Cognitive Social Psychology: the Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition

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Cognitive Social Psychology : The Princeton Symposium On the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition Moskowitz, Gordon B. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 0805834141 9780805834147 9780585384719 English Social perception--Congresses, Social psychology--Congresses. 2001 HM1041.P75 1998eb 302/.12 Social perception--Congresses, Social psychology--Congresses.

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Page i Cognitive Social Psychology The Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition Edited by Gordon B. Moskowitz Princeton University

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Page ii Copyright © 2001 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by photostat, microfilm, retrieval system, or any other means, without prior written permission of the publisher. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers 10 Industrial Avenue Mahwah, NJ 07430 Cover design by Kathryn Houghtaling Lacey Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition (1998) Cognitive social psychology : 2001016136 the Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition / edited by Gordon B. Moskowitz. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8058-3414-1 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Social perception—Congresses. 2. Social psychology—Congresses. I. Moskowitz, Gordon B. II. Title. HM1041 .P75 1998 302'.12—dc21 Books published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates are printed on acid-free paper, and their bindings are chosen for strength and durability. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Page iii CONTENTS Part I. The Motives Driving Social Cognition 1.A Relational Approach to Cognition: Shared Experience and Relationship Affirmation in Social 3 Cognition Curtis D. Hardin and Terri D. Conley 2.The Personal Need for Structure and Personal Fear of Invalidity Measures: Historical Perspectives, 19 Current Applications, and Future Directions Megan M. Thompson, Michael E. Naccarato, Kevin C.H. Parker, and Gordon B. Moskowitz 3.Behavioral Discrepancies and the Role of Construal Processes in Cognitive Dissonance 41 Jeff Stone 4.Self-Evaluation: The Development of Sex Differences 59 Eva M. Pomerantz, Jill L. Saxon, and Gwen A. Kenney 5.Evaluating the Self in the Context of Another: The Three-Selves Model of Social Comparison 75 Assimilation and Contrast Hart Blanton 6.Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System Justification: A Paradigm for Investigating the 89 Effects of Socioeconomic Success on Stereotype Content John T. Jost Part II. Building Blocks of Social Cognition: Representation and Structure 7.A Case for the Nonconscious Self-Concept John J. Hetts and Brett W. Pelham 8.The Role of Theories in Mental Representations and Their Use in Social Perception: A TheoryBased Approach to Significant-Other Representations and Transference Serena Chen 9.What We Theorize When We Theorize That We Theorize: Examining the “Implicit Theory” Construct From a Cross-Disciplinary Perspective Michael W. Morris, Daniel R. Ames, and Eric D. Knowles 10. From Cognition to Culture: The Origins of Stereotypes that Really Matter Mark Schaller and Lucian Gideon Conway, III 11. The Dynamic Relationship Between Stereotype Efficiency and Mental Representation Jeffrey W. Sherman 12. A Cornerstone for the Science of Interpersonal Behavior? Person Perception and Person Memory, Past, Present, and Future Leonard S. Newman

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Page iv Part III. Subjective Perception and Motivated Judgment 13.On Partitioning the Fundamental Attribution Error: Dispositionalism and the Correspondence Bias Douglas S. Krull 14.Let's Not Forget the Past When We Go to the Future: On Our Knowledge of Knowledge Accessibility Diederik A. Stapel and Willem Koomen 15.Illusory Correlation and Stereotype Formation: Tracing the Arc of Research Over a Quarter Century Steven J. Stroessner and Jason E. Plaks 16.The Other Side of the Story: Transparency Estimation in Social Interaction Jacquie D. Vorauer 17.The Flexible Correction Model: Phenomenology and the Use of Naive Theories in Avoiding or Removing Bias Duane T. Wegener, Meghan Dunn, and Danny Tokusato 18.Exploring the Boundaries of Rationality: A Functional Perspective on Dual-Process Models in Social Psychology Akiva Liberman

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Part IV. Control Over Cognition and Action 19.The Crossroads of Affect and Cognition: Counterfactuals as Compensatory Cognition Neal Roese 20.Goals and the Compatibility Principle in Attitudes, Judgment, and Choice C. Miguel Brendl 21.Preconscious Control and Compensatory Cognition Gordon B. Moskowitz 22.Implicit Stereotypes and Prejudice Irene V. Blair 23.Exerting Control Over Prejudiced Responses Margo J. Monteith and Corrine I. Voils

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References Author Index Subject Index

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Page v PREFACE On January 8, 9, 10, and 11, Princeton University's psychology department welcomed the year 1998 with a conference that brought together a group of young researchers working in the area of social cognition. The idea for a conference struck me during the first Society of Experimental Social Psychology (SESP) meeting I attended. Although I had been surrounded by an incredible cohort of graduate students during my years at New York University, I was overwhelmed by the number of young researchers who had converged on Washington, DC, for that SESP meeting. My first thought, aside from getting a beer, was to contemplate getting this group that had been scattered across the globe together for a chance to meet as a cohort – both as a social occasion and as an opportunity to discuss where our research as a collective was heading (and forge collaborations with colleagues one might not otherwise have the opportunity to meet). With the financial backing of Princeton University, and the Langfeld fund within the psychology department, I was able to have such an event. Needless to say, without the support of my department at Princeton, this event would not have been able to occur, and each of us who participated is grateful to Princeton for having made this a possibility. Thus, little did my friend and colleague, John Darley, realize what he was initiating when he invited me to be his guest at that SESP meeting. I decided to pattern the conference after two conferences that I experienced only through the edited volumes that emerged from them. One was held at the University of Colorado in 1957 and was entitled Contemporary Approaches to Cognition. During that meeting, the participants (Bruner, Brunswik, Festinger, Heider, Muenzinger, Osgood, and Rapaport) set for themselves the task of outlining a historical introduction to the topic of cognition, detailing each contributor's orientation and recent research, and looking to Fritz Heider to discuss future trends. As they stated, the symposium “undoubtedly reflects the Zeitgeist, but our major aim is to influence it.” The second was held at the University of Western-Ontario in 1978 and brought together researchers who had focused their interests on the cognitive processes involved in person perception and person memory. Borrowing from Heider (1944), they dubbed this thematic concern with the processing aspects of impression formation and social judgment Social Cognition (Volume I of the Ontario Symposium series). Throughout the 1980's such research began its transition from the cutting edges of the discipline to occupying the heart of social psychology. Its entrenchment in the middle of the road was perhaps most clearly marked by the impact of Fiske and Taylor's Social Cognition text and three edited volumes – Wyer and Srull's Handbook of Social Cognition, Sorrentino and Higgins' The Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, and Uleman and Bargh's Unintended Thought . Throughout the 1990s a new crop of social cognition researchers, trained by the contributors to the volumes described earlier, have begun to exert their impact on the direction of the field. In the past 5 to 8 years, these young scientists have established labs of their own and conducted research that will help define the shape of social cognition for the future. However, this group has remained fairly isolated from one another despite working on issues and with methodologies that would greatly inform one another. Although their mentors have shared numerous opportunities to exchange ideas over the years, as of 1997 (when I was plotting the conference) this group had had little chance to gather as a unit and discuss their vision. But the opportunity, once made possible thanks to the Langfeld funds, then presented a problem. Who was I to invite to this conference given that 4 days allowed for a maximum of only 24 talks (at a grueling pace of 6 talks a day, 45-60 minutes each) and 24 participants? This was a dilemma I did not take lightly because, like anyone, I certainly was ill-suited to select from among my peers a handful who could attend. To solve this problem, I attempted a rational approach. I decided that I would like an edited volume to emerge from the conference and that it should attempt to define social cognition somewhat broadly (to include not simply people who study accessibility effects in person perception, but anyone with an interest in the ways in which goals and cognitive processes interact in mediating social responses; e.g., attitudes, impressions, actions, etc.). I started by making a list of topics in social cognition that I would want covered in a comprehensive book. I then made a list of every nontenured faculty person doing social cognition research I could track down and summarized their research interests, with a special focus on where their interests were heading (by virtue of their most recent publications). I then matched people with topics – a process that occupied a chunk of my time while visiting at Tolman Hall in Berkeley in the spring of 1997. I then began a process of selecting people based on the goal of having a group that, as a collective strung together in the proper order, could produce a coherent volume on social cognition. This was, of course, still an imperfect solution, because for

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Page vi many categories there were multiple people who could have been invited. In these instances, I tried to balance out the graduate training institutions where folks came from. Certainly there are many people I wish could have attended who were not invited. I admit to having a bias in some instances to inviting a person I knew when there seemed to be more than one equally plausible candidate based solely on research interests; but that was a last resort. Much time and effort went into an attempt at being rational. As we see in several chapters, attempts at rationality often fail, and I cannot claim to be exempt from this fact. This was the process, and it produced an exciting conference spilling over into late-night discussions over extravagant dinners and bottles of wine and beer. Although we had many participants, the aim was to make the conference feel small. It was spread out over many days, with numerous social events built in, and time allotted within each presentation for discussion. It was an amazing and stimulating experience for me, and I hope the excitement of the long weekend is captured by the chapters in this volume. This volume represents the efforts of our conference participants to not simply review their own work, but to place that work in a historical context and to take aim at the future. The volume that has resulted defines social cognition quite broadly, in that it brings together researchers from varied perspectives, but whose interests still cohere along some important dimensions. I am grateful to the contributors for taking this charge seriously and not just producing summaries of the latest results coming out of their labs. The book is organized in a fashion that allows each chapter to build off of each other. Although it is an edited volume, the aim was to allow it to operate as a text in social cognition as well. I want to thank all those who participated in and attended the conference. I especially want to thank the members of the psychology department at Princeton university who chaired the various sessions of the conference and attended the marathon sessions with the interest of a new graduate student. I know the conference participants appreciated their enthusiasm as much as I did, so a special thanks goes to those who chaired the sessions: Joel Cooper, Debbie Prentice, Mike Hogg, John Jemmott, Joan Girgus, John Darley, Dale Miller, and George Miller. There are several people who helped in coordinating and organizing this event who also need to be thanked. Adam Galinsky and Ian Skurnik were active participants in all the sessions as well as being tremendously giving of their time and energy for making sure the conference ran smoothly. I was very lucky to have two such incredible graduate students during my first years as a professor, and everyone in attendance got to observe just how lucky I was. Mary Ann Opperman must be credited for making the conference a reality. She worked on every detail and taught me a great deal. I am indebted to her for making the conference simply perfect (at least from my perspective). I want to also thank those people who have served as my mentors over the years – scholars who have guided me and taught me (by both their actions and inactions) in grad school and in the early years of my post graduate student life in social psychology. It is through the committement of such mentors that the work of all the contributors in this volume is made possible. In my personal case they include John Darley, Marcia Johnson, Joel Cooper, and Dale Miller at Princeton; Peter Gollwitzer, Ute Bayer, Jule Malzacher, and Veronika Brandstätter at the Max Planck institute; John Bargh, Shelley Chaiken, Tory Higgins, Diane Ruble, Jeff Tanaka, Yaacov Trope, and Jim Uleman at NYU; and finally, the students and postdocs who overlapped with me at NYU: Chuck Stangor, Tim Strauman, Wayne Winborne, Roman Thein, David Schechter, Mary Tota, Elizabeth Van Hook, Len Newman, Felicia Pratto, Abigail Panter, Akiva Liberman, Carlos Rivero, Lisa Spielman, Ronda Eisenberg, Tracy Wellens, Orit Tykocinski, Jenny Vookles, Erik Thompson, Chuck Hymes, Bob Roman, Tom Alfieri, Paula Raymond, Roger GinerSorolla, Eun Rhee, Magda Garcia, Eva Pomerantz, Stacey Lutz, Gerd Bohner, Doug Hazlewood, Beate Schuster, and Piroska Hunyadi. Finally, the thanks of all the contributors are extended to the folks at Lawrence Erlbaum for giving voice to our young group. — Gordon Moskowitz Summer 1999

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Page vii CONTRIBUTORS Daniel R. Ames, Columbia University, Department of Psychology, 406 Schermerhorn Hall, MC 5501 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027 Irene Blair, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 80309, USA Hart Blanton, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, New York, 12222, USA Miguel Brendl, INSEAD, Fontainebleau Cedex, 77305, France Serena Chen, Department of Psychology, Institute of Personality and Social Research, Tolman Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720-5050, USA Terri D. Conley, Department of Psychology, 1282A Franz Hall, Box 951563, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1563 Meghan Dunn, Federal Judicial Center, Research Division, One Columbus Circle, NE Washington, DC 20002 Lucian Gideon Conway, III, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1Z4, Canada Curtis D. Hardin, Department of Psychology, 1282A Franz Hall, Box 951563, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1563 John J. Hetts, Ohio State University, Department of Psychology, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, 43210-1222, USA John Jost, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA Gwen A. Kenney, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, Illinois, 61820, USA Eric D. Knowles, Department of Psychology, Institute of Personality and Social Research, Tolman Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720-5050, USA Willem Koomen, Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands Doug Krull, Department of Psychology, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, Kentucky, 41099, USA Akiva Liberman, National Institute of Justice, 810 7th street, NW, Washington, DC, 20531, USA Margo J. Monteith, Department of Psychology, 115 Kastle Hall, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 405060044, USA Michael W. Morris, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA Gordon B. Moskowitz, Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 08544, USA Michael E. Naccarato, Backbone Media Inc., 550 Front Street West, Suite 206, Toronto, Ontario, Canada Leonard S. Newman, The University of Illinois at Chicago, Psychology Department, 1007 West Harrison Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60607-7137, USA Kevin C.H. Parker, Clinical Psychology Department, Kingston General Hospital, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

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Page viii Brett W. Pelham, 356 Park Hall, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, 14260, USA Jason E. Plaks, Department of Psychology, Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University, New York, New York, 10027, USA Eva M. Pomerantz, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, Illinois, 61820, USA Neal Roese, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5A 1S6, Canada Jill L. Saxon, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, Illinois, 61820, USA Mark Schaller, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1Z4, Canada Jeffrey W. Sherman, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, Illinois, 60208-2710, USA Diederik A. Stapel, Social and Organizational Psychology, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1, 9712 TS Groningen, Netherlands Jeff Stone, Psychology Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 85721, USA Steven J. Stroessner, Department of Psychology, Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, New York, 10027-6598, USA Megan M. Thompson, Command Group, Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, 1133 Sheppard Ave., West, P.O. Box 2000, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9, Canada Danny Tokusato, Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 47907-1364, USA Corrine I. Voils, Department of Psychology, 115 Kastle Hall, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 405060044, USA Jacquie D. Vorauer, Department of Psychology, Duff Roblin Building, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 2N2, Canada Duane T. Wegener, Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 47907-1364, USA

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Page 1 Part I. The Motives Driving Social Cognition

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Page 3 1 A Relational Approach to Cognition: Shared Experience and Relationship Affirmation in Social Cognition Curtis D. Hardin Terri D. Conley University of California, Los Angeles Social psychology is poised to realize the synthesis envisioned in the ‘‘The Sovereignty of Social Cognition” by the late Thomas Ostrom (1984), who defined social cognition as “the struggle to understand the interdependence between cognition and social behavior.” In so doing, Ostrom broke from contemporary definitions of social cognition, which in the 1960s and 1970s was defined as the study of cognition about social objects and since the early 1980s has been defined as the study of the cognitive bases of social perception and behavior (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Although Ostrom celebrated the identification of cognitive foundations of social behavior, he lamented the lack of research on social foundations of cognition. However, it can no longer be said that the social bases of cognition have been ignored. Indeed the recent decade has witnessed a blossoming interest in how social relationships affect even very basic information processing (e.g., Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Higgins, 1992; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Leary, 1995; Markus & Kitayama 1991; Schwarz, 1994; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Tice, 1992). We argue that pursuing theoretical integrations of cognitive and social activity will yield important new insights into the hallmark issues of social psychology, including attitudes, social perception, the self-concept, and stereotyping. To do so, we first identify in the history of social cognition research two fundamental human requirements – social connectedness and cognitive understanding – and argue that a full understanding of social-cognitive interdependence requires a renewed focus on how social interaction structures basic information processing. We propose that shared reality theory provides one such synthesis from its postulate that both relational and epistemic requirements are served by the interpersonal realization of shared experience (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Moreover, research demonstrating the role of shared reality processes in the regulation of interpersonal behavior and individual cognition provides tentative promise for Ostrom's prescriptive charge for the social cognition endeavor. FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION: RELATIONSHIPS AND EPISTEMICS Twisting through the history of research on social cognition, like the frayed strands of a double helix, is the observation of two great forces driving human behavior: One is the requirement to establish, affirm, and protect social relationships, and the other is the requirement to understand the self and its environments ( inter alia., Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1954a; Freud, 1922/1989; Heider, 1958; Higgins, 1981a; James, 1890/1950; Lewin, 1931; Mead, 1934; Newcomb, 1953; Schachter, 1959; Sherif, 1936; Sullivan, 1953). Interestingly, for the most part, the contemporary literatures on the pursuit and consequences of the relational and epistemic needs have evolved independently. For example, contemporary social cognition research has been characterized by a near exclusive focus on epistemics (see Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume, for a review) – that is, how the cognitive system enables individuals to understand and thereby adaptively navigate an informationally complex world (e.g., Bargh, 1996; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Markus & Wurf, 1986; Stangor & Lange, 1994; Swann, 1990). Meanwhile, research on the negotiation and maintenance of social relationships has occurred on the selfdescribed margins of mainstream social psychology (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Collins, 1997; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Murray & Holmes, 1997). This was not always the case, however, for the American psychological tradition arose out of the modern conception of human nature, including the assumption that individual thought is a product of social activity (e.g., Dewey, 1922/1930; Freud, 1922/1989; James, 1890/1950; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970; Wittgenstein, 1953). Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it

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Page 4 appears that the theoretical alienation between social behavior and cognition is a relatively recent (and perhaps temporary) development. An expressed focus on their interdependence characterizes classical social-psychological theory, and recently contemporary theorists have reaffirmed an interest in social-cognitive interdependence. Epistemics and Relationships in Classical Psychology At its genesis, American psychology accepted as axiomatic the proposition that cognition and social activity are fundamentally interdependent. For example, William James argued that human knowledge is not an individual end, but emerges from an ongoing process of adaptive, cooperative, social activity (e.g., James, 1890/1950, 1907/1992, 1909). Indeed, James' postulate that good thinking is a collective activity (rather than a solitary activity) is one of the defining elements of the pragmatic philosophical tradition (e.g., Dewey, 1922/1930; Mead, 1929). In so doing, James broke radically from classical philosophy by identifying the search and validation of “truth” in practical, social terms rather than in the ephemera of platonic ideals: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not . … Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But this all points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other's truth. But beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure. (James, 1907, pp. 100–101, italics in the original) The social behaviorists built on James' insight with descriptions of ways in which the individual's cognitive world is constructed and regulated by social structure and interpersonal interaction (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Cooley, 1902/1983; Dewey, 1922/1930; Mead, 1934; Stryker & Statham, 1985). In this tradition, the social-cognitive synthesis is realized by taking as axiomatic the necessity of social relationships for human survival and postulating that adaptive cognitive structure emerges from the internalization of social organization. For example, Cooley (1902) made a foil the individual solipsism of Emerson and others to emphasize instead that individual understanding is predicated on the internalization of the social world: A castaway who should be unable to retain his imaginative hold upon human society might conceivably live the life of an intelligent animal, exercising his mind upon the natural conditions about him, but his distinctively human faculties would certainly be lost, or in abeyance. George Herbert Mead articulated a mechanism by which society might be internalized, and in so doing argued that human cognition reflects an ever dynamic interplay among socially shared perspectives (Mead, 1930, 1932, 1934, 1938, 1956). Mead emphasized in particular the role of ongoing cooperative social interaction in the creation and maintenance of meaning. Mead's synthesis of self and society was also predicated on the necessity of human relationships for survival, but through the mechanism of the organized exchange of social gestures and concomitant perspective taking. Mead likened everyday social interaction to rule-governed play in organized games like baseball, in which each participant must continually take the various perspectives of each of the other participants to understand its place, responsibilities, and plans for action. For example, a catcher in baseball must take the perspectives of the batter, shortstop, outfielder, and pitcher (among others) to understand itself and the everevolving reality of the game. The cornerstone of Mead's theory is the concept of the significant symbol , on which rests the human capacity for language and cognitive representation. The significant symbol is realized when an individual evokes in itself, by a social gesture, the functionally identical response the gesture evokes in others. According to Mead, it is only through significant symbols, realized in ongoing social interaction, that people are able to remember the past, anticipate the future, and experience the present. From this perspective, the mind cannot be separated from cooperative social action, but instead arises out of it. Notably, Mead's objective relativism broke radically from the introspectionists and phenomenologists – and, indeed, from many varieties of subjective relativism popular among poststructural theorists of today – by postulating that the individual mind can exist only in relation to other minds with the capacity to share experiences. The social expression and validation of an idea is essential for both its clarity and objectivity, ultimately relieving individual experience of mere solipsism. One of the most important implications of Mead's theory is that, through significant symbols, individual experiences are socially constructed, existing only in relation to the organized social activities that support them, thereby creating meanings out of what would otherwise be an undifferentiated flux of stimuli

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Page 5 (cf. Whorf, 1956; Wittgenstein, 1962). Yet because such cognitions are assumed to be linked directly to the shared perspectives of real people in actual social exchange, Mead's social-cognitive theory is a thoroughly material account of mind, and hence congenial to the scientific endeavor (Jost & Hardin, 1997). While theorists in the Jamesian tradition articulated a social-cognitive synthesis in which epistemics was the primary adaptive consequence of organized social interaction, a complementary synthesis was being articulated in the tradition of psychoanalysis in which social connectedness – and concommitant psychic integrity –was the primary adaptive outcome. Freud and his students postulated that psychological structure is not only grounded in family dynamics, but ultimately motivated by the human need to feel connected with significant others (e.g., Erikson, 1959; Freud, 1922/1989; Jung, 1934; Sullivan, 1953). Like the American pragmatists, Freud (1922/1989) grounded his theory in the necessity of society for survival, identifying separation anxiety as the most primitive human fear. For Freud, the primacy of social relationships renders connectedness an essential human motivation achieved through social identification, in which one attempts to take on the characteristics, desires, and behaviors of the object of identification. The primary means by which identification occurs is the attempt to understand others by taking their perspectives as well as attempting to elicit understanding from them. Hence, Freud proposed that social identification is the process by which humans regulate all important social attachments – a notion central to his theorizing. For example, in discussing his theory of psychological structure, Freud (1933/1965) wrote: The basis of this process is what is called an “identification” – that is to say, the assimilation of one ego to another one, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself. …It is a very important form of attachment to someone else (p. 56). Although Freud was the first to emphasize the primacy of social identification in cognition, his students translated the insight into a language that may have better communicated the social character of healthy individual cognition. For example, each of Erikson's (1959) stages of human development involve social validation of one kind or another for successful resolution. Jung (1934) emphasized the necessity of individual consciousness to find resolution with shared cultural values. Bowlby (1969) wrote that ‘‘the young child's hunger for his mother's love and presence is as great as his hunger for food.” Indeed, Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory of psychology articulated psychodynamic theory in a way that resonates unmistakably with Mead's (1934) emphasis on perspective taking in cognition: By the end of childhood, the pressure toward socialization has almost invariably fixed a big premium on carefully sorting out that which is capable of being agreed to by the authority figure. This is the first very vivid manifestation in life of the role of consensual validation, by which I mean that a consensus can be established with someone else. (Sullivan, 1953, p. 224) Hence, two great traditions of classical psychology – Jamesian social behaviorism and Freudian psychodynamics – not only emphasized the interdependence of social and cognitive activity, but converged on a similar social-cognitive synthesis. Yet each synthesis had a distinct flavor. Although both emphasized the essential role of perspective taking in cognition, the social behaviorists focused most on its epistemic functions, whereas the psychodynamic theorists focused most on its relational functions.1 As discussed later, shared reality theory represents an attempt to integrate these two motivations within a single social-cognitive framework. Relationships and Epistemics in Classical Social Psychology Early social-psychological theorists also began with the social-cognitive assumption of interdependence, but did so from a perspective borne of a world ravaged by revolution, war, and genocide (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Asch, 1952; Heider, 1958; Le Bon, 1896; Lewin, 1935; Sherif, 1936). Although the epoch produced a social psychology defined by an interest in the social foundations of knowledge, it represented a kind of neo-rationalism in which the power of society to structure individual thought was not merely acknowledged but conceived as a threat to individual rationality (cf. DeCartes, 1647/1970; Russell, 1912). Hence, both the relational and epistemic motivational strands of social cognition dominant in classical psychology survived, although most American social-psychological theorists viewed the two motivations as essentially binary and competing (for critiques, see Baumeister, 1987; Geertz, 1973; Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). With few exceptions since, social psychologists have assumed that cognitive integrity is defined by the degree to which individuals are able to resist social influence, whether it be interpersonal, group based, or imputed through more broadly societal or cultural means. Consequently, social psychologists

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Page 6 have studied social influence in terms of its power to delude the individual, as evidenced, for example, by the pejorative labels used to characterize it, including conformity (e.g., Milgrim, 1961), groupthink (e.g., Janis, 1982), deindividualization (Zimbardo, 1962), and social loafing (e.g., Latane & Darley, 1969) – and, indeed, by the fact that the preeminent journal of the fledgling discipline was entitled Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. Some contemporary theorists have criticized this perspective as peculiarly “Western” (e.g., Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), characterizing it as an individualistic conception of personhood arising from cultural prescriptions for people to be unique, free, and unbounded by social relationships. However, we find it notable that proponents of intellectual individualism expressly assumed that their prescriptions were neither endorsed nor practiced by people in general (e.g., Descartes, 1647/1970; Nietzche, 1954/1977; Russell, 1912; Sartre, 1933). Moreover, intellectual individualism appears to resonate with the broader ideology of the JudeoChristian canon, which views individual resistance to worldly social influence as impossible but laudable (e.g., Bloom, 1992). From our perspective, however, it is notable that resistance to worldly influence in the Judeo-Christian tradition does not occur in a social vacuum, but rather is enacted to affirm one's relationship with God as well as the earthly community of believers. Finally, although social psychology is fairly characterized as subscribing to a paradigm in which the otherwise rational individual is pitted against irrational social influences, this perspective has produced with more clarity than any system preceding it demonstrations that people value social connection more than anything else – except, perhaps, air to breath, food to eat, and shelter from the elements (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). Nevertheless, in some instances, social-psychological theorists expressly recognized the adaptive interdependence between social influence and individual cognition by investigating the role of relationship concerns in the basic structure of thought. For example, Vygotsky (1962, 1978) turned Piagetian theory on its head in research demonstrating the social foundations of cognitive development. Lewin (1931, 1951) proposed that social influences form the forces at the very foundation of psychological structure and the psychological situation. Sherif (1936) assumed the generally adaptive function of the social motivation in cognition by demonstrating the role of group dynamics in the construction of coherent perception out of ambiguous sensation. Moreover, Sherif recognized that social interaction not only formed the basis for individual understanding, but also that shared understandings have social regulatory functions: “Established social values are standardized fixations which the individual incorporates in himself and which henceforth have a great deal to do with regulating his likes and dislikes, his closeness to or remoteness from other individuals, and his activities in satisfying his basic needs” (p. 125). Asch's (1951, 1956) research demonstrated that otherwise simple and unmistakable judgments created severe discomfort and even uncertainty among individuals faced with the incorrect but unanimous judgments of others. Although ironically Asch's work has been assimilated within the rubric of conformity, which is where in contemporary textbooks one now invariably finds discussions of his famous line experiments, he rejected the rationalist paradigm pitting social influence against adaptive cognitive functioning. Instead, Asch concluded that adaptive human understanding is predicated on social influence and shared experience: If we were unable to come to agreement about [our] surroundings, sensible interaction would lack all foundation. To the extent that we do so and to the extent that we can make known our experiences, the relations of identity or similarity of our perceptions become the condition for mutual action. These facts become also the intelligible basis for relations of difference in our experiences. …For this reason I am able to enter into relations with others. (Asch, 1950, pp. 128–129) Asch not only recognized the epistemic functions of socially shared cognition, but, like Sherif, emphasized its role in regulating relationships: That attitudes have such social roots and implications has consequences for their cognitive and emotional functioning, for the conditions of their growth and change. Their content and their persistence and change must be seen as an expression of the need to maintain viable group-relations. Only in this way can we fully understand the pull of social conditions in the formation and modification of attitudes and the fact that they vary lawfully with group membership. …For a Southerner to deny the prevailing views about Negroes requires a drastic intellectual reorientation and a serious snapping of social bonds. It would be tantamount to questioning the perceptions and cherished values of those nearest to him and of casting himself out of the group. (1950, pp. 577–578) Follow-up research employing Asch's (1951) line paradigm supported both the epistemic and relational functions of social consensus by demonstrating that conformity increases with the difficulty and ambiguity of the

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Page 7 judgment task (e.g., Asch, 1951; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), as well as by group attractiveness, cohesiveness, and interdependence (e.g., Back, 1951; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Gerard, 1954; Jones, Wells, & Torrey, 1958; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956). The repeated observation of the potency of epistemic and relational needs eventually elicited theoretical integrations. For example, inspired by Gestalt principles of perceptual coherence, Heider's (1946, 1958) balance theory described the social consequences of intrapersonal and interpersonal belief symmetry and asymmetry, postulating synthesis through the mechanism of cognitive consistency. According to balance theory, if attitudes and/or others are perceived to belong together in unit relation, then there is a pressure toward coherence within the unit relation. For example, people have more stable relationships with others who like their friends and dislike their enemies. Unbalanced states are unstable because they are met with attempts to restore balance by either (a) changing one's own attitude or the attitude of one's relationship partner, (b) misapprehending the attitude of oneself or one's partner, or (c) changing one's attitude about one's partner (e.g., Monsour, Betty, & Kurzwiel, 1993). Festinger's (1954a) social comparison theory provided yet another synthesis of relational and epistemic needs in a framework that continues to be influential today (e.g., Taylor & Lobel, 1989). Social comparison theory postulates that human gregariousness serves epistemic needs by facilitating the use of social standards in (self-) understanding. According to the theory, social comparison processes afford understanding of both “what is real” and “what is good,” each having different implications for social motivation and action. The goal of understanding what is real is facilitated by social comparisons with similar others because they are assumed to be in a better position to provide consensual validation that one's opinions are accurate. Hence, particularly in the case of opinions, group members will attempt to reduce discrepancies to the extent that they exist, thereby increasing uniformity within the group. However, particularly in the case of abilities, people attempt to acquire more and more of what is good, which motivates movement upward (and away) from the group norm. By the end of the 1950s, then, social-psychological research was rife with demonstrations of the power of the society to constrain beliefs and attitudes, particularly through attempts to establish, protect, affirm, and maintain social relationships. Yet Schachter's (1959) review of this literature led him to conclude: Despite the importance of the study of affiliative needs, almost nothing is known of the variables and conditions affecting these needs. We have no precise idea of the circumstances that drive men either to seek one another out or to crave privacy, and we have only the vaguest and most obvious sort of suggestions concerning the kinds of satisfaction that men seek in company. (p. 1) Although Schachter did not forward a theory of affiliation, he identified some conditions likely to produce affiliative behavior. Affiliation with others of similar experience is more likely under conditions of uncertainty and anxiety (e.g., Schachter, 1951, 1959) as well as with ingroup members when group beliefs are attacked (e.g., Festinger, Reiken, & Schachter, 1956). Moreover, when affiliation is delayed or precluded, individuals may even exhibit symptoms of insanity (e.g., Faris, 1934). Indeed, Schachter (1959) reported his own attempt to study the psychological effects of social isolation, but aborted the research when he found in a preliminary study that just three of five participants exhibited severe symptomology in 3 days, concluding that such research was economically impractical because it would require 10 to 12 days to reliably produce psychotic symptoms. In summary, classical social psychological research not only proceeded on the assumption of social-cognitive interdependence, but repeatedly demonstrated the operation of epistemic and relational motivations. The era produced at least two attempts to synthesize them within single theoretical frameworks, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954a) and balance theory (Heider, 1958). After briefly outlining the presence of these themes in contemporary social cognition research, we describe our attempt to integrate them within the rubric of shared reality theory. Relationships and Epistemics in Contemporary Social Psychology Although the cognitive side of social cognition has dominated research for several decades – culminating in the 1980s definition of social cognition as the study of the cognitive bases of social behavior (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984, 1992; Higgins & Bargh, 1987) – recent years have witnessed a decided resurgence in research on relational needs as well (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 1995; Murray & Holmes, 1997). This emerging interest bridges the classical interest in relational demands to the contemporary emphasis on epistemics in ways that afford syntheses in the language of contemporary social cognition theory. In short, research shows that relationships are pursued with unusual purpose, and have profound emotional and cognitive consequences. For example, it is now well accepted that forming social relationships is

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Page 8 easy and breaking them is difficult. Social attachments are formed in infancy (e.g., Bowlby, 1969) as well as under conditions in which history, interdependence, or instrumental interests are absent (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). Mere proximity can produce stable social attachment (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950) under both positive conditions and even extremely negative conditions (e.g., Elder & Clipp, 1988). A review of this kind of research suggests that shared emotions are crucial to the development of interpersonal relationships (Moreland, 1987). Moreover, research suggests that, once formed, social relationships are difficult to escape. Even participants in temporary groups deny that relationships within the group will end when the group dispenses (e.g., Lacoursiere, 1980; Lieberman, Yalom, Miles, 1973). Remarkably, people have difficulty escaping even abusive relationships (e.g., Roy, 1977; Strube, 1988). Relationship status has substantial emotional consequences. For example, young children exhibit extreme distress when separated from their caregivers (Bowlby, 1969, 1973). Recollection of social rejection elicits anxiety, and imagining social rejection increases physiological arousal (Craighead, Kimball, & Rehak, 1979). People feel happier, better off, and less depressed when they are in a network of close relationships than when they are socially isolated (e.g., Argyle, 1987). Indeed, the prospect of losing important relationships elicits anxiety and depression, and severed relationships elicit loneliness and grief (e.g., Leary, 1990). Interestingly, loneliness is related more to lack of intimate social relationships than lack of social contact per se (Reis, 1990; Wheeler, Reis, & Nezlek, 1983; Williams & Solano, 1983). Although severe anxiety is elicited by social exclusion, anxiety is relieved by social inclusion (Barden, Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985). A review of this literature led Baumeister and Tice (1990) to conclude that social exclusion is the single most important cause of anxiety. Finally, research suggests that the pursuit of social relationships has important cognitive consequences. For example, compared with standard attributional categories of locus, stability , and controllability , S. M. Anderson (1991) found evidence that the strongest attributional dimension was interpersonalness, reflecting the degree to which participants attributed causes of their behavior to their relationship status (e.g., “Because I'm married’’). People attribute more positive characteristics and fewer negative characteristics to ingroup members than out-group members (e.g., Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Leary & Forsyth, 1987; Zander, 1971). Partner-serving biases are as strong as self-serving attributional biases among members of happy marriages but not among those in unhappy marriages (e.g., Fincham, Beach, & Baucom, 1987; Murray & Holmes, 1997). Moreover, research suggests that relationship orientation appears to affect self-representation. For example, social relationships have been implicated in self-evaluation (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990), including vulnerability to negative stereotypes (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Close relationships appear to be bound up with self-representations (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), In summary, contemporary social-psychological research has not only made progress in identifying social consequences of basic information processing, but has corroborated the importance of relational pursuits identified in classical research. Moreover, the emerging identification of information-processing consequences of affiliation make the time ripe for new attempts to provide theoretical syntheses of epistemic and relational aspects of social cognition. SHARED REALITY THEORY: RELATIONSHIP AFFIRMATION IN COGNITION We have drawn liberally on the insights of the social cognition tradition by taking as axiomatic human epistemic and relational needs and integrating them in the context of contemporary communication theory. In particular, shared reality theory synthesizes epistemic and relational needs through a single social-psychological mechanism: the perceived achievement of mutual understanding, working intersubjectivity, or what we term shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Put simply, shared experience links specific interpersonal relationships to specific cognitions, thereby simultaneously binding social relationships and maintaining the individual's grasp of a dynamic world. Predicated on the assumption that epistemic and relational needs are realized through the achievement of mutual perceptions of shared experience, shared reality theory postulates two fundamental axioms from which several useful predictions may be derived (illustrated in Fig. 1). In short, people share reality both to connect with others and to know. Firstly, as represented in Axiom I, social relationships are established and maintained to the degree that participants in the relationship achieve specific, mutually shared understandings of themselves or the world about them. Conversation creates friendship when conversants discover common experiences. With the birth of a child, for example, new parents find themselves sudden inhabitants of a society in which the

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Page 9 shared joy and heartbreak of parenthood connects them to other parents, including a remarkable number of strangers in restaurants, grocery stores, and gas stations. By the same token, shared reality theory postulates that establishing and maintaining social relationships is impossible without the achievement of shared reality within the relationship. Conversation fails friendship when conversants discover no common experience. Secondly, according to the theory, cognition is as dependent on shared reality as relationships are. As represented in Axiom II, cognitions are established and maintained to the degree that they are recognized, validated, and shared with others. For example, it is difficult to sustain belief in a revolutionary new childrearing technique if, when communicated in ecstatic enthusiasm, one is met with dull stares or disagreement. Although few would argue that these postulates are principally impossible, the skeptic may find the heart of shared reality theory implausible. After all, why should human capacities as fundamental and ubiquitous as social connection and cognitive representation be dependent on something as slippery as mutual perceptions of shared reality? We believe the communication literatures provide some answers. As reviewed elsewhere (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1981a, 1992), it is well accepted that communication (a) involves shared, rule-governed conventions concerning social roles and behavior (e.g., Austin, 1962; Cushman & Whiting, 1972; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972; Peirce, 1940; Rommetveit, 1974; Ruesch & Bateson, 1968; Searle, 1969; Watzlawick et al., 1967), (b) requires cooperative coorientation and mutual perspective taking (e.g., Cushman & Whiting, 1972; Grice, 1971; Mead, 1934; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Rommetveit, 1974), (c) functions not only to transmit information, but also to create and define social relationships (e.g., Blumer, 1962; Bolinger, 1975; Garfinkel, 1967; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972; Hawes, 1973; Watzlawick et al., 1967), and (d) is a socially interdependent process in which the purpose and meaning of the interchange is collaboratively determined (e.g., Blumer, 1962; Burke, 1962; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1959; Hawes, 1973; Krauss & Fussell, 1998; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Rommetveit, 1974; Watzlawick et al., 1967). Communication is not only central to the construction of meaning, but requires at every turn the establishment and maintenance of “common ground,” which is, the mutual perception that communicative participants are talking about the same thing and share conversationally germane knowledge (for reviews, see Clark & Brennan, 1991; Krauss & Fussell, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). The literature not only documents the innumerable strategies employed to achieve, verify, and Fig. 1.1: Shared reality theory Axiom I: The establishment and maintenance of social relationships requires shared reality. Axiom IA: Relationships are established and maintained to the degree that shared reality is achieved and maintained among relationship participants. Axiom IB: Relationships are abandoned to the degree that shared reality is not achieved and maintained among relationship participants.Axiom II: The establishment and maintenance of individual experience requires shared reality. Axiom IIA: Beliefs are established and maintained to the degree that they are socially shared. Axiom IIB: Beliefs are abandoned to the degree that they are unshared. sustain accrued common ground in everyday conversation, but also the severe social and psychological disruption engendered when common ground is ecologically or experimentally subverted (reviewed in Krauss & Fussell, 1998). One can demonstrate this for oneself by observing the consequences of suppressing the usual head nods, mmms, and uh-huhs elicited in everyday conversation. However, we suggest aborting the experiment quickly if you want the conversation to continue or, indeed, if you wish to remain on friendly terms with your partner. In short, we are convinced that the fundamental role of cooperative, interdependent, meaning-making activity is not only the foundation of common conversation, but also the foundation of social relationships and cognitive representation. Thus, shared reality is defined as interpersonally achieved perceptions of common experience. Shared reality includes explicit agreement and consensus, although it is not limited to them. Shared reality may be expressed or tacit, newly negotiated or long assumed. Shared reality processes may operate either consciously or unconsciously, achieved through effortful deliberation or automatic information processing. Shared reality is assumed to be a perceptual state, that may correspond to objectively accurate mutual understandings to a greater or lesser degree. Defined as such, shared reality is closely related to notions of perspective taking, intersubjectivity,

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Page 10 and common ground, thereby fitting well within the social-psychological tradition, which has long observed that people act on the assumption that they inhabit the same world as others who perceive it as they do (Asch, 1952; Heider, 1958; James, 1890). Indeed, virtually all theories of cognitive development assume that children learn to regulate themselves in relation to the desires and demands of the significant others in their lives (e.g., Case, 1985, 1988; Damon & Hart, 1986; Fischer, 1980; Selman, 1980; Sullivan, 1953), leading some to argue that the only means by which the child can establish an understanding of the outside world is as it is objectified through perspective taking (e.g., P. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Mead, 1982; Vygotsky, 1962, 1978). Yet the capacity to see the world as others see it is not easy. Full-fledged perspective taking is said to not occur until relatively late in human development, perhaps as late as between ages 4 and 6 years (e.g., Case, 1985; Feffer, 1970; Fischer, 1980; Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1978; Piaget, 1965; Shantz, 1983). Moreover, despite the ubiquitous assumption that people are capable of perspective taking, the issue has proved thorny for psychologists and philosophers of mind, because it is no small feat to describe plausible mechanisms by which inherently discrepant subjectivities may be fully shared (e.g., Bakhtin, 1986; Rommetveit, 1974; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Wittgenstein, 1953). Many of these difficulties are avoided by our conception of shared reality as the mutual perception of intersubjectivity rather than objective intersubjectivity. Hence, from our perspective, the ecological relationship between perceived and objective shared reality is an empirical question. However, like common ground, we conceive shared reality in pragmatic terms, as objectively accurate as necessary to be sustained given the goals, communication status, and knowledge of participants in a given interaction (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Krauss & Fussell, 1996). In short, shared reality is a “working intersubjectivity” that may well dissolve if objective conditions preclude the perception of mutual understanding. The Phenomenology of Shared Reality Shared reality (or lack thereof) is often felt reality. The experience of mutual understanding can be as sweet as the experience of misunderstanding can be sour. Anecdotally, few will deny the frustration elicited when others do not recognize the validity of their beliefs. Nor will many deny the charm of discovering that a new acquaintance experiences a poem or sunset in just the way that they do. Indeed, the delight engendered by the realization of shared reality is evidenced by modal constructions of humor. Jokes often involve the dramatic delay of an already shared understanding of the world, which is realized with a bang in the punch line. From this perspective, it makes sense that so much comedy trades on common stereotypes and prejudices, which provide culturally prefabricated shared realities. Systematic research also suggests that, in general, phenomenology is pleasant when experience is shared (e.g., Newcomb, 1953), and that an inability to achieve shared understandings is disagreeable and unpleasant (e.g., Orive, 1988). One of the most striking discoveries of Asch (1952) was the agitation and visceral discomfort exhibited by participants who found themselves at odds with a unanimous majority who did not share their experience of the length of lines. More recently, Schachinger (1996) found that an unobtrusive measure of the degree to which people believed significant others viewed them the way they viewed themselves was negatively related to anxiety, loneliness, confusion, and anomie. Although the experience of shared reality may be pleasant in many circumstances, it is important to note that shared reality theory does not invoke valence as a parameter in the model. Indeed, little reflection is necessary to think of everyday examples in which distinctly distasteful experiences may be shared. On the one hand, it may be useful or even pleasant to discover that others share the experience of, say, political subjugation, which may explain in part the power and utility of consciousness-raising activities (e.g., MacKinnon, 1987). Alas, however, shared reality processes are not limited to progressive situations designed for healthy self-actualization. They are at least as likely to be operative in the service of everyday interpersonal and institutional subjugation (e.g., Jackman, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Marx, 1846; Sidanius, 1999). In the case of the shared beliefs forming the ideological justification institutional economic classism, for example, felt shared reality may well be more pleasant for the haves than the have-nots. Moreover, it is likely that situations that allow one to break free of burdensome or otherwise distasteful shared realities about the self engender positive feelings (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995). Thus, shared reality theory does not postulate that either shared reality or relational connections are inherently pleasant, but rather that shared reality is required to bind social relationships (whether positive or negative) and objectify cognitions (whether positive or negative). NEW EVIDENCE SUPPORTING SHARED REALITY THEORY As reviewed elsewhere, we believe that evidence gleaned

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Page 11 from a broad variety of extant literatures provides support for the basic axioms of shared reality theory (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). However, good theory not only provides a parsimonious grasp of extant facts, but also must prove useful in generating new research programs and empirical insights (e.g., McGuire, 1997). Hence, we now turn to a summary of new research generated from the perspective of shared reality theory in which we have focused on the role of relationship management and motivation in social cognition. In particular, we find evidence that relationshipspecific shared realities not only regulate cognition but also social relationships. Shared Reality in Social Cognition Nisbett and Ross (1988) wrote that the single most important lesson of social psychology is the degree to which individual thought and behavior is determined by the immediate situation. Contemporary social-cognition models of representation, including schema theories, connectionist, and construct accessibility theories (e.g., Bargh, 1995; Higgins, 1995; Smith, 1992; Stangor & Lange, 1988), are congruent with demonstrations of malleability and stability in social judgment. Shared reality theory complements these approaches by postulating a social-cognitive mechanism regulating when and for what purposes representations are established, maintained, and changed. Perhaps the most fundamental implication of shared reality theory is that particular cognitions are attached to the particular social relationships in which they are shared. Across a variety of research paradigms, we have found evidence for this in the context of the self-concept and social judgment. As suggested by the axioms illustrated in Fig. 1., evidence for the fundamental postulate of shared reality theory may take two broad forms. On the one hand, cognitions should change as a function of relationship activation along lines that implicate particular shared realities germane to the relationships. On the other hand, relationships should change as a function of belief activation along lines that implicate shared reality processes. Moreover, this implies that cognitive malleability and stability should mirror relationship malleability and stability. That is, to the degree that particular cognitions are attached to the particular relationships in which they are shared, and to the degree that different shared realities are achieved from relationship to relationship, cognitions should vary lawfully as a function of which relationships and concomitant shared realities are activated. We have termed this the relationship-specificity conjecture (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2000). Social Identities and Significant Others in Self-Stereotyping Several programs of research have examined various ways in which self- and social judgment are subject to the demands of social relationships along lines laid down by shared reality theory. In one program of research, we investigated how common stereotypes affect the self-concept (Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 1999). To the degree that ethnic and gender stereotypes represent broadly shared cultural beliefs (e.g., Allport, 1954), shared reality theory implies that the self-concept should (a) reflect the stereotypes of one's gender and ethnicity, (b) change along stereotyped dimensions as a function of social identity activation, and (c) reflect stereotypes to the degree that one believes that significant others stereotype the self. It is worth noting that although the first two hypotheses can also be derived from self-categorization theory, the third hypothesis cannot. To investigate these hypotheses, participants evaluated their math and verbal abilities after either their ethnic or gender identity had been made salient across several experiments. To explore relationships among self-evaluation and reflected social appraisal, participants also indicated their perceptions of how people in general as well as important others viewed their math and verbal abilities. Pilot research indicated that the perceived views of people in general reflected participants' sense of broadly held stereotypes, and that the perceived views of important others reflected participants' sense of the views of significant others, including family, close friends, and favorite teachers. The social identity manipulation was simple and unobtrusive. On the top, right-hand corner of the questionnaire, participants indicated their age and either their gender or ethnicity. Experiments involving participants from three different ethnic groups demonstrated that the social identity salience manipulation affected self-evaluations and the perceived evaluations of others along stereotype-consistent lines. Moreover, evidence suggested that participants were vulnerable to self-stereotyping to the degree that they believed that significant others endorsed the stereotypes as applicable to them. For example, Asian American women's selfevaluations of math ability were greater when their ethnicity was salient than when their gender was salient, but their self-evaluations of verbal ability were greater when their gender was salient than when their ethnicity was salient, consistent with stereotypes about Asians and women, respectively. Overall, self-evaluations were highly correlated with perceived evaluations of others, and effects of the identity salience manipulation on the perceived evaluations of others were

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Page 12 identical to those found on self-evaluations. However, congruent with the mechanism specified by shared reality theory, results indicate that the relationship between self-evaluations and the perceived evaluations of people in general (i.e., stereotyped expectancies) was mediated by the perceived evaluations of significant others. In particular, although the relationship between self-evaluations and perceived evaluations of people in general was eliminated after statistically controlling for the perceived evaluations of significant others, the relationship between self-evaluations and perceptions of significant others remained strong after controlling for the perceived evaluations of people in general. An analogous, stereotype-consistent pattern was found in an experiment utilizing a sample of European Americans, for whom the particular gender and ethnic stereotypes are different. Here again correlations among self-evaluations and perceived evaluations of others were strong and affected identically by the social identity manipulation. Moreover, as with Asian American women, results indicate that the relationship between stereotypes and selfevaluation were mediated by the perceived evaluations of significant others. Although yielding a different pattern of results, an experiment utilizing African-American participants provided converging evidence of the role of shared reality negotiated in relationships with significant others in selfstereotyping. Given evidence that African Americans are particularly likely to cultivate close relationships in which racist stereotypes are collaboratively challenged (e.g., Ogbu, 1986), we anticipated that, although African Americans would be aware of stereotyped social expectancies, this knowledge would not translate into corresponding selfstereotyping effects. This is what we found. In particular, we found that African Americans perceived the evaluations of people in general (i.e., stereotyped expectancies) as more negative about their academic abilities when their ethnicity was salient than when their gender was salient, consistent with prevailing stereotypes. Yet no such effects of social identity salience were found on either the perceived evaluations of significant others or self-evaluations. However, the mediational analysis revealed that the pattern of judgments of social expectancies and self-evaluation observed among African Americans was explained by the same mechanism characterizing the self-stereotyping we observed among Asian and European Americans. Correlations among self-evaluations and perceived evaluations of others were high, and the relationship between self-evaluation and perceived evaluations of people in general was mediated by perceived evaluations of significant others. Hence, the mechanism postulated by shared reality theory integrates both the findings of substantial self-stereotyping among Asian Americans and European Americans as well as the lack of self-stereotyping among African Americans. Relationship Motivation in Self-Stereotyping Shared reality theory postulates that it is the activity of establishing and maintaining social relationships that gives life and resonance to beliefs, including stereotyped beliefs about the self. In particular, to the degree that shared realities serve relational functions as shared reality theory postulates, then effects of social appraisal on the self should occur to the degree that one is motivated to achieve or maintain the relationship. We have pursued this issue in a research program that directly investigated the role of relationship motivation in self-stereotyping by examining the degree to which participants assimilate the likely views of others into the self-concept (Sinclair & Hardin, 2000). In a series of experiments, women completed self-concept measures in the context of imagined or actual interactions with others they knew to value traditional versus nontraditional gender roles. For example, in one experiment, we found that women judged themselves as more feminine after imagining a conversation with Barbara Bush than Hillary Clinton. In another experiment, women completed self-concept measures after imagining either a positive or negative interaction with a famous woman characterized as either gender traditional (Barbara Bush, Martha Stewart) or nontraditional (Hillary Clinton, Madelaine Albright). Although the social self-tuning effect was replicated under conditions in which participants imagined a positive interaction, the effect was eliminated under conditions in which participants imagined a negative interaction, demonstrating the role of relationship motivation in the achievement of shared reality concerning the self. In follow-up experiments, social self-tuning was examined as a function of actual interactions with male confederates who ostensibly held gender traditional or nontraditional attitudes about women. Results suggest that women assimilated their self-views toward the confederate under conditions of high relationship motivation, but if anything contrasted their self-views away from the confederate under conditions of low relationship motivation. For example, women judged themselves as more feminine after interacting with a confederate with traditional (versus nontraditional) views under instructions to attempt to “get along as much as possible,” but judged themselves as less feminine after interacting with a confederate with traditional views under instructions to

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Page 13 attempt to “evaluate his personality as accurately as possible.’’ These experiments not only demonstrate that shared reality about the self is achieved on highly valued dimensions when relationship motivation is high, but also that shared reality may be actively subverted when relationship motivation is low. Hence, this research extends previous demonstrations of social tuning effects on attitudes about others (e.g., Higgins & Rholes, 1978) to attitudes about the self. More important, it directly demonstrates the role of relationship motivation in the negotiation of shared reality about the self, converging with demonstrations that individual differences in relationship motivation moderate the degree to which shared reality may be achieved about judgments of others (Higgins & McCann, 1984; McCann & Hancock, 1983). Finally, this research is consistent with shared reality theory's postulate that shared reality functions in part to establish and maintain the social relationships in which it is achieved. Relationship Relevance and Automatic Prejudice The communication literature documents the ubiquity with which people seek common ground with others in everyday conversation (e.g., Clark & Brennan, 1991). However, shared reality theory goes an important step further by postulating that common relationship demands change more than the mere expression of beliefs. To further test the power of everyday relationship demands in information processing, we investigated social tuning in the context of automatic prejudice (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2000). We examined the hypothesis that even automatic cognitions would assimilate toward the likely beliefs of others and would do so along relationship-relevant dimensions, as implied by shared reality theory. In particular, we assessed automatic prejudice under conditions in which the experimenter was more or less likely to be prejudiced. Across three experiments utilizing two different measures of automatic association, we found social tuning effects on automatic anti-Black prejudice, but only for participants whose ethnicity makes prejudice relevant to the new relationship. In particular, we found that the anti-Black prejudice exhibited by European Americans was greater when the experimenter was White than when the experimenter was Black. Pilot research indicated that participants in the experiments assumed that the experimenter was much less likely to be prejudiced against Blacks when he or she was Black than White. Furthermore, consistent with shared reality theory's prediction that social tuning effects should occur on relationship-relevant dimensions alone, we found that, although anti-Black attitudes of European Americans were affected by experimenter race, the anti-Black attitudes of Asian Americans – whose relationship with blacks is not characterized nearly as much by concern about prejudice – were not affected by experimenter race. This research not only provides support for the relationship specificity conjecture of shared reality theory, but demonstrates that even automatic cognition is dynamically regulated according to prevailing social relationship contingencies. Notably, these experiments directly pit automatic social tuning against simple stereotype priming, which would be indicated by the opposite pattern of results. In summary, our research suggests that broadly shared cultural stereotypes may be dynamically utilized in self- and social perception, but that this occurs according to the parameters described by shared reality theory. Research on social identity-related self-stereotyping suggests that stereotypes are incorporated into the self-concept to the degree that they are shared with significant others (Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 2000). Research directly examining relationship motivation in self-stereotyping demonstrates that the shared realities achieved in even new relationships may have pronounced effects on the self-concept, but do so only to the degree that one is highly motivated to establish the relationship (Sinclair & Hardin, 2000). Research on automatic prejudice demonstrates that automatic social tuning occurs along dimensions chronically relevant to particular intergroup relationships. Shared Reality in Self-Regulation Shared reality theory not only postulates a role for the collaborative construction of self-views and social attitudes, but implies that these shared realities, in turn, affect the course of subsequent social relationships. In one research program, we have found that self-verification behavior is moderated by the degree to which self-beliefs are perceived to be shared with significant others (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Self-verification is the set of processes in which people go to great lengths to elicit confirmation for the beliefs they have of themselves (e.g., Swann, 1990). This literature demonstrates that, regardless of whether self-beliefs are positive or negative, people privilege selfconsistent versus self-inconsistent as assessed by (a) time (Swann & Read, 1981a), (b) diagnosticity ratings (Swann & Read, 1981b), (c) confidence in feedback (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987), and (d) solicitation of feedback (Swann & Read, 1981b; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Remarkably, the pattern extends to people's social interaction choices. People choose temporary interaction

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Page 14 partners whose evaluations are consistent with their self-views, whether positive or negative (Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992), and they are more committed to their marriages when the view of their spouses matches their self-concept (Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde, 1992). Self-verification theory explains these findings in terms of the epistemic benefits of cognitive consistency (e.g., Swann, 1990). We have argued that self-verification effects may be explained instead in terms of relationship motivation (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Shared reality theory postulates that (shared) self-views are not only worth defending on epistemic grounds, but function in part to maintain valued social relationships. To test this hypothesis, we examined selfverification behavior along dimensions of the self-concept perceived to be more or less shared with significant others, assessing self-verification in one experiment with an information-seeking paradigm and in another experiment with a partner choice paradigm. In a pretesting session, participants listed traits they believed characterized themselves as well as traits they believed significant others thought were true of them. These trait listings allowed us to ideographically identify self-views that were perceived to be shared with at least one significant other versus self-views perceived to be unshared with significant others. We chose shared and unshared traits that were matched on certainty (cf. Pelham, 1991). In one experiment, participants were contacted several weeks after pretesting by telephone, ostensibly to be recruited for a computerized evaluation of their personality. Participants were presented with choices of aspects of themselves they would be most interested in learning about. Replicating the basic self-verification finding, participants expressed more interest in learning about aspects that were selfconsistent than self-inconsistent, whether the attributes were positive or negative. Moreover, self-verification was shown to be affected by the degree to which participants perceived the self-views to be shared with significant others. Participants were more interested in learning about self-consistent attributes if pretesting indicated that they were shared with significant others. A second experiment replicated this pattern of results when self-verification was assessed by partner choice. Participants preferred to meet new acquaintances they believed had impressions of them that were self-consistent; moreover, they preferred to meet new acquaintances whose self-consistent impressions were shared with significant others. A follow-up experiment demonstrated that self-concepts shared with significant others regulate self-descriptions shared with new acquaintances as well as the course of social interaction. To do so, we observed the cognitive and social consequences of activating a self-concept shared with a significant other by manipulating the ostensible characteristics of a new acquaintance in a procedure developed by Andersen and Cole (1986). Previously unacquainted women were recruited in pairs for a study on getting to know others from a sample who had completed a pretesting series of questionnaires in which they had listed self-descriptive attributes as well as the attributes they believed significant others thought characteristic of them. Additionally, participants had listed attributes they believed characterized several significant others including their mothers. In the focal experiment conducted several weeks later, each participant first read a brief psychological profile of her partner, which was based on the attributes describing either her own mother or a yoked participant's mother. Immediately before the meeting, each participant wrote a brief self-description and completed several questions about expectations of the upcoming interaction. After a 10 minute unstructured conversation with their partners, participants completed a parallel questionnaire about the interaction. Results were striking in two respects. First, self-descriptions included more self-attributes perceived to be shared with mothers when participants anticipated meeting a partner who had been described like their own mother than a yoked participant's mother. More important, the partner manipulation had no effect on plausible alternatives, including self-attributes in general, attributes about the self perceived to be held by participants' mothers, or attributes about the self perceived to be held by other significant others. Instead, the effect of anticipating an interaction with someone who resembled participants' mothers affected self-descriptions only on the traits that participants perceived were shared between them and their mothers. Second, the manipulation affected both the anticipation of the interaction as well as post-interaction impressions. Participants anticipated liking more, getting along better, and being more interested in their partners when they had been described in terms resembling their own mother than a yoked participant's mother. Although predictably weaker, these effects held after the actual interaction. In another line of research, we have investigated how the dynamics of relationship motivation mediate selfimprovement motivation (Pham & Hardin, 1999). From the perspective of shared reality theory, ambivalence about self-improvement is less about managing hedonistic impulses and social norms and more about managing mutually incompatible shared realities found in different social relationships. To examine this process, we utilized a standard social comparison paradigm to

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Page 15 investigate motivation to self-improve in the context of academics. According to shared reality theory, the positive self-improvement effects on academic motivation as a function of exposure to a lazy target should be moderated by the degree to which participants disidentify with the lazy target. Two experiments demonstrated that participants viewed themselves as less lazy, intended to work harder in the future, and exhibited increased self-esteem after exposure to a lazy (versus non-lazy) social target. The effect was most pronounced for people who most valued hard work – as assessed by a self-discrepancy measure and thereby likely to be based in shared realities with significant others (e.g., Higgins, 1989a). Most important, however, results indicate that the effect of negative social perception elicited self-improvement motivation to the degree that participants socially distanced themselves from the lazy target, as indicated by expressions of dislike and disinterest in meeting him. In short, the effect of social comparison was modulated by a kind of relationship management, in which the value of hard work had to be sacrificed to the degree participants were interested in connecting with the lazy target. Shared Reality in Interpersonal Interaction In research extending the shared reality analysis to the regulation of interethnic relationships, we have investigated effects of beliefs about the O.J. Simpson trial on interpersonal perceptions and behavior among African and European Americans. Due to the overwhelming amount of publicity surrounding the differences in white and black attitudes about the trial, we assumed that the Simpson trial represents different interethnic shared realities, and hence hypothesized that making the Simpson case cognitively salient would affect interpersonal relationships differently as a function of their ethnic composition. In one experiment, mixed-ethnicity and same-ethnicity participant pairs completed a cooperative task after subliminal exposure to images of O.J. Simpson, Bill Cosby, or the participant university icons. After completing the task, participants independently rated the quality of consensus achieved in the interaction as well as the extent to which they liked and felt similar to their partners. Results indicate that exposure to O.J. Simpson had opposite effects depending on the ethnic composition of the pairs in a manner consistent with the predictions of shared reality theory. As predicted by several theories, participants in the mixed-ethnicity pairs liked their partners less, felt less similar to their partners, and judged the consensus achieved in the interaction as poorer after exposure to Simpson's face than Cosby's face. In contrast, however, as predicted by shared reality theory alone, participants in the sameethnicity pairs like their partners more, felt more similar to their partners, and judged the consensus achieved in the interaction as better after exposure to Simpson's face than Cosby's face. In both cases, liking, similarity, and consensus judgments were intermediate after exposure to university icons. This pattern of results was replicated in two additional experiments that extended the effects on interpersonal perception to cooperative performance in a game of Pictionary, in which participants take turns attempting to communicate a target word to their partners through nonverbal drawings. Although participants in mixed-ethnicity pairs performed substantially worse after thinking about the Simpson trial than after thinking about the ClintonLewinsky scandal, participants in the same-ethnicity pairs performed substantially better. In summary, this research demonstrates the role of achieving shared reality about the self with significant others in regulating both the dynamics of self-understanding as well as relationship motivation. Self-verification appears to be predicated in part on the degree to which aspects of the self-concept are perceived to be shared with significant others. Moreover, the self is presented to new acquaintances along lines already laid down in significant relationships, thereby affecting the course of the new relationship. Moreover, beliefs assumed to be differentially shared among different ethnic groups can regulate the course of interpersonal perception and behavior along lines directly implied by shared reality theory. CONCLUSION We have argued that the study of social cognition should involve more than the identification of the cognitive foundations of social behavior, but instead should focus on the interdependence of cognition and social relationships. We believe that renewed attention to social-cognitive interdependence will not only reconnect the two great thematic strands represented in the history of social psychology, but promise substantive advances in our understanding of how humans work. We have argued that shared reality theory provides one such synthesis. Although simple, the formulation is generative. In addition to the predictions directly implied by the axioms of shared reality theory, the postulate that epistemic and relational functions are linked through the shared reality mechanism affords the derivation of several empirical corollaries worth future investigation. One concerns the specificity of experience implied by shared reality theory. To the degree that shared realities

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Page 16 are bound to the particular relationships in which they are maintained, and to the degree that individuals have different clusters of personal experience, individual experience should vary to greater and lesser extent from relationship to relationship and situation to situation. For example, one's experience as an academic, shared and realized at school with students and colleagues, may operate relatively independently of one's experience as a member of the Sierra Club or PTA. Following the same logic, relationship motivation should also vary situationally as a function of the salience of relationship-relevant experiences. A further implication of the relationship-specificity conjecture is that human cognition has the capacity to be quite plastic, at least to the degree that one's social world is complex and compartmentalized. Hence, shared reality theory suggests a mechanism well suited to the repeated demonstrations in the social-psychological literature of cognitive malleability. By the same token, however, shared reality theory also postulates a mechanism for cognitive stability. Just as cognitive malleability may be explained in terms of relationship structure and motivation, so might cognitive stability. Stable social institutions create stable interpersonal relationship dynamics, which, in turn, produce stable cognitions. In short, shared reality theory offers a single mechanism compatible with observations of both stability and malleability in human cognition. The assumption that shared reality is relationship specific also implies that the proximal mode of self-categorization is interpersonal, although this does not in principle preclude self-categorization according to abstract group identities. However, shared reality theory's implication that social identification has psychological resonance because it is modulated by specific interpersonal relationships provides an empirically useful point of departure from selfcategorization theory (cf. Turner, 1984; Turner et al., 1986). Several other implications follow from shared reality theory, particularly as they involve relationship affirmation motives. For example, to the degree that shared reality binds social relationships, the motivation to achieve shared reality should be especially high under conditions of relationship threat or social anxiety. For example, not only do jilted partners in intimate relationships seek shared reality among friends, but it is not uncommon for them to attempt to get even former partners to understand their plight, sometimes even at the cost of personal dignity. However, to the degree that shared reality objectifies experience, motivation to achieve shared reality should be especially high under conditions of uncertainty. This may explain in part why graduate school classmates often become lifetime friends. To the degree that shared realities are realized in the establishment and maintenance of social relationships, they will be defended because a threat to a given shared reality represents a threat to the relationship on which the shared reality is grounded. For example, the realization that a new acquaintance does not appreciate one's political view is not problematic for its inconsistency per se, but rather because it represents a tacit threat to the relationships in which the political view is shared. Hence, from the perspective of shared reality theory, the psychological conflict borne of both intra- and interpersonal attitude discrepancies is viewed in relational terms as relationship-specific conflicting shared realities. When potential shared realities are incompatible, which one prevails? As implied by shared reality theory, the half-life of a given shared reality is positively related to the degree that it is grounded in multiple relationships and to the degree that the relationships on which it is grounded are stable, either through institutional imperatives or conditions in which relational motivation is high. For example, the relative permanence of family relationships makes them particularly potent social foundations of self-understanding, lending shared realities maintained in them more strength in the face of attack than a competing shared reality achieved, for example, with some guy once met at a party. Alternatively, asymmetrical relationship status may render one participant more motivated to affirm the relationship than another participant. In such cases, this corollary implies that movement necessary to achieve shared reality will occur more for the person more motivated to affirm or maintain the relationship. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported by NIH grant MH-10544 and a UCLA Academic Senate COR grant awarded to Curtis D. Hardin. Terri Conley was supported by a National Science Foundation graduate fellowship. For helpful comments on a draft of this chapter, we thank Brian Lowery, Yesi Pena, and M. Park. ENDNOTES 1. Interestingly, for both Mead (1934) and Freud (1933/1965), the impetus for their theories was the problem of self-consciousness (i.e., how the self makes itself an object of its own perception or, put another way, which part of the self is observing the self). Although their formulations were different, the root mechanism was the same: perspective taking. For Mead, self-consciousness is the product of a repository of others'

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Page 17 perspectives on the self, motivated by epistemic interests (i.e., the generalized other). For Freud, self-consciousness is the product of significant others' perspectives on the self, motivated by social identification (i.e., the super-ego).

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Page 19 2 The Personal Need for Structure and Personal Fear of Invalidity Measures: Historical Perspectives, Current Applications, and Future Directions Megan M. Thompson Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Toronto Michael E. Naccarato Kevin C. H. Parker Backbone Media, Inc., Toronto Kingston General Hospital, Kingston Gordon B. Moskowitz Princeton University Without too much absurdity from a functionalistic point of view, a biogenic need for structure or meaning could be postulated and hostility to alien events be accounted for in terms of threat to the structure or meaning attached to the situation. It is not necessary to posit the tendency to structure as a biological imperative, because, native or not, the making of some kind of sense out of a situation appears invariable and unquestionably essential to the prediction of recurrences and differences in the surrounding world. To cope adequately with the environment, even to survive in it, seems to necessitate the ability to read it or define it in some degree of veridicality at least. – Harvey (1963) Attaining meaning has been characterized as a primary human goal. Each person, each stimulus that meets our senses changes our environment, at times challenging our sense of knowing what to expect from the environment. Without structuring this array into coherent units that provide meaning, the world would be experienced as chaos. This is a disturbing and unsettling state that people are driven to avoid/reduce (Peirce, 1877/1957; Dewey, 1929). Why? First, for survival, an organism needs to know both whether immediate danger exists and whether stimuli that satisfy need states are present. Second, aside from promoting survival, the experience of knowing serves the drive to approach pleasant/beneficial and avoid unpleasant/harmful experiences. Without meaning being attached to the stimuli around us we would have no way to determine what stimuli in our environment are pleasurable (and perhaps species-promoting) versus painful (and perhaps species-hindering). Perception, categorization, inference, and memory are the cognitive tools humans are equipped with to provide the meaning that will shape subsequent action toward stimuli. Bruner (1957a) referred to this as categories serving a predictive function (noting that the predictions that are derived from one's inferences are of varying degrees of veridicality). James (1907/1992) stated these cognitive processes produce the meaning that allows us to anticipate, expect, act, and react, thus linking cognition with pragmatism. Third, attaining meaning is also a desired end state in and of itself. Doubt is experienced as unpleasant, and attaining meaning (knowing) allows that unpleasant state to be removed. This fact led Heider (1944) to conclude that humans possess a causal drive – a drive to establish a set of causal explanations that account for the stimuli in the environment. Heider assumed this was “a third basic drive beside the drives for self conservation and for the conservation of the species” (p. 359). Finally, Heider (1958) described this causal drive as not only reducing the unpleasantness of doubt, but also providing a sense of mastery or control over the environment. This sense of determinism allows one to feel as if the universe is not random, which is essential for both avoiding feelings of helplessness and initiating appropriate action. Given the central role that the attainment of knowledge plays in human functioning, it is not surprising that the processes through which and the manner in which meaning is sought represent fundamental pursuits in many areas of psychology and philosophy. How meaning about the social world is attained is an essential concern of social cognition and the dominant theoretical concern of this chapter. Our focus is on individual differences in how people tolerate the existence of uncertainty. Although it is believed that imposing meaning on the

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Page 20 environment is a pervasive goal for all individuals, the decision as to how to expend both time and cognitive effort toward accomplishing this end is determined in part by chronic tendencies we have called the personal need for structure and the personal fear of invalidity. The Phenomenology of Personal Need for Structure (PNS) An individual possessing a high chronic need for structure prefers structure and clarity in most situations, with ambiguity and grey areas proving troublesome and annoying. Characterized by decisiveness and confidence, such people experience discomfort if they perceive structure and clarity to be missing from situations. They should dislike or be disturbed by people who vacillate or by opinions and situations that lack clarity and order. Although the clearminded, decisive individual is often lauded by society, this style may also lead to rigid, inflexible thinking and an unquestioned acceptance of the validity of one's beliefs (e.g., a reliance on stereotypes). It may prove to be an ineffective or unsuccessful style in highly creative environments that demand the generation of many hypotheses and/or the ability to adopt many perspectives on an issue or problem. Similarly, this style may be less useful in situations requiring the rapid review and reconsideration of beliefs in light of new evidence. The Phenomenology of Personal Fear of Invalidity (PFI) Although some individuals are driven by needs for clarity and structure, others may be more generally concerned with the cost of committing errors and be considered to have a high Personal Fear of Invalidity (PFI). Individuals high in PFI would be preoccupied with the consequence or perceived risk of an undertaking. To avoid potential mistakes, they would be more likely to see alternatives, vacillate between options, and show discomfort with feedback that indicated an error had been made. A heightened concern with error might be manifested through behavioral and cognitive hesitancy and a resistance to committing to situations and ideas. This characteristic manner of reevaluating options is logically linked to an agitation around decisions, as well as vacillation, ambivalence, and procrastination regarding important decisions. But in some circumstances a concern with error may have positive implications. For instance, this flexibility of thought suggests these individuals would be more data-driven than theory-driven and, as such, may be less likely to employ stereotypes or be quick to reach conclusions (see Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES A Brief Look at Two Philosophical Views of Epistemology The philosophical debate about how people pursue meaning revolved around the pragmatist belief that all knowledge is constructed and subjectively determined (with what is deemed to be “truth” at the whimsy of the perceiver) and the associationist perspective that knowledge is revealed to the perceiver from the truth that is inherent in objects. These beliefs led to opposing positions regarding the manner in which the individual conducts the quest for knowledge, with one camp endorsing the position that people seek truth (the best possible knowledge) and the other asserting that people merely seek an end to doubt (any sufficient knowledge that can structure the situation in a meaningful way that allows for prediction). Seeking truth implies that people prefer a thorough appraisal of the data; the mere removal of doubt suggests people are willing to rely on theories about the data rather than close inspection of the data itself. The pragmatist school believed that knowledge is functional – it allows one to prepare action (e.g., James, 1890). This suggests that if adequate knowledge (that allowing for useful inference and appropriate action) is capable of being produced by expending less effort, then the individual will be satisfied to stop the epistemic process. Peirce (1877/1957) referred to the struggle to remove doubt as inquiry, stating that “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But…as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be false or true’’ (pp. 12-13). This position asserted that perceivers seek fast, structured knowledge that is satisfactory to allow for successful interaction with a stimulus rather than seeking to analyze the stimulus further. In opposition to this view that humans freeze their search for knowledge on the first reasonable explanation that comes to mind was the belief that the pursuit of meaning involves the quest for a more absolute truth. Bertrand Russell (as cited in Meyer, 1985, pp. 36-38) summarized this position well in criticizing the notion of inquiry as put forth by John Dewey (a disciple of Peirce). The first criticism is that “data, in the sense in which many empiricists believe in them, are rejected by Dr. Dewey as the starting point of knowledge.” Instead of the search for the meaning inherent in the data, the pragmatists place their “emphasis upon inquiry, as opposed to truth, or knowledge. Inquiry is not for [them], as it is for

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Page 21 most philosophers, a search for truth; it is an independent activity.” Finally, this conception of humans as seeking closure mostly through effortless processing led Russell to state “knowledge, if Dr. Dewey is right, cannot be any part of the ends of life; it is merely a means to other satisfactions. This view, to those who have been much engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, is distasteful.” What is evident from this debate is that both camps are discussing ways in which perceivers typically attain knowledge by providing closure. The central issue is simply focused on the different strategies for providing such closure. Even the more deliberate process of closely analyzing the data to distill the true essence from a stimulus, with knowledge as an end in and of itself, is an attempt by the individual to gain closure. In this instance, the individual is just thought to be willing to tolerate greater amounts of uncertainty before bringing the epistemic process – the search for knowledge – to a halt. This fundamental difference in how people are presumed to pursue meaning is derived from differing assumptions about the nature of knowledge and meaning. For pragmatists, meaning is imposed on a stimulus by accepting any sufficient explanation; for associationists meaning is distilled from qualities inherent in the stimulus through accurately and effortfully attempting to analyze the data. A Psychological Theory of Epistemology Dual process models that have dominated the field in the last 20 years (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999) reconcile these antithetic philosophical approaches by suggesting two broad strategies people use to understand social stimuli. The opposing endpoints of a theoretical information-processing continuum mirror the distinct strategies debated by philosophers at the turn of the last century. First, people may systematically and effortfully examine the existing data and construct theories and meaning from the ground up. Second, they can heuristically and effortlessly (sometimes implicitly/unconsciously) arrive at a sufficient sense of knowing by starting with existing theories and expectancies and operating from the top down. Our work on individual differences focuses on what end of this processing continuum perceivers typically inhabit, and it has its roots in the theory of Kruglanski and Freund (1983) labeled lay epistemics . The theory of lay epistemology (e.g., Kruglanski, 1988; 1989) details the cognitive and motivational components of knowledge seeking. Although the cognitive component of knowledge seeking refers to the specific content of the concepts, thoughts, and beliefs generated, the motivational component refers to how motives determine the initiation, course, and cessation of the knowledge-seeking process. The cognitive and motivational elements operate concurrently in a twostage process of hypothesis generation and validation. The hypothesis generation stage is chiefly dependent on cognitive capability. This capability is, in turn, governed by the availability (e.g., the requisite knowledge stored in long-term memory) and the accessibility (the momentary ease of retrieval of a portion of what is stored in long-term memory) of particular thoughts or hypotheses. Hypothesis validation is the process through which an individual collects the evidence that serves to support or refute the generated hypotheses. Thus, in attempting to reduce doubt, individuals perceive a stimulus, generate hypotheses about what the appropriate category to capture that stimulus might be, test (validate) the hypotheses, freeze the hypothesis testing when an appropriate solution has been found, and then make inferences and plan action accordingly. The particular course (i.e., the evidence attended to and the weight given a piece of evidence) and termination of the validation process is directed by how quickly the person desires an answer (his or her willingness to live with uncertainty) and whether a specific type of answer is desired. Kruglanski and Freund's (1983) model focused on the testing and cessation of knowledge-seeking processes, labeling these as being affected by two orthogonal motives: (a) needs for structure and validity, and (b) needs for specific versus nonspecific closure. A need for structure, typically operationalized by Kruglanski and Freund as time pressure,1 occurs when an individual is compelled to impose structure to dispel uncertainty, doubt, and ambiguity. Thus, the need for structure is equivalent to a need to quickly remove doubt and arrive at a meaning – any meaning that adequately captures the stimulus situation. This is associated with cognitive consequences such as generating fewer hypotheses, a less thorough examination of relevant information, and a greater degree of confidence in one's judgments (Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987). A need for validity (or the fear of invalidity), frequently operationalized as evaluation apprehension (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), is related to the perceived costs of error as a result of some decision. When costs are substantial (such as concluding a stimulus is harmless when it is harmful), individuals are more cautious in their judgments. Thus, the need for validity is equivalent to a need to be cautious about inaccuracy. Fear of invalidity is associated with cognitive consequences such as generating more hypotheses, conducting a more careful information search, delaying reaching closure too quickly (lest

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Page 22 one arrive at knowledge that is incorrect), and having less confidence in one's beliefs (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987b). The Development of an Individual Difference Approach to Lay Epistemology The first two authors of this chapter became aware of the need for structure and fear of invalidity in 1984 when we were first-year graduate students, and Arie Kruglanski was a visiting professor, at the University of Waterloo. While taking his seminar detailing the then situationally based theory of lay epistemology, it occurred to us that it was likely that needs for structure and validity characterized typical response styles of certain individuals that would be evident across situations. Certainly individual differences in dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962) had been long identified by clinical and motivational psychologists. These individual differences were described as “hot” motives that served basic emotional desires. However, they also contained components of structure seeking and avoiding that suggested to us that such differences might exist independent of the “hot” emotional components. Further, consistent with an interactionist approach (see Blass, 1984), we assumed such styles interact with situational demands, leading people to seek out and remain in situations that best meet these needs. We felt that recasting the situationally based need for structure and fear of invalidity as chronic tendencies had the potential to add to our understanding of how individuals understand and interact with their worlds. With Kevin Parker, we proceeded with the development of these individual difference measures on our own after Kruglanski left Waterloo. By October 1985 we had finalized versions of a 12-item PNS and a 14-item PFI scale. These measures went on to play central roles in our masters' theses (Naccarato, 1988; M. Thompson 1989). Moreover, the scales, particularly the Personal Need for Structure, were soon being used by other researchers examining social-cognitive processes (e.g., Kaplan, Wanshula, & Zanna, 1991; Moskowitz, 1993; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Beyond extending the situational theory of lay epistemology into the realm of individual differences, we also postulated an underlying conceptualization in which PNS and PFI represent two separate constructs that are moderately positively related to each other as they occur intrapersonally. For instance, high PNS and PFI might be expected to work in tandem in cases where one seeks out structure in order to clarify what is required in a situation, thereby reducing anxiety and the potential for error. After all, it is easier to avoid making potentially costly mistakes when one knows and sticks to the rules of the game. Second, at its highest levels, greater concerns with error might become so overwhelming as to effectively halt further hypothesis generation, thus appearing to lead to greater rigidity (Effler, 1984). In 1989 Kruglanski published his book describing the theory of Lay Epistemology, and applied it to a variety of social psychological phenomena. Kruglanski articulated a model of knowledge seeking governed by two orthogonal dimensions of closure and specificity, resulting in four distinct motivational orientations. One notable amendment at this time involved changing the names of two of the central constructs of the theory. Presumably because the needs for structure and validity described different situational pressures that affected how quickly people reach closure, these constructs were renamed. “Functionally opposite to the need for closure is the need to avoid closure. Those two needs are conceptualized as ends of a continuum ranging from strong strivings for closure to strong resistance of closure (Kruglanski, 1989)” (c.i. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p 1049). But what are the implications of this theoretical reformulation? Need for closure versus need for structure: What's in a name? If the names of these constructs are changed, the metaphorical processing continuum specified by dual-process models would be anchored by needs for closure and needs to avoid closure. Treating closure-seeking and closure-avoidance as opposing processes seems to imply that the philosophical debate between pragmatists and associationists over epistemology was exclusively between ending doubt (need for closure) and prolonging doubt (need to avoid closure). It was not. It was solely about ending doubt, with conflicting strategies with which it is assumed humans prefer to accomplish this task. It is for this reason that the labels need for structure and need for validity would appear to be more appropriate, because those labels suggest different routes toward the common end of attaining closure. They also describe opposing levels of ability to tolerate lacking closure without simultaneously implying that delaying attainment of closure means that closure is something that is always undesired (to be avoided). Indeed, often times closure is desired but is just arrived at more cautiously and slowly. Thus, because we felt the original labels of structure and validity better capture both the philosophical distinction between methods for arriving at knowledge and the psychological constructs that account for how meaning is produced,2 we retained the names need for structure and fear of invalidity in our work.

