CLOTHING
THE
S PA N I S H E M P I R E
The Americas in the Early Modern Atlantic World Series Editors: Amy Turner Bu...
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CLOTHING
THE
S PA N I S H E M P I R E
The Americas in the Early Modern Atlantic World Series Editors: Amy Turner Bushnell and Jack P. Greene The Americas in the Early Modern Atlantic World publishes volumes on any aspect, people, or society of the colonial Americas within an Atlantic context. The premise of this new series is that new work on the early modern Americas having an Atlantics frame of reference will contribute importantly to informed colonial comparison. Published by Palgrave Macmillan: Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue By John D. Garrigus Clothing the Spanish Empire: Families and the Calico Trade in the Early Modern Atlantic World By Marta V. Vicente Forthcoming titles: Inventing Lima: The Making of an Imperial Capital By Alejandra Osorio Black Townsmen By Mariana Dantas
Clothing the Spanish E mpire Families and the Calico Trade in the Early Modern A tl antic World
Mar ta V. Vicente
CLOTHING THE SPANISH EMPIRE
© Marta V. Vicente, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7226–2 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7226–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vicente, Marta V. Clothing the Spanish Empire : families and the calico trade in the early modern Atlantic world / by Marta Vicente. p. cm. — (Americas in the early modern Atlantic world) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7226–5 (alk. paper) 1. Cotton textile industry—Spain—History. 2. Calico—Spain— History. 3. Family—Economic aspects—Spain—History. 4. Fashion—Spain—History. 5. Clothing and dress—Spain—History. I. Title. HD9885.S7V53 2007 382⬘.4567210946—dc22
2006046553
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
List of Illustrations
vi
Acknowledgments
vii
Abbreviations
ix
Introduction
1
1 Family and the Calico Trade in the Spanish Empire
9
2 The Personal Is Commercial: Women and Family in the Race to Make Calicoes
23
3 A Microcosm of Families: Workers, Factories, Owners
43
4 The Craze for Calicoes: Selling Fashion in Spain and America
65
5 From Barcelona to Veracruz: Clothing the Spanish Empire
85
Conclusion
115
Notes
123
Bibliography
161
Index
175
List of Illustrations
Figures 2.1 Allegorical depiction of the Spanish empire, 1746 3.1 Catalan fabricant, 1801 (fabricante in Spanish): “Have you seen La Pona? [typical Catalan woman’s name]” 3.2 “Charles the III, King of Spain &c. In the Robes of the New Order of Carlos Tercero, from the Original Picture of Antonio Velázquez” 3.3 Cotton plant and seed, 1784 4.1 Petrimetra from Madrid, 1801: “Do you think all women are the same? Petrimetra with mantilla and chequered basquiña [short-sleeved overdress] with two tassels” 4.2 Pertimetra from Cádiz, 1801: “The one wearing jumo [fine silk veil]” 5.1 View of the port of Cádiz in 1792 5.2 Dandy from Madrid, 1801: “I am going to see her before she leaves. Cur[r]utaco with frock coat”
25 51
52 57
67 68 95
99
Maps 3.1 Iberian Peninsula 5.1 Atlantic Spanish World
48 88
Table 1.1 Professional origins of early calico investors (1740–1760)
19
Acknowledgments
T
he following institutions provided generous financial support that made possible the research of this book at different stages: Fundació La Caixa de Pensions (Barcelona), the Comissió d’Innovació de Recerca i Tecnologia of the Generalitat de Catalunya (CIRIT, Spain), the General Fund for Research at the University of Kansas, and the Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry of Culture and United States’ Universities. I wish to thank the staff of the many archives, libraries, and research institutions in Spain and the United States where I have worked over a number of years. Their assistance often proved invaluable to my research. In particular, Laureà Pagarolas and Montse Gómez at the Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona were exceptionally accommodating to my research needs. At the Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona Maria Angels Solà has often gone beyond her duties as a librarian to help me complete my research and make it enjoyable, even during long and noisy periods of construction in Ca l’Ardiaca. Darin Grauberger, from the Cartographic Services at the University of Kansas, helped me prepare the maps that appear in this book; Pam Lerow from CLAS Word Processing Center at the University of Kansas helped me with the preparation of the final manuscript. I also want to thank the help of Gabriella Pearce from Palgrave MacMillan in preparation of this book. She has made the process of publishing a smooth one. Over the years many friends and colleagues on both shores of the Atlantic read parts of different versions of this book and made helpful comments, offered bibliographic references, or helped me with editorial advise. I feel indebted to Jim Amelang, Lisa Bitel, Enriqueta Camps, Montse Carbonell, Megan Greene, the late Tamara Hareven, Bernat Hernández, Karen Hellekson, Jane Humphries, Richard Kagan, Betsy Kuznesof, Peter Mancall, Liz MacGonagle, Carolynn Nelson, Barry Reay, Alejandro Sánchez, the late Pablo Sárraga, Beth Schultz, James K. J. Thomson, Jaume Torras, Leslie Tuttle, and Sherry Velasco. I also want
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to thank my parents (and most particularly my mother) for their great encouragement over the years. Most of all, my greatest debt is to my husband, Luis Corteguera, for his unwavering support, his patience reading numerous drafts of this book, and his helpful and insightful comments. I dedicate this book to him.
Abbreviations Archives and Libraries ACA: Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó (Barcelona) ACA RA: Reial Audiència ACA APM: Arxiu de Protocols de Mataró ACB: Arxiu de la Catedral de Barcelona ADB: Arxiu Diocesà de Barcelona AGPR: Archivo General de Puerto Rico AHCB: Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona AHCB AB: Ajuntament borbònic i constitucional AHCB AV: Arxiu del Veguer AHCB C: Consellers AHCB FC: Fons Comercial AHCB Gremis: Fons Gremial AHCB MS: Manuscrits AHM: Arxiu Històric de Mataró AHPB: Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona AHPM: Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Madrid ASJA: Arxiu de Sant Julià d’Argentona ASMM: Arxiu de Santa Maria de Mataró ASMP: Arxiu de Santa Maria del Pi (Barcelona) ASSJP: Arxiu dels Sants Just i Pastor (Barcelona) BC: Biblioteca de Catalunya (Barcelona) BC JC: Junta de Comerç BNM: Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) CIDDIT: Centre d’Investigació, Documentació i Difusió de l’Institut del Teatre (Barcelona) MAHC: Museu-Arxiu Històric de Calella MAHC FA: Fons Alsina
Other Abbreviations llig.: lligall reg.: registre
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Introduction
A
t age fifty, Joan Baptista Sirés became anxious that he would not find the right heir for his thriving Barcelona cotton factory. He had never married and had no illegitimate children; he had no younger brothers, and only one nephew and a younger cousin were interested in the business of printed cottons. Thus, in 1781, Sirés began to court his younger cousin Jacinto for the job while trying to arrange a marriage for him with the daughter of a wealthy family. The family of the future bride was very well connected in the commercial world of the cotton trade. Thus, the union was meant to help Jacinto in his professional future and, if Jacinto did become Sirés’s heir, it would also aid the factory’s interests. But Jacinto ruined his elder cousin’s plans by marrying a vicar’s niece from València instead.1 Sirés treated Jacinto’s act as treachery and refused to name him heir, although Jacinto kept working for his cousin’s business until 1798. The persistent factory owner next focused on his nephew Antón, already a foreman in his factory. But the nephew also decided to become independent and left the factory to establish his own. In what was probably a desperate move, in 1793, at the age of sixty-two, Sirés got married, but for unknown reasons, the marriage lasted less than a year and left no offspring. Finally in 1806 Sirés decided to appoint his older brother Pau as head of the factory. Maybe his hope was to get Pau’s son interested in the family business. This probably never happened. When Sirés died, at eighty-four, he left all his fortune—by then diminished—to his grandnephew, the son of Antón, the nephew who deserted Sirés to establish his own factory. Sirés’s predicament—spending more than thirty years seeking a blood heir to inherit the product of almost fifty years of work and success—was not uncommon among his contemporaries. At fifty-five, Bernat Glòria, one of the most successful merchants in eighteenthcentury Spain, worried about what would become of his business. One thing was clear though: after his death, his company, which bore his name, had to remain in the family. Only a relative—someone emotionally attached to the business—could offer the unconditional loyalty and trust necessary to properly run the business. Unlike Sirés,
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Bernat had a son, but the son was not interested in the daily managing of the factory and the many related hardships. His ambitions were probably somewhere else, in the more grandiose world of commerce and trade. Bernat thus appointed his brother as the head of the factory, and after his brother’s death a nephew took his place. When Bernat died in 1762, the nephew took charge of the main management of the factory and the son dealt with the commercial part of the business. Such was the determination to have a relative inherit the business that partners Esteve Canals and Bonaventura Canet were willing to leave their company, The Canals & Canet Co., in the hands of women. In 1747, when Canet died, his widow, Magdalena, succeeded him in the business. She worked with Esteve Canals, probably taking over her late husbands’ tasks in the company. Nine years later, Canals’s widow, Mariàngela, stepped in. But the two widows had different ideas regarding the managing of the company; in a few months they decided to end their partnership after they failed to reconcile their disputes.2 After buying out Magdalena Canet’s part, the widow Canals continued to run the factory until her death in 1763, when her son Joan Pau took over.3 The stories of these three extremely successful companies reveal a fundamental principle in the eighteenth-century Spanish world of manufacture and trade: entrepreneurs treated family as business and, accordingly, business as family. When individuals like Sirés, Glòria, or Canals and Canet had to make what was probably one of the most important decisions of their lives as businessmen, they came up with solutions that involved the family. This priority explains the fact that some, like Sirés, ended up with an unsatisfactory solution rather than leave the factory in the hands of someone outside the family. Canet and Canals took the drastic step of leaving their businesses in the hands of not one but two women rather than let a male partner outside the family manage the company until Canals’s son came of age. These accomplished entrepreneurs knew that the key to their success was the involvement of their families in their businesses. Only family members could provide the most crucial assets to any business: loyalty and trust. Business partners were always available in good times, but in hard times—during periods of war, when credit was not available, or when workers walked away from the factory floor—only blood could guarantee that people stayed. Only family members would invest their money and efforts in the face of an uncertain outcome. By relying on relatives’ emotional attachment to the company, entrepreneurs could expect them to work long hours, to risk their lives traveling to unfamiliar places, where they would stay for months or even years
Introduction
3
at a time, or to offer their last penny to help the factory in difficult moments. The most careful planning and the insistence on the need to surrender personal preferences for the sake of the family business sometimes failed. Bernat Glòria’s son hesitated before finally shouldering responsibility for part of the company. Sirés’s cousin did not follow the dictates of his relative, and Canet’s widow preferred to sell her part of the business rather than stay in partnership with the widow Canals. Yet the weaving of family and business interests was present through a company’s life because most of the time it worked. When in 1800 Josep Cona wrote bitterly to his brother-in-law and business partner Francesc Alsina that had they not been brothers-in-law he would have broken his relationship with the company long ago, he was echoing an attitude characteristic of many partners of other companies.4 If Cona had left the company, it would have harmed not only their common business but also their families’ well-being because the two went hand in hand. In this book, I tell the stories of families like the Glòrias, Sirés, Canals and Canets, and Conas and Alsinas—their lives, their successes, and achievements as well as their setbacks and misfortunes. Through the eyes of the families of businessmen and entrepreneurs, from small artisans to wealthy merchants, I tell the story of the calico industry, one of the major industries in the eighteenth-century Spanish world. The calico industry produced the printed cotton fabric that revolutionized the world of fashion in eighteenth-century Europe and its colonies. Scholars have seen this industry as pivotal to trade and early industrial growth. Yet these same scholars have connected the achievements of the calico industry with the actions of individual merchants and the institutions they formed. I argue instead that behind the successes of the industry, we find the families that made those achievements possible. The economies of manufacture and trade cannot be detached from the world of emotions and sentiments of the families that created and shaped them. Interest and emotion formed the bases of the business world as much as the family world in eighteenth-century Spain. The family is also the protagonist of this book in yet another way because I use the concepts of family and household as models to study the calico industry and trade. The word economy itself—oikonomia in Greek—means household management (oikos, “household,” and nomos, “managing”); thus the management of the household is at the root of the meaning of the term economy. In fact, as I illustrate in chapter 2, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political economists
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C l o t h i n g t h e S pa n i s h E m p i r e
extensively quoted Xenophon’s work Oeconomicus [On Household Management] to emphasize that no matter how large a household was (be it an artisan family or the Spanish empire as a whole), all households were formed to yield a profit—material as well as emotional— that would assure the maintenance and well-being of its members. We find the management of a household based on the harmonic combination of the correct tasks that all household members must perform, in particular the jobs of the husband and wife. This model—management geared to guaranteeing the survival and improvement of its members— holds true for running commercial companies as well. Early modern entrepreneurs used the family as a metaphor to explain their trade and commercial practices. In fact, the elements that help to explain the functioning of a family—the parents and offspring—were not so different from the functioning of a commercial enterprise, formed by partners and their employees. Trust and loyalty, rather than being innate, were learned in the practice of being a member of a family, and thus trust and loyalty became the basis of commercial strategies in the world of the calico industry. In the early modern Spanish world, male merchants managed the complex businesses of the “commercial house” by assigning duties to all family members according to their ability and gender. Mothers, daughters, and sisters often stayed at home in Spain, while husbands and son traveled to major commercial centers in Spain and America. Fathers, fathers-in-laws, and uncles trained younger relatives in commercial activities. Sons married daughters of merchants to expand business connections. The model of the family thus extended beyond those related by blood to embrace outsiders and form commercial houses; the men and women of these houses established enduring family trading clans across the Atlantic Ocean. The calico industry was not the only family-based industry. Many other industries in the early modern Spanish world functioned in similar ways. Jaume Torras has written extensively on the family links of the Catalan wool industry. For industries as diverse as silk weaving and fishing, family provided the means to create networks of access and distribution of knowledge of trade and credit. I have chosen to study the family and the calico industry in the context of the Spanish empire for several reasons: first, because this industry was by far the most innovative of all industries in eighteenth-century Spain; and, second, because the calico industry showed the highest degree of dynamism of all industries during this time. This was particularly true in the city of Barcelona. Men and women were overcoming daily difficulties by resorting to strategies and resources that were simultaneously traditional
Introduction
5
and risky. In addition, what makes the case of the calico industry so unique is that the nature of the industry—with its sudden, unexpected reversals—made family loyalty and trust all the more crucial. In spite of its dynamism and innovation the calico industry was particularly unstable since its product, the calico, was always dependent on the changing fashion tastes. Moreover, it was a new industry that promised substantial rewards, and thus competition was intense. The need to succeed in the calico business with only basic resources made the clothing of an empire a real challenge. Entrepreneurs required flexibility of production in order to respond to the whims of fashion, and family loyalty was especially important in this context. As a historian of women and the family, I therefore look at my sources with the main concern of explaining the nature of this relationship between family and industry. For instance, why did partners choose family members to become their associates? Why did factory owners hire relatives? Were expectations characteristic of family relations, such as obeying the authority of the head of the family or showing unconditional loyalty, also nonnegotiable assets in a company? Economic historians do not typically ask these questions. Yet answering these questions ultimately helps us rethink economic notions and the value of invisible actors, such as women, in the shaping of industrial growth. Moreover, by looking at the history of the Spanish cotton industry of the eighteenth century from the novel perspective of the family, I challenge traditional historiography that has seen the history of this industry largely as impersonal—the product of economic forces or the results of individual, entrepreneurial activity.5 However, when we look at the daily practice of making and selling calicoes to clothe members of the Spanish empire, we find individuals connected through family links. Calico entrepreneurs rarely worked alone; often their strategies and decisions were part of a network of relatives that formed the body of their emotional and economic world. Economic decisions were also inextricably linked to the emotional survival of the family. Thus, if the family was a commercial venture, the commercial venture per se relied on family structure and strategies. It may well be that a company refrained from investing further in a enterprise that proved too risky for the survival of the entire family, instead preferring to diversify capital to other forms of business that would at least guarantee the family’s survival. When the history of the family enters the economic history of the calico trade, we gain complexity and insight into the process of economic change of which it was a part. By studying the family in relation to the traffic of calicoes, we can also reconsider the place of Spain in the quest toward capitalism. It has
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long been argued that the Spanish empire, with its stifling mercantilist policies and rigid institutions that hindered economic growth, seemed irremediably impotent in the face of foreign competitors and rampant smuggling.6 Several important studies have outlined the origins of the Spanish calico industry and its place in the colonial trade, but primarily from the perspective of economic history. Scholarship on Spanish industry—as well as industries in other countries—has regarded the entrepreneurial drive that led to industrialization as one coming from individual merchants rather than families of artisans and merchants. In this telling of the story of the calico trade, there is little room for the study of ordinary individuals and even less for their families. The few exceptional men who became the protagonists of historians’ narratives were ministers and wealthy merchants who symbolized the individualistic character of capitalist growth. Once we look at the successful stories of families in the Iberian Peninsula who manufactured and sold calicoes to the American colonies, the economic failure of Spain needs to be at least reconsidered. From the perspective of these families, a controlling bureaucracy that froze economic growth through monopolies and commercial restrictions during the eighteenth century did not limit the Spanish empire. As revealed by their participation in the calico boom, families had great potential for flexibility and adaptability to the changes required in industry and commerce. In fact, individuals, with the aid of their families, were able to develop successful trade strategies that predated and in some cases inspired governmental policies. The new opportunities for riches in manufacture and trade of consumer goods attracted the competing interests of Spaniards, criollos, and foreigners, each of whom sought to claim those profits for themselves alone. Through a microhistorical approach that examines the day-to-day lives of families, historians can explain how individual decisions of men and women on both sides of the Atlantic generated new sources of wealth in the Spanish empire. In their daily struggles to clothe the people who made up the Spanish empire, the families in the calico trade transformed the early modern Atlantic world in important but not immediately obvious ways. It was a transformation that first took place largely away from the public, inside people’s homes and workshops wrought by men and women going about their everyday activities. In their seemingly inconsequential affairs, the families employed in the calico trade introduced a number of important, if unspectacular, innovations in production and trade that made the dramatic growth of a new industry possible. For the most part, the changes were not new in themselves. For example,
Introduction
7
for many generations, families had used dowries as financial capital to establish companies. They had sent their relatives to unknown lands as far back as we can trace the history of commercial ventures. However, it was their application of traditional practices to the new industry of making and selling this popular cotton fabric that would prove revolutionary. As we will see, the essence of these family relations, based on expectations of unlimited trust and obedience of their members, made it possible for family firms to establish a thriving commerce across the Atlantic Ocean, which in turn had an important impact on the economic foundations of the Spanish empire.7 I tell the story of the calico trade and its protagonists through five chapters. Chapter 1 narrates the stories of a group of pioneer Spanish merchants and entrepreneurs of the 1740s and 1750s who initiated solo careers with the help of their families to feed the hunger for calicoes in the Spanish empire. They created regional webs of contacts and agents by relying on the trust and loyalty of their families while also relying on the family to create their “commercial house,” the bases for the formation of the calico factories. Chapter 2 further explores the economic nature of the family by examining the ideal nature of the household. In its basic premise, the family is both an economic and moral unit, a melding that permitted women to play a more prominent role in the business decisions of the families of entrepreneurs. In chapter 3, we see how from the 1760s to the 1780s these same families of entrepreneurs replicated family relations when establishing their factories. This occurred at the managerial level as well as in the productive relations in the factory floor. Moreover, the commercial house based on the family model of trust and obedience among members became helpful in the running of small and large factories alike. Whereas the first three chapters of the book focus on the way family structure and strategies combined with the formation of the factories, chapter 4 studies how the ideal of the family was also crucial in the sale of calicoes. The topic of this chapter is the debate regarding fashion and luxury in the decades of the 1780s and the 1790s, when the Spanish empire witnessed the peak of the calico craze. Throughout the early modern period, the moral dangers of fashion and luxury had become problematic to producers. It was the success of the calico industry that made the debate tip toward a more positive view of fashion. The work that the industry could bring to families, and in particular to women, would compensate for the potential harms of fashion. Once the problem of selling a morally harmful fabric was resolved, though, manufacturers and traders faced an even more
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powerful challenge: how to distribute calicoes to the Spanish world in times of war. Chapter 5 concludes the narrative by telling how calico entrepreneurs achieved this by creating an extensive web formed by the diaspora of families and their commercial agents in the Spanish American colonies. By the early 1800s, Spanish calicoes reached every corner of the Spanish American empire through a large-scale migration of commercial agents related to each other by ties of blood and friendship. The experience of these enterprising families reveals the essential connection between family, trade, and empire across the Atlantic Ocean. My aim in this book is to emphasize that the history of the family provides valuable insight into the study of economic history. If in fact economy is about the management of the household, regardless of its size or importance, then it is imperative to know who comprised the members of this household (or oikos) and how they interrelated, as well as the process of decision making and management. But as I discuss in the following chapters, this management was nothing particularly new. Families of artisans and merchants had produced and sold new, fashionable products for centuries. To find and understand the specifics that underlie this period in history and its development in different countries and empires, one needs to rely on the management of other “households.” This implies the study of economic and political decisions by government and institutions, the analysis of war strategies, and even consideration of environmental and scientific discoveries. We therefore need a marriage of distinct ways of approaching this complicated and rich episode of the history of humanity. But my goal in this book is to illustrate how the family can become a category of analysis. This mode of analysis permits an examination of women as central to the study of economic change. The history of an industry and its impact on economic change cannot be fully studied without a comprehensive understanding of the actions and lives of those individuals who made it possible. In this book, I demonstrate that these individuals were not alone: family interests lay at the core of their economic decisions.
Chapter 1
Family and the Calico Trade in the Spanish E mpire
At the end of the eighteenth century, a calico craze swept the Atlantic world. Calico, originally from India, was a fine cotton cloth painted in attractive, colorful, and flowery motif designs. Its exotic name recalled the Indian town of Calicut, where the fabric originally came from. Elsewhere, the cloth’s name offered a more generic appeal to its Indian origins: indienne in French, indiana in Spanish and Catalan. The oriental flavor extended to the names of other types of calicoes, including the painted cotton chintz (derived from Hindi), the silk and cotton taffeta (of Persian origin), and the coarser cotton muslin (from the Iraqi town of Mosul).1 But aside from their exotic names, calicoes’ main attraction lay in their brilliant colors and designs that did not fade wash after wash.2 Calico was cheaper than silk and lighter than velvet, and Europeans fell in love with this Asian fabric the minute the Dutch, English, and French merchants first imported Indian calicoes as a luxury cloth in the early seventeenth century.3 In 1610, Indian workshops produced 10 million yards of cloth for the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern markets, with only a few yards designated for sale in Europe; half a century later, between 35 and 40 million yards reached the European continent. In 1684, the English East India Company alone imported 45 million yards, more than 6 yards each for each man, woman, and child in Great Britain.4 By the early 1700s, calico cloths of all kinds and patterns were everywhere. In 1708, the English writer Daniel Defoe reported that calicoes had “crept into our houses and bedchambers; curtains, cushions, chairs and at last beds themselves were nothing but calicoes or
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Indian stuffs.”5 In major European cities, shoppers could purchase the finest painted chintz, Bengal muslin, and taffeta for clothing and decoration.6 Consumers in Madrid put calicoes to a myriad of uses, such as bedspreads, sheets, pillowcases, tableware, curtains, and wall coverings; they also used the fabric for men’s shirts, petticoats, mantillas, bonnets, aprons, girdles, shawls, scarves, and handkerchiefs.7 In time, the “Indian craze,” as contemporaries labeled it, transformed calicoes from a luxury affordable only to the wealthiest individuals in Madrid, Paris, and London to a necessity for larger numbers of men and women.8 Wearing calicoes became a fashion statement denounced by some as a threat to social order. Calicoes offered the ordinary man and woman a taste of French aristocratic fashion at an affordable price.9 Young French country women sighed for calico gowns, weavers in Barcelona wanted their chairs upholstered with calico fabric, and criollas from Veracruz longed for fancy shawls made of this fashionable and light cotton fabric.10 In English cities, cotton weavers occasionally attacked “calico Madams” or “calico Picts,” as were called women in calico clothes, in the streets.11 In 1699, English wool makers satirized such calico madams, comparing them to peacocks: “After these Toys they ran a madding. . . . And like gay Peacocks proudly strut it, When in our Streets along they foot it.”12 As Daniel Defoe reported in 1708, it was not so much a problem that chambermaids wore calicoes but the fact that their mistresses were also wearing them: “Even the Queen herself at this time was pleased to appear in China and Japan, I mean China silks and calico.”13 English wool weavers shared such views when in 1719 they reported that the wearing of calicoes set “all degrees and orders of woman-kind into disorder and confusion” because it blurred class differences, and the lady “cannot well be known from her chambermaid.”14 The popularity of calicoes not only endangered the social order, but it also, and more importantly, threatened to ruin entire textile industries. In 1686, the French government prohibited the import of Asian toiles indiennes (Indian fabrics) and in 1692 banned the wearing and use of calicoes.15 Three years later, a Parisian merchant proposed paying anyone 500 livres “to strip . . . in the street, any woman wearing Indian fabrics,” or, as a lesser measure, “to dress up streetwalkers in Indian fabrics” in order to publicly mock those who wore calicoes.16 However, in the words of the early eighteenth-century French writer Jacques Savary des Bruslons, all efforts failed in “curing people of this obstinate contraband” in Indian cottons. Anyone found buying and selling would suffer a hefty fine of 1,000 ecus and the confiscation of goods. An even harsher edict issued on 15 December 1717 threatened
F a m i ly a n d t h e C a l i c o T r a d e
11
“sentencing to the galleys for life, and even worse if the case called for it.”17 Other European governments enacted similar legislation to curb the demand for calicoes. In 1712, 1714, and 1721, the English government issued several decrees against the import and sale of all foreign printed cottons.18 In the Spanish American colonies, the growing demand for calicoes from Indians, criollos and criollas, and free blacks and free blacks19 encouraged the smuggling of calicoes by English and Dutch traders. In 1718, Philip V banned from his Spanish territories importation of calicoes from Asian countries, including India, in an effort to protect the local wool industry.20 Yet in 1722, tax administrators in Barcelona complained that local markets were still inundated with foreign calicoes. By the 1730s, officials in France, England, and Spain continued to find large amounts of prohibited imported calicoes in shops.21 In response to this, in 1728 Philip V issued another edict that also banned the import of European calicoes. This time Philip V hoped the new law would encourage Spaniards to develop a domestic cotton industry. This hope is revealed by the terms of the edict itself, which excluded spun cotton thread from the island of Malta from the import restrictions.22 The clause in the 1728 edict was also the first state measure designed to promote the production of calico printing in Spain. Finally, in 1730, another royal decree established a system for monitoring calico stock “to ensure by all means possible that new manufacturers should be founded in these dominions.”23 But what government officials and established manufacturers saw as a problem of contraband and negative balance of trade became a golden opportunity to anyone who could tap this seemingly insatiable demand for calicoes. With 27 million consumers in the Iberian Peninsula and the American colonies in the early 1700s, supplying the hunger for calico cloth in the Spanish empire offered enormous possibilities for profit.24 Among those who sought their share of the riches from this trade were hundreds of families of merchants and artisans, mostly in Barcelona and its environs, some of whom became rich from the manufacture and trade of this highly desirable and trendy cotton fabric.
