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3 AIRCRAFT .. AIRCRAFT TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS 5 SQUADRONS AND BASES
...
'90
195 20' 206
PART II THE STRUCTURE OF NAVAL POWER 1 MY LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY
23
2 ADMIRALS AND FLEETS
27
PART IX THE SUBMARINE SERVICE
3 COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE
34
1 THE ORGANISATION OF THE
.. THE ARTS OF THE SEAMAN
39
5 LOGISTICS
44
PART III ENEMIES AND ALLIES 1 ENEMIES 2 ALLIES 3 THE MERCHANT NAVY .. THE OTHER SERVICES
•• •• 60 66
SUBMARINE SERVICE
2"
2 SUBMARINES
214
3 SUBMARINE TECHNIQUES
219
PART X ESCORTS 1 ESCORT VESSELS 2 LIFE IN THE ESCORTS
3 ESCORT TECHNIQUES .. ESCORT BASES
225 226 233 23.
PART IV THE SHIPS 1 SHIP DESIGN
2 SHIPBUILDING 3 ENGINES
4 ARMAMENT 5 SENSORS 6 FITTINGS
73 76 64 66 9. 9.
PART XI THE COASTAL NAVIES 1 COASTAL FORCES 2 MINE WARFARE 3 THE PATROL SERVICE AND HARBOUR DEFENCE
2.5 250 253
PART XII AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
'07
3 COMBINED OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES
259 262 267
"6 , 22
CONCLUSION
272
APPENDICES
273
1 COMBINED OPERATIONS PERSONNEL
PART V NAVAL SOCIETY AND CULTURE 1 THE ADMINISTRATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL 2 NAVAL MEDICINE 3 NAVAL LAW AND DISCIPLINE 4 NAVAL CUSTOM AND TRADITIONS
2 LANDING VESSELS
,"
PART VI OFFICERS AND RATINGS 1 OFFICERS
'29
2 THE HIGHER RATES
135 136 144
ABBREVIATIONS
276
"6 152
NOTES
277
BIBLIOGRAPHY
291
PICTURE CREDITS
293
INDEX
264
3 .JACK AFLOAT AND ASHORE 4 ENGINEERS AND OTHERS 5 THE ROYAL MARINES 6 THE WRENS
PART VII THE BATTLE FLEET 1 SHIPS OF THE BATTLE FLEET 2 LIFE IN THE BATTLE FLEET 3 THE FLEET IN BATTLE 4 NAVAL BASES
'61 '67 171 176
PL\RT
The Royal Navy in Peace and War 1 The Navy in 1939 The- RO)
th~
n-l."nueth ttntury on the: eral of .. ",noe.
It \\~ the: rtUm unumcm of Ihe greatest empire In lhe worid.:and it "~ .lIbolll 10 come ~'en mon: inlO the public C)'e and ha~'t" a ''nl expulSIon p~lIlmc dUTlng an arms nee ",th Gemuny. But the TUVy whIch ....-em 10 ....';\1' In 19H. though technologically advanct'd. was ucticalt)' aUlious. socialty l»ckw.url ;mc:! compbcenl. It bikd 10 Win a great victory agalllst the Ccrnun High Seas Reel. as It had :l!10\'0'e'd the publIC 10 expect. and was \'el)' !J()\\. 10 adopt annsubnurme meOlsures such as con\'o), when the country ";IS under ser~us Ih!l'.lI1 of sun....tion III 1917. [fli highly dcvdopcd atl' arm. Ihe Ro)'al Naval All' xrv1(:e. w;as uken .tway and mergro into the new RO)'al/m Force III 1918.The Gernun flerl f'\...,ntually surn:nde~ at Ihe umistice of November 1918. but regained its dignity by scuttlmg itself III Ihe m:,illl Unush b:I.K :1.1 XJ.pa Flow 5e\-'en months bIer.
Hard Times The navy's troubles continued in pucetime. An arms race with the Unitl,"d Statt'S thrl,"atened. but the politicians and taxpayers .....e re nOI prepared to pay for il and forced the na\')' to Jccept the Washington TrealY in 1922. Battleship strength, still rl,"gardl,"d as the main detl,"rminaru of naval power, was 10 be equ:l.I between Bril:l.in and the United SI:l.tes. France, h:l.ly and Japan had their fleets reb'"lJlated to a proportion of that size, whilo:- Germany was still allowed o/lly a very Slllall and limited f1eel. The Americ:l.m wen:' happy to be granted panty With Britain. and parity with France was wdcomed b)' the Italians. Howe\'Cr. the French were \'CT}' unhappy with the demotion to a nav.al power of the Ihml rank. and the Royal Navy was devasuted at the blow to Its prestige. LIke the Americans and the French 11 took Ihe Ireaty limits \'ery seriously. with two long-term eff«ts. The navy needed as nun)' cruISers as possible to Ill
vmble br bnd ,.'ly
Opooiu:TIM Medilern.... an F1eer in C..1Kl Harbour. Mal'a, in
.,n.
RNVR wen: onk-red to dU:lr dl-potS 10 be sent on to the fleet 111 b.:nches as requln-d.Thl: ItNIt took longer to mobili~ as many men were:;till at sea. and others could not be- called ulltil repbcements had been found III their regular jobs. Naval pensIOners were c3.lJed OUt as required, Ihough some were no lonb-cr sUluble for scn.,ce - one man h:ld becollle too fat to p.:IM through engine-room h:nches. A dr.l.fi of 2000 was SCnt :KlOSS Fnnce by r;til and then b)' Sleat1leT to Mala. where some of the n:5Cf'\"C ships "'ere twcd. The oIdcT nlen ""CTe gJ\"Cll ~ jobs in the m\'a1 N:scs Jnd proIccung anmllanition. which W;l$ ofim dispcned In railway nmncls and sidiJ>g:i. The )'OUngr:r men \\'nC pm moo desuo)"Cn, 0Ihcrs III boom dcf~ \'CSSC1s whIch would IlOI: go far 60m the~}
Readiness for War The fleet that went to war in $q>lember 1939 consisted of 129.000 officers and 1111:11. supplemented by 73,000 raervists. Including Ausmban and New Zealand forces it had 317 opc'r.ltional w;lrships. conSlSrmg of 12 bauleships and battlC'Cruiscrs, 8 aitnafi earners. 58 cnliscfS. 100 f1~1 dc:SIllJ)'CI'S, 101 escOrt vessels and 38 subnurmes. It IS possIble 10 find senous flaws m almost evl'ry aspect of the RO)':ll ,l\'y as It W;l.S m 1939. II lud f:Ulffi to pn:dict the IUlUre of the war It "";as about to light. though tlut ....'as a fault cotnJ1l(ln to plXQcalty alllhl" set"1Ces, the pobncwu and public. ItS offi«r corp5 was ll"CTUiled Irom 100 IUrrow a I»sc ;lnd Iud das.s atrilUlks whk-h looked Incl. to thl" Victorian agr t:l.lhe-r tlun fOf>\~ to a 'pcoplc'5 ....'lIT•• Then: werr tunes .... hen the peaccume OffiCCTS seemed m cLmger of losing contae1 with lhe mCTl thcy wcrc supposcd 10 ll"ad. The lower deck ....'as recnlltro on ;In annqU3.IOO 10ng-SCTVlce S)"Stem, lud 100 few opportunities for prolllonon. ;lnd ...."as only just ~ting over its discolltems of prevIous years. The navy's c~pit;ll ships were 100 old. too slow. or too hghtly ;lrmoured compared WIth rh"als. and the newC'St ones were ~ing built 10 COlllpromlsc dCSlgllS. Nav~l :lvi:ltion was back....'llro becaUS(' of Ihe conflict with the ItAF. Ships lacked adequ;lte :lnn-:lin:nft ;lrm,1l1lent, ;lnd the mea.m of dlrectlng ltli fire. EJc:lggerated faith in &dic Iud Iffi il to undcn:sonute the submarine. which would PTO\'t' to be the nlO5t 5C'rlOUS du't'at. II Iud done :ilinoSI nothmg about c~ foet:cs or ;lmphihK>Uli .....arfare. The lUV)' relied 100 much on ill-ftlucall'd :lIKt poorly d1soplmed fishermrn for one JI:ln of its R'SC"I"\TS. and III ~ncral 11 Iud failffi to up into the (1lmusiasln :ltId resourecs of the popuboon. Yet its fC("oro III the IllICT-W:l.r )~ao \\'as not onl" of failure. Thr enormous SPIT1l of Ihe Royal Na\')' had been mainuinffi through nuny tribulations. It W:lS :l much Illore fleXIble organisation than III 1914, bolh tacti(";llly :Iud 1I1 It! :lbiliry to l,1kc new personnel :lnd ideas. All lhis would be reflected 1Il its \\"arlimr performance.
2 Society and Politics When the Treal)' of\'ersa.illes fomWiy ..oded the First World War III 1919 and im~ 51"\,"", penalties on a dcfeuffi Gcrnuny. the world entered a 2O-)'t'u plu:5C' bter known gIoonuty but IIOl inxc-untrty ;l.S 'be""~n the wao'. Thl"re \\'t're no 'oorlll:ll' times in the pcriod: Bmaln
W;l.S either recO\~ring frolll one de-.'lIsuting "'lIr. enduring economic t'l'i::l"$Sion or preJl:lring for ;lllOther ....'llr that promised to be C\.... n more lraunlllUC thall the last. On thr frmgcs. wong minorities supponro doctrines such as conmlUnWn or fascism, but the greal 1Illl$S of thr popu.b.tion was increasingly disillusionffi With politics. ReligIOn "'as m dl"dine aftCT the horron of the ....'lIr and the Slgtn of clerics claiming divine support on both sides. The 1920s lud an inlllge of hcdolUSm. while the unempJopnent of the 19JOs created despair more m3.n angel. Britain lud :l population of 46}f mdhon III 1938. a small increase sincr 1919. The old bndowning class. which had ruled for centurlcs. was in decline. having been forred to sc:U sollie of its land bcc;luse of high laxes :lnd dealh duties during the war. Great COUntry houses \\'t're expensi\'C to 1l13.llllain and ;llrcady lhl"ir owners were beginning 10 ll1:1ke a living by opening lhelll to Ihe public. The idea of class, based on birth and soci:l1 condiriolllng ;l.S Illuch as wealth, was being IllCTCaslllgly ch3.Jlenged but It \\'as still Slrong. An eduC;ltion in ;III expcml\'t' public school such as Eton or H;lrTO\V would bnng ;I )'Oung nun inlO conuct with people who would help him III bIer hfe. Thepotenual U1lm'lldcrs of 1940 \1C\\~ Ihls wilh :an c-Irmrlll of envy.
fOftl..... otd, d.e chaplaio il ill the tenue ...;th the officen and peuy officen behind
him, Ind mOn of deck below.
10
Churchill's Navy
1Irp~1
EnglISh
IIw imnrsu
IM."S und 1« IN mtlll/ing
r!f IMr lilo '" lht' promo""" II.!
fI.! 1M Engluh ruling dw.'
The- lIppe'T d~ lIuinuined Its 'soOcr{ ccnuro round shooong pamcs, hone nclng. and ~1Is in londOIl_ Accent was still Illlportmi. and a regIOnal or 'Iow~r cbu' one could dc~r a person from accrpUllcC' in society. or from a commission in [he IIJ\')' or cutUII n:!.'1l11cnts of the army. The middle class W,lS growing, hut felt in~urc :md livcd in leu opulent drculllsl:l.nn-s thall in th~' P,1st. with Car (ewrr domestic servants :Ind smaller numbers of children. who lIught lll"~'d support to establish IhcmsekC'$ in a cal'«"r.
M.lW\ldtryS
&Ialn
lJ~arJ 4U IJ
pildiDmnrl.uy _hy, but in spile
~
,Iv
dctr«rolllSdt'.m ~ lIS fll1IJt"Uh.m, pildlamml'"Y and gwnnmmlallJbsolulUm pmuil. TlJdll)'~ sta" otgolniS<JriOll if molllflollrrtd /ry t~ morwtrJnst and bmfa_lil" llnnmts..
Narunlly thq< ~w the Je....'S -.as over-powl."rful. from the rimt" of Iklti3rnin Disndi in the pmnous cemury. After 1922. ·... no new c.. bmets were formed withoul including Jews. Ualdwin s last cabinet comained tWO Jews from the financial world... '. American servicemen were given a far roslCr piclUre of tlte British political system. . .. u-ilhill Ihis
Theatre-goen paa
throup d.e ....rUc nalb ;0
c...~1
Ganlen in LoadoD in 1939.
British Politics
u\>rkl/lR IU'f>II;tth
Bntlm was a hl."redu;lry monarchy and King George V was held in great respect dunng hIS ragn from 1910 10 1936. His oddest son,
Ed.....rd VIII. \\'H far more contro\'erslal. A~" from hIS pbns to nuke ,In u!tSuu;.;IblC' marnage 10 ;1Il Americ..n di\'OI"Cee, hIS V1t'WS on politia
From 1918, for tht" first tin1t" in histOI); propcrt}' tenun: ...."35 no kmgrr .. factor m the nght to \'Ole and it ....'3S givc·II to ;ill mell OOon the
..nd hIS tendency to mterfen: nude hun unxcq>Uble to the politial esublilohrnent ..nd he was forced to ..bdiote. HIS brother and successor, George VI. was Jlcr\uus .. nd sh)' and unsuiuble for publiC life m nuny ways. btu mC'SC' defectS nude him less likely to interft"~ in politics. and ende..n:d mm to hIS subjectS. Bnmh palma w-.as controlled by the p
(tnlury
demllfflll)' uoirirh is ill smlll uuys
t"llnt
1Il0rt j1o.ibk
Iht u,/I
governmem which included some former Labour and Liberal supporters. Dl'Spite a good deal ofhunb"C'r for change, the 1920s and 30s were :I barn:n penod for social reform. There W;lS nothing to compue with the great Liberal teforms befote thc Flr'St World Wu. or Labour's setting up of the Wc:lf;tn: Sate 3fter the second. The: Conseryati\oc part)' had e:mbneed SOCl:a1 reform under Ikltianun Disr,;le:li in the 18705. bur now it reflected the mood of me middle clusn. who fe-ared socialism, conullunislll. rOOc- unions. high UDtlon, econonuc ruin...nd dunge III gconenL Its nwn leader of the pc-dod ...."35 St
The British Economy Ilrium h..d lost her position -.as tht" only real lIIdustrial po.....er in tht" .....orld more than half:l century before, wllh the nse of the American and German t'conOlllll'S ill thl' 18705. She was sull a country whICh relied \·ery much on manuf3ctunng lIldustry......hich emplO)·ed JUSt under h:llf the working populauon m 1931. compared \Vllh about a quarter 1II tr,;lde and tr,;lnsport. and less than 10 per cent in 3griculwrc. There was a steady mow towards new industries such :IS cns, chl'lIlinls and dectriciry. The largesl slllgie 1Iiduslfy was coal lllllung... hich fmpIO)·t"d more th3n a llIillton men m 1930. II was
The Royal Navy in Peace and War
11
large parts of Africa and lIl:ln)' or the West Indilln islllnds. the British Empire seemed Slrong<'r than evcr. The only illllll...diatc setback was III In:land. wh~n: the largest pan of the coumry fought for mdepcndence and g;ained it in 1922. The colonies where Iargc numbers or Europeans had settled - Canada. Australia. New Zealand and South Africa - wen: aln:;ldy largely self-governing .and from 1931 they had filii comrol of their own fon:ib"ll policy_ Sinc~ thq< tended to back Urilllin in world lIffain. Ihis "OIlS se~n as a strength ralher thlln a weakness for the cmplre, whICh now added the term 'Commonweliith' to melude rhese self_gQ\'erning pllrts.lndill ""lI$ also gIven a mellSure ofsc:lr-go-."<'rmnent in 1935, much against the wuhes of Churchill. But m thIS case 1I strong opposition lIlO\'l::menl, lind dl\"1510n bet\\~e:n Hmdus and Mushms, nulk the sub-continellt \"<'ry ha.rd 10 g'O\'Crn. The: lleu-Iy xquircd nUIl
"Jbe ramOUI Jarrow
In pn\.... I~ hllmh lind "'':l:!I l"lI~ked by slTlkes ~nd poor tnduslri~1 ~btlons. Th~ t~xtil~ induSlrin "~re also brg~. lind irQn and "~d "'OIlS II~Xt "'ith mor~ Ihan a qUllrl~r of a lIulhon ~mplo'fen.Th~ tnd~ umon movem~m " .... 5 51rQng among skilled worker<;. while the Tr.llnsport ~nd Gener.lll Workers Union was founded in 1921 und~r Erlll:'St [levin for Ihe less sklll~d. But the umons were defeated In th~ 10-dllY General Strlk~ of 1926 and had nOt fully reco....cred from that, whIle slumps and the Ihrear of unemployment cow~d what rcmaim:d or th~ workrorc~. All this rended to breo:d n-s<:lItmem alllong the workers, and a Cl'nam amount of mistrust and cynicism aboUl the ll1an.agell1cnt. Uritish industry had lost m.any O\"Cneas markelS during the FIrs! World Wa.r. but C\'Cn more imponam It had lost much ofia old sclf-
"':l:!I
World Affairs In the 19205 Germllny was defeated and RUfoSla. by th~n known :as the Savle:t Union. w:as cut off from world lIff:llT'$ because of the ideology of the R'gulle. In the: Uniled SUt~. politicians and people mostly favoured a policy of isol.llion. wtllch k~pt her. too. out of full parUClplillon. As a resuh. IJriulll and Fr.ll1ce: appeared to be the only real world powers. Both still had g~at ~Illpin:s. which had actually inc~ased in the bSI rew years. Under L~ague of Nations mandate. Britain took O\W comrol of PaleSllne, Tr.llIs-Jordan and Ir.llq and had protectonrcs in Egypt. Suda.n, Somahbnd lind Ade:n.Adde:d to India.
built in lin attempl to cOIX with thIS thR'at. Thl' ...ollcepi of ~mplre wu not particullirly fuhlonablc, excepl for a group led by th ... press barons Norrhcliffe and lJea\"erbrook, who campaigned for free tr:lde within th......mpire lind lllgh tariffs on good~ from outsiJ Thi~ CUt lIcross Ihe morc: traditional policy of general free tr:ld lind WliS def...al...d by th ... Con~ervath·e lC'ader lJaldwin. On the whole. Ihe empire \\OIS a liability rather than an aSSCI to Britain in th ... 19305. \\....5
March or 1936. The
pl'C)lnl;ng about high len" or
uneonployn,enl, mainly c:sused by the pumanent e....ll.re or Palmer's shipyard in Northumberland.
!"'_....:;i-
~
BRITISH EMPIRE SHIPPINC, 1931 /1 Df5T~BUTION ex stllff'lNC ex 3000 lOfG '1 CIlOSS AltD MOlE <* 1lIE 24-"~ I9SZ ..._• ..-mUIQGI __
'"'~~~-.L-_=_---C:---.---..
~
:..::~
- - ....... _...,._••
-_..... ... --_..-----.-.... ----~ -----:.- ..- . o,
3 The Naval War The 'Phoney War' bnd and In the ;Lir wn :lImos! dornunt for the' fif'S{ autumn and "'1m.:. and,,~ dulUd .he 'I'honcy\V,u'by tho: pttS$. BUI thIS was llC'\'t'r the :u :K'a. On the firR wy. ag;Jilm Hit!C'.s ....
"*
Iklow
l~ft, Gf,nnan
'
~
......
...~k~ .. they
fe"''-'
ill 19)6. ill mach
of incn... lional
The Norwegian Campaign In Frbruary 1940 the: C,.zj Sp«~ supply ,hlp. the Allmofrlr. was caTI')1ng 300 merrMJII ruvy prisonen to Ge1"mallY when she was boarded III neutn.! No~~n W:ltCTS by the dntrQ)'t"r CcmArk uOOn Upulll Phllhp Vu.n.As ,,'t'U as mowing Bmuh deternunaoon to caTry on the .....u.the affair drew British and Ge1"nun altelltlOl1 to the north. Supplies of Iron ore for GeTnuny came from Sw~dcn vu the Norw~gi;1Il port ofNarvik and Churchill pbnned to stop It by llllll\llg the passages :unOllg rhe orwegian isunds, using troops to secure the ~irion if neccss;lry. The Germans pbnned a much greater breach of neutnlity. by invading o.,nnurk and NOlW;ly. h WolS a vcI')' daring opc:nriOIl :l.IId ag:lI11sr the normal principles ofSlnlcgy as Germany did not havt': command of rhc sea.
""rir
8dow
rip, N....iIIe
Ouunberlain
uri,_ bad: from .... meeci"C with Hide. in s..p.embn 19.18, hcHding aloft
hu 'piece of pape.'. wbkb be believes guanon•.eI 'peace
for "u. lime'.
The I3rlllsh shiPS Slood down JUSt as the: Ge1"mallS bunched :I fi\'t"pan in\':asion pun on 9 April. Apart from dse lr'OOpS which took lknmark "1thour :I strUggle. forrn sailed for Oslo. Krisriansmd. l3ergt'n.Trondhellll and Nan'ik in the far north. The NOf"\\'t'gmu sank Ihe cruiser BlUlh~. and rhe British destroyer GI
Dunkirk and the Fall of France By thiS tlille the CJ.IllP~llgn In Fr.mce ""':IS gomg \-ery badly. GeTman lroops In\":lded Ihe neulnl etherbnds.lklgiulIl and Luxemburg on 10 May 1940.Just;lS Pnme MllllSter eVllie Challlbe-rbin fell from office and """:IS repbced by Winston Churchill. n1irzkries .....as C\"l'n more successful than anticipated and the French WC'n:' drh"l'n back while a large pan of the British army retreated to Dunkirk. More th:r.n 300.000 Allied lroops were e\'J.cualed. :r.lthough twO thirds were rakcn olfby deslroycTS from the harbour....Ihl·r than by fishing boats and yachts from the beaches as is popubrly thought. Hundreds of sm:r.ll craft did t:r.ke pan. mostly ferrying the troops from the bcaches
•
15
The Royal Navy in Peace and War
to p:lSsen~r ships offihon:. The opcntlon. directed by Adnllnl lknnm Ra~y In DO\"C'r. confirmcd one of Ihe l~llS of Norway. thu air allack.s were vel)' dangerous 10 shipping in confined .......tel1. Anolher 200.000 troops wen: e'...cuated from other parD of Fnnce. desplle the Sinking of the liner LJIlCQSlri>l offSt Nazaire with the loss of sevenl thousand li\~. As Fnnce callie dose to surn:ndn and Italy nude an opponummc declannon of " ...r. Churchill became concerned about the fate of Ihe French fleet. Force H. a powerful group of major w~rships ........s forlll...d umler Adminl Sir J.: Panol Scn;ce and Coasal Foren would be the fint 10 rnc:et the mvaSlon.
The Atlantic War By the middle of 1940 a U-bo:n was allowed 10 sink on sight \;rtually any ship believed to be helping Britain. The German position was inum:a.surably boosted by the sc:i:rnre of bases m Norway and France. and the battle moved OUl imo Ihe "tbmic. while southern and eastern
Unosh porn such as London and Southalllpion ....l:re brgdy closed due 10 bombing. During the wlnter of 1940-41 the U-boats dc\~loped the uruc of surfaced atuck by mght and had glUt success agaHlst .....~ak1y esconed con\~'S III an area nonh of Ircbnd and west of ScOtund, In Mareh 194 J. as in\lU were wilhdrawn from Bn:n through the English Channel. The British \\"C'fC' humilialed as their ships and airenft failed 10 SlOp Ih...l11. but in facI It lllJlrked a slntegic relreat by the Germans,
Na",,1 gunfire oupporlS an .rnlY landing nur Na"'ik in No....",y,
16
Churchill's Navy
I3nUto gamed two pO'w~rful illic:s in the COUIY of 19~ 1. but that did hdp the AWlllie \lOU in the shon (C'rm. The German 1I'l\'2SIon of Rusw In JuOC' ~ated the need for com.'U)~ to [;Ike supphes to Murnunsk: md Ardungd In the north. JW!. the U-bt»lS. surtxe ships :md oIircnfi: ~ in orv.ozy and through .1Ippalbng sea conditions north of the- Amx Cm.-k. One- of the grates( dMten of the war orne 10 July 1942 wnen the: Adnunlt}: Ix:b~~ dut lhe &.sm.nrH mtCf-shIP ,,:zs OUI. onkred COIl''O)' PQ17 [0 cbsperse. Two thirds of the ' at' sunk. 11K- Uruled Sola ('meTed the "W;UteT the atbl;:k on !\oHl Huboi" In Dcecmba. but Uul opmed the I\rnenan East Co$ 10 U-003I anxk. and 51ups there rrnuUled unesconcd lOr the lim tulf of 19-12. suffcrmg gmt 105so:s. TOen in thc srcond luH" of lhat }~M the U....tx»lS mO\~ bxk to nud-Atbnoc. for the cnszs of thc U-lxut \\w. ll()(
r.rpo'z wps . .
The Mediterranean War The naval war in the Meditcrnncm bcg;an In June 1940. all France colbpscd and Iuly d«brrd ....';ll". Th~ ~limil1;l.rion of the French f1ccl al Men c!·Keblr was murnanc and Bnwn ~ l;enll'1ll1 ~ at M;llt
The ...ithdn....1 from Dunkin,
paint" b), Richard Eurich. In the fOf'eJround. troo...
in ImaD boau ... carried oul
'0 • "'I.' h.hinl bo'l•• paddle names birr.
In the l>acklroon4.
uoops oa the mol..... boudinr; desll'O)·O'rl.
turnour ;lIT;lr,mto.OlfC:lpe M;lUp.tn in Much 1941 Adnu....tAndrcw Cunmngtum led a OCCt wluch sa.nk: three- Iuli;lll cruisers.The n;lVY 1;0operated \\'1lh the army ~ in Egypt which was JUf;f;cssful ;lgutUI the iulians in Libp.. hlUlp VWl had some wcccss ag:unSI the luli;l11S al Sin~ on 17 December. btll the following d.ty a force of CnJlSCn ran IIlto a nunefield and three we're sunk or wnugcd. On the 19th lull;ln mann~d torpedoes penetrated the main British b;tse al AI",x;llldru and seriously wm;lged the l»ttIeships Qul'D1 Ellz
17
The Royal Navy in Peace and War
Ml."dilcrnnean flc.ct had no :~crnce.1b1c aplt;a.l slups by the bcgmmng oll942.Tbcn: ....'21.1U :ambiguous IUCceu.tgaJn .11 Sine in MHCh ~ IWO Iwun destro)'ers \\'ere sunk in a ~orm but Ihe Brilrih comV)' ....<1$ dcbycd and suffcKd havy danUl~ from !he alZ". Cunmngh.tm left WI lIIQmh.....,th Ius lIeet In much reduced C1rcumsunces.
the Indull Oee.1J1, ....hile the great PaCific ....'.1r .....as lefi almon entirely to American forces. wnh help from the small AUSlnh2n and New Zcilind n.1vic:s.
Victory in the Mediterranean The Retreat frOJn the Pacific The Royal Navy had long been aW.1re how difficult it wQuld be to defend the empire in the Pacific and IndIan Oce.1n ag.tmst j:l.pan at Ihe same time ali fighting a ....'.1r III Europe, ChurchIll optimistically behc....e d that a modCr.1le force of Uritish capit:l.1 ships could act as a delerrent so the Prinu ",flllJ/N and Rtpuls< were sem to Smgapore, ahhough no alrcnfi arner W.1J a....allable to proteCi them. The japanese atf.1d:ed Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 tQ bring AmerIC.1 mto the 'o\";lr. and al Ihe UTIle lime Ihey launched atucks on the Bmish colony at Hong Kong and IhreJlened M2bya 2nd Smgapore. Admlr;tl Tom Phtlhps took h,s two ships out dnplte the lack of air CO'o"Cr. and on Ihe 10th Ihey were sunk by j;lpanese torpedo bombers and bombers. Two months bier the Bnmh EmpIre suffered pcrtups Its most humili;lting defeal of .111 ome when Singapore surrendeKd. The crulstr Extur fought Wllh the Americans .1t the Battle of Ihe Java Sea. bul \\'21 sunk .1 fcv. cb)'S later. Admu.1l J.1mes Somen'llIe, who look command of the fleet .1t Ceylon after Phillips' dealh. \\"3S forced to rerrcat to
Convoys \\"C~ forced through to Malta against heavy JOssel by aIr and V-bo.1t attack dunng 1942. Opentlon Pedestal III i\ugust 19-42 W1l5 escorted by 4 alrcnft C;lrners (one of which W.1S lost and two damaged), 2 batdC5hips, 7 cruisers (IWO lost, two damaged) and 27 dC$troye~. Only 5 out of 14 urgo ships reached the ,sbnd. Illcluding the tanker Olli". which limped into harbour with vlt~1 supplies of oil. BUI the lide began to turn. largdy because of the bnd campaign III North AfrIU. In October General Montgomery began the Battle of EI ALamcin 2nd C""Cntuall)' forced Rommel to rerrcat. In NOlo'ember, in Opentlon Torch. the Alhes bnded III French Morocco and Algcna. :lIIId AxlS forces W~n: trapped bcl\\"Cl"n thelll, being dn\'en hack 10 Tuni5i.1 and forced to ,*i.!hdnw to Iuly III Mol)" 19-0. The Anglo-Amenc:l.n forces Wl"re now on the o!Ten)i\·e. as Cunmngh.1m relurned, In July hl" led lhe naval side of the In\'2110n ofSicil) under the Amenan General ElSCnhOYo"Cr.!he most heaVIly opposed Illvasion so f.1f III the WCSI. It ustd 580 \\'.1rships .1nd 2000 bndmg cl'.1fi. Two lIIomhs bu~r Allied forcC$ were pUI ashore at
o
......... ~., ..........
by dM
f.......
Ror-I N..-y
;..~
N..-dI
s-. Afttk
0.... ... 114,4i....
18
Churchill's Navy
The
t",w of the PW_-Jm/Q ,nnsrer.o. deteroy,••, the ~h;p
i, ,unk b)'
Japane", alrcrafi.
~lerno in laly. Itlly C\oenroaUy surrendered but the Gcnruns offered strong miscance. British na~~l forces on bolh sides of haly aided the slow Allied advance and In January 1944 troops bnded at Antio ncar Rome bur missed a ch:mcc to make sJ'C'ctacubr adV;lnCf:S. By chis time anconon had shifted 10 C'\ocntli in notlhern Europe. but British forces helped a mainly Amcrkan landmg In the south of Frallce in Augusl 1944. British forces also oper:atcd in the Aegean. attad::ing the Germans in Seplelllbcr and October as th('y withdrew from Greece.
The Crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic Dunng the second tu1f of 19-'2 the .....'01f packs" of U-~tli hamscd Allied shipping in the Nonh Arbonc. The Adnuralty fougtn the }ugh comnund of the RAF for mort resources to be laken away from me hugely expensIVe bomber offenswe against Ccrnuny. ;lnd fo~ '-ery long_ I';lnge aircraft which could close the 'alr gap' In the nuddle of me ocean. In the me;lntime 98 ships of 485.000 tons ....'ere sunk in September alone. There was a lull during the winter. hUI in March 1943 the V-
boats returned to the attack against two eastbound convoys. HX229 aud SC 122, which lost 21 ships between them, against one V-boat sunk.
19
The Royal Navy in Peace and War
But the: tide: began to turn. Radu was Incre:asingly u~e:d to de:tect U-bc»tI on the ~urface. new moods of A!.dlc and we;apons such as Hedgehog were: coming into use as we~ new c:scorn in the form of fngaln. The air gap ",";I~ gnduilly dOSC'd. whtle C'SCon c:arners went Yo'IIh nun)' convoys 10 pl'O\'1de ;aIr suppon. As the supply of cscoru iocrNsed. support groups ....-ere: formed 10 go to the aid of bekague:~d COIl\'oYS. In May con\'oy ONS5 forced IU ...."3). through ;a conccntnnon of U-bc»u "'llh rhe loss of 11 ships out of 42. but SC'o"Cnl U-boals ""Cre: sunk. At the end of the month, worried aboul falling morne: and lossn by ship and alrcnfi. Adnurn Damu Wlthdrr\\' me U-boau from Ihe Nonh Ad.lnllc. Thi~ secured Ihe supply line for Ihe Allied :armies building up in Europe:. bUI it "";IS not the end. The U-bo:au C'\'enru:ally re:mrne:d. some fitted with a powerful anll-alrcnft :armament. To\\";Irds Ihe end of 1944 the Germans began 10 use the: schnorkd, which allowed Ihem 10 ope:r.ne far more elfeclI\"Cly underwlIIcr. They began a ncw campaign In Brllt~h coast:al \vaters, whete the)' h;ad nOl bun since early 1940. They had e\-en more c:lTeCli\"C boat! such as the: Wahhe:r type: up Iheir sleC'\"C. but Ihe war ended before: Ih~' came IntO use.
In the north, the ~urfacc: threal to the Russian con\'oys ....-as gnduall)' diminished. The: Scha,nh(lFJ/ was tnppe:d by the: Home Flee:t on BoxlIIg Day 1943 and sunk. The: Tirpitz ....-as cu.mage:d by muigel submannes III September 1943, and finally sunk by RAF bombers a )-eu late:r.
Victory in the West Although he: sc:t up a Combmed Opc:ntiollS organisation immedme:ly after the Fill of Fnnce, Churchill rc:1iuc:d Amc:Tian p~~ to in\~ nonhern Europe: until well into 1943.After that the: whole: ofJouthan England be:camc: an armed camp as Britidt. CaJudian, Free French, PoII1h and American troOpS ffiO\'fii there: in incrc:.3Sing nu~rs. A huge: force of landing cnft ....'ZS buill up.After ~ dc:byJ D-Day w:as set for 5 June 1944. but atroCIous wc:atha ClIUKd anothe:r de:by to a welllher Window me next cu.y. Se..'\'.nry-nine'" f'C'"t" ce'"nt of combat:ant \'CSSC'"k would be: British and Canadian, 16}s" pc:r cent Ame:ncan and 4}S" pe:r cent would be: operated by the: ome:r Allies. Alhed forces landed on the Normandy beachc:s in the'" early hours of 6 June 1944. The: Ih~e: easte:rn be:achc:s, <:ode named Gold, Juno
Opon....
Hupool>•• Malu "om,O)' of J..19n.~ned
rIM bf,ttJ."hip M~.
by
20
Churchill's Navy
and Sword, ""eft' :ttUcked by Brilish and unadlan troops In Bnmh bndmg craft. The Americans used moscly their Qwn landing enft on Uuh and Onuha beaches. bUi a luge part of the covering forces were Brilish. Aparl from b.nding CIOlfi, ....'arships patrolled the cdS" of the :m:a for surface' warships, I-boats and submnincs and prewnlcd
any signific:am pencrnnon. They provided 1J,llu-urcrafi ,over and bombarded enemy peKitionli. both on me CO:lSt ;md K\1:nl nules mund. Apart from heavy G$ualtio on Onulu Bach. the bndmgs wtte highly successful and n.n~ casualties ....~ft' unexpectedly Iigtu. 8uI once ;ashon' the amun were bogged down. Caen. a UrlUm obj«tl\1: for the lint cby. "'
...... - p _IOu-rpool aft«
oiIokiac ..,.
....... ............... u--.~
Oppotite: A t-vily
r....
......... .......,
loaded toldirr of.
LaDdinc Crafi
lafaDCry darina !he Nortn8DIIy bDdiDp.
Back to the Pacific The Brmsh Go\'t'rnmem was determined to ""turn to the Pacific In some form. From b.te 1944, after victory ll\ the Battle of the Atbntic, the success of the Normandy invaSion, the surrender of the Itahan flect :md the attrition of thc Gcrman surface fleet, II had enough spare shlJK to do so. Thc British Pacific Fleet was formcd under Sir Bruec Fruer, but It was puny eomparc'd ...."lth the American forc~ m the area. Its tqulpmem \\"21 brgd)' outdated and It had much to karn about the blest techniques. lIS CrC'\O.~ ......ere only 100 aware how far thclr pay and condLoons h:ad fallcn behind Iltosc of the Americans. It carned out r;uds on 011 refincTlcs In Sumatra bd'on: Ihe war ended with Ihe first alom bombs. Brmsh warshlJK wcre present in Tokyo Bay and Fruer was one of the slgnatOTles of the Japanese surrender document. but the huge American force showed how far the Urll1sh had slipped bchmd thcm III
resources.
PART II
The Structure of Naval Power 1 My Lords of the Admiralty The RayJ.! N3VY
\'n'l
headed by the Admiralty.Te
lloard of Admiralty. bill colloquially it referl'l"d to th.. whole government
dl.'"partmcnt, i~ building:; and all it:; works. Uke any government departtllcnt the AdmiraJty was theoretically subject 10 the king. George VI had served as a naval officer in his youth and was much l'l'Spe'Cted in til(" service, although he had no decisive inJ]u('"IlCC O\'er how it "'as run. except in matters of mdition. such as the naming of major warships. The Admiralty was also subject 10 lhl" control of Parliament, which V()IM the money to run th<, navy. In l'l"turn Parlianu:-nt expected an annual statement on nav:al affairs by the First Lord....od the right to
question him or his ministers at regular intervak But pJrliamentary control of the navy was TOnner light,
~peciaUy
in W1lrtinlt,'". The NaVllI
Estimates of the war produced only gener.tlities about the amount of money TO be spem, in the form ofa vote for 'such numbers of Officers, Seamen, Boys and Royal Marines and of Royal Marine Police, as His Majesty may dl.'em nl.'cessary to be borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions... '. Even the numocr of men allowed for the navy, a figure which WOlS almost sacred in peOicetime, was dropped during the war. As Churchill expbinM in 1940:
., .il is mIt expedielll to lay prrtisefatlS al/dfigulY's if Ihe proposed stlY'uglh aud roSI of Ille Navy ill Ille romiltg year lJtfort the HOIISC as 11'1' should IIawrally desirt 10 do. I.. l!refirsl piau, il is pJrysically implmil1le 10 makt' t'xaa tslimafts for wruil(gNKies whi(h art (ol/slal/lly (hal/gil(g; alld ill Ihe u(olld piau, Illtrf' is I/O lind fO tell lilt t/lt/llY mort Illall is gi»dfor him ab.>uf wlrllf U't art daillg. [n pea<:ctime the Treasury also exerted a strong influence on the n:l.VY, by controlling budgets and keeping expenditure within estimates. This, tOO, was mueh less tight in wartime:
Iliros brtll agrted wifh lilt Trtosury Ilral fart(osts if(ash rtql4irtlllt1l1S fer llaNI st/1li(ts ill flrt fi"a,Kial year 1940, rtlldtrf'd by Deparfmellis aud Bra'l(!res, ..may be lrealt'd as flrouglr flrry Jrad bet/r Nal')' Eslimalts approlltd ill lire IlTlfillary way. ... /1 will 1101 be Ir«asary 10 musulf fire Treasury mtrf'ly bttause a propostd servile /IIay ill~'Olllt 011 exltss Oil Ilrt VOlt Ilf SubJread 100u:emed'
Churchill's Role Winston Churchill resumed his association with the Royal Na\')' 011 thl.' first day of the war, when he took office again :as First lord of the Admiralty. A famous signal wem OUt TO the fleet: 'WinSTOn is back'. Churchill had first taken charge of the Royal Navy in 1911 whl"n it was thl" largest in till" world and had unshaken prestige, during a period of rapid tl"chnologicaJ change ~nd rising budgeTS, His fall from office afler the Dardanelles campaign of 1915 "''as a bitter blow.
Churchill took a great deal of naval knowledge with him when he became Prime Minister in 1940, but th~t did nOllllean tlut he fa\'Ourcd the navy unduly. He had staned his career :as an army officer. After the Dardanelles he conunanded a battalion on the Western Front. He \\'as Secrelary ofSt;lte for War in the e~rly 1920s, and whill" out of officl" in the 1930s his main project h:l.d been :I. four-volume biography of his forebear, an eighteenth-century general. Genl"ra.! Sir Alan Brooke cOnlmented; 'Winston never had the slightest doubt that he had inherited all thl" military genius from his great ancestor Marlborough',' Churchill was equally at home with the air force. He had tried to learn to fly before ~nd ~fter thl" First World War, ~nd had been imtrumemal in setting up the Royal Naval Air Service which became pan of the RAF in 1918. He made a s~ial slUdy of the balance of power in the air in the 19JOs. He became an honorary air conullodorc in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and often \\'Ore the uniform. Churchill's knowledge of all three services w:as almost perfecLly halancl"d. and it enabled him to supl"rviSf' all of thl"m. As well :as being Prime Mini~ter, ChurehiU \v.1.S Ministl"r of Defl"nce. The post had no real constitution:l.l authority. and pff'Vious attempts to Sf't up ministers 'for the Co-ordin:l.tion of Defence' had been failures, but this did not stand in his w:ay. His ChiefofStaff Genera.! Ismay, wrote: ... IJre Prime Minisftr himself, witlr ollille polVtn mrd authorily wllitlr aff
10
q{ilt, txertfstd a persoual, dirtll, ubiquitous alld lomim.om mpervisiou, ollly OWr tilt formulat;e'l if mililary poUI)' af fVtI}' ~Iagt'", bur 0'VI"l'" Ille gt'"'Ireral 10lrdll(I of military PptrMiQ/IJ.) rlral
1101
As his private secretary put it on the first weeks of his taking officl" as Prime Ministcr: 'Churchill scrutinises any documem whi<:h h:as anything to do with the '-"";Ir and does nOt disdain to enquire imo the most trivial poinf.'
The Board of Admiralty The Admiralty was a highly compkx org.lllisation. Unlike civilian lninistries ~uch as the HOllll" Offil"l" or the Ministry of EducaTion, it w:as directly responsible for every aspect of the lives of the servicemen under it. Like the other service ministries it had to bl" able to initiatl" and comrol every aspect of their organization rather than just regulate it. Commerce, for example, would continue in some form without the influence of the Board of Trade. Education was largely run by the local authorities and only lightly supervised by thl" ministry in london. But without a body such as the Admiralty, thl"re would be no navy at all. Unlike the other sen'ice ministries the Admiralty was an operalional as wl"ll as an adminislrative
Opposite: Chul'<'hill
with Adn,inl Sir Dudley Pound (Iell) and Majo. Ceneral
headquarters. with power to direct ships and tleets 3t sea. [n Pr.lCCiCl· this W:lS used sparingly and the two wartime First Sea Lords believed that the man on til\' SpOt was usually tht' bt,·tter judge of what 10 do. The Admir::llty was also responsible for procuring most of its own sllppli~. including ships. whero'as th.. War Office work..d through the Ministry of Supply and Ihl.'" Air Ministry through tht· Minimy of Aircraft Production. The Admir:alty managed one of the world's Iargt'St dvili~n workforn'~ ill tht'" roy1ll dockyards, ~rnuml:m ~tores and other depots. There were 127,{H)() men and women in the homl' prds at the end of 1941, plu~ nearly 45,{H)() in overseas yards. The Admiralty w~s well awal"l.' of ilS great powe{'5. It was notoriously peremptory in me wording of its ordeT'5, and its pompous nunner in~pired mild s.atire ~rllong the recipients of its orders, who spoke of deci~ion~ by 'tht'" Admir;llty in ilS \\oi5dOlll', or 'M y Lords of til(' Adlllir;llty'. According to Sir Oswyn MUIT:lY, who had retired as Sccn:t:lry in 1936:
11,e Ad",iralty is ti,e drpar/tllfIJl 4 sta'e U~,j(11 is d,argrd willI ,1,.. Ildtlli"istrllriOll .if Ihf IIIlI'd1 bmim:ss I1f rI,r (
of rlrf immSlS
Empire by ua.'
Unlike SOIlIl' othn gon'rnmt'"nt comminees thl' Board of Admiralty was a fully working body with real control on:r thl' affairs of the navy. Early in the war Churchill decreed that the Board should meet at 4 p.llI. e\'ery Friday and memb!.'{'5 \\'
The Civilian Politicians The First Lord of the Admiralf}' \\'in~'Ss relating to the Navy and merchant ~hipbuilding and repairs'.' Churchill's successor at the Adrniralf}' ill 1940 was a strong contra,l. A V Alexander \v;lS a Labour MI~ a man of no great personalif}', As Churchill said of him after a major gaffe, 'Such a nice fdlow - but rcally...... Like the other service chiefS he was not ~ member of the War Cabinct, so hl' had no say in grand Str;lteg)', He was a good diplomat and administrator, respew:d by all those who worked with him. Alexander ""s a cog in the admininrati\"e lII~chine, although quite an dlicknt one. The First Lord was assiSTed by rwo junior ministers.The Parlumenwy and Fimncial Secretary was always a member of the 1·louS<' ofCommons, as only that house could dea.1 with fin~ncia.1 affairs, HI: deputisl-d for thl: First Lord in Parliament and dealt "ith finance and contr:lcts. The Civil Lotrl might be a member of either the Lords or Common,. He was mainly l"I.'Sponsible for the buildings of lill' IU\')' and the industria.1 staff. The Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs was a wartime anomaly: neither politician, nor naval officer, nor civil servant. The post was held by Sir William Lid1b'OW from a well-known Clyde shipbuilding family, and ht'" \llas, as his title implies, responsible for merchant shipping which was largely under gon:rnment control in wanime.
The Sea Lords The kt')' person in ~lIY na\"a1 adminiSlrarion "";IS the First Sea lord, the senior ",1\'al member of rhe Boord and me chief na\"a1 adviser (0 the gO\·ernmelll. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound took office in 1939 after the ullomd)' death or illnl'SS of S\..... -eral otlwr candidates. Hl' tended to head off Churchill's \\ilder idcas by quiet diplonucy rather than confrontation. which g;tn: an imp~oll of weakness. He was respected by Churchill. who u~u~Uy follO\\'I..J hi~ ad"icl' and Wrotl' of'our friendship and murual conlldence'.The Primc MinisTcr had no hl'Sitation in getting rid of $Cnior officers he did not belic"c 10 be up to the job, and he n:'mO\'Cd tWO ChiefS of Impt:ria.1 Gelll:raI SfJif aud onc Chid ofAir Staffduring the war, but it was a f,ltal illness Imr rcmO\'Cd Pound aner four years of war. His habit of app:.rently nodding offduring ChiefS ofSl3ff meeting; and w:.lkmg when
25
A meeting nf the
80IIrd of Adrmrally
in 194J. ThoM
praent iDdude AIe~(I),
PotaDd (2). W!lirworth (J), Markham (.) aDd
LitJoao- (5). the- fm.y ""25 mmDOnCd ""25 mocked by his ~ bul OmrchiII QV. »11 \'m1IOOrl ofhis ~Ti prxticc ol"ukingm alicmoon nap. Pound Iud IDe lDditional Ila\-..J officn$ rducancc- to ddeg;ite. but he ",,,25 11 good adnurusmtO£.Accordmg to Ius wcce::BO!". he 1di the Adminlry 'ruruliJJg on
It
Oiled wheek" which "'eTe ho""'e\.'tt'r.lIlhtt inclined to run in a gmv.~'.' Andrew BIO\\Ti Cunningham, who look O\tt ~ First Se1l Lard, ....'3$ a very different officer. He ~r...cd brilli1lnLly u coml1UJlder-in-<:hu:f III Ihe MediterDnean during thl:' IllOSI IIItl:'ll$C )'C'an of the tu\-..J w:ar. He ....'3$ widely reg'l.lt1ed :as the grenest IJrmsh sailor since Nelson, although his Impact on Whitehall w:as 1C$S than mighl h1lve beell expected. Ap1ln from thl:' inY:ol5Jon <;If Europe. the mmt intense p1ln of thl" naY:olI WoIr w:as brgcly QVl:r by the nme he took office in Oetolx-r 19~3, 1Ind
Cunnmglum ....'3$ exhausled by his e1lrlier cOlllll1:Uld. Cunningham bcg;In a lypinJ day :al 9 a.m.. m hour before most of the Civil serv:ants :arTi,~d. He IlIteTVlewed hlS wff officen on the prevlOUS cby's oper.l.Iions. then utl:'nded the Chid; of Staff nK'C'Wlg ....,th lhe hads of the moo snviccs.!Jtl:'r tlut he "'3$ back III the office 'scring people. dealing ",th p.aptn. or .utcndmg meeang'l' He retUrned to the office after dinner 1Ind wenl 10 bed al II p.m.. unku 11 nlttUng wilh Chun:hiU kept him up btl". l11e Second SeJ Lard ....'3$ a !lemor admll-..J m ctutge of aU nuaen of IU\-..J personnel. The Third SeJ Lord ....'3$ abo the Comrolkr of the
NlIV)', responsible for IIlalcrw ITUUers. HlS depuunenl Included the Dareaor of a'-..J ComuuCtlon md hlS sulf',:as \',' 1'11 :as the dcp;lmncna dealmg cngmes.. electrical cnglllttring. torpedoes. mines 1IIId lIa\':I1 ordlUnce. The Founh Sea Lord ....'3$ m durge of supplies 1Ind tDnspon, while the Fifih Sea Lord, 11 polIltion 1Idded to the BoJrd In 1937, wu responSible for the naval :aIr arm.
",th
Impcrw Gcncr:al Saff .....ho headed the army and the CIucf of Air Saff cxh Iud an 'mdr."1dwl md colkcm'C' mpomibilit)· for ~"1sing on defence pobcy as a ",-hok'. They met for ","v or ~ houn on SIX. Ound had agn:M to Churchill knding Out ill5UlIctions to destroy the French banleship Rkh,li(U. ThIS had importollll r:amifiClitiOI1$ and tile)' tud to meel again in the altcrnoon to find w:a}"lI to elk Churchill OUI of it. Thursdays meeting wzs men;:ifully shon bul on Monday they heard 1II01t'" bad new~ about jJpanesc adY:ol.nccs :and by Wcclncsday !hey ....'I:n: diicus:SIng how to get Ill()r'I: :lid to RUlISI1I al a ','nY difficult COS'.'" All tins rne:anl thai the First: lord hJd brrutcd nme to administe1'" the Ila\Y, so he Iud a wongVi« CIuef of N:n-..J Suff 10 hdp hun ...., th much of the roullnC business..
The Naval Staff The 112\..J saff Iud been founded by Churchill in 1912 .togJin5t the oppoSIDOO of nuny adnunk.1t "''JlI fonnilly haded by IDe Fint Sa Lon:I himself, ",ith his deputy :md Assastant ctue& of :i\-..J Saff for trJde,
foreigl'l and home alfurs and ....upom. Its dunes were 'me collection and cbsscmuunon of N:n-..J InlClligCl'lCe. the fQming onong-term pIms, the condUCI of oper.1bons and In shan the srudy of the whole field of 1la\'a1 strategy and uetics'. Tlus Imvh't'd t:alung 11 brt»d \'lew of the whole field. :tlthough the sufftud no execun\'I: authoriry in itself.
The Chiefs of Staff In the Second World War the n1lvy had 10 opcnte far mon: dosdy wilh Ihe Olher ~rvices than e\~r before, esp«W1y at the highest le\'l:b. Churchill emplwised that the Fim Lord of Ihe Admll'alty. the Chief of
The saK was l1umJ)' nude up of IU\':lI ~. The brgc:sc 5Ingk group ....':\:5 111 die 1\~ Imdh~~ Depunncnl. An important hul much snWkr division ck~t ....1 th Pbns.:md otMn dalt ....1th 10uI dd"('n("c. antisubmarine ........ n1ll'. min"'Swl"cping, mck, K<)nOnur ........rf1ll'. Opcr.lDom. tr.Iining, :;ur w;uf:an:. 1la\7oI :lIr org:umarion 3/K1 gunnery. The scitnrific dq=n~t'S.mo (".lI1llC uockr the Fim Sc.ll Lord. though I}(M romully pm of the 5t:Iff. ~ included the HydrographIc Department which produced chHts and nlll the RO)';I] Ob5er";lIory.1l1 G~l1wich. the Signal O"'panmcm, the: MClcorologiai Br.lnch :.l.nd the Navigation Br.mch. In J.lIlluary 1941 Churchill complained about the excessive numbers of n.llv:al offie<'rs l'mploycd .lit Ihe Admiralty. More th.llll a quarter of regular Il.ll\'al capt:nlls and comnundcrs were employed ,liefC'. a totll of 545 officers. He recommended 'a through purge' and ....'as not sms6ed 10 weeks Iner when AlexandeT .-eported that \"ef)' lmle could be done." The saff connnued to gtO"' but In f1(:t thc nllll1beT of officers
8+low Itoft,,..,.., Ad.min!Jy Buildin, in
Whil~hall.
Bfiooo'
TM
rid'"
~Ir
of 1M
Adminlly (ro", Th~
MaU, .bowing
Ihe nineleenth.
Cflllury '''lelUion and Ihe Ciladel.
bascd in the Adilliraity re:nulned qUite snuII compued With thc SllC of the mvy or thc ciV11 service - ;UQund 2100 from the Royal ;1.\1'. RO)'i! Mannes andWRNS early an 19-H.Thelr rlUinjob was to bring r«enl 1U\.,u experience to bt'.u, so tht'), tcnded to rotate t"\'C'f)' two or three )"eafS, III COntrast to [he- ci\.u ~nts. a\'i! officers Iud bttlc tmlUng for thc job. When Dpuin H K Oram ....';IS appolnt«l DIrC'aor ofTr:lining and Sufi" Duot'S U1 19-42, he admlttcd It ....."1S 'a Job whIch I k.nev.' absollltdy norhing alx:mt and the",fo.-e tud 10 spend the fim fcw ...."eeks fer",llng :UOllnd to 61ld our what It lllCant'." As Dir«tor of Pbns in the middle )"ears of the .....;l.l". upt:un Charles Lambc complained about thc amount of time he had to spcnd altcrtng the worchng of orckrs and memos. though ht: agrero that 'Cucful and dear dr.tfting is ~ntial in all p.1pcr work.There: must be only ont: mt:anlllg'.'·
The Secretariat The SecretaI'")' to the Adminlt)" ...."1S the SC'IUor ci\'I.1 ser\Olnl in the dep;artment. He ....-as the equivalent of a Permanent S«reury In another j!O\"ernment dep;artment, but less JlO""erful In that he tud to share hiS mfluence wnh the m\.,u officcrs on the I3o;rrd or Adminlf)'. At the beginning of the .....ar the Secretary ...."1S SIr Archibald Caner .....ho had spcm most orhis ca.-eeT in the India Office and was nC'\"er at homc wnh tht: Ill1flCatC and subtle structure of the Admiralf)'. In Deccrllber 1940 he W;lS replaced by Sir Hcnry Markham. who was rdath'ely young at 43. Hc had sef\"t'd in the arlllY on the Wcstcrn Front during tht: FIn! World War. He gr.tduatcd from Oxford and joined the Admir.tlty in 1921, thcn worked as privatc SC'creuf)' to succcssiw First Lords from 1936-8. According to a collcague, his gre:l.test gift .....as his 'fbir for UIllUllg COITt"d: <:onstirutional procroure with efficitncy of organisation'. He ...."1S a good leader With a SC'nse of humour, and was almost toully dC'\'Oled to his work. finishing nor long before midnight most Illghts." HiS duot'S indudro numging the offict :lind its ci\,l 'leTVafla, wptn"lSmg Adminlty proccdure :md Kong as Accounting OfficCT, rrsponsiblt to Parlwntnt for the conaol of m\-aJ expcndJrure. HiS luborduutt'S aJso worUd kmg hours, ofi~n imt'rrupttd by aIr r.tlds. Cdu LJonQ:lInd hCT coUeagues 'did a ten-bour tby,ofien much Ionge-r. SC'\~n lbys a wttk, ....'th OM Sunday off C\~ry dutt ",ttn' Th(')' bec:une d~cpl)' III\"Oh"ed In thc .....urk. dealmg ....,th the Kcounts of individual Uiips. 'HM Ships assumed a \~ry real Ilknoty and ach one beC'1fllC \"ery 1"('a1 to us. Through thc accounts "e becamt f:llnulur ",th the p.1ttern of hfe on board :lind Ul Splfll ,,~ ~re \~f)' close to the officers and men forming the ships company'," Thl:' civil servicc naluta.lly exp:lIndcd in .....artimt and the numbers III the Adnllralty grew almost fourfold; It had JUSt under 13,000 civil
The Structure of Naval Power
$CT\'ants ;tt the sun of the W;tr:and mofl' th;tn 48,000 by the begJ.nning of 19+4 . AI the ~ of me civil W"rvice ...."» the Adnwustno\~ CWs.. fl'CI'Ulted from )"oung men an thelf emy I\\'elloes ...mh good degrees. mostly from Oxford;md umbodge. Like I1lOSI civil $CT\':lIlts mey ....~fl' selected by coml'C'titi\'e u;tmin;ttion. They lended to ;tVOld speci.aliSJtion but brought acadenuc skills to ;t problem. The Class was qUlte smaIl,leu dun I per cent of the service.lS;t whole, but they fiUed the majority of the higher posts. Their nuin concern was With pohcymaking. and supervising the nwu~ment. Below them was the Execuo\"I: Class. which carried out mO$t of the nulUgt'OIent and had graMs at the higher level which ovnhpped With those of the Admirmua,ti\"C' Clm. It was a much brger group, fl'CI'Ulted from men :and women With a secondtry school eduation. EMly in 19+4 the Admiralty Secreuriat included mofl' dun 500 men an the Adrninistmi\'e and higher Ex«uU\~ grades. There wefl' 58 .....o~n. mostly 10 temponry posa, at the 100Att end of the ~. Parallel to them ....~fl' the scientific :and teehnical suffi with their 0'0\'11 $)~ems of gOOng. and below them .....e re the lJUJJItrOUS datcal ~ \\mntn f)'p1$U.. and the mcsstngal ",ilO earned paptt\\'Ori: fiom offia to offi«. In the 19305 oneTfl'WD)' ofIic:UJ ~ that theAdmiraky "'
\\vro
then. The: depmmenlli of the Adnunky. he dmned. \\'== far from wateraght and Iud to \\OI'k doscly together at all Ievek to get thin8\' ~. 'The whole of the work. indeed. l:J exceedmgl:y closdy interrebted, and has fl'famce to a ~ small numbtT of common ~' .•
As a result, pohcy often h.ad to be app~ by severallkpartmenlli. For eample, when it was dtC'ided 10 adopt $Ulldard nomencbtufl' for aircnft carrien ;md their officen, the file circulaled for 20 months and attracted more than 50 comments from various officers b<'forc It was C'\~ntu;aUy incorpor.ued in an Admiralty Fleet Ordt'l'."
The Admirah) Buildings The bead office of the AdnunIry \\'21 a wdl-knoo.\'11 building on the ....~ udc ofWhlteha1l, dose to ParlWnenl, ~ning Smtt and other nup g'O\UlUllC"Dt rninisnics. It \\';1$ built 10 the cady oghreenth c=tury to ;m undmtngwshed cbgn. ~ redeemed by the screen Ul &om mlCnded to keep out noang seamen. AdDunky House was put up in the 178(k as ;a residence for the First Lord.. A brge extC'Jl$MXI .....as buik bef......e en 1888 and 1905, &onang on Hone Gwrds Parade. AdmanIty Arch was added Ul 1911,. the cntrmce to The MaD and fXtng Tn&Ig;v Squ;aJt In 1939 the ooncrefC' DtIdd W.lS ~ as an air nid sheker.:and Its unattnCtI\'t bulk ....';1$ evennully sohmed by the vq;moon w1uch ~ on It. The orlplla1 boardroom was saJ1 used as in the days of Nelson, but the offices around i( hearne crowded with more and more offict'fS and civil W"....OInlli. Originally it had been pbnned to ev::ictUte I1lOSI of the depuwlem 60m London and the [hreClor of Nav:al Col1SDUction and hIS suff mO\~d OUt hastily in 1939. bul in the end TIlO$t of the higher officials of Ihe Admiralty sta}"l:d in Whitehall. New prcmi$es around London were used. often In temporary wamme buildings such as NonbWlck Park In north-west London where Celia L Joncs worked m the Accounts Department in 1944.'"
27
2 Admirals and Fleets Flag Officers The Admiralty was all-po'Io\'el'ful in theory, bul in rcahty much of Its ;tuthority ....';1$ delegated to the adnurals on the spot. particularly the conunwders-m-duef of the nwn fleets. 'Why h.a1.~ comnunden-inchiefand do their work for them)' Pound WI'OIe in 1939.'The Adlluralty should ~ on aU the intelligence it had ;md lei the Adnural make the
. . - . . . . 01' THII .....,.
decisions, unless radio SJ1ence had to be nwntallled'!' But there "~re cases whICh cut aCl'055 the boundariC'i of more than one conunand and Pound did inlervene decisi\~ly during the chase of the Bu_1r III 194 1, and with ~ e!feet III ordenng the escort 10 ab;andon convoy PQl7 to Russia m 1942.Though the AdminJty was sparing in the use of Its po'Io\ttS, Churchill ....';1$ not aM"a}'5 ~ of lhc: accepable
boundaries and as Fm:t lord he pcrlups 1Otcr\'C'flCd too much III the N()f\\qun c;arnp;a!gJI of 1940. TIns continued ;dkr- he came 10 the ~ p in f\.by 1940 ~ Cunningtwn.. Comnwxier-m-Ouef MC'diternnean. ....~ oflus'ungraoous and hasty' ~ wgrng more off~ action. But tins \\
n:':1I
"_a,
28
Churchill's Navy
\
Admi ..... of 'he
Flu! Sir And...,w
Cunningham.
The Art of the Admiral The Royal Navy was bk'SSCd with a number of very successful fleel commanders during the Second World War, with skill levr-ls ranging from highly efficient to brilliant. At ,he highest level \\I,IS Andrew Cunningham, who led the Mediterr::mcan Fleet through its most difficult year-s and then became First Sea Lord. H.. WJS closely followed by Sir Max Horton. who conunanded the submarin(' force until he look charge of the Battle of the Atl:mtk :IS Comnundcr-in-Chief Western Approaches. in 1942; Jnd by Bertram Ramsay who as Comnundcr-in-Chicf Dover org:lIIist"d {ht.'" Dunkirk t:V
with perfect s)'mmcny led {ht" na\';ll side of th~' landing; in Italy and Normandy. Other leading admir.als included Sir James Somerville who COlllmanded Forc.. Hand th..n Ihe Eastern Fleet, Sir Bruce Fr.a~r of Ihe HOlne and Ihe British Pacific Fleel. and Phillip Vian who COlllmanded in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Not all th.. gIl'at Iv.lrtime admirals had f1ouri~hed in peacetime. l"l..3n1SllY had Il'tirt"d in 1939 due to a dispute over his slafT duties. Somerville had retired due to ill health and Honon had been in command of the Reserve Reet. But Ihe war soon brought Ihese energetic and intelligenl men into prominence. Not all admirals weIl' so successful. Some. such as Sir Dudley North at Gibraltar. were suspected of spending too much time before tnc W,lr in social duties such as running the royal yachls_ Sir Tom Phillips lvaS regarded as highly capable as Deputy Chief of Na\':I1 Staff. but \\':I~ pill in command of Ihe Prillce
Adm.....l Sir
Be.na", Ramsay on the D_Day hea<:h... wilh Ai.
Chief Marshal Tedder, who wa. Ei..,nho....er..
deputy.
..
w:tS ~""';Iy (rom the ~~r-
was no large
I1ttl
Russl~. It formed" dc:fC'nct aga.insl any sortie by the n'pll<:. and under Sir Bruct Fraser it suc,te'ded. III $Itlkmg the SchamhofSl in 1943.
of turdeshlps 10 lead. A new gener;ttion of officcn
ScUrwu- iD
Oe<:e~r
clKouraged much moR' initiative :.tnd less detaIled pbnnmg. When
19·4).
po.i.lIed by C .... ries
Cunnmgham5 staff gave hUll a 6O-pab't' SCI of orden for a J)('ac~iI1W exercise. he ordered them to cut II. After it ",;as reduced 10 .. quuu:r he:
The Mediterranean Fleet
Pun. T7t4' DM~
The ComllundC'r-in-ChiC'f of the HOIIIC' F1c:ct had rcbtiwly few
rCIll;/.rkcd Ihat h(" agreed wnh one sentence - 'The fleet will ~ manoeuvred by the Commander-ill-Chief." Furthcrrnor<', Cunningham had been brought up in dt'SlI'O)'cn r.uher than big shIps
administr.ltivc and diplomalic dUlle'S. because he .... 'as T1Qrmally sunoned
'''''. the OagsJUp of Ihe Home Filoel, U
ru:ar home and because the adnurals commanding at Orklll")' and
con,ing up from
Shetland. and
Ihe lefl. and lIar
and bc1i('Ved in lcavmg most of the
Commander-in-Chief Medill:rranean. on the other lund. had a filII
Ih.,lJ. .,., being
r.allgc of rcsponsibilicCli ashore: :l.Ild afloat. ThC' Meditcrr.l.llun AC:CI ....'as
fire
Ihe largest and It'lOSl popubr peacetime command in the nav),. but at the
the
lllmatl\'C 10
the officers on the spol.
Rosyth
took responsibility for his main ban",.
The Home Fleet
beginning of the war il had to ukc.- $C'Cond pbce to the Home Flc:ct.Thl5
The Home FkcI was the num sHlkmg force in Ihe nllV)', b)' far the most powerful group of ships C'xcq>t for the Mednernne:.m Flttl. ....hich ....;as only slightly smaller. Its oam<' tud bttn dunged from Ihe luunlll; Flttl In 1932. p.-.rUy to \\1pe om th~ memor), of Ihe ImTrgordon Muony of the pll"Vious ~T~r. AI IhC' beginmng of thC' w.ar 11 Iud fi\T bmkships IOdudmg the most modem ones. Srt- ~nd RDtJ'Jrf. the- Innl«ruisC'n Hood ~nd Rqnl~. tM Arlo Roy<Jl which was
changtd ,tty rapidly
IhC' only modC'rn ;urcr.afi: arrier in servicC', thR"('
~uadrons With ~
tou!
of 14 cruisers and tWQ lkstro)Tr Doulbs of nglll or mne shIps. It dId not
gre~uy IIlcrene' III
nrengrh durmg Ihe: war. II soon had
10
abandon
III
ITUd-1940 as Fnnce collapstd and Iuly entered
the ....'Jr. ComnundC'd \'ttY ~bt). b)' Cunningham. the fktt operated O\ga.'nsI tM odds in the Easu:rn M,:dlll:rnnC'all. lavmg the ,,~em SC~ 10 ForcC' H.1t suffered heavy losses &om Gc:rnun arr po'I>-'tt III the Dauk for Cm:e. &om C'oem)' subnunno. ~nd &om wring luhan human 10rpC'do ntxk which w ~ tWQ hmkstups III Aknndru H~r. In April 194 t. as It approached one of Its grenest Crises III IhC' Danle for Crele. (he MedlterranC'~n FI«I was run fiom Cunningh:aIll'S nagship thC' famous baltlcship lillISI'll'. The hI BattlC' Squadron was conunamkd by a rear-admnaJ
lIS base: at Sup~ Flow until ami-submuine defences \\Tn:' fully
forces. by a \
III
III
the bauJes.h.p Barham. and IhC' hghtC'r
the crulscr Orimi. The 3rd Cruiser
also comnunded by a rear-:admiraJ. with a Rear-
prepared and oper.ated fiom Loch Ewe. thl" Clyde and Rosyth at
Squadron
diffc:rem limes. ThC' HomC' Flc:ct cO\Trcd Imporum con\'oys. such as those brtngmg Can~dl;l.n troops to Europe in 1939-40. It was fully
Admiral (Airrraft Carril:rs)
cngagC'd under Admiral Sir Charles Forbes durtng the Gc:rnun
generall)' operatC'd separatC'ly. Ashore. thero: were (HMS Nilr). Malta. ISlllalia ;lnd Haifa.
itl\'asion ofNorw;ly in 1940. It l'xpected
l
n.. t.inkiDr; o£ the
to
send irs destroyers sollth in
III
thl," Fonmdab/,. Force H was nOllllnall)'
undt'r Ihe cOlllmand of the COlllmandtr-IIl-ChiC'f MC'dittrrant'an, bUl ba~
in Alexandria
the event of a German inv;aSlOn of Britain. with the m"in force
In the second half of the war the Mediterranean Fl«t was
oper.lUng from Ros)'th. It led Ihe hUn! for the Bismillrk ill 1941. but
transformed as lhe Alhes look North Al and ill\"ded Sicil)'. hOlly and
after th"t ils operations were malllly
the 50Ulh of Franct'. In June 1944 il
III
the north. con:ring convoys to
\\'as
conunandw b)' Adnm,1I Sir
Urgel.
tI/
11M Fleet al Gibfalc.r in June 1919 durins doe ~""-">Ta.
MKliler
FlftI
in IiPlI
obipt
ITeTo Horne FlftI dlipt
John H Cunningham - no rebtion to his predecessor - .....ho had his headquanen ashon:: at Algiers. It "'';IS no.... a series of area commands rathcr than a fighong Beet. Cunrungham Iud lbg officers for Gibr.dr;u-
AmerIcan ones m the Pacific. Funh~nnore:. the Americans had no interest in supporting a rC'tUrn of Bnash imperialism 10 the ;ue;t and were scc:ptial aboul their abilit)· 10 operaI(' on SlIch a scale. On arm'a1 III the
and the Medilenanem ApproKhes.. Western Mednernnem. Mala and Central Medlternnl"an and ~';lJ1t md the Easlern Mednernnean.
Pxific:. the British Pacific: FIc:n "'';IS rc:duc«llo lhc: status of Task Force 57' in the: Amenan scheme dungs. It had 10 karn ~' urlmiques in
....ith authonry O\TT the US naval commander in Nonh WestA&ic:a.and French. ltal.i.m. Grttk and Yugosbv forces 1ft the ;moa."
replenishment al ~ a.nd "'':'5 \'C'I)' mIlCh a poor reboon to the: t\meric::ms.
or
an m daft
The Area COtnmands
1:"'1.Ne~ 10
dae eamen
Ilft
d""..o,.en,a Ihree_funneUHi
County dall e .. ui~ .. it 10 Ih",
left, and balliethipt lie oultide Ihe harbour.
The Anomaly of Force H Normally a tkc:t or a comnund Iud a dear geographicaJ ~. It might be a small are:a like: the l)oo.~r Command. or a huge one hke the PacWc Aet't, but usually Ihe lIeet's limits were: clearly ddined, The majOr exception to thIS was Force H. a strong group of c:api~1 ships. ;lirc:r:lIi c:arri"rs and supporting ships. It was formed bte mJune 1940 m tl.'Sponse to the tWQ new faclors in the Meditt'rr:l.Ile:m - the [talian entry to the war and the problem ofkeeplllg the French fleet OUt of Gerlll;l.n h;l.nds. It .....as b:asc:d ;l.t Glbraltlr. but not fully under the authonry of the Fbg Officcr Nonh Atbntic (FONA). who .....as also based there and was nonUiully mponslble for shIps in a brge seclion of Ihe east-<enrr:ll Aclantic. This caused much confusion in June 1940 when a French fOKe of cruiser's and desuoyers =ped through the: Strall. FoKe H had only bc:c:n asked ....1th pTe\'C'nong 1t:a1wl ships from eJtiting whik FONA. Sir DudI~ Nonb, f~led 10 IOltn'me much 10 Churchill's fury. Force H initially consist~ of th~ hattl~rUlser Hood as flagshiP. me hanles1ups l'WIlIrI/ and RtwIU/IPIl, the :Ul'Cr.ltt Ql"rier Arlt R"J'd/. rwo cruisers a.nd II destroyers. II "';IS corruna.nded by VlCe-AdnuraJ Sir james Somervillt. In df«t il b«a.m~ tht nu.in Bnosh force III the Wc::uern Mc:dJterrallem. whue Cunningl:ums Oeel ....';IS based in A1tx:a.ndru and occupied III that region. Apa.n from Itl other orders. Force H could bt w,'ilche-d to the AlbnllC If nc:c:dc:d, a.nd It played a dec:1sh'C' pa.n In che hum for the &smolrrk in 19-\ I.
The British Pacific Fleet [n late 19-\-\ ",th the Juhan fleet surrendered a.nd thc Gcrnun surface' c/fort largely dCSll'Oy<'tl, th.. British Jtt..mptM ~ rcnLrn to the Pa.clfic trom which thl1' hOld bo:CII drin'n in 19-\1-2.A ncw British PJcific FI....t \\'JS form«lundcr Sir Uruce Fraser. Initially It W:l$ alIocatcd fi\'\,' fll....'"t aircrafi c:a.rrie'rs. two battlc'ship!', nine cruisers and 22 dc:stro)'C'rs. ThiS was a \"tT)' po.....erful force by ptl....·lQUS Dnllih standards. but it was small by !\"Cent
At home. the CO;lSU and seas around Briain ....'C're divided into area commands, each headed by an acbmral and usually ....,th SC"\-eraI subcomnunds. An a.rea c:omm;mder was responsible for the operation of naval harbour crafi.loc:al defence against raids and ilwasion. ;lnti-E-boal warf:lre: and COn\'O)' C:SC:Ort. dockyards and buudmg shps III the area. the examination of shipping. training bases. and mineswtcpmg. Tht l'ornll1omh Comnu.nd was one of the oldest in existenc~. Its area included most of the eastern English Channel. and it shared with the Dover Command th~ T('Sponsibility for sca hnks \\ith France at thc btj,,"l-nnmg of Ihe war. It:; lim wartime comnu.nder-in-
srnps
Ius Slory as Tht Pwtmtou/It I...ntm. The: Non:: CoIlltlUnd ......as :mother ,UlCIent one, ubng lIS name: from an anchorage in the Thames Estuary where f1eelS of sa.iling ships used to assemblc:. It .....as somc:whal reduced in area in .....a.n:imt, having lou ternlOry 10 both Rosytb a.nd [)oo.TT. The Sheerness sub-c:OlllIlUnd included Ih( doc:kprd at the momh of the Med.....:ly. md the brger dQd:prd at Chatham was allother COll1l1u.nd.lts largest sub-c:ommand .....: u at H;lI'\\"h. which carried out a great deal of m.incswecping :lnd oper.llrd nu.llY ofth~ ships .....hich <"SCorted con\'O)"5 along the cast C[);lSt of England. It h;,id lU:arly 300 ships at its peak at the time of D-D1)'. including 27 dcsuoyc~, 33 coasul fOTCl'S craft based :II FelixslOwe :lnd 80 landing cra.ft. Gn-at Yarmouth was 1nOlher sub-command, sct up in July 19-\0. It operaled coasul forces and minesweepers, protected <:011\'0)"5 &om aIr rauh and c:a.rried out ;ur-sca n'$Cue opt"rations to ~\'C'
;urllYn. Th~1\" W~I\" snu!ll"r sub-couul'Unds at Southe-nd. Bnghtlingsca. Grimsb)· and on the RI\U HumOO. The command mduded SC\"CT.l1 important r:r.unlng bases Including IWyrll Art/".. al Skegnl'SS and thl" P.urol Sl"rvicl" dt>pOC at lowcstofi. AU personnel basl"d In london W~n:' nominally attached to HMS PmlbroW IV under a n:'UadnuraJ. whll~ thousands of men could bl" found in HMS Pnnbrokt.lhe n.wal barraeks at Chatham. at any gin'n momenl. lI In comrast the Dover COl1m~I1U was focused on mon:' specific tasks. though these \·;aried over the yeaTS. II ""'liS set up llndl"r Bl"rtr:lrll RaJllS
Western Approaches W<'Stcrn Approaches was perhaps the IllOSt div.. TSl" cOlllmand in th.. navy. It \~ doctndtd fmm th.. old Plymouth Command and 31 Ihe
'Or#:-
0IIlltl«V5 •
~-ned
.
~T\.NCl5
......
~.".,
~OSYTH
...
__ ........
•
01_
___"--IT __
WUTVlN ~
._- -<-
--;-~>.~:-,--,;<j .'t:':l
' ,..
",.
.......
conunaDds ..I the
beclnning of tJw ....r •• nd
RAF
CouW <:onuno.d J:roup bounduift.
stan of the \\'lIr it lIlciuded th.. ecaS! horn
south~\\"a(
England
10
thl."
Finh orClrde.At the bt'gtnnlllg of 194\ Iht headqumers nlO\'c.'d hom Plymouth to llV..rpool I\"fltcling the increased importance of the Batd.. of the Atlantic. A new PlYlllouth Command w;u S('t up. including the are:J SQulh of the Brmol Ch:Jnncl. The nOrlh-west coast of Scotland was taken O\'er from th.. Rosyth Command. The COlllllland includ....d :ICon'S ofships for convoy escort. but it also had n'SponSlbihty for all naval activIty on Ihe west coast of Britain north of Ihe Bristol Chann..!. In 1944 it had no fewer than 25 ~·-.v
ro/j~
(
~:\,.':":.*.I(::e,lr
r
\\
'-~''''"''',.~ \'" ~_::_:::__~_,~it~~1
.-
~
SOIml_
IT IAn
'ND'II
ITAr'ON
I ..c""r--I--.J)L'~:-~'",:"~.+~-~-·-~-Pc'--t-r~",,'c"c.:'O"C1ti~ _"-P'
f_-"..
'6C".e .u_
r
The g,'e...,... co.nrnandl in \941.
.._<_
.- .......
_.. -- ~"JI~~~~~t'~~I---- ---0--
Gr.mth<>m. whom CUllmngham a1Jed 'Uut moll bri1fun1 and cap.1bk officer", Grandum took comnund of tht PIuJdJ.t, but weh disruption could dlsonem:uc
Lake. who 'had all ,he qu.tliries for
hiS
post;
good !.Caman, an
Indefatigable "','orker.
-- ---- r~
...
~
commands in warti~. :and most ....~re qualified ~grW officcn. Unusuilly for the- onK'. 51( Max Honon employed a ,,"onun fbg Iieuterum. K2)' Halbnn. of lrish-Amcricn I»ckground.
- . ...,
The admiral's bo-idp of.
~
~VeWi
ballHship.
SM hlld immlnSt P"~ ilI1d J/lVr,li,-jJirt lind Itnn' go' lilli/rd. A ""y good mixn, ilI1d r~lUl/ly (hllnni"g loAdmir,,1s tllld filrings. SM htld $(I mU(h IIl(J Il"d (horm of mOil/If'!" Ihal she uw able 1;1 J,lIlldl, illlJHllimr smi"r r1Jitm mU(h mlln' d[tttil'tly Ill"" ,,"y 11I"le jUllior t:?f!i«r (ould IIIIVI' dOllr."
All the ...dlllinis had a sccrcury. who was a senior officer of the admimstnn~"C branch of the navy - a !'aynwur Capuin in the cue of a commandcr·in-chicf. :md U$ually a Pay~er-Conunandcr for a
,.~
Cl
'I»..
'<0.
I
_.-
_.-- -- -- -- --- --- ----
The cwpniWlt.ion of the H.ff or dw
8ritioh Pacific FlHt
in 194.-S.
34
Churchill's Navy
The _pal flap
junior 8.tg offict'r.The upt;Un of me Reel w.u brgdy I't'SpOnslbk for maimclUoce. me M:tSter of the R~l for IUviguion. Other suff offic~
uMd by eM uvy
...."ere taken on as Ihe new expanded. The lUff 31 W~('rn Appl'O;lch~ num~nod about ;II chouSMId by th(' time Honon look comnlVld. It W1S headed by a commodore and divided Into Opcntions.
for~1 pu~.;n
addition
10
the
Administration and Material. The- Briwh P:u:ific Reel ~ founded in 1944 had one of the mOSI developed suITs oftht' time, including four
leuen .00 numenW
of lh.e ......ma1 code.
SPECIAL FLAGS USeD IN NAVAL SIGNALLING.
AEAOrtANE
RAG
,,"u. 'lAG
IUD flAG
SCAnN
AHfAD
RAG
divi5ions with 11 offictn duling with PLans, mra: with Tl"lIde. !Ie\'C:ll with Penonncl wd nine with Material and Maintenance.'" In addition to his saff officen. m adrrunl n«
3 Communications and Intelligence Commumcauo" has always b«tl viw in 1U\':lI warf",rc, whether tletk...uy in battle or in directing the stntl:glc openoons of fl«ts and convoys. It was morc imporunt dun C\~r in 1939-45, becnne of the gi<XW. JI
RAG
Visual Signals SQt)A[)AON
AffIfl.P"\ATlVE
OUTlI.OTIEA
RAG
DIVISION 'lAG
Am,N flAG
fISHu'Y
.." 'no cou.,' " RAG
NEGATIVE
,lAG
""
fLOnLLA
'lAG
STAll·
10"'''0 'LAG STATION-
ING 'lAG
SUa-DIVISION
RAG
....TT1.f.SHtr·
SUIHAAlNIE
flAG
'lAG
In bame and on nunoc:uvres, the navy InditionaUy prcferR"d 10 use visoul signals for gIVing ordel"S and inter-shIp communication. Signal lbgs wcrt: the most common, using ,I SCI of 26 letter flags, 10 numenls, 26 SpeCl;Iy, but it was more difficult in othl."r situations. A battle [leN was n'btivdy compact, and rnanntd by highly (rained personnel in peacetime. A wanime convO)' might be ~pread over fluny miles in bad visibility ",nd it Iud \"Cry few fully tnined signallers, so other means We'R' necessary. Anolher form of \;stu.! sign.illing ....'as by bmp using Morse: code:. This was useful for m.nsmitting lon~r SlgrWs which ....~R' not n«<'SUnly In the sundml. ,ode' book. It could be tnmmintd .slowty 10 oUIow for ~rtialIy trained sigtU1lers. The navy also Iud senuphoR' ava.ibbk This could be sent by a nun U$lng flap. or by a serrulphoR' nudune 6ued on luger ships; it "'as 1'1IIf'n in snulkr shi{K.
The World Wide Communication System
""C, 'lAG BLUE
AffiRMATIVE
"'" flAG
PRU1AMTTYE====
UNION
flAG
T~
Adnun.lty nccdc:d '" world-wuk S}"$tem 10 cOJlUllurucale both ope:l'1IItlolU! orders to naval bues round the ....urld md to slups at sea. Th(' Admiralty building was equipped \vilh brge radIO masu on It:! roof to send ",nd rccel\"C' 1IICS$;lgt."S. and shore Stltlons were accessible by Iandline and teleprinreT. The world was dIvided into sea ",rea! ",nd Ihl." British Empire was extensive enough to provide a tr:lnsmimng Slation in each - Colombo for mOSt of the Indian Ocean, Dc:rllluw for Ihe Ca.ribbeafl and west-central Atbnnc, and the Falkland adminisrl'1lllh~and
lsl.a.nds for the South "mntic, for example. Hundreds or thousands of radIO rt'IC$Sagd ....~re sent out from sUllons su,h as Simonst(».\T1 in South
-
-
,
W-
M
I
.....
)
..
~
"~ t+"7"-~~f--+--~ 5
Q
-,-
--.~-
•
A&ic.. ",,~ry month, with the btest Adnur.alty orden md infornucou 10 shIps at SC1l - me Area Bn:wicsr. whIch ;ill ~lIPS in 1M nogion listt'11C'd 10." Adnur;llt}, officWs ....~f\" WMnffi not 10 !IOI\"l: fTIC'»
tm-
,-.
,-..
~.-
---w
NU
----
, "'*\r
I
';
I
t
-
Radio Telephony
'1"he Adm;nJcy
RIT or \Vlce telephony bca.mc mcn:
...dio broadc&J.I
Ihe srStl:m bec;lIl1C \TTY crowded with routine m~ and nun)' ~lauon~ Iud
(0 tr.mSl1ll1 almost continuously on sc...t'r:l1 "':I.VClt'llgths.
Wireless Telegraphy When USlOg radiO. Ihe navy still preferft'd wirt'icss lekgnphy
usmg
~ IT).
Mo~
codC'. :11 Ihe bcgmnmg of Ihe war. The a!tcrtun\1;:. OO'Q (tic-phony (R/T) using \'01(:(', W;lS dilficult 10 keep !\"COrds of and ....'3S '''n1.'fi! ....ith SUSpiCIon. Fi\'r difl"~nt f~ucncy ~ds ....'l:.'K' powblc :II this time. VLF or \'l:.'f)' low frequC'1lC)' "''as bdO'w 30 kilocycles. [I \\~ th(' only one tlut could be uSl:d to communiate ...."ith subnurincs undC"nAOIItC"r. LF or 10\\' f~ut'ncy (JO-JOO Idloc)"dcs) was common :u the begmmng of thC" w;u. [[$ lOInS'" was ~hon but suffiCient for Ihe opt'lOItions Ih
benme Ihe mosl common in Ihe COUfSC of Ihe .....u.VHF or "cry hIgh ~uency. on Ihe other h
5
TIlt Ir
W2S
whtn officlM1 ulked 100 mu<:h. FunhC'fIlWrt,
'The diffC'fing K<:enlli of I'.\V $lgJI
anti ia 19-42,
bJ"..... 8riti"'" .....
_ ... pool.ed. -~"
36
Churchill's Navy
In the lTadltJoNlsmse of the ICTlll. III Wgc IlUlllben. II ...;IS intendtd 10 xquin: miliury mleU~e on bduIf of the thI't'l." seT\"ICCS. but bmo.'t'C'T1 the ....'aI'S lIS ~ w;as less dun dut n«ded to run a single desm:rtn III the Home Fkn. so II dld tlOI ha>.~ a hugt' nl."lwork of agrnts when .....a r broke OUi. ThIS ....':IS the onJy kind of work dut the Foreign OfficI.' regarded JS·inteUigence'.lts routine ....ork im'OI\"ed diplonuts :acquiring infomution in tht counuy they were in by reading nl."\\'Sf'a~n, pe-fSOllai visits and u1king to mdividuals in a normal w:ly. The Intl."lligcnn· canummily also indudC'd thl." c;o..~rnment Code and Cyphl':r Cenm: which W:lS to pro....e crucw ill tlie war. and the InduStrial Imdlib'l."IlCe Centre which colll':ctl':d infornunon on the opacities of Gernun indunry. The Special Ope-ntions Executi\l: or SOE "-':IS set up after thl': Edl of France to co-opente with resIStance lllO\'l:lllemS in occupied Euro~ and that. too. provided a 50IlTCe of Imdbgcnce. JS well JS tncoon ....,th the omer SCIVICCS. The thltt se....ices each had inu~Jh~nce dep,1.rUnenlS for their specuh5ed purposes. and they lended to use a much broader definition of mteUIgt'nce. mdudlng SImple low-grade mfofllution. which WJS obuilUbie hom newspolpen. go'>'l:rnmem n:llemenlS and other pubbc soun:es, Accordmg 10 an officer who se....~ m the N~\'ai Intelligence J)qumllem m the 1920s. The moK \'aiw.bIe infomution is ~Idom secret:. The dlfficuhy IS thai people seldom l't"aI.tse lIS \'aiue',
A ..dio ope"'lOr On board a
for COllllllunicat;on wilh outlying ships, and a Ingh &equcncy one for conullunicatioll betwecn senior officers. The auxiliary w;tve was 'an allernative acnon mtc:rcolluIlUrUc;ltion and manoeuvring circuit for cruisers and abo\-e'. The fla~hlp also kept watch on the RAF reconruissance W;l\'C," and aira:lfi canien on :I striking force wave. In COIl\'O)'S by the: nuddlc of the war. all warships listened to the ;m,a
brwdasl.1bey also bSl:cned fO the COf\\uy Rrr wa...e. nomWly on a Ioudspeakcr cxcqx when cn.rn, ,,~ an mrm.. Escort oonunmden had
The Intelligence Services ~rt in the "aT. although for allllOY ckcacks followmg It the public h:ld a lluskadmg mlp~ion of the role of 5pit'S and 3 b'C.'nts. This ....~ partly due to Churchlll$ own :lecount, n,t &ClmJ lI'Qrld IV"r. wriuell at lime when the eJ(ttlll of l'3dio iJ1ldh~nee could nOI be revealed. Thl." Brlllsh premonilion of th~' Gl."rman illv:lsioll of Russia. for txalllplt, W;l5 atmhuted to 'onl." of our mosc truSIl:d soun:~"S·. Many peapll." took this to ml."an J spy. but in fact it was thl': decodmg of l."nl."lIly signals." In I3ritloin. MIS was R'Sponsiblt for Iml':rrul Sl':CUnt)' and counteraplOlub":. Th~' Forelgtl Office rom the Sc.-<:n:1 (or SP«W) Imdligl':nct Strvil':t. also known JS M 16. ThIS was the only ckpartllll."nt that uo;ed spies.
ImeUIgl:nce w:q (0 pby an essential th~
their HWUlon of Nol""''2Y :uld Dennurk. 1bcK w~n: reportS from the l3~itish embassy m Stockholm, hom a secret foreIgn Office source IIlside Germany. from Ihe American am~or in Copenhagen ~nd from ph<Xognphlc l'l.'l."onlUlSS:Ince all pointing in the same dil'l:(:tion.·' The failure 10 put these repom together, plus a naval belief that an inv)Sion on Ihi5 scale was impossible without control of the sc~.led directly to the lint b"l't'at .....Illed defeat of !lu.' \var......ftcr that the JI05ition \\':IS much impl'O\'l:d: intelligence was assessed and shal'l.-d much bencr. and othcr and more revealing sources came into pby, From 1942 therc "''as much sturmg of intellIgence at all k.~k with the American ser....ices.
The Organisation of Naval Intelligence The N~....~I Intclhgt'llCe Dcpamnent (NID) ""':IS formed btl." in the nilll."leemh cnuury. nuinly to collect ~IC d:r.u on fon:lgn ruvies uncia the ·t'o\'OopOW'.'f surnhrd'. The Roy:1I Nn')' ....':IS to be nuinuined al the 11."\'1:1 of the next two brgat combmedo:uld obviOusly it had to kno..... what other IUvies had. Unnl WII\Slon Churchill formed the n:.I\;U SI2ff III 1912. and it became lruly dfecti\l: in 1917.lhe NID prcl"/I(icd the nu.m body of 1U\'ai officen al Ihe Adnunlly and "-'Zli used for OIher uslcs. bul afttr thai il was reYrlcled to mtelhgence dUDes.The depanmclII ....':IS sall one of Ihe brgest at thl." .....dmiralty. II tmpl~'Cd 24 na\'21 offic'.'l"$ and 42 civtll:lns III June 1939. and 291 na\"l officers ill Jun'.' 1944." Its duties still mcluded many matten thn wen: qUill." rouumo and nory far from any cloak-anti-dagger associations. It was resporlSlble for supervising 113v:1l att3chC:"S, advising on interpretl."~. posul cell«)~hip, and producing geographlc~J handbooks for v:lriOllS countnes. Licutenalll Jama Callaghan, a f"lUre prime ministcr. edited one on Japan. wllhoUI any previous knowledge of the coum..y. The Director of Navallmelhgence for the fint half of the war was
37
The Structure of Naval Power
.,.
R~ar-Admiral
(later Admiral) John Godfrey, who had distinguished hilll5elf in sraff ""'(Irk in the First World War and cOllullanded the baulecruiscr Rqmur from 1936-9. His :assistant was Commander Ian Fleming RNVR and he was a model for'M' ill the James Bond books. with his 'keen sailor's face', a hou:;(" full of naval prints and relics. with stories of 'battles, tornadoes, bizarre happenings, courts-martial, eccentric officers, neatly worded signals'. Despite his great success in ll;"viralising nav:tl intelligence, Godfu:y \v:ts too outspokell 10 win favour. After dashes with Churchill he \v:tS removed in 1942 and beame the only admiral not to be honoured for war services. He was ll;"pbced by Ihe more amenable Caprain Edmund Rushbrooke, Another distinguished officer \v:tS the barrister Ewen Montague, who masterminded the 'Man who Never Wa!.' deception in which a body bearing papers W1tS left in Ihe sea off neutral Spain to mislead the Germ;uu that the next inv:tSion would be of the Greek islands. nm Sicily. RNVR officers were regarded as suitable for intelligence work; they generally had good. broad education and enquiring minds, which were not encouraged in regular naval officers of the day.
ue
U~IUS ........
0/'
\
O"'C~
U ..... S.. ,.T(.$
IIIC1lvIU
LI.-..,.
, .. P l/ ..../. I ".p; J l P l/',,,/'
o l/' ... /., 4 KI'.
,I "" llO. '/0-111' 0/'.
1939
TRrSAl.
"AOII
I"IIIG. .. IIIIU
"IIIIAl
L....,....
1 f·,uII/.O/.
Above; RtarAdminl John
Godfft,y •• Chi.. f
Sources of Intelligence
'''"$'''''[115
Espionage in the mditiona.! sense played a small pan in die Sc.'Cond World War compared with the Cold War th.at fOllowed it.There wl:re few highly placed agent'! close 10 the centre of the rtspeeti~ government'l. It was less ofan ideologic:l1 ~ than the Cold War. It was much shoner, with less time 10 sel up netwOrks. All the govemment'l concerned had fUll .....":J.rtime P'O'~ which could exclude- :;uspecled persons from the sensitiw positions. am;1 they used these PQ\\"C1"5 with v;rying degrees of ruthlessness, Vnlike the Cold War there was practically no regular conununiolion bem=u the opposing sides. so it \vas very difficult to get information OUt. and virtually impossible to defect if things went wrong.The spy still had his role, but he or she was not th~ main source of naval intelligence_ [n general. they ~re agents ncar the ports ill enemy-held terrilory, such as Brest and lorient in France and llWIy Norv.~ pons. Equipped with secret radios, they could ttansmit valwble inforl11:ltion on shipping Il1O\'l:'ments. Another source was prisoners of~, and SUbsQlIltia! numbers were caprured from V-boot'l during th~ Battle of the Atlantic. At first the Adnllralty was sceptical of their value. It used reports on their inlerrogation as indicators of morale in the V-boat service. but it discounted cbims that boot'! could diVl: to 600 feet or could be n:fueDcd at sea as mere boosting. From 1942 it began to take them more seriou~ly and planted ~tool pigeons or used microphonC$ 10 ov~rh~ar con\"t''I''sations between prisoners. Caprured or sunken vasek could aho provide information of great value. British agent'l purchased the wreck
, "." l/.·.,/,
of the C"!! SfW off Montevideo to find OUI more about her carly radar. Several V-boot'l \WI'\' oprured including U·570, which subsequently w:as operated as HMS Grap1l. Anti-submarine crews were carefuUy mined in mock-ups in c~ Lhe opportunity ofcapture should ever arise. Airborne photo reconnaissance developed rapidly during the war - it was a photograph of Bergen which told the Admiralty that the Bismarrk had sailed on her famous mission in May 1941 - and il could be used to monitor progress in enemy shipyards as weD as the ltlO\'Cmellt of ships and the effectS of bombing. It was gencr.illy carried out by the RAF using f.ast
ofN.....
U(.l'VUs
, "u, ../.
J
J • • l/O·II/. I ..... v .. /~ 2lP V.. /f('''''SC(IU(1I5)
lI'-,,/,
, "'
Inldligenc.,.
lUi'''.
1./..../. 0/'
r
..",'u"" 010 LSc'.]
••• .... O • .c.... EOUI' .. I ...
19.5
BATTLE.
radio .... ulr........ of
d"troyron. from
193910 1945.
Spitfire or Mosquito aircraft, but the Fleet Air Arm operated some aircraft including a flight fiom Gibraltar, beca~ the government had assured the Spanish that the RAF would not operate from mere. By 1942 the btest camens could produce pholos from 30,000 feel at a sca.le of I:1O,OOO,and had a magazine of 500 exposuTC$. Nearly 3000 sorties ....'('fl. flown in 1943. although only a minority of these \~re for naval purposes. SevI:raI interpretation unit'! ....'ere SCt up. some speciafuing in 1Uv.J.! work."
Radio Intelligence Radio intelligence proved to be the mOSI fruitful source by far. It came in several different forms. Traffic Analysis orTA consi~ted of noting the volume and ongin of signals, A sudden increase, for example. might show that something was about to happen. Some basic codes might be understood, for example the V-boat'!' 'S-bar' (Morse .._ ..) meant the sighting of a convoy or target, An experienced listener could also identify Ihe MOl"$e operator, and hence his V-boat. by the characterislics of his tOllch on the hoy, At another leve! was radio direction finding. The German raetical SYSlem demanded a greal deal of signalling between the V-boots and their headquarters, using high frequency transmissions which eould be picked up anywhere. At the srart of the war the British had four Direction Finding (OF) Stations; by 1942 thtre were 19 at home and lllore than 50 abro~d. covering aU the ocean~." V-boats transmitted Oil a consum frequency. within the high frequency range, and refused to believe that their signals were being used for direction finding, so their
38
RighI: An RAF uria!
reconnaissance photograph showinglhe bauleship TirpilZ in
• No.......gi.n fjord.
system Tenuincd unch:mgcd throughout the w;oIr.A single station could only find a direction for ..aeh {r.lI1smi~ion. at leasl tWO were needed to
Below: An Enign'. coding machine.
get J. fix. al suilably varied angle'l', and preferably three or mon:o lnfortlution \vas tr.lllsmitted vcry quickly across the oce:.u1S 10 a cemral point in Uritlin, and the positions of many V-boats were established. Cl~ne» brought greater accuracy and High Frequency Direction Finding (HF/DF) insullatioru were put in lllany ships fmm 1941. to find V-boots cl~e to their convoy. Thl.'" third and most dramatic lc\'el ""s the
decode che ml"SSages ic SCnt, and by early 1941 chey were lar~..d y successful, chough wich some delays in the early period, There wali a blackoue from February 1942 when che Germans introduced a fourth rocor to the machine. but Illesliab-d were again being decoded from Duember thaI year, and conrinuing unci! the cnd of the war. The decoding wa~ more useful for the 11a\}' than other sen-ices_ Aircrafl tended to usc un-coded voice Illt"SSages. land IroopS kept in touch by mher means as far as possible. but ships needed regular radio conlaCl to find targelli or a\uid hazards. The decoding could gi\'e warning of ship 1II0velm:ms and 10ng-ICTm plans. but It was most JJ1Ulwdlatc1y useful in the Battle of th(" Atlantic. It allowed the Admiralty to follow thc formation of palrollines across the path of a con\"oy and takes Sleps to avoid ic. II w;u only when che Atlantic became coo crowded for this. for example in the renewed V~boat attack III March 19·0, that rhis laCl;c failed. !lut ;t was balanced by rhe faCl thaI Ihe Germans, too. unknown to Ihe Allies, \\l.'re able to break codt'S. W!wn COllVOY HX229
was re-routed to avoid the pacrol line R,wbgr'!f in March 1943, the Germans knew :lboUI it :lnd che V-bo:llli were shifted in order 10 Counter it. According co N:l\':I1 Inlelligence it was difficult 10 understand this 'without assunung compromise', bue thl' war had ended before the eXCent of Germ:1.Il decoding w:u re:lli~ed. 0'
The Submarine Tracking Room and the Battle of the Atlantic Ali well as obUining intelligence. ic h:ld 10 be JSSc~!iCd and imerpreced. For general purposes. Ihe Admiral!}' sel up chI' Oper.nionallmel1igence Centre to do this in 1939. Mort" specifiully, the Subnl;lrine Tr.tcking Room in che Admiralty de:llt wich the V-boac \\':Ir.lt was headed by a b:lrrister, C:lpuin Rodger Winn RNVR. and ic was generally felt that lawye-TS, with thdr e-xpe-rience of aSSl."Ssing <'vidence, were ideal for this role. Na\".:J1 officers found ic too difficult to c:on!ndict their superiors and often had coo many preconcei\'ed ideas, blll accourltanlli were found useful for che more dec:lik'd work. The small SC
SlIbllUmnl" Report. ediced by another lawyer. Each issue contained
39
The Structure of Naval Power
regular fcawrt'S on Ihe laH.'St British and German technoIOb,,)'. reports of individual convoys and of coastal command activity. It started \vith a \~ry p"rc"pti\"" =sm"nt of the current position largely p,""pa,""d by Winn and his staff, In May 1943 it assessed correctly that dte turning poim in Ihe Battle of the Atlantic had been reachcd.
COlllparison with GCrlllany The German§ were adept at the matheJTL:ltical ta§k of dl'Coding Allied radio messages, allowing them to find COll\'OYS in the Atlamic. Otherv."ise, their sources of intelligence were far fcwcr. The nature of the V-boat war made it very unusual for them to take prisoners or capture ships. There were fc"Wer occupied territories where they could deploy agenu.ln addition, the Nazi syslem did not foster the cnquiring mind. As a l't'§ult, the Germans had sevenl spectacular and crucial failum of intelligence. They refused to consider the possibility that the Briti§h had eentimetric ndar, were using HF/DF at sea, or could decode their Enigma messages. The§<' mistakes probably C()§t th"m th" Oattk of the Atlantic and, eventually, the war.
4 The Arts of the Seaman Deck Seamanship E\'ery seaman had to learn th.' use of rop.'S, though it was far k-ss centnl to his duty than it had becn in the days of sail. Hc knew how to tie a bowline to put a loop in the end of the rope. a clove hitch to attach a rope to a fixed object, and man)' other ways of handling rope. He ne\'er used the term knot except to describe a specific opcntion such ;u a \1'3.11 knot - he talked about bends and hitches, the fonner used to attach two ropes together, the latter to attach a rope to an object. He had learned something about more elaborate ways of treating rope by splicing or forming knou in the end and he ....'3$ used to lllore difficult work with wire, which formed a great part of the standing rigging on modern §hips. He knew how to throw a mooring line ;uhore and to tie the ship up to a shore mooring or a buoy. The $Calllan learm,d how to raise and lower the ship's boats using cranes and davits. to row them and to handle them under sail and power. He could Sleer a boat or a ship according to order, using the compass or a fixed point on land, A fully experienced $Calllan knew a little about navigation in taking soundings by casting the lead. and to take readings from the ship's log. But the seaman of the 10....'er duk, despite his desire for independence and his great skill at improvisation, was used 10 taking orders and did most of his seamanship under the direction of his officers, Only Ihey knew the complex business of handling a big ship, and how to set a course (as distinct from steering one) through a narrow channel or OV('r the open ocean.
The Bridge and the Chart Room British officers generally fa\'()Ured a bridge that \\'3$ open to the wind and the weather. They argued that il allowed them 10 spot sudden
changes in the wind. and 10 ha\'e a good view during an aircr.lli: attack. The bridge was usually situated forv.'ard at the highest pari of the superstructure to gi\~ a good view, both on deck and outboard. Too far forv.'ard. however. and il would suffer from breaking leas as happened with some American desrroyers."The main part, the compass platform, ....'as usually quite srmll. for it did nOt ha\~ the win~ which merchant ship officers uled for docking on one side or the other. Some frigates had wings carrying light anti-aircnft guns. Capital ships had more than one bridge. with a lower one for the admiral. An older ~hip like the Hood had mOSt of the bridge facilities in a spotting tOp in the nust, but Ihe most recent trend was to simplifY the bridge strucmre to avoid creating shot tnps. The central platform on the btidb'C wa5 scaled off with a low partition, and only officcrs and mcn on duty would emer it, Its deck was wooden to prevent compass deviation_ In the centre was the main compass, situated a\vay from any iron. Forv.'ard of that was a Pc!orus, high enough 10 look over the bulkhcads and used for taking bearings on objects or ships. There were wooden chairs for the captain and Ihe officer of the watch, and in a major \\'arship Ihere \vas a captain's sighl on each side, used to indicate the bearing of a target to the guns. Some ships had a hooded table, covered with giass to allow the study of a chart in bad weather. but elabonte plotting or navigation was donc in a separate chan room nearby, Round the §ides of the bridg.. Were voice pipes to communicate with the steering, engine room and the opentors of the armament. There were boxes for \-arious publications such as the signal books. From this position. the ship would be controlled in ordinary service. in exercises and in battle, The chart room W;lS as dose 10 the bridge as the geography of the ship allo.....'Cd but sometimes a deck 10\\'er in srllallet ships, It was fitted with a tablc large enough to hold a full-size chart, which measured 41 x 27M inches and drawers for many more charts below, It had bookshelves for navigational publications, and a couch for the navigator to snatch somc rest during long spells when he had to be available,
Helm and Engine Orders Sleering the ship was a job for an experienced rating_ All able seamen were assumed to be capable of doing iI, but in action or in difficult I1Unoeuvres a senior rating, the quartcrm;uter or coxswain, would takc over. On m()§t ships the hell1lilllan \\'3$ stationed at least one deck below th.' bridge, where he was relatively safe from fire, If he had a view ouuide, it might be through a periscope or mirrors and it was intended to let him see if the ship was swinging slightly, not to let him make decisions, which were the prerogative of the officers on the bridge. The helmsman might be ordered to steer on a particular compass COUtsC. He would bring the 'lubber's line', a mark on the compass bowl that represented the heading of the ship, onto the approptiate number on the compass rose. If the course was to be used for some timc, it \vas chalked on a blackboard ahead of him, He might be ordered to turn the helm to a particular angie, for example 'port 20' and he would watch an indicator 10 see that he got it right, He might be ordered to use the full angie of rudder of abom 35 degrees, though 'hard a port' was obsolete, and full rudder \\':l§ only u§ed in emergency.
-<
'\ ,! fit. 1
i
C/
fit. 2
1owIM . . . . 1IIM
f_t .... ""'1
ExAmple. of Ibe ....pework thai every llean.an had 10 learn.
Rg.2
40
Opposite
Churchill's Navy
abo,~:
Method of communicating orden from the
bridge 10 Ihe helm.man and engine room.
Opposile
~Iow:
The nav'gating officer of .he
balde,hip RNltt"t
The helmslIlan might be given .he Ord"l 'sleady' which meant to keep the ship on the course it W25 on at that moment. and to stop her swinging if neCess,ary This often involvt!
chart, logbook
detailed control of speed. In some ships this was oper.ltl."d by a lc\'l."r as with the engine room telegr.lph, in others the oper.ltor had to wind a
and various
handk to thl' appropriate speed.
a, work with
in ••rumen15.
Below:The bridge
Ship Handling
up'.;"" lighl 10
Onen warships had to anchor where there was llOt a suitabk wharf or mooring buoy. A ship usually anchored by Sleering directly into the current and SlOpping engines over the spot whert' the anchor was to be dropped.!'u a rule of thumb, a ship needed to let OUt chain equal to at least thrt'e times the depth of water she was in at high tide. The cable \val; paid out slowly as the ship mowd astern, in orocr to prevenl it piling up on the bottom. and was fixed on the capstm once the right amount W
the left.
might give the ship a hUb'C turning circle as the tide changed. Two
of Ihe cruiser
SJltffitill showing
office... and lookouts, with the
con,p." behind thelTl, and ....ke pi ..... and Ihe
anchors could be laid out to counteraCl this, bur there was a danger thllt their cables might heconw twisted as the ship swung. A swivel could be awched to the cables to pren~m this. Giving instruclions on bringing a ship imo a mooring, whether II quay or a buoy, was rccOgtlised as the only task thllt the ClIptllin could not deleg:ate, for he w.IS expected to uke personal chafb'C of the manoeuvre. Some captains had commanded destroyers in mid-career and had kept in practice, but a gunnery officer such as ROT)' O'Conor had ne\"t:r done this kind of scamanship since he was in chargl." of a boat as a midshipman. He took advice from AdmiT:l1 Jack Tovey, to: N~ M ill a IrUrT}' (b) Nf'VI'r M praud M W'Irell JriglrlTfted, use fi'/1 speed
(a)
But he still made rnisC
Any manoeuvre had to be planned well in advance,
becau~
everything moved slowly. Engine orons Wl'rc relayed by voice pipe to the telegraph opeT:ltor in the wheelhouse below the bridge, who then sent them by engine telegT:lph to the engine room. There, throttles had to be opened or closed as quickly as possible, Steering Orol'rs went direcl to the helmsman by voice pipe, but [here \val; a time lag before thl." ship began to turn, especially at low speeds. Captains could Il~ mgs in the major nava.l porn, but tlll'SC were nOI alWt'l7ri.\.~1 to approach an anchorage \vith a strong beam wind; as way is reduced, the \'CSSC1 \vill try to turn to \vindwaro.A cruiser with a ffitwler bow will tend to do the opposite.''' When conting alongside a wall, the capC
The Structure of Naval Power
Troup j}1\-e det;ukd lIIstruclions for mooring up at llIdlvldual buoys in Gr:lIld Harbour, Malia. It wu uotJuSllhal Ihc approach wa~ difficult with sharp Iurns and variable wllld~; the harbour is like an amphItheatre and the whole of Malt<'W society might be wal(hlllg a5 the fieel came in. More than one ct:lcbr:It\'d naval feud \vas st::rorted or fuelled by ill(idents 1II Gl':lnd Hnbour.The approach to bUO)"li 11 and 11 A off the nan.l hospital .lIt l3ighi W:iS difficull beCll~ of Ihe sharp lurn inside the harbour entl1llncc. Accordmg 10 Troup. the ttsk .. . ~ol~ difjicN/r,/« il S«HU llull
if 1M JIlrp grxs pr mOlljlt
$l~-UI:l)' fltmjde the Mral.-u'lltT, she u,1I
10 ",am/am
be ~'W ''''' jur u4rm lhe buUff
art rttJ(1mJ • "'" litis 1,1 IIOl Itou' 1/ ,,'Orb our. Allllull is rt'luirtd iJ 10 rtdutr spttd
w,,,
For the :lctwl mooring to a 000)'. il was usuaDy n«es.uJ'y to Knd men :In...ad in one of the shlp's boats.
Count is shapnI ~ilUf 1M wind Of' luk.for tht ""or. kffping il "" W _ mit
used 10 determme deplh. but mostly ruvig;ttors had to n'ly on methods Ihal had been in usc ~ince Ihl' ninl'leemh cenNry and earlIer. Accurate navigation was as lI11porum :IS it had evcr been in avoiding the hazanl:s of the Ka. bm new uses wt're found during Ihe war. It was often neassary for an escon 10 find a comV)' III lIud-Atlantic.or to direct ships or aircnfi: onlO a suspC'Cted V-boat. In amphIbious ...." rf..re. it W:iS viul to find the nght !pO( on the righl beach if the bnding pWI .....:is not 10 be put in disarny. E~'C"f)' dJip. down 10 a tlutt-nun bndmg cnfi:. needed :II lea$! one na\'Jg;ttOl" who ....'ZS compt'tent :II the work in question.
mId fht rllble sluJ(kltd 0"."
If mooring alongside a w:ill or jetty. light ropes known as heaving lind wcre thrown firsl. Each had a hall of ropt' C1llcd a monk:cy'~ fur at Ihe end to make it II':I\T1 betlcr. Then Ihe lIlaln moormg lines ",-ere Muled ~hore and thc loops at their ends wcre put O\-er bolbrds. and the ship's crew tuulcd them ught. As w\:U as the.- IOpei :II the bow UKI $tern. a ship n~ ""''0 springs -Iina running from the bow to a poslOon ali: and lTum the stern 10 a po5Iuon forw:lI'd. to Pf"C"\'l:llI her rubbmg up and down the )Ctty "'1th the dunge oftidc.ln home porn the rise and fall of Ihe tide lud 10 be ulcn inco ;Kcoum and the ropes lud to be
slackened or tightened as rcqull"Cd.
The Navigator All officers of the execlllivc bl1llnch "''Ould qualify to uke charge of a watch on the blldgc and wert' exp«tcd to kllow a ccruin allioum of ruvigation. It was the defining skill whICh l<pal':lted $eMllen officers from the lesser breeds of thc enginullng and p3ym:aster bl1llnchcs, and from the Kamen of Ihe lo\\'l:r ekek. rng;ttion lud ,,",v 1IU111 runcnons.: to determine Ihe position oflhe ship at:l gnTn moment, and 10 find the best route 10 a dcsoruoon. lUtbr was onl}' JUSl begmning 10 be useful in ruvig;tOOfl, for ldcnnfymg land fearnres and ::I\'Oiding eoltrs.on m poor visibility. 1UdJ0 ruVlgarion aids wcre cOllung mto sen1ce md echo JOundmg could be
HOW A SHIP IS CONNED. STW\ED & DRIVEN .. __ +- ORD(RS rROM THE. 0.0 w_ - -
At the top of the: n:l.Vlg:ilDoruJ tree ....'l"re me officers who had done speci:l.list <me-YC:1r cou~ in the School of Navlg;anon n Ponsmoum. They bon: the leuC'r (N) against their n.unef in the Navy LiSI. ;l,nd fended to.serve In luge stups or in headquaners. At the other end ....ere the y;lChiSmCn of the Speci.a] Reserve who Iud nude ruvtpnon thelT hobby. In John Fernald's l:lErtn»'" Jrrmt Amtrita. the 1U\'igating officer :I. 'mud iqwmng yxhamm...the an of Navigation had almlCled
was
his imcTe'l.t
to
the exclUSion of almost C'\'U)' ocher aspect of ruval In conl~. the gn:al nujonr)' of rw.'1I officers had
knowl~ ... '"
Largely forgonm thar tughIy lechrucal educaaon at J)ntmouth ;md
repnkd llJ\'iption as a chore. Gortey Pun descnbes m RNVR rw.,ptor who 'more thJn :ioy IQ~-.I offic~ I hJ\~ C'\'tl met. rulIy did Io\'l" the !Ie) md C'\'tt)"thmg about II'."
A ship un be lU\'g.Jtc:d by Sleenng tOYo'afds a fixed object such as a buoy or a prominent faron: on shore; this ts moM common In natl'O'o\' dunnels whert' the ode docs n<X ha\~ much dT«t. h can be kept ;l.l ~ fixed be.lnng and dlsuncc from another ship. as .....hen fomung pan ofa llen or a rom,oy. In other cases. espcci.llly when our of ughr of bnd. a ship was navigated by orderUlg the helmsnun to follow a panieubr course on the comp~. ThIS coune: was not so easy for the naviptor to determine and he had to ben In mmd that the ship .....o uld hardly ever go In exactly the same direction as the compass cou~.lfhe was using a magnetic comp~ he had to make allow;lUces for variation caused by the earths magnetic field and dCVIatlon resulnng from melaUlc features in the ship itself. He had to allow for constantly changing tidal curn:n" pushing the slup one way or the other. and for strong winds which might push her Sideways.
Illstruments and Charts The basiC n~vigational instrument \o\'aS the compass. The magnetic \'~mon was used on the bridgt.-s of all ships and its needle pointed to nugnetic north. This of COUfSC was subject to magnetic vu~tion aud dc:vI.ltiOIl and In oceiin-going ships it was supplemented by the gyro comjnSS, which was based on the principle of the gyroscope:. Depth under the huD was found by usnng .I lead attached to a lme ~r the ude, usuaDy from a spcci.aI pbtform off me SIde of the slup. It was also powblc to do this by echo sounding - bouncing a 110"" offthe bottom of the ~ and musunng the time It took. The log was used to measun: the ~ of me ship and the dutance run through the watn" 0\'Cf a pcriod. Then \o\~ $C"\'Cf:lI types but the moM common ....';15 tr.ukd 0\-.:1" the stn"rl cku of the shlp's wake. An Impeller was turned by the ~n t of the water to gn~ a n:admg ofspecd and dutancT on a dial on the ships stern Over the' Pn:YlOUll century 2Ild a tulf, the Admiralty Hydrographic Dc-partment had produced charu of mOSt of the seas and e~a of rhe world. They Gille In thn:e nuin K;l\CS. urge-$C..Ie ont:s w~rt' used for crossing oceans and W~n: on the gnomomc proj«tion with lines oflongitude cotlW'rging towards the poles 50 that a straight hne drawn on the chart would give a gn:at cirde courst'. Medium-scale charts We're used for the brcad-and-buw:r work. They Ilsed Mernlor's projection in which the world was opened out to forlll a cylmder rather than a sphere, by stretching distancC'$ towards the poles and makmg the hnes of longitude appear paraDei. This meant that the same compass coune would apply across the whole art'a of the chart, but lhe naviptor had to n:member that the sa.le varied
43
The Structure of Naval Power
-------
_ur.m.l
from lOp to bollOrtl. For e-x.ullpk. In'bnd would Jppe-:l.r to Ix the sarn(' si~e as 130nwo on sueh J chart. but the fonner WJS 260 milt"'< long while the 1.1IIer, closer to lhe eqUJlor, was 600 rniks. SnIJJl\CJle cllulS wer" drJwn on th~' anumplJon dUI the world was n.n, and were used for lIldlVldual ports :lnd hJrbours. It \\'3$ very IIllport:ml to kttp charts up 10 rulle, e5pcri:illy 1II w;ulillle when I~\\ mindidds or WT("("ks IIUgbt :r.p~ar m-emlght. The na\·lg,mng offi("('r Iud :r. lIuJOr wk In addmg eor~elioM 10 his eluru.. b.tscd on mfornunon In the Wttk.ly Admir:r.11} OI:in's to Mannen. Iksi~ that. he kept numerous other Adllur:r.ll}' pubbc:r.nons Includmg lhe pilol: books foe die 1001 a~a :r.nd 11lG ofhghts and radio signah. For workmg on his ehnl, the IU\'igalor needC'd :r. sofl pene-II so thai his lines could be rubbed out, parallel rul~'n to uke Ixarlngs from the (ompus ros~"S IIlSCI on Ihe charr, a protraClor for c<'ruin angles, Jnd dividers for rtleasuring dislJncN based on lh~· lalll\ld~' marked on the side of the chart.
l::It:. •• _
-
Ocean Navigation For oceJn navigalion Iht' main 1001s w"('re the $C'xunt which ("ould ukl' J \'l'ry Kcurale ml'asuremenl of thl' Jngll' bl'(\,\"('l'n J ulnliJI body and lhe honzon. and lhe :r.!nunK \\ hich ga\T Ihe JlQ$lIlon of Ihl' sun, moon, pbnl'u and lhe most useful sU.n O\"('r lhe roune of J )"('u. He nl'edC'd an aceurale measurement of lime and for thiS he u5C'd J chronometer,
L
=....
----
_-
--_ .... -- -_ _ _.... -.m_ _
Coastal Navigation Channd Navlgauoll \\~ defined :r.s die naVlg;mon of a ship in 'rurrO\\ ("hanncls W1d1 d.angcn on both sid~ alKl in riven and harboun :r.nd their enmnces·.... In normal circumstllM;"C'$ a Ioal pilot nught be uken on to do this.. but die 'Imp's na\"lg;Ilor ~ to be able to suptn·~ the pOOt :r.nd to do It hUTlsclf If optnuona.l e-olKlrlions nWe it nccC$$Jr)'. Ewrbbshcd harboun w-en:' URWIy w-eD marked w1d1 00a)-s to ldennfy the ("hannels Jnd d.angcn. In lhe sundard Brilish system, a comc:r..l red or bbck buo)' IIurked Ihe surbmrd SIde of Ihe e-hamld as lhe mlp was elllering harbour. :r. Oat-lopped chequered red and white 0111' marked tile port. Others markcrl lhe dhoision of J channd, the ('d~"S of a sandoonk. wn:'cks ami \'JriOllS dangers. E~n wlthlll Urila!n there wen: \"JriJlions from port 10 pori Jlld thl'~ was no Illll\~nal world S)"Sll'm, 10 lhe 11J\'ig:llor nl'eded hiS ,hJrl Jnd pilot book. He al'>O ne~-dcd to be 3ware of loc:r.! ~'lJl.Jlions,
--
_ ,.......... owoo_.-
.
_----
ro_
.... - ..... _ - .... _
- --
--- ---
.._---- --- ----. ------
~-
- .... _ ---
.... _ -....-
"'
--
_
-._ ...-
--
When eros"rllg an OCl'all. a good lIa\'lgalor would nOl SImply work OUI the CQlllpass course which polnled lhe s}up directly Jl lhe dc1unanon. He kllew dUI lhe most efficienl roule was a greal Circle UKk. followmg a circle whose cenlre w~ III die cenln: of the- canh, This meanl plotllllg die roUlC on a chart wing the gnomonic proJC("tK)n m whICh the hiles of bllwde wen:' show :r.s cun'tS. and ch.angmg COUI'SC' slightly every f~' hours. This ....":r.s r:r.rt'ly pr:r.cu(":r.! 111 W":lrtillle and corwoys, for eXJmple. weT(' USUJlly roull'd to a\'Qld likely U-boats rather than on In Idl':r.!lrack from J navigation:r.1 polm of vtew. Out ofsighr of land, then: wen: two ways of determimng posllion. 011(' was by deJd reckoning, but lhlS had Cl'rlJin inaccuracil"S, e5pecially O\-er a long penod, and lhe navigator would IJk(' sights of thl' SUll, moon, pbll<"lS and surs whenever Ihe weJther permitled. Findmg lhe blitude W":r.s I}(II \'l:T)' difficult. I-Ie: used hiS Sl'XUm 10 uke J \-ery xcur:r.ll' me:r.su~mem of the sun's angle J!Jo"T the horiZOIl al noon. To lh.al he would .add Ihl' knowlI angk of lhe sun :r.ngk from Ihe eqWlOr to find Ius bUludc. longllude w~ :r.I\\'J)'S more difficull. The lU\oigalOr lIughl :r.Iso USl' an Jngle on the wn al , ome othC'l" dwl nOOIl, or die moon. Thu would bri\"(' only .. ~ngk posltlOll bne. bul he could c:r.kubll' thl' distance run SUlCe die noon J,lgnt to gt\-e J reasonably xcurate $CCond lint'. The
The S1aDdlo
SYSIrn>
on,••oylIp
i.. British ..... 1~rJ..