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Page 23 We were especially pleased to see that by 1989 Kruglanski also had extended his own theorizing to acknowledge the potential influence of chronic tendencies: ‘‘[S]table individual differences in [need for structure] may also exist. Thus, people may reliably vary in their disposition to apprehend the world in clear-cut terms” (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 6). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) subsequently published the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), a 42 item scale consistent with their unidimensional vision of closure. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) presented a confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) model and results of CFA analyses illustrating their conceptualization of the NFCS in terms of a second order factor structure with five factors loading onto a single closure construct. The NFCS included 11 of the 26 items in our PNS and PFI scales. Kruglanski and Webster (1994, see also Kruglanski, Atash, DeGrada, Manetti, Pierro, & Webster, 1997) maintained that the scales (PNS/PFI and NFCS) tapped orthogonal constructs, reporting low correlations between the measures. Neuberg and colleagues disputed these results (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997; see also Neuberg, West, Judice, & M. Thompson, 1997). They provided convincing evidence that the three scales are not orthogonal, obtaining an average correlation of .7 across numerous samples. Neuberg et al. (1997) also persuasively challenged the psychometric quality of the Webster and Kruglanski (1994) NFCS. They concluded that the NFCS is a multidimensional instrument measuring an ostensibly unidimensional closure construct – indeed they discussed the dangers inherent in adopting such an approach. The dimensionality of these respective constructs is an issue we shall return to later. Moreover, Neuberg et al (1997) determined that the most potent NFCS items are those 11 taken from our original PNS and PFI scales. Given the importance that pursuing knowledge serves in human functioning, and given the central concern of social cognition with delineating the mechanisms involved in how knowledge is produced, it seems critical to have the best vehicle possible to measure such phenomenon. The measures we present here will hopefully be of some assistance in this endeavor, illuminating important individual differences in structuring and making sense of the social world. THE PSYCHOMETRIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PNS AND PFI SCALES Psychometrics: Phase I - Initial Item Generation From the inception this work the first three authors attempted to adhere to the strict lay epistemic definitions of the situational need for structure and fear of invalidity constructs, focusing on the face validity of each item. Each PNS item was clearly linked to a desire for structure, certainty, and decisiveness, and every PFI item reflected a concern with error and decisional consequences. Efforts were made to keep each scale item content free (i.e., not bound to particular content domains such as political ideology) and to tap the cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestations of the PNS and PFI, thereby promoting the application of the constructs to a variety of psychological phenomena. This process yielded a pool of 25 PNS and 30 PFI statements.3 Subjects and Procedure Two hundred fifty-eight introductory psychology students (104 males and 154 females) at the University of Waterloo completed the 25-item PNS(A) and 30-item PFI(A)4 scales in an “Attitude, Belief, and Experience Survey” administered as part of a mass testing procedure. Responses were recorded on a 6-point Likert rating scale ( strongly disagree - strongly agree ). Results for PNS (A) Factor Structure of the Initial Version of the PNS(A). Table 2.1 includes the factor analytic results of this iteration of the PNS scale. Principal components factor analysis (PCA),5 employing oblique and varimax rotations, led to the retention of three factors, accounting for 47.9% of the variance. We labeled the factors (a) Preference for Orderliness (12 items; 28.8% variance; e.g., “I like to see to it that my work is carefully planned and organized;” (b) Discomfort with Unpredictability (10 items; 11.7% variance; e.g., “It bothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily routine”); and (c) Disdain for Ambiguity (3 items; 7.9% variance; e.g., “It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind”). Results of the PCA using an oblique rotation indicate that Factor I, Preference for Orderliness, was moderately correlated with Factor II, Discomfort with Unpredictability ( r = .28) and unrelated to Factor III, Disdain for Ambiguity ( r = .08). Discomfort with Unpredictability yielded a moderate correlation with Disdain for Ambiguity ( r = .21). One criterion for inclusion in the next version of the PNS scale was a factor loading of above .40 on any of the first three factors. When items were considered to be identical in meaning, only higher loading items were retained. Using these criteria, 15 items were retained for the PNS(B) scale. Factor analyses on retained items

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Page 24 yielded a similar factor structure, with the three factors accounting for 57.9% of the explained variance in this subset of PNS items (Factor I: 7 items, 34.1%; Factor II: 5 items, 12.4%; Factor III: 3 items, 11.4%). Factor loadings ranged between .01 and .86. Internal Consistency. Reliability analyses conducted on the PNS(A) scale yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .88, with itemtotal correlations between .08 and .68. The Cronbach's alpha for the 15 retained items was .85, with item-total correlations ranging between. 13 and .64. Results for PFI(A) Factor Structure of the Initial Version of the PFI(A) . Principal components analysis yielded identical unifactorial solutions for both varimax and oblique analyses accounting for 22.7% of the variance in PFI scores. Factor loadings ranged from .01 to .76. The 15 items retained in the next version of the PFI scale had loadings of .40 and above. Poorly worded or ambiguous items were deleted from further analyses. Principal component analyses conducted on retained items revealed a one-factor solution. Factor loadings ranged from .01 to .76, accounting for 23.4% of the variance in PFI scores. Internal Consistency. The internal consistency of the PFI(A) scale was more than adequate, with a Cronbach's alpha of .84 and item-total correlations ranging from .004 to .69. A second reliability analysis of the retained PFI items yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .87 with item-total correlations ranging between .35 and .70. Psychometrics: Phase II Three issues were of importance here. First, the three-factor structure that emerged from the original PNS items suggested the scale might not reflect as pure a personal need for structure as might be wished. Second, we hoped the refinement of the scale would increase the amount of variance accounted for by scale items. Third, earlier analyses eliminated almost all reversals on both scales, thus several contrait items were developed that were mirror image reversals of items retained for this iteration of the scales. This second item generation phase resulted in 27 items in the PNS(B) scale and 30 in the PFI(B). Subjects and Procedure Participants were 210 (77 males and 133 females) introductory psychology students who completed the PNS(B) and PFI(B) measures as part of a mass testing session – a procedure identical to that of the first study. Results for PNS(B) Principal Components Analysis . A principal components analysis of the PNS(B) scale, presented in Table 2.1, again revealed a three-factor solution, which accounted for 42.6% of the variance in PNS scores (Factor I: 9 items, 26.8%; Factor II: 10 items, 9.3%; Factor III: 8 items, 6.5%). Factor loadings ranged between .004 and .80. The factor intercorrelations were r = .31 (Factor I & Factor II), r = .28 (Factor I and Factor III), and r = .02 (Factors II and III). Items with factor loadings above .40 were retained. Again, ambiguous items were eliminated, and an attempt was made to retain as many reversals as possible. Similar factor analyses performed on the 12 retained PNS scale items revealed a one-factor solution, accounting for 36.5% of the variance in PNS scores. This unifactorial solution indicated that the item selection process reduced the noise in PNS scores without a substantial reduction in the amount of variance accounted for. Factor loadings ranged from .50 to .73. A review of a three-factor solution imposed on the retained items failed to produce three conceptually meaningful factors. Internal Consistency. As Table 2.1 also shows, the Cronbach's alpha for the 27-item PNS(B) scale was .85, with itemtotal correlation ranging from .01 to .67. The reliability analyses conducted on the 12-item final version PNS scale produced a Cronbach's alpha of .84, with item-total correlations between .40 and .62. Results for PFI(B) Principal Components Analysis . Table 2.2 includes the principal components factor analysis of the PFI(B) scale. A one-factor solution accounted for 31.2% of the variance in PFI scores. Factor loadings ranged from .02 to .74. Items with factor loadings above .50 were retained. Factor analyses run on the retained 14 items indicated that a onefactor solution provided the best fit with the data, accounting for 40.0% of the variance in PFI scores. Factor loadings ranged from .44 to .72. Internal Consistency. Table 2.2 also indicates the results of reliability analyses conducted on the revised PFI(B) scale, which yielded a very strong Cronbach's alpha of .91. Item-total correlations on these items ranged from .02 to 74. Similar analyses were performed on the 14 items that were retained for the final PFI scale. Here the alpha was .88, and item-total correlations ranged from .44 to .72. Together these results suggest that the PFI scale has an excellent internal consistency.

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Page 25 Table 2.1: Psychometric Summary of the PNS Scale (PNS(B)/PNS) ItemFactor LoadingsItemTotalCorrelationsItemFactor LoadingsItems-Total CorrelationsPNS(B) 27PNS12PNS(B) 27PNS12PNS(B) 27PNS12PNS(B) 27PNS12123123PNS1 *.15.60.25.55.47.46PNS14 *.31.73.02.59.57.49PNS2 *.16.34.62.57.47.48PNS15-.08.45.05.22PNS3 *.64.04.42.70.55.60PNS16 *.70.08.33.73.58.62PNS4-.04-.02.43.15PNS17-.26.26-.43-.16PNS5.79.09.17.55PNS18 *.57.28-.08.52.44.41PNS6 *.09.42.40.50.41.40PNS19.31.64-.11.47PNS7.22.32.70.57PNS20 *.28.16.57.55.46.46PNS8.56.03.43.48PNS21.03-.01.59.25PNS9.24.55.27.51PNS22-.004.28-.34.01PNS10.19.32.13.22PNS23 *.80.18.06.71.61.61PNS11.04.56-.22.22PNS24 *.31.004.48.51.34.41PNS12 *.64.18-.07.53.42.42PNS25 *.38.55.32.71.63.62PNS13.31.64.34.67PNS26.24.07.07.22PNS27.51.24.14.49EigenvaluesTotal %Chronbach's alphaPNS(B)277.242.511.7742.6.85PNS124.3836.5.84Note: * Items retained in PNS scale. Highest loading factors on the retained items from PNS27 are indicated in boldface type. Psychometrics: Phase III We administered our 12-item PNS and 14-item PFI scales to a separate sample of 157 introductory psychology students (29 males, 128 females) at the University of Waterloo as part of a mass testing session. Our aim was to determine whether the psychometric qualities of the items would yield values consistent with earlier samples. Results for PNS Principal Components Analysis and Reliability Analysis . Table 2.3 includes the results of psychometric analyses of the 12-item PNS scale. The PCA yielded a one factor solution, with factor loadings between .54 and .69, accounting for 37.8% of the variance PNS scores. Reliability analysis yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .84, with item-total correlations ranging from .58 to .60. Results for PFI Principal Components Analysis and Reliability Analysis . As indicated in Table 2.4, the PCA of the 14-item PFI scale produced a one factor solution which accounted for 31.4% of the variance in PFI. Factor loadings ranged from .22 to .73. The results of the reliability analysis of the PFI scale, also presented in Table 2.4, produced a Cronbach's alpha of .82, with item-total correlations ranging between .18 and .62. Therefore, the internal attributes of the final version of each measure remain good, each yielding scale characteristics comparable to that of earlier samples. Questions concerning the convergent and divergent validity of our measures remain to be answered, however, and are the focus of the next section. The Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the PNS and PFI Measures We have hypothesized that PNS and PFI are ubiquitous constructs that underlie important phenomena in a variety of psychological domains. As well, we suspect that there exists a moderate and positive relation between PNS and PFI. To explore these ideas, we selected a variety of scales measuring constructs reflecting a variety of human experience: Rigidity About Personal Habits (RAPH; Meresko, Rubin, Shantz, & Morrow, 1954), Right-Wing

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Page 26 Table 2.2: Psychometric Analyses of the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale (PFI(B)/PFI) ItemFactor LoadingsItemTotalCorrelationsItemFactor LoadingsItems-Total CorrelationsPFI(B) 30PFI14PFI(B) 30PFI14PFI(B) 30PFI14PFI(B) 30PFI 14PFI1 *.55.55.52.47PFI16.34.50PFI2.24.20PFI17.56.71PFI3.43.38PFI18 *.76.44.44PFI4.58.53PFI19 *.50.52.56.57PFI5.01.02PFI20 *.62.64.49.44PFI6.45.40PFI21.51.51.29PFI7.76.73PFI22.30.62PFI8 *.53.51.50.44PFI23.66.69PFI9 *.63.66.58.60PFI24 *.74.74.72PFI10.52.48PFI25 *.78.78.53.54PFI11 *.65.66.60.58PFI26.58.62.27PFI12 *.68.68.64.60PFI27 *.30.56.57PFI13.13.11PFI28 *.62.66.74.71PFI14 *.64.67.59.60PFI29 *.78.77.44.47PFI15.34.31PFI30.51.56.37PFI(B) 30PFI14Eigenvalues9.355.61Total % Variance31.240.0Cronbach's Alpha.91.88Note: PFI30(b) indicates secondversion of PFI scale. * Items retained in PFI scale. Factor loadings for retained PFI items are in bold face type. Table 2.3: Factor Loadings and Reliability Analyses of the PNS Scale ItemFactor LoadingItem-Total Correlation1.It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it..56452*I'm not bothered by things that upset my daily routine..59.483.I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life..66.574.I like a place for everything and everything in its place..61.515.*I like being spontaneous..54.446.*I find that a well ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious..61.507.I don't like situations that are uncertain..58.488.I hate to change my plans at the last minute..68.589.I hate to be with people that are unpredictable..57.4710.I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more..69.6011.*I enjoy the exhilaration of being put in unpredictable situations..64.5312.I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear..55.43Eigenvalue 4.45Total % Variance37.8Cronbach's Alpha .84Note *.Note: Contrait items

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Page 27 Table 2.4: Factor Loadings and Reliability Analyses of the PFI Scale ItemFactor LoadingItem/Total Correlation1.*I may struggle with a few decisions but not very often..58.482.*I never put off making important decisions..50.423.Sometimes I become impatient over my indecisiveness..57.454.Sometimes I see so many options to a situation that it is really confusing..70.595.I can be reluctant to commit myself to something because of the possibility that I might be wrong..68.586.I tend to struggle with most decisions..73.627.Even after making an important decision I continue to think about thepros and cons to make sure that I am not wrong..62.498.*Regardless of whether others see an event as Positive or negative I don'tmind committing myself to it..22.189.I prefer situations where I do not have to decide immediately..37.3010.*I rarely doubt that the course of action I have selected will be correct..47.3911.I tend to continue to evaluate recently made decisions..61.4912.I wish I did not worry so much about making errors..68.5613*Decisions rarely weigh heavily on my shoulders..43.3614.I find myself reluctant to commit to new ideas but find little comfort inremaining with the tried and true..36.27Eigenvalue:4.35Total Percent Variance:31.40Cronbach's Alpha:.82Note:* Contrait items Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and Self-Consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Personal Need for Structure Authoritarianism . The notion that people require more or less structure and clarity in their lives is inherent in the work on the authoritarian personality (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988). We expect that people high in PNS will also evidence a predilection for clarity and certainty in thought and action – a major aspect of authoritarianism. However, the authoritarian syndrome also includes a preoccupation with power and strength and right-wing political attitudes that need not relate to the PNS construct, which taps a more general idea of structure. This suggests that the magnitude of the correlation between the PNS and F scales should be moderate rather than high. Rigidity About Personal Habits (RAPH) . The RAPH scale measures the degree of rigidity evident in one's personal habits and includes traditionalism, rule boundedness, and discomfort and opposition to change. People scoring high on the RAPH are less likely to modify their behaviors and personal habits even when it may be appropriate to do so (Meresko et al., 1954). Because both the PNS and RAPH constructs emphasize rigidity and discomfort with change, a positive relation is expected to exist between high PNS and RAPH scores. Depression . Stable, negative, global attributions and rigid self-schemata that disrupt the depressive's ability to utilize positive information typify a depressed state (Beck, 1963; Beck et al., 1979). This primitive thinking style reduces “the complexity, variability and diversity of…experience and behavior” (Beck et al., 1979, p. 15). We suspect this rigidity would be reflected in a moderately positive correlation between PNS and scores on the BDI. Self-Consciousness. Self-consciousness is the extent to which an individual is in touch with one's inner thoughts and feelings, and concerns about oneself as a social object (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Theoretically, there is little reason to expect any relation between the PNS and self-consciousness scales. Personal Fear of Invalidity Authoritarianism . We expect a slight positive relation between PFI and RWA scores because high

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Page 28 scores on measures of authoritarianism reflect a tendency to engage in rigid disciplinary behavior (Adorno et al., 1950), conceptually similar to punishment for committing errors. Nonetheless, we also expect the relation between PFI and authoritarianism to be much less than that of PNS and RWA responses. RAPH. Inspection of the RAPH indicates that there are few items that overlap with the identification of authority and harsh injunctions that we believe account for the slight relation between the PFI and RWA sales. Thus, we expect there to be little relation between scores on the PFI and RAPH. Depression . Beck and colleagues maintained that an emphasis on the negative aspects of experience contributes to depression such that depressives appear to need “absolute certainty of the correctness of a decision” (Beck et al., 1979, p. 168). It could be argued that it is the concern with error that leads an individual to focus on negativity and failures. This focus, in turn, leads to dysphoria and other associated symptoms of depression. Self-Consciousness. One of the general dimensions of self-consciousness is the tendency to attend to inner thoughts; this is referred to as private self-consciousness. The other dimension involves an awareness and concern about the self as a social object and is tapped by two factors: a greater sensitivity to rejection by a peer group (public self-consciousness) and discomfort in the presence of others (social anxiety; Fenigstein, 1979). Concern about how one may be viewed by others might be viewed as anticipatory apprehension linked to the possibility of embarrassment due to the commission of some social error. Social anxiety is similar to public self-consciousness, but here the emphasis is on concerns with active censure from others and is likely tied to some history of social faux pas or perhaps the threat of punishment for errors. Thus, we expect a positive relation to exist between PFI and Self-Consciousness. Subjects and Procedure Subjects were the 157 male and female first-year university students who participated in the third psychometric study described earlier. Subjects completed the validity scales along with several others during class time and received course credit for their participation. Results A multitrait-monomethod analysis was conducted to establish the validity of our scales. Two patterns of results are important. First, each scale should be positively related to other scales that tap related constructs, Table 5: Multitrait-Monomethod Matrix for University of Waterloo Sample PNSRWARAPHPFIBDIS.C.PNS(.84)RWA.37(.73)RAPH.64.46(.82)PFI.24.22.15(.81)BDI.29.20.25.47(.86)S.C..26.10.21.64.48.(75)Note: Scale reliabilities are presented along the diagonal. SC=Self-Consciousness Scale establishing the convergent validity of the PNS and PFI measures (Selltiz, Wrightsman, & Cook, 1976). In this case, PNS should be positively and more highly correlated with RWA and RAPH than should the PFI scale, whereas PFI should evidence a greater relationship to Self-Consciousness and Depression than should PNS. Second, evidence of the discriminant validity of the scales would be indicated by low correlations between the PNS and PFI measures and other scales that are expected to tap less related phenomenon (Selltiz et al., 1976). Thus, the PNS measure should yield moderate to small correlations with the Depression and Self-Consciousness scales. Similarly, the discriminant validity of the PFI scale would be evident by yielding correlations of a small magnitude with both right-wing authoritarianism and rigidity about personal habits. The Interrelationship of PNS and PFI. Results of Pearson correlations, presented in Table 2.5, confirmed our thinking about the conceptual interrelation of PNS and PFI being moderately and positively related to one another ( r = .24, p = .001) in this sample.6 Personal Need for Structure. Table 2.5 results substantiated our prediction concerning a moderate and positive relations between Authoritarianism and Personal Need for Structure ( r = .37, p < .001). As expected, we also found a positive relation between high PNS and RAPH scores ( r = .64, p <.001). Further substantiating our predictions, there was a moderately positive relation between PNS and BDI scores ( r = .29, p <.001). Although we expected little relation to exist between PNS and Self-Consciousness, results of correlations indicate that PNS was moderately and positively related to the tendency to be self-conscious ( r = .26, p = .001). Because this result was not expected, we conducted a partial

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Page 29 correlation between PNS and Self-Consciousness, controlling for the effects of PFI. The results of this correlation indicate little association between PNS and Self-Consciousness ( r =. 14, p = .04) after the effects of PFI were partialed out. Personal Fear of Invalidity. Substantiating our hypothesis, the correlation between the PFI and Authoritarianism scales was r = .22, p = .005. Results of the z test also tend to substantiate our predictions, in that the correlation between PFI and Authoritarianism was of a smaller magnitude than that obtained for the PNS and RWA scales [ z (158) = 1.61, p < .10, one tailed]. As we had also anticipated, there was little relation evident between scores on the PFI and RAPH ( r =. 15, p = .005), providing evidence of the discriminant validity of the PFI scale. Results were even more striking when we performed a partial correlation between PFI and RAPH scores, controlling for the effects of PNS ( r = .001, ns.). Also as expected, high PFI was strongly associated with a tendency to experience depression ( r = .47, p <. 001). Finally, as Table 2.5 indicates, PFI is related to overall self-consciousness ( r = .64, p <.001). Inspection of the pattern of correlations between the PFI measure and the self-consciousness subscales is also informative. Recall we expected PFI to be most strongly associated with the private self-consciousness and social anxiety dimensions. As we had anticipated, PFI is positively associated with private self-consciousness ( r = .34, p <.001), but is even more strongly associated with the dimensions of public self-consciousness ( r = .55, p <.001) and social anxiety ( r = .56, <.001). Z tests indicate that the correlation of PFI and public self-consciousness was significantly greater than the correlations of PFI and private self-consciousness [ z (155) = 3.009, p < .01]. A similar pattern was evident concerning the correlations between PFI and social anxiety and PFI and private selfconsciousness [ z (155) = 2.42, p < .01]. Summary We substantiated our hypothesis that PNS and PFI would be moderately and positively related to each other and related to criterion scales in predicted ways. Correlations are high when they should be and lower when they should be. Variance is selectively associated with constructs according to predicted patterns. Note the magnitude of the PNS - RAPH correlation is high enough to indicate a degree of redundancy between the two measures. We would argue that the PNS scale possesses phenomenological precedence. Although a ubiquitous need for structure could be manifested in rigidity concerning personal habits, it seems less likely that rigidity in personal habits could cause a high need for structure. Similarly, we would argue that a concern with error could be manifested as a greater focus on oneself, particularly in terms of concern about evaluation and rejection by others. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION AND PERCEPTION: THE CASE FOR PNS AND PFI As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter there has been considerable interest in the PNS and PFI measures dating from the beginning of our research efforts in 1984. The work detailed in this section was undertaken by the cited researchers soon after the development of the measures at the University of Waterloo: happily, collegial interest in the measures continues today. In the next section we review these studies, providing evidence that individual differences in PNS and PFI affect fundamental perceptual and knowledge-acquisition processes in important and diverse domains of social cognition. In one of the earliest published efforts, Neuberg and Newsom (1993) found that the need for structure captured by the PNS scale cut across various knowledge domains. Specifically, high-PNS subjects tended to use less complex representations in their Q-sort categorizations of social and nonsocial stimuli (furniture and colors). Similarly, they found that high-PNS individuals used less complex representations in their trait-based representations of the elderly and even in their trait-based self-representations. Neuberg and Newsom then demonstrated that high-PNS individuals were more likely to rely on gender-related stereotypes to account for the ambiguous behavior of a female target than for similarly described behavior of a male target. Moskowitz (1993) wondered whether the need to impose structure might be strong enough to promote the unconscious use of trait inferences (spontaneous trait inferences [STI's], see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) in the categorization of behavior. Because STIs are one manner in which perceivers impose structure and gain a sense of control in their interpersonal interactions (Heider, 1958), people particularly high in the desire for structure might rely on such inferences to a greater degree. Additionally, they may take these inferences to be more than descriptions or summaries of observed behavior, but to be descriptors of the personality of the perceived person. Heider (1944) described dispositional inference as the most complete and structured explanation for an event, leading Moskowitz to posit that people who employ STIs may be more likely to “make the inferential leap from behavior identification to dispo-

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Page 30 sitional attribution” (1993, p. 135). Results indicate that, as hypothesized, high-PNS people (vs. low) were more likely to form STIs. In a later cuedrecall test, they were more likely to pair previously presented sentences with traits that served as recall cues.[7 High-PNS subjects were also more likely to associate the names of the stimulus targets with traits in the cued-recall test, suggesting that they were more likely to have formed (unconscious) dispositional attributions. Other research (E. Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken & Bargh, 1994) has found that priming effects (see Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume) were also mitigated by PNS. In their research, high-PNS subjects were more likely to use constructs that had been recently primed in making subsequent judgments about the target's ambiguous behavior. The judgments of low-PNS individuals were not consistent with the primed constructs. These researchers concluded that high-PNS people tended to freeze on the first available explanation, were confident in their decision, and so were unlikely to search for further alternative judgments. Those low in PNS might be less confident in their most accessible judgments and so would be motivated to consider alternative judgments. Thus, their impressions are less reflective of the classic assimilation effect because they do not simply and confidently draw new information into the category that is the most readily available. Kaplan, Wanshula, and Zanna (1991) examined the impact of PNS on impression-formation processes. Subjects classified as high or low PNS, under either time pressure or no time pressure conditions, were presented with two, four, or six pieces of positive or negative information about a target person. High PNS subjects under time pressure were less likely to integrate new information about positive or negative traits regarding a target. Further, whether subjects received two, four, or six pieces of information (i.e., set size) had little effect on high-PNS subjects who encountered time pressure. Their judgments were largely guided by their initial impressions. Schaller, Boyd, Johannes, and O'Brien, (1995) explored how PNS might influence statistical/logical reasoning processes, the likelihood of forming stereotypes, and the effects of accountability on interpersonal judgments. Subjects reviewed pieces of information indicating a group to which individuals belonged and the number of easy and hard anagrams they had attempted and had successfully solved. Results indicate that high-PNS subjects were more likely to stereotype targets and engage in more simplistic forms of reasoning, but only when subjects were not required to subsequently justify their judgments. Expecting to justify their positions tended to homogenize the effects of PNS: High-PNS respondents became less simplistic in their judgments, whereas low-PNS subjects actually became less complex in their reasoning processes. Most recently, Pilkington and Lydon (1997) conducted a sophisticated impression-formation experiment in which individuals who were high and low in prejudice and high and low PNS rated the interpersonal attractiveness of heterosexual and homosexual targets who possessed attitudes that where similar, ambiguous, or dissimilar to those of the subject. They hypothesized that the desire for cognitive simplicity characteristic of high PNS would lead such individuals to be more responsive to information consistent with their preexisting schemas, whereas low-PNS individuals would be more responsive to schema-inconsistent information. Specifically, they predicted that, because of the threatening worldview inherent in prejudice, PNS would interact with both prejudice and attitude similarity information to predict judgments of interpersonal attraction. Consistent with these notions, low-PNS/low-prejudice subjects appeared more receptive to information indicating that the target held attitudes differing from their own. Low-PNS/high-prejudice subjects (those possessing an inconsistency bias and high threat worldview) appeared to base their attraction judgments of the target primarily on information indicating attitude similarity. Interestingly, subjects with a high consistency bias and high threat (high PNS/high prejudice) were more responsive to information indicating the target's attitude dissimilarity, whereas high-PNS/low-prejudice subjects were most responsive to the target's attitudes that were similar to their own.8 Research conducted by the first author (see M. Thompson & Zanna, 1995) has investigated the personality-based antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes. Ambivalence occurs when one is both drawn to and repelled by an object (Brown & Farber, 1951; Hovland & Sears, 1938; Lewin, 1951; Miller, 1944; Mower, 1960): Continued rumination does not lead to a decision; resolution and commitment remain elusive. Thus, we expected that chronic differences in PFI should affect individuals' vulnerability toward experiencing ambivalence. In the experimental session, respondents concentrated on either the positive (or negative) aspects of each social issue (e.g., legalizing euthanasia) and indicated how positive or negative they felt regarding each issue. Subjects completed either the positive or negative version of the questionnaire, spent 15 to 20 minutes filling out various other scales, and then completed the opposite valenced form of the ambivalence scale. Results demonstrate that individuals possessing higher levels of PFI expressed greater ambivalence

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Page 31 Fig. 2.1. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the University of Waterloo sample: 12-item PNS scale, Thompson et al. two-factor model

across a variety of social issues. A second study suggested that the PFI-ambivalence relation existed only under conditions of higher issue involvement (see also M. Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1996). Consequently, the tendency to have greater information about these social issues did not lessen the ambivalence of high-PFI individuals. In other research, Somers and Lefcourt (1992) found that first-year university students classified as high PFI in a mass testing session at the beginning of the term were more likely to procrastinate and fail to complete their course requirements. High-PNS has also been related to early completion of experimental participation credits in an introductory psychology course (Neuberg & Newsom, 1991; Roman, Moskowitz, Stein, & Eisenberg, 1991). PNS, PFI, AND THE NEED FOR CLOSURE: TESTS OF ALTERNATE THEORETICAL MODELS Thus far, we have presented evidence of the reliability and validity of the PNS and PFI scales. The empirical findings summarized in the last section corroborate the relevance of these measures to a variety of phenomena in social cognition. In the introduction of the chapter, we briefly outlined a conceptual model in which PNS and PFI represent two distinct, yet moderately positively related factors. Although our correlational results support the existence of a moderate positive relation between the two constructs, this is clearly only preliminary evidence of the theoretical relation between PNS and PFI. Yet the understanding of the essential nature of the constructs is critically important. As Neuberg noted: To know what an instrument means – to know what psychological construct or constructs it represents – requires among other things that we understand its dimensionality. And demonstrations of convergent and divergent validity help us define constructs by suggesting not only what an instrument is measuring, but also what it is not measuring (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 1026). Thus, in the next section, we utilize confirmatory factor analysis as a more rigorous test of the underlying theoretical relation of our constructs in two samples. Moreover, we compare our model with two alternative models in the literature: a multidimensional model of PNS based on Neuberg and Newsom (1993) and Kruglanski's unidimensional conceptualization of closure. Previously, Neuberg and associates conducted confirmatory factor analyses of the NFCS. That research indicated the various unidimensional models of closure proposed by Kruglanski failed to achieve conventional levels of goodness of fit. Yet the dubious psychometric quality of the NFCS might suggest that its items do not present the best test of the utility of the unidimensional closure conceptualization, proposed by Webster and Kruglanski (1994). Thus, we apply CFA techniques to the PNS and PFI items (the strongest items in the NFCS)

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Page 32 Fig. 2.2. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the University of Waterloo sample: 11-item PNS scale, Neuberg & Newsom two-factor model

to test alternate conceptualizations of structure, validity and closure. We begin with an overview of each of the proposed theoretical models. Thompson et al. Model We believe that there exists a moderately positive relation between PNS and PFI, illustrating this relationship by suggesting that one might seek out structure as a means of reducing the likelihood of making an error. The literature on both Authoritarianism and Depression demonstrate instances wherein rigid cognitions and anxiety coexist. Indeed, they are the hallmarks of these phenomena. Our earlier correlational analyses implicated both PNS and PFI in Authoritarianism and Depression. In both syndromes, anxieties are thought to be the result of parental injunctions, censure, and punishment: Authoritarians externalize these reactions onto a safe outgroup, whereas depressives internalize parental injunctions. Thus, our basic theoretical model possesses two latent factors with correlated errors between PNS and PFI. Neuberg and Newsom Model Neuberg and Newsom conducted psychometric analyses of the PNS scale resulting in the elimination of 1 of the original 12 PNS items (“I like to be spontaneous”) as being too socially desirable. This revision of the PNS scale loaded on two factors, which Neuberg and Newsom named ‘‘ Desire for Structure” (PNS Items 3, 4, 6, 10) and A “Response to Lack of Structure” (PNS Items 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12; see Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Although they do not address the relation between PNSS 1 and PNNS2, or the relation between the PNS factors and PFI, we suspect that there may be a relation between the response to lack of structure and the fear of invalidity. For instance, inspection of the PFI and PNSS2 items reveals that both scales contain negatively valenced, and affectively based statements expressing distress, worry, and discomfort. Thus, this alternate conceptual model includes the same two latent variables with a modification in which the PNS construct is represented by two subfactors [(PNSS1 (Desire for Structure), and PNSS2 (Response to Lack of Structure)], and the addition of correlated errors between the two PNS subfactors, and between PNSS2 and PFI. Kruglanski et al. Model The position of Kruglanski and colleagues concerning the underlying dimensionality of the need for closure is somewhat equivocal, variously describing the NFCS measure as unidimensional (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and multidimensional (Kruglanski, et al., 1997; see also Neuberg et al. 1997). However, the most consistent theme suggests a unidimensional perspective. Kruglanski contended that the need for closure and the need to avoid closure are two ends of a single continuum that operate in opposing fashions “ranging from strong strivings for closure to strong resistance of closure (Kruglanski, 1989)” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049). Again their conceptual model, presented in their paper introducing the NFCS depicts a model in which five factors load on a single closure construct.

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Page 33 Fig. 2.3. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the University of Waterloo sample: Kruglanski et al. one-factor model

Subjects Sample 1 included 157 introductory psychology students (29 males, 128 females) at the University of Waterloo who participated in the third psychometric study. Sample 2 consisted of 149 first-year psychology students from Arizona State University (ASU) who participated in a mass testing session.9 Measures University of Waterloo Study. The PNS and PFI measures were included in a mass testing session along with scales tapping Rigidity About Personal Habits (RAPH),10 Authoritarianism (RWA), Depression, and Self-Consciousness.11 Arizona State University Study. The measures used with the ASU sample included the PNS, PFI, Authoritarianism, and BDI, and the Openness, Extroversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness scales from the Big Five dimensions of personality (John, 1990; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1987). We included the BFI scales because “There is accumulating evidence that the Big Five dimensions …represent broad fundamental traits people use to characterize themselves and are meaningful in predicting behavior” (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 1400). Results An ideal vehicle by which to determine convergent and divergent validity of a measure (Judd, Jessor, & Donovan, 1986), CFA also evaluates degree of fit of alternate theoretical models as applied to sample data via direct comparisons of chi-square values. Chi-square values of one model are subtracted from a second, as are their respective degrees of freedom. If the resulting chi-square value is significant, the model with the smaller degrees of freedom is considered to provide a superior fit with the data (Judd et al., 1986). Because chi-square values can be affected by sample size (see Bentler, 1985), we also consider other relevant measures of fit including the goodness of fit (GFI), the adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI), the root mean square residual (RMR) indexes, as well as the comparative fit (CFI, Bentler, 1990) and normed fit (NFI) indexes (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). University of Waterloo Study. The Thompson et al. CFA model would mean that the RWA, RAPH, and PNS would load on one factor, called structure here, whereas PFI, Self-Consciousness, and Depression load on a separate factor, called affect for convenience. Allowing the parameter between the two latent variables to vary reflects the hypothesized association between PNS and PFI. The results of the Thompson et al. two-factor model presented in Fig. 2.1 appeared to fit the data extremely well, yielding a nonsignificant chi-square [ X 2(7) = 9.64, ns.]. Other indicators of the goodness of fit, including the

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Page 34 Fig. 2.4. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the Arizona State sample: 12-item PNS Scale, Thompson et al. twofactor model

goodness of fit index (GFI: .98), the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI: .94) and the root mean square residual (RMR: .01), the comparative fit model (CFI: .99), and the normed fit index (NFI: .96), all indicated that the model fit the data quite well. The Neuberg model, presented in Fig. 2.2, reveals that this modification also fits the data extremely well. The chisquare value was not significant (although marginal), [ X 2(10)=17.90, p = .06], and the other estimators of goodness of fit all indicate that again this two factor model was quite applicable to the data (GFI: .97; AGFI: .91; RMR: .02; CFI: .98; NFI: .95). The alternative structural equation is Kruglanski's one-factor model that reflects the basic assumption that Openness and Closure Orientations form two ends of one dimension.12 As indicated in Fig. 2.3, the one-factor model was much less successful in providing a fit with the data. The chi-square value for the one-factor model was significant [ X 2(12) = 134.71, p < .001]. Moreover, the values of the GFI (.79), the AGFI (.51), and RMR (.06), CFI (.63), and NFI (.62) indexes all indicate a decidedly poorer fit to that provided by either two-factor model. When the three alternative models were directly compared, results indicate that the Thompson et al. and Neuberg models were essential equivalent to each other [ X 2cha(3) = 8.26, p < .05], revealing only a slight advantage in the Thompson et al. model. However, direct comparisons of the Thompson et al. model, as well as the Neuberg model with the unidimensional Kruglanski model yielded significant chi-square values [Thompson et al. vs. Kruglanski: X 2cha (5) = 125.07, p < .001; Neuberg vs. Kruglanski: X 2cha (2) = 116.81, p < .001]. These findings suggest that, when compared to the unidimensional model, both of the two-factor models provide a substantial improvement in terms of their fit with the data. Arizona State University Study. In this instance, the Thompson et al. model is represented by Authoritarianism, Intolerance of Ambiguity, PNS, and Openness loading exclusively on the Structure Factor. As indicated in Fig. 2.4, PFI, Depression, and Neuroticism load only on the Affect factor. Inspection of the correlation matrix indicated that Conscientiousness should load on both the Structure and Affect factors. Correlated errors exist between PNS and PFI, as well as between all BFI items, accounting for shared method error. Once again, this two-factor model fits the data quite well. Although the chi-square value is significant [ X 2(13) = 44.12, p < .001], other indicators of goodness of fit remain quite acceptable (GFI: .94; AGFI: .83; RMR: 04; CFI: .91; NFI: .88). Similarly, the parameters of the Neuberg two-factor model, depicted in Fig. 2.5, remain good when applied to the second data set [ X 2(19) = 43.10, p <.001; GFI: .94; AGFI: .89; RMR: .04; CFI: .94; NFI: .90]. As was the case in the University of Waterloo sample, the unidimensional model (indicated in Fig 2.6) does not appear to account for the data as well, as indicated by the lower

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Page 35 Fig. 2.5. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the Arizona State sample: 11-item PNS scale, Neuberg & Newsom two-factor model

goodness of fit indexes [ X 2 (21) = 129.91, p < .001, GFI: .84; AGFI: .66; RMR: .07; CFI: .71; NFI: .69]. Direct comparisons of the three models indicate that both two-factor models provide a better account of the data [Thompson et al., vs. Kruglanski: X 2 cha(8) = 85.79, p < .001; Neuberg vs. Kruglanski: X 2cha(2) = 86.81, p < .001]. In this instance, the Thompson et al. model did not provide a significantly better fit to the data than the Neuberg model [ X 2cha(6) = 1.02, ns.]. FUTURE DIRECTIONS The literature reviewed on the PNS and PFI measures suggests their significance in terms of important processes in social-cognitive phenomena, attitudes, and, on a more limited basis, behaviors. From the outset of our work, we conceptualized these measures as assessing pervasive cognitive styles. To the extent that this assumption is true, the measures should be readily applicable to an even wider variety of psychological phenomena. In this section, we address the future theoretical and applied research questions concerning the measures that remain to be explored. A central goal for future research should be to continue to disentangle the underlying theoretical relation between the Structure, Validity, and Closure constructs. The results of our own analyses here, as well as the prior work by Neuberg, suggests that a multidimensional model provides a better account of the data in each sample than does a unidimensional model. Accordingly, the question remains as to whether there is a place for the unidimensional need for closure construct. We believe so. According to Heider (1944), every human interaction introduces at least a modicum of doubt. We see a need for closure as the arousal state caused by this doubt. Structure seeking is one process by which such arousal – which is ubiquitous – is reduced. Thus, it seems probable that people may have developed separate mechanisms for how they tolerate doubt (e.g., how much and for how long) and how they work toward the removal of doubt, the reduction of arousal caused by doubt, and the attainment of meaning. Despite his reticence about the Need for Closure scale, Neuberg too has similarly concluded that Closure is a viable theoretical construct. Indeed, he utilized Webster and Kruglanski's depiction of a two-stage process of seizing and freezing as a way in which to understand this relation. Seizing “represents the person's urgent desire to obtain any closure as quickly as possible” (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 1405), whereas freezing “is organized around protecting the answer just obtained, the existing structure” (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 1405). Closure here involves the somewhat nonreflective cessation of a cognitive search (i.e., the seizing), and structure is a mechanism invoked to maintain closure. Future research should be directed toward the determination of the particular antecedents, correlates, and consequences of needs for structure, validity and closure. Perhaps in its most unadulterated form, a need for closure is associated with novel environments, extreme

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Page 36 Fig. 2.6. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the Arizona State sample: Kruglanski et al. one-factor model

levels of time pressure, and/or less important or personally relevant knowledge domains. Whatever theoretical relation between closure, validity, and structure prevails, we believe that each construct has a place in the understanding of knowledge-acquisition and validation processes. Efforts also should be directed toward the further elucidation of the interrelations among PNS, its subfactors, and PFI. The CFA evidence presented here clearly only begins this task. The ideal construct validity study would be one that included both the PNS and PFI scales and demonstrated that the two constructs have similar knowledgeacquisition effects under some conditions while having distinct effects under other conditions. For instance, people high in PNS should demonstrate a preference for consistency and structure in virtually all situations. However, persons high in PFI should only wish to invoke structure under conditions that increase their concerns with error. It would also be useful to determine how these measures may be related to specific phases in the judgment and decision making process. For instance, it would be interesting to determine which differences in cognitive styles emerge in the hypothesis-generation stage, the validation stage, or both. Preliminary work on this issue suggests that, once attributes are generated, individuals who are high in PNS sort them in a more simplistic manner (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Although highly suggestive, future research might more directly address the hypothesisgeneration sequence. Similarly, research might assess the hypothesis-validation sequence by directly tracking how respondents go about weighing, promoting, and discarding alternative hypotheses. The link between PNS and the processes related to stereotyping is one of the most robust findings associated with the PNS scale (e.g., Kaplan et al., 1991; Moskowitz, 1993; Naccarato, 1988; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Pilkington & Lydon, 1997; Schaller et al., 1995). The next important step would be to demonstrate that individuals possessing high PNS also engage in punitive behavior toward certain groups or individuals. If this relation is established, research efforts should be directed toward lessening the likelihood that those high in PNS will form, maintain, and act on negative stereotypes. Schaller's (Schaller, Boyd, Johannes, & O'Brien, 1995) work has already provided a potential start point for such efforts. As the above research illustrates, much of the past work concerning PNS has highlighted its potential negative consequences. However, our original aim was to create measures of cognitive styles that would be free of some of the evaluative aspects present in other scales such as Intolerance of Ambiguity. Thus, it would be interesting to show that a high-PNS style might be as readily associated with positive outcomes, at least in some instances. For example, those high in PNS might be more resistant to incorporating new negative information into an existing positive schema. Would the need for consistency persevere even when a behavior has some cost for the individual? In these instances, perhaps it would be individuals who are high in PNS who would be more likely to “show the courage of their convictions”. These ideas naturally lead to a consideration of the broader issue of how cognitive styles affect the attitude-behavior relation. For instance, the desire for structure and consistency between past and present beliefs should dictate that individuals high in PNS might be more likely to act in ways that are consistent with their beliefs. Conversely, the hesitation, ambivalence, and doubt so

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Page 37 characteristic of high PFI indicates that it should be much easier to disrupt the attitude-behavior links of individuals high in PFI. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore the reactions of those people who are high in these cognitive styles in dissonance-arousing situations. It would be particularly interesting to identify the dissonance reduction techniques associated with each cognitive style. Presumably, individuals high in PFI experience and thus endure the affective and cognitive struggles inherent in dissonance more often. Although dissonant states are unpleasant for all individuals, they may prove especially distressing for people high in PNS. Thus, those high in PNS may be motivated to reduce dissonance more quickly. Indeed, might there be instances in which high-PNS individuals demonstrate greater attitude change to justify and reconcile their apparently inconsistent actions? Similarly, the doubt, reevaluation of options, and revisiting of decisions once made that is typical of high PFI should mean that there would be evidence of a variety of conflicts at each point in the epistemic process (e.g., anticipatory regret, postdecision regret; see Janis & Mann, 1968) for those high in PFI. These measures could also have a potential application in the context of interpersonal relationships. For instance, one of the most salient characteristics of the transition between the infatuation and accommodation phases of a relationship is the discovery (and hopefully acceptance) of the more negative aspects associated with a partner (Braiker & Kelley, 1979; Brickman, 1987; Levinger, 1983; Murray & Holmes, 1993). For whom would confronting the negative qualities of one's partner (see Holmes & Rempel, 1989) be most damaging? Would the drive to consistency of those high in PNS simply overwhelm the acknowledging of negativity or lead them to see virtues in faults (see Murray & Holmes, 1993)? Would these basic cognitive styles therefore affect level of relationship commitment or at least the latency with which a commitment is made? Perhaps those high in PNS might be more likely to make a commitment early on, whereas the doubt and hesitation associated with high PFI may create greater reluctance to commit to a love relationship. An applied domain that may benefit from these measures is health. A major problem among health practitioners is that patients often fail to follow prescribed drug/medical regimes (see Meichenbaum & Turk, 1987). Perhaps individuals high in PNS would be more likely to keep appointments and follow medication instructions. More interestingly, would high-PNS patients only be likely to do so if the medical and drug instructions were simple in nature? One additional benefit of this study would be to indicate an instance when it would be advantageous for an individual to possess a high Personal Need for Structure. At the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine (DCIEM), we are exploring the relation of PNS and PFI to successful leadership styles. It may be that a high-PNS leader may be seen as too domineering and resistant to alternative ideas. In contrast, a team leader who is high in PFI may be seen as too indecisive to be effective. The more sophisticated hypothesis would be that there are certain circumstances that would be conducive to each style. For instance, in a crisis situation, team members might be most likely to follow and have respect for the archetypical decisive and confident leader. A related issue is whether team decision making will benefit or suffer from the cognitive styles of members or from particular combinations of cognitive styles among team members. One could conceive of situations in which the decision-making process of a two-person crew consisting of individuals high in PNS would exacerbate the quick closure and high confidence that mark this cognitive style. Should a team be comprised of individuals high in PFI, the hesitation and doubt characteristic of this style might also be magnified. Depending on the parameters of the decision-making situation (e.g., in an aviation setting where timely, correct decisions are imperative), premature closure or too long a decision latency could have disastrous results. Indeed, we have preliminary data suggesting that individuals' typical decision-making styles affect both the quality and latency of team-level judgments. We found that the judgments of military reservists performing a team naval assessment simulation were more accurate and timely when both leader and subordinates were low in PNS (Thompson & Baranski, 1999). We are also interested in exploring other real-world effects of these cognitive styles. This ability or inability to deal with ambiguity may also be manifested in problems dealing with ambiguous issues in certain occupations or situations. One such ambiguous situation is military rules of engagement during peace support operations (Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich, & Batres, 1997). Thus, a further real-world application is determining whether those soldiers possessing high PNS might have more problems dealing with often ambiguous rules of engagement or with other cultures while on deployment. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Over 15 years ago, Blass (1984) documented a trend toward the convergence of social and personality psy-

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Page 38 chology. He noted 11 social-psychological constructs that had undergone reformulation from an individual differences perspective (e.g., self-consciousness;, Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975; the need for uniqueness; Fromkin, 1972; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977; the belief in a just world; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). This interactionist perspective was thought to reduce the variance left unaccounted for in traditional social-psychological paradigms, and thus to better approximate real-world phenomena (Blass, 1984; Bowers, 1973; Ekehammer, 1974; Endler & Magnusson, 1976). The PNS and PFI measures continue this tradition by addressing individual difference factors that may affect and interact with knowledge-seeking and decisionmaking processes in important ways. In the introduction of this chapter, we summarized two philosophical positions concerning the seeking of knowledge. The associationist school emphasized the seeking of some ultimate objective truth, whereas the pragmatist view suggested that people would be content applying a satisficing rule (see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Simon, 1982) of knowledge seeking. The perspective we present here corroborates the approach of dual processing models in reconciling the philosophical distinctions of the associationist and pragmatist schools. In the present case, we would characterize these distinctions as reflecting stable knowledge-seeking orientations captured by the personal need for structure and the personal fear of invalidity scales – orientations that are both implicated in a more comprehensive overarching epistemological process. These measures also speak to the broader issue of whether humans are essentially cognitive or motivational beings. Advocates of synergism propose a dynamic interreliance between motivation and cognition: Attempts to ascribe primacy to one or the other system fail to do justice to this intricate relationship (see Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). In this vein, Tetlock and Levi (1982) suggested that determining “how people reconcile their desires with their beliefs about the world’’ (p. 84) reflects a truer, pluralistic view of human nature. This is precisely what our measures attempt to do by (a) detailing cognitive activities in their focus on knowledge structures (i.e., cognitions), and (b) by delineating important motivational moderators of this process. Thus, ultimately we offer the PNS and PFI scales as useful tools in undertakings that seek to reveal the ways in which people come to understand many aspects of their world, and detailing the mechanisms by which tentative hypotheses become transformed into unquestioned beliefs and facts. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowships to Megan M. Thompson and Michael E. Naccarato, and a Natural Science and Engineering Research Council Visiting Scientist in Canadian Government Laboratory Postdoctoral fellowship to Megan M. Thompson. We thank Joseph Baranski and Luigi Pasto for the helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. We are indebted to Steve Neuberg for his guidance and encouragement in the completion of this work. ENDNOTES 1. Need for structure/closure has also been operationalized via the soliciting global judgments (Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985), and environmental noise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). 2. A decision bolstered by one of us having had the pleasure of hearing Stanley Schachter eloquently articulate this same logic during a colloquium discussion at Columbia University in 1990. 3. An initial psychometric iteration of 62 PNS and 54 PFI items was completed and formed the basis of these 25- and 30-item scales. The results of this initial iteration are available from the first author. 4. We use the identifiers PNS(A) and PFI(A) to refer to the first iteration of the scales and PNS(B) and PFI(B) to refer to the second iteration of the scales. 5. Factor analyses were conducted using both pairwise and listwise deletion of missing data. Both sets of analyses yielded similar factor structures. Due to concerns regarding missing data in the earlier psychometric studies, the factor analyses results reported are based on pairwise deletion of missing data. A similar strategy was used regarding the correlational results. Again the pattern of findings was similar with listwise or pairwise deletion of missing data. 6. The positive correlation between PNS and PFI has been found to be robust across several studies and samples. Correlations between the PNS and PFI have included: r = .32, p = .0001 (n = 258) in the first psychometric study reported here, and r = .34, p = .0001 (n = 210) in the second psychometric study included in this chapter.

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Page 39 7. All sentences were pretested (see Winter & Uleman, 1984) so that a priori links between traits and sentences were unlikely. 8. Identical effects were obtained when Pilkington and Lydon replaced their measure of prejudice with a more direct measure of psychological threat. 9. We are indebted to Steve Neuberg for the collection of the Arizona State University data on our behalf. 10 In the CFA study analyses, we used 18 items from the Intolerance of Ambiguity scale and 9 items from Rigidity About Personal Habits scale because they improved the reliabilities of each measure. 11. Because the pattern of correlational results was similar for all Self-Consciousness subscales, only the overall score was included in this model. 12. To be as consistent as possible, we retained the correlated errors between PNSS1 and PNSS2 and between PNSS2 and PFI across the Neuberg and Kruglanski models. Note that this model provided the strongest results for the one-factor closure model.

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Page 41 3 Behavioral Discrepancies and the Role of Construal Processes in Cognitive Dissonance Jeff Stone University of Arizona, Tucson Over 40 years ago, Leon Festinger (1957) introduced the theory of cognitive dissonance, a rich and fascinating theoretical framework about the interplay among behavior, cognition, and motivation. Festinger's original views and initial research on cognitive dissonance predate what many seem to recognize as the formal introduction of social cognition into the field during the 1970s (e.g., Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Wyer & Srull, 1989; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Nevertheless, Festinger made several assumptions about the cognitive processes that underlie dissonance phenomena. For example, in his discussion of dissonance arousal, he made assumptions concerning the cognitive representation of information in memory, the accessibility of cognitions about behavior and belief, the perceived fit between these cognitions, the computation of a ratio of consistent to inconsistent cognitions, and the assessment of the relevance (i.e., applicability) and importance of the cognitions in the ratio. Festinger (1957) predicted that when these processes led to the perception of more dissonant than consonant cognitions, a negative drive state would be aroused, and people would become motivated to reduce the arousal. Dissonance reduction, in turn, could be accomplished by altering the cognitions in the dissonance ratio so that there were more consonant than dissonant relations among the elements. Thus, Festinger relied heavily on assumptions about representation and process to shape dissonance theory's novel and important predictions about social behavior. Contemporary researchers continue to investigate dissonance phenomena, in part, because many of the original assumptions about the process of dissonance arousal and reduction are the focus of considerable theoretical and empirical controversy in the field. The decades of research have produced a number of revisions to Festinger's (1957) emphasis on psychological consistency, each of which makes specific assumptions about the cognitive mechanisms that arouse and reduce cognitive dissonance (e.g., see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). The various perspectives disagree over several theoretical issues, including whether aversive behavioral consequences are necessary for dissonance to be aroused (see Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996; Scher & Cooper, 1989; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992) and how individual differences such as self-esteem moderate dissonance motivation (Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). The debate among the various perspectives has inspired new research (e.g., hypocrisy, see Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994; trivialization, see Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995), but there currently is little agreement about the cognitive processes that underlie dissonance motivation. This chapter reviews the debate over the proper interpretation of dissonance phenomena with an eye toward how the various theoretical perspectives have treated the role of social cognition in dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction. It then presents a new process model of dissonance that was designed to synthesize the various perspectives. The goal of the new model is to highlight a cognitive process that plays an important role in how dissonance is aroused and subsequently reduced. Specifically, it argues that dissonance begins when people commit a behavior and then interpret and evaluate the meaning of what they have done. The key to understanding which motivational state follows from the assessment of behavior lies in the type of attributes and standards people rely on to evaluate the quality or appropriateness of their behavior. By focusing on the way in which people construe action, it becomes possible to predict the conditions under which behavioral discrepancies create the different motivational states that have been specified by the various perspectives on cognitive dissonance.

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Page 42 LOOKING BACK: THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY Few ideas in social psychology have generated as much theoretical and empirical interest as the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The premise of the original theory was elegantly simple: Inconsistency between two cognitions causes an aversive drive state similar to hunger or thirst. Festinger (1957) theorized that, like other drive states, people are motivated to reduce the discomfort associated with dissonance. However, in the case of dissonance, Festinger posited that people are motivated to restore consistency among the discrepant cognitions to reduce their discomfort. At the time dissonance theory was published, psychological consistency was a ubiquitous theme in social psychology (Heider, 1946; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Festinger conceptualized the motivation for psychological consistency as stemming from the need for accurate knowledge about what he called “reality.” In a previously unpublished early draft of dissonance theory (in Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999), Festinger proposed that people form cognitions in two ways: directly from their own experience and indirectly from communication with others. The impact of direct and indirect experience would exert pressure on the cognitions to conform to the experience: In other words, there will be forces acting on the person to have his cognition correspond to reality as he experiences it. The result of this will be that, in general, persons will have a correct picture of the world around them in which they live. This is, of course, not surprising since the organism would have a hard time surviving if this were not the case. (Festinger, 1999, p. 356) Festinger (1957, 1999) proposed that elements of cognition – such as attitudes, beliefs, values, and feelings – typically reflect what a person actually does or feels, or they reflect what actually exists in the environment. In some situations, a person's reality may be what other people think or do; in other circumstances, reality may be what is experientially encountered or it may be what a person is told by others. Thus, Festinger appeared to assume that the motive for consistency among cognitions stemmed from a basic desire for a coherent and meaningful set of connections among oneself, other people, and the events in one's experience. Of course, Festinger was not interested in the equilibrium (as he called it) that people experience when in a state of consonance or consistency among cognitions. He was more interested in what happens when there is inconsistency between cognitions. He argued that people often have cognitive elements that deviate markedly from reality, such as when people conduct a novel behavior, learn new information, or are misled by others. When this is the case, he proposed that “the reality which impinges on a person will exert pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality” (1957, p. 11). He called this pressure cognitive dissonance. In discussing the reduction of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) talked in depth about the process of cognitive or behavior change that was necessary to restore psychological consistency. A complete discussion of his views on dissonance reduction is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, according to Festinger, the foremost determinant of how people choose to reduce dissonance is the responsiveness of these elements to reality. Although Festinger believed people were capable of self-serving distortions of reality (e.g., the smoker), he stressed that cognitive or behavior change had to mirror social and physical reality for either to reduce dissonance effectively. The overall picture painted by Festinger of the dissonance-plagued individual was that of a vigilant information processor, one who must seek a careful balance between physical and social reality on the one hand and the need to reduce an unpleasant state of arousal on the other. The original theory of cognitive dissonance was broad in scope, encompassing just about any type of cognitive inconsistency, but history suggests that Festinger was very interested in inconsistency between behavior and cognition. He noted in his early draft (1999) that, whereas cognition certainly dictates behavior because there is a “general tendency to make one's cognition and one's behavior consonant,” behavior often “steers’’ cognition (p. 358). His interest in how behavior might influence cognition is reflected in the fact that most of the original experimental research on cognitive dissonance examined an inconsistency between behavior and a specific attitude or belief (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Take, for example, one of the original experimental tests of dissonance theory – the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) forced compliance experiment. In that experiment, participants first completed a very boring experimental task. Then, through an ingenious ruse, the experimenter asked participants if they would be willing to tell a waiting accomplice that the task was actually fun and interesting. It presented those who agreed with an inconsistency between their perception of reality (that the task was very boring) and their behavior (telling someone

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Page 43 that the task was fun and interesting). The key manipulation in this study, however, was the amount of external incentive participants were offered for telling the lie about the task. Festinger and Carlsmith predicted that when participants were offered $20 to tell the waiting accomplice that the task was enjoyable, no dissonance would be aroused because saying something that was not true would be consistent with being paid handsomely for it. In contrast, when participants were offered only $1 to stretch the truth about the task, Festinger and Carlsmith predicted that dissonance would be aroused because, in this case, there is no clear external justification or explanation for their distortion of reality. As a result, participants would be motivated to restore consistency between their behavior and beliefs. The data show that, when the incentive for being untruthful to the waiting confederate was low, participants changed their attitudes about the task to bring them into line with their behavior. Consistent with what they had told the person who was waiting, participants came to believe that the task was fun and enjoyable. Also as predicted, those paid $20 did not alter their perception of how boring the task had been; high incentive or reward did not produce liking for the task. Thus, as predicted by dissonance theory, people would restore cognitive consistency when they acted in a way that was discrepant from their perceptions of reality. The Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) experiment proved to be more than just an intriguing finding; it inspired hundreds of experiments that helped distinguish social psychology from previous schools of thought about human behavior. At the time dissonance theory was published, the most dominant view of human behavior in psychology derived from learning theory, and psychologists were attempting to explain most human actions in terms of reinforcement contingencies. Dissonance theory made an impact because it was able to account for human behavior in situations where the relevant contingencies were supposedly not capable of eliciting behavior. Other early research designed to investigate the unique predictions made by dissonance theory revealed that people can bolster their religious beliefs in the face of disconfirming evidence (Festinger, Schacter, & Rieken, 1956), increase the value of items because they were difficult to select (Brehm, 1956), dislike others more after causing them harm (Davis & Jones, 1960), and enhance their attraction to other people for whom they have suffered (Aronson & Mills, 1959). The framework provided by dissonance theory was able to pull together a number of seemingly unrelated and perplexing social phenomena. At the same time, it showed that human beings are thinking, active participants in their environments and not simply the passive recipients of contingencies from the social context. However, at the same time dissonance theory was carving out new territory for the field of social psychology, researchers began to raise important questions about the basic assumptions of the original theory. One serious ambiguity in the theory concerned the precise nature of the cognitions underlying cognitive dissonance effects. Festinger (1957) focused primarily on inconsistencies that involved behavior without making a specific statement about the types of attitudes or beliefs that are relevant or important in a given situation. Aronson (1992) mused that this was an important problem with the theory from the outset, because even Festinger's students often had to ask Leon which cognitions would be inconsistent when applying the theory's predictions to a novel phenomenon. It was not long before the ambiguity about the cognitions responsible for dissonance led to several attempts to revise the original theory. One of the first revisions was offered by Aronson (1968; Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962), who argued that dissonance invariably involves a discrepancy between behavior and cognitions about the self. Specifically, Aronson argued that dissonance is a function of discrepancies between behavior and self-expectancies for competent and moral behavior. He predicted that people who hold positive expectancies for competent and moral behavior (e.g., people with high self-esteem) are likely to experience dissonance following behavior such as lying or poor decision making. However, people who do not expect to behave in a competent or moral fashion (e.g., people with low self-esteem) would not experience dissonance following an incompetent or immoral behavior (e.g., Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962). Aronson's focus on cognitions about the self redefined dissonance motivation as stemming from a specific need for self- consistency. Following this and other revisions (e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962), much of the research on dissonance in the 1960s focused on uncovering the situational antecedents that were necessary for dissonance to motivate attitude change (e.g., perceptions of choice; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967), as well as expanding the theory into new domains (e.g., attraction; Darley & Berscheid, 1967) and wrestling with alternative accounts of the motivational basis of dissonance (e.g., self-perception theory; Bern, 1965). When social psychology began to turn toward questions about cognitive representation and process in the early 1970s, cognitive dissonance researchers followed suit. One important advance was the introduction of attribution principles into the process of dissonance arousal and reduction. The discovery that people could

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Page 44 misattribute dissonance arousal to another source (Zanna & Cooper, 1974) and that attributions about personal responsibility for behavior moderate attitude change (Cooper, 1971; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) represent two such applications. Another major advance made during the 1970s was the demonstration of the affective component of cognitive dissonance, including evidence that dissonance operates like an arousal state (Pallak & Pittman, 1972) that is necessary for dissonance-induced attitude change to occur (Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978). As with other areas of theory and research in social psychology, the rise of social cognition had an important impact on the evolution of cognitive dissonance theory. According to some in the field, interest in cognitive dissonance theory lost its steam by the early 1980s (e.g., Ableson, 1983). Explanations range from the hypothesis that the “cold,” information-processing emphasis of social cognition had so dominated the field that few young researchers were interested in “hot” motivational theories (Berkowitz & Devine, 1989; Markus & Zajonc, 1985), to the problems associated with the use of deception and highimpact experimentation common in dissonance experiments (Aronson, 1992). But the idea that dissonance theory lost favor in the field overlooks some very important advances made during the 1980s, two of which involved the application of social cognition to understand the processes underlying dissonance arousal and reduction. If interest in dissonance had waned, Cooper and Fazio's (1984) “New Look” at dissonance and Steele's (1988) theory of selfaffirmation certainly revitalized theoretical and empirical intrigue in dissonance phenomena. COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN DISSONANCE AROUSAL: THE AVERSIVE CONSEQUENCES MODEL In their review of the literature, Cooper and Fazio (1984) concluded that dissonance did not appear to have anything to do with psychological consistency. The evidence gathered over the previous 20 years indicated that attitude change did not always occur when behavior and belief were inconsistent. They also proposed that the evidence supporting a role for cognitions about the self was equivocal. Cooper and Fazio argued that whereas the findings concerning self-consistency (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962) and self-esteem effects were provocative, ‘‘each (perspective) probably has not addressed sufficient data to be a complete theory of the causes of cognitive dissonance” (p. 232). Cooper and Fazio concluded that the relevant data, based mostly on research in the forced compliance (or counterattitudinal) paradigm, indicated that dissonance occurs when people take personal responsibility for having committed a behavior that produced an aversive outcome. The motivation to justify behavior through attitude change only operates when people perceive that their behavior has created an unwanted or aversive outcome or product. In detailing the cognitive processes that underlie dissonance, Cooper and Fazio (1984) proposed a sequential model by which dissonance is aroused and subsequently reduced. In the model, dissonance arousal begins when people engage in a behavior and then immediately assess its consequences. The information used to assess the consequences of behavior includes where the outcome falls in relation to latitudes of acceptance and whether the consequences are revocable. Only when the behavioral consequences are perceived to fall outside of the latitudes of acceptance and are perceived to be irrevocable do people conclude that the behavioral outcome is aversive or unwanted. At this point, people proceed to the next step, which involves the attributional search for responsibility. Responsibility for the aversive behavioral outcome is determined by evaluating two pieces of information: choice and forseeability. Responsibility for the aversive consequence is high if people perceive that they acted under their own volition; if volition is perceived to be low, then they conclude that they had no responsibility for the act despite having committed it. In addition, people determine whether they could have foreseen the outcome either at the time they conducted the act or when they reflect back on what they have done. If they conclude that they could not have foreseen the negative consequences of their behavior, they do not perceive responsibility for the outcome. If both choice and foreseeability for the behavioral outcome are perceived to be high, then people accept responsibility for the behavioral outcome. According to the model, the acceptance of responsibility causes dissonance arousal. How people interpret the arousal, however, is a critical determinant of the nature of dissonance motivation. Cooper and Fazio (1984) suggested that the initial arousal that arises from acceptance of responsibility for an aversive outcome is general and undifferentiated. Consistent with the two-factor theory of emotion (Schacter & Singer, 1962), interpretation of the arousal is dependent on cues in the context. For dissonance arousal to motivate cognitive or behavior change, it must be interpreted as a negative psychological state (e.g., psychological discomfort). If people label the arousal as positive or negative but attribute it to another source, the arousal will not cause the motivation that precipitates

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Page 45 cognitive or behavior change. Evidence for these suppositions comes from several lines of research, including the use of the misattribution paradigm, which has demonstrated that people are capable of misattributing the arousal caused by their behavior to other internal sources, such as to a pill they believe is arousing (Zanna & Cooper, 1974), or to external sources, such as a booth said to create feelings of claustrophobia (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). It has also been shown that people can interpret the arousal state as positive when humor or other cues associated with pleasant states are present (e.g., Cooper, Fazio, & Rhodewalt, 1978; Rhodewalt & Comer, 1979). According to the Cooper and Fazio (1984) model, once labeled negatively and attributed to the actor, dissonance arousal becomes dissonance motivation – the pressure to alter one's perception of the behavioral outcome. If the consequences of a counterattitudinal behavior are irrevocable, Cooper and Fazio proposed that people are motivated to change their attitude about the outcome to convince themselves that it was not as aversive as initially perceived. Thus, the motivation to reduce dissonance lies squarely in the service of rendering the consequences of behavior as nonaversive. Limitations to the Processes Specified by the Aversive Consequences Model Several researchers criticized the aversive consequences attributional model for presenting an overly narrow picture of cognitive dissonance phenomena (e.g., Berkowitz & Devine, 1989; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992; see also Aronson, 1992). The model also inspired new empirical work on dissonance, some of which was designed specifically to test the necessity of aversive consequences for arousing cognitive dissonance. Two findings, in particular, raise questions about the aversive consequences process model. There is evidence suggesting that cognitions about the self play an important role in dissonance processes, and there is evidence that aversive consequences may not be necessary for dissonance arousal to occur. First, a number of studies show that cognitions about the self can moderate dissonance processes. For example, Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) showed that people with negative self-expectancies would not experience dissonance following an unwanted test performance, which was later shown to be moderated by how certain people are of a negative self-view (Maracek & Mettee, 1972). More recently, Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) reported that when primed to think about self-attributes before making a difficult decision, people with high self-esteem did not change their attitudes to justify their decision, whereas those with low self-esteem showed significant post-decision justification. Similarly, Prislin and Poole (1996) showed that people with high and moderate self-esteem reacted differently to the negative consequences of making a counterattitudinal advocacy. Although self-concept effects have been difficult to replicate (e.g., Cooper & Duncan, 1971; Ward & Sandvold, 1963), there is enough past (e.g., Glass, 1964) and present (e.g., Stone, 1999) evidence to suggest that there may be conditions under which idiosyncratic cognitions about the self operate in dissonance processes. Second, two contemporary lines of research suggest an aversive negative product for behavior is not necessary for dissonance to be aroused. One challenge comes from the work on hypocrisy (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; see also Aronson, 1992). Hypocrisy was operationalized as a situation in which people make a proattitudinal statement about the importance of performing a specific prosocial behavior, such as the use of condoms to prevent AIDS (Stone et al., 1994), conserving water during a drought (Dickerson et al., 1992) or recycling (Fried & Aronson, 1995). By itself, the proattitudinal statement does not arouse dissonance because it is neither inconsistent with one's beliefs nor capable of producing an aversive outcome. However, dissonance can occur when participants are then made mindful of the fact that they do not perform the behavior they have advocated to others. The discrepancy between behavior and belief, as in the classic dissonance paradigms, is predicted to arouse dissonance. As a result, participants become motivated to “practice what they preached” (e.g., take shorter showers, Dickerson et al., 1992; purchase condoms, Stone et al., 1994) even when other strategies for dissonance reduction are available (e.g., Stone et al., 1997). The hypocrisy paradigm raises questions about the necessity of aversive consequences for dissonance arousal because participants persuade someone else to perform a positive, prosocial behavior, only to be made aware later that they do not take their own good advice. It suggests that it is not necessary to produce a negative outcome to another individual for dissonance to be aroused. A more direct challenge to the necessity of aversive consequences was introduced in an article by Harmon-Jones et al. (1996), in which aversive outcomes were manipulated independently of attitude-discrepant behavior. For example, in one representative study, participants wrote an essay under conditions of high or low choice, in which they proposed that a foul-tasting beverage – Kool-Aid mixed with vinegar – was enjoyable and refreshing. They were then told to discard their essay in the trash,

