Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and Fall of a Policy (Case Series on Peacekeeping)

Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism

This book re-examines the evidence surrounding the rise and fall of peacekeeping policy during the first Clinton Administration. Specifically, it asks: what happened to cause the Clinton Executive to abandon its previously favoured policy platform of humanitarian multilateralism? Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism aims to satisfy a large gap in our understanding of events surrounding 1990s peacekeeping policy, humanitarian intervention and the Rwandan genocide, as well as shedding some light on US policy on Africa, and the issues surrounding the current peacekeeping debate. The author takes an unorthodox stance with regard to the role of public opinion regarding peacekeeping policy, and delves deeper into the roles that the legislature, the military and, in particular, the Executive had to play in the development of US peacekeeping policy in the 1990s. The conclusions reached concerning the role of the United States and international community in the face of the Rwandan genocide are of particular note in their departure from the accepted wisdom on the subject. This book will be of interest to students of peacekeeping, international relations, US foreign policy and humanitarian intervention. Leonie G. Murray is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Ulster. She has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Ulster.

Cass series on peacekeeping ISSN 1367–9880 General Editor: Michael Pugh

This series examines all aspects of peacekeeping, from the political, operational and legal dimensions to the developmental and humanitarian issues that must be dealt with by all those involved with peacekeeping in the world today. 1 Beyond the Emergency Development within UN missions Edited by Jeremy Ginifer 2 The UN, Peace and Force Edited by Michael Pugh 3 Mediating in Cyprus The Cypriot communities and the United Nations Oliver P. Richmond 4 Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies Edited by Jim Whitman 5 Peacekeeping and Public Information Caught in the crossfire Ingrid A. Lehman 6 US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton A fairweather friend? Michael MacKinnon 7 Peacebuilding and Police Reform Edited by Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide 8 Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution Edited by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse

9 Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century Edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram 10 Women and International Peacekeeping Edited by Louise Olsson and Torunn L. Tryggestad 11 Recovering from Civil Conflict Reconciliation, peace and development Edited by Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel 12 Mitigating Conflict The role of NGOs Edited by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond 13 Ireland and International Peacekeeping 1960–2000 A study of Irish motivation Katsumi Ishizuka 14 Peace Operations after 11 September 2001 Edited by Thierry Tardy 15 Confronting Past Human Rights Violations Justice vs peace in times of transition Chandra Lekha Sriram 16 The National Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era Edited by Pia Christina Wood and David S. Sorensen 17 A UN ‘Legion’ Between utopia and reality Stephen Kinloch-Pichat 18 United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era John Terence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees 19 The Military and Negotiation The role of the soldier–diplomat Deborah Goodwin 20 NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999 Policies and doctrines Henning-A. Frantzen

21 International Sanctions Between words and wars in the global system Edited by Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano 22 Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations A new nordic model in the making Peter Viggo Jakobsen 23 Kosovo between War and Peace Nationalism, peacebuilding and international trusteeship Edited by Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen 24 Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism Rise and fall of a policy Leonie G. Murray

Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism Rise and fall of a policy Leonie G. Murray

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Leonie G. Murray This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Murray, Leonie. Clinton, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention : rise and fall of a policy / by Leonie Murray. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Peace-building. 2. Peace-building, American–History. 3. Humanitarian assistance, American–History. 4. United States–Politics and government–1993–2001. I. Title. JZ5538.M87 2007 327.1'72097309049–dc22 2006038495

ISBN 0-203-08913-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-41277-3 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-08913-8 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-41277-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-08913-2 (ebk)

Contents

1

Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix x

Introduction

1

Policy change and public opinion

9

Introduction 9 A multilateralist public: survey results 10 Misrepresentation: why did it happen? 21 Conclusion 27

2

Executive decision-making

29

Introduction 29 Early positivity 30 Two thorny problems 37 Reality dawning 38 An administration deflated; a policy disowned 51 Naivety 53 The ‘blame-game’ 58 Conclusion 61

3

Congressional accountability? Introduction 63 A turn to the Right 64 The 103rd Congress versus Clinton Administration multilateral policy 75 Congressional culpability for Clinton retreat? 85 Conclusion 88

63

viii Contents

4

Somalia

89

Introduction 89 Background 90 Impact 107 Conclusion 120

5

Rwanda

123

Introduction 123 Background 124 Genocide 128 International response in brief 130 International response: a question of awareness? 132 International response: a question of indifference? 143 Conclusion 166

Conclusion

169

Notes Bibliography Index

174 209 219

Acknowledgements

This work began as a PhD thesis, and to that end I would like to express my thanks to everyone who helped me along my way during the completion of that project: my doctoral supervisor Dr Stephen Ryan for all his help and advice, Professors Tom Fraser and Alan Sharp, my external examiner Professor Tom Woodhouse, our School Secretaries, and the Library staff of UU Magee. These people facilitated the writing of my thesis in more ways than one and I am very grateful to them all. In the process of developing thesis into book, several people were of invaluable service, chief among whom was Professor Tom Fraser, who, although at times would almost certainly have rather done anything than read one of my chapters, gave of his time and advice freely and without hesitation. Finally, I would like to thank my parents: Don and Elaine, and siblings: Donette, Simon, Serena, Marie Claire and Dominick (especially my sisters) for all their support, as well as tolerance of my moods throughout writing, and my friends Rosalind and Margaret for the lighter moments. Lastly my thanks to my fiancé Laurence for his love and support (and Internet skills!) throughout. Without his unfailing good humour I would have given up hope a long time ago.

Abbreviations

APC ATIF CCFR CDR CENTCOM COS DIA DoD DPKO DPKO HQ EC ETO GNP GOP ICRC JNA MDR MRND MSF NATO NGO NMOG NRA OAS OAU PDC PDD PIPA PL PM PRD

Armoured Personnel Carrier Americans Talk Issues Foundation Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique U.S. Central Command Conservative Opportunity Society Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Headquarters European Community Ecole Technique Officielle Gross National Product Grand Old Party (Republican) International Committee of the Red Cross Yugoslav National Army Mouvement Democratique Republicain Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement Medecins Sans Frontières North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non Governmental Organisation OAU Neutral Observer Group (Rwanda) National Resistance Army Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Parti Democrate Chretien Presidential Decision Directive Program on International Policy Attitudes Parti Liberal Prime Minister Presidential Review Document

Abbreviations xi PSD QRF ROE RGF RPF RPG RRF RTLM SC SCF SG SJR SNA UNAMIR(II) UNAR UNA-USA UNCRO UNHCR UNICEF UNITAF UNOMUR UNOSOM (II) UNPROFOR(BH) UNSC WFP

Parti Social Democrate Quick Reaction Force Rules of Engagement Rwandan Government Forces Rwandan Patriotic Front Rocket Propelled Grenade Rapid Reaction Force Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines Security Council Save the Children Fund Secretary General Senate Joint Resolution Somali National Alliance United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (II) Union Nationale Ruandaise United Nations Association of the United States of America United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund Unified Task Force United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda United Nations Operation in Somalia (II) United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia Herzegovina) United Nations Security Council World Food Programme

Introduction

This inquiry grew out of the sense of injustice caused by the lack of action on behalf of the International Community in the face of the worst of crimes: the Rwandan genocide. It appeared at first glance that the finger of blame for this shameful episode pointed clearly in the direction of the United States, and necessarily at the Clinton Administration. Blinded by the possibilities that emerged from the Cold War’s ending and optimistic to a fault regarding the potential of the United Nations and its tool of peacekeeping, the first real post-Cold War American administration set about crafting a new foreign policy. However, disaster in Mogadishu, and perceived public and Congressional pressure, engendered retreat from multilateralism and abandonment of peacekeeping and the UN. This in turn led the US to thwart effective action on the UN Security Council in the spring of 1994. It is not overly surprising that these are the conclusions one takes from a review of the general literature both on the Clinton Administration’s relationship to peacekeeping, and the response of the International Community to the Rwandan genocide, as an assessment that focuses primarily on American culpability appears to be the general consensus. None the less, a thorough and faithful appraisal of events has led this study to several contrary conclusions. The end of the Cold War produced an almost euphoric wave of optimism which swept the world causing the widespread conviction that now, in the absence of superpower stand-off, even the most ‘protracted’ of ‘conflicts’ and complex of issues could be solved.1 As William Shawcross writes, ‘there was a belief that . . . much of the world could be put to right . . . [and] reason, not politics, might prevail’.2 In particular, a confident optimism emerged that cooperation would replace division on the United Nations Security Council, and the UN would finally fulfil the role that was intended for it almost half a century before at its founding. Peace would reign supreme in the projected ‘New World Order’.3 It was in this unique state of geo-political sanguinity that the Clinton Administration came to office, with fresh liberalist ideas of a more morally based foreign policy rooted not in the unilateral imperialism that

2 Introduction characterized much of American international action throughout the Cold War, and particularly the Reagan years, but in multilateralism, cooperation with allies, and with significant emphasis on protection of human rights, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and economic and democratic enlargement. One journalist wrote at the time in criticism of this approach: ‘[t]he Clinton Administration is not so good at resisting temptation, especially the temptation to do good.’4 In the absence of the distinctive geo-political atmosphere attendant at the Cold War’s end, it is impossible to imagine the adoption of such a position, particularly by the world’s most powerful nation; it simply would never have been contemplated (and as we shall see, was in the end relatively short-lived). American politicians and pundits were particularly vulnerable to this optimism; perceiving victory in the Cold War to be theirs, an exaggerated hubris was born, which convinced Americans (the ‘winners’) that they could right countless wrongs. So the premise went, ‘[i]f America cannot get a grip on the world’s impending disasters, nobody can’.5 With hindsight it is easy to see how naively idealistic this prognosis was. None the less, at the time, this optimism was so amplified, even at the highest levels in global politics (it was President Bush who coined the phrase, ‘New World Order’), that quite a few points were overlooked. Indeed, the success of the UN-sponsored Persian Gulf mission and an eagerness to find a role for the lonely superpower in the post-Cold War world did not serve to temper enthusiasm. Optimism and hubris blinkered the Clinton Administration to the downfalls of multilateralism and peacekeeping, and caused them to simply gloss over many significant details. First, the expectations placed on the UN as a result of the aforementioned enthusiasm were unrealistic. A stubborn hope and a willingness to believe that the world could change overnight, and a pride that assumed they would be the ones to change it, blinded the United States (and others) to the inherent problems that the envisaged expansion of UN peacekeeping would expose: organizational and bureaucratic inadequacies, resource overstretch and the difficulties of mixing traditional peacekeeping with the new concept of peace enforcement. It also caused a failure to adequately assess the potential ‘costs’ of the newly proposed peacekeeping in terms of credibility, capital and casualties. Consequently, when things went awry, as they were bound to do (as a result of the failure to plan for the costs and problems), those ‘optimists’ were naively and shamefully unprepared and ill-equipped (psychologically and politically) to deal in a constructive manner with the problems, reacting instead with extreme negativity; the disappointment of expectations. As Mats R. Berdal writes, ‘(t)oo often, periods of misguided idealism have generated impossible expectations, only to be followed by unwarranted gloom and cynicism.’6 The result? A crisis of faith among recent UN converts and a reaffirmation of the multilateral sceptic doctrine. This is not to

Introduction

3

say that the ideal was wrong. The problem was the administration’s inability to ‘follow through’ in establishing a well thought out and comprehensive doctrine that would have provided for negative eventualities, enabling the President and those around him to deal more constructively with the problems they faced; explain themselves better, and prepare the way for the benefits and drawbacks to come. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we will establish conclusively the reasons why a supposedly positive Clinton Administration, full of postCold War optimism, discarded its previously favoured policy platform of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and the prosecution of international affairs through multilateral organizations. Second, this study will evaluate the oft-cited belief that policy change (which is usually described as being a result of a single-factor analysis with reference to either public opinion, Congressional pressure or the Somalia debacle) and therefore the Clinton Administration, was directly responsible for the International Community’s inability to act effectively to prevent or halt the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This dual investigation will commence with an examination of American public opinion. The reason for this is that one of the most frequently cited explanations for the Clinton Administration’s policy U-turn is an overwhelming public negativity towards UN peacekeeping as a result of the Somalia debacle. The US public, it is suggested, disgusted by the images of a dead US soldier paraded, trophy-like, though the streets of Mogadishu, and disenchanted with this strange new concept of multilateralism, simply demanded it. Chapter 1 takes a contrarian stance to this established viewpoint. In fact, systematic study of collated poll data on this issue demonstrates that the American public is characterized rather by a marked positivity towards the United Nations and its most familiar tool: peacekeeping. Not only this, but the massive public outcry that Congress maintained erupted following the Somalia incident simply did not happen. Survey results show that only a minority sought immediate withdrawal of US forces from the Horn, with only one poll displaying 50 per cent in favour of such an action.7 This chapter makes a close inspection of collated survey results in order to establish, without doubt, the public’s positivity towards the UN system, and approval for peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda/Burundi. The American people, in greater numbers, trust the United Nations than are inclined to trust any branch of their own government. Since public opinion was not overwhelmingly negative as was suggested, we now need to understand why the Clinton Administration believed this to be. Consequently, we must then examine the reasons why the policy-making elite in the United States misinterpreted public preferences. Through this inspection we shall stress that a combination of factors caused public opinion to be misconstrued, such as: paternalistic attitudes among policy-makers towards the public; a dwindling interest in

4

Introduction

foreign affairs in the post-Cold War period; a reliance on vocal minorities as representative of mass opinion; an increasingly conservative Congress that was predisposed to negative opinion; a self-re-enforcing triangular relationship between the Executive, Congress and the media, and the assumption that both Congress and the media accurately reflect the public mood. The study will then move to an examination of the Clinton Executive in order to ascertain what factors, particular to the administration, caused an attitudinal shift away from multilateralism and peacekeeping. It is true that the administration was initially highly supportive of these tools, and Chapter 2 will present evidence to that end. However, in this chapter we will dispel the inadequate assumption that the experience of Somalia alone was responsible for the policy change that occurred in late 1993. Somalia was undoubtedly the catalyst, without which there may not have been such a sweeping change (we shall discuss Somalia in greater detail in Chapter 4). None the less, it was the negative experiences of 1990s peacekeeping, of which Somalia was simply the worst example, coupled with the perceived pressures exerted by an increasingly conservative Congress (the subject of Chapter 3), a naivety and a lack of preparation on behalf of the administration caused by the optimism at the Cold war’s ending, and more significantly as regards the literature on this subject, a lack of real commitment to multilateralist policy on behalf of the administration. Clinton was not genuinely committed, so when the administration felt threatened, they cut it loose. After offering evidence in support of the administration’s early positivity, Chapter 2 will move to explain how it was that the problems of 1990s peacekeeping affected the Clinton Administration’s perceptions of those crises and the manner in which they chose to deal with them. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) was one result of this change in attitude. Originally the far-reaching and ambitious Presidential Review Document 13 (PRD13), PDD25 was a hard-bitten, cynical version of the callow, idealistic review document that it replaced. The other consequence was the castigation and scapegoating of the UN by the Clinton Administration. Unwilling to take the blame for a poorly thought out policy that had not been given the full attention of the foreign policy Principals, the Clinton Administration cast around for someone else to blame. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and American Ambassador to Somalia Robert Gosende, lost their jobs, but that was not sufficient. The only other possibility was the United Nations. And so it was. The UN became, as Michael Hirsh calls it, the ‘Fall Guy’.8 It is then the turn of the Legislature to fall under the scrutiny of this study. Second only to citations of a negative public, the most oft-cited reason for the attitudinal shift within the Clinton Administration is a negative Congress ready to shut Clinton down; to obstruct his key domestic agenda if he did not fold on multilateralism, and particularly

Introduction

5

UN peacekeeping. However, this study holds this to be a simplistic reading of the situation. Congress had undoubtedly been moving steadily to the right since the early 1960s, and was more assertive than at many times in its history (on a par perhaps with that which faced Truman in the 1950s and Nixon in the 1970s). It is also accurate that the 103rd Congress leapt on the multilateral issue; first, because of the generally antagonistic slant of conservative opinion regarding such issues; second, as a result of the significant numbers of freshmen and sophomore legislators who, having entered Congress since the end of the Cold War, were considerably less focused on international issues; third, as a consequence of the discovery that the UN could be used as an effective political and electioneering tool for Republicans, and lastly resulting from the personal dislike that many members felt towards the person of the President, which caused them to deem, if this man was for something, it must be flawed. None the less, and contrary to the common wisdom, examination of the various actions taken by Congress vis-à-vis the Clinton Administration’s multilateralist policy and the main foreign policy crises of the day, demonstrates that there was no real concerted push by Congress to constrain the actions of the Executive concerning its foreign policy movements. No legally binding action was taken, and any more antagonistic measures were toned down or thrown out. Consequently, any limiting of the administration’s foreign policy was, in fact, self-imposed. In fact, it is interesting to note that the real trouble, the real period of Congressional antipathy towards all things multilateral, came after the Clinton Administration had already ‘capitulated’, during the 104th Congress, elected the following November. Fearing what Congress could do if tempted, the problems that Congress might pose for the administration and its crucial domestic agenda, combined with a lack of real commitment to ‘assertive multilateralism’, and the Clinton Administration changed tack. As soon as the administration felt a threat to domestic policy, multilateralism was discarded. Somalia was considered sufficiently important, albeit in combination with other factors, to warrant a separate chapter, in order to explain why the impact of the Somalia disaster was so great. A case study of Somalia is presented, pertaining to the history of the nation, the civil war and famine, and the international response, coming finally to the events surrounding 3–4 October 1993. While it is generally posited that Somalia took America by surprise, thus accounting for the strength of response, this position is discounted herein. With the exception of Congress (whose ignorance in this case was astounding), the reaction to the deaths of the 18 servicemen was not an overwhelming one of shock. The Clinton Administration had failed to prepare adequately for the negative eventualities that its policy might incur in Somalia, had not devoted as much attention to developments in Somalia as it should, and was disappointed

6

Introduction

when things went awry. However, it is without credibility to suggest that the administration was not following events in Somalia, and the President’s assertions to the contrary are without merit, and must be put down to political theatre. One of the most extreme reactions elicited by the Somalia debacle is thought by many to have come from the American military. This study challenges this supposition, suggesting instead that unlike the administration, the military was fully prepared for negative eventualities, and not in the least surprised when an ambitious mandate coupled with limited resources resulted in 18 dead. Chapter 4 will also discuss Somalia comparative to other missions that sustained fatalities, such as Panama and Grenada, the Gulf War, and Beirut. After discussing the effects of Somalia, this analysis will shift its focus to the secondary line of investigation: whether it is possible to support the generally accepted argument, that as a direct result of the Somalia debacle and ensuing US negativity towards peacekeeping and the UN, the International Community was powerless to halt the genocide in Rwanda. This inquiry originated with a much smaller study that dealt with the roots of international inaction in the face of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The results of this study, unsurprisingly given the general consensus in the literature, suggested that the United States was, indeed, almost solely responsible for the failure of the International Community. The US, it appeared, still smarting from Somalia and labouring under strict new criteria laid down by PDD25, was not prepared to run the political risk of entering into another intervention. Therefore, she stalled the decisionmaking process in the Security Council, and stopped others who were more than willing to intervene from doing so. This study suggests otherwise. While it is without doubt that the newly negative US approach resulted in part from the fall-out surrounding the 18 deaths in Somalia, and that PDD25, and the outlook that engendered it, produced a Clinton Administration that was not prepared to act in Rwanda, this is only one side of a many-faceted story. First, the stance of the Clinton Administration altered, not just because of the Somalia debacle, but through a false perception of public opinion; negative experiences of 1990s peacekeeping (of which Somalia was merely the worst example); an adversarial and conservatively inclined Congress; a certain naivety and lack of comprehensive analysis regarding multilateralism, which resulted in an exaggeratedly negative reaction to the problems, and more importantly a clear lack of genuine commitment to the policy under discussion. Somalia was certainly the catalyst for what came next, but remained only one of several factors involved. Second, the United States and PDD25 cannot be held entirely to blame for what happened on the international scene in the spring of 1994, and only an irresponsible treatment of the subject would do so. Many other

Introduction

7

actors must share in the widely available guilt for a doleful international response. France, and to a lesser extent Egypt, supported the ethnically biased and corrupt Habyarimana government, as well as the genocidal one that followed. Belgium had excellent intelligence regarding the potentiality for genocide and did not act on it. Moreover, Belgium conducted a shameful campaign aimed at the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, following the deaths of ten of its peacekeepers, in order to cover its own ignominious retreat (albeit after attempts to have the mission reinforced had failed). And the United Kingdom was as reluctant to act as the US, bogged down as it was in the Balkans. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat must also accept some liability for their cautious and at times misleading approach to Rwanda, both in the formulation and deployment of UNAMIR, and their actions before and during the genocide itself. Fear of triggering a repeat of the situation in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in Somalia the previous summer, which, as a former Ambassador to the UN comments, was the real scandal among the Secretariat during this period, in addition to the dread of a negative reaction from its most powerful member state, caused the Secretariat to refuse requests for more ambitious action from the Force Commander on the ground. The Secretariat also misinterpreted events in Rwanda during the genocide, and both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Iqbal Riza (Deputy Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping) deserve particular mention. Both focused in their reports and briefings on the civil war aspect of the crisis, and thus on the attainment of a cease-fire, rather than the genocidal killings. This meant that incomplete evidence was often presented to the Council, and consequently an inaccurate picture of the dangers that would face any reinforced mission was supplied, as the Council assumed that such a force would be required to stand between the warring parties, rather than hasten behind the lines of major combat, preventing massacres and rescuing civilians. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali was consistently absent from New York, and from important Security Council debates on the issue, travelling as he was, at the time of the crisis. That he did not deem the situation of enough importance to cut short his trip and return to New York, where his leadership was badly needed, is certainly also questionable. Chapter 5, therefore, challenges both the assumption that Somalia was the only factor affecting the Clinton Administration’s policy judgements, and that the administration was single-handedly responsible for blocking action by the International Community. Chapter 5 will commence with a case study approach, touching on some of Rwanda’s pre-genocide history, followed by a brief glance at the events of the genocide, after which we shall evaluate the response of the International Community, both prior to and during the genocide. The Clinton Administration breezed into power with a serious

8

Introduction

emphasis on multilateralism, cooperative security, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. However, not long after taking office it had turned abruptly from its previously favoured policy ideals of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and the UN, and failed to act decisively to halt the genocide of hundreds and thousands of innocent people in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Why? The following chapters hope to provide the answers.

1

Policy change and public opinion

Introduction On 3–4 October 1993, 17 US Rangers and one elite Delta Force operative were killed in a firefight on the streets of south Mogadishu, Somalia, and an ‘ominous shadow’ was cast over Washington DC and the future of US/UN relations.9 Constituents reportedly swamped telephone lines in the offices of the Legislature. Outraged by television scenes of a dead American helicopter pilot dragged triumphantly through Mogadishu’s streets, the US public as a unanimity (testified Congress) wanted the United States out of Somalia.10 Unified Congressional pressure was too much for President Clinton, who immediately reproached the United Nations for the deaths of the Rangers, scheduled the extraction of US forces from Somalia and began to consider, very carefully, his government’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and multilateralism. The Legislature continued to dwell on public estrangement from multilateralism and disaffection with the UN; its performance, wastefulness and corruption. Indeed, it seemed one could make a career from ‘UN-bashing’ in Washington; prominent Republican critics included former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Bob Dole, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and in particular, Senator Jesse Helms, who as Michael Hirsh writes, ‘made an obsession’ of attacking the UN.11 Criticisms ranged from the absorption of national sovereignty and subordination of US foreign policy to that of the organization (an ‘obvious threat to US national interests’), to corruption and ineptitude in the international bureaucracy.12 Upon entering office President Clinton had set in motion a review designed to re-evaluate the role of the United States in relation to peacekeeping. The resultant review document, Presidential Review Document 13 (PRD13), had been thought so progressive as to create waves when a draft version was leaked to the press earlier in the year. Following the Somalia incident, the innovative PRD13 became Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25), the stringent and restrictive set of policy guidelines that signalled the operational death of US initiatives and participation in peacekeeping.13

10

Policy change and public opinion

So it would seem that the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of its previously favoured policy platform of peacekeeping and interventionism was a direct result of the massive and overwhelming public negativity towards peacekeeping, multilateralism and the UN caused by the trauma of viewing firsthand the defeat and defilement of America in Somalia. Many commentators, both media, governmental and academic, agree with this assessment of events; consequently, it is hardly surprising that such an attitude persists. This study suggests, however, that such an appraisal entirely misinterprets the public mood. As we shall observe, the American public was by no means overwhelmingly negative in response to the Somali debacle, nor were/are they critical of the UN, peacekeeping or multilateralism in general. In fact, US public opinion has demonstrated consistent positivity regarding all manner of UN activities, including peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it appears that the perception of a negative public was just as potent as its true existence, and that perception was sufficient, in combination with other factors, to engender retreat on behalf of the Clinton Administration. This chapter will seek out and discuss the linkages between public opinion, Congress, the Executive Branch, the news media and policy change with regard to the implications and impact those linkages had on relations between the United Nations and its most influential member state, the United States. Analysis of collated survey results will clearly demonstrate that the US public was not as negative as was emphasized by the media, and indeed, Congress.14 Finally, we shall see how imperfect data-gathering techniques by policy-makers, reliance on a self-reinforcing triangular relationship between Congress, the Executive and the news media, as well as problems of reliability in the media, have created a situation wherein it was virtually impossible for policy-makers to understand public opinion. Consequently, responsibility for the retrenchment of the Clinton Administration from its earlier enthusiasm for multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN cannot be placed, by Congress or anyone else, on the American people.

A multilateralist public: survey results Congressional calls for an end to multilateralism, and demands that the US distance itself from the United Nations in the latter half of the 1990s, had little to do with the majority of public attitudes. Systematic analysis of poll data clearly demonstrates that the American public was not as hostile as Congress and the media emphasized. A closer examination reveals that the universal clamour that Congress maintained arose after the 3–4 October incident simply did not occur. According to many in the United States Legislature of the mid to late 1990s, the constituents they professed to represent, and indeed American citizens in general, were not interested in involvement in international affairs, were unhappy with the United Nations, opposed American contri-

Policy change and public opinion 11 bution to UN peacekeeping ventures (militarily and financially), and in general disapproved of the organization, its performance and its practices. This attitude, it was maintained, stemmed from a backlash against multilateralism resulting from the so-called ‘Somalia debacle’. However, collated survey data regarding the issues of internationalism, multilateralism, UN performance, peacekeeping (specific missions), UN dues, and domestic voting behaviour relating to the UN, appear to paint a remarkably different picture. Internationalism – moving into multilateralism In general, Americans prefer to remain actively engaged in world affairs with 62 per cent, 65 per cent and 61 per cent in favour of such a proposition, as the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) discovered, in surveys conducted in 1990, 1994 and 1998 respectively. Just days after the Somalia incident, 88 per cent of respondents to a Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll agreed that ‘[b]ecause the world is so interconnected today, it is important for the United States to participate, together with other countries, in efforts to maintain peace and protect human rights’.15 On the whole, Americans do not want their country to perform the role of world policeman, as many politicians believe. This was even the case, and remarkably so, during the height of the Gulf War, when a Los Angeles Times poll reported 75 per cent of respondents answering in the negative to the question: ‘[s]hould the US be playing the role of world Policeman?’16 When asked who should be the world policeman by the Americans Talk Issues Foundation (ATIF), the US or the UN, a strong 76 per cent replied that the UN should perform the duty.17 In addition, an overwhelming 85 per cent of poll participants in PIPA’s April 1995 survey agreed that ‘[t]he only way for the US to not always be the “world policeman” was to allow the U.N. the means to perform some policing functions. U.N. peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries.’18 Americans strongly believe in cooperating with other allies and international organizations such as NATO, and in particular, the United Nations. When asked in 1998 if their country should ‘take action alone in responding to international crises if it does not have the support of its allies’, 72 per cent answered that they should not, and 66 per cent of respondents, when queried in 1995, disagreed that ‘[w]hen there is a problem in the world that requires the use of military force, it is better for the US to act on its own, rather than working through the U.N. because they can move more quickly and probably more successfully’.19 Moreover, a considerable majority of 90 per cent answered favourably when presented with the following statement: ‘[i]t is important for the United States to build unified support in the UN before making a major foreign policy decision’ by an ABC News poll.20

12

Policy change and public opinion

An equally large 89 per cent of participants in a CBS/New York Times survey believed that it was important, ‘[n]ow that the Cold War is over . . . [for the US] to cooperate with other countries by working through the UN’, and when UNA-USA/Wirthlin asked in both 1995 and 1998: ‘[i]s it important that America be an active member of the United Nations’, and PIPA, the same question in 1995, respondents answered that it was indeed important, by 82 per cent 93 per cent, and 62 per cent majorities respectively.21 Furthermore, as Table 1.1 illustrates, of responses to questions regarding whether the US should cooperate fully with the UN, taken over eight years, majorities were in favour of full cooperation.22 Use of force through the UN Eighty-seven per cent of participants in a Newsweek survey answered in agreement to the statement: ‘[t]he US should commit its troops only as part of a United Nations operation’.23 This was quite a remarkable result, and as Steven Kull writes, ‘[w]hile it is unlikely that such a large number really meant that the United States should never use force unilaterally, it does demonstrate how strongly Americans prefer multilateralism’.24 When the ATIF asked the question: ‘[w]hen faced with future problems involving aggression, who should take the lead – the US or the U.N.?’, once in 1991, and again in 1995, respondents answered 85 per cent and 69 per cent in favour of a UN lead approach. When PIPA asked: ‘[a]s a general rule, when it becomes necessary for the US to use force, do you think it best for the US to . . . act as part of a United Nations operation?’, 69 per cent replied ‘yes’, and 59 per cent responded that the ‘US should try to use force only in concert with the United Nations’ rather than ‘use force in our own national interest regardless of the United Nations’.25 The percentage response to the question: ‘[w]hen there are conflicts among other countries where the US has an interest, should the United States be prepared to use US forces so that the conflicts are resolved the way we think they ought to be, or should we support the use of United Table 1.1 ‘The United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations.’ Exception is PIPA (1995) which asked ‘[s]hould the US cooperate fully with the UN?’ Agree (%) Times Mirror 1991 PIPA 1995 Times Mirror/Pew 1995 PIPA 1996 Pew 1997 Pew 1999

77 62 62 59 59 65

Policy change and public opinion 13 Nations forces so that they are resolved in a way that tries to accommodate all sides?’, posed twice by UNA-USA/Wirthlin in 1992 and 1995, rose from 55 per cent to 69 per cent between the years concerned.26 Finally, a plurality of 48.5 per cent agreed that it was best for the US to ‘act as part of a United Nations operation’ when it became necessary for the country to use military force, and a further 25 per cent added that it would be best to act as part of a NATO operation, underlining further the general multilateralist sentiment among Americans, and perhaps a frustration with the constraints on the UN’s ability to act more forcefully. UN performance Of nine instances, as demonstrated in Table 1.2, in which surveys asked participants whether they felt the UN was doing a good job or a poor one in trying to solve the problems it has had to face, only two even managed a clear minority (42 per cent and 45 per cent).27 The other eight responses were more positive, with positive responses representing a majority or plurality of respondents. Furthermore, when asked by ATIF whether they ‘approved’ of the job the UN was doing, participants replied that they did: in 1991 with 78 per cent, and again in 1995 with a 59 per cent majority.28 As Table 1.3 illustrates, when asked how ‘favourable’ their attitudes towards the UN were, respondents to surveys displayed just how positive their feelings were.29 Apart from one anomaly, collated results demonstrated a wholly upbeat response. UN peacekeeping The positivity regarding UN performance displayed clearly by aggregate data carried through to perceptions of peacekeeping. When asked whether they ‘favor or oppose the idea of U.N. peacekeeping’ by PIPA, of Table 1.2 ‘Is the UN doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?’ ‘Good job’ (%) CBS News/New York Times 1991 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1992 CBS News/New York Times 1993 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1995 CBS News 1995 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1996 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1998 Gallup 2000 Gallup 2001

67 45 62 54 42 49 60 52 54

14

Policy change and public opinion

Table 1.3 ‘How would you describes your feelings towards the UN?’ ‘Favourable’ (%) Times Mirror 1990 Time/CNN 1993 Times Mirror 1993 Times Mirror/Pew 1994 Pew 1995 Pew, June 1995 PIPA 1995 Pew 1996 Time/CNN 1997 Zogby International 1998 Pew, June 1999 Pew, September 1999

70 77 73 76 62 67 64 65 73 35 71 76

respondents to the February 1994 survey, 84 per cent answered in the affirmative. A further 67.3 per cent agreed in April 1995, as well as 66 per cent of the February 1994 poll, concurring that ‘U.N. peacekeeping helped contribute to stability in the world’. In a remarkable show of support, 92 per cent of participants to a 1996 UNA-USA/Wirthlin survey responded that UN peacekeeping should be a priority of the UN system, and when, in 1994, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) asked: ‘[s]hould the US be part of a U.N. peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world?’, 51 per cent of poll participants answered ‘yes’ with a further 23 per cent feeling that it would depend on other factors, while respondents to the 1998 poll were 57 per cent in favour.30 Commentators feared that when queried specifically with regard to contributing American soldiers to peacekeeping missions, support would drop off significantly; however, this does not appear to be the case. When poll participants were asked whether they favoured such an option, support appears definite, as Table 1.4 suggests. Support was evident even shortly after the deaths of the 18 US Rangers in Somalia, when NBC reported that 71 per cent of poll participants favoured the contribution of US troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Strengthening the UN Most Americans favour strengthening the UN and believe this should be a priority in US policy, as Table 1.5 demonstrates. Not only is support evident for strengthening the UN in general, but when faced with specific ways in which the organization might be strengthened, majorities of 69 per cent-83 per cent favoured proposed measures, as PIPA’s November 1995 survey demonstrates.31 The American people also seem to desire a UN capable of more forceful action. When in April 1995 PIPA

Policy change and public opinion 15 Table 1.4 ‘Do you favour contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping operations?’ PIPA (February and July 1994) responses combine ‘in general’ and ‘in some’ ‘Favouring’ (%) NBC, October 1993 ABC, November 1993 PIPA, February 1994 PIPA, July 1994 CCFR 1994 PIPA, June 1995 PIPA, June 1995 PIPA, June 1996 PIPA, September 1996 Roper Starch 1997

71 60 91 73 74 65 881 571 591 621

Note 1 in favour if the US votes in favour of an operation.

Table 1.5 ‘Is strengthening the UN important/a priority?’ Combines ‘top’ and ‘some’ priority and ‘very’ and ‘somewhat’ important ‘Priority’/’important’ (%)

Strengthening the UN a ‘high priority’. It is important to strengthen the UN Strengthening the UN is a good investment. The UN needs strengthening1

Times Mirror/ Pew 1993. 87

Pew1995

Pew 1997

81

81

CCFR 1994 84

CCFR 1997 84

PIPA 1995 68 PIPA 1999 67

Note 1 After being told the following: ‘[s]ome say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we need to strengthen international institutions to deal with shared problems. Others say that this would only create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies’ and gave a list of organizations that might need strengthening.

asked: ‘[d]o you think the U.N. should make greater efforts to strengthen following through on its threats to use military force even if this means sometimes taking some risk, or do you think that the U.N. should not do this kind of thing?’, 74 per cent answered that the UN should.

16

Policy change and public opinion

The same study questioned whether as ‘a general rule, when the U.N. tries to deal with a violent conflict’, respondents would like to see ‘A. Only mediate between the parties [or] B. First try to mediate but if this fails, and at the same time many civilians are being killed, consider bringing in a substantial military force to stop the killing?’, 64 per cent approved of option ‘B: use force if necessary’. In addition, in February 1994, 83 per cent of PIPA participants favoured sending in UN peacekeepers in a conflict zone, ‘[w]hen atrocities are being committed against large numbers of people’, and 81 per cent, when ‘gross human rights violations are being committed against large numbers of people’. Bosnia Poll data also reveals strong support for specific UN/multilateral operations among the American people who wish they could do more. In April 1995, PIPA asked numerous questions regarding strengthening the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and the results were clearly indicative of the US public’s desire to see stronger action there. The question: ‘[w]hat comes closest to how you feel about the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia? Would you like to see the U.N. peacekeeping force: Withdraw from Bosnia, stay the course they are on, or get tougher?’ elicited a 50 per cent response in preference for the ‘get tougher’ option. A further 64 per cent favoured intervention, when asked ‘[i]f the Bosnian Serbs continue to carry out ethnic cleansing, would you favor or oppose having the U.N. threaten to intervene with a large military force unless the ethnic cleansing stops?’ Similarly, 65 per cent determined that peacekeepers should ‘actively defend civilians in safe havens if they are attacked’, and a significant majority of 87 per cent favoured the proposition that ‘U.N. peacekeepers use force if U.N. convoys delivering food and aid to Bosnians are attacked or obstructed’.32 Majorities also preferred the UN as the principle force in any future mission over NATO (50 per cent UNA-USA/Wirthlin, and a 39 per cent plurality PIPA, April 1995). Finally, when Gallup/CNN/USA Today queried in 1999 whether it was ‘a mistake sending military forces to fight in Yugoslavia’, a 53 per cent majority answered ‘no’. Rwanda and Burundi Feeling was particularly strong with regard to action in Rwanda, where an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsis were massacred in 1994 by their Hutu co-nationals. When the atrocities were still occurring (and while the term ‘genocide’ was still avoided), PIPA asked a series of questions regarding what the US/UN should do in the face of the killings. Sixty per cent of respondents to the survey replied that America should participate in a UN operation to set up Safe Havens, and 61 per cent agreed that the US

Policy change and public opinion 17 should participate in a ‘large’ UN force to occupy Rwanda and ‘forcibly stop the killing’.33 Similarly, when presented with the argument: ‘Rwanda is far from the US and we have no real interests there. Therefore, it would be wrong to risk the lives of American troops in a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda’, 62 per cent of participants found it unconvincing.34 The killings in Rwanda were not officially termed ‘genocide’ at this point, but when asked whether they believed the killings fell ‘into the category of genocide’ a majority of 61 per cent believed that it did, and a further 80 per cent agreed that if a ‘UN commission . . . concluded that genocide is in fact occurring there [Rwanda] and the US accepted this conclusion’, that ‘the UN, including the US, should then intervene to try to stop the genocide’.35 Another poll taken by CBS News in July 1994 demonstrated that 63 per cent of those involved approved of the ‘United States sending troops and humanitarian assistance to the Rwandan refugees’, and a Time/Cable News Network poll reported 69 per cent in favour of ‘sending . . . US military forces to provide Humanitarian aid to citizens’ of Rwanda. In April 1995, PIPA again questioned participants on their views regarding Rwanda, this time with respect to what the UN/US ought to have done. When presented with a series of steps that might have been taken in Rwanda while the killings were occurring (they did not use the word ‘genocide’), 74 per cent said that the UN should have forcibly entered the country and set up Safe Havens, and 60 per cent favoured destruction of the extremist radio station that had encouraged the atrocities. A further 62 per cent replied that in the event that the above measures were not successful in bringing a halt to the massacres, the UN should ‘have gone in with a large military force to occupy the country and stop the killings’. Eighty-six per cent of those who replied positively to the above statement favoured contributing US troops to such a force. It appears that Kull was wholly correct when he wrote: ‘[f]or many Americans, genocide creates a special moral imperative to act.’36 The same PIPA poll addressed participants on the issue of potential conflict in Rwanda’s neighbouring country Burundi, where there is ‘tension between the same ethnic groups as Rwanda’, and when asked, 62 per cent of respondents favoured sending a UN peacekeeping force into the country should the Burundian government request one, with 100 per cent of those holding that opinion favouring the use of American forces in such a mission.37 Somalia Even when questioned whether sending troops to deliver food/aid to Somalia was the ‘right thing to do’, majorities clearly responded that it was: 82 per cent (PIPA, April 1995), and 66 per cent (CBS News/New York Times, December 1995) agreed, demonstrating marked support for peacekeeping even after the shock of 18 US fatalities. Indeed, poll data

18

Policy change and public opinion

Table 1.6 ‘Should the US withdraw immediately from Somalia?’ (October 1993) ‘Yes’ (%) ABC CNN/USA Today CNN/USA Today Time/CNN ABC

50 43 37 37 37

also proves that the massive, universal, nationwide clamour that according to Congress reached a feverish pitch following the October 3–4 incident simply did not occur. Various polls taken shortly after news broke of the deaths verify that mass majorities did not call for the immediate withdrawal of US forces from Somalia, as Table 1.6 demonstrates. In fact only one poll, conducted by ABC, showed a majority figure (50 per cent) in favour of immediate withdrawal, while others showed no more than a healthy minority. Majorities, in fact, supported increased involvement, at least in the short term, with 55 per cent, 56 per cent and 61 per cent of respondents to surveys carried out by CNN/USA Today, ABC and NBC respectively. Seventy-five per cent of an ABC poll called for retaliation against Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, who was deemed responsible for the deaths. Majorities did hope that the US would withdraw from Somalia at some juncture; however, Kull sees this as having been prompted not ‘by the fatalities’, but instead by the people’s understanding that once the ‘people were fed . . . the job had been done’.38 News coverage of the operation had dropped off significantly, and as a result very few people were aware of continuing US efforts there, and of the violent turn in the nature of the Somali mission; thus they were genuinely taken aback to discover that soldiers were involved in combat situations with Somalis, whom Americans thought they were helping. UN dues American public support for the United Nations shines through again, when pollsters posed questions with respect to the payment of UN dues. When asked similar questions regarding this subject spanning eight surveys and five years, as Table 1.7 illustrates, strong majorities were reported in favour of paying dues. Moreover, 65 per cent of respondents to a 1994 PIPA poll were persuaded by the statement: ‘[s]ince all peacekeeping operations must be approved by the US and the US agreed to pay a certain share of the UN peacekeeping budget, it is hypocritical for the US to not pay its dues’.39 Sixty-five per cent of participants of the same poll also found convincing the statement: ‘UN peacekeeping helps contribute to stability in the

Policy change and public opinion 19 Table 1.7 ‘Should the US pay its UN dues?’ ‘Yes’ (%) UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1989 PIPA, April 1994 PIPA, April 1995 PIPA, June 1996 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1996 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1996 PIPA, April 1998 PIPA, April 1998 UNA-USA/Wirthlin, August 1998 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1998 UNA-USA/Wirthlin 1998 Zogby International 1998 CCFR 1998

601 552 65 58 643 784 77 60 775 856 737 62 48

Notes 1 Do you believe that UN member states should always pay their full dues to the UN on schedule, or should a country hold back its dues to pressure other members to agree to changes it believes are necessary? Per cent responding ‘countries should always pay back’. 2 Do you think the US (United States): Should not pay any of its UN (United Nations) peacekeeping dues, should pay a partial amount of its UN peacekeeping dues, should pay its UN peacekeeping dues in full? per cent responding ‘in full’. In addition, 34 per cent responded that dues should be paid in part, bringing the figure up to 89 per cent. 3 Some people say America’s large share of dues gives the United States special leverage over other UN member countries. Do you believe that the United States should always pay its full dues to the UN on schedule, or should the United States hold back its dues to pressure other members to agree to changes it believes are needed? Per cent responding ‘US should always pay’. 4 Do you believe that UN member states should always pay their full dues to the UN on schedule, or should a country hold back its dues to pressure other members to agree to changes it believes are necessary? Per cent responding ‘countries should always pay back’. 5 Pay UN dues in full if UN makes financial reforms. 6 Is it every country’s legal obligation and treaty responsibility under the UN Charter to pay its dues? Combines ‘very convincing’ (51 per cent) and ‘somewhat convincing’ (34 per cent). 7 All members of the United Nations are required to pay dues under the UN Charter. In recent years the United States has not been paying all its dues, and in December it will be two full years behind. Please tell me your feelings about paying dues to the United Nations. Combines ‘strongly in favour’ (37 per cent) and ‘somewhat in favour’ (36 per cent).

world. This makes it less likely that the US will need to do expensive things like sending military aid and US troops to other countries. In the long run if we don’t spend more money on UN peacekeeping we will probably end up spending more money on defense.’ In addition, 78 per cent found unconvincing the perception that ‘UN peacekeeping is a bad idea because it tries to solve other people’s problems in parts of the world that are of little concern to the US’. Therefore, America should ‘pay as little as possible for UN peacekeeping – preferably nothing’.

20

Policy change and public opinion

In addition, respondents to a UNA-USA/Wirthlin study made in 1998 were satisfied that ‘[p]aying the dues will let the UN do its job on important efforts like protecting humanitarian relief and fighting the spread of deadly diseases’ by 83 per cent.40 What is more, a 1998 PIPA survey found that 68 per cent of participants were sceptical of the statement: ‘[b]ecause the UN is inefficient and wasteful, the US does not get a good return on its money. Therefore it is a bad investment and the US should not feel obligated to pay all of its UN dues.’ In fact, it appears that the American people, generally speaking, believe their own government to be more wasteful and inefficient than the UN. For example, when PIPA asked respondents in 1996 to estimate ‘what percentage of the money that goes into’ the UN and the US government ‘is lost to waste, fraud, and abuse’, 40.4 per cent determined that their own government wasted above 10 per cent, while this figure dropped to 30 per cent for the UN. Moreover, an ATIF survey conducted the previous year (June 1995) revealed that only 24 per cent of participants felt they could ‘trust the government in Washington to do what is right’, compared to the 47 per cent who had faith that they could ‘trust the United Nations’.41 (The study also revealed that 21 per cent felt they could ‘never’ trust their government to do the right thing, compared to only 8 per cent who felt the same way about the UN.) Support for the UN, however, appears to be coloured by a perception among most Americans that their government contributes much more financially than is actually the case. When asked how much of the defence budget they thought was devoted to UN peacekeeping, the mean response to a 1995 PIPA study was 25 per cent, while the median was 22 per cent. Of course the actual percentage at the time was roughly 1 per cent of the defence budget devoted to UN peacekeeping. The same survey revealed that a 58 per cent majority of participants thought the US spends ‘too much’ on UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, when informed of the true levels of spending, 52 per cent thought the amount was ‘lower than it should be’. Similarly, 65 per cent agreed in 1994 (also PIPA) that they would be willing to ‘cut spending in some other areas of the defense budget so as to increase spending on UN peacekeeping’.42 Most interestingly of all, when PIPA queried, again in 1994, ‘how many tax dollars’ participants would feel comfortable paying personally each year towards UN peacekeeping, the mean response was $115.41 (23 times the actual amount at the time of roughly $4.00) while the median was $10.00 (more than twice the amount), and when informed of how much they actually did contribute in tax each year, 74 per cent replied that this was lower than they expected.43 When the same question was asked of a half-sample of participants in a 1995 PIPA poll, the mean response was $196.00 (a whopping 39 times the actual amount at the time, which was around $5.00) and the median was $20.00 (still four times the actual amount). When the second half-sample were informed that they spent around $5.00

Policy change and public opinion 21 in tax on UN peacekeeping, 73 per cent replied that the sum was ‘lower than expected’. Consequently, it is clear that the opinions and conduct promoted by Congress, and which contributed to the strict policy change that came about, bore no relation to the actual opinion of the American people. Yet how is it possible that the policy-makers got it so wrong?

Misrepresentation: why did it happen? Why was there so great a disparity between what the public wanted and how their government acted? How did positive public opinion, which favoured multilateral action through the UN as its chosen organization (and one that one survey determined the public seemed to trust more than its own government), translate into the ‘public flogging’ given to the UN and multilateral peacekeeping in the press, from Congress, and by the Clinton Administration itself? How did positivity become calls for withdrawal from the UN, actions that sought to lower US contributions, and the withholding of funds due to the UN as determined by international law? It has become clear during the course of this investigation that a combination of factors resulted in the failure of American public attitudes to be accurately represented in political life. Elite dominance in foreign policy decision-making, the post-Cold War environment, reliance on vocal minorities, an increased conservatism in Congress, the existence of a selfreinforcing triangular relationship between the Executive, Legislature and the media, and a bias in government towards assuming Congress accurately reflects the public, all combined to ensure that public opinion was not accurately reflected. Elite dominance (paternalism) One of the major obstacles to elite understanding of public opinion is the view among the great majority of policy-making elites, in conjunction with old-school academia, that the American public was ‘lacking depth and sophistication . . . narrow, parochial, and emotional’; a ‘volatile entity’, as one interviewee in Kull and Destler’s study commented, and therefore incapable of a role in foreign policy.44 Such elites view their own credentials as reason enough why they should be the deciding voice/influence on policy issues. Consequently, they rely (and relied in the 1990s) on their own policy preferences for guidance. Post-Cold War environment Of course, Congress ought to represent the public view on issues; after all, this is the key to democracy. However, the results disclosed above demonstrate

22

Policy change and public opinion

that this is simply not the case. Although Congressional representatives are aware of the need to keep their constituents ‘onside’, they are not really concerned with nationally based opinion surveys. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era (as in other periods of ‘peacetime’), and in the absence of a defined external threat, public interest refocused (rightly so) on domestic issues. Consequently, legislators felt free to follow their own foreign policy preferences, with little fear of electoral reprisal, as long as they continued to perform domestically.45 As Jeremy Rosner confirms, ‘[t]he less voters focus on foreign policy during campaigns’, as became the case after the Cold War, ‘the more leeway elected officials have in choosing what positions to take on those issues back in Washington’.46 Vocal minorities Another reason for the existent gap is that many in the foreign policy elite, both Executive and Legislative, treated ‘vocal minorities’ (those sections of the community who voice their opinion strongly: who write, call and email governmental offices with complaints or praise) as, if not representative of the public in general, then politically more significant.47 Even if members of the policy-making community were aware that the vocal minority which called for disengagement from international affairs was just that – a minority – and that there was a ‘silent majority’ out there, readily supportive of the opposite stance (officials do read opinion surveys even if they discount them afterwards), more attention was devoted to the views of that vocal public because that minority is ‘politically active and has potential to be a political problem’.48 A vocal minority is more likely to make an electoral issue out of a particular policy or topic than the silent majority, and hence pose a much greater threat to the political future of representatives.49 Consequently, while the majority of public opinion in 1990s America was positively engaged with the idea that they could relate to the world and international problems in a multilateral manner, it was the vocal minority – craving isolationism, or unilateralism, or both – who had the ear of Congress. Conservatism in Congress Such attention is of greater note because it mirrored the dominant philosophy of the increasing conservative and Republican Congress of the 1990s. The make-up of the Legislature in the early 1990s was such as to predispose its members to object to the type of foreign policy the Clinton Administration was formulating. Since the 1960s, American politics has been characterized by the rise of conservatism, which saw its finest hour in the election of the 104th Congress of 1994. Unilateralism and a move towards disengagement from international affairs coloured ‘new’ conser-

Policy change and public opinion 23 vatism, as well as suspicion and scepticism of such international organizations as the United Nations, and what they considered as the deflection of much needed finances to such organizations; a mood that ran ‘deep within the right wing of the US body politic’.50 This already evident trend was catalysed by the end of the Cold War (that had necessitated international engagement), which presented disengagement sentiment with the opportunity to re-emerge as a political doctrine, but also by the huge insurgence of ‘freshmen’ members during the past decade (the US of course has a long tradition of isolationism). The result of this freshman influx was that a great many representatives had taken their seats after the collapse of global bipolarity; thus their public or political lives were unaffected by the sorts of global considerations that had shaped the outlook of their predecessors.51 This new conservatism also manifested itself in the fact that the principal concern of these freshman members was with domestic issues, primarily of a domestic economic manner, such as tax cuts and budget deficit reduction. To them there was ‘no global threat, no lethal enemy beyond the horizon to deter them from the business of reshaping the US economy’.52 Such factors combined to create a partisan disengagement/unilateralist mix in the Legislature that was inclined to object to UN involvement and multilateral issues. Mechanisms for gathering public opinion data: executive, legislative, and media Problems of the vocal minority and the rise of conservatism cannot account for the entire picture, nor is it an explanation representative of all levels of government, or indeed of all those within the Legislature. A fuller explanation must take into account the fact that the general mechanisms employed by policy practitioners acted as a major impediment to a more perfect understanding of public attitudes. One might suppose that Democrats in the Executive, and at least a few in Congress, would have been more than pleased to discover a credible and reliable source of public opinion that endorsed their administration’s foreign policy ventures. Congressional and Executive reliance on the news media, and the Executive’s reliance on Congress as accurate sources of public opinion, perpetuated a system, which made it very difficult for each institution to gauge public opinion accurately. Both Cohen and Powlick, as well as Kull and Destler, have demonstrated that policy-makers rely very heavily on Congress and the news media.53 Eighty per cent of officials interviewed by Cohen and 48 per cent of Powlick’s study cited the news media as an important source of public opinion, and 70 per cent and 43 per cent respectively cited Congress, whereas, Kull and Destler concluded that ‘comments from policy practitioners suggested that they base much of their thinking about the public on the assumption that Congress and the media are reliable mirrors of public opinion’.54

24

Policy change and public opinion

To illustrate this point further, Powlick quoted one official as stating that the media is ‘what public opinion means to me. It’s not an Iowa corn farmer’s response to a poll. It’s the Washington Post or other news media.’55 One policy-maker involved in Kull and Destler’s study opined that ‘Congress is the best reflection of the American public’s views’; another reported that the media was ‘a mirror often’, and a third said that public opinion was derived from members of Congress because ‘[m]ore than anybody else it’s their job to know. That’s the whole theory of representative democracy.’56 Herein lies the crux of the problem. By observance of the sheer gap between public opinion and the actions of government in the past decade, it would be fair to argue that neither the news media nor Congress reflected the public in any realistic way. The media cannot have accurately reported the public mood, else Congress (which relies heavily on the media) would not have behaved in the manner that it did. So, where did the news media get its details on public opinion from, and why did it present such a view of a negative, neo-isolationist public? Surely news organizations do their own polling; indeed, we have seen the results of these surveys above. Do they ignore the results of their own polls? It seems that the media approaches survey results in a similar manner to government. Polls may be glanced over but disregarded because they do not fit into the established position. One reason why the media fails to correctly represent the American people (and a ‘large majority of the American people would insist that the news media do not represent their views’57) is that it relies heavily on official sources for its information. In fact, the two institutions – the media and government – appear to be involved in a complex ‘symbiotic relationship’.58 For many years the White House has sought to ‘manage’ the news media, which it viewed as its ‘major channel of communication’ to the public, ensuring that a ‘timely supply of information’ was passed from its auspices to the press. The Executive has also endeavoured to structure the ‘media’s routines, contacts and information sources’ so as to achieve the maximum effect from it as a public relations tool.59 Franklin Roosevelt created the post of Press Secretary, and facilities were provided to ensure that right of entry to government sources was as easy as possible. Furthermore, following the rift that occurred between news media and government during the Vietnam War, the Johnson Administration made an even greater effort to regulate and influence the media.60 Indeed, some administrations such as Reagan’s have made masterful use of the media to further their own objectives.61 Furthermore, since the resurgence of Congress, beginning in the late 1970s with the War Powers Act, legislators have been catching up with their Executive branch colleagues in media relations in order to ensure that their opinions and policy stances are presented in the public sphere.62 Thus, many news media sources are in fact governmental, either Execu-

Policy change and public opinion 25 tive or Legislative, because the facilities are there, sources are willing, and importantly are considered ‘reliable’. The media need not incur much expense unearthing corroborating evidence for stories. As Herman and Chomsky commented, ‘[g]overnment and corporate sources have the great merit of being recognizable and credible by their status and prestige’.63 Consequently, journalists come into contact with the official ‘line’ on a story, or the opinions of Congress, as well as the same vocal minorities that have captivated the policy-makers, and journalistic ‘dependence on these highly self-interested parties leaves them vulnerable to political manipulation’.64 Another problem associated with the news media as a source of public opinion is the question of what forces motivate it to cover/put out a certain story. Does it cover only what is ‘sexy’ – what will sell newspapers or absorb viewers, and attract sponsors or advertisers – as the modern media becomes ever more stimulated by financial considerations, shareholders and the bottom line?65 After all, ‘the primary purpose of media today is profit . . . [and as such it] is profoundly corrupted by its own economic interests’.66 There are also large corporate interests behind the media, which have great sway and financial input into subsidiaries. Similarly to government, corporations too make it easy for journalists to access information framed as they wish. After all, these corporations, a small number of which control the vast majority of daily newspapers, magazines, TV, books and films consumed by the American people, ‘have a special interest in the status quo by virtue of their wealth’.67 It is therefore in the interest of this elite corporate group to make sure their media subsidiaries promote corporate interests and conceal their detractions.68 The various polling data discussed above determine that the Legislature is not a mirror of the public. Obviously in line with democratic theory, Congress ought to act as a conduit for public policy preferences. However, if we are to isolate the example of 1990s foreign policy attitudes, the Legislature did not accurately represent the public, and the American people sought less unilateral action, and more cooperation between the US, its allies and international organizations, as it would ‘rather share risks and build consensus’.69 But instead of promoting that, Congress did the opposite by attempting to pull the US out of the UN; reducing and actually withdrawing financial contributions, and scaremongering. Members refused to acknowledge the validity of opinion polls and instead took their prompts from vocal minorities and the news media, and the media took its signals from Congress, the Executive, and whatever financial or corporate interests it was beholden to. Poor Les Aspin, who frequently found himself ‘out of the loop’ during his time as Secretary of Defence, was reportedly forced to call on veteran political reporter for the New York Times K.W. (Johnny) Apple in order to ask him if he could get hold of or obtain information on the status of policy from National Security Adviser

26

Policy change and public opinion

Anthony Lake, illustrating just how far this self-contained information structure went.70 Thus, as Kull and Destler point out: If the media get their cues about public attitudes from congressional behavior, and members of Congress . . . get their cues from the media, this creates a closed information system that can be self-reinforcing and resistant to contradictory evidence.71 But why does the Executive rely so much on Congress and the media? Why do members of the Executive pay so little attention to raw public opinion data such as poll results? The answer to these questions is that the ‘executive branch tends to accept the idea that the realm of public opinion is the domain of Congress’ and that interference in that domain would not be met well in the Legislature.72 As one official commented: ‘[i]f the administration witness goes up upon the Hill and says, “Here’s polling data and therefore, your position, Senator, is not what the American people want”, it doesn’t necessarily go down well.’73 Congress is still very possessive of what is perceived to be its territory, even if in practice legislators do not respect the theory. In fact, Nancy Soderberg seems to accept that Congressional opinion is in fact synonymous with public opinion.74 Congress also wields a power over the Executive through ‘oversight, budgeting, and legislative activities’ with which it can convince an administration to accept legislative attitudes on a subject of policy; the inference being that if an Executive does not, rocky times might be ahead.75 As any president knows, the ‘post-Vietnam conventional wisdom’ tells us that ‘congressional support is important to sustain policy’, and so at times it is in the best interests of an administration to assume that Congress indeed represents a ‘collective proxy for the opinions’ of the people.76 This was the case in the mid-to late 1990s, when the Clinton Administration languished in a weak position vis-à-vis a Republican Congress, and was forced to appease the Legislature in order to protect its domestic agenda (after all, Clinton had been elected on domestic issues, not foreign). The increasingly conservative Congress found the issues of peacekeeping and multilateralism a ‘target-rich environment’ through which to attack the Democratic President from the other side of the partisan divide.77 Consequently, for all the above reasons, paternalistic attitudes among policy-makers and subsequent scorn of the opinion poll, the relative ‘freedom’ from electoral restraints vis-à-vis foreign policy experienced by politicians in the post-Cold War environment, the general mood of disengagement from multilateralism and the world in the Washington Legislature, over-reliance on a non-representative, self-reinforcing triangular relationship between the news media, Congress and the Executive, and Clinton’s fear of a truculent Congress with its potential to devastate the

Policy change and public opinion 27 administration’s domestic agenda, the US government failed to carry out the wishes of its people.