Barcelona, a “Radiant Crown” in the Spanish World Barcelona was a city with a long tradition of trade and manufacture of textiles dating back to the Middle Ages.25 In the 1400s it was the largest of the eight principal centers for the woolen industry in
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Catalonia, with a production capacity of some 40,000 pieces of cloth a year, and one of the leading industrial centers in Spain.26 But during the early modern period, the city, facing the economic crisis of the 1600s, became a peripheral player in the Mediterranean and Atlantic trades, fighting what increasingly seemed to be a losing battle to maintain its stature as the main industrial and commercial center of Spain. It was not until the early 1700s that Barcelona—and Catalonia as a region—began an astonishing recovery in agriculture and industry. As if fulfilling the predictions of the political economist Narcís Feliu de la Peña in 1683, Catalonia became the legendary phoenix reborn from its own ashes.27 In the eighteenth century, along with a general economic and demographic recovery of Spain, whose population grew from 7.5 to 10.5 million, Catalonia also witnessed a recovery in its demography, industry, and agriculture.28 In the years after the War of Succession in 1714 to the 1750s, Catalonia’s population doubled and its production of highly commercial crops—such as grapes, nuts, and almonds—also increased.29 Catalan merchants exported the product of these crops in the form of wine, liquors, and dried fruits to European countries and the American colonies.30 Rapid enrichment of some areas in Catalonia also led to an increase in purchasing power for peasants and landholders, as well as a renewed effort by merchants, artisans, and other entrepreneurs to invest their profits in commerce and industry. Moreover, the networks that merchants developed in the early 1700s to market the increasingly important production of Catalan hard liquors to the Spanish American colonies served as the basis for a dense net of contacts to market other products.31 The economic recovery of Barcelona went hand in hand with the funding of the first calico factories in the city. In the 1740s Barcelona was already home to almost a dozen calico factories; by the late 1760s, that number had increased to more than seventy factories, where over 10,000 men, women, and children made 2 to 6 million yards of calico cloth annually, surpassing the output of such major industrial centers as Manchester, Paris, and Rouen.32 Visitors to Barcelona found calico factories in virtually every street corner, the owners of which were happy to show the premises to interested clients. Dozens of calico manufacturers widened their shops’ entrances and put up signs at their thresholds announcing their new businesses. They sold everything from expensive taffeta to cheaper calicoes made of a mixture of cotton and linen. They sold fabrics with intricate designs or simple stripes and checks, and fabrics dyed in madder red or in indigo blue. Amid this thriving legal trade was a widespread black market for locally made calicoes.33
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By 1784 Barcelona had become the main center of calico production in Spain, with 80 factories, their sizes ranging from small enterprises of 2 or 4 workers to factories such as the large Félix Prat factory with 296 workers.34 Of the remaining twenty-three calico factories in Spain, sixteen were spread throughout Catalonia, three were in the commercial center of Mataró, and there were two each in the woolproducing towns of Olot and Vic. The rest of Spain had seven factories, five of them in Cádiz and its environs, key ports to the commerce with the colonies, and two in València.35 Calico output represented 4 percent of the total industrial production in Spain, with calico manufactures employing barely 2.5 percent of the entire Spanish working population.36 In this sense, Andalusia and Castile’s production of wool cloth had a larger quantitative impact in Spanish textile production than the calico industry. In 1784 alone, the 10,042 looms in the wool manufactures in Andalusia, Castile, and Extremadura—a region west of Castile—yielded 8,887,068 meters of cloth.37 This account does not include areas such as Catalonia and València in the Mediterranean or Asturias and Galicia in the northwestern part of Spain. In the same period, Barcelona’s 2,452 looms and 1,044 printing tables in the calico industry produced 6,875,483 meters of printed calicoes.38 This level of productivity surpassed production not only of the wool industry but also that of any other industry in the history of Spanish textiles. The number of looms, number of workers employed, and amount of product point toward a successful industry with increasing productivity. Barcelona’s role as a leading center of calico production within the Spanish Empire was connected to Catalonia’s importance as an industrialized region at the turn of the century, what Jordi Nadal labeled “the factory of Spain.”39 This large regional network of entrepreneurs had their contacts in the main commercial cities in Spain and its colonies in America. The existence of this extensive web points toward a decentralized industrial and commercial division of work, with Barcelona as the core of a “crown radiating” to surrounding secondary commercial and industrial centers.40 These secondary commercial and industrial centers were crucial to the marketing of Catalan calicoes. Although Barcelona’s factories were the main producers of calico cloth in Spain, this production had to be closely coordinated with the selling and marketing in the rest of the Spanish empire. Bartolomé Yun and Jaume Torras have further illustrated how this reordering became effective because Catalans used their local networks not only to trade with the rest of Spain but also to establish their own communities of families of merchants and manufacturers.41 As such, when
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seen as a region connected with the rest of the Spanish empire, Catalonia seems to be in many ways a provider not only of goods but also of human capital—the individuals’ skills and abilities in the trade. Therefore, although Catalonia seems isolated as a producer of calicoes, in fact, the sales to other regions of Spain reflect the impact of the success of Barcelona calico production on the entire Spanish world.42 The role of commercial networks becomes even more important as we realize that calico enterprises developed within these same families of entrepreneurs. One of the most striking aspects of Barcelona’s calico industry was that, despite its importance and size, it depended on family-run businesses. This followed some skepticism from the Spanish monarchy regarding the overall possibilities of the industry. Although some of the largest factories received from the king the privilege of bearing the title of “royal,” no calico factory was run by the government, as was the case with the French royal manufacturers— the Savonnerie or the Gobelins—or the Spanish tapestry factory, where Goya designed beautiful outdoor scenes.43 Nor did calico factories have boards of trustees such as the Spanish Royal Company of Yarn Thread of America, or the more famous Dutch East and West India companies and their English and French counterparts.44 The family aspect of calico business helped to compensate for the difficulties of obtaining royal support in the initial stages of the industry. In general, the Spanish monarchy was conservative in giving individual privileges to calico entrepreneurs. Merchants and artisans hoping to obtain royal privileges to establish a calico factory often became frustrated with the many obstacles they encountered. By asking for royal privileges for their calico factories, entrepreneurs expected exemptions from taxes on their retail sales and the possibility of importing raw materials free of taxes or with reduced tariffs. When these privileges were granted, they included providing the title of royal factory, providing a coat of arms for the factory’s owner, and exempting the factory workers from the military draft.45 To grant these privileges, the monarchy believed entrepreneurs had to show evidence of a good prospectus for success. Thus, when in 1749 Ferdinand VI granted a royal privilege to Francesc Clota for his factory, he explicitly stated that the privilege was meant to encourage his owner to keep up the good performance of his factory and to become a model for other factories to emulate. Clota’s factory had 40 looms, produced 2,888 pieces of cloth annually, and employed 117 workers.46 The great majority of entrepreneurs, however, could not hope to reach the staggering number of forty looms—nor even the twelve
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looms that Antoni Serra & Co. had when it became the first royal cotton manufacture in Spain in 1741.47 During the first decades of the industry, manufacture was mostly in the hands of families of entrepreneurs and their commercial houses to make the growth and success of the industry possible.
The Family in the History of Calicoes: The Commercial House The trust and obedience inherent in family businesses comes across most clearly in the concept of the casa comercial, literally “commercial house.” The casa comercial often overlapped with the family household as well as its more legal nomination, the company or compañía.48 All over Spain, the commercial house’s basic principles were familiarity and solidarity “without limits,” a slogan that seems more fit to place on a family’s coat of arms rather than a business contract.49 Relatives provided the commercial house with what a number of scholars have called “social capital”—the support and networks of trusted relations essential for all aspects of business that underlay family-run firms. These social networks were based on principles of trust and mutual reciprocity, all that made the commercial house, in the words of the historian Fernand Braudel, “one of the most successful forms of associations.”50 Just like in the home, the organization of most commercial houses depended on individuals, who were usually bound together by family ties; specific duties were based on a hierarchical and sex-based division of work. More often than not, a patriarch headed the commercial house. He assigned various tasks in the factory to his male blood relatives, or they acted as brokers in their own cities or beyond. The reliance on family proved especially valuable when selling calicoes overseas in the American Spanish colonies. The patriarch dispatched male relatives to important commercial entrepôts across the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic to supervise the distribution of calicoes to costumers and send any profits back to Barcelona. Trusted relatives in trade centers sent confidential reports to the home office about new calico patterns that might predict changing tastes in fashion.51 Brothers, sons, and nephews too young to travel abroad received training by undertaking duties in the commercial house according to their age and abilities. Even elderly relatives carried out minor tasks, such as hawking the firm’s goods in the city streets. Women relatives also played important roles in the commercial house. The wife brought her dowry, which could provide the initial investment to
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establish a firm.52 Mothers, daughters, and sisters often stayed home in Spain, running the day-to-day business while husbands and sons traveled to major commercial centers in Spain and America.53 The success of a commercial house often depended on a social capital that made it resemble a family more than an impersonal business arrangement among partners. In his study of the Alegre & Gibert Co., historian Pierre Vilar concluded that the key to the commercial house’s success and longevity lay in “the fact that they acted as family members rather than as individuals.”54 Yet not all members of a commercial house were blood relatives. In fact, the constitution of the house itself encouraged the association of unrelated persons, who in turn brought their own family networks and contacts.55 Oftentimes, when members of the commercial house were not blood relatives, marriage served to permanently fuse these new business contacts. For example, a wife might bring her family’s business ties to the husband’s firm, or marriage might bring the husband into the wife’s family’s commercial house.56 This was the case of Maria Gibert, daughter of the merchant Agustí Gibert. In 1714, Maria married Miquel Alegre, a Barcelona paraire, or cloth draper, later involved in exporting Catalan products to America and the owner of a famous calico factory. Maria facilitated her husband’s contact with her brother Agustí Gibert, with whom Alegre formed a compañía or casa comercial in 1724. Maria Gibert’s knowledge of her husband’s business allowed her to take over his business activities after his death in 1736 and to form an association with her son-in-law, Manuel Guàrdia, for the sale of Catalan products and imported calicoes from his shop in Madrid.57 The structure of the commercial house was spread throughout all of Spain. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the partners of the first calico factory first became a commercial house organized in the form of a company (companyia in Catalan) to establish their factory. On August 25, 1736, Jacint Esteve and two partners, Josep Sala and Jeroni Aranyó, formed Esteve & Co. to establish a calico factory.58 The three partners put up the money to cover the expenses of purchasing cotton yarn and dyes, renting workshops and bleaching meadows, paying the workers’ salaries, “and anything else the factory needed.”59 Aranyó did little more than invest his money—that is to say, he was only a silent partner. Sala had administrative and commercial duties, whereas Esteve had charge of the manufacturing process. The companyia hired a calico printer from Marseilles named Joan Benet Huvet to teach Esteve the secrets of the calico-printing process.60 By contracting the French Huvet, Esteve & Co. sought to overcome the principal technical limitation that had prevented the
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establishment of calico manufacturing in Spain: mastering the process of printing cotton cloth with brightly colored patterns.61 Of the three main parts of calico making—spinning the thread, weaving the cloth, and printing the calicoes with dyes—the most crucial part was the printing of the cloth with engraved blocks.62 The expert on dyeing was the fabricant, the only person who knew the secret of “making the colors,” or creating the mixture of mordant and thickener that ultimately determined the different colors of the cloth.63 Barcelona’s entrepreneurs had long purchased good-quality cotton thread from Maltese merchants, and the city’s artisans could weave, bleach, and dye cotton cloths. Yet since at least the late 1720s, attempts to master the technic of calico printing had failed. Huvet would now be able to share those secrets with the partners of Esteve & Co. Unfortunately for the new company, it appears that the Frenchman’s premature death dealt them a fatal blow.64 The factory closed its doors on July 21, 1737, less than a year after the company’s establishment. During the summer of 1737, when the Esteve & Co. factory folded, Antoni Serra, a merchant (negociant) and son of a stocking knitter, established a manufacture “of calicoes, tapestries, handkerchiefs and other things” in Barcelona’s Sant Pere neighborhood, which for centuries had been home to the city’s textile industry.65 As with the first calico factory, the second factory hired a foreign fabricant, a Swiss named Pedro Genus. Likewise, three partners formed Serra & Co.: Serra himself and two Barcelona merchants and clothiers (paraires) named Esteve Canals and Bonaventura Canet.66 But unlike the Esteve factory, the Serra factory survived the first year and grew quickly. Within two years, it moved from its original two small workshops to a larger building of 832 square feet, located in the same Sant Pere neighborhood.67 The factory was puny compared with the Madrid Royal Factory of Santa Barbara, which in 1744 occupied a building of 149,145 square feet plus its own garden. We do not know the size of the first factory, but Serra & Co, the first royal cotton manufacture, only had twelve looms and thirty-seven workers in 1739. This was about the size of the third calico factory, Glòria & Co., which also dates to the late 1730s. In the following decade, Francesc Clota’s factory of 48 looms and 117 workers was considered large, although it was half the size of Sebastià Canals’s 1746 factory, which had 100 looms and about 300 workers.68 The relative smallness of factories would become a future mark of the Spanish calico industry. Even a large factory building of the booming 1760s, such as Canaleta’s on Carrer de Sant Pere més Alt, was
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barely 2,200 square feet.69 As long as the industry remained located within Barcelona’s city walls—such as the crowded Sant Pere neighborhood—its factories would not be big. In their tiny new space at the Serra & Co. factory, twenty-five weavers with twelve looms wove the fabrics on which the fabricant printed the colorful calico patterns. The survival of the factory was now certain. When its founder Antoni Serra died in 1743, his two other partners simply replaced his name with their own. The renamed Canals & Canet Co. factory would remain in business for another five decades. The success and longevity of the Serra & Co. calico factory and its successor depended on its reliance on social capital. Serra’s other two partners, Esteve Canals and Bonaventura Canet, brought to their company valuable connections to the city’s artisanal and commercial community, which were more important than their financial capital. Serra’s factory was already in business the year before Canals, and Canet joined him in establishing Serra & Co. Canals and Canet facilitated finding clients for the factory’s calicoes and obtaining access to the highquality cotton yarn used to make the cloth. The largest investor, the clothier Canals, was married to Mariàngela Martí, whose dowry consisted of half of the capital that her mother had in the draping company.70 Eventually, he owned three shops, where he may also have sold calicoes made at the Serra factory.71 The second partner, the broker Canet, was the son-in-law of the broker Jaume Ferrusola, who was the Barcelona agent of Maltese merchants, the principal importers of the cotton thread essential to make the calico cloth. In addition, in 1739, the year after the establishment of Serra & Co., Canals opened a clothiers’ shop with Canet’s brother Pere, who in 1742 married Canals’s daughter, Gertrudis.72 In 1740, upon Antoni Serra’s death, the one-year-old Serra & Co. became Canals & Canet Co. When Canet died in 1747, his widow Magdalena took over his duties alongside Canals until the latter’s death in 1756, when his widow Mariàngela stepped in. But after a few months, the two widows decided to end their partnership after they found themselves unable to reconcile their disputes.73 After buying out Magdalena Canet’s part, the widow Canals continued to run the factory until her death in 1763, when her son Joan Pau took over.74 He had mastered the technic of calico printing, and in 1770 he published a book on the subject, which contained recipes for colors.75 Under his direction, the company quickly expanded and entered its most glorious period, selling calicoes across Spain and to the American colonies until it closed in 1795, fifty-eight years after Serra had founded the original factory. From its distant beginnings as Serra & Co., the history of Canals & Canet Co. points to an essential trait that would characterize the
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Spanish calico industry: calico companies were essentially family businesses. Two circumstances contributed to this situation. First, the company’s demands were such that family ties appeared essential among partners who were active in running it (as opposed to mere investors), to the point that unrelated partners often established family links or eventually parted ways. As in the example of Canals & Canet Co., occasionally family interests even superseded other interests, resulting in poor decisions, a change in direction, or even the end of a business. In these companies, economic interests were inextricably bound with family interests. Second, for practical and cultural reasons, in both large and small factories, the company director behaved as a patriarch. Shared direction was possible, but there was a tendency for one individual to assume the principal direction of factory operations. He would often assign relatives to key positions in the company. Upon the patriarch’s death, frequently widows, sons, or sons-in-law would take over the company’s direction. As commercial houses, calico companies depended on their extended webs of family connections for everything from access to credit, technology, and raw materials to supervisors and workers, brokers, and skippers. In short, family ties could not only guarantee a business success, but also assure its very survival. Those ties fostered notions of duty and trust implicit in family relations that proved essential to calico firms’ efforts to adapt to market changes and acquire all kinds of information crucial for success in business.
Artisans, Family and the Company in the Spanish Empire Despite the sharp contrasts between the short-lived Esteve & Co. and the successful Serra & Co. factories, their histories shared a business culture ingrained among Barcelona’s master artisans and merchants, who formed the bulk of the future calico businessmen, as reflected in table 1.1.76 During the first decades of the industry, more than two-thirds of investments in calico companies came from artisans such as Table 1.1 Professional origins of early calico investors (1740–1760) Profession Master artisan Merchant Fabricant
Lliures invested
Total investment (%)
152,830 62,150 8,000
68.5 28 3.5
Source: Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera,” 76.
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the three partners in the Esteve & Co.: one esparto maker (Esteve) and two glassmakers. Likewise, two of the partners in Serra & Co. were master clothiers, although clothiers’ activities were often closer to those of traders like Serra. Nearly one-third of investments came from merchants, which included both wholesale merchants known as mercaders, commercial brokers (corredors), and smaller traders.77 No other institution reflects artisans and merchants’ approach to business better than the companyia. The structure of the company had long been attractive to artisans in large part because it allowed the pulling together of small investments in business and trade activities. Men and women of humble means, as well as the wealthy, made money at a reduced risk in a variety of activities in which they could not otherwise participate. In particular, artisans and merchants found companies an effective way to raise resources to establish businesses, such as calico factories. The small size of their companies made it difficult to amass spectacular riches, but in return, it allowed for diversification of activities that spread risk. The threat that their business might fold did not have to mean personal bankruptcy. Given the widespread appeal of foreign calicoes, the lure of success remained strong enough for many to try their luck even after failing—as in the case of the partners of Esteve & Co., whose bankruptcy did not end their participation in the calico trade. The relative modesty of these businessmen is also true of the early calico factories themselves, which were on the whole rather modest enterprises, although not unlike calico manufactures elsewhere in Europe. One way to gauge this is to consider their initial investments or the size of their workforce. If compared with the huge royal factories of the first half of the 1700s, most calico factories seem tiny.78 As James K. J. Thomson has demonstrated, the calico industry in European cities tended to be about the size of Barcelona’s. In 1719 London’s twenty-three calico manufactures had an average workforce of twenty-eight workers. Later in the century those numbers increased, but not by much: Neuchâtel’s calico factories had an average of forty-seven workers in 1760, and in 1787 Prague’s average was seventy-eight workers, which was almost identical to the average in French factories in 1806. Very large factories in Mulhouse and Geneva had an average of 267 and 235 workers, respectively.79 French royal factories such as the one in Villeneuve, in Languedoc, had almost 3,000 workers; Abbeville, established in 1665 during Colbert’s ministry, had nearly 4,000 workers in 1728.80 The calico factory of the Swiss Jean-Rodolphe Wetter, which employed about 600 workers in 1762, was considered exceptionally large.
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As to initial investments, the main building of the French royal factory at Abbeville erected between 1709 and 1712 cost 300,000 livres, equivalent to 750,000 Catalan lliures. Very few calico factories anywhere came close. The starting capital of those of the large calico factories of Robert Peel in England and Oberkampf in France was barely the equivalent of 100,000 lliures.81 In sharp contrast, the three partners of Serra & Co. established their factory with 8,000 lliures.82 When the Serra factory moved to a larger building in 1739, it costed only 2,734 lliures, although it allowed the manufacture to stay in business for more than half a century.83 Both sums were considerable for the average master artisan, who in mid-century could aspire to earn an annual income of between 60 and 100 lliures.84 On the other hand, these investments were modest sums when compared with the 36,000 lliures that Miquel Alegre, one of Barcelona’s richest merchants, and his three partners put up in 1717 to establish their large companyia.85 According to Lidia Torra, in the first part of the eighteenth century, companies with investments of 20,000 lliures or less were considered modest firms. During the first half of the eighteenth century, 76 percent of Catalan companies fell in this category.86 As the calico industry grew, middling artisans and merchants relied on relatively modest sums from acquaintances and relatives to purchase basic equipment—most of which was widely available, often secondhand, to hire a few workers and to rent a space to set up shop. The first factories of the 1730s and 1740s established the model for all future calico factories. From the start, the character of their organization and functioning was essentially that of family businesses. Throughout the history of the calico trade, the presence of parents and children, husbands and wives, and other relatives in most factories was so widespread that household and business often overlapped. In addition, these businesses would establish professional partnerships and commercial networks through existing family ties or by establishing such ties through marriage. At a more fundamental level, the family provided a model for how these companies were run and how its members should relate to one another. Even when there was no existing kinship or marriage tie, the family would shape everything from the roles assumed by the heads of the calico companies to their relationship to factory employees, the company, and business partners. Simply put, these early modern companies sought to replicate certain aspects of a family, which they considered absolutely essential for the proper functioning and ultimate success of any business. Understanding these familial relationships will therefore shed light on the character of Spanish calico companies and the decisions that secured their success—or led to their failure.
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By the 1760s the Spanish calico trade centered in Barcelona was on its way to becoming the most innovative industry in the Iberian Peninsula, ready to embark on its rapid transatlantic expansion that would culminate at the turn of the century. At its height in the 1780s and 1790s, calico factories gave work to thousands of men, women, and children who produced millions of meters of fabrics of all qualities and prices. Royal authorities, economic and political writers, and contemporary observers hailed the rapid success of the industry. Its achievements were all the more impressive given the initial failure of the first factory, whose rapid demise seemed an inauspicious beginning half a century before. In the next chapter, I will examine how the ideal of the family, which aimed at providing for not only the material but also moral and emotional well-being of its members, shaped the development of the calico industry. This double aspect of the family extended to the formation of calico companies, where economic benefits were inseparable from the moral commitment expected from their members that only relatives could offer.