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Page 46 eliminating any consequence for having written the essay. The results show that, despite the absence of an aversive consequence for having written the essay (i.e., there was no product for their behavior), participants in the highchoice condition showed significantly more favorable attitudes toward the foul-tasting beverage compared with those who wrote the essay under conditions of low-choice. Harmon-Jones et al. (1996) concluded that, although aversive consequences are sufficient to arouse dissonance, they are not necessary; the only necessary condition for the arousal of cognitive dissonance is psychological inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). Together, the evidence for self-concept differences and that dissonance may be present in the absence of a negative behavioral outcome suggest that the aversive consequences model does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the dissonance arousal process. It does not help us understand how dissonance can be aroused in the absence of an aversive outcome for behavior or how dissonance can be aroused for some people but not others when all have performed the same discrepant act. COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN DISSONANCE REDUCTION: SELF-AFFIRMATION EFFECTS One important advance in theory about dissonance-reduction processes emerged from research on the theory of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988). Steele proposed that dissonance experiments, like the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) procedure, typically induce research participants to engage in actions that pose a threat to the integrity of their selfbelief system. One way to restore the integrity of the self-system is to eliminate the discrepancy by changing relevant attitudes or beliefs. According to self-affirmation theory, dissonance reduction through attitude or behavior change is just one way people go about the business of maintaining the integrity of their globally positive selfconcept. Under some conditions, justification or rationalization may not be the most efficient or desirable route for reducing dissonance. According to the theory (Steele, 1988), the primary goal of dissonance reduction is to restore the positive integrity of the entire self-system. As a result, any thought or action that restores the integrity of the self is sufficient for dissonance reduction. The novel prediction made by self-affirmation is that if a person can call on other positive aspects of his or her self-concept when threatened, dissonance will be reduced without having to confront the issue that caused the threat in the first place. To use the famous example of the smoker first used by Festinger (1957), the person who smokes despite his or her knowledge of the dangers of smoking experiences an attack on his or her positive self-integrity. The smoker's dilemma can be resolved by recalling or focusing on other aspects of the self that are highly regarded: “I may smoke,” the smoker may reason, “but I am one heck of a parent, athlete, and lover!” By bringing to mind other cherished aspects of the self, the smoker can reduce dissonance without changing the cognitions relevant to his or her discrepant behavior. A number of studies show that the accessibility of positive self-attributes can attenuate changing one of the discrepant cognitions following the arousal of dissonance. As one example, Steele and Lui (1983) induced dissonance through counterattitudinal behavior and then had half the participants complete a scale measuring socio-political values prior to completing a measure of their attitudes toward their discrepant behavior. The data show that dissonance-induced attitude change was eliminated when participants with strong sociopolitical values were allowed to reaffirm those values by completing the sociopolitical survey before their attitudes were assessed. Participants who were not value-oriented, or who did not complete the sociopolitical value measure after writing the essay, reduced dissonance by changing their attitudes. The attenuating effect on dissonance reduction of priming selfattributes indicates that people do not necessarily need to confront the discrepant cognitions directly following a discrepant behavior. If other positive self-attributes are somehow brought to mind following a discrepant act, dissonance is reduced without justification of the act. A further tenet of self-affirmation theory concerns the dispositional availability of positive self-attributes. For selfrelevant thought to attenuate attitude or behavior change, people must think about more positive than negative selfattributes following a discrepant act. People with high self-esteem presumably have more positive attributes available for affirmation compared with people with low self-esteem. Therefore, affirmation of the self should be more available and efficient for people with high compared with low self-esteem. Steele and his colleagues (Steele et al., 1993) tested this prediction in an experiment in which participants with high or low self-esteem participated in the free-choice paradigm originally reported by Brehm (1956). In Brehm's study, female participants were allowed to make a choice between two household appliances they had rated previously as equally attractive. After they made their difficult decision, when asked to re-rate the attractiveness of the items, participants rated the chosen alternative as more desirable, whereas the unchosen alternative was

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Page 47 rated as less desirable than before the decision. According to Brehm (1956), the potential inconsistency introduced by choosing one desirable alternative over another aroused dissonance, which was then reduced by altering perceptions of the desirability of the two alternatives after the difficult choice. In the contemporary version of the free-choice paradigm by Steele et al. (1993, Experiment 2), participants were asked to choose between two desirable compact disks. To test the use of self-attributes for dissonance reduction, for some of the participants, self-attributes were primed when they completed the Rosenberg (1979) self-esteem scale before making their decision; the other participants made their decision without having their self-attributes primed. The results show that when self-attributes were primed before the dissonant act, participants with high self-esteem did not change their ratings of the alternatives, whereas participants with low self-esteem showed significant decision-justifying change in their ratings of the alternatives. In the no-prime control, both self-esteem groups showed similar levels of significant postdecision justification. Note that the Steele et al. (1993) pattern of self-esteem differences in dissonance reduction are exactly opposite what is predicted by the self-consistency revision of dissonance theory (i.e., people with high self-esteem should show more dissonance reduction that people with low self-esteem; see Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). In summary, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) proposes that the reason people change their discrepant attitudes or behavior is because these options for dissonance reduction are the only ones provided by the experimenter. If alternate strategies for affirming the self are provided, self-affirmation theory predicts that participants will use the strategy that most fully restores the integrity of the self even when it has little to do with the behavior that caused the dissonance in the first place. By showing people may have flexibility about how dissonance is reduced, the selfaffirmation perspective seriously questions whether dissonance induces a motive to restore consistency or reduces perceptions of aversiveness following a discrepant behavior. Limitations to Self-Affirmation Processes Other research, however, indicates that there are important limitations to how and when people can rely on the accessibility of positive self-attributes to avoid changing cognitions associated with a discrepant act. One qualification was published by J. Aronson, Blanton, and Cooper (1995) and Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, and Aronson (1997). In the J. Aronson et al. (1995) research, participants completed an attitude-discrepant essay writing task in which they argued to reduce funding for handicapped services. Participants were then allowed to read the results of a personality test that they had completed prior to their participation. Specifically, they could read paragraphs that described their high standing on a number of positive self-attributes, some of which were attributes related directly to the discrepant act (e.g., compassion) and some that were unrelated to the essay (e.g., creative). The results show that in the high-dissonance conditions, participants avoided reading information about positive self-attributes that were relevant to the dissonant behavior. DesPite the fact these attributes were positive, participants preferred to read paragraphs that told them how wonderful they were on the irrelevant attributes, such as how creative they were. In a follow-up study by Blanton et al. (1997), participants were provided with positive feedback about their standing on positive traits that were either relevant (i.e., compassion) or irrelevant (i.e., creative) to the discrepant essay about handicap funding. When the positive feedback was relevant to the counterattitudinal act, participants showed significantly more attitude change compared with participants who wrote the essay but received no feedback. This suggests that the positive feedback increased dissonance arousal beyond what was induced by just writing the essay under conditions of high choice. In contrast, when the positive feedback was irrelevant to the behavior, participants showed significantly less attitude change compared with the relevant feedback and no feedback control conditions. Together, these studies indicate that people will avoid thinking about positive selfattributes that relate to the discrepancy (e.g., J. Aronson et al., 1995); when they cannot avoid exposure to related self-attributes, thinking about positive attributes will increase the need for dissonance reduction (Blanton et al., 1997). This suggests that the accessibility of positive self-attributes will only attenuate attitude or behavior change when people can bring to mind attributes that distract them from thinking about the discrepancy. In another line of research, Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) proposed that when people bring to mind other positive aspects of their self-concept, the salience of such important cognitions may cause people to trivialize or reduce the importance of the behavioral discrepancy. In a series of experiments, Simon et al. (1995) found that when people made an attitude discrepant advocacy, they were more likely to reduce the importance of what they had done when provided the opportunity to think about positive self-attributes before they were asked to indicate their attitude toward the essay topic. Thus, based on one of Festinger's (1957) original

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Page 48 assertions about dissonance reduction, Simon et al. (1995) argued that the accessibility of positive self-attributes attenuates attitude change by reducing the importance of the behavioral cognition. Affirmation of the self may only occur if people can somehow downplay the discrepancy. A third challenge to self-affirmation theory concerns how people prefer to reduce dissonance when more than one strategy is available. Stone, Weigand, Cooper, and Aronson (1997) distinguished between two general strategies for dissonance reduction: direct, which is defined as changing one of the discrepant cognitions, and indirect, which involves strategies like self-affirmation whereby people reduce dissonance without altering directly cognitions associated with the discrepancy. Stone et al. (1997) observed that, in many self-affirmation studies, participants are provided with the opportunity to self-affirm (i.e., use an indirect strategy such as focus on positive self-attributes) before they know they will have an opportunity to change their attitudes or behavior (i.e., use a direct strategy). Finding that people will use an indirect strategy for dissonance reduction before they are offered the use of a direct strategy does not tell us much about which strategy they prefer to use for dissonance reduction. It may be that people usually want to resolve the discrepancy directly through attitude or behavior change. However, if they perceive that the indirect affirmation option is the only option available, they may use it to reduce their discomfort, but they may then feel regret when the second option presents itself. To investigate preferences among different reduction strategies, Stone et al. (1997) offered more than one strategy at a time and allowed participants to choose following an induction of hypocrisy. In the first experiment, participants were made to feel hypocritical about their practice of safer sexual behavior to prevent AIDS (e.g., Stone et al., 1994). In one condition, participants were then provided with an indirect, self-affirming option for dissonance reduction: They were offered an opportunity to donate their subject payment to a homeless shelter. In another condition, participants were offered the opportunity to donate to the homeless shelter, but before they used this option, they were provided with a direct strategy for dissonance reduction: They were offered the opportunity to use their subject payment to purchase condoms. The results show that when offered only the indirect option, fully 83% of those in the hypocrisy condition donated to the homeless shelter. This indicates that when it is the only option available, people will use an indirect self-affirmation strategy for dissonance reduction. However, when the indirect strategy was offered alongside the direct strategy, fully 78% chose to purchase condoms, whereas only 13% chose to donate to the homeless shelter. A follow-up study showed that participants preferred to use a direct reduction strategy even when they could self-affirm on a behavioral dimension that held more importance for their selfconcept than the direct strategy – a serious challenge to the tenets of self-affirmation theory. These studies show that, under some conditions of dissonance arousal (e.g., hypocrisy), people have a strong preference for directly resolving the discrepancy that caused their dissonance. Indirect strategies for dissonance reduction, such as selfaffirmation, are useful when they are the only means available. However, if given a choice, people sometimes prefer to reduce dissonance by altering the cognitions that contributed to their discomfort. Together, these studies suggest that self-affirmation theory does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying the reduction of cognitive dissonance. People may avoid thinking about positive aspects of the self if they remind them of the behavioral discrepancy. When they do think about positive attributes that are unrelated to the discrepancy, such thinking may reduce dissonance by shifting attention away from the discrepancy (Cooper, 1999) or by providing a frame by which people can reduce the importance of the behavioral discrepancy (e.g., Simon et al., 1995). Even when other positive aspects of the self are available for use as a reduction route, people sometimes choose to confront the discrepancy head on and change the relevant cognitions or behavior, thereby erasing the discrepancy altogether (e.g., Stone et al., 1997). CONSTRUAL PROCESSES IN DISSONANCE: THE INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF ACTION When put all together, the 40 years of research and deliberation over the proper interpretation of dissonance phenomena resembles a giant, unfinished jigsaw puzzle. Several researchers have constructed some pieces or even large sections of the puzzle, but the debate over the necessary conditions for dissonance to operate has obscured the overall picture. As Berkowitz and Devine (1989) noted, the focus on analysis over synthesis has failed to produce an integrated portrait of the entire dissonance arousal and reduction process. In a recent article, Stone and Cooper (2000) argued that one way to integrate all the pieces and begin to see the big picture is to assume that each of the contemporary perspectives describes an important part of the cognitive dissonance process. For example, it is quite reasonable to suppose that, under some conditions, people are moti-

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Page 49 vated by a desire to uphold important attitudes (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) or beliefs they have about themselves (i.e., self-consistency). It is equally tenable that, under some conditions, people are motivated to reduce the perceived aversive consequences of their unwanted behavior (i.e., the “New Look”). It is also the case that, under some conditions, people would prefer to think about other positive aspects of themselves rather than face the implications of their behavior (i.e., self-affirmation). If we assume that behavioral discrepancies are capable of inducing different motivational states, then we can see that the different perspectives are neither synonymous nor simple linguistic translations of one another. Rather, they each describe a distinct and important piece of the overall dissonance process and, in doing so, make a unique contribution to our understanding of cognitive dissonance arousal and reduction. Nevertheless, to bring these various perspectives under one roof requires looking for what they have in common. Indeed, all of the contemporary perspectives on dissonance theory have at least one common bond: Each makes an important assumption about how people assess the psychological meaning of their behavior. Specifically, every major perspective on cognitive dissonance, starting with Festinger (1957), assumes that dissonance begins when people commit an act and then try to make sense of it, which they accomplish by determining how their behavior fits with other relevant cognitions. However, because each makes a specific assumption about the cognitions people use to make sense of their behavior, each perspective on dissonance offers its own interpretation of dissonance motivation. Thus, the various models share the assumption that dissonance begins with the detection of a discrepancy between behavior and some preexisting set of cognitions. Where the models appear to differ most is in their assumptions about the content of the preexisting cognitions, especially those related to the self, that people use when deciphering their behavior. Stone and Cooper (2000) proposed a new model to account for the processes by which people determine that their behavior is discrepant from other relevant cognitions – the first step in many of the models of dissonance. According to the self-standards model , people may determine the fit between cognitions by comparing the outcomes of their behavior against cognitive representations for how they should have or could have conducted themselves. That is, dissonance processes start with a comparison between behavior and a guide for behavior, which can include cognitive representations of various attributes (e.g., attitudes and beliefs) or self-standards (e.g., Higgins, 1989a; 1990). The basic assumption of the self-standards model is that the motivational basis of dissonance – why and how people reduce dissonance – depends in part upon the attributes or standards people use to interpret and evaluate what they have done. An important assumption of the self-standards model is that any given behavior may be construed in a multitude of ways, for example, as relevant to one's attitudes, self-concept, or the rules of a given society or culture. The model predicts that how people construe the meaning of a given behavior, and the specific discrepancy that they perceive as a result, determines the nature of the arousal and motivation that follows (see Blanton, chap. 5, this volume; Vallacher, 1992). There are two contemporary areas of research and theory in social cognition that offer support for the assumptions made by the present model. The first has to do with how people interpret or define action; the second has to do with the way in which people evaluate their behavior. The Interpretation of Behavior Multiple lines of research in social cognition have made the observation that the interpretation and evaluation of behavior is a malleable state of affairs. When people act, the meaning they ascribe to what they have done can be influenced by the context in which it was conducted. Vallacher and Wegner (1985; see Vallacher & Kaufman, 1996) proposed a hierarchical model of action identification that specifies that any given action can be identified at various levels of interpretation, ranging from detailed, mechanistic descriptions of behavior that explain how an act is completed, to more comprehensive and abstract identities that explain why a behavior was conducted and with what effect (i.e., consequences for behavior). To illustrate, imagine a researcher using a computer to analyze data or write a paper. The same activity on the computer can be thought of as “punching the number pad’’ and “typing letters on the keyboard” (low-level identifications), or as “entering the data” or “writing a paper” (intermediate-level identifications), or as “conducting research” and “advancing my career” (high-level identification). Like other models of self-regulation (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992; Scheier & Carver, 1988), Vallacher and Wegner's model of action identification assumes low-level identities (e.g., typing another manuscript) provide the information necessary for reaching the higher-level identities (i.e.,. advancing my career), and higher-level identifications (i.e., advancing my career) serve as goals to direct the lower-level activities (writing another manuscript). Higher-level action identities often define the actor as well as the action. Vallacher and Wegner suggested

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Page 50 that as action identities become more comprehensive and abstract, “doing” becomes “being”; behavior identified at the highest levels becomes self-defining. ‘‘Playing the piano” becomes “expressing myself” and then “being a musician.” The experience of successfully maintaining lower-level identities (e.g., “playing the piano”) facilitates movement up the identification hierarchy (e.g., “expressing myself”) until the behavior represents an important selfconcept dimension (e.g., “I'm a musician”). Within the hierarchy of possible identities, people tend to focus on only one identity for their behavior at a given time. The level of identification that becomes “prepotent” in thinking about behavior is determined by the difficulty of the behavior (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). Behaviors that are unfamiliar, difficult, require effort, or are timeconsuming tend to be identified at a lower level in the hierarchy. The logic of this claim is largely functional; thinking about the mechanics of an unfamiliar or difficult action facilitates smooth and successful performance of the act. For example, when dancing a waltz for the first time, the novice bride and groom have to think in terms of the mechanics of the dance to successfully execute each step. Despite the functional value of thinking about new or difficult acts in terms of the lower-level mechanics, action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985) maintains that people are not very content with mechanistic representations of behavior. Even when a behavior is personally difficult, people prefer to think about it at a level that provides comprehensive psychological meaning. The interesting observation made here is that, because people prefer to think about their behavior at a more comprehensive and abstract level, when they are conducting an act that requires low-level identification they are susceptible to new ways of conceptualizing what they are doing. They become acutely sensitive to the context surrounding the act, and they embrace whatever higher-level identity cues are provided by the situation (Vallacher, 1992). Consequently, the emergence of more abstract and comprehensive interpretations for behavior are most likely to occur when behavior is personally difficult and a situational cue makes accessible a higher-level identity for understanding what they are doing. What theory and research on how people interpret their actions offers to our understanding of dissonance processes is the observation that the construal of one's own behavior is malleable and dependent on the context in which the behavior occurs. This may especially be the case when people engage in acts that are novel, difficult, or require extensive cognitive effort. To the degree that a given behavior requires low-level identification for successful execution, interpretation of what the act means to and for the individual is particularly susceptible to cues provided in the behavioral context. The implication is that any of the classic dissonance-arousing acts, such as making a difficult decision (Brehm, 1956), attempting to persuade a confederate about the nature of a task (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), or having to construct a counterattitudinal essay (e.g., Scher & Cooper, 1989) could be prone to the emergence process. Consequently, the interpretation and evaluation of these acts could be influenced by whatever identity cues are operating in the situation (Vallacher, 1992). The construal of a particular behavior as representing a significant discrepancy should therefore be influenced by the salience and accessibility of cognitions relevant to the evaluation of behavior. Salience and Accessibility of Attributes and Standards for Behavior Part and parcel of the debate among the various perspectives on dissonance is the disagreement over the information people use to interpret and evaluate the psychological meaning of their behavior. Once people have acted, dissonance theorists generally assume that the behavior or its outcome are evaluated against some relevant criteria. When the behavior is judged not to fit the relevant criteria, a discrepancy is detected and the dissonance process is engaged. What determines the criteria for evaluation? According to the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2000), the context in which the act occurs can make some criteria especially more salient or accessible, and therefore invoke a specific construal of the act. The specific content of the discrepancy, and the nature of the dissonance motivation that follows, may be determined by what criteria are made salient in the context in which behavior is performed. For example, the psychological consistency perspective (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) predicts that dissonance can occur for discrepancies between behavior and a specific attitude or belief. If in fact the construal of behavior is dependent on what cues are salient in the context, then it seems possible for dissonance to be aroused if the situation cues the use of relevant attitudes or beliefs to make sense of the behavior. When this is the case, people should identify their behavior at a relatively intermediate level of abstraction – one that does not focus on the mechanics of writing nor on the higher level identity implied by such acts (e.g., competent). For example, if asked to describe what they have done, people might say they just “advocated a position on a topic opposite my own” or “decided

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Page 51 between two attractive alternatives.” Such interpretations of behavior may focus people on resolving the discrepancy between behavior and a specific attitude or belief relevant to the act. The motive for psychological consistency may then operate when people make an intermediate-level identification of their behavior possibly because the situation makes salient specific attitudes or beliefs and the context either does not make salient a higher-level identification or, as in the Harmon-Jones et al. (1996) procedure, eliminates any high-level meaning (i.e., by eliminating the consequences for one's act). Thus, psychological consistency may be a central motivating factor in dissonance even in the absence of an aversive outcome or product for behavior, but perhaps only when something in the context cues the use of specific attitudes or beliefs to interpret the behavior. However, there is no reason to believe that people routinely use specific attitudes or beliefs to interpret and evaluate their behavior. According to the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2000), any behavior that can be perceived as discrepant from a specific attitude or belief can also be perceived as discrepant from cognitions at a higher level of abstraction, such as cognitions about the self or normative rules for conduct. When people interpret and evaluate their behavior at higher levels of meaning, the discrepancy they perceive and the dissonance motivation that arises may take on qualitatively different characteristics. From the perspective of the aversive consequences model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), dissonance processes turn on the perception of a negative behavioral outcome. How do people determine that their behavior has reaped an aversive consequence? According to the analysis offered by Cooper and Fazio (1984), they do so by comparing the outcome of the behavior to standards for what they should have or could have achieved from the perspective of others – what might be called normative standards for behavior (e.g., Higgins, 1990). The aversive consequences model assumes that people interpret and evaluate their behavior at a higher, more abstract level of meaning than what is suggested by the psychological consistency perspective (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). For example, when norms are salient and people are asked to identify the meaning of a counter-attitudinal act or difficult decision, they might say, “I have violated norms for social responsibility” or “I have made a socially undesirable choice.” According to the selfstandards model, when normative standards for behavior are salient, most people, regardless of individual differences in the content of their self-concept, should perceive a discrepancy between their behavior and the relevant normative standard. Consequently, dissonance should be aroused for most people (assuming that they subscribe to the salient norms), and reduction will be targeted toward reducing the negative perception of the behavioral outcome. Alternatively, a different high-level construal of behavior is assumed by the self-consistency revision, which predicts that cognitions about the self play a role in the process of dissonance arousal. Specifically, according to the selfconsistency revision (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), dissonance involves a discrepancy between behavior and specific beliefs about the self-attributes of competence and morality. Moreover, because people vary in how competent and moral they expect themselves to be, the self-consistency perspective predicts that self-esteem differences should moderate for whom dissonance is aroused. Dissonance from the self-consistency viewpoint is predicated on a perceived discrepancy between behavior and idiosyncratic self-expectancies for competent and prudent behavior. A central assumption to this process concerns the cognitive elements that underlie self-expectancies. According to Thibodeau and Aronson (1992), self-expectancies for behavior are based on personal standards for morality and competence that are ‘‘culturally derived, and largely shared, by most people within a given society or subculture” (p. 596). In other words, the standards that people rely on to assess their behavior are normative in nature. If in fact the standards used to assess behavior are always derived culturally and shared by all, how can people with different self-concepts draw different conclusions about the meaning of what they have done? One possibility is that, for self-consistency processes to operate in dissonance, in addition to the relevant normative standards, people must also take into account their actual self-concept when assessing their behavior. Stone and Cooper (2000) proposed that when people commit a dissonant act, two chronic aspects of the self can become accessible in memory: a) the self-concept, represented by an actual self-attribute for competence or morality; and b) the normative self-standards for competence or morality. Together, these two cognitions can form a self-expectancy, in that people expect their behavior to confirm or verify the chronic relationship – the degree of discrepancy – between the actual self and normative standard on the dimensions of morality and competence. So, once induced to commit a dissonant act, a person might assess the competence or morality of his or her behavior by comparing the contextual self inferred from the behavior (e.g., “I just said something stupid and immoral”) against a chronic selfexpectancy (“I am

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Page 52 usually a smart and decent person – relative to the norm for competence and morality”). As in this example, when a discrepancy is detected between the behavior and chronic self-expectancy, dissonance is aroused. However, another person with a different expectancy might not perceive a discrepancy in this case. For example, another person might infer the same contextual self from behavior (“I just said something stupid and immoral”), but conclude that it does not represent a discrepancy when compared against a less positive self-expectancy (e.g., “I am NOT ALWAYS a smart and decent person – relative to the norm for competence and morality’’). In this case, the use of selfexpectancies – the chronic degree of discrepancy between actual and normarive standards – does not lead to dissonance arousal. Thus, idiosyncratic self-expectancies can be represented in memory as a chronic discrepancy between an actual self-attribute (e.g., competence or morality) and its relevant normative standard. Dissonance is aroused when a given behavior fails to confirm the chronic relationship between the actual self-concept and its normative self-guide. What distinguishes people with positive versus negative expectancies for their behavior is the size of the discrepancy between their chronic actual-self, referred to as the self-concept , and the normative standards for competence and morality. These differences in how self-expectancies are represented (i.e., the size of the discrepancy between the chronic actual self and self-standard) seem to operate as the definition of self-esteem in the self-consistency perspective (cf. James, 1890; Rosenberg, 1979; see also Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Thus, people with high selfesteem, who have a smaller chronic discrepancy between their actual self and norms for behavior, should experience dissonance when “lying, advocating a position contrary to their own beliefs, or otherwise acting against one's principles – the stock in trade of countless dissonance experiments” (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992, p. 592). Alternatively, those with negative expectancies, who have a larger chronic discrepancy between their actual self and normative standards, are simply not surprised when they act in a way that deviates from the norm. In the self-standards model, the activation of self-expectancies also depends on what information is made salient in the context of a given behavior. Specifically, for chronic self-expectancies to moderate dissonance, the normative standard cannot be the only salient criterion by which people evaluate their behavior. In addition to the norms, an idiographically based, unique conception of the self-concept (e.g., actual self-attributes) must also become accessible during the construal of behavior. For example, as supposed by the self-consistency perspective (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), if people were to use their own personal standards to assess their behavior, they may activate their chronic self-expectancies and then self-esteem differences in dissonance reduction would emerge. Otherwise, if idiosyncratic actual self-attributes are not made accessible when assessing behavior, then most people, regardless of their self-expectancies, should perceive the behavior as discrepant from the norm, and dissonance should manifest itself without self-concept moderation of the arousal process(Cooper & Fazio, 1984). Finally, unlike the other views of dissonance, self-affirmation theory (e.g., Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993; Steele, 1988) does not define how people determine a threat to global self-integrity, nor does it define the cognitive representation of a self-threat. It focuses primarily on how people cope with dissonance once it is aroused. As a result, it is conceivable that the affirmation process could follow the detection of discrepancies that involve attitudes, self-expectancies, or normative standards, although as noted earlier, there are important limitations to how the accessibility of positive self-attributes can reduce dissonance (e.g., Blanton et al., 1997; for full discussion of affirmation processes in the self-standards model, see Stone & Cooper, 2000). In summary, each of the perspectives assumes that dissonance is aroused when people detect a discrepancy between their behavior and specific attributes or standards for behavior. The malleability with which people interpret and evaluate their behavior, however, suggests that the construal process may not always rely on any one source of information, but instead may be dependent on what criteria are salient or become accessible in the context in which the behavior occurs. Consequently, the nature of the dissonance motivation that follows from a behavioral discrepancy should be a function of the attributes and standards people rely on to interpret and evaluate their behavior. THE CONSTRUAL OF BEHAVIORAL DISCREPANCIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE The approach to testing the predictions made by the self-standards model has thus far involved making specific attributes and standards accessible in the context of one of the classic dissonance-arousing behaviors. If the interpretation of behavior is subject to whatever attributes or standards are brought to mind in the situation, it should be possible to manipulate independently the motivation for psychological consistency, self-consistency, selfaffirmation, or the reduction of aversive consequences by priming the specific criteria each

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Page 53 perspective assumes people use to understand their behavior. Evidence that different motives were engaged by priming various attributes and standards is shown in part by the pattern of dissonance reduction (e.g., attitude change) across groups of participants with different levels of self-esteem. In one of the first experiments designed to examine how the accessibility of self-attributes and standards in the context of a classic dissonance-arousing behavior might influence the processes, Stone (1999) had participants with high or low self-esteem (as measured in a pretest session) conduct a free-choice paradigm based on the procedures reported by Steele et al. (1993). The accessibility of self-attributes was manipulated for some participants when they completed the Rosenberg (1979) self-esteem scale just before they made their choice; other participants were primed for self-attributes in the same way just after they made their decision. The results presented in Table 3.1 show that both self-esteem groups reported significant change in their perceptions of the alternatives in the no prime, decision-only control condition. This suggests that when selfattributes were not primed, both groups appeared to be focused on the inconsistency inherent in their decision and were motivated to change their attitudes about the alternatives (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, when primed for their self-attributes before the choice, participants with high self-esteem showed significantly less justification of their decision compared with participants with low self-esteem. When primed after they made their decision, participants with high self-esteem showed significant post-decision justification, whereas participants with low self-esteem did not. The results in the priming conditions suggest that when self-attributes were primed before the decision, they operated as self-affirming resources (Steele et al., 1993) and reduced the need for decision justification among those participants with high (but not low) self-esteem. In contrast, when self-attributes were primed after the difficult decision, they appeared to engage self-expectancies and the motivation TABLE 3.1: The Interaction Between Self-Esteem and the Timing of the Self-Attribute Prime on the Spread of Alternatives (Reported in Stone, 1999). Self-EsteemTiming Of Self-Attribute PrimeNoneBeforeDecisionAfterDecisionHigh1.350.551.35Low1.522.480.52Note. Higher numbers indicate more dissonance reduction. for self-consistency (e.g., Aronson, 1968). As a result, those with high self-esteem showed more dissonance reduction than those with low self-esteem. This study shows that the nature of dissonance motivation can be a function of when people think about themselves in the context of making a difficult decision. In another series of studies, Stone, Galinsky, and Cooper (1999) examined how the accessibility of different selfstandards for behavior would influence the arousal and reduction of dissonance. Specifically, in one experiment based on the free-choice paradigm described earlier, participants with high or low self-esteem were asked to make a difficult choice between two desirable alternatives and then complete a measure of “self-understanding.” The task was designed to prime different standards for behavior by having participants write a short description of a fictitious target person who exemplified two positive self-attributes such as competent and rational. To manipulate the type of standards made accessible by this task, some participants wrote about the target person using their own personal standards. Specifically, they were instructed to think about the standards for competence and rationality from their own perspective and then describe the target person using their own personal standards for each trait. Other participants wrote about the target person using normative standards. They were directed to think about the same standards from a societal perspective and describe the target using “the standards for what most people think” represent each attribute. Once they completed the self-standard priming task, the experimenter had them rate the psychology studies for desirability again. As seen in Table 3.2, participants with high and low self-esteem in the decision-only control condition showed significant levels of post-decision justification. As noted previously, the free-choice paradigm, which was created to investigate psychological consistency in the early days of dissonance research, appears to focus people on the discrepancy between the choice and specific beliefs about the alternatives (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, when primed for their own personal standards, participants with high self-esteem reported significantly more post-decision justification of their choice compared with the justification reported by participants with low self-esteem. In contrast, when normative standards were made salient, both self-esteem groups reported relatively equalivalent levels of postdecision justification. Thus, as predicted by the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2000), making personal standards for behavior salient engaged self-expectancies and caused participants with high self-esteem to seek more dissonance reduction than partici-

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Page 54 pants with low self-esteem. In contrast, making salient the norms for behavior caused the same level of decision justification for both self-esteem groups. Stone et al. (1999) conducted a second experiment to examine the effects of self-standards primes in another classic dissonance paradigm – one involving counterattitudinal advocacy. In addition, several measures were included in an attempt to capture mediational evidence of the hypothesized processes underlying the various predictions made by the standards model. For example, measures were included to tap the valence of the self-relevant thought induced by the standards primes. According to the self-standards model (e.g., Stone & Cooper, 2000), when personal standards are salient in the context of a discrepant act, people with low self-esteem, who presumably hold less positive expectancies for their behavior, should show evidence of more negative self-relevant thought, which should correspond with less self-justification after a discrepant act. In contrast, people with high self-esteem, who presumably hold more positive expectancies for their behavior, should show evidence of more positive self-relevant thought, and this should correlate with more justification of the discrepant act. Furthermore, the model predicts that when normative standards are salient, most people, regardless of their prevailing self-esteem, should be focused on the positive normative standards for behavior. Consequently, the content of self-relevant thought should be positive for those with high or low self-esteem when normative standards are made salient, and this should correlate with the level of justification following the discrepant act. These predictions were tested by having participants circle traits that applied to each type of attribute when they were primed for personal versus normative standards following the induced compliance task. Self-report measures of negative and positive affect were also collected. Elliot and Devine (1994) presented evidence that self-reports of psychological discomfort were enhanced by writing a counter-attitudinal essay TABLE 3.2: The Self-Esteem X Standards Prime Interaction on the Spread of Alternatives (in Experiment 1 of Stone, Galinsky, & Cooper, 1999). Self-EsteemSelf-Standards PrimeNonePersonalStandardsNormativeStandardsHigh0.881.770.55Low1.080.920.86Note. Higher numbers indicate more dissonance reduction. under high-choice conditions, and Galinsky, Stone, and Cooper (2000) found that psychological discomfort was reduced by focus on irrelevant positive attributes following dissonance arousal. According to the proposed selfstandards model of dissonance, when personal standards are salient, people with high self-esteem should experience more psychological discomfort and more negative affect directed at the self compared with people with low selfesteem. In contrast, when normative standards are salient, both those with high or low self-esteem should experience psychological discomfort and negative self-affect associated with dissonance and the salience of the normative prime. Thus, to investigate the potential mediating role of negative and positive affect, after participants completed the induced compliance task (and in some conditions, the standards primes), they completed a measure of their current affective state. In Experiment 2 (Stone et al., 1999), participants with high or low self-esteem made a counterattitudinal advocacy under conditions of high or low choice. Specifically, participants were asked to generate arguments in favor of a tuition increase at the University of Arizona (e.g., Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). Once they had completed the advocacy task and choice manipulation, those randomly assigned to the standards prime condition were asked to examine a list of 30 trait words that ranged from negative to positive (Anderson, 1968). The traits were chosen for their relevance to the counterattitudinal argument task (e.g., Blanton et al., 1997). Those randomly assigned to the Normarive Standards Prime condition were told the list of traits represented various normative standards for behavior. They were told to examine the list and think about which traits represent the type of person they should be from the perspective of others. They were then instructed to circle the traits on the list that best represent the normative standards guiding their behavior. Those randomly assigned to the Personal Standards Prime condition were told the list of traits represented various personal standards for behavior. They were told to examine the list and think about which traits represent the type of person they personally wanted to be. They were then asked to circle the traits that best represented the personal standards guiding their behavior. After the standards prime manipulations, participants received a questionnaire designed to measure three affective states: psychological discomfort, negative self-affect, and positive affect (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Galinsky, et al., 2000). After participants completed the affect measures, the experimenter had them complete the attitude questionnaire ostensibly because he forgot to have them complete it earlier. The primary measure

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Page 55 asked participants to indicate their agreement with the statement “I believe that tuition should be raised for the next academic year.”1 Analysis of the attitude change scores shown in Table 3.3 reveals a significant interaction between self-esteem and the self-standards priming conditions. Planned contrasts showed that participants in the high-choice control condition tended to justify their advocacy more ( M = 1.80) than low-choice control participants ( M = 1.06), and this was not moderated by self-esteem. Further contrasts revealed that attitude change was significantly moderated by selfesteem when self-standards were primed. Those with low self-esteem showed significantly less attitude change compared with participants with high self-esteem when personal standards were primed, and they showed less attitude change compared with those with high or low self-esteem when normative standards were made salient. There were no differences found between the other standards prime conditions. Analyses of the mediational measures of affect and trait listings did not reveal reliable differences across the experimental conditions. However, within-cell correlations showed that, among participants with high self-esteem and personal standard primes, attitude change was positively correlated with both feelings of psychological discomfort ( r=0.35, p<.12) and negative affect directed toward the self ( r=0.41, p<.06). For participants with low self-esteem, correlations between attitude change and the measures of negative affect did not approach significance. In contrast, when normative standards were made salient, there were positive correlations between attitude change and feelings of psychological discomfort ( r=.44, p<.05) and negative affect directed toward the self ( r=.42, p<.06) for participants with low self-esteem. In contrast, for participants with high self-esteem there were no correlations between the affect measures and justification. But there were significant negative correlations between perceptions of choice and psychological discomfort ( r=.47, p<.02) and negative affect directed toward the self ( r=-.51, p<.01). Table 3.3: The Self-Esteem X Standards Prime Interaction on Attitude Change Scores (in Experiment 2 of Stone, Galinsky, & Cooper, 1999). Self-EsteemLow-ChoiceControlHigh-Choice ControlPersonalStandardsPrimeNormativeStandardsPrimeHigh0.981.502.522.68Low1.142.090.572.52Note. Higher numbers indicate more dissonance reduction. The data from the experiments reported in Stone et al. (1999) support the idea that the attributes and standards made salient in the context of a behavioral discrepancy determine the nature of dissonance motivation. First, the results from the no prime control conditions suggest that the behavioral discrepancies studied in the classic dissonance paradigms, like in the induced compliance or free-choice procedures, tend to focus participants on the discrepancy between their behavior and a specific attitude or belief. That is, without priming specific attributes or standards, participants focused primarily on the situational antecedents of their behavior (i.e., choice); when external justification was low, they reduced dissonance by changing their attitudes. These effects were not moderated by self-concept differences nor were they mediated by self-reports of psychological discomfort. Although it is premature to conclude that attitude change in the control conditions was a function of an intermediate level of action identification, the data are compatible with what might follow when people are focused on an intermediate-level interpretation of a behavioral discrepancy. In comparison, when self-standards were made salient in the situation, these cognitions appeared to become part of the assessment of behavior, and they changed the way in which people perceived what they had done. Priming personal standards for behavior appeared to make self-expectancies accessible, which caused more dissonance and attitude change in people with high compared with low self-esteem. In addition, participants with high self-esteem showed more correspondence among attitude change, psychological discomfort, and negative affect directed at the self compared with participants with low self-esteem, who showed almost no evidence of dissonance reduction or discomfort when personal standards were primed. As predicted by the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2000), the use of personal standards to interpret and evaluate behavior engaged self-consistency motivation (Aronson, 1968), a phenomena that has proved difficult to replicate in past dissonance research (e.g., Cooper & Duncan, 1971). Finally, when normative standards were primed, both groups showed evidence of dissonance reduction, suggesting that both came to the same conclusion about the meaning of their behavior. One caveat to this interpretation, however, is that whereas both groups showed significant justification when normative standards were primed, the mediational data hint that attitude change in each group may have been influenced by different concerns about the meaning of the salient normative discrepancy. For example, low self-esteem participants

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Page 56 may have been influenced more by feelings of discomfort and negative self-affect, whereas participants with high self-esteem may have been more concerned with attributions about responsibility. One possibility is that when norms for behavior are salient, people with different levels of self-esteem may be motivated to justify their behavior. However, in doing so, they may be attempting to achieve different goals (e.g., reduce discomfort vs. alter perceptions of responsibility). If they have different goals in mind, they may prefer to use different strategies for dissonance reduction when multiple options are available (e.g., Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). In summary, the results of these experiments provide some initial evidence that the process of dissonance arousal and reduction is highly malleable and dependent on the construal processes operating in a given situation. As predicted by the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2000), the specific motivational state that follows from a behavioral discrepancy depends on on the type of attributes and standards that influence how people make sense of a discrepant behavior. Thus, instead of assuming that dissonance is a function of one master motive, it may be more accurate to view dissonance motivation as a function of qualitatively different processes, the activation of which depend on the information made accessible in the context of behavior. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS The construal processes described by the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2000) suggest a number of directions and issues for future research on how dissonance is aroused and subsequently reduced. Dissonance Arousal First, future work should continue to examine how the use of different attributes and standards to interpret and evaluate behavior influence dissonance processes. The research presented here only provides a hint at how these processes may operate, and future research should utilize cognitive methodologies such as lexical decision tasks (Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996) or self-schema effects (Markus, 1977) to measure the accessibility of different constructs during dissonance arousal. Response latency to different attributes and standards, and the relationship between response latency, affect, and dissonance reduction would be especially useful for delineating the processes that follow from different construals of behavior (see Monteith, chap. 23, this volume). A full understanding of how social cognition operates in dissonance will most likely require dissonance researchers to step outside of the classic paradigms or incorporate more contemporary cognitive measures into the classic paradigms to directly test hypotheses about the dissonance-arousal process. Second, the current model offers an alternative explanation for how dissonance may be aroused in the absence of an aversive consequence for behavior (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Specifically, it suggests that dissonance may be aroused when people perceive a discrepancy between behavior and a specific attitude or belief. In social cognition terms, dissonance may be aroused when people think about their behavior at an intermediate level, even when an unwanted product for behavior is absent or negated in some way (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Future research can examine these hypotheses directly by manipulating the identification level at which participants interpret a counterattitudinal essay or difficult decision (e.g., Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986). Examining discrepancies between behavior and different levels of interpretation may reveal new insight into how the importance and relevance of cognitions influence the arousal process. A third implication of the current model has to do with the point at which dissonance arousal begins to emerge following behavior. According to the steps described by the aversive consequences model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), dissonance arousal does not begin until people detect an aversive outcome, conduct the attributional search for responsibility, and conclude that they are responsible for the outcome. The current model suggests that dissonance arousal may begin earlier in the process, such as after the detection of a discrepancy, and that the attributional search for responsibility may be the first line of dissonance reduction. Assuming that the attribution of low choice or unforeseeability for an outcome can reduce dissonance arousal, then the attributional processes that follow the detection of a discrepancy may represent motivated reasoning (e.g., Kunda, 1990). Future research should examine the point at which arousal begins following the detection of a behavioral discrepancy and how subsequent processing is influenced when arousal is present immediately following behavior. Labeling of Affect The use of different attributes and standards for interpreting and evaluating behavior also has implications for the affect that corresponds with dissonance arousal. For example, Elliot and Devine (1994) reported that dissonance is experienced as a generalized state of psycholog-

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Page 57 ical discomfort, one that is not tied specifically to affect directed toward the self. However, Stone et al. (1999) found that when personal or normative standards were made salient in a similar context, participants reported a correlation between attitude change and negative affect directed specifically at the self. This indicates that how a behavioral discrepancy is construed may influence the affective state that corresponds with dissonance arousal. Research by Higgins and his colleagues (e.g., Higgins, 1989a) has shown that violations of different self-standards are experienced as qualitatively different emotions. For example, deviations from ought-self standards are experienced as agitation-related emotions. Consequently, to the degree norms are perceived to represent what people should or ought to do, dissonance following a violation of the normative standards may be specifically experienced as an emotional state such as anxiety or guilt. In contrast, to the degree that personal self-standards represent important wishes or goals (i.e., ideal self-standards), dissonance following violation of personal selfstandards may be specifically experienced as dejection- or frustration-related emotions such as shame or embarrassment. Consequently, different behavioral discrepancies may be experienced as qualitatively different emotional states, which may have implications for how people seek to reduce them. The labeling of dissonance arousal as a particular emotion also raises a question about how people can misattribute their arousal to an external source if important standards are used to assess behavioral outcomes (Zanna & Cooper, 1974; see also Cooper & Fazio, 1984). According to the aversive consequences process model, after dissonance arousal is labeled as negative, a situational cue can cause people to misattribute their arousal to a source other than their behavior, assuming its current source is ambiguous (e.g., Schacter & Singer, 1962). But are people always unaware of why they are experiencing the psychological discomfort associated with dissonance? It seems likely that there are conditions under which people are acutely aware that their behavior is the source of their psychological discomfort. One prediction that follows from the current model is that the more people are acutely aware that their behavior is discrepant from personal or normative standards for behavior, the less likely they will be to misattribute their arousal to an external source. Dissonance Reduction The connection between different affective states and dissonance-reduction strategies may also be an important direction for future research. Self-regulation theories (Carver & Scheier, 1990a; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992) predict that the higher the standard for behavior in a hierarchy, the more important the discrepancy, and the more negative affect that is generated when behavior falls short of the standard. If psychological consistency , defined here as an intermediate discrepancy between behavior and a specific attitude or belief, causes dissonance arousal, the affective experience may be less intense than discrepancies that involve higher, more abstract standards for behavior, such as those that relate to the self or to norms for behavior. Consequently, lower-level discrepancies may cause a generalized, negative discomfort (e.g., Elliot & Devine, 1994) that can be effectively reduced through a variety of strategies. High-lever discrepancies, however, may cause a more specific negative affective response that can only be reduced through a strategy that in some way reduces the discrepancy (e.g., Stone et al., 1997). How people label dissonance arousal as a particular negative emotion may delineate qualitatively different states of dissonance motivation which could influence the strategies people use to reduce their discomfort (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Elliot & Devine, 1994). As noted previously, even when different attributes and standards are salient or accessible, it is conceivable that people are not completely aware that they are using them in the construal process (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Under some conditions, the interpretation and evaluation of behavior may be very quick like a conditioned emotional response. When this is the case, people may not be consciously aware of the source of arousal because the construal of behavior is relatively automatic (e.g., Bargh, 1997). Another direction for future research is to examine the conditions under which dissonance arousal and reduction operate automatically such that people are unaware of why they experience dissonance or how they ultimately reduce it. CONCLUSIONS Forty years after its initial publication, dissonance theory continues to intrigue researchers with its fascinating blend of cognition and motivation. By illuminating a potential process by which people create meaning for their behavior, it may be possible to go beyond the current debate over which contemporary perspective is the best account of dissonance phenomena. Although the debate over the most parsimonious interpretation of dissonance phenomena has been productive for the discipline, more synthesis among the major perspectives seems possible. By focusing on how people construe behavioral discrepancies, and the potential processing

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Page 58 that follows from a specific interpretation and evaluation of action, dissonance theory can move forward in new directions that continue to present important insights into human social behavior. ENDNOTES 1. Also included was a question designed to measure perceptions of choice to write the essay. Analysis of this item indicates that those in the low-choice condition perceived significantly less choice to write the essay compared with participants in the high choice conditions.

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Page 59 4 Self-Evaluation: The Development of Sex Differences Eva M. Pomerantz Jill L. Saxon Gwen A. Kenney University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign How people evaluate themselves has a number of important implications for their psychological functioning. Selfevaluation appears to influence the manner in which people deal with challenge (see Bandura, 1994; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998, for reviews), as well as people's emotional experiences (see Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Higgins, 1987, for reviews). Hence, a great deal of attention has been directed toward understanding how people evaluate their competencies and expectancies for future performance. In addition to the question of the consequences of self-evaluation, several other questions have guided work on the topic. What motives drive the manner in which people evaluate themselves? What aspects of the situation influence how people evaluate themselves? What characteristics of the person determine the form that self-evaluation takes? The effort to answer questions such as these in social psychology began with James (1890), continued on with Festinger (1954a), and is evident in much current social-cognitive work (see Eccles et al., 1998; Suls & Wills, 1991; Swann, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1998; Trope, 1986; Wood, 1989, for reviews). Although these questions are important, another question of import is whether there are sex differences in selfevaluation. This question has taken on particular significance for investigators attempting to elucidate sex differences in psychological functioning (e.g., Dweck, 1986; Eccles, 1984; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994; Ruble, Greulich, Pomerantz, & Gochberg, 1993). The issue of sex differences in self-evaluation is at the heart of the present chapter. To situate the work on sex differences in self-evaluation, the chapter begins with a review of self-evaluation as it has been studied more generally. This is followed by a review of work on sex differences in self-evaluation. Subsequently, an approach that may be used to guide future research on sex differences in self-evaluation and its consequences for psychological functioning is presented. We end by briefly highlighting some of the key differences in work on selfevaluation in general and work on sex differences in self-evaluation. We also suggest how the two might be better integrated. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SELF-EVALUATION Motives Underlying Self-Evaluation One of the most central questions guiding work concerned with self-evaluation is that of what motivates selfevaluation. That is, why do people evaluate themselves? What purpose does it serve? Until recently, this has been a hotly contested issue. In his seminal theory of social comparison, Festinger (1954a) initially proposed that people have a need to accurately evaluate themselves to reduce any uncertainty they have about themselves. He argued that, in an effort to meet this self-assessment need, people seek to compare themselves with similar others. This concern with self-assessment is also evident in Carver and Scheier's (1998) model of self-regulation. Carver and Scheier proposed that people desire to assess their progress toward their goals in an effort to ensure that they eventually meet their goals. Only by accurately assessing their progress can people change ineffective strategies and adopt effective ones (see also Ruble & Frey, 1991). Although Festinger viewed the self-assessment motive as the central force guiding self-evaluation, he also suggested that people are motivated by self-improvement. As a consequence, according to Festinger, people compare themselves not only with similar but also with superior others. Such upward comparison has been well documented (see Taylor & Lobel, 1989, for a review) and actually appears to foster self-improvement (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, Kuyper, & Hans, 1999). As investigators further explored the motives that drive self-evaluation, two other motives came to be viewed as central. Although research subsequent to Festinger's theory on social comparison provided evidence for both the self-assessment and self-improvement motives, it also suggested that these two motives were in no way the only motives guiding self-evaluation (see

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Page 60 Wood, 1989, for a review). Indeed, a number of investigators have argued that people are motivated to evaluate themselves by a need to feel good about themselves (e.g., Epstein, 1973; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988). Evidence for this self-enhancement motive has been provided in a number of studies showing that people go out of their way to ensure that they view themselves in a positive light, often comparing themselves to inferior others (see Taylor & Brown, 1988, for a review). Swann (1990) introduced another motive playing a role in self-evaluation. He proposed that the central goal guiding self-evaluation was the desire to verify one's self-views (see also Secord & Backman, 1965). People seek to preserve their views of themselves in an effort to predict and control their environment. Swann has provided a great deal of evidence for self-verification by showing that people prefer positive feedback in areas in which they possess positive views of themselves, but negative feedback in areas in which they possess negative views of themselves (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). Two other motives have also been identified, although they have received less emphasis in the work on selfevaluation than the other motives. Self-evaluation may sometimes be guided by an effort to solidify one's identity (e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). For example, females may be willing to evaluate themselves negatively in male stereotypical domains, such as math, to heighten their feelings of femininity. When self-evaluation is public, people may be guided by the desire to make a good impression (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Paulhus, 1982). Such a desire may often be driven by the need to obtain the approval of others (Baumeister, 1982). The selfpresentation motive may often manifest itself as self-enhancement, as people attempt to present themselves in a positive manner. However, people may also want to show that they are concerned with accurately evaluating themselves. Moreover, the appearance of concern with self-improvement may be of importance. People may also want to be viewed as correct in their evaluations, and thus their self-evaluation may show evidence of selfverification (see Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). Although there was initially a good deal of debate over which of the motives was dominant, it has recently been suggested that the motives underlying self-evaluation vary as a function of characteristics of the situation and individual. Indeed, Taylor, Neter, and Wayment (1995) provided evidence that, at times, self-assessment, selfimprovement, self-enhancement, and self-verification motives may all drive self-evaluation. In the face of much work suggesting that self-enhancement and self-verification were the most predominant motives, Trope demonstrated in several studies that the self-assessment motive guided self-evaluation when people felt uncertain about their abilities (e.g., Trope & Bassok, 1982). Subsequently, Trope (1986) suggested that the motive guiding self-evaluation is determined by a larger self-regulatory system in which people attempt to maintain their self-worth while also seeking to meet their goals (see also Taylor et al., 1995). In such a system, short-term gains in self-worth are often sacrificed for long-term gains in self-worth. According to Trope, people are likely to engage in self-assessment, seeking out negative, but useful, information when they feel good about themselves. However, when people do not feel good about themselves, they may avoid such information, focusing instead on positive, but not very useful, information. In this vein, Trope and Neter (1994) provided evidence that self-assessment motives predominate when people feel good about themselves. People receiving positive feedback about their competencies in one area were more willing to seek out negative, but useful, feedback about their competencies in another area. In contrast, people feeling poorly about themselves appeared to be guided by self-enhancement motives, preferring positive, but not very useful, feedback about their competencies. Trope and Pomerantz (1998) elaborated on this finding by showing that, when people place a good deal of importance on being competent in a particular area, they are likely to seek out both negative and positive feedback. The proclivity for negative feedback in areas of importance, however, decreases when negative feedback is received in another area, but increases when positive feedback is received in another area. Hence, self-assessment and self-enhancement motives wax and wane as a consequence of how people feel about themselves. Ruble and Frey (1991) also provided a framework incorporating the multiple motives that underlie self-evaluation. These investigators have proposed that such motives vary as a function of skill acquisition. In short, initial skill acquisition is characterized by concerns with learning how to do the task at hand. Hence, when one is just learning a skill, self-evaluation is oriented toward self-improvement. Once a skill is acquired, the main motive is to assess one's competence accurately. At this point, uncertainty is high. Consequently, people engage in self-evaluation for purposes of self-assessment. Once conclusions are reached about competence, the concern is with maintaining adaptive strategies. According to Ruble and Frey, self-evaluation may be quite infrequent at this time. When people do engage in self-evaluation, they may do so to enhance their self-image in an effort to remain involved in the task. The maintenance phase continues until people are given a chance to discontinue

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Page 61 the task. At this point, people will again be concerned with self-assessment in an effort to make an informed decision about whether to continue. Research examining changes in the manner in which children evaluate themselves as they progress through elementary school is quite consistent with Ruble and Frey's framework (e.g., Butler, 1989; Pomerantz, Ruble, Frey, & Greulich, 1995). In a somewhat different vein, Swann has sought to determine the situational contingencies of the motives guiding self-evaluation. His aim has been to distinguish between the conditions in which the self-enhancement motive is dominant and those in which the self-verification motive is dominant. Drawing from Shraguer (1975), Swann and colleagues (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987) showed that the self-enhancement motive is more likely to guide how people feel about evaluative feedback, whereas the self-verification motive is more likely to drive how people think about evaluative feedback. Relatedly, Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, and Gilbert (1990) demonstrated that people's initial preferences for feedback are guided by the self-enhancement motive, whereas their later preferences are guided by the self-verification motive. Swann and colleagues viewed this timing difference as reflecting a difference in the complexity of cognitive operations necessary to meet each motive. Because selfenhancement requires fewer cognitive operations than self-verification, when cognitively constrained, people will engage in self-evaluation reflecting self-enhancement; otherwise, self-verification will dominate. Hence, selfverification may predominate over self-enhancement when cognitive resources are limited. Investigators have implicated a number of other situational factors influencing the motives driving self-evaluation. These include, but are not limited to, past or future threat (Taylor et al., 1995), one's stage in the decision-making process (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), and perceptions of the modifiability of traits (Dunning, 1995). Individual differences, particularly self-esteem (e.g., Wayment & Taylor, 1995; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994), also appear to play an important role in the motives driving self-evaluation. Processes Involved in Self-Evaluation A variety of social-cognitive processes are involved in self-evaluation. It is through such processes that people are able to meet the various motives just highlighted. Information seeking is one of the key processes involved in selfevaluation. The type of information people seek has been assumed to influence the conclusions they make about themselves. A good deal of theory and research has simply focused on the valence of the information people seek, comparing the preference for positive versus negative information (e.g., Swann et al., 1989). However, in the tradition of social comparison, there has also been a focus on the type of comparisons people make. Of particular interest has been the extent to which people choose to compare themselves with inferior others, similar others, or superior others (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Notably, although information seeking may influence how people evaluate themselves, how people evaluate themselves may also influence the sort of information people seek. When people have self-verification motives, their decision about what type of information to seek is guided by their self-views. The types of attributions people make for their performance have also been viewed as a key process involved in selfevaluation (see Weiner, 1985, for a review). When people view their performance as due to ability, their performance is likely to influence how they evaluate themselves. Attributions of failure to ability are likely to result in negative self-evaluation, whereas attributions of success to ability are likely to result in positive self-evaluation. Attributions to other causes, such as effort or luck, are likely to mitigate the effect of performance on self-evaluation because such attributions carry the implication that performance will change in the future. Of course, self-evaluation can also influence the type of attribution made. People with positive views of themselves are probably less likely than those with negative views of themselves to see their failure as due to a lack of ability. Several other social-cognitive processes are also involved in self-evaluation. First, within-person comparisons have been the focus of much work concerned with self-regulation. One form of such a comparison is contrasting the actual self with the self that is being pursued (e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). In this vein, people compare their current accomplishments with what they aim to accomplish. Such comparisons result in an evaluation of one's goal-related progress, with implications for how the self is viewed. People may also make temporal comparisons, contrasting their present performance with their past performance to arrive at a self-evaluation (e.g., Ruble & Frey, 1991). Second, people's evaluations of others have been assumed to contribute to self-evaluation (e.g., Wagner, Wicklund, & Shaigan, 1980). By denigrating others' abilities, one may come to view one's own abilities in a positive light. Similarly, by giving others' more credit for their accomplishments than they deserve, one may come

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Page 62 to evaluate oneself in a negative light. In a somewhat different vein, Tesser (1988) suggested that at times people's self-evaluation is enhanced when they view close others as possessing positive attributes. In Tesser's terms, people bask in the reflected glory of close others. Consequences of Self-Evaluation One of the reasons that self-evaluation has received such a great deal of attention is because of its consequences for psychological functioning. Self-evaluation, as well as the social-cognitive processes involved in self-evaluation, has been suggested to have two major consequences for psychological functioning. First, self-evaluation appears to play a large role in motivation, thereby influencing achievement. Second, it has a number of emotional consequences that have implications for the experience of internalizing symptoms, particularly anxiety and depressive symptoms. Motivational Implications . The manner in which people evaluate themselves has been key in models of motivation. For example, a number of investigators concerned with the extent to which people persist in a particular area have relied on expectancy-value frameworks (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Eccles, 1987; Feather, 1982). In such frameworks, persistence in an area is assumed to be a function of people's expectancies for their future performance in the area and the value they place on performing well in the area. A good deal of evidence has accrued in support of such models, with expectancies being a particularly strong predictor of persistence (see Eccles et al., 1998, for a review). In a slightly different vein, Deci and Ryan (1985) suggested that self-evaluation influences the quality of motivation. These investigators argued that feelings of self-determination lead people to be intrinsically motivated. Part of feeling self-determined, according to Deci and Ryan, is feeling competent. Hence, positive self-evaluation is likely to foster intrinsic motivation, whereas negative self-evaluation is likely to foster extrinsic motivation. Dweck (1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) proposed that how people account for their failure influences their motivation. In this vein, Diener and Dweck (1978, 1980) documented that children attributing their failure to effort show a mastery-oriented reaction to failure. In the face of failure, these children engage in self-monitoring and selfinstructions in an effort to change their strategies to make them more effective. In contrast, children who do not attribute failure to effort display a helpless reaction to failure. These children search for explanations for their failure instead of focusing on how to improve their strategies. In addition, they evaluate themselves negatively when confronted with failure, often displaying negative affect. In the end, these children often give up. Emotional Implications . The manner in which people account for their failure has also been argued to be a central influence in the onset of depressive symptoms. Abramson and colleagues (1989) proposed that depressive symptoms may emerge as a consequence of how people respond to failure. In brief, people with a tendency to blame failure on global and stable causes may be more likely to evaluate themselves negatively in the face of failure. This negative self-evaluation is expected to foster hopelessness, which in turn is expected to lead to depressive symptoms. Empirical evidence is generally consistent with this model (e.g., Lewinsohn, Roberts, Seeley, Rohde, Gotlib, & Hops, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1986), although there is also some evidence that depressive symptoms may cause negative self-evaluation (e.g., Cole, Martin, & Powers, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Self-evaluation has also been linked to anxiety symptoms (e.g., Leitenberg, Yost, & Caroll-Wilson, 1986), although the role of self-evaluation in the onset of anxiety symptoms has received relatively little attention. Taylor and Brown (1988) have taken a somewhat different approach to the issue of the emotional consequences of selfevaluation. These investigators argued that there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that overly positive selfevaluation – positive illusions – promotes mental health (but see Colvin & Block, 1994). Higgins (1987) attempted to distinguish the type of self-evaluation that leads to depressive symptoms from that leading to anxiety symptoms. In his self-discrepancy theory, Higgins suggested that people hold guides for what they would ideally like to be (the ideal self) and for what they feel they ought to be (the ought guide). To the extent that one's perceptions of what one is actually like (the actual self) differ from these guides, people will experience negative emotions. However, according to Higgins, the type of negative emotion is dependent on the type of discrepancy (but see Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). He has shown that when people feel that their actual self does not meet their ideal guide, they experience dejection-related emotions, such as disappointment, sadness, and shame, which put them at risk for depressive symptoms (e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). Yet when people feel that their actual self does not meet their ought guide, they experience agitation-related emotions, such as fear, guilt, and restlessness, putting them at risk for anxiety symptoms. Notably, Higgins has further suggested that the emotional consequences of self-discrepancies may be the most intense for people possessing strong self-guides.

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Page 63 The strength of a self-guide is defined by its accessibility, coherence, and the commitment felt toward it. Accessibility refers to the likelihood that the guide will be cognitively activated; coherence refers to whether it has clear implications for behavior; and commitment is the extent to which one is motivated to live up to the standards embodied by the self-guide. Operationalizing self-guide strength as accessibility, Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997) have found evidence that strong self-guides intensify the emotional impact of discrepancies. Summary In answer to the question of what motivates people's self-evaluation, investigators have emphasized four central motives. People are motivated by concerns with accurate self-assessment as well as with self-improvement. In addition, people evaluate themselves with an eye to enhance their self-image, boosting their self-worth. People also seek to verify their self-views in an effort to control their environment. These motives have been integrated into models in which people are assumed to attempt to regulate their progress toward their goals while simultaneously maintaining their self-worth. The emphasis of these models is that the dominance of self-assessment, selfimprovement, self-enhancement, and self-verification motives depends on a variety of factors. Although these four motives have received a great deal of attention in work examining self-evaluation, there are also two additional motives of importance – solidifying one′s identity and managing the impression one makes on others. It is essential for future models to integrate the occurrence of these latter two motives with the occurrence of the other four motives. Notably, there are multiple social-cognitive processes by which people evaluate themselves. These processes, as well as the final evaluation at which people arrive, have important implications for people′s motivation and emotional experiences. We now turn to the issue of sex differences in self-evaluation. Although some of the issues we have discussed up to this point, such as the consequences of self-evaluation, have been of concern to investigators focusing on sex differences in self-evaluation, other issues, such as the motives guiding self-evaluation, have been given scant attention at most. AN OVERVIEW OF SEX DIFFERENCES IN SELF-EVALUATION Although research on sex differences in self-evaluation has not generally focused on motives, there is some evidence to suggest that the self-evaluation of females is guided by different motives than the self-evaluation of males. In general it appears that the self-evaluation of females is driven by self-assessment, whereas the self-evaluation of males is driven by self-enhancement. Indeed, females appear to be more sensitive than males to failure feedback, adjusting their evaluation of themselves to reflect such feedback (see Roberts, 1991; Ruble et al., 1993, for reviews). Moreover, females are often more likely than males to attribute their failure to a lack of ability (see Deaux, 1976; Ruble et al., 1993, for reviews; but see Sohn, 1982). Although there may be sex differences in the motives guiding self-evaluation immediately following failure, such sex differences may not be as pronounced at other times. Research comparing the self-perceptions of females and males generally finds that males have more positive perceptions of themselves than do females in stereotypically masculine areas, such as math and sports (see Eccles et al., 1998; Ruble et al., 1993, for reviews). Females, however, have more positive self-perceptions than do males in stereotypically feminine areas, such as reading and interpersonal relations. Moreover, during the elementary school years, females also tend to view themselves more positively in terms of their general academic skills. Unfortunately, measures of actual performance have rarely been collected in conjunction with self-perceptions. As a consequence, it is difficult to determine whether there are differences in the extent to which females and males accurately represent their performance. Consistent with the perspective that self-assessment guides the selfevaluation of females, whereas self-enhancement guides the self-evaluation of males, the few studies that have collected measures of performance have indicated that females tend to accurately estimate their performance, sometimes underestimating it, whereas males tend to overestimate their performance (Crandall, 1969; Frey & Ruble, 1987). However, the tendency for females to view themselves negatively in stereotypically masculine areas and males to view themselves negatively in stereotypically feminine areas may be indicative of a self-verification motive. People may internalize the societal expectancies and then seek to confirm them. This tendency, however, may also represent an attempt to solidify one′s gender identity. Moreover, to the extent that such self-evaluations are made in public, it could represent a tendency to make a favorable impression by demonstrating adherence to societal standards (see Lenney, 1977). Unfortunately, sex differences in some of the other social-cognitive processes involved in self-evaluation (e.g., information seeking, within-person comparisons) have not been systematically examined. The interest in sex differences in self-evaluation has

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Page 64 grown out of an effort to understand the persistent under-representation of women in high-level positions, particularly in advanced quantitative fields (e.g., Eccles, 1989; Hoffman, 1972; Lenney, 1977). Although sociological factors such as institutional barriers are crucial to women's absence from these positions, the sex differences in selfevaluation may also play a key role (see Eccles, 1989, 1994). Females may be less likely than males to pursue highlevel positions, especially in stereotypically male fields, because of the motivational consequences of negative selfevaluation. More recently, investigators have become interested in the sex differences in self-evaluation because the differences may account, in part, for sex differences in internalizing symptoms (e.g., Ruble et al., 1993). As early as elementary school, females experience greater anxiety symptoms than males (see Feingold, 1994, for a review); by adolescence, females are more vulnerable to depressive symptoms than are males (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994, for reviews). Because self-evaluation has been linked to internalizing symptoms, it is quite possible that the sex differences in self-evaluation represent precursors to the sex differences in internalizing symptoms (see Ruble et al., 1993). Several models have been proposed to account for the sex differences in self-evaluation. These models generally fall into two categories.1 One set of models has emerged from the area of adult social psychology, with a particular emphasis on social cognition. The models focus primarily on the role of gender stereotypes in sex differences in selfevaluation. The guiding philosophy is that sex differences in self-evaluation occur when gender stereotypes are salient. A second set of models has grown out of the area of developmental psychology. These models focus on gender socialization. The major postulation of these models is that members of society, such as parents and teachers, treat females and males differently during childhood, and this causes females to evaluate themselves more negatively than males in some situations. During the past decade, explanations for the sex differences in selfevaluation have been based primarily on gender stereotype models. This uneven focus has been due in large part to the conclusion that there is little evidence that parents and teachers treat females and males differently (see Eccles & Blumenfeld, 1985; Lytton & Romney, 1991, for reviews). However, such a conclusion may be premature. Thus, the lack of attention to gender socialization models may not be warranted. Gender Stereotype Models The focus of gender stereotype models has been on the role that proximal cues play in sex differences in selfevaluation. In these models, consistent with Deaux and Major's (1987) proposal that gender-related interactions are influenced by the social context in which they occur, females are not expected to evaluate themselves more negatively than males across the board. Instead, sex differences are only expected when cues related to gender stereotypes are salient. These cues are assumed to activate societal expectancies about what females and males are like, which in turn guide self-evaluation. Gender stereotype cues may be made salient by features of the environment in which self-evaluation takes place (e.g., the presence of another individual, a reminder of one's gender) or by the area of self-evaluation (e.g., math skills, interpersonal relations). Lenney (1977) presented the first formal proposal that gender stereotypes play a role in the sex differences in selfevaluation. Lenney noted that there was a good deal of inconsistency in the sex differences in self-evaluation. She suggested that the inconsistency was meaningful and that it reflected the possibility that the sex differences in selfevaluation are sensitive to situational cues. Her analysis centered, albeit not entirely, on the role of cues related to gender stereotypes. When tasks are viewed as masculine, females evaluate themselves negatively. Conversely, when tasks are viewed as feminine, males evaluate themselves negatively. Lenney emphasized that the gender linkage of the task can be reflected both in the culturally held stereotype (e.g., males are better at sports than females, females are better at reading than males) as well as in the simple labeling of the task (e.g., this is a task in which females usually outperform males, this is a skill that males are more likely to possess than females). In addition, Lenney proposed that when one's gender is made salient (e.g., being the only female in the room, repeated references to gender), gender stereotypes are likely to be activated. She expected that, as a consequence, sex differences in self-evaluation would be evident in such situations. Lenney's proposal was followed by Eccles’ (1984, 1989) application of an expectancy-value approach to understanding sex differences in self-evaluation. The central concern of this model is with what underlies sex differences in achievement-related choices. Key to such choices are people's expectancies for their future performance in a particular area and the value they place on success in the area. Consistent with other expectancyvalue models, when people possess high expectancies for performance in a particular area and place a great deal of value on success in that area, they choose to pursue that area even when they are faced with failure. Eccles posited that culturally held stereotypes about

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Page 65 females' and males' competencies and roles foster sex differences in expectancies for performance and the value placed on performance in gender stereotypical areas. First, gender stereotypes provide information about females' and males' skills in these areas, and this leads to sex differences in expectancies for performance. For example, because gender stereotypes indicate that females are less skilled at math than males, females expect to do more poorly in math than do males. Second, gender stereotypes shape the importance of the attributes and goals associated with gender-stereotypical areas for females and males. This, in turn, fosters sex differences in the value placed on success in these areas. For example, because gender stereotypes characterize females as more likely than males to become involved in child care, females may view the attributes associated with being involved in child care as more central to their identity than do males. Consequently, in a desire to solidify their identity, females may place more value than males on attaining such attributes. Eccles suggested that people's expectancies and values may be influenced by proximal factors (i.e., gender cues in the immediate situation) as well as distal factors (i.e., socialization influences) that accrue over time. Most recently, Steele (1997) has put forth a model of stereotype threat. This model was designed to explain sex differences in achievement in math and science, as well as racial differences in general school achievement. Although the major concern is with actual achievement, the model also speaks to self-evaluation. According to Steele, stereotype threat arises when one is doing something for which a negative stereotype about one's group applies. In terms of gender, the negative stereotype is that females are not good at math and science. Significantly, stereotype threat only occurs when the negative stereotype applies to an area central to self-definition. Consequently, stereotype threat is most likely to affect the self-evaluation of females who do well in the areas of math and science. Steele argued that stereotype threat is elicited by cues in the immediate environment that emphasize stereotypes. The cues can be as subtle as reminding people of their gender or as blatant as directing people's attention to the relevance of gender stereotypes to the task at hand. Steele argued that stereotype threat can lead to anxiety over performance through two pathways. First, when taking a test in math or science, females may feel that, despite past success, they may confirm the stereotype that females lack competence in this area. This may foster anxiety that interferes with performance. Second, stereotype threat can lead to disidentification with the area for which the negative stereotype is relevant. Females continually reminded of the stereotype that females are not good at math and science may cease to view being skilled in these areas as an important aspect of their identity. Such disidentification may undermine persistence in math and science, thereby inhibiting their performance. Their poor performance may lead females, often guided by self-assessment motives, to evaluate their skills in math and science in a negative light. Evaluation of the Models . The models focusing on gender stereotypes have a variety of strengths. Perhaps most important, consistent with Deaux and Major's (1987) analysis of gender interactions, these models posit that the sex differences in self-evaluation are not evident in all situations. Specifically, the gender stereotype models suggest that the sex differences in self-evaluation are evident in situations in which cues related to gender stereotypes are salient. This postulation is consistent with the empirical evidence indicating that females evaluate themselves more negatively in stereotypically masculine areas, whereas males evaluate themselves more negatively in stereotypically feminine areas. The gender stereotype models, however, also have some notable weaknesses. A number of findings suggest that the salience of gender stereotype cues in the immediate situation is not the only factor underlying females' tendency to evaluate themselves more negatively than males. First, as noted earlier, research suggests that females are particularly likely to evaluate themselves more negatively than males in the face of failure. It appears that, at least in the face of failure, females are guided by self-assessment, whereas males are guided by self-enhancement. Yet none of the gender stereotype models can make these predictions. Second, although little research has examined selfevaluation in very young children (i.e., children younger than 5 years of age), there appear to be sex differences in reactions to failure among such children. As early as 3 years of age, females are more likely than males to experience shame after failure, suggesting that they may be more likely to draw negative conclusions than boys about their competencies from failure (Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). However, because children do not have extensive knowledge of gender stereotypes at this age, particularly in regard to males' and females' psychological attributes (see Ruble & Martin, 1998, for a review), such findings pose a potential problem for models positing that gender stereotypes represent the major cause of the sex differences in self-evaluation. Although gender stereotype cues may maintain and even promote the sex differences in self-evaluation once children become aware of gender stereotypes, such cues are unlikely to be involved in the initial development of the sex differences. Third, despite

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Page 66 the fact that the gender stereotype models provide an excellent account of why females are less likely than males to occupy high-level positions in math and science, they do not account for the pattern of sex differences in internalizing symptoms described earlier. Gender Socialization Models The general philosophy guiding the gender socialization models is that teachers and parents treat females and males differently during childhood, leading either directly or indirectly to sex differences in self-evaluation under some circumstances. These models focus on differences in how males and females are treated and the processes by which such differences lead to sex differences in self-evaluation. Most of the models assume that gender socialization is due to culturally held gender stereotypes, but give little, if any, attention to the processes by which these stereotypes lead to gender socialization. Although much of the research on gender socialization has proceeded without the guidance of theoretical models, there have been a few impressive attempts to build such models. Teacher Gender Socialization. One of the most influential models of teacher gender socialization is the set of proposals put forth by Dweck (Dweck & Bush, 1976; Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978). Dweck was concerned with why females attribute their failure to ability, whereas males attribute their failure to effort or external sources, such as the evaluator. The central hypothesis of her model is that such sex differences are due to teachers' differential use of evaluative feedback with girls and boys during the elementary school years. First, teachers may provide their female students with more positive than negative feedback, but provide their male students with more negative than positive feedback. This may lead females to be more likely than males to attribute positive feedback to external causes, but negative feedback to internal causes. Second, Dweck proposed that teachers give girls negative feedback about intellectual aspects of their work but give boys negative feedback about nonintellectual aspects. As a result, females are more likely than males to perceive negative feedback as relevant to their ability. Third, teachers are less likely to attribute girls' failure to a lack of motivation than they are boys' failure. Consequently, females may be less likely than males to explain their failures as due to a lack of effort. In summary, Dweck suggested that teachers are more sparing and discriminating in their use of negative evaluative feedback with girls than with boys, and this leads girls to be more likely than boys to view such feedback as particularly informative about their ability. Roberts (1991) also argued that females view feedback as more informative about their ability than do males. Fennema and Peterson (1985) identified another dimension of teachers' behavior as playing a role in the sex differences in self-evaluation: control. The central hypothesis of Fennema and Peterson's model is that teachers exert more control over girls than over boys during the elementary school years, leading girls to have less confidence in their abilities than boys and consequently to attribute their failure to a lack of ability more often than boys. Fennema and Peterson outlined a variety of ways in which teachers may be less likely to promote independence among girls than among boys: Teachers encourage less independent thinking in girls than in boys, teachers interact less and at lower cognitive levels with high-achieving girls than with high-achieving boys, and teachers are more likely to impose rules over girls than over boys. This pattern of differential treatment presumably leads females to be more likely than males to view themselves as incompetent and thus to attribute their failure to a lack of ability. The notion that females may be less likely than males to be encouraged to act independently in the classroom has been echoed by investigators concerned with teacher socialization of general sex roles (e.g., Brophy, 1985; Fagot, 1978, 1981). Fennema and Peterson viewed the sex differences in attributions for failure as crucial to elucidating the decline in females' achievement in math following elementary school. Drawing on research by Dweck (e.g., Dweck et al., 1978; Dweck & Repucci, 1973), these investigators argued that females' tendency to attribute failure to ability leads them to avoid challenge and to give up when faced with challenge. According to Fennema and Peterson, this is particularly detrimental to achievement in math. Parental Gender Socialization. Hoffman (1972) suggested two dimensions on which parents differentially socialize girls and boys that are central to the development of the sex differences in self-evaluation. According to Hoffman, this differential socialization begins as early as infancy. First, parents are more likely to encourage independence among their sons than among their daughters. According to Hoffman, parents' encouragement of independence may manifest itself in a variety of practices, including, but not limited to, allowing children to explore and manipulate their environment, permitting children to attempt moderately risky behaviors (e.g., using scissors, climbing on a stool) on their own, allowing children to play away from home, and praising independent behaviors (e.g., taking one's first step, putting a puzzle together on one's own). Second, parents are more likely to encourage their sons than their daugh-

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Page 67 ters to establish an identity distinct from the desires and wishes of their parents. Hoffman suggested that this is because mothers are often the primary care-givers, and consequently girls identify more strongly than boys with the central authority figure in their lives. Biologically based sex differences in activity level may also lead boys to create more conflict with their parents than do girls as early as infancy, which aids boys in creating a distinct identity. Hoffman argued that this pattern of differential treatment hinders females from developing skills to cope with challenges, thereby inhibiting their confidence to do so. This, in turn, causes females to be dependent on others to cope with such challenges. Consequently, females are more likely than males to be concerned with pleasing others in an effort to maintain the guidance of others. Hence, females more than males are driven to achieve by a desire to please others. Hoffman proposed that such an orientation has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, when achievement is valued by others, it heightens motivation to perform well, increasing effort and thereby achievement. On the other hand, when others do not value achievement, it decreases motivation in this area because effort is directed to areas that are valued by others (e.g., being a good friend, having children). Moreover, Hoffman argued that being motivated by a desire to please others can lead to poor achievement as it heightens the emphasis put on performance instead of mastery. Higgins (1991) highlighted several important differences in the way that parents socialize their daughters and sons, many of which are consonant with those emphasized by Hoffman (see also Block, 1983; Huston, 1983). The central theme among these differences is that parents are more controlling with their daughters than with their sons in a number of ways: Parents put greater pressure on girls than on boys to be nurturant, obedient, and socially responsible; parents respond more quickly to the mistakes of their daughters than to those of their sons; parents are more likely to interrupt, intrude, and direct their daughters' activities than those of their sons; and parents maintain closer track of girls than of boys, often keeping their daughters under surveillance. Drawing from his self-discrepancy theory, Higgins argued that this pattern of gender socialization leads females to possess stronger self-guides than males. Specifically, the parenting practices used more with girls than with boys emphasize the importance of meeting standards set by parents. Consequently, females may feel more compelled than males to meet standards valued by society. According to Higgins, possessing strong self-guides may have psychological trade-offs. It may increase motivation to perform well and, to the extent that this leads to success, foster positive self-evaluation, inhibiting internalizing symptoms. However, when such motivation does not lead to success and failure is encountered, possessing strong self-guides may lead to negative self-evaluation, fostering internalizing symptoms (see also Costanzo, Miller-Johnson, & Wencel, 1995). Evaluation of the Models . Similar to the gender stereotype models, the gender socialization models are consistent with the extant research indicating that females do not evaluate themselves more negatively than males across the board. However, unlike the gender stereotype models, the gender socialization models are consistent with research finding that females are particularly likely to evaluate themselves more negatively than males in the face of failure. Moreover, the gender socialization models assume that parental gender socialization begins in the earliest years of children's lives. These models also do not suggest that knowledge of gender stereotypes is necessary for the sex differences in self-evaluation. Thus, the gender socialization models allow for the possibility that sex differences in self-evaluation may be evident even at very young ages. Finally, as we elaborate on later in describing our approach, the gender socialization models may also have the power to explain the pattern of sex differences in internalizing symptoms. Despite these strengths, the gender socialization models have some significant weaknesses. First, these models do not fully account for why females evaluate themselves more negatively than males in stereotypically male areas but more positively than males in stereotypically female areas. Second, the research on whether teachers and parents actually treat children differently is ambiguous at best. For example, after conducting a meta-analysis examining parental gender socialization, Lytton and Romney (1991) concluded that there is little evidence that parents socialize their daughters and sons differently; similar conclusions have been made in reviews of teacher gender socialization (e.g., Eccles & Blumenfeld, 1985). However, there are a number of reasons that such conclusions may be premature (see Block, 1983; Fennema & Peterson, 1985; Keenan & Shaw, 1997; Leaper et al., 1998; Pomerantz & Ruble, 1998). Many of these reasons grow out of the approach we suggest in the next section, and thus they are elaborated on there. Third, and relatedly, the lack of attention in these models to the causes behind gender socialization is problematic. Indeed, as highlighted in the next section, the inattention to this issue may be one of the reasons that evidence for gender socialization is so ambiguous.