44
Churchill's Navy
preferred method \\'3li 10 uke the angles of lhrtt or mo~ sun. prefcr.ably
The Victualling Department
al twilight or dawn when the horilon "'"as abo \'lSibk. For cxh 51ghl he could usc IDe almanac 10 akuL.te the position of thc sur d1~ abo\.~
The VlClualling l)ql:utlll("lIt ....';1$ largely civilian mannro. excepl for a
the cM'th at tlut given moment. and Ius dlsuJlCc from dUoI position. WhKh ....'OlIld put hun on a circle on the~.With two S1gbCS he could nuke the circks inten::~ 10 gn\" ;I definite position. :md ""th three or four he could be moK' cnwn of 11..The cirdcs \\'n'l: ~ IQO brgr to plo\: on hIS ctun. so he would usc the rvun: St HLWI"C' UlIUC(:pl: nJnhod to K'blc lhem 10 his $iJlutl'd position and pIoIlhc-m fiom dul. With good VISibility and plenty of sights a good IU\.j~lor would mo.,.. theposltJOn w\thm a mile or so in the middle of the- ocnn.
interl'StS of du"" u~n. II had We m.ain usb: [he supply of pl'OVISJOIlS and
\Try U1u11
num~r
of IU\
dothlllg for the- 6~; the examinarion. S10rage and accouming of the stores Im'Ol\"ro; runmng \'ietwll.lllg )':ards a[ home and abl'O<\d: [he victualling )':ard cnfi suvice which look Stores ou[
[0
ships
In
the
doc:k),ud an:Zi; Ihe coolcing and bread-making arrangements of the 11~; and
[he: adnunrnr.mon of ships' alntenlS where: ~Ilon could buy W',lS hexlcd by the DlfUtor of
addi[lolUl food and small luxunes. II
Vicnulhng. and had divisions dc:.t.Iing with AdnunlSlr.ltJon, FilUllCe Jond Accoums. SlOclu and Supplles. IJhr OrganlS;luon. and Transport and Pcnonnel. Dunng "':arOlll(" II was responsible for a brgt' numbl:r ofloal dc:poG in 16 areas of the country.The Thatdum area, CO\Tnng
5 Logistics
PortSmouth. Iud 21 depocs alone. The cemnl depot "":IS al lXptford on Ihe Thames near London. There wen: :l.iso O\Tnt:as )":lJds In :ill the pIKes when: [he 1U"y opc'r:lte
A 'UVY,
IIIQR'
dUll othn- armed stTViccs. has to supply us men wnh all
the' llC'<"nl'lUa orhre. ~'n1 air in the case of sublTWlrincs.lhough it did nOl: tun: to be paid lOr. !Wlors:ll $e;l c:mflOt nornully supplcmcm ,heIr
w[
Indies and l'aOhC areas,"
Nornully ships' provisions
w~re
SUpphM by Ihe Ion! victualling
depotS. but if nc:ec:ss;l.ry Ih.. account:llli officer ofa ship C"ould buy food
dictli by ronging in wanirne or by trips to loc;)! shops:lt other limes. In
from other sources. either [hrough the N:ufi or direct from local
addLUon a fleet needs v:m quantitio orNel. i1I1Ullunitioll and s~re pUts
supphen. Officers' slcu':ards wen: u:lined lIl·nurkeung'. which
to suy opc'r:l.!ion:l.l. All this was [he respOllSlbdlty of Ihe Adnur:all)\ opt"r:aung through \"ariou~ a~m;iC$ Illosdy manned by civili;,"s.
1I1 thOS(' cbys IUealll bU)'IlIg plQ\'lSions ill local llurkelS, Officers wen: gh·..n SOllle lIlSlrUCnOn on how to acquin: provisions, Calrle. for example. were to ~ gi"en 48 hours rest before sbugh[ering, [hen killed by
humane mcthods.
The Messing System Older ships, and [hose smaller [h:ln cruisen, m05tly used the Stand:lrd Ra[ion and Messing Allowance S)'stl'm. The Admir:1lry supphc:d a proportion of thc food known as dlc Standard Ralion, and p:lid MessingAllowance [() each mess. so [hat i[ wu able to food 10 a certain extent. Thl'
llless
orgam~c iu
prepared itS food and look
Il
:I
own
[0 the
galk-y to be cooked. subfT.Jn$ tuu of i15 _bnJ ;n rollltimr uolio, durillg rllt' JomWOfr pili« and ptrp
mtSS
u\lull. dtilll Iht
Thc
~tcm "'"JS
sonlC"thing of a shock
[0
new
~aml'n
and [r:linCl'1 al
HMS Gu~ "'TTe warned WI
Tht mm (4/t1rr u,/I dmtk UM thr mm u;/l hal... '" nil. \0., Uftm rook uf thr u;/l ~ dtr J:tod - on thr mas IoIbIr rw!w - tJler umm)'U" u;/I lINt Ufta: J"'U _ 111m,
It
"'';lS
and J.Jkr 1/ '" rhr g«Jry '" lor dlinlt
qUlle difficult 10 find rc:opes thai could be Prql1rl'd III one go
Gate of the Royal
wilhou[ mulliplc: [rips 10 the gaUey. but St'2ml'1l "'Tre: rc:conunendc:d to
W;Diam ViC1.. allin~
learn how to nuke p.uIry and dumplings. and [0 prep:.!re dilfttCllI kmds of \~bla - beetroot should flO( be 5kmnM or lIS \'alue ,",'Ould
Yard io J>tyynoulh.
45
d"ring
a R"nian
eonYO)' in 19U.
be lost. be.. ns ..lid dnfiJ pns should be scukcd O\.-ernight. pnsnips should be washe:d ,,-ell befoK canng. Simple rn::ipc:s "=C: wggntfiJ. such as cottage pie. 'poor mom's g'O'OW" ... ppk dumphngs md .. \';Inety of suet puddings. The IJ1OS( exonc was beef curry "'nh rice." The General Messmg System was mOK modern ..00 "'ZS .. pphfiJ on most ships of crulSc:T SIZC: and abao.~. which had their own ~coununl officers. All meals - breakfast. dinner. tc:a and suppc:r - "~re prepared ceornlly for Ihe ship ;as a whole and the mc:ssa had much less initiative. Submarint."S ll"lIded to usc: the Cenenl Messing Sr;lem, ..s did 11I..ny ..uxiliaries and armed mcrcham enlil<:l'S. Other n-ssels. such ;as cOI"1:enc:s and minc:swec:pc~. ul<:d a third system. known as Vicru..l1ing Allow,mce:. They wcn:- usually 100 Sl11.2.l1lo han: Iheir own ..ccoullum officer. so Ihey boughl proVlSIOns from Ihe one: at their shon:- m:.c: "lid "~I'C .. ble to buy OIhcr goods fiom cantCTIIS or 10al sources to gl\~ more: flexibility in Ihelr d,el. Cold stonge: was P1'O\1dc:d on rtlOS( slnps. with a cold ruolll 011 a ternpc:r.arun:- of 15-18"F (minus l()....8"q for kc:c:pmg OOzen buf md
J
•,, ,
muuon. offal, poulll)', butte:r and some kinds of fish. The: cool v.'ZS used for smoked bacon ..00 nurpriOC'. mom. wim a 1C:Illpe'ntu", of 23--JO"F.
NavaJ Diet Thc: V,clU:llhng Departmenl issued IIlS1ructiOns on sources :Ind Slonb"C of ceruin kinds of food and drmk. Coffee was usually from Kenya. with no chicory. Lime Juice was much less in faVQur than it had been III the past: it was issued 'solely as a bcvcnge sinee neither of the two commercial products has gIVen satisfactory results when tested ;as anll-scorbutics'," Instcad. vilamin A ,",,'as obtaim'd from othe:r sources. l'otatQn WCll:' an importanl part of Ihe Brlllsh d,el. and on bolord ship they were: Slowed m sacks in a ,,-ell-\'ellliialed cOlllpntment nudc: up of wooden gnlings. Rice: "0l:S of Ihe Puna V3J"ie:ty. but so~ of the ~un;:es of 11 ame under Japanese: control during the war. RUlli W1IlS the standard dnnk. II ,",,'as ·purctw.c:d in the:
I
~
Royal Fkfl
wp cu..... ODe of a Auxiliuy
daD of.-;p. Wpl
or 11,500 toni.
47
One ..... thod of ~fuclling .c
fU.
by trailing
hose
~
.nern of Ihe
l.nkcr. Thi....... nO " ... for pauing
good. such M .mmunirion
Ammunition Supply
Fuel
In the ~ much ofthr navy's :lJnlllunition hxIlxcn nude in lhe Ror~1 Onbunee Factory at Woolwi<"h nne London. but du.1 w;rs \~ vu1ncnbk to bombing met the won: ....'as ~ to DUIlln'Oll5 fxtoncs uound !he counuy. Coedit.., m.. main propellalll of shclb. w:as mostly n13dr at Holton H"th nne Pook III Dona. Torpedoes \\'ef'C' manuf~ III :I luge fxtory, f~rty ~ C1r \\~rb, ~I AkandrU in Scotbnd. In peact:rime :lJmnunition \\'as ston:d in lCnIn' conditions III huV drpou nC'n the main dockymb. for example Priddy's Hard for 1>Ort5lTK)Um ~nd Crombie for Rosyth. These, too. were \'U1nerable 10 bombing and lIIallY more \\'t't'C opened during me wn, ofien in OOIr.'C'ned factories and w:ut:houses, Disused r.ailway tunneIs. such as those: at COIv.....1l and Hawthorn, ....'('ll' used for safe :;.corage, Sollie wen' used 10 disperse' Ihe allununitioll inland, some served new or n'.-opened naval bud such as Lyness at S<:apa Flow, and SCUll.. suppliffi merchant ships with ~JiIi-aircraft alllmunition.By laiC 1943 th('fC .... 'Cre 33 depots in Ihe Unilffi Kingdom, plus mallY sub-depol$, wim others at all the nUln basd ab~.There ....'C're also torpedo depots at all me main porlS, :lnd nunc depots.at Frater ncar Portsmouth and al Rosyth, NornWly $hips CUll(" inlO pon 10 uk on anununition supplies, whleh
Befon' die war most ofthc ruvy's oil fud"'aS acquired by \\'3)' of the Cornpm)', in which the Bnash GO\-anmc:nl tud ~ 51 per cent st::a«.11us bcC.llffit' less cerulll ~her the Medit..rranean \\'as
"':as done under conditions of great ilCQIriry. Ex~\'e \\'rf<' ttM1:"d .alongude th.. ship in un-pov.'<'T<'d lighters 10 a\'Oid contaa wim the fin' of$learn engines - a RoyaISol.'""f" cbss b3ltk$hip needed four bghte~ for lIS l5-mch ammunition and t\\'O for lIS 6-mch. Derricks \\'rf<' rigged 10 bout It 001 of the lighter met Jo....n it illlo the nug.uine. ConIite w:as h<»sced in fil'Sl bccU5e du.1 \\'as WX'Cd u a 10....= k\'l:1 in me rn1pZInC', followed by the- sheIls thnmch=." On .lI dc.mo)tt thr .....o n: \\'as bs fomul but JUS! .lIS turd. 7iIu tl«p driftm (arM ah>ngriM, rhcir hoidJ sflldttd Illirh woodin b.xm. lind 1M shlpi rompmry sa tllll",*, SomtSOf irt/o rllt drifim /Itld handed I~ Mwy hems
of rhe G./, (GII/mrT)' /llStn/(forj, Or/~ boxa and lillS rhe hold dud IlIdr rollTttJfS ~d up si'Jgly - h"mfrtdJ of slie/Is IIlId IlImdrtdf of cllII'Xfi Th~ "'ff!' (amtd fll lilt shell rooms IIml slored IlInr ilf /ll(ks." tkrJt
Ulltkr I~ dirmiun
U'('1l' IIIf$lR'ul('d ill
Anglo.~rsim Oil
closed to shipping. so od \\'as obt.lIincd 60m Trinidad. Valczweb and Ihe Unitrd Sl2tC'S.. though ilS quality "'as eonsJdaC'd mfcnor. It "'as stofl'd in gJC'.lIt tank fums ne~r the n~\'".lIl bases, burird undttground .lIS f~r .lIS possibk, Such tanks still domirut.. the bndsope in tWnJOrntcentury bases such :as Im'('rgordon and Lyness. It soon b«.ame necessary 10 store qll.llmiries of diesel oil for bnding cn.fi algines.:lnd petrol for ai.-cn.fi and co:ast.al forces. Taking on oil fuel Won ~ far less Strenuous process Ih~n Ihe older one of'coaling ship'. which still had 10 be done on a few amiquated vessels. [n harbour, fud could be lakell on by going alongside ~ wharf or jetty. by coming ~Iongside .an oil r.anker, by using pipes attached to buoys and connected to the oil plan! on shore or by bringing an oil lighter alongside the ship. N~\I:II officers were a lillIe w;;\ry of tanke~ commg alongside. as they wetC' 'unh.andy' singlewhich might do danuge. Solllelimes on dcstrQ)'ers the pipes had 10 be led through mcssdecks .....hleh required dUlling aflelW1rds, but in general the process wu painless. .lIS pipes \\'('11: conneCled and oil was pumped IntO th.. spaces in the double boltom and dsrwhefC." Refuelling at sea was.ll n'bt1\'Cly unusual technique III 1939. .lIS th.. ruV)' n'lied on b.llSCS spn'.lId round Ihe "~r1d. This pro>'cd inadcqu.llt.. first III the AWntic......hich Ius no natural n'fuelling stops III Its cenU't': and bier in the Paci6c. where the dutances well' JUSt 100 vast. The early tC'chnique .....:lS to refud dcsno)"C'T'S from brgrr ships, The desrr-o,'C'r ......lIS wen in tow al 12 knots, then speed ....'as incn'ascd to 15 knots, while a hOSt' .....:as p.llSSC'd O\'C'r. The next method. tried in the Atb.mic in 1941. was to trail a f1O.l1nng hose. For the Pacific ......lIr thC' Roy.al N~vy bcg.an to adopt thC' AmC'rican technique of the 1\\'0 shIps eOllling alongside. sollle distance apart due to the danger of roHmg. Jacksta)'S were passed between them, allowing refuelling at rebtkcly high speeds. and also the transfer of alllrtlunition and other Storcs. blll il was not fully dC'\'doped by the end of the war. KfCW \'C'SSC1s
III
Enemies and Allies 1 Enemies Dril~in (..ced Ihree" main enemies during the W:iT, all of whom h:ld ambllions 10 become grc:1.I SC:I powers, although only the J3pam~sc had the geographic..1 situ.uion and the: dCIt"rminadon 10 do this fully. hOlly ""liS brgdy confined iruldl," the Mcditcrnnc:m and bckc:d any kmd of aggressi\"C' mmal strategy, whlle Gernuny gOlYC prill1.llC)' to her lIrmy .lind air force and the n:lVY concentrated on subnUirinn. which could threalcn routn OVC'f the $C1 but ne...er concrol it. But the mere [:lct due .ill three naVlCS wen: hostile and undcfnlf'd .. t the Solmc: Drne sU~lchcd British se... po'o'·cr to il$ limiu. and kd 10 d~tns such u the loss of the Prtnu of ~l'illts and Rquln In the Pa'ific In 19"1. AU the enemy JlO"'tT1 "","re toulitilrull rcWmC$. where ~cc 10 the WIle "~ ukcn for granted. UnlW:- Bnwn. the UmtC'd Sates md the ComnJon....-eOllth countries. comcnpoon ~ considered normal :;md the: Individual ""'21; expected to nuke: ~rific:C$ uncQmpbiningly.
The Strategy of the German Navy TIle modern GernUlI navy wu
crc~ted by AdmiralVonTirpitt
lit the: end
of the: nineteenth eencury, ne:lIrty three: declldc:s liner the: country Iud been
Ul1Ited by ClunceUor BiSllW"Ck. In 1906-14 it wlllpeled strongly With thto Ror~l NliVY in building Dre:ldnougl:u budc:ships. though :IS II nwnly bnd pc"".er Gc:nruny e:ouId nC\'a" hope: to ombuild tM British."The lU\o;I.! offiur corps bc:1i~-ed it 1Dd WQfI III )ulhlKJ in 1916, and ....~ de\"JSUted wnrn mulinie$ in 1918 kd ulunl,ltely 10 the: Gemun defa.c. It \\'21; further outnged when the MT111SIicc: dcnundcd the intnnmc:Tll of tM ~ .although it!.ll\-ed it'i honour by §cunling the ships al Supa Row In 1919. UndeT the: Tre:IIly ofVnw.lles wluch ended the W1%". Gemuny ....'21; forbidden to pmsc$S b.atdc$hlpl on::r 10,000 tom.. miliary urcr.J1i: or $ubnunncs. Hitler rrnounced the In.'lIly when he- caine- to po,.....er m 19.3.3 and bc:pn to rebuild the U-boat ann. By = :agreement of 19.35. Gernun wu allowed to build up to 35 per cent of British lU\o;I.!
Opposile: A navy poole. Ibows the two Sa- dau
INonlahipo and aD
ain:nft carrier
and celebntes the defeat of Italy. II
~ 1>01
ac..........edp the
ra.et
that lbe
G4',mam in Italy ~o.. linued
to lighl
on. Painu,d by Fonle', Len: Karl Don;l,,"and. behind
Hider and Hermann Goering .,arly in 1943.
50
Churchill's Navy
to~.
Accordmg 10 Pbn Z of 1939. ~mun)" ""H 10 tu\'e 13 Nftlestllps.33 cruucrs.. 4 llrcnft earners and 267 U·~lS by 19-17.The Il;I,,.1 high COllIllUnd was deeply dis;lppomu:d when war wlm Britain broke OUt soon afterwards. :IS ;t "'3$ not n.... Il'~y and the FUhrer tud assured them thJI war would nOI tuppen for ~Ill" )'l'us. The Germ;m armed ~r...icn ,o-o~r:ICl.~d weU dUring the IIl\111Sion of NolW:lY in 19-10, but ri.....lril"S :l.Ild IM"nonal diffucllcn soon broke OUI. The am})' was alW:l)'1I\"g:tnll'd as the primary ~rvice in Germany. The Liftu~ifff was headed by Hitler'$ dose associate Herman Goering and the lIavy lOok thiro pbe.. for much of Ihe lime. The u!/iu"!/fr did liltl.. 10 supporl the V-boal om..nsin", with only minimal n:connaiwnce over the Atblille and few r:l.ilh on the key Briush poTU. HOWC"'l:T. the nav.d air arlll of die Uifilluffi employed 100,000 men In 19-13. Expecnng 3 short W3r. the Gernuns 3b3ndoned Pbn Z 300 conumnted on shIps whose consnuenon "''as :.rJre3dy wdl 3th.mced. 3.l1d on U-~l$. The only 3ircnft orner. the Cr4 Zq!prlin. wu bunched III 1938 but connnw.Uy postpOned 3nd ne"'er completed.The surfxe fk.ct W;lS used for nim on Brmsh supply IOUles 300 3g;Iinst the Russi3n eOll\'O)"S. It 3M SoCno~ as 3 'f1eet In being'. whose shIps were 3 eOllSW1t thR'3t to the enemy C\~ if th..-y nrd)' len port. ThIS ....';15
"y
helped by the fKt dut most German w31'SIups "'~ weD designed. 3rmcd 300 constructed. But the surfxe f1«t ....';15 reduced by 3ttrlOOO O\'er the }'e3n 3nd It wu nen:r brgt: to bc-glll with. The Kri~ri~ ....;as obliged to rdy increasingly on the U·b03t as IU me311S of 3tQck. The German n3'')'. like most othen. h3d no expenence of 3mphlblous w3rf~re In 1940 when it ....'as uked to phil the ill\'woll of Brit3in - Opention Sea Lion. It did ItS OOt ....'th ImplO\'UCd enn 3nd con\lt:rtt-d bUge$. but it is doubtful how welllh..-y would ha\'e stood up to weather In the Enghsh Ch;mncl had th.· inV,iSion c,'cr be<:n bunched. Hitlers interference had less effect on the naV}' than on the army. though his obst:ssioll th31 lhe Allies might inv.lde NO......":ly. for example, sometimes created dIfficulties. He took 3 stlOng imen."St in 113\,,11 3ff3irs, 3nd 011 the sllrf~ee 31 least. Adminl Karl Donm: saw h,m :u a smtegte ~ruus.After a
'J1M,
su-..... in
her
Baltic Sea rarnoulbop .. ...-n
on her r_,dial ,'OpI't
in May .9-4..
1llC'Cling in 1943 he commemed:
Tht' "",rmolls SIMlS,h 1I~,ilh lilt' Flit'hm roJdillra, his ""I1,,,,,,tri,,!!. (onfidm«, Q"d Ins j;I,-slgh't'd apprdiMll ".f 1M IIQ/iQ" si'IIQt/Of! hllvt ,"lldt ill'"'l cltll' in lhat tkys Ihlll II" lift' .nJ I'")' Insign!l'Clml in "p"'pw, U,"lItJ Qft' jrIlgmmlary. A,,)'OI'It II"''' brl,tI'ft ht' (lIlt JII bt'll~ ,Ira" 1M Fllthm is silly.'
I'llif'.
But In ~ncn1 Gernun m\'1ll OffiC~fl ....'eft' 3po1irial. Apart &om Admin! DnulS, th~ h~ad of inlelli~n~e. vny f~ .....ere ~Ied with the plot to kill HidtT in Jul), 19-44. At th~ bcgnullllg of th~ w:n Ihe KrUgsntilrint W25 h~adcd by Ench R..oedcr. who Iud ~n'ed nuinly III staff posu until he ...."3$ 3ppointed in 1928. K3rl DOnitz W25 :.l. form~r 3C~ subnurmer of the Wt war. H~ began Ih... wu;as the eapt3in in chuge ofsubmarines. but he grew .... ~th the job :.l.nd ....':lS a full 3dmiral in 1943 whcll he was called on to succeed Raeder. Despile his background he persuaded HItler not to scnp the bIg ships. and showed such determination in conducting the war that Hiller appointed him :u his successor when hc HUed himself in 1945. The Gernun naV}' expanded npidly in the first years of the war, flOrn 78.000 men ill August 1939 to 320.000 in March 1941. This number aJso Included nuny of the men who opcnted coasw def..ncf'S. an area which became important by 19-43 as prep:lnuons \\'t1e nudeto rnm an Allied in,':ISion_ Th...... .......ft' 37 heaV}' and 132 IllC'dium coastal amllery balletles In May 1941, and thcft' We1\" 371.000 men opcnting them In mid-19-43! But expansIon of the mV}' prop.-r lud come to a stop. It \\"3$ on!>' aboul 7 per cenl of Ih.. loW lI'lftmwrllf of nearl}' 10 nuUwn men. and rt'SOUfC"CS .....ere needed ..I:srwhcr.-. In Jun.. 1943 DOmtt wanted -438,000 men for n~ U~b031$ and other construction. He "'"3$ offered only 103,000. HlIkr lold him: I hamt'r RO' Iht' pmotrntl_ Tht' /J,,'i'/Jirrr.lji lI"d nighl figlrl~ /oms mUSI bt inoT.ucd in ordn 10 prolwlht enmllfl ritlrs. II is /Jiw nnnSJIry 10 JIMlginm
tnt Eas'trIl IZrurlf. 7ltt Amrr fltttis Jiloisions for I/lt' ptVlttfiD1l
".f Eu."
The Surface Fleet Germany retained a few p....-Dreadnought battleships :u tr.Iining ships, but her first large modern ships were the lhl"('c \'CS$('ls of lhe DtulJCJdatld class begun in 1929-32 under the restrictions ofVeruillcs.Nmed Wilh II·inch guns. they were faster than battleships but better armed than crui~n: the Germans called them Panzt'rS(hiffm or armoured ships, the British. 'pocket: battleships'. OrigiruUy Intended for IISC' 3g;Iinsl the
Soviet Unioll. their long nn~ nude them df«o''C' as commerce nlden on the !ugh seas. despite' the loss of the Cra! Spff in 1939. Tht agtttmC'm of 1935 aIJov.~ the Kntgsm.1n~to begin the Scltamlrorst :lnd CntIsntau, h}-brid ships with high speed but relan..dy bghl arnumenl. They caused the Bnosh many problems until the ScIYmItom
W25
sunk
•I -
... ,
A
i
'
1-
lI SECTION C
SEt1lC•• 8
---
,.
z
enee~
.
--•
••
•
,
" , <:::>
~c=:J
•
.
.. _.::x:::::J:~
u
E·: the: nxJ of 19-t3.1bc BcsmmrIt and Tirplfz wrn: much brgennd "''ere of:.l mre,al ""'1m theIr lS--mch gum and a speed of 29 knoa.. Greal effOrt W;lS needed to sink the lJismarrk in 1941, and 10 fill4lUy sink the Tirptt:: by bombmg Ul a Norwegull fjord Ul 19+4. The Km-gSmMlM W1S Il()( well pl'O'o'lded WIth cnllscn.. The heavy cruisers 8ludwr and the light crursen Koo'igsbrrg and IG..,s",~ ,,~~ SUnk during Ihe: lI~iOIl or Norway kanng only (WO heavy and four bght cnllsen to DId Bnmh commerce. They \\'en: supplemented by about 10 converted merchant ships" hich Iud some success On the high seas. The deCISIon to suspend ....,or\: on luger shIps 11 the beginning of the wn W2S ~nsiblc: enough and was par.ll1d to §inubr decisions by Churchill. who m''K"Tthdcss l"Xpt'Cled a long w:u. Uss wise wu the: decision 10 build no morc of (h~ very useful ships. destl"O)~rs. The pre-W:lr ships were (as! :md well armed, bm 10 out 0(21 were lost al Nnvik in 1940 and only a IUlllled numbt.-r of replacements were built. One area III which thc Kritgs,nariM excelled was in the small. fm n1Ol0T torpedo boat. known:lS the 5-BooI OT &hlU'fl-800110 the Gemull$ or the E-boat or C'nemy boal 10 the Bnum. The Treaty ofVeruilics W3S \~e about whether sllch bo.m \\-'ere pcrmJlled. and the navy look ad\'ancgc of this. The Gcrmms were wQrId leaden in lhe diocl engine and they ~loped a f:.lSl. hghl\\~ght \'l:l"Slon to pOWI:!" their boal5.The typical E-boal W2S 114 feel long With three dlocl engmes giving a speed of almoS! 40 knoa.. II calTied 1\\'0 10rpedocs in rubes plus two rekmb. and \\~ big enough to ~ a I\e;lvy gun arnumelll ag.unst alrcnfi and Bnwh MTBs. In aU. 249 of !hem Wtte built.
:.II
~nl IllOI"c:
The V-Boats 11lough It staned III \'Cry \\'eak condltion, the Gcrnun U-boat arm Iud as much inl1ueoct 011 the .....·ar as mosc sc-rvi«s of much gJTalCT numbers. and camt closer dun :lily orner force to wmmng I:ht war In the Wtst.. Gt-rmany Iud Just 57 U-boats ,11 the btginning of dlt .....ar, of which 48 \\T1'l' operatiolUi. By mt \PI"ing of 1941, ",,-im me- bilure of i.ll\~on pbns and me bombmg of aba. It \\~ ckar tlul die U-boat was !he only remsuc w~ to dd"e-at Bnwn. In February Hider decreed: 1M . , of OHr./Nturr II.... tfforu IIINSI f~ bt- 110 l'Dnl'm1TllU" nonr ItItmu of II¥"t IIW" by ~a and air lOrI mtIII)' swpplinf« ",~as as IIdl as Itttpi"l
The standard U·boat ....'as tht Type Vile, of which 665 were buill. It \lo'aS JUst large enough for Atlanl;C opention al 67.1 metra and 865 tom submerged. but
It "'as
highly manoeuYrable and sUitable for
mus producuon.
Officers Office-r sek'Ction used mOil of the saml." criteria as other naoons. but with a N~t1onat Socialist slalll. Loyalty to Ihe Fuhrer was essential, and psychological tests were applied. Ill- Jrad 10 gnup /11'0 nuls IOf a bar, mrd Olllt IJrt appamtuJ uw su;uhed on arid Ihe nmtnt btgan 110 floll' W!' (ouldll'l ItI g<J if Ihntl. ,\'/lny of IlS jllS' 5mamtd - qllllt Iht lvron.~ lhiu:~ - bul IOthm bl! Ihrir (hub dud Iry drau'llg rhmr m gal'r lIIr imprtMion '!ff sInn ntdurlllllt. Allihis uw filmtd, bUI wt 11eI.'tr saw Ihtfilm, IhollgJr i, mllSI haw brm an inlrrrsling ont.'
Successful candldatcs weI'C enrolled as cadtts and tramed on the Island of Danholm......here thq· wore a uniform silllibr 10 dut of Ihe army. In pcacellJlle and early in Ihe ....'aT they wem on to a sail lralnmg stup to learn InsIc seamanshIp, and then had a long-dl5tance triP on a CTUlSC"r.They \\'elll to [he Naval Aculemy at Aensburg as midshipmen. to ICOIrIl naviganon. boat.haodlmg. mathematics. physics and chenustry, and the general pnnapks of guns and tofPC'does. As the navy expanded in the first )'ears of the \\'ar, the proportion of officers to men de-dined noticCOlbl:y - one officCT to 16 men III 1939 :lIld one to 28 men III March 1942. Tr::umng courses ....'ere shOTie-ned, men were brougtll III from die mercham navy and petty officers \lo'ere promoted A brgc stup hU die Buman:J: Iud more dun a hurxftd officers he*d by a 1<.1'''",n 211, 5«. HIS secOnd-in-
•
•
-_.......... u.m_M
--~
'
ID
a IicuIaunr m die 8nDIh 01' Ammaa 1I:f't'kC'. 'Then:
nm the bocat. maintain moraJr ill ditIindt tIfFU and CODlkM:t an aaack.. He _ advised.
110
CdCW'.iN:Cll.
..
Navy in !:he bit _
mel _
IDllIIIy &: oaIy b
sbcft duDes.. 1bt
of ..... dem:mded maIrr WIlds 1UdI» U--boa, S-bcNa COraIl of frmce' ... Norway. Tbnc nerdrd a higher pmponion of petry officers.
IIIIQft
mel pMmI cn& oJI the
co 6Dd
Naval Bases 1,. .Jl ~ ~fU' rM twM)'. tIw ~ of dw ~M is tfIIitdr j~,. -.1m his __ MrisiMs, IUIIm sp«Ul til-
'I' ......
.,....."ulWfo<· The Seuneu
Ia pexeciaatollilon Wllwllftft:d lOr a pcnod of 12 )aft'1CftICC,. Mea willa ........ _ ~ tkiIIs _ pn.:ulady encourapd. Tbry
_"" _ _
..... _
ol""~
..... _ .....
The tnditionII Gemw1 naval bales _ at WiJhdrnstuwn in !he North Sea aad • IUd in the &kic. which . , served • beadquarten of the 8M and rhr main Irainins brae. 1bm: wen: anaDcr bMcs .. Cwduvea. aDd ~ 00 the NM:b Sea cmst. and aI Swinemiindc m the BaIbc. 1"be 1ft*: COIIlIIIICIriaI pons of HImburs -. Blieu..rlu..m _ liaR used by tbc: nwy.1be Fat offTaDcr me-. . . . . U-bocIa IDDVCd 10 . . . ~ COllI. wbcft. ... l
"~ shdIen
0... •
~.
"lI
at
Blat. 51: ~
_
built by tbc: 1Gdr
La PaIitt IDd Bocdcaux.
tcnic:e. SeIec:aed _ _ lniDaIa petty o8iocn 01' A4M1J..aad at the
ll."
• of the- _
darft' _
tcbooIs at Kid .-I SCnIIund. AlMa
_Ibc..-
mil c:»a... ..........aalco nII& oltbc: -.bul: 011 pi
I"
The Japanese Navy
Tbr.Jat-- ~ .. one of tht _
~
.. Ibr wodd.. led:
cquallO Ibt Uailftl Sbcn in tDV3I Mabon .-ben it MtXUd IbII-brbor .. Deccmba' 1941. 8n:IIb ...... had taha.-wunt flidle ImpcrUI .JII-- IUV)' at the 19n, aIthoup .. prxaa: wa Gcrmaay mc:anI daM 8nbin _ rIC'\U lUIly n1ppd with it. The PrirttIt l!fMiIrs mel RqMIIt _JUDk by DRDi at I>cccmbcr 1941. 'I'IK- cruisn ~ _
* __
1Unl. afin the bde of the jav.I Sea m Fcbnaary 19042, aDd 8nbIb sbaps cha.ed.Japannor subnwines in die Indim Ocean, bur the mun ampaIgn _ aImoIt: cru:udy Amencan. By the t:iJne the Britisb rrtumed to the Pad6c m 1944,the~ bad been comprdxmavdy defeated and thc rnnalIWlI rhrnt came from the ~ suicidr piJoa. .PPan _ opmed up ro westcTII idc'Z by dK Amcriun Adnunl ~nMw Perry In 1852-4, bur m uvaI nwten Ilk rnwXd ro follow DorM practK-C' in the- linl: it1SWlC~. A ~ coDcgc _ set up M:
53
_0
-.---
--
0--
-------_.-
-
~
• EqjlJDl. modcDed on Dartmouth hue With bter entry and eftn unctef Early wanJups were built in Briwn, and ~ an:hit«n Wfi(' $ml: to Grttnwich to train. In the nrly 1920s a Bntisb mitAon .nb"Oductd the Japanese to naval avuaon. unal che Americms InAAed on the mdmg of the AncIo-Japanne dimc~_ Japan hMI no iJJdepmdmI air me. aDd rivaInn ~ cbe DaY)' and tbc army weft' IDOft IIIb:DK than In any ochn coumry. The MIllY bad frw: DmCS ~ IIWI)' officen .IS tM navy. and cMy dnDMly in tbc nomina of the tbIC'. japm ... already mppd III bloody md bruaI waf m CIana &om 1931. aad . . .my pIIIbcd for _ WIth the United Stan .aia Pro"dt... ROOISndr impoKd _ oil nnbIrJo. The ...,. _ Car IDOft rducuat. iu IauDchcd the ItlX1 011 Pnd HarboI'IIl December 1941 dcIpdc. douba.. The pPancsr weft the only AAan nation ofthe adop: modnn Wftlft'D rndhock., oombinina: them wiIb a fmaDcaI ~ to the Emperor aDd the code of ~ 01' the WIy of the w.rior. Japannr fighttn abnoa ~ sunmdmd .mel WCft' ~ of mnmn who dKl trnang them w:ry ~ They bcame :a wUqudy dfutive fip:hang ~. They Mar me ClUnev in tR94 and the Rumaos Ul d~phnc.
_."ted
.10
1905, bu. ~ had imponanl gaps m thear stntqy. They followed the of me AmeriI;an Capum Mmm too dogmac:i.aIJy, which kd them ro ntglect COI1tl't1eKC protrcrion md the possibility of llnaclt 011 A,,~riuJl "IIppIy 1iDeJ. E¥t'JI RI(JIT Imporunt. the Japanese bad a brF and ~ &n at tbe begmml'l[l: oftbe war, but lacked the rooufCCS .~
--
........----cw, .........
.... • •942.
Brir.1in. co rnbinl: tbrir own ~ p'ogtan...-. 1M japanese' rqIl:md Ibc "Ibmanne as a means of aa:ad: QII enemy supply bncs. and aIIlad cooceaaao:d on . . . a lIDOI of die baaIe Beet. Tbry had a brp ~ ofboatl and _ dc-lrdcp:d I'IIidFb ~ attack.
a
Naval Aviation 1M..Japmcx" '-ned abouc 1921-2 lu .-. de :k:ped
avtIIioa .... a BnoIb - . : l oJ btyoad Ibar.. '1'bt' tinr: arner. Ibe
and IGp m 1927-8, R-.er II-. elI*Id die o6::u oarp. . ."",,tamed '-F IlUIIIbcn of pdtY o6:er 'Iheir c:.riea W .... ~or_."AdalnIY •· . . . dlqroilhe ...wioo dcpuanc:u m 1935 aDd ... a "IiIicm • _ pcIIIB' • 1M
detun..... vi....... nmI ..... The caner bcIt pw fiaa _10 10 ship 1n 1938-41. In thC' MibulIiIhi Zao c.- 01 _ _ cI"ecaw -.om of _ nml war. Iboa&b ' , by ........ Amtncan desipa. 1lIe runI air -..a aIIo (OJ &:d Ibe .,.. be-. whKb paaoIed me -. japanne IUV31 wuooo Imtiatled one of me IDOIC terrifyins and drcctive 'lIIII."apOm of the ·.'ar, chco suicide pilot. akbousb at the time only japanese ~ would pemuc ouch caetics.. Airaai wm: ficted
to pn:mcIto WJK. :aiR."afi: and pdocs lOr a long conffict .-ma the industtw mipn of the Unile'd ScaIn. They rmed 10 ~ aD dfic1mc I'albr. and did DIX uodmand the C'xtmC 10 whacb Amcnan PpIh tnrdlgmce _ bftng .-t.nsr thnn.
Japanese Warships ~ of her ~ ~.lI SIroaI fxooa In the navy mil supponcd IDe batt'tsbIp » the mull weapon. They had lo fOKc of I0 apW dupI.ar me begmning oftbe waf. mosdy quMe old. TIM: new v....... cbs! ... onpnaIy UIImded 10 ~ of bar dUps. bul: only two wett lauDcbed In dw fOnn. They weft far 1qer dun anydung used b)' any ochrr power. the only ships Willi l8-inch gum. The ~ hoped thc-y would OUIca ~ tbe Amnicam could build fOr some ynn. and ~ tbm the buer dUp5 wou&d be ~ btIJ for the Pmmu UrW.11aey were buill co widwmd aemendou$ pumsbmffll. bul both _ !lUnk by inrffltive ;air artaek in 1944-5. The ripl('('D Japannc' heavy 0'UlSm m snvi« in Dc'Cembcr 19041 ~ brF. &sc and -:D zmcd lOr japan often buik her ships behind hi&b wA In .1 scc:Tetiw: ~ and n:Cft'ded bTaty limib. ~ ~ of dx- ~' ca- wat: buik in 1928-J 1 and fon:td omn powers. mdudmtJ
IMpu: the
~
._.... .. -..........-
A __
~ _
.M5, .....
,.....,DtY4
-
Abo>... , A I.......... an h.lian manned
torpedo.
Righl:l'1Nl A"W'a1ian cnaioer
ea....... buill OCI Oydetide iD 19u-t. Simila. 10 • BriWh Counry ........ ship, obe _ .....a by the
.PPa- ia .9-41.
with 550-pound bombs and sterred directly onto ....OIIrshlp!. which pl'O\"ed dC\'15t:1ung when fint used and nec~il:l{cd a much greater mc of anti-aircr:afi: gUllS. The British carrier l"d1otf(~ablt w:as hit by one in April 1945. but h..r armoured deck s.:lvt':d her.
The Italian Fleet The lU\')' ....'3$ \'")' 1I1lport:l.lll to Mussolinij idea of hali"n suprenucy. He oikn ulkcd of the: Mediternnean md M"If' Nosm.m or 'our!ilea' but "'as also ali:J.id t1ul it might b«ome a prnon.llns helped moIJ\"lItC W amp.ugn III Ethopu ill 1935. which offered 1mcs Outside me Mediu~rTllnc:on. The 1alwn.1cd b). the- lIISplnDOnal Coun! IhJbo. ....~ nlth~ foc aiT po....n md formed a sq»DtC air force qum' early. As in Bnwn and Gn-m;ul}', ttm hindered the tk--elopmem of 1U\'aI aIr pawn. and ,,~relnforced b). Musso!uus bc1Jd"Uu' luly W;IS in dfea an unsinuble aircnfi: carrin- because of her crntnl posioon In the Mronl:'J'nJlnfl.Thc- lI;wy ....'aS doigned for- a war ag;l105t Fnoce. md ship dc:ugn conccmnted on spttd nther dun armour or gun po....~. MlMOlinis dccLlr.nion or ....';Ir on Unum and France m June 1940 W;IS purely OpportUIUSUC and t~ Iuli,m people Iud no !Tal motl\~ or wish to fight, whIch ....~ ollen reflected III theIr performance in bolttIe. In u;lditional surface shIp actions, thc Bnush WQuid have mon: conuct with the [ulian fleet than ,my OI:her. When Italy cnlered the \\';Ir she had four old bm modernised battleships, widl two modern ont<; of the [JU"rill class just completed, and another to elm~r servin' in 1942. Heavy 8-mch ewisers of lhe TrCIllll :md ZarJ cWscs were supplemented by variOUS groups of thc Condottkri clm, intcndcd origill...lly to fight off French dcsu'O'j'crs, From a pe... ccome stn:nboili of around 75,000
offict'TS and men, the n...vy exp:lndtd 10 ... round 190,000 bct\\~n 1940 and 1942.The Rtgia :\Imina also had 128 d('S(1'O')~rs, ...nd 115 subnurincs. Ilesides lhe lack of ,'...val air power. the Rtgia Marillil was h...mpered by ils leaders' belief in 'the fleet in being' - the ide... th... t a n...vaI force's ~ry exinencc had all eITeet on slralegy ",lId sometilll<'S it was better 10 protect it in harbour th...n risk it at sea. Thu \\IlI:i dealt a fatal blow by tht Aen Air Ann att:ld: on T.....:mto in NO\'Cmber 1940. The doctrlnl' also resultcd In the rallun: to ukc a historic opportullity cartier in lhe )'Cu, Wilh the French lU\1' om of "'WOII and the- British fearing IIl\'JSion al horne, the It:aIiJ.ns had a numcneal superlonty md rrughl ha\'C won a dCClSl\'C \1C10ry, had thC'y not ~n ~ cautious. In f:let the lU\1' \\~ used only 10 protect lufun wpply hila ill the- Mtditcrnnean, and a\'Okkd COlltlCt with the British fleet as mue-h ;IS p<mible. It was helped by German auom including Stub dh-.: bombers. md by UboJ.ts .....tllch passed the Strail of GlbnlW", but GeTluan surface ships \\~ not risked 011 such a ~~ through the SIr
Torpedo Boats and Midget Sublnarines If the luhans f;'l.lkd 10 d<:ploy lht'ir ~lIrface fiC<:t effeclivdy, and had only rnOOcr.lte 51lCCCSS with $ubnurinlos, thl}' had SOlllC speetolcular victories with lhe ~ma1J~t ~1s. They developed the motor torpedo boat enthusiasuC'a1\y, for it was highly suiuble for a ....~aker naval power III narlO\\' seas, ...nd It SUIted the daslung Iwan 111nper.llllenl. Their motor 10rpedo boJ.ts had a good engine III the lsotta-rnscluru, and a conulluous
55
Enemies and Allies
hne of &....l:lopment Ul the mla-wu }l::m.. The f:unol.n 10th flonlh or Om"", .\1AS Opcr.llc:d both sutf.lcc ~t\ ,lIld nwult'd rorprdoc:s. II SlInk the cruisn }~ ill Sucb thy in Crrle in 1941,:md di:SlIbkd the balUcluJ)5 Quml ~1Jhfth:md lillu3n1 U1 Aknndn.i Hubour:ar the rnd of the )l:U. B.ucd sccrcrly III Algcam U1 ncmnl Spalll. II pn1C!r.lred Gibnlur !=bour md SlInk IllCTClwlI !hips in eom'U)~ dlc:Tc:. II "'~ ro no n
:at Tobamory :and Londonderl): :alta which the sitwrion "''a5 much impl"O\-ro.°The capein .111 LondondCTI)' round !har mey "'l,T(" ','C"'fY bad at first bur "''tTl.'' \'-'1)' co-operaa\l::and k.1lTJlt qUickly'. IJnnsh na''al officers ttndcd ro .1l5SUnK' th:at Ihe- f:lSl exp:ansion "'"25 rhe root of Ihe problem. but it "'"25 abo IrUe th:at rhe Carulwn escon groups "'l:rr often rhe b5I to be wued With new c:qillpmenr,:and the)' "'l:l\" ofte-n ll\"Jred .a1 dl-dlsclphned ·coloni.:ah·. By the brer sugn the RO)'a1 Can~h:an <W)' "'';flo much mol\" efficiem :and pTQ\'ided ne:arly hili'the escoru III the AtLtnac bmk.
Australia and New Zealand
2 Allies
N:av<Jl affairs were consldcred Imporum III Austnlia. a coumry which Jj,'C5 by the sea :and h;Jd :an ob\-iOUli potemi:al ene'llI)' III rhe
The Conlmonwealth Navies
sh:ape ofJ:apan. The- cruiser see-med Ihe- n:atunl shlp.:as Ih~' could be
Widun the huge: Bnash Enlp~.CerulllcoIorues h.1ld 00\'0' become ,mu:aD)'
effecll\'e III thc greJt dlsunces acl'055 the PJCtfic. The Austr.lhan~ had SIX of them at the beginning of Ihe w
under the CfO"Tl. These "'ne the dommJOl'l5 of DI\.1lI:b. AuwaW. Ncw Zcmnd and South Afiic:.1l. when: the: dc:scc:n
~ nma forme:
or
h.1ld pahDa! control as In South AfrIca.
11uoughout !he rWerilicth century mcrr Iud been COOSlder.lble deblre :abom how Ihese ooumries could contrioou: to the IU\;U defence the:
or
empire. Should they concemr.l1e on Ioal defence, or dcvelop mro regwrul IU';U pow~rs, or should mey send ships md men ro fonn p.1lrt of :a Conullon"''e.1lhh IUval force?These qucsrions wen: never fuD)' rc:5Oh-.:d.:and c:;lch of rhe 'wrurc dolllilUOnS' resolved II III :a shghu)' dUfcl'C'm "'7'1 durmg rhe Second World War. AD adopted rhe ships, 10m" :and ming struouro:and mOSt of me procedures of Ihe Ro.,.al Nary. with 5JluIllocal modifications.
Canada C:an:aw ,vas more dClermined th:an the orhcr dominions ro maim:ain a measure of naval independencc from Brit:ain, :and rhis was reflecred in il5 1)(:Ilic)'. Most of the Ill:ajor centres of populuion. ap:an from Vancou"er, are fu from rhe open sea, bur the n:arion supported a renurk:able expansion of n:aval forces during rhe war. Then: wen:: onl), 2000 n::gular officcrs and nrings in the Royal C:anadJ:an Nary in 1939. supplememed by )(X)() TCSCtvlSU. operating a force of destroyers. The Dnadl:a115 used British instruClors:and methods but builr ships in their own y...rds ro producc a specialised tl.1lva1 fOKe- consisting of escOrt \"nsels for the Bartle of the At:4nric.Two escon carriers were added bte in the ....'ar. bul a hgtll fleet cnrier v.'"J5 nOI l\"ady until mcr it h:ad end~. Two cruisers were conlllms.ioned in 19"4-5 but ap.1lrt from !har the RCN was nude: up of sruJ)5 of dc:stro)n lIze :and less. The 6n1 C:anadw1 tr.II.rung SoChook were .111 H:alifax on the ~ ccwt md &quinuult in the: "'l:SI. l...:oIIa. basic mining "''a5 carried our in about 20 voIum=r tCSn'"\l: dn'!5lOn5 Xl"Oi5 the eounuy. When the map eom'O)' base ar HmCu beamc: O'l,'nCTO\'''ded, a ncw tr.II.rung cenlTC W2.\ opened :al Dttp Brook III the thy of Fundy, NO\'a Scoti:a.'The RO)Ol1 C.1ln:adi:an Nz.-y IDCl\"35Cd oc:arl)' tWC"'fl(y-fold to a mgh pomr of 92,000 men .1lnli women III 1945. HOYo'C"\'t"t, many ships proo.'C"d nthcr mdfiClent when
they first P to sa. upum Donald M:ocin()~ compWnc:d: "The ..ppear:ance of many of these tn\'CStics of ....-arships "''a5 unbcbc:\'ably dmy md umeamanhkc',' Then- "''C"tl: disasters to ~on:ed corJ\'O)'S Lolle In 1942.1lnli me.r shtps ",ne senl for umlr.lining in the Brimh bases
lraming and Ihere we-re spcciahst schools III orher p:arts of the coumry. There was a srrong volunrcer rcsen'e forcc :at rhe beginning of Ihe war. and SOrtlC officcrs werc sem 10 sen'e wirh the Roy...1 Navy in home- "''aten. Yachrslllen wcre also tr.llned m rhe supple-memary resen'e as In Urll.am.lJy the end ofrhe war the Roy.tl AlI5rnlian N:ary had four cruisers. II dt"5tl"OYcrs. rhree bnding shIps, elghr sloops and frlgares and nearly 300 cscorts, motor launches and OIher vessels." Sydncy was being de"dopcd as :a m:ajor base for Commonwcalrh forces in rhe Pacific. New Zealand also favollred the cruiser before the war and provided half the crews of the lighr crui5crs Lt""dtr and Arhilles. The
The Enginee.
buer ship gained fame early in rhe war in thc sinking of rhe Cr4 Spero Twc!ve.year engagements In Brlfish style wcre used before the
on Ihe deJlnrye.
Office. (,... i " OUl .n inJpe<:lion
uf lhe boiler
.<)<)",
H101CS Ni"t" ....
Churchill's Navy
56
war but ...."Crt' not popular in a country whcrt' C"mployment prospe.'cu wcre better. In w:IIrtimc, men wcre ul.:cn on for hOltlliuC'S only. and.
nuny yachulllcn wcrr
~nl
10 Briuin for {raining as officers, ollen
Krvlng with the Royal Navy after commissioning. A tnining school for nnngs ~ opened at Aucllind In 19~ 1. N~' ZC'ilind also produced mort' th;l.n 1000 aircrew for the Fleet An Arm. The Roy.al N~' Zealand Navy reached a Rrength of 10,649 men and. ....,ornen mJuly 19<45."
naval force. II had a snuD f1eel al the beginmng of the war. opennng a ~ force of $loops and supporting \'eSSeIs. Ir consisted largely of Inman nongs under Europem officers.There were Indian officers. 001 the British Admiralty uied 10 resala their nght to command European personnel. or 10 sir on courtS martial. on them.The personnel of Ihe RO)'2llndran Navy Increased SIXfold dunng the ..'at", to nun six neon \'eSSt'ls. 10 minesweepers and numerous coasul cnfi. 001 It w:as 001 easy to r«ruil SUibbie men. Indians were used 10 joining the army and man)' sen'ed III me mtn:ham navy,oot mon of til<- r«ruics from c~1
dismas "..ere considered tOO iU-
South Africa South Arrin. wuh a substantial Afr,bller popubnon. had a 51gmficant ami-British l1lO'o"('mcnt :,mc:!. w.u less committed 10 the
The Free Navies
ruval "''2r. so (he donumon md less of an mdcpe.'ndcm lIa\'21 fOKe.At the Ix-ginning of [he war the South Aman Na\";J.l ServicC' lud no slups andjusllhrec officers ;Ind three r,nings, wilh;l \'Oltm{UT resen"<, force of about 800. rrnncd. III Royal Navy ships on the South African St:uion.1I was the nc....'eSt and iC'ast prestigious of the country's armed servicn. A SeaYlo'ard Defence Force of 29 \'es.sels was sel up early in 1940 to protect the base at Simonswwn, and escort groups .....ere formed 10 protect con\"O)'1 in the region. Though the hard·lme Nationalisl party did nOI bke po.....er unlil after Ihe war there """as a
As soccessi\", counrries were O\"rrrun by me Germans In the fim ha.lf of me war, elel1lC'llts of meir nav.U fon::es often CSCIped 10 suppon me Allied cause. In some ~ ships and mcir cte\\"S .....ere deployed to 6ght alongside the RO)'2l avy. almough lhat could cause supply problems Wlm unusual cabbres of ammunition and so on. In other cases $Qndard British ....';Irships were allocated to me exiled go'\=~ntS.The officers and r:uings usually kept meir old uniforms and ranks. The various free naVies provided a useful supplement to the hard-pressed Allied forcn. JUlt as importlnt, mey rcpre:scnlt:d me peoples under OCcupluon, and g2\0C' moral fon::e 10 the Allit:d ouse, Poland had a modenre navy of four dcstroyell. fi\OC' submarllles and a few other ships when the country was inv:llded by Germany in 1939. Three of the d~'Stro)'ers were selll to Britain, and the resl of the fleet was qUickly put out ofaccion. British "';Irships \\OC're added to the force, induding two cruisers and six demoyus 10 ~ manned by exiles. The Polish lIavy helped t'SCOrt nearly a thousand convoys and look part in oper.ltions far from home in the Mediterr.lnean. When the Germans invaded Denmark in 1940, Ihe country \v:lS o\octwhehm'd quicldy and bloodlessly. In AuguSI 1943 the Germans altempted to cake over the ships of the Danish navy, bue mon of dWIII .....ell' Kuetled by their crews. Resist"lnce was much slrongu III Norw:ry and a large number of the lntiquated and ill-pll'pall'd navy \~Is \\"rll' sunk, Some ships escaped, as did large numbcn of seamen. A fOl'(e of desltO)-e~, escorts and coasul forces was buill up and by 1945 the NorvoOC'glan navy \\';IS stronger than it had bcc-n in 1940. lklgiulll had \"Cry little of a naval fon::e, but the Netherlands had a $trollg force both in Europe and in irs colonies in Ihe East Indll':J. Unlike Ihe French colomes mese supported me exiled 8O'''Crnmenl in London alter the homeland ...."as O\"Crrun. and fought alongsIde me AmC'rtC:IIIlS when the Japanese war brgan. suffering heavy losses. Al Ihe OIher end ofEumpe. me G~k navy"';IS largely eliminated by German air lltack in 1941. Two deslrO)"rll. 10 escort \"Cssds and four submarmes ",,=e plO\1ded by the Allies for Medilerranean openoons.
considenble measure of segregation - black and white ere..... members messed separ.uely. and commanders would ha\'e preferred to 'Europeamze' thelt crews if numbers had permitted, The SANF remained a small force on a world scale, peaking at 78 vessels and a lot-..I ofjust over 8000 officers and men, of ..... hom nearly 3000 were seconded 10 the Royal Navy.ll
The Free F...,DCh
The Royal Indian Navy
"...,w on the fo...,
Of the remaining colonies under more or less direct Brirish rule, India .....as by far the mOSt populous and the only one to produce a subnantial
deckJ of.
deJ~"
The French Navies The French navy had a more complex history thln most of those of me lXCUPled counmes.lt .....:as one of me grealest In me world In 1939. with a f1ttl of Sol'\-en old and nt\\' capItal ships and tWO more on Ihe \\';Iy. 19 CTuasen lnd 66 dc$tI"O')TI"S. some of which "",re \'irtulll) light cruIsers. In 1940 It took part III me NOn>-egurJ C:UUpalgr! and when
•
, ,
57
Enemies and Allies
Fr.l.nc~ "~ in~';Ided it sutr~red Iosscs during th~ ~';ICU:uion frum Dunlurk. With the Ftnlch surrender. a brge pan of the fleet \\~ dcstm)~d by !he Bnum at Mel'S e1-Keblr. Ships in British \\'OIters and in A1~Dndria h3rbour \\~re seized. though few of them \\'UC' servic~able. Most of m~lr crews "~re repaa-uted md onlr about 3000 remamed lO Jom Ihe Free rnnch und~r General de Gaulle. Thl")' manned escOrt ~"CSSCIs. som~ of which pb)'ttI a distinguished pan in the Bank of the Alhnac. The rerrwnmg 'unfree' mnch fkct helped plT\~nt a 8nmh Im'aSlon of Dakar!n \9'40. but W2S ICM successful wh~n Ihe Allies im.'3ded Nonh Ama IWO )=n bier. When me Gc-muns then IlUl'Ched !nlO unoccupied Fnnce In NO\~mbcT 1942. I1lO5I: of the reTTUmlng navy scumed l~lf m Toulon.
The Soviet Navy lXspil~ se-.~ra1 ambitious building progr.ammes in dlC 19201; and ~ and lt5 excluSion 60m th~ \V2shmglon and london Ul:aties. the SovIet navy remained a mmor forc~.Therc"'aSexccssi1."C politial comrol aft~r a mutiny in the ruY31 b;asc at Kronsudt had nearly dcstm)'ttI the regime
m 1921. The country's mdunrul resourees "~rc sUl:lChed and technology W2! oft~n back\\'OIrd comp,arcd with th~ West. Because of gttlgI2phy. the Soviet flcct was divided imo four ;a!11lO5I: \.\.7ltertight a~ - the B;a!uc.Arctic. Pacific and Black Sea.The Baltic Fleet gained a httle operanonal expenence during the war with Finland in 1939-40, but that "';IS limited. When the Germans irw.lded in June 194\ the Baltic Fleet was the srrongcst in conventional {('rms, \vith tYo"O battleships and twO cruisen, 19 dest~n and 65 submarines. But the \.\.7lr in thl," rcgion "';1$ largdy fought on land and the major unia were kept in harbour, while small cnft such as torpedo boalS and improvised landing cr.lft carried Ollt the campaign on the coasts and riven. The Padlic Fleet was numerically the largest. with 11 deuroren and 86 submarines, bill it pla)-ed no pari in the war. The Black Sea Fleet \v,u supreme in itS area until the Germans used great effortS to bring in
slups and submannes O\'t'r land.. In the !ut:tic. the foree began with eight de:mo)'en and ....'as buill up to \6. MOM of th~m wen' based on lulian designs. which WeTC highly unsuit:lble in the :un. They cooperated ",1m the Dnwh and Amcncans in com'U)' cscon, but they had little opcratlorul expenence - m~)' I~nded to op."l"lItc tOO long at fun speed and then run OUt of fuel. Because me campaign _ mainly on land. nearly 400.000 wlon "'t're mnsfe~ to the arm)' in the course of [h~ "'OIr and fougt'll \'ery wen. The British battlrship R"Y"I So..'tn'ign "~Ioaned to lhe Russians in 1944. but $:1\\' no action.
The United States Navy The DntUh and Uruted Sates ruYles tud a ceruin amount in common III 1939. They shared a good de.al of conunon heriage. as the United Sates N~ fono...'ttI British lines when it was fourxlcd late in me eightccnth century. OfficCT ranks "~ ~=y similar except at the top and the boltom: th~ highest Amenan nnk W2S Reel: Adm.iral and it was a\\'OIrded very sparingly. Irmead of sub-licuterunt!i me Amcricun; Iud ensigns and heutel'Wlt5 Gumor grade). Both ruvies vied to be the greatest in the world in 1939, but Ihere was no doub! about who had \\"On the nee in 1945. Both regarded themseh"O as me prirmry forcn of meir nauon. espccWly after the attllck on the Beet at Pearl Harbor brought the United States into th~ W,lr. Th~ Americans also wff~rcd from competition from the air. There was no indcpendem air force and naval :wiation was firmly under ruval control. but General 'BiUy' MitcheU's extreme claims about the pl}"'Cr of aircraft to sink ships caused sOllie divenion of resources. Isolationism and financial sO"ingency held back progress betYo'Un the wan. But in many other respectS the US Navy \.\.7lS more successful than the Royal Navy in dealing with the situation. On the whole its ships were better conceived than British ones, it nude far more progress \vith naval aviation and slightly lIlore in amphibious "';Irfare.The pay and conditions of itS crcws wert: greatly impttM:d.
Sovi.1 lorpedo
.....u in eM S.lck lete in 1942.
58
Offic~..• and
enline
Churchill's Navy
'6'.....'t''~'!' \, . ...
rg
dinincl;on5 of ,he
us Navy.
The US Navy \\':is under Ihc authority of the Prcsidem as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Money was VQlcd by Congress. which often imposed quite tight n."Strictions Oil how it should be spent. The: political head was the Secretary of the Navy. a cabinet miniSler with direcl access to the President: the post \\';1$ held by Fr:mk
Knox during the
''':n. The
professional head
\\':'$
the Chief of Na\':ll
Oper.ations. a post held by Ernest J King in 1942-5. Adminim'lIlion was through II series of bureaus dealing with Aeronautics. Yards and Docks,
MC"dicinc. Ordnance, Supplies. Ships and PersonneL
Personnel The Navy Department had control of several other activities besides tht· navy proper. It ran the US Coastguan:l \Vhidl prevented smuggling, surveyed the coast and carried out l\.'SCUl' oper.llions, III wartime it was merged with the navy and provided many serviceable ami-submarine \'esse1~ and minesweepers. The United States Marines had far greater responsibilities than the British or any othn marino:s. and often played a significam pan in land activities. They held [cebnd for the Allies and fought a hard campaign alongside the army in GuadalcanaL for example. They had far more publicity than their British coumerparts and proudly used their slogan The firsl to bnd'. Naval aviation included shore-bas"d airerafl. which in Britain wonld be operated by Coastal Command of Ill\' RAE The navy used thousands of men in construction banalions (or 'seabees') to build impromplu naval bases and airfields. The navy proper doubled in size from 16\.000 to 383.000 men in thl' 18 months bl'fore America entered the war. It multiplied nearly tenfold during the w:lr itself. to nearly 4}f million men and women. The marines had a similar expansion. fwm 28.000 Illl'n in 1940 to 485.000 in 1945. while the eOaStguard also expanded approximately ty,·entyfold. 10 170,000 in 1945.This was achi"ved very efficiently, with a minimum of tension. The Bureau of Personnd (DuPe-rs) llsed mOOl'rrJ management methods to keep track of its men, plan their training and put them in specific jobs. unlike the old-fashioned and ad hoc system of the Brituh. In peacetime, naval officers wue trained o\"er four years in the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Maryland. Entry was on the recomml'ndation of a congrl~5man, and di.\.cipline wa~ severe. especially in the first or 'plebe' year. But this source could only supply about a thousand men a year. about I ]X'r cem of those needed m \vanime. Till: peKetinw navy aho dl,vdoped its reserve officer programme with Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps in selected colleges. It commissioned more than 60.000 warrant and petry officers during the war. hUI its main 5QlIrce of officers was direCl entry
by men with a college degree - far more commoll in the USA than Britain at that time. This source began TO dry up :.IS young men were comcripted before they had a chance 10 complete college. The navy developed the V-12 programme. by whkh suitable young men Wl're enlisted in the navy and trained in colleges.The US Navy had no large body of engineer offic"rs, and all'line' officers wt'"re expected to take engine-ering in their stride. The US N:lVY relied on \"()Iunteers during its first year of war. supported by th.. wave of enthusiasm after Pearl Harbor. Then it was forced to rdy on conKription. pardy beeau:oe volunteers were drying up, partly to integrate it into the rest of the defence effort. With a Va5t inland population. the USN had long given lip the idea that seamen could only be found in port IOwn~ and had an extensive recruiting and training organisation. well eo-ordinated by the BuPers. A recruit slarted as an appremiee seaman then Went on to become a seam:ln second and first class.lfhe had been trained in any specialised 5kill h" would be rated as petry officer third class. for there were no 'nonsubsl3n1ive' ranks as in the British fleet. On being raled chief petty officer he gave up the 5<]uare rig uniform and wore a collar and til' likl' the officers. Petry officers were usually known by their rate. such as torpedornanS mate third class. aviarion radioman second class. yeoman first class or chief pharlllacist's mate. The women's na\
The Fleet The US Navy was affectcd by tho: Washington and London treatit."5 as much as any other, but on the whole the results were advanlageous.ln battleships. the Americans had several sunk or badly damagl'd at Pearl Harbor. but this \\';15 not to be a battleship war and it helped to release personnel and ch:lnge perspectivcs towards aircraft carriers. The new battle5hips of the Nonll Carolilla and SOli/II DakOfll clas5es wcre armo:d with 16-inch guns in triple turrets. outclassing anything in Britain or Germ:I.l1Y. Thc four ships of the 1",,,,, class. commissioned in 1943-4, had the same armament and a high speed of 32.5 knots. Like other nalions Ihe Americ:l.l1s had built 8-inch cruisers until the early 1930s. then switched to ships with a large number of 6-inch guns. The Brookly" class of the mid-1930s had 15 in triple turrets. the numemus C/n'¥'/alld class, built fmm 1940 onwards. had 12. Modern American destroyers, such as the F1tuher class first launched In 1942,
60
Churchill's Navy
.o;ometimes developed with Anglo-American CO-opct:l.lion, Ihough the Americans claim sole credit for the fast and adaptable Higgins ('"['lift, and most of the credit for the versatile Landing Ship Tank.
The Infrastructure As well :IS the navy y:m!s, th.. US Navy built ships in large private
y:lrds such as the one at Quincy in
M~achu$5etu
and the New York
Shipbuilding Comp:my's premises at Camden. New Jersey. Henry J Kai~r $t't up yards 011 many grtenfield siles for the production of both
....-arships and llll.'"rchant ships.The onl: :II Tacoma in Seattle built esCOrt carriers.The Electric Boat Company of New England W2! one of the leading submarine builders, while the Higgins Boat Company of New Orleans produced innOv:.lcive light landing craft.
Ashon:, the US Navy
w::n
divided into 13 districts at home.
including an inlJnd one which included States such as Montana and Kansas, as well as much of the Great Lakes. There were: wellestablished navy )':lrds at New York. Philadelphia. Norfolk in Virginia and San Francisco. for the building and repair of warships and their supporting facilities. The navy aho had the use of great fleet anchonges such as Hampton Roads in Virginia and San Fnncisco Bay. Overseas the greatest base was at Pearl Harbor with its natural anchonges and well-devc:loped facilities. But once the war in the Pacific became mobile, the US Navy relied increasingly on a large fleet train which included depot ships for submarines and destroyers. and on island bases hastily constructed by the seabees. It also developed techniques of taking on fuel and other SIOrc:s at sea, so that aircraft carril.-rs could remain in operation for long periods.
Iud Italy. a pOlentiai enemy. Even ....'OTSe, the Japanese merchant fleet had more than doubled. The USA was more of a conlInercial than military rivaL and her seagoing tonnage had increased by 340 per cem with government sUpporl, giving her the second Iarp merchant fleet, nearly half the size of the British. The British Empire now controlled less than a third of the \\oorld's tOnnJ.t,"C. compared with (Wo fifths in 1914. If that was not enough, the numbers of British seamen were falling faster, and there were 47,000 less in 1937 than in 1911.The number of mastcrs had r.ulen by 52 per cem, deck officers by 33 per ('ent and engineers by 20 per cent. In fact this largely reflected a change to bigger ships and increased efficiency, but it WllS often taken as a sign of dedine. and dte nation had fewer n:seT\.~"S to draw on in \vartime. "Thl' Merchant Navy had endured hard times during the great depression. and things were lillIe better on the eve of war. Freight rates were down in 1938. and in 1939 grain pritt'S ~lumped, leaving 50 ships idle in Argentina for lack of a ('argo. The Merdtant Na\'Y was less structured and unified than the Royal Navy, but it was wntrolled in a different way by regulations. mostly by the Board of Trade. That deparmlent administered the Merchant Shipping Acts, especially the act of 1894 that comrolled the qualifications of officers, regulated their relations with the crews, and provided for various safety measures for ships and passengers. Shipping was also ('omrotled by thc illSuran('e market. Llord! of London was the main institution in the ....:orld, and its inspectors laid down standards so that' A1 at Uoyds', meaning that both the hull and rigging were up to scral('h. became a universal expression.
The Shipping Companies
Empire and COllullonwealth had risen in compensatioll. so Empire tonnage as a whole was up about 1 per cem since 1914. But it was rebti\"C rather than ab$olme dedine that worried the str.lIc:gists. Germany had not
A shipping firm might be almost any size. The British India Steam Navigation Company had over a hundred ships in 1939. At the other end of thc scale. a syndical~' or an individual might own a singll' ship and charter it through an agent. For example. the Chine Shipping Company of Cardiff owned the CallJonl Cl'itre of 5500 tons and used her for general tramping, until she \vas sunk by U-52 in February 1941 with the loss of all 35 people on board. Pea('etirtle shipping \V:l.S divided imo liners and tramps. Liners were nOt nen"SS3rily passenger carriers. but were simply ships which operated on regular routes. Each of the major routcs \V:l.S controlled by ('onferences between the owners, who fixed prices and agreed on olher nUttcrs. Tramps, which were not necessarily as decrepit as the name suggests, were those which sought cargoes around the world using the radio and the electric telegraph. They never carried pa~ngers in great numbers, and usually transported bulk goods such as coal. Sometimes they were chartered by the liner companies 10 supplement the ships on their roules. Each of the major Jines tried 10 foster its identity by its own distin('tiv<' house Gag. and pailm'd its funnels in a particular way. Cunard had its well-known red \vith black stripes, while Alfred Holt of Liverpool was universally known as the Uille Funnel Line. Coastal shipping \vas mainly run by smaller companies. operating round the British coast and to the ncar cominent. but largely carrying coal to London and other cities. Owners were often merchants who
succeeded in rebuilding her fleet to pre-war standards. but smaller countries such as Greece and Norv.ay had more than doubled theirs. as
used the ships to carry their own goods. or captains who brought experience and commitment 10 the trade, or owm'rs and brokers who
3 The Merchant Navy Protection of merchant shipping had a.iways been one of the Royal Navy's key roles, and even more so in the Second World War when the country's survival depended on it. The navy also needed the Merchant Navy to provide a rc:s.c:rve of experienced officers and seamen. ships which could be converted to armed mercham cruisers. (TO
The Size of the Fleet Though the British Merchant Navy was by far the largest in the world :md was .umost e:uctly the same size as it had becn a quam.'r of a cemury earlier, there were many who worried about its decline. Acnlal British tonnage had gone down slightly since 1914. though ships owned in the
Enemies and Allies
tud de~ IlUlde knowl~. The)' were: $pre::ad ~round the coast 001 ""Ih COnCWtr.lllons in the I1lOIIjor ports such as London. CWgow. Livnpool and Newc:a$tle. As empIO)'eni. me shipping comp~me:s ....'ere: compleltly dilfere:1II to the RO)'lI1 N~vy. R.uher th~n ~ single empIO)'er. thry "''en:' ~ group of hundn:ds of '"ery di~p~r.lte comp~llIl"S. The Royal N~vy offered pc:rnum'm emplO)'Illem but '"ery few pc:ople in the mercham ~rvice h~d ~ny kmd ofjob .securily ~nd e"en c~pl;lins .....ere u~ually Iaken on for ~ single '~gc: only. The tanker COmpllllle:5. such as the An~lo-
minililUre·... Thosc- on lhe shan Kli crossmgs. for e:rcamplt from [)oo.'Cf to Cilits. tud no ntfif for O\"ermgtll ~col11J1lOlhtion as the joornry only took a few hours. Th~ operating 10 the Netherlands or Germany n«dc:d 1Il0n:' eqUipment. ThiS .....as lInother I1lOIIrkel where speed was an lICh'lln~ lind Ch~nnel ferries. like Atbntic liners. hlld rurbine engines ~Ild a speed ofabout 20 knots or more. Of course their Ilurkel brgdy disappc:lIrW at lhe bc:lpnning of the WlIr. to be replaced with carrying troops to France. Thllt. too ended in 1940. and lII~ny of the ferriti were: conll •
61
62
Churchill's Navy
~ of 10-11 knots. Sixtr..~igtll ofml'm cmtTed ~'cc. The sundl.ld fast eat1>'O hner did not t:llJeTgC' until 1943. It "~of 12.()(),} lOllS and hxI a sp«d oflS knocs. nuking It mdependan of oom'O)~~ C'lght shiPS of the- Emp'ft" "''",,, class of 1944 "'ttt much snuller. and deslgned for he~1'
The Seamen
hfi.11tro:1: jQIw;brd l)'pe$ ofWlker ....~ produced.The etta'i l)l't'. ~ on a dcsagn b). SheD. ....'3I of 12.000 cons "1m a speed of 12 11:000. ,he NOO'o~n t)-pe \"~ 51ighd)' brger;l.l 14,500 Ions, MId tm Stmcbrd m t)'JK' I"('\Trtcd 10 the snWkf- ~ but \\;m a ~ of 15 knots. ~ hundred and lC\~my coasten wtTe bwlt. mdudlllg 6J 0)* pulfcn. mosdy filled "1m dlC5d englllC:5 to bebc ~r rume.•
Ofien ~ wu not Bntuh: in 1938 then:' w'ere more than 50.000 Iasc.Irs,
Culturally Ihe Merdum Na\1' nang was \'Cr)' dlfferem from hiS RO')
he chJnged Jobs at will and he had Imle respect for formJI dtScipline. rccruilcd in India, China :and AfriCJ JI reduced rata of p:l}'. There ~'Cre
:Wo neJrI)' 10,000 fOn:1gJlC'n, comparffi with 132.000 Brinsh seamen. $tC\\-ards m the MCTClu.nt NJvy were oftC'fl of Goancsc or Mallcsc origin. Jnd thC're were romp.aran\'C~' few women, Despite the obo.,ous luzards. il
WZi not
difficult to recruit mercham
seamen m \\-amme. ThC')' wel'C e:
cCTuin allloum of choice rcgardlOg whICh shIp they sen"Cd
The Officers
QIo"" M~'J' wuri"K
her
_nilll~
painr
in Tasman;an .......rs in 1940,
during her
~nice
ferrying A""ralian •....,p~ 10 ,h....... r
in Europe and North Af.ica.
Then: ...~ th~ Ilgin "<1)""$ 10 bKome ;l. deck officer III dX' Mcrctu.nl Nn')·.Thc most ccTt;l.m and presugwus"':IS 10 tr.llll In Olle oflhc.o !lChook and m.illlng shlps.weh ;lS CHlnuy in the Mcnq: 11:nm-,n- UI the Th:ullt."$ or the NilunoJ COUC'gl:' which W:IS unexprelt'dly 'InN al Pmgbournc In mlmd lkrkslure. These mSmUUQl1S nuinuined good rcboons with the Royal Nwy. whIch olfen:d C1cktships in the RNR ;md C'\'l:n the.- n:gubr RN. Tb.:y producrod ~bout ~ hundrffi gnduatN a }~ar who tended tow~rds the more prest1glOus shipping IinC$. weh as P&O and CUII~rd. The second ~nd most common roule \v.IS by apprenuCl"Slup 10 a Shlpplllg bne,About 650 entered ill thi:i W,ly ('Jch ycar between 1928 and 1932, Aboul ~ hundred ~bo entered by promooon from the 10\\'1:1' d<:ck. The deck officer began ~,l c:IIdet then S('n"t'd lime ~ <1 thmt. second :lind fint officer to become <1 nUSlcr aftl'r ,loom 20 ycal'!; or SO - Slrklly spC'aking 'capUin' W,lS a courtesy title in the Merchant Navy. Smce 1918 lhere had been ~ S!:
W~I'C
aDOI.''Cd to go
W,lge:s
ItKC'
Slndd}'
10
III
S('J
at 16 ralhCT dun 18 for lhe Royal Navy.
w:arume. from m a''-Tagc of £9.12.6
<£9.62) ~
1II0mh in 1939 to £)A :II momh III February 19-0, whICh cOl11~red ~'Cll ~,tb wb sen'ice and ci",ilian wag.: rates.
The Merchant Navy in War E\'t:rythmg chanb-ed for the mercham scallUll
III
\\-arlin\<:. Captains
Wl"re used to .l.lllmg alone; now they Iud to work hard III
10
keep :a SUllon
a con\Ulj. The ships' funn"ls. hilherlo p;lmted brightly
III
house
colours. \\"t'f"(' now grey or camouflage'. Lmen Jlld tramps, passcll~.....n and cargo ship.!i. ~iled t<>gcth"r in apparelll l"quJlity. All \\"t'l"C' under the authoTlty of the MmiStry of\Var Transport. which arranged CIf'KOCS and routes instead of the shIp oWllen. At sca the shIps wen: controlkd by lhe commodore of th" cOllvoy. who was often a relired Jdllum1. There wu ConS1J1ll wngt:r.llot from the SCJ but from <'nellly action, evcn if lhe ~amen were civilians,The merchant scall1Jn had beell on the of un<'lllployment in pe;lcetime. but
110\\1
\"Cll,'l:
he was in great demand.
The mercham service had sufTl·n:d hCJvily in the First World W;r,r Jlld no ont had any illusions about how hard it would be III the Scrolld.Mler tll<' FJII of France cOiIStaI shipping was mostly deployed
1Il
kcepmg
London supphed \\~lh coal. Convoys ran down the e,lSl coast through 'Eboat alley' off East Angha where the)' might suffer heavy losses from hght craft and bomben. Oce,ln-going ships w... re more likely 10 be Jttacked by U~bw.t.
l'crIups the.')' WQuid bc sunk IIlst:mdy, PCrhallS Ihe ship would
eJteh nre. or the crew mIght esc.ape
10
hfeboJt. Neari}' 56.000
in ships sunk during Ihe war Jlld
OC\\' ,",'ell'
spend
25.864 of them - 46 p1:rcem - dred,The- MC'1'(1lJ1lI deJth rale of 19 per cent, f:IT hlghC'r rn.all
=)'
U1
open
wy had:an Q\=aD
of lht- Jl'med SoC'n'lct:S.
Arilled Merchant Cruisers The- idea of oon....: ning nle1'Clu.nt ships mlo w:antllps. III the form of mned merclu.nt crutserS (MiG), had long bee'll a~ng. fJsl (l«Jn hnen wookl be shan of \\ort 1II a nup W:IT. and Iud lht- speed :and ran~ 111
to operate on the (l«an. MOS! were ~sned 10 be lillrod \\,th guns
some form. They
WtTl'" 001 Ilm:nded 10
fJ("e C'IlC'tny \\-anhips. bul thC')
coukl help bIocbde Germany by pa.tmlhng lhc:
;md Icebnd.;me:! could assist \\,th
betweC'1I Scotbnd
I('J.5
COll\'Oy ~on. More
rn.an 50 rne-rclum
t:aL:n O\"t'I" III 1939,compkte ~'Ih cl"C'\\"'\.,:and lined with gum.. The rok of t~ armed ITlCTChant C!'Ul§CT bcgJn to dcchne attCT 19-41. The-
shIps \\'nl.'
RJa,ulp",Ji ;lnd
Jm-is
&y were sunk by Gnnun
W~nhlps.
;me:! the
..::".:."f:.:"1 W''' L.wM . . . . . . . . .:
•
}fMc ..
I
64
'70)"'_ .,.,......... 6.. "
I~I .,,11. I .'k.u I ",............ ,..
n.u.r ...
........
>'T"
~
s. ...
TIl.e YariOid
UJ.
Ulip in USC .1 th
beginning of the
_r. TIl. latget! on.... thlt
nc tSAL•
....,...l.\IlI.) Ii:.
included.
""
...
"ft.." ...
I~
Cooma...
rn-dantk Iirlen.
.... _
.... *. ...
.~
m-
of Mtrdlarlc Navy
"'I~rr-
.,I'Lll'" t
,.,~
... 197ft.
I .ft. ....
~ -J.:w..... "fl.'"
..
- ."'-I
"1-'
,.,J'g .... r..
.-
, 1"'.n' .... ft..
,,-
•_ _1
.I
,,-
...-1"..-0.... '''- -"'
I•.
..
AmaiQfl entry to the war crtated a detmnd for tM:m as East troop amen. whik me supply of ~ I w;uwps w:as Increasing. By me t:nd of 1942 il \\':15 proposed to retain only 13 in savi<:~ ITV:ISdy in the &inge arns of the South Atbntic, W(Sl; Afiia and the Indian Ocean.-
In Sf'rvice me OEMS gunners ....'Ol'e umfonn. fonning .1 striking contntsl wim Ihe Men::h:mt Navy crew in thcir'miscelhnC'OUli gOlrments', OlIthough dreu code OCc;um." much more rl'lax..d .1t Sf'''''. OEMS gunners arrit:d civilian c1othC'$ to ""void being interned ~ comb;iunts in nt'UrnJ palU. By Febnury 1944 there ....-ere 33,000 RO)I:ll NOlV)' men ill the OE.".1S serw:e. mcluding 500 officers ""nd 1000 in mining schools."
Convoy Commodores In 1938 the AdJmnlry deoded 10 employ Its numerou!i retired apuim md fi;,.g officers as conunodol'e$ III c~ of the merchanl stups of a COI1\'O)'. The lirK 53 ....~ ""ppainted in Seprember. with the nnl:: of Commodore Second Class. the highC'$1 Olvaibble in the RO)'.1I NOlval Reserve_ The fim course W.1S held in the Adnural[)' Ol yen lite. Up 10 14 officers could be trained.1t once. in.1 \'t'ry imense course lasting ~'O or three cbys, It included: Thr ll'R'!nislllillll JOtJlmning (Ott""'Ys lit ....:m·IIUli potU lind Ilir llWm, mil/II/ills, tlIld signlll bll4l1es wuedJ(/( Ihe (ondun of ronW)'1111 $til, indwding llili. difmet by sltip$ lind lIiJ'ffllft of Iht RO)'III Navy lind of CNsIIII Command. Tht rowrst ~ dellil ...;th Iht il'lSliIlllltion of wtllpl>l'lS, lifto-SilVillg •.Jju, tlIld I"i~ ptDttttiOfl, Ihe fUppIy ofsigrrallirtg gcllr, s~-mng 1!f'P'l1'llfUf, lht fitting of Rlmmuni€lIfulrlli jrOfrr bridgu 10 tngittt - . J , tilt tnJirrillg of guns' Ql'W'J in IfltYdwnt ships. lind lither matterS. )0
The escon conulunder. in a comntissiont:d w;anhip. w;as pUt
In O\'enll
durge of e.1ch con''O)'·. nther tlun Ihe collunodore. 'The commodore of the COll\'O)' is 10 uke durge of the COll\'OY as a whole. subject 10 Ihe
DEMS Even before thl: waf, the Admil':l1ry pbnnw 10 give merchant ships the
means needed to defend themselves and chose the title 'Defensively Equipped Mf'rchant Ships'. From 1941 the leu...n DEMS wert' borne
as part of Ihe nOIl-subst:mti\'e gunner's badge. Tnining bcpn for Mc:rclunt Navy office" and men in eight llujor ports in July 1938. and a )"nr bier 1400 officers Iud bttn mined in fire (OOlfO!. with a month pa5$ing through. Two sranun gunners were to be trained for exh dUp in ... f;OWK wung 10 ....,orkinS
lao
1941 they ....nc: fonned into the Maritime RO)I:ll Anill.-ry wim ...n ...nchor shoulder patch.The numbers pe... ked n 14.200 lllen in September 1942." In ~tober 1943 the Admil':l.lty outlined.1 new policy for nunning gullS on men::tunt iliips on thn:e :;o1n: norn101l; double Ilunning in .1re~ particuWly !.Weeprible to air Olruck: md sp«Wl'1lte5 for SOllie ships such as '1I1Of1Sler' linen.. Most oo:an-going ships would now ~ 20nun Oerlikon gum. OlIthough some only Iud IIIXhine guns:" Fmm ]anUM)' 1941 the b01sic tnmmg <:a.lllp in \ValC'$. HMS Gkndl7Wt1, WZii largely dn'Oled to trainmg Hosnbties Only men for $C'rv:lce in men::hanl slups. They did fi'T weeks of bOlsic discipb~ry training, foUO\\-ed by rwo-...nd.........lulf ....-eeks ",ch on advanc~ !ol:;lnunship Olnd gunnel)~ men tItr« ....Teks on specWUed OEMS uaJmng. to nuke .1 tOW of 13 wreb.
Senior Officer of the Escort. He is responsible for the conduet of Ihe convoy :l[ lieOl Olnd for its internOlI orgOlni$;ltion'. At the $;Illle time Ihe escort commOlnder w;u to 'ben in mind the gre.1lcr experience
possessed by the Commodore ~ to Ihe cOlpOlbilities of the convoy. Olnd he should re&.un from Interference wilh the latters disposiriom. unless the corwoy is in
T124 Merchanl seamen under- RopJ N""vy romnund were nornully SlgJIed on ... TI24 agre<'ment. on.1 form p(O\.jded by the Tnnspon I}o;lrd. UnoJ 1940 this onl}' cO\-ered .1Il indnidtu! seanun III .1 particubr ship. until the Adminlty introduced me TI24X ;,.greemem.. which me.1nt dut Ol nun could be lnnliferred from one ship to moth..r. ""nd tlut his serviCes
65
J
uft, Caplain Tafl.,r
of .he
C~~ H~ ...,"
on !he bridge ..·ilh
lhe helmunan.
("ould be reuined 'for the ~nod of 11K- prnetll eIDe¥n')". The}' would bc' :I~"" .... u.-clury Mnnbcn of Ihe ....mlc:d Forccs', :lnd 1101 reqUired to regrn:l:f for comcription.AIl mcrcham samen nnpkl')-ro by !he ll.llry ,",'OU1d be Ir.IINl:fred 10 TI2~X UI 11K- course of wne:.T124 l"IXn wel"C' pnnapa1l}' nnpkl')"l:d In umed merdl.llnt cruisc'n unnl:lbollt 19~2, when nUll)' were used in mercham ain::rafi arnen or MACs. These ships were comnuodC'd and nunned 17)' Mercmm Navy cn:ws, "'1!h Reel Iur ....rm alrcn:,\\, and mech:lnJcs. [I was s.lIid of lhe first one. ErHpil'( .\I
rf IN vast! uw ro..gllty fifty tarh mnr/wm IIIlV)' /",d jim air arm, /Iud U'l'n" utld" difftmrl (odes rf dislipiint a"d .. m- paid III 1'f7)' (OfwdlT.lbly
John Kllbr.l("ken flew a Swordfish from Empirt MQ(alpitlt and the informality of Ihe Mercham Na~'Y pl"O\'cd popular. The Fleet Air Arm officers adopted Mercham Na\'Y unb'"\.lage. calhng the wardroom the s.aloon and lounge and Ihe shIp a boat, a great solecism ;n the Rapl Nary. Some aircrews had th<:" ,",'Ords 'Merchanl Nary' painted on theIr alrcrafl, in pla("e of'R~"" Na\'Y'.l"The wne poll')' was apphed to the first eKon nrrien. which were urger dun MAGs. bul il was soon found to be mol"C' com",nient to oper::lte !hem with R~"" ary Cfl:\\,.
Allied and Neutral Merchant Shipping Some of Ihe countries with Ihe largest mereham DC'CU - Nonn}', the e!herlands. DcllJlW'k and Greece - were occupied by the enent}' durmg 1940-41. Many of the ships '"'",re already under chan« to Britain when the countries "",re invadc:d. while othen at sea were: induced to come O\'Cr to the Alhed causc, though 40 per cent of the Dam.sh dry-eargo fleet was caprul"C'd by the Germans. and 28 per cent of Ihe Norwegian Deet. JII Nevertheless, there Wl.'tc 840 foreign drycargo ships undl.'r British control in 194()--41, including 156 from Greece. 147 from the Netherlands and 180 from Norway. The United SI3I~ M<:"rchant Marine worked alongl'ide tht., Ol'lt!sh in Atlantic and RUS$ian con\'0)'5.....meriC1l.I1 merchant shipping had
bttn In d«bn<:" since the Civil \VoIr. despite gQ\TI"mnenl altenlpts 10 n:vi,,,, il. The MC'"I'ChaJu Manne A" of 1920 g;!'''' US-reg1Stered ships prefcrence on nun)' tndes but failed 10 mspiR' l1C\\ \~sds. and a .sUbsIdy of $250 million offered in 1928 producc:d only ~2 ships. sonl<:" of which wC're. h(J'\\~",r. of \"'ry good qw.lit}'. The Mannme ConUluwon of 1936 authorlSC'd loans of up to 75 per cnll for nC"\\ \tiSCh.. and some ingenious sundard dc.-sigm were produ("ed, but buk had been done before the- SIan or !he war III 1939.ThlS WOI'I nude up for after 19~1. when Henry J Kalscr ran the f:lmous Libert}· ship prognmme. m;m-producll1g moR' dun 2751 sundud .ships of7176 Ions with a spced of II knots. a crew of 65 and :I US Navy armed guard. the equi"alent of Ihe lJrilish DEMS gnnnen. In 1940 the US Merchant MarinI.' had olll}' 65.000 officers and men and it was difficult to crew all the new shIps. Huge tnining camps were
Below' Nnal
OEMS gunn,"" with .he 6-inch gun of a merchatl' .hip .' U,..,rpool.
66
Churchill's Navy
set
up on the Ust and West Coasu and on the Great ukes. Boys of 16
wc:re recruited to the service. St;Ino:brds of training and hccnsmg were
reducC'd so m:.n It was possible 10 become an offict"T after ;l ~~r's SC;l service and a four·momh COUfSC', and a Clpt;Un aficr tWO )~an as an officer. By thew lIle.ms the Mcrdunl M:arille w.u mcre.ued to a qU:l«cr of a million men by the c:nd of the W;le.
4 The Other Services
\1CtOI)' al EI
Abmein
bt~
in 1942 and the tm';l:SM)rIS ofSlcily.laly and
orttU.l'ldy dUot the armys prestige
probIems.1bc
11,1\')'
begarl 10
rtsc-. but thn'e
'l~
sriII
was more successful dun the AlIl(1"icalls in bnding
troOpS in Nomund)·. bul the Briri4t army soon became bogged dowTl and took a month 10 take Caen, one of their fim-d3)' objectives.. Aner dUol. the bulk afthe bnd fighting fell to the Americans. More dUll any other Sotrvice. the Bnmh army Iud an Image of a classlwcd.snobblSh :society headed by upper-class officers but acmally run by crafty, domineering sergeants. Regular privatl"S. according to the legend. wert" brutish unemploy.tbles. This was ncvcr cnordy (Tue and for much of me time it was easier for a llUn to gaill a commission &om the ranks
in the army than Ihe navy. MOreO\w.JUSI bcfol't the "".I.r. the War Office.
The Army Bdow len: A con>'O)' c:onunodOR
-.ad •
CIlpui.. 011
the bddre of. rnetdoant&hip.
Below rip>!: The
Cotnman.der.in.
Chi.,r of the
Britith
&pediUoOUY fon:e in France.
Lord Con, Itudin •
map in • chuuu in
The: army was by 1M rnc: ~ of the British SCTVICes In ",,,,reimc. rising to :a I1UXlJTIwn of more duJl .3 million men, compared wjlh jUSl Olltt a million in me RAF md 855.000 in the IUV)~ lis J=Sll~"~ k;m' for "lOSt ofche war. Young n~n had hurd ofme horrors ofme Wdlcm Front III the PI"CVlOU$ "''31" Dum &tMn. uncles md schoolnmtClS. In me CUl1'cm \\'U. the 1ml)' "'. . amted b). ddQr In Norwzy. France-. G~c and Cmc. while the 113\')' appeared as the go,;oor who Iud l'l.'SCUCd the lrOOp5;11 the bsl: moment. Alia th:it. fl)(,$ of the army WOlS ba§cd al home In ~ I inactn1()', but arnuII)' p~ng to Teszst.ll Geroun lJ1\".lSIOn or to bunch one of ItS own. Its wuform. khili ~ttkdrcss."'
to
thc new ;u-mies undl'l" tr.u.ning. It
"~
only with
which headed the army. nude strenuous dfons to I'tmedy any defects. Warortle rccnllts had to SCT\'t some time in the ranks before betng cOllSJdcrcd for a comrnis.s:Ion. efforts "'~ nude to lind suitllb/e candiwles "hatc'\'tT their class or cduc.aoolUl bxkground. and selection lestS "~ more :KIl".l.llCed and ·democr.atic· than dlOSC: of the IUV)'. On bang comcnpted InIO me armed forces, a }l;)ung nun (ould ll;)luntett for elthc1" die lUI'')' or die au fOKe. If he dld
not
o(k eithcf
of thcst- boxes on his application form, he "''
10
get mlo die 5CfV1ce of dicir choke and went into the
army anyway, A dU.r.lClCf in 1M IIfzy Ahcad ts asked by Ius ofIi(Cf If hc thmks he ",U like die army. '1 wanted to .10m the lUll". he rqllies_ But this docs not mean dUI all army I'tcrUlts "'eft" so dtscontented, Some dehbcntdy Opted for rhe arlTL)' be<:alt5C they did nOl like the idea of gomg to sea or flrlng. and RAF ground
(l'!:'WS
sounded too boring or
menial. Others Opted for parricubr rq,,'1l1l('na, because of family or 1001
PLATOON IN THE ATTACK-FLANKING MOVEMENT
67
Indi.rion.This ....<15 np:rially strong In COUI1l:fy dIs:trica ~ in Scoc:bnd, wh~ suppon for 10caI ~u ....~ and ''n}' inl<":~. Th..-: army$ rt:gi.~u1 tndition was \~ry usdUl in peacttime, but in wu It ....<15 double-edged. Some regunenu, such :1$ Ihosc- forming the: Brig;adc: of Guards, Iud a rqlutation for ~mc: snobbery. Thr regimrnul tr.Iditlon made il mOll" difficull for differrnt uniu to <:o-operale m tnining, and for men to tnJufer from one unit or ende to anotha.
rt:rnams.
Slulled engmurs, for e:xample:, rc::sc:nu:d It when they .....~re t:lken out of their infantry rrgimrnt.s to bec::ome far 1II0re u~ful in sped:discd UIUt5 such as the: Royal Ek<:lrital and MechalU<:a! Engine:e:rs (REME). The: army had a poor record in deploying mrn with useful civilian qua.hfiol1ons, bul br-ga.Jl to rectify il bter in me: wu. The: ruvy had its own fon:e of nU!"U1C'S wluch took O'\'U much of me: defence: ofISObted or am.mced ruv:al basd such as Sopa Row, and 5mb (by In Crete. II orne in contaCt wim the army nuinIy :1$ ~gnl m uoopships or bnding cnft.. Tl1Xlp5Iups cuned IOldJen and :urmcn on long royagc:s and the nuhtary cbss .system was al ilS Il105l: int~ on thar decb, where the officl"n lived in fil'll cbss., the ~q in K'Cond class, and the Olha rmb in the hoId.John CoMlk, Chun:luIli former pnv;Ite sc:creary. enfutc:d m the: RAF :1$ an 21rttl1ftnun second c:hm md was sent 10 South Afria for Inining. He: compbinc:d to Mn Churetun:
... Ilmlt tM omntIU~ on tItt lou"" dtrIeJ uw 10 in_ duu if uaJ only JomtIlIllll!5 ponibIt UI litfl.u ort dtd, ar llVOid bodily ","«<1 u.oim odtm, tItt IIjfi«rs tmd ".IIrJIS had nw spacioNs to «ria to damumu In tItt ~ llS wr stood at' IlIt ~ Mow, lW WllrdtttJ dancing on A-tkdt and lisunttJ l(l mNSit:.frr:wn If Jlring mrhom!. 1M litmUS of 1Mfil'KOU~ dlllnn!.for 1M comm~d r.:nb wm' Mntktlround 1M mas-dab uohih wrJttlOtf (lIIr IUlJal.'DIU)' IlfliOlti. Colville admitlc:d to being 'hoiu .....ith hiJ 0Wl1 petard' when he: rel1lrne:d bier as a sergea.lll-pilot and the: conditiOlU were much more eo.~n.'" Troops were lesJ likely to spend a long time: on landing craft, bul their usc: de:manded ever-doser c;o-operation bC'tween the: ~rviCC5 if me:n ~re to bc' landed succasrully on a ....~U--defended bexh. Soldiers, sailors and aIrmen tr.ained logethe:r as pan of the: Combme'd Opennons organisation. Nav:al offi<:m had to be a~ thn the: soldte:r ....<15 in an un£muhu .....orld on board UIIP.
Ht wrllfS MiW'f '"",,,,..,.itiolf hoou' "lnd "" tqwtprnn!t IS Mavy and I:wlky. His tq.lllpmtrlt III4kcl: "im 1WJk to IoJt "IS Nlana if /I Jhip /ufd\a His boots lin' rI(ll matk.fiw dtdu, - r ".I then Jud Itrfd - r of IJ,m, "./1m wrt. 'ar do
tMr _oW it rtUitr- jw "i", '" dimb Jtttp IiJdJm MR"lWt ".gil COllIIIillfJ. TIlt bulk ".I "IS tqllipmmt III4kcl: It txtmr/dy diffiodt to ~u MntlW (N
The RAF The very e'xistence: of an air fon:e: made: some co-operation belWa'n the: SCl'Vl<:CS essential, although that was not al~)'$ fully rec;ognuc:d by the people: <:oll<:e:rnc:d in Ihe: 19305.The: brash young Royal Air Force:. founded In 1918. had an aura of moderntty In <:oncnst with Ihe oldf:lShloned technology and <:lass atlirudcs of the morc: established
t
T --------
----
., .
Left: 11M Haftdud metbod. of.ttack "" til
id.f.azlay
................. pbltooa of about
5eTVlCl!:L The uDl)' lud I<":nded to sec iadf as an auxilury to me ruvy, O[cqM: during the European w,u" m 1914-18, bul 21r force: officers bC'lJnoed that they could Win me: nrxt W:lIr ~. AII"Cr:lft, wh<":ther ship- or shore-bzs,c:d. could operate Just :IS w~U O\'er me ~a as the: land. and It was meviublr that mey would pby a pan in ~a wufare. By 1939 the main hOllle operational <:ommands of the: RAF ~ Fighler. BombC'r and CO:lSui. and all of mc:sc: had lOme role In the: nav.l! ~r. Fighter Conmund was mainly charged with lhe aerial defencr oflhe homeland. In 1940 il ....,on its grratcst glory in the Oattk ofBriuin......hith began wilh nids on convo)'$ in June: and July. The' enemy atuck then moved on to RAF aimrlds. btrr to London. Fighter Conmund also hdpnl 10 defe:nd e:lSl. <:oast <:011\'0)'5 from r.tidc:rs. a campaigll whith peaked In me 5pring of 1941 bc:fore most of me Gc:rrrun :lircnfi: \1ierr senl to me RuMian Front. The ruvy's rebtiom ....ith I30Inber Conunaoo wert:' nu::h mon: difficult. The: suategie; air oiI"c:nsM otgWlSl: Gcmwry dc:mandc:d huge: roowcc:s m men and lJWc:I"Ws, and duJ oused diversion of eftOn liom
lMIow: Croon_D Wllu line up for
....ruc.. __ lIM Rl-.- Orme
ia NCN"mandy,
July 1').4.4.
)0
'----
_ _ ..
_
C\lIlHIIL ~ .. toe....,..;tII ... .vuom::
~"
~
•
•
',,'
,
....
' F.t--r
IkJ.
Co.1st:lI ConmW1d :uld til(" Banle of the Atlantic. Bomber Comnund f3ikd to dcstro)' the U-bmit pens III the .....eSIc:m Frcnc:h ports .....hile- they were bcmg built ill 1941.:u!d thq. pTO"'\'"d tOO suong to doauy mcrv.~ II did. lxM~'a". any out much of the otfnlSl"'\'" Ilmling ampaagn .lg:unu: Gcnl~ which sank or ~ more dun 1300 ~ Its nXk OIl UboJ.t buiIdmg}-=B WeI ~ danugo:- to\\.M the nld of the .....31". Tho: RAF also competed ...., th the IUV}" for the ~ of the w.. mme recruits. In peacetime. }'Olmg mell JOined one 'ICT\o"1Ce or another b«"ausc they lo\'\'"d the Ide.. of tho: sn, or n)'ing. or military hfe. In ....-;lnime. thl"}· had 1('$S Choice but could opt for ooc or anothl."f in the hope of being accept«1, In the 3fternuth of the Bartle of Brlmll the RAF was f3r mon: succes.'lful in artr;rcting conscripts than Ihe navy. Jlartly because naval expalUlon W3S lIIuch slower and there was not P3C(' for all the l1Ien who applied. At Ihal sugc:. ",,-icc as lIlallY men appbed for the RAF as the navy. uler in the war Ihe proportlOIlS were rt:\'t'r<ed and far mort: men appbed for Ihe IU\')',
found tlut this nude lJltk dlffcrence provldcd there was goo(hnU on both sides, 3nd nel-d«1 very liltle written lllstl'Uction liom Ihc Admlnlty, ~31 Comm.1nd was dIVided 11110 groups, o:;Ich covering 3 p3rticu!:lr :m'lI of se;I and partly reflecting the home romnunds of the n3vy.ln 1939 No. 18 Group eoo,'l:n:d the:llra ofRosyth, 0rImq' and Shetbnd and pm of the Nore Conunmd and ....;as Nscd IleM Rosyth. No. 16 Group cO'o~ me nest of the Nore Comnund plus the 1)00.'1:1", Pomrnouth and Pordmd IU\~ ConUIunds.. No. 15 Group co\~ the ~ mccttng No. 18 Group III the Nonh Clunnd bmI.'n'Il Northnn Ireland and Scotbnd.ThIS was demy mcom~t III the hod of '3I" dut foilool\'ni, and 0. 15 Group look control of ,ul the north- 'CSt ~hn 10 BriDIII. WIth 3 northern boundary running from Cape Wrath III the north of xotbnd to lcebnd alld us southeTll one in the midJle of Ireland. It c:lrri«1 OUt most of Ihe con\'oy ocon patrols. wlule the new No. 19 Group took rhatgl: ofsouth-wCSlern Waten., Coostal Cornnund! W3r began wllh Nonh Sc:;t patrols mostly directed against Gc:rnun surface ships.. but II' ;urcnfi prt/''Cd nudC'qLUle. A great de,u of unu: ....';1:5 aken up with 3nti-ilJ\-';lSion patrols in the 5CCond IuJf of 1940. but mu-subnunnc patrols wcrt' UlStltuled in the north·....'eStern ~hcs and 1:1)- the spnog of 1941 they had succeeded III forcing the U-boats a.....2 )' 60Ul the British «»Sl: 10 the mtd·Ad.mtic. Dcsptle the occupaoon of Iceland and the usc of Nscs m Ne.....foundbod, there rerrwncd m'.lII" gap' in mid ocean. whICh the Gcrmms exploited to the
fun lJl the fine tulfof 1943.AJtn- that. CozaI Command bq;;m to benefil 60rn no:w ;un:nfi and tcchnology.long-rangc libcntor bombcn helped to dose the: g;ap.aIoog ",-im CSCOrl C3rncn operaled by the Fkct fur Arm. lY
1m
the use of lIberalors. the lIleWUllH"3118C' :urcr.tfi Iud b 10 do and. In cooper.arion ....lth lhe 1\,1\-')\ they tTlOOnted m offeTlSl\'\'" agaJllSI U-boats
md &om their b;.ses m the ~'ofBlSC.l}; ""m tlUXl:d results. 1be odKT nuJOf rok of the command "'';1:5 10 mounl m offenm'\'" ag;UIlSl C.e-rman cNSbl shlppu~ USIng torpedo bombers. T1w:re w~ success when a Ikaufon of 42 ~ succ«dcd III chsablmg the Lul.,'ll'lI' III june 194 t, but III gctlt'I';l.I there "'\"Il' few results benusc of the poot" perfornunce of the :urcraIi. Re..cqUlplll("nt Cl"C'3led much beonl."f results after 1942, and airrnfi. bq;an 10 usc R)(k~ to atw:k GeTlluJl shlppmg WIth some success. In the Medit..rran<'an, torpedo bomben had much impacr III cutting Rommel's supply hiles to North Afrin. ~t.ll Collltll3nd also operated phOlQ-reconnaisuncc flights. and rom the air-sea rescue service, which u<ed aircraft and fast boats to pick Allied airmen up from the !iC:a. The RAF had be<'n inleR'$f«1 in fast cnfl for some time, brgdy to scr'VIce Its flYlllg bmilS. uwrence of Arabu. UWlg Ius ~udollym ofAircraftnull Ross. pb}~ a ludrng pan in the ~gn. 11Kre was much mnsfCT of It''Chnoiog}· w,th th<' IU\~ mOlor torpo:do bmits and CYUlnully the RAF ,)11"-50 rnc-ue SC1""-lcCS used more dun 700 \-nsc:Is. in Il<'OIrI} 70 tw.C5 round the Bnnsh a-a: and many more abrtYd. One conunan type "';as the British Po-.'I:1" Boat Colllpoilly'S 63-foor: bunch ....'th a 'Ipccd of39 knots p<7"'~ by (\0,'0 Napier 5<.'3 lion 500 honepowt'T engines. of wtuch 69 "'\'"R: buut. 1IlO'o'lJlg 10
(oastal C
II 11 nd ~ Command ofdlt' RAF ....-.as set up bcfon: the: W2r to operate il}lng boJ.a. sc:apbno ;md ~bascd airoafi around the Bnash coast. p.anI)' m co-opcrmon ""th the IUY}'-At the begmrung of the "''31" it poitroUcd the orth Sea 3nd the ....-;lfcn around Bm:un, bul bitT Its mcII5t unpotum rok ....';1:5 to operate III the former 'air gap' nuddle of the Ad.moc, SO Its otic r.1thcr undcrsuted II' funcuun. From the Fall of Fr;rnco:, the SlOry of Co;rsbl Command was one of findmg mcreasmgly ]ung-rangt' 3ircrafi to operate further OUI 10 SC3. of improving na\-i[::atlon, of de\'r:!opml; radar and orher IllCallS of findmg tile enan)", and of xquiring weapons that could dmuge or destroy a U-boat or a surfxe ship. Coasa.I Conunal!d bt'garl the "''31" with kss than JOO :uroafi, mostly of Joy,. ~.It lud four tughJy COIllpt1t'l11 COIllllUlXk-rs-m-ctucf in wcc<'SSion dunng the war. SIr Fredcnck Boo.o.tuU. $l.r John Skssoc, Sir PhtIhp Jouben de b F.me ;md Sir ShoI10 Douglas.1be hndquancn ....'3$ af Northwood,jUSt"'CSt ofLoodon.A key figure there was Capwn DV Pc)1on--W:ml, nn':l1IUlSOn officer and a SUbIlUI"IOCf 60m the: bsr "'-;lr Coa:staJ Command remain«! pan of the RAF but feD under the opcr.rDOnaJ connol of the Adnunlty from Al""iI 1941. Sir Sholto Douglu
69
Uft: CoaataI
c
...
BnaftiP'en .nack o.,~
minesweepen pn>lenl.... c _ 1 COIMJf
North
I.a che
s.. in
AUJUIII 19«.
Another type "''35 the Thorntj'crofi 67-foot Whaleback. of which 105 were buill. II had a speed of 25-26 knots and was defended against aircraft by two or three machine guns in aircr.lft-$tyle turrct$. Below decks, It had space for casualucs in slrCtchers around midships. when: the motIon was least, WIth a e
The Aircraft At the beginning of the war Coastal CoIlUlund's main aircraft \\'as the Avro Anson, adapted from a ci\;l airlin..r in 1934. It was only capable
of carrying 360 pounds of bombs, had a speed of 173 nllles per hour and its range of790 miles did not allow it to patrol across the width of the North S~'a, so the gap had to be filled by subnurmcs. It \vas plused oue and found a new life :t$ the RAFs most popular utiltt}' transport. It was succeeded by the Americm Lockheed Hudson. which PlQVed f:.lr moI'l." effeceke in the North Sea :.In:a. ObsolCKent bombers, such as the Bristol Blenheim, HandlLj'-P:agc llampden and b.ter the Vickers Wdlington wen: often tra.nsfun:d to Coastal Command. Coastal Comllund's m:.lin long-range aircraft at the beginning of the war was Ihe Short Sunderland, a monoplane developed from a long line of mostly colllmcI'l."ialllying boats. II cnteI'l."d service in 1938 but its imendcd successor. the Saro Lcrwick, was a failure and production of the Sunderland had to be resumed. It had a speed of
-_. ... .........
mlOCh .s.uiI of
hal .m-t
=
_. ,r:'"
--- -~
A __
--
::"Jm-'
;:;;....
'~
~
::.. _ 'u
-
IlOthUIa
.. _oldM
,..;.
-
..
-""
boac. II &h'M
Churchill's Navy
70
20 miles per hour and.
The complicated
p<'O«'dllf'e
r....
moori"C· SuDdeftand, often
crucially. a nnge ofneuty 3000 nilles,
Afi of dut ",-en: the weeping qmncrs ...
doae ... bad _I,,"
IDOR'
wluch allowed II to JUy in the air for 13.5 hours. It had ;a crew of 13 10 illow w:lItchcs to be kept on long lhghlS. lis onpn as :an aUUncr g:;WI' it :a deep huD ""ith accommodarion on tWO d«ks.Abo\-c \\~ the ilight deck wnh ample $plIce for pilots. mvig:;l.Iors. ndio oper.ltors and engmeen,
all,".
..................
nose turret
IUf«"I.
plus manually opcr:ued be.lln
guns and a bomb or depth c~rge
Air Bases
4 - - _ .. _
.....
?"~ :o=.:;:r'::::::"'":
-
...
- ::.::0------
.5 ------~._--
6 - - . _ ........_ _
.................
-------
.:::::=.?~
SUNDERLAND
Moorlngprocedure
~
long.range aircrafi were mostly flying boau in 1939. Thu was not because they exp~cted 10 land in mid-ocean, for Ihal was Impraetloble In allY lUnd of rough weather, bul because runway) for large alrcrafi had not yet been buill. The Rum basa before the war had been al such places as Felix5towe in eastern England. and Calshot ncar Southamplon in the' south. Th('S(' "~re 001 much usc in th~ 8.lnle of the: Awntk and new bases wae set up often III S<:olt1sh and norlh~rn Irish lakes and lochs 10 the north and weu.The: nc:utr:al.lty of EIre wu a probkm here. but by 1943 Ih~rr "~re bases at ~~ Archdale on Lough Erne in Northern Ireland, SuUomVoe In Sh~th.lld and Ohan. Bowmore on Way \\':as situate:d In loch Indul1nd had 1){ ckar nul" of landing are-a with liltl~ tide and good anchoring ground In hard und. It had no ilipway to ntSC' boats out of th~ water, but had squadron worbhOJK. with a 5-lon crane and refuelling faclhnes. SIX
PART IV
The Ships 1 Ship Design Pncticilly ;ill the- luge dUps of m( ruvy wen: designed wlthm the orpnisacion, although in wntimc some mcdJum-iized cbMe. such u con~ttC$ md fi-iguc:s. ....otr'e d~gned by pri\';Itt cmC"rpr~ und(T ruy;;aJ (ontm!. SnuJlcr v\'Sscls ~U('h as motor lorpc-do 003a md bnding cnlt oflC"n Call1le &011I oUUldc the IUvy. In ....';Iromc nuny shi{K, r.lIIlging
from linen to fishlllg boats and )"Ichts, wen: taull up from pn.... w owntrs. A few ships camt" from allies that dropped out of the: confhct: many others. both old and new. c:lme from America. The navy's ship dc:sign w.u much criticik'd before and during tht, Second World War. and it is true th;oIt it never produced :1 cbssic design. C'xccpt pahaps the hghl llC'et ;aircnf1 C
Every ship design is a series of compromises, bet.....e en speed. K'akeeping, armalllcm, lIccollunodarion, fighring power. ~nge, COSI in
l>ewJnpon Docky:ord.. He Iud ....vrUd OIl D.pain Scoa's Disawtry and designed submannes III me Fim World War. On becoming DNC in 1930 he dzd much (0 advance ain:nft arrier design. In 1936 he ....'3l. succeeded by Sanley Goodall. who w:os unusual III Utal he had begun !us career ~.lI 1U\'lIl engmeering officer. He kept kmg hou~ during Ihe war, bm .lvoided Ihe O\'eI"\\'Ork th.llt d:onuged tht, hea.llh of I'll.:!ny of his col1e:.guc:s. He kept 1I dillry and al me end of e\'l:ry year he sunmurised his feelings. The year 1937 ....'as a 'thick year', 1938 was even WOrK', 1939 was 'mOSl: diure:ssing' with the death of Henderson and SIr Roger Ihckhousc. 1940 ....-..s '\~ry aying', The year 194 I SUrted well wim the success of nuny ne-.-' ships such :os me fUusrriouJ class carriers and the L CWI deKro)vs, The loss of the Hood W;l:S 'JJO( unexpected' but
GoocWl fxed unfair criticism O\'n Ihe loss of the PM« tfliWa. whICh continued imo lhe foDov.wg )nt.Although 1943"'25 f:or bmff. Gooda.lJ handed O\'tt Ihe dzrcctonhip (0 Sir Cturks Lillicnp in 1944. continuing as assiSQIlI conrrolkr:md elder Sbtcsnun. One ntanber of a succeeding generation of 1U\'al COnsauClors regarded him ;t:S 'prob.lbly the I1lOS( oUlSUnding .....arship designer of all rime',' He designed ships [0 difficull spccifiorions for a much wider range of functions dian e'Jer before,:mel coped with me denunds of a prime miniSlcr who had little ide:. of the boundaries of his authoriry or competence,
finllncial lind real lermS, lind mllny mher fliclOrs. The job of Ihe ship designer \\.'25 10 !'Cconcile Ihese in Ihe besl way possible. accordmg to sundmb K'I by his CUSlomer, Ihe Wiry.
The Controller and the 0
C
The JUry's ship design feU under me respollSlbiliry of me Third Sea Lord and Comroller of me Nn1', who "'25 in cha~ of'malertal for Ihe f1CCI, induding ships and Ihdr machmC1')".' JUSI before me war me post was held by Adminl Sir Reginald Henderson,:o \~ry experienced aircnft curier officer who conlribmed much 10 design policy before his unlimely retirelllcnt and dealh. His successor ",,:os Sir Bruce Fraj,er, bIer a grelll adminl in his own righI, who had served ~ a gunnery officer and as direClor of naval ordn:.nce. He w;as succCC'ded by Sir FrcderickW:.ke-Wa.lker in 1942. Under me ConuoUcr was me Durctor of N.lval ConstrUCtion (ONC).'...me pnnop.l1 lechrucal adviser 10 me Board ofAdmiralty. and me firui aumomy on me design of w"nhips and other \·essds... Directly responsible to the Controller for all marten of destgn, Stability, sm-ngth of COllSU\lCtlOll, waghl built into Ihe hulls of ships, MmOUr. OO:ots, nusring:tnd :ill other JUurica.l :'PPM"tus for all ships',' MOSI: of the ships III servia: .lI1 the begimung of me "".lI" h:od bc= designed under me authoriry of Sir Arthur johns. who had begun his ",oOOng life in
Oppoo;le: Men and WOmen work sid. by sid. in the dra"";ng offiee of
a "J}'ae.side shipyard in IUJ.A
Len: Sir Slanlqo
Good.ll in 1938,
74
1M Empire Hotel La Blth, uHd u
heoodq
~
for lIM N ... Consm>ctioa $WI'
durinC ............
The Naval Constructors Ship deslgn wu th~ D$k of the: Royal Corps of
:noal ConstrUCtors
(RCNq. foundfii in 1883. It had HI members on the C\'e ofw"M. Col1W'Uctors ....l:~ ra:ruited by euminarion !Tom apprentices In the l'O)':lI dock)'ilrds. They did alTd 10 .....ork hard!'..
Those who ~ the examination ...."m through the ranks. stamog \\~lh a )'c:ar Wlth the fleet 15 Constructor Lieutenant. They would Inch III(' civil r:.lI1k of Constructor at the age of about 30 and. If successful. they would be promoted to Chief ConSlfuclOr about 10 YC,lrs latcr.
Only :loom a third of the corps was involved in ship design at any given mOIllIl.'IlI; the ochers were in the dockyards. u ~,l or oversc:cmg ships under conStruction. Critics fdt that the syslem produced men who wen:: tOO n:nmw in their outlook. and perhaps it is not a coincidence thar Goodall reached the rop by a different roUte. The ship dcsigners worked in the Admiralty in Whitehall in the 19305. E3ch team designing a pankuhl' elm
""'as
headcd by a corl5lrUClOr in rhe
ofTr.umog and Sta.lTDuI:ies, \'arious dr.oisJons web as !he ~ torpedo and engineoering branches of !he staff would be med about the reqwmnmts for a new class of ~p.These, !he '~h n:quirnl1ertts'. went to the ONe who quickly commented on thar prxuabthty.Afin'!lut the rm.'a! saIf would draw !he 'draft staff rtquirttnents'. &om whw:h the DNC would
~
a more deta.ikd srudy.11lC:SC'
\\'l:rC'
cin::ubted among up
10
a dmen dn"sKms c,{!he rm.'a! saJf and then becune the saff requllCmCIlts
after apprv.'a! by !he Board ofAdnllnlty.1bey would describe the funcuon of the ebss, Its speed and endurance, armament and annour plOlection. manoeuvr:lbilit)~ ra.cIar and Asdic, signalling eqUipmem, lublubdlly mit any other specialised n«ds. Using thC$C pan.mcteTS. the ONCs dep,utrnent sct about designing a mil' in the sm.allcst dt'Ull. Na\-aI atchitccts ran::ly surt with a. clea.n sheet of paper when dl'Slgning a llew cbss ofship, cxcept perhaps ill rhe case:: ofla.nding a;tfi in the Second World War. Normally the new dl.'Sign IS solidly b.lscd on an old one. It might be a suaightforward improvement.
;1.\
when the
aircn.ft ca.rri~·1l of thl." /I/imrious c1a$S were followffi by rhe /lJd~l",ilalllt with bener airr:r:an: acconunodation. It might combine sc\'eral difTerem trends of recent ye.a.rs. For exa.mple, wartime destroyers of the
centre oflhe room. ailed 'sir" in accordance with the custom of rhe lime.
Eme"b'l:ncy Progn.II11l1C'S were imermffiiate in sile between the [ and
Junior corJSlTUctors urried Oul the numerous calculations of weight.
J c1a.s5es. with the arnument of the formn. It might be a reaction against
resmance, stability and so on.They filled hundrcds of pagn of workbooks,
the weakness ofa previous type, for example wtlh the RIVer elm mg:ncs
""~re
kqx permanently as a record, and they were nO! alIowcd to dc:lde any rllist;tkes.AI ~ outbreu. of war th", dep.artmelll \\'as c\'acwted to Ibth. to find aeronunodation in the Pump Room HOlt'I and othn' grand establishments. Ekkrly residenlS were eviCled from ~ hOleb and e\'t"I1 b.lthrooms \\~ COI1\'erted into drawing offices. Bur lbth was n(M safe from bombmg: much sk'q) was ~ in air mds and in April 1942 the Pump Room Hotel \\'as cbmaged. 1be ONe l11O\ocd bxk to London to be closer 10 the ccnmo of affairs and his staff Ixgm 10 m(",~ to huts JUSl which
OUtslde
Ibth. By the end of ~
"''W ~
corJ'$ had 305 mcmbers.
mdudmg 101 emplo)ocdoo ship dr:sign.Of~ 305.172 "'~ permanent. while <Xhers included rlallal archilects drafted m &om pm'ale srnp)'Utk.
and II Uo'{ds Wf''l')'On. FiJt'{.cgbt "'l:TC in uniform with sihn-grey cloth ~ttn the nnk stripes of an officn! ~ was a Consuuct<wCapGllll. equn'a1em 10 a ChiefComtruaor. \\,th exh of the nU1rl Beets.
which were pbllnffi to be
The Design Process
difTerenl from the Flower cbss cor\'eltC'S.
The dimensions of a class of ship we~ laid down In some det:lll In a four-page form known ;rs the L~nd of Particulars.They were on:ell cOIIStr:uned by external f:aeton. Large ships wt're sometimes planned with the \\idth and length of the na\-aI dry docks In nund. The RI\~r cbss frigates and Ihe Cascle cLtss COryeltes w",re dcslgned to speCific lengths. to lit the shp"''a)'S of metcham shipbuilding preis. 8)' thiS sugc the designer knew the number of decks of the ship. Illi general
arran~ment of guns. engines, acconunodation
features. He was prepalTd
10
greatn' speed,
;1$
and nuny other
st:ln on Ihe dcuiled work.
a\'a!
necessa.nly the
\\'a)' co
atchnectS kne...... that a long narrow hull
\\'as not
il had a gre"tn' wellM area for a
gl\~n
volume and
thIS mere!}' cre:ated slun &teoon and mg. The nudstup section represented the \\,dest pan of the slup and one of the first
1be desq;n of a new cbsli of ~p began \\ith the rm.'a! sufi" in the Admtr.Uty. who repn::sCllted the usas. Under the IexlerWp of the D1n:ctor
\'Cry
but which also used llWly features of the sloops that had preceded them.