Chapter 2
The Personal Is C ommercial: Women and Family in the R ace to Make Calicoes
T
he lives of the families in the calico trade offer an exceptional perspective from which to examine the ties between industry and empire. Families played a central role in the enormous migration of people who crossed the Atlantic after 1492 to conquer and settle the new colonies.1 In the next few centuries, families also featured prominently in the formation of political and economic elites in the Spanish empire.2 The importance of the family in the economic and political thought in the early modern Atlantic world is less known. Scholars have generally focused on the actions of individuals in the study of commercial relations across the Atlantic. From the perspective of the individual, the story of these commercial relations has often been the story of male entrepreneurs—merchants, shopkeepers, and brokers— working before the public eye, busy at La Lonja (La Llotja in Catalan), or the stock market, traveling to America and throughout Spain. Historians have thus studied this business world in opposition to the world of the “informal” economy—of the family, and of the work of women, children, and marginal men such as foreigners and the elderly. Yet the day-to-day lives of family members in the Spanish calico trade reveal that these divisions were far more fluid than is implied by the opposition of formal and informal. The family mattered, not simply because it was a vehicle for demographic changes or personal connections but because within the informal world of the family, emotion and sentiment combined to shape the economy and
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its institutions. In fact, the history of calico families reminds us that the interaction within the family was far more dynamic than the term patriarchy supposes, and this in turn points to a more dynamic relationship between family and empire; ordinary family actions could have an impact on the workings of an empire.3 Men and women’s tasks changed according to the needs of the family enterprise. When necessary, roles reversed: women could head the business when male relatives were absent, and despite patriarchal ideas, men frequently delegated their duties to women. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the structure of the family allowed interchangeable relationships by uniting economic and moral interests. It was this close and interchangeable relationship in the setting of the family that offered women a more prominent role in the development of the calico industry. The first section of the chapter examines the economic model that the family represented and its combination of material and moral interests. The second part studies this economic model in the practice of the Glòria & Co., one of the oldest and most successful of the early calico companies. The third and final section of the chapter analyzes how this family-based model of economy allowed entrepreneurs to build the commercial networks necessary to stay in business and export calicoes to the Spanish American colonies.
The Economic Model of the Family in the Spanish Empire The seventeenth-century Spanish writer Pedro Fernández Navarrete stated that “kingdoms are nothing but a large and extended family” and that the king, as the head of the household, should be a father to his subjects.4 Early modern authors like Fernández Navarrete were well aware of the connection between family and empire, because to them the family was a microcosm of the empire. Spanish authors defined both family and empire as two forms of “dominion”: the household, which was headed by the father, consisted of the wife, children, servants, and slaves; the empire, which was headed by the monarch, consisted of territories in Spain and abroad, which were themselves composed of families (figure 2.1).5 Political writers refer to the management (nemein) of each of these two dominions or households (oikos) as the basis of an empire’s economy (oikonomia). In this way, the two dominions—the family and the empire—depended on each other. Moreover, the notion of family in early modern Spain served as the ideological bases upon which contemporaries understood
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Figure 2.1 Allegorical depiction of the Spanish empire, 1746 Source: From Lorenzo Boturini Benaducci, Idea de una nueva historia general de la América Septentrional (Madrid, 1746). Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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economy and empire. The Spanish empire itself was a large family consisting of the mother—the metropolis—and its children—the colonies. In 1656, to Englishman James Harrington, the early American colonies needed to remain dependent on the mother country, just like “babies who cannot live without sucking the breast of their mothercities.”6 Such a maternal relationship between colonies and the mother country reached the level of moral duty between Spain and its American colonies. In the years before many of the Spanish colonies broke from Spain in the early 1800s, a number of publications blamed the upstart American children of Spain as vicious and ungrateful.7 If it was important for the empire to govern its families and do it justly, it was also crucial for each household of the empire to justly manage itself because, as Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla wrote in 1597, such households are the true model of the government of the republic, which “will enjoy prosperity if it is well governed by its families.”8 This was reminiscent of the Roman law where the household becomes the measures of all units, even of the empire itself. Thus, to preserve the empire, good management of the dominium is crucial.9 But who governs the dominium? To answer this question, early modern political writers turned to ancient Greek authorities as well as to Roman jurists. Aristotle’s approach toward government in terms of masters ruling over slaves was one cited authority, as was Xenophon, particularly his Oeconomicus, which proposed a division of work in the household where everyone had his or her place.10 Although not incompatible with Aristotle’s Politics, Xenophon’s understanding of the household is one that offers some agency to the household members under the control of its head.11 In spite of the unfavorable legal status of women under Roman law, some Roman jurists shared Xenophon’s view of the household. In fact, the publication in 1577 of an anonymous work of Roman jurisprudence, the Consultatio veteris cuiusdam iurisconsulti [Legal Opinion of an Ancient Jurist; 450–506 BCE], confirms this view that husband and wife needed to have an equal share in the management of the household.12 The Consultatio regards the government of the dominium as the one shared between wife and husband. It condemns the action of the husband who makes decisions regarding the wealth of the household while disregarding the opinion of the wife; the author of this work also points out that the husband’s administration of the wife’s patrimony is only licit because the wife willingly accepts this arrangement.13 Therefore, while the head of the household—or dominium—was responsible and in charge of the government—or imperium—such successful government could only come about if and when all members of the household performed their duties accordingly.
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Thus, all the families of the empire had to obey and work for the monarch, who acted as the paterfamilias. In the ordinary family, the wife and children had to obey the head of the household and work for the benefit of the entire household. However, while in the large family that Spain and its colonies represented, the subordinated families can never take the place of the head of the household, in the family formed by the husband, wife, and children, the wife can—when sufficiently instructed—exercise full authority, even at times over her husband.14 In 1813, the jurist Francisco Martínez Marina, while conceiving the family (and paternal authority) as the basis of the formation of any nation, still emphasized that “the paternal authority rests with two [individuals]; because it is not peculiar of the father, and it does not belong to him exclusively: the mother exercises the same superiority and empire over their children . . . because the power and authority of the parents comes from their obligation to provide for the conservation and perfection of the products of the conjugal society.”15 Thus, at the base of the sexual division of work in the household, partnership is needed for the full and perfect functioning of the household.16 And the perfect functioning of the household was at the base of the good functioning of the empire. In the management of the household, economic interests combined with moral requirements. Thus, the paterfamilias held the reins of the dominium, but he could not sustain the family alone. His moral authority had to be shared with his wife, the mother of his children.
Women and the Ideal of the Family Throughout the early modern period, the basis of the household and its management had a double nature: the material aspect of the survival of the household, and the moral and emotional well-being of its members. This emotional and moral part of the binary was particularly important for the overall harmony of the family. In fact, in many of the works of the writers of the Enlightenment, inherent in the concept of the “rational man” was the possibility of man being able to govern his human passions and desires to become a useful and productive member of society. This miracle could only happen in the perfect and harmonic setting of the family, including the work of a family’s women.17 There was agreement among thinkers of the Enlightenment that sentiments were the realm of women. Many of them—Mary Wollstonecraft included—also believed it was more difficult for women than for men to control their own passions18, because, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated, sex shaped a woman’s physical and
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social being.19 Women’s inability to control their feelings would affect their behavior in social and family life. It was the job of men to assert control and authority over women. Yet when it came to the realm of the household and the home, women’s emotional nature was helpful, even desirable. Women’s emotions and feelings made her more sensitive to the needs of the family and the husband. They instinctively knew what was right for each family member and would willingly sacrifice their own individual well-being for the sake of the family. The union of moral and economic components in the family meant that women were active members of the household, with an important role in society at large. The presence of the family in early modern industry and trade translates into the union of affective, moral, and economic interests, all of which allowed women to find enough authority to participate in trade and commercial activities.20 Spanish writers from economic writers to poets underscored the connection between women’s moral duties to serve their husbands and raise their children and their economic duties to administer—or, as they preferred to call it—govern the household. Women’s work was part of the duties assigned by God to women and men to serve civil society.21 As the Spanish economist Lorenzo Normante pointed out in 1785, women’s work included “observance of the conjugal obligations”— where the husband was expected to observe monogamy and the wife was expected to breast-feed her children—as well as the work done to increase the wealth of the household.22 In the latter case, the husband would work in whatever profession he had trained for, while the wife acted as the good administrator at home.23 The renowned poet Fray Luis de León addressed this point by quoting both Xenophon and the Bible in his highly influential La Perfecta Casada (The Perfect Wife) of 1583, which was reprinted many times through the eighteenth century. Fray Luis argued that the perfect wife should care for the upbringing of the children and the well-being of her household; for this reason, she should “govern her household and decide what needs to be done and provided for each day.”24 The image derived in part from the book of Proverbs (31:11–16), which describes the perfect wife as follows: The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her, so that he shall have no need of spoil. . . . She seeketh wool and flax and worketh willingly with her hands. She is like the merchants’ ships; she bringeth her food from afar. . . . She riseth also while it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household, and a portion to her maidens. She considereth a field, and buyeth it: with the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.25
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Similarly in 1720 Fray Antonio Arbiol Diez praised the wife who diligently got up in the middle of the night to make sure her household was in order—a woman who never went to bed before making sure that her children and husband were fed and provided for.26 Arbiol also stated that the wife’s government was crucial to the household because no matter how much the husband earned, if the wife was a poor administrator, it would bring the household to ruin. It was the husband’s obligation to educate his wife in the orderly participation in his business to serve as an emotional and economic partner.27 In 1799 Francisco Antonio Galavis, a priest in a remote town in Cáceres, southeast of Castile, also conceived marriage as common “work,” where the social and economic spaces combined.28 In this sense, the economic efficiency of the wife as an administrator was united to her job in ensuring the moral survival of the household. The education of women to become perfect mothers was at the center of religious thought as well as part of the agenda of the writers of the Enlightenment, in France as well as in Spain.29 Such efficient administration and moral care that women provided as mothers was the quality that the late eighteenth-century writer Josefa Amar y Borbón praised in women. Amar relied on Xenophon’s Oeconomicus to state that oikonomia, understood as the management of the household was women’s own science.30 She agreed with Xenophon that a wife’s task as an administrator consisted of spending those possessions that “usually come into the house through the man’s actions.”31 Thus, a woman’s good housekeeping would make the difference between a household’s wealth and poverty. Finally, the wife should also be the companion and confidant of her husband, advising him in his decisions and problems. Once again, a woman’s moral authority allowed her to have a voice in the economic matters of the household because both areas—morality and economy—were one in the context of the family. The author, however, emphasizes that it is the husband who ultimately makes the decisions. As an eighteenth-century manual on political economy advises, a husband needs to listen to his wife because she often has “good and trustworthy ideas.”32 At the center of this economic society lay the important financial component of women’s contribution to the family at the moment of marriage. Brides brought their own family networks and contacts to their new union. But the bridegroom also expected his wife to enter conjugal society with a dowry, as the extensive literature concerning the social importance of the dowry in early modern societies makes clear.33 The economic impact of the dowry in the business world has been less studied than its social importance. And yet, the dowry
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appears to be crucial when applied to the practical case of the formation of commercial houses of the Spanish world, because it sometimes provided entrepreneurs with the initial financial capital to establish their enterprises. According to the medieval Catalan jurist Francesc Maspons, the dowry was “what the wife or others in her name offer or promise to the husband for the maintenance of the needs of the family.”34 Under some inheritance systems, the dowry became equally important to or even more important than the family inheritance. Laws regarding dowries and transmission inheritance varied in the different regions of Spain and Spanish America. In the American colonies, the different virreinatos (viceroyalties) followed the Castilian model of inheritance, which was increasingly based on an indivisible inheritance, the mayorazgo, or entailed estate.35 In the mayorazgo, the state was passed on to the next generation by primogeniture, usually the male heir.36 Yet this practice was more often limited to the nobility; for many other groups, inheritance was partible, and daughters received an equal share of the family estate. Accordingly, Castilian inheritance laws tended to be protective of the married woman who, if separated from her husband, was entitled to half of the gains and property accumulated after marriage. Under Catalan law, families followed an indivisible inheritance, which favored the eldest son—or if there were no male heirs, the eldest daughter—before the rest of the heirs. This male-favored system of keeping the estate intact left women more vulnerable in terms of economic survival, and thus they depended more on a dowry as the only material guarantee of some kind of economic independence. Moreover, when marriage ended—either by legal separation or death—the woman could claim as her property the product that the dowry yielded during the time of marriage. The dowry system in Catalonia became powerful, and it worked in some cases as a form of inheritance.37 The dowry helped the material maintenance of the family while the husband was alive. When the wife became a widow, her dowry ensured her economic independence, which would in turn guarantee her moral well-being. The dowry was thus the last thing a woman would sacrifice for the family’s sake. When in 1709 Marianna Jericó, wife of a Barcelona artisan, maker of instrument strings (corder de cordes de viola), refused to use her dowry to pay her husband’s debts, she was making a statement about the limits of a wife’s commitment to the family economy.38 Her sister-in-law Teresa Salvat i Jericó also demanded that her husband’s debts be paid with his own property and not with her dowry. Salvat’s dowry was substantial for an
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artisan; it included 100 lliures (equivalent to the annual salary of a skilled artisan), two trunks of linen and clothes, and 25 lliures of escreix, or dowry augmentation, offered by the husband.39 Outside the dowry, women would be considered the users rather than owners of their families’ properties. This role as custodian could revert during widowhood to the woman, permitting her authority. This structure of the family and the role of women are characteristic of other European countries and of the guild system, in which the widow of a master was allowed to have complete legislative action of the enterprise and pay taxes, but her role was only to preserve and transmit the workshop and shop for the male heir of the master.40 If the dowry retained a flexible nature and could be used when the household economy was in crisis, women’s role in the economic household could change from administrator to provider if the household’s well-being was in jeopardy. This happened, in the majority of cases, when the commercial house faced disaster, usually when one of the partners died. In these circumstances, women were able to unite the roles of administrator and provider. Briefly put, motherly, and thus moral, responsibilities had forced these women to undertake these activities, even though they were not the duties usually expected of them. According to Fray Luis de León, just by being a virtuous and perfect wife, a woman became a mujer de valor (courageous woman), capable of overcoming woman’s weak nature for the sake of her family.41 Likewise, the seventeenth-century priest Gaspar Astete, in a treatise on “the government of the family,” stated that the mother, particularly if she had become a widow, should be a “virile woman” in all aspects of her maternal duties.42 In colonial Spanish America, women were also expected to carry on and secure the future of their husbands’ enterprises by performing their domestic duties well by remarrying or by advantageously marrying off their daughters.43 The recognition of the wife’s share of authority in the household may not have challenged the authority of the husband, but it points to the close connections between moral and economic concerns, and between informal and formal activities in industry and trade at home and beyond. Early modern economic thinkers did not distinguish between the individual obligations that merchants as independent tradesman had and their moral duties to their families and communities.44 The union of affective and economic interests is reflected in Spanish descriptions of marriage as the “conjugal society” (la sociedad conyugal) or “matrimonial company” (la compañía matrimonial), a contract that combined sentiment and economic interests and activities.45 Marriage was thus often a contract—a society—because in
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theory as well as in practice, it functioned as an economic society.46 As Paloma Fernández and Juan Carlos Sola-Corbacho have pointed out, some Catalan merchants in Cádiz spoke of their marriage as a “good partnership,” and one merchant in particular “considered that marriage was based on common goods or gananciales (capital accumulated after getting married),” and for that reason was similar to a commercial enterprise.47 The importance of women’s work, and the material and emotional contribution to the new family were at the basis of the formation of commercial houses in the early modern Spanish world. One of these commercial houses crystallized in the form of the companyia, the form of commercial association most characteristic among Catalan merchants and entrepreneurs. In the companyia, the familial component and the role of the wife and daughter of the entrepreneur shaped the trajectory of the commercial house.
The Practice of Managing the Household: The World of the C OMPANYIA Central to the character of the calico trade was the traditional Catalan business institution of the companyia, or company, which at once relied on and encouraged business partnerships based on family connections. The companyia, first created in northern Italy in the thirteenth century and present in Catalonia since the fourteenth century, became a commercial and industrial association popular among artisans and merchants.48 It had sustained the great late medieval expansion of Catalan commerce, which made the Crown of Aragon a Mediterranean power extending its domain South to the kingdom of València and East to Sicily, the kingdom of Naples, and the duchy of Athens. Even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the companyia remained attractive in large part because it allowed the pulling together of small investments in business and trade activities. During the eighteenth century, the companyia proved fundamental to the birth and subsequent growth of the calico trade. Although characteristic of the Catalan enterprise, the company extended throughout the Spanish world, and in particular, it became common as a form of commercial association in early modern Castile.49 The Catalan word companyia and the Spanish compañía, like the English word company, derive from the Latin cum panis (with bread) so that, according to Fernand Braudel, the company was “a close association in which everything was shared—bread and risks, capital and labor.”50 In fact, among the definitions in the Spanish Diccionario de Autoridades (1729, 1732) for compañía, we find “the same as family”
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and “the same as husband and wife.” In all three—company, family, and marriage—their proper functioning depended on solidarity, commitment, and trust. As in a family, individuals in a company had legal and moral obligations to do their part for the welfare of their association. Not surprisingly, in early modern companies, most partners (companys in Catalan, compañeros in Spanish) were either related by blood or had family members working for the company.51 Related or not, each company partner often mixed his personal and financial interests in a way that reminds us that “the personal is commercial,” not just political. This is particularly true of small companies with a small core of partners—in calico companies usually no more than six—expected to sacrifice their time, effort, and even personal wealth for the sake of the company.52 In addition, partners in early modern companies relied on an extended network of contacts that constituted a form of social capital that accompanied each partnership. Those contacts were essential to obtain information, long-term credit, and commercial opportunities. The overlap between family and company is especially clear in the case of the Glòria & Co. calico factory. In 1738, two years after the opening of the first calico factory, the forty-eight-year-old merchant (comerciant) Bernat Glòria established the third such factory in Spain.53 His social origins are typical of early factory owners. He was born in 1691 at the height of Europe’s initial calico craze. His father was a velvet maker, and so was his younger brother Jeroni. His older brothers, Jacint and Francisco, became a veil maker and military man, respectively. Bernat turned instead to the world of commerce. He became an administrator to the merchant José Francisco Comelles, with whom he established a company to trade in textiles. Glòria, aware of the appeal of foreign calicoes, tried to tap this demand by producing high-quality calicoes. As he later asserted with pride, since 1728 he had unsuccessfully tried to master the technic of calico printing, spending “abundant assets in money to imitate the cloth and composition of the foreign imports.”54 Finally he resolved the problem by doing as the first two factories had done: hiring a foreign fabricant. A year after establishing his factory, Glòria boasted to the officers of the Board of Trade that his calicoes had nothing to envy imported ones: “as far as colors are concerned we equal them, and as for prices we will make them as cheaply.”55 Bernat married Isabel Pico, which allowed him to establish familial and commercial ties to important mercantile family in Barcelona. Isabel’s father was the merchant and honored citizen Ramon Picó, who would become Bernat’s major partner. Isabel’s mother was
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Marianna Guàrdia, whose father and brother were well-known calico businessmen. In 1730, Bernat and his father-in-law established a company.56 In 1735, Barcelona’s merchants appointed Glòria and Picó as their agents to lobby the government for the establishment of a branch of the General Board of Trade in their city.57 The history of the Glòria factory followed a familiar pattern. In 1739, Glòria established a companyia with five other partners: three merchants, and Josep Sala and Jeroni Aranyó, former partners of the defunct Esteve & Co.58 Glòria & Co.’s fabricant was also foreign-born, the German Johan Frederich Hartung.59 With its thirty-four looms and seventy-eight workers, the factory of Glòria & Co. was larger than the expanded Serra factory of twenty-four looms and fifty workers. Unlike the latter, Glòria & Co. was not located in the Sant Pere neighborhood but rather near the port on Carrer de la Merced, perhaps even adjacent to the opulent two-storied, eight-bedroom house where Bernat and his wife lived with their son, Bernat’s three brothers and their wives, and later his young second cousin Onofre. As in the traditional homes of artisans, in 1741 Bernat Glòria established a cloth-draping factory with cloth draper Rafel Guardans in the ground floor of his house. Friends, clients, and competitors alike referred to the casa Glòria, which referred not only to the Glòria house but also to its household and home.60 This symbolic (and to some extent physical) union of house and company reminds us of the multiple connections between the family or household/casa and of the company/companyia. Early modern definitions of family did not restrict the family to those bound by kinship or marriage. At the same, time the word for partner (company) applied to members of the company as well as to the husband and the wife (as well as to members of a religious order or an army). In the household the sharing of food among its members (related or not) recalls the Latin root of company, meaning “with bread.” This communal sharing established bonds and expectations that transformed its participants into a real family. A contemporary court trial underscores this idea. When a testimony to the trial was asked whether Antonia Cabesa’s son-in-law and his father were part of Antonia’s family/household, he asserted that indeed they were because they all ate together “in the same table forming a single family.”61 The overlap of family and company may also explain the reasons why, even though the notion of “company” implied the coming together of friends and equals, a patriarch tended to run the company as in the family.62 Glòria, a man of strong character, personified the company patriarch in the way he handled the calico factory and its
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related businesses. Although the lack of a notarized agreement among the Glòria & Co. partners leaves us in the dark about how they divided their duties, from its early days, Glòria was clearly the head of the company, and his “silent partners” had no direct participation. He assigned key positions in the factory to relatives. Glòria’s twenty-oneyear-old son, Josep, took up administrative duties. Josep also supervised five mancebos-escribientes, or secretaries, as well as a treasurer and a general administrator. Perhaps more important, Bernat’s younger brother Jeroni learned from the factory’s German fabricant “all the manner of manipulating the manufacture, the secrets of composition of colors, the quality and quantity of the materials and other things that will be shown to him and which the said printer will have to teach him” in order to become a “perfect painter.”63 Bernat’s son Josep was more interested in the commercial aspect of the business. Thus he may have been happy that his uncle Jeroni wanted, or was willing, to take on that task. In only two years Jeroni had become the fabricant, and as such had become responsible for contracting the labor force for his factory. In addition, he may also have had a hand in some of the factory’s commercial dealings, given his previous knowledge of maritime insurance in the American colonial trade. Bernat’s efforts to have his brother Jeroni become the fabricant responds to a general desire among factory owners to ensure that the knowledge of making dyes for calico printing stayed within the family.64 The death of Jeroni in 1744 posed a major challenge to the factory. No one else in the factory knew the technic of calico printing. The company partner Josep Sala, who had trained as fabricant alongside Jeroni, had gone off to establish his own factory. Yet by this time, knowledge of calico printing had begun to spread among the city’s artisans. Glòria & Co did not have to find a foreign fabricant; instead, they hired local artisan Josep Mestres to “paint” the factory’s calicoes. At age sixty-five, Bernat Glòria looked to a younger generation of relatives to train someone to assist his son after his own death. And so in 1756 Onofre Glòria, the son of Bernat’s cousin Jaume, who had emigrated to Majorca in the early 1700s, came to live in the Glòria house. Initially Onofre trained as the factory’s accountant. Under the close supervision of Bernat, the young cousin rose from his position as bookkeeper and eventually became the factory’s chief administrator. Meanwhile, Bernat’s son Josep progressively tended toward the selling and marketing of the calicoes, the world of politics, and commercial contacts. When Bernat Glòria died in 1762, he must have had the satisfaction of knowing that he left the future of the family business in
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good hands. His thirty-nine-year-old son Josep, himself a husband with three daughters, became the new patriarch of the casa Glòria. Josep left his cousin Onofre in charge of the day-to-day managing of the factory and traveled throughout the Iberian Peninsula to do business with Josep Cantallops, his nephew and a future calico factory owner in Mataró, north of Barcelona.65 Josep Glòria also continued his father’s campaigns to secure the monarchy’s support and obtain privileges for the calico industry.66 Josep and Onofre established their own company in 1776, which they renewed in 1781, a year before Josep’s death. As the new head of the family, Onofre appointed Tomàs Serrallach, his son-in-law and a former worker in the Glòria factory, to the duties previously held by Josep Glòria. Under Onofre’s leadership, the Glòria factory lasted until 1793, when its bankruptcy ended the long life of the casa Glòria. The story of casa Glòria tells us of the organic relationship between the household, the family, and the business world of the company in one of the first calico enterprises in the Spanish world. Although the women of the family were behind the scene, they still remained at the center of the company through their networks of contacts and with their dowries. In the case of the Canals & Canet Co. discussed in chapter 1, the dowry of Mariàngela Martí, which consisted of half of the capital that her mother had in the draping company of her deceased husband, allowed Esteve Canals to enter the company as the largest investor.67 Mariàngela’s dowry probably gave her certain control over the finances of the company, and when her husband died in 1756, she was able to run the factory until her death in 1762.68 In the examples of Glòria & Co. and Canals & Canet Co., family ties either facilitated commercial opportunities or helped strengthen partnerships with merchants and shopkeepers. Those networks were built on familial and personal connections that ideally supplied the necessary trust in commercial activities. Such expectations of solidarity, commitment, and trust among family and company members also extended to partners in trade that were not related by blood.