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Page 68 Fig. 4.1. An approach integrating gender stereotypes and gender socialization models of sex differences in selfevaluation.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS In this section, we describe an approach for future research integrating ideas from both the gender stereotype and gender socialization models. This involves incorporating social-cognitive notions, such as construct activation, expectancy-based judgments, and stereotype use, into existing gender socialization models. The major strength of such an approach is that it takes a step toward accounting for the complex pattern of findings on parents' differential treatment of girls and boys as well as on sex differences in self-evaluation and internalizing symptoms. Moreover, it also has the potential to explain the development of these phenomena in general. This approach has generated a model we have begun to test in our research (see Fig. 4.1). Consistent with the gender socialization models, the central hypothesis is that parents are more controlling with their daughters than with their sons. We view control as attempts on parents' part to push children toward meeting standards. As highlighted shortly, there are a number of practices by which parents may do this. Unlike the prior gender socialization models, attention is given to the factors – namely, culturally held gender stereotypes – that lead to parents' differential use of control with their daughters and sons. Parental control is expected to convey to children that meeting standards, particularly those set by parents, is important. As a consequence, females may become more invested than males in meeting standards. This may have consequences for self-evaluation as well as internalizing symptoms. In a departure from prior models of the sex differences in self-evaluation, social-contextual and social-cognitive developmental factors are viewed as important to the emergence of the sex differences in selfevaluation as well as in internalizing symptoms. Gender Stereotypes and Parental Control One of the key hypotheses is that gender socialization is due to culturally held gender stereotypes. (The development of such stereotypes in the culture and how they get transmitted to parents is beyond the scope of this chapter; but see Schaller & Conway, chap. 10, this volume). Culturally held gender stereotypes may lead parents to use control differently with their daughters and sons through two mechanisms. First, parents′ perceptions of their children as possessing stereotypically female characteristics (e.g., helplessness, indecisiveness) or as lacking stereotypically male characteristics (e.g., confidence, self-reliance) may lead parents to be more controlling. For example, when parents view their children as lacking independence, they may make decisions for them. Second, the more parents possess stereotypical feminine socialization goals (e.g., child should be responsible, obedient) and lack stereotypical masculine socialization goals (e.g., child should be independent, assertive), the more controlling parents may be. For

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Page 69 example, when parents are concerned with ensuring that their children are independent, they may refrain from making decisions for them. Because parents may be more likely to hold stereotypically feminine perceptions and goals for girls than for boys, parents may be more likely to use control with girls than with boys. The proposal that gender stereotypes cause parents to exert control differentially over girls and boys suggests that such differential treatment may be context-specific. Forms of control to which gender-linked perceptions of children or gender socialization goals are relevant may be the only forms of control that parents use differently with girls and boys. For example, perceptions that girls but not boys are helpless may lead parents to monitor the progress of girls but not of boys. These same perceptions, however, may not influence parents' use of discipline with girls versus boys because this form of control may not be governed by perceptions of children as helpless or as possessing other gender stereotypical characteristics. Grouping together multiple forms of parental control may thus obscure gender socialization (Block, 1983; Pomerantz & Ruble, 1998). Yet most prior research has done just this (see Lytton & Romney, 1991, for a review). Research on stereotypes suggests an additional set of factors that may moderate the extent to which parents differentially use control with their daughters and sons. For stereotypes to exert an influence, they must be accessible (see Bargh, 1990; Higgins, 1996, for reviews). Stereotypes become accessible when they are made salient by situational cues, triggered by immediately observable characteristics of the interaction partner, or chronically high in the system guiding people's perceptions of the world (see Deaux & Major, 1987; Higgins & King, 1981; Moskowitz, Wasel, Gollwitzer, & Schaal, 1999, for reviews). Once stereotypes are accessible, even people who do not endorse stereotypes may act on them when they are not motivated to avoid doing so or have depleted cognitive resources (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989; Geis, 1993). Hence, although parents may not endorse gender stereotypes, they may act on these stereotypes in their daily interactions with their children because they have goals other than gender-neutral socialization or are preoccupied with other issues (e.g., being on time, a conflict with a spouse). Consistent with this proposal, correlations between parents′ socialization beliefs and behaviors are quite low (see Holden & Edwards, 1989, for a review). Evidence for the proposal that culturally held gender stereotypes may underlie parents' differential use of control with their daughters and sons is beginning to emerge, although, as of yet, this evidence is somewhat indirect. In a sample of mothers of elementary school children (ages 7 - 10), Pomerantz and Ruble (1998) examined the possibility that parents' differential use of control with their daughters and sons is limited to forms of control to which gender stereotypical characteristics are relevant. These investigators assessed four forms of control to which gender stereotypes were thought to be relevant: helping (e.g., helping child with homework when child does not request it), monitoring (e.g., checking to make sure child has done homework correctly when child does not request it), decision making (e.g., making decisions for child about the topic of a school project), and praising (e.g., giving child a reward for getting a good grade). To test the hypothesis that the differential use of control is dependent on the form of control, mothers' use of control in the form of disciplining (e.g., withdrawing privileges for getting a poor grade) was also assessed. It was expected that gender stereotypical characteristics would not be relevant to this form of control, and thus differential treatment would not be evident. Because it was crucial to obtain assessments of mothers’ use of control that would not be biased by their beliefs, control was assessed with a daily checklist completed over a 1to 3-week period. As anticipated, mothers of girls were more likely than mothers of boys to use control in the forms of helping, monitoring, decision making, and praising, but not disciplining. Because the daily checklist also provided information about the frequency with which children engaged in behavior (e.g., requests for help) that might elicit mothers' use of control, it was possible to account for girls' and boys behavior. However, there were no sex differences in children's behavior. Mothers also completed measures of their beliefs about control (Pomerantz, 1995). Consistent with prior research, mothers' beliefs were only modestly correlated with their behavior. Moreover, there were no differences in the beliefs of mothers of girls and mothers of boys. Although more research is clearly needed, these findings point toward the possibility that culturally held gender stereotypes may underlie parents' differential treatment of girls and boys. Consequences of Parental Control How might parents' differential use of control with their daughters and sons lead to sex differences in selfevaluation? The gender socialization models, as well as other theory and research on control (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harackiewicz, Manderlink, & Sansone, 1984; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wolfson, Mumme, & Guskin, 1995), suggest that control may communicate to children that it is essential for them to meet standards, heightening their

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Page 70 investment in successfully doing so. When parents use control with their children, they provide two types of information that may heighten children's concern with meeting standards (Higgins, 1991). First, through the use of control, parents convey what their standards are. Second, parents' use of control communicates that they feel it is important for children to meet such standards. For example, parents who frequently monitor their children's homework to ensure that children do it correctly indicate that doing well in school is important and that part of doing well involves doing homework correctly. The continual emphasis on the standards parents deem important may lead children to feel compelled to meet these standards, often feeling that their self-worth is dependent on doing so. In Higgins' (1991) terms, parents' frequent use of control may lead children to possess strong self-guides. The proposal that parental control may heighten children's concern with meeting standards has begun to receive empirical support in a study (Kenney & Pomerantz, 2000) employing laboratory observations of mothers' use of control with their elementary school children (ages 7 - 10). In this study, children were presented with a difficult cognitive abilities task, and mothers were told that they could help their children as little or as much as they wanted. These mother-child interactions were then coded for the extent to which mothers used control with their children (e.g., directed how children did the task, did the task for children). As anticipated, children whose mothers used a good deal of control were quite concerned with meeting standards. These children reported that performing well on an intelligence task they were about to complete was very important to them. In addition, they reported feeling a good deal of pressure from others to be perfect (e.g., ‘‘Other people think I have failed if I do not do my very best all the time,” “Other people always expect me to be perfect”). Although this research suggests that parental control fosters investment in meeting standards among children, longitudinal research is essential for determining the direction of influence. Consequences for Self-Evaluation and Internalizing Symptoms The heightened concern with meeting standards resulting from parental control may have psychological trade-offs. Key to this proposal is that when a great deal of investment is put into meeting standards, meeting standards is often central to protecting one's self-worth (see Pelham, 1991; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tesser, 1988; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). In our research with both children and adults (Pomerantz, Saxon, & Oishi, 1999), placing a great deal of importance on meeting standards is associated with the view that one's self-worth is contingent on successfully meeting standards. The contingent self-worth associated with investment in meeting standards may foster psychological trade-offs (Higgins, 1991). On the one hand, people placing importance on meeting standards may fear that failure to meet standards will threaten their self-worth. Hence, failure is viewed as quite upsetting. This view may foster worrying over performance, thereby leading to anxiety symptoms. On the other hand, people placing importance on meeting standards may endeavor to protect their self-worth by exerting a great deal of effort to meet their standards, resulting in a good deal of success. This may lead to positive self-evaluation, consequently promoting positive emotions (Higgins, 1991). However, when failure is encountered, people invested in meeting standards may be particularly vulnerable to negative self-evaluation and its consequences (Higgins, 1987, 1991). Because parents are more likely to treat girls than boys in a manner that may foster investment in standards, females may be more vulnerable to anxiety symptoms than males. Yet females may be less vulnerable to negative self-evaluation and consequent depressive symptoms than males when effort fosters success. When effort does not foster success, however, females may be more vulnerable to depressive symptoms than males. Our recent research has yielded a good deal of evidence suggesting that when children and adults are concerned with meeting standards, they are prone to worrying and anxiety symptoms. We have found that children (ages 7 10) who place importance on doing well at an intelligence task are particularly likely to feel nervous right before the task (Kenney & Pomerantz, 1999). In addition, children (ages 9 - 12) who place importance on doing well in school, possessing social skills, and pleasing others are highly likely to worry about their performance in these areas (Pomerantz, et al., 2000). Even when people (college students) list their own standards, there is a link between being invested in meeting standards and worrying over whether one will be able to meet standards (Pomerantz et al., 2000). Notably, this link is evident in concurrent analyses as well as in longitudinal analyses predicting worrying from concern with meeting standards at an earlier time while adjusting for worrying at the earlier time. Consistent with our proposal that concern with meeting standards fosters worrying because it is accompanied by the view that failure will be very upsetting, the link between concern with meeting standards and worrying is mediated by such a view among both children and college students (Pomer-

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Page 71 antz et al., 2000). There is also evidence suggesting that concern with meeting standards has positive consequences, particularly the promotion of positive emotions and the inhibition of depressive symptoms. This has been documented by Emmons (1986) in concurrent analyses. In our work (Pomerantz et al., 2000), evidence for such a link is also evident in longitudinal analyses predicting depressive symptoms from concern with meeting standards at an earlier time while adjusting for depressive symptoms at the earlier time. Among both children and college students, the positive selfperceptions of competence associated with concern with meeting standards mediated the relation between such concern and positive emotions. It appears that the link between concern with meeting standards and selfperceptions may be due to the heightened effort fostered by the concern with meeting standards (Pomerantz et al., 2000). Notably, as suggested by Higgins (1987, 1991), when people concerned with meeting standards face failure, they may be particularly prone to depressive symptoms. Indeed, Higgins and colleagues (1997) provided evidence that this is the case. Moreover, Dweck and colleagues (see Burhans & Dweck, 1995, for a review) have shown that children who feel that their self-worth is contingent on their performance react negatively to failure. Social-Contextual and Social-Cognitive Developmental Changes Social-contextual and social-cognitive changes that children experience as they progress through elementary school and into adolescence are postulated to intensify the relations among children's concern with meeting standards, their self-evaluation, and their internalizing symptoms (Rholes, Newman, & Ruble, 1990; Ruble, 1994; Rutter, 1986). This is anticipated to heighten the sex differences. The transition from elementary school to junior high school is a critical social-contextual change that children experience. This transition is often characterized by heightened failure because standards may no longer be met simply through increased effort in junior high school, as was the case in elementary school (see Eccles et al. 1993; Ruble & Seidman, 1996, for reviews). The transition from elementary to junior high school is also characterized by a good deal of uncertainty about how to go about meeting standards (see Eccles et al., 1993; Ruble & Seidman, 1996, for reviews). Consequently, even if standards may be met through effort, children may not know how to channel this effort. These two aspects of the transition from elementary to junior high school may lead children concerned with meeting standards to view themselves negatively because they feel incapable of meeting standards. This negative self-evaluation may foster feelings of disappointment and shame, leading to depressive symptoms among children concerned with meeting standards. Therefore, because parents are more likely to treat their daughters than their sons in a manner fostering the development of concern with meeting standards, the transition may heighten negative self-evaluation and depressive symptoms more for females than for males. Consistent with this proposal, research finds that girls are more likely than boys to experience decrements in self-esteem and increments in depressive symptoms following such transitions (see Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994, for a review). In terms of social-cognitive developmental changes, a substantial body of research indicates that, as children progress through elementary school, they increasingly conceive of ability as a stable capacity (see Rholes et al., 1990; Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989, for reviews).2 Conceiving of ability in this manner implies that poor performance cannot simply be attributed to a temporary lack of effort, but has implications for future performance. Consequently, performance-relevant information may be more meaningful to older than to younger children. Negative information may be more likely to lead to feelings of hopelessness in older than in younger children because hopelessness is only possible when one's situation (e.g., a lack of ability) is viewed as stable. Feelings of hopelessness are critical to depressive symptoms (Abramson et al., 1989), and thus conceiving of ability as stable may be essential to the onset of depressive symptoms. Conceiving of ability as a stable capacity may therefore influence children's vulnerability to depressive symptoms more than to anxiety symptoms. Indeed, we have found that when failure is encountered, concern with meeting standards is more likely to be associated with depressive symptoms among children who possess conceptions of ability as a stable capacity than among children who do not possess such conceptions (Saxon, Altermatt, & Pomerantz, 1997). This pattern, however, was not evident for anxiety symptoms. Thus, even in the face of failure, sex differences in depressive symptoms may not be evident before the late elementary school years, when children develop a conception of ability as a stable capacity. The introduction of social-contextual and social-cognitive developmental changes suggests why the sex differences in anxiety symptoms may emerge prior to the sex differences in depressive symptoms. When the criteria for success are not difficult to meet, being concerned with meeting standards may foster anxiety, but

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Page 72 not depressive, symptoms. The more concerned children are about meeting standards, the more anxiety symptoms they may experience as they worry over the possibility of failure. However, such children may also be more motivated to meet such standards. As a consequence, they may exert more effort, resulting in success. Success may in turn foster positive self-evaluation, thereby inhibiting depressive symptoms. Thus, because parents treat girls more than boys in a manner that may foster investment in standards, girls may be more prone than boys to anxiety, but not to depressive, symptoms prior to junior high school, when the criteria for success are generally not difficult to meet. During this time, even when failure is encountered, it may not foster depressive symptoms because it is not viewed as due to stable causes. Once children make the transition to junior high school and develop a conception of ability as a stable capacity, however, girls may become more prone to depressive symptoms than boys. Conclusions The approach we have described here integrates ideas from the prior gender stereotype and gender socialization models. It goes beyond these models in accounting for the complex findings on parents' differential treatment of girls and boys as well as those on sex differences in self-evaluation and consequent internalizing symptoms. There is clearly a long way to go toward fully validating the model, as we have only begun to test it empirically. However, the empirical evidence we have collected thus far is consistent with the model. It is our hope that this approach will lead to programmatic research on parental gender socialization and sex differences in self-evaluation. Moreover, in addition to elucidating the development of sex differences in self-evaluation, it is our hope that the model will elucidate the processes involved in self-evaluation in general. Despite the strengths of our model, a central weakness revolves around the consistent finding that the sex differences in self-evaluation depend in part on the extent to which gender stereotypes characterize the area in which the self-evaluation is made – females evaluate themselves more negatively than males in stereotypically male areas and more positively than males in stereotypically female areas. One explanation for females′ more negative self-evaluation in math that fits with our model may be found in Dweck′s (1986; Licht & Dweck, 1984) suggestion that the sex differences in math are due to the fact that the criteria for success are often ambiguous and difficult to meet. In addition, Ruble (Frey & Ruble, 1987; Ruble et al., 1993) and Crandall (1969) suggested that females′ tendency to evaluate themselves more positively than males in stereotypically female areas is merely a reflection of their greater skills in these areas. If analyses adjusted for actual skills, females would evaluate themselves more negatively than males. Another possibility is that the pattern of parental gender socialization observed by Pomerantz and Ruble (1998) only occurs in stereotypically male areas and that the reverse pattern occurs in stereotypically female areas. The empirical examination of these speculations is a fruitful direction for future research. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS We began this chapter by discussing the issue of what motivates self-evaluation. This issue has been at the heart of much research concerned with self-evaluation in general. Yet investigators concerned with sex differences in selfevaluation have generally not sought to explore this issue. As noted earlier, the sex differences in reactions to failure suggest that females may be motivated by self-assessment whereas males may be motivated by self-enhancement. Roberts (1991) is one of the few investigators who has focused on sex differences in motives. She suggested that females are more likely than males to approach achievement situations with self-assessment and self-improvement goals. In contrast, males are more likely than females to view such situations as competitive in nature and, consequently, to be guided by self-enhancement goals. The approach we have proposed suggests that females may be more motivated than males to maintain their self-worth by meeting standards. This may result in females possessing a stronger self-regulatory system than males (Higgins, 1991). As a consequence, females may be more likely than males to be guided by self-assessment and self-improvement goals in an attempt to meet their standards. However, when improved effort does not foster success, females may drop these goals and adopt self-enhancement goals. Hence, under such conditions, females may have stronger self-enhancement motives than males. In all, females′ motives may be more sensitive. Consistent with this view, Lenney (1977) suggested that females′ selfevaluation was more variable than that of males. Yet the fact that females evaluate themselves more negatively than males in stereotypically masculine areas and males evaluate themselves more negatively than females in stereotypically feminine areas points to several other motives that may also be important (see earlier discussion). The issue of what motivates self-evaluation for females and males needs to be pursued in future research. In this vein, it is important for future research to disen-

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Page 73 tangle to what extent the sex differences are due to motivational factors and to what extent they are due to socialcognitive factors. Hence, sex differences in the wide range of social-cognitive processes implicated in self-evaluation need to be examined. In conclusion, we have argued that research needs to consider the role played by both gender stereotypes and gender socialization in the development of the sex differences in self-evaluation. An integration of these two perspectives in addition to more general perspectives taken in studying self-evaluation is essential to fully identify the circumstances under which the sex differences emerge. The approach we have proposed has the potential to account for the complexity in the sex differences in self-evaluation and internalizing symptoms. It is our hope that this approach, based on theory and research from a number of areas within psychology, will lead to programmatic research on the factors that lead to the sex differences in self-evaluation while also elucidating basic processes involved in self-evaluation in general. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by grant R29 MH57505-01A2 from NIMH and ORWH and grant 9809292 from NSF to the first author. We are grateful for the constructive feedback we received on the ideas presented in this chapter from the Social Cognition Group at the University of Illinois. We also appreciate Ellen R. Altermatt's helpful comments. ENDNOTES 1. Roberts' (1991) model of sex differences in self-evaluation is the only one that does not fit into either of these categories. Thus, given space limitations, we do not give much attention to this model in our review. However, we do highlight where it overlaps with the other models we discuss. 2. Conceptions of ability as a stable capacity that changes as children progress through elementary school appear to represent a different construct than the entity theories on which Dweck and Leggett (1988) have focused (Pomerantz & Ruble, 1997).

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Page 75 5 Evaluating the Self in the Context of Another: The Three-Selves Model of Social Comparison Assimilation and Contrast Hart Blanton State University of New York at Albany From the straightforward premise that evaluation of the self is relative, social comparison theory makes predictions on such diverse topics as self-regulation, subjective well-being, interpersonal attraction and rejection, group formation, group conflict, prejudice, and perceptions of injustice. Unfortunately, the history of this theory is anything but straightforward. To begin, social comparison is not one theory but two. One theory is about motivation and the factors influencing the type of social comparison information people seek from their social environment. The primary dependent variable in this research has been social comparison choice, To a lesser degree, research has also examined efforts to change the self or others so that desirable comparisons can be made. The second social comparison theory is about self-evaluation and the factors influencing the effects social comparisons have on judgments of the self. The primary dependent variables in this research have been mood and state changes in selfesteem. Of the two, the first theory has received the most empirical attention. A possible account for this is that motivation was Festinger's (1954a) interest. His views on motives were captured succinctly in the first two hypotheses of his original theory. In Hypothesis I, he argued, “There exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities” (p. 117). This statement lead to Hypothesis II, “To the extent that objective, nonsocial means are not available, people evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of others” (p. 118). The research that followed these pronouncements has established that Festinger's perspective was lacking in two regards. First, it underestimated the variety of motives contributing to interest social comparison information. The motive to obtain accurate self-evaluation is one. Depending on the context, however, social comparison information may be sought to help in efforts toward self-enhancement, self-verification, and selfimprovement, or to help with any number of other personal or interpersonal motivations (see Major, 1994; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wood & Taylor, 1991). The second way in which Festinger's original perspective has proved lacking is that it underestimated the desire for social comparison information. People seek such information even when “objective, non-social means” are readily available. Thus, to the extent that one is motivated to self-evaluate (or to self-verify, or to improve, etc.), social comparison is often the first source of information sought (Wood, 1989). Whereas a great deal of research has advanced a theory of comparison motives, relatively little has advanced a theory of comparative evaluation. However, a host of seemingly contradictory findings suggest that more attention should be paid to this second theory (see Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Collins, 1996; Tesser, 1988). For instance, research has demonstrated that both upward comparison with superior others and downward comparison with inferior others can both raise and lower self-evaluation. As a result, it is often difficult determining what motive is driving an interest in social comparison information in any given situation. To illustrate, someone who seeks upward social comparison may be doing so because of a motive to self-enhance, if this is a circumstance that will raise selfevaluations. Alternatively, this person may be doing this because of a motive to improve, if this is a circumstance that will lower self-evaluation and increase commitment to a goal or if this is a circumstance that will raise selfevaluations and increase feelings of self-efficacy. Finally, this person may be doing this because of a motive to selfverify, if this is a circumstance that will validate an assumed similarity between the self and an exceptional other. Thus, to decode the motives driving different comparison choices across different contexts, it would be informative to clarify the effects that different comparison choices are likely to have on self-evaluation.

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Page 76 A COMPARISON-BASED THEORY OF SELF-EVALUATION It is the goal of this chapter to introduce a framework that predicts the effects of social comparison on selfevaluation. This effort is indebted to a number of models identifying factors that moderate reactions to social comparison information (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Collins, 1996; Tesser, 1988). However, the current chapter uses an outside source as its guide. Rather than turning to research within the social comparison tradition, which has focused mostly on the motives for comparison, it turns to research within the social cognition tradition. Specifically, it looks at social-cognitive theory linking categorization and comparison processes to the evaluation of social objects. This research tradition is applied to the social comparison literature to predict how categorization of and comparison with another person influences evaluation of the self (cf. Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). It is beyond the scope of this manuscript to review and integrate the many disparate theories linking categorization and comparison processes to evaluation (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Martin, 1986; Parducci, 1965; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Thibau & Kelly, 1959; Turner, 1987; see Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume). Instead, this chapter utilizes one theoretical perspective – the Schwarz and Bless (1992a) inclusionexclusion model. Although the Schwarz and Bless model draws on previous theories and, in turn has influenced a number of more recent frameworks, it seems to be the model best suited for organizing social comparison predictions related to self-evaluation. This is in large part because it is based on straightforward and established rules of categorization and comparison. Thus, application of the model does not require distinctions between different mechanisms that ultimately lead to the same evaluative outcome. This feature is desirable with social comparison, which is a complex social phenomenon potentially affected by a multitude of factors. Inclusion and Exclusion The inclusion-exclusion model assumes that any evaluation requires two mental representations: A representation of the target stimulus and a representation of a standard. The target stimulus is the object that is being evaluated, and the standard is a point of comparison allowing the perceiver to locate the standing of the target stimulus on the dimension for which it is being evaluated (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). The representation of the target and the representation of the standard are assumed to be constructed at the time of the evaluation on the basis of information that is both chronically and temporarily accessible (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The latter information varies from situation to situation and forms the basis of context effects on social judgment. Consistent with prior models, the inclusion-exclusion model states that whether contextual information causes assimilation or contrast depends on how that information is categorized. If the information is included in the representation of the target, assimilation will result and evaluation of the target stimulus will be displaced toward the evaluation of the contextual information. If the information is included in the representation of the standard, contrast will result and the evaluation of the target stimulus will be displaced away from the evaluation of the contextual information. Finally, if the information is not included in either the representation of the target stimulus or the standard, neither contrast nor assimilation will result. As an example of inclusion-exclusion reasoning, a recent study by Stapel and Schwarz (1998a) assessed the effect that a context prime, General Colin Powell, had on evaluations of two separate target stimuli, the Republican Party and Republican Senator Bob Dole. Because Colin Powell is an example of a Republican, he should be included in the representation of the Republican Party, resulting in an assimilation effect in evaluations of the Republican Party. However, Colin Powell is not an example of Bob Dole because Bob Dole forms his own bounded category, of which Colin Powell is not a member. Thus, Colin Powell should be excluded from the representation of Bob Dole and no assimilation should result. However, the presence of Colin Powell could influence the evaluation of Bob Dole if Colin Powell is considered relevant as a standard against which to evaluate Bob Dole. Because most would evaluate Bob Dole in terms of his standing as a Republican presidential candidate, and because Colin Powell is a Republican who has also been considered as a potential candidate, Colin Powell would be a reasonable standard against which to evaluate Bob Dole. Thus, reflecting on Colin Powell should cause a contrast effect on evaluations of Bob Dole. These predictions were supported in the study by Stapel and Schwarz: Because Colin Powell was popular at the time of the study, reflecting on him prior to judgment raised evaluations of Republicans (assimilation) and lowered evaluations of Bob Dole (contrast; see also Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Schwarz & Bless, 1992b; Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume). In summary, the same contextual variable can have either a contrast or assimilation effect on a target depending on how it is

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Page 77 categorized. Inclusion in the target encourages assimilation, and inclusion in the standard encourages contrast. Ultimately, the size of assimilation and contrast effects depend on the extremity of the contextual information. For instance, if Colin Powell were rated no differently than the average Republican, including him in the representation of his party would have had no influence on evaluations. Similarly, if Colin Powell were not evaluated either more or less positively than Bob Dole, including him in the representation of the standard would have had no influence on evaluations (Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999). Thus, whether a contextual variable will have measurable effects on evaluation depends both on the way in which that information is categorized and the extremity of that information in comparison to the other information already represented in the category.1 Terminology Before applying the inclusion-exclusion model to the domain of social comparison, it is necessary to clarify terms. In social comparison language, it is typically stated that a person engages in social comparison with one or more target persons. Here the term target is usually (although not always) meant to imply that the other person has been used as a temporary standard for self-evaluation. If one were to use the language of inclusion-exclusion, however, the target in this situation would be the self because the self is the social object being evaluated. The other person would then constitute the judgment context because the other person has introduced information that may alter the evaluation of the self. Because of these differences in terminology, a separate set of terms is used to avoid confusion. Throughout this chapter, social comparison refers to any situation in which a person's self-evaluation can be influenced by information made accessible by the real or imagined presence of another person. Because the focus of this chapter is on the effects of social comparison information on self-evaluation, social comparison is only considered as it relates to the comparison of abilities and valenced traits. The focus is specifically on the effects of upward social comparison with someone who is superior to the self versus downward social comparison with someone who is inferior to the self. In each case, it is assumed that the upward or downward social comparison information is extreme enough to influence self-evaluations. During social comparison, the individual who engages in social comparison is referred to as the perceiver and the other person who makes social comparison information accessible is referred to as a comparison other , or at times as an exemplar . An assimilation effect is said to occur when self-evaluation is displaced toward the evaluation of the comparison other (raising self-evaluation following upward social comparison and lowering self-evaluation following downward social comparison). A contrast effect is said to occur when self-evaluation is displaced away from the evaluation of the comparison other (lowering selfevaluation following upward social comparison and raising self-evaluation following downward social comparison). Based on the inclusion-exclusion model, it is assumed that self-evaluation requires two mental representations: The first is a representation of self, which is the social object being evaluated. The second representation is the standard , which is a point of comparison used to locate the self on the dimension for which it is being evaluated. In traditional social comparison theory, the standard is nothing more than a representation of the comparison other in terms of that person's standing on the dimension by which the self is being evaluated (e.g., a representation of the standard that is based on the comparison other's intelligence during evaluations of one's own intelligence; Morse & Gergen, 1970). In the current framework, the standard is any mental representation used to locate the self on the evaluative dimension. Social comparison occurs when a comparison other introduces evaluative information that is extreme enough to alter the judgment context. Thus, the comparison other can alter either the representation of the standard or the representation of the self. The latter effect would occur if the comparison other is used as a proxy for the self during self-evaluation (e.g., a representation of the self that is based on the comparison other's intelligence during evaluations of one's own intelligence; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). This broader definition of social comparison , in which the comparison other can alter either the representation of the standard or the representation of the self, is necessary for predicting whether contrast or assimilation will result. INCLUSION-EXCLUSION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON How might the presence of exemplars influence self-evaluation? Three possibilities seem most likely. First, when accessible information about the exemplar is included in the representation of the standard, contrast results and selfevaluation is displaced away from evaluation of the exemplar. Second, if information about the exemplar is included in the representation of the self, assimilation results and self-evaluation is displaced toward evaluation of the exemplar. Finally, if information about the exemplar is included in some shared social

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Page 78 category, of which both the perceiver and the exemplar are members, then assimilation occurs if self-evaluation is based on the evaluation of that category. To determine which of these three outcomes occurs, a mechanism is needed that can predict how comparison information is categorized. The current framework identifies two, both of which have received a great deal of research attention. First is the perception of similarity . Social comparison research has long considered the role that similarity plays in determining whether another person is considered a relevant source of social comparison information. For the most part, similarity has been found to translate into relevance. However, whether comparison relevance leads to inclusion in the self or inclusion in the standard depends on the second mechanism, which is the type of working self-concept that is accessible in memory. Consistent with prior theory, the self is conceived as a complex collection of interrelated self-conceptions that become differentially accessible depending on the current judgment context (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1983; Gergen, 1967; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934; Rosenberg, 1979; Turner, 1985). When individuals form judgments about themselves, the type of self-concept that is active predicts how comparison information from similar others can be categorized in relation to the self. The current framework distinguishes three broad classes of working self-conceptions. These are: individual selves, possible selves, and collective selves. Because the effects of similarity are assumed to depend on the self that is active, predictions for self-evaluation are covered separately in the sections that follow. Individual Selves The individual self refers to perceivers' conceptions of their current and personal attributes. In many ways, it appears that the individual self-concept is the default value of the working self-concept (cf. Markus & Kitayamma, 1991). For instance, when asked to describe themselves, people spontaneously mention attributes that distinguish them from salient others (McGuire & McGuire, 1980; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire & PadawerSinger, 1976; see also Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995), and their self-evaluations are based more on evaluations of their distinct attributes than their evaluations of common attributes (Ditto & Griffin, 1993). Apparently for these reasons, people often base their behavioral choices on the perceived social consequences of distinguishing the self from others within the social environment, instead of basing them on the perceived consequences of becoming similar to others (Blanton, Stuart, & VandenEijnden, in press). Interestingly, research on social comparison has shared this default interest in the individual self. Of the studies that have examined comparison effects on self-evaluation, most have occurred in contexts that would increase the salience of individual attributes. As examples, participants have been given comparison information in the context of standardized testing (e.g., Major, Schiacchitano, & Crocker, 1993; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) or during competition with another (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; Pleban & Tesser, 1981). Based on the principles of categorization, comparison information in these studies should not cause assimilation because comparison others are excluded from the representation of the self. However, comparison others can cause contrast effects when they are considered relevant to comparison by being included in the representation of the standard. For this to occur, it is typically necessary for the comparison other to be perceived as similar to the self. Similarity Perhaps no sentence has guided social comparison research more than ‘‘Given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone close to one's own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison” (Festinger, 1954a, p. 121). This, Corollary III A of “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,” was based on Festinger's (1954a) third hypothesis that the desire for social comparison decreases as a target becomes less similar. For Festinger (1954a, 1954b), a similar other was thought to provide a meaningful standard for self-evaluation, whereas a dissimilar other was not. Interestingly, Corollary III A seems to have inspired research as much because it generated confusion about what Festinger meant by a similar other as by any desire to test his proposition (Wheeler, 1991; Wood, 1989). At times, he seemed to be referring to similarity on the evaluative dimension , which is the performance, trait, or ability being assessed. At other times, he seemed to mean similarity on surrounding dimensions, which are the attributes, traits, or abilities not being evaluated. Most of the initial studies testing the similarity hypothesis measured interest in similarity on the evaluative dimension (Wheeler, 1966; Wheeler et al., 1969). These studies used the rankorder paradigm, in which participants were given performance feedback and then allowed to select, on the basis of rank, the test score(s) of others that they would like to view. Findings generally supported the similarity hypothesis: People preferred to compare their

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Page 79 performances with others at a similar rank (e.g., Gruder, 1971; Gruder, Korth, Dichtel, & Glos, 1975; Wheeler, 1966; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982; cf. Wheeler, 1991). However, subsequent research gave more attention to the features of a surrounding dimension that might compel a social comparison. The Related-Attributes Hypothesis . The first major revision of the similarity hypothesis to address surrounding dimensions was best articulated by Goethals and Darley (1977; see also Wheeler et al., 1969; Wilson, 1973). They argued that, by similarity, Festinger (1954a, 1954b) meant people who are similar on surrounding dimensions that are “related to and predictive of performance” (p. 265). This idea, termed the related-attributes hypothesis (Wheeler & Zuckerman, 1977), was based on attribution theory. People were thought to seek comparison with others who would be expected to perform at about the same level as themselves, based on background variables, to uncover diagnostic standards against which to assess internal attributes and abilities. For instance, a runner who compares her speed to other women of the same age and training history can get a better sense of her underlying running ability than if she were to compare herself to men of a different age and training history. Research has generally supported the claim that people seek comparisons with others who are similar on related attributes (e.g., Gastorf & Suls, 1978; Gastorf, Suls, & Lawhon, 1978; Sanders, Gastorf, & Mullen, 1979; Wheeler & Koestner, 1984; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982). For instance, people typically prefer comparisons with others who are similar on related dimensions even when they already have information on the evaluative dimension (Wheeler & Koestner, 1984). However, related attributes are not the only criteria used to select comparison others, and people often seek comparison with others who are similar on the evaluative dimension as well (Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982). Identity Comparisons . Although the related-attributes hypothesis clarified the conditions under which someone should use another person as a standard of self-evaluation, it did not account fully for the preferences for surrounding similarity. In fact, much as early attribution theory proved effective in identifying the conditions under which people deviate from rationality (Jones, 1985), the related-attributes hypothesis proved useful in identifying the conditions under which comparisons deviate from diagnosticity. For instance, various studies found that participants preferred comparisons with others of the same gender even when they knew that gender was not a related attribute (e.g., Feldman & Ruble, 1981; Major & Forcey, 1985; C.T. Miller, 1984; Suls, Gaes, & Gastorf, 1979) and even when they had information that was more diagnostic of performance (Tesser & Campbell, 1980). Analogous preferences were shown for comparing with others similar in physical attractiveness (C.T. Miller, 1982), age, and race (Tesser, 1986). Various explanations have been offered for the robust preference for similarity (see Miller & Prentice, 1996; Wood, 1989), and it appears that identity concerns play a consequential role. C.T. Miller (1984) found that women who identified strongly with their gender made comparisons within gender even when it was unrelated to the evaluative dimension. However, women who did not identify with their gender compared within gender only when it was a related attribute. D.T. Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1988) linked such comparisons to reference group theory (Hyman, 1960; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Singer, 1966) and demonstrated that people often choose standards that help them determine how they stack up within personally relevant reference frames. In this regard, gender and ethnicity seem particularly meaningful, such that people often ignore out-group standards and base their self-evaluations on their standing within their in-group (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, 1994). Effects of Similarity. In summary, similarity exerts a strong influence on perceiver's choice of comparisons. However, studies on comparison choice do not demonstrate that similar others have greater effects on self-evaluations than dissimilar others. They also do not demonstrate that contrast always results. The guiding assumption behind virtually all of the studies just cited is that it is more meaningful to assess one's own ability relative to a similar other than it is to assess one's abilities relative to a dissimilar other. It follows that contrast should be magnified when comparison others are similar. The most direct test of this proposition in terms of evaluative similarity was conducted by Sanders (1982). He exposed undergraduates to social comparison information regarding their performance on an analogy test and found that small discrepancies in performance between the self and comparison others produced the greatest changes in ability evaluations. With small discrepancies, a contrast effect emerged. As the comparison discrepancy widened, the effects of comparison information diminished to the point that extremely discrepant comparison information had no greater effect on self-evaluations than slightly discrepant comparison information. In theory, if this discrepancy between self and other continued to widen, comparison information would have ceased to influence self-evaluations (see Radloff, 1966; Wilson, 1973; Wood, Taylor and Lichtman (1985). Just such an effect was demonstrated in a

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Page 80 recent study of pay satisfaction by Brandstätter (1999). Participants estimated the satisfaction of two individuals differing in degree of similarity in salary. At first, small decrements between the two lead to contrast estimates on pay satisfaction. As this gap widened, the contrast effect leveled off and, at the extremes, estimates began returning to baseline. The ironic consequence of this pattern of responses is that it suggests that people will at times prefer the company of others who are much better than them on an evaluative dimension, rather than choosing the company of others who are only slightly better than them (see Mettee & Smith, 1977). Research on surrounding similarity also indicates that increased similarity can lead to increased contrast (i.e., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Major, Schiacchitano, & Crocker, 1993; Nadler & Fisher, 1976). As an example, Major et al. (1993) found that the superior performance of a comparison other lowered self-evaluation when comparison others shared the same minimal group, but this had no effect on self-evaluation when the comparison was a member of the outgroup. Most of the remaining evidence linking surrounding similarity to contrast has been conducted by Tesser and colleagues. Tesser (1986, 1988) proposed what he termed a self-evaluation maintenance model of social comparison. This model states that social comparison should have contrast effects on self-evaluation when the perceiver is psychologically close to the target. Closeness in this formulation is linked to what Heider (1958) referred to as a unit relationship. This is a broad term that encompasses surrounding similarity in terms of both related attributes and a shared identity. Consistent with the model, when perceivers are outperformed on important domains, closeness has been linked to negative affect (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988), task disengagement (Tesser & Campbell, 1980), and distancing from the comparison other (Pleban & Tesser, 1981). Although these studies did not directly measure effects on self-evaluation, findings can be explained by assuming that the participants′ responses reflected a desire to maintain positive evaluations of the self in contrast to close others. Interestingly, Tesser (1988) also proposed that closeness can lead to assimilation. People are thought to cease evaluating the self when the evaluative dimension is not important to self-esteem. Freed from caring about their relative standing, people do not seek out standards against which to self-evaluate. Instead, they reflect on their associations with close others, causing assimilation (Cialdini et al., 1976; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980). Because this part of his model is not concerned with evaluation of individual attributes, discussion on this is held until later. In summary, social comparison theory has traditionally focused on comparisons of individual attributes. Although much of the work in this area has refined the definition of similarity or focused on comparison choice, similarity does appear to increase contrast effects in contexts in which the self-concept is based on individual attributes. Possible Selves Although the individual self may be the spontaneous representation for the perceiver, alone it is not sufficient for interpreting the diversity of human experience. One reason that the working self-concept is thought to be contextually fluid is that flexibility is necessary for people to interpret the full range of their current, past, and future actions (e.g., Cantor, Markus, Niedenthal, & Nurius, 1986; Gergen, 1972; James, 1910; Little, 1983). In this regard, Markus and Nurius (1986) argued for the importance of possible selves. These are defined as self-representations “that have not been verified or confirmed by social experience” but that nonetheless exert “a significant influence on individual functioning” (p. 955). Markus and Nurius suggested two primary functions of possible selves. First, they act as incentives that guide future behavior; second, they act as interpretive structures that lend meaning to current experience. As incentives, possible selves can either be positive “hoped-for selves” that one tries to attain or they can be negative “feared selves’’ that one tries to avoid. For example, high school students should exert effort into their school work when they have hoped-for selves as college students and feared selves as highschool dropouts. As interpretive structures, possible selves guide reactions to current situations. For instance, a student with a hoped-for self as a college student would probably feel like a failure after getting a “C” in a class, whereas the student who fears failing out of school might feel like a conquering hero. Numerous studies support both the motivational and interpretive functions of possible selves, indicating that they influence achievement striving and subjective well-being above and beyond what would be predicted from current self-concepts (e.g., Ogilvie, 1987; Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995; Oyserman & Markus, 1990; Oyserman & Saltz, 1993; Quinlan, Jaccard, & Blanton, 1999; Ruvolo & Markus, 1992; Ryff, 1991). For clarification, it should be noted that positive and negative possible selves are often viewed as similar to Higgins′ (1987) notions of ideal and ought self-guides. However, theory related to possible selves addresses how self-evaluation, affect, and motivation are influenced by representations of the self, whereas Higgins′ self-discrepancy theory addresses how these same outcomes are influenced by

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Page 81 the type of standard against which the self is evaluated. The current model assumes that these two processes are inter-related, with the representation of the self influencing the representation of the standard and vice versa (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). For clarify of focus, however, the current model considers only on the effects that changing self-representations have on comparison and evaluation. Possibility Through Comparison As a working self-concept, the possible self differs from the individual self by extending beyond individual attributes to include attributes that others possess. In the present framework, comparison others can influence possible selves in one of two ways. First, they can make new possibilities available that would have been unknown to perceivers in the absence of social comparison. As an example, any successes of the American women's soccer team may cause young girls in the states to consider the possibility of becoming soccer players, when they would not have entertained this possibility before. Second, comparison others can make previously stored possibilities accessible in working memory in situations in which they would not otherwise have been considered. Thus, a usually confident soccer player who is experiencing a moment of self-doubt may take inspiration from a teammate who scores an unexpected come-from-behind goal. In each instance, the comparison other alters the temporary representation of the self, which can then influence self-evaluation. Although it may be intuitive that people assess what is possible for the self by considering the qualities of others, it is important to note that the alternative to this does not seem likely. Specifically, it does not seem that people will infer possible selves from considering attributes that others do not have. Thus, it is not predicted that a child who observes that most of her peers are different from her and that most of her peers are bad athletes will then conclude she has the potential of becoming a good athlete. This observation was made early in social comparison theory. Before the dominance of downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981), in which people were thought to maintain esteem by contrasting themselves with worse-off others, it was upward social comparison that was linked to positive self-evaluations. This prediction was based on the notion of the positive instance , which is mostly ignored in current research (Collins, 1996; Wheeler, 1991). The positive instance was the idea that it is easier to imagine the self possessing a desired trait by observing people who have that quality than it is by observing those who do not (see Berger, 1977; Gruder, 1977; Mettee & Smith, 1977; Thornton & Arrowood, 1966). A related and more general construct is the feature-positive effect , which is the tendency for both animals and humans to find it easier learning from an event occurrence than from an event nonoccurrence (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969, 1970). Fazio, Sherman, and Herr (1982) linked this to self-perception by demonstrating that people are more likely to draw inferences about themselves through their own actions than through their inaction (see also Allison & Messick, 1988; Cioffi, 1994). The parallel in social comparison is that people should be more likely to infer a possible self from observing people who demonstrate a possibility than from observing people who do not. In summary, when the working self-concept is represented in terms of its possibility, comparison others are predicted to influence self-evaluation through the exemplar's inclusion in the representation of the self rather than its exclusion. As a result, assimilation is generally predicted and contrast is not.2 Including Possibility The classic study demonstrating that comparison information influences self-evaluation was conducted by Morse and Gergen (1970). Participants were exposed to a job applicant who was competing against them for a desired job. The primary finding was a contrast effect: Subjects who viewed a competent applicant (“Mr. Clean”) reported more negative self-evaluations than those who observed a less competent applicant (“Mr. Dirty”). The reason for this effect is presumably that the evaluative context focused participants on their current attributes, which then seemed inadequate in the presence of a better job candidate. The current framework would predict an assimilation effect in Morse and Gergen (1970), had the evaluative context focused participants on the possible self. This focus would have increased participants' perceptions that they can interview at the level of the superior job applicant. Evidence in support of this prediction can be found in a set of studies by Lockwood and Kunda (1997). In Study 1, participants read a newspaper article about an exceptional and award-winning working professional. Much like the “Mr. Clean’’ in Morse and Gergen, this “Ms. Clean” represented an upward comparison other for the participants. However, the comparison other in this study was too different from the participants on both evaluative and surrounding dimensions for them to view her as a relevant standard against which to evaluate current abilities. This woman was no longer in school, presumably older, and receiving an award for extreme

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Page 82 accomplishments in the “real world.” Thus, the similarity hypothesis would lead one to expect that this person would not be considered a relevant standard of comparison, and so she should not influence self-evaluations. Nevertheless, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) made it so that participants in some experimental conditions viewed this woman as a future possible self. This was done by manipulating the personal relevance of the exemplar's job title. Participants were preselected to be either education or accounting majors, and the exemplar was described either as a school teacher or an accountant. As predicted, this led to an assimilation effect in conditions in which the exemplar's career matched the participant's career aspirations. The school teacher raised self-evaluations of education majors and the accountant raised the self-evaluations of accounting majors. When the major/career profiles did not match, there was no effect of comparison information on self-evaluations. Similarity As with the individual self, an exemplar only has an effect on evaluation of the possible self if it is considered relevant to self-evaluation. As before, relevance is determined in large part by perceptions of similarity. Although similarity maintains its various meanings, what is most important with the possible self is that the perceiver can imagine becoming like the comparison other at some point in the future. This was demonstrated in Lockwood and Kunda (1997), in which assimilation depended on a shared career path. A variety of other features might contribute to this type of similarity. Recently, Buunk and Ybema (1997) argued that perceivers typically require some individuating information about a person to view their performance level as attainable. They noted that in the typical studies that demonstrate a desire for downward comparison, participants are asked to choose their comparisons based on a single test score or other outcome measure (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Swallow & Kuiper, 1993; cf. Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wheeler, 1966; Wheeler et al., 1969). Preference for downward comparison in these cases probably reflects a desire for self-enhancement. Without any basis for identifying with that person, this is achieved by contrasting the self with worse-off others. However, when people are presented with individuating information about the comparison other or when they have contact with that person, people more typically seek upward comparison (e.g., Molleman, Pruyn, & van Knippenberg, 1986; Rabbie, 1963; Ybema & Buunk, 1993). With more information to work with, it is easier for them to see their own future in the performance of another (see Klein & Kunda, 1992; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Thus, the same selfenhancement motive as before can be served by looking for upward comparison with a better-off other, which raises self-evaluations through assimilation. Another important determinant of perceived similarity with possible selves is a perception of control over the attribute under evaluation (Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991). By definition, people must believe that they can achieve a target's success if they are to view that person as a possible self. Similarly, for a downward target to become a feared possible self, perceivers should doubt their own ability to keep from becoming like that person. Recently, Buunk and Ybema (1997) linked control perceptions to a variety of different features of the comparison context. For one, control depends on the comparison dimension (Buunk & Ybema, 1997). For instance, Buunk, Schaufeli, and Ybema (1994) found that people were more likely to seek upward comparisons with people at work who had more experience at their job than they were to compare upward with people who were more competent at their job. This preference presumably reflected the relative ease with which participants could imagine gaining experience over gaining competence (see also Buunk, 1995). In addition to the comparison dimension, control depends on time. People are more optimistic that they can achieve a positive target's success if they have the time to become like them (Aspinwall, 1997; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). An example of this can be found in Lockwood and Kunda (1997). In their second study, they demonstrated that first-year graduate students showed assimilation after reading a vignette about an exceptional fourth-year student, whereas fourth-year students did not. With a couple of years ahead of them in which to achieve the successes of the comparison other, first-year students could see their own future superstar status in the successes of the comparison other. With most of their graduate training behind them, fourth-year students did not see this possibility. In summary, comparison others are predicted to cause assimilation effects when those others are considered possibilities for the self. This occurs when these others are perceived as similar in the sense that their attributes seem attainable and under personal control. Collective Selves Various theories of the self, most notably social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its extension, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg,

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Page 83 Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), contend that the working self-concept shifts in focus between representations of the self in terms of individual attributes and in terms of membership in social collectives or groups (see also Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Stryker & Statham, 1985). Although there are important distinctions between the different theories (see Deaux, 1996; Jost, chap. 6, this volume), each shares the assumption that people represent the self in terms of collective selves and that, when this occurs, self-evaluation is based on evaluations of one's group memberships (see Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Therefore, when the collective self is accessible, comparison others should influence self-evaluation by altering group evaluation. This then carries over to the evaluation of the self as a member of the group (see Stapel & Schwarz, 1998a). The current framework predicts two ways in which this occurs. First, if an exemplar is a member of the perceiver's in-group, that person can be included in the representation of the in-group. This categorization leads to assimilation effects on group evaluation, which can carry over as assimilation effects on self-evaluation. Second, if an exemplar is excluded from the representation of the in-group (possibly due to membership in an out-group), that person can be included in the standard against which the ingroup is evaluated. This categorization should result in contrast effects on group evaluation, which should then carry over as a contrast effect on self-evaluation. Although both possibilities seem likely, only the former is discussed. This is due in part to the paucity of research on the latter and in part to the belief that discussion of the first instance provides the necessary information for making predictions about the second. As with the individual self, whether the comparison other is considered relevant for comparison depends on perceptions of similarity. People who are perceived as similar have the potential to be perceived as fellow group members, which would make assimilation the predicted outcome. At first glance, this prediction appears to contradict earlier arguments that increased similarity leads to contrast. However, assimilation is predicted with increased similarity when it shifts attention to a shared group, thereby shifting the working self-concept to a representation of the self as a member of that group. Interestingly, similarity on both the evaluative dimension and surrounding dimensions can cause this shift in the representation of the self. Evaluative Similarity Recall that traditional social comparison theory assumes that similarity on the evaluative dimension increases contrast (e.g., Brandstätter, 1999; Sanders, 1982). To illustrate, one can imagine students in a math class evaluating their math ability in terms of their standing relative to others in their class. Due to dissimilarity on the evaluative dimension, however, they view the one exceptional student in class as a math whiz and thus not relevant for comparison (Wood et al., 1985).3 Thus, as already reviewed, comparison between two students in the class who are similar in ability should lead to contrast effects, but comparisons between an average student in the class and the lone math whiz should have no effect on ability evaluations for either student. Interestingly, most social judgment models do not predict this intuitive example because they do not predict increased contrast with increasing similarity, but instead predict increased assimilation (e.g., Eiser, 1990; Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Parducci & Wedell, 1990; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). For instance, Herr (1986) had participants evaluate another person who engaged in a behavior that was ambiguously hostile in the context of a moderately or extremely hostile exemplar. When participants were primed with a list of extremely hostile people (e.g., Adolf Hitler), a contrast effect occurred and the target person was judged as relatively less hostile. However, when participants were primed with a reading list of moderately hostile people (e.g., Joe Frazier), assimilation resulted and the target person was judged as relatively more aggressive. Although the various social judgment models have different bases for linking similarity to assimilation and not contrast, the primary reasoning is that people are less likely to differentiate two stimuli if they are similar on the evaluative dimension. Lack of differentiation can occur because discrimination becomes more difficult with increased similarity (e.g., Sherif & Hovland, 1961), because stimuli are seen as sharing the same conceptual category (e.g., Herr et al., 1983), or because one stimuli assists with the encoding of the second stimuli (e.g., Philippot et al., 1991; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998; Stapel & Schwarz, 1998b). The reason that social comparison theory seems to make the wrong prediction is that a failure to differentiate the self from the comparison other is not a possibility in contexts in which the self is represented in terms of its individual attributes. By definition, the individual self creates its own bounded category, of which the exemplar cannot be a member. Thus, similarity can only increase the comparison other′s relevance as a standard, leading to contrast (Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). However, the self is not always distinguished from others and so this should not be the

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Page 84 universal prediction. In fact, similarity on the evaluative dimension can cause a shift in the working self-concept from the individual to the collective self, causing the perceiver to no longer differentiate the self from the comparison other (Turner, 1985). To illustrate how this happens, consider again the situation in which the comparison other earns the label math whiz. If both the comparison other and the perceiver are doing extremely well in math class – so well that they beat all of their other classmates – this label would be appropriate for describing not just one of them but the pair. As the only two members of the math-whiz group, each should come to think of the other in terms of this shared membership, causing them to see one another as psychologically interchangeable when they are evaluating that category. Turner (1985) captured this feature of categorization with a comparative rule that he termed the meta-contrast principle . This states that, in any given context, two individuals will cease to differentiate one another on an evaluative dimension to the extent that they are less different from one another on that dimension than they are, on average, from others in their frame of reference. For instance, two students should develop a shared math-whiz identity when they both are so much better at math than the rest of the class that their abilities distinguish them from the rest of the class more than from one another (Haslam & Turner, 1992; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; see also Mullen, 1991). Because shared categorization, as defined by the meta-contrast principle, depends on the average similarity within the reference frame, the likelihood of assimilation should vary accordingly. Consider, for instance, what would happen if the two math whizzes earned membership into a school for the gifted. If this new school brought them in contact with many others of similar ability, their previous identity would no longer create a meaningful categorization. Moreover, if the two students now found themselves sharing a similar rank, but only now buried within the middle of the distribution instead of at the extremes, they may begin to see one another as relevant standards against which to evaluate their own personal abilities in the way predicted by the similarity hypothesis. In this context, contrast should result (Oakes & Turner, 1990; cf. Gibbons, Benbow, & Gerrard, 1994). Surrounding Similarity Much like similarity on the evaluative dimension, similarity on surrounding dimensions can shift representation to the collective self. Gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, and even college major can be the basis for a meaningful group identity. Comparison others who share these attributes can cause assimilation effects by altering the perceived status of these shared groups. Of course, the difficulty with predicting assimilation due to similarity on surrounding dimensions is much the same as with predicting it for similarity on the evaluative dimension: A shared group membership can be a basis for considering a person a relevant standard of comparison for the individual self, and so it can increase contrast as well. Thus, predicting assimilation requires some clarification of the conditions under which shared group membership draws attention to the collective self instead of the individual self. Group Threat. One important factor moving evaluation to the group level is a perceived group threat, or a challenge to group status. When the qualities of an important group are called into question, people often become preoccupied with how they will be perceived as members of the group (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995). As a result, they should become focused on how they will be perceived through their associations with other in-group members. They should avoid associations with individuals who diminish the status of the group and seek associations with members who enhance it (e.g., Cooper & Jones, 1969; Mackie, 1984; Marques, Robalo, & Rocho, 1992; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Novak & Lerner, 1969). As an example, Mackie (1984) found that ethnic minority school children were more likely to make upward in-group comparisons if they were making comparisons on an evaluative dimension in which negative group stereotypes were made salient. This was interpreted as a largely defensive reaction on the part of participants, who presumably sought evidence of in-group excellence as a way of dispelling negative stereotypes. Although suggestive, Mackie′s (1984) study did not establish that in-group comparison would yield an assimilation effect. Direct evidence can be found in a recent set of studies by Blanton, Crocker, and Miller (2000). They gave African-American participants a bogus test of mathematical ability under conditions that were designed to increase the salience of negative intellectual stereotypes about African-American students. Before taking the test, a White experimenter informed participants that he was in the process of standardizing a measure of math ability for the purpose of determining how a representative sample would perform. This statement was included to create a concern among participants about their group′s performance. After taking the test, participants were told that they had done about average. They then overheard feedback being given to

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Page 85 either a White or a Black4 confederate, who ostensibly performed extremely well (i.e., 99th percentile) or extremely poorly (i.e., 20th percentile). As predicted, when the confederate was White, a contrast effect occurred: Participants reported more positive self-evaluations following social comparison with a White confederate who had done poorly on the test than they reported after social comparison with a White confederate who had done well (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970). However, when the confederate was Black, an assimilation effect occurred: Participants reported more positive self-evaluations following social comparison with a Black confederate who had done well on the test than they reported after social comparison with a Black confederate who had done poorly. In summary, group threats can cause individuals to evaluate the self in terms of the group status, leading to an assimilation effect following in-group comparison. However, group threat is not sufficient to cause this focus. For this to happen, the individual must identify with the group and view the lowered status as illegitimate. When this does not occur, individuals cannot take pride in the superior performance of an in-group member (Crocker & Blanton, 1999). For instance, Blanton, Christie, and Dye (2000) found that the presence of negative gender stereotypes, unlike negative ethnic stereotypes, increased the tendency for women to contrast their performance with members of the in-group (i.e., other women). One explanation for this effect is that women seemed to endorse the negative gender stereotype when it was invoked. In this light, it would make sense that increasing the salience of the stereotype would increase contrast because the presence of real gender differences in ability would make gender a relevant attribute for including a comparison other in the standard (Goethals & Darley, 1977). This finding bears resemblance to Biernat and Manis' (1994; also Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) finding that perceivers evaluate people using different standards based on their stereotypical expectations for them. Thus, when judging the competencies of women on stereotyped dimensions (Biernat & Manis, 1994, Study 1), both male and female perceivers spontaneously used standards that assessed how well the women had done as women. It seems reasonable then that women in Blanton, et al. (2000) would evaluate their own abilities by determining their standing relative another woman to a greater degree when (believed) gender stereotypes were activated (see also Jost & Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994). A second reason that threat to the group may fail to cause assimilation with gender is that gender, unlike ethnicity, is not psychologically distinct. Recall that people typically think of themselves spontaneously in terms of particular attributes when these attributes are distinct (e.g., McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1978). In this vein, they also think of themselves spontaneously in terms of shared in-groups when these groups are distinct as opposed to common (Brewer, 1991; Levine & Moreland, 1987; Mullen, 1991; Simon, 1992). Because gender is not distinct in most social contexts, contact with someone of the same gender should not lead to identification with that person as the member of a shared group (cf. Taylor & Fiske, 1978). This principle was illustrated in a set of studies by Brewer and Weber (1994). They told participants that a group they shared with a comparison other was either relatively common (80% prevalence) or relatively distinct (20% prevalence). Then, much like in the “Mr. Clean/Mr. Dirty” study (Morse & Gergen, 1970), they exposed participants to either upward or downward comparison information regarding performance on a job interview. As predicted, social comparison resulted in assimilation effects when comparison others shared a distinct in-group, but it resulted in contrast when the comparison other shared a common in-group.5 In summary, group threat may focus attention on group evaluation, leading to in-group assimilation effects. However, this is not predicted when the group threat is perceived as legitimate or when the group is common. Evaluation Indifference. The study by Brewer and Weber (1994) suggested that group threat does not lead to ingroup assimilation effects if the group is not distinct. This study makes another important point as well: Group distinctiveness can be sufficient for creating in-group assimilation effects even in the absence of a group threat . The fact that participants identified with another person simply on the basis of a minimal group assignment suggests that distinctiveness alone is enough to create a curiosity about group status. A more dramatic demonstration of this principle can be found in a set of studies by Brown and colleagues (Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992). They found assimilation effects as a result of a social comparison with someone who simply shared the same birthday. This shared category is distinct but all the more meaningless. What is surprising about studies by Brewer and Weber (1994) and Brown et al. (1992) is that it is hard to imagine why participants would form a collective identity on the basis of meaningless groups. However, results are consistent with other studies suggesting that assimilation occurs when people are not motivated to self-evaluate. Recall the findings by Tesser (1988), which indicated that assimilation occurs when people make comparisons

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Page 86 with close others, provided the evaluative dimension is not self-relevant. When people do not care about their standing on an evaluative dimension, they presumably do not care how they stack up relative to others with whom they share a close bond. As a result, they cease evaluating their abilities and shift to thinking of themselves in terms of their associations with close others. Integrating Tesser's (1988) findings with those from studies using meaningless groups (Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown et al., 1992), assimilation seems to occur when people do not care about self-evaluation – either because the group or the evaluative dimension is not self-relevant. Recently, Pelham and Wachsmuth (1995) proposed a model that accounts for this emerging pattern of results. Based on arguments by Martin, Seta, and Crelia (1990) they suggest that assimilation is the default processing strategy whenever people are not motivated to engage in explicit and deliberate self-evaluations, whereas contrast is expected when people are so motivated. This proposal is consistent with Schwarz and Bless (1992a), who argued that the default response to contextual information is to include it in the representation of the target stimulus (see also Higgins, 1996; cf. Gilbert et al., 1995; Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume). Thus, when the comparison other is categorized as similar (“close’’), assimilation should occur in contexts that do not elicit interest in self-evaluation, but contrast effects should occur in situations that do. In support of their model, Pelham and Wachsmuth found assimilation effects when perceivers were certain of their abilities (and thus not motivated to evaluate them), provided the comparison other was close. However, low certainty and high closeness lead to contrast presumably on account of the desire to self-evaluate. This framework would account for the findings in Brewer and Weber (1994) and Brown (Brown et al., 1995) if one assumes that meaningless groups do not evoke self-evaluative concerns, but do evoke feelings of similarity. In summary, similarity on surrounding dimensions is predicted to cause assimilation effects under conditions that focus attention on the collective self. Although many factors may be relevant, group threat and group distinctiveness are two important determinants. Group threat can increase the concerns for the status of the group when it is perceived as illegitimate, thus causing assimilation effects in response to comparison with in-group members. Distinctiveness may be necessary for these effects to occur, but it can also cause assimilation in the absence of threats to status. Assimilation seems to occur in the absence of threat because distinctiveness can create a basis for shared categorization, but it typically does not evoke interest in deliberate self-evaluation. Thus, assimilation is predicted in two very different circumstances: when the group is meaningful and its status is under question, and when the group is incidental and its status is meaningless. Contrast is predicted with common but meaningful groups under conditions in which interest in self-evaluation is high. FUTURE DIRECTIONS The current framework applies basic principles of categorization and comparison, as outlined by Schwarz and Bless (1992a), to predict the effects of comparison on self-evaluation. Although many factors that can influence comparison processes were discussed, many more could not be addressed. One serious limitation to the current framework is that it focused exclusively on evaluations of the self in terms of valenced traits and abilities. It is almost certain that effects would be different if the same principles of categorization were applied to attitude evaluation. The most serious challenge to the current framework, however, is the limited consideration of contextual factors that alter the type of self-concept that is active in working memory during comparison. Although a few mechanisms were discussed (e.g., the meta-contrast principle, group threat), most of the discussion treated the type of selfrepresentation activated as something determined prior to self-evaluation. Predictions had an if-then logic to them: “If the self is represented in terms of individual attributes, then relevant comparison will be included in the standard, etc.” This is admittedly simplistic. A perceiver does not have to focus attention first on the individual self to feel diminished by a superior job candidate. Similarly, one does not have to go looking for an inspiring possible-self to find it in a role model. Based on norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), it seems more likely that comparison others tell the perceiver simultaneously what self and what standard are appropriate for self-evaluation. In the words of Kahneman and Miller, the appropriate representations are determined “on the fly,” based on both the features of the comparison other and the nature of the judgment context. Explaining how this occurs is one of the more interesting challenges to face social comparison theory in the future. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to thank Bram Buunk, Tonya Dodge, Frederick X. Gibbons, Jim Jaccard, Nawaf Madi, Julie Osland, Anne Stuart, Ladd Wheeler, and Jan Fekke Ybema for comments and assistance with earlier drafts. Thanks especially to Norbert Schwarz for providing an

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Page 87 expert opinion on Schwarz and Bless (1992a). ENDNOTES 1. It should also be mentioned that the impact of a new piece of information is affected by the amount of information already in the category. Inclusion of one new piece of information will have less influence on evaluations the more information one has represented in the category. 2. There are situations in which representation of the self in terms of its possibility can lead to contrast. This will occur when the comparison others are used as standards against which to evaluate possible selves. This was demonstrated by Lockwood and Kunda (1999). They exposed participants to upward role models after first having them reflect on their future ideal selves. Contrast effects were observed presumably because the upward role models were superior to participants' ideal selves. In short, the upward comparison others showed participants that their greatest hopes for the self fell short of what others had already achieved. 3. Thanks to Dale T. Miller for this example. 4. In this chapter, the term African-American is used to refer to the perceiver because stereotype threat is conceived as the result of acculturation to American stereotypes about Blacks. However, the term Black is used when referring to the comparison other because the perceiver only knew comparison racial appearance. 5. Some subjects were exposed to comparison others who were members of the out-group. It was predicted that out-group standards would not be relevant for comparison when the in-group was common but would be relevant when the in-group was distinct. Results were consistent with these predictions (cf. Major et al., 1991).