Conclusion The American public has been co-opted and marginalized in the realm of foreign policy-making; just one more legacy which the Cold War seared on the collective brain of the policy-making elite. The fear and mistrust of public opinion – born of the anxiety that without stringent control and oversight, an unrestrained foreign policy could lead the nation into a spiralling hell – has perpetuated a policy-making process that side-steps any real public input and privately denies its very validity. The President cares about how the public views his performance in an election year, as do Congressional representatives. Other members of the Executive (e.g. the State Department, NSC, Department of Defence), have not the worries of the elected; hence they need not refer to public opinion at all unless it suits them, since the public poses no threat to their careers. Regardless, all relied on vastly inadequate systems of public opinion data retrieval. Resulting from the paternal ‘intuitive’ style existent among policymakers, the opinion survey is and was rejected by most as a reliable method of revealing public attitudes; therefore they are denied an important and useful source of information. Vocal minorities are and were treated as representative of ‘the whole’ of American society, and the complex, self-reinforcing relationship between Congress, the Executive and the news media prohibited understanding of substantive mass attitudes. Congress relied heavily on the media for pointers on public opinion, and similarly the Executive depended on Congress as well as the media. In turn, the news media relied on governmental sources for stories and faced agenda-setting by financial considerations relating to volume of sales, attraction of advertisers, and the important corporate giants who own such a large percentage of media companies. All of these factors create a very imperfect system for the gathering of realistic public attitudes. If one is wrong, unintentionally or otherwise, then all are ‘mislead’. Both the news media and Congress presented an inaccurate picture of public opinion regarding multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN because of the reasons cited above, but also, and importantly, because of the conservative cohort in Congress. This increasingly influential group wished for disengagement, and public opinion was called upon; a powerful political tool in liberal democracy. As was concluded in the San Francisco Chronicle (1995), there was ‘a new isolationism and unilateralism on the rise in America, but it . . . [was] largely confined to one particular loony bin: Congress. The rest of America remain[ed] . . . pragmatically internationalist and multilateralist.’78 And we have an abundance of data to prove it.

28

Policy change and public opinion

It is meaningless, therefore, to assert that policy change in the United States, on the issue of the United Nations, multilateralism, or much else for that matter, was a result of public outcry (with the possible exception of situations such as that produced by the war in Vietnam). The policymaking community pays scant attention to what is considered the ignorant, transitory, fluctuating will of the common people; little compared to the vast experience and intellectual capacity that policy-makers congratulate themselves on. The perception of such a negative public, however, certainly had a significant effect on the administration, if opinion (in this case negativity of opinion) was believed to be overwhelming.79 In this sense the perception that the public was overwhelmingly negative was as noteworthy as a genuine public outcry. Clinton felt the weight of this perception, as he commented to adviser George Stephanopolis at one point: the American people were ‘essentially isolationist and would back off at the first sight of body bags’; they were, he added, ‘at a gut level, on Henry Kissenger’s side’.80 Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration could surely have done more to defend its position and policies. As such, a significant portion of blame must fall to an Executive that did little to counter the ‘deepening contempt’ for the UN which grew in Washington in the mid-1990s, and to a President, who as Michael Hirsh so aptly puts, ‘was AWOL in its defense’.81

2

Executive decision-making

Introduction The Clinton Administration breezed into power with a serious emphasis on multilateralism, cooperative security, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. The United Nations was to be a significant tool and simultaneous partner in the struggle to craft a peaceful, democratic, post-Cold War world; something that the idealists in the Clinton team were particularly concerned with. Bill Clinton, in addition to his foreign policy team – Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright, even Warren Christopher (as well as their undersecretaries and deputies) – uttered numerous statements of expectation and enthusiastic support regarding these issues, and were determined to fashion a more morally based foreign policy, being both personally and politically ill at ease with the imperialistic style of American foreign policy during much of the Cold War, and particularly during the Reagan era. However, not long after taking office, the administration turned abruptly from its previously favoured policy ideals of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and the UN. This chapter will expose the reasons for this change in attitude; to explain how and why an apparently positive administration altered its stance from supportive and progressive to negative and reactionary, and to challenge the established consensus that policy change was due simply to the fall-out from the Somalia debacle. First, however, we must confirm that the Clinton Administration was indeed positively inclined towards the peacekeeping. This will allow us to answer the chapter’s main query, through examination of the Clinton team’s policies towards the two main international problems confronting the administration: the former Yugoslavia and Somalia; demonstrating that it was the global realities that the administration had to face, and experiences of 1990s peacekeeping (of which Somalia was only the worst example) that affected and altered their attitudes towards a favoured policy. Positive messages of support soon became assertions on the limited benefits of involvement in multilateral ventures, and the originally encouraging Presidential Review Document 13 (PRD13)

30

Executive decision-making

became the restrained and damaging Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25). Certainly, the harsh realities of 1990s peacekeeping were brought to bear on the Clinton Administration, but there also existed a certain naivety and lack of preparedness among members of the administration; not because of their lack of experience, although none could be considered veterans, but because of the unique circumstances of the postCold War era, which produced a sort of euphoria among even the most practised of international statespeople, blinding them to the ills of certain policy choices. A combination of inexperience, idealism and hubris impeded a truly realistic appraisal on behalf of the administration regarding the potential dangers and subsequent consequences of its chosen strategy. Less thought had been devoted to the practical application and costs of policy than to the appearance of the political postures struck. In brief, resulting from a lack of real, comprehensive thought regarding the fine points of multilateralism, peacekeeping and all that these entailed, the Clinton Administration was not primed for the difficulties of achieving specified goals through its chosen framework, and thus reacted harshly when things went awry. In addition, a lack of real commitment to the policy did not help the administration to weather the problems experienced. The essence of the administration’s reaction was to point the finger of blame in the direction of its once favoured instrument of multilateralism. When things did not go to its liking in Bosnia, the Clinton Administration blamed its European allies and the UN. In Somalia, the risky mandate that required the capture of the warlord Aideed, as well as the fateful raid that resulted in the deaths of 18 US servicemen, were also the fault of the UN. The Clinton Administration had discovered the usefulness of multilateralism as a scapegoat for the inadequacy or incompetency of its own foreign policy dealings (of course, it was not the policy but the lack of preparation and thought, which were inadequate in the Clinton Administration’s case).

Early positivity The initial stance struck during the Clinton Presidential campaign, and subsequently in the early days of the administration, prompted speculation that this President, during his tenure, would ally himself strongly to the United Nations in solving foreign policy problems, and establish his administration as a firm advocate of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Such an approach, and confidence in multilateralism in general, would be highly visible tools of this new generation of policymakers.

Executive decision-making 31 Campaign rhetoric It is widely recognized that then Governor Clinton ran an election campaign fuelled by domestic political considerations (‘it’s the economy stupid’); the ascendancy of domestic importance in the immediate postCold War period was not a strange or unanticipated consequence of ‘peacetime’. However, foreign policy did have its place. That place was a device to draw attention to deficiencies in the foreign policy record of Clinton’s rival, President Bush.82 The commonly known foreign policy prowess of the incumbent President was an incentive, further to that of the refocus on domestic issues, to ‘minimize’ emphasizing foreign policy.83 Thus, Clinton avoided subjects in which Bush was known to have been successful, focusing instead on issues that were popularly criticized, such as Bush’s failure to bring his influence to bear on China’s human rights record, the civil war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Somalia, where thousands were dying from famine, and Haiti, where he rebuked refugees and yet failed to do anything to solve the problems that generated them. And of course, the refocusing of policy, even foreign, on economic dimensions was obvious throughout the campaign.84 Clinton mainly focused his foreign policy pronouncements on the shortcomings of his adversary, but this in itself contributed to the development of themes in the campaign rhetoric. Criticisms of inaction in China, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti led to statements of a much more interventionist and humanitarian foreign policy type: ending human rights abuses in China, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, aiding destitute Somalis, and restoring the democratically elected leadership of Haiti.85 Regarding Bosnia, candidate Clinton pronounced: [i]f the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralysed in the face of genocide . . . United Nations demands should be backed by collective action, including the use of force, if necessary.86 With echoes of President Truman’s assertion that ‘if history has taught us anything it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace anywhere in the world’, Clinton proposed that, if elected, he would curb threats to international peace and security, and advance principles of democracy and human rights through, among other things, strong support of the United Nations and an expanded role for peacekeeping.87 He even went so far as to publicly endorse a UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which would stand ‘guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and combating terrorism’.88 This aggressive idealism, so-called neo-Wilsonianism, was portrayed as an ‘essential element of US security policy in the post Cold War era’ by a

32

Executive decision-making

campaign team that epitomized a new generation of policy-makers determined to ensure that their America would live up to its declared ideals, after many years of compromise, and imbued with the belief that in this new era much of the world’s wrongs could be righted.89 In this time ‘an interventionist policy . . . appeared to be a genuine option for the incoming administration’.90 Moreover, this support for, and increased reliance on, multilateralism and international organizations was a cost-effective way to inject US influence into international affairs while minimizing the cost. Multilateralism was the key to the responsibility vs. resource dilemma that the United States experienced post-Cold War. As the sole remaining superpower, America acknowledged that the resolution of many global crises may fall to it. However, in the absence of a direct and tangible threat, and in a time of dwindling resources, there was little patience for large foreign expenditure. Influencing international affairs through a multilateralist medium that would see other nations helping to shoulder the burden of cost, both financially and physically, seemed an ideal solution.91 Influences in the campaign team came from close friends of Clinton such as George Stephanopolis, and trusted advisers such as Professor Richard Gardener from Columbia University, who focused Clinton on UN issues, with particular regard to the Rapid Reaction Force.92 However, those involved in the rise of Governor Clinton to the Presidency acknowledge the influence of former Carter Administration official and future National Security Adviser Anthony Lake on the campaign’s foreign policy positions.93 In fact, Michael Mandlebaum (an inner-circle initiate during the campaign) would go so far as to testify that the campaign’s foreign policy philosophy was simply a reflection of Lake’s own convictions.94 The moral content of the campaign rhetoric was seen as being drawn from the experience of officials such as Lake during the Carter Administration. Commentators seized on such individuals in accounting for candidate Clinton’s foreign policy programme rather than the man himself, who, as many observers of the time remarked, projected little but a sparse knowledge, and a ‘sense of both personal unease and disinterest’ in foreign policy issues.95 Indeed, as one journalist commented at the time, Clinton ‘seems to regard foreign affairs with as much pleasure as a skier regards an avalanche’.96 While it is undoubtedly true that Clinton was, and intended to be, most concerned with what he could achieve at home in both domestic and economic terms, and despite the influence exerted on him by the insights of both Gardiner and Lake, it does not necessarily follow that he was uninterested, untutored or easily led regarding international issues. Clinton was, after all, a student of international relations at Georgetown, during which period he worked part-time for the foreign policy giant Senator J. William Fulbright, in addition to which he attended Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.97 Consequently, he was certainly not ignorant of the field. Nancy Soderberg

Executive decision-making 33 insists that the positivity towards the UN and multilateralism inherent in the campaign, and the early days of the administration, came very much from Clinton himself. She recounts: ‘[h]e thought about these issues all his life and understood them, and . . . the people who came into his campaign helped him to flesh it out . . . but it was very much Clinton.’98 What little he did not already know, he was quick to learn. Indeed, even Colin Powell pays tribute in his memoirs to Clinton’s vast knowledge and memory.99 Positivity regarding multilateralism came from Clinton just as much as from his team. They were affirmatively inclined towards the UN, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and multilateralism, and chose to articulate this when speaking on foreign policy issues. Clinton chose advisers such as Lake who reflected his own positivity, and when he came to office he chose a foreign policy team that again shared this optimistic multilateralist outlook. Early administration stance The early days of the administration carried through and built upon the multilateralist positivity that ran through the campaign as the new President openly ‘emphasized the importance of the United Nations in his strategic views’.100 This commitment was no more evident than in the re-elevation of the post of Ambassador to the United Nations to Cabinet level, demonstrating the anticipation of ‘integrating UN planning’ in the future of US foreign policy.101 The President’s inaugural address ‘interjected a Wilsonian notion, merging the challenge to American interests with international ones’.102 Clinton acknowledged the fact that the Cold War was over, but warned that the world was ‘threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues’.103 The American people were exhorted to face the challenges of a new world wherein domestic and foreign knew no distinction and in which America must lead.104 Clinton’s reference to those occasions in which the US may be called to act in the international sphere was particularly telling. In addition to committing America to engagement ‘where our vital interest are challenged’ – a fairly bland and typical statement for any politician to make – the President vowed not to stand idle where the ‘will and conscience of the international community is defied’ and to counter such challenges ‘with peaceful diplomacy wherever possible, with force when necessary’.105 He continued, with echoes of a Kennedyesque rhetoric, ‘[o]ur hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.’106 Such statements exhibited a strong commitment to a morally based interventionist policy, and needless to say, such an address undoubtedly raised expectations among Americans and others further afield.107

34

Executive decision-making

When the administration came to office a review was immediately put in place regarding US participation in UN peacekeeping. The review (PRD13) was intended to become the basis or framework for a new phase in US foreign policy, in which the UN played a pivotal role and was initially very positive.108 Early drafts: strongly endorsed the expansion of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and recommended that the United States support multilateral peace operations politically, financially, and militarily. Reflecting PRD-13, the draft PDD endorsed peacekeeping as an essential element of US security policy and suggested that whenever possible the United States commit itself to the multilateral, rather than unilateral, use of force.109 Some of the strongest rhetoric articulated by President Clinton in these early months could be heard during speeches made at the opening and dedication of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum at the end of April 1993. The United States, he stated, had a particular duty to remember the Holocaust, and to combat aggression, violence and human rights abuses.110 The President stated that the struggle against evil in humanity itself would never end, and those alive today had an ‘obligation to history’ to ‘mobilize morality’ to ensure that nothing like the Jewish Holocaust ever happened again.111 In remarks to the remaining US UNITAF troops returning from Somalia, and again to the West Point graduating class of 1993 (both in May), President Clinton chose to emphasize a major role for the military in future multilateral and humanitarian peacekeeping operations. Stressing proudly that ‘American leadership can help to mobilize international action to create a better world’, he counselled the troops that they must work increasingly with ‘an array of multilateral partners, in new arrangements’, displaying a commitment to innovation in multilateral operations.112 Such sentiments were echoed in the later address at West Point, where he advised the new officers that American forces ‘must change to meet the challenges and dangers of a new world’, and that they would ‘be called upon in many ways in this era: to keep the peace, to relieve suffering’; making clear to the military – the main instrument of any future multilateral intervention – his foreign policy outlook.113 With reference to Somalia, Clinton conveyed firm US support for the UN mission there, and of the ambitious goal of nation-building.114 He also issued steadfast support for UN resolution 837, which authorized retributive action against Somali warlord Aideed who was deemed responsible for the death of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993. Clinton stated: ‘I ordered the participation of our troops in this action . . . for if U.N. peacekeepers are to be effective agents for peace and stability . . . they must be

Executive decision-making 35 capable of using force when necessary to defend themselves and accomplish their goals’; a clear endorsement of the newly employed principle of peace enforcement.115 In fact, the same speech goes on to give a sparkling appraisal of multilateralism and the fulfilment of American responsibilities around the globe: [t]he United States cannot be the world’s policeman, but we also cannot turn a blind eye to the world’s problems, for they affect our own security, our own interests and our own ideals. The US must continue to play its unique role of leadership in the world. But now we can increasingly express that leadership through multilateral means such as the United Nations.116 The incoming foreign policy team also had much to say regarding the administration’s attitudes towards multilateral and interventionist issues. These foreign policy representatives expounded the notion of support for international organizations, peacekeeping as an important American foreign policy tool, and increased reliance on multilateralism, in order to inject US influence into international affairs while minimizing the cost.117 Various administration officials are on record from this period reaffirming this positivity. In his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Warren Christopher (Secretary of State designate) took the opportunity to underline, in the context of the many US goals and tools of foreign policy, the value of multilateralism and encouraging institutions, ‘especially the United Nations’, to take a more active role in crisis solving, conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention. He emphasized American’s place in this: Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force – decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in case of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces – purposes such as peacekeeping, peace-making, humanitarian assistance.118 The most absolute endorsement of the concept of multilateralism and of the UN came (not altogether surprisingly) from the newly appointed Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright. In her confirmation hearing, Albright explained how the President emphasized that her position was ‘one of the most critical foreign policy positions’ of the time (quite an elevation).119 Dr Albright declared, in true neo-Wilsonian style, ‘if there is one overriding principle that will guide me in this job, it will be the inescapable responsibility . . . to build a peaceful world and to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization’.120 Peacekeeping

36

Executive decision-making

missions current at the time were described as ‘incredibly important to the US’, as was discussion of a RRF that would give the UN ‘teeth’.121 When called upon in April 1993 to report on the status of US policy in Bosnia, Somalia and UN reform to the House of Representatives, Albright listed some of the many problems facing the world: ‘ethnic conflicts, aggression, genocide and ethnic cleansing, famine, refugees’, and stated firmly: [w]hether we like it or not, the United States cannot turn from these problems . . . We, however, do not and cannot shoulder these burdens alone. The United Nations needs us, and we need it to reach and then implement a multilateralist strategy. There is simply no other way.122 She goes on to endorse the nation-building mission in Somalia: [t]he key to the future of Somalia will be the establishment of a viable and representative government and economy. . . . The United Nations will be deeply engaged in this institution-building exercise, and the United States should play a constructive role.123 Post-Cold War foreign policy posed a dilemma for the United States; do nothing or do everything alone. The answer to this quandary lay with multilateral action, through a ‘principled international community’.124 The strongest of the Ambassador’s utterances in validation of the administration’s attitudes towards multilateralism occurred in the form of what was to become known as the ‘assertive multilateralism speech’.125 Albright attempted, through this address, to respond to the fictitious charges floating around the Capital, or as she described them, the ‘myths’ about the UN, to set the record straight about the benefits that the United Nations held for the prosecution of US foreign policy. She declared, ‘[t]hough sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will necessarily point toward multilateral engagement’, and insisted that the US must display leadership in collective institutions such as the UN: ‘[t]hese two realities – multilateral engagement and US leadership within collective bodies – require an “assertive multilateralism” that advances US foreign policy goals.’126 (References to ‘assertive multilateralism’ were in fact an attempt to allay legislative fears that reliance on multilateralism would mean a weak US foreign policy guided by the UN.127) Peacekeeping was now ‘instrumental’ to national interest imperatives; a major departure from previous administrations.128 To describe the occupation of an international organization that concerns itself with common goals, human rights and peace for all mankind as vital to the national interest was quite a radical step. Consequently, it seemed clear to any observer, from Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, to the foreign policy proclamations of the newly elected

Executive decision-making 37 President and his foreign policy officials, that here was an administration on the brink of far-reaching change with regard to foreign policy. The use of the multilateral organization as an instrumental tool through which to prosecute external affairs permeated much of what the unseasoned administration declared with regard to its foreign policy goals. To the Clinton team multilateralism fulfilled a number of important criteria. The American people no longer wanted the United States to assume the position of world policeman; therefore, delegation of a number of international problems to the auspices of organizations such as the UN removed the burden from the US. Such an approach satisfied the resource/responsibility dilemma faced by the first truly post-Cold War administration: how to remain actively engaged in the world, while at the same time conserving dwindling resources that were badly needed at home. Splitting the burden and cost with the UN was a perfect solution. Finally, pursuing certain foreign policy goals through multilateralist means provided a legitimacy and a moral authority that the new Democrat administration, uncomfortable with the unilateral – even imperialistic – prosecution of American policy in the past, keenly sought.

Two thorny problems Early developments in the various missions or crises ongoing in the early days of the Clinton Administration affected attitudes held regarding the UN, peacekeeping and multilateralism. The two chief problems faced by the administration in the beginning of its tenure were Somalia and Bosnia (the former Yugoslavia). Somalia was a humanitarian mission initiated originally by President Bush, and passed that spring to the auspices of the UN, who was then involved, with the help and approval of the United States, in attempting to rebuild the country’s shattered institutions and infrastructure. Bosnia, or more accurately the former Yugoslavia, saw Serbs, Muslims and Croats embroiled in vicious civil war, ethnic cleansing and genocide. European countries such as Britain and France already had people on the ground there, and former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Minister David Owen were working on a peace settlement. As we have observed, ‘early rhetoric suggested that the United States had a major interest in trying to intervene to manage such conflicts’.129 Somalia looked quite good to the administration. There had been success in feeding the starving population there and, for the Americans, a relatively trouble-free transfer from the US-led force to a UN mission, where an ambitious programme for peace, reconciliation and nation-building was underway. As Nancy Soderberg commented, ‘we thought it was going fine’.130 Somalia would be a test case for the new-era implementation of a UN Chapter VII mission that seemed to embody the foreign policy ambitions of the new administration. One has only to look at the various

38

Executive decision-making

comments made by Clinton, and foreign policy Principals such as Albright, to see the commitment felt by the administration to this venture, and the hopes they had for the Somali mission’s success. Albright stated that with regard to Somalia, she sensed that ‘humanitarianmilitary missions are here to stay because of this precedent’.131 Somalia was the embodiment of what the Clinton people had been trying to say since the campaign trail; the test case for their rhetoric and the type of approach they felt desirable in the post-Cold War era. To the Clinton team, ‘Somalia was transformed from a famine-stricken back water where heartless warlords and hopped up gangs reigned over helpless innocents, into a laboratory for new theories of U.N. peacekeeping’.132 Bosnia, although appearing more complex than the Somali situation (at that time), seemed also to be going well policy-wise. Bosnia dominated the American press, as the situation there fluctuated; thus Clinton was questioned on events there much more regularly than other foreign policy issues. The President had called for greater action to stop ethnic cleansing during his campaign, and in his many discussions with reporters during his first months in office he often repeated his belief in the need for action to stop the killing there, exclaiming during one exchange: ‘I am sickened’.133 Officials such as Christopher echoed these troubled sentiments, with comments such as ‘our conscience revolts’.134 Albright, who was deeply concerned with the crisis, reported that she was ‘totally horrified’ with events in Bosnia, and that the US must ‘make sure that it is very clear to the world that this is not acceptable behaviour in any time, but certainly not at this period’.135 Not on their watch. Clinton reminded reporters in March, however, that America was involved in a multilateral decision-making process with the European allies and the UN, and was actively seeking a solution. In the event of the conclusion of hostilities resulting from peace negotiations, he pledged that the US would take part in a multinational effort to police an agreement.136 Bosnia was, like Somalia, considered in some ways another ‘test’ for the new administration of how the world, or the UN, would deal with conflicts in the future. In addition to being a test of the new administration, this was the administration testing the UN.137

Reality dawning What happened to alter the administration’s attitudes from positive endorsement to public retreat, abandonment and censure? According to Nancy Soderberg, ‘reality sort of set in’.138 The foreign policy team was idealistic up to a point, but the unanticipated realities of the problems it faced began to challenge its judgement.139

Executive decision-making 39 Somalia When Somalia’s corrupt, despotic ruler of 20 years, Siad Barre, was expelled from the country in January 1991, the state fell very quickly into what William Durch describes as a ‘Hobbesian anarchy’, as each of the clans upon which Somali society is based attempted to take power for itself.140 Somalia had become what is known as a ‘failed state’. Civil war, drought and lawlessness brought about widespread famine, from which it is estimated that one million people died. The problem was exacerbated due to the inability of aid to breach the obstacle of armed banditry and extortion.141 The scale of the tragedy caught the attention of the United Nations late in 1991, and attempts were made to mediate the conflict and produce the conditions in which NGOs and the UN could distribute food aid to the starving. Progress was reportedly made, chiefly as a result of UN Special Representative Sahnoun and the work he carried out in establishing relations with all echelons of Somali society. However, following on from what appeared to be inexplicable insensitivity on behalf of Boutros-Ghali to the situation on the ground in Somalia, and the work that his Special Representative accomplished, Sahnoun felt forced to resign. Following Sahnoun’s departure, the situation deteriorated sharply. Then in an unexpected last act of apparent goodwill, prompted by several factors – not least of all involving media images – the outgoing US President George Bush offered to lead a coalition force to restore conditions in which aid could reach the starving. The successes of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) or Operation Restore Hope (as the new mission was variously known) were wideranging. Famine was stayed, and many lives were saved. However, Bush’s hopes that American forces would be home by January 1993 were found to be grossly misplaced. The Bush Administration was replaced by that of Clinton, and US forces remained with the intention that the US would transfer the mission to UN auspices at some point in the near future. The incoming administration, however, had given the impression that it was in favour of more aggressive interventionism, and therefore had much more ambitious plans for the UN mission (UNOSOM II) that was to replace UNITAF. An expansive mandate was drawn up in the Security Council with a resolution (814) that was quite literally ‘championed’ by the United States.142 UNOSOM II was mandated as a peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission, and was tasked with disarming the Somali factions, regenerating the national economy, infrastructure and government, and continuing efforts to ensure that the Somali people were fed. Albright referred to UNOSOM II as a much ‘more robust’ mission with ROE that encompassed the ‘assertive use of military force’, and before Congress she insisted on the consistency of the mission ‘with what we [the

40

Executive decision-making

administration] have been planning’.143 This operation would act as the administration’s ‘test case in multilateral peacekeeping’.144 Clinton spoke out strongly in favour of nation-building policies in Somalia on various occasions. He admitted that the US originally entered the country to stop the famine, violence and bloodshed, but insisted that because an absence of order ‘gave rise to these problems . . . a lot of nation-building’ was necessary in Somalia.145 These were ambitious tasks for an overstretched, understaffed and underfunded Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and an undermanned mission in Somalia itself. Unsurprisingly, the situation deteriorated. Things came to a head on 5 June 1993, when Aideed ambushed UN personnel attempting to inspect a weapons site at Radio Mogadishu. Twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers were killed and three Americans wounded. The mood in the UN Security Council was that such an attack could not go unpunished, and a strong resolution was drawn up calling for the perpetrators to be arrested and brought to justice; ‘an important principle was at stake – that U.N. peacekeepers simply could not be killed with impunity’.146 None called more forcefully for action than the United States, as the President avowed, ‘we cannot have a situation where one of these warlords, while everybody else is cooperating, decides that he can go out and slaughter 20 peacekeepers . . . we had to take appropriate action’.147 Hence, on 6 June, Security Council Resolution 837 added to the UNOSOM II mandate a manhunt for the culpable party: Aideed. The US Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which had been stationed in Somalia since UNITAF, was ordered to participate in police actions against Aideed’s SNA in support of Resolution 837, and during the course of June and July it embarked on several raids: ‘hunger and poverty and sickness were no longer the enemy: Aideed was’.148 On 8 August the United States experienced its first fatalities during UNOSOM II; four US personnel killed by a remote control detonated land-mine. When six more lost their lives in a further landmine on 22 August the Clinton Administration finally agreed to dispatch the Ranger and Delta Force that the new Special Representative to the Secretary General (and an American) Jonathan Howe had been requesting since the deaths of the Pakistani peacekeepers in June. Accordingly, Task Force Ranger was dispatched to Somalia to do what the QRF could not: capture Aideed. Unfortunately it met with a similar level of success. Not long after the Task Force was sent to Somalia, the Clinton Administration began to vocalize a change in approach to the conflict. Through various addresses and press conferences President Clinton began to move US policy away from the hunt for Aideed; away from what had become a highly militarized mission for the UN, and the US troops involved there, and towards a greater emphasis on political reconciliation. This shift was a result of an increased risk for American troops, and perhaps more signific-

Executive decision-making 41 antly, increased political risk for the President himself, as pressure from an ever more conservative Congress to pull out of Somalia and disengage from the UN mounted.149 There were also considerations with regard to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Unless Somalia could be tamed, Clinton said, ‘it’s going to be very hard to convince Congress to provide the forces to implement an agreement on Bosnia’.150 We can tell by Clinton’s response to questioning during a late August press conference that he was beginning to reconsider the efficacy of the increasingly militaristic nature of Somalia policy. His response to one journalist – ‘the United Nations operation set that [capturing Aideed] as their objective, and they asked us for our help in that regard’ – made it sound as though the UN could set itself a task without the full consent of all the permanent (veto-wielding) members of the Security Council, of which the United States is the most powerful; as though the will of the United States, the most powerful member state, was completely divorced from the will of the UN.151 This shift points clearly to a change of attitude, and a divergence between the UN and the Clinton Administration. Remarkably, on 17 September, in response to journalistic questioning, Clinton emphasized three times the need for a political solution to the Somali problem, that ‘some renewed political initiative in Somalia . . . that leaves the Somalis in control of their own destiny’ was crucial.152 Here it is also worth noting the change in rhetoric away from international responsibility for a solution to the Somali crisis, towards the Somalis themselves. This transferral was echoed later in the month, when the President again highlighted the need for a ‘political strategy that puts the affairs of Somalia back into the hands of Somalia’.153 In his address to the United Nations on 27 September, Clinton underscored the need to ask harder questions regarding peacekeeping missions, a theme echoed by both Anthony Lake and Albright.154 They would have to ask tougher questions, ‘pick and choose’ missions.155 Greater emphasis was now placed on the administration’s recent consciousness of the fact ‘that there are limits to what that partnership can achieve for the United States’.156 It was clear that by the end of September ‘the US was moving the other way’ on Somalia.157 Unfortunately no one thought to inform the troops on the ground of the supposed change in policy.158 Neither had the United Nations passed any resolutions altering the mandate for UNOSOM II forces. Such an action would have been the logical next step for an administration that sought to alter the mission had its convictions been made of sterner substance than mere rhetoric. The administration could have pushed a resolution through to halt military action in Somalia at any time. It did not. Thus, in the absence of contradicting orders, the hunt for Aideed continued, until the night of 3–4 October brought it screeching to a halt. Eighteen US soldiers were killed and many more injured in a raid to

42

Executive decision-making

capture some top people in Aideed’s SNA (the Somali death-toll was considerably higher). The deaths came as a great shock to the United States: particularly the Legislature. Straight away Congress demanded immediate withdrawal.159 By the following day the old policy had been ‘fully orphaned’ and the damage control began.160 Clinton felt compelled once again to reassert his past role in advising the UN of the need to move its emphasis in Somalia towards the political.161 The administration started as it meant to go on in its dealings with the crisis, beginning the ‘blame game’ by pointing the finger at the United Nations. Clinton’s Secretary of State Christopher reinforced his President’s position with several remarks on 7 October, which yet again claimed the US role in ‘pressing the United Nations to refocus the Somalia operation on the political process’.162 The administration had attempted to rein in the UN, it was claimed, but the organization continued with abandon, unheeding of America’s concerns. The fault, therefore, lay with the United Nations, not the US. At this time, we even have the dubious suggestion by Edward Warner (Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Requirements and Resources) that the administration was forced into helping out with the hunt for Aideed; that its involvement was ‘not simply voluntary’.163 This sort of suggestion is incredible, since the UN ‘is a mirror of the actions, inactions, fudges, and fantasies of its leading members, who can veto anything they do not like’.164 In his address to the nation on 7 October President Clinton stated, significantly, considering earlier assertions by himself and members of his administration, ‘[i]t is not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society’.165 He returned then to a theme that he had already begun to filter into rhetoric regarding Somalia; that it was not the responsibility of the United States to create a ‘political process that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves.’166 Indeed, by 9 October what was necessary was now supposedly ‘an African solution to an African problem’.167 This kind of rhetoric centring on the lack of American responsibility would arise again in reference to Bosnia. The President resisted more extreme calls for immediate withdrawal, but promised to remove all US forces from Somalia by March 1994, while in the short term strengthening existing troop numbers.168 The March deadline was apparently to give the Somali people the time necessary to help themselves.169 However, subsequent to the more cautious approach by the United States, a revised UNOSOM II mandate was adopted in February 1994, which precluded ‘UNOSOM forces from intervening in interclan war’, and the bolstered US troops were more or less confined to barracks to ensure no further casualties.170 Consequently, the increased troop numbers and the slightly extended deadline (compared to that which some in Congress were demanding) were simply a cover for quite a hasty retreat on behalf of the US Army, as well as Clinton Administration

Executive decision-making 43 policy; a ‘tactical escalation to cover a strategic retreat’.171 UNOSOM II was unable to achieve any success in Somalia after the October incident, and as Ken Menkhaus commented, ‘the quiet marginalization of UNOSOM . . . [became] a goal of, rather than a problem for, the United States’.172 The administration blamed the United Nations and busied itself with de-emphasizing its own role in the decisions made in the Security Council at the time, discounting the fact that ‘it was a series of US decisions, particularly the aggressive manhunt for Aideed, that led the UN into the impasse from which the US was now blithely departing’.173 The administration chose to forget the very pertinent fact that the US forces involved in the mission to capture Aideed were acting under the direct orders of US military commanders with no input from the UNOSOM II command, and in fact on that fateful night, entirely without their knowledge. Understandably, ‘[g]iven its close relationship with the United States in crafting Somalia policy, the UN took exception to finding itself in the role of convenient scapegoat’.174 Bosnia The situation in the former Yugoslavia (or Bosnia, which was the main focus from an American point of view) was a heartfelt problem for the Clinton Administration. Yet rather than being a foreign policy nightmare in terms of an ‘incident’ such as Somalia, or like Haiti, where there was already a clearly identifiable solution (how to arrive at that solution was a different matter), Bosnia was a long-drawn-out litany of atrocity and conflict that ebbed and flowed. For years, there it was, always somewhere around the corner, ready to pounce; to the Clinton Administration, a symbol of its own inadequacy. After the death of Communist leader Josip Tito, and influenced by the rise of ethnonationalist entrepreneurs such as Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic and Franjo Tudjman, the ghosts of their country’s long and turbulent history came back to haunt the people of Yugoslavia; economic decline, dislocation and ethnonationalist politics made them important to the present. After months of uncertainty, and declarations of sovereignty followed by those of independence, Croatia and Slovenia became the first to break away from Yugoslavia as a whole. Fighting immediately broke out, first between the Slovenians and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in which the JNA was quickly defeated and pulled back, and then between the Croatians and the Serbs combined with the JNA, with various cease-fires being brokered and broken. In reaction to the fighting, on 25 September 1991, the UN Security Council approved an arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia (which, whether global recognition was present at this point or not, in reality did not exist any more). Fighting continued. Then,

44

Executive decision-making

shortly before Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence – but as a result of its intention to do so – fighting broke out between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian government forces. The shelling of Sarajevo and majority Muslim areas began, with the conflict merely increasing in ferocity after independence was declared. At the end of May the United Nations demanded the withdrawal of the JNA from what was now ‘sovereign’ territory, and imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, which then relinquished control of the JNA in Croatia and Bosnia, thus ensuring that the Serbs had the monopoly on heavy weapons. Various efforts to mediate the conflicts came and went. Attempts were made by the European Community (EC), and joint UN and EC efforts were also formulated. Finally, the UN decided to intervene with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to endeavour to bring about the conditions necessary for peace negotiations to occur, in addition to facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid.175 It would prove to be an extremely difficult job. Ambassador Albright described it as ‘like sending David against Goliath, only without the slingshot or any sign of divine help’.176 Even so, UNPROFOR’s mandate was soon expanded to include Bosnia-Herzegovina. When Clinton ascended to the Presidency, many expected considerable changes to occur in US policy towards the former Yugoslavia, since ‘forceful action’ had been promised throughout his campaign, and as a result, expectations had been on the rise.177 Such changes, however, were not readily discernible in the form of actual policy moves. Yes, the attitude was different. This was a new, ambitious administration, concerned with a more proactive moral foreign policy.178 Bosnia was a major issue for the Clinton Principals, much more so than any other foreign policy concern at that time (even if Somalia came to dominate following the October firefight). But for an extended period the administration did very little. The President defended his policy, protesting, ‘this is a much more aggressive position than the United States has taken’ to date.179 Yet in the end, like his predecessor, Clinton hoped that the Europeans would take the lead. There were three major issues at stake here for the administration. First of all, this crisis was ‘closer to home’, so to speak. Bosnia was/is in the heart of Europe, close to many of America’s key friends and allies; thus the US had strategic interests in ensuring that nothing happened to threaten those allies.180 The administration was afraid of a Balkanization such as that which occurred at the beginning of the First World War; that fighting would spread to other parts of Europe and become a wider conflict that might involve America in a costly defence. As Clinton commented, ‘it is in the national interest of the United States to keep this conflict from spilling over into a lot of other countries which could drag the United States into something . . . we don’t want. . . . [It has] powderkeg potential.’181 National Security Adviser Lake confirmed that Bosnia

Executive decision-making 45 could ‘all too easily explode into a wider Balkan conflict’, echoing the President’s concerns.182 Second, and particularly so for this administration, the foreign policy team felt that it had a humanitarian responsibility – a moral imperative – to do something to relieve the suffering and atrocity that occurred daily in the former Yugoslavia; all too similar to that which was carried out on the Continent 50 years previously. Serb action was described as ‘savage and cynical ethnic cleansing . . . [that] offends the world’s conscience and our standards of behavior’.183 And Albright confirmed that ‘the United States cannot ignore the human toll’.184 Finally, Bosnia could act as a further test of a multilateral foreign policy for the administration. Much like Somalia, the Bosnian situation was viewed as somewhere the new administration could test its multilateralist theories for international crisis management, and somewhere the administration could test the UN’s efficacy in carrying out these ambitious ventures. Bosnia was something that the administration, some members more so than others, felt obligated to act upon. Clinton clearly felt a responsibility; he declared, ‘we are after all, the world’s only superpower. We do have to lead the world.’185 However, contrary to presumptions derived from campaign rhetoric, the Clinton that arrived in office in January 1993 had no intention of introducing US troops into the former Yugoslavia, either unilaterally, under the UN, or anywhere in between, until a peaceful settlement was reached and committed to by all parties to the conflict.186 In working with this crisis, this administration placed its emphasis firmly on a multilateralist framework, and through the United Nations. Clinton asserted in April 1993, ‘I have operated from the beginning under the assumption that whatever is done must be done within the framework of a multilateral cooperation, that this is not something the United States could effectively do alone.’187 With specific reference to which multilateral organization, he stated, ‘[w]e must work together through the United Nations’.188 Unfortunately, however, the administration’s initial policy towards the former Yugoslavia was anything but consistent. The first action that was reportedly taken regarding Bosnia policy was to reject the hard-won peace plan put forward by former secretary of state Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the former British foreign secretary.189 The truth was that the ‘Clinton people had deep reservations about the plan’ because they felt it legitimized, or institutionalized, the ethnic cleansing being carried out at gunpoint by the Serbs.190 Neither was it kind enough to the victims. This behaviour caused the Bosnian Muslims to suppose that Clinton was prepared to do more to further their cause than was perhaps the case, and stall on the agreement. Seeing that the Muslims were stalling, and thinking that they could get a better deal, the Bosnian Serbs also stalled, and so the agreement stalled.191

46

Executive decision-making

The tables then appeared to turn. Publicly, support was repeatedly confirmed for the peace plan being put together by Owen and Vance. Clinton stated overtly, ‘we support the Vance–Owen plan, and we want it to be the basis of an agreement’.192 Not only did he support it, but now it was lauded as ‘the best vehicle for a potential peace’ available to Bosnians.193 The administration committed itself to active involvement in Vance–Owen negotiations, and Reginald Bartholomew was dispatched forthwith as the administration’s direct representatives in those talks. However, it has been suggested that Bartholomew’s sole mission was to obtain a better deal for Muslims.194 Seeing the Americans throw their weight behind the deal, the Bosnian Muslims agreed to the terms. Unfortunately, the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic assented to the deal subject to ratification in the Bosnian Serb Parliament, which soundly rejected it.195 At this point the administration seemed to decide the plan was not worth the effort after all. Comments such as ‘the United States is skeptical that we’ll be able to satisfactorily resolve this within the framework that has been proposed’ replaced previously positive statements.196 More cynical commentators would suggest that the United States did not want the Vance–Owen plan to succeed because it would then be forced to honour its commitment to contribute troops to policing that agreement. Boutros-Ghali cites a Washington joke from that time in illustration of this point: ‘[w]hat’s worse than the Bosnians saying no? Bosnians saying yes.’197 Subsequently, little mention was made of the plan, or further EC/UN efforts. The foreign policy team then moved on to what became known as ‘lift and strike’, which was formulated in the spring of 1993. ‘Lift’ referred to the lifting of the arms embargo which had been placed on the whole of the former Yugoslavia, which was to be coupled with simultaneous air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets; hence: ‘strike’.198 The proposal was aimed at helping the Bosnian Muslims by keeping the Serbs busy while giving the Bosnians the opportunity to arm themselves. Clinton had always wanted the arms embargo lifted as it was viewed by his team as unfairly disadvantaging the Bosnian Muslims, while at the same time benefiting the already well-armed Serbs.199 While it was true that the embargo was detrimental to the ability of the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves, the European countries who already had troops on the ground with UNPROFOR (and subsequently UNPROFOR-BH and UNCRO) found this plan objectionable, as it would put their forces under greater danger. While Clinton expressed understanding of the European position, it did not deter his administration from fixing on this initiative, and although his allies assured him that such a policy would never be accepted in the European capitals, Secretary of State Christopher was dispatched to Europe to sell it.200 The policy was roundly rejected.201

Executive decision-making 47 When it became clear that ‘lift and strike’ was going nowhere fast, the administration began to flail around, searching for something to replace it; some sort of initiative to combat the impression of their own impotence. What they came up with at this stage was not a single, decisive policy plan, but a series of minor policies, which in the end added up to ‘a combination of half-measures and bluster that didn’t work’.202 The administration also pushed continually for extensions of the UNPROFOR mandate (along with other countries) to include the ‘use of force if necessary to carry out its mandate’.203 However, such ambitious roles as the US and others pushed repeatedly for were not conceived of when the mission was set up.204 The rising demand for a tougher UN resulted in attempts to combine traditional peacekeeping operations with the newer doctrine of peace enforcement, a doctrine that had simply never been crystallized with regard to its major principles and procedures, into a cohesive doctrine. To implement such a peace enforcement mandate in Yugoslavia (as with Somalia) would require commitment of larger units, better training, clearer rules of engagement, and more sophisticated command and control procedures, none of which were provided, not to mention the political will for the implementation of such an ambitious task. Furthermore, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are totally incompatible in a practical environment. Peacekeeping involves consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence, whereas peace enforcement, conversely, is often non-consensual, partisan in nature, and may use force at will.205 Conceptual confusion caused by this sort of mixed mandate certainly did not help, and was forced on UNPROFOR (as with Somalia) by Security Council members, and significantly by the United States, which none the less remained reluctant to back the newly ‘vigorous’ UNPROFOR with the necessary forces and finance. Such action merely demonstrated the lack of real commitment and/or political will on behalf of the Americans to see the things they insisted on realized. Was it just posturing? Obviously such a lack of will and steadfast support greatly inhibited the chances of success in Bosnia. Troops in theatre did not have the resources or the political backing to effectively implement such measures as were asked of them, particularly the next option the United States lighted upon: Safe Areas. The idea of creating Safe Areas in Bosnia was initially rejected by President Clinton, as evidenced by his statement of 21 May: ‘I think it’s something we have to be very skeptical of about. We don’t want our people in there basically in a shooting gallery’ (exactly which ‘people’ he was referring to is unclear).206 Curiously, and for reasons that are as yet unknown, the very next day it was announced that the Safe Areas concept was to be the new focus of US policy in Bosnia. Discussed and vetted by France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Spain and the US, a ‘Joint Action Plan’ outlining the policy was issued.

48

Executive decision-making

The Safe Areas were to be protected, with force if necessary, including the use of NATO air power. The option was then pushed vigorously at the UN. Clinton now declared that the scheme was a ‘step towards ending the ethnic cleansing and slaughter by staking out the safe havens . . . in such a way that was clearly designed to end the slaughter, provide safety and humanitarian aid’ and that they would actually decrease the risk to personnel on the ground.207 However, the concept was not greeted with enthusiasm from all quarters. The UNPROFOR Generals opposed it, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UNHCR objected.208 Furthermore, David Owen had ‘serious reservations’, and called on the US to ‘demonstrate its commitment’ by contributing ground troops to UNPROFOR. But as he and others well knew, ‘the US would do nothing of the sort’.209 Christopher had grasped the idea as a way to get Bosnia policy off the agenda and out of the headlines; a ‘new way to shunt Bosnia to the sidelines . . . [to] allow Clinton to do what he should – focus on the domestic agenda’.210 Yes, Safe Areas was agreed on by several countries, and had been called for prior to that by many in the General Assembly, in addition to which the Bosnian Muslims were in favour of the concept, but proper protection of each area was demanded. However, the US stymied any such discussion, as it was estimated that it would require 34,000 preliminary military staff to defend the Safe Areas.211 Indeed, Boutros-Ghali contends that 70,000 military personnel would be needed in all.212 Consequently, in the ‘Joint Action Plan’, ‘defend’ was dropped in favour of the less ambitious ‘deter attack’.213 People on the ground with UNPROFOR ‘assumed there was . . . the political will to fully support this operation’.214 However, it soon became all too apparent that neither the resources nor the political will would be forthcoming should any real attempt on the Safe Areas be made.215 The Siege of Sarajevo prompted Clinton to look for new options in his anxiety to appear to be doing something; to appear tough. And so the call for air strikes came once again. He must have realized, however, that his European allies would not consent, and consequently, in the end, the Americans would not be forced into costly action; they could talk the talk in the knowledge that they would not be required to walk the walk. The threat did loosen some of the Serbian strangulation of Sarajevo, but in the long term, NATO threat minus action only led the Bosnian Serbs to believe NATO to be lacking in conviction, and their threats lacking in substance. It was not long before events in Somalia overshadowed activities in Bosnia, which, for the Americans, altered little in scope and ferocity, whereas events in Somalia arrived at a dramatic climax. It is probably fair to say that little time was devoted to Bosnia policy in the latter part of 1993, and any real impetus did not return until the Sarajevo marketplace attack of February 1994. However, Bosnia policy does not appear to have

Executive decision-making 49 been affected so acutely regarding multilateralist policy as was the case with Haiti. Why? Perhaps because it had bedevilled the Clinton Administration’s multilateralist plans since it had taken the problem on. The administration already viewed Bosnia as a problem child; the situation there was inimitably complicated: intransigence on behalf of most if not all of the parties was inherent, and domestic criticism flew from all directions – not doing enough, doing too much. What was worse, the spectre of Vietnam loomed around discussions of the situation there. Journalists and even high school students asked Clinton ‘is Bosnia going to be your Vietnam?’216 These were comparisons Clinton could have lived without. If and when he committed troops to Bosnia, he could open himself up to accusations of lack of respect for human life, ‘for subjecting young American soldiers to the risks he evaded himself 30 years earlier’.217 Moreover, like his predecessor, Clinton did not want to get drawn into Bosnia in a way that he could not easily extricate his administration from. This was particularly true after October. Bosnia began to look increasingly like Vietnam with the word ‘quagmire’ cropping up more and more frequently.218 One issue that was very obviously and publicly exacerbated by the Somalia episode was that of troop contribution to the peacekeeping force which was to police any eventual agreement in Bosnia. We have witnessed above the strong support for American participation in such a mission that was initially forthcoming from the Clinton camp. It was stated firmly that should an agreement be reached which was acceptable to all sides, the United States would be happy to commit troops to a UN mission to enforce said agreement. Nevertheless, as time wore on and the problems and complexities for the administration became more apparent, American enthusiasm soured as policy preferences failed to prevail, and commitment wavered. Any time an agreement looked likely, assurances of support became more vague and evasive. The higher the potential for US military involvement, the more cautious the administration became.219 On 30 August, when various representatives were in Geneva holding talks, the President was asked, if an agreement was reached at that time, how many American soldiers would be given over to its enforcement. The answer that was provided was incredibly evasive: it all depended on whether Clinton believed the agreement to be ‘fair, fully embraced by the Bosnian government, and . . . enforceable’.220 Yes, Clinton said, the United States would participate, but ‘I want to see what the details are. I want to get the briefing on it . . . I want to know whose responsibility it is to stay for how long.’221 A lot of ‘buts’ for someone who had already made the commitment. By early February 1994 the tone of comments had altered considerably. Now Clinton stated that ‘American forces could only be used, if at all, in the implementation of an agreement’, as he listed the conditions, and then noted that even if involved ‘since the problem is in Europe, the American forces would be in the minority’.222

50

Executive decision-making

In addition to this more cautious tone on troop contributions, there was a marked move from participation through the United Nations to NATO auspices, which was seen as a safer military option for US troops. The interesting thing is that Clinton frames this move as not a move at all, maintaining that this was what he had pledged since February 1993. He even goes so far as to emphasize that the force would be ‘a peacekeeping force from NATO, not the United Nations but NATO’.223 At this point association with the UN was almost tantamount to political suicide. The move to NATO was a significant one, but was smoothed over by the President, and from this point on NATO figured much more heavily in the administration’s thinking towards Bosnia. Notably, the change came in late summer/early autumn of 1993, around the same time that Clinton’s Principals began to worry that the UN mission in Somalia was becoming too risky for American troops. The administration’s withdrawal from the earlier more ambitious behaviour to a more modest policy approach was more in continuity with past US foreign policy behaviour. Following the Somalia incident, and in keeping with the kind of language employed regarding the solution to the conflict there, Clinton began to speak about the future of Bosnia in a similar manner to that which he had begun to employ with respect to Somalia: ‘[t]he conflict in Bosnia’, he now asserted, ‘ultimately is a matter for the parties to resolve’.224 Such a phrase mirrors those that appeared with regard to Somalia, and is illustrative of a significant change in attitude towards these crises. The Clinton team went from an administration, which in simple terms held that it could help and would help, to one which shrugged its collective shoulders and shook its head at the intractability of intrastate violence. The mantra went from ‘their cause is America’s cause’ to ‘it’s not our problem’. Hendrikson quotes a senior State Department official as saying: ‘Bosnia was almost dead in terms of US participation but Mogadishu put the last nail in the coffin.’225 After Somalia, the US voted to limit the UNPROFOR mandate in direct contradiction to its pre-Somalia activism and emphasis on ambitious mandates.226 UN Special Representative Yashushi Akashi expressed worries in the summer of 1995 that UNPROFOR was on the ‘edge of the Mogadishu line’.227 The reaction of US politicians became more important than what measures were needed in theatre. The Clinton Executive was unprepared for the complicated reality that was the situation in Bosnia. The administration entered the multilateral decision-making process with a naive view of how far it could push its ideas and concerns over the ideas and concerns of its allies. It did not want to use force, but in the end was compelled to. It was a similar story with the peace agreement. The administration was not happy with Vance–Owen, and wanted more for the Bosnian Muslims. However, the results of the Dayton Agreement, which was brokered by the US in 1995, differed very little from the provisions laid down by Vance–Owen in 1993, and demonstrated how reality finally dawned on the them.

Executive decision-making 51

An administration deflated; a policy disowned As we have seen, during the campaign for Presidency and in the early months of office, the Clinton foreign policy team dispensed ideas of a foreign policy based on a new moral agenda: an endorsement of interventionism, humanitarianism, and a reliance on multilateralism. What the administration neglected to do, however, was devote to such concepts and rhetoric cohesive prior thought; to prepare themselves for the realities of multilateralism, as evidenced through the specific foreign policy problems: Somalia and Yugoslavia. What this translated into when things – surprisingly – did not go the Executive’s way was a retreat from early rhetoric to a much more cautious realpolitik approach. Foreign policy shifted away from multilateralism to the ‘enlargement’ doctrine, which was better thought out (the foreign policy team had the Transition period, plus seven to eight months to perfect the version that came out in Anthony Lake’s 21 September show-case speech). The United Nations was used as a scapegoat in Somalia and Bosnia, and multilateralism was to a large extent rejected. The experience of these missions made the administration more cautious, and effectively muted the tone and content of the ongoing PRD. The process, much like the administration, had begun optimistically, reevaluating the future of US involvement in UN peacekeeping, but as the foreign policy team learned the hard lessons that Somalia and Bosnia threw at them, the review became suitably and reflectively cautious. The result was an administration that shied away from multilateral action and intervention. Having been unprepared for the difficulties, the Clinton team resolved to avoid them as far as was possible, and this was codified in law in the form of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25). In Clinton’s speech to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, the long-awaited affirmation of support and ambition was replaced by references to: asking harder questions about proposals for new peacekeeping missions: Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? From now on, the United States should address hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins.228 Then came a clumsy statement for a usually eloquent President: ‘[i]f the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no’; even though the situation was in fact the reverse, that it was/is the US who held the power to say ‘no’ to UN proposals.229 As Edward Luck commented, the statement was ‘absurd because

52

Executive decision-making

we were the ones who had the opportunity with the veto to say no.’230 In any case, ‘the United States had voted “yes” on UN involvement in all those operations’ to which Clinton referred.231 Rhetoric changed to accommodate the new perceptions of the Executive, and its acceptance of realpolitik. The language emanating from the Executive became more negative and dismissive, with comments now conversely stating, ‘[p]eace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of US foreign policy’.232 Other Principals such as Lake commented that they would ‘have to pick and choose’ missions as confirmed, by Albright, on a ‘case-by-case basis’.233 Gone was the talk of more accountable foreign policy driven by humanitarianism; now ‘only one overriding factor can determine whether the US should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests’.234 Policy was now more strongly coloured with realpolitik and national interest; as Christopher stated, ‘Realism must guide US policies toward these conflicts.’235 However, it was the hitherto positive Albright who delivered the firmest rebuke of past policy. She averred, ‘we are not about to substitute elusive notions of global collective security for battle-proven and time-tested concepts of unilateral and allied defense’.236 Those ‘notions’ did not appear quite so ‘elusive’ during the campaign and early months of the administration; however, necessity demanded that they be discarded. Such testimony was vastly different to the previously altruistic outlook towards peacekeeping. The administration had been ‘recalibrating . . . [its] expectations’.237 Clinton now referred rather to the limitations of US power than to what could be achieved. He said, ‘our ability to stop people within national boundaries from killing each other is somewhat limited and will be for the foreseeable future’, while Lake remarked, ‘the reality is that we often cannot solve other people’s problems – and we can never build their nations for them’.238 One of the most interesting statements, given the post-Cold War optimism that many wrongs could now be righted, came from President Clinton in mid-October. Remarkably, he commented, ‘[w]hen you’re talking about resolving longstanding political disputes, the United States as the world’s only superpower is no more able to do that for other people than we were 30 years ago’; the virtual opposite of the Wilsonian optimism with which they entered office.239 After October, multilateralism dropped off the agenda entirely, and was only mentioned insofar as reporters asked about it, and none of the major foreign policy speeches dealt with it in any kind of detail after this period (of course, until the administration’s second term). Enlargement became the focus of the administration’s foreign policy (where indeed it had been moving since late September, with Anthony Lake’s speech to the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University). The centre of US policy abroad would now focus on strengthening existing free market democracies, helping to create new democratic countries with

Executive decision-making 53 free market economies, acting against aggression from non-democratic countries while working to ‘liberalize’ states ‘hostile’ to democracy and free market capitalism.240 The Clinton Administration would continue to pursue a humanitarian agenda, not through multilateralism and peacekeeping, however, but through aid, and the fostering of democracy and free market economies in ‘regions of greatest humanitarian concern’.241 In fact, Clinton stressed that in this ‘new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of marketbased democracies’.242

Naivety The experiences of 1990s peacekeeping certainly introduced the Clinton Administration to the difficulties and dangers of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. However, a certain naivety among the relatively young and idealistic officials surrounding Clinton, and indeed the President himself, caused the foreign policy team to overlook many of the negative facets of their favoured policy as it was being formulated, both during the campaign and in the early days of the administration. One may wonder how it might be that officials who had served in previous administrations could be considered naive, but this naivety was a product, not of their lack of experience (although a few years in a previous administration or as Governor of Arkansas does not a political veteran make), but of the unique geopolitical situation that followed the end of the Cold War. The optimism that characterized the post-Cold War era caused them (and they were not alone) to gloss over the details of their policy, or simply fail to notice the dangers. The Clinton Administration campaigned and took office amid the euphoric afterglow at the end of the Cold War when, in the wake of the Gulf War and the absence of stalemate in the UN Security Council, optimism regarding the United Nations was in the ascendant. The foreign policy team saw the potential of peacekeeping and multilateralism as foreign policy tools, made possible for the first time since the end of the Second World War. This increased reliance on multilateral structures seemed the perfect solution to the resource/responsibility dilemma facing the first real post-Cold War Executive. In addition, the new humanitarianism satisfied a general predisposition among those in the campaign/ administration for a greater focus on morality in foreign policy. Hence, administration officials and the President himself began in early 1993 to lay the framework for what they hoped would be a workable multilaterally based foreign policy. What is questionable however, is whether they (and much of the rest of the world, to be fair) were adequately prepared for the consequences that would accompany this new reliance on multilateralism, and the responsibilities and expectations that were now piled chiefly upon the United Nations.

54

Executive decision-making

A combination of inexperience, idealism and hubris impeded a truly realistic appraisal of the potential dangers and subsequent consequences of the chosen strategy, and hindered the establishment of a cohesive and comprehensive doctrine dealing with the problems that new-era peacekeeping missions would engender. Moreover, the rapid deterioration of circumstances in the main foreign policy issues taxing the Clinton Executive meant that little time was allowed for such a task to be carried out before changing realities intruded on the newly appointed administration. Very little time had passed since Clinton had come to office before it became obvious that, multilateralist rhetoric aside, the administration had given less thought to the practical application and costs of policy than to the appearance of those political postures struck. In interviews with reporters, President Clinton quickly appeared frustrated with the constraints a multilateralist framework placed on the administration in following what he believed to be a more ‘pro-active’ Bosnia policy. He complained about the UN resolution that had imposed an arms embargo on the region before Bosnia had been recognized as an individual state and described it as a resolution: which has, in effect, given military victory to the Serbians . . . which has had the effect of opening up for the Serbs the entire arms cache of the Yugoslav Army and denying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims and to a lesser respect, the Croatians.243 This state of affairs the President believed to be immoral, but feeling the constraints of multilateral decision-making, deemed he could do nothing about it: ‘I think the policy of the United Nations it applies to that government [Bosnian] is wrong. But I am in the minority.’244 The administration was also frustrated by the reluctance of European leaders to put their troops on the ground at greater risk by lifting the embargo. This was a theme to which Clinton returned repeatedly.245 He held that the concerns of the Europeans, and other allies with ground troops expressed regarding the repercussions of lifting the embargo, were ‘outweighed by other considerations’; considerations regarding the right, as he saw it, of the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves.246 There were times when he attempted to appear more conciliatory, but his frustration was evident.247 It was clearly an irritation to the team to be unable to follow its chosen policy positions. However, the situation was of the Principals’ own making, arrived at through none other than their own previously stated preference for multilateralism. This position displayed a lack of analysis on behalf of the administration as regards the processes involved and results expected in and of a multilateralist framework for global involvement. Clinton was clearly forced to water down or reject favoured policy routes as a result of consultation with his allies in the multilateral venture.