Family, Networks, and Atlantic Trade In the world of early modern commerce, and particularly in longdistance trade, trust was absolutely necessary to make up for the many limitations of premodern transportation and communications. This was especially evident in the case of commercial agents. Companies doing business in distant locations relied on agents to act in those
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commercial centers. For example, calico companies in Barcelona trusted their commercial agents, whether in Cádiz or America, with such delicate matters as finding clients among the merchants and shippers in Andalusia who conducted much of the Spanish trade with the New World. Commercial agents in Madrid not only coordinated sales of calicoes in the royal court but also their distribution in the Castilian heartland and sometimes as far as Cádiz.69 Likewise, agents in Lisbon sold wine and liquor in Amsterdam and other northern European ports to purchase the fine cotton cloth used for the most expensive calicoes produced in Barcelona. Commercial agents also cashed letters of exchange and remitted payments and valuable information back to the company’s home office. Commercial agents had long allowed Catalans and merchants from other peripheral Spanish regions to participate in the American trade. Since the sixteenth century, Catalan agents settled in Seville, the port from which all Spanish shipments sailed to America. When Cádiz took over the monopoly of the Spanish colonial trade in 1717, Catalan agents moved there and continued their previous activities.70 During the 1740s, changes in Spanish commercial policies made those agents especially important to the rapidly growing calico industry centered on Barcelona. In 1740, all fleets that controlled the American trade were suspended, and instead the Crown licensed single ships to trade with the Spanish American colonies. Although vessels headed across the sea they still had to register their cargo at the Casa de la Contratación (House of Trade). The use of single-registered ships was a radical break with the past, providing more frequent services than the old fleets and attracting more traffic. Between 1681 and 1709, 793 vessels left Cádiz; between 1710 and 1747, that number had risen to 1,271, an increase of 60.3 percent.71 Between 1739 and 1754 alone, 753 single ships crossed the Atlantic, consisting of an average of 47 per year, compared with 30 ships per year between 1717 and 1738.72 Commercial agents allowed calico companies to take advantage of this unprecedented opportunity. Whenever possible, company patriarchs appointed relatives as commercial agents, just as they did with key factory positions. If no relative was available, a company partner seemed the next best choice. In both cases, trust appeared to be more important than experience. After all, in the calico family businesses, as in most small enterprises, all members might be called on to act “as owners, as entrepreneurs, as sources of skill and expertise, as collaborators, as participants in network and learning activities, and as agents of their own careers.”73 But when neither a relative nor a company partner could perform those
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duties, family businesses turned to their commercial networks to find a trusted agent, who might in time become a family member. For example, in 1756 Canals & Canet Co. were able to have a relative acting as commercial agent in Madrid after Canals’s granddaughter, Rosa Vicent, married the Catalan merchant Antoni Nadal i Darrer, whose family had a long-standing business partnership with the Canals.74 Other times, Canals & Canet Co. was not so lucky. When Canals & Canet Co. had an irreconcilable dispute with their commercial agent in Cádiz, a Catalan merchant named Angel Ferau, they were forced to appoint Josep Sabater, another Catalan merchant living in that port, to make Ferau return the company’s calicoes or pay for them.75 Scholars have long noted the tendency among Spanish merchants to rely on commercial agents who were compatriots. Basques usually established such business partnerships with other Basques, Catalans with Catalans, Andalusians with Andalusians, and so on. Historian David Ringrose has described early modern Spanish commerce as made up of urban and regional economic networks “with individuals who mediated between local and long-distance, rather than as a national economy.”76 It was a practice not restricted to the Spanish world during the eighteenth century, as Gayle K. Burnelle has demonstrated for the merchants of Rouen. Burnelle’s study has illustrated how commercial networks in early modern Rouen allowed the vibrant industrial world of the city to connect with the colonial markets.77 By understanding this “overlapping and interconnecting urban and socio-geographic networks that operated over varying distances,” it has been possible to understand how basic information and technology was transmitted, connecting local industry and individuals to a larger historical context.78 Yet as will be seen, those social and geographic networks were more often than not built on familial ties that resulted from commercial partnerships. Bernat Glòria, who was busy running the family business from Barcelona, appointed Jaume Campins as his commercial agent in Cádiz.79 The choice of Campins was not fortuitous. Since at least the late 1730s he established himself in Cádiz, where he later sold calicoes made in a factory he had established with five other partners in 1746 in Mataró, north of Barcelona.80 During the 1740s and 1750s, Campins acted as commercial agent of more than a dozen other wellknown Catalan merchants and calico manufacturers, some of whom had strong ties with Glòria. The best known was Francesc Clota, perhaps the greatest Catalan merchant of the middle decades of the eighteenth century, who was knighted in 1744 and in 1749 became a calico manufacturer.81 In addition to Glòria, Clota and Campins
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shared business connections in the American trade.82 In 1746 Clota and Campins were coowners of the small ship (pinque) San Francisco de Paula, which made one of the first expeditions by a Catalan-owned ship from Cádiz to America.83 A year later Campins and Clota together invested in the construction of the saetia Nostra Senyora de la Concepció to trade with America. In 1748 Campins and Glòria invested in the construction of yet another ship, Nostra Senyora de la Merced, which sunk off the coast of Havana.84 Before Campins arrived in Cádiz, he had relied on the Catalan merchant Pere Marsal i Sans to act as his commercial agent. As the other Catalan merchants, Marsal invested in ships participating in the American trade. In fact, he was a lender to the second expedition of the ship La Perla de Catalunya, the first Catalan vessel to trade directly to America. For newly arrived Catalan commercial agents in Cádiz, Marsal’s familiarity with the Catalan mercantile community could prove of great help. Thus when the master stocking knitter Josep Sabater arrived in the Andalusian port, he quickly established connections with Marsal. Sabater’s career as a commercial agent in Cádiz was typical. In 1747 he and his brother-in-law became partners in the Formentí calico company, which would eventually become one of the largest in Spain.85 As a company member, his principal duty was, from his base in Barcelona, to supervise the export of the company’s calicoes to Cádiz. Without leaving the Formentí factory, in 1750 Sabater joined Pujades & Llauger Co., which exported Catalan products to Cádiz and America.86 After initially relying on a commercial agent in Cádiz, in 1753 Sabater moved to the southern port to act as commercial agent for Pujades & Llauger Co., for the Formentí factory, and for his relative Pau Sabater, of Anglí & Sabater Co. Two years later, Canals & Canet Co. appointed Sabater as their commercial agent. By tracing the activities of two key commercial agents—Campins and Sabaters—it is possible to see the formation of commercial networks that connected calico companies to the Atlantic trade. These networks derived from commercial partnerships in which joint participation in a company provided certain familial elements—above all, a sense of trust and common interest. Through these business partnerships, we find networks of partners in large- and medium-size calico companies, master artisans, and merchants involved in long-distance trade, commercial agents, and the building of commercial ships. And so Glòria was a partner with Clota, Clota with Campins, Campins with Marsal, Marsal with Sabater, and Sabater with Canals and Canet. All of these individuals belonged to multiple networks that intersected
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with each other and spawned new networks that allowed calicoes to reach America via Cádiz. In this context, it is worth considering the growing efforts of men like Bernat Glòria to establish direct trade between Barcelona and the American colonies as part of a strategy to integrate the activities of commercial agents in Cádiz more directly within the company. Throughout most of his professional life, Glòria and several of the major exporters of calicoes to America remained actively involved in lobbying the Crown to allow greater commercial opportunities to Catalan entrepreneurs. In the 1730s, the lobbying efforts of Glòria and his father-in-law ultimately led to the creation of a branch of the Royal Board of Trade in Barcelona, which over the years played a crucial role in promoting and regulating the calico industry and trade with the colonies. In 1752 Glòria secured a royal privilege to import cotton from America. A year later, the leading merchants of Barcelona commissioned Glòria and his brother-in-law Ramon Picó to petition the monarch for the creation of a privileged company enjoying a trade monopoly with the Caribbean ports of Puerto Rico (San Juan), Santo Domingo, Santa Margarita, Cumaná, and La Guaira. Ferdinand VI’s 1755 privilege established the Reial Companyia de Comerç de Barcelona, of which Bernat and his son Josep were members.87 Company members paid only half the taxes on most exports and imports, although their vessels still had to register their shipments in Cádiz.88 Although Glòria’s lobbying efforts continued, he died three years before the 1765 decree, which for the first time ever granted direct trade between Barcelona and a number of Caribbean ports. By 1762, the year of Glòria’s death, the booming Spanish calico industry was on the verge of a spectacular rise. During the 1760s, the proliferation of factories would force the creation of legislation to regulate production.89 Exports to the colonies were rapidly growing, and with greater access to the colonies in the 1760s and 1770s, calicoes would soon reach virtually all major Spanish colonial ports. As the historian James Thomson has stated, even if the American trade was not a reality in the first decades, “it should be noted that the illusion of exploiting this market was clearly high in the list of priorities.”90 Likewise, there were other powerful illusions behind the birth and expansion of the calico trade. There is no doubt that much of the success of these companies depended on sound business decisions, although the right connections were often no less important. Yet in following the lives of these ambitious men—and a few women—one senses that money alone did not drive them to strive for success. When Bernat Glòria died in 1762, he bequeathed his family more than a
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profitable business and other material goods. In 1744 the overachieving Bernat received from the king the coveted noble title of ciutadà honrat, or honored citizen, for his commercial and industrial activities, an honor his descendants would be able to claim for themselves.91 Other distinguished businessmen and merchants were able to bequeath similar honors to their families. The notion of building a business that would bring wealth and titles to the family would remain a powerful incentive, one that moved men and women in the calico trade to achieve extraordinary feats.
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Chapter 3
A Microcosm of Families: Workers, Factories, Owners
In 1779, the Spanish journalist and Anglophile Francisco Mariano
Nipho praised Catalonia’s industrial achievements by asserting, “If Catalonia were all of Spain, Spain would overshadow England.”1 Nipho’s exaggerated claim had a grain of truth. The cotton industry had transformed the urban landscape of Barcelona in the second half of the century. Calico factories of all sizes replaced the characteristic vegetable gardens of neighborhoods such as El Raval, in the southeast part of the city. At the end of the century, factories in Barcelona employed more than 10,000 individuals and fostered a culture of prosperity and conspicuous display of wealth among Catalans.2 This alone gave Barcelona the flair of a cosmopolitan, industrialized city that many observers praised.3 Arthur Young, the Englishman known for his travel diaries, invited other Spaniards to act like the industrious Catalans by establishing prosperous factories of wool and cotton textiles.4 In particular, it was the cotton industry that prompted Young’s and other visitors’ admiration for Barcelona’s burst of industrial activity. In 1792, the French Baron de Bourgoing observed how Barcelona owed its “splendor and wealth” to the activity of its many calico factories, of “which there are up to 150.”5 Calico factories symbolized industrial growth, and the coveted fabric yielded wealth and prestige. As the century advanced to its end, ordinary folks could afford a wider variety of the inexpensive calicoes that the many local factories made. It was one thing, however, to own calicoes; it was quite another to be part of the wealth and prosperity that calico making brought to those who manufactured this fashionable
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fabric. Yet this was a dream that many ordinary Catalans hoped to achieve. The fame and wealth that some factory owners enjoyed had lured young workers into the field with the hope of perhaps becoming another Bernart Glòria, a Joan Pau Canals, or even an Erasme Gònima, the latter considered “the man of the century” for his extraordinary rise to riches.6 The Spanish monarch had granted the three factory owners the titles of honorable citizen, knight, and baron, respectively.7 All three men had become wealthy entrepreneurs who could afford a stable of servants to assist them and nicely equipped carriages to take them up and down Barcelona’s newly built boulevard, Las Ramblas. Las Ramblas, today a crowded boulevard frequented by tourists, street artists, and pickpockets, until 1778 had been a road lined with shops all the way from the old university to the port alongside the wall dividing the medieval city from the outlying gardens and open plots of land at the foot of Montjuic. In 1778, Las Ramblas underwent a transformation into a visually festive place of public entertainment, aesthetically matching the promenades of the Royal Gardens of Aranjuez, located near Madrid. By the 1780s, Las Ramblas had become a fashionable place for gathering and a site for the public display of wealth and ostentation. In the summer, all kinds of people strolled up and down the street in the evening, or they sat in one of the more than 300 chairs that the city placed under the many trees planted on the promenade. Workers as well as people of leisure chatted until late in the evening as they watched the stream of carriages, such as those of Joan Pau Canals.8 To ordinary individuals, Canals and other wealthy factory owners may have resembled French aristocrats traveling on fancy carriages along the Champs Elisée.9 Proud factory owners without titles or carriages still displayed their most beautiful calicoes on their factories’ balconies on days of processions and religious holidays. During Corpus Christi processions, thousands of people passed by the dozen calico factories in the Sant Pere neighborhood, where they could gaze in awe at the beautiful, rich calicoes hanging from the balconies. Even more people gathered just to enjoy the fabrics “of superior taste” covering the entire facade of the Magarola factory on Carrer dels Tallers in the neighborhood of El Raval.10 The Magarola factory was one of the many calico enterprises that had sprung up during the 1770s and 1780s in El Raval, where the city’s industrial success in the eighteenth century left its greatest mark. Located in the southern part of Barcelona and separated from the rest of the city by Las Ramblas, El Raval had changed dramatically since the 1750s. Initially a neighborhood where convents and vegetable gardens were concentrated, throughout the 1770s, city permits
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allowed the opening of new streets, unnamed roads were paved and factories erected, and new structures were built to house the growing population of factory workers.11 In 1783, three new factories were built, two old factories were remodeled, and about eleven were enlarged.12 Of all the streets of El Raval, one in particular saw a spectacular rebirth: the Carrer Trentaclaus, paved in 1776, with its Teatro de la Comedia—the new city theater—and later, in 1792, with one of Barcelona’s first cafés.13 It was also on Trentaclaus that the first Spanish aeroestatic balloon took off on January 30, 1784 from the bleaching field of the Sirés factory, one of the largest calico manufactures in the area. The chronicler Rafel d’Amat described the curious onlookers watching from crowded terraces and balconies as well as from the tower of the nearby church of Santa Maria del Pi. Carriages took ladies to the bleaching field, where the creme of Barcelona’s society paid half a duro to enter to witness the event. Those who could not afford the entrance fee watched from the walls south of Trentaclaus as the balloon rose in the air and glided off toward the Mediterranean.14 The spectacle of the aerostatic balloon hovering over the city of handsome boulevards, where men and women showed off their taste in fashion, tell us of the sense of prosperity and trust in progress described by Nipho. In large measure, the spectacular growth of the calico industry was responsible for fostering such a vibrant atmosphere. In this chapter, I will examine how the men and women of the calico trade made this unprecedented industrial growth possible by following models of familial—and paternal—relationships. The model of the family, and the authority of the father, was deemed as the ideal to foster relations between factory owners and their workers. Thus, the familial nature of companies of manufacturers for calicoes also translated into the relationships between employer and workers. Hence, when we study the cause of the unprecedented growth of the calico industry, we find individuals organized in familial ways more than we find social groups or institutions. This chapter will also elucidate how the less familiar story of these calico factories became central to the better-known history of the last great period of the European colonial domination in America. The first stage from the 1750s to 1767 witnessed the first major expansion of the calico trade led by Catalans skillful in the art of printing cloths and by factory owners, many of whom had accumulated riches from shipping and trade with America. During the second stage from 1767 to 1778 the industry’s continued growth coincided with the multiplication of small factories practically everywhere in the city.
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Partly in reaction to this uncontrolled growth in such a profitable industry, large factory owners tried to regulate calico manufacture. Finally, during its third and final stage from 1778 until 1796 the industry faced the challenge created by its extraordinary growth in demand for calicoes all over Spain and America. In 1796, right after these years of greatest success, war with England ultimately brought about steep decline in the calico trade and the end to half a century of spectacular rise. The scene of the aerostatic balloon taking off and flying toward the Mediterranean Sea will also bring us to the main focus of this and following chapters: how families of entrepreneurs were able to export their networks and strategies to the main commercial centers of the Spanish American colonies. Thus, the history of the rise and fall of the calico industry is closely tied to the expansion of commerce across the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. Although I will discuss the role of family and commerce in the clothing of the Spanish empire in later chapters, it is important to note that the three stages of the Spanish calico industry correspond to similar phases in the history of commerce between Spain and its American colonies. The first period of factory growth roughly coincided with the initial phase of commercial expansion to America during the first half of the eighteenth century, when the Andalusian port of Cádiz presided over a trading system whose origins dated back to the late fifteenth century. The second phase of rapid expansion in Barcelona’s calico industry paralleled the first challenges to Cádiz’s monopoly in the 1760s, when a limited number of ports received permission to trade directly with specific destinations in America. The calico trade’s third phase coincided with the 1778 royal decree that increased the number of Spanish ports that were allowed direct traffic with centers in the Spanish American colonies, a period of great commercial activity that came to an end with the wars of independence in the first decades of the nineteenth century.
Early Success, 1750‒1767 In the 1740s and 1750s, a number of individuals who had enriched themselves by trade with the Spanish American colonies in the 1720s and 1730s turned their attention to what was still the relatively new calico trade in Spain. Merchants such as Joan Pongem, Francesc Clota, and Miquel Alegre, all from Barcelona, are just a few examples of the type of merchants, experts in the Atlantic trade, who decided to try their luck in the new calico industry. In addition to Barcelona, Mataró, a port city active in the trade with Andalusia and therefore
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with the Atlantic, was also home to several future factory owners.15 The Mediterranean coastal town of Mataró was part of what the historian Albert García Espuche has named “the crown of Barcelona,” namely, a territory surrounding Barcelona that, together with the big city, formed one of the largest and most dynamic urban and commercial centers in the Iberian Peninsula (map 3.1).16 From Mataró emerged personalities such as Rafel Peramàs, a factory owner who made and sold his calicoes through extensive networks of family contacts in Gibraltar, Lisbon, and Cádiz. From these cities, Peramàs sent his calicoes to America during the 1740s and 1750s. In 1754, his son Esteve also established his own manufacture, selling calicoes throughout Spain and America, probably with the aid of his brother Rafael, a merchant established in Cádiz in 1756.17 Individuals from the towns of “the crown of Barcelona” arrived at the capital ready to explore the new possibilities that the calico industry might offer them. They came from places such as Calella, Canet, Argentona, and Mataró, and they found in El Raval a new area in which to establish their premises. These were men like the future factory owner Joan Baptista Sirés, a native of Argentona who arrived at Barcelona in 1747 at the age of fifteen to become an apprentice to a dealer of dry chemicals and dyes.18 Another future factory owner who came to the capital was Francesc Fraginals, a veil maker, also from Argentona. Either in Argentona or Barcelona, Fraginals met veil maker Pau Sirés, who introduced Fraginals to his brother Joan Baptista. Joining Fraginals and the Sirés brothers would be Josep Aymar, a master wool clothier and dyer from Mataró, who learned calico making in Barcelona during the early 1750s. In 1756, he was already instructing others in the secret of combining dyes for printing calicoes.19 Six years later, Aymar was put in charge of making dyes at the Josep Ribas calico factory.20 Aymar became a good friend of Fraginals, who introduced him to Joan Baptista Sirés.21 In 1766, Sirés, Fraginals, and Aymar agreed to form a three-year partnership to make and sell “calicoes of all kinds” under the name Joan Baptista Sirés i Companyia, or simply Sirés & Co.22 The place that the members of Sirés & Co. chose for their first calico factory was a modest building in El Raval, on Carrer de Montealegre, across from the convent of Sant Agustí. The factory was probably a small building with a few rooms large enough to house its fourteen looms and about thirty workers.23 A year later the three partners moved factory production to a larger building on Carrer de Sant Pau, also in El Raval. Fraginals’s wife Rosa sold the calicoes in the family shop on Carrer de la Boqueria; Sirés’s brothers Llorens and Pau
48
Map 3.1 Iberian Peninsula Source: Prepared by Darin Grauberger, from the Cartographic Services at the University of Kansas
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contacted new clients and transported calicoes to their destinations. Aymar’s relatives facilitated contacts with Maltese merchants, who sold the company spun cotton thread. Initially, the Sirés factory made calicoes to sell locally, but soon they sold fabric all over Spain and its American colonies. In 1765, Barcelona’s calico companies welcomed the greater possibilities of exporting to the Spanish colonies in America made available by a royal edict that liberalized the American trade. That edict conferred on Barcelona and eight other Spanish ports for the first time ever the privilege of trading directly with the ports of the islands of Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Margarita, and Trinidad.24 It was also in 1765 when members of the Junta de Comerç—the Board of Trade formed mainly by Catalan merchants and owners of large calico factories—began to discuss plans for importing American cotton to be spun in Catalonia. As we will see, these two initiatives proved crucial in creating further links between Catalan manufacturers and Spanish America. Within fifteen years, calico manufacturers would see America as essential to the continued growth of their businesses. Encouraged by the possibility of selling calicoes to a growing number of customers both near and far, in the late 1760s, a greater number of entrepreneurs established factories of all sizes, making printed calicoes of all kinds and within all price ranges. Calico making was no longer associated with large spaces and foreigners who knew the secrets of making exquisite colors and designs. In the 1730s and 1740s, factory owners had to hire foreign experts from France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, countries where early local production of calicoes had developed during the first part of the century. Although these skilled workers tried to keep their trade as a secret, progressively Barcelona artisans became more and more familiar with color-making technics. In the 1750s, Barcelona artisans like Josep Aymar were skilled enough to mix the right type of dyes that, when printed on cotton, resulted in calico cloths. In 1756, Aymar had taught his art to Francesc Iglesias, who in turn taught the factory owner Olaguer Iglesias.25 Years later, Olaguer passed his knowledge to his son Josep.26 In 1769, the factory owner Francisco Ribas received a royal privilege to teach printing technics to a number of young apprentices, the first among them was his own son.27 The spread of calico-printing knowledge also reached the silk industry. In the 1760s and 1770s, Isidro Català, a veil maker whose parents were from Mataró, fostered among Spaniards the craze for painted fabrics a la xinesca or in the Chinese style. The Barcelona Junta de Comerç described Català’s silk fabrics as “exquisite” and
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praised his colors for being “liquid and sharp, without mix of oils or gums.”28 Català’s revolutionary technic consisted of applying the dyes used in the calico industry to the printing of silk fabrics, mostly to make women’s scarfs or kerchiefs. In 1769, Català asked the king for a privilege to teach silk printing. On May 28, 1769, he obtained permission to teach his art to his cousin Ignacio and later to individuals sent by the Junta de Comerç to his factory.29 For his service, Charles III granted Català a pension of 200 pesos a year for life. By 1766, the knowledge of dyeing calicoes had extended so widely that the owners of the largest factories advised the Junta de Comerç to enact ordinances regulating the trade. Among the twenty-six articles of the new calico ordinances, two stand out: one required every factory to have a fabricant examined by the Junta in the making of dyes; another imposed a minimum of twelve looms per factory to produce calicoes (figure 3.1).30 The ordinances, which Charles III approved in 1767, would later apply as well to the painted silk industry (figure 3.2). Within months of the ordinances’ approval, the Junta licensed twenty-one fabricants. A year later, only four out of twenty-nine factories did not comply with the new regulations but remained in business.31 However, the true number of unregulated, and therefore illegal, factories was probably much higher, and as will be seen, such illegal factories grew quickly in number in the coming years.
