other hand, Hulunbeier is very rich in natural resources, especially underground water and cultural heritage, which are very important for developing tourism and other cultural industries. However, given the harsh weather and very vulnerable ecological balance in this region, especially the one-sided idea of economic booming-up, or catching-up, mentality, the local government officials are still highly ignorant to over-population and environmental degradation. Therefore, based on my investigation and research, I have proposed to the local scholars and officials, including Russian and Outer Mongolian officials, to organize a cross-border international conference, and even set up a standing committee, to study the necessity and possibility for making regional international treaties to regulate urbanisation, industrialisation, pollution, and deforestation in this area.

THE BIGGEST CITY IN THE WORLD? In October 2001, the Chinese State Council authorised the change of Hulunbeier from Meng (league) into a Shi (city, or municipality). Thus, there came into being the biggest city, by size, in the world. The “big” Hulunbeier City is to govern five “smaller” cities

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(Manzhouli, Yakeshi, Zhalantun, Eerguna and Genghe) below it, one district (Hailaer which used to be a city and the capital of the league) and seven Banners (traditional Mongolian administrative unit equals to a county in Mainland China) which are engaged in either forestry or stock raising (or semi-forestry and semihusbandry). The total population of this “big city” was 2.65 million in 2003, 2.7 million in 2008, a figure that should not be regarded as “too big” because, according to recent statistics, there are more than 30 cities (big, or extremely big) having a population of more than 2 million.1 In terms of population size, Hulunbeier is certainly much smaller than other inland big or super-big cities in Mainland China.2 It is, however, extensively large in territory size, which covers 253,000 square kilometers, equaling the total size of the two provinces of Shandong (150,000) and Jiangsu (100,000). It is 16 percent smaller than Italy (301,277), but 4.3 percent bigger than England (242,000). Such a super-mega city must be the Number One, or may be the only one, in the world!! At a municipal meeting organised by the City Administration in 2007, I voiced some concerns regarding the logic, feasibility, and difficulties in management for such a super-mega city with criticism, and with no surprise, the audience agreed with me. In fairness, the Municipality-Over-County System (MOCS) (Shiguan-xian, in Chinese, literally means to put rural counties under cities’ administration) proposed in the 1980s had its rationale in certain aspects for the leaders of the Chinese Central Government. They were probably aware of the disadvantages and limitations of the separating system (or dual-system) between urban and rural societies. With the developmental gap between cities/industrial centers and rural areas being increasingly widened, the disadvantage of those rural counties was particularly manifested, especially in those areas that were fully agricultural, and far away from transportation accessibility. Consequently, these counties became “bottle-necks”, dragging their feet behind the eastern coastal areas which were benefiting from the economic boom. To increase economic development, the Chinese central and inland cities were expected to play key roles in stimulating their surrounding rural areas. As a result of the above

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expectations, the MOCS was put in practice by the Central Authority from the 1980s and onwards. Accordingly, many prefectures (states or leagues in minority autonomous regions) with underdeveloped commerce and industries were upgraded to the same level as cities. These newly emerged cities, together with the old ones, were expected to assist their surrounding backward agricultural counties in economic development. We might admit that there were many reasons behind the MOCS strategy for that period of time. Judging from how it worked out and the consequences at the present age, however, we have to acknowledge that the MOCS strategy has had several limitations and drawbacks. First of all, the guidelines of MOCS place more emphasis on administration rather than economic rationality, not to mention market relationship. Resources were therefore distributed according to administrative ranks, or special connections, rather than economic needs that were otherwise regulated by supply and demand in a free market economy. Second, being cocooned by the urban/rural dual system symbolised with the household registration (hukou) system, the MOCS strategy failed to see that the demarcation between urban centers and rural communities should be broken down in order to allow production elements to flow freely among and within different regions and sectors, subject only to the objectives determined by economic production, circulation, and market exchange. Third, when MOCS was first initiated in the 1980s, the economic development level was still low. Therefore, policy makers had a fear, or a narrow-minded idea, of the expansion or “invasion” of a market economy. Thus, they opposed China’s rural urbanisation by a so-called strategy of “small-town development.” Their slogans included “leaving fields without leaving country-side,” and “becoming workers without entering cities.”3 It seems that this fear of urbanisation should be one of the important reasons that have significantly jeopardised China’s urbanisation process. It may also answer the often-asked question on how China could achieve industrialisation without urbanisation.4 However, over 20 years later, tremendous changes have taken place in economic growth because of the MOCS structure which has

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turned itself into a manifest obstruction for the national development. Particularly with the current urbanisation put on the agenda, the absurdity and drawbacks of such a structure are becoming increasingly evident. Historically and presently, the three-level system (TLS), namely, province, region and county is, by logic, seen as a timehonored concept in administration. From one dynasty to another in China’s history, there have been hardly any changes in the boundary within which the magnitude and size are kept intact. The concept of municipality is, however, a different story because it does not matter whether a city is big or small in size. In fact, a place where business dealings are carried out together, whether regularly or occasionally, can be named as something municipal — big as a city and small as a country fair (or market or market place in the country). This place, regardless of its size, is a constituent part of the whole governed by the TLS, which is similar to the relationship between a point and an area in geometry. What is happening now is that this “point” is authorized to govern the whole area: League (meng) and Banners (qi)/counties are all named as cities. This means that the point has replaced the area, or even treated as the area, thus causing much confusion and trouble. To begin with, it is impossible to distinguish different levels of governments (which one is main and which one is subordinate), because within the MOCS, the province, region and county are all labeled as a “city.” To refer to one administration at a certain level, we have to add something before the word “city” (such as provincial-level city, prefecture-level city, county-level city, etc.), which clearly creates some inconvenience. To make matters worse, a place is named a city full of responsibility for agriculture or farming, which has nothing to do with what should be done in a city. The major function of most cities is rural development rather than urban growth. There are also too many counties within prefectural cities and too many villages within county-level cities. On the surface, there is no division between the city and the country or between city inhabitants and farmers. In reality, however, the gap still remains between the urban the rural created by the residence system.5 This has not only created much confusion for gathering data

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for consensus but has also brought about two negative consequences. The first one is that the urban development encountered obstruction because the MOCS was unable to concentrate on what it can do well given its obligatory duties for investing in something superficial and doing something that can, in fact, be done well by a city. The second concerns the barriers that prevent new counties and cities from advancing themselves while the industry and commerce expand rapidly. This is particularly evident around the Pearl River Delta Region. For example, Zhongshan City and Shunde City (both at a county level) below Foshan City (at a prefectural level) are quite capable of outshining Foshan (in fact, they have already achieved it) in terms of their total economic production and scale for urban development. Unfortunately, these two county-cities, being cocooned within the MOCS system, cannot be advanced, let alone rise above Foshan in municipal construction and rank. The situation is even worse for villages and towns. The level of their urbanisation (non-agricultural population and non-agricultural products) has, in fact, outperformed many county-level cities. They usually have over 200,000 permanent residents and their city-like environment and surrounding is extraordinary and remarkable. But they will forever remain as villages or towns unless the Central Authority gives permission for new administrations to be established (e.g., Zhongshan City would become independent and get promoted to the same rank as Foshan), and unless they come up with some alternative names — new and bizarre, say, “village-cities” or “town-cities.” Such is the reality in China today: a stiff and odd concept in addition to the confusing and illogical administrative divisions. Is it not a serious barrier to its urbanisation? On the contrary, a system of county-governing-city is implemented in some Western countries in Europe and North America, where national administrations are set up at two levels only — province (state) and county (similar to those in Mainland China). But the difference is that if a Western city is located within the boundary of a county, the city is then automatically governed by this county.

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This is the practice in all cities — big or small (with a few exceptional cases). Moreover, unlike what is done within the Chinese system, the authority and responsibility for law enforcement, finance and taxation within the Western system are distinctively separated between the federal (i.e., central) government and local governments. As a result, there would not be any complications when a city needs a construction or expansion. It is often the case that a county may govern several cities (e.g., Los Angeles County in California governs over 50 cities). As long as the population of any given village or town within the county has reached a certain level regulated by law, its residents (excluding non-permanent) can vote at a meeting held locally for upgrading into a city without political intervention either from outside or above. In addition, several small cities or towns can be merged into a big city in order to have a comparable economy. Conversely, if local residents feel their city has become oversized and that it affects the quality of their life, they can vote through debate for breaking it up into smaller ones for easier management. On the whole, whether to combine into a big city or broken up into small ones, all there needs to be done is to submit the change of administration to higher authorities for their endorsement. It is not necessary to get permission from a higher authority, or to change the administrative structure of the province (state) and county. If we looked more carefully into the process of how Western cities have become more advanced than China’s, we would find varied factors with the most crucial ones being freedom in population mobility, life choices, and flexibility with a variety of municipal infrastructures and a continuing stability within its administrative establishment. Some scholars have proposed that for effective governance, China should consider a reform of the current provincial-andcounty administrative system. The size of provinces can be reduced and the number can be increased to 50 or more. In accordance, administration at prefecture levels (cities) and town levels can be eliminated. The ultimate result would then be a four-level system similar to that in America — federal government (central government), states (provinces), county (county) and municipality (town). And everything below the fourth level should have autonomy in

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managing their own affairs.6 This is, of course, a matter of great significance, and up to this date there has not yet been any publication on the topic; I have not done much research myself. I am, here and now, simply seizing on the topic of the largest city in the world to express my own views, in the hope that others who are experts on public administration will share their professional opinions and insights.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HULUNBEIER Let me now return to my topic on Hu-Meng’s urbanisation and governance. Over four or five days, I looked at Hailaer, Manzhouli (the two largest towns in Hulunbeier) and Erwenke and Chenbaerhu (two banners which are similar to counties in Han Chinese-occupied provinces). I heard about some briefings on a few administrative offices and enterprises in Hunlunbeier (region) and those below them. I visited a stock-raising farm, a dairy factory, beer brewery, a green house, a trading harbor located on the borderline, and colleges/universities where I held a seminar and some discussions with many individuals from different walks of life, and from whom I got to know about the general problems in Hu Meng. Based on what I heard and saw in Hu Meng, I am offering below three of my most memorable impressions.

An Earthshaking Change in the City When I was covering the news as a reporter in Hailaer in the summer of 1967, the most imposing presence was that of the Hu Meng Hotel and the League Administrative Bureau located in the center of the city; there were hardly any multi-level buildings in other streets. The bustling railway station nearby was surrounded by one-storied houses built of mud bricks, where alleyways and pathways were narrow with dust soaring to the air. It did not look like a city at all and most of it could be considered as a small town, remote and distant. A similar landscape was found in

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Manzhouli, the borderline city famous at home and abroad, with an exception that there were a few Russian-style edifices (the Border Gate, Railroad Hospital, and the Garrison Headquarter, etc.). Standing nearby were the railway station and an overhead bridge, which helped creating some hustle and bustle of being modern, industrial and international. What were left to be seen were a few quiet streets and empty shops. The so-called city could not even be compared to a small Russian town, called Zabagalsk in Russian and Houbejiaersik in Chinese, across the border. As a journalist at that time, I was not able to go over the border for a closer look of the town, and all I did was to watch it from afar from an observing tower. The Russian houses — white walls and red roofs built of solid bricks and stones or quality-wood walls and roofs covered with strong iron sheets — were colorful and shining, standing orderly in lines among the green affluent forest. In contrast, city streets on the Chinese side were dusty, rustic and sluggish. During my recent revisit to the city, however, I enjoyed observing its transformation and recalling my past impressions of the city (as described above). Looking around from Yiming River Bridge at the center of Hailaer, I found that all the old sights were gone without a trace except for the old Meng Administrative Bureau which was still recognisable. Reminded by a friend, I then recognised the old hotel, where I stayed during my previous visit, on the right of a newly-built three-star hotel. Placed among a host of new buildings and edifices, this proud hotel, which used to greet and receive many experts from the USSR, appeared to be diminutive, country-like and ignored. Similar to a speedy urbanisation that took place in Hailaer, Manzhouli was actively engaged in borderline trading and regional integration. Although the latter did not have as many broad streets as the former, it was equally as modern, impressive and grand in its façade and overall atmosphere. Thanks to the trade among cities on the borderline shared by China and Russia, there were more Russian business people (than those of other nationalities). Therefore, in Manzhouli, buildings were mosaic in style, shape and in color, including North European styles, Russian

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styles and Mediterranean styles, and were positioned seemingly casual but unique. The city looked much more foreign than Hailaer. Then, looking at the small town, Zabagalsk, on the Russian side, I found hardly any changes — the town remained almost the same. China’s “old brother” (in the 50s and 60s) seemed to be poor and humble when compared to the market economy that had brought to China a flourishing and prosperous panorama in its national development in the 21st century. The latest landscape in Hulunbeier can be seen not only in downtown of the above two cities but also in the conventional dairy industry in the Banners (counties) and farming in villages. For example, Bayantaohai Town within Erwenke Autonomous Banner used to be a little town that had been characterised by its wild plants growing lavishly and clay shelters lightened by a few small lamps blinking and dim. They are now replaced by wide and paved streets leading to Downtown Hailaer, and a lot of buildings and houses are linked with one another with high-voltage mercury lights brightening the whole area at night. The Banner’s Museum of Nationality is unique in its style and simple elegance. The display there is rich and diverse, and varied descriptions and stories are vividly told. The museum, surrounded by green trees, lawns, and flowers, exposed itself with a highly artistic taste, outshining many museums at a county level in Mainland China. Based on the great emphasis on cultural development, one can easily imagine that what has been achieved in urbanizing Hulunbeier is quite telling and uplifting.

Market Economy that is Full of Beans The city’s fundamental change, in essence, signifies its increased and strengthened economy. Within a short period of only 30 years, a shortage economy has turned into one with surplus, and a seller’s market has now become one for buyers. It was a common street sighting in the past to see people were lining up or going back-doors in order to get their daily necessities. In contrast, commodities are piled up and the worry now is how to sell them out in reasonable prices.

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During the time when three red flags were held high, there was a dream for the Chinese people to live heavenly in a socialist country like the USSR. What is this heavenly-like country today? Without any sophisticated theory and abstract thinking, people will get an answer to this question instantly and intuitively by just standing on the border between China and Russia and taking a glance at either side with their own eyes. As the largest ground-border gate in China, the railway station in Manzhouli undertakes over 50 percent of the export carried out by other stations in the country, which is translated into a capability of 5,000,000 tons annually.7 Interestingly, while trains coming eastbound into China carry industrial materials such as wood, coal, oil and mineral resources, trains going westbound into Russia are full of commercial goods with labels of “Made in China” on them and wrapped in big bags or small boxes. In the hotel where we stayed in Manzhouli, there were many fairly well-off Russians lodging there. They often came here for consumption and trade, similar to what many Mainlanders had done 30 years before — buying whatever caught their attention while visiting Hong Kong and Macao. RMB is circulated as a norm in the markets on both sides of the border. Many China-made trademarks have become what a lot of Russians constantly demand. In the final analysis, it all simmers down to the difference between the pace of economic development that fosters such a reality that the urbanisation in Hulunbeier has, to a great extent, surpassed what has been achieved in the Far East, including Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea. It may sound strange that during the competition in the market economy, people tend to focus on visible factors contributing to success or failure, including natural resources, capital investments, science and technology and the like, and at the same time, they often seem to ignore an invisible factor — a commercial concept. When all kinds of production components are taken together as a whole, the Russian parts are in no way worse than those from Hu-Meng. Russian farmers are well known world-wide for their endurance of adversity and hardships. They are good at farming but not in business and management. For instance, Chinese vegetable farmers pursue this

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advantage by setting up, near the border, huge solar greenhouses (plastic shelters recently changed into a greenhouse built with glasses to provide a mild temperature for plants) in which they grow vegetables to sell overseas cross-border to Russia. In the freezing winter season, they will bring fresh vegetables and fruits to Russia and sell them there. Even in the summer when Russian farmers can grow vegetables themselves, they are unable to beat the Chinese farmers who plant vegetable seeds in the greenhouse much earlier than their Russian counterparts. As a result, their vegetables are in the market two weeks earlier than the Russian’s, which brings them extra profits. Of course, a commercial concept is not something that one is born with. It can be learned or even imitated. However, as a Chinese saying goes, it takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze. A simple carbon copy will only bring trouble to the imitator. This is similar to what happens in a stock market. If someone does not think carefully and acts only as a “follower” — buying and selling stocks when he sees others doing so — he will never make money.

Unlimited Potential Resources to be Tapped Hu-Meng’s market economic base is strong and has tremendous potential for future development if steered by sound strategic policies. 1. A vast land with a small population: The total area in Hu-Meng is over 250,000 square kilometers and the population is just slightly over 2 million, resulting in 10 square kilometers per person, which is even less than one tenth of the national population density (1,135 people per square kilometer). This is the place, richly endowed by Mother Nature, that is coming out on top in the entire country. 2. Aquatic resources on tap: The issue of water has already restricted the continuous development of many Chinese inland cities. A shortage of water also affects Beijing, the capital city, and for this reason, some people have even proposed a relocation of the capital. In Hu-Meng, however, there are abundant aquatic resources flowing both on its land and underground. On average,

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each person can enjoy 11,000 cubic meters of water, a figure that is almost four times the national average. It is also a key factor to have sufficient energy resources. China has now become a country that imports energy while there are plenty resources in Inner Mongolia (coal, oil, and gas) that can be a sustained source of constructing energy sent off to surrounding provinces. HuMeng’s coal reserve is 1.8 times that of the sum of Liaoning, Jiling and Heilongjiang put together. In addition, there are many kinds of energy sources that has not yet been opened up, such as oil, natural gas, wind power and solar power. 3. A rich variety of products: In Hu-Meng, there is a rich store of gold, silver, black and colored metal, non-metal minerals, wood and many other resources such as wild animals and foliage, existing almost exclusively there, and with their quantity and quality on the top of the national list. Deforestation for wood, however, has been an issue of over-harvesting and it is therefore necessary to maintain and plant trees in order to revitalize its ecological system. 4. Beautiful environment: In many places overseas, whenever Inner Mongolia is mentioned, people usually associate it with a wasteland, plateau and sand flying in the wind, which is indeed true on the western part of Inner Mongolia. However, it is hardly known that it is different in Hu-Meng which situates itself on the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. It has a grassy landscape and looks more like virgin forest and prairies in Siberia. Although Hu-Meng faces a few ecological issues in some areas, it is still largely a land of purity, unique and indispensable for China in comparison with many coastline and interior places, which are over-industrialised, highly urbanised, and over-populated. Hu-Meng embraces nature with vast prairie lands, massive forests, clear flowing waters, clean fresh air and a blue sky with white clouds. (What follows will highlight that it will never be overly stated to recognise the significance of Hu-Meng’s use of its biological advantage for a continued and sustainable development). 5. Many sites full of cultural heritage: Hu-Meng is full of historical attractions like the site of our ancestors (Zhalainoer Man in

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Manzhouli) of 30,000 years ago is located here and the original site of more than ten northern tribes roving around as nomads for over two thousand years (Easter Hu, Kun, and Xianbi, etc.). It is beyond doubt a life-size melting pot of the Chinese culture representing different nationalities.8 In addition, there is an integrated group of people who are racially different, including thousands of Russian decendents, Ge Sa Ke from Central Asia, and Koreans and Japanese from East Asia whose cultural influence is seen everywhere. There are also revolutionary sites and cultural relics of contemporary times as well as multiculturalism which continues to be developing itself. In total, there are 31 different nationalities that live here and who are progressing together. Different forms of economy thrive in juxtaposition with one another, such as hunting, farming, nomadism and husbandry, clan societies and tribes that were previously well-to-do, and currently urbanised villages and towns. Different cultures like a hundred flowers are blossoming together, along with all sorts of customs, religions, literature and art. This place is indeed an ideal base for conducting field investigations by anthropologists interested in nationalities. As a sociologist, I consider these humanistic resources priceless, and much more important than the sum of all goods and materials.

NEW PROBLEMS FACING THE CURRENT URBANISATION WAVE While achievements and developmental potentials are mentioned and praised, problems and shortcomings in urbanising Hulunbeier should be addressed as well. Otherwise, one would be seen as some kind of a partisan who is in the habit of painting a rosy picture and ignoring the opposite. In summary, Hulunbeier’s urbanisation is not as plain sailing as it seems to be. In confirming its achievements, it is essential to acknowledge that Hu-Meng still faces significant problems. Some are locally relevant while others may be national issues. These problems are neither created by the policy makers at the Meng-Municipal levels (whether is called a League or City) nor can they be solved

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through the effort of local governments alone, although there are some that have much to do with what should be done at the local level. If they are to be taken seriously and overcome these issues without delay, it will help prevent severe dilemmas from happening. Specifically, there are several issues worth discussing.

A Tendency of a Rising Bubble Economy in Real Estate During our trip,9 we flew from Central China to Hainan, and from the most southern city, Sanya in Hainan, to the most northern city, Hailaer in Inner Mongolia. Wherever we went, we saw construction sites and new buildings on the rise. While it was fortunate for construction business to be flourishing (workers had jobs), it was worrisome that a real estate bubble might occur. The former example was not distant from us. During the mid-1980s, there had been a construction boom in Hainan — encircle the land and construct buildings. Up to this day, there is an overflowing number of “mashed buildings” (unfinished constructions) still standing, telling stories of the wrecked bubbling in realty. Now, after two decades, from Shanghai Pudong, the new district considered as a good example for the country, to Manzhouli and Hailaer, the prairie border cities, many new buildings are seen empty and unpopulated. It is reported that the national rate of uninhabited new houses is close to 25 percent, and in some cities the rate goes as high as 40–50 percent. In the meantime, realty developers are still busy erecting high-rises around the clock, with roaring machines digging into the ground, which disturbs residents while they are sleeping. What causes the bubbling in real estates? Is it because what people have is good enough for them and they no longer desire an improved housing condition? The answer is, of course, no. Described in a term commonly used in economics, this is called an inadequate purchase power. Plainly speaking, many want to buy but cannot afford to do so, and many able to buy cannot afford to keep it. In Hailaer, we found a phenomenon of sky-rises springing up all over the place in the downtown area. They were magnificent and yet there were not many buyers. As I just described, many local residents who

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were the original occupants of these places were unable to purchase or keep a high-rise apartment. In the end, they moved to a more remote area and bought one-storied houses with the money given to them for re-settlement elsewhere. The government encouraged urbanisation to gradually turn old cities into modern ones with two goals: a) to uplift the city from a backward situation; and b) to improve its residents’ housing condition. Unfortunately, for many residents who have to relocate, their housing conditions are not improved at all. What they have done is to move out from their slums located downtown, and move into new slums in more remote areas less desirable than before: inconvenient for those going to work and those going to school. A change in the city environment has turned the downtown area into a better place — clean, orderly and superior. On the contrary, the suburban district has become another dirty slum in complete shambles. Perhaps, a few years later, the government may end up with no choice but to move backward — starting another project of “remaking the old” in the suburb again. If land developers and decision-makers in charge of urban development neither prioritize housing improving for local residents, nor consider “the necessity of a buying power (or the validated necessity)” of the majority population, as a major reference factor in making investment decisions, and just blindly go after high-class commodity, as well as seeking a higher quantity of GDP as their personal political feats, the real estate market is, sooner or later, bound to go bubbling and bankrupt. This is similar to what happens to other commodities whose production is blind, ignoring the buyers’ market.

The Relationship between Government Control and Market Orientation Foreign scholars are often puzzled by why such a highly bubbling crisis in real estates in China (including in the Macao SAR) has emerged. This is something unimaginable in America because: (i) If there were so many unoccupied high-rises and unfinished constructions, developers would have gone bankrupt or been put in jail; (ii) The local government would not tolerate half-done buildings standing along the streets nor

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the den of iniquity and evil practices. Instead, the government would shut down and auction these places to other buyers who are able to bring them into completion (e.g., one dollar for one building). It is, however, a different story in China, a country that has some unique national and human circumstances, including the extent to which the land and realty market are highly monopolised and the privileged are protected by the government and so forth. Strictly speaking, a mature real estate market has not yet been established in China. At best, it can be tagged as a special market or semi-market. This is because, from the suppliers’ position, China does not have a privatized land ownership; thus, in a real sense, there is no market for land. When different levels of governments make policies and set prices for leasing land, they often do so at the dictates of chance. Sometimes, they give a piece of land away as a gift and sometimes they act almost like those who coerce people by blackmailing. Who is the real owner of the land? How to decide on a fixed leasing land? Who are the parties involved in the whole deal regarding the distribution of ownership? How is the distribution carried out? There are no clear legal guidelines for people to follow in handling these issues. At present, buying or selling an ownership is set for a period of 50 years only, yet no one is clear about how to reset the prices and how to do it all over again 50 years later.10 Moreover, the financial market in China is not systematic either. Borrowing or lending money for real estates largely depends on personal relationships and preferential policies. If a government has decided to support a buyer, a bank will have no choice but to give money to the borrower (i.e., the person who has the approval from the government). If the borrower’s financial account turns out to be a bad one, no one will be responsible for it, let alone for anyone to go bankrupt or go to jail. Even if when there are so many high-rises unoccupied and constructions unfinished, municipal governments usually dare not deal with them on their own because behind the developers, there is often a strong force from share holders, who may just happen to be the government itself. Now let us consider the buyers’ position. At the present, there are very few people who have the ability to afford high prices for any

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commodities in the real estate market. As housing consumers, highsalaried people not only own houses themselves but have also bought houses for their children and grandchildren. If house owners put their house up for rent or resale to others as investors, they may have to face two types of uncertainties or dangers: a) potential problems may emerge if their property had been purchased by corrupted money; and b) it is unclear that housing prices will go up. So, there is not much hope to rely on but a few super-rich people or persons full of wealth to uphold the housing market. Many local people who truly want or need to buy new houses, but whose salaries are average or below, cannot afford it. A worker in Hailaer once told me that his month salary was over 800 yuan (close to the average of 777 yuan, an official figure released in 2001).11 He could only afford to live in a low-priced house instead of an apartment in a high building because the latter would require him to pay as much as over 400 yuan in maintenance fees for varied items, and what was left would not be enough for food, not to mention for medical care if he got sick or his child’s schooling. Therefore, even if the government gave him one apartment for free, he would not dare take it. Similar problems are found not only in Hailaer but everywhere in the country. In short, if land ownership, capital market and supply/demand for buying power are not regulated and systemized, how can the real estate be called a market-orientated business, and how can it grow healthy and mature? Of course, there is no quick fix to these problems. To construct residential development, local circumstances should be taken into account. Based on the different needs of people, houses should be designed and built in varied styles and at affordable prices. The number of residential establishments that embellish what is already beautiful should be reduced. Instead, more houses that are reasonably priced should be increased so that a majority of salaried people can afford and keep what they need. In addition, subsidised housing should be provided to those living in extreme poverty (low interest rate or interest free). To begin with, the focus should be on eliminating city slums. With an increasing average income and improved housing for most city residents, newly-created city slums should not be tolerated, to say the

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least. Only in this way can a healthy and mature housing market be nurtured.

Synchronisation between Economic and Social Development When it comes to the housing market, we have to consider the residents’ income and the issues related to the widening gap in incomes. It is admirable that the Chinese economy has, in recent years, been accelerating unmatchable in the world. But on the other hand, social inequality and a widening gap in incomes are becoming increasingly evident, an indication that the social reform has not been mapped out comprehensively. This could lead to a detrimental or unsustainable development. The unfair and unreasonable system alone is sufficient in revealing the seriousness of these problems, not to mention the corrupted government officials accompanied by smuggling business persons take illegally what belongs to the public as their own through devious means. According to Hulunbeier government statistics on the income gap among people from different backgrounds, in 2000, there was 2.9 times the difference between the highest incomes and the lowest ones, with those working in the energy industry making the most — 14,112 (RMB) — and those in manufacture making the least — 4,801. By the end of the 2001, the difference was 3.7 times, still with those in the energy industry earning the most — 18,829 and those in agriculture, stock raising, forestry and fishing earning 5,099 (and the difference with the manufacture increased to 3.4 times).12 Such an odd income gap among different industries, especially the speed at which the gap is widening, is the result of the high level of monopoly exercised by the power industry, which is, on the one hand, making profits by monopoly, and on the other, controlling the mobility of the labor force. This industry has, in effect, become an independent “kingdom” that ensures that employment opportunities are given to the children of its employees who are said to be both players and referees — they always win and never lose.

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Similar phenomena are found in other enterprises like postal and telecommunications, finance and insurance, and so on. To work out and solve these problems, it can be both easy and difficult. For example, if an “Anti-monopoly Law” is passed, special privileged rights will be taken away and the market can be mobilized. Accordingly, pricing and income will gradually take a natural course, settling at a reasonable level. To ensure a fair competition and to stop monopoly are issues concerning both economic and social reforms. There are many other tasks for social reform such as medical care, unemployment, care for the elderly, education, community service and harmony among different minorities. Education should be a pure and clean (non-profitable) investment for the society and national development. It should aim to nurture and train human resources and talents in order to improve national human quality and competence. It should not aim to make a profit and turn itself into a money making industry. Sadly, it has now openly claimed to be an educational industry. Those who have money can go to school without taking examinations and those who have no money cannot, even if they have passed an examination. In order to make money, some schools are now devoid of all sense of shame. They do not care about the quality of education; instead, they sell school diplomas and degrees. In effect, these schools have become a company that sells faked and inferior products. Due to the fact that Hulunbeier is an area inhabited by a mixed group of minorities, a harmonious atmosphere among them is an important factor to social development. If people could not live in harmony, social stability and unity would not be guaranteed and even the best strategic policy for economic development would be in vain.

The Power for Expanding the Reform and Open Policy In a nutshell, this is about the continued depth of reform and an expanded scope for the open-door policy. If put together, today’s social and economic developments in Hulunbeier can be described as an earth-shaking change and its past is no longer on par. When compared with other cities in the country on the same level as

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Hulunbeier, particularly with those developed regions located along the southeastern coastlines, Hulunbeier is considerably lagging behind, and in some areas, the gap is becoming increasingly widened. If the Hulunbeier government does not make an effort to catch up with them, it will fail despite being in such a superior condition and having various development resources, in addition to its inability to live up to the expectations of over two million people, a population made up of different nationality groups. Before the reform years in Hulunbeier, its total GPA was listed before all other League-cities except for the two industrial cities of Huhhot and Baotou, and the average income per capita (whether working in towns or cities or on farms) was ranked as number one or two in the entire area. I remember that when I was at InnerMongolian Normal University during the 1960s and 1970s, there were a few classes for Mongolian students, who were the richest at the university, who came from Hulunbeier. Every one of them had a camera and a portable semi-conducted radio. When chatting about salaries and incomes in Hu-Meng, they often said jokingly, “You university graduates make 40 or 50 Yuan per month, that’s even less than selling a cow in our prairie!” Now, 30 years after the reform and the opening policy, the average income in Hulunbeier’s stock raising area is far behind that in towns and cities. I was extremely puzzled when I heard that the Xixinba Qi (The Western New Baerhu Banner), which used to be beautiful and affluent, now has a financial deficit every year, and it has to ask high-level governments for help otherwise its people would not have enough for food! It is absolutely impossible that the herders in that banner are living in extreme poverty (poorer than they were during the Cultural Revolution). But it is quite believable that the poverty level is relatively high. What is the root of this problem? Is it due to the reform and the open-door policy? It is impossible. I believe the problem lies in the insufficient extent to which the reform has taken its course. The depth and scope of the reform should be further tapped and expanded. I often debate with others on the definition of the reform and open-door policy. In my opinion, the so-called reform and opendoor practice, in essence, mean to make the doors open fully — open

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to the outside world and to the people at home as well. Not only should economic needs be open but also politics, society, thought, and culture. Policy implementation should also be open. Once the problem of how to open the doors is dealt with, the thinking, direction and steps on how to carry out the reforms will be made clear, such as when a channel is completed and water flows. As Dr. Sun Yet-san once said, in dealing with the issue of social revolution and reform, the trouble often seems to be imagination. Once people resolve the issue of imagination, it will be easier to push it forward.

NOTES 1. According to Hulunbeier City’s official web site, its total population was 2.6988 million in 2008, in which urban population accounts for 66.46%. See Dalian ren zai Beijing (A Dalian Native in Beijing), http:// hi.baidu.com/liujun/blog/item/29b9b745e4e31d22cffca3a9.html. 2. According to China’s categorization on urban centers by population, a city that has a less than 100,000 population is a small city, a city that has 100,000 to 500,000 in population is a medium city, one that has 1 million or more is a large city, 2 million or more is an extremely large city. See Tianya wenda (Tianya Q & A) http://wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/ thread?tid=19ae8ee827d15805. 3. Such a limitation in thinking is representatively highlighted by Dr. Fei Xiaotong’s article entitled Small Towns in China — Functions, Problems & Prospects, Beijing: New World Press, 1986, pp. 9–170. 4. Some scholars had highly appreciated this phenomenon, describing it as a miracle in the developing world. But the by-products, or negative socio-economic consequences, of this development strategy were gradually discovered in recent years by more and more China specialists. Industrialisation without urbanisation has being regarded as one of the bottle necks that obstructed China’s further development for its domestic market. 5. While writing up to this point, I found that there was some on-line news that before the Spring Festival of 2009, the Central Government had held a conference on the work carried out in the countryside and

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6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

decided to allow for a free mobility for all people by abandoning the categories of the country-residence and non-country-residence. If true, this would certainly create a new state of affairs. To prepare for the new wave of urban developments, the MOCS should be indeed changed into a country-over-city system. It so happened that the same topic is discussed on-line about the autonomy for villages and towns to replace the current village-and-town governing system. I feel, however, that it would be possible for villages but impossible for townships to achieve self-management. To ensure social stability there, it is perhaps necessary to temporarily restore a district office to function as a mediator between the county and villages or towns. It has to make sure that such an office with a staff no more than ten is not at a level of administration and does not need a separate financial system because it only acts on behalf of the county government. The office will be closed when the autonomy for villages and towns are firmly in place, where villagers and farmers are ready to function fully on their own. Hu Qitu and Li Zhengdong, Jinri Neimenggu: Hulunbeier (Today’s Inner Mongolia: Hulunbeier), Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People’s Press, 1997, p. 97. Hu and Li, Jinri Neimenggu, pp.10–12. I have made two trips to Hulunbeier for this research. The first one was in 2003, the second one was in 2008, and there was no fundamental difference in my major findings from the two trips. There are some recent reports on extending the land usage term from 50 to 70 years in some regions. The Overview of Hulunbeier, 2002, p. 111. The Overview of Hulunbeier, pp. 113–114.

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6 Prelude to the Diaoyutai Dispute: Chinese–Japanese Controversy Over the Liuqiu Islands as Seen from an International System-Change Perspective Edwin Pak-wah Leung Department of Asian Studies, Seton Hall University, USA

ABSTRACT The dispute over the Diaoyutai islands continues to be a heated and controversial issue in Chinese–Japanese relations today in the context of China’s policies on borderlands and their international implications. Japan has now put the administration of these islands under Liuqiu (or Ryukyu in Japanese) — an island chain (originally a kingdom by itself and also a tributary state to China) that Japan had forcefully annexed in 1879 and turned it into the Okinawa 117

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Prefecture under Japanese sovereignty. Thus, the Liuqiu controversy has become the origins of the Diaoyutai dispute. This chapter will analyze the Liuqiu controversy by using an international system-change perspective in order to shed light on the Diaoyutai problem.

The Chinese–Japanese controversy over the Liuqiu islands is a subject that has received little attention from scholars. However, this controversy is an important topic in the study of China’s foreign relations and coastal defense. During the controversy, what was China’s attitude towards the tributary states in general, and towards an ex-tributary state of Japan in particular? How did China resolve (or not resolve) the seeming dilemma at the time when it was thrust into the Modern Nation-State System while still keeping the traditional Tributary State System? Specifically, what was China’s policy towards Liuqiu vis-a-vis Japan, as seen from the perspective of international system-change? And what is the impact of this on China’s borderlands, including Diaoyutai? The Liuqiu island chain lies between Japan’s Kyushu Island and China’s Taiwan Island, off the coast of China. The Liuqiu dispute arose because both China and Japan laid claim to the islands. The Liuqiu Kingdom had been a faithful member of Asia’s traditional international system known as the Tributary State System which was dominated by China. Japan, however, challenged China’s suzerainty over Liuqiu by using the Modern Nation-State System concept on the basis of clarifying its political boundaries, thus precipitating a crisis between China and Japan in the modern times. The “fall” of Liuqiu to Japan, indeed, not only jeopardized China’s coastal security immediately, but also directly encouraged the development of Japanese expansionism from that time on, leading to the incorporation of Diaoyutai by Japan into the Liuqiu administration. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the nature of the Liuqiu dispute within the historical context. —*—*—*— Official Chinese–Japanese relations had been held in abeyance for the three hundred years preceding 1871. Japan was also a tributary state

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of China for a time during the Ming period. The Japanese shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, accepted the tributary status in order to enrich his coffers from trade — from 143 to 1549, eleven tribute and trade missions sailed to China. Subsequently, however, nationalistic Japanese statesmen found such relations humiliating, and discontinued the practice after the middle of the sixteenth century, thus ending the official contact with the mainland. The year 1871 marked a new change in Sino–Japanese diplomatic relations. Soon after the newly created Japanese Foreign Ministry came into being in 1870, Yanagihara Sakimitsu was sent by his government to Beijing to seek a commercial treaty similar to China’s treaties with Western nations. He was instructed, in particular, to secure the most-favoured-nation clause in the treaty. Although his mission was viewed by the ultra-conservative elements in the Chinese government as opportunistic and ill-timed, it was received with warmness by the more pragmatic and progressive leaders like Li Hongzhang, the newly appointed governor-general of Zhili and Superintendent for Trade of the Northern Ports. Li felt that: Japan, which was not a dependency of China, was totally different from Korea, Liuqiu, and Annam. That she had come to request trade without first seeking support from any Western power showed her independence and good will. If China refused her his time, her friendship would be lost and she might even seek Western intervention on her behalf, in which case it would be difficult for China to refuse again. An antagonized Japan could be an even greater source of trouble than the Western nations because of her geographical proximity. It was, therefore, in China’s interest to treat Japan on a friendly and equal basis and send commissioners to Japan who could look after the Chinese there, watch the movements of the Japanese government, and cultivate harmonious relations between the two states.