;trc;tS
\\";1$
to be designed. A rounded or V-shaped bottom
would n(M necessanly add to speed. and lended to produce greater draft for a gi\'en "re". A compktely square boaom would make' strntnhlwlg thfficull. bul pn),..ided the comers. or b1Igrs ",~rr: rounded, It tud btde
75
The Ships
eff«t. u~r ship!l often hxl a compll"tdy Oal bottom. muller ond such a~ dl:5uoyer"> had a shght roundmg or rISe of the floor so lhal lhe bilges wrre slightly aboH: the level of the keel. The area of lhe mid~hip SI:cUOIl cOlllpa~ wilh a n:cungle "
,mal. ranging &om 10 degrees on the Kmg GM:Yt' V cUss 10 20 degrees on Tribal class dcstro)us. Many aircraft carriers Iud a curved 00-..,
abo-~
the "'7tertine. to brmg lhe shape up 10 the fOI',"7rd part of the fuglll decl:. A \'ery fine elltry at the boo". would rc:duce "7\'e.nukmg and hence rt."SUWlCe, but II was usdcss as accommodation or stOr.lge ~c. The ~tern was a more complex shape as it had to accollullodate both the propellers and rudder undenVlller, and lhe shape had to allow waler to reach lhem without interference. Se\'cral different forms "''ere J\7ibble. induding the CTUtser stern, whIch sloped gemly forward abO\-e the "7terlme. and the fbi 01'" transom stern. which became popular by the end of the war. The designer drew the stupe of me hun between the midship scaion
and the 00..'5 01'" stern. The sid.o:s might be panlJcl fOl'" part of the hull so that the midship S«tioll WlIS sunply continued foT\\w 01'" aft - thIS was quite COllunotl on dcstro)'t'n- lbe fineness 01'" omen.'is
wp<.'
\'OIume OCCUpIed by the planned ship ,,-.as compued "ith tJus shape, giving a good indic:ation of the fineness or othef'\1SC of the hiles. The loul area ofeach K"Ctlon was reduced usmg a formula based 011 the square root of the length and lhal was used. to ca1culau: the ~h3pe of the hull at various horizOllullincs, or waterlines. at \7riou~ 1C\'CIs.The designer's job "'lIS to nuke the hnn of the hun ;IS streamlined or 'fair' as possible. He also Iud to eliminate any mq;ubritin round fcarures such as rudders and propeller Wfu, which might create c-ddtn and hence rt'SlStanCe. As soon as the hnn plan wu n:asonably complete, a model "'as nude IJl wu to test by towmg through the unl: in the Adnurall)' ExperitllC"nt Works at H.asbr nC'al' Portsmouth. The supenntendent there. R W l wwn. "'as one of the kadmg figure$ m naval. archit~uTl' and commented on many designs. One feature to watch for "'as a sudden rise in rnistance at a cenain poml 115 the speed incn:~d. A c1C\'er dC$ign would t1unllluse this and Cawn commented of the Rh'Cr class: 'We found thiS model so utisfaclOry with a negligible changC" of re5lS1ance consulll O\'er a wide speed r.lnge that we used it as a standard model for corfCcting results for a number of years'.' During the age of the 1U\71 treatin bel\l.ttn the war">. British naval constrUCtors and their nusters "'ere ob5nsed with keeping wlthm the "'eight limits, :,md aU soru of devicn "'~n: used to keep weight 00....·11. This was less crucul m wartime. but the wetgl" of exh item in the W\lctllre and on board Iud to be calcubtcd c:arefully.Too mueh waght
and the ship would sinl: 100 deep 1Jl tht- "7ter, although there "'-.as some room for nunoeu\'re here and IllOSI: wamme shlp!l ended up C:l.JT)ing far more gear than they Iud been designed for. Weight in the wlOlig pb«would nuke the ship unsubk, (,Ir c:a~ hCT to be m poor tnm. whIch would reduce her speed or manoeuVTllblhry. The \\'elghU of diffCTent
demenu in a ship were also calcubted. For a r-iji cLm cnuscr of 10,354 tons (fun load). for example. the biggest smgle ill'"m was lh.. hull at 3819 tons or 37 per cent. Fuel was n..Xl al 1700 tons. nUichinery at 1413 tons, armour prolection at 1289 tons and arnument al 1188 tons.Aircr.tfi and other c:qUJpmelll 1001: up a rebm'ely snull amount of weigh!.'
The linel of tIM Hum elau d...lroye. eocorl5, which h.d
'0 be modifit'd due to &II trIO. in 11M calc"brionl. TIlt dn.rinllbowl •
Seaworthiness and Stability
Mrits of a-ot.I
A ship at ~a IS subJCCI to six diffCTent motions, caused by the sea and. to a Ie:s.stt attnt. by the wind. Surglllg IS \':l.I'UDon in the fQn\w motion. SW3)' i:l; dlspbcelllent &om sirk to §Ide and hea\'!' is the up and down moaon. The three other motions aU ilnul,'e rotation aboul the Uitp's axes: roll as the upper pan of the hull I1iO\'t'S liom side to SIde, pitch as the bow i:l; TJisc:d and low~=i when headm{; into wa\'t'S. and pwing as the steenng IS affected by omsidl'" forces. Pilching "'as fell mOSt m the bows of the ship. R.olling "'as ofl<'n what disturbed CI"C\\I$ most, for example in tll<' Flower eLm COf'"CIICS. which were tOO snull for th~' NOM Atlannc where they did nlOSl of their service. It could cause extreme exhaustion. but wlut c:au$Cd most st::l.SIckness \\'as heave, the up and down 11I01.l0n. though that "'as not: aM7YS appreciated at the time. U~mg Ihe weIghts he hJd calculued. the constructor "''as able to
Opposite: Filling the ....... model to ••pede] r;g iMide
th" .tl' unk in the N.cionaJ Ph)"';cal
Labono.ory •• TNd.i.lI&toa in
Middl_s.
find the: ('('nue of gnVlly of the shIp. He was also able: 10 find the centR' of buo)'.mcy from Ihis hnes plan. ThIS would be dll"cctly aoo..'C the et:nlR' of gl1lnly If the ship W~ uprigtll. but would nl(l\"(' gndwlly ;lW2Y fTom II as the ship heeled (l\Tf due 10 wind or "':I\'rS. This created a motion th.at would tcnd 10 nghl the shIp. unlC'SS II w~m 100 far and nUSC'd a cilpsizc. The distill';:!: ~rwccn the (conn of
gravity and buO)'al1C)' was the mcucclllric height.lfi! "'~ 100 great. me ship "'"Quid be In dtn~r of capsizing. If II W;lS 100 snull. the ship ....,ould be tOO 'stiff' and ""OUki O\~rrrllhe lower part to c!'Cale a 'knuckle':u ill nearly a1lllritish cruisers. It was also less likely to happen \\~th a IOllgl:r huU, and till.' R.iwr da.loS, 50 jl<'r cent 1011b"t'r Ihan th" Rowers. was qUltC successful in this respt'<:l. A btQ;ldt"l" huU (QuId reduce rotllng. but a much simpler solution W:15 10 fit bilge keels. Tht'S( \\-ere fin-like strucrUI'I."S wmch \\'tT\' fitted along the bilge for about Iulf thr kngth of lhe slup. They \\-ere beutedly fitted 10 the FlO'wcr d:l5$ alier they Iud I:l<'t-tl I$M in Ihr Atuntic. and did much to tl'ducc thelT probkms. AnothtT §alulJOn \\";IS to fil De'nny-llrown stabilisn's. which 1-d an arra~t of fins and gytOlCopes. 1'hcK "'en:' tned on Hum cbs,s C'SCon dcstm).'n'S. blll "'n\" ncx fully dC\'C1opcd unnl alter Ihr wu. Stabwt), w:u a rather different problem from ~a",o"hlllt'SS. The Flower dus CCln"l'ttes \\"I're perfectly scawonhy m that thC)· ""I're no! likely 10 be faull)· dull:l~ in rough ~:lS.. They endul"l'd the wom wnther of the funic of the Atbnric. and none "'H wnk from Ihe action of the $Ca alone. But this \\'35 srrW.I comfo" to their crews. C$Jl<"Cially in the early suges of the war, for the)' h.ad to endure appaUmg mUmg which caused seasicknos ;lIld exh.ausuon.
Design to Building As the deslgl1 progressed. more alld more passed to the d",nghtsmell who would settle IIUIl)' of Ihe detalls accordmg 10 slandJrd ruk"S. and d",w plans thai could be SCIlt 10 the shipyards. Naval draughrsmen, like construCtors, had tTa1l1ed 111 the royal dockyards bUI Iheir SI..IUS was rather lower. In W
the d\'iliall ShlPPrds. In the nuJor programmes for COT\"l.'"rtes and fnl!i:ll<.'S. 1l'lOS' of the design work \\'H fumed OUI to pn\':Jle shipyards and then apprm"l.'"d b)' L1~'ds of London befofl:' b<'ing $ol'nt back to the Adnuralcy, Under the su~'1Sion of the COl1SU"UetOfS the dnughl5nlCn would s('uk the l1cuils of collstrucnon. A shell-planng diagram would g1\~ the S1~(, and shape of C':l.("h plate. while the indi\'iduaJ melllMTS of the frame would be drawn out.The enb'll1C' room w;u punned III §allle l1cuil. including the supports for the englOCS .lnd bOIleD and the complicated plplllg. Exh compa"ment was drawn in dcta.il "ith lIS fiuin~ and fumitufl:', while wirmg and plpmg dla.gra.ms ""I'fl:' nceded for the whole slup. A SCt of s("\"l.'"TaI hundfl:'d plans \\'H Sf'1Il to eKh of the ShlM'':Jrds bUlldmg the new cbu. E\'l;'n tll<'1l til( work of the 11a\':l1 conStructor "'35 not ended, for membcn of the (Qrps wen:- b;ased in tllC prds as ruv.l.1 o...,,=n to SUjl<'TVISC the bmldmg.The completed shIp was tll{'n It'Sled on a measured mile, olien the one offArran in Scodand Ih.U ofretl'd deep W'.ller. Lessons rmght iN: karm:d aboul how thl' design worked OUi in p",ctict.
Coastal Forces Coll\-cnnon.ll naval archltectun:- dId not work so ""I'll on the smaller and newer tyIl<'5 in tht wamme na\')'. Most snl.l1J bnding craft abandoned an)' attempt at producing a stfl:'.lmlllled hull, though sublhcy \\':lS quite ImpoT'UJlt m VICW of the heary ""I'igho> §anlC of them had to carl): The fast cnit meet by Coasul Forces ,,-ere different m another w~. Largn w;mhips had dispbcelllelll hulls III which Ihe amount of hull m the "':JteT \\'35 reasonabl)' constant for a gi\""Cn ~. Coasul forces urgcly used punmg hulls, desIgned to lift much of the \'l'SSt'1 OUt of the water at high speeds. It would only work on small \'~ls of hght displacement. II }w anguur bi~ of 'hard chll1C" as It \\-as called. whICh made It \"l.'"1)' lIltlDclCllt at low sp«ds. II had to be shon III propomon to 10> btudth. which a1so nude It perform poorl)' al low speeds.The basic principle was th;.t al high speed the shajl<' of the hull would cause much of Ihe \'esse! to be r:l1Sed OUI of the water. It usually had a V-shapcd bottom under the chlllcs,ThlS dId not ard speed and a tht bottom would hav>:, donI;' JUSt as well. The V·botrom gavc somc ducwonal stablllt)'.alld It allowed the hull to settle Inck in the W;lIer as sp"rd was reduccd wlIh less'slanumng'. Much of the early dt"Slgl1 of such cran was len to private contraclon such as Falrll1llc, Vosper and the British Power Boat Compauy. bUI tilt' whole process w..s sup"JVis,rd by W J Holt of the ReNe.
78
Churchill's Navy
2 Shipbuilding The Shipbuilders British shlpbuudmg Iud sujf~'red heavily ill the great dcprrn;ion. perlups more dun any other industry. Aner a pc:r.k of more IMn 2 million tons of Illw:hanl shipping in 1920, it Iaunche-d only 133,000 IOns In 1933.1 Uncmploymelll In the industry reachl'd 60 per cenl in 1932, comparro with :a rutiorul :r/cngc' of 23 per cent. Industri.u reblions M"no noubly Ind, with the famous 'demarcation' strikes bctwttn unions and a muJtiplicity of mdcs doing VOIrious jobs - one authority wrote of'the D"Oubies tmt Disc beC1we of the rigid linulS as 10 "'Ork which are b.id down by a number of rival trade unions' ,"The managcmc:nl, SC'veral geller-alions on from che engineers and cntrepreneun who Iud founded the grt'.11 compamcs. displayed a strang\" blend of complacency and fear - they "'ere complacent that the skilb of Britnh shipbuilding could n~~r be replicated anywhere else, bul fearful tholl another depression wouJd destroy them altogether. As a !'dull. inveslmem in capital equipment and in the traming of labour W» ~ry spa~ in these ~ars. The largest shipp.rds "'ere concentrated on the Clyde. the ri\'en of nonh--cast Engbnd such as the Tyne and T~. and the Mersey, Labour and land costs had dri~n the industry &om the Thames. but yards CQuld be found in small southern
"'" ""-u..
.. ............... ........ ........ -. .aup,.nt
""""' """" I9)Z. k '"""
-..y
- r.• " ' .
pons such as Cown and Dartmouth. The Clyde did not have a monopoly of Scottish shlpbuildmg. which was carried out in Leith. Dundee: and Abe-rdecn on the east coast. The gm't'rnmem had SC\ocral num sources for Its wamllps.The royal dockyards wne the most obvious. but in f;let their nnin function was repan rather than builwng. The three malO yards. Chatham. Portsmouth and Devonport. did build some ships m peacenme.largely to keep the labour force together and stay in touch with the latest techniques, but in warti.mc they mostly went over to TCJnlr. The main
exception was Chatham. which built eight subnurines during the W1T but only completed olle cruiser. Devollport built the nrrier Terribk, the only one butlt m a royal dockyard. Most naval shIps ""ere built by private industry. During the peace the number of experienced w.lrship builders had d~lined oom
.. ' . ' .
rard on Tyneside. but in general it was shoruge of bbour rather than land Ih3t cOllStnined British shipbllliding. Hov.'Cver. there ""ere many other esubli~hed and recently under~employed y.t.rds which built merchant ships. Rather dun con\"en them to the skills of warship production. the Admiralty confined the building of c;l.pital ships, (Cruisers. destroyers. submarines and sloops to its usu;l.1 yards. Olher
.'..,
we
-
!:= ... ~
types of w.lnhip. such as the Flov.'et cbss corveues and the Rivt"r class frigates. were designed to merch;l.1Il ship suncbrds, so thai Ihey could be built elsewhere. This opened up a large number of shipyards for w.lrship production. led by SllUlh's Dock of Middlesborough, who initiated the AO\\-"er and RIVer programmes, Even the Il\IIUben of esublished merc!J;l.nr shipbuilders ....-ere not enough to ml'"t:t warume needs. and Otlll'1' conlp;l.flie5 outside the industry ....~re deployed. I'ower·bo
79
The Ships
~nlin:ly h:,IPPY. but more recem dCSlgJU such as the Dpt:lin class frigates and the Iltr
A Typical Shipyard Most Brmsh Shlpy.lrds had been bId out btl' in the nin~t~cnth century when smaller ships were common.They usually had houslIlg and other facilili"5 built round them, so expalUlon was not easy. A report of 1942 stated that 'Most of the old rards on Ihe North East Coast and Scotland
Shipyard worb.., frolll the
""'rlil1l~
publlc.non
8.;/11 tJu SJoi"
Churchill's Navy
80
are !inured In 51ZC md annoc asily ~ dw:u boun
decanted With models of drips the firm had b\l1lt. TheT( ....'etl: "'OI"kcn entrances to the y:ard for the different tDdcs. and plumbcn'. shen-lIOn, timnu~ and paint Wops on W eNeTn !.ide of the yard. The srruthy \\'» dose b)'. along wuh :I lirushlllg shop f()£ the making of furnishings.11le steelworkers' shed nn panlkl lO the fln= Clrde. and conwne:d :I ~ ofhe:lvy rollc:n for bending pbtc5 up to 35 feu III 1c:ngth.;an deanc pbrung nudune.:I lhngmg mxhmc: and four punching mxhincs. 8ctund dus W2S ;an :Itea for Ronng Red pbtcS m the open. mCT they had bttn brought in by niM7Y and u-amlines:llong the Renfrrw RO:Id. The joU1CTS' ~ was ~I the \\~c:rn end of tim nnge. \Yuh the mould Iolt on the :ia:ond floor. Then "'2S; :I 53W mill, ~nd the ~rd used hydnuhc pumps. arr comprnsors :md :I boiler to power the machinery. In me cenuc of the yard w:u the senes of SIX \\'tte
$eJl~IC
",!OSHP !i£CTION -CAlISER
,. ,: , ;
" , . , UOSlI
'
....
j
JeCtion
of. cruller, lhowiag the thlckn,.... of lhe dl(fttall f..mel'
and pial.., with .rma... On
-_ ..
.... ....
..
_",..
o
w.ps.
building bid out in 1927, filted With clectnc cnnes 120 fen tugh With an ouuca<:h of70 feet :md a "Vrking Io:Id of 6 tons. MOR dtipyu
The Labour Force A shipyard ....';15 a noisy and
Dun", IN WIIr WI' worIeed ""Y Iorrf houn IIlId jf UIU lvlJuh bl.d dotm ,hnr. 1M JIrNs, n>nl ~ ,k SIUf WCJ lh,nlrw. wnr dmft! IItld djngy. "l"My Juul III tN, oj W OW'!" rhem, drDr INS "" dOIhori!'e bI«/r..."", nl1YlItlU, 1/ uas JWSl III ~ 1m OW'!" 'M gI4ss J1wu 0l'I fM roof. AU fM "-vvp IuJd grriJI btg sailtlM" twl1"
81
""o~~odinl
rt'd-hot &wnes oa tM bendin,; obb in • ~d~ shipyud
ill 190,A
photognph by
Building Techniques
....rong. The l,"i/h. a frigale launched al leith III 1942, 1le\'Cr did
Wu~hips
perform properly b«~usc of poor ~Iigllrncnt. In an alterroati\1:: system, Ihe m~lIl Slrellb'1h of the IT:llncs lIught be plJccd along lite length of the hull uther than ~cross it. When thiS was
U'K"d D-qu~lity $t('l."! 1II h")' parts 10 S.l!\1:: weight. ~ pnctlc(' whu:h Iud 1)<:en encoungC'd while the hnmaf10n t~aties w('~ in force. Merchant ships. and thOS<:' ~uch as frig;ttes ~nd corWUl-S built to rnerchalll ship ,undards. used mild SI"d which W:.IS much ('uler to work. Sec..! was brought inlo Ihe shipyard mostly by rail and 'plcklcd' III a weak sollllion of hydrochlo~ic acid 10 remove mill ~alc.
lis grade w.u measured by Ih,' wl'lght of a squ~rt: fool. For I)'plnl cruiser of Ihe I 'J30s used "O.pound steel. which Wa! an lIIch IhICk, A ship \\'U built on ... building sbp SItuated so dUI the fimshed prodUCI could be launched 11I10 the rl\'er. The ship was erected on blocks and \\'U angled slightly 10 allO\\ 11 10 shlk down the ways on completion. Thr krd w~ the bilckbonr of lhe mlp. Sometimes It was two \~"lC2l keels COllll«'led lognher. a box kd.ln snulIer slups 11 WOtS a SIngle Jenes of vertial pieces of Sled JOllied logelhrr. Thr bo\\ of a warship was ltil.WIy quitr simplr in Ihis period, and Ihe S1etllposl which cominued Ihe ked up......... rds \\'U nornWly stnlghl or shghtly wr."t'd. The "('m WOtS more difficult ~nd oftcn needed a complex casting 10 form thc outlinc ofics shape. In Ihe n.. dition~l tnns\'Cf$(' fnllung s)'stelll.lhe fnlllC'S th.n gJ\1:: the hull 115 slupe were atuchcd ~long the length of the ked. They wrre nude of U· or Z-secnon sleelm WUSIIlPS, and benl 10 shapc against pms plaerd in holes on Ihe prd's bcndllig sbb. Thl")' 1l1lgIJt also r.:quire sollie bcvellillg. or anglmg of the bars, Fl";Illles were placed () feel apart III cruisers and I foot \} lllches to 2 feci (, incbes in dcstro)'ers, The engine bear.:rs in th.. cenlr.: of till' ship \\"'n.' thick plates and th.. shipwrights hJd to take parucular can: in lining up the propdlcr shafts, for a ship nught n('\'er p<."rform properly if it was don.. eX~lIIph:. ~
proposed for Ihe J Jnd K c1a~ destroyers jusl before the "'2r, the Clyde shipbuilders led a delegalion 10 the Adunralty 10 WJrn JgJmst II. But II was highly effectl\'C III a long narrow vcsscl such as a destroyer and becJme standard," The pb.tCS which would form the skill of Ihe hull ....'Cn.' cut to shapc and bem by special rollers. If rweung was wed, Ihey had 10 be punched \1::T)' accurately so thai Ihe holes would linr up with those on the !Tames,11I<")' would Q\1::rbp on Ihe finished ship. and \';lrlOUli Jyslcms ofJosglmg' \\1::t'C used to gwc a smooth OUnick hull. The hun was Jiso plated Illienully III lIS 1000\"r pan to crrJtr a double bottom for S1rrngth, s.afrty and furl storagr. Strong bulkheach ....~re plxed at rcgubr 1Il1CT\'Jh and w~rr an lInportant pan ofth(' $b'UCtUT"C. Thq ga\'l' strength to Ihe struclure and ~ ....'C'd to subdivide the hull in Ihe C\~nt of dan13gr. Thc). Iud con~rvative
...."Jterlighl doors and hatchC1 to be closed when danb"l::r threJtcned, The decks wnoe ~Iso pan of thiS "mclUre, hclpmg kerp waler or 011 om when necessary and bncing Ihe: sides against ...."Jtcr pressuT"C,
Riveting and Welding Since the advent of iron and steel ships in tht" nint'lt'cnth ,,"ntury, riveling had bt'cn tilt, standard mClhod of fixing the parIS logether. Several types of rivet were used, lIIc1uding coumersunk, pan head, straight neck and so on, according to how smoolh the surface had to be, the $1TC'ngth lll'('dt'd and Ih,' app,'~nnCl'. jOIlJ15 formed by
82
Churchill's Navy
ri\~ting .......r.. not ,Lh.....ys completely "";lIernght and had 10 be 'f;Julk('d' by ~plmmg on.. edge of the pieces to be joined and driving
II "'gliIiSI the :adjacent picce.
Welding "~ don.. by placing (\\'0 adpcem pam of the SUUCWI't' :lIongsl(k OrK' another with a triangular gr00'01:' in the join between them.'" meal rod W3S melted by an d«mc arc and ajoin ...."as formed as the meal solid.fied. W..lding had 11Ull)' advanugeJ. Pb!CI could futrd al right anglo to n:ducing th.. n~ for rht- ~rion.lbey could be bid end to end wllhoU[ ~riap. saving "Tight and crc:uing a much slllOOl:her and more ....";ltcnigtll surf:ICl: dun riveting. Once 11 tad ~n kamcd. ",,~lding "''";IS much quid:..r and cheapl'r dun riveting
Unions which might resist dunge, Aho. D-qanlil}' $l~I. as used for British warships. was difficult to """l:ld,Amrnnn yards. SWtlJlg with :m alfTlO5l: de:m sh~. were far more tnthusUstic about """l:idIng :md used II eXlmsl\Tly. ootably in IDe famous Liberty ship programme, British )'ards also began to ~t it during the war for mousands of landing craft and for a pmgrammc of200 frigalCl, wruch began IJ1 1942 and was to produce the Loch and Bay d~.
m.mes.
TIM fnu... ofa ohip erKC~
on lJw,
build;nl dip.
Prefabrication The 1942 liipte programme W2S also the first British one 10 apply prefabrication on a large scale to ocun.going ships. Numerous subU$Cmbbcs ""~ made in differnlt pbces. onen by engineering and bndgc-building firms with no expcnence of shipbuilding. The whole prognnmlC had to be very carefully pbnllC'd, with a central drawmg office m Glugow. ContnCtS ""~ pbced for individl.l.l.l sections. nollC' larger dun 29 feet long,. 8 fcci 6 IJ1ches wide and 8 feet 6 inches high. to fit on road and rail transportation, or more dun 2M IOns III """l:lght to suit shipya.rd cranes. John Brown of Clydcm.nk built the protOfypC Lxh Filda. amidst their usual work in banleships and cruisers. Other mclhods were used for some of the snu1ler craft. wruch """l:rt' nOt buill by COn\"l:nrional shipbuilders. C~ forces craft """l:R: mostly COIlSlruCted in p!r""OOd by yacht builden and bnding craft by boat builders and Olhers, More lr.Iditionai wooden methods were used for mOtor minesweepers. Barges were built in COTlCrele. and experiments were made with glass reinforced pbsric, a I1Ulenai which could be moulded and was immune to the effects of the magnetic mine.
Launching SiTlce Queen Victoria's time it had been traditional for a ship to be launched by a woman breaking a bottle over ia boo.vs, u.rge ships wt'l'l' often launched by the highest in the land - in 1938 the crui5Cr lklfoUt was launched by Mrs Neville Chamberlain. and Clementine Churchill launched several. Queen Elizabeth launched the carrier lmpl«ab/t in Glasgow in 1944.A bunch is alWllYS a telUoC lime for the Shipbuilders. but the lmpl/l(IIb/t posed special problems for the na\.aJ O\ocrs«r. Vic HaU. The ship had had her engines fitted before launch wruch IIUde her unusUillly heavy. and th~ rhocr was narrow. SO she had to be turned through 75 degrees as soon as she etllered Ihe ""'lIter.
1sptftt d s/«pkss nighl Muuhing tM ship lind IuJd Iht SJrip)'llrd Mall~ alld I"Ompany, all" us prrtrndjng 1I1f II'""'" IIt'fW'U and "nxWIIS. NO:I day Iht G>ocf u/ftl fill't us an O:lr.: 1fi 6 illS " IIdt - SWih a ,h"'g hdd ntwr IuJpptntd btjtNt on 1M OyM - amI 1M lalllll'h 14\1$ II prill swam borh Itthnll'':/Iy lind soOally."
DirmllrJ.f«
The: bunch of a ship
W
83
The Ships
Repair and Refits Ship R'pair W
and ul.c:d na"d ntings inslead of doxkyartt workers. III addition. lIIorc than 52.000 repair'S of " ....nhlps were earned out 111 pn\
T_pedo damage 101M Unon of 1M
calap 11 obiI'
Ari,PO
St.
.-d>ed pon 10 be
pul iu dry doc:k.
84
Churchill's Navy
3 Engines 1k RO')
b;tndoned SJlil by the early ~'CnDcth century. M=}' other IUYles used sailing ships as part or officer lrainmg. bul Admiral Lord Chadick! h.uI. dUUlVdy rq«tcd a ~,vaJ of wi lnlning in the 1930s_ S3i1 ....~ OCC2SN)rWIy usM as 1n auxtlury to J'O"o'ef on \'er)' snuB cnft on ddi~ trips. for CJQI11Jlle Iurbour defe:nce mocor bunc;bes on The \\~ to fOTC::lgD K:lDonJ. It _ also usM in ships' bo3ts and Iikbo.ors, and ;ill SUllie" lud some m.amng In handhng smaU cn.fi. Oars wef"(" also used in $hip$' b<»t:li and had some 10k In awung and lifcszving. But ;all \\'3n!nps ....~ ~ cnfi. rdiml on wir engines lOr mobilny :md nun)' 0100 fimcuons. Na\'a1 cngmn ""CI'I: under the- authority of the Enginea-m-Ch.ef of the N~ who \\'Zi :Ill Engineer Vice-Adnunl In the ControUns IXp... nmenl. He "''a! the ·Princlp.d advucr 10 the Board on all qunDOOJ Ufecang N3YoI1 Engineering', and "'Zi responsibk to me ContmUCT for,
-
n.e baic """""""Dlof • turbi_ ...gi....
... fill _11m of «sign, InspmUm IHId prodllCllotl t! proprllrng, IIUXI/lIuy and hyllnlN/it in intnlUl1 tombustion _ninny (MilD than Gumlny
~ Engmcn-m-Chief'"s scaff W1I5 brgdy rruck up of ruvaI eJlgIIl«nng officcn - more: dun 80 of than ,n 1943. mclucbng SC'Ynl R:¥-adnum. He aho lud ci\,lun soenn6c officers:md other CM1 ~D on hIS staff plus those emp~ in dlle Adminlty Enginrering l3bor,llory ~t Wr'S!: Dnyton In Middlesex. Engmen ~ "~ ~\')} offi«n. sprnd around the counU)' to SllpervlSe "Qrk In the: $lup)'3!'ds ~ to Inspect coal bought for- thoe Adminlrr But the E~r-in-Crud"', ~rtrnI:':nt nn:ly toOk the 1IUaao\~ In new de-.~lopml:nlS, which ~- came fiom prmllle Industry or- w offic~ In the fket..
Steanl Turbines Sill«" the building ofHMS Dmldnougltr In 1905-6, the "e:llm turbIne had bttn thl: num power pbm of:ill new w;umips of dr'SCroyn or sloop UU: UpW:llrds. It'! mury moaon n«ded fn\~r movmg FIS. hence less nuintell:llJ1ce ,Iud ~ reduced engme room comrleml:nt. It was mo~ fud dlickm thm thl: rrcipfQC:llring I:ngine a! the high speeds which w:uships n~ded. It wn lighter :lind 11:1 cenue of gnvny "~ Iowt'"r, which :lIdC"rl stllbility. Thl: tlIrblne I:nginl: nttdl:d high-pressun: stc~m of ~bo\lt 200 pounds per sqWIl' inch. Theil' wen:': SC'.~nl w:ays of convcrnng Ihl! to ~ roury 1II0tion bul by f:llr thl: most common Brit"h onl:, invented by Chules I'~rwru, wu the re~etion SYSII:Ill. hlSldc ~ cylll1dnca.l a1111g. S1e~m W:lIS p:llSSCd through a series of rotors fiul:d With bbdcs. ~ltcrn~ung with fixe-
The Ships
the Flnl: World Waf. Mafllie turbine linkers did flO( keep in touch with the nnnuf;lCtull'n of d«trlcuy gclK'raton. who were womng m a ~aUy expmdmg nurkct and nude nuny ad...;mces be:f\\un die wars. In comnsc. there ....-ere betteT linb bern"t'rll th., rwo sides of th., indUSlry in the USA and Il'a1 ad\omces were nlade. /\mencan turbines Iud f('\\'t'f btxks.;md th«e wen: ImpfO\'ements In die design ofbollers. supeme.llen and geanng. As a result. th., "lIgi~ ofdl., USS ll':l$hinglon
at the CroS.dll..w,Tills could Pl\'Ot. and Irs lower end ....';15 ataChed to the Cf2I\kshafi to mnsLne dI( up and oo...TI l1lO\'emem IntO a lOUry motion.
w~
Both the rurbme and the rnple expansion engine required Stearn .11 high pressure. 11K- Flower cbss con'eUes were fined with cytindriaI Scotch
39 f'"'I' comt mort' fud efficknt dull those of the KirJg ~ V OIl low speeds. and 20 per cmt at hIgh speeds." It was 1943 be:fore die Engrll«r.m.Chlef bcpn to :address tbe- probkm. but implO\'emenrs only shov."ed in the Om,,!, cbss desuO)'t'T'S wluch appeatt'd rhC' uw.
mer
Boilers boilers as usallII the Mcrdum avy. bul these pro-"ed mapablc: of m., sudden changes III speed needed In U~I hunting and u~ the onty real f;lult m the engines of the cbss.. Ortla ships Iud water rube boikn.. According 10 the .\lilrlrmtry Harulbook of 1941. the V>'ater lUbe bcnIcT was 'bghtCT. more SUltabk for burning oil fuel and Steam can be raised
Steam Reciprocating Engines The steam I't'CIprocaung: mgme w;as f:u older. mm:rly descended fiom those ck\'eloped by James Wan and his ~ in m., .,ight=nth c.,nrury.lt was based on the principle rIut S«'aIll.. when condensed C'I\-"atCS a parmi \':K'\Ium alld rIus can be used to nuL:c: a pisron 1TlO\'e \\idlin a crbndel'. It w;as a r«lproc;lting engin., in rlul th", pisr:ons nlO\\"d up and down, raula uun ill a roury Illooon. Wnt added the ~u." CondellSCf Sll that SCcarll w:as drawn OUt of the cylinder to n'Oid wasting heaL From a nur1l:lI11e point of Vl(:\\·. the bil;l;C'SC sc"'JlS ClIIl'" in Ul'" bl'" ninf't.,.,nth C.,nlury when high-p~urt'sceam w:as U5ed.A !i«ond cylinder was addcd. to use up ole lower pressun: ~te;un from th., first cylinckr.:meI a mird ....';15 inmxluccd;n 1880 10 create the triple ujWlYon engine. This had uu~ Ot four cylmdc'I'5, a small onc for high-pressure Kearn. a slightly brger intermediate one, and one Of two b~ ones for the remaining lowpll'SSure SCeam, TIlis g;t\'l.' much grt';ller fuel efficicncy ;lnd madc the oce;ln.going S1calllship practicable. whether W;l.rship or merchant ship, The navy had virtually abandoned the triple expansion engine after lhe [ml1dtr,mgltt wn built. but irs simplicily. cfficiency;ll low specds and low ftnt con made It auraClive for Ihc gre;ltcr p;lrl of the merchant manne. It kcpl coming lnd:: to the navy as the power unit of ~quisitioned lllerch;lnl ~hips and fishing b
iJ fC'el 8 UlChn lugh at rhc- top of the casmg. and the cylin
The engme could be put into n:o.'er-se by aItmrrg lbe- din::ttion of nlO\~II1C'llt of lhe cybnders, Sll It Ilt"eded no geanng.
qUlCM. Also a wateT·lllbe boiler c;m be ~ to .....irhswld higher prosures and gi\'e a higher degrtt of superheat·.ll It was designed 10 expose the nwamum surlXe area to the hen of me furnace. and at lhe Orne uithsund the IJelllt'J'ldous prosures mat buill up inside iL lh: Admiralty ......' att:flube boiler 100 bttn de-\'eloped III the 1920s:mel tesrf'd agall1~t the ronmln'Cl.:l.i productS of Babcod::. and Wikox and Y:urow. It u'3llenl·hke in stupe. wilh the ~am tank for-ming irs ridge along m., top 2nd tWQ u'ater tanles. of §tllaller dianlC1<:r. as the en'CS. NlUlllTOlIS .....'alc:f tubes formed the Sldes.;llld mc furnace was inside dut. It containf'd up 10 a do~en oil burners which pl"QVided the he::lt. e~h running the whole length of Ihe boill'r, TIlt' ends of UIC furnace were lined with fircbriclcs. The U'alef in Ihe lowef bnla U'aS heated and p.:l.SSf'd Ihrough the S:J.11'lt'
I\'bes into the Sle;lll1 tank above, This was sui12ble fOf triple expansion enginl"S. which preferred the stcam to be: a linle '\\'er' ;lS the moisture would help lubricale lhe cylinders. Turbine engines used 'dry' Slearll which was he;lled even mort', From thc Sle;lrll lube il was passed through a scrics of smaller tubes running fore and aft among thc main boiler tubes. Sll lhal it ......';15 f;li~ed 10 a higher lempenlUre, 2nd;l pressure of 250 pounds pef square inch, Thc cnglllcs wcre situated as low ;lS possible in the ship to impl'O\'e the centre of gravity, simplify If;lrlsmission to the propellers and to minimise Ihe potenli;ll for aClion cbnuge from sheDs, The bottom of thc ship was cspcci:illy strong in thc engine room. Engine mountings ....'ere oflen of C;lS1 Iron in the .,arly stages bUI it lendC'd 10 crack with :lClion dama~, so IhC'S(" ....'l.'re replaced by f2brioted SUlICIUI't'S where possible, Much thought wc::nl into the byout of the boil.,r and cngin., rooms JUst before: and during the war, b~ly to milli~ action daIlU~. Whc::re ~b1e on luger ships. e;lCh engine :lnd boiler .....as in a scpante comparUIl.,nt, WIth CI'OSS-O\'er pipes so mal a boil.,r could f.,.,cf a different engine If n.,.,cfed. Access was needed on each side of ~~ry unit, Sll a grealer amOl.lnl of spac., WZi n.,.,cfal.
inches..
Steam emr:rullt at a nWWllum pressure of225 pounds pt'T square Inch. III the mel of lIS srrokc It v>'otdd exluUSl: to the Intermt'dute pressure cybnder, WIth a dumt'la" of J I inches.. then alter mod>cr sno~ the Steam ......ould be di\itkd t'l{wIIy bt:tv.ttll the f\\'O low pressure cybndcTs.. oue at ('xh end ofrhc enplll: u,th an lllternal ~er of 38M inches.. FiruUy It would go 10 the con<J.,mtT to be rurned ~Ir:: into ....'all'T. Each of m., pisr:om 1r.l\~1kd JO inches up or oo...TI with e-xh snoke. 11KpISton rod .....'3l 6xrd to II. and was bo'!tf'd Ul rum to the conJ1C'CUon rod
Internal Combustion Engines Th., diC'S("1 omgi"", Iud been lilted to ships smce the Sdilfldill. a Danuh
coast<:r of 1911. but It w:as only ronsiden:d suitabk for snuIkr merc~nt shIps and the 8rttish shipping industry reuilled irs confide-lICe in sc.,am. Dit'SC'1 .....as \'ery fud-diicienl and could be Openled by a snull ('re\\' compared ....,th a §t.,:J.ITI engin.,. PIllS it could be opcraled by a
\"Cry
snuII
(rt'\.\'.
Unlike perrot engines westl fuel .....~
85
The O1O'lor I'OOm or lM .lIb""ar;M n;..... in 1942.
not combustible unlt"SS compressed inside the cyhnder. which ....'35 a greal u1v:1lllOlge for a ~rup Ihat h30d 10 go imo action. Du~sd engines w~rc the nuin surface p<J\'~r pblll$ of British SUbll13rillC'S from 1907. This was one case where Ihe AdnunJty took a
1C3d In cngUie dc,-,.~Ioplllem. brgdy beuusc of the deficienclcs of me Brmsh dll~sd mdustry. The AdnunJty Expcrllllenul ubonlOry 3t West D~1on tested single-cylinder examples of engines.. and thell mulacyhnder models ....~rc imUlkd in subnurines. Engines b)' Sulzer (S\\'1ss) and MAN (Gc-mun) w~re lested ag;llllSl Bm~h ones b}' the Adminl!}' and Vickers m the T-eLm subllUrmes of the 1936---7 progr.lIJune 3nd were considered superior. The olher way m whICh dlcsel and cleanc power ....'35 combmoo III the RO)';Il a"Y"Ol'i in the upuin cbss frig3tcs built III the USA. Thcsc UK'd the electriC motors as 3 meallS of gC3nnl! dowll the steam IUrbincs. Dtcscl engmcs were also used III many bndtnl! cnfl. The slluller t) pes were imported from Amenca. whtk mallY of those powering medium-sized \'l'Sscls such as Tank Landing Craft were built by the Bnmh firm of Dall)' Paxman. According to onc of its direclO.... ..• ,hr N',l!'ffN tl"" II(l,H(l'tTf.ihlr. bill 'I..,t" rottu('(ud '(l (lil,,'prr.Jlrd r(T.lt'fSt rlrr (.1IIlroJ <>f rI,r mMlrmrry 1<'11$ IIrr.mgcd by II<" /I'1WS for
IJlld FfdIWIO" gtlJl'1:
tolth Ultl'. emt 10 (Omrollht mgint ~ptTd /I"d Iht (lIM'O roll/roll/It htad IN m'NJt rluuh(J cf Iht gt'lir-box, lIl1d Iht (o",roI 1n'tTS.for /1/1 mgillf'5 Il-'m' grollprd in /1 jinglt j'ar;on 1I;lh $Jugr """rdj wordIly luiblt ,lrcrrfivm. Starrillg I<W tffmrd lrr laW rlrrrrie 51/111" motors, in Iht samr lIuy lU a IIWrl>r (1Jr, ("'fj(qutllrly, "" dnll Uftaln'fT U'IU ~ n1M 10 j/(rr1 or rvn thr mgi~, or 10 tOIlI""'M "ptr.rlilHl of 1M propclfn." The GcmurlS used drcsell:ngmes In thl:lr E-boat\. but British indUSlr)' lu.d f;ril<:d to ~'ek>p ;r IJgh(\\~lgtll. hlgh-spc:<:d I:ngllll:. SO they hold to usc penol engmes. despile Ihl: obo,'ious d.m~n of combusnon. E\~n then Ihe supply "';IS doubtful. as UIIIU of O\~r 1000 hon.c:p.:......~r wen: needed. Engincs such as the Rolls RO)'ce Merlin wen: n:sen't:d for 3lKnfi. and research and de\"<:lopllu:m also concemr.lted on aero engmes.The engltll"S of the flrsl mOlOr 10rpcdo OO;ru were built 1»' Ihe Italian firm ofhoUJ Fraschml.TheAdl1ll(alty nllsscd 3 chalice to have dll'lII produced under licence in I3rilain and the supply was of COIlfS(' Cllt of)' whl'lI Italy etllered till' war. The Hall SCOIt Defender from AlIIl'rica was lIsed as a StOP gap. It had bcen dl'wlopcd 10 combal boodeSKers. bUI il had a ho.-sep<.>wer ofonly 620. which meant [har Ihe speed of boats was ll-ss than 30 knolS. The PJ,c\(ard engine of 1230 horsepower also came from Amenca. and was far more gnsfaclOry.
The Ships
At the ~g of the ....-ar about lWfoflow-specd ships'b02.a .....~re equipped Wlth perro! c:ngmes. Th~ W~re: unrc:lioable in surting from cold and wre: ....~ a policy 10 rc:-cquip Ihnn with diC5C'l. High-speed booatJ, Wlth the hoard dune: hull fonn. ....nc: ;a1] 6tted with petrol engma.. Re-cqulpmc:nt ....'3$ slow, but by the end of the ""'U about 95 ptt cent of dUps' boats used di6c:lThis crnted moany supply p~ :15 ~ ....=e more dun 80 dUfere:nt !ypc:s In use......Ith lJUfJ)' dili'crc:nt imalhtions.'"
w:ar. P:aper quahfie:atlons ""'l.'re: fn higher tlun in th....ngineering dep:arunem, bul prxlical uperienc.. aOOOlt ....'as f:at less. Nn-;aJ d«tnal .-qulpm..nl WZi dlV1dcd inlo high JXl""''CT. wtllch ....'as dfcctl\TIy the muscles of Ihe slnp and opented gun turrc:ts. winches, cnnes and so on; and low po"''CT, .....hKh opnated th.. 'ncnn' such :IS ndar. hsdie and other cqwpmau. The IUV}' rc:tIincd dirc:a CUrrc:tlt, whcrcOIS the US Navy began to go C''tr to alternating curre:nl in 1932. HO\\T\=. Ae g<"nenton Iud 10 be lined .....hal !unerican equipm~1Il ....'3$ adopted P\)oA'n' .....:IS produced b). gencnton opcr.tted nuinly by the
Propellers
.dup's CDglnes. :and "';as alrudy lined In ships supplied b)' the USA. Emergency pov.= ....~ aha pl"O\idcd by snulkr steam cnginCS'.ln 1938 il W3S dcoded 10 say .....Im 1lm.:IS thq.....~ COMldC'red more: re:luble: th:an di6c:1 engines. ThIS .....;as re:thought aficr SC\'Cr.II w:arrirnc disasters.
A few UWIO\\'-dnlt \'eSSels such 015 minesweepers still used paddle wheels. and the n;avy had experimented wilh jet-dmT in boding CM before: the war.Aput from WI. the ruvy re:hed on the~' propcDa to drnT ;a1] Its slups.ln gcnenl there: ....'015 one propcDer for C:OICh engine. A con'etle h:ld only one, where::15 the much smilla motor torpedo boat might Iu\~ thrc:e. Mmor Iandmg cnfi hOld one or 1.....0. dcstro)Tn ;and fngoates h:ld t'I\'O, and Cfln5ers, mltleslnps and aircntt arriers had four. Unless il was mounted on Ihe centre: line, the wit of the prupeDer had 10 be held out of the SIde by a V-shoapcd bnckel. Most ruv;a! propellen ""Tre: threc-bbded and nude in nungoanescbronze 10 protecl Ihem 110m decOI}'. Diameler WllS con5tr.Iincd by the position under the huD. The bbdes tu.d to be soong enough to beu Ihe streSS, but not 100 Wlde to creale inefficiency. The edges of Ihe blades were: elliplical and a gre:at deal of work and t;lnk testing went into their design. /I.!; ....~U ;as Ihe outside diameler. propeDers were: :aho cbs.scd by their pitch.This was the dislOlnce it would In\TI through the water in a single revolution in idea.! conditions. ~ithout any slippage. A snuDcr pitch .....:as more: uscful at lower speeds. ;as with the low gear in a c:ar. and the converse W,\5 Irue Oil high specds. But VOlriable-pitch propellcrs would have been tOO complex and vulnenble for the technology of the time. The correct pitch could be imporunt. In 1943 CaplOlin King of the frig:lte Ai'll" found that his had been wrongly st41rnped wilh a pitch thai \V;IS 2 feel less than Wlul ....';as intended. re:ducing Ihe spced of the ship to 16 knoa instead of20."
Electrical Systelns The Royal Navy had used c1ectrial JXl""'\"T in some form since the 1870s. for inlerior lighting, pumping :and lifting. signilling and sc:archltgha :among other purposes. It ....';as to become increasingty vitaJ during the W,U';as r:Kbr and sonu b«:ame more: and more: imporunt, and degaussing s),stems ....nc: filted to prolecl ships from th~ nugnetk min~. Th~ navy lud no dectrinl bnneh :IS such. for it ....';as put of th~ torpedo offic~r's duDes. /I.!; :a resull th~re w~ no corps of ~xpcri~nced ruv;a! electrical officers, :and th~ Depanment of th~ Direclor of Electrinl Eng1O«nng at the Adrninlty WZi :almost entirely civil=I rrwmcd. The Dutttor. Sir jmles Pringle, ....';aS the 'Principal Electrical Adviser 10 the Board' and 'Directly responsible: 10 the Controller for;a1] mattcn concermng the design. mspecuon. producaon and trUls of;a1] 6mrtgS. abies. appanrus. nuchmery :and IIl5Wbtions 10 .....arshlps :and au:o!ury \'eSSels of;a1] typeS. except W rr appuatus·... His sufTincludcd nuny members and associat~ mcmbcn of the Institute of Electnnl Engmeen, some Wlth th~ d~gr« oflbchelor ofScience and one Ph.D. in 1943. It lud only thrc:c ruv.lI offiurs,;a1] retired, at me hright ofth~
87
lJlCluding lhe 10ss of ttl<" I1rlt RoyPI in 194 I. If the main boilers ....TI'<" lrnockcd OUt the electnnl system .....o uld WI and there would be no JXl""''n' for the pumps. Alter Wt II \\'~ dcaded to fil emergency di6c:1 genCr.lIOD in all ships. sited aoo..T the willerline where possible. f'o",,\"T ""';as tnllSnUlted round the slup 17). mc:ans of a nng ITWn system. wh,ch ""';as 10 'extend fore: :and aft on Clch side of the \'tSSC1.
behind armour and. where: incre:ascd prOlection is secured Ihcrcby. bdow the .....aterline·. The poucy on CIrcuit breakcn ....';as that Ihey should be 'constnlctcd :and adJusled so ;as 10 opente in the following scquence:- bnnch breakers shall open first, the speed of opening to deu he:avy faula 10 be of the highesl pncticable WlthOUl undue compltcanon ofdcs.tgn.ll..tng nuin ilnd feeder brakers sh:all open next. and finally. supply breakers'.-
tell in a tank.
-- --
,
_ _ fCMI .....
\
-
- -
I.L .1HCl1 IUJIK 1JllI GUN
--
o o
---
(ct,LI
90
Churchill's Navy
The Muir. XXIII gun ....~ighed nearly 7 tom and fired .lI shell of 112 pounds oo."er ... r.m~ of up to 25.480 yards or ffiOn' thlln 14 miles. Other "cnions of the b-inch gun Included the: Mark XXII. which was mnwr but r.llhcr heavier and formed the 5CCondary arnumcm on the Nelson .and Rodnl}'. and Ihe elderly Mark VII.
which had
~n
imroduced in 1901 and was still used on a few ships
and rmny linen and arllled merchant cruisen.There were still 629 of these in scrvicc when the \VaT began. The 8~inch gun ....';l5 dC\"eloped for the heavy cruisers built between the WlIn. Some: wel"(' will'-wound, some wtre built-up. reflecting the ch:mge in construction. Onc hundred and sixty-eight WNt' nude. with ;a nnge of IllOrc than 30.000 )'3.rds Olnd ;a 256-pound projctuk The: 12- and IJ.5-inch guns of me FintWorid War were obsolete: so there was a 5ubsu.ntul gap to the' next size. the' 14-inch gun ofthl' King ~ V cbss. Thc design incorpor.lltcd the: blest technology and the range: of 1Il0rt' dull .18.000 }'al'ds ""'25 greater tlun dul of the: much olde:r IS-inch. wluk the: PlQjectile: W35 Uightly Iighler at 1590 pounds. l11e IS-inch gun W35 a cbssic dc:s1gn wmch eqwppc:d :til the- bter C2pital ships, of the- Fin! World w..r -l11e EJi:1JbnJu, the R cba and the: battkcruz5cn Hood. RrptdM and RmoM.w. It "'25 a great advance in it! cby:ond could still mort' thm hold it! own m 1939-45.Thert'"'ert' 179 ofthe-m a\oa.wbk 10 the n:ovy in 1939. though some: "~rt' 1051 with the Roy.JI OUr, &tIwm, Hood and RquLK.1c Iud a nuxi.lllum range- of 33.550 }oa.nk or 19 nwe and fired a plQjectile "~lgIung 1938 pounck.
o-n
Fitting
Ih~ll.
into
carlridg. in • Mini$Cry of Supply fillin. faClory, 1941.
The 16--mch gun. c:xclusi\'C: to the N~ :000 RoJroq. W35 the largest type in the navy. and the Wt heavy wtrt'6wound gun. It Iud the longest nngc: at 39.780 yards and the brgesl plQjecrile weighl at 2048 pounds. although dut \\'2S Je55 than the mort' modern 16-inch gum used in the American IOU'll cWs.
Quick-Firing Guns The Royal Navy produced a variety of guns in the medium nnge. unlike the US Navy which conccntnted on the 5-inch as the main gun of d~uo}'C:rs and the secondary unumem of battics hips and cruisers. The 4.7-inch Mark IX gun ~ used on mOSt destrorers. apan from the older V alld W cbs5cs of the Firsl World War, and SOllle of the Land M cbsses which had a mort' modern \'C:rslon. The Mark IX was built up in Ihrtt piece - the gun orA' rube. the jxket and the breech ring. The bre«h could be 5C't 10 quick firing or semi-autonutic. In the I.llter c:ose the breech opened autonuticilly aner firing rt'ady to kml the nexl round. which "'C:ighed up to 50 pounds and Iud .I rTUXimum range of nearly 17.000 yards.. Another t}pe of 4.7-inch gun formed the :onti.lircnn unumc:nt of the Ndsorr and RMnrt and okkr ain:nft arrien. It used fixed :ommunition in which the artrl~ and sheD "nt: 5CCUred logether for easier kmling. The only brgn quick-firing gun ""'25 the 5.25-mch. used for the seconchry arnwnem of the lUng Qow VcWs and the main armament
The Ships
of most of m~ Dido cbss cruis<'r'S. It ....~ lksigncd to fUlK't1On equ.ally weD :as an anti-aircraft gun and 10 fight surface craft.. It could fire 80pound Uiclls:lt:l nle of 10 to 12 per nllnUl~. The tWin -I.S-inch gun ~ de\-dopt'd for 19~ :Urcr:afi: nrrttn :and OJllC in SC'"l:"ral venions It ";IS filled In modcrruscd luttlC$hips in the ute 19J1A.Anothcr version ....~ used in the Ado Ro)W:lnd in 'IlIbllunlH' dqJol: shIps. The Dcrwe~n Decks or 3D Vt'rsion \\~ u5ed in flIlufrious class orricrs - this ....".IS a countersunk mounung designed 10 keep it de;ar of the :Lircr:afi: on deck. [t w:as used in single mountings in the IJt~r w:anim.. dcstl'Cl)'t':rs of Ihe S, Z Jnd C d35.SC'S :md in twin mountings in futtle c\a$s d(."lt~rs. but m~ of thC$C wen: nO! n:ady until mer the war. The 4-ineh gun also e:l.me in sc\'er.r.1 versions. The MJrk V \'nS Ihe oldest, Still e:arried on some of Ih.. old<'1't cruisers and :l.in:raft orne". Th.. M:lrks XVI and XXI .....e rt' wry common as the ano-alrenn arnument of nuny older b:l.n1cshlps. modern eru~rs. Hilled ~rclunt c::ruISCT$ and most Trihal cbss dlt'Sl.~"l:"r'S. It had a 35-pound p[QJ«u1c with nngc of 19.850 ymls ag,umt surfacc ~ts and :I C::Clhng of 39.000 feet ag:Limt :Lircnft when me gun was elevated 10 80 dcgtfts. More than 2300 of wm ....~re nude. Th~ Mark XIX ....~ a che:l.p.lQy,· \-docity gun moulded in a smgk block. Hnung (:()J"\'tttcs ;and frigates agunst $urfxed subnunncs.
Gun Mountings The navy was almost touUy dependent on a single C::OIllp:any for the.dnJgJ1 ;and nunuf:aeture of its heavy :l.nd medium gun mountings. As a nUtler ofpolicy th~ ....~re produced byVkkers-ArnlSlrong. for the work ffiluired \'n)' expell:sh"l:" equipment. whkh ....,ould 1x diffi=h to llLillllt.lJn during the nJvaI slump betwttn the WJrs. As :I. priv;lte company. Vkker:s-Armstrong could support it by t:lking on fon:ign orders. N<.'\'<.'rthd($$, dl."\'elopment tinw W3$ \'t:ry slow and it took SC\"l:"raJ )"<':1." to pmduce a nl."\\' gun. whic::h W3$.1n imporulll faclor in choosing the I-I-mch for the King ~ V class b:l.ttlcships al an early St:lge of their design in 1936. Ca~ity aIVickers ....";IS expanl'C$$Ion.The nC\\'t'r type W1S the l;:l:ntn! pi\'()l mounting in whkh the trunmons were supponed by a Sltel pbte on each side with a third plate forw:ml to connr:ct them. On a lightcr gun on a single mounting, the whole assembly was secured to:l. fbt circulJr plate mounted on rollers to allow milling. A lJrger gun \\'3$ tnined by the 1Il0ven":m of the turn:l. A heavy gun mounting \\';1$ a huge construction. The quadruple 14· inch lurrets of Ihe King Qow V class wen: 60 feet deep o\'er four
L
d«ks ;and wcighed a.bout 1550 tons. On a snu1Ier sale the Mark XXIII tripk 6-inch turret "~ ~ on Ed",butgh ;and fiJI class cruucn and a simibr 1II0unung was used on the Soulh~mplon dass. The upper pan W:lS the gunhousc. protected by 2-inch Hmour on the sides. n:a.r and mof. and -I-inch on ilS front face. The middle gun ....~ mounted 2 feCI 6 inches b:l.ck fro/ll the othen. P:l.rtIy so th:l.l ;adja.cent crews would not interfere with one anOlher. At the re:l.r of Ihe lurret W3$ a pbtform and periscope for the offic..r in chargt.'". and a SC:l.t for a tclephon.. operator. Cordite and amlllunition hoists c:l.me up through holes in the floor. closc 10 the IMding tr.JYS of the guns, whkh c::ould only be used if tht elC\r.llion w:.r.s 12M degrees or less. E:l.ch gun had a scat for the la)"<'r who controD"d Ihe elevation. There w.l.5 only one Irall1cr. for the turret W:l.$ mO\'t'd :IS a ..... hol~. and h~ sat b<.'lwe..n th.. firsl and second gun. The hole .....h..re each gun penelnltcd the shidd ....":1.$ c::0\..:n:d by a can\';lS bWt. ba.g. The turret ~ hydraulic:: poy,..:r III t'\\'O engll1es to min :l.t ;a nuxlmum rale of 5 dl"grcn per SC'Cond. Local SIghts ....~re fitted for ~ if th~ dim::tor failed and a small gun. known ZIi 'sub-calibre' \\~ $lowed on one SIde of the turret for usc in prxtiee. Three fcci below Ihe floor of the turrel ....'15 the turnuble comparrmcnt hich conuined Ihe clt"\"ting and Ir.l.imng ~;u. ;and the rollen on hich the turret rotated. Below that W1.$ me ....,orkmg elum1xr WIth the rrwn po'\\..:r unll. an od cookr, md lund mining gear for use in an elll~rgeney. At Ihe next IC\..:I down ""5 all xccss pialform for inspecting the gear leading 11110 the turrel to be mspc-eled. The shell hoiliu ran dO\\'n from the turret 10 the armoured shell I'QOms weD below decks. The cordite hoisl nn :I. deck funher down.lnlO the nugazine. Both typeS of hOtsl "~re protected by doors to pre\'ellf a fl.1shing p:l.ssing down to the uugazine. Nine mcn .....o rked in the shell I'QOIIl of o:-ach turrel. three in the cordite h:l.ndling room :l.ud eight in the nugazine proper. The whole turret :l.sscmbly weighed more than 630 tons!' The 4.7-inc::h single mounting of a destroyer w.l.5 much simpler. [t W:I.$ dc\"ted by Iund.turmng a wheel on Ihe len side of the gun which operated gears to nise or lower it. Tnining .....;as also by h:.md. a.nd the gun and iu mounting turned by means of a two-speed ge:lrbox. be\'t'l .....heels. :I worm gcn ;and pillIOn. In fut gca.r for anti-aiTCr.lft usc il could lllO\~ through 4 degrees per second. :lnd 2 dcgrca in .slow gear. There \\~ a semi-circuur loa.dmg tny on the kn SIde. where the allUJlUIUOOn ....";IS plxed before It ....~ nmmed IntO the breech by a handle O~ted by Slccl Wire ropes. There \\~re pbtform.s on each side for the crew of SC"\'l:fl. The gun ....'15 prot«led by a hghtly-armoured shield rather than a fuD rutTet. The reH ....~ open ;and the breech prmruded some way behllId w shldd.-
Ammunition Cordlte wa.s the main propellant of all 11:1'1:1.1 guns from the l6-mch to the .303 machine gun. although it C:l.me in different grades aC("ordmg to the size of gun. II conslSled of th....xplosh'l"S nilroglycerine and nitro-cellulose wilh petroleum jelly as :I. lubricant. It could be made in blocks (origilully cords. hence Ihe name). It did not explode in the true sense of the term, but burned v~ry rapidly pushmg the shell :l.long Ihe I~nglh of th~ b"Un barrel. The Roya[ Navy h:l.d iu cordite factory at Holton Healh on Ihe south coast of
91
92
Churchill's Navy
England near Poole. For Bl guns. sticks ofcordice were tied lov!ber Wl!b .sdk !bread and pUI III a si.Ik cloth bag. bc:c:ausc: that doth would dISappear compktdy on ignition. In the: casc: of QF guru. they were plac-ed UI :I br251S ortrid.gc: C:iI$C. Smaller guns wilhlll thili cbss tended to use 6xed ammurubon III which the artndge and shell were secured togt1her. Others Iud ~rate: ammumnon wnh the shell Ioa.dcd first. then Ihe ca.rtridge. Shc:lb were: I'TI.lIde III more than 20 dlfferem f:lClOnes. mostly m the north of Engbnd.The blllc shape was forged, then It was curned very acCUr;J.Ic:ly 10 a stre::lmlined shape in a lathe:. The c:xplosl'""eS .... ere
........,..,..
--
Oooa-.-.
-- .......... O-Wof.
"-w••
__
made aI WoolWich :lnd III other f:lctories. md unlike corone Ihey we", high explOSIVes. 'Illstl\ndy conVierted to g:u ,,~:nh grtcal ',olem;e' - Types used mduded TNT, RDX. l)·,lthte and Sheline. Filling die shells was In many ways !be moS! dangerous pan of the process and was done In p-emmem factories under !be control of Ihe Board of Ordnance. Shells arne III sevn':I1 t)'pn.Acmour-ple-rcing she-tis Iud a thick h~d and w:llk and a hard steel pc:ne:ttaIl'''C cap. Thcy wne not Intended 10 explode inunediatc:ly on impact, so w fuse was SCI m Ihe ~ I4tMr dun !be- o.p. Hlgb-<,xplmi,l:' shc:lb had Ihinner walls and highc:1" charges; to create the maximum effect a.gumt un-armoured Iargets indudl.llg aircraft. They had their filS(! in Ihe nOSe':. Shrapnel was Ihmw:illc:d and conlaJned ba.lls ofle:ad which .....Quld be spread on 1I11pac1. for usc: against lroops or aircrafi. Star mell Contamed an il1ulllmanng c~ .....hlch was I"""l:'te:d slowly by parachule during a night action. Smoke shell could be: used as a arget fur ana-aircraft pn.CtlCC, or for creating a slllob SCR':etl. Low-angle or LA practice: shdk ...."Cre ofien
smok.e pcllcu..AlI wuc: dearly I'TWked wnh thnr SlZC and functIOn. and ...;m colour-coded bodtes. ups and nngs..
Ammunmon
"'01:5 s(CM'\"d
in
~
on rxks in the nuganllC'
In
the
bo¥.'l:b of UK' slllp. 25 fu as possible from dmu~ and protected by armour In the ase of Qp1tal shiPS and CfUlSCCrs. ThlS ""15 an IInporum poUlt for the Royal N~. whw:h lud klost W'\~ nUJOl stups In both wodd wan due 10 munwuoon expIOWOll:li.
DI'e "tors ThQugh all guns could be firM USlng'loal control'lf n«c:s:wy. thoK on opiul ships, cruisrrs. Wcr:1tt alricn. ~rs ;and the more: JOphuncated neort \'e»els used a centr.tl method of control. the dll'l:1;:tor JY$Icm. The director lIxlf W25 mounted tugh up. usw.lly ;at the ;lIft..r ..ud of the bridge- of 01 nKXkrn lll.lp. wnh
ntl-
craf< Guns
MallY quick-firing guns ...-ere: suilabk for- anti-l\.lrcrafi use.and t""en dlt': MNle:t Bl guns could be depiO)"Cd on ocC3S1oo.lhougb 10 Imlc: effect.
93
The Ships
WlIh poor ...iming syslem~. dos.:-range ...nu-"'II"C-rafi Wl."Jpons needed ... n'ry f"'~l ratl' of lire 10 'lund", ehJnce ofJ hll....nd ... t.l.rgel \\'2'1 only in r;lI1gl' for J Vl."ry short \lllle. TIlrt~ .. nJ3in lypC"'l w("re used during lhl: war. twO of which were dr:signed ",bro... d 111 Ill."utnl COUnlrn:s. TIle home-gJQ\\'11 wl:... pon WOIS the 2-pounde:r 'pom-porn' gun whie:h ublquitow In Ihe arty dlys of lhe: \\'21'. It "";IS wJter-cooled ",nd USC'd
\\':IS
the: rc:coliiO rdo...d it'IClf on the s;lnlC" prnlClpk OIS ... nudum: gun. It "';U used in singk "lOUnllll~ on some escort ve:ssels and older dc:saO)-en. on '" qwdruplc: mounnng on .mull amen.. Iig'" croisen ;md modcrn dcsuo)~ and on ...n righl-bandkd mount on bl"gl..'T slups. ThC' Kl"J( Grooyr I' cbs.-;; hild so: Of C'lg'" of these mountings.. The mulllpk pon,. pOfll was quite successful 10 pIOdUCIng the volume of lirr WI he~ to remure Cft"\\'S. bul a~n from lhe ddiciencie:s of the ...lIlWlg S)'StC'll1. II was handicapped by ... low muzzle: \'e1oClty of2().W fCC! pc:!" s«ond, com~red wnh 2750 feel per second fOr ... lyplcalllJ.\'2l gun. Mow dun 70Cl0 guns served with rhe RO)'21 Jrld CornnlOn"'c...llh na\'il."S in 1939-45, The firsl of lhe imported designs was the 20mlll OerJikon, IllJde in SWllzerl... nd and muoduced 10 1939.11' was 10 ... simple design in which Ihe breech block "'2'1 slmpl)' blown b<1 round, It W:I$ usually 011 ... smgle nunual pedestal IllOummg. operated by a gunner by rrw:Jns of shoulder 1l'SU. Aiming was usUJIly by means of ring sights.The 'lo3ding numbcT' Clullged !hi: 6O-round drum nugnillC" when requm:d. Spent anndges ""en: ('\'lClro 1Il10 a bag. II had J bglu armoured shldd.
would be: acti\"lIled by sound or ndar 10 e:xplod( in th( \'Kllllly of Ihe urget.uThe early porn-porn dlreclors n'lied on t")"t'$hooting 10 a gn'at (Xlenl and lll(n'l)' n'mm"c:d lhe diR'<:tion of the guns 10 a more n'mote IUtion, wilhoUl adding greatly 10 th( accuracy of the finng. The Mark IV drrector. mtroduced III 19~, med an inSlrum(nt known as Ihe Gyro Rale Unil or GRU 10 IIl(JSUre IhlS more accuratel)', It "'2'1 not scrbilised ...g::r.mslth( mO\·emenl.$ of Ihe ship. and ne(d(d a crew of (Ight. A time fuSot' could be S(I to (;>
The Torpedo Anti-aircraft Systems The ...mung of",nll-"'lrcnfi gum posed much grealer problems Imn "'plllSl SlllPS, The target "",,'eel much faster....nd ...ircn!i spex-ds wen: 1IlCTl:1Slllg rnpidl)' before and during lhe \\'21'. An Jm::rnft \\'JS Inghly manoeuvrnble ...nd eQuid clungc coun<.' lnmndy in three dimensions_The ship itself W;lS an umt;lble pbtform, ...OO lhe director h",d 10 be st
The: torpedo "'2'1 the pnm"'f)' wnpon of rhe submarine and Ihe 1Il0tor torpedo boat, alld surted roughly equal with Ihe gun in destroyer'S, though il hJd prob~bl}' becn o\,(,rt... ken by the end of Ihe WJr. It w~s carried by most cruis('rs and some of Ih( older capilJl ships. It w...s sdf.propelkd. whIch lll(atlt that its handling equipmenl "''2S less elCJ!'l."nsl\'e than lhat of a gun, bill the projecllk Itself cost much more. II could be Kt 10 keep lhe same: deplh Und(IVo'2I(r. which meam thai II was easie:r 10 ...1111 Ih...n ... gun. bill of couts( it was far sl()\\"er. WIth a spl."ed of ~ 10 45 koots. It uplocle:d undcl"\\"lIler so Ihat a single: hil "'~ likely to slllk '" me:rcham shIp or do Sot'rious dam",gc 10 :I ""lInhlp wlIh good armour and subdivision. Its nme:te:enth-cemury 1ll\"emol'5 had dreamed of bunching il from a snull. cheap boat and sinking ... greal baltleshlp, ThlS was not emirely unrealistic and Ihe Royal Ork, Atk Royal and &rliam w(re
At> .;pl_b....llood. 2_pow>d~r
,om.
porn gun w;lh its <:f'O"W. TIw
circul..
sigblll .... _&I 11M top of the picI.....
boJ
~Kh
.. de of lhe gun barrel•.
to k('cp il al the righl level. and gyroscopes 10 keep on a straight course. Externally It had hori:.tOIll~1 ~nd v",rtinl rudders and tWO propellers rot~ling in opposile direniolls on thc same axis. Th", btest torpedo in servic.... lhe Mark IX, w;as silllibr in principle bUI slightly longer. with ~ rang<' of up to 15,000 )'~rds. First used in 1930, ii, too, had de\'Cloped b)' 1939 ~nd galliI'd lU"(I astcri~ks. It W
TO<"pedoes being
6rfil &om the lUbes
of a detU'O)'ft.
~II sunk by torpt'dOt."$ from U-oo...ts. Dritish SC'~borne torpedon h~d less dr.amatic success, but surface ships I:uned Oilt 383 sucl:t'SSful attacQ during the w;ar. and subm~rines c~rried out 776."
Torpedoes ....'ere de\ll:loped in the Royal Naval Torpedo Faclory al Greenock. Ihough one disgruntled officer compbmed that:
II had magrriflml/ u""*shops, /Ill kindllf laborn'oms 5'4frd by mlhNJi,u1l, fl.,11 S>.lpnb wl:firing fariliries If 1111 kinds on //$ doorslql I UIlU ,old IMt during iu lifnilM it fuuJ linn 1ICfUil11y protIumJ /I WIV ,~do 'M' junnimlf'd aJ inthlMd, llidutugh doub,1a5 " £lid 'MK"'"nduvrltp ~"Itha' "'"" /attf produerd by priltlt/' mttrpriM!'
1De ;111""";0<" of a II_inch 'O<"pecLo.
Torpedoes ....ne nunufxtu=i in another faclory al Akxandr~ 011 the other side of the Rnn Ct)'de,~nd le:Red on ~ r.1.Il~ at Loch Long ne:ub)~ Se~-launched Dritish IOrpedoes .....ell:" 21 inchtl in diamct(J", whereas airborne ones, ~nd some of those on MTDs, wen:- 18 inches. The IlIOSi COllllllon 'Ype w;as the Mark VIII··. used by tlIodcru submuines. The Muk VIII was the first British torpedo to use thc burner cycle engme. III which compreSSC'd air wu h('al('d 10 abom 1000°C and then mixl:'d with oil and ignited m a chamber. It had developed some-.-·hal by 1939, hence the aSlerisks in ilS dtsign
SOD LB
HIGH EXPLOSIVE"Q]~!QQrJ
tEORE SODY
baltleshlp5. Motor torpWo bl»1S had lU"O or four single fixed lUbes. subnurints had up to 12. but OI.her lorpedon ...." «C firni from lUbes on deck......hich could be rol:lled 10 aim on:r the side of the shIp at a target. Some of the old First World War dtstro)'ers had triple mountmgs with one lUbe superimposed on thc other two. but illler-\\'";I.r development had concemrated 011 Ihe quadruple lube. With all of Ihem on the samc level. A Slandard deslroyer earried a pair of Ihese. though the I cl.us of 1935 introduced quintuple tubes. After Ihat th.. import:lllce of thl:' lorpedo SC'emed to dmunish. The Tnbal class destroyers W('rt' designed .....ith gun power in mind and had onl)' one Stt of qu~druple tubes. Laler e!assn had lU'Q sns. but nun)' had one Stt rcnlO\'l'd to nuke way for extra antl-~lrcnft guns. One nujor de\'Clopml:'nl durmg Ihl:' war .....u Ihe fitting of gpo-angling. lftostTO>'Crs could onl)' fire torpedoes about JO ~ fOT\o\".Ird of the beam and had to turn b.-o;ods.ide on to launch an alUck. Gyroscopes were used 10 rurn the 10rpC'do Ihrough Ihe renl
5 Sensors The Human Eye Despite:all the dc\~k>pmenn til ICChoology.the JU\')' stiD relied on the C)'t its main me.ms ofobsa>;ng the .....o rld ouwdc the slup and 6ncbng the
2S
cncnry.McdiclI offi~~' duc;Jbe q'O ofnun arc thc mosr tughly de\rlopcd K'f"GC organs fouoo in the aninlJl kingdom·... Enlrams to the se=un brmch ~ thorough C)~
AFTER BODY
tcSIS
before they ....'m:' accepted.
UPPER
VERTICAL
FIN & RUDDER
FOR'NAR~\ ANO AFTER
PROPEllERS-
'"
I
I
,/
,
~
~~
oe
{)(.-n<~GtNI:
.~
@
COIITIIOl. CilNl fOIt 2ND.
,
~
/
Fn ~nd nur lookouts ....~~ sutioned for surf~ce work. ~nd fog lookouts if necess;ary. Special anti·~ll'Cr.lfi lookouts were also posted. Tht'Y used binoculan and were carefillly instructed in their c~re ~nd use.
lookouts ....~"' tmned nol to look: dIrectly at an object at night. but 10 :;urn :I little W:lY off. 'The \'ery cen~ of Ihe eye, which IS the mOSt ~nsiti\'( put of :Ill in
@
Id.
Surf.- LxJJHJIlIS should Sl~ Ihfir 1110 syslt1IIllti(lIlI)'. going <WtI' tht wholt txtmt f1J I k Ill'( tMh limt, Illid tllkingfi"m Iwlf II ltl;nUlt 10 a minult lI(((mling fo lI'l"lIlhn rotldi/i,,1IS, lIlld thm ~lingjM half II millUlt.
AI
_.'" '" 1:~ -- ~.~
,,;
"""""" ~ m
~~1'Wf'O< U---- _ _ ~~,.
EJ ~::;va '""OM""- :
'Mu:EXruu- - ,
·••
···: ExtCtt'
.,
Top: The
,,"yout of
: ,
Early Asdics The C)~ was no US(' ag;tinst a subnurine, exc.-pt ~rh~ps in the deuc:r w:lIten of the Mediterrm",an. In the Atbntic and North X:I, the navy relied on the echo-soundmg dC'\'1ce kO(MTl as AscIic. dc:\~loped ble in the First \\'orld Wn.lt W;lS hued on an oscilbtor or mnsducer, :I doc of about 2 f('('t in dIameter mounted in a 'dome' under the hull. Fut vessels such :IS destroyers uSC'd a remcbble dome so th:lt il did not impair them at high speed. A current of 14-24 kilocycl~ W1S passed through the transducer, producing a sound wave with a range of about 2500 ynds in good COllditions. It would bounce off any objeet it hll, and the echo "''Ould be heard and the nme measured. giving both a bearing and range for the {;l.tgCl. It could also be used p;tSl:h'dy to IUlen for the engllles and lI1O'\'emeOI of submnines, known :IS the 'hydrophone effect'. The Asdk 'office' was illWted on or near the bridge to allow the opctin or officer of lhe
"'-alCh to interpret echoes. There W:lS sleady ck\~lopmtnt ofAsdic ben\~n the .....a n. The btest sc:t III 1939 "":IS T)l)C' 128, originally fitled m d~~ but bter III tsCon vessels. Asdic was nOI eonfined to tsCon ~k. Tr~ 132 of 1938 was designed as a purely deftnsiv" srt for cruisers - they ....,ould usc: it to ~\'Oid submarines, but m~ hlld no direct means of att:lcking them, [I \\':IS alSQ fiued to some bJltleships. AI the other end of the scalt.'. much smaller sell were de\'eloped for cO~$lal fon:es. boom defence ves.sels and merchant ships. There wert: special SC'1l for subnurin~ and C"o'en midgel submarines. Landmg craft sometimes used Ihem 10 detect underwater obs~des.
Bearing Recorders The rmin de\~1opment during the Wll W:IS not in Asdic il'Sdf. but III the mans of reoording and interpreting ill ,"""ults.T)'J'C' 1+4 W:IS the first: to incorporale lhe bearmg reeordc:T in its design. During tri.al:s in 1942:
Tht btan'ng rromJrr uwfollrld to bt f1J tht grtllltsllWisllllla in Irrtping trmllltf ulilh Il 11l'8'" "11,t 11/01 will S/lIlW III o,l(t if lilt tllrgtl hIlS II h(1l/1 mIt of tlllIll.gt oj btadng a/HI in s,«h II (lISt Iht omllaror is tmined so Iltal I/lt Btllring
Recorder st)'/us is m01'1!d 10-20 drgrw off Ihr ,aw, lind in Iht dimfion in l.liflilh Iht tllrgtf is ,"wing. The lIJtiIlIlIU1 is Ihm a/lou'td 10 Slep b.xk 10 m«1 the 11I>gt' lind, if the plolllgllin shou'J thlll lhe Illrgtl is s/ill thanging Iwllrinf rapidly, Iht proms IS rrpt
_u
T)'JIC 144 ",-;u ;;clso designed to operale wilh the new ahead-throwing weapons eoming into use. such :IS Hedgehog :lnd Squid. It could be linked 10 the st:c:c:ring so duol the hdnwnan would follow directions dllecdr from the Asdte. aiming the apuin to COlKentrale on the Stnteglc SIlWoon. It could oper.I1e ;;CI a nwomum speed of 25 knOts ;;cnd PlQ\'Cd highly successful. beconung the nuin t\5dtc SC't of the bter stages of the a~ttle of the Adanoc.
an
~ie
office filled
wilh.'tYPe 144 HI.
Boclom: AMlic openrioa_ The while cin:1es
.n.-
lbe ..... or.n~c beam.l ........ dUt1Ace frvm the
target,.nd
.n.-
....... iIClto ... diflieull 10 . _ Ihe ellleni of. largel if the deplh
is nOI known.
96
-"""'" Entrgy ;$
.inri
;III'from
lilt
Ir.JIISIIIl/," III
nnn,", is ..lw 1tI(I$' $tItii,i.'t i" lhe
....."""
Ulmt
Int jo)r1I1
of"
rtrri.,..,. $ign
,r.lllSlIlmrr, IJrtd 1M
Tn- oftadar
Irlllt
d~
iJ ",~
lItlm'" ,,"'ieh 'pNht'.from ,he
/Inti' (If
"m'''' oftM ".fItrJ~J mtrgy '" '....Ito' orrlO 11ft rrrttl'rr. ThIS
OPI " (olfm:..k
ial~rf~rw;:.
r.ty fUM."
79. plO\'C'd effcetl\~
"""""'led wilh
The finl:
tbftn. no. lop
deteenng :urcnft at r.lI1b"t'S of up to 60 milt'S, and
tht'H Ii-.
I/It
Tht M.Jml,fl ".i"" cbJ"f1S found lry ror,,"'1;l!' lhe mum'IIf'.... omtl rtrri,,", "round
pUfposes.. Rt'-dcstg1UIed the: Tn.e nngc 6ndlllg for gunner)' and SC".lin;:hmg for surfxc siJips w\"rt added to Its fi.llletlons, After thaI. OIh"".
u-
doe A-o.an. the
dlffertlll sets ....'t'K dC'\~1opcd for more specialised Ul.CS, much aIded b!o' Sir jallIt'S SonlCn:.lk. a signal officet. as Comrolkr of the Na\')" A
bo....... one dnh wiLh the pt.n
dl!iIlUetion .....as made betwt"t"n sc1n;:h SC"ts .....h,ch uscd a rt'buvdy broad
Pat.ition IndialOf.
beam to find an enemy ~nd t)'Pt'S Inttnded to auad: 11n;:nh: or surface ~hlps, Metric sets uscd \\'
Depth Finding ~-.:Iopmelll had aw.lnltd dUI
n.n':a1 ,,£ri'MC would ukI.- plxe In I'd..:m\'dy wltrn:d W:lIcn such as .he North ~:.I.. I n the much dcrpc1 wall'r'S of tile' Admric. V-bo.ns could dJ\~ 10 ;I depth of 780 feel," Early escon \'a5I:k lud to b'l.lI"SS ,h" dt"Pth of:.l. t:I.'},-et. or ~ a Llrge ~ttcrn of
Early!\sdi,
dqxh
dUrgd fO
cO\'Cr nuny poWbihccs. TIle
about 15 dq;Tt"C'\ in tile' vertical plane. so
Ix;llll
It £iI\'!:
of all "sdk co\'rl'l"d
hnk mdlcaooJl of dqJlh.
From 19-1J.Typt· 144 !i('(S w('"rc fined \\~th the Q atLlchlUcm. an addmOl131 oscilbtor that dellcct«l uw beam 10\\'1:1' and alIO\,,-,d dCII"Ctiotl at :.I. dO'ler anl9l' to the t:lfl,'el. Type 1-17 AsJic. inrroduced 1.:IIc III 19-13. UK"d:.l. much narrower Ix'am III lil1' \"l·rtic:1l plane and could find depth accul';ltcly. Fitted initially to Ihe Loch d.n
1.5 lIIelfl.'S
to dctcet surfact ships 1nd lo.....-f1ying alrcnft, as well as
sup.:rseding the dccimttric sets
III
gunnery nngmg.
Warning Radar In 1'.140. with the thn:at of ill\'asion. an air and surface warlllng .set for destl"O)TI'S was a pnority.Type 286M W1~ ~J1 ~dapt;ltion orth<, A$V (Air to SurfaceV~I) Mark 1 uSl'd
by the RAE whICh
\\';15
qUICkly pn'SS<'d nlto
servICe. It u$l:d a fixed aerial (Overing: the forwan:1 lulf of the ship. so
SqUId. It Iud a "\:ry high 5UCCc\s rale ag:linsl submarines,
It
could gl\'e warnmg of nnb'\.' but very llttk mdlGltioll of dil\"Clion.ThirlY~ two SC'ts Iu:tllJ.l,en filted
b!o' Ihe cnd of thc yen. and It bad SOIllC SUCCl"SS in
The Development of Radar
findlllg: the enemy at Maupan in March 1941. In the 5a.lllC momh the
R~dn ....';IS one of che Cw...1C de\'dopuR"lIU of Ihe Second World War.
b!o' the nllddk ofJune:. whl'n
AlnK)"i1 unkno.....n ~I the brgtnnmg,II ....';IS mdlSpcnSOlble by Ihe end.TIle
to r.Kbr. Mo.... than 200 5mps Iud been filted
1\0)':1.1 N~~'
a 111......' \'I.'TSlon. ....-ilh a lightwright TOtlItmg acrul ....';15 produced, UUI
Slgml School OlC PortSmouth ....~ m close couch ....'Ih SIr
Roben \V,mon-W.m·s enly expcnmenu m che ble 1930s, Olnd r.cwr scts
Earl)' ncbr could dtlcct I,ugc ships In good eondltlons, bul a slll~ller
III thc early st;1ge5 of thc .....ar priorit), ~ co be gl~~n co the RAFs
obJcct ~uch as a surfxed U-boat p~med far mo~ difficult}"
n«ds for ground-b2scd n
It
espt'cully ~lIIong the ......a\'es of th(' Nonh Albntic. Thi~ ....~ of vlul
....~ kno.....n :as RDF for R~dIO 1)I~on Fmdmg. The Am.:nanl ":Ttll
imporancc, as surfxt'd mgbt atuck .....as the U~boat's 1II0St dt\'
'ndu' for R~dlo Dir«tio.. and ROlnging ....~ m IISC
b!o'
19-'3.
Tht' m~~nnon of Dtbr took plxe almOM !>imulannmsly m W'\'t'nl
W."t1C III 19-11. A$ eOlrly:as 1938 thc Adllllnlt)' w.u Interested III the narro......er beam of a cenllmenic splelli. but Ihrtt SClcntlfic
cOllnlrics includlllg Unum, ('.ernuny and che USA. It depended on
b~akthmughs - tht' CJ\'t}· nugneaon \"1I~'t'. Ihe rtDex kr)'Sl:on \'
n:'C"enl dC'\'t'lopIlIt"IIU in r.adio. weh as rt'St'Jrch IIIto the p~t1on of
and Ihe c'1'5U1 mixer - We~ ~ for 11 10 5tlcct"t"d.Tht' fint SCI
\\'2$
shon .....a \'n. .lind the dC'\'t'lopmelll of cde,.. ~ion. The b'l:lIenl pTlIlClpln
~.ldy b!o' n:bruary 19-'1 1nd the t)l't" ....~ It''5led 011 the eo,",,~uc OrrhiJ.
ofn
T\\'('nt}'-fi\~ ....TI"t m sc,",,'ce
b!o' the middle of the: )~ar and the)
PTQ\-t'd
a gll.".lil wcct'SS. The ...maJs .lind SCt ""~rt enclosed IlUlde a cylindrical
Tllt «1'1;11' "'!fthe HI dtl'tmls orr Intjx!,n..,. w4lm w,rrlt.u w~n lit tilt (llwrsr "'!f ,htir t"m-I tnroIo'n," .IIIY cbjM,,, cmoflll .. _It' uf tnngy iJ njltruJ bMJ: ..1of!fl ,Itt "".~" .. /l"'lh, $OlfIftl-lt.Jr
l'cr
~,(,l'SIon, T)l't" 272, was dC'\~loped ....'th Ihe T'.lOdar office lip to
.w ft't"t
98
Churchill's Navy
Radar Aerials
Operating Radar
Ide:llly the S1ZC' of an acri:r.l dlould correspond with ,he W;I\'('lcngth uSt:d. so thai ;;l llldrk Stt would rrquirr .ll much bigger one than ;;l CCCnOlnCtflC KI. ThIS conflicted with the' n«-d 10 kccp lopwcight low :md ~ncn.lly the IUY)' used 'dipolc' xri.m which \\'('rc luIf the kngth of lhc \\';1'.... Thct\" W~ ;;l rnItur.U ~irr to platt an ;;lcru.1 ~ high as po$:l'lbk. 10 gl\"l: the lon~ 1'1II1lgc'. This h.d:lll a(h'('~ dfl:'Ct on $ub,hty :md created a Dud for much nrongcr IlWlS. Another problclII wilh nrly ccmimetric r.adar ""'
Radar sea "~fC not normally kcpt in consum USC', and w.itching an early one on ,,~ a considenble ope-nllon - It took 21 separate Stagt'l' in the cas<" of a Tn)(' 271. A K"t needed Ixt\o.ttn 5 and 20 mmUICS to w..rm up. accord.lllg to the model. After th
sluped :aeruls pointing tow..rds the t:ltg\"!. Type 2n, the repbcemem for 271 on snWl shiPS bte m me W:lIT. h:lld :lI skektal dIsh sh:lIpe-, Type: 286M used :lin e:llrly ·bcdste:lld' :lIerial, imended to cn'ate the grt'atcst width for the minimum weight_ Sol11e aerWs wefC fixed pomring forward, such u the Type: 286. Other early oncs Iud to be rumed by hand using :lI wheel m the I';ubr office. They could not rotlt" through more thall about 400 degl"C'CS without the cable becommg rwmed, 50 it Iud to Wo-crK' dlfCCtiOn alter e:llcli sweep. From 1944. new :lIir warning SdS Iud P'l"'ered continuous lOt:ltlOn, which was far more SlIitlblc for a PPI :lind for ploning in all action information room. Righl:The uta)' of cru;~r, r.
2--_
1'145.
I. Type 279, long" range .ir warning.
2. Type 2H. inturogalOI. 1. Type 272P,
....rninl of suna.,. ttafi. io • eirew.. Penpex bmle.n.
4.1)pe 242 recei...... 5. Type 2"', uHd 10 direcc the ",.in armamenl ap;nOl
lW'face urru. 6. Type 285,
r....
a"ri••ircnfi fire control. fa. "I'll: A_ocan
openlon
iD.~
27'9 recei.i"C oIJ"tc .
..............
One openlor lu d.. other lop lhe~.
.
,
----/ ,'
"''1th both tOUted :lit :lIbout 6 rpm for surfOice wnning. Tho: operalor nught also caTTy out 01 5«1or S'\ttp If trouble "'"25 expected £rom a ceruin are:ll. or thot- TCSl of the .spectrUm Wat CO\'C1'Cd b)' other ships. One of hIS m.un wb WOlS to dimi....te interference from the set, b)' good numterullCe and good adJustmenl. He learned hoo,o,' to dmmute f.aulry dispbys such as'rnm Imes', 'cms-eross p,lItern' :lind '1';IIhngs·. He reported the echOCli of ships or airn:afi to the bridb"t', unless thc'y were Idcnnfied at shIps III company. On findmg a hosnle echo. he IIUgbt be ordered to hold on It, or fO TCSume hIS S\\'Ccp." In the e;J.r1y d;J.)'S of nchr, bearing and nngn weI"(' conllllullltated \'efb:l1ly to the captam on the bfld~ and he llI(erpreled them. pe:rh;J.ps usmg a plotting t2ble. This became far more dlfficuh u iliOn: types of sel were fiu"d. :l.IId tht' Action Infornution Org'lIl1Jation (AID) evol-oed to cope with it. On a Iargc ship this oper:lted in se\'cral COlllp;lrlmcnt5. each with a differenl function. The Opel';mons Il..oom dealt with the surface situation :lind used both loc;ll :lind gencral plofS of the area. It often used :1.1I mnrUlllent called a Ski;ltron, which projected lht' picluTt' from a PPI (0 the underside of a tnnslucem Clreubr t:llble so tll:lIt morl' than olle person could
99
A CRUISER'S MAINMAST TOPMA~T _-..""
\'Iew II. The I\lrenft Dln:ctlon Room de~h With rhe Sltwtlon In lhe and was ready 10 direct fighlers omo an tntmy au.:ock if rc-quired. h. 100. h;ed a Skiatron. SomeUfIIC'S there was a sepante Taq,'t't Indlcallon Roolll nearby. The Raclat Duplay Room was used by the nthr officer to carry our rechmcal supervIsion :os wdl :os undc:rt.,kt centnlised COrlnQI. heighl finding and IFF. There was :0 Bndb't' ~Ir
Plomng Room close to the command po~a[lon where rhe C"pUlll could view the dar:o as it filtcred through Ihe Ala. In smallc:r ships there was no Aircnfl Direction Room. the Op('nliollS Room was combined with th\.' chan house and the whole affair was sited on or near rhe bridge. making a separale Uridge Plouing Room unnecessary. AboUl :0 quarler of tht flcet had efreclive Acuon
CAP LowER MA~THEAD
SIGNAL
YARD
1/
J,
BOnLf.-Sc.Rf.W AND 5L1P, FOR 5E.TTING UP
Information Organisauon by 1945." One ofIhe fasrcsl movtng Iasb was Ihe conlrol offighlers in defente of the 11~1. Deslll)yers in Ihe British Pa.cific Fleet were nOI equipped wllh r:uhr 10 act as plClcc!$. so the carners of., Iask force Iud 10 defend thtmselvC"S. Wirh anacb from S('\ocnl dlreaions. the PPI men looked hke'a bursting bag of srnalI pcilS.... Frolll tWO ships :1I me bcg1nmng of the w:u. nthr eqUiPped thousa.nds ar the end. The Prill« If WilkJ wn thr first ship 10 arry multiple S('tS in 194 t:TYJl'C' 281 for air ...."lIming.Type- ~ for the- maJII allllJlmellt din:ctor. four Type 285s for ann-aucraft: din:ctors ;end four 282s for the dosc-nnge "oc.,pons.- Suth filtings bea.~ tonUl1on by the end of the ...."lIr. L:lIer ships in the \V:u Eme-rgency DC'Stro)'tr Prognmme had Type- 286 or 291 for tombine-d surf.,ce and air ""lIrnmg. 276. 285 for air gunnery and 282 for combined air and surface gunnery. whIle sollle ships also had 271 or 272 for surface warnmg. The use of ndar was already beginning to alter the whole nature of n.."al warfare. as the main cenut' of command ~'gan to mo\'c from the bridge 10 a posiuon below ded'S. Many capt:llns resisted Ihis and nearly all remained on Ihe bridge in batde. with th.. result that in action the n:al decisions were oftell llIadl' by the operations officers rather than the Capt:un.
6 Fittings After bunch. a ship "'tnt for fimng out. uslU1ly .,float in a twin in or close to the pm whkh had built h..r. The pro<:C$ii indudc:d theinsulbtion of engin" .,IM;! armam..lIt. and also me- fitting of other nscntul (eatura. Most of thc"sc - nggmg. boa!$. anchors. and pumps. for example - .....~re !used on equipment that had been used for c('nruri". but .....e n: adapted for modun purp05CS.
LOWER ENDS / OF
/~:ANOING RIGGING
BACK5TA~
twNMAST MAtNTOP~T
S!1RC:lWSo.-..J &oROUDS
(~\....MAlNMMT STAY
'MAlNTOPMA5T STAY
EVE PLATE ON
SHIP'S SIDE
known fiom th.. bottom as the 10\l.'tI" nl3Sl. topm;& and IOpgalhnt.The KIIl.I! Gro~ II class were fitted wnh an 85-foot long. steel fon:nl3Sl with 113 heel resting on the Iluin deck. and it .....as 2 feet in diame-ter at Itli wides!. It had a 55-foot wooden topmast that O\oerlappcd ,,~th the lower mast by 10 feel. and a 22-foot 'Adrmnls pole' a~ Ihat. Uolh the upper ma~tli could be 100wn:d or 'struck' for pa~ing under bridgt.'S. so that th.. maximum heighl a~ thl' \\"lIwrline was 145 feet. The mastS were fittc-d with an upper 24-foot )"lIrd across the ship. for sigl131 halyards and W rr aerials; :lI1d a 36-fO
practice - thr dcsno)l:r ~ lost itli .....o oden lIl3S1 durUlg an Atlanoc gale m June 1941. because of the ,,'tIght of Itli 286M xnaI." 8y the ~nd ohhe war the IaleSl shIps ....'ere belltg built ,,~th lattiCe' masts lib- pylons. to support the incn-..sing amount of rawr equipment.
Masts and Rigging A warshIp usually had tWO masts. the fon:IlUlit situated just afi of the bndge. whIch .....as rhe larger. and the rnal11masl.At the beginning of tin' W,lr Ihey were used for signal (Jags. lamps and win:k-ss lell-graphy aerials and navigation lights. Small ships. l'Spcn..lly l"SCon \nsels. had crows.. lll'St3 for look-out3. Most capital shIps and cruisers had tripod nuSl'S. C'Spcaally the foremast. E,ath mast earn.. in one. two or three portions
Steering Most warships had a singl<' ruddl'r III thl' c\.'llIrdine of Ihe shIp as far aft a~ possible 10 give gn:ater !e.-enge. II wa~ able ro rurn up 10 35 degrees on clIher side. for more than tlI..t would tend 10 cause undue n:si~\;lnce through Ihe w:lter.ln the case offwin-so:rew slups It !lughr ha\oe IIlcreased manoeu\'rabillty by havmg one rudder bchmd each
TIM riU..... of • cnIi.."... maM.
.nchor ge.r of lbe buduruiur
Th~
Rqlldsr.
propeller, but this was not done even on frigates whe~ il mighl h~\" given SOllie adv;ml4lge. Ne;Irly all ships used a b3bnced rudder which pivoted about its centre so lhat it lOok a minimum or effort to Iurn il. The mdirional wooden steering wheel was still in use in sollie ships. lI.lthough many now used a meed version without lhc lundles ouuide lhe rim. Major ....OlI'"Ships needed powerful steering ;,ITr;tngcmenl;$to n~ their mddcrs. especWly at high speed. Older and snu1Ier ships used a mechanical system in which pc1'\'Cr ....hydr.lulic Steering gear, in whkh the rudder crQliSh~ W3S lurncd by tWO hydr.lulk: rams. I n me Killg ~ V dus this consisted ohwo ~nte mOlors in me stttring «»llfW"b1lCnt aft,and a steam drr.'l:t! pump III mc starboard CUb-inc room'.A 'tcJClllotor'system of tr,lll5llUssion alJov.'Cd mis 10 be controlled from eidtcr" me SlCering wheel on me bndgc or me action position lower down in the hull. In an ~1JtrgeJ1CY n could be
or
conuoDcd ~ trom lM rudder had The sptCI6caoon ror!he a :rnd P cWs dcstrn)'C" demanded:
extremes or the ,.ul;"li{" and the tropics. Air conditioning was only Ilsed in selected m:l.gazine SP:l.Ce!i before the w:ar. It w:as added to SOllie comrol compartments, 10 aid the operators' COnCeml'3110n, and a rew other areu. but its weight w;r,s considered prohibitive :l.ud it was not used in living spaces.Trunking was used to bring rn.'1h air. whether hot or cold, 10 the messdecks :l.nd living spaces.Trunks had to be kept SlTull 10 avoid imerfering wilh the structural imegrity of the ship. Air W3S spre:l.d ~round the comp..nmem in question by means or directiollal centrirupl r311S known as 'punhh louvres', which nme III variOUS sizes from 5 inches 10 17M inches and could be operated al two speeds. At full blut me &os of a rJLlIjor "ouship could in mcory ch:l.n~ the ~ir in a galley C\~ry h:l.1f-minute. and Ihat on :I. rncboonal meudeck every fi\~ minutes. The mcssdccks created m~ny problems, The air might be cbreeted 10000IrW particuhr hammocks. whose occupanlli had 1Il0re dun they needed. The hammocks added 10 me problem 15 mey tended 10 rnlrict Ihe circubtion. Officers (apart from medinl officen) genen1ly look little IIltCttS( In \'Cntilation ~lld il ...."U left to the occupaJlt'i or the mess. The surgcon.heutenam of me mg:lte All" In the North Atlantic reponed m;It there was :l grc:l.l deal of conOens.toon or 's....'C:l.ong'. caused by lIl.adeqwte luung of the bulkhe.ads with {"orlr.. More was .added. but tlus rod not change !he culture or the IO\\n deck.
He described an
Habitability The RO)'".l1 Navy or 1939-45 Iud to {"OJX' ",,;m a gTC'ater range of ""'Camer condmons dun C\~ before, beeaU$C II Iud nrdy opented III Arttk ...."tet'S in pe;lCl"timc. II rought for a lon~r period lhan any modem war and often with imp~ and ""'nero"'oded ships. Living {"on
.. .u.nhta/fhy dismp«r, lhal S«IlU III bt tr.u!IIWll4l OImMg K<JJIItft,/cr.fresh ai' 1M mess d«h. P""hzII lou"",, 1l"tFr oftm rlDwJ,jl4ps rlDKd dou." ot"tF
(1ft
txhlluJf "n"
mmJu II/thOUgh ,lit /alltt u.w JuJl~tl
'11 _
tx'tr/I '" _
r~
on rmmI u
d«1u VI" IMw ~
101
The Ships
•
B(l.LA
HAWSf. PIPES
Funhermore. the samen w~re prone to an 'incliso=t use of d«tricaJ heaters'. which rmde the sitwtion e
The navy ....';5 I"lIther kss prrpned for concbnons
10
the Indun Ocean
than mIght have been expecled. for its ships Iud ~ spnll short ~riods at sca there
in peacetime. Canvas awrungs \\'eTe used
to
keep the
sun off the deck 10 ha.rbour. and at sca the men were olien allowed 10 sleep on deck, but they srilI had to spend a good deal of time below.
fl is olle thi/lll to spnrd ~ week or /U\! ullder SlId, nmditio/ls, bm quite IJllolhc- 10
sptlld momlu OIr md u~'llr fittle prospect ofrrlitfAsftr as possible. it IWS "rr",~d Ilrat ships sho..ld rfjit in .solliit Afiic"n JIO'ts, to giV(' ship's rompanits II 101lic, bm 1M next wliif smm II long uuy off u"'nr tht Lut is II Ihilrg of the pas,!' With a tem~r.lturt' of over 9O"F (32"0 in his cabin. the constrUCtor captain of tht Utero Reet wondered If 'conditions would be less uncomforubk iftaking pan in a COflYO)' to Mumunsk·. He concluded that they would
I1Ol,
though one of his colleagues did think so. 'Arroc
condiaons presenl appreaable problems. These,
ho\\l:''e!",
are oot as
5e\"C:re as those in tropical IDeaIfO of operation·
Those on ~ Arctic cOflYO)"S might oot fu..~ ~ Punbh 1oo\'feS 'eTe gemraIIy optnled at low speed Ul cokkT condlOons. and messdecb ve 6m:d with steam radulon 10 any case. lbere was a problem with ~tion on nun)' ships.. lagging \\>;as found useful in both Arctic and uoplcal condloons. as il helped to keep the heat 10 or OUt as ~U1red. Modem centtalised mewng created new problems, as there was grr
re~ fiom I1UI1)' ships 10 sa\"C: weight and the hawse pi~ blocked off.) The strealn anchor was used ;as much smaller - 60 C\\1
In the case of the HOold. Kedge anchors \\'eTe 'smaller :anchors, used foelighl .....on.: such as kedging, wuping or hauling the bunch ottt when laying ottt a oo...'n" or sheet :mehor &c. They are sto\\~ III any com-enient positions under sulobk derricks or dao.its ustWIy one: on rach side ofthr ship'. The kedge- anchors of the Hood ....-crt" of 16 aud 12 ewt. n Smaller ships had fC"-'n" and smaller a.nchon.A FIo:M= das:s can'ttte had three oo....'efS of21X cwt and ;as used with all ship$ anchors. Apart from in gt'('
~
get angled and Its waght
not
it lie horizontally 011 the
SoCa
bcd, providing
efficient pull on the
Anchors and Mooring Gear
a formula worked out by W
An anchor is a device for holding a ship or boat to the sea bonollI. used
Construclors. It was me
J
Holt of the Royal Corps of Naval
JX inch. Length also wried with
when there is no other means of keeping Ihe ship in position. Nav:d
up ueh link
shIps needed
the size of the ship. It was measurt'd in shackles. each of which W:lS 12M
were not
f
such ;as Scapa Row or Habfa:<, I"lIther th
a.Ion~ide
jetties in che
h;ad 14. When raising :mchor, the ch
\\>;as
h
hole in the bows. II ....>;as then led to a stC':llTl or electric ....inch or
IndmonaJ tu":ll bases. The older cype of
haw~
wich nukes. with
capsun. which did the ....,ort of haulJng It up.
the arms. It
known as the Admmucy pattern :mel it fe;as thc" Slocldess anchor. Ie 1ud a slunk and tWQ ums. wluch PI\'Oced ;as in use. holding the ship in plxe
different p
the tu\"C:1 pipc1 co the cable locker .1 device ~'11 as a Dbl;e's lltp
~u ';5
be:b-. decb. When hauled up.
fitted co the able bet\\un the
ca.psan and the ha.....K pi~ to $C'CUre It, bor the main wort of holding the anchor \\'as dollt b,' the bnke on the opsan ilKlf. For mooring
mooring ro~ cle
Boats E\'t'ry naval ship carried a complement of boat:!. which wen:: used for
conullunication with the shon::
name implies were kept in the bo\vs, in constant rt'
on supplies and allowing men
of Hood Wl:re of 190 cwt or 9M cons. The .!heet anchor
ofsimilar size
recreation
starbo.ard side of
om
wW
\'I:Jj
~. It w~ in a hawse' hole on the
the ship.jw ab;aft one of the bo-.--en. (Later in the wu.shC'et anchon wert:
to
go ashore on lca\-e. for r.lcing a.nd
The layout of the
tD lbe bows of • .hip.
102
Churchill's Navy N
...---.r---',---",
boal5 \line: a commoll (earure of tumour bfe, cspcciilly
In
places hU
Sca~
Row. OfIKen comKlem:i WI boal-pulling W2S supenor to the: ~ decks first 1oYe. football. bcallK It ifNOh.-nI a (
Mala and
bolI(. Such conl<$S ",,'('no r:lrt'r in w:l.nimc, bUl the cruiser Mlllln"/ius wu able to org:mLK' a contest at Taralllo in 1943. involving 27 (1'l'\YS fmm s.evrraJ ships.·' MO$dy, bons hJd £:I.r more seriOUS USl.."S III wartime.Tht')' helped ev:.JCWI~ troops from the buchC';!; .,.fDunklrk, until th~ flotilb. of snuB cnfi arrived. They rescued crews oflorpedoed llI~n::h.ant ships
II...,' 10
pdi"l boal.
btImg to
wt.... .. It
""ff«m
Iiltt
s/llp Ill/t Yl""1>
I
)'ll'l'"
',/rx
U\:Irlt
to «mUMrlll
It Mll
ID lor pari IInIi pMftIl'f W
)'lJ"
likt
)'OOrJ,
Bdo-. A rypicaI.
Bo;.IS "'~ \'IW
r.....
6ncst uauung as ~ seanun ~ fQ~ comnund WI he an possibly 1u\'C' IS In ;I bo.Jl If he IS gWn! compkte chargt'·... R.O'o'o'llig r;l(a bomo.=n
moc.orboIol
of 19J9.
In
1M wftaltf hiNI_ tldfiw/ty in gdJing
ro
I''-,,/-·
e.m..r-tI~ Ojfim WoW"
trammg m,dslllpmen.Accofdmg to O'eonor.'TIte
~
"
i:
_
n._
.. _.-i
... -.- __ . ..-~.
----.
~
in tN Slomri
~
tN
«rNttIIy got dow", /" tItt "'-r WfftJol _.jVrJiJtg tItt ituitIt in ~ tIarfmm b.u.fitr.fimt.fwma At dtt bMom if
I
,
lying sn.nrfy
""'..,. 1wdI. 17Jt Pint
"
H ,:
------ ;v
linflmoflll
The Ships
officers and l1Il'n b'O forlh in thl' boots 10 do battle for Ih.'ir ship'. Each br:Jnch produced its own crew. perhaps for S<"wr:J1 differem kinds of boal. Such contests were r:Jrcr in w:utime. but the cruio;er Mauri,ir.s was abk 10 ol},'anls<: a COllll'Sl at Tar:Jmo III 1943. in\'olving 27 crews from several ships." Mosuy, boats had far more serious uses in wartime. They helped evacuate lroops from the beaches of Dunkirk. umillhe f10rilla of small crafl arriwd.TIll"Y l'I.'SCul·d crews of torpedoed merchant ships and boarded sinking V-boats,:IS \vith HMS Spty in Febnl.lry 1944. TI,r u4udrr Ilad 50/"( diffin/lly illgt'tr;,!~ alongsidl' Ilrl' V·boar MaIlSI' of Ilrl' slighl sra Ihal uw nmu;'i!i> bill f1~II/II"lIy my Fim Utlllrll<J1U <Jlld 01/( R<Jling 1Il<Jllaged 10 Sl1lImbie OIl b.lQnI. 711t'n' IIW mIl' Jl'iI,1 ml;ng "n rl,e g,m [Jatfrmn a"d rl'e COlllmm,dill.!! Qfficer tillS Iyi'!~ 5/;'l'l:rdy IIVllllded ill II'e slo",afl, aIOl!~side rile romling 1OI1'l'1' Ilarrh. 711e Firsl UtWfflilllf <JrJllillly go'l dOll'll '0 III<' IOJIJfI' ("mm! l'l)()m,ji"diIlJl III<' ;mide ill lOlIlplerr darlml'J.5 ImrJrttfrom jiunI'S.AIII... borlolll of ,ltr Ilalrlr 11'115 a la'},'I' "'w, poJ.j;bly Wllli/illi".!! books, btll ;1 litIS 100 Itrill'Y j;" him '0 gel "p Ihl' (OImi,!!! '''WIT; hI' Ihrnfi,rr rfi",bt-d up "~a;,, 10 get" li,l<', Ilrt Ralill.~ 011 beanl Mug fully (,rrllpitd stTllrillJl lite u!/,altr alld J..WP;/Ig all l')'l' "n IJr.. utlwlded (nplni". TIle Fim UeJ/lrl,nm IJilll barrly ~'li, ...d lire opI'll oil' (/II(T IIIon' ul/lm ,lIT boal ~II 10 sink aud UIJlrr ro Iilp "11IT rite rom,iug IllUIIT Irnlrll. Ht and IIII' Rari'rg bmh jlllll/ll'd 0Vtr lI,t sidl' ami SIIum IV Iltl' u4lII/,b",J«' ((mwd by lite V-boal Sillkitlg.'"
Pulling, that is. l'Q\\~ng bo.ns came in 1'\\'0 main eypes. both clinker built wilh overlapping planks.The 32-fool cutter was a de\·doptll("m ofa type used by the navy for nearly 200 years. [t had a wide beam of 8 feel 6M inches for b'OOd SOliling. and a squan.· or transom stl"rn. [t \\~ doublebanked. that is. il had two oarsmen on each Ihwart. one on each sidc. to a loul of 12.Thcy were carried by cruisers and capiLlI ships. Th.. 27-foot whaler \'';OS deri\~1 flQm the boat used to harpoon wh",k'S ",nd was used on must lypt.'S ofs.hip. [t tOO W:IS clinker built. bllt was double ended \\~Ih a sharp bow and siern and a narl'Q\V Ix-am of6 feel. which made il beller at lll\ving than sailing. It waS single-banked. wilh its fj",: oarsmen sitting on alternate Ihwarts. Smaller types of sailing boat. such :is Ihe 14-foot dinghy, were nuinly used for recrearion and training. Thc navy had virtually abandoncd steam-powered boats in recent y.·ars. redueing the weight by two-thirds and eliminating Ihe need for stokers to go with e\'ery boal. By 1939 it was also m01ltng [Owams high-speed mOlOrboats with planing hulls. opening 'a new chapter of seamanship' according to Conunandn O·Conor.... Meanwhile. Ihe 'slow Iyp;.·· of motorboat survivcd in the service. ranging !Tom the 50fOOl motor pinnace carried by battleships ",nd fitted with two cots for on:rnighl 'lays. to th.· 13M-foot motor dinghy uS<"d by submarines. F:lSt motorboats had hard chine for planing. Thl')' were carvel built WIth tWO layers of diagonal planking running in opposite directions. They had cabins and sollIe accommodation. AI th.· top cnd of till' SC1l1e W:is the 45-fool motorboat used by capital ships. [t could be filled out :is an ",dmiral's barge, or for general purposes. It had three engines for a 10131 horsepowcr of looThe 35-f<)Qt boat \\';OS similar. used by cmiscrs and:iS a cT1lSh tcncll"r by aircraft c",rriers. The 3O-foot boat WaS uS<:.>(\ by light cmisers. while the 25-foot boat W:is used by most ships - Ihe largest power boot on deslroyt:rs and escorts and a utility boot on la'b>er ships_ A Illediulll-,ized power boat was crcwl:d by four men.Tht· coxswain was in ehaTb'l:: unless an officer or midshipman was Pfl."SCnt. The
bowman was responsible for the bow lines when coming alongside. the stern sheetllun did Ihe same job aft. A stoker was carried for engim' maimt'nance and gl"lll'ral dutks. but he no tongn had to Oper.llC th!." engine during manOC\l\'res :is wilh a steam boat, because it was under the full comrol of the cOlCSwain. who oper.lted the throttle from his posilion at the wheel. A dcstroyer or frigate usually carried three boats, slung !Tom davits on both sides of the ship. A RilleI' class frigate. for example. had a 27foot whaler. a 25-foot motorboat and a IS-foot dinghy of a type used by trawlers. In 1939 &1f
Pumps and Damage Control Ships needed pumps and dr.linage for routine- t:lsks such :is removing Water from the bilges. They also needed Ihtm for fire fighting, for flooding magazincs to pren:nt explosion. or to correel heeling nused by damage. Thl")' also needed th!."1lt 10 remove la'b'l: quantiril."S of waler that mighl enter after underwatcr damage by mine or IOrpedo. Typically. thc 0 and P class dcstroyers were designed 10 han' the means to remove water from every comparlment. A main galvanised-stecl suction pipe 2)0$ inches in diamCler ran the length of the ship. with another under Ihe upper deck and hranch pipes leading off to the sidt·s. II was Sl:rved by fire ",nd bilge pumps in tltl.· engine room and an electric pump in one of Ihe hoiler rooms. The main m~chinery spaces had circulaling pnmps and ejectors, sel as low down as possible. For fire fighting. a pipe It,d forward and afl from tltl.' l"ngine room under Ihe upper deck. sen'ed by the same pumps. [t had various branches and screw-down valves and hose
103
-------- -------------------
104
Churchill's Navy
and hopdully confme Ihe enemy about her type or intentions. Ml:anwhile. Wen"rn Approach..s Command us..d the servin'S of Pl·t...r SCOtL son of a naval gunnery officer. and a yachtsman. paint..r and naturalist hirnsdf, He JHl:mpted 10 see the ships through th ... eye of a U-boat cOllllnandl·r. and used light..r shadl"S of gr..y and gn·l'n. This was successful and was adopted hy many ships in other commands. 'Mountbauen pink' pro.."d far Ir.-ss elT..eth·". There was no s..t scheme for bnding craft al firsl and Alec Guinnl:S$ 'dcvised a pattern of pale bluc and whitc reclangles. rather like a I3raqu". My fdlow officl']"!; complain"d that [ had made mine look like a hospnal-ship and far too conspicuous; but wh"n we wer" out on the ocean they equally complained that they couldn't see me·... Stanwrd palt"rns w"re allocate
(j)
dark blul" or grl]' pato;:h in thl' n·ntral part of th" hull. Underwater. the hulls \\'l"re cO\'en·d with ami-folllmg paml. This contained "ither mercury or copper. though scientists were divided about whl·ther it poisonl"
• Life-Saving Gear The Royal Navy did not like to think about the possibIlities of defcal. Exampl... of
camouflage Khema. 1. TI,e baltllKhip
Rod...,.. 2.An A to I cla..
dem'O)'er ill the
Admiralty Intermediate
Scheme. J. An Eme'l:""ry
COll1u·ctions. The magazines could be flooded dIreCt (mill the sea by opening 6-inch _,a_cocks and flood ,,~I"es_ They could be open..d fmm pmitions on till,' upper and lower deck. Despite these provisions. damage control proved inadequate in the early Slagl'S of the war, Men were nOt fnlly IrJincd 10 carry it Ollt. and oftt'n the cqmpllll'm showed fatal fhws. The Ark R
pardy rcrncdi"J during thl: war. but nl'W shiVS \wn" fill~"d with at !l"a'! on(" di("~~'l gell<'F.ltOr pJac("d above thc w:nerhne.
'It"'. I'rogr,on'",e dHI~~r
in the
Ad",i ... lty light
Painting
Schen,e.
In pe~cetil1le ~hips w<.-re painted dark grey in British waleT$ and light gn"y 011 forel,!,'lt statIOns. M
•. A RiyU cws frigale ill the \I'estern
Approaches oc:hen.c.
and pcrhaps that is why it t"nd"d to neglecl life-s:l\'ing g:"ar until well into the war. [n Sepll'mber 1939 th"n' weTC slill no plans to issue men with perronal equipment. After urging by the Commander-in-Chief Honll" FIl'el, the Admil
•
;00 outfit. dc-u.Iong KJI :lnd jacob'S bdIkr. It otr~ no proteco.on
~.Cod
:ag;aiJISI cold :and 11l1ll. :and was dcigncd so dul Iulf me: mrn ....,ouid br OUlSldr me: nfi: dmgmg 10 roJX"S. :md me: Il'$t.Sillillg round the run. \\'t1'e
6oa1 befon pulling
ne\'er compleldy dry. II
w~
hor.rdy adequale for w:u in the North Se,l
or Mcdilerr1mean, and complelely ullSUllable for Ihe AU:lIltic or Arclic. wht're rescue mig}n be delayed ,lnd Ihe men were
\'ulner~ble
to
exposure. An inquiry of 1946 reported. 'Time :l.lld:i.g2in Luge numbers who ha\-e reached Ihelr n'fuge tu.\-e colupsed from cnmp ,lnd cold, :lnd wed before ~ :lrm'ed'."Whe'n tht' Wild .suvn ....':IS SUlik ill 1942,:..0
Ihc- W:lICT but Ihey lad 10 w:ln m~ for 13 hours for of them ....'t1'e .lffeaed by cold. Ihrtt mOl\" b«:u1lC' ewllSted :md dJoI.-'tlC'd. MC'n In moc:orbo.lts and ..... tu.kn ....'t1'e we. bul the' mrn go!
iJlIO
tC'SCUt'. Thirt}'-ollC'
those
III
d1t' Driey f!o:lts suffered As Ihc- slupi medial OIDcCT
ronlnlC'lltcd. 'No li,'n ....'OUld ha-.'t: been Iml If !he life~ing t'<Juiplllr-1II
hxI been adeqlUle 10 k«p me men OUI of me "":aICT.-The Carley ilo:ll ....':IS supplememed by :I device ailed a Ooanet. which, as Its rwne Implies. is,l rl('[ supponed by OO.lt!. II ....':IS useful as 'a tim refu~ until rhe 11I01\' solid suppon of:l. raft could br I\",lched·. Despile rhelr f:lults, incre.uing numbers of Drk-ys :Iud 1l0l:1nClS \\'t:1"e I$SUed during Ihe W,lr. nle hor.tucship
HOWl:
had 54 Carleys ,lnd 101
nounelS for a complement of more dun 1800 men, while the arrier fl1domilabk had 74 Carle')"S ,lnd 28 floc::Ule!S for just under 2000 men, Carley BoalS migtn be sucked 011 odd cornen of the deck, as on many h;r,tueships.. Cru~ and:wcnft amen usaulty hxI n')\\'5 oflhc-Ill stQ\\'t:d \'t:tt1nIt)' 3long !he Sldc$ of the' ship. I\"ady for USC". E\'t:fI so. many could noc: br bunched. eilhcr becaUSC" bad IIwntnl:lnC'e ;illoy.'ed !he slip' !O sci.u up. 0<" no knife ....~ :n'2l1:lbk w cut the ropes. II ....'as cb.imed WI
only aOOuI 10 per call ofDrley BoalS became ....':Itabomt' on :a smhng.
Then- tS good re~l 10 bdiC\~ WI Il\iIIl}' oflhe 50.000 sailon who died In the wu could M't: bet-ll rescued b)' benet bfeslvmg methods,,,
.._rins life
\'aU
in die waniroo
r ,)ART \I
Naval Society and Culture 1 The Administration of Naval Personnel DUTmg the W,lr the H..o)'al Navy and RCJy.l1 Marines v.vuld <'xpanJ from 131.!XKl regub.rs and 73,000 reservists at th(,- beginning of 1939, 10 a maximum of 783.000 men :md 72,000 ....,omen in June 1945. The great TTUJority of the new recmil.'l were conscripts or shon-tl"rm \'OtUlllttrs who Iud no pbns 10 make the IUry melr career. Thu npld
expansion was less Uun the arm)'. which Iud J mtillon men at its pe;lk. Of the RAF, which tud O\~r a mdbon.lJul a IUvy'S ~nnd ~ uc far more complex dun d>osc of annic:s Of an forces. Most of 10 men
win spmd a brge pan of theIr arne
at
sea, whICh IS IlOI man i nann"al
CClMronmem. They win hve .hac' In \~ry difficuil and
the Olrmy for the Roy.aI Mmnes. md lIIOst of the ail' force i sIuIIs for the Fkrt Air Arm. The- eXpansion put gre.. t stnln on the IU\'Ys personnel system but brought into pby one of the ruvy's gr'f'.llt$ ~ngth5 - the .llbility to improvise.llnd modernuc wnhm .ll tndioorul fnmcwQrk. N.ll\'.lll m.anning \\'.ll$ domin.llted by two r.lther uch.llic principlelO. In the fil'$t placr. in throry il W.ll$ nOI po$Sible for a TlIting to be a lIlember of the navy as such: a r.ltillg had to be borne on the books of a p.llrticular ship. Of COUl'$( many thOIl~nds of Illen wrrr in shorr h.ll5CS. but these usually h3d ship n.lllllelO. such .llS HM$ GafJ,~, the tTllining b.llse on the River Ol"'Nl.'"ll.Thc fiction W.ll$ uken even funher and C\"Cry b:lSe .lletU.ll1ly h:ld .ll ship or:l hO:I1. For eX.llmple, HMS 1{jI.llyrV, thr TlIdar tTllmmg b.l.e on thr hJr of M.lln, h.lld .ll con\"Crted Iifebo.llt which W,l$ supposed to be:lr i~ cornpkmCIlI of lIuny hundreds of men.' E\~n scmor officers ....~re p.lln of the ficnon: suff officers .lll the Admir:l.lty ....~re lechme~ .lltuched to HMS ~jtlml, .ll depol: uup moored'm the Tlumes. II WZS.ll cus.tom llul lud pc'rlup$ lud some moning m the early days of the Wling ruvy when stup$ were nunnrd for single amp.lllgm or \ ~ only. It w ....i-.ow Ihe Innsirion to continuous service in the 1S5&,.llnd the bulldmg of short: Nscs fium the 1890s on"''.llnk and did IlOI end unw the NJ\'2l Duoplme Aa of 1959. The n.llmes of shore Inses .....e re often .ll nutter of clunce. Nsed on SOlllC .llndent w.llrship which had bttn reduced to h.llrOOur SCrVlce III tlul port 11I.1111)' years earher, The ongmal Gd~, for eX.ll.lllple. \\':IS an SO-gun ship of the line built m 1821 .llnd bmkrn up more th.lln a century Iner. Solllr Nse5 h.lld TlIthrr frh'QIOIlS names. HMS Varbrl, the b.llsc for midget submarines on th~' Island of ButI', \\'.lIS :I comhin.uion of th., 1I.llllld ofVarley .llnd Bell. the officers who founded it. Secondly, :Ill pe:lcerime .lind most wartime TlItings .llnd W.llrTllllt officers ...."eTC at(;lched to onc of thre~' 'horne poru' or 'nunning divisions' - Chnham. Portsmouth :lnd Demnpo" (Plymouth). The new dockyard .1111 Rosych was never developed :IS .ll rn:lnning port despIte ambitious pbns. so (>C'...cetirne IUval rt'Cruillllcm tended to be
concenlr.lted in thc south of Engl:ind. In \vanilllc this W.llS somewhal modified .lind 5rWn] speei...li$Cd lII.llnning divisions were set up, for eX:llllple for cO:lSul fon;-cs. but 11I01"(' th:ln half the n...vy n::nuined with the thlC'<.' tnditional divisions In 1944. E:.ch '~ner:l.l servin" ship of the ruvy - mduding c:lpiw ships, cruisers,l:.llrriers .llnd escort vessels - w.u an..ched to o~ of the thf"C'C' WVISIOns md Its crew would come nom there. It "'':IS 3 system tlul Iud \\'Qrked ",~llin puct:timr, illowing neh
Oppooi~..:Tbc
Second s.,. Lord, Vic.... Adnliral Sit
nun 10 $Cale his f...mily in the :lin of the pon in the kllowl~ hu ship would retum there ~ner or bter md he ",~uld be scnt on le:l\~ or counes m the ;are:l. In ",,,,mme II ome under considtDble SU1Iin.