Years of Growth, 1767‒1778 The propagation of the small factories was evidence of the success of their companies—namely the casa comercial or commercial house. In fact, by forming companies to establish their small factories, humble manufacturers were following the successful model of large factories. With its core of only a few partners (who were often related), large manufacturers had established an industry that demonstrated a tremendous ability to make products in great demand. These partners relied on the trust and obedience of the members of their commercial houses as essential to the success of their businesses. Such loyalty was particularly expected from partners and clients who were also family members. It was a simple idea remarkably easy to replicate, as large factory owners realized with increasing frustration. Thus at its most basic, the difference between small and large factories was one of scale. Small factories used the same strategies as large ones, including employment of family members. And so, despite the efforts to impose a minimum number of looms in each calico factory, establishing a small factory was becoming
51
Figure 3.1 Catalan fabricant, 1801 (fabricante in Spanish): “Have you seen La Pona? [typical Catalan woman’s name]” Source: From Colección general de los trages que en la actualidad se usan en España: principiada en el año 1801 (Madrid, 1801), 73. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
52
Figure 3.2 “Charles the III, King of Spain &c. In the Robes of the New Order of Carlos Tercero, from the Original Picture of Antonio Velázquez” Source: From Henry Swinburne, Travels through Spain, in the years 1775 and 1776 (Dublin, 1779), frontispiece. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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increasingly cheaper. Unlike the first manufacturers in the 1740s and 1750s, who invested no less than 15,000 lliures, by the 1770s and 1780s, start-up costs had generally dropped to 5,000 Catalan lliures.32 Modest businesses could cost even less. In 1788, Bartomeu Rovira and three associates established a calico factory with only 300 lliures—approximately three times the annual salary of a factory worker.33 Aspiring factory owners saved money by purchasing secondhand tools or by using terraces on the roofs of apartment buildings to dry calicoes instead of buying or renting a separate building.34 Thus men and women from all sorts of backgrounds sought to get a share of the profits from the rapidly expanding calico trade. During the 1770s, small businesses run by a few relatives and acquaintances inundated the city. Master artisans remodeled their workshops or turned their apartments, terraces, and balconies into tiny, improvised “factories.” Numerous surviving building permits document how more ambitious individuals transformed their apartments and small houses into factories. As Barcelona’s master artisans had done for hundreds of years, Bernart Llorens lived above his tiny calico factory in a two-floor house.35 The master turner Pablo Vidal used the workshop in his own house to engrave printing molds for his friend Miquel Llorens, who owned a small factory.36 The veil maker Francisco Dordal dyed and printed calicoes in his modest apartment on Carrer Mònec in the Sant Pere neighborhood. He used thirty-four printing blocks that he had bought for only 3 lliures at an auction selling the goods of a factory owner who had died.37 The cotton cloths he printed probably came from the workshop of his forty-year-old brother Josep, a veil maker who wove cotton cloths with two looms in his rented apartment, also in the Sant Pere neighborhood.38 Likewise, the weaver Tomàs Viure made cotton cloths with four looms he rented from Miquel Buxadell’s factory at a cost of 10 lliures annually for each loom.39 Such small enterprises thrived because demand for calicoes was so brisk. As Francisco Torres, the owner of a four-loom calico factory, affirmed in 1778, he was happy to produce cloths “for whomever gave him work.”40 Despite the 1767 ordinances, throughout the 1770s, small factories kept selling calicoes to whomever wanted to buy the desired fabrics. Unregulated silk-printing factories had also increased their numbers; some of their owners were the recipients of royal favors. The brothers Tramullas, who owned a small printed-silk factory, received a privilege to teach silk painting, which they did to about twenty-five pupils. The sisters Francisca and Isabel Abril were famous in Barcelona for their painted silks, despite repeated fines imposed on them by the
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Junta de Comerç for operating without a license. (As women, they could not legally obtain such a license.)41 In October 1784, the silk printer Rita Gerle petitioned to the Junta to become the first woman fabricant in all of Spain, precisely to avoid the situation faced by the Abril sisters, who had to move their business every time they were fined. Although they denied her the title of fabricant, the Junta examined Gerle and allowed her to run her own factory.42 Significantly in 1787 the Junta stopped implementing the 1767 ordinance requiring factory owners to have a minimum of twelve looms. Whether forming small or large companies, when partners drafted a contract for the establishment of a factory, they entered a “company and society,” two terms that had familial connotations. Marriage was some times referred to, in legal texts, as the “conjugal society” or the “matrimonial company.”43 In small factories with only two or three partners and where most of the workers were immediate relatives, the trust and obedience expected of family members seemed especially necessary for the survival the business. But even in large factories, with five partners and dozens of workers not closely related, the core of the business remained family-like. When in 1770 the Sirés factory merged with the Alegre & Gibert Co., the resulting Sirés & Co., with its large factory on Carrer Trentaclaus, still functioned as a small family business. Sirés remained the head of the factory. He contacted clients and dealt with brokers and merchants from whom the factory purchased dyes, raw cotton, and yarn on credit. He also kept the factory’s account books with the assistance of a journeyman who received 100 lliures a year. Sirés’s annual salary was 350 lliures, only surpassed by the fabricant Aymar, who earned 50 lliures more.44 In the 1770s, the fabricant was still the most important person in the factory—even more so than the main owner. For that reason, like most fabricants, Aymar was required to become part of the “family” that the factory represented, living in the factory premises, which he did, together with his own family. The third Sirés partner, Fraginals, remained the director of textiles; he supervised the sale and distribution of calicoes to clients.45 In addition, his wife, Rosa, sold the fabrics from the “large shelves and a table” in Fraginals’s veil maker’s shop.46 Rosa, who had been a secondary character in the factory, became a partner with full rights in December 1770 after her husband died, leaving her his part of the business.47 In this way, the death of one of the partners did not alter the structure of the association. Moreover, the continuation of the association after one of its members’ deaths followed along family lines. Not only was Rosa the wife of a deceased partner, but her daughter married a relative of Aymar’s, and Sirés may have been a distant relative of Rosa’s husband. However, it was Sirés,
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and not Fraginals’s widow, who took on Fraginals’s former job supervising the sale and distribution of calicoes, a task that Sirés took on in addition to his work as the factory’s administrator. The working environment inside the Sirés factory also fit the mold of familial relations. At the top of the power structure, members of Sirés & Co. had their own relatives participating in the making of calicoes.48 Sirés’s brother Pau lived and worked in the factory, and later his nephew Pere Antón, a certified fabricant, came to work there. His sister Antonia who lived in Cardedeu, about 30 miles north of Barcelona, hired weavers to make cotton cloth for the factory. Their brother Antón delivered calicoes to shopkeepers around Catalonia. When Antón died in 1771, the youngest brother, Llorens, took Antón’s job transporting calicoes for the factory. Another relative, Jacinto Sirés, became the factory’s principal agent seller in Vinaroz in the kingdom of València. In 1798, Pau Sirés, who had been living in the factory, went to help Jacinto as a merchant’s assistant in charge of all business correspondence.49 From the top to bottom, Sirés also made sure he presented himself as the caring father figure for his employees. He showed his generosity and concern toward workers by lending them money without interest to buy clothing, food, and medicine and to bury their children.50 He even paid to get his workers out of jail.51 Sirés tried to maintain the family environment for his workers by allowing many of his employees to labor alongside their family members, a characteristic of many other factories in Barcelona. In the factory, at least 25 percent of the workers were parents, offspring, or siblings of other coworkers. The number was probably much higher—the relationship among workers is always difficult to trace after because family members did not always have the same last name. Some of these families lived in the factory premises: the building on Carrer Trentaclaus allowed about twenty families of workers to live and labor in the factory. Besides its five rooms, which were large enough to house one hundred looms and printing tables, as well as space to store cotton and thread, the factory had living quarters for workers, a chapel, and an interior patio with two wells.52 The factory separated each working room as if it were a family workshop, which allowed for each room to have workers attending to a single task—whether it was winding thread, warping and weaving the cloth, or printing calicoes with engraved blocks. Therefore, each part of the calico-making process had its own space: the winders’ room, the weavers’ room, the painters’ room, and so on. Factory owners such as Sirés also sent parts of the calico-making process to family workshops off-site, creating yet another “family space” away from the factory.
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In the 1770s, the success of the calico companies, large and small, created new problems—in particular, the need for a steady supply of cheap cotton. To that end, on August 24, 1772, forty-two owners of large factories formed a company to import raw cotton from American colonies and to have it spun in the company’s headquarters on Barcelona’s Carrer de Santa Anna (figure 3.3).53 In exchange for buying the cotton at a reduced price, the factory owners had to surrender their spinning machines. After receiving a royal privilege in 1773, the venture became known as the Real Compañía de Hilados de América (Royal Spinning Company). In the 1770s, the company promoted technological innovations on the spinning of cotton yarn to keep pace with the factories’ demand. However, even though by 1784 more than 31,000 workers spun American cotton, the factory owner Miquel Formentí complained that shipments of cotton were insufficient and prices remained high.54 Catalan manufacturers therefore continued to rely on provision of North African cotton thread imported by Maltese merchants until the establishment of the first mechanized spinning factories in the early 1790s.
Unsuspected Heights, 1778‒1795 It was in 1779 that the journalist Nipho predicted a great future for Catalan industry. His vision of Catalonia overtaking England’s impressive industrial progress was inspired by the growth of the calico industry, which was entering its greatest moment. This multiplication of large and small factories in Barcelona coincided with the expansion of the calico trade throughout Spain and across the Atlantic Ocean. Those same factory owners opened manufacturing facilities in other parts of Catalonia and beyond. One such owner named Francisco Ribas made in 1778 plans to open a factory in Málaga.55 That same year, the Free Trade Regulation allowed direct traffic between thirteen Spanish ports, including Barcelona and fifteen Spanish American destinations. Thus, in addition to the Caribbean ports opened up for trade in 1765, now calico producers could sell their fabrics in places such as the River Plate Region, Mexico, and Guatemala. A year later, in 1779, the king granted thirty-six Catalan calico manufacturers privileges to establish new factories in Madrid.56 This measure reveals the growing demand for calicoes as well as the importance of the calico trade to the monarchy. Because Madrid was the main entrepôt linking northern Castile with La Mancha and Andalusia, the presence of Catalan manufacturers in the royal court guaranteed calicoes’ access throughout the kingdom.57
57
Figure 3.3 Cotton plant and seed, 1784 Source: From Joseph Quer, Flora española, ó Historia de las plantas, que se crian en España, 6 vols. (Madrid, 1760–1784), vol. 6, 501. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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Sales of calicoes increased to destinations all over the Iberian Peninsula, but exports to America rose to previously unimaginable levels. Between 1780 and 1784, Spanish factory owners and merchants exported an impressive 515,542 yards of calicoes to America through Barcelona’s port.58 These are remarkable numbers given the conditions under which this trade took place. Between 1778 and 1783, Spain joined France in supporting the American Revolution against England. But if the war prevented the sale of calicoes from reaching a higher ceiling, these hostilities did not have long-term negative consequences on the industry. On the contrary, according to the historian James Thomson, in the Spanish colonies, the war “led to a depletion of stocks and thus to the building of a strong demand for when the peace ensued.”59 The peace following the end of the War of the American Revolution in 1783 would prove the greatest—and the last—significant period of expansion. From 1785 to 1789, calico exports to America reached an all-time high of 4,704,948 yards. In 1784 alone, Barcelona’s factories produced 7,406,666 yards of fabric, making Barcelona one of Europe’s most important cities for calico making. In 1785, Paris made approximately 2,844,638 yards of calicoes, while Rouen turned out 3,326,039 yards—less than half of Barcelona’s output.60 In the same year, factory owner Maria Formentí described with astonishment to a client in Cádiz that there was such a “great consumption” of calicoes that merchants who wanted to export calicoes to America would take the cloths “away from the manufacturer’s hands” by doing the unimaginable: paying in cash for large shipments of calicoes, rather than the usual practice of buying on credit.61 In addition, calico companies preferred to sell the expensive type of calicoes to the colonies. Ninety percent of the total sales of calicoes to Spanish America were from high-quality calicoes known as pintats (pintados in Spanish), made of fine white cotton cloths, sometimes imported from Switzerland or the Netherlands, and then printed in Spain. These fine calicoes had elaborate designs, including scenes of landscapes or aristocratic pastimes.62 However, not all calico manufacturers were content with selling the more expensive fabrics to America. In 1785, Francisco Ribas, a partner in the Formentí factory, informed their client in Cádiz that despite an impressive growth in sales, entrepreneurs needed to further reduce the price of calicoes to attract more clients from the Americas. As he put it, “I am of the opinion, as you are, that the excessive price of our manufactures in general will diminish the consumption in our
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Americas. . . .; and yet, there is no lack of consumption and more ships are sent to provide for it.”63 Perhaps manufacturers and merchants had become overly confident in their ability to sell any calicoes. Such overconfidence may explain the one exceptionally bad year of 1787, when apparently calico companies overestimated the demand for their goods, which remained unsold in shops and warehouses.64 Nonetheless, by the end of the 1780s, demand for calicoes had recovered, and Barcelona exported more calicoes than any other fabric to the Spanish American colonies. By the early 1790s, the sale of calicoes had reached a point that seemed to make it immune from the effects of war and bad weather. Between 1790 and 1794, that sum rose to an unbelievable 7,789,088 yards.65 Calico manufacturers must have been convinced that the demand for their goods had no ceiling. The relationship between the liberalization of trade with the colonies and that of industrial expansion is not entirely clear. Initially, most calico factories did not sell large quantities of calicoes to the colonies. In addition, Spanish factory owners tended to sell calicoes of higher quality, and therefore of higher price, to America, whereas for clients in Spain, they reserved more of the medium-quality fabrics known as indianes. Unlike pintats, which were printed on imported cloth, indianes were printed on cloth produced locally and featured less elaborate designs than those in the pintats. For the Spanish market, calico factories expected profits to come from a greater volume of sales. However, exports to America sometimes reaped extraordinary profits—as high as 215 percent66—which would more than make up for the greater expense, effort, and risk involved in the transatlantic shipment. Whether the greater profits of the American trade or the larger volume of sales to the Spanish market drove the last great phase of expansion in the business of calicoes has been hotly contested.67
Coping with Success The potential fortunes to be made from the industry’s extraordinary success brought serious challenges to the calico companies and drove tensions high. Partners—even those who were close relatives—disagreed over how to run the factories to secure the greatest profits, which types of calicoes should be made for the different markets, and how to divide any profits among the various partners. Growing sales of cloths and the need to keep up a fast pace of production inevitably also caused tensions between factory owners and workers. As calico making became an increasingly profitable and attractive business and
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establishing a factory became cheaper, workers dreamed of leaving their demanding employers and becoming factory owners themselves. The familial nature of these businesses shaped how owners and workers perceived those problems, as well as the solutions they considered most appropriate to preserve the future success of the industry. The conflicts faced by the partners of Sirés & Co., as well as their painful resolution, were typical of other calico manufacturers. In 1780, at the beginning of the Sirés factory’s golden years, disagreements occurred between Aymar and Sirés on how to run the factory. Both partners shared the many responsibilities of managing their factory. Sirés took charge of the sales, credit, and general bookkeeping, while Aymar controlled the supervision and organization of work in the factory. However, it seems that Sirés had strong opinions about how to run the company. Perhaps he became too greedy, or maybe he wanted to increase his control over the factory’s management. Over the years, petty squabbles erupted, but the real explosion occurred in 1784, when Aymar asked for a salary increase. Sirés used this request as an excuse to dismiss him.68 Aymar and Rosa Fraginals complained that Sirés’s action was unwarranted. They further accused him of certain irregularities in his bookkeeping and demanded that he show them the factory’s books. Sirés refused. Confronted with his intransigence, Aymar and Fraginals sued Sirés in May 1785 before Barcelona’s Reial Audiència, or royal court of appeals, alleging that he had failed to pay them their share of the factory’s profits along with salary increases owed to Aymar. Sirés countered that his partners were suing him out of greed, because “he was now a man with large capital, worth 36,000 lliures.”69 In 1786, the court ruled in favor of Aymar and Fraginals. The presiding judges ordered Sirés to open his account books and pay his partners their fair share of the factory’s profits plus interest. This amounted to 1,001 lliures for Aymar and 6,402 lliures for Fraginals, which represented about a 300 percent return on the initial amount each had invested. In addition, Sirés had to give Aymar 700 lliures: 400 for Aymar’s annual salary plus 300 lliures to cover a raise owed to him for the last six years. Aymar never went back to work at the factory. The major changes in the leadership of Sirés & Co. confirm the tendency of calico companies to change personnel but retain a small core, often made up of relatives. After Aymar and Rosa Fraginals left the Sirés factory in 1785, Sirés increasingly relied on the help of his brothers. By 1806, Sirés, in his seventies, identified his older brother Pau as the head of the factory.70 For her part, Rosa Fraginals united with merchant and factory owner Francisco Marimón to establish the
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Marimón factory. By the late 1780s, Fraginals also began to include her son Pere Jaume in the Marimón Company’s affairs. Aymar went on to establish his own company, opening a small factory in El Raval with the help of his son.71 All the three enterprises blossomed into the late 1780s and early 1790s, in the midst of a period of wars. It was the peak of calico fashion in the Spanish world, and not even war and the inevitable disruption of commerce could stop entrepreneurs from becoming rich by pleasing their clients in Spain and overseas in America. The growth in the industry not only created tensions among factory owners, but it also made it harder for large factories to retain sufficient workforce to keep pace with production. In 1784, the Real Compañía de Hilados commissioned a report on this problem to three major factory owners: Mariano Rovira, Francisco Ribas, and the inventor of silk painting Isidro Català who was aging at that time.72 Not surprisingly, the report blamed the situation on the uncontrolled growth of the small factories: “In every corner of this city,” their report reads, “one finds that anyone is setting up a calico factory . . .; the entrances and the first, second, and third floors of small houses that can only house one or two printing tables have become the offices of this noble and important industry.”73 Small factories were easy targets, in part because it was impossible to ascertain the extent of their activities. The reports’ authors admitted that they “did not know where these factories were and the name of their owners,” but the fact that they did not comply with the Junta de Comerç’s regulations indicated their disrespect to all authority. More important, the report asserted that the owners of these small factories were runaway workers of former large factories: “It often occurs that, after missing a weaver from our factory rooms, someone tells us that he has set up three or four looms to produce cotton cloth calicoes to sell to whoever wants to buy them.” Such actions seemed incontrovertible evidence that workers were—in the report’s own words—disloyal, vicious, insubordinate, and unreliable. “The ambition of becoming independent” was such that some workers went so far as to steal tools from their employers’ factories to use in their new enterprises. Such “lack of courtesy and discipline,” the report warned, threatened factory owners’ authority over their workers and thus jeopardized the entire industry. At least one of the report’s authors may have spoken on this matter from his own experience. In 1771, Català was dismayed to learn that three of his journeymen had left his small factory right after Christmas Day, taking some “brushes and drawings” to establish their own
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premises.74 The offense was even worse because one of them, Josep Lavila, was the son-in-law of his longtime factory overseer and friend, Celedoni Estruch.75 According to Català, Lavila stole his tools to set up his own factory with the help of Lavila’s wife Rita—the same Rita (Gerle), who in October 1784 petitioned to the Junta to become the first woman fabricant in all of Spain.76 Ambition to take their share of the industry’s great potential for profit lay behind the alleged insolence of factory workers. To the factory owner’s chagrin, highly skilled workers found themselves in a seller’s market, aware that if they did not get a fair price for their expertise, they could offer their services to a competitor—or better yet, become their own boss. For their part, factory owners were afraid of losing valuable employees, and they resented the fact that workers routinely imposed their wills on the masters “with proud despotism, working how and when they pleased,” as Joan Baptista Sirés complained about Domingo Crous.77 Sirés hired Crous in 1784 to make the color indigo blue for penciling blau de perfil—a type of popular calico dye. However, according to Sirés, Crous spent his time doing proofs of reds, blacks, and violets instead of taking care of the bleaching meadows and the printing of calicoes, as he had promised to do.78 This was not the first time that Sirés felt betrayed by his workers. Between 1783 and 1784, years of peak production in the calico industry, he lost four of his most important skilled workers, and worse, they usually gave no advance notice, thereby making it almost impossible for him to find replacements before they left. The 1785 report of the Real Compañía de Hilados looked to the family for how the calico industry should correct the problem of workers’ disrespect. The owners of large factories firmly believed that only a paternalistic structure, one in which workers treated owners with filial respect and obedience, would save the industry from moral decadence. Factory owners and their foremen needed complete authority over all employees. The factory owner delegated part of his power to a small group of foremen, but ultimately, all workers depended on the father-owner. This hierarchical division of work and the subordination of workers was necessary, it was thought, to organize work in the factory satisfactorily. Thus, the foremen ensured workers arrived on time, were present at work, and labored according to the factory’s daily needs.79 According to the report, while the foremen controlled the workers’ daily performance, the factory owner’s authority helped to form “a class of enduring workers.” Thus, workers, “having entered the factory beardless, go gray working in it, loyal and faithful because of the love of their employers, who provide them with
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a continuous and secure mode of subsistence.”80 Yet regardless of what the royal companies thought, workers kept leaving their employers with the hope of establishing their own calico factories. In all factories, particularly in large ones, between 60 and 70 percent of the employees stayed less than a year.81 The paternalistic family environment thought so crucial to the success of large calico factories was reproduced in the smaller factories. In both large and small manufactures, fathers and sons, husbands and wives, widows and sons, and siblings owned large and small calico enterprises. When the factory’s name does not already underscore its family origins—“Rafel Arxer and Sons Co.,” “Ramon and Teresa Clossa Factory,” or “Widow Vicente & Co. Factory”—the extant archival documentation tends to confirm it. Manuel González owned a factory that manufactured printed silks, but it was his brother-in-law Jaume Pons who managed it.82 The calico factory of Martín Riera was partly managed by his wife, Rosa. Factory owner Mateu Farra had his son, his brother-in-law, and his grandson all working for him in the factory.83 In 1796, the Joan and Antonia Costa factory opened in an apartment the couple rented on the recently paved Carrer del Conde del Asalto. The Costas had their small calico factory on the second floor of a four-story building; the first floor of the same building was inhabited by another couple who were also factory owners, Francisco Babil and his wife Teresa.84 Likewise, in the 1790s, Joan Ricart and Josefa Pou married and established a calico factory on Carrer Riera d’en Prim. When Joan died shortly after, Josefa took over the business, which prospered into the first years of the new century.85
The Specter of War, 1796‒1814 Just as the calico trade was reaching unsurpassed heights, it also faced the worst threats from the effects of war on both land and at sea. What the factory owner Miquel Formentí called “the specter of war” made the search for the potentially high profits from the transatlantic trade also dangerously risky.86 In 1796, Spain declared war on Great Britain, and the British blockaded Spanish ports in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The war with England lasted until 1801, but hostilities broke out again between 1804 and 1808. Between 1808 and 1814, the French occupied Spain. Although the period of the 1790s and the first decades of the 1800s will be described in a greater detail in chapter 5, suffice it to say for now that this period of war effectively brought to an end the great period of industrial expansion between the 1760s and the early 1790s. The end of the war against England in
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1808 also coincided with the beginning of the Spanish American revolutions, which lasted until 1826 and reduced the exports of calicoes to the American colonies.87 Looking back at the period between the late 1700s and first decades of the 1800s, the hopes that Francisco Mariano Nipho had expressed for Spaniards in 1779 were only partly fulfilled. The calico industry and trade had certainly transformed Catalonia into the industrial powerhouse of the Iberian Peninsula, which had extended its business across the peninsula and across the Atlantic Ocean. That industrial and commercial growth had been spectacular, and perhaps Nipho himself could not have predicted the heights it had reached by the mid-1790s. However, the long period of war that followed unraveled that achievement for decades, and Spain as a whole would not recover for more than a century. Yet one of the legacies of this dynamic industry would be in its ability to create ways in which to provide a new group of consumers driven by the desire to possess fashionable clothing. As this chapter has illustrated, Catalan entrepreneurs were quick in identifying calico as a fabric with tremendous possibilities for sale in the Iberian Peninsula and the American colonies. By the early 1790s, Catalans could already claim a conquest of this insatiable calico market, after overcoming the initial limitations and challenges that this industry represented. What seems surprising is that they achieved such a feat by relying on simple, traditional ways of organizing themselves and their workers. As next chapter will illustrate, family and traditional work would also be at the core of the heated debate over fashion and luxury at the end of the eighteenth century.
Chapter 4
The Craze for C alicoes: Selling Fashion in Spain and America
I
n 1788, New Spain’s Board of Trade warned the Spanish king that a craze for calicoes was sweeping the viceroyalty’s principal cities as well as its countryside. Prohibitions against the sale of foreign goods had failed to stop traveling salesmen from peddling their fancy European wares in faraway villages. The foreign fabrics enticed even the poor and the humble, who gladly went into debt to acquire the same fashionable clothes worn by wealthier Europeans.1 Those who could not wait for the arrival of the peddlers asked merchants and shopkeepers to procure them the forbidden fabrics. Women were especially enamored of these foreign goods. In 1791 Eusebio Ventura Beleña, oidor (judge) of Mexico’s Audiencia (Royal Court of Appeals) reported to the viceroy that, upon seeing a foreign lady arrive in Veracruz wearing white “dresses from Cologne” and exquisite foreign fabric (lienzos), the local women rushed to buy the same dress. They longed to wear it not just on special occasions, but daily.2 This voracious appetite for foreign clothes led to a flood of imported calicoes, which in turn made them cheaper. To the oidor, the trade in textiles in the whole of the Spanish colonies might fall prey to women’s capricho, their fickle whim. “How long will [this] women’s craze [entusiasmo] last?” the oidor asked, to which he responded in despair: “God only knows.”3 Not only Mexican women fell prey to foreign clothes. Bàrbara Casals was a twenty-year-old maid of a well-to-do Barcelona family, who in 1778 agreed to prostitute herself in exchange for a calico
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dress.4 In May of the same year, Bàrbara, looking out the balcony of her employer’s house on the posh Carrer de Santa Anna, spotted a peddler of calicoes.5 Peddler Teresa Roca, noticing Bàrbara’s interest, signaled to her to come down. However, unsurprisingly, Bàrbara could not afford the clothes. Teresa told Bàrbara that a dress could be hers if she went to the peddler’s apartment the next morning. When the young maid arrived, Bàrbara learned she could have her calico in exchange for sexual relations with a gentleman who was present. Only after she became pregnant did Bàrbara take Teresa to court. During the trial, Bàrbara came through as young and inexperienced. But it was also clear that she was seduced by the allure of foreign fabrics, which would allow a poor servant to look like her mistress.6 Such was the irresistible attraction of calicoes. The exaggerated fear of the seductive powers of foreign fashion became the focus of a hotly contested debate throughout the Spanish empire during the eighteenth century (figures 4.1 and 4.2). On the one hand, merchants and political and moral writers had long denounced foreign fashion as a threat to the wealth of the monarchy and to the moral well-being of its people in Spain and in the colonies. Money spent on imported goods enriched traders from nations that were often the enemies of the Spanish king. Not only did this send work to other nations, but also the contraband luxury items generated moral degeneracy and weakness, particularly among women.7 Fashion, like women, was moved by vanity and fickleness, and the best remedy lay in discouraging its noxious appeal. On the other hand, there were those who saw in the irresistible attraction of fashion an excellent opportunity to increase the nation’s wealth as well as their own. The same year that the Mexican Board of Trade issued its threatening report, the anonymous Discurso sobre el luxo de las señoras [Discourse on the Luxury of Ladies, 1788] predicted great profits to be made from the sale of calicoes, particularly in the American colonies.8 It calculated that 5.5 million women would readily spend 118 million reales de vellón (about 5 million British pound sterling) “in fashion and luxury goods.” If Spanish products replaced foreign imports, then Spanish manufacturers, traders, and their king would keep that wealth within the monarchy. Moreover, feeding the insatiable desire for fine clothes would provide work to Spanish families, thus transforming what was otherwise an unwanted vice into a source of virtuous activity. In fact, the work of families in the Spanish calico trade ultimately demonstrated that the promise of riches was real and that the “calico craze” could be harnessed for the benefit of many.