Executive decision-making 55 In further illustration of this type of naivety and lack of preparation, Madeleine Albright, the person chosen to export the new US optimism to the United Nations, arrived in New York completely unprepared for the manner in which the UN, and in particular peacekeeping, operated. It was apparently a revelation to her. On one occasion, in mid-March 1993, Albright cheerfully informed Congress that her job was like ‘being in a candy store’, because ‘as a former professor of international relations, I talked about all the issues with which I am now dealing’.248 Yet, for a former professor of international relations, who, by her own admission, was attentive to all the issues involved in this new stage of her career, she was seemingly unaware of the ad hoc, or as she termed it ‘improvised’ nature of UN peace operations. ‘It may surprise you’, she told her audience, ‘it certainly surprised me – to learn that each time the United Nations had conducted 28 peacekeeping operations since 1948, it has started from scratch’.249 Strange that she did not take the trouble to discover how the organization she was about to take on actually worked. None of these issues ‘would have surprised anyone who had had anything to do with UN operations over the past 30 years’.250 Thus, Albright exhibited a ‘curious lack of knowledge’ and one might add interest, regarding the operation of UN peacekeeping.251 It seems remarkable that a former professor of international relations (as she termed herself), come Ambassador to the UN – from an administration that repeatedly emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the United Nations – should be so poorly equipped for the realities of the types of operations her administration keenly endorsed. Thus, we have here further evidence of the lack of cohesive planning and preparation surrounding a policy that was heralded as the ‘linchpin’ of Clinton’s postCold War foreign policy. Indeed, Albright admits in her memoirs to being ‘more optimistic than I should have been’, following a trip to Somalia in July 1993, which in turn perhaps led her to act in a less cautious manner towards the Somalia crisis.252 These are just a few examples of the naivety exhibited by the administration with regard to the execution of the types of multilateralist policies espoused both by candidate Clinton while blazing the campaign trail, and the administration in its earliest months of tenure. They do, however, serve to illustrate how ill-prepared the team was to ‘take on’ multilateralism and all its trappings. It came as a shock to the administration when not everything in its favoured multilateralist approach went its way; as did the reality of less deference to the US position. The administration was not prepared for the experience of 1990s peacekeeping itself, a central aspect of its espoused policy. Nevertheless, it does not appear, from the reactions which emerged, that negative eventualities were planned for or factored into the team’s thinking regarding its progressive policy. In short, resulting from a lack of real, comprehensive deliberation regarding the fine points of multilateralism,

56

Executive decision-making

peacekeeping, and all that these entailed, the Clinton Administration was not geared up for the difficulties of achieving specified goals through its chosen framework, and simply ‘appeared to underestimate the enormity of the task ahead, and to overestimate the capabilities of a fragile UN structure to deal with the challenges it would face’.253 The Clinton Administration was not primed for the realities that its early rhetoric would entail. The Principals did not expect what reality threw at them – the difficulties they encountered in peacekeeping missions, in relations with allies, in multilateralism – because they had not taken account of negative eventualities in their policy formulation. The administration had not established a cohesive multilateralist doctrine to back up its rhetoric, and this lack of planning, this naivety regarding the realities that might be faced, soured the Principals on their foreign policy gem: multilateralism; the model that resolved in one easy word the postCold War resource/responsibility dilemma. Neither did the Clinton Executive pay events in Somalia and Bosnia the kind of attention that could have, to some degree, rectified any lack of preparation on its part. Had attention to events as they developed been what it should, many poorly considered actions may have been cut short. And even if closer scrutiny did not produce a sharper, more pragmatic approach to the crises, perhaps at least the impact that was so painfully experienced by the administration may have been mitigated. Such disenchantment and naivety was seen time and again through statements by the President and speeches from administration officials throughout the course of 1993. When asked if he had underestimated the complexity of some questions of policy, Clinton answered, ‘at least on the international front, I would say, the problems are more difficult than I imagined them to be’.254 Nancy Soderberg remarked with regard to Somalia, ‘it was the ultimate naive act of not knowing what we’re going to do next . . . we thought it was going to be fine’.255 With Somalia, Clinton held that the administration ‘may have underestimated the difficulty of setting in motion a political transition’.256 The Principals were, in fact, least prepared for Somalia of all the foreign policy ventures: I think it is fair to say that everyone involved in Bosnia is perhaps more sensitive than was the case in the beginning of the Somalia operation, about the . . . dangers of it, and the need to have a strict set of limitations and conditions before the involvement occurs.257 Finally, Bosnia was in the end a tough lesson for an unprepared Clinton Administration. The imbroglio pointed up all of the problems inherent in cooperative foreign policy/multilateralism that the administration was not prepared for, as disagreement with the American stance was simply not bargained for. Clinton found on many occasions that his ‘position did

Executive decision-making 57 not prevail’, and he was therefore left with the same options as the other members of the UN: ‘all I could do is what we did last week. I voted with many nonaligned nations in the United Nations, and we didn’t win the battle.’258 The administration may not have been happy about how Bosnia policy was shaping up, as Clinton commented, within the framework that it had committed to, America could not ‘impose’ its ‘will’ no matter how much it may have liked to.259 Again, as Soderberg notes, the administration did not want to use force in Bosnia, but ultimately it had to.260 The lack of preparation is particularly evident in each of the situations above, any time a problem was encountered. When an unfortunate incident occurred, the shock and disappointment experienced by the administration is testimony to its lack of understanding regarding the multilateral system it had supposedly endorsed. Was this lack of planning down to American hubris? There are hints that the administration did expect to ‘get its way’. The expectation was that as the sole superpower, America could look forward to dominating any world body or collection of allies and having its preferred policies carried out. Using the multilateral system meant that it could get what it wanted without having to pay the whole cost. Clinton maintained: we are well aware that when we commit ourselves to working with our neighbours, through NATO, through the U.N., through the organization of American States, through any other group, that we have to be prepared not to always have our way just prevail overnight.261 But the fact was that the Principals were not ‘well aware’ of this state of affairs; they were only becoming aware of it when the above statement was made in July. The administration’s reaction to the problems experienced with allies and the United Nations system belied a different reality. The goals and approach employed would certainly have been different had this been so. Surprise was probably the least of reactions when American dominion did not always turn out to be the case. But the administration did not force the issues; it did not insist on the American way or the highway, because commitment was actually quite limited. As we have seen, when American interests were damaged and it was felt necessary to place strict limitations on its multilateralist involvement, the administration did insist and its policy preferences did prevail with the institutionalization of PDD25. This document became not only America’s criteria but the UN’s criteria, and the criteria for all other nations involved, demonstrating that the Clinton Administration was no stranger to superpower conceit. The following quote from Madeleine Albright is unfortunately illustrative of this point: What has happened . . . [at the UN], and I am very heartened by this, is that one of the permanent representatives came to me and said,

58

Executive decision-making wait a minute. You have the veto. That means that if these are your criteria, they are going to be our criteria. And I said, really, you got it.262

Thus, experience affected policy. Had the administration sufficiently understood the minutiae of multilateral policy and the problems and disappointments experienced, it may have borne such trials with less shock and more stoicism. However, they were not borne stoically, and the result was a retreat from earlier rhetoric, which as we have seen was positive and full of possibility and optimism (probably to the point of obscuring reality). What Charles William Maynes describes as ‘benign realpolitik’ took over as the guiding principle.263

The ‘blame-game’ For whatever reason, foreign policy did not go exceedingly well for Clinton in the first few years of his Presidency as he ‘stumbled from crisis to crisis, trying to figure out what was popular, what would be effective, and what would pose the lowest risk to his presidency, and, especially, to his reputation’.264 However, as he discovered, his involvement in multilateralism and the UN served a very useful purpose for the administration after all. Multilateralism and its foremost international organization, the United Nations, were perfectly placed to take the fall for a poorly thought out foreign policy from an inexperienced administration.265 Yes, the UN and 1990s peacekeeping were equipped with many faults, but reform was ongoing. Furthermore, many problems inherent in the system were not the fault of the UN, but of the parts that constituted it: the member states, and particularly the permanent five, of whom the United States was/is undisputedly the most powerful and influential. The United Nations and America’s allies were continually blamed (whether the facts supported such a stance or not) when things went wrong for the Clinton Administration. The President in particular obviously relished the availability of such a scapegoat on many occasions.266 As we have witnessed, Clinton frequently blamed his European allies, and subsequently the UN, for holding back what he insisted would be a successful Bosnia policy. He complained about inaction but placed the blame elsewhere. Thus, if nothing was achieved it would not be the fault of the administration, but of the Europeans who would not let the Clinton team put its plans into action. Perfect. Somalia was the main problem for which the United Nations wrongly bore the blame, particularly from a smarting Clinton Administration.267 Albright confesses that ‘even in the White House’, the UN fielded the blame for the debacle, but that this ‘was not the whole story’.268 The United States was as much if not more responsible for what happened in the unfortunate country. None the less, the UN was held responsible.269 The President was very short with reporters questioning him about a

Executive decision-making 59 bungled incursion as early as August, and immediately insisted that the UN was responsible for the raid and the mandate and everything to do with it: ‘the United Nations set that as their objective, and they asked us for our help.’270 Such a statement pretends ignorance of the veto-wielding capability of the United States, and how strongly the administration pushed for the increased mandate that allowed such raids to take place. Neither does it reference the fact that the intelligence, planning, command and responsibility for the raids were entirely under US authority. Clinton intentionally painted a disingenuous picture of the relationship between the US and UN in planning and implementing the UNOSOM II mandate at every stage. Someone had to take the flack for what had gone wrong, and Clinton was not about to do so. Therefore, the US busied itself with the ‘inaccurate but highly effective practice of blaming the entire debacle . . . on the United Nations’.271 It was during the President’s Address to the Nation on Somalia, however, that the administration’s power of amnesia truly realized itself. Clinton insisted that the mission was a UN one, with a UN mandate and UN plans. No mention was made of the fact that all of the raids were US planned/led/authorized, and inexcusably, that when they ran into trouble, it was UNOSOM forces who drove into the middle of a firefight with thousands of Somalis, to get them out. No words of thanks were forthcoming for the UNOSOM troops who risked their lives, or of condolence for the Malaysian soldier who lost his life in the effort.272 The UN as deflection device began to take shape. On 14 October Clinton stated that it was a ‘UN requirement that got us all into the position we were in last week’.273 This is a misleading statement, since it gives the impression that the UN had the independent power to take such decisions. The hunt for Aideed was a UN requirement that was determined in the Security Council, of which America was/is a veto-wielding member, and not only that; the hunt was something pushed for strongly by the American team. What Clinton was seeking to publicize was the impression that he had sought to guide the UN towards a more sensible path, but that they had ignored his council. However, the UN does not make its own decisions, it can only do what member states tell it. Clinton was seen to remark that the goal of his September speech to the United Nations had been to moderate its actions in Somalia, but why would a speech change a UN mission’s mandate? The US did not put forward a motion in the Security Council to tone down the mission in Somalia, nor did she veto any of the resolutions issued by the SC that affirmed the mission there and its mandate, any such actions that would have contained the off-track operation. What is more, nowhere in his speech to the UN does Clinton urge a refocus on the political aspect of the mission in Somalia, or a cessation of action against Aideed; therefore there is no reason to suppose this speech would have made a difference. This sort of dissemblance served only to

60

Executive decision-making

further confuse the American people, and to pitch an already anti-UN Congress into battle mode. Consequently, according to the Clinton team, the United Nations was liable for the flawed policy that led to the fateful raid. What the administration then attempted to do was impugn the UN for the specifics of what went wrong in the raid itself, suggesting that the organization itself was in command at the time, which as we know was entirely incorrect. Clinton disclosed: my experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United states here.274 This statement infers that a command, other than American, was in some way responsible for the activities prior to and during those incursions that eventually resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. That a UN commander made the decisions that put American lives at risk is manifestly untrue. The UN Security Council provided the mandate, backed by the United States, but that is where any UN influence ended. Yes, limited operational control of a very few American troops existed in Somalia, but command remained firmly routed through General Hoar at CENTCOM. As for the Ranger and Delta Force that was responsible for the October raid, the command and control structure was entirely American. In fact, the UNOSOM II command structure was almost wholly unaware that the raid of 3 October was taking place. The decision was made in the US and delivered directly, through US command structures. Admiral Howe was completely unaware, and General Bir, the UN Commander, was only informed after things went wrong. The only UN official who knew was the deputy Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Montgomery, who also happened to be America’s top military man in Somalia. And, when he was questioned regarding the raid, Montgomery commented that it was largely the US which helped change the mission into a more militaristic one with SC Resolution 837, but failed to provide any further troop levels to enable the new situation to be dealt with adequately.275 Congress had accused the Clinton Administration of relinquishing control of US foreign policy and command of US troops to the United Nations. Yet, rather than countering such an attack with the truth, namely that the administration had not passed its foreign policy responsibilities to the UN, and that American combat troops had never served under any other than US command, the Clinton Administration decided that it was better to appear as though it had not been in full control of its own affairs than incompetent. Thus, officials variously declared, ‘the President will never relinquish command authority over US forces’, and ‘the American people need to

Executive decision-making 61 have reassurance that if American troops are involved in a combat role, that they will be led by Americans’.276 Members of the military establishment, such as Lt. Gen. Wesley Clarke, were instructed to deliver similar reassurances: ‘[t]he President will never relinquish command of US forces; that is inviolable.’277 Hence, the misperception that US troops had operated under UN command on the night of 3–4 October persisted. Following Somalia, the administration clearly sought to distance itself from the United Nations and its previously progressive attitudes towards multilateralism. Using the UN as a instrument to deflect its own accountability, the administration appeared to ditch reality in order to play to the fears of Congress and a vocal minority, even though such fears were, as it was well aware, misguided and without foundation. But as all Presidents should know, a good foreign policy will not help you, but a bad one can hurt you.

Conclusion The entry of the Clinton Administration into the political equation in 1990s America, and indeed the UN, engendered hopes of a newly vigorous US policy towards multilateralism, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, largely as a result of the team’s ambitious campaign rhetoric. To all intents and purposes the administration was happy to allow this perception to prevail, as this was indeed its intention at the time. However, early pronouncements fuelled hopes and aroused fears. Nevertheless, as the months came and went, the Clinton Executive began to feel the weight of problems experienced in foreign policy crises in Bosnia and, most of all, Somalia. The difficulty and risk involved in multilateralism, and one of its most popular expressions at the time, peacekeeping, was too much for the Clinton Administration, who had gone into the business overly optimistic (like many others) and naively unprepared; remarkable for such a supposedly cerebral and academic group; in fact, the administration’s support was a mile wide, but an inch deep.278 The complicated and often devastating realities that faced peacekeeping operations in the 1990s (and still do today) were simply not anticipated by the naively optimistic administration, and thus when things did go awry, the Executive and many others previously supportive of such ideals withdrew sharply, alarmed and disappointed. As Jonathan Clark and James Clad comment, early ideals ‘collided with complicated realities abroad’ and at home.279 There had to be someone else to blame. Responsibility could not lie with the administration’s inability to recognize trouble ahead. Its erstwhile partner in all of this, the United Nations, was primed and ready to take the flack. Clinton and his team, only too glad to deflect Congressional criticism away from themselves, placed the blame repeatedly and damagingly on the UN.

62

Executive decision-making

The review process that Clinton had set in motion upon entering office was hijacked by the concerns of a crestfallen and pressurized administration, and the result was a severe and restrictive policy document which limited the ability of the United States to participate in peacekeeping operations; going so far as to attempt to limit the ability of other nations to act, by placing restrictions on the type of mission the US could authorize, even if it had no intention of contributing troops. Amazingly, Madeleine Albright touts before Congress the many operations that might have gone ahead, but because of US insistence did not. Because of US policy no missions were authorized in ‘Burundi, Sudan, NagornoKarabatch, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone despite the terrible violence that . . . [had] occurred in each’.280 To cite this as an achievement, aside from being sickening, is truly indicative of the change in attitude that came over the Clinton administration in the short space of time it had been in office. The ‘neo-Wilsonians’ of the Clinton campaign had become ‘curiously indifferent’ to catastrophe and suffering around the world; the same catastrophe and suffering that they had set out during the campaign to put right.281 The place that would suffer most from this newfound ‘indifference’ was Rwanda. In fact, such was the extent of the administration’s risk aversion after Somalia that rather than the deaths of the 18 servicemen, ‘American flight from responsibility in the case of Rwanda became the big scandal’.282

3

Congressional accountability?

Introduction Congress presented a formidable challenge to the Clinton Administration. Although initially positively inclined towards the benefits of multilateralism, peacekeeping and the United Nations, the Clinton Executive was quickly faced with an increasingly conservative Legislature, which was not inclined to sit on the sidelines while the administration, in its eyes, squandered the power and influence it had garnered during the Cold War. Although legislative conservatives had their finest hour (prior to the election of unified government during the recent Bush Administration) with the election of the 104th Congress in November 1994, conservatism as a force in American political life had been on the rise since the early 1960s, and the Legislature of the 1990s held a significant number of conservatives by the time the 42nd President was elected; certainly sufficient to make his life difficult should the mood take them (and it did). Nevertheless, was the 103rd Congress sufficiently powerful and sufficiently hostile to Clinton Administration foreign policy to force change? This chapter will demonstrate the manner in which the Legislative Branch impacted upon Clinton Administration attitudes, and ultimately policy, towards multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN; to illustrate the manner in which this Branch contributed to the formulation of a more restrictive policy line, but to demonstrate that ultimately, and contrary to the accepted knowledge on this subject, it was the Clinton Administration’s perception of threat, and a lack of genuine commitment to the multilateral ideal that led to the abandonment of its previously favoured foreign policy platform. The key to a truculent 103rd Congress was its conservative character. Consequently, our first task is to map how this growth in conservatism occurred, culminating during the first Clinton Administration with the election of the 104th Congress, and what was known as the ‘Gingrich revolution’.283 This conservativism greatly increased the likelihood of conflict between Clinton and his Congressional counterparts, and ensured that the administration’s particular espousal of the principle of multilateralism

64

Congressional accountability?

would be met with stern opposition. The political colouring of Congress affected the overall attitude of the Legislative Branch towards multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN, which were seen as ineffective, inefficient, wasteful of forces, contrary to the national interest, and reckless with resources that would be better employed domestically. We shall consider briefly the significant number of relatively new representatives in Congress at this time, entering governance without memory of the constraints that existed during the Cold War, and accompanied by an inclination towards all things domestic. We shall also take into account the GOP’s use of the UN and multilateralist policy as a partisan electoral tool, in addition to the general feeling of dislike among some legislators for the President himself, and how these factors affected the general attitude of Congress towards the Clinton Administration and its foreign policy preferences. Our attention then shifts to the particular relationship between the Clinton Administration and the 103rd Congress, taking into account the role played by legislators in persuading the President to rethink his predilection for multilateralism Ultimately, we will ask: How far can the Legislature be held responsible for the Clinton Administration’s U-turn on peacekeeping and the UN? The Legislature that President Clinton had to deal with was much more oppositional and activist than at many times in its history, but does that explain how legislators managed to overrule the preferences of the Executive Branch, which retains major foreign policy control and initiative, despite its relatively small portion of constitutionally specified powers, and in spite of the decline in deference conferred on that Branch during the Cold War?

A turn to the Right The Congress that President Clinton faced during his first term in office was an increasingly conservative one. This condition reflected changes that had taken place in American politics, and more specifically, within the Republican Party, since the 1960s. Although generally remembered as the apex of Liberal idealism, the decade that saw the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency also saw the true birth of conservatism in American politics. A product of disillusionment with Democratic dealings and old-style Republican elitism, the Vietnam War and Watergate, many Republicans (and some Democrats) found themselves searching for a third way in US politics. Conservatism, although by no means a cohesive political movement, was the answer for many.

Congressional accountability? 65 A historicist approach Claiming heritage arising from classical liberalism, and Republican stalwarts such as Robert Taft, a fragment of the GOP began to identify itself as conservative.284 This group felt that the Republican Party was not doing enough to stem what it saw as the tide of ‘big government’, New Deal welfarism, inaction in the face of communism, and a moral haemorrhaging in US politics initiated by Democrat Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Their early leader was Presidential contender Barry Goldwater, and their year zero: his attainment of the Republican nomination for President in 1964. The assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 ensured that no one but his Vice-President Lyndon Johnson stood any chance of winning the Presidency. None the less, the significance of Goldwater’s nomination lay in the fact that prior to this point, the loosely affiliated conservative groups were considered within the GOP as fringe elements and extremists. Goldwater’s selection however, was evidence that mainstream Republicanism had moved sufficiently to the right to nominate a conservative for the White House (although, in fact, a large section of the Republican electorate voted for Johnson, against what they perceived as Goldwater’s extremism).285 Indeed, the party’s next Presidential hopeful, Richard Nixon, felt sufficiently respectful of the growing power of the conservative element to court it energetically in his bid for the 1968 nomination, even though, as his Presidential record attests, he was much more pragmatic and conciliatory in leadership than those conservatives who had helped place him in office would have liked.286 Conservatives were becoming politically organized, but importantly they were also developing a solid basis at the grass-roots level. Conservative groups had begun to spring up in the mid-1950s, but by the 1960s and 1970s the number of conservative publications, political organizations, youth groups, think-tanks, foundations and fundraising groups had grown appreciably.287 What the conservative movement had now was a movement. It had grown up, as Goldwater had urged, and realistically entered politics with the necessary intellectual, financial, organizational and public backing.288 Of particular import for the future of American politics was that young people, influenced during the Goldwater campaign, and later, reacting to the counter-culture that had begun to assert itself in society, began to identify with more traditional values, and a strain of political thought and politician, that would provide them with an antidote to the ‘sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll’ of the 1960s and 1970s.289 The conservative movement, of whichever branch, seemed their salvation. Significantly these were some of the young men and women who would go on to fill the House and Senate in the 1990s.290 In the late 1970s and 1980s conservative groups such as the New Right made political marriages with the religious Right, operating under the Moral Majority banner, and conservatives in general came together to seek common goals.

66

Congressional accountability?

President Carter wrested control of the Executive from the Republicans when he took over from Gerald Ford in 1976, and his policies certainly did not delight conservatives. So when Ronald Reagan won the 1980 Presidential election, conservatives were overjoyed. Reagan was a self-identified Democrat-come conservative Republican, therefore for the movement, his ascension to the Presidency was a vindication of all that they stood for. Unfortunately with Reagan, conservatives experienced some of the same disappointments as they had with Nixon. Although he was more of a ‘true’ conservative, he too encountered the necessity of compromise and conciliation that accompanies leadership. None the less, the election of a selfprofessed conservative to the highest office of governance in the country attests to the growing influence of conservatism in American politics. Reagan also brought with him a great many conservative Republicans to occupy Congress, thus further increasing the march of conservatism in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Also of importance was the conservatization of some Democrats, who began to distance themselves from the party ‘during the Vietnam war’, becoming known as ‘neo-conservatives’ in the 1970s, and following the success of the 1980 Reagan campaign, ‘Reagan Democrats’.291 This type of conservative differed in many ways from Republican conservatives, both traditional (Goldwater), New Right and Christian Right, but they none the less contributed to the conservative make-up of politics and politicians. A further factor was the growth of conservatism since the late 1970s among African-Americans, a section of American society typically Democratic/ liberal in outlook.292 After Reagan, his Vice-President, the establishment’s man George Bush (a ‘closet liberal’ according to conservatives) upset the rank and file of the movement by deviating in many ways from the policies of his predecessor.293 But within Congress, a conservative young upstart by the name of Newt Gingrich had put many noses out of joint by defying all the rules and engineering his ascension to position of Republican House Whip, one of the three top Republican jobs in the House (1989). Gingrich was the epitome of the new, activist, conservative Washington politician, and his political grouping within the House of Representatives, the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS), had carved out quite a niche for itself in the public psyche, utilizing free public air time provided by C-SPAN coverage of House floor debates, to promote its views and issues.294 These politicians represented a ‘new breed of American conservatives’.295 Conservatives were appalled by the election of Clinton in 1992, and the return to unified government (controlled by Democrats). None the less, conservatism was firmly lodged in American politics, and the activism of the now mainly conservative Republican leadership of the Senate (Bob Dole), and the House of Representatives (Gingrich, Richard Armey) presented quite a challenge to so-called liberals on both sides of the Pennsylvania Avenue divide. The conservative insurgents presented a

Congressional accountability? 67 considerable challenge to the Democratic White House, with the Contract with America, on the domestic side, which later led to the National Security Revitalization Bill (1995), on the side of foreign affairs. The apex of conservative domination came with the sweeping Republican gains of the 104th (1994) Congress. Republicans captured the House and narrowly missed domination of the Senate. In 1995, Gingrich took over the stewardship of the Republican Party in the House and thus the leadership of House Republican Party became ‘almost entirely conservative’.296 Those conservative groups which had begun to sprout up all over the country in the 1970s and 1980s became very important in 1990s politics. Groups such as the New Right were instrumental in supporting Gingrich in his campaign for Republican Whip, and provided: campaign funding, strategic advice, policy ideas and justifications, staff training and support, honoraria, personal favors, and other benefits to a defined subgroup of Washington D.C., groom, educate, socialize, and patronize these members.297 The conservative movement of the 1990s was sophisticated, well organized, and largely successful in recruiting and socializing new additions to the Washington scene (freshmen members of Congress) into the conservative establishment. These groups went about their business in an almost evangelical way; a style perhaps borrowed from their Christian Right compatriots. An additional factor that played a part in the hostile make-up of the Legislature faced by President Clinton was the large number of freshmen and sophomore members of Congress. The 1992 elections brought in a massive number of new legislators, with 110 new members in the House of Representatives and 12 in the Senate.298 These recent additions, particularly among the GOP, could be considered conservative in outlook, and in fact nearly all the ‘newly elected Republicans . . . in 1994 were conservatives’ but for one.299 These ‘younger more conservative Republicans . . . endorsed a more aggressive, more confrontational, hard line approach’ than the traditional Republicans.300 Moreover, combined with this increasingly activist style was a marked decline in interest in foreign policy. To the newly elected legislators entering politics since the end of the Cold War (‘[m]ore than half the members of the House . . . [had] been elected since the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989’301), domestic issues held precedence: cutting taxes, reducing the federal budget deficit, improving domestic conditions. As Robert Greenberger comments, ‘[t]heir public lives [bore] . . . none of the burdens of the Cold War’ and therefore ‘[t]hey . . . [saw] no global threat, no lethal enemy beyond the horizon’.302 Thus, there was no reason to support foreign aid and international organizations, or involve America in foreign conflicts or crises. Inasmuch as these new members were concerned with foreign issues at all, these were

68

Congressional accountability?

driven by economic issues: world trade, the international competitiveness of US businesses, and the quality of American education in preparing its young people for the global workplace.303 The new conservative-leaning politicians displayed little concern for matters of foreign policy; however, where they were opposed to a policy, that opposition was vehement. Issues surrounding the United Nations, peacekeeping and multilateralism drew the attention of these legislators because they saw them as detrimental to US domestic interests; as costs that ought to have been distributed at home. Such new members therefore played a significant role in ensuring that the make-up of the Legislative Branch was of a class that would be inexorably inclined to oppose the Clinton Administration’s early multilateralist foreign policy leanings. Consequently, a marriage of traditional Republicanism (which, by the history of hostile Democrat opposition during years of Republican Executives alone, was determined to provide a blunt opposition to Clinton’s Democrat White House), New Right conservatism, the religious Right and neo-conservatism united during the early 1990s to present a strong conservative challenge to the Clinton Administration and its foreign policies.304 Conservatives and multilateralist foreign policy issues We have seen how conservatism has come to play a significant role in American politics since the 1960s. But why is the increasingly conservative nature of many US politicians important to this study? The answer to this question lies in the ideological bent of these politicians. Conservatism displays a particular character in domestic politics, but has always placed a significant emphasis on liberal mismanagement of foreign affairs. During the bipolar struggle that characterized the greater part of the twentieth century, foreign policy was high on the agenda of the conscientious conservative, in particular, in the form of the fight against communism.305 For conservatives, liberal policy was simply not forceful enough in the face of this critical threat to democracy. They argued that politicians ought to be more activist at home and abroad in countering the red peril. Communism was not something that the United States had to struggle against, it was something the United States must defeat. Disasters like Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis only served to exacerbate the conservatives’ opinion that liberal politicians were fundamentally unqualified to conduct foreign policy. Conservative foreign policy outlook stems largely from its domestic ideology. According to this, ‘big government’ must be ‘rolled back’, with less federal interference in just about every aspect of governance, and devolved responsibility to the states. Taxes can always be less than they are, eliminating a vital source of power for the Federal government, which should also involve some devolution to the state level. Rooted in what they

Congressional accountability? 69 saw as the dangers of the New Deal era, conservatives are also firmly antiwelfare, and constantly sought revision of welfare provisions. On foreign policy, conservatives have always been big on military, believing the US should be actively seeking victory in the Cold War, rather than, as they saw it, the feeble strategy of Containment. Such an approach would of necessity require a strong military to defeat the communist threat and protect the US homeland and way of life. Consequently, conservatives do not approve of programmes such as foreign aid. To them even structured aid to allies reeks a little too much of welfare, albeit on an international scale. Similarly, conservatives are almost ‘reflexively suspicious’ of the multilateral prosecution of foreign policy, anything in the peacekeeping pantheon, or international organizations such as the United Nations.306 These are considered with sceptical mistrust, and conservatives refer variously to involvement in multilateral initiatives as ‘surrender’, ‘subversion’ and ‘subservience’; subordinating US foreign policy, and indeed leadership, to institutions full of non-Americans, and isolating foreign policy from American decision-makers and the national interest.307 Multilateralism simply delivers too much control of US affairs into the hands of others, who do not necessarily, and quite often purposely, do not have America’s best interests at heart. As Representative Donald Mazullo commented during a debate on Somalia, ‘[t]he real issue here is the abandonment of foreign policy to the United Nations . . . turning over decisions that we should have been making for ourselves’.308 While we know that no decision can be made in the UNSC without the consent of its five veto-wielding members, such comments are indicative of the attitude among conservatives with respect to the UN. In the eyes of the conservative, international organizations such as the UN are made up of vastly bloated and inefficient bureaucracies, much like the Federal government, which levy a disproportionate charge on the taxpayer. Multilateralism, peacekeeping and the United Nations cost too much for too little. Moreover, conservatives assert, reliance on multilateralism and peacekeeping is not conducive to a strong military. Multilateralism assumes that a large, powerful military is not necessary; only the capacity to contribute to multilateral ventures is required. In addition, involvement in peacekeeping lessens the effectiveness of the military as a tool of the United States’ national interest by allowing control to rest in the hands of non-US personnel with a non-US agenda. Such use of US forces ‘turns the military into a cooperative instrument at some cost to its war-fighting capabilities’.309 Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and nation-building are far from the national interest, yet place the lives of American men and women in mortal danger, often, according to the conservative, at the behest of a foreign commander. As Representative William Goodling censured, ‘I don’t want us [American soldiers] to become pawns in the hands of the United Nations’.310 Thus, international institutions like the UN are,

70

Congressional accountability?

to the conservative, a ‘malevolent magnet’, pulling the United States into problems that it had no business being involved with.311 Moreover, conservatives, some more nonsensically than others, tend to exaggerate the potential of organizations such as the UN to evolve into some sort of supra-national government; a sovereign entity in its own right with a standing army and enormous power. Such a scenario would create an entity resembling their antagonist, the Federal government, inflated tenfold. As Terry Deibel explains, ‘conservative’s negative views toward all government often produced a strident opposition to international agencies, which are forms of government at the international level’.312 More than that, many conservatives fear that international institutions like the UN have a very real potential to become supra-national governments, powerful enough to control the United States, thereby threatening her sovereignty. There are those who would even go so far as to suggest that this is already the case; buying into conspiracy theories involving UN plots to take control of the United States, even the world.313 Equipped with an already functioning private army which is epitomized by images of fleets of unmarked black helicopters ‘overflying the Rocky Mountain states in preparation for a UN takeover of the country’, the United Nations had become too powerful and must be stopped.314 However ridiculous such theories are, and however little sway they may hold over the vast majority of American politicians, they are none the less indicative of the extremes which distrust of the organization among conservatives had reached in 1990s American politics. Conservatives have typically been unilateralist when considering the use of force.315 However, since the decline of the age of superpower conflict and the refocus in American politics on the domestic agenda, many conservatives have tended towards a neo-isolationism; a sort revisitation of the interwar period and before that craves disengagement from global affairs.316 The true isolationist is rare however, and most conservatives tend towards a concept of foreign affairs which revolves around the view that Americans ought to mind America’s business, and the rest of the world theirs; becoming unilateralist when pushed by the threat, real or potential, of violence. Two senators are of particular note in their frequent proclamations regarding multilateralism, and in particular, the UN system: Jesse Helms, a fairly traditional, albeit colourful Republican politician, very conservative in his anti-UN views; and Bob Dole, traditional Republican-come conservative Republican leader of the Senate (ally of Gingrich in engineering the sweeping Republican gains in the 1994 Congressional elections), and author of the radical challenge to Clinton’s multilateralist foreign policy, the Peace Powers Act, and 1996 Presidential challenger. Both men ‘made UN-bashing into a favoured pastime’.317 However, whereas Dole undoubtedly used the issues at stake here for political gain, it is said that the more truly committed Helms ‘made an obsession’ of calling attention to UN detractions.318

Congressional accountability? 71 Writing in Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy respectively, the two men provide us with concise summaries of the conservative attitude towards the UN, and multilateral foreign policy. Helms, writing specifically with regard to the United Nations, bemoans the organization’s bloated bureaucracy, spiralling costs and recklessly expanding mission mandates, which exact a terrible price from the American people. But what is worse, the Carolinian complains, ‘the United Nations is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign state itself’, presenting a clear and growing threat to US national interests.319 Helms seems to believe that the UN is administrated (badly) by some faceless coterie of Machiavellian international diplomats, without state or national affiliation, pursuing their own private agenda, without regard to the member states of which the organization is comprised.320 Without doubt, such comments as those referring to the inefficiency and wastefulness of the UN bureaucracy are, or at least were at that time of writing, reasonable charges to make. The United Nations was in great need of reform, something that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had begun to deal with, and which was continued with many accomplishments by his successor Kofi Annan. However, comments concerning the evolution of the UN into some kind of sovereign entity run by faceless diplomats who are answerable to no one are unfounded. As is the idea that the US taxpayer bore a disproportionate burden of the cost of such undertakings as peacekeeping, particularly considering the fact that the United States was at that time severely derelict in its financial duties toward the organization. The disturbing feature here is that such notions of a supra-national United Nations, once ‘mutterings of the paranoid dark’, were now uttered ‘in the light’ by respected politicians.321 Such beliefs are/were typical of the conservative stance concerning multilateralism and the UN. Dole (using the journal as a means to articulate his foreign policy platform during the 1996 Presidential campaign) deals with a wider spectrum of foreign policy issues. In covering questions of multilateral policy, international organizations and issues such as peacekeeping, his language is less inflammatory than that of Helms, but his message is largely the same. He rails against those who would rely solely on world bodies like the UN to protect US interests abroad, stating that the policies of the United Nations were often not in America’s best interests; claiming that there were even times when UN policies were in fact contrary to those interests. Furthermore, Dole maintains that relying solely on multilateral bodies to prosecute US foreign policy allows non-Americans to ‘call the shots’, thereby ‘[s]ubcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating American sovereignty’.322 Multilateralism, in his eyes, weakens American credibility abroad, presenting an enfeebled image of the United States to the world; something that could only serve to ‘embolden’ America’s enemies around the world.323 Not only that, but following multilateral

72

Congressional accountability?

policy physically weakens the US militarily. Reliance on the use of force through multilateral alliances presages cuts in defence spending as a larger military is no longer necessary; this Dole sees as a profound threat to the American national interest. The implications for national security would be disastrous, he laments. Finally, he argues, such impulses as cause the UN to call for action in places like Rwanda and Somalia are no basis for foreign policy, and they are certainly no basis on which to send American men and women into potentially life-threatening situations; he protests: ‘[t]he American people will not tolerate American casualties for irresponsible internationalism.’324 Perhaps the above appears to be a summation of many reasonable objections to multilateralism; however, the concerns are voiced in a manner that suggests the Executive of the time had already farmed out US foreign policy to the United Nations, decimated the American armed forces, and substituted international utopianism for concrete matters of national interest in its formulation of foreign policy. Whatever the criticisms of the Clinton Administration’s prosecution of foreign policy, it was clear, particularly by 1996, that this was not the case. As early as autumn 1993, the Clinton Administration had facilitated the transformation of a globally respected body into a political ‘untouchable’ in the American political arena. The UN as a political posturing tool Our study comes now to the next factor relating to Congress that influenced the Clinton Administration’s ability to engage in the foreign policy of its preference: the United Nations as a posturing tool.325 The composition of Congress during the 1990s was of an increasingly conservative ilk, and the conservative commonly regarded/s multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN with a measure of cynicism and distain. In addition, as we have observed in Chapter 1, many in Congress, influenced by ‘vocal minorities’, believed the public to be similarly negative towards these issues. Consequently, the UN system was a perfect ‘symbolic issue’, ready for use in pointing up Democrat inadequacies.326 In placing its foreign policy hopes on the principle of multilateralism, the Clinton Administration provided the ever more conservative Congress with a ‘target-rich environment’ for use any time it sought to discredit the President or Democrats, to draw attention to itself as an activist Legislature, or to draw distinctions between conservatives and nonconservatives.327 A perfect electioneering device. It proved a very useful tool, particularly following the 1993 Somalia debacle and the languishing hatred and horror that was Bosnia, with which to ‘score political points’ in the lead up to the 1994 Congressional election.328 Dole, Helms and many other Republicans used the disappointments of multilateralism to draw attention to supposed Democrat detractions: ‘the

Congressional accountability? 73 Democrats got 18 of America’s finest killed’, ‘the Democrats have put US foreign policy in the hands of non-Americans in the United Nations’. Dole, in particular, found the UN an enormously useful device in his bid for the Presidency in 1996, even stooping to blatant racism in drawing attention to the organization’s failings, with personal attacks on the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. His reference to the Secretary-General as ‘Bootros-Bootros’ became a regular crowd-pleaser at Republican rallies.329 Having used the line during his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, he found that ‘[t]he name of the Secretary General set off an instant roar in the Convention hall’.330 It was a ‘cheap shot’, but Dole approved of its effect, and used it at every opportunity he could thereafter. In emphasizing the position of multilateralism in its foreign policy inventory, the Clinton Administration perhaps allowed the impression that it was not fully in control of policy; therefore in criticizing the UN, Dole was effectively criticizing Clinton’s judgement, and in essence his fitness or ability to govern. As Boutros-Ghali points out, doubtless with a certain degree of resentment, ‘[b]eing anti-United Nations was smart politics in Washington’.331 The partisan nature of attitudes towards UN issues may also be seen clearly through comparison between the support conferred by Republicans on UN ventures championed by past Republican presidents, and the negativity emanating from the same ranks during the Clinton Administration. For example, Representative Benjamin Gilman was reproached by Democratic colleague Gary Ackerman for his anti-UN posturing and demands for immediate withdrawal from Somalia, when ten years previously he had endorsed Reagan’s decision to maintain a US presence in Lebanon, where they had been involved in a peacekeeping operation turned violent, resulting in the deaths of 241 US marines. Ackerman stated: [y]ou were right then Mr. Gilman, and I happened to have agreed with you and voted with you in support of that President and the placement of troops at that time. I believe you were right and I stuck with the President who happened to have been of your party, and I believe you are wrong now and I can’t think of too many other circumstances, other than the party of the President, that have changed.332 In addition, Gilman was a strong supporter of the multilateral UN operation to liberate Kuwait in 1991.333 Responding to charges of a lack of consultation by the Clinton Administration over UNOSOM II, Democrat Harry Johnston also commented that during the initial deployment of US troops to Somalia in January of that year,

74

Congressional accountability? there were 28,000 troops put into Somalia with no debate prior to that time . . . there was no debate on Desert Shield, on Desert Storm, there were half a million troops there before the debate even started.334

Consequently, Republicans who complained about Democrat Clinton’s policy actions while having supported Republican President Bush in the past were involved in a highly partisan hypocrisy. As Hendrikson writes, ‘Republican views of the United Nations Security Council decisions contrasted with the GOP’s support of the UN under President Bush.’335 Although it is possible to pose various other reasons for this shift, for example, the newer members of Congress (1992), or a disappointment of post-Cold War expectations and optimism, it is fair to say that partisanship played a significant role. The UN was used above and beyond a partisan positioning tool; it was used as a way for politicians to simply taunt Clinton himself. As Greenberger attests, the one thing that united Republicans in the Congress of the 1990s was ‘their intense dislike of and lack of respect for Clinton’.336 Clinton was the Democrat upstart who denied President Bush a second term; a slight for which many could never forgive him. He represented all that was wrong with liberalism, had ‘acquired a reputation for political evasion and double-dealing’, and to many he was morally corrupt, being well known as a ladies’ man (having what was widely referred to as a ‘zipper problem’).337 In this atmosphere, the feeling among Republicans, traditional and conservative alike, was often ‘if Clinton is for it, it just must be bad’.338 Even if the situation was not one of legislators questioning the validity of a policy, the general sentiment was that if they could make Clinton look bad, or cause him concern by opposing him, they would.339 In this sense it is almost as though ‘Bill Clinton himself posed a problem for his presidency’s relationship with Congress’, although of course, in the absence of such a prevailing trend towards conservatism this is much less likely to have been the case.340 Hence the probability was increased that if Clinton was for the UN, peacekeeping and multilateralism, Republicans in Congress were against. How was it possible for politicians to ‘use’ the UN/multilateralism as a tool with which to ‘win points’ against political opponents, or to direct pique at the person of the President when, as we have seen in Chapter 1, most of their constituents were largely in favour of multilateralist engagement, and held positive attitudes towards the United Nations; more positive in fact than towards Congress itself?341 As previously discussed, since the end of the Cold War (as has been the case in other periods classed as ‘peacetime’), and in the absence of a defined external threat, public interest refocused on domestic issues. Consequently, with constituents concentrating less keenly on foreign policy matters, politicians felt free to follow their own preferences as regards foreign policy, since they held little fear

Congressional accountability? 75 of electoral reprisal.342 As a result, the Legislative Branch, which was progressively more conservative in outlook, was free to follow its own negative, oppositional views towards the United Nations and multilateralism, and the use of force. The 1960s saw the birth of an American political movement that would shape the fortunes of the United States President three decades on. Conservatism, characterized in its foreign policy views by its abhorrence of international agencies (the United Nations in particular) peacekeeping, and multilateralism more generally, came to play an extremely important role in the difficult relationship between the Clinton Administration and the Congress it faced, both the 103rd, and especially the Republicandominated 104th. Although, the election of the Arkansas Governor saw the return of unified government following a significant absence, the weighting of Republican Congressional representatives in favour of conservatism even then, in addition to the significant number of Southern, conservative Democrats, made for a particularly confrontational and, characteristic of the conservative Right, activist, Congress. Thus, although our period of examination lies before the election of the Republican 104th Congress, many of those factors which made that Legislature so virulently opposed to the policies of the Clinton Administration were already in play, if to a lesser extent, during the 103rd. Moreover, the significant number of freshmen and sophomore members of Congress added to the President’s problems by introducing a new class of politician into the mix. These younger, post-Cold War politicians were much more focused on domestic politics and also tended to be rather conservative in outlook, predisposing them to challenge such proposals as multilateral peacekeeping ventures should the situation arise. These factors, combined with the more hard-nosed use of multilateralism/UN as an election tool and a device with which to engage in political posturing, and the personal dislike and distrust that many members of Congress felt towards the individual of the President, created a surprisingly hostile environment in which the Clinton Administration was required to sell its foreign policy preferences.

The 103rd Congress versus Clinton Administration multilateral policy ‘When Clinton took office, the political atmosphere was harsher than anyone had expected.’343 The election of the 42nd President saw the return to united government at the federal level after many years, but Bill Clinton would soon discover that his presidency would not be carefree visà-vis its relationship with the nation’s legislators. This section deals with the measures that the 103rd Congress brought in opposition to the Clinton Administration’s multilateralist policies in general, and with specific reference to the main foreign policy issues of the day: Somalia and

76

Congressional accountability?

Bosnia, in addition to the two main multilateralism-related issues for Congress: financing the United Nations, and the command of US troops by UN personnel. In order to obtain a clear picture of Congressional activities towards the Clinton Administration policy, one must first reach back to the final year of the Bush Administration when Congressional pressures to act in the face of problems in Somalia and Bosnia originated. Many of the vocal Republican critics of the United Nations and Clinton Administration multilateralism were supportive of the Bush Administration’s venture (through the auspices of the UN) in the Gulf region, and publicly praised the organization during these years. Similarly, when news of devastating famine and civil war poured out of beleaguered Somalia throughout the course of 1991 and 1992, many in Congress called on the Bush Administration to act in some way to stem the loss of life. A bipartisan group of 88 members wrote to Bush asking for action, and Congress in general called for an international humanitarian relief operation to be mounted through the UN.344 Much of the pressure originated with Senators Paul Simon (D-Ill.) and Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.), in a bipartisan push for humanitarian intervention channelled through the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In fact, the Senators went so far as to embark on a fact-finding mission to the country in early 1992. This pressure was crucial in convincing the Bush Administration to, first, support the formation of UNOSOM, and second, decide upon intervention with the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) later that year. Presidential hopeful Clinton also drew attention to the plight of Somalis during the 1992 campaign, insisting that more could be done. The year 1992 also saw pressure originating from Congress to take action in Eastern Europe, where Congressional representatives had observed the former Yugoslavia descend into a spiral of civil war and ethnic-cleansing (this term is in fact a euphemism for genocide; however, both the media and politicians jumped on the term during the Bosnian war, and in the end it was used so frequently that it has fallen into common usage). Again, pressure originated with a bipartisan group of representatives, including leading Senators Bob Dole (R-Kans.), Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who appealed for the controlled use of force against Serbian troops. This request resulted in the endorsement of a Senate resolution urging the United Nations to examine the possibility of using force in intervening in the crisis.345 Congress also issued support for the employment of armed resistance in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia, and granted the President the authority to lift the arms embargo that the UN had applied to the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia when fighting first broke out. In addition, Congress authorized the provision of up to $50 million in military assistance to the Bosnian Muslims. None the less, there remained

Congressional accountability? 77 within the Legislative Branch general resistance to any notion of armed American intervention in the crisis. In the interim period between losing the Presidential elections and leaving the White House, President Bush had committed US troops to the Somali humanitarian venture Operation Restore Hope (or UNITAF). This meant that when Clinton arrived in office, he was already Commander-inChief of American forces deployed overseas. In accordance with this fact, Congress began to question the legitimacy of the President’s ability to dispatch troops to Somalia, as they had played no part in the decisionmaking process therein as was required in the Constitution, as well as the 1973 War Powers Act. Senate Majority Leader, Democrat George Mitchell, expressed doubts at the constitutionality of the President’s involving US forces in UNITAF, asserting that Congress clearly had a role to play in decisions regarding the commitment of American men and women to peacekeeping missions, consistent with the UN Participation Act (1945). The significance of such a challenge to a brand-new President from a leading member of his own party is clearly demonstrative of the atmosphere of Congressional assertiveness into which Clinton stepped, as well as the importance that many Congressional representatives (from both sides of the partisan divide) placed on such legislative assertiveness in the new postwar era. Other politicians from the President’s own party including Carl Levin, as well as respected senior Democrat Sam Nunn, also raised constitutional issues, and expressed concerns that the Legislature was evading its War Powers responsibilities by not insisting on the power of approval in Somalia.346 Nevertheless, these constitutional qualms did not stop Senators from approving Senate Joint Resolution 45 (SJR 45), which endorsed the mission in Somalia, affirmed that it was consistent with War Powers legislation, and stated that should hostilities occur, the War Powers ‘clock’ would be automatically activated. The above actions are indicative of the confrontational nature of the post-Cold War Congress; however, they are also indicative of the unwillingness of the Democrat-dominated Legislature to act substantively to challenge the incoming Democrat President. In late April, however, the Republican minority in the House of Representatives began to make noise. Debating SJR 45, Representative Doug Bereuter (R-Nebr.) slammed the resolution as weak, open-ended and in violation of the War Powers Resolution. Subsequent to the transfer from UNITAF to the UN-led UNOSOM II in May, ‘a highly partisan debate ensued over Congress’s role in dispatching troops under the United Nations’, and the change in status of the Somali mission, accompanied by a very ambitious mission mandate, unleashed fire and brimstone from the increasingly conservative Legislative Republicans.347 Representative Benjamin Gilman, the ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led an unsuccessful GOP attempt to

78

Congressional accountability?

reduce the authorization for the Somalia mission from 12 months to six. Gilman and Toby Roth, echoing earlier Democrat comments, registered complaints that Congress was avoiding its War Powers responsibilities, and Bereuter inserted into the Congressional Record a call for a complete end to the operation and withdrawal of US troops. One of the most significant problems that Republicans appeared to have with the UNOSOM II mission, and indeed UN missions in general, was the idea of American soldiers serving under a UN commander, and this was an issue to which members would return again and again, particularly following the October deaths. However, as a result of the Democrat majority, SJR 45 was passed in the House of Representatives on 25 May. In a worrying moment in mid-July, senior Democrat Robert Byrd took to the Senate floor and to the pages of America’s newspapers to criticize the UN mission in Somalia and the Clinton Administration’s policy there.348 This criticism from an esteemed ranking Democrat, although cause for concern, turned out to be a minority position among Democrats at the time. Byrd’s comments coincided with leaked copies of the administration’s policy review on multilateral peacekeeping operations. At this stage of the review, the document contained many of what the administration would have described as positive and progressive improvements to the United States’ approach to peace operations.349 Many legislators, and in particular the conservative Republican minority, however, did not view the leaked document in this way; it was in fact the source of great concern for many. Particular concerns revolved around the possibility of placing US troops under UN command, and the perceived strain of UN peacekeeping on the US budget. There was little pressure on the administration from Congress to do much more with regard to Bosnia than it already had. However, there was a small faction of very concerned Senators, including Democrat Joseph Biden and Republican Bob Dole, who actively lobbied the White House for a more assertive policy. Some expressed fears that the involvement of American troops in the region following Clinton’s preventive deployment in Macedonia could lead to an incremental escalation of commitment (as had occurred in Vietnam) but most were supportive of the limited troop contribution. The humanitarian airlift that began in early 1993 had the backing of the vast majority of Congress, and most favoured the option of limited air strikes against the Serbs, as well as lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. On 8 August there was a marked change in the intensity of Congressional opposition towards Clinton’s multilateral policy. On this day, US forces in Somalia experienced their first fatalities when a land-mine killed four American soldiers. Most members of Congress were absent from Washington on their summer break, but none the less this unfortunate event signalled a ‘new level of congressional assertiveness’ in the area of foreign policy, and particularly denoted a modification in some Democrat

Congressional accountability? 79 positions which, up until now, had afforded the President a certain amount of leeway.350 American citizens had lost their lives in Somalia; this changed the situation inexorably: ‘as a body, Congress rose to force change in Clinton’s foreign policy’.351 The deaths of the four US personnel saw the vocally anti-Somalia Senator Byrd lead a large Congressional contingent in an attempt to eliminate funding for Somalia if the President failed to obtain the full approval of Congress inside a month. Writing in the New York Times, Byrd described US involvement in rapidly expanding UN peacekeeping as a ‘cause for concern . . . not worth American lives lost and injuries sustained’.352 Fortunately for the pride of the Executive, this aggressive legislative push was tempered by the remaining Democrat majority in Congress, and instead a non-binding resolution requesting the President to consult with Congress by 15 October and acquire approval by the following month was passed 90–7 (and supported by Senator Byrd). On 23 September the House slashed $60 million from State Department requests for future operations and ‘requested the administration to notify all relevant committees about costs, funding schemes and durations of mission, before any future missions were launched’.353 When three more US personnel were killed in Somalia on 26 September, the House of Representatives began to assert itself, after having been content up to a point, to allow the Senate to take the lead in criticizing the Executive’s multilateralist policies. It too passed a non-binding resolution establishing a 15 November deadline for the President to obtain full approval; in illustration of the concern arising from Democrats as well as Republicans, this resolution was co-sponsored by Democrat Richard Gephart and Republican Gilman.354 Such requests demonstrate the extent to which Congress wished to manage the administration’s ability to become involved in peace operations. Any hope that the Clinton Administration might have had for its multilateral peacekeeping policy died along with 18 members of the US Task Force Ranger in the narrow streets of downtown Mogadishu on the night of 3–4 October. Twenty-five Americans had been killed since the UN took over from the Unified Task Force, and on this one occasion 78 soldiers were wounded and one taken hostage. Images of a dead helicopter pilot dragged through the streets by triumphant Somalis scorched retinas throughout the United States. Reacting to what they believed to be a mass public outcry, members of Congress now fought ‘vigorously . . . to limit the American role in UNOSOM II’.355 There were calls for immediate withdrawal from Somalia, calls for a revision of existing administration foreign policy, more questions on the mission’s constitutionality, and invocations of the War Powers Resolution.356 Not all called for an abrupt withdrawal however. Senators Nunn, Mitchell, and surprisingly, Dole, cautioned against any such action.357 On 7 October, President Clinton faced the nation on the subject of

80

Congressional accountability?

Somalia, and for the first time since entering office he faced Congressional leaders. He had not consulted them over his administration’s multilaterally based foreign policy over the past ten months. On this occasion he informed the leaders of his intention to set 31 March 1994 as the final withdrawal date for US troops in Somalia, but that in the interim, forces would be strengthened to ensure no repetition of October’s disaster. If Republicans were actively confrontational towards the Executive’s foreign policy before October, after the 18 fatalities they became a united wall of opposition. Some 142 House Republicans sent a letter to President Clinton demanding removal of American forces from Somalia forthwith, and it was at this stage that UN command of US troops became a major issue in Congress. Senator Byrd remarked acerbically, ‘I do not see in the front of this chamber the U.N. flag.’ Such a comment misconstrues the facts of the October raid, but serves to illustrate the strength of feeling surrounding the deaths of the 18 soldiers. Of course, the command and control mechanisms in place in Somalia were entirely American, with no input from the UN structure, either in Somalia or New York. In fact, the only forces under any sort of UN control (but never command) in Somalia were a small logistics division. This did not stop members of Congress getting the wrong end of the stick in this regard, and keeping hold of it. Jesse Helms in particular, having spent a great deal of his career attempting to limit American involvement in the United Nations, leapt on the issue and kept it alive. Again, there were examples of politicians calling on the constitutional powers of Congress. Democrat Peter De Fazio and Republican John McCain both called for a legally binding role for the Legislature, with the ability to limit any further time in Somalia. McCain’s resolution, which came to a vote, was avoided 61–38. For some in the Legislature, events in Somalia were too much, and they overshadowed every other foreign policy decision of the time. Senator Don Nickles (R-Okla.) acted swiftly, introducing legislation which, if passed, would prevent the United States from participating in UN military operations abroad at all. Senator Helms relished every moment at the hearings on American participation in Somalia peacekeeping, held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 19 and 20 October, taking every opportunity to draw attention to deficiencies in the administration’s policies, in particular accusing the administration of ‘double talk’ in its dealings with foreign policy and the Legislative.358 Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) called on the War Powers Resolution; however, on this subject, Senator Paul Simon argued that as far as the consultation issue, which most representatives appeared worked up about, the Executive had been in contact with him, and therefore had fulfilled its duties in that regard.359 The President had designated 31 March 1994 as the cut-off date for US troops serving in Somalia, but the House GOP fought a bitter fight to have that date brought forward. Gilman and Floyd Spence, the ranking minor-

Congressional accountability? 81 ity members of the House Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services Committees sought the return of US forces by 31 January; a measure that was only barely defeated in the Foreign Affairs Committee by 22 votes to 21. Representatives instead agreed to implement the substitute offered by the Chairman, Democrat Lee Hamilton.360 In that same hearing Representative Toby Roth delivered a statement which sums up what many in Congress felt about the situation that had developed in Somalia during that year. In a rhetorical twist he claimed ‘we have seen this administration snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in Somalia’.361 Clinton’s cut-off date was accepted, but as Clifford Krauss of the New York Times commented, not without politicians ‘on both sides of the aisle throwing sharp oratorical spears at the President and his advisors’.362 With regard to Bosnia policy the President had been given a fairly easy ride from Congress. The Legislature, however, was really only awakened to Bosnia after the debacle in Somalia. There was substantial opposition, particularly among Republicans, to the deployment of troops to the former Yugoslavia. Realizing that Clinton had promised 25,000 US soldiers to police any eventual peace agreement, and sensitive to the disastrous potentiality that this held after the experiences of Somalia, the Senate issued a non-binding resolution requiring the Executive Branch to seek Congressional sanction before any military forces were dispatched to Bosnia. This resolution was also approved by the House of Representatives as part of a Defense Appropriations Bill that was eventually enacted into law. The rest of 1993 saw little action on the multilateralist/interventionist policy front. Chastened by the reaction of the Legislature to events, and administration policy, in Somalia and Bosnia, the Clinton team concentrated on reorienting the focus of PRD13 to take into account the now obvious Congressional opposition to any increase in the United States’ peacekeeping commitments. When an early 1994 leak of the document hit the press, and Congress was still unimpressed by what many saw as the continued subordination of US interests to those of the United Nations, PRD13 was once again taken back to the drawing board. The leaking of the review document coincided with the introduction by Senator Dole of what became known as the Peace Powers Act. With this act, Dole contended that the War Powers Resolution was no longer sufficient in defining the relationship between the President and Congress in prosecuting military operations.363 His hope was that the Act would ‘impose significant new limits on peacekeeping policies’.364 Although the Act died on the committee floor, many of its provisions were incorporated into the State Department Authorization Bill formulated that year.365 In addition, Peace Powers must be taken in conjunction with the unveiling of the House Republican platform for the 1994 Congressional elections: the Contract With America, brainchild of House Minority Whip Gingrich. Although not specifically formulated to deal with foreign policy issues, the

82

Congressional accountability?