WiIliazn'lPhirwc:o.th, I~
••
The Second Sea Lord and his Staff
Below:
s..am....
N3val personnel poliCY ....-as the responsibility of the Second $e.ll lord. 3 $Cnior 3dmir.>! md member of the Board of Admir.>!ty. In 1939 the
ril thftr hanunocks
,wuthcd~_
in the oa.oaI
post ....-as held by Sir Clurlc:s LIttle. In 1941 he w.u wcceeded by W J Whit\\'Qrth. who h.lld led the lt1lnpi/t into .llctlon .llt the Second l3.llttle
.....racb .,
of NaTVlk. one of the few successes of Ihe Nor.....e gi3n C3mp3ign. In 1944 the post wem to Sir Algernon Willis. .ll gl"('.llt .lldminimlltor .lind Cunninghalll·s former Chicf ofSblf, bm one of the 'Never compl...m, never cxpl...in· school. according 10 his l\ltun:: son in law.' The Second Sea Lord was responsible 10 the Uoard for recruiting and tnining the
fleet, l<:ning the levels of complements fOr ships. the appointment of
officers. and for the adminiSlrarion of the Royal Marines. WRNS, reserve forces and naval hospitals. His Na\';ll Assistant ....'35 responsible for officer appointments. and the Engineer Admiral for Personnel de;!]t
wilh
posljn~
within his own branch. The Director of Personal
Services was responsible for mOSl of the manning issues. Under him, the Manning Division c:alcu1:lIcd the number of men needed for each
period. the Personnel Division advised on the welfare of the lower deck and the Tr.lining Division co-ordinate
The ""'pan,;.,n of the nIlV)'. army
and ai. force
skills needed for the ships that were likely to be in conunission in the coming ye:tr. with a proportion for shore bases, training :tnd so on. Again this came under stra.in in wartime as ships. such as the 50 American
3500
-
3000 f-2500 2000
r--
1500 1000 500
/ /
/
i
.-----: 1940
departments involved. This could become highly complex because of the different trades, and the siwation became worse as new equipmem was fitted to ships. including radar and anti-aircnfi: guns_
Volunteers and Conscripts In peacetime, and even in wartime in 1914---18. the navy relied on voluntary entry. The terms of the seaman's normal 12-year service we.-e harsh, and life at sea was often uncomfort:lble and restrictive, bUI the navy had unrivalled prestige, while a long period of guaranteed employment seemed attncri,"e in the harsh economic climate of the 1930s_ There was no shortage of good-quality volunteers. The navy \vas slightly reluctant to rdy on conscription even in 1939, but it soon became part of the fabric of wartime life. By the spring of 1942, men bet\veen the ages of 18 and 46 were liable, and "..oml'n between the ages of 18 and 31. E\~n within that there \vas an element of volunteering. E\'ery man was :lIlo\\'ed to volunteer for either the navy or thl' RAE Ifhl' did not, or failed to get into the service of his choice. he went inlO the army. No one joined the navy entirdy agltinst his will and. in fact. a large number of men were attra.cted by the prestige and the tT:l\'e1 opportunitits, and were nOt put off by the dangers and dis<:omforts. For most of the war the numbcrs :;electing th ... navy W ...TC about three times those needed and th ... !;Crvice W11 able 10 pick and ch~
1941
1 1942
1943
-- Royal Navy ...... Army -- RAF
its men to a certain extent. The only exception was in the great p(Oriod of I94}-4, when 31most e\'eryone who ume up to
",xp3n~ion
I
0 1939
destroyers, we.-e :tcquired unexpectedly, odters well' lost in action. or individuals became casu:llties at unpredictable rates, New types, such as landing cnlt, were developed and the Fleet Air Arm expanded npidly. so it was :lImost impossible to predici numbers accuntely. The crew of an individual class of warship was decided within the Second Sea Lord's office, after consultation with the various
1944
1945
the minimum medic:ll and psychologic:ll sundards \vas accepted. The numbers each service was aUo",ed to recruit ""
~
109
Naval Society and Culture
that our limited null-power is usrd to the best
ad~nu8C"'.)The
ISSue of
entering the admlllisu'lIive, domcstic or mediol bnlKhes. He Iud to
the 'm.anpower budgcol' beame more mtense by 1943 :as !he popubnon
have good teeth Qr W(';ar dentures, fQr n;av:t.! food w.u often tough and
became fully mobIlised and !here ....':IS
few ships ('uTled dentiSIS.lfhe passed he went on to;an interview. In
110
sbck lelt ill the system.
The mvy expanded more slowly !h:1.Il the Olher servkn III lhe eady suges of the Ynr. Dig ships took severn ynn to produce and snuller \'essds, such as co:utal forees and bnding craft, dId nor comfO into full use l1Iltil the second tulf of tM Ynr. ThfO f~$ expms.ion came III 194H as tM mvy grew from 671,000 to 790,000 mal.The tkc:t ....':IS building up for D-D~, esron orrieo from tM Uniled SuIt"S ""'fOl'C' b«conung :t\;ribbk, and !he gteat building programme for esc;on _ k WOlS baring fruil_ III gencnl!hc ~'s demands for penormd W~I'C' satisfied m the urly saga.. By 1942 !he army UJd air foree demands were bemg CUt tuck, 001 the mY)' ....':IS :ill0'"-m 85 per ('cnt of us requ~ ;and look in more thm 20,000 Illen and women III the lIIonth of August alone. In thc following yen It w:u .tl.Iov.'Ied 190,000 new entrana, but in OClober!he manpower crisis began
IQ
bitc and Its
the fint ye;an of Ihe w:ar these WfOre I;Qllduned by retired ('hid petty offi,,~rs,
whQ knew Ihe Krvi('e ba('kw:ards but h;ad little or no
cXpC'rleu(,c Qf newcr br.mches such n aviation or "uhr. They replaced
v.'t'1'C'
by well-educ;aled WTt'n pelty officers tralllcd by
psychologists, .and thc:y proved ;a great suceess.
Ranks and Ratings In mmy ""~ the ruvy ""'0lS ;a lJIQre ho~ body thm the army, wh05C regunents rewnc:d ;a \'tt)' distinct identity CIoTti m w;arume. Sailors, 011 Ihe other h;and, were Qf'1C'n U1LllSferred from UllP to ship without any reg:tn:i for tndiuQn. But In one respect the mY)' was more c1urly divided. The ;army and ;air foree had aoopted the uu!tClri;an
denund for 247,000 men w.u cut to 67,000 and Iluny older shIp! lud
battlcdreu ~ the garb of a n;atiQn in arllU. and it \\In worn proudly by
to be uken out Qf KrVlce to nun the new ones.'
General MQmgomery Iumself. On shore and in big ships ;al least, nlO$l
A mm who
\\-':IS
nOt in a
~l"Ved
occupnion and w.u of;a SUlublc
age ....':IS called to ;a strict med.iC1l.l cxmwuo.on. He needed good ~gbl wi!hout gW.ses unless he Iud mde quilifia.tioll$ or ";as
TlIDngs
wore ;a completely different uniform from the Qffic;:ers. In battle
the: rmh ....~ uightly ks5 obvious. as t'\oTI'}'One won: Heel helmetS:and = y had :mo.-flash gear WIth Ies5 otMow TlIfIk dt5tinctionJ. Afloat in
New entrants
.... c...eled by • _rr.nl office. On
arrival .t HMS
JUr-I Amll'" in the botiday camp . t ~ i..
Febnoary 19010.
n...,. ....
rathet
.............. ~ .....
reenoils.
110
The NIY)' In 1137
-.------
,...
... ,... ... ,
,
/ /,/
<3"
-
•- I
• • • • • .;' /// /' /" / / / ~.
JI'
/
0
The nwnben of
ratinl' in the difl"e.....1 bnDc......
of the navy in I'J7.
s
the snWkr ships. dros tended to be informal 001 the mw caps S3-id lIIuch about their rank e\'ell if they \\~ in O\~nIh or workmg dn:u./I. $C'lUO!" officer had gold br:aid round the e<4,... of the ~ of hIS ClP. A JUnior or wunm offict"T had the same
they Ih,"" in temporary ;md requisitioned amps around the pons. New entr.u11S hated Ihe burxb and were only tOO mn to get a sea draft. Older long-sen.;ce men. on the- other tuncl. looked for comforClbk biUeu ashore in order to become ·~rrack sunchiOos'. But a nun ""Quid n:main a!uc::hed to his division wherever he went. HIS service number wu prcfi:u:d wnh the leucr P for Portsmouth. D for Dcvonpart and C for Ctuttulll. The conunander of each barracks W;I:$ responsible for the drafting of $e'arnan ratings to each ship. as requested. In peacellme he would try to gh'l' each nun a fair de:.al. with appropriate periods of foreign :.and home JCrvice. sea and shore jobs; this was impossible in wartime, Men would be callt"d Out by Tannoy or given 'dr:tft chlu', then marched to the nfamt railway il:.ltion to uke a train to the yard where the ship was completing. Often thl1' did not know the name or type of ship at this stage. but could only guess by the size of the draft.
The Manning Divisions
The Branches
After his basic training, a man would probably find himself attached to one of Ihe three: naval barracks to await ~ting to a ship. They ...."en: O\'('rcrowded, unsanitary ilulllS. £\'('n the legcndlry oplirniim of Ihe journalist Godfrey Winn, who joined as an ordinary seanun. could nOI hide: the defeclS of th.. IUlmel at Chatham where nuny men had to
The navy was divided into many bronchcs represenling different trades. Naturally the seaman branch w:as the largcst, and it included gunners, torpedomen, AscHe and bter ndar operators, It formed about a third of the navy. Sign:.allers, both visual and r.ldio. were close 10 the seaman branch and were about:) per cent, Stokers came next
det"p for fear of:lIf raids.
behind the seamen.They provided the JCml-skllled and heavy labour force in the engine roorrn and formed about 20 per cenl of Ihe navy, whereas their mon: skilled coumerparu. the- e-ngine room artifice:rs and mechanici.ans. formed only:} or 4 per cent. Other hIghly skIlled men such ai :.auiiaos :.and ordnano::e and decukal artificers were about 3 per cem. Mannes. who were recruite-d and lrainw separ.ltely from the 54110rs. were about 10 per cem of the totl! fie-et, The rem4linder formed the medical. domestic and adnumSlratwe SIde of the navy and mcluded sick berth auendlnu. cooks. ~t,~wards :.and Wllters or clerks, They formed about 6 per ce-nt and were distinguished from the olh",rs. in Ihat ",v",n Jumor ralmgs wore 'fore :.and aft IIg'. a versIon of the uniform worn by offic"'rs and petty officers. with pe4lked ap and o::oIbr and ae. Each branch tud n-o"'"" separalely m",r the )",ars. With lIS own b:.adges. system of promouon and informal rules. The- iCaman W~ a \"'ry dIfferent ;amnul from [he Stoker, and .:quilly sep:u:llte from thenurinc:, The snuller branches relied more on lechmcal skill for
... 1 susJWf.' ,hll' hlld
Ih~
if Char1.i~ hlldrl'l &«n wirh mt Ihal
nighl, 1 u""uldn'l hallf'
gulS 10 push my '"'y righl 10 Iht md of Ih~
runn~l,
no.... dipping
my "tlld, nou' Sflu«zing p
'ott'"''
h(l(lJts In Ih~ 1(011' roof, lIr1d UorR' busy lying Ih~ IlJCrs of Ihri, boots lind "llnging Ihnrr na' 10 Ihri, bid ... Evm Ilollm ..... n'","~d Iht fimhtfl trld il looktd hook
ll/""dy dOllbly ttnployrd. ... £,,",Iua/ly Chllrlit spn'iJd my
hammIKk on
II
sh~/f. .. 1 h,d my u'oJ"h, pilI my 60011 btlll'l'tn myulfond Iht
Olll" _II of Ih~ l..nMI, mlldt a pillow of lht lnlO
my blankrls... 1 U'/IS
100
li"d
rNl
of my dOlhu lIr1d tr.luitd
lo,,,rr.'
There ""'l'TC 48.500 lIIen in the three 1U\':lI1 ~rracks III Febrwry 19..... Sollie ""'l'fC penuanent sun. iOffiC ""'l're undergoing courses. but 12.000 of these ....'l'TC raangs awa.lung posang. As w~U as tm: barrxb
Havallbtings and Marine Odler Ranb,
111
s.p..... to.r 1944
..... ,...,
"
/
ad\';mceU!cnt. and SOnle were uadmollally mo"" ~mecl in thel~ m':lIlners Ihan Ih", Sl:'amen o~ Slok",rs, The dl!fert.'m groups wen: often fi",rce rh';lls, but al heart Ihey knew Ihal ('\'('T)' branch had ,ts p.m 10 pby In ,\n dnClenl sh,p and n'\\')'.
avies Within the The
/
iket and noon
dun~"S, but !he crews of moft' speClahsed <'Seon \l'55Ck tended to l1."l1l.lin III the same line ofbusineSlS of the whol.c .....ar. In dl"CCl. ~ \\~ six or SC\l:'JI dlffcn:m IU\"K'S \\1Uun!he Royal NJ\')' III 1939-6, each \\1m me same lltUform and ranks and often rhc same tf1lldes and qwli6c:aoons.. bul maolllng diff(']'l"lll ships and lighting diffcn:nt kinds of war. Exh of these lU\ies I'lt"C'ds 10 be COflSldered separately.
avy
mem~rs of mt'
thtl"l' port dh'isions made up aboul 60 per cem me IU\')'. The Subnunl1(" $(-I'\')('e was b.rgcly St:JW""1t' S11lC('" its founc:Uoon early In the cenru~)'. In .ldd!non, a new dIVISIon ....'ZS §t't up for thc FIcn l\l~ "~m III 1939. and remained a pe1'"llullelll pan ofme na\'}~ though
ail'Cf:lfi orTle" and me non-,\eron,\uncal pans of Ihcir crews """uined altached to the thrt'e =ditional di\·isions. nil.' Pauol $(-lVtce was mmned by fishermen at the bl:glllllmg of the wa~ :lnd continued on a scparalc b;r.sls. \\;th lIS depol al Lowestofl. ~l Forces was also sct up ea~ly in the war. to man srtlall. f;r.sl craii around British shon-s and latcr in the Meditl·~ranl';ln.Combinl'
"avr
11It gtNr RdIuII/"6" if rllt ptrsml ~pltm U '''"l fMM.furm lUI apnr tk mrps of '''nr OUfl lind '''n~ ,.tun.(S kllOU1 that Ihri~ w
2 Naval Medicine MedICal officers \\'('re 1I1volv~d at every stage in a scanun's carttr.Thcy helped to sclect him for elllry to the navy and for special tasks such as aircn:w and stlbnurines.Th~')'looked afie~ his health on board a ship on acuvc service and treated his wounds from accid"nl or b.3u.l". Mosl of these dUlil'S w"re don", by men who were almosl as raw as tlte majority of seamen in the navy. There was wry Iitde in the life of a peacclime general practitione~ to prepaft' hIm fo~ the crowded, stuffy condilions of shIps' mes.sdecks. for sudden changes in climatl.' between tlte UOPICS and Ihe Arctic, or the hornfic nuunes thaI I1lt'n mighl suffe~ III lnnle. The mcdica.l department of the navy Ollie unde~ the Second Sea Lord and ....'ZS hexled by a Su~n-Vice Admi.raI. This \\'1IS S'r l'em\':l.! Nicholk until he was suc«<ded by SI~ S F Dudley in July 1941. HIS saff at the Admiralty \\~ dmded uno fou~ sections. dealing \\lim pcnonnel. nUIClU1 and finance, skk~ and sul'\'l")~ and sausUa. H" prc-....
tkptnd on Ihrir "'"" ".!JUm "olro Iut,'t II _tIlolr"J frt'tT Iwnd in t"iJ ",,,JUT
tlul/! w()w/d lit ,1,(" ~
if t~ jllffN Worn' "'lImltd.fwm som(" ttrI'r"list'li fX"'I."
Naval Surgeons For historical rt';lS()ns naval doclOrs were known as
Ewo \\1mlll the uadloonal nunolllg pons. <'Seon \esek such as co....Tttes and frIgates wert'. in practice. k",pl SCJural(" from dw largc~ warsillps. A5 NichoUs Monsarral wrow on ukmg (OIlUiund of a frig:Itl:: Togcth("~ wllh ocean convoy ~'SCort. il was in pOlllt of f.let the only son of navy I knew anything abom: the ship I \\~ booing 10 (ommand .....o uld be dll' bi~'t'SI I had ('\1:'1' boankd, and Ill"!" job. convoy cseon,lud brt-n my hfe fo~ as long as I could I1."membe~·.' 1:>ntroo,1:'1'S nught Ill()\'(' easlly bctwttn
SUrgeOIU.
though
mOSI had no sJX'Cllic trallllng III sU!'b,<,ry and well' in fact phrstClans in the usual sense of the te~m. Theft' were about 400 of them in the prcw:lr na\')' - tim'" to a brg.. ship such as a battleship. onl' to a d~'1lroye~ lIodlla of eight or nine ~hj~. In peacl'lime a naval surgeon was gh'cn a six-month coum: in subjeclS of spcdal imc!'eSt, such ~ trcatmenl of casualties and p~e\1."nti\"l" m"dicine, which Wefe ra~ely uught adequ;ncly in nO~Ill..1 medical$Chools. Early III tht" ......u it was d«ided
Nnill ....rinp and
"luilM otMr ranb ;n
t~
difTe...,n'
1"''" of the navy in ~pnmbft
19+t.
112
Churchill's Navy
that. as desl:IO)'Cr1 no longer oper.ued \\~th dldr l1oril1.u ,ill me 001e. a medIcal officer \\';IS nefiied on ...u:h onc. In 1942 n~ f$Corts such :IS mgnes WC!'C' gl\'~n a doaor each. grc-atly 11}("rl:U1llg Ihe dCllund. Thr service pe.-.ked <with mo~ dun 2500 medial officcn In 1945. ~1l1(' rul,'::l.I surgrons "\OflO mo!it.Iy ~ilt~d from gt'nttlll pl"lIcnu. from Slfu:mom WhCK mCTC" "'ZI' anomCT panncr 10 cury on Ihe pr.lcncl;'. 'Thq' JOined the RO')
/ht bt;einning ".f"fint
su~n-li"uIClUntli.
10
In ,",,'UO.lllc.
In
19-ID.
after [\\V "'cdu In the na''}', wilb little knowl~ of procedures. In M:I)' he found hunsclf:lS put of the Dunlork t'\"Ktunon. arr)'mg up to 800 troops al a rime and suffermg 238 cuu.tloes In 01}(" tflp ;done. He W2S nOt able 10 kC'q' up wilh {he pJ.P'"rv,ork :l.nd W2S rebuked by
the Medial DIr«1or ~neral for 'the unudy and ordn.s way' in which his JOurn.ll Iud been compiled and fur fadmg TO 'appn:(ute the unpornn(e of the: record'," From 1943 each new surgeon-uwtelUnI was issued with an dghtpa~ booklet. "4>ltj for ,\fedil<J1 QffigrJ on EII/ry "'/0 Ihe Rf1)\l1 1"IJI'Y' but thaI deall nI<1inly wilh prolocol and administntion, ap.ln from a few IIlStrucnons su(h as 'It IS very much betTer that a malingen:r should ~t away wilh il for a day or twO Ihan tlUI a serious ilInn.s should be:
A
Ii..u
~_
RNVR
fine aid in .... d..,..rvya" neon ;t.,." .... ill
1942.
nuuc:d', and that the crew mould be tnined in fim aid ill 'nOl so much whal would be Ideal as what IS gomg to be: poliSlblc III "ACtlOl1" conditions'. II ended "11h the: rousmg mJuncnon: )\Ju
"n' "t
Mind
w
k lI'l"Jr1hy l7j iI,"
At sea.mo:- surgo:-on found his prxtico:- \TrY dliftrrm from what he: w~ used to ashorr. It mcluded only fil )vung men. \\ ho wen: ne..:erthd~ under gfl'al smss and discomfon. He could fo¥, hIS slulb In dealmg with pregnancy or wim me diseases of ctuldren or old ~. He mIght ha\~ a \'('1)' snuJI prxlice (ompued wilh whal he \\~ used to. perhaps 1.JO ml:On In :I fng:t[e.....,th Wsunt rrsponslbdlty for seamen III orner w:lrships :lnd in a COlI\'O)' being tsCone:d. In nornul nmes he Iud bttle to do ;lUd hl:O nugtll be asked 10 lake on e"tn rrsponsibdities. from cl:OllS(lnng Il:Olten to supervismg the olenng, or aeullg as a sportS officer, He might lake: a strong mte:resl III pTr'l.'eno\'e ml:Odlcml:O. which (ould le
---.-
114
Churchill's Navy
He should ~ well Q(qll~ifJIl'd lVilll rhe 1UIIIl/lm- olld posirill/ls cif rhe main b,,'khfllds, Ihe hn/chfi and Ihe ulll,tr-lig!rt doors wlruh art opel! (Jf dased durillg Ilffioll, ,hI' precis/' sima/rIm oj tire !=h-IWltT tanks and main ....lIfila/rug tmnks. ... the hallOC wTOught by all explosivt shell between duks ulill tif/m rnlder lire la5k of rt
In action, everylhing changed and a surgcon who ljved a comfortJble life ;l.shore might suddenly find hinudf in great
personal danger and dealing with the most traumatic nsuahies in
gr.::1.1 haste and with linle experience.
Sick Berth Attendants The Sick Berth Anend:mt or SBA \v:l.'l :I. m.ale r.1Cing, usually recruited without any p.-evious medial experience. He could be asked 10 carry out a wide variety of dUlies, from ward orderly to what would be called a paramcdic to
The Sick Bay The main medical compartmem of 1 warship was known as the sick bay. [t servM :IS a sJlull hospital, as a doctor's consulting room and sometimes as an:onunO:;Irking spacC$ and sited where the amenities of natur:tl lighl and ventilation :m: avaibble'." Ship designers had to make the impossibk' compromise bcl\\'Cen a small area for normal use and a much urger one for banle casualoC$ or the treatment ofsurvi\"Qt'S from other ships.A new battleship like the Prin« ifl1'
A{WmlflOOaliolr itt tire Skk Bay consists if 22 suluging WIS, 4 of u~rk!r an' ill all isololiolt ward. 71rm is also prOllsiM for rlre slingirrg of 8 Iramlflocks. In au fmetgtluy firm
u'lmld M s/1ficielll.floor spate for 12 or //JOn' slre/drlT (
115
Naval Society and Culture
surgl'on~command<.'T of the nl'W aircraft carrier /ndlllnil<1hlr was happy wilh the sick bay when the ship was completed in 1941. comparing it unfavourably with the County class cmisers ofth... 19205.
Th...
!lOt
TIle N.Jllug oJffiJllmrod.JllolI is 1'C)' /1oor illdN'd and tilt mess l.Jbir ilrddrqllolrr. It IlllS "Ol~' borne ill ",I,ld Illdl I" tile l'fI'$n,l Il"r s/,ips af'/' OJJ('r,lIi,rg Off tl,( O(I'
II could follow a main tll."l."t around at a discreet distance. though this was comparatively rare in wartime. It could serve as a mol'l" or less slatic ship al an improvised na,,,l base:. such as Scapa Flow or Alexandria. where facilitit.'S ashore were inadequat.... Or it could be used to transpon c.l!\I.11ries berween the fleet and shore hospitals. which was lhe mOSI COTTlmon role. Thl.' navy used II hospital ships during the W;IT. and only fin: up to 1942.AI Ihe beginning of the war only the ,\I
In contrast. the acconullodation in the war~built R.iv... r class frig:ltt'S was much apPlQ1l1:d of. The surgcon-lieUlCnam of HMS Barfe reponed:
the catde trade with South America and had a speed of8 to 10 knots. No purpose-built hospital ship was compleled. and the others were a mixed bag of converted merchantmen. Only olle had been built more
recently than 1922. Their si:w "aried from 2000 to lOJ)(:X} tons and spced from II 10 18 knots. Some were powered by diesel engines. some by oil-fired steam and some by coal - an arrangemenl that
Hospital Ships Naval policy was to get sick and wounded men off the ships as soon as possible, 10 more specialised facilities ashore or afloat. This was not easy in tht" nJiddk of Iht" Atlantic, but slightly simpkr ill narrower seas such as the Mediterranean.The naval hospital ship had three main functions.
produced a great amoum of dust and was wry umatisfactory. Sollie carried 500 parients, the smallest carried 170. One of the mOSt aeli,.... hospital ships ""s the Oxj",ls/ril'f or 8646 10m. built in 1912 for thl.' Bibby Line. She was fitted for 505 patiems and had a medical st
Oppo,ite alxn'e:
The Hospi.al Ship Tj;rj~lnlgh
a.
Liverpool. Built in
.he Netherlands. by .he Adrni ....l.y in
1942 and
~t'\-'td
mainl,· in Af.ican po... MfoTe going
10 AUSTralia in 1945. Oppo
near Por.. rnouili in lhe 1920.. Left: A nnat nuning .iSle. in the hospi.al al Mal.a.
116
Churchill's Navy
Shore Hospitals and Sick Quarters
Preventive Medicine
Th~ RO)":lI
N;lV:l\ surgeons reported on die: 11k of the men III thetr ~ and wen: deeply conct:med 3hout O\~rcro.,...ding. the lack of ,-=tibtion and the problems of condensation. The $Urgeot"l of the old cruiser ~d reponed in 1943: 'The XCOmmod;ltlOn of this stup is ina.dc:qwte for the pmocm complement (702). Passagevo.~ are obsuucred b)" Iockcn and men weep for whom there is oot sufficient room in the messdecb'.They a~ commented on the seamen's d,et, 6nding d';lt there ,,,,as onen mil 3 la.ck offn:sh vegetables and excessivc lIS(' of tinned foods. Surgeons also h3d to dc~l \\lith the ill effects of the seamen"s 'run a.shore'. Drunkenness was. of course, common, a.s were venereal diseases, and somerimes the ill effects of fights between rh-al ships' compames. Officen "''ere generally loler.lnl of all of thcsc:' ,.. at 2100 hours our Sick bay was full of"casualties", mostly .....ith black C)"e5 ... , I g'lIher Ihert' are simila.r asu:l!tie:s III the SIck bay of the otht'f ship 1n\'OI\'ed!'.'" Some medical officen .....e re less unckrsunding. In 1944 the surgeon of the frigate HtlfonJ g:J\'l: a very deuiled repon: on the luurds of the loa! brothcls in Aden," The 1l;l\'aI dental service included 686 officcf$ n in pc»: in 1945. There was no question of distributing them 31llOl1g sm.;iller lhi~ as with doctors, and only ba.ttlc:ships :uxI fleet atn:nR ca.rncn had their own.lnst~, dentisu kept;l good w:nch on the: !lQmen's dental ha..lth on theIr VISits to shore lnscs. It ....'
avy Iud U5Cd shore hospiah for ncarly (wo ccnturies.The oldest ''''
csublishcd 1l:l'0I1 lwn at Plymouth. Portland, Chlth:.lm, the Firth of Forth and great Ynmollth. All lh~ &::lined tempor:uy extensions during the wn. and auxIliary hospllals were added at pbees such as Londonderry. which the navy had nOf used much in peacetime. Civilian hospit
Ih31l 75,000 p3tients, to the facilities at HMS Gordon further up the river, which tn:3t~'d 330.
Organisation for Battle The Nursing Services Queen Alexandra's RO)"31 Nn7.l Nursing Service \V;lS founded in 1902. Al the outbre3k of war it wu qu1te a small orgamsation, with 85 women, plus 168 in resc'n~. They wore a dignified but rather oldfashioned nurse's umform, modlfied in conditions of acti\'e service. They .....ere treated as the equh'
In lhe ('~rly st:lges of the war. much of che pca.cetime order of battle was adhcrtd to. In 1D~ ships Ihis (OnS;Sled of ewcualillj lhe Sitk Bar 10 Dislributing Sralicnu situated rn prot«ted positicms, w-hu-h lJCIed merely as plam of".fuge for medital SIm'CS lind persofllln. Pmding a lull in 1M «tiofI l4S1UI1/ln could mriw Oflly rninil'fUll first llid locally, .. U1!m 1M IIlfion ww DIn; rM Sick &y, if sIm snvta.abfe, mJerltd 10 rlS orrJjnory jimnion;OIhnuUi-,SOfM upper Jiock sptW had 10 M drosm w4lerr IN c.uuafties would M givm rnorr rnClhodlCai /l'rllllfOnll. More flaubk- :unIlplCtlG KlOII hearnc /ll:'CC:lS.at): puricubrl)' In die: ease of:llr ;lttxks which might contlnlX' for lIWJY houn. By 1943 die: defC"Cl$ of the old sick iuy ....-ere gcneral})' rccognJSed.'ln "''3J" dus exposed postDOri 15 e~tmnely vulncnbIe, :and it becomes necessary to proo.,dc a mon:: proteaed place to which l:XIStllIg SIck an be: quickly tr.mSf'crred and .....hcn:: casu:l!ries can be: rccet\'t'd:" It \\'
Naval Society and Culture
Fint-ald postS .....ere 00 be set Up round the mip - a cruDer. for ex1mple, would h:,o'-e four, port ;and starboard, fon: md 1ft. E1Ch md either a medial officeT. a SIck berth faong or an c:specially weD-mined first alder, plw one less skilled man An open.ting the;atre would be sel up below decks, though the principal medical officer ....'as advised 'nOl to be inunobilisc-d permanently u any onc post', but 'able 10 move about as necessary', The surgeon should ....-ear O\-e."lls with brge pockets to carry equipmenl ;and tools from pbce 10 pbce. But in battle he should nOI expect to achieve tOO much,
During Q(rion. «mdilions in Ihe rJptTIJlirrg Ihtll/" II" SIKh Ihlll no Strious swrgillll IWI'.l: can lit II/templtd; Iht tr"dithmlll si/ttI« is replrJad b)' II rol'.fi4sing !Mdley of wwnd - lilt roar of sa!wtj lind slsal/tring dttDnllrions IlS tht ship giveJ lind ft'ld1'e1 punishmtnt. tht din of Fire Partin dtaring burning debris anJ Rrpdir Amin shoring up b"lIdttllds andjixillg ICIlPO'iU'f lighting lko/U.'tm dtrJu. ~ II" 1M adikd dOOHrtfort offwmn, s~ Ilnd IW~ anJ 1M ship's twlutWtu will irtar_ 1M txknl and.frequtrlly of htr ""land pillh. In a snu1J mip the sinSk me SQ)'" ;al his post: unless surnmonrd elsewhen-. for uample to Ilbente a C2SW1ty who ....-;lS pinned down or 10 g1\-e 6nr. ald 10 an officer who coukl n
117
frxturts
III the 10....= J=t of the body, and far ....ur.se injuries in its ImmedUle vicinity. In 1940 one medical officer ofa de5tro)= reported: 'a scenc: of indescribabk horror mc1 me. Men .....en: cut in t o. mtanal VtSCtta strewn aboul md mtest1nes .....n.ppcd around the n-r. hich .....as VlStble when I looked up through a brgc hole in the upper deck·. n
The Problem of Fatigue and Stress By the time of the Second World War, IllOSI armed services Iud some system for resting personnel. The army tended to rotate unit.'! in the from line unless a major operation was in progn:ss. Air forces ~ed nR"TI after a specific number ofoper.Itions or a fl"W months in oom.bat. But the Royal Navy was ,tty sJow- to accc:pr the necc:ssiry for this. The It<'ef1 ka>-e only during a drydocking or ;a boikr dean.1bc: navy had always behC\-ed that ia .saiIon ....' en: tough enough to endure almosl arrythmg _·the men can SWld it. the nuchincs can't' .Admirailkarry .....rote to Chun::hiD arty in the Fine. World War.- But !he Second Worid War would put far more stnm on penonnel than ewT before. m tenns ollength. tntrnSlty and range of opntions.. ltd a result. many officers and men would bo:oome 00m1 OUI througb SIn:tL
A 8rirish _maa
I:Oftred
u. oil after
hK tanker . . . MInk by U-bcMa;D JaDuuy If.tJ.
118
Churchill's Navy
frw aso of outright cowumce. bc-cause on tht' whole: In Ihe film In 111lith II? Sm.,.. Ul wluch :a )'Oung ~okeT pb}~ by Richard Aut'nborough descncd hl~ post In action. w:as apparently uue but umyplcal. MoTe' ('0I1U11011 ....'H d~ reacnon obseno'ed by a mecboJ officer under 1oe\'C'TC' ThrTC'
The N.aval DiKiphne Act w;as Ihe leg;al .authority b)' which Ihe IUvy
lium the Arndes of Wu fim ISSUed by Ob\'tt in (he 1650s it was passed m Its modern fonn In 1860 whni the death penalty ....;IS sriD common. If \\;IS amended
~nlC'd. Descended Cromw~Di rC"8ill~
sbghll)' oo,'tt Ih.. }"C"an. bul sall huI
BUI (\'C'II me m\'nt rouId nQl cndurr tim fol"C".'a". M:arinc Peanon of
the CfUISCI" Ktlll Iud ;a1rody seen Ktion In the ExntT 111d &Nylt brl"~ he went 10 see his sergnm-nujor in 1~2. He "~ beconung \'l:ry agitated at possibwty of ,"OlllN!. ~ ~. dq=sscd and drank hc:avity on shore. 10k :uked for :lmtion on boW when: he could not Stt th.. xtiOll, :l.lId hoped for .a shore job t\~ntu.ally.· C.apt.lIn 'Johnny'
!lOt
define II. [I had a long section
on prize money ~Id fo, captUred enemy SlllPS, though Ih.lit w.u no longer relC\';Im to the modern IUry. 11:$ out-tbted bngwge gave It .an :lImost blbltcal nng. whICh tended to inCff"as<" il:$ authority.
me'
W;alker, the f.anlOUS COllunmder of the Second Escon Group. died of
Clus.ea
by O\~rwork in 19-15. The medical KrvtCC bcg31l to devdop w.ays of recognising problclll'i before Ihey beanll: 100 Kr;o\U. By 19-13 the Cltc:gory of·f.arigue' W3! recogmscd (though 1101. .a1\V3)"S d...alt with .ad~uJtdy).A ship's conunillion nornully wled 12 to 18 months. wuh wille shore time afio:r ii, if the simarion permitted. cerebnl thrombosis
Ewry ojJilrt subj«llo Ihis An who sh"II.fin1w'" III p"'rs~ Ihe ehllSt r'.f "n)' crremy, pir",e or wbcl, ~lIlnr lI"d.flying, or u",11 not n'Ii(lJ( lI"d 1/SSlJ/ II "'/IOlI'1 fiimd i" ,,;ew 10 Ihe m",ost if his POtl'tr, or ",--hll sh,,11 IrImorously forsllke hIS Slanon, shllIl if he hIlS Ihmin IImd frll;I01OJlsly, SUif" de",h. Th.. act could .also be used to punish ordirnry offences such as murd..r, m
\V:lS
left OUt. it allowed punishment of .acts '10 Ihe prejudic.. of b'OOd order 2nd n
Killg~
Rcguill/iotls lind
3 Naval Law and Discipline
Ad",imlty /mrnl/ri\ltrs. issued by Ihe 130ard of Adminlt.,.. The 1943 edmon \V:lS nearly 900 pagt.'S long. [t co\'ered m.au("~ such as e-ert'lIIony,
LIke any umed foree,.a nn'Y n~ds its own laws to prevent desertion.
dUlies of ollic..rs. th.. powers of \'llrious courlS, the fighting ..Iliciency
to punish cowndice in the face of Ihe enelllY, and to enforec the
and navlg:luon of the ship and various .accounting procedUIl:$.
lhe authority of comm:l.I1ders, th.. qu:llific.atiolU. .appollllm.. nt and
.authority of oflice~ and petty office~. It has 10 oper.no: well beyond nornul CIVt! law. exto:nd tho: .authority of the 5t
from diKiphne. It o:mployed severe punishm..nts. because In
Courts Martial The coun manu! ""':IS !he pimude of the naval dLsnpluwy Pn:)("css. If
w.amme llI.. n ue 'l.b·e3dy openong in eXlremely unpleagm conditions .and und..r thre.al of Injury
of presuge amongst officers and
tndmollally reauned from Ihe lowe:st lC\"t'1s of SOC;I:f)' (though far Icss
there ....-ere only -I() in 1939. rim1g dr:tnuacalty 10 .a pcB. of 1134 III
so by the Sc-cond World Wu) and miliary and na\-al law tl:nded to reOc:et th.lil by Its s.rricmcss. NaVies are dlfferem from Unlln and our
there was otlC' court manW for C\'ff)' 2833 ollicers .and men. by 19-15 il
W:IS att..ndt"d with 'considenbll" cettmonial' .and enJO)"C'd 'a high degree ntin~·.
It w;as quite nro: in the IUry-
1945.This w~ not mtif<'1y dUl" 10 Ihc increasI.ng SIZe of the nary. In 1939 IlmO ~ llW!}'. Ha....~"<'T. It ...."3!
forces. III thac their ships ofien openle We'D aW
had rlSCn to one In 6-1-4. mort' dun four
Na"C"nhdess. Ihere were nun)' who thought th.lit na\-aI law was too
wluch huI the huge number of -19.113 in th.lit }"C"ar.This ....
h.lirsh. Tho: pacifist pU)"'Tight George Bernard Sh.liw WR)(e;
beausc: th.. fl3V}' was more bw-abKhng. ~ !he thn:shoId fOl" !he coun nunW ....
, do PIOl btlin't for a mcrrtml Ihill me BnriJh FI«I is Itl.lnll(f/ by " hon/c if rn/lmli/atni WMltgtwnlS ",-#..> (annot bt tnos''''' ",oith 1M libmin Ilf a Ir.lltlp ill a (,uuoJl "'\lRI. ... II is Mid Ihlll. if I~ man or bclr uorrr ftct 10 go ",-#1m M IIIml ",r n'1ISOP1abIt noli«, lIS i" dl'i/ cmpl"Y'flC'll, dfld Ihn, tlHtlllWlld(f clfl"uly ftct 10 SMJr <J ",,,,, ",',"0 ",us not ",,,,.lh his sail, tM offiIm """,,,Id "II thn,
w
far 1l1Ort' conunon in the RAE which had 3868 In 19-15,
re-qum:d the pR:S<'llCe of many senior officers .and witnesses and was dlilicult to hold 31 SC
b)' ntings W'r"f<' dt:lll ....1th b)' sumnury punnhmem b)' the caputn or Ius suborduutn. About -I() per CCTIt of coons rnartiil were on officers. for they ....-ere IlOI sub.t«t to surruJwy purushmem. In ....'llrurn... officers
119
F1lg Officer
c.,u;.
Snllnrt"" lm~
--.
' - - - .1I---'==oF'------' !
DilmiJI
Dismiulll
....
Redl-:tioa ia
~..
SIoppIoJl." of pIIY
Coun r.bnial 5 to 9 offieers
Pea)' OffICer
Dilln;"
.....
could mo be med by disciplilW')' court. which
Noo
"'as
less fon=! ;uw time·
consuming dun) (oun rrurtial.ln 1942.2744 raongs and nunncs were !ned by coun nurtia.I. 205 officen by dOOplimry court and 92 by COUrt nurrial. Chie6 and peny officers abo md the right to elect cUI by court Ilurtial. if the offence might in\'oh~ dU--r.mng. If he decIded thai a court martial was necess.;lry, a cap~in sem a 'cin::ullIslantiallcttcr'to the adrnil1ll. If the admiral decided to convene one. he nom.i,ulcd a president and the I'l.'SI of the officers were appointed by seniorlty, to a lOu] of five to nine. Legal advice came fiom the office of lhe Judge AdVOCltc, who might send one of his deputies. a barrister. to an important trial. In other cases an officcr of the supply and ~Ul bnnch with some legal mining might be dep~. The
capt;tin or C'Xl"CUti\'c office.- of the accused's ship normally acted as p~tor whik the defence was conduned by me 'prisoners mene". who ought be his divisionil officer or a ovilim bwytt. The proudure followed the ;ad\~ S)"Sl:<=I used in civilim coum and witnes5e5 "'~ calkd on boUi sides. follO'ww by wmnung up.TIle rncmbcrs of the: coon then \"Otro on the: verdict. \\ith the JUruor offiCtr dKiding lint. A simplr nuJOrlty was $Ufficirnt. ~rpI in ~ imw.ing the death ~ty, when
w
two fifths ",ne needed. ~ Vl:ldJn "''
po'"
Lord conunemro:'So long as a ship ft'mains afloat and has C\'t:n one gun In action she nuy cause
Cells and Detention Quarters N::l\~
oH"cndc:n rouId be scnte:n«d 10 dftention in the: shiP5 own aDs.
lfshc:"'aS large: enough to tu..'t: them.The IGrtg ~l'd_}gdsu:."'t:D forward on the- kM-n- deck.. They nuglu be: used 10 contain oH"~ aW1ltlllg trial or 100 drunk 10 go to their rrJt.WIecb. 01" they could conwn mtnSftltenud 10 up 10 14 cb)"5 by the:apain.A nun "'35dnuc:d bedding for the: first four c;bys of Ius sentence. then only on altc:nute rughts mer that. He: \\'as fed on the: 'low diet' of biscuits and W21C'T and only allo....ed religious or imuuctional books. When thc:sc: conditions "'t:I'C mitigated towards the: end of the wu. sam!." offieC'fS COTISlderc:d that the punishmem was now a '"'t:lcome reb:ution' 10 nuny offenden. Men sentenced 10 longer periods of confinement were put in prisons ashore, The: n2VY distinguished between 'detemion' and 'imprisonment' - the fonner was kss rigorous and did not carry the: S2,me: srignu which nught follow 2 nun 2fi:er he Iefi: the navy. In pe
Naval Society and Culture
~ollle more !>C'riou$. A drunken nUll would be rnlr.lIned by Ihose of equal r.mk $0 Ih:n he would nOi become guilty of a1S3ulting a superior officer. If ~n offence W
'Halrl Ltft I"",! Qff (liPS! OnJi""ry &
l\wdoJlisttl i/1 lire mess·duks.' '" '1I1rat Jrll... 1"''' got ro SIly,jonn!'
'Hold .. ftu' drillks. sir' ... 'SmIlUS ".fkI1(ts, 11// flltH,Alld)'OJOI nwde .. ""isa"ft of ytn'rJtij; tw, kttpmg 1Ij ptopk ,....,..._ First Un
. "'t
If the Clptaln found the case p~\"d ~ could usc :ll V,lricry of pulllshments - Sl:Oppage of gl'Og. Of l('a\l' for up to 60 days, dcduroons from pay, reduction to the K'COnd du:5 for ka\"/;' which meUlI Iosmg KlIllC PZ)' and mon ka...es. ~nd Cllllng for shIps' 00,."5. Wim the app~-al of hl$ adnur.U he could lund out much more SC""Crt' ~ntenctl'. of up 10 Ihrtt montm. improonment or delentlon.
Discipline Ashore When sllLps w.:l't: III pon.lhe officers and the master-~t-armsorg:llnisc:d patrols to deal wllh dnmken ~nd disorderly SC:~l11en. These were under the generol conllul of the Naval ProVOSt Marshal for the area. Each palrol included l11l'n Ix'low the !';luk of petty officer, '10 order 10 remove from drunken men lhe opportunity to strike Iheir superior officer'." They w...... oflen selected from lhose in $hol\' bases or training ealllp$ in thl" al't"~. At the Plymouth b'Unnery school, for clGIlllpk mcn had to do a shIft after they had already don.. a days
\\urlr.:. Such men wtre found 10 be if)('xpct"Ienccd alld unmou\":ltcd. and oscilbted between OffiCIOUSllCU md neghgcnce. They compared unfa\uunbly wilh the regular nuhtary pollet of me army and in 1944 II \\":15 proposed to tr;tin Itading patrolmen who \\vuJd pohce naval porls under Ihe comral of iliOn: $tlllor r;tlmg'i." The three 1'0)'",1 na\'",1 barracks were partkularly difficull to perno They nuinly houSfii men in lransil and did not ha\1,~ the sense of purpose of most shore baSl'S. Thl'}' tcndl"d to allract more th~n their shan' of bad characlers among men evading Sl'"3 drafts and there \YoIS easy access 10 alcohol in the ncarby towns. As conunooore ofthe Iloya.l NaV,l1 Barr;tcks al Chatham, Angus Cunninghame-Graham found it W;lS difficult to numtam order among a shifting population. 1 al) ,wt Imow wlwr pwptK/lt1Il pnfnslO/Ia/ mlll;II,Us II1U IIp in ()Jlr rot/Unllll;ty, IItllll Wtnl1lunity of ()J'l'!" 20,000 pnMMd IIJ Ilirh SOIfIt ;n most br-,l/Khts. NI) n1l/mnm, 1 lim gWd 'I) Sory, uoh;k /IIVS In, llul 1Iu'j11arJ. pldl1p«1tm. rhrn'f'S" IltId If(! doubr ",hns thrn 1 c.mlfClt rrmmrM IlII foonJ" pia« Ilith w. 1M III1.rUJld.JbIt I.dr tJjrf.>g Sl
~ wrrr ~rns. SllTndlns
On ~\'en.ge. 10 def~ulters ~ Wy ....l'K brought before the commodon' for senous offences. SC\.l'n or eight timo the nornul figure In Ihe navy. One nun \\
The Threat of Mutiny Mutiny. or collective disobedIence by ~ group of men. w;u the most senolls breakdown of nav~1 discipline. British ofIicet"$ had Strong memories of 1m'ergordon, and th~ Ir.:new th"'t earlier in the century nl\~l mUtlmes h:.td spuked off revolutions In Russia ~nd Germany. There wu no general mutlny of thaI kind during the Second World War. bUI there were fTUny snull ones on mdlvidu:al ships. only ~ few of which c:lme to court nurtlal. These mduded one In the headqu.tners shIp LI//Ii
Ukt ""dgm l'nrrrgi,'S ({1ll1;I1l/sly from till' «(lSy gloom r.if their Ilinter Itll, SI1i1l)r "ft" Slli/I)' $Il/mllied 1)1111) Ihl' iro" d«!t. ;11 rilt Immi"g SlmliglJl.
121
122
Churchill's Navy
Rubbing tll/'iT f}'f'J, Ilrry llOOd ill all elllb~muud litlf 10 In- dt/ailrd offj"r /I varin)' of Illlmda"t dtanillg jobs by rill' cltiif &arsutljn~ Matt. Nowdy look/·J ar Illly"nf else." By 1944 the Admiralry was concerned about such incidents becoming more general. especially as sailors were being sent 10 a different war in the Far East while their army and air force brothers prepared for demobilisnion. Notes 011 Dealillg willi Mmitl)' Ilr Massed DisDbeditfla advised captains to avoid the development of griev.lllces if possible. If mutiny did occur. they wen: to try 10 separ;ltf: the loyal men from Ihe rest, to address any meeting from an unexpected :mgle :md to St'l up a citadel d..fended by officers and loyal sailors and marincs. Sir Max Horton objected to the toliC of the document and poinled out th:l.t it was likely to sC:l.re inexperienced captains and undermine its purpose. The document was limited in its dislribution :l.nd no general mutiny took place, p<,rhap~ bec:l.u~e the W;lr with J:l.pan ended unexpectedly with the atom bomb.
mounaches without beards. They also had to ask permission frorn the capt
... Mr. Clmrrlrill uus Sflmdillg to anellli"" or, IIII' quarter-derk, his ha'id wised 10 rlrl' peak ofllis C
4 Naval Custom and Traditions Tnditions weighed very he:l.vily in tht· R0)'31 Navy. though lIl:l.nyof them were not as old as people assumed- the sailor's collar, for example, did not date from the time ofNeI~n but from the mid-nineteenth century. There was an ambiguou~ :l.ttitude to tndition. It often had to be neglected in w
The Mercham Navy used the red ensign with a red background. and the blue ensign ....'as for civilian-nunned ships in government service and for ships with a proportion of resen... officers on bo.anL The white ensign was normally lowered
Kilrg Alfred Geoffrey Wilhns was told:
The Ship /r U pt>lllblr.. .111111 somr of)'<''' ",ay find Yl'ul'5tll't"s ill ro"ulla"d of a dirly litlle slll"p dropping ",,(hor jor lire "ighl i" a I
Respect for Higher Authority TIle Ro)'al Navy alwa)'s felt it had a spl'cial relationship with tht:" monarch and the royal family. Since rhe funeral of Queen Victoria in 190 I, the Illen of Excl'lIl'1ll had hauled the royal coffin on a gun caniag<..'. Both King Georgt:" VI and his father had st'rved in tht:" navy. and e\'ery ship bore Ihe title HMS or His Majesty·s Ship. Out of respect for Qu....n Victoria·s husband, Prince Albert. sailors never wore
Sailors and officers both gave great loyalty to their ships. though their attachment was not pt:"rmanelll and most Wl'fl' likdy 10 be tnnsferred after about tWO ycars. Rivalries bctwccn seamen and stokcrs might well be buried when ashore and replaced with conflict between th.. crews of dilTt'I'Cnt ships. This might lead to violence on tlte streets and, likemodern football hooligans, s.ailors believ..d that they were defending tlt"ir collective honour by such fighting. Ships' names were decided by a coltunillec in the Adrniralty. For the largest vessels they used names that had been established by long traditiOIl, although some like IHIrl"Jlirl' weti': obscure, whill'" others like Arrogam had taken on a kss complim~'ntary meaning - tilt' ~hip that was 10 bear that name was cancelled in 1945. Cruisers had theme-
r
Naval Society and Culture
r.athcT pecuhar IW'rlC5 ....'l'1"t' used in ""utimc. Submarine ru.lIX$ W(:h :IS T.:I/ly No, Tiplt>r and TnmdInJn mUSt ~'I:: $ttmed stnnge w foragn an. The- COI!11JUSSI.orung of Sued with a commissioning urd. 'made
Ollt
from tlu: watch bIll, briving ;m
eXIne!
for each llIarl showing his name number on the ....'arch bill. watch. pan and sUDchvision of the watch. quartcl'$. arms. boat. division. s~daJ duty (if any). mess. kit locker. and halllll10ck SIOwagc'," Orgaltmoon had to be precise: on the d.:ly of commissioning as the new crew arrived.
nil' ojJirm IJnd "fUlating ptl/y offi«rs $h"../4 bt trdrly wilh ((llIlmwwnins r,m" al l\ltilHtS rlJbla, oJ(Xofliil18 tll 1M 1IItN~ nltings. Filii in tilt- sh,p~ aMIpa"y, milrth tM ... riaws roJlirrgs I" I~ tlJbIn, furn'"g OlIn" 1M Sloirm ana mllnMS I" Ihtir "U'" ".ifi«n. A ',n4fm.,llt. Inth ., rrgulttlillg P't"Y ojJi£tr, shUll/a k "II the IfltU tkdt wilh "pllJn showing Iht posiliOfl1 '?! Iht a!fftJrnl ItIt1S4 Anolfttr ojJi£n, .....tJr
TI,e prtViows
aay hlJa
Mtn rptnl in a smts of ronjtrrnm Ima inspetlions, a
IIf'(rnary prrludt la fht handill;: al"'" oj Iht rMp by lire buildtfS, ,\-term. 5111:l1l,
Humrr &- Wij,'/ram RiclrardsOIl ojIVal/stlrd,ol,. Ty'lt, 10 11110m s/rt 'lIdS mOrt Job' lII,mbtr. By nOOIl Iht shjp~ rompany arril
jamilimly hI""" by lIfT
Gmillg an boon/INS,ID tllSY lask, llSlht ship llw/ying a/(IIIgside Ihefit/uFt Ansoo lind /101 Iht )tlty. umchtJ1lIo'hich could be earned on the bows of ilS boalS for eumplt. mhough for secumy IUSOOS this was in abr)"OCt during "''aJWlle, When still in lISt. capital ships had a round ~dgc. CnIuen Iud a pentagOnal shape. destrO)'etS a shlcld;md other t)'pcS a diamond. all approved by me CoUegr of Heralds. Baltic honours, on the othtr hand, WCIl' likely to be enhanced m ......rtime.The houours were awarded for prnence al a noublc \'!CIory or campaign. and transferred from one ship 10 another bearing the same name, so soml': had very long hi~torie'S.Therehad been fiw Orilms in Ihe Royal Navy ~ince 1787 and Ihe ship had 20 honours. ending wilh Normandy in 1944.Thcy well' borne on a board moumed in a SIOCC
pronunem place on the ship. In all. nearly 50 honours Wtll' awuded during the war, from tht River Plale in 1939 to Japan in 1945. wllh
123
sOllie awarded for JnI'U"paDon III Iong-IC'rm ampaigns such as the AtLannc. Mediterranean aud Arctic CoII\U)"S'.
Ccrenl0nies Crossing the line. or equator. was all anciC'n1 practice. which allowed Ihe c",'wa kmd ofSaturnalu durmg which the amhority of the officers was temporanly di~penSl':d with. Lists WeR" made beforehand of men who had not crossed the line befon:. and on thl.' day the officers and crew assembled in from of an improllised J\lIimming pool on deck. led by one of theIr number drcs.scd as King NtplUnt. New mtn had their fan'S cO\.'tred with paste or soap suds and ....'tlt: shaved by the 'barber' uSlIlg:l I(ing George V1
brgc wooden razor. then ducked III the pool amid great riOOldry. Bunal at sea was naturally a much moll' somber occasion. of Christian rather than pag;an onglll, It was much less used dun III pasl
board the battJabip
time'S. as
Dtoh#fl'orlt.
most
\U)':l.gn were quite shon and it was betrer to get the
and 'We therefOre commit his body to the deep' .md finished srrongly on 'Blessed :lre the deul which die in the Lord; even so, uith the Spirit, for they rest from their labours: withoul " writtm texl
fl1
help me."
Officers Customs All officers (includmg warnnt officers) were entided to :l wute from those jumor to them,.1l1Id were elCpCCted to return it If in uniform :lnd wc.1lTing:l C:lp.The Il.1l.v.tI wUle W.1l$ different &om the :lml)' one, in thn lhe hand ....~ held w:ith the p:llm f:lcing downwards.
_.y....u
........
-....n or _ "'va. ."....
0TMr; _ _ Of ... WM'" """'CfU
-........lW""_.·..
...... ON _ _ .... 00. ••
Of .... 00'1"...... y ...
__ DIIl_nc. _ "_n:>-.cOMCU.
FlAGS FLOWN IY FLAG OfFICE'S
.... ..,.. .,-
THE H,o\STHEAO PENDANT
~ )c:'==~1
.... .... "'... ..............
-- ........... _. ",,-
body ~hore to bury the nun, with some ceremony, in .lI cemet~_ But
"" ......
m.1lny ckadlS in the Battle of the: .... tlantic wbich look pbce c:specWly of re5Q]ed ~hanr ship survivon, :md no room to ston: bodies on :l lerribly ~rcrowdM ship. The corpse W.1l$ prep.1l.red for buri<J.I by being ~n up in :l CUIVU shroud :lnd the bsI stitch W.1l$ put through the nO$!: to pm-c:nl the body falling out. It w.u placed under:l Union fug on:l plank :lgailllt the ship's side :lnd lipped overoc;,:lrd. Normally the c.llpuin $upc'rvuro if lhere ....~ no chlJplain on bo.lrd. bur NICholas Mo~t did the Job in C"mfJdnuLJ.
~
_ o l ...
Seabfor..-..n
the~ Wl:!'e
fa from
Ih~.
elm. Bo.n:I of
f(} .mow rMr burial $t'1Vite by hNrt. 1 (l1uld flUily '''"~ dosed the /look 'M.1l1I Wt is born of .....onun h:lth but :l shon arne to live,.1l1Id is full
1(lime I1n
of misery: and mn right I1n Ihrough Iht 'Slop tngille~' signal '" /ht bridgt,
1M IUMl1 StlIure is INltH by bringing up the righ, lumd 10 rhe t4p, "IIfunJly and slllllf'fly, bur nof humttlly, wilh the Ihumb "ndfingm et"ud f"ff'thn, elboN' in lint willi the Jhouldn, hand IIIld /rJrr- in lint, with t~ JHfIm ".! the MHd INmN 10 W /41, "'" inclined diglt,ly i"w.mk"
At the beginning of the W.1lT, s..1l1utes were stiU considered important and Nichol:&s MonS.1lrDt spent his time u King Alfrrd 'learning how to s..1lJute :lnd how to Te$pond in a $Cam:lnlike lIIallner to the Loyal Toast'. By the l:lter ye:lD even the Royal Marinn were becoming careless in this respeCt, and it w:as complained,' ...there is something wrong with Ihe S.1lluting training in the Corps - the' tl'<"hnique of drill or the salute itself... only a proportion of the Corps now S.1l1ull:$ with he:ld propc'rly poiK'd and with the tip of the forefinger one Inch above the right eye'.'" S:lIutes were :limOS! .lIbandoned in many of Ihe smaller ships of the fUvy, where few of the officers .lind crew wore proper uniforrrl$ in any C.1lSl'. There w.u much cc:n:rnony in connection with ships' boats. A junior officl:1' .1llw.1lys got into a boat fint and OUt of it last. One appro.1lching :l ship was chalknged by a $C'ntry and would reply w:ith the: word 'SundaRI' if a member of the royal f.1lJTli}y w.u on board, 'FIag'.1l1Id the name of the flagmip if carrying an .lIdmiral, the name of the ship for a upuin, :lnd .....ye, :lye' for :lny other officer. Whcn thc c.llptain arrived on bcwd the side put)' by the g;ulgW3y nood to atte:ntion and he was 'Piped aboard' by the boarswain's whistle. The wardroom, where the rrnljority of the officers lived, tried to mainwn the aanOlphere of a gentleman's club, w:ith m.1lny nav.tl fe.llNres added on and. of course:, gycarly modified by overcrowding and the necessity to live: together for month$ at :l tim.... Officers p.1l.id into funds to supplemem the Il.1l.v.tI rations, and tried to keep up a high sundard of tradition where ever possible. NaV3J officers h.lld the unique privile~ of drinking the loyal toUt to the King sining down, because: of the danger, in old wooden ships, of banging huds on beams. There was .lI separate tO~t for each day, for example Thursday's was 'A bloody war :lnd quick promotion', Friday's was 'a willing foe and plenty of sea room' and Saturday's w.u 'Sweelheuu and wives (m.1l)' they never meet)',
Music Sea shanties were the work songs of the Merchant Navy but ....-c:re nor ellcouragc-d on w:arships, where they nught be conSidered subversive of discipline. Ships otg.1lm~ed concert p:lrtic:s, and messes had their occnional singsongs using a combin.lltion of naval :lnd popul:lr songs.
125
Naval Society and Culture
On larger !hips the Rayoal Manne boand provllkd entll:l'UlIlment. For moR' fornul OII:aslOns 'Heoart of Oak' "">:aJ uJed u the offic:w nanl anthem, WIth 'I+. Life on the Ocean Woa\'e' for the Rap.! Mann", while- 'Rule Driunnioa' alwoays had strong nav;aJ connecnorn by I!li \"ery words 'Bnunma rule the """'lI\-es'. Bm the hand had a much wlder range th;1Il that, and in the case of Ihe cruiscr .\I~urilius, from 'Ueelho\"en 10 SCOI( Wood via Sous.oa, all laStM han' been JallSf1ed'. The bandmaster had to deoal wllh 'l'C\'oluuonaries like 5111ilh who lhmk lhat Ikethoven only wrote hiJ $lufT thai way because swing h~dn't been discovered' Thc salllC Musician Smith gave a half-hour show on SOUdl Aftican ratho, while Ihe band as a whole felt its besl concert was done at Kilindini in East I+.frica, in co-operalion with !I\(: band of the 1I1mpiu, and included Ihe FUllalll/ia symphony. A more popular favourite was 'Colonel Bogey', played ironically 'wilh appropnate words' to the crew of Ihe Frobishn when M~urilius's men had to break the lea\"e to take O\"er her convoy,S! Though some might quesuon Its mUSlcai sums, a.nd loudspeakers ha.d replaced il for most purposes, the boatswains ca.U w:os used to summon Ihe men on ocasion, such as calling the hands to dmner, According 10 one officer that parucubr call wu 'almost sacred' but 'dlfficull 10 describe'. TN IINts_rn (If' PtIt" of lilt ptfly ".ffi«n slatlS tff u;th a.frw shon drirps 1<1 (,311 up Iht Olhm..IYhm all a". lagdhtf' ell(h drm'S a lortg brrillh ,,.,d ,hnl all
Lower Deck Culture The scama.n's lifestyle was ~'"Y rcstneted on board !hlP. but he found W3)'S to expros hiS coUccn~1: or mdlvidua.l identi~'. One was by mo
'f1It 'liu/r roulld h.Jr' as fir from Iht mural poli,imr lIS aUlhorily 11;// pm!lll, I/lr bou, ".fits ribb'}I/ ttQlt'd ill/o oj/at, symrm'lri.-ol rowu... Tht spollm 'blIlr frail' «lllor, I~"'" its u_~lilr bordm )1leomi".~. 711.. blark silk irolled 10 imprtt
(nOf rrg"lofion, Ihis, "'" alloll'ed) IJftktd royly Mltalll lilt bI«k. 711.. '''''1/l.l;dt lIS wrlll)' It'lrttiorl fro'" 'PussnJ sl(lr(S' or irutrumollS 10 fht ship's 'Ililor C"" iJChitL'l', "ridfiw Ihtfirslfrl4' "'O"'tIllS 01 IillSl ~arillg JOt/if lr.J(f oflilMud",al.fi:llding (for trousm tIlT II0000d 1'11)' wrrfillly:fim lumtd iruidt 011' and 11Im..fOlkd ammTIHiI'''oist luI a wrriflll ~tIS' tJPPttuJ." boIl/OW'lIS
Anoth('f was by the usc of sbng. for many IUval terrm "'"ere of purely 10\\'n" ckck origin, 'Oppo' or 'oppos.lle number' implied 3 more.-qual kind of &~ip_ According to George MeUy, 'Winger' or 'WIngs', meaning a younger or less expcneoced mend_ 'can, though f~r &om In(VlubIy, imply a honlOSt:xwl rebtionship'.... A girllTiend W~ known as a 'party'. CoUccti~~ly Ihe navy wn known as 'the Andn:w', Traditiona.l niclr..names ""'t're often atQChed to particular surnaffiCS,
no,..,
pipr II Iong-dlllu," tHarUling slllrtirtg III In.. botlom of lilt Sfillt ilnd grilduilily rising to Ih.- top, thm J1(lU~yfilling '0 Ih.- bolt"'" ag..in_ N.-x' (Dml'"S II l(lng,dr.JWfl ilgain bul u,;I" moJulil,i()fIJ irr th.. middl..; Ihm amrr tht lrills as wtl/ as Iht modl/laliortS. Lastly (lmrs '''r 'pipr doolll' (.iI1/, a IOtrg. SUJlaillrd lrill Oil ,lIr "'I' 1I(1'r droppillg suddru/y 1(1 0 trill mr lire bollmn 'IOU, aud ,Ire (al/ is r"d..J willi
no"
The Rum Issue Tht' 1l3vy had always supphed Its Kalllen with alcoholic drink to keep tht'm happy amiclsl many hardships. RUlli had long compt'led WIth beer, winC'" and brandy as the Slancbrd issue, and 3t first it was only used in Ihe West Indi('$. Howf:\.'t'r, by th.. t\\"enDeth century II was "''t'U oablished u the $.allor's fa\"oumC'". Bo,-s undC'"r 18 wC'"re not a.IIowed rUlli, and olhers could becollle tccloulers for this purpose and h3~"e 3 cash payment instead. The ,\launmu "..;as rega.rded u 'a big rum-dnnbng shIp' in that 500 OUI of700 crew dtC\\' their 'tot'. Rum w~s issued 31 11 a.m. ",,-jth a gQoOtl deal of ceremony.The dul)' gunner, regulaung pt'tl)' officer, Krgcam of nurlll('$, supply petl)' officer and ship's butcher got rhe barrel up from the Spirit room, The cooper opened it under the C)1: of the dul)' officer and the hands were called by bosun's pipe. The pell)' officers were gh"en half a pim of neat rum each, the allOW,lnce of the other ntttngs was dilUled by one part rum to three p3.1S water. Offici311y each nun was supposed 10 drink it himsclf, bUI lower deck custom allowed a man to be off~'red 'sippt'rs' by his mates on an occasion lik.. hiJ birthday, or 'gulpers' aJ:t reward for a speci:!1 fa\'our. The rum issue was :tn essemiJl pari of 10""1:r deck life, even if it encouraged a hard-drinking culture th31 was often reflected ashore when lhe men were on lea\"e.
Kin!!: Nepc"ne .nd hi« ""h.OrtJ durin!!:
• Cronin&: the LiJM
havt 'Shinn'Wright, 'Dusty' Milla; 'Pindtrr'Milrtin, 'Ndlk' Waf/
For inslall«
u~
~onyin.
eruiHr in
.'42,
126
Churchill's Navy
'P.uldy' UZlW., 'Nobby' O4lrlt, '&ngy'II'if/i.2IIu. '}Mit' H,I/(lfl. All ~ mr 'T""","ll', lind ..il _btrJ uf tht Day dDn iI1l" 'HtIppy' Ttlll 1ft'" 11ft IIflukd til lIS 'lAftr·. shM mm lIS '51"",f'J', '~,".Qtf' or .SIwtty....
I>c>ard HMS RHowy
;a l!UO.
S....'\""3ring. which ....'as almost uni\=saI on the ~,",r deck, ....'as another mnns of kttpmg the ~ sqJarate £rom his offieen. In his s('l1Iifjetion.al account of msic a::urung 1nd dal:m)v hfe l:ny Orrlll'my SNman, J P W Mallalieu ~ the cemar by ha\'i.ng the II1tII S3)'
'fllckmg' In almost e\'tt)' semence and had to expbm It away. 'Though I ha\'e med 10 gt\'e an accurate <\Ccoum of hfe on the ~'er deck of a dcstl'O)'n. 1 ha\'l:' not bo:l:'n aJloy.'ed 10 a.ny realism to the poiOi of pnnnng some of the words wluch \l.Tre consandy used there. I have had to substltule words which no SCMlUIl ....'QUld deIgn to use, bul which ~n preferable to bhnks·... Aleoc Guinness s.J)'S ofhlS first days m Raltlgft. 'Th~'s a sailor telling a Pory as I write this. "Fuckin"tus lXOI~ 3 ames e\'tt)' word oflhe Pory'."
127
Naval Society and Culture
RIBBONS OF MEDALS AWARDED TO MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES, 1939-45
GALLANTRY MEDALS
=~
VICtOria Crou
CAMPAIGN MEDALS
1939-45 Star
Bur'1Tlll Stu
Allantic Star
Alrica Star
t939-45 War Medal
Pacific Star LONG SERVICE MEDALS
I..Dng Setv. & G. Conc1. M. (NWf)
-
RN.R
Medals and Decorations On~ aspeCt
of naval tT:lrlilion which was gn:ady augmented in warnme was de<:orarions and m~dals. Again it wu T:lther less old than most people thought. In Nelson's time medals had be~n issued by go'o-ernmenl and pnVolte enterprise to senior offie~n after gn:at vi<:lorirs. but rne first campaign medal wued to all \\~ th~ Na'-;tl ~n~nJ SC'rvice Medal, which cO\'eKd servict' in rnt' ~:olt \\-;tn of 179,}-1815, but ...."as nol: issued until 1848. A cbsp ....~ awarded for each action. Tht' CUS!om SlU.'h"ed and SC'\'en mt'dak well: wut'
............. awuded. 10 Royal RN.V.A
"""""-
RN.R Long Serv. &
R.N.V.A I..Dng
G. Cotld. M.
Serv. " G. Conc1. ...
1940) which could be given 10 all ranks, and award~d posthumously. The ViclOria Cross was held in ~V\"n grl'ater rt'spect in 1939-45, as it had become l1Ircr than before. Only 182 were awarded comp:.lred .....ilh 634 for 1914-18. NaY.l.1 penonnd were :.Iwarded 23 Victoria Crosses in 1939-45. Other medals for bl';lvery induded the Disringuished SC'r...ice Order or 050. awarded to senior officers ofaU Kn'lces. N~~';l\ officers were digible for the Di$linguuhed SC'lVIee Cross. and ratings for Ihe Cornpieuous Gill:.Inu)" Medal and (he Disringuished SC'rvice Me
Nary penonDel in 1939-45.
PART VI
Officers and Ratings 1 Officers Most n~v:l1 officeO' Wl."re llll,'"mb<:rs of the executive or ~3m:l.n br:mch, tDined in $canunship. n:l.vig:ation, ludership and fighting skills, and eligible: 10 cOllmund ships and Deets when the: time came. They WC~ SlJpporlC'd by the more slXda.li.sC'd officers of the engineering J.nd KCQUnUDt bnnchcs. with more restricted areer prospeCts. Ev.::ry IUval officer requiru a sUlubie blend of lcadenhip quilitics and technical 1lciI1, ;and it lu$ ~ bun e2SY to get tlus qUite ngtll. ConvenuorW WISdom suggated thai good officers could only be cruted from soluble nUlcrial. by mC:lITlS of rigorous tnining :lnd kmg experience. h would dearly be wny difficult to expand the ruvy beyond a C«W1l pornt m wutlmc wnhoul modifymg or b~kmg these rules. The Royal Navy did 001: consider reducing the proportion of officers to men, ;rs the GnrTWlflS did. In fact. new fields such as aviation and bndmg crafi requllcd more officers dun C'\'er. and the npldIy c:qnnding wartime JUY)' ....';\5 msatiablc in its derrunds.
The Training of Regular Officers It
normal for a potemial I10IvaI officcr to begin his mining at the ag<: of 13. A young nun would pUI himself forw:l.ld for compctitin, examination, perhaps aner a time at a naval 'cr:muncr'. Creat store was placed on Ihe imerview by an admiral and senior officcrs, and a family ruval background was an advantage. Ifsuccessful. the young m;m would go 10 the Royal Naval Coll~ at Dartmouth in De\'Qn. where he would take on the rank and uniform of cadet. He ","'Quid undergo a ~neral education in the style of an English public school, wim a lechnical bi2s and with a ctrUin amount of I10IvaI training added on. Mitt some years he would be promoted to the r:mk of midshipman, Wlm a wrule p.uch on each collar of his pcUL His short eduction would cononue, bm ht a.Iso sptnt time at sea in a bank$hip or CTU,,", perlups laking c~ of a ship's be»t and $UpenrWng puties of seamen. "''25
Then: "'~ IIWI)' criticisms of!he pea«mne offieen' tnining. Few othtr I1lSI$led on such an emy enuy and dx Amerian~.. GemwIJ and Ppuoe$C produced ''a)" efficient fort"~ whilc- m:rwDng officcn in their Lue I~ Selecoon depended \'a)" much on a SUltabit pttpar.uory school educ.aoon and a good cIat\ bxkground - al the beginning of the WM Chun:hiU h3d 10 inten'eflC after a candidate: ""m a 'sbglnly cockney accem' "''2S rejected' The training "''2S often 100 techmcal, and did 001 always ~
prqme thc candIdate for the varied problenlS an officer mighl encounter. For-IIII' most f'ltrt llJ/!jlr em~d llW II difrlrirr bmd affrt, rOll.~Jr, IiigJrly Irll;lIrd bill skf/lhily rdl/lllird profrsS;OlltlIs, rt'ady for ;rlS/mlt JIlIy,for JUlraJrs or Ira
part;tJ,ftr ltlllHlropJrts,for ~a« Or lltlr; mrifidnrt Iladm, a/tTl seamm,jilir aJmilliS/tillOrs, pool dell'g
Tht only othtr ,vay to enter as a rcgubr officer
I.V;I~
by
'~pecial
entry'
at the age of 18. Regular officers were nearly J.1I public school boys who underwtnt a suict exammanon and then spent 18 momhs doing whal the DarmlOmh candidates had done over five yc'ars. Many Ihought that the Special Entry scheme "''25 the more effiCIent of the IWO. and It produced. for eumplc, Terence LtWln. a future Admiral of Iht Fleel and Chltf ofDtftoct Staff during the Falkhnds Wolr of 1982. Alter promotion to nudshipnun. Dartmouth and SpccuI Enuy boys JOined tht tralrllng shIp Vindltfi.>t. According to her captain Iht boys
Oppooi•.,: .... tty
Officer ~aman. apd. "8, •.,Us yara. '0 l6-yrar-old Hiltnta Oa
••. (JIrried
"",..n the dllties tIuzt jl R'_ ptifumu in II ship, ~i:":. quanlmWftI;
L TO tmd S. T ofw Iolurdl, Itdnumtln, IetlriJmlitl, atIP of tslJ rypa of bodu, S4UI~s _ , boat.Iwuid party, gwntolT~ pdTfy, ~ of 1M Ulil/(Ir, j('....,t~ trtu\ ~ts N. For II sJwrr period fMy M't InorJ 0I'l IN nttSSdtrk llndtt fM _ ltIPIdrtions iIj ll.seaman.
~Vin
Ki., \'''0.
6ooolUwui,,~ mIIU',.Jideblly,
They Ituned 'the general prinCiples of Gunncry, Torpedo and Elccrncs', they 'acqum:d a certain amounl of"P!m-er of Comnund'"
B,dow: Cadtu ia the RU)-.d Nin-.d
...........
CoUrp aft..... i • Darunouth '0
Eu_ HaU ;11 19<4J.
130
Churchill's Navy
and ';I measure ofself-confidence and enough knowledge. pracucaJ and
thromie.u. on which 10 build reaJ officer-li~ quaJities'.' The navy was ollen aml>J\';Ikm about ~ SQntli of a midshipnun. Comrrurukr Rory O'Conor claimed dw on bo=:I dup m()' could be lI't'ated :IS a n~ngrr by the lhough~ as 'w:hooIboys and their ~rur.ll prq' by"Tr.unmg and Edocaoonal expms (....i1osc- IWI1(' is Iqpon. for tMy ~ nuny)" or:l$:m offica.O·Conor was strongly m fn'OUl" ofthc bst. II mlds/npm
,,,uI
uu-'
gll!m " uobie" uohnhn in dll"Rt of 1I boGl Of' lIS MlIlsllIJ""ilPl of 1M lI~lth, lind OfIly his Aaiotl Sllltion mWI ~ pmttkn«. Ow I,,· I'tIJl~d Ihil' M WIlli br Il'tll,nJ with 1M ji
M frds M C
lUI
OIl.!1,
o./fia1, IUHIIW gi~'a " frlldin IUpollH than
his job Ilnd
0fI
II MidJhipm..rn, '" ktmM$$ 1M ship, b.nh in lin ",.rio lind in lin pIay.'
In
In \\'ammc. both groups of adcu ,,~re ~~nnWly ~ fiom Danmoum 10 ~lOn HaD in Cheshire, away from the rh~.u of bombmg.AI me age ofabout 20, midshipmen WeTC plOnlOled to sub-
heutcnant. the
IO\\~
r.llnk of comrrussioned officer.
An Officer's Career Alter conunissioning a )l;lung man "'l:luld spend a rd..ri,·dy son time as a sub-heuce/urn, mostly on councs ac Greenwich and m me gunTOOm of a big .!hip, wpervising midshipmen. Hu promonon to heucelUm would partly depend on his exam results as a midshipman. Alter chal. he
would be COrlSldered a fu1l}' tl~ n:l\'al officer. He nught be a junior officer m a tunleship or croisa, rising pcrlups to fifSl: beutelUllI of a dcsuo)Tt. He mighc well do a ynr's cr.Uning and ~cer one of the subspcoahsauom open 10 Junior officen - gunn(r,~ corpcdo. navigation, submannes, SIgnals or avution. In pcaeetlJ1le ~ bst: of these U1\'OI\'w subordination 10 th.. RAF and was a backwater. N
lflt1l11/t lsi
I Cpptain I
Sl""'llllisl
Minimum 2 yean
I
Commander
I
LieutClWlI
om.,.,,.,.
I''''''''" I
I
I
I
Midshipman
Special I!llrry 81 II
131
Officers and Ratings
\'Ol' digible 10 conunand a squadron. If he had sen'ed In destroyers or smaller ships he llllght be gwen his firsl command. After thaI. prornOlioll was by sclection 10 the r.mk of cOlllllundl'r, wilh lh.-ee fuJI-width stnpes III hiS slel'\'e. For a seam;m officer, lhe most unporunt posnng was as the sccoI1d-ln-cornmaJld of a brgt' ship. where he had 10 1"1'0\'<:: himself as an wminiSU':ltor and leader of the' crew. A eOllllTlilnde'r IIUght scn'e on the staff of;m admIral or at the Adnun.lty III london. If successful. Ihe officn" would br promoted to the rank of Upglll. one of the high poiJlIS in any lU\-aI career, ApUt fiom wfi'duna. he' nught COI1U1UOO J. ~tt1eshlp. cruISer or au~rafi n.rru,'r or a llonJ1.a of destroyers.
The Reserves On the outbreak of war. the navy was able 10 SUPpkllll"llt lU officer corps by calling 011 scver.ll dlfrc~m groups of n:sen'cs. Retired officers could be used III llIany tasks, such as the commodores ofconvo)'s.They often had to drop Iheir former r.lnk and (;Ike on lower on~ III the RO)'J.1 NJ,\":l.1 Reserve - the most famous enmple' was SIr Gllberl Stephenson. who was a Vlce-Admlr.ll before Ihe \\'J.r. but sen'l:'d as a commodore m ch.lrge of Ihe lr.lining ~ al Tobcrmory. The next group W
""""lit
of WOlr. It 1"1'0\1:<1 \'")' usefUlm the' eul)' sugc::s of Ir.llmng in the Ihe confllCl. Th~ n~lItu.all)' ttOlmed Included ludot'lC KellnC'd)'. the broadc:aster. E\\-en Monugu of The ,\11111 11110 XtlOfT IliI fanle. ;Iud
Monsarr.lI,lhe no\'Clist.Tr.limng at HMS KmgAlfrrd III HO\-e was often brit-f. Accordms 10 Kennedy. 'At 7.30 each morning we walked lhe few hundred yards 10 lhe car park. dressed (for uniforms 10010. time to br made) in :1.11 odd ;lssortJncnt of sports Jacke'ts. casual trousers, Trilby hats and n.ps'.' EWe'n Monugu dC'SCrloo the' course. Fro", lhe .'"1 Jim day of opnaril1lU In rhe KmgAlmd rhe sr4f of rlwr 'Jhip' In rhe .JJrills u4ril-h we u'OtJJ MnI, ~tion, $tIlnwmhip.gumwry 111111 so ml, bill also ,01ll:mflIPlI0 IU uofra( U\lJ almost_ btgGlI, nor (Iflly 10 mlln us
i"'J'Otf.lm - ,he ~ri( oJ,he X
Telnporary Officers The onl}' \\7'1 the' l1J.\')' could ~ beyond lhese limits \\'a1 10 open up officer mtry 10 the geoer.aI. non-scaf:llring popubrion. FoIlowtng the aaJl1ple of the aTnt): the 1LlI\'Y dcnded Just. before the war dut .all canwdnC'S foe Ic:mponry c:omrrumom !Ihould mttt mrough the r.mks and br 5C1ccted after some ter\ice on the kJoIou deck. Some )OUrtg men mtered through the Y Scheme.sc:I up in 1941.11us had the reputaaon ofbemg;m offica-pmduang schttnoe, open to )~ng men with :II good eduaoon who applied before being called up into the navy. In fXl it was des1gned to l'C'CTlIit polenua.l technicians as much as officers.;lnc! the scheme perlups raUed expc<:Unons tOO high. The llavy also set up uni\'Cnity units to give pre-t:llIry Ir.lining 10 undergr.ldualcs. though with limitl-d success,
A15.-oupof~ of.mi~r
Ootilb-, u.o..·in15 the diffe....n. ttr;peI
worn by RN, RNR lind RNVR.
133
Officers and Ratings
of a con"erte in 19·0 after two and a half year.; a~ junior officer and fir.;1 lieutenant. Olhers. such as Edward Young. look cOlllllland of submarines. while Coast31 Forces were dominated by ItNVR officen III all grades up to lieutenant-commander. 13ul many others were in dead-end jobs as junior lieutenants. 'chained to theIr oars' as Monsarrat Pllt it.
Engineer Officers The problems of imegrating technical skill and officer-like qualilies were molt intense in the ('ngineering branch of thc navy. Early 111 the century Admiral Fisher had Iried to make engineering a subspecialisation of the seaman branch, ralh"r like gunnery or navigation. That failed. and ref,'u1ar englll<.'er officers werc trained at Keyham in Plymouth Dockyard and the half-completed Manadon College just our..side the cilY_ It was recognised Ihat an engineer officer IK·l.'ded a greatcr dcpth of knowlcdge than a seaman offin·r. and he was nor likely to serve at sea until he was a lieutenant. He had far l...ss authority OVer his men than an executive officer. and h" W;l.S distinguished by purplc doth between Ihe stripl'S. Hl" W;l.S never going to command a flect or a ship, and his promotion puh ended with II,.. Engin....r-in-Chi..f of the Fleel. a vic..-admiral. Th.. l"nginl"cr offin"r of a frigatl" or cruiSl"r was a commandl"r. but those of destroyers and muller ships were often \VJrfJnt officers. well below the captain in rank and Slat us. The supply of engineer officers \....as particularly difficull in wartimt'. Th..re wt'rt' very ft'w our..sidt' resourccs to draw on. as the Ml.'rchalll Na\'y and civilian industry nl"l.'dl,d all they could find. M:I.llY .artificers Wl.'re promoted 10 warrant officer to t.ake over the engint' rooms of dcslroyt'r.; and frigatcs. Cour.;cs w.. rt' set up in civilian collegt'S to give h.asly training to well-educated young men, :lhhough the supply nevcr quile met Ihe demand. The engine rooms of con'cltcs were manned by artificers, the equivalent of chief petty officcr.;. while thl" motor.; of coastal forces dl"manrled a nl"W breed of engineer :lltogcthcr.
I~'~t:~.:.:. or
17, of Khool certifiuote who h;l...e ~r ... ed in .any of . . . . . . MlInttoned just below, c.an ..... for the N ....y by the' Y' method, ... +
..
After beinl accepted. they tr.ain in the Sea Cadets, Home Gu.ard, Air Tr.aininl Corps or other recocni.ed units
, . . COlI-.
the d.y when the
~
.., toM
calk upon them .and the ROy;l1 N;lY1 for ser...icfl
Here they will h....e e...ery ch.ance of Iflttinl • commi••ion as Deck OffIcer... Observer or .. Pilot
Accountant Officers The navys aCCOun1a1ll officers were responsible for all financial matters of a ship" flotilla or shore base. :IS well as general administration :Iud supervising the cooks and slewards. In peacetime" most were recruited through the Special Entry scheme, and they wore white bclv.een their slripesThe navy did nOi plan for a large-scale c:<pansion ofthe br.tnch, and most of the administrative work of slllall ships d(-voked on the exeeurive officers, or on shore and florilla sr::affi. More were recruited through lhe CW scheme. though only mcn who had accountancy qualifications, or defective eyesight which would han" pn"wllted them becoming executive officers. Normally all na\'31 officers were expected to go to sea ifcalled upon, but there were soml" specialists. such as intl"llig<"ncc offin"rs" meleorologislS and administrators to whom this did nOl necesurily apply. These formed the special branch of the RNVR" wearing a green stripe betv>'eell the gold ont'S. The branch also provided a home for many r.tdar and radio spccialiSlS.
PrOtnotion frotn the Lower Deck The emphasis on formal t'dllcation lended to preclude many experienccd candidatt'S fmlll the lower dt"k in the King Alfrt'd system. as one MP told the House in 1942.
A po.ter ad,"'r,ising the V-Schen'e for fOllng ",en 10 gel p..,~ntry
Prople have
bem st'lwt'd as amdidales jor (ommissiolls ulld pili Illrllllgll tluir
4 Ira Irl1durl Illnmell'CS ill a SOli/or-like Iltly,)\'1 !/rey hal~ b«ll plmed asfil W 100ke (/raISe of silips Olttd >11m. TIll'''' halT brett r.urrmr 1a50 l.l4lf'fl' (hirj pt't1y "ffirers. lI.;tI, 20 or 30 yt'urs e."prriellf(', il<1l'C' IICI beerl thouglll U'lml, fllllSiderillgjor rOlllmissilms, )'l'1 JIt""ple
(Ollrse
to
.he
trtining
navy,
u>illl tlO sea ex~rietu:e are stluud 011 Ille txptrietl« riley Irm't' Irad all/side, ",lIid, ItllS 'lSually ball IIUlr rtf a fink or sOllie r1Ji« Illllrkn.'·
'"mil
It W:lS far more difficult for Teb'1,!Iar, experienced seamen to be commissioned than wdl-educated Hostilities Only men. There wn an accepted wisdom that a man who had left school at 15, undergone the rigorous training at Gouges or a similar school and then spent years absorbing the culture of the lower deck would nevcr be suitable for a commission. There was, however, a scheme known as 'upper yudsmell', by which promismg young seamen would be specially trained and eventually commissioncd, Its predecessor had been set up by Churchill JUSt before the First World War, but it had experienced many difficulties in the inter·"'ar years, Rr'b'Ular officers tended to close ranks against incomers, and there was little time for study on the lower deck, so the numbers of entr.lJlts were small.
Warrant Officers The other route to a commission from the lower deck was a sIO""l'r one. through ",arran! rank. The nav:r.l warrant officer w:ls a very different animal from his arm)' or air force namesake, although bmh had risen from the ranks, He was a junior officer with R'$tricted promotion prospects. while in the afmy or air force he I'IaS in effect a senior NCO. Naval l'Iarram offin'rs weR' de-scended from thl' boatswains, gunners and carpenters who had kept Nelson's ships running. They were still specialists ofconsiderable experience and their ranks now included warram torpedo gunners. signal boatswains, telegraphists. engineers and air engineers. Schoolrl1a.lters were the only ones who were recruited direct into the l1a\')'. Others might be promoted from petty officer in their twentir'$, like Edward George Mason who W:lS a gunner in the de~troyer Eskimo at the age of 28. They might remain in warrant rank for mJny years, like John Webster who was bouswaill of the Royal Naval Duracks at Devonport al the age of 73. A warrant officer wure the fore-and-aft uniform of an officer, with the sallie cap badge and a single thin stripe. After 10 years hr' WliS digibk to promotion to commissioned Wlfr.mt officer, the cquiv:r.lent of sub-lieutenant. ana then to licuten;mt and e\'cn lieutenant-commander after another eight years of service. Apart from the enginel'rs of dcstroyers and frigates. warrant officers were mainly found in larger ships, depot ~hips and shon' bases. In 1939 large cruisers such :IS ,'\''''10111 had tWO commissioned gunners and a comnussioned torpedo gunner, a cornl1li~sioned ordnance officer, a schoolmaster, a gunner, a warralll telegraphist. warrant shipwright, warrant enginet"r, warrant mechanician and a warrant electrician. A dl'$lroyer flotilla kadl'r, such as HMS DII"nllJ, carried a tOrpedo b'unner and J w:lTrant engineer for flotilla duties, with another gunner III a different ship of the flotilla." From the lowl'r dl'ck, Gl'orgl' Mdly thought that warrant officers were:
"·Ii,,
MarfitlW. sriddrn for Ihe It'IlIT rtf till' lall; I",rd rrsr"tji,1 lIlet! fl"alisrd Ille}' /rad risrtJ from rhr rauks otJ mITi, bill breu bl<1(lIrd for a (omnr;ss;QIt Or! grol/tlds. Coughl ""easily lNo'II'ffU lire I'I'/a,wd bcu!lot/lie of rile flO's mru IItHf Ihe rasy formillily rtf Ille Iwroroom rlrey U'fl'l' pw,(liliolts ill rlreir
rllISS
Officers and Ratings
;llsisrellU 011 Oilier foml, rorrt'rrilllde, Ille mllrk.! of fl'speCl Killg's Rtgll!ariOlIJ.'·
<1S
laid dO ..,1 by
The Admiralty \\'3.'; JWJIl: of the \VJrrant offieers f:lullS. 'The type of officer obtained from this source may be very much "set in his ways" :lnd unsuit:lble for st:ltr :lppointlllents. bUl with his limits he is :In extremely VJluable officer'."
2 The Higher Rates The holders of the higher subS!Jntive r.ltin~. the chief pt'tty officers. petty officers :lnd le:lding seamen, wen: the l'$$Cntiallink between the officers :lnd the lower deck, the true backbone of the navy in the eyes of many, In the seaman branches and many others they were invariably promoted from the junior TOltes. There was always controversy aboUl how far they were technicians, how far they ....'ere disciplinarians. The senior rates, from petry officer upwards, needed mastery of their particubr skill in torpedo or gunnery for eUlllple, thl], needed 'power to command', Jnd they needed considerable experience. In many ways Ihey were harder to find than officers, and a definite skills gap was emerging by the buer half of Ihe war.
Leading Seamen The TOlting of leading seaman had emerged as a skilled man aw'e an able seaman TOlther than as having authority to comm:lnd. This SOQn began to change, especially after the rating of petty officer second class was abolished in 1907, and by 1939 it was ....'ell eslablished thai a leading seaman should be able to rake charge of men. He, :lnd his equivalent in od\(~r branches, was dislinf,'Uished by an anchor badge on his lefl Jrm above his good-eonduet stripes, This gave rise to the nickname of'killick', meaning:l small anchor, and a man's promotion \vas referred to :IS 'getting his hook'. A large ship before the war was
:llIowed nine le:lding seJmen for e\'Cry 100 of the crew, Each mess had :I leading hand in charge, but oflen he found it difficult to m:lintain his au(hority, 'Due to (heir messing with the men the Leading HJnds of a ship ha\'e a difficult job to maintain the extra dignity of their rate'. Captains were urged to 'Render them allihe help you can with advice and privileges in giving real meaning to the word .. LeJding..·." The Admiralty did nothing to nuke life easier for the leading Sl';lnun. His pay rise on promotion 10 the TOlte was small. He did not have :I change of uniform and his bad!,.... of a single anchor did little 10 nurk him out in the public e)'e. Unlike the petty officer he continued to live with the lllen in Ihe mess ;lnd he had 10 esublish his authority there. This wuld be difficult for younger men, as older hands gave more respeCt to long-service stripes th;ln to subs12nti\'C TOlte, When John W Davies was promoted jusl before he qualified for his first good-conduct stripe, he w\tS told it would 'provoke scnior ratings, and must nOI be ,illowed 10 happcn.... MOTeO\'l:r, the leading hand had much less formal :lulhority than a petty officer. HI' was not a superior offic"r within the meaning of till' N:lvaI Discipline Act, so ill5ubordill;ltion. for example, was only cOl15idered 'an Jet to the prejudice of good order ;lnd naval discipline', Yet leading Sl'amen wen: ;In essential part of the chain ofCOlllIll;lnd, and Ihe only source for potential petty officers. An ambitious regular SCarll;lrl would sce the rate as a step on the ladder to....':lrds the privileges and starns of a petty officer or chief. All Hostilities Only nun was Tlot likely to look so far ahead, amllll,my considered Ihat the promotion was more trouble than it W:lS worth; especially since some them had their pay nude up 10 civilian S1anda.rds by their former employers, An Jble SCJlllan had to spend a cemin time at sea and pass an examination 10 be eligible for promotion. Even then. in peacetime he might ha\"e 10 wait up 10 SC\1,"n }1,"ars for :I suilable vacancy. There was no formal dlOre tTOlining for leading seamen, but COllllllander O'Conor suggested that able Sl'amen who lvert'; eligible and showed promise should be given a chance to develop 'power to COlllllland' by raking charge as the lc:ading hand of the \\"3tch or second-in-command of large parcies. 'The objeclh·e is 10 ensure that every Able Sealllan passed for Leading Seamen ha:s chances, both in his daily work and :II his action station, to take charge of one or more men'. [n \\"3n:ime,
135
Opposile ab",..,: C.det rltingo, ....,a.ing 'pu.ity bind,' round .hei. capo, lnrn luning and pilQtage at
HMS KlngA!fn'J in
I~O.
Oppm.ile below, Esoginee. IUb-
lieu.ena"I' ill a leel"", in Ihe Roy:o.l Nn...l
Enginee.ing College al Manadon, nn. Plymoulh,
CAl'INSIGNIA
CtllfF P£TTY OffiCER
Bot!l
LEADING SEAMAN Upper lei! sIefMI.
sIeevlls. b1Ul1l)< ..Me uroiform.
CHIEF PETTY OFFICER
PETTY OffICER SUN·HELMET INSIGN!/<
fOR 8 YEARS
Upper leI! sleeve.
FOR 3 YEARS UP\lef IeIl sleeVe.
"
CHIEF P£TTY OfFICER
,
PETTY OfACER
MISCELLANEOUS JUNIOR RATING
,
MISCELLANEOUS JUNIOR RATING
The .:Iee"e
and
cap badge. worn
by chiefl, pelt)'
offie.....IId leading .ea....en.
136
Churchill's Navy
OliefPmyOfflcenl%
_Offian'"
Offictn ....Tre urged to give petty officers '''''ery re.1.SOrubie mdulgence'
and to 'nme mem fed tll"'l confidence is reposed in them', [t was hoped dUI thq' .....ould be .1.ddressc:d by all ranks by their fornul titles of'chlef peuy officer' .1.nd·petty officer', but mese (tid tongue as easily as the army's
·~rge.1.llI' .1.00
not
tnp off me
'corporal',.1.nd drsoplme
olten less fornul on board ship. so first IUrnes and nic.krwnes \\'ere used more onen by the Io\\'er deck. The petty officer lud me ngin to trW by court lIW1:iaI instea.d of wt1UllH)' pumshmenl In cerum Clrcunuunce5. md he W3S freed &om $OnlC" of me more irluonxreuTlcnons on Ie;ll\'o: and such rmtteni. He was ",b1e 10 a\'(Jld the lJIC"oW ....'(Jrlr. of the Io\\'o:r
Officers ....'ere advised that: Prtrr Qf/ims ..", nor ..dmnctd
~------TIw proporriOllI of Mam~n aDd ,....y offiNn on
'0 «apr 1M fUpotLlibilirr of Ihti, pMiliOll. Thty JIw"ld U'llrt al II1llirrw.for 1M u'tll-lItrng ond 4ficimq of lilt ~ lIS 0 w#ro/t. Thty JIw..fd Jet lin
prolllQ(ion w.rs f-nr.",r :md therr "'..~ liltl", if .my g;.p bet""!:,,,n ~mg and promotion, so such grooming ""as ulln«~ry. After at I",;rn six months of good conduct,:r. nun could p~ for le1dJ.ng SCUI1Ol11 3t :lily time :lfit'r his AD rating. though it would be ~ring for the: fitS! ye.1T.
ccamplr of /oy;llfy lind diJciplinr. n Pelty officers' posu. had Yolrious :lItCh:llic tides,ofcen as 'Ilules'lo IIlales .....ere members of the
19J5.
~",nun
branch, deQiled
lO
w:.lTr.lllC
Bo.1.~wain's
officers who Wl:rc: not necessanly present m snWler ships.
run the cbily
rouune, including rousing the men &om Ihelr hallUIiOclu and keeping
Petty Officers The petty officer
"':lS
.....:lIch in Ihe wheelhouse. The chief quanernuslcr was usually a petty
far mon: ancient dun the lndlllg $eIDW1. and
origin.illy th.. title n:f~n-G to the: holdtt of a p.1rricular mmor office, such as the )'t'OIlWl of the :dlt."etS who controlled cc:min rop.:$ on a !I;Iiling ship. In rho5c tbys !';lIe "':IS often lost on tT:msfcrring from iliip 10 ship. but the
officer or chief. according 10 the sile of Ihe ship. He supervised che sceermg and assisced the navigating officer, Gunner's nulC:S wen: experienced members of that br.mch who had Tlsen above the more speci:.lliscd SlrllCnLn: of qU:.lrters I;Itings, and so on. They, 100, \\'ere
permanent r.mk. When faced
discip[inarbns, in che tradition of the branch. The yeolllan of signals
with lIlduoplim: or mutiny. tli!," Admirilty'$ first l'eKlion "'OK 10 qUOIion lin: role of petty officers in suppl'C$ling it,and then to a-y!O mrn:zt" thl'ir sums. Following \':I.rious incidents mer thte Fim World War, it gmdgmgly gav't:
more muncbne title of petty officer cdegraphisl. Petty officers \\'ere distinctly shorl in Ihe newer branchl"S of radar and Asclic, because of
petty officers of four }'l."m' $l."niority me righl to We:.lr lhe 'fon: and an' umform ....,th pe",ked C1.p :l.Jld colhr :l.Jld tie. Mer hl\'e'rgOrdon this ....;as
a pair of crossed :l.l1C00n on the left .1.ntUOO unlike the leadmg semlCn they had a
cnJYo'tl
abo--T to ~'llbolise their grata" fom.... authority;
was lhe hea.d of the visual signallers, ..... hile a wirdcss OperalOr h",d che
npid a.dll;lllcemem .1.nd a policy of slow promotion, In ('SCort vessels ~nior
AscIic operator
W:lS
rarely more lhan a leading sealllan,
imo action against a subnurine,ln the racbr branch, an Adnuralty Fleet Order pointed oul ea.r1y in 1942 lhat, 'Advancement to
has not
)'0:1
uken effect in sufficient numbers
complemems'.AlI chis was designed
l'romouon w» reuD\'dy slow l:\'t'n UI .....artulle, and John Whebn observed: 'II ....~ nm until 19+4 Ihat Ihe first H,o. Petty officers quilified as S.O.l.s ISubnurinc DeteclOr Instructors). II .....as possible 10 become '" Jumor R.N. V.R. Officer wnJun SIX months ofJOining. but il look f.1.r longer 10 nuke.1.n ascilc mstrUCtor',- HIS own e!"'..... oon came
10
10
allow
I~o.
lh~
(R.O.F.)
ratings in
nuinulll the SUIUS of me petty
officers by a\'Oiding too f:lSl promotion; but il nuy ....'ell h;ll\'o: had the 0pposlle effect, m givmg high WtUS 10 junior ratings. There were SC'\'C'n chidS and petty officers of the ~ branch for C\'CI)' 100
of the rn:w. They ....'ere
gn'Crl
mutine duties on board ships.
Some sen-ed as captains of cops. in c!urge of Ihe ~I of IDe foreaWc,
wp. each
after a Lultw:lIffe bomb h:l.d killed ma.ny petty officers :l.Jld chiefS m
qU:l.l"ttTdeck, fore top or nuintop. In a brge
[)cvonpon I:brracb. Cl"C.1.ung llUO}' vacanClC'S,
svUor petty officer in general chargr as a.puin of the: top, ....
WVI$lOII tgJ
a
'm ~ts
tUIIUIIOCIr..s. 10 insuuct the young mel to supervise the mewiech. At sea, Ihe petty officer of Ihe .....alCh \\':l.S to mUSler the walch fu.'e minutes befOf'C' \I ....'25 due to go on_ co do the n.>UIlds of Ihe ship C"o'Cl)' hour, 10 uke charge of the keys.1he ll:I\'1gaoon bght'i and the lo.....ering of the 5e:lI-bc»t III Ihe absence of an
to taU charge of the men's bags and
Oil'isiona/ Offim..." R.N, V,R Iltlnmmmtlldal .for .MVttmHtP/I.' Said tilt Am Utlll,",,""', llftO 'R{wmmmdnlfor ...nv~I,· SJlid
I~
""',,",11y if""/!fitJ.
'Rtqum gromltli: SJlld lilt uplai", 'Rrqum gr
J~
llW
~
officer, He .....as 10 supervist
me ~ hand ofme . . .au:h.~ l"ctt)' officers
could also SI:I'\o'C' as ul5O"lX"tOn for the ships' boys, Ihoogh officers
\\'el'C'
Officers and Ratings
advised lhat 'Imcructlonal petty officers, although gener.illy _U up in their particubr subj«t. are ~endy unable to di$cinguish between the essential and the unimportam', and wne to be su~ ardiilly." On arriving on ~rd his fint ship, the armed merchanl cruiser Umt1OOfl, Tristan JOIleS 1Ao"U amazed to find thaI Ihe petry office~ wen: very diJfffml from the nunmets he had known as a boy in Ga-ngt'S.
5horIt to rill' to bt IJdJrmtJ in the It4st bit SO rivilly by "")'l'fIoI' OM"/" thr PO~ I'tIIa IMIS tUmoJI gmtit-, IIrUl thm IMIS d wt/c:oMilw ~ in hU qr. Ht _ drmtd i" his Numbn Thttr bIw mgt lUliforrn, bIlt oudiItt tW b.rrmtlt bul1ks', Iris IMIS _1IrUl grNSr in pollrho, tmd Iris Jh«s IooIrnIIU tlwugll tIwr hmI AanlIy n'tr bmt poliJMd. Tht (1ft hU c.rp - • QllUIII - ' IIIIdIor - _ I4lt'f bqlmd btIitf His j.Ja - lit ww no _ , II
&MIS d
m of LtIJding .xa-n. Tht
*
IIWII1d gurs.s, Ihtm i" Iris tni,ult- ~tks -IMIS, 'i~ Iris (ttp tmd .. ~, IWm tmd wry. He iooIetfI aJ if lit hmlnot IwJ d g«Hi night ~ JIrtp i" Ufth 2< George Melly ako found thai petty officen 'NCn: an amenabJe nee.
l.Dng ~ with liar IN /VIII ilJ poru It.III Kir- thtrtl d «rIdi1i toIDIVIt .wphistiution, ptIrt eynit'M but cmmnly d.JfrctiOftollrlr Sol. TItq Jwul it'drnt 10 misfnlJt tM _ , inrptNlilJltJ ~ ""Y Oftt plol« MaKSt' INy IuuI stm thtm rrpI«rd by adam, oftm t4....ur rigid IIrUl ~ rUtwIrrrr. TIlt fJi€} ntiUk dUow4rtm kJofi'r IU lmtponll}' JoliIIJfJ.. U. _ thm b.nrKsr wr 1uul,0 bt. Onr dar tItr _ -u 6r OM"/" tmd the N-r ilJ I)/J Jdf; II nt«hinr./« utih",
.".»
Even in a ~ with a high Compkmml of rqulan m the early sages oldle war.JOK'Ph Wellings oftbe US Navy nonced how nwch tht officen dtpended on the petty officen.
o,..,W,(m, but if,fo. illSlarut, .. boal .....$ (4/1"d "Il.Ol)' for" rtKue, whm I u'aS buff". I lWUld be rtsp<"l$iblt fo, gtttillg "'dl bo4, i"fO Iht WI:llel ,,"d /ou'tring ir Of' hoisting il."
Chief Petty Officers The ,hi..f pl'"tIy offi'..r had no hadgl'" as such 011 his normal uniform bUI inslt::ld he was distinguished by Ihree brm buttons on hu sleeve and a cap badge with a wreath round the anchor and a crown above:. The navy lended to protect him mon: Ihan any olh« ra.ting. In Ihe seama.n bra.nch, even in wartime, he had to haY\' served at Ieasl: three ynn after passing tOr petty officer. and a.t least five yean a5 leadmg 5eaRWI and petty officer,50 the ra.nk was not open to many Hostiliries Only sailo~.The navy did 1101 compromise on too. so sollle duef petty otlicen' messes wen: nther empty later m the war, despite the recall of large numbers of pensionen. The chi..f pl'"lty offic..n lAo~re .. nritled to their own mes:s, with dighdy iliOn: space than the petty offic('TS. The tughly 5killrd artihcen wne equiv3lenl III rank to them, but often much younger and wen: kept ap3n in 5Cpanle m~. In a large ship befon: the ~r then: was one chief of the seaman bnnch for every seven petty offieen, although not all these billea Wl:TC filled in wamme." ChiefS tendrd 10 predominate in sh~ b.a5es, whn'e Ihrir expnience was irw»wble in training and a.dminisu1lcion. In dn~ and smaller ships the CODWalJI, the senior dutf peuy officer, was a key figun:. To 0 A Rayner. 'In a smaD ship the conwain is the rhitd most imporunt nun, a5 far a5 the ha.ppmc. of me ship is eoncemrd'.- According 10 Nicholas Monsamat:
"jnvtI; ... Tht ~ CIIlI maIrr all dw: ~ on /xImd. As tilt smiot tdling in W ship, rtsporuiblt for much of its distipliItl'" IIrUl
A good For aollrlplr W Jia-fmm IlOl 0fI1y tNJ but inttrpm • JigrwJs. 1ltq always tdI W CXJD fOj/itff of 1M drdtJ W rIIl'oIIIing of 1M sign4I bill nol thr Jigrwl ilJ4lTltrr tdso bow 1M I4(ti(4I f"'hIiclltiottJ IIr')' w-ghl)( Tht offi«rs _ not aIIIttrrInI with IUJttrJ, CC«pl tItr arpt4in wIw knew rIJr _ing of "" tItr sigrlII& 0IItn p«ty offi«rs pnfonn thri, lI..firs in thr _ _ 4J
sam
rIJr~. [MIISI '!fJ dIt' oJIiars... tIid notlun't"'"' II ~ng J:rJowIt. oftht tqJlipfwrIt with wlIidr tIwr 1RnWd. 1ltq tIid _ smn itumsfd in Jwlt
-am. This is 1ft! 4Dffbt dw to 1M IfNI ~ pt.«J 011 dttir prtry ~ ..
The dependence was even gttattt with temponry offi«n. uriving bewildered for thetr traming schook.
....mm 1M" Jolilrd in Clematis Irtwing thr dod: in BristDlIllUl GoIm dtr:A_. MW in Ihnwy in ~ ".ft. An ordrr _ u- to gn "'" d SfWing.
I
Extnamiinarily, , W olhsoIMrtIy ISO idu wh.u IN 0IIkr _ t and simply twmrd IJJ __ of tht Prfry Offims. 1 lold /rim to gn OWl " spring IJfUi IMIJ intripni to IWIdI wh.u ~.:If Despite the grnter privileges. many newly promolN mm fdl thai the duties of a petty ol1icer wen: no!: very dilkmlt.
em 4 .....ICIr. il did,,'1 rtMIy Miff wIrm )'Otl ball".,. " PO. You JliH It.III d UJ(I/(h 10 krrp. If Ihnr IWI't drry ptmia lI..ring tlar nigh/ )'Otl "",uld maIu crrtolin Wt pcopk W dogd up propmy. I would (htrlr. I wtnl 10 Iht 4inti. gull wIlml IMIJ II PO. W1lm IIMIJ " ktuling htUIJ I U't1l/ (In to Iht
137
(ltI:JlRIin iJ
_ .. _. n.
_
•
IN3
-''-'
138
Churchill's Navy
arlmiuisrrMiofl, he has a profOlmd f'jfttr 011 produtillg a happy IlIld 1filitnl sllip~ ((mrpan)'. USlio/ly he i$ II 'chamaeT',1O IlW on ovmwrkt'd bur explicit word: that is, a strollg pnlofJlllity lIJro llI,mld nJllkt' himsi'llfell ill
He is Ihe frirnd of flIfTJ'Oflf air board, Olld "goodfrimd IrJI) - if 111I'y UIlIll him to be,
lllld ifllH~y
desert'(; it:jJiling
Ihlll,
he makes a very bad nremy!'
The Admiralty urged new captains to Il."cogniSl." his importance.
The Royal Navy was alw:olYS reluctalll 10 use temporary rank, to gi\-e men statuS that would have to be taken away afler the war. It was used more in new branches such as Combined Operation:;;. and in thl.' Submarine Strvice, but if a man became entitled to a 'fore and ali:' uniform after a year's temporary service, he had to buy il himself. To some extent Ihe problem \\'3:1 insoluble, in that the rating of petty officer demanded experience that could not be produced in a hurry. But the British system wrnpared unfa\"()urably with tht US Navy. where men WCIl." given far more en<:ouragcment to advance themselves. The Roy.I.1 Navy tended to pre\'em urnuitable men for rising. rather than to train more to become suitable. There ....';IS no equi\'alent of the wavy RNVR. stripe:llo distinguish wartime petty officers from regulars. and that \\"()uld probably not have been acccptabll.' on the lower deck, which \\'3:1 \'ery conscious of Status. But more leadership mining and gre;lter use of temporary rank could have done something to solve the petty officer problem.
TIJI~
Coxsu",ill ilr pmlirular 11115 au esptdal posilion ill Il,e slll1"s {/)mpany. is ,,0 reason why III' should UOI hi: a &amd Qffitt'1 oj Ihe lI'<71th al sea, He should be
Rayner felt that there should be 'a spedal bond betv."een Captain and <:oxswain. It is he who takes the wheel in action. or when entering or leaving harbour. One of the most comforting sounds I know is the voice of your trusted coxsw:olin coming up the \'oice-pipe, "Coxsw:olin at Ihe wheel, Sir'''.''
Shortages By early 1943. :l:I the navy expanded f:l:ltcr than ever before. the Director ofPtrsonaJ StntiCts [sicl was increasingly concerned abour the shortage of leading seamen aud petty officers. The navy was 18 per cenl short of leading seamen and 8 per cem short of petty officers. More petl)' officers \vould be promoted soon. but this would only reduce the numbers of leading seamen, and Ihere was no immediate sigu of relief there. The First Lord of the Admiralty \\'3:1 equally concerned. TI,etI' is increasing f'Vidm(f Ihal Ihe ",,,,,be.- oj higher a"d tmi"ed 1«/miml ralings is "01 keepiltg up wil/, lilt ralt or whi(1t Iltt Itavy hIlS expalldtd arrd lilal tI largr proponion oj mfIJ eUlmd for 'HOSliUlies Dllly'la.ck rlJe Ilonltal ;1I«mive Jr.>r ad'I
3 Jack Afloat and Ashore Long Service Men Since the middle of thl.' ninctl.'cmh cemury naval seamen had joined as boys at the age of 15 or 16 and remained in the sentice for alkast 12 years from Ihe age of 18. with the option to sign on for another 10 years to get a pension at the ab'C of 40, In periods of rapid growth men wcre sometimts allowed to sign on for SC1<"tn years follo....-ed by fi\'e in Ihe reser\'e. but long service was the central feature of the na\'al seaman's life. That. alld the natural separation from sociely nused by his lifestyle, led to the development of a strong and unique naval culnm::. The Admiralty was strongly attached to it. but the system of early entry and long service had its crilks. 111 1941, onc nun told John Davies, 'Joined as a boy when I \\'3:1 fifleen .... Me old man shoved mc in. J ain't forgiven the old bastard to this day'." Fifteen rears of steady employment might have seelllcd aHracd\'e during the great depres:sion, bUI \vas less so by the end of the war. In 1946 a petl)' officer wrote:
Is our p'lbli( allluls klOitg III rlre Aanlirnlly. Imagine: 15 )If'a11 siglled I11tuy by c/'ildrru IltJtlU!
Siu(( I left Gange:; f IrIJlIf' hem in matry htllish pllUes, itrdudiltg a w"ple of Frt!IItir Foreig/l Lrgio/l b,,"1U1u aud fift«u prisous ill WIf'IIIf' rormrrio. NOllt of Iltetll ulfrr Ileady lIS melllui/lg as HMS Gangts as a bmiII-lU-1stillg, body. ra(kilrg gn>llllli of ttlt'lr",1 blillyiug alla physiral straiu!'
Officers and Ratings
Thc long9SCT'o'KC' SC'1l1Un was nW'ktd OUt by his C'any C'ntry to lilt na~')' and thC' df«tS of 1U\':l1 dlliClrhnC' al an Un} age, bul h.. stiU l'C'umC'd IhC' rr.... and ..uy altitud.. of a sailor HC' ""'2S dtffC'«'nt from a S'loLer, \~ ho had elltel'C'd later and .....o rktd :It a dtmer and mol'C' lechmcal trade; lnd the marine who had llso ..nlerrd later but ....'U more dC'pend..nt on Ihe disciplinary struelure. In 1 na~'Y which valucd long loCf\'ICC \"Cry highly, It is not surpriSing thlt 11 W1S reg:mied lS the most l111p<JrullI faclor by somt'. Long ~en'ice 111 r:nings W35 1l13rk"d by ch<.'\'rons on lhL' left arm, under lhe bldgL' of a kading seaman or pl:t1y ollin'r, If worn, A Illan was lw:lr(kd Olll: Slnpe for three yens' $Crvlce,:I second for tighl rC'ars and 1 thml for 13 }'t'ars. Each strilX' broughl 3d pcr d:ly extra P:lY and incn'lj.('d prt'$ligc on the mC'SWecks. Thl' nnpl'S Wl:re more promment thll1 the nllk bldgcs. lnd the pubhc. lnd somellmes nC""" entrants to the nl'>'}', often mislOok Ihem for army NCO's stripes. The 'lhl'C'e~ h1dge AU' who h:ld done ius 13 }'C'1I1 without lny promotion W15 1 subsclIllJai 6gul'C' m the pre-war 1UY)' when: ld\':lncemem ....'U slo"". lnd he had solllC'thmg of a rrvi....1 in ""...nime 1S pcmoionen; ....'C'I'C' r=allcd :lnd pos:tcd to the- Inlmng C2lllps. Icholas Morwrnt dC'scnbcs hlln as a 'Icgl:ndary Ch.lnCler·,
.nrhn M 1wIf~ dar kJ", and"ln}l)' kI passp LLildlllg Sc-_, (01' lit doc:m) wrlromt ,f:spolJjibf/lly. or M 1ika 1/ u-hnr M u', or jor- arry odw If'asort. •• Hr nl.l)' lOlmd dldJ and Slupid bul hr is m1tly IMI, _ cfrm lium roof lor knous II 111/, •• Gi'l( hi'" 1I job Ilftd Itr w;n wvrif his IIII»' Ihrough II: rwr IITlh any.fLuh dupL7y rf tllt'lg}',/ikt 0I1t' rf,hMt jumprJ-up )Ullllg />riff Qf/itm. bul "f 1I rmjill ,md SlrolJy pa«, wofllrh fYll(If$ both WfltllK'Fldillrm alld mnliJ",... ,
50% m
a" Jfrll Ol'l'r 10 H.\fS Ralrigh. This U: 10
btf"" slanillg Ihfil /l(fwIII {(JurJt. 1M lI«"",modaflOff is 1'f"Y sallifanory, Tht 7;airttts "Ir «r"",,,,odartd lnoSlly 111 WooJ(l1 buildi,'1S, Ihough Ihr .11m Drrks IIrt ~britlt. Thm (I1r 9 S1rrpill.~ HillS. rll(h IW/Ji,'i 52 btds.11u'$t brds "" i" p<JirJ o"r l'Vfl' Ihr of/rer, /IUls al/pu;"g ample sf'llCt bt'1l1n'll II,e brds. wof,irh
Mosl of the (lmPS were usc:
FfrobUhtr/88,juhionrtland ll'ffdrtllogrWr in fil'l' Ilm-s, UUJ trturning 10 its bul tlJ(/r IfUln ..us I41ting oNtl)' w,jth h,,,, _ INm At broughl in. &ell CDNfd i
br 11 tluis4nrr
'IllI
til
Dr:llicd LIltO thIS. the Hostilities Only (HO) man generally round and look on the eullure of Ihe regulars, The
him~lr O\'e......,hdmed
'~...rtllne navy ....'U :l meltmg pot, rt:CfUlUng men &om 1 greater socl.ll and ~phlal r:mge thln C'\'t'r bC'fore, Despite his e;l
Tr:l1llmg nmps for HO raollgs ""'t're set up round the C01Sl, in convened hohcby cnnps such 1S Budin's al SkegnC"SS or Ayf. III cOl1ventd bo)'S' traillmg C2mps such as Gul.~ :It Shot.le)'. or pUI"JlOS'C'buIlt such as R4lngh nelr j'lpnouth. A medlC2l officrr drscri~ Ihr Sltuatlon :It 1 camp in Cornwall in 1941.
H.\IS Impregtuble- is 11 IIolIlUIl.' r.1ldblisllmnll JM lIlt COlllmullir
A
traiJliftc
duo .,
HMS R.,.J Arch, .1 ~
..'idlthe
Ie.wng .um.... ;"'truetor in the
Tile HOs. IIlcluding COlllllllli101l and Wnr:mt Clndi1btcs who were JUSt pusing through the lower deck, were 3nuzed by what lhey s,3W
The Hostilities Only
139
eentre. The "",,iety in _get i. cle.rIy seen,
140
Churchill's Navy
;md
soTIle
of them publish"d accounts. such
3.'1
JPW
M ...llalieu's Very
Ordi"ary Seaman ... nd S Gorley Putt's AIm Drwt'd as Sellmm, which revealed lllC$Sdeck cultul'C' for the
fi~t
time. New men were quickly
swept up by Ih.. attitudes of the lower deck and aped the regulars. Captain Or:lITI of HQwkim wrote of 'the w;mimc Sailor. faithfully modl."ling himself upon his glamorous predecessor... collSCious of the ll'ady-made Jura which attached to his own intcrpret
vtrernll framml. lit risked II,e wrallr 41he rlliif gunner's mall' by omi/W Ihe lapt1 of aUf (ollars so Ihlll /hey shOl/ltd II U.jrOIll illSlead of lire rrgllialiolJ II.. jon', and Ivt" made Sllll' lilt had Stvl'1J horizOIlllJI creasN (110 mort', 110 len) ill IJIIT bel/-Ixmoml'd I(OUSers. All ti,e$( mailers wrre im/X'fla/ll 10 us."
Uniform Unlike soldiers :md mnines, seamen took no oath of allegiance, so the issue of uniforms \~ a defining momtnt and the firsl introducrion to the strange naval (ultufl.-.John Davies wroll' Ihat the seaman'~ shin wa.s an 'amazing garment'. [t had a square-cut neck and shon sleeves and lIlany ml'll had difficulty at first in finding which way to put it on. The seaman's trOusers were 'outlandish'. Then callle the jumper. Gertillg ill/a Ihe jllrllpn 1/.\:1$ an all-itl
stn,.~~ll',
of an/IS f"l/oull'd finally by a rotJdili"lI
of romplele Irelplesmell
tlO holds MtTfd, a wild Wal,;nH
Brt'atiliess a"d Ourlvilled f at IlUr slood sliII, my sllouldm alld uppn anllJ rtlnJlleJ5ly (aughl ilJ blu/' sewr, lire e:ClrmliriN dangling helplessly before me. Thrn as rhouglr In
Naval uniforms 193'1-45.....n: a captain's u."kc
dffSS. CAnlre:
duff~l
coal and life vesl •• worn on
acove
scrvice. Right: a raling" uniform .h""';ng 'h",
separate CGUa..
rtspmse 10 OIl i/lllliriw!tfli/rg Illal all uw "01 u'I'lI, one rljlhe whlle-slJirled alit'S SlIddnlly appearfd, duddng under 11,1' smTIl. ~Vrthou, rrmnotly Ire Irf
Messdeck Life The messrleck wa.s ccntral to Ihe SC::UlJan's life. [n peacelime, a mess on a battleship \vas mixed but happy.
I uus lIi(/lta/led ill a rIleu, lire rIlrmbro of Ivhirh IIltrf mainly Irish ar 1,llest COIIII/t'}'ltIftl, SllJU Queen Eliubelh UIM a OnJOtJpon ItIlllltled ship. 'if 1I'\'Tf a lrappy-go-llIlky 101 a"d ttlallY u'I're IIII' tittles wt Irad a jitlg-sotlg, WillI a (ouple of our Irish mrmbro play;,rg p;a"o ammlimu. The Comish at/d /)cv'm
r 141
Officers and Ratings
Iypa ~d If soft lind pltlU
frIend or 'urt \\'Ot I pICked up' III the clnenu. IWWS did w\'e a real attempt at representing not only sailors at war. but families· ... AI the: wue. the: DntlSh pubbc saw the IU\'Y as the: most reluble of the: Ikforc Dunkuit. the: army .w.lfc:rro from the: recollections of the WOl:ttn Front; after Dunkirk. il ....';1$ under thc: ~. of defeat for some }=D.The populu 1943 film 11m, ~ Otyllto.' prcMdc:sa smkmgtribute
sc:n'lCCS.