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Page 89 6 Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System Justification: A Paradigm for Investigating the Effects of Socioeconomic Success on Stereotype Content John T. Jost Stanford University And in the moment you are born since you don't know any better, every stick and stone and every face is white, and since you have not yet seen a mirror, you suppose that you are, too. It comes as a great shock around the age of 5 or 6 or 7 to discover that the flag to which you have pledged allegiance, along with everybody else, has not pledged allegiance to you. It comes as a great surprise that Gary Cooper killing off the Indians, when you were rooting for Gary Cooper … that the Indians were you.(Interview with James Baldwin, The Price of the Ticket ) It is not only the discipline of psychology that has undergone a cognitive revolution in the latter half of the 20th century. Social science in general has shifted toward an increased reliance on mental states and processes in explaining the behaviors of individuals and groups. Sociologists and political scientists, for example, have focused more and more on expectations, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, decisions, and judgments in explaining such diverse phenomena as political socialization, group dynamics, voting behavior, and other responses to structures of status, power, and prestige (e.g., Berger & Zelditch, 1998; Howard, 1994; Iyengar & McGuire, 1993; Ridgeway, 2001). Anthropologists, too, have moved increasingly toward beliefs, construals, interpretations, and other intentional states in their descriptions of cultural systems and practices (e.g., Geertz, 1983; Shweder & LeVine, 1984; Sperber, 1990). Even philosophers have adopted the language of cognitive science to the point where traditional metaphysical and epistemological approaches have almost disappeared (e.g., Goldman, 1988; Kornblith, 1994; Solomon, 1992). In the field of organizational behavior, social-cognitive constructs such as attributions, accounts, scripts, and justifications have been used to shed light on such applied topics as job satisfaction, division of labor, employee relations, task design, and corporate strategy (e.g., Baron & Pfeifer, 1994; Martin, 1982; Salancik & Pfeifer, 1978; Weick, 1993). Neo-institutionalist theories of organizations have further analyzed the ways in which ideas and symbols are used to structure and legitimate business cultures and spread influence (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio, 1990). Somewhat improbably given the subject matter, cognitive theories of social movements and revolutions have become paradigmatic (e.g., Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Moore, 1978; Snow & Oliver, 1995), even among Marxist scholars, who are traditionally among the least individualistic of social theorists (e.g., Elster, 1985). These intellectual developments, spread as they are across a variety of disciplines, mean that constructs such as attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs have proved useful indeed for explaining behavior that clearly falls outside of the original domain of cognitive psychology – in this case, behavior that is collective, coordinated, and downright political. More precisely, one might say that in the post-cognitive revolution world, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and organizational theorists all accept the fundamental assumption that social systems are maintained at least in part through attitudes and beliefs that support them. In the language of social cognition, researchers would say that conscious and unconscious thought processes play a pivotal role in the acceptance or rejection of particular social and political forms (Jost, 1995). One variable in particular, the appraisal of legitimacy , has emerged as an important social-psychological predictor of responses to inequality (e.g., Major, 1994; J. Martin, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tyler, 1997). Historical and ethnographic studies make abundantly clear that, in the absence of militant or totalitarian rule, authorities, procedures, and social arrangements are stable and enduring to the extent that they are perceived as having legitimacy (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Moore, 1978). Inequality among groups and individuals is accepted and perpetuated, even by those who stand to lose the most from it, so long as it is perceived as fair and legitimate. This is one of the starting points of the theory

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Page 90 of system justification (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994), which is intended as a social-cognitive theory of intergroup relations and political behavior, and it is also one of the central contentions of this chapter. THE JUSTIFICATION PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY In their ground-breaking work on The Social Construction of Reality , Berger and Luckmann (1967) observed that “the institutional world requires legitimation, that is, ways by which it can be ’explained’ and ’justified’” (p. 61). In other words, we do not support social structures unless they satisfy our cognitive needs for validity and rationality. Sociologists and organizational theorists have described the excuses, accounts, and explanations we use to smooth over social interaction (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968), spread organizational influence (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio, 1990), and preserve public reputations (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). However, it is the discipline of psychology that reminds us of the fact that people must generate reasons and justifications privately, for themselves, as well as for others (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Festinger, 1957; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985; Weick, 1993). Psychologists know better than anyone else that we are cognitive creatures; we need reasons and arguments to justify both action and inaction. If we behave in an inconsistent or counterattitudinal way, we must come up with rationalizations for the departure. If we do something that causes social disapproval, we must defend ourselves with ideas. And sometimes, we just want to know that there are reasons and explanations for the actions of others and the way things are. These principles are assumed by such diverse theories and research programs in social psychology as balance theory, cognitive dissonance theory, equity theory, attribution theory, and social cognition. In other words, one of the central contentions of social psychology from the 1950s to the present has been that people justify themselves, their associates, and the world around them in the sense that they use ideas to provide validation and legitimacy for all of these things (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Justifications differ from explanations, in that the former (but not necessarily the latter) render social events right and appropriate. It is no accident that justice and justification derive from the same Latin root. The existence of class systems may be justified – that is, made legitimate – by postulating wide individual differences in effort or motivation; patriarchal systems may be justified by asserting insurmountable gender differences in achievement or ability; and systems of ethnic or racial segregation may be justified by claiming incommensurable group differences in intelligence or morality. In this way, people use ideas about groups and individuals to reinforce existing social systems and preserve the sense that those systems are fair, legitimate, and justifiable (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This need not be a conscious process, as Bem and Bem (1970) pointed out in their analysis of gender socialization and the subtle, non-conscious ways in which girls are taught to “know their place” and to participate in a sexist world. Yet why would people perceive the world around them to be justified and legitimate when so many features of their environment seem unfair and illegitimate? One answer that social psychologists have given is that there is a general motivation to “believe in a just world” (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Olson & Hafer, 2001). The guiding thesis is that living in circumstances that are unpredictable, uncontrollable, and capriciously unjust would be too psychologically threatening, and so we cling to the illusion that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. The theory of system justification builds on this essential insight (Jost & Banaji, 1994), deemphasizing somewhat the universal, psychodynamic aspects of the process and stressing instead the impact of social learning, institutionalized norms, and the power of ideology (cf. Bem & Bem, 1970; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Major, 1994; Tyler & McGraw, 1986). Stereotypes as Ideological Justifications One of the most common ways in which people use ideas and beliefs to justify the social world around them is by stereotyping members of disadvantaged groups in ways that rationalize the inequality. The stereotype that African Americans (or Hispanic Americans or blue-collar workers) are not as intelligent or hard working as other, more successful groups, according to this perspective, serves as an ideological justification for the substantial socioeconomic differences between these groups and others. This justification or rationalization function was recognized by Katz and Braly (1933) and Allport (1954), but it was not studied directly until relatively recently, when cognitive and ideological analyses were again combined. In sociology, Jackman and Senter (1983) provided survey data leading to the conclusion that ideological values and stereotypes were relatively consensual and favoring of dominant groups′ interests across racial and gender contexts. C. Hoffman and Hurst (1990) conducted experimental research in which people formed stereotypes of fictional groups as a way of rationalizing unequal divisions of labor and social roles; the authors explicitly called into question the kernel of truth view of

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Page 91 stereotypes, arguing that stereotype contents reflect rationalization rather than perceptual processes. Ridgeway (2001), too, has summarized field and experimental studies, leading to the conclusion that people form status beliefs in the course of face to face interaction in such a way that structural inequalities tend to be legitimized and perpetuated. In all of these research programs, we see that stereotypes operate as ideological devices to justify or rationalize inequality between groups. The most surprising and powerful cases of system-justifying stereotypes arise when members of low-status groups internalize unfavorable stereotypes of themselves and favorable stereotypes of others as a way to justify the existing hierarchy (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This process may give rise to the attitudes and beliefs that are out-group favoring. Such ideas and justifications are taught to us as children until they begin to operate non-consciously (Bem & Bem, 1970). Ultimately, system-justifying ideologies and stereotypes become imperceptible – like water to the fish. Outgroup-Favoring Stereotypes Under Extreme and Ordinary Circumstances From a psychological standpoint, it is especially striking that disadvantaged people would justify the very social system that places them at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, it seems that people sometimes do favor the preservation of the social order even over their own personal and collective interests, as the opening quote from James Baldwin attests. Familiar examples in the domain of public opinion include women′s widespread failure to support the Equal Rights′ Amendment (Gurin, 1985; Mansbridge, 1986) and the significant lack of support among the American working class for policies of economic redistribution (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Piven & Cloward, 1977). Even more dramatic examples are found in historical and journalistic accounts of war camps and slavery. Psychoanalytically inspired work by Anna Freud, Bruno Bettelheim, and others on the phenomenon of ‘‘identification with the aggressor” suggested that, among victims of extreme injustice and deprivation, there was an implicit rejection of the ingroup and a preference for the outgroup. A historical novel set during the Holocaust provides a stirring literary example in which a young Gypsy boy encounters his first Nazi officer. In The Painted Bird, Jerzy Kosinski (1966) writes: His entire person seemed to have something utterly superhuman about it … he seemed an example of neat perfection that could not be sullied: the smooth, polished skin of his face, the bright golden hair showing under his peaked cap, his pure metal eyes … I thought how good it would be to have such a gleaming and hairless skull instead of my Gypsy face which was so feared and disliked by decent people (p. 100). Similarly disturbing cases of system justification exist in contemporary accounts of the ongoing slave trade in Africa and Latin America. A 1992 article published in Newsweek magazine (Masland, Nordland, Liu, & Contreras, 1992), for example, quoted a 25-year-old Mauritanian slave as follows: I am a slave, my whole family are slaves … Sometimes they treat us well, sometimes they treat us badly, but only the children get beaten … A master is a master and a slave is a slave. Masters are white, slaves are black … Naturally, we blacks should be the slaves of the whites (p. 32). These anecdotal examples are of rare and extraordinary circumstances. They are relayed to suggest that psychological investment in the status quo may occur even under the most horrific systems of inequality and exploitation. If some degree of system justification arises under such dramatic conditions, system-justifying impulses should be even more likely to arise in ordinary life. It was a widespread assumption, in fact, of early researchers of intergroup relations that members of disadvantaged groups such as Jews and Blacks could not help but internalize society′s biases against them and exhibit a kind of inferiority complex at the group level (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bettelheim, 1960; Lewin, 1941). This was also the conclusion reached by Clark and Clark (1947) in their famous studies of African-American children′s preferences for White dolls. A series of laboratory studies conducted by Sachdev and Bourhis (1985, 1987, 1991) demonstrated convincingly that assignment to high-status or powerful groups leads people to display ingroup favoritism, whereas assignment to low-status or powerless groups produces outgroup favoritism. Because evidence of outgroup favoritism is often deemphasized in the literature on intergroup relations, the data from tables reported in an influential metaanalytic study conducted by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) are rearranged and presented in Table 6.1 according to the percentage of experimental groups showing ingroup favoritism, outgroup favoritism, and exact equality – broken down according to relative status of the ingroup. What this reveals is that members of high-status and equal-status groups are indeed going overwhelmingly with ingroup favoritism, but 85% of the low-status groups are displaying outgroup favoritism. That is, they

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Page 92 TABLE 6.1: Number and percentage of experimental groups showing ingroup favoritism, exact equality, and outgroup favoritism by relative status of the ingroup. StatusHighEqualLowIngroup favoritismNumber20273Percentage100%73 %15 %Exact equalityNumber020Percentage0%5%0%Outgroup favoritismNumber0817Percentage0%22%85%Note. Table adapted from a meta-analysis reported by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992). Ingroup favoritism indicates a positive Z-score reported by Mullen et al., exact equality indicates a Z-score of zero, outgroup favoritism indicates a negative Z-score. are saying that members of the other group are more intelligent, more industrious, and so on, than are members of their own group. This type of evidence led Jost and Banaji (1994) to argue that many low-status groups accept as legitimate their alleged inferiority. Rather than attempting to raise self-esteem or enhance ingroup solidarity, they use their evaluations and judgments to reinforce and justify the existing system of inequality. In some ways, this interpretation implies a rediscovery of the Marxian concept of false consciousness (Jost, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Contrary to some claims (e.g., Mullen et al., 1992), systematic evidence of outgroup favoritism does not seem to be restricted to laboratory groups. Field studies conducted by, among others, R. Brown (1978), Hewstone and Ward (1985), Jost, Burgess, and Mosso (2001), Mlicki and Ellemers (1996), Skevington (1981), and Spears and Manstead (1989) have turned up strong evidence of outgroup favoritism among members of various low-status groups. In fact, evidence coming from many real-world groups supports Roger Brown's (1986) observation that: Subordinate groups like black Americans, South African Bantus, the Mayans of Guatemala, and the lower castes of India either do, or until recently did, derogate or look down on the in-group and show positive attitudes toward the depriving out-group (p. 558). It has often been suggested that the prevailing theory of intergroup relations, social identity theory, is not wellequipped to handle the phenomenon of outgroup favoritism (e.g., Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993), although it is true that the subject has been addressed in some detail by social identity theorists such as Turner and Brown (1978), Tajfel and Turner (1986), Spears and Manstead (1989), and others. In many ways, system justification theory seeks to build on the foundation laid by social identity theory, much as social identity theorists sought to build on theories of social comparison and realistic conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Outgroup Favoritism and Social Identity Theory Social identity theory was developed to account for the initially unexpected finding that minimal laboratory groups with no history of interaction displayed ingroup favoritism with regard to social stereotyping, performance evaluation, and resource allocation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Drawing extensively on Festinger's social comparison theory, it was argued that because people need to evaluate themselves favorably and because group membership is an important constituent of the self-concept, people tend to evaluate their ingroups more favorably than they evaluate other groups (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975). Thus, according to social identity theory, there is a general drive to enhance individual and collective self-esteem by making favorable comparisons between the ingroup and relevant outgroups (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Although it is true that social identity theory emphasizes the generalizability of ingroup favoritism among members of many different types of social groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Mullen et al., 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it has also done much to frame the social-psychological understanding of how and when groups that are low in social standing will accept their alleged inferiority and when they will attempt to challenge it (e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; Spears & Manstead, 1989; Turner & Brown, 1978; van Knippenberg, 1978; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). From this body of literature, it is possible to discern three distinct explanations for the phenomenon of outgroup favoritism among low-status groups. One account has to do with self-categorization processes of identification and dis-identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), another account distinguishes between comparative dimensions that are relevant and irrelevant to the status differences (van Knippenberg, 1978), and a third account is related to perceptions of the legitimacy

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Page 93 and stability of status differences (Turner & Brown, 1978). According to the first type of explanation, members of low-status groups exhibit outgroup favoritism to the extent that they shun identification with their own negatively valued group and identify instead with members of a positively valued outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It has been argued that disidentification is the preferred choice among low-status group members in general (e.g., Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Lewin, 1941; Tajfel, 1978), and research suggests that when the option of individual mobility or exit is available, low-status group members tend to take it (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright et al., 1990). Research has also demonstrated that people who are made to identify only weakly with a low-status ingroup are less committed to the group and more likely to express a desire for individual mobility to another group than are people who are made to identify strongly with the ingroup (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Although it seems plausible that levels of ingroup identification would predict the direction and magnitude of ingroup versus outgroup favoritism among members of low-status groups, there are reasons to think that ideological factors such as the perception of system legitimacy play a more determining role. For instance, group consciousness-raising among women and minority groups requires not merely an identification with one's group, but a perception that the group's low status is illegitimate and unfair (e.g., Gurin, 1985; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Thus, from our perspective, group identification is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rejection of outgroup favoritism. According to the second type of explanation, members of low-status groups may accept their inferiority and engage in outgroup favoritism on dimensions that are highly relevant to the status differences, but they may exhibit ingroup favoritism on irrelevant dimensions as a way to compensate for an otherwise negative social identity (e.g., van Knippenberg, 1978). In fact, there is a wealth of evidence to support the notion that members of low-status groups accept their inferiority and exhibit outgroup favoritism on dimensions that are highly relevant to the status differences, but they exhibit ingroup favoritism on irrelevant dimensions as a way to compensate for an otherwise negative social identity (e.g., Mullen et al., 1992; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; van Knippenberg, 1978). For instance, Skevington (1981) examined intergroup relations among professional nursing groups that differed in status and found that low-status group members judged the other group to be more intelligent, ambitious, responsible, organized, and confident than their own group, but they saw themselves as more cheerful, thoughtful, happy, and practical than the outgroup. The strategy of compensating for the effects of a low-status position by displaying strong ingroup favoritism on dimensions that are unrelated to the status difference has been referred to as social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A third account – one that is most closely related to the concerns of system justification theory – has to do with perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the social system (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Specifically, it has been found that members of a low-status group accept their inferiority on dimensions related to the status differences and display outgroup favoritism unless they perceive the status differences to be both illegitimate and likely to change (Turner & Brown, 1978). Thus, whether low-status group members accept or reject their alleged inferiority is hypothesized to depend on whether they perceive “cognitive alternatives” to the social system, which are said to be brought on by appraisals of illegitimacy and instability. Although there is no published research to date linking perceptions of legitimacy and stability to counterfactual thinking with regard to social systems, research in social identity theory has highlighted these variables as important predictors of group identification and intergroup behavior (e.g., Caddick, 1982; Ellemers et al., 1993; Turner & Brown, 1978). The Influence of Social Identity Theory on the System Justification Perspective Social identity theory is an important precursor to the theory of system justification in at least three ways. First, it brings a social-psychological perspective to bear on intergroup relations. Differences in status or success between groups are predicted to affect group members′ perceptions of their own group and other groups, and these perceptions are theorized to affect the future course of relations between the groups as well as the viability of the social system (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Wright et al., 1990). Second, the theory introduces ideological factors such as perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the status system as relevant to ingroup and outgroup favoritism (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). Third, the notion that social groups invent ideologies that justify their competition against other groups, when combined with perspectives emphasizing the persuasive power of dominant groups′ ideologies, helps explain why stereotypes and other ideas justifying social and material inequalities eventually come to be endorsed even by members of subordinate groups (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Jost &

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Page 94 Banaji, 1994). Nevertheless, there are some limitations of the social identity perspective that make it more of a jumping off point than a terminus for the theory of system justification (cf. Jost & Banaji, 1994). Most important, theorizing about when low-status groups accept the status quo and when they reject it has tended to be relatively undeveloped in the social identity tradition. Turner and Brown (1978) argued that “subordinate groups will seek positive distinctiveness from dominant groups to the degree that their inferiority is not perceived as inherent, immutable or fully legitimate” (p. 207), but the theory fails to specify when the system is perceived as “inherent, immutable, or fully legitimate” and when it is not. Perceptions of legitimacy and stability have been addressed by social identity researchers, but they have entered into the theory as independent variables (e.g., Caddick, 1982; Ellemers et al., 1993; Turner & Brown, 1978). As a result, not much is known from social identity theory about the causes of perceived legitimacy or about why members of low status groups would ever find the system to be legitimate, when such a perception clearly conflicts with group-serving motivations. The guiding assumption of social identity theory is that people are motivated to favor their own group over other groups, but this motivation seems conspicuously lacking in any display of outgroup favoritism, even outgroup favoritism under conditions of legitimacy and stability (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). System justification theory, by contrast, draws on the vast literature on the tolerance of injustice (see Jost, 1995) and posits a motive to invest in and rationalize the status quo, and this motive is thought to be present even among members of disadvantaged groups, although typically to a lesser degree. Furthermore, research on system justification theory has begun to treat legitimacy and stability as moderating and dependent variables, demonstrating, for instance, that the act of stereotyping increases perceptions of the magnitude, legitimacy, and stability of status differences (see Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, in press). Thus, system justification theory seeks to elaborate further some of the socio-structural variables identified by social identity theorists. In fact, Tajfel (1984) seemed to realize some of the limitations of social identity theory when he wrote that: This disymmetry between the ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ groups has been recognized to some extent in the social identity approach to intergroup relations which has specified the different strategies for achieving distinctiveness that can be adopted by members of groups which differ in status … But this is not enough (p. 700). Elsewhere, he noted the importance of justice perceptions in particular for an understanding of when group members will accept and when they will reject the social system: [an] important requirement of research on social justice would consist of establishing in detail the links between social myths and the general acceptance of injustice, and research which would attempt to specify the sociopsychological conditions which could be expected to contribute to the dissolution of these patterns of acceptance (1982, p. 164). Here, Tajfel seemed to be appealing to justice researchers to determine when people will engage in system justification and when they will not. He alluded, it seems, to the need for a theory of false consciousness (Jost, 1995). Obviously, these are top priorities of the system justification approach, the implications of which are still being developed and tested in emerging research paradigms. After a brief overview of the theory, we describe an experimental paradigm that has been used to shed further light on the dynamics of ingroup and outgroup favoritism and the role of several variables identified by social identity theory, including group identification, attribute relevance, and perceived legitimacy. THE THEORY OF SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION Although phenomena such as outgroup favoritism and internalization of inferiority may be puzzling to social, political, and psychological theorists, who assume that attitudes and behaviors are driven largely by self-interest, groupinterest, or needs for personal or collective self-esteem, there is a rich tradition of Marxist and feminist scholarship on the problem of false consciousness (see Jost, 1995, for a review). This work especially emphasizes the cognitive dimensions of oppression and system preservation, building on Marx and Engels' (1846/1970) observation that, “The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production ” (p. 64; emphasis added). This theme is carried on in 20th century Marxism, most especially in György Lukács′ historical analysis of class consciousness and Antonio Gramsci′s cultural theory of hegemony and consent. Contemporary sociologists working under the banner of dominant ideology theory have continued to explore the extent to which subordinate groups are persuaded to hold beliefs that are at odds with their objective social interests (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1990; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

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Page 95 System justification theory, then, is a theory of social cognition that takes its impetus from the Marxian ideological tradition, with its focus on the justifcation of inequality and exploitation (Jost & Banaji, 1994). One of the main theoretical assumptions of this perspective is that, all other things being equal, people tend to use ideas about groups and individuals to justify the way things are, so that existing social arrangements are perceived as fair and legitimate, perhaps even natural and inevitable. There are at least seven established social-psychological phenomena that we draw on and take to support the general system justification perspective. They may be summarized as follows: 1. Members of groups low in social standing exhibit ‘‘outgroup favoritism” by internalizing unfavorable stereotypes of their own group and subscribing to favorable stereotypes of successful outgroups (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993). 2. People form stereotypes as a way of “rationalizing” unequal divisions of roles, especially in terms of essentialistic biological categories (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jackman & Senter, 1983). 3. Members of disadvantaged groups tend to draw intrapersonal and intragroup social comparisons rather than intergroup comparisons, as when women judge the legitimacy of their own income against standards of the income of other women and of their own income in the past (Jost, 1997; Major, 1994). 4. People perceive existing institutions, procedures, and outcomes as fair and legitimate, even when there are reasons to suspect that they are not (Lerner, 1980; Martin, 1986; Tyler & McGraw, 1986). 5. People exhibit decision-making biases in favor of whatever option is perceived as the “status quo” and avoid choices that are perceived to entail change (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Silver & Mitchell, 1990). 6. People stick disproportionately with past behavioral practices simply because they are familiar or habitual and fail to consider innovative alternatives (Hackman & Oldham, 1980; Silver & Mitchell, 1990). 7. People display “outcome biases” in their evaluations of groups and individuals, so that people described as “winners” are selectively perceived as possessing enduring attributes that are consistent with their success and people described as “losers” are seen as always having possessed attributes that are consistent with their failure (Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996). What these distinct bodies of evidence have in common is the notion that what is tends to be experienced as what ought to be; Although some of these phenomena, most especially status quo and outcome biases, are usually explained in purely cognitive terms by social psychologists, there is an ideological tenor to them that adds a layer of political significance and motivation to the basic information processing functions. According to the present view, cognition is deployed in the service of the social system. An Experimental Paradigm On occasion, the phenomenon of outgroup favoritism has been dismissed as something of an experimental artifact that does not occur in real-world groups. For instance, Mullen et al. (1992) wrote that “a concentration on transitory, task-specific conceptualizations of status would lead to the misguided conclusion that ingroup bias occurs predominantly in higher status groups” (p. 118). One of the goals of the research paradigm summarized here is to examine ingroup and outgroup favoritism by using an experimental manipulation of status that is neither transitory nor task-specific. Instead, we sought to devise an experimental paradigm in which ingroup and outgroup favoritism could be investigated in the context of real-world group memberships, whereas relative social status could be manipulated experimentally so that differences due to social status of the ingroup could be attributed solely to variations in status and not to other factors associated with particular real-world groups. Additionally, the manipulation of status was defined in terms of socioeconomic success. This was done to improve on the ecological validity of previous experimental manipulations of status in terms of performance feedback on tests of creativity (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991), reasoning skills (Turner & Brown, 1978), or other “transitory, taskspecific conceptualizations” (Mullen et al., 1992, p. 118). Because system justification theory is especially relevant for understanding cognitive responses to wealth and poverty (e.g., Jost, 1995; Lane, 1962; Major, 1994), status of the ingroup was operationalized as relative socioeconomic success. The basic procedure for varying perceived socioeconomic success is as follows. Shortly after arriving for an experiment billed as “The Inter-Collegiate Study of Abstract Thought,” university students are told that they are about to participate in a research project aimed at understanding “why differences in social and economic success exist between graduates of different colleges and universities.” Half of the participants are presented with statistics indicating that alumni members of their own university group are significantly less successful in terms

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Page 96 of socioeconomic achievement than are members of a rival outgroup, and the other half are led to believe that the ingroup is more successful than the outgroup. These statistics include information concerning average financial income, career advancement and promotions, status of professions entered, rates of admission to graduate and professional schools, and years of postgraduate education completed. The materials used for a study involving University of Maryland students (low-success condition) are presented in Table 6.2 (see also Jost & Burgess, 2000, for more information). This procedure has been used successfully in a series of experiments involving students at Yale University, the University of Maryland, and the University of California at Santa Barbara (U.C.S.B.), with comparison outgroups of Stanford University, the University of Virginia, and the University of California at Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.), respectively. These three experiments are described in abbreviated form in this chapter; two of them are presented more systematically elsewhere (see Jost, 1996; Jost & Burgess, 2000). Manipulation checks indicate that, in all studies conducted thus far, the statistics concerning socioeconomic success differences (ascribed to sources such as U.S. News and World Report and the Chronicle of Higher Education ) were accepted as credible and convincing. These studies also demonstrate that relative socioeconomic success has a major impact on the stereotypes and evaluations that people have about ingroup and outgroup members. As a general rule, random assignment to the high-success condition leads people to display ingroup favoritism – that is, to express beliefs that their own group is superior on a number of stereotypical characteristics, whereas assignment to the low-success condition leads people to display outgroup favoritism – that is, to express beliefs that the more successful outgroup is superior. This pattern has been observed on qualitative, open-ended measures of attribution in which respondents are not constrained by the expectancies or questions of the researchers. In the Yale study, following the experimental induction of relative success, participants were given the following instructions: “Think about the differences in social and economic success between Yale and Stanford alumni/ae. Can you think of any explanations or justifications for why Yale and Stanford graduates would have different rates of socioeconomic success?” Participants were then asked to spend 2 to 3 minutes listing up to five responses in clearly numbered spaces. Two independent judges coded the open-ended responses as focusing either on the ingroup (Yale) or the outgroup (Stanford) and as expressing something favorable, unfavorable, or neutral about that ingroup or outgroup. TABLE 6.2: Sample materials for manipulating perceived socioeconomic success. Virginia AlumniMaryland AlumniMean Financial Incomeafter 5 years$38,500$24,700after 10 years$53,200$39,500after 20 years$69,700$54,100at retirement$78,300$62,500Career AdvancementMean number of promotions after 5 years2.41.3Mean number of promotions after 10 years5.33.0Mean number of promotions after 20 years9.56.2Number of CEOs of major corporations4117postgraduate EducationMean years of postgraduate education1.30.4% of applicants admitted to medical school44%21%% of applicants admitted to law school43%19%% of applicants admitted to business school57%30%% of applicants admitted to graduate school60%41%% receiving post-baccalaureate degrees49%23%Sources: U.S. News & World Report, 1993; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 1994 When Yale students were assigned to the high-success condition, explanations making reference to characteristics of the ingroup tended to be very favorable (e.g., “Maybe Yalies are smarter”; ‘‘Yale admits students with better records who are innately more driven”). According to the independent judges, 81.5% of ingroup-related statements were favorable in content, and only 2.4% of these were unfavorable. When members of high-success groups generated explanations pertaining to the outgroup, 42.1% of these were judged to be unfavorable (e.g., “Because Stanford is a sport scholarship-granting school, they are going to get athletes that are not as intelligent as the students who get in regularly”; “Stanford students are somehow superficial. They simply glide

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Page 97 on the surface without seeking the deep reasons”). Only 15.8% of the explanations having to do with features of the outgroup were favorable. When Yale students were assigned to a position of low socioeconomic success, the results were very different. Under these conditions, only 12.3% of the explanations involving the ingroup were judged to be favorable in nature, whereas 42.5% were unfavorable (e.g., “Yale is full of your bookworms and your dorks”; “Yale students are too idealistic, and usually have impractical or false imaginations about real world life”). Of explanations involving the outgroup, 62.2% were judged as favorable (e.g., “Stanford offers a better education than Yale”; ‘‘Stanford is a more selective school, so it has smarter people”), and only 4.2% were unfavorable. Thus, members of low-success groups display outgroup favoritism in making open-ended attributions for the socioeconomic success differences. As with stereotypes, evaluations, resource allocations, and other types of social judgments, the research literature on intergroup relations has stressed the ethnocentric nature of attributions about ingroup and outgroup members (Cooper & Fazio, 1986; Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). The notion that people generate groupserving attributions for outcomes is also highly consistent with social identity theory. Our research suggests, however, that low-status group members do not attribute their inferior position-to situational factors or extenuating circumstances, but rather seem to internalize the inequality in the form of internal attributions about the unfavorable characteristics of the ingroup and the favorable characteristics of the outgroup. According to a system justification analysis, members of groups that are low in social or material standing should exhibit ingroup derogation and outgroup favoritism to the extent that they perceive the overarching social system to be fair, legitimate, and justifiable. Thus, it is hypothesized that perceived legitimacy is negatively related to ingroup favoritism among members of low-status groups, insofar as people who accept ideological justifications for a status quo that places them at a disadvantage should be more likely to consent to their own inferiority. However, perceived legitimacy is hypothesized to relate positively to ingroup favoritism among high-status groups, insofar as they gain confidence and esteem from the sense that their advantage is legitimized; their sense of superiority is increased by the perception that the system is fair, legitimate, and justified. This interaction hypothesis is slightly different from that which has been predicted by social identity theorists. Turner and Brown (1978) hypothesized that “[g]roups with illegitimate status relations would display more ingroup bias than those with legitimate status relations” (p. 210), regardless of the status of the ingroup. Their reasoning was that perceived illegitimacy should render the system of status differences unstable and insecure, leading both groups to vie for a position of superiority (see also Caddick, 1982). This implies a main effect hypothesis such that ingroup favoritism should be greater among people who perceive the status differences to be low in legitimacy than among people who perceive them to be high in legitimacy. Thus, although social identity and system justification theories make the same prediction with regard to the behavior of low-status group members, the two perspectives differ when it comes to predictions about high-status group members. In an experiment involving students at the University of Maryland, the procedure described earlier was used to manipulate perceived socioeconomic success. Following this induction, participants were asked how fair or unfair, how justifiable or unjustifiable, and how legitimate or illegitimate the socioeconomic success differences were between the ingroup (University of Maryland) and the outgroup (University of Virginia), and their responses to these three items were averaged to create a general index of perceived legitimacy. Ingroup and outgroup ratings on status relevant (intelligent, hard working, and skilled at verbal reasoning) and status irrelevant (friendly, honest, and interesting) attributes were solicited. As illustrated in Fig. 6.1, perceived legitimacy increased ingroup favoritism among members of high-success groups, but it decreased ingroup favoritism (and increased outgroup favoritism) among members of low-success groups. This interaction pattern was also observed in the Yale study (Jost, 1996), suggesting that the focus on legitimation in intergroup relations is well placed. Perceived legitimacy seems to have opposite effects on high-status and low-status group members, as system justification theory predicts, and not as Turner and Brown (1978) suggested. In addition, Jost and Burgess (2000) found that Maryland students assigned to the position of low socioeconomic success showed significantly greater attitudinal ambivalence directed at their own group than did students assigned to the high-success condition. This was explained in terms of a psychological conflict between opposing tendencies toward group justification and system justification – a conflict that faces members of low-status but not high-status groups (see also Jost et al., 2001). We also reasoned that members of a psychologically meaningful group such as this (for whom at least moderate levels of group justification motives would be present), ambivalence toward the ingroup

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Page 98 Fig. 6.1. Means on ingroup favoritism (stereotyping) by ingroup success and perceived legitimacy

would be increased as levels of system justification were increased for members of the low-status group, but ambivalence would be decreased as levels of system justification were increased for people assigned to the highstatus condition. And this is what we found. Perceptions of the legitimacy of the status differences were associated with increased ambivalence among low-status group members and decreased ambivalence among high-status group members (Jost & Burgess, 2000). One potential limitation of the Maryland study is that perceived legitimacy was measured rather than manipulated, and so there was no random assignment to conditions of legitimacy or illegitimacy. A follow-up study involving students at U.C.S.B. did employ an experimental manipulation of perceived legitimacy. After learning that their own group was less socioeconomically successful than the comparison outgroup of U.C.L.A. students, participants were exposed to a pair of persuasive essays that were allegedly written by members of the ingroup (as part of a cover story concerning abstract verbal reasoning); these essays were in actuality designed to alter perceptions of the legitimacy of the socioeconomic differences. In the high-legitimacy condition, for example, one of the essays read: There are two good reasons why UCSB students are less economically successful than UCLA students: (1) UCLA admits students with more varied and more experienced backgrounds, and these people have a better sense of what they want to do later in life; and (2) there is a perception out there (and it's probably right!) that UCSB students are partyers who do not take academics seriously enough. Both of these reasons would easily explain the disparities. With regard to the first, everyone knows that people who are ambitious and knowledgeable are in a better position to succeed economically, and they deserve that success. With regard to the second reason, potential employers are probably sensitive to legitimate differences in the qualifications of students at the two schools. The corresponding essay for the low-legitimacy condition was as follows: There are two main reasons why UCSB students are less economically successful than UCLA students: (1) UCLA admits more students with privileged backgrounds, and these people have more advantages to begin with and more connections later in life; and (2) there is a misperception that UCSB students are just partyers who do not take academics seriously. Neither one of these reasons is fair. With regard to the first, everyone knows that ’wealth begets wealth’ and that it is far easier for people of higher social classes to succeed economically, whether they deserve that success or not. With regard to the second reason, potential employers are probably relying on false perceptions, without paying enough attention to the merits of qualified individuals at UCSB.

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Page 99 Fig. 6.2. Effects of legitimacy manipulation on ingroup and outgroup favoritism on the part of low status group members

Although a subset of participants (12%) were not persuaded by the essays, those who were persuaded that the system was either legitimate or illegitimate showed changes in their stereotypes (see Fig. 6.2). Compared with students who were assigned to the low- legitimacy condition, those who were assigned to the high-legitimacy condition exhibited stronger outgroup favoritism on status-relevant attributes (intelligent, hard working, skilled at verbal reasoning) and lesser ingroup favoritism on status-irrelevant attributes (honest, friendly, interesting). In addition to clarifying the important role of perceived legitimacy in determining the degree of ingroup or outgroup favoritism exhibited by low-status group members, the experimental paradigm we developed also provides us with some insight concerning the issues of disidentification and attribute relevance. Does Disidentification Account for Outgroup Favoritism in Low-status Groups? According to one prominent account derived from social identity theory, members of low-status groups exhibit outgroup favoritism to the extent that they disidentify with their own group. However, it may not always be feasible for people to avoid perceiving themselves in terms of ascribed group memberships and to persist in thinking of themselves as part of a group to which they do not belong. Research indicates, in fact, that ingroup identification tends to be stronger among members of some low-status groups (e.g., African Americans, Hispanic Americans) than among members of high-status groups (e.g., European Americans), insofar as the former group memberships are more numerically distinctive (rarer) than the latter (McGuire & McGuire, 1988). An even bigger challenge to the disidentification thesis is the fact that correlations between ingroup identification and ingroup favoritism are weak and inconsistent (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). A study by Mlicki and Ellemers (1996), for example, finds that Polish citizens identify especially strongly with their own national image, but the image that they hold is a predominantly negative one, presumably because of recent failures of their economic system. Therefore, it is doubtful that decreased ingroup identification among members of low-status groups, even if it can be demonstrated, would be sufficient to produce the extent of outgroup favoritism that has been observed. Although ingroup identification has not been a focal point of the research program reported on here, it was included as a measured variable in the Yale study and as a manipulated variable in the U.C.S.B. study. In the Yale study, no evidence was obtained for the disidentification

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Page 100 Fig. 6.3. Stereotypic evaluations of high status and low status target groups by an observer group

hypothesis that members of low-success groups would identify less with the ingroup than would members of highsuccess groups. Ingroup identification was in fact nonsignificantly higher among members of low-success groups than among members of high-success groups, possibly because cognitive dissonance is aroused by belonging to a group that is low in social standing, and this dissonance may be reduced by redoubling one's investment in the group (cf. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & Smith, 1984). In the U.C.S.B. study, a bogus pipeline procedure was used to convince members of low-status groups they were either especially high or low in ingroup identification (cf. Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). No significant main effect of ingroup identification on ingroup favoritism was obtained, although this should have been expected on the basis of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Taken as a whole, these findings deepen existing worries that social identity theory insufficiently explains status differences on ingroup favoritism (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993). None of this is to say that disidentification processes play no role in the phenomenon of outgroup favoritism or that issues of group justification are unrelated to intergroup evaluations. What our results suggest, however, is that disidentification with the ingroup does not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for the sort of system justifying outgroup favoritism observed among members of low-status groups . Does the Moderating Role of Attribute Relevance Support Social Identity Theory? Studies employing our experimental paradigm for manipulating perceived socioeconomic success replicate the finding that attribute relevance moderates the display of ingroup and outgroup favoritism on the part of low-status group members (e.g., Mullen et al., 1992; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; Skevington, 1981; Spears & Manstead, 1989; van Knippenberg, 1978). In the Maryland study (Jost & Burgess, 2000), for example, members of low-status groups exhibited strong outgroup favoritism on status-relevant attributes of intelligence, industriousness, and verbal reasoning ability, but they exhibited strong ingroup favoritism on status-irrelevant attributes of honesty, friendliness, and interestingness, a finding that was replicated in the U.C.S.B. study. Members of high-status groups, by contrast, exhibited ingroup favoritism on relevant and irrelevant attributes. Although we have replicated the pattern of results obtained by social identity theorists for relevant versus

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Page 101 irrelevant attributes, another one of our studies casts doubt on the theoretical interpretation that has been offered repeatedly for this pattern. U.C.S.B. students were asked to rate two outgroups – Stanford and U.C.-Santa Cruz – on exactly the same stereotyping measures used in all of the prior studies. Although U.C.S.B. students did not belong to either of the groups being rated, the stereotype pattern they showed was almost identical to other studies in which the ingroup was implicated in the comparison: The higher status group (Stanford) was rated as more intelligent, more hard working, and more skilled at verbal reasoning, whereas the lower status group (U.C.-Santa Cruz) was rated as more honest, friendly, and interesting (see Fig. 6.3). In fact, the mean differences corresponded almost exactly to mean levels of ingroup and outgroup favoritism in our other studies. This suggests that the tendency among members of low-status groups to favor the ingroup on status-irrelevant dimensions of comparison may not actually be driven by group-justifying needs to compensate for threatened social identification, as has always been assumed. The possibility that people subscribe generally to lay or folk theories in which a negative correlation exists between social or economic status and favorable socioemotional characteristics (such as honesty and friendliness) is being addressed in ongoing research. In fact, it may be that such beliefs serve system-justifying ends and that highand low-status group members might all feel that the system is more legitimate if they can sustain stereotypes of the “poor but honest” or “poor but happy” variety. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THE THEORY OF SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION One question that has not been addressed sufficiently in the research reported herein is “why do people engage in system justification?” Our response is that it is probably overdetermined. There are many forces, internal and external to the individual, that pull for system justification sorts of attitudes and behaviors, and these should be investigated in future research. There are cognitive factors, such as genuine attempts to explain and understand the world, as well as tendencies to preserve existing attitudes and beliefs and to achieve certainty and closure. Thus, we have argued that political conservatism and other system-justifying attitudes serve to reduce uncertainty and satisfy the “need for cognitive closure’’ (e.g., Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999). In addition, there are motivations to stave off existential terror by preserving the sense that the world is a fair and manageable place in which people “get what they deserve and deserve what they get” (e.g., Lerner, 1980). Situational factors also determine the strength of system-justifying responses. In recent research with Yephat Kivetz, we have found that the presence of an ideological threat directed against the national system increases stereotypic differentiation between high-status Ahskenazi Jews and low-status Sepharadic Jews in Israel. In general, too, people face structural constraints, such as rewards for obeying authority and tolerating unequal outcomes, and punishments for challenging the legitimacy of the system. Therefore, we argue that one major (and overdetermined) function of attitudes, stereotypes, and social judgments is to justify existing social arrangements. System justification refers to a set of social, cognitive, and motivational tendencies to preserve the status quo through ideological means, especially when it involves rationalizing inequality among social groups. Our research (in collaboration with Grazia Guermandi, Monica Rubini, and Cristina Mosso) has begun to explore the ways in which people use stereotypes to justify socioeconomic differences between northerners and southerners in the United States, England, and Italy. There are other issues, too, that future research would do well to address. For one thing, it would be important to know the extent to which system justification and outgroup favoritism are truly internalized on the part of low-status group members, as opposed to being strategic, self-presentations displays that do not reflect privately held beliefs and attitudes. Jost and Banaji (1994) argued that outgroup favoritism might be even stronger at an unconscious or unexamined level of awareness insofar as such impulses would be less subject to controlled processing and to conscious activation of ego and group justification motives. Our research has begun to explore these issues, using reaction time paradigms and other unobtrusive methodologies to estimate the extent of outgroup favoritism on nonconscious cognitive, affective, and behavioral measures (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2000). Finally, the future of system-justification theory will have to accommodate exceptions to the rule by explaining when and why people fail to provide ideological support for the existing social system. In other words, the theory should be useful also for identifying opponent processes that govern group consciousness-raising and inspire social and organizational change. Some of these are likely to be associated with processes of ego justification and group justification, which are hypothesized to stand in an inverse relation to system justification processes for members of low-status groups (Jost et al., 2001). Individual difference variables might also identify

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Page 102 people who are especially likely or unlikely to engage in system-justifying outgroup favoritism. Candidates include the “belief in a just world” scale and the “social dominance orientation” scale (see Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000), as well as political orientation (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, in press). In collaboration with Grazia Guermandi and Erik Thompson, we have also been developing a scale of “economic system justification’’ (see Jost & Thompson, 2000). Evidence presented here – that perceptions of illegitimacy are associated with the rejection of outgroup favoritism – is also a step in the right direction, but more research is needed to determine when and why people will shed the layers of false consciousness and begin to substantially challenge the existence of social inequality in all of its various guises. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Portions of this chapter are based on writings submitted in partial fulfillment for the Ph.D. degree granted by the Department of Psychology at Yale University under the supervision of William J. McGuire. Funding for the research described herein was provided by a Robert M. Leylan Fellowship in Social Science from Yale University, a grant from the Faculty Research Assistant Program at U.C.-Santa Barbara (both awarded to the author), NIMH Grant #5R01MH32588 awarded to William J. McGuire, and NIMH Grant #R01-MH52578 awarded to Arie W. Kruglanski. I am grateful to Joyce Liu, Cristina Mosso, and Oliver Sheldon for assistance with manuscript preparation and to Sonya Grier and Michael Morris for helpful suggestions concerning revisions of this chapter.

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Page 103 Part II.Building Blocks of Social Cognition: Representation and Structure

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Page 105 7 A Case for the Nonconscious Self-Concept John J. Hetts Brett W. Pelham Ohio State University, Columbus State University of New York at Buffalo In fact, I cannot totally grasp all that I am. Thus, the mind is not large enough to contain itself: but where can that part of it be which it does not contain? – St. Augustine Virtually all contemporary research on the self-concept has examined people's self-reported, consciously accessible self-conceptions (for reviews, see Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1998; Brown, 1998; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Wylie, 1974, 1979). However, emerging evidence suggests there are many aspects of experience that are outside our conscious awareness and control, including aspects of memory, learning, attitudes, stereotypes, and, notably, self-esteem (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Schacter, 1992). Evidence has thus begun to suggest that St. Augustine was correct. Apparently a large part of who we are remains inaccessible to us. That is, there appear to be important aspects of the self-concept that reside outside of conscious awareness. The idea that there are domains of the mind and the self to which people have little access and over which people have little control is not new. In fact, this idea can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. For example, the idea we are often unable to exert our will over our behavior was expressed both by Ovid, “I see and approve better things but follow worse,” and Euripedes, “We know the good, we apprehend it clearly, but we can not bring it to achievement.” Throughout history, a variety of philosophers, writers, poets, play-wrights, and physicians (inter alia St. Thomas Aquinas, Cervantes, Galen, Montaigne, and Shakespeare) have explored mental processes over which people have little awareness or control (for reviews, see Margetts, 1953; Whyte, 1978). In recent years, researchers have developed techniques for examining unconscious beliefs, and we believe such techniques contribute to the development of a complete theory of the mind and the self-concept. Before discussing contemporary research on nonconscious aspects of the self-concept, however, we briefly review the history of how people have understood nonconscious thought. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS Many revered thinkers have tackled the concepts of the unconscious and the self. Perhaps more than any other thinker, René Descartes (1641/1993) laid the foundation for a modern understanding of nonconscious aspects of the self. However, he did so not by developing the concept of the unconscious, but by developing a dualistic model of human experience. Two of Descartes' premises proved critical. The first premise was that human beings represent a union between a self-conscious, thinking entity and an unthinking, reflexive mechanical body. The second premise was that the self resides in the thinking entity, even in thought itself (thus the famous phrase “Cogito, ergo sum”). Descartes assumed that self-understanding (in addition to understanding the world more generally) could begin only with the awareness of one's existence. Additional principles of self-understanding could subsequently be deduced on a logical basis. This rational model of selfhood had a profound influence on the understanding of nonconscious elements of the mind. Descartes' dualistic position on mind and body dictated that anything outside of awareness must reside in the body rather than in the mind. Thus, the body became the source of drives, needs, and instincts. Reactions against Descartes' emphasis on consciousness facilitated the development of the idea that there are aspects of the mind and self of which we are not aware. These ideas laid the foundation for our contemporary understanding of the mind and, as we hope to demonstrate here, the self. The Cognitive Unconscious One of the first thinkers to organize arguments against

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Page 106 Descartes' position on mind and self was Blaise Pascal. Pascal (1670/1966) held that aspects of both self and behavior lay outside of our awareness. As he put it, “The heart has its reasons, which reason knows nothing of.’’ Pascal further held that the conscious, self-aware thinking entity (Descartes' self) sometimes interfered with the achievement of happiness (cf. Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Both Spinoza and Leibniz emphasized similar perspectives. For example, Leibniz (1704/1996) foreshadowed Freud's conception of the preconscious, Weber's (1834) conception of absolute threshold, and many contemporary analyses of consciousness (e.g., Dennett, 1991) by arguing that the perceptions of which we are aware are the accumulation of smaller perceptions that are of insufficient size to yield awareness. Like many modern students of the cognitive unconscious (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1990; Schacter, 1992) Leibniz also postulated that people's experiences could influence later thoughts and behaviors in the absence of any conscious memory for the experiences. The Affective and Motivational Unconscious In the wake of Descartes and his contemporaries, other philosophers laid the groundwork for a second dimension of modern understandings of the unconscious: the idea of nonconscious emotions, instincts, and drives. Rousseau (1781-1788/1995) suggested that many uncontrollable behaviors, both remarkable and mundane, are primarily grounded in emotions or feelings. Hume (1777/1976) went further, suggesting that nearly all behaviors, including those we perceive to be consciously controlled, are grounded in instinct or physiology. In a similar way, Goethe (1957) located the imagination completely in the unconscious and posited that the mind was the unified interplay of conscious and unconscious aspects of existence. He thus proposed that no conscious thought existed without the operation of unconscious elements and thus anticipated contemporary views of intuition and insight (e.g., Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996). The Pathological Unconscious As thinking about the unconscious continued to evolve, philosophers began to speculate about harmful aspects of the unconscious. For example, Schopenhauer (1819/1995) suggested that the primary purpose of consciousness was to rationalize unconscious desires and instincts. Similarly, Nietzche (1954/1977) held that humans are not rational but rather rationalizing, self-deceptive beings strongly influenced by unconscious drives. Nietzche anticipated a great deal of Freud's description of the unconscious. For example, Nietzche foreshadowed Freud's argument that difficult or disturbing memories are often forced out of consciousness. Nietzche also suggested that consciousness is a late and incomplete evolutionary development (cf. James, 1890/1950). Thus, to Nietzche, consciousness was a narrow, superficial epiphenomenon whose impact on behavior paled in comparison with unconscious influences. The growing emphasis on pathological aspects of the unconscious during the late 18th and early 19th centuries was partly fueled by scientific attempts to understand hysteria (Kelly, 1991). Franz Mesmer was at the forefront of such efforts. Mesmer discovered that he could either elicit or relieve various psychosomatic symptoms through “animal magnetism,” now known as hypnotism. Expanding on these mesmerizing ideas, Charcot began the differentiation between neurological and unconscious causes of mental illness, paving the way for the subsequent psychological study of the unconscious by Janet, Freud, and Jung. Janet (1907) was one of the earliest thinkers to employ careful observation in the study of unconscious aspects of psychopathology. Moreover, he argued forcefully that the understanding of the unconscious mind was crucial to the treatment of certain mental disorders. His work, largely overshadowed by Freud's, helped pioneer the use of projective tasks such as hypnosis, automatic writing, and dream interpretation, techniques that were adopted in earnest by Freud and Jung. Although earlier thinkers anticipated much of his work, Freud did more than anyone else in history to increase people's interest in the unconscious. He did so by postulating an intelligent, motivated, dynamic unconscious. In his early work, Freud (1900/1965) theorized that the human mind could be divided into conscious and unconscious parts. He further theorized that the unconscious mind could be divided into a portion that could be brought into consciousness (the preconscious) and a fully unconscious portion that contained material too difficult for the conscious mind to accept. Freud (e.g., 1927/1950, 1933/1965) later revised this division, postulating three distinct components of the mind: the now familiar id, ego, and superego. From this perspective, only the ego was primarily, although not entirely, conscious. Freud felt that the source of many mental illnesses was the ego's unsuccessful negotiation of the conflict between the constraints of reality and the motives of the two primarily unconscious components (id and superego). Freud took a number of routes to bringing people's unconscious thoughts into consciousness, including dream interpretation and free association. It is noteworthy that many of

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Page 107 these projective tasks bear more than a superficial resemblance to modern tasks used to assess implicit memory (e.g., Toth & Reingold, 1996). Because of Freud's emphasis on controversial ideas such infantile sexuality, catharsis, and repression, many researchers interested in the mind and the self failed to appreciate the importance of Freud's insights about the unconscious (see Epstein, 1994; Westen, 1998a, 1998b, for related discussions). Nonetheless, Freud and his successors generated a great deal of interest in the unconscious, and many early ideas about the unconscious have been validated by contemporary research (see Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997; Westen, 1998a, 1998b). Much of this work could also be considered an extension of Jung's less exotic view that the unconscious performs most of the same functions that more typically take place in the conscious mind. Jung (1961) also anticipated contemporary work on the unconscious by emphasizing that we often experience the products rather than the processes of unconscious mental events. These products then form the contents of consciousness (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCONSCIOUS Psychoanalytic theorists were not the only ones who paved the way for the study of the unconscious. Early students of perception, learning, and memory also did so by anticipating phenomena such as implicit memory and implicit learning. Ebbinghaus (1885/1964), for example, observed that even when people could not consciously recall previously studied stimuli, they could learn these stimuli more quickly than could people who had never before seen the stimuli. Ebbinghaus specifically noted that these savings represented a measure of memory independent of people's conscious recollections. Helmholtz (1866/1925) reintroduced the idea of unconscious inferences, reasoning that some forms of learning (e.g., depth perception) are unconscious. William James and Functionalism One of the foremost scholars of the self, William James also proved to be highly influential in developing our modern understanding of the nonconscious mind. One of the major contributions of James' perspective on human behavior was to shift study away from the contents toward the functions of consciousness. This change greatly expanded existing theories of mental processes and laid the foundation for later interest in the idea that many everyday psychological processes occur outside of conscious awareness. James (1890/1950) took issue with the idea that consciousness is epiphenomenal and has no causal influence on behavior. Questioning why consciousness should closely parallel something that it has nothing to do with, he suggested that consciousness has discrete functions and observable effects. James concluded that the primary purpose of consciousness is selective attention. It directs attention when there is competition from multiple impinging sensations (e.g., it allows one to keep writing despite the impinging sensations of hunger). What function can this serve? James postulated that consciousness and selective attention allow people to behave in highly efficient ways in a variety of circumstances. That is, consciousness functions in the short run in much the same way that evolution functions in the long run: It quickly produces adaptive behaviors that could take eons to evolve in the absence of consciousness. According to James, consciousness utilizes the flexibility of higher brain functions while allowing people to take advantage of well-learned habits. James took it as evidence for his position that consciousness (i.e., self-awareness) is highest at moments of greatest indecision (i.e., in the face of danger, uncertainty, or competing cues for behavior; see Baumeister, 1998; Carr, 1925; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). At the same time, James also disputed contemporary descriptions of the unconscious as a font of desires, wills, repressed pains, and instinct, dismissing such theorizing as untestable (a claim, we suggest, that proved to be incorrect). However, despite his emphasis on the prepotency of consciousness, James made substantial contributions to the position that unconscious processes are important to daily experience. He did so primarily in his treatments of habit and emotion. Habit . James thought of habits as consistent modes of conduct that become easier to activate with repeated use. Just as a path through a thicket becomes easier to traverse with each additional trip, habits become more inviting with each additional expression. Thus, according to James, one of the important functions of habit is to diminish the conscious attention necessary to perform a task. Thus, habits become self-sustaining: One aspect leads to the next without the necessity of conscious oversight (cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Emotion. According to James, emotional experience derives partly from bodily movements and actions: “We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (James, 1890/1950, II, pp 449-450). This suggests that the conscious experience of emotion has important determinants outside of our awareness (namely, behavioral and physiological responses). This

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Page 108 perspective anticipated the contemporary view that emotions are often a joint product of arousal and labeling (cf. Schacter & Singer, 1962). Unfortunately, as the ideas of James and Freud were beginning to take root in psychology, a paradigm shift toward behaviorism lead to a deemphasis of consciousness, the self, and mental processes. Behaviorism's emphasis on objective verification and the intractability of mental processes relegated the self – including the unconscious self – to the philosophers armchair. However, behaviorists and neobehaviorists eventually provided researchers with the paradigms, tools, and hypothetical constructs (from shuttle boxes and latent learning, to Skinner boxes and cognitive maps) that eventually made it possible to study unconscious mental processes. Moreover, they began the accumulation of evidence of automatic behavior (by showing that stimuli often lead automatically to responses). Paradoxically, then, behaviorists and learning theorists invented and refined many of the tools that are now used to open the black boxes they typically considered impenetrable. MODERN EVIDENCE FOR NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SELF The cognitive revolution in psychology revived psychologists interest in mental processes, eventually including unconscious mental processes. This development, however, owes more to attempts to understand the cognitive and affective components of the unconscious than to the study of Freudian dynamics (Kihlstrom, 1984, 1987, 1990). Although Freud deserves the credit for popularizing the importance of the unconscious, modern treatments of the unconscious are rooted less in Freud's analysis of the dysfunctional and maladaptive and more in James analysis of the functional and adaptive (cf., however, Westen, 1998a, 1998b). For example, reviewing a great deal of past and recent research, Bargh and Chartrand (1999; Bargh, 1997) argued that the vast majority of our thoughts, emotions, and behavior are determined by preconscious automatic processes (processes that depend solely on the presence of a triggering stimulus or condition). They further argued that this routine automatization of virtually every aspect of our mental lives liberates our conscious mind from monitoring and directing the multitudes of our mental activities. Drawing on inferences based on the study of skill acquisition and knowledge compilation (as reviewed in Bargh, 1996), dating from James chapter on habit, Bargh and Chartrand argued that, over time, our mental activities are increasing delegated to the efficient and reliable preconscious automatic processes. This allows conscious resources to be allocated to tasks that require attention and cognitive resources.1 To develop our case for the existence of nonconscious elements of the self-concept, we first examine current conceptualizations of the nonconscious mind as it pertains to memory, social cognition, and affect. We then suggest how the findings in those areas may be applied to our understanding of the self. However, before specifying the likely architecture of the nonconscious self, we begin by outlining the general terrain of the nonconscious. What are the hallmarks of automatic or nonconscious cognition? Bargh (1989, 1994) identified four important attributes of nonconscious or automatic processing (see also Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). They include (a) a lack of awareness of a stimulus or of the stimulus effects on subsequent experience, (b) a lack of intention to make a judgment or act in a certain way, (c) high levels of efficiency (automatic processes require little processing capacity), and (d) low levels of controllability. Few processes meet all four of these criteria. Rather, most processes involve a mixture of nonconscious and conscious processes (Bargh, 1994; Jacoby, 1991). We thus focus on processes that reveal at least some of the qualities of nonconscious processing. Nonconscious Cognition: Implicit Memory and Implicit Learning Research on implicit learning and memory holds substantial promise for informing nonconscious aspects of the self. Researchers who have tackled implicit learning and memory have learned to identify introspectively inaccessible effects of previous experience on the facilitation or disruption of current task performance (for reviews, see Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1987, 1989, 1992). For example, researchers have assessed implicit memory for previously viewed stimuli using performance on perceptual identification tasks such as the recognition of degraded words (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981): Other researchers have assessed implicit memory using word-stem or word-fragment completions. Even when participants cannot consciously recall words to which they were recently exposed, this previous exposure increases the likelihood that participants will generate such words in the word-completion task. For example, participants recently exposed to the word caper may not be able to recall the word, but they will become especially likely to generate this word in response to fragments such as “____APER” or “CAP____” (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982). These implicit effects of prior exposure occur

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Page 109 even when exposure to the critical stimuli is incidental (Eich, 1984) or extremely brief (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and they occur even for patients with profound forms of amnesia (Schacter, 1996). Not only have unconscious, introspectively inaccessible effects of previous experiences been systematically identified, but they have also been carefully distinguished from the conscious remembering that people more commonly think of as memory. In an influential review, Schacter (1987) summarized the observed distinctions between implicit and explicit memory. Four of his points are highly relevant to our position here. First, Schacter noted, manipulations that influence explicit memory (e.g., depth of processing) typically have little or no effects on implicit memory (e.g., Graf & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Winnick & Daniel, 1970). Second, seemingly superficial changes in the stimuli between exposure and testing (e.g., moving from auditory to visual presentation) have little effect on explicit memory but can substantially disrupt implicit memory (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). Third, the interval from exposure to test often has substantially different effects on implicit and explicit memory. Interestingly, implicit memory sometimes decays very quickly relative to explicit memory (e.g., Graf & Mandler, 1984) and sometimes persists much longer (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving et al., 1982). Fourth, measures of implicit and explicit memory are typically uncorrelated (e.g., Eich, 1984; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Tulving et al., 1982). Schacter (1987, 1989, 1996; see also Moscovitch, Goshen-Gottstein, & Vriezen, 1994; Shimamura, 1986; Weiskrantz, 1989) also noted that, unlike explicit memory, implicit memory is highly robust in the face of physiological insult, including amnesia. Similarly, whereas explicit memory declines with age, implicit memory does not (Light, 1996). Conversely, in infants and children, explicit memory increases with age, whereas implicit memory remains relatively constant (Rovee-Collier, 1997). Although other evidence has begun to suggest that the dissociations noted earlier are not as extreme as Schacter originally suggested (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 1986; Sloman, Hayman, Ohta, Law, & Tulving, 1988), his basic conclusions seem to be well supported (Kelley & Lindsay, 1996; Schacter, 1989). To account for the observed dissociations, some have proposed different underlying memory systems (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). However, others have provided alternate interpretations based on similarities and differences between encoding and retrieval processes (i.e., transfer appropriate processing; Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). From our point of view, however, whether the dissociations represent different types of encoding and retrieval processes or distinct memory systems is not critically important. Regardless of the precise source of these dissociations, they suggest that our understanding of memory and, by extension, the self can be greatly expanded by attending to these dissociations and what they suggest about nonconscious processes. One important controversy that has proved useful to understanding conscious and nonconscious aspects of memory is the controversy over “process-purity’’ (Jacoby, 1991). Frequently, implicit and explicit memory tasks are assumed to represent implicit and explicit memory processes. However, many memory tasks may reflect a combination of implicit and explicit memory processes (e.g., Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Consequently, some researchers have attempted to develop techniques that distinguish between conscious and nonconscious aspects of memory. Schacter, Bowers, and Booker (1989), for example, suggested that implicit and explicit measures of memory should be made as similar as possible except for their instructions. For example, some participants might be instructed to complete a word fragment (e.g., _APER) with whatever word first comes to mind, whereas others might be instructed to use the word fragment as a recall cue (Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996). Alternately, other researchers have attempted to place implicit and explicit processes in direct opposition to one another. To this end, Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1994) have developed the “process dissociation” technique.3 Jacoby and colleagues compare participants responses on an implicit memory task under two conditions. In one condition, participants are instructed to base their responses on previously encountered stimuli. Both conscious and nonconscious processes ostensibly influence these responses. In the other condition, participants are instructed to base their responses on anything but previously encountered stimuli. Thus, task performance should only reflect nonconscious processes in the absence of any conscious contamination. Thus, the difference between these two conditions reflects the contribution of conscious processes to performance on the memory task. The contribution of the nonconscious processes to task performance, however, depends on the underlying assumption regarding the degree of independence between conscious and unconscious processes,

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Page 110 which is a matter of some controversy. To date, however, such techniques have produced dissociations between nonconscious and conscious aspects of memory consistent with previously observed patterns, although the size of the nonconscious effects now appears to be smaller than previously thought (Kelley & Lindsay, 1996; RichardsonKlavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996). Whether such techniques could be adapted to refine the measurement of people's implicit beliefs about themselves remains an open and important question. In addition to research on implicit memory, research on implicit learning (for reviews, see Berry, 1996; Berry & Broadbent, 1995; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Seger, 1994) also suggests that people possess and acquire knowledge of which they are unaware. Specifically, research on implicit learning indicates that people can learn to respond appropriately to complex situations in the absence of the ability to explain how they are managing to do so. One of the most mundane and important examples of this is the ability of young children to produce grammatically correct language without being able to explain the rules of the acquired grammar. Implicit learning has also been demonstrated in the learning of artificial grammar. For example, Reber (1967) demonstrated that when participants are asked to memorize letter strings that have an underlying grammar,they can readily discriminate subsequent letter strings as grammatical or ungrammatical. This performance occurs in the absence of awareness that one is studying letter strings with an underlying grammar. In fact, instructions to attend to an underlying grammar during learning appear to interfere with learning (Reber, 1967)4 Nonconscious Affect: The Primacy and Automaticity of Affect Several areas of research suggest that attitudes toward social objects are activated relatively automatically and in the absence of conscious processing, even in the absence of explicit attitudes for the object (for a further review, see Roese, chap. 9, this volume). First, research has revealed that mere exposure to a stimulus leads to positive evaluations of that stimulus, with liking increasing as a function of number of exposures (Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983; Zajonc, 1980). These effects occur in the absence of immediate identification or later recognition of the stimulus (Zajonc, 1980), or even when the stimuli are presented subliminally (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). Second, recent evidence suggests that attitudes are activated automatically by the mere presence of an attitude object (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). For instance, for many graduate students, exposure to the stimulus qualifying exam might automatically activate a wide variety of negative associations, making it easier for them to respond to subsequent negative targets (e.g., nonsignificant) and more difficult to respond to positive targets (Ph.D.). This effect becomes more robust when the judgments about the object are more likely to preclude conscious evaluation (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Finally, neurological studies suggest that affective or evaluative processing is governed by relatively primitive brain centers such as the amygdala and the hippocampus (for reviews, see LeDoux, 1992, 1995; MacLean, 1993; Zajonc, 1998). For example, according to Damasio's (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, perceptual information is relayed directly to these centers, and the affective responses that occur in these emotion centers then shape identification and higher order processing of the information. Damasio's position dovetails nicely with the evidence for the automatic attitude activation effect. Nonconscious Social Cognition Implicit Inference. Both the extensive research on implicit learning and memory and the cognitive revolution in social psychology have spurred a new approach to understanding nonconscious processes in social inference. An early reflection of this influence appeared in research on social judgment and trait inference. One area of this research focused on construct accessibility – the process through which recently activated concepts influence the categorization or evaluation of subsequent (usually ambiguous) stimuli. This research documented that recent exposure to a construct (e.g., priming) increases the likelihood that the construct will be employed in subsequent social judgments (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977), especially under conditions of repeated exposure (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980) and even when people are not aware of the exposure (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). Repeated activation of a construct over long periods also increases the likelihood of the constructs application (e.g., Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Moreover, the application of chronically accessible constructs appears to be relatively efficient, occurring even under cognitive load (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Bargh & Tota; 1988)5 A second area of research on nonconscious aspects of social inference is research on spontaneous trait

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Page 111 inferences (for reviews, see Newman & Uleman, 1989; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). Participants unconsciously and automatically categorize certain social behaviors as reflecting underlying traits, and they do so in the absence of the intention to do so (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985). Moreover, these spontaneous categorizations can influence subsequent judgments (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992), as in research on construct accessibility. For example, participants who are instructed to unscramble sentences containing hostile content later perceive ambiguous targets as more hostile than usual (Srull & Wyer, 1979)6 The work of Gilbert and colleagues (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988) on the correspondence bias (i.e., the tendency to attribute behavior to the actors disposition rather than to aspects of the situation) represents a third example of nonconscious aspects of social inference. Gilbert and colleagues argued that an action or behavior is automatically categorized and then attributed to the disposition of the actor (what they referred to as characterization). They further argued that correcting such characterizations (e.g., to make a situational attribution) takes mental effort and cognitive resources. Consistent with this position, participants deprived of cognitive resources exhibit enhanced tendencies to attribute behavior to actors dispositions. Implicit Stereotyping and Automatic Prejudice. In much the same way as research on construct accessibility, spontaneous trait inferences, and the automaticity of attitudes, contemporary research on stereotyping and prejudice has also applied cognitive models of the unconscious to the understanding of human social behavior. More specifically, there has been a rapid proliferation of research on the nonconscious aspects of stereotypes and prejudice. First, building largely on research in implicit memory, research on implicit stereotyping has examined the implicit influence of gender or race-related information on subsequent judgment (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) and behavior (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997). For example, Banaji and Hardin (1996) found that participants primed with words associated with gender (e.g., nurse) responded more quickly than usual to genderconsistent target pronouns (e.g., she ) and less quickly than usual to gender-inconsistent target pronouns (e.g., he). This was true whether participants were required to judge whether the pronouns were male or female or whether they simply reported whether target words were pronouns). Second, researchers have also attempted to measure people's automatic evaluative associations to members of stigmatized groups, usually Blacks, building on research on construct accessibility and automatic attitude activation. That is, researchers have developed automatic measures of prejudice (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz, Wasel, Gollwitzer, & Schaal, 1999; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1995). Automatic prejudice is usually operationalized in terms of the relative accessibility of positive and negative thoughts after exposure to race-related stimuli. For example, Fazio and colleagues (Fazio et al., 1995; Fazio & Dunton, 1997) primed participants with either a Black or a White face and then asked participants to quickly categorize subsequent positive and negative adjectives as positive or negative. They argued that if a people's automatic associations to a group are positive, people primed to think about the group should be able to subsequently identify positive adjectives more quickly than negative adjectives (Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986). Conversely, if people have negative associations about a group, these processing differences should be reversed. People's response to target words under different priming conditions can be used to generate implicit stereotyping scores (in this case, for implicit stereotypes about Blacks). Most research on automatic prejudice relies on some variation of this technique. Regardless of the assessment technique used, research on implicit stereotyping and automatic prejudice has yielded a number of consistent findings. First, like work on implicit learning and memory, research on implicit stereotyping has typically shown that both implicit stereotyping and automatic prejudice are unrelated to their explicit, consciously controlled analogs (cf., however, Dovidio et al., 1997, Study 2; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1995). Furthermore, both those high and low in explicit stereotyping typically show evidence of implicit stereotyping, suggesting that implicit stereotyping occurs even among those who wish to avoid stereotyping others. Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that measures of implicit stereotyping predict a number of variables better than explicit measures of stereotyping. These include nonverbal and spontaneous behaviors, the use of ethnic or gender categories in person perception, and other implicit measures of racial attitudes. In contrast, explicit measures of racial attitudes tend to predict more deliberative

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Page 112 judgments such as the decisions of mock jurors or explicit interpersonal evaluations. Although this area clearly represents a promising new avenue of exploration for understanding stereotyping and prejudice, a number of questions remain. For instance, the meaning and significance of implicit measures of stereotyping are under contention. Some researchers characterize measures of automatic prejudice as a “bona fide pipeline” to participants true attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995; see also Greenwald et al., 1998). Others suggest that implicit measures simply represent a different aspect of stereotyping and prejudice, a set of overlearned associations that subsequently influence behavioral responses to category members (e.g., Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000). Perhaps the most consequential debate revolves around the inevitability of the influence of implicit stereotypes on judgment and behavior. If implicit stereotypes and automatic prejudice are typically unconscious, difficult to disrupt, and widely held, then their impact on judgment and behavior may be much more pervasive than has often been suggested. However, emerging research suggests that implicit stereotypes and automatic prejudice are not always activated in the presence of a stereotyped target, they may be activated but not applied in judgment, and their activation or application may be influenced by current processing goals (see Blair, chap. 22, this volume; but cf. Bargh, 1999). BEYOND SELF-REPORT: PEERING DEEPER INTO THE MINDS I By far the most important object of social cognition, however, is the person doing the cognizing. (Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994, p. 154) Given that the self is one of the most widely studied domains in social psychology, we have been surprised by the lack of attention given to nonconscious elements of the self. Indeed, in many reviews of nonconscious social cognition, the applications of these findings to the self often receive little consideration (cf. Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Consequently, we briefly summarize some reasons to suspect that many of the unconscious processes reviewed thus far are likely to play a role in the self-concept. Nonconscious Elements of the Self-Concept First, memory and the self appear to be closely intertwined. Numerous thinkers have suggested that a persons stable sense of self arises from autobiographical memory (Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; James, 1890/1950; Kihlstrom et al., 1988). Recent research in social cognition has strongly implicated memory, learning, and stereotypes as important aspects of self-construction (see Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Linville & Carlston, 1994). For example, research on the self-reference effect has demonstrated that information related to the self is typically remembered better than other information (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Moreover, information relevant to the self is more easily and more quickly activated than other types of information. For example, in her research on self-schemata (i.e., cognitive representations of important self-relevant characteristics), Markus (1977) found that people can decide more quickly whether trait terms describe them when the traits under consideration are part of people's self-schemata. Similarly, Bargh (1982) found that participants performance in a dichotic listening task was significantly impaired when self-relevant stimuli were presented in the non-attended ear, suggesting that selfrelevant stimuli are highly accessible and readily (perhaps automatically) capture people's attention. These and other egocentric biases in encoding, processing, and retrieval led some to suggest that the self was a unique cognitive structure. Although the exact interpretation of these and similar findings has been the subject of some debate (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986), most now agree that these effects are not unique to the self. Rather, all kinds of well-elaborated, highly accessible cognitive structures share similar qualities, generating the observed advantages in attention, encoding, and retrieval. However, even critics of the “self is special” hypothesis agree that the self-concept is one of the most elaborated, evaluatively laden, and accessible of all cognitive structures.7 Clearly the self shares features with other well-elaborated cognitive structures. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the processes involved in implicit memory and implicit learning generally should apply to the self as well. That is, a persons experiences should exert nonconscious influences on the persons self-conceptions and self-evaluations. At the same time, the self should exert nonconscious influences on social perception and judgment. Implicit Influences on the Self-Concept. One major area of research that can be understood in terms of the implicit influences on self-relevant beliefs is research on self-presentation. It is well established that our attempts to present ourselves in a particular fashion to others can lead to changes in how we perceive ourselves (for a review, see Tice, 1994). That is, self-presentation often

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Page 113 leads to self-concept change (e.g., Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981; Tice, 1992), especially when the self-presentation occurs publicly (Tice, 1992, 1994) and when the initial Selfconceptions are not held with great certainty (Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). The desire to feel good about oneself can also have an implicit influence on ones self-views (Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991; Gump & Kulik, 1995; Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). For example, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) found that people altered their self-ratings of introversion and extroversion after reading a story about a student who either did very well or very poorly in school and who was either very introverted or very extroverted. When extroversion was linked with success in the story, participants described themselves as more extroverted. When the reverse was true, participants described themselves as more introverted. Many other temporary situational influences may influence our self-conceptions in ways of which we are unaware. For example, moods appear to exert a largely unconscious influence on people's self-views. For example, induced negative mood increases the accessibility of negative self-relevant thoughts (e.g., Brown & Taylor, 1986; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980; see also Sedikides, 1995). Moreover, some kinds of chronic negative moods (e.g., depressive symptoms) may lead to the development of automatic negative associations to the self (Bargh & Tota, 1988). As another example, manipulations of the distinctiveness of self-attributes (e.g., being the only psychologist in a room full of politicians) can cause those attributes to take on a prominent role in self-descriptions and subsequent behavior (Markus & Kunda, 1986; McGuire & McGuire, 1981, 1988). If manipulations of distinctiveness are relatively enduring (such as the gender composition of a persons family), the distinctive attribute can become a stable part of the persons self-description (e.g., McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire, McGuire, & Winton, 1979). Similarly, chronic social circumstances can also implicitly shape self-conceptions. For example, students from elite schools perceive themselves to be of lower academic ability than do students of equivalent ability levels from less elite schools (e.g., Bachman & O'Malley, 1986; Davis, 1966; Lieberman, 1956; Marsh & Parker, 1984). Implicit Influences of the Self-Concept. One might also expect that the self exerts influences on perceptions and actions that operate outside of awareness. For example, research has shown that existing categories or prototypes are imposed on newly encountered stimuli in a relatively nonconscious way (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Boss, 1989; Lewicki, 1986; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992; Lewicki, Hill, & Sasaki, 1989). Presumably, the self includes an important set of highly accessible categories and prototypes and thus might influence the perception and encoding of ambiguous self-relevant stimuli (cf. Greenwald, 1980; Swann, 1987, 1990). Recent research by Story (1998) confirms this idea (see also Tafarodi, 1998). When participants were given ambiguous feedback, participants with high self-esteem recalled the feedback as more positive than did participants with low self-esteem. Moreover, this effect was not mediated by participants conscious perceptions of feedback credibility. Research on self-schemata has shown similar effects of people's strongly held self-views. Self-relevant information often captures people's attention (e.g., Cherry, 1953), particularly on dimensions about which people have a great deal of well-articulated self-knowledge (Bargh, 1982; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Markus, 1977; see also Kuiper & Derry, 1982). Presumably, self-schemata constitute stable, chronically accessible dimensions of the self that influence both self- and social perception (Carpenter, 1988; Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Fong & Markus, 1982; Lewicki, 1983; Markus & Smith, 1981; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985; Markus & Wurf, 1987). People are more likely to recall, accept the validity of, and be confident in their judgments about self-relevant information that is consistent as opposed to inconsistent with their self-schemata. Moreover, people who are schematic on a particular dimension (e.g., height) are quick to categorize and judge others based on this dimension. Similarly, people with high selfesteem tend to exhibit more positive evaluations of others than do people with low self-esteem (e.g., Brown, 1986; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Epstein & Feist, 1988). Even people's undesired self-views (i.e., things they do not want to believe about themselves) may lead to perceptions of precisely these traits in others (e.g., Newman et al., 1997). People's self-views even appear to influence their memory about what they were like in the past (Conway & Ross, 1984; Ross, 1989; Ross & Conway, 1986; see also Klein & Kunda, 1993; Pratkanis, Eskenazi, & Greenwald, 1994). That is, the content and structure of a persons current self appears to make self-consistent (as opposed to selfinconsistent) experiences and beliefs easier than usual to retrieve. Presumably, this implicit influence of the self on memory enhances the perception of personal consistency and continuity.