Contract made a few fairly unambiguous references to the detrimental nature of US/UN relations, and in turn spawned the National Security Revitalization Act in 1995, which dealt explicitly with foreign affairs and contained some very restrictive measures relating to US involvement in missions of a multilateral, humanitarian or United Nations nature. Combined, the Contract With America and the Peace Powers Act presented a united conservative Republican attack on President Clinton’s policies. Senator Byrd was also successful in passing a resolution that cut funding for the Somalia operation on 31 March 1994. Clinton had already named this date as the extraction point for US forces, but such a resolution ensured that no change to that decision could be made in the Executive. The administration took into account these criticisms when once again reformulating its policy on multilateral peace operations during the spring of 1994, and the policy that was released: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD25) was a shadow of its former self. PDD25 now contained two sets of very strict criteria regarding US decision-making with respect to UN peacekeeping. These criteria stuck firmly to the traditionally established, post-Cold War logic of the military establishment, the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, and essentially denied the possibility not only of US involvement in future peace operations, but sought to restrict the rest of the International Community’s ability to do so as well.366 However, these strict criteria were not restrictive enough, and members of Congress such as Gingrich described the document as a ‘profound mistake’, which would continue to ‘subordinate the United States to the United Nations . . . and places Americans in a U.N. chain of non-command’.367 Finally, the colourful Representative accused the administration of continuing to harbour a ‘multinational fantasy’.368 Cost and command and control issues As mentioned above, the two main issues of concern for the 103rd Congress, particularly following the deaths in Somalia, were: the financial burden which the UN places on the United States, and the placement of US troops under the command and/or control of the United Nations (thus endangering their lives).369 As Michael MacKinnon asserts ‘complaints came largely . . . over the intention . . . to permit US troops to serve under UN control, and the apparent acceptance of an increase in peacekeeping costs’.370 A brief review of comments made with respect to both of these issues, taken from Congressional hearings and newspaper articles alone, provides the reader with clear evidence of the concern felt throughout much of the Legislature, particularly following the Somalia incident. Representative Floyd Spence, for example, referred to the United Nations as a ‘drain on this [defence] budget’ that ‘lessens our ability to

Congressional accountability? 83 meet national security commitments’, and Democrat Tom Lantos insisted that ‘the view of many of us in Congress . . . [was] that the United States pays a disproportionate share of peacekeeping costs’.371 More noteworthy, given the context, was the comment of Representative Pete Domenici, who, while debating the peacekeeping budget in April 1994, stated: ‘peacekeeping money is not an entitlement’, and Harold Rogers (R-Ken.) judged plainly that the US pays ‘way too much’ to the UN.372 Cost was a constant issue for Congress; hardly surprising, given its role in dishing out federal funds, the looming bulk of the budget deficit, and the domestic preferences of conservatives and freshmen members. Senator Byrd described a ‘a growing reluctance to write . . . checks’ for the UN’s ‘mushrooming ambitions’, and writing in the New York Times, Senator Dole maintained that ‘[t]he US taxpayer can no longer afford the U.N.’s warped way accounting methods’.373 It was too much cost for too little gain, too sparsely related to the national interest, and as in Somalia, was at times detrimental to the country; as Jim Lightfoot (R-Iowa.) made clear in questioning why the US people should pay for UN peacekeeping ‘with their dollars and their lives’.374 In fact, when it came to paying for the UN ‘from the viewpoint of . . . the new Republican Congress, the United States should be charging the United Nations’.375 The second major issue was the placement of US troops under the UN.376 The misperception that the Task Force involved in the October raid in Somalia was under the command and control of the United Nations seemed to pervade Congress at the time, which is perhaps a testimony to how poorly informed members were. None the less, the decision of the Clinton Administration to use the UN as the scapegoat for this particular incident, and indeed the failings of its foreign policy thus far, did not help curb this false impression. The administration was happy to allow Congress to labour under such misapprehensions, and it was only in the following May when the Senate was finally permitted to hold hearings on the actual events surrounding the unfortunate raid that Major General Montgomery, overall commander of US forces in Somalia and Major General Garrison, commander of Task Force Ranger, were able to set Congress straight on that issue.377 The command and control for this mission was entirely American, and in fact only one member of the UNOSOM II force was aware that the raid was taking place, and that was Montgomery, who was at the top of the direct line of US command. Senator Gregg, during the hearings on Somalia on 19 and 20 October places the blame for American deaths on 3–4 October on the United Nations for not accessing the troops with the rescue mission promptly enough. He even went so far as to particularly single out the Malaysian forces involved, despite the fact that a Malaysian peacekeeper lost his life rescuing the pinned-down Americans, and many others from Malaysian and Pakistani contingents were wounded.378

84

Congressional accountability?

Following the release of the PDD, Representative Sonny Callahan (RAlab.) complained that the restrictive document went too far with respect to allowing US forces to act under the control of non-American commanders, and Jim Lightfoot lamented that placing US troops under the UN was the beginning of a ‘slippery slope’, while Senator Dole remarked that ‘[i]n light of the U.N.’s gross incompetence in Bosnia and other places, I fear it is only a matter of time before U.N. command flaws cost American lives’.379 It seemed at this point that some members of Congress were so convinced that the command and control procedures in existence on the night of 3–4 October were to blame for the disastrous results of the raid (i.e. Americans under the control of the UN) that they were not prepared to accede to the most limited of multilateral provisions, even going so far as to insist that ‘American soldiers could not be ordered to wear a UN uniform (that is, blue berets)’.380 Specialist New, who complained at having to serve under a Finnish rather than American commander, and who was court-martialled for his refusal to wear the UN badge and beret during deployment in Macedonia, became the poster-child, and even hero, for the anti-UN coterie in Congress.381 The ‘blame-game’ The Legislature had become highly antagonistic towards UN peacekeeping following the Mogadishu imbroglio; however, the administration, in addition to suffering the effects of this negativity, must take responsibility for in fact instigating it (vis-à-vis Somalia) and perpetuating it (in general). The Clinton Administration obviously relished the availability of such a scapegoat on many occasions. With Bosnia, the Europeans as well as the UN provided a useful patsy for Clinton’s inability to settle on a more proactive strategy.382 But Somalia was without doubt the crisis for which the United Nations wrongly bore the most blame at the administration determination.383 Although it was clear to anyone who glanced even briefly below the rhetorical surface that the Clinton Executive was as much, if not more accountable for the disaster, the administration propagated the claim that it had sought to guide the UN towards a more sensible path, but that this prudent council had been eschewed.384 Not only was the irresponsible policy the fault of the UN, according to the Clinton people, but the UN was also responsible for the disastrous specifics of the raid itself, regardless of the fact that the mission was entirely planned and executed by US command and control, with US troops.385 political support for the organization it had hoped would be an instrument of its new foreign policy, the United Nations, fell sharply, in part because the administration sought to deflect responsibility for its own failures in Bosnia and Somalia onto the international organization.386

Congressional accountability? 85 Clinton obviously sought to deflect Congressional and domestic criticism away from his administration. However, this was in the end a doubleedged sword, because although this objective was in part successful, it ultimately created more tension and confrontation as regards future foreign policy. The sort of dissemblance employed served only to further confuse the American people, and to pitch an already anti-UN Congress into battle mode. As Edward Luck commented, ‘the President said that basically the UN was at fault, and that just opened the door for members of Congress.’387 It is clear that the level of confrontation extant between the Executive and Legislature during this period was unusually high. The conservative bent of many in Congress during the early 1990s meant that the Legislature was predisposed, both as a result of the ideological underpinnings of conservatism and its antagonism towards multilateralism, and of the activist nature of these new members of the Right, to openly confront the Clinton Presidency regarding its foreign policy preferences. There were concerns hailing from both sides of the aisle with respect to administration policy in Somalia and Bosnia, as well as questions of constitutionally and legally awarded War Powers, and relations with the United Nations. None the less, it was only after US personnel began to become fatalities in a foreign conflict (Somalia) in the autumn of 1993 that Congressional opposition became genuinely intimidating for Clinton. A concerted effort was made on behalf of both the Senate and the House of Representatives to limit the Executive’s ability to commit troops to future involvement in Bosnia, rein in the ongoing situation in Somalia, and alter the dynamics of the relationship between America and the United Nations. However, does this adversarial vigour prove that Congress was responsible for altering American policy towards multilateralism, the United Nations and peacekeeping, for compelling a once so enthusiastic administration to abandon its ideals?

Congressional culpability for Clinton retreat? The power and activity of Congress in foreign affairs has grown significantly since the Vietnam War. In particular, the post-Cold War Legislature, as witnessed in past postwar eras, sought to insert itself more readily in matters of foreign policy, becoming as energetic and confrontational as any Congress since that facing President Truman in the late 1940s. However, the President remains the principal deviser of foreign policy. Two World Wars, the Depression and a Cold War confirmed the Executive as the pre-eminent party in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, as such critical circumstances demanded strong leadership and prompt decision-making ability. And despite the post-Cold War activism of Congress, the Executive has managed to retain its supremacy, because, as Edward Luck comments, ‘by and large, the public, and even members of

86

Congressional accountability?

Congress . . . expect the President to lead on foreign policy. It has always been, despite War Powers and challenges over Vietnam.’388 Consequently, it is implausible to suggest that the powers of Congress had grown so large and wide-ranging by the early 1990s as to force fundamental changes in the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy. Moreover, if we look again at the actions of the 103rd Congress in the face of administration foreign policy, it appears that the Legislature was more compliant than the rhetoric emanating from its ranks might suggest. With the benefit of a second glace, it becomes obvious that although Congress was very vocal in its opposition to Clinton Administration policy, particularly post-October 1993, this vocalism did not produce a great deal of substantive action. All the resolutions passed requiring the Executive to consult with Legislators before committing troops to military action were nonbinding, and all the more restrictive and potentially embarrassing attempts to further limit the President’s power were mitigated by the Democratic majority, and usually replaced by an more lenient version sponsored by senior Democrats. Errant members of the President’s own party were corralled by the leadership, and any serious challenge by the Republicans was unceremoniously put down. For example, despite attempts by the Republican minority to alter the withdrawal date for troops in Somalia from 31 March 1994 to 31 January, Democrats ensured that the date remained as the President had set it, and although Senator Byrd was successful in cutting off funding on the 31 March, the President had already designated that date for extraction, so this was of minor embarrassment. These actions demonstrate a Congress deferring to the President, even though its statements made it appear to be otherwise.389 Consequently, although there was plenty of strong anti-UN, multilateralism and peacekeeping rhetoric darting around Congress, little concrete action was taken. Legislators did not place any binding restrictions upon the President’s ability to prosecute foreign policy, neither did they enact into law any alternative policies which the Executive was then forced to follow; hence, it is not credible to suggest that the Legislature was wholly responsible for the policy change that occurred within the administration. How, then, can we begin to explain the actions of the Executive Branch in this instance, and the deference with which it treated the more extremist elements in Congress? The essential factor in examining this particular question is domestic politics. Bill Clinton ran an election campaign based on domestic issues; so much so that it led many observers to surmise that he was uninterested in and even ignorant of foreign affairs.390 Although we recognize that this was not the case, it was no secret that Governor and, subsequently, President Clinton hoped that the tasks that awaited him on the domestic front would dominate his legacy. There were rumblings from within the administration that the fraught events of 1993 had been allowed to overshadow domestic issues and distract the President’s attention from this crucial domestic agenda.391 Then

Congressional accountability? 87 Somalia set news headlines on fire, completely monopolizing any discourse regarding the goals of the administration, and sending Congress into a frenzy of criticism. Concerns within the administration were that its critically important domestic programme, which had already been eclipsed for much of the year, was in real danger of falling flat on its face.392 Difficulties had already been experienced with the President and First Lady’s favoured programme of health care reform, and it seemed as though the Legislative Branch was now on the war-path, and demanding a scalp to satiate its thirst for retribution. Foreign policy was in that sense expendable, and so the Executive proffered the UN’s head (in place of its own).393 It would not damage domestic proposals if the administration discarded multilateralism and the previously indispensable United Nations, but if Congress were to be taken seriously, it could seriously harm domestic strategies if it did not. The essential ingredients were therefore the administration’s primary focus on domestic issues and its perception of legislative opposition (even if exaggerated). As MacKinnon points out, ‘[t]he fact that Clinton was not willing to push Congress on peacekeeping was . . . a function of domestic priorities . . . there was not a strong enough commitment to “assertive multilateralism” as a worthwhile policy doctrine to justify the fight with Congress.’394 It is true that Congress did not enact any truly damaging legislation; however, the sheer possibility that holding on to this particular foreign policy issue might jeopardize its ability to act domestically was enough to scare the Clinton Administration into retreat. The domestic agenda was the real goal, and administration commitment, if the lack of coherent thought given to multilateralist policy is anything to go by, was weak at best. Therefore, given a situation where the administration felt forced to make a choice between domestic and foreign policies, domestic would win out every time. Nevertheless, Edward Luck contends that although there was a ‘perception in the White House’ that relinquishing the UN was ‘required politically’, the price for maintaining relations would actually have been lower than the administration feared; ‘I don’t think it would have been in terms of losing his [Clinton’s] domestic legislation’, he observed.395 The interesting thing is that the real concerted attacks on the Clinton Administration in relation to the UN, peacekeeping and multilateralism came during the time of the 104th Congress, after the Executive had already capitulated, scapegoated and demonized the United Nations. This significantly more confrontational and hostile Legislature mounted a sustained and almost daily assault on the Executive. Hence, as a result of the hostile make-up of Congress and the convergence of unfortunate events in 1993, as well as a lack of real commitment to multilateralism, and an exaggerated perception of a Congressional threat to his domestic agenda, ‘the leader of the free world willingly

88

Congressional accountability?

sacrificed the United Nations . . . to domestic politics’.396 It was deemed necessary, and so it was done.

Conclusion The Congress that President Clinton faced throughout 1993 and early 1994 was the most dynamic and adversarial since those formidable Legislatures that Presidents Truman and Nixon tackled following the Second World War, and the Vietnam War/Watergate. Having expanded its authority in foreign policy since the early 1970s, on the cusp of another conflict’s end, and filled with younger members more energetic in outlook, the 103rd Congress was perfectly placed to take back the reins of power from the Executive Branch. The 103rd Congress was also increasingly conservative in nature and outlook, with the domination of the Legislature by such conservatives just around the corner due to the sweeping Republican gains of the 104th. This manner of politician was predisposed to object to the administration’s foreign policies of multilateralism, peacekeeping and the United Nations, viewing such notions as humanitarian intervention and cooperative security as unrealistic and impractical, counter to the national interest, wasteful of sparse resources, and flippant with the lives of US servicemen and women. Not only that; many in Congress objected to the person of the Chief Executive Officer in the form of Bill Clinton. They did not like him, they did not trust him, and consequently, anything that he was for, they, as a matter of principle, were against. Moreover, many had discovered the utility of multilateralism as a partisan and electoral tool. And yes, the problems of 1990s peacekeeping and multilateral policy in general exacerbated all of the above. Mixed with the loss of American life in Somalia that October, these ingredients produced a formidably hostile Legislature with which the Clinton Administration had to conduct business. Had support for the issues at stake – multilateralism, peacekeeping and the US relationship with the UN – been more than a mile wide and an inch thick, the administration may have fought a little harder to hold on to them.397 However, Clinton’s unwillingness to jeopardize his domestic agenda caused the administration to abandon the multilateral ship without any attempt at a defence. In the eyes of the Executive, a trade-off was required and, unsurprisingly, foreign policy lost. Thus, much like the impact of public opinion, the power of Congress was exaggerated, but none the less real. That the Clinton Administration believed its domestic agenda to be under threat from an antagonistic Congress as a result of its manifest aversion to Executive foreign policy was as significant as if that threat were genuine.

4

Somalia

Introduction On 3–4 of October 1993, 18 US soldiers were killed in an abortive raid in south Mogadishu, Somalia. Never before had one single instance, in which fatalities were sustained, had such an exaggeratedly negative impact on the politics of US foreign policy. The imbroglio that followed saw Congress call for immediate withdrawal from the country, and from UN peacekeeping and multilateralism more generally. The Clinton Administration fell into rapid retreat from its earlier more ambitious humanitarian, multilateral agenda. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive examination of international and specifically American involvement in Somalia in order to explain why the incident had such a massive impact on US political life. Public opinion, Congress and a lack of real commitment on behalf of the Executive all played their parts, but without some sort of galvanizing dynamic it is possible that a large-scale policy retreat might not have occurred. This chapter will unravel the reasons why Somalia had such a severe impact on American foreign policy, first, through comparison with conventional, in addition to other non-conventional military operations which experienced fatalities: Beirut (1983), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and the Gulf War (1991), in order to determine why Somalia left such an impression on the politics of American foreign policy when these operations did not, despite similar or greater levels of fatality. We will turn to the reactions from the various facets of the US political forum, such as public opinion, the Executive and Legislative Branches, and the military that were reportedly most affected by events surrounding the abortive raid. As regards the reaction of the public, we observed in Chapter 1, that an increasingly conservative Congress drew on public outcry (which we have seen was a minority reaction, albeit a vocal one) in order to petition the administration to abandon its previous multilateral inclinations. However, this call to negative public opinion was unfounded.

90

Somalia

We will consider the Somalia imbroglio with respect to the ‘shock’ allegedly experienced by the administration and Congress, and discuss whether, in each case, given the levels of information available, it is credible to assert that shock was in fact responsible for the severity of reaction. The military can also be considered from the point of view of ‘shock’. However, as we shall see, although it is popular to assert that the military was tainted irretrievably against operations of a multilateral, humanitarian or interventionist nature as a result of Somalia, the Pentagon was, in fact, the one facet of the US government that was least shocked or affected by the deaths of the 18 members of Task Force Ranger. Finally, we shall look at what we might term the ‘disappointment of expectations’ experienced as a result of the unrealistic optimism that followed the close of Cold War hostilities. Somalia was the catalyst that brought the Clinton Administration peacekeeping policy to the crossroads; what follows is a more nuanced reading of the impact that the Somalia debacle had on the politics of American foreign policy. We will begin with an examination of the situation in Somalia, and what the United States and United Nations were doing there in the first place.

Background Somalia is a colonial construct with no real sense of national identity, operating as it does on a fluctuating system of clan loyalties.398 This clan system was not dulled by colonialism, nor by attempts at democratization, or by the policies of despotic leader Siad Barre. In the late 1980s, Somalia disintegrated into civil war, which finally centred around two rival warlords: Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Farah Aideed. Mogadishu became a ‘place of unpredictable death’, witnessing some of the worst fighting.399 Massive artillery and other large-scale weaponry were used with abandon in an urban theatre, and, it is estimated, cost the lives of 14,000 civilians and injured 27,000 more, earning Mogadishu ‘a special place in the annals of human cruelty’.400 All with little result on either side. Aideed did deprive Ali Mahdi of parts of Mogadishu, but both remained there, each in their respective area, without either one being able to claim ownership of the city, or victory over their adversary. Famine came quickly. Effects of the severe drought of 1984 were still felt throughout the country and, combined with the war and destruction waged particularly in the agricultural regions, and the arrival of another drought in 1991, food production simply stopped.401 Much of Somalia, including the army, had already been dependent on food aid since the late 1970s.402 The civil war affected this source of food, as most countries cancelled aid donations in response to the human rights violations taking place, in addition to which most aid agencies and international organizations, including the United Nations, had pulled out of the country by

Somalia 91 early 1991. The notable exceptions were the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Save the Children Fund (SCF), CARE, Concern (Ireland) and a few others. Those agencies that remained were compelled to engage the services of armed guards in order to maintain the ability to carrying out their work. For the ICRC this was the first time in its history that such protection was necessary. By the end of 1992 it was estimated that 400,000 had died from starvation that year alone, and aid agencies were warning that if drastic action was not taken by the International Community, over 1,500,000 more Somalis would die.403 A whole generation of children would not be given the chance to grow up. Over 70,000 tons of food were needed per month to avoid this tragic potentiality, and in general 4,500,000 Somalis were in need of some kind of international assistance. Some 1,500,000 additional Somalis had fled to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya as well as Europe, the US and Canada, and the Scandinavian countries. Gangs of teenagers high on the local drug ‘khat’ roamed around in what the Somalis called ‘technicals’, looting and terrorizing the populace. The devastation, suffering and anguish that the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) uncovered was ‘worse than their worst imaginings’, particularly in the farming region.404 The city of Baidoa became known to the West as the ‘City of Death’, as poor, war-ravaged and starving farmers and their families fled to the city in the hope that food and security awaited them. However, all that waited for them there, for the most part, was death.405 Humanitarian organizations faced major problems with all aspects of their work in Somalia. They ‘found themselves caught up in a web of clan protection rackets and became part of the warlords’ political economy’.406 Relief aid became the main target of the marauding gangs and clan militias (the distinction between the two was not always readily apparent despite the claims of factional leaders). The port of Mogadishu and its airport became, according to one correspondent, ‘probably the world’s most dangerous’.407 NGOs were forced, as mentioned above, to employ protection. Sometimes this protection was reliable; often it was not. Response of the International Community The response of the International Community, as discussed, left much to be desired in the early days, especially as the depth of the severity of the crisis could have been avoided.408 However, with the end of the Cold War US interest in the strategic value of Somalia had waned. It was no longer a necessary addition to American concerns in the Gulf and Indian Ocean.409 Besides, there was revolution, disintegration and civil war in Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, and a shady dictator to put back in his place in Iraq. The scale of the tragedy caught the attention of the United Nations late in 1991, and attempts were made to

92

Somalia

mediate the conflict and produce the conditions in which NGOs and the UN could distribute food aid to the starving. UN Security Council Resolution 751 established UNOSOM, and 50 unarmed military observers were dispatched to Somalia, along with the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General to Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun. Upon his arrival in Mogadishu, Sahnoun embarked on what would be a trying but fruitful six months. Progress was reportedly made, chiefly as a result of Sahnoun and the work he carried out in establishing relations with all echelons of Somali society: warlords, elders, religious leaders, women’s groups and intellectuals. Through patient and diligent negotiation he earned their trust, and began to embody, to Somalis, the organization that he represented, thus increasing their trust in the UN itself. Mogadishu port and airport were de-fanged through good relations with the warlords, food distribution increased in scope, and work began at levels, including but other than the warlords, towards rehabilitation and national reconciliation.410 However, Sahnoun’s lack of ‘respect’ for bureaucratic channels and protocol, and his open criticism of the UN did not go down well among colleagues in New York. He also tended to overlook Somali criticism, particularly hailing from Aideed, in favour of ‘obtaining . . . cooperation on the ground’, which rankled New York.411 Regrettably, following on from what appeared to be an inexplicable insensitivity on behalf of the Secretary-General to the situation on the ground in Somalia, and the work that his Special Representative accomplished, Sahnoun felt forced to resign.412 The Algerian diplomat had spent considerable time and effort convincing the warlords (particularly Aideed) to accept a small UN force of 500, when the Secretary General announced from New York – without any consultation with UN personnel in Somalia – that the 500-strong force would now in fact be more than 4,000 strong.413 Aideed was infuriated and the credibility that Sahnoun had so painstakingly built up was lost. So ended any real chance of success for the first UNOSOM mission. The departure of the patient Algerian sparked a wave of violence in Mogadishu as Aideed reportedly refused to deal with his replacement, the Iraqi Ismat Kittani.414 Aideed mounted attacks on UN positions at Mogadishu airport and the port that Sahnoun had, through careful discussions, cleared of its gunmen, was once again treacherous. A World Food Programme (WFP) ship was shelled in November and left unable to offload its cargo. The UN suggested an international airlift, and the US complied with Operation Provide Relief. Much of the aid continued to be looted however; indeed, as Hirsh and Oakley point out, the more food the US pumped into the country, the less actually made it to those who needed it most.415 It was becoming increasingly evident that more vigorous action would have to be taken.

Somalia 93 Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) Acting Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger informed Boutros-Ghali on 25 November that if the Security Council authorized it, the United States would lead a large intervention force to provide a secure environment in Somalia for the distribution of humanitarian aid.416 With this in mind the Secretary General brought five options for action before the Security Council, and on 3 December 1992, Security Council Resolution 794 authorized the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) for Somalia.417 On the American side the operation would be known, in the grandiose tradition of the US military, as Operation Restore Hope. In a Chapter VII move, the resolution requested that the force use ‘all necessary means to establish . . . a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’ and entrusted it with unprecedented goals and mandate.418 The failure of the Security Council to specifically delineate what exactly constituted a ‘secure environment’ would lead to numerous problems for US/UN relations during UNITAF’s tenure, and have serious repercussions for the success of its heir apparent UNOSOM II. Former US Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, was dispatched forthwith as a diplomatic forerunner to the massive intervention; his prime objective, to ensure the deployment went smoothly and with no loss of American life. The principal Mogadishu warlords, Ali Mahdi and Aideed, where broached and agreed to observe a cease-fire and to use their influence to assure the peaceful deployment of military personnel.419 Thus, when the first troops (US) arrived through the surf and sand of Mogadishu several days later, ‘their only challenge was a beach full of rabid reporters’.420 Disparities between US and UN: mandate The United Nations and the US had divergent views as to how the operation and the future UNOSOM II mission should be conducted, and both held significantly different interpretations of the mandate laid out in SC Resolution 794. The United States saw UNITAF’s mission in a very literal way. The resolution called for the provision of a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid, and this was interpreted in a very predictable post-Vietnam war, post-Gulf War, US military fashion: enter with overwhelming force and an obvious show of strength, intimidate the ‘aggressors’, achieve the aims of the mission, and get out. For Somalia that meant: enter with a massive force, intimidate the gunmen into hiding, provide food to the starving, and leave.421 The Bush Administration, and the Pentagon particularly, made it clear, however, that they would not become involved in disarming the clans, and it was rumoured that Bush talked privately about being out before Clinton took office.422 The Americans insisted on the detachment of their activities

94

Somalia

from any political matters; however, their very presence made them players in Somali politics, such as it was. Everything they did as an intervention force had short- and long-term effects on the political climate.423 Hence, it was extremely shortsighted of US policy-makers to distance themselves so thoroughly from the political and social aspects of the crisis. UNITAF people on the ground in Somalia were actually much more involved than perhaps they, or their bosses in Washington, had intended, with grass-roots organizations, traditional clan elders, religious leaders, women’s movements and the establishment of an interim police force all impacting on the political and social structure in Somalia. Disparities between the US and UN: disarmament Perhaps the most important difference between the US and UN view of the UNITAF mandate was the refusal of the Bush and Clinton Administrations and the military leadership to become embroiled in the disarmament of the various factions, considering it beyond their mandate, and frankly too dangerous for their troops. In addition, there were fears that such actions would drag them further into the Somali crisis than they wanted to be, losing the capacity for a clean, quick-exit strategy.424 This merely led militias to hide weapons to be brought back into circulation at any time of their choosing. Accordingly, as the mission progressed and violence flared up again, UNITAF found that the situation required them to do more than they had originally intended. Consequently, disarmament became a piecemeal affair in which some gunmen were disarmed and some simply moved or hid their weapons.425 The notorious Bakara arms market was raided, and Aideed and other warlords were targeted after aggressive moves on their part. In addition to this, however, ordinary Somalis, forced to arm themselves because of the continuing insecurity of life, and armed guards who had been hired to protect NGOs and other foreign personnel in the country, were randomly disarmed.426 Such an uneven and unbalanced approach had no real impact on the ability of the warlords to wage war should they be so inclined. The only real purpose it served was to increase the insecurity of the ordinary people and reduce their ability to defend themselves ‘without offering an alternative means of security’.427 Top UN officials on the other hand felt that the ‘secure environment’ described in SC Resolution 794 could not be attained without systematic disarmament. Although the Resolution did not specify that the various factions be disarmed, it was seen as a ‘natural and necessary extension of the mandate’ and as such indispensable to the mission.428 Officials believed that only the US had the capacity to undertake the kind of disarmament necessary to ensure the types of conditions in which a UN force could operate. Accordingly, UNITAF was pushed to become more involved. Bush had made it clear to Boutros-Ghali from the outset that American

Somalia 95 forces would not be drawn into disarmament, or any other exercise perceived to be related to ‘nation-building’; nevertheless, the SecretaryGeneral, believing the time for disarming was optimal – when the force was strong and still retained the goodwill of the people – continued to recommend it in his reports to the Security Council.429 Again, the United States continued to resist. The new Clinton Administration, which came to office in January under the foreign policy banner of multilateralism, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, gave fuel to the hopes of the UN Secretariat. Hirsh and Oakley note that in addition to Boutros-Ghali, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan believed that despite its protestations to the contrary, the US would begin to disarm once its numbers came up to full strength; and that US commanders would take a more activist role in the country. However, no appreciable change in policy could be seen and the Clinton Administration seemed as anxious to set an exit date as its predecessor.430 Albright describes in her memoirs how her first instructions upon arriving in New York were to negotiate a ‘rapid handover of principal responsibility from the United States to the UN’.431 The National Security Council, she recalls, was ‘relentless, calling . . . every day to ask, “What’s taking so long?” ’432 Successes UNITAF did have much to be proud of. In the areas policed by the Unified Task Force – which was roughly 40 per cent of Somalia split up into nine zones – the warlords and gunmen were sufficiently in awe of the well-armed and equipped force to ensure that violent attacks and militia operations were kept to a minimum (except around the southern port of Kismayo where warlords Omar Jess and ‘Morgan’ continued to fight for dominance). This lull was dependent on the continued presence of intimidating US marines, ready and most willing to challenge anyone who opposed them. Although violence did flare up again later in its tenure, it was forced to become more involved with disarming the factions; as Africa Watch noted, UNITAF caused an ‘immediate and dramatic improvement’ in the lives of most Somalis.433 Vital supply routes were reopened and Mogadishu port that was once so impassable became the busiest port in Africa.434 Looting had become almost non-existent, the starving were being fed, and many deaths were prevented. Some grass-roots empowerment was taking place with traditional elders, women’s groups and youth groups, all of which was enabled by the lull in violence created by the intervention. Furthermore, moves were made to establish an interim police force in Mogadishu, an initiative, however, which only gathered momentum after the United States began to take casualties.435 Finally, the peace conferences at Addis Ababa were facilitated as a result of the international force. An informal meeting was held from 4–15 January 1993,

96

Somalia

which set the agenda for the later, formal talks in March. The results of the conference were very promising, with provisions for a cease-fire, commitment to disarmament, and national reconciliation and reconstruction. Unfortunately, it soon became obvious that few who had signed the accords had any intention of adhering to them, and the agreement went unpoliced. It is possible to suggest that the situation was already beginning to turn around by the time UNITAF intervened; death rates had dropped, but then people could only die once.436 In addition, Africa Watch has maintained that looting of official aid stopped, as the perpetrators were unwilling to go up against the US army. However, the bandits, rather than give up on their newfound and lucrative career altogether, simply moved on to more vulnerable sources such as foreign journalists and aid workers, and places where UNITAF was not present.437 Wherever the prospects of looting became slim, the general populace was more at risk: ‘[a]s thugs moved to unprotected areas looking for new victims, these areas became more dangerous than before the foreign troops arrived.’438 Many Somalis found greater insecurity as a result of the UNITAF intervention. None the less, in general, the operation provided a tenuous short-term security in the country. People were being fed, insecurity diminished, and some reconciliation appeared to be taking place. This was all dependent, however, on the continued US presence. As soon as the Americans left, so too would the security and many of the gains that had been made. UNITAF did ‘not adequately address underlying causes of the destruction of Somalia’s social fabric that ultimately led to the famine’ and, consequently, its gains were doomed to be short-lived.439 Transfer problems More problems emerged as the Clinton Administration began to plan for America’s phased withdrawal from Somalia. The UN hoped that the new US Administration, with its focus on multilateralism and UN peacekeeping, would become more deeply involved in the political aspects of the Somali crisis. However, Clinton seemed just as keen to pull US troops home, even if his policies were more optimistic and supportive of an enlarged UN role in the country as UNITAF’s replacement. Boutros-Ghali argued that disarmament would have to take place before any transition to UNOSOM II could begin. Hence, the Secretary General, and many others, believed to the last that if ‘pressure on the United States were kept up, UNITAF might eventually agree to do the job.440 This effectively stalled the decision-making process for UNOSOM II. Consequently, the level of planning and preparation was substantially less than for many less daunting ventures that had gone before. Since it was generally believed, up until the last minute, that the US would take on the task of disarmament, the UN never planned for having to do the job

Somalia 97 itself.441 Interestingly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell had predicted such handover problems before President Bush resolved to intervene, but these concerns, it seems, were never really addressed.442 The reluctance on behalf of the UN to accept that the US-led force would not disarm, and the determination of the SG that the organization could not handle such a responsibility, had its roots in the UN decisionmaking process surrounding the establishment of UNITAF. Although the Security Council and the UN Secretariat were anxious that something must be done about Somalia, during discussions with the United States, top UN officials explicitly ‘rejected the idea that the US initiative should eventually become a UN peacekeeping operation’, and there were legitimate questions as to the ability of the UN to cope with an enforcement mission at that time.443 The Americans intended to conduct the operation along traditional post-Vietnam military lines (Weinberger– Powell Doctrine), with overwhelming force and conventional ROE, which was at odds with traditional Chapter VI operations. UNITAF went ahead without clarification of this issue; the US was convinced that the UN would shortly take over, and the UN was convinced that the US would expand its role and remain indefinitely. Such confusion would ‘plague both parties and create a myriad of problems, small and large’ both on the ground and particularly when it came to the issue of transition.444 The transfer process was further complicated by the fact that the closer it came to the changing of the guard, the more violent conditions became. The situation had been deteriorating for some months, and knowing that the US would soon take its force and leave, the warlords and gunmen became more brash in their actions, thus making the UN less willing to take over an increasingly insecure environment. The DPKO was aware that the presence of UNITAF merely caused the vast quantities of weapons available in Somalia to be moved or hidden, to be returned whenever it suited the gunmen.445 The American perspective on Somalia either failed to perceive the link between the state of political/ governmental vacuum and the famine/humanitarian crisis in the country, or ignored it because they knew recognition of this fact would necessitate a deeper involvement than they wished to commit to. This would suggest a dangerous hubris on behalf of the United States, either causing it to overlook the causes, or to believe that it could affect change even while ignoring the root causes. A final problem for the transfer was the fact that the principal warlord in Mogadishu, Aideed, had a long-standing grievance against the United Nations. He, like most Somalis, resented the flight of the UN agencies during the onset of the civil war; but Aideed was also convinced that the organization favoured his rival Ali Mahdi.446 Added to this, he had a personal grievance against the Secretary-General, holding him in part responsible, during his time as deputy Foreign Minister of Egypt, for helping to keep Siad Barre in power. This created problems, as Aideed

98

Somalia

was never happy dealing with the UN and would exploit any opportunity to obstruct it. UNOSOM II was seen, particularly by the United States, as a logical progression from the UNITAF mission; the US et al. would arrive in Somalia, ‘secure’ the environment, get the food supplies running through their sectors, and then hand it over to the UN to continue with national reconciliation and rebuilding the state. But there were vast differences and disparities between the missions. UNITAF was an enforcement mission with, for the most part, standard US military ROE, and a typical US military structure. So although the rationale for intervention was an unprecedented one, interceding in the affairs of another state for purely humanitarian reasons, the command structures, procedures and ROE were all standard, well established and frequently operational. Moreover, although other states contributed troops to UNITAF, they were small in number in comparison to the US component, and the US was firmly in charge (the other nations played in the full knowledge that the US named the rules of the game). This situation was vastly different to the UN operation that followed. The United Nations had very little experience of Chapter VII enforcement operations, and the forces involved were no doubt confused; trained as soldiers in their own countries, retrained as peacekeepers for UN missions, and then told to behave as soldiers again, but not fully. Drawing, as it did, its component parts from many different national armies, UNOSOM II forces had little common ground: varied training, levels of experience, equipment, and different ROE and command and control procedures. Compared to the US-heavy UNITAF, it was not altogether a coherent whole. UNOSOM II plainly could not provide the ‘grrr’ factor which exuded from the American force, necessary to keep the factions in awe or to challenge them. Another problem was that the UNOSOM II mandate was much more ambitious than that of the Unified Task Force, but was to be executed by 17,000–18,000 less personnel. UNOSOM II encompassed all of Somalia, whereas UNITAF only covered 40 per cent, and included national reconciliation, and rebuilding the governmental, national and social infrastructure.447 It was given the responsibility for recreating a Somali state, and not only that; UNOSOM II was also expected to keep warlords such as Aideed under control, but bullies respect the biggest boy on the block, not the one who always breaks up the fights. The UN simply did not inspire the same awe, or boast the same responsive power as the large American force. As one commentator noted, UNOSOM II was ‘multilateralism on the cheap’.448 UNOSOM II Nevertheless, on 26 March 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 814, which officially established UNOSOM II. On 1 May UNOSOM II offi-

Somalia 99 cially took over from UNITAF, and on 4 May the last US soldiers deployed as part of Operation Restore Hope returned home. There was a complete changeover in personnel, with some of the ‘foreign’ (i.e. non-American) contingents remaining to be reintegrated into the UNOSOM II structure. Command was assumed by Turkish General Cevik Bir, Kittani was replaced by retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe, and Oakley by Robert Gosende. The United States had relinquished responsibility, but retained control of much of the decision-making by ensuring that US personnel were installed at all levels of the operation. The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General Howe was an American, and, as one might expect, had many American advisers, including Gosende (not to mention a direct line to the foreign policy people in the Clinton White House). In addition, the deputy Force Commander, Major General Montgomery, was US Army. Almost all the top people in Somalia were American. UNOSOM II was certainly not divested of US influence, even though it had been divested of major military presence. The military set-up of UNOSOM II was very different to that of its predecessor, with much smaller capabilities; there were 28,000 troops from 27 different countries, plus a US-supplied QRF of roughly 1,100. It was, however, minus the latest US military hardware, heavy weapons and much aerial support, which left along with their human operators when they pulled out. A major problem was created by the dual command and control structure now extant within UNOSOM II. The QRF, which the US had left behind, reported directly to Montgomery; circumventing the Force Commander, Bir. Montgomery in turn received his orders regarding US UNOSOM II troops, not from the Force Commander, but from his superiors back home. The QRF certainly provided a flexibility that the mission would not otherwise have had; however, the two command structures inevitably created tension and disunity. UNOSOM II had many achievements. The mission continued the stellar job of feeding the starving. It worked on restoring basic services, infrastructure and water supplies, and provided essential medicines, health care and vaccines. There were attempts to restore some kind of education system, providing textbooks and teachers’ guides, and the mission tried to restore some kind of indigenous farming, providing seeds, tools and pesticides. In addition, UNOSOM II helped train the embryonic Somali police force, and attempted to fulfil the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement in establishing transitional councils. Trouble brewing Nevertheless, things began to go wrong for UNOSOM II almost as soon as the mission was deployed. Many of the incoming officials, notably the Americans Howe and Gosende, arrived in Somalia with a preconceived scepticism towards the Addis Ababa accords and particularly the commitment of the

100 Somalia warlords to fulfilling the conditions of the agreement, and to peace. Rather than proceeding carefully along the course established by the agreement, undertaking to achieve compliance, and evaluating the behaviour of the various factions on an ongoing basis, Howe and Gosende simply assumed that the warlords, and Aideed specifically, would not live up to their commitments, and bypassed them.449 The Americans argued that the mission should focus on rebuilding Somalia rather than reconciling the warring factions.450 It seemed to escape their notice that without reconciliation among the men wielding the guns, and peace on the streets of Somalia, none of the other goals would be achievable. This hard-nosed attitude sidelined the warlords and established a status quo that they could not but challenge. In addition, it further tainted the UN’s already tattered reputation in Somalia; Howe advanced the US line at the expense of the organization that employed him. In early June this attitude manifested itself in a problem involving Howe, Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and two proposed ‘peace’ conferences. Howe supported the conference of Ali Mahdi’s design, but fearing that Aideed’s proposal, which appointed him to the role of Chair rather than an independent adjudicator, was merely another ploy to place himself at the centre of politics in Somalia, he rejected Aideed’s proposal and the conference went ahead without UN sponsorship. This incident marked one of the major turning points in the deterioration of events in Somalia, as following this ‘rejection’ Aideed began to broadcast heavy anti-UN propaganda and the SNA stepped up hostilities. 5 June On 5 June, a Pakistani contingent arrived at the Radio Mogadishu compound (the radio station from which Aideed broadcast his anti-UN propaganda), but which also held the weapons storage site that the Pakistanis had come to inspect. They were attacked. Aideed claimed that his people had thought that the Pakistanis were coming to close down the radio station and may have over-reacted. However, a written warning had been furnished before the inspection had taken place, and the attack came only after the peacekeepers had finished their inspection and were preparing to leave the compound. Moreover, within moments a second, seemingly coordinated, attack was launched against Pakistani peacekeepers at a food distribution centre in another part of town.451 The clashes ‘had all the appearance of an orchestrated attack’.452 Twenty-four Pakistanis were killed, and three Americans who had come to the aid of the pinned-down peacekeepers were injured. This event sent shock waves through the United Nations. Never had UN peacekeepers been so blatantly targeted. An outraged Security Council determined that such an attack could not go unpunished and a strongly worded resolution was drafted, calling for those responsible to be

Somalia 101 arrested and brought to justice. There was no doubt in anyone’s mind that the attacks were premeditated, and that Aideed was responsible. He was even named in an early draft, but was later removed in an effort to appear more impartial. None called more forcefully for action than the United States through its representative Madeleine Albright.453 This was backed by strong rhetoric from President Clinton, who declared: ‘[t]he United Nations and the United States refuse to tolerate this ruthless disregard for the will of the international community.’454 Accordingly, on 6 June, Security Council Resolution 837 added to the UNOSOM II mandate a manhunt for the defiant warlord Aideed. President Clinton ordered the QRF stationed in Somalia to participate in police actions against the SNA in support of Resolution 837, and during the course of June and July they embarked on several raids.455 Clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aideed supporters also increased during this time as disarmament was stepped up again, in accordance with Resolution 837. The Somali death-toll began to rise. In addition, the cohesiveness of the forces that comprised UNOSOM II began to break down, as other national battalions discovered that US forces were not taking orders from the UN Force Commander, but rather from their own capital; accordingly, they began to do the same. The Abdi House The situation disintegrated sharply after 12 July when the US QRF attacked what was known as the Abdi House, where representatives of several clans were meeting. Believing the building to be the SNA command and control centre, the QRF blocked all escape routes and, without issuing a warning, reduced the house to rubble. Clan elders, businessmen, religious leaders and women serving them in traditional Somali manner were killed; 12 to 20 according to the UN, 70-plus by SNA figures, although the level of destruction made it difficult to ascertain exact figures.456 This constituted a major departure in the history of UN involvement in any trouble spot around the world. The QRF, although taking orders from the United States, was under UN auspices, and the people inside the Abdi House were given no warning and no chance of escape. This was a very black hour for the United Nations, and ‘12 July can be termed the day when UNOSOM II joined with an almighty bang the chaos it was supposed to alleviate’.457 In terms of the situation in Somalia, the effects of the raid were ‘irrevocable’.458 It was an appreciable turning point in terms of the level of conflict in Somalia, and Aideed/SNA aggression towards the intervention force. The first to suffer were four foreign journalists, who had arrived at the Abdi House to record the scene there and were beaten and stoned to death by the very angry Somali crowd that had also gathered there. In late July/early August violence spiralled; as one author described, ‘it was bad, getting out of control’.459

102 Somalia Task Force Ranger goes to Somalia On 8 August the United States experienced its first fatalities during the UNOSOM II stewardship of the crisis; on this occasion a remote control detonated land-mine killed four US personnel. A further land-mine on 22 August killed six more. These deaths finally spurred the Clinton Administration to dispatch the Ranger and Delta Force that Howe had been requesting without success since the deaths of the Pakistani peacekeepers in June. Hence, late August saw the dispatch of Task Force Ranger to Somalia; their mission, to capture Aideed. Now UNOSOM II had a tripartite command and control system as Task Force Ranger reported directly to their commander Major-General William Garrison, who reported directly to General Hoar at CENTCOM. Unfortunately, despite their superior training and ‘special’ skills in the area, Task Force Ranger did not fare a great deal better than the QRF had in apprehending Aideed. Their first raid, on 30 August, turned out to be a UN building, and their prisoners Somali UN employees.460 A later raid (14 September) scored them, not a SNA official as they had been informed, but a US asset, and the man who the International Community hoped would head the embryonic Somali police force.461 They also managed to destroy the National University, a cigarette and match factory, a vaccine factory, and the building that housed the Ministry of Livestock.462 Deterioration The situation on the ground was worsening for the other national contingents in UNOSOM II. Instead of attacking the strong US forces, Aideed tended to focus on the weaker battalions, with Pakistani, Nigerian and Italian troops in particular coming under frequent attack. In addition, the tactics employed by Aideed’s militia, who used women and children as shields, meant that the Somali death-toll rose ever higher. On one occasion (9 September) Pakistani positions once again came under attack and US Cobra helicopters were called in to rescue them. In this encounter it is reported that scores of women and children were killed.463 Political changes September also saw the withdrawal of Medicins Sans Frontières from Somalia, an ill omen of conditions to come in the unfortunate country. MSF is often the first NGO to enter many trouble spots, and the last to leave when violence heats up; therefore, its departure is certainly indicative of how precarious the situation in Somalia had become, and how badly off-track the mission had gone. Back in Washington, the Clinton Administration began to show signs of malcontent with the way events were developing in Somalia by delivering

Somalia 103 to the Secretary-General a ‘non-paper’ outlining what it hoped would be an altered approach in Somalia with less focus on the hunt for Aideed and more on the political side, which had been neglected as a result. In fact, not only the political side of the operation in Somalia had been neglected. Action in relation to the distribution of humanitarian aid had been dramatically decreased as the hunt for Aideed consumed the energies of the mission. President Clinton and the top foreign policy actors in the administration began to disseminate, in the form of various speeches in the public forum, this newfound stance, emphasizing at length the need for a ‘renewed political initiative in Somalia . . . that leaves the Somalis in control of their own destiny’.464 Christopher and Albright met with the Secretary-General on 20 September and informed him of the administration’s wish to focus on the political aspect of the situation in Somalia, presenting him with a ‘non-paper’ to that effect.465 However, as Boutros-Ghali rightly points out, the mandate in Somalia, agreed to by the US, remained the same, and the delivery of a ‘non-paper’ stating wishes otherwise did not change that.466 Bosnia was much higher up on the Clinton Administration’s agenda at this time, and it was well aware that unless Somalia could be kept ‘under control’, Clinton said, ‘it’s going to be very hard to convince Congress to provide the force to implement an agreement on Bosnia’.467 Administration officials were out in force in late September, extolling the limitations rather than the virtues of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Clinton spoke at the opening of the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, and Christopher, Lake and Albright were all to be found speaking publicly on the subject of foreign policy.468 Peacekeeping and humanitarianism were now corollaries to the politics of US national interest, rather than the essential tenets they had been during the Presidential campaign and the early days of the administration. At this point US policy began to appear slightly less than coherent. The experience of suffering fatalities had the effect of dispatching the Task Force Ranger to Somalia, but things continued to swing out of control, increasing the risk to American troops, and the special force did not seem to be making much headway. This was combined with increasing political risk for the President as pressure from Congress to disengage from Somalia mounted. Therefore, the Clinton Administration made a rhetorical shift to a greater focus on political reconciliation in Somalia policy; away from the fixation with Aideed, and away from what had become a highly militarized mission for the UN, and the US troops involved there. The shift may be described as a rhetorical one because it had no real, physical or practical effect on either the direction the United States went in the Security Council, steered by Madeleine Albright, or the actions of US troops on the ground in Somalia. If policy did indeed change, those at the decision-making level ‘neglected to pass the relevant orders to its

104 Somalia troops in the field’.469 Albright herself admits that no political solution was found, and that the ‘standing orders to the US Ranger force in Mogadishu remained the same’.470 Many in the military, such as Powell and Hoar, were consistently against involvement in Somalia and would have jumped at the chance to pull their men out.471 But the order never came. US influence in the UN Security Council could have been used as a more subtle way of expressing a change in policy preference, but aside from the ‘non-paper’ handed to Boutros-Ghali, no change in policy was visible in New York. In fact, in spite of the apparent change in direction sketched out by statements made as September drew to a close, on 22 September the Security Council passed Resolution 865, which reaffirmed unreservedly all the previous SC Resolutions regarding Somalia, including Resolution 837. The change therefore was obviously ‘more in the form of a wish than a policy statement’; that wish did not extend as far as the Ambassador to the UN in New York, as Albright did not vote against this reaffirmation.472 If the policy change was more than a rhetorical exercise for the benefit of the public or Congress, surely Albright would have carried it through and directed the will of the Security Council as the US had done many times before and since. But she did not; she remained a strong advocate of UNOSOM II. Returning from a visit to Somalia in July, Albright penned a strongly worded article published in the New York Times (10 August). The article, entitled ‘Yes, There Is a Reason to Be in Somalia’, defended the UN decision to go after Aideed, saying, ‘[f]ailure to take action would have signalled to other clan leaders that the U.N. is not serious’ and that critics would do well to remember that efforts to work with Aideed had been unsuccessful.473 In closing, she issued an ultimatum: [t]he decision we must make now is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy. For Somalia’s sake, and ours, we must persevere.474 Disaster strikes On 25 September Aideed’s militia downed a US helicopter using a rocketpropelled grenade (RPG), killing three more Americans. This was an ominous warning of the events that would take place the following week. The Somalis had never achieved anything so bold before; they would not be afraid to try again. On 3 October 1993, Major-General Garrison received word that highranking SNA officials, and maybe even Aideed himself, would be meeting that day in a building near the Olympia Hotel. The raid would be typical of the Task Force signature thus far. Unfortunately, the US underesti-

Somalia 105 mated the ability of the SNA military commanders, men who had been schooled in Soviet and American military colleges, not gunmen from the desert. Following the same pattern with virtually every raid since their arrival in Somalia, the Task Force had long ago lost strategic, operational and tactical surprise.475 In the early afternoon a Somali informant confirmed that the meeting was to take place, and a Little Bird helicopter took to the air to record the position as he marked the target. The Task Force was scrambled, only to learn that the informant had lost his nerve and pointed out the wrong building. A new assault plan had to be readied, but 40 minutes later Task Force Ranger, transported by Black Hawk helicopters, hit their target. As was standard practice, Rangers encircled the target while their Delta Force colleagues penetrated the building and rounded up those inside, who were then led out to the waiting Ranger convoy. Initially the raid went well, aside from one young Ranger who lost his grip on the fast ropes, which they used to descend from the Black Hawks, and was badly injured.476 This time however, militiamen ‘reacted a few minutes more quickly than usual . . . [which] made all the difference’.477 The volume of hostile fire soon intensified. Fortunately, Aideed’s militia were poor marksmen and few casualties were sustained. RPGs made their appearance at around 4.15 p.m. and minutes later Black Hawk, call sign Super-61, registered a hit and crashed roughly 300 yards east of the target building with its seven crew members. The raid now became a rescue mission. The US’ Quick Reaction Force had been notified at 2.14 p.m. that a raid was to take place, but were given no further information. They stood ready, but did not know to where they would be called. When Super-61 went down, the QRF and a flying reaction team of Little Bird and Cobra helicopters were ordered in. The QRF could not act immediately however, as they had to go first to Ranger headquarters to be ‘integrated into the ongoing operation’.478 A Little Bird picked up two survivors from the wreckage, the pilot firing his own personal weapon to cover the co-pilot as he pulled the survivors on board. Another Black Hawk was hit while deploying reserve Rangers around Super-61, but managed to get back to the airfield. The soldiers reached the wreckage less than a minute before the militia, where they engaged almost immediately in fire.479 The entire neighbourhood was drawn to the spectacle, and women and children milled around the firing gunmen, many acting, or being used, as deliberate shields by SNA fighters. The Task Force shot anything in its path. The Ranger ground convoy, which had been in place to extract the captives from the raid, now attempted the few hundred yards to the crash site, but were bombarded from all directions by heavy fire and rocketpropelled grenades. The commander of the ground convoy was wounded and one of the drivers had his head ripped off by an RPG. The streets

106 Somalia were so narrow, twisting and hostile that the convoy got lost, and when they began to go in circles, unable to reach the crash site, they were ordered back to headquarters. Around this time the second Black Hawk, Super-64, was hit through the tail rotar while circling the other downed helicopter. Her crew tried to steer the aircraft back to the airfield, but the rotar broke away from the rest of the craft, and it crashed around two miles south of the original target building. The small force on the ground, hemmed in inside a very hostile area, now had two crash sites to defend. While Super-64 was hitting the Mogadishu dirt, the QRF was assembling at the airfield, and a ragtag bunch of Ranger volunteers, including cooks and clerks, was marshalled and led the convoy out of the airfield in an effort to link up with their beleaguered colleagues. The rescue mission was underway, but not for long. Upon entering Aideed territory, the rescue force was almost immediately pinned down, and the convoy was forced to stop, dismount its troops and engage in a heavy firefight. By 6.15 p.m. the rescue force was still not moving and was recalled to headquarters a few minutes later. Even then it took an hour to disengage. Realizing that the QRF would not reach Super-64 where the crew were still alive and battling it out with Somali gunmen, two Delta snipers volunteered to protect them. The Black Hawk that dropped them struggled to get back as it was hit by an RPG which knocked the co-pilot unconscious and took the leg of the door gunner. The two snipers defended the fallen helicopter and its pilot (the others had already been killed) to their own deaths, and were each awarded the Medal of Honor (posthumously) for their bravery. The pilot was then set upon by the Somali mob, narrowly avoiding death when a shrewd gunman decided that he might be worth more alive than dead. When the first rescue attempt was unsuccessful it became obvious to Major-General Garrison that his Task Force was going to need the help of UNOSOM II. They had no US heavy armoured or air support as none existed in theatre. It was not envisioned that such a heavy responsive force would be needed. Neither was it anticipated that the United Nations would have to come to the aid of the renowned United States military. ‘The possibility that the Americans could need help from UN troops had not been considered at all’; therefore, General Bir had not even been informed that a raid was taking place.480 This fact now posed serious problems for assembling a reactive force. UN command had to be informed, pride swallowed, and a force cobbled together from the available national battalions. Contrary to many reports that surfaced after news of the disastrous night broke, the UN responded promptly and willingly to US requests for assistance. The Italians offered tanks and personnel carriers, the Pakistanis four US-built tanks, and the Malaysians 32 Soviet-built armoured cars.481 It would take hours to get them to where they were needed, but

Somalia 107 the real problem was the disparity in language and training. Nevertheless, at 11.24 p.m. the convoy was on its way. It progressed in fits and starts, with the Pakistanis in the assemblage hesitant in the face of hostile fire; this was hardly surprising, given the losses they had already suffered in Somalia. The convoy was fired on from all directions by any weapons the SNA had. Finally, however, at 1.55 a.m. the rescue force met up with Task Force Rangers, and they began to move out. A small group of Rangers were overlooked as they were uninjured, and were not loaded on to any of the convoy vehicles. Anxious to get out of hostile territory, and unaware that anything was amiss, the fleet sped away, leaving the Rangers to run the rest of the distance without any cover in what has become known as the ‘Mogadishu mile’. Through what can only be described as miraculous intervention, the men made it to the football stadium serving as the Pakistani Battalion HQ, unharmed. During the course of the night, 18 US and one Malaysian were killed, one American pilot was captured, and many involved in the raid and the various rescue attempts were injured. In addition, it was estimated that around 300 Somalis were killed.482 The disastrous incursion was over. The fire-storm at home was yet to begin.

Impact Brief effects The presence of the international media in Mogadishu meant that the events of 3–4 October hit the world’s headlines almost instantaneously. Satellites beamed television images of a dead American pilot dragged triumphantly through Somalia’s ravaged capital by a jubilant crowd, and the Clinton Administration began to take flak.483 Congress had been badgering the Executive to pull back from Somalia for months, and although Clinton had endeavoured to temper such tendencies by moving rhetorically away from the militaristic hunt for Aideed, not much was altered on the ground; thus the death of 18 men was a very final, last straw for legislators. The public reaction, it seemed, was disgust at the violation of US dead, and disapproval of any further involvement in Somalia. Day after day, television programmes, newspaper articles and columns all said the same thing: the public wanted out of Somalia.484 Statistics flew back and forth, seemingly reflecting the negativity and distress of public opinion, and Congress, which was reportedly swamped with telephone calls from angry constituents, was just as reactive.485 The common message: it was time to shut Somalia down. Not only that, it was time to let go of the multilateralist illusion that the Carter humanists in the Clinton Administration had been chasing since the Presidential campaign. The Clinton Administration was not inclined to fight for a foreign policy ideal at the expense of its other agendas, or accept the potential

108 Somalia crippling of Executive power for the rest of its time in office in what seemed like a no-win situation with Congress, so it turned on its international organization of choice, and was complicit in disseminating the widespread but erroneous notion that the UN was to blame for the whole debacle.486 Politicians and pundits busied themselves rewriting history.487 Although the President resisted more extreme calls for immediate withdrawal, a March withdrawal date was set, and whereas in the short term troop numbers were strengthened, a new UN resolution was pushed through the Security Council limiting the UNOSOM II mandate.488 US troops, while increased in number, were largely confined to barracks.489 Comparative to other military operations The impact of Somalia on US foreign policy and politics was severe but superficial. Consequently, why did the incident in Somalia have such a severe effect on so many aspects of US political life, when operations such as the invasions of Grenada, Panama, and even the Gulf War, in which fatality reports elicited hardly an utterance from the ‘public’ or from Congress, and the disastrous ‘peacekeeping’ mission to Beirut, which saw the loss of 241 US Marines, elicited a much lesser reaction? On 25 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan ordered 1,900 US marines to the small island of Grenada to dispose of General Austin, a supposedly communist officer who had taken power there by coup, killing the elected leader. Eighteen US marines were killed, the same number as the Somalia incident, yet there was no massive outcry.490 On 19 December 1989, President Bush dispatched a division-sized force to invade Panama and capture the errant Panamanian leader Emmanuel Noriega. After much confusion he was apprehended, but not before 24 US soldiers lost their lives; six more than the Somalia incident, yet there was no outcry.491 Take the further example of the 100-hour Gulf War; in what was supposed to be a war that was fought mainly from a distance, the US still managed to incur losses of 79 dead. This was more than four times the fatality rate of the 3–4 October firefight, yet there was no outcry, and in fact, rather than having a negative effect, President Bush saw his approval rating soar to 90 per cent. Indeed, even growing opposition at home to the recent coalition mission in Iraq has more to do with disagreement with Bush policies than rising fatalities, and even then has had little effect on Bush Administration policy. All of these relatively contemporaneous interventions, in comparison to Somalia, evoked lesser reactions.492 What makes even less sense in comparison is the impact of the Beirut bombing of 23 October 1983, where 241 (not 18) US marines stationed in Lebanon were killed – many in their beds – when a suicide bomb ripped their barracks apart. The buildup to this dreadful event was similar to that

Somalia 109 of Somalia, with the US moving from a neutral intervention force, to involvement in the violent conflict there and, as a result, paying the ultimate price, as did those troops in Somalia when they became involved in police actions against one faction. Parallels can once again be drawn between the effects of both episodes, which were wide-ranging. In both Beirut and Somalia public opinion was charged as being negative, Congress passed restrictions on further action by the Executive, the War Powers debate between Congress and the Executive was reignited, and ultimately, US forces abandoned their positions in both Lebanon and Somalia. In addition, following these incidents, both Reagan and Clinton became more wary of any interventions involving multilateral partnerships. Beirut generated what became known unofficially as the Weinberger– Powell Doctrine regarding military engagement. The experience of a younger generation of generals, having served as junior officers in the Vietnam War had imbued them with a particular view of military intervention, which the disastrous morning in Beirut had crystallized into the form of several tangible points, then laid out by Caspar Weinberger and later elaborated on and institutionalized by Colin Powell in his Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.493 The Doctrine dominated military thinking into the twenty-first century, particularly with Operation Desert Storm, and indeed the military principles behind Operation Restore Hope (if not the ideological ones). Both affairs had a substantial impact on the politics of American foreign policy. However, in a remarkably prescient statement issued before UNITAF was established, US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone warned President Bush that if you liked Beirut, ‘you’ll love Somalia’, and he was right.494 Even the Beirut bombing cannot compare to the violent shock waves that Somalia sent through the United States. Although Somalia was much less calculated and brutal – a firefight growing out of an ill-fated raid versus a planned and grisly attack on sleeping soldiers – and the fatalities incurred were 13 times less than in Beirut, it still evinced a more significant impact. In fact, the number of US personnel killed in Beirut is second only to the loss of 246 soldiers on the first day of the Tet offensive during the Vietnam War and remains the largest loss of US military personnel in any non-conventional theatre of conflict. What made Somalia different from these other operations? The first reason is time scale vis-à-vis the Cold War and ‘perceived interest’. Both Grenada and Panama were viewed in a Cold War context. Deaths could therefore be justified in terms of a definable national interest; protecting the United States from the communist threat (in addition, Panama had an added drugs threat). Indeed, Reagan was even able to use the Cold War card to prolong US presence in Lebanon long after domestic pressures could otherwise have forced him to withdraw. Somalia, conversely, occurred outside of a Cold War context, and therefore could not make

110 Somalia use of the domestic political device of an automatically available justification for losses. Moreover, Somalia had been unashamedly billed as a purely altruistic, humanitarian mission of mercy, divorced from the national interest; thus when things went wrong there was no ‘perceived interest’ to justify the loss of lives and was consequently considered not ‘worth it’. Note that concerns regarding national interest refer to the political establishment and not necessarily to the public’s perception of what constitutes an acceptable basis for foreign policy. But what of the Gulf conflict? It occurred outside of the Cold War context, and aside from the obvious, but underplayed, national interests tied up in Middle Eastern oil and the general security and stability of the region, was billed in a Just War context as a moral war against aggression, yet few questions were asked regarding justifiable ‘perceived interest’ versus war dead. Here our second factor enters the discussion: the concept of ‘perceived success’. In this instance ‘perceived interest’ plus ‘perceived success’ equals a justifiable loss of life. No outcry occurred after the Gulf War because the mission was a ‘perceived success’. From the US perspective Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqis subdued, it seemed. Debate regarding whether Iraq had in fact been subdued or not of course continued to exist, and formed the basis of justifications regarding the declaration of war on Iraq in January 2003. Thus, the perception of success outweighed the lack of perceived interest, and the death-toll was deemed justifiable. Somalia, on the other hand, was not viewed as a successful mission. Although the objectives of the ill-fated October raid had in fact been met, the goal of capturing Aideed and bringing him justice had not. Neither had the wider goal of securing a peaceful and sustainable environment within Somalia. Therefore, there was no ‘perceived success’ to counter the lack of ‘perceived interest’, and to create a sense that fatalities had been ‘worth it’. Thus, it appears that a combination of factors, such as timing, the loss of Cold War justifications and a lack of ‘perceived interest’ or ‘perceived success’ places Somalia apart from other operations, which may have lost more lives, but heralded much less of a bang in American politics. Public opinion A supposed massive and overwhelming public outcry acted as the catalyst for what followed regarding the repercussions of the Somalia affair. However, this is a misguided analysis of the situation. Scrutiny of poll data clearly demonstrates that the American public was not as negative as was emphasized by the media, and indeed, Congress.495 A closer examination reveals that the universal clamour that Congress maintained arose after the incident of 3–4 October, did not occur. Only one out of five polls taken by the major television stations in conjunction with news magazines

Somalia 111 delivered a majority percentage (50 per cent) in favour of immediate withdrawal from Somalia, while the others showed only a minority in favour.496 In addition, surveys that took a retrospective look at America’s role in Somalia, asking whether sending US troops to aid the people there was the ‘right thing to do’, showed that a clear majority believed it was; with 82 per cent responding ‘yes’ to an April 1995 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll, and 66 per cent positive response to a December 1995 CBS News/New York Times survey.497 When asked about the United Nations and active engagement in the world around the time of the Somalia incident, the American public did not appear to be negatively affected in its views. A PIPA survey taken only days after the 18 men where killed indicated that 88 per cent of respondents concurred with the opinion that due to global interconnectedness, ‘it is important for the United States to participate, together with other countries, in efforts to maintain peace and protect human rights’.498 And when a 1993 CBS poll asked ‘is the UN doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has to face?’ 62 per cent believed that the organization was indeed doing a ‘good job’. Remarkably, this response was second only to that given in 1991 (the year of the highly popular and successful Gulf War) out of the eight years the question was asked.499 Most significantly, however, surveys questioning participants specifically with regard to the contribution of US soldiers to peacekeeping missions returned very positive results, even through periods of supposed anti-UN, anti-peacekeeping sentiment. Seventy-one per cent of an NBC poll taken in October 1993 favoured the use of US troops in peacekeeping, 60 per cent of a November 1993 ABC poll were in favour, and in February of 1994, just four months after the ‘crisis’, and in a period of intense ‘UN-bashing’ in Congress, 91 per cent of PIPA participants favoured contributing American troops to UN peacekeeping.500 This substantial support is even more impressive when we factor in the fact that most Americans already believed that the US was doing more than its fair share multilaterally.501 Consequently, the massive impact on US politics brought about by ignominy in Somalia was not triggered by public opinion, but by a perception of public opinion. There were several reasons for this misperception of a negative public. First, there existed a paternalistic elite within the government that did not necessarily bother to gauge a truly representative sense of opinion, but simply decided how they thought the public would react. Second, there is a reliance by Congress and the news media on the views of a negative vocal minority as representative of the public as a whole. Third, an increasingly conservative Congress which naturally held anti-UN as well as anti-Clinton attitudes was predisposed to react in a negative manner to events. Finally, poor mechanisms existed for accurate assessment of public opinion, created by the self-reinforcing channels of information between the Executive, Legislature and media, which do not necessarily reflect any view outside of that triangular relationship.