The HOs and esp«ully the CWs IIUght mtrude In thu scene. Leadmg Scanun John Whcbn was bemused when 12 CWs arrived on booltd. TheIr accents lmmc'OOO mess.
to the rchability of the IUV): though It \\'25 set enorely III an lllland English \'lIbgc:. The vi.lhgc: is ukc:n 0-\"1" by Gennm parnroopc:n ~iscd as Dritish soIdiCTs. .....ho qUlddy expose themselves through thar crudty and
SiJ,; of' us ~
10 rq>O" 10
ruthkssnes:s. The local Home Guard
My
1M
numbah (\00'000 mess. the oIDt'T SIX are gomg 10 numlnh one mess', Bur dK' aonosphere in rnixcd messes could be very)O\'1
afur jtllllWnJ
MtSS•.•
I did"., /mow it
til
tlw
ti~ ... t1c4f
IMy . . - " mJtnf of Iht fi~1 "'"' 1 tII\'r r~ IJfflW in my '!fr. pall,,,", pm;m,,1 PfalldJlloa. .•• I I«Hl got /0 .blow oJIl fifitm mnl in my mm vtr)' u~lI, IItld JMltd OUI WlU
IN onn '0 cul,iWlt Gnd 1M
no swcll possibill/y Of!
..
ontS //1 -
nOf avoid -
In<'"
nOll'l/rd shIp - drdl by.
His mc:ssnutcs mduded leading ~a~n Pony Moo!\" and Rossie 1113/1 or about thirty who'd once skpl with the wue of a mnch cognac duuller'; renlled pcmionen Tingcr Ling and Ruher Williams. Vl:te:r.ms of the: lasr war; R~ Lee a London Barrow boy and Jock McAllister a Hebridean 'with his angel face. his soli musical \'Oiee and his pink (:heeks'. Brigham Young md Pineher Martin ....'('re HOs in rhdr early t....'enties. rhe biter from a \Vl:althy flUluly. Roger the Lodger was an illlellectual who read the D.lily Ttkgroph and could (:onfuse his sU(l'riors by swirching from a Cockney ro an Oxford 3(:(:cnt.Jones also found two fellowWehhrnen,TaffWilliams and Organ Morgan. who 'tn-atro me like a youllboer brother·." Homosexuality \Ya5 nOI common. nor was ir talked about much at the time. but rhe tong absencC'$ of (:onGict with Ihe opp05ile sex nude $Oml." kind of c;ompromise nl."cc:wry. According to George MeUy. '$ex on the Dido was comparariVl:ly low key but ullcensorious. There were a few obvious homosexua15. the doe-eyed wriler for one. many heterosexuals. and a fair number of those: who ....,ould. on a casual buis. reli('\'(' sexual pl'C$Sure with their own sex·.*
Hl'rIx-r" '., tundsornt
The Seaman and the Public The pubh(: inugc oflhe seaman wu one oflhe navy's gr-eatCSl ::us.ets, in both r«ruitmenl and monle. This image was both reflected and mnforcc:d by popubr enlCrwnmem. particularly the cinenu. The most famous elQmple was In l"llicJr Itio Snw. nude by Noel Coward and based \'ery dir«tly on the exploits of Lord Louis Moumbatten in HMS &Ily. It was much more subtle t1un the usuil pmpagancb pl«es. IIItroduclllg ISSues such as boredom, fear :md death, although its atritud~ 10 ems look ridieulomly old-fashioned. lq.,."er d«k meuon to It ""';1$ fa\vunble. If shghtly amblnIent. One insidCT felt thai the film 'did NOT rqlrcscnt lower deck speech and nunnen·. but he agreed ttult 'The a\'('r.l£" sailor IO\~ 10 see parriotic sruff on the: sc~n. although he: mighl grumbk like blues when with his nutes. lnugme the glow of pnde. how('\.~r. when sitting with his wife. girl
ClucfGunn«s M1te, W2S exp«ted to be 1 sma dlsapillurun 1nd the petty officers of the br.mch "''eI"C mined in 'pou'eT to comnu.nd' and barking orders in a miliury f.ashlon. TIus tcnded to make II unpopubr ",th OIher branches. JUst befol"C the war the gunnery branch W;IS rt'Orpniso.-d into four sub-branches. First :md second cbss Dongs wore crossed guns. thm! class men had a smgle gun. with thc appropriate leiter undcrnC1th. Control ratings (C) operated range finders 1nd othcr inSlnlnlcnts. Quarters ratings (Q) oper,t1ed the guns and took charge of the sllUlIer ontos. uycr ratings (L) aimed them and worked in the director (Owers. Ann-aircrafi ratings (A) manned large and Slllall guns_ urge numbers ofAAJi. or anti-aircrafi gunners third class, were needed for the 55.000 OerlJkon guns that the navy used. One was In charge ofe:l.ch gun with a less skIlled a.ssisUllf. and he might become :I. kind of 10Cl.-l hcro if he was cft'dited with shooting down a plane. Other sub.branches were :l.dded during the war. for specuhns m merchant ship gunnery. boom defence and radlr control. whIch would e\'entually rq>lxe visua..l r:tn~ finding. Gun~ry ratings "1:'1"(' tr.lli~ in the famous school. HMS &«Ihl on Whale Ishnd In Pommouth. wheft' limess md p:;tradc:ground dlSopline was as Important ;IS gunnery. TIleI"(' "'1:'1'<' othl"T schools :;tltlChed to the Plymouth and ChaduJIl COlllllun
'fT""
... ,Itt tWIN r1p"iltM wparlN ngllt "htlJd·.lIt U'm' rillhtt Jrulfy 1IbC/u11l. btll Itt slutk 10 his guns, and IItt ani",o 'stllnd by' h.uijust btm ~d '0 tht dtpth marge parry lIof1tn IItt U·bo
Radar Radar or RDF was an even newer bnnch than anti-subm:lrine. and
as yet it had no real hicnrchy on Ihe lower deck. Not all thc ratings would be fully tnined,due to lhe hug ("xpansion of radar in ]'HI-2. Th(" schools would provide three men for each set, and the others needed 10 keep up a continuous watch "'t're to be acting RDF ntings. tnined up on bo:lrd. Captains weI"(' warned that there W2S no dille in the schoob 10 leach m("n fully. 'Commanding officers must therefore appreciate th:;tt Ordinary ~mt'n (R.D.F.) nC'wly dnfted 10 sra cannol b.o considt'red fully rnined either In pncuca..l openung or in SC':l SC'nsc. Thu tnllllllg must b.o continued :lfloar :lnd ~ry help and encouragemenr mUSI be gi~'t'n ro openlors 10 lC'un·. The main Inining school for nwr opentoo ....':IS:lt HMS KrlJrynt on the Isle of M:ln. where ndar aen:;tb "'C're SC't up with :;t \'lew O\'C'r the IrISh Sea. For secunty Te:lSQns r:mngs had no badge of Iheir Qv.'T1 unlll btl' in Ihe war but their informal staTuS wzs high. It W:lS nOI unusu:l1 for a dup to be delayc'd III s.uhng because the key nwr opentor was absent.
Torpedomen and Submarine Detectors The ride of the torpedo bDnch was shghdy misle:;tding. II did Indeed IlUmum :;tnd lirc torpedoes :l.nd other underw:t1er weapons such :IS mines and depth charges, but it also had responsibility for low power electrical systems, so torpedomen Inlght lind themselves posted to ships with no torpedoes. Thcre \\'ere half_hearted attempts 10 split the branch inlO lorpedomen proper and electricians, but mOSI men continued to learn both aspects of the job :;tnd Ihe navy f:li1ed to set up a properly integrated electrical branch during the war. Portsmouthbased torpedomen wert' tnint'd al HMS l'tnwn. originally :It Porumouth but rt'-sited to Rodean School. Those who passed ""ore a Single torpedo for a xaman Torpedoman :lnd crow:d torpedoes for :;t Wding Torprdonun or ;l Torprdo Gunners Mate. In ....'aJ"timC'. thC' bnnch h:ld mort' sub-divisions than any o!hl"T......Ith lki1.Ied ekculClanS known 2S W1rt'nun md specia..lua In contrOlled nuning. landing cra.lt. boom ckfence and min~~rs. AscHe openlOrs werC' nled as submulIle detectors. .....lIh promOtion prospects to the non·subu.anu\·e ntes of Higher Submarme Detector (HSD) 1nd of Submarine Detector Instructor. The SO bnnch W:lS forced 10 exp:lnd rapully alter peacetime neglecl. It had only 1200 tnllled men III 1939. rising to 7600 III 1945. Ongmally II W:lS based at Portland on Ihe south cmost of Engl:lnd but in 1940 it was rIlo~~d 10 two tnining schools III the Firth of Clyde - HMS Ni",r"d a\ Campbeltown and Osprey at DUlloon further up the Firth. Often the HSD, who might only be an able seaman and l'al'<'ly was higher than leading $e:;trnan in a con'eue or frigate. was the senior openlor in lhe ship and bol"(' 1 great deal of reiponsibility. Sometimes :In operator h:l.d to :lSSCrt hllll$Clf 19;tllUl his officers. Peter GreHOn reports of the frig:lte Tay:
Signallers It W:lS never quite clear how f:;tr signallen ....'C're considered p.an of the SC'aliuti bnnch, :lnd how far they formed :l bDnch of their own. They wore the ~ual'<' rig of th~ $C':llllan and lhey were divided into tWO groups. Visual signallers used fbgs, scmaphore and Mone coo(". worc a badge ofcruISed flags and oper::tted mainly on lhe bridge. In peacetime. they "'ere usuilly $C'lected from the beuer-educated boys at the tnining schools :lnd Nicholas Morw.rrat Ltked working with them.
If yo.. "\In' an txamplt of alttl inttllignu~ in ,lit ,....'av'(. " yo.. ng sigPlalman. illttreSttd in his job ,,"d Irnn II' ~t ahtad, is prob.1bly tht bat spttimtlf. Fro", 'ht l'I'7y nal..rr of his "",rio. ht bows morr abo..t tht .ship and htt mowmtnu thlln allY o,hn ,...,ing; and ht Iuu tilt OJ'pcnl..n.'y of
"n
ItarPlirtg m....h mo~ baidu Ht S«J II/""'-SI twry -signa/lhal (oma III. a l'I'7y .. ,dt writry of s..bfrm r.:lllglllg ./ram 'ht First Lo"'~ aPlnil-'tTJ
of la/Iring 10 his ~m aPld of pil:lting "p /mh
idt.u."
Radio opentors "~I"C known ;IS tdegnphists and wore a badge of a lightning flash :lnd wings. Onglll::t.lly they were responSible for m:;tlnten~nee :;ts "'C'll :u openung Ihe selS, until 1 ra.dio mechanic bnnch W1S formed later in lhe war. Telegraphists needed a good knowledge of Morse code and were oftl'lJ tnined in civilian schools in wartiml·. Unlike the visual signallers and the membets of the seaman bnnch they were not expected 10 assume milit:lry comT1l:lnd of:l. comp:lrtment or a boat. so in that sensr they were closer to the engineers and other speciahm.
143
144
Churchill's Navy
4 Engineers and Others The RO)';I.! Navy ....~ toully dependmt on its engillttrs for all of Its aetlVlUc:s. No "'anlup could oper:m' for long without them, (or C".~n ;l sutle ckpoc dllp nttdallG dectrial :md other lIuxllury KIVICd. Yft lU\oU 1'1Igin«1'$ h.d to work btlow- decks In unpkaunl condmons and at Iugh tl:'lllpcnlU,", often knowing little about whal ....~ Iuppcmng :lbm-e. They ....'eft: more :il nsk than other crew members when ;l !hip unk.: 'il is evident Wt caswltlc:s to men In $unk or dunaged dups D affecting the Ilumw ofhigha- Engme Room r,tUngs
Opposhc - - :
.............Scobn
dwctial
"'~bo""
boiIw room o£. N.....,.....,." 1942.
Bel.-, The ChId" ERA al
wort< ill the
...........i_
In 1942.
Tn""
zv.adablc. as the proporuon of casualties 15 usually highest In thc Engme and Boiler Rooms'." But the ~~r dcock did not ha\'t' the smle preJudi(:(, agamst cngm«nng tlul was pl'CSC'm among the officcn. Ratings lM:re a\\;an' tlul such techmc.lIl skills coukl serve them wdl In OvUlMl life. In a \\"y tmot ability with guns or miliury dOOplmc could ne\~T do. Engine room \\.'Ork tt:nded to free men from the more menial and oppressi\~ asp«ts of nuhwy life, such :II clcOlmng decks or rifle drill. All S;lilors grumble:, ;md in such 3 tuurdous .md uncomforable ...." 'r they had C\~ry right to; but the ruII....u engineer ""';;1,$ as h:ippy as 3nyone else:. During Ihe: Won Ihe:re:- WZIi :i V:iSt incrc:iSC in snuller vessels such as to:.uu.! fOI"Cn 3nd bndlllg tnfl, 3nd e:ieh one h:id 10 h:ive some kind of engineering saff. There:- ....';;1,$ no ~:it tethnologlcal thange In englnC rQOlIlS durmg the W1Ir, but the engineering bl'1lnch h3d to cope wnh 3 fn wider nngc of power punts dun c:vrr before:. Befon: Ih.. Won nl':irly :ill W1Irships (3pnt from submanncs) had used thl' 51e31ll turbmc enginc:. H05lilitics brought the rc:-introduction of the Slum re:clpmc;;r.nng engine for escort vessels. the IIIcreascd usc of pelrol engind for cO:lSul forces and diesels for bndmg cran and othcr vc:$scls. [I W1IS difficult to Il'1Iin experts who tould operote and mamt"'ln 311 these cngml:li, so sollle had to tram ill one type or anolher.
Selection Apin from officers. the ruvy had tWO basiC 1C\'e1s of skill for Its c:nginccn. Ani6ccn ~ highly skilled, 5tol::er1 .....ere srrni-skilled. In .......rome there: .......s nol the: arne: to tr.lm enough arnfiters 10 the highCSl: standard. so some tompromuc: was needed, not W1thm the group Itsdfbut by creating 'dilutres' who could do sonIC' bul not: all of the wllcd wort. The navy found enough volunleers for its engine IOOlIlS despite the vast: CXJWlSion. Indudlllg .Dr pcnonncl, Ixtwec:n 14,000 and 15.000 wen: under training for e:ngmttnng dUDd u the m 1943." N;;r.runIIy It tned to find those With pIC\'lOUS ~ In civ1l hfc:. Askrd to inw5tipe how lJ:IIincd rngincering \VOI'kcn; WCIC dcpkJ)cd by the mllcd sc:rvi<:a. Sa William ~ Nt! much pnlSe for the navy.
peu
The: milk ~ting of W
is tmwliud, sumdatdind and objmlVt.AU rJu &gmt ROOtII Artip lit" Ord_ A rtip an.' (aId on uniform mnlwds at oM of rJu fhlft ~ J'I'ffJ by I""for-n« flI'liPlSt timt of Il Itt p~ of Ii""'; IllJ w umdidllta.fcr IlppOlntmcll IU El«tnclll Arlifiar
umQltUlQ for appomtmmt as
As the .......r progrcw:d the supply of skilled llle:n lended 10 dry up 3nd the navy had 10 Identify those with edualtional qualiliations to be trained as engine room, I'1Idio or air methanics. A sUlvc)' showl'd that men training for these tl'1ldes had 10 come fll)m the top JO per cenl of the Intelligence I'1Inge. rqualto potcntial officers."
Engine Room Artificers The engme room artifieer W2S one of the most skilled men on the kM~r dc:<:k.ln pracdime most canlC' from the dockyard tC/WTIS or ruval schook and had strong 1U....u OOlIDC'(:oons. They ....'eTC recruited as appn:nDccs at the :lge of about 16, and chd 3 four-year (OU~ 301 Plymouth or Rosyth. Thry learned 3 sIulIed tr.ldc » 3 finer, rumer, botkrnuker or snuth and were ablc: 10 make C:lncrgc:ncy repairs in OUI of the way pbces. They abo learned how to ah: durgc: of an c:ngme room. Tbry hxI. 'wide: pnctica1 experience of Itt1proaDng. rurblne, mtcrtal tombuscion. comp~ ignition, rc:frigel'1long 300 hydraulic machinery; cngme md boiler room tdiltmg. Capable of fub applkaoon of tDdc qualifiClltions."The Adrrur.a1ry .......s deternuncd 10 m.unwn their ~ C'YCIl in ....mme. The: wining and tdUl
Officers and Ratings
"""Its
Accordingly, their knowfed~ Jhould not be gained simply.fram or tllken lit! mm.fram th6r lerJdln; they should be tmil~d tll IIpproillh sllbjnfJ .fram the standpoint if ob5nVrJtion, and tll I¥OJlIn 1I1lf thdr (lWPf ((IttdllsilmJ," Nevertheless, much greater numbers wue needed, and HO$tilities Only men were also recruited, if they had at least two and a half years' experience in a relevam trade. They ...."ere given a short course in engine room work, but the Admiralty had to adntit that their 'Efficiency as tradesmen varies widely'. An engine room artificer wore the fore-md-afi: rig for the entirety of his naval career. He started his working life afloat as an ERA fifth cbss. not yet fUlly trained and equivalent to a petty officer. Mter 12 to 18 months and gaining boiler room and engine room watch-keeping certificates, he ...."Quld be rated fourth class and have the SUfUJ of chief petty officer. He would then adv;lnce through the classes to be<:ome a chicfERA aficr atlcast six years' practical experience, though his Indgo did not change during that period. Indeed, he had no specific badge at all, only the three buttons of a CPo. A chief ERA might be the chief engineer of a small ship like a corvette, or in charge of the watch in a larger one. His promotion prospects ...."ere good by lower deck sundar
Stokers The title of'stoker came from the days be.fo~ the First World \V.ir, when coal had to be shoveUed into the furnaces of the boiler roonL ThiJ w:as no longer necessary on oil-6red ships, and coal burners were rare outside me Patrol Service, which had dilferent conditions ofemployment-The name lingered and suggestions to change the title to 'mechanic' fell on deaf ears for the momem.ln the meantime:. it was hoped that the: stoker might lose: his image of a muscular bl'llte. 'He require<; intelligence, menta'! alertness
and a reasonably high Sbnoord of education, if he is to watch-keep on machinery with understanding'," Under the supervision of an ERA or enginee:ring officer, me stoker 'tends coal or od fired boIlers, keeps watch on main MId auxiliary nuchinery. Reads simple recording instrumenlS, inspects self-lubricated bearing;, oils open type engines, runs fire and bilge pumps'... They made: up the great mass of the engllle room complemem on nearly aU ships, while a single one might oper:atl' till' engines of a ship's boat or a smaU landing cr:afi. Five hundred were
145
146
Churchill's Navy
('nK-ring duo' training schools ~...'t'ry week at the height of the WllT. The culture of the stoker W:IS n:ry different from that of the regubr 1-1" had joinffi at the age of 18 or O\'eT and Iud ne\'eT been broh'l\ by (amps such as G,,,W's, so he tended to be more independent. A5 a seaman, Tristan Jones watched him at work.
~alllan.
f 'ookt,d dOll'll IlmJJl.~ll lire iroll gru/i"gI "",I Will Sroka (al",ly goi"g about I,;s Imsi/Ins. ... "I1rry appt'arrd '" lit '''/IIp/m'ly isoia/cd from Ille world !l't' kmw /OI/sides, amf II,t m
kmw r!rm (mly II quarrer illlh of sierl plillc stood belWi'tII ,hem "lid
Juddl'll,
txm,ciarillg aNII,,"
CookJ a' work in
Ihf gallf)' in "H,
In peacetime the stoker was distinb'1.lisllt'd nuinJy by the age of his entry, bm in wartimc hc was gencrally selected after the potential engine room mechanics and other intellibocnt men h:ad b..-en t:1ken out, leading to a suspicion that the stoker was inferior in quality;'" ,the selection of th~':SC men has lowered the genenl st:md:lrd of the stoker,:md if the \v:lI' W13 for many y"'':l.I)' will have a lll.arke
higher ratings of the future', It was found thai bc'tween 10 and 20 per cent of men under instruction were of' low mentality' and 'semi~illiterates'," Pethaps this group was representcd by a Stoker Smith on the cruiser KnJl in 1942. He n:5ente(\ being n::prim:lIlde
Officers and Ratings
higher prupomon of sellIor ntes th~n se~men. A fTlpte Iud one chIef stoker, SIX stoker petry officers ~nd SIX lc~dlllg stokers as well as 12 slOkers. A light fl«t ~ircl
h~d ~
1t.I\'~r c1~ss
a"
AU jimngs insidt tht 00iIn -"1- dt;,.,ing, IJlld tIw- 1II1mJ<J1111rjus of a boiltr ..... smJ,b,:d dtllll ,,,,,h II'" 1mIbbm, strotpm IlIId lighl rhlpping h.immm MFlf ll1td if n«t!SlI1y ill tyfmdrwll»ilm. SpniaIII"'rr ~ _ ~d for flw ruba of IIW(Nubt boilm. .\fm lI~ng in 1I",n·lllM bltikn IlUUf not lor 1J1Iou'td 10 I.tlkt ill wilh 1'- ""ylhing lllrl(h may fall mID 1M Illba, lind IJlIlJrfidD u.ftd III Iht /xtiltr shf'l./d bot mmftrtd
Electrical and Ordnance Artificers The: elecuical artificer train~d over rhe same: period as all ERA and had Ihe same: (ondil;oTlS ofservice ~nd promotion. He had a far wider nllge of skills than the torpedo nflngs, who did simpler ....,ork. Maintains
flJfflp;wtS
Engine Room Work En","lIIe rooms usually work«l III three .....;l!cMs. n .... n if the: l"$ of the shIp ....'3$ III IWO w.iIIch= Capital ships ~nd t"ru~ had t"nough lIlen co nuinuin fun po'""" during !hrec' .....att"ha. ckstro)'nS md smaIl \nscls tended to USC' thar speed in bums ~nd nttded only to maintain tlunofifths pew. r al other time." There re th~ different :lJ"('<J$ of ....vn:: the engines proper, Ihe bolkn and the auxiliMy nuchmcry. A promJ!ing young Sloker ....'3$ expc:cl«l to progress from the boiler room 10 the engine roolll. and then 10 begin .....o rk on Ihe ~uXllury nuc.hmery." un l'torry joined the destfO)'er &lJglt bte in 1943. His first Job was clc~ning the bilge pumps, 'plunging )vur arm into freezing, filthy bilge water'.Aftl'r a while he W'as assigned to boiler c.ontrol, which ill\'Olvcd 'moving like a gazelle when the bridge calle:d down for "Full Speed'''. He: was promoted to keep walch on the distilling plant for fresh water, wdl ~ft in the ship where he had to lash himself ~gairm a pipc in rough .....e~thcr. Then he ....'Cnt to the elile Ihrottle party whit"h controlled the speed ofthc engines on orden from Ihe bndge.They wen: 'mm~ like finely honed and superbly mlllcd athleles, ll'lO\'ed ;as one tcam. IIlsumly responding to ~'t'T)' imuuclion from Ihe bridgco'.'" In dlC boiler room. the "vrk beg;m ..... h~n the ship ....'» ordered to sa ~nd th~ boLler Iud to be: In or'fWhcd up', It took some nnlC 10 gel the W2tet bollmg ~nd the ship re~ 10 mQ\..... If the t"ompkmenl ~11ov.~. ~ petly officer or lading SIOker "'Ould be m clurge: of the watef levt-I.;as it ....'» ,'t'T)'
lit ntvrl" 1tMu, if Ih~ propk lIn Ih~ brid~ i?f lkagl~ II'"'" having IJ bil i?fJim 10 rrlin't IIII' borrdom, or Wffl' Ilboul 10 drop dtplh cha~ lallnch tOl]'(dlln,
womng
StrViring
ItI/l'r
IJmplijim. ...
Apn !he ~kCtria.I uti6cn'$ tad to be diluted ....ith kss--s.killed men, In dlis ("2SoC ~"'Cre the electncll mcduflll;:s ..... ho were sekctcd &om HO men 'of cducu:imul sundard noc b dun 4th Form sc:corxbry so::hoo!' but I10l nec~y with tnd.- experit'll("e, 2nd gi>.-m six months' lr:tItIIng. The: ordnance anifiCCT tnmcd III the $MTIe u'ay. but specialJS('(I in the nUlIltenance of guns and theIr moumings. H~ o::ould refil the bl'l'e<:h mC(:hanism of a gun of any SIze, work on the hydrauhcs which opented the mounting. or line up the fire control il1SlTUmenlS. He had an assiSlant, the able ~aman qu~lified in ordnance, or QQ. He was ~ gunnery nting and carried out SOIllt" of th~ less-skilled wks. but h2d to give up th~ nte on promotion to leading ~alllan."
Artisans and Radio Mechanics Arnuns ....'ere distinguished from arlificers in that their .....ork c:ould be done as easily on JhOI"t" as ~I se~. They ifldudcd shlpwnghlS, bbeksnuths. plumbe" ~nd p~lIltcn. In gt'n~ra.l Iheir SUIUS .....~s equl\'a.lem to tlut of artificers. ~nd they ....,ore fore-and-~fl umform .....ilh a crossed lunmler ~nd axe: badge on the collar. Mosl of Ihem. hown'Cr. had no p~th 10 W2rnm ~nd commissioned nnk......hich ennged Chufchill III 1939. Referring 10 Hiders alleged C2r1y employment as a house paimer. he wrole: lI"ifl YOII ltindly txpI4i,. 10 me IN " _ """it'll JrlJ<,r indiuid"a!s ,n <ma". br.Jrtdles from rising by mml 10 romm,mOfttd ,ank? ." if a ItiWotphlll may fist, u"'y not II painrn? Appaml/Iy 111m IS no d!f!UuIIY IJblllll paint", rising ". Gtrm"nyf' R~dio mc:ch~nic was a f~r newer branch. formed early in Ihe war. It wu iml'nded to remOH the need to train tdegraphisu in mamtenanc:e work ~nd ~Ilow them to concemrate on sign~llillg. Candidates we:re sc:l~"ed from young men with the school certific:ate in llt~thematics and given Jrttcrtst\'e tnining in civilian colleges, They were nted as kading h:mds on completion of lh.. (ourse: and ~s petty officer a )"~U later.
147
148
Churchill's Navy
Chifhlld Oflt t1 rllt hdrJrsI j~r.a1 \..-rilen idelllif) Ihe stC\\'ilrd branch ';II Ihe ongll1 of IT'I)"Ihs :lOOut rhe hOIllQSexwlity. According 10 T risun jones:
~cks of Ihe navy wrrr run by men who .....o re an mferior \ocrsion of the fore-:md-aft umform. descnb.,.d :IS 'J. cross bC'lween thaI of J. tl.Xi driver and J. lvorkhoU!C: mnutc'."'Thc:y W<.'I'I: dlitlllb'\lish...d by sur-shaped badges on Ihe left arm. with J. I.-tier inSide - W for wnrcr or clerk. S for supply r.ltmg. C for shIp's company cook, OC for omcers' cook and for officers' srew3rd. Medical standards wo:n' gl'lll'r.uly lower in thl"$(' b~nch('5 and 111<"11 Wt"n:
The domesnc and admilllnr:ltive
as
Jnvtd.711t)' 1I'lR' ml'SI likely III be fi.lllnJ dm"'!!, fll( SI<>rrs Illld suppl), fllringt. dnd <1ficm' Jrtll'an/s.. I don'r litH"", 11,,,, ,,\If Mllust Ihty "It" J
5 The Royal Marines
allowed to wur gluscs. Tilt' writer \~ Trg:mled J.~ slightly superior fO the other !';lungs 1II 11m umform. In p"ac("dllw he was cntcn:-d after an examination in English :md :mthmctic. HI." wn divided imo IWO m.un typt"S. III a pay and cash office he would kttp the shIpS ledgers, carry out ..II p"'y aCCoullting and Illcorne t
The RO)'il1 MUlIlt"S
duties. and OIMN we~ elllpl~'Cd as Interpreten.The supply ranng ....'as Slllular to the .....mer in $Utus. and .....Qrked in Sl:ore rooms 011 bo;ard s}up and ashore. He mIght speo;ahse III IU\'6l Sl:OrtS such as tools. Iurd....... re
"\lr d"d pta« is II' pn....dt d(fiJthmtJlfS lIohitll, u"'rlsljUlI)' ("pdblt t'j
and eonhgc. or m plO\1sions for Illcss.tng purposes. A new breed of a\'I:IIOOIi storts rating emerged during the w:u. With the cbss S)"Stems of the ..gt'. II IS no surpnse that the cooL:s .... e~ dl\'ided 1I1t0 two groups. for officeR And for crews. Cookmg w;as n:garded as menial worL: "lIher Ihan an an in Unt..111 .II Ihe time...nd shIps' cooks were wI") much ukeJl for granled, but it w..s hArd work. espeCIAlly on .I 'null. unsublc shIp. Undcr Ihe St:m
... 11I
"wmillt rllcir sIIdf(
The nurmes w~n: self-drxmg compMC'd wnh theIr Umted Seltt) COUIllC'rpans and tht' officers wt'1t' ·r.ilher Sl:lluglv ~ wnh tht'lr o.....n ohKumy'. xcordlllg 10 Ihe 11O'o~list E\~lyn \'(/augh. \\00 sc:n~ wnh them m w;ammt'." The corps \\'as \\~U ,1\\"';If1." of IQ nuny dichotomies. E\"CT) marine ....'as·a JOldltr and :li s.ulor 100' xcordmg ro KIpling. ;and he Iud 10 lx- cqwUy ready for bnd and~;a sen.-lee. or C\~n
149 Flekl OIlars
Other OffICers (while taCI com)
I
'm,,"
Ueutenam
""""
,,--,
.... ""'.,
~dier
"
Corporal
lieutenant
"'-
.,
¥
~
lance Corporal
~) ~~ Company Seroeam-Ma1Of
"'---
"'" Seroeanl Ouartermastef
WlIrram Orticer's
"'''
....
Captain
lieutenant
""'"
w,o.
lieulenant
...... ... ...... • ~ ~ D IJ
Provost Seroeam
Bandmaster, 1st Class
Drum-MajOl'
8andmast8f.
2nd Class
Band Corporal
"".,
flying duties in ~ small number of cases. The nurines had highly aggressive roles a.s com11U.nd~, cre.....s of bnding craft or in landing parties. They had more dcfcnsi~ rolcs in protccting naval NSC$. Th<1' acted ~s domestic st"p/allts to both fUVll!and mume officers. and sollie weTC' aranli in th:lt they provided the band service for the navy as a whole. One of their duties was to provide bodyguards and lllcsscngen for the Prime Mini5lt"r, ~lld partit'S accompamed him on hIS overseas voy.a~. Bur their Sl'rvice as mcsscnger<; was less successful. John Colvine, one of Churchill's privatc Sl'crcuries. often found it ea.sier to carry letters himsdf, a.s the marines 'move so slowly and with such dignity'." In wartime the Roy.l.l Marincs would find some of tlll,"ir tnditiona! roles less imporullt than before. but tht'}' ....uuld take on m.any new ones. for the corps always survwed through Its fleXibility.
such as the Sten and the Lanchester. the Vickers heavy machine gun and the 2-inch mon:u. Marin" ranks ....'CTC' virtually identical to the army, with a few exceptions - warram officers Iud fUVll! rather than army narus. so they were in effect Junior officers. whde sergeant majors wcre senior sergeants. The formal marine uniform consisted of a blue runic and a pcah-d cap or while troptC21 helmet. It was snllwued to ships' dCClchments and bands, but most manncs wore battledress like the army. The Royal Man nt'S rellcd on both the army and the fUvy for nwch of their infut.s;trucrure. Administranve support at all levels was provided by the navy. and later by the WRN5_ The ll:l.vy also provided medical services, while much of manne training was based on the work and methods of the army. In rerum the marlnCS provided some infrastructure for th.. navy, and ran much of its recruiting Sl'rvice.
The Organisation of the Marines
Recruitment and Training
The corps WJ.S h..aded by the Adjutant-General. re-titled the Genenl Officer Conunandillg and then the Commandant General in 1945. He tune under the Second Sea Lord at the Admiralty, and the post was held by Sir Alan Bourne during the W:llr_ He was promoted to full general. unusually high for a Royal Marin.... He had a staff of twO genera.! officers. I\\U brigadiers and 18 other officers and warnnt officers in his hradquarters at QUttll Anne's Mansions in 5t Jamcs'S Park. within walking di$tance of the Admiralty building." Marines and offil·crs were allocated to the three m:l.1n dIvisions at Charium, Pornmomh and I>lymouth, which p3ra11e1ed the manning divisions of the navy. Each was hcad<-d by a colonel-
In recruitment, tht' nurincs w<'re always III danger of falling betWC'en the I\\U stools of the :l.rmy and the navy. In pracnce, they a1W:llys found enough mtn who WJ.nted to combine the best of the 1\\'0 Sl'rvices. In peacetime, they rccruited at a later age than the seaman branch of thl' navy. so thL')' offered a career to men who \vanted to sec the world but were nOl attr.l.ct"d by the heat and confinement of the engine room. In wartime, Ihey took on '·olunteen within the system of conscnption. in the gme w:l.y as thc lIavy or air foree. A surprising number found a family connection with the marines.....hile others were attracted by the prospect of service in big ships and the blue uniform which was still in use on certain ocC:l.sions after the arlllY had gone O\,<:r entirely to banlcdress. That hope proved illusory Raymond Mitchell ~'Olunlcl'n:d in 1940 after seeing a poster of a nurine ill blue jacket and white helmet. But'l spent my entire Service life in khaki and, sa,,, for a few transportatlonJI excepnons. entirely upon dry land'." Rccruit training continued at Deal, but as wllh all services nuny more facilities wt."rt." nceded and annexes were opened. A ncw camp was set up for basic tnining on the R.iver Exe in De\un and it had more than 40lXJ men in M:l.Y 1944. Courses wert." shortt'ncd from 10
The ..nk bMps of
be Royal MMiMI.
150
Churchill's Navy
fO 6 weeks in wartime, then increased again 10 eight. Men learned the tr
diaries and leiters. Bm after that the marines went over to army style training. Potential officers were selected aflcr a p"riod in the ranks, and trained imensi\'Cly in the Officer Cadct Training Unit in a converted hotel at ThurieslOne in De\'On. Critics s.aid the system produced a superior priv,lIe soldier r:lther than an offic"r abl" to Illake d~isions. The Royal Marinl'S had nearly 11,000 lllcn in 1939. By May 1941 this had more than trebled to 36,000. Expansion slowed down alter that, but in December 1944 corps numbers had risen to 67.655.·
form :I single corps in 1923. NO'v marines were entitll'
Marine Bands Shipboard Service Shipboard service was traditionally thc most imporl1l.m part of Royal Marine activity. but it was not a growth area in wartime, as new building of battleships. cruisl:rs and aircraft carrkrs bardy covered war loss.:-s. There were 7000 marines in shipboa.rd detl.chlllents at the end of 1944. including bandsmen - a little O'~r 10 per cem of the corps. In addition there were 570 serving in llIl'rchant ship5 as OEMS gunners." At one time marine gunners had been segregated in the ROYOII Marine Artillery, but that was merged with the Ropl Marine Light Infantry to
The marine. of Qu..... F./i::QN-rlr are in.~e.M
by .he
Free French Genel1ll1
in 19U.
Catro"~
Since 1903 the Royal Marines had providcd all the band services for the navy. In peacetime. boys with a Illusic:ll inclination were recruited and tr:tine
151
Officers and Ratings
of hard work. In action they oper.lted Ihe tr.lI1smitring sution in Ihe bowels of Ihe ship. and Iheir camalty rate was high when ships well' I~!.
Mobile Naval Bases Defence of na\';I1 bases was a t...ditional marine role. and the marines founded the Mobile Navaillis<: Defence Organisation or MNBDO in 1923, al1:er experiences with the unreadincs.s of Scapa Flow in the lm war. Due to its uck of funds il remained a skeleton org:miution until after the olnbreak of war in 1939, when MNBDO I was formed at Fon Cumberland in l'onsmouth. It \\'35 intended 10 provide air and .sea d"f"nc" offoJW:lrd bases, using 4- and 6-inch b'Uns:os coast:ll anillery.and long- and short-Tllnb"C anri-aircTllft guns, It had an csublishm<:nt of mo,,-' than 4200 officers and men, bm its equipmem was slow in arriving. [n 1941 il sailed for the Middle E3:st and parties were unded on Crel" during Ihe German invasion, though 100 laic to defcnd the base at Suda Ba}'. They served :l..'i infantry and formed part of the final rearguard \\~th heavy casualties. Nine hundred of them well' t:lken prisoner. although Major R. Garrett organ-ized an =p<: in a landing bargc, with ovcr 100 people on board, the nujority of whom were marines, which W:l..'i propelled by sail for much of the way to North Africa. MNDDO I continu<·d in opl·...don and lat~·r served in Ceylon. Meamvhile MNBDO II \\In formed near PortsmoUlh in 1941. with many officers lransferred from army offictr cadet training units (OCTUs), and a large proportion of inexperience
The Royal Marine Engineers A small force of Roy;U Marine engineers had served in the Firsl World War bUl W:l..'i soon disbande
Other Activities Thc marines wcrc responsible for till" f;llllOus 14-inch guns at Dovcr, designl."d to fire acron the 21 miles of thl." English ChanncllO Calais.
They were set up in the autumn of I940 and augmented by olher guns from lime to time. including some manned by the army. The marines pro\,idl·d many of thl· nll"n for fOrls sunk in till" Thanll"S &Ill;lry 10 d\'3l wilh German minclaying aircraft and orher raiders. On" hatt:llion helped Wilh the repair of bomb damage in London, and another provided guards for vulnerable poims along til(" coaSI. In the field of special operations. the mOSI famom aClivily was the raid by five \\I/o-man canoes under Major ·Ulondie' Hasler in December 1942. They were laullched from Ihe submarim· Trilla and t\\"O of Ihem succeeded in altaehing limpel min<:s to ships far up Ihe R.iver Gironde al Bordeaux; but only H:l..'iler and his No.2 surviwd Ih" mission. Marine officers could also S('T\'(' with the Fleel Air Arm. and 31 pilots ;lnd [\\'0 obser\'ers did so, Nine NCO pilots were also trained. but had 10 transfer to lhe navy ;IS petty officers. Capt:lin Oliver Patch look pan in the raid on Taranto. and Major Alan Newson became a squadron commander.
The Royal Marine Division The Royal Marine Urigade w:os formed "arly in the war. whell Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, Hl' plannt'd 10 ust' it for offensi\"C operations, perhaps in the Mediterranean if Italy entered the war. [t comprised three baualions ;lnd was conullanded by Brigadier SI Clair Morford. It had thn·e and latcr four baltalions, hut \\~ split imo 101 and 102 brigades in the summer of 1940, when 101 Brigade had 66 officcrs and 1350 lllt'n - about half the size of an army brigade. [t took charge of CO:l..'it defences west of Plymouth, then SCT\"Cd in the aborrin' expedition to Dakar. A new brigade, 103, was formed lale in 194(1 to creal~· the Royal Marine Division. [t stood by for Ihe capmre of the Canary Islands in 1941, bUl it provt:d difficult 10 aU:lch arlillery and other specialist unill; from the army, so its p<:rsonnel mostly became comm;lndos or landing crafl crew.
Marine NCO. ""der l ... i"i,,(; al
Deal in 194•.
152
Churchill's Navy
Marines in Landing Craft
Commandos
The question of using nurines on board landing craft firsl :nose during 1942. Ll.nding Cr.lft Gun lmd l:lnding Cnft Flak wen~ intended to engage mainly in the shon: hank r.lthl.'"T than with warships, and it made sense to man Ihdr guns with nurines. Me:mwhile the RO}':I.l Marine Division was being dishanded and it \\~ suggested thai ships wilh m
Comm:l.ndo regiments were first formed :l.fter the F;l11 ofFnnce on the initiative of Churchill. Thcy wcrt' intcndcd to form an aggressivc niding fol'('t", withoul the drudgery and parade-ground disdpline of norm:l.l military life. The Roy:ll Marine Brigade might h:l.Vl: been transformed into such a force, but it was held back for possible invasions overseas, and:iS one of the few intact military formations afler Dunkirk it had :l.n imporunt role in home defence. Innead, the fint conullando regiments were formed from the army. But in 1942, when Mountbatten W:l~ head of Combined Operations, the first Roy:ll Marine Conmundo was formed from volumeers within the corps, with a strength of 446 men after those less fit had been weeded OUl.lt had no administrative tail, no heavy weapons and moved largely by sea, so it W:is an ide;l1 role for the marines. It was evemu:a1ly re-titled 40 Commando, and eight others were formed before the end of the war, either by convening e}(isring battalions or by accepting volunteers. Commandos tr.l.ined in a nototiously tough cOune at Achancarry in WeStern Scotl:l.nd. Officers h:l.d to forgo privileges of rank and endure the ~me hardships :is Ihe men. There W:is physical Inining and high-speed marches.
All if Ihis lUIS i"lers~d wi,h sessio..s if....a,med (ambped llVt'T a mel Irawstf aud croSSillg Ille 'roggle bridge' as imlrndorl hurled hlllld.grttlades i.. lo II,e .,'er below...... Roy:ll M:l.rine Commandos saw :l.ction as pur of the Dieppe raid in 1942, when an attack on the Channel port was foiled with heavy casualties.This ....'as foUowed by Operation Torch. the landings in North Africa and invasions of Sicily, Italy :l.nd Normandy. They fought on Lake Commachio in Italy. on the island of Wakheren in thc Nctherlands, and in the Fu East. The Royal Marines were a rransformed force by rhe end of the war. Out of 67,655 men at the end of 1944, more than 14,000 were engaged in active operation ashore in Italy, North Wesl Europe and Sourh Easl Asi:l.. Nearly 18,000 were :l.tuched to Combined Operations, and 8000 more served in Roy:ll Navy and Fleet Air Arm bases. mainly as drh'Cr'S." They had largely been replaced in menial duties such as servants. Their role on board ship was far less significant and only employed 8000 mcn, and their dcfensivc work had ne\'l:r really borne fruit. Instead they setved mainly as commandos or landing craft crews, in :I. highly aggressive spirit which is maint:l.ined by thc modcrn marines_
6 The Wrens Organisation The Women's Royal N:l.v:ll Service (WRNS) was first founded in 1917, as Britain mobiliscd its resources for lotal war, and the idea of
153
Officers and Ratings
women in the fighting services was gradually becoming accepted. It disb:mded at the end of that war, although its members kept in touch throughout the peace. In the inter-war period, women's position in society improved slighdy. They gained the vote between 1918 and 1928, and professional work was gradually opened to them, but they were still regarded as inferior to men in almost every kind of work outside the home and family. In 1939 it was decided to revi\oe the service and a newspaper advertisement announced: W,lS
11I0.'HE/\"S SERVICE INTHE ROYAL NAW
t>J "'I"""" (initially "00.. 1 1500) .. >iI/be .."",ud to t"ke tht'I,/lJ((" of Nawl aud !1,.1arillt' (dnks ami ratings ill Nm'
lJ .. m~'
"fX'"
/lnllr. Drill alld «rollouial fi~llrt'd 1'lIxdy alld 11'm' laMl by r.wd/nll Pl'lly Qffi(er Wrrrlf JIIlder a qualified I?'f QffiCt'T. 'nlert II~ 'ty/JIltf 011 naml lraditioru, ImlU mId CUSlllnb', /lud 0'1 lIoval raub, rIllillgs /llld bIldgrs. '" TIre fyllabrlf illtludt'd all r.wel/nll /wurt' all 'St-ClIrity' 11;111 II film fNlIJ Ille Nal'dia/ dtrJlalll\>rk."
Oppo.i'e abo\.." A marine gun
c~'"
On "ithe' 'Winnje' Or 'Pooh', .he rwo '.-inch gunl fitted at Om'", '0 6..., • .,...,•••he Englilh Channel.
Most women had already been selected for a parricular trade, and the}' now "oem on to a specialist school. In 1943 thell'" were 14 of these. mostly shared with male ratings, such as HMS Cabilia at Warrington for coders, the Photographic School at Arundel and HMS Verlloll, the Torpedo School.'" Many wem to the Supply and ~cretariat School at Wetherby in Yorkshire.
Oppo<-10"" M.rine con,ntandOI
pnopa.e
'0 b.nd On
IhIO i.land of Wakhe~n
in the
Nethe.b.nlh, '0
The idu was instantly popular and aoout 10 women applied for each place. Thl'" wartillll'" director of thl'" WRNS, or Wrens as they were popularly know, ....':1$ Vera L;lUghron Mathews, daughter of a weU·known naval historian and OnCe a sutTragette who had campaigned for votes for wOllwn. She brought a great deal of administrati\'t· experience and dynamism 10 the role, and her frequent visits to na\';ll bases earned her the nickname of'Tugboat Annie' Under her was Angela Goodenough, the Oaughtl'"r of an Indian Army officer. who was 'so calm and steadfast, so tireless' in the ex«urion of her duties." By lale 1939 there were fi\-e Superintendents, one each for Chatham, Portsmouth, De...onport and Rosylh, and one for the officers' training course, There were nine chief officers, 26 first officers and 191 second officers. Nearly half of them, mostly ill the I/Iore junior ranks, were the wi\"t'S, \vidows or daughters of naval officers. Churchill \\oeleomed this 'both as the evidence of the wish of these ladies to serve the State in the capacity which it seems natural for tht'Jll to adopt, and beaUS(' there is undoubted advantage to be gained to Ihe Service from the especial ease with which they can assimilat~ its requirements'." But the WRNS would have to brQ;lden its base enormously in the course of the \var.
Recruitment and Training Women up to 30 were liable for conscription by 1942, but the WRNS was able to attract enough \'Olumee-rs to fill its ranks - though of course some of thl'"m ~vlumeered to avoid conscription. Many joint'd because of poners bearing thl' slogan 'Free a man for the fleet". If accepted, they were ghoen ('\\'0 weeks' intensive training. At first this was done in se\-cral cemres around the COUnlry, which \vas suilable for the early phase of'immobile'Wrens who cominued to livt' at home. Later it \vas centralised at Hampstead and Mill Hill in London, and in a Victorian castle near Glasgow During training the women wore an unattractive dl't"SS known as 'bluettt'S', apparently dt'Signed to 'make you pack in the whole daft idea and go home before }'Onr probarionary fortnight was o\,l;'f' ... The bas;l' training in I/lr rrnlral dqxm U\lS rxtrmrrly ill/msill(', p«krd as II U\1S imo II pUlly /II" lI'«ks, ..1r;(11 IlW r.wmded ro IllrH 1l11erl Jlrrss.." UUf INS
Demetrius INS Jlll'lty grim. 'nrt' sl4f 11't'1l' uiu alld Ille l'OJlrit' fJOI 100 bIld; bw lire whole stt.,,1' IIUS 50 like a mild jorm ofrOlJwrtmtimr tIlml' thaI il gol one d.... I~I. /r Ilwn'r Ilelped "r rhi r;'(lrtII1r told - J I dt'g11'fjfalHrnlrrit offtojl erne lIIomirlg ... 17,e ro..rse IllSlt'd six wrt'kJ - IU'C ..wks 100 lotlg, ill my 0Jliuion; we lllt"l' "II Slalt' by tire end t>Jllle monrlr.'"
f...e the pa..al;lO
'0 .he Belgian port of An....erp.
Below,Vera Laugh.on Mathew:<
After the initial burst ofsenior appoinmlCnts, officers \~oere selected from the ranks, e:
in.pee•• W ...n chief. and pe.ty offiee.. in the Royal Naval
Bunek< at Oevonporl in 1942.
155
Officers and Ratings
entr:oIIlce the ROSPOI~ "DiR"ClQr Wn.'I15" would cau$(' Ihl' gn.·at wroughtiron Anson g:It<."S to iwing back, and in we wuuld i\Veep P3.'lt the eh:lSte cOUJU and classic columns'.'0;1 l3ut things wt':re far more squalid for th<" IT:linl'l-OS, lospcrially during the rocket attaclG on wndon in 1944.
.. .Illl' Ilad 10 sl"p 011 II,l' Srolllrdjloor of Ihe Nllrses Home Oil palliassts, ll~li(/, Iwd reI No will'll up ill IJ.r lifr 10 11,1" 'op flool, "~'rrr ll.'{" "ad "ur ("/ri,,s, as II,is was Ill/" rim/" "j II,l' Buzz 00111'" lift, to say II,l' leasl, 'IUS so"'l'u~lIll dismrbtd. Itt hlld 1<1 tllke aill/(d Hall sa IJ,"C Ihft'(: lIoert IIfV('T too ma"y /)('(Jplr i" II'l'rr al (J"l' lime, mid if II,/"Tt IIUS m, 'immedialt' aim', "lillie srl'll'lmis dfp
Uniform and Ranks The Firsl World War uniform with the sailor's eollar W3.'l rejeeted for the new Wrcl1$, who adopt.,d a version of the 'fore alia aft rig' with collar and tk and skirt instead of trousers. The first ratings hat was of floppy 'pudding b3.'lin' shape, but it W:lS replaced by a \'I:rsion of the sailor's cap which proved more popular. The officer's and peny officer's cap \\'25 insuntly successful. 'Ii suited nearly everyone I ever s.aw in it', wrote Angela Mack.'" There \\'25 some at'bate about thc SUtus ofWRN$ offin'rs.They wcn: givcn Iigh[ blue stripes and r:lIIlG1ike firsl, second and third officer, which WI"Tl' d05l'r to th05l' of the Men:hanl thJn the Roy.tI Navy, with J diamond rather dum a curl above. As the ranlG cvcntually C'\'01\1.XI, the director had the broJd and narrow nript."S of a n:ar admiral. J ~uJX"rintendent had the four ~lTipel of J capuin. a chiefofficer h:rd three. a first officer had the '[\VQ and a haIr ofa lieutenant-eonunander,a second officer had rwu Jnd a third officer had one. The r:atings of chief wren, petcy officer :rnd leJding wren were established quite early. Wrel1$ were divided imo 'mobile' and 'immobile', The former,like other members of the armed servieC$, could be drafted anywhere, :rhhough nOt overseas in the early yeats,The immobiles were recruited locally in the vicinity of nav:ll bases and st:ltions Jnd would continue to be employed then:. They were oftell of high social class, like one driver of a utility vehicle, -n,l' Tilly dril'fT looled ilfJpalil'lllly. /1 1l\1S
Lady R"'ln AlrSamgt', ill " /rurry II)
,err /NJlk '"jcrry Nal'
Status The Jcronym 'WI1.NS' was a fortunate choiee in 1917, alld it W:lS soon translated into Wrens, In 1939 a civil servant first suggested that it might also be used :IS a r:ating title. producing 'Wren'. 'Leading Wren' and eventually 'ChiefWn'n': It was a far suung<:r litle than tht, army's ATS or
Auxiliary Territorial Serviccs. which \\'25 I.veak and meauingless: or the even RAF's Women's AuxiliJry Air Force. or WAAFs, In £:ret the Wrens scor<"d over the army in several \\'Jys. The khaki ATS uniform was unatlT:lctive and the service had a reputation for atlT:lcting undesirable women, while the army's pn.':Suge was low for most of the I.v:lr in any ease. In contraSt. the Wrens had quite a high SI'C\"er, Wrens \\"ere riot always welcomed. Some considered that the idea of women in uuiform \\'25 a tra\'t"5ty, Otlwn found dIat Ihey adopted snobbish attitudes. hO\\'C\'er humble their backgrounm - they were 'officers' girls' who paid little attention to the ratings who were nominally their peers. At first the Wrens came undt'r the Civil ESlablishments Branch of the Admiralty, implying that they were civil serv:mlS in uniform rather than members of the services.This lvas reclified in 1941 when officers werc tntl\5fern:d to tht, CW Bnmch and ralings to the Naval Branch. At first the authority of their officers and petty officers over naval personnd \v:lS queslioned. but in 1942 it \v:lS estJblished by an Admiralty Flt'et Order. DUI disobc.'dience to a Wren p'-"tty officer by a mJle rating would be considered only as 'an act prejudicial to good order and nav:ll discipline' rather than a more serious offence. Wrens \\'ere paid less than men, even if they replaced them in the sallie job. as was comlllon in civil life at the time. Ven Laughton Mathews acc,-"pted thi~ reluctantly on Ihe grounds that women were not liable for the hardshipi of sea lCrvice. In general a woman earned about [\\'0 thirds of a man's pay, though there \\"ere many anomalies in Ihe nav:ll service. On nal.-al bases, the culture of Ihe age and the
WRNS officers under
I .... ining
at
GrHnwieh, being drilled by a Royal Marine inSlruclor.
156
Churchill's Navy
....
Ab(>... ~:WRNS offiun' rank
Oppo.i.~, A W~n
visual signaller with the FIe"" Air A,", in s"odand, using ..
signalling lamp.
--
CHIEf OffiCER
HAT INSIGNIA
llo:'l .... U1h tor MediI:aIllIlicefS
explosi~ rnixtull' of many young women away from homo: for ,h.. firs, rime with $
service',"" BUI it was also found that Wrens' quarl"rs owrsC
Clerical and Administration By the J930s office work was already accepted as suitable for women, prefer:lbly uJlllurried, and it \vas one of the fir.;t rolC$ of lhl," Wl"l,"ns on
foundation, By lh\.' end of 1941 there were 1445 shorthand typisu in the ~rvke, 1210 supply Jssistants, 1372 general writers and 1184 who specialised in pay'" There were women who worked all day in <:orre<:ting charts or 'Kings Re~..ubtioru', and in nuny other arcJne na\l:ll mailers. As offi<:ers, women also took on many mol'\.' tasks, Audrey O\.'a<:on was S<.'<:retary Plymouth Command,
10
th\.' Illaintenance captain of the
III limes WI' seemed /0 flu/fricm almosr as a Cili;:ms IIdvi« BUTf'au Tf'npiellts of allY Iype of prOOll'm, 'I1re SlIbjms dl'all ll';l!r al diffrrerll IIIIII'S jllduded rolls"llali,,,, ,,';,1, CNJ",.lml'"rs of IIII' Cily Cmmri/, diwmiotls ll';lh
YMCII aud 7('1: H {a sewi«s we!!art' otgallisariolr{, ar.all,J;i1tJ; for Dockyard Dqra'/IIll'lrts 10 dealll';II, difeas (l' d!ffi(JIllits ilJ "'1uisilill/,ed pmtJists, IIrlpiug Il,e flruo/y.,miwd Polislr """,I '!ffi(ffl I" s"rr 0111 ,m I7lOmlOl<S "mxe of problems, exploriug possible ways of mmorylagilrg lire rllilla.day spoil.lleal's 1I0n!r oflhe riry (llo/,i(1r ar ollerilllf 1lI1'''' I1'Ollg11l ItJ IN Ilflpillg Genuatr bombers 10 piIlJlo;,,, Il,e posirioll of Ply",o",I,) .. '01
Don1estic Duties By lhe l,"nd of 194 I lherl' were 4517 stewuds in the WrelU, and 2437 cooks. Wren cooks and stcwards had TO I,',ork in a great variel)' of kitchelU ashore, from gr:and requisitioned hotels to lhe NiSSl"n huts of training camps.
SECOND OFfICER
Ranl<$ witl'llJeu{ftlanl
Ihal t'I'I"yolll' wok a /lim al ro'/glr 11'(1'1.', Ilrey IIIl're ;Zrowirr& im,' e,wel/em aud (art'flllllal'd/llousekrepers. nO As for medical work, much of that was alre
Signa11ing and Comtnunication Women were accepted for signalling dutil'S quitl," l,"arly on and a few were rated as chief petl)' officer with the Shore Wirel= Service. It proved popular despite Ihe obvious discomfo.ts of visUJI Signalling al all hours Jnd in all wealhers. One candicbtt, dl"SCribcs her [raining by all a!;ed RN chief petl)' officer. lIt Iroisred I/r~ IlIle",aliollal flags, Wt' It'aml 1t~IlJI '" I""k up ill lilt' Cm!fidemial Books, ll~ llfft' imTPdl/«d 10 BR619, I/r~ Pmdam Usr, 1I~'lrh ill/mid N "". Whie, lire FSB (Reel Sig"a/.s Book) alld IIII' AIISn (lI,t~jJiro IIppnldix, and lire IIlamr Sigrlll/1ahie, alld Ihe Smo. Sysl~fIJ for Ainr,y;, at,d ll,uh"n'ug afld Jrarlllmr sigua!s, aud (alapll/lillg Illrd aliglrliug sig"alsfo. airrmfi rarrirrs, ami mt'SS'W pmsigrlS, ""d I/rl' abbm,j
Wrens wc.e JIm used JS dispatch riders, which \\l:lS not an easy job in the days of total blackoul and before lhl' building of thl" 1ll0torWays, They took parr, for exampk in thl' planning for the Dicppe raid of 1942, The Qrrlrrs had '" be rakl7l by dispalrl, Ridffl as fIW
Recruiting and Training Duties 11re Willr!,.Kupiug sysrl'm j" rooks 'md slell'(lrds rmun'd Ihri. >!etrillg a good 1<mg spell off dllfy al /ef'''elll IMd bUll ro falll("<$ ullOols, mOSI I,ad lIel'fr Sel'fl " p"'al,' Or a cabbage i" IIII' .,11" bej"e IllI'y j"i"rd lire se",irl'; flOII', mllfer a syslem w/r,el, lIIade If
[n 1941 lhe fir.;l Wren r\.'l:ruiting assistants were appoimed. They were women with J [eJching or social work b;tckground who we.e gh'en th.. rat.. of pelty officer and replaced the mature chief Pl'tl)' offiCl'rs who illlervil'\wd nJval candidates and assessed their suilJbi1ity - after that, a young man's first COJ1[;tC( wnh the na\)' was lih"ly ro h.. wirh a Wr"J1. Sir Clements Ma.kham of the AdmiralI)' was al fir.;t sceptical aboul lhem. unnl hl' underwent a mock imcrview: 'My fears Jre completely Jt rest. [ feel that J could tell my lif.. slOry several tillll"S a day to Mrs O'Brian'.'" Thl"re was plenty of work for Wrens in the rrainmg bJ.Sl'S of lhe navy. Thc'y opt'rated cinema projectors and simubtors such as the dom..
obj«tion to the term ':;earnan torpedOIll
Wrens at Sea In 1943 Ihe qucstion of :;ending Wrens to sea for long periods was considered, but the din:ctor poimed OUt that il \\uuld be impossible to employ mixed crews. Warships were already grossly overcrowded, and it would be impossible 10 find extra space to :;egregate \\Ulm'n. Nor was it possible to m;m warships with entin:ly female cn:ws, due 10 Iheir lack of I'xperiencl"" [t was, however possible to employ women in harbour cnft which did 1I0t fI.'quire th.'m to go illto action, or to ~lXnd the night on board on a n:gul.ar b:lsis, The firsl ones wen: trained in OClober 1941 and it soon proved highly popular, despitl' thl' hazards of uking a party of ratings baek to their ship :lfler a run ashore. Women also :;en.,-,d as signallers in the great Atlantic liners which were now openting as Iroopships.Angela Mack joined the Malfrrttlllia. I'lld alrl'lldy worked Olfl Olfr roM ".fdUly and she look me a/otiS la Olfr 'c1fi((', II rillY nafT(llV (abi" fiued o,4/ wilh a ,VPtki'lg MlCh, IllV SU;lrg sealS alld lliorkab/e C
Wrens wen: originally recruited for homc service, and the first attcmpt 10 send them o\-erseas ended in disallter in August 1941, when the troopship Aguila wa~ torpedoed on the way to Gibnltar and a party of 22 was Ion. By the end of the yen numbers abroad wen: still quite small: 30 in the F:lr EaSt. 25 at Gibraltar, 36 officers and 18 ratings in W
The Experience The Women's Royal Na\':I1 Service W:lS a highly successful org;;misation. As early
questioned about their compctence.'''Thcy const:lndy demanded more and 1Il0re Wrens for the rest of the war. Some women, such as uPlXr-dass immobile Wrens. were carl)'ing om f:lr morc meni:ll duties th:ln they were used to, but they tended to do it with great style. Others may haw exchanged one form of drudgery for another, perh
",..,..king On .he
ploning ,able of W"st"m App......ehes
hndquar,en in W-erpool.
PART VII
The Battle Fleet 1 Ships of the Battle Fleet HMS DrradllOJlgllt, the first modern battleship, was conceived by Admiral Sir John Fisher ;md bUllched in 1906. She had an all-big gun armamem 10 fire effective sah-oes at long nngt', a second:lry armament for protection apinSI torpedo bo.1t .1nack, good :lrlllQUr protection :md high speed provided by turbine engines. ThIS Il'lluincd the concept of the battleship over the next 40 )"(:,U5, though wuh J1U.ny changes. There was a npid incrc~ in the size of the num guns. (mm the 12-inch ofthe Drelldrroughllo th(' 13.5-m(h of the 01'1011 class of the 1909 prognnunc :md the 15-im;:h for the: superb Quun EliZI1Mth dass ordered In 1912. After a pp. thl' British adopu~d the 16-inch gun for the j....c/sfm and Rodnq in the' 192OJ. With (.rer beget ships and f'Wuccd defence spendmg, there y,~
If Ill' n:build Ihf ballltj/«1
a"d sl'f"d ma"y lIIi11i",1S doing so, aud flrtll Imr our balllfShips art I1lpirlly dtS'royrd by ai,
(OlllfS Illid Illf aimlf" art n:~llI.
'""'If)'
E\"en III $t'ptembcr 19~I, the Iuttleslllp w;as sriII iUn;as me leading clement of IU\-al powrr. Whtn Chun::hill addn:$scd we crew of we nt'w a.ttitr Indomuabk. ht' 'spoke of me nun of war and hIS Wlfe. or l"~etheatt, me .utcr.ln a.JTler, who ~ our to find his dimlf'r fot him and 5Omc':~ cooks it and Ius il done to a turn K1 Uut the nun of wlIr may cat it'.' Such \'iew'S did nor sul'vl\~ we sinking of me Prirt« tfll~/l:f:md RqmlM by me J~p~nesc rhltt months later, folla....'t'd by the great carntr hattie:! bctwttn the Amtricam and the Japanese III we Paci6c in the follO"''ing }~ar.
The Older Battleships Apul 110m tht aged ~nd disarmed /rotl Dullr and ern,,,rion, the oldt'St bmlC$hips in the fle~·1 well," th{" five ships of the QJIfflI Eliza~11r dm, Iaunchl."d in 1913-1~. The brgest and mosl p<m'Cmlllnulcships of the
Oppotoite:Th.. banlMWp If"' ..p1~ at Gibrsllar, in abo"l 1938,
with d
tl'O)'. . n
alonpid .
162
Churchill's Navy
10 th.., superSlrucmfC. The nl'\\' slups had {;lIt anb'"Ular bridl,'e stfUctum and single, straight funnels, with Ihe S(condary arm,1111elJ{ on either side. Thl;' had almost till" speed of the Quem EIi"alJell'f, with in-buill IOrpedo proteeUon, slightly heavier and ocuer-(k-signl'd armour, and a heavier broadside, They wefC known 10 the lower deck as 'the ugly siste!>' or 'th.. pair of boots', while the officers called them 'the cherry tn'l~'
- cut down by Washilll,'1on. The dl"$ign was nOI repealed whe" battleship construction W:lS TI.'Sum.'d in 1936, bllt Ihl,· proved dreeli,"e ships with the Hom.' Flee!. Force H and in the invasion of Normandy.
, .'
Battlecruisers
-.1.-
_.
• sunk by U·47. The n.OSt of the class SI.'rwd with th", HOIl1\" and Eastern Fleets. but were reduced to reserve or lr.lining ships ncar the
\V3S
end of the war, as the enemy tlm:3! ,-"dllced.
The R"dllry and :'\'rls<>lI, laund1l'd in 1925. "WI.' tl1l' only Dritish bMdcships built tr1 thc 1')205. and were odd ships by any SI:llldards. At the end of the First World \Var the Adl1lir.llty was planning giam baulccruiscrs of ..8.000 IOns. Tht" Washington Treaty irnJ>Qsl'd a ll1aXll11um 0(35,000 tons. m the (WO new ships were em clown in size' and dcsib'11Cd {O S3\~ weight as much :b pos-ible. TIll.-y adopled the 16inch gun for the tint tilll\", and pUI them in Ihrn' [ripk lUrrc(S inlte'ad offour {win ones.This mCTCased broadside weight fmm 15.360 pounds as in [he Q""" E/;;,aiN'l/, dass. to 18,432 pounds. The three turrets Wl're conn'nu"lll(,d forward of till' ..,ngllll~ and supl'r;tructuR" with thl' third one al a lower kvel than the SC'cond one so that it could nm fin' ahead. Nor could the guns b.. fired tOO far af!. witholll serious damage
Only three batdecruisers remained with the Royal Navy in 1939.Th.Rrpuur and Rmou1l Iud bl'ell begun early in the First World War, with the rcmrn of Fisher to the Admiralty and a \'J:II"C ofeuphoria about the early success of the banlecruiscrs in eliminating a German COn1l11l'rcer.liding force at the Falklands lrl 1914.They were gken 15-inch gUIl$ to !Ilatch the Qr.,,,, Eliza/)NIIS, bm by the time they were ready in 1916 the concept had been discredited at Judand. They had a good deal of recOnsttlJClion between till' wars and it was hoped that a spel.'(! of 30 knots would allow them to be used :l..S ("SCorts for Casl carriers. But Repulse was Slink by Japan<'Se bombers in December 1941. The Hood was designed just before Jutland but her construction WliS suspended while th" l<'Ssons of the batde were considered. However, plans to increaSl' Ill"f dtck and mab'\lzine armour Wl're never fully carried OUt. When she was COlllmissioned in !920 she W:l..S the largl."St warship in the world. with eigllt IS-inch guns to match any vessel afloat, and a spl"l'd of 31 knOIS. SI1<' was a handsome ship, the pride of the navy, and in 1923--1 she look the Princl' ofWak"S on a world cruise during which Ihe ship tr.lvelle
The Ki"g George V Class In 1936 Britain resumed construclion of battleships as the treaty limitations w('n' about to .'xpir<" but the Adlllir;llty jumped the wrong Wlly. Since thc' 1935 lreaty limiled the size of big guns, they embarked on {he de-sign of ships to carry twelve 14-inch guns in quadruple turn'lS. TIl<' m'w ships had many positi\"(, features including good armour protection and thl' high spl'cd (for a battleship) of 28 knots. but the US ilwoked all e-scape clause in Ihe treaty and Ihe Germans wc'm for 15-inch guns, the A'llericans for 16-illch and lhe J~l'anrse for HI-inch. Furthc'rmore, two of thl' Brilish ships' b'"Ul1S had to Ix: kft OUI because of subility problems, and the full broadside was weakened. Churchill was well aW,lTe of the faults of the King George lis. 1-1" was out of offin' in 1937 but he re111l'mbcn::d how he had lx'l'n illStrUtlltll{;l1 in increasing the calibre to 15 inches a quarrer of a century earlier .and had a long corn."<pondence with Ihe First Lon! of the Admiralty over it. His C011Cern \\I:lS rwived in AUb'"USt 1941 when Ill" crossed til(" Atlantic in the second ship of the cbss, the Prin(t
The Battle Fleet
TIw ",,,,ri,\~ if rlw 5Im,r"rt' I/y Ilrr pWl'i5;Oll iflllr arllldmrllr
fi', Illr sakr ".! ilmillg a ((mpk 4/011' qlld/ily airrr.ifr, rlrr u1lo/r pn'uriplr of rilr rir,ldil S" "'ill r.wlIIJllfJitd ill rili Nrls,m ,md RMlJiy Ims WII (i/Sl asidr.· The scr-::ws overhpp"d Jud cJused vibr.ltion. which nude the Jfler pJrl of the ship uninh,k in Decl·mber. Jnd was held up by b:Id \\"erk WJS prc:scnt Jt thc JJpJnc:sc surrender in Tokyo Ihy in 1945,
TIl<' crui:)(:r w~s suff"ring sonu:thitlg of In id"mity cnsis by 1939. It was redundant JS J scout for a baltic flcet, which no longer existed in ils old form, Jnd g.:neral reconnJiss,,111C.. W3S beller don.. by Jircrafl (Jlthough th,' NoifoJ/k Jnd Sliffo/k did wdl in finding tilt· Bismarck in 1941).The £WIIT, AcltiJIl's and Ajax gaincd e\-crbsting f3me by hunting down the Cmf SI'f'f' in 1939. but in g..neral th.. th .....Jt 10 cornrn..rce ca'I1C from til(' U-wJt, and cmiSl'rs w,'n' tOO la!},"C. cxpcnsivc and tlnlllanocu\'nble to pby J mJjor role in hunting Ihcm. Crttisers no longer heJded flotillJs of destroyers. having been sup..rsc
They took on a new role in Jnli-aircraft ddenc!'. and like battkoships Ihl'}' pron:d useful in short· bombJrdmcnr. Then' w.::re S<.·\·... ral projl'Cts for n,'w d,osigns ofcruisers during the W:lr,
and consrruction st
&.,,,,,,,1,,
were beb'llll and compk!Cd during thc WJr, Jlong wilh half J dozcn of the Did" class. This contrasts with fleet de:slloyers which \\Trt" cheaper. fasl<:r to build and JlmOSt as \'CTSatile - a dozcn tlotilla:> ofeight ships l'Jeh wen.· begun and finished. Jnd scn:nl more flotillas W1:n:: under constnlction when the W:lr ellded.As a result. all the cruisers in the navy \\T..... of pre-war d.:sign Jnd suffercU from the fJults of pre-war policy. More Ihan
163
O"posil":
U.iti.h
"."ilal .hip d ....,•. I. The hl"'~liM.
of fh·., ohi,," of th., R..,..I s.-m". or R d.u. On.,
..,fit ea,ly in 1941. juOf before her 10... 5. TI,e NdMHo in 1945 .ft.,.... ...,61 in .he United Siales.
Cruisers The cruiser had been important to th.. ROY'll NJvy in the y..Jrs of pekI·d for 70 cruisers but ll<'\"l.·r h~d mon° thJn 50, Inter-war cruiser dL"Sign O$Cilb1l"d belwcen thc desire to build the Ja~t and heaviesl armed ships poillble to mcct simibr enemy cruisers. and the neL-d for thc largc:;;l numlx'rs, which implicd SIllJller ships. Thc heJvy cruiser, wilh S-inclt b'llll.'i. hJd !>«'n specifically crcJted by the Washington Treaty in response to the Ikitish RJlltig/1 class with 7.5-inch b'llns. The large ships were the three-fnnnelled Kml, Lmdo" Jnd N<Jtjrolk c1ass'''S with four twin 8-ineh l,'1llt tuTTCts, followed by Ihe slightly snuller \crk class with three turrets,AfteT lito'l lhe British began 10 favour smaller ships IIIJt could be dispersed rollnd Ihc oceans, Jnd no Iltore 8-inch ships wen' built afler till' £'(/.'/,1 of the Y.>rk class was complell'd in 1931. In thCQry the cruiser was the most flexible of W;Irships, It had gun powL'r inferior only tO.1 battleship, long r.l11g... and WolS JlmOSI as f:Ist JS J d,"Stroy,·r. It hJd J good anti-aircl"llft Jrmament and often carried an Jircnfl or two of ilS own. It hJd J dct:lchment of Royal MJrincs for shon' operalions. Jnd torpedoes. The only gap was .1 Jack of antisubma,inc armalllcnt, for il was fast Jnd mobilc "l1ough to "vadc any known subnurinl"S. Some crui.rers wcre filled with AscIic :Ind dcpth charges for .self-defence, This flexibility was attractive in peacetime, but WJS perhaps Icss valllable in \var, whcn a cheap ship designed lightly round a particular task oflt'n prowd the mQjt useful.
6, Th., HIII
The Older Cruisers St'vcral classes of cruiser sum\"t-d from the rim... of the Firsl World War. These included 13 of Ihe C class ofjusl Oller 4000 tons and a relati\-cly light armament of five 6-inch guns, as well as eight ships of Ihe slighdy hq,'Ct D class and tWO of the E class. much bibb"Cr at Jround 7500 tons and with seven l,'1JllS, The four 'improved /:Iinlli/lgltdllls' or RJlltiglr class, ,I,<,rc ofn...arl)' 10,000 lOllS and hJd 7.5-inch guns.Thc old cruisers had mostly bt'Cn built for 5ClVic... wilh the lll't'f in the North Sea nther than
of.he!
Kinl Gu'l" V cI.....
in 1945 with uln anti-aircnfl a.n,arn.,n' ... dd.,d.
Below: Th., H ....or of •...,
KinlG~V
dau in 1942,
thdr arrmmem was not
Six-Inch Cruisers llriuin had already b{"b'1.ln thl' d<'sib'!l of a smaller cbss of cruiser. thl: un"dl'1 class ofth{" 1929 and 1930 programmes, ofjuSt O\'cr 7000 rons, wilh "ight 6-inch gull$ in twin turret<.Thl'}' had single funnels which were unusual for cruisers and fooled the capuin of th,' Cr4 Sp« 11110 klic\'ing h{" was king attackt"d by destroyers in 1939. Eight of thc<e were built, fol1ow"d by four more: of till' Arrlllllw class.•imilar but with rearranged machin{"ry and two lall. thin funnels. In 1933 BTltalll was compelled to mow to brg{"r 6-inch gun ship< 10 coutller silllilar dC'<1:lopmenl$ in the USA and Japan. The 5<"ulll1l/1J1"'" and N"""Mlle had the fina tripk 6-inch turren to gl<'e a to{al of 12 mam guns. The)' Tl:\'{"T{e
secondary armalllen[S of the Ki,rg Georg<' II class battleships had priority. Some of thc' Dirlt1S had one t\lrret ormulxl and replaced with a 4-inch gun. while the Stylla and Cltdrybdis had 4.5-inch guns in all turre~. The cruisers worked hard during the war and suffered heavy losses. T\\'Cmy-nrne wc'n' sunk, includmg n:PTl.oscntati\'los of c\'Cry class c'xn'pt the Ltmd""s. Two of the four Arrl/11IS
Destroyers The dcstroyer of 1939-45 \\'as dIe lllost flexible of w:arships.and took pan in almost e<'l'ry asp<:.'C1 of lla\'al wartaTl.·. The America.n obso:rvcr Joseph Wellings observed in 1941 that destrO',-ers were 'al"'.....y:s 011 th{" go'." A battleship ran:ly sailoo without three or four destroyt"TS as ~Ort, An alTCr.tfi: carrier also needed a destTO)'Cr close behind. to TC$CU{" aircrew fJom pbnl'S that ditched in the w:att'f_ At Narvik in 1940, deslTO)'CTS and the bmk'Ship lI\1~Jlilr providl·d die only British succn:s of the Norwcgian campaign. At Dunkirk. 39 dt..ostmyers TC$CU{"d almost:a third of till' Allied tlOOPS tlkell off. Four dCSltU)'CT5 took part in a command raid on thl' Norwegian island offiag:;o in 1941. Tlu.'}' could form part of a COll\'Q)' ~ort. and their speed allow{"d them to come 10 the n:selle of:a bdeab'l,ered convoy. Thl·y carried Asdic :and depth ch:argt"S. and w,'re fitted for llliuloswwplllg. though II was difficult 10 do Ihat at dl-"
rakl: parr.
The A to I Classes The Dido Class The Did" clm was concdved in 1936 as a Slllall. {"hl'ap cruiser on a hull derived from the Arrtlrusa class. to SeT\'\' as flagship of the Tl"ar-admiral in charg<' of til(,' dl~tTO)'l:r< of a main fll:et. Anti-aircraft armamcnt wa~ already a priority. and this was boost"d by th,' adoption of the 5.25-inch gun. which could ser\'e l"qually wdl in the anli-alrcraft and al1l1.shlp role. It was planned to fit fi\'e twin turre[S. three of thcm superimposed forward of the bridb,<:.The class pTO\'ed succlossful m tlu: ami-am:raft rull' and 16 of them wcre bUilt. mcludmg five of the variam Bdl"'ta class. They weTC the only cruisers in produclion during the war. aparl from a few Fijis which had btoen ordered before hostilitks kgan. How{'wr. there wen: problcms with thl" supply of the 5.25-l11ch b'\ltJ. and the
With hundreds of ships Idi o\\'r fJom the First World War. the Adtll1r:tlry did not look at d<-'St~'1'r dc<;ign again until 1924. TIle leading dest~'Cr build,'rs were in\'itl:d to submit dl'Signs for an ltlll't'Q\'Cd W type. and thOS(' submitted by Thornycrofi: and Yarrow \\'Cre sueccs.sfitl. BOlh \\'CTC launched early in 1926. The Thomycmft ship. the Am
The ".ui..,.
had a standard displacemcnt of 1854 tOllS. 27 per ccm more than the G. H and I classes. alrhough rhey u~d a similar hull design. Their hOl'$<:powcr was increased ro 44,000 giving a speed of 36 knots. Torpedo armament was less of a priority and only a s1l1gl<' quadruple S!.·t of tubes was installcd. Gun power was far more imporunr and rhey had eight 4.7inch guns in four twin turret>. hydraulically op...ratt'd. Anri-airerafr armalllem was not much improved. although then' was a quadruple 2~pounder pom-pom. The new ships ....-ere known as rhe Tribal cUss and 16 of them were built for the Royal Nal')' plus three for rhe Australians and Clghl for the Royal Canadian Navy. They were rhe IlIOSl modern desrroyers in service in 1939, and had rhe heaviest gun armamelll. They \\we often selecled for special tasks. for exampl<- when til<' Oml(k mtercepled rhe Cr4 Spec's supply ship AI/mam in Norwegian W:lleTS early in 1940. On being posted in 1940. Ludovic Ktnntdy WTOlt: Top: The lafoul
of a
& .. I~~"'p",,,
dan crui,e•.
AIHl"e,The ClHlri"lrotl, Ihe firsl of Ibe inter-
war dest.."..,. lud"r., .Iighdy larger Ihan Ihe A duo buill ~I th" "me lime. She
wa, lunched in 1929 and .unk in 1940.
quanerdcrk along half the It'nb'1h. Their 34.000 horsc:power engirK"s gave a speed of 35 knots. They had tWO raked fimncls. Great emphasIS was plan:d on torpedo armament. despite failures at Jutland, and th"')' C1rried two set'! of quadruplt, torpedo tulx.'S amidships. Each ship Iud tWO 2-pounder guns as anti-aircraft armament. As well as eIght ships to form a full flotilla.lhe Adlllir.llty ordered a slightly la'b'Crleader. the G>Jri,rgIOll of 1540 lOllS. carrying an ex!r.l b'lln amidships. This process would be repeated annually for the next 10 yea.TS. Eaeh year a flotilla was ordered wilh names bq;inlling with successive leiters of the alplubct. with a leader IUllKod afi('r a famous admiral. Clunb't'S Wl.'n,' introduced gradually.The C class of 1929 had a single 3-ineh HA b'lln :md had a more sophisticated directOr tower. The E class of 1931 had facilities for minelaying and tWO quadrupll.' ,5.inch nuchilW I,.... IIIS as the antiaircraft arnument.The CllJlm\mll of the 1933 order experimented with Tv>'Q quintuple torpedo tubes, and that became sundard widl the I class of 1935. Meanwhik. the H class of 1934 imroducl.-d amon,' >treallllitl<'d bridge strucnlre. The A to J cl:lS.Sl.'S were quite dfectivl.' ships. but bckl'd anti-aircraft al"11ument, as their 4.7-inch guns could only bc c1("\,':ltl.'d to 40 dl'grn'S. TIl<' dl.'Sign had changl-d wry ,lowly sille<.' rhe VWs of 1918. and by rhe mid 1930s British dl....rroyl.·rs wen' hr.'ginning to fall belllnd those built by Glher powers.
The Tribals In 1934 tl1I.' Admiralty beb'3n to conl' FtlbHki class wirh SIX 5-inch guns lt1 rW11l turrets. The new Urlllsh class
Im//tcdiaf( ill'll/irks m~oIlcd 11101/ 1111." Tartar U\IS Olll' of IIII' jamous Tribal rlass deSIRlj'i'T$, l""'I'II'Ir,f a ~ar MjMI' IIII' tl'
The
J, K, Land M classes
After Ihe Triools rhere was a tllOI.'e 10\\':lrds a Snl.1llcr and SImpler desrroYI:r. The ships of the 1936 prog..nmnc were fitred wirh r\\'Q boilers instead of three with horsepower reduced to 40,000 and speed to 36 knots. The J cbss \\':lS rhe first 111 the rv.ennerh eennlry to have a single funnel. and the firsl wirh longitudinal framing. despite rhe pTOtl'SU of Cl)'de shipbuilders. The)' reimrucluced the cight-torpt.'do armarnenr. bur had only Ihree Instead of four twin-gun mounrings. The Ik'SigJl was repeated ill rhe K and N classes ordered in 1937 and 1939, wuh eIght shtps Ix'ing bUIlt ofeach. Sol111' were fim'd a> kadl'TS but Iht'), ....'ere nOI sigmfieamly larger or beller armed than the others. The Js and Ks were sent to rhe Medirerranean in 1940-1 and sutli:-rcd htavy losscs. including Mou11lbaul'Il's famous Kflly of 1938. On"rall tlJ<' Js and Ks suffered almost as heavily as rhe Tribals - 12 out of 16 were lost. The Land M classes ofrhe 1937-9 programmcs were based on the Js but wilh more beam.Ix'cauS!.' rhey \\'I.'rl' ro carry their main guns in fully enclosed mounrings insread of hemg ml.'rely prorectt'd by sluelds,
167
The Battle Fleet
This "'as fu molt.' effiCIent but mcre.lS<'d the weight. The guns could ele\':Ite to 50 degrees. aldlOub.... this "~ Still not enough fo~ a ~nsfilctor)' ann·alrcraft role.The eight Ls ser.'l,.'<1 wllh Force H and the MWllernnean Flttt. the Ms wllh the Home Aect unril I~-'.
The Enwrgency War ProgralTIITIes The First Emergenc)' floulb of eight d~ro,..ers w~ orderd the and it was somelimcs impossible 10 reliC\'C !Ill: officer of lhc "':Ilch due 10 he..vy seas. Tile R ebss placed them under the bndge strucwre,Ann-alfCf;lft Ulllalllent "':IS Irtcre..scd. pardy by using the 201l1tll Oerlikon b"l",.The Qs had six ofthem.lhe Ts had 10 and the U class h..d .. twin 40mm Bofors mount. NmelYsix ships were bUilt to the Ioarne b.aslc design.
Destroyers for the Pacific Me..nwhllc lhe IUvy "<;IS ..warc !lLlI the W:l~ in the ""eifie would denund brgrr ships Wilh lon",'e~ t:lnb'e and bc-uer ..nti-.. i~naft ..rnl.Ollttl'nt. The O.. ttk cWs of cite 19..2 PIOb'T:lItUlll: W:lS .. bre..k !Tom prevIOUS dcslgns. Each ship "':IS 10 COlrty tWill ".5-inch guns in t\\'O tu~n:ts forward, .....jth ..n dC\"Jtion of80 degrees 10 nuke them effC'Cri,..:- ro~ both ..nti-aircraft :Uld lUlU-slup .....ork. At more than 2300 tom they ....l:n: cort.'lldcrabl)' brgr:~ C\1:n dun theTntuJs. Three Dottllas were ordered bul only five slups "'Cre in .service when the war ".jth 'pp;1Il ended. Othe~ d~gtl:s mclud~-d lhe We..pon class. SttWJe~ than the )hIdes and Intcndcd 10 US(' the sho"e~ shpwa)'s m some )<;Irds; ..nd the D.Jrings of 19-'4. highly SOphlStlC:lled '1:s.sds with ..II-welded construction. .. ulOIlUli(: Jo;;ading of guns ..nd the Latest uchymetrlc syste'm of "IIU· "lI\:raft dJ.reCIJOII. They ......:-n: too Late fo~ the ""Jr but formed ..n Imporunt p..n of the' post-W:lr navy. 1Jcstro)'CTS ....l:'rc the only r)'lX' of ship from the trxiirion..1 ""'1' to fl:1IUIIl III production thlO\lghout the war. They fought pcriu.ps Iurdc~ than any odier Iype ..nd 154 \1o..:-re lost. "lOre than the lou! number m commISSion ..t Ihe beglnnmg of the "'':I~. ~'ClopnK'nt "'
2 Life in the Battle Fleet
Oppooil~
In the P'C:lcetlllle n..,')' the b'g shIps - boitdl'Ships. \l;Inkcrui~rs. Crul~rs :lnd aircraft orners - .....t>re the focus of ..tlenuon, Spcruhst scanun officcn, tr.I1ned In ",'Unnel)~ torpedo o~ IUVIg:uion, ustUlly gr.t"tatltd cO\\':Irds them. The big ship t..ndc1:l to . - na,':l.I discipline and routine in its 1II0St ~igid fO~IIl.ln pe,l('etlll~" ship was prob..b1y ..IUlchcd to the HOlllc or MedtterraneMt Fleet. where It "'
•• oM ..... ;n 19-42,
lOp right:
Dal~n,
I.The lromu o£ 1936 She~u!he .1,""6e>~1
of IIw A 10 I C'luM$, wilh Itrt"""lined bridge and ,_ ....... ru.....
2. The
e-.ct of
!he famous T~ibal dU',.IWWU
compklN ia 19.)1. J. The Jt'nV, one
The Ship Hierarchy
ofl....
Each bfl,'l: ~hip lud a commanding officn'. who ..ctlUlly held the rank ~ w... 11 ~ the posmon of capum. ",th a commander of the "",anun branch as sccond-m-eomnund. [SOlrdeshlps "'Cre .. IIO'w~d ~'O gunn~ty officers. cruisers h..d one.A fully qualified IOrpcdo office~ w.as allocaled 10 each slltp of crulSl.'r sIZe ..nd abo\1:. fo~ elcctncal as well as torpedo dunes. and each shIp had .. tuvtg:mng officer, The rest of Ihe scattun officer cOtt1pl~menl was m..dc up of lieulenant-collllllilnders.
of lIM bard. ...........ingJ. K .....
lieulenants ..nd sub.!Icuten..nts...ccordlllg to the needs of thc ship m acnon, Thcre was onc officer for COlch gun rurrct of 8·lIlches and abo\'e. one for each group of 6-lllclt gun~ in a ligllt eruiSl:~. twO or thn:e to ctkc charge of the "",concbry .. ~nument. four lllOre for .....riOtlS dUlles in fin: cOtllrol. and in pe..cetime anOlhe~ in ch..rge of lhe ..nliaircl';lft arm..menl. The numlx'r of midshipn1l'n was not fiXl'd ..lid d\'p<:nded on the needs of thc opef;ltlOn. There were commissioned gunncrs and b"lrnners in chI' dirl'ClO~ lowers and conlrol positions ..nd in charge or ammunition ~upply; four ill b.. uk'Ships of thc NelsOlI c1.. ~, tWO III a ~1ll ..1J crUiser. U:I{t1eships COl~~ied .. boats"':Iin ..nd those eqUIpped with torpetlocs Iud J torpedo gunner.
The Role of the COlnlllander The comrn.. nde~ or K'Cond-in-colllm..nd of a brgc ship took on most of {he mpotlSibdny for rultltlng It. lea"mg the COlpUlIll to concentr.lt'" on strateg)'. It was a key Job for an ambmous office~, fo~ he had to do well 10 gel furrher promotion. Nickrumed 'Ihe Bloke'. he "
thoe 'uvr He dcplon;-d '-o!UIIUIiOUS ~unding ordcTS and :Jd>.'OOtro .. much sunpkT system.. 'lfMO!SCS CQU\d comrol thoe pcopk ofl.srxl for forty }":-aN III thoe ~ Ten Cornnundmcms, It would he surprising if moll' "l:1'C 1K'C'ded of"lIK' running of .. ship'. o'Conm took Laws on theft and
",th
IllUrder for granted. and Ius conul1~ndmcnts concrntralW on thoe custonl of the K'f\'Ke. thc good ..ppev;tnee of the shIp. the coodllCl of the mcb''ldlUl. COllttcs}' to officers. dK' plOll1JX exrcurion of ortkrs. putlctu.alll)' (ofi:en {1Il1l"d b)' .. stop ......lIch). ptnlUSSJ()lI to k"'1: work, reporung rhe COIltpkuon of wort.. bmmng of gambhng, and the ngll{ of a nun to put hIS pOtnt of \'lew 10 .. snuor officn'. Hut rhe real Ten
~
act;"..,
lhip'
N cI........
dnlf'O)'t~ of
Ihe Emergcnq War l>rolnnm,~.
5, The
Axi_rt ••
o:otnpleled juS( .ft...
lh...... ~. On" of Ih,
n'lll,
clUI
d~lip,d
fOf' I,cilic
°1>eraliOllJ.
the King (LoW VJ, where, unlike the other officers, they lived in hammocks r.lther than bunks.
Th. wardroom of ,h.
Pri",~ ..f H&hr,
.itua'~
aft on do..
uPIH' dKk.
Commandmenlll are reinforced by codes of national law, which can only be understood after seriotlS mldy, and O'Conor produced all influential book, R",millg" Big Ship, with Illuch more detail. ~perin K C B Dewar sUIlb'CSted that the conunander's job W:!S quite easy if he knew how to delegate, but he ....':IS a maverick who had left the navy by 1939.'" O'Conor was much more typicaL Army officers, he wrote. \VCI'C amaztod to find that the conunandcr got up at six in the
morning to supervise: the hands washing the decks, but the navy did thing'" differentl)' - '''Drry on, Sergeant Major" is not good enough'." The eonunander had a small staff to help him. The LieutenantCommander (Regulating) w:lS his main assistant, who took much of his paperwork. The Chief Petty Officer (Regulating) kept the seaman's w:Itl;:h bill up to date, in consultation with his colleagues in the gunnery and torpedo branches. In addition, there was a writer or clerk, and a mC'SSCnger. The Commander's Office issued daily ortlen to the crew, arnnged training classes and published daily orders. In peacetime or during a quiet period it issued a weekly progr,amme, but that w:lS optiminic 011 activc service." The cOllunander also supervised the master-at-arms (the Jaunty'), who was the senior petty officer on boartl, and the ship's police or regulating petty officers ('crushers').
AccomlTIodation The allocation of accollunodation ill a large ship was noticeably more complicated than in a snull one, and it reflected the ship's hierarchy and illl divWon into different trade groups. In a battleship serving as a f1ag"'hip there was a lll(1OS for the admiral alld his staff. and a separate onc for the aperin. The majority of the officers li~ in cabins with recreation space in the ....'artlroolll. aft on the upper deck in the Killg (LoW V class.
oftht Prince ofWales IIW a /olrgt: 1O(Im SOIIIt si:o::tyfeet ill /tItgtJr ... You JrqJpM Jlritiglrr illto it from I!~ qll
The warram officers had cabins and a mess. Midshipmen and the sublieutenant in charge of them had a separate lIl(1OS, \\-"Cll below decks in
Rating'" w~re divided by trade as well as by rank. It was uni\-'~rsaI policy 10 separate seamen from stokers because of different standards of discipline and cleanliness - 'Oil and water don't mix' as the saying Wl:nt. Officers' stcwartls and writers wcre separated for reasons of confidentiality; signallers regarded themselves as s1ighdy superior to the seamen. Marines were always kept separ.lte in their 'barr,acks', placed afi ncar the officet5, because traditionally they had been regarded as a buffer against mutiny.There w~re separate messes for chief petty officers, engine room artificers, marine sergeants, the master-at-arms and the regulating petty officers, and various types of petty officer. Boys \vcre kept apan. and the leading,able and ordinary seamen were divided among the many messes on boortl - a Killg Qow V class ship had I 16 in tow."
OthtT rMings art aaommodaltd in Opt/I mas spaas, i.t., spaas boJlllded by the Jhip's JlrucrllTt alld 1I0f partiliolltd off ill allY II'lY. Mt55 lablts, Jtools, kil locktn for siowillg clotho, mas mcks, bread lockm, e/(., art' provided 11$ f/ectsSary. rhe IJIXlIlllmodation is bastd on a mif/il/lllm reqllirtmtlll of iflChes per mall at lable. HafflmlKks art J/lIllgjrom hooks NtIIrtd 10 fire ~ams. !des Illbies Qrt usllally Jllpported by tlVO hooks rogOWiflg in II small angle iron at the I1l1lboard md... W'hnl not in lISt 1M tables art'stmvtd by !rillging 11II'In 111>
Z,
In wartime the messdecks wert: even more crowded than this implies, with many men sleeping on lockers or in passageways. One rating describes conditions in a destroyer late in the war. ... if is Ilbolilihe si,u of 1l1O(l/ll ill all awrngt hOllse. Mlm of tile Jpate iJ taktn lip I7y IlJbJes, lockers, wpboords, mess-Imps, ImcktfS, kitbagJ mId hammocks, which ItlJWJ only a fnl' sqJlart yards of spa« fl1r lilt JO-oJd ratillgs. R.Jbbits in hutehtJ Iillt ~lItT fhttfl Ihis. ... Owrhelld there art barJ wirh groolltJ fM I!lt
hamm«k ropn TIltIt' aT!' only IIfoollJplJr/; II1JKhiug thl'l'r ncighbollrJ all nth" Jidt."
ml'll Jlt'f'JIlllith
their hammocks
Ship Organisation Big ships lended to spend less continuous rime at sea than small ones and mostly favoured the two--watch system in which the men had four hours on and four houn off. though even lhen engine room mff \Vl:rt: on a thrce-\vatch system.The watches were known as port and starboard, and each divided into first or second parts, so that only a quarter of the men nc<.od be on duty in harbour. The watches and pans of watches needed equal numbers of men ofequal skills from the various branches.A watch was also a period of time, usually four hours, except for the twO ""-'0hour 'dog watches' betwecn four and eight III the afternoon. which meant that men did not have to stand the same watch day after day. The seamen proper were also divided into 'parts ofship' for duty and welfart' purposes. A major warship usually had four equal parIS. known as forecastle, foretop, maintop and quarterdeck, from old sailing ship terms. Each group would keep that part of the ship clean and perhaps man the gun IUrrt't in the art'a. with the marines manning a turrt't and
169
-...,....,
NormIlI Day Station Action Station
$«:ondor.ry lITnumcnt of ,hCIT own. The speculistS also ffi,d their own STOUps, :and together Ihc:sc fOfllled Ihe dl"iSlonal system. E2.ch raong 'MlS alt.u:ht.-d 10 a p:lnl('ubr division, for example of siokers. signallers
or lorpcdomcn. The division was under a hier.tTChy of officers. midshipmen and pt'uy officers and aUowcd regular contact between officers and men for wdfare. dLsciplmu)' and hygIene purposes. The qUMtcr bill ",!located Ihc men 10 rheir particular dUlies III .lIenau. Se.amen were also allo(;l(O:d duties for the numerous wks thai h:.td to be orried Out, largely b:lSC'd on the w;uch lnd qwncr bill. By 1932 then: WI::rc: iuD for cLty action. nighl action. fire scotians. collision Staoons, emumg or lea,ing h:;IIOOur, dnn. alnndon slup. bndmg puries. ;tirillg beddmg. anchor watch. ammumoonmg stllP and nuny others. and more weR' added In war,"
traily 10 bt fitrd on nthrr sidt; 2 mil'S s~t in Iht starboonl Jllmp., about 40 yards form tllnr mouHls, 1 l'R'U' in the officrrs' gil/lry (Olllpmmml abom 10 Yilnlsfrom tilt HAfUi fflOU/ffS, LA (or!ttol P'Jrti~ stood U\ltell 'lIld u\ltelr(omp/tre I'n"ll" - additiollal 11Im taktll from tIlt HA ",,,'rolll~ri(h 1I1fr(' "01 tIllJmred, Pom.poms lJ"d ,5 ",
or
In harbour It was usu.al IO 1(;1\l: one ~" ofa walch in charg.:the ship. changing al ooon e"o'Cl')' thy. Silk JUI"Iks ....l;'n:' posl:cd to man the g;angway
:met gr=t visitOl"S ....ith the :ippropnate «ret1lOIIies. At anchor or at a buoy. the slups' boaD ....~ kMned OUI md TTIallI1M,:met a npiw 5hip usuaDy had an att~t drifi:er 10 aU Illr"ll ashore on st-1 ~~ O!"Iibeny'. If they ....'Cft' \~ry lucky the sallors nught go :I5hore In one of me great
1l:I\'a1
pom Juch as Plymouth, where the civil popubdon t-J
long specialised in providing e"o~ry
S<"JVlCC'
a Jailor on k,l\~ mighl be
prepared to pay for, Bm in wartime Ihey ....~re far more likely 10 find
Duties and Routine
thenuelvcs among sparse houses, emply roads and waterlogged fields at
AI sea,rhc officer of the watch W~ in ch,UKC m normal nnlCS, though lhe
Loch Ewe or Scapa Flow, where the football fields usually bore the sign
captain was nen:r 6r aw:.ty m his sea cabin and probably remained alcrt if
'All grounds unfit for play',
there ....'as any possibility of action or danger, The captain of the d~"Stl'O)'Cr
Eskimo ....-..s
The Effects of War ",on fN bridgt at all timts d"n'ng aff manlltJll.TN, irl(luding Ia~ (Mt1gts III (l)U~. At othrr tlft'Ots Itt mtlallml in his tmngtrtCy (.JIlin, a drclt ~ tN bndgt. trading light IrftT'!lu" lIttd sktping, Ht" found out lhal M could nDi """,,in on IN bridgt all dory and all night""d IJt nttlltaUy and physically alm
..""til
lin
~ amst',-
The officer of !he watch had a qwrternustt'T to supervise the st~'CrUlg. an eye on whal was happe:mng on deck, Men nomully did 'tricks' of an hour each ~ helmsman, lookout and so on, There were numerous Olher dutics to be dont' - sweepers to cle
who would be ready to launch in the WJr
C:lSt:
Opcr.llors had 10 dc>.~1op their own OrprlWtlon whdt' lookout dUrles became e"o'tt more Impon:ant fur the ol'duury seamen. Men also had to be kt'pt at re.Hfiness for long hours when
Tht flInrt
cml.,
CfUISt'T
In
range
&rmlrWr"nt:
skpl itt tltri, turrrts. Tht 4" HA fLit {hIgh angltl#qu, arlg/tf cml' anrlally ou uu/(h uTth stanhrlls
I'n"ll. nooJ u\ltdr lIS jol/rm.; 1 nto"m
It
was showing Jigns of SlTolm. Tra\"~'Uing aoCTOM the
Atlantic With Churchill
In
the DNItt '!f\0rlr in Dc.::embeT 194 I, Capwn
.. ,6O%oftht shtp) romparry han' _bml to _ bifotr. T1tt propomort r/RXR and R,,"IIR '!lJicm is l'n)' high, Thty ow a shD.prltss 101 somdJou,atId thtrt is 1101~ of 1M aail'C' $m!i(t sm/od mit~ aborll lit/." ship. 171m smn l
of'nun O\'Crbo;mf and
progressed, the specWisa such as radar and sonar
of t'nt'my aircraft. In 19-41 ill the 1Igl11
of the wu I"'\TIl
Charle5 Lambe saw deficiencies m the (TeW of the ship:
and boatsw.a.inS males 10 transmit ordc:rs by means of whistle, and to keep
nuny OIMB. As W
The big-shlp navy was the Wt 10 feel the effeclJ of wamlll(' chlunon
by inexperio:"l"l('cd and hastily trained new entnnlS, but by the thud )l:ar
The Pnme MmlStt'T agreoed and renurltcd: 'They are lI()( ready for lighting. Disciplinc:md marmen are lax. He'd ne\'tt seen such a thing'.'" OUl this was a bilk unfair as !:he Dill« 1j)'iJrlr was 00l long in rommMion. Captain Oram
'>''as
more positi\~ while in command of the cruISer
Hauokiru in 1942.
In dJm tht slup uus Sftatntd and dtfrndtJ by a cross·Sfflwn cif an/ish provillCia/lift uitlr a hotldful <Jj .sm.th Afiicans Ihrou'" in
Tb.
of lIM c... w of. balll~shil"
JMk ".f ~<JU'Iim~ uus
Life in Destroyers Mosl dC'Sl~~rs "~re (;omm.mded by li..ut..ll.lInI-comnundc'fS
D.-stroyt"r dl~.pbne: was modition
Big ship timt is s"id 10 ~ "u~ss"ry ro "II. I hlSli'l 1l(l~TI""lld il Sll.IV"1S1 I d" kll"lI' is Ih"l all)' (.'ICes without specialist help,
171
The Battle Fleet
3 The Fleet in Battle
W2li rtSpOn5Ible for pmmg on n ~ aocl checkmg dUI gUlWghB and fuses "''ere Kctll"lllCIy SCI1be 1945 C..,,1Itr)' P«h1 Bro.l: stn"SSCd the importmce of Ie
Ql r ten W2S the supreme 101: of every \oOo~nhip and the numbas III her crev. wen: assessed WIth dUI III "und. E\'t'ry dup lud a qwncr tnU. a 1m that g;lVC C'\'Ct)' nun's semon In arnon.ln ships whIch urncd them. Royal Mannes USt~JIy malllled oue of the m.ain gun tundS plus a proportion of the sccon
funic
eqUIpment In the mnSlIlIwng ~t:1t10n. Not all the Ih~ w:ltehes of Slokers ....~re needed in th" engine room at Ollt' ti"I(.... so about 25 per (('nt of them hdped wIth the m;Ull\1ng of the guns :md others formed
rurrca, often wrrcnng less qu;ili6cd II~I. The dHo 1Uy)', the 16-inch of tile' "'rfsofI cb», n«dcd a gunner's mOlte. 15 :lC':iIDUJI gwUln'l BId twO other snmen In the gun ~: ~ gunnay nang'! me! mne OIher seantnl in w corditc tundling room; four gullnny I"lItintp; ..nd 21 omen in the nug;&ZUlC: 41 gumter;' nute...nd eight gumte1"f I"lIWlgs m w sheD Iundhng mom ;uK! nght gwmery I"lIQngs; 4IJId 17 odlen m the shcll room. a toul 01'93 uxhvidwl guns
brgdl rurttts
~
In
men." A lkstro)oers 4.7-inch gun Iud 41 qU41nen I"lIring 2nd cbsl w comnund, p'lOb3b1y .. lading ~;UIWl or pc'ny officer.The gunb)'tt and the tr.l.lller, .....ho pomtcd the gun m Ihe vernul and honronul directions, "'"C'I'C both layn I"lItl.llgs 3rd cWs. The other four membcn. wnh no gunllery qlUli6ntiom, ",'e1'C the myworker who loaded the gun, Ihe proJecnle supply number who h;mdled the shells, the nrtridge sUPIlly nUlu1Jc,r who 114Indled thc Ill'Opdbms. and the sightsetter who
damg ~njObs bul u a team domg one JOb'," In a modem war, .....hen air all:ad: nught h2-.oe come at :my mOlllefll In Ihe Medilerr:mC;Ul or Arctic theatres, II ....
of LA
~
poWbic bul
not
inurunalLThl1 degree
~1lCSIi W3S
norrruJ}y used at mght III oper.t.tioual :tl'C".a5.. '" hik M ~ sotJOm wc,", in opc:ntion when the ~t of au atuek existed 0\'l:I"" long pc:riod. 1bn W:JS hard on M gunncn 4IJId son)C men 60m the LA amumcnt "'ttl: rrnned to _ them. In the fourth &gr«. one of the LA guns was nunned. Of" a qu:.trtcr of the M MllWllenl.
()ppotiu 'op: ~_dw
~"'Ih.
........ Otftoo.
_...
Os>s-illo .........
mid
:
...ri--airo;nft ,..... of
• .s..uo,- ......;.. -icIM
d.
waIdoes.
-_ ....... ..... -- .... B.brwr. .....
......... o f _
... .....,,, •
S
.. -
.....1....
I-ire
.antral
long-range gunnny S}~e:TllS Iud t"YOl\'rd "'lUun the IUV)' OYC'T the pl'C'VlOUS 35 yean or so,:.tOO .... 'rTC' hIghly cffician 17)' 1939.1be IN "'
--.... '-
.. II.
ao:oioIII . . . -
.n..,., ....
LOW AHGU flit( CONTROl. TUM
--
-
-----
--
..
....
--
-=-I
,
,•'
'--'_~LJI
I
I I
L
...
-.,
m
o
..... rn
o
I-~~~
......,.... 0
"""'....
0
I
rJ!"~
iI =-='_1
---.--=--.----
172
Churchill's Navy
1U'o'al gunnery. and :,t ~t ship might hn'e nlO\\"d more than a q~"CT of a mile: dunng the time of tlighl of the shot alone; other fxtors lOcluded wear on the gun twTels and v'lnd. To gIVe the ~atl:S{ accurxy. guns \\'f'Tr nomully ccntnlty aimed "'00 fired. In gun xaon. the apuin of ~hip idcmi6cd the tlI~ to be cn~d. He pomted his sight
me-
Further fOl'W3rd and lower down In rhe dIrector were Ihe r:llings of rhe connol leam. The direClor uyer was a senior gunner), nrc Wlm considc:nble rcsponsibilily. 'On me Dir«tor U)'t'r. more than any other mdl'l1du:l1 m the ShIp, except perlups the Control Officer, depends Ihe success of Ihe gunnery action'. He lOIt on the lcft·hand SIde of a gyro-comp:w. looking mrough srabliliscd binoculars or a telescope al the enemy. He opcnted a handle which eJe\-:tred or depressed the gUllS 10 conuul rhe r.mge. and also obsf,rvcd rhe spread of each »Ivo :.md its accuncy of aim. On the other side of the gyrocompass was the direcror tniner, also a senior nting. USIng sundar binocu[~rs or telescope. he kept the direclor pointing al the t:lrget. The cross level opcntor ~pplied correctiom for the roll ~nd other movements of lhe ship. The nnge might Ix: taken by a mall inside the director. though Ihe nnge finders altached to battl('Ship turrets were WIder and rherefore more accunte, while ndar provided an evell bener alternath'e by the end of rhe ....'::If. The laSI member of the direClor team W;lS a telephone opt'rator. Information from Ihe director and other sources \V
10 me aIm. The processed cUtl. WB mmnutlcd 10 the gun turretS. md me guns ....'t're bid and mined according 10 II. Firmg was done by me louch of a bulton IIlside me direclor, once Ihe opcntor knew lhat aU guns III me lOIl\U ....'t're lwidc:d. md he 'hunted me roU' to lind Ihe righl moment in me ship'$ nKJ'l,'emcm lo:aim .accur:llely. In me carl)' Stl.gO of an action me 'bddcr' system W.:I.S uloed ro find the DOge: of the: tl.rzet. Two lOIl\'OCS \\~ fired 10 esubhsh Iht: bne of the rarger. !pre.ad slightly O\'l::r .a Ihlrd of the length of the tl.rgt'l. Two more \\~ 6=1 with some sprew 10 find the range. and corrected m 400-)':lrd steps unallhe wget was smddled. A nonNJ 5.:I.hu m a ship \\im rwin rurms W2S to firc ooc gun ttl exh ruon...... hile: the other ~ The nine-gun RDdMy nornu1ly fired her rnne nutn guns U1 sahoes of6\'I:: 2nd four, but when she took put in the smkmg of the Bis1HIJJdt in 1~1 she .also fired one eigll[-gun sahu and rhcTt: w~re ~lm-gun ones-According 10 mAnlCrican obse':n.'n" on bo=l:
D
dtrlr hdd walrrJlooding Ihl' dtrks.'"
Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Antt-aircnft gunnery had \"CI')' different problems from anti-ship action. Aircnft were far more vulnenblc and a nt:.ar miss with .1n explodmg shcll could d~'Suoy one. They could be set:n much further away. and picked out by ndar. On the other hand they flew .about 10 t11l1~'S fasler and W~Tl' f.ar more manoeuvnbk In addition. th~ RO)'31 N.aV)' bggcd belulld in anti-aircnft gunnel')', partly because ri\OIlry with tht: RAF made realistic exercises more difficult. P:I.I"tly because of a Ct'rulIl allloullt of compbcency. I3crnttn rhe .....'.1rs ][ f.1lled to dC\'elop tl.cncs ag:.ullst dh'l:: bombers, and rejC'Cted pbm for a r
by h.ast.ily-rnincd merch.am ships crews. Slightly more sophlStlore:d w.as ·C)'nhooting·. Gunncn used ~ghlS wirh n\u or rhrtt rings. exh reprcscnnng 100 knots of m :I.l1"C'I'2fi'$ speed.
~ I,('I'D,
nw buic
....iacipM
of eya/>oolinC'
NN OUt-<; V((D l'OCl...cn
~...-;u; )0
l>tGlOlD
......... 'lO'Ul> '00 CtoOtS
~arrll/fl
~
. . - <£'10. OUt
.
n.c mnhod rf...nng 1M Jigh, U l'")' simpit-. ~ .., dtc ilirrrajr, noll' itJ d,rrni
lOCI CNOn
..-otOI AoIGU: to l>((,II(U .......... ~(O lOQCOOOTS
32.-EYESHOOTlNG SIGHTS.
Ir W.:I.S not p.1mcubrty cifcctl\"I: wlm me slower finng pom·porn ~..u n. and ~b Wdlinp ofrhc US N.a\)' ~n.'I::d:·The dose nnge \\'l::apons
have no remote control nor director
10
wte. , ha\oe met
(\\1;1
~kippel1'
who <:Iaim 10 ha\'l" shot down pbnes with pom-poms. I alii convinced lhat allY hies wcre only due to lhe volume offire'." II was more effeClh-c with the 20mlll Oerlikon. though there was a tendency for gullnel1' to open fire 100 soon and cxpt:nd Ihcir magazine before the encmy was \vithm r.mgt:. High-le\'c1 bombing proved ineffective aviJ1S( ships. because Ihey could IIIQ\oe out of lhe way III time. R.oderick MacDonald describes hlS experience :.IS 011 ffildshlpl1Un In the battleshIp l>ali<1flt off Norway. ...1.1'1- 14_
(l1htT. II .Juuys u'Uriml, lIS 1M aploskms drld w/"mns ".f ..'til" t1Ilpltd u.Wtff' WI' 14'1JJlld (l,hrru~ Mor bm1!' uo/l«l h,ml
0IIt
14\1)' '"
lilt
Low k1.oel bombing ....-;IS effecD\oe In me tarfy wgts apill5t ImCrehml ships. bul could be dri\Tn offby gunfire. The Gcrnu~ did not dnTIop me torpedo bomber \"n)' far. although me japmCK did md UKd \I . .fISt the Pnn« ".f1l~fl1 and Rqmlst. BUI the most dfccri\T 1ir ....'e2pon apillst ships ....-;IS dlC di\'C bomber, and lhe GenuallS had a suiuble
am:rafi. IJI the Junkns 87 Stub. The range dungt:d npidly dunng a W\T, whIch I1Udc range finden and fuse sencn lIIeffecrl\'c,The wrxbtd method in the carty wgcs was banagc hre. The shells could be ~ to explode at a fiu
Crele alone. Good anti~aircnft gunnery had to await the arrival of the subilised uchymetric anti-aircraft glln lowards the end of the war. and the proximity fuse just alief it.
The e.-ew of. fOll._b..relled pom_pom leke ei", e' the le'lel.
Gunnery Practice Then: wen: sn'Cm types of gunnery practice, each with its own advanl
adJUSlcd so tml J1I shots would fall well shoo-t of the targtt." BesIdes finng with mell n!J1II armament, CfUISCn and bJnlcslups ....Tn' eqUIpped for ·sukalibl'e'finng. Guns of a smaller calibl'e could be lix«I III hne ....'Ih rhe bIg guns III the nu.in turretS and firm in .. ~. Pr2ctice of this kllld consen'ed the- barrels of the mam guns. ~\'ed on amffi14nJuon. and V\'C good pr.aetI« for th.. conuol S}"Uatl and me lr.tJ~rs and b)"Cl'$ O\'Cr a n:bu\"ely short nngr. It g.J\T little mlMc pnetic.. to the loading numbers.
....'3$
"hst'f..,1!-. NI'XI, III(' mmrr's slriki"sf<Jrtr if '''Tfll'd<J b.>mbt'7J rl'<J".~/1 (III
,Ms
Mr<Jm,~,;lr
IIrr mristrS, spR'ad
Il/XtlS;(lII.
IImmgh u" fiUl11 ,'II
<1 Ihri~,
'hry
"'I'II/ ,'" '"
UtTI'
,mlltk,
1101 srm:nifll/.
Il Iilll' <Jj """ril!C, /JIlsl,rd ill I,' 1
rrlrruy'r /wllir Jlen, ,md fiually Ilrl' I,r""y sMps ,Ilrmsrll'l's (<Jllle ;11I0 <111;0>1." In bank commandcrs pn'(erred dirt."Crion~.The
diffell'nt
to
split tht'ir (OrcL'S and atock from many
acrion against the Gr
pI:rhaps the bst to be fought undcr old ,ondition~. with minimum "ff~"Ct from aircraft and radar. Commodon: Harwood used 1m thn:l' shrps to dwt'n the fire of the enemy's fWO
Ulr~ts. though
in pracrice rhe Germans do not
St...,m to hJ\"C been affc
/Tom
~moke
screens in different directions to driw off a Larger Iulian force.
Destroyer Tactics As wdl as the llllm"rons and miscellan"0us dutit"S dut \\"CTt' found for them in wartimt', d,'Stt'O)'l'n slill had ,he basic rok of >en'l'ning fll...'lS of b.mleships, cmisen and aircraft carricn against aircraft. sunace ship and parlicuLarl)' submarine atlack. Their organiSJtion "'a~ still based on the flotilla of about ~'ight :;hip5 under a uptain (I), though this "'a~ ran'ly uSt.-d in banII'. Lieurenanl-Comnunder Wellings o( th.· US Nal')' was told by a dl"'l~'t'r
ClIptaill dIal 'dIC most import:lJll difft'n'rJ<:,' bel\''l'~'11 pt.·an'till1l'
training and operating in war was Ihat he now Iud to think for himself. U~ually
th,,1l' is no division comllundl.'"r
10
follow and opt"ration~ orden
with thdr t'bbor.llt' aruW!Q'S al\'" n,'wr SCftI.lt was a 'ClIpr:ain's "'ar.'" for screening a force. the d<.'Stroyl.'"n mighl adopl a formation such as the on.. used to protl.'"ct the carrier P"ri<JIIS and
1\\'0 crui~l.'"n
in
OClobt'r 1940. The Ilt'avy ships fornlt'd a singll' lim' with four dl'Stroyen ahead. A and D \\ocre 3600 yards out on eithl.'"r side. jmt ahead of dll.'" bow~ of th .. leading cruiser. Band C were 2800 yard~ dial,'Ollally alwad of the ~Ill" point, and 2500 yards apart. Thi~ IIlt'alll that Ihert:
\\':IS
no anti-submarin.· protl.'"clion on "ilher sidl' o( the big
ships, SO il waS con~idell'd ~uitable at ~peed~ of 15 10 18 knOl~ whieh a V-boat could not kcep up with. and wllt'll A:;
Fleet Tactics nearly Ih""" 'eT1tn~iL"S the fleel had relicti on the lin.. ofbattl.. as its
Nov('mber 19.JO. con~i~tcd of six destroyers. The eapilal ~hips wcrt: in
main tactic.All the battll"Ships WI:R' a~ran~xl in a singk lirw ah,'ad so that
lim' alwad with thn'" cruiscn a~t~'rn of d".rll. Thc'c wa~ a dL...troycr on
gur and helmet.
one did nOI Illask rhe fire of anOlhe~. It was scldom used during th"
each side of Ih,' Rqmlse abom 1000 yards out. wilh Ih" samc (or the
during .he Dieppe
Second \Vorld \fI.1r. bn:ausc th ..re Were rarely enough battlL-ships tog..ther
raide of 1942.
10
Hood. Two moll' deslroyen patrolled 1000 yards ah.-ad. 1500 f.1rd~ apart." 13m d,'Suoyer scrl"en~ were nOI alwar> impenelTable. U-JJ I
20",,,,
O~rlikon
...taring ami_nash
r-o~
1,'OOd. Another tyP" of scn·cn. used by Ihe H'JOd and Repu/sc ill
forlll a lint'. Fllrtlll"rmorc, it WQuld oc "asily disrupted by air attack as
ships had to manOCllvrc to :lvoid bombs. One exception Ab""e, A pr.le,iee
\I':IS
th.· BJUI"
of J:I\"J Se:l in F..bruary 19.J2. when a mixcd group of l.lriti~h. Dureh.
largel in USe off
AllIl'ric:lll and Au,rralian ,ruisc!"> ami d,..,troYl·!"> fortll<'d up against till"
Trille"",al"e in
Japarll"S'.·.Thcrc was immediate confusion as on,' ship dropp"d om o( th" line. followed by di,.;).~tcr in which thell' Wl're he;wy I~.
19H,
'0 ",.Iibra,e
,he guns of 'he
Ot'tl\·t',n till" wan rhe Tanical $"hool at Portsmouth had e\'OI.,,'d
manag"d to pass through th" om' cseorting thl' battll'Jhip &,lrmrr m NO\'clllocr 1':.l.J1 and ....1 nk her with torpedOt's. III thc early ~r:agL'" of the " ..r rhcTt' was
3
belicf Ihal torpedo allack by
d<...,ITO)'l·rs
W.IS
for
and the fear of aIr att.1Ck resulted
t1WI11.
becoming Obsolt-tl·. Th,'no \\'l'n: rehdwly (ell' hrgl' tJ!b'l.·ts III
the removal of sollie
torpedo tub<..... De:suQyen we.., al their 1"""'1 unde~ ,owr of night or
th,·IlI.
smoke scn...·ns. but big s111ps w,'n' tim·d wnh radar fint ami could CQUllK'r
finding that his action olrCabbri,l in July 1':.l.JO (ollow,'d almost exactly ·tlll" lin,") of the battl,.., we us.:d 10 fight Ollt on thc t"bl,··.
and G,wis.~,,,,, p.~~sing thlOugh the Channel in 1942 highliglned the lIeed
new mcthods of fighting. and Cunmngham paId mbm,'
10
~Ilch
anacks. Howe\'er. (ailurc5 sll(:h as the anelllpt to JlOp the Sd'<Jmlrorst
radar lhelllscives and Ihey reg.111led SOIlll.'" of Ihl.'" rniriarive."
I3ri(i~h
,k'Slroyen had rheir torpedo mbes mounted al1li(l~hips. and
tilL)' could only fin' aboul 60 dq;:rc(.., forw:Jrd of dl,' b~·alll. In Ih, t'arly
~
1615/lrs/
~'72On ~ \"cro~ Support DeSlroy.,. A,r.eA'
.I .I.~. J.... /" I "oo,~. / / / •
1815m;
e.",.",.
,."
t
"
L • \
·....~i.~l.~.i~ ..
N
.... IIl1S1r.;
"''.~rroy.r, i move In to Alf,ek
)."
•
I. L ~ ... ~""".. '6151n~;3~~'~ J" !815m " . \
.....,mn .
• I " \., \ ' ,
&tt"$hlp
; .......',\' 1\
':,f'\ \ '\. \
~
'"
~',
,~
•• ISoISi'n \ •
'..)
'D" "
"~I •~ '/ '" 1 RolIIil:J
ITAUAN FLEET • " "
~ ,
"
\\ '" " .. '. '1..-_ ,
~- .....\'
l.5C:lChs
"
1615hrs
.
j '.. /
co,,"
-_
"oom
16151'n
,.".
o.Jlro~fS
--===- W;wsprte
l.
""''''........_
, / '" ' ; 2~/ , ,'~
1
•
r
..........
//MaJzya
::;;. .......-=-...........
,
__ - - ' Gloucester
-----~_.-.ISOCW'n
rS'51w$
u-pooo
-....
,
,
Orion
,~
··-··~I'-----""-;"9··'·:'
Del'reyers i V/. Eagle
\.
"t.-"1:> ' ....
'4
BRmSH FlEET
~:
'.!
j;'
.~
....
I~
....
~:
'"
Sydnoy
sages of the
this mC,l1ll ltul lhey Iud to turn ....n>QSl brQ;>(\sidc on to the en=t)' bdon:: finng. gIVing hun good wurung. Later they ~~ fitted "'1m gytO-2nglcd torpedoes. whIch could be set 10 rom .aficr finng. so dut a destroyer could bUll(:h ,In :lfuck dir«dy mead. din:cdy
:ostern. 0.- in
Wilf
Sl:\TnI
other dtl"C'Ctions.