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Figure 4.1 Petrimetra from Madrid, 1801: “Do you think all women are the same? Petrimetra with mantilla and chequered basquiña [short-sleeved overdress] with two tassels” Source: From Colección general de los trages que en la actualidad se usan en España: principiada en el año 1801 (Madrid, 1801), 11. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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Figure 4.2 Pertimetra from Cádiz, 1801: “The one wearing jumo [fine silk veil]” Source: From Colección general de los trages que en la actualidad se usan en Espasña: principiada en el año 1801 (Madrid, 1801), 108. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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In this chapter I examine how families in the Spanish calico trade at once benefited from changing attitudes toward fashion and contributed to this change of opinion. Writers against fashion blamed increased spending on luxury items because it brought families to moral and economic misfortune. What this chapter illustrates is the ways in which some political economists and merchants themselves linked fashion and family in a different way: moderate spending in fashion promotes family work and thus harmony and industriousness. Thus, the union between families’ calico making with those families themselves consuming the products they made turned calico fashion into a more acceptable trend. Moreover, producing fashionable goods could occupy idle female hands. With tasks such as the spinning of cotton thread, which manufacturers used to weave cotton cloths, women would bring money into the family while being indoors, away from moral corruption. The first section of the chapter examines how the astonishing growth of Spanish calico manufacture based in Barcelona and its surrounding territory, and the rapid expansion of its trade across the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic, affected this debate. Their success in part made possible the transformation of fashion from a sign of moral degeneracy to one of virtue. As the second section demonstrates, although fashion had once threatened the social order by altering traditional distinctions expressed through clothes, the manufacture of Spanish calicoes offered an opportunity to reassert the social order. The business of fashion also fostered a work ethic among Spanish families that would create wealth for the monarchy. The third section discusses how their industriousness provided the means to attack the problem of contraband in America, which would reinforce the colonies’ dependency on the Spanish motherland.
Fashion: From Vice to Virtue Early modern Spanish writers, clerics, and government officials had long been concerned with the possibility that fashion could induce moral laxity and social disorder. In 1673, an anonymous author described the actions of merchants who introduced new, expensive, or immodest clothes as a “severe sin.” They led to moral corruption because a woman wearing a new dress could lead many other women to sin “moved by her example wearing the same kind of dress.”9 In works of literature, fashion could induce moral corruption as well as provoke social confusion by having noble characters change attire to transform themselves into commoners and vice versa, with lowly
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pícaros (rogues) disguising themselves as respectful courtiers. Early modern religious authorities denounced plays in which women dressed as men as immoral. The seventeenth-century writer María de Zayas popularized characters of ladies who defended their honor by cross-dressing as men and of servants who dressed as ladies.10 A dress could also hide more things than sex or social status. In early modern Spain a chorus of critics condemned the raging fashion of bulky skirts known as guardainfantes (literally, “hiding infants”), with which women could allegedly hide their advanced pregnancies.11 The royal government banned the guardainfantes and reformed court fashion in order to discourage wasteful spending as well as undue attention to things that promoted licentiousness and vanity instead of Christian modesty.12 In the eighteenth century, philosophers, economists, and clergymen revisited the debate over fashion and luxury prompted by those who challenged their exclusively negative moral connotations. In The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714), Bernard Mandeville, a Dutch writer established in England, argued that governments could generate wealth for the nation by tapping into the innate human passion for luxury. Women’s susceptibility for novelties might therefore not be so bad after all: “The worst of women and most profligate of the sex did contribute to the consumption of superfluities, as well as the necessities of life, and consequently were beneficial to the many peaceable drudges, who work hard to maintain their families.”13 Mandeville’s argument did not have an immediate impact on the Spanish thought. For most of the century, Spanish authors strongly rejected any notion that fashion and luxury could bring public benefits on various grounds. “Fashion has always been fashion,” insisted the renowned Benedictine friar Benito Jerónimo Feijoo in his Teatro crítico universal [Universal Critical Theater, 1726]. The human inclination to seek “new uses” posed a danger to society’s moral well-being, particularly when it came from France, a country that had “blinded our good judgment with its extravagance.”14 The French, Feijoo continued, had “taken with their inventions infinite money from us . . . turning us into vassals of their whim.” Similarly, the Spanish Jesuit Juan de la Paz, writing under the pseudonym of Antonio Ossorio de la Cadena, argued in La virtud en el estrado [Virtue on the Stand, 1739], that northern European countries “dictate the laws in fashion of dress and politeness. And [since] in those countries heresy reigns . . . is it not dangerous to embrace here as good and honest what the freedom of conscience has introduced in other provinces?.”15 In 1781, the journalist Francisco Mariano Nipho
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could still agree with Agustín de Rojas’s critique of fashion written nearly two centuries before: “Looking at the many changes in a woman, I sometimes ask . . . since you were born naked, how do you invent at a moment’s notice so many kinds of dresses and embellishments?.”16 Nipho denounced merchants who made a living from women’s vanity and inconstancy because fashion drove women and their families to insanity and corrupted society’s good mores.17 Yet by the 1780s the rapid expansion in the Spanish calico industry, which reached markets far away in the Americas with greater freedom than ever before, demonstrated that the business of fashion had some redeeming features. On the one hand, since the 1760s calico manufacturers had been able to offer an alternative to foreign calicoes. Francisco Corriols and Jaime Amat y Pons both traveled to France and other European countries to gather designs in order to make calicoes of even better quality back home.18 On the other hand, having witnessed the growth of the calico industry, in 1768 the Catalan lawyer and well-known economic writer Francisco Romà y Rosell insisted in Las señales de la felicidad en España y medio de hacerlas eficaces [The Signs of Happiness in Spain and the Means to Make Them Effective] that in monarchies of “large proportion like Spain, luxury is not only useful but necessary.” Even Nipho, despite his conservative critique of fashion, could not contain his effusive praise for Catalonia’s industrial might. Spanish writers in general condemned the adoption of foreign tastes and fashion, yet Nipho found no better way to describe his admiration for Catalonia than to declare it “a little England at the heart of Spain.”19 Rather than denounce all fashion and luxury as evil, it was now possible to distinguish between wasteful luxury and “productive luxury.”20 In 1784, the Real Compañía de Hilados de América (Royal Spinning Company), established to supply cotton manufacturers, many of whom served as company officials, boasted that Spanish calicoes (indianes) “are the most comfortable [fabric] for people’s everyday use ever invented, suitable to all seasons of the year and all climates and regions; they dress the poor, the rich; they are the longest-lasting fabric, which beautifies and costs the least.” No wonder that despite doubling production, calico factories could not satisfy the demand!21 A fabric of such exceptional quality would certainly drive Spaniards mad, as Ramón de la Cruz Cano ridiculed in his oneact play El petrimetre [The Dandy]: “And so Spaniards see / that wallpaper and calicoes / to dress walls / are better / than the paintings of Velázquez / Cano, Ribera, called / el Españoleto, and other / little painters of that kind.”22
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By the late 1780s, those arguing the virtues derived from fashion and luxury appeared to have the upper hand. It was the Spanish intellectual Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, minister of Charles III in 1797, who took the lead by adapting to Spanish interests the ideas of Adam Smith. Adam Smith believed that certain luxuries were for “public benefit” and necessary to the wealth of a state. Such luxuries he saw as “necessary commodities” or “the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without.” Thus Smith called beer and ale “luxuries” but leather shoes “necessary commodities” since “the poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them [in England].”23 Jovellanos also believed that the revenue from the sale of fashionable goods compensated having to renounce to “the protection of the pure and primitive costumes of a country.”24 In fact, by adapting Smith to the Spanish version of the ideas of the Enlightenment, Jovellanos was also making the core of Mandeville’s argument available to the Spanish reader of political economy.25 As Ernest Lluch has argued, although Mandeville’s work was not translated into French until 1740 and into Spanish until 1982, his ideas arrived to Spain through the interpretations of more widely read and accepted economists like Adam Smith.26 Thus Jovellanos believed if luxury could be of benefit to the Spanish nation and increase its population, then it could be tolerated. Moreover, the production and purchase of national products, even if fashionable and luxurious, could represent a patriotic act. In fact, it was the enlightened Spanish minister who saw economics as “the science of the citizen and patriot.”27 This more tolerant attitude toward luxury and fashion was not limited to the intellectual circles of enlightened philosophers and politicians like Jovellanos. It reached widely read weekly newspapers such El Censor [The Censor], El Observador [The Observer], or El Pensador [The Thinker], all tailored after English newspapers such as The Spectator and The Tatler, which earned a growing audience at the beginning of the century by becoming the critical eye of their societies’ customs and fashions.28 One of the focuses of debate and criticism for the Spanish newspapers in the 1780s was the moral connotations of fashion and whether it was acceptable or whether it even benefited the national wealth. In 1786, Luis Cañuelo, the editor of the Madrid weekly El Censor, asserted that Spanish calicoes were a legitimate luxury that reflected national wealth free from scandal, vice, and corruption.29 In fact, Cañuelo declared luxury “absolutely necessary” for the
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prosperity of the state.30 Two years later, on January 25, 1788, the Diario de Madrid (Madrid’s Newspaper) published an opinion article urging women to buy Spanish fashion rather than imported clothes as a patriotic duty, because buying imported items took away jobs: “Many women have seen it as an obligation to give sons to the Patria (Fatherland); now we will all be midwives to those unfortunate manufacturers and workers . . . dressing up with the product of our industrious manufactures.”31 That same year, both New Spain’s Board of Trade and the anonymous author of the report Discourse on the Luxury of Ladies discussed at the start of this chapter agreed on the evils of foreign fashion. The author of Discourse on the Luxury of Ladies insisted that foreign luxury “foments passion and vices, impoverishes the state, weakens its population and annihilates and destroys monarchies,” whereas the “brilliance with decency” of Spanish fashion instilled salutary, even patriotic, values. This work proposed designs for a “national dress” that included ornate women’s attire for the most important ladies to wear on special occasions, as well as more modest dresses for being out in the streets.32 The proposal drew considerable attention. The journal Memorial Literario (Literary Memorial) of Madrid praised its insistence on eradicating “excessive luxury, fomenting marriages and national manufactures, avoiding confusion of hierarchies, and reestablishing the honesty of feminine dress.”33 A Junta de Damas, or Board of Ladies, established to promote schools in Madrid for the instruction of young women, convened to consider the proposal’s merits.34 Presided by María Francisca de Sales Portocareero, Countess of Montijo, the fourteen well-known Spanish salonnières rejected the Discourse’s call to royal authorities to assign dresses according to women’s social standing. Nonetheless, even the Board of Ladies agreed on the need to promote national industry by discouraging women from wearing foreign fashion.35 Similarly, in 1787 Manuel de Aguirre argued in his Discurso sobre el lujo [Discourse on Luxury] that allowing women the freedom to choose their dress and fashion would benefit the national industry.36 Juan Sempere y Guarinos’s Historia del lujo y de las leyes suntuarias de España [History of Luxury and Sumptuary Laws of Spain, 1788] took the discussion one step further. He discarded establishing a national dress but called on the monarchy to take measures to increase the consumption of luxury because “the greatest stimulus to the arts, to industry, and to commerce consists of the multiplication of consumption.”37 More important, this scholarly work turned the long-standing attack on the immorality of fashion on its head. Earlier authors had cited seventeenth-century Spanish authorities as a reminder
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that fashion would bring about moral degeneracy. In sharp contrast, Sempere y Guarinos now insisted that the decline of the Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century had in fact resulted from royal legislation against luxury. In the end, the private vice of luxury could indeed encourage public virtues. Luxury, Sempere y Guarinos concluded, is essential to the state because it increases industry, which in turn fosters respect for work, marriage, and the family.38
Industriousness and Family Life Sempere y Guarinos dedicated his work to the minister conde de Floridablanca, who himself had been a close collaborator of Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, a champion of the importance of work to families.39 Sempere y Guarinos found a great affinity with the ideas of Campomanes and in fact supported his arguments in his book Historia del lujo by quoting from Campomanes. The latter, in his Educación popular de los artesanos [Popular Education of Artisans, 1775], had urged the monarchy to promote “useful luxury” in order to educate families in the virtues of work that were essential to the preservation of social order, and ultimately for the good of the state.40 He looked back for a model to the traditional artisanal family, where the entire family worked together under the close supervision of the master-husband-father.41 Yet the new calico manufactures appeared to be in an even better position to promote work for everyone. A 1784 report by the Royal Spinning Company authored by three calico manufacturers, Mariano Rovira, Francisco Ribas, and Isidro Català, stated that eighty factories in Catalonia provided work to 4,607 men, 1,740 women, and 2,291 children, for a grand total of 8,638 persons.42 This was a significant number, especially because most of those factories were centered in Barcelona. This meant that in a population of 100,000 individuals, almost 10 percent were directly working for calico factories. Moreover, these were only factory workers; the sum did not include all the other persons involved in related activities, such as trade and transportation. If we include the number of people whose trades depended on the calico industry in one way or another, the percentage would be much higher. In fact, in 1775 the Junta de Comerç had stated that in the whole of Catalonia, the number of people “of all classes, mostly formed by children and women,” was 50,000 individuals.43 As the 1784 report from the Royal Spinning Company explained, far more workers could be employed if the imports of cotton increased, so that the number of women spinners alone would be “extremely numerous”: “No woman shall remain idle
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because of lack of useful and productive work in a decent manufacture easy to learn, clean, that is not exhausting [and is] fit for girls from ten years old, pregnant women, the sick, the handicapped, and aged, as long as they have a healthy and free use of their eyes and hands.”44 Such work would strengthen the institution of marriage in two principal ways. First, young women who did not have an opportunity to work and who otherwise would have remained unmarried now would have the chance to marry. Second, women who worked ceased to burden their husbands, who otherwise had sole responsibility for supporting the entire family. There was yet another way in which the calico industry promised to encourage the kinds of values Campomanes considered necessary to inculcate in working families. As discussed in chapter 3, calico manufacturers and traders replicated the model of the traditional artisanal household with its patriarchal hierarchy. First, most of the tiny, unregulated factories remained little more than artisanal workshops, more often than not headed by a husband and father who had direct oversight of the work of his wife, children, relatives, and assistants. Second, even in the larger factories, the organization of work encouraged parents to work alongside their children, and in some cases, families lived within the factory premises, such as in the factory of Joan Baptista Sirés Co. Third, calico companies remained essentially family businesses, whether headed by the family patriarch, his widow, or the eldest son. The inclination to recreate long-standing familial models in the new industry is not surprising given the social origins of most factory owners and workers, who came from either artisanal or commercial families organized along traditional lines. By the end of the century, admirers of the calico industry presented it as living proof of how the business of fashion could promote industriousness and the family to the unquestionable benefit of the monarchy. To find such a message in reports by calico manufacturers and in promoters of industry is to be expected. But to also discover it in contemporary literature suggests that the new trade left an impression beyond the business world. Such is the case in Francisco Durán’s three-act play La industriosa madrileña [The Industrious Maiden from Madrid, ca. 1790] about an orphaned weaver who saves her life and honor by making calicoes. In the play, the industrious protagonist Doña Cecilia weaves cloth that surpasses foreign calicoes in beauty, shine, and good taste. Cecilia’s skills make her widely popular throughout her hometown of Madrid, which provokes the envy of her stepmother, who keeps the young woman hidden in the attic of their house, weaving all day long. One day Cecilia, dressed as a man, flees
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her prison and settles to work in the town of Olot in Catalonia.45 There she meets Don Esteve, a Catalan manufacturer of calicoes, whom she falls in love with and eventually marries. The play concludes with a number of unexpected twists and revelations. The king of Spain acknowledges Don Esteve’s contribution to the benefit of the monarchy by granting the manufacturer a noble title. Doña Cecilia’s evil stepmother repents and reveals that her orphaned stepdaughter is in fact a marquise. The play ends with Cecilia’s stunning appearance in public “dressed and coiffed honestly, in the style of Madrid; but the fabric of her dress is new, strange, and of good taste.”46 Cecilia is the perfect example of how a woman can enhance her virtue through calico work. Her loom is her world: “My greatest pleasure is to be indoors (estarme recogida); with my looms I forget all my sorrows,” she humbly states. Her own industriousness keeps her distracted from any other undignified task, and it permits her to escape her dysfunctional family and create a new one. The industrious couple gained the respect of their community through the product of their hard work, which earned Don Esteve his noble status and did not demean hers. In fact, one wonders if perhaps the source of inspiration for such a work may have come from the repeated examples in which the king of Spain recognized the contributions of calico manufacturers with titles of nobility. Men of humble social origins, children of artisans and merchants, became wealthy and earned noble status because of their work in the fashion business: the merchants Bernat Glòria, Josep Francesc Segui, and Antoni Pongem, as well as the cloth draper Jaume Guàrdia, became ciutadans honrats (honored citizens, a noble title); Francesc Clota, a weaver and broker, became a knight; Joan Pau Canals, the son of a cloth draper, was first made an honored citizen and later baron of Vallroja. Their spectacular rise must have sparked the imagination of many with stories of virtue earned through honorable work. On June 23, 1785, Barcelona’s chronicler Rafel d’Amat recorded how Joan Canaleta had not only become wealthy, but his fame in the world of calicoes had guaranteed his knighting and a royal permission to own a carriage and enjoy the lifestyle of an aristocrat.47
Women, Trade, and Fashion At the end of the eighteenth century, the debate over selling and consuming fashion and luxury paralleled the debate over the production of fashion. The image of the fictional Cecilia making fashionable calicoes that she herself wore, and with this keeping her virtue, follows
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some of the expected behavior from women through the early modern period. In 1600, the historian and theorist Gaspar Gutiérrez de los Ríos wrote in his Noticia general para la estimación de las artes (General News on the Estimation of the Arts) that even “Emperor Octaviano Cesar Augusto made his daughters and grand-daughters learn how to spin and they did not wear other dresses that those they themselves made.”48 This author also believed that “with the occupation of spinning a woman provides for her household, and keeps her faith and loyalty to her husband,” because even the “Virgin Mary, mother of God . . . supported baby Jesus with the exercise of this work.”49 In the eighteenth century, writers who, like Sempere y Guarinos, were in favor of the production and sale of fashionable textiles emphasized the positive moral consequences that activities like spinning would bring for women and their families. More production in textile would not only increase national wealth but also have a direct impact in the families that produced those fashionable fabrics. More women would be employed in the spinning of cotton thread, a task that they could carry out while safe at home and could thus help to support their families while keeping away from illicit sexual encounters. The specific linkage between profashion arguments and the moral wellbeing of the family led to a debate over the liberalization of women’s trades.50 The increased production of fashionable textiles would require more hands for the preparation and finishing of the fabrics. In this sense, women’s work was crucial for the success of the calico and other fashion industries. Economic writers and political advisers thus focused their efforts in breaking down the guild barriers that limited women from formally working in many trades. Work in the calico factories had called into question the already unstable position of guilds in the economic life of the Spanish empire. Although new calico factory owners often organized themselves in ways that were strikingly similar to the guilds, in fact, the growth of the calico production industry became a model of growth outside the guild system. Writers, economists, and legal advisers in both Spain and France saw the guild system, which excluded women and foreigners, as contrary to the ideas of freedom of trade.51 In the 1780s, economic writers, who had before them the successful experience of calico production, linked the debates on the guild system and the liberalization of women’s trades. In 1784, a royal order declared that all women could freely sell the products that they themselves made, even if they were the privilege of a guild.52 In the same year, the Board of Trade established a school for spinners lead by the Italian Margarita Berthot, and in 1786, this effort was expanded to the establishment of schools
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for spinners in the countryside.53 Throughout the last years of the century, Spanish economic societies, who had among their many goals the promotion of the education of women, established spinning schools in different parts of Spain. Their aim was to provide working women with enough training so they could work in any trade “compatible with the strength and decency of their sex.”54 Historian Jaume Caresmar stated in 1780 that women ought to learn and practice “the different trades and arts compatible with their sex,” which they should combine with their job in the house, to benefit their families.55 Work for the growing textile industry, if carried out indoors, could offer all the moral benefits that wearing the fabric seem to compromise. The anonymous novel Juanita o la inclusera generosa [Juanita, or the Generous Foundling], published in 1815 but set in Paris in the late 1780s, illustrates this point.56 The book tells the story of two sisters Juanita and Cecilia who, after losing their family fortune, need to work “for the public” doing embroidery work and “other female tasks.” The fashion world of the Parisian scene, which required large quantities of silk laces for elaborate women’s dresses, gave the sisters enough piecework to get by and “keep their virtue.” Lacking family help, the two sisters found the means to stay away from sexual temptation by focusing on their work. Following the literary pattern of the Industriosa madrileña, one of the sisters, Juanita, is in fact the daughter of a wealthy man. Although laws and guild records show no evidence of the moral approach to work and fashion seen in essays and other literary works, in their debates over work, legislators and guild officials also centered their debates on women and trade on moral and family concerns. We may ask, then, what was new in the calico industry and the debate over fashion? The answer may be that at the end of the century, writers and political economists willing to reshape the nature of the industry found the moral arguments of family, women, and work useful in abolishing the guilds and increasing the cheap workforce that women represented. Thus the liberalization of the female workforce, which was required to expand the industry and increase the wealth of the nation, had to be linked to the moral protection of the family.