112 Somalia These factors combined to create an impression of public opinion that was negative enough to influence the actions of both the Clinton Administration and Congress on the subject of Somalia and UN peacekeeping.502 It was enough for each to believe that the public was negative, even if this was not necessarily the case. ‘Shock and awe?’ One of the reasons why the Somalia ‘crisis’ had such a severe impact in the United States comes from shock. So the established wisdom goes: the American people were shocked, Congress was shocked, the Executive was shocked. After UNITAF pulled out of Somalia media coverage dropped off dramatically, and as such, very few people were aware of the military buildup in Somalia, the hunt for Aideed, and the involvement of American troops in military operations there. As far as most were concerned, the US had gone to Somalia to feed the starving people there, done its job and had come home; thus many were genuinely surprised and bemused by the discovery that the military was caught up in the sort of combat situation that could result in fatalities. The administration The Clinton Administration claimed to be shocked by the events of 3–4 October. No one seemed to be able to understand how such a thing could have happened. ‘Shocked and deeply saddened’, Albright recalls, wondering ‘[w]hat had we done wrong?’503 Indeed, Clinton insisted that he had not been informed of the raid, and that in fact he had been labouring under the impression that such action had been called off entirely. But is it really credible that the Executive and the Commander in Chief did not know what was going on in Somalia? A general air of post-Cold War optimism resulted in the slightly naive approach of the Clinton Administration to foreign policy, and in this case multilateralism, and caused it to gloss over the fine details of their ideals (particularly in Somalia) until disaster struck in October. A broad air of support for multilateralism, and a more ‘moral’ foreign policy, was expressed during a presidential campaign that did not focus greatly on foreign policy issues, and upon entering office a policy review was put underway but little else was accomplished regarding the development of a comprehensive multilateralist doctrine in US foreign policy. The realities that the administration’s rhetoric might entail were not prepared for, particularly by those at the top levels: the President, the Department of State and the National Security Council, with the exception of the Department of Defense and the military, which was always the most realistic of those involved in peacekeeping policy. The President was reportedly shocked and angered to discover that the

Somalia 113 raids were ongoing, insisting that ‘he had been led to believe that the policy had been moderated’ and the raids called off.504 Indeed, Halberstam contends that Clinton went so far as to suggest privately that he had not even approved the deployment of Task Force Ranger in the first place and that there had been ‘a shift in policy without his informed approval’.505 He claimed that no one had told him about possible downsides to the policy; that he had not been given a realistic assessment from his advisers, suggesting that they had not spent much time thinking about it themselves. There was no planning or preparation for negative or disastrous eventualities that might involve US troops; thus, when the 18 Rangers/Delta were killed in one unfortunate night in Mogadishu, the Clinton Administration was shamefully unprepared for the consequences. The Executive’s primary focus on Somalia ended when the last US troops pulled out of UNITAF on 5 May 1993, and UNOSOM II took over. As it was now a UN mission Madeleine Albright was left to deal with the matter, as one of her many responsibilities in the role of Ambassador.506 Clinton, Christopher and Lake had bigger fish to fry. Clinton was much more concerned with his domestic agenda and, as regards foreign policy, his focus was on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as was that of Lake and Christopher. And although Defence appeared to be keeping track of events, the Secretary, Les Aspin, observed some difficulty in finding an ear at the White House.507 Not one meeting of the foreign policy Principals had been convened on the subject of Somalia until after the crisis ignited.508 The administration was not fully engaged in Somalia policy and the spotlight was certainly elsewhere, but the eyes of the whole world were on Somalia once again after 5 June saw the deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, an event which certainly focused the administration on events in the Horn once again, and resulted in several very spirited and forceful demands from both the President and particularly Ambassador Albright that those responsible be captured and brought to task.509 As Clinton boldly pronounced, ‘[t]he United Nations and the United States refuse to tolerate this disregard for the will of the international community.’510 In addition, the incident on 5 June prompted the administration to place the US QRF stationed in Somalia at the disposal of the UN (but still under US command) in order to achieve the aim of capturing Aideed.511 Attention may then have dropped off once more after that highly charged week, but returned periodically between June and October by US fatalities in the country. The nature of the National Security Adviser’s job made it necessary for him to be aware of events in Somalia, as he was tasked with briefing the President daily on every major foreign policy issue involving the United States. Hence, it would have been a gross oversight on his part, or on the part of his staff, to be uninformed of events somewhere in the world where US troops were stationed. In fact, Drew (1994) cites one instance in

114 Somalia which Lake took Clinton aside during a trip to Asia to inform him of a raid to be carried out in Mogadishu on a suspected Aideed compound. She claimed, ‘Lake wanted Clinton’s approval’, and one might assume approval was given, since the raid went ahead as planned.512 The manner in which foreign policy is conducted, the channels of information and the chains of command further negate any suggestion that Clinton or others may have made at the time, namely that they were unaware of developments and thus shocked by the happenings of 3–4 October. Of course Military Command and the Pentagon were familiar with events on the ground in Somalia because they were directly involved, in most cases on a daily basis, particularly with regard to troop deployments, all of which ‘must be approved by the Secretary of Defense’.513 And although Aspin was reputedly ‘having trouble’ with the President, all requests for troop deployments, such as the deployment of the Task Force Ranger in late September, ought to have gone through Clinton as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Drew (1994) again cites an instance where Lake made sure that an NSC staff member informed Clinton, who was in Martha’s Vineyard at the time, of the decision to send the Task Force to Somalia.514 Thus, even if he had not been involved in the decision-making process which led to this move, the fact that his approval was necessary means that at this point at least he was made aware of the seriousness of the situation in Somalia and the deployment of specialist forces. It is then specious to suggest that the Commander in Chief was not informed as to the actions of US forces in a hostile situation. In his memoirs Clinton (2004) claims that the raid of 3–4 October had not been sanctioned by General Hoar at CENTCOM, but aside from being contrary to the chain of command, this is at complete odds with the testimonies of Major General William Garrison and Major General Thomas Montgomery (Task Force Ranger commander and overall US commander in Somalia respectively).515 Consequently, although it is credible that the Clinton Administration was not prepared for the crisis, and again that it had ‘not focused on’ Somalia with attention being elsewhere, it has been alleged that ‘Clinton knew more than he let on’.516 It is incredible that any member of the foreign policy team was completely unaware of the situation in Somalia: the deterioration of security, the deployment of Task Force Ranger, or the continuation of the raids even after a rhetorical shift towards reconciliation in Washington. Accordingly, the appearance of shock can only be put down to political theatre. Congressional ‘shock’ Following 3–4 October Congress, above all exploded with shock and sheer disbelief that 18 of America’s finest could be killed in one night in Somalia. Like the administration, it should not have been shocked; there-

Somalia 115 fore, is this a credible assertion to make? In this case the answer might actually be ‘yes’. Although Congress had been actively involved in putting pressure on the Bush Administration to act in Somalia, and even though it was constantly briefed on the subject, there was a lack of real attention to events there from Congressional Representatives, who, like their President, were much more concerned with domestic issues. Consequently, even though some in Congress may have been briefed frequently on Somalia, foreign policy was not at the forefront of their minds. This fact becomes clear through even the most cursory glance at the proceedings of the many Senate and House hearings focusing on Somalia. The collective amnesia seemingly suffered by members of Congress is quite remarkable. Senator Paul Sarbanes questioned Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff in one hearing on the history of UN/US involvement in Somalia for four pages in the hearing record; a considerable waste of time when much more pertinent questions could have been asked, particularly when Senators had already been briefed on numerous occasions.517 Not that the answers provided satisfied Sarbanes, for on the very next day he continued his quest for basic facts, this time with Ambassador Albright.518 In addition, the continued insistence of members of Congress that US troops were under UN command, despite constant briefings and assurances to the contrary, demonstrates the poor attention to important detail. Senator Frank Murkowski stated: ‘I do not recall one instance of the administration coming before this committee and asking us to support a combat mission with US troops under the U.N.’519 Tarnoff replied that ‘the combat forces that have been in Mogadishu and in the region have never been under U.N. command’; yet the notion continued to persist.520 When the Senate was finally able to hold hearings on the actual military procedures of 3–4 October, Senator John Glenn questioned Major General Garrison whether on that fateful night US troops were ‘under orders from the U.N.? Did we follow whatever the U.N. wanted to do?’ Garrison replied, ‘No, sir. I was not. I was working for General Hoar at the US Central Command’.521 But this avowal of US control obviously still had not sunk in, as Senator Sam Nunn asked the same question during the afternoon session of the same hearing, and was told again that the UN had nothing to do with the decision-making by both Garrison and Montgomery.522 While the administration was partly to blame for allowing the perception that the UN was in command to persist in the public forum, the fact that the US and not the UN was in command that night and during any other night or day in which American combat troops were stationed in Somalia had already been made clear during other hearings, to Congress at least. Even Senator Jesse Helms, who made opposition to the United Nations and peacekeeping a Washington sport, seemed to be poorly informed

116 Somalia regarding events in Somalia, commenting at one hearing held after the October incident that American soldiers were ‘taking fire and casualties . . . day after day, night after night’; a gross exaggeration of the situation in Mogadishu and especially in greater Somalia.523 Such information had been made available to legislative representatives on many occasions, and therefore one might reasonably expect them to recall it. It appears that however many times Congress was briefed on Somalia, little information was retained. Consequently, it is credible to assert that at least some members of Congress were indeed genuinely shocked by what occurred, and subsequently were unenthusiastic towards United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, and around the world. None the less, while it may be accurate that some members were sincerely shocked, the fact is that the increasingly conservative, anti-UN, antipeacekeeping, anti-Clinton bent of Congress at this time was prone to negative assumptions regarding any of the above, and thus leapt on the Somalia disaster as the perfect excuse to attack, particularly characters such as Senator Bob Dole and Representative Newt Gingrich who, in addition, sought misguidedly to designate UN peacekeeping an election issue.524 Therefore, although the severity of reaction among legislators was partly due to genuine shock over the deaths as a result of poor attention as a whole to the Somalia ‘problem’, it was equally due to the ideological colouring of Congress at that time in US history, which predisposed it to a harsh and unconstructive response. Military reaction Somalia had the largest impact on the politics of US foreign policy since the Beirut bombing, which enormously affected the military establishment. Beirut was, in combination with experiences in Vietnam, the catalyst for the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine that came to dominate military considerations throughout the last years of the Cold War and into the twentieth-first century. Somalia, however, had a much lesser effect on the US military than any other group in government, and indeed made less of an impression than is generally supposed. It is the established belief that the military, already sceptical of the new focus by the Clinton Administration on peacekeeping, was shocked and incensed by the events of 3–4 October; of all walks of political life, the military reacted in the most negative manner towards the deaths in Somalia. This study suggests otherwise. While it is undoubtedly true that the military was frustrated that its people had been placed in such a precarious position, with inadequate support and resulting in 18 dead, it is difficult to believe that it was particularly shocked by this occurrence. The military as an organization remained sceptical regarding the viability and benefits of peacekeeping throughout the protracted period of

Somalia 117 unrealistic optimism that followed the end of the Cold War. Clinton’s new focus was viewed in the context of the Vietnam War and the Beirut experience, both of which suffered from many of the same sins. This prism led military leaders to view peacekeeping operations in a particular way. As Colin Powell (1996) puts it: [m]any of my generation, the career captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, seasoned in that war, [Vietnam] vowed that when our time came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support.525 Weinberger–Powell dominated military thinking from the mid-1980s onwards, and this doctrine of vital national interests, clear and realizable objectives, exit strategies and overwhelming force, with overt domestic support, did not fit well with the new emphasis on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.526 Peacekeeping was an unpredictable, ‘grey’ business, and was therefore difficult to plan and train for, lacking in transparent aims and objectives, and crucially, possible exit strategies. Such operations usually consisted of limited force, and action was not typically dictated by questions of national interest, or assured of public (perceived) or Congressional support.527 Such concerns emerged when the Bush (Sr.) Administration put in place a National Security Council review, which generally stated support for full participation in UN peacekeeping from most sections, except the Joint Chiefs of Staff who ‘flatly’ opposed proposals for a Rapid Reaction Force.528 The Chiefs further asserted that the US should only contribute its ‘unique’ capabilities (e.g. logistics, air power, intelligence) to such operations. Thus, the NSC Decision Directive (NSDD74) that resulted was considerably less positive than during the review process.529 However, the military did endorse the creation of a larger peacekeeping planning staff and greater emphasis on peacekeeping training.530 As these shifts in training arose, and American involvement in peacekeeping increased with UNITAF and the entry of Bill Clinton to the Presidency, concerns surfaced regarding the combat readiness of troops as a result of participation in peacekeeping operations. The traditional goal of the US military is to ensure the ability of its forces to fight and win two wars simultaneously. Increased participation in peacekeeping, it was feared, detracted from that ability, as each unit sent abroad on peacekeeping had to be first trained in police/peacekeeping functions and then, after having supposedly lost its combat edge, retrained upon its return in how to be a warfighting unit once more. Participation in peacekeeping tied up more troops than standard military operations, so causing the forces in general to be less capable of their traditional goal. For each unit in the field in peacekeeping, two more would be tied up as a result: one

118 Somalia training to replace the unit already there, and another arriving home from duty requiring retraining in how to be warfighting soldiers again. The military was never overwhelmingly negative however. Powell, who did appear to view some facets of peacekeeping (such as earmarking troops) negatively, was not so dogmatic in his opinions. As National Security Adviser to the Reagan Administration, Powell headed an interagency review on the United Nations and concluded that overall, the administration should be more positive towards the UN system. This review was influential in what some commentators see as the largest positive shift in the history of US/UN relations, which occurred during the second Reagan Administration.531 As more experience of peacekeeping operations occurred, both Powell and the military in general accepted pragmatically that peacekeeping would figure in the future of the US military spectrum, and must therefore be planned for. Powell was reportedly the voice behind Operation Provide Comfort to the Iraqi Kurds following the 1991 Gulf War, and it was on the basis of this operation that UNITAF was planned, even if the military leadership was against intervention in Somalia, viewing it as an altogether more dangerous operation than Northern Iraq. They felt ultimately justified in their concerns with the death of 18 of their best soldiers. The episode of 3–4 October and the deterioration of events in Somalia therefore did not come as a shock to the American military, elite or otherwise. This organization understood better than any other group the situation on the ground in Somalia; the dangers, the day-to-day manoeuvres and operations, the casualties, the firefights, and had understood the risks since Bush had proposed Operation Restore Hope, and the risks regarding peacekeeping in general.532 Consequently, when things went awry (as the military was well aware they might) it did not come as a surprise, and therefore did not affect military considerations regarding peacekeeping as much as, for example, the administration, which was unprepared. In addition, the military was conscious that what it was expected to do in Somalia after UNITAF ‘left’ was virtually impossible; that UNOSOM II was given a mandate, but not the adequate resources to carry it out (something that would become somewhat of an unfortunate pattern in 1990s peacekeeping). The Somalia debacle merely confirmed to the military that peacekeeping, by its very nature, carried with it a much higher level of risk than operations that adhered to strict Weinberger–Powell guidelines, and because the political leadership often expected more than was possible, given mandate and means. Somalia verified beliefs that in future operations must coincide more with traditional principles, and that greater training would be necessary. This risk-averse approach was obvious in the manner in which the campaign to liberate Kosovo from Serb oppression and ethnic violence was conducted.

Somalia 119 Although determined to ensure that the dangers of Somalia were not repeated, events did not sour the military on peacekeeping; they merely, in the words of Major General Montgomery, made the army more ‘determined to learn better ways, where possible to ensure the effectiveness and the security of future missions and to help the United Nations as it works to improve its own capabilities’.533 This proactive stance is evidenced by the expansion of peacekeeping training and doctrinal development, most of which occurred after the Somalia incident. A new division was created in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with UN issues, peacekeeping training was introduced at all levels, the Peacekeeping Institute was established at the Army War College, peacekeeping training for the Marines was implemented at Quantico, and peacekeeping training was incorporated into instruction at the Army Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana and the Combat Manoeuvre Training Center in Germany.534 In addition, major work was carried out at the doctrinal development level with the publication of the Doctrine for Joint Operations, as well as the development of a peacekeeping field manual.535 Furthermore, at a time when military budgets were being cut as a result of post-Cold War peace dividend thinking, endorsement of peacekeeping represented a smart way to help keep the military budget afloat; a way to ‘describe its work with new relevance in the new post-Cold War era’, and thus maintain its finances. The administration did return to this concept later on in its second term in office (when thoughts had turned from ‘four more years’ to legacies). Therefore, it was in the military’s best interest to assimilate peacekeeping into its already established structures. The military approached the Somalia ‘crisis’ and the issue of US involvement in peacekeeping, not with negativism, but with pragmatism; recognizing its limitations, while planning for its eventualities, and continuing to factor it into post-Cold War policy and planning. In the long term, Somalia did not alter the military outlook greatly, simply confirming the veracity of Weinberger–Powell. Disappointment of expectations Finally, with regard to the supposed shock that the October deaths in Somalia triggered in the politics of American foreign policy, we must elaborate on what we might call the ‘disappointment of expectations’. As previously discussed, the end of the Cold War produced an almost euphoric optimism that cooperation would replace division in the UN Security Council. The world organization would finally fulfil the role intended for it almost half a century before at its founding, many of the world’s most intractable conflicts could now be solved with relative ease, and peace would reign supreme in the projected ‘New World Order’. With hindsight it is easy to see how naively idealistic this projection was;

120 Somalia none the less, at the time this optimism was so pervasive, even at the highest levels in global politics, that quite a few points were overlooked.536 The Clinton Administration (and many others around the world) fell foul of this blinding faith. Unfortunately, the expectations they and others placed on the UN as a result were entirely unrealistic. A stubborn hope and a willingness to believe that the world could change overnight blinkered many to the inherent problems that the envisioned expansion of UN peacekeeping (the mechanism through which the new order of peace would be established) would expose: organizational and bureaucratic inadequacies, resource overstretch, and the difficulties in mixing traditional peacekeeping with the evolving concept of peace enforcement. This outlook also caused a failure to adequately assess the potential ‘costs’ of the newly proposed peacekeeping, in terms of credibility and casualties, as well as capital. Subsequently, when things went awry, most particularly in Somalia, those ‘optimists’ in the Clinton Executive (and elsewhere) were naively and shamefully unprepared, and psychologically ill-equipped to deal in a constructive manner with the problems, reacting instead with extreme negativity and disappointment. As Berdal writes, ‘[t]oo often, periods of misguided idealism have generated impossible expectations, only to be followed by unwarranted gloom and cynicism.’537 The result? A crisis of faith among the optimists, and a reaffirmation of the multilateralist sceptic doctrine, followed by a very public retreat by the Clinton Administration.

Conclusion The effects of Somalia on US foreign policy were second only to those of the Vietnam War. As well as suffering from the Vietnam syndrome, American politics now had a Somalia syndrome to contend with. However, the precepts behind both are the same: fear of intervention in intrastate violence, reluctance to become involved in nation-building, refusal to become engaged in conflict without overwhelming force and clear exist strategies, and a mistrust on behalf of the military of the civilian politicians who pull the strings. The 18 lives lost on 3–4 October 1993 fundamentally altered the foreign policy direction of an already ambivalent administration whose commitment to multilateralism was questionable. Reeling from the trials and tribulations of 1990s peacekeeping, the disappointment of overexaggerated expectations, the illusion of a negative public, and a perceived threat to its domestic agenda from a truculent Congress, Somalia was merely the catalyst needed to push an already teetering administration over the edge. Thus, the traditional post-Vietnam logic of the Weinberger–Powell precepts was codified in the principles governing decision-making surrounding US approval of, and participation in, UN peacekeeping ventures: PDD25.

Somalia 121 Very particular historical and cultural factors created a Somalia that was heading for conflict in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Clan culture, and experience of colonial rule, coupled with twenty years of brutal and divisive dictatorship, and an unfortunate collaboration of nature and savage civil war, brought about the tragic state collapse and crippling famine in which Somalia found itself in the early 1990s. The addition of an initially inadequate international response, followed by the shortfalls of massive American intervention, which handed over to a lesser UN force, led to problems which transformed a humanitarian venture into a military operation, and the deaths of 18 US servicemen. The finger of blame was pointed wildly in all directions, but a Clinton Administration in conflict with its own domestic interests and a negatively assertive Congress could not afford to lose face, and culpability was placed squarely on the shoulders of the world organization, even though much of the real blame lay with the American approach to the crisis. What was unclear was the reason why the deaths of 18 men left such a considerable impression on US foreign policy. One explanation comparative to other missions which resulted in fatalities is that a lack of ‘perceived interest’ coupled with a lack of ‘perceived success’, divorced from the Cold War, resulted in a more significant impact than was the case for many other operations where lives were lost. We have found that closer examination demonstrates that the Somalia debacle does not uphold the claims of a truculent Congress regarding the reactive public. Rather, evaluation of the large quantities of polling data available discounts the oft-cited reference to overwhelming public negativity following the Somalia debacle, and emphasizes that only minorities sought the immediate withdrawal of US troops. Subsequent analysis has also revealed that Somalia’s significant impact resulted from ‘shock’ experienced by sections of the US government, but that such an assertion (put forward at the time by the White House) is not credible for the Executive, which could not have been unaware of events in Somalia. It was not shock, but the pretence of shock, calculated to deflect criticism away from the administration and its chosen policy, and away from its crucial domestic agenda. The Legislature, however, was, it seems, genuinely shocked (at least in part). It ought not to have been as a result of frequent briefings on the subject, but the post-Cold War shift in priority to domestic issues meant that foreign policy was a much smaller issue for this Congress, and so less attention was in fact paid to events in Somalia. In addition, Congress in the mid1990s was of an increasingly conservative bent, and was consequently predisposed to negativity towards all things vaguely multilateral. Regardless of the facts, Somalia provided an excellent vehicle for the demonization of the United Nations (a useful election tool for conservatives). Contrary to popular belief, the Pentagon was not shocked by the fatalities of 3–4 October, as it was intimately involved with the day-to-day events

122 Somalia in Somalia. Neither was it as negatively reactionary as is supposed. This facet of the political establishment was well aware of the situation in Somalia; well aware that its job there, and the tools with which it had to work, were not a match. Consequently, it was aware of the potential risk under which its forces worked. The military had retained a healthy scepticism throughout the period of unrealistic optimism regarding peacekeeping that followed the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it was not shocked when things went wrong; as evidenced by the fact that the bulk of the changes made to include peacekeeping training and doctrinal development in the military occurred after the Somalia incident. Finally, the end of Cold War hostilities produced unrealistic expectations regarding what the UN and peacekeeping could realistically achieve, to such a degree that when things did not work out as had been hoped, the disappointment was crushing. This caused many who had been strong supporters of the UN and peacekeeping to react very strongly against it. The claims of father and son, Presidents George and George W. Bush, that each had managed to kick the Vietnam/Somalia syndrome with their respective involvement in a war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and in both peacekeeping and nation-building exercises in Iraq after 2003, have yet to be verified beyond question. The negative impact of both Vietnam and Somalia linger, yet the lessons that ought to have been learned regarding how to effectively carry out the sorts of tasks being required of the military in Iraq, while minimizing conflict, have not. The ‘lessons’ that were learned, namely no intervention without realizable goals rooted in bald national interest and domestic support, and a clear exit strategy, were applied with macabre effect to any proposed mission to stave off the rapid and horrific genocide underway in Rwanda between April and July 1994. It is to discussion of this impact that our study now turns.

5

Rwanda

Introduction It is estimated that during the Rwandan genocide 500,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by the majority Hutus, instigated by the interim government and carried out by Rwandan government forces (RGF), militias and the general populace over 100 days between April and July 1994; more deaths than were experienced during four years of Balkan war, and at a greater rate than that of the Jewish Holocaust. Millions were displaced within Rwanda, and an estimated 2,000,000 people (mostly Hutus) became refugees within the borders of neighbouring Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The International Community stood by as if dumbstruck. Unlike the preceding chapters, which examined the various factors leading to the abandonment of peacekeeping and the UN by the previously supportive Clinton Administration, this chapter seeks to investigate the impact this alteration in outlook and policy had on the ability of the International Community to respond effectively (and in a timely manner) to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The accepted wisdom on this subject is that the United States, still smarting from Somalia and labouring under strict new criteria laid down by PDD25, was not prepared to run the political risk of entering into another intervention. Therefore, she stalled the decision-making process in the Security Council, and prevented others who were more than willing to intervene from doing so. However, this is a much too simplistic reading. Although US policy had a significant impact on decision-making concerning Rwanda, there is a much more complex explanation for that policy change, and as we shall witness, the US was only one of many actors including France, Egypt, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the UN Secretariat, that must share the blame for the International Community’s inability to act to check the genocide. This chapter seeks to ascertain what the International Community knew before the outbreak of the genocide, what signs that Rwanda was headed for trouble were accessible, but remained unheeded by the

124 Rwanda International Community, and why. Second we will examine what the International Community knew, and what measures were taken during the genocide itself. How soon did the community of nations realize that genocide was taking place, and why was no effective action taken in the face of the orgy of inhumanity that spilled across the small African nation during those three months in 1994? An RPF soldier whose mother, father, and ten brothers and sisters where killed by Hutu militia commented to reporters in June 1994, ‘Rwanda is a tiny place. But we have all the hatred in the world.’538 How was it that almost an entire people turned on their neighbours? A dark spot crowded out the soul.

Background Prior to the 1860s, ethnicity was not an issue in Rwanda. Yes, two groups inhabited the territory: the minority Tutsi pastoralists who ruled over the Hutu agriculturalists in a feudal-style system, but this was a class distinction rather than an ethnic one. A rich Hutu (who owned many cows) could become a Tutsi, and likewise, a Tutsi who had lost their wealth would become a Hutu. In addition, there was significant intermarriage between the two classes.539 Following the reign of Tutsi King Rwabugeri, and after the Belgians took on the responsibility of Rwanda-Urundi from the Germans following the First World War, ethnicity became fixed. A 1933 census registered all Rwandans on the basis of their ‘ethnicity’, a fact that was arbitrarily discerned at this time by how many cows one owned.540 The Belgian colonizers preferred the Tutsi overclass and perpetuated myths of racial superiority. However, in the period that followed the Second World War, Belgium was pressured to prepare the country for independence, at which point, recognizing the inevitability of Hutu rule, Belgian administrators switched allegiance to the Hutu majority.541 The years 1959 to 1962 saw widespread violence. Elections were held in mid-1960 with Hutus manning polling stations. Unsurprisingly, the Hutus emerged triumphant and a provisional government was installed. In 1961 the monarchy was abolished, and on 1 July 1962 Rwanda officially attained independence.542 The result of the intimidation and the massacres directed at the Tutsi minority was to send an estimated 120,000 to 200,000 into exile in Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and, of particular note, Uganda. These refugees, and those who followed them, would come back to haunt those who exiled them, and the stability of the nation. There were approximately ten armed forays into Rwandan territory from Uganda between 1963 and 1967 followed by alarming episodes of reprisal massacres of ordinary Tutsis, and while exiled Tutsis relinquished their plans to restore themselves to former glory after 1967, violence directed at Tutsis within Rwanda did not cease, and in 1973 (it is sus-

Rwanda

125

pected at the instigation of northerner Juvenal Habyarimana, Chief of Staff of the Army) there was a widespread purge of Tutsis from the universities and educational institutions, which ignited violence elsewhere, soon spreading throughout the country.543 This particular bout of violence, influenced by Tutsi-on-Hutu violence in Burundi the previous year, served as the pretext for Habyarimana to step in and restore calm by staging a military coup d’état, establishing himself at the head of the Second Rwandan Republic (which would not embrace democratic principles any more strongly than the last). Habyarimana’s was a one-party state dominated by the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), which placed extreme emphasis on ethnic groupings. In elections, the President – unhindered as he was without rivals – achieved 99 per cent of the ‘popular’ vote, and Hutus benefited from racial quotas which downplayed the proportion of Tutsis per population.544 When there was trouble, Habyarimana, like his predecessors, played the ethnic card. While he and his coterie of close confederates – drawn mostly from the influential northern family of his wife (Rwanda’s very own Lady Macbeth), known as the akuzu, or little house – enriched themselves, the Hutu poor were encouraged to blame the Tutsis for their troubles.545 Thus, violence periodically flared. With the end of the Cold War, Western states were no longer willing to support the kinds of corrupt, authoritarian regimes they had bestowed favour on in the grave days of superpower struggle. Consequently, openness, inclusion and democratization were demanded by the West, and fearful of losing the previously never-ending supply of personal wealth, the Habyarimana regime began to capitulate.546 Within Rwanda there was also growing domestic hostility to the single-party state, and indigenous political opposition groups began to emerge, and while Habyarimana appeared extremely reluctant to make concessions to democratization, in a surprise move in July 1990 he announced the introduction of multi-party elections to the political system.547 The refugee question Successive waves of mainly Tutsi refugees beginning in 1959, with significant additions in 1963, 1967 and 1973, and in varying floods and trickles up until the 1990s, fled into neighbouring Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda. By the late 1980s, the United Nations estimated that Burundi held 280,000 refugees, Zaire 80,000, Tanzania 30,000 and Uganda 80,000.548 With the exception of Burundi, life for exiled Rwandans was hard. No more so than in Uganda, where oppression and scapegoating by Idi Amin and two bouts of Milton Obote, convinced Tutsis there that the only way they could ever achieve security and prosperity was to return to Rwanda.549 Many second-generation refugees, the children of those who

126 Rwanda had fled in 1959 and the early 1960s, found employment, and a purpose in Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA), which engaged both Amin and Obote, finally ousting Obote in 1986. These refugees, many of whom were high-ranking officers in the NRA, had formed a coherent political structure in 1979, which in 1986 renamed itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).550 RPF invasion (1990) and the Arusha process The condition of perpetual insecurity amplified the craving among the refugee population to return to Rwanda, and the massive recruitment of Rwandans into the National Resistance Army, presented not only the capacity to return to Rwanda, but demanded that it be a new Rwanda of political and social openness and equality for all. The existence of this group forced recognition by Habyarimana of the need to negotiate, but as a result of what PRF demands meant, simultaneously compelled him to recoil. He therefore stalled negotiations on many occasions. This became untenable for the RPF, and on 1 October 1990 an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 RPF troops, having deserted the National Resistance Army, invaded Rwanda.551 Unlike the Tutsi rebel refugees of the 1960s, the RPF disavowed any intention of reinstating Tutsi hegemony, and many Hutus who sought political reform within Rwanda numbered among its ranks.552 Initial progress was halted by French, some Zaireans and a handful of Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), and the RPF was forced to retreat to the Rwandan border. However, the organization had achieved its goal: to bring Habyarimana to the negotiating table in earnest, and to force political reforms in their home country. This resulted in the signing of the Dar es Salaam Declaration (February 1991), which heralded the beginning of what is now known as the Arusha process. Because of repeated cease-fire violations, a buffer zone was finally established between the RPF-held region to the north of Rwanda and the rest of the country, and the parties requested that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) monitor this zone. Consequently the OAU Neutral Observer Group (NMOG) was established. Demands from the RPF and continued internal pressure also resulted in a loosening of political strictures within Rwanda, and the growth of domestic opposition led to the proliferation of opposition parties.553 A coalition government formed in April comprised these parties, and a prime minister was named from the ranks of the moderate opposition party, the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR): Agathe Uwilingiyimana. These parties were also to benefit from the power-sharing that would result from the Arusha process, and thus they were, with the exception of the extremist Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), in tacit alliance with the rebel organization that would make their political aspirations a reality.

Rwanda

127

During Arusha talks, violence erupted periodically between the RPF and Rwandan government forces, usually in response to human rights abuses and mass killings of Tutsi civilians, perpetrated by, or at the instigation of, the government or the CDR. On 8 February 1993, in response to the massacre of at least 300 Tutsis in the north-west of Rwanda a month before in which the government was believed to be complicit, the RPF fought its way to within 23 kilometres of Kigali, despite assistance to government forces once more provided by the French, before voluntarily ceasing action.554 They had demonstrated their power while remaining committed to power-sharing principles.555 From this time on the RPF negotiated from a much stronger position. Following the February cease-fire breach, the UN was requested to establish an observer mission on the Ugandan side of the Rwanda/Uganda border in order to monitor the activities of the RPF and the Ugandan army. Consequently, on 22 June 1993, UNSC Resolution 846 launched the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR). After many months of negotiations the Arusha Accords were signed by both parties on 4 August 1993. A broad-based transitional government was to be established pending fully democratic elections, with Habyarimana remaining as President, albeit in a titular position. The RPF and Tutsis were to be fully integrated into the government, armed forces, gendarmerie and society. The Accords also called for an international force to police the agreement, provide security in Kigali, and assist with the implementation of the transitional goal of integrating the RPF and the army. Thus, on 5 October 1993 UNSC Resolution 872 established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).556 The Mission would be headed on the military side by Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, and on the political side by Special Representative to the SecretaryGeneral Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon. The situation deteriorates Although the Arusha Accords had been signed and sealed and a UN force established in Kigali, it soon became clear that Habyarimana had not negotiated in good faith, and that he and members of his favoured elite in the MRND and CDR had no intention of abandoning their privileged position in Rwandan society.557 As Adelman and Suhrke point out, although the Accords were a ‘veritable coup d’état for the RPF and the internal opposition’, they represented a ‘frontal attack’ on all that the regime and the extremist elements therein, such as those of the akuzu and CDR, held dear.558 Extremist elements had not been represented at the talks, and neither were they to be included in the make-up of the broad-based transitional government. Consequently, the elite’s privileged status, its source of

128 Rwanda wealth and power, and Hutu rule without input from the Tutsi minority, were all under assault. These elements within Rwanda, perhaps even including Habyarimana himself, would not allow the Accords or international pressure to destroy their way of life, and threatened on one occasion that the Accords would have no less of an affect than to bring about an apocalypse.559 Every time progress was made in implementing the agreement, the hardliners struck out at the Tutsis. Habyarimana, undoubtedly under pressure from the akuzu, stalled repeatedly in implementing the terms of the agreement, encouraging division within the opposition parties as they polarized between moderate and Hutu power factions, and failing to rein in factions of his own elite clearly bent on bloody solutions to what they perceived as the nation’s woes (the Tutsis). An anonymous government official told Dallaire that violence would break out again if the political deadlock that existed over Arusha ended.560

Genocide The killings begin At approximately 8.30 on the evening of 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, were entering Kigali airport on the way home from a summit meeting regarding the implementation of the Arusha Accords when a missile, or a number of missiles, struck the aircraft causing it to explode and crash in the grounds of the Presidential Palace. Everyone on board was killed.561 The murders of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira were blamed on the RPF, the Tutsis and the Belgians variously. The intent was to incite hatred and violence against these groups. There was absolutely no evidence to support any of these claims, and UNAMIR was denied access to the crash site to make any kind of assessment. However, it is generally agreed that the most likely culprit was the Presidential Guard on orders from hardline members of the akuzu, and was the signal for the genocide to begin. Before news of the deaths had even hit the airwaves of Radio Rwanda, the militias, who would become generally known as the interahamwe (or ‘those who attack together’) after the largest group, had set up roadblocks all over Kigali, and Tutsis who had been moving around the city as usual, going about their daily lives, were taken aside and killed. Then, the Presidential Guard, elements of the regular army and gendarmerie, and the interahamwe began a systematic, house-to-house search and destroy: first of moderate Hutus, followed by prominent Tutsis, followed by any Tutsis. All of this was conducted from prepared lists, and abetted by radio.562 Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana was murdered, along with the ten Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers who had been sent to protect her. Refer-

Rwanda

129

ring to their very limited ROE, the Belgians had laid down their arms at the request of Presidential Guardsmen. They were subsequently taken to a nearby base, killed and horribly mutilated.563 Uwilingiyimana was killed, as were many others, for being a moderate Hutu; a member of the opposition. The ten Belgian soldiers were killed in order to facilitate Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. Belgium was the largest contributor to UNAMIR, and her withdrawal would gut UNAMIR and necessitate its entire withdrawal.564 An interim government was declared, formed by the extremists in the military who had performed a quiet coup, and drawn from the Hutu power politicians of the Habyarimana regime, and began a cleverly manipulative dance with the International Community, misrepresenting the character of the violence; suggesting that they were doing all in their power to calm the situation, while simultaneously coordinating the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Civil war renewed In response to the massacres, the RPF battalion that had been stationed in Kigali as part of the Arusha Agreement broke out of its barracks and began to engage with Rwandan government forces, while the bulk of the movement deployed from the north-west region it had previously occupied, towards Kigali. Thus the civil war resumed, a fact that would serve to confuse international statespersons and diplomats, and obscure the reality of the genocide.565 The RPF advance was rapid. One section of the rebel army stationed in the north entered Kigali on 12 April, causing the interim government to flee to Gitarama. The regular Rwandan army was poorly trained and suffered from low moral. Consequently, in three months, the RPF had liberated most of the country, with the exception of the French safe ‘humanitarian’ zone; the final stronghold of the interim government fell on 18 July. The killings spread Over the course of the 100 days that followed 6 April the people of Rwanda, moderate Hutus and Tutsis alike, experienced a horror and fear so terrible that it is beyond that which the imagination can conjure. The interahamwe and RGF constituted the backbone of the assault, but the involvement of ordinary Hutu civilians was shockingly pervasive. Neighbour turned on neighbour, doctors turned on patients, teachers on pupils, priests and pastors on parishioners and visa versa, and relatives turned on each other. Many of the civilians involved, however, were unemployed, socially dispossessed people for whom, as Gerard Prunier comments, ‘the genocide

130 Rwanda was the best thing that could ever happen’.566 They could take out their social frustrations on those better-off than themselves (as long as they were Tutsis, or the wrong kind of Hutu), they could elevate their economic status by looting, they could rape and kill with relative impunity, and ‘they could get drunk for free’.567 Countless were rounded up, or fled to places where they believed they would be safe: churches, hospitals, UN enclosures. Many were even encouraged to do so by their soon-to-be killers in order to facilitate maximum body count. Most who did so were slaughtered. Ripped apart by grenades, shot, stabbed, hacked to death with machetes, and clubbed with traditional weapons known as masues (clubs with nails embedded in them).568 The rate of murder was three, four, even five times that of the Jewish Holocaust, and the perpetrators did not have the technological advantage of mass execution chambers.569 Here, ‘technological underdevelopment was no obstacle to genocide’.570 Huddled together, blameless men, women, children and even the unborn were killed, 3,000, 6,000, even 10,000 at a time.

International response in brief UNAMIR’s reaction UNAMIR responded to the seeming chaos by attempting to broker a cease-fire between the RPF and the interim government, hoping that such an agreement would halt the killing of civilians. Generally however, the international force was unable to perform any useful role, as its numbers were too small and it was lacking in adequate supplies and equipment. There were examples of brave attempts by UNAMIR soldiers to protect the lives of civilians, but these were the exception rather than the rule, as by and large UN troops could not or would not involve themselves.571 General Dallaire called strenuously for reinforcements, but these calls were not answered, as on 21 April the UNSC voted with Resolution 912 to reduce UNAMIR to 270 in order to ensure the safety of its people. The remaining skeleton crew was to focus its energies on monitoring events and acting as a go-between for the two warring factions.572 It was not until 17 May that the Security Council, in delayed recognition of the perilous situation of non-combatants in Rwanda, voted with Resolution 918 to strengthen UNAMIR (numbers were to be boosted to approximately 5,500). The newly strengthened mission would take on the name UNAMIR II.573 Unfortunately, troop and equipment contributions were not easy to come by, and the force was not deployable until the genocide had ended.

Rwanda

131

International evacuation The initial priority of the International Community was the evacuation of its nationals living and working within Rwanda, and a massive operation was put underway to do just that. A significant number of French and Belgium troops entered Kigali airport on 11 April, secured the area, and proceeded to extricate expatriate workers of all kinds. In addition, a significant US marine presence arrived in Burundi to facilitate the removal of expatriates by land.574 Rwandan workers begged to be taken with them, but were by and large refused, although there were always exceptions, one of whom was former Rwandan first lady Agathe Habyarimana.575 Belgian peacekeepers under UNAMIR are known to have exchanged UN command during this period for that of their national regiments, and abandoned Rwandans under their protection in order to assist with the evacuation mission.576 Dallaire was reportedly galled to see the large, wellarmed French and Belgian contingent at Kigali airport, while his ragtag team of demoralized peacekeepers watched the slaughter take place all around them. Operation Turquoise While the Secretary-General was engaged in attempts to man and kit out UNAMIR II, the French came up with a plan to unilaterally (but mandated by the UN) enter Rwanda to halt the genocide. The UN was getting nowhere with UNAMIR II and the other members of the Security Council jumped at the chance to finally be seen to act (without having to involve their own troops). Consequently, Operation Turquoise was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by UNSC Resolution 929 on 22 June.577 In testimony to the fast-acting capabilities of a major power, France was able to deploy its initial units on the same day as authorization was received.578 By 9 July, the French had established a ‘safe humanitarian’ zone in the south-west of Rwanda, bordering Zaire. It is estimated that 13,000 to 15,000 Tutsis were saved from camps where they were to be executed. However, most of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu population had already been killed by the time the French had arrived, although the French government claimed tens of thousands were saved.579 Moreover, commentators note that massacres continued in the safe zone, and that the French, knowingly or not, facilitated the flight of the RGF, the interahamwe (weapons and all) and the genocidal provisional government into Zaire.580 The refugee crisis As the RPF advanced, thousands of Hutus fled before them, goaded by largely fictitious but inflammatory broadcasts on RTLM that the RPF was

132 Rwanda massacring all Hutus in its path. As the RPF advanced south and east throughout April, Hutus fled into Tanzania. On 29 April, aid agencies witnessed the fastest single recorded movement of people across a national border; an estimated 250,000 people traversed the Rusumo Falls bridge into Tanzania.581 Refugee numbers peaked at roughly 500,000582 Refugees also fled into Uganda and Burundi (approximately 10,000 and 255,000, respectively). Nevertheless, the largest flow was westward into Zaire. As the RPF moved across the country in its final sweep that July, and again encouraged by RTLM claims that they would be massacred, an estimated 1,500,000 million Hutus crossed the Rwandan/Zairean border.583 RTLM also exhorted its listeners to flee in order to ensure that cover was in place for the departure of the crumbling interim government. The movement of refugees into Tanzania the previous April was the fastest movement of people aid agencies had ever seen; however, the movement of refugees into Zaire would soon top this record, as agencies observed an estimated 10,000 people crossing the border per hour.584 In total the refugee crisis involved roughly 2,500,000 people. Now the International Community had something it could really get its teeth into. Whether international action in the face of this unprecedented crisis was a result of guilt over inaction in the face of the genocide, whether the community of nations simply did not realize that this was an entirely separate phenomenon, or whether action on behalf of major powers was a result of a geo-strategic wish not to see the destabilization of entire central Africa, is unclear. Whatever the motivation, now the International Community spun into action with amazing rapidity and force.

International response: a question of awareness? How aware was the community of international actors involved in Rwanda’s supposed ‘road to peace’ of the potential for massive violence and even genocide to erupt? The international NGO community was well aware of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda, and strove to awaken the International Community to the dangers; however, such NGOs were largely ignored. Warning signs? Signs that all was not well in Rwanda proliferated after 1990, and particularly so from 1992 onwards. Indeed, Joyce Leader describes an atmosphere of ‘palpable fear’ among Rwandans as far back as winter 1992, and a critical warning from the Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda stated to Brussels that a ‘secret command’ was extant within the Rwandan government which was ‘planning the total extermination of the Tutsis in order to resolve, once and for all, the ethnic problem and to destroy the Hutu opposition’.585 These early clues went unnoticed.

Rwanda

133

Although the Arusha process was ongoing, gross abuses of human rights continued unabated, and increased in number and scope as the months continued. The 1993 International Commission of Inquiry, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, and reports from several human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch, African Rights, Oxfam and Amnesty International, provided anyone who would listen with facts regarding the deliberate targeting, by the government as well as other Hutu extremists, of Tutsis and Hutus of a politically moderate inclination.586 This targeting did not only involve intimidation and arbitrary imprisonment; the International Commission of Inquiry reported massacres of civilians, with the death-toll reaching upward of 2,000 since 1990.587 The UN Special Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, confirmed the culpability of the government and government-affiliated groups in these actions and in incitement of ethnic hatred among the civilian population.588 In December 1990, the anti-Tutsi newspaper Kangura published the Hutu Ten Commandments, which exhorted Hutus to discriminate against Tutsis in every possible way, in essence excluding them from society in Rwanda; but more ominously, Hutus were told to remember 1959, and to cease having mercy on the Tutsis.589 Indeed, Samantha Power compares these ‘commandments’ to the Nuremberg laws in their significance.590 Later, at the close of 1992, prominent MRND politician Leon Mugesera urged crowds at a rally to kill all Tutsis: ‘What are we waiting for to execute the sentence?’ he asked; the Tutsi had no right to live among Hutus, they were inyenzi, accomplices: ‘[w]hat are we waiting for to decimate these families. . .. Destroy them. . .. Drive them out.’591 Hutus were known to have quoted passages from this incendiary speech as they went forth to massacre Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. By 1992/1993 death squads and death lists were such common knowledge that one could pay to have one’s name removed.592 Neither was the US government bereft of intelligence on the worsening situation in Rwanda pre-1994. The US State Department received reports in February 1991 of the arbitrary detention of 5,000 civilians in March 1992 and of a massacre that occurred in January 1991 at Kinigi where 500 to 1,000 Tutsis were killed. In January 1993, the CIA reported on massive arms shipments to Rwanda.593 And in February 1993, the American State Department received reports of a March 1992 massacre in Burgesera, a January 1993 massacre of Tutsis, disappearance of Tutsi youth, the expansion of the Rwandan army, and the existence of death squads.594 From the moment of deployment the United Nations received constant reports from UNAMIR regarding the decline of the security situation within Rwanda, and specifically Kigali. There were politically and ethnically motivated killings, massacres, extremist proclamations over the air waves (emanating particularly from RTLM), the continued arms flows into and around Kigali, militia death squads, and the existence of prepared death lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was common knowledge.

134 Rwanda On 21 October 1993 in neighbouring Burundi, elements within the Tutsi-dominated army staged a military coup, killing the nation’s first democratically elected President Ndadye, a moderate and a Hutu. His death ignited revenge attacks perpetrated by Hutus, with Tutsis as their victims, whereupon the Tutsi-dominated army stepped in, brutally suppressing the population. Between 50,000 and 200,000 people were killed (both Hutus and Tutsis), and approximately 700,000 mainly Hutu refugees fled to southern Rwanda.595 These events significantly destabilized the situation in Rwanda. Burundian refugees who had fled during 1972 and 1993 became some of the most feared, savage and sadistic killers of the genocide, marked particularly by their need to humiliate their Tutsi victims before killing them.596 In November the extremist CDR announced publicly that the ‘majority population’ (Hutus) must prepare to ‘neutralize its enemies and their accomplices’.597 As all Tutsis had existed in an atmosphere of blame and recrimination since the RPF invasion of 1990, there could be no equivocation as to the meaning of this announcement. In that same month the Belgian Embassy informed Brussels that the assassination of the Prime Minister (a moderate) had been called for on RTLM.598 Then on 3 December 1993, UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire received a letter from several high-ranking military officers in the Rwandan government informing him that the militias were planning massacres.599 This plan was said to have been masterminded by Habyarimana himself. Massacres were to begin in Kigali and then spread throughout the county, particularly to areas where concentrations of Tutsis existed. Opposition politicians were also to be assassinated.600 In addition, the RPF was to be induced to break the cease-fire, thus providing the pretext for a renewal of civil war.601 On 11 January 1994, a fax was sent to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It was from Dallaire, and was addressed to the DPKO’s Military Adviser, Major-General Maurice Baril, a fellow Canadian with whom Dallaire had previously served. This communication detailed information provided by an informant put in contact with UNAMIR (specifically, Colonel Luc Marchal, commander of the Belgian contingent) by a ‘very very important government politician’.602 The informant, who was a high-ranking interahamwe trainer, notified UNAMIR of a plot to assassinate Belgian peacekeepers in an attempt to provoke the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, to incite the RPF battalion stationed in Kigali to engage in hostilities, and to target moderate politicians. The President, he stated, was not in control of some elements of his government/party. He also informed the international force that there were 1,700 interahamwe scattered about Kigali and its environs, and that he had been instructed to register all Tutsis in Kigali (‘he suspects it is for their extermination’).603 Although the informant supported resistance to the RPF, he could not ‘support the killing of innocent persons’.604

Rwanda

135

In a shocking estimation of capability, the informant claimed that ‘in 20 minutes, his personnel could kill 1,000 Tutsis’.605 Arms cashes were also identified, and Dallaire indicated his intention to launch an operation to retrieve these arms as they were in violation of the Kigali weapons-free area, as stipulated in the Arusha Accords. He ended the fax, in an unusual manner for official correspondence, with a personal message to Baril: ‘peux ce que veux’, his high school motto, approximating the English maxim ‘where there’s a will, there’s a way’, and the motto of the brigade he commanded, ‘Allons-y’, or ‘let’s go’.606 Both held specific relevance with regard to the situation. Dallaire desperately sought a proactive capability in dealing with the deteriorating situation around him. Here was a concrete opportunity to show those intent on killing peace that at the very least UNAMIR would not stand idly by. Such arms cashes were widely known around the capital, and as Colonel Marchal later remarked, everyone was expecting the UN to do something about them. Even Booh-Booh, who was known for his Habyarimana sympathies and tendency to downplay the situation, complained that each day that arms recovery was not attempted was a day closer to danger.607 Nevertheless, as Gourevitch puts it, Dallaire’s call, ‘let’s go’, elicited from DPKO headquarters a response of, ‘[l]et’s not’; the prospect was denied.608 The action directive came later the following day from Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Kofi Annan, signed by his deputy Iqbal Riza. Dallaire was told on no account was he to proceed with the operation outlined in his correspondence, as it was outside his mandate and to headquarters spelled a potentially dangerous position for UNAMIR troops. They were rather to take the matter to Habyarimana himself, who, they were to assume, knew nothing of the plans and to warn him of the grave seriousness of these charges (even though a month previously they had been informed of a similar plan devised by Habyarimana). They were also to appraise the French, Belgian and American embassies in Kigali, and request that they deliver equivalent demarches to the President.609 Riza recounts that the fax ‘alarmed’ the DPKO, because although they often received ‘cables of that nature’ it was unusual to receive information ‘of this magnitude’.610 Yet nothing was done bar the various diplomatic demarches delivered to the President and his party. During the month of January 1994 the CIA provided the State Department with a report that detailed a worst-case scenario in Rwanda in which, if hostilities resumed, 500,000-plus people would die.611 This information was not shared with UNAMIR until after the genocide had ended.612 In contrast to this, the intelligence available to UNAMIR was almost nonexistent. The mission had zero intelligence capabilities, although Dallaire did the best that he could – having been denied requests for the means to gather intelligence – using the Belgian military information office, and two French-African military observers. The mission only acquired a small

136 Rwanda facility, when Marchal (going outside UN channels) pleaded directly to Belgian military intelligence, which provided them with a two-man cell that reported directly to Belgium. None the less, this greatly improved the mission’s previously poor capacity, resulting in a small network of informers.613 On or around 20 February, Jean Birara (a Kigali banker) informed a Belgian reporter that Sylvain Nsabimana, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff and a relative of his, showed him a list of 1,500 people in Kigali who were marked for elimination. In addition, the Papal Nuncio gave the Italian Ambassador two lists of Tutsis who were to be murdered.614 A few days later, Dallaire reported to DPKO HQ that he was ‘drowning in information about death squad target lists’ and that ‘any spark on the security side could have catastrophic consequences’.615 On 24 February, Booh-Booh told the DPKO that violence in Kigali was ethnically motivated and directed at Tutsis.616 Ominously, on 25 February, Habyarimana confessed to the Special Representative that his life had been threatened (he did not say by whom).617 And Belgian intelligence reported on 27 February that ‘[t]he interahamwe are armed to the teeth and on alert . . . each of them has ammunition, grenades, mines and knives . . . they are all waiting for the right moment to act’.618 By the time February was out, Belgian intelligence had ‘obtained solid information about extremist plots’.619 Accordingly, the Belgian government sought to strengthen the UNAMIR mandate, such was their anxiety regarding the security situation within Rwanda, and the safety of their troops stationed there.620 At this point, the security situation in Rwanda degenerated sharply, with daily violence and demonstrations as well as the assassinations of political leaders.621 The small Belgian intelligence unit was receiving more and more alarming reports of interahamwe activities. The Hutu extremist press was forecasting that ‘something very big’ was about to happen.622 African diplomats warned of CDR claims that there would soon be no Tutsis left in Rwanda.623 The Belgian Embassy reported to Brussels on 1 March that RTLM was broadcasting more virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda and calling for the extermination of the Tutsis, while the following day an MRND informer told Belgian intelligence of the existence of a plan within his party to eradicate Kigali’s Tutsi population should the RPF renew civil war; ‘the Hutu will massacre them without pity’, he admonished.624 On 10 March, Belgian intelligence reported that the MRND was angry with the President for meeting Ugandan President Museveni without consulting them, and on 14 March that Belgian peacekeepers may be under threat from militias. Reports were also transmitted that indicated increasing evidence of links between the interahamwe and high-ranking officers in the RGF and gendarmerie.625 Around 22 March, a highly placed Rwandan army intelligence officer

Rwanda

137

informed a group which included Belgian military advisers that ‘if Arusha were implemented, they were ready to liquidate the Tutsis’.626 RTLM broadcast, on 3 April, that things were heating up, and that on 6 April ‘a little something’ might happen, followed by the 7th and 8th and all the other days in April, on which ‘you will see something’.627 Throughout this period the International Community was well aware of the increasing arms shipments to Rwanda, and in many cases was actually directly or indirectly involved in that trade. Of particular note might have been the import of vast quantities of machetes, many more than could ever be required for agricultural use in a country the size of Rwanda. Remarkably, two days before Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, Theoneste Bagasora, who was a major figure behind the genocide, told an assembled group that included high-ranking UN personnel that ‘the only plausible solution for Rwanda would be to eliminate the Tutsi’.628 Such information as was available to the UN was available certainly to the permanent members of the Security Council, if not to those nonpermanent members. However, this information-sharing was not necessarily a reciprocal relationship. The permanent members, particularly the United States and France, and the former colonial nation Belgium, all had very good intelligence regarding the situation in Rwanda. The deteriorating security situation was watched closely by the diplomatic community in Kigali, and reported back to home capitals, in addition to which states possessed their own special intelligence-gathering tools; the United Nations had nothing comparable to these. Failure to heed the warning signs The above represents merely a sample of the warning signs that were readily available to the US, the UN, and other governments capable of preventing or stopping the genocide in Rwanda. But since the warning signs were so numerous, why were they not heeded? Why, when governments put two and two together, did they fail to come up with four? Why did no one respond to a nation so obviously in trouble? Several factors ensured that the indictors emanating from Rwanda were ignored. It is to these that we now turn. It is possible that there was a general inability to conceive that such an evil was being planned by the extremist elite in Rwanda; it was just too terrible a notion to comprehend.629 Prudence Bushnell maintains that such a concept was ‘so counter to the thinking of an American mind . . . that one would [be] behind the scenes, planning the slaughter of people’ that it was not even close to being considered.630 And Joyce Leader explains that ‘it was very difficult for those of us who were at the embassy . . . to imagine the magnitude of . . . [what was to happen]. People tried to tell us and tried to help us understand, but . . . we just didn’t get it.’631 Failure to heed the warning signs may also be attributed to what one

138 Rwanda might variously term desensitization, fatalism, or indeed racism. In essence, many of those who were familiar with Rwanda’s history and troubles had, however unjustly, become desensitized to the internal violence, coming to view it as part of the scenery.632 Consequently, the violence that had been escalating since the beginning of the 1990s was seen as simply another cycle in a protracted chronicle of ethnic tension. Riza seems to have adhered to this analysis, and although he apologizes for putting it so ‘cynically’, he maintains that ‘[i]t was nothing new’.633 Taking this factor a step further, this attitude becomes fatalism. Observing a national or subnational entity such as Rwanda, or Bosnia, wracked with ethnic conflict, there are those who perceive discord to be rooted in age-old struggles between ancient enemies, and as such defies solution. This sort of fatalism encourages inaction, and certainly did so in the years and months preceding the Rwandan genocide. The final facet of this attitude has its origin in basic racism. With this explanation there exists one core consideration: this is Africa. In their natural state, Africans have been killing each other since the dawn of time; therefore, this is just another example, no different from the past, with no reason to pay any more attention than usual. (Not that if one did, one could provide a solution.) Dallaire, observed more plainly: I do not believe that the developed world actually considers Africans . . . as total humans. I still feel that they consider them as children, as reactive to extreme emotions, and that sooner or later even the most developed ones you’ll have a coup d’etat . . . and they’ll go into [mass killings] . . . [and] that sort of stated as an excuse to not get involved.634 This racism played its part in the International Community’s failure to heed Rwanda’s warnings. A further problem is a question of what we might term diplomatic bias. This prism through which the peace process and the deterioration of events in Rwanda was viewed caused those closely involved – the diplomatic community, as well as government officials in national capitals and, indeed, the UN – to assume that the state-level actors whom they were dealing with (i.e. the Habyarimana regime) were rational national/ international actors, after the manner of themselves; that the regime had negotiated in good faith, and that it was committed to the process. Diplomats simply did not believe the RPF – as Bushnell states – when it described the extremists as committed to wiping out Tutsis.635 This situation occurred largely as a result of the diplomatic bias. Normal, rational state actors would not plan and orchestrate mass murder or genocide. However, the ruling elite in Rwanda, which in fact represented the extremists, was not committed to the Arusha process or to power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis. The Accords were signed and sealed, but the

Rwanda

139

government who signed them (and its close associates) did not intend to see them implemented. Such a consideration did not fit into the diplomatic bias. An addendum to the previous point is the extent to which the diplomatic community, its home governments and the United Nations were invested in the Arusha process, and once signed, its implementation. The diplomatic community, and latterly the UN, had been heavily involved in the process, and as such did not wish to see it fail; thus ‘once the paper was signed, it became a kind of sacred text’.636 As Bushnell commented, ‘[w]e had put hope in Arusha. That was our winning horse . . . [and] once you become energized with one solution, it’s very, very hard to let go and even consider something else.’637 Bushnell’s boss, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, stated more plainly, ‘we were heavily invested in supporting the Arusha process’.638 This focus blinded many to the faults of the process and eventual agreement, and to the growing instability within Rwanda. This fixation or ‘mezmerization’ with Arusha was unfortunately coupled with a lack of sophisticated understanding of the circumstances in Rwanda.639 David Rawson, US Ambassador to Rwanda in the lead-up to the genocide, admits that they ‘didn’t fully understand what was going on; we didn’t fully appreciate . . . the seriousness’.640 In a remarkably similar statement, Kofi Annan reveals, ‘perhaps we did not fully understand the complexities of the situation we were dealing with’.641 The political dynamics in the country were not fully comprehended, as Moose commented; neither was the determination or clout of the extremists. The political and ethnically motivated violence and its escalation was seen as a function of the delay in implementing the power-sharing agreement, as opposed to the reality, which was that the former elite, soon to be bereft of power, wealth and consequence as a result of the Accords, were gearing up to ensure that this never happened by eliminating the threat.642 As Bushnell states, ‘[t]here was concern . . . that people were being targeted and killed . . . [but] there was a hope that this would stop, if and when an interim government was put in place.’643 This belief is echoed by Riza, who defended that to those in New York, the ‘violence was not connected to a planning of a genocide. . . . It was seen as a result of a political deadlock.’644 A further obstacle to action in this instance was an apparent failure of the pertinent information to make it sufficiently far up the pecking order to Executive levels within governments, and indeed the UN. This is not to suggest that had the information filtered through, action would have been taken, but the absence of the facts in the hands of the leaders certainly made it more difficult for states/the UN to act effectively. Those at the top, placed to do something about the information, were either unaware of the signs or were simply not interested. Their focus was on the many more ‘pressing’ issues of the time.