Vun W2S periups the most succc:sslU1 Bnrish destroyer officer of rhc war and. like nl;lny of hlS rontC'mpor:l.ri~, he ~xtc:d :!pillS( ok! Il""thods. Roderick Macoou,lld of the
I ~d
Lut, allong bIotHIy LuI, offlltt /flUh . ... Fasrn and./tfSln, plunging and su~rrg. ~ng
with S,raill until Ion wIroIt hull smll1ftd in prolat. ... AU "'" could str U'!"I'l' lMi, p
ofW
flint' Q/~ Ikstrvytrs
smoke m :I. 'ttl· short ame. In adWooo dc:sao)",," mel MTBs (~-tllch of counc "ttl:: not SlC2lll-POwered) Iud chkJrolulphuric xid cquipmtm and coulJ discturg.e "moire by tho"« nouks (JIol:'f the ~. When UliUlg smou. apulllS had to take- xrount of hUflutb~ wluch uught Wet the r.r.te :l.t wtuch n dispened. 100 wmd dnunon 100 strength."
,..... arm.
In the ~ ~ bornlwdmeUI Iud bttn n:g;uded :IS \'n)' much 3 li«QTllbry usk for ....':Irs/llps. excepl: for a sp«iaI group ItnowTI » 111OlUtOf'S, with the nwomum gun JlO"I.~t on the snulk:sl: hull.lbtrlcslllps.
b.ldahipl ...re I....
cn-users and C'YI"II dt$ro)'I:'"fS \\""re co,!Sidrred tOO ,...!table to risk. ;tg;lUlS( forts ~lId blttcries ()fl shore.11l1s bt:g;ln to change III the lit"COnd laIf of the W:If. as the Gernun and It:l.lgn lk«s were miuced :l.nd amphIbious Oper;l{)()'1S
beGllne ever moR' prominent.
Shore bomb.1rdmcm became l111port:lm dunng the Mednemrleal1 Cllllp:llgri. The II:I.\')' h:l.(/. its first unh:l.pPY experi"n<:;e of :l.tI
were ~ down tOO e;)Sjly. so f
to
produce :I. ducIt dood of bbd::
c:ampen.d ...
Shore BOIubardn1.ent
....':It'SIups had means of U1j«tU1:g oil fuel
11CT\'OU'Ii oppo~nt
I~O,...twa
Cuoninc:t-n" fIefl lIa1i.aa farce 10
b",n the thre:l.l posed by :I. 10rpedo :l.IUCIt could ~ ~Kti\"" .Jg;linst a andV'gn used il 10 force a pov."CTfullwall sqwdron 10 rettelIt at the Second Batde ofSIrtC' in Mueh 1942. Smoke scrrcns ~ :IrI unporunt part of desao)-.er opcntioos.. ~ m the emy sages of the ....'M before rxbr bca.me Ufl~.lbey couJd be ~ by :IUCt;If1. or- by thus dropped m the Water. All stearn..p<J\"~
lI:mpllf' COJlSldercU tlut It "'':1.5 tOO dangerous to :l.ncbor e\""n If the W:l.ter W;l:S stulJow enough, fot It would uke tOO long to get under ....':I.)' If lhen: ....':lli .1 counler :l.tt:lClt. lie preferred 10 ha~"" .. nur\er buo)' ~ with the sillp usmg her engines 10 It<
fht
Abo\-e left:",.
ia JIIIy
Ih~
II.... 10 keep up
wilh
I ....
fIefl.
Abow ripn: n..
.....
...-~
proucri"l 11M and
If~1t
N...... m~r
tY:I'
H~
in I~O.
Churchill's Navy
176
the fall of shm. It w:as imporullt that the pilot ....-as briefed adequately and had a chance 10 make contaCt with the bombarding forces. Mik.. Crossley describes his experiences in a Scafire. wday, D.Day, wt' worked IIl'ry j,,,rd i"dN'd. Do" (lU' spoiling. My jimJlighl rook iff M 0735, u-irh Dall Kte" as my number 2.11'1' spellt 45 rni,W(N OI'tT Fratl(t wotring on "lrtlll'Y glm posit;('" fled. IIII' Cll1ril( (onrow dl/5f flunK lip by II-anpites sltells"
Below l..tI:.Th.,
dellroyer IIh""" of 1918 eRat,.. a
Below .-ight: A erui~r's
gun. fire
in .uppon of.
landing.
The navy \\':1.5 proud of irs role in shore bombardment and fdt that it justified the cOlllinued role of the gun in naval warfare. Certainly it had an effect on enemy morale and they took cover ;IS soon ;IS the spotting aircraft appeared. But naval h't.ms were not dt'Signed for this kind of pinpoint accuracy. or for substained firing. Mike Crossley ebims that some ~hots were 2 miles from the target. and only about 1 pt'r cent hit the target at long range."
4 Naval Bases
Meanwhile, joint naval and army parties selected taTgCts on shore. Tactics varkd according to whether they had landed themselves or nor. [n Nornundy and at Wakheren there were complaints that na\"al forces did not know enough about the rllOllemenrs of their own troops and opportunities were mi~~. For example. a group of tanks appeared but the bombarding forces had no way of confirming that they were enemy. Naval guns could reach some miles inland, and during the NorJrulndy in\'J5ion a Panzer regiment parked south east of Caell had a shock when Rodtrq"s 16-inch shells. fired at a ranh" of32,000 yards. beglln to explode among Ihern. & a result of the experienee of the invasion of Sicily in 1943. it was concluded that the best aiming technique \\'J5 ro make a few one or two-gun :;a1\'QCS to get the r.mge. and establish the line of the target. Once the line was found within a 200-yard bracket. dctilx'ralc fire was opened, followed by rapid fire. The caprain of the l-Illrspire believed that:
The battle fleet required {''NO kinds of base. the functions of which sometimes overlapped. It needed operational bases such as Scapa Flow, where the fleet could anchor between sonit:$. rdativdy :;afe from ~urface. submarine or air attack but well po~irioned to intervene if the enemy mov..d. And it needed repair bases with the ~pecialised facilities to deal with large \\"arships. The navy m\"a)'S found it more difficult to get money for infrastructure than for ships and men, and the period between the wars was worse than mOSI ;IS limited funds were concentr.ned on keeping up th.. numlxrs of the battl.. fleet. Vote 10 or the Navy Estimates, for 'Works, Building5 and Repairs at Home and Abroad'. Iwver exceeded £ZX million in the early 1930s out of a total bucib'Ct or more than £5(J million. This \\':1.5 less than a third ofthe cOS{ ora modern battieship.The only major building project was tile ill-fated base at Sillgl1PQre. E\'Cn in 1936. ;lSVote 10 crept up to £2,537,500. the list orprnjeca \\':1.5 not ambitious.
Delil1rn7lr s/roolilrg adrilWs /iulr mrd is uUSIrful of time, J Irallf' fljl dOllbl in my mind II,al Illis sliip has SCCljf(d rlre besl mults by gtllilrg u~'lltilJ say IQ() )'Ilrd~ of rhr rll'Ert afirr mmir'g mrd IllIm qlli(/;1Iy 'plastering' w;111 Ilrdr r.urge fM 111m' orfom salvos or IlIrrillhe fall of s/ro/ lI'1'1ndm,'!
TIte prilldpallJt'1v worb fOI wMdr provi~i"" u mad.. romprise n/?UI '/IIIJrICrs a' &mlUdll for silJgit ll'\lrkllltll /r,,"iftrr..d from Iht Hemle D«kyards, ,mdl'rpirmillg "lid IlIldtm'lllrr ",,,,irs to wllaif u'
The Ballie Fleet
In wartime Ihis neglccI would Ix rdlectcd in twO main aTC:IS. Fleet anchor.agcs ~uch as Scap:l Flow were dangerously unprepared, and docking: facilities for large ships were in:ldequate. The Roy;tl Navy had only nim' docks worldwidc which were c:lpablc of taking the la'l,"t'St battleships and :lirer.aft euriers. Three were at Rosyth, tWO e:lch at Portsmouth and Devonport, and one eadt at Gibr;llt:lr and Singapore." The battle fl<,(,t was more dependl,llt th:lll other pUts of the n:lvy on the tnditional n:lval b:lScs. The aforementioned b:lScs had dry docks large enough for the bi~t battleships and :lircr.aft carriers, c",nes and other equipment to deal with h('avy engine'S and guns, :lnd:l spcci:llised labour force for the requirements of umoUT plate :lnd the nav:ll style ofship construction. Other ty~ ofship, such :IS escorts, were generally smaller and built to mernntile standards, :>0 thcy could bt' repaired anywhere with a shipbuilding indu~try, such :IS the Tyne, Mcrsey or Clyde, Coastal forces were e"en smaller and could be repaired,:IS they were built, by Y"cht-builders or "voodworkers.
The Dockyards Under Attack In past :lgl"S, n:lval str;ltegists had believed that J fleet could decline :lction :lnd stay in port as a 'fleet in being:' which still had decisive effect on the w:Jr. But by 1939 no port was completely safe from bombing, long-r:Ull,'C gunnery and subllluines, not to mention the threat of invasion. All nations suffered from this. and one need only mention the attacks at Tar.anlO and Pe:lrl Harbor, the destruction of the French :It Mers cl-Kebir :lnd the sinking of the Royal D.lk and Tirpil... Ships well' little safer in port than at sea in 1939-45. nlc older home naval bases, at Chatham, Sheerness, PortslllOUth :md Plymouth, had been founded in the days ofsail :lnd expanded in the early steam age for ""'ar against Fr:lJlce. They '-''ere all in the :>oUlh of England and were highly vulnenbk to air attack alicr the F.ill of fr.tnce provided the enemy with idc:l1 bases. Chatham was slightly more difficult to find than Ihe others, and was close to the more tempting target ofLondon,:>o it suffered l~ damage, Portsmouth cndurt-d several heavy raids. for exalllple on the night of 101 II J:lnlury 1941, when 153 aircrati: dropped 140 tOlUles of bombs. Churchill visited tile town :lnd his priVottI' secretary saw 'a dis.nw sight ... where one wholc street ""'t' wem along had jUSl ceased to exilit'. Plymouth was not l:Vl:n pmte<:led by:m island like Wight, and was an ideal distance from France on short nights. It bec:lme one of the most heavily bombed towns in Britain. After a series of fiw nids in nine days in April 1941. 600 civilians were left dead and 40,000 were homeless. Large partS of the docky.trd were destroyed, including most of tile historic Officers'Ter",ce. German bomber <:rews began to doubt the wisdom offurther attacks and one wrote;'The target is Jgain Plymouth. Docs it re:llly tTI:lke sense to drop so milch on the south cOOSI.juSt because it lies nearest to us""Visiting Plymouth in his ship. Commander Donald Macintyre was horrified 10 find 'what a backwater the greJt pon of Plymouth :md Devonport had become, with thc shifiing of the nen'C ee.mre of the Atlantic war to Liverpool and its satellite ports·... Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth on the eaSI cout of Scotbnd, was slightly belter positioned against the German thTCat but it had been neglected beT\\'Cen the wars and was smaller than the other bases. It attracted some :I{lention from the u.fiW(Jife in the early stages of the war whcn warships in the Fonh were bombed. but an air attack
inmlved a long flight o\"er the North Sea in which the aircraft could easily be picked up by radar, and Rosyth was left alone during the main blitz. BUI $capa Flow was famously pcnctrated by U·47 euly in the w:u and the battleship Roy~1 Oak was sunk. The o,,'Crseas yards were even more vulnerable. Gibraltar and Alexandria were both infiltrated by Italian midget submuitH."S and the battleships Qurnr ElizalNlIl and Valiam were seriously cbrllagcd in the biter port. Malta was paralysed by bombing for much of the war.
Dockyard Facilities The main feature ofany dockY"rd, from wht're the ltallle comt'S, was the dry dock, which could be drained of water fOr access to the undcnvater hull of a ship. Such docks were scarce in 1939-45, partly because of the lack of pre-war investment. There was no time or resource'S to build any new docks in ,vartime.A rypic:l1 dry dock \vas lined in stone, with huge steps on each side, to provide bases for the plOps that would support :I ship under repair. EJch had a floating gate kJlown as a caisson. SonlC dry docks, such as those in the older pm of Chatham Dockyard, opened directly onto the river troll[, but that tTI:lde m~ment difficult due to tidal conditions_ Most modern dry docks ""'ere aceL'S$ible througll Wet docks - largo: rt'ctanl,'Ular areas of water where ships could be protected from the rise :lnd f:lll of the tide, Llrge elcctric cranes ",'Cre fitled alOund Ihe dry and weI docks. for lifting heavy machinery and parts. Roaring docks could be used instem of 6.."I:d dry docks. They wl.'re relatively inexpensive and could be to\\"Cd from one hue to anOlher, but this might takc :I long rillle :lnd they could be sunk by torpedo or bombing-AFD (Admiralty Flooring Dock) 8 \vas sunk at M:l1ta in 1940 and AFD 23 collapsed at Trincomaltt while lifting the battleship v"lianr in 1944. Eiglll docks of275O tons each were built for the use ofdestroyen a.nd snu1Ier ships. Each was fitted \vith 1\\'0 5·ton electric cranes." A dockyard needed space for ships which ""'ere awaiting repair, were laid up in peacetilllC or whose crews were resting. Some weTC accommodated in wet docks, where the rise and fall of the tide was controlled and they were safe from torpedo attack, if nOt a.erial bombardment. Others wt're moored alongside wharves and jetties and yet more were tied up to buoys inside the h:lrbour, or had to anchor offihore. A suitable anchora~ was :In important feature of any dockY"rd or naval base. Ashore, :I dockyard was cquipped wilh workshops of various kinds. for ironworking, bO:ltbuilding, wood\\'Orking and storage.
The Dockyard Workforce The royal dock)':lrds were nunaged by the DireClor of Dockyards, a senior flag officer who reponed to the Thittl Sea Lord. Many of the senior nunal,'l.'ment Wl.'re members of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. Each rl13jor dod,)':lrd had its own Admiral Superintendent, assisted by a Captain of the Docky.trd. Thcre was :I tlUn:ll,'l.'r for thc Conslructive Depanment assisted by variou~ nav:l.l consOUetors, :md :I brge stl-ffofcivil engineers to tTI:lintain Ihe y.lrd itself. Traditional titles such :IS Masler Rigger :lnd Boal$\\':lin of the Yam ""'ere maintained alongside newer ones su<:h as Adminlty Chemisl and Senior Electrical Officer. The Engineering Department was he:ldcd by a naval captain or rear-admiral.
177
178
Churchill's Navy
The brgnt pan of the bbour fort\" consisttd of shIP\1.T1ghts. for in ehe dockyards they renumed me pnnclpal ....,orkcrs on the hull of a ship. in contr.ast 10 private mduscry. They formed the brgnt group in the Nav.d Construction Dc:putmenl, but ....TTl: supplemented by smiths. JOiners. paucrn makers, plumbers. I;oppe.'f$llIidu and painlcrs. The Manne Engmeering Dqlartmc:nt mcluded cngmC' fitters and bricldarers (for boil..rs) ~ ,....d l :.IS nuny kinds of mc:ulworkc:r. The deetric:u cngmcerlllg dlvi~ion h..d e1C'clrical fitters and electricians at \":Irious levels of skill. More tr.ldirional lr.r.dC'S WCrt' rcpn:scnlcd by the: sailmakcrs and riggcrs. Tht dockyard workers wcre gcncnlly union mcmben. and the nlatlagcmenl usually Iried to adopt a conciliatory appn»ch during negotinions with them. ThlS wem againsl the grain with many admirals. for sailors tended to regard the dockyard 'rTUtl")'S'
ROl}-th Dock)'ard had only just been re-xti~70ted after more than a decade of closure. and mett' ....'31 no pool of slu1kd bbour to dnw on ....-ilhin Ihe area. In 1939 It emp1o)~ 10 naval officers. 32 sernor and 133 JUlUor CIVI.I $C'~nl$ and 1670 industrial workers, wtth a total w~ bill of£10.390 per ....=k. Natura1ly mere ....70S a need for~";l:Sl expansion and 1695 men were transferred ftom the southern )7ords and paid an e-;t(tr:a allowance of 21/· (£1.05) per wttk each. Thtte \\':15 just one- woman among the mdusmal employen ill 1939. Dy the l'nd of the war thert were 2204 ,omen \\'Orke-fS in thl' yard along wnh 7096 men. Thl'Tl' were 21 11:l\ 1 officers. 101 senior civil se~nts :lnd -t09 junior.
as Iuy and mefficle'nt.....-ith no respect for naval tradition. Tradllionally. skilled dockyard worker'S were Ir,line'd
A$ w~1l
by
apprenticeship in the dockyard schools, Ihough m wamme me yards xcepted sh.lled nxn who h;Ki been tr,tined else......here, :md partlytrained 'dilutee!' who could do selecred pam of the job. Thett' were nearly 100.000 workers in the home and O\'C'rseas yards al me beguuung of the ""70r. rising 10 128.000 al home at the end of 1941. and nearly -t5.000 abroad." AI Chadum me number of malt workrn hardly incn-ased at all durmg die \\70r, from 9750 to 9755, wlule more than 1500 w~re relased to the armed forces and 2000 \\~nt on to olher services such as )70rds abn»d. Thetr numbers w~re augmented by 579 male dllutees and the female workforce grew from 130 to n~rly 2000. Chatham had long employed 'bodies' for sewing in the' fb.g loft. and 'women' for heavier work in the fOp<'ry, but now Ihey took on many new tasks and the d;tSS distinctions were obscured. Bomb d.m.g" in Port>.mouth.
p.inled by Richard Eurich. 'Cood old
Bubbles!' il ",rille..
on One of'M ....U...
• "",f"...,<>cc
10
Admiral Sir W-'Iliam
Jarnft,IM Comnunder-;n-
Chi.. f, ,,'ho was dw rnocld for.
pooinrin, by Millah
;.. NI chikihood..
Other Naval Facilities as tht faoltocs of the dock)....ni itself. which Wffl' lkvoted to Strv\cing the ShIps, a full naval baSt n«ded to lundIe the peQple. thew~apolls and me other supplits. PortSmouth and 1>IYTTloum \~nt' the tnOSl cOlnplect m dus mp«t. PommQuth had many differtfll oobnes. mostly on t~ peninsulas and iWnds round me natural harbour. East of the entrance was dxo Gunwharf or HMS l'lmon. the torpedo depot for me ~. On tht wnttrn silk of tht entr,tllCt '"''en: H...wr naval ho:Iplul and Fon Blockhouse. me' poceume hndquanns of the submarine service. FUMt1" in .....as the to\\11 of Gospon and me RO)~ Cbn.-nce Vicnu.lbngYard. Pnddy's Hard was on a pemnsubJIZSt to tht north. and indudtd the main arnummt depot. Opposnc was the dock)'ard 11Sl:1f. :md noM of Uut ....'31 Whale Island. lhe home of the gunn~ry school HMS &a/kilt. AI this poinl me c1unnel UlIO the harbour divided into ~'O stTl'ams.To the ....~ ....';l!; Founum Lake. \\1th Ihe great mining camp HMS CoJlnlgU'{lOd and the arnlallle-Ill depot al lkdenh31ll on shore. The
•
The Battle Fleet
eastern channel. known as Ponchester Lake. led past Whale Island and the firing range at Tipner. to the ancient castle of Portchester. Pomdown Hill. behind the town. had tunnels for underground filel Sto"'ge. The
manoeuvring a mip imo a dock. PortSmouth had two sailing bal1,'CS, able to carry ammunition in S,lfety and several rowed lighters. The navy adapted the design of the Clyde puffer for vicrtlalling \~ls or Vies. At
town of PortSmouth included the main nav31 barr.lcks. heavily bombed in 1940-1. and several tcmporary camps where seamen between ships could be accornmod~ted.TheRoyal Marine Barracks \v;>S at Eastney. east of the town. On the Gospon side was HMS 51 VrU(/'III. the initial tr.lining
Scapa Flow. requisitioned fishing drifters were allocated on the basis of one per ship and rwo per aircrafi carricr. but were kept in a common pool. known as the 'marine menagerie' because of the great ""riety of cnft. Tht;, were used to ferry erew and SIOI\.'S to and from ships. In Augusr 1942 there .....e re more than 150 vcsscls including tr.lwlers. ferries and y:achrs, as well as wood and steel drifters powered by Steam or diesel.
base for the Fleet Air Arm: HMS Su/rml for the training of engineers and HMS D.,rdiJius, the airfield at Lee-on-Solent. En:n in peacerime the whole area was dominated by the navy. and far more so in wartime.
179
The Home Bases
Harbour Craft The n:l"}' maintlined :I large fleet of civilian-lll:lnned rugs, ammunition vessels and supply bo
The naval base ar Chatham had been in relative declint' slilce the sevenreenth cenrury. More receorly, if had becn hit by rhe Dreadnought re\~lution, for its narrow. winding channels and smaller docks could not cope with tilt' larger ships. The older 8O-acl\.' site which roday is the Historic Dockyard - was by rhis time mainly being used for storage. administration and lighter industrial activity, although th~' older building slips were used for submarint'S, a Chatham speciality. The nC\\'er dockyard was to the nonh of rhe Qld one and was three times the size. It had been created in the nineteenth century by cutting
in 19·«). ",rn,.n trn,. ,..,.'" d...fo:nn~ ofSc"'I'~ W~I"(" 1x1l1J.: n:p~m ..,j. ~ I\ ... hlx~ f10m the lI~l11e of Ihe bq.,~ ntbgc' 111 the ~R'~" or more crypnully .lS "I'on 1\"" 11 W;lS R'bl1\oe'h e.lS\ to kttp ck~r of mlll<'lO" Ihough OIl tlul lim.. tho: )\\"'cprn W~n- nOI J\
Opposite lop: R...ylh l:>ocl<)"'rd
in
Opposit~
th., ,ate, of Plymouth l)...,k)"'rd in
October 1940. Opposi.I' bouom, Naval rul" 1_' a
--
The Development of Scapa The fxilon \\"tTC bondtully IIUPrtJ'\"t'd 0\= thc )~an. D 1\ 1U)'nCJ" of the SJ.ik<m \-lsllm ml\ngoS! 1943 ~fi('1" a Ihm."-ycar gap and found:
II w~s well med to c10sc thc entr.mcc to Ihe North a" and" ~s It lurncd out, 10 support urnpaigll~ in NO""
dnt:l"O)'t'T
to se:rvkc th,' war-hips anchor,'d
1,11"1 Il
Scapa Flow. and l11any othl'r fa.cihu,-s \wn: d~plo)",'d In dl"pot shIp! afloat" At Ih... hClghl of Ihe war Ihe boom dcfcrlce ofScapa Flow cmplo)'etillOO lIa,.,,1 pe:rsonnc:1 :and 111
130 eiviJi:an$. In ~ddilion 10 the !arm!;" opcnmg and nl1lmCllann" of boom dt."fe:nces" groups of tnwlcn and drlftcn wcrc used ~s llllnn",...epen and anll-submanne \~I$ a10und ScJpa_ Aficr the sinking of Iho: RUf'l1 Oak II \\
'111r ;sl,,,,ds u,'rr 1rI:t'lcu,jusr lre'I/IIiT ,md gr,lSS, sc,i/!Jrds "ud sll"p. "ml ",ross Ill( b,s1T plfr ,'.I Ill( How IrlU/lf'SIS b/(ll'. '?firll p'r 11,lyS ."1 m.l. '1111"rr u'I"rr IlrJ U\)IIl(U" ",!tops.. WSI,m"mls,jl4S1 "("Uflll"'.I rdlll"", 111,11 Iltspt'"wd U\"III !>ITr. " !r
....ulflh;p ;010 '" Iodr.
in
19~O.
ufl: The 1MMne dod;)~
aDd ........
........... l'J'-4S.
Sop~
~nchoring.
middl.,:
'Il:'orktN ...n,er;ng
all<:TIUI1\'t" ~nchor.lge "hen m:al<:Ti...1 b«on_ ~\
FIlM III the OrknC}'1 h~d nun}' ad\"1nuges .lS a na\"lI1 anchonge" It W;li ~ large ar..a of "'qUJfl'. of suil:able deplh for
194}.
111(1Y' Ilad bIT" }J1I/d5lir {/r"".\'(S. II '11m' IJ,I'n' I1"J benl mill'S if ml/ddy roods ali
"'11''
The Overseas Bases Thc gn-~t ()\"ene~ lIa\':l! bm.,. ~t Glbnlur" M~IlJ.. I\lcx:andna" SIIIg;lPOR'" Ikrmulb, Hong KlIIg and SIO\Onsto\\"11 ~I Ihe Dpc of Good Hope'" "'oe'R' products of British impt"rul;"'u :and the n«d 10 pfU(C'C1 trade- ,,'Orldwide-. Somc Oftht"lII" nolJ.bIy lkrmow" "''crt on the frlllb'C1 of thl5 p:amc:ubr "'
hfl'akw;ll"['\ to Ul.'ate ~n elldos..:d ~pace of \\"lIler. Thn....· dry docks wen: bUIll" lIlCludll1g the Pnnce ofWak., Dock" which could cope wllh Ihe Uf)."\.'!Ot slurs. GlbT;lIQr \\
182
Churchill's Navy
rock \\'-'::Te concreted over to all(l\\.· rainw:lter to be COUe-<:led. Tht" Spanish never g;ln: up their claim on the island and it look a great deal of diplomacy (and lhe threat to inv;ldc the CanJry l~bnch) 10 prevt:nt an alliance with Germany. which would hm: been faul to I3ritiih Gibraltar. TI"" civil popubtion of 14,000 was evacuated in 1940. although 4000 remained ochind for docky;ml wQrk and local defence. The Admir,l.lry was able to build an airstrip across the bnd linking the rock 10 the llI.ainbnd. though du{ was a sensi{i~ issue with the Spanish,The port \1I2S easiJy vi>ibk from Spain.:Kl there was no security. and Itllian sublll.arint";
oper:l.ting !Tom a secret Spanish ~ did sollie danlab"C
to
merchant
shipping. 13m Gibraltar was a vital base for guarding the srrail th.:lt bore its n...mc. for n:,I"CC H. which ope"'tcd in the Westcrn Mt."diterr:mean and the AtL:mtic, as 3 scging post for convoys imo the MediterTalW3n and towar
Opposite: B.irifh n.VIII bafes lhroUgbOl.1 the ",....Id. Below: Scapa Flow showing the defences.
Earll lIjlhe "Qu-Iy joillt'd buiMi"gs "IdS tillre. a platt oj mtrllaimllellf or smllt
olJrlT JacililY Jor Qur bnrifil. &rbrrs' shops, bed.arH/·bl'fakJasl.jorlUlre lellillg: all doillg a MIring Iradt, Musil" filled II,e air. A doull publit I,OUS( piallos millgled u,;,Jr rltt' small bauds fro,,, lJre bigger sillvans ..,j,lt 1I11llles SutJr
•
This ch3nged compleu:ly in wartilllt". Malta, only 50 miles from tht" coast of Sicily, W3S bombed incCSS3ntly by the Germans 3nd [t3Ii3ns. The people craved indep..nd..nce but supported the Allied caus<:: the ,sbnd won the GCQrge Crms and a place in Briti$h hearts. The m3in harbours of M3lu were on either side of the city of V:tleU3 011 the north coast, founded 3nd fortified by the Knights of 5t John who had ruled the i$bnd until 1798. To the e;ISI of the city was Gnnd Harbour, used for battleships, cruisers 3nd 3ircraft c:lrri.. rs. To the e:lst of that wele the 'three cities' of COSpicU3., Vinioroso and Senglea where most of the docky:trd workers lived. French Creek opened off Grand H3Ibour 3nd included four dry dot"ks 3nd other facilities forming the nuin dockY3rd 3fea. Dockyard Crt"ek on the other side of Sengle3 h3d 3nOlher dry dock :lnd sheltered mooring f:tciliues for Cluist"rs, There W:lS a naval hO'lpital 3t l3ighi on another peninsu13 3nd Ihe entr3nce to the h3rbour W3S protected by FOri St Angelo to the e3st, and :t bre:tkwal..r to Ihe west. At the other end of Grand H3rbour wt"re basins for b3rgt"s and small craft 3nd the Corr3dino Heights h3d two of tht" common fe31Ures of twentieth-cenlury naval b3ses, fuel unks 3nd football pitches. The whole h31bour W:lS OVl.'rlookt"d by the lIIagnificcnt forrifications of the Knights. Marsamxetl Harbour on the other side of V:1letc II-'3S only slightly inferior. The side 3way from V3letta w;u divided by M3l1oe1 Isbnd with it'; fort. The two creek.-; thll$ Cre3ted, Lu.aretto 3nd Sliellu, were used for destro.,-ers and 5ubnurinesThe COllUlundel-in-Chiefof the Mecliterl1lnt"3n Fleet had 3 house in Valetu itself, though forthe C3liy p3n of the W:1I" he h3d to OJX'l1lte from Alexandri3. The bombing of M311:l was much reduced mer 1942. Its dry docks :tnd rep3ir f3ctlitil's weI"\: T\'Stored to use and it oJX'l1lted as a major b3se for the in\'3.\iom ofSidly 3nd nuinbnd 1t:t1y. In the wtern Mediterr;lIlC3l1, the Royal N3\'}' bee:tJIl" highly reliant on in improvised b:tse at Alexandru. Egypt lud ~n tht'Orctically indcpt"ndt"nt of British rule since 1922 3nd W3S neutril in Ihe l\'3r, but under an agret"mem of 1936 the British were 311ov.'Cd to b:tse large forces Ihere, including the use of the lurbaur 3t AlelUndria, In f3et, much land 6ghting took place on Egyptian $Oil, includmg the B3ttlC of E1 Abmcin in 1942, though the British politic31 position in Egypt remained slightly precarious. The :lncien1 cit)' of Alex3ndri3 \\~ sited 011 a T-shapt"d peninsula with a natural harbour on e3ch side.The weSlern h3rbour wu tht" most developed, with 311 OUler h3rbour of ne3rly 1400 3crt'S :lnd an inner one of 464. The whole I\':IS protected by :t breabvatt"r but the t"ntr.lllce \\':IS shallow, with 35 feCI of w3ter through the Gre3t Pass as the only viable route for big ships. This left only 3 fOOl or twO of deannce for :I battleship. The R0)'3l N3vy h3d the usc of thl' Gabb:tri dry dock, which could uke sm311 cruiscrs, 3nd AFD 5 was towed then: from Portsmouth. [t W3S brge enough to handle :I battleship but CUrlningh3111 worried constantly th31 it might bt" sunk, perhaps with a shIp inside,Thc subm3rine depot ship libo/u;tll was $ent there in 1940 to :iCI 3S 3 tender for dt'Stroyers. Workshops used by the KhedivaJ sbippmg line and thl' Akxandri3 ITaIllII'1lY$ wt're l:th'n o\'er and $hore f.ldlities wcre gr:tdually buill up. It was difficult to attnct enough workmen flQnt Malta 3nd th.. Egypti:lns were nOI considered S3tisf3ctoly - 3fter an air raid they insi$ted on taking that day off 3nd the following ont". Tht" Mcditerrane3n Fleet suffered badly from the 13ck of maimen3nc.. facililies. Tht" banleship ,\fl/laya, for eX3111ple, h3d
The Ballie Fleet
'condtnstnm' - tmubk
;th
th~
coodcmcn in ha boikr
~~C'IIl -
m could noc: kttp up Ith thc fk.et. and the boaka of me RMlfIlh6 and RDy.Jl SAnngn ....=c In tw:j shipe. lkfOR: the \\'U the- navy too dcvdopnIlhc conc:ep: of:l mobik lU\'31 ~_ Tlus ....'as pudy lrSlcd :at Su
:;IS
~ Defence
Organiution ~ on
me IIbnd bul was soon caught
up UI the lighc agunsc cbc Gcrnun aubomc: InvasJOn, and Iosr 1200 men
as pan of the rnrguani whiJt the isbnd was CVKlUlCd. The idea . . a gral: naval ba5c a Smppott was adopced m 1921 and benmt ux:rramgIy .mpoliMIC dJc ilIIc:J-q yea when Bnwn's aIbmce wuh jlIpan was ended on !be insisknc::e of the Amcric.Ins. It was an impn-i.JI r3lha dmJ 8rDII: the Mally Sates aDd me gomnnxna of AlISttIIu and NeoN :z.emnd nxunIIy Iud a ate UI It, and the COllI were co be dumi. A IJtC ....-as chosen on the SembIwang Riwn in the Old Sound ~ ~ bbnd and me nwnlmd. 12 males oonb of me CIC}' ofSuJppore.A 10WtI fOr I:WOO -.-ten was planned. Progress was slow UI an en of governmenc cuts..md me K:heme was suspended UI
1924. The: :cnmal scheme _
fOr a brgc-
WCI:
dock and fOuf greac dry
docb.11us was soon CUi
_0
..
rJ Sio I iO IlilOM1
,
183
-
PART VIII
Naval Aviation 1 Aircraft Carriers N~vy h~d piOllccn.·
The Royal
carrier could be fully ...ffectin". Development slowed down aftt'r thar. and as n:sult the navy's carrico at the beginning of the war were a
mixed bag. mostly conversions of merchant ships or wanhips. with only one modnn purpose-built ship.
Prototypes The A'X,,"s of 1918 "':IS the wodd's fiN' (TUe ain:nft carrier. wid. a completely flat deck (or landing 011 and taking off. NUlllt'roUS experiments in the Fim World War had shown thaI it was rebtively easy
10
I.II;lS pbnrll'(l that the hanga~ could lx, opem.'(1 forward to aUow aircraft to uke olfflom that leyeLan idea which was later ab.1ndoned. With more than 22J)(X) tons displacement and speeds of 30
bow:; and stern. and it
kno~, the lhree ships providl.'d the nail)' with ""Iuable experiencc during many exercises in the 1930s.The PuriQJI5 carried 33 ai=ft. the others 48 each and they increased th" potential air power of the imer-war fleet dramatically. CI"riOlI5 and C",n~l1fi'll5 wen.' bolh squandered in lhe early scgl.'S of thl' Seeond World War. COtm~lIS was torpedoed on a filtile anti-submarine parrol in 1939. and CloriO/lS was sunk by the guns of the &1t",,,I"'1St and C"tiw.",,, after C~puin D'Oyly~Hughes misunderstood
ht'r role during the Norw<:brian campaign. Furious scryl.'CI \vith the Home Fleet for most of the war.
Conversions The Furious, Gloriom and Cwr'W"llS were light baulecruisers. ordered by Fisher I'3rly in the First World War for an expedition into the Baltic that lIevl:r took pbce. As planned, the FuriollS \v.lS to !la\'e t\\'O 18-inch b'llt1S and the others four IS-inch each. The three were eccenlTic ships by any stand;mh and \\'ere known to the lower dCl:k as the Uw~ H<4t'~ and Hoprlm. FuriollS was quickly fitted with a cke-olf deck forward. then a landing deck aft but air currents ()'.'er her central supersrrucrure made this arrangement impracticaL In 1925 she emerged flom dock as a fully convened carrier, without the island superstructure introduced by Eaglr and Hmllts. She had a small retractable conning tQWCt on the foredeck and even smaller one<;, for navigation and aircraft controL on either side. CI.mOllS and COllmgrollS followed in 1928 and 1930. this time with a sllUlll island. All three ships had a lIight deck which stopped well shon of the
HeOrl
carrier in a
convoy, a. Oftn by the pilol. with the bauman in view On Ihe p
.ide of the
flight deck, in a
lannch an aiTCr.o.ft fmm a ship. but lIlueh harder to land it Oil
the Sll'Tn in the airflow created by the superstructure. Th.. AtgJlS, convened from a liner, was on trials when Ihc war ended. She continued in service until the next war, but her 470-fool flighl deck was tOO shon for modern operations, She served in trade protection and as a training carrier in the Clyde, and delivered aircraft to Malta. The Eaglr of 1924 \\':IS built on the hull of a battleship ordered by Chile, with a longer flight deck of 652 feet. She introduced the 'island superstruCture' set off to the starboard side to lea\'e the flight deck unimerrupted. and established that thu was a practical proposition, She .served in the Mediterranean and South Atlantic until she was sunk in Operation Pedestal, the Malta convoy of AuguSt 1942. The Hrrmrs. also of 1924, was the first carrier to be built as such from the bottom up, and the only one for some years. At 10,850 tons she was smaller than the AtgllS and she was little changed between the wars. She served in tlll.' Far East at dte bt:ginning of the war and was sunk by Japanese dive bombers in April 1942.
Opposite: An
aircnft land. on an
wanime posler by
The Ark Royal
Roy N<>ekold.
In 19JJ the navy began the design of a new curiel' and the Ark Royal, laid down at Cammcll uird's shipyard in Birkcnhead in 1935.
incorporated all the expericnce so far. She was similar in
si~e
and
IUlow: A lake-off from .he ded..
speed to the three conversions. but she was built from the bottom up. which allowed a far more efficient design, She had hangars on tWO decks to carry 72 aircraft. Her flight deck of 720 feel was far longer
of the CO"""gfi>""
than allY used before. Unlike previous carriers. her aitcraft were fully enclosed in the hangars, although they were not protected by
following in esse
in aboul 1935, with a dHltoyel
of accidenl.
186
Churchill's Navy
armour. With a complemem of 151 officers and 1630 radngs, she ('llll."red service late in 1938.
Ilelow;The A./o R"T"I sinking in 1941, with the crew
being laken off by d....roy....
The Am RuyaI was the only modern carrier ill service at the bo:ginning of the war and soon beamc one of the most famous ships in the world. \Vhen building, her hull lowered alxn-e the houses ofBirkenllt.'...d and her height ga,-e her a distinctive appearance. In s.:ptClllOCr 1939 Adolf Francke of the l.Jiftuuffi \~ decor:lled and promoted. for sinking her in the North Sea. though in fact she was N.ll'ly damaged. and he made no such claim himself. and was ("\lcntUally driVl.'"1l to suicide by thl' strain. German propagand.:l :lSked, 'When: is the Ark RD)'
BOllon>: A
Swordfi.h landing 011 the IIIW,tri"WI, the li...1 of the
Armoured Carriers By 1935 the Briti5h were becoming concerned about the increasing power and value of aircwt, and their ability to inflict dtlllage. Brirish
carriers were already well protected agairnt accident:ll fires, and it WJS now decided to armour the flight decks so that the aircraft in the hangars \\'Qnld be safe from bombing. T\\'Q new ships, thl' nll'S/riOl'S and VIf/OriOl<5, were designed on the gcnenl lines of the Ark RO}'llI but with their hangars protecled by 3-inch armour on the decks abo....e and below. and 4M inches on the sidt:s. In effecl.the hangars were large bo.xes which contribute
CAM and MAC Ships Meanwhile dl'5ign policy was moving towards smaller ships which could be built quickly and cheaply and spread over the oceans. The question of convoy protection was extremely urgent in the spring of 19~ 1, and 35 mercham vessels wen' fitted with calapults to launch a single, expandable Hurric:me fighter against Germ:m Focke-Wulf reconnai~nce aircraft. Known as catapult aircraft mercham or CAM ships, tlll'Y had SOllle success but it was a desperatt' measure. [n 1942 another idea was adopted, by fitting merchant ships with flight decks so that they could ny off and land a small number of 10"'performance .urcraft for anti-V-boat palrol in the air gap in the middle of the At:lanric. Suit:lble ships were selected, with a speed of at least 11 knots and room for a flight deck of al 1l'"
•
L
ships or merchant aircT:lft G1rrieT'i, they made 216 Ath.mic crossings in 19+1 alone and lkw mon' than 2600 \oOnks. Although tlwy mounted only abom a dozen att:lcks on U-boats, their deterrent effect \1'£'1 importlnt.
Escort Carriers Since at least 1926 the Royal Nal'Y had been planning: for small aircT:lft carrkn to t"Kort individual convoys, but th ... projl'CI5 Wl'n' always pushed uide in favour of larger carriers. In 1941 the captured German m"rcha'lt ship Hauollf'r was converted and fe-named Alldatily. Carrying six or eight Martkt fighters, shl' l"SCortl,d Sl.'wr.ll C01WOYS, shot down fin: enemy :liccT:lt1: and damab'Cd K"VCT:l1 ochers before being torpedoed at th.. end of the year. The Aail'ily \v.l.S also cOlwerted from a merchant ship in 1942, :lnd was to l"KOrt many C01WO}'$ for the rl'St of the war, followed by the Prt'roria Caslle, Nairaua and Vinde.>: in 1943. But merchant ships were in short supply, and th.. Royal Navy was to find a much larger \oOurce of !."$Cort carrieT'i in the United States. The US Navy was already developing its own ideas on escort carriers and the first one, based on a standard merchant ship hull. was completed as a carril'r and turned Q\'Cr to the Ro)"al Navy as HMS ArrJrer. She entered service in at the end of 1941. although she had lllany teething troubles due to her fast building and the inexperience of her crew. Four more of that class followed. each with a wooden flight deck Hl feet long, a tonnage of 8200 and .1 speed of 16 knots. They carried all air group of 15.They were follQ\ved by the eight ships of the Arr
The Light Fleets By late 1942 the Royal Navy had already begun to plan for a cheaper urri...r, which could m."\'Crthelcss keep up with the fleet and oper;lte high-performance aircr.lll.. Thl' loss of the Pri,ue of 1I'illes and Rrpulst confirmed the nced for earners to accompany battleships, and four classes of'light fleet carriers', totalling 24 ships, were ordered in 1942-3. Th..y had adt'quate flight decks, weI\' almOSt 700 f<'l't long, and could make 25
knots. Thl1' were lightly built aecon:ling 10 lIIen:ham ship standards, with none of the armour which protected the /II'/sltilll/s and her near sistcrs. Only four of the light fleets were in commission by the end of the war with Japan and they played no pan in the conflict. They wt're, howevcr, a triumph of design and some lasted many YC.1rs in service. Many were transferred to Allied nations and they were used by Fra.nce, the Nethcrl.1nds, Brazil. Argcntin.1, India, Australia and Canada. The Hermes was not launchcd until 1953. but went on to lead the British n..et in th.. Falklands War nearly three d..cades later.
The Design of a Carrier According to olle of Britain's leading aircraft carrier desiglll"n of the pcriod.J H C Chapn1.1n of the Royal Corps of Nal"JI Constructors: The airrmft rarrier pn:Wfrl$ IIII' ualul ro,mnlaor wirll wme of d,e ",0$1 diffirnlr problems ClII"OIIllIrn-d iI/ lI'
='
Fle.. t carri"rs n....ded powerful engines. Not onl}' did the)· have 10 keep up with the fleet. they might have to turn aW
Top:
Th~
Em","
fII
or
th~ m~..,hanl
Abov~:Th~
"""on
carrier Rdj
at
S.,anl., in 1944.
188
Churchill's Navy
handling YIl/. AcconunodatiOll on aircraft carners was in principle the ume as on other \Y:Irmips, with messes for all the different ranks :IrK! trad.. groups as on a ooltleship. It was even more o::rowded, however, panly beaus<: of the higlwr proportion of offic('"l'S.As orighulJy pbnlled.
..... :-.
nlountings designed not to protrude abm'l: the flight deck and interfere with flying. Pom-poms were common in the early years bUl soon Ihe Oerlikon :lnd then the Bofors prolifer.lIed.TIle AIIQ(m clas5, for l'.Q.lllple, tud eight Bofors and up to 35 Oerlikon moumed on sponsons al IWt) levels along each side.The kamikaze threat in dw Pacifio:: nH;":lllt that ("\lC1l more guns Iud to be :ldded.
The Flight Deck Early British flight dccks were nor completely fbt, for 'round-down' was o
•
Above, Briti....irenoft carrien. 1. The
HtTllUl.
the tint ca.-rier buill as tueh from the keel up. She was
too unaD for IJ>o, job, and ........nk by Japanese .ir attack in 19H. 2. TIM: F.ri....,
COnftrt~
&on> • ligbl baldecnli..,r,.s .he ..... in 1942.
). The Arlo RArwI, wilb her double bani'" deck. was .ignmcantly higher than bUr carrier•• ~.
The lII.. tril>llJ in 1940.
S. The E",ptN••
all
IKon curin (o",plned io 1943.
6. Th.. CalQ..... the fint of the lighl flee' carrien 10 eDle. ..,.v;"e, al the tDd of 19.....
then C:ltch up with it again. The four-shaft geared rurbin~ of the fmplil£
or
were kept low in the ship to avoid imerrupting the hangan. and this was not too difficult with turbines which took up linle vertical space. The 'nornul warship fe:llures' mentioned by Chapmall included anchors in the bows. Mooring lines had to be used as in any other ship and rectmgular holes ...."ere left in the hull ncar the bows and stern for
used both forward and aft in an auempt 10 stteamlilW the airllow. H<M'Clw. it rcnd<.'
189
Naval Aviation
::; ~:: :;:::::::: ................ ...... ... ..... ..., .......... .... ... ................ .. ... ...... ....... ............... " .. .... .. , .. , '" . limt'o Tht' Ark Royal had three. 1:'.\'0 to starboard and one to pon. to servin' hl:r tWO hang;lrs. Gr.ain ships convened to MACs had one lift. while convened oil tankers had none. Aa:t carriers h~d mobile cr.md so dut crashed aiftT.lfi could be rcIllO·.~.-d qUickly. and eVEs Iud llrcnfi lundling booms on dther side. Night flymg bghlS wcre fitted. carefillly designed so that th~ would rll)(
gl\<e the ship ~,,~ to surf;oce cnfi. Outriggen "'n'e fined in bttT )'C:U'S. 50 thai all artO'3fI could be hung paroa1Iy O\~ the side OUt of the \\~ of Lmdtng oper-mOllS. Fleet and hghl 6ffi: carriers Iud IO\\~ oflarg!o g;i1ltr11'S aiong exh sWk ,,;m Ihr oWn ndio :aerials s1ullg ~'t'C11 ~n. They \\'n'e ratsed \....-rncaIIy when m usc. and b\l:fC'd then eying W:liS m ~
The Superstructure The uhnd supersrrueture o( a tleel Clrner was its IKe....\'" an~. II ,,-as gl\\'"n a streamlirnod (orm in the Ark RI1'f'II and some Ialer shJ~. to reduce inlcrfercnce O\,,-,"r thc fhghl deck.A cenam amounl o(sp3ce was takcn up by the need 10 ttunk funlKel gast1 Ihrough it. but Ihe superstructure containcd a number o( key arus. The most oc,..;ous \\";15 the oomJn55 pl.nfoml from which the ship \\";15 SI~red, (our decks above thl' flight deck on most tleet carriers. CI~ 10 II was Ihe Commandcr's (Rying) control po"iition. fined with nuny UlStrument:! :md with good communication to allow the hl"ad o( Iho:- air group to comrol optr.ations on the flight deck. The air operations room was on the deck below thl' compass platform. :llId was used b). aircrew to K\-"1 the blest information bd"ore flymg. cspecWIy when:l separ.lIe briefing room w~ 00l: provided. The Colpuin usually h~d his office inside me island, and d\oC' air ~nment office W:liS close 10 It. \\;th ~ comrnuruonng dooc or halCh. A lecture room W:liS pbccd II'wde me SlIpersuucn11\'" in me llldomu.1blt dag and later. equipped ,,;th bookC:l5('. bbckbc:wd ~nd n'iC1.
By the end of the .....;u there "'n'e plans 10 add an air mtdbgence office .....heR- officcn could peruse ICCTC'I: tnatten m sedusion. The all'crafi direcoon room \\~ sciIIln the SlIperstrUCtUl\'" at the end ofthc war. though then: \\'n'e plans 10 IDO\~ it do
direct contact \\;th the Conmunder (Aymg). Ready rooms (or the :l1TCT'CW .....el\'" pbced as dose to the !light deck as pos'Iible, equipped ,,;m 1I0tice bouds, dnwo:-rs (or person:&! equIpment. sencc bunks (or ronng between OpentiolU :lnd lockers (or f1ytllg gear.
Below Decks Below decks. the space tended 10 be dominaled by the huge hang;irs. 3nush designers were \~ry concerned with sa(ety and the hang;irs o(the
~
TIw llipll dedi: of •
typical Oeec carrier.
i
;
lI/ustri
500-.....<111 bulbs. conesponding with the rows o( Slowed aircr.afi.. Theil" decks had arrangnt\oC'nts (oc 5eCUfUlg mcnIt in b:&d \lo~athcr. AJrcnfi \lo'n'e usu:&1Iy pushed rn:&nU:&1Iy InlO place when Slowing them but some ColTrIC11 Iud mnsponen or rail S)''Slcm5 to 1lIO\~ Ihcm sidcv.~ as II \lo~ difficult 10 get the bst ~ or dun: ;wcnfi uno the comen.. All this was supcrv1SCd by the hang:&r cono-ol officer. and by the end of the war there \\'n'e plans to gn\'" him a position 8 (eet or 10 (eet ~oo..~ thc deck U'orbhops \ \ = t situ3lcd around the hang;us. mcludmg shops (or tngmt' 5Ulppmg, damng and assembl)~aircnfi met:aI working. sparking plug servicing. e1ecrriColI and insuun\oC'nt repair. :md radio and radar repair. P"r.>ehutcs had to be hung and l'C'p:lcked l\'"gUlarly and :I 40-(001: table \\~ provided. with a hanging comparnncm. This W;lS not available on CSCOrl carriers. which had 10 lIlake their own arrangements, Aviation fuel was S10red in eompanments low in the ship. (Ol'\V,ltd and aft o(the engine I'OOm. Ready-use ammunition 'MIS kept ill S1ll31J qllalltitics JUSt below the flight deck. Bomb lifts were filled on larger carriers. and sped:&! Irolk-ys wert' used to transpon and load Ihem. Torpedoes were mostly stowed :II the ends o( hang::lts. Aircra(t spares were stowed ingeniously 10 sa\'C as much sp:lce as possible. The (a\'Oume me was suspended from the deck above. between the beams. Engmes. winS' :lnd C\~n fuSC'lagcs could be hung Ihere and eVEs could Colrry the equiwlenl o(six Sc-afirn betwern the beams. Sp:m- propeUen ,,~re hung from sicks or bulkheads or kept
eon.u. avnmod i.,w dM .....gar of
190
Churchill's Navy
disassembled. Smaller spare pans were kept on T;lcks aft of the afrer lifl 011 fleer carriers_ In addition, each squadron had a suppl)' of ready-uS<' stores and specific spaces 10 keep tlll'llI in. Offices ""-ere needed for the air department of the ship. Aput from the air office near till' captain's cabin. th.. COllllllJnder (Flying) was expected to use his cabin as a personal office. The air engilll:cr officer had an office fitled for work on plans. and shared it With thl." air electrical officer. Each squadron on board ;ll~ had sollie space for adminiSlr.ltive work. equipped with 'cupboards. rncks, notice board. ndiator. telephones. desks and chairs for at least three people'.'
2 The Personnel of the Fleet Air Arm
commander in th..
Apart from Combined Opemions. and Coastal Forces. which had no permanent post-\v.lJ" existence. the Reet Air Arm was the navy's gtcatest single growth area during the war. In 1939 it had a fcw tmined pilots and ob$<.'rvcr;; but vim,aUy no servicing crews of in own. By September 19-\4 it had more than 63.000 men and it was the only branch which was still
RNVR ai, branch,
expanding at the end of the war. in prepar.ltion for the connia ,vim Japan.
Below lefi:The shoulder straps
of. Iieutenanl.
divisions dealing with naval warfare, and airfield and carrier requirements. The Fleet Air Arm was established as a separate manning divi~ion soon after til(' n
and hi, o},g,..er'.
Recruitment The Fleet Air Arm Hierarchy Below righl: Rea•• Admiral MeG.igor,
the C.ptain and the Conllnander (Flying) walch fighters landing
from the control position of Ihe c..rie. l ..iltfttil"hlr
in
1'«.
NaY.11 aviuion was normally administered by the Fifth Sea Lord. a member of the Board of AdrnirnlTy. Howcvcr, Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer w:l~ appointed Chief of the Na\';ll Air Service in July 19-\2. because Churchill believed that he would 'bring a fn.osh mind to bear 011 these problems'. His senioriry meant that he would OUTrank other m<'mbers. and he w,,~ not able to sit on the Iloard of Admirnlty. This nude it difficult for him to gel his polich.os adopted. and he left afu:r six momhs and the old system resumed.' Under the Fifth Sea Lord WeTC se\1:rnl admirals including those in chaI},'l' of carrier training and naval air stations. The naval suff also had
[t was important for the Fleet Air Arm to l'"StJblish a slrong identiry with the public, 10 prevent aU the suitablc airerew candidates being a[!ra.cted [0 the RAF. It did this by combining the long-standing prestige of Ihe Royal Navy with the glamour and ,",xcitemem of
flying. But this did nor remOVt': all the problems. An RAF flier knew th~t he w;\~ the centre of ~nention, put of Ihl.'" dill.'" of thl.'" foTCI.'" ~nd instantly recognis.able (0 the public by the winged badge on his breut. [n the navy, the ship always came first, and airer..w wore less prominent wings on their slet'VC$. The navy Tl."fused 10 subvert the norlll~l promotion IfruCture for the sake of its Jircrew, and promotion wu far slower than in the RAF. Old boys rf pub/it stlrools, ri/llmillg 10 r/rdr st/roou 011 lfisi,S as Midsllipmw a,rd S'lb·UtlIlttrarlts, saw tlltir t<Jmempamriej, wllo Irad joilled lilt R.A.F., ri/llmillg as Squadron uadrn and ~Ving Commalldl'rf, a fotl w/r/ell flOI umtarurally Ilad ml advtrse eJJta "" rtl'rllirmeur for rlrt l\'awl Air Arm.'
In the RAE promotion depended almost entirely on leadership in the air, whereas in the navy it depended on vacancies and on Ihe perform~nce of other dutiC$. Up to the r:mk of wing (QllUllander (equivalent to a naval commander) an RAF pilot hJd very few adminisrr.ltive duties, whereas every naval air officer ""';IS expecled to t~ke ~ full parr in the running of the squJdron. The Reet Air Arm's advanuge was that it could Jimost guJr:mtee a commission co pilots and observers, whereas the RAF used an increasing proportion of serge~nt ~ircrew during the war. Pub[ic schoolboys tended to expeci a conunission whatever service they joined. but middle-dus boys tronl the grammar schools were less secure and might be lured to the Reet Air Arm. But this did nOt me~n th~t the force was entirely middle class.John GodItj', an old Econian who bter inherited the title of Lord Kilbracken, found that four or five of his 16 contemporaries in training were also public school boys. though shy to admit it.'
Officers and Rating Aircrew Originally the Admiralty had envisaged that a large proportion of aircrew would be t:ltings, just u many RAF aircrew were sergeants during the war. One of the motives for the split with the RAF in 1937 W:IS the desire to min T:lting pilots ~nd observers, because of the shortage of officers. Ai late as M~rch 1941. the establishments for Fleet Air Arm squadrons allowed for about a third of pilofS in fighter squadrons to be petty officers' But in practice the Admiralty h~d already found a way of distinguishing air offic"rs from odwrs, by using
th.. air branch ofth.. RNVR. lis officers wore the well-knowll wary stripes with th" letter A inside the curl. According to Charles Lamb:
,,/10m rlrt Navy, or aootU stam"ns!rip or navigalioll, and could IrOI Itl' '" allSWfr allY '1u~slioll w/ridr was /101 abo"l aviation. III orllff words, il was tilt Ollly luJ<1gt Ner wor" "y a ""wi OffiUT ro i"dir"l~ Ilral Ih~ II!fOrir was not '1t1a1ified to do somelhing,'O
A~
left: Recru;ls
~xpw~d
Above r'gill: Brili.h and American lrainee. _lit to the'r a'n:nfl 1<>
This allowed th.. navy to recruit large numb"rs of pilots and observers direct from civilian life without having to give them a fuU training as naval officers_ [t was com'enient, because the Admiralty now believed that they needed 'officer-like qualities'. An RAF pilol usually km:w the aim of his mission before he left - to intercept a t:lid, or bomb a city, for exampl... The situation ~vas naturally more fluid at sea, and the Reet Air Arm pilot might fmd an enemy naval force and han: to decide whether to engage it, with Whal weapons and taclics he had, or to wait for help. He might have to direci the battle fleet or ils guns onto a target, dearly a job for an officer. As a result, the great majority of pilots and obsen'ers were commissioned officers during the war. A few pilots remained as petty officers, either because they had blotted their copybooks during tt:lining, or were regarded as unsuitable to become officers.They were mostly confined to second-line duties.
begin .nilling ••
Selection and Early Training Air crew recruitment WJS one of the mo~t important ta~ks of the war. All aircrew were vohmte"n for a haurdous but gbmorous role, and they needed good eyesight and very high medical standards. Their selection took priority over everything else. ~nd a young nun could even b'('t OUt of a TCS"rved civilian occupation if he volumeered successfully for aircrew. The RAF founded the Air Training Corps (ATC) in 1941 to catch candidates )'oung, from the age of 14. [t W:lS far IlIOrc succn-sful than the Sea Cadets spollSOTl."d by the Admiralty, but its chaner included the recruitment of boys to the Fleet Air Arm as well. Raymond Lygo \\':IS in the ATC when he first came across the Fleet Air Arm. 'They were mon: than jU~1 pilots, they were in the Nary. tht-y were part of our great u
Bunker Hill, Indiana. The aircraft Ire ~ing Stearman Kaydels.
193
Naval Aviation
CandicUlIe5 were selecled by mu~rvlew and stiff medIcal enrmrunon. They wcrt' sem 10 HMS 51 v,rutm u Gosport for initial ruval lraining. under the watchful C)'eS of Chief Pcny Officer Wilmon, 'of the ycUow fangs and the bloodshol and unrt'rmrnng C)~ and a \'Olce !lice a rust)' wmch, and Petty OfficerTnm who had been l;\\~my )~an a postman and \\'as not relishing his rcull 10 the coloun·."They learned naval discipline m the same ~ as ill new cmnnu. by foot drill. They \\~rt' rr:rincd in a ceruin amoum of seamanship. for they had 10 (:G-QPt'nle wilh ships and report on enemy activirit'$. They also learned aOOuI the lU\igation and thc theory offltght before bemg sent on to flying rr:rining.They u~re a.lso selcceed. finally. for further training :IS a pilot or observer.
Pilots Pre-...·OIT Aeet Air Arm piJot
o.ff imo u-;lId (bul u.;lh what COI"tII/ration!), dimbtd 10 600 fm, madt a ti1TUil, Ilud (bur u,;lh whm ehreJrilrgs Illrd rt..:httkiltl!S of/rim artdjlaps, of spnd and heighl!), I.l"dtd; a snit! of
After inilial t!';lining. pilots wem on to more advanced schools. flying Ininers such as the Nonh Alllerican Harvard. or obsolete aircnft such as the Fairey UalCle. According to Hugh Popham, 'We had learnl how to fly an aeropbne: now we had to learn 10 use il: and 50 the rouune of tUrns. naYig:ation exercises, preClutionary bndings. gavc way co formation flying, di\-e bombing and firing p!';lctice at a towed I:Irgrc·... On quakliC;l(lOn. pllolS were au'OlTdcd their wings to be \\'Orn on the though It ~ done 'WIth faJ" las ceremony than in the RAE They ...~re 5C:lected for specific types ofaircraft such as fighter. torpedo bomber or rccOlUU1S$aoce. They usually Tl:tUrncd to the United Kmgdom for further tramlng. as optnnonal f1ymg im.'Olved much closer co-optnrion wilh the fleet. and learning British ncher Ihan Amcriun methods. They \\~m 10 operaoonal Ir:iIlrung bases such 2S Cr.u.l III Scotland for IOrpcdo bomben. Yrovilcon in Somerscl for figtlleTS, and Dund« for the amphibians usrd in ships' flights. Simuluon ...~re much usrd at this stage. ioduding the Torpedo Auack Train«. whu;h aIIo....ed a pUoc to ptxtice aiming a torpedo quite rcahsocilly. They abo had to lurn deck landing. pncricing on a shon runway ac RNAS Arbroalh Ihen doing their fint bnding; on A'J"S. the world's oldest arner. m the Firth of Clyde. slt"t'\~.
Observers The navy used 11M: cerm obscn.'l:T to describe the 'back~lcn' III lIS aircraft. They "ttt' cqwvakm co IUVlgicon In the RAF. but in the IU"'y thac term ~ already Iaken 17)' dup IUvigaton.. FunherrtlOf'r. the obscn.'tt had many Olhcr duries. such as spotting for gunfire. shrp rccognibOn and openung the radio and rear guns when a IC:kgnphlSl an gunner ....as noI: camedln null)' \\'2)'5 !he lU\')' regarded !he obscn.'l:T 2S more Importml than the piloc.. The mosI intelligent men \\'l:l't' often sdcaed for the duty, md they mnamed ebgible to We COffifJW1d of ;urcnfi and squadrons. Unlike non-pJ!ol:urcrew in the RAE Obscn.~TS, unlike pilots and servicing CtrN5....~re almosl entirely Ir.lined within the IUvy.Mer initial Ir.lining al 51 Vineml. tuIf \\ttt' senl to Afbroath In Scodand and the othen to the more exotic location of PI.llTCO III Tnmdad. ThC)' ....ere gh'Cn a good deal of ground mining in IUYigation and lIleteorology. srin in the rating of leadtng :umun and w"nng square ng. In the air. their instruelon wcre uswlJy officcn who were unhappy u me mcnial \\'Ork they Iud been assigned w.
'And u~ u'fluld 14'" bt going loday?' 'If)'l1u doo'r mind, Sir, ro14ld uor pltlUt dtpllrr lWn' Iht &Iljcnh H,,'tl su,;mming pool "II a courJt cf095 drgrm.' If WlIS Illulf)'S Iht su,;mmiug pool: 1111 imilgillllf)' aifffajl cam" 'sail'ftorn Ihlll poml III Il speed oj 25 /mots en Il caUlK of 030 dtg7ttS, Ihus ",inging It clost: 10 Ilrt lillit porr ojSlo,U'hllVl'll 1lji"IlU hour, "r "ftith limt WI" _Id haw romp/tltd a dqg /rg roUIK (ll.\"t ,ht st'll alld _/d Illltmpi '" Ilml~ Cl'l'T, or 'mltrrtpl' Iht (Ilm" rht appropriatt limt Il"d pIa« on Iht C04SI. ThtSt alft"'pls bl'OOktd m'lCh sarrasllf cammmi from tllIr pi/DIS. 'LeSf tJgaiu Iltt U~? A"d U'hm u'OlIld you SIl,~SI U'" go "OW ifu",'fF "Of '" mlu /lUllh?~'
_'d
a,
Ai, liu,."
A' wo,k Or
On 0.. ,.ngine
• Swordfish on boud 0...-4" H."".I. RAF ..... n
_ .. ,.n.pktyed throughOUI
Ih,. war.
Churchill's Navy
194
ntd, .. rltJ'fy and ((Imp/ml)', ,"Ihm II SJ"'« of ~r 10,000 yards.lVilhin Uwl tnra ..,. lilt, sltpl, dunlt, (hafrtd wirh our frimds, altrndd m..rrh, "",'dled films, look o"r ~ - and jl(lV, I.mtkd Of rnuhnJ our lIirtr.yr." 171m
IlW 110
~ flighl
Cku weCClSd weh as T
Gm.:, Iwd '" be (orurllmfy rrmindd Ihlll '1Ill amr"",' dId IW/ "..."n 'no Iusd abw/..,ely no mt::"ns ofltno.mlg hou' IIWnr nllN'1
A;rcnfl h.1tdJen on...";ng a Hellcat
on 1M deck of doe llUlif.rtit<'tl~
in
tarly
The observer's b~dge "''as designed in 1942. in urne- for a great cxparwon of numben. It lud tWQ wings, unlike Ihu of the ItAF navigator ..... ho only had one. bur they were clipped shon. LIke: the pilol's badge. it W;lS worn aoo.,,-, the bnid on the left sleeve.
19~5.
Telegraphist Air Gunners The one bnnch of Fleet Air Arm air(rCw which was dominated by
ratings was the tcJegr.lphist air gunners. They had the buic nlnk of lc:adillg seaman, whereas all RAF aircrew were al IUSI sergeants, one rank higher. They W<.>fC recruited from men who were physically fil
enough
10
become aircrew. but did not have the education required
of pilou and observers. A(ter b:.uic naVOl] tnining at Royotl An/Illl' and S, VinurII. they w(Om on to RAFWorlhy Down to learn the 1""'0 parts of their tude. Gunnery ....'as monly with single: lluchine: guns on Oe:xible: mounts in Ihe: re:
Flying Stress The Fleet AIr Arm did not ~uffer the: high cuu...lt)· nte of pUIS of the RAF such
To compound the: probl..m. th.. navy h
Servicing Crews It is c;:h~ractcristic of
195
Naval Aviation
on their lr:lining, 3nd selected young men werc scm on a three-ycar coursc from 1938. The n3vy disagreed with the RAF about the length of training net'dt'd and for once It set up tIS own course. which moved to Neweasde-under-Lyme after bombing in the somh east. Air 3rtificl"rs would specialise in either 3irfr::llne 3nd e"gine or ordnance 3nd electrical. They wt're trainl.'d to bl.'come highly skilled 3nd responsible men. A~ ~"'tior I'karka/lIJrd ordllaflrc /tlailJ/nrllllrt ralillg ill Flcf! Air Arm, takes rlla'lr of lIIorlu/IOp alld jllllior Illaimrllalr« ralings all rtpair, lllltrllau/, modiJialtion alld illsptr/ioll of l'I«trim/ ami ord"atlrt eq"i/""elll of a;r(mfi. &",im, rrpair$ mrd ol'(',hallls e/wriral grar wrllrollillg Ille firill~ ofgll/IS mId rarmolls, oprratioll of gWI fUffl'ts, lorprda, bomb, deprh dtlltge sWi'rgs lllld wrptdo droppillg gear. Services
Bm the first three-year course only started JUSt btorOI"\' the war. and only 300 were tr:lined per year. so it W;lS not the answer to the Fleet Air Arm's short-term needs. Air finers we".. st"lt·cu."d from 'nwn with tWO and a half ye;lrs' civili3n experience who p3ssed tr::ade test, or from superior rypes not necessarily possessing any previous tr::ade experience'" and trained in 3 shortened version of tht" ardfict"rs' syllabus. Thcy WOrt" forc-and-aft uniform from the beginning and were rated 3S leading seamen soon after qU31ificadon, with fast promotion to peny officer and chief. or the opportunity to qualify as fully-fledged artificers. They were also more specialised, in either .1irframe who wore the letter"A' under their badgt", t"ngine (E), electric31 (L) or ordnance (0). In addiTion. radio mechanics were reg:lrded 3S equivalent Though they were nOt necessarily spedalist'd in .1ir work. Air fitters were trained by the RAF in huge base~. such :IS Ht·dnesford n...ar Birmingham. where more than 5000 nJval personnel were stationed in Autumn 1943. A torpedo bomber squ3dron \V3S allocaTed a chief 3ir artificer Jnd eight 3ir artificeri in March 1941, 310ng with :In dectrical and an ordnance artificer; but it was recognised thJt these r::ates were in shon supply and 'Air Fittets of any rate and appropriate trade may be employed in lieu until the necessary Artificer t1ltings become :lV3ilablc'.11 Like artificers. air finers were qualified to sign Form 700 indicating .1 plane's airworthiness. Below them were the air mechanics, who wore the square rig of the seaman ulllil promotion to petty officer. An 3ir mechanic w:u a 'Semi-skilled maintenance rating employed on minor inspection and rep.1ir by replacemenL·" Few had any previous trnde exp.·rience but they were sent Oil 18 wcdts' Tcchnical tt1lining under the 3uspices of the RAE Like the fitters, they were divided into airframe, ellgint>. electric31 3nd ordnance Jnd wore .1 two-bladed propeller b3dge in~te3d of the four blades of tht> filter. Air mechanics wete needed in large numbers" for by 1944 .1 squ3dron W.1S .1llocated one air mechanic (A) and one (E) for each aircr:lft wiTh an air mechanic {OJ between twO and an (L) bet'.....·en three." For most of the war the navy uied gener:ll service se3men to manh.1ndle .1ircraft, in what iT regarded as 'unskilled work on the flight deck and in the hJng3r", E3ch squadron h3d about a dozen
men for its own needs, while for more geneTJI purposes 3 Iarg,· carrtt" of th.· tIIl/slrious cl:lss w
3 Aircraft The Role of Naval Aircraft The naval aircraft as used in the Second World WJr W:15 invuiably a fixed wing machine, which could l:lnd either on the dl.'ck of an ain:nft carrier or on the SC3 alongside another ,vJrship. In 1942 the Admir:llry ga\~ serious eonsidcntion to equipping merch3t1l ships with the newly i",'ented helicopter, or its fon·runner thc :lulOgyro which could land vertically but needed a short t:tke-otf run. Det:tiled plans \\~re produced for flying platforms. but the first Sikorsky Hoverflies only entered service in Febru:lf'{ 1945.The Admiralry, unlike the inter-war RAF, ,~ deeply and rightly concerned aoout th.. problt"ms of navigating an 3ircr::aft over a featureless se3 10 find ill; t:lTgCt ;lnd then b3ck to :I mobile platform. It h3d moved on from the early 1920s wht"n it itlSisted on room for a full-sized charT t
Swordfish wings
being cousuucfed in an ain::rafi f."fory in Yorbhi...,.
-
bte III Ihe ""ar. It WOlS posSlbk to adopt the 'pusher' U,'OUI. pcrlups "1th the engllle mounted high abol~ the- fuscbb'l" ,md Ihe pmpeD" behind II as III the- W;\lrus, but thiS "';1$ .wocute-d "1th low performance-. Otht'r :urcrafi had the ,mgi~ in from of Ihe- cockpIt. te-ndmg to reslflCl thepllofs ~'Iew forwards and dowuwards. Purpose-buIlt n"nl airenfi. such as the Sworrlfuh and the Manlet. often had the cockpll slightly rluSI"d to give a beul'"r vil'"W for d«k bndmg, Jnd perhJps the cockpll level with the lcadllll; edgt." of the wing, as with th.. l3~rr:lcuda. Adaptl'"d bndp[Jnes.such as tht, SeJfin:. did not enJO)' th~'SI" advantagl"S. Onl' problem of the Fletl Air Arm WJ~ IIIJt Its aircraft t..nd..d to Sl"n'e 111 small numbers aboarrl ship. which m"Jn1 that multi-purpose deslgn~ wen: needed. ThIS tended to cause: delays lt1 production. W that they w..rt' ofil'"t1 obsolett befon: they tlllerc:d service. [n July 1940 the Commander-ill-ChIef of the Hom.. Fll"et complained: Thtrr> is Il() gruing r1U\1)'f t- d~jJa dUll thr 1I:rlrns, IItt SmJflljisJr QtIQ rltt SI..,",. 1l4clfh afttr 10'"f _ths cf...".
Out of about ;a dozen
b'b~
llrms in th.. I3mish ;\in:'nft mdustrY.Ihere:
""~n: t:wo which specuJlSCd ill t:IJ~'li ;am:-nft (~ dlSOnct from brge flpng boats Oper.1ted by the RAF). U1.:lckburn 'urenft of Em Yorkshm: Iud produced;a whole Ime of torpt"do bombcn III lhe Inlet:-W
Top: A Sufire
for the:
laxi~1
constl1lim on dr$ign.Two- or thR"t'-Sl"JtI'T alrrr:afi: had to be bulh u'lIhm
on
.f1u landing
the lII... trionu.
hiS dum :md equipment. Thu
W;IS
a seriOUS
the lmuts of Jlccnft o.rncr stowagt.", and often using th" 1OI111C ",ngin~ single-SC'J(cn because: thl:SC were thl.' only Olll."S J\'Jllabll',
;IS
Ab<w.: A Martlal run. Ull ;b a"g;ne
on the Oigl>l deck
or the
""""jJdJ~
•• ili' crew 1M cl>o<:b.
IiI
On
The ProblclllS of Design The milit;lry aircl"lfl had dn'eloped fast in Ihe luI' 1')305. It had already acqull\'d an alUIIUIlIUlIl alloy intl'rn:.r.1 ~trucllm: instead of J wooden one and It now bcg;ln to usc: a meal dun ;u Wl:U (Ihough progl\'SS III this \\0lS not complete by 1939 and th(" hlgh-JX'rfornunce Hurnc:mc stili Iud p:mly f.. bnc-
now tud a rcuxubk und~ (0 reduC"C' dng .md :m cndosnJ cockpil. Acorn cngill<"S Iud lnlproo.Yd In pcl\\\"T-\\\"lghl r.ltlo. fud consumption and rclJabwl): MO'il ob-.-ious of ~II, the monopbl}(" was rapidly succttd:lng I~ blpbne.The 01dc:T I)'JIC' Iud rd.led on two ....ing> fO£ its "",in <'(rnIgth. "1th one- bnced against tM other by ~ S}"MarI of dDg-
durtng the ""r. The F..ircr Avi;uion Company of Hayes near London. on the olher hand. produced nun)' ""mme types, including eht tot:pedo bombers Sworrifish,Aloocore Jnd Uarr:leuw, and th.. twOU5('
Sl"at fighters F\JIr.."r and Firefly. The cOl11pJny'~ chief design!'r before che war. Marcel Lobelle. was Wl1lCtlllng of a genius. though unli".. It J Mitchell of Spitfire {Jme he mostly workl:d with dlfficulc na\'al spI'cificatiolls ~nd nl" .... r produetd a sl1cce~~flll hlgh-pcrfot:manee alll:nft. Like alll3nmh allcraft firtns In warume, Fairey ~ ..t up 'shadow factories' III co-opcralion \\1th othcr compal1lt'S and most Sworrlfish. for t'xamplc. were built by Blackburn at Leeds, Th.. Jet engme did not reach the- Fleet Air Arm until JUSt ..fier the w..r. and only the ('~rmans used d1oc:1s on aircraft. W aero cngmt:s "'t'rt' pelrol-dri,"('n and fell inlO two lIlam I)-pes accordmg to the arr.ulb~t11l:nt of the ql.tn
Tlwre \\';15 a fceling that their machine gun armament "';15 not sufficient against such robust planes as the Fockc- Wulf Condor. The Supermarine Spitfire, designed by R J Mitchell, W:lS one of the most succc:s.sful. famous and ~autiful airct:lft of all time, and it W:lS adaptcd for naval use. This occurred qUiTC latc in thc dt'\'c!opmcnt of The Spitfirc. which had reached Mark V, with tv.·o 2(}mm cannon, by 1942. About a hundred aircraft were lilted with arrdter hooks and went to sea as ·Spidill.'S (hookcd)'. A naVlli Vl."rsion, with a more efTecti\1: arrester hook and lashing points. was known as the Seafire m and entered service with 807 Squadron in June 1942.The first version built from thc beginning for naVlliusc W:lS thc Mark II, which also had catapult spools. The Mark III added folding wings :l.Ild it becamc the most common version, more than 1200 of the 20lXl Seafires produced. Thc Hurricanl" dropped from the production lines mid-war. but the devdopment of the Spitfire continued. with thc Seafire not far behind. The Sealire Mark XV was the first with the new and more powerful Griffon cnginc giving a top speed of 384 mph; but it only entered service in May 1945. Despire being produced by a company called Supermarine, and its dt"Kl"lll from a linl" of seaplanes that won the Schneider Trophy for Britain, it was not easy to adapt the Spitfire to a carril"r-bascd fighTl"r. If \\'as tOO delicate. its range was tOO shott and its undercarriage was TOO narrow. It
Top: A Swordfish ~ockpil.
Abo\..,: A F.;rey Barn~uda
in Oighl.
T1w Hawkn- Hurriane was the R.AFs fi~ monoplane fighter. rccognisably cU.-scended fium a linl' ofbipblll'S product-d by tlu: company sincc the Fi~ World War. and still retaining a certain amount of fabric CO\1.·ring in its con$tnlction. Though it was more conventional than the Spitfire ;l.IId had a slightly inferior performance. it was the principal defencc of Uritain against air attack in 1940. Its introduction TO na\";ll :;crvice w~ alrm;l$t accidental. when some had to be ev:lcuated from Nom";ly by the carrieT Clon'oru.This was tile first time high-performance modern aircrati: had landcd on a Llntish camcr. and it opened many eyes in the navy. including the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Al't't. 'ftlst God' if/Ire "'UiIlNS 4f/yillg Oil llud o?!fII ClIm·/.T blllllOUl rll/l/ ;1 Irill bn-I, d,me byj.",r RAF JlilolS i" GlatlidlOf$ a/ IheirJim attn/IJlf lIud rm Hum'(am:11,arT IXTnjlOlnl 011(0 1I Climer lire "Ulller slrould /If rlXOluidm'd.'"
•.. U'l"IUlI'l" "111M II
It "''as October before :;criOllS investigations began into using the HurriCJ.Ill· at sea. and January 19~ 1 before the first 20 modifiation kits WiTh arresTCr hooks and catapult spools were ordered. In thc mcantime. another version. the Sea Hurric:'llle IA. was fitted with caupult spools only. for it "':IS ullwdcd as a smgle-nussion fightn to Ix· calapulrl-u from merchant ships and land 1ll the sea afterwards. Thc first aircraft carrier ver<;ion. the Sea Hurricane 1B. was in service by the spring of 19~ I. filling a Il1J.Jor gap in the tJeet's defence, AU Sea Hurricalll'S \wn' conwrsions from landplancs and they nell:r had folding wings. which limit<.-u the numbers That could be carried_ Around 800 aircralt were convenl"d. bm thc rypc "':IS supcrsl:dcd by the Sl'afirc and AIlll'rican fightcrs from 19~2 onwards. As a cat..1pult lightcr. Sea Hurricml'S were launched only eight times and thl)' shot down seven enem)' aircraft ror the loss or one pilot.
••• "'<1$ 11('\'ff all aeroplatJi' de~iglled for dak IIl/ldi"K ""d, ""less o"e JI"/ i/ dOl.." J-'t'T)' {llriful/y, it would fltl," Irap bark off lIre deck aud go ;"'0 (Ire ba"ier,
The Grumman F4F-J or Wildcat entered service with the US Navy and Marint"S in 1937. They were also ordered by Britain. France and Greece and 91 airct:llt of thl' French ordcr. WiTh non-folding wings. were di\'erted to the Flect Air Arm on the Fall of France, replacing Sea Gbdiators in thc dcfenn" ofScapa Flow in September 1940.They were known as Martlet Is to the 13ritish: The Manlet 11. with folding wings and a more powerful engine. wem to sea WiTh 802 Squadron in August 1941. With a speed of 300 mph. good manoeuvrability and a reliable Pt:ltt and Whitney Twin Wasp enbrine. the Martlct 11 carried a po\wrful armament of six 0.5-inch guns and was an important addition to the fighting power or the fleer. Later \~rsions. known as the Wildcat to the 13ritish 3S well as thc Americans. were 20 mph fastl·r. More Than 11(l() orthcm wcre supplied to the Royal Nav)'. They wcrc succeeded by the Grumman Hellcat. which reached 3 speed of 380 mph. and wert" first used by 800 Squadron in July 1943. More Than 1100 of thl'Sc wen' supplied and they wcre monl)' used III The Pacific. The Chance-Vought Corsair W::lS ::Inother classic design. one or the fastest carrier-borne aircraft wiTh a speed of up TO 415 mph in its later \1:rsiorls. It had an IIlvencd gull wing TO allow a short~r undercarriage. bllt its cockpit was tOO far afi 3nd the pilot"s view was poor on landing. It was initially rejcctcd as a carrier aircraft by thc US Navy. but the Fleet Air Arm was able to usc them in this role, partly by t:lising the
Naval Aviation
cockpit 10 Improve the view.The COrs
Two-Seat Fighters The singJe.sear fighter was adequate to defend the fleet, bm the Admiralty fdt the need for a Iwo-scater carrying an observer, in order to proteel bombers on 10ng.r.lllge offemin' opentions. Fighters wuld usc the bombers' navigation on the way OUl, bUI might well become separated in air combat over the targel and have to find their own way home, This probkm tcnded to diminish during the war as incre;lSingly effective radio navigation aids wen:: fitted, but a new problem began to emerge. Enemy aircraft could now attack the fleet at night using thtir ndar, and night-fightcr defence was essential. RAF experience' showed that a second crew member \\'a.'l needed to operate the air intereeption (AI) radar and the two-seat fighttr had a new lease oflife. Tht.· Fairey Fulmar was adapted from a light bomber which had already suffen::d heavy losses in France before it joined the Fleet Air Arm in mid-1940. It had the same Merlin engine as Ihe Spitfire, but in the Fulmar it had 10 power an aircraft of 11,000 pound~. nearly twice the ",,-eight of a Spidire, m its top speed \\'a.'l only 246 mph. Five hundred and sixty-three tmered service, forming a large proportion of the fighter defence of the fleet in the crucial years of 1940-2. The Americans did not develop the two-seat fighter and several projecled British aircnft failed to materialise. The only other two-seat naval fighter was the Fairey Firefly, first used by 1770 Squadron in July 1943. Its performanct was rather better with a Rolls Royce Griffon engine and a top spel."d of319 mph. By the end oflhe war 658 ofthem had been built.
Torpedo Bombers The torpedo bomber was the most effective offensive weapon of the Flel."1 Air Arm. and perhaps of the navy as a whole. British na\"l aircT;lft launched 609 torpedoes in anb'Cr during the W2[ and had a hil nle of 33.5 per cem. compared with 22 per cem for submarines and 16 per cent for deslroyers. But torpedo carrying was only one task of a lllultirole aircraft, which had 10 be equipped to spot a ship's gunfire. carry om reconnai.ssance over wide areas of sea, and larer [Q carry our antisubmarine anack. The Fairey Swordfish, the Aeet Air Arm'~ Standard aircraft at the beginning of the war, was firsl flown in 1934 as a multi-purpose aircT:lfi. According to Fleff Air Arm legt'nd: 'when trying it OUI ""~th all those differenl loads some wag n:markcd that. "No housewife on a shopping spree could cram a wider ~iety ofarticles into her stringbag."The name SUlek and from that moment the pilots always called it the 'Sttingbag'.JO It was tht." only biplane to sen.-e in combal throughout the \var. It took part in the atuck on the [Ialian fleel at Tar.lllto in 1940 and launched the torpedo that fatally damaged the Bisl/larck in the following year. Howe\-er. it failed to Stop the ScI"",a,or5t and GIleisem", in their Channel dash in 1942. with heavy losses. Its tOP speed of only 139 mph did nOl inhibit il; it found an afterlife in the new MAC ships and escorl carriers, as a low-performance anti-submarine aircraft
operating in areas of ocean where enemy air power was weak or non~ existent. It aim operated from short' bases in this role late in the \var. The Swordfish was a hard ael to follow, and its SUCCt'Smrs were disappointing.The Fairey Albacore introduced an enclosed cockpit and a slightly improlle
199
A cuta....ay view of
the Sllpermar;ne
200
Churchill's Navy
Dive Bombers Though the RAF was scomlUl ofdive-bombing. the .uvy ~w quile early
bm suffidl'lll/y Ilbot~ and bl'hind ILl" 10 make ro'WlThlliOlI JKWibie. Or! a rougll day rhe H-alrns Maws moll' like Il (OW tJUl1I a bus - a wry ftiffld1y (OW 1wwtvtr.:N
on that il provided a wry effecdw \vay ofltitting a mO\iug target such as a ship. When ilS specification ....';1.5 issued in 1934, the Blackburn Skw. w.IS
About 500 served \vith me Fleet Air Arm before catapult flights \vcre
seen as a very adv,lnud monoplane design, but it fell into a COilUllon lr:Jp
disbanded from 1944.The Walnls continl/ed in usc: with the RAF for air·
of British naval aircrafi design. By AUgu51 1939 it
sca=e.
IV<1S
compbincd that:
Dut 10 ll,t J}{ yt'a~ which "ow elapsd si.1a tilt illltplilm of lilt dnigll, l!r~
airrr4r
The Supermarine Sea Otter \.\r,l5 intended as a replacement for the Walrus. It had a traCtOr rather than a pusher layout for the propeller and \~s
generally more streamlined, but by the time it came into service
in 1944. the original conCept was obsolete.
Training and Second-Line Aircraft On.. hundred and ninety Skuas were ordered and they entered service with the Ark R,qy.tl in 1939. k a fighter it shot down the first Genn'lll aircr:lft by the Aect Air Ami on 25 September 1939.& a dive bomber it $:Ink the cruistT KooigdJtrg during the Norwegian campaign, but it ....'aS too
Since the Reer Air Arm was essentially an operator of shipboard
slow at 225 mph and \.\r,l5 p~ out ofoper.u:ional service by early 1941 The American Curtiss Helldiver wu highly successful in the Pacific.
crews would fly in scrvi",. For training observers and air gunners it
aircraft, it was rather restricted in its usc of support aircraft. Most of its pilot training was carried OUI by the Rl\F or the Canadian authorities, and for its operational training it tended to use the actual aircrafi that US<.'d a variety ofaircroft, including the multi-seat Airspeed Oxford and
with the resuh that the British were only allO\\led 26 of them. built in
De Havilland Dominil", and thl" sm.aller American Stimson Reliant.
Canada. and they saw no oper.ltional service. The Albacore and
Another training rol.. was th.. target tug for anti-aircraft fire. The
Ihrracuda had some provision for dive-bombing and the lattCr aircrafl
Doulton·Paul Defiant, a failed Rl\F fighter,
distinguished ics.elf in the role, but the lack of a successful specialised dive bomber remained.a g.ap in the n.avy's range of weapons.
requirement units. Another approach was to use a radio-controlled
\~s
used by many fleet
drone. Thc Queen Ike was a versioll of the De HaviUand Tiger Moth miner, used on both landplane and floatpbne vcnions.The btter could be catapulted from ships of the fleet and landed after exercise.
Floatplanes and Flying Boats Large ships, cmisers and battleships could carry a small number of aifCroft for recormaissance and spotting for gunfire.They could be c.atlpulted into the air and then land on the sea. Wheeled ail"Cl'3fi such .as the Swordfish could be converted for Ihis by adding floot\., at some COSt in perform;lnce.
Thc Fleet Air Arm had a variety of .mall transport aircnft for communication work. Thcsl" induded the British biplane the De Havilland Dominie and monoplane Airspeed Envoy, as well as the American monoplane the Beech Expediter. The Fket Air Arm used small numbers of twin-engined RAF types such as the Bristol
while specially-designed flying boat\. had a hull for landing on water.
13eaufighter, Vickers Wellington and De Havilland Mosquito for
The Fairey Seafox floatplane was a typical pre-war biplane, one of a series produced by the company, Small numbers served wilh the fleet
tnining and shore-based photo reconnaissance.
and the Seafox had its greatest IllOlllent when one was launched from
Weapons
Ajax to spot for the fire of three crui5ers in the Battle of the River Plate in 1939, It remained in service until July 1943. The Supennarine WalnlS was a flying boat, one of the cbssic aircrafi of
flexible mountings were operated by the tc:1egrophist air gunnen and
the war. It was produced by the same company as the Spitfire and Sewre. by the same designer, [t, too, had its origin in m;lchines designed to .....i n
Walrus which could also mount one firing forvn.rd. The short-lived
Opentional naval airr:rafi carried guns, mostly for self-defence. Guns on usually consisted of a .ingle light nlllchine gun firing ali:, except for the
the Schneider Trophy, but it is difficult to imagine two more different
Blackburn Roc, a variant of the Skua, carried a four-gun turret as used
aircraft. The Walrus \-Ilas a biplane with a hull for landing in tho;> water. an
on Rl\F bombers.The GrunUlllln Avt'nger wa> more successful with its
engine mounted
turret mounting a single .5 calibre gun, \vith a .3 calibre weapon below.
1.1.'(:][
above the fuselage to keep ir clear of the sea, and a ahead of the propeller. It .also h.:ad
Apart from that, naval aircraft had fonvard-firing guns aimed by
retractable who;>o;>ls to land conventionally, It had a crew of three. with a
pointing the aircraft. Early British-built aircnft had .303 machine guns,
pilor in a nther angular enclosed cockpit, an observer buried deep in the
from the single one carried by the Swordfish to the eight-gun
'pusher'layout in which the engine
"'as
fuselage but with access to a position ahead of the pilot for a forward-
mountings of the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane. American aircraft such as
firing gun: and a teh:gnphistjU51 behind the observer with his own rear-
the MartIet introduced the more powerful .5-inch gUll, and the Seafire .and later \'Cnions of the Sea Hurric.ane brought in 20mm cannon with
firing gun afi in the fuselage. The Walrus h.:I.d a top speed of 135 mph and a cruising speed of 40 mph less. Its good flying qualities made it popular.
its exploding shtll. The standard air-launched torpedo was 18 inches in diameter,
TrmlS are made with slow dt~lity, Ill" 0111' miglJl imagilll' Il 6Q-srarff bl/s 011 a smootl, road. Pif'l'S and tobaao lOme our, the tnmspamll pa1lel jj !lid Ol-I'l" our heads, />.41 IJrI' side u;mlow is lift open for fresh air. The I'llgil1e makeJ a stl'lldy roar
compared with 21 inches for a normal ship-launched one.The Mark XII in service at the beginning of the war ....'Cighed 1548 pounds - less than half a shipboard torpedo - and had a nnge of 1500 yards at 40 knots. A
201
Naval Aviation
bter version. the Mark XV, had a r.mge of 2500 y.uw at the same speed. Depth charges and mines were generally fOO heavy fO be used by shipborne airc....ft. though depth charges were u~d by Co~tal Command. and m.ines were laid by Bomber Command. Naval aireralt could carry a variety of bombs. although of course nor the huge olles de,~loped by the R..AF in the war. Probably the most succ~ful onr-s
fl/lg, offbrakfS /lnd aW
were those of 500 and 1000 pounds carried by Barracudas in the attack on the Tirpi/Z in 1943. Unguided rockers proved a very effective way of attacking surfaced V-boats after their introduction in 1943 and
Aircralt were usu:llly bunched in 5ub-l1ights of three. with the leader of each formation taking off first. ThOS<' in the :lir would fly b:lck and forwards at 1000 feet over the imcnded course of the flight until aU \\ocre in the air and the formation \v:lS assembled.
lIIany Sv.'Ordfish operating from e1COrt carriers or shore bases were fitted to carry them in t\\"O racks of four. The sundlrd rocket was JUSt over 6 feet long and had a warhead of 60 pounds.
Deck Landing
4 Aircraft Techniques and Tactics
Desk bnding \v:lS the defining skiD of the ain:nfi carrier piloLThe pilot was guided down by the deck landing control officer. generally known :IS the bJt'lllun because of his nuin tools. His sigJ1:1ls \\OCre mandatory. 1 picked up Um'fII"'" MrQlltt'll qlli'f f"rly, a lillie doll-like figure wilh his (oniforfi"gly held 1l0rizoll/al. III/flut: (Oll(etJlralioll alld i,/SfalJl respo'ut: 10 Ilis twry lIIal't'llltlll. hlili"ily il "II SUllied i" slow mOlio", lI,m rI,i"gs happened i" a nlsh. Sllddfllly the ship malmali5fd all around me, the b.1tsmllll jaw Ille em, Ihe plalle Ihumped On 10 the detk, fire hook (
Much of Fleet Air Arm flying was simibr to that of the RAF and other aerial services. but there were many techniques that had to be specially learned: Gying of[ and landing from aircraft carriers and ships. navig:lting over a fe:lNreless sea :lnd in torpedo and di\oc bomber attack on shiP'l. for example. The differences beg:ln when :lircnfr were made ready for ilight on the crowded decks and h:lngars of:l c:lrrier.
Deck Take-off During operations. aircnft were kept in sevenl states of readiness on the deck and in the hangars of a nrrier. On Stand-By. they were nnged in :I position for uke-off. This meam that the :lircnfi required ....ocre set out on the :lfter part of the deck. leaving the forward part clear for the first take-off run.The engines \varmed up :lnd the aircrew were briefed but not necessarily in the aircralt. At Rudiness. they were :It 10 nunures notice for bunching, with the engines warmed :lnd the night leaders ready for a fin:ll briefing. If Available. they were in the hangar ready to be nnged. If on Stand-Off. they were at 30 minutes notice to be ranged. and if Released. at two hours notice. Although aircnfi could be launched from C:lrrier decks by catapult. it was a slow process and it was far more common to Nrn the nrrier into the wind for both take-off and bnding - in the Home Fleet in 1943. this was reg:lrded as having the relati\~ ,vind 10 degrees on the port bow. Dy the Air Fightilrg Insln.mollS. Gying llUght begin while the c:lrrier was stiD turning :lnd was still 20 degrees off the wind." A carrier would hoist the :lppropri:lte flag fi\~ minutes before turning. The adminl could decide whether to tUrn the whole fleet imo the wind. or just the carrier in question. which would then h:l~ to c:ltch up at the end of flying operations." When bunching :I brge formation. the Fighting InstruaiolU of 1942 suggested an interval of 15 seconds between pbnes. although the /lIustrious cbimed 10 to 13 seconds in December 1940." The take-off usuaUy began tow:arW the stern of the flight deck.
Aircraft parked on the flight deck
The flight dtlk rifji,n lloU","S Iris linle flag arollnd Iris head 10 fell me 10 wind II,e er!gil~ up to full rewluliolls- Hold il for a momelll. Then dow" wilh Iht
of the INd"",ifOW" in 1943.
Naval Aviation
how
f~r
lhe alf(:rafi
"'';IS
blown olr course. It wu ame-consurrung. but
k~dcrs of fomunom were urged to carry It out ~ the group
a\SC':mbled.
They were 10 ~ the inforJlurion to other cr~ws. so 111011 in lhe C'\'C'tlt of SC'pUaUOfl they ....ould ~ able 10 find therr ....'a}' to the target. or homC'. If na"'ganon was unsuccessful In finding Ihe way ~ck, an aIrcraft unler could usc lIS radio and radar to dil'C'Cl than in, though in ~n openrional area II would ~ ..'ttY reluctant 10 break radio SIlence to do thIS. l\ benc:r alteTlun\,e "'';U the brge radIO beacon fined on nUJOr earners.. When hOISl:ed up Ihe rJUSl: for opeT;uions, it TOUled through J60 degrees sending OUI a narro.....-beam SIgnal. The radio m exh aUeM "'';U lUned 10 thu and could home m on it.
"ghler ucna \\'C'l'C generally adapted from RAF p1'2Ctice. with modificuiom 10 suil ru..-il conditions.Tht' 1'·IflJlII.,i,r Fighling IttSlructloru of 1942-3 aIlov.'t'd for fleXibility.
Pighltr Wltia art ClIfISI<J11tly chtmgi,'J and If is _ mttrukd 10 CRJ1I1p ltIdMdJ4lI corrrmmdm In any 14"); 4J ir IJ IrigIIIy ~ th.u rMy JhouId _ Ihdr oun 1P1lnarn>t '" dn.ist jJmwions Iltld wail:J '" mm local ntrds UluJ coruJjtiClfu. .. ~
A 6ghlt'r attaCk .....as di..,ded mlo three sugcs: the txtical ~ppmJch. which began the moment the enemy ....';U S1gtned; close com~t ....·hkh bepn when he "'';U ....ithin nnge. C'\'t'n if fire had not llCl:csgrily bun
mer
Reconnaissance and Spotting l\ reconrulss,ance might be ordered O\'C'r a specified geognphical afl:'a. or :lJl area in relation to the fleet such u a SC'CI'or of 70 dc-l,'Tt'e'S m front of II. It demanded good navtganon and the O~T'\'C'r ....';U e"JlC':Cled 10 plol the alrcraft·s poslllon C'\'C'ry 20 minutrs. ~ there might not be time to do il once the enenlY ....';U sigJnw. For mght KarchC'!, parachute flam nught be used for iIIumirution. On finding a submarme, a reconnalssan,e aircrafl would norm.ally alla,k it immedialely if at all possible, as il was likely to di\'e.lfit was a surface ship he would ha\'C,~ 10 be "'C'ry ,alt'ful aOOm his identification, especially of merchanl ..·csscls whose characleristics were leu easy to cbssity. If Ihe U~t W
opened; and the break <1."''3)' the com~t ce
pilou look '" illll",PJI immn/ililtiy. Thty W'l'n' rMst uno eouldjudgr Jpttds NIWS if pUfSuil',lry IlSiltg t)'tJighl <JIuJ 1M tllU
if ilpprollCll,
Ot\'P1aki'!f Jp«tf if uboul 50 miles Oil /reo", arrd art lingle off if obo,,' JO drgrm. l1wy ll'llll/d Ihtll hdl't
Defence of the Fleet l3y Septt"mber 1941 ClIrncr officer'S "''t'!t'
ro /It ~Iy Ironnl, 1/ ww}mly bonrw In 887 '" M palrolllllg
IfJ
"'" J"O"" WIngman Of yo,,, jllgllI Wit Mrltmnly palrolltrl
lint back illrdfonll
In an elevated posmon nur the centre of the room. In a l1agl.hip he would Iu\'t' tht' flen FDO silting neXI 10 him. The main dispby plot was in a cucular cable surrounded by S('\.'C't:l1 plotl(:"rs. with intnceptor ploa on elmer SIde, su~f'VlSoCd by deputy FDOs who dil'C'Cled indi\.;dual formations. Infornution ClIme: in &001 many sourc(:$, induding th(:" ship's own Dthr md WI of other stups. Ora of pilots in the
203
204
--
NINAb nGttIU .tUbeIl 'H) &11.1
II
u NAVAl. DGtfTE:BArrAClSlO1.QllUhlI ... { Q Q ~ _,.. ,,"AL'1!.'OHlur1/D<JJ1ILl:
.tJ...."
Righi: 1'Ypfl of .wlck by na,...l
./
figh.ers.
(
flying in Vic formation•.
(
!
0Ppos;le Mlow: A
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: /'" :.,. ......•
i ( .~
:
':1',
i
,
_~'\...
<',(_-:>
~~-::> y Y i
-
'" .orpedo in an
unci" ,he war.
Attack The torpedo turned out to be the most cffccri\-e WC3pon of the Fleet Air Arm, especially carly in Ih.. W
the Mcditerf\lllcan camp",ign. U't'rr (tm;fd
,ml agaillSl sllips in I,arbour m 'Tamil/v ,md rOOmk and &ll/h 4 Ma/Ill mrd dJITing IIJI" bailie of MMllplltl. all of which mel will, cotlSidembJ" IUa~ TIlis pllasl" .."dI"J 141/11'11 ll,e arril!l:ll if Gmnall airmlfi ;" Ihe Medill;Trilllealr wirh Ihe loss if effie prolr;b;lfJ II,e lise oftamers ill rlre E<15len! Aled;lcrralieall."
Ilgllins/ an flaUall (OlIVO)'
According to John Kilbrach'n who piloted a Swordfi~h for llIost of the w:l.r, 'Dropping ~ torpedo is ~n extremely tricky business'. Aircraft approached at a suitable height then dived to sea le\'el when in c1O'le range of the target. hoping to ~pend not more than 10 seconds at that level. Dropping height \V1'i between 50 ~nd 70 fel."t ~nd an ide~l range was around 1000 yards, The pilot had to allow for the mon'lIIem of the target ~nd lI~ually aiml."d slightly ahead:', ..o"er a minute will daP5.... if you drop from 1000 y;lrds. before the tin-fish reaches its target, which will meantime haye travelled 800 yards if steaming at 20 knots. So you mu~t judge her speed, aim th right di~ranc... ahead and gue» what n"Oiding ~ction she may uke· By 1942. night att~cks were possibll." when led by an aircraft carrying ASV radar. The leader ordell'd the striking force to break formation and dive to the attack, tll... n dropped flares in a pre-determinl."d position to guide them in." Fleet Air Arm pilots learned dive-bombing from the Americans.The pilot flew the plane o'ocr thl." urget until it disappeared between thl." leading edb't: of the wing and the fusclab't:. He then cut the throttle, opened the dive brakes and wem imo an almO'lt vertical attimde. though the aircr.lft was actually moving about 70 degrees 10 the vertical. He wu in the dive for about 10 seconds, during which the speed did not greatly increase due to rhe brakes. He used the gunsight to aim rhe bomb and had ro rake care 10 pull out ar the right momellt, as he could not see the altimeter directly,lO Dive-bombing was accurate against rhe sutic urgCt of the T'irpirz in 1943, rhough rhe rebtivcly light bombs did not Pl."netr.ltl." rhe armoured target. Atucking formations had to expect enemy opposition, and tht'}' were not always optimistic about o\'Crcoming it,Thcir guns ....'Cre nor e"lX'crcd to be much USl: ag;.inst enemy aircr.lft, so they had to rely on a suiuble
,
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.::¢:::Y
,
, ..
c} ' ......-..,! 'i
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:
£ro'
,i
t,,~-~
:
1t , __._....j
l,
MrO~
OpnaliolJ$
7T +
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.
Swordfish dropping
-oartl ~
-+T+/ j
Albacores
•
I
Opposi,e abo...e: Fai~
""'U
i 1'.,~- y~'-.
,i
!
formation, fighter defenn' and C\'3Sive action. TItc formation wu based on the 'Vic' or sub-flight of three aircraft in a V formation, or multiples of such a group. Fight.,rs might <"SCort fast aircraft such as tlw A,'eng<.-r. though they no longer us/:d a w('"aying motiOll as the pilots had to observe their leader instead oflooking out for the enemy. Biplanes sueh as the Swordfish and Albacore Wl'n' too slow to be <"SCortl'
Carrier Groups British aircraft c~rrier doctrine dC\'Cloped slowly and tTagment:lrily, with very diffell'nt experienc~ in the Atbntic, Ml'diterranean and Aro;:tic before they reached the Pacific. It was rare to operate carriers in groups in the early stagl."S, because they ,\'Cre in short supply due to the loss of the CI"ri"U5 and COIIT
Naval Aviation
yards apart, so thoU they did not interfere with one another's nying oper.ltions. Unless they Werl' shan offuel.tl1<' d~troyen would turn lllto the wind with the carriers during nying off!'
Servicing Mainten,tnce of naval aircraft poses 111any difficulties which are not present on bnd. [t is done in very confined spaces on a moving platform, oflen when the weather is tOO rough to aUow flying. Eaeh carrier has to be self-corllained, and il is not possible to bring in expertise or spare parts at shan notice. Na\'al aircn.ft have to endure harsh conditions al sea and in deck landing, and often have to switch rapidly from one role ro another. Nevertheless, the Fleet Air Arm tended to follow RAF procedures in ils servicing, There Wl're four main types of aircraft inspection. undertaken before a flight: daily: a 'minor' inspection after every 40 hOUTS flying or quarterly, whichever was the shorter; and a major inspt'("don after every eight minor onC'S, Work was f(.'("orded on RAF Form 700, which was signed by the pilot before a flighr. In the early stages of the war the record was eventually transferred to a logbook and Iht.' forms dt'stroyed. Howt'vl'r, this was dropped to save paper and the forms were retained as the only record. 'The Form 700 became extremely dirty and almost unreadable, and dll're W('re m'wr enough "boxes" on lhe log eards to earry Ihe Ill'ceslary information·. l i Each air("[;aft type had a handbook whidt outlill\.'d maintenance procedures. The Supermarine Walrus could bnd on w;lIer and it was necessary to drain the hull and clean weeds off it occasionally. There was a det;ailt'd scheduk for oiling. with SOlll(' p;arts- lubricated by anti!Tel'zing oil. some by ami-freezing grease and some by grease gun. The Uarracuda was a monoplane with c:mlile\'er wings. so it I-'.':I.S not necessary to adjust the bracing win.-s as on a biplane. Wht'n unfolding the wings for flight. thl' training edge I-'.':I.S set hydraulically but there was a complex four-part procedure for setting the rest. The tlying cOlllrols had 10 be checked regularly and thero:' were detailed instructions on how to fill and dnin tne fuel tanks in the wings.'" In the early Stages ofIhe war servicing was carried Out on a squadron basis. This had the advantage of keeping a ~trong link between the air and servicing crews, but it tended to be wasteful of specialist l1Ianpov'er. Only a few of the most specialised ratings belonged to the crew of each carrier, and the rest were auacho:'d to the squadrons and landed. with stores and equipmem, when tne carrier entered harbour and the aircraft lransferred to a shore base. There was a gradual lllO\"t'ment from 'the pre-war ~ub-division on a rigid and parochial squadron systt'11l' to a 'wholly n'mralisl'd sausage-machine of the c1ming nab't."S ofthe \\':I.r in the Pacific'. Shore bases e\"Olved in different ways, but Henstridge and Yeovihon develope
under the deckheacls of hangars. [n other cases. aircraft \\"t're sent to shore bases for major repair or maimt'nance. This was reasonably practicable in home \\'Jten. but in the longer distances of the Pacific it was necessary to employ specialist maimenance carriers, such as the U,riro..., for longer and heavio:'r jobs.
anifo:as. Air Finen ma)' be lISCd in .," ..... r""" CPO 10 headirc hoPJ
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Air Arm
squadron, c. 19·42
Domestic
•
The personnel of
a
Admin &
Air Mechanics
Air Anificers & Finers
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5 Squadrons and Bases The Squadron Until 1933 the basic Fleer Air Arm unit was the flight of abom six that it \v.lS thc: squadron. which \\';15 ~d on the equiV
~iJ'C",fi.Afier
formation in the RAF. To avoid confusion with the RAE fleet Air Arm squadrons were numbered from 700 upwards. wilh numbers up to 749 for catapuh squadrons, 750 to 799 for u;lining units. 800 10 809 and 870 to 899 10 single-seat fighters with groups in between for torpedo bombers,sponer reconnaissance squadrons and 50 Oil. A [)'pical squadron had a dozcn aircraft of the same: type. divided into tv."O flights, as in the RAF. but in pr.&ctice there "vere many \"arianolls on this.At one extremc a squadron such as no. 700, which supplied cruisers and battleships with catapuh aircr.&fi like the Walrus. It had 65 aircr.&fi when it was
....'as
formed in 1940. and it ne\"Cr came together as a unit. Another \I1Iriation a squadron formed to serve in a small aircraft carrier with more than one type: of aircr.&ft; for example 824 Squadron had nine Swordfish and six Sea Hurricanes on Sm1:er in late 19H.» Later it was decided that all ....'as
senior lieutenants. In theory, the flight comn13nders were to be lieutenants. but soml."times there was a shortage of senior men and a squadron commander might lind himself with only sub-lieutenants under him. Squadron officers usually had subsidiary duties besides flying, for example in adtllinstration, engineering or in organising sport or entertainment. The tclegr.&phist air gunners usually had a petty officer or chief as their leader. The squadron also had about up to 90 ratings and marines for 110nflying duties. By the cstablishment of March 1941. a 12-aircrall: torpedo-bomber squadron had a chief petty officer airman who had ceased flying and was employed in administrative duties, although it was recognised that these were in ,"cry shorl supply and for the moment general service ratings would be used instead, It had seven air artificers, one ordnance and one electrical artificer, with six CPO and PO air
the aircr.1ft of the same type on a L1rger carrier should be in the same squadron. Thus in 19-14.887 Squadron had 24 Seafirc:s on /"'JlII1(JJbie."
mechanics (A) and (E). They It'd a group of 14 air mechanics. and alongside them were six air mechanics (0) and the same number of e1eClric~1 mechanics, each led by ~ CPO. In all (here were 43 technical
Normally a squadron was led by a lieutenam-collllnander. the equivalem of the ItAF rank of squadron leader, Since the navy was always rc:lUCtant to use temporary r.mk, some were COlllmanded by
ratings. making up exactly half the ratings of the squadron. Thl'!\' Wl're three writers and supply assistams for adminiSTration, plus a few more men for paT;lchute packing 3nd 'regulating' or disciplinary work, and a
207
Naval Aviation
photographer. The Royal Marinl"S providOO a dozen men 10 act as w:ndroom a{\enwnts and batsllwn for Ihe officers. though du.'S<.' \\"l're gndually replaced by members of the stcw:ml branch." Many of thc ledlllical staff wert seconded from the RAF. especiall>' <'arly in Ihe war befon.· thl' Fll'l'l Air Arm had time to Il'llin its own tl·chniciall5. A Fleel Air Arm squadron led a nomadic life, en:n by naval or air force stanwrds. In 1943 alone. for example. 824 Squadron had \5 chang<'S of baS<." $Crving in three diffl·n.·n1 carriers and s/"\'en diffl'rem shore bases. including fi\'e spells in Machrihanish in Scotland."
The Sites Since thc skies of southern England were soon filled with aircraft both friendly and hostile. most Fleet Air Arm bases were located elsewhere. Some were situ"ted ne"r the llI"in wartime lll'et b"SC'S. Machrihanish on the Kintyre peninsula sen'ed the many warships in the Firth of Clyde, while Hatston and Twan on Orkney weon': close to Scapa Flow. Many lllore were in Scotland. including those at Cr.ail and Arbroath on the cast coast. Sollie were in north-west England. such ;lS Inskip in LanC;lShire, and Maydown and Eglimon were in Northern Ireland. Hugh Popham ,,,1100 Machrihani~h the 'Cn.·Wl· Junction of the Fln't Ait Arm'. which \\'3$ not a compliment, as hI." coruidercd it
Royal Naval Air Stations The aim of the Fleet Air Arm was to operat<' ship-based aircraft. so in theory it had no m·l·d for opl'l'lltional land aerodrollll'S. although Ihis was modified in practice. The force took 0\'1."1' the air defence ofScapa Flow for a time, and contributOO to the defence of Malta. In addition. the FIl."et Air Arm needed airfid
.flre r",i't"rly <1esol"tr Slll/;Oll Y<''' ,,"illl' /If ifJ rlre e"rly Jrorm: cf lire fflorl/ifJ,g, nr, aud filially deparljrom, /Jollr rill' JVist'T. .. .sJlpreffll'ly ir is lilt: pl
in the United
AoyaI Naval A!I Station 0
Kingdom.
Satelile StabOtl •
mid_I9H.
No! COO'.I.......1lld 0
0_0_
v~:<>
oS0_
0-'
208
Churchill's Navy
,
~
~. _ 0
,
~~
..,
The Layout of an Air Station
- - - -,/ ,'
Air stations taken
OV(f
from the RAP had the convcntional layout
of the servke, with three mnw:!ys (:loch 50 y:uds wide. New llJVOII air
, I
.......
"
stations mostly had four runwJys. One suggested explanation was thaI naval pilots. tniocd to land on carriers which were steaming into the wind. were not used to dC:lling with cross winds. Another \VJS thai winds were slrong and highly variable on many of the sites allocated to the navy.
,i
The
run",,~ys weTC
arranged in various forms, always crossing one
another but not all at the »nle point, to ;lvoid the possibility of a
Righ<:Th," n.va]
air station It Crail
,
in Fir...
~Iow:
RNAS"IW8l1
in Orkney in me winte, of I'US.
.-........
t~
,
... ,-._- ,.-'or
,. t;';'..=-.,._ atn.,_
L
....
n'/t'"
single bomb putting the station out of action. H~nstridge in SomerSet was the only airfield in Britain with five runways, apart from Arbroath which had a very short one for deck bnding tDining. Since the navy did not operate heavy aircraft or have to scramble fighrers several at a time, runways al the new naVOll air stations were only 30 feet wide. They wer~ made of tarmac rather than conCrete which was cheaper but less durable. HMS Nightjor in Lancashire had four runw:lyS 30 Y:lrds wide, between 1000 :lnd 1200 yards long. They were :lngled at roughly 45 dl"grel'$ to one another to gh'e the m:lximum range ofbnding possibilities. A perimeter track ran round the :lirlield for Ihe movement of :lircraft. :lnd most had ·frying pan' shaped ar("as, each to hold :I single aircraft when disper$Cd against enemy air attack. A few airlields were far simpler than that. Dunino. :I satellite of Crail in Fife, was simply a gDSS field a few miles from the main aerodrome.
The Buildings The pre-....":Ir RAF tried to maintain certain :uchitectunl sunchrds in irs buildings, even during irs expansion period of the late 1930s, This was not possible for either the navy or the RAF in ....":Irtime, so most Royal Naval Air Stations relied heavily on temporary accommodation. The most common was the Nissen hut, invented by :I colonel in the unadian army in 1915. Sleeping accommodation:lt HMS BllUkrop at Streuon in Cheshire was divided into three Sitl'S. No, 1 as used for 196 officers and men of the ships comp:lny while the others held 70 and 162 officers and men of visiting squadrons. Sixteen ratings were aCCOllUllodated in each Nissen hut, or eight petl)' officers. Four officers lived in a hut, with fV,·O in a C:lbin :It e:lch end, while lieutenant-commanders :lnd :lbo\"e might have a single cabin. They were heated by slow combustion StOVl'S, but the medical officer considered that they might become rather stuffy at night when blackout boards were in place. Dr.linage was into the statioll's own sc\vage farm. but only No. 1 site had proper WCs - the others h:ld latrine buckets that were emptied each night.·' Various types of hangars were uscG in Royal Naval Air Statiom. Some were large in order to put maintenance facilities under Ihe smallest numocr of roofs. The n:lVY preferred to concenrrate ceruin maintenance activities in large hangars and each stlrion had an Electrical Repair Shop and all Aircraft Repair Shop, each with a brge, specially fitted hangar. Others were \"ery snull to disperse the aircraft and protect against aluck.The lIavy had a slight advantage here. in rhal its aircraft could fold their wings to t:lke up less space. Lee-on-Solent.
209
Naval Aviation
an a:-RAF iUDOn, IW six dilfen:m t)'PCS of tungar including twO bW Type u from the int~-war period. Thrtt of them wuc of the ,'")' ronunon Bcllmm t)'PC. which tud been designed by an engmen of the ))utttor.ue of Works to be erected in a hurry by unskilled bbour. The 12 Mains tungan were rebo\'C1y S1mJ1 sheds where dJspI."ncd alrcnft could be SCTVlCed. The SQoon also tud SC\-enl old se~pbne sheds, ~Ithough these: ,,-ere no longer used. Arbrmth h~d six lkllnuns, two smaller \'Cmons known ;IS lulf Ikllmans, SIX sheds for alrt.'"nft with folded Wings and 76 more sheds along the mads up to 5 IllIles aw.ty for dlspcrsmg aircr~ft, One distinctive nav,al feature was the coutrollowc'r. It was usually bl'KCr than :a RAF tower, three nOrl" high With :1Il aLI' w.ttch office on the roof. It Included ganges for ~ cnsh trndrr and ~n ~lIIbubllCe on the ground floor. with offices for the Illetrorologiol n.aff, the air lliteULgt'nce officr, :and I:tAF halson on the fint floor. and wm::lcss telegnphy and the air traffic controller on the ~olld floor.
E\'Cntually the RAF followed With brger eonuoltow'CT$. Imfidds nceded nuny other fxllities.. Arbl'()ath ~ RODb"C for 72,000 gallons of avUUOIl fud, tons of bom~ and 1I1Ot't' dan a million munds of nacmne gun ammullioon. II had bulldmg for fild tenden, bomber and gun wm:t Ir.lmmg .and all the tnppings of ~ Iluhury paR, for elGlmple the guard room at the enulInce and the officers' tIIt."$S. Thc openoolls block w.u p~rtly underground and there wen: morc domcsoc bUlldmgs such as latrines :and bundrill'S,:I church which l.erved sevenl denominations, a s
n
about airfield Ikfellce agullSt both bombc:n rod par.atroOpcn, which fell 011 the Royal Mmna. In May 19-H the)' had SQnc ullIa al JCV"tnl R~ Nav.al Air SUDOns on Ihe eaM aud south coasu.. cuh COl'lSlRlIIg of three officc~ and 110 orn~ nnh.,,)
A Sufi.., ., RNAS Y..-iboa ia
PART IX
The Submarine Service 1 The Organisation of the Submarine Service Subnurillt'S were not as cemral to British strategy in this period as they were to Germany. or indeed to the post-W,lT British navy. As Admir.al Binney noted in 1943: 'Formerly subrllarin~ were considered to ~
the weapon of thl' weaker power at rea. Their usc by the British Empire wu visu:llised chiefly for scouting :md lookout, during and after a flee' action, and for anti-subm.arille purposes'.' The Suhm.uine
Servin' was quite smaU, with only 9090 l'1ltings in xptcmber 1944.' though it was grmving with the launching of new boaG - 3226 men Were allocated to 50 new mbmarineo; planned for 1943. One of th.. difficultks of the servi<:c. as Admin! Binney nOI('d. was that when a submarine was lost the crew \\lU almost ceruillly lost with it.' Despite its small size the ~rvicC" was highly publicised, ;md it W3S one of Ihe few to take the war direct 10 the enemy ill the middle yean of the W1lr, 50 its prestige \v.l.S high. [n &Ild Down a Dew, ~ novel b:ued on Chulcs Ma<:Hardy's OWlI experien<:e, a young ordinary S('am~n spem his le~ve in Glasgow. 'He'd m:l.med the <:entre of the city, going from b~r to bu and getting a kick out of it :I.S he noticed people's eyes lighting up with Il."Spect as they caught sight of his H.M. Submarines cap IlIlly. He wished he could :l.lso hn-e worn his white mil-neck subm:l.rine jersey, but they were forbidden :l.shore.'·
Flag Officer (Submarines) The Subnurine Service W1lS :I. rebrively comp:l.CI organisation even in wartime, with its own drafting :l.rr.lIlgements and mditioru. and ~ very high morale engendered by success in action, public esteem and good relations be(\\'ccn offi<:ers and men. Men were dr.tfted from the peacetime headquuten at Fan Blockhouse at Gospon in the emr.m<:e to Portsmouth h~rbour, The headquarters of the Flag Officer Subl1l:l.rim:s was also at Gosport in pea<:crime. but in 1939 it was moved nonh. hs well as administering thl.' Submarine Servicl.' thl.' :l.dmir.t[ w.u expe<:ted to uke operation:l.l comm~nd of boots in home walen, :l.nd it w:IS intended to give good li:l.i.son with COllllllander-inChid Home Fleet at Rosyth :l.nd with a nearby Coastal COlllmand he~dquuteT$. Sir M:I.X Horton, who took cOlllm~nd in Jallu:l.ry 1940. was unhappy with the distance from London and wrote: ... Iill' FIllS Qffirrr Sllbmllrines, al rhe lime bt'ing ilr (ommlllld if all SIMs ill Ir"me WIlliTS mrder C'"II-e HOllie Btel, '''''Slrlllll HQ ill rht Firth if Fc",h will, hi, a/If!mriv"al ,Iaff, ,d,ile Ihe maren'al side remained ar P"rlsrr",nrlr rims Iht mlljoriry if papers hlld ro makt a Ili« lillie rrip (If 450 miles eMh 11'l1Y ro be min1l/ed, clUd fltt ptrSolrallo,/(/r /JelU'fftl fire fWO divisions if Ihe Slaff 1/oUj ail/losl romplm.Jy 1051. Furll,n, lire Flag Qffiln S"bmarineJ, as ptrsOlrallldvist'r
(0 Ihe AdmirllllY 011 SIMs, was quilt Oll( if I"u(h, alld his own "perorional sllpervi5iotl IIUS nOI so good. / rollldn'l Mar sl«h an otgarlisolion, despile fire golf COlltSe jllSf olliside lire from door, /lIrd derided 10 /IIrwe Ilearrr Iht Admirillry where "lie lI'Plild bt' al /tast in d"se personll/ towlr wirlr III leasl Ollt of my masfen.' Horton had his WllY and moved to a block of OalS in London,
Oppo,ite:The
.....Td.oom of an s c1..~ .ubma.ine,
The Flotillas
,..;m a view towards
British subnurincs ....-ere org:mised in Ooti~, usu~ b:l.Sed on 0 depot ship, except at Dundee where local building-; and:l. dock w\'re con...erted. Subnurines were not expeCled to provide full technical lind ~cIministr.lti,-e ~upport from their own resources., md the depot ship WOIS supposed to give better living and recl'C"lItionai fadlities for crews bctv.'eell potrols. Depot ship crews ....-ere not counted 2:5 pon of the $ublTW"ine Servia,_ which wos restricted 10 th~ who actually wem to sea. in the MIS. Each flotilla Wl\S headed by a Captain (Submuincs) who direc;ted opentioru. [n June 1939 the Fonlr, headqwrten of the Se<:ond Flotilb,
to direct the nnumem. but the submarine capt:LIn was the only ooe
wllh
:I
ckar "iew of the a'1,'tt through his periscope, and hl: :lImed
brgdy by chrerong the bo.1t
01110
it. He had
;I
truly in&pc-ndcm
comnund, for lubnurirn:s uswlly operated Illlgly or OCC'a.s1onally III pans.
tlut comnuoo
W
might COllie \1:1)' e;arly. Submarirn:s Yl1:re usually comnundcd by heutenant-
liOffiC
by liC'ute:tUnts. In 1940 the
scruorlty of beutenanCl quahi)1ng for eommand was 5iho 6){ }'~ars.This had dropped to IX to tWO )'ears by the 6rst IuIf of 1943.' Po(enual submarine conuna.ndclS SCI OUI h.:onl C)dJps on prxoaI couna. wluch 100I1 bcame kJloo,o,'t1 as ·Pertshers'. One throry su~
"""""'.....