Selling Fashion: Making a Stronger Empire In addition to encouraging industriousness among men, women, and their families, there was yet another way in which the business of fashion could demonstrate how a vice might foster virtue—namely, by
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strengthening the bonds between the Spanish monarchy and its colonies in America. A diverse group of individuals, organizations, and institutions presented essentially three interconnected arguments for how the promotion of exports of Spanish fabrics to America could ultimately benefit the empire. The first two arguments were largely economic in nature, clearly inspired by contemporary mercantilist principles. On the one hand, by increasing the traffic of goods between the metropolis and its colonies, the Spanish monarchy would increase its wealth and have the resources to defend itself from powerful enemies. On the other hand, an increase in Spanish textiles would help to stem the flow of contraband goods, which a variety of authorities claimed resulted from the inability of Spanish merchants to satiate the enormous demand in the colonies for such products as fine and cheap fabrics. A third argument appealed to a rather different interest: Spanish rather than foreign fashion would instill Spanish values among subjects in the American colonies, and these values would in turn forge a closer relationship between them and the motherland. These three arguments require separate attention. The Catalan Francisco Romà y Rosell, cited above for his defense of luxury as a source of wealth for the monarchy, provides a succinct statement of the need to increase trade between Spain and its American territories. “The common happiness of the metropolis and its colonies,” he wrote in 1768, “lies in that the former provides the latter with manufactures . . . and the latter gives in exchange its products.” Royal policy ought to support and protect those activities that would encourage economic dependency to Spain, which was “the most powerful law and still the only with which contraband can be avoided in America.”57 Protectionist policies were important, but they alone would not end the demand for foreign products. Spanish industry had to be capable of supplying that demand. The promotion of luxury industries should therefore encourage sufficient production to meet the needs at home and export the rest to the American colonies, which will “lead to greater wealth.”58 This last point highlights the fact that the blame for the widespread smuggling of foreign textiles to the colonies in part resulted from of the inability of Spanish manufacturers and traders to satisfy demand. Much of the second half of the eighteenth century witnessed seemingly endless debates among government ministers, commercial associations, and factory owners over the best policies the royal government should pursue to encourage Spanish trade and industry. Charles III (r. 1759–1788) was especially interested in such policies, some of which encouraged the establishment of commercial companies, such
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as the Royal Spinning Company, which was created in the hope of—unsuccessfully as it turned out—resolving the problem of the availability of cheap, high-quality thread for the manufacture of calicoes. In addition, the dismantling of the Cádiz monopoly over the American trade occurred between 1768 and 1778. The Aragonese economist and theologian Arteta de Monteseguro argued that freedom of trade with the colonies, together with the elimination of tariffs and taxes on local production, would allow Spanish factories to sell as much as half of their production to the Caribbean colonies.59 Not surprisingly, calico manufacturers also insisted that the prohibition of imported fabrics would protect the industry and allow it to flourish. Yet despite the widespread belief that protectionist policies would ultimately contribute to the expansion of the Spanish calico industry, the industry managed to grow even during periods when foreign fabrics legally reached Spanish consumers. By contrast, efforts to prevent contraband in Spain and in the colonies proved largely ineffective. Historians’ long-standing focus on royal policies to tackle the seemingly uncontrollable smuggling of foreign products to the Spanish colonies tends to leave out the no less important efforts, often at the hand of calico traders, to promote Spanish products and reclaim a demand satisfied by illegal imports. In other words, although contraband in the Americas is often seen as the failure of the Spanish to compete against English, Dutch, or French trade and industry, contemporaries also recognized that it responded to an enormous appetite in the colonies for manufactured goods. In 1748, the Spanish scientist Jorge Juan and the naval officer Antonio de Ulloa stated the following in their account of their voyage to South America of this insatiable thirst: “it may be said without exaggeration that the finest stuffs made in countries where industry is always inventing something new are more generally seen in Lima than in any other place; vanity and ostentation not being restrained by custom or law.”60 In New Granada (today Colombia and Panama), consumers could choose from among a long list of imported fabrics that included damask, taffeta, silk, flannel, linen, calico, serge, lace, and thread.61 At the end of the century, buyers in Mexico could choose from among thirty different kinds of calico fabrics, in contrast to twelve types available in Spain. Mexican consumers had become accustomed to buying fine fabrics to the point that a merchant based in Veracruz asserted that even “the most wretched black woman wears her underskirt of good embroidered [cotton] muslin.”62 The 1788 report by New Spain’s Board of Trade cited at the start of this chapter had noted that the demand for foreign fashion among women had extended from the
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major American cities to rural areas—even to the lowest social groups. Moreover, contraband in foreign goods was not only a drain to the wealth of the monarchy; the foreign origin of those goods made them vehicles of values contrary to what Spanish moralists and authorities considered appropriate for their Catholic empire. Replacing foreign fashion in the Americas with Spanish fashion would therefore have a double economic and moral benefit. Spanish economic writers, government authorities, and merchants wanted to meet consumers’ demands with Spanish products in order to preserve wealth within the empire and to promote Spanish values through Spanish fashion that would appeal especially to women. Designing fashion that would especially appeal to women customers in America was therefore absolutely essential for the success of Spanish industry. Such an achievement could not depend exclusively on banning foreign imports. “In commerce all is art; commerce has its own rhetoric to persuade with its inventions and to attract the fair sex,” the mayor of the Catalan town of Puigcerdà noted in 1777.63 It was thus essential to learn what appealed to consumers in Spain and its American possessions in order to meet demand—or, as contemporaries labeled it, their capricho (whim). The members of Barcelona’s royal Junta de Comerç—mainly merchants and owners of large calico factories—repeatedly sought to collect “more reliable facts on what to base their commercial speculations” in the Spanish colonies, particularly regarding those products that enjoyed “the greatest appeal in those countries.”64 At the Junta’s request, in October 1779 Charles III sent a memorandum to the viceroys and governors of the American colonies requesting individual reports on “the number of people of both sexes, their whims (caprichos), their means to satisfy them, [and] the difficulties to achieve this and other things of this kind.”65 Calico manufacturers and traders were keenly aware that among female costumers, courtly fashion had an especially powerful appeal, and therefore they sought to recreate it for a larger public. Thus when the great Catalan factory owner Joan Pau Canals saw the fine chinoiseries in the rooms of the duke of Alba at the royal palace at Aranjuez in 1768, he was determined to copy these designs. Two years later, his Barcelona factory reproduced these fabrics to sell to the public.66 Calico manufacturers who could not be in the royal court relied on informants and agents to keep them abreast of changing tastes. One such manufacturer was Joan Baptista Sirés, who requested samples of the most popular calico designs in Madrid from his contact Josep Armada.67 Sirés also maintained regular correspondence with another trustworthy contact in Madrid, Ramon Nadal i Guàrdia, who
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informed the factory owner of the most recent fancies of sophisticated buyers at the court. As in the case of Joan Pau Canals, the Sirés Factory reproduced those designs, which were exported to the Caribbean, Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay. During the 1770s and 1780s, calico manufacturers sought to appeal to women by selling the Spanish courtly fashions of Goya’s paintings in New Spain and in the Spanish islands in the Caribbean. This meant the creation of light, shiny fabrics based on the French style but made by Spanish factories. Fabrics made of cotton mixed with flax or silk were worn in multiple layers. This style of dress, which the French had designed for silks, was now adapted to the calico industry’s needs, thanks to the versatility of calicoes.68 Calicoes used bright floral patterns, and although the floral designs on French embroideries were much more formal and stylized, they did not have the natural appearance of calico prints. But designs covered much more than flower motifs. They ranged from landscapes to scientific public displays (such as the launching of a balloon) to mythological scenes. Supplying such a capricho would not only make manufacturers rich, it would also spread the Spanish court’s fashion, tastes, and, it was hoped, its values as well, to the farthest regions of the empire. Of the consumption of fabrics in the Spanish colonies, Rebecca Earle has pointed out that fashion offered those American costumers “status and ethnicity.”69 Likewise, Woodruff Smith has argued that individuals wanted to buy calicoes because “calicoes were a convenient and attractive means by which a wide variety of people could attempt to participate in the context of gentility.”70 Selling more Spanish calicoes would therefore help to make Spain, rather than England or France, the point of reference in the search for status. Spaniards and criollos throughout the American colonies would thus be able to keep their Spanish attire and inculcate those tastes in their children.71 The Mexican writer José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, writing after independence, thought it quaint to satirize such aspirations by making the protagonist of his comedy Anita la Respondona [The Impertinent Anita] ascertain that “husbands and fabrics are best when [they come] from Spain.”72 Yet just as in the 1780s the project for a Spanish national dress had been a serious endeavor; the desire to promote Spanish fashion in the Americas to build closer bonds to the metropolis was no less ludicrous. In 1796, the Guatemalan Society of Amigos del País invited essays for a contest on Indian dress. Claiming a mixture of economic and charitable motives, clothing Indian women a la española (in the Spanish style) would allegedly cut down on infant mortality and instill moral values and virtues.73
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All of these lofty goals depended on one practical problem: how to sell these Spanish fabrics across the Atlantic. Here again, calico manufacturers and traders were faced with the challenge of organizing the sale of their goods in distant lands. They had already found solutions to this problem in Barcelona, where they could easily entice customers by displaying “samples in their houses and on the walls that face the street so the public would know of the operations that there they practiced.”74 These producers had to rely on agents and representatives who would sell calicoes to local merchants and shopkeepers. In New Spain retail stores, a variety of fabrics abounded in the main cities of the viceroyalty, from Veracruz to Mexico City and from Guadalajara to Durango. In these shops, known as pulperías, tiendas mestizas, alacenas (small stores selling used items) and cajones (imported-merchandise retailers), customers could buy on credit and pay in installments;75 they could even pawn items as a form of payment.76 Calicoes and other textiles were also available to people through traveling salespeople who either bought the items directly from the merchant or from the shopkeeper. According to the Board of Trade, these traveling salespersons were largely responsible for the fact that “a few years ago they [calicoes] were only known in the coastal towns and populated cities of Spain and in the Americas; nowadays they have spread to the bowels of the Kingdom, and the most unknown town and the remotest village dress in calicoes.”77 The question remained whether these peddlers would sell Spanish calicoes instead of foreign ones. Such a goal proved a strong argument in favor of granting Spanish traders the freedom to trade directly with New Spain, which had been excluded from a 1778 decree. Eventually the royal authorities gave in, and freedom of trade was extended to Veracruz in 1789.78 In 1787, a description of the Magarola factory in a Barcelona gazette hailed the success of the Magarola brothers in selling their calicoes in Havana, Veracruz, and Guatemala. The fame of the Magarola calicoes was credited by the fact that agents ordered their calicoes because buyers preferred them to any other calicoes made in Spain. Their contacts in these American outposts sent monthly notices of what they needed so that “those inhabitants could buy them first hand.” The Magarola factory sent over 22,500 calicoes of cotton and linen (pintados sobre algodón y lino), whose value surpassed 4 million reales, to these Americans.79 These large exports to the colonies provided work to over 1,500 individuals who worked for the Magarola brothers. Whether other factories could duplicate such success remained to be seen.
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Chapter 5
From B arcelona to Veracruz: Clothing the Spanish Empire
A
t the end of the century, the sale of calicoes to the men and women of the Spanish empire became a challenge for the hundreds of calico manufacturers and merchants in Spain and its colonies. If by the turn of the century the debate over the benefits or evils of luxury and fashion had ended with a certain approval of the moral and economic rewards from the making of calicoes, the problem was now how to make this coveted fabric reach every corner of the empire. The almost continuous wars Spain faced at different intervals between England and France jeopardized the ability that manufacturers had to sell their fabrics across the Atlantic. Yet once again the flexibility that the family offered the commercial house allowed for the entire calico industry to survive, and even prosper, during the tumultuous years between the 1790s and the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century. Rapidly changing political and economic circumstances forced the “commercial houses” to adopt new approaches quickly in order to profit, such as reducing the size of their transactions and diversifying their activities. All of these survival strategies, however, depended on families and the creation of networks throughout Spain and in America. The success of companies ultimately depended on such family ties and a hierarchical organization based on trust, loyalty, and obedience. Such sentiments compelled every member of the commercial house to work hard for the survival of the family’s business during times of exceptional uncertainty. The following four sections of this chapter roughly coincide with the principal stages of this long period of hostilities and the race to
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clothe the Spanish American colonies. The first section examines the war between Spain and France from 1793 to 1795. The activities of merchants and entrepreneurs in America during the first war against England from 1796 until 1802 are the focus of the second section. A third section examines the renewal of war between Spain and England from 1802 to 1808. Although the supremacy of the English navy depressed the Spanish transatlantic traffic in textiles, families in the calico trade demonstrated surprising resiliency and the ability to adapt under extremely difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, the fourth section will demonstrate how the daily struggle for survival in this age of war also tore apart families on both sides of the Atlantic.
Selling Calicoes to America, 1792‒1795 During the early 1790s the climax of the calico industry in the Spanish empire coincided with the expansion of trade between Barcelona and the American colonies. Between 1784 and 1786 Barcelona saw the establishment of 112 factories. Between 1792 and 1794 the number of factories increased to 150.1 Half of the calicoes made in these factories went to customers in America. The 1778 Free Trade Regulation had facilitated traffic in textiles by opening trade between Spanish ports and several major colonial destinations. In 1789 Venezuela and the large and populous viceroyalty of New Spain, initially excluded from the 1778 decree, joined the list of regions that enjoyed direct trade with Spanish ports.2 Veracruz, New Spain’s most important port, witnessed an extraordinary increase in Spanish imports of all kinds, particularly of calicoes.3 Free access to Veracruz allowed calico traders to reach consumers in the interior as well as other ports in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. In the thirteen years between 1778 and 1792, exports of calicoes from Spain to all the American colonies increased an impressive 500 percent.4 In 1792 alone, Barcelona exported 3,338,061 yards of calicoes, an increase of 110 percent from the previous year.5 That same year, the traffic of exports from Barcelona to New Spain reached its historical climax for the period between the end of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth.6 Also in 1792 the city witnessed the construction of a new customhouse in the Plaça de Palau, adjacent to La Llotja, and the founding of a daily newspaper, Diari de Barcelona. Its listings of all arrivals and departures of ships from the city’s harbor, with the names of each ship’s captain and owner, made this publication extremely helpful to merchants.7 As all this make plain by 1792 Barcelona’s merchant community was ready to embrace a future of continuing expansion in trade.
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On June 23, 1792 one of the ships sailing to Veracruz from Barcelona’s port carried the merchant Miquel March (pronounced “Mark”). He hoped to gather information that would allow him to profit from the recently decreed policy of open trade with the Mexican port. March was a native of Calella, a coastal town about 50 kilometers north of Barcelona.8 Home to fishermen and sailors, Calella belonged to what Albert García Espuche has called the “crown of Barcelona”: a web of relatively small towns that, together with the Catalan capital, constituted one of the principal Spanish urban centers in the western Mediterranean.9 By 1780 merchants from Altafulla, Arenys de Mar, Calella, Canet de Mar, and Mataró, almost always with connections to Barcelona, were exporting many calicoes and other textiles to the American colonies. Men from these towns became well known for their skills as merchants and sea captains, sailing to America with their shipments of locally made fabrics.10 In fact, when March arrived in Veracruz, he met with other acquaintances and relatives from this region who were involved in commercial activities in the Mexican port.11 It is unclear how long March stayed in Veracruz, but in 1793 he was back in Calella, making important decisions about his future. At first, it would appear that March’s timing for his Mexican venture was unfortunate. On March 7, 1793 revolutionary France declared war on Spain. Spain had to defend its frontier along the Pyrenees from French attacks. Because Catalonia had a long frontier with France, a French invasion threatened Calella and Barcelona, along with other ports and their commerce with America. Nonetheless, March and other merchants and entrepreneurs appeared undeterred in their quest for riches. In December 1793 he and two other partners agreed to establish Alsina, March & Cona Co. with the aim of exporting calicoes from Barcelona to Veracruz (map 5.1). March’s partners were also his cousins: Francesc Alsina, a merchant and former sea captain, and the fisherman Josep Cona.12 In addition, Cona was married to Maria Alsina, Francesc’s sister. Francesc Alsina was the largest investor in the new company (3,000 lliures), followed by March (1,500 lliures). Cona brought no money to the association, only his willingness to accompany March to Veracruz.13 Although not written in the contract, such family businesses demanded hard work and unconditional loyalty to the company. The company’s survival would depend on ensuring a constant flow of transactions, because, as Alsina told his partners, “silver does not increase by staying in the trunk” but by the trade it generated.14 But the partners’ determination and their dreams of enrichment from the American trade would have to overcome the dangers of the ongoing war with France.
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Map 5.1 Atlantic Spanish World Source: Prepared by Darin Grauberger, from the Cartographic Services at the University of Kansas
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Alsina, March, and Cona were typical of a new breed of Spanish traders at the end of the century who were forced to conduct business in the midst of war. In 1793 the count of Revillagigedo, then viceroy of New Spain, offered a valuable description of these new traders that sheds light on the changing nature of the transatlantic commerce at this crucial moment. According to the viceroy, “the old merchants have withdrawn their fortunes leaving the commerce to new speculators with less capital, but more instructed in the new commercial methods and less used to excessive earnings and a perfect and tranquil security.”15 Revillagigedo asserted that this new breed of merchants “will be satisfied by earning a little bit more than their subsistence and will not aspire to establish mayorazgos and other kinds of entailments more harmful than useful to society.” Mayorazgos were akin to the English entailments and other arrangements common among early modern European noble families who sought to protect their family fortunes by establishing trusts. In other words, according to Viceroy Revillagigedo, the new merchants, perhaps because of their more modest profits, were unlikely to abandon their trade activities for a noble lifestyle—what later historians would describe as the “betrayal of the bourgeoisie.”16 Although such sweeping generalizations inevitably fail to convey the diversity of individuals in the trade between Spain and the colonies, the viceroy’s comments deserve closer scrutiny. To some extent, they reflect changes in Spanish American commerce since the opening of trade after 1778. Those changes were even more recent in Mexico, because the monarchy only opened Veracruz to trade in 1789. Under the new commercial regime, the old transatlantic trading network based on the monopoly first of Seville and later Cádiz gave way to what the historian Bartolomé Yun has described as “the new type of network” of merchants from the Spanish coastal regions, especially from ports in Andalusia, the Basque country, and Catalonia.17 Compared to the “old” established merchants with their protected share of the colonial monopoly, the new ones may have had to rely to a greater extent on links of kinship and place of origin that connected national and international trade. Such personal links supplemented the lack of large starting capital or family fortunes, as was the case with Alsina, March & Cona Co. Perhaps for that reason, Viceroy Revillagigedo thought that these merchants did not, or could not, aspire to ennoblement. He may have underestimated their ambition. Although Alsina and his partners said little about their long-term plans, Cona confessed to dreaming of returning to his hometown to retire “like a caballero,”
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a gentleman. In 1804 March wrote to Alsina that “it is better to govern a company that to be king of Spain,” although four years later, Alsina would accuse March of living like a gentleman and wanting to become a king.18 For his part March, would accuse Alsina of behaving as though he were a despot. But the full realization of their ambitions may have seemed unlikely because, as the viceroy noted, traders had to accept delays in taking their profits, which in any case were expected to be more modest than in earlier times. On the other hand, this very modesty became an asset: with relatively little to lose, the new breed of traders may have acted more as, in the viceroy’s words, speculators who dared to venture where their predecessors may have deemed conditions too risky, especially in light of potentially mediocre returns. On January 24, 1794 the two cousins Cona and March set sail for Veracruz. It was the company’s first commercial voyage to America. Alsina stayed behind to take care of business in Calella and in Barcelona. The two partners arrived in Veracruz on June 3, nearly five and a half months after their departure. They were welcomed by March’s brother, Felicià, who helped the newly arrived men to get settled and to meet other merchants and clients, some of whom were also related to the Marchs. One of their contacts established through Felicià March was the Catalan merchant Josep Reynal, from whom Miquel March and Josep Cona rented a warehouse to store the goods sent by Alsina from Spain. March was also related to the Martorells, who had a business in Xalapa, an inland trading post between Veracruz and Mexico City. In Veracruz, Cona and March were in charge of transporting the company’s goods from the port to their warehouse and from there overseeing their shipment to clients throughout New Spain.19 They were also responsible for notifying Alsina about the type and quantity of goods he should ship to Mexico, for finding buyers for those products, and for shipping any profits and unsold cloth back to Alsina. Alsina orchestrated every move of his partners across the Atlantic. He arranged the shipment of textiles and other local products from Catalonia to America. All three partners could expect very hard work with no anticipation of real profits until after the five years stipulated in their contract. At that time, they would divide their profits as follows: 10 percent of the benefits for Cona, 40 percent for March, and 50 percent for Alsina.20 Although the partners had agreed to these terms in the company’s contract, they would later complain that their shares fell short of their real efforts and
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personal sacrifices. However, during the first years of the company’s existence, survival, not profits, were Alsina, March & Cona Co.’s principal concern. Even though the war with France did not always pose an imminent threat to calico traders, it forced them to adapt in order to survive. For example, in the spring of 1794 the French occupation of the northern Catalan cities of Figueres and Girona halted the trade of cotton cloth across the Pyrenees. This situation particularly affected one sector of calico trade: the production of pintats, which were expensive calicoes printed on high-quality cloth imported by way of France from a variety of locations in northern Europe. Consequently, during the first years of the war, Spanish exports of pintats to America fell by 30 percent. Manufacturers made up for this loss by selling more of the inexpensive calicoes stamped on locally produced cotton cloth.21 Sixty percent more indianes were exported in 1794 than in 1793.22 American consumers kept purchasing calicoes, and a constant shipment of colonial goods assured their availability and low price. Despite the war, calico traders found reasons to be optimistic about their business. In August 1794 the merchant Francesc Espar wrote to Ramon Llobet in Caracas, expressing his amazement at the fact that the war “had not produced the slightest alteration in the price of [colonial] goods in Spain; more than that, we are awed that we are experiencing such calm in all transactions.”23 In October, factory owner Joan Canaleta earned up to 10,000 lliures from a single shipment of calicoes to Veracruz.24 By the end of the year, Alsina, March & Cona Co. reported profits of 56 percent from their shipments to Mexico.25 Josep Cona and Miquel March were pleasantly surprised to discover that when it came to selling items that were in fashion— whether calicoes, silk stockings, laces, or women’s fans—they could sell almost anything their partner in Spain sent to them, even though prices were constantly changing. On February 5, 1795 March wrote to Alsina in Barcelona, “Send me whatever you feel like; I won’t tell you what, given that one thing today is worth a hundred and tomorrow less than twenty; and something that today costs twenty tomorrow a hundred.”26 He was particularly astonished at the success of sales of indianes, whose price kept rising.27 Other merchants noted the willingness of consumers to pay higher prices for lower-quality calicoes. On July 11, 1795 the factory owner Francisco Ribas wrote to the Catalan merchant and businessman Ramon Nadal i Guàrdia in Madrid stating that as a result of the scarcity of pintats, buyers would
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purchase inexpensive platillas at higher prices even when they were of poor quality.28 The signing of the Peace of Basel on July 22, 1795, which formally ended the war between France and Spain, inspired among Spanish merchants “hopes without limits” about future business.29 If trade had been good in times of war, the announcement of the peace promised benefits equal to those earned during the years of greatest activity between 1790 and 1792. The three partners of Alsina, March & Cona Co. were exhilarated about their prospects for the future. They had not only survived the two-year war but seemed on their way to building a fortune. However, the resumption of war later that year, this time between Spain and England, would dampen those hopes. As Viceroy Revillagigedo had warned regarding the new breed of merchants, the three partners would have to delay collecting their share of the profits beyond the five years stipulated in their contract. Even worse, unlike the French forces, the powerful English navy would pose a serious threat to Spanish trade with the colonies—a threat that could easily end their businesses, if not their lives. Rather than riches, the next six years of war with England promised grave dangers and uncertain benefits to those involved in the transatlantic calico trade.
The War at Sea, 1796‒1802 During the late summer of 1796, Barcelona’s merchants and brokers anxiously awaited news about war at La Llotja, the palace that housed Barcelona’s bourse, the heart of the city’s commerce.30 Before making their important business transactions to Spanish America, traders relied on messengers, travelers, and sea captains who arrived at La Llotja from early in the morning until late at night with news of events in Madrid and political turmoil in Europe.31 This time, growing rumors of an impending war against England worried Barcelona’s commercial community, which feared the serious consequences that a war at sea would have on their Atlantic trade.32 After two years of war against revolutionary France—a conflict known to Catalans as la Guerra Gran (The Great War)—on July 22, 1795 Spain had signed the Peace of Basel with its neighboring country.33 On August 19, 1796 the two countries signed the treaty of San Ildefonso, which was in effect a defensive alliance against Britain. War against England appeared imminent. However, as the days went by without any hostilities, many hoped that war would not happen after all. Barcelona shopkeepers even accused merchants of falsely inciting rumors about an imminent war in order to raise the prices of colonial goods.