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Page 114 NONCONSCIOUS ELEMENTS OF SELF-EVALUATION: IMPLICIT SELF-REGARD In their influential review, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) summarized research suggesting that self-esteem has a wide variety of implicit influences on a persons perception and behavior, including instructor evaluations, ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup paradigm, denial of disadvantage, and self-serving biases. We would argue that some of these effects reflect implicit (i.e., introspectively unidentified) influences of consciously considered or explicit selfevaluations. Indeed, the relationship between self-esteem and self-serving biases is well established (Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Although controversial, there is evidence that people high in explicit selfesteem are more likely to exhibit ingroup bias than are those low in self-esteem (Crocker et al., 1987). To the extent that people are unaware of the role that their self-esteem plays in these effects, we agree that effects such as these may well be implicit (i.e., introspectively unidentifiable) effects of explicit self-esteem. We believe that another implicit phenomenon discussed by Greenwald and Banaji may be an even more important implicit aspect of the self. Based on the primacy and automaticity of affect and automatic attitude activation, coupled with the high levels of accessibility of self-relevant information, people will likely develop overlearned evaluative associations (i.e., automatic attitudes) about themselves. These automatic self-relevant associations are likely to reside outside of participants awareness. That is, it is possible to distinguish three different types of effects of self-evaluations on decisions and judgments. The most straightforward is the traditional effect of explicit self-esteem on consciously considered judgments and behaviors. For example, most people seem to realize that when they are feeling bad about themselves, they judge others more negatively than usual. The next two effects appear to be intermixed in Greenwald and Banaji's analysis. The first is the introspectively unidentified (i.e., implicit) effects of explicit self-esteem on judgments or behavior. For example, people probably are not aware of the degree to which their feelings about themselves influence their feelings about the groups to which they belong. The last is the introspectively unidentified effects of people's automatic evaluative associations to the self (i.e., the implicit effects of implicit self-esteem).8 To distinguish the latter effect from the implicit effects of explicit self-esteem (which Greenwald and Banaji also refer to as implicit selfesteem), we refer to these automatic, chronically accessible self-evaluations as implicit self-regard (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999b, 1999c). The Functions of Implicit Self-Regard What hypothetical functions might implicit self-regard serve? One way to answer this question might be to ask what functions explicit self-esteem (or the need for positive esteem) is thought to serve, and to ask whether implicit selfesteem might serve similar functions. One perspective – self-affirmation theory – advanced by Steele (1988; see also Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) argues that positive self-regard helps inoculate people against the stresses, strains, and defeats of daily life (see also Taylor & Brown, 1988). Positive implicit self-regard might thus serve as a kind of shield against such threats to the self. Given the evidence that chronically accessible self-schemata help people reject self-inconsistent information and make sense of ambiguous information, implicit self-regard might serve as a kind of automatically deployed, strategic self-threat defense initiative. That is, positive implicit self-regard might serve to fend off threats to the self before they become the fixation of the conscious self and thus undermine selfevaluations and self-integrity. Another proposed function of positive self-esteem is to protect people against more existential threats. Terrormanagement theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) posits that anxiety surrounding our awareness of our own mortality intensifies our support of culturally shared belief systems. In this formulation, feelings of self-esteem reflect the degree to which we believe we are meeting standards represented by our cultural world-views. Thus, self-esteem buffers us against the fear of death by connecting the self to meanings, values, and institutions that will persevere beyond our individual lifetimes. Interestingly, recent research suggests that terror-management processes operate most powerfully at nonconscious levels (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Simon et al., 1997). This suggests that implicit self-regard rather than explicit self-esteem might be a better yardstick by which to measure people's freedom from existential angst. A third perspective holds that the need for positive regard is merely an expression of the more fundamental desire to gain the esteem and approval of others, especially close others and ingroup members (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Rogers, 1951; Tesser, in press). In this view, positive regard for the individual or social self is a reflection of others evaluations of us (Cooley, 1902/1983). That is, our regard for ourselves serves as a

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Page 115 marker of the degree to which we are succeeding at gaining social approval (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). We suspect that to the extent this hypothesis is true, implicit self-regard may represent a more direct sociometer, than explicit self-regard because it is probably less prone to distortion or rationalization. Additionally, making implicit self-regard the display for the sociometer suggests a way in which positive self-regard may play a larger role than as a simple reflection of acceptance. Rather, the development of positive implicit selfregard (i.e., chronically accessible positive evaluations of the self) might lead one to interpret others behavior, especially when ambiguous, more positively. Consequently, one might treat those others more positively, thus generating positive behavior in others (through self-fulfilling prophecy effects). This, in turn, should lead to more positive and stable relationships, which should cycle back into the long-term maintenance of positive implicit selfregard (Murray & Holmes, 1993; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). A final perspective on the origins of the need for positive regard is provided by attachment theory. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) posits that attachment behaviors develop to facilitate caregiving between parents and infants. Attachment researchers theorize that infants develop “internal working models” that reflect both infants self-characterizations and their characterizations of their primary caregivers (see Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). Despite their presumed development during infancy and childhood, attachment representations exhibit substantial stability over the life span (Baldwin & Fehr, 1995; Elicker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1992; Kirkpatrick & Hazan, 1994). Moreover, because implicit belief systems appear to develop earlier than explicit belief systems (e.g., Seger, 1994), a great deal of what is learned about self and others during childhood is likely to be learned implicitly (see also Main, 1991; Reis & Knee, 1996). Indeed, the internal working models of attachment theory, if translated into the realm of nonconscious processes, would substantially resemble implicit self-regard and implicit caregiver regard (for lack of a better term). In fact, the study of attachment appears to be headed in just that direction (e.g., Cline, 1999). However, a second approach to understanding the functions of implicit self-regard might be to speculate what its functions might be from the broad perspective of nonconscious social cognition. That is, a chronically accessible, automatic evaluation of the self might have functions independent from those of explicit self-esteem. For instance, Bargh and Chartrand (1999; Bargh, 1997) might argue that one function of implicit self-regard is to free the conscious mind from continually monitoring the environment for self-relevant stimuli. Rather than having to constantly reevaluate ourselves as additional self-relevant information arrives, people who engage in nonconscious self-regulation might rarely have to devote the entirety of their conscious attention to dealing with threats. Thus, the integrity and positivity of the self could be maintained in ways that leave explicit self-evaluations unaffected. Development and Properties of Implicit Self-Regard If implicit self-regard represents the automatization of our self-evaluations, how might it develop? What are its likely properties? Given the early development of implicit cognition relative to explicit cognition, one might assume that implicit self-regard would begin to develop very early in life, possibly as early as infants are able to distinguish self from nonself. For infants even more than for adults, one might also expect implicit self-regard to operate in a primitive, associationistic fashion. Whereas counterarguing and reinterpretation in the face of negative or disconfirming feedback may influence conscious self-evaluations, we suspect that these strategies are less likely to play a role in participants implicit self-evaluations. For example, when Diane's significant other has a bad day and takes it out on her, we suspect that Jacks explicit self-evaluations will not usually change because he will be able to discount his partners behavior. However, we also suspect that the hurt caused by a critical partner may have longer lasting effects on Jacks implicit self-regard. Indeed, we assume that people automatically process the valence and frequency of many kinds of evaluative feedback (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Lewicki, 1985). Similarly, we assume that people initially, and more or less automatically, accept incoming information as veridical, especially at the nonconscious level (cf. Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993). Presumably, these initial judgments are modified only when people are aware that the basis of the judgment is erroneous and possess the cognitive resources required to correct the judgment. However, this conscious correction may leave the nonconscious effects unaltered. Thus, implicit self-regard is likely to reflect the accumulated effects of social feedback, with only minimal benefit of reinterpretation or correction. Second, by extension, we also expect implicit self-regard to be more or less independent of explicit self-evaluations. That is, if explicit self-esteem can benefit

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Page 116 from conscious repair and reinterpretation, and implicit self-regard must instead suffer the slings and arrows of life, it stands to reason that there will be many instances when the two are no longer in accord with one another. The dissociations among implicit and explicit learning, memory, social inference, and stereotypes reviewed earlier further suggest a similar dissociation between implicit and explicit self-evaluations. Third, implicit self-regard should have independent effects on social judgment and behavior. As people's chronically accessible evaluative associations to the self, implicit self-regard should frequently determine gut-level responses to self-relevant stimuli – responses that may precede their conscious responses to social stimuli. Although people may sometimes choose to modify these initial judgments, social perceivers who lack the motivation or cognitive resources to do so should be particularly likely to fall back on the habitual, automatic responses that are influenced by their implicit self-regard (James, 1890/1950; Posner & Snyder, 1975; see also Bargh, 1999; Bodenhausen, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). Thus, implicit self-regard should frequently translate into self-relevant judgments and behavior. This fact may help account for some inconsistencies in the relation between explicit self-esteem and individual and social outcomes (Baumeister, 1998; Wylie, 1979). Finally, we expect that implicit self-regard should be both durable and malleable. That is, we posit that implicit selfregard is formed by associations to the self and built up from numerous instances of self-relevant experience or feedback. Consequently, one would expect that it would take a great deal of contradictory feedback, across a variety of situations, to change a persons chronic level of implicit self-regard. However, this does not mean that implicit selfregard will remain highly stable from moment to moment. The particular set of self-relevant associations that are most accessible from moment to moment is likely to vary from situation to situation, and thus implicit self-regard should vary notably across social situations. However, this change should be firmly anchored around a core set of well-established self-relevant associations. To use an analogy, implicit self-regard has characteristics that resemble both climate and weather. The climate of a region typically reveals a predictable and stable pattern of temperature and precipitation. However, the weather in a particular locale can vary dramatically. Similarly, implicit self-regard should change only gradually but should also show substantial variability from day to day and situation to situation. Notice that this metaphor suggests that it may be difficult to get a clear picture of a persons chronic level of implicit self-regard without measuring the persons beliefs on more than one occasion. Existing Evidence for Implicit Self-Regard One simple source of evidence for automatic self-evaluation comes from the phenomenological experience of the self. As James (1890/1950) noted, “there is a certain average tone of self-feeling which each one of us carries about with him, and which is independent of the objective reasons we may have for satisfaction and discontent” (p.306). James also noted that a positive feeling and emotional attachment accompanies everything associated with the self – from relatives to material possessions. James argued that this attachment arose, at least in part, from its association to the self. Not surprisingly, recent research (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) provides a second source of evidence supporting the presence of automatic evaluation of self-related objects. Research on the name-letter, mere ownership, and endowment effects indicates that people evaluate stimuli or objects associated with the self more positively than comparable objects not associated with the self. This effect has been demonstrated for letters in people's names (Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993; Nuttin, 1985, 1987), numbers in their birthdays (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997), computer icons associated with the self (Feys, 1991), and a variety of physical objects (e.g., pens, mugs) that belong to the self (Beggan, 1992; Belk, 1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). Second, Paulhus and colleagues demonstrated that manipulations such as arousal and cognitive load increase the favorability of people's self-evaluations (e.g., Paulhus, 1990; Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987; Paulhus & Lim, 1994). This suggests that, for most people, evaluating oneself positively is a dominant, automatic tendency. In contrast to Paulhus view, Swann and colleagues (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990; see also Shrauger, 1975) suggested that the automatic, overlearned desire for positive feedback will sometimes be overridden by a desire for self-verification. Nonetheless, Swann and Paulhus agreed that, for most people, the desire to self-enhance or feel good about oneself is highly automatic. A third major theoretical perspective that suggests the potential existence of implicit self-regard, as discussed previously, is attachment theory. According to attachment theory, attachment behaviors develop to facilitate parental caregiving. However, caregivers vary notably in how responsive they are to their infants needs, and Bowlby theorized that infants develop ‘‘internal

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Page 117 working models” that reflect their caregivers responsiveness. These models reflect both the infants selfcharacterizations and their characterizations of their principle caregivers (see Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), Because implicit belief systems appear to develop earlier than explicit belief systems (e.g., Seger, 1994), a great deal of what is learned about self and others during childhood is likely to be learned implicitly (see also Main, 1991; Reis & Knee, 1996). Epstein's (1994, 1998) research on cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) probably provides some of the clearest support for the existence of an implicit self-system. In his integrative model of the self-concept, Epstein posited that people's self-evaluations arise from two distinct conceptual systems. The first, the rational system, is consciously controlled, deliberative, and highly effortful. In contrast, the experiential system is simpler, more intuitive, and operates automatically. Thus, Epstein's conception of the experiential self-system is quite similar to our conception of implicit self-regard. Moreover, his careful organization of diverse research domains suggests the existence and importance of implicit self-regard in understanding the self, emotions, cognitions, and behavior. However, a full exposition of cognitive-experiential self-theory has been held up by the same stumbling block as Greenwald and Banaji's analysis of implicit social cognition – the lack of an effective procedure for assessing implicit self-regard or (in Epstein's case), experiential beliefs about the self.9 Current Research on Implicit Self-Regard As suggested by the research reviewed thus far, a measure of implicit self-regard is clearly needed (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). To that end, we have developed two primary methods to assess implicit self-regard (Hetts et al., 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999c). The first method is an adaptation of the method used to measure the automatic activation of attitudes. Research on the automatic attitude activation effect has shown that the presentation of a prime (e.g., chocolate ) facilitates responses to subsequent targets of similar valence (e.g., wonderful ) and disrupts responses to subsequent targets of dissimilar valence (e.g., disgusting). Based on this research, we reasoned that we could use people's patterns of responses to valenced targets to determine their evaluation of primes that preceded them (for similar analyses at the individual and the group level, see Bylsma et al., 1991; Perdue, Gurtman, Dovidio, & Tyler, 1990). Thus, to measure participants implicit self-regard, we assessed their latencies for identifying clearly valenced targets (e.g., good and bad) after being primed with a self-relevant pronoun (e.g., me). When participants are repeatedly exposed to self-relevant primes, it is possible to compute a simple measure of implicit self-regard by subtracting participants response latencies for positive target words from their response latencies for negative target words. Of course, it is also possible to assess other beliefs in this way. For example, to assess implicit group-regard, one needs merely to replace self-relevant primes with group-relevant primes (e.g., we ). Similarly, as a simple control procedure, one might use neutral, self-irrelevant primes (e.g., it, that ). Other researchers have successfully adapted this procedure (e.g., see Spalding & Hardin, in press), whereas still others have developed alternate approaches that build on the same underlying logic (e.g., Farnham & Greenwald, 1998; Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999; Greenwald et al., 1998). To construct measures of implicit self-regard and group-regard that do not require collecting response latency data, we adapted word fragment-completion tasks from implicit memory research (e.g., Tulving et al., 1982). In the case of these measures, we activate personal or social identities by asking people to respond to nonevaluative self- or group-relevant statements (e.g., “I am very sensitive to my inner thoughts and feelings”). Immediately after exposure to an identity-relevant prime, participants generate three separate completions (in the order they come to mind) for a specific word fragment. For example, for the fragments (1. _ICE 2._ICE 3. _ICE), we code for the serial position of the positive word NICE. For the fragments (1._OOR 2._OOR 3. _OOR), we code for the serial position of the negative word POOR . By subtracting the average serial position of the positive word completions from the average serial position of the negative word completions, we generate an implicit self-evaluation score that is logically analogous and theoretically comparable to the response latency measure discussed previously. We have found that both of these measures of implicit self-regard have many of the theoretically predictable properties we have identified in this review. We provide a couple of illustrative examples next. Implicit Self-Regard and Culture . If implicit self-regard represents associations to the self that accumulate over ones lifetime, then one of its primary determinants should be the socialization practices of the culture in which a person is reared. Research on the relation between culture and self-concept suggests that the members of Eastern and Western cultures understand and evaluate the self quite differently (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995). Specifically, this research suggests that Western cultures encourage an individualistic

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Page 118 approach to the self. Along these lines, the typical members of most Western cultures are encouraged to create and affirm positive individual identities. In contrast, the typical members of most Eastern cultures are encouraged to create and affirm positive collective identities. That is, Eastern cultures predispose people to focus and obtain validation from their social rather than their individual identities. These differences in the understanding and construction of the self have important implications for implicit selfregard. For inhabitants of independent cultures, nonconscious associations to the individual self (i.e., implicit selfregard) should be predominantly positive. However, for inhabitants of interdependent cultures, nonconscious associations to the individual self may be much less favorable. Given our hypotheses about the stability of implicit self-regard, we might expect that when people immigrate from an interdependent to an independent culture their implicit associations about their personal and social identities might continue to bear the influence of their collectivistic upbringing. In contrast, such people should be able to quickly correct or adapt their explicit self-evaluations to the normative demands of the new culture. This is precisely what we found in three studies of participants who differed in their degree of exposure to Eastern and Western cultures (Hetts et al., 1999). In Studies 1 and 2, recent Asian immigrants to the United States exhibited significantly lower implicit self-regard than both European and Asian Americans, despite being similar to these groups when it came to their explicit self-evaluations. Moreover, the longer the recent immigrants had lived in the United States, the more positive their implicit self-regard became ( r =.46). In contrast, participants explicit self-evaluations were equally favorable regardless of how long they had been living in the United States. In these same two studies, we also found that, when it came to measures of implicit group-regard, the recent Eastern immigrants to the United States had somewhat more favorable implicit self-conceptions than their more fully Westernized counterparts. Presumably, the focus on group harmony and group identity that is common in many Eastern cultures leads the members of such cultures to develop favorable implicit associations about their social identities. Consistent with our assumption that implicit beliefs change slowly over time, we found that the longer immigrants had lived in the United States, the lower their implicit group-regard became ( r = -;.65). For these participants, learning to toot their own horns went hand in hand with feeling worse about the other members of their band. Hetts et al. (1999) also examined the implicit and explicit self-evaluations of a group of Japanese university students. Some of these students had substantial exposure to an independent culture (they had lived for 5 or more years in the United States or Canada). Others had never lived outside of Japan. Again, differences in participants cultural experiences influenced their implicit self- and group-regard but not their explicit self-evaluations. Specifically, participants who had never lived in a Western culture possessed lower implicit self-regard and higher implicit groupregard than did participants who had spent substantial time overseas. Again, we observed little differences in participants explicit self-evaluations. Taken together, these studies have a number of important implications for self-evaluation. First, they demonstrate the ability of implicit self-evaluation measures to identify differences in people's experiences that may not always be revealed by explicit measures. That is, a complete reliance on explicit measures of self-evaluation would have suggested that the effects of culture on self-evaluation are short-lived and can be eliminated very quickly when people immigrate to a new culture. These studies also demonstrate the relative stability of implicit self-evaluation (and, by extension, the long-lasting influences of culture on the self). Third, these studies reveal an important sense in which the typical members of Eastern cultures possess highly favorable associations about the self. Specifically, the higher levels of implicit group-regard observed among participants with greater degrees of exposure to Eastern cultures suggests that the need for positive regard (Pelham & Hetts, 1999b) may be common to both Eastern and Western cultures. However, this need may be expressed in very different ways in different cultures – through the individual self in independent cultures and through the social self in interdependent cultures.10 Implicit Self-Regard and Ethnicity. Another variable that should have an important impact on people's implicit selfevaluations is ethnicity. Numerous studies have shown that, relative to Euro-Americans, people of color face higher levels of prejudice and discrimination, are subject to disparate treatment by the criminal justice system, endure systematic economic disadvantages, and enjoy less social and professional prestige (e.g., Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, a great deal of research has indicated that people of color are able to marshal a number of strategies in defense of favorable self-conceptions. In fact, many studies have revealed that the self-esteem of people of color is at least as high as, if not higher than, that of Euro-Americans (Crocker & Major, 1989; Cross, 1985; Porter & Washington, 1979,

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Page 119 1989, 1993; Rosenberg, 1979). At the same time, however, research has found that members of stigmatized or low-status groups sometimes display subtle effects of their poor treatment by others. For example, relative to high-status group members, lowstatus group members often engage in outgroup favoritism (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jost, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). More specifically, a variety of studies have replicated Clark and Clark's (1947) observations of outgroup preference and negative self-stereotyping in African-American children ( inter alia Fine & Bowers, 1984; Gopaul-McNicol, 1995; Landreth & Johnson, 1953; Powell-Hopson & Hopson; 1988; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; Spencer, 1984; Williams & Morland, 1979; for similar results for Hispanic children, see Bernat & Balch, 1979, 1981; Teplin, 1976). Interestingly, the studies that have demonstrated outgroup preference or negative self-stereotyping have usually used indirect measures of self-evaluation (Simmons, 1978). Further, they appear to be largely focused on evaluations of the ethnic group rather than the individual self. In contrast, studies documenting that stigmatized group members possess positive self-conceptions have typically made use of direct or objective measures, most commonly survey measures of self- and group evaluation. A few studies have shown that African-American children possess positive explicitly reported self-concepts but demonstrate outgroup preferences toward Euro-Americans when it comes to projective tasks (e.g., Clark, 1982; Spencer, 1984) These findings are consistent with our conception of implicit self-regard as a relatively associationistic belief system. Thus, although people of color can successfully deploy a number of strategies to protect their explicit selfevaluations (Crocker & Major, 1989), their implicit self-evaluations, especially their implicit group-regard (the target of the stereotypes), may still reflect the adverse effects of socially shared stereotypes. We (Hetts & Pelham, 1999) have conducted preliminary investigations to examine this possibility. In keeping with previous research, we found that the explicit self-evaluations of people of color did not differ noticeably from those of Euro-Americans. In contrast, we found that people of color exhibit lower levels of implicit group-regard but higher levels of implicit self-regard than Euro-Americans (see also Hunter & Mackie, 1996; Steele, 1997). This is consistent both with our model of implicit self-evaluation and some otherwise puzzling findings in the literature on stereotyping and stigma. For example, it is consistent with the finding that the members of many stigmatized groups (e.g., women, people of color) often report that, whereas their fellow ingroup members are frequently the targets of discrimination, they themselves rarely feel the brunt of discrimination (e.g., Crosby, 1984; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). Although generally supporting the finding that stigmatized group members often develop high self-esteem, these findings also suggest that defending ones social identity against stigmata and stereotypes may not be as straightforward as previously thought. Implicit Self-Regard and the Ghosts of Christmas Past . If implicit self-regard does in fact represent the accumulation of positive and negative self-relevant experiences over ones lifetime, then one might expect people who have received less special attention over their lifetimes to have lower implicit self-regard. For the most part, people in the United States have 1 day a year – their birthday – in which they are praised and celebrated for merely existing. In contrast to most other people, however, the unfortunate person who is born in close proximity to Christmas day may fail to receive the attention that normally accompanies ones birthday. That is, being born in close proximity to a holiday that so fully captivates the attention of most Americans virtually guarantees that people born at this time of year will be the victim of oversights and omissions – on a day in which they might otherwise expect to be praised and adored. For this reason, one might expect people born at this time of year to have lower implicit self-esteem than people born at other times (see Cooley, 1902/1983; Mead, 1934). However, because most people are able to understand the circumstance leading others to neglect them on their birthdays, one might expect that the effects of being born near Christmas day would not be as extreme for participants explicit self-evaluations. This is precisely what we found (Pelham & Hetts, 1999a). Participants born within a week of Christmas day had significantly lower implicit self-regard than people in general and than two control groups from early December and early January (to explore the possibility of time of year effects). In contrast, there were no differences between the groups in implicit group-regard or explicit self-esteem. In a second study, we showed these implicit self-esteem effects were not simply mood effects in disguise. In a third study (using an indirect, behavioral rather than a strictly implicit measure of self-esteem), we showed that these effects occurred for Christians but not for non-Christians (Jews, Muslims, or atheists). Construct Validity of Implicit Self-Regard. In our initial enthusiasm over our findings, we may have failed to pay sufficient attention to the less exciting task of gathering psychometric data on the basic properties of

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Page 120 our implicit measures. However, evidence for the validity of the implicit self-regard construct is beginning to accumulate. For example, we have found implicit self-regard to be generally distinct from explicit self-esteem, collective self-esteem, explicit dimensions of specific self-evaluations, mood, and attributions (Hetts, 1999; Hetts et al., 1999; Hetts, Shimojo, & Hardin, 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999a, 1999c). At the same time, to the degree we have observed significant relations between implicit and explicit measures of self-evaluation, they have been highly predictable. For example, implicit self-regard is more highly correlated with explicit measures of individual selfesteem than with explicit measures of collective self-esteem. Similarly, implicit group-regard is more highly correlated with explicit measures of collective as opposed to individual self-esteem. Farnham and colleagues (Farnham & Greenwald, 1998; Farnham et al., 1999) found a similar pattern of relationships using an alternative measure of implicit self-regard based on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Furthermore, in two initial examinations of the testretest reliability over a long delay (5 weeks), the testretest correlations for implicit self-regard were r (164) = .48, p <.0001 (Hetts, 1999, Study 2) and r (41) = .47, p = .022 (Pelham & Hetts, 1999c, Study 6). Moreover in the first study (Hetts, 1999, Study 2), we were also able to demonstrate the distinction between participants implicit self-regard at both Time 1 and Time 2 and their implicit evaluations of another construct (computers), rs (164) = .19 and .10, ps = .013 and ns , respectively. Pelham and Hetts (1999c, Study 6) also found that for participants who had lost a competitive game, implicit self-regard predicted self-serving judgments, r (20) = .68, p < .001, but not group-serving judgments, r (20) = .03, ns . In contrast, implicit group-regard predicted group-serving judgments, r (20) = .40, p = .068, but not self-serving judgments, r (20) = .09, ns . Bosson and Swann (1999) have also begun to demonstrate elements of convergent validity among different measures of implicit self-regard. Namely, they found that measures of implicit self-regard based on the IAT, a subliminal priming version of the automatic attitude activation effect paradigm, and our word-completion measure all load (albeit weakly) on one factor. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLICIT SELF-EVALUATION Implicit Self-evaluation and Implicit Self-Verification The possibility that people possess both implicit and explicit self-evaluations may have important implications for a number of important theoretical questions about the self-concept. As a case in point, most previous researchers have assumed that self-enhancement is more automatic than self-verification (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Paulhus & Lim, 1994; Swann et al., 1990). However, we assume that for people who possess low levels of implicit self-regard, it may be more automatic to engage in self-disparaging rather than self-enhancing behaviors. Swann et al. (1990), for example, found that participants who possessed negative explicit self-views engaged in self-enhancement (e.g., by embracing compliments) when they were cognitively loaded but engaged in self-verification (e.g., by embracing criticism) when they were not. However, implicit self-regard is not typically correlated with explicit self-regard, and most Americans appear to possess predominantly favorable associations about themselves (Farnham & Greenwald, 1998; Farnham et al., 1999; Hetts et al., 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999c). Thus, the cognitively taxed participants (Swann et al., 1990) who appeared to be engaging in automatic self-enhancement may actually have been engaging in automatic self-verification. Although this possibility awaits empirical scrutiny, we have observed that people with low levels of implicit self-regard engage in self-disserving judgments (e.g., by failing to take personal credit for their contribution to a groups success; Pelham & Hetts, 1999c, Study 6). Implicit Self-Regard, Self-Presentation, and Nonverbal Behavior.Because psychologists are usually interested in people's genuine attitudes and opinions, they have frequently sought out ways to circumvent participants attempts to present themselves in a particular way (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998). This has been particularly true in studies of sensitive topics such as stereotyping and self-evaluation. Whether to make a positive impression on others or protect their impressions of themselves (Baumeister, 1982), people generally present themselves favorably to others (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Schlenker, 1975; but cf. Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). Thus, biases such as the above average effect (Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and the common tendency for people to give themselves high marks on most self-esteem scales (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) may not provide a completely accurate depiction of people's self-evaluations. Measures of implicit self-regard circumvent self-presentational motives, and thus may provide a special window into participants genuine self-views (Farnham et al., 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; cf. Fazio et al., 1995). Although we believe that measures of implicit

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Page 121 self-regard circumvent certain self-presentational concerns, we think it would be unwise to grant privileged status to measures of implicit self-regard as indicators of people's true beliefs about themselves. Although subject to certain biases, people's explicit self-views often serve as powerful predictors of people's judgment and behavior. They should not be cast aside when measures of implicit self-regard have yet to be linked conclusively to a wide range of judgments or behavior. We believe that reaching a full understanding of the self will likely require a careful examination of both the unique and joint contributions of implicit and explicit self-evaluations to social judgment and behavior. Along these lines, it seems likely that explicit self-evaluations are closely associated with certain kinds of carefully considered judgments (e.g., people's explicit evaluations of their close relationship partners; e.g., Murray & Holmes, 1997; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). In contrast, implicit self-evaluations may be more closely associated with many nonverbal behaviors. Because many nonverbal behaviors are extremely difficult to regulate through conscious efforts (e.g., DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988; Zuckerman, Spiegel, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1982), these behaviors may be more intimately linked to implicit than to explicit self-evaluation. Spalding and Hardin (in press) recently observed support for exactly this position. They found that the degree to which people behaved nervously during a self-threatening interview was strongly related to people's level of implicit self-regard, but not to their level of explicit self-esteem (see Fazio et al., 1995, for similar findings with respect to automatic prejudice). In contrast, participants explicit selfevaluations predicted their explicit judgments of the quality of the interview. The Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Self-Evaluation Although researchers are beginning to document potential correlates and consequences of implicit self-regard (e.g., Bosson & Swann, 1999; Farnham & Greenwald, 1998; Farnham et al., 1999; Hetts et al., 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Spalding & Hardin, in press), the lessons of implicit memory and learning research suggest that further efforts to differentiate implicit and explicit self-evaluation are still warranted. For example, it is possible that participants explicit self-evaluations sometimes have long-term effects on their level of implicit self-regard (e.g., when a person makes a carefully considered decision to spend more time with an emotionally supportive friend). It seems equally possible that implicit self-regard may sometimes influence participants explicit self-evaluations. Despite the unique connections between implicit and explicit self-evaluation and social experiences documented to date, further attempts to separate these two kinds of self-evaluation (e.g., by adapting Jacobys “process dissociation” technique) may help us better understand the origins, functions, and consequences of these alternate forms of self-evaluation. Second, despite our expectation of a dissociation between implicit and explicit self-evaluations, we also recognize that at least some experiences may have the same effects on both implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Thus, another important task in the development of the construct of implicit self-regard is to determine when it is and is not related to explicit self-evaluations. For example, a number of potential moderators of the relation appear worth pursuing. If one assumes that explicit measures of self-evaluation represent a mixture of implicit and explicit processes, than participants explicit self-evaluations should reflect different mixtures of implicit and explicit self-evaluation depending on whether they have the motivation or resources to think carefully about the self. Thus, manipulating variables such as performance, self-awareness, arousal, or cognitive load prior to assessment of self-evaluations may provide an opportunity to more carefully specify the relation between implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Indeed, the works of Swann et al. (1990) and Paulhus et al. (1989) provide initial evidence that variables such as cognitive load or arousal may in fact moderate the relation between implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Likewise, if social desirability or self-presentation interferes with the measurement of true attitudes about the self at the explicit level, then one might expect to observe stronger than average relations between implicit and explicit self-evaluations under conditions of anonymous rather than public judgment. Along somewhat different lines, the precise origins of people's beliefs may influence the degree of overlap between implicit and explicit self-evaluations. More specifically, when explicit attitudes are based on direct experience rather than speculation, second-hand opinion, or reconstruction, we might expect to see a good deal of overlap between implicit and explicit attitudes (self-relevant or otherwise). That is, explicit attitudes forged through direct experience are especially stable, especially resistant to change, and especially likely to predict behavior (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978; Regan & Fazio, 1977; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1981). Consequently, one might expect that

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Page 122 explicit attitudes might have these properties precisely because they are in synch with implicit attitudes that have grown out of the very same experiences. Thus, in the case of self-evaluations that have grown out of a great deal of consistent and consensual validated social experience (e.g., Cal Ripken, Jr.'s self-evaluations on the dimension of durability), implicit and explicit self-evaluations might be closely related. CONCLUDING REMARKS In this chapter, we have reviewed a wide variety of evidence attesting to the potential importance of nonconscious elements of self-concept and self-evaluation. Moreover, we have provided preliminary evidence that implicit selfevaluations can be measured, that they exhibit surprising stability, and that they are systematically related to aspects of human behavior that are not predicted by explicit self-evaluations. If we assume that people do possess both implicit and explicit self-evaluations, this might raise the question of why these two separate systems of selfevaluation exist in the first place. Our suspicion is that implicit self-regard exists for the same reason that many other implicit belief systems exist. Like learning to comprehend and produce language, learning to engage in the myriad forms of self-regulation that are necessary for survival in a social world requires an enormous investment of time and energy. If these complex skills had to be acquired solely based on carefully considered reasoning, or if they never became automatized, many complex aspects of human social experience would be severely compromised. The more we can self-regulate without devoting cognitive resources to the effort, the more capacity we free up to deal with other pressing problems of survival. From this perspective, implicit self-regard may represent an important and highly adaptive piece of the puzzle of human adaptation to a complex social world. ENDNOTES 1. One omission in this analysis is a careful delineation of what precisely the resources of the conscious mind are being saved for. Bargh and Chartrand hint that one answer might be decision making or self-regulation, as suggested by the recent work of Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). Three other possibilities seem plausible. Conscious resources may be conserved for instances in which automatized thoughts and behaviors will lead to mistakes – for example – in novel situations or conflicts between nonconscious processes (e.g., Cart, 1925). Another possibility is that conscious resources may be conserved for the strategic direction of nonconscious processes. That is, the conscious mind may be a commander in chief: It attempts to direct the entire force of the organism through the manipulation of processes that reflect a mixture of conscious and nonconscious processes (high-ranking officers), which subsequently guide processes reflecting even less conscious processing, until one reaches the nearly automatic processes (sergeants) and the most highly automatized processes (privates). Finally, if Bargh (1997) is correct that conscious processes are necessary for the development of preconscious processes, it may be that conscious resources may be conserved not for themselves, but to hasten the development of additional nonconscious processes to create an increasingly efficient mind. 2. Implicit memory is contrasted with explicit memory, which involves the conscious recollection or recognition of previously encountered stimuli. Other researchers have employed different terms to describe a very similar distinction, including (a) direct and indirect memory tasks (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988), (b) memory with and without awareness (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; cf. Roediger, 1990), and (c) memory as a tool and memory as an object (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). 3. Richardson-Klavehn and colleagues (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996; Richardson-Klavehn, Lee, Joubran, & Bjork, 1994) took a complementary but distinct approach. They divided the implicit-explicit distinction into two dimensions – the intentionality of memory (whether the participant is trying to remember items) and the awareness of recall. They did so to highlight the possibility of conscious involuntary memory (when a stimuli springs to mind in full awareness without effort) and voluntary unconscious memory (when trying to remember previously studied stimuli influence responding despite the phenomenal experience of inability to retrieve the stimulus). 4. Implicit learning has been similarly demonstrated in the control of complex systems (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989), such as the regulation of production in a fictional sugar factory. Such studies have shown that: (a) practice increases performance but not the ability to explain ones performance, (b) the ability to correctly manipulate a complex system comes before explicit knowledge of that system, and (c) performance and explicit knowledge tend to be unrelated (see also Bright & Burton, 1994; Mc-

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Page 123 George & Burton, 1990; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). 5. A great deal of additional work has been done examining different sources of temporary and chronic accessibility and the interplay between the two types of accessibility that necessarily lie outside the scope of this manuscript (see Higgins, 1996; Higgins & Bargh, 1987, for reviews). 6. As with construct accessibility, a great deal of additional work has been done examining the parameters of spontaneous trait inference and employing a variety of indirect (i.e., nonconscious) dependent variables that cannot be covered herein (for reviews, see Newman & Uleman, 1989; Uleman, 1999; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). 7. For evidence that the structure may not exist, or that it may exist solely for negative self-attributes, see Higgins, van Hook, and Dorfman (1988). 8. With some imagination, one can imagine the possibility of a fourth effect: the effects of our automatic evaluations of our selves on our judgments and behaviors that we are aware of (i.e., the explicit effects of implicit self-regard). Although we suspect that the awareness of the influence of our automatic evaluations of ourselves is rare, we nonetheless believe that it does occur. For example, the point of some psychotherapy techniques is precisely to achieve such a state (i.e., to make people aware of the chronic, negative evaluations of themselves that are exhibited in some form of nonoptimal behavior). 9. In our opinion, the Basic Beliefs Inventory (Catlin & Epstein, 1992) and the Faith in Intuition scale (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) are likely too explicit to satisfactorily measure nonconscious aspects of self-evaluation. 10. One additional implication is that explicit self-evaluations may be heavily influenced by the normative demands of the situation or culture. That is, they may not always reflect participants self-concepts, but rather what people believe their self-concepts should be. Thus, cross-cultural comparisons relying exclusively on explicit self-evaluations may tend to exaggerate existing differences in the self-concept while concealing underlying variation within cultures.

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Page 125 8 The Role of Theories in Mental Representations and Their Use in Social Perception: A Theory-Based Approach to Significant-Other Representations and Transference Serena Chen University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Social cognition researchers have made substantial progress in elucidating the nature of mental representations and their role in social perception. A diverse array of perspectives on representational content and structure exists (for reviews, see Carlston & E.R. Smith, 1996; E.R. Smith, 1998; Wyer & Carlston, 1994), along with a rich understanding of how and when representations are likely to be activated and brought to bear on the tasks of perceiving and judging the social world (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1986). Considerable progress has also been made regarding the role of mental representations in guiding social behavior (e.g., Bargh, 1990, 1997). Where do we go from here? This chapter examines the content, structure, and use of mental representations. It focuses on the idea, long recognized on a theoretical level yet often absent from empirical work, that perceivers' stored mental representations of the social world may include “theories” – that is, explanatory or causal forms of knowledge. If we have not been examining such knowledge all along, then what have we been examining? Even a quick mental survey would reveal that in much social-cognitive research, representations are treated as if they were composed, essentially, of lists of features or attributes. Further, their activation and use are thought to depend, in part, on the fit or overlap between the features of a stimulus and features associated with perceivers' representations (Bruner, 1957a; Higgins, 1996; see also Bargh, 1997; Hardin & Rothman, 1997). For instance, the activation and use of a racial stereotype to interpret a stimulus person are often thought to occur by virtue of the fit between racial features of the person and ones stored as part of a perceiver's stereotype representation. Or, observing a stimulus person engage in a helpful behavior, such as helping an elderly person across a street, is thought to elicit the use of a perceiver's representation of the trait helpful due to the overlap between a feature of the stimulus and one stored as part of the perceiver's trait representation. In recent years, however, challenges to such a feature-based approach have arisen in the social-cognitive literature (e.g., Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, 1997), paralleling trends in cognitive and developmental work (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985). These challenges argue that theories are basic to mental representations and their use. Unlike features, which are often treated as unrelated units of knowledge, theories are seen as embodied in explanatory relations linking bits of knowledge about an entity. To illustrate the potential value of theory-based views, this chapter presents a theory-based approach to mental representations of significant others. It is an approach that brings together theory-based ideas in the cognitive, developmental, and social-cognitive domains with the growing body of evidence for the role of significant-other representations in interpersonal perception and relations. The role that representations of significant others play in interpersonal perception and relations reflects transference, originally a clinical notion (Freud, 1912/1958; Sullivan, 1953), but one that also has been conceptualized in socialcognitive terms (Andersen & Glassman, 1996). In these terms, transference refers to the phenomenon whereby something about a new person activates a perceiver's representation of a significant other, leading him or her to interpret and respond to the person in ways derived from prior experiences with the significant other. Applying theory-based ideas to research on significant-other representations and transference, the main thrust of the theorybased approach proposed in this chapter is that perceivers are especially likely to have theories stored about their significant others, which implies that the content and structure of significant-other representations involve such theories, and that these theories play an important role in the transference

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Page 126 phenomenon. A BRIEF HISTORY The content, structure, and use of mental representations are long-standing topics in social cognition (e.g., Lingle, Altom, & Medin, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1984) and ones that continue to be debated (e.g., E.R. Smith, 1998). Because many of the issues surrounding them relate to ones discussed in the cognitive literature (e.g., Keil, 1989; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; E.E. Smith & Medin, 1981; Tversky, 1977), a brief history of relevant cognitive work is presented first, followed by a closer look at relevant social-cognitive work. Features as the Building Blocks: Cognitive Views The general assumption that features are the primary building blocks of representations has a long history in cognitive views on categories and categorization (for reviews, see Komatsu, 1992; Medin, 1989; Rosch, 1978; E.E. Smith & Medin, 1981). The classical view is often discussed as the starting point of this history (e.g., E.E. Smith & Medin, 1981). This view maintains that categories are defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features. For example, the features orange and round might be a subset of the features that define one's ‘‘basketball” category. According to this view, category membership is all-or-none. If an object possesses all of the necessary and sufficient features of a category, it is a category member; otherwise, it is not. The most immediate criticisms of the classical view took the form of prototype or family resemblance approaches (e.g., Rosch, 1975, 1978; Tversky, 1977; Wittgenstein, 1953), which contend that categories are organized around a prototypical member whose features reflect the central tendency of the category or summary abstracted from various experiences with category examples. In such approaches, category membership is seen as probabilistic or “fuzzy”, rather than all-or-none. Objects are members if they possess some, but not necessarily all, of the features associated with the category. Greater featural similarity or overlap with the prototype implies being a more prototypical category member or, put another way, having greater family resemblance. Although classical and prototype perspectives differ fundamentally in their definitions of categories and their views on categorization, they nonetheless share the general view that features are the main building blocks of categories. Prototype approaches have been challenged by exemplar ones, which argue, in their strongest form, that representations of single instances, called exemplars, are stored in memory rather than prototypes abstracted from experience with various instances (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1976; E.E. Smith & Medin, 1981). From an exemplar perspective, then, decisions about category membership depend on the similarity or overlap between the features of an object and those associated with stored exemplars, rather than with a prototype. Although prototype and exemplar views differ in several other basic ways, these differences are beyond the present scope (for recent discussions, see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Komatsu, 1992; E.R. Smith, 1998). Of key relevance is the fact that, by and large, features have been treated as the basic building blocks of categories in exemplar approaches, just as in classical and prototype ones. Although assumptions about representational structure have tended to be less explicit than content ones, some inferences might be drawn about the former from the latter. In particular, feature-based approaches have often treated the featural content of representations as unrelated units of knowledge, which is a view that arguably suggests little or rather simple structure, at least in terms of structure that lies in linkages between features (see Medin, 1989). However, the notion of correlated features has long been discussed (e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) and is one that arguably suggests a greater degree of structure. Nonetheless, neither the principles that account for why features correlations may exist, nor the nature of the linkages between features that such correlations imply, have been spelled out with much precision (for a review, see Murphy & Medin, 1985). Relative to assumptions about structure, feature-based views on the use of representations have tended to be more explicit. Specifically, feature-based ideas about content and structure have often come hand in hand with the view that categorization, or the likelihood that a representation is activated and used to interpret a stimulus, depends on the number of matching and mismatching features between a stimulus and a stored category (e.g., Tversky, 1977). The greater the number of matching features and the fewer the number of mismatching ones, the higher the likelihood that the stimulus is classified as a category member. Said differently, categorization has often been conceptualized as reflecting some function of feature-based similarity between a stimulus and a category (for reviews, see Goldstone, 1994; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993; see also Bruner, 1957a). Over the last decade or so, several lines of cognitive and developmental research have offered alternatives to feature-based approaches. In broad strokes, these alternatives contend that the building blocks of representations

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Page 127 may extend beyond features. Before considering this work, featural assumptions in social-cognitive views on mental representations and their use are examined. Features as the Building Blocks: Social-Cognitive Views Featural assumptions have been pervasive not only in social-cognitive work on mental representations and their use (e.g., Bruner, 1957b; Higgins, 1989, 1996; Lingle et al., 1984; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; Wyer & Srull, 1986), but also in social-cognitive views of personality (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989). In these social domains, features have been widely defined as trait attributes (see Zuroff, 1986). For example, representations of professors might be treated as if they include educated and absent-minded as features, whereas representations of Asians might include shy and hardworking . Although it is likely that most social cognition researchers would not, on a theoretical level, endorse simple feature-based definitions of representational content and structure, featural assumptions are often built right into the research methodologies used. For example, the stereotyping literature is composed largely of research in which stereotypic features were presented as stimuli, and participants' stereotypes were assessed in feature-based terms. Nonetheless, tracing the history of social-cognitive work on mental representations and their use reveals that, although features (i.e., traits) have been widely treated, especially on an empirical level, as the basic units of perceivers' conceptions of others, there have been hints of forms of knowledge extending beyond such features from the start. Elemental and Holistic Approaches . The beginnings of social-cognitive work on mental representations might be traced back to work on impression formation. Early on in this work, an important distinction was drawn between elemental and holistic approaches (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Leyens & Fiske, 1994). Elemental approaches emphasize the elements or pieces of information that presumably underlie perceivers' impressions of others (e.g., N.H. Anderson, 1974). These elements are treated as separate entities, ones that generally do not exert any influence on one another. In this regard, elemental approaches are fairly akin to feature-based ones in the cognitive literature, discussed earlier, that view the content and structure of categories in terms of lists of features and that tend to treat the features associated with a given category as independent entities. In contrast, the essence of holistic approaches is that perceivers' impressions of others should be viewed in terms of wholes rather than separate elements. Said differently, impressions reflect coherent configurations of individual elements. Moreover, unlike elemental approaches, holistic ones emphasize the subjective nature of perceivers' construction of reality, thus arguing that perceivers subjectively construe coherent meanings among separate elements. Gestalt psychology, which reflects this holistic view, was a major influence in early social-cognitive work. From a Gestalt perspective, individual elements (e.g., traits) are thought to influence one another, implying that relations exist among these elements such that each element only has meaning in the context of others. Asch's (1946) classic experiments clearly demonstrated the major propositions of the holistic approach, as did subsequent work in the same tradition (Asch & Zukier, 1984; see also Heider, 1958). For example, emerging from Asch's early work was the concept of central traits , which refer to traits that provide organizing themes around which the individual elements (i.e., traits) of one's knowledge about another person are interpreted and understood. These themes allow the presence of traits related to a central trait to be inferred, and the result is unified and coherent impressions reflecting these themes. Implicit Personality Theories. Compared with elemental views, then, holistic approaches hinted early on that any view of features as the sole building blocks of representations was likely to fall short. The concept of implicit personality theory has a similar flavor in that it refers to the very idea that relations exist among features (for reviews, see Leyens & Fiske, 1994; Schneider, 1973). Indeed, implicit personality theories are thought to be embodied in the linkages between traits. The concept was introduced by Bruner and Taguiri (1954) in part to account for how perceivers are able to form unified impressions around central themes and to infer the presence of traits from the presence of others to which they are related. It appears, then, that even some of the earliest findings from research reflecting a holistic approach to impression formation suggested, if considered in the language of mental representations, that features may not be the sole units of analysis for representational content, structure, and use. Indeed, as social-cognitive theorizing on representations developed, with the introduction of the schema concept, as well as the importation of the cognitive concepts of prototypes and exemplars, holistic themes persisted. Schemas, Prototypes, and Exemplars . The schema concept emerged in part from holistic notions. A schema is a “cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and

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Page 128 relations among those attributes” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 98; see also Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Carlston & E.R. Smith, 1996; Fiske & Linville, 1980; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; E.R. Smith, 1998). On the one hand, it is important to note in this definition that features/attributes are, once again, treated as the basic building blocks of representations. Yet, on the other hand, there is also an explicit recognition of relations among features, just as there is in the notion of implicit personality theory, implying the existence of internal organization and structure. Indeed, schemas have often been likened to theories that perceivers have about a given concept or stimulus, which harks back to the Gestalt notion of unifying themes or configurations (e.g., Markus & Zajonc, 1985). The term prototype has often been used interchangeably with schema in the social-cognitive literature (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; E.R. Smith, 1998), which suits the present purposes. As in the cognitive literature, prototypes in socialcognitive work have referred to categories organized around a summary, central member or prototype, abstracted from experience with various instances (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979). Likewise, this prototype has been characterized by a “fuzzy” set of features, and category membership has thus been seen as probabilistic rather than all-or-none. Also paralleling trends in cognitive work, exemplar approaches arose in the social domain as an alternative to prototype or schema views, suggesting that representations of people, groups, and social situations can be highly specific, designating individual instances rather than abstracted summaries of multiple instances (e.g., Lewicki, 1985; Linville & Fischer, 1993; E.R. Smith & Zarate, 1990, 1992). In the social realm, as in the cognitive arena of object categories, the assumptions of schema (or prototype) and exemplar views differ fundamentally in various ways (for a discussion of these differences, see E.R. Smith, 1998). Of central relevance here, however, are the generally converging assumptions these approaches make about how perceivers represent the social world, which are discussed next. So Where Do Social Cognition Researchers Stand ? Taken as a whole, theories in social cognition have tended to treat features, typically in the form of trait attributes, as the basic building blocks of perceivers' impressions of others and, presumably, of the representations that correspond to them. Indeed, in line with featural assumptions about content and structure, prevailing social-cognitive views on the use of representations have also tended to be featurebased. The relevant literature here is that concerned with principles of knowledge accessibility and use. In this body of work, it is widely agreed that, in addition to chronic and transient sources of knowledge accessibility, the activation and use of stored knowledge depend on applicability, which is defined as activation arising from the featural match or overlap perceived between the attended-to features of a stimulus and featural knowledge stored about a knowledge construct (Higgins, 1989, 1996; see also Bargh, 1997; Bruner, 1957b; Hardin & Rothman, 1997; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; Wyer & Srull, 1986). By serving as a basis for the contribution of applicability to knowledge activation and use, features have been accorded a central role in governing the use of representations in social perception (see Chen, Andersen, & Hinkley, 1999). In fact, paralleling feature-based views of categorization in the cognitive literature, described earlier, it has been explicitly argued that “the greater the number of shared features [between a stimulus and construct], the more the stimulus would contribute to a construct's activation level” (Higgins, 1996, p. 156). Yet as noted, there has long been the recognition that perceivers construe, and presumably store in memory, more meaning than implied by a list of independent trait attributes. This can be seen in Asch's (1946) early research on impression formation, in later work in the same Gestalt spirit (e.g., Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1951), such as work on implicit personality theories, and still later in the vast literature on schemas and prototypes. Each of these lines of thinking seems to suggest, in some manner, that organizing themes or configural meanings – indeed, theories – emerge out of individual attributes. Such emergent meanings imply that attributes are in some way related to one another and, in this regard, that the content, structure, and use of mental representations are likely to involve more than simple lists of unrelated features. Exemplar approaches in the social-cognitive literature, in their defining emphasis on separate instances, also suggest that relations between attributes may exist in being able to account for feature clusters or correlations. Before drawing the conclusion that social-cognitive work departs from prevailing feature-based approaches in the cognitive literature, it is critical to note several aspects of this work that suggest this conclusion is not yet warranted, at least on empirical grounds. First, as noted, the bulk of social-cognitive research has focused almost exclusively on trait attributes, despite considerable evidence that perceivers' conceptions of others also include knowledge about others' attitudes, thoughts, goals, feelings, and so on (e.g., Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Fiske & Cox, 1979; Karniol, 1986; Park, 1986; Prentice, 1990; Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990; Trzebinski, 1989). Thus, if representational content,

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Page 129 structure, and use involve themes or meanings that extend beyond trait attributes, the social-cognitive literature cannot speak very extensively about these yet. Second, in most research in the tradition of implicit personality theories, the focus has been limited to trait attributes, and theories have been conceptualized simply in terms of trait covariations or a small number of dimensions (for reviews, see C.A. Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Schneider, 1973). That pairs or bundles of traits may covary does little to elaborate on, in a substantive way, the view that features (i.e., trait attributes) are the main building blocks of representations. The same holds true even when viewing implicit personality theories in terms of dimensions because such a view is still based on the notion of trait covariations, with traits that fall within or along the same dimension expected to covary. Overall, then, although long-standing social-cognitive theorizing in the spirit of holistic approaches – such as Gestalt views, implicit personality theories, as well as schemas, prototypes, and exemplars – clearly hinted at the notion that features are not the only building blocks of representations, in most existing socialcognitive research, alternatives to a feature-based approach to representational content, structure, and use have not been fully realized. BEYOND FEATURES: THE ROLE OF THEORY-BASED FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE Having provided some historical context, recent work on mental representations and their use is examined. The focus is on theory and research which propose, in one form or another, that beyond featural units of knowledge the content, structure, and use of representations involve theoretical, explanatory, or causal forms of knowledge. As a group, these bodies of work are referred to as theory-based approaches despite variations among them. After briefly touching on relevant cognitive and developmental work, emphasis is given to social-cognitive work on theories and theory-based processes so as to lay the groundwork for describing a theory-based approach to significant-other representations and transference. Cognitive and Developmental Work Despite their pervasive influence, alternatives to feature-based approaches to categories and categorization have arisen in the cognitive and developmental domains, challenging various aspects of feature-based views (e.g., Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips & Collins, 1993). Although an examination of the full range of these challenges is beyond the scope of this chapter (for discussions, see Goldstone, 1994; Medin et al., 1993), a few of the most widely questioned assumptions of feature-based approaches are considered next. Challenging Key Assumptions of Feature-Based Approaches . Perhaps first and foremost, feature-based approaches have typically assumed that category members cohere due to their featural similarity to one another, and that classification of a new instance as a category member is thought to depend on the degree to which the instance is featurally similar to a category prototype or to category exemplars. In short, feature-based similarity serves as an organizing principle in many feature-based views on categories and categorization. Closely related to this assumption is the view that categories essentially reflect lists of features, thus implying that features are independent entities, as noted previously. The assumption that feature-based similarity grounds categories and categorization has been called into question on numerous grounds, most notably by research showing its flexibility (for reviews, see Goldstone, 1994; Medin et al., 1993). For instance, research has shown that variations in the directionality of similarity comparisons may alter perceptions of featural similarity (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983;Srull & Gaelick, 1983; see also Medin et al., 1993). Research on Tversky's (1977) contrast model, which views similarity between two objects as a weighted function of their common and distinctive features, has also shown the fluidity of judged similarity as a function of factors such as the nature of the task and stimuli being judged, as well as the scope of the stimulus context (e.g., Gati & Tversky, 1984). Several cognitive and social-cognitive models of categorization similarly recognize that featural similarity is not fixed (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987; E.R. Smith & Zarate, 1992; see also Higgins, 1996). These models posit that similarity depends on perceivers' allocation of attention to particular stimulus dimensions, which in turn depends on, for example, the context. The malleability of feature-based similarity suggests that features may not be the sole building blocks of categories, nor the sole basis of categorization (e.g., Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; see also Goldstone, 1994). How so? If the degree to which members of a category are featurally similar and the degree to which a new instance is featurally similar to members of a category are not fixed, this implies that, under any given set of conditions, there must be knowledge extending beyond features that help provide coherence to categories and that serve as a basis for categorization, respectively. Such knowledge helps to define or constrain the basis for

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Page 130 determining what makes members of a particular category similar to one another, and what instances should be classified as members of a category (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Indeed, a critical problem with featural similarity as an organizing principle is that it is unclear how the particular set of features that makes members similar, or that determines categorization, is decided (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Medin et al., 1993). There is an infinite number of features that make two stimuli similar or dissimilar to one another, or a new instance similar or dissimilar to the members of a category. As such, the assumption that categories reflect feature lists, and that categorization is based on some function of the number of shared and unshared features between an instance and a category, falls short because knowledge beyond features is needed to constrain what features are relevant to category membership (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985). Perhaps the clearest examples of this shortcoming are categories that group together instances that share little or even no obvious featural similarity, such as the category for ‘‘things to take out of one's house in case of a fire,” which might include pets, money, jewelry, and photo albums as members (example cited in Murphy & Medin, 1985; see also Barsalou, 1983; Medin, 1989). Feature-based approaches, and the assumption often inherent to them that feature-based similarity grounds categories and categorization, have also been challenged by research documenting the nonredundance of ratings of similarity and categorization judgments (Rips & Collins, 1993; for a review, see Goldstone, 1994; cf. Smith & Sloman, 1994). This work has shown that judgments of how similar an instance is to a category versus judgments of the likelihood that the instance is a member of the category are differentially influenced by variations in a given stimulus dimension. If similarity ratings and categorization judgments diverge, this implies that similarity, defined in featural terms, is not likely to be the only basis for categorization. If it were, judgments of how similar an instance is to a category prototype or exemplar should go hand in hand with judgments of the likelihood that the instance is a member of the category. In essence, challenges to feature-based similarity as the sole organizing principle of categories and categorization counter the idea that feature lists adequately capture the content and structure of categories. This idea has, in fact, been explicitly called into question by various strands of theorizing and research in both the cognitive and developmental literatures (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1983; Barsalou, 1983; Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989; Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rosch, 1978). For example, Armstrong et al. (1983) argued that knowledge about a given entity (e.g., bird) is likely to reflect not only a list of features associated with the entity (e.g., has wings, able to fly), but also relationships between these features (e.g., birds can fly because they have wings). Taken as a whole, challenges to feature-based approaches tend to suggest that the glue that holds category members together may involve more than shared features among them, and that the basis on which categorization judgments are made may involve more than the matching and mismatching of such features. In fact, the mounting evidence against features as the sole basis of categories and categorization coincides with the growing recognition of a potential role for theory-based forms of knowledge in cognitive and developmental work (for recent reviews, see Komatsu, 1992; Medin, 1989). Theory Based Approaches as an Alternative. Although there is variation in the precision with which theories are defined, and in how directly theory-based processes in categorization are addressed, theory-based approaches in the cognitive and developmental domains maintain that people's lay theories about the world are fundamental to how categories are represented and used. Unlike feature-based views, which tend to treat features as unrelated units, such approaches argue that explanatory relations among category features exist and are what make a category coherent (e.g., Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1991). Although some have argued for merely treating theoretical relations as kinds of features (e.g., Goldstone, 1994), such a resolution continues to imply that categories are grounded simply in features, rather than also, potentially, in the theoretical mortar binding the featural bricks of categories together (Armstrong et al., 1983; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; see also Gentner, 1989; Medin et al., 1993; Markman & Gentner, 1993). Put differently, it is argued that recognizing that theoretical relations may exist is “to concede that attributes may have a complex internal structure … this internal structure means that one is working with more than a list of simple attributes and that constraints and explanatory power will derive from this richer structure” (Murphy & Medin, 1985, p. 297). Support for theory-based approaches cuts across a wide range of domains and has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see Murphy & Medin, 1985). As alluded to before, particularly notable is evidence for the fluidity of featural similarity, which various researchers suggest implies that perceivers must bring knowledge extending beyond features to bear on judgments of similarity and categorization, and thus that categories and categorization are not simply feature-based (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Medin et al., 1993). It is worth noting that much of the

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Page 131 evidence for the malleability of featural similarity has involved judgments of the similarity between a pair of stimuli, rather than judgments of the featural similarity between a stimulus and stored category, with the latter speaking more directly to the possible role of theory-based forms of knowledge in categorization. However, some direct evidence for the influence of theories on categorization judgments also exists. For instance, developmental research has shown that children's theories about category membership may at times override the perceptual (i.e., featural) similarity of a stimulus to stored, category information as the primary basis of their categorization judgments (Gelman & Markman, 1986; for reviews, see Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989; cf. Jones & Smith, 1993). Research on category learning also points to a role for theories in categorization (Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). In this work, participants were shown two sets of children's drawings, which were either given neutral labels (“Group 1” vs. “Group 2”) or theoretical labels (“drawn by creative children” vs. “drawn by noncreative children’’). They were then asked to categorize a set of new drawings, providing a rule for each of their categorization decisions. Category learning varied depending on whether a theory had been activated. For instance, whereas the categorization rules of the neutral-label group referred mainly to concrete features, those of the theoretical-label group referred to relations between these features and more abstract ones that reflected previously assessed lay theories about what drawings done by creative versus noncreative children should look like. As a final example, cognitive work on analogical reasoning fits the notion that categorization may at times be theorybased (for recent reviews, see Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Specifically, some researchers have argued that relational (vs. attribute) similarity between stored knowledge and a stimulus may trigger the retrieval and use of the knowledge to interpret the stimulus (Genther & Markman, 1997; see also Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Markman & Gentner, 1993). In other words, structural “parallels” rather than simply attribute-based matches may at times fuel categorization judgments (Gentner & Markman, 1997). Social-Cognitive Work Social-cognitive support for theory-based approaches also takes various forms. First, as described, some of the earliest contributions to social cognition suggested that perceivers' impressions of others reflect unified configurations or Gestalts rather than sets of separate elements or features (Asch, 1946). As noted, a major idea emerging from this work is that meaningful relations exist among the features (i.e., trait attributes) associated with an entity, a notion also embodied in the concept of implicit personality theory (e.g., Bruner & Taguiri, 1954; Schneider, 1973). Beyond this, early work on attribution theory also reflected Gestalt influences, as seen quite clearly in Heiderian views on the formation of causal units composed of persons and acts (Heider, 1958). More recent work in the Gestalt tradition has explicitly conceptualized relations between traits as theoretical in nature. Specifically, research has shown that one way people make sense of incongruent information about others is to impose a theory – that is, call on knowledge to serve expressly as an explanation – for why the incongruence exists (Asch & Zukier, 1984; see also Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990; Park, DeKay, & Kraus, 1994). Along the same lines, it has been argued that perceivers tend to integrate inconsistencies in their experiences into internally coherent narratives or stories, which similarly implies that perceivers may think in terms of explanatory relations (e.g., Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1994, 1996; Pennington & Hastie, 1992, 1993; Read & Miller, 1993; Thagard, 1989; Zukier, 1986). Recent work on person models also has the flavor of a theory-based approach (Park et al., 1994; see also Wittenbrink, Park, & Judd, 1998). These researchers argue that perceivers' impressions of others resemble stories or narratives consisting of a central concept that serves as an organizing structure, in which pieces of information about others are linked in ways consistent with the central concept. More specifically, they demonstrate that perceivers may extract different central concepts from an identical pool of target information, which leads to the formation of distinct person models that, while having certain target attributes or features in common, nonetheless imply, overall, very different portraits of the same target (Park et al., 1994). Thus, this work fits the idea that conceptions of others may include linkages among the attributes associated with them, some of which may be explanatory in nature, that transform the meaning of attributes considered in isolation. In the same spirit is recent research conceptualizing implicit personality theories as person types (Sedikides & C.A. Anderson, 1994; see also Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; C.A. Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979). The main argument of this research is that perceivers often conceptualize others in terms of person types, which are composed of causally linked traits. While acknowledging the possibility of

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Page 132 various other types of glue bonding traits together (e.g., evaluative), this research has explicitly shown that causal connections are one type of link between traits. In this regard, this work speaks quite directly to the idea that representational content and structure involves causal or explanatory forms of knowledge. Social-cognitive work on analogy also exists. This research offers rather direct support for theory-based approaches by demonstrating that explanations are stored in memory, and are capable of being retrieved and used (Read & Cesa, 1991; see also Schank, 1982, 1986). Specifically, it found that retrieval of a previously generated explanation was facilitated when participants were faced with the task of explaining a new, unexpected event similar in causal structure to the one for which the explanation was originally constructed (Read & Cesa, 1991). Thus, stimulus cues reflecting causal relations helped trigger and render applicable the stored explanation for the prior event. In a similar vein, recent research has argued that stereotype representations include knowledge about cause-effect relations, and that this knowledge may influence the processing of stereotype-relevant information (Wittenbrink et al., 1997; Wittenbrink, Hilton, & Gist, 1998; see also Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1989). This work focused on perceivers' theories about the cause of African-Americans' socioeconomic disadvantage (Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Participants scoring high on the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) were thought to hold the cause-effect belief that African-Americans are responsible for their disadvantage, whereas those scoring low were thought to hold the belief that African-Americans are the victims of structural disadvantages. In two studies, the two participant groups varied in their perceptions of responsibility (i.e., causality) in a dispute involving an African-American target in a manner reflecting the nature of the cause-effect belief each held (Wittenbrink et al., 1997, Experiments 1 & 2). In a third study, the impact of participants' cause-effect beliefs on perceptions of causality was found only when the pool of to-be-interpreted information contained cause-effect cues that matched these beliefs – that is, when the information was presented in a way that facilitated versus inhibited construing causal structure among them (Wittenbrink et al., 1997, Experiment 3). Overall, this research suggests that matches between cause-effect relations (i.e., theories) stored in memory about a stereotype with cues in the stimulus environment that embody these relations contributed to the activation and use of the stereotype (Wittenbrink et al., 1997). In a somewhat different vein, theory-based notions can also be seen in connectionist models of social perception (Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; see also Miller & Read, 1991; Read & Miller, 1993; cf. Kunda & Thagard, 1996; E.R. Smith, 1996, 1998). Reflecting basic connectionist assumptions, these approaches generally argue that mental models of persons and social groups contain interconnected pieces of knowledge about others' traits, goals, beliefs, and so on, some of which are explanatory. Reminiscent of Gestalt principles, these approaches view social perception as conditional – that is, people perceive the characteristics, emotions, and behaviors of others in the context of one another, as a configuration, with the aim of achieving a coherent understanding of the social world. That is, each element or piece of knowledge about a person or group only has meaning in the context of all the other elements to which it is connected (Read et al., 1997). Conceiving of individuals in such conditionalized terms lies at the heart of the long-standing cognitive-social model of personality (Mischel, 1968, 1973, 1990; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Countering widely held assumptions about the stable and traitlike nature of personality, this model takes an interactionist approach, positing IF-THEN relations as the basic units of personality. IFs refer to situations or conditions, and THENs refer to the responses that are exhibited in them. The notion that personality is composed of IF-THEN relations raises the possibility that perceivers may conceive of other individuals and social groups in terms of such IF-THEN relations, recognizing that what others think, feel, and do may be contingent on the situation (Shoda & Mischel, 1993). The idea that perceivers may possess knowledge about the IF-THEN relations of others served as a primary basis for the theory-based approach to significant-other representations and transference presented later. To provide a conceptual framework for this approach, the social-cognitive model of transference is first described (Andersen & Glassman, 1996; Chen & Andersen, 1999). The main thrust of this model is that the phenomenon of transference can be understood in terms of the activation and use of significant-other representations in interpersonal perception and relations. THE SOCIAL-COGNITIVE MODEL OF TRANSFERENCE The concept of transference refers to the idea that past experiences with and assumptions about significant others may resurface in relations with new others (Freud, 1912/1958). Said differently, transference entails the reemergence of aspects of past relationships in present

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Page 133 ones. This general notion can be seen in various psychological domains, among them the clinical, personality, developmental, and social literatures (e.g., Baldwin, 1992; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Bowlby, 1969; Bugental, 1992; Feeney & Noller, 1990; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Homey, 1939; Horowitz, 1991; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Rogers, 1951; Safran & Segal, 1990; Shaver & Rubenstein, 1980; Sullivan, 1953), and forms the basis of the social-cognitive model of transference (Andersen & Glassman, 1996). Basic Assumptions According to this model, mental representations of significant others are stored in memory, housing considerable knowledge, including characteristics of significant others, as well as feelings, motivations, and roles experienced in relation to them (for a review, see Chen & Andersen, 1999). Relative to representations of stereotypes, traits, and nonsignificant others, significant-other representations have been shown to be associatively richer, in that perceivers spontaneously list a greater number of idiographic features to characterize them (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Studies 1 & 2). Further, significant-other features have been shown to be distinctive compared with features of related stereotypes and traits, meaning they are less likely to be associated with stereotypes and traits compared with the reverse (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 2). Featural richness and distinctiveness suggest the greater structural complexity of significant-other representations relative to the other representations (Tversky, 1977; see also Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Srull & Gaelick, 1983). Significant-other representations designate single individuals, rather than categories or types of individuals, and are thus exemplars (e.g., E.R. Smith & Zarate, 1990, 1992). As alluded to in prior sections, research has shown that exemplars are activated and used in social perception, just as are other constructs designating, for example, traits or stereotypes (e.g., Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). As such, transference can be understood in terms of the activation and use of a significant-other representation to interpret and respond to a new person in representation-derived ways. Chronic and Priming Sources of Accessibility In viewing transference in terms of the activation and use of significant-other representations, it is important to consider principles of knowledge accessibility and use. In line with prevailing social-cognitive models (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Higgins, 1989, 1996), the triggering of significant-other representations depends on chronic and transient sources of accessibility. Chronic sources arise from the frequent past activation of a representation. They are often referred to as the chronic accessibility of a representation, or its chronic readiness to be brought to bear on social perception. Research has documented the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations by showing that participants made stronger inferences about a target person based on a significant-other representation, compared with various control representations, even in the absence of transient sources of accessibility (Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995). One possible transient source of accessibility lies in cues in the environment that temporarily increase accessibility levels. This source is widely referred to as priming (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Research has shown that priming contributes to the activation and use of significant-other representations (Andersen et al., 1995, Study 1). Specifically, although participants made stronger inferences about a target person based on a significant-other representation relative to various control representations, even in the absence of priming, inferences derived from participants' significant-other representations were still greater when these representations were primed. This finding is similar to ones from research on trait constructs showing that chronic and transient sources of accessibility may combine to trigger the use of trait constructs, as seen in the enhanced strength of traitconsistent inferences about new others in the presence of both sources versus either source alone (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986). Applicability Sources of Accessibility The contribution of chronic accessibility and priming to the activation and use of a stored representation to interpret and respond to a stimulus have typically been examined using stimuli to which the representation is somehow applicable or relevant (for reviews, see Hardin & Rothman, 1997; Higgins, 1996). For example, research has used ambiguous targets of perception who have features that are equally similar to an activated representation, as they are to some alternative one (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977). Other research has used vague targets who have enough features to render a representation's use appropriate but not inevitable (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979). Beyond this, the potential for a to-be-interpreted stimulus to contribute to the activation and use of a representation has not been widely discussed (for exceptions, see

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Page 134 Bruner, 1957b; Bargh, 1997; Hardin & Rothman, 1997; Higgins, 1989, 1996). Nonetheless, as discussed in prior sections, considerable research indicates that activation can also arise from applicability, defined as the overlap – that is, the match or fit – between the attended-to features of the stimulus and those associated with a stored representation (e.g., Higgins & Brendl, 1995; Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980).1 In terms of transference, cues in a new person that match knowledge stored about a significant other should enhance the activation and use of the representation of this other to interpret and respond to the person. Research has found direct evidence for such applicabilitybased triggering of transference, with applicability arising from a target person's featural resemblance to a perceiver's significant other (Andersen et al., 1995, Study 2). Specifically, participants' inferences about the target based on a significant-other representation were stronger in the presence of applicability relative to in its absence. The Basic Transference Paradigm To empirically examine the transference phenomenon, a combination of idiographic and nomothetic methods have been used. In the typical research paradigm, participants idiographically generate features to describe a significantother representation, as well as various control representations, in a pretest session. For example, they may generate descriptive features such as “Ramona is smart” or “The nerd studies hard.” In an ostensibly unrelated session, which takes place at least 2 weeks later, participants' idiosyncratic information is used as stimuli in a nomothetic experimental design. In the learning phase of the experimental session, participants ‘‘meet” one or several fictional target persons by being presented with a series of descriptive features about them. For each target, some of these features are ones that participants had generated in the pretest session to describe a given representation. One target is always characterized in part by features that participants had generated earlier to describe a significant other. Thus, applicability-based triggering of significant-other representations is operationalized in terms of feature-based cues in a target person that overlap with features associated with a significant-other representation. These cues serve as feature-based triggers for the activation and use of the representation to interpret the target, and are viewed as an analog for the cues that perceivers confront in the context of actual, face-to-face encounters with others (Chen et al., 1999). After the learning phase, participants are asked to complete a recognition-memory test about each target; they are presented with a series of descriptive sentences and asked to rate their confidence about having learned each one earlier (see Cantor & Mischel, 1977). Some of these are ones that were actually presented earlier to characterize a given target, and some are ones that were not actually presented earlier but that were derived from the representation to which the target corresponds. For the target corresponding to the participant's own significant other, recognition-memory confidence ratings for representation-derived descriptors that were not presented earlier serve as an index of transference – that is, of inferences about the target that are derived from the participant's representation of a significant other (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen et al., 1995, Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Chen et al., 1999; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). Overall, a growing body of evidence supports the social-cognitive model of transference. However, as in the broader social-cognitive literature, featural assumptions have been embedded in research on transference. Yet such assumptions may not pertain equally to all mental representations; instead, theories and theory-based processes may better characterize some representations and their use. In particular, this may be the case for representations of significant others, which is the central argument of the theory-based approach to significantother representations and transference presented next. A THEORY-BASED APPROACH TO SIGNIFICANT-OTHER REPRESENTATIONS, AND TRANSFERENCE The present approach draws in part from the cognitive-social model of personality and social perception (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Shoda & Mischel, 1993). As noted, this model takes an interactionist approach, arguing that IF-THEN relations are basic to both personality and social perception. IFs refer to situations and THENs refer to the responses exhibited in them. In terms of personality, the model contends that the nature of IFs depends on the acquired meaning of a given situation for an individual (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) – that is, it depends on the individual's construal of the situation. Thus, for example, the IF designating a given situation may be construed as “at a party” for one person, whereas for another it is seen as “when meeting new people.” Regardless of how a situation is construed, the model maintains that situations activate particular sets of cognitive-affective units (e.g., feelings, goals, expectancies) that represent the psychological mediators of the IF-THEN relations that constitute personality.