WaDlt:lyD (with
Iud ~ conmundcr as second-lOoCOIlInulId, ~ p3)T1laStt1" hC'\I!e:tU1II as sccreury. WIth mglnttr ;Ill(! p3)'TIU$teI" comnundcn In c~oe of lhc.-tr v.lnOUS dqmnnenl$. and spreiilisl: gunnery. torpedo. ~nn-subnunlW' ~nd
beard) .00 lhe
1U\1g.atmg bcUtelUlIIS. Yl1th a warnll! W-Lpwright. tdcgnphist dectrici.m.
of mort' dUll I 100 men. When the war beg.an aU the operational Driti5h submarinc:s in home waters were sent to 110tillu n Blyth and HanVleh 011 thl' l:ast coast of Engb.nd, ~l1d at Rosyth ~nd Dund«.Alter the F~II of France there was ~ Ill()\'e to the west ~nd SC\'erai depot shlp'i moved to Ihe Holy Loch and Rothcsay UJ.y in the Firth ofClyde.The CydtJ/lJ III the Holy Loch was the headquarters of the Seventh Flotilla. providing submarines for anti-sublllarlIlC :l.Ild Combined Operations tramlllg. Later the FOrlh was ordered to go to th.. Holy Loch. while the CydtJpJ would 111()\'C to Rotlwsay. Uy AUgu5t 1940 the ~ub11larine force in Scolland consisted of the ForrlJ and IVhitr &ar in the Holy Loch \\11th Ihe Second Flotilla. COll5istillg of ..ight boats. mostly of the modern T cl.1SS; the Seventh Floulb ~t Rothl'SaY with Crr/ops ~nd 15 older boats. 1l1ostly used for tr.llll111g; and the Third Flotilla at Rosyth wuh the Tira"ia alld five modt'rn bo.1ts, mostly of the S class. The submarme b:ue at Hanvlch was d05C'd on 5 Non·mlx.-r and only tht' Nimh Flotilla remained on warnnt officom
that this
Yl~
IUllp/)' a COl"T\lpoon of the 'Penscope' Course, artother that
they YlT'l"C so-aDcd bca.usc f:tilurc would bar the cmdidate fiom my further
:I
boat to the
C)d>pf ~'n)' mOrtllllg before breUfast. He describes his 6rst 1II0ck ;luxk.
He P
old submuUle Opl'rating as a 'c1ockwork mou$<:' from Rothcsa.y.'
the North $c
Officers A typIcal Sl.Ibnunne had three junior 5Cal'tWl OffiCl'l'S. The first tieutctum \\~ "'SpOll5iblt' for adminismOon,as III ~U small ships.
abo for the !tun
of the bw.t whl'n going into xtion. The liC'Cood lieulenant W
1M uunl·roorn cf H.\fS Forth MJ bnn nitklumtl'd 1M C.JobnIVtUYJ' aula Jprauvd III 1M d«p (hain IIlId suupprd y.mu t,ntl, c1fi«nfrom Oflln boau u;m Uftom IMy IloId JhaIrd kpth d~ in lilt .\ltdJlnT.J1lMl. .\1/71 ~k S.u",Wl'IIIm
Jrmt 1M &y cf BUlgy d~ laeticJ _d opnimcrs u.,h .frinllb doct'lfmm Illt AII'IJI" Cirdr or Ill'rWI Jrom "«uuy.1ltrK UUl" K'f"J1 t.J& . ., X"flluy.· In the- Medllerrane;J.ll. the First FkM:illa opented from Ale;undru and Ihe
f~nlOUJ Temh
FIoulh was formed at Malu III St-p1emoo 1940,
lIulIII)' Yl1th U cw..s bo.ns.. and Opcr.lled "1th b'TC
Submarine Captains A lubnunne capum W
<1111
;luKk
of other ships rehed he;l\1l)' on gunner), or torpcJo officers
of ll.J\'Iganon. With a junior lieutenant III eharge of gtJtulCl)' ~nd the torpedoes. All coukl lund ~ w
213
The t'Tlginl:t'T offict'T" was the only f)'pc" of specU.hst to be found III brgt' nUl11bt'n III me wardrooms of tht' Subnunne St'niCt' and one was a1localt'd to t'xh ~aSQIng boat, t'lI:cq>l: the snullt'T U cbss.. He might be a lit'Ult"lunt or a COflU1Ussioned or ....... rram englllCt'f and was respClllSlbk nwn!)' for me diesel t'ngJnes and all tht' pumpmg nuchlllt'l')· which was Vltal III a subnunlX". Ht' could also stand a .....; luh .... hen nrc~'. for lilt' concept of'OIl<:" nUll one job' did Il()( apply In subuUflflt'S. Subnunne mgulC'er offict'n Iud to be- abk 10 opt'T"'att' on Ihcir O'\\'Jl, IO be :Kbpubk and 10 USt' tht'lr InlIUD\Y III ,Ill t'T1~. Many ne.....ly appoim~ .....arralll officrrs ....'t'Tl' dr:tft~ in agaillSl tht'-ir .....ill.. lxolJSot' in 19-fO It .....3S
their "".,a (rom ,he F.r E... in
"pril I9H.
obum EI1i>'lIl«!" Offit't'n at ally pncc and ~ of J'f't"'lOUS subnunl1(" upc'rlt'llCe'. MOSt non-\'Olunlt't'n. it was .wd.'iOCNl becaI,lt' ll"Collcikd 10 tilt' 'slll(CD of diC'Sd fud'. A hundred and n1UC1:em englIl/:'l,.'T offi~ ....'t'Tl' rnmcd for subnunnes dunng the war, of which 37 ....=c: regubr RN bC'UlC1Un~, 15 ....'rft" temporary Iit'utt'IWllS and 56 II«t'UU)' '10
......re in Ult'
COIIUII~
and W;Ur.llll gndo:s.
p<11litklllji (),w
of my frllou' mnlH'!'S" dId. It 1rc'n Ihr U\lltf "flU lit chIn
The Drafting of Ratings
,Itt prmu,,"
rqUdllsni lI11d rlU' InJ"t1Ul1or f11NPWd Ihr Iwuh
~-th of the SubllW"ulC." 5cTvIct' was quile slow comparai wllh SOIllt' br.mchcs of the navy. It t'Xpandt'd from 2909 rrgubr r.lting and 474 mobilised Il:St'T'Vists al the beginning of the war, to a pa.k ofjusr 0"l:T 9000 officc:n and nR'n al the peak 1II St"ptember 1944 - r.lther las Uun thl"t'ClOld. Howt'\'l:r, c.uualucs "''ere high and 306 officers and 2567 IIlC."n wert' 1ol.I., while many OIht"rs 100 10 be dr.lfied out bt'ca~ of ml-dical probleTllS. More th;ln 10,000 r.long'l w..re mined for the St'l'Vice during tilt' course of the \\...r, wilh a peak of3221 in 1943." The service- Iud high pn.'$uge and ofrl'n:d Cl;~rt:l.ln adv.l.nClb't.'S such as contndeship and exlr.l P:IY at the r.lle of9d to 3s 9d (3.75p to 18.75p) per
ch
The:' ....':&rUI1ll:
the: rules ....'en: dunged IO pm~1II thIS. More posIID'eIy: lecrures ....'ere held and Adnurally Fket Ordt'rs poblicist'd the ad\'ml
UfIU
.If
IttiRhI
tlU' top cf,hr
On a\"t~ngt' aoom 12 JK"r ct"1lI failed Ihe eoulW, oflen at Ihi~ ~ge." The class thl.'n WI:III on 10 the subnurint' base at Ulyth III Northumberland for IWO months' pn("lical training in ~n old S("agoing submanm:. Then thl'Y went to Ihe s.n.... nth Flotilla b.asc-d in HMS Cyclops orr Rothesay in Ihe- Firth of Clyde, whert' Ihey tl'J.int'd in old ooals left O'o'er from the Firsl World W~r. It " ...s noted thai ml"n from t1w Ch~thalll pori division h3d a far highl'r f3ilun: nte Ihan those fTom I'orf$lllouth and Plymouth - 39 J>l"r celli compared with 12.5 and 10 per ("elll. The: ~llfhoritiC"\ rl'jeetl'd 3ny suggl"\lion lhal 'town-brl"d' ml"n from tlw london an:a IWn: u&'rior. as 1Ill:n wen: spread e"enly through the home porn durmg Ihe war." The final sage: ....';IS Ihe ....'Orking up of ~ boat ....ilh if$ OJ>l"r.ltionai en'\\' in iiI{' Firlh of Clyde. In 1942 Anhur I) Dickison of HM Subnurllle s"ftn found Ihn:The 1\\'0 months based al HMS FORTH wert' heelic. We were III dnd OUI of the Holy loch and inlO lhe CI)'de- ESlUary on
trials and ell:C'rcisc: 10 brmg the boat and her crew up 10 opcr.lllorul scndard', In 1944 A"hur Hez1el look the TteJJClwm through her workmg up and trials. Guns \\~~ 6rai :l.t slt'e\"t' targetS - long pit'Ct'S of fabric 1Q\\l:d by 3uuafi - and sub-calibrt' finng \\~ earned OUI agatllSl surfxe- C1f'b'eU. One of the blj;b"t'Sl t::l5ks ....~ torpt'do anack.
Subnurine mining started ....ith six .....~eb' ~ imuucuOIl Ul the Pommoum ,k'poI, HM$ DoJIphIn, dunng winch, xcording 10 Anhur I)
Jrp.H sllIp ,lint uus ~ .$uImwnrw AUoICl: uolChrr In u.nldl, uuh modd ships IlIId
D1c1tison, 'We- 1le\'U 5t't fooc 1II a wbnunne'. IlISlad !hey ~I t o .....eeks being drilled in escape' procedure, and the USt' of thc: D '1s Submerged Esape AJlPM31US III a mock subnW"lllC' compa.rtment at the
bonom of a ank. ~ ~ t cf ,hat ....,tf llrI
,Itt Iwk
cf '"1
w.."r rising up '"1 body _Jr rht "llin Sllllld lip
Il"k lllld .. ohm
" 'owhrd my chili I ..\IS ,1Dl fir ~
II "",~'r~ 'SIJrm.mM' uull ~ shorr prrUtupr,
214
Churchill's Navy
The Ratings Each 5ubmarinc had 11 Chid" ERA under the engineer officer, with an 3\"l:~ of 15 to 18 )'QlS'~cc in submarines in 1941. .... T class boat had four more ERAs with service ranging from II yean lO three plaob.lbc ~r onc ""'ZS the 'ouWdc ERA' woo took ~nsibilil)'
pmvlCkd the nuin conaCi with th~ ouwde world and the d«tncWl Opc:nlnt th~ moton.. According to Arthur Hezle:t. 'Condmons when submC'rged on patml were re;illy quile good. It "'
for the equipment outside the engme room. such as pumps. compressors, periscopes and steering gear. The othen stood ....'lItch In the engine
100m.
ERAs "'ne in parricubrly short supply and were
dnfted In from nwty soun:e5 tnduding general SCfVItt. newly trained men and civilUn indusuy. A T cbss b<»r huI a chief SlOker, SC'o"C'ra1 KOker petty officeis, four or fi,"C' leading $lOUts and about a do~cn Jtokn. The coxswam. wuilly a chit-f petty officer. was the senior nong on any boat.As ....'ell as his disciplinuy:md adminism,m'e funcnons he \\-,s C'JI[pecled to ru.\'e knowl~ of firu aid. as there was no medical Spc'CIWC on ho:ud. Most mt" Iud a non-substantive nlc as corpedomcn, gunnen, 5ubnurinc dcl~on :md sign.illcn. New ratinp ....'en' addrd 10 the complements Oliff the )"CMl, ~er nrdUI corwdmanon of the clf«t they ...."OUkIIu,"l: on ~c on board cooks and anti-aircnft gunnen in 1942,Asdic and nWr nongs In 1943. and m('n Iclegr:aphht and $ick berth ntingot for mips strving on the \'tty long patrols In ~CT" ....'lItcn." The- :;tano;brd cn:w of 11 T d3S5 boat W3$ ~
officen and 55 men, but that tended to increase: O\n
th~ )'nI1.
Life at Sea AbJ~
Seaman Sydney Hare describes his first patrol from HMS Fonlr in the early months of the w,u.
A IlIlrrow g<JIlg plallk rail dowrl 10 Triad's s/ipptrY det:k; Wf wumbkd dlll~" il ill flIt, ~d (lur kilS rhrough a 1/nllll Muh, alrd 10 sqll«Ztd (lU~IIItI illlO 0111 ship~ illll'riOf'.11Jt.mmospJrn? l/.W Imnn and SlI/lfy. Tht l;glrlS $Nfflid dulllllld l~llns by «mlmSr wilh Ik 10le Illllllmll SlInsfl (llllSitk. So Wf 1IJfl11 rIJrollgl1 fhe flWI~lOOm ill/a till: slIlalllnt:U, CNlIlprd as il llOffllalJy IIW, lllld IIOtv, 1I,;lh I)Ijr slrllmillg bags IllllllltT lire pWt, looking /i~ any Umdotl Tubt ar IllI: 1U$h hollr. For us lh~ srale t'.f affaitJ would be nomIIlljOr rhrrr smob dumtioo Of' I~abouu. sil~~lt
11K' wbnurinu Iud to endure many discomfom :as weD :as ow:rCl,,",dmg. c~ and only possibl~ 10 me tht coile! at c~rum ames and "1th ~I~.:as the "'aSte W
10<'
SIll~U
person. It
of di~sd oil pn-meated the boat and everyone's
"''as
11K' Submarine Service "'~ essentially nocnImaI. 1beJe "''ere dutt watches. 001 only bunks for ,,",0 dUM of the men,50 they had to 'hoc:b.mk'. Men off duty "~ ~ to rest while- the boat was submerged. 10 Q\.-e air. Thc: submarine .surfxed at rught to dwgc: 10
battaxS mel matt ~ prog=!i 10 its destination with the much higher speed of 10 dlesd engmcs. Thc:se wtte fiilly I'lWlned lmdtt chc: OucfERA. thc: wue!ess opc:ntor1"'Orked hard recCJ\,mg ~ thc: radar and AsdIc opn2ton lOOk up lhe!.r sations, !he cook ~ hoc: meak and !he ~ of chc: ~ :acted as Iookouo U1 roaoon. U1 asc: of sudden au- anack.. The boal .submerged at dawn and the emplO)menl panern changed. Some of the lamen worked as hdmsmen .. nd on Ihe hydropunc:s and an ERA opented the b1ov.1ng and lloodlng panels. An Asdic opc:nlOr
2 Submarines In the 1920s and early 30s the British Iud
C'lC~rimc:nlnt
WIth
suhnunnc:s m \'arl01lS min: with high SUrfKe ~ 10 opc:nte in conjunction ",ith the nuin llett, as moniton with he:avy guns for shore bombMdment, m fh..r 101" pasMd fO Safari, and _ lind all in 1M uurd_ dtridtd ,lull .. W flu name u..
rherr
$howld 11ki.' '0 1urvr.:D
Design and Building The Subnunn~ ServJce bc:ne6ted from 10 compactneSS 1Il nuny ways. and this apphed to ship deslgn as much as aJl)'thmg else.There was \-ery close h;uson between OOiJders and opentors. G W Pampbn "''
.PUISCOI'E sm'G LOWEReD ";"PfAIScoPE SuPPOllT.
216
Subnurin('S had tv.·o propellers. held "'W
CI'OU
IeClion
of ....bnlui....
External Fiuings
conUlII 10 !be sunace,
The byout of Olher d",5SC5 W:.lS nOI very different. In Ihe sm
The l_linodiBal oection of a T class
r
I'! I
I
I!
•
I I
I
I
i
I
I
,I
The conlllllg tower of '" submarine g;lve an elevated position nom which the vcs.sel eould be directed or 'conned' .At the top ofthe tower was the bridge where rhe captain. officer of the watch "'nd lookouts opented on the surface. 111 1939 there were operiments with an ellclosed bridge or ·ub'. This reduced resistance undcrwater. but
tum
r:lIthtr Ih~n Knl OUi pmgs.lhdn Yo'3$ fim fined 10 th~ Prott'IH m 1941 but Ih~ Krvice Yo~ lukcw.lrlll ~boUI ilS \·alUt. T)"J)(' 267W W31 not rc~dy unul btc III th~ W.lr and boau for thc Amtnc.an Type 5j.
Ih~
Far W
w~rc
fined with
\nnanlent Torpedoes YoffC arried insHJc lhe rR'SSU1\" hun III !he bow'S of all optnaonal subnunno. four III Iht ~ of th~ wWJ U cbss. six in S ~nd T cWscs.. lJruuh subnunnes :lho arned ~XtCTn:lI tOl'pCdo rubes.. outside ~rc hull.Thi!:lIIIaoo."'t'd ~n inc~ of:llrmamtnt and d'It hu~ 100IOrpNo salvo of the- T c~. but they could not be rdoadcd ~t Je.J. nor could !he torpedoes be 'lCl"Vlccd.. 10 they WUI: ah\'Z)"'S kss rcli
w
w
"",lhdrcw.
ellclllY ships or for defence against a'rcr.:lft. DUI thc gun's import;;llnce tcnde:d 10 Incrc.lJe :u anaclu on merchant shIps bcc:lfJlc mon:: cOllunon and Ihe problellls of air d~fenc~ Increased. SublT\;lrm~ guns made 150 successful amcks on enellly ships up to July 1943. and 30 p:lrli:llly successful. M.llll guns wel'C upgr,:lded.The 4-mch gun ofrhe T c1:us ~s gr.ldually improved, while the 4-inch rcpl:lced the 3_inch on Ihe S cbss, and Ihe 3-lIIch rcpbecd the 12-pounder on the U class. Oerlikon anti-alrcr.tf, guns were .ldded to lhe re:lr of Ihe conmng towers of the Sand T classes. Bnnsh submarlllC'S wuaJJy cuntd Ihelr gullS 111gb abo>'\: Ihe surfaced waterline. ThIS did nOI help sublllly, but It all()\\-'Cd the gun fO be brought into action as the boat W;lIS surfacing, .lnd if made it e:uier Co use III rough Wlo'.lther.
.lnd an enbrged \'et'Sioll of 1926 cbspbccd more than subme~.The
Older Subrnarine After Its foundatlon III 1901, the RO)'31 Navy's Subnurllle $en'lce C\vh't'd its boat design quite rapidly ;;lind by the end of tht First World War It tud the highly sansf:ll({ory 'unpJ"O\"C'd H' t"~ of -423 tollS on the surf:ll(e.The btger boats of tht L d:us wt're dC\-dopcd from the E d:us .....hich tud been the- n)OS( succeulUl r:ypt during tht ....ar. Nine of the
H cbss SUT\'1>"=ClIIIIO the S«ond World War, along with thrtt of the lI., mostly used for tnlrnllg ~ These tv.'O c!:uses :lI1so provided the ~ for most subseq~m lJnw.h designs.. whlCh were C\'Oiunoll.lf)' mher dun ~uUOlUry until aner the Second Work! W;u-_ The first IIIter-wu subnunne \lo~ the expenme-mal X·I. carf)'lng 5.2-lIIch guns. It w;as a f~ul"t'.lnd tud the disnncnon ofbemg the only British Yo~ip buill aner the- First World W:1t to be scnppcd bcforr the Second. The 0VC1l('~ patrol. submarines of tht 0 c1.a:ss, tht protorypc of wtuch w;as bid do.....n III 1924. Yon\: dalgned ""'1th the long disan<'C'S of tile P,Kific III nund. They Yo'ttt adopted by the Bntish
2QOO
tons
1929--30. WUI: smuIar. Thtlr sne nude- them rather UnmanOCU\Table and future p:ltrol submannes wt're snuller.
I' and R classes. buill
III
The R.t\'" dass was dnlgncd III 1929, as .lIl attempt 10 produce a subnunne which could u.ep up Wlm the battle Ott! and bUrl(:h torpNo .lmcb on an ellC'Tll)' This had been tried wilh thc S1e;;llJJlpowered K chs:s of tbe Fu~t World War, with ~ result);. The Rn't'rs had huge wC$C1 nJgUlC'$ of 10.000 horsepown ;ond the imrrn.si\'C
The Ounng
~
.eo" Clanes me war, Unnsh submanne deSIgJl
nuin cbstles - tht brgr T
was to colw:emrate on dutt
dass. medium S cbsis and the small U class.1be
0111)' new t)]K' 10 be dc\'dopcd. the A cbss. Yo~ 100 bit 10 ~ any dftct on tht W:1t."T'hc S cbss tud 6nt been ~ III 1930 as rt'pbcc!IJettt
_.. _e-.
.....
A _ ......
_ o L .. Set..
~.".
218
,-
.
pi
~,
I.
,,~;g;.) CD
9
;;=.;)
Top' Checking the lor~o
tubel. Ab(n'~: Cl:u~s
of s"bmarin~.
Righi: An X-crafl
I. L dau '-, in 1920.
or nudgel
2.0 clan O,irilllJ
submarine, with her
J. The T'he",u as S dau &1" a.
complel~
compl~led
in t9l8.
in 19.}2. Sh was sunk in 1940.
eomple,ed in
commander and
~.
01110 of Ihe crew
S. The Tri.",ph of the T dass in t9J9.
on deck.
6. U dass V.Ji"" in 19J1. sunk in
for the ageing H class. for offensive parrols in home \\':Iters and the Mediterr.me:lll_ They we~ small COJ1lp:1red with the 0 class and ilS !iUccessors, displacing 730 tons at full load on the sulface and 927 submerged. The four original boats '.'.'ere succeeded by a lengthened Vt'T';ion with improved internal IaYOllt_ Eight of these were bunchM in 1933-5, and in 1939 five more bents of a Ihird version \wre ordcl'\'
19~5.
19~(l.
pons. Sir Mv.: HOllon's idea for a midgel submarine W:is making slow progress, so a 'chariot' or hum.:m torpedo W;l$ designed;l$ a S10PS'lP. using ideas from captured lralian nuchines. They were 22 fcct 3 inches long and the crew of 1:\\'0 sat asTride them on the outside, '.I:earing a specially designed diving suit. They could mO\'e for fi,'e or si", hours ;1$ a spe<:d of 2.5 to 3 knOts, and leave a detaeltable warhead attached to the huU of a target ship. They failed to pcnemte the fjord where the 7irpilZ was moored in 1942. but had some success against Itllian warships in the Mediterr,lnean in 1943. The first X-er.tfi or midget submarine \\.';IS ready during 1942. It \\';IS conceived by Commander Cromwell Varley, who had [cli: the navy between the wars to set up a marine engineering business. and built by Vickerr-AnnsU'Ong at Barrow. It was 51 feet 4 inches long in its de\'eloped '.'eI;ion and carried a crew offour in very cnmped conditions. Powered by diesel on the surface and electricity underwater. it could makt: a spt'"ed of JUS! over 6 knots sUl1"aet:d and slightly less und('l"\\.':I.tcr. Only aftcr hydroplanes were fitted. and these were opcr:lted by hand. as was tlle rudder. Side charges were dropped under .111 enemy ship, set to e"'plode up to 16 hours Iater.Twdv\' of dR'SC X-enft wcre built. Six took pall in:rn operation against the Trrpit::: in September 1942. towed to the area behind larger submarines of thl' S cl3SS. T\\'O Tl'ached the urget :I.lld tho:' enemy batl1eship "'';IS dan1.Olged but not sunk. A larger version. the XE-eraft, \\"as designed for operation in the Pacific, \vith an airconditioning plant and beller filosh '.'':I.tl'r supply. T..."el..... of I1ll"Sl' were buill, and in July 1945 two of them attacked ships in Singapore Harbour.
Depot Ships X-Craft Early in 1942. following til(' Italian SUCCo:'S$ in AlelGlndria Harbour. Churchill enquired into British Pl'Ob'l'C$$ ..vith regard to penemting enemy
British submarines rm:ly used shore bases, and wen: supplied by depot ships moored in the nujor porn.This allowed a cerlain amount ofuctieal flexibility, as when the n1.Olin bases shifted to the Firth of Clyde after thc Fall of Fr:lncc. The mips came !Tom sevcral sourees. The &llal'l'lmHl'.
•
,1,fonICWrt' and l.fil!fr wen: convened merchant ships; the HI/cat, had been built as a torpedo boot depol ship well before the first World War; while the Adamalll, Maid5lOrlt and Ftmh were built for Ihe service in 1937--4Q. A typical depot ship, such as the purpose-buih Folth of 1939, was equipped wilh eXlensive workshops and machine rooms, a foundry, a periscope repair room, a bakery and cold store for food. EXlernally il had 6- and 1Q..-ton cranes. Its engines were quite small and its top speed was only 17 knots. II was defended by eighl 4.5-inch guns and had a crew of 1167. Submarines would usually moor alongside it when in port. [I had re~nably comfortable accommodation for Ihe officers, but dte ere....'!' quarters were Spartan to say the least, and depot ships were never popular wirh the submarine crews.
Tht)' are Ihe biggesl disgrace in the Navy. 1 ("!lid Iell )'t'l/ scores of /flles.fronr my (}u'I experietra. Of subm<Jn'll~ rrtU'S preferring It) §' "', parrot rdrller Ill<Jtl st.1)' ill 11ll' ikpDl ships ""Joodfit ""Iyfor rill' gasl. bwkn. Of roJtings rorryi,rg IIU'ir di",li'r 01, the derk alld dilrhing it wer the side ill Jwm of Ihe em."'ander (uJ,,, u~ prob<JbJy Utlilillgj(lt' his six-roll1$e IlIIldr). Of m'U'S sleepillg ill Ihei' boots wlletl aff pa,ml, a/'hougll Ihlll U\:U agtlilUt Ihe ml~ krOItSl' ,I,ff/' U~ "0 roo", 10 slrep i" lite depot slu"p. Subffwrim: rreu'S aJ't'jJr rwlle off th<J1J tl,.. depor.ship IlJliugs.·
3 Submarine Techniques Patrol British submarit1t'S began the war by purolling ofT Norway to supplement the short range of maritime aircraft, but lost Oxley to another British submarine, Tritoll. Patrols in the Heligoland I3ight dose to Germany were ended early in 1940 due 10 heavy los~. but those off Norway continued after the German occupuion, often in support of Arctic convoys. During the passage of PQ 18, four boats were Slationcd off the Lofoten Islands and three off northcrn Nonvay 10 give warning of enemy activity. SIO'''' v,"35 one of three boal:! allocated areas off North Capt' in November 1943, as her captain describes.
Whw appro~hilrg a Ilrll' po,rol billrt ht must adjust Iht slIb",arille:S sINed so as to bt able ,0 dill't at dalllll I" the righl PCSllioll, alld 1l0t soJar aliI 10 stall'ilrd as 10 UW"te a day in gt'lti"E do~ in. Hr ""1St choose Ihe besl oJiproadr ,vlrtn ketplllg dellr of shOlllll'ater and Jor early precise idem!fi(alioll of the laur[{tlll. ." 1 u~ more rwrried alxmt possibililits (ojgoirlg <Jgmulld or dnfiillg 0.41 illlo Iht A,I,mlie{ Iho" / UW" of t1~oumeri"g Iht ttrt"'y. rr After the Fall of france subm:l.rines patrolled the narrow seas against invasion bUI suffered heavy losses from enemy patrols. They were sent to the Bay of Biscay 10 patrol against V-boats leaving and Il.'"turning from missions, but th:l.t ...."35 only Ill:l.rginally successful as losses balanced
The Submarine Service
219
victories. They had filrther difficulties when the RAF carried out an offensive in the area, and probably sank HM Submarine UIlMattll in
depot ,hip A"~m""',
error. They operated unsuccessfilily off Brest against the Scha",llorsl and G",'ise"oll, and Ben BTy.lnt found that it W:l.S 'a boring business. ""iting aboul for the baltle-<:ruisers that did nOI come Out'." Submarines were far more successful in Ihe Mediterranean. attacking enemy coaslal shipping and se"erely disrupting Ihe supply lines with North Africa. There was little 'remote COntrol' from base. They
."OI"'l1l1y did porrols of Irw f/111Jr« lt~eks, or less if tlrey Ill" 01" v/'orpt'does, lI't' carried twelve. Tilt)' would be giVf1l all area oj sell, b,1I no-olle kuew thei, l,vllerealxmts ill Ill<J1 <Jfe<J unless 50S e<J11s fro", the tIItmy wt're ill,erItJ,ted. Notlri"g "\:U "'Ort' i,ifi,ril1li'rg Jor a C. 0. Ihlll' 10 M IIIovt'd jU!it when ht Irad galhertd lire i,rjormatiOJl /(I "'ake a slrikt."
of which
Altogether they sank 286 ships totalling more than a million rons, including 16 submarint"S. [n return. tht')' losl 45 boots,1O British submarines also operated in the far East, llecause they were smaller than American boats. they were allocated areas such as the Strait of Malacca. Alistair Mars was not happy about working under American control and found the orders far tOO prescriptive. .. .il 1I\:U i'ifi'rialillg 10 <J ",all bmuglll up 0" the itllel/igerJl elastidty of Iht Ruyall\II1 "'1' . A ehup UW" gi~, <JIl
Diving Sublllarin~ of the age Wl'"re basically submersibb, far fastl'"r 0/1 the surface Ihan underw::ltcr, forced to spend much of their time on the surface using diesel engines for propulsion and to charge the baneries which supplil.-d the electric motors. Most submarines on palrol slayed on the surface all nighl and dived whcn the sun rose. The official manual described the procedure for diving. using a combination of hydrophones and flooded tanks to increase displacement.
A.fSu",ing Il,e submariut to M sill" '?!fJor dilliug a"d prorudillg alltad 0'1 htl' ",,,i,, ",olo~ Ihe 111l1ill II1"b art' floodtd, thr joremo~1 hydropla"es "re put /
The subm..ine
buill in 1940.
220
Churchill's Navy
alld prtssurt in Ibs. ptr sq. iu_, togtilltr U,;/I, law c/i"cmnffl to iltdiClllf rile "ngle c1 tire ship lire jitted QlJt!r the Jrydwp/alle wmr"u. As sOOn as i/ is knOllllllhm Ihe mail/Ill/fks art jill', tire main vems are slm/, so 111<1/ tire liluks ate rtillg.'"
Nornully this
lvaS
donc with the full crew. but an experienced one
could do without diSlUrbing rhe watch off dury, as Edward Young, for example, was able to do in the Storm :l.fter months oftr:lining_'"
emh diving was necessary if any unidentified ship or ainnft was sighted. The opoin or officer of the: \Voilch on the bridge sounded the ;ilarlll Khxon, and in case it did not work he :ilia shouted 'dive- down the
voice pipe. He might order an alteration of WUTSl: to avoid pn:sl."nting a broowide to the enemy, or to m:lke it e~ier to dive in rough se~. It \vas now v"'ry impoTUlIt that ..wry offic..r and r.lting did th.. right thing, or Ihe submarine would Ix- exposed on the surface, or in a wry dangerous condition below it. In the control room. the r.lting on w.nch \l:nteO. the t;mks and pm {he hydroplane$ 10 dive until rl'"liewd by the dUly ERA. The engin<' room suffdisengaged thl' dieseb which could quickly suck the boat dry of :lir. and put the ek~ic mOlors to full speed. At the fore end of the boat the plan
Tn.c1r. charts of
palrols by the sub",,,rin.,
Lefl: An
Tu~.
aboni,~
operation off"
ne-eded in each of the OOlIasr tanks, taking into account the en'r-changing sute of the OO
'-'"eTC
felt more
dearly.To a\"Oid det«tion it might be n«t-ssal)' to hold a boat SlOpped. in which case [he trim had to be perfecl when [he mOIOrs were nJrned off. Even then, th" bow ,-,"Ould probably t"nd to drop slighdy and the crew had to Ix- moved about the ship to compensate. In shallow water a boat might lie on the bottom. Again the trim had to be perfeCt, and the boat was brought in \"t'ry slowly ill a di",ction to S1"m any currenL" A submarine would use irs hydropbJR's to go deeJX·r. The watn PR."SSlln: \\"Ould reduc" its volum" and more water was ne"ded in the tanks to comp..nsat" for this. It had its risks during a pursuit, for th" tanks could be noisy. Submariners wen: increasingly awan' of different demity layers undeT\.....[er, "specially in are~ such as the entrance to the Baltic when: different streams of water met.Tht'SC could affect the trim but could also be used to confuse pursuers.
No.......y in NO\~mbu
Using the Periscope
1941.
Right:The Oay of
Underwater
Biscay, D«ernber
Once underw;r,ter. it \\'
1940.
Submarin~
wert' equipped with Asdic, which they mostly used for hydrophon" "ff"ct rather than give their position away by constam pinging. Ap:lrI from that. the periscope w~ the only cont:lct with the
........" , Norwegian Sea 211XW1~
_.--
-----~~-
"...",
~
"""'" -
tih-"--= 'f
--
0.,.,,,. -~ ..... _.""",,, -~
221
The Submarine Service
outside world when submerged. but it had to be used sparingly. It could only be employed when lhe bool was at a relatively shallow depth. which made the submarine vulner;lble in itself. A periscope: made: a wash which could be seen. ('Specially by aircraft. and the instrumem itself could be spotted by a sharp lookout e\'Cn when the boo! was S10ppc:
"tDIHI~
T-,..--"':..,,,-__ ..... _
••
w~~
.....
....... .............. --
-
-"...
...-
Torpedo Attack
would justifY a full salvo of perhaps six. The commander might be under orders to ~rve a salvo of torpedOC'S for large warships, ;IS Edward Young was in the Mabcea Strait in 1944, until they were cancelled to allow him 10 altack merchanl ships" The commander would also ha~ to decide the spread of a salvo. to give the maximum chance of one or mon:: hilting. [n the daylime, che auack w:u made submerged. Since the target was almost cerl:linly faSler, the submarine had 10 get into a position ahead of ic. Torpedoes h:l.d :I. range of up to 10,000 yards, but a hit at a range of more chan 2000 yards was largely a matter of chance. The ideal range was about 600 yards, bUl anything from 500 to 1500 yards was possible. The submarine had to get into a firing position ",..dl in advance. as che target was moving faster than the submarine could turn. He had to keep his speed low !O avoid decection, to filld his way round any escores which mighc be screening a v.rluable l:lrget, :l.nd to avoid sudden movements which might cause the first lieucen.am 10 lose the trim and perh:l.ps causc the boat to break surface. The commandet would estimate the enem)"s speed by observation of ies bow wave; its inclination by the distance between it'! masts, and ies discance by means of a range finder on the periscope, though chac involved nising it high out of the water, In directing the attack. the commander could use the Submarine Torpedo Director or 'fruit machine'. This was :I. kind of mechanical computer invented by Commander Wadhalll in 1929." Captain Ben Bryant, howevet, dismissed ic as 'che moo! rudimentary of attack instruments', and preferred nO! co use ic bue do che sums in his head. The commanding officer set the artack angle on Ihe periscope, and fired when Ihe targec was in place. Then he had to wait.
Ac nighl. a submarine ...."(luld usually actack on the surf:l.ce. Before an attack, the commander had co decide how nuny, if :l.ny, torpedOC'S 10 usc. Men::hant ships below 1500 tons were considered coo small for a lorpedo, while :I. larger ship might merit cwo, and :I. major warship
selo/lds licked Il....,)'; lit 45 knots Ille torpedo would lake O'\Ier lwo 10 gf/ Illne. The lorpedo t:if!icn WIlS (ollnlillg tire stfonds. Two minutes Ilnd slill t/r~ ship $Ilil~d on.
Surfacing
'Blow IlI1 maill bIllIlISt!' IIiIllIeS on tire roil/rei ptJltd wert opetled one afitr the Of1m, lind 11,m Cllllll' 1l1O<mding inlO Ihe ballast lallks. Thl' h)'droplane operators tumed Ihrir wheds 10 pilI tM pllllles 10 'risr: The ship took a slighl bow-IIP augle as WI: bf"gllil 1II01~'Ug tOIl'llrdS Ihe s1l111«. Numbtr Otte slOod III Ihe fool of Ihe Ittddn clllliflg tlrl' clrllngiltg depths 10 the Captllin, who was now ""easing Ihe clip! Of! the upper hillch; 'T~rl)':fr~Tf«l. sir. . "lwell/)' f«t, sir... F!fi«nf«r, sir... ' and 11,m Ihe Cllplllin tlrmsr his Ilrm up a/ld swung Ihe hauh open. A few drups of I/.'Illtr came dllWFI t/~ lOwer, Ihe s;gflilimiltl lind 1M 'ook-outs (/ombered up Ilnd IlS Ihe Channel 5llJell fook (hll(gt' of us I had 10 hllllg on 10 one of Ihe pciKope U'i~s 10 Slflldy m)'self. 'SlOP blowillg,' shomed Number Otte Ilblwe the dill of the roarill8 air, Ordm Cllllre doWFI Ihl' lJOia.pipe from Ilze Captain, and swn the diesels Wffl' flruudning Ilnd Ihe ship /Jeg
Th~
millures
-_.-.
~
~,._i7 __ ...__.._--.... _...- .......-
jJoo~rdJ lind
Submarines usually surfaced at nightfall unless chey were in the presence of the enemy, 10 charge cheir batteries and make much fascer progress to Iheir destination. A T class boat, for eX:l.mple, could make less than 9 knots underwater and only for a limiced period of time. On the surface ic could tnvel at 15 knoes for up to 15,000 miles. Edward Young describes the action of surfacing.
IICTlOM
-.;1IV"
'The method of dlYing a ...bnoari...,.
222
Churchill's Navy
Abo-.-e lefl: Pelty
All allful feeliltg of dfipllt' faml' QIltT IIII'; at 1lUI, aftIT all rlto~ mom/u of Ilad gOI II ,hllllrr 10 allllrk and I /rad missed. Suddmly II grial (OIWIIII
Officer WoodIer. the ....cond cOXJ"'"in of the
Trih"•• at Ihe
lI'ailil~ 1I~
fOl'Wllrd hydroplane conlrob.
Submarine Gunnery submarine captain
training On ti,e auack lucher, with the 'fruit ",ach,ne'
b
Submarine SllllS had some success in the right circumsunces.They were little u~d in North European waters and only 10 ~ll(;(;c:s5f\l1 amu:ks on ships were recorded. linking ;m a\"crage of less than 250 tons pcr ship
They were far more commonly used in the Mediterranean. where they $Olnk more than 70,000 tons of ~hipping in 268 attacks, though the ships were still very small. aver.lging about 264 tom. Ben Bry3nt suggested that the 12-pounder gun II fined 10 the U clas~ Wll 'as near u~eles~ a weapon as could have been thought or." This WOl~ perhaps true in northern w;nen. but in the Mediterr.lntan agaimt small caiques and schooners. U class boats sank nearly 16.000 tons in 88 anacks. not far behind the T class with the much mon:: effective 4-inch. Bryant hirmclf. in the 5.lfari. was confident that guns were useful in the Mediterranean despite strong air patrols, because few aircraft had radar for use at night. In the Far East 452 vessels of 64.000 IOns were dt'Stroyed by gunfire." Submarine commanders were warned 10 make sure that the gun was funClioning properly befon:: surfacing for an attack. as it might deteriorate underwater. They could allow lhe gunla)"er to look at the larget through the periscope in advance. They would Try 10 choose a range at which the enemy could not reply: morc than 2000 yaTds if he carried machinl.' b'1.ms. 4000 yards if he had a 40mm gun. It was tmportant that the gun crew got 1ll1O action quickly, e\'Cn i( they were
drenched a~ the submarine surfaced. and it should come up on an even ked to improve their aim. Submarin1.'S were warned never to engage aircraft if there w:u any possibiliry of diving." Briti~h submarines mostly worked alone, but the 'wol( pack' was developed later in the \v.lr. This was very different from the much larger German group. and normally consisted of rwo boats which had trained together. In the Mediterranean it was used by S}'lllimllr and '&Ildog. One surfaced to attack an enemy landing ship which fled. only to encounter the other. Another ucric was (or one boat to attack on each quarter. so that whichever way the target tried to tllrn it would present a full broadside." Arthur Hezlet used the tactics well in the Malacca Strait and his TTf'ue/uI/II co-operated \vith Tmaplll, using Asclic to cOll1l11unicate underwater. They sank a submarine chaser and a coaster, and drove three other coasters ashore. Sepal'3tely,lh1.')' also sank tWO coasters, four junks. rwo lighters and a tug."
Evasion Once its presence was known to the enemy the submarine usually had to dive to escape, and there it was at a disadvantage as long as its position was known. The crew braced themsel\'Cs for an attack by depth charge. The enemy normally used hydrophones to detect submarines. r.lther than active sonar. which nuglll give lhe laTb't:t more warning of lhe approach. It was a tense time (or commanders and crew. 'n,is
was what f disliked
IIlM/
oj all, rtlis si/eut wai/illg, wi)l1Ilerillg wll('"I' lile
lIeXI expl"siQU u'lIJI/d WlIlt, a"d
u~'etl'er II
u'lIllld be ue.lrtT Illau rl,e lasl m,e,
u",/ ,d,ell il cume 11ll!i"g il ",;I/IOUI 11 elM"" I" rl'lidiall', JUMble III dQ l11lylili'(g
bllr CTl:fP quietly away. ,WI b,oll'i,W what ,b( ell(my U'aj dQi"g, IIIe bafOmCI('l" witJr Ihe asdic reports."
The Submarine Service
But
the~
we!l'
c\';lSl\'e
techmquts tmt could be used when there
\\';lS
some depth or K'~ room. 0rII1' !kltfltd )'I'" wo.. ld hOlllt ro sptrd ..". milk il il\:lk - Il-ohich you hoptd M lWuld ,"urillft jJr tht SlIbltt.lnlft Itsdf- IU/d <1It" COIlfU' ilIfd dtplh. II U\lS "" gwJ ""'rig rhis li/l M U\lS COfHmilud 10 Iht ilrfllClt, pilf1ic1l/'nty
Rescue Subm~nne
crews \\'ere rnint'd in thl' uSt' of the D3Y1s Submerged Esope Appmtus or DSEA. This consisted of a breathing I»g. a metal canISter holdmg iOda hme. 3 rubber fIl()uthpiece. oxygen fbsks mel ~ \"ah'e connecoon. [f ...."as self-<:ontllin~ and dtliv\"~ pure orj'gen to the .....l'~ll'r's mouth. II could also be u!ioed in ~moke or U a gas lIluk. If:lll tsClIpe wu contemplated. the men gathered under one of the three huches. fOI'\\"ard. 3ft or undtr tht gun. Tht DSEA was put to the ready position and the comp3rtment """;IS flooded. Men tsClIped one by one. the senior offictr or ntmg working rhl' \"ah'<.'S 3nd supervising rhe procrss befoll' esc3ping lUI." When the Umpirt \\lU ~ullk ill a coUisioll ill 1941 Edward Young escaped without the appantus bec~use he thought il would be roo restricri\~ in 3 righr l'nvironment. though lIlost of the crew used it. He saw mcn 'coming up at fairly regular imcr\l1lls. stnngc Martian creatures wirh their DSEA goggles and oxygen bags. and rendered a[mosr unrecognisable by black oil which had flooded up from the bilges'." Such measures nuy h~\'(' gi\'en SOllie confidence to crews but were nrely useful in ~ction. Sur....eying submarine manpower. Adminl Ulllney W;lS coldly rea[istic:· ... whl'nt\'Cr a submarine is lost. thl' crew is unfortunately lost wirh it'.»
Clandestine Operations Subm~rllles ....~re
the nUln means ofbnding mW.l ~es ofcotT1l'tWldos on enemy c~tlme:s. and carT)1ng out nuny othl'r cbndntint opentions. This required good navigation. and patience as when Den OrY.I.lll·S S4m landed a ColllbmC'd ~tlons piJouge pMty off Algiers. Trim~d
righl down, 10 JIww Q mi"i",,,,,, of ~/hOIlf1l~. tltt
P~f1ence was also needed when ~ group v.as being 1«00'ered. 5IlJni bndtd ~ p~rty of COffilTLllndO'i on thl' Nonh African coast and th.-ir reco....e ry is described by her sigtUller.
At 0210 a.fOl#-t uus sighltd "u'In- 'M M""'U~ IUId 1 ..us onltrtd '" oJl " "" ,Itt (r.uJIllJ( ~ IU It uus Mlldlng /lU"'Y and u'lluld havr ptWtd us. ... II alltml ",UM us. ..._ of tilt Ami)' ".!Jicm rrporud rll d~ bridgt and spokt '" tht Uplai". ThDr uus 110 sign of rllt "'hns tmyUMr. II s«rMd IMI l1fl lImavl "" sh«It _ _ had tlroppd lMiT _hiM"t"" and tM ""guanlluMJ optMd up 1I,ti1 njk j". 'Illd SnlI up -}l.J1P$, bullllXOfding '" tilt Anny ".!fictr t1't1")'l't1f' hIld gor a..")'In- 1M shorr. Tm mi",,'tI WIt a dinghy W4S sighltil .."h _figures l1fl board ad tMy wm' ,S(It>rI1l1""gJldt.AlflIrhtr 10 "'IIIUla 1M "'htr dinghy tmlal""'g un mm I.lUS sightLd. ... Tht mWing IPI.JIf uus a Stf'gtQIII aIId t1<m though .... IlIrW' wry Mil. t
I""um
$ubnunnes also participatC'd in some f=xxr; oprntions. Six of the Sand T cbss IO\\~ the X-
Sub....rin..... tHin. the O."i. esc.pe
.pp.... IU. in lbe I.nk al Gmparl.
PA~ ~
x
Escorts
1 Escort Vessels The spccialilicd ('SCon vessel. designed to proteCi convoys of merchant shIps again~t subnurinc and 10 a lesser extent ain:...rt attack. lx.-calllc one of the most important T)1X"S in the war. At the begmmng. <:scon design was bedeVIlled by the 1WO problems of exaggerated faith in AsdlC, and the unexpected SWitch of Ihe war fmm British w .. tc~ to the North Atbntic after th.. Fall ofFnlllce.As a result II look some time 10
producl' suiubk \~Is. and they ....'CR' ulr::en lYom nuny sources: :and modified destro)~rs. fishing and wluling cnfi. anti· subnurn~ ships of 1m- ;nll'.-...... r ~T:l.rs and sp«i.ahsfil designs for the Atbndc. Doth British and Amencan dups ....Tn: usrn.so nuny dllfcn:llt d~rs
md cWscs perfornxd (l\~rbPPlllg functions. the: \'\'1')' minimum.. '1ll ~on \'l:':ssd ,l('("(\(d th(" lllallS 10 find and dtosl:roy a $llbnurirx- - As
At
nC.llhcr of th~ ...."'''" Irkal v~St"1s for thc ....,orl.: in other respectS. uu,'r in Ihc war, C$Con \~1s ca.rnW ahead-throwing weapons such as Hedbochog and Squid. and racbr to dele<:t subnurin~ on the sUlface. Thc:se. too. callie to be regardfii as minimuIII I't'<juirements. There were abo minimum speed requirements for an escorl. Obviou~ly II had to be able 10 I.:eep up wnh Ihe convoy being <'Storied, and a hnle f~er 10 allow for zigzags :md other nunocuvn.'S. Ideally it Iud 10 be fastl:r than an em'my subnurLl1l' on the surface. which could do about 17-18I.:noa. Speed was also useful III ca.lchlllg up with t~ convoy agam mer lhe long hum of a U-~t. or in a support group wlu<:h h
qUO for rdUeUmg at sea ....'en: saU prinuC\"'. Ikcause of Ihe mlu.al assumpcon of a coasul U-boat ca.m~gn. and because oothmg dsc was a\'alublc.lhe RO)'aI Navy used more than 200 lra.....krs nunnl"d b)' the P;auol !ktv\ce as cscon \'nSC1s In the early sta~ of thc war, They were wllh1 as 500n as urger escorts bca.mc av.lIubk. An escon \'nSC1 had 10 ha\'e good SC'a-kC<'ping quallOt'S. bul agam these were nor al.....ays a\'allabk. Some of the early dcsuoycf'S "''ere too delicale for Awnlie ....,orl.: unnl they ....'ere cOIl\'Crlcd. and early con'eues. Ihough pcrfecl!y safe, \\'Cre ba<;cd on a design used by hardened seafarers and .....cre far tOO lwdy for Ihe civilian seamen who manned th<.'1ll in pracnc<.'. Crews would qUickly become seasick and exhausted and this Iv;lS detrimcntal 10 their efficiency. Ships dcsiglled wilh the Atlantic in mind. such :IS the Rh'er :Iud L.och class fng:lll'5, wcre far more dlicielll in dlls respect. although the North Atlanllc could newr be made eornfOrt:lble.
A cenain minimuIII kllb'1h Iv.as m:o:dcd for this. close co ehe 300 feet of tho: R..m :rs and thc L.ochs. bm that tended to coumt'r.Jcl anothcr faclor, manocuvnbiJity. A shorl shill likc :I eon'etlt: had snuU I\lflIllig cude. which was veT}' useful in pUrsUit of a submanne aking C\~r.'e aetlon. In ehe lliule of me Awnlle Itself, n .....as possible 10 COIKcntrale 011 PUl'e ann·subnunne pcrforllunec as surhce §hip and air atQek ....'l:'fl: b likely lhan in Ihc: MedllernnC':l1l or the: An:cc COII\'tJ)'S- 8uI a good a11round CSCOrl vessel would need 10 defend IlSClf agaiml air auxk :II leas!. Ifsurface shiP .mack was bkely.as \\ hen the BU-m:ir emernl the AWnoc III 1~1. or off Norway dunng the Ncoc com'O)'S. then b3n1estnp'CrulSCTS and destn:J)tt1 would opcr.nc m support. For air awek. nuny escon v(SK1s were iU-cqUlpped for self-dcfcnce ....'eII by Ihc: rather kJoy,. British sundnds emy in the .....ar. TIus did flO( mana In nud-AWnoc \\hc-re enall)' aucrafi could flO( rexh, but II rod In orner areas.. RrulI): escon \'esSC1s \\'ere needed in brgoe numbcn. w cheapness and ease of production was as irnportllllt as aIlyuung else.Tim meant acecpnng less than perfect suncbrds of finishing. simplified huD design. IIKTClum ship !':lthcr rru.n warship methods as Ihe:n' .....e re far more merchant shipbuildmg yards. and u1nnulcly pl'efabflcanon. By these methods., SC\~ral hundred escOrt \'C'$.SC1s were btult or acquired during the wu.
Destroyers The btest types ofdestfO)'er were ft'SCn'Ctl for work \\1th the tleel and for special usb n-qUlrmg fast and \\'eU·armcd ships, so the duty of COl'll'O)' escon feU mainly [() the older ones. The cIestro)'rT5 speed of up lop 36 knoa (nX>R'!han twic.. a roru·tte) could be uscfuI in cOllung 10 Ihc: rebd"" of a belcaguernl COfJ\'O)'. as ~ and LvI« chd With me Gibralw 0011\'0)' <Xi71 In August 1941. But III gcnrnl thr). \\'en: burr !han was 1lC.'dcd for clo§c escort wlIh merch.anl ships lhal !':lrd)' cxcC<'ded 10 knou. and ag;unsl U-~1So that did not: excttd 18 k..nocs on the surface. The dcstro)'Cn of the V :lnd W c~ ....'en: the blest 1)'JlC' at Ihe end of Ihe RD! World War, and IllCorpor.nfii much of Ihe expenence.They \\~"" designed fOT :I "''ar in the North Sea ramer than the Awnne. so they had lllluted fallgt and poor sea.keepmg qualmes... The officers' qua.ncrs m the stern ....'Cre olien cut off fimn the bridge by rough seas.. Their powerful engines. d...."'loping 27,000 shafi horscpou'er. ga\'e a speed of)4 knots. bul Ihis was 1afl,'l:ly .....a stcd esconlllg con\'O)'5 that ral'ely did more than 10, Many ships were rearmcd; their six torpedo tube'S wcn: ofhllk uS<.' in the U-boat war and were gcm'rally f!.·lIIovl·d. Ne\'crthcless, the ships weI'<.' often tlS('d by the :;Clllor officers in comm,md of escort groups, pardy became ehcy were faqer Ihan cor\'ectC$ or fng:ltt'S. Large numbers served III the lJatllc of Ih<.' Aclannc. becausc nOlhmg else "''as a\'ailable.
Opp<>
launehed by the H~lm~1 in lupport of Ihe Normand)'
226
_~
Churchill's Navy
,-,-
4r~
A~:
(%) j
1YJl'ft of ftCoM _ I .
I. The "".,ilu" of the V dau as co......,tted to • JoDI·...... ftCon. lohow'l> in
(94).
2. 0... of m.
cr-- dan of Amnia..
IIOme or whic:h
~
~
buill in 1918-19,
tnnd"e.red 10 the R.".,u Navy iD 19.fO.
). The Hi"'" of
S.The B..,...,•• con'I:Ue of the F\cowe. cb.. in 1942. 6. TM
officers' accommodation. with comfortabk bunks, runnmg \\I:l.ter m each cabm and steam radiators for heating. The wardroom W15 sm.aller than would be expected on a British ship. but the Americans had provided good showers and u.v.atones. The ratlngs wet"C' accommodated in fixed bunks instead of hammocks, which took up a gl'eat deal of space and restricted other activities. The blackout of the galley was so poor Ihat me;Us could not be eookt-d after dark and the sick Ny was 'totally ilUdequale'.' 1kstro)'elS usually had numc:tOUS guns. though somc: of than ....~ tOO sma1I to be: dfective. Tbc:YWs had four -l-inch guns. dX' TO\oVI15 had thltt in single: mountings. More: modem de.saO)oers Iikc: me Hs had the much more etfecnvc: 4.7·mch gun. ....ith director conaol !O"'elS to allow \'1:1')' accur.lIe aiming. AU dc:stm)'et5 carried depth ctwges. although gmenIJy in snulI numbers comparM with purpose-built escom.
FoIl,'
Ri\l'f' da" frig'lle, in 1942.
Other old dcstro)~ "'crt sometime$ U5Cd, such as the 5 class of 1918-20. D 1\ Rayner W,lS ambiv:I.lent on aking COIl1JJU.IId of the Shikari. BtJOft glJing on bllllrd I w hlld pur JrtT lines on pa~r. JI was only II pity Ihal she had mIl bUll b"ill 0" II biggrr 5(al.,Jo, IlItll sht W()uld iralit' bUll tlrt ptrftct tIcMI IIt'JJd. 1/ ilPfKa,td (0 tJre Ullmans qr thar sh, llIas (a'ryir'i fat 100 "uull gtlJr Of' rht upptr dtrk - 115 i"dted she llIas ••. and (trlai"ly htr drsigner haJ "flit" mCdn, h" fa carry 110 depth (haws 0" flIt upper dt(k, utith all Ihtir htlwy throwing gear.' One type of n=latively modern d~troyn often usc:d on escOrt du[)' was the H clns. particularly six ship5 under construction for I3ratil al Ihe beginning of Ihe ....';1r and taken O\'l:r by the Royal Navy. Capaill Donald Macintyre: CQmplained about the poor torpcdoa and firt' conlfOl cquipmenl ill Hnpmls when first compleled. but Ra)'ner was far mort' s.Josfied with Highl<Jnd~. 'What ships they ....'ere! ... She was re:ally the most beautifully fitted "'':lJ1hip I had t\'er seen.... At sea, too. she .....o uld be far more: comforable than any previous ship'.f The Town class dC:SlfOyen ....'l:re far less popular. In xplember 1940 Churchill was delightt-d 10 recei\'e 50 old d~rTOyen from the Unut-d States III elCchangc: for the use of ceruin 1U~';11 bases - the first concrete support from thaI source. Ho.....e ver. Ihe ships IhenlSC'I~~, buill in 1917-20, .....e re poorly d~lgned and were no more sUitable: for Ihe Atlantic Ihan Ihe cO"'eIt~. In his book Dati'll!,"" from Amm(<J John Fernald U1ed to be as kind as possible about their qualities. but his characters claimed thaI rhey had 'Iong narrow !lnes', .....tuch .....ere 'more like a college eighr than a ship'" The most famous of the class, the Campbell"",,,, (tlC USS Burhalfalf), was usrd to $l1lash the lock 82t~ at St NaUlre durmg a famous raId of 1942, Accordmg to her medical officer she originall)' had good
Sloops and Destroyer Escorts The sloops Sanau.'i(h and Bridgnml~ of 1928 "'l:re the lirst attempts at medium-si~ed w:umip$ mer the Finl World Wu and ....'ert based on "';1rtime txpt'rience. They "'ere intended for min~'eepmg, ann· subnurine operations and for $howing the flag in the Empire,The type: evolvtd in several daigns O\.'l:r the n('Xt few )'ean. It had a long forecasde for good sea-keeping. because unlike a destl"C\lytr it did need torpedo tubes ami
Corvettes Acoon:l.mg to Sit Stanley Goodall. the Du'tCl0r of a\'al Construction, the F\ov.'l:r cbss of COT\'eI1C:S ongmated m a con~'('fs.J1Jon between tum and Adnural Sir Rogn Ibclr:.hou:sc:, the First Sea Lord (193&-9), whe.n i'fthning fIIick and ftsl
douds _
u'IlJfJd brrak. Hr sml for
227
Escorts
,.
,.
\. ..
.,...><
"""-r-£'~I' .. -
f_T .. ~?,.
,
.
"\'~
!1;lU"m Um-
Frigates
Far len, The deeb of the
The resulting mips h:.l.d a simpl!' niple-cxpansioll engine of 2750 hOl'1C'powcr. giving a top spc'ed of 16 knoll. which "'as nOI enough 10 ClItch a SUrfliCed U-~t. They (:limed oW depth charges at 6rst. and a Single 4-.nch gun In the ~'S 10 deal with subnurines on the SlUncC.
In me autumn of 1940, as soon as it b«ame appnenl that th... F\oY.'t'r class C()l"\-efles ....Quld lu\'t' difficulty in Atlantic opmlUons,lhe Adminlty beglln the design of a new class. known at first as twin-iCTeW con't'ttes. They ....'ere 40 per cem larger than lhe RO\\'t'n. with flared bow-s 10 mttt the waves and twice the engine power. The Adminlty origimUy w:l.llttd a speed of 22 knots to chase U·b<»t3, but 20 knot3 W:IS the 111051 that could be achieved wtthout much Larger ships or engines. Nearly all the Ri\'er class ships were fitted with Hedgehog as the nuill allti-submarlne arnumem. but mis ...."as an afienhought in the design and the position on ~ forecastle was unsUItable. The title of th.. class was dungtd to &ig;u.. in March 1943. The first: ships ellleTt'd servict' in me spnllg of 1942, alld ~"rntw.lly 59 It...er ,lass frigates ....'t'"l't' built for me lto.....ll avy :and 70 mort' "''t'"l't' buLlt III ~ fOr dl<" RO)'iI! Ca.nadU.n Navy. Th.-y "''t'"l't' quickly SU(",«'ded \I)' the 1...o<"h class, ....ith lhe hull I't'desigJlro for "''eldmg and pref.libnaoon. Since mq' carntd SqUid Instead of H~hog, thq' ,,=e \'n)' suc:cc:s.sful on opttatioos. Another \~rsion. dl<" lby clHi. h.1id a nuinly anti-ain::rafi: arnument for use m ~ Pacific. T....nuy-fi\'t' Lochs a.nd 19 Bays "'Ttl: completed for the 1t00'iI! Nzvy during the ......r. .along wuh others for Canada and AUSlnIia . The Capuin cbss frigates ",-ere built in the USA in 1942-3 and
f('l(l sl,,"\ lind tIlUrfS txpmSi,1t '" l1ui/d in monq' and tint('. Ht "''llmed somt sorr of lhip Ihlll U'ru,fiulrr ,hon 1M mm"n, (ould bt' buill Tflpidly, and lJIould 110/ Il«d " big complnnmr sUlh
They prowed ~-ay urx:omforQbk in service when uansferred from the English Clurmd and Nonh Sa 10 the Atbnoc. Steps were taken to Impl'O\'e the RO'"'ef"S.. They ....~ giv\"n Iongc'r forec~es 10
make them drier and bilge It«Is to p~'em roOmg. The design "''as fimdamenWly sound and we despite initial appearances. and me Rowt'n wt're the most common r),JW' of escort \'\'$Sl'1s for practically all of th... war.A hundred and forty-fh~ ....~f'(" buill in Bnum for the Ro....al Navy and 95 more m Canada. Th()' ....t're .1ible to uke mosl of the btest dt:\'ices m tIme, mcludmg ndar, Htdgehog and.l.ueT. Squld.Th... numbl"r of Cfl'W quickJ.... rose from 85 to 108. Work beglln on th ... design of .1illOlhcr type' of con't'ue in 1941. Though the RiVt'r class ttivtes \\'t'n: now in producrion. it was recognised Ihat many shipy:mls were tOO sm"l1 to build them "nd lhe C"stle cbss emerged. They were 252 f.,.-t long. 47 feet more than the Flowen. ,Illd had the s.ame engine. but improved design ga\'t' Ihem a speed of 16.5 knots. Many of Ihem were: filt... d with early Squid morurs. which nude them quitt' dTccth-e and good value for monC)'.
loaned 10 the Roy..l Navy under lend-leaS<". OrigmaUy a programme of520 ships ""as planned for Unum. but 78 were bullt for Ihe Royal Navy and 565 for the US Navy as DEs (desuo)'..r c:scor[5). Some wert' powered by diesd-decuic engint"S. The de-sign was a combinauon of Oritish and Amerkan praCllces and provcd quite: seaworthy m action, although with some problems in bad w..ather. Their main guns were: 3·inch. which was 100 lighl for ami-submarine work. but they "Iso carried a heavy arui-airnaft armament which m"de them useful on routC'S when:: air atuck was hkely. They wen: fastcr than the River
Ullll..... of abe VW cI... escorl;ng .n enl COllI! co......,.
in
1~41.
Top:Thc sloop
Sc.rm",·tll. launched in
I~JO,
in peacetime.
d... """"'" escon TaIyNool as completed in I94J.
228
Churchill's Navy
2 Life in the Escorts
..._-
.- ,.. .... .. .. .. .. .. "..1'
~
........
r
... .........
••
-------.......... ,
A~rl from subTllarmcs.. alre"," earners and the big ships of Ihe battk Ol"Ct. <."SCan ,-nsek in the funl.. of Ih.. Atumic \\~re Ihe only shIps which hablNally WCnt 10 SoC'" for \\~eks at a timc.A battl..,hip Gill \till SoCT'-e as a deterrent. ~n ofa 'fI('('1: In bemg'. ('\~n If II JU)"5 III harbour. An escon \-nsel is only ..arning ill; k«p If It IS at SoCa. proll'Ctlng the suppl)' Imes. Much of thIS \\'21' done m the "u~ wealhCT oflhc Nonh Admtlc. and cornU)' ~n posed lpC'CUI clulkn~"I'S for thl'" hardlC'Sl: saikiI'). not to mention the illexperlenced lempor.ll')' RNVRs and HOJ who Ktual.ly lIIanned dlC slnps. h is described ~"",phIGlII) III Ichobs MOm.llTllt5 nO\-e1 TM Crud Yol. as wcD:as hIS \\urks ofnonfiction. soch ali Thrn> Gm'tfrts. It ;l,1so fe.lNfeS III nun)' kss wdl-known
nlCnlOlrs of lhe period.
The Theatres of Action For most people Ihe Nonh Awnnc IS an uool'>nnl."l.nshcd mass of rough " ..alher. grey SoC""" huge wa\"('S and perhJ.ps ICCbergs. For lhe sailors of Ihe escon (orces il was all IhJ.l, but It .also had ItS nouble
Top: A ,. .",,;on o(
..
FIOVo~r
dns
",>neue in an nrl)'
class, with ~ speed of 23.5 knots. They wen: lIlalllly uSl·d III support KTOUpS and took pJrt in Ih.. sinking of 35 U-bo.m from OClObcr 1943 onwards.
..ate, "'ilh .. sho•• foU€a$tl...
nllll."Stones.ln Ihe: uri)' stages of!hl'" connlCt there"~ Ihe Ime: of 17'" or Liter 19" WI."SI, lhe filnhl."St OUI Ihu escortS ope",!ed, Afler 1941 there wen: CHOP o~ ch~nb'(' of opc:r.lt:.ional cOlllm.and hiles, where dIrection wu hJ.nded over fium BnulII or Canada 10 AmeriGl, or vic.. \·t:rsa. Mon: ~ini~lcr w~~ Ihe air g;.p in Ihe middle of the oce,ln, where .alrcr.r.fi rarely opc:rated bl"fore 19·B and the U-boals \\"l"rt: al their llIost dfecu\'e. For all the dls.:td\',lnuges, Atbnnc escon .a! leasl allowed a predl<:lable routine. A slow conn»' (rom HalifJ.x 10 UrIlalll look aoout 17 dJ.ys; a fast one look aboul 13 days. Cotllillandt'r Pewr Gretton w.as able to plan IllS weddmg .e.-cral momhs 10 ad.-aIlCI'". knowmg lhat the Systl'lll would allow him [0 be Ih".... on lhe day. There w;u a dlt1(.-rt·m kllld of war on thl' ea,>t coa,>l of Driuin. Convoys wcre protected from subn13rmc Jluck by mmdid remained J threat. AaordlllA to Pelcr Grenon. Ihen first l!Cutenant of a dl"SllUycr:
The Ideal Escort Abm :Th. Hik......
.. Fl ". cla.. <:o",..,n•.
The Roy:!1 Navy cnded up using J. great \';mccy of enf, 011 ,"SCon dUliC'S: IWO cbs~ of CO....~tlf·. J. \'3riecy of desu'O)ocrs. Kvenl t)'PCS of dt-,;uu)'c. ("SCQrt. (rlgatt" of both British and Am<".icall dcsii,"I1 and sloops of prr-........ t)'PC'S. All had different ~"Qod and 1»d poIIIIS. and WI'R' us.:flll in \.lightly difff'rrm roles. The Ideal ("SCort \'~I "~ nC:\'eT developed during .he wn. but the Loch cbu "':IS probably dQK'l;l. It wn tht: first Bnmh clus special!) d<'Sib'llffl for trUl' m.ass productlon. It had re:lSOnablt speed, Ihe best SC'a-kl'"epmg of an)' cms, good ",da~ and sona~ and the bC's1 anll\ubnu~me w~apon m Ihe SqUId. Anothl"r approxh was 10 look ;,&1 ;J th~c-tier S)'lotl'lIl of t'SCons \\11h shghTl)' dlfferenl fimCClom, Somc could be r.lther s!O\\, to fill Ihe gaps in Ihe escOrt screcn, Thc Cudc dm cor....c u('\. slightly' fasler and bl"UCT dl"SlgJlc:d dun the FIo\\('1" dass, would filllhis role. Thcn thcre was a need for a Uq.,'('r, faSler ship to )e;w the group and ca~<)· out .;mri--subnu~in" hunts. The Lochs were best for thIS. followed by the Rivers and GpuIllS. FlIlall~ Ihc~ \\~ a rok for f.lls( sJurs to form suppon groups to }.,'Q to the aid of beleaguered COI1\U)"'S. The Hums. onee their urh' faults Iud been corrected. were sUluble for lhlS rolt. Ihou~ III p",uice Ihe BI.vk SNIIIlS pl'O\~d e....e n beuer.
Cc4swl ("m,,}'1 lI'l'r1' II ''"Y diffrrnrl aJf.llr from ....UIl n>lu'tJy.l. ·111..y U'I"rt' sm.rllfT jfill" r.uI-ro
nlllI,,),.·
The Arruc COlI\'O)'S to Ruwa Illlroduced OIh..r factors, Thc}' wcn: \"uln«ablc to aIr. subnunne and Mlrface ~hlp aluck, as "",II as bad We;llhr'T and extrelllc cold. II U\lI ml$ffolbl.. lI\1Uh-kr-rplllg III 11111I(1": I'ur rna", I'('''polllll''. dolY /."J "',1th" "liS klllKkill.lt ilt from tht gun brttrhts. rht m;l~U IIl1d rilt n,fNme. In .. deslrl')'tf p/IIIIJtll',f! ..wlmd In h,.~/, U~lId:i,. II"" ;s "(1/ a p;>S1;1'r d,,'y- If .
In,," ,,"'(11
"JIt1' III fmok.. oI11d PlOll't".-
229
Escorts
OF
ere\\
14"'*
in Itdlllilal1mosl'" ofh.Jw '" nul o(h /holt IIOIIu"!i _Id hoi,,' SI"PPft/ IU. IIi MIl w gtr tM sllIP mIll ~ IN ..., fi1!htlllg rnm, ",,11,1141 Jht sI~ ~ « trolining
The neon force was most!}- 'tr.loncd by rypc of engagement In lhe 1U'1'. Escon group COfllnunlkrs. $l.Icb as F J Wotlkn-, ~er Grelton .. net Dotuld Mxinty1l"• ....~n: llSUilly rt'gUbr RN. though D 1\ Rayner reached me po!1uon as 1 perm;IIl~1 RNVR officer. Comnundmg officers of ships. .. put from dewo)T", wrn: mostIl RNR. !:hough .. (no. I",mpor:ll)" RNV~ ~ch,l) ichobs Monsunr took comnund. nm Ilcutcrunu ....'C~ onen RNR, JOmc \\'tTe RNVR. l1l<' JunIOr offic~ """n: nf::lI't)' ~";J)'S tcmpoar)' RNVR. "'.:uql!: ~ (11gi~ who ""TIl" ottnl conunissioncd from \\;3.rmlt rank. On the- lown d«h. the- p«ty offic~ "'~ ~br RN, whik ~ hew,....· (hem ...."'rr O'o,tTv,hdmm¢y H(h. In the- "',nly ~S".lID shIps suffcrro from a sborugc of expenrncro officm.
Ow rJjfit.m rorUblftl of II lNl'l(JllJnl·e"",-ltk, DIll1 t1rI'tf IiIlP R..\: l:R JUbs, .mtI, apart,""""" ".fru' sLJhllm AmJ't Stn'lll' f.Ul/res. IN 111m Ut'ft"
.....ter 111 the: "ou lU)'nef noaced OIl chffermt bTttd. 'Of the officcn I could nuke 1K'1Iher top nor ad. Although they "'ete 1M kgat~ of the robust u;W10on of the WcRern Appl'O;K:hcs. the)- ....--n"C' touD)' dilT~t &om thnr ford>cus In background. outlook 1nd tr:umng.ThIS docs ll()( mc1n dut they wC'~ mclfioent. They \\'etC merely products o'-the R~r Age_ R~bilir)' ~t .... u.e.- ha'-ity on shoukkn not )'C't brwd enough w bc-ar the waWl!·. All shIps e1mcd mort' officers OIInd men dun they tud been designed for The complement of the FJo...,1:'I'" cbss con-cue ; ~ &om 85 to 109_ Frig;lIn \\'etC designed for 100 mrn but uswDy Iud Uxmt 140 on sen1ce. They tud nght to 10 officers mcludmg OIl wrgeon-hanC'fUnt 1nd 1n englllC'eT, \\ ho W;IS ;I sub-licutC'fl
----,
";,
~\
~:
'1:
,
,,
..............
••
,,
f: ,
,~
,
•
•
-~whM::h doe DMde of doe AtleMic
... fOOl"",
sl4dl tqu,pmnI', d«s "'" entitle the Com_d'ng Qffim oftlult sillp to 6dit'/lt IMI his ship is TrIJlly fiw.all /»f/tingtM4 Mud! _ iI rtf'rt/td btforr It {JIll Ire
tLnmcd to rortSttlllte IJft
tfficiml fighringJotrr.
T1tc Com_di.
Offitrr luis '0
Ire satisfittl that "'"l' CljJi«r .brows "'" ""Iy hIS 0...." duty !rul tlul' of"'"l' othtr ofJiar IfIJd dtt uoholc sIUp~ aIfflP""'lIuls til Ire MONlt/td Imll _ 1e1JlPl.
nil (/JIlII« Ire II«OPIlplisltcd if tltt txJoIr i1t the g
Offiun dfftMd (<<
m. AdaJolic _
_tt-
... bridp of ...
a chid' ERA and ~ ERAs. There was one dud' 5lou.., $IX 5lou.. petty ofli«n and SIX kadmg 5l0Icn as wdI as 12 5lOUn. Miscdhr~ r.UlIlgs Included a sw;:k berth attendant. a suppty nmunt. a Indmg cook and his assistant :md tItr= 5l~'al'ds and a cook for the officeR.. In IDe dcstro)~ W~, IDe mcdic2l officer complained thai the b\'ll18 ~es only tud 81.5 cubic fttt of:m per man. co~ With the ~nmcndcd
200 cubic fert. Accommodation w.IS ' ••. further ~a5Cd by the ab5t:ncc of KO'". for gnr such as duffel coau. oihJcirJ5 nco Dunng ....-n .....~atha, the amount of wet clodung winch accumulates senousty affects the drynns ofbving ~n'." His opp05ile number in the KtpptI complained that 'ThCTe arc many In every lllC$5 wubk to s1mg a hammock and SOI11C 301\" necessarily poorly a.cconmlOClatcd. Sweallng of the ship IS cotlSlderable, and when !he 5C1l is ()\O~r the fon-aWc, "';:lter risc.'S qUlckty to two Inches in the mess decks'."
Tobcrmory Each newly commissioned escort vessel was l.ent 10 ....'Ork up under HMS litstrrn Islts at Tobermory, undcr thc command of Commodore SIr Gilbert Stephenson. He had retired as a vice-admiral in 1928 bul came back as a commodore of con\"O)'S before tlIking comnund of ~ltsrrrn hln 1I1 1940. He had a fierce and cnergctic personality, and delighted m surprlsmg the crews of ships sent to him. He was equally delighted Whffi th~ responded in kind. Q)tIll'fft wnidl /trpl a fiTr hoM' n~d In TrlJdllltsS, IJnd uoftm lrid '0 Jffllmble on booN urwnnounttd, Itt him hwt il}UN bl.ul. 1l1rm the oJ/i«r of the tkfk Ioohd IJWT the side Itc _ the Commodorr hImself, drmchcd to the skln /VId danang up IJnd down in hu wunth, wuglnng and $4lfing 'UHI dOfIC - oft, wcl1 dOfIC',u
That U'
_
Itc blows hil jOi lIPId shows ship k lOfWdtw:d tffiOml. U
If
arrrft« dilPDS'tiorr i1t his mess,
After Tobcrmory, ships: "''eDt 5lnighl to the Bank of the Atlantic in the carty 5tlIga of the war. From bte 1942 th~ wenl to Larne U1 Northern I ~bnd foe more technial aauung as ~rt of an escOrt group.
Bad Weather We U1 a mull ship in wntime couk! be utterly extuusting, C\'eIl Wlmout an atuek by the enemy. The early AOWtt cbss corvetln wen: by far the wont.There was a saying In the navy:'Corvettts Me ill nghl. The blou who i~med co....'Cttcs is a genius. The only trouble is he didn'l im'Cnt the men to go with them'." John Palmer describes his introduction to life :as a junior officer in the Clematis.
Wi' lift M 0700, wind frrshmingfrorn Iht North· ~t'ts,. II didn'l lOlJk healthy - visibiliry uw poor 11IId low cloud WIll making the wtst (0IlS1 look tU simster tU il (an look Mauliful. It WIlln'l helJ/lhy. 8'1 0930 l had bun sick - SD hlJd 'Ifarly tl'fr}'t'llf fhe - and by 10J thcrt wt'n" six inthn '!ffutl DillJ'ld u\lttr in lilt WIlNlOOm aud in ",y cabin. II got WDrst steadily. Bylunchli",e nD Mt u.w really tapable. Lift utmCd hardly WDrrll /ivinS, J mflmlbtr. 'l71at rlight, Dr mther tht next morning, u>hm I u.w kttping 1M maming waU", uw the WDrst I ""I mflOllbtl': I rould hardly flll/ld. Wwcs broJrc grrcn DvtT lhe "PtrI bn'dgt and JM amJ rolling soJar tlurt the boou 1000hed the UUler M tilher sidt." Things could get e\'Cn worse. as descnbed by Nichobs Monsarnl: ()p,e rne
off iu brrKlrn in lhe IMlNroom. Apartfrom 1M rwU il pnxluas, ,olling "'u /I rttad«ning ffryIIurt thou is _ ofdw minor torTuIU of rough ucthcr.11 _ stDpS Dr mwtJ II bellI, it l
r:wptd llIr)'IlftM.lf)W go /Iwr.IgIl1J Though the PCnonWty of the commander rrught appear to domm.lIIe. thl"tl' was in fxt a syllabU'l. For a Ca5lIe class co....oeue the tr.1J.rnng \asIcd 18 gruelling da}"5. mdudmg 35 houl"$ of ~ time doing anu-submarinc and ana-.lln;nfi: ~ 37 hours of gunnery and ana-:wcnft dnlb and 160 houl"$ of cbwoom imauction. The aum of the school ....~ .lIS much to do Wlth le;un",w\;;. .lIS technical in5lnlcUon..
Iaf
~ the ji»d spills <'!If ~ ~
w DUIny will "'" J/Jf i1t p1IJa. 71ungl: IIlI1 b.d - ' hun you..,.mr.
""""t,-' ~ atul Jlidc -rcmziJy;atul dttft _ ExluU5lion began ro set watches.
In,
cspccuUy when the shIp
"''35
opented
In
t\\V
To CtlUtp .. _jor
IWI'
~ftStI
with
~UH!ole
dqHJr dungts,
otrI,karu, ~ SifMltI, ~ nuf.., """ DfF - _d Ire sarisfrd tM' part ofdw sh,p ~ aHflP""Y iI suJ/iamtly CDm'mIVIt WI/II the IItCfItotl ofopt'ro1hon of
Slrain ""d tirtd/ftj$ i"duu a sorr of hypnosis: )'I)" _ til H mlWl"S In I' IMd dfl'lfm, pllfJlltd nol by ItmlrS but by "" irrlO1trabk fl)util\C. YIJU (l)MC' off
231
Escorts
"L!h,"
1.oJu moYe;I /neon
wauh al midnighr, spaJred, ru>itrhillg, yemr eyes raw u>ilh Ihe willd alld sraring ar shadows; )'ard,oom pall/ry and srrip off IJre rop layer of soddell dor/res; y'"' d", say, an h"",'s irrrrica(e dpJrc,ing, and rhcrclljtcr mlllCh afew hours' slcep bNUleCtl lIIel blll/lJreu, ll>ilh Ille itiflared life-belr ill you, ribs t'(minditl,~ you all I/le lillie rllal Ihiugs Itappm quickly.; and Ihell, fl.'l"'y lIight for I(....m.... tl tlighlS all md, you',e u",kclI al un ro f""r by the bOSlln's malC, atld you Sla'e ar IItc dukhead mill rltink: My God, / ran'l go up Ihef( agaill in Ihe dark alld fillhy railr, and srmtd allolhrr four h"urI of if. But you can, of (Ourse: il buotllrs aUlomatic in rhe clld."
MOVE!!" Rfjht.',1 qat it!?
Conditions might improve 51owly, as Monsarr:J.t records. I1rcrr's respilr nOli: att)'lVlty: hal IIIrau illSlrad of Ira alld cOrlled baf salldwicltes; stuI' wilhoulMillg ripped 0"1 of your bunk, a wllolr wareh will,oul grlling 1I1t'r. Thr upprr-dffk pelly c1fia:r grlS ro work Silla,ins up, thr sralllall gUllllIT of Iltr lllclfrir rlealls rhr lLwis and Horeltkiss gmu, Iltr leading signalmml t/refks "lilT his rorl'ffS and flares ..." The sailon' dre5S owed little to the mditional n:l.v.r.I uniform.
if il uw wrr, )'OU knoll' raillillg, )'Ou'd k dTl:$srd in a pair of sra bools, opai, of hroV)' sea boor srockings, roal, a lII«kim"sh rom a lap of rhat, a SOU-lll£Slrt; a rOWl'1 ritd round your nttk, a pair ofglo....s alld II pair ofbillOlUlar! alld you'd rlllm/ln up litis ovw's nesr alld grl imidr il.'"
The Dangers Most of the V-boal :l.ttack W3S :l.gaillSt merch:l.nt ships ralher than thtir eKorl5, w their los~ were not excessive. But they did h:l.ppen, :l.nd could often be horrific. C:l.puin Chules Cuthberl:!on describes his txperitncl':S in the Sinking of the corvene Zilmia in 1941.
Almost u munuric wu the picking up of men &om torpedoed mtrch:l.lJ( ships.
enfOr<:" hiJ will
SIIrvivor! itt lilt mess drrks,jilling fVf1)' aNi/abit spa«: aslup "II Ilrr duk, 011 Mttthes, llgaillsl bulkltellJs: silfillg ar lables willi llleir htads berU'lm rheir hallds, lalkittg, shillf.'rittg, rvo!Jilrg food, Slarillg al nothing. Soml' ".! rhrm half naked, wrapped ill blalllms and makeshift SItIlfS: some wilh parhelic lillie cardboard Slliuases, huggrd d"se: pII~ded bl«kf«es, pillchrd yel/ow ones, rirrd blrary while masks rlsar srill IIIUSlrr a grill. Mm half-dead, mm rocky as bedamlled: mftl suffnillg from eJl:posuTt, frosl-bire, oil filii p"isonilrg, lUIS, gashrs, brokttl limbs: mnl harrgittg '" lifr by II Ivt'l rltrrad.~
Officers' Accommodation sltppiltg Olll of rlrr bridgr asdic housr alld ftuittg Ihr fumrrl attd OooUI 25 fft/from rht explosion. The asdi{ /rouse {ollapsed mrd pam rif Ihe ship U't'n' tlrrowtl ill rlrr air. Shl' immediarrly h....led etVn" "n /lJ hIT srorOOard beam mds, olld in fillt suonds hod copsized Iltrough '20 drgrns. The blasl did ttOI hurl me "lid Iht ("psizillg hurltd me imo rht WIlltr 011 rlre SI"rl1ou~ rising lilTlic"fly our of rhr warer, rhf}' disaPPf"rrd lVi,ltitia feu' secollds. HMS Zinni:l. hlld SUlik ill 15 or 20 suottds. TIltt'( was tlO wm:ka~. I heard mallY mes f"r hrlp ill tltr WIllet, alld rSlinlaled Ihere UJl'Tt' abeul 40 IIIf11j/OilhoJ/l siglJlil/g /lie, ftJCJl/ually 0.1 0530 / was picked up by a boal from anolher (oMlle, HMS C:l.mpion. J had ro be hoimd illOOard, (Ollld ollly crawl "lolIg rhe deck, (llld U-\:IS tomplelrly blinded. / u\:u SliII fully dOlhed." I
U'OJ
'Monkey' SlepMnron
Even in such snuU vessels officers h:l.d some privileges, especially in Ihe allocation of space. A Canadian reporl of November 1943 found that in :I. River cuss frig.lte 15 per cem of the acconullodnion sp:l.ce ,","';IS for the use of:l. dozen or so officers. 58 per cent was for :l.bout 130 men. and the remaining 27 per cem wu for neutral spaces such as passages :l.nd the sick bUlI1ing IlS Ihe mfSJdf(ks: Iwo subs had ro ral ar a 5qHl,alr rabie, alld lite romperili"lr for Ihe sofa al Ihe md of a meal ~alled Iht ajter-dimJtr TU.lh al II rtsidell/ial hOlel... Wimimt arrsrmfy II'OJ mu.h ill (Vidmee as rrgnrds Ilrr jUmishillg - bI~ak iron radillr"rs ilurrad of a SIOIIf:, attd (hair! of rhar modml lubulll, desigll wllich makes 'Ifte slr"pe of rlrillgs 10 tomt' S<J morbid" prospetl." C:l.pt:l.ins usually dined with the other officers in the W3rdroom. but v..-erl: W,lrned :l.gainst spending too much time there.
on. group of ....men.
Th,.
con..,,,,.
Cl.....alu pi.ching
in the sea.
Au",/l(/' UU)' if'fl'llt'rlillg I" ry~' is 10 becomr 100 mucll if a wffiCI'T. J" 11,., smalirSI slrips II,e O/pMi" is illl'l'iMbly a member if /ilt mess aud i,s presidelll, bill III slrips /ike a deslW}'tl' lIe is
Daily Routine Tnmsfcrring from thl' Trib:.l.l cb~ destroyer TImor lO:.I.n old V and W on convoy CKort, Ludovic Kenncdy found that life \vas very different. ... ill 1/11" Wanderer lalli/ally Walchman/ ir uw rhr drSfKT
H~'
Oftinu in .he wardroom of a des.TO)"'" Oil
.,o..or, duty.
des<:ribt.-s till' routim' bl'ginning of a walch.
'n,t' jirsl !rollr or IIIU of Ilrt ll'llfCIr p
In such slilall \'csrels one would eXptt"t the mcn to know cach other. but acconting to Monsarrat, 'Strange people come 10 surface when "Action Stisicu illlo sIIIal/ groups, if comdnl/;ollsly applied, mal.'f'SjilT dlJig/l drgree if cOlljidmlt beluffll o./fiters <111.1 mtll. n
Occ:uiollally caplains onkred 'divisions', a parade 011 dl'ck, whcn conditions permitted, The captain of HMS Clef/I
_.,,~r..,. IIIf Itamisftll itt iu Ilrl' momittg "".1 tlel Cf" bnrk olr board nml YOllr 1'1ll"1s 11'1.' slippilrg.'" When attack seemed likely, the whole crew
\\ill
ready for action.
III lire Tay ,he ship ~ comp
234
Churchill's Navy
s"low:The
The: operations in the anti-U-bo:u \V3f weTC conducted by the arca commands. Norc and Rosyth shared responsibility for the east CO:LSt CQllVO)'$, while WC$lern Approaches command. with its headquarters in
O~ration$
Roon.
in Derby Houle,
Li,..,.poo!. The main AII.ntic plot il to
Lin~rpool. rom the Battle of the Atlantic from the British side of the ocean.There, Sir Percy Noble and later Sir Max Horton conducted the battle with great skill from Derby House in Livt'rpool.
the lefl. will> the home walers plol in
the bKkground. Bouom: A con'-.",
eonfe..,nce in prog~".
The Convoy System The sinking of the Atllf7lia 011 the first day of till," war led the Admiralry to introduce convoy straight aw:r.y, for all merchant ships except very f:lSt ones (over 15 knots) which could evade V-boats. Merchant ships were on charter to the Ministry of War Transport.
which arranged their C1lrg0e5 and their d<:$tinations. The navy, in the person of the Naval Comrol of Shipping officer at the pon of departure, allocated the ship to a convoy. This mighl depend on the ~peed of the ship. Shi~ in slow convoys needed a minimum of 7 knot';: those in fast ones needed 10 or 11. Each convoy route had 1...."0 or thru code letters, sometimes given for slightly frivolous reasons troop con\"Oys to the Middle East were WS, or Winston's Specials. Sometimes the name of the pon wa5 incorporated, so those coming from Halifax were HX, or HXF for fast convoys. SC from North America did nOt mean 'slow convoy'. but referred 10 Sydney CO\'e in Nova Scoria where they assembled. The PQ series to Rus~ia ended soon after the disaster to PQI7, and they were laler resumed under the new code jW for security reasons. In all, there were more than 500 convoy codes, ranging from AD to ZT." Each COll'"oy route had its own cycle. The east coast syslem suned S\r.light away. running almost daily between London and the Tyne or Forth. In the early stages in the Atlantic, convoys were only escorted out to \7 0 W; then 19"W from October 1940, and by that time they were routed round the north of lreb-nd to or from the Clyde or Liverpool. Use of bases in Iceland allowed escort to be eXlended to 35°W; about hallWay across the Atlantic, from April 1941, and from then on there wa5 a gradual introduction of 'end to end' escort to the Canadian 00ses, although the whole journey wa5 nOt usually done by the same group. The HX COIl\'OyS rom on a four--day cycle and from mid-1942 NewVork replaced Halifax as the ....\-'Stern end. A COll\"oy leaving New York was met at the Halifax Ocean Meeting Point or Homp off Newfoundland and then escorted by British. Canadian or American w3rships to WIOIIIP where a British escort took over for the last part of the journey. From july 1942 there \vas a c1unge of operational control for an eastbound convoy from American to British at the 'Chop'line at 26°W; though this was moved west\vards late in the war. Dy Ihe middle of the 1942 there wa5 an interlocking COIl\"oy system covering the whole American coast and down into the Caribbean.-
Convoy Organisation Convoy commodores were oftcn very senior retired RN officers, with the rank of Commodore RNR. E.1ch \vas in charge of the merchant ships of the convoy. and was stationed in the ship at the head of the cemral column. Even in his reduced rank, the conunodore was tv."O grades senior to the escort group commander. but regulations nude it clen that the 'The COlllmodore ofth~ Convoy is to take charge of the convoy as a whole, subject to the orders of the senior Officer of the Escort'." Donald Macintyre was able to use this 'obscure passage of the convoy instructions which did place the ultimate safety on the shoulders of the escort commander' on the one occasion when he differed from the commodore." Each convoy Slarted Wilh a conference attended by naval officers, the conunodore and the mastcrs ofallthe merchant ships involved. joseph Wellings attended one in Halifax in September 1940.
The Halif(lX Naval COli/fill &rvi(e Qf!i(er 1/.\U in (h"'ge of Ihe (o"fere'lie. The of all Ihe sMps ill Ihe roIJIIOl\ plll£ Ille cdplain of rhe ocean eUMI, IlmI II,e rolllJOY rommodol? ill/elIded tile (o'!I'm'Iit'. Earll (dpra;" was giveu d copy
(dPldill
of II,e S
Escort and Support Groups Escort vessels were org:
in. with II Slrong first lieutenanl under him. Groups tended 10 include sC'veral dilTcrent typl"S of ship, relll.'cting what was available in the early suges, but it soon became clear thaI each class had a different role tr:lwlers were often all that was available to surt with. corvettes eventually providcd the numbers. dt'5tTO)'en had the speed to fill gaps or catch up after the hunt of a U-boat. and the new frigates of 1942 had the sea-keeping and range for longer operalions_ The ocean escOrt system was not fully developed in July 1940, when there was only one escOrt vessel for every two convoys_ In October, as the Atlantic battle became more serious. lhere were nine destroyers. 10 sloops, 10 corvenes and 18 trawlers escorting 20 convoys, an a\"cf;lge of two p<'r convoy. A year later the corvettes had begun to enter service in largcr numbers and there w<.'re 45 of lhem. wilh 30 destroyers including Ihc e,,-US Town class, with sloops and trawlen to make the loul up 10 94. an a\'ef;lge ofsix per convoy.This was the number ofships in lhe 5th Escort Group in April 1941 when it t'SConoo con\'O)' HX 122 and sank U-99 under thc ace Otto Kretschmer. Numben tcnded to dip during the winter months and in Mareh 1943 the ill-fated convoy HX229 was escorted by three destTO)'Cn alld two corvettt"S when it em::oulllered a
c
.
.
A
CONVOY 9 ooluron,
Q
AWOOyd~W
,li R , ... "
\I'estern Approaches Tacnc.l Unit in
Liverpool. The t ....inees .it in the curtained ...... behind them.
. 8
.. F
~ooo
y4".
ConVQY formations. The One on the
/1
__ ". .....1.. I
.
p F
the plot in the
Il
H
"..
Wr1'n. Inamng up
.
..
2000 yd!!.
2000 y4•.
S
S
...1
right is for eight e$(:orU, the One On the leO: is a generic
di.g.... m for aU purposes .
236
Churchill's Navy
,,
,,
,
'~/ <> /
,,
'~' /
/
" "S'tar:s'
S"",'
mid-ocun. was considered carlyon but it
so
$0
'\ < ~~ / \
$G
(.."!I,", .,..",....
Pineapple.
March 1943 before
I
if attmJIu
5"""
~~7 Opersrion
W2$
enough ships wen" "vaibblc to impkmelll It, and five suppOrt groups were formed. They tended to be more uniform than escOrt groups, be
brgc COncl.'mratioll of U-boats. The acting group cOllun:mder nude Ihe disastrous if understandable misl4lke of det;;aching l"Kort~ to Il.'$(UC
surviVQn. leaving the screen even wcaker. But by July there wen: 82 escOrtS;1I sea. mcluding some of the new frig:lIes, for II con~, giving an :lvc",gc: of7.5 per group. and the U-bo
At first each group developed its toIetics independently, which c:Ioused problems when a shIp operated with a strange group.
'Krahl/OIl Sir.' 'KroJkalO
Likewise, when f\\'O groups opeF.lted together in Augusr 1941, 'many of th~11I miSSt:d th~ir old leader's voice, and may on OCCision ha\"e waited for an executive order which never callie'." But uctics tended to Ix: similar betv."ecn thc groups, even If the signals were differertl. Captain Gilbert Rob<:rts worked our the ideal system in his TactiGl.I School at Liverpool. The whole thing was plQmulg;&tl-d by me:uJS of the Ad:mtic Convoy Instnlctions, and rcmforced by group traming cour~.A 5Chool W;l$ Sd up in Northern Ireland b;rsed on the Y"cht PI,il",,'e and t'S(:on groups \\\'"l"C scm there for training be[\VCffi comuys.lt w.IS permps less memOT;lble than the course at Tobcrmory but no less gruelling and it conc~ntrated on tlctics T:lther titan teamwork and char;tw:r-building. By the Kitl.g~ Rrg,/la/iollS, the protection of the convoy wu the first duty of the escort, and destroying U·boars or other attackers was !.econdary.lt was not e.1.SY for an e5Cort to spend a great de,,1 of time "u
Convoy Escort The ocean escOrt was grouped round irs convoy. In November 1940, they "..ere placed 3000 yards apart, though it was Te
..." U-bo
1ftcl btfOrl' silt
Standard formations evolved for daytime. when there was suffiCient hght for a periscope att:ICk. and night when a surfaced aruck might =pe dt"tection. With a typical Sl'\'Cn-ship escOrt in the
237
Escorts
lII\vhTd 16 alter-mons of 15. 25. 30 and 35 degrees O\1:r t\\V hours and
Air Support
gener.ll me: m deaf "-ealher m subnunnc mfested arc~." Con\Xl) tigugging became unfashionable bier in the w .. r. bul ocom
CoII\'O)'S could IX' supported from lhe: ;air~' IWO m;ain SOI.Irces. Carrierborne alrcnft began to appear ,,~th me tnuoducoon of the fl;L\C shIp and bier the escOrt carner, They gcnenlly operated Jo...,·-pcrfornunce aIrcraft weh ~ lhe Fai~ Swordfish. ThC)' conm.unicatc:d wilh the
WD III
cOllunued 10 do II 10 l1J(reasc Ihe area of thclr Asdte eO\1:r. By lh)' Ihey follO\\Td the motions of Ihe semor officer, .11 mgt\! Ihc)' steered Independentl)' wilhm I"rocribcd limits."
Reactions to Attack By NO\1:mber mgtll aruck.
I~
11
was esubhshed Uut m me
C'\'l"nt
of a
camer on the con\'O)' radio td"''Phone ....';l\1:length. wmch was hnked ""th thr' escort COl1lltUndcr. Their 0\"Y0'S "l't't' tr:IlOed by the IUV)' and they could be bntfed ,lI1d debriJcd on bo:wd the: curio. 50 gooxIliaison was nuintam..d,The onl). dilliculty was ofcommand.. because the carner capwn was often semor 10 the escort group comnundcr, John Kllbncken new 'VIpers' from Empirr .\f
All NaWlJ lin ,lit trtR"J:td sitk, llr "" botll JIlin if,1tt silk of tM dl/lI(k is IFf lkHln, ,"m 90 dtgrm QUtIluntJ Icgnhn lItld J"UC"d d' full sfWtd jN" dislmt« of rtff mi/n from 'lit (OflWf,firing sldrsllnl oon 'lit ,,>holt dFf d""1.ftom lilt ronl"')"<1 ,II"m'ntllt lilt "lTd.-
about 15 nulcs range, He "''25 more nc:"""'QUS when sem OUt '0 chase a reponed V-boat. hIS firsr time out ofsighl ofland and ships,
ThiS latef bCCJlIlc knO\\'n as a ·r.lSpMrr)", or 'half raspberry' in its abbrt'viated form. The use of fruit code nalllCS becallle ("ommon. :n did the pnnclple of',urmng mght mto lhy' to the di~d\":tnt:lge of a surfaced U-boat. U)' 1943 thert' "1:rt' s'·....eral difrC'rt'1ll opentions that might be ord..r..d in the e\'ent of a thrcat. If there was an Asdl(: contact dOS\,' ahead of th~' ("011\'0)', the ship would ("ounter attack at once and hOIst a warnlllg Signal. If II wu further awa)" she would auempt to id..ndfy the contact 1II0re carefully befon' " ...ming and auadang, A h)'drophone efreer C:OIlt:lC1 at Illght probabl)' meant a surfaced boat. The <"SCort would altt'"r course to"...rds it and try to l,'l:t a ndar ccho, With a radar contact, sht'" would again alter course lowards It at maxImum speed and report it by radio. On sighling a U-boat at clOS<' range an <'SCort would either op~'n firt' or ram, th,'n drop shallow depth charg"s o\'er the SII". If she saw a torpedo track she would take :,.\'oldmg action, holSt 3 w.l.rning sign31 and tht:'n run along Iht:' IrJck of the torpedo hoping to find tIll' submarine th~t had fin:d II. rf a shIp In the con\'o), "';IS torpedoed by day, the senior officer would make: the code word 'Artichoke:' o'..e:r Ihe: radio. The ship in the
Jligh, of ",,·bmls, .. I..W paull of ""","d. " "oh..k ot "n i(rbtrg - dlld "" u"uld JUlOOp doo'll 1<1 tX"IlII11~ ,I. All ryu skllllltd bu, IIMIIlng '0 fir Sttrl. A"d U'/' S'
'whlPP"'r l11' posmon would S1l','r to\\... n:h the ClIsualty, while those on Ihe: forn...rd posmons would go on the rt'clprocal course 3nd those on Ihe fbnks would continue forward unlil they reached the suspecte:d poslUOn of the U·boat. It was hopt'd to 'cO\'('( 3S far as possible the area which the U·~t IS IIkel)' to be',lfthe amck took place by mght and It .... ';IS MhC"'o"l:d to be from a slIlgle V-boal, 'banana'. Ihe successor to r;>5pbc:rry........s used,By 1943 the \...Iue ofturmng mglll mto day by use of tllununanu was bemg qu~oned,Wlth the mcreascd me: of nlhr and the nsk of spotllllg the ViSIon oflookoulS. A suspected pad. atuck was met by 'pin..apple' in "hich the all the escorts would go to full spcc'd, tnnsnut on their AsdlC and Zigzag wudly to incrc:aK the CO\1:r. [f a V-boat ....'25 behC"'o"l:d 10 M submergfit In a pamcubr area al mgbl, Oper.llion ~r......m ~ carried OUI. The: fi~ CSoCort to arri\""C searched round a square Ith 2-nule- SIde's after markmg out the centnl POint "llh a flare. The second ....-e11l to the edge: of the sqWIC opposite the first. If escorts could be spared from Ihe- co"''o)' long enough. they nllght hU1l1 the U·boal 10 exhausnon so thaI It was forced 10 surface after Its air was used up." III
UFTIJrlC ('It
Orr sl«hJlI.~lltS. ,ht lIIot/
JII,ro"lIdillg
II.·'
[I .......s rccoglllscd thai the maJorny of such patrols ....uuld only ha\"(' a d('te,rent ('freel. Nenonhclt'SS. escort carrier borne aircraft had their first nUJor engal,'Cmem 1II May 1943, when BiI"5 pbnc:s attacked SIX V-boats, ~nd ~nk on... Later in thc lIlonth Bog"t'S aircraft nude six a,tacks III a few hours, smking one submarine and helping a con\'O)' to get through wlthOUl loss. Communicalion with shore-based aincnft. opent~'d and trait1l'd by th" 10\F. WliS l,'l:I...rally mon: difficult, Captain Macintyre railed against the futility of man)' earl)' p3trols due to poor training 3nd conl111Unication. 'A code of \'ery brief signOn. From Ihe air,
Inplh ehuStS
Sunderland PIIOI Alan W Deller n'porled:
and Iht meanl
or
dropping and
As _ as lilt _iot oJJittr "'lIS SDtisjitd as to "", idmlily '" Jlashrd 11.I IIIJtrntlllmsjor Iht Iypt of fXltwl ht lWnltd 11.I 10 carry 0"', wt having l<.>Id hilll h"", IdS S(1 lII-'f'mI'06../,,'td as 1<1 fit "lm"sl umnltf/igrblt, Idf)ltly JII.I' d IMlllljn,~kss _rillg noist, So (Ofllmulli£dlkm Imdtd 10 bt Htalllly by "'lIIp
Depth Charges The depth charge ,,-.as sunpt)' a ~
con~
fined with expkJsn'CS
SC'I
10
WhCll the: .......,er prtSSUre uKbaled a certain depth. Thq' could bedroppt'd &om nUs. pro'>'Idt.ng the ship w~ going &sf. enough to ;r.'Old blowu,£ her 0\\"11 stem oR" ....,th the expkJsion. or fired oW)'ank out fronl
IhrowinSIMm,
238
I I
Churchill's Navy
., ,,
II
hIm )v
'--.-:.-- :'::.:::."
a".....~.
M
-~
!>.no
"""- ........
ld,lo'_ ......
-
.... ~ •• I) .......
...... A>e+ I ....' • h....'. O! :m... • -..
1m 0
b ....
""""
!llo
t.
h •• ('.'UN,,_"
_ . . . . ' ..'y'...... T. 13
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T_. 00 ",.,••• IHU..
, w ..
.
. ........" . ,-
·_!.. .
lo!
,
: A" •••,_ ~ ..,.
.
Above IIP-li:n,.
throwers on rither ~de of the ship to increase me SPl\'"ad ofa J>'lttcrn.Thcy
advaulages of
came in IlOrnul types with a ISO-pound weight to sink it, and heavy with
allacking by
J
Hedgehog, a.....iding
300-pound weight to nuke it sink moll' quickly in deep atucks.
Euly estinutes about how much cbmage a depth charge could do at
che blind 8..".
a distlnce were too optimistic, and Ihe Batde of tile Atlantic was fought
under the ,"Kort.
in dccp WolICrs. so /lew tactics W{,"R' necessary. The 14-char~ pattern w:I5 developed, with settings ~t 150,300 and 385 feel. It w~s found th~t on.. char~ tend..d to im.. rf..1l' with ~noth ..r, and the 10-charge palt..rn thcn occamt' ~tandard 'whcn carrying OUt ~ deliocr:ttc attack 011 ~ conUCI which is vcry likely to be ~ U-bo~t, in \v:lters of 40 fathoms or moll". For a shallow attlck, th.. charges W"1l' ~t at 100 ~nd 225 f....t. for a medium attack at 150 alld 300 fcct, and for a deep panel'll at 150 ~nd 385 feet. On the buner signal to fire, two charges, one norm~1 and one heavy, w..re fired from Ih.. throw..rs on each side. and a normal and a heavy charge- wt're n'leased from the rails. Four seconds later wht'n tra\'elling n a speed of 18 knots, or ;lfter tr:l\"elling 40 y.uds, another normal ~nd ~ heavy charg.. w..re Il'leas.ed from th.. nils, and this wu repeatt'd ~fler a further 4 scconds or 40 yards." Eight, seven and fivecharge patterns could also be used, mostly from ships which were not fined for the full complement. If there \Vllli cnough timc, ~hips and dt'pth charges 10 ll\OUllI an extensive ~tt:lck, the U-boats fate \v:lS probably se~led. The plaster attack ....'3S developed by Walker's c..lebr:at..d S..cond Escort Group and con~isted of three ships dropping as llIany charge'S as possible at fiw:second int.. rv:lls, as Ihey did in June 1943.
Aboo..., right:
The Squid
Iriple-ba....eUed anli-subm•• iuIP-
moria•.
... tlle IIlrIT ships Sl(am(J l/llfl' Ihe 'pifW'd' /X'Silil/1l l/f Ihe U-/x.Mr JroppifJ.~ a amtiuulIllS stream
The creeping att;lck by others.
New Weapons The grcatt'St single problem widl depth ch~rge ~ttack was th~t the urget would disappear from the Asdic some dist:lllce from the ship, especi;llly if it \\'3S deep. The ~It~cking ship had to make intelligent gut'SSt'S ~bout its movements ;lnd drop the depth chugt'S allllost blind - V-bo;lt capuins knew this well ;lnd m;lnoeuvr<:d unpredictlbly during this interval. Ahead-throwing weapons Were developed to atl;lck dw U-boat while it was still in Asdic nngl'. The Hedgehog consisted of 24 spigot mortlrs firing a charge of up to 35 pounds of explosiv.. ahead oflhe ship. to land in ~ circle 100 feet in diameter in which it was ho~'d would include the V-boat. Fitted to Riwr class frigates and to many corvettes ;lnd other ships, it \v:lS rushed into servic.. in 1942 to beat its rival. Squid, ~nd cre~ were inadequ~tely tnined.Aitning and firing were much more complex than wilh depth charges, and the early success nte was low. The ch;lrges only exploded if th..y actually hit the submarine, so they did not hav.. the psychological impact, on both sidt'S, of tht' dt'pth chargt'. Nevcrthdt'SS, orde~ were given to use the Ht'dgehog wht'n possible, to a\ooid the dangers posed by the German acoustic torpedo. This tended to Illake its reput;ltion worst'. as it was fire-d without proper prt'paration. Success r:ates droppt'd to less than 7 per cent between April and July 1943. A series of trials off Londondt'rry t'Stablished faults in maintenance and procedure. Once these Wl,'n" corn'ceed. Hedgehog had 3 success r:ate of 37 per cent. By that time its main riv31 W:lS in servict' and was proving e\"t~n mon" mat'SsfuL
239
Escorts
Squid was ~ Ihree-b~ndled rnon~r fired fTOm Ihe forw:ud pari of the ship. Unlike Hedgehog it used depth mher than comacI charg<.'S. and il '-"':IS aimed using direct links to the ships Asdic, including automatic depth settings for Ihe charges. Fined on Castle class corvettes and the new Loch class lTib':ltes. it soon proved highly successful, t'SpedaUy il1 twin mounts. which had a success rate of 40 per cent early in 1945. In September the fi-ig:lte Lagm, '-"':IS the first ship to be sunk by the new German acoustic torpedo. known to the Allies as GNAT. It was on.ly effective against ships doing beN.een 10 and 18 knots, so unlike other "''e..pons il '-"':IS ~imed al escorts r:lther than merchantmen. It "-':IS countered by reducing speed in an atDck. which Jlude Hedgdlog rather than depth charges necessary, and by towing a noise-making machine known as Foxer behind the ship. That worked. but it made much more noise than the ship iaclf and could givc her position away. Another technique was 'step asid.·' in which an attacking ship WQuid alter course suddenly.
Attack on the Surface The convoy escon had tv.'o main means of atlacking a V-boat on the surfacc - gun and ramming. The 4-inch gun fined on many t'SCorlS \vas 'the light "Woolworth" rype, developed for merchant ships, with a compar:llivdy short r:lnge' [t had no great superiority over the V-boat gun. but the submarine was not likely to sund and fight. 1O Destroren had bigger and better guns. and also had more sophistieated aiming sYSlems using directors. but COf\'ettes and frigates had 10 rely on the marksmanship of the gunners to achieve hits, Even then. the 4-inch \vas b~rely enough to penetr.lte ~ Stout V-boal hull, and many escaped. Ramming ....'as considered a suitable Dctic at first. By its nature a submarine has very little reserve buoyancy, so a small penetration of the hull is likely to be fatal. Twenty-se"en V-boars were rammed with SOllie degree of success in 1940-3, and in about half of dlt'Se cast'S ramming was the major cause ofsinking. But ramming \vas not certain (0 sink the bo~t, ~nd it could often harm Ihe rammer - the destroyer Oribi rammed V-5JI at 22 knolS in May 1943 and her bow \vas considerably damaged, Afier that capcains were ordered to ram only if there w;lS no other way of preventing imminent danger"
Air Defence In ocean convoys the main air threat was from the long-rangeFocke-Wulf Kondor. These four-engined aircraft were the longest r:lnge mae-hines the Germ:ms had at the time. but their primary role was reconnaissance. The appearance of one in the- vicinity of a convoy tended to signal an imminent a((~ck. Before MAC ships and HCort carriers became general. the single-u~e Hurricane fighters wt're deplored against thO:-III. Rlmi:ln convoys generally h~d the resources of the Home Fleet. including aircraft carriers. for their defence, East COOSt convoys could be protected by RAF lighters but h
4 Escort Bases Most Second World War escort bases \\'en' in one sense or another improvised. beC:l.use Ihe Fall of Fr:lnce closed tI\(' JlQrts in the south and easl, and the V-boat w:u extended far wider than anyone h:ld predicted. TheR' was no time for extensi\'e civil ...ngineering work. so escort bases wen: either n:ltura! harbours such as Loch Ewe. or establishl,d commercial JlQrts such as Li\'erpool. In some b:ues. such :IS the Clyde and Lin·rpool. warships :I.lld merchant ships shared the facilities. Others. such as Londonderry and Har....ich, wen'" mainly used by wanhips. Escort vessels had :ldministrative, technic:ll and personnel support in the bases where they found themselves. Each British group in the Battle of the Atlantic \vas allached to a JlQrt such as Liverpool. Londonderry or the Clyde. bUi it might also find support while waiting at SI John's in Newfoundland or Freetown in Sierra Leone. for example. It was a system that worked quite weU, with shon: officers who were close 10 the needs of the ships and ga\'C them priority. Dona.ld M:lcintyn: felt that this contrasted with morc established bases such as Plymouth: 'We weR" illlruden then'" and made to feci oursel\'es nui~n,es'.1f Ap:ln from a luge h:lrnour. a good escon basc: no:-eded a headquaners. ofien with an operations room. and an accounring base for the ships. It had to be defended against atta,k from the air. surface vessels. submarines, torpedoes :lnd mines. In view of the ex,essively shon range of lIlany escon \l"SSCls, fuel ~upply was critical. [t needed recrcation facilities for crews betv.·ccn missions, and good transpon to send them on lealle - Liverpool's location. with a good rail network. was the best provided for this. It had various training establishments. including :l school, for merchant ship gunners, and simulators for continuity training. Londonderry. for example, had a Night Escon Attack Teacher. an Anri-
....:onna;tunee phOlognoph of
Liverpool. GI~dslone
Dock,
on.in escort baH, is On the
lhe
lOp left.
240
Churchill's Navy
Submarine and Tactical SchooL twO Ami-Submarine Attack Teachers. depth charge, Hedgehog and Squid drillers. a mock up of a U-boat for boarding pJ.n:ies. and gunnery. sib'1lals. din:<:rion findiug and radlr Khools.'" A bm: also necdt·J repair facilitk-s for mcrcham ships and warships suffering from the c/feelS of enemy action or rough wt";Idler.
rmloadlll,l!: plus Illri, w,~
The Clyde Naval Control of Shipping All th.. br.allchd of die inshore navy were to b.. found in the Iypical base:
the Patrol Sl·r... in~. ControUt:d Mindidds. Coo..>ul Foret'S, Doom Ddt'nee and the Examination Service. Om' import:lI1( dement W2.S the Nav:l.l Comrol of Shipping Office (NCSO). This W3S m;lllllcd by fonner officers. later misted by Wn'IJ officcl'$. Thl1' controIft:d the rouling of convoys which. thlT' were ull,'t:d. 'should lIen:r be allowed to tx"::OIllC a routine matter". They decideth of one captain and II other officers of tht" RN and RNR, wilh four signallers, a writer and tWO civilian clerks.l3y 1944 HMS Loigh was under the COlllmand of a commodore who doubll,d as NCSOThalllcs. \\~th a smff of78 officers and 25 WIT"n officers by early 1944_The buer were advised that a female boarding officer should Inn' already bel'n in a boats crew to leun scamanship; to han"a complete bck of sense of modcsty' as shc was likely to find sailors in all state'S of undress on IJ.o".rding; to be able to resist COlltinuous offers ofdrinks; and to be 'daslic and acrobatic' l'nough to c1lmb ladders and planks." The core of the comllland was formed by twO doz.en commanders, RNR, who had experience of both the Royal and Merchalll navies. Fifteen of thl'lll had lx'en recalled from retirement to servc. Thcre was link difficulty wilh routing as there was only one path imide the east coast minefields. but timing was very important SO that convoys wert" nOI l'xposed during daylight in the most J3ngerom seCtor'S. UnJikt" otht"r COllllllands Lrigll was closety involved in the headline evcms of the war: th....vacuation from Dunkirk, the London blitz and Ih..
Togcther the main Clydt" ports of Glasgow and Greenock wt"re much smaller than Liverpool or london, accounting for about 4 pt:r n'nt of Urltish tradl' Ix,fon- the war. TheIr rail links with other parts of the count!)' wcrc not cl(tensivc, and they had small dock labour forces. Howe\"er, tht" Finh of Clyde waS fitrther from bombing than any other industrial part ofl3rnam (dt'Spltc dCVJ.statll1g raids on Clydebank on 13 and 1-1 March 19-11) and offered a large arca of anchorage in the Tail of the l3al1k off Greenock, and in sc\"eral 'Sea lochs. To supplement the port facilitk's, docKl'r'S were broughl up from london. A scheme of 'ovt"rside discharge' was Slarted, in whICh the cargoes of arriving ocean merchant ~hip§ wt"re unloadcd illlo (oaSlers to go 10 smaller pons round tlll' (oumry.A nl'W port was cn'ated at FaslaTlc on the Can-loch, intt"ndt"d for the t"xport of military personnel and goods, such as the heavy t"quipmt"nt for tht" Torch landinb'S in North Africa_
Norrn~ndy landinb'S' It handled a total of 3367 convoys, of which twO thirds were along the east coast.'"
Londonderry Liverpool
The Idca of u~lIlg Londondl'rry ortginated in September 19-10. It had declined as a pOrt since 1922 when lhe illd~pendel1ct" of Eire cut it off from most of its hillll'rland. It was on till' fringl'S of the Unlt..,U KlIlgdom, alld tht" Wl"Stern shon' of the Rl\1:r Foyle lcadmg up to 1I was Imh tcrritor)'.lt was -I miles upsln."am, in a narrow riwr with r:J.th"r rundown faciliti...... indudingjt"ttil'S and a graving dock. It was oflmle 1l'Sl.' for runcham ships, b<:cau'SI.' It had no dtn,C{ hnk with till' tlriush ratlsystem,
Li\'Crpool was one oftht" \\"orld'~ great ports, vying with London for the leading position within Drit~in,lt was largdy an artificial creation. with Illany mik'S ofenclosed docks on the cast bank of the River Merscy and more on lhe other side at l3irkenh..ad. It had ,"cry little naval presence in peacetinw, bm with till' virlllal clOSIJrl.' of tht, Pon of London and tlll: English Channel to ocean shipping, it occallle the main emry P01l1t to the United Kingdom for most of the war. It also became tht" base for Illany escort '1.'Ss,:b, which Wt'n' moon'd in Gbdstolll' Dock in thl' northern end of the port. Nicholas Monsarrat was a native and it was hu f.lvourit(' bas(', despite regular bombing in 1940-1.
but Its gn.'atcst ,ld"JIllJge was liS sm,ation. Ap,Ul from Campbelto\\ n near Ihe end oflhe Kintyre p.:nillsula, it WAS thl' dQSl'St Uriti~h port 10 th.., area m wInch the Umle of the AtlantIC waS fought, which Illadl' It Ideal 1ll VIew of the short r:J.nge of marlY escOrt \'<':'50s<.'1s. Furth~rmoll'", Campbcltowll was isolated and in a very sparsely populatl'd an'a.
Lil!f'T1X'Ol, l!rl' !rub ,f rll(, 11b-lml Approadra rommand, IIUI" a t.lI~1 u~1I IIIJrfl1 JrilliU,lt, ·,Jrm U'I'R' Irtl'l'r INS rlum a Imr"Jmf s!rips III 1r.IIJ"mr, IVIldilrg aud
Londondnry was close 10 mduitnaJ l3elfasl and had a bib.... CIVIlian labour force, for Northern Ireland was nor subJcct to conscription. Captain P Ruck-Keene built Ul' the ba..;o: aud in February 1942 it was
and housn ~ akn1 000=. but !be LNER Hou:l trm:lIJICd:llt ~ It \\'3S m o",1w1 tunds 001 could onI)' be I"t'Xht-d by ~ \\ith 01 ~... pa, Tht: ~ :If'PC:ln.lhinly dftguiKd, in MQfIS:lI'nt ~ Em GAur Conon't.
IS JKW1b4t u,tlrm 1M 'um MUUI pnWds..
8)' Ftobrwry 19-11 Ihiny-six slurs ""'1:'1"(' ~ at Londomkrry.Thc ~ ~ 3 ~ of 1-155 by the beguuung of 19~. hc:rocd by
'1) "" lJNt~
w;ar. It used SC\Tr.l.1 sloops. mlOally for :lnti~ubllurillt p;alrOl ~nd ncorl dutin, By 19-tO it W:lS c1~;ar th;at ;aircr.lft "Tn: the gR';at~r thR'al ill Ih~ al\"a and they wI:n' convcrt~d to All. limps, with OcrillwlU ;and 2-pounder pom-polllj.
Loch
]~we
;anchor.l~ ill 1939 when Sc~p;a beomc: unten;able for :1 whde, [t was empty for most of 19..0, unn! DC'Cembcr when II W15 decided to devdop it for conVO)-s hming round the north
Loch Ewe in
llonh-w~t
Scocbnd hOld been used as;a flcci
Ihe FiN World Wu. and II was n."Vivt:d
III
of the COUntry to :lvold tile Engbsh Channel. Soon
It
w"s bemg IDC:J 10
1SSClllble pMU of COll\'O)' ROmg to H:1.bfu. Sicrn Leone. Iceland. Gibraltar ;and North A&ia Irs mouth was ckkrn:kd by tr,Iwlers ;l.nd 6-
oast Bases
,nch gull b.ltteTlCs. II soon had 01 loul sWf of 1535. llKluJmg 175
H"....ich H'II'OOur is one of the: besI: Ul taS'lcTn England north of the: 11umes. :I ruNral ~ funned by the conftucnce of me mus Stool' ~nd Orwd. II Iud been wcD knc:M'll to the IU\"J' .since the rimoe of 5.lmucl Pep)~ cwo ~nd a luIf centurln eaffler.Tht: tn.IlUOg ~ HMS Go.nto was on the pemnsub bt:t\\~ the ,"0 m~ and there \\VI': CoasuI Forcn.md RAF Wsoes ~t FrhXSUMT 10 thc: north_ HB..-ich ~~
Wmu, Of these,
th~ I1llm
dt.fficull weR' the crews of
th~
merchant
oden:lnd ;au.'(lhan('S who \\TTl' 'connnwlly going ashore without lenT,
~
getting drunk. brnking Ie:l\'e etc' A la¥ oil tank. "-as built.:l OIl(1IU "015 ert'C1:ed. but Ulan: O!<.·<;onulKxbtion n:lJWned 01 pmbkm. ",th only a snl:lIl ho«:l for officen' qwnen;and hadqlartC'n. Loch E"T ~ OIX" of the Tl'tIIOlCSl ofbaso:\, "ith no ~il facilities.. ;and ("o""t'll the sboR' suff Iud rntncted bYe. Tht:re "-ere no sbon: .mIusemencs excepl rho5c prt:l'ndcd b)' the lUW, such as foodl.ill pitches. III 19-t 1 the Nse \\-as lundling:ln z,,~ of 80 mnehalll slups mel 20 l:'SCom JlCI' "'ftL·
used for IoaI defence cnfi md ~V md ~ IUgs..A brF lempcnncc dub for ~ungs \\'3S $CI. up Oil I~ whak Ihor supenon had me usc: of!he MlChxhron Na\'6I <:>fIi«-n' Dub, esubmhed b)- !be m:unl~ Cl.pUin of!be port :lnc! S1lU:lted in ooucfuJ grounds 2X miles &0111 Pnkeslon. V.mous hotels
Hoilifax In N~'a Scoci.I a;a gJnIll:lIUn1lurbour. m ~ mkt -t rmJcs long md neuty 01 nule wMk • lIS C'I11nn«, wttfl ~ :lICI ~ 13 5qWf\" rmks
1JUI1}'
purposes in "~II(', induding the ~ for !he 5100ps :lnd ron.~ csconed the: coal COl1\'O)'l 10 London md the 5OIlm. Most of !he
\\luch ~';I)
faobD<'5 "'CTeOit
~on ~ dIt'
comlllCflul ferry port 3
up thc: Stow - tJN.o 1O'o\'ll qU3)'" • H;uv.ich
--.........
n ..............
~
The \testern Atlantic
-n..
. . . . . . . . . 1IIarm
Mltu.
... _. L-'
Tht ht
",r
~nd
........... ...... ..-... ... ..doDnpo_ ....