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Yet wary merchants began storing calicoes in their American warehouses and stopping the return of silver to their headquarters in Spain.34 Finally, on October 5, 1796, all their fears became a reality when Spain declared war on England.35 Not surprisingly, Barcelona’s merchants were the first to learn of this news from Madrid. The Board of Trade, whose offices were at La Llotja, announced the declaration of war to the city. “The unexpected has happened,” wrote Rafel d’Amat in his diary. In Madrid, frustration at the end of the one-year peace led to protests. Popular demonstrators before the Royal Palace shouted that they did not want another war. Protesters tore down the announcements of the declaration of war that had been posted on every street corner. D’Amat sympathized with their frustration and expressed in his diary the general uncertainty about the future: “Let us see what happens; everyone is tired of wars.”36 Yet wars would continue for years. The war against England would last from 1796 until March 1802, and after a nearly three-year truce, it would resume between December 1804 and 1808. Shortly after the declaration of war with England, a brooding Alsina worried that “this would be a very different war than the war against France.”37 He would be right. The British war at sea would not only make transport more difficult, but it would also increase speculation in Spanish and colonial products. The challenge companies faced now was how to minimize these problems and perhaps turn this situation to their advantage. The new war would also test Revillagigedo’s assertion about the new generation of “speculators” who were willing to accept modest earnings to keep their businesses afloat.38 To commercial houses such as Alsina, March & Cona Co., risks were justified if some benefits, even if modest, could guarantee the survival of their businesses. Perhaps the first strategy for survival was to think small. Rather than send large shipments of calicoes across the Atlantic, calico commercial houses preferred several smaller ones that included a variety of goods. This would not only safeguard against the loss of expensive manufactures, but would also allow speculation with different products that were in great demand. In the case of Alsina, March & Cona Co., 60 percent of the products it shipped to Veracruz between 1794 and 1796 were textiles, not all of them calicoes. Their cargoes could include everything from fine silk lace to coarse calico cloth. The remaining 40 percent of the goods the company sent to America consisted of spirits and other products. For instance, in 1799 Alsina ordered his agent in Málaga to load wine and oil in a vessel carrying a load of textiles and hard liquor from Barcelona to Veracruz. If these
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products were not available, Alsina wanted the agent to substitute paper and more hard liquor, which he knew had earned profits of 110 percent or more for other companies.39 In Veracruz, March and Cona would gauge the best time to sell the products received from Spain. Cona reported that he had been able to sell—immediately, and for an exorbitant amount—a cargo of calicoes, wine, and hard liquor that arrived after the declaration of war with England. This shipment alone earned the company more than 150 percent in profits.40 When prices were not good, March and Cona would store the items in their warehouse at the port of Veracruz until prices rose. Likewise, rather than send all of the silver earned in America back to Spain, merchants shipped only a portion of the silver, along with other colonial products for sale in Spain, often for a good profit. From Veracruz, March and Cona shipped back to Barcelona silver, sugar, and smaller quantities of cotton and dyes. Although sugar was more perishable than the other two products, during war, buyers would pay three to four times the peacetime price. Alsina had learned this lesson the hard way.41 In September 1796 he had too quickly dismissed the rumors of an impending war with England and sold two shipments of sugar at their peacetime price, which he later regretted. But another calico trader Antoni Cabanyes warned against the temptation to rely on speculation, “because when a merchandise costs much in one place, everyone makes all possible efforts to send this merchandise to this area, and, moreover, an unexpected peace can always come. It is very wise to take advantage of each moment, and it is useful to pursue fortune, but not to force it, because much is lost when one wants to become wealthy too soon.”42 However, one can sense the great temptations speculation offered to merchants from another of Cabanyes’s warnings against the practice: Whenever you find you can speculate with merchandise whose price has reached a height, beware that though you may gain much you may also lose much. Better that you let it go; as the Catalan saying goes: “Turn your face away from expensive merchandise.” . . . When merchandise has a good price it is better to sell part of it and try your luck with the rest. Neither is it advisable to give much credit to the vox populi when they predict a great increase or decrease [in the price] of merchandise, because they never increase as much as one thinks or decrease as one believes.43
As the British naval threat to Spanish ships increased, other strategies would prove essential to protect lives and merchandise traveling
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across the Atlantic. On February 14, 1797 the defeat of the Spanish navy at the battle of Cape Saint Vincent, off the southwestern tip of Portugal, marked a turning point in the war at sea, with dire consequences for Spanish American trade. During the battle, the British navy destroyed most of the Spanish warships. Those that managed to escape were forced to dock in the port of Cádiz. With the Spanish navy effectively out of action, the unprotected Spanish merchant ships became easy targets for the enemy. Throughout 1797 the British captured many Spanish ships carrying all kinds of textiles.44 Moreover, in April, Admiral Nelson, the British naval commander, blockaded the port of Cádiz, the principal Spanish port in the transatlantic trade. Spanish authorities feared disastrous consequences (figure 5.1). The Catalan Antonio Olaguer Feliu, viceroy of Río de la Plata, described “the impossibility of entering safely the port of Cádiz or any other in the peninsula, while the former continues to be blockaded by an English squadron, and the others are infested with corsairs from the same nation.”45
Figure 5.1 View of the port of Cádiz in 1792 Source: From Antonio Ponz, Viage de España en que se da noticia de las cosas mas apreciables, y dignas de saberse que hay en ella, 18 vols. (Madrid, 1774–1796), vol. 17, 316. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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American ports were not safe from the enemy either. In July 1797 British warships blockaded the port of Havana; in August, they trapped thirty-three Spanish merchant ships in Montevideo. British ships kept a continuous watch over Veracruz: every day, from the port, it was possible to see at least one or two British ships sailing along the coast. Spanish sea captains whose vessels were docked at the Veracruz harbor were naturally hesitant to sail to Spain.46 New Spain’s viceroy, the marquis of Branciforte, predicted that, unlike the war against France, the war against Britain would have devastating consequences for the Spanish economy and trade.47 Barcelona did not escape the blockade of the British navy, which made Alsina compare the Spanish plight to the Babylonian captivity.48 In response to this critical situation for the Spanish economy, on November 18, 1797 the Crown issued a decree allowing ships from neutral countries to trade with the Spanish American colonies.49 It was a desperate measure intended to avert a greater disaster. Although Spanish merchants and manufacturers feared that the entry of neutral countries to the Spanish colonial trade would reduce their own sales of Spanish goods, they were also compelled to make the best of the new situation. As the historian Josep Maria Delgado has demonstrated, the use of neutral ships to trade with America became a common practice among Spanish merchants during the war. Between 1797 and 1798 ships with flags from neutral companies carried 59 percent of all Spanish exports to the colonies.50 On December 13, 1797, less than a month after the publication of the royal decree, several Veracruz merchants, including the partners of Alsina, March & Cona Co., made the necessary arrangements to import products from Jamaica and transport them to Mexico on a neutral ship. Cona shipped paper for the Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory in Seville in neutral vessels.51 Spanish traders also took advantage of the royal decree in less legitimate ways. A neutral flag might allow merchants to protect their own ships from British attack. Thus in December Alsina hired a Catalan captain to take a ship to Genoa, purportedly to be sold there. The transaction, however, suggests that Alsina intended to adopt the flag of a neutral country in order to sail to America.52 Flying a neutral flag did not resolve the growing problems of Spanish trade. In January 1798 Francisco de Saavedra, the Spanish minister of finance, informed the prime minister, Manuel Godoy, that the British blockade of virtually all Spanish ports also prevented the departure of ships from neutral countries.53 On February 16, Alsina in Barcelona asserted that “manufacturers and merchants are like the servant of Santa Anna [street],” by which he meant that none of them were doing any work.54 Trade with Veracruz was now a trickle. By the end of 1797, the
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viceroy of New Spain, Miguel José de Azanza, informed the Spanish monarch that in the course of that year, only nineteen small ships known as mistics and three large ships from neutral countries had arrived in Veracruz, causing a scarcity of clothing and fine goods.55 The reliance on smaller vessels made sense during this time of war. Although according to the viceroy of New Spain, in times of peace three larger ships could have brought the total cargo of the nineteen mistics, under the current circumstances, trade in small ships offered better possibilities of evading the British blockade of Spanish ports. Confronted with the British threat and the inability of the Spanish navy to protect its merchants, calico traders resorted to yet another long-standing strategy to minimize losses by relying on smaller ships. Not only were the ships smaller, but the shipments to the colonies were also distributed in as many ships as possible to minimize the risk of the loss of cargo and the kidnaping of crews by the British navy and privateers. The reasoning was simple enough. Writing later (but at a time when the British threat was still great), Antoni Cabanyes asserted that on trips from Cádiz to Veracruz, one out of three ships was lost. At the same time, “since the goods that we send now can yield profit of one or two hundred percent, we can wisely conclude that the trip from Cádiz to Veracruz is a safe undertaking.”56 However, he advised that the silver earned from the transaction should stay in Mexico until it was safe to ship it back to Spain. Similarly, Alsina, who noted that their competitor Isern & Co. had successfully followed this strategy, would send as many vessels as possible to ensure that “one or another will make it” to their final destination.57 At the end of 1797, Alsina, March & Cona Co. had managed to send goods worth 1,349 lliures to Veracruz in one small ship.58 This was a modest amount when compared to one shipment worth 10,000 lliures sent to America in 1794 by the Rull calico factory. Yet by 1797 the Rull factory had seen its exports to America drop sharply—70 percent from the previous year.59 As long as the British blockade remained in force, calico commercial houses would have to content themselves with whatever they could earn. The year 1798 proved even worse for the calico trade. That year, Alsina, March & Cona Co. was unable to send any shipments to Veracruz, forcing it to respond to its desperate situation with the unflinching determination characteristic of Spanish calico traders. Alsina decided that it was now necessary to try yet another strategy. In the summer of 1798 he left the house he rented in Barcelona and moved back to his hometown of Calella. From there he would be in a better position to more closely supervise the construction of the company’s own vessel,
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which had been commissioned earlier in the spring to shipwrights in Arenys de Mar, a town a few miles up the coast from Calella with a long tradition of shipbuilding. The ship was a pinc, light yet capable of undertaking the long Barcelona-Veracruz voyage. After nine months of construction, the vessel, named Nuestra Señora del Rosario (Our Lady of the Rosary), was ready to set sail. Alsina, March & Cona Co. was the new ship’s principal owner, with 80 percent of its shares. Others who had shares in the ship included Maria Alsina (Francesc’s sister and Cona’s wife), Josep Cona’s father, and several of Alsina’s cousins (9 percent). Other individuals probably related to the ship’s captain owned another 10 percent. The remaining 1 percent was divided among investors and merchants who would transport their goods in the company’s ship. It is remarkable that at such a bad time for trade, these individuals were willing to push on with their business activities. Although trade with the colonies remained a dangerous enterprise,60 in October 1798, Captain Josep Oliver made the final preparations to take the company’s ship on its maiden voyage to America. At Barcelona’s Llotja, Alsina registered Nuestra Señora del Rosario, often called by the shorter El Rosario, with a cargo of mostly locally produced textiles sent from several locations in Catalonia, particularly from Calella, Canet, and Mataró, where Alsina, March & Cona Co. had numerous contacts.61 The bulk of the cargo consisted of two kinds of calicoes: the cheaper indianes, and pricier pintats made with imported cotton cloth. These two types of calicoes had constituted 27 percent of Spanish exports to America between 1785 and 1796, and during the war with England, they remained the most common calicoes exported.62 These calicoes came from the factories of prominent calico manufacturers. One of them was Barcelona’s Widow Ramon & Son Co., owned by the well-known widow Ramon, which had a wide network of contacts in the main ports of Andalusia. In addition to calicoes, El Rosario’s first voyage would carry silk textiles and other kinds of goods, such as dry fruits, hard liquor, and paper. On December 7, 1798 El Rosario sailed from Barcelona’s harbor and headed for Málaga, on the Andalusian coast, where the ship would load more goods for America. But soon after leaving Barcelona, the ship faced the realities of war. Several encounters with British ships forced El Rosario to dock briefly at ports in the Mediterranean, including the port of Palma in the island of Majorca and the Andalusian port of Almería, where Alsina’s ship joined the Currutaco (The Dandy), owned by another Catalan calico factory, Cabanyes, Cortecans, Pasqual & Co., with which Alsina had close business associations (figure 5.2). The two ships made the trip together from
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Figure 5.2 Dandy from Madrid, 1801: “I am going to see her before she leaves. Cur[r]utaco with frock coat” Source: From Colección general de los trages que en la actualidad se usan en España: principiada en el año 1801 (Madrid, 1801), 7. Courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas
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Almería to Málaga, where they arrived safely on Christmas Day.63 In Málaga, the captain of El Rosario loaded mostly inexpensive calicoes (indianes), as well as silk stockings, ribbons, fans, dry fruits, and liquors to be shipped to Puerto Rico and New Spain. Different Catalan companies had sent most of these products overland in carts to Málaga. On this occasion, Alsina, March & Cona Co. also loaded calicoes that had been stored in the port since 1796, when a ship could not leave for Veracruz because of a British blockade. On February 22, 1799 El Rosario left Málaga for the transatlantic leg of the trip as part of a convoy of twenty-two ships.64 A British attack forced them to dock at Algeciras, near Gibraltar, but they were able to enter the Atlantic the next day. After a month-long voyage, El Rosario arrived at Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, on March 24, 1799, along with the Currutaco and several other ships in their convoy.65 The stay in Puerto Rico was brief, and both ships finally arrived at the port of Veracruz on May 10, 1799, five months after their departure from Barcelona.66 In June, El Rosario would begin its return voyage to Barcelona.67 Individual success stories such as El Rosario’s could not make up for the reality that the British blockade had depressed calico exports and forced hundreds of factory workers into the streets. Paula Llorens, the widow of a Barcelona merchant, stated that the lack of cotton imports and the difficulty of shipping calicoes had left “thousands of people submerged in the most extreme misery.”68 Bad harvests in 1797 and 1798 only made matters worse. In March 1799 the newly created Board of Charity sought to assist the growing number of unemployed. In April the Spanish monarchy revoked the neutral trade decree on the grounds that it was not helping the difficult commercial situation. If anything, it was making it worse because there was no effective way of checking the authenticity of the ownership and the nationality of the crew of vessels, as well as of their points of origin and destinations.69 Ultimately peace, not charity, would remedy the enormous problems caused by war. As Paula Llorens reminded king Charles IV, “the unfortunate state of war represents a great obstruction to commerce.” Many family commercial houses must have asked how much longer they could continue in business unless conditions changed soon. With peace nowhere in sight, there were at least signs that there might be a break in the long British blockade. Late in 1799 a French squadron helped the Spanish to weaken the blockade of Cádiz.70 In November the return of his partner Miquel March in El Rosario from its first voyage to Veracruz allowed Alsina to move back to Barcelona. This was a sign that the company expected business to increase. Before the end of the year, Alsina had received four shipments from
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Veracruz with much-needed colonial products. By the start of 1800, the calico industry also witnessed modest signs of recovery.71 But the war was not over, as Alsina, March & Cona Co. unfortunately discovered. On June 5, 1800, on its return to Spain after its second voyage to Mexico, the British captured El Rosario near the Caribbean island of Tortugas. March, who at the time of the capture was back in Veracruz, took the news with a positive attitude: “It is much better that this has happened on the ship’s return” to Spain. The partners could also be grateful that none of them was taken prisoner, as was the case with Joan Espar, the son of the owner of the Catalan firm Espar & Co., who had been captured by the English earlier in March en route to Caracas.72 All Alsina, March & Cona Co. could now do was hope that France and England would soon sign a peace treaty, because it was expected that the truce between England and Spain would follow shortly after that. But they would still have to wait more than a year. In January 1802, France and England signed a peace treaty. The Peace of Amiens, which ended the hostilities between England and Spain, followed soon after on March 27, 1802. Now March felt confident enough to remit to Barcelona all the benefits earned by the company in Mexico since his arrival in 1794. Finally, it was time to assess the company’s profits and divide them up among the partners. The total in silver was 28,000 pesos, the equivalent of 52,052 Catalan lliures.73 This was not an insignificant amount: in fact, it was more than 10 times the 4,500 lliures that the partners had initially invested in the company. The total might not have reflected the enormous personal sacrifices and dangers it had represented to the partners, but it was enough to cause them to renew their company for another five years.74 In this sense, the three entrepreneurs fit the profile of the new breed of merchants described back in 1793 by the Viceroy Revillagigedo: they seemed content with earning just enough to survive. Indeed, many must have agreed that survival was sufficient reward during these difficult times: Miguel de Xiorro, who had also chosen not to send the silver and coins he accumulated in Puerto Rico, died four months before the end of the war, in November 1801.75
“Once Again in the Ballroom”: 1802‒1808 Bankruptcies provide a broader perspective for examining the strategies followed by calico companies during these years. Against all odds and in spite of the wars, between 1793 and 1808, the last year of war
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with Britain, the number of calico factories founded outpaced the number of bankruptcies. Fifteen factories closed between 1793 and 1808, while more than eighty new calico factories were established.76 Most of these factories were small enterprises employing forty or fewer workers. The size of the factory had to shrink to meet the demands of the American customer and not suffer from the unsettled commercial conditions produced by the war. In other words, the ability to remain flexible appeared to be crucial for the survival of factories. Other segments of the calico business did not withstand the impact of the wars as well. Josep Maria Delgado’s study of bankruptcies in Catalonia from 1796 until 1802 concludes that only 3.6 percent of manufacturers of calicoes went bankrupt, in contrast with 23.2 percent of transporters, whether sea captains or carters. Not surprisingly, merchants, who were the most exposed to British naval attacks, constituted 73.2 percent of bankruptcies.77 Although it is difficult to ascertain, this distribution of bankruptcies perhaps reflects another objective of calico family businesses. If one takes into account that families often participated in all three activities—manufacture, transportation, and commerce—one may argue that the higher survival rate of factories responded to the desire to save the heart of the family enterprise at the expense of more volatile commercial activities. As will be seen, diversity of activities proved an effective way to avoid complete disaster during this time of war. In 1802 Spanish calico traders expected a speedy recovery after six difficult years of war. That year King Charles IV and Queen María Luisa officially opened the restored building of La Llotja in Barcelona. The beautiful new building, with its four sculptures representing the continents of Asia, Europe, America, and Africa, gave eloquent proof of the enormous wealth made by the city in the last years of the eighteenth century and its determination to pursue that prosperity across the world in the next century.78 The French traveler Alexander Laborde may have derided that determination when he explained that Spanish merchants made up for the bad years of the war with England by speculating during the brief peace that followed. Yet speculation was not necessary. The historian John Fisher has demonstrated that the two years following the signing of the peace “were the most successful for Spanish exports to America in the whole period 1797–1820,” evidence of the great capacity for recovery of the Spanish industry.79 These were years of great prosperity for manufacturers of calicoes and other textiles, when factories owners once again reported large profits. For instance, between 1803 and 1805 the Rull factory enjoyed annual profits that reached 55 percent.80 Likewise,
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between 1802 and 1803 the Sirés factory increased its profits by 40 percent.81 The bright prospects for the future also provided the backdrop for Alsina, March, and Cona’s decision on June 17, 1802 to renew their association for four more years. This time, each of the partners invested a substantially higher sum than when they first established the company eight years before. This time, the three partners contributed 100,000 lliures divided as follows: Alsina, still the largest investor with 64,000 lliures, March 24,000, and Cona 12,000— compared to 3,000 lliures, 1,500 lliures, and nothing, respectively, in January 1794. It proved an ideal time to invest in the export of calicoes to Mexico. In 1802 a record number of Spanish imports arrived in Veracruz.82 That year alone, Alsina, March & Cona Co. sent goods worth 91,442 lliures to Veracruz, most of which were calicoes. Between 1802 and 1804 they sent a total of thirty-seven shipments worth 320,651 lliures to Veracruz, of which 307,630 lliures represented their own products and the remaining 13,021 lliures products sent by commission.83 In return, the company earned 61,365 lliures from one shipment of colonial goods and silvers.84 But international relations again threatened to end their prosperity. In May 1804 the resumption of war between France and Britain soon dragged Spain into a new conflict with the English. On October 5 a surprise British attack outside of Montevideo led to the Spain’s formal declaration of war on October 18.85 A few months later, in March 1805, the British again blockaded Cádiz. In April it was Barcelona’s turn to face a blockade. That same month, trade in Veracruz came to a halt when the viceroy of New Spain prohibited all commercial activity by sea and ordered all merchants to move their activities to the inland town of Xalapa. Spanish traders such as Isern & Co., Martorell & Pla, and Alsina, March & Cona had to scramble to find lodging and warehouses in Xalapa.86 Then on October 21 the British victory at Trafalgar virtually annihilated the Spanish navy. It must have been one of the worst moments for Spanish transatlantic trade. As part of their war against the Spanish empire, the English resumed their attacks on Spanish merchant ships, causing significant losses to calico companies.87 Spanish calico traders once again had to turn to their wartime strategies in order to survive. “My friend,” wrote the calico factory owner Arnaldo Sala to his agent in Veracruz, “we surely are once again in the ballroom.”88 All profits made in America would have to remain there until it was safe to remit them to Spain. The factory owner Antoni Cabanyes reported that upon hearing the news of the declaration of war, traders removed their goods from
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the ships that were ready to sail for America. Cabanyes immediately wrote from Barcelona to his partner in Veracruz, advising him that “if we send a shipment at all it will have to be small and carried by ships leaving from Cádiz or La Coruña, because the English have blockaded this [Mediterranean] sea so that not even a cat could get out without getting caught.”89 Small vessels were, of course, not immune from attack. The British captured the small polacra of Juan Montserrate, a merchant from Vilanova i la Geltrú (a coastal town south of Barcelona), which was on its way to Havana. He had fortunately unloaded the ship’s cargo in Puerto Rico before the attack, although it would take him months to sell those goods and even longer to remit any payment to the cargo’s owners in Spain.90 A safer option was to avoid the seas altogether. According to Antoni Cabanyes, one Captain Davesa, who had already set sail on a voyage from Barcelona to America, got off his ship in Tarragona and returned to Barcelona, where he announced his intention “to go to the mountains and work there as a teacher.”91 Staying in business during these years would take the kind of resolve that critics might denounce as greed, but that Alsina preferred to see as courage and idealism. Against those who thought Alsina, March & Cona Co. were fools for their decision to continue sending their ships to Veracruz, Alsina saw himself “playing the part of Quixote.”92 His Don Quixote was the idealistic hero willing to risk his life to attain his dreams rather than the fool unable to grasp reality. Besides daring, staying in business required resorting to another time-honored practice of diversifying their economic activities. For example, the building of a ship enabled commercial houses to make money from yet other activities, such as the transportation of goods for other companies. In addition, companies also supplemented their incomes by representing the business interests of other calico manufacturers who did not have their own agents abroad. Manufacturers hired trading companies to sell their fabrics in return for an average premium of about 7 percent of the value of the shipment. For example, after the sale of the calicoes of another company and the safe return of the payment to Spain, Alsina, March & Cona Co. earned as much as a third of its profits from the sale. During the 1790s this method of exporting calicoes to America increasingly replaced the earlier practice of calico manufacturers sending their fabrics directly in the charge of a ship captain. Commercial houses specialized in the traffic of textiles and used a network of contacts in America. Entrepreneurs also diversified their financial interests and business activities by lending or investing in other commercial houses or
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buying shares in different ships. The amounts lent or invested could vary greatly, depending on the risk involved. But it is significant that sums could be small—as small as 1 percent share—because it enabled a greater number of investors, both men and women, to take part in commerce at a reduced risk. As several scholars have pointed out, since the late Middle Ages, Catalan families had engaged in similar practices, such as the arrangement known as la barca, which allowed the purchase of shares in commercial ships.93 These forms of investment retained great appeal during the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Calico commercial houses often participated in several or all of the activities listed above. The company of Bonaventura Magarola and his brother Felip is a typical example. The Magarola brothers manufactured calicoes at their medium-sized, seventeen-loom factory in Carrer Tallers in Barcelona for export to Veracruz. Other calico companies hired the brothers to transport their calicoes to the Mexican port or to act as their brokers in Cádiz, where they located merchants who were interested in the cotton fabrics.94 In addition, the Magarolas regularly lent money to Espar & Co.95 Similarly, the partners of Alsina, March & Cona Co. participated in a wide range of activities that provide important insights on the objectives of the company’s strategy of diversification. In his personal llibre de caixa, or account book, for the years 1792–1812, Alsina kept track of a long list of loans, the totals and returns of which varied widely.96 He probably did not expect to collect the small amounts (under 100 lliures) that he handed out to an acquaintance or relative going through a difficult time. He invested 687 lliures in 1/32 of the bergantí Sant Joan Baptista belonging to a captain from Calella, of which he collected only 281 lliures before the French, and later the English, captured it—a reminder of the importance of not putting all one’s eggs in one basket. On the other hand, when Alsina trusted an individual or a company, he would repeatedly lend larger quantities of money. Between 1810 and 1811 Alsina lent to Cabanyes, Cortecans, Pasqual & Co., traders from Calella, 4,309 lliures, 639 lliures, and 1,464 lliures (for a total of 6,402 lliures), for which he received a total of 11,309 lliures upon repayment.97 In addition to owning their company, the three partners invested in other companies usually owned by relatives or longtime commercial partners. On October 26, 1804, just a few days after the Spanish official renewal of war against the British, Alsina and March (although not Cona) became partners in the Martorell & Pla Co.98 March was related to the Martorells, who had helped Alsina, March & Cona Co. get started
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in the trade with Veracruz. Moreover, the construction of ships allowed the company to seek investments from other partners and relatives. It is worth recalling that among those who bought shares in 1798 in the construction of El Rosario were Cona’s father and wife (Alsina’s sister) and several other investors. Likewise, during the second war with the English, Alsina and March sought new investors to build three small ships for their traffic to Veracruz. The company promised investors a fixed interest of between 0.5 percent and 2 percent per month, or else one lump sum ranging between 25 and 30 percent of the money invested. In September 1805, one month before Trafalgar, Alsina began to coordinate the construction of a second El Rosario—this time a bergantí Alsina intended to be “the best ship made during this war.” His quixotic aspirations remained strong. Although there is little doubt that Alsina was a daring businessman, the examples listed above suggest how the strategy of diversification may have prevented that daring from being sheer folly. Even during war it was possible to seek new opportunities to make money without risking bankruptcy. As noted before, it may be necessary to evaluate such daring action by taking into account not only individual transactions but also the whole of a company’s activities. That the failure of transportation or commercial ventures did not always have to mean the bankruptcy of the calico factory may ultimately have reassured men and women in the calico trade that taking a chance now and then did not have to threaten their entire business. On the other hand, the diversification was inseparable from a larger strategy. Lists of loans, of company partners, and of owners of shares in ships reveal an endless process of creating personal connections that made such activities possible. In fact, to these fairly modest family commercial houses, all of the