Li Hongzhang toyed with the idea of a possible Sino–Japanese “alliance” in the wake of Western encroachments in Asia. His suggestions to “cultivate harmonious relations” with China’s ex-tributary state was not out of love for Japan, but out of a cold realization of the need to strengthen China’s position in order to ward off the Western

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threat. Li was also aware that an “antagonized Japan could be an even greater source of trouble than the Western nations because of her geographical proximity.” With this attitude in mind, the Yanaghara mission was well received. In fact, to show Chinese good will, a Sino–Japanese treaty with 18 articles and a trade regulation of 33 articles were finally signed in 1871 by Li and Yanagihara’s successor, Date Munenari. Among other things, the treaty provided for the exchange of envoys and counsels and the rendering of good-offices to each other should a third party intimidates or threatens either of the contracting parties. By careful negotiation, Li Hongzhang purposely excluded the mostfavoured-nation clause in the treaty. Article 1 of the Treaty was an important provision: “In all that regards the territorial possessions of either country the two governments shall treat each other with proper courtesy, without the slightest infringement or encroachment on other side.” China took for granted that the term “territorial possessions” was meant to include those tributary states around China’s frontiers. But this Chinese assumption was not to be shared by the Japanese. This ambiguity was not realized until the controversies over Liuqiu and Korea arose in later years. In 1874, Japan sent an expeditionary force to Taiwan to “punish” the aborigines there who had earlier mistreated the shipwrecked Liuqiuans and Japanese. The first incident occurred in 1871 concerning Liuqiuan citizens; the other, in 1873, involved Japanese nationals. The Japanese government, on the pretext of these two incidents, decided to take action in an attempt to resolve Liuqiu’s “dual-subordination” problem. By sending forces to Taiwan in the name of “protecting its nationals (meant to include the Liuqiuans),” the Japanese government would first challenge the Chinese suzerainty in Liuqiu and then legitimatize its claim by stating that it had already exercised sovereignty over Liuqiu. The detailed story of Japan’s Formosan Expedition, however, is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice to say is that not only did the Japanese expeditionary forces sent to Taiwan fail to accomplish the objective of “punishing” the aborigines by being “trapped” there, the episode also triggered a crisis

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between China and Japan — a development which worried Li Hongzhang as well as many Japanese leaders. What followed was the ¯ kubo Toshimichi by the Japanese government to China dispatch of O to settle the crisis. ¯ kubo reached Beijing on August 27, and immediately entered O upon negotiations. An agreement between Japan and China with reference to the island of Taiwan was finally signed on October 31, 1874; the Liuqiu Islands, however, was never mentioned in the treaty. As far as the Liuqiu sovereignty problem is concerned, it is debatable as to whether or not China, by signing this agreement, had “accepted that the Japanese contention that the Lew Chews (Liuqiuans) were Japanese subjects was correct.” One historian has remarked that “the phraseology of the first article clearly affirmed the Japanese right to protect ‘her subjects,’ which was a clear recognition that the inhabitants of Lew Chews (Liuqiuans) were subjects of Japan.” The question stands: Was the Treaty really a “clear recognition” that the Liuqiuans were Japanese subjects? More specifically, ¯ kubo and the Chinese negotiators intended to find a solution had O to the Liuqiu problem during the course of their negotiations? It is highly unlikely that either side, at least in 1874, had intended to clarify the ambiguous political status of the Liuqiu Islands at the risk of directly opposing the other. In retrospect, the Japanese later “distortion” of the 1874 Treaty arose from the ambiguities of the treaty itself. Moreover, these ambiguities were tailored by the Meiji government to Japan’s favour upon the advice of Gustave Boissonade — an entrusted legal advisor — in ¯ kubo Toshimichi himself, while in March 1875. But in 1874, O Beijing, was unaware of the possible implication that China, by recognizing the Japanese Formosan expedition as “righteous” and by paying the consolation money to the victims, was to recognize Japan’s sovereignty over Liuqiu. He made a frank confession on December 15, 1874, that the treaty he had just signed with China had no legal basis for Japan’s sovereign claim over Liuqiu. Earlier, in a letter to his friend Kuroda Kiyotaka, written on October 30 — a day before the signing of the 1874 Sino–Japanese ¯ kubo had suggested that a good sum of the relief money be Treaty O

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paid to those who displayed valor in battle. The remaining four hundred teals should be returned to China to be spent in Taiwan for the administration of the area inhabited by aborigines and for the protection of navigators against future outrages. Although his proposal was ¯ kubo did not consider the payment not acted upon, it indicates that O of consolation money an indication of China’s agreement to abandon her suzerainty over the Liuqiu Islands. What concerned the Japanese home minister at this point was not the Liuqiu problem, but a quick conclusion of the Formosan expedition. In fact, during the course of ¯ kubo even deliberately negotiations with the Chinese officials, O avoided raising the Liuqiu issue in their discussions. ¯ kubo’s outward semblance of affecting a sense of humanity by O remitting the relief money was not the real reason behind his gesture; rather, it was based upon political considerations. By this unprecedented move, he hoped to dispel China’s suspicion toward Japan, and at the same time revealing to the world Japan’s magnanimity. He was anxious to reach a rapprochement with China, a country with which Japan would have to cooperate if her future prosperity was to be ¯ kubo’s expression of good will toward China, conveyed in assured. O the course of his November 3 talk with Li Hongzhang in Tianjin, was not mere formality, but a genuine declaration of his feelings. This undoubtedly impressed upon Li Japan’s desire for a closer relationship with China. Li Hongzhang was receptive, yet equally aware of the rapidly rising power of Japan and its threat against China’s security. But Li feared the Western maritime powers more; Li initially directed his schemes for self-strengthening against the West, not Japan. It was logical for him to think of Japan as a possible “ally” to ward off the Western threats, since China and Japan were geographically closer and culturally similar. Throughout the 1870s, Li Hongzhang was relatively tolerant of Japanese expansionism until 1879 when Liuqiu was annexed against Chinese will, and he was shocked into the realization that a Sino–Japanese “alliance” would be impossible. —*—*—*— After the settlement of the Taiwan crisis, Li Hongzhang was even more convinced that his “alliance” idea would find supporters in

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Tokyo, even though the conditions in Liuqiu deteriorated progressively. In his letter to the Zongli Yamen on September 14, 1875, Li again pointed out the difference between Japan and the Western powers in their relation to China: Japan was close to China and was an immediate source of anxiety and trouble for her, whereas the West was a long way away. While fully aware of Japan’s expansionist ambitions toward Liuqiu as well as Korea, Li nevertheless still entertained the hope of a Sino–Japanese cooperation against the Western powers throughout most of the 1870s. He believed that due to its continuing unrest and huge financial deficits at home, Japan was in no position to undertake a new venture abroad. He was also aware of Japan’s fear of Russia. In November 1876, Li was visited by Mori Arinori and Soejima Taneomi, two diplomats from Japan. Expressing concern over Russian expansionism, the visitors told him of Japan’s desire for cooperation with China and Korea in warding off the ¯ kubo had expressed similar ideas to Li in 1874. Russian threat. O Although it is likely that Li was lulled into complacency by Japan’s professed desire for cooperation, he still hoped that Japan could be placated to remain friendly to China in the latter’s disputes with the Western powers. In 1877, when the Satsuma Rebellion broke out in Japan, Li readily loaned 100,000 cartridges to the Japanese government. Li could not have foreseen that the Japanese government, after the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion, would annex Liuqiu. In retrospect, Li’s policy of tolerance toward Japan weakened China’s position in the Liuqiu dispute. In Liuqiu, drastic changes had taken place by 1877. The Japanese had steadily extended their authority over the Islands. All their efforts had been directed toward the establishment of a legal basis for Japan’s claim, including the termination of Liuqiu’s tributary ties with China, as well as the creation of a Japanese Home Ministry office in Okinawa. The pressure from Tokyo, therefore, constituted an unprecedented national crisis for the Liuqiuan King Sho¯ Tai. Consequently, he secretly sent two envoys, Ko¯chi Pechin (Xiang Dehong) and Lin Shigong, to China to seek aid. They arrived in Fujian on April 12, 1877, and informed governor-General He Jing and Governor Ding Richang that the tribute missions had been

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interrupted by the Japanese. He and Ding, in a memorial of June 14 to the throne, observed that a refusal to aid Liuqiu might be constructed by the Western powers as a sign that China was unable to protect her tributary states. They recommended that He Ruzhang, recently appointed minister to Japan, take up the matter with the Japanese. This recommendation was acted upon on the same day that the memorial was received. As will be seen later, China, in actuality, was unable to resort to military means against Japan in defending Liuqiu due to naval and financial reasons. He Ruzhang’s mission to Tokyo to open negotiation with the Japanese government regarding Liuqiu admittedly did not produce any result. The Meiji government refused to negotiate on the ground that the Liuqiu affair was an internal matter of Japan, and that He Ruzhang was a foreign diplomat. In April 1879, Japan finally annexed Liuqiu, forcing the Liuqiuan king to take up residence in Tokyo. The Liuqiu Kingdom ceased to exist as a nation. The news of the Japanese annexation of Liuqiu came as a shock to Li Hongzhang, but he still did not completely abandon the idea of an “alliance” as yet. He reasoned that he could use the good offices of former US president Ulysses S. Grant, who was scheduled to visit China at that time, to mediate in China’s behalf. If the mediation were successful, Li thought, the “alliance” idea could still be kept alive. Li met with Grant on May 28 in Tianjin. Grant’s first impression of the governor-general was a favourable one; as he recollected some years later, he ranked Li first of the four great men whom he had met in his world tour. This personal factor probably influenced the American ex-president on matters relating to the Liuqiu affair during his visit to China. Accepting Li’s request to mediate in the Liuqiu dispute, Grant went on to Japan to take up the case with the Japanese leaders. Grant’s mediation, as it turned out, did not produce any concrete results either. It was difficult for him, as a Westerner, to be able to fully comprehend the concepts of tributary relationships. Furthermore, after hearing the Japanese side of the story, he simply could not make a judgment on the dispute. There were rumors that Grant had made

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a concrete suggestion to the Chinese and Japanese leaders for the peaceful settlement of the dispute: the partition of the Liuqiu Islands between China and Japan. Extant records do not support this claim. Grant, however, did suggest that China and Japan each should appoint a representative to meet and work out a solution to the Liuqiu problem, a suggestion which was finally accepted by the Japanese government. The Chinese government welcomed the suggestion, for it was Japan which had repeatedly refused to discuss the matter through diplomatic channels. In 1880, the Japanese government decided to send Shishido¯ Tamaki to China, and this decision was considered, at least by Li Hongzhang, as a sign of Japan’s willingness to directly negotiate with the Chinese government. Prince Gong, head of the Zongli Yamen, was appointed by the Chinese government as its representative to negotiate with Shishido ¯ Tamaki. Negotiations began on August 15, which lasted for about two months. On October 21, a draft treaty was agreed upon by the two representatives. It appears that, once ratified, the agreement would finally settle the Liuqiu dispute between China and Japan. But as soon as the draft treaty was sent to the Beijing court for ratification, it created a storm within the Chinese officialdom. According to the terms of the draft treaty, China would grant Japan trading privileges and concessions (specifically the most-favorednation clause) in exchange for keeping two southern islands of Liuqiu, while Japan would keep the rest of the islands permanently. The Liuqiu Kingdom, the center of the controversy, would not be allowed to be restored. This agreement clearly represents unnecessary concessions made by Prince Gong to his Japanese counterpart. It was also inconsistent with China’s policy toward Liuqiu in terms of protecting the tributary states. On the other hand, it reflects Japan’s ambition and aggressiveness, as well as its insincerity in dealing with China. This draft treaty shattered whatever hope Li Hongzhang still had towards Japan; he, therefore, strongly opposed its ratification. —*—*—*— The timing of Li Hongzhang’s rejection of the draft treaty is significant: China, in late 1880, was on the edge of settling a dispute with

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Russia over Ili in the Northwest frontier. With the Russian threat seemingly to be removed in the immediate future, and with his disillusionment over Japan’s unwillingness to cooperate, Li had by now advocated peace with Russia instead of with Japan. He had learned from Commodore Shuffle of the US Navy that a Russian fleet of two ironclads and 13 fast ships was already in Nagasaki and had purchased five hundred thousand dollars’ worth of fuel. Li believed that Japan was about to venture into the Sino–Russian troubled waters. Consequently, on September 30, 1880, he urged that Zongli Yamen adopt a conciliatory policy toward Russia, and to allow Marquis Zeng Jize (the Chinese representative in St. Petersburg) greater power in negotiation with the Russians, so that a peaceful settlement over Ili might be reached. Li made also clear his stand on the Liuqiu issue: “I think China had better not receive the southern part of Liuqiu and return it to the Liuqiuans themselves. It seems to me Japan will never yield any more.” On November 11, upon the request of the Grand Council (November 6), Li sent to the throne a powerful memorial which stated, strongly and explicitly, that since the two southern islands of Liuqiu, to be retained by China, were of so little value, the granting of so broad a concession as the most-favoured-nation clause to Japan was unwise. Li feared that once the Japanese started to make trouble, other countries might follow suit. Li impressed upon the court that: The whole situation hinges on whether the Russian question can be settled. If it can, Japan and all other countries will be hesitant [to move]; if it cannot, they will plot [against us]. Rather than make concessions to the Japanese who cannot help us resist Russia — thereby we lost to bother Japan and Russia — would it not be preferable to make some concessions to Russia and secure her help in checking Japan? The strength and weakness of Russia and Japan differ by a hundred fold. Judging by the injustice of their claim, the Japanese also insulted us far more [than the Russians].

An analysis of this statement reveals a basic change in Li Hongzhang’s foreign policy: peace with Russia and resistance to Japanese aggression. The question arises: Why did Li’s long-time “pro” Japan policy change over-night? The answer has to be sought

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in the light of both strategic and institutional considerations. First, Li did not consider the Liuqiu problem a serious threat toward China’s maritime security. From the very beginning, he regarded Liuqiu’s tribute as too insignificant an issue for China going to war. He clearly expressed his views in a letter to He Ruzhang: Liuqiu is a small place, beyond the seas and completely cut off from all places……near to Japan and far away from China……Even if China wished to assist and rescue her neighbours, the geographical situation prevents it. China receives no great benefit from the Liuqiu tribute. Moreover, if China accepted tribute from Liuqiu but could not protect it, then China would be looked down upon by all countries. Japan would not listen to arguments. It would not only be a waste of time but also absurd for China to use force to fight for a small tribute from a small country and for the sake for an empty name.

It is here that Li began to speak of the tributary state system as an “empty name.” In his letter to Zeng Jize of October 19, 1879, Li also wrote that China’s naval capacity and financial conditions crippled her ability to wage war against Japan. What concerned Li more, therefore, was China’s domestic effort for self-strengthening — a theme which had consistently been shared by many zi-qiang progressive leaders: “Since we [China] cannot threaten war with Japan [over Liuqiu], we have to adopt a soft policy, and at the same time to try our best effort for self-strengthening in order to strive for later strength and power.” Li seemed to stress the possibility that China’s protest and Japan’s fear of foreign intervention would restrain Japan from taking further action in Liuqiu. He accordingly instructed He Ruzhang to engage in diplomatic maneuvering, despite the latter’s repeated suggestion for China to take military action. Another reason why Li did not advocate a show of force, as we have discussed, was his secret desire for a Sino–Japanese “alliance” to ward off the Western threat. But the news of Japan’s annexation of Liuqiu took him by surprise in 1879 and he was disillusioned by Tokyo’s lack of cooperation. He also realized that he had underestimated Japan’s strength. Nevertheless, he misconstrued the arrival of Shishido¯ Tamaki to Beijing as a sign of

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Japan’s willingness to negotiate directly with the Chinese government. Therefore, he ordered He Ruzhang to stay in Tokyo and continue seeking the help of the various foreign ministers in Japan. Li was, however, totally disillusioned by the 1880 draft treaty negotiated by Shishido¯ Tamaki and Prince Gong. Why should China give Japan the pernicious most-favored-nation clause in exchange for the two small islands of Liuqiu? Since Japan’s annexation of the Liuqiu Kingdom did not correspond to China’s national interests, why should China sign the draft treaty, thus endorsing the Japanese rule over the greater part of Liuqiu? Li began to pragmatically shift his policy and hoped that Russia could be appeased and so support China in her disputes with foreign powers, especially with Japan. Li’s concept appears similar to the traditional strategem of “controlling barbarians with barbarians” (yi-yi zhi-yi), because both relied on the use of alien power to protect Chinese interest. This traditional policy was also akin to the European balance of power concept. The balance of interests among several Western powers in China, as Li discovered in the summer of 1876 during his negotiation at Yantai for the settlement of the Margary affair, might even serve to restrain the demands of so dominant a power as Britain. He also knew that the combined interests of several Western powers in China helped stabilize China’s position in this period. He was apparently acquainted with the European balance of power concept. In the summer of 1878, Ma Jianzhong, Li’s protégé who had gone to France the previous year to study international politics with a group of Chinese naval cadets from the Fuzhou Dockyard, wrote from Paris expounding the balance of power principle and explaining that the Western nations had historically endeavored to maintain it in the conduct of international relations. Li and Ma, along with other “progressive” Chinese (such as Huang Zunxian, a councilor of the Chinese embassy at Tokyo), were apparently impressed by the British intervention in the Russo–Turkish War and the Berlin Congress of that summer, which saved the Ottoman empire from complete dismemberment and destruction, and helped preserve the existing balance of power in Europe.

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This “modern version” of the traditional Chinese strategem of “using barbarians to control barbarians” provided Li Hongzhang with a rational basis for his new policy of peace with Russia and resistance against Japanese aggression. He was aware of Japan’s fear of Russia and believed that it was strategically more important to defend Korea in order to secure China from Japanese aggression. This was a new variety of yi-yi zhi-yi, beyond traditional usage. Another explanation for Li Hongzhang’s opposition to the 1880 draft treaty seems to have been his rivalry with the Zongli Yamen over foreign policy formulation. The Zongli Yamen had been established after the Treaties of Beijing in 1860 specifically to deal with foreign affairs. But, since its creation in 1861, its main policy had been to try to evade questions rather than to face them. As a result, issues were dealt with according to expediency rather than according to wellconceived plans. In contrast, Li Hongzhang by the late 1870s, had become not only the implementer of policies but also their initiator. While the Zongli Yamen was incapable of properly handling foreign affairs, Li had emerged as the most influential man of his time. His position as Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, when coupled with his right to handle foreign affairs, made him a one-man foreign office in competition with the Zongli Yamen. Li began acting as a powerful rival of the Zongli Yamen. The official reports of Chinese ministers abroad were often addressed to both the Yamen and Li. Li could directly issue orders to ministers abroad without the Yamen being informed. The operation of the “two foreign offices” showed the great trust Empress Dowager Cixi placed in Li Hongzhang, but it constituted an anomaly in the administration of China’s foreign policy. In actual practice, therefore, the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports was in charge of the Qing court’s diplomatic activity. The Chinese envoys abroad were directly under the command of the Superintendent of Trade for Northern Ports, and the court’s orders prepared by the Grand Council were sent to Li Hongzhang for transmission to ministers abroad. In effect, the Zongli Yamen was bypassed.

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Li believed that he understood the Sino–Japanese problem and the Liuqiu issue better than the Yamen ministers. It was Li Hongzhang, not the Yamen ministers, who signed the Sino–Japanese Treaty of Friendship (1871) — a treaty without the most-favorednation clause which he considered to be one of his greater diplomatic achievements. It was Li who advocated the importance of coastal defense against Japan, as illustrated in the great policy debate of Maritime defense versus Frontier defense in 1874. It was also Li who initiated the idea of requesting the former American President Ulysses S. Grant to mediate in the Liuqiu dispute in the interest of China. Understandably, Li felt humiliated by not being given the power as special commissioner to work out the settlement with Shishido ¯ Tamaki over Liuqiu. The frustrated man might have decided to use his opposition to the 1880 draft treaty as means to embarrass the Zongli Yamen in their contest for power. In any event, because of strong opposition from Li, the Chinese court announced that it would not ratify the draft treaty. Since the Chinese court refused to ratify the draft treaty, Shishido¯ Tamaki decided to leave China as a protest in early 1881. The Sino–Japanese dispute over Liuqiu, therefore, remained unresolved legally. While there were some further discussions and counter proposals at Beijing, Tianjin, and at Tokyo, this was the end of the Liuqiu controversy. From 1881 onwards, the Okinawa Prefecture of Liuqiu, created by Japan after the annexation, has technically been an integral part of the Japanese empire. From the Chinese point of view, however, the Liuqiu question was never settled. —*—*—*— The episode of the Sino–Japanese controversy over the fate of the Liuqiu Kingdom significantly illustrates China’s dilemma in juxtaposing the new modern Nation-State System with the old Tributary State System. In reading the Chinese statement relating to the dispute, one cannot fail to observe the confusion which existed in the minds of these statesmen as to the real status of the Liuqiu Islands. These islands were sometimes considered as an independent state, and at other times, as a part of China, or, worst still, as a “common

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dependency” of both China and Japan. This confusion, to be sure, reveals not only the ambiguous political status of Liuqiu as defined by Western international law, but also the incompatibility of the Tributary State System with the modern Nation-State System. That the Chinese leaders had not comprehended in the 1870s that the tributary relationship had no status in Western international law may seem incredible. As one noted historian has asserted: “By 1867 the Zongli Yamen knew……that the tributary tie was a logical impossibility in the modern world.” As far as Liuqiu’s tributary relationship with China was concerned, Li Hongzhang believed that it was not worth fighting for. In his letter to He Ruzhang in Tokyo, he pointed out that “it would not only be a waste of time but also absurd for China to use force to fight for a small tribute from a small country and for the sake of an empty name.” Indeed, Li Hongzhang began to seriously question China’s moral obligation of defending the Tributary State System. In appears that the ideological structure of the Chinese Confucian universal empire had begun to crumble. Li Hongzhang believed that a war with Japan over Liuqiu would be detrimental to China’s national security and the Self-Strengthening Movement. “Since China could not threaten war with Japan [over Liuqiu],” he remarked, “we have to adopt a soft policy, and at the same time to try our best effort for self-strengthening in order to strive for later strength and power.” From the very beginning, he carefully and pragmatically tried to form a Sino–Japanese “alliance” against the West, for fear that “an antagonized Japan could be an even greater source of trouble than the Western nations because of her geographical proximity” to China. He hoped that the appeasement of Japan could better serve the Chinese interests. Li’s design, therefore, must be understood in light of his pragmatism and analysis of international situations. When it appeared that this goal could not be reached, as evidenced by Japan’s decision to annex Liuqiu against the Chinese will and the subsequent draft treaty of 1880, Li began to shift pragmatically his “pro” Japan policy by appeasing Japan’s enemy — Russia — in order to counter the rise of Japanese power in Asia. This modern version of yi-yi zhi-yi, as explained in the terms of balance of power, provided Li with the rational basis for his foreign

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policy change. In retrospect, however, Li’s abortive attempt to appease Japan in the 1870s weakened China’s position vis-à-vis Japan in the Liuqiu dispute. In the long run, China’s “loss” of Liuqiu to Japan contributed to the disintegration of the Tributary State System in Asia. Before the annexation of Liuqiu, Japan never mentioned that Diaoyutai was under Japanese sovereignty. Geographically speaking, Diaoyutai is also not a part of the Liuqiu island chain either. But once Japan forcefully took over the Liuqiu Islands, she began, in the late 19th century (particularly after the colonization of Taiwan in 1895), to speak of her claim over Diaoyutai as a part of Japan. Thus, the dispute over Diaoyutai continues to be a heated and controversial issue in Chinese–Japanese relations even until today — an issue which has been further complicated by the rise of nationalism in the two respective countries. With the disintegration of the Tributary State System as an international system in Asia, China has to deal with its ramifications on her borderlands within the context of the Modern Nation-State System by clarifying her national and political boundaries, one of which is Diaoyutai. In retrospect, had Liuqiu not been annexed by Japan, the Diaoyutai dispute probably would not have been an international issue that is still troubling China and Japan today. China’s inability to defend the Tributary State System in the long run helped to contribute to the Diaoyutai dispute in the present age.

NOTES 1. Liuqiu had not only acknowledged China’s suzerainty since 1372, but, since 1609, also paid tribute to the Satsuma domain of Japan. This dual dependency on two overlords was due to Liuqiu military and economic weaknesses. 2. Chouban yiwu shimo (The Complete Account of the Management of the Barbarian Affairs), Beijing, 1930, 77, p. 35. 3. Chouban yiwu shimo, 77, p. 35. 4. For details, see Wang Xi, Li Hongzhang yu zhongri tiaoyue 1871 (Li Hongzhang and the Sino–Japanese Treaty of 1871), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1981.

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5. Nihon gaiko ¯ bunsho: Meiji nenkan tsuiho I (Diplomatic Papers of Japan: Supplement to the Meiji Period I), Tokyo, 1964, p. 142; Chouban yiwu shimo, 96, pp. 27–32. 6 For details, see Edwin Pak-wah Leung, “The Quasi-war in East Asia: Japan’s Expedition to Taiwan and the Ryu ¯ kyu ¯ Controversy,” Modern Asian Studies, 17 (2), 1983, pp. 257–281. 7. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Tongzhi jiaxu ribing qin tai shi mo (A Complete Account on the Japanese Formosan Expedition of 1874), Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1959, p. 141. 8. Shanti S. Gandhi, US Diplomatic Relations with China, 1869–1882, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1954, p. 308. 9. Ibid. 10. For Boissonade’s advice to the Japanese government, see Hiratsuka Atsushi, Zoku Ito¯ Hirobumi Hiroku (Supplement to the Confidential Records of Ito ¯ Hirobumi), Tokyo, 1930, pp. 32–36. ¯ ¯ kubo Toshimichi papers), 6, Tokyo, 11. Okubo Toshimichi bunsho (The O 1967–69, pp. 237–239. ¯ kubo Toshimichi bunsho, pp. 152–161; Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Gaiseika 12. O ¯ kubo Toshimichi (O ¯ kubo Toshimichi as a Diplomattoshite no O Politician), Tokyo, 1942, pp. 237–241. ¯ kubo Toshimichi bunsho, p. 237. 13. O ¯ kubo Toshimichi bunsho, pp. 158–60. 14. O ¯ kubo Toshimichi, p. 243. 15. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Gaiseika toshite no O ¯ ¯ 16. Okubo Toshimich nikki, Diary of Okubo Toshimichi, last part, pp. 339–42. 17. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao) (Complete Works of Li Hongzhang), 4 , Shanghai, 1921, pp. 24–25. 18. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 6, pp. 31–32. 19. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 7, pp. 3–4. 20. For aspects of the “Disposition of Ryu ¯ kyu ¯,” see Endo¯ Tatsu and Goto¯ Keishin (eds.), Ryu ¯ kyu ¯ Shobun teiko¯ (Salient points in the Disposition of Ryu ¯ kyu ¯), 1879, reprinted in Meiji bunka zenshu ¯, vol. 25. 21. Lin Shigong (Rin Seiko, 1841–1880), Beishang Zaji, Miscellany of My Northward Trip, 1884. 22. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao (Historical Materials concerning Sino–Japanese

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23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

Negotiations during the Guangxu Period, 1875–1908), 1, Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1963, pp. 21–22. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, p. 22. On October 7, 1878, the frustrated He Ruzhang sent to the Japanese Foreign Ministry a note of strong protest. The full text of the note is non-existent in Chinese documents. It can be found, however, in Japanese documents: Nihon gaiko ¯ bunsho (Diplomatic Papers of Japan), 11, Tokyo: 1937–40, 1949, pp. 271–271; Tada Komon, (ed.), Iwakura Ko jikki, (A Factual Account of Iwakura Tomomi), 3, Tokyo: 1968, pp. 578–9. Endo¯ Tatsu and Goto¯ Keishin, (eds.), Ryu ¯ kyu ¯ shobun teiko¯ (Salient points in the Disposition of Ryu ¯ kyu ¯ ), 1879; reprinted in Meiji bunka zenshu ¯, 25, pp. 132–133; Ota Cho¯fu, Okinawa kensei gojunen (Fifty years of Okinawan Prefectural Administration), Tokyo: 1932, pp. 43–44. Grant recalled that, “I have met on this journey four great men, Bismarck, Beaconsfield, Gambetta, and Li Hongzhang. I am not sure, all things considered, but Li is the greatest of the four.” In John Russell Young, Men and Memorials: Personal Reminiscences, NY, 1901. II, p. 303. The relations between Grant and Li had almost the element of romance. See Young, Men and Memorials, p. 319; Liang Zhongying, Li Hongzhang dui ri waijiao juece zhi yanjiu (Studies on Li Hongzhang’s Foreign Policy Toward Japan), Taipei: Liang Zhongying, 1974, p. 79. Edwin Pak-wah Leung, “General Ulysses S. Grant and the Sino– Japanese dispute over the Ryu ¯ kyu ¯ (Liuqiu) Islands,” Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Asian Studies, Hong Kong, 1979, II, pp. 421–449. Richard T. Chang, “General Grant’s 1879 Visit to Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica, 24 (4), 1989, p. 381. See Grant’s identical letters of 13 August, 1879, to Li Hongzhang and Iwakura Tomomi, in Grant Papers, in microfilm, Library of Congress, Reel 2, S. IB, 6312–15.

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32. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, 2, 8a–10b. 33. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, 2, 14b–17; Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Zou Gao) (Complete Works of Li Hongzhang: Zou Gao), 39, pp. 1–15. 34. For details, see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of SinoRussian Diplmacy, 1871–1881, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. 35. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Zou Gao) (Complete Works of Li Hongzhang: Zou Gao), 11, pp. 26–28b. 36. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao) (Complete Works of Li Hongzhang: Yishu Hangao), 11, p. 36b. 37. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 10, pp. 26a–27a. 38. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 2, p. 14. 39. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, 2, pp. 14b–17; Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Zou Gao), 39, pp. 1–15. 40. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 8, p. 5. 41. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Pengliao Hangao) (Complete Works of Li Hongzhang: Pengliao Hangao), 9, pp. 1b–2b. 42. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 8, pp. 1–2. 43. Economic Research Centre, Bank of Taiwan, Qing guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao. 44. Wang S.T., The Margary Affair and the Chefoo, London, Oxford University Press, 1940. 45. Sanjing Chen, “Luelun Ma Jianzhong de waijiao sixiang” (A Brief Discussion on the Diplomatic Thought of Ma Jianzhong), in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan (A Collected Works by Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), 3.2, Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1972, p. 548. 46. Zhonghua Mai (comp.) Huangchao Jingshi wen Xinbian (A New Compilation of Noted Writings of Our Imperial Dynasty), 72, Taipei, 1972, pp. 9a–13a. 47. Sanjing Chen, “Luelun Ma Jianzhong de waijiao sixiang.” 48. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu hangao), 8, pp. 1a–wa, 4b–6a. 49. Siming Meng, The Tsungli Yamen: Its Organization and Functions, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 3–4.

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50. Liu Xinxian, “Zhongguo waijiao zhidu de yange” (The Evolution of Chinese Diplomatic Institutions) in Zhongguo waijiao shi lunkan, II.5, pp. 23–28. 51. Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai Nissen kankei no kenkyu ¯ (A Study of Sino–Japanese Relations in the Modern Times), Keijo: 1940, p. 13. 52. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Zou Gao), 1, p. 23; 2, p. 10; 6, p. 26; 15, p. 26. 53. Qing Guangxu chao donghua lu (The Dong-Hua records of the Guangxu period in the Qing Dynasty), I.295, Nov, 1876, P. 45; I.319, Nov, 1876, p. 135; I.1037, Feb, 1881, p. 7, Taipei, 1963. 54. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, “The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs. Frontier Defense,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25, 1964/65, pp. 212–228. 55. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Zou Gao), 39, pp. 1–5; Nihon gaiko ¯ bunsho: Meiji nenkan tsuiho XIII, pp. 379–380. 56. Shishido¯ Tamaki’s communications with the Chinese government are now collected in the Shishido¯ Tamaki kankei bunsho in the National Diet Library at Tokyo. 57. Jiabin Liang, “Liuqiu Wangguo Zhongri Zhengchi Kaoshi,” (An Investigation of the Sino–Japanese Dispute over Liuqiu and the Fall of the Liuqiu Kingdom), Dalu zaizhi, 48 (5), 15, 1974, pp. 193–218. 58. Mary C. Wright, “The Adaptability of Ch’ing Diplomacy: The Case of Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies, 17 (3), 1958, p. 381. 59. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Yishu Hangao), 8, p. 5. 60. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Pengliao Hangao), 9, pp. 1b–2b.

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Chapter

7 China’s Northeast Water Frontiers, East China Sea Disputes and Co-Management Approach Quansheng Zhao Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for Asian Studies American University

ABSTRACT Borderlands and water frontiers are two important parts of Chinese foreign policy. There are a number of problems with China’s neighbouring countries within these areas. This chapter conducts a detailed study on China’s northeast water frontiers, focusing on the disputes in the East China Sea, including three with Japan — Senkaku/ Diaoyu, Chunxiao/Shirakaba, Okinotorishima/Chongzhiniao, and one with South Korea — Socotra/Suyan.* The chapter will then * Note: In this chapter, the first listed name of the disputed territory/area indicates the country that is currently occupying the territory, regardless of how strong the country’s claim is. 137

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examine the significance of these disputes in terms of political, economic, and military dimensions, as well as regional and international relations. The study then analyzes the evolution of Chinese foreign policy toward these disputes. The primary attention is on China’s recently adopted co-management approach. The chapter attempts to illuminate how this co-management approach will or will not work in these disputed areas. In the new era of globalization and regional integration, one may hope that there will be enough political and diplomatic wisdom among the leaders in Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, as well as Washington, to settle these issues peacefully. This practice may also become a foundation to enhance the momentum of the East Asian Community process.

INTRODUCTION China is, perhaps, one of the few countries that have extensive borderlands as well as water frontiers adjacent to its numerous neighbouring countries. The borderlands and water frontiers comprise two very important parts in Chinese foreign policy considerations. This chapter will first examine in detail the current disputes in the East China Sea frontier between China, Japan, and Korea; it will then elaborate on the significance of these disputes in terms of political, economic, and military dimensions, as well as in the context of regional and international relations. The study then moves to the evolution of Chinese foreign policy toward these disputes and, in particular, illuminates the most recent co-management approach, that is, how this co-management approach will or will not work in these disputed areas.

BORDERLANDS VS. WATER FRONTIERS China has a long tradition of paying close attention to its borderlands, known as bianjiang ( ), but only recently has it begun to pay equal attention to its waterfronts, known as shuijiang ( ). The total distance of the borderlands is 22,147 kilometers while the total distance of the water frontiers is 14,500 kilometers. Over the

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past several decades, and particularly the recent decade, China has advanced its efforts to settle border disputes with neighbouring countries. It is reported that China, in December 2008, finally completed its agreement over its border with Vietnam and over 200 border markers were erected, ending virtually one of the last remaining disputes.1 Another important element of progress is China’s final settlement with Russia in terms of its borderlands, also completed in 2008.2 Therefore, the only one remaining dispute in China’s border lines is with India. There are, however, a number of problems with China’s neighbouring countries within China’s water frontier areas in both the East China Sea and South China Sea. This chapter conducts a detailed study of China’s northeast water frontiers, focusing on the disputes with Japan and South Korea. Its disputes with Japan include three areas: Senkaku/Diaoyu, Chunxiao/Shirakaba, and Okinotorishima/ Chongzhiniao. There is one dispute with South Korea, namely Socotra/Suyan. (Note: In this chapter, the first listed name of the disputed territory/area indicates the country that is currently occupying the territory, regardless of how strong the country’s claim is).