""",,ltd
1M "'
1 II),
wiD
-t
,)/'J.RT X
The Coastal Navies 1 Coastal Forces C03SIJ.1 Forn"S was olle of the great growth areas of Ihe w:lrtime navy. cxpandlllg from alm~1 nothing (0 more than 20.000 men. using a \';Irkd force of ''ery snuU w;lrslups GUt'ild(- the gencnl Ime of dC\"l,']opmclII, :md altr.!eDng a gn:at dul of PUblICI()' during the "'aT. Yel theIr success was highly ;ambiguous. They wen: nOI as obviously llt'Cc:ss::.Iry as major w3clUps. C$CC;lr! \TSSCIs and Imdmg crati for example, no IIUtleT how m~nious their dcslgners or how bm-e rhelr crc'ws.
Early Development ~ ""ttC ~u essential probknlS ";th British coasul forces - the- bck of any dt-o.dopmC'flt for more tIwl 15)'nn Ul a lughly techrucaI fidel and ~ bd: of a sulubk engme.' The Bnmh Iud used fast power 00a1S kOO\\1l as coaiUI II)()(Of boats in the Fint World WM. but ~ W.IS no POSH\W na'..! imerrsl unril1935 whrn Hubc.-n Scon Pamc of tile Bnnsh Iw'tT Boat Coutpm)' JX.'tSlUded the Admll'21t')' to 111\'eS( In one of hiS designs. Scon Paim' "'Zi ~mething of 1lI1 cnmusl;ast and lw chims for f~ cnfi \\~ ('Jagger-ICC'd. He ilia up5Ct hiS commercul rwals such as Vospc1" and Thomycroft by his exclusi~ deal wilh Ihe Admir.dty.ln me meantime Ihe Germans and hJlial1$ made good progn'SS m th.· field. and Scou l>:linei
6O-foot boal proved uns:trnfaetory. though il led 10 a re-birth of interest. In 1936 Vospers produced a Iargt'r. 68-fOOl boar, MTB 102, which could reach a spn=tl of 43.7 knou. In 1938 Ih.· British Iw'Cr ~t Compan)' fl,.'$pOndl:d wlm a 70-foot !>mI. and lhe Adnmalr)' deaded [0 go ahead wlm orden for boau of rh,lI length fioll\ Vospers and Thornyooft. The fOl.Sl ships ofC<-ul Fore" wen: 1110101" torpedo OOau or MTBs and mOior gun!>mu or MGBs. MJny ofmesc were ofthc ·turd chme' hun form. \\1th \'er)' disonctivc tdges ~ttn the upper and lower pari of the hull. They wcre designed for 'pbmng'. usmg 'dynarruc hft· to ralSC IIIOS1
of the hull out of !he watef
at high s~ of -W knOIs or
so. The
bOItom was V-sh:aped. because a l1at bonom would sbm 100 much in Ihe "'J,on and when it n:~nle~ Ihe "'Jlef as mc boat slowed down. TIm form lended 10 creale a short. ",de boat. and a f)"plcal MTU was about rwo and a half omes as as a dC'StR))",r in proportion 10 iu kngth, ThIS nude it incfficient at Iow't'r spc<.'ds. Ikc:n..lS(' of me lack of continuous dco.·t'lopmem then: "'t'rt' nWI)' problems 'wim nuuen weh as proptUer d"ign. The amounl and dtstrlbunon of ""'ight \\'as crucial. "pccially when planing. bul cO:I$UI fore" suffered from the usual wartime addirioll$ of gull$ and oth.·r equIpment. often fined al aoulla kvd WIthout the eornc:nl of the na\'Jt consO'Uctors.
",dc
MTBs The motor torpedo boat"":l.S mlcndcd to carry two or more 10rpedoes on a minimum we of hull al a nuximulll sp«(1. to attxk .·nelll)' merdUlll
ships alld warships in coJStll \\';lters. [t had a cert:;lin attraction as a cheap. fOl.Sl craft manned by nOIHU\':II p('rsonnel which could potenti.l11y destroy a ship of man)' times iu own \'alue, But it \\'as dieS<' v"ry f;aclor.; which mad" il unpopubr with the Admiralty in thc Uller·\\",\f penod. and enllmCCd 115 appeal [0 \\~r IUVI" JUCh as Gcrnuny and Italy. Aftcr me competitIOn bct\\"CCn the builden in the ble 19.1oOs. mOSI construction of MTBs \\';IS based on the Vosper design......Im a hull form tlut dld nOi change much. T)"plcal boalS. buIlt berv."CCn 1942 and 1944. \\'t'1't' of 37 tons on a length of 72M ffft. They had a speed of J8-4O knots iffiun:!. wim their intendC'd engines. tWO torpedo rubes. a 20nun gun and [Vo'O machine guns and \\crt' oper:lIn:!. b,. a <:rn\' of 13. The British PO'....er Boat Company (UPB) continun:!. 10 build boau 10 Its O\\Tl design.:IS did od~ firms such as White of CO\\on and Camper and Nicholson. The 81'8 f)'PC had a d1snncti\~ hull with lIS n1J.Xlmum bl't'adth \\'t'll forv.'Jrd and a deck which fOUnded doY.T1 1000'ards the bo.....s 10 implQ'\'" me view forv.'ard. Other boalS "'t'n: supphed under Iend·leasc by the ElectrIC Boat Company (Eko) of Nt'\\' Jersey. Op.....ile:The
MGBs There was no need for a mOlor gunboat until 1940. when Ihe fall of Norway, the Nl:thl:tlands and France cn:ated the possibility of shortrangt' warfare in the 'narrow seas' around Britain. Th" Brilish MTB was not big enough to orry ~ defensive arnulIlent of iu OWI1. and It was not suiuble for fighting off E·!>mt attacks on convoys. A group of aboUI a dozen mOior ano-illbnunnc !>mu or MAlSBs \\"'n' a1n'ady urNkr ronstruction. mostly by BPB, and \\~re unemplO)'t'd beousc me 1.'11"111)' dkIl1Ot: blllKh an msbon: campJ,lgn. MOSI of mem .....en: eomntn:!. mto lTlOIor gunboats by fimng 2-poundcr and 2(hIUTI guns. bul they \\"l:n' sJoy,. al 23 knots. \Wious othtr \'nSoCb "'t'rC' Dken ()\""('f lium de(nted
machine gun. of
MTB 10' of the While fype, wilh olhe~
boau of lhe
OOlilb in Ihe background, Beloor. /It. mocOr lorpedo boat of lhe 8ririoh
~
Boal dftip.
n.
yard old.
BridIh Puoo- IIoeI CompayMHydoot
_
s-doan'ploa.
. . . _RAF ...... .... IftaM
10
d.
tau.ch
ricfot aod •
Bn1Il .......
10
It",
1eft.11M IIMdI
Ilft
:r.lbcs. from commerci:r.1 orden for other eOUmrlt'S, or tr.lnsferred from the Unit«l Stud. The fim Urmsh 00:r.1S desJgntd :IS MGBs \\'t:~ :r.g;un produced by DPB and h~ the char.tcla-istic hull 4~pt. They "~ 71 fc:e:t long. Iud a speed of up to oW knotS ;and "'t:~ fined wnh :r. 2-poundtT,IWO Otrlikons:r.od four mxhme guns. Othen ....'t:~ dcslgned b)' the )~hl-buiJden, Cunper and Nicholson and the AmtT'an firm of t hpgms. 10 the: force ~nuuJed snull wd nuscdbneous until the brgt"r bo:r.lS of the F.llmult type ClIme mlo being.
Steam gunbw~ ""Cf"C built "",inl)" bec:r.uSC' the pctm1 engUles of MG8I \\'t:rt' tOO noIsy for a surpnse :m:aclt, They Iud :r. ceruin :r.mount of ~ceu, bul theIr numerous stem1 pipes and bo.kn \\'t:rt' vuinenbk to a single hu. and armouring them added grraa:ly to Ihe ""''''Ight.ln an)' case, fast craft ....'t:1't' hltdy 10 be gw",n :r.way by the huge \\hite bow w.w", .IS much :r.s b)' the: no~. Onl)' ~'nl ste:r.rn gunbwQ \\~ bullt, but lhe)' "~ gi,,,,,n rwn.,s r.ttbrr dun nUrtlMn.
lLs Early Ul the war the- Fa1rnuk Compauy of Cobmm Admuwry With
;m
a~hed
the
lde.1lOr:r. Ilo-fue:x motor bunch for :&I1t1-subnunne
purposes. T.....d"e of this l>o:It, known as the A type. wert' orde~d bul for an MTB and tOO weak for gcner.tl purposoes. The
rl'O\.-ro tOO slow
IJ l)'PC was even slou.""r:r.1 20 knotS., but mort' robust wd eventmlly 568 "'ell: built :r.t home md :r.bro:r.d. Imn:r.lty Ihey c:r.rn«l :r. J..pounder gun and IWO m:r.dune gu"S, with :r. complenl(11l of 16. In 1943 Admlr.U BII1rtq' found du.t MLs "~ nwnly 1I~'OI,'l:'d 111 cwsul COI11.'O)' escort but pa-formed dlfferrnl fiJllCbOn$ 111 ceh of the home conunmds. Such ''n'S:ltility ofien nlCOllll du.t they. "'\'ere not ide:r.l for :my of the usb. Out of SIX 6ot:i1bs III the Norc, 11= ....~ tnoed as c~ ~ where E-bo.II :r.ttXk "'as likdy. The othcn nornul}r opented 10 the C1ISl of COI~ to giYC' nri)' .....vning of nuck, lhough thc:r ""'\'ere too slow to mta"Cept E~lS. Thetr nWD v:r.Iue ...., th the COl"''O)~ .....as Zl IifdJo:r.cs i:lr tol"pedotd or bombed ships. In Orkney and Shetbnd It "
of Ihem
The Coastal Navies
fitted to the engine 10 ill(Tea5C' the speed to 32.5 knots. Later craft were fitt\~d as cOlllbilled MTBs and MGBs, wilh four 18-inch torpedo tubt'S, two 6-poundcrs, Oerlikons and machine guns. [n all 228 ....1:TC completl"d, 19 of them for the RAF as air-sea rescue b.unches.
HDMLs Harbour defl'lKe 1ll010r bundll"S wl"re used for al1u~submaflne patrols along booms and at harbour e-ntrance-s, for thc destruction of submarines de-tecu:d by hydrophones and other devices, for p~trol against surface- attack and u lookouts for ent'my mindaying. The- firsl dt'Slb'll w~.li produced btl" in 1939, aftl"r the- R"j'oll Odk w:lS sunk at Scara. They were wooden round-bilge cr.lfl with a length of 72 feet and a 'peed of II or 12 knots. They w\.'n' fiued .....ith A5dic and armed wllh ~ 3-pounder b'lln, an Oerlikoll ~nd two Ll."wis nuchme guns. They were manned by r.....o office-rs, tWO petty officcrs and e-ight ratings! Four hundred and fifty of them wen' built. W J Holt considered them one of his best designs: 'In a SC"~w~y they seemed to possess an unusual harmony of weight, buoyancy and sh:lpe forward, in rdalioll 10 pitching and speed, whi<:h euabll'd them to move ill rhYlhm with the seas to make Ihe besl of prc\";Iihng condItions'.' Admir.ll Binney \vas .sceptical aboul dleir value in 1943,:.IS there had been no U-boat aHacks on Brilish ports since the R"yal Oak three )'ears e~rht'r. He consldl.'red that Ihe fishlllg dnfter, manned by Ihe PannI Se-rvice, w~s superior m e\'ery respeCl,'
Building The great
m~joT1ry
ofcoastal forces craft were built 1I1 wood. One major was Ih~t Ihey did not compete wuh merchant shlpplllg and brger \\";lrships for either m~terials or skilled bbour, beuuse their fnUIlI.'S weI"\' often cut OUI by woodworkmg finns such as furllllUre lIukers, ~nd :lSSCmblcd by y:achl-buildcrs. These mcluded well-known yacht-builders such as Camper and Nicholson at Gosport ~nd Alex R.obcrtwn at Sandbank in Scotland; and builders of IIlbnd pleasure craft such as Herbert Woods ~l Pottcr HClghall1 on the- Norfolk Bro~ds. The- Fairmilt boats used the most developed sySle-m of mass produ<:tion. The hull was based on plywood franit's, CUI out wry l'collomically by a wood.....orking company in Bl"\'l1uord Ile-~r London. A bell-e~sling comp~ny made the propellers, a wire-netting manllfacl\,rer the rllddc~, and a radiator compally made fuel and water t~nks. Thl' whole kit could be sent to a boat-builder's for erection and bunch,' Despite Ihe best e-/forts, there were nuny problems with the- woode-n hulls, According to Holt: ~dvant:.lgl"
<:$Con due- to Ihe Wortage' of dCSlroycrs. But on the- whole- Billney found 'no real enthusiurn' for MLs. NOIIl." tud l."\"t.T sunk ~ U-bo~1 ~nd they wen: toO slow 10 en~ E-boots. They ....'t'Te only ured because nothing else: ....
The Fairmile 0 The Falrmile Company commued 10 dt-velop its Ii00fool hull. and the C type of1941 W2S a mOlor gunbo~t.Twenry-four were bUIlt, bUill was still too slow at 26 knots. Me~nwhile W J ! lolt, the chief coast:l.1 forces dnigne-r ill Ihe Naval Construction Departllle-lll, had stepped Ill, A desD"O)'t'r type of bow ....
As a rl'SU/1 4/ltavy dri'~IIg, il U'tlt I<J '"c
All this tended to undermine the original ideJ of J fast. light craft.
247
248
Churchill's Navy
Armament and Equipment The w.ndnd ~mumcnl of the c~rl)' MTB was :I p;ur of 21-lOch lorJlfikx's. one on t:lch s.ick. The Mark 8·' fOrpedO was l.1rgd)' rnc....-nt for $lJbnurinn and MTBs Iud to m;lkc do with older MarL .. and 5 models unnl 1942. The foll0"'>1ng yen the supply of IS-Inch IMpc-doc:s inc~astd .lind they Iud TlC'\\' warb~ds "1.h 5..5 pounds of Torpc'x. It \\~ r!O"' possible 10 Ii. four IS-inch lUbes In brger MTDs. and tWO In snullcr onc-s. However. ItS range was lllllllC'U 10 2500 prds .,00 il was difficult 10 get .hat dose to a \\l':Il-<'SCOflcd enelll)' ('00\'0)'. uri) idas for r,IIl disctutgl:' of torpedoes by Soou ~1J)C and f;llm ge.n byThom)'crofi Wt'rt disardcd and MTB torpcOOn Wt'n: arned III and li~ from nlbes on euh SIde o£the ~I.A \~ry SImple Sighl was fined to nrly bo:;.ts for ;liming. bm ;1 "':IS Ie» cas)' 10 confUse the settings for enemy angie \\1th the bow angle In the cbrk. and a Mnk 2 \"t"nion. Inuoduced In 19#, R'tnC'dled these dcfcas and ;lIlO'wcd for SII:cnng by the co.xsw;ain, ;and r.>d;ar comroL" <:<mal forco carm-d a gre:lt \W1C1)' of gun arnUJIK11t.a.'" 18 chlfCT'C'llt r)'J'CS are hsl:ed for the Falnniles ~nc. Early I11C)(Of torpedo bool$ omcd only .JO}.inch mxhine guns in addition to the main :armament.This W';IS ~;T;J,dlWly 11lCft';)S('({ :IS encoumers with E-OOaa gttW. a.'" PQ""t"rrnountC'd .5-ulCh guns \\VC' added. Moror gunboool$ uswDy had !he 2pour"'er pom-pom ';IS rn.,it main gun. and bq,"l'r guns wcre fitted bt('f all, Uoots were lrlCrc~lngl:y fittC'd WIth racbr,though t~ fint I)'JX.2681'u' W';lS vt"f)' urtSOltisfKlOr'f ar'" only Iud a r;lOge of2 miles :ll?illSi an E-boot.
Officers and Men CooSlOlI FOrCl-S formed a scpar.ltl· manning division within the uavy. equivalelll to the three hOllle poru or the Fleet Air Arm, but much ~maller, It illcluded 1294 officers and 7721 ralings in November 1942. and a total of 20.855 officl'rs and ntings in Septemlx'r 1944,' Nearly all. about <)8 pcr cent. weTC temporary RNVR officers and l-Iostll1l1cs Ouly r~tiT1gs, [" December 1940 they We"'" placed under the Rear-
~1,"IOp:T_
Fairmi" Os around
1943. Oppooilr middle:
Ii. hubow drfrDCe mOlo. bunch
under .. UlO
......
f..el oa • d.l;......,.
•...,'P.
AdnuraJ. Couul Forcl-s. but that appomuneru later bp;cd and lhey weTC mtegr;lted WIth the hOllle commands. uch area had a Captalll, Coast;al Forces, and boars were org:lrIised in flotillas, nornully elghl boats onder a lll'Ulenant-<:ollullander, HOwl·...er. up 10 half the OOau in ,my flotilla might be onscnKe;lble at ,IllY gi\'cn momCIll. Co;lSl;a1 f"Orces \\~ one of the lllost highly publiciscd partli of tbe IUvy. and attr;J,etcd SOIllI' wry hlgh.profilc officers. 011(,' of lhc nlOSl f;llllous was Peter Scott. son of Scorr of thc Anurc'UC. and dcstlned to becomc thc first gre.u n..rure pfl:'So!'m.-r on Icl....'kion.The 15th MGI3 FlouUa at Danmooth mcloded Go)' Hanulton. a fUlull' film direclor. Dand I31000m. thc husb.J.nd and fathcr of (V,'Q famous smgers. and Mlkc MarY.all. an Oxford and Engbnd rugb), pbyer. The Admlr.t.lty found thc pUblICity useful m ilttr.Kllng ambilious ~'Qong men who ()(hcrw~ might havc b«n draWTI to'\\
""tt
The f
A lorry ronrplif.IltJ limtlablt 1/'IlJ omJr/gtd so ,h"'/«III~ ifllt lIt"h t1jJicm .IIIJ mtll) Drrtlpitd lilt dll)'S. .Illd frrqlltll/ l<JCtk.I1 txnOlts om/pltd Iht lII,e/us, -n,e prllgr
Bases
Opposilr bonom:
A fai.n,;l,. Do.I
lin dtllJly "rm"mrnl uftuh htlJ jllJt blOlnl 10 bilJ , Slnm,e/y N(,.mtd rnrmy U11h hrT lmI' if skillrd sailms for 11ftoM' Ii,'ft ht IIW" ~I"'"J.bIr . ... SOl ooly HI/eh bill Q lot of Oliln mrn UftO Um' bt'rf "''' so ~ htlt'\" .fi>t'nJ tho, kind ".f IlJfDr/Uhllltflt. , • ' rom'Uy, rMIi
8~ blc 1942 thm:- wm~ C~ Forces ~;lI1 rouoo tile Brilish C()$. servtng dtlferent fimcnons. lI:Up at Do"n and Fm,",1 at Ilatl1S~lc \\'t'tl: part of the Dm"I"T ConUlUJ'" hC
-----------------------------
250
Churchill's Navy
l'1lid on 51 Na:u.irc. which destroyed the huge dry dock there. Meanwhile,
more conventional action! were beginning to increas<.' with 78 encounters in the fil'S( quantr of 1943, rising 10109 in home w:lters in the first half of 1944. By that time CO;lSl:I.I Forces Wl'1'l' wry llIuch invoh-ed in the invasion of Normand)" They protected the routes t:lk...n by the bnding ships, and a piCNTe of the Fairmile Os of the 55th AmiUa ;It Gosport bec.tnH~ one of th.. classic images of the perioo. Coastal Forces continut'
wC"
e:lSt
COllSt
of Engbnd, the nuin ta5k
\\';15
defending c();lStal
com~'S
c:l.rrying c~ into London liom E-boat :leuck. MGBs were used. because th.. torpedoes of MTlJs were not suitable against such mull, f:lSt
and shallO\" targcu. MGBs were abo not suil;lble fOT close escort,:IS their planning hulls wen: not efficient at low speeds. A convoy usually Iud an escOrt of desuoyers. trawlers and corvettes, so cO:lStal forces were used to intercept the E-~u. Tht.1' wen: inhibited by their small siu and poor sea-keeping, for it is recorded dut on 16 nighu when E-~ts were OUt in the aurunm and winter of 1943-4, CO:lStal Forces v..ere not able to operate on fOUT of them. Nor were they able to defend the convoy directly, because they were slQ\\.'Cr than E~boats, Most raids "'Cn" fi~ detected by the escortS or shore radar and the MGBs wue directed onto them, but tht.1' tended (0 reach them Oil the way home aller tluo' raid,Th('" nuin advantage of coastal forces in this role was du.t that their sh.allow draugln aUQ\\.'Cd them to pursue the enemy across rninefields. i1 The main role of MTBs in the North Sea was to attack C!l('"lllY shipping, particularly convoys off the Dutch CO:lSt. They were not particularly successful in this, despite exawratM w;ulillle claims. In £Jct tht.")' sank only 40 mercham ships in nortll('"rn Europ<." a total of JUSt under 60,000 toIlS, The peak year was 1943, when 13 ships ofmon:: than 26.000 tons were sunk.'" MTBs also sank 70 enemy warships, mostly small ones escorting convoys, In the Mediterranean, cO:lStal forces saw action along the coast of North AfTiu, and they supported the invasion of Sicily and luly. Afwr that the)' operated on both sides of Italy, helping with the Capture of islands in the Adriatic and moving up the west coast to attack enemy coastal shipping. In action, motor gunboats rclit:d 011 good marksmanship rather than scientific gunnery. In describing the lessons of action, L C Reynolds of MGB 6S8 unconsciously echoed Nelson's diClum that 'No C3ptain can f,"O far wrong ifhe places his ship alongside one ofth......nemy' .
2 Mine Warfare The Threat Statistically the mine could be seen as the greatest single threat 10 British shipping in the Second World War. It sank 281 British \varships. compared with 271 by aircrafi:, 172 by submarine and 109 by surface cufe. However. the ships sunk by mines were usually small - only one cruiser and nothing bigger. compared with 23 destro)'l."rs, 23 submarines and more than a hundred tr.twlers and drili:ers."The effect on the enemy was just as serious. More than ISOO enemy vessels were sunk or damaged by mines laid by surfac... vessels and submarines. including three capital ships damaged and. 414 merchant \"Cssels sunk.'" In addition, whol.. areas were d..nied or made unsafe co one side or the other through mining, with a profound effect on str.tlegy, and large numbers of personnel wen:: employed in dealing with mines. Fif1:yseven thousand British sailors were serving in nearly ISOO minesweepers in mid-1944." Vet minesweeping was quite: low in the pecking order of lIaval prestig.... It was not formally recognised as a specialisation for officers. It was not a separate manning division like SubmaTines or Coastal FOTCes, it had no non-substantive badf,'t:s and minesweepers generally w... re unglamorous ships. The crews of minelayers never had the satisfaction of seeing hia on the enelllY and those of
. om~
De••il.
"f.
common
A gun action happened very fase. Commander McCowen of the 53rd MTB Flotilla report ...d on an attack on a convoy in MaTCh 1944;'We held the stage for perhaps IS seconds, and then the enemy opened a heavy and sometimes accurate, but mostly \\~Id, fire on the unit from all din"etions, with th ... l'xception of one CO;lSteT. which was heavily hil by our initial burst."
8ATT£RY
DETONATOR
251
The Coastal Navies
sweepers needed somc imagination to sec the end product of their work. John Miller. ~n ex-yachlSll1a!l officer. volunteered for rninesweeping because '[ fdt for humanitarian reasons that [ didn't want to shoot at the enemy'. But mllleswet'ping officers dId sometimes become heroes. COl1111l.;lnder Norman Morley was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and three bars for clearing the way to landings at Sictly, Salerno and Anzio. 1•
Types of Mine The moored conuct mine had been in use since the Crimean War nearly 90 years earlier. In the den~loped I·ersion. ;u used since the beginning of the twentit'th century, it was attached to a sinker which went to the bottom of the sea. The mine itself was f:l.ltened by a ""1T'C and f1oot«l to the correct depth just und... the water. If a ship hit one of the 'horns' on the sidt., of the mint.". it would detonate. British cont:lct mines could be used in deptm of up to a mile. [nfluence mines did not ne«l direct cotllact.The best known was the nugnetic mine. imnx!u(l,'d by Gernuny early in the w:lr.1t \\':IS dropped in rebtin'ly shallow "'':Iter, and was detonated by the nugnetic field of a ship passing over.At firsl it \vas regarded as Hitler's secret weapon, and indeed it damagt.-d thl' b:lttleship l\.'rl~cm and thl' cmi~r Brlfa5l;U well :IS many merchant ships. But Brit:lin W:lS not far behind in such lIIim~s. and an intact German example was recovered offShoeburyness in Essex in Non~mber 1939. Counterlllea~lI= were soon dl'Viscd. at some cost. A~ well as mineswt':..ping, tht':Se included degaussing, or Il'ducing the lll:lgn..tic field of ships by passing electrical c:lbles round th..m. Other types of influence weapon ineludl'd the acoustic mine, which was set offby the sound ofa ship. It was first used in August 1940. bur a~ with magnelic mi[](~s the Germam st:lrted to usc them before Ih<.1' had adequate stocks. allowing time to develop countermeasures. The most difficult type of all was the pl'ffiiUTC minc, S<,t off by Ihe waves of a passing ship.This was first used by the Germans immediately after 0Day. and the only way of dealing with it was 10 ha\'e a well-protected or expendable ship pass O\'er ii, Mineficlds \\'eTC even moTC deadly if se\~T:ll Iypes of mine were combined. or if delayed action fuses were set so that it would only become active after scveral ships had passed. Controlled minefields were used ncar harbour entT:lnccs,They were e1eClrically linked to the sholl' :lIld could be de-activated when friendly vt'Ssc1s wer~' passing. Tht., navy had a cOtllrolkd mining service that numbered 1368 men in November 1944. mostly working .1shore and unfit for sea sen'ice.'"
Minelaying Offensi\'e minclaying W.1S USU.1l1y done close to enemy shorelines and W:l.S intended 10 sink his ships in home "':Iten. or to restrict the areas in which they could operate. The Brilish laid mines off Ihe coaSt of Germany and all the occupied countries using surface ships, submaril1l'S .1nd aircraft. In the Bay of Biscay. .1 large minefield was used to help stop U~boats getfing to and from their b;ucs. Defensh'e minelaying \\':IS intended to protect one's own coast and shipping. Mines were laid across tl1l,' English Ch:lnnel and entT:lnc(S to tl1l,' North Sea at the beginning of the \\':Ir. bllt these wen' soon outflanked
by the German adv:mce. Far more useful \\':IS the East Coait BarT:lb'<'. running a few miles offShore from thc Thames Estuary to the north of ScOtland. [t was very \"luable in protecting shipping from U-boats and surface attack. except by E-boalS wluch could often pass over It. Other fields were laid at the entrances to the Irish Sea, and 10 pTCVent a counteT:ltlack on the invasion forces in 1944. In all, about 185.000 mim'S w..:re laid for defensive purposcs III 340 dtffl'n'lll operauons. Sun.'lce ships "''eTC Ihe oldesl form of mineb}'eTS. They were most useful for defensive purposes. and merchant ships could be converted easily. Train fnrk'S, such as the SIII:pP'f'rcm and r'ri"uss l/j(/j1ria. were obviously useful with their flat open deeks and stern ramps, but the most prolific minelayer was Ihe Pmt QUI'OO, converted from a Port Line cargo ship of 53% tons. Sht., l:lid moll' (han 33,000 mines as pan of the 1st Minelaying Squadron. Off..nsive minebying "':IS far more difficult for surface ships. but six wry fast ships - tht., AMid class - wt.'1l' built for this. With :In overall length of 420 feet they resembled small cruisers, hilt had :I much great..r spet':d of nearly 40 knots and could carry up to 156 mines. Howl'n'r, they were also found useful for oth..r tasks such as k....ping the beleaguered g:lrrison of Malt:l supplied, and spent comparatively linle time in their designed duties. Only the Apollo laid more than 8000 mines. Tlm'e of thl'm w~'n' sunk - the LAtolla by bombing in 1941 before Shl' had laid any min<.'S. Eight d<.'StroyeTS also laid mines. but again thll't': were sunk. Submarines had oc-en used as offen~i\1: minelay'Cr;; in the First World War. and mines could now be launched IIom torpedo rubes so that ~ specially-design«l boat was not necessary. But in practice only six boats of the p"rpoi~ and Nandral das.scs were U5Cd in Ihe role, plus the Free Frcneh Rubis. Five of them \\~re lost. the Seal and Grampw after laying only aoout 50 mines each, and only the ROIlj'r,a/laid more than a thous.and mint'S in her career. The aircraft turned out 10 be the most successful means of offensi\1: minelaying. Usually the work was carried OUl by Bomber Command of the RAr: often as pan of a di\'er;;ion from a raid on a city. More than 54.000 milK'S \\~rc laid by ail"Cr.lft but again the COSt was he~vy alld it is estimatcd that 500 aircrafi: \\'ere lost on these duties,'"
The minela,.." ItW,h",n carrying
supplies inlo Valel1a.
252
Churchill's Navy
Sweeper:> usually worked in foTtludon, with thc leading ship ill ... ufe are.... Using the G formation, the ships sailed in echelon :l.Ild each following ship of the flotiUa w..as protected behind the S\\ff'p ofth.. one ahead, w a large :.Irca could be cleared. Each ship covered an are... of one cable or 220 yum. The A sweep form:.ltion h.1d all the ships side by side in a line, linked by a single wire. This W;l,S used as a final check
..._.1----1
after an area h:.ld been cle:.lred. In the K fornutioll. the ships streamed oropcsas on both sides and operated in t\vo lines. at a ceruin risk to the leading ships, but providing 100 per cem coverage. The LL sweep W;l.5 used :.Igainst the m:.lgnetic nunc. [t consisted of
_ ~
,a_ ,
•
~-
,
tWO electric cables towed astern of lhe ship. one 575 )':.l.rds long the other 225 )':.l.rds, to spread lhe area affecled by Ihe electric currem between them. The minesweepers were degaussed by passing:.l currem
.
I~ '7:.:..-1 --~
G"_
I
round them to neutralise their Ilugnetic lield.T\vo ships sailed logelher and a current was passed bef\\-een Ihe sweeps al short imervals. hopefUlly detonating any mines inside it. But some mines would only
-- I --0'J'_.
detonate after a fixed number of ships had passed. so the same area often had to be S\\-ept nuny rimes to be declared loafe. The SA sweep W;l.5 used against acoustic mines. It attempted to simulate Ihe noise of a propeller. mosdy using a spring hammer which was ...."Orked electrically. It could be towed astern or mounted in a flooded area in the ship's bows_
Top: Sland.rd min_ping (ormation••
Righi: Minelayers and minesweepers. I. The m;nelaye.
AUid in l'Ul. 2. One orlhe
r:'~"~o{., ~1 _~t~i
&,10..", cl... of miMI_peri.
which moody
l=s-1-, ool~
served whh lhe
Australia.. navy. J. Th.. &uul, one ofa dass of
Sweeping Techniques
min_pin.
The nwn method of sweeping moored c:ont:let mines W2$ ..... the oropes3. s.....tt-p, devdo~ just after the Fi~ World W.u .and tested in a trawler of dut TUlllle. A wire S\Yeq> was W'eaJued at a discuKC fium the ship by the torpedo-stu.pcd oro~ f1(),3.c.:rnd in eenm.l part W,IS held at the right depth by anglt:d bbdes known as kites and otlt'T§.The sweep was fitled wilh wire cunen along its length, and the G1bk of11 IllOOn.-d nunc would be dr.r....n tow:I.IUs one: of thC$C :rnd ~d. The: mine: would f\o:at to the surface where it would be desu.. by gunfire. AlIlh~ needed a
U'awl...... in 1937.
irn
,.,-oo
high $Undm! of old-fashioned $CaJnanl'iup with TOp($ and wires. Conuct minesweepers needed a safe area 10 begin opentions. The edge of .... p3rticubr minefield might be known, in which c~ th.. ~""=per:> could start to work from the ouuide. Othl,"rwile the swc-ep might begin through the centre of the field at high tide, when the shallow-draught ntinesweep<':rs could hop<': to pass over in safl'ty. Light nurker:> known as danbu~ nurked the cleare
Types of Minesweeper An ideal minesweeper needed a pov.-erful engine to lOW Ihe sweep through the water. It needed :.I de:.lr deck aft where the gear could be handled. and good manoeuvnbility. II should have good internal subdivision to limit damage if a mine was hit, and preferably a shallow draft which would :.IlIow it to ope...te inshore and p:.lSS over contact mines in certain tidal condltiollS. If illlended for oper:ations far from its basc it necded fuel stonge. crew accommodation and guns for defence. Many difl"erent I)IIX:S of vessels could be adapled for mim."S\\'toeping. Destroyers could operate sweeps for moored mines at either high or low speed, but the high-speed s",,-eep covered only a very small are:.l and dcstl'O)'Cl'S were 100 expensive and deep draughted 10 be useful in Ihe role. Thirty-twO passenger paddle SICanlers were TCquisitioned early in th.. war because of their shallow draught. but they were difficult to control in rough seas and their lack of internal subdivision nude Ihem very vulnerable. E
The Coastal Navies
The Bill'!"" and &l/runt dmcs "=C: built in the early )~ of the ....w with "arious IypCS of rngulC'. but the cbmc- des1gn wzs the AJgmnt' cb.u. ..... lnch"~ designed In 1940 and tint entered se....'ce in the MMCh 1942. Thq'"'tte ~rgdr buik in Cal~ and 29 ....=c: in ~e in home walen by Sept.e1l1ber 1944. ",m 22 more stnq ab~ The Algm"nt' cbss wzs designed for mrtlme engmes but mo5l ne bullt ....,th aipic' expansion due to shortages of mtbine bbdes. 1bey =c: of up to 1325 tOUl' at fun k»d and h3d a top speed of 16.5 knots ",m a cn·..... of up w 138. Larger dun p~"IOUS ~-essek of the rype, they JlfO\'ed \'tt)' sausfaetOr)' in service.
Training Apan from a !lnlll numbe, of regular officers who had ~iali~ in minesweeping, at the begmnmg of the war the service "~ dommated by fuhmg skIppers recruited rhrough the R. Rand appomted warnm officers. But they wen: not successful in mooem conditions. 'The tr.lwlcr sioppen could be a problem. They were nearly:a1l professlona.! lishC'lmen and gn:.lt seamen, but they were not eaSily amenable to naval discipline, no, did they take kindly to too much flag signaUing'.t1 l'on Edgar on the Fmh of Fonh was commissIOned as HMS L«himoar III November 1939 as the l1I:l.in mines.....eeping mlining~. Officen were sem for :l. course combllung pr.lcucal sea expenence wnh Icctures m mmcsweepmg, gunnery and seanunship. Twenty arrh'ed every three weeks. They spent lhe firsl [wo days al sea in tr.lwlen or paddle sICa men watchmg cre~1"S workmg up, then a week of leclures on mincsweeping, olle on gunnery practice, another on gencr.ll drill. and a fourth wt'ek on seamanship. Afler that they had three weeki of practical tr.lmmg on trawlers specially fined with gunrooms to accommodate 10 officers. Each look a [UTU as first licutenant. and there were practical exercises, as dt'SCribt:d by the government pamphlct His Majrsty~ Milresu~epers:
Ot, 'Aui"" Srali""s' Ihq I,>i/l r,mgt /he g'lns Plr an jmaginary subm..ri"e "r h"s/;/e airrr.y;. Masked figures u;/l r<J(e alo,(~ the dtf/ts UJhtll tilt gas ala",r is gil~l, PII fire dUly pr pwtillg Pllr (,,//iswn mlitL The (lJmm""ds ',\I"" ()verbodnl' "lid 'All\/)' Seabodu' dfrflalld the lIppropriate drill. Sweeps lIrt Ilff'rtd pm In IUriPIIS jotm"tlO/lS. l)au-blll1)'s art l.Jid and ft(m~d, the fogbuoy Strtdllltd, the dll(1,pr lI'Cightd by hd,ld.'"
Brendan Maher and hu colkagucs Iud seen the pamphlet when he jomed the cou~ In 19.f3, and laughed al Ih~ cbim that :a1I t:M men ....'\"n" 'picked ~'Olumt'C"rs·. In the tr.l'A·kn: 1ft JnNmtd SIIftJ1S, stf depIhs. thangnJ dtpdu. SII'Jl' IJtNSioo.M dummy mintS In thtrtejJr /l pwpaw,g.n.~ Jmring onIm, - ' 1IQl.~ (not dfffindt 10 do Ufttrr Pfft is IIf WPUIlInI Jfgftl of rht Fonh Bri¥). Ht . , spmt /lieu' Ixws in dtt 'TIll'
"lid uwdln/ tht- stoItm lZf rhty nulltssJy sItoIoeIIed AAd into tht- newfy blirrding anJ JI- of /he firthox. ... 1ft /OIiIttII durin Off dtot _w -' g.>mtd " bide ~ domg nw1I of the tllIngs dut hal 10 bt- dont - C1rtrpf stokittf."
100m
P
Cturks MeAra.. who l\"aUy Iud Jtated :l. pttferrnce of minesw~pCJs, found dll" 5C"oigOing course was'a RmIUOOS, chcnful nmc, but very dirty as the trawkn "=c: eo:tI-burmng and the ....':t5hmg fxi1itics mirrinu!....
253
3 The Patrol Service and Harbour Defence The R.0)-aJ Na~-aJ P:llro1 Senitr "'21' founded in 1907, md In pracewnr II COIISl$ted of fishermen who did lOme pxt-time miming with the navy. In the Firu World War it nwmed much of the AuxilWy Patrol. which carried out a large pan of the ano"""ubnurinc work. Its IIUlJ1 lOIn ....1:'rc 1IW1C'S\\1:'cpmg and mti-subrrurine pa.ttol. largely m defence of lurbours. and II o••'trlappcd to some- eXlent with c~ forces and grnrr.ll servic~. In 1939 the Adrrunlty plmned w aU up 100 trawkrs for JJlDsubnunne work md 200 ftx nun~.....eeping. lIunned by more than JOOO seamen and enginrcn.· A5 wilh lIIost thi~ in wartime, it expanded f:tr bc)'Ond that ",th morc tlWI 60,000 men m aboul 3000 small ~~Is. l.ar};cty b)' clunce. the Patrol Service "''25 the only one of the 'lU\ics ....ithin the n:tvy'to Iu~~ i~ own b:tdge.A5 Fi~ Lon! of me Admira.lty m 1~. Churdull authorncd a umque, small meal b.dge for ~ who Iud sen'ed SIX months on nunt:S'\\'eCJlCn.1t ""'25 !lOOn cxte-nded 10 coasuI ano-submarinr work, and ba:ame associ:lIed with the P:l.trQl Service.
A minlKweepinc 'noininc .nip o~now..C from
HMS l.MJUIIN. in
lhe M"h of Forth.
Officers In wartime tlu: PatlOl Sc:rvICl' was headed by a senior Roy;aJ Naval officer. Captun Pu:~rcy In 1939 and Commodore d(' P:l.5S from 1941.
A dllDbuoy is lMin.
........red
10
m.1it
the twepl .re•.
254
Right:The crew
of Ihf trawler
e.....tI;"" ,,(Ier shooting down a
German Heinkel 111 bomber in
19~2.
Opp<>.i'e bottom:
The trawler CItuw.",11 al sea.
He had a considerable stafT in his lu.'adquarH.'TS at LOlwstoft. fcom where rarings were trained and drafied to the boats :md ports where they were nceded. It was a fully !ledgl'd manning division on a par
with the three home ports, and its men had thl: prdix LT (for Lowcstofr) before thcir service number. The key figures in the Patrol Service Wert' the skippers, Il'J.rr:lIlt officers appoimed from among experienced fishcrm<:n. Tlll:y won" the imemvined braid of the RNR and could be promoted 10 Chief Skipper. the equiv.:dent of a cOlllmissioned w:arrant officer, and eventually to Skipp<:r Ucutcnam,Thcl"l.' wnc"oo oftlwm in the navy in 1939 and 525 lllore were quickly uken on from thc fishing fleet,
plus 300 more proJlloted from the r.lting of S<'cond hand." The SkipJX'r RNR was a wry ditTel"\.'nt figun' to the traditional naval officer. Skipper Lang of the L1l1l Trdla was'a fi~t rate seaman and knew things about the way of a ship at sea which no one not trained in sail could have undcmood', His navigation \\'ali by l.')'C rather than chart and sextant and he had a fund ofweacher lore. 'IVirld'lI freshf11 Jiw" Ihe s()Ulh 'ard ocf;>re midttigJrs, Sir.'
'How so Skippu?' 'Sn th()~ gulls Sir, Ilmnviug U\lI..r owr IJr..ir backs - SJ/re sigll rif a sOUl!lrrlr ulilld Ihal Sir.' '111ifll ll'eatlJl~r or drar Skipp"?' ['d oJ5k. 'Oil thi'k Sir, U1111 a l/Iizul of raill. Did YOll 1I00itt' how red ll'llS Iht mSI 01/ Illal bllOr WI' passtd a u~lilt balk - blood rrd il UIT$. 'Tr'lilll.>l'
Thl.'rl' !lIlS Iillll' i'll1/'I'Uff ..dlilatrd, /IIorr amellaMr 10 Imillillg alld bn'lJgill,~ 10 11lj" lask a jrrsJr, f1Jtlmsiastit alld ,wbiMl'd milld, prm'l'dfar lUCri tJliril'lI/ aud riliabll'.'
RNR skippers had IIlJde up 43 per celli of millesweeping officers at tht btginning of the war. By the end they were only 6 per cent while RNVR. offict'T$ formed 63 pl'r cent,-
Ratings The lI\ale of a small Patrol Service vessel held the rating of second hand. l.'quiva](-m to a p<,tty officer. Originally they were fishermen who held a Board of Trade certificate, bue they Were soon augmented by 1Ill.'n with experience of other kinds of small boats rat<'d as S<'eond Hands (Small Craft Only), There was a suspicion that bOlh groups were under-(Iualified for the rule. The Patrol Service btgau to take on HO seamell frum g('ner:U scrvict" quite soon alter the stan of the war, to allow for its great expansion. It was gin'" permission 10 trai" signallers and in 1942 it beg;Jn to train its own b'Urttlen III a school II nnkos SOUIiI of LOW('SlOft, Thl)' WOI"\.' llonsubst.1mive gunncl)' badges wuh thc leiter I' underneath. Al fiT${ the engines of Patrol Service \'eSsels wt'... all stl'am I\'ClprocaUng, and they \\'l'Te malUll.'d by skllkd ('ngitll"llwn who W<'I"\.'
255
The Coastal Navies
e:qui\....h:m 10 ERAs, and by stokC'rs. Petry officer stokc:n ....1:1'1:
h"d Iht imprwiOfl /h.lt her tit.Jigller h"d
m &om gencral scl'V1ce to nuke up me numbers. In 1940 the Panni Scl'V1ce bcpn to uke responsibility for mOlOr miJJC$\\1Xpc:n, but iu me:mbns h;>
lIrrvw
more tlun a qwner of the toul. These included nearly 7000 engmemen and chief enginenJen." TIt.. authoritiC'S ....'t'r'C ambivaJ~lt about the quahry of men m the Patrol X-l'V1cc. Concemed about thc numbers Wt failed officer tr.umng. Combined Operations hc:~wnc:rs suggested m:u candiohteS who wt'r'C abo\.,. a\"t'f';)gc in the Patrol x-rvice 'do Il()( compare fa\ounbly WIth nnd1ohtC'S &om odler soun:es'. But at the same time II ",,;as found that Patrol Scrvicc: subnurine detKtor tr.Lint'rS (ould k;U"TI mc: opc:ratioll of scts much more quickly and this was put down to me-Ir hlgh(T U1J1dard. 'Almost CC'"1'U1n1y the PIS gelS a bcl'ter qwlity of raang.lInce someone: at Lo.....estofi aii:er thc:ir inte~'.·
100"
The Ships Fishing tr.Iwlers .....cr'C deigned 10 tow cquipnX'tU through the wat('"f and coukl be adapted for nUlleswt'cpmg. The Admiralty began planning dJe Patrol Sc:TVlCC .dill'S III 1933 wim me design ofthc amn, a tr.Iwkr ofT75 tOIlS......nd the s1ighlly 1I1ulier .Hasriffof 1938. But it was ~ m::ogniscd that 1I1e maUl expall$lon of the P:l.Uol Service would com!' through requisitioned fishing \'t'SoSC1s which ....nuld find it difficult 10 pursue tlleir normal busill~'$$ in ....'U conditions. Wtulcrs .....e re me brgest and fastest and were suit:lble for anti-subm.... rine duties, though not for inshore ....ork. Trawlers were the lllost common. The b.rg~"St ones, designed 10 oper.l1e in rough seas ofT Iceb.nd. were about 900 IOns with a crew of up to 50 and ....1:re ofien u$<'d u ocun escorts ill the early stages of the: war. Snuller ones were uSC'd inshore for Co;lSt:l] patrol and escort and harbour defellcc. Drifien were a different type of fishing boat, used to eatch herrmg in the North Se..... They h....d mull endurance, poor aceolllmodfi with a CKW of fi\'t' or six. In aU, about 1700 civilian \"esSC1s were t:Iken O"o,.r m the course of the ........r. Their conversion posed some problems. pamcub.rty when guns and cquipmem lad to be: mounted high up.. :llTc:cting their stabiliry. In ~neral, thc: fish hold was COlt\'t'rted IIItO Cn'W accolllmodaoon, An anti-subnurinc coasta.! escon tr.Iwlcr uslUlly had a -l-Inch gun to tical with a surf.acc:d submarinc, Ocrli1l:0ns and mxhine guns for scJf-dd'cncc. and about 25 depth charges. But cwn aft(T COIr.nslon, conuncrcW rrawlers ofien retained their duraetensaa, .....ell known to the liWrmen who saikd thnn in pI'.acetime. According to 0 A Rayner: Loch T ulh uw wniqW amDrIj'Sf lIoNW ... Regal. IsoU IItfd Brontcs wm' lIS f/WdI tdikt lIS miff pins. II u.s not ,,"til fhq dn-do,wd /i"~ idi~yrtmUW5 ".! 1M' au .. unrkr tM. _ ((.",mandrllj' ".1fKm dull )"OSI {QUId tdl/hnn IIp'Irt '" " dutlltf«
of hiI Ihoughf I«mrd 10 ""~'f' ,"wd 1M tllrgrf. To " ~ilmlln It did nO/
apprll' IIraI tltt
bow ,"lIfllttti Ihr Itrm.·'
Large eOllllllereial trawlers of the period lad too deep a draught for coasnl ....'Or1l:. but spc:cWly deslgne:d Admiralty rrawlen of the Trn.
Berow: A
~obr
in the ~nJi"" room of the trawler
..f.'. ,
•
PART
XII
Amphibious Warfare
1 Combined Operations Personnel CO-OJX'r.llnon btrwrrn the three nilX'd ~f"\;("rs WZi much I}rglt"CtM htofoR' the w~r. ExptriC'IKt'S of ~lIIl'hibio~ oprntions in the' Fint World Wu luch as th, D",n!m,UC'$ tud b«n \~IT unlup~: :and eh, w:u \\~ l.ngdy fought In $Cp.ir.llfC comp;anmtnrs.ln Ih(' 1920s ;lIld JOJ Ih, ~n'ic(' chiefs WCR' oflen bart"ly on spc'
them illlo submission. All this colbpsc-d wilh thl." F:.r.ll of Fromn." in 1940. It was den Ihn aD rhrel' 5el"\'lCl"S would h
10
including Ihe: ('\"Xwlion from Crete: - he: be:came the modcl for Ewlyn W.lughi idnunble CoIonc:I Tonml>' Bbckhousc: Combined C>pc:n(ions hid Whitclull. built in 1822
is
Withm d1ys of till" FiU of Fr.lnc.· Chun:hill
"':IS
considering
\\':I}'lI
to get
Su'OTrl "Horrour.
f"ight \'\'"ry gnnd dwdllllg houses and II \\-.IS
i
Jomt servle:e: orgams.mon. Ihough xrording 10 Anhur M;lnhil1 of Ihe iTllty il was'i br'b'C"ly ni'l'-orie:lluled plxe' where: 'brisknc:» \\
WliS
gc:rnng (OlllewhcTl':·. Senior n;l,.,.1 o!fittn continued
(0
Tl':fe:r
10 offices ;IS abir" ind IllCSSigf"$ is sigrlik. and (0 pick on both lIT11ty offin'n and the It VR.lIlthough (h.· RII.F'sce:med (0 p:m muste:r·.' Combmed Opcr-mons was gi,'\'"n "";;IS
liS 0\\11 ha~
in 1942. It consisted
\\'Om by ill thTC'C SCTVicn in addiaon
10 od1l'r nllk. (r.lde and b"OOd-conducl
Combined Operations Organisation
In
he-xiqll.1lrl<:TS in Richmond Terracf" in
S1luitl,"d oppos.ltl," the entnnce 10 OO'wnmg Stree:t. NilUr.Uly
ofi b'lll1. incllor ind e:1Ig1e: olnd
renlrn the arlllY 10 Europe.
lIS
hat4,'l:S. For most of (he:
Oppoc:eAdmi.... Lonl MOU.llb.II ....
Chief of Combined Opt
the anu.eircn1i
gllnnen of lhe
MOlllllmlle:n e:n the force: \\"~ 1I1mOSI indl."pClldl,"TII, but it was
con.bined
n:lI1tl·gr.lt~·d Wllh th.· arm)', nJvy and :lir force ;v; 0-0:1>' appTOllched. lIS
operalioll••hip
blggc51 SmWl," dmy
\\':I.S
10
nlall
landing ships .lnd craft. so Ihe: nujority of
Empirr
1'rl1l~
mck to Ihe cormncm.Thc Chlcfi OfSt.llf ~ppoillled Generaillourne of the
its personnel we:re n.l\"31. [n April 19-4J.just bt·foTt" til<' gTCit l,"xpansion
ROlo"31 Marines as Conmunder of Raiding Operntions but this W3S
for D-Diy, tl1l'TC w,'n' n.·Jell' -44.000 of dll·lIl. including ne.lr!y 30.000 in Iandlllg craft. moTl': (han a Ihou~nd in beach cornm.lndos and
I)elow: Richmond
Tl':coll1l.. i~lnce units and morc: than 6000 in bnding $hips.' By mid-1944
Ternce in
th,'Tt" wen.. man' thJn 5O,lXJO men m bndmg cr.ln J.!on.·"
Whileh.n,
100
limitl."d for Chun:hiJrs "blon. He appoum-d Admlr.ll of the FIl."Ct Lon! Kll1."S ;v; Dm:ctor of Combmed Opcratlolu. He \\"3S (:A'C'r 70 by this time. but in the pmtiOIlS \\'~r he had led .. f.. moll" mid on Zeebrllgge. and had only juS' f3ikd to bt"t:Ollle First Sea Lord III Ihl' 1930s. Kl.l"t"S lI1adl' a good deal of progn:ss m scmng up ~. d<:\'<'I01"mg cr.lft and mounting comnundo raids. but he W;IS fon:d\11 arK! opiniolUu:d and 1Iitinutdy iUnOyl:d Chlln:hlll wnh his cor1St3m cnUCbm of tm: Prune MlIlIStl.T and othen. Lord LOUIS Moumbattcn W,IS as we\l·known ;IS Keyes but belter connecled. for he was a cousin of the King ind his f;;"her hold ol1ce b«n First Sea lord. He hid scl'\'C'd as a sIgnal officer Ihen m cOlllm:md of the destTO)'C'r Krfly. whose smkmg
\\':IS
used by Noel Coward as the
l»slS for the filrn ttl 1I1lkh lit &nY'. In 19-41 he W;lS;I upuin ;lnd p1l'p;iring 10 u.kc on:r the arrier IIIus,njIUJ \.. hen he
"'":IS
glwn Keyes'
Job. When he protnled Chun:hlll n:plu:d. 'You fool.!The best thmg }uu C;ln hope for IS to n:peal \uur lui: xhl('\'\'"ment ;11K! g."t >'Oul'Il"lfsUlik'. He was irnml:di;llel) prornOled CommodoR' and bier to Acting ViceAdnur.U. and piTl!)' Wllh the: Chle6 of Staff. He: Md much gTC';ller mfluenee IMn Kc>'\'"$ ind gOI.llm~ l'\'\'"T)'tlung he w.lllted until he left .lfte:r I"'U >'C':ln 10 becOIlle: SupR'me Allied ComlTUnder in BurlTU. HIS $Uccc:ssor. SIr Roben u)'cock. "":IS llIuch less fhmbo)-=I. He:
\\-.IS
\\'\'"U eOllnCCled.lS the son·m·Ltw of ~ I'rw)' CounClUor.lOO member of the RO'o..u Hone Gu.lrds. bul IhlS W;IS trivi.al in comp.ni:son "';Ih Moumb;tuell. He "-.IS ~ 10 gt't UlIO Combme-d Operations 10 escape pOSIlllg tn chenun! W;ln.lR' and he took pin In oper.mons
.I
snm
in 19.3,
-
.. h~-·"""".
s
Aboo.... left: L.nd'ng
Training
Craft 'hhide .lId
Thl: COlllbllled Tr.llning
AuIouh on • betH:h
l!l July
ne.,lm~...;'"
W;lI~r
manyothen
stn,lght from die lrammg (;I/llJ'l'. \\'l:Il: senl
rr>O<:rftd in tho Loc:h.
m lhe new cnlt and pracructl bndmg on Ill<: shorn of the loch. En~;ulttrs "'eluded mowr medurllcs wllh pelt), officer rale for the
C~mrc
WOlS set up Oll Inwr.lr.l)' on Loch F)11e
19oW. It w;u 3W3)' OOm other OlCIIV1U('S bill had 1,'001.1 acn-:ss to th.· and \\';IS SOlf", from ,l1r raICIs. ScOlm~n r.mngs. nearly 311 HO men Ihe~
for Ol four-\\'fi:k courst'
Cornbi-.:l
bq,"C'r
Opencioont ......
rooms in lhe snulkr OOC'S. TbougIlII was hoped dut J1l pet'SOllJl<:1 \\'OUld
r~ittllw
klKJ\\ ho\\ 10 SQn. SlOp :lJId run an .,.ngUlt' III OlII tnl<:fh"'<'IlC)·. ('\~ rht snu1ksI cnfi Iud a KOker-dn\'\.'T In duf),"t' of II. Inshort n:wig:lDon was ;mlmporum lSSut.ln ~ 0:St' ofboomg §h1J'l'. dley had 10 find ~ ·kJ.."nlllg pos1oon·. usuall) 7 mites offihorc. \\h.,.rc dlt') would lowt
~
M;r.II) bndmg cra" offictr5 weK' muned by normotl \\OIrt1me methods Oll Ki,~AltmJ. but ~. 19-12 II WOIS rccogmscd lhal Ol much hIgher proportion of officers was needed for bndmJ; crat1 - twO officers ;lnd 10 men III a
undmg Cr.l1t Tank. for tlUrnplt'. A ~ shonentd course: was SCI up al Loduilon 111 Scodmd_ S<:rwd I)) IWO ItalOS Ol dlo,- OIl the Wtst HIghLind ROltlw~y from Gbsb'O\\. II was Ol toUgh coone of si:< w",u U1\'OI\'ng much m:kkmg 0\'t1" mounc1l1S. Oloo sonl<: quesaoned whClhcr Il \\OIS rt'"ally sUlubie (00- me kind of officcon netdtd.
Crews Lmdmg shIps Wl:rc usually nun ned 1))' Mercham N;r.\)' k'OlI11<.-n on TI2"'X ag.....emelHs. w;.h;r. nJ\'JI parT)
10
lIl;tn rhe Lllldlllg cnt1 rhar rhc)"
97... offin'rs and "'55'" men o( rhe Men:h;r.nl NJ\')' on tllI~ duty III Aprtl 1')-13. A typical slup of d1l' Gkn class \\';IS malUll'd by 28 Men:ham NJ\')' ofticcrs .mel 2(,3 men. wnh 12 na\';l1
WQuid bunch. Then'
\\\,i\.'
officen and 220 men
10
cn"\\' 1-1 bndinjo; craft. She Ollso CJrried 87 army
officcn Jnd 1000 soldlen.' CJpcnn DJ\'ld lione found IhOll dll'rc could Ix· confliCI Il<'tw""n his Mt'rchJnl NJ\')'
~JllIen
men o( lhe blldlllg cra(l. (or e;Ql1Ipk \\ hen sholl'
A CombulCd Opt.·ralJolls ptloo!,'.: :;dlOO1, HMS }lilli'S ('......".. Oll Tighrubnulch ~
.....~rc also
~phJblOus
III
w~ Soct
Ol\)"
bo1\..,.n.
up Our lIIl'fT/lJ"'",nr, MIlg J<>iidly mdt'pnuJnrt. 1'l'1l'Irlt'd lilly '1,.".lIormK' r" nm .wr..>rf'.11 "- IIIL\-nJgroups of rrtfT(h.n1/ "rid ,Wl'Y mm j>J/hnnJ III OCIT OM "\!lILli/I(" g.r1~\J}~ Iht' n;Jful P.Q .. .ltdd up IItt' dl5p
"1.'1011 10 CO\~r
\\':lff;ITC.
~
no·nns on lh... Finh of Forth.As D-D~' OlpprOJChtd. dlcll' was 3 gtOIdual IllO\," l.oUUt. otldlOUgh IhOlI brought ships c1o§rr to wnger. Ibsd \\l."rc Oliso
.M:t
up
III
~IXIl1\
Olenon
~nd
dI... J\hJdle EbI Olnd F",r Ust (or locAl
needs: A S<"I'Jr.lI... orpnis.luoll. n~ly III nonh W... ks. milled RO']....... M:mll':s "ho llO\' IIunned Ol 1.lrg>:" proportion of minor IJndirlg Cr.ltt. RO'].' Nelson tlcscrllx'1 h,s trammg
III
the momh, Ixforc D-DJ)'.
lullS m U 20 £11/11I/- 11\· U'"II' "llom'ed /0 d,l,rr { • ((\lSl/ll;" "11I1 ,ll'I"k lr,lIIds) II (51"km) s<}l",ds. Orr mSIn...,,'1S 11ff[' "hlll,l}' Rl\,' IlfY$p,m,{ ",,,I.r,,,,,, J
th(" Flnh o(Clydc m NO\\'lIlborr 19"'2. MOlIlY Olhcr
Tht.TC" "OIS a h~~Wln ... o al urg'i Olnd Ol sigJuI Apyurc coast. ~ a::uIWlg KbooI for amphibious cnk \\OIrf...rc ~I TO\\OIrn on dHo othn- ~ of tilt Flnh o(C1rdt-.~nd~ baseOlt Rosn~~dI on the moudl of dHo G:aK'kxh (or ~lIgilKTrillg pcn;otll1otl. On Iht other $Idt- ofScothnd.. T;mk u.ndmg enfi c~ws \\Tn" lr.1uK'd Oll ~hOOI ~I
medical officer. sick berth J,tt<:nwm and writer. It compriS!.·d of 12 craft each, headed by a flotilla officer. pell)" officer. ~ignall1lan. writer and supply assistant. Each flotilb had J. maintenance 51:1fT of 15. headed by an cngiJwl.'r offin'r and
three
flOtilla~
a chief ERA.
Pilotage Parties and Beach COlllnlandos A landing on till.. isbnd of Rhodes was planned while Ih.. Llritish were in Green' in 19-11. and Nigel Clog;toun-Willmol! trained by swimming 25 lengths in the baths al C;liro every day. bcfon:: landmg h)' folbo! canoe and ..xplorillg Ihe beach on th<' island. He found that the charts wt.'n: wildly inaccur.lte, and some fcanlrt.os were shown a mile rrom their true position. blll the buJing 11l:wr lO<.Jk place. Clogstoun~ Wilmott went on (0 set up Tl'connaiSi..lllCe rartlC:S for Operarion Torch,
A beach commando headquarlers during
the Normandy ;n,,,,;ol\.
though al first lhl.1' were trealed by suspicion by senior officers at Gihn.l!:u. Their \':Jlue was eltablishl.'d whl.'n s<:veral groups landl'd llliks from their fJrget."Combined Operarions Pilotage Parties were set up aftl'r that experience. By November 19"2 rhl' stand:ml party consistl'd ofthrel' na\':lI and one military officers, r\\"o Sl.'amen ratings as coxsw:lills and paddlers for the canoes, an artificer or mechanic, a COlllmando corporal and a dr.tughtsmall from till' Royal Engineers. Thl' sizl' of the unil was restricted by the carrying capaclry of a submarinc." B(,"ach partie'$ wcre planned to co~ordinale the 1110\'l'ml'nt of vl'SSels, troops and vchicles during and after a landing. They wwrgl'd informally during the voyage to Madagascar III 19-12. It was Moumbaltl'n who suggestcO lhe tidl' 'commando' r,lther than 'party'. bc.'cause to the Sl:amen the Iann lCrlll implkd an unpkas:lnt work derail. Uut commando unphed a more combati\"(," 1'01(,", and wh(,"n two petty officers hclpl'd dl'ar pill oo:
;j:l I
,
"Commando" is rcgn'lfablc. I consider. as it implio:s a complet...I}' fals... role for this parry'. ,. E\"l.'mually tWO dozen of tlK'm Wl'l\' forl1l(,"d and lllOSI of them were lrained at HMS Armadil/<J among the Clyde sea lochs. Originally a full beach group consisted of thre.. offic..rs and 112 other ranks from thl.' army, an officer and three l1I(,"n from thl' RAE and tWO naval officers and 16 T:ltings."The petty officers in the party were tr.rilll'd in seamanship. ebllentary piJotag", beach drill, gunnt'ry, first aid and mallY other maners," Thl;' h:ld to h:lw aoon' averagl' 'power of cortlnt,md' in order to control be\vildered parties of troops on thl' ~ach_ All nuks had to bt- abl.. 10 ' .. ndurt' hard work for long hours wirh Im\c food, :lnd having to li\1,' III the OJX'n for up to a week' ...
2 Landing Vessels The problems of landing an arm}' had greatly increased smn' the Firsr World War, for it was now necess:lry to land tanks and artillery and their fud, ammunilion and Sloro:s with the first wavl' of troops. Planners had lar~,'d}' disl'ountcd the llN'd for amphIbiOUS wufal\' in {h.. 1920s and 3Os, and progress in landmg CT:lft design was slo\\; so a gre,lt deal had to be improviK'd handy. It is surprismg how ofl('n rhe designers w..re righ!. and how much of the landmg cT:lft of the early 19-10s is rcl1l'ctl'd in present-day dl."Sign. Dattlo:ships have disappeakd. suhmarines arc now v(:ry different, dl'Stroyers and frlh'3fCS have changt'd tht'ir fmlClions, bUl tht' basic landmg craft has survh·(,"d. The British :lttempted long-range landings at DakJr in 19"0, and morc sucCl-ssfully on Mawgascar and North Africa in 19-12, but in general they operated o\'er much shoner T:lngcs than the Americal15, crossing lhe Mcditl'rraneau or thl' English Channel. Influenco:s came from a wide \':lril.'f}' of sources on both sidl'S of the Atlantic cOlwert..d merchalll shIps and Thames barb'CS' 'hallow-drauglll oil tankcl'\, powl'red pleasure cran and evell a traditional local cT:lfl, th.. Northumberland coble. Thl' ll'dmiqul'S and matt'rials of rill' motor industry were often used In production.Th(," na\1' had one basic dt:sib'll of battleship during till' war and three or four submarine designs. bur according to one aUlhont}' therl' werl' 38 dilTl'"rcm f}'pl'S of landing craft and eight rypes of barges and (,"\-cn {hat docs not l'xhaust the full ranh'C of possibililil'S.'" Broadly. landing craft w..r.. used for thrc... different roll'S; to carry and land personnel. to carry :lnd land vehidl"S, and in support funcuol15 such as comrol. navigation, oomhardllll'm and \upply of food_ Landing vl'S5<'ls couM also b.. classifi...d Jccording to function. TI1l' llomendalUl\' was nor ah\-JYs applil'"{l prl'ciSl'ly, for eXJl11ple llltlle case ofbnding tanks, but in g,'nt:ral a landing ship took troops and \-d,ick-.; wilhin a few milo:s of th.. bcach and then load(,"d them IIllO landing craft for til,' aou"l as~ult. Major landing crJft madl' the whole Journey from loodlllg port to bl'ach, whIle minor landing naft did rI", trip from th.. bnding ship to lh(," bl."ach. An 0pl'nlllg bow ramp or doors is oftl'l1 scr-n a~ the main l-haraCleristic ofa IJndlng craft.This \\"as not uni\-crs:t1ly true, as nlen l'ould JUl1lp frurn a COllvl'lltional how or \"ehicil'S could dise-mbJrk aft, but it wOllld not be l'as~ to dl'Sign a landing craft which could bcadl 'tern-first withonr cbmaging ItS propeller. Ceruml~ thl' opening oow offen'd rtlany
ad\":Int:lges, bnding troops and \-.:hides in the shallowest possible water and getting them straight inlo action. Conventional n;wal architects wen: doubtful about it and f('"arW kaks. Rowland Baker of the Royal Corps of Nav;a] Corutructo~ iruiSled on a sump to collect water in the design of the Tank Landing Craft Mark I in 1940." Leaks wen: less ofa problem th.m anticipated, but Ih('" bow ramp of snWJ landing craft did tend to restrict speed. The most essential chJracteristies of any cran: intended to land on a bt:ach were shallow draught and a flat bottom, Jnd thes.e, too, could TC$trict performance and sea-keeping. British landing cnft did much of the work alongside the Americans in the D-Day invasion of 1944, an achievement that must nnk with the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic in Ihe scak of historical achievement. From a flect of about two dozen \-.:ssels befon: the ,",,-ar, it built up to a force of 44 landing ships, 115 tank landing ships, 1265 major landing craft, 3777 minor landing craft and 276 baq,~ in May 1945, dtospitc losses of more than IJOO vessels."
Landing Ships E\-.:n befon: the Fall ofFranee, the Admiralty planned landing operations in German territory and beg;ln to COn\'Cn three pJ$Seng..'r ships of th(," Gkn Line, the Clnm'y, Gielleam and C/ellgyle. They \\'Cre of neJrly 10,000 toru and "',en: cOIl\-.:rted to carry 14 landing craft and more than a thousand lroops, with a crew of 291 plus 232 for landing craft crews. Rat(,"d as unding Ships Infantry (uq,'t), they plO\"Cd \"Cry successful and saw much service in the Mediterranean, Normandy and th(," Far East.AU were updated SC"\"Crai times during the \v.lI" to carry more troops Jnd landing cran:, at some COSt in stability. Other LSI(L)s included the Ktrtfl and Kamnja of the British India Steam Navigation Company, which w(,"!\'" conv('rtc-d in 1942 and could carry 1500 troops. They had Merchant Navy crews during the early pare of their service. In the Kanmja, according to Evelyn Waugh, Ihe sergeants lived in rdati\'C luxury in lecond-dass cabins, while thc quarters for the r.mk and file were extremely cold." In the ~llle ship, Rowland Draper found that 'the food, which was cooked by Merchant Navy cooks, was appalling', beGlIlSC the Goanes.e S1e\\...ros had no experience of preparing potatoes." A Dozen American-built merchJnt ships were COll\ocned to LSI(L)s in 1943, and many more ships!.C'rved for particular operations_ Cross-channel ferries obviously beOl11e !\'"dundant after the Fall of Frallce and ill October 1940 the Admiralty took O\ocr several Belgian ships, They were reasonably fast but had limited C;;Ipacity and therefore shon range. Thory had a certain alllount of cabin space, but also wide promcnade decks which could be used to Stow landing craft. They were classed as Landing Ships Infantry (Small), The I:>riHU CltarltJ, built in 1930, was of nearly 3000 IOns \vith a speed of24 knots. Her decks had a combination of tll(," original passenb'tr and crew bunks and hammocks for crew and troops. She could carry 377 rroops with eight landing craft, Ferries designed for slightly longer voyages, such as the UIsIer,\-{lma,,1t and the lIIe 4 CUertl$ey, had 1lI0re obin space but no promenade decks where landing craft could be stowed. The davi~ projected from the side. an improvised and ung;ainly arrangement. All British infantry landing ships were converted from merchantlllen, Army office~ found that their fittings \\'CTC not ideal. and Major Plowden of the Royal Engineers cOlllmented:
TI,e $o!dirr ill bailie or!kr lakes lip au exllwn!illllry amOUIII if sP<J«...111£ lIIiuilllUIIJ U~'dlll if Ilily rolllJlim is ~Il kindliness. ,. if my lIIaiu ullmes uw /WI Iilllt Ihe gale lWuld illtrrjerr will, I!le pJ,ysira/
,,,,It
The British aJso tried to develop a ship which could launch landing craft to tl.ke ashore large nUl1lbc~ of tanks, or to carry extra bnding craft to ferry them from ship to shore. TWQ Landing Ships Stern Chutt., Wl'!\'" cOIl\"(,"rt('"d from train ferritos and carried landing enft on deck and Iaullched them o\ocr the stern, but this was a dangerous procedure.Three Landing Ships Gantry used lravelling cr.mes to hoist heavily loaded landing craft into tht., :;1;":1, bUI the wncept was not fuUy developed. The best long-term solution wa.s probably the unding Ship Dock m which a large compartment at the stern was flooded 10 allO\" landing craft to reload with heavy ~'Chic1,?; bllt it newr ~w servi",,· during thc war,
Tank Landing Ships The problem of landing tallks was soh-ed by a fine example of AngloAmerican co-operation, Urged on by Churchill 10 find a ship which could land them anywhere in the world, British constructors turned to shallow-draft oil tankers used on Lake Mancaibo in Venezuela. They went on 10 design the &xu class or Landing Ship Tank Mark I, which could carry 13 ranks and move at up to 13 knots. But they beacht.'d in 5 fet.,t 6 inchC"S of water fOT\vard and a long ramp was needed to get the \'Chicles and men ashore. The Americans werc asked to help in building and design and in the winter of 1941-2 they produced the LST(2), which could carry up to 18 tanks o\-.:r an ocean at a maximum speed of 10 knots, and could beach in 3 feet of wat.'r fOT\\"'Jrd. Its bow doors would open, a shorl, steep ramp would be lowered and the tanks and vehicles would disgorge straight Ollto the heath. Thl' LST(2) was 327 fect long with a light displaccment of 1468 tons, with a crew of 13 officers and 73 men. It turned our to be a classic design: able to load in port, transport its cargo across a sea or
A
Landing
Ship
Tank unloading a
lorry during the Normandy ;n,....;on.
264
Churchill's Navy
Landing C ..... ft Tank
ocean and thtOn bnd it on the lx·adJ. Thousands \wrc rn:m-produccd
(4) training in .he
in Amaica and many were sent 10 Uritain under Itnd-lcase.Thcy fook PH! in all the major IJndjn~ and th('lr d"sign had much influence on the ro-ro ferries of post-waf yeaTS.
to be ;lbandoncd on a bt.·aeh. l( neCl.OSs3TY. 3(ll'r landlllg its cargo, bUI this \\<;IS d,'(\l.'d by Ihe aUlhoritlc~, ', ..all al1elllpt was al\\<;IYs made to r"con"r the more .eriou.ly damaged craft. either in one piece or IWO. and al Il'asl om' returned to the U.K. under ItS OWIl power, lowlllg its fore_end!''''
Tank Landing Craft
One RNVR offi,'l'r d.'SCnbcos Ius LCT(4) as 10adl·J (or
Firlh of Cl)"dt'.
[n June 1940. again under pressure from Churchill. rhe Admirnlry Ix:g;lll to look at a craft to bnd tim".' of til.· brge;;{ tanks of the time. 40 (OilS each. in 2 fl."1."c 6 inch."S of wateT. A prototype. the LJnding Crnn Tallk
Mark
r. was buih on Tynesidc \\~{h
nuny nowl (cacmes. indudmg a r.lmp
with a hing." just abo...- til" watcrli,w and a doub!", floating dock-type of hull. bm il cTCated alarm as it swung from sid,' to sid." going dowl1 th... rin~r. A few weTl" built and shipped OUI fO the E3~I<'rn McdllerranC3rl. Th<· IWXt wr
17,1' .HIIl: 2 m"~1 Itm~' !IITr, dr5(~"ril by" ",,,<1,,,,,,,. II I",d r/,m" !X
"jridi,,,, bn",1 ,,4,H, 1",,/ " lifr of 50 IIO,m. ... AlrllOugl, ut' h",III",.,. ,·"gilli'$ Ilrt.'Tl' Ut'll' (>Illy IIII' us",,1 doublr It"I<:I!r"plrs, s" U.1' I,arl,o uSl' ollr i,t~'i'I",ily I" r!~ "I' a ul«r-.'pl'for Ihr murr rl(~i,,/,. 'n,is "US Ilr/' ('iral ol1r,ftr r/,/' cr4t u'tl,dd
D-D~y.
,\fy ITllJi mrrir,1 six SJ,rrm,m I,mks. '"'' !J,'If-tr,lad, ll\' wmr<1 four l?!fir/'rS 1111<1 fiJiy{.",r Gis. 1;, '1«,,,,,,,,(..1(1(1:
from Iht'ir $/eryliug quarrm, u~rtrl' t'l't'1)' IIMII had !lis au,r brm/..>. nl~ gallry Ulll" fJearl/ifidly f'Ilr,ippf'li, wirlt art nwrllllllU wM ,Ionw room altd nfrig~mwr adjoini'Jg.'"
Alan Vil1iers, the well-known sailor and writer, describes it from another angle. 'l7riy SIffTt'd Iiki 11U//t(arJ nilll t/iCtric 11<)U't'r llird a glldgiC Uki a (armalJ~ iuite/I; rlrty ioariablr Ililell I'TCptlltr u4lillr u>as adjJlSltd rlearj(al/y. 7<> gv IlSfrm, borh Jlrol'ellrrs had 10 be adju5fed la ,lfEali,It' pir(h.
But despite his unrivalled experience in square.rigged ships, Vi1Iiers found them to be 'splendid sea boats', able to cross oceans and widtstand much damagc.J(I
Small Personnel Landing Craft The only type 10 be de\ocloped in Britain between rhe wars was the Motor Landing Craft built by J SWhite of COWl'S in 192610 carry 100 troops. Propos:lls for improH'tttt'm came to nothing umil 1928 whcn the Inter-ServiceTr:lining and Devdoprnem Centre began to take an inteR'S!, Altl'rnative dt'Signs were produced conmlt'rcially but were not \'ery satisfactory. The Admir:l[ry produced the Assaulr Landing Cnft 2, later the LCA. II was 38 feet 9 inches long and had a bow r:lmp, bulletproof side decks and an arlllourt-d stcering position fOl"\llltrd in the developed \ocrsion. Nearly 20lXl \\ocre produced during the w:n, at a rate of60 per month in [944. Meanwhile tilt' Americans adopted anOthl'r approach, Andrcw Jackson Higgins, a colourful boat-builder of New Orleans, used his experience with speedboats to design a light craft which could carry 30 men at 18 knots. 11 had a conventional bow rather than a nmp. Instead of the armour of the LCA, the Eurcka or Landing Cr:lft Personnel (Large) as the Uritish called it, relied on speed for protection and it could drive some \vay up a beach, or over the top of a ~hallow sandbank. Some were bought for the Royal Navy. At the Soime time, the LCI' (Small) was being developed in Uritain. [t was short, and light enough to be slung from ordinary merchant ship davits. Thc slllalbt type of landing \-esscl was the folbot, a folding canoe that would be dismantled for srowage inside a submarine and used for commando oper:ltions. The standard model was 18 feet long and was paddled by two men.
Landing Craft Mechanised [n the inter-wars years the British had continued to study thl' problem of designing a craft which could land a single tank or large \-ehide. By 1938 they had evolved the Lmding Craft Mechanised Mark [, which could carry 16 tons at 7M knots_ [t was simply a floating pontoon wirh the sides built up, and the tank deck was above the waterline. Al the time of Dunkirk the prototype was the only
vessel capable of beaching with a tank. Many more were ordered, often built by r:lilway companies. The US Marine Corps looked at the LCM(I) in 1941. but it could not carry a large enough lo:.rd for their purposes. They consulted with Higgins, who lowered the deck 10 below the waterline to increase slabi[il)', and produced the LCM(J) which could carry a JO-lOn tank. The British ordcred 150 while the Americans were still sceptical. and evenrnally thousands were built (or Allied use, The LCM(I), however, continued in use, because it was light enough to be hoisted with its load on hoard, Higgins also produced the Landing Craft Vehicles and Personnel, or lCV (P), based on his LCI~ Ir adopted the bow nntp and could carry a 3-ton lorry or 36 troops_
Landing Barges The classic Thames sailing barge was designed for the shallow waters of london's estuary, wilh a flat bottom and shallow dr:lfi so that it could pass over sandbanks and unload on beaches. Twcmy-fivc of thcm took part in the evacuation of Dunkirk and their use for the reveTSC operation was obvious. Stripped of Iheir sails and filled with engines, more than 400 of them were eonvcrted for various functions. Nt'w crew mt'm\x'rs, dreaming of appointments to destroyers or MTBs, were disappointed. ntr fOJlOlI.i"g till)' u\' U~ Illkf"// .101m to Fisltbollnlr, 1-11>0110/1 e,erk . Ht arrizlt'd ar Ilti U'llI{'7"S rd,~ a"d 1/1lT/' i" lilt' ril'l"r, moored Ilrad 10 ifml, U'o'Tf a ItUlIZbtr of silapts rlJt Iikr of u4til1l I Irad itnt so ".fInt 0" IIU' LJmlofl Rilw: haW.> willI liltir bar-k>ide> 5/1lIT1J offaud iOlllr JI/allk> ,ylimbff IJrM Ipgellu:r ro fomr a romp alld a 114ttrl box; tlOI tvI"Il a rrmrrblalll'f' rif a brid,~. nrtre uw somr sort of(omraplioll up ftrwarrl rrumbii,zg a mat:ltilri gill', u41illlwnU'd om 10 hi aIU';" HOlt:lJkiss //tlldr ob501t'1t' ill flJt /914 u",,"
Some were able to carry up to three tanks, others took oil supplies into the beach a~a and bore la'1,"C signs indicating the ty~ of fuel carried, for exampk 'Dk-sd', Soml' carried ami·airct:l(t guns, som!.' were fitlt-d for eme'1,'Cncy repair ofother boats, some carried w;tler, and others \\ocre fined with kitchens to feed the crews of minor landing craft during the operation. 'Tht, kitchen cnll c1o~dy resembled an overgrown caboose set on a ba'1,'C, and its many smoking stove-pipes mad!." this unseaworthy Noah's Ark look most om of place battling it Oil! in the mean sea lowards Normandy, where it was badly needed'.»
Landing Ship I"fanlry (L) of the Glen daD, "'hiek
"'n-ed aU l"rough the "'ar,
Churchill's Navy
266
Gun and FI ,k
cllg;lged directly in the hI.nd battle. Dpum
JA
tJm~d
uTln 25 pdT hold a tlllill role: and
III
19-H-S and
pU'P"~.
Hm,
/)rin.~
1H&ow: 1.aDcIiAI c..A ,,-..II ., _
malllltttl ill II lIa1ul furrrt, and /tailing "Ill'lll sigh/illS ammgtmtrllS, rllt)' Il't'I't
._or
(QJ"lbk offimlfl 011 1M Ill""' at ~a, nrltn at 'awls ilflOilI Of; IlS illtnu/tJ, ill lol'XfIS I1Inol't. 5«O/llJ, M~ fidd Ilni/lay prftd, anti h"l,n.~ Royal An,lIar
in Jane 1943, led by
"WM:h.
l'Jjfield
IlS
ill/illtt)'. ~'hy
Good of the R.oyal
Marlllt'J served III a L:llldmg Cr.Ili: Gun (Medium) became cornmiuM to the concept.
The LeG(M)
u'ltll, thq could /MI, wIIm firmly Iw«htd, lIS 1/ sanD" 1IffSll/i1e II.... unr! ... IIi in LCG(J\t)s 11m''' proud IOI.jlm')' so,]or ollr emfi Il'm' pllrpost blllll m,d h
Na\';l] shIps could plUvldl' gunfire support during a bnding. :lnd bnd artillery could SOlllctimes be- used from a landing tnfi. but ;as often happened It W:IS found that speci2.11y dc!;ignro equIpment \\'35 the: best. The Landing Cr:lfi Gun, in various sizes, could go d~ inshore and
Th~
landmg Cr.afi: Rock.~t \\~ an amu.mg vessel, arlll~d with 792 rockel pmj«liles - for 3 s«ond or tWO il had the firepower of 80 cruisers or 200 dt'St~rs - but it W
H
IU
r er Ships
One lesson of the Dabr alTair was thilt a seaborne in\"ltSion n«ded lkdJ.cat~d h~adquutC'rs ships. ;as eom'Cnuonai v.-arnllp5 fuch u CTUI$CA were m ciangcr of bemg called away to perform their usu.ll Juri". This w;as rcinfon:ed during the North Afria bndings btt' in 1942. when th~ AmeTican cnusoer ..illfllS,a had to leave her fU,uon with the suff on ~rd, By Wt rune the BmlJh had already Con\Trted the cx-pmenger ship &do'" ;as the first headquutC'o ship.
follO\\'C'd b)' the Lmgs. SmaJJC'T srnp5, such as &Igat", WhiCh pn;ro.'C'd un$Ulubie for ocean sentlce: for one re;ason or another, ....'el'C cOmTrted to LSH (Small), capa.ble of dirrcting the bnding of one bng;ade 'bnek' durmg an InvasiOn. FlghtCT Di~OD Ships or LSFs ....'ere also fitted OUt ....1th sophlSQo,[ed nubr, plomng equipment and ",dio to conuol. the: air battle abo\;e the bnding.
... -. ·....--_.-
•
~
.-
".
•
",'
3 Combined Operations Techniques The Experience Th.. Combinffi 0p"ration'l org:miS.3tiOIl had a chanc.. to build up a <:umubtive \'xp<..'ric'nCl: of bnding tfQOp5 on hostik shon"S, and to ll:arn from 'IOllle quite scrious misukC$. \Vithdrawal.s such as Dunkirk, Greece and Cll'tc pTOvidffi some experience of the danb",rs of operating ships dOS<.· inshore. Tlu: abortive attack on Daka.r in 1940 :;IIOW\-J dle IWt-J for ships to land tanh and to carry the headquaners. The landing of m.1TinC$ on Madaj}lSCar e'llJbli~hed Ihe necd of a beach organiS.3tion. Th" disam"Qus raid on Dil'PIX' in 1942 providl:d nuny k5WllS. including tho: dfectiwncss of Gl'rman coastal batteries. the dangers of choosing the most ob.. iou~ landing place. and tht problcllls of communication if tCKl llIay mdio SCt$ an: in usc at once. TIl(" North Mrican bnding:; latl'r in tlw year were unoppos,:d. but th<.;' emphasised th" nf't."d for good training of landing craft crews and for navig:ltion aid~. the imporlancc of reconnaissan<:e to as<:ertain certain fact$. such u Ihl' e.oct gradicm of beaeht"S. and that army conunanders should not go ashore until their .ignals headquam'rs an: l"Stablishl-d. TIll" landing on Sicily the following year was rebtivdy t."a.lY. but the opt'meon at Salt."rno on mainbnd luly met the heavie'lt opposition so far. The value of gunfire from large wOlrships wu l."Stablished, and Ihl' usc ofcarriers to e5tablish air SUp"riority was b'Cnerally successful.Army conunandl'rs learnoo that it was dangerous to press on tCKl far \Yithout securing the flanks. At Anzio Lntr in the year. th~'learned the opposite lesson. that a fOTl:e should not remain static on tl1l' beaches lind allow the elH:my time to regroup. Bnnsh expenence was dIfferent from that of the Amnicans in Ihe Pacific The Americans had no policy of <:om'llando raids. and th<.;· generally bndl-d on small islands where navigation and the identification of the correct beach wcr.: not great problems. On the other hand they were dt."aling with a fanatical foe. The Germans were skilled and dl'dicated soldil:l'S, but not as suicidal a.I the Japanese, and thlj! usually had a line of retreat so did not have 10 fight to the finish, unless the FUhrer ordered it in one of his disa<;lrous tactical interventions. Nevertheless. tht." British kept in toueh with American de\'c!0pllwnts in tactics.
in many ports from 'IOuth Wale'l to Easl Anglia. The Cabis area had few suitablt." beaches. and any prepamtions directly opposile w"Quld be obvious to the enemy (a1hough ships in Dover harbour were used for deccptive purposes). MounTbancn Staged a well· managed conference at Laegs in Scotland in 1943. a kind of'psychological mOtor show' and
Mechanise
and nuke the final approach in the light. It usually had its way.A suiuble beach needed to have a reasonably stcep slope. or the landing crali \\"Quld have to beach a long way from the 'Ihore - this made lIluch of the Dutch coast. for example. unsuitabk for landing. Tide5 and currents were powerful in nonhern Europe, though not in the Mediterranean. Strong currents migllt push crati: 'Iideways and had to be 1I110wed for. Landing at high dde would give a shoner distallce for Ihe tfQOPS to ctoSS between the landing point and the enelllY defences, bm in fact thc NOlllundy
Landing Crafl Flak.
bnding:; tCKlk place at low tide to expose enemy beaeh obstacb. This placed a vital constraint on the timc of The landing, making it neCCSS31)' 10 choose days when low tide was dose to dawn. Detailed opl'T':I.lion ordt:1'S wen' produced and issued to commanders of landing crati:. Under American comm:md for the Norlllandy l.llldingo;. Ga\'in Douglas cOlllmented:
11ral paJKr lI",rk de1ffllN a book I,' il1l'!f Eacll cr4r caml'd 1
0'"
Detailed photo reconnaissance was vital in planning a landing, to show The original idl'a of Combined Operations was perhap~ to build up from small commando raids to bigger optrations.This did not work. as there proved to be a large gap belween raids and full inv~sions. The Du::ppe nid was Ix:tweell the two. bllt it \\'3'\ an appalling failun·. [t was Illlponant 10 chose the site of a landmg carefillly. The most f.1rreaching deci'lion was to i,wade Normandy rather than any other pan of northnn Europ<:. The Gennaro had a1wa}"S assumt-d that it would be done ovt."r the shorlest sea roule in lhe Sirait ofOover. but thc length of lime at sea was irrelevant. a.I ~hips and crati: would han' to be assembled
Icr.: A
Landing Craft
p<:l'Suadl'd tlH.'" scnior officers pn'SCnt that Normandy was the pbce. The arlllY gcncrally \\"Quld have preferr.:d to [and in darkness. but the navy fa\uun-d dawn. so that it could appro.ach under cover of darkness
Reconnaissance Planning
AbO',e
tht: btl'St st.lte of the dcfcnCl"S. It was not complete. for it did llot neces.s.arily show the heigllt of a feanm:, the Sr:lle of the beach or the water and tidal conditions, so it had to b., 'Iupplell\ented by inforlll.3tion gained on the spot. Thl' Adllliraity Hydrographic Df'panment had a vast fund of knowledge of the \\urlds coastlines. but it was not always delailed enough to plan a l.lnding.ln SOllll' pla<:es. Ihe charts were out ofdate and inaccumte. which is where the Combined Operations !'ilotal;(' Parties (COPP) calllc in. They uscd a \~rsion of the folbat c::moe. illlpTO\"Cd to fit their own needs. They landed at night after being launched by
Abo-..., right: A manned by RO)'llI Marines.
Opposile lOp: Canadian 'roops (lOme carrying folding bi""cles)
USe lines 10 eOme
aIDOTll from a La.nding c .... ft Infantry (L) on Juno U..ach on D-Day.
268
Churchill's Navy
mainland of lcaly. It found Ih"t beach No. II was 5000 ya.-ds long and had an excdkm gndicnt of I:20 except for an 800-)'ard bank 10 the nonh. The beach WJ5 nOI eJ5Y to pick OUI, however, and pilotage instructions \\"'rt' olTcn-d;
I Vl1r11 u;llIill aoow :4 mile Y"u u;/1
ICI'
f/mmglr )'tllir gl
""allr, Il'rmillQlillg lit Ilrl' uorllrml nrd ill IItT d!ffs mll/lligil grrll/lld i" ,lrl' lw"i,y cif !'lleQ.HERA . .. 'n,T IwdIT-II'IlIIT 1111«1' is laud
The Voyage Landing craft weR"COlllbatload"d·. with the CqUlptll<'tlt that would be needed "!'!il ready 10 be bndcd quickly. Control of rroops in a crosschannel invasion required some skiD among the officers of major landing craft. They needed' Abiliry to maintain disclphnc and an aggressive spim both among the cmllS IhemSt:'lv<:5 aud among the IIoops embarked, under condinons of exceptional
SITI.':IS
through enelllY a(lion ',!"
The planning ofan opention depended
be covered
011
the approach. In
\'Cf)'
:l. COllll1l3ndo
milch on the disunce to
raid such as the albck on
Lofoten bland ofT northern NOT\\'aY in March 1941. the Troops would tra\ocl bolh ways in Landing Ships Infanrry or smaller vessels. In one involving" long sea voyage. such as Maclagascar, the force would travel in a big-ship convoy with naval <'SCOTt and carriers to provide air cover. The number of troops carried wa.s also determined by the length of the \U)'Jgt'. A Landing Ship Tank. for example. could carry 400 men on a \1)~'ag\' bot only 170 on it long one,'" A shon sca crossing, such J5 the landings in Italy and Normandy. would carry th.. troops Out mainly in landing ships and pll' them ashort' in Landing Craft Assault. Thl1' might travd in three f)'pt.'S of (o))\V)', :l.ccording to speed.The slow :lSS3ult COI1\-OYS would leave first. consisting of the slower Landing Ship Tank Mark 111 and some stort"!; ships. with spc,'ds of 6 to 10 knots. The 'cnfi COll\'Q}" ofTank Landing Ships and Craft and Landing Craft Infantry tra\"l.~lled at 10 knots. The f:lSt assault convoy had a spt'"fti of 12 knots and included Landing Ships Infantry (L) and Landings Ships Pc'rsonnd. During til(' \"O)'agc' ofdl<' CT:lfi COtwoy th~ l3nding Craft Tank would form lines :lStern along the cemn.. with LCI{L)s Oil the outsid.., with the whole force protected by a naVJJ escOrl
shoTt
Canadian sur...i"ors of Ihe di ..."rous
raid on Dieppe
submarine. As well as checking the navigational fC:l.turt-"S shown on charts. th")' could test the strength ofa beach for heavy equipment. and CllTTy OUI mallY dclaikd .UTWYS." Tht"}' \wn' tasked with finding
return to Brilain in
pilotage directions for the :LU3ult COIl\"OY as well as the landing ships on
August 1':H2.
th.. beache5. to l'Sublish th.. nature of th.. beach with irs gradients.
obst:.ldes and ('xits to tnt' shore.TIu: submaril1l;" carrying thelll might lak<' phOlogr.1phs in daylight through its periscope, but pilmage partil'1 preferred 10 work in moonless nights, and they claimed that with training in night stalking du:y could Op<'ratl' within 20 y.;arm ofan .'tWIll)' sl·ntry.Thl1' would anw silhollCltl"S orthe Cn:l£t. both from thl." loW\:ring
position 7 miles offihoIT'. and 300m 3 miles off to check the rome. They wQuld mak<' l"I.-comm<'ndatiOlls ~bout any leading m~rk$ that might bt: then' aln'ady, or any navigational aids that could b.: pm in place for the landing. Th.ry would check the surface of Ihe beach 10 see if it would bear heavy vehic1.:s.Th<:y u~ underw"ter writing pads to make notes, "nd wrote them up a:l soon :L:I th<1' were back on board the subm.arine or olhn vessel carrying th..111." COPP No. 5 was landed by the submarine SllllkNp"....r in the Gulf of GiOia inJuly "nd AUb'l.lSt 1943,in prepar.nion for the first landing on the
of cruisers Jnd d<"5troyers." Though thc' Gl'TII1an$ managed to ilwad<, Norway without it. the British :lnd their allic'S insist<'d on a b'l,''': Illargin of sea superiority for large-scale operations. especially if they w~re oppa;ed. Invasion forces en route were prolected by m;tior war
Amphibious Warfare
invasion. They would ll:ach a ll:ndezvous point. just south ofthl': lsi.. of Wight and known infornl;llly as 'Picudilly". Normally tM was to lx' in dayliglll on 0 minus one. to allow the cran to assemble, 'in a position arefully chosen so thaI il does not dIsclose thl': I':X
269
Landing Craft Gun, which ...."Quld nOI land untillat<·r bllt ...."Quld cng
Assault Fonnations The :.ISSault began in earncst when thc landing and headquarlcrs shlps arrivcd at the lowenng point. 7 mi!".,; offihore in th.. case oftbe British forces on D~Day. Captain David Bone of the landing ship CimHsiil watched a well-tnlined crew in exerciS('. The ships anchored and then lowering began.
Other 'hall IIII' first slrrilling if Ihe bos'nJ- pipe II,err Wl'rf no Irigll words if r"mm
Abo>..,: A ...,lec
-~ ~ •• --- - --- ~~ ,~
As my laudillg lTIIfi Iril 1111' !>tun; WI" look il /trW _ ... ovt'r 'hI' side_ A fOOl if umtr su';//ing rolmd Ollr fm. Gel pumping - Danrtr! Tht bi(gr pumps 1101 u'llrkillg, sa ge' IMililrg willr lill hals. Diffiru/l in rht: lTIImped amdilioll$ Oil b<><Jrd, aptdally as $0111i mnl b6ng silk." The assault craft would approach the beach in c
o.-d~ ..
.000 ••••
.000 ••••
L.-fl: 1'ypical forma';ons for .n asP"I, landing.
__ .... _
~CroII1
-~.
----
-I I
0 0
-~I.M>diflgc."" Tro.
--
~
[]
• • • • • • ,"-_HOt
""""""""
000000
I
•
I
"sed in
0l""ra,ion N"p,un~, the n....1 sid.. of the in....sion of Norm.ndy.
0
I.M>diflgc."" ..........
~CroII
Slowcr cran: ....'t:nt into the W:ller first to begin their journey towards thl': hl':ach. In Ihe h3d .....e ather that day. this was hazardous in itself. According to Major Porteus of No.4 Commando:
of charu and
I 1~
1.MllItve- _ _ • . . . - - Croll 0.-0 - . . . .
0
........ CroII_O
=.o:...-~.
270
Churchill's Navy
army gUllS. which would also stay slightly offihore for Ihe moment Jnd U~· their we~ponry. Then c~n1l" $CV('ral W:Wl"$ of LeAs with infantry and commandos at intl'TVJ[S of 10 or 15 minutes.Tht, hC3dquJ"cn ship for this force of one army brigade group or "brick' W;lS stationed nO{ faT offshore Jnd the Oallks were protected by Hunt cbss {!<-stroy<'r
escorts 4000 yards offihoTe. and f]l,>CI desnoyers with longer r.u1b'C gullS funher OUt,
The COTlmlander of ",aeh (nft had to find his way ashon: in the final to
Lieutenant-Commander Rupert Curtis of
LCI(S) 519:
My
mi"d
a",mrrfr/fed lIr! ji"d,ug a path Illro'
FOr/whstely
In theory the authority of the naval commander owr the trooJl$ ('nded when the enft touched ihore. The aiSault landing cnft carrying Lieutenam L E Anderson hit an obstacle which stuck through the."
The Landing stages. According
flurkius romplClely by imliIlN... l fell / I"t",/d diSlem tlrr mrllarill.~ srakl'S. 11 l(l{Ikfd II hil
bottOIll of the boat 'which Illade it ~pin like a roulette wh<'el in th<' rough iCa'.After an a!'b'l.ullent with the coxswain it was agreed that they went ashore and the troops waded out, up to th<'ir l1<'cks in water. In his waterlogged craft, Major Porteus ,vas not sorry to reach the beach. 'Approadung the beach all hl'll going on but anything prefcroblc to this horrible boot. Ai the from ramps wem down. she." finally iank in three feet ofw;lte"." It was imporDm to let f,'O of the kedge or Stl'TI1 anchor so that the craft could be hauled off after the load wai discharg.::d, as Able Seaman John Holden found in training.
I"udillgs "'I lire OCIU/, fr"", early I/IlJrrlill,l? hI lale t'I'flliug.l1le lI'
.uperstructure and
if we /OSI "lIr kedge mull,1( wire by d{oJlPillg rlre slem .W(Ir", /
chimneys) ...pplie•
Ille t'ut'mr-"
B",.ge Kitchen (easily identifiable
by iu high
• "".ief)' oflanding craft mooTed aJongoide.
Landing on SicIly, Alec Guinness's cable was CUt by a pamng ship and the LCI(L)'i kedge anchor was losl.The ship drifted diagonally to the beach and the troops had to cluub o..-er the side. It w;u 10 c1ayi before a passing destroyer towed hcr off."
Air and Sea Support Bombing and bombardment from the sea might begin iOme time before the landing, although the strategistS had 10 be caTl.'f"lnot to give the me away, In thc case of Normandy, the aIr atuck conccnrratcd on traniport facilities, which helped conceal Allied intentions. Parachnte and glidcr trooJl$ were landed on the flanks of the m\'aslOn !O secure bridgchcads and prevcnt countcrattack. Artillery iuppOrt of a landing came in three phases. During the approach the heavy artillery from ships' guns could saturate th(' bcach batteries and defcnces withom risk to their own troops. Landing Craft Rocket were deployed just before the lroOJl$ landed. providing an imprl'ssJ\'e dtsplay of pyrotechnics for a few seconds. The first si:l: were uied at SICtly III 19·0 and opened up 500 yards from the beach. hearlening the troops of the 1·li~h1and Division who "'crc about to land.~' At H-hour, as the first landings Took place, the situation was mon' difficult as ship·s· f,'lll\S we,... nOI accurale enough, and th.. army's own arttllery had !lOt y<:t la.nded. This W35 ",hert' the Landing Craft GUll came into ttS own.
(OII/rol (lrrll,rgrmrms as well, tlrey (oll/rf Mr, u1/171 firmly bt'adrrd, as a 1m"""
offirld artillif')'. [lery ''trialil,
WI'
ll'mf"
Thl.' durd phase was the advance inbnd. when ]ong-r.lllgc slups' b'l.lllS bec;1mc usc fill again in firing at enemy batteries and strong points and targets of opponuniry as pointed our by reconnaissance aircraft of forward obseT\'ation officers.
As well as
T<.'connai~nce.
bombing support at
~a
were now ablc to repair damaged naft 011 the beachl"S. so a largl' kil of tools was no longer needed." There Wl"TC fimher lessons from Nornl.1ndy. Ikach parries worked conrinually for two or three da)" and went into two w;ltel'l'S, and SOlllt" parril"S appointed cooks (0 keep th\."m supplied with tOad. Jeeps and motorbikes were nel"ded (0 l11.1itlt.lin conmn on long beaches. espl"ciatty when tht" sigu,,1 unit became scpar.lted. nt"(;cssit.1tiug lhe use of flashing light signals. CasUairil'S Wl're higill'St among officers and petty officers, which perhaps jusrifil"d the complement of three officers. tWO petty officers. twO leading seallleu aud 20 ~ble or ordiuary se~meu in a unit."
aircraft were ncc=ry to give fire and
and :ashoTl:', and to provide a figiller se"''''J1 o\"er
Supplying the Armies
rhe operation. There was one headquarters slup for each beach 10 the Normandy invasion. They anchored offshore at !ir<;t light on D-Day,
After lhe frustr:trion of th\." DlCPP;: r:ud lhe AllIes realtscd thaI It would be \1:ry difficult 10 CaplllT<" a m;tior pon ;nmct. bUI armies wo"ld still
and the army command remained on board for about six hours umil their signals units were set up ashore. By thIS (lme fighter direction ships manned by the RAF were used as well, so the headquaners ships
have (0 Ix: supplil:d on a seal<' Ix'yond whal could Ix: landl:d on open beaches. After the Quebec Conference in July 1943 they began Operation Mulberry, (0 build anificial harbo"rs and (Ow the dements across the Channel to Normandy. 'Phocnixes' wcre floating COnere!l' caissons up (0 200 feet long that were sunk to form breakwaters,These Wt".-c supplemented by old merchant ship<; which were scuttled, and by rafts known as bombardolU which fOfl11l'd an outer floating breakw:ltt:r. Inside the space thus created were f10aringjenies held in place by piles in w:Jter deep enough for ships to unload. connected to lh.. beach by caust:w;!ys held up by small floating units knol11l as Ix,t'des. Olher quays were used for unloading stores from Tank Landing Ships. Th.. bloclcships and caissons 11·.. l't" lhe first to SCI s.ail for the invasion,
had litde to do in that mau\."r. TIl<." ships remained on station for lIIore than a .....e ek after that, mostly doing n';IVal dutiC's such as direcring landing craf(.1>
On the Beach In the book and the film TI,C umgm Day the public was giwn a Wty one-dimensional view of the buchm;lSter with an image of Captain Colin Maud standing alone with his dog on Juno Beach, waving a stick and shouting 'Get a mo\'c on....' In fact thc beachmaster \vas leader of a skilled and varied team controlling movement by sea and land in all impromptu but wry busy port, often under enemy fire. Betwl"en the firsl phase of thl" landing and the capturl" or building of the first port. the beachmaster and thc beach commandos had to eOll1rol the build-up of forces. Some lessons had been learned from the Italian landings. It was suggested thaI the mOSI difficult task ....-as controlling the landings of the landing Craft Mechanised. whose visual signalling was often poor with such a small crew, and whose engines tended to drown out a loud hailer. Wheeled vehieles should b\." landed ncar a roadway, lracked vehicles should never b\." on a wire roadway as they would destroy il. Heavy armoured whicles should not be landed on a beach. and squadrons or balleries should not be split bctwccn differl"nt parts of the bC
from faral\l
Conclusion When Ihc war tlrully endl-d widl the surrender ofJ~pan aftt"T the dropping of the al0111 bombs in 1945. the Royal Navy \\,:15 showing signs of exhaustion. It had lost 1500 ships and ve&'1s ranging from the banlecruiser H(l()(/ and the am::rafi orrkr Am Rry;d to 21 dumb ba~. lu. men had SJlCllI long years at sea and \\'cre ready for:l. ren. Of the million men and
women who served. morc dUll 50,000 would not come back. The wartime
ll
was quickly demobili$cd. and the $)'$tcm was fair enough
10
prc\-rnt any serious discontent. J.1though very few wamlll(,> ratings wamc
navy - Ihe Admiralty was rather shaken by 11 raring in the o::ruiser BI<J£k Itill(l'.13y 1'}49 it had been n:duced to 144.000 men. a sixth orits wartillll: strength. The infant technologies of the bier .'luges of Ihe war - nuclear \\,{"lIpo;lll'i. guidt-d missiles. jet aircraft - would combine \\~th ll'Cently CSCIblished onl'S such as radar and amphibious warfare to producl' a IU:W kind of navy. Soci.1l1y, the navy was slow 10 respond 10 changes in the outside world bUI by about 1960 it had got rid of till' WOl"Sl of i~ class distinctions and becaffil.' a W!)' effecti\'(' modern foree. though a1wa~ constrained by budgets which were much lo:ss dun wlut it wanted. The Roya.! Navy C:Ul1e Ollt of the St'cond World \Var with almost unsullied cn:dit.1t had no disasteo on the SC1lk of the army's defeats in France, Greece and Crete. It did not Iuve any morally and strategically dubious campaigns on the scale of the RAFs bombing ofGermany - its most COlltrovenial episode, the destruction of the recently-allied French fleel at Mers el-Kebir, was imposed from above and was directed against ships and SI.'rvicelllcn. not civilians. [t made a substantial contribution to almost every campaign in l'\OCry theatre of the Second World War. dl"Spit<· a national base which was under thR"at ofill\'aSion. was bombed and had grossly over-stretched peIWnncl and industrial resources. It maintained and de\ocloped forces for every kind of warfare. on. under and over the sea and on the interface with Ihe land - the only navy to do so filily. aparl from the Vnitt.-d States with much greatt.·r resources. It ended the w:lr with restorcd prestige and -nsdy increased experience. but without its old position as th.. world's greatCSI sea power. Cerlainly the navy had seriOIlS faults. It maintained a system of class distinction which w:u already being challcnb,<:d during the war. [t had placed eX:lggt:rated faith in Ihe banle fleet before the war. to the neglCct of anti-submarill<' warfare, amphibiolls opc"'tiolls and coastal warfare. [t W;lS able to calch up in tillle in the first two of th<.'SC fields. but not in to volunteer for the
an t~y on '\Vhy I Prefer Civvy St....-ct' by
the third. which was arguably far less imporul1t in any case, It failcd to de\'clop an adequate method of anti-aircraft gunnery, and in the early Stag<.'S it did not even appreciate the importance of this failure. [t Il·ndt.'d to place tOO little faith ill the self-disciphne of its sailon, ~nd maint:lined dnconian punishillents for minor misdemeanours. Conversely, it expected tOO lIluch of thelll in action or in S<:.'rvicl.', bdkving that tht.")' would cndure and even relish harsh conditions for long periods. As a result, men were worn OUI from flying or combal stress when a period of n.-st could havc restored them. It rcfuS<:.·d 10 think dt.'ft.'nsivdy and neglected to dc\oclop life jackcts and cfficiclll lifeboats, and was late with dalllage--conlrol tedmiqucs_ None of these faults lost a major battle or campaign. although mdJVidual ships such 1lS the Hood. IIrk RoYtd, f'ri,,(r ofJl'al~s and Rt:pldse suffered from them. BUI more generally. the faults caused unnecessary \\IaSte oflalent and loss ofHfe. The navy's Strong points shone through this. Having finally fn:·(,·d itsdf from the malaise of the late nineteenth and early tWl:mil·th
cenmries, it allowed initiati\"e to its middle-ranking officl'rs. [I proved very adaptable and dl'\'Cloped an amphibious warfare org:misadon out of almost nothing. Its mining methods \\"ere far from perfect, bUI il absorbed hundreds of thousands of men and women into th.. esoteric naval culture. motivated them and gJ\'e the vast majority of them a lasting affection for the navy, with all its faults. That w:u one me for its tradition. The othl'r one was th!' hatred of failure, Ihe refilsal to break off an opt'ration when it W1lS b'Oing badly. Sir Dudley Pound was no Ndson, bUi one phrase of his echoes the great admiral.·So long as a ship remains afloal and has ev.. n one gun in action sh.. may cause damage to tlu: enemy'. This was in conm~t with the c~ptain of the eraf 5J1rt who scuttled his ship, and with the V-boat eaptaim who failed to pn."SS thdr aU:lcks home in the summer of 19H and had 10 be rebukcd by ])Oniu:. Without the Second World War, the Royal Na\')' would seem very different from a hislOrian's perspccri\"C, looking back to tltt.' faraway days of Ndson for its last gre~t triumphs. lkfore the previous world war in 1914-18, it got practically everything it "''Jnted from tlXpa)'Cr and b'O'o"Crlllnent, but failed 10 shine in action. lkfore the Second World \Var it complained consuntly about neglect, bllt performed \'Cry well. Alter the WOlf, it carried out various thankless tasks in connection with winding down the British Empire, or the Cold W~r, It maintail1l.'d the subnurine nuclear deterrent, but that role was unpopular \\~th Large elements of the public and boring for those who c~rried it OUt, It had thn.'C unpopular 'cod wars' \\~th Iceland O\~r fishing rights, and it played second fiddle to the army in twO Gulf wars. Only in the ""Jatively small Falklands Conflict of 1982 did it show anytlung of its former fanll' and skill, but C\\'n that did not pre\~m a long-term decline in numbers, finance and public interest. !lut its conduct ill the Second World \V:tr allows it to be remembered as one of thc decisive (ol'n'S of til<: tw<'ntieth CemU!)', which pre\ocnted the in-nslon of Brit:lin in 1940, struggled for comrol of thl' Mediterranean, fougl,t lhe 101lb>es! campaign of all in die Ilatde of the Atlantic, and put much of til(.' Al1kd armies ashore in Normandy in 1944.
Anlslam Chi.. f of Naval Siaff (\Vnponl) 9 ~pr..",btr 1941 R -Adnn ..d R H McGrtgor R -Adnur:al W R I'm~""n 8 March 1943 A..illanl Chief of Naval slarr (Fo",lgn) 8 April 1')40 Vic..-Admir:al Sir Groff",)' Duke I l:k-cernbtr 1940 Rear-Ad""r:aI S" Hcnry H.",-ood Posl .."dt:d, 4 Aprtl 1942
JO s..l"cmoo 1938
Ani_unr Chief of Naval Suff (lIon.e) 27 MlY 1'J40 Rnr-Ad",ir:al A J l'ower 1'0>, endt:d. 28 I\-b)' 1942
Third Sn Lord and Controlle. I March 1939 Vic..-Adn"",1 SIr IJruc.. F.....r 22 M.y 1942 Vicc_Adnu",1 SIT Fn:derlck Wak.._Walk..r
Pullam.. n •• ry and Financial Secretary 28 May 1937 G.. offiry ShlkC'SJX'l,... 4 April 1940 SIr Victor \Varrcnd.cr Po.t cnded, 9 hbruary 1942
Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies ynd Transpo.. I Oc,ober 1937 Il~ac Ad""r,d G S ArbuthnOl I Aprd 1941 Vic('_Adn"",1 Sir John Cunninghl1ll 8 M~y 1943 Vicc-Admir:al F H l'cs",m 10 M.rch 1944 Vice-Adm,,,,1 A F E V.llt..... Fifth Sea Lon! and Chief of Naval Air Service_ 19 July 1938 V,c.._AdminJ Sir Al~xanckr A M Rwwy 21 November 1939 Vic('-Ad",ir:al C G G R~'I .. 14 M.l' 1941 R~lr-Adm,,,,ILu,,d"Y Lptcr (in a~"ncc,July 1942 10 JantL:Iry 1943. Adnur:al Sir F,....)cnck D"'),<,r, Ch,~f of N,,-.I Air s..,,'ic<'S. wa, nu, • rn~",bcr of Ihe boanJ) Flflh Sea Lord and Chi ..Cof Naval Air Equipmenl 14 Jan...r}' 1943 Vicr_Adm,,,,1 S" O<:"u" Boyd (Decan", Filih s... Lotd (A11') on 1 M.y 1945) Depury Chief of Naval Staff (Vke ChIef from 11 April 1\140) I January 1939 Ilc~r-Admir:al Tom I'htllip; 21 Oc.ober 1941 Vic('_Adnu",1 SIT Henry Moo... 7 Junr 1943 V,cc-AdnunJ SIr N ....·'lIc S)'f ,
Parliamenlary and Finan.,bl Se.,retary 8 AuguSt 1945 J Dugdalr Civil Lord 15Jul)' 1938 5 M.",h 1942
C.pOm U A M Hudson CapOlU Il A l'dk,nglOu
Controller of Merchanl Shlpbnlldlng and Repain I Fcbrulr}' 1940 Sir Jam... Lithgow Permane". Se.,retary 23July 19:16 5 l>«.. mbtr 1940
S.. Arch,bald Can..r Si. H('nf)-' Markhll11
Aisi... Chief of Naval Staff (Trade) 10 JlnUlf)-' 1939 R(,l1-Admir:al H M IJu,rough
4 Commanders-in-Chief, 1939-45 Dale appointed
Home Commands No~ I»KJ~,
a..,....",
...dntir:al Sir Studholm(' IJrowm,gg ...dntir:al Sir Rtgi,>:l1d P1unketl-Ernle-Etle-1mlt V,c..-Adtttir:al Str G.-org.. Lyon 00.,1"" ...1 of ,he Flr<:l SIr John T",~' Portsmouth Adnur:al Sir Willia", Jam", Ad""r.>.l SIr Ch..l", Lntl.. Ad"ur:al S,c GroffK)" L.y,on
Date appoin.ed Naval Air Stalion_ BastJ a, Ltt",m-&lnll R~.r_Admir:al
9 Ja"...ry 1939 I O<:ccmbtr 1930 200.1',,11941 7 July 1943 J() Ju"c
19J'1 1 Ocwbcoc 1942 1 M.)· 1945
R Il D,,·,...
Rrar-Adn"",1 R A C Moody R~.._AdJtl,r:aI CV Robrnu:>n V"....Adn" ...1 SIt I).. nni, Boyd Plyn.oulh Adrn,ca1 SIT r-.h"", Dunb..-N..",,,h "'dm,,,,l of,h.. Flc~, SIt Chari... Forbc< L'p
24 May 1939 30 s..p,..",bcr 1941 12 May 1943 1Jun.. 1945 24 Oc.ober 1938 I M.y 1941 12 M.l' 1943
'"
9'"
;00
2'; July 1940 Rnr-Admir:al H R Moon: 21 Octobtr 1941 V".._Adrnn,,1 E L S Kmg 7 I)"".. moo 1942 R ...,.-Adu"",IJ H Ed..I"..,,, M~mbe"l"p of,h.. !>o,ntl ..ndt:d. 30 Oclol>o:r 1944
Admir:al of th~ AUI Sir Dudley l'ound Admir:al of ,h.. Flee' Sn Andn,w Cun",ngl..."
'"
no 830
3 The Board of Admiralty, 1939-45 Firsr Lord of Ihe Admlrally 3 S<-p'<=oo 1939 W",,,on Churchill 12 MlY 1940 Albert V Alcx.lnd~r 29 M~' 1945 Drc,,
.... 3»
GodoLniA G 11:0pen00ruI Faoguc' Ul •\I'.n • "'_.\'01. 91 no. I. Febru.oI)' 2005 C Bdl. a.-lIiwW II:' II AIlnIIli c.u.-,.. London. 1m HltmOll. W A. Norry.s.-Jfi>lr __ ~ ....... M.arJl>orough.. 2002 GnIum Dudlln. 8nluJI AI1fWU 8ooiWnor< of. . StoM lIiwW lI;.,. Em Stillion.
'nneo. I~.
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on Ute <Jeo,..,lopntenl of each dnlll".They orr an ,,,,..Iwble >oul'l:e bu. OS I) K Ii..,.,.·" put! il-Utey COrttlln."The Truth. N<xtunll but .he Truth bul oncn '-cry r... nom lhe Whole Trulh: Pa... phleu 'Tlm coIkrnon n one 0( the undnc:",......,.j trtasum 0( the IrI\D/:Um, ..,th many nrc and u""Inc coplCO ci obscure but "Cry Uld\d ...,m.. >lICh ... Capum PdIy's A" ~.. ~ A""
Sum. A J.c;...II,_.T..-tions llw' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' of N-I S1uF """" If;",..... cidle l""'IUIIOfl ci N..-.I Archuoooo. 19~5 TIOUp.J A G. ()n . . Bn«c. Jrd edmon. London. 1950 Wngl'll.Nod kI
Manuscripts Na,io.."l An:hi.·.,. h .. no< """",,,bill ......,.,,110 g.J'''' a U)'. Fo. e","mI'le. lhe IlCSl d=.,.",o" of lhe dUlIo of ",dtv,du.l cb...... of n.....1 r:l.l1ng<" 10 be found. UOI '" ,he Ad""nlry P'pe"'. h... ,n M""'fT)' of Labour LAB 29/N9. Some Oflhe most ..",r..1 >cn~ ~..,:
Lbnry oflho. lto)-.J Na.-::oI M .........."'. l'ommo... h. n much n1olC'l 1o ~.,... ADM 187: P",k luu. 2(18. Red lJm. 209. 8lu¢ llSU. 210. G....,n LnG. II;"'" die ouoon< of ,.......... dlfrerrn. !)1""' of sh.p~' oppr<JlotJl d... .~
IW. IV _ SmIor about die Fkn AJz Arm a IO'UCd by Canal + ,,,''- InIO'mll>Orlll•• 999
Picture Credits
283
Picture Credits Anon Books Ltd
IS
committed 10 respeCI1l1g the
1l1l<:lICC[U~J proper!)'
rightS of olhers. We ha\"e therefore IJkcn all reasonablc drorts (0 ,,"sure lhal th(' ...: production of aU content
on (hcse pagc5 15 done Wllh the full consent of COp)Tlghr owner!. If yOll no: aw;l.r(' of any unimcmional otnissioll~ please contact Ih.. company directly SO Ihar any necessary corn:cti01U may be made for future editions.
Navigali/llt ,\[a""al, H M Slalionery Office. 1938: 43; Britaill s Clon'ollS Nal'Y. edited by Adminl Sir Reginald H S Bacon, Odhalm Press Ltd. 1942: 76. 94.166 top. 216 tOp. 237. 250. 256: Britoins Merth""t Navy. edited by Sir Archibald Hurd. Odh;llllS 1'rcsJ Ltd. n.d: 64: IJlliid tile Ship, H M Sutionery Office, 1946: 79: DrmlY DJlmb.molJ 1844-1932. Willi~m Denny & Brothers Limited: 1932: 78; Emyrlop.>edia ofAvidtioll. compiled and edited by Squadmn-Le;tder C G lJu~. Sir Isaac Pitman &: Sons Ltd. 1935: 199: 1111' CumlCr)' Poc~r Book. 1945.Admira.lty: 46. 88 top & bottolll, 89. 92 left & right. 171 right. 172: lmed on material in)oint Army and Na,'y P"b/i(dt;O" N",,,bn- Olt. 1943-4. Washington: 27. 120 riglu. 135. 156; ltya"rry "lhJi"i'I.~. I';lrt VIII. The War Office, 1944: 67 tOp; Ma"",,1 t.if Stama"ship, Vol. I.
132. 142: Pratlital Co"muttioll of Warships. It N Newton. Longman. Green and ~ Ltd. 1941: 80; based on n13teri;t1 in 'fJII' lWyal Marillt' Pock(l 8ooil, Major I' H B Wall
209 (TRI27S). 211 (1\8429),215 (TR612). 218 lOp left ("'7742). 2221eft (TR506). 223 (A 13888), 224 (A23959),234 lOp (A28350). 234 boltom (A 11796). 235 lOp
;lnd Lieulenant GAM It1tJOn. 1945: 149; A Sra'I'I"ns Pockt't.&ok,June 1943. H M Stalionery Office: 41 tOp. 99. 101: Srlmed Papm 01'1 Bririslr Ii-'ilrship Ot'sigl'l il'l IliJrld lIirr
II. from the Transactions of the Roy;t!lnstitutiOn of Naval Architccts 1947, Con,,~ 1983: 219. 228 top. 265. 267 left: lhr nir. af Sta. Vol. I. S W R~kill. H M Slation<:ry
top (" 17190). 258 (A 17304). 260 left ("29897).260 right ("'29904).263 (A23949). 268 (H22604); Thl' Nalional Mchivcs: 35 ("DM2J91241. Diagram 2),37 Icft
Office. 1954: 31 tOp. 182:The War;ll Sea.Vol.ll. S W R~kill. H M SCllionery Offic<:.
("'DM239/24 I. Diagram 15).48 (INF3/131), 9S IXlUQrI1 ("DM239/303, Fig. 4).
1956: 68. Further information 011
96 ("DM239/307, Fig. (4).98 lefl (ADM239/307. I'hotograph 2).98 right
~ funnd I..ux- _ Allred Hok of In'ttpool Rof... gun 89. 93. 97.167.188 Bc>ur-. Gn>lh >nIr)' 66-67 Bomb oazt of fQl Bn<>lh Conunoo"",akh II Bnl:>lh Emrm' II. 11 BrlOlb Irl
JI...,..
2<J
Br,m!> .......'tt IJo>t ConlpJOy 68. 76, H5 Bnm!> Yud M_..,.".,. 256 lSroooU. em $or AUn 23 lliymt. Cpc Ben 221. m. 22J buo)-. 'Y""m ..3 Do> 2Q Cill>g/>:In. u Junes (bter I'M) 36. 1040 UNdun IU\'Y (RCN) 55. 166. m ~ 1'il,J0. 152
V-JO 1'4.61
19, 109. 175. 180.263.270-271 do ~" em CIwks 57 do P Com", 253 l><:nn'j.• Bro-.... .ubib>en 76 o.r..ou.Cpc K C 8 168 06....2,Adm K3rl 19.20.4'.50.272
Doup.. s.r Sboko 68
O·Oyiy·H"&f>co. Cf'C 185. 190 I>Royft.Adm Sot Frederick 190 I>uo.Iq'. Sa S F III 0..1:<: ofWlndoor 27 Dunbrt 14./6.28.31,57.\03.112.131. HI. 152. 165 Dutch mnc:h:uM ""') 65
E.ttck Od and Shtppuog <:omp-y 61 Em of coo. and Cl<'m\'y 27 E-boot 1't'( Gnm>D ""''Y SiMtf-BM f.dw;ud Vlll