140 Rwanda The 1990s were an inauspicious time to be an African country on the brink. The end of the Cold War had opened up avenues of action in humanitarian crises and collective security that no one could ever have thought possible during the constrictive years of bipolar freeze. But therein lay the problem. When the RPF invaded from Uganda in 1990, the world’s attention was on the collapse of the Soviet Union, and seized of the new possibilities provided by the recently relaxed atmosphere in the UN Security Council, exemplified in the multinational force at work in the Gulf. Throughout the early 1990s, right up until the inception of the genocide, the world’s attention remained deflected from the small African nation. Madeleine Albright points to ‘clashes or extreme tensions in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sudan, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan’ as well as Iraq’s continued defiance of the SC, and protests that in intelligence summaries ‘Rwanda was not cited either prominently or frequently’.645 The UN, meanwhile, was immersed in El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia to name but a few. While the Americans were more concerned with China, The Middle East, Bosnia and Haiti, and as regards Africa, South Africa, Somalia, Liberia and Burundi merited greater focus than Rwanda.646 France and Belgium followed events closely, but the French were plainly biased in favour of their ‘old friend’ Habyarimana, and it seems that no one was listening to Belgium’s infrequent warnings. Thus, Rwanda was a low-status issue for most major powers, and indeed for the UN. There were, it seemed, more pressing crises elsewhere. Rwanda did not impinge upon any vital national interests, and a peace process was underway; therefore it seemed as though the situation was ‘under control’. The final factor in explaining the negligence of the community of nations is related to the difficulties of 1990s peacekeeping and the souring relationship between the Clinton Administration and the UN/peacekeeping. The year before the genocide commenced saw UN peacekeeping in crisis. Operations, particularly in Bosnia and Somalia, had gone badly wrong, and there was a reluctance on behalf of the major powers, especially the US, to become involved in internal state problems or anything deemed risky therein. In addition, the Secretariat was disinclined to engage in risky actions that may have been beneficial in the course of a mission, or to bring certain issues to the attention of the SC that they did not think would be positively received. The Somalia mission had a particular effect on both the major powers on the Security Council, and the Secretariat. On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in coordinated ambushes, causing uproar in the halls of the United Nations. Never had UN peacekeepers been so blatantly targeted throughout the organization’s history. The

Rwanda

141

death of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia was the real catastrophe for the UN during this period; an incident that rocked the UN to its foundations. As former Canadian ambassador to the UN David Malone commented, even when genocide was occurring in Rwanda, UN people were still reeling from the incident on 5 June.647 Genocide was not the outrage in that period; the deliberate targeting of the Pakistani peacekeepers was. One of the guiding factors in formulating UNAMIR was to avoid a repeat of this, thus accounting in part for the limited mandate conferred on the mission. Subsequently, on 3–4 October 18 US soldiers were killed during an abortive raid in the Somalia capital. The political mess that followed saw Congress call for immediate withdrawal from the country, and from UN peacekeeping and multilateralism. Reeling from the trials and tribulations of 1990s peacekeeping, the disappointment of over-exaggerated expectations, the illusion of a negative public, and a perceived threat to its domestic agenda from a truculent Congress, Somalia was the catalyst that pushed an already teetering administration over the edge. Negative experiences of multilateral interventions irrevocably coloured the perceptions of the US, the UN and other major powers with regard to peacekeeping. It was an accident of fate that the Arusha Accords, which contained provisions for a neutral intervention force, were signed during the deterioration in Somalia (as well as worsening events in Bosnia), and that the resolution which eventually authorized UNAMIR was issued two days after the Mogadishu firefight. The United States was loath to become involved in any other peacekeeping ventures at this point, and thus became the strongest advocate for the weakest mandate.648 Such a mandate went unchallenged by a cautious Secretariat. UNAMIR was therefore conceived with a very cautious mandate and one which sought to ensure that its peacekeepers would/could not engage in any sort of potentially dangerous activity that might result in casualties. No one wanted a ‘repeat of Somalia’, even if this meant different things to different people.649 Annan and Riza both laid the blame for this cautious mandate squarely on the doorstep of the Somalia experience.650 Clinton was also under pressure from Congress to reduce the strain of peacekeeping on the US budget; therefore, the Americans consistently requested that the Secretary-General find ways to reduce the cost of UNAMIR. This merciless quest for thrift created the situation in which Force Commander Dallaire found himself upon deployment to Rwanda: devoid of basic necessities such as food, water, fuel and medical supplies, not to mention shortages in troops, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and intelligence capabilities. The cautious mandate and lack of supplies all took their toll on UNAMIR in its attempts to fulfil its duties, to manage the deteriorating security situation, and to respond proactively to halt genocide as it raged all around.651

142 Rwanda Once the mission was deployed, the shadow of Somalia continued to loom large over considerations there.652 As Riza comments, ‘Somalia was always there in any operations that involved risk.’653 Fear of putting UN personnel in potentially dangerous situations resulting in more dead peacekeepers, and the death of peacekeeping as a tool, as well as the realization that any more ambitious requests made on behalf of the Force Commander would be rejected as a result of the US, and latterly the British position, became the guiding factor for the Secretariat, rather than what was pertinent on the ground. This is what appears to have happened with regard to the oft-cited 11 January fax from Dallaire to Baril. Aside from the fact that the DPKO was supposedly swimming in similar information from missions around the globe (as Boutros-Ghali contends) the information was not passed along to the Security Council because Riza and Annan believed that such information would not be well received.654 The directions contained within their reply were as a direct consequence of the atmosphere of negativity emanating from the Somalia experience; both UN and American experiences. Dallaire was told not to go ahead with his planned raid because it sounded too much like Somalia for comfort. As Riza remembers, the immediate thought at DPKO headquarters was ‘[n]ot Somalia, again’.655 The DPKO did not want to jeopardize the lives of its personnel, nor did it seek to place itself in a position wherein peacekeeping was shelved because of yet another disaster.656 More importantly, however, DPKO personnel knew that the UN’s most powerful member state would not be amused. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali even goes so far as to say (perhaps embellishing a little) that the DPKO had been controlled by the United States since the Somalia debacle; a claim that Annan strongly denies.657 The warning signs in Rwanda were ignored because no one put two and two together, and no one of consequence tried. Nobody was really paying enough attention, and those who were, were not of enough consequence to make a difference. Even if attention had been paid, it is highly unlikely that action would have been taken to avert the crisis because the shadow of Somalia loomed so large over proceedings. The US was unwilling to risk anything after that point and the Secretariat suffered from the same over-caution. The extremists in Rwanda observed as the world sat back and watched while they abused, imprisoned and murdered with impunity. These genocidaires had witnessed the lack of reaction as Burundi imploded in a frenzy of violence in 1993, and finally they watched the deployment of a cautiously mandated and poorly manned and equipped UNAMIR, that was permitted little scope for action in the face of spiralling violence. The extremists saw that there was nothing to fear from the community of nations; thus they were encouraged in their grisly campaign.658

Rwanda

143

International response: a question of indifference? UNAMIR was dispatched to Rwanda with insufficient mandate, manpower, equipment and supplies. Why? Because faltering missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia combined with domestic political considerations within the United States to create a negativity within the Security Council that tended towards inhibiting the costs and scope of peacekeeping. No one, including the UN Secretariat, was willing to challenge this position or step into America’s shoes, either because they too were affected by the negative developments that plagued peacekeeping in these years, they were unwilling to take risks with the future of peacekeeping by placing missions in potentially dangerous circumstances, or because they were loath to accept the risks involved in peacekeeping without recourse to a US ‘cavalry’. Unfortunately, this list of explanations as to the substandard nature of UNAMIR is true also of the International Community’s inaction in the face of the genocide. This section will examine the day-to-day actions of the International Community during the genocide, primarily, but not exclusively, as played out in the UN Security Council; providing a clear picture, not only of the role that the United States played in obstructing positive action, but of the other countries in the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat, and the functions these fulfilled in decision-making therein. Although the US policy change played a significant role in ensuring that effective measures were not introduced, we cannot be blinded to the transgressions of other actors, which contributed to the dishonourable conduct of the International Community as a whole. International Community: knowledge and action The first reaction at the UN when President Habyarimana’s plane went down on 6 April 1994, according to Iqbal Riza, was ‘it was an accident’.659 No other sentiment appeared forthcoming. In the US State Department Prudence Bushnell recalls realizing immediately that ‘disaster was about to ensue, given the vulnerable state of both countries [Rwanda and Burundi] at the time’.660 When asked at what point she knew the killings to be countrywide and systematic, she said again, ‘[i]mmediately. I knew immediately . . . we were getting information.’661 On 7 April, Annan received confirmation that UNAMIR had suffered fatalities, with the deaths of the ten Belgians. Upon learning that his country had lost troops, Belgian Prime Minister Claes asked BoutrosGhali, who was travelling in Europe at the time, to consider immediately strengthening the UNAMIR mandate to include enforcement capabilities. The Secretary-General was inexplicably unreceptive to the idea, both on 7 April and when Claes appealed once more the following day.662 The Belgian representative to the UN was instructed to go to the US and UK to

144 Rwanda push for the application of enforcement in Rwanda. He was met firmly in the negative from both camps.663 Boutros-Ghali declined to return to New York, despite the obvious seriousness of the situation, and in a press conference President Clinton stated that he was ‘horrified that elements of the Rwandan security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan officials’; condemning such actions and calling on ‘all parties to cease’ immediately.664 On 8 April, the DPKO received its first report from Dallaire as to unfolding events in Rwanda. Dallaire detailed that fighting had resumed between the RPF and RGF, but stated clearly that a well-planned and organized campaign, targeting Tutsis, and led by the Presidential Guard, was also underway.665 In his book, the Force Commander confirms that Annan and Riza were notified of the days’ events as well as the systematic nature of the killing that was unfolding.666 None the less, when Riza briefed the Security Council on the matter, mention of the systematic slaughter of Tutsis was omitted.667 Instead, focus was maintained on the reengagement in civil war, and the reply that Dallaire received instructed him to attempt negotiation of a cease-fire.668 The possibility of reinforcing the mission was not raised in the Security Council, except in the context of expatriate evacuations.669 The following day in Rwanda an interim government was sworn in and immediately commenced the smoke and mirrors campaign conducted for the duration of the genocide, promising continued talks with the RPF and a return to the Arusha process as soon as was practicable.670 It was on this day that UNAMIR came across the first large-scale massacre of the genocide at Gikondo, while a shipment of arms from France arrived at Kigali airport for the interim government.671 Within days, American Special Forces were dispatched covertly to Kigali on a one-day reconnaissance mission in order to ascertain the situation. It is reported that these men returned ‘white as sheets’, recounting that corpses were so numerous that one could ‘walk from one body to the other without touching the ground’.672 Thus, it was determined that an immediate evacuation was necessary for all non-Rwandans living and working in the country. For the time being this operation became the focus of the International Community, and particularly consumed the United States, France and Belgium. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also swung into action within 24 hours of the onset of the genocide. Because of the primacy given to protection of American citizens in Rwanda, the DIA was afforded any and all intelligence requested. Consequently, it was given access to satellite photographs and communications intercepts in order to prepare the US evacuation. However, in the course of this action, communications intercepts also revealed instructions from ‘government’ officials to persons in outlaying areas relating to the extermination of Tutsis, as well as subsequent replies that these orders had been fulfilled. Satellite

Rwanda

145

photographs provided pictorial evidence of massacre sites from all over Rwanda, and confirmation was supplied by the RPF who themselves were coming across massacre sites daily.673 This information, which Alan Kuperman describes as ‘unconfirmed’ (how much more confirmation was required is unclear), did not ascend the chain of authority to Executive levels, or it seems even to the Deputies level, possibly as a result of the fact that ‘[o]ther executive branch and intelligence agencies . . . disagreed with these extreme DIA estimates [death-toll] at the time, and explicitly noted this . . . in intelligence summaries prepared for senior officials and the president’.674 It is strange, however, that intelligence personnel could disagree with information that seemed so clear-cut. It is possible that there was a sheer information overload. During such times Kuperman holds that officials tend to ‘dismiss extreme, unconfirmed reports’.675 Another reason why this specific information may have been discounted was that the DIA analyst was known to be close to the RPF, and thus the reports may have been considered compromised.676 However, it is extremely doubtful that such sensitive employment would be provided to an analyst whose background did not ‘check out’. In addition, reports dropped off in frequency after the American evacuation because, for the US, the danger had passed. Therefore, at this point there was even less information getting through.677 Interestingly, Lake insists that he asked the DIA what was happening, who was killing whom and asserts that they could not tell him.678 Dallaire received orders from New York to cooperate completely with the extraction force. Contained within these orders was the only instance in which the UNAMIR force was permitted to go beyond its mandate in any way as it watched the dead multiply.679 The detachment was permitted to use force in order to ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals, but was never officially allowed to use force to save Rwandan lives (unless of course if UNAMIR soldiers were under attack themselves). As Dallaire states, on the morning of 7 April, Riza explicitly informed him that UNAMIR was not to fire unless fired upon.680 Riza denies this strongly, saying that personnel ought to have known that their strict ROEs did not apply to the protection of civilian lives.681 Dallaire reportedly ‘felt sickened’ by this denial.682 Whatever the hindsight response of the DPKO, these orders sent a message: Rwandan lives were expendable. The request to assist the foreign national evacuation was followed on 10 April by a phone call from New York ordering Dallaire/UNAMIR to get ready to vacate Rwanda. The Force Commander answered that such an action was out of the question. This request would be repeated on two further occasions over the course of these first few days; in both instances Dallaire once again stubbornly declined. On 11 April the Security Council was finally informed of the thousands of Rwandans who had come seeking refuge under the UN flag.683 The New

146 Rwanda York Times reported the information also that day and revealed that Special Representative Booh-Booh had described events in Rwanda, in a cable to UN headquarters, as a ‘ruthless campaign of ethnic cleansing’.684 However, Booh-Booh also emphasized (misguidedly) that the primary objective was brokering a cease-fire between the warring sides.685 A DPKO meeting designated the situation in Rwanda as appalling and, off the record, the United States circulated the unofficial edict that expectations on this one were to be kept low.686 As early as this date, the United States had decided what its reaction would be. In an interagency meeting on the subject chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott there was, according to John Shattuck (Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), an ‘increasing sentiment – certainly coming from the Pentagon – that the force ought to be withdrawn’.687 In illustration of this sentiment, a memorandum prepared for the UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Wisner, under the heading: ‘Is the USG [United States Government] willing to get involved’, stated simply ‘[n]ot inside Rwanda or Burundi until peace is restored’.688 The administration demonstrated clear cognizance of the seriousness of the situation but a misperception of the causes of the deaths, commenting that ‘[u]nless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue’.689 Moreover, the Americans were aware of the regional implications, noting the likelihood that the violence would spill over into Burundi and create an enormous refugee crisis spanning the region.690 The fact that it was understood that many hundreds of thousands of Rwandans would die and that the crisis would seriously destabilize the region, and yet the US remained determined not to be drawn in, is illustrative of the severity of the Clinton Administration’s newfound peacekeeping aversion. A French and Belgian evacuation team was flown into Kigali airport, also on 11 April, whereas the US evacuated overland awaited by a contingent of marines in Burundi. While Dallaire watched with envy the wellequipped and heavily armoured French and Belgian troops at Kigali airport, wondering why they could not have been tasked with reinforcing UNAMIR instead, lines of command began to break down between UNAMIR battalions.691 Belgian troops stationed at the Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO), to whom an estimated 2,000 mainly Tutsis had fled for protection, began taking orders from the newly arrived Belgian extraction team. Having been requested to pick up a group of foreign nationals and head for the airport, the peacekeepers left ETO, knowing that a group of interahamwe had gathered outside the school compound awaiting such a departure. As the Belgians left through one gate, the interahamwe entered through another. Those who had foolishly believed that the UN would/could protect them were slaughtered.692 On 12 April, Belgium announced that it was pulling its troops from UNAMIR. From this point on, determined to mask the shame of leaving

Rwanda

147

the mission to fend for itself without its largest and best-equipped contingent, Belgium conducted a flurry of diplomatic activity in an attempt to have the entire mission withdrawn.693 The US was only too happy to oblige, as this stance was its preferred option, and began to call for complete withdrawal.694 As George Moose comments, ‘quite clearly the Belgians wanted to have a cover of having others leave as well, and we yielded to that request.’695 He wonders in retrospect ‘if that was the right thing to do’, but following the US retreat from Somalia it would have been difficult to look the Belgian Foreign Minister in the eye and tell him Belgium had an ‘obligation to keep . . .[its] forces on the ground’.696 The ‘African Group’ within the SC urged immediate action to protect civilians.697 In a letter to Congress regarding the evacuation of US citizens from Rwanda, Clinton explains that after the deaths of the two leaders ‘some members of the Rwandan military began killing opposition leaders and civilians’ and that ‘[g]eneral fighting broke out’; demonstrating a marked, if not deliberate, lack of understanding on his behalf.698 Boutros-Ghali drafted a letter to the SC on 13 April, which declared that if Belgium pulled out, UNAMIR would have to withdraw.699 The Security Council took this letter as a recommendation, although the SG maintained later that it was merely a tactic by which to pressure members into finding rapid ways of augmenting the mission. The British position favoured non-action, as they already felt overstretched in the Balkans; thus it was David Hannay, the British Representative to the UN, hoping to push this preference, who presented the first set of options to the Security Council, which would in fact be mirrored closely by the recommendations contained in Boutros-Ghali’s report submitted eight days later.700 The three options presented consisted of reinforcing the mission, which Hannay cautioned would lead to a repetition of Somalia with its well-known and dire consequences, pulling the mission out, which he thought would send an unnecessarily negative message, and leaving a small remnant force in place. Nigerian Representative Ibrahim Gambari attempted to impress upon the Council the reality that thousands of innocent civilians were dying.701 He wondered unsurprisingly the next day if Africa had fallen off the map of moral concern.702 However, US alternate Ambassador Karl Inderfurth stated that ‘peacekeeping was not appropriate for Rwanda’.703 It had obviously escaped his notice that a greatly beleaguered and seemingly abandoned peacekeeping force was already in Rwanda, struggling to do anything amid a torrent of violence. It was also on this day that the violence in Rwanda was first termed genocide, in a statement by the RPF. In contrast, the interim government in Rwanda described the killings as spontaneous outrage at the death of the President. The government described the perpetrators as disorderly soldiers whom they were struggling to bring to heel amid attacks from the RPF.704 In SC discussions on 14 April, the Council was informed of a

148 Rwanda massacre of up to 10,000 people in a report from two military observers in Gisenyi.705 The following day Gambari pleaded for the reinforcement of UNAMIR. This request was strenuously countered by the United States, which would not accept any other resolution than one that withdrew the force entirely; thus decision-making was delayed further, and a disagreement broke out between Annan in the DPKO, who did not agree with total withdrawal, and the Belgians, who did.706 As the New York Times reported, the Clinton Administration had ‘no interest in becoming too deeply involved in an effort to staunch the violence’, and on 15 April Madeleine Albright received a cable from Warren Christopher with instructions to push for complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.707 ‘There is insufficient justification to retain a UN peacekeeping presence in Rwanda’, the cable stated, and ‘the international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible’.708 The final position of the US was that ‘[o]ur opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm’.709 Although Albright admitted to having her own reservations about the efficacy of a peacekeeping mission as a result of her government’s experience with Somalia, as the debate surrounding the issue wore on, she ‘became increasingly convinced that we were on the wrong side’.710 What followed was the famous incident involving Ambassador Albright (heard by astonished UN personnel) screaming down the phone to Washington that her ‘unacceptable’ orders must be changed.711 She had called the NSC, even though her instructions had originated with the State Department, because she felt that there was a greater chance of a sympathetic hearing by the body headed by humanitarian Lake. However, in this instance she spoke not to Lake, but to Dick Clarke who headed up the peacekeeping review underway since February 1993. As a result Clarke was more aware of the existing tensions and problems with regard to peacekeeping within the administration and in Congress; therefore, his response was not as positive as she would have liked.712 Her outburst did eventually lead to a change in administration policy, but for the time being the US mission pushed the Clinton Administration line. On 16 April the Security Council was informed that many terrified Rwandans had sought the protection of the UNAMIR contingent stationed at the Amhoro Stadium but still no decision was arrived at. Throughout the genocide the interim government held a seat on the Security Council, and the indecision, if not indifference, of the International Community, as well as the mission plans of the Force Commander, were reported faithfully by the Rwandan representative back to his superiors.713 Seeing that it had little to fear, the interim government resolved, on 16 April, to push its campaign of genocidal slaughter south, which had hitherto escaped the madness that had enveloped the rest of the country.

Rwanda

149

The following day Dallaire sent a long report to headquarters detailing the situation his force was facing. After this communication the DPKO determined that the elusive cease-fire which it had hoped would materialize was unlikely. The DPKO, which had been heretofore against full withdrawal, determined that this was the only option. The SC was now also provided with more information on the systematic targeting of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. However, this did not seem to make an impact among the permanent members.714 In the early days of the genocide, human rights organizations made significant efforts to motivate the US government and the Security Council to act to stop the killings. Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch recalls a flurry of activity including meetings with government officials, where she found those tasked with African issues, such as Prudence Bushnell at State and Donald Steinberg at the NSC, to be sympathetic, but that those tasked with peacekeeping, particularly Susan Rice at the NSC, were not. Madeleine Albright was sympathetic but indicated that that she ‘was not the person to hear this’.715 She told them to take it to the NSC where Anthony Lake turned out to be receptive, but of the opinion that the public did not care. ‘Rwanda was simply not an issue that created enough noise for them to pay attention’, he said.716 If they wanted action, they had to ‘[m]ake more noise’.717 Human Rights Watch labelled the crisis in Rwanda as genocide on 17 April.718 On 19 and 20 April Dallaire and Booh-Booh both cautioned headquarters against withdrawing the mission entirely; both supported reinforcement, but if reduction without complete withdrawal was the only option on offer, they would accept that.719 The first report of the SecretaryGeneral arrived at the Security Council on 21 April, two weeks after the outbreak of the genocide. What Boutros-Ghali based his assessment on is unclear. However, what is striking is the extent to which his characterization of the nature of violence in Rwanda – ‘a torrent of widespread killings’ set off by the death of Habyarimana, and perpetrated by ‘unruly members of the Presidential Guard’ – corresponds to the line promulgated by the genocidal interim government.720 Linda Melvern goes one step further, asserting that the Secretary-General’s report ‘clearly reflected the views of the “interim government” ’.721 The report was notable in its failure to so much as mention the systematic nature of the slaughter in Rwanda, and only briefly referred to ‘political and ethnic dimensions’ of the killings. Instead it focused almost exclusively on the reignition of civil war and the absolute necessity of obtaining a cease-fire agreement.722 This attitude was echoed, and no doubt re-enforced, by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative who was quoted that day in the Washington Post as saying: ‘[i]f . . . [the warring parties] do not reach an agreement on a cease-fire, it must be very clear we shall not stay.’723 Boutros-Ghali listed a series of tasks performed by UNAMIR and although protecting civilians as far as possible was among them, he stated

150 Rwanda that the most urgent task was the ‘effort to secure a cease-fire [and a] return to the peace process under the Arusha agreement’.724 By this stage of the crisis his attachment to cease-fire attainment was a completely inappropriate response. The preoccupation among members of the SC was therefore with the renewal of civil war. Consequently, any consideration of intervention was taken within the context of interceding between two warring factions that would have of necessity involved a massive, heavily armed and capable force (which was out of the question) rather than a more modest force whose only task would have been to protect civilians. Three options that echoed Hannay’s earlier proposal options were presented to the Council, again from the perspective that they were dealing with a situation of civil war. Little reference was made to attendant peacekeeping efforts to safeguard the thousands of civilians still under UN protection, and there was no suggestion of any future plan to protect civilians, although the Secretary-General expressed his preference for the latter option of reinforcing the mission.725 In discussion of the report the alternative Nigerian Ambassador stated with chagrin, the coming days and months will be especially critical for the United Nations . . . and the question must be resolved whether the United Nations will turn its back on Rwanda or be prepared to do a little more to save the lives of many innocent civilians.726 Some of the non-permanent nations which perhaps did not have the intelligence capabilities of the permanent members did not feel that they were being adequately appraised of events.727 The representatives of these states did not feel that the Secretariat was bringing to the Council all the available information; therefore, they requested a briefing by Major General Baril who had been in daily phone contact with Dallaire. Non-permanent members also made contact with the NGO community in an effort to become better informed.728 At 10.30 p.m. on 21 April the UN Security Council passed its first resolution (912) in response to the crisis. The Council chose the middle option presented by the Secretary-General (and previously by Hannay), which proposed leaving a small skeletal crew in Rwanda to act as mediator between the two warring factions, and hopefully facilitate a cease-fire.729 Albright was pleased because she had been granted the flexibility she had sought, and in general, for those who were against withdrawal SC Resolution 912 was quite a coup.730 Again, this action was designed with civil war in mind, not the mass extermination of the civilian population.731 Maurice Baril telephoned Kigali, and said ‘[t]ell Dallaire that there is no cavalry coming over the hill. None.’732 Dallaire was to be left with a grand total of 270 troops.733 Nevertheless, in a ‘clearly illegal act, Dallaire and his deputy, Brigadier Henry Kwami Anyidoho . . . defied the Security Council’ and managed to hold on to roughly 500 troops.734

Rwanda

151

On 22 April, a statement by the Clinton Administration’s press secretary called on the parties to the conflict to ‘agree on an immediate ceasefire and return to negotiations’, and stated that the Arusha Accords must remain the basis for a ‘return to peace in Rwanda’.735 Although the statement went on to name the leadership of the RGF in an effort to shame them and let them know that the International Community recognized their role in the crisis, this announcement demonstrates that the administration, like many others, misinterpreted the heart of the catastrophe to be war rather than genocide, and thus presented a completely inappropriate response.736 Also on the 22 April, following a meeting with Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch and Monique Mujawamariya (a Rwandan human rights activist who narrowly escaped the country with her life), National Security Adviser Lake made a public statement appealing to Rwanda’s military leaders – by name – to do their utmost to end the slaughter. As Human Rights Watch affirms, although the statement did not condemn the leaders it ‘represented an important departure from routine diplomacy’ because it acknowledged that individuals were responsible for the violations of human rights and international law, and publicly named those who were capable of ending the massacres and did not.737 A day later, Mark Doyle of the BBC, one of five journalists left in Kigali, reported that up to 100,000 people had been killed, and a New York Times op-ed piece reported that what was happening in Rwanda looked very much as if genocide was occurring, and that with Resolution 912 the International Community had simply thrown in the ‘bloodied towel’.738 Then, on 25 April, Maurice Herson of Oxfam reported to his headquarters in Oxford that 100,000 was a vastly conservative figure, and that in his estimation, in three weeks closer to 500,000 had perished. He commented that genocide was the appropriate term to use, although he hesitated to do so. The following day he called again, desperate. Everyone would soon be dead, he said. An Oxfam worker in Tanzania, Alfred Sakafu, said that bodies were clogging the Kagera River.739 On 26 April, two very contradictory events occurred. A letter from the RPF arrived in New York stating that genocide was in fact occurring in Rwanda and calling members’ attention to the 1948 Genocide Convention, while in Paris, two members of the interim government were received like legitimate statesmen.740 France and Egypt both held talks with the interim government and hoped that the UN would intervene in Rwanda, thus halting the progress of the RPF.741 By treating it as a legitimate government, France and Egypt encouraged the genocidal regime to believe it could get away with its crime. In Washington, government officials were told to avoid using the word ‘genocide’, and on 28 April the journalistic community was treated to the sight of Department of State spokeswoman Christine Shelley dancing not so artfully around the term during questioning by reporters.742 The

152 Rwanda United States was one of the last countries to sign up to the Genocide Convention, which requires its signatories to act in order to prevent genocide from occurring, and to step in and stop genocide once it has begun. Consequently, admission that genocide was taking place would have required the United States and any other signatories to the Convention to act decisively. As the US was not prepared to do this, its officials were not permitted to utter the word.743 By 21 May the Americans were still mulling over what form of words to use. Shattuck had used the phrase at a press conference in Geneva on the way home from his Africa trip in late April, ruffling feathers in Washington, and forcing the administration to reconsider the phrase.744 It still took people who were concerned about Rwanda at Shattuck’s level in the State Department a month to force change on even labelling the crisis as containing acts of genocide alongside civil war. By this stage, Shattuck says, ‘it was just so evident, it had to be called by its proper name’.745 A secret memo stated that the Department of State at the Assistants’ level believed that officials should be authorized to use the phrase ‘acts of genocide’ as regards Rwanda.746 This level had been quite heavily involved in the crisis, and although officials were eventually permitted to use this phrase, these deputies, Moose, Shattuck and their deputies, for example, Bushnell, did not have a great deal of input into the final policy. As the New York Times reports, use of the word ‘genocide’ was still prohibited by 10 June. However, more than likely resulting from the pressure exerted by the likes of Moose, Shattuck and Bushnell, officials were now permitted to suggest that ‘acts of genocide’ had occurred in Rwanda, rather than genocide in general.747 This was still a shameful avoidance of the subject on behalf of the administration and, embarrassingly, flew in the face of what most knew at this stage to be fact.748 Karol Kovanda, the UN Ambassador for the Czech Republic, had been very concerned about the progression of events in Rwanda, and confronted the Council in an informal session on 28 April with the fact that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide. He chided members for their misplaced focus on the civil war aspect of the crisis and cease-fire obsession. It was, he said, like ‘wanting Hitler to reach a ceasefire with the Jews’.749 America and Britain were furious, and afterwards rejoined that ‘on no account was he to use such inflammatory language outside the Council’.750 Clearly the two nations were labouring under the misapprehension that Kovanda’s instructions issued from London or Washington, rather than from Prague. Oxfam had delayed issuing a press release after Herson’s report from Rwanda, fearful of not being taken seriously, but by 28 April the weight of evidence was too strong. A statement was released terming the Rwandan crisis genocide. However, at this point the growing refugee crisis in Tanzania was taking over in terms of press coverage.751 It was, up until that time, the fastest human movement in history. Journalists had been focusing on

Rwanda

153

the first democratic elections in South Africa, after which they were diverted, not to Rwanda to cover the genocide, but to Tanzania to report on the refugee crisis. It made better news. On 29 April a letter from the Secretary-General reported ‘strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians’ and stated that ‘[m]assacres continue on a large-scale in the countryside, especially in the south’. The letter requested that the Council ‘re-examine’ the decision to draw down UNAMIR forces, and consider what, if anything, might be done to stop the massacres.752 Boutros-Ghali recognized, however, in the first of his attacks on the Council’s inactivity, that any such action to stop the killings ‘would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate’.753 A stunned Security Council expected recommendations to come with this statement, as was the role of the Secretary-General to provide. However, none were forthcoming.754 On this day the Security Council also finally addressed the issue of genocide. Prime Minister of New Zealand Colin Keating called for a resolution recognizing the crisis as such, as under the terms of the Genocide Convention governments would then be compelled to act. Argentina, Spain and the Czech Republic were also in favour of such a resolution. The United Kingdom objected to the term ‘genocide’, even though the wording did not actually state directly that genocide was occurring, but that laws existed to deal with the perpetrators of genocide. Hannay insisted that if the Council used the word genocide and continued to do nothing in the face of such a threat (as countries such as his own and the US had no intention of intervening), it would make a fool of itself and lose all credibility.755 The US was also against it, as was China (and obviously Rwanda). Keating, however, determined to craft a resolution, and before his term as President of the SC ended the following day, kept the ambassadors in session until early the following morning, threatening to enter his draft resolution in his national capacity, which would have required a public vote against it. Finally, at 1.15 a.m. on 30 April a resolution was passed. The final draft avoided the use of the term ‘genocide’, but quoted directly from the Genocide Convention (‘killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable by international law’).756 France insisted that equal burden for the conflict be placed on the RGF and RPF, even though it was quite clear that in areas occupied by the RPF the mass killings ceased, and Hutu civilians where protected (even if suspected genocidaires were shown no mercy).757 The same day Dallaire met with Paul Kagame, commander of the RPF. Upon Dallaire’s reflection that it was perhaps time to reinforce UNAMIR, Kagame said that such a time had now passed. Now only the RPF could stop the slaughter, and if UNAMIR got in the way, they would become

154 Rwanda enemies.758 This warning significantly increased the unwillingness of the US to intervene, as well as providing a convenient ‘get-out clause’. On 30 April, President Clinton made the unusual move, for a US President, of making a direct appeal via radio for a cessation of violence in Rwanda. However unusual, the statement was brief (one minute) and vague, and had little impact.759 The same day also saw John Shattuck leave for Africa. His mission: to drum up support for an African peacekeeping force, the latest idea that the US seemed willing to back.760 Shattuck recalls that any such force would have required heavy logistical and other support from the United States. None the less, he did not feel ‘strongly backed by his government’, and although he believed the African leaders were close to committing troops because he was unable to offer firm commitments of US support, in the end the negotiations came to nothing.761 In fact, an African peacekeeping force was an ‘old idea in US policy’, and had been the Americans’ ‘original plan for a peacekeeping force in Rwanda’.762 However, as Bushnell now told Shattuck via telephone, there was ‘growing opposition within the Pentagon to really do anything to engage the US directly in this kind of regional peacekeeping operation, logistically or otherwise’.763 And as she remembered later, ‘[t]here was a huge reluctance in the joint chiefs to become involved in much of anything’, as the planned invasion of Haiti was beginning to take priority at this stage.764 On his way home from Africa Shattuck held a press conference in Geneva, where he took the same approach as the National Security Adviser in naming and attempting to shame the provisional government. He also said that he believed genocide had occurred in Rwanda.765 On 1 May, a secret Department of Defense document discussed policy objectives with regard to Rwanda, suggesting changes to the language of these objectives. With objective two, ‘to support the UN and other in attempts to achieve a cease fire’, the word ‘attempts’ was to be supplanted by ‘political efforts’ in order to lessen the ‘danger of signing up to troop contributions’.766 The document insisted that language stating support for humanitarian assistance be tailored so as to focus only on surrounding countries, and advised that the term ‘genocide’ be very carefully handled, as attaching the term ‘could commit USG to actually “do something” ’.767 In early May the magnitude of the killing was becoming widely evident. On the evening of 4 May, Boutros-Ghali appeared on the American show Nightline. It was the first time the UN had publicly termed the crisis as genocide. He blamed the Security Council for its lack of action.768 The following day saw the release of the Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (PDD25), which Boutros-Ghali described as a ‘deadly blow’ to peacekeeping.769 This policy had been in formulation since Clinton had entered office, but had undergone significant changes as a result of the administration’s experiences with 1990s peacekeeping, and an unreceptive Congress. The release of the

Rwanda

155

policy document itself was merely a formality, the changes already having been factored into US decision-making at the United Nations. Rwanda did not meet the criteria; the US insisted that any mission must.770 The same day, Frank Wisner sent a memo to Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to inform him that Anthony Lake’s request to jam inflammatory radio broadcasts in Rwanda was an ‘ineffective and expensive mechanism’, feebly citing further obstacles stipulated by international legal conventions regarding air waves and so on.771 A day later the non-permanent members of the Security Council called for the reinforcement of UNAMIR. The United States and the UK countered that any effort must be an African one, and that the role of the OAU was vital. Clinton mentioned the possibility of an African force much later, and cited any such mission as an important test for Africa. The rest of the world it seems was exempt. However, it was widely known that in areas such as peacekeeping the OAU was at this time lacking the capacity to deal with large-scale peacekeeping operations. Salim Ahmed Salim, the organization’s Secretary-General, told Boutros-Ghali this when contacted with regard to such an idea, saying that any mission, even one manned exclusively by Africans, would have to be under UN auspices.772 In May, Sam Kiley of The Times reported a conversation with a priest, Vieko Curic, described as the ‘only white man south of Kigali’. This man had been looking after some 30,000 displaced persons in Kabgayi, but they had had no food, water or medicines, and Curic was forced to slip into Burundi in order to obtain supplies. On his journey he saw bodies everywhere. In his estimation, at least 500,000 people had died.773 Although still grossly underestimating the number of dead, Keith Richburg of the Washington Post reported on 8 May that the slaughter in Rwanda had been systematically planned and orchestrated, and directed at the Tutsi minority, by the country’s leaders.774 On 10 May, Vice-President Al Gore met the Secretaries-General of the OAU and United Nations in discussions regarding Rwanda, and appeared to have offered logistical capabilities for an African peacekeeping force.775 But even this small contribution was denied by the strictures of PDD25; as a 13 May cable commented, ‘the US is not prepared at this point to lift heavy equipment and troops into Kigali’; according to Peter Tarnoff, it was just too risky.776 After this point the African idea was essentially abandoned by the Clinton Administration. The newly appointed High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, stated at a press conference in Geneva that he was ‘inclined to accept’ that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide.777 The term, however, was omitted from his report issued on 19 May, although he referred to the Genocide Convention.778 On or around 11 May, according to a declassified memo, staff from the National Security Council and some Members of State attempted to convince the Pentagon to support a stronger peacekeeping operation, but to

156 Rwanda no avail.779 The Pentagon stated sharply that they ‘strongly object to signing up for open-ended missions that could lead to UN troops being in life-threatening situations without proper arms or ROEs’.780 On 13 May, the Security Council received its second report from the Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali suggested a reinforcement of UNAMIR to the tune of 5,500 personnel (Dallaire’s request).781 There were immediate complaints from the US, and again on subsequent days, who criticized the plan as inadequate and lacking in field assessments. It did not, at this point, conform to the new criteria issued by Washington, and the American Mission insisted that it must.782 An instruction cable from State to the US Mission revealed that the administration had ‘serious concerns’ about the possibility of an expanded force.783 Enforcement was entirely ruled out as, recalling Somalia, Albright argued that force might beget force.784 According to the delegation, any UN mission required a ‘well defined concept of operations’, clarification of issues of consent, ‘availability of resources’ (see: cost, and troop/equipment contributions), and an idea of the ‘duration of the mandate’ (see: exit strategy).785 Thus, any decision on reinforcement was further stalled as American requests were met. A little mud slinging followed this session as the United States labelled Boutros-Ghali’s plan a public relations exercise rather than a serious consideration. The Secretary-General hit back at the Security Council for ‘meekly following the United States’ lead in denying the reality of the genocide’.786 On 13 May Senators Paul Simon (D-Ill.) and James Jeffords (R-Ver.), the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, dispatched a letter to President Clinton, calling for the administration to use its influence in the Security Council to obtain authorization for a reinforced UNAMIR, and in a significant move hand-delivered it. None the less, they received no reply, and upon calling to follow up the request could not speak to anyone of importance. The Senators were told that there was no public support for such an action. A reply was finally had on 9 June, simply listing the administration’s actions since the outset of the crisis.787 This case is remarkable in that it was the only concerted effort on behalf of the United States Congress to even draw the attention of the White House to the atrocities in Rwanda. Even the famous Black Caucus was relatively silent on the issue (Kweisi Mfume and Donald M. Payne did write to the President urging more effective US action). In comparison, several members of this influential caucus were arrested for civil disobedience in protestation at the Clinton Administration’s refugee policy towards Haiti. In response to genocide, their voice was conspicuous in its absence. In general, the increasingly conservative nature of Congress, fuelled by the faults (real or imagined) of the Somalia mission inclined the Legislature to stay silent on the crisis. More outspoken Republicans such as Bob Dole had voiced early on their belief that America should stay out of this

Rwanda

157

one as the US had no national interests tied up in Rwanda. Dole stated: ‘[t]he Americans are out. As far as I’m concerned in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it.’788 On 16 May, the ‘foreign minister’ of Rwanda’s interim government addressed the Security Council (no one quite remembers how this was permitted to happen), claiming that the massacres where down to the RPF and a Ugandan plot to seize power.789 The speech was not well received by many, and an outraged Kovanda began his scathing retort: ‘[t]he crocodiles in the Kagera river and the vultures over Rwanda have never had it so good.’790 Kovanda directly challenged the Rwandan ‘minister’, citing facts and figures of massacre after massacre, clearly ascribing culpability to ‘Hutu cutthroats’ and the interim government.791 It was genocide, Kovanda stated, and the International Community ought not to let the existence of civil war blind them to the more important issue: saving the lives of civilians.792 The French complained conversely that the only solution was a cease-fire within an Arusha framework.793 A secret State Department document from the Office of the Legal Adviser dated 16 May advised that what was occurring in Rwanda legally constituted genocide, as laid down in the 1948 Genocide Convention. The document outlined the criteria that constituted genocide, and commented that ‘[t]here can be little question that the specific listed acts have taken place in Rwanda’.794 The paper also stated that in ratifying the Genocide Convention, the United States prepared its own interpretation of what constituted genocide, stating that a substantial number of an ethnic group would have to be destroyed before the US would consider it to be genocide. However, the legal paper remarked that the ‘numbers of Tutsis subjected to killings and other listed acts . . . can readily be considered substantial’.795 Consequently, it was by 16 May, not later as some Clinton officials and commentators would contend, that the US was aware that what was occurring in Rwanda was in fact genocide. At this point the British and Americans were still arguing about the necessity of a cease-fire.796 And it is interesting to note, given the tone that the Clinton Administration began to take regarding Somalia and Bosnia, as we have already seen, that Ambassador Inderfurth says of the crisis on this date, ‘[t]he true key to the problems in Rwanda is in the hands of the Rwandan people’.797 It was of course an incredible thing to say, when one section of the Rwandan people was engaged in an attempt to systematically annihilate the other. The following day the Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 918, which expanded the size and mandate of UNAMIR (now UNAMIR II) to 5,500 troops. The resolution recalled that any attempt to wipe out an ethnic group was a crime punishable under international law, and was to include the protection of ‘displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk’.798 However, as Keating commented, ‘as you will see, the US has essentially gutted the resolution . . . in reality the expansion is a fiction’.799

158 Rwanda Albright and the US delegation used the conditions of PDD25 to delay UNAMIR II’s deployment, insisting that the force could only be sent ‘after a further “review” of events’ in Rwanda had been made, ‘including progress towards a cease-fire’.800 The delegation pressured others in kind, reiterating the same arguments used during discussions on 13 May.801 Thus, UNAMIR II was only finally authorized 22 days later on 8 June. Albright testified before Congress that it would be ‘folly’ to jump feet first into the ‘maelstrom’ that was Central Africa, and said that any mission dispatched to Rwanda would be a test of the Clinton Administration’s new policy on peacekeeping (PDD25).802 Reporting the content of this hearing, the New York Times noted that ‘[i]n a sign of new caution about such intervention, not one member of Congress countered today that the United States had a moral imperative to take action’.803 On 18 May Boutros-Ghali wrote to several African leaders requesting troops for a reinforced UNAMIR. He also sent Riza and Baril to Rwanda between 22 and 27 May in an attempt to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire agreement (still focusing on this issue). Their report, which detailed the systematic nature of the killings in Rwanda and estimated that 250,000 to 500,000 people had died, became the basis of the SecretaryGeneral’s third report.804 By about 18 May, as an intradepartmental memo demonstrates, the United States was itself fully aware that the interim government of Rwanda could be implicated in the ‘widespread, systematic killing of ethnic Tutsis, and to a lesser extent, ethnic Hutus who supported power-sharing between the two groups’.805 Throughout late May, the Clinton Administration continued to block effective action by querying the ‘inside-out’ plan advocated by Dallaire and the Secretariat. This plan proposed landing peacekeepers at Kigali airport, securing it, and fanning out from there through Kigali and the rest of the country. The plan the US advocated was rather (their ‘outsidein’ approach, which had been put forward since mid-May) to send the troops in overland and to set up safe zones around the borders where threatened people could seek refuge.806 The administration was arguing economy while thousands of people died. Money again seemed to be the issue when it came to releasing 50 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to UNAMIR, which were to be attached to a waiting battalion offered by Ghana, and which Dallaire believed would be helpful in accessing vulnerable civilians. The terms were haggled over. The UN wanted to lease, while the US preferred that they buy, and when that was resolved (the UN would lease at a high price) the US demanded that the organization pay to return them. Then it was tracks or wheels, painting, stencilling; it seemed to go on forever. As the OAU report rightly points out, strong leadership on this issue from the Executive could have pushed through the bureaucratic morass at lightning speed. However, it was obviously not an issue close to the President’s heart; a fact confirmed by US officials.807 The APCs were finally shipped to

Rwanda

159

Uganda on 23 June, but the UN could not find a way to insert them into Rwanda (why the US could not transport them a few more miles south is anyone’s guess). In the end they arrived only after the genocide had ended. George Moose describes the APC debacle as ‘one of the most shameful moments in the whole process’.808 Conversely, Clinton actually refers to his release of the APCs to aid the peacekeepers in a list of the positive steps the administration had taken in the face of the crisis.809 On 25 May Boutros-Ghali held a press conference at which he placed the responsibility for the Rwandan genocide on the shoulders of the Security Council. Genocide had been committed, he admonished, and it was a scandal.810 On 31 May the SG presented his third report to the Council. The report contained appalling fact, and a few admissions. Boutros-Ghali used this opportunity to declare that on ‘the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that . . . [the mass killing in Rwanda] constitutes genocide’.811 Once more, he concluded his report by chastising the Security Council: [t]he delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict . . . the international community appears paralysed in reacting almost two months later even to the revised mandate established by the Security Council. We must all recognize that, in this respect we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of human lives.812 There were further attempts to man and equip UNAMIR II, without a great deal of success, and the actual authorization for UNAMIR II was finally achieved on 8 June (SC Resolution 925).813 Several African nations offered troops, but most had to be equipped.814 None the less, there existed a fully equipped, trained and available Ethiopian contingent ready to go, in need of merely a means to get to Rwanda.815 Regrettably, there were no offers to transport this contingent. Hence, in the end, no supplementary troops arrived to reinforce Dallaire and his beleaguered colleagues until after the genocide had ended. The French proposed sending a unilateral force, authorized by the UN but commanded by France, into Rwanda (ostensibly) to provide humanitarian assistance. The plan was not well met by many.816 However, when by late June the killings continued, UNAMIR II had still not got off the ground and the offer was put before the Secretary-General, recommended that the SC accept it as a sort of sandwich force until UNAMIR II deployed.817 The US was in favour of the mission, and Albright admonished her colleagues that they should be ‘flexible enough to accept imperfect solutions

160 Rwanda when no perfect solutions are available to us’.818 Accordingly, SC Resolution 929 (22 June) authorized Operation Turquoise.819 Five nations declined to vote on what they found an objectionable, if interim ‘solution’, given past French relations with Rwanda: New Zealand, Nigeria, China, Brazil and Pakistan.820 French newspapers questioned the decision, accusing their government of being too involved in the situation to be an intervention force, and the RPF rebuked that the only purpose behind French action was to give quarter to the perpetrators of the genocide; their erstwhile allies.821 In Rwanda, Dallaire was ‘incredulous’.822 His belief was that the only goal of the French was to impede the advance of the RPF, and as this was the only thing that was counteracting the genocide, it could only be negative.823 Kagame described the decision as an ‘act of war’.824 In a testament to how quickly a modern army can deploy, the first French soldiers arrived in Rwanda the same day that the mission was authorized, and in a testament to the intentions of the government of France, French soldiers were told that the Hutus were the victims and the Tutsis the enemy. This falsehood was exposed on 30 June, when soldiers came across Tutsi survivors emerging from a forest in Bisesero. They had been on the run since August and were suffering from terrible injuries.825 Soldiers found bodies everywhere, and as they listened to the stories of the survivors they began to realize that they had been lied to. As one bewildered soldier said, ‘[t]his is not what we had been led to believe . . . We were told that the Tutsi were killing the Hutu.’826 On 18 July, having taken control of all Rwanda apart from the area occupied by the French, the RPF declared a unilateral cease-fire and announced its intention to establish a government of national unity. The International Community was off the hook. However, the refugee crisis had now reached staggering proportions. The RPF advance, combined with inflammatory radio broadcasts, had managed to top the justestablished record for mass human movement, as more than a million people crossed the border from Rwanda into Zaire in a few days. Now the International Community swung into action. Be it as a result of guilt because of their inaction in the face of the genocide, or that confusion truly existed over who these refugees really where, thousands of troops and NGO personnel flooded the Great Lakes region.827 The US in particular mounted a massive operation.828 For a nation that was overly concerned with cost during the genocide, it now appeared to be of little consequence. Between $300 and $400 million and 4,000 military personnel plus civilian contractors and NGOs were devoted to the crisis, and it took a mere three days once the Pentagon had issued the order for the first troops to be deployed.829 As Iqbal Riza commented, ‘[i]f the political will is there, troops, APCs and tanks can be airlifted in a matter of . . . days.’830 The management of the relief operation was taken over by the National Security Adviser, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of USAID

Rwanda

161

and the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Lake commented, ‘that’s more four stars and senior officials that they usually get’.831 This in itself gives the reader a picture of the importance that was given to this mission. Tony Marly, political military adviser to the State Department, remarked that the reaction was guilt because the Americans knew it was genocide and did nothing.832 On 22 July President Clinton described the refugee camps as the ‘worst humanitarian crisis in a generation’.833 Genocide obviously did not meet his criteria. Explaining international inaction How could it be with all the information and avenues of action available to the International Community, as outlined above, that no real measures were taken to stop the genocide once it had clearly begun? Again, there was an inability on behalf of many on the international scene to conceive that evil of such magnitude as genocide was being carried out; thus blinding them to what was really going on in Rwanda, and causing leaders to hesitate in assigning responsibility to the interim government, since they could not possibly have planned and executed such a horror.834 Of course, the fact that Rwanda (as represented by the interim government) sat on the Security Council throughout the genocide, obfuscating matters with their deliberate and calculated misrepresentation of the situation, did not help. Moreover, media coverage of the Rwandan genocide did not help the International Community develop an accurate picture of what was really happening. After the first week only a handful of journalists remained in Rwanda, and consequently the information that was making it out of the country was sketchy at best. One has only to take a brief look at the sum of newspaper reporting regarding Rwanda during this period to appreciate that most journalists were not on top of events there. Death-tolls were consistently underestimated, and the focus was on mindless violence, spontaneous outbursts, ancient tribal warfare and civil war, rather than a preventable genocide.835 Media coverage in turn ensured that top-level officials, who take many of their cues from the news media, remained in a general state of ignorance regarding the true nature of the violence in Rwanda. Whether the level of ignorance was wilful or inadvertent is a question for top officials to answer. At any rate, it seems that Rwanda did not merit their attention, at least until the refugee crisis aroused the concern of the world in late June/July. We are already aware that, in the case of America at least, officials such as Bushnell, Moose and Shattuck were well informed; Bushnell phoned the leaders of the genocide (‘Stop it. Stop killing people’), in addition to making frequent statements on Voice of America condemning the killings.836 Unfortunately she, and even her immediate boss, were not

162 Rwanda high-ranking enough to make any real difference. Anthony Lake said later, ‘I did not know a whole lot about what was going on in Rwanda’ and Albright suggested in her memoirs that it ‘would be weeks before most of us understood the nature and scale of the killings’; this is questionable however, since both Lake and Albright were informed of the situation by human rights activists in mid-April.837 Lake also commented, more credibly, that the problem ‘for me, for the president, for most of us at senior levels, was that it never became a serious issue . . . we never came to grips with what in retrospect should have been a central issue’.838 Therefore, it seems that the real issue was that no one with the power to say ‘stop’ (and that really means the President) was engaged with the situation, as Lake affirms: ‘[t]here’s no question in my mind that, in the end, the president would have had to push it.’839 Unfortunately however, according to Boutros-Ghali, Clinton was obviously unmoved. When he met him at the White House in the midst of the genocide, he alleges that the President was more concerned that a particular American be named the new head of UNICEF than the hundreds of thousands losing their lives in Rwanda.840 Again, a familiarity with the history of the area played a part in desensitizing the International Community to the massacres that broke out in April.841 The situation was simply regarded as another Burundi; a repeat of the paroxysm of violence that had engulfed Rwanda’s neighbour the previous year in which approximately 200,000 people died. It was thought by many that a few hundred thousand people would be killed (an apparently acceptable number) and then things would simmer down. Consequently, it took much longer for a true appraisal of the situation to come to light. An element of fatalism/racism was also at play here, as previously discussed, causing many to discount the possibility of effective action. Furthermore, various matters seemed to take precedence over considerations of action in Rwanda. The evacuation of foreign nationals was the number one priority of the International Community, holding their attention until mid-April, followed by something that was close to obsession regarding cease-fire attainment, predicated on the erroneous assumption that the restoration of civil war was responsible for much of the violence. This cease-fire fixation blinkered the International Community to the reality of genocide for a significant period, thus diminishing its ability to act effectively (had it so wished). The international inquiry into the actions of the UN during the crisis found it ‘disturbing that the Secretariat . . . show[ed] a continued emphasis on a cease-fire, more than the moral outrage against the massacres’.842 The systematic and ethnic nature of the killings in Rwanda was known to the DPKO, yet it chose to ignore it, focusing instead on the civil war aspect of the crisis when briefing the SC. Riza admits that as regards his former department, it had not developed an accurate picture of what was happening on the ground in Rwanda.843 This shortcoming was due to