CHINA’S PROBLEMS WITH ITS NORTHEAST WATER FRONTIERS In terms of China’s problems and disputes with its neighbouring countries over water fronts, the progress has been much slower as compared to the progress with the borderlands. Those disputes can be divided into three main areas: Northeast with Japan and South Korea; East over the Taiwan Strait (this is considered more of a domestic issue, but still with international implications); and South with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This study will only concentrate on the Northeast water frontiers. Table 1 indicates that there are five international disputes in China’s northeast frontier waters. China and Japan are each involved in four, and South Korea is involved in two. In terms of the current occupier, China occupies one territory, and Japan and South Korea each occupy two.

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Country China Japan South Korea

Number of Disputes

Number of Territories it Currently Occupies

4 4 2

1 2 2

Those disputes around China’s northeast water frontiers involve islands, rocks, or gas/oil fields, as seen below: In the East China Sea • • • •

Senkaku/Diaoyu — between Japan and China (also Taiwan) Chunxiao/Shirakaba Gas and oil fields — between China and Japan Okinotorishima/Chongzhiniao — between Japan and China Socotra/Suyan — between South Korea and China in the Sea of Japan.

In the Sea of Japan •

Dokdo/Takeshima — South Korea/Japan

(The current occupier is listed first). As we can see from Table 1, the first four disputes are in the East China Sea area in which China is involved (three with Japan and one with South Korea). The last one is in the Sea of Japan and involves only South Korea and Japan. This chapter will primarily discuss the first four disputes in detail and will mention the last one briefly.

DISPUTE OVER SENKAKU/DIAOYU — JAPAN/CHINA (ALSO TAIWAN) The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute involves perhaps the largest island territory compared to the others. It is about seven square kilometers,

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Figure 1.

Map of Senkaku (

)/Diaoyu (

).

Source: Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16th to 21st Centuries” The Asia-Pacific Journal (2009), 9(4). .

whereas other disputes involve only tiny islands or even rocks (Fig. 1). The initial dispute began with a report in 1968 regarding the discovery of potential large gas and oil resources in that region.3 In the early 1970s, students from Taiwan, either within the island or abroad, launched demonstration campaigns known as Baodiao Yungdong ( ), meaning “defend Diaoyu movement.” For example, even current Taiwan President Ma Ying-Jeou wrote his doctoral dissertation at Harvard Law School, entitled “Trouble Over Oily

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Figure 2.

Picture of Senkaku (

)/Diaoyu (

).

Source: “People in Taiwan estimated that Diaoyu Island is worth more than 100 million TWD” Huanqiu Shibao, July 14, 2009. .

Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments in the East China Sea,” which explored the Diaoyu dispute (Fig. 2).4 Since then, the dispute has become an international issue, primarily between Beijing and Tokyo. Currently, the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputed area is under Japan’s occupancy, and Japan has been steadily increasing its control over the island, but it did not prevent China from making its own claim over the island. China’s claim is based on the fact that the island has long belonged to China, supported by historical documents. According to Beijing, the island, together with Taiwan, was ceded to Japan as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki following China’s defeat in 1895, or was simply stolen by Japan during that time. If the first instance is the case, according to China, with the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, Japan should have returned the island together with Taiwan to China. Japan’s argument is that the island was uninhabited and unclaimed prior to its occupancy, which took place in January 1895 during the war and prior to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki

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in May 1895.5 Moreover, after World War II, Senkaku, together with Okinawa, was occupied by the United States military authority, so in 1972, when the US returned Okinawa, it also handed over Senkaku to Japan. Therefore, it might be regarded as a timid acquiescence from the United States. One should note that the US position over this dispute has been ambiguous. In 1971, the US, supported Japan’s claim by stating that Japan does have administrative jurisdiction over the island and that the island’s safety is part of the US–Japan security alliance, but at the same time, stated that it is not biased toward either party in this dispute. This statement was reaffirmed in October 1996. The ambiguity of the US position also stems from its desire to improve its own relations with China.6

DISPUTE OVER CHUNXIAO/SHIRAKABA GAS AND OIL FIELDS: CHINA/JAPAN This dispute is in regard to China’s gas and oil fields in the East China Sea of which the most well-known one is Chunxiao (Shirakaba in Japanese). Chunxiao’s production of the gas field began in 2009 (which was developed several years ago). The exact amount of reserves in the area has not been confirmed.7 China uses a continental shelf extension argument, stating that China’s water territory is far beyond Chunxiao. Japan’s argument is using a median line approach based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), namely that the two countries’ water fronts should be in the middle of the two countries’ land territory (Fig. 3).8 The two different arguments, therefore, produced a dispute between the two countries involving a huge water area.9 Furthermore, China claims that even according to Japan’s water front claim, the Chunxiao oil field still lies within Chinese waters (Fig. 4). Japan does not dispute the location of the oil field as lying within Chinese waters, but it argues that the oil might be drawn from the seabed within the Japanese claimed area and, therefore, the production should be stopped. A recent compromise between Beijing and Tokyo is that they have all agreed that any oil gas production within the

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Figure 3.

Map of China’s Oil-Gas Fields, Chunxiao (

).

Source: “China, Japan Territorial Disputes” Abduction Politics .

Figure 4.

Details of the Chunxiao Oil Fields.

Source: Sun Bin. “The East China Sea Deals — Details” June, 2008. .

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disputed area can be jointly explored and developed by the two nations together.10 However, since Chunxiao is on the Chinese side, and not in the disputed area per se, China believes that it has the right to oversee the oil production either by itself or seek foreign partners (Japan included) according to international practices (which is not the same as joint-development in the disputed areas).

DISPUTE OVER OKINOTORISHIMA/ CHONGZHINIAO — JAPAN/CHINA Okinotorishima is a rock far away from Japan, about 1,700 kilometers south of Tokyo Bay (Fig. 5).11 As early as 1931, Japan claimed these rocks as Japanese territory, and insists that they are islands (“shima” means island in Japanese). It is, however, only in recent decades that Japan has begun to not only intensify this claim and attempt to include it into its EEZ areas, but has also spend a huge amount of money to consolidate and even construct concrete platforms as the rocks

Figure (

5. The location of Okinotorishima ) in the East China Sea.

(

)/Chongzhiniao

Source: Sun Bin. “The East China Sea Gas Field ‘Deal’” June, 2008 .

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Figure 6.

Satellite image of Okinotorishima (

).

Source: Wikipedia. “Okino Tori Shima” .

erode over the decades. China, however, claims that Okinotorishima, (or Chongzhiniao in Chinese) is only a reef; in the high tide hours, the area is less than 10 square meters (Fig. 6). Therefore, Japan’s claim is a violation of the international law which has no legal standing.12 According to international law, no country should be allowed to claim sovereignty over rocks. What is at stake is 40,000 square kilometers of water that can be claimed as exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by Japan if the claim has legal standing. With this dispute, China has also officially lodged a complaint with the United Nations regarding the Japanese territory claims. For the past two decades, the Japanese government has allocated millions of dollars to enhance the rock. In 1988, the Japan Marine Science and Technology Center built a platform which has a helicopter landing pad.13 On March 9, 2005, it decided to build an artificial structure on the rocks in order to provide a base for the establishment of a lighthouse, and on March 27th of the same year, it further decided to attempt to build a radar facility.14

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DISPUTE OVER SOCOTRA/SUYAN — SOUTH KOREA/CHINA The fourth dispute involves a group of rocks in the East China Sea between China and South Korea, known as Socotra in Korean and Suyan in Chinese (Fig. 7). The rock’s location is roughly equidistant between the land territories of South Korea and China. Again, natural resources are at stake, as well as how one country can claim its water territory. It is still uninhabited; in the 1990s, South Korea began to claim it was the southernmost Korean territory, and recently constructed a weather station on the rock. China has rejected this claim and made it clear that Suyan is a part of Chinese territory based on historical record. The two countries have been able to agree that it is a submerged rock, and not an island, but both still claim the rock within their respective EEZs.15 Overall, this dispute has been relatively subdued from the official point of view that both Beijing and Seoul do not want this issue to

Figure 7. (

Map of Suyan ( ).

) Socotra/Ieodo (

)/Parangdo

Source: Modified from Wikimedia Commons, September 18, 2006 .

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escalate. However, this is still a significant dispute that not only involves potentially huge natural resources such as gas, oil, and fisheries, but it is also an emotional issue in terms of public opinion. For the time being, due to the increasing economic interdependence between the two countries, the dispute has been temporarily shelved.16

DISPUTE OVER DOKDO/TAKESHIMA — SOUTH KOREA/JAPAN South Korea and Japan have had a highly publicized dispute over a small island known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese (Fig. 8).

Figure 8. Map of Dokdo (

)/Takeshima (

Source: <www.japanfocus.org/-Alexis-Dudden/2852>.

) Liancourt Rocks (

).

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Figure 9. Details of Dokdo (

)/Takeshima (

) Liancourt Rocks (

).

Source: .

This uninhabited island is located between the two countries in the Sea of Japan (South Korea has refused to call this the “Sea of Japan” but, rather, the “East Sea.”) The territory currently occupied by South Korea and China is not involved in this dispute (Fig. 9). One may notice that China has adopted a neutral policy towards this dispute.17 In April 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesman, Qin Gang, made a specific comment about the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, stating that “as a neighbour of South Korea and Japan, we hope they can satisfactorily settle this dispute through consultation and dialogue,” clearly indicating China’s neutral position.18 Since this chapter deals with Chinese foreign policy, it will not be discussed further. China’s three disputes with Japan and one with South Korea in the East China Sea have far reaching significance; they impact virtually all aspects of Chinese foreign policy toward its northeast water frontier, including political, economic, and security dimensions as well as international relations in the region. In the sections below, I will discuss these significances in detail.

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Significance — Political Politically, these disputes are extremely sensitive. Like all issues involving territories, it can always be regarded as a sovereignty issue; hence, each country has a core national interest involved with the disputes. More often than not, these disputes are also closely related to rising nationalism, which has intensified over the past couple of decades. Take Senkaku/Diaoyu for example: a Japanese right-wing group moved onto the island in 1996 twice and established a lighthouse.19 From the “Greater China” side, NGOs and civil groups from Hong Kong and Taiwan are particularly active.20 People in Hong Kong and Taiwan launched ongoing campaigns by sending fishing boats to try to land on the island, and on a couple of occasions, they have been successful in putting China’s (and Taiwan’s) flags on the island. Occasionally confrontational accidents took place; Chinese fishing boats were hit and damaged, and at one time the conflict even caused one Hong Kong sailor’s death. It is clear that when it comes to the issue of national interest, all Chinese, regardless from the mainland or from Taiwan and Hong Kong, are united. An interesting example is that in June 2008, when a Taiwanese fishing boat was hit by a Japanese coast guard ship21 and sank and crew members were detained (specifically the captain was mistreated during detainment), both Taipei and Beijing governments launched protests. This “united front” forced Japan to retreat from its original tough position and agree with three demands from Taipei, namely to apologize, release the captain and other crew members, and provide compensation for the fishing boat, gear, and equipment lost.22 The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, therefore, has virtually become a trigger point between Japan and China, as well as people in Taiwan and Hong Kong. As we can see, despite the political and ideological differences between these three places, when comes to the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, nationalism will serve as a link to unite Chinese people from different locales, encouraging them to adopt a similar position. It should be noted, however, that some people in Taiwan would not have a problem in giving Senkaku/Diaoyu to

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Japan, especially in exchange for support for Taiwanese independence. Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, in 2008, was quoted during a visit to Japan as saying “the land of the Senkaku Islands belongs to Okinawa, therefore it is a territory of Japan.”23 It is not difficult to find similar nationalistic sentiments in both Japan and South Korea when facing issues involving territory disputes. The water frontier disputes also often involve historical memories. For example, in the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu, the territory was viewed as a part of the territory concessions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, from the Chinese perspective.24 As mentioned earlier, at the end of World War II, when Taiwan was returned to China, the island should also have been returned. The settlements of the disputes are also heavily influenced by the dynamics of the changing international environment in the post-war era. In this case, it involved both the Cold War and US influence, as explained earlier. Similar arguments can be applied to the case of Dokdo/Takeshima between South Korea and Japan.

Significance — Economic Obviously, the water frontier disputes have important economic implications. As mentioned, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute was triggered by a report indicating that there is a huge oil/gas reserve below the water surrounding the island of Senkaku/Diaoyu. The case of Chunxiao/Shirakaba is directly related to the oil and gas fields. This is because the dispute concerns Japan challenging the Chinese right of developing an oil field at that location. It is also reported that over the surrounding area, which is partially disputed by the two countries, there may be one of the last undiscovered gas and oil reserves.25 Traditionally, those areas are also rich in fishery resources. The disputes, therefore, often appear to concern fishery rights. Many conflicts occurred around the East China Sea disputes involving Chinese fishery boats fighting with Japanese coast guards’ boats. This is especially true with the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu. On a number of occasions, fishery boats from Hong Kong and Taiwan sailed to the island area and experienced confrontations with Japan’s coast guard.26 Although some may consider the economic value of fishing

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to be negligible as compared to other issues, namely security issues, it is still an important economic dimension of the disputes. Recently, the issue of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) has drawn wide attention over the disputed areas. Both Okinotorishima/ Chongzhiniao and Socotra/Suyan have such implications. For example, as discussed before with the Okinotorishima/Chongzhiniao dispute, if Japan can successfully claim these rocks as legitimate territory, Japan’s water territory will increase enormously. This is the real reason for the Japanese government’s allocation of millions of dollars to try to permanently develop the rocks with possibilities of a lighthouse or other structures as detailed earlier. Therefore, this water dispute involves enormous economic stakes, including natural resources, fishery rights, and EEZ.

Significance — Security/Military All of the disputes have clear economic and political significances, but a few of them may also have important security/military significance. The best example is Senkaku/Diaoyu. There are a few proposals from the Japanese side to use the island for security/military purposes, with some experts claiming that the largest island could be used to build a missile base, radar system, or even a submarine base. Once these proposals become reality, they may indeed have significant security functions.27 Another dimension of, perhaps, larger potential significance involves sea lane transportation; there are differences between public international waters and those claimed as an EEZ with regards to transportation in the area. While the country who has claimed the area as an EEZ cannot completely block other countries from using the area, the country does have legal rights to restrict its usage.

Significance — International Relations in the Region How to solve these disputes is significant both in theory and in practice. Theoretically, this may become a test to see whether the mentality of a zero-sum game can be replaced with a win-win solution. As one remembers, during the Cold War era, the prevailing

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mentality was a zero-sum calculation. But with the new era of globalization and economic interdependence, arguments are increasingly in favour of win-win solutions for international disputes. China’s approach toward land border disputes (most recently in the cases with Russia and Vietnam) has clearly indicated that China’s preferred solution is to work on a compromise with disputed parties in order to achieve a win-win settlement. China’s desire to achieve a peaceful rise rather than through confrontation is another factor that needs to be considered. As mentioned, China has, by and large, settled its border lines with its surrounding countries (except India). What about the water frontier? Are there possible ways for China to settle the East China Sea disputes through peaceful means? Whether these issues can be settled through consultation or through confrontation is directly related to regional peace and stability. Therefore, all involved parties face a classic dilemma between rising nationalism domestically and the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. How to find the middle ground between these two basic areas has, therefore, become a test for all of the countries’ leadership. Moreover, the successful settlement of these issues is clearly linked to the development of the proposed East Asia community. When entering the 21st century, the momentum to develop an East Asia community modeled after the European Union (EU) is increasingly urgent for all related parties. The Beijing summit of October 2009 where leaders from Japan, South Korea, and China met included a detailed discussion about future directions of this issue. The very fact that an East Asia community proposal was raised by Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio indicated that there may be new momentum toward this direction.28 One cannot help but notice that historical memories and disputes in the East China Sea are two major obstacles to further the development of regional cooperation.

EVOLUTION OF BEIJING’S APPROACHES Ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Beijing’s foreign policy has adapted several different

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approaches. In an earlier published article,29 I proposed that one can at least discern three different approaches of the past several decades: the “history-embedded” approach, the “national interest-driven” approach, and the “co-management” approach. I also argued that until recently, China has emphasized the first two sets of considerations, but seems to be gradually moving toward a new approach, namely co-management with major powers.30 Chinese policy towards its northeast water frontier, particularly the disputes with Japan and South Korea, can be analyzed from these angles.

The History-Embedded Approach Towards the disputes with Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea, China’s policy is partially driven by China’s concerns about history. The most noticeable example is the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese side firmly believes that it had possessed the island for a long time and lost to Japan towards the end of the 19th century only because of the decline of the Qing dynasty and the defeat by Japan which led to the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 that ceded Taiwan to Japan. In that case, the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue and the issue of Taiwan are connected, although not exactly the same. It should be noted, however, that the history-embedded approach is not as important to Japan as it is to China. Japan has a tendency to ignore history, a fact that is evidenced by what is taught and not taught in Japanese schools. Japan is more concerned with the rise of China and what effect it will have on Japan’s place in the world. As a matter of fact, Beijing has been extremely sensitive toward any issues involving sovereignty and territory integration. During the period of Sino–British negotiation over the return of Hong Kong, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher that the Chinese government has no choice but to be firm regarding the full return of Hong Kong, because it is related to the legitimacy of the Chinese government.31 Deng further stated that if Hong Kong is not fully returned to the Chinese government, the leadership will be criticised as “contemporary Li Hongzhang.” Li had signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding Taiwan to Japan and was widely regarded by the Chinese as a traitor (even though there are different assessments by

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historians). Therefore, this history-embedded sentiment has been a powerful driving force behind any issues that involve China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is also clearly the principle motivation behind the Baodiao Yundong (Defend Diaoyu Movement) initiated by the people in Taiwan in the early 1970s that included the current president of Taiwan, Ma Yingjeou, who had been a student at Harvard. As mentioned, people taking fishery boats from Hong Kong and Taiwan attempting to land on the island are thinking along similar lines.

The National Interest-Driven Approach In recent decades, Beijing has begun to pay much closer attention to its national interests over these disputes. It becomes more tangible when economic interests are involved, such as oil, gas, and fishery resources. That issue may also include military and security significance, and concerns access to international sea lanes. China has become the world’s second largest oil consumer, and therefore, energy security is a major factor in Chinese foreign policy considerations.32 As China has increased its appetite of energy resources, any issues concerning oil and gas reserves cannot be taking lightly. The case of Chunxiao/Shirakaba is a clear example of this; with reports of up to 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent in the East China Sea, the Chinese are keen to keep this area under their control.33 The rising nationalism is closely associated with national interestdriven foreign policy approach. The dispute with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu as well as historical memory issues such as textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine triggered several large student demonstrations. Noticeable ones were in the 1990s and 2004. These bitter memories also include the lingering animosity towards Japan’s World War II invasion of China, and its brutal war behaviour during this period. These strong nationalist-oriented demonstrations may sometimes develop into anti-Japanese violence.34

The Co-Management Approach There have been many coordination efforts with other countries in Chinese foreign policy practice, but the co-management approach is

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different. Co-management involves more players at different levels of importance. While coordination implies countries working together at the same level, co-management implies that some players are more crucial than others. In recent years, Beijing has increasingly moved toward a co-management approach for the following three reasons. First, as China increased its political, economic, and even military power, it became ranked economically as one of the top countries in the world. With China becoming more integrated in the existing international system, China was asked repeatedly by other industrialised countries to become a “responsible stakeholder,” a term famously used by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick under the Bush Administration.35 Second, as China further integrated into the existing international system, the ongoing normal rules have gradually become a part of Chinese practice in its foreign policy. The learning process for China has been quick, and China increasingly prefers to use existing international institutions to solve various disputes. Third, with further integration in East Asia, the development of an East Asia community has required a closer cooperation between China and its Asian neighbours. Northeast Asia is involved in China’s core national interests. A win-win solution over disputed areas would be conducive not only to regional stability and prosperity but also to China’s own development. We can see a number of areas in which China has adopted comanagement approach. There are several examples: The most obvious example is the Six-party Talks (6PT) regarding the North Korea nuclear crisis. 6PT has been hosted in Beijing and has involved all major players in the region, including China, the US, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas.36 Despite its on and off pattern, it is clearly the only security framework in the region that involves both China and the United States as leaders. The second example is what I have called “implicit co-management” between China and the US on the issue of Taiwan.37 This was particularly true during the era of Chen Shuibian (2000–2008), who pushed hard for Taiwan’s independence, making the cross strait tension unprecedentedly high.38 In order to avoid military confrontations,

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both Washington and Beijing worked together to prevent Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence, therefore effectively avoiding what would have been a disastrous military confrontation between the two powers. The third example is China’s cooperation with ASEAN through the ASEAN+1 framework. China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 with ASEAN as a means of resolving territorial disputes and committing to joint exploration of the area, and in 2003, China signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.39 China also signed free trade agreements with the ASEAN countries; full implementation is to take place in 2010.40 The fourth example is the establishment and development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This relatively young international organisation reflected China’s co-management approach with Russia in dealing with Central Asia-related issues. In this organisation, China and Russia play co-leadership roles, not only working with official members including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but also including observing members such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

CONCLUSION: CO-MANAGEMENT ON THE DISPUTES IN EAST CHINA SEA When we look at the concept of co-management, it involves three basic elements. First, there must be an existing coalition of willing nations. Second, there must be incentives to overcome the differences between countries since cooperation is hard to maintain. Third, necessary mechanisms and institutions must be established to act as vehicles to facilitate cooperation among related players. In October 1978, when Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo to sign the peace treaty between China and Japan, he made a famous statement over the dispute of Senkaku/Diaoyu: “It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a

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solution acceptable to all.”41 The idea to shelve the issue was agreed upon by the two sides. Meanwhile, both sides should be prepared for joint development in the disputed region before they can find a final solution for this issue. This joint development idea has become an agreed upon way to, at least temporarily, settle the disputes. It may be called the initial stage of this co-management approach. Similar ideas might be used in the Socotra/Suyan issue between China and South Korea. There are, nevertheless, remaining questions about the effectiveness of these co-management and joint development approaches. First, it seems like there is not yet a guarantee for a peaceful settlement even with a timid agreement for joint development. Time and time again, particularly when the bilateral relationship worsens during a low point period or when the nationalist sentiment increases for various reasons, it becomes a possibility that this dispute may trigger military confrontation. Second, it is only logical that the country currently occupying the disputed territory may have the advantage. In the East China Sea case, Japan occupies Senkaku/Diaoyu and is also in practical control of Okinotorishima/Chongzhiniao. Therefore, Japan has greater freedom to act as it wishes. Similarly, China is in control of Chunxiao; therefore, China may ignore Japan’s protests and go ahead to develop the gas/oil fields and get resources from these operations, as has been the case most recently.42 Third, international opinion seems uncertain. The United States, for example, has appeared to have taken a neutral stance, although has stakes in these dispute issues, most notably in the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu as it may, at least indirectly, be related to the US–Japan alliance. We have examined Chinese foreign policy toward its East China Sea water frontier, particularly its disputes with Japan and South Korea. We have also analysed the evolution of Beijing’s approaches as an important part of Chinese foreign policy. Although China’s position has gradually shifted to a co-management approach by emphasising joint development, the history-embedded and national interestdriven approaches have continued to play important roles. Even when

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all related countries have agreed to use a co-management approach, there are still obstacles and uncertainties that exist before a peaceful settlement can be made. Facing these challenges in this new era of globalisation and regional integration, one may hope that there will be enough political and diplomatic wisdom among leaders in Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul as well as Washington to settle these issues peacefully so that these areas rich in natural resources can be jointly developed. The co-management guided practices may also become a foundation to enhance the momentum of an East Asian Community process.

NOTES 1. “Report: China, Vietnam Agree on Land Border,” 1 January, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/01/01/china.vietnam/ index.html. 2. “China: Russia to Return Disputed Border,” USA Today, 21 July, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-07-21-china-russialand_N.htm. 3. Zhongqi Pan, “Sino–Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12 (1), 2007, p. 72. 4. Keith Bradsher, “Discipline First for Taiwan’s New Leader,” The New York Times, 24 March, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/ 24/world/asia/24taiwan.html. 5. Janet Xuanli Liao, “Sino–Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 25 (1), 2008, p. 62. 6. Reinhard Drifte, “Engagement Japanese Style,” In Chinese–Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Complementarity and Conflict, Marie Soderberg, (ed), London; New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 55. 7. “China Develops Gas Field in East China Sea–report,” Reuters, 4 January, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINT33874420090104. 8. Liao, “Sino–Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability,” p. 61. 9. Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, 31 (1), 2007, p. 132.

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10. Shan Zhou, “China and Japan Agree on Joint Gas Exploration in East China Sea,” The Epoch Times, June 27, 2008, http://en.epochtimes. com/tools/id72597. 11. Ming Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 41. 12. Zhaoxu Ma, “Japan’s Claim of Chongzhiniao Rock Is a Violation of International Law,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 19 January, 2010. 13. Okinotorishima (2010, August 7). In Wikipedia. Retrieved September 8, 2010 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okinotorishima. 14. Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations, p. 41. 15. Reinhard Drifte, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea: From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 22 (3), 2009, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/ 3156. 16. David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 116–118. 17. Mark J. Valencia, “A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, 32 (4), 2008, p. 160. 18. Gang Qin, “Chinese Foreign Ministry Press Conference,” Chinese Foreign Ministry, 26 April, 2006. 19. Pan, “Sino–Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,” p. 75. 20. Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989, p. 50. 21. Stuart Biggs, “Taiwan Boat Sinks After Japan Coast Guard Collision, Kyodo Says,” Bloomberg News, 10 June, 2008, http://www.bloomberg. com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aNfOQUcp.g5w&refer=japan. 22. “Japan Official Apologizes to Taiwan Fishing Boat Skipper,” The China Post, 21 June, 2008, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign% 20affairs/2008/06/21/161941/Japan-official.htm. 23. “Lee Teng-hui Arrives in Japan,” Taipei Times, 5 September 2009, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/09/05/ 2003452834. 24. Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894–1972, Chicago: Rand McNally College, 1975, p. 25. 25. Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, 31 (1), 2007, p. 128.

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26. Reinhard Drifte, “Japanese–Chinese Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea — Between Military Confrontation and Economic Cooperation,” Working paper, Asia Research Center, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008. 27. Pan, “Sino–Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,” p. 72. 28. Aurelia George Mulgan, “Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and Regional Leadership Rivalries,” East Asia Forum, 13 October, 2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/13/hatoyamas-east-asiacommunity/. 29. Quansheng Zhao, “Moving toward a Co-management Approach: China’s Policy toward North Korea and Taiwan,” Asian Perspective, 30 (1), 2006, pp. 39–78. 30. Lars Carlsson and Fikret Berkes, “Co-management: Concepts and Methodological Implications,” Journal of Environmental Management, 75 (1), 2005, pp. 65–76. 31. John F. Burns, “Britain and China Sign Agreement on Hong Kong,” The New York Times, 19 December, 1984, p. A3. 32. Liao, “Sino–Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability,” p. 58. 33. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute,” p. 128. 34. P.S. Suryanaryana, “Tensions over History.” Frontline, 22 (9), 6 May, 2005. Also see “China, Protest Timeline,” 21 February, 2010. . 35. John Lee, “Big Trouble with Big China,” Foreign Policy, 2 February, 2010. . 36. Jayshree Bajoria and Carin Zissis, “The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1 July, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/. 37. Quansheng Zhao, “Explicit and Implicit Co-Management: China’s New Approach to International Crises,” in Conflict Prevention and Management in Northeast Asia, Niklas Swanström and Sofia Ledberg, (eds.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010, pp. 207–259. 38. “Interview with Taiwanese President Chen Shui-ban,” The Washington Post, 10 October, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn? pagename=article&node=&contentId=A9815-2003Oct10¬Found= true.

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39. Hongyi Lai and Tin Seng Lim, (eds.), Harmony and Development: ASEAN–China Relations, Singapore: World Scientific, July 2007, pp. xxi. 40. Vithoon Amorn and Apornrath Phoonphongphiphat, “China, ASEAN Sign Agreement on Investment,” Reuters India, 15 August, 2009, http://www.asiaone.com/Business/News/Story/A1Story20090815161280.html. 41. Pan, “Sino–Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,” p. 74. 42. “China Develops Gas Field in East China Sea — report,” Reuters India, 4 January, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/articleID33874420090104.

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8 The Evolution of Beijing’s Military Strategy Toward Taiwan You Ji School of Politics and International Relations, University of New South Wales

ABSTRACT Taiwan’s regime change in May 2008 has helped remove de-jure independence from Taipei’s official agenda and paved the way for the resumption of high-level official contacts and the exchange of good-will between top leaders across the Taiwan Strait. The overall tension has been eased substantially. This has the potential to change the nature of the tripartite military interaction between Washington, Beijing and Taipei in terms of de-warization. However, still in a state of war, militaries of both sides have not adjusted their force deployment, posture and readiness to fit in the changed political environment across the Taiwan Strait.

On 15 August 1964, ten days after the incident of Bay of Tonkin, Mao Zedong received Le Duan, the top aide to Ho Chi Minh. Mao 163

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said that “you do not want war. Neither do I. Nor do the Americans. Therefore, the war will not erupt.”1 However, the war did break out and lasted for more than a decade. In the Taiwan Strait, history seems to present a similar dilemma: nobody in Beijing, Taipei and Washington wants war but the clouds of war have never cleared since 1949. This paradox represents a central defining feature of the security relations between the mainland and Taiwan: that just because no one wants war does not mean peace. They have confronted a tragic irony that peace can only be maintained through the threat of war. On the other hand, looking back on the 60 years of precarious peace, one may be attempted to ask a question that, despite all signs of military tension in the Taiwan Strait, have we exaggerated the possibility of a Taiwan war? The very reason for asking this question is that a Taiwan war would be most likely Beijing’s initiative, as only the mainland would have the reason to launch a major war against Taiwan. Yet Beijing’s Taiwan policy has been embedded in its overall domestic and international strategic calculus. Military pressure on Taiwan, while a key component of its Taiwan policy, has always been made subject to other priorities. The core has been politics, not military. After the Korean War compelled the PLA to abort a massive amphibious attack against Taiwan in June, 1950, Beijing has never formulated any similar war plan to capture Taiwan by force, or anything similar to Taipei’s plan (guoguang jihua) to recover the mainland by military means that contained great operational details. This chapter argues that Beijing’s military policy toward Taiwan has been reactive-oriented and rationally contemplated. While there is no room for debate over what to do if Taiwan moves toward declared independence, a leadership consensus has been established that short of a de jure independence, no major military action should be taken, as it is not in the best interests of Beijing to do so. Therefore, any review of Beijing’s military threat against Taiwan has to be pursued from this perspective. Certainly a strategic consensus does not eliminate all the space for elite disagreement, especially over what to do with Taiwan’s creeping effort for independence under the DDP. Even if the leadership debate remains at the tactical level, it can affect Beijing’s decision-making process over many concrete

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issues, such as whether there is a need to impose a timetable for the ultimate solution.2 Misperception often arises due to a lack of nuanced analysis on Beijing’s determination on a war against de jure independence and the tactical ambiguity it tries to maintain to preserve the status quo in order to manage other international and domestic priorities. Politics thus provides the key for a dialectical balance to be achieved. Under such an analytical framework, this chapter will review how Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao managed the military aspects of Beijing’s Taiwan policy in the four periods in which they were the CCP leader.

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS UNDER MAO Till 1979, the military solution had dominated the thinking of CCP leaders who saw Taiwan affairs as exclusively military affairs — an extension of the unfinished civil war in the mainland, as understood by the two sides. Yet Beijing’s official slogan, “liberating Taiwan,” was not substantiated in any operational plans to liberate Taiwan after the US deployed the 7th Fleet in the Strait. Despite periods in which the PLA took offensive acts, the most noticeable being the 23 August bombardment of the Jingmen Islands in 1958, the mainland’s overall military posture was largely defensive during the bulk of the three decades. The newly released archive has revealed many interesting facts about Beijing’s Taiwan policy making that have not been previously properly explored.3 Mao’s Taiwan vision was strategic and never confined to the geographic setting of the Taiwan Strait. His central concern was about how to play the Taipei card in the Cold War power game, not merely by reunification through military actions.4

The Aborted Campaign to Capture Taiwan As early as 14 June, 1949, Mao issued the first order to Senior General Su Yu, asking the Third Field Army to start planning immediately for a major maritime campaign to capture Taiwan. One week

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later, Mao sent him another telegraph explaining why the invasion of Taiwan was so important: “Without taking Taiwan, KMT’s air force and naval bases in the island from which attack on the mainland was mounted would not be eliminated; Shanghai and the entire eastern coastal line would be under constant threat; the shipment route for China’s eastern provinces would be blockaded……”

Mao, for the first time, set the timetable for the campaign: making preparation in the summer and autumn and action in the winter. But due to the slow acquisition of combat aircraft and naval vessels for the operations, Mao instructed Zhou Enlai and Su Yu to postpone the date to the summer of 1950.5 Su’s plan assigned 12 armies for the operations in the first wave of attack, with a total manpower of half a million. Considering that KMT also had a similar number of soldiers, on 23 June, 1950, Su asked the CMC to reinforce him with three or four armies from the 4th Field Army. In the meantime, the naval assistance to the Taiwan operations was sought. By April 1950, the navy collected 51 combat ships and 52 landing ships. With other supporting ships, a total displacement of 44,000 tons was acquired.6 This was far from enough. According to Su’ calculation, in order to ferry 500,000 soldiers across the Strait, the Navy should provide transportation of 135,400 tons, including 575 ships above 1,000 tons and 2,000 landing crafts for 60,000 assault units in the first wave. A lack of naval capabilities repeatedly delayed the campaign. After the US 7th Fleet moved into the Taiwan Strait in June, the CMC officially terminated the Taiwan Campaign. The only chance for Mao to complete unification evaporated.

Politics Driving Cross-Strait Military Confrontation When Beijing realized that US involvement in Taiwan put its plan of invasion on a permanent hold, it readjusted the nature of PLA missions in the Strait from a quick military victory to protracted confrontation. But by then, the Taiwan issue had no longer enjoyed Mao’s priority attention in his overall management of state affairs.

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Soon, it became an important chip in his strategic chessboard in dealing with the complicated Cold War power game. International politics began to drive Beijing’s Taiwan policy formulation process. Although the ultimate objective remained to be reunification, the PLA’s actions were meant to support Beijing’s immediate diplomacy in between the two superpowers. Yet as far as the military guidance was concerned, it was designed not only to fulfil the PLA’s limited campaign objectives but also to maximise the political significance.

The anti-blockade operations In the Mao era, the PLA executed several rounds of troop redeployment according to the geographic shift of defence gravity. East China was the defence priority area in the 1950s, due to the Taiwan threat (the focus shifted to the north in the 1970s to cater for the rising Soviet threats).7 The primary combat mission for the PLA was to counter Taiwan’s blockade warfare (initially hard naval blockade in the early 1950s, but later surveillance blockade), sabotage warfare and tactical air and sea operations. Taiwan’s routine blockade in the Taiwan section of China’s coastal waters cost Chinese economy very dearly, forcing Beijing to rent foreign commercial vessels to transport goods overseas.8 It also cut off the linkage of the PLAN’s East Sea and South Sea Fleets. In 1962, Taiwan’s surveillance blockade was extended from the Taiwan Strait to almost all the SLOCs surrounding the East and South China Seas. As a counter measure, the PLA adopted a strategy of launching small but continuous counter-blockade operations in order to enlarge the combat zones in the coastal areas so that the enemy’s line of blockade could be pushed outward. This strategy was conditioned on seizing KMT-occupied offshore islands.9 In 1962, the PLA warships began to tail US destroyers along China’s maritime border-lines, a defensive measure similar to what it has been done to US spy flights in recent years. The sabotage warfare was meant to counter the similar warfare of the Nationalist Navy along the Chinese coast in the 1950s. This included mainly the ambushing of Taiwan’s naval vessels to the effect of counter-blockade. Hundreds of armed conflicts were recorded, with both sides suffering

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serious damages. Some of the actions, such as the 6 August Sea battle 1965, remained the largest in PLAN history. The PLA’s tactical campaigns involved some major landing operations, the most wellknown being the Yijiangshan amphibious attack.