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Page 135 Applied to social perception, the model suggests that perceivers may perceive others in terms of IF-THEN relations, viewing others' feelings, thoughts, and behaviors as contingent on the situation (Shoda & Mischel, 1993). The present approach extends this basic idea by proposing that knowledge about the IF-THENs of others may at times represent theories – that is, IFs may serve expressly as explanations for THENs. What kind of IF-THEN knowledge might be considered a theory? It is argued that knowledge about the observable situations (e.g., “in school”) in which another person exhibits particular responses is not especially explanatory because it simply reflects prior empirical observations of the person. At times, however, perceivers may take an explanatory step beyond simply making observations about another person to making inferences about the psychological situations that produce his or her responses – that is, the psychological contingencies of these responses. Psychological situations refer to internal, private states such as feelings, wishes, or motives. In the present approach, IF-THENs in which the IFs refer to the psychological situations that elicit a person's THENs are seen as theories because, essentially, they reflect knowledge about the most proximal causes of the person's responses. That is, they reflect conceiving of the IFs of the person not simply in terms of the observable situations that, according to the cognitive-social model, activate psychological mediating variables, but rather directly in terms of the psychological mediators linking observable IFs and THENs. The central argument of the current approach is that perceivers are especially likely to conceptualize the IFs of their significant others at the level at which they perceive these situations are construed by these important others. In terms of the previous example, rather than merely viewing the IF as an observable situation such as “at a party” or “when meeting new people,” for a significant other, perceivers are particularly likely to view the situation in terms of the psychological situation of the person (e.g., “when feeling inadequate”). Thus, rather than simply conceiving of IFs in terms of the observable situations that presumably activate particular psychological situations, which in turn elicit particular THENs, perceivers are especially likely to understand the IFs of significant others directly in terms of these psychological situations. In summary, the present approach defines theories in terms of IF-THENs, in which the IFs represent inferences about the psychological situations of another person believed to produce his or her responses or THENs (e.g., “IF Ramona feels insecure, THEN she doesn't talk in class’’). Put another way, it proposes that perceivers' conceptions of others may include not only unrelated units of featural knowledge, but also psychological-state theories that take the form of short, explanatory IF-THENs, each composed of a psychological IF and a THEN to which it is causally linked. The overriding argument is that perceivers are especially likely to make sense of significant others in terms of such psychological-state theories. This implies that the content and structure of significant-other representations, as well as the use of these representations in transference, are likely to involve such theories. These assertions are bolstered by various strands of existing evidence, which are considered next. The Case for Theories about Significant Others As reviewed earlier, a growing body of social-cognitive work suggests that perceivers' conceptions of others involve explanatory or causal knowledge (e.g., Sedikides & C.A. Anderson, 1994; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Such knowledge implies prior causal thinking on the part of perceivers. But why would perceivers be especially likely to engage in such thinking about their significant others? Causal Thinking About Significant Others. A wide range of theory and evidence suggest that, given the relevance of significant others to one's emotional and motivational outcomes, perceivers are likely to be especially willing to exert effort to make sense of these important individuals (see Andersen et al., 1997, 1998). Indeed, it is widely agreed that having one's outcomes dependent on others, such as is the case with significant others, engenders more effortful processing of information about these others than if there were no such outcome dependency (e.g., Erber & Fiske, 1984; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This desire to know significant others is likely to involve coming up with explanations for the behaviors of significant others (e.g., Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). Such explanations should enable perceivers to better regulate their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Andersen et al., 1997, 1998). Said differently, figuring out why significant others think, feel, and act as they do is likely to serve a self-regulatory function, informing perceivers about how to feel, what goals to pursue, what to expect and hope for, and so on in relationships with these important others. Indeed, considerable evidence supports the basic idea that significant others are relevant to self-regulation, essentially demonstrating that the self is experienced in part in relation to significant others (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Baldwin, 1992; Downey & Feldman, 1996; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; Moretti & Higgins, 1999). Direct evidence that perceivers engage in causal

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Page 136 thinking about significant others can be found in close relationships work (for a review, see Chen & Andersen, 1999). For example, research examining attributional tendencies and relationship satisfaction indicates that relationship partners engage in attributional thinking about each other and their relationship (e.g., Fletcher, Fincham, Cramer, & Heron, 1987; Miller & Read, 1991; Read & Miller, 1989), and that the types of attributions that partners make about each other may be associated with satisfaction in the relationship (for a review, see Bradbury & Fincham, 1990). The association found between attribution type and satisfaction has been found both when attributions are assessed using direct solicitation procedures, as well as when they are assessed spontaneously, suggesting that attributional thinking in relationships may reflect controlled, conscious processing, as well as relatively automatic processing (see Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). Building on the attributions and satisfaction work is research examining the association between attributional tendencies and attachment style (Collins, 1996). This work suggests that individuals with different attachment styles are inclined to interpret and explain relationship events in ways consistent with their particular working models of self and other. Stated another way, it proposes that working models of the self and others entail explanatory tendencies, developed in part on the basis of past experiences with significant others (see also Downey & Feldman, 1996). For instance, this research has found that individuals with a preoccupied attachment style tend to formulate explanations for relationship events reflecting a more negative interpretation, as well as more negative views of relationship partners, than do securely attached individuals (Collins, 1996). In turn, such variations in explanatory tendencies have been shown to influence emotional responding, as well as self-reported behavioral intentions. Still more evidence that perceivers engage in causal thinking about significant others lies in research showing that perceivers construct theories about significant others to construct and maintain positive illusions about these individuals, thus bolstering feelings of confidence in relationships with them (e.g., Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1994, 1996; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; see also Holmes & Rempel, 1989). In more concrete terms, this research has found that, when faced with a romantic partner's fault, people formulate theories to “encapsulate or defuse the negativity” of the fault (Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1994). For instance, they reconstrue the fault into a virtue, in this way forging protective, explanatory linkages between the faults and virtues of their significant others. Analogous data have emerged in research on transference (Andersen et al., 1996). Specifically, one study found that, on encountering a target person characterized by some negative descriptors associated with a positively evaluated significant other, participants responded to these descriptors with especially positive facial affect while encoding them. The inconsistency of the negative features in relation to the overall positive affective tone of the significant-other representation apparently led perceivers to transform the negative into a positive response – arguably a reflection of the influence of their positive theories about their significant others. The construction of theories that cast significant others in a favorable light may reflect a basic motivation to remain attached to these important others (Andersen et al., 1997). That is, they may reflect motivated attempts to bolster a perceiver's sense that a significant other loves him or her (see also Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1994, 1996). Overall, considerable research indicates that perceivers engage in causal thinking about significant others. Such thinking suggests that significant-other representations contain more than unrelated featural units of knowledge; they may also include knowledge reflecting causal relations – essentially, theories. But what evidence is there that such knowledge is especially likely to reflect psychological-state theories? Psychological-State Theories About Significant Others. On perhaps the most fundamental level, several lines of research have shown that representations of significant others contain more knowledge about internal, private states (e.g., thoughts, feelings) than do representations of various others, such as nonsignificant others (e.g., Andersen et al., 1998; Prentice, 1990). This finding bolsters the argument that perceivers are particularly likely to have psychological-state theories stored about their significant others insofar as it indicates that they have an especially large pool of psychological-state knowledge to draw from to construct such theories for these important individuals. Also relevant to this argument is recent research in which close relationships have been defined in terms of the inclusion of the other in the self (Aron & Aron, 1996; Aron et al., 1991). This research suggests that, to the extent a significant other is incorporated as part of the self, there should be greater similarity in the nature of cognition about the self and this other (Aron & Aron, 1996). For example, actor/observer differences in perspective are likely to be diminished (e.g., Andersen et al., 1998; Aron et al., 1991), resulting in greater similarity in the attributions made for one's own behaviors and those made for the other's behaviors (Nisbett, Caputo,

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Page 137 Legant, & Marecek, 1973; see also Prentice, 1990; Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988; Zuroff, 1982; cf. Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976). Similarity in cognition about the self and significant others implies some degree of similarity in representations of self and significant others. Although recent work has shown that self-representations contain more knowledge about private aspects (e,g., thoughts, motives) than do significant-other representations, it has also shown that significant-other representations resemble self-representations more so than nonsignificant-other representations in several ways (Andersen et al., 1998). Specifically, significant-other representations are more similar to the self than to nonsignificant-other representations in terms of the distinctiveness of knowledge about private aspects relative to public aspects (e.g., behaviors), as well as in terms of the accessibility of knowledge about private aspects. The notion that there is some degree of similarity in knowledge about the private aspects of the self and significant others is pertinent because, coupled with research indicating that perceivers generally view cognitive/affective information to be more informative than behavioral information and that this is especially true for the self versus others (Andersen & Ross, 1984), it suggests that information about significant others' internal, private experiences is likely to be seen as especially informative, just as for such information about the self. Overall, this coheres with the research noted earlier suggesting that perceivers are likely to be especially motivated to engage in effortful thinking about their significant others (e.g., Erber & Fiske, 1984), and extends it by suggesting that inferences about others' inner, psychological states are particularly likely to satisfy perceivers' desire to know their significant others, just as one's own inner workings and experiences are thought to best reflect one's “true” self (Andersen & Ross, 1984; see also Andersen et al., 1998; Johnson & Boyd, 1995). Overall, the bulk of existing evidence suggests that the knowledge perceivers store about the psychological states of significant others is substantial. Although it is less than what is stored about the self, it is nonetheless comparable in various ways to such knowledge about the self and is more available than such knowledge stored about nonsignificant others. Together, the clear availability of psychological-state knowledge about significant others, and the informational value perceivers place on such knowledge, along with evidence suggesting that perceivers are especially motivated to know their significant others, suggest that perceivers are particularly likely to draw on psychological-state knowledge to explain the behaviors of their significant others. In short, although it may often be sufficient to know that an acquaintance or a “nerd’’ is smart and skinny, it is unlikely that such simple, feature-based conceptions would suffice in making sense of a significant other. Instead, the present approach proposes that perceivers are especially likely to know their significant others in terms of psychological-state theories. Evidence for a Theory-Based Approach to Significant-Other Representation and Transference Research examining this approach has focused on three main hypotheses. First, the argument that perceivers are especially likely to conceptualize their significant others in terms of psychological-state theories suggests that such theories should be more available in memory about significant others relative to various control targets. Second, it suggests that these theories should be especially accessible from memory. Finally, if significant-other representations are especially likely to involve psychological-state theories, then cues in a new person that reflect such theories should be especially likely to trigger transference. Thus, it was hypothesized that applicability-based triggering involving psychological-state theories would serve as a particularly powerful source for the activation and use of significant-other representations to interpret and respond to new others – that is, transference. Three studies have been conducted to examine these hypotheses. In each, “theories” referred to participants' inferences or beliefs about the psychological situations (i.e., IFs) that explain the responses (i.e., THENs) of others. Also, in each study, participants were asked to idiographically identify a significant other (e.g., romantic partner) and, as control conditions, a stereotype (e.g., jock) and nonsignificant other (e.g., friend of a friend). Theory-Based Content in Significant-Other Representations. A first study tested the hypothesis that psychologicalstate theories are especially likely to be stored as part of significant-other representations (Chen, 1997, Study 1). To do so, this study examined two kinds of IF-THEN knowledge. In the first, the IFs referred to observable situations (e.g., “at a party”). To assess this knowledge, participants were given a list of sentence prompts for each representation. Each prompt designated an observable situation (i.e., IF), and participants were asked to complete the sentence if they felt they knew the most likely response (i.e., THEN) of the significant other, stereotype, or nonsignificant other in the observable situation. Thus, these IF-THENs assessed the number of empirical observations participants have stored about

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Page 138 each representation (e.g., “IF at a party, THEN Amy talks to everyone”). In the second kind of IF-THEN knowledge, the IFs referred to psychological situations. To elicit such IF-THENs, participants were asked to consider each IFTHEN observation they had listed and provide an explanation for the observation if they felt they had one. More specifically, they were asked to provide a BECAUSE phrase (i.e., explanation) following each observation they felt they could explain (e.g., “IF at a party, THEN Amy talks to everyone BECAUSE…”). Participants' explanations were then coded as ones reflecting psychological states, such as thoughts, feelings, or goals (e.g., “…because he wants to get ahead” or “…because she thinks others don't like her”) or ones that did not reflect such states (e.g., ‘‘…because he's in school” or “…because it's her job). BECAUSE phrases referring to psychological states served as an indirect measure of psychological-state theories, in that they reflect participants' inferences about the psychological situations that elicit the responses exhibited in particular, observable situations. Put another way, these BECAUSE phrases reflect what participants perceive as the psychological mediators between observable situations (i.e., observable IFs) and the responses (i.e., THENs) that occur in them. In this regard, these psychological-state explanations represent participants' perceptions of the most proximal IFs of THENs. Participants were expected to provide more psychological-state theories to explain the IF-THEN observations listed for their significant other relative to their stereotype and nonsignificant other. This would support the hypothesis that perceivers are especially likely to go beyond simply making IF-THEN observations about their significant others to formulating theories that reflect beliefs about the psychological situations that mediate these observable, IF-THEN relations. Although the difference between the significant-other representation versus the control representations was expected to be largest in comparisons involving such theories, participants were also expected to list more BECAUSE phrases overall for their significant other relative to control representations, regardless of whether these phrases were based on information about psychological states. This prediction reflects the general idea that perceivers are especially likely to engage in causal thinking about their significant others. Several findings emerged from this study. First, participants listed more IF-THEN observations for their significant other relative to the control targets, a finding that fits prior evidence indicating that perceivers are more likely to view familiar versus less familiar others in situation-specific terms (e.g., Prentice, 1990; Zuroff, 1982). The situations examined in the earlier work were also observable ones, such as “in class” or “with family” (Prentice, 1990, p. 383). Extending this earlier work, a greater proportion of participants' IF-THEN observations about their significant others relative to those about the control targets was backed by an explanation (i.e., BECAUSE phrase). Moreover, the explanations given for IF-THEN observations about significant others were especially likely to refer to psychological states. In short, participants were especially likely to provide explanations about their significant others, and these explanations were particularly likely to reflect psychological-state theories. Despite strong support for this study's availability hypothesis, one limitation of this study was the nomothetic nature of the sentence prompts that were used. These prompts were used to measure the number of IF-THEN observations participants have stored, controlling for the observable situations considered. This also allowed an assessment of differences across representations in the degree to which participants' IF-THEN observations were backed by an explanation – based on the same set of situations. To address this limitation, a second study conceptually replicated the first using a fully idiographic procedure in which participants were asked to freely generate psychological-state theories for each representation (Chen, 1997, Study 2). The findings of this study converged with those of the first. Namely, participants spontaneously generated more psychological-state theories (i.e., IF-THENs with psychological IFs) to describe their significant other versus their stereotype and nonsignificant other. Taken together, these data clearly suggest that the content of significant-other representations is particularly likely to include psychological-state theories defined in IF-THEN terms. Theory-Based Structure in Significant-Other Representations. If perceivers tend to think about their significant others in terms of psychological-state theories, it was hypothesized that the linkages connecting stored knowledge about the psychological IFs and THENs of these individuals should be especially strong – that is, activation should spread relatively quickly across them. Thus, the component parts of psychological-state theories should be retrieved from memory in tandem quite readily. Put another way, psychological-state theories about significant others should be particularly accessible, suggesting that perceivers should find it especially easy to retrieve the psychological IFs that explain the THENs of these important others. To test this hypothesis, Chen (1997, Study 2) had participants generate psychological-state theories to describe each of the three representations on a computer,

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Page 139 which recorded their generation latencies. More specifically, participants generated each theory by first typing in a response (i.e., THEN) true of the individual (significant other or nonsignificant other) or stereotype being described, followed by the psychological situation (i.e., psychological IF) that they believe produces the response. As predicted, participants showed significantly greater ease in coming up with psychological IFs to explain THENs (i.e., shorter average latency within IF-THEN units) about their significant other relative to the control representations. This was true even when controlling for the average latency between IF-THEN units –verifying the distinctiveness of the average latency within IF-THEN units, and bolstering the interpretation that the latter reflects the existence of IF-THEN units in memory that, for significant-other representations, possess particularly strong linkages. These results support the accessibility hypothesis and suggest that psychological-state theories about significant others take the form of especially tightly linked IF-THEN units, each composed of a psychological state and the piece of data it explains. Said differently, they indicate that the theory-based content of significant-other representations has structural implications. A Theory-Based Approach to Applicability-Based Triggering in Transference . Applicability's role in the activation and use of a representation can be understood in learning terms (Bruner, 1957b; Higgins, 1989, 1996; see also Bargh, 1997; Hardin & Rothman, 1997; see also Lewicki, 1986; E.R. Smith, 1990). Specifically, a representation's applicability to a stimulus depends on the stimulus patterns that have most frequently led to the activation of the representation in the past. Thus, applicability is based in part on a representation's activation history. For instance, some research has found that the effect of priming gender-stereotypic traits on ratings of male and female targets on these trait dimensions was greater when there was stereotype-consistent fit between the primed trait and the gender of the target (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). Presumably, target gender enhanced the applicability of the corresponding gender stereotype because of the gender-consistent nature of the activation history of gender stereotypes (see also Higgins et al., 1977; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 1996; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). By and large, the stimulus patterns or cues thought to contribute to the activation and use of a representation have been conceptualized in featural terms. That is, applicability has been widely defined in terms of the match between features in a stimulus and feature-based knowledge stored as part of a representation, with greater match corresponding to greater applicability (Higgins, 1989, 1996; see also Chen et al., 1999), as noted in prior sections. But if perceivers conceive of their significant others in terms of psychological-state theories, the stimulus cues that should render a significant-other representation most applicable are ones that embody these theories. In other words, psychological-state theories about significant others should serve as a powerful basis for applicability's role in triggering transference. For example, observing the IF-THEN relation “when criticized, a target person gets angry” should activate a perceiver's representation of a significant other because the IF-THEN embodies the psychologicalstate theory that her significant other lashes out at others if feeling inadequate. In short, the main basis of applicability-based triggering should reflect the level at which perceivers tend to think about the entity designated by the representation (Hardin & Rothman, 1997). A third study examined the hypothesis that psychological-state theories about significant others play a distinctly powerful role in triggering transference (Chen, 1997, Study 3). This study used a variant of the basic transference paradigm and compared the contribution of theory-based applicability to that of feature-based applicability to the activation and use of participants' significant-other representations. More specifically, participants in this study learned about several target persons, one of whom was described by descriptors that participants had generated in a pretest session to describe a significant other. The other targets resembled various control representations. Thus, as in all research on transference, applicability-based triggering of participants' representation of a significant other took the form of a target's resemblance to this important other. The critical difference in this study was that applicability was based on either features or theories associated with the significant other. In the feature-based applicability condition, participants saw feature-based stimuli in the learning phase (e.g., “Terry is an intelligent person”). In contrast, participants in the theory-based condition were presented with stimuli reflecting psychological-state theories (e.g., “Terry is nice to others when he wants to get ahead”). In both conditions, participants were given a recognition-memory test about each target in which they were presented with a series of descriptors and were asked to rate their confidence about having learned each one earlier (see Cantor & Mischel, 1977). Some of these descriptors had been presented earlier to describe the target, and some had not actually been presented but were derived from the representation that the target resembled. Confidence ratings for representation-derived

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Page 140 descriptors that were not presented earlier were averaged as a measure of the degree to which representationderived inferences about the target were made based on the corresponding representation, Inferences based on a significant-other representation served as an index of transference, as in prior research. Regardless of applicability condition, participants made stronger representation-derived inferences about the target resembling their own significant other relative to the control targets – an effect that constitutes evidence for transference. In the feature-based condition, this effect replicates prior research in which applicability-based triggering of transference has always taken the form of feature-based cues in a target that matches features associated with participants' significant other. However, if perceivers tend to represent their significant others in terms of psychological-state theories, then theory-based cues in a new person should produce a stronger transference effect. Although some deviations from this strict prediction emerged, the transference effect – defined in terms of greater representation-derived inferences about the significant-other target relative to the control targets – was in fact significantly stronger in the theory-based applicability condition relative to the feature-based one. This finding supports this study's key hypothesis that theory-based applicability plays an especially powerful role in triggering transference. Taken together, the three studies described earlier provide support for a theory-based approach to significant-other representations and transference. The content, structure, and use of representations of significant others appear to be especially likely to involve theories, defined specifically as perceivers' IF-THEN knowledge in which the IFs refer to the psychological states that elicit the THENs. ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS On one level, the theory-based approach presented earlier clearly resonates with the recurrent idea in the socialcognitive literature that perceivers strive for coherence in social perception, thus viewing others in terms of configurations, organized around central themes, rather than in terms of separate elements or features. Asch's notion of central traits, and later concepts such as implicit personality theories and schemas, embody this basic idea. It is an idea that leaves room for the possibility that theoretical relations exist among features and are basic to representational content, structure, and use. On several other levels, however, the present approach extends existing social-cognitive concepts. Among them, it goes beyond viewing features simply in terms of trait attributes, which are the focus of most social-cognitive research. More precisely, it posits not only that representational content and structure may include explanatory relations, but also that these relations may involve inferences about others' feelings, motives, thoughts, and so forth. On a more basic level, the current approach offers a concrete view of the form that theories might take in the social realm, which is a level of specificity that is absent in most social-cognitive work consistent with, or even explicitly espousing, theory-based notions. On a different note, the present approach is also distinct in arguing that representational content, structure, and use are likely to vary as a function of the significance of the “other’’ designated by representations. More specifically, it suggests that to understand the content and structure of perceivers' representations of others, as well as the processes that govern the role of these representations in interpersonal perception and relations, it is critical to consider the nature of perceivers' relations with these others (see also Hardin & Conley, chap. 1, this volume). Put differently, how the self is related to others is likely to influence how perceivers go about making sense of these others, and, as a result, how knowledge about these others is mentally represented and how and when it is likely to be used. By proposing that the nature of perceivers' relations with others influences mental representations and their use, the current approach is part of an expanding literature reflecting a cross-fertilization of social-cognitive theory and close relationships work. Finally, in a related vein, the present approach extends existing work on the principles that govern knowledge activation and use by suggesting that applicability may at times be primarily feature-based, and at other times theory-based, depending on how perceivers conceive of the entity designated by a given representation (see Chen et al., 1999). Of course, many issues have yet to be addressed. Some of these are considered next, followed by a discussion of some future directions they suggest or compel. What Is Meant By “Theories?” Existing theory-based approaches vary considerably in terms of how and the precision with which theories have been defined. One dimension onto which many variations fall is the globality of theories. Whereas some theory-based approaches appear to define theories as single, global, or all-encompassing explanatory principles, others suggest a lower level of analysis, at which multiple

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Page 141 theories about a single entity exist, embodied in linkages connecting bits of featural knowledge. For example, global theories often seem to be implied in cognitive and developmental work, perhaps because this work tends to deal with theories about objects and other nonhuman entities (e.g., lawnmowers) which focus on the function of these objects or some other singular essence. Of course, some social-cognitive conceptions of theories, which generally deal with human entities (e.g., individuals, social groups), also seem to suggest a global view of theories. For instance, the notions of central traits, implicit personality theories, and schemas often seem to imply a single organizing principle or theory. Although the theory-based approach proposed in this chapter concurs with relatively global views of theories in the basic argument that representations involve explanatory knowledge, it is worth reiterating that theories were defined in the present approach as knowledge that explains other stored knowledge, rather than knowledge that fully accounts for who or what an entity is (see Read, 1987, with the latter implied by more global definitions of theories). Although perceivers may well possess single, global theories about objects, people, and groups alike, research testing the present approach has thus far only examined theories at a lower level of analysis, namely, in the form of IF-THEN units. Defining theories in such IF-THEN terms fits squarely with the increasing recognition in the socialcognitive literature that perceivers may at times view the social world in interactionist, IF-THEN terms (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Prentice, 1990; Shoda & Mischel, 1993). What Is Meant By Theory-Based Processes? In terms of what is meant by theory-based processes, theory-based approaches espousing relatively global definitions of theories often tend to focus on the notion that theory-based knowledge may be invoked in various judgmental tasks. For example, perceivers may draw on a global theory about what makes a given object what it is in deciding whether an instance is a member of a given category, or in making theory-derived inferences about the instance (see Murphy & Medin, 1985). The latter type of theory-based process is often what is implied in the vast social-cognitive literature on schema-driven processing. Schemas have often been likened to theories that guide topdown processing, whereby perceivers make schema-derived inferences about a stimulus person. In contrast, the present approach, which defines theories in terms of explanatory relations among featural bits of knowledge, is specifically concerned with the role of theory-based processes in knowledge activation and use. That is, as noted, the focus is on the match between cues in the stimulus environment with stored, theory-based units of knowledge. Put another way, theory-based processes have to do with the mapping of theory-based cues in the stimulus environment to theory-based content and structure, which should enhance a representation's likelihood of activation and use (see also Gentner & Markman, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997, 1998). Overall, future work needs to be precise about what is meant by theory-based content, structure, and processes because variations are likely to carry distinct implications for the role of theories in interpersonal perception and relations. Some Further Avenues to Explore Beyond addressing what is meant by theories and theory-based processes, future research might consider more closely the notion that self and significant-other representations are related. In the research presented in this chapter, the focus was on perceivers' conceptions of who their significant others are – specifically, on their psychological-state theories reflecting knowledge that is entirely about their significant others. However, another potentially critical kind of IF-THEN is that in which perceivers themselves are the IFs of their significant others' THENs. Just as perceivers are likely to be motivated to figure out the psychological situations that elicit their significant others' responses, they may also be motivated to understand the relational dynamics that elicit these responses. Examples of such relational IF-THENs might be “When I am feeling frustrated, my partner soothes me” or “When I am weak, my mother criticizes me” (see also Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Seidel, & Thomson, 1993). The idea that linkages between the self and significant others exist coheres well with various lines of research (e.g., Baldwin, 1992; Bugental, 1992; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). For example, research outside of the transference realm has shown that activation of a significant-other representation leads to changes in perceivers' self-evaluations (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). It is argued that such self-evaluative changes occur by virtue of self/significantother linkages stored in memory as part of perceivers' “relational schemas” (for a review, see Baldwin, 1992). In the transference domain, research has shown that when a significant-other representation is activated and used in an encounter with a target person, stored expectations regarding the significant other's acceptance or rejection are likely to color relations with the target such that the perceiver comes to expect the target to accept or reject him or her just as his or her significant other does (Andersen et al., 1996).

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Page 142 Similarly, stored motivations to approach or distance oneself from a significant other have been shown to come into play in relations with new others when transference occurs. Expectations and motives associated with significant others reflect knowledge about relational patterns between the self and significant others, just as relational IF-THENs do. Beyond this, research has shown shifts in self-definition and self-evaluation in the context of transference (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). That is, activation of a significant-other representation accordingly activates aspects of a perceiver's self that are associated with the relevant significant other, leading the perceiver to become the self he or she is when with the other – that is, the “self-with-significant-other’’ (see also Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991). Thus far, research on transference has conceptualized self/significant-other linkages in terms of what they imply for the nature of interpersonal perception and relations. In line with the current theory-based approach, however, future research might consider the role of relational IF-THENs in triggering transference. For example, having one's concerns about a particular issue belittled or dismissed by a new acquaintance may be a relational cue that reminds one of a pattern of interaction often experienced with a significant other, thereby triggering the activation and use of the relevant significant-other representation. The idea that relational IF-THENs may serve as triggers of transference raises the questions of when and for whom different kinds of IF-THEN cues might elicit transference. Cross-cultural differences in social perception are interesting to consider in this regard. For example, research examining the distinct ways in which Americans and Hindus explain others' behaviors suggests that Hindus may be less likely to come up with explanations that refer to internal or psychological aspects of others (Miller, 1984). In general terms, this research found that Hindus were more likely than Americans to generate contextual explanations for an actor's behavior, such as explanations referring to social norms, social roles, or interpersonal relationships (e.g., “Because she is his aunt”), rather than explanations referring to something internal about the actor (e.g., “He was interested only in himself”). Such differences in the kinds of attributions made by Americans compared to Hindus were interpreted as reflecting the emphasis placed in Indian culture on “locating a person, object, or event in relation to someone or something else” (Miller, 1984, p. 968). This work suggests that evidence for the pronounced availability and accessibility of theories about significant others, defined specifically in terms of IF-THENs with psychological Ifs, and the especially powerful role of such psychological-state theories in triggering transference, may hold more or less strongly among perceivers across different cultures. CONCLUDING REMARKS Because much of everyday social cognition involves significant others, it is critical to consider how perceivers go about making sense of these individuals. The theory-based approach presented in this chapter, and the findings it has yielded thus far, suggest that perceivers are especially likely to make sense of significant others in terms of psychological-state theories about them. This is reflected in both the content and structure of their representations of these important others, as well as in the triggering of these representations in encounters with new others. On a broader level, this work suggests the need to explicitly incorporate a role for theories in social-cognitive work on mental representations and the processes that govern their use in making sense of the social world. Social cognition may often be theory-based, and potentially in qualitatively different yet systematic ways, about the different persons and groups that make up the perceiver's social world. ENDNOTES 1. Although applicability has been theoretically defined in terms of overlap between a stored representation and cues in a to-be-interpreted stimulus (e.g., Hardin & Rothman, 1997; Higgins, 1996; see also Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980), applicability has not been examined strictly in these terms in the small body of research examining its contribution to the activation and use of stored representations. In this work, much of which has focused on the applicability of a stored, trait construct to a target stimulus, the degree of applicability Or match of the trait construct to the stimulus has most typically been operationalized on the basis of pilot participants' ratings of how much the stimulus implies the trait (e.g., Higgins & Brendl, 1995). Nonetheless, research on transference has taken a rather strict, featurebased approach in defining applicability, guided by theorizing on feature-based approaches from the social-cognitive domain (e.g., Higgins, 1996), as well as from the cognitive and developmental literatures (for recent reviews, see Komatsu, 1992; Medin et al., 1993). As noted, these approaches generally maintain that categorization reflects in part the degree of feature-based matches and mismatches between stored knowledge about a category and a to-beclassified stimulus.

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Page 143 9 What We Theorize When We Theorize That We Theorize: Examining the “Implicit Theory” Construct From a Cross-Disciplinary Perspective Michael W. Morris Daniel R. Ames Eric D. Knowles Stanford University University of California, Berkeley The human ability to make sense of events through generating explanations has long fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and other scholars. Particularly impressive is the facility with which people generate explanations for others' behaviors. Starting at a surprisingly early age, children seem to instantly interpret observed action in terms of what an agent is thinking, wanting, and planning. They also trace these fleeting mental states to origins in enduring personal dispositions and situational forces. This penchant for making sense of others as individuals with particular beliefs, desires, goals, and traits is essential to how we navigate the social environment. Our inferences about an actor's dispositions tell us whom to avoid, whom to trust, whom to blame, and so forth. Moreover, our perceptions of situational forces tell us which positions to seek out and which predicaments to avoid. Many scholars have described the lay person's process of generating explanations by analogy to the scientist's process of reasoning from theories. The role of theories in scientific explanations is seen very clearly in the field of psychology because the factors driving behavior cannot be directly observed and hence have to be posited on the basis of a theory. Areas of psychology that settle on a cogent theory often move forward quickly as researchers easily generate explanations for a variety of phenomena; in areas lacking a theory, generating explanations is more difficult. Hence, in accounting for the facility of lay people in generating explanations for behavior, it has been tempting to suggest that they possess theories. Although the differences between lay and scientific explanation are apparent, a host of scholars have drawn the analogy to capture similarities between the lay person and the scientist. This account – sometimes called the “theory theory” – has developed in several different academic disciplines. In philosophy, scholars have described the role of folk psychology (e.g., Dennett, 1991). In developmental psychology, researchers have proposed that children have an implicit ‘‘theory of mind” (e.g., Wellman, 1990). In social psychology, researchers have argued that individuals understand behavior in part by invoking implicit theories (e.g., Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Heider, 1958; Ross & Nisbett, 1980; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). In psychological anthropology and cultural psychology, a growing body of work examines the roles of cultural theories in judgment and explanation (e.g., D'Andrade, 1995; Peng, Ames, & Knowles, 2000). The essence of these accounts is that lay people work with knowledge structures that have the same structure, function, and relationship to evidence as that of scientific theories. Proponents of the theory theory differ in how far they push the analogy between lay and scientific theories. In this chapter, we take the analogy seriously by identifying the criteria for identifying a piece of knowledge as a theory. This distinguishes the theory account from rival, alternative accounts that posit different kinds of knowledge as the mechanism for lay social understanding. One class of alternatives posits other kinds of learned, structured knowledge such as narratives (e.g., Bruner, 1990) or metaphors (e.g., Lakoff, 1987). Other alternatives posit knowledge structures that are not learned: innate modular cognitive mechanisms for social understanding (Fodor, 1986). Elsewhere, accounts posit learned knowledge that is not structured into theory-like forms, such as knowledge that exists in an associative network (e.g., Read & Miller, 1993) or knowledge derived from imaginative simulation of another person's state of mind (Goldman, 1993). All of these proposals are plausible and may capture part of people's social understanding competence. Our goal, however, is to review the evidence that supports the theory theory relative to these other proposals. This does not require that the alternative approaches be wrong, just incomplete. We do so by reviewing theory theory scholarship in four fields – phil-

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Page 144 osophy, developmental psychology, social psychology, and cultural psychology. We begin by identifying defining characteristics of theories. WHAT IS A THEORY? In claiming that people employ lay theories, it is meant that they work with mental structures in a way that is analogous in important respects with the way scientific theories are developed and applied (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Ross & Nisbett, 1980). To distinguish theories from other types of knowledge, we review key criteria that have been distilled in philosophy of science. The criteria considered are widely accepted by philosophers as the defining characteristics of scientific theories (although there is by no means complete consensus) and accordingly provide a promising starting point in clarifying the claims involved in positing that lay people possess and use implicit theories. Structural Features Several structural features distinguish theories from many other kinds of knowledge. First, theories involve an ontology – a set of assumptions about the kinds of things that exist. To reason with a theory means treating these often unobservable entities as if they exist (Boyd, 1991). For example, genes were posited theoretically long before it was possible to observe them directly. An example from social psychology is the state of cognitive dissonance that was posited based on theory rather than on direct measurement. Second, theories propose causal mechanisms – principles that account for regularities in concrete phenomena (Cartwright, 1991). The fact that most Icelandic people have blue eyes is explained, for example, in terms of the causal role of the blue-eye allele and its preponderance in the Icelandic gene pool. Third, theories comprise a set of coherent principles, not merely a list of unrelated causal beliefs. Constructs and principles interrelate in lawful ways, working in conjunction to explain observable phenomena (Glymour, 1980). For instance, certain genes are posited to explain blue eye color, whereas other genes are posited to explain brown eyes, and there are principles describing their interaction – for example, that the dominant brown gene, if present, will block expression of the recessive blue gene. A final structural property, resulting from the first three, is that theories are expressed in abstractions rather than in the vocabulary of concrete observations (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). The property of abstractness sets theories apart from other knowledge structures. A theoretical statement is more abstract than an empirical generalization, which merely infers a regularity (e.g., “Most Icelandic people have blue eyes”) from a set of observations (“Most Icelandic people I have seen have blue eyes”) and are still phrased in the language of the evidence. The abstractness of theories distinguishes them from other belief structures such as analogies and stories that preserve the concreteness of observation. Functional Features Another distinguishing characteristic is that theories can be used in explaining, predicting, and interpreting phenomena. Like many knowledge structures, theories afford explanations – that is, accounts of how an outcome was caused. Although simple attributions of an outcome to a cause could be produced from a simple cause-effect belief, more complex explanations such as those involving multiple plausible causes or counterfactual conjectures would mark the existence of a theory about how different causes interact. Next, the abstractness of theories means they are less tightly yoked to past experience (than are other knowledge structures) and hence enable prediction about a wider range of phenomena – even phenomena unknown at the time of a theory's construction. Finally, theories also aid in interpretation of evidence – that is, in deciding which evidence is relevant to a particular problem and which observations may be ignored or attributed to methodological failings. Empirical Defeasibility Perhaps the most central issue in analyses of how science differs from religion or purely formal disciplines is the relation between theory and empirical evidence. Philosophers of science have debated how scientific theories depend on, and change in light of, counterevidence. The influential empiricist school (Carnap, 1966; Popper, 1959) proposed a simple model in which predictions are deduced from a theory and subsequently compared to empirical observations. According to this account, when the predictions conflict with the observations, the theory is falsified and rejected. This model has itself been rejected based on arguments of Kuhn (1977) and others about resilience of theories against initial counterevidence. The history of science reveals that theories are fortified with ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses that explain away conflicting data for quite some time until the structure becomes so unwieldy that scientists find it unattractive and rally around a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1977). A full answer to the question of how theories are empirically defeasible requires distinguishing types of

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Page 145 theories at different levels of abstraction or generality. Following philosophers of science (e.g., Lakatos, 1970; Lauden, 1977), we can distinguish the general frameworks that define a discipline or paradigm (e.g., trait psychology, the framework of tracing differences in behavior to dispositions) from the more specific models that guide research within a content area (e.g., the authoritarian personality model of prejudice). A theory's level of abstractness is related to its resistance to counterevidence and, consequently, to its ability to resist change. Because more specific scientific theories are more tightly yoked to particular patterns of evidence, they are the more easily disconfirmed. Likewise, lay theories that are more specific may be more likely to change based on the lay person's observations than more general framework theories (Wellman, 1990). The commitments of the theory theory stance can now be seen more clearly. Lay people possess knowledge structures that (a) abstractly represent the kinds of things that exist in a domain and the configuration of causal relations among these things; (b) are used in explaining, predicting, and interpreting; and (c) are affected by empirical evidence. Few scholars would claim that lay theorizing parallels that of science in a more extended sense (i.e., lay theorists do not submit their conclusions for anonymous peer review). Rather, theory theory claims rest on the three basic defining features of theories that are enumerated earlier.1 THEORY THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY Whereas philosophy of science has provided our criteria for theory, philosophy of psychology provides our first literature in which the theory theory of social understanding has been advanced. A long tradition of philosophers concerned with the problem of how lay people understand each others' minds have assumed that people interpret observed behavior according to a body of commonsense knowledge about how people's situations, mental states, and behavior are related. This structured knowledge, seen as analogous to the knowledge garnered through scientific psychology, has been referred to as folk psychology (see e.g., Carruthers & Smith, 1996). This knowledge is theory-like in its structure in that it specifies an ontology (positing kinds of mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and goals), describes causal mechanisms for mental states to direct behavior (reactions, deliberate acts, etc.), and integrates these mechanisms at an abstract level. In addition, this knowledge is theory-like in its function in that people use it to interpret, explain, and predict others' behavior. Moreover, the presumption is that individuals adjust their folk psychological beliefs in light of empirical evidence. Among philosophers of psychology who acknowledge the existence of folk psychology, there remains disagreement over the issue of whether these lay people's theories mirror the actual causes of behavior. Those in the realist camp think folk psychological notions about mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires are largely accurate; these folk-theorized entities are real (Searle, 1983). Those in the antirealist camp compare such folk notions to debunked historical ideas about impetus and phlogiston: Although widespread, they are ultimately wrong (Ryle, 1962) and do not correspond to the real causes of behavior in the brain (Churchland, 1988). In between the positions that folk psychology is largely correct and utterly invalid lies the position of Dennett and others, that folk psychology should be evaluated for its practical value rather than its veracity. Folk psychology works not necessarily because it is true, but because it allows social coordination. According to Dennett (1986), beliefs and desires are not real things so much as abstracta – calculated entities like centers of gravity or vectors that are useful in prediction. Right or wrong, folk psychology is an interpretive stance that gives people an ability to deal with others. As we shall see, this question of whether lay theories lead to accurate understandings is an important one across disciplines. The important point for now is that proposing theories as the mechanism for social understanding does not require one to believe these theories posit constructs that have a real existence. Indeed, the inaccuracies that come from overreliance on theories is an important source of evidence for the theory theory. Challenges The position in philosophy that social understanding relies on a folk psychology is challenged from two directions. A nativist challenge by Fodor (1986) and others holds that evolution has provided us with an innate capacity to understand other minds by hardwiring modules for detecting intentions and other crucial mental states from their signatures in others' observable behavior. These perceptual modules meet some criteria for a theory. For example, they serve the function of explanation. However, they fail other criteria, such as coherence and empirical defeasibility, respectively, because they are encapsulated and indefeasible. Hence, this position differs from the position that lay people develop theories of other minds. A second challenge emphasizes the primacy of introspection, arguing that people's other-understanding relies on a simulation of one's self in their position. Gold-

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Page 146 man (1993) argued that, ‘‘One can predict another person's choices or mental states by first imaging himself in the other person's situation and then determining what he himself would do or how he would feel. … You do not need to know any psychological laws.” In other words, folk psychology does not hinge on something people know (a knowledge structure), but rather on something they do (the process of introspection). The evidence adduced for a simulation account over a theory account is the seeming superiority of self-knowledge of mental states. Philosophical proponents of the theory theory perspective have not fully explained why people feel a stronger understanding of their own minds than of other people's minds. These two basic challenges to the theory theory – nativism and simulationism – are seen in other disciplines as well. In the philosophical literature, it seems there have been no deciding arguments by theory theory proponents that have not been answered by the nativist and simulationist camps. As we shall see, however, empirical work in areas of psychology has provided more incisive evidence. THEORY THEORIES IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY Debate about implicit theories and social understanding in the developmental psychology literature centers on some of the same issues as the philosophical literature. Yet developmentalists bring a different kind of evidence to these questions: Developmentalists track age-related changes in children's performance that might suggest what kinds of structures or processes underlie that performance. The history of lay-theory constructs in developmental psychology begins with Piaget, who proposed that children develop causal theories, or schemata,2 in order to understand the physical (Piaget, 1960) and social worlds (Piaget, 1965). Piaget assumed that these theories are associated with distinct ontological kinds – mechanical events and human behavior, respectively – and that they capture the associated causal principles. Also, Piaget is explicit that such theories are abstract enough to be cognitively reversible to allow both prediction and explanation. The dependence of the child's theories on the child's empirical observation and experimentation is also clearly assumed in Piaget's writing. The weakness of Piaget's account of the child's understanding is its own relation to empirical evidence: Piaget's clinical method of interviewing children did not allow him to observe the sophistication of children's understanding. Subsequent research with methods that minimize communicative demands on the child has refuted many of Piaget's claims about the limitations of social and physical understanding in older children. Correspondingly, there has been a theoretical shift toward the view that a child's empirical learning complements innate capacities. For example, researchers of children's understanding of physical and biological concepts find evidence that children are prepared to carve the world of experience in particular ways. Even young infants seem to work with a basic ontology and associated causal principles to interpret, categorize, and predict events (see Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989). This work was reinforced by contemporaneous arguments that the coherence of categories used by adults derives not merely from the similarity of shared features, but from the general theories in which categories are embedded (Murphy & Medin, 1985). The most encompassing theory theory of children's understanding was presented by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997). These researchers claimed that children develop a number of theories in their first years of life, starting with initial innate notions and revising them into increasingly elaborate learned theories. Children are seen (like scientists) as tinkerers and testers, sometimes experimenting and sometimes (again, like scientists) misinterpreting and ignoring counterevidence to their current theories. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) pointed to evidence that children are born with rudimentary theories. The fact that newborn infants imitate other humans – but not machines and objects – indicates an awareness of the human kind. The fact that they look for effects of their actions in their local environments suggests an understanding that the nexus of mechanical causation is physical contiguity. At around 9 months, children begin to act on principles of physical causality, through regulating their physical contact, and on principles of social causality, through communicative attempts toward people. They begin to develop different notions of causality in two domains: people and objects. By 18 months, their actions take into account specific properties. An understanding of physical principles becomes apparent in their manipulation of objects and an understanding of specific properties of individuals apparent in their interactions with people. Eventually, through empirical observation and theory change, children become able to understand that other persons have distinct beliefs that are representations of reality. To illustrate how developmentalists investigate children's understanding of beliefs, let us consider how children's errors provide evidence for their use of a theory. Piaget noticed that children fail to appreciate the extent to which beliefs differ between self and other, and suggested that children conceive of thoughts like objects

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Page 147 – simply a part of the physical environment. Children's understanding of belief has been greatly illuminated in recent years by studies with Wimmer and Perner's (1983) “false-belief” task. In its original form, a young subject learns about Maxi, a character who places some chocolate in a particular location in a room. After Maxi leaves, the chocolate is moved to another location. The child is then asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate on return. To succeed, the child must think that Maxi thinks that the chocolate is in the original location rather than in what the child knows to be its true current location. In other words, to predict Maxi's behavior, the child must entertain the notion that this other person has a belief that does not correspond to current reality: a false belief. Young children fail this task, indicating that they cannot conceptualize and reason about false beliefs. Since Wimmer and Perner's (1983) work, a nearly unbelievable number of false-belief studies have been conducted and have converged on the finding that children undergo a dramatic shift in the ability to solve the problem at around age 3 (see Astington et al. 1988; Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Shifts in the child's understanding of others, such as the shift in understanding of belief around age 3, are described as analogous to paradigm shifts in science by Wellman (1990). Contrary to Piaget, Wellman contended that even early childhood theories make an ontological distinction between mental things, like thoughts and dreams, and physical things, like balls and clocks. Yet where these theories run aground is that they fail to recognize that beliefs are representations of reality mediated by perception. Wellman proposed that the child first develops a desire theory, which posits that individuals have unique wants and generates explanations of behavior in those terms. Next, the child develops a conception of individual beliefs and eventually a belief-desire theory that allows for actions to be explained in terms of either beliefs or desires. When relying on this theory (shown in Fig. 9.1), children generate explanations that reference either an actor's desire or belief. They can conceptualize distinct individual beliefs and hence can solve the false-belief task. Finally, the next major change is toward a theory in which belief and desires are assumed to be jointly necessary for intentions and intentions to be the proximal cause of action. Children relying on this theory generate explanations more like those of adults (see Fig. 9.2). The evidence for these theory changes comes from age-related tendencies in children's performance on prediction tasks and from an analysis of the content of their spontaneous explanations (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Gopnik and Wellman concentrated on rendering the Fig. 9.1. A child's lay theory of mind (Wellman, 1990).

major changes in children's abstract framework theories rather than more concrete specific theories. These researchers have relied on data about systematic age-related change in several kinds of performances: success in predicting behavior of others in situations that require sophisticated understanding of mental states, and the content in children's spontaneous explanations. As in the philosophical literature, the emphasis in this research has been on lay reasoning about mental states of other individuals. Challenges The rivals to the theory theory in developmental psychology closely parallel those in philosophy. First, from a nativist perspective, Leslie (1994) argued that the knowledge structures guiding children's understanding of causes are innate modules dedicated to particular kinds of causation. The primary evidence for modules as opposed to theories comes from demonstrations that infants are sensitive to highly specific stimulus patterns that mark types of causation (e.g., mechanical events, intentional actions) before the relevance of such patterns could have been induced from experience (Leslie, 1988, 1994; cf. White, 1990). Also taken as evidence for modules are studies of autistic children that suggest highly specific impediments in understanding mental states. Baron-Cohen and others have argued that this mind-blindness is best explained by a genetically based deficit in the module for understanding intentional acts, although alternative accounts can be framed in terms of the theory theory (see Currie, 1996, for a recent review). In summary, the evidence raised by nativist researchers points to some role of innate mechanisms. However, whether this role excludes a role of empirically defeasible theories is an open question. Many theory theorists posit a role for innate structures as well as theories. Although parsimony suffers from positing both kinds of processes, it is also the case that purely modular accounts do not afford parsimonious accounts of

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Page 148 Fig. 9.2. The adult's lay theory of mind according to Wellman (1990).

qualitative shifts in processing with age, needing to resort to competence/performance distinctions or ad hoc arguments about when innate mechanisms come on-line in development. Hence, parsimony does not clearly favor one camp over the other. A natural question for the theory theory raised by nativists is why children converge on the same kinds of understandings at around the same times; experimenting scientists surely do not seem to do as much. Gopnik (1996) argued that children have more in common with each other than do scientists: Given that children share the same innate concepts as a point of departure and have similar early experiences (i.e., parental caretaking), it is no surprise that development is largely homogenous. Astington (1996) and others emphasized a Vygotskian perspective that social experience and acculturation is a major source of theories. Consistent with this perspective, a number of researchers have found that social experience variables associated with increased acculturation – contact with parents and siblings – lead to earlier success at false-belief tasks (Dunn et al., 1991; Perner et al., 1994). In a second form of challenge to theory accounts, Harris (1989, 1991) adopted the perspective that we simulate others through our self-understanding. He argued that empathetic, imaginative projection – rather than conceptual understanding – is at the heart of how children comprehend others' minds. Even very young children, according to Harris, can predict some behaviors given wants and, given behaviors, ascribe some wants as explanations, all through simulating what it would be like to be the person involved. All of this, Harris claims, can be done without explicit knowledge of belief/desire or theory concepts. Errors like those in the false-belief task might result from projected self-understanding rather than from a limited theory of action. Another important source of evidence for this position is the developmental priority of mental state self-ascriptions as opposed to other-ascriptions. Nevertheless, defenders of the theory theory reply that the facility with self-understanding may simply reflect greater expertise with self than any other given person (Gopnik, 1993). In summary, developmental psychology has produced a rich tradition of theory about lay theories that change with age. However, many of the central pieces of empirical evidence for and against this proposal are vulnerable to alternative inter-

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Page 149 pretations. THEORY THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Although the idea that adults understand themselves and others by applying theories dates back to James (1890), the first elaborate accounts of social understanding in terms of lay theories came from the mid-century scholars who applied Gestalt theory to social perception. This literature is immense and so we only review contributions where the analogy to scientific theories is taken seriously. To organize our review, we draw on the contrast between more general framework theories and more specific domain theories. An early and influential contribution was Ichheiser's (1943) account of recurrent misunderstandings in social perception. Ichheiser noted a tendency “to interpret in our everyday life the behavior of individuals in terms of specific personal qualities rather than in terms of specific situations…based on the [ideological] presupposition of personal determination of behavior (as opposed to the situational or social determination of behavior)” (p. 151). In his famous analysis of social perception, Heider (1958) drew on Ichheiser's ideas for his proposal about the general framework theories that guide the lay person's understanding of action. Heider imputed to the lay person a framework theory much like Lewin's field theory, in which action results from the dynamic interaction of personal and environmental forces. In the path diagram with which he expressed the proposed lay theory, causal interactions are seen in the convergence of paths (Fig. 9.3). Heider proposed not only this broad framework theory, but also, embedded within it, specific models for particular kinds of behavior, such as achievements or emotions. With regard to evidence, the framework theory was defended by allusion to general patterns in experimental findings; the more specific proposals were supported by more direct evidence of how these conceptions were represented in folk tales, literature, and ordinary language. Proposals About General Framework Theories A great deal of research energy has been devoted in the intervening decades to testing consequences of general framework theories. The bias to see “behavior [as] caused primarily by the enduring and consistent dispositions of the actor, as opposed to the particular characteristics of the situation to which the actors responds” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 31) has been called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). However, whereas Fig. 9.3. The lay person's theory of action (Heider, 1958).

Ichheiser asserted that the bias derived from ideologically tinged framework theories, Heider did not. Rather, he emphasized Gestalt perceptual processes that draw attention to factors internal to the actor. Close in spirit to Heider's account, most influential reviews since have emphasized the role of judgment heuristics (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). However, cross-cultural comparisons (see Krull, chap. 13, this volume) have recently reawoken interest in the contribution of theories to the fundamental attribution error. Before turning to proposals about more specific theories, it is worth noting in proposals about general framework theories two points of contrast between social psychology, on the one hand, and developmental psychology and philosophy, on the other hand. A key principle for social psychologists is that the perceiver strives to attribute behavior of another person to stable, distal properties. As Heider put it, “Man grasps reality, and can predict and control it, by referring transient and variable behavior and events to relatively unchanging underlying conditions, the so-called dispositional properties of his world” (p. 79). Whereas developmentalists portray a perceiver who attends to the psychological states proximal to another's action, social psychologists portray a perceiver who tries to read something from the actor's behavior about the actor's enduring dispositions or the stable properties of the social situation. In part, this difference may reflect that adults make different inferences owing to different theories. Wellman (1990) proposed that the adult's lay theory is far more complex in its ontology and causal principles than the child's (compare Fig. 9.2 to Fig. 9.1), such that inferences about proximal causes of behavior such as the actor's beliefs and desires are traced back to ultimate causes such as traits. As Wellman (1990) wrote “Specific beliefs and desires are often explained as springing from such larger traits (the desire to wear

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Page 150 Fig. 9.4. Distinction between theories of intentional action and unintentional behavior (Malle, 1998).

pretty clothes may spring from a vanity or, perhaps, from an insecurity about one's attractiveness). Because of this grounding of specific beliefs and desires in traits, traits figure prominently in causal explanations of actions’’ (p. 114). This emphasis on learning about stable properties may reflect a more general orientation of adults to be more pragmatically driven rather than curiosity driven in the inferences from another person's behavior. Perhaps the converse of social psychologists' emphasis on the inference of stable traits is their lack of attention to inferences about fleeting intentions. A core idea among philosophers and developmentalists is that perceptions of intention are pivotal in social understanding. Yet social psychologists have only focused intermittently on inferences about the actor's intentions. An influential model by Jones and Davis (1965) accorded a central role to ascriptions of intent, but the specific claims of this model did not fare well empirically (see Jones, 1979). For the most part, inferences about intent have been prominent in social psychology only in discussions of responsibility and culpability assignment (Shaver, 1985). Similarly, there has been intermittent attention to the notion that a distinction should be drawn between responses to intentional actions as opposed to mere occurrences of behavior (Buss, 1978; Kruglanski, 1975). This argument has been elaborated in recent work by Malle and Knobe (1997a, 1997b), which proposed that perceivers have distinct theories for explaining intentional actions as opposed to unintentional behaviors. A sketch of this framework can be seen in Fig. 9.4. Although the tests of predictions from Malle's distinction are as yet few, it appears to be a promising way to reconcile the tradition in social psychology that behaviors are directly attributed to traits and the tradition in other scholarship that actions are understood first in terms of intentions. Proposals About Domain-Specific Theories A broad characterization of the history of lay theory research in social psychology might be that theorists have tried to winnow and formalize the ideas in Heider's eclectic and sprawling treatise. In an influential article, Kelley (1972a) provided precise proposals of specific implicit theories in a matrix formulation.3 An assumption of multiple sufficient causes (MSC) was posited as

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Page 151 Fig. 9.5. Lay theory that interpersonal behaviors have multiple sufficient causes (after Kelley, 1972a).

underlying the understanding of interpersonal behavior (Fig. 9.5 presents this implicit theory in matrix formation and in a causal path formulation). Briefly, perceivers may view behavior as having several sufficient explanations, with each acting independently, and only one of which is needed to produce the behavioral effect. For instance, a person's nervous behavior may be caused by a situation (a high-pressure job interview) or a disposition (an anxious person); both are not necessary to explain the behavior. Kelley proposed a list of implicit theories at this level of generalization, described patterns of inference that should follow from each, and linked each to a domain of behavior. The path diagram formulation makes clear that the lay person purportedly assumes that each factor is sufficient, to cause the behavior. This marks a difference from Heider's insistence that lay perceivers assume factors interact to produce actions (Fig. 9.3). One area of evidence for the MSC theory concerns the discounting principle , which holds that when one gains evidence for one causal factor being present, this reduces one's confidence in the presence of an alternative causal factor. If one learns a nervousacting person is on the way to a job interview, there is less need to posit dispositional anxiety. An interesting twist in Kelley's work is that the analogy to scientists is used both descriptively and normatively. The discounting principle is presented as a rational inference akin to those that would be made by “a good scientist” reasoning from evidence and theory. Following Kelley, a number of researchers have worked on the specific theories that guide inferences in particular content domains. The work of Weiner and colleagues (for a review, see Weiner, 1986) has greatly clarified the set of assumptions that guide attributions for achievement. Reeder and colleagues (Reeder, 1993; Reeder & Brewer, 1979) have closely analyzed the inferences drawn from schemata for domains such as achievement and morality. This work highlights asymmetries in the evidence needed to draw inferences about traits on different ends of a dimension (e.g., a single act of cheating can lead to an inference of dishonesty, whereas a single act of rule following is unlikely to lead to an honesty inference). Other researchers have tried to understand individual differences in social understanding in terms of differences in domain theories. Research by Dweck and colleagues (see Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995, for reviews) focused on a divide between two ways of thinking about a particular domain of behavior. Starting with the domain of intelligence, Dweck argued that lay people fall into two basic groups: entity theorists, who hold that intelligence is fixed, and incremental theorists, who hold that intelligence is malleable. Dweck and colleagues showed that this individual difference in belief affects both teachers' and students' judgments and actions in the classroom (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Related research showed that perceivers differ in theories of moral behavior, and these assumptions carry with them patterns of reasoning about moral behavior (Dweck,

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Page 152 Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Hong et al., 1997; Chiu et al., 1997). Elsewhere among the social psychologists studying organizations, the construct of implicit theories of organization has proved a useful way to understand how organizations differ in the assumptions that members share (Downey & Brief, 1986). As with theories about personal characteristics, such as intelligence and morality, these theories of group or organizational characteristics have been empirically linked to consequences in perceivers' thoughts and actions (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999). Proposals About Highly-Specific Theories Thus far, we have discussed highly general framework theories and more specific theories that apply to a particular kind of behavior or characteristic. The lay theory construct has also been used to refer to even more highly specific knowledge structures delimited to particular actions, social groups, or persons (for a review, see Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). The earliest use of the construct at this level were studies identifying the ideographic theories of personality held by particular perceivers by Rosenberg (1972) and others. This research is covered only briefly here because it is central to another chapter in this volume (see Chen, chap. 8). A seminal research program on highly specific theories was the work of Schank and Abelson (1977) on the scripts used to understand routine activities, such as having a restaurant meal. Although more concrete than general theories, these bear a resemblance to theories because they are abstracted from aggregations of explanations for observed instances of the behavior (Read & Cesa, 1991). Others have proposed that stereotypes are not simply lists of features, but theories about the structure of factors causing behavior by a particular group (Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, 1997). More specific yet, some scholars have proposed that perceivers rely on lay theories of particular other individuals (see Park et al., 1994). Some researchers of knowledge structures representing particular events rather than classes of events or objects (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1993) have described them as stories rather than theories. Can the criteria that we have distilled help us distinguish highly specific lay theories from stories? The functional criteria may be of little help because stories and beliefs can serve functions such as explanation, prediction, and interpretation. However, structural criteria provide some distinctions. Accounts of scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and action stereotypes (Wittenbrink et al., 1997) are abstracted from observations; by describing interactions of causes, they bring coherence to one's understanding of the mechanisms producing a particular behavior. Stories, however, are not abstracted; they are in the same language as the evidence at hand. Challenges to Theory Theories As in philosophy and developmental psychology, accounts of social understanding in terms of lay theories have been challenged by proponents of alternative accounts. Again these challenges come from two fronts. On one side are researchers who argue that the lay perceiver has no need to acquire elaborate learned theories because social understanding proceeds through innate capacities to perceive relevant social cues. For example, the Gibsonian approach of Zebrowitz and others (for a review, see Zebrowitz, 1998) has focused on inferences that are drawn based on properties of faces. However, although some dispositional judgments may follow directly from facial evidence without the need of folk theories, it is doubtful that other kinds of inferences (e.g., judgments about a target's beliefs) could be explained in this way. Elsewhere, researchers argue that, instead of developing theories, perceivers construct social understandings through associational processes. The connectionist approach to social cognition (Miller & Read, 1991; Read & Miller, 1993) describes judgment as a process distributed throughout a network of associations shaped by continuous input and output. Given a set of inputs, the network settles on an output solution through a process of selective activation and feedback. Such a process is implicit and requires no semantics or knowledge structures such as theories. Like simulation accounts, connectionist judgments are not a matter of knowing but a matter of doing. In some sense, this poses an alternative to lay theory descriptions of decision making. However, little research has been done to directly compare these accounts for given domains of judgment. Although these rival accounts of social understanding have been raised in social psychology, they do not present a serious threat to the widely accepted accounts of social understanding in terms of lay theories. The greatest challenge has come from critics who have pointed out that, despite the wide acceptance of some proposals concerning causal theories, the evidence from empirical tests is quite weak. In other words, skeptics demand more detailed evidence that people possess and use knowledge structures in this form. For example, one of the most influential proposals is that lay people possess and widely apply the specific theory that interpersonal behaviors have multiple sufficient causes

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Page 153 (Kelley, 1972a). This theory that purportedly underlies people's tendency to discount one causal factor given the presence of an alternative factor, and researchers have examined patterns of attributional inferences to look for evidence of the underlying implicit theory. Yet such tests have not converged in support of Kelley's proposal (for reviews, see Shaklee, 1983; Surber, 1981) with some research programs concluding that participants err by discounting less than would be rational (Jones, 1979) or more than would be rational (Calder & Staw, 1975; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). A critique of research on lay causal theories by Fiedler (1982) suggested that “first inferring a causal schema from judges' modal attributions of an event or action and then explaining the same attributions by the same schema” (p. 1003) is circular and that progress requires that the theories be measured directly and independently of attributions. The problem of whether implicit theories can be measured directly in themselves rather than merely detected indirectly in their consequences raises a number of interesting questions. Many researchers have assumed that theories are implicit – beyond the lay person's declarative knowledge. This has been acknowledged, in part, by developmental researchers who use paradigms such as the false-belief task (rather than asking children, ‘‘Do you believe in beliefs?”). There is the danger that simple self-reports of one's beliefs might tap metacognitions that differ from people's actual working theories. Also, as stereotype researchers have long been aware, social desirability concerns often lead people's espoused theories to diverge from their implicit theories. However, some researchers have tried to measure an individual's theory independently of the attributions purportedly based on the theory. Approaches to Direct Measurement of Lay Theories The predominant approach among researchers who have attempted to directly measure lay theories is to design belief or attitude inventories. Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) developed measures of this sort. Although not measuring an individual's theory in all its nuances, they suffice to sort individuals into the general categories of entity versus incremental theorists about a given domain. Developmentalists have designed tests of whether children have acquired the capacity to make decisions premised on an understanding that interpersonal behaviors have multiple causes that operate independently (Morgan, 1981). Although these techniques allow for a less circular research strategy than the one that Fiedler critiqued, they do not measure lay theories in enough detail to test Kelley's (1972a) argument that people draw the discounting inferences that follow rationally from the theory triggered in a domain. In another approach, Morris and Larrick (1995) suggested that Kelley's proposals about implicit theories can be formulated in terms of subjective probability and, by interrogating individuals about a series of specific probabilities, a researcher can elicit the implicit theory that the individual applies to a behavioral domain. In addition to affording a way to measure theories, the probability formulation has two other important advantages: First, it is more descriptively flexible than a matrix or path-diagram notation. Second, it enables an explicit normative analysis of the discounting inferences implied by a particular theory about how the multiple causal factors in a domain interact to produce a behavioral outcome. For example, the lay theory of multiple sufficient causes comprises the following assumptions: The sufficiency of two causal factors, C1 and C2, for an effect, E, which can be represented as the conditional probability of the effect given each cause, P(E | C1) and P(E | C2). The independence of the causal factors, which can be represented in terms of whether the conjoint probability of the two factors equals the product of their base rates or prior probabilities as opposed to equaling a higher quantity (in the case of positively associated factors) or a lower quantity (in the case of negatively associated factors). The number and prevalence of other, third causes for this effect or, in other words, the exhaustiveness of this pair of causes, which can be represented by the difference between the total probability of E minus the probability of E given C1 or C2. Morris and Larrick (1995) showed analytically that discounting follows from MSC and that the amount of discounting depends on the prior probabilities of C1 or C2. They analyzed the discounting inferences from lay theories comprising all permutations of assumptions on these dimensions to uncover the boundary conditions of where discounting is logically implied and where it is not. Morris and Larrick (1995) suggested that variations of lay theories may account for behavioral domains where slight or extreme discounting inferences have been observed. They tested this in a few cases by measuring each participant's lay theory through a series of questions. For example, the strength of a causal mechanism or level of sufficiency of cause C for effect E can be measured with a question such as, “What is the likelihood that E would happen, given that C is present?” or more

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Page 154 extentionally, “Of 100 cases where C is present, in how many of these cases would E be present?” Morris and Larrick (1995, Study 1) examined the lay theories participants applied to the behavior of writing an essay in favor of an unusual political position, and found that participants tended not to assume that external instructions to write such an essay are a sufficient cause of doing so. Consistent with previous studies, when participants were later asked to make an attribution for a particular case of essay writing, they tended to attribute it to the student's attitude, and this attribution was not entirely discounted on receiving information about the presence of the situational pressure of instructions from a professor to write the essay. However, Morris and Larrick's participants did not fail to reason rationally; their level of discounting matched that which normatively followed from their idiographically measured theories (see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for a discussion of similar approaches). Their tendency to attribute to the dispositional factor even in the presence of the situational factor did not result from an inferential bias, such as anchoring and insufficient adjustment. Rather, it resulted from the application of a theory that assumed the situational cause was not by itself perfectly sufficient – an assumption that is incorrect about this particular experimental setting although it may be generally correct about most contexts in which essays are written. In initial studies, Morris and Larrick (1995) found perceivers' attributions correlated highly with what would be normatively appropriate given their assumptions about the sufficiency and independence of factors. In subsequent studies, Morris and Larrick (1998) found that people's inferences are highly sensitive to some normatively relevant parameters, such as the association between two causal factors, C1 and C2, and less sensitive to other parameters, such as the magnitude of other, third causes of an effect. This suggests that people's theories or schemata may not be well elaborated with regard to the latter dimension. In other words, schemata may focus on the relationship and properties of two focal causes. That is, people focus on probability of the effect owing to the two focus causes and not on its complement, the area of the effect accounted for by other causes. In any case, the technique of representing and measuring schemata in terms of subjective probabilities holds promise for more nuanced descriptions of the packages of assumptions people bring to bear on particular domains of behavior and on the inferences drawn from each. Summary As the foregoing review makes clear, the lay theory construct has played a long-standing and central role in the social-psychological literature. Our review yields several summary insights. First, it seems useful to distinguish levels of abstraction or generality in lay theory proposals. Just as framework theories in science are less likely to be overturned by empirical observations, the same may be true for framework theories in lay understandings. Also, it may be the case that researchers should expect different kinds of evidence for lay theories at different levels of abstraction. Just as framework theories have less direct contact with empirical experience, they may be less accessible to introspection. Proposals about general framework theories may have to rely on much more indirect evidence than proposals about specific domain theories. Importantly, proposals about knowledge structures at different levels of abstraction need not be rival accounts, but rather may be complementary. Second, against the backdrop of scholarship on lay theories in other disciplines, the social-psychological approach reveals some distinctive, perhaps arbitrary, assumptions. This lends support to recent calls for questioning the assumption that lay perceivers single-mindedly strive to infer personality traits (Kihlstrom & Hastie, 1997). The idea that perceivers distinguish beliefs, desires, and intentions of actors may prove useful in resolving a number of social psychological questions (Ames, 1998). If, as philosophers and developmentalists propose, lay perceivers work within the framework of a belief-desire folk psychology, this calls for a reconsideration of core concepts such as traits and situations. The social perception of traits may be best seen not as detecting some essence that manifests itself in behavior, but as a set of mental events, of thoughts and wants, that perceivers impute to others. To understand how perceivers reason about the effects of situations on others (e.g., the fundamental attribution error), we can consider how perceivers see targets' beliefs and desires as situated in particular contexts. Finally, there is a benefit to considering how the notation in which lay theory proposals have been instantiated has encumbered scholarship. When Kelley's proposals are converted from matrix notation to path-diagram or probabilistic notation, some of the assumptions of the model become more explicit. For example, the feature that two causal factors are each independently sufficient to produce a behavior (represented by two independent arrows leading to the behavior) differs from the notion in Heider's thinking that lay perceivers understand behavior as emerging from an interaction of factors. Morris and Larrick (1995) found that this feature of Kelley's model does not square with their participant's

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Page 155 actual theories, in that situational factors were not seen as perfectly sufficient, in isolation, to produce the behavior. To name another example, Kelley's (1972a) matrix formulation, drawn from his (Kelley, 1967) earlier ANOVA cube model of induction, carries the assumption that the two factors are statistically independent without making this parameter explicit. A subjective probability notation makes this assumption and its consequences transparent (Morris & Larrick, 1995). The lesson is not that one notation is superior, but that theorists should guard against the tendency to inherit or ignore particular assumptions as a function of whether the notation used makes those assumptions convenient. IMPLICIT THEORIES AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES Whereas early work on cultural differences in social psychology relied heavily on claims about differences in values, researchers have increasingly posited that many cultural differences are better understood in terms of lay theories. We focus on the research most relevant to questions of social understanding that have been central to debates about the theory theory in the disciplines we have reviewed. A first wave of such research has focused on the extent to which the lay theory underlying the error of overattributing personal dispositions is a product of the individualism in North American culture. Lay Theories About Persons Several recent ethnographies have proposed that lay categories of person radically differ in their most basic ontological assumptions. Rosaldo (1980) studied the Illongot people in the Philippines and found different notions about internal states that cause action, such as rinawa, which translates as heart. Rinawa is considered the center of thought and can be found in plants and other aspects of nature; it leaves the body during sleep and gradually disappears with aging. Elsewhere, Lutz's (1985) work on the Ifaluk of Micronesia turns up other conceptions, with the center of thought located in the gut. D'Andrade (1987, 1995) used ethnographic interviews to examine American adults' lay theory of mind. When appraising the folk theory that he depicted, D'Andrade (1995) emphasized the striking extent to which it holds thinking to be visible to consciousness and under an individual's volitional control. Lillard (1998) reviewed these and other “ethnopsychologies” and concluded that there is substantial variety across cultures in conceptions of person and mind, as well as the casual relations to action. However, researchers using more structured comparative methods have questioned whether the espoused lay theories uncovered by ethnographic methods actually direct cognitions and emotions (Mesquita et al., 1996). As yet there is little psychological evidence to support claims about differences in the most general folk framework theories of person. Far more research has focused on whether cultures differ in the more specific lay theories that guide social understanding in particular domains. The notion that cultures differ in folk theories of a particular domain of life has been a long-standing idea in ethnography. These claims focus, for the most part, not on the basic ontology of causes of behavior (i.e., beliefs, desires, social pressures, etc.), but on the mechanistic beliefs about the strength and configuration of these factors in producing particular kinds of actions. For example, ethnographers who have studied the accounts given for everyday behavior in Chinese society have described a tendency to refer to an actor's social context, rather than to personality characteristics, that reflects a society-centered conception of social behavior (Hsu, 1953). Ethnographic (Selby, 1974) and comparative (Miller, 1984) studies of everyday explanations in other non-Western societies have similarly found that there is a greater tendency to account for an individual's deviance in terms of the individual's social context rather than in terms of the individuals internal, stable personality traits. Morris and Peng (1994) argued that lay perceivers in the individualistic North American cultural tradition and the more collectivist, Confucian tradition differ in their implicit theories and consequently in their attributional biases. In the United States, a theory centered on the autonomous person channels attributions to an individual actor's internal, stable properties; in China, a theory centered on situations and groups directs attributions to the actor's embeddedness in groups and roles. A number of studies have been conducted in the last decade to investigate the extent to which these differences in the ethnographic record actually reflect theories. To assess this, it is helpful to consider the criteria that distinguish theories from other kinds of knowledge structures. The structural criteria that we have suggested for a lay theory is that it specify an ontology, define causal mechanisms, describe their coherence, and do so at a level abstracted from any particular case. Perhaps the only structural criterion that is directly tested in the cross-cultural literature is abstraction. Researchers have striven to prove that cultures differ not merely in particular beliefs about the causes of a specific action, but rather in more abstract, general beliefs. The standard method has been to demonstrate that a pattern – the greater emphasis on personal traits rather than social situations

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Page 156 by North Americans compared with East Asians – occurs across many different examples of behavior (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Miller, 1984; Morris, Knowles, Chiu, & Hong, 1998; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1998). The hypothesized pattern should be as broad as the purported underlying theory but not broader. For example, Morris and Peng (1994) showed that the influence of culturally varying social theories is seen in perceivers' interpretations of the behavior of social animals but not the behavior of mechanical objects.4 Moving from the structural to the functional criteria for a theory, the evidence is much more direct. A knowledge structure functions as a theory if it enables prediction, explanation, and interpretation. Findings with all three kinds of tasks supported the hypothesis that North Americans and East Asians work with the differing lay theories of person proposed earlier. In a prediction task, Norenzayan et al. (1998) found across many specific behaviors that American participants were less likely than Korean participants to predict that a behavior would follow from a salient situational cause. A number of studies measuring patterns of explanation have found predicted differences. Morris and Peng (1994) found that different explanations for the same crimes are offered in English-language as opposed to Chineselanguage newspapers: Regardless of whether the criminal is American or Chinese, the mainstream American paper dwells more on personality dispositions than does the Chinese-language paper. To eliminate alternative explanations, Morris and Peng followed up this content analysis of archival data with a survey of Chinese and American graduate students at an American university, all of whom responded in English. Again, North American respondents were more likely to trace criminal acts to the criminal's internal dispositions, whereas Chinese perceivers were more likely to point to the criminal's social context. Several studies have employed paradigms based on that of Jones and Harris (1967) to test whether the well-known tendency of North American perceivers to be relatively insensitive to situational constraints on behavior is less marked among East Asian perceivers. Studies with East Asian participants in typical procedures manipulating the presence of subtle information about situational constraints replicate the typical pattern (Krull et al., 1996; Masuda & Kitayama, 1998). However, when the situational factor is made more salient, Choi and Nisbett (1998) found that Korean perceivers are more sensitive than Americans to its presence versus absence. In a similar study with a different design and participant population, Morris, Knowles, Chiu, and Hong (1998) found that American participants' tendency toward dispositional attributions was virtually unchanged by the introduction of information about situational constraints on the actor, whereas for Hong Kong participants, situational cues dramatically reduced dispositionalism. Finally, other studies have reported findings suggesting that interpretation of perceived events differs across cultures in the way that would be expected if perceivers in the two cultures were relying on different theories. Interpretation, in this sense, largely involves deciding what deserves attention and what can be ignored. Studies that have compared how persons are described reveal that North Americans are more likely to refer to internal personality traits when describing themselves (Cousins, 1989) or when describing others known to them (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). Other researchers have found that cultural individualism is associated with a tendency to make spontaneous inferences to personality traits from observations of behavior (Duff & Newman, 1997; Newman, 1993). The argument is that acculturation into individualistic theories results in automatized habits of interpreting behavior through personality trait inference. Many social psychologists have argued that trait inference is automatized on the basis of findings (with North American participants) that perceivers under cognitive load show more dispositional interpretations of behavior (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Apparently, perceivers burdened with performing unrelated cognitive tasks at the same time as a social perception task have fewer resources for drawing nonautomatic inferences to the situational factors influencing an actor's behavior. Yet it has long been known that automatic inferences to situational factors are also possible (Krull, 1996; Quattrone, 1982). Knowles, Morris, Chiu, and Hong (1998) argued that the impact of cognitive load should be qualified by culture because the automatized procedures of Chinese perceivers is more balanced between personal and situational causes. That is, busy Americans become more dispositional because they fall back on the automatized trait inference processes that they have been socialized into (see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), yet busy Chinese perceivers will fall back onto a mixed set of processes. In several studies adapting the Gilbert et al. (1988) paradigm, Knowles et al. (1998) found that the dispositionalism of Americans increases with cognitive load, whereas the dispositionalism of Chinese participants is unaffected by cognitive load. A final set of studies makes particularly clear the role of theories in guiding the interpretation of observed events. Most evidence concerning the consequence of culture relies on correlational or quasi-experimental methods, in which an individual's dispositional value

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Page 157 Table 9.1: Functional Criteria for Theories and Cross-Cultural Evidence Understanding personsUnderstanding groupsPredictionCompared to Americans, East Asians makestronger predictions of actions given salientsituation causes (Norenzayan, Choi, &Nisbett, 1998)Compared to Americans, East Asians make strongerpredictions of group responsibility (Morris, 1993)ExplanationIn explaining individual deviance, NorthAmericans place greater weight than Asianson personal dispositions as opposed toexternal factors (Peng & Morris, 1998)North Americans are less sensitive to thepresence of salient situational constraintsthan are East Asians (Choi & Nisbett, 1998;Morris, Knowles, Chiu, & Hong, 1998)In explaining group transgressions, East Asians placemore weight than Americans on group dispositions asopposed to external factors (Menon et al., 1998)InterpretationBicultural participants show a bias towardindividual attribution when primed withAmerican cultural symbols and a bias towardgroup attribution when primed with Chinesecultural symbols (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet,1998)East Asians make more reference than Americans tosocial groups when describing themselves (Peng &Morris, 1998) and when describing others (Miller, 1987)In describing ambiguous negative outcomes inorganizations, North Americans are more likely toconstrue an individual as the key actor while EastAsians are more likely to construe a group as the keyactor (Menon et al, 1998)Need for closure increases Chinese bias toward groupdispositions and American bias toward individualdispositions (Chiu et al, 1998) orientation or an individual's nationality is the independent variable. Along with the limitations of these methods, research of this sort has led to a limited conceptualization of the relation of individuals to cultures, positing that each person has a unitary and static cultural orientation. Moving beyond these methodologies and conceptualizations, Hong, Morris, Chiu, and Benet (1998) used a method that effectively manipulates the operative culture in bicultural participants. Participants selected for their acculturation into both traditions in Hong Kong (Study 1) and California (Study 2) were randomly assigned to be primed with icons of either American culture (Mickey Mouse, the Capitol building, etc.) or Chinese culture (a Dragon, the Great Wall, etc.). Results show that this manipulation shifted perceivers' interpretation of an event entirely unrelated to the objects in the primes, indicating that an abstract theory is triggered by the prime and becomes a lens for interpreting the subsequently encountered event. In summary, as Table 9.1 shows, evidence on cultural differences in understanding of persons meets the criteria for positing the involvement of lay theories. Lay Theories About Groups A recent wave of studies has shifted the focus from how perceivers understand individuals to how they understand groups. Consistent with the arguments about collectivism and social context reviewed earlier, the notion is that Confucian E. Asian cultures regard groups as having stable properties that confer to them agency or autonomy. Some historical evidence for this is seen in that collective responsibility is a distinguishing feature of traditional Chinese law. Starting from 746 BC, the system of yuan zuo (holding offenders' superordinates, kinsmen, and neighbors responsible for their crime simply because they are related to the offenders) was widely practiced in China (see Nishida, 1985; Zhang, 1984, for documentation of the prevalence of yuan zuo ). The rationale underlying this practice was the belief that the would-be

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Page 158 Fig. 9.6. References to individuals and groups in newspapers explanations for negative outcomes in organizations (reprinted from Menon et al., 1998).

offender's ingroup had the obligation to monitor his or her behavior, and therefore should have been able to prevent the crime. In studies comparing the social judgments about groups made by East Asian as opposed to North American perceivers, a pattern of greater attribution to dispositions of the group appears across a wide variety of particular cases (Chiu & Hong, 1992; Morris, 1993). A recent line of research has examined cultural differences in attributions to individuals and groups with the goal of demonstrating that the East-West difference in attributions to individual dispositions reflects a theory of person rather than a domain-general difference in goals or style of social perception. Across a range of particular outcomes (Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1998; Morris, Menon, Chiu, & Hong, 1998), in analyses of newspaper articles and in surveys, individual attributions are endorsed more by Americans and group attributions are endorsed more by Chinese (see Fig. 9.6). The pattern of greater Asian dispositionalism with regard to groups has been observed even in interpretations of the behavior of social animals (Menon et al., 1998). In summary, there is good reason to conclude that the theory underlying these differences is abstracted from any particular content example. We can move on to review how the emerging evidence concerning culturally varying theories of groups fares with regard to functional criteria for theories. The earliest studies of culture and group perception involved prediction tasks. For example, Morris (1993) asked American and Chinese survey respondents to predict whether particular groups would feel responsible after a negative outcome involving one of their members; Chinese respondents predicted more group feelings of responsibility. Although this implies that a theory of group dispositions is used to make predictions, a test of the more direct predictive use of theories would be a useful step for future research. That is, it should be that when predicting a group action from a group disposition or from a factor in the group's environment, Chinese participants are more influenced by the group disposition than are Americans. Most of the evidence for culturally varying theories of groups comes from research with explanation tasks. In a vignette study by Menon et al. (1998, Exp. 3), negative outcomes (e.g., designing an unfair compensation system) were described as following the action of either an individual or group actor. For each vignette, North American and Hong Kong participants rated a series of possible causal factors, including internal stable factors (greed), internal unstable factors (haste), external stable factors (difficulty of the task), and external unstable factors (chance). Analyses focused on the extent to which internal stable factors (i.e., dispositions) were favored relative to other kinds of factors. Results show an interaction effect of perceiver culture x level of actor: American participants were more likely to endorse dispositional factors in the individual condition than the group condition, whereas Chinese participants were more likely to endorse dispositional factors in the group condition.