Rwanda

163

a combination of genuine misinterpretation (according to former DPKO deputy Riza), a guarded approach to UNAMIR caused by the understanding that the most powerful nation on the Council was in no mood for wild west antics, and caution reflective of the general mood in the Secretariat to avoid a repetition of the deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia the previous year; an event which had sent shock waves throughout the UN.844 Therefore, the DPKO’s concern was what was feasible for the peacekeepers in reacting to the crisis, and avoiding a situation of all-out war that brought with it the possibility of casualties.845 In addition, it seems almost certain that the Secretary-General was not fully aware of the true situation (hardly surprising when he was hardly in New York during the entire period). Once the International Community surmounted the cease-fire issue and realized belatedly that perhaps genocide and not civil war ought to be its focus, the refugee crisis took over in terms of international attention. This new facet of the crisis was of such unprecedented magnitude that the International Community now became fixated with it. Here was a situation that it could tackle relatively easily, and without any major risk. The media is also partly to blame for this fixation, as it honed in on the refugee crisis and contributed to the confusion over who the refugees were. One article in the well-respected The Economist magazine is so far from accurate that it is appalling. After describing the deaths of (they estimated) half a million and the shameful inaction of the International Community, the article reads: ‘[t]he first task is to avert an even bigger catastrophe’, the imminent disaster in the refugee camps.846 All needless death is deplorable, but can the media really have considered, in late July, when it was clear to the world that genocide had taken place in Rwanda, that the refugee crisis (involving at least some of those who perpetrated the genocide), even the deaths of refugees from disease and malnutrition, was more catastrophic than genocide itself? Another factor that carried through from the period immediately preceding the genocide is the world’s attention vis-à-vis other countries/crises. As described, the International Community of the 1990s was preoccupied with dozens of other crises and peacekeeping operations, and Rwanda was simply not of great moment to many. The same was true when the genocide commenced. As Prudence Bushnell explains, the Americans, at least, were more worried about the destabilizing effect Rwandan violence might have on neighbouring Burundi, which was ‘getting more attention in terms of concern than Rwanda’.847 Power notes that there was not one single Principals meeting with regard to the massacres in Rwanda, and to the extent that ‘the subject came up at all, it did so along with, and subordinate to, discussions of Somali, Haiti, and Bosnia’.848 As regards the United Nations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was understaffed and overloaded, as the number of missions it was responsible for had mushroomed in the five years prior to the

164 Rwanda genocide.849 Information spewed across desks in the DPKO relating to several high-priority missions, and the fact was that it was simply not equipped. Thus, attention was frequently elsewhere, engaged with what, at the time, appeared to be an equally terrible crisis somewhere else.850 Moreover, it is almost certain that many in the International Community, NGOs as well as politicians and diplomats, were afraid that if they started screaming genocide they would lose all credibility and consequently avoided the phrase. This was the line taken by British Ambassador to the UN David Hannay. US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson also commented: ‘[a]s a responsible Government, you don’t just go around hollering “genocide”. . .. You say that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be investigated.’851 NGOs were reluctant at first to call the genocide in Rwanda what it was for fear of being labelled the organization that cried wolf. Of course the crux of the situation for signatories to the 1948 Genocide Convention was, if they labelled events in Rwanda as genocide, then by law they would be required to act in order to stop it: [t]here existed a predisposition on the part of a number of the key actors to deny the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required them to alter their course of action.852 None were prepared to do so. A myriad of factors ensured that once genocide had commenced in Rwanda the International Community stood still. However, had the political will existed to act effectively to put a stop to the genocide, many issues might have been overcome. As Richard Holbrook stated, it was simply the case that ‘[m]y government didn’t want to get involved’.853 Many of the non-permanent members of the Security Council fought hard for recognition of genocide, and subsequently for action to be taken in order to stop it. But the permanent, veto-wielding members, led by the United States, were loath to commit to what appeared to be a potentially dangerous situation for their troops. Again, the misplaced focus on civil war gave the impression that a peacekeeping force would be inserted to stop the warring factions, thereby incurring much more danger than a force designed to stop the massacres. However, recent experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, as well as domestic political considerations within the United States, had caused the United States and also the UK to recoil. The US had been badly burned in Somalia and to a lesser extent, by involvement in multilateralism in Bosnia, and Britain was still experiencing the problems of peacekeeping in the Balkan region, and neither was prepared to involve itself in another mission. A former aide to Madeleine Albright, Michael Sheehan, commented: Rwanda unfolded at the time we were leaving Mogadishu. . . . The memory of the tragedy . . . [there] was still burning on the minds of

Rwanda

165

the policy-makers within the administration . . . there . . . [were] no big advocates for taking US forces that were basically steaming out of the port of Mogadishu . . . and reinserting them into central Africa.854 The independent inquiry into the actions of the UN tended to agree. ‘For the Government of the United States’ it averred, ‘the events in Mogadishu were a watershed in its policy towards UN peacekeeping’.855 And although Lake and Soderberg (both NSC) deny that Somalia had any impact on the change in policy, that Somalia happened, so Rwanda would not, Albright clearly blames the inaction of the international community, and her own government, on the deaths of the 18 US servicemen.856 Commenting on how after losing Americans in Somalia, ‘[i]t was a very difficult time’, she explains that another humanitarian peacekeeping mission was ‘not even vaguely on the cards’.857 In her memoirs Albright remarked that ‘[t]hrough a grim coincidence of timing, the shadow of Somalia hung over’ SC deliberations.858 She should have pushed it, she confesses, but because of the above, ‘people would have thought I was crazy’, a telling situation.859 The Clinton Administration had also been working on redrafting its previously ambitious peacekeeping review document, to bring it more in line with traditional Weinberger–Powell principles. PDD25, as it was known, was issued on 5 May, but its tenets had already factored into US thinking regarding peacekeeping. This is why Madeleine Albright received a negative reply from Dick Clarke when she telephoned on 15 April demanding more flexible instructions. He had been in charge of the review and he knew the mood in Washington regarding it. Albright recalls that the new criteria ‘put us in a position of raising a lot of questions of process . . . at a time that a volcanic explosion was happening in Rwanda’; they ‘tried to fit the situation in Rwanda into the framework we had created’ but the lessons of Somalia did not apply to Rwanda.860 As Elaine Sciolino commented in a New York Times article, [a]lthough it has not been articulated this way, no member of the United Nations with an army strong enough to make a difference is willing to risk the lives of its troops for a failed central African nationstate.861 Consequently, those in the International Community who had the capacity to act in order to stop the Rwandan genocide once it had began either could not believe that what was occurring was genocide, were too focused on the civil war aspect of the crisis and fixated on the achievement of a cease-fire, were ignorant or confused as regards what was really going on in Rwanda, felt there was nothing they could do to stop ancient, tribal, African slaughter, or lacked sufficient political will to act. The focus was constantly on the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda at the time, or the

166 Rwanda possibility of sending another. There was no flexibility of response. This demonstrates both a failure of the UN system, as an institutionalized response was all that could be mustered, and of individual countries that could have energized the decision-making process and produced a flexible solution. As the independent inquiry into the actions of the UN in the face of the genocide rebuked, ‘the United Nations had an obligation to act which transcended peacekeeping’.862

Conclusion One of the most difficult things to understand as a child is man’s inhumanity to man. The events that engulfed Rwanda in the spring of 1994 brought that childlike incomprehension back to bear with searing effect. Not because it staggers the mind to grasp how one group of human beings could simply turn on another and attempt to wipe all memory of them from the face of the earth, because unfortunately we – the world – had seen that before. No, it was because after 50 years’ worth of ‘never again’, our pledges came to nothing, as did the collective will of the International Community. The world simply watched. It is more or less accepted that the United States, still smarting from the deaths of 18 members of Task Force Ranger in Somalia, was directly responsible for insisting on a weak UNAMIR, and suspending effective action in the UN Security Council, both actively and through back-door channels. That through the auspices of the newly formulated policy attitudes on UN peacekeeping, issued as PDD25 while the genocide was at its height, the Clinton Administration stalled decision-making, insisting that its criteria be met before any mission be approved, and that the Executive was therefore single-handedly responsible for the paltry global response. It is undoubtedly true that the United States was scorched in Somalia, did alter its stance on peacekeeping and did issue a restrictive new policy document, as well as ensuring that UNAMIR had no teeth and prevaricating in the Security Council during the genocide. Nevertheless, we have seen through the preceding chapters that the administration’s change in attitude towards peacekeeping came as a result of negative experiences of 1990s peacekeeping (of which Somalia was simply the worst example) pressure from a confrontational and increasingly conservative Congress, and a commitment to policy that was a mile wide and an inch deep; not merely as a result of the Somalia experience.863 Therefore, the internal politics of the United States are more to blame for the behaviour of the Clinton Administration, and not simply Somalia or PDD25. As regards single-handed US culpability for the inaction of the entire International Community, it is a severely blinkered analysis that points the finger of blame (as so many do) at the United States alone. Information flooded the capitals of the world regarding the dire situation within

Rwanda

167

Rwanda from at least 1990 onwards, and continued to do so as the genocide unfolded. Many states had the capacity to act both in prevention and cessation of the violence, but did not. France, and to some extent Egypt, appeared to actively support the Habyarimana government, as well as the genocidal regime that grew out of its decapitated remains. Belgium had clear intelligence regarding the possibility that genocide might occur, dating as far back as 1992. Worse, after failing to secure reinforcements for UNAMIR following the deaths of ten of its peacekeepers, Belgium embarked on a shameful campaign to secure the entire withdrawal of the UNAMIR force. The reason? Simply to avoid embarrassment. The United Kingdom, bogged down in the Balkans, was loath to become involved, particularly in an area of Africa without colonial ties.864 Many other countries struck highly moral postures, but appeared to lack the courage of their convictions.865 The UN Secretariat must also bear some of the blame for its cautious, and at times misleading, approach to the crisis. The Secretariat was aware that the mood in the United States was to block effective action, but the overwhelming wish, not only in the DPKO but in the UN generally, was to avoid another Somalia. Not in the sense that the Americans may have meant it, however. For the Secretariat, ‘Somalia’ recalled the murder of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993.866 The overriding anxiety among the Secretariat was therefore not to anger the Americans, and to safeguard the lives of its peacekeepers. This caused it to approach UNAMIR with extreme timidity both during the period in which it was authorized and the genocide itself. Boutros-Ghali, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State Iqbal Riza, deserve particular mention with regard to discussion of the Secretariat. Both seemed to have laboured under a false impression of events in Rwanda, focusing almost exclusively on the civil war aspect of the violence and the necessity of obtaining a cease-fire. Consequently, incomplete evidence was often presented to the Council, in addition to an inaccurate picture of the dangers that would face any reinforced mission, as the Council then assumed that such a force would be required to stand between the warring parties, rather than hasten behind the lines of major combat to prevent massacres and rescue civilians. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali was consistently absent from New York, and from important Security Council debates on the issue, travelling as he was at the time of the crisis. That he did not deem the situation of enough importance to cut short his trip and return to New York, where his leadership was badly needed, is certainly also questionable. Therefore, while the impact of the altered status of US policy towards peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention is indisputable, and while it is certainly true that few countries will participate in a peacekeeping

168 Rwanda venture that the US does not at least tacitly support (because of the lack of recourse to the American ‘cavalry’ should things go wrong), in the case of Rwanda, others must share in the blame (and there is sufficient to go around). In fact, several countries rather benefited from the stern US stance, as they were afforded the option of standing behind the Americans, while at the same time publicly throwing up their hands in desperation, safe in the knowledge that they could appease domestic critics without being required to really ‘do something’.867 In April 1994, a dark spot crowded out the souls of the Rwandan genocidaires, enabling them to kill with abandon. But that dark spot crept also over the souls of politicians, diplomats and international civil servants in Washington, London, New York, Paris, Brussels and Cairo. Every peacekeeper that left a Rwandan to their fate in order to save their own skin, every UN member state, every journalist, editor, producer and private citizen who did not seek the truth, who did not speak out, and did not oblige their government to act, experienced the same thing. The dark spot on our souls enabled us to become attendants to carnage. The whole world failed Rwanda, and the most shameful thing is that she would not be the last.

Conclusion

One of the most frequently cited explanations for the foreign policy Uturn made by the Clinton Administration in late-1993/early 1994 is that the American public, disgusted by television images of a dead US pilot dragged through the dusty streets of Mogadishu, and disenchanted with this strange new concept of multilateralism, simply demanded it. This study has shown that this established viewpoint was simply not true. In fact, systematically collected survey data establish that the American public in the 1990s was characterized rather by a manifest approval of the United Nations and espousal of its most famous instrument: peacekeeping. Furthermore, a close inspection of data suggests that the massive public outcry that Congress maintained erupted following the Somalia incident was a myth. Results demonstrate that only a minority of people sought immediate withdrawal of US forces from the Horn, with only one single poll displaying 50 per cent in favour of such an action.868 If public opinion was not negatively inclined towards multilateralism in the 1990s, then public preferences were seriously misperceived by the policy-making elite in the United States. Elite dominance of the policymaking process, which creates a paternalistic attitude among policymakers towards the public; the post-Cold War environment marked by a dwindling interest in foreign affairs; a reliance on vocal minorities as representative of the mass opinion; the influence of an increasingly conservative Congress which was predisposed to negative opinion, and a self reinforcing triangular relationship between the Executive, the Legislature and the media, coupled with the assumption that both Congress and the media accurately reflect the public mood, all ensured that mass opinion was misinterpreted. Consequently various factors caused the Clinton Administration to believe that the public mood, consistently positive as it was, expected no less than the abandonment of the multilateralist ideal, thereby contributing to the Executive’s decision to renege on its foreign policy of choice. Second only to citations of a negative public are those of an unconstructive Legislature ready to impede Clinton’s key domestic agenda if he did not reverse his policies towards multilateralism, and particularly UN

170 Conclusion peacekeeping. However, as this study upholds, this is a greatly flawed reading of the situation. Congress had undoubtedly been moving steadily to the Right since the early 1960s, and was indeed more assertive than at many times in its history. Moreover, the 103rd Congress leapt on the multilateral issue; first, because of the generally antagonistic slant of conservative opinion, which regards such issues as inefficient, wasteful of forces, contrary to the national interest, and reckless with resources that would be better employed domestically. Second, significant numbers of freshmen legislators who, entering Congress after the end of the Cold War and consequently bearing none of its constraints, were considerably more focused on domestic issues and therefore less likely to approve monies for overseas expenditure. Third, as Republican politicians discovered, the UN could be quite an effective political and electioneering tool, and finally, many in Congress objected to the person of the Chief Executive officer in the form of Bill Clinton. They did not like him; they did not trust him; and consequently, anything that he was for, they, as a matter of principle, were against; any policy he endorsed was necessarily unsound. None the less, and contrary to the common wisdom, there was no real, concerted drive by Congress to hamper the actions of the Executive concerning its foreign policy movements. No legally binding action was taken, and any of the more worrying measures were toned down or thrown out. Consequently, any limiting of the administration’s foreign policy was, in fact, self-imposed. It was the potential damage that Congress could inflict on his vital domestic manifesto that worried Clinton – rather than any real contest that occurred at this time. Besides, the administration was never truly committed to peacekeeping and multilateralism, and so previously favoured policy preferences were easily abandoned. In the eyes of the Executive, a trade-off was required and, unsurprisingly, foreign policy lost. This is the key point. The Clinton Administration was never truly committed to the multilateralist ideal.869 The fall-out from Somalia had an undeniable impact on the Executive’s subsequent foreign policy decisionmaking. However, it was a lack of commitment that caused the Executive to abandon multilateral peacekeeping so quickly and so completely. The administration came back to multilateralist principles during its second term. Clinton’s renewed support for a more permanently available UN force, and Albright’s assault on Congress over UN issues during her time as Secretary of State suggest that original support was genuine. Such concepts were once more advanced, when it was no longer politically costly to do so. Nevertheless, when the cost appeared high, the policy was sufficiently insignificant to be cut adrift. Political hay was to be made by the President’s opponents. Therefore, unwilling to take the blame for a poorly crafted policy that had not caught the full attention of the foreign policy Principals, the Clinton Administration cast around for someone else to blame. The administration’s erst-

Conclusion 171 while partner, the United Nations, was perfectly placed to take the fall. And so it was. Although Somalia clearly had a significant impact on the Clinton Administration’s decision to alter its policy stance, it was not clear why. The United States had lost troops before; had experienced equal and greater death-tolls, in similar and vastly larger missions, than that incurred by Task Force Ranger in 1993. Panama and Grenada saw equivalent losses and the Gulf War and Beirut many more, yet the impact ‘back home’ was negligible in comparison. Panama and Grenada could be regarded in a Cold War context; thus there was a definable national interest to balance out any lack of ‘perceived success’. Reagan was able to use the Cold War card to prolong US presence in Lebanon long after domestic pressures could otherwise have forced him to withdraw. The Gulf War was viewed outside of the Cold War context, but was perceived as successful. Somalia, however, could be seen neither through the lens of the Cold War, and was in fact billed as an altruistic mission divorced from the national interest, nor was it perceived as successful. It has also been suggested that Somalia’s impact was so great because it took America by surprise. However, with the exception of some members of Congress, whose ignorance in this case is astounding (given the fact that they were briefed regularly on the subject), and who were therefore shocked at the deaths of the 18 servicemen, it is not true to say that the overwhelming reaction was one of shock. The Clinton Administration had failed to prepare adequately for the negative eventualities that its policy might incur in Somalia. It had not devoted as much attention to developments in Somalia as it should, and was consequently disappointed when things went awry. However, to suggest that the administration was not following events in Somalia is devoid of credibility, and the President’s assertions to the contrary are without merit. Contrary to popular assertion, the Pentagon was not shocked by the fatalities of 3–4 October, as it was intimately involved with day-to-day events in Somalia. This facet of the political establishment was well aware of the situation in Somalia; well aware that its job there, and the tools with which it had to work, were not a match. Consequently, it was aware of the potential risk under which its forces worked. The military had retained a healthy scepticism throughout the period of unrealistic optimism regarding peacekeeping that followed the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it was not shocked or reactionary when things went wrong, as evidenced by the fact that the bulk of the changes made to include peacekeeping training and doctrinal development in the military occurred after the Somalia incident. This was a work of two parts. The first, the results of which we have seen above, was concerned with the causes of Clinton Administration policy change; the second, with the consequences of that policy in the wider international context.

172 Conclusion This work stemmed from a much smaller study that dealt with the root causes of global inertia in the face of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The results of that study, predictably given the consensus in the literature, implied that the United States was, to all intents and purposes, exclusively responsible for the International Community’s failure of Rwanda. The US, scorched in Somalia and labouring under exacting new criteria laid down by PDD25, was not willing to run the political risk of another seemingly ambitious intervention. Therefore, the decision-making process in the Security Council was hindered, and others who were more than willing to intervene were prevented from doing so. However, this is a much too one-dimensional analysis of the situation. While it is without question that the new US approach resulted in part from the negative fall-out surrounding the 18 deaths in Somalia, and that PDD25 (and the approach that generated it) created a Clinton Administration which was not willing to act in this instance, this is only one side of a many-faceted story. First, the administration modified its position, not just because of the Somalia debacle, but through a false perception of public opinion; negative experiences of 1990s peacekeeping (of which Somalia was merely the worst example); an adversarial and conservatively inclined Congress; a certain naivety and lack of comprehensive analysis regarding its favoured policy resulting in an exaggeratedly negative reaction to the problems, and more importantly, a clear lack of genuine commitment to the policy under discussion. Somalia was certainly the catalyst for what came next, but remained only one of several factors involved. Second, the United States and PDD25 cannot be held entirely to blame for the failure of the entire International Community in Rwanda, and it would be injudicious to suggest that it could. Many other actors must share in the widely available guilt for the woeful response of the International Community. France, and to a lesser extent Egypt, supported the ethnically biased and corrupt Habyarimana government, as well as the genocidal one that followed. Belgium had good intelligence regarding the likelihood of genocide and did not act to prevent it. In addition to this the Belgian government conducted a shameful campaign aimed at the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR simply in order to cover its own ignominious retreat following the deaths of ten peacekeepers (albeit after attempts to have the mission reinforced had failed). The United Kingdom was as reluctant to act as the US, bogged down as it was in the Balkans. In fact, in 2004 (the tenth anniversary of the genocide), while the rest of the world paid tribute to the Rwandan dead, John Major (British PM in 1994) seemed more concerned that two RAF pilots killed in a helicopter crash be cleared of the human error charges laid down by the Ministry of Defence, than the fact that up to 1,000,000 Rwandans were brutally murdered on his watch. Moreover, the UN Secretariat must also share in some of the guilt for

Conclusion 173 its cautious and frequently misleading approach to Rwanda, both in the formulation and deployment of UNAMIR, and its actions relative to the genocide itself. Fear of causing a repeat of the situation in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in Somalia the previous summer, in addition to the dread of a negative reaction from America, caused the Secretariat to accept the US-led drive for a limited UNAMIR mandate, and to refuse requests for more ambitious action from the Force Commander on the ground. The Secretariat also misinterpreted events in Rwanda during the genocide. Both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Iqbal Riza focused in their reports and briefings on the civil war aspect of the crisis and on the achievement of a cease-fire, rather than on the genocidal killings. This meant that deficient evidence was often offered to the Council, and consequently, an imprecise picture of the risks that would face any reinforced mission was presented. Much of what the accepted wisdom has to say about the circumstances surrounding the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of peacekeeping policy, and the consequent liability of that administration for the failure of the International Community to act to check the Rwandan genocide, appears to be wrong. Through this study, at least a few of these inaccuracies have been put right.

Notes

1 Stephen John Stedman, ‘The New Interventionists’, Foreign Affairs, 1992–1993, vol. 72, no. 1, 1. 2 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil. Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict, London: Bloomsbury, 2000, p. 31. 3 William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World. Remaking American Foreign Policy, London: Praeger, 1999, p. 5. 4 Charles Krauthammer, ‘Playing God in Somalia; The United States is not in the Business of Recreating Nations’, Washington Post, 13 August 1993, A25. 5 The Economist, ‘Foggy Bottom Fumbling’, 16 October 1993, 17, 18. 6 Mats, R. Berdal, ‘Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, 1994, vol. 36, no. 1, 48. 7 ABC, October 1993. 8 Michael Hirsh, ‘The Fall Guy. Washington’s Self-defeating Assault on the UN’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 6, 4. 9 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – “Operation Rekindle Hope”?’, Global Governance, 1995, vol. 1, no. 2, 172. 10 See e.g. The Economist, ‘Americans in Somalia.’ 9 October 1993, 16; Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1; The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 45, 46. 11 Hirsh, op. cit., 7. 12 Jesse Helms, ‘Saving the U.N. A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General’, Foreign Affairs, 1996, vol. 75, no. 5, 2. 13 Ivo, H. Daalder, ‘Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy For Peacekeeping’, in William J. Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990, London: Macmillan, 1997, ch. 2. 14 The Economist, ‘Americans in Somalia’, 9 October 1993, 16; Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of U.S. Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1; The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 45, 46. 15 PIPA, October 1993; also, 77 per cent of respondents to the 1999 PIPA poll agreed with the statement: [b]ecause that world is so interconnected today, the US should participate in efforts to maintain peace, protect human rights, and promote economic development. Such efforts serve US interests because they help create a more stable world that is less prone to war and is better for the growth of trade and other US goals. 16 Los Angeles Times poll, March 1991. Neither do Americans wish to be the world’s ‘primary peacekeeper’ (not that they are) with 61 per cent answering ‘No’ to a March 1998 CBS News poll which asked just that question.

Notes 175 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

ATIF, June, 1995. PIPA, April 1995. CCFR, 1998, PIPA, April 1995. ABC News, March 1993. Combines ‘extremely important’ (50 per cent) and ‘somewhat important’ (39 per cent), ‘very important’ (54 per cent) and ‘somewhat important’ (28 per cent), and ‘very important’ and ‘somewhat important’ respectively. The United States should cooperate with the United Nations. Agree/ Disagree. Except for the PIPA (April 1995) which asked: ‘[s]hould the US cooperate fully with the United Nations?’. Newsweek/Gallup, December 1992. Steven Kull, ‘What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn’t’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101, 105. PIPA, June 1996. UNA-USA/Wirthlin, 1992 and 1995. CBS News, 1995. Combines ‘strongly approve’ (31 per cent) and ‘somewhat approve’ (47 per cent) and ‘strongly approve’ (14 per cent) and ‘somewhat approve’ (45 per cent) respectively. Combines ‘very favourable’ and ‘mostly favourable’ except for PIPA, 1995. Combines ‘high priority’ (75 per cent) and ‘somewhat of a priority’ (17 per cent). Eighty-three per cent favoured improving communications and command facilities, 82 per cent favoured joint training exercises, 79 per cent favoured a 1,000-strong rapid deployment force, and 69 per cent favoured possession of permanent stocks of military equipment. Combines ‘favour strongly’ (65 per cent) and ‘favour somewhat’ (22 per cent). PIPA, June/July 1994. Combines ‘very unconvincing’ (36 per cent) and ‘somewhat unconvincing’ (26 per cent). PIPA, June/July 1994. Kull, op. cit., 113. PIPA, April 1995. Kull, op. cit., 112. Combines ‘very convincing’ (34 per cent plurality) and ‘somewhat convincing’ (31 per cent). Combines ‘very convincing’ (56 per cent) and ‘somewhat convincing’ (24 per cent). Combines ‘just about always’ (3 per cent) and ‘most of the time’ (21 per cent) and ‘just about always’ (7 per cent) and ‘most of the time’ (40 per cent) respectively. Combines ‘definitely yes’ (32 per cent plurality) and ‘maybe yes’ (30 per cent). Combines ‘much lower’ (46 per cent plurality) and ‘somewhat lower’ (28 per cent). Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, Misreading the Public. The Myth of a New Isolationism, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, pp. 224 and 222. Jeremy D. Rosner, ‘The Know-nothings Know Something’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101, 119. Ibid. Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 212; Edward Luck, interview with the author, Columbia University, New York, June 2002. Ibid., p. 216.

176 Notes 49 Ibid., p. 217. 50 Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 241; William J. Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 12. 51 Robert S. Greenberger, ‘Dateline Capital Hill: The New Majority’s Foreign’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101, 160. 52 Ibid. 53 Bernard C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973; Philip J Powlick, ‘The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials’, International Studies Quarterly, 1995, 39. 54 Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 219. 55 Powlick, op. cit., p. 435. 56 Kull and Destler, op. cit., pp. 219–220. 57 Powlick, op. cit., p. 435. 58 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media, London: Vintage, 1994, p. 18. 59 Lawrence R. Jacobs, ‘The Recoil Effect. Public Opinion and Policymaking in the US and Britain’, Comparative Politics, 1992, no. 24, 203–204. 60 Ibid., p. 210. 61 Eric F. Alterman, Who Speaks for America? Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1998, p. 154. 62 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 132–138. 63 Herman and Chomsky, op. cit., p. 19. 64 Alterman, op. cit., p. 158. 65 Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1997, Part 2, pp. 105–192. See also Herman and Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 5–8 and 16. 66 Alterman, op. cit., p. 155. 67 Ibid., ‘the concentration of power in the hands of so few’, p. 156; Bagdikian, op. cit., p. 8. 68 Herman and Chomsky, pp. 21–23. See also Bagdikian, op. cit. and Alterman, op. cit., p. 157. 69 John E. Reilly, ‘Americans and the World: A Survey at Century’s End’, Foreign Policy, 1999, no. 114, 105. 70 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace. Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, New York: Scribner, 2001, p. 259. 71 Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 220. 72 Ibid., p. 221. 73 Ibid. 74 Nancy Soderberg, interview with the author, New York, June 2002. 75 Powlick, op. cit., p. 436. 76 Ibid., p. 437. 77 Rosner, op. cit., p. 116. 78 Quoted in Rosner, op. cit., p. 118. 79 Thomas W. Graham, ‘Public Opinion & US Foreign Decision Making’, in David A. Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 195. 80 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 291. 81 Hirsh, op. cit., p. 3. 82 William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World. Remaking American Foreign Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, p. 16. see also George H. Quester, ‘Defense Policy’, in Paul S. Herrnson and Dilys M. Hill (eds), The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–96, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 140. 83 Tim Hames, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Herrnson and Hill, op. cit., pp. 126–127. 84 Edward Walsh, ‘Clinton Indicts Bush’s World Leadership; Democratic

Notes 177

85

86 87 88 89 90 91

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

Nominee Issues Sweeping Call for “Pro-Democracy Foreign Policy” ’, Washington Post, 2 October 1992, A12. Roger Morris, ‘A New Foreign Policy for a New Era’, New York Times, 9 December 1992, A23; The Economist. ‘The World in His Lap’, 12 December 1992, 29, 30; Simon Tisdall and Martin Walker, ‘The World According to Bill. Three Weeks Before Taking Office Bill Clinton has Already Set the Tone of US Foreign Policy’, Guardian, 29 December 1992; Hames, op. cit., p. 14; Simon Tisdall and Elaine Sciolino, ‘Clinton Shift on Bosnia Reflects Despair of Mediation’, New York Times, 19 June 1993, 4. William J. Clinton, quoted in Clifford Krauss, ‘US Backs Off Report on Serbian Abuse’, New York Times 5 August 1992, A1. Harry J. Truman, quoted in Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 93. William J. Clinton, quoted in Elaine Sciolino, ‘US Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers’, New York Times, 23 September 1993, A8. See also Tisdall and Walker, op. cit. Daalder, op. cit., p. 36. See also Stedman, op. cit., 1, 7 and William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil. Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict, London: Bloomsbury, 2000, p. 31. Thomas H. Hendrickson, Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, USA: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 14. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, A Strong United Nations Serves US Security Interests. Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Address before the Council on Foreign Relations’ Conference on Cooperative Security and the United Nations, New York City, 17 June 1993. Nancy Soderberg, interview with the author, New York, June 2002. Ibid. See also Michael Mandlebaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs, 1996, vol. 75, no. 1, 17. Mandlebaum, op. cit. Hendriksen, op. cit., p. 6. See also Halberstam, op. cit., p. 193; Hyland, op. cit., p. 197. The Economist, ‘Foggy Bottom Fumbling’, 16 October 1993, 17, 18. Halberstam, op. cit., p. 114; Hames, op. cit., p. 127. Soderberg, op. cit. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, New York: Balantine Books, 1996, p. 563. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 70. Soderberg, op. cit. Hendriksen, op. cit., p. 7. William J. Clinton, Inaugural Address. 20 January 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 1, 2. Ibid. Ibid., p. 2; emphasis added. Ibid. Hendrickson, op. cit., pp. 14 and 7. Elaine Sciolino, ‘New US Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the U.N. A Sharp Shift From Clinton’s Campaign Stance’, New York Times, 6 May 1994, A1. Ivo H. Daalder, ‘The Clinton Administration and Multilateral Peace Operations’, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign Service. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994, p. 1.

178 Notes 110 William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Reception for the Opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 21 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 473. 111 William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Dedication of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 22 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 479–480. 112 William J. Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia, 5 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 565 and 566. 113 William J. Clinton, Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York, 29 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 781. 114 William J. Clinton, interview With Foreign Journalists, 2 July 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 987; William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Caribbean Leaders, 30 August 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton. 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1410. 115 William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, 12 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 839, 840. 116 Ibid., p. 840. 117 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 5, Myths of Peacekeeping, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. 24 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, 28 June 1993., vol. 4, no. 26. 118 Warren Christopher, Article 2, Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing, Secretary Designate Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 13 January 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, 25 January 1993, vol. 4, no. 4. 119 Madeleine K. Albright, in Q & A Session, Nomination of Madeleine Albright to be United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 21 January 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 39, 40. 120 Madeleine K. Albright, quoted in Charles Krauthammer, ‘Playing God in Somalia: The United States is Not in the Business of Recreating Nations’, New York Times, 13 August 1993, 25. 121 Madeleine K. Albright, in Q & A Session, Nomination of Madeleine Albright to be United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 21 January 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 39, 40.

Notes 179 122 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. 123 Ibid. 124 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, A Strong United Nations Serves US Security Interests, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 11 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. 125 Although not for the reasons it became known in Congress and the press. 126 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 5, Myths of Peacekeeping, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 24 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. 127 ‘Assertive multilateralism’, meaning a multilateral approach dominated by the wishes and interests of the United States. 128 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 5, Myths of Peacekeeping. Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 24 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. 129 Charles William Maynes, ‘Relearning Intervention’, Foreign Policy, 1995, no. 98, 108. 130 Soderberg, op. cit. 131 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. 132 Chester A. Crocker, ‘The Lessons of Somalia. Not Everything Went Wrong’, Foreign Affairs, 1995 vol. 74, no. 3, 4. 133 William J. Clinton, interview With Dan Rather of CBS News, 24 March 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 350. 134 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 143. 135 Madeleine K. Albright, in Q & A Session, Nomination of Madeleine K. Albright to be United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 21 January 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 25. 136 William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, 10 February 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 79. 137 Tony Smith, ‘In Defense of Intervention’, Foreign Affairs, 1994, vol. 73, no. 6, 41. 138 Soderberg, op. cit.

180 Notes 139 Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 12. 140 William J. Durch, ‘Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and “State-Building” in Somalia’, in Durch, op. cit., p. 311. 141 Ibid., p. 139. 142 Jonathan T. Howe, ‘Relations Between the United States and United Nations in Dealing With Somalia’, in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds), Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p. 176. 143 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on foreign Relations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. 144 Shawcross, op. cit., p. 98. 145 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Caribbean Leaders, 30 August 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1410. 146 Ken Menkhaus, ‘Getting Out vs. Getting Through: U.S. and U.N. Policies in Somalia’, Middle East Policy, 1994, vol. 1, 157. 147 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 15 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 849. 148 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 257. 149 See Chapters 3 and 4. 150 Drew, op. cit., p. 323. 151 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Caribbean Leaders, 30 August 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1411. 152 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Ciampi of Italy, 17 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1526. 153 William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders, 28 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1624. 154 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 1616, 1617. 155 Anthony Lake, Article 3, From Containment to Enlargement, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. 156 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World, Madeleine K. Albright, Address at the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. 157 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 260.

Notes 181 158 William J. Durch, ‘Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and “State-Building” in Somalia’. in Durch, op. cit., p. 327. 159 Martin Fletcher, ‘Clinton Dilemma as Congress Erupts over Somali Taunts’, The Times, 6 October 1993. 160 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 264. 161 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the AFL-CIO Convention in San Francisco, California, 4 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1668. 162 Warren Christopher, Article 2, Achieving a Political Settlement in Somalia, Secretary Christopher, Washington, DC, 7 October 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 42, 18 October 1993. 163 Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Requirements, and Resources, Q & A Session. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1995 – S.2182 (HR 4301) and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 23 March 1994, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 954. 164 Crocker, op. cit., p. 6. 165 William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia, 7 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1704. 166 Ibid. 167 William J Clinton, Exchange With Reporters at Yale University in New Haven, 9 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1729. 168 Hella Pick, ‘Clinton Rejects Early Pullout’, Guardian, 14 October 1994. 169 William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia, 7 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1704. 170 Menkhaus, op. cit., pp. 147 and 151; Douglas Jehl, ‘US Shifts Troops to Defensive Role In Somalia Mission’, New York Times, 20 October 1993, A1. 171 Mats R. Berdal, ‘Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, 1994, vol. 36, no. 1, 39. 172 Menkhaus, op. cit., p. 147. 173 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 154. 174 Howe, op. cit., p. 183; Mark Huband and Hella Pick, ‘United Nations Irate at Casting as Whipping-boy’, Guardian, 11 October 1993. 175 Geoff Simons, The United Nations. A Chronology of Conflict, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 216. 176 Madeleine K. Albright, Madam Secretary. A Memoir, London: Macmillan, 2003, p. 179. 177 Shawcross, op. cit., p. 71. 178 William J. Clinton, interview with Don Imus of WFAN Radio, New York City, 12 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 632. 179 William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, 10 February 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 79.

182 Notes 180 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 14 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 660. 181 William J. Clinton, interview with Don Imus of WFAN Radio, New York City, 12 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. William J. Clinton, 1993. Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 631, 632. 182 Anthony Lake, Article 3, From Containment to Enlargement, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. 183 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Export Import Bank Conference. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 576. 184 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. 185 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 23 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 488. 186 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with President Francois Mitterrand of France, 9 March 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 259. 187 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, 16 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 441. 188 William J Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 14 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 660. 189 Shawcross, op. cit., p. 71. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A US – U.N. Saga, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 69, Berdal, op. cit., 37; Halberstam, op. cit., p. 198; Julia Preston, ‘Mediators Urge US Support for Balkan Plan; Facing Collapse of Talks, Owen and Vance Turn to US for Support and Ground Troops’, Washington Post, 2 February 1993, A15; Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Best Plan for Bosnia’, Washington Post, 4 February 1993, A21. 190 Drew, op. cit., p. 147. See also Shawcross, op. cit., p. 72; Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Best Plan for Bosnia’, Washington Post, 4 February 1993, A21. 191 Shawcross, op. cit., p. 72., Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 72. 192 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with President Francois Mitterrand of France, 9 March 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 259. 193 William J. Clinton, Q & A Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 1 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United

Notes 183

194 195 196

197 198

199

200 201 202 203

204 205 206

207

208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216

States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 374. Drew, op. cit., p. 147. See also Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 69. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 72. William J. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 21 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 713. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 77. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 14 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 660. William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1430. Drew, op. cit., pp. 155, 156. For Albright’s description of ‘lift and strike’ see Madeleine K. Albright, op. cit., p. 180. Albright, op. cit., p. 181. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. Geoff Simons, The United Nations. A Chronology of Conflict, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 216. Ibid. William J. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 21 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 714. William J. Clinton, Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Manchester, New Hampshire, 22 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 724, 725. Paul Lewis, ‘U.N. Aides Cite Drawbacks To Bosnia Safe-Haven Plan’, New York Times, 30 May 1993, p. 10. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 82. Drew, op. cit., pp. 161, 162. Shawcross, op. cit., pp. 72–80, 90. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 84. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 91. Eric Lars Wahlgren, ‘Start and End of Srebrenica’, in Wolfgang Bierman and Martin Vadset (eds), UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 181. William J. Durch and James A. Schear, ‘Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Durch, op. cit., p. 251. Don Imus, interview with Don Imus of WFAN Radio, New York City, 12 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993,

184 Notes

217 218 219 220

221 222

223

224

225 226 227 228

229 230 231 232

233

234

Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 631; William J. Clinton, Remarks and a Q & A Session With High School Students in Bensonville, Illinois, 11 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993. Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 622. George H. Quester, ‘Defense Policy’, in Paul S. Herrnson (ed.), The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–96, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 148. Simons, op. cit., p. 216. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 71. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with Caribbean Leaders, 30 August 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1410. Ibid. William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the NATO Decision on Airstrikes in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters, 9 February 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 220. William J. Clinton, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1455. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in Bosnia, 20 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993. Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1781. Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 13. Ibid., p. 17. Yashushi Akashi, quoted in Shawcross, op. cit., p. 138. William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 1616, 1617. Ibid., p. 1617. Edward Luck, interview with the author, New York, June 2002. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 115. Statement by the Press Secretary on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 3 May 1994, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. 1995, p. 853. Anthony Lake, Article 3, From Containment to Enlargement, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993; Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, Use of Force in a PostCold War World. Madeleine K. Albright, Address to the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 September 1993, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World,

Notes 185

235

236 237

238

239

240

241 242

243

244

245

Madeleine K. Albright, Address to the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. Warren Christopher, Article 1, The Strategic Priorities of American Foreign Policy, Secretary Christopher, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 4 November 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 47, 22 November 1993. Ibid. Madeleine K. Albright, Statement, Tensions in United States–United Nations Relations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 17 May 1994, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 8. William J. Clinton, interview with Timothy Russert and Tom Brokaw on ‘Meet the Press’, 7 November 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1925; Anthony Lake, Article 4, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Opening Statement at a Press Briefing on the Peace Operations Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Lt. Gen. Wesley Clarke, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 5 May 1994, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 20, 16 May 1994. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 14 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1746. Anthony Lake, Article 3, From Containment to Enlargement, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. Ibid. William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. 1994, p. 1614. William J. Clinton, interview with Don Imus of WFAN Radio, New York City, 12 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 631. William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin of Russia and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1430. See; William J. Clinton, Q & A Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 1 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 379; William J. Clinton, interview With Foreign Journalists, 2 July 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20

186 Notes

246

247

248

249

250 251 252 253 254 255 256

257

258

259

260 261

262

January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 981. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with European Community Leaders, 7 May 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 594, 595. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, 6 April 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 410–412. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 7, Current Status of US Policy on Bosnia, Somalia, and UN Reform, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 March 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, 5 April 1993. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, A Strong United Nations Serves US Security Interests, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 11 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. Berdal, op. cit., p. 33. Ibid. Albright, op. cit., p. 144. Howe, op. cit., p. 176. William J. Clinton, interview with CNN’s Global Forum With President Clinton, 3 May 1994, United States Government Printing Office. Washington, DC, 1995, p. 832. Soderberg, op. cit. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1622. William J. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders, 28 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1624. William J. Clinton, interview with Foreign Journalists, 2 July 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 985. William J. Clinton, interview with the Italian Media, 17 May 1994, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 1000. Soderberg, op. cit. William J. Clinton, interview with Foreign Journalists, 2 July 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 985. Madeleine K. Albright, Q & A Session, Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation for 1995, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice,

Notes 187

263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270

271 272

273

274 275

276

277

278 279 280

and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, Part 3, Department of State, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1095. Charles William Maynes, ‘A Workable Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, 1993–1994, no. 93, 3. Hyland, op. cit., p. 203. Stephen Canard, ‘The U.N. as Scapegoat’, op-ed., New York Times, 22 April 1994. Menkhaus, op. cit., 147. The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 66. Albright, op. cit., p. 146. Mark Huband and Hella Pick, ‘United Nations Irate at Casting as Whippingboy’, Guardian, 11 October 1993. Clinton, William Jefferson. The President’s News Conference With Caribbean Leaders. 30 August 1993. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 1411. Ken Menkhaus, ‘Getting Out vs. Getting Through: US and U.N. Policies in Somalia’, Middle East Policy, vol. 1 (1994), 147. William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia, 7 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 1704, 1705. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 14 October 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1743. Ibid., p. 1746. Thomas M. Montgomery (Major General), Q & A Session. US Military Operations in Somalia. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 32. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 3, Building a Consensus on International Peacekeeping, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 20 October 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 46, 15 November 1993; Warren Christopher, Q & A Session, Foreign Policy Update, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 4 November 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 50. Lieutenant General Wesley Clarke, Article 4, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Opening Statements at a Press Briefing on the Peace Operations Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Lt. Gen. Wesley Clarke, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 5 May 1994, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 20, 16 May 1994. Luck, op. cit. Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, After the Crusade. American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age, Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995, p. 6. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General Clarke, Executive Summary, Statement by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the Subcommittee

188 Notes

281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307

308

309 310

311 312 313

on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 5 May 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 20, 16 May 1993. William G. Hyland, ‘A Mediocre Record’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, vol. 101, no. 101, 71. David Malone, interview with the author, New York, June 2002. Although these particular events lie outside the time frame of this particular study, the factors that put them in motion existed during the years with which we are concerned, and thus affected policy. Douglas L Koopman, Hostile Takeover. The House Republican Party, 1980–1995, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, p. 69. Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties. The Conservative Capture of the GOP, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, pp. 89 and 96. Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution. The Movement that Remade America, New York: Free Press, 1999, ch. 9; Brennan, op. cit., p. 137. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 78–82, 97–99, 153–154, 184–191, 225, 226; Brennan, op. cit., pp. 64–66, 112–115. Barry Goldwater, as quoted in Edwards, op. cit., p. 94. Brennan, op. cit., p. 118. Edwards, op. cit., p. 138. Koopman, op. cit., p. 76. Edwards, op. cit., p. 287. Ibid., p. 208. Ibid., pp. 270, 280–282. Halberstam, op. cit., p. 298. Koopman, op. cit., p. 142. Ibid., p. 74; Edwards, op. cit., pp. 271, 272, 277, 278. Greenberger, op. cit., p. 160. Dean McSweeney and John E. Owens (eds), The Republican Takeover of Congress, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 49. Ibid., p. 49. Greenberger, op. cit., 160. Ibid., 160. Ibid., 165. Koopman, op. cit., pp. 69–83. See also Halberstam, op. cit., p. 298. Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 241. Ibid., p. 242. See Shawcross, op. cit., p. 102; Ivo H. Daalder, ‘The Clinton Administration and Multilateral Peace Operations’, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994, pp. 1, 9. Donald Mazullo, Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, H. Con Res. 170, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 16. Terry L. Deibel, Clinton and Congress. The Politics of Foreign Policy, Headline Series, fall 2000, No. 321. Foreign Policy Association, 46. William Goodling, Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, H. Con Res. 170, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 19. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 232. Ibid., p. 43. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 202.

Notes 189 314 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 5; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever it Takes. The Real Struggle for Political Power in America, New York: Viking, 1997, p. 40. 315 Kull and Destler, op. cit., p. 242. 316 Ibid., p. 241. 317 Shawcross, op. cit. 318 Hirsh, op. cit., p. 7. 319 Helms, op. cit., p. 2. 320 Ibid., p. 3. 321 Shawcross, op. cit., p. 202. 322 Bob Dole, ‘Shaping America’s Global Future’, Foreign Policy, 1995, no. 98, 37. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid., pp. 38, 41. 325 Greenberger, op. cit., 166. 326 Hames, op. cit., p. 157. 327 Rosner, op. cit., p. 116. 328 Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, ‘Congress and the Somalia Crisis’, in Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., p. 192. 329 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 292. 330 Elizabeth Drew, Whatever it Takes. The Real Struggle for Political Power in America, New York: Viking, 1997, p. 127. 331 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 232. 332 Gary Ackerman, Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 30. 333 Ryan C. Hendrikson, The Clinton Wars. The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002, pp. 30, 31. 334 Harry Johnston, Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 15. 335 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 40. 336 Greenberger, op. cit., 166. 337 Respectively, Michael Foley, ‘Clinton and Congress’, in Herrnson, op. cit., p. 25; Halberstam, op. cit., p. 114. 338 Howard Berman (Representative, Democrat, California) quoted in Greenberger, op. cit., 166. 339 Greenberger, op. cit., 167. 340 Foley, op. cit., p. 25. 341 See Chapter 1. 342 Rosner, op. cit., p. 119. 343 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 210. 344 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 70. 345 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 72. 346 Sam Nunn and Carl Levin, Current Military Operations in Somalia, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 25 March 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 20 and 28 respectively. 347 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 72. 348 Hyland, op. cit., p. 56. 349 See Chapter 2. 350 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 40. see also Lynne Duke, ‘President Promises “Appropriate” Response; Clinton Rebuts Criticism of Somalia Mission’. Washington Post, 9 August 1993, A13.

190 Notes 351 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 40. 352 Robert C. Byrd, ‘The Perils of Peacekeeping’, New York Times, 19 August 1993, A23. 353 Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton. A Fairweather Friend? London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 67. See also Elaine Sciolino, ‘US Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers’, New York Times, 23 September 1993, A8. 354 Clifford Krauss, ‘House Vote Urges Clinton to Limit American Role in Somalia’, New York Times, 29 September 1993, A1. 355 Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 35. 356 Ibid., see also Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1. 357 Krauss, op. cit., A10. 358 Jesse Helms, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 and 20 October 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 82. 359 Paul Simon, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 and 20 October 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 43. 360 Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, H. Con. Res. 170, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994. 361 Toby Roth, Withdrawal of US Forces From Somalia, Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, H. Con. Res. 170, 3 November 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 12. 362 Clifford Krauss, ‘High Cost for Clinton on Somalia Vote’, New York Times, 16 October 1993, 6. 363 Bob Dole, ‘Peacekeeping and Politics’, New York Times, 24 January 1994, A15. 364 Bob Dole, quoted in Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Back to the Womb. Isolationism’s Renewed Threat’, Foreign Affairs, 1995, vol. 74, no. 4, p. 6. 365 MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 69. 366 Clinton Administration Policy on Multilateral Peace Operations, 5 May 1994. 367 Ann Devroy, ‘Clinton Signs New Guidelines for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’, Washington Post, 6 May 1994, A30. 368 Newt Gingrich, quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 6. 369 Clifford Krauss, ‘House Vote Urges Clinton to Limit American Role in Somali Conflict’, New York Times, 29 September 1993, A10. 370 MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 43. 371 Floyd Spence, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, S.2182 (H.R. 4301) and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 23 March 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 952; Tom Lantos, US Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session, 24 June 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 11. 372 Pete Domenici, Peacekeeping Budget, Plans and Actions, Hearing before the Oversight and Investigation’s Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed

Notes 191

373 374 375

376

377

378

379

380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393

Services, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 April 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 654; Harold Rogers, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 157. Byrd, op. cit., A23; Bob Dole, ‘Peacekeepers And Politics’, New York Times, 24 January 1994, A15. Respectively. Elaine Sciolino, ‘New US Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the U.N. A Sharp Shift From Clinton’s Campaign Stance’, New York Times, 6 May 1994, A7. Joel J. Sokolsky, ‘Great Ideals and Uneasy Compromises: The United States Approach to Peacekeeping’, International Journal, L, 1995, 280. For all of the above see also, Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1. Pete Domenici (R-NM), Peacekeeping Budget, Plans and Actions. Hearing before the Oversight and Investigation’s Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session. 12 April 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 665. Thomas Montgomery (Major General) and William Garrision (Major General), US Military Operations in Somali, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12, 21 May 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 55. Judd Gregg, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 and 20 October 1993, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 48–50. Sonny Callahan and Jim Lightfoot, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1995, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 5 May 1994, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 588 and 593; Robert Dole, quoted in Ann Devroy, ‘Clinton Signs New Guidelines for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’, 6 May 1994, A30. Hyland, op. cit., p. 149. Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages. American Politics and International Organization 1919–1999, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999, p. 184. See Chapter 2. Mark Huband and Hella Pick, ‘United Nations Irate at Casting as Whippingboy’, Guardian 11 October 1993. See Chapter 2. See Chapter 2. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, 1996, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 1, 30. Luck, op. cit. Ibid. Hendrikson, op. cit., p. 72. See Chapter 2, See also section entitled ‘The blame-game’ above. Drew, op. cit., p. 162. Luck, op, cit. See Chapter 2.

192 Notes 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429

MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 98. Luck, op. cit. Hirsh, op. cit., 7. Luck, op. cit. Terence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 7. Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Somalia. No Mercy in Mogadishu. The Human Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle for Relief, 26 March 1992 (New York and Boston, 1992), p. 3. Ibid., p. 1. See also The Economist, ‘Somalia. St Valentine’s Massacres’, 22 February 1992, 33, 34. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 7. Ioan M. Lewis, Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society, Discussion Paper No. 6, London: The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 1995, pp. 4, 5. The Economist, ‘The Map of Hunger’, 15 August 1992, 32. The Economist, ‘The Price of Charity’, 12 September 1992, 70. Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, Fiasco in Somalia, Occasional Paper No. 61, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995, p. 10. Lewis, op. cit., p. 8. The Economist, ‘Death by Looting’, 18 July 1992, 55. For more detail see Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia. The Missed Opportunities, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 56. Ibid., p. 63. John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, p. 30. Sahnoun, op. cit. The United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia. Reference Paper, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 30 April 1993, p. 3. Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post Cold War Intervention, Claremont, CA: Regina Books. 1998, p. 19. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 25. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 58. Ibid.; United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), 3 December 1992. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), 3 December 1992. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., pp. 50, 54. Brune, op. cit., p. 24. See also The Economist, ‘Lights! Action! What Next?’, 12 December 1992, 47. Brune, op. cit., p. 20. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 60. Lyons and Samatar, op. cit., p. 43. Brune, op. cit., p. 23. The Economist, ‘The Bandits on their Donkeys’, 1 May 1993, 40, 41. Ibid. Lyons and Samatar, op. cit., p. 42. Africa Watch, Somalia Beyond the Warlords. The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights (7 March 1993), p. 22. Lyons and Samatar, op. cit., p. 41.

Notes 193 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453

454

455 456 457 458 459 460 461

Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 107.; Lyons and Samatar, op. cit., p. 42. Albright, op. cit., p. 142. Ibid. Africa Watch, Somalia Beyond the Warlords. The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights (7 March, 1993), p. 14. John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, p. 59. Ibid., p. 89. Africa Watch, op. cit., p. 14. Sam Kiley, ‘Welcome for Marines Soured by Attacks on Relief Agencies; Somalia’, The Times, 10 December 1992. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 61; Africa Watch, op. cit., pp. 15, 16. Africa Watch, op. cit., pp. 1, 2. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 105. Ibid., p. 103. Daniel P. Bolger, Savage Peace. Americans at War in the 1990s, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995, p. 283. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 45. Ibid., p. 47. Henry Kissenger, ‘Thin Blue Line for a World Cop. As US Troops Move Into Baidoa, Capital of Somalia’s Famine-Stricken Bay Area, Henry Kissenger Examines the Notion of Humanitarian Intervention’, Guardian, 16 December 1992. Makinda, op. cit., p. 65. United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), 26 March 1993. Bolger, op. cit., p. 296. Lyons and Samatar, op. cit., p. 54. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 57. The Economist, ‘Warlord at Large’, 12 June 1993, 70. Madeleine K. Albright, Article 5, Myths of Peacekeeping, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 24 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, 12 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book I – 20 January to 31 July 1993, Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 839. See also Lynne Duke, ‘President Promises “Appropriate” Response; Clinton Rebukes Criticism of Somalia Mission’, Washington Post, 9 August 1993, A13. The Economist, ‘First, Catch Your Gunman’, 19 June 1993, 16, 17; The Economist, ‘Hope Behind the Horror’, 19 June 1993, 41, 42. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 121. Abdullahi, op. cit., p. 25. Hirsh and Oakley, op. cit., p. 121. Bolger, op. cit., p. 311. Keith B. Richburg, ‘U.N. Missions in Somalia Seen Beset by Infiltrators; Relief Aides Dispute US Account of Raid’, Washington Post, 7 September 1993, A01; The Economist, ‘Somalia: The Mire’, 11 September 1993, 40, 41. Rick Atkinson, ‘The Raid That Went Wrong; How an Elite US Force Failed in Somalia Series: Firefight in Mogadishu: The Last Mission of Task Force Ranger’, Washington Post, 30 January 1994, A01.

194 Notes 462 Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9, October 1993, Oxfam (UK and Ireland) (Oxford, 1994), p. 33. 463 The Economist, ‘Somalia: Manhunt’, 18 September 1993, 46; Stevenson, op. cit., p. 90. 464 William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 1621. See also Martin Fletcher and James Bone, ‘US Aims for Swift End to Somalia Involvement’, The Times, 29 September 1994. 465 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 99. 466 Ibid., p. 100. 467 Drew, op. cit., p. 323. 468 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 27 September 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II – 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 1616, 1617; Anthony Lake, Article 3, From Containment to Enlargement, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993; Madeleine K. Albright, Article 4, Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World, Madeleine K. Albright, Address at the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 September 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993. 469 Durch, op. cit., p. 327. 470 Albright, op. cit., p. 145. 471 US Military Operations in Somalia. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session. 12 May 1994, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994. 472 Abdullahi, op. cit., p. 29. 473 Madeleine K. Albright, ‘Yes, There Is a Reason to Be in Somalia’, New York Times, 10 August 1993, A19. 474 Ibid. 475 Bolger, op. cit., p. 310; see also Atkinson, op. cit., A01. 476 Atkinson, op. cit., A01. 477 Bolger, op. cit., p. 317. 478 Ibid., p. 320. 479 Ibid., p. 318. 480 Ibid., p. 317. 481 Durch, op. cit., p. 347. 482 Bolger, op. cit., p. 327. 483 Martin Fletcher and Eve-Ann Prentice, ‘Gloating Somalis Parade Corpse of US Servicemen’, The Times, 5 October 1993. 484 See e.g. The Economist, ‘Americans in Somalia’, 9 October 1993; The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 45, 46; Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1. 485 See e.g. Martin Fletcher, ‘Clinton Dilemma as Congress Erupts over Somali Taunts’, The Times, 6 October 1994; The Economist, ‘Americans in Somalia’, 9 October 1993; The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 45, 46; Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1. 486 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp. 105, 106.

Notes 195 487 The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 66. 488 Hella Pick, ‘Clinton Rejects Early Pullout’, Guardian, 14 October 1994. 489 Douglas Jehl, ‘US Shifts Troops to Defensive Role in Somalia Mission’, New York Times, 20 October 1993, A1; Martin Fletcher and James Bone, ‘Clinton Wants 2,000 More Somalia Troops’, The Times, 7 October 1994; Mark Huband, Simon Tisdall and Hella Pick, ‘Clinton Builds up to Withdrawal from Somalia’, 7 October 1994. 490 T.G. Fraser and Donette Murray, America and the World since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 228. 491 Stephen Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism. American Foreign Policy Since 1938, London: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 359. 492 Ibid., p. 395. 493 For more details on the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine see Chapter 2. 494 Smith Hempstone, quoted in Martin Fletcher, ‘Clinton Dilemma as Congress Erupts over Somali Taunts’, The Times, 6 October 1993. 495 The Economist, ‘Americans in Somalia’, 9 October 1993, 16; Clifford Krauss, ‘Senators Seek Early Pullout Of US Troops From Somalia’, New York Times, 12 October 1993, A1; The Economist, ‘The Retreat’, 16 October 1993, 45, 46. 496 See Chapter 1. 497 See Chapter 1. 498 See Chapter 1. 499 See Chapter 1, Table 1.2. 500 See Chapter 1, Table 1.4. 501 Kull and Destler, op. cit., pp. 29, 30. 502 For more details on these factors see Chapter 1. 503 Albright, op. cit., p. 145. 504 Hyland, op. cit., p. 58. and Drew, op. cit., p. 335. 505 Halberstam, op. cit., p. 262. 506 Ibid., p. 257. 507 Ibid., p. 256. 508 Drew, op. cit., p. 319; Halberstam, op. cit., p. 253. 509 Madeleine K. Albright, Article 5, Myths of Peacekeeping, Madeleine K. Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 24 June 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 26, 28 June 1993. 510 William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, 19 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1993, Book II, 1 August to 31 December 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 839. 511 See letter to Congress (10 June 1993) informing them of the incident on 5 June and of the use of the US QRF in police actions against Aideed. 512 Op. cit. n. 27, p. 274. 513 Major General William Garrison, Q & A Session, US Military Operations in Somalia. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress Second Session, 12 May 1994, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994, p. 44. 514 Drew, op. cit., pp. 321, 322. 515 Senator John Glenn and Major General William Garrison, Q & A Session, US Military Operations in Somalia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 2. 516 David Malone, interview with the author, New York, June 2002.

196 Notes 517 Senator Paul Sarbanes and Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, Q & A Session, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 October 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 33–36. 518 Senator Paul Sarbanes and Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Q & A Session, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 20 October 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 86, 87. 519 Senator Frank Murkowski, Q & A Session, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 October 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 29. 520 Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, Q & A Session, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 October 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 29. 521 Senator John Glenn and Major General William Garrison, Q & A Session, US Military Operations in Somalia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 2. 522 Senator Sam Nunn, Major General Thomas Montgomery and Major General William Garrison, Q & A Session, US Military Operations in Somalia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, pp. 55, 56. 523 Senator Jesse Helms, Statement, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 19 October 1993, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 3. 524 Johnston and Dagne, op. cit., pp. 192–199; Rosner, op. cit., p. 116. 525 Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, New York: Balantine Books, 1996, p. 149. 526 Caspar W. Weinberger, ‘The Uses of Military Power’, Excerpts from address given to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984, Reproduced in MacKinnon, op. cit., pp. 140–146; Colin L. Powell, ‘US Forces: Challenges Ahead’, Foreign Affairs (1992–1993), vol. 71, no. 4, 32–45. 527 Weiss, op. cit., p. 173; Karen von Hippel, Democracy by Force. U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 176. 528 Daalder, op. cit., pp. 38–39. 529 Ibid. 530 Ibid., p. 38. 531 Luck, op. cit. See also the pragmatic views of Powell’s doctrinal co-founder: Caspar Weinberger, ‘How to Lose a Peacekeeping Force’, Forbes (29 August 1994), vol. 154, no. 5, p. 33. 532 See: US Military Operations in Somalia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994. 533 Major General Thomas Montgomery, Q & A Session, US Military Operations in Somalia, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12 May 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 28.