23 August bombardment The Quemoy (Jinmen) bombardment in 1958 was the biggest military event in the last six decades of Cross-Strait confrontation and has had lasting impact on the Cross-Strait relations. From the very beginning, the bombing was not planned to effect Taiwan only. It was a calculated military adventure for political purposes that fitted in Mao’s plans on Beijing’s response to domestic and international challenges. First, the bombing was meant to send a strong protest to Washington against the signing of the US–Taiwan Security Cooperation Treaty. Second, Beijing expressed displeasure to Moscow over Khrushchev’s flirt with the US for a détente (his visit to Washington and his proposed treaty on nuclear weapons). By not explicitly informing this war act to the USSR, Mao conveyed to Khrushchev a message that it was he, not anyone else, who decided on key initiatives regarding China’s strategic interests.10 Third, the bombing was to retaliate Taiwan’s continued incursions into the Mainland. This was the only openly announced reason. Mao timed the attack amidst US involvement in the Middle East to offset the likely strong response from Washington. Initially, Mao did think of taking Jinmen, as he told a Politburo meeting that in the process of the campaign, Taiwan troops may be forced to withdraw from Jinmen, then the PLA should occupy it.11 However, Mao’s strategic vision was beyond Taiwan and he never attempted a showdown with either Washington or with Taipei in terms of launching any amphibious attack. None of the three motivations mentioned earlier was worth a war with the US. Mao summoned Lin Biao and Ye Fei to his summer resort in Beidaihe in August to solicit their opinions on how to avoid any accidental clashes with the US Navy. Lin even suggested to pass a secret message onto Washington through Sino–US ambassador talks in Warsaw to warn the US about the

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forthcoming bombardment. It was hoped that US warships would therefore keep away from the war zone. 12 At the Sino–USSR summit meeting in 1959, Mao also told Khrushchev that he had only intended to make trouble for the US rather than occupy Jinmen. So Moscow need not worry about being involved in a Taiwan war.13 Khrushchev was puzzled. He asked Mao “since the attack was already mounted, why not occupy the Islands?” Mao had his own calculations on the function of Jinmen under KMT control. First, Jinmen could be used to tie Taiwan to the mainland politically. Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from the offshore islands because they were not defendable. For Chiang, these islands provided the linkage with the mainland. They were also linked to his claim of the legitimate leader of all of China. Mao saw this as Chiang’s commitment to eventual reunification. The political value of these islands could be maximised under Taiwan control in that this would complicate America’s two-China solution to the Taiwan problem.14 Second, from the military point of view, Jinmen pinned down a large number of KMT troops. It was relatively easier to deal with the troops in Jinmen islands than if they were deployed in Taiwan per se. And Jinmen could be used to force Taiwan to send human and logistical reinforcement. This may create opportunities for the PLA to engage the enemy at the time and place it chose to fight. With these considerations, Mao used Kinmen to implement his “hangman’s noose” strategy.15 In 1962, Lin Biao formulated the PLA’s overall war guidelines, defined as withholding the Americans (in South Korea) and Japanese in the north but luring KMT forces in the south (beiding nanfang). It would take advantage of the KMT’s major invasion on the mainland (fangong dalu) in the south to weaken Taiwan’s military manpower, which was easier than dealing with it in Taiwan through an amphibious attack. Taking Jinmen would eliminate the foundation for such a hope.16 Later, Mao vetoed this formula. Mao argued that without USSR support, it would be doubtful that the PLA would withhold in the north. And he also doubted if Chiang would really carry out the plan to invade the mainland. In the late 1960s, he ordered the PLA’s

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six best armies to transfer from South to North China, further moving away from the idea of “liberating Taiwan.”17

A Brief Review Summary In Mao’s era, Beijing’s Taiwan policy formulation was actually simple and straightforward. It catered for a military confrontation rooted in the civil war between 1946 and 1949. Short of necessary capabilities to occupy Taiwan, Beijing selected a cold peace option. A status quo situation was thus ensued. However, in order to show Beijing’s determination against US demand that it should give up the threat of war as the foundation of its Taiwan policy, the PLA had to take some initiatives of war. This explained why the small scale armed clashes occurred up to 1966, more as an offensive measure for the purpose enhancing defence (yigong weishou). Mao set a two-pronged principle on dealing with the US and Taiwan. In answering the US request that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully, Mao said China could interact with Washington in a peaceful manner, but not with Taipei. He did not want to fight with the US. As for Taiwan, he treated it as internal affairs, so no option should be ruled it out. Negotiation could be attempted but military means had to be the core of Beijing’s Taiwan policy.18 On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek’s one-China principle and Chiang Ching-guo’s “three-Noism” (no compromise, no contact and no negotiation) actually made Beijing’s Taiwan policy process relatively easier: Taiwan’s anti-independence stance made it neither necessary nor urgent for a war to be planned.19 In 1959, Mao told Khrushchev that the Taiwan issue could be frozen for 30 years. Similar remarks were uttered to Kingsenger in 1971. This non-war, non-peace state of affairs (buzhan buhe) allowed Mao to concentrate on his priorities at home and abroad: launching the Cultural Revolution and promoting a strategic triangle framework between Beijing, Washington and Moscow. Consequently, politics served as the foundation of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. The unique practice of bombing Jinmen only on odd days reflected this principle and created the best military transparency between the two foes.

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BEIJING’S TAIWAN POLICY UNDER DENG AND JIANG 1979 was an epoch-making year in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. The slogan of “Liberating Taiwan” was substituted by the rhetoric of peaceful reunification.20 However, during the periods of Deng and Jiang when peaceful reunification was emphasized, military threat never ceased. Beijing’s Taiwan policy swayed in between but away from these two ends, a pendulum phenomenon still valid today.

From Ye’s 9-Point to 9.2 Consensus Peaceful reunification as a new guidance in managing Cross-Strait relations was first raised as an expedient measure for the establishment of Sino–US diplomatic relations. Beijing itself did not take it seriously at the beginning, as its realisation was non-existent. Yet the relationship between two emphases on peaceful reunification and military pressure gradually underwent major changes. On 13 June, 1983, the two sides had the first direct official contact near Xiamen where the mainland returned the corpses of Taiwanese pilots whose airplane crashed a few days earlier. The meeting was approved by the apex of power, Deng in Beijing and Chiang in Taipei.21 This marked the beginning of the end of Chiang’s “no-contact” policy. Soon the floodgate was open, as the KMT soldiers of mainland origin were allowed to make home visits. Business exchange followed. During the entire 1980s, Beijing adopted a proactive approach to embrace Taipei’s initiatives aimed at broadening Cross-Strait interaction. A new era of Cross-Strait relations had already begun. Official contacts played a crucial role in bringing the two authorities together. Top aides to Jiang (e.g. Zeng Qinghong and Wang Daohan) and Lee Denghui (e.g. Su Zhicheng) exchanged the views of both sides directly. In over two dozen secret meetings, a wide range of topics was discussed. Some of them achieved impressive results. For instance, the 8th meeting between Wang Daohan and Su Zhicheng in Hong Kong on 16 June, 1992, worked out the basics of the 9.2 Consensus that led to the first Wang-Gu talk in Singapore in 1993.22

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The 9.2 Consensus and the first Wang-Gu talk had been of great significance to both Jiang and Lee in terms of their power consolidation, probably more so for Lee than for Jiang. At that particular point in time, Lee needed to rally support from within the KMT at the initial stage of succession. The Cross-Strait relations could be used to garner support from the powerful mainlanders who still dominated the top echelons of KMT leadership. As a result, Lee contributed to the passage of the Unification Guidance (guotong gangling). For Beijing, eased tensions in the Strait enlarged the space for it to manage Sino–US relations that underwent substantial changes following the end of the Cold War. If Taipei were non-committal to independence, the Sino–US strife would remain ideological, not military. This alleviated the pressure on the PLA that faced a transitional vacuum in arms development: the bulk of its weapons were obsolete but it would take decades for its new designs to be operational. Beijing needed more breathing time. The 9.2 Consensus was important for long-term Cross-Strait relations in that it provided a framework for Beijing and Taipei to co-exist in the long process leading to ultimate reunification. In the meantime, the settlement of the state of war across the Strait could be found. As far as Beijing is concerned, it is not a satisfactory framework, as it may create a two-China phenomenon in the long transitional period. It is understandable that, at that time, Beijing did not officially embrace it. Yet the formula was not unacceptable to Beijing. It undermined the foundation of de jure independence and signalled that the Cross-Strait ties moved in a positive direction. Beijing hoped to gain more than “one China interpreted differently” in future negotiations. However, the situation suddenly changed in 1995, leaving Beijing little time to adjust to the new reality.

1995: A Year of Turning Points Lee Denghui’s US visit in 1995 forced Beijing to rethink its post1979 Taiwan policy. When the Politburo decided to accelerate preparations for military struggle in 1999, mainly for a Taiwan crisis,23 the basic policy guidance began to lean toward the threat of

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force, although it was not officially announced as such then. A brief review is necessary to provide a background for further analysis. Jiang’s Eight-Point Declaration, published in early 1995, reflected the Party consensus on a Taiwan policy based on peace inducement. It was meant to enhance official contacts following the Wang-Gu talk. Its key message: the Chinese do not fight the Chinese in wars, led to a half-way discarding of the military means as an option in resolving the Taiwan challenge. This reflected Jiang’s pragmatism that reunification could no longer be realised by military invasion which would only further alienate the Taiwan people. The purpose of Beijing’s use of force gradually shifted from aiming at reunification to deterring independence. Taiwan’s course of development since democratisation had to be accommodated. Lee Denghui may have sensed the danger of enhanced CrossStrait contact to his grand blueprint for independence. By 1995, with the help of James Song, Lee had consolidated his power in KMT. Conditions were ripe for him to do things that he was unable to do before. His US visit marked a turning point in the Cross-Strait relations. Beijing had always suspected Lee’s true intentions. Now he was seen carrying them out.24 Lee’s US visit triggered a heated debate in Beijing over what to do next. In the Beidaihe party’s annual working conference, leaders from state agencies of power (qiangli bumen) raised the issue of reviewing the Taiwan policy that overtly stressed on peace-inducement and which not only tied the hands of the mainlanders but also sent messages of weakness to Taipei, encouraging Lee to challenge China’s core security interests. Most importantly, they foresaw the emergence of an irreversible independence trend. Therefore, they called for new approaches in dealing with the Taiwan challenge. Some of them went as far as suggesting the revision of Deng’s one-centre strategy for China’s rise, namely placing economics as the centre of party work. They argued that, given the changed nature in the Cross-Strait relations, Beijing must be better prepared for what could happen in Taiwan in the years to come. They partitioned that another centre of work should be added to the one-centre principle, namely safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity through enhancing military pressure on Taipei.25

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Most of these leaders were PLA generals who once heard Deng say to them that the primary task of the Party and the PLA was to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.26 Jiang made enormous efforts to quieten down these voices. He persuaded them that adding another centre to the one-centre of economics in command would comprehensively alter China’s grand national strategy. For instance, the military budget would have to increase substantially, costing the economy dearly. Sino–US relations may adversely be affected to the point where room for cooperation would be significantly narrowed. More importantly, China could not afford to repeat Mao’s practice of perpetuating a sub-war state of affairs that exhausted national wealth, made the population nervous, and intensified external relations. To Jiang, despite Lee’s attempt, the situation was not that bad to warrant such a tremendous change in the national development strategy. Eventually, the politburo upheld Deng’s onecentre principle.27 On the other hand, the CCP also decided that Lee’s US visit should not go unanswered. This resulted in the series of missile exercises in the lead up to Taiwan’s general election in March 1996. These exercises served a number of purposes. First, it was a message to the PLA that the Party was very serious about the new Taiwan challenge and it was responding to it with appropriate measures. Second, it was a message to Taiwan that the military option in resolving the unfinished civil war still had its practical effect. Beijing was not afraid of using it against the action of de jure independence. Third, it was a message to the US about the bottom lines of China’s Taiwan policy. The war game signalled a level of brinkmanship but it kept a subtle balance between the need for continued stability in the Strait and the need to demonstrate Beijing’s resolution against Taidu. However, Beijing’s peaceinducement centred Taiwan policy was no longer sustainable, given the evolutionary trend in Taiwan. Instead, military pressure was given more prominence in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. In sum, the war game indicated leadership agreement to confirm the economics-incommand strategy but expressed Beijing’s determination of using force under certain circumstances.28

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1999: Accelerating the Preparation for War The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 changed the groundwork upon which China’s foreign policy was formulated. The incident convinced Chinese leaders of the US ultimate motivation toward the PRC.29 During that year’s Beidaihe conference, the Party made a profound decision to accelerate preparations for military struggle. To put it bruntly, it meant preparations for an eventual showdown with America. When this decision was relayed to the military, it received overwhelming support.30 Another main catalyst for the decision was Lee’s announcement of the two-state thesis that conveyed a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is not part of China. Jiang was outraged when he was informed that Lee organised a secret group to formulate the twostate thesis under Tsai Ing-wen during the time in which Jiang tried hard to restore Wang-Gu talks in 1998. Jiang’s untimely eight-point declaration seemed to reflect a one-sided love affair. To Beijing, Lee’s open announcement of a major policy that was so secretly brewed that even Su Chi, Chair of the MAC, did not even know about, revealed the seriousness of the event: his plans of de jure independence had moved to a new stage that warranted effective response. Accelerating war preparations is not an abstract concept. It entails detailed programs of troop redeployment, weapons R&D priorities and specific war game plans (zhanzheng yu’an). As far as the Taiwan issue is concerned, this new policy guidance reflects a higher level of urgency for military modernisation because any plan for a Taiwan war has to factor in US involvement. Moreover, it prescribed concrete steps in designing combat engagement and national mobilisation. The altered regional security order led the PLA to shift defence priority from North China to South/East China adopting a posture that was more offensively oriented.31 This was a huge project and the key to its success lay in the improvement of Chinese relations with its land neighbours. China’s prudent policy towards the Spratly dispute stabilised China’s relations with ASEAN but the moderation of action was specifically motivated by the PLA’s concern of avoiding having both “hot potatoes” in hand.32

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The Party’s 1999 decision amounts to a de facto two-centre strategy; although the centre on economic growth was dominant in the open, the centre on war preparations was basically a low-key endeavour. The contrast was sharp when compared with the mainstream thinking in the 1995 Beidaihe meeting. The moods of both civilian and military leaders was visibly different as well, following the DDP’s coming to power in 2000.

HU JINTAO’S CONTROL OF TAIWAN POLICY Hu took over the daily management of Taiwan affairs at about the same time he became deputy commander-in-chief in 1999. That year he, rather than Jiang, presided over the annual national TAO conference, normally held in December each year. He also presided over the meeting where Qian Qishen announced the “new three-sentence” (xinsanju) that defined the status quo in the Cross-Strait ties in a similar manner of the KMT’s: both Taiwan and the mainland belong to China that is currently divided. This was Beijing’s concession on its previous definition that Taiwan was a province of the PRC. Hu’s presence at this meeting added the political weight of the policy change. After the 16 Party Congress, Hu made a tactical attempt to re-emphasize peaceful inducement before the Cross-Strait situation further deteriorated. Since then, Hu demonstrated a high level of rationality in meeting the DDP’s challenge. In a way, he believed that the prospect of war in the Strait was real but not as urgent as it appeared to be. Therefore, it was possible for Beijing to concentrate all national energy on developing the economy. This was clearly expressed by Hu in his first news briefing as the new party leader on 15 November 2002.33 Despite instability in the Cross-Strait relations, Hu’s rationality was the mainstay policy platform in Beijing.34

2004/05: Heightened Tensions in Cross-Strait Relations Hu’s statement, “boosting economic development with all national will” (yixin yiyi qiufazhan), was less heard in official media after Chen won his second term in office. Instead, on 29 August, 2004, Hu spoke

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to the national conference of ambassadors in Beijing, stressing that the primary task of Beijing’s diplomacy is to protect the nation’s sovereignty and security.35 Chen’s push of de-sinfication (qu zhongguohua) convinced Beijing that even if the war was not eminent, preparations for it had to take a higher gear. If Chen moved to hold a referendum on the Constitution in 2006 and promulgated a new constitution in 2008, as he repeatedly promised, it would mean war, but the PLA’s readiness for it was far from adequate. The PLA believed that it should not trust the US in containing Taiwan’s unilateral change of the state quo. Chen’s “Five Nos” in his May 2000 speech was seen as a smoke screen for the pursuit of perpetual separation. In response, Beijing issued a 17 May statement that could be read as a notice for action. Now, the sequence of Beijing’s concerns in dealing with Taiwan started to shift in the ranking of military, economics and politics, as compared with the rank of politics, economics and military before 1995. Gradually, the Cross-Strait interaction moved into a sub-war confrontation. One of Hu’s first orders upon resuming the post of commander-in-chief was to urge senior PLA officers to place war preparations as their top priority in work.36 Accelerating war preparations quickly emerged from a disguised form.37 In the 1980s, Deng raised his political slogan: rich nation first, powerful military to follow. This underpinned his one-centre mentality: without economic prosperity, how could China build a powerful military?38 Under mounting US pressure and the DDP challenge, Beijing realised that without a powerful military, a rich nation could be fragile. Prosperity meant little, if the country was pushed around. Now, rich nation and a powerful military received near-equal emphasis in the CCP’s priority list.39 Indeed, such a new understanding promoted the rise in importance of national defence and accorded the Taiwan issue a status of being the core of national interests. War preparations became the most important, practical and urgent task of the PLA.40 This indicated that PLA leaders were planning against the worst case scenario that the DPP may take a decisive step for de jure independence in Chen’s last years in office. Shanghai deployed S-300 missiles against Taiwan’s potential attack and conducted an anti-air-raid exercise in 2002, the first in nearly five

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decades.41 The process of accelerating the preparations for war had entailed a process of quiet national mobilisation.

The Anti-Secession Law The Anti-Secession Law (ASL) was an integral part of war preparations that underlined Hu’s new thinking on the Taiwan policy: prioritizing anti-independence over reunification. He made the hard means harder and soft means softer. The two seemingly contradictory themes in Hu’s Taiwan policy were reconciled by the objective of maintaining the status quo. Accelerating war preparations aimed to build military superiority in order to deter Chen’s independence attempts and to reduce the US absolute military superiority to a relative one. The soft approach in Hu’s Taiwan policy, as demonstrated by his shelving “one country, two system” formula, acquiescing in the ROC as the symbol of the status quo, making further economic concessions to tie Taiwan’s economy to that of the mainland, and extending support to anti-independence forces within Taiwan, continued the peace/war nexus, increasing the cost for de jure independence with visible success. In the long run, both soft and hardline options may create favourable conditions for Beijing in a race against eventual secession. The ASL was the mechanism used to channel the soft/hard approaches into one legal framework.42 The ASL was Hu’s response to the rising pressure of Taidu.43 What is unique about the ASL is that it was not designed to respond to the DDP’s piecemeal initiatives. It sets the final line of defence against de jure independence. When such a policy is legally codified, it generates the predictability of Beijing’s behaviour in a given situation. At the same time, the Law reflects Beijing’s hopes to uphold a maximum level of tactical ambiguity, the key for war avoidance. To Beijing, the DDP’s move for de jure independence would not be a desperate act but one based on the belief that the PRC would only “bark” about independence. Many analysts speculated that Beijing would not take action for fear that a failed attack would cause regime collapse.44 The ASL was thus intended to assure that peaceful independence was a myth. However, if this message can be

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effectively received by Taipei, it is necessary for Beijing’s threat to be convincing. Article Eight serves this purpose. Domestically, without this law, Beijing’s inaction to de jure independence may just mean a loss of legitimacy in the public’s eyes. With this law in place, its inaction would be interpreted as betraying the CCP’s claim of being law abiding. The huge pressure may trigger massive social protests that may bring down the government.45 Indeed, in Beijing’s scale of worse case scenarios, the fear of a legitimacy collapse due to inaction against Taiwan independence outweighs the fear of anything else, such as high economic cost. This strategic calculus underlined the production of the ASL and the reason why Beijing positively backed itself in a corner. When forced to make a choice between state survival and an unpredictable war, all the CCP can do is to plan the war carefully to avoid defeat by making any armed conflict in the Strait more political than military.46 This is about winning by not losing. This predicability of military action inherent in the ASL is reflected by three prior-declared situations listed in Article Eight: declared independence; a major event leading to de jure independence and no possibility left for peaceful reunification. Yet launching military actions against declared Taiwan independence has been the PRC’s open policy all along, why restate it in a law such as ASL. The answer lies in Beijing’s situation evaluation. Taiwan’s independence is a long-term threat but China was most vulnerable to it up to 2008: Chen’s desperate challenges to Beijing in his last years in office, Hu’s consolidation of power, Beijing’s Olympic Games and the PLA’s transitional difficulties in capability building, to name a few. According to Huang Jiashu, Chen’s push for constitutional reform was actually drawing the roadmap for de jure independence and, if it went ahead, it would qualify a major event of de jure independence defined by the ASL. A war may be just around the corner.47 By 2005, a wide-spread feeling emerged among China’s strategists that a Strait war was inevitable.48 This threat perception highlighted the military centrality in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. To Beijing, the preparation for war was a long process in which resolve is more important than capabilities in preventing a premature showdown. In the extent to which psychological warfare serves as a deterrence, the ASL was an effective embodiment of such warfare.

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Hu’s New Thinking: Ambiguity is the Name of the New Game Ironically, the ASL was designed to avoid war as an ultimate goal. This would be achieved through enlarging the space for Beijing to operate ambiguity in meeting the Taiwan challenge when domestic stability dominated Beijing’s security concern.49 Ambiguity gives Beijing the final say to when and how to fight. It also meant adding deliberate obscurity when interpreting the urgency of the challenge. Thus, the decision-making process is allowed to acquire the highest degree of flexibility. Hu’s dialectic Taiwan policy is that, until the showdown sets in, peace initiative must not be given up. While military preparations were strengthened to provide the means of deterrence for the peace inducement, this alone was inadequate for maintaining the status quo. A comprehensive package must be developed. This can be seen from the following aspects.

Ambiguity on the one-China principle The One-China principle is Beijing’s bottom line of its Taiwan policy. Tactically, however, there is leeway to interpret its meaning. On one end, one-China can be Beijing representing the whole of China and Taiwan, a province. On the other end, one-China may be neither PRC nor ROC. It reflects a reality that China was in a state of division. Over time, Beijing’s official interpretation gradually leaned towards the latter, as stated in Hu’s six-point statement in December 2008 that further abstracts the principle in order to break the dead-lock in Cross-Strait interaction. The origin of the concession was Deng’s decisive intervention in 1992 to clean up obstacles to the first Wang-Ku talk. Deng instructed that both the PRC and ROC belonged to one-China whose political meaning could be purposefully left undefined until conditions were ripe. In doing so, Beijing dropped its previous centre-provincial stress. More importantly, under this principle, the ROC was no longer treated as a defeated power, nor was Taiwan as a renegade

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province. The de facto equal status of the two parts was therefore acknowledged. The significance of Deng’s intervention is twofold. First, an initial expedient move was made, providing official guidance for Beijing’s long-term Taiwan policy.50 Second, this guideline allowed Hu to formulate the Taiwan policy with maximized flexibility.

Ambiguity on a timetable The essence of a timetable for reunification is about war and peace in the Strait. It is another dilemma for Beijing. Under a timetable, Beijing will have much diminished space for tactical ambiguity. Mao realised this four decades ago. He told Kissinger that he could wait 100 years for a solution of the Taiwan issue. This proved to be the guidance for Deng to construct the Taiwan policy. However, Mao could not anticipate a non-KMT ruler in Taipei that would move the island away from the mainland. The wait of Mao and Deng was conditioned on Taiwan holding the one-China principle, no matter who represented that one China. A timetable would force Beijing to readjust its national strategy and adversely affect Sino–US relations. Since 2004, when Washington said that it was opposed to any unilateral change in Taiwan’s status quo, it has basically targeted the DDP. However, had Beijing pronounced a timetable for an early resolution, it would have become the party intending to change the status quo with serious consequences beyond the Cross-Strait relations. The successive national leaders in Beijing tried to shelve this question for the sake of their broader strategic consideration of the country’s internal and external affairs.51 Before 1999, the timetable was not a key issue in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. The issue was revisited when Beijing published the second Taiwan White Paper in 1999, which threatened to use force if Taipei resisted the reunification talk indefinitely. In a way, this was a copy of Jiang’s remarks to a TV interview with the Associated Press in 1998 when he used the rhetoric of “indefinitely.” However, the word indefinitely does not really represent any

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timetable. It gives Beijing a new justification of using force while setting no enforceable deadline for using force. The White paper addressed different constituencies with an important policy platform. Jiang’s alleged time framework of 20 years was interpreted as imposing a timetable. However, this may well be his judgement that within that timeframe, Taipei would attempt de jure independence and, as a result, a war had to be fought.52 In fact, Jiang’s policy was consistent that there should not be any specific timetable for reunification.53 A timetable would inevitably stress the centrality of a military solution of the Taiwan challenge and disrupt China’s economics-in-command strategy. Immediately after Hu became CMC chair, he convened a high-level Taiwan affairs meeting that adjusted Beijing’s Taiwan policy. A three-newsentence principle was again set: peaceful negotiation should be sought; preparation for war should continue; and patience should be exercised. The last sentence shows the leadership’s rejection to a timetable.54 The word indefinitely has now disappeared from official statement.

BEIJING’S POLICY EVOLUTION SINCE 20 MAY 2008 The regime change in Taipei has substantially altered the strategic nature of the Cross-Strait relations. To put it simply, if Beijing’s Taiwan policy was bottom-lined on anti-de jure independence, it registered an overnight victory almost without a fight on 22 March, 2008. In the foreseeable future, e.g. up to 2016 if Ma clinches the second term, Beijing is automatically in a “no-lose” position, as far as its efforts of anti-de jure independence is concerned. This sudden seachange opens a wider range of policy choices for Beijing to build a gradual preponderance over Taiwan.55 As an outcome, Beijing has taken a reluctant but positive-sum response toward Ma’s requests in political, economic and diplomatic areas. Yet Beijing’s compromises, so far, seem to have been tactical by nature in comparison with its new strategic gains.

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Beijing’s Strategic Gains The significance of the KMT in power to Beijing can be concretely seen from the following points. 1. It gives Beijing an extended “strategic opportunity period” to 2016.56 This would be a further extension of eight years that Beijing has already obtained, thanks to the war against terror since 2001. By 2016, the PLA will get closer to achieving minimum MAD (mutually assured destruction) capabilities vis-à-vis the US which would complicate Washington’s decision-making process concerning a Taiwan war. By then, China’s economic power will have reached a new height, delivering a lot more wealth for military transformation. 2. The likely de-warization (qu zhanzhenghua) in the Strait will help reduce the level of militarisation in the Sino–US relations. As Taiwan is the only cause for the pair to engage in a war,57 peace in the Strait on the basis of maintaining the status quo, the core of Ma’s mainland policy, may help remove the most likely trigger for armed conflicts between the two nuclear powers. Without a drag such as the Taiwan issue on China’s diplomacy, Beijing can also deal with challenges posed by other countries with a relatively freer hand. 3. The reduced level of tension in the Strait helps Hu concentrate his time and energy on handling his priority concerns over domestic stability. One of these relates to how the next round of CCP succession will be managed. Without an overt disruption of the Taiwan challenge, arranged succession would be pursued with a level of smoothness. 4. Taiwan’s creeping independence has lost momentum when it lost state sponsorship. For a long while, Beijing had no effective counter measures against the DDP’s salami moves.58 Now the situation has been reversed when an elected leader helped to curb the trend from within. 5. Taiwan’s economic dependence on Beijing will deepen significantly by 2016, with a quickened pace of integration between the

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two sides, driven by three-direct-links and the ECFA. When half of Taiwan’s economic activities are tied to that of the mainland, according to Chinese economists, de jure independence will almost become an unrealisable concept.59 The list expands. Predictably, as long as Ma’s non-independence stance holds, concessions from Beijing will be further expected. Beijing’s good-will gesture to improve the bilateral relations will be structured into aiding Ma to win the second term in 2012. The immediate policy challenge to Beijing is, however, how to recalibrate its existing hierarchical order of the two-pronged policy. The employment of military pressure may have helped prevent the worst from happening, but at a high cost.60 It was high time that there should be a change in approach, if not in texture.

De-Warization as the Immediate Goal Ma’s non-independence policy has made it possible for an emerging trend of de-warization (qu zhanzhenghua) in the Taiwan Strait. De-warization has been the largest common denominator for Washington, Beijing and Taipei. The DDP’s search of de jure independence undermined a strategic framework for maintaining the status quo that was upheld until 2000. Today, the three parties restored this strategic framework. Clearly, the PLA has been a visible beneficiary of this trend. First, the trend of De-warization allows the PA to break away from a sub-state of war (linzhanzhuangtai) for the second time since the late 1960s when Sino–USSR tensions forced it to prepare for an imminent military clash. Large quantities of low quality arms were promptly produced and became obsolete soon after, becoming a huge waste of resources.61 Up to 2008, history seemed to repeat itself, though with qualitative differences. After the Politburo’s 1999 resolution on war preparations, China’s defence industries received an unprecedented number of orders. If the DDP made good its promise to hold a referendum for a new Constitution in 2006, a Taiwan war seemed to be more imminent than common sense judgment would

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have indicated. In order to maintain a high level of deterrence, the PLA had to introduce a conventional armament that, it knew, would become obsolete quite soon. For instance, the PLA procured a substantial amount of advanced but near obsolete Russian weapons. Yet, without these arms, the PLA could be ill-prepared for a worst case scenario in the Strait that appeared likely to happen in Chen’s last years in office. Without a better option, the CMC chose the lesser evil that was economically expensive.62 Under no pressing war pressure, the PLA is in a much better position to project its comprehensive transformation. For instance, when the need to acquire emergency hardware systems has eased, more allocations could be directed to enhance PLA informationization (xinxihua), such as the C4ISR architecture and the military space programs. The PLA’s equipment policy can be adjusted with a longer view. This would induce the change in arms production from aiming at specific battle scenarios in the Strait to aiming at production for the purpose of raising the PLA’s overall capabilities so that it would be better equipped to deal with all situations, including the Taiwan challenge. More money is available for the R&D of the future generations of weapons without weakening the current level of readiness due to a lack of any urgent situations. One specific example is the on-going debate among naval planners. After the completion of the 18-New Ship Project, they are facing key choices: to add a few more third generations’ destroyers (053) and frigates (054), or to concentrate on the fourth generation combatants. Taking the former choice is logical, as the three two-pairs of ships (052C, 053B and 053C) can be regarded as experimental ones. Adding follow-ups is explainable. However, if the pressure of a Taiwan war is not high, it is more sensible for the PLAN to choose the second choice. Japan’s new carrier destroyers has stimulated the PLAN to think about how to match it. The carrier project may also get a boost.63 Second, China confronts multiple security threats, but in the last decade, it has to focus on building military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan.64 Security threats from other strategic directions, e.g. along China’s land borders, could not be given due attention they deserved

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until now. The new challenges in Xinjiang and Tibet call for immediate counter measures through more force deployment. Terrorist threats remain real, although not strategic by nature. For a long time to come, the PLA’s overall deployment guidance of defensive defence in the north and defensive offense in the south (beigong nanshou) will not change. This entails a strategic guidance of the 1.5 war scenario: waging an offensive war against Taiwan independence and a defensive counter attack along the land borders due to the “chain reaction of a Taiwan war by China’s hostile land neighbours.”65 Yet the defensive posture in the northwest and southwest can now be better taken care of with strengthened redeployment against India’s stationing of 60,000 more soldiers in the Zangnan region, increased hostility in the Korean Peninsula and clashes along Sino–Burma borders.66 This continental defence has been comparatively less emphasised up to now in order to place the limited resources along the eastern flank. Now, if the CMC wants to adjust the force strength in the two directions, de-warization in the Taiwan Strait may offer an unprecedented opportunity. For instance, when the missiles deployed across the Strait are reduced in number, they can be moved elsewhere to counter the new threats.67 The above mentioned strategic gains of the PLA since May 2008 provide the foundation for Hu to fine-tune Beijing’s two-pronged Taiwan policy: easing military pressure and increasing peace inducement. However, this is easier said than done. The major source of tension lies in the fact that the two sides are still in a state of war and the hostility of many Taiwanese toward the mainland is deeply entrenched. Ease of tension notwithstanding, there are huge uncertainties ahead that are serious enough to put the PLA on the constant alert, e.g., the prospects of the DDP coming back to power in the future.68 This is reflected by the so-called Ma Ying-jeou dilemma in Beijing’s Taiwan policy.69 To many PLA officers, the analysis by Gompert before May 2008 that: “Imaging a future moment in which Beijing concludes that Taipei is using practical cooperation and political dialogue with China as a smoke screen for the pursuit of de facto independence” may be more relevant now under Ma’s “mutual non-

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denial” (hubu fouding) guidance than under Chen’s creeping independence.70 Even if “mutual non-denial” is frameworked within the “one-China” rhetoric, it is clearly a notion of two Chinas. When this notion is operationalised in Taipei’s efforts to enlarge international space, it is linked more to ultimate secession than to reunification. In the views of many mainlanders, Taipei has been presented with a real bargain with one vocal commitment to none-independence, as seen by Beijing’s unprecedented concessions: WHA, ECFA, tourism, mainland’s investment and its positive response to so-called “diplomatic truce,” to name a few. Ma’s three-Noism is a recycled expression of US advocacy. More seriously, in this three-Noism, resisting reunification is deliberately tasked prior to shelving de jure independence. In addition, Ma has changed a long-term KMT definition about Taiwan’s future status from belonging to the people across the Strait to belonging to the Taiwanese only. Beijing’s Taiwan specialists are troubled by a strategic question of whether Ma’s Strait vision converges with Lee Denghui’s.71 So far, Beijing has selected not to employ such an interpretation, wisely and correctly. In order to maintain the momentum of closer contacts across the Strait as an outcome of Taipei’s rhetorical adherence to the 1992 accord, Beijing has exercised a maximum level of ambiguity to manage the Ma Ying-jeou dilemma. The question is whether this compromise will be firmly upheld, as ambiguity is a hotbed for controversies by itself. This is especially true when sensitive issues arise, such as the Dalai Lama’s Taiwan visit in August that forced Hu to make tough decisions on whether to retaliate.72 Not all CCP leaders see that Beijing’s strategic gains from Ma’s claim on non-independence exceed its tactical concessions. Occasionally, sharp criticisms are heard over some issues, such as the US arms sales to Taiwan.73 Major General Luo Yuan has been the only senior official to criticize Ma by name over his approval of the Dalai’s visit to Taiwan.74 However, Beijing’s mainstream post-5.20 Taiwan policy has been centred on promoting peaceful development across the Strait. This will help to institutionalise the desire for peace and the fear for war in both capitals. Beijing and Taipei hope to end the state of war between

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them.75 The current trend of de-warization represents the first step toward this goal, but there are many practical obstacles on the way. As a start, the military confidence-building measures (CBM) could serve as the practical means for institutionalising the current ad hoc military interaction across the Strait. Hu’s call for building mutual military and security trust with Taiwan in his six-point declaration has caught many analysts by surprise. When both Lee and Chen raised the CBM issue, Beijing’s response was predicably negative. PLA researchers wondered how it was possible to end the state of war when political hostility was so deeply entrenched. CBMs were simply impossible.76 Now they have realised that on the basis of the status quo, military and security trust is probably more conducive to Beijing than to Taipei, considering the multiple threats China confronts. It is worth pursuing, as nothing else is more helpful than a mutual no-war arrangement in preventing the PLA from being dragged into a two-war situation. Hu’s advocacy of ending the state of war in the Strait cannot be sought without a tacit agreement on military and security trust between the two sides. With de jure independence and reunification as the primary goals of Beijing and Taipei being shelved, the most difficult obstacle for negotiations has been removed. It seems that such CBM talks have become inevitable, although the biggest threat for the talks to proceed smoothly is a hasty approach toward it. Gradualism is the name of the game and the roadmap is drawn from the periphery to the core of the security concerns of both sides. As far as Taipei is concerned, one immediate thorn is the PLA’s missile deployment along China’s eastern coast. Both politically and militarily, the number of the missiles is reducible. And as a good faith in materialising CBMs across the Strait, streamlining a level of missile deployment may have become a question of when, not wether. Even when pro-independence forces were in power, missile reduction may have already become a resolvable issue, as disclosed by Jiang’s formula of “reduction of missile deployment for reduction of US arms sales,” suggested to Clinton in 1998. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s former ambassador to Washington, also confirmed a plan for reduction, if a regime

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change in Taipei was realised.77 However, the PLA has to ensure that its action on missile reduction is based on the following conditions. First, the withdrawal of the missiles has to be on PLA terms, not as an answer to any precondition imposed upon it by anybody else. The PLA’s missile deployment in the eastern coast is not merely aimed at Taiwan. Japan and the Korean Peninsula are also war scenarios that require creditable missile deterrence. Second, in operational terms, it is simplistic to assume that missile deployment is highly mobile so it is easy to withdraw and re-station. Many technical factors exist to make reduction difficult. Third, Taiwan also deploys LACMs and other types of missiles against the mainland. Last but not least, if the reduction is indeed politically necessary, the withdrawal has to be done at a right time to maximise its strategic significance. Probably a proper timing would be prior to Taiwan’s general election in 2012. However, since missile reduction is fundamentally a political issue, a level of political trust has to be achieved before it can be done.78

CONCLUSION Beijing’s Taiwan policy in the last six decades has been dominated primarily by political considerations centred on maintaining domestic stability and minimising international backlashes. Rhetorically, Beijing seems to have an unwavering goal of reunification. In fact, it has not had any specific plans to reunify Taiwan by force. The reasons are many, such as the PLA’s inadequate naval and air power to subdue Taiwan’s resistance; Beijing’s hierarchy of national priorities that see Taiwan issue at a relatively low rank unless there is a major trouble there; consideration of long-term negative consequences of armed occupation that may cause too many unnecessary casualties; and of course, the international factors. Simply, the mainland has no official policy of taking Taiwan militarily. Certainly Beijing does formulate plans for coercive use of force, against a background of Taiwan moving faster toward independence. These range from launching missiles against high-valued military targets to limited sea blockade.79 But what is not in the plan is the so-called “decapitating Taiwan’s leadership” (zhanshou jihua).80

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Beijing, not to mention the difficulties in locating, tracking and targeting the Taiwanese leaders, understands the consequences that this kind of operation may cause: it would bring the Taiwanese population behind the leaders, and it would definitely escalate the war to an uncontrollable level against Beijing’s goals, defined as a military action to roll back the moves of de jure independence rather than an all-out war.81 It would make US military intervention more likely and arouse international condemnation. Unless the mainland already suffers a large number of civilian casualties with the unfolding of war, decapitation is not on the card. The insistence on not relinquishing a military option to resolve the Taiwan issue has changed in nature over time. In the early days of the PRC, the military option was based on a genuine desire to achieve reunification by force. Gradually, it has become an instrument for maintaining the status quo through the threat of war. In the international arena, it serves to show Beijing’s policy consistence from Mao to Hu. Domestically, it acquires a function of legitimacy consolidation for the consecutive generations of leadership. Yet the possibility of Beijing to resort to the employment of force has become smaller and smaller as time passes. Even inside China, the majority of the middle class people would not see it necessary to realise reunification through launching a massive military campaign against Taiwan. The Emperor Kangxi way has become increasingly irrelevant. In fact, there are other better and cost-effective means available for Beijing to promote ultimate reunification: economic and cultural integration. This is the core content of Hu’s Taiwan strategy defined by “peaceful development,” which reflects Hu’s confidence that time is on Beijing’s side. Peaceful competition is probably a more appropriate term to capture Beijing’s real mood: with its ascendance as a world power and with the two economies becoming inseparable, the initiative will be firmly in Beijing’s hands. Therefore, as long as the Taiwan Strait remains stable, CCP leaders would be less concerned about ultimate reunification than about effectively managing the complicated domestic and international affairs. Increasingly, the military option has become a non-option in resolving the Taiwan challenge, just as war-causing de ure independence is a non-choice for

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the well-being of the Taiwan people for a long time to come. In addition, the majority of the Taiwan people have not accepted the fact that they have to fight a war for independence.

NOTES 1. The Chinese Soldiers in the Vietnam War, a documentary by Phoenix TV, 26 July 2004. 2. This was reflected in the PLA’s 2002 Defense White Paper which stated that the Taiwan issue should not be dragged on indefinitely. 3. The book edited by Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng provided good insights on the decision process. See Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng (eds.), Managing Sino –American Crisis, Washington DC: Carnegie Foundation, 2006. 4. Yan Mingful and Zhu Ruizhen, “1959 heluxiaofu fanghua de qianqian hou ho,” (Events prior to and after Khrushchev’s China visit in 1959), Sources of CCP history, 4, 2006, p. 36. 5. Mao Zedong, The Chronicle of MaoZedong, 2, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, p. 541. 6. Ibid, p. 541. At that time, the East China Naval Headquarters was the only naval command in the PRC. The CMC wanted to make it the national command. Clearly, Qingdao is the better location for the purpose, but not so good for the Taiwan operations. At Su Yu’s request, the CMC established a separate headquarters in Beijing later. 7. Ye Huinan, “Jianguo yilai woguo guofang zhanluede sici zhongda tiaozheng”(The four major adjustments of our national defence strategy since the founding of the PRC). The Journal of PLA National Defence University (PLA NDU), 5, 2000, p. 16. 8. The cost was very high, with the total amounting to 170 million Yuan a month. See Liu Jixian and Xu Xikong (eds), Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yuduice yanjiu (The maritime strategic environment and the study of counter measures), Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 1996, p. 339. 9. Li Jie and Su Dushi, “Mao Zedong yu zhongguo haiyun” (Mao Zedong and the PLA Navy), China Military Science, 2, 1997, p. 71. 10. The debate of whether Beijing informed the USSR about the 8.23 bombing has lasted to this day. As the major event leading to the

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11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

Sino–USSR split, its significance should not be underestimated. Shen Zhihua, “Paoji jinmen, zhongguo shifou gaozhile sulian?” (Did China inform the USSR prior to the Jinmen bombing?,” zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (The history study of communist party of china), 4, April 2004. Sun Qimin, “Zhongsu guanxishi” (History of Sino–Soviet Relations), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 343. Ye Fei , “Yefei huiyilu” (Autobiography of Ye Fei), Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2007, Chapter 42. Yan Mingful and Zhu Ruizhen, “1959 heluxiaofu fanghua de qianqian hou hou,” p. 39. Zhu Aihua and Sun Longhai, “Jinan daoyu fengsuo zuozhan” (Blockade operations against the offshore islands), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe (Military Science Publishing House), 2002, p. 28. Ye Fei , “Yefei huiyilu,” Chapter 42. “Jianguohou Linbiao Luo Ruiqing weihe chuxian zhijun zhanlue fenqi” (Why Lin Biao and Luo Ruiqing had the strategic difference in designing a national defence strategy), Wangyilishi, 30 August 2009. On this round of force redeployment, see You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, Sydney, London & New York: Allen & Unwin and I.B. Tauris, 1999. Yan Mingful and Zhu Ruizhen, “1959 heluxiaofu fanghua de qianqian hou hou,” p. 41. Mao approved Zhou Enlai’s suggestion that some contacts with Taipei should be arranged. This led Zhang Shizhao’s meeting with KMT representatives in Hong Kong in 1964. Robert Ross used the word tolerance to characterise the reality. See his article “Navigating the Taiwan Strait,” International Security, 27(2), 2002, p. 54. Ye Jianying’s New Year message. Xinhua News Agency, 1 January 1979. TV Documentary “Zhandi huanghua” (Yellow flowers in the battle field), the Phoenix TV, 31 August 2009. Su qi, “Weixian bianyuan: cong liangguolun dao yibian yiguo” (Brinkmanship: from the two-state thesis to one country on each side), Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian Publishing Co., Ltd., 2004, p. 12. General Qian Guoliang, “Quanmian luoshi silingbu jianshe gangyao” (Comprehensively implement the guideline of headquarters construction), Journal of the PLA National Defense University, 6, 2000, p. 4.

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24. Dai Wenbing (Research Institute of Taiwan Affairs, Beijing) on the situation across the Taiwan Strait, Ta Kung Pao, 16 March 1996, p. 1. 25. Talks by Professor Ch Shulong in an international workshop on Taiwan in Canberra in May 1996. 26. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, “Deng Xiaoping zhanlue sixiang” (On Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thoughts), Beijing: the PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1994, p. 109. 27. Ch Shulong’s talk. 28. You Ji, “Making Sense of the War Games in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, 6(15), 1997. 29. Peng Rixuan, Ying Lin and Li Tao, “Zhongguo jundui xiandaihua jianshe huigu yu zhangwang” (The review and forecast of the Chinese military modernisation), Journal of the PLA National Defence University, 5, 2000, p. 9. 30. General Qian Guoliang, “Quanmian luoshi silingbu jianshe gangyao,” p. 4. 31. The dividing lines for North and East/South China the Yellow River. You Ji, “China’s New Diplomacy, Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy,” in Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (eds), China’s New Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 77–105. 32. He Fudong, “Linghuo yingbian zhangwo junshi douzheng de zhudongquan” (Flexible response to control the military initiative), The Journal of the PLA National Defense University, 11, 1994. 33. Xinhua News Agency, 16 November 2002. 34. According to Richard Baum, the CCP considered to compromise on several of Taiwan’s diplomatic requests, such as the Taiwan associate membership of WHO, if Chen were not re-elected in 2004. This information is from his talks with Party officials in Beijing in September 2004. He revealed this in a seminar at the National University of Singapore on 17 September 2004. 35. Renmin ribao, 30 August 2004. 36. The PLA Daily, 21 September 2004. 37. Hu’s speech to the 4th plenum of the 16CC emphasized the centrality of development. In the same speech, he highlighted the need for war preparation as the primary task in defending national security.

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38. This led his decision to decrease the military budget for the whole of the 1980s under the slogan of “Jundui yao rennai” (the PLA must refrain from demanding too much allocations). “Deng Xiaoping wenxuan” (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), 3, p. 128. 39. Ibid. The official language is like this: economic development is the primary task of the ruling party in rejuvenating the nation, and safeguarding national security and territorial integrity is of primary importance to the country. 40. The order was issued to the CMC enlarged meeting on 20 September 2004. Jiefangjunbao, 30 September 2004. 41. Taipei Times, September 2004. 42. You Ji, “The Anti-Secession Law and the Risk of War in the Taiwan Strait,” Contemporary Security Policy, 27(2), August 2006, pp. 237–257. 43. According to Li Qiusheng, research chief of the NPC, the proposed laws from the public were shelved due to these considerations. The reunification law was neither in the NPC’s five-year plan of legislature, nor in its plan for 2004. This shows that the decision on the Law was a prompt one but based on a long policy deliberation. Li Qiusheng’s talk to East Asian Institute, Singapore, 21 July 2004. 44. Edward Friedman, “Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects of a Larger War,” Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 1997, p. 9. 45. Michael Swine, “Tough Love for Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, 83(2), 2004. The large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005 testified this “people’s power.” The Taiwan issue can arouse stronger popular response. 46. For instance, a dominant school of thought in the PLA projects a war of non-engagement: medium and long range precision missile attacks, information warfare to paralyse Taiwan’s military assets and selective sea blockade. Yang Jinshan, “Weilai zhanzheng de lianhe zhanyi de xingshi” (The form of joint campaigns in the future warfare), The Journal of PLA National Defense University, 1, 2004, p. 31. Without amphibious invasion, the PLA may not face failure, as the goal of war is not the occupation of Taiwan. Chen Min, “Haijun zhanlue xingdong yangshi qianxi” (Brief thought on the navy’s model of strategic operations), Military Art, 11, 2002, pp. 56–58.

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47. Huang Jiashu’s interview with Cross-Strait (a current affairs program of the CCTV), 14 September 2004. 48. Yan Xuetong, “Reasoning for containing Taiwan independence through use of force,” Zhanliu yu guanli, 3, 2004, p. 1. 49. Liu Jixian, “Jundui zhengzhi gongzuo lilun de chuangxin fazhang: xuexi Hu Jingtao junduizhengzhigongzuo sixiang de renshi” (New development of PLA political work, reflection on studying Hu Jintao’s idea of military political work), Zhongguo jundui zhengzhi gongzuo, 10, 2008, p. 2. 50. Zhang Minqing’s speech to the News Conference of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs, 29 November 2002. 51. Deng said that “leave the Taiwan issue to the next generation to deal with, we can wait.” Deng’s interview in the 1980s with pro-DDP figure Lee Yuan Tseh who twice played a crucial role in helping Chen get elected. Current affairs dialogue, Phoenix TV, 18 September 2004. 52. Information from a PLA analyst who is familiar with Beijing’s Taiwan policy process. 53. Wu Xiuyong and Liu Jingdong, “jianchi xietiao fazhang shi Jiang Zemin guofang zhanlue lilun de tese” (Coordinated development is a key content of Jiang Zemin’s national defence theory), Journal of the PLA National Defence University, 12, 1999, p. 12. 54. Current affairs dialogue, Phoenix TV, 18 September 2004. 55. As the balance of power has decisively shifted in favour of the mainland, Beijing would have more options against Taiwan’s challenge. See a roundtable discussion by Asia Policy on the concept of healthy balance across the Taiwan Strait. Asia Policy, 8, 2009. 56. Huanqiushibao (Global Times), Beijing, 13 June 2008. 57. James Thomson, “US Interests and the Fate of Alliances,” Survival, 45(4), 2003–2004, p. 214. 58. You Ji, “China’s New National Defence Strategy, Naval Transformation and The Taiwan Conflict,” Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies, 15, 2005. 59. Talk with a Chinese bank executive in Sydney in May 2008. In addition, the pace of integration has accelerated since Ma came to power. The proportion of Taiwan’s university graduates who intend to work in the

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60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68. 69. 70.

mainland has risen from 51 to 73 percent. Liangankaijiang , CTV (Taipei), 5 September 2009. The truth is that the strategy of peace through the threat of war has worked, as explained by Li Hongsi, a DDP elder, to the DDP Party School in August 2004: without threat from Beijing, Chen Shuibian would have opted to remake the Constitution, not revising it. Zhongtian TV (Asia), 15 August 2004 and China Times, 16 August 2004. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, “Wenhua dageming zhongde renmin jiefangjun” (The PLA in the Cultural Revolution), Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989. You Ji, “Friends in Needs or Comrades in Arms: Sino–Russo Military Cooperation,” in Andrew Tan (ed), The Global Arms Trade, Routledge, 2010, pp. 52–64. Except for Varyag, an ex-Soviet carrier that is being converted into a trainer carrier, there is no evidence of any PLA decision to construct its own carrier. Senior colonel Wang Guifang, “Fei chuangtong anquan yu guojia anquan zhanlue” (Non-traditional security and national security strategy), Zhongguo junshi kexue (Chinese military science), 1, 2008, p. 125. Liu Yongxin, “Liansuo fanying beijingxia bianjing fangyu zhanyi zhidao” (Guiding principle for defensive campaigns in the border regions in the background of armed conflicts elsewhere), Junshi xueshu (Military Art), 3, 2003, p. 39. For instance, after Burma shelled inside the Chinese border and killed and wounded over a dozen Chinese, General Liang Guanglie, Chinese defense minister, told a high-level meeting in Kunming that Southwest China was a key strategic direction and the task for war preparation was very heavy. PLA Daily, 29 August 2009. Jiang Zemin told Clinton that it was not impossible for the number of missiles to be reduced. Similar remarks were also made by former Chinese US ambassador Zhou Wenzhong, Voice of America, 11 November 2008. The PLA Daily, 30 July 2009. For an analysis on Beijing’s dilemma, see Alan Romberg, “A Confederacy of Skeptics,” China Leadership Monitor, 29, 2009. David C. Gompert, “Strategic Context,” In Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and the US Military, 2007, p. 21.

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71. Shin-yuan Lai (Minister, Mainland Affairs Council) made it clear that the ROC is an independent sovereign state without a need to announce independence. Her first news conference upon accepting Ma’s nomination on her, China Times, 2 May 2008. 72. Ma gave a visa permit to Dalai when Beijing tried hard to raise money to help the storm rescue. The Chinese media regarded it as stabbing Beijing in the back. Oriental Daily, “Allowing Dalai’s entry is like a very sick patient seeking hurried medical treatment,” 29 May 2009. 73. General Chen Binde, chief of staff, used tough remarks on the visiting US Army chief of staff regarding US arms sales to Taiwan in August 2009. 74. Luo’s father Luo Qingchang, was in charge of the security aspects of Taiwan affairs for decades under Zhou Enlai. Phoenix TV, 2 September 2009. 75. Hu proposed to end the state of war in the Strait in the 17th Party Congress in 2007, anticipating the KMT’s return to power. Ma’s call for ending hostility across the Strait is equally strong. 76. Xian Fengli, “Ping Taiwan 2002 niandu guofang baogaoshu” (A review of Taiwan’s 2002 defence report), Journal of the PLA National Defence University, 10, 2002, p. 28. 77. For Jiang’s offer to reduce missile deployment in the Crawford Summit, see Thomas Christensen, “The Party Transition, Will it Bring More Maturity in Chinese Security Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, 5, Fall, 2003. It was significant that a Chinese leader discussed an issue that Beijing always regarded as internal and related to its sovereignty with a foreign leader. On Zhou’s talks on the subject in Washington, Voice of America, 11 November 2008. 78. Major general Luo Yuan’s interview with Phoenix TV, 2 September 2009. 79. Zhu Aihua and Sun Longhai, “jinan daoyu fengsuo zuozhan,” p. 2. 80. Peter Brook, “US–Taiwan Defense Relations in Bush Administration,” in John Pollack (ed), Strategic Surprise, Newport, Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2003, p. 208. 81. General Zhang Youxia and Shi Xiangyuan, “Zhuquan kongzhizhan: xianshi junshi douzheng nike caiyongde yizhong zuozhan xingshi” (War for protecting sovereignty, a realistic method of operations in conducting military struggle), Military Arts, 29(11), 2002, p. 3.

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9 Theorizing Language Rationalisation in Greater China: Political Transition, Self-Governance and Language Outcomes in Post-Handover Hong Kong Jean-François Dupré Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT This chapter investigates the implications of Putonghua rationalisation in the PRC for language and identity outcomes in post-Handover Hong Kong. Western-based approaches on unilingual Rationalisation and regional revivals ignore the subtleties of Chinese dialectal differences, and seem ill-adapted to Hong Kong’s institutional multilingualism. The first section assesses some of these approaches, and proposes an analytical framework based on David Laitin’s strategic modeling and Neo-Institutionalism. The second section surveys recent linguistic developments with regard to language regime 199

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creation and Chinese use in Hong Kong and the PRC, and highlights the significance of Hong Kong in the politico-linguistic context of Greater China. The chapter finally assesses some previous studies on language attitudes in Hong Kong, and underlines the conditions for different language outcomes in the SAR. On the whole, the chapter argues that language outcomes in the SAR will be determined not only by political and identity developments regarding the meaning of self-governance, but also by the linguistic coordination of diverse segments of Hong Kong society.

INTRODUCTION In the early 1970s, a University of Hong Kong professor wrote that “sometimes the activities of some Chinese in Hong Kong suggest that there is a desire for it to become an independent Cantonese republic; for after all, the logic of the campaign [...] to make Cantonese an official language is the logic of Cantonese nationalism.”1 Today, this statement appears to be indubitably unfounded; no overt form of cultural or secessionist nationalism has emerged in Hong Kong so far, even though it forms a largely self-governing Cantonese “speech community” within a Putonghua-advocating China.2 On the other hand, more than a decade after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty as Special Administrative Region (SAR) in 1997, Putonghua appears to have made little advance in the Special Administrative Region. If anything, the Handover, and more specifically the departure of most British civil servants, has arguably elevated the status of Cantonese to a level never paralleled before. Despite Hong Kong’s official trilingualism, “Cantonese has achieved in Hong Kong a unique and very special status in comparison to any other Chinese dialects wherever they are spoken.”3 Identification with the Chinese Motherland has also made little advance in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong identity remains almost entirely devoid of “nationalistic component.”4 From the 1970s onwards, Hong Kong’s identity has been centered on economic dynamism and entrepreneurship, along with its common law system, strong civil society, and more recently, steps towards universal suffrage.

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This ‘civic’ focus contrasts sharply with many cases of ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ nationalism, where market autonomy and competitiveness are linked with the prospects of enhanced ethno-political sovereignty (and vice-versa). However, the changing status of Hong Kong — from global financial centre under the British rule to self-governing Special Administrative Region in an emerging economic power — is likely to bring important identity transformations in the SAR. Given that the local identity is often set against the prospect of ‘Mainlandisation,’ linguistic outcomes in the SAR might become a valuable proxy for analysing the evolution of Hong Kong identity. Will the Hong Kong people fully endorse the use of Putonghua for its economic advantages and adopt it as a co-societal language? Will a peaceful form of diglossic bilingualism, as found on the Mainland, emerge? Or, in the context of self-governance,5 can earlier speculations on the emergence of “Cantonese nationalism” be revealing? How does Cantonese hegemony relate to a sense of forming a selfgoverning political entity in Hong Kong? The present chapter investigates the implications of Putonghua rationalisation in the PRC for language and identity outcomes in postHandover Hong Kong. Well-established approaches to unilingual rationalisation and regional revivals seem ill-adapted to Hong Kong’s institutional multilingualism, and ignore the subtleties of Chinese dialectal differences. The first section assesses some of these approaches, and suggests the adoption of an analytical framework drawing on David Laitin’s strategic modeling and Neo-Institutionalism. This political science-grounded approach has the advantage of taking into account both internal and Hong Kong–Beijing political dynamics. The second section surveys recent linguistic developments with regard to Chinese use and language regime creation in Hong Kong and the PRC, highlighting the significance of Hong Kong in the politico-linguistic context of Greater China. The chapter finally provides a critical assessment of some previous studies on language attitudes in Hong Kong, and argues that long-term language outcomes in Hong Kong will be determined not only by political and identity developments in the context of selfgovernance, but also by the linguistic coordination of diverse segments of Hong Kong society.

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TOWARD A POLITICAL APPROACH TO LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY OUTCOMES National identity and nationalist mobilisation are complex phenomena, which nature and contexts of emergence have been vividly debated in academic circles. As a starting point, this study adopts a modernist position, which defines nationalism as a modern ideological principle according to which cultural nations ought to be concomitant with political state boundaries. Gellner and other modernists have stressed the role of Republican France in shaping the nationalist imaginary worldwide.6 Initially widely multilingual, France has been one of the Western countries most successful at achieving language hegemony and rationalisation, defined by Laitin as “the territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient administration and rule.”7 In a nutshell, the modernist argument maintains that industrialisation processes in the early modern era required unprecedented degrees of linguistic, cultural and technical uniformity. In Republican France (as in many other cases), this homogeneity was partly achieved by the implementation of a compulsory education system in French. Mass-education, in turn, contributed to the emergence of a common identity based on a shared culture, itself partly based on the French language. In his seminal work on the genesis of nations, Anderson also links the emergence of national consciousness in Europe to ‘printcapitalism’ and the diffusion of standardised languages.8 According to Anderson, the development of market economies in industrialising Europe promoted the circulation of publications written in vernaculars rather than Latin, accelerating the formation of more or less uniform ‘print-languages.’ These print-languages were eventually further standardised and diffused, developing into proto-national languages. It follows that people’s growing awareness of their linguistic bonds with co-speakers resulted in the creation of strong identities. The sheer intensity of these new ‘national’ identities, together with the idealised commensuration of linguistic and political boundaries were to have irreversible consequences on Europe’s political imagining; as Gellner points out,

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“cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy.”9 In other words, the strength of linguistic identities laid out new principles for self-determination based on shared languages and cultures. There is, therefore, by all accounts, an unmistakable interrelatedness between language and the historical development of national identities. Despite the nation building processes that accompanied the establishment of nation-states in Europe and the Americas, most remain multilingual today, and many count more than one official language. For instance, Belgium, Canada, Spain and Switzerland all count more than one official language. Nevertheless, these multilingual states are, in effect, multinational federations, and are thus further divided into self-governing administrative regions (states, provinces, etc.) that tend to be primarily unilingual, or whose governments promote official or de facto unilingualism. Moreover, most of these federations have been shaken at one time or another by important secessionist movements, partly basing their legitimacy on cultural or linguistic distinctiveness. In fact, even when language rationalisation is achieved, many state languages do not become hegemonic, and continue to compete with regional languages. In these cases, there might be an attempt by leaders of minority language communities to embark on projects of language rationalisation of their own, which often take the form of language revival or language maintenance movements.10 From a sociolinguistic perspective, one element that may play particularly strongly against peaceful multilingualism is the difference in social status or socio-economic prospects associated with the knowledge and use of certain languages. In fact, multilingualism within a single polity often leads to diglossia, a “non-symmetric bilingual condition (where matters of importance are the reserve of a ‘high’ language, while matters of affection, or of private affairs, are discussed in a ‘low’ language).”11 High prestige languages are usually languages of mobility, granting access to higher paid jobs, for instance. While diglossic situations often lead speakers of low prestige languages to assimilate into the high language, language policies and language planning processes that accompany regional revitalisation

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movements generally have for objective societal language shifts away from high prestige languages; this is generally done by means of status planning policies aiming at enhancing the standing of low languages. However, while some peripheral nationalist movements have capitalised on the unfairness of diglossic conditions, there is little evidence that diglossia can in itself trigger regional revitalisation movements, and sociolinguistic perspectives generally do poorly at explaining why some languages become politicised in some contexts, and not in others. Diglossia is, in fact, often necessary for state construction purposes, especially in post-colonial polities where the adoption of high-status European languages can palliate to the lack of indigenous linguae francae.12 Smolicz even considers that the idealised monolingual nation-state remains largely unappealing to many developing polities: “Linguistic pluralism for individuals, and diglossia or societal bilingualism for the state, have long been accepted in many parts of the world, and nowhere more perhaps than in Asia. [...] In Asia there has been a traditional recognition of multilingualism which many European states lack.”13 Does language rationalisation constitute a Eurocentric approach to national belonging, or is it an intrinsic part of political modernity? The experience of East Asian countries like Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan and the PRC provide an important challenge to Smolicz’s assumptions, and shows that the ‘One Language, One Nation, One State’ ideal is no stranger to Asian political elites. Even in highly multilingual countries like India, according to Laitin, “the failure at language rationalisation cannot be explained by elite preferences for cultural diversity. Rather, language diversity maintains itself in India despite a variety of attempts by ruling elites to foster rationalisation.”14 Instead, language outcomes seem more likely to be determined in developmental (economic) and institutional (political) factors. Gourevitch’s developmental approach stresses the importance of the concomitance of economic and political centers in the process of state building.15 Following Gourevitch, Laitin observes that “linguistic hegemony is achieved only when the political center is also the economic center of the state, such that working class migrants move

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toward the political center and thereby assimilate its language.”16 Similarly, Laitin suggests that “Consistent with Gourevitch’s hypothesis, areas of strongest linguistic revival in Spain (Catalonia and Basque Country) were also the regions of economic dynamism.”17 This developmental approach is also relevant to the Chinese NorthSouth dynamics, as the predominantly Cantonese-speaking province of Guangdong, together with adjacent Hong Kong, have been a major driving force for the Chinese economy. Though this might have strengthened the social status and popularity of Cantonese, no obvious form of Cantonese nationalism has emerged in either Guangdong or Hong Kong. Wang attributes Guangdong’s anomaly for developmental theories to Cantonese political elites’ access to high echelons of power in the central government, and to a majority of Guangdong residents identifying with the Chinese nation.18 These factors can, in fact, be interpreted as side effects of institutional structures. In recent years, Neo-Institutionalism has made significant contributions to the study of ethnolinguistic mobilisation. Institutional approaches to ethnonationalist mobilisation imply that leaders in culturally distinct peripheral regions, especially if they are not granted access to the higher echelons of power in the central state, or in the context of unequal development, have an incentive to play up and capitalise on cultural differences in order to enhance their own political legitimacy. Neo-institutionalists “suggest that political institutions, such as party systems and the territorial distribution of power, create conditions that may favour the construction and politicisation of cultural identities. They also suggest that cultural identities are activated and stimulated when it makes political sense.”19 It also sees ethnonationalist politics as a competing ground for the strengthening of a group’s political or social institutions. From this perspective, recent surges in peripheral nationalism in Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia, for instance, are attributable not to inherent cultural identities that inevitably find their ways into politics, but to attempts on the part of political elites and civil societies to maintain their formal and informal institutions in the face of increasing state centralisation.20 In this light, it comes of no surprise that linguistically distinct regions in

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China — a non-democratic unitary state — 21 bear different ethnopolitical outcomes from federal liberal democracies like Canada or Spain. The strategic approach, elaborated by David Laitin, is similar to the rational-choice subcomponent of Neo-institutionalism. In order to exemplify the strategic logic of regional revivals, Laitin proposes a game theoretical modeling based on a Ruler-Lord game. This game represents a conflict of interest between a ruler seeking to centralise and optimise his power by rationalising his state, and a regional lord trying to maintain control over his realm. As state centralisation would jeopardise the lord’s position, his expectable strategy is to emphasise his realm’s cultural distinctiveness by preserving its regional language, as “a linguistic bond would make future appeals for common action against foreign oppression more attractive to the people, who presumably would be exploited equally by lord and ruler.”22 The lord must, therefore, promote the local language while insuring that the language of the centre does not penetrate his realm. For this purpose, the lord may implement language laws that will act as incentives or deterrents to language use; the adoption of a regional language as medium for mandatory education is perhaps the most obvious attempt on the part of authorities to influence the linguistic makeup in a polity. This is precisely what happened in 1970s Québec, as an emerging Francophone (yet technically bilingual) middle-class elite capitalised on the language issue to enhance its economic interests and protect its political standing in the province, enacting laws with the aim of making French the sole language for schooling, work, business, and advertising. However, Laitin’s strategic approach also suggests that linguistic or cultural differences are not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) for the emergence and success of regionalist movements. Moreover, it suggests that regional revivals are not the only obstacle to language rationalisation. While recognising the influence of ideological, sociolinguistic, economic and institutional factors, Laitin sees societal language outcomes — and, therefore, the success or failure of language rationalisation — as the result of “a conflict of interest among members of different cultural groups in the process of state building.”23 In his analysis of post-colonial countries, Laitin posits

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coordination games based on the preferences of political elites, civil servants and parents for colonial, indigenous, or regional languages. This allows him to speculate on the linguistic future of these polities. In post-colonial India, for instance, nationalist politicians who had fought the British colonial power wanted to do away with colonial legacy by promoting Hindi — an indigenous vernacular — as Union language. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, had invested many resources in learning the colonial language (English), often studying abroad or in elite schools, and derived much of their prestige from their English proficiency. They, therefore, opposed Hindi rationalisation, as it undermined their status and often incurred extra costs in having to learn a new language. Similarly, parents in non-Hindi speaking zones still saw English as the language of mobility, and had little interest in educating their children in Hindi. Their preference was, therefore, for English and their local vernacular. This largely explains the failure of Hindi rationalisation and hegemony in post-colonial India. Laitin’s strategic approach throws light on the reasons why some developing and post-colonial countries have not achieved — and in many cases have not even strived to achieve — language rationalisation. Its emphasis on rationalisation failure is particularly well-suited to the Hong Kong case. The creation of language regimes in substate entities like Hong Kong is particularly complex in that it involves a lord-ruler game simultaneously with politician-bureaucrat and state-parents games. The latter is especially relevant to Hong Kong, as changes in Medium-of-Instruction (MOI) policies became particularly controversial in the years following the Handover; these policy changes will be analysed in more depth in the next section. The next section outlines the main characteristics of the Hong Kong and the PRC language regimes, and highlights the significance of Hong Kong in the Greater Chinese context. Especially contentious in this context is the status of Chinese dialects vis-à-vis Putonghua or Standard Mandarin. The coming section, therefore, assesses some of the implications of the nature of the Chinese language (or languages) for theories of language rationalisation and revitalisation.

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LANGUAGE REGIMES AND THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE STANDARDS AND STANDARD LANGUAGES: GREATER CHINESE PERSPECTIVES The boundary between language and dialect often stems from political convenience rather than the science of linguistics, as the granting of language or dialect status is sometimes used to foster a sense of national cohesion or suppress the ethnic distinctiveness of linguistics minorities. In order to be granted official status as national or public, and, therefore, be used for nation building purposes, a language must normally have standardised oral and written forms. Language rationalisation and revival movements in the West have consequently often involved giving oral dialects a standardised written form. The creation and rationalisation of Putonghua — a highly standardised state language based on the Beijing dialect of Mandarin Chinese — shares many facets with this process of linguistic standardisation. In fact, Putonghua standardisation in the past sixty years or so has involved a whole range of language development processes ranging from vocabulary to grammar and syntax, and from Romanization (pinyin) to character simplification.24 The conceptual relationship between Putonghua and Chinese dialects similarly owes much to political convenience. Bauer and Benedict consider that “by the criterion of ‘mutual unintelligibility’ such divergent speech varieties as Cantonese and Putonghua could justifiably be termed languages rather than dialects.”25 In fact, the degree of mutual unintelligibility between Cantonese and Putonghua has commonly been exemplified by comparisons of French and Italian,26 Dutch and German,27 and English and Swedish.28 The situation in China is, however, more complex in that written Chinese constitutes a highly standardised “script-language” with a high degree of independence from its oral vernacular forms, or dialects. In other words, Standard Written Chinese (SWC) acts as a lingua franca for both Cantonese and Mandarin (or Putonghua) speakers, although both dialects are by and large unintelligible orally. What this implies, with regards to Anderson’s theory of print-capitalism, is that while

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SWC is a print-language, its dialects are not. Or to put differently, it means that many dialects can relate to a single ‘print-language,’ making neither of them distinctive print-languages on their own. In fact, SWC is not without parallel (but is neither readily comparable) to old script languages, like Latin, which served as a European written lingua franca for centuries. Bauer and Benedict highlight three main reasons for the continued conceptualisation of these languages as dialects or as ‘varieties of Chinese’: First, the Chinese dialects are spoken within the boundaries of one sovereign nation whose majority Han Chinese population regard themselves as a relatively homogenous ethnic group with a shared history, culture, and language [….]. Second, as linguists in China often point out, the Chinese dialects — despite their differences — share many features of grammar, phonology, and lexicon. Third, the linguistic unity of China is based upon a writing system with an unbroken history of over 3,000 years, and the dialects include the reading pronunciation of the Chinese characters.29

The place of the various Chinese dialects vis-à-vis Mandarin, the dominant dialect of China, has been especially problematic. Already in 1888, Ball indicated that “an impression appears to have got abroad that Mandarin is the language of China, and that Cantonese and the other languages spoken in China are but dialects of it.”30 The way around is to consider Mandarin and Cantonese (together with other Chinese dialects) as separate languages or “dialect groups,” each with its own varieties, but relating to a common written language.31 As far as Hong Kong Cantonese is concerned, the situation is further complicated in two fundamental ways. First, while the PRC uses a simplified script, Hong Kong (like Taiwan and Macao) still uses traditional characters. Although the use of different scripts does not significantly impair the mutual intelligibility of texts, it gives Hong Kong Cantonese a distinctive aesthetic flavour. It is also worth noting the use of traditional versus simplified characters has been, and remains, a source of contention in Taiwan and the Mainland, the latter of which appears to have banned the use of traditional characters for advertising purposes.32 These minor variations in script, however, do not constitute a considerable obstacle to Chinese language rationalisation. More

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significantly, Hong Kong has developed a written vernacular of its own for highly informal purposes, preserving important elements of Hong Kong Cantonese.33 In fact, Hong Kong Cantonese has gone further than any other dialect in developing a written non-Mandarin vernacular. Even Taiwan’s nationalist elites’ efforts at standardising the Minnan (Fujianese) dialect, the mother tongue of about 75 percent of Taiwan’s population, have been largely in vain.34 Conversely, Putonghua and SWC have gradually converged, following language standardisation processes in the PRC; as vernacular varieties of Mandarin are becoming standardised into Putonghua, SWC is being brought closer to the vernacular.35 On the whole, these processes appear to enhance the discrepancy between Putonghua and Hong Kong Cantonese. Since the 1950s, the PRC appears to have adopted a paradoxical policy of minority language preservation and development for non-Han ethnic groups, and of Putonghua promotion — and, to certain extent, dialect suppression — for the so-called Han population. As Windrow points out, the portrayal of Putonghua as both a ‘common language’ and ‘standard Chinese’ denotes a clear attempt to forge not only a national identity but also a sense of unity among the Han.36 While dialects such as Cantonese, Shanghainese and Fujianese, all widely spoken in areas of high economic vitality, have enjoyed considerable popularity in their respective provinces, language policies have been promulgated since the 1990s in order to initiate a shift to Putonghua for purposes of administration and education. In the province of Guangdong, for instance, public service employees have been required to adopt Putonghua as language of work, and quotas for broadcasting in dialects were considerably reduced.37 If dialects are used alongside Putonghua in the early years of kindergarten and sometimes primary schools, Putonghua becomes the only language of education from the upper primary school years onward. The 2000 ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language’ further strengthened and officialised these measures: Article 9 Putonghua (Mandarin) and the standardized [Mandarin] Chinese characters shall be used by State organs as the official language.…

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Language Rationalisation in Greater China 211 Article 10 Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be used as the basic language in education and teaching in schools and other institutions of education. […] Article 14 The standard spoken and written Chinese language shall be used as the basic spoken and written language in the following circumstances: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Spoken and written language for broadcasting, films and TV programs; Written language for the facilities in public places; Written language in signboards and advertisements; Names of enterprises and other institutions; and Packaging and specifications of commodities marketed in the country.38

While prominent dialects such as Cantonese, Wu (Shanghainese) and Minnan (Fujianese) continue to enjoy considerable popularity as informal vernaculars, Putonghua seems to be taking hold without much resistance. On the other hand, if Putonghua has been successfully rationalised, it is not as of yet hegemonic. In line with Laitin’s strategic approach, the long-term success of Putonghua diffusion, and the future status of dialects, will depend on the compliance of regional political elites, civil service employees, educators and general populace, the linguistic preferences of who remain largely unstudied. Some obvious elements inherent in the Chinese linguistic and political context would render the use of dialects for regional revitalisation or counter-Rationalisation movements difficult. The use of a common written Chinese language, together with the proximity between spoken dialects, reduce the cost of learning Putonghua and make nation-wide promotion of the official language somewhat easier and subtler than in the case of Western languages. In this context, what could potential regional cultural engineers be expected to do in order to counter the Putonghua tide? Regionalist movements in the Greater Chinese context could be identified by elements such as: 1. The public use of dialects by government officials and civil servants; 2. The adoption of dialects as co-official regional languages;

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3. The standardisation of dialects’ pronunciation and adoption of official romanisation systems; 4. The development of written dialects in Chinese characters (which might involve the creation of new characters), following dialectal rather than Mandarin conventions with regard to grammar and lexicon; 5. The teaching of these standardised dialects as part of the school curriculum; 6. The use of dialects as compulsory medium of education, and; 7. The promotion of dialects in TV and radio broadcasts. Given the Chinese political context, these measures could hardly be implemented except in contexts of crisis, as in the unlikely case of rapid democratisation. However, of all Chinese societies, Hong Kong (together with Macao) has come closest to fulfilling these requirements. First of all, none of the PRC laws regarding language use applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Although the PRC has elaborated a clear unilingual agenda for its Han jurisdiction, Hong Kong has adopted an official policy of “Trilingualism and Biliteracy” where English, Cantonese and Putonghua are promoted. If this new language regime has added Putonghua to the EnglishChinese (generally implying Cantonese) bilingual colonial regime, it has also officialised Cantonese. Second, especially since the departure of most British officials, Cantonese has become the de facto language of Hong Kong politics. Third, while Putonghua has been made a mandatory subject from primary school onward, Cantonese is used as the main language of instruction alongside English. In fact, following the Handover, the compulsory language for education in secondary schools was largely changed from English — the colonial and international language — to Chinese — a national language. Since Chinese in the Hong Kong context is usually understood as Cantonese, the “Mother-Tongue Education” (MTE) policy had the ambiguous effect of strengthening the status of this Chinese dialect to an unprecedented degree.39 Authorities’ stated rationale was that students would learn better in their mother tongue; of course, at least from the perspective of political analysts, this shift also had symbolic and nationalistic

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implications in the context of the Handover. The policy change was, however, strongly objected by parents and students, who still favoured an English education for its economic value, and protests forced the government to tone down its policy. On the whole, these policy debates are largely in line with Laitin’s government-parents game. While the government recently made further changes to the MTE policy, it was not to reinforce Putonghua, but to reinstate English. Although no conflict regarding linguistic convergence with Beijing appears to have occurred in the context of Hong Kong’s political transition, the near absence of official discourse on long-term linguistic expectations regarding Putonghua use in the SAR suggests that the issue might have been avoided altogether. Perhaps there were fears that this could become a matter of contention. Overall, the status of Hong Kong Cantonese, together with the political status of the largely self-governing SAR, makes it a crucial case to study from a political science point of view. The coming section analyses the linguistic situation in Hong Kong in more depth, and highlights the conditions for different language outcomes.