Notes 197 534 Sokolsky, op. cit., pp. 280, 281; von Hippel, op. cit., p. 177. 535 Kull and Destler, op. cit., pp. 280, 281; Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3–0, Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 September 1993. 536 Berdal, op. cit., p. 48. 537 Ibid. 538 Time, ‘Rwanda: All the Hatred in the World’, 13 June 1994, vol. 143, no. 24, 36, 37. 539 Joseph Mullen, ‘From Colony to Nation: The Implosion of Ethnic Tolerance in Rwanda’, in Igwara, op. cit., p. 25. 540 Tutsis were found to be 14 per cent of the population, and Hutu, 85 per cent. Guy Vassall-Adams, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action (UK and Ireland), Oxford: Oxfam, 1994, p. 8. 541 Fergal Keane, Season of Blood. A Rwandan Journey, London: Penguin, 1995, p. 18. 542 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 9. 543 Ibid., pp. 20, 21. 544 Gourevitch, op. cit., p. 75; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 11. 545 Gourevitch, op. cit., pp. 77, 80, 81; Keane, op. cit., p. 22. 546 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 21; Gourevitch, op. cit., pp. 81, 82. 547 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 21. 548 Ibid., p. 11. 549 Ibid., p. 15. 550 J. Michael Vaccaro, ‘The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda’, in Durch, op. cit., p. 370. 551 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 21; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 12. 552 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 21. 553 Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience. Study 2. Early Warning and Conflict Management, Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996, p. 23. 554 The Economist, ‘France in Africa: Mitterrand’s Muddle’, 27 February 1994, 42. 555 Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., p. 26. 556 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, pp. 23, 24, 27. 557 Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2001, pp. 44, 45. 558 Ibid., p. 25. 559 Ibid. 560 A ‘very very important government official’. Dallaire, Major General Romeo. Facsimile, from Force Commander Dallaire, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Major General Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Request for Protection for informant’, 11 January 1994. 561 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 37; Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., p. 41. See also Paul Lewis, ‘2 Africa Leaders Die, U.N. Says; Rocket May have Downed Plane’, New York Times, 7 April 1994, A1; Keith Richburg, ‘Rwanda Wracked by Ethnic Violence; Rampages Follow President’s Assassination’, Washington Post, 8 April 1994, A01.

198 Notes 562 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 32. See also Keith Richburg, ‘Witnesses Describe Cold Campaign of Killing in Rwanda; Leaders Allegedly Sought to Wipe Out Tutsis’, Washington Post, 8 May 1994, A01. 563 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959–1994. History of a Genocide, London: Hurst & Co., 1995, p. 230. See also Keith Richburg, ‘Rwanda Wracked by Ethnic Violence; Rampages Follow President’s Assassination’, Washington Post, 8 April 1994, A01; William E. Schmidt, ‘Troops Rampage in Rwanda; Dead Said to Include Premier’, New York Times, 8 April 1994, A1. 564 Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., pp. 43, 44. 565 Ibid., p. 41. 566 Prunier, op. cit., p. 231. 567 Ibid., p. 232. 568 See Gourevitch and Keane, op. cit.; African Rights, Left to Die at ETO and Nyanza. The Stories of Rwandese Civilians Abandoned by UN Troops on 11 April 1994, Witness to Genocide, Issue no.13, April 2001. 569 Gourevitch describes the rate as three times that of the Holocaust; however, this rate of killing is wholly dependent on which number one finally ascribes to the genocide. 570 Gourevitch, op. cit., p. 96. See also Roger Winter, ‘Journey into Genocide: A Rwanda Diary’, Washington Post, 5 June 1994, C01. 571 Mark Huband, ‘UN Troops Stand by and Watch Carnage’, Guardian, 12 April 1994; Donatella Lorch, ‘U.N. in Rwanda Says It Is Powerless to Halt the Violence’, New York Times, 15 April 1994, A3. 572 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 44. 573 Ibid., p. 47. 574 Robert D. McFadden, ‘Western Troops Arrive in Rwanda to Aid Foreigners. Evacuations are Begun. The US, France, and Belgium Send Forces as Bloodshed Continues for 3d Day’, New York Times, 10 April 1994, 1. 575 Gourevitch, op. cit. 576 African Rights, op. cit. 577 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, A1. 578 Ibid., p. 55. 579 Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., pp. 54, 55. 580 Gourevitch, op. cit., pp. 158, 161; Adelman and Suhrke, pp. 55, 56. 581 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., pp. 39, 40; Keane, op. cit., p. 95. 582 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 40. 583 Ibid. 584 Ibid., p. 48. 585 Joyce Leader, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’ conducted on 30 September 2003. Available online at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ ghosts/interviews/leader.html; Telex de l’ambassadeur Swinnen du 27 Mars 1992 in Belgian Senate, Commission d’enquete parlementaire concernant les evenements du Rwanda. Report, 6 December 1997, pp. 493–494. Quoted in Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, London: Zed Books, 2004, p. 81. 586 Organization of African Unity, Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, ch. 9, para 9.5. 587 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 25. 588 Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1994/7/ Add.1.

Notes 199 589 Samantha Power, ‘A Problem From Hell’. America and the Age of Genocide, London: Flamingo, 2003, p. 339. 590 Ibid., p. 338. 591 Leon Mugesera, quoted in Gourevitch, op. cit., p. 97. 592 Power, op. cit., p. 343. 593 Ibid., p. 338. 594 Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 9, para 9.5. 595 Vassall-Adams, op. cit., p. 19. 596 Keane, op. cit., p. 19. 597 Quoted in Melvern, op. cit., p. 89. 598 Organization of African Unity, op. cit. para 9.13. 599 Power, op. cit., p. 343. 600 Organization of African Unity, op. cit, ch. 9, para 9.13. 601 Melvern, op. cit., p. 89. 602 Major General Romeo Dallaire, Facsimile, from Force Commander Dallaire, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Major General Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Request for Protection for Informant’, 11 January 1994. 603 Ibid. 604 Ibid. 605 Ibid. 606 Ibid. See also Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted over four days in autumn 2003. Available online at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html. 607 Lieutenant General Romeo, op. cit.; Melvern, op. cit., p. 95. 608 Philip Gourevitch, ‘Annals of Diplomacy. The Genocide Fax. The United Nations was Warned about Rwanda. Did Anyone Care?’, New Yorker Magazine, 11 May 1998, 43. 609 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide, 15 December 1999, p. 11. 610 Iqbal Riza, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html. 611 Melvern, op. cit., p. 91. 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid. 614 Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 9, para 9.13. 615 Power, op. cit., p. 345; United Nations, op. cit., p. 14. 616 United Nations, op. cit., p. 14. 617 Organization of African Unity, op. cit. para 9.13. 618 Ibid. 619 Kuperman, op. cit., p. 101. 620 Ibid., p. 97. 621 Melvern, op. cit., p. 100. 622 Prunier, op. cit., p. 223. 623 Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., p. 38. 624 Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 9, para 9.13. 625 Ibid. 626 Ibid. 627 Prunier, op. cit., p. 223. 628 Theoneste Bagasora, quoted in, Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 9, para 9.13. 629 John Eriksson, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Synthesis Report, Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996, p. 21.

200 Notes 630 Prudence Bushnell, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 30 September 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/ interviews/bushnell.html. 631 Joyce Leader, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 30 September 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/leader.html. 632 Eriksson, op. cit., p. 21. 633 Riza, op. cit. 634 Dallaire, op. cit. 635 Bushnell, op. cit. 636 Alison Des Forges, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 1 October 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/desforges.html. 637 Bushnell, op. cit. 638 George Moose, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 November 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html. 639 Eriksson, op. cit., p. 21. 640 David P. Rawson, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 5 October 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/rawson.html. 641 Kofi Annan, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 17 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/annan.html. 642 Moose, op. cit. 643 Bushnell, op. cit. 644 Riza, op. cit. 645 Albright, op. cit., p. 149. 646 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html; Dallaire, op. cit., Bushnell, op. cit., Moose, op. cit.; John Shattuck, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 16 December 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ shattuck.html. 647 Malone, op. cit. See also Power, op. cit., p. 345. 648 Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 12, para 12.33; Boutros BoutrosGhali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 44. 649 Annan, op. cit. 650 Annan, op. cit.; Riza, op. cit. 651 The Economist, ‘Rwanda: No End in Sight’, 23 April 1994, 44. 652 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html. 653 Riza, op. cit. 654 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html. 655 Riza, op, cit. 656 Ibid. 657 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html; Annan, op. cit. 658 Des Forges, op. cit. 659 Riza, op. cit.

Notes 201 660 661 662 663 664

665 666 667 668

669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688

689 690 691 692 693

Bushnell, op. cit. Ibid. Melvern, op. cit., p. 138. Ibid., p. 139. William J. Clinton, Statement on the Deaths of the Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi, 7 April 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 635. Melvern, op. cit., p. 130; emphasis added. Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 260. Albright, op. cit., p. 149. Document 41, Letter dated 8 April 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the role of UNAMIR in the crisis situation in Rwanda. Not issued as a United Nations Document, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, p. 225. Melvern, op. cit., p. 140; Power, op. cit., p. 354. Melvern, op. cit., p. 131. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, pp. 38, 39. Melvern, op. cit., p. 354. Kuperman, op. cit., p. 32. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., p. 35. Anthony Lake, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 15 December 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html. Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 15, para 15.7. Romeo Dallaire (Lieutenant-General), Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 299. Riza, op. cit. Romeo Dallaire (Lieutenant-General), Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 299. Paul Lewis, ‘U.N. Forces Shelter Thousands In Rwanda’, New York Times, 11 April 1994, A17. Ibid. Ibid. Elaine Sciolino, ‘For West, Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle’, New York Times, 15 April 1994, A3.; Melvern, op. cit., p. 148. Shattuck, op. cit. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, ‘Talking Points on Rwanda/Burundi’, 11 April 1994. Confidential. Ibid. Ibid. African Rights, op. cit., p. 28. Ibid. For example, see the letters to the Security Council contained in Document 47, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting

202 Notes

694 695 696 697 698

699

700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720

similar letters dated 15 April 1994 to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium recommending the suspension of UNAMIR and conveying the decision of the Belgian government to immediately withdraw the Belgian battalion, S/1994/446, 15 April 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 261. Adelman and Suhrke, op. cit., p. 45. Moose, op. cit. Ibid. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, p. 40. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Evacuation of United States Citizens From Rwanda and Burundi, 12 April 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 678. Document 45, Letter dated 13 April from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning developments, which may necessitate the withdrawal of UNAMIR. Not issued as a United Nations Document, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, p. 259. See also ‘U.N. Considers Pulling Troops Out of Rwanda’, Washington Post. 14 April 1994, A26. David Lord Hannay, Channel Four News, 7 p.m., 3 April 2004. Melvern, op. cit., p. 153. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 117. Melvern, op. cit., p. 159. Ibid., p. 160. United Nations, op. cit., p. 21; Melvern, op. cit., pp. 161, 163. Melvern, op. cit., p. 162. Elaine Sciolino, ‘For West, Rwanda Is Not Worth the Political Candle’, New York Times, 15 April 1994, A3. US Department of State, cable no. 099440, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal’, 15 April 1994. Confidential. Ibid. Albright, op. cit., p. 150. Madeleine Albright, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 25 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html. Ibid. Romeo Dallaire (Lieutenant-General), Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 195. Melvern, op. cit., p. 166. Des Forges, op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. United Nations, op. cit., pp. 21, 22. Document 48, Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, containing a summary of the developing crisis in Rwanda and proposing three options for the role of the United Nations in Rwanda. S/1994/470, 20 April 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 263.

Notes 203 721 Melvern, op. cit., p. 172. 722 Document 48, Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, containing a summary of the developing crisis in Rwanda and proposing three options for the role of the United Nations in Rwanda. S/1994/470, 20 April 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 263. 723 Jacques-Rogers Booh Booh, quoted in ‘U.N. Force Nears Collapse in Chaotic Rwanda’, Washington Post, 21 April 1994, A26. 724 Ibid. 725 Annan, op. cit. 726 Mr Ayewah (Nigeria), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3368th Meeting, Thursday, 21 April 1994, 9.35 p.m., New York, S/PV.3368, p. 3. 727 Organization of African Unity, op. cit., ch. 15, para 15.35. 728 Des Forges, op. cit. 729 United Nations Security Council Resolution 912 (1994), 21 April 1994. 730 Albright, op. cit., p. 151. 731 United Nations Security Council Resolution 912 (1994), 21 April 1994; Melvern, op. cit., p. 173. 732 Dallaire, op. cit. 733 Julia Preston, ‘Death Toll in Rwanda is Said to Top 100,000; U.N. Votes to Pull Out Most Peacekeepers’, Washington Post, 22 April 1994, A01. 734 ‘Cold Choices in Rwanda’, New York Times, 23 April 1994, p. 24; Melvern, op. cit., p. 174. 735 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary’, 22 April 1994. Non-classified. 736 Ibid. 737 Human Rights Watch/Africa. Genocide in Rwanda, April–May 1994, vol. 6, no. 4. Available at 129.194.252.80/catfiles/2502.pfd. 738 Mark Doyle, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 12 December 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ doyle.html; ‘Cold Choices in Rwanda’, New York Times, 23 April 1994, 24. 739 Michael Binyon, ‘Oxfam Warning of Rwanda Genocide’, The Times, 29 April 1994; Melvern, op. cit., pp. 176, 177. 740 Ibid., pp. 177 & 181. 741 Ibid., pp. 181, 182. 742 Power, op. cit., pp. 359, 362. 743 MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 108. 744 Shattuck, op. cit. 745 Ibid. 746 Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas J. Bennet, and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad K. Harper, through Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, ‘Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?’, 21 May 1994. Confidential. 747 ‘US Aides Avoid Labelling Horror’, New York Times, 10 June 1994, A1. 748 Ibid. 749 Power, op. cit., p. 361. 750 Melvern, op. cit., p. 181. 751 The Economist, ‘Politics and Current Affairs’, 30 April 1994, 6; Melvern, op. cit., p. 178.

204 Notes 752 Document 54, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Council re-examine the revised mandate given to UNAMIR in Resolution 912 (1994) and consider what action it could take in order to restore law and order in Rwanda and end the massacres, S/1994/518, 29 April 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, p. 270. 753 Ibid., p. 271. 754 Melvern, op. cit., p. 181. 755 Hannay, op. cit. 756 Mr Keating (New Zealand), President, United Nations Security Council. Forty-ninth Year, 3371st Meeting, Saturday, 30 April 1994, 12.30 a.m., New York, S/PV.3371, p. 2. 757 Ibid. 758 Melvern, op. cit., p. 187. 759 Human Rights Watch/Africa, op. cit. 760 Paul Lewis, ‘US Examiner Was to Assist Rwanda Without Troops. Direct Action Rejected. Officials May Request African Neighbors to Intervene to Stop Ethnic Killings’, New York Times, 1 May 1994, 1; Martin Walker, ‘US Ready to Finance Peace but Won’t Send Troops’, The Guardian, 2 May 1994; ‘Horror in Rwanda, Shame in the U.N’, New York Times, 3 May 1994, A22. 761 Shattuck, op. cit. 762 Rawson, op. cit. 763 Ibid. 764 Bushnell, op. cit. 765 Human Rights Watch/Africa, op. cit.; Shattuck, op. cit. 766 Discussion Paper, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, 1 May 1994. Confidential. 767 Ibid. 768 Melvern, op. cit., p. 190. 769 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 135. 770 Lake, op. cit.; Vaccaro, op. cit., p. 378. 771 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, National Security Council, ‘Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts’, 5 May 1994. Confidential. 772 Melvern, op. cit., p. 192. 773 Ibid., p. 193. 774 Keith Richburg, ‘Witnesses Describe Cold Campaign of Killing in Rwanda; Leaders Allegedly Sought to Wipe Out Tutsis’, Washington Post, 8 May 1994, A01. 775 William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange With Reporters, 22 July 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995; p. 1299, ‘US Discusses Peace Effort’, New York Times, 11 May 1994, A9; Power, op. cit., p. 378. 776 US Department of State, cable no. 127262, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Rwanda: Security Council Discussions’, 13 May 1994. Confidential. 777 Romeo Dallaire (Lieutenant-General), Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 395. 778 United Nations, op. cit., p. 25. 779 Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, ‘Rwanda

Notes 205

780 781

782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804

Interagency Telecon’, drafted by Lt. Col. Michael Harvin, c 11 May 1994. Confidential. Ibid. Document 61, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, noting that for UNAMIR to provide safe conditions for persons in need and to assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the mission would need to be expanded to at least 5,500 troops and to be rapidly deployed, S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, pp. 277–282. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 135. US Department of State, cable no. 127262, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Rwanda: Security Council Discussions’, 13 May 1994. Confidential. Ibid. Mr Inderfurth (United States of America), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, p. 13. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 135. Power, op. cit., p. 376. Robert Dole, quoted in Elaine Sciolino, ‘For West, Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle’, New York Times, 15 April 1994, A3. Mr Bicamumpaka (Rwanda), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, pp. 2–6. Mr Kovanda (Czech Republic), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, p. 15. Ibid., pp. 15, 16. Ibid., p. 16. Mr Merimee (France), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, p. 11. Draft Legal Analysis, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, drafted by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Joan Donoghue, 16 May 1994. Confidential. Ibid. Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom) and Mr Inderfurth (United States of America), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, pp. 12, 13. Mr Inderfurth (United States of America), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, 11.10 p.m., New York, S/PV.3377, p. 13. United Nations Security Council Resolution 918 (1994), 17 May 1994. Melvern, op. cit., p. 198. Douglas Jehl, ‘US is Showing a New Caution on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions’, New York Times, 18 May 1994, A1; The Economist, ‘Saving Rwandan Lives’, 21 May 1994, 15, 16; Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 136. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 136. Madeleine Albright, quoted in Douglas Jehl, ‘US is Showing a New Caution on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions’, New York Times, 18 May 1994, A1. Douglas Jehl, ‘US is Showing a New Caution on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions’, New York Times, 18 May 1994, A1. Document 64, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, reporting on the political mission he sent to Rwanda to move the warring

206 Notes

805

806

807 808 809

810 811

812 813 814 815

816 817

818 819 820

parties towards a cease-fire and recommending that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized for an initial period of six months. S/1994/640, 31 May 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, pp. 290–297. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Toby T. Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad Harper, ‘Rwanda–Geneva Convention Violations’, c.18 May 1994. Confidential/ORCON. Paul Lewis, ‘US Opposes Plan for U.N. Force in Rwanda’, New York Times, 12 May 1994, A9; The Economist, ‘Saving Rwandan Lives’, 21 May 1994, 15, 16; US Department of State, cable no. 127262, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Rwanda: Security Council Discussions’, 13 May 1994. Confidential; Moose, op. cit. Moose, op. cit., Shattuck, op. cit. Moose, op. cit. William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange With Reporters, 22 July 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 1299. Julia Preston, ‘U.N. Chief Denounces Response to Rwanda; “Failure” Laid to World Body, Top Members’, Washington Post, 26 May 1994, A33. Document 64, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, reporting on the political mission he sent to Rwanda to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire and recommending that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized for an initial period of six months, S/1994/640, 31 May 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997 p. 296. Ibid., p. 297. United Nations Security Council Resolution 925 (1994), 8 June 1994; Paul Lewis, ‘US Agrees to Deployment of U.N. Force in Rwanda’, New York Times, 8 June 1994, A12. The Economist, ‘Saving Rwandan Lives’, 21 May 1994, 15, 16. Document 68, Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, suggesting that the Council consider France’s offer to undertake a multinational operation to assure the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to strength, S/1994/728, 20 June 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, p. 305. United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3392nd Meeting, Wednesday, 22 June 1994, 1 p.m., New York, S/PV.3392, pp. 2–4, 7, 10–11. Document 68, Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, suggesting that the Council consider France’s offer to undertake a multinational operation to assure the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to strength, S/1994/728, 20 June 1994, The United Nations and Rwanda. 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997, pp. 304–306. Madeleine Albright (United States of America), United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3392nd Meeting, Wednesday, 22 June 1994, 1 p.m., New York, S/PV.3392, p. 7. United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 (1994), 22 June 1994; Marlise Simon, ‘France is Sending Force to Rwanda to Help Civilians’, New York Times, 23 July 1994, A1. United Nations Security Council, Forty-ninth Year, 3392nd Meeting, Wednesday, 22 June 1994, 1 p.m., New York, S/PV.3392, p. 5.

Notes 207 821 For a summary of the above see The Economist, ‘Who Will Save Rwanda?’, 25 June 1994, 13, 14. 822 Melvern, op. cit. 823 Romeo Dallaire (Lieutenant-General), Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 422. 824 Melvern, op. cit., p. 212. 825 Sam Kiley, ‘Injured Tutsi Stagger from Forest Hideouts; Rwanda’, The Times, 1 July 1994. 826 Melvern, op. cit., p. 214. 827 Power, op. cit., p. 381. 828 Anthony Lewis, ‘World Without Power’, New York Times, 25 July 1994, A15. 829 Julia Preston, ‘U.N. Says Troops Are Needed Now For Planned Rwanda Peace Mission’, Washington Post, 29 July 1994, A30; Chris McGreal, Ian Katz and Ian Black, ‘Clinton Announces “Massive and Immediate” Aid Increase’, Guardian, 23 July 1994. 830 Riza, op. cit. 831 Lake, op. cit. 832 Melvern, op. cit., p. 219. 833 William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange With Reporters, 22 July 1994, Public Papers of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, 1994, Book I – 1 January to 31 July 1994, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 1298. 834 Eriksson, op. cit., p. 21. 835 See e.g. Power, op. cit., p. 356; collected articles from both the New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian and The Times, of which there are simply too many to be reproduced here. 836 Bushnell, op. cit.; Human Rights Watch/Africa, op. cit. 837 Lake, op. cit.; Albright, op. cit., p. 149. 838 Albright, op. cit. 839 Ibid. 840 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html. 841 Eriksson, op. cit., p. 21. 842 United Nations, op. cit., p. 41. 843 Riza, op. cit. 844 Malone, op. cit. 845 United Nations, op. cit., p. 36. 846 The Economist, ‘Helpless’, 23 July 1994, 15. 847 Bushnell, op. cit. 848 Power, op. cit., p. 366. 849 Michael Sheehan, interview for PBS ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 30 September and 1 October 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/ghosts/interviews/sheehan.html. 850 United Nations, op. cit., p. 39. 851 ‘US Aides Avoid Labelling Horror’, New York Times, 10 June 1994, A8. 852 Eriksson, op. cit., p. 21. 853 Richard Holbrooke, quoted by Annan, op. cit. 854 Sheehan, op. cit. 855 United Nations, op. cit., p. 41. 856 Lake, op. cit.; Soderberg, op. cit. 857 Madeleine Albright, interview for PSB ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 25 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html.

208 Notes 858 Albright, op. cit., p. 152. 859 Ibid. 860 Madeleine Albright, interview for PSB ‘Frontline’, Conducted on 25 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html; Albright, p. 154. 861 Elaine Sciolino, ‘For West, Rwanda is not Worth the Political Candle’, New York Times, 15 April 1994, A3. 862 United Nations, op. cit., p. 50. 863 Luck, op. cit. 864 Albright, op. cit., p. 152. 865 Sheehan, op. cit. 866 Malone, op. cit. 867 Malone, op. cit. 868 ABC, October 1993. 869 Luck, op. cit.

Bibilography

Documents General Congressional Hearings (Senate and House of Representatives). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. William J. Clinton. United Nations Security Council Minutes. U.S. Department of State Dispatch.

Specific Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas J. Bennet, and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad K. Harper, through Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and UnderSecretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, ‘Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?’, 21 May 1994. Confidential. Dallaire, Major General Romeo, Facsimile, from Force Commander Dallaire, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Major General Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Request for Protection for informant’, 11 January 1994. Discussion Paper, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, 1 May 1994. Confidential. Draft Legal Analysis, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, drafted by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Joan Donoghue, 16 May 1994. Confidential. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Toby T. Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad Harper, ‘Rwanda–Geneva Convention Violations’, c.18 May 1994. Confidential/ORCON. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, ‘Talking Points on Rwanda/Burundi’, 11 April 1994. Confidential. Memorandum from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to Deputy Assistant to

210 Bibliography the President for National Security, National Security Council, ‘Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts’, May 5, 1994. Confidential. Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, ‘Rwanda Interagency Telecon’, drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Harvin, c.11 May 1994. Confidential. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary’, 22 April 1994. Non-classified. US Department of State, cable no. 099440, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal’, 15 April 1994. Confidential. US Department of State, cable no. 127262, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, ‘Rwanda: Security Council Discussions’, 13 May 1994. Confidential.

Books Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, Fiasco in Somalia, Occasional Paper No. 61, Pretoria: Institute of South Africa, 1995. Albright, Madeleine K., Madam Secretary. A Memoir, London: Macmillan, 2003. Almond, Gabriel, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Greenwood Press, 1977. Alterman, Eric F., Who Speaks for America? Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Ambrose, Stephen E. and Brinkley, Douglas G., Rise to Globalism. American Foreign Policy Since 1938, London: Penguin Books, 1997. Bacchus, William I., The Price of American Foreign Policy. Congress, the Executive, and International Affairs Funding, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Bagdikian, Ben H., The Media Monopoly, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1997. Bennis, Phyllis, Calling the Shots. How Washington Dominates Today’s UN, New York: Olive Branch Press, 2000. Beshloss, Michael R., ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy’, in Wilson, Rober. A. (ed.), Power and the Presidency, Public Affairs, New York, 1999. Blackman, Ann, Seasons of Her Life, New York: Scribner, 1998. Blumenthal, Sidney, The Clinton Wars: An Insider’s Account of the White House Years, London: Penguin, 2004. Bolger, Daniel P., Savage Peace. Americans at War in the 1990s, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Unvanquished. A U.S.–U.N. Saga, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999. Brennan, Mary C., Turning Right in the Sixties. The Conservative Capture of the GOP, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. Brubaker, Roger, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Brune, Lester H., The United States and Post Cold War Intervention, Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998. Calvoressi, Peter, World Politics Since 1945, London: Longman, 1996. Clarke, Jonathan and Clad, James, After the Crusade. American Foreign Policy for the Post-superpower Age, Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995. Cohen, Bernard C., The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973.

Bibliography

211

Converse, Philip, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in Apter, David. E. Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press, 1964. Cox, Michael, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Superpower Without a Mission?, London: Pinter, 1995. Crabb, Cecil V. Jr., Antizzo, Glenn, J. and Sarieddine, Leila E., Congress and the Foreign Policy Process. Modes of Legislative Behavior, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. Crozier, Michael J., Huntington, Samuel P. and Watanuki, Joji, The Crisis of Democracy, New York: New York University Press, 1975. Daalder, Ivo H., ‘The Clinton Administration and Multilateral Peace Operations’, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Washington, DC: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1994. Daalder, Ivo H., ‘Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping’, in Durch, William S. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1997. Dallaire, Romeo, Shake Hands With the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003. Drew, Elizabeth, On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Drew, Elizabeth, Showdown. The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Drew, Elizabeth, Whatever it Takes. The Real Struggle for Political Power in America, New York: Viking, 1997. Durch, William J., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1997. Durch, William J., ‘Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and State Building in Somalia’, in Durch, William J. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s. London: Macmillan, 1997. Durch, William J. and Shear, James A., ‘Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Durch, William J. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1997. Edwards, Lee, The Conservative Revolution. The Movement that Remade America, New York: Free Press, 1999. Foley, Michael, ‘Clinton and Congress’, in Herrnson, Paul S. and Hill, Dilys M. The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–1996, London: Macmillan, 1999. Fraser, T.G. and Murray, D., America and the World Since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Gourevitch, Philip, We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families. Stories from Rwanda, London: Picador, 1999. Graham, Thomas W., ‘Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making’, in Deese, David A. The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994. Halberstam, David, War in a Time of Peace. Bush, Clinton and the Generals, New York: Scribner, 2001. Hames, Tim, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Herrnson, Paul S. and Hill, Dilys M., The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–96, London: Macmillan, 1999. Hamilton, Nigel, Bill Clinton: An American Journey: Great Expectations, London: Arrow Books, 2004. Hastedt, Glenn P., American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000.

212 Bibliography Hendriksen, Thomas H., Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, Stanford, CT: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace/Stanford University Press, 1996. Hendrikson, Ryan C., The Clinton Wars. The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002. Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media, London: Vintage, 1994. Herrnson, Paul S. and Hill, Dilys M., The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–96, London: Macmillan, 1999. Hersman, Rebecca K.C., Friends and Foes. How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2000. Hirsh, John L. and Oakley, Robert B., Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. Holsti, Ole R., Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. Howe, Jonathan T., ‘Relations Between the United States and United Nations in Dealing With Somalia’, in Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey, Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997. Hyland, William G., Clinton’s World. Remaking American Foreign Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Igwara, Obi, Ethnic Hatred. Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN, 1995. Johnston, Harry and Dagne, Ted, ‘Congress and the Somalia Crisis’, in Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffry, Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Intervention, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997. Kamukama, Dixon, Rwanda Conflict. Its Roots and Regional Implications, Kampala: Fountain Press, 1993. Keane, Fergal, Season of Blood. A Rwandan Journey, London: Penguin, 1995. Kegley, Charles W. and Wittkopf, Eugene R., American Foreign Policy, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996. Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Kennan, George F., At a Centuries Ending. Reflections 1982–1995, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Koopman, Douglas L., Hostile Takeover. The House Republican Party, 1980–1995, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. Kull, Steven and Destler, I.M., Misreading the Public. The Myth of a New Isolationism, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Kuperman, Alan J., The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Lewis, Ioan M., Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society, Discussion Paper No. 6, London: The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 1995. Lindsay, James M., Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion, New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1991. Loch K. Johnson, America as a World Power: Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework, New York: McGraw Hill, 1995.

Bibliography

213

Lyons, Terence and Samatar, Ahmed I., Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995. MacKinnon, Michael G., The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton. A Fairweather Friend?, London: Frank Cass. 2000. McSweeney, Dean and Owens, John E., The Republican Takeover of Congress, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Makinda, Samuel M., Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993. Mann, Thomas E., A Question of Balance. The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1990. Melvern, Linda R., A People Betrayed. The role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, London: Zed Books, 2004. Morgenthau, Hans J., In Defense of the National Interest. A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, New York: Knopf, 1951. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: McGraw Hill, 1993. Mullen, Joseph, ‘From Colony to Nation: The Implosion of Ethnic Tolerance in Rwanda’, in Igwara, Obi Ethnic Hatred. Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN, 1995. Page, Benjamin I. and Shapiro, Robert Y., The Rational Public. Fifty Years of Trends in America’s Foreign Policy Preferences, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pottier, Johan, ‘Representations of Ethnicity in Post-genocide Writings in Rwanda’, in Igwara, Obi Ethnic Hatred. Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN, 1995. Powell, Colin L., My American Journey, New York: Balantine Books, 1996. Power, Samantha, ‘A Problem From Hell’. America and the Age of Genocide, London: Flamingo, 2003. Prunier, Gerard, The Rwanda Crisis. 1959–1994. History of a Genocide, London: Hurst & Co., 1995. Quester, George H., ‘Defense Policy’, in Herrnson, Paul S., The Clinton Presidency. The First Term, 1992–96, London: Macmillan, 1999. Ramet, Sabrina Petra, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996. Richburg, Keith B., Out of America. A Black Man Confronts Africa, San Diego: Harcourt & Brace, 1998. Robinson, Mary, A Voice for Somalia, Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1992. Rosenau, James N., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, 1969. Russet, Bruce, Controlling the Sword. The Democratic Governance of National Security, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. Sahnoun, Mohamed, Somalia. The Missed Opportunities, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Imperial Presidency, London: André Deutsch, 1974. Semujanga, Josias, Origins of Rwandan genocide, Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003. Shawcross, William, Deliver Us From Evil. Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict, London: Bloomsbury, 2000. Shapiro, Robert Y and Page, Benjamin I., ‘Foreign Policy and Public Opinion’, in Deese, David A. The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994.

214 Bibliography Simons, Geoff, The United Nations. A Chronology of Conflict, London: Macmillan, 1994. Small, Melvin, Democracy and Diplomacy. The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Steel, Ronald, Temptations of a Superpower, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Stevenson, Jonathan, Losing Mogadishu. Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Thompson, Kenneth, ‘The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy; The Policy Paper’, in Muskie, Edmund S., Rush, Kenneth and Thompson, Kenneth W. The President, The Congress and Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Vaccaro, J. Michael, ‘The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda’, in Durch, William J., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1997. Von Hippel, Karen, Democracy by Force. U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Wahlgren, Eric Lars, ‘Start and End of Srebrenica’, in Bierman, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. Walker, Martin, The President They Deserve, London: Vintage, 1997. Warshaw, Shirley Anne, The Clinton Years, New York: Checkmark Books, 2005. Weinberger, Caspar W., ‘The Uses of Military Power’. Excerpts from address given to the National Press Club, Washington, DC: 28 November 1984, reproduced in MacKinnon, Michael G. The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton. A Fairweather Friend?, London: Frank Cass, 2000. Wittkopf, Eugene, Faces of Internationalism. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990.

Articles Badsey, Stephen. ‘The Media and UN Peacekeeping Since the Gulf War’, Journal of Conflict Studies, 1997, vol. 17, no. 1. Berdal, Mats R. ‘Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, 1994, vol. 36, no. 1. Caspary, William R. ‘The “Mood-Theory”: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, The American Political Science Review, 1970, vol. 64. Crocker, Chester A. ‘The Lessons of Somalia. Not Everything Went Wrong’, Foreign Affairs, 1995, vol. 74, no. 3. Deibel, Terry L., ‘Clinton and Congress. The Politics of Foreign Policy’, Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, 2000, no. 321. Dole, Bob. ‘Shaping America’s Global Future’, Foreign Policy, 1995, no. 98. Eban, Abba. ‘The U.N. Idea Revisited’, Foreign Affairs, 1995, vol. 74, no. 5. Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. ‘Intervention and Intrasensitivity. Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad’, World Politics, 1995, vol. 47. Greenberger, Robert S. ‘Dateline Capital Hill: The New Majority’s Foreign’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101. Helms, Jesse. ‘Saving the U.N. A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General’, Foreign Affairs, 1996, vol. 75, no. 5.

Bibliography

215

Hendrickson, David C. ‘The Recovery of Internationalism’, Foreign Affairs, 1994, vol. 73, no. 5. Hirsh, Michael. ‘The Fall Guy. Washington’s Self-defeating Assault on the U.N.’, Foreign Affairs, 1999, vol. 78, no. 6. Jacobs, Lawrence R. ‘The Recoil Effect. Public Opinion and Policymaking in the U.S. and Britain’, Comparative Politics, 1992, no. 24. Kohut, Andrew and Toth, Robert C. ‘Arms and the People’, Foreign Affairs, 1994, vol. 73, no. 6. Kull, Steven. ‘What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn’t’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101. Mandelbaum, Michael. ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs, 1996, vol. 75, no. 1. Maynes, Charles William. ‘A Workable Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, 1993–1994, no. 93. Menkhaus, Ken. ‘Getting Out vs. Getting Through: U.S. and U.N. Policies in Somalia’, Middle East Policy, 1994, vol. 1. Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. ‘Constituency Influence in Congress’, The American Political Science Review, 1963, no. 57. Moore, William H. and Hanour, David J. ‘Domestic Politics and US Foreign Policy: A Study of Cold War Conflict Behavior’, Journal of Politics, 2003. Available at www.fsu.edu/~polisci/whsp–papers/working papers/p_20023wmoore.pdf. Powell, Colin L. ‘US Forces: Challenges Ahead’, Foreign Affairs, 1992–1993, vol. 71, no. 4. Reilly, John E. ‘Americans and the World: A Survey at Century’s End’, Foreign Policy, 1999, no. 114. Rosner, Jeremy D. ‘The Know-nothings Know Something’, Foreign Policy, 1995–1996, no. 101. Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. ‘Back to the Womb? Isolationism’s Renewed Threat’, Foreign Affairs, 1995, vol. 77, no. 4. Sokolsky, Joel J. ‘Great Ideals and Uneasy Compromises: The United States Approach to Peacekeeping’, International Journal, 1995, L2. Stedman, Stephen John. ‘The New Interventionists’, Foreign Affairs, 1992–1993, vol. 72, no. 1. Weiss, Thomas G. ‘Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – “Operation Rekindle Hope”?’, Global Governance, 1995, vol. 1, no. 2.

Interviews Albright, Madeleine. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 25 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html. Annan, Kofi. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 17 February 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/annan.html. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 21 January 2004. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali. html. Bushnell, Prudence. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 30 September 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/bushnell.html.

216 Bibliography Dallaire, Lieutenant General Romeo. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted over four days in autumn 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html. Des Forges, Alison. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 1 October 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/desforges.html. Hannay, David Lord. Channel Four News, 3 April 2004. Lake, Anthony. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 15 December 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ lake.html. Leader, Joyce. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 30 September 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ leader.html. Luck, Edward. Interview, Columbia University, New York. Conducted in June 2002. Malone, David. Interview. International Peace Academy, New York. Conducted in June 2002. Moose, George. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 21 November 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ moose.html. Rawson, David P. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 5 October 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ rawson.html. Riza, Iqbal. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html. Shattuck, John. Interview for PBS ‘Frontline’. Conducted on 16 December 2003. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/shattuck.html. Soderberg, Nancy. Interview, New York. Conducted in June 2002.

Reports Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience. Study 2. Early Warning and Conflict Management, Copenhagen: Steering Committee if the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996. Africa Watch, Somalia Beyond the Warlords. The Need for a verdict on Human Rights, 7 March 1993. Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Somalia. No Mercy in Mogadishu. The Human Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle for Relief, 26 March 1992, New York and Boston. African Rights, Left to Die at ETO and Nyanza. The Stories of Rwandese Civilians Abandoned by UN Troops on 11 April 1994, Witness to Genocide, Issue No.13, April 2001. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Introduction to The United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996. Blue Book Series, Volume VIII, New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1996. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, New York: Department of Public Information, 1996/1997.

Bibliography

217

Bradbury, Mark, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9, October 1993, Oxford: Oxfam (UK and Ireland), 1994. Eriksson, John, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Sythesis Report, Copenhagan: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 1996. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Genocide in Rwanda, April–May 1994, vol. 6, no. 4. Available at 129.194.252.80/catfiles/2502.pfd. Ndiaye, Bacre Waly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Execution, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1. Organisation of African Unity, Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Vassall-Adams, Guy, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action, Oxford: Oxfam (UK and Ireland), 1994. United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide, 15 December 1999. United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia. Reference Paper, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 30 April 1993.

Newspapers/news magazines Economist, The. Selected articles. Forbes. Selected articles. Guardian. Selected articles. New Yorker Magazine. Selected articles. New York Times. Selected articles. Time. Selected articles. Times, The. Selected articles. Washington Post. Selected articles.

Polling organizations Americans Talk Issues Foundation (ATIF). Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR). Gallup. Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). The Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press/The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. UNA–USA/Wirthlin Worldwide. Zogby International.

Media polls ABC News. CBS/New York Times. CNN/USA Today. LA Times. NBC.

218 Bibliography Newsweek. Time/CNN.

Media Channel Four News, 3 April 2004, 7 p.m.

Index

Ackerman, Gary 73 Africa Watch 133 Aideed, Mohammed Farah 17, 34, 40–2, 59, 90, 92–4, 97–8, 100–7, 110, 112–14 Albright, Madeleine 29, 35–6, 38, 39, 44–5, 52, 58; Bosnia 38, 44–5; concerns on peacekeeping 41, 52; naivety 55; optimism for multilateralism and humanitarian intervention 29, 35–6, 170; retreat from peace operations 52, 55; Rwanda 140, 148–9, 156, 158–9, 165; Somalia 36, 38, 39, 103–4, 112; US Ambassador to UN 35–6, 55, 95, 101, 113, 115 Americans Talk Issues Foundation (ATIF) 11–13, 20 Amin, Idi 125 Amnesty International 133 Annan, Kofi 71, 95, 135; Rwanda 135, 139, 142–4, 148; Somalia 95; UN reform 71; Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping 95, 135 Aspin, Les 4, 113 Balkan conflict see Bosnia Baril, Maurice (Major General) 134–5, 142, 150, 158 Barre, Siad 39, 90 Belgium 123–4, 129, 136–7, 140, 144, 146–7, 167; blamed for death of Habyarimana 128; colonizers 124; deaths of peacekeepers 143; military advisors 137; military office 135 Berdal, Mats R. 2, 120 Bereuter, Doug 77 Biden, Joseph 76 Bir, Cevik (General) 99, 106

‘Black Hawk Down’ incident 41–2, 102–7 Booh-Booh, Jacques-Rogers 127, 135, 146, 149 Bosnia 43; background to conflict 43, Clinton policy 31, 38, 44–6, 47, 48–50, 54, 56–7; Dayton 50; ‘lift and strike’ 46, outbreak of war 43–4; Safe Areas 47–8; Somalia 48–50; UN arms embargo 43; UNCRO 46; UNPROFOR 44, 46–8, 50; UNPROFOR-BH 46; US troop contributions 49–50; Vance–Owen plan 45–6; Vietnam comparisons 49 Bosnian Muslims 45–6, 48, 50 Bosnian Serbs 44–5, 48 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 7, 39, 46, 48, 71, 73; Bosnia 46, 48; personal attacks on 73; Rwanda 131, 142–4, 147, 149, 150, 153–9, 164, 167, 173; SecretaryGeneral of UN 93, 95–7, 131, 143, 149, 150, 153, 156, 159, 163; Somalia 39, 71, 93–7, 103–4; UN reforms 7, 163 Burundi 123–5, 128, 131–2, 134, 140, 142, 146, 155, 162, 163 Bush, George H.W. 2, 31, 37, 39, 63, 66, 74, 76–7; Congressional support for Somalia 39; Gulf War (1990) 108, 122; New World Order 2; Panama 108; UN peacekeeping review 117 Bushnell, Prudence 137–9, 143, 149, 152, 154, 161, 163 Byrd, Robert 78–9, 82–3, 86 Callahan, Sonny 84 CARE 91 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 135 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 11, 14–15, 19

220 Index Christopher, Warren 29, 35, 38, 42, 46, 48, 52, 113, 148; Secretary of State 29, 35, 42, 46; Somalia 103; Rwanda 148 Claes, Wily 143 Claibourne, Pell 76 Clinton Administration 29; blaming UN 58–61; Bosnia 37–8, 40–1, 44–9, 50, 54, 56, 81, 103; campaign rhetoric 31–3; command and control of US forces in Somalia 50–61, 80, 84–5, 112–14; Congress 75–82; early administration stance 33–8; early positivity 30–8; naivety 53–8; policy change 51; Rwanda 123; Somalia 39–43, 89; US/UN responsibility for Somalia mandate 58–61, 84–5, 112–14 Clinton, Bill: Bosnia 37–8, 40–1, 44–9, 50, 54, 56, 81, 103; Congressional pressure on 9, 63, 64, 78, 116, 141; multilateralism as scapegoat 30, 72; optimism over multilateralism and peacekeeping 8, 29, 31, 33–4, 95, 117, 120; presidential campaign (1992) 30–2, 51, 53, 55, 86, 107; Rwanda 141, 144, 147–8, 154–8, 161–2, 166; shift away from peacekeeping and multilateralism 3–4, 30, 41–2, 49, 53, 56, 60, 61–2, 89, 109, 113, 120, 123, 169–73; Somalia 37–8, 40–1, 50, 56, 59, 60–1, 73, 79, 80, 89, 90, 94–6, 101–3, 107, 113–14, 116, 120, 171 Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) 126–7, 134, 136 Cold War 2–5, 27, 29, 30, 32, 52, 63, 69, 174; impact on peacekeeping and multilateralism 140; legacy 27, 32, 63; policy shift to domestic issues 121; post-Cold War optimism and attitudes 2–3, 30, 52, 56, 63–5, 77, 85, 117, 119, 121–2, 125 command and control of US forces in Somalia 58–61 Concern (Ireland) 91 Congress 63; 103rd Congress and Clinton Administration 75–82; action in face of Rwandan genocide 114–16, 156–7; command and control issues in 82–4; conservatism and multilateralism 68–72; conservatives and foreign and international organizations 69–70; Contract with

America 67, 87; cost of multilateralism 82–4; increased conservatism 64–8; misconception regarding UN command and control in Somalia 80, 84–5; National Security Revitalization Act 82; Peace Powers Act 81; responsibility for policy change 85–8; Rwanda 156–7; Somalia 79–81; UN as political posturing tool 72–5 conservatism of Congress 64–8 Contract with America 81 Croatia 43–4 Dallaire, Romeo (Major General) 127–8, 130–1, 134–8, 141–2, 144–6, 149, 150, 153, 158–60; call for reinforcements 130; command of UNAMIR 127; fax to DPKO 134; first report to DPKO 144; ‘inside out’ plan 158; meeting with Kagame 153; Operation Turquoise 160; plans to raid arms caches 135; on racism towards Africa 138; report to DPKO of target lists 136; tipped off by government official 128; warning of planned massacres 134 Dayton Peace Accords (Bosnia) 50 De Fazio, Peter 80 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 144–5 Delta Force 40, 102–3, 105, 106, 113, 114 Department of Defense (DoD) 112 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 40, 48; Dallaire fax to 134, 142; disagreement with Belgium over UNAMIR withdrawal 148; post-Cold War overstretch 163–4; Rwanda 134–6, 142, 145–6, 148–9, 162–4, Somalia 40; support for withdrawal of UNAMIR 148 Des Forges, Alison 149, 151 disappointment of expectations 119–20 Domenici, Pete 83 Dole, Robert 9, 66, 70–3, 76, 78–9, 81, 83–4, 156; against US involvement in Rwanda 156–7; attacks on BoutrosGhali 73; critical of Clinton’s judgement 73; foreign policy matters during presidential campaign (1996) 71; multilateralism as threat to US interests 72; opposition to UN 70–1, 83–4; Peace Powers Act 81

Index Doyle, Mark 151 Drew, Elizabeth 113 Eagleburger, Laurence 93 Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO) 146 Egypt 123, 151, 167 enlargement 2, 51–2 Ethiopia 91 ethnic cleansing 16, 31, 36, 130, 134, 136–8, 144–6, 158; planned ethnic cleansing in Rwanda 136–7, 146, 153 European Community 44, 46 Executive Branch see Clinton Administration explaining international inaction during Rwandan genocide (1994) 161–6 Feingold, Russ 80 France 37, 47; arms shipment to interim government in Rwanda 144; Bosnia 37, 47; evacuation team in Rwanda 146; French humanitarian zone (Rwanda) 129, Operation Turquoise 131; Rwanda 123, 126, 129, 131, 140, 144, 146, 151, 153, 157, 159, 171; support for government in Rwanda 126, 140, 167, 171 Gambari, Ibrahim 147, 148 Gardener, Richard 32 Garrison, William (Major General) 102, 104, 106, 114, 115 genocide 1, 3, 6, 7–8, 16, 17, 31, 35–6; 1948 Genocide Convention 151–3, 157, 164; first use of term in relation to Rwandan by RPF 147; Gikondo massacre 144; and international community 124, 140, 156, 164, 166; Human Rights Watch use the term for Rwanda 149; US government officials to avoid the term in relation to Rwanda 151; US guilt at in relation to Rwanda 161; US State Department document on in relation to Rwanda 157 Gephart, Richard 79 Gilman, Benjamin 73, 77–9, 80 Gingrich, Newt 66–7, 81; accusations of ‘multinational fantasy’ 82; and House Republican Platform for elections (1994) 81

221

Goldwater, Barry 65 Goodling, William 69 GOP 64–5, 67, 74, 77, 80 Gourevitch, Philip 135 Habyarimana, Juvenal 125–9, 131, 134–8, 140, 143, 167, 172; death of 128, 143 Halberstam, David 113 Hamilton, Lee 81 Hannay, David (Sir) 147, 150, 153, 164 Helms, Jesse 9, 70–2, 80; lack of knowledge on events in Somalia 115; opposition to UN 70–1, 80 115 Hirsh, Michael 4, 9, 28, 92, 95 Horn of Africa, the 169 House of Representatives 33, 36, 67; and growing conservatism 66–7; Somalia 80, 115; see also Congress Howe, Jonathan 99, 100, 102 humanitarian aid: Bosnia 44; Rwanda 132; Somalia 6, 91, 92, 99, 100 humanitarian intervention 2, 29–30, 33, 53, 61, 76, 88 human rights abuses: Bosnia 31, 38, 45, 48; Rwanda, 125, 126, 131, 133–4, 144–6, 151 Human Rights Watch 133, 149, 151 Hutus 123–6, 128–36, 138, 149, 157, 158, 160 Inderfurth, Karl 147, 157 interahamwe 128–9, 131, 134, 136, 146 International Commission of Inquiry 133 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) 153, 155, 157, 164 international evacuation of Rwanda 131, 144–6 Jeffords, James 156 Johnston, Harry 73 Kagame, Paul 153, 160 Karadzic, Radovan 43, 46 Kassebaum, Nancy 76 Keating, Colin 153 Kigali 127–9, 131, 134, 136–7, 144, 146, 150–1, 155, 158 Kittani, Ismet 92 Kovanda, Karol 152, 157

222 Index Lake, Anthony 26, 29, 32–3, 41, 44, 52, 103, 113, 145, 148–9, 151, 155, 161–2, 165; as National Security Advisor 26, 32, 44, 103, 114, 161; Rwanda 145, 148–9, 151, 155, 161–2, 165 Leader, Joyce 132, 137 Legislative Branch see Congress Levin, Carl 77 Lift and Strike (Bosnia) 46 Lightfoot, Jim 83 Luck, Edward 51, 85, 87 Lugar, Richard 76 McCain, John 80 Mackinnon, Michael 82 Malone, David 141 Mandelbaum, Michael 32 Mazullo, Donald 69 media, the 11–18, 23–7, 39; polls conducted by 11–18; and the public 4, 25; reliance on by Congress and Executive 23; Rwanda 124, 145–6, 151, 152, 155, 160, 163, 165; Somalia 39, 107, 110–11; symbiotic relationship with government 24, 27 Medicins sans Frontières 91 military reaction to deaths in Somalia 116–19 Milosevic, Slobodan 43 Mitchell, George 77 Mogadishu 89, 90–3, 95, 100, 104, 106–7, 113–16 Mogadishu line 50 Mohammed, Ali Mahdi 90, 93, 97, 100 Montgomery, Thomas (Major General) 99, 114–15, 119 Moose, George 139, 147, 152, 161 Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) 126 MRND 125, 127, 133, 136 Museveni, Yoweri 126, 136 nation-building 34, 36, 40, 42, 120 National Resistance Army 126 National Security Council (NSC); review on UN peacekeeping and NSDD74 117; Rwanda 149; Somalia 112, 114; UN 95 National Security Revitalization Act 67, 82 New Right 68 New Zealand 153, 160 Nickles, Don 80 Nixon, Richard M. 5

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 48, 50, 57 Ntaryamira, Cyprien 128 Nunn, Sam 77 Obote, Milton 125 Operation Provide Comfort (Iraqi Kurds) 118 Operation Provide Relief 92 Operation Restore Hope 93–8, 113 Operation Turquoise 131, 159–60 optimism at end of Cold War 1–4, 30, 53, 61, 90, 112, 117, 119; in relation to enthusiasm for multilateral and peacekeeping from Clinton Administration 29, 30–6, 40, 49, 53, 55, 112 Organization for African Unity (OAU) 126, 155, 158; OAU Neutral Observer Group (NMOG) 126 Oxfam 133 Pakistan 7, 83; attacks on 102; deaths of peacekeepers 7, 34, 40, 100, 102, 113, 140, 163; participation in rescue mission in Somalia 3/4 October 1993 83, 106–7; Rwanda 160 peace enforcement 39, 47, 98 peacekeeping 1–5, 9–10, 13–14, 16–17, 19–21, 29, 30, 33, 40, 49, 51–3, 55–6, 58, 61–2, 63–4, 69, 71–2, 77, 82, 87–8, 90, 93–107, 111, 116–20, 122, 130–7, 143–51, 153, 155, 157–61, 164–5, 167, 170–3 Peace Powers Act 70, 81–2, 87 Powell, Colin 33; against involvement in Somalia 104; formulation of Weinberger–Powell Doctrine 109; as National Security Advisor to Reagan and review on UN 118; review of US/UN relations under Nixon 118 Power, Samantha 133 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) 4, 6, 9, 30, 51, 57, 82, 120, 123, 154–5, 157–8, 165–6, 172 Presidential Review Document 13 (PRD13) 9, 29, 81 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 11–20 Prunier, Gerard 129 public opinion 79; Bosnia 16; conservatism in Congress 22–3; elite dominance 21; internationalism moving into multilateralism 11–12;

Index mechanisms for gathering public opinion data 23–7; misrepresentation 21; post-Cold War environment 21–2; Rwanda and Burundi 16–17; Somalia 17–18; strengthening the UN 14–16; UN dues 18–21; UN peacekeeping 13–14; UN performance 13; use of force through the UN 12–13; vocal minorities 22 Quick Reaction Force (QRF) (Somalia) 40, 99, 101–2, 105–6, 113 Rapid Reaction Force 117; support from Clinton during 1992 presidential campaign 31–2 Rawson, David 139, 164 Reagan, Ronald 2, 29, 66, 73, 108–9, 118, 171 Red Cross, International Committee of 91 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Summary, Extra-judicial and Arbitrary killings 133 Republican Party 65–8, 70, 73–6, 78, 81–3, 86, 88; see also GOP responsibility for UNOSOM II mandate 58–61 Riza, Iqbal 138–9, 141–2, 144–5, 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, 173 Rogers, Harold 83 Roth, Toby 78 RPF invasion 1990 (Rwanda) 126–7 RTLM 131–4, 136–7 Rwanda 123; APC debacle 158–9; Arusha process 126–7; awareness of international community prior to genocide 132; civil war renewed 129; Congressional action in face genocide 156–7; explaining international inaction during genocide 161–6; failure to heed warning signs 137; genocide 128; history 124–5; international community’s knowledge and actions during genocide 143–61; international evacuation 131, 144–6; international response to genocide 130; killings begin 128–9; killings spread 129–30; Operation Turquoise 131, 159–60; refugee crisis 131–2, 160–1; refugee question 125–6; RPF invasion (1990) 126–7; UNAMIR 130–1, 133–6, 141–3, 151–2, 166–7,

223

172–3; UNAMIR II 157–9; US avoidance of term ‘genocide’ 151–2; US Congress 156–7; warning signs 132–7 Rwandan civil war (1994) 129 Rwandan genocide 128 Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) 123, 126–7, 129, 131, 144, 149, 151, 153 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 124, 126–32, 134, 136, 138, 140, 144–5, 147, 153, 157, 160 Rwandan refugee crisis (1994) 131–2, 160–1 Safe Areas Concept (Bosnia) 47–8 Sahnoun, Mohammed 32, 92 Sarajevo 44, 48 Save the Children Fund 91 Senate 65–7, 79–83, 85, 149; effort to limit US troop contributions to UN 85; foreign relations committee 80; growing conservatism 65–7; hearings over Somalia deaths 83, 115; see also Congress Serbia see Bosnia; Yugoslavia (former) Shattuck, John 146, 152, 154, 161 siege of Sarajevo 48 Simon, Paul 46 Soderberg, Nancy 26, 32, 37, 56–7 Somalia 89; 3/4 October raid 41–2, 102–7; Abdi House 101; command and control of US forces 50–61, 80, 84–5, 112–16; comparative to other operations 108–10; deaths of Pakistani peacekeepers 40, 100–1; deterioration in summer 1993 99–100; deterioration in autumn 1993 103; disappointment of expectations 119–20; disparities between US and UN mandates 93–4; famine 90; history 90–1; impact of October raid in brief 42–3, 107–8; military reaction 116–19; Operation Provide Relief 92; political changes in Washington, autumn 1993 40–1, 102–4; public opinion 110–12; response of international community to humanitarian disaster 91–3; shock in Clinton Administration 114–16; success of UNITAF 95–6; Task Force Ranger in Somalia 102–7; transfer problems between UNITAF and UNOSOM II 96–8; UNITAF 93–8;

224 Index Somalia continued UNOSOM I 92–3; UNOSOM II 34–43, 98–107; US/UN responsibility for mandate 58–61, 84, 85, 112–16 ‘Somalia Syndrome’ 3, 4, 6, 10, 120; impact on Rwanda 123, 156; impact on Somalia 171 Somali National Alliance (SNA) 100–7 Spence, Floyd 80 State Department: expansion of UNAMIR 156; intelligence from CIA on Rwanda 135; Rwanda 133, 135, 157; secret State Department document on genocide 157; use of term ‘genocide’ 152 Tanzania 123–5, 132, 151–3 Tarnoff, Peter 115 Task Force Ranger 40, 90, 102–6, 113–14 Task Force Ranger deaths (Somalia) 41–2, 102–7 Tito, Josip 43 Truman, Harry S. 31 Tutsis 123–34, 136–8, 144, 146, 149, 157, 158, 160 Uganda 123–5, 132, 140, 159; alleged Ugandan plot to seize power in Rwanda 157 UNAMIR 130–1, 133–6, 141–50, 152, 166–7, 172–3 UNAMIR II 157–9 UN arms embargo (Yugoslavia) 43, 54 UNCRO 46 UNICEF 162 UNITAF 93–8 UNITAF-UNOSOM II transfer problems 96–8 United Kingdom 7, 37, 45, 47; Bosnia 37, 45, 47, 167; Rwanda 123, 142–3, 147, 152, 155, 157, 167, 171 United Nations (UN) 1–4, 10–40; blamed by Clinton administration 58–61, 83–5, 87, 170–1; Bosnia 43–4, 46–8, 50–1; Chapter VII operations 97–8; deaths of UN peacekeepers 101, 128–9, 140–1, 143; as electoral tool 64, 72–5, 116; issue of US troops under UN command and control 77–8, 80, 82, 84, 115; opposition to in

US 67–71, 79, 81–2, 85–6, 116, 141, 156; peacekeeping in crisis 140, 154; rescue of US forces 106; Rwanda 7, 8, 72, 123, 127–31, 133, 135, 137–58, 167; share of blame for Rwandan genocide 123, 143, 159, 172–3; Somalia 39–43, 51, 58–61, 72, 90–4, 97–8, 100–2, 106, 108, 113, 118, 121; UNAMIR 128–30, 133, 135–6, 141–3, 145–6, 148–9, 153, 155–6, 158–9, 166; UN Rapid Reaction Force 31–2, 36; UNSC resolution 846 and UNOMUR (1993) 127; UNSC resolution 872 and UNIMIR 127; UNSC resolution 912 reduction of UNAMIR 130, 150; UNSC resolution 918 157; UNSC resolution 929 Operation Turquoise/France 131, 160; withdrawal of UNAMIR 8, 145 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 48 UNOSOM I 39, 92–3 UNOSOM II 39–43, 98–104 UNPROFOR 44, 46–8, 50 UNPROFOR-BH 46 UNSC Resolutions: 751 92; 794 93; 814 98; 872 127; 912 130; 918 157; 929 160 USAID 160 US troop contributions to Bosnian peacekeeping 45–50 Uwilingiyimana, Agatha 128–9 Vance–Owen plan (Bosnia) 45–6 Vietnam War 28, 64, 86; legacy of 117; ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ 120 War Powers Resolution 77, 79–80; responsibilities 78 Watergate Scandal, the 64 Weinberger–Powell Doctrine 82, 93, 97, 109, 116–20, 165 Yugoslavia (former) 43–5; see also Bosnia Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 43–4 Zaire 123–5, 131–2, 160; forces help halt RPF 126; Zairean border/refugees 132