LANGUAGE OUTCOMES IN POST-HANDOVER HONG KONG The special status of Hong Kong Cantonese is a result of distinct historico-political conditions rather than the deliberate outcome of regionalist governments. Hong Kong society developed under British rule before being handed-over to the PRC in 1997; partly due to the fact that English was, until 1974, the only official language of the colonial administration, there was initially little concern about the type of Chinese that was to be used in the colony. When Chinese was adopted as a co-official language in 1974, as a result of the campaigns mentioned above by Harris,40 no mention was made of the dialect to be used, and it was probably assumed that documents would be written in Standard Written Chinese, while the oral lingua franca would remain Cantonese. While Bauer suggests that “for political reasons the colonial preference was for Cantonese (one more division or

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barrier between Hong Kong and the mainland),”41 there is no documentary evidence to sustain that there was any overt attempt on the part of colonial authorities to reinforce Cantonese to the detriment of Mandarin. Nevertheless, the general “indifference” of the colonial administration towards Chinese dialects prevented Cantonese to “enter into any direct competition with Putonghua.”42 As a result, while a variety of dialects are still spoken in Hong Kong today, Cantonese has remained the mother tongue and everyday language of use for the vast majority of the population, so that “Cantonese can be regarded as the language of Hong Kong.”43 However, if Cantonese really is the language of Hong Kong, what explains the choice of a trilingual regime after the Handover? Does Cantonese feature as a prominent element of Hong Kong identity? What will the linguistic context of Hong Kong look like when its SAR status expires in 2047? A number of studies have been published on language attitudes in Hong Kong before and after the Handover. Most of these studies have focused on bilingualism and on the statuses of Chinese (understood as oral Cantonese and SWC) and English. For instance, Chan offers a mapping of Cantonese and English along Bourdieu’s concepts of social habitus and types of capitals (economic, cultural, social and symbolic).44 Central to her analysis are popular reactions to the policy changes enforcing MTE after the Handover. According to Chan, parents’ objection was due to the high status of English on the territory, not only in terms of trade opportunities (economic capital), but also in distinguishing Hong Kong people from Mainlanders (cultural and symbolic capitals).45 In fact, English has generally been perceived in a positive light in Hong Kong, despite being associated with colonialism. From a sociolinguistic perspective, we can suppose that this partly has to do with demo-linguistic dynamics on the territory. Due to the low proportion of native speakers of English, i.e. British settlers, in the colony, the vitality of Cantonese in Hong Kong has never been challenged by the colonial language. Hong Kong, therefore, benefitted tremendously from its use of English on the global market, without fear of acculturation: English was bound to remain a high-prestige business and administrative, yet second-language in the colony. Perhaps more importantly, English was the

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language associated with Hong Kong’s development. However, the main challenge to the vitality of Hong Kong Cantonese at the moment comes not from English, but from Putonghua, the official state-language of China. Yet, most studies of language attitudes in Hong Kong do not take into account the differences in status between Cantonese and Putonghua. Language dynamics and identity in Hong Kong can be analysed from the perspective of Chinese nation building and the promotion of Putonghua as the national language of China. In other words, it can be framed as an issue of Mainlandisation versus localisation, more or less following the ruler-lord logic. In Bauer’s view, “Since Putonghua is China’s official standard language and Hong Kong is now a part of China, the central government’s ultimate goal is for Putonghua to eventually replace Cantonese […] in the classroom, within the civil service, in the courts, legislature, official meetings, on television and radio broadcasts, and in motion pictures.”46 According to Bauer’s predictions, Putonghua is, therefore, destined to become “Hong Kong’s second essential language of wider communication and upward mobility alongside English” (ibid: 49). Similarly, Pierson predicted that Putonghua would ultimately supplant both English and Cantonese in importance as the language of politics and administration.47 As a result, both Pierson and Bauer believe that Cantonese will eventually become a low-status variety in a diglossic framework, being relegated to the fields of family and intimacy. Bauer even expresses concerns about the prospects for Hong Kong Cantonese to retain its vibrancy, or even survive as a prominent language in the PRC: “most Cantonese speakers […] perceive no threat to the language and feel there is nothing to get excited about. Their attitude reflects the healthy state of the language, but it also makes me wonder […], how much longer can it continue?”48 In light of these predictions, there are two questions of interest to us: (1) How plausible are these observations? and (2) Would this sudden shift in status from public-hegemonic to home language be tolerable for Hong Kong’s Cantonese speakers? The first question can partly be answered through Anderson’s theory of print-capitalism.

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In section one, mention was made of the importance of print-languages in the development of state formation and national identity. Now, Cantonese has already been established as Hong Kong’s lingua franca, and has already been used extensively for trade, administrative and educational purposes. In other words, no language is explicitly needed in Hong Kong to supplement or replace Cantonese in areas where it is deficient (where this is the case, English, not Putonghua, already fulfills this need). However, developments in language policy in Hong Kong and the PRC might, in the long run, have a negative influence on the survival of Hong Kong Cantonese as a printlanguage. In fact, there have been talks of policies aiming at promoting Putonghua as the language of instruction for the teaching of Chinese writing in the future;49 this method is already in place in many schools in Hong Kong. This implies that Hong Kong would follow Guangdong province’s policy of neglecting formal Cantonese instruction to the profit of Putonghua.50 According to Bauer, these policies would cause Hong Kong people to become reliant on Putonghua for reading purposes, which, in turn, would make written Hong Kong Cantonese obsolete.51 By extension, we could assume that the status of Cantonese, which would thereby be more evidently relegated to the status of oral vernacular, to be somewhat impaired. This could have a negative influence on the maintenance of Cantonese as Hong Kong’s lingua franca. Also important in defining the status and prospects of a language is its economic usefulness as language of mobility. On this level, Bauer believes that in the short run, Cantonese will continue to carry economic advantages for trade with adjacent Guangdong.52 The continued usefulness of Cantonese in this context will, therefore, depend on its vitality in the Guangdong province, the prospects of which seem uncertain due to Beijing’s above-mentioned policies favouring Putonghua as MOE. Moreover, the rapid emergence of Shenzhen — a new immigrant megacity where Putonghua appears to have been largely adopted as common language — between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, weakens the homogeneity of the South-Guangdong area. While native speakers of Mandarin are, in the short run, likely to remain a small minority in Hong Kong, future Cantonese-speaking

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immigrants from Guangdong are likely to be fully conversant in, and perhaps partly acculturated to, Putonghua. Given the declining birthrates of Hong Kong residents in recent decades and the SAR’s reliance on economic immigration to maintain the city’s demographics, it seems more than likely that the status of Cantonese in the SAR will be dependent on language planning and educational policies, few of which have been elaborated so far. In fact, linguistic debates in Hong Kong are almost invariably grounded in practical matters — such as teaching capacity and labour force availability — rather than ideological concerns. However, to turn to our second question, how will Hong Kong people react to such changes in linguistic status? According to Joseph, the linguistic future of Hong Kong “depends on the future direction of Hong Kong identity. If Beijing continues to see the major threat to national stability as residing in movements for regional autonomy, it would not be surprising if active efforts were made to promote the use of Putonghua over Cantonese in Hong Kong.”53 However, more than a decade after the Handover, Putonghua — together with discourses on its promotion — have made little advance in Hong Kong. Referring to the cases of Québec, Flanders and Catalonia, Pierson mentions that “Cantonese could have a similar symbolic value in the unlikely event that the Beijing authorities grievously misgoverned Hong Kong, and were thereby perceived as outsiders and oppressors.” In such an advent, Pierson believes that “Cantonese might then become a symbol of freedom, democracy, and independence, and a reminder of the ‘good old days’ of benign British colonial rule.”54 If this view was “unlikely,” at the time of the Handover, it can now be confirmed as unrealistic. First, the population born in the colonial era is already declining, and few appear to reminisce of the colonial era among younger generations. Second, in the context of China’s economic rise, Hong Kong business and political elites have seized and secured new (and often greater) opportunities. As a result, especially from the perspective of Hong Kong’s political elites, the Handover represents an important development towards self-rule. If Chan is right in seeing “commitment to Hong Kong” as essentially “instrumental,” progressive acculturation might be the most likely

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outcome.55 On the other hand, if Cantonese hegemony happens to relate to a sense of forming a distinct self-governing political unit, it would be unsurprising, especially in the context of Hong Kong’s uneasy democratisation process, to see some political entrepreneurs from the Pan-Democrat camp try to capitalise on the language issue. Overall, it seems that the linguistic future will largely be determined by the Hong Kong people themselves rather than Beijing’s coercion. At the moment, the 1998 controversy on MTE and its ongoing development — akin to Laitin’s region-parents’ game — probably constitutes the best standpoint from which to speculate on the present and future stances of Hongkongese identity as it relates to language. However, it remains unclear whether the policy should be interpreted as a step towards Chinese language Rationalisation (away from English) or Cantonese revitalisation (away from Putonghua). On the one hand, the policy was enacted after the Handover, at a time when English was least likely to threaten the status of Cantonese. Therefore, in this context, it seems that putting English aside could only contribute to bringing Hong Kong’s culture closer to that of the Mainland, or at least Guangdong. Moreover, the mother-tongue policy also coincided with a reinforcement of Putonghua in the SAR, as it was made a mandatory subject from primary school onwards. This move was generally well received by both nationalist elites endorsing Chineseness and parents seeing it as an advantage on the job market, where proven trilingualism is now often required.56 In this light, should the policy be interpreted as a political bias towards the PRC and Putonghua rationalisation? It could well be the case; though largely autonomous, Hong Kong’s leaders are carefully selected and appointed by Beijing. However, political elites are but one group of actors in the crafting of language policies. Was Cantonese, on the contrary, being reinforced in order to enhance the linguistic distinctiveness of Hong Kong vis-à-vis Putonghua rationalising Beijing? This hypothesis should not be ruled out either. Given that the PRC would tolerate no overt form of Cantonese or Hongkongese nationalism, any promotion of the SAR’s distinctiveness will be bound to subtlety and implicitness.

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CONCLUSION To conclude, the current literature on language and identity in Hong Kong and Greater China is in urgent need of a political perspective. Similarly, it seems that studies on Hong Kong’s identity would greatly benefit from including a linguistic element. If we are to clarify the relationship between language and political identities in Greater China, studies must move away from simple language use and attitudes, and collect opinions about medium-of-instruction policies, dialect standardisation, and other political aspects of language regime creation and maintenance. How does Cantonese, from an institutionalist point of view, relate to a sense of forming a distinct political unit in Hong Kong? Are pro-Beijing parties and their supporters more likely to favour the introduction of Putonghua, and pro-democracy groups the protection of Cantonese? How do language preferences — in accordance to Laitin’s approach — vary along different segments of Hong Kong’s population, such as politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, business elites, educators, and parents? How do they vary between Pro-China and Pro-Democracy forces? Hong Kong, with its SAR status and idiosyncratic linguistic makeup, constitutes a crucial ground to test political theories of regional counter-rationalisation movements, and to clarify the political attributes of Chinese dialects vis-à-vis Putonghua. If Hong Kong’s population and political elites come to use the language card to enhance their distinctiveness from the Mainland, institutionalist theories can be said to be robust and applicable to China. If, on the other hand, the people of Hong Kong willfully accept societal bilingualism, and potentially diglossia in a Putonghuadominated system, either Chinese dialects really do not carry the political and identity potential of western languages, or Hong Kong identity is not significantly set in opposition to Mainlandisation. In line with Laitin’s approach, further studies stressing linguistic conflicts of interests between different societal forces, including political parties and their Pro-China and Pro-Democracy counterparts; have to be done in other to determine the place of Cantonese in Hong Kong identity. Applying this framework to Hong Kong will help forecast turns in identity politics as Hong Kong attains universal suffrage in the

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coming decades. It will also be helpful in predicting the potential of ethnolinguistic autonomist movements in a modernising PRC, especially in the eventuality of liberalisation or democratisation.

NOTES 1. Peter B. Harris, “The International Future of Hong Kong,” International Affairs, 48(1), 1972, p. 70. 2. Cantonese is the mother-tongue or everyday language of about 90 percent of Hong Kong’s population. While many languages and dialects are spoken in all parts of China, including Hong Kong, there has been a clear intent on the part of the central government in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to enforce Putonghua (“Common Speech”) — a standardised form of Mandarin, and spoken in diverse forms by over 70 percent of China’s population — as the official standard of written and spoken Chinese. 3. Robert S. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” in Language and Education in Postcolonial Hong Kong, David C.S. Li, Angel Lin and Wai-king Tsang, (eds.), Hong Kong: Linguistics Society of Hong Kong, 2000, p. 37. 4. Gordon Mathews, Eric Kit-wai Ma and Tai-lok Lui, Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation. London: Routledge, 2008. 5. The basic law of the Hong Kong SAR, under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems,” grants Hong Kong a significant level of autonomy. This principle of self-government is known in Hong Kong as “gang ren zi gang” — Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong. The question is: how important is Cantonese hegemony in conceptualising the Hong Kong People? 6. Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change: the Nature of Human Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. 7. David D. Laitin, Language Repertoire and State Construction in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 9. The concept of language rationalisation is borrowed from Weber’s concept of state rationalisation. Laitin sees the process of language rationalisation as an attempt to influence the language repertoires of a given population. It is, there-

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8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

fore, an important aspect of language planning and nation building, and its success results in the creation of officially unilingual language regimes. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. While language revival or revitalisation originally referred to processes aiming at adverting language death, it is also used to refer to counterrationalisation, where otherwise vibrant languages are officially endorsed by regional governments to promote cultural distinctiveness. David D. Laitin, “Linguistic Revival: Politics and Culture in Catalonia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31(2), 1989, p. 309. Joshua A. Fishman, “Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism,” in Language Problems of Developing Nations, Joshua A. Fishman, Charles Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, (eds.), New York: Wiley, 1968, p. 46. J.J. Smolicz, “Is the Monolingual Nation-State Out-of-Date? A Comparative Study of Language Policies in Australia and the Philippines,” Comparative Education, 20 (2), 1984, pp. 265–285. David D. Laitin, “Language Policy and Political Strategy in India,” Policy Sciences, 22, 1989, p. 422. Peter Gourevitch, “The Reemergence of ‘Peripheral Nationalisms’: Some Comparative Speculations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 21(3), 1979, pp. 303–322. Laitin, “Linguistic Revival: Politics and Culture in Catalonia,” p. 311. Laitin, “Linguistic Revival: Politics and Culture in Catalonia,” p. 311. Yuan-Kang Wang, “Toward a Synthesis of the Theories of Peripheral Nationalism: A Comparative Study of China’s Xinjiang and Guangdong,” Asian Ethnicity, 2(2), 2001, pp. 177–195. André Lecours, “Theorizing Cultural Identities: Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the Culturalists,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 36(1), 2000, pp. 517–518. Daniel Béland and André Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Some consider China as a federal state. While this may partly be true from a strictly economic perspective, institutional and legal configurations make these claims questionable, except as far as Taiwan and the two SARs of Macau and Hong Kong are concerned.

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22. Laitin, “Linguistic Revival: Politics and Culture in Catalonia,” p. 306. 23. Laitin, “Language Repertoire and State Construction in Africa,” p. 304. 24. Minglang Zhou and Hongkai Sun, (eds.), Language Policy in the People’s Republic of China: Theory and Practice since 1949, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. 25. Robert D. Bauer and Paul K. Benedict, Modern Cantonese Phonology. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1997, p. xxxv. 26. Bauer and Benedict, Modern Cantonese Phonology, p. xxxiv. 27. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” p. 43. 28. John E. Joseph. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 132. 29. Bauer and Benedict. Modern Cantonese Phonology. 30. J. Dyer Ball. Cantonese Made Easy. Hong Kong: Kelly and Walsh, 1888, p. 13, quoted in Kingsley Bolton, Chinese Englishes: A Sociolinguistic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 77. 31. Bauer and Benedict, Modern Cantonese Phonology, p. xxxv. 32. See, for instance, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi fa. 2000. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language], art. 14, Quoted in Hayden Windrow, “From State to Nation: The Forging of the Han through Language Policy in the PRC and Taiwan,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 37(1), 2005, pp. 403–404. 33. Donald B. Snow, Cantonese as Written Language: The Growth of a Written Chinese Vernacular, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004. 34. Victor H. Mair, “How to Forget Your Mother Tongue and Remember Your National Language,” Pinyin.Info, http://pinyin.info/readings/ mair/taiwanese.html#part4. 35. Claire Saillard, “On the Promotion of Putonghua in China: How a Standard Language Becomes a Vernacular,” in Language Policy in the People’s Republic of China, Zhou and Sun, (eds.), London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. 36. Windrow, “From State to Nation,” pp. 373–422. 37. Ping Chen, Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 73. 38. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi fa [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written

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39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

Chinese Language], 2000. Quoted in Windrow, “From State to Nation,” pp. 403–404. The language-in-education policy was recently changed back to the English-medium for many secondary schools, effective from September 2010. See introduction for this chapter. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” p. 20. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” p. 20. Bolton, Chinese Englishes: A Sociolinguistic History, p. 78. Elaine Chan, “Beyond Pedagogy: Language and Identity in PostColonial Hong Kong,” British Journal of Sociology of Education, 23(2), 2002, pp. 271–285. Chan, “Beyond Pedagogy: Language and Identity in Post-Colonial Hong Kong,” p. 272. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” p. 39. Herbert D. Pierson, “Cantonese, English, or Putonghua — Unresolved Communicative Issue in Hong Kong’s Future,” in Hong Kong Becoming China: The Transition to 1997, G.A. Postiglione, (ed.), London: East Gate Book, 1997, p. 183. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead,” p. 37. A study by Groves shows that although nearly 85 percent of Hong Kong residents believe that Putonghua will become an everyday language alongside Cantonese before the end of the century, the same proportion believes that it will never supplant Cantonese. Julie M. Groves, “Language or Dialect — or Topolect? A Comparison of the Attitudes of Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese towards the Status of Cantonese,” SinoPlatonic Papers, http://www.sino-platonic.org/complete/spp179_ cantonese. Bennan Zhang and Robin R. Yang, “Putonghua Education and Language Policy in Postcolonial Hong Kong,” in Language Policy in the People’s Republic of China, Zhou and Sun, (eds.), London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. Bob Adamson and Winnie A. Lai. “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong: Dilemmas of Triglossia,” Comparative Education 33(2), 1997, p. 242. Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead.” Bauer, “Hong Kong Cantonese and the Road Ahead.”

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53. Joseph. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious, p. 159. 54. Herbert D. Pierson, “Societal accommodation to English and Putonghua in Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong,” in Language in Hong Kong at Century’s End, Martha C. Pennington, (ed.), Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998, p. 107. 55. Elaine Chan, “Political identity and Nation-Building in Hong Kong,” in Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy, Joseph Y.S. Cheng, (ed.), Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999, p. 106. 56. Zhang and Yang, “Putonghua Education and Language Policy in Postcolonial Hong Kong.”

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10 Local Autonomy Matters: One-Country Two-System Policy in Macao and Its Implications for China’s Policies on Its Borderlands Bill K.P. Chou Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau

ABSTRACT This chapter offers an analytical framework to evaluate Macao’s autonomy in relation to Beijing. When autonomy is viewed from a top-down approach and an equivalent with an object that is transferrable, it can be cautiously concluded that the autonomy of Macao is low, given that Beijing has no constitutional and legal constraints to remove the “high autonomy” framed by the one-country twosystem formula. From a bottom-up perspective, which defines autonomy as the space of expressing local identity and using local ways in public administration, however, Macao may be considered 225

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being conferred with high autonomy: Portuguese and Cantonese languages are still widely used in public administration. Portuguese passport holders are not discriminated in public offices. The cultural identity of Christianity is free from the state’s suppression. The highest public offices are reserved for local people and the party organisations remain low profile in politics. This chapter concludes that Macao is a good example demonstrating that high autonomy in expressing and developing local identity does not weaken central control. Some substances of the Macao model may be extended to the borderlands which have difficulty in identifying with the political centre and whose cultural identities were felt marginalised.

INTRODUCTION Chinese leaders are often wary of territorial disintegration. China’s policies towards its unstable borderlands cause the country problems in its relations with the US, EU and India, especially after the 1980s when the Tibetan issue became highly internationalised.1 The riots in Xinjiang in the summer of 2008 and Tibet in the spring of 2009 revealed the determination of Chinese leaders to maintain territorial integrity at any cost. This chapter argues that due to Beijing’s propaganda, economic inducement, and co-optation with social elites in Macao, Macao’s “high autonomy” framed by the one-country twosystem policy, does not weaken Beijing’s control over Macao. Both Macao’s government and its community are subservient to Beijing. Organised resistance to central authority is non-existent. The Macao government is, therefore, left to run its business and is immune from much of the international scrutiny over its post-handover development. The case of Macao may be exemplary in that Beijing may continue to exercise sufficient control over the borderlands to assure territorial integrity, even if the borderlands are allowed more autonomy — which is a means for the people in the borderlands to express their identity and to accept China’s sovereign power. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part offers a conceptual analysis of local autonomy — an important theoretical concept rarely investigated in the literature on the one-country two-system

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policy. The second part examines the degree of Macao’s autonomy. Beijing has the absolute authority to override the Macao government’s decisions, but it refrains from exercising this authority. The Macao government is able to conduct a wide range of business without open intervention from Beijing. The third part investigates why the institutional limits on Macao’s autonomy do not provoke backlash from the Macao government and civil society. Beijing’s propaganda, economic incentives and co-optation with societal forces play important parts in creating stability. The fourth part analyses the implications of cordial Beijing–Macao relations for China’s foreign relations and borderlands. The absence of explicit disputes between Beijing and Macao provides little reason for foreign powers to condemn China for intervening in Macao’s domestic affairs and violating human rights. Beijing’s policies towards Macao offer lessons for Beijing on how to deal with China’s unsettled and often restless peripheries.

LOCAL AUTONOMY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS Almost everyone in the political spectrum from the left to the right in Western liberal democracies desire local autonomy; local autonomy is considered a basic element of democratic political systems.2 Every US president since World War II had plans to revitalise federalism by returning significant responsibilities to state and local governments.3 Local autonomy is deemed to be a panacea to a wide array of political, ethnic and administrative problems such as territorial disintegration, marginalisation of ethnic minorities, and inadequate citizen involvement. In Spain, for example, an increasingly federalist institutional setting was used for settling central-peripheral disputes.4 The Israeli government granted the West Bank autonomy and eventually self-determination for long-term peace and territorial conflict resolution. With more autonomy, local governments and citizens are able to assert control in the “politics of place,” involving communitybased opposition to public facilities. Local autonomy is also believed to be useful for addressing the problems of democracy deficiency that have arisen as a result of public policy by technocrats, which led to a

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new pattern of marginalisation of public opinions from decisionmaking processes.5 In regards to its strategies of politically integrating Hong Kong, Macao and eventually Taiwan, Beijing uses the “one-country two-system” policy — a formula underlining high local autonomy for easing the political integration of Macao, Hong Kong and ultimately, Taiwan. The policy is framed by the Article 31 of the State Council, conferring the three territories “high autonomy” on domestic affairs through the installation of special administrative regions (SARs). The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macao — the mini-constitutions of the two SARs and the implementation plan of the “one-country twosystem” formula — states that the two SARs enjoy a high degree of autonomy over internal affairs while Beijing controls their foreign affairs and national defense. The one-country two-system policy is exclusively applied to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, but not other peripheral territories. The Dalai Lama has proposed to extend the policy to Tibet, but Beijing rejected it on the grounds that the reunification with Hong Kong and Macao and the subsequent policy used to govern these areas was to exercise sovereignty over the territories separated from China by imperialist aggression. Tibet has been part of Chinese territory since the 13th century and China has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over it.6 The term “high autonomy” in the one-country two-system policy is tricky. Its definition is not delineated by constitutional means. Rather, it is subject to the interpretation of Chinese political leaders: commenting on Hong Kong’s local autonomy, the Chairman of National People’s Congress (NPC, the national legislature), Wu Bangguo, said that Hong Kong SAR government’s authority and reach was contingent on Beijing’s decisions. Hong Kong did not have any residual power, that is, power that is not clearly divided in any constitutional and legal documents.7 Current Western literature on the one-country two-system policy overwhelmingly draws illustrations from Hong Kong, not Macao.8 The political and constitutional nature of the policy arouses the attention of many political scientists, lawyers, and historians.9 Scholars from such disciplines as education and social welfare are also interested in

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studying the policy because its focus is to preserve Hong Kong people’s lifestyle.10 While certain discourses in the literature, as explained later, also reflect the situation of Macao, the authors of the literature treat Hong Kong as an isolated case. The problematic local autonomy of Hong Kong (and Macao by proxy) is interpreted as the result of authoritarian rule buttressed by absolute political control from the centre. This perspective of studying Hong Kong’s autonomy neglects the examples of other democratic countries. In a unitary state like the UK, the autonomy of the local government is also much constrained as the power and form of the local government originates from a single authority. The US federal system divides power between the federal and state governments through the Constitution — the power and structure of the local government is determined by the federal government.11 The restricted autonomy of local governments in liberal democracies implies that the limited autonomy in Hong Kong may be attributed more to the zero-sum power relations between centre and localities than its undemocratic sovereign state. Furthermore, the literature usually concludes that Hong Kong has less autonomy than promised by the Basic Law. Lee claimed that Beijing — through its legislature Standing Committee of National People’s Congress — assaulted Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy and the decisions of the Hong Kong Supreme Court on the right of abode in Hong Kong through interpreting the Hong Kong Basic Law — Hong Kong’s mini-constitution delineating the autonomy of Hong Kong and its relations with Beijing.12 Lo contended that Beijing undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy in democratic reform when it ruled out universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and all of the Legislative Council members in 2007 and 2008, respectively, through its interpretation of the Basic Law. Through its control of entry to China’s domestic market and professional practice, Beijing successfully silenced opposition from Hong Kong businesses and professional sectors on its policies with Hong Kong.13 Lai argued that the business constraints of media owners resulted in the mass media’s self-censorship. The favorable coverage on news in China affects the thinking of the people and weakens the organised societal forces in opposition with the policies of Chinese government, including its Hong Kong policies.14

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While the arguments above are true, the discussion about the definition of autonomy is inadequate. There is no consensus on the concept out of the context of Hong Kong and Macao. In fact, in the literature of local autonomy there are two approaches in defining autonomy. The first approach is a traditional static one, defining local autonomy as the power granted by higher tiers of the state. Local autonomy may be considered an object that local governments possess in various amounts. The central question of the researchers using this definition is how much and which kind of autonomy should be allocated to local governments.15 The dual politics theory of Saunders portrays a gloomy picture of local autonomy, suggesting that local autonomy is often constrained by central authorities which, in turn, are hijacked by global capitalism and preoccupied with maintaining and improving the means of production. In contrast, power dependence theorists do not think that local authorities are powerless in defining the degree of autonomy. Local authorities may possess huge amounts of resources and/or monopolise certain information. National authorities have to negotiate with them on the degree and style of local autonomy. Consequently, local autonomy and discretion may differ in degrees across different localities and policy areas within the same constitutional system of governance.16 To operationalise this concept of local autonomy, Clark constructed a typology of two variables — initiation and immunity. Initiation is defined as “the actions of local governments in carrying out their rightful duties.” Immunity refers to “the power of localities to act without the fear of the oversight authority of higher tiers of the state.” With high immunity, local governments can make decisions that cannot be overthrown by the higher tiers of the state. A typology with four types of local autonomy can be constructed on the two relative concepts: Type 1 is one with complete autonomy (initiative and immunity) while Type 4 (neither initiative nor immunity) is the opposite. Between the two extremes are Type 2 (initiative but no immunity) and Type 3 (no initiative but immunity).17 A major weakness of Clarks’ theory of local autonomy is its failure to acknowledge the relative concepts of initiation and immunity. In the post-Westphalia era, the sovereign states have to exercise their

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sovereignty (or autonomy) under the constraints imposed by international organisations, bilateral and multilateral agreements, foreign countries, and the mobility of capital and multinational corporations. It is hard for local governments to enjoy absolute initiative and/or immunity. Similarly, even in a bureaucracy constructed entirely on Max Weber’s ideal in which the administration must observe laws and policies from higher tiers, street-level public offices still reserve certain discretion in refining the laws and policies for operational purposes. An alternative closer to the real world is to conceive of the two factors as relative concepts based on a continuum between extremely broad and narrow autonomy, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates a modified Clark’s theory of local autonomy on the basis of the relative concepts of initiative and immunity. The strength of the modified theory is that it rules out the problem of finding examples for Type 1 and Type 4 which exist only in an imaginary world. In the Type 1 of Fig. 1 are local governments A and B. Local government B enjoys less initiative and immunity than local government A does, but both A and B are classified into Type 1 as long as their autonomy is higher than most others. The second approach is to define local autonomy as a relational construct “created and expressed within the ongoing process of social interaction that defines the local in relation to broader social and political entities.”18 Local governments are not conceptualised as products of state, but social construction in relation to central authorities. Local autonomy is not only an object transferable between

Initiative Broad

Narrow

A Immunity

Broad

Type 1

Type 3

B Narrow

Figure 1.

Type 2

Type 4

Modified Clark’s theory of local autonomy.

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central and local governments, but also a power relation between them. The power relation includes the capacity for expressing, developing and using local identity, that is, the freedom of using local ways in refining national policies and delivering public programmes. The examples include using local customs in dispute arbitration and local dialects in public administration. Rather than the kinds and degree of autonomy, the researchers following this approach look for reasons to explain the difference in local autonomy by examining the social process of state formation and the unfolding events in central-local relations.

MACAO’S AUTONOMY — A CRITICAL EVALUATION On the basis of the typology in Fig. 1, the local autonomy of Macao can be classified as Type 2. Macao’s power of initiative is broad. According to Basic Law, Macao has high autonomy in domestic affairs. Foreign relations and national defence are under the jurisdiction of the central government. The Chief Executive (the head of Macao SAR government) and most of the Legislative Assembly members are elected by Macao citizens through contested elections. Macao’s Court of Final Appeal is established to hear and judge final appeals. It is vested with the authority of interpreting Basic Law; its decisions cannot be overridden by China’s highest level court, the Supreme People’s Court. Except the those stipulated in Basic Law, China’s laws and regulations cannot be applied to Macao. Macao can keep all the tax and non-tax revenue from Macao, and dictate its own economic, cultural and social policies. In addition, local identity is permitted to express and develop. Portuguese has been used as an official language for 400 years, and continues to be used as a working language of the administration. Putonghua (the official language of Chinese government) and the simplified version of written Chinese do not replace Cantonese (a southern Chinese dialect and the mother language of most Macao people) and the traditional version of written Chinese is the administration’s working language. Only Macao citizens qualify to be elected

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Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly members, and appointed political officials. Almost all civil service positions are reserved for Macao citizens. The Central Liaison Office of Macao — or the Macao SAR Committee of Chinese Communist Party — remains low profile and restrains itself from openly instructing the Macao SAR government and Macao citizens. Different religious beliefs are allowed to be practise. Unlike the home churches in the Mainland that are subject to occasional harassment by the authorities, religious freedom in Macao is generally respected. While the above institutional expressions of local identity are also applied to Hong Kong, the peculiar arrangements in Macao over the issues of nationality and legal system mark a broader autonomy of Macao compared to that of Hong Kong’s. Under China’s Nationality Law, dual nationality is not permitted for fear of dual loyalty. Therefore, Hong Kong citizens with the right of abode in foreign countries are not allowed to take senior public posts and most seats in the Legislative Council. However, the Portuguese government gave Portuguese passports to about one fourth of the population before negotiations on Macao’s future began. Portuguese passport holders included many judges, politicians, and civil servants who were indispensable to the smooth transition and successful implementation of the one-country two-system policy. China had to make concessions; hence, only the post of Chief Executive is exclusively reserved for a Macao citizen without a foreign passport.19 Furthermore, all Macao and Portuguese laws continued to be valid after the handover, unlike the case of Hong Kong where the Acts of the UK Parliament became invalid. Until 1976, Macao did not have its own legislative authority and all Portuguese laws were automatically extended to Macao. When Sino–Portuguese negotiations started, all judges in Macao were sent from Portugal. Beijing tried to localise Macao’s legal system in order to sever the links with the Portuguese legal system. Laws were translated from Portuguese into the Chinese language. Chinese legal workers were provided with Portuguese language training. Some of them were selected to receive further training to become judges.20 Ten years after the handover, however, the localisation process remains incomplete. Mainland and

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Macao-trained judges are unable to meet the demand. Judges have to be recruited from Portugal. The Macao Lawyers’ Association which oversees lawyers’ registration is dominated by Portuguese-speaking lawyers. High proficiency in the Portuguese language is still a prerequisite for registration. In spite of the extensive power of initiation and much room for expressing local identity, Beijing possesses several ways of leveraging that makes some of Macao’s autonomy merely symbolic. Beijing can manoeuvre the composition of the Election Committee — the organ electing the Chief Executive. Most Election Committee members are leaders of pro-Beijing interest groups who are co-opted by both the Beijing and Macao government.21 The posts of Chief Executive and his/her principal officials are managed under China’s nomenklatura system. Therefore, only the candidates approved by Beijing can win Chief Executive elections; only the people nominated by the Chief Executive and approved by Beijing can become principal officials. Through the Chief Executive, Beijing can influence the seven appointed members of the Legislative Assembly. Beijing’s agent, the Central Liaison Office, may coordinate and support different proBeijing candidates running in the Legislative Assembly and NPC elections. Article 143 vests the power of interpreting Basic Law in Macao’s courts to make all decisions on all cases except two types: (1) the cases related to Macao’s relations with Beijing; and (2) the cases under Beijing’s jurisdiction. These two types of cases are never clearly defined. Beijing can stretch the definitions to include the two SARs’ political reforms. Consequently, the Standing Committee of the NPC was able to rule out universal suffrage for the Hong Kong Chief Executive and all seats in the Legislative Council in 2007 and 2008, respectively, through interpretation of Hong Kong Basic Law. In 2005, the Standing Committee of the NPC interpreted the Hong Kong Basic Law again to define the terms of office of the new Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang who replaced his predecessor Tung Chee-hwa before the end of Tung’s appointment in 2007.22 Economic incentive is another means to undermine Macao’s autonomy. Macao’s economy is highly dependent on China. China supplies Macao with 100 percent of its fresh water, living poultry and

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livestock, as well as 70 percent of all electricity consumed in Macao.23 Macao has no water territories. All reclamation projects — the only means for Macao to acquire land for the projects of infrastructure, property development, and casino development — require Beijing’s approval. As a result, Macao can hardly resist Beijing’s instructions even though the instructions may go against Macao’s interests. In April 2008, the Chief Executive Edmund Ho announced that due to Beijing’s instructions, Macao SAR government would temporarily halt new casino construction projects. The move is believed to be motivated by Beijing’s intention to alleviate Macao casinos’ overspill effect on China which results in problems such as money laundering and the embezzlement of public funds. In response to Chinese leaders’ repeated call for “appropriate economic diversification” so as to lessen the dependence on the gambling industry, the Macao government has had to diversify its casino-based economy into the industries of convention, exhibition and logistics which are unable to survive without government support.24 In 2009, Beijing scaled down Macao’s reclamation project tabled in 2005 from the proposed 700 hectares to 362 hectares. The Macao government was pressured to improve land management and utilisation.25 Tourists are the major sources of casino-goers. Over half of the tourists come from China. The number of tourists and casino-goers depends heavily on China’s policy on outbound tourism which, in turn, is partially contingent on the overspill effects of Macao’s gambling industry on China’s criminal activities, such as money laundering and embezzlement of public monies for gambling. In 2008, the Chinese government tightened outbound tourism to Macao in order to lessen the downside of the booming gambling industry. Macao’s economic growth then slowed. Macao’s autonomy is further constrained by its narrow power of immunity. In his comments on Macao’s autonomy, Wu Bangguo said that the autonomy of Macao SAR government is a form of delegation from Beijing.26 In other words, Macao’s autonomy is not a constitutional right if it extends beyond Beijing’s reach. It is constitutionally legitimate for Beijing to overthrow the Macao government’s decisions, testified by the examples in Hong Kong. In 1999, Beijing

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overthrew the ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal on the right of abode disputes through the Standing Committee of NPC’s interpretation of Hong Kong Basic Law Article 24 concerning citizenship. Beijing also bypassed Article 158 (and Article 143 of Macao Basic Law) to interpret Basic Law without the consent of the SARs’ courts.27 The limits on Macao’s autonomy, however, do not arouse public discontent. Disputes between Beijing and Macao SAR governments and between central government and average citizens, if any, are unnoticed. Macao people have a high trust in the Chinese government and give a high rating to Beijing’s Macao policy. Since 2005, Macao people have had an even higher trust in the Chinese government than the Macao government (see Fig. 2). Many Macao people are satisfied with Macao SAR government’s handling of the onecountry two-system policy and its relations with Beijing (see Tables 1 and 2). Macao’s civil society does not provoke Beijing, unlike that of Hong Kong’s which continually disputes Beijing on such matters as political reform, Chinese officials’ encroachment of Hong Kong’s

90 80 70 60

Trust in Macao Government

50

Trust in Chinese Government

40 30

Approval Rate on Beijing's Macao Policy

20 10 0 2005

2006

2007

2008

Figure 2. Public opinions on Macao government, Chinese government, and Beijing’s Macao policy.* * The maximum rating point is 100. Source: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Poll, Macao Studies (various years), http:///hkupop.hku.hk.

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Chief executive’s most satisfactory performance area.

Performance area Implementing “One-Country Two-System” Policy Handling different political factions Keeping Edmund Ho’s promises made in policy speech Maintaining personal charisma Maintaining high integrity and working for public interests Not appointing the members of Edmund Ho’s family clan to political positions Appointing political officials on their merits NA Others Total

No. of respondents

%*

621

56.51

339 300

30.85 27.30

185 172

16.83 15.65

163

14.83

144 136 13 1,099

13.10 12.35 1.18 —

* Since the respondents were allowed to choose more than one option, the overall percentage exceeded 100 percent. Source: The Editorial Board of Academic Journal of One Country Two Systems, “Aomen tequ shinian fazhan jinbu daxing mingyi tiaocha baogao” (An Opinion Poll of the Development and Progress of Macao Special Administrative Region in the Past Ten Years), Yiguo liangzhi yanjiu (Academic Journal of One Country Two Systems), 2, 2009, p. 112.

autonomy and freedom, and China’s human rights record. Macao democrats, who are considered opposition forces, are small in number. They strictly follow the Basic Law’s roadmap on Macao’s political reform, and did not make a serious attempt to demand a more democratic political system until 2007.28 Probably because of their moderate stance, Macao democrats are allowed to cross the borders freely while some of their Hong Kong counterparts are barred from entering the Mainland and Macao. The mass media are self-censored; they support the Chinese government in their editorial line. Macao’s only terrestrial television channel and the most popular radio channel are government-owned and uncritical of the government. Macao Daily — the newspaper with the largest circulation and readership in the city — is owned by proBeijing entrepreneurs. News from political desks report the activities

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238 B.K.P. Chou Table 2.

The most successful policy of Macao government.

Policy Applying for Inscribing “Historical City of Macao” into UNESCO World Heritage List Liberalising the gaming industry Introducing cash sharing policy Implementing “One-Country Two-System” policy Alleviating crime Fighting SARS epidemic Legislating National Security Law Establishing Sino–Portuguese speaking country forum N/A Others Total

No. of respondents

%*

541

49.23

529 527 485 304 300 244 225 28 3 1,099

48.13 47.95 44.13 27.66 27.30 22.20 20.47 2.55 0.27 —

* Since the respondents were allowed to choose more than one option, the overall percentage exceeded 100 percent. Source: The Editorial Board of Academic Journal of One Country Two Systems, “Aomen tequ shinian fazhan jinbu daxing mingyi tiaocha baogao” (An Opinion Poll of the Development and Progress of Macao Special Administrative Region in the Past Ten Years), Yiguo liangzhi yanjiu (Academic Journal of One Country Two Systems), 2, (2009), p. 114.

of pro-Beijing politicians and societal associations much more widely than those of democrats. Investigative reports that serve to monitor the government are uncommon. Pro-Beijing and pro-government views dominate news reports and affect public opinions. There are no reports about Chinese officials pressuring the Macao mass media to adopt editorial policies in favour of Beijing, unlike the attempted control of press freedom in Hong Kong where its mass media are more eager to uphold the freedom of expression.29 Without the controversy of political reform and articles in Basic Law, the Standing Committee of NPC need not interpret the Macao Basic Law to trump the SARs’ courts and risk being accused of meddling with Macao’s domestic affairs. The three branches of power of the Macao government have never fought for more local autonomy. The Chief Executive is loyal and subservient to Beijing. As mentioned above, Edmund Ho went against the interests of Macao, but followed Beijing’s instructions to

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halt the expansion of casino projects. When commenting on Macao SAR government’s malfeasance and weaknesses, Ho blamed himself and other officials’ inadequate understanding of Basic Law.30 The enactment of National Security Law in the two SARs exemplified that Macao is eager to be the motherland’s “good boy,” in contrast with “rebellious brother” Hong Kong. In 2003, Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa tried to enact the highly unpopular National Security Bill — a gesture widely believed to be paying allegiance to Beijing. Hundreds of thousands of people took to street in protest on 1 July, 2003. In the face of the public outrage, the Chairman of Liberal Party, James Tien, resigned from the Executive Council in support of the protestors. This forced Tung to withdraw the Bill and paved the way for Tung’s resignation in 2005.31 Macao’s case was different. The draft National Security Bill was unveiled in October 2008. Although some articles in the bill were controversial and considered a violation of human rights, the voices against the bill were weak. The Legislative Assembly promptly passed the bill in early January 2009, less than three months after the bill was announced for consultation.32 The Chinese political leaders’ appreciation of Macao’s swift passage of the bill revealed the symbolic meaning of the bill, which was Beijing’s eagerness to solicit subservience from localities.33 The subservience of Macao to Beijing and cordial Beijing–Macao relations received high commendations from Chinese officials. On comparing the political systems of Hong Kong and Macao, Deputy Director of State Council, Hong Kong Macao Office, Zhang Xiaoming, said that Macao’s political system was “more constructive.” The executive, legislative and judiciary branches were more cooperative and better coordinated with each other than their Hong Kong counterparts. Zhao’s comment implied Beijing’s rebuke of any political reform in the two SARs modeled on Western liberal democracies characterised by the separation of the three branches as it would pose challenges to Beijing’s control of the two SARs.34 In December 2009, Wu Bangguo commented that different sectors of Macao society upheld the principle of maintaining Macao’s prosperity and stability. They insisted on working for consensus, tolerating

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diverse opinions, undertaking consultation, and resisting external forces’ meddling with domestic affairs. Heavy emphasis was placed on social harmony, but not “simple politicization” of social disputes. Furthermore, Wu appreciated the Macao citizens’ belief that Macao was an integral part of China. They took the initiative to safeguard the core interests of the state and the authority of the central government. Wu added that Macao had successfully implemented an executive-led political system, appropriately handled the relations among the branches of executive, legislative and judiciary, and safeguarded the authority of the Chief Executive “with self-consciousness.”35 Wu’s appreciation of Macao’s loyalty underscored the heavy emphasis of Beijing on political control.

FACTORS FAVOURABLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE-COUNTRY TWO-SYSTEM POLICY The study of the one-country two-system policy may be traced back to Beijing’s Macao policy during the Cold War era. Portuguese colonial rulers lost the will and muscle of effective governance during the 1966 riots, an overspill of the Cultural Revolution. Without strong colonial rule, pro-Beijing societal groups, business associations and labour unions have successfully expelled the pro-Taiwan elements from Macao and penetrated almost all aspects of the social sphere, education included.36 Many young people studied in pro-Beijing Chinese schools, received tertiary education in China (or in Macao through Chinese universities’ distance learning programmes), and were affected by the official ideology underlined in the educational process. Without a government-sanctioned unified curriculum, Macao’s fundamental education did not instill the students with a sense of belonging to the city.37 Macao was not a territorial centre, which, in the words of Rokkan, was built on economic/technological resources or cultural/ religious heritages, and had little difficulty in integrating with an overarching political entity.38 In the absence of a strong local identity, Macao people who are mostly ethnic Chinese, naturally seek identification with cultural and political China (see Table 3).

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241

Identification with China and Macao.

Year

Proud to be Chinese

Proud to be Macao people

1991 1999 2006

66.9% 74.1% 79.5%

53.6% 38.8% 65.8%

Source: Yu Chun, Lü Guomin, “Dazhong zhengzhi wenhua” (Popular Political Culture), In Huang Shaolun, Yang Yuwan, Yun Baoshan, Zheng Hongtai, (eds.), Aomen shehui shilu: Cong zhibiao yanjiu kan shenghuo suzhi (Macao Society: A Quantity Analysis of Quality of Life, (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007), p. 306.

The variation in the strengths of the democrats in the two SARs also impacts the relations between Beijing and the two SARs. The start of democratisation in the late 1970s (in Macao) and early 1980s (in Hong Kong) paved the way for the rise of democrats in domestic politics. They criticised China’s human rights record, provided support for China’s political dissidents, and were the staunchest critics of the two SAR governments. In Hong Kong, democrats have seized 60 percent of the votes in the post-handover Legislative Council elections (geographical constituencies) and over one-third of the seats in the Council. They call for universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council, a demand perceived by Beijing as a means to weaken its political control over Hong Kong. They have mobilised various societal forces to halt the legislation of the controversial National Security Bill. This finally brought down Tung Chee-hwa and three of his political appointees. Many of these democrats developed their political skills in the social movements in the 1970s during the debate of Hong Kong’s political future in the 1980s. Their vigilance over Hong Kong’s government and their distance from Beijing’s government have won them acclaim among the public, but mistrust from Beijing. Some of these democrats lost their political clout after the handover. Their distance from the Beijing government became a political liability. In the eyes of many Hong Kong people, China’s rise in the global economy and international politics meant that China will determine one’s future career advancement and business

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expansion. Being close to Beijing does not necessarily have a negative connotation. Nevertheless, the public support of democrats has been sustained by the emergence of a new breed of democrats. These new democrats owe their political careers to their success in legal professions and their heroic defense of the rule of law in Hong Kong. In Macao, the democrats could only win some 20 percent of the votes in post-handover legislative assembly elections (geographical constituencies) and less than 10 percent of the seats. None of their motions proposed in legislative assembly have been passed. The democrats show a weak ability to mobilise social movement. The limited success of Macao democrats in amassing public support is due to the deep penetration of pro-government interest groups in all walks of life. Many interest groups are established and funded by the politicians and entrepreneurs with strong connections to both Beijing and Macao governments. These interest groups and their members are loathe to support democrats for fear that their patrons’ political future and/or business opportunities will be put at risk and their funding sources will dry up. Without a strong opposition camp, both Beijing and Macao governments find it easier to contain disputes rather than jeopardise their relations.39

IMPLICATIONS OF MACAO IN CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS Beijing is aware that Macao’s local autonomy in terms of its economic decisions invite the form of foreign influence that Beijing does not welcome. In 1999, the US passed the United States–Macau Policy Act which authorised Congress to receive an annual report from the State Department on such matters as US–Macao relations, the development of democratic institutions in Macao, and the implementation of the Sino–Portuguese Joint Declaration — an agreement signed in 1987 between China and Portugal on Macao’s post-handover constitutional arrangements. In 2002, Macao broke the casino monopoly and announced the granting of three casino concessions. The casino liberalisation attracted a tremendous amount of American capital. Five years after the liberalisation, the accumulated investment made

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by US resort and gaming companies was close to US$8 billion. The increasing presence of US capital and the implications of the gambling industry with such criminal activities as money laundering and human trafficking led to the US government’s concern about Macao’s gambling and financial industries. In March 2007, the US Treasury accused a Macao bank called Banco Delta Asia of laundering money and distributing superdollars for North Korea. US companies were ordered to cut links with the bank. A bank run then followed; the Macao government had to take over the bank’s management to stabilise Macao’s financial industry.40 Probably prompted by the incident of Banco Delta Asia, Hu Jintao outlined his most recent policy towards Macao (and Hong Kong) in his political report to the 17th National Congress of CCP in October 2007. He called for “resolutely opposing external forces that meddle with Hong Kong and Macao affairs.”41 Hu did not elaborate about the external forces; it was believed he meant the US government and American capital in the gambling industry. Based on the past episodes in Hong Kong, the disputes over political reforms and civic rights offer opportunities for the US, EU, and other international organisations to express their concerns about the SAR’s domestic affairs and the implementation of the 1984 Sino–British Joint Declaration, the equivalent of the Sino–Portuguese Joint Declaration. Disputes between Beijing and Macao are rare, and so is international criticism of Beijing’s Macao policy. The annual reports of the US State Department did not point out any significant problems that escalated the US–China conflict. After 2004, the annual Macao report was replaced by separate subreports on Macao under the China country report. The subreports covered such areas as human rights, human trafficking, money laundering, and narcotics control. The conclusions of some reports were unfavourable. In discussing the efforts of the Macao government to fight money laundering, a report stated: Macau authorities have taken steps to improve compliance with suspicious transactions reporting requirements in banks and casinos, but the threshold reporting limits remain well above international norms. Macau’s Financial

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A report on human trafficking concluded in even harsher terms: The Macau government did not make progress in investigating and prosecuting trafficking offenses. Although the government studied ways to improve the handling of cases involving violence against women, it has not yet instituted a systematic approach towards identifying and protecting victims of trafficking. Moreover, no tangible steps were taken towards dedicating resources for the sheltering or counseling of trafficking victims.43

The reports, however, have not triggered an outrage of China. China has seldom openly accused the US of meddling with Macao’s domestic affairs. In addition to the relative insignificance of Macao to China’s strategic interests, the reports accurately pointed out the problems that also concern the Chinese government. These problems have spilled over to China and worsened China’s criminal activities. The Chinese government has vested interest in making the problems known to the public and pressuring the Macao government to address them.44 Moreover, the reports prompt US officials to hold discussions with the Macao government about the aforementioned issues and provide technical advice to improve Macao’s response to these policy areas.45

IMPLICATIONS OF BEIJING’S POLICY ON ITS BORDERLANDS The desirability of more local autonomy in China’s borderlands is widely discussed. Pei, for instance, stated that self-determination was a workable compromise between complete independence and the status quo with occasional violence in minority-inhabited borderlands.46 Davis argued that a form of autonomy that lived up to China’s constitution and international human rights practice may help to settle the current disputes in Tibet.47 On paper, the Chinese government also acknowledges the merits of local autonomy through establishing five

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autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties and over 1,000 autonomous townships in regions with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. The 2009 Xinjiang riot and 2008 Tibet unrest proved that current policies have failed to stabilise the two autonomous regions. Some lessons can be drawn from the case of Macao when it comes to improving Beijing’s rule of unstable borderlands that have difficulty politically integrating with China properly. First of all, granting more power of initiation to localities (such as the methods of electing governors at various jurisdictional levels) does not necessarily result in the loss of political control if their power of immunity is not strengthened. Party committee secretaries, who are not members of ethnic minorities or indigenous communities and who exercise the power of immunity on Beijing’s behalf, remain low profile. The open contest for the post of Chief Executive (such as between Beijing-supported Edmund Ho and banker Stanley Ao in 1999) rarely challenges Beijing’s intention — that the Chief Executives elected by the Beijing-appointed Election Committee composed of Macao citizens are always Beijing supporters. Although the election is not rigged, most of the directly elected members in the Legislative Assembly are pro-Beijing politicians, and as long as Beijing can maintain cohesion among different pro-Beijing factions, it is accepted. Second, the opportunities for expressing and developing local identities, such as using Cantonese and Portuguese in public administration, neither weakens identification with the national identity defined by the state, nor affects territorial integrity. The issue of national identity is related to propaganda and education policies controlled by Beijing. More room for expressing and developing local identity (such as a wider use of the mother tongue of ethnic minorities and less control of religious practices) in public space may lessen the feeling of marginalisation among ethnic minorities. As indicated in different multi-ethnic countries such as Singapore and Brazil, local identities can live side by side with national identities. Through smart co-optation policies, Beijing is able to keep significant societal forces on its side. Religion is important to civil society in many communities along China’s borderlands. Alienating charismatic religious leaders is

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not as good as co-opting them into the Beijing establishment for purposes of social control. These strategies cannot eliminate all opposition forces. However, the riots in Xinjiang and Tibet show that the current carrot-and-stick policies also fail to achieve the target goals. Furthermore, the existence of some opposition forces does not weaken Beijing’s effective control over Macao, but shows Beijing’s tolerance of dissidents. This helps to reduce the likelihood of foreign powers criticising Beijing’s human rights violations. Second, local support to Beijing and its agents in Macao is partially contingent on equitable distribution of economic growth benefits. After the 2002 casino liberalisation, Macao’s GDP more than doubled in six years. The booming economy, paradoxically, went hand-in-hand with the rising public discontent with the Macao government due to rising property prices, political corruption, traffic congestion, and pay hikes falling behind the inflation rate.48 When talking about its contribution to the borderlands, Beijing often emphasised the general improvement in people’s well-being. In Tibet, for example, the central government’s subsidies to Tibet accounted for 95 percent of Tibet’s financial expenditure in the 40 years since it was established. In 2007, the fiscal revenue of Tibet was 2.3 billion yuan while the fiscal transfer from the central government was 28.5 billion yuan.49 But there is no mention as to whether the fiscal transfer from the central government and the benefits of economic growth are equitably distributed among the people. Much fiscal transfer and the private capital following the fiscal transfer end up in productive activities such as infrastructure construction and the service industry. Many ethnic minorities are unable to engage in these fields because of a lack of suitable education and vocational training. Ethnic minorities living nomadic lives benefit little from the current mode of education and public housing that require them to settle in particular places. Instead, the economic growth in the borderlands has attracted many immigrants who reap the benefits of development. To address current problems, Beijing must assure the ethnic minorities that the capital channeled will be for activities that they can participate in. At the same time, more investment in education that suits ethnic minority culture has to be made in order to equip them with the skills that will allow them to adapt to the economy.

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CONCLUSION Beijing faces a dilemma in ruling its restless borderlands: more autonomy is regarded as a threat — it may potentially accelerate national disintegration. The current carrot-and-stick policies with little true local autonomy, however, are unable to stabilise the regions, win the hearts of the people, and crush the secessionist forces. The heavyhanded policies used to deal with the riots in Tibet and Xinjiang provoke Western powers’ criticism of China’s human rights record and raise their concern that China’s rise in global politics and the international economy will do more harm than benefit to international communities. Beijing has to fend off Western criticism to satisfy domestic nationalistic sentiments and accentuate the mutual mistrust. The case of Macao shows that more local autonomy does not necessarily weaken Beijing’s control on localities: as indicated above, the concept of autonomy is multidimensional. It is composed of the power of initiation, the power of immunity, and the capacity for expressing and developing local identity. More local autonomy in the form of the power of initiation, and the capacity for expressing and developing local identity can satisfy demands of certain members in the borderlands who are discontent with the status quo, but unwilling to break away from China. Beijing’s tight grip on the power of immunity can ensure its control over the decisions on important personnel and socioeconomic policies deemed essential for national unity. The reshaping of the local autonomy, together with sound co-optation policies, can help to break the current dilemma in ruling the borderlands and satisfy various stakeholders in both domestic and international communities.

NOTES 1. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 2. Staurt Weir and David Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain, London: Routledge, 1999. 3. Gordon L. Clark, “A Theory of Local Autonomy,” Annals of Association of American Geographers, 74 (2), 1984, p. 195.

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4. Luis Moreno, The Federalization of Spain, London: Frank Cass, 2001; Robert Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in Spain,” International Political Science Review, 17 (4), 1996, pp. 385–401. 5. Robert W. Lake, “Negotiating Local Autonomy,” Political Geography, 13 (5), 1994, pp. 423–442. 6. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper 2004: Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040524/index. htm. 7. Xin Yu, “Wu Bangguo you guan xianggang jianghua yinqi fanxiang” (The Speech of Wu Bangguo Has Aroused Controversy), Dajiyuan, 9 June 2007, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/7/6/9/n1738423.htm. 8. The literature by Lo, Yee, and Ghai is some of the few that study policies within the context of Macao. See Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, Political Change in Macao, London: Routledge, 2008; Hebert S. Yee, Macau in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Yash Ghai, “The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau: Some Reflections,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1 (49), 2000, pp. 183–198. 9. Sonny Shiu-hing, Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008; Ming K. Chan, (ed.), The Challenge of Hong Kong’s Reintegration with China, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997; Michael C. Davis, “Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 34, 1996, p. 301. 10. Mark Bray and Ramsey Koo, “Postcolonial Patterns and Paradoxes: Language and Education in Hong Kong and Macao,” Comparative Education, 40 (2), 2004, pp. 215–239; Ian Holliday and Linda Wong, Ian Holliday and Linda Wong, “Social Policy under One Country, Two Systems: Institutional Dynamics in China and Hong Kong since 1997,” Public Administration Review, 63 (3), 2003, pp. 269–282. 11. Michael P. Brown, “The Possibility of Local Autonomy,” Urban Geography, 13 (3), 1993, pp. 257–279; David Wilson and Chris Game, Local Government in the United Kingdom, Macmillan, Basingstoke: Palgrave,

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12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

249

2002, cited in Lawrence Pratchett, “Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the ‘New Localism’,” Political Studies, 52 (2), 2004, p. 362. Eliza W.Y. Lee, “Governing Post-Colonial Hong Kong: Institutional Incongruity, Governance Crisis, and Authoritarianism,” Asian Survey, 39 (6), 1999, pp. 940–959. Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations. Carol P.Y. Lai, Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom And Political Change, 1967–2005, London, New York: Routledge 2007. Harold Wolman and Michael Goldsmith, “Local Autonomy as a Meaningful Analytic Concept: Comparing the Local Government in U.S. and U.K.,” Urban Affairs Quarterly, 26 (1), 1990, pp. 3–27; Gordon Clark and Michael Dear, State Apparatus: Structures and Language of Legitimacy, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984. Jens Blom-Hansen, “Policy-Making in Central-Local Government Relations: Balancing Local Autonomy, Macroeconomic Control, and Sectoral Goals,” Journal of Public Policy, 19 (3), 1999, pp. 237–264; Peter Saunders, “Reflections on the Dual Politics Thesis,” In Urban Political Theory and the Management of Fiscal Stress, Michael Goldsmith and Soren Villadsen, (eds.), Aldershot, Gower: 1986, pp. 1–40. David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, “Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology,” In Policy Networks in British Government, David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, (eds.), Oxford: Claredon, 1992, pp. 249–268; Michael Brown, “The Possibility of Local Autonomy,” Urban Geography, 13 (3), 1992, pp. 257–279; R.A.W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-central Government of Britain, London: Routledge, 1992, cited in Pratchett, “Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the ‘New Localism’,” pp. 358–375. Clark, “A Theory of Local Autonomy,” pp. 195–208. Lake, “Negotiating Local Autonomy,” pp. 423–442. Ghai, “The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau,” pp. 193–194. Ghai, “The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau,” p. 193. Yi Tie, “Li Chengjun: jibenfa shi aomen fanrong fazhan jishi” (Li Chengjun: Basic Law is the Foundation of Macao’s Prosperity and Development), Aomen ribao, (Macao Daily), 5 December 2009, p. A2. Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations, pp. 81–108.

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23. Zengwei Jiang, “Huli hezuo gongchuang fanrong (Mutual Cooperation for Prosperous Future), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) (Overseas Edition), 12 January 2010, p. 3. 24. “Hu Jintao xialing aomen duye buzhun kuochong. He Houhua: bu zengfa dupai, bu zhun jia duzhuo, bu pidi jian duchang” (Hu Jintao Instructed Not to Allow the Expansion of Macao’s Gambling Industry. Edmund Ho: No More Casino Concessions, Gambling Tables, and New Land Lease for Casino Construction), Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), 23 April 2008, p. A2. 25. Huang Dong, “Zhongyang you zai song dali. Shanyong tudi mo hulai” (Central Government Gives Concessions Again. Land Should be WellManaged), Journal Informacao Son Pou, 4 December, 2009. 26. Wanwen Guo, “Jiangqiu shehui hexie, buba maodun wenti jiandan zhengzhihua. Wu zan ao ningjuliliang cu fazhan” (Emphasizing Social Harmony. Not Simply Politicizing Disputes. Wu Bangguo Commended the Contribution of Macao’s Solidarity to Development), Aomen ribao (Macao Daily News), 5 December 2009, p. A1. 27. Yash Ghai, “Citizenship and Politics in the HKSAR: The Constitutional Framework,” Citizenship Studies, 5 (2), 2001, pp. 143–164. 28. A private communication with a Macao democrat in December 2009. 29. In view of Hong Kong’s vigilant mass media, the Chinese government responded by denying permits to certain Hong Kong journalists working in China, openly criticising the mass media for their reports unfavourable to Chinese government, and removing the news reports considered negative from Hong Kong newspapers and TV television broadcasts available in China. Media owners may dismiss the journalists critical of Chinese government out of their concern of their business interests in China. See International Federation of Journalists, China Clings to Control: Press Freedom in 2009, Brussels: International Federation of Journalists, 2010; Lai, Media in Hong Kong. 30. Wanwen Guo, “He Houhua tan tequ shinian chenggong yu buzu. Shizheng shiwu yin dui jibenfa qian quanmian lijie” (Edmund Ho Talked About the Success and Failure of Macao SAR in the Past Ten Years. The Weaknesses of Governance Was Due to Inadequate Understanding of Basic Law), Aomen ribao (Macao Daily), 5 December 2009, p. A2.

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31. Ngok Ma, “Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14 (44), 2005, pp. 465–482. 32. “Macao Legislature Passes National Security Bill,” People’s Daily Online, 2 March, 2009 http://english.people.com.cn/96528/6603579.html; “Macau Unveils Proposed National Security Bill,” The Standard, 22 October, 2008, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking_news_ detail.asp?id=8363&icid=a&d_str=20081022. 33. “Jiangqiu shehui hexi.” 34. Yuangui Cai and Jianxian Mo, “Fu zhuren Zhang Xiaoming niuqu sanquan fenli gangaoban jie aomen cai xianggang” (Deputy Director Zhang Xiaoming Distorted the Concept of Separation of Three Powers. His cynicism about Hong Kong showed by his use of Macao), Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), 11 November 2009. 35. Wanwen Guo, “Jiangqiu shehui hexie.” 36. Bill K.P. Chou, “Interest Group Politics in Macao after Handover,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14 (43), 2005, pp. 191–206. 37. Kwok-Chun Tang and Mark Bray, “Colonial Models and the Evolution of Education Systems: Centralization and Decentralization in Hong Kong and Macau,” Journal of Education Administration, 38 (5), 2000, pp. 468–485; John Kang Tan, “Secondary School History Curricula,” in Education and Society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative Perspectives on Continuity and Change, Mark Bray and Ramsey Koo, (eds.), Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 1999, pp. 171–194. 38. Stein Rokkan, “A Model and Conceptual Map of Europe,” In State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works, In Peter Flora with Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 145–147. 39. Bill K.P. Chou, “Hong Kong and Macau under One Country, Two Systems,” In Interpreting China’s Development, Gungwu Wang and John Wong, (eds.), Singapore: World Scientific, 2007, pp. 67–71. 40. “China ‘Regrets’ US Ruling on Bank,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6452857.stm.

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41. “Hu Jintao qiang diao: tuijin “yi guo liang zhi” shijian he zuguo heping tongyi daye” (Hu Jintao Emphasized: Implementing One-Country TwoSystem Policy for Unifying the Motherland), Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:82/17d/17d07101510.html. 42. Consulate General of the United States, Hong Kong and Macao, U.S. Policies and Issues: US and Macau 2009, U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ usmo_state_2009043001.html. 43. Consulate General of the United States, Hong Kong and Macao, U.S. and Macau (2008), U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment, http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/usmo_traffick_ 2008022801.html. 44. For cross-border criminal activities between Macao and Mainland, see Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China: Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Shapre, 2009. 45. Consulate General of the United States, Hong Kong and Macao, U.S. and Macau, http://hongkong.usaconsulate.gov/usmo_pa.html. 46. Minxin Pei, “Self-Administration and Local Autonomy: Reconciling Conflicting Interests in China,” In The Self-Determination of People’s: Community, Nation, and State in an Interdependent World, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, (ed.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 315–334. 47. Michael C. Davis, “The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet,” Journal of Democracy, 18 (4), 2007, pp. 157–171. 48. Bill K.P. Chou, “Interest Groups in Macao: From Corporatism to Cronyism,” In Interest Groups and Lobbying: Volume Three — Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, Conor McGrath, (ed.), Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2009, pp. 317–340. 49. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper 2004: Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040524/index.htm; “Xicang jingji, caizheng shouzhi” (Tibet Economy and Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure), Zhongguuo xicang wang (China Tibet Net), http://x z.people.com.cn/BIG5/138902/139219/139607/8407704.html.

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11 China’s Myanmar Policy: Challenges and Adjustments Hong Zhao East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

ABSTRACT Myanmar was claimed as a “de facto Chinese state” or “a virtual Chinese satellite.” However, China is facing an increasing number of challenges with respect to Myanmar, including illegal immigrants, drug trafficking, gambling, transnational crimes, and smuggling. How will China change or adjust its policies toward Myanmar?

INTRODUCTION Myanmar has been described as a “de facto Chinese state” or “a virtual Chinese satellite.” Recently, however, it seems that China has been increasingly facing challenges and crisis with respect to Myanmar, including illegal immigrants, drug trafficking, gambling, 253

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transnational crimes, and smuggling. As Myanmar’s military government increased its cooperation with some new players, including India, Thailand, and Russia, China’s leverage over Myanmar has been decreasing. Last year, Hillary Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, something that the ASEAN has been seeking from the US for two decades. The Obama administration also sent a mission to Myanmar and had talks with the military regime. This indicates that the US has ‘come back’ to Southeast Asia, and is more willing than before to pursue a direct diplomatic dialogue with the military junta, and engage with Southeast Asia regardless of democratic credentials. These changes above suggest that China cannot afford to be complacent about its relations with Myanmar. Beijing needs to carefully re-evaluate its policies towards Myanmar and adopt a more plural approach that moves beyond an old bilateralism.

KEY COMPONENTS OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS MYANMAR Border Stability China’s foremost concern regarding Myanmar is to ensure the stability of its shared border. The Myanmar–China border is estimated to be 2,204 kilometers long. There are more than 40,000 comparatively independent minority armed forces in the north and northeast areas of the Myanmar–China territorial boundary. As the military government has not been able to carry out effective management in the minority regions, a series of non-traditional security issues such as drug trafficking, gambling, transnational crimes, smuggling and money laundering exist along the border. “Nothing makes China’s leadership as nervous as regional or border disputes with the potential to incite internal instability.”1 Myanmar served as a passageway for opium and heroin from the Golden Triangle in the 1980s, bringing drug addiction into China’s southern provinces and producing China’s first HIV epidemic. Now

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more than 95 percent of the heroin sold in China comes from this region. Drugs enter Yunnan through the border, from where they are trafficked along established routes to Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu, Guangdong and Fujian. Due to both governments’ efforts, the opium eradication campaign resulted in substantial reductions in poppy acreage in the decade since 1997 (by about 86 percent) and a steady downward trend from 2002 until 2007 when acreage went up by 29 percent.2 In 2008, this upswing continued, probably driven by high prices and a lack of viable alternative livelihood for the impoverished farmers in the Kayah and Shan hills. Estimated to involve around 168,000 households and the total potential value of the yield reaching US$123 million, planning poppies remained a major industry in remote areas where the government’s opium eradication drive was compromised by terrain, ecology and ceasefire arrangements with the Wa and Kachin ethnic groups.3 The Chinese government considers problems related to drug abuse as potential challenges to social stability and has delivered food and crop substitution aid.4 Drug use and crime are directly correlated. Armed confrontation between drug dealers and the police are common in border areas, with drug dealers equipped with grenades, shot guns, and often, machine guns. In Yunnan’s south west border county of De Hong, more than 60 percent of criminal offences are drug-related.5 Drug abuse and commercial sex have fuelled the spread of HIV/AIDS in the border areas. The most worrying issue concerns infections which have been driven by increasing migration and improved road transport within and across the border, carrying the virus further into China and back into Myanmar. It is also being spread by high-risk behavior and persistent lack of knowledge about HIV prevention. The UN has warned that China could have ten million HIV cases by 2010 unless it takes stronger steps to educate the public and fight the epidemic. Another serious problem is the casinos along the Myanmar side of the border. Some of these casinos have been run by the ethnic groups, and some by Chinese business men. They have been associated with

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widespread illicit activity and have attracted Chinese government officials, some gambling with state funds. Gambling has led to the kidnapping, torture and murder of gamblers who are unable to repay their debts, including businessmen and the sons of high-ranking government officials. The Yunnan government responded by cutting off water, telecommunications, power and roads to the Myanmar town of Maijayang to pressure the local authorities.6 Chinese troops have closed border crossings to casino towns and raided casinos across the border, arresting and fining all Chinese, including casino operators and gamblers.7 The Chinese government has concluded formal agreements to address cross-border issues, including memoranda of understanding on narcotics control and illegal logging.8 But illicit activities continue unabated. Ethnic groups on both sides depend on them as a main source of revenue. It is believed that lower level government officials, particularly army and police personnel posted in border areas, are involved in enabling the narcotics traffic and gambling, although there is no credible evidence that senior officials in the Myanmar government are directly involved in the drug trade.9

Economic Interests Economic relations are another key component of China’s policy towards Myanmar. Myanmar is an important outlet for the economic development of interior provinces, in particular, Yunnan and Sichuan. Promoting the economic development of China’s interior western provinces has been a primary objective of the central government since early 2000.10 Myanmar is also a potential source of and transshipment route for energy in the case of interruption of shipping through the Malacca Strait. The greatest areas of cooperation between China and Myanmar are trade, mining, oil, gas and hydropower. In 2008, the bilateral trade reached US$262.6 million (Table 1), and China has become the second largest trade partner of myanmar. China mainly exports textiles, steel, agricultural machinery, and refined oil to Myanmar, and imports timber, jade, agricultural products,

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China’s trade balance with Myanmar (US$ million).

Year

Total

Export

Import

Balance

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

621.3 631.5 861.7 1077.2 1145.5 1209.3 1460.1 2062.5 2626.0

496.4 497.4 724.8 907.7 938.6 934.9 1207.4 1691.9 1978.5

124.8 134.2 136.9 169.5 206.9 274.4 252.7 370.6 647.6

371.6 363.2 587.9 738.2 731.7 660.5 954.8 1321.3 1330.9

Source: The China Commerce Yearbooks (2001–2009).

Table 2.

China’s direct investment in Myanmar (US$ million).

Year

Value

Accumulation

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

— 4.1 1.2 12.6 92.3 232.5

10.2 20.2 23.6 163.1 261.8 499.7

Source: The China Commerce Yearbook, 2009.

marine products, natural rubber, and paper pulp from Myanmar. Myanmar is currently Yunnan’s largest trading partner among the ASEAN countries. In 2008, the Yunnan–Myanmar trade volume reached US$1.19 billion, accounting for almost half of China and Myanmar’s total trade.11 In 2008, China’s investment value in Myanmar reached US$232.5 million (Table 2), being the fourth largest foreign investor in Myanmar. China’s investment in Myanmar mainly covered infrastructures, minerals, hydropower, agriculture, oil and gas. Infrastructure development is a significant aspect of economic cooperation. Backed by low-interest loans and export credits,

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Chinese companies are building roads, dams, bridges and ports. Chinese enterprises are building dams all over Myanmar to increase electric power generation, the largest project being the 7,100 megawatt (MW) Tasang Dam on the Salween River, which the ADB will integrate into the Greater Mekong sub-region power grid.12 When completed, it will be the highest dam in Southeast Asia. In 2006, Sinohydro signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Myanmar for the Hat Gyi Dam along the Thai border. In 2007, Farsighted Group and China God Water Resources Co. signed MOUs for a hydropower project on the upper Salween. While these dams provide thousands of megawatts of electricity generating capability, most of the energy is to be sent to Thailand and China, bringing little benefit to the people of Myanmar.13 In return for its investment in infrastructure, Myanmar has granted China privileges in the exploitation of oil and gas.14 Though Myanmar is not a major energy supplier to China, Chinese state oil companies and the government have demonstrated increased interest in Myanmar’s energy resources in recent years. CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC have all started oil exploration projects. China has competed fiercely with other countries, such as India and Korea, to secure access to potential reserves of gas off the west coast. Chinese companies are also heavily involved in Myanmar’s growing mining sector. According to Myanmar’s central Statistical Organisation, there was a sharp increase in foreign investment in the mining sector to US$861 million in 2008, drawing more than 88 percent of foreign investment in 2008. Of this amount, 99 percent came from China.15 The joint Tagaung Taung nickel deposit, the country’s largest mining project, was approved by the Myanmar government in September 2008.16 The US$800 million project, financed by Chinese state banks, has been called “one of the greatest collaborative efforts in the history of Sino–Burmese mining.” Myanmar has been a major recipient of economic assistance over the past decade, generally provided in the form of grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans or debt relief. Statistics showed that by 2005, China’s total aid to Myanmar reached US$100 million. From 1991 to 2005, the Bank of China and China Import-Export Bank

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provided Myanmar with seller’s credits worth over US$1 billion. In 2006, China provided another US$85 million of loans to Myanmar for purchasing two new oil-drillers. This laid the solid foundation for China’s economic involvement in Myanmar.

Strategic Interests China regards Myanmar as an important geo-strategic country mainly because of the concerns of a potential blockade in the Malacca Strait. “China has to pay careful attention to developing relations with Southeast Asian countries, since the Indochina Peninsula would become the only free route between China and the Bay of Bengal if the Malacca Strait was blocked because of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.” Myanmar is not only a potential supply route bypassing the Malacca Strait, but also a strategic staging point for controlling access to Malacca Strait’s western approaches. Clearly, China’s security interest in Myanmar is to gain access to the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea. Myanmar’s location at China’s southwest region holds strategic importance for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in terms of its reach to the Indian Ocean via a Myanmar-controlled island. The PLAN would be able to shorten the distance by 3000 km by bypassing the Strait of Malacca in reaching the Bay of Bengal. In terms of energy security, this has also become increasingly important as China’s dependence on imported oil reached 50 percent in 2008 from 34 percent in 2003 and is expected to increase to 60 percent by 2020.17 China has helped develop port facilities in cities stretching from the South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, on towards the Persian Gulf: Gwadar, Pakistan; Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, Myanmar; Laem Chabang, Thailand; and Sihanoukville, Cambodia.18 Within Myanmar itself, China has provided assistance in the construction of radar, communications upgrade, and refueling facilities at ports in Hainggyi, Coco, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Kyun, Myeik and Kyaukphyu.19 China may make use of these ports for commercial and other reasons (subject to permission), but they are not naval bases designed to support PLAN deployments into the Indian Ocean,

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as some Indian analysts and “China threat” proponents have claimed. India has issued alarming reports about a Chinese signals intelligence station on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island to monitor Indian naval activity in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. While this was later proven to be untrue, it was a factor that led to India’s decision on 1993 to reverse its critical policy and strengthen ties with Myanmar.20 India has been aggressively pushing forward with its own plans for military expansion — with a particular emphasis on warship — to counter China’s influence in the region.21 Chinese companies are building oil and gas pipelines from the Myanmar south-western port of Kyaukphyu to Kunming.22 While Myanmar will not supply its own crude oil to China through the pipeline, it will transport oil from the Middle East and Africa, bypassing the Straits of Malacca, through which nearly 80 percent of China’s imported oil must pass. Given the pipeline’s projected path through territory controlled by ethnic groups, China’s interests in Myanmar’s stability have grown commensurately. It is believed that the pipeline will reduce China’s reliance on the strait for oil transportation by at least one third, reducing shipping time from Africa and the Persian Gulf, and providing easier access to crude oil for new inland refineries.23

CHALLENGES OF CHINA’S POLICIES Uncertainty of Business Environment China has invested a lot in Myanmar, aspiring for an open market economy in Myanmar where Chinese businesses can sell more goods. Yet Myanmar’s excessively weak governance continues to undermine political and social stability which impacts and risks China’s investments. The military government’s failure to implement an effective economic development plan and other reforms significantly limits commercial potential and reduces confidence in the investment environment. In 2005, the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation placed Myanmar in the most risky category for investment.24 Corruption, a weak judicial system, the lack of transparency

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and accountability as well as other governance issues make it difficult for Chinese and other foreigners to do business in Myanmar.25 Moreover, Myanmar is heading towards elections in 2010 which are a potential step towards significant constitutional and government changes. China has invested a large amount of money on infrastructure projects in Myanmar, counting on being reimbursed with resources by the military government. However, given the current political climate and possible government changes, the repayment of loans through resource extraction is not guaranteed and ensured.

Anti-Chinese Feeling In recent years, more and more Chinese people and capital have penetrated into Myanmar. Estimation by the Chinese Embassy in Yangon revealed that there were more than two million Chinese in Myanmar in 2005, including half a million ethnic Chinese; and “this influx is believed to have changed the demographic make-up of northern Myanmar.”26 Today, many parts of southwest China’s hinterland, from the city of Mandalay in Myanmar’s core up to Kachin State in the north and across to Shan State in the east, are dominated by Chinese business people and traders. Indeed, most businesses in almost all of Myanmar’s major cities have some form of Chinese investment. It is estimated that about 60 percent of Myanmar’s economy is in Chinese hands, taking into account the holdings of both ethnic Burmese–Chinese as well as more recent immigrants. In many towns along the China–Myanmar border, there is little to tell travelers that they are not in China; shopkeepers prefer renminbi to local currency, and the mobile telephone service comes from China Telecom. As a consequence, these new Chinese immigrants wield considerable power and influence in Myanmar society. However, the economic effect of the boom created by these Chinese is less than what it might seem. It is reported that about 70 percent of Myanmar’s exports to China is unfurnished wood that does not create any downstream and value-added wood-based industries. Some Chinese companies pay little attention to the

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sustainability of Myanmar’s export commodities or to their environmental impact. When constructing huge electric, cement, chemical and mining plants in Myanmar, instead of hiring locally, Chinese companies usually brought their own workers with them. Few benefits accrue to the local population and economies. Moreover, as pointed out by Myanmar critics, the transfer of older and less environmentally-friendly technologies from China to carry out many of those projects does create a fear that Myanmar is becoming a dumping ground for industrial waste. In this regard, the fact that Chinese companies have increasingly won bids for big projects in key sectors across Myanmar cannot help but reinforce anti-Chinese feeling among some local people.

Beijing’s Policies Undercut by Local Actors In many cases, China’s goal of stability and development are being undercut by the actions of local actors. The central government is willing to take some tough measures to decrease the import of rubber, jade and tin, and tighten the border control for drug trafficking and cross-border gambling. But the central government’s stance does not necessarily coincide wholly with the interests of the local governments. Kunming has stronger incentives than Beijing to deepen relations with Myanmar as trade and investment activities with Myanmar are its main revenue source. In addition, the revenue from the day trips across the border can account for as much as a third of the revenue of some bordering counties. This is why most border counties disagree with the central government’s ban on border tourism which is aimed at stopping people from gambling. For a long time, Yunnan, and especially its bordering counties, sought to maximise their economic interests in doing business with Myanmar. Many of Myanmar’s natural resources — minerals, oil and gas, timber — are located in the special regions controlled by ethnic groups. In the 1990s, the military government had already stipulated that only the central government had the right to exploit natural resources. However, many enterprises from Yunnan still continue to

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sign contracts directly with the ethnic minority groups, aggravating tensions between Beijing and Kunming, and creating problems for Beijing’s bilateral relationship with Myanmar. In 2005, the Myanmar government protested strongly against the illegal logging and mining activities in the north. In response, in March 2006, China banned its citizens from going to Myanmar for illegal mining and logging activities, stopped the transport of timber and minerals from Myanmar and prohibited Chinese from migrating to Myanmar. Yet, some agencies such as the commerce department of Yunnan and county governments tried to persuade the Mining and Forestry Ministries in Myanmar to recognise the logging and mining contracts already signed with the armed ethnic minority groups.27 This practice has undermined Beijing’s policy of good neighbourly relations and its international reputation. Activities by Chinese logging companies approved by the Yunnan provincial government or local governments without Beijing’s knowledge have led to friction between Beijing and Naypyidaw. In addition to increasing Myanmar’s suspicions about China’s strategic intentions, these activities damage China’s reputation among the local Burmese. Tensions between Beijing and Kunming surface when Beijing is called to account for illicit activities of its local businessmen and officials.

LIMITS OF CHINA’S LEVERAGE IN MYANMAR It is widely believed that China has special leverage with Myanmar government, as Myanmar has been described as a “de facto Chinese client state” or “a virtual Chinese satellite.”28 China is increasingly expected to deal with the Myanmar military regime to deliver its promise as a responsible rising power, and some ASEAN countries tend to stress that China is the only country able to influence Naypyidaw.29 China undoubtedly has some certain leverage over Myanmar, but the question is whether that leverage is sufficiently powerful. In fact, China faces increasing constraints in influencing the Myanmar military regime, and its leverage is limited.30

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The US and some western countries have imposed political and economic sanctions on Myanmar since the later 1980s, pressing the military regime on human right issues, democratisation and the release of political dissidents. China took the advantage of the situation to cultivate closer relations with the military government through trade, investment and large-scale infrastructure projects undertaken by major Chinese state-owned enterprises to build dams and transport natural resources. China’s economic and strategic interests, as well as political clout, have steadily risen in Myanmar since Beijing reversed previous policies and withdrew support from the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (BCP) in the 1980s. This contributed to the BCP’s later collapse trough a mutiny in 1989, and in its splintering, the formation of several ethnic-based insurgent organisations, including the narcotics trafficking United Wa State Army, are now active along the China–Myanmar border. In reality, Myanmar’s military leaders are fully aware of the potential dangers of being too close to China, and have consistently denied any Chinese military presence within its border or an establishment of a strategic alliance in China’s favour.31 From the early 1990s, Myanmar had decided to adopt a ‘counter hedging’ strategy and moved to diversify its diplomacy in an attempt to reduce its dependence on China: allowing itself to be courted by India and other big countries. Based on the foreign policy of non-alignment and multilateralism, Myanmar managed to rely on its strategic location and resources to attract and sustain the interest of many other countries, and has successfully balanced China’s economic and political influence.

Economic Influence China has invested in several energy projects in Myanmar, but it is only one of the external players in Myanmar. Many other important players have been actively involved in Myanmar, including India, Thailand and South Korea. In fact, most of the oil and gas projects have already been seized by Thailand, South Korea and India. India had already signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of

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natural gas, and has discussed with Myanmar on building several pipelines to the western and eastern parts of India. Though China has secured a gas pipeline from the offshore gas fields in the Arakan state near the Bay of Gengal to Yungnan, Indian and South Korean companies are currently the major stake holders in those oil and natural gas fields. In terms of trade, China is the second largest trade partner of Myanmar. Table 3 shows that China has been behind Thailand and India in terms of Myanmar’s export destination although it is still Myanmar’s largest import supplier.32 In terms of investment, China was the fourth largest investor in Myanmar. Table 4 shows that Myanmar’s foreign investments derive primarily from Asian countries. As of 31 May, 2009, Thailand is the biggest foreign investor in Myanmar, accounting for 47 percent of its total foreign investment. China ranks behind the UK and Singapore, although the ranking may not be a good reflection of China’s investments in Myanmar as many ventures are local or indirect.

Table 3. Countries

Myanmar’s top five trade partners (US$ million).

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2,752.6 831.2 314.2 124.5 100.3 69.8

2,767.5 827 355.2 154.1 126.9 72.6

3,157.0 1,230.3 363.7 187.7 163.5 97.2

3,706.0 1,623 450.9 249.5 184.9 121.5

4,479.0 2,135.7 653.1 229.7 225.6 113.5

4,794.0 2,104.9 729.8 336.9 269.2 126.6

6,650.0 3,446.5 833.2 585.9 288.4 162.5

2,969.1 797.3 355.9 576.6 263.1 157.8

3,228.5 998.8 483.3 716.0 154.3 202.4

3,456.5 1,029.2 665.4 717.1 164.3 178.2

3,577.1 1,028.4 777.3 656.1 270.3 132.0

3,838.4 1,328.0 837.9 620.0 181.5 133.4

5,522.1 1,861.1 1,054.6 855.8 231.6 321.2

6,938.4 2,177.1 1,449.0 1,415.0 346.3 268.2

Export Total Thailand India China Japan Malaysia Import Total China Thailand Singapore Malaysia Korea

Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2009.

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Foreign investment in Myanmar (as of May 31, 2009).

Countries

Value (US$100 million)

Percentage (%)

Thailand UK Singapore China USA Korea Japan India Others Total

74.1 18.6 15.5 13.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.9 27.3 157.7

47 11.8 9.8 8.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 17.3 100

Source: Chinese Consulate General in Mandalay, http://mandalay.mofcom. gov.cn/aarticle/sqfb/200907/20090706383238.html.

Political Influence As Myanmar pursues a foreign policy of non-alignment and multilateralism, China’s influence has been counter-balanced by some big powers. India–Myanmar relations were close during the early years after independence, with both Nehur and U Nu originating and leading the Non-Aligned Movement. Both countries signed a Treaty of Friendship for a duration of 5 years, which was to remain in force “for ever thereafter” if neither side gave notice of its desire to terminate it six moths prior to its expiration. However, after the 1962 coup, relations came to a standstill. India’s interest in Myanmar began to recover from the early 1990s when Narasimha Rao assumed power, concurrent with a shift from a low-key policy which emphasised human rights and democracy to one which reflected a pragmatic strategic policy towards Myanmar. In India’s strategic thinking, Myanmar’s location is central to strengthening its Look-East policy, energy security, and counter-balancing China’s expansion in Southeast Asia. India has sought cooperation from Myanmar in its counterinsurgency operations in the north-east along their border and held several joint military operations. India also supplies the military government with

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weapons and has got involved in various fields such as agriculture and telecommunications. US–Myanmar relations have produced some positive changes. One of the changes is that the US has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, something that the ASEAN has been seeking from the US for two decades. One of the principle clauses of the treaty is non-intervention, meaning that the US has to give more respect to ASEAN’s internal affairs and restrain interference. The other one is that US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, led a fact-finding trip to Myanmar last November, and had discussions with the military regime and met with democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as some ethnic group representatives. This indicates that the US is more willing than before to pursue a direct diplomatic dialogue with Myanmar, and engage with Southeast Asia regardless of democratic credentials. Strong voices in the US prefer an end to the US policy of isolation towards Myanmar in the past few decades, which had resulted in China’s growing political and commercial influence in Myanmar. All signs indicate that Washington wants to resume its status of a benign hegemony in the post-Bush era and counter the growing influence of China in Southeast Asia, particularly in the case of Myanmar, as Campbell said that “through diplomatic exchanges, the US can create a dialogue to potentially balance China’s influence in Myanmar.”33 In recent years, Russia has sought ways to exert influence in Myanmar, assisting the country’s development in areas that have aroused concerns from the international community: arms sales and energy. Upon the April 2006 visit to Russia by Maung Aye, the second highest-ranking member of Myanmar’s military junta, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov declared that Russia saw relations with Myanmar as a priority in Southeast Asia policy. Like China and India, Russia’s position vis-à-vis the ruling junta was helped by the fact that it saw Myanmar’s domestic upheavals as purely internal. While Russia sees great potential in Myanmar’s energy sector, Myanmar sees Russia as another important international partner to broaden its diplomatic base.

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Russia agreed in May 2007 to help Myanmar build its first nuclear reactor. Since 2002, more than 1,000 Myanmar scientists, technicians, and military personnel have received nuclear training in Russia.34 In the face of Western opposition to Russian negotiations on nuclear cooperation, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasised that nuclear cooperation did not conflict with the nonproliferation treaty, nor with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements, and would proceed.35 Moreover, Moscow has supplied arms to Myanmar, agreeing to a 2001 request by the government to purchase Russian-made MIG29 and MID27 jet fighters and a 2007 request to provide assistance with an air defense missile system.36

HOW WILL CHINA ADJUST ITS POLICIES TOWARDS MYANMAR? While the present situation still gives China a comparative advantage over competitors, its policies pose political, social and economic risks, including aggravating tensions and conflicts between central and local governments. Since some of China’s investments are largely concentrated on the extraction and exports of natural resources, they have limited impact on the broad-based economic development in Myanmar and have aroused some resentment against Chinese people. Myanmar’s ‘counter hedging’ strategy has led it be courted by more new actors and has largely reduced China’s leverage. As the US has ‘come back’ to Southeast Asia, China’s main concern is that the US involvement in Myanmar’s internal political affairs might result in domestic unrest and lead to regional instability. China also fears that a US–Myanmar détente will definitely go against China’s strategic interests.37 Given these challenges and changing regional dynamics, Beijing needs to carefully re-evaluate its policies towards Myanmar and adopt a more plural approach that moves beyond an old bilateralism. On the whole, China will not change its non-intervention policy which is primarily about not intervening in others’ internal affairs. China supports Myanmar not because this regime is military or

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authoritarian, but because “China believes that this regime is needed to maintain its domestic order.”38 Economic calculations also matter; pushing the generals in Naypyidaw too much on political reconciliation potentially damages Beijing’s economic agenda.39 Nevertheless, for Chinese leaders, non-intervention does not mean that China is not planning to use more effective methods to influence the other party. China has a great interest in the idea of ASEAN playing a larger role in influencing the military regime. At intervals throughout the past 20 years, ASEAN has sought not merely to talk to the junta, but also to put pressure on it to speed up the pace of political reform. This was a major motivation behind the decision to admit Myanmar in 1997, and it has formed a central plank of ASEAN strategy ever since.40 The ASEAN way — seeking non-confrontational, consensual, constructive engagement and non-interventionist ways to solve regional conflicts — complements Beijing’s longstanding policy of non-interference. There have been some indications that Beijing might be prepared to cooperate with ASEAN in pressing Naypyidaw. The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, held that, in relation to suggestions made by ASEAN, “China sincerely hopes and expects that the Myanmar government will give due consideration to those recommendations, listen to the call of its own people, learn from the good practices of others and speed up the process of dialogue and reform.”41 At the 2007 Singapore Summit, China and Indonesia agreed jointly to rely on diplomacy to encourage reconciliation, democracy and development in Myanmar.42 This suggests that China supports ASEAN as the main and more appropriate regional forum to address the challenge posed by Myanmar. Economically, China might intensify its efforts to help Myanmar implement some needed economic reforms. There have been particular and growing interest in China as economic models among some members of the Myanmar cabinet, and various sources indicate that Chinese advisers are suggesting the regime to privatise the country’s state-owned enterprises and undertake other structural economic reforms, including liberalisation of trade, and banking and exchange

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rate reforms. China can play a more active and constructive role in assisting Myanmar at this critical “economic transitional” phase. If China can focus on those projects and economic reforms that truly benefit the people of Myanmar, the results would stretch beyond economic development and enhance China’s reputation and image in Myanmar and the international community. “More responsible business practices would generate a large increase in human welfare inside Myanmar, and would enable China to play an important leadership role in the sphere of corporate social responsibility.”43

NOTES 1. Wen Liao, “China’s Black Cat, White Cat Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, 10 July, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/10/ chinas_black_cat_white_cat_diplomacy. 2. Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar in 2008 Weathering the Storm,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2009, p. 208. 3. Maung Than, “Myanmar in 2008 Weathering the Storm,” p. 209. 4. China revealed that, over ten years, it had delivered food and crop substitution aid valued at US$101.9 million, and another US$22.5 million in 2006 to plant rubber, tea and other cash crops in Northern Myanmar and Laos. It also reported that over one hundred of its private companies invested millions of dollars in the substitution of sugarcane and rubber for opium in the Shan State with China allowing their importation free of tariffs. For details, see Paul Sarno, The War on Drugs, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2009, p. 233. 5. “Dehong da xiang jin du ‘renmin zhanzheng’,” (People’s War on Drugs in Dehong), 26 June 2006, www.ypncc.gov.cn/pubnews/doc/read/ yxwx/149918100.173003891/index.asp. 6. “All Young People Kidnapped to Myanmar Released,” Xinhua, 23 January 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/23/ content_7425378.htm. 7. “Zhongguo jingfang qingjiao bianjing ducheng Maizhayang: Canduzhe jun wei zhongguoren” (Chinese Police Cleared Border Casino Town Maizhayang: Gamblers are all Chinese), Nandu Zhoukan (Southern

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8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

Metropolitan Weekly), 17 March 2009, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/ sd/2009-03-17/101117423397.shtml. Commitments have been made at high levels to work together to fight cross-border crimes such as drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal border-crossing. See “China and Myanmar to Step up Anti-drugs Intelligence Exchange,” Xinhua, 9 March 2002, http://lanzhou.china. com.cn/english/28456.htm. Sarno, “The War on Drugs,” p. 229. China launched the “Go West” campaign in 2000 to reduce regional disparities by promoting the development of six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing) in Western China. “2008 nian Yunnan dui dongmeng maoyi huiluo” (Yunnan Trade with ASEAN Dropped in 2008), Xinhua, 25 January, 2009, http://www. yn.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-01/24/content_15546739.htm. There are at least 45 Chinese companies involved in 63 hydropower projects throughout Myanmar. “Monsoon Leave over, Chinese Workers Back in Myitsone Project,” Kachin New Groups, 11 November, 2008, http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/news/news-archives/116-monsoon-leave-over-chinese-workersback-in-myitsone-project-.html. At present, Myanmar is the world’s 10th largest natural gas exporting country. According to Oil & Gas Journal, as of January 2009, Myanmar’s proven reserves of crude oil were 50 million barrels and its natural gas reserves estimated to range from 283 billion cubic meters (BCM) to 600 BCM. “Statistics: Myanmar Foreign Investment Rises Sharply in 2008,” Xinhua, 19 March, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200903/18/content_11032577.htm. The project is run by state-owned China Non-Ferrous Metal Group (CNMC) in cooperation with the Third Mining Company of Myanmar’s Ministry of Mining. The general manager of CNMC said that the project would lift Myanmar’s GDP by more than 2 percent, and upon completion, would have an annual production capacity of 80,000 tons of nickel iron. (“China Group Says US$800 Million Myanmar

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17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Mine on Track,” Mining Journal, 22 April, 2009, http://www.miningjournal.com/production-and-markets/china-group-says-US$800-millionmyanmar-mine-on-track). “Asia/World Energy Outlook 2009,” Institute of Energy Economic, Japan, 26 October, 2009, http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/report_detail.php? article_info_id=2927. Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “China’s String of Pearls Strategy,” China Briefing, 18 March, 2009, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/ 2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-string-of-pearls-strategy.html. Ravi V. Sharada Prasad, “The String of Pearls,” Indian Express, 27 April, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-string-of-pearls/ 451520/; “China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal?” Asia news, 10 September 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China_eyeing_ base_in_Bay_of_Bengal/rssarticleshow/3343799.cms. “Gwadar Port has Strategic Implications for India,” Intellibriefs, 22 January, 2008, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/01/gwadarport-has-strategic-implications.html. In February 2009, the Indian government said its defense budget would increase by 34 percent to 1.4 trillion rupees (US$30 billion). India has announced plans to have a fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines at sea in the next decade and recently tested nuclear-capable missiles that put China’s major cities well within range. It is also reopening air force bases near the Chinese border and has stepped up its joint exercises with the US navy. See “Hambantota Harbour and Indo–China Ocean War,” The Sunday Times, 8 June, 2008, http:// sundaytimes.lk/080608/index.html; Siddharth Srivastava, “India’s Nuclear Submarine Plan Surfaces,” The Asia Times Online, 20 February, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KB20Df02.html. China’s National Development and Reform Commission approved the plan to construct a crude oil pipeline to Yunnan in April 2006. Work on the pipeline began in 2009 and is expected to be completed by 2013. The oil and gas pipelines will stretch from Myanmar’s deepwater port at Sittwe through Mandalay to the Chinese border city of Ruili, and then on to Kunming. Sinopec, the contractor on the pipeline, will invest over $1 billion as well as provide an $83 million loan to Myanmar for the pipeline. See Simon Wardell, “Chinese Government Reportedly

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23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

Approves Myanmar–China Crude Pipeline Plans,” Global Insight Daily 17 April, 2006. This pipeline would shorten the import route by about 1,200 km. Zhaohe Chen, “Cong nengyuan jiaodu tanxi Zhongguo duiwai zhan Lüe” (Interpreting Chinese Foreign Strategy from Energy Perspective), Zhongguo lunwen xiazai zhongxin (China Dissertation Download Centre), www.studa.net/guoji/090415/15520382.html. Myanmar was given an eight out of nine ranking, where one indicates the safest countries for investment and nine the riskiest. See Toshihiro Kudo, “Myanmar’s Economic Relations with China: Who Benefits and Who Pays?” In Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (eds.), Canberra, ANU E Press, 2008, pp. 87–112. According to the 2008 Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, Myanmar ranks 178th among all the 180 countries in the world, on par with Iraq and above only Somalia. (“2008 Corruption Perception Index,” Transparency International, 2008, www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi_2008_ table). Ramachandran Sudha, “Yangon Still under Beijing’s Thumb,” Asia Times Online, 11 February, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Southeast_Asia/GB11Ae01.html. Chenyang Li and Liangfook Lye, “China’s Policies towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?” China: An International Journal, 7(2), 2009, pp. 255–287. Tin Maung Than, “Myanmar and China: A Special Relationship?” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2003. Jurgen Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30(3), 2008, pp. 351–378. A recent test of Chinese influence was the Myanmar army’s raid against the Kokang ceasefire group in August 2009, which resulted in the flight of 37,000 refugees into China. Despite having strongly warned the government against such a move, Beijing was not able to dissuade it, nor was China informed before the operation took place. Than, “Myanmar and China: A Special Relationship?”

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32. Official statistics on bilateral trade are not so reliable due to continued smuggling and under-reporting. 33. Brian McCartan, “US Zeroes in on China’s Clout in Myanmar,” AsiaTimes, 24 October, 2009, www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ Asia/KJ24Ae03.html. 34. Paradorn Rangsimapon, “Russia’s Search for Influence in Southeast Asia,” Asia Survey, 49(5), 2009, pp. 768–808. 35. Rangsimapon, “Russia’s Search for Influence in Southeast Asia.” 36. “Why Russia’s Mum on Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, 10 October, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ10Ae02.html. 37. Some other observers in Beijing would welcome US economic and trade engagement in Myanmar, as a prosperous Myanmar with social stability fits China’s interests and those of ASEAN countries, thus China can hardly oppose any positive US engagement in Myanmar. See Junbo Jian, “China Wary of US–Myanmar ‘Detent’,” Asia Times Online, 17 April , 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KD17Ad01.html. 38. Hak Ying Li and Yongnian Zheng, “Re-interpreting China’s Nonintervention Policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention,” Journal of Contemporary China, 18(61), 2009, pp. 617–637. 39. Bertil Lintner, “China no Sure Bet on Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, 8 November, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK08Ae01. html. 40. Ian Holliday, “Beijing and the Myanmar Problem,” The Pacific Review, 22(4), 2009, pp. 479–500. 41. “Security Council Meeting 5619,” UN Security Council, 12 January 2007, http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_5619. 42. Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar.” 43. Holliday, “Beijing and the Myanmar Problem.”

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Index Afghanistan 25, 26, 34, 54–56, 64, 74, 75, 77, 157 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 86, 157, 175, 254, 257, 263, 267, 269 Anti-Secession Law 178 Aung San Suu Kyi 267

Chongzhiniao/Okinotorishima 137, 139, 140, 145, 146, 152, 158 Chunxiao Oil Field (Shirakaba) 11, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 151, 155 Collective Security Treaty Organisation 56, 75 Colonialism 214 Colour Revolutions 8, 57, 75 Co-Management Approach 11, 137, 138, 154–159 Cross-Strait Relations 165, 168, 171–173, 176, 181, 182 Cultural Assimilation 13

Baotou 113 Beijing’s Olympic Game 179 Bilingualism 201, 204, 214, 219 Cantonese 13, 200, 201, 205, 208–219, 226, 232, 245 Central Asian Countries 5, 8, 9, 54, 77, 83, 87 Chiang Kai-shek 169, 170

Dharamsala 22, 28 Dalai Lama 5, 7, 10, 22, 23, 25, 27–33, 40, 41, 187, 228

275

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276 Index

DDP (Democratic Progressive Party) 12, 164, 177, 181, 184, 186 De-warization 163, 183, 184, 186, 188 Diaoyu Island (Senkaku) 10, 11, 137, 139–143, 150–152, 154, 155, 157, 158, Diplomacy 8, 11, 41, 47, 48, 50, 54, 63, 64, 84, 167, 177, 183, 264, 269 Multi-lateral 8, 49 Bi-lateral 8, 15, 32, 47, 48, 60, 63, 71, 79, 83, 86, 158, 184, 231, 256, 263 Dokdo (Takeshima) 140, 148, 149, 151 East Sea 6, 11, 149, 167 East Turkistan Islamic Movement 26 EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) 147, 152 Edmund Ho 235, 237, 238, 245 Eight-Point Declaration 173, 175 Energy 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 40, 49, 50, 55, 59, 60, 64, 69, 77, 81–83, 85–87, 105, 111, 155, 176, 183, 256, 258, 259, 264, 266–268 Ethnic minorities 5, 21, 40, 227, 245, 246 George W. Bush Georgia 8, 75

25, 26, 28, 34

Greater Mekong Region Guantanamo Bay 34

258

Hamid Karzai 26, 75 History-Embedded Approach 11, 154 Hohhot 115 Hu Jintao 22, 30, 34, 61, 82, 165, 176, 243 Hulunbeier 9, 93–95, 100, 102, 103, 106, 111–113 Hydroelectric Power 258 Identity 13, 14, 21, 24, 199–202, 210, 214–219, 225, 226, 232–234, 240, 245, 247 Language 199, 201, 202, 219 Politics 219 India 3, 7, 20, 22, 25, 31–33, 40, 85, 139, 153, 157, 204, 207, 226, 254, 258, 260, 264–267 Inner Mongolia 9, 93, 105, 107, 113 Japan

1, 10–12, 73, 117–128, 130–132, 137–140, 142–146, 148–158, 189, 204, 265, 266

Kashgar 78 Kazakhstan 22, 25, 38, 47, 48, 52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 69, 72, 74, 79–83, 157

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Index

KMT (Kuomintang) 12, 166, 167, 169, 171–173, 176, 181, 183, 187 Kyrgyzstan 25, 26, 47, 48, 52, 53, 57, 60, 62, 69, 72, 74, 75, 77–79, 83, 157 Language Education 13 Lee Denghui 171–173, 187 Li Hongzhang 119–122, 124–126, 129–131, 154 Linguistic Pluralism 204 Linguistic Hegemony 204 Liuqiu 10, 11, 117–128, 130–132 Local Autonomy 225–232, 238, 242, 244, 247 Macao 4, 12–14, 103, 108, 209, 212, 225–247 Ma Ying-jeou 141, 186, 187 Malacca Strait 256, 259 Manzhouli 95, 100, 101, 103, 106, 107 Mao Zedong 163, 165 Mikhail Gorbachev 70 Most-favored-nation clause 128 Multilingualism 199, 201, 203, 204 Myanmar 4, 14, 15, 253–270 Armed Ethnic Minority Groups 263 Casinos 4, 15, 235, 243, 255, 256 Drug 4, 10, 75, 253–256, 262

277

HIV Epidemic 254 Illegal Logging 256, 263 Mining 256, 258, 262, 263 Nuclear 156, 168, 183, 268 Nation-State System 10, 118, 130–132 National Endowment for Democracy 26 National Interest-Driven Approach 11, 154, 155 National Security Bill 239, 241 New Silk Road 78 North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 73, 75, 76 North Korea 4, 11, 103, 156, 243 Oil

9, 11, 14, 15, 60, 64, 69, 81, 82, 103, 105, 140, 141, 143–145, 148, 151, 155, 158, 256–260, 262, 264, 265 Okinawa 10, 117, 123, 130, 143, 151 Okinotorishima (Chongzhiniao) 137, 139, 140, 145, 146, 152, 158 ¯ Okubo 121–123 One country two systems 237, 238 Outer Mongolia 9, 93, 94 Panchen Lama 23 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 164–170, 172, 174, 175,

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177, 183–186, 188, 189, 259 PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) 164, 166, 168, 169, 175, 179, 185, 188, 189, 228, 259, 260 Portugal 12, 233, 234, 242 Putonghua 13, 199–201, 207, 208, 210–219, 232 Rebiya Kadeer 7, 23, 27, 34–36, 40, 41 Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 58, 74 Russia 5, 8, 9, 25, 47–49, 51–53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 70–72, 74–77, 79, 81–87, 93, 94, 101, 103, 104, 123, 126, 128, 129, 131, 139, 153, 156, 157, 254, 267, 268 Ryukyu 10, 117 Secession 178, 187 Senkaku (Diaoyu Island) 10, 11, 137, 139–143, 150–152, 154, 155, 157, 158 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 8, 9, 11, 25, 26, 47–64, 70, 71, 73–77, 82–86, 157 Counter-Terrorism Convention 75 Members 8, 9, 24, 26, 27, 31, 47, 48, 51–53, 55, 57, 58, 60–62, 74, 75, 76, 84–86, 150, 152, 157, 206,

229, 232–234, 237, 242, 245, 247, 269 Shirakaba (Chunxiao Oil Field) 11, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 151, 155 Socotra (Suyan) 137, 139, 140, 147, 152, 158 Southeast Asia 2, 254, 258, 259, 266–268 Soviet Union 3, 25, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78 Suzerainty 10, 30, 118, 120, 122 Taiwan 3, 6, 8, 12, 13, 21, 36, 50, 72, 76, 118, 120–122, 132, 139–142, 150, 151, 154–157, 163–191, 204, 209, 228, 240, 259 Takeshima (Dokdo) 140, 148, 149, 151 Tajikistan 25, 26, 47, 48, 52, 53, 60, 69, 72, 79, 80, 83, 157 Tashkent 58, 74 Terrorism 6, 9, 23, 25, 26, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 64, 74, 75, 77 Islamist 23, 25, 26, 38, 39, 54 Territorial Integrity 6, 11, 36, 50, 58, 62, 71, 76, 155, 173, 174, 226, 245 Three Noism 170, 187 Tibet 4, 6–8, 12, 19, 20, 22–25, 28–34, 40, 41, 50, 76, 186, 226, 228, 244–247, 255

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Trade

4, 8, 11, 15, 54, 55, 59, 60, 69–71, 77–80, 85, 87, 101, 103, 119, 120, 129, 157, 214, 216, 256, 257, 262, 264, 265, 269 Central Asian Republics 69, 71, 72, 77, 79 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 157, 254, 267 Treaty of Shimonoseki 142, 151, 154 Tributary State System 10, 11, 118, 127, 130–132 Tung Chee-hwa 234, 239, 241 Turkmenistan 69, 79–82, 86 Ukraine 8, 75, 82 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 143 United States 3, 20, 24, 26, 28, 34, 71, 74, 76, 77, 81, 85, 87, 143, 156, 158, 242 United States–Macau Policy Act 242

279

Ürümqi riots in 2009 19, 40 Uyghur 5, 23, 27, 40, 49, 69, 70, 74 Uyghur American Association 27 Uzbekistan 8, 25, 26, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76–82, 157 World Trade Organization (WTO) 4 World Uyghur Congress 23, 27, 40 Wu Bangguo 228, 235, 239 Xinjiang 4–8, 12, 19, 20, 22–27, 33–39, 50, 69–71, 74, 76, 78, 82, 86, 186, 226, 245–247 Yunnan 4, 15, 22, 255–257, 262, 263, Zongli Yamen 123, 125, 126, 129–131

CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS BORDERLANDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS BORDERLANDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

T

his book examines the interplay of two sets of policies: the Chinese government’s policies to its borderlands and international relations. It proposes a conceptual framework and argues that China’s policymakers fail to make complete use of the opportunities in the borderlands for accomplishing foreign policymakers’ agenda to strengthen China’s relations with other countries, neighbouring ones in particular. As a result, these foreign policies reflect the political elites’ inadequate consideration of the negative impact of these policies on the borderlands, and underscore their worry for territorial disintegration. Therefore, these policies center on the pursuit of central control through exercising administrative-military coercion, making the borderlands economically dependent, standardising the cultural identity, and indoctrinating CCP-defined ideology.The challenges of the borderlands to the national integration are exaggerated so much that political elites pursued control and standardisation at the expense of the identification of many people in borderlands with the regime, China’s international image and the relations with its neighbouring countries.

World Scientific www.worldscientific.com 7471 hc

7471.Samantha.CC.indd 1

CHINA’S POLICIES ON ITS

BORDERLANDS AND THE

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Edited by

Yufan Hao • Bill K P Chou

Hao Chou

ISBN-13 978-981-4287-66-1 ISBN-10 981-4287-66-0

,!7IJ8B4-cihggb!

World Scientific

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