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Page 159 There is also compelling evidence that lay theories of groups guide interpretation of social outcomes. One way to see this is in what a perceiver's attention is drawn to when the actor behind an outcome is ambiguous. The consistent finding from several such studies (experiments 1 and 2; Menon et al., 1998) is that American observers pay more attention to individuals associated with the outcome and Chinese observers to groups associated with the outcome. Another way to see the role of theories in interpretation is to contrast individuals identified as high versus low in need for closure – a dimension of cognitive style that can be identified by inventories (Kruglanski, 1996; see also Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume). High Need for Closure (NFC) is associated with greater reliance on stereotypes and other ready-made explanations to filter the facts of perception (Kruglanski, 1996). In a striking result, Chiu, Hong, Morris, and Menon (1998) found that among North American participants NFC is associated with more dispositional attributions for individual acts and not associated with any particular type of attribution for group acts, yet among Hong Kong participants, NFC is not associated with any particular type of attribution for individual acts and is associated with dispositional attributions for group acts. In summary, as Table 9.1 displays, there is evidence for culturally varying theories of groups that satisfies the basic criteria for a theory. Challenges Although we stated that cross-cultural research benefits from the construct of lay theories that developmentalists and other “theory theory” advocates have done much to refine, it is equally true that the theory theory position benefits greatly from cross-cultural evidence. One reason for this is that the standard rivals to the theory theory do not account as well for cultural differences in social understanding as they do for developmental differences. Consider first the nativist account of social understanding. It is hard to build an account of cultural differences in social understanding in terms of genetically prepared perceptual modules. If innate adaptations for social understanding exist, they have been tailored by prehistoric environments that bear little relation to current North American or Chinese cultures. Although nativist accounts cannot explain cultural differences, some researchers have pointed out that cross-cultural data do not necessarily indicate any differences in general lay theories, but only in the strength of specific causal beliefs in specific domains. In a useful commentary, Wellman (1998) suggested that cultural differences may exist in specific content theories but not in underlying framework theories. Just as framework theories in science are less susceptible to empirical data, lay framework theories may be less likely to change as a function of differences in an individual's socialization experiences. Likewise, a simulationist account of cultural differences in social understanding is unsatisfying. To explain cultural differences in other -understanding in terms of differences in self-understanding merely begs the question of why cultures differ in self-understanding. That is, one needs to explain why particular ways of interpreting self (and other actors) differ between populations sharing distinct cultural traditions. The best explanation seems to be that lay theories are represented in teachings and practices and are transmitted from one generation to the next. Approaches to Direct Measurement of Lay Theories The primary challenge to the advocates of the theory construct in cultural psychology is to clarify two questions: Are theories held implicitly or explicitly? Moreover, how specific are belief structures that differ across cultures? Researchers who conceptualize theories as explicitly held knowledge, like explicit attitudes, have attempted to develop scales like those that measure explicit belief structures such as locus of control. Results thus far have met only partial success. A pioneering study developed a scale to measure the general belief that attitudes cause behavior and found that individualist Australians were higher than collectivist Japanese participants (Kashima et al., 1992). Similarly, recent work by Nisbett and colleagues measured endorsement of dispositionalist versus interactionist accounts of behavior. They found that Koreans are more likely than Americans to reject statements expressing a purely dispositionalist view of behavior and to endorse statements expressing the view that the behavior arises from the interaction of dispositional and situational influences (Norenzayan et al., 1998). Although these fairly general measures of theories have identified clear patterns of cultural difference, they have not statistically linked these theories to attributions. Hence, the validity of these measures remains unproved. Other researchers have focused on narrower social beliefs. Menon et al. (1998) assessed beliefs about the autonomy of individuals and organized groups and found that Americans tended to endorse the autonomy of individuals but not groups, whereas the opposite was true for Chinese participants. Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu (1997) assessed beliefs about the temporal stability of moral characteristics of both individuals and social

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Page 160 institutions. Of particular interest were respondents who saw moral characteristics at one level to be fixed and at the other level to be fluid. Americans were more likely to assume that individual moral character is fixed and the social world is fluid, whereas Chinese participants tended to assume individual moral character is fluid and the social world fixed (Chiu, et al., 1997). Although these more specific measures of social beliefs showed modest correlations to attributional outcomes, the goal of statistically mediating country differences in social understanding with an explicit measure of theories remains elusive. One interpretation of this state of affairs is that general theoretical beliefs fail to predict attributions for the same reason that general attitudes fail to predict behavior, and that researchers should measure highly specific theoretical beliefs in order to predict specific attributional outcomes (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). One method that may work in this sort of approach is the technique of Morris and Larrick (1995, 1998), which measures the particular theory-based expectancies that perceivers impose on an event. Another interpretation of the foregoing pattern of results is that the actual theories shared within a culture are held implicitly. Because individuals lack direct introspective access to the theories they hold, these theories are at best weakly tapped by explicit measures. To the extent that researchers believe that theories are implicit, then the best approach to establishing the causal role of theories may be manipulating theories through priming experiments rather than attempting to measure them. Work in the psychology of categorization has demonstrated that priming a theory can facilitate category learning by directing attention (Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). Priming studies have been used in a similar way to establish the role of theories in producing the patterns found in cross-cultural studies (Hong et al., 1998). The emerging dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition centers on this notion that cultural theories impact social understanding only to the extent that they are operative – accessible and applicable to the task; mere possession of cultural knowledge does not ensure its influence. Summary We have already noted the importance of theories as knowledge structures in guiding everyday judgments such as explanations and predictions. To the extent that we are concerned with cultural differences in such conclusions, we are well served to articulate and measure the folk theories that seem likely to underlie them. We might even go so far as to suggest that what it is to have a culture is to have a set of shared lay theories for understanding and explaining the world. If that is the case, cultural researchers should feel obliged to identify and measure important folk theories and gauge their relationship with everyday judgments. Cross-cultural findings also provide further support to some of our recommendations about future social-psychological work with the lay theory construct. We have argued that researchers have imputed an overly simple notion of traits to lay perceivers, whereas the lay understanding of factors causing behavior may be more nuanced. Research in East Asian cultures makes it clear that perceivers form impressions of personal dispositions that are context-bound and situated. Similarly, the conventional assumption about the perception of traits is that it should only occur in the case of individual actors. However, research with East Asian participants has made it clear that, to these lay perceivers, group-level traits are as plausible as individual-level traits. This is surprising to many researchers, but should it be? Group-level dispositions are no different than individual level traits: They are unobservable latent constructs underneath the regularities in observable outcomes. The lack of attention to perceived group dispositions in social perception research may reflect the extent to which individualistic lay theories have shaped our scientific theories. Studying lay theories across cultures helps us recognize the extent to which our lay theories have limited our scientific imaginations. CONCLUSION We have reviewed arguments and evidence that the ability of humans to understand each other owes to the fact that we possess and use theories. Social psychologists and cognitive scientists have discussed a variety of kinds of knowledge structures, such as associative networks, models, scripts, expectancies, and beliefs. Clearer definitions help one avoid artificial debates between proponents of constructs that should not be construed as alternative proposals. The definition we have provided clarifies that some of these constructs are synonymous with theories, some are alternatives, and some are components of theories. Our review of arguments and evidence from different fields reveals a variety of support for the theory theory position. In particular, evidence from developmental psychology helps remind adult researchers that, at one time, they too would have failed a false-belief task, having an incomplete understanding of the nature of belief. By watching children tinker with evidence, change their theories, and make predictions, the role of folk theories – perhaps taken for granted by adults – becomes

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Page 161 more apparent. Meanwhile, cross-cultural researchers have found a pattern of consistent differences in the social judgments adult perceivers make about persons and groups. These patterns are highly consistent with the idea that specific domain theories differ across cultures, being shaped by acculturation into belief systems as well as by the ecology of behavior and causes in which the perceiver is embedded. There is no easy way to account for such differences in social understanding in terms of innate capacities or in terms of simulations. In summary, there is increasing evidence, across a variety of disciplines and topics, for the stance that we understand the social world through inferences based on specific theories about behavioral domains nested within a general framework for understanding social actors. ENDNOTES 1. The foregoing discussion of criteria from philosophy science draws in part on similar arguments by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) and Wellman (1990). 2. The construct of causal schemata, as discussed in development by Piaget and adult causal reasoning by Kelley, is equivalent to the construct of implicit theories. That is, schemata are abstract expectations about cause-effect relationships that are organized into a system and used for interpretation, explanation, and prediction. Further, they are subject to change. Thus, schemata are more like theories than they are like beliefs, attitudes, narratives, metaphors, or scripts. Although Piaget, Kelley, and other scholars originally described their ideas with the term schemata , we use the label theory for consistency with our argument. 3. The matrix formulation was carried over from Kelley's (1967) previous model of causal induction because he saw schemata as the residue of previous inductive activity in a domain. Perhaps because induction model is context general, secondary treatments of the schema or lay theory model have often misconstrued the extent to which Kelley claimed that one or two given schemata are used generally. In his statement of this model, Kelley (1972a) linked specific schemata to specific domains, such as achievement, and he also discussed sub-types of each. 4. This same study also tested predictions from proposals about more specific theories that would affect the extent to which American and Chinese perceivers encoded displays as social interactions as opposed to non-contingent actions of an individual near a group. These predictions were also supported: Displays involving an individual becoming connected to a group were more likely to be seen as social than displays of an individual becoming separate from a group. Displays of an individual harmonizing its movement to that of a group were more likely to be seen as social interactions by Chinese perceivers than were displays of discordant movements between the individual and the group.

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Page 163 10 From Cognition to Culture: The Origins of Stereotypes That Really Matter Mark Schaller Lucian Gideon Conway, III University of British Columbia Stereotypes matter because they have consequences. Stereotypes matter because they have specific consequences. The specific consequences result from the particular contents of those stereotypes. If you believe that folks from the American South are fond of a good slab of barbecued meat, then you may be more likely to serve smoked pork shoulder when you have your new Alabamaborn co-worker Billy over for a welcoming dinner, but this particular stereotype of Southerners is not likely to make you reconsider the rest of your guest list. Alternatively, if you believe that Southerners are racist bigots, then this stereotype probably will not influence the menu, but may make you decide not to invite the Nwazuruokeh's from next door to join you as well. Stereotypes matter because they have general consequences. The general consequences result from the fact that stereotypes are, to some degree, shared. If you are the only person who believes Southerners to be barbecue lovers or racist bigots, then the consequences of this stereotype would be minimal indeed, affecting the lives of no one but you and the Southerners whom you encounter. You might insensitively invite a finicky vegetarian over for a rack of ribs, or your coworker Billy might miss the opportunity to meet your Nigerian neighbors, but these incidents hardly comprise a social problem. However, when these stereotypic beliefs are shared by many, then the consequences of the stereotype are broad, affecting the actions of all those who hold the stereotype and the lives of the much larger set of Southerners that these many individuals encounter. None of this is news to anyone who has either a personal or professional interest in stereotypes. In commenting on several stereotypes that have historically mattered – such as stereotypes of Jews – Haslam (1997, p. 119) noted that ‘‘the stereotypes became potent because, within the groups who held them, they came to reflect and express a particular world view which dictated that group's collective behavior towards particular targets of oppression.” But, although social scientists may readily acknowledge why stereotypes matter, we do not know very much about how those stereotypes that matter come to be what they are. If we wanted to predict which exact traits and characteristics would be central to a shared stereotype of some group, we would find that the existing socialpsychological literature offers only a rough set of rules on which to offer a prediction. One challenge for the future, then, is this: We need to nourish a scientific literature that more completely offers explanations for the origins of stereotypes that really matter. How do emerging, shared stereotypes arise that have the specific contents that they do, rather than some other contents? Through what processes can we understand and predict how some individual cognitions rather than others become socially shared cultural structures? WHAT WE KNOW Prior to the cognitive revolution in social psychology, content and consensus were the explicit foci of many studies of group stereotypes. Consider the well-known “Princeton trilogy” of studies examining ethnic stereotypes (Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933; Karlins, Coffman, & Waters, 1969). The questions these studies addressed were explicitly: “What are the contents of stereotypes about various ethnic groups?” and “How much consensus is there in the perception of these stereotypes?” However, just as these research questions revealed the focus on stereotypes that really mattered, the results also reveal the limitations of the accompanying sociometric methods: The studies were descriptive, not explanatory. However impressively they described the content and consensus of ethnic stereotypes, the results offer nothing by way of explanation. Why these particular contents and not others? Why are these contents consensually shared? To answer questions such as these, it is necessary that stereotypes be defined at the individual level of analysis. Within contemporary psychological frame-

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Page 164 works, a stereotype refers to some sort of cognitive representation consisting of the knowledge/information that is associatively linked to a group label – the information that is especially likely to come to mind when one perceives or otherwise thinks about the group or group members. These associative knowledge structures may include many types of information, including traits that are judged to be diagnostic of group membership, images of typical group members, script-like expectations about typical group behaviors in particular situations, and so forth (see Stangor & Schaller, 1996). With this definition in mind, important questions about content and consensus can be framed more explicitly. How is it that particular stereotypes come to be defined by particular traits and prototypes and expectations, rather than by others? And how is it that the contents of these individual-level cognitive representations come to be so similar across large populations? Why Do Stereotypes Have the Content They Do? Whereas early sociometric studies were weak on explanation, a focus on explanation has been the strong suit of social-cognitive approaches to the origins of stereotypes. Results revealing the various causal processes that explain the formation of stereotypes are too numerous now to be easily summarized within any standard review article (for partial reviews, see chapters from Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Sedikides, Schopler, & Insko, 1997; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997). Answers to questions about content, however, are relatively rare within the social cognition literature (Schneider, 1996). It is not impossible to find answers to the questions about content, but one does have to read between the lines a bit. Esteem-Related Goals Lead to Stereotype Content That Is Negative As has been amply demonstrated, stereotypes are handy tools to have in our cognitive toolboxes (e.g., Allport, 1954; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). The fact that stereotypes are functional explains why we have stereotypes at all. Of course, some stereotypes are more functional than others, and this obvious statement offers several general answers to the question of content. People want to feel good about themselves (see Blanton, chap. 5, this volume; Pomerantz, Saxon, & Kenney, chap. 4, this volume, for discussions of the self-esteem motive). Toward that goal, people desire to perceive groups to which they belong in a positive light. Evaluative perceptions of ingroups are most meaningful within a comparative context, in which ingroups are judged relative to relevant outgroups. Therefore, according to the language of social identity theory, individuals seek to establish positive distinctiveness of ingroups relative to outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The goal of positive distinctiveness may contribute to predictable effects on the contents of stereotypes. In general, outgroup stereotypes are likely to be more negative than those about ingroups. Consistent with this line of thinking, descriptive studies on the evaluative contents of ethnic stereotypes have shown exactly this pattern – although the tendency varies depending on the social context within which stereotypes are measured, and the sensitivity of measurements to that context (e.g., Devine & Elliot, 1995; Karlins et al., 1969). More clearly, mere categorization into groups leads individuals to form beliefs about groups according to which they differentially evaluate ingroup and outgroup members on evaluatively laden traits (Brewer, 1979; Jost, chap. 6, this volume). Indeed, the power of the ingroup/outgroup context is such that it not only affects the outcomes of the information integration processes through which people form impressions of groups (e.g., Schaller, 1992a), but can actually change the very nature of those processes. For instance, Schaller and Maass (1989) found that impartial observers of groups based their eventual impressions of the groups on recalled bits of information. In contrast, recall for specific information played little role in the eventual impressions formed by people who believed themselves to be members of those groups. Instead, categorization into groups led perceivers to engage in more effortful, integrative on-line processing of group-relevant information. Aside from the general prediction about the relative negativity of outgroup stereotypes, social identity considerations suggest that whatever traits most efficiently and effectively contribute to positive distinctiveness are most likely to become stereotypic. The extent to which any particular trait may contribute to that goal is influenced by a variety of other variables relating to idiosyncratic aspects of perceivers and social contexts under which groups are perceived (see e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994, for a review). If we want to predict which particular traits are likely to become central to the stereotype of some group, we might narrow down the range of possible traits along evaluative lines by first attending to the perceiver's own group membership. And then we would have to make certain ad hoc predictions on the basis of a deeper consideration of the personal and social context.

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Page 165 Epistemic Goals Lead to Stereotype Content That Is Accurate People want to predict their social environment (see Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume). Stereotypes provide us with a handy, albeit imperfect, basis on which to predict the behavior of individuals in the absence of any information about those individuals other than their membership in some group. Of course, if stereotypes are to serve the function of predicting individuals' behaviors, then the stereotypes must be somewhat accurate. A consideration of this epistemic need leads to the prediction that the specific characteristics that emerge as central to individuals' stereotypes are likely to be those characteristics that do, in fact, accurately convey information about a group's behavioral tendencies. This general assertion is supported by abundant research evidence indicating that stereotypic beliefs of groups are, at least to some extent, based on reality. Individuals' judgments about differences between European and African Americans in scholastic performance correlate positively with actual differences (Clarke & Campbell, 1955). Judgments about the differences between men's and women's behavior do correlate positively with the actual differences between men's and women's behavior (Swim, 1994). Across all kinds of different target groups, there is plenty of evidence that individuals' judgments about group differences are never entirely divorced from objective reality (Jussim & Eccles, 1995; McCauley, 1995). Of course, the mere observation of a correspondence between stereotypes and reality cannot distinguish between the effect of reality on stereotypes and the reverse causal effect of stereotypes on reality (self-fulfilling prophecies; cf. Jussim, 1986). Perhaps more persuasive in demonstrating the role of objective accuracy in determining the emergence of stereotype content are results from research by Ford and Stangor (1992). In an experimental investigation into the formation of new group stereotypes, they found that those traits that were most objectively diagnostic in distinguishing between two target groups (as consequences of intergroup mean differences and intragroup variabilities) were most likely to emerge as central to a set of stereotypic beliefs about groups. It is worth noting that this investigation did not merely measure ad hoc judgments about groups, but also used a spontaneous, free-response format; as such, it more truly assessed the contents of those traits that were cognitively linked to group membership. Thus, there is abundant evidence that grains of truth underlie the content of many group stereotypes. The content of stereotypes is influenced by those traits that are diagnostic in distinguishing groups from other groups. If we want to predict which particular traits are likely to become central to the stereotype of some group, we would be advised to identify those traits that really do accurately describe a group and distinguish members of that group from others. Epistemic Goals Lead to Stereotype Content That Is Inaccurate Just because stereotypes serve individuals' needs does not mean that these needs always exert the intended effects on stereotype contents. The epistemic need to accurately predict our social environment does not always guarantee that we accurately explain our social environment. People are imperfect observers, and so what we perceive as accurate may not actually be objectively so. In addition, even if our explanations accurately predict behavior, they may not be based on accurate theories or explanations about why those behaviors occur. Indeed, research into several different cognitive processes in the formation of stereotypes implies that accurate recognition of behavioral differences between groups in no way guarantees accurate inferences about the causes for those observed differences. One reason for the fallibility of inferences about underlying group differences lies in the fact that groups differ not only in terms of their overt behaviors, but also in the circumstances under which one perceives group members. The circumstantial differences between groups offer clues as to the traits that are likely to emerge in group stereotypes. For instance, across virtually every human culture, men and women tend to occupy different social roles. Men tend to occupy agentic roles that require the performance of instrumental behaviors, whereas women tend to occupy communal roles that require the performance of nurturant behaviors (Eagly, 1987). Does this mean that men and women are inherently different in their capacities for instrumental and nurturant behaviors? No. But, not surprisingly, instrumental and nurturant traits figure prominently in stereotypes of men and women, whereas traits that are far more accurately diagnostic of the social categories of men and women (e.g., bodily restlessness; Hall, 1984) tend to be more peripheral to the stereotypes. Two complementary processes help explain the emergence of these particular stereotypes. First, although people may accurately recognize that group membership and behavior are both correlated with some social role (or other situational constraint), they often fail to take this third variable into account and so fail to recognize

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Page 166 that an observed relation between group and behavior might be entirely spurious. This failure to intuitively partial out the effects of confounding third variables can contribute to the formation of new group stereotypes (Schaller, 1992a, 1994; Schaller & O'Brien, 1992). Second, people may draw erroneous causal inferences to explain the observed correlation between social roles and group membership (cf. Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Although the reasons that men and women have differentially occupied agentic and communal social roles almost certainly owes more to differences in physiology than to differences in personality, perceivers are inclined to assume that the choice of roles was dictated by role-congruent personality. This explanatory process also contributes to the formation of new group stereotypes (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Thus, the content of stereotypes is determined by those traits that most accurately describe the meaningful social circumstances in which groups find themselves. If we want to predict which particular traits are likely to become central to the stereotype of some group, we would be advised to identify those traits that describe that group's physical and social environment. Goal-less Cognitive Processes Lead to Stereotype Content That Is Inaccurate One of the most important messages emerging from the cognitive approach to stereotype phenomena is that cognitive processes entirely hidden from phenomenological awareness may contribute to the formation of group stereotypes. Although these processes almost certainly emerged in response to evolutionarily functional concerns, they proceed in the absence of any explicit stereotype-relevant goal being active in working memory. Several lines of research reveal that certain stereotypes may emerge simply as unintended side effects of these cognitive processes. Ironically, one process has its roots in relatively sophisticated statistical reasoning. People intuitively appreciate the problems of drawing confident inferences from small samples (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Schaller, 1992b). Consequently, the smaller the sample of behavior about any particular group, there is a greater regression phenomenon wherein observed differences between normative (frequent) and counternormative (infrequent) behaviors are judged to be less diagnostic of true tendencies toward normative or counternormative behavior. This phenomenon has important implications when drawing inferences about the characteristics of majority and minority groups. Given that there is a smaller sample of evidence from minority groups than from majority groups, the regression phenomenon is more powerful in judgments about minority groups, and so the impact of counternormative behavior on emerging stereotypes of minority groups ends up being relatively greater than its impact on emerging stereotypes of majority groups. Consequently, even in the absence of any objective correlation between group membership and behavioral tendencies, people tend to form erroneous stereotypes in which minority groups are believed to be more likely to engage in counternormative behavior (Fiedler, 1991; Fiedler, Russer, & Gramm, 1993). A second process results from the tendency to make judgments or form impressions on the basis of evidence that is most accessible from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When forming impressions about groups, for instance, the most accessible bits of evidence are likely to be those that received the most attention at the time of encoding. It is often the rarest events that attract the most attention, and within minority/majority contexts the rarest events are those that match minority group members with counternormative (infrequent) behaviors. Thus, to the extent to which group stereotypes are based on accessible information, those stereotypes will most likely be based on a subset of information that overrepresents incidents in which minority group members engaged in counternormative behaviors. So, again, even in the absence of an objective correlation between group membership and behavioral tendencies, people come to believe that minority groups are more likely to engage in counternormative behavior (Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985; Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994a). These phenomena suggest that some of the roots of stereotype content lie in the broad social norms that govern the behavior of all people within a culture. If we want to predict which particular traits are likely to become central to the stereotype of some group, we might predict that traits corresponding to counternormative behaviors are likely to be stereotypic of minority groups. Why are Stereotypes Shared? Given that the cognitive approach to stereotypes focuses on the ways in which individuals process information, the question of consensus is answered only indirectly. The existence of stereotype consensus is, at best, tacitly attributed to some sort of common informational input (Haslam, 1997). The explanation rests on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that the information on which stereotypes are based is available to most perceivers. Second, it is assumed that the motivational and cognitive

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Page 167 processes operating on that information are common across most perceivers (at least by those who are outgroup members). If roughly the same information is integrated in roughly the same way by roughly all relevant perceivers, then it is inevitable that some degree of consensus will emerge among those perceivers. Of course, given the power of the social context to influence the cognitive processing of information, that degree of consensus will be far from perfect. The logic underlying this common information input model is compelling. The implications of that logic fit with empirical observations concerning stereotype consensus. Stereotype consensus in the real world is far from perfect. In some descriptive studies, the measured degree of consensus for some stereotypes has been surprisingly low. Indeed, it may be tempting to argue that stereotype consensus is not sufficiently high to warrant additional explanation beyond the appealing account implied by common information input. This approach to the consensus question is not only logically compelling, but it reassures us that the reductionist tendencies of the social cognition approach are scientifically fruitful. If all the subtle cognitive processes that contribute to stereotype development indirectly contribute to the emergence of some consensus, then we have gained something but lost nothing when we put the question of consensus on the intellectual back-burner and shifted our empirical attentions specifically toward questions of process. Even better: If a purely individual-level cognitive analysis is sufficient to explain a cultural-level phenomenon, then this analysis is powerful indeed. These comforting assurances, however, are best resisted. There are some clear explanatory limits to purely individual-level explanations of stereotype consensus. First, empirical research on other elements of shared knowledge has revealed that purely individual-level perceptual and cognitive processes fail to fully account for whatever level of consensus is present within a culture (Boster, 1991). This is almost certainly the case with stereotypes. Stangor and Jost (1997) pointed out that common informational input models “are clearly limited, both because individuals develop stereotypes about groups with which they have had no direct contact, and because contact is notoriously ineffective at changing stereotypes” (P. 34). Second, the appealing parsimony of the cognitive approach is an illusion: Although a common informational input process can account for some level of stereotype consensus all by itself, the fact is that other processes operate on individuals' beliefs as well, and these other processes also contribute to the emergence of consensus. These other processes demand that we attend to the psychologically complex and messy – but very real – consequences of interpersonal interaction. Consensus Goals Lead to Consensus Just as the contents of stereotypes may be direct consequences of individuals' goals that are logically and phenomenologically relevant to those contents, so too consensus may be directly influenced by individuals' psychological needs for consensus. People achieve consensus because they try to do so. There are a lot of reasons that people might seek consensus. People may seek consensus because it implies social approval. Social approval is emotionally rewarding and may serve as an important buffer against existential anxiety (as specified by terror management theory; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). In addition, people may seek consensus because it provides a form of social validation of their own perceptions and beliefs (Hardin & Conley, chap. 1, this volume; Sherif, 1936). In the absence of objective criteria against which to judge the accuracy of one's subjective perceptions, people attempt to validate these perceptions through comparisons with others' perceptions. Consensus provides validation: If lots of other people believe something, then attributional logic implies that an objective external reality provides a firm foundation for subjective perceptions and beliefs. Finally, and perhaps most important, the desire for consensus helps satisfy the psychological need for a feeling of belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). Consensus can remove feelings of isolation because we fit in with those whose beliefs we share. Given these multiple underlying psychological needs that are met through perceptions of shared reality, people often experience the goal of achieving consensus. The desire to obtain consensus does indeed lead to the achievement of a perception of consensus (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). And it often leads to actual consensus. Although it is difficult to find research explicitly examining the role of consensus goals in the formation of group stereotypes, there is supportive research examining the application of existing stereotypes. People are more likely to form similar stereotype-based impressions about individuals under conditions in which they are explicitly motivated to seek consensus (Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996). Social Influence Goals Lead to Consensus Circumstances within which people are explicitly attempting to create consensus are probably relatively

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Page 168 infrequent in comparison with circumstances in which other goals are active in working memory. Although these goals may not be experienced phenomenologically as desires for consensus per se, the successful attainment of these goals ordains that consensus must occur. Some of these goals may be experienced as desires to influence others – to convince others to hold the same perceptions, impressions, and beliefs as oneself. Although only a tiny percentage of the voluminous literature on persuasion pertains explicitly to beliefs about social groups, the psychology of persuasion operates on stereotypic beliefs just as it does on any other belief. One implicit end product of successful persuasion is increased consensus on the target belief (for examples relevant to beliefs about groups, see Clark & Maass, 1988; Myers & Bishop, 1970). Other goals may be experienced as desires that make one vulnerable to influence by others. For instance, under conditions in which needs of understanding or needs for belongingness are threatened, individuals are especially likely to be influenced by the beliefs of others (Sherif, 1936; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). These psychological pressures toward conformity and/or conversion have consequences on Stereotype consensus: The more vulnerable individuals are to conformity, the more likely consensus is to emerge as a consequence. The perception of consensus influences vulnerability to conform – suggesting that consensus breeds greater consensus (Allen & Levine, 1969; Prentice & Miller, 1996). Recent research reveals this effect on shared stereotypes: Perceptions about the degree of consensus in stereotypic beliefs among others influences individuals' own endorsement of those stereotypes (Stangor, Sechrist, Jost, & Bar-Tal, 1997). These general processes of social influence may have specific consequences within ingroup/outgroup contexts. After all, a feeling of belongingness typically requires that an individual identify with and feel accepted by a set of individuals who are perceived to differ in some meaningful way from other individuals (Haslam, 1997; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). The social influence processes that enhance consensus are most persuasive among ingroup members (Mackie, 1986). This has implications for understanding changes in preexisting shared stereotypes. When people are members of meaningful group categories, their desire for a coherent and positive social identity increases their desire for consensual perceptions of ingroups and outgroups. This motivation, coupled with the opportunity for social influence through communication, influences consensus in perceptions of groups and affects the overall favorability of the impressions of ingroups and outgroups (Haslam, 1997). Communication Goals Lead to Consensus In addition to offering a useful means to persuasive ends, effective and efficient communication represents a desired end. Toward fulfilling that goal, in conversational contexts, people establish and maintain shared reference points and consensual sets of perceptions (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1992; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Isaacs & Clark, 1987). Given the important role that social categories play in individuals' impressions of themselves and others, people regularly engage in communication about groups and group members. It follows that these communicating individuals will seek to establish common beliefs about these groups to facilitate efficient communication (Gardner, 1994). Empirical evidence is consistent with this analysis. For instance, Gardner, Kirby, and Findlay (1973) observed that high school students identified stereotyped groups more accurately and efficiently when those stereotype traits were more widely shared – results suggesting that shared stereotypes, like other common perceptions, contribute to efficient understanding of interpersonal communications. Goal-Less Communication Leads to Consensus Sometimes communication operates in the service of particular social goals, but not always. As anyone who travels by airplane knows, sometimes people just talk. But even idle chatter has consequences for those subjected to it. Communication always has some content, and that content – like a flu virus – stands a good chance of being spread when people open their mouths. Stereotype consensus may emerge simply as a side effect of interpersonal interaction. The most persuasive evidence of consensus emerging as a consequence of mere communication is revealed by research on dynamic social impact theory (Latané, 1996). Simply as a result of the many communications between the many individuals who comprise a population, there emerge stable clusters of consensually shared attitudes and beliefs. These clusters emerge in part because people are most highly influenced by those close to them in physical space and because certain individual differences – both demographic (e.g., wealth, status) and psychological (e.g., credibility, extroversion) – lead some persons to be consistently more influential than others. The simple coincidence of communication and individual differences predicts both that some consensus will emerge and that consensus will rarely be complete

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Page 169 across an entire social landscape. Instead, clusters of consensus emerge that are limited to certain bounded subpopulations. This occurs not only because people within those subpopulations are more likely to communicate within than without their group boundaries (e.g., liberals are more likely to talk to liberals, and conservatives are more likely to talk to conservatives); it occurs because the boundaries of those subpopulations are established by the existence of the shared beliefs (e.g., liberals and conservatives are defined by the existence of shared ideologies). Communication is not merely influenced by cultural constraints, but culture emerges as a result of the interpersonal dynamics of communication. The specific implications of dynamic social impact for stereotype consensus remain largely unexplored (Schaller & Latané 1996). But, as the cognitive representation of stereotypes is governed by the same psychological processes that govern the representation of other elements of social knowledge (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), this much seems inevitable: The act of communication compels the emergence of clusters of shared stereotypes. Summing Up A joint consideration of the cognitive processes influencing stereotype content and the interpersonal processes influencing stereotype consensus offers some preliminary guidelines that help us address the question of why stereotypes with certain types of contents become socially shared. All else being equal, traits indicating negative behavioral tendencies are most likely to become central to culturally shared stereotypes of outgroups, and those negative traits are most likely to pertain to counternormative behaviors. These beliefs are especially likely to be consensual under conditions in which communication about those groups is most likely to occur. These are useful guidelines for prediction, and they do – on the surface – seem to fit the nature of stereotypes about real groups. WHAT WE DON'T KNOW These general rules, however, offer rough and highly fallible means of prediction. Empirical research reveals that stereotypes are not made up of simply negative and counternormative behaviors. Many traits that are perceived to be stereotypic of minority outgroups are, in fact, valued very highly. Among Americans, for instance, certain outgroups (e.g., Germans, Japanese) have historically been viewed in many positive ways (Karlins et al., 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933). Even chronically maligned ethnic minority groups are the subject of stereotypes with positive elements: Jews tend to be perceived as intelligent and industrious (Karlins et al., 1969), and African Americans are perceived to be athletic and rhythmic (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Furthermore, although the range of negative and counternormative traits is huge, only a small number of these traits actually ever becomes central to the shared stereotype of any particular minority outgroup. Among Americans, honesty is valued at least as highly as intelligence and industry (Rothbart & Park, 1986), yet traits connoting dishonesty are relatively rare in cultural stereotypes of American ethnic minority outgroups compared with the frequency of traits connoting laziness or ignorance (e.g., Karlins et al., 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933). Additionally, traits that offer the most diagnostic descriptions of group members or of those group members' social circumstances are not necessarily the most likely to become central to consensual stereotypes – even under conditions in which communication about those groups is most likely to occur. The traits central to many group stereotypes are clearly not diagnostic in differentiating among groups. In one descriptive study of stereotype content among American perceivers, the trait (industrious) that was most commonly believed to be descriptive of the ingroup (Americans) was also commonly believed to be descriptive of most other outgroups as well (Katz & Braly, 1933). Clearly, this trait was not diagnostic of group membership. Furthermore, lots of traits offer equally accurate descriptions of groups or their circumstances, but not all become central to shared stereotypes. In relation to their overall demographic frequency in the United States, African Americans are overrepresented in popular professional sports; not surprisingly, athletic is central to White Americans' stereotype of African Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995). African Americans are also overrepresented among the ranks of fatherless families, and white Americans are well aware of this overrepresentation (McCauley, 1995). Yet traits pertaining to this descriptively diagnostic characteristic have not once appeared in the various descriptive studies on the contents of stereotypes about negroes, blacks or African Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995). In fact, one study found that the term loyal to family ties to be the single most commonly endorsed descriptor of the group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) – a finding that violates every single one of our general heuristics for predicting stereotypes that matter. So the question remains: Why do some traits become central to the contents of shared stereotypes while other traits do not? Our reflection on the past does help

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Page 170 clarify a direction for the future. Questions of content do demand a consideration of individual goals and other cognitive phenomena. Questions of consensus do demand a consideration of interpersonal influence and other communication phenomena. Questions concerning the content of shared stereotypes demand; therefore, the explicit integration of individual- and interpersonal-level processes. Acting in dynamic synergy, processes of cognition and communication are likely to more effectively help us understand the origins of cultural-level structures such as stereotypes. Recently, we have been exploring the implications of one particular metatheoretical perspective along these lines. It is a social-evolutionary framework, and it yields a number of interesting hypotheses concerning the origins of stereotypes that really matter. A SOCIAL-EVOLUTIONARY FRAME-WORK The contents of socially shared cognitive structures are influenced by processes roughly analogous to those that influence the emergence of organic structures within biological populations (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Campbell, 1965; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Hull, 1988; Sperber, 1990). As a result of biological evolutionary processes, the likelihood that some specific genetic information is to be transmitted from one individual to another predicts the likelihood that anatomical characteristics associated with that information become widely descriptive of a population. Similarly, as a result of social-evolutionary processes, the likelihood that some specific knowledge is to be communicated from one individual to another predicts the likelihood that this specific knowledge is to become common across a population. Applying this idea to group stereotypes, it follows that the specific characteristics of shared stereotypes are likely to be influenced by selection pressures through which certain variants of stereotypes are selected for or against within the processes of interpersonal communication. A Trait's-Eye View of Stereotypes To appreciate the implications of this social-evolutionary framework, it is useful to adopt the perspective of a potentially stereotypic characteristic or trait. To become stereotypic in a way that matters, a trait must establish itself as part of the network of associative memory links that define stereotypes at the individual level, and to do so within the cognitive structures of many individuals across a population. In theory, all traits have equal potential to do this. In fact, however, that potential is usually achieved by only a handful of traits at any given time. To gain the competitive edge necessary to attain such a place in cognitive space, a trait must be likely – relatively more likely than other traits – to be communicated from person to person. From the perspective of a potentially stereotypic trait that aspires to make a home in as many individual cognitive structures as possible, a high likelihood of being communicated is a highly desirable characteristic. So here we arrive at a fundamental hypothesis underlying this social-evolutionary approach to stereotypes: The more likely that some particular stereotypic belief is to be communicated to other individuals, the more likely that it (rather than some less likely to be communicated belief) is to become shared across a population of people. This basic hypothesis is a deceptively simple statement. Of course beliefs are more likely to be shared if people talk about them. If you tell me that your Alabama-born coworker Billy gobbled down a kilo of pulled pork with peppered vinegar sauce, then sure, there is now one more person in the world who believes that Billy likes his pig. But that is not what this hypothesis says. Rather, it suggests that, if you think Billy is both a barbecue fan and a bigot, but you are more likely to tell me that he made a racist remark about your Nigerian neighbors than you are to tell me that his eyes go moist and misty in the presence of grilled meats, then I am more likely to get the impression that Billy is a bigot and not so likely to get the impression that he is a barbecue aficionado. Moreover, this may not be merely your idiosyncrasy. Perhaps there is some general population-wide tendency to communicate more readily about others' racist statements than about their gastronomic weaknesses (we discuss later some answers to the important question of why certain beliefs are more likely to be communicated than others). If so, each individual within the population will both hear and tell stories about prejudicial tendencies performed by all sorts of people, but these individuals will not be trading tales about dietary habits so much. Although individual-level appraisals of reality might suggest that both traits are equally stereotypic, the two traits do not emerge as equally stereotypic at all. The inevitable implicit influence that occurs through communication is such that the emerging shared stereotype of Southerners coalesces around one of these traits, but not the other. The implication is this: To the extent that our decisions about what we talk to each other about are not random or idiosyncratic, then these decisions influence the contents of emerging cultural stereotypes. The

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Page 171 decisions do not have to be based on anything that is either logically or phenomenologically relevant to stereotypes or prejudice. All they have to do is influence the contents of our communication and that, in turn, will influence the emerging contents of our culturally shared characterizations of groups. The Influence of Communication Likelihood on Stereotype Formation and Change Several pieces of evidence support the basic hypothesis that those traits that are most likely to be communicated to others are more likely to be perceived consensually as stereotypic. One intriguing piece of evidence relates to changes over time in the contents of cultural stereotypes. The social-evolutionary hypothesis predicts that the extent to which any given trait persists as part of a cultural stereotype is a function of the likelihood that people will communicate with others about the particular trait. Traits that are less likely to be communicated – for whatever reason – are less likely to remain strongly stereotypic. Traits that are more likely to be communicated are more likely to remain stereotypic over time. Schaller, Conway, and Tanchuk (2000) empirically tested this prediction on data pertaining to changes in stereotypes about African Americans held by European Americans in the United States. Katz and Braly (1933) reported 12 traits that Princeton students in the early 1930s most commonly indicated as stereotypic of Negroes. Each trait was identified with the exact percentage of subjects who indicated that trait to be especially central to their individual stereotype of the group. This percentage can be taken as a rough measure of the centrality of the trait to the culturally shared stereotype at that point in time. Two subsequent surveys of Princeton students (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins et al., 1969) and two more recent surveys conducted on other University campuses (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) used similar methods and so reported the extent to which various traits defined the content of the culturally shared stereotype at later points in time. These descriptive results provide opportunities to assess the extent to which each trait remained stereotypic of African Americans over time. To assess persistence, the percentage of individuals endorsing a trait as stereotypic at a particular point in time was subtracted from the percentage endorsing it at subsequent points in time. Higher values indicate greater perseverance over time in the cultural stereotype of African Americans. The question of interest is whether variability in the extent to which traits remained stereotypic over time was predicted by a measure indicating the communication likelihood of each trait. The index of communication likelihood was based on an independent sample of 33 university undergraduates who rated a list of 76 trait adjectives (including each of the adjectives reported as most stereotypic of African Americans in the surveys identified earlier) in response to two questions: “Suppose you met a person who had this trait, and now you're talking to others about this person; how likely is it that you'll tell these others that this person has this trait?” and “In general, considering all the various traits of people that you talk about when you talk to others, how common is it to find yourself talking about this trait (or behaviors relevant to this trait)?” Responses to each question were averaged to yield two scores for each trait. The resulting scores were highly correlated and so were averaged to yield a single index for each trait indicating its communicability. Treating trait as the unit of analysis, correlations were computed between the communicability index and the extent to which each trait remained stereotypic across different points in time. Ten separate correlations were able to be computed, indicating persistence across one, two, three, and four generations. Nine of these 10 correlations were positive – indicating that the communicability of a trait predicted its persistence in a stereotype over time. These correlations remained positive (and substantial in magnitude) even when statistically controlling for differential tendencies toward statistical regression and for the general evaluative favorability of each trait. In addition to predicting stereotype change, a trait's likelihood of communication also predicts the trait's tendency to be part of a stereotype in the first place. In a controlled experiment (Schaller & Conway, 1999), participants in groups of two were presented with information describing individual members of two groups about which they had no previous knowledge (the Red Group and the Blue Group). The information was structured in such a way that the groups were objectively different on two personality characteristics; in general, people in the Red Group were both more aggressive and more intelligent. During the course of examining the group information, participants also communicated periodically with each other concerning their emerging impressions. We included a manipulation to directly influence the likelihood that information relevant to intelligence or information relevant to aggressiveness would be communicated within dyads. In one condition, both dyad members were told to try to communicate primarily about positive information; in another condition, both dyad members were told to try to communicate primarily about negative information. At the completion of the session, each participant completed measures

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Page 172 assessing stereotypes of the groups. Consistent with the social-evolutionary hypothesis, results reveal that, although all individuals had identical information indicating that the two traits are equally stereotypic, the contents of the emerging stereotypes differed in the two conditions. Under conditions in which people were more likely to communicate about positive characteristics, intelligence emerged as a more central component of stereotypes. Under conditions in which people were more likely to communicate about negative characteristics, aggressiveness emerged as more central to stereotypes. Additional analyses (not reported by Schaller & Conway, 1999) revealed that these particular stereotypes with particular contents were not merely individual-level knowledge structures; the stereotypic beliefs formed by each individual were correlated with the beliefs formed by their dyad partner. In fact, this within-dyad similarity remained positive even after controlling for the predicted effects of the manipulation. This indicates that the emerging consensus could not be accounted for merely by similar inferential processes operating within individuals, but was the product partially of unique communicative interactions between individuals. It is also noteworthy that these effects emerged in the absence of any explicit goal to form stereotypes of some specific sort or to create consensus. Apparently the things people communicate about, even if not directly intended to influence the beliefs of self or others, do have an impact on the contents of emerging shared stereotypes. The Role of Cognitive Variables in Directing Social-Evolutionary Mechanisms So, traits that are more likely to be communicated between individuals are more likely to become and remain central to shared stereotypes. This basic social-evolutionary hypothesis begs the more interesting question: What factors influence the likelihood that a specific trait or belief will be communicated to others? Or, more to the point of prediction, what specific features of traits, persons, and situations might we attend to to predict the content of stereotypes that matter? Advantageous Properties of Stereotypic Beliefs Dawkins (1989) highlighted two general key features of beliefs that can influence the extent to which they are likely to become widespread: copying fidelity and fecundity. Copying fidelity refers to the extent to which the particular belief resists alteration and change in the process of communication. Fecundity refers – very generally – to the extent to which the particular belief will be acceptable to others. What determines a potentially stereotypic trait's copying fidelity? Given the limits of languages and the limits of the people who use them, it is nearly impossible for any communicator to communicate a stereotypic belief that is fully representative of the form that belief takes in her head. Moreover, as any student of rumor can attest, beliefs often are received in a different form than the one in which they were transmitted. Stereotypic beliefs that, in general, are least likely to suffer changes in meaning are more likely to become and remain part of stereotypes that matter. Among the various characteristics of potentially stereotypic traits that might influence their copying fidelity, one strikes us as particularly likely to exert an influence: Complexity. The more complex some characteristic is, the less likely it is to be communicated with fidelity. Complex beliefs are more likely to be sharpened by communicators to ease the act of communication. Complex beliefs are more likely to be sharpened further by cognitively fatigued or strongly schematic receivers. Given these pressures, it is likely that the characteristics of groups that become stereotypic are those that are simple to express and easy to understand. Of course, complex and simple are vague and relative terms. Beliefs may more complex because they include qualifying or limiting statements (“Southerners sure like barbecued meats, but the preferred style of meat sure varies from region to region”) or for a variety of other reasons as well. What makes a trait fecund? It seems likely that the fecundity of a trait is determined largely by the implicit rules of conversation that govern the exchange of information between any two individuals (Cushman & Whiting, 1972; Grice, 1975). Of particular importance is the social maxim concerning relevance: Savvy conversationalists observe the social rule that the information they transmit to others should be interesting, useful, and relevant to others' needs and goals. To some extent, individuals surely assume that if they find some group's traits and behaviors to be interesting and personally relevant, then so will others. Indeed the psychological literature on causal attribution reveals considerable overlap between the sorts of social information that inspires individual interest (as indicated by inferential activity) and the information that is judged to be interpersonally relevant to communication (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1993; Hilton, 1990). This link between causal attribution and interpersonal communication suggests that the traits most likely to enter conversation – and so to become stereotypic – are those that correspond most unambiguously to behaviors that have important personal

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Page 173 consequences. There is little point to transmitting social information that is nondiagnostic of actual behavior, or that is diagnostic only of trivial and inconsequential behaviors. Research on behavior-trait correspondence (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965; Rothbart & Park, 1986) implies that traits that are especially counternormative or negative are perceived to be especially predictive of correspondently unpleasant behavior. Other research (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991) indicates that people are especially attentive to the implications of negative characteristics of others – probably for the purpose of avoiding unpleasant social interactions. It follows that negative (or other counternormative) characteristics of groups are especially likely to be judged as interesting and relevant, and so more likely to be communicated to others. However, not all counternormative behaviors and negatively valued traits are equivalent in their practical implications. Recent functional perspectives on stigma and prejudice suggest that, for reasons based ultimately on biological evolutionary pressures, individuals may be especially sensitive to traits that most clearly imply the threat of physical injury or illness (Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, in press; Schaller, 1999; Stangor & Crandall, in press). For instance, although both stupidity and hostility are similarly negative, a group's cruelty more clearly indicates a potential danger. Consequently, people may generally be more attentive to hostility than stupidity, and may be more likely to communicate to others about the hostility rather than the stupidity of a group. Thus, the individual-level processes that conspire to tilt the content of stereotypes in a particular direction are likely to be amplified through the communication process. These brief and preliminary speculations suggest promising and fruitful directions for future research. If we can identify those features of traits that influence their fidelity and fecundity, we may discover that the explanations underlying the contents of cultural stereotypes lie not only within ourselves but also within the properties of what we talk about. Dawkins (1989, p. 200) once suggested that, ‘‘a cultural trait may have evolved in the way that it has, simply because it is advantageous to itself.” Standing alone, this is merely a provocative statement; when considered in the present context, it offers a potentially fruitful twist on the usual functional perspective we bring to the study of stereotypes. Interactions Between the Properties of Beliefs and the Properties of Individuals If traits differ along dimensions of fidelity and fecundity, it is because people in general share similar cognitive limitations and psychological goals. Although the presence of cognitive limits and certain psychological goals may be common across individuals, the magnitudes of these limits and goals differ between individuals. To more fully predict those potentially stereotypic traits that really do emerge as central to stereotypes that matter, it may be valuable to consider the variable features of beliefs in conjunction with the variable features of the people who traffic in those beliefs. Any personality variable that influences the successful communication of information from one person to another is potentially relevant to the process of stereotype formation and stereotype change. Some of these variables surely pertain to cognitive abilities and rhetorical styles. One such variable is the need for cognition – the desire for and enjoyment of effortful cognitive activity. Research on collective decision making reveals that individuals with a higher need for cognition generate more valid arguments to support their perspectives, and so are more persuasive in determining the eventual outcome of collective decisions (Shestowsky, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1998). Similar processes might operate when individuals discuss different beliefs about the characteristics of groups; those individuals who support their perspectives with more compelling arguments may ultimately have a greater influence on the eventual contents of stereotypes shared across a populations. Of course, such an effect may not operate equally across all traits. Traits differ in the extent to which they are easily confirmed or disconfirmed by supportive evidence (Rothbart & Park, 1986). To the extent that rational argumentation about a group's traits depends on reference to evidence, it is most likely to be persuasive in regard to those traits that lend themselves to clear confirmation or disconfirmation. Another individual difference variable that may merit attention is the need for structure – a personality variable that relates to dogmatism and close-mindedness (Thompson, et al., chap. 2, this volume). Persons with higher chronic needs for structure are more inclined to infer stable traits from others' behaviors (Moskowitz, 1993; Webster, 1993), more likely to form erroneous stereotypes of groups (Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O'Brien, 1995), less inclined to be persuaded by new information once they have formed a preliminary belief (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and, when conversing, more inclined to use linguistic constructions that implicate stable traits in others (Rubini & Kruglanski, 1997; Webster, Kruglanski, & Pattison, 1997). Considering these tendencies together, it may be that stereotypic beliefs formed by persons higher in need for structure would be especially likely to become shared

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Page 174 across a population of communicating individuals. If so, the implication is disturbing: Those individuals especially likely to form erroneous stereotypes on their own are also especially likely to infect others with their stereotypic beliefs. Meanwhile, those individuals who are less likely to form stereotypic beliefs on their own are nonetheless likely to contract those erroneous stereotypes as a result of their contact with others. Some empirical evidence (Conway & Schaller, 1998) supports the general line of thinking that people high in need for structure are sometimes especially influential bearers of stereotypes, although the evidence is preliminary and must be interpreted with considerable caution. In general, the consideration of individual differences in cognitive styles offers an interesting perspective on the role of individuals in the emergence of public opinion. Obviously some individuals are more influential than others in determining the shape of norms and beliefs that coalesce over time in any population. However, the factors that determine who is influential are not always obvious. Certainly opinion leaders are likely to be those who are most blessed with features that facilitate intentional persuasion, such as physical size and wealth (Latané, 1996). Some of the characteristics of opinion leaders may be considerably more subtle – pertaining to cognitive style rather than material strength – and may operate even in the absence of any deliberate attempt at influence. In addition to variables pertaining to cognitive style and epistemic goals, it is also worth considering the implications of individual differences in the need for belongingness. If the need to belong plays a role in our desire to achieve consensus, then those people who are particularly high in belongingness needs may be more likely to engage in behaviors that create consensus – such as accepting others' stereotypic beliefs about groups and attempting to pass those normative beliefs on to others as well. If so, then people who are high in the need to belong may be especially effective receivers and transmitters of stereotypic traits. Moreover, it may be functionally most advantageous to communicate content that is especially relevant to the defining features of the social group to which individuals wish to belong. If individuals within a particular population define themselves and their group according to their antiracist beliefs, the stereotypic belief that “they [outgroup members] are racist bigots” strongly supports the social belongingness needs of the ingroup members. Consequently, more so than many other potentially stereotypic traits, traits relevant to this group definition are likely to be especially virulent within this population (especially among individuals with stronger needs to belong). Within a different population of individuals in whom a sense of belongingness was predicated on a different social identity, the same belief would be less likely to become central to the stereotypes that matter. Interactions Between the Properties of Beliefs and Social Contexts Motives, goals, and other cognitive processes that influence the contents of communication not only differ across individuals, but also across social contexts. Thus, depending on the features of local cultural norms and expectations, one might expect different traits to actually emerge as stereotypic. Within certain normative contexts, it may be more likely that some beliefs about groups are more or less acceptable to discuss openly. Indeed, the potentially powerful normative influence on the acceptability of group-relevant communications underlies virtually all formal and informal interventions designed to undermine existing intergroup perceptions and behavior (e.g., political correctness). But norms do not have to be either logically or phenomenologically relevant to groups or stereotypes to exert an influence on the contents of stereotypes about groups. Given the operation of social-evolutionary processes, any contextual and normative variable that influences communication may have a indirect (and entirely unintentional) impact on the emerging contents of group stereotypes. Consider, for instance, the impact of impression management motives on the formation of brand-new group stereotypes. One's desire to make a good impression on others appears to bear little relevance to anybody's tendencies to form group stereotypes. But appearances are deceiving. A social-evolutionary perspective illuminates the potential impact of impression management motives on stereotype formation. Interpersonal communication is a medium through which individuals craft desired public images. Depending on social context or local norms, people may strategically choose to talk about certain characteristics of groups rather than others to cast a desirable impression. Those characteristics of groups that are most likely to be communicated are most likely to emerge as central to emerging culturally shared stereotypes of those groups. Two recent experiments yielded evidence of this indirect impact of impression management motives on emerging stereotypes (Schaller & Conway, 1999). Participants in groups of two were led to believe that desirable personal outcomes in life were associated with either tendencies to talk about positive characteristics of others or tendencies to talk about negative characteristics of others. They then received, over a period of time,

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Page 175 information describing individual members of two groups (e.g., the Red Group and the Blue Group) who actually did differ on two personality characteristics – one of which was positive (e.g., aggressiveness) and the other negative (e.g., intelligence). Participants also communicated with each other periodically concerning their emerging impressions. It was expected that, in their desires to cast desirable personal impressions on their communication partner (who held the same belief concerning the success implications of talking about positive [or negative] traits), both dyad members would strategically alter their communications to talk more about positive (or negative) traits. Given the implicit influence of communication content, this strategic self-presentation was expected to exert an indirect influence on the emerging contents of their stereotypes. Results from both studies show these predicted effects. The contents of interpersonal communication were indeed influenced by the subtle impression management norm. For instance, compared with other dyads, individuals within dyads operating under a “talk about negative things to make a good impression” norm were more likely to communicate about the negative characteristics of group members. As a result, there was also an effect on the emerging contents of group stereotypes. Although all participants read and communicated about the same objective information, participants operating under an implicit ‘‘talk about negative things to make a good impression” norm were more likely to form stereotypes based on differences in negative traits (e.g., aggressiveness) and less likely to form stereotypes based on differences in positive traits (e.g., intelligence). The contents of these emergent social structures cannot be attributed solely to individual-level cognitive processes. Comparisons with several control conditions (e.g., a condition in which participants wrote notes with the intention of exchanging them, but never actually made the exchange) revealed that the manipulation required successful consummation of communication intentions to exert its full effects on stereotype content. Thus, although there certainly may be some effects of purely individual-level processes associated with the transmission of communication (e.g., Zajonc, 1960), the effects observed in these studies demand a explanation that attends to both individual-level cognition and interpersonallevel communication. These effects of impression management motives on stereotype formation offer a glimpse into a potentially fruitful realm of scientific investigation exploring the indirect and unintended effects of individual cognitive process variables on the contents of emerging cultural stereotypes. Any individual-level cognitive structure may – if it has any effects on the contents of interpersonal communication – shape the formation of stereotypes that matter. Operating within social-evolutionary processes, individual-level cognitive variables that superficially seem irrelevant actually play important roles in the origins of stereotypes that matter. FROM COGNITION TO CULTURE Stereotypes are but one example of the consensually shared belief systems that define any culture. Processes that influence the contents of cultural stereotypes influence the contents of cultural norms of all kinds. Just as we acknowledge that some of these norms really matter, it is easy to dismiss many of these norms as merely superficial fad and fashion. The norms that take the form of cultural self-concepts or group stereotypes have substantial consequences; those that take the form of regional accents or favored styles of barbecue may seem trivial and inconsequential by comparison. This sort of judgment is dangerous; it fails to consider the functions that every one of these norms serves for the individuals and populations described by the norms. The extent to which an outside eye judges a normative belief system to be important or trivial is probably uncorrelated with the actual significance of that belief system to the people defined by those beliefs. Within the American South, stereotypes matter and so too does barbecue. (John Egerton, an expert on things Southern, once wrote that “the pit wars rage from eastern North Carolina to the western tip of Texas, and if you don't think it's serious business, try asking for tomato-based sauce out east of Raleigh, or telling a Texan how you really prefer pork. I'd sooner stroll unarmed through downtown Beirut” [Egerton, 1990, p. 68].) Cultural norms of all kinds matter, and the origins of them all might be fruitfully examined through a social-evolutionary lens. Science too is defined by its norms, and scientific norms emerge and evolve in the manner of any other cultural structure. Once upon a time and not so long ago, social-psychological inquiry into group stereotypes was defined by a method that merely described the contents of shared stereotypes. When the cognitive pandemic replicated across the psychological landscape, the emphasis shifted. Description of contents gave way to description of processes. The shift in emphasis has been spectacularly successful; we can now no more rid ourselves of a cognitive perspective than the American South could rid itself of barbecue. And that's good. Of course, while the recipe for a tasty meat snack might well remain successfully unchanged for generations, the recipe for successful science calls for new ingredients all

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Page 176 the time. It is in this context that a social-evolutionary approach to socially shared beliefs seems especially useful. This framework invites us to consider the many still undescribed effects that motives, goals, and other cognitive products have on the contents of communication. It invites us to consider too the many still unknown influences that communication has on the emergence of cultural beliefs. These invitations are well worth accepting. A vast amount of potential knowledge about the cognitive origins of culture awaits discovery.

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Page 177 11 The Dynamic Relationship Between Stereotype Efficiency and Mental Representation Jeffrey W. Sherman Northwestern University Stereotypes are “cognitive structures that contain the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a human group” (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986, p. 133). In the past 20 years, a great deal of attention has been devoted to understanding how stereotypes influence the perception of individual members of stereotyped groups. This research has shown stereotypes to have a profound impact on many basic cognitive processes that underlie social perception. They determine the kinds of information to which people attend, the ways in which that information is interpreted and encoded, and the manner in which the information is stored in memory and subsequently retrieved. Of course, stereotypes also influence the content of resulting judgments about target individuals as well as perceivers' behavior toward those individuals (for a review, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). More recently, attention has also turned to defining more precisely the nature of these stereotypic cognitive structures or mental representations (for reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Sherman, 1996). Broadly speaking, a mental representation is “an encoding of some information, which an individual can construct, retain in memory, access, and use in various ways” (Smith, 1998, p. 391). Research on the mental representation of stereotypes has been concerned with identifying the manner in which knowledge about social groups is constructed and retained in memory. When we say that a stereotype has been activated, what, specifically, do we mean? What exactly is being represented and activated in memory? To this point, research on the influence of stereotypes on social perception processes and on the mental representation of stereotypes has proceeded in a largely independent fashion, with little overlap having been noted or pursued between the two topics. However, these topics are much more closely related than has been previously acknowledged. We cannot directly observe people's mental representations. We can only infer these representations through the processes that act on them. As such, any model of representation is also a model of cognitive processing and is constrained by what we know about cognitive processes. In turn, what we learn about mental representation constrains the viability of different process models. Thus, one cannot be fully understood without a corresponding understanding of the other (Anderson, 1978; Barsalou, 1990; Smith, 1998). The primary goal of this chapter is to detail how research on stereotype representation and stereotypic effects on information processing (particularly as they relate to stereotype efficiency) inform one another. First, I describe recent research on stereotype representation and detail how concerns for efficient information processing play a vital role in the nature and development of stereotypic representations. Next, I explain how these representations in turn influence the processing of stereotype-relevant information. This discussion focuses on a recently developed model of how stereotypes confer efficiency in social perception. I argue that the efficient processing of stereotype-relevant information is largely dependent on the representational nature of stereotypes. Finally, I describe how these efficient processing mechanisms feed back into and reinforce the representational nature of stereotypes. Thus, the relationship between mental representation and processing efficiency is a dynamic one. Concerns about efficiency influence representation, which in turn influences processing efficiency, which in turn influences representation. THE MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF STEREOTYPES At one level, the mental representation of a stereotype can be defined in terms of the particular content that is included in the representation (e.g., the particular traits thought to characterize the target group). However, such a definition is merely descriptive and uninformative as to

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Page 178 the mechanisms by which stereotypes produce their effects. At another level, stereotype representation can be defined by the specificity with which the particular stereotypic traits are represented in memory. Research on this question has focused on the distinction between abstraction-based and exemplar-based knowledge (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Sherman, 1996). Abstraction-based knowledge summarizes the features of a concept that have been extracted from experiences (both first- and second-hand) with specific instances of the concept. Generally speaking, these abstractions can be thought of as category averages along different attributes (including, perhaps, summary estimates of category variability; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Park & Hastie, 1987). In the case of knowledge about a social group, an abstract stereotype would consist of a group summary along a particular dimension (e.g., friendliness) that had been extracted from relevant experiences with the group and its members and had become associated with the group. In contrast, exemplar-based knowledge consists of the specific instances of the concept in question. Exemplar-based stereotypes would consist of representations of particular group members and their behaviors (e.g., specific friendly and unfriendly behaviors). A central argument of this chapter is that specifying the different contributions of these two types of knowledge to stereotype representation has significant implications for understanding the functional significance of stereotypes in information processing, and that defining stereotypes at this level of specificity can clarify the roles that stereotypes play in attentional, encoding, retrieval, and judgment processes.1 Historically, abstractionist views have held sway, with stereotypes being conceived of as (over)simplified generalizations about groups of people (e.g., Brigham, 1971; Lippmann, 1922). In more recent years, these generalizations have been described alternatively as schemata (e.g., Taylor & Crocker, 1981), prototypes (e.g., Brewer, 1988), expectancies (e.g., Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990), and Bayesian base rates (e.g., McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Alhough there are subtle differences among these models, they share a most important feature in common: They all suggest that people develop and store abstract impressions that summarize the behavioral tendencies of social groups. These abstractions may initially be extracted from encounters with specific group members. However, once formed, they may be retrieved and used independently of information about particular individuals and their behaviors. Although these conceptualizations are clearly abstractionist in nature, they are not highly specified models of mental representation. Specifying and testing underlying representational assumptions have never been primary concerns to researchers in these traditions. Indeed, few attempts have been made to verify the proposed abstract nature of these stereotypes. Moreover, the potential role of specific exemplars in group knowledge is usually not considered in these models. This is not to say that these models posit no role for exemplars. Rather, the question is simply never raised. Although these models have frequently been characterized as “pure-abstraction” models that are hostile to exemplar-based processes (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Sherman, 1996; Smith, 1990), they are so more out of neglect than out of clear intent. Serious consideration of the role of exemplar-based knowledge in stereotype representation has appeared only recently. Researchers have proposed pure exemplar-based models of stereotyping that directly challenge traditional abstractionist conceptions (e.g., Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Smith, 1990; Smith & Zarate, 1992). According to these models, stereotypes do not exist as independently stored knowledge structures. Rather, group knowledge consists solely of information about particular group member behaviors. If knowledge of the group as a whole is required, it must be created on the spot by retrieving and summarizing information about specific individuals. A Developmental Mixed-Model of Group Representation The preceding discussion of abstraction and exemplar-based models of stereotypes suggests that group knowledge is either entirely abstraction- or exemplarbased. However, it has become clear that neither pure abstraction nor pure exemplar models accurately describe group knowledge. It has been relatively straightforward to demonstrate that particular category exemplars may sometimes form the basis of people's perceptions of social groups (e.g., Sherman, 1996; Smith & Zarate, 1990) or at least influence those perceptions (e.g., Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wänke, 1995; Lewicki, 1985; Schwarz & Bless, 1992).2 Likewise, it is clear that group knowledge is not always based on information about particular group members and is sometimes abstracted (Park & Hastie, 1987; Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998). As a result, many theorists now subscribe to mixed models of mental representation. According to these models, knowledge of a group may be based on either abstract or exemplar information depending on the circumstances. For example, the extent to which group knowledge is based on

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Page 179 abstractions and exemplars has been posited to be mediated by group membership (ingroups vs. outgroups; Park & Judd, 1990; Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991), group cohesion (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), target stereotypicality (Sherman, Klein, et al., 1998), and learning order of abstract and exemplar information (Smith & Zarate, 1990), among other factors. In my own research, I have proposed and tested a model of group representation that specifies group familiarity as a key determinant of the extent to which group knowledge is based on abstractions or exemplars (Sherman, 1996). According to this model, in the early stages of learning about a social group, judgments of the group are based on information about particular group members because too few exemplars have been encountered to support the formation of abstract knowledge. With sufficient experience with group members (or secondhand accounts of their attributes), perceivers form abstract representations of the attributes that are stereotypical of the group. Once formed, these abstractions may be retrieved independently from group exemplars to make judgments about relevant features of the group. Thus, group knowledge is exemplar based primarily when no abstract knowledge exists (although other factors may encourage exemplar based judgments once abstractions have developed; see also Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994, for familiarity-based models of the mental representation of self and other individuals). The predictions of this model were supported in two experiments. In the first experiment, participants formed impressions of an ill-defined group of college students who all belonged to the same club on campus. No other information was given about the group that would allow participants to rely on preexisting group stereotypes in forming their impressions. After learning either a relatively small or large amount of information about the group, participants performed a judgment priming task that assessed the extent to which judgments about the group depended on the retrieval of information about particular group members. Briefly, this task required participants to either make a judgment about the group or perform a control task, and then retrieve a particular behavior performed by a member of the group. If participants spontaneously activate behaviors about specific group members when they make judgments about the group, then it should take relatively little time to retrieve one of these behaviors following the judgment task as compared with the control task. In this case, the behaviors would have already been activated and would be relatively accessible. The results demonstrate that group judgments were based on activated exemplars only when participants had received little information about the group. At high levels of group experience, judgments no longer depended on exemplar retrieval. In this case, it appeared that participants were able to rely on abstract, trait-based stereotypes that had been formed about the group. The second experiment examined the mental representations of more familiar social groups. Participants learned either a relatively small or large amount of information about either a group of engineers or a group of priests. For these groups, participants may rely on preexisting stereotypes to form judgments of the groups along relevant dimensions, regardless of how little information they have received about particular group members. If these stereotypes exist as prestored abstractions, then judgments along relevant dimensions would not involve the retrieval of information about particular group members. However, if stereotypes are merely exemplar-based constructions, then relying on them would involve the retrieval of the novel, experimentally presented group members (e.g., Smith, 1990). That is, the most recently encountered exemplars would be activated in making the group judgment. The results demonstrate that judgments along stereotypical dimensions (engineer-intelligent, priest-kind) did not involve the retrieval of group exemplars, regardless of how little information had been presented about the groups. Even when participants had learned a small amount of information about the groups, judgments along these dimensions did not depend on exemplar retrieval, presumably because participants were instead relying on their preexisting abstract stereotypes. By contrast, judgments along nonstereotypical dimensions (engineer-kind, priest-intelligent) did rely on exemplar retrieval. This research suggests that stereotypes are often stored as abstract knowledge structures in memory, and that their availability reduces the role of exemplar-based processes (see also Sherman, Klein, et al., 1998). The Need for Efficiency Influences Stereotype Representation The developmental mixed model of stereotype representation is based on a functional analysis of memory. According to this analysis, the ability to summarize experiences across time, situations, and individuals is critical to the efficient operation of memory. There are two aspects to this efficiency. First, by capturing patterns of invariances in the environment, people are able to learn generalizable skills, predict the future, and explain novel events (McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Schank,

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Page 180 1982; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). In this way, information that is learned from past experiences can be brought to bear on a wide variety of novel experiences. Thus, an individual's behavior may be predicted and understood in light of the trait generalizations that have been made about the person. Likewise, a group member's behavior may be understood (or misunderstood) in light of the abstract stereotypes that have been formed about that person's group. This is what Bruner (1957a) referred to as going beyond the information given, and it is an important factor in the development of abstract knowledge. The second reason that the development of abstractions is efficient has to do with the need for streamlined representations and cognitive processes. Theoretically, it would certainly be possible to create generalizations solely via repeated exemplar activation and summation. However, there are at least three reasons to posit that this would not be the case. First, the ability to create and apply knowledge that may be used in response to general and invariant features of the environment may be inhibited by the levels of temporal, spatial, and contextual detail preserved in exemplars (particularly behavioral episodes; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). As such, it would be useful to formulate and store abstract knowledge in addition to exemplars. Second, the predictive validity of these summarizations depends on the number of experiences included in the summarization. This is simply a question of sample size. Because each experience represents a single sample from the environment population, it is necessary to aggregate across many experiences to obtain a reliable population estimate (McClelland et al., 1995). This is related to the third point – that it is simply more efficient to maintain prestored abstractions than it is to re-create them every time they are needed by retrieving and summarizing specific events or exemplars. Most researchers assume that there are capacity constraints on the number of relevant events that may be found and summarized in a timely manner (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Hamilton & Mackie, 1990; McClelland et al., 1995; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell, 1978). To constantly do so would be inefficient compared with keeping a running summary of relevant exemplars that could be accessed whenever necessary. Indeed, the retrieval and application of specific episodes is more easily disrupted than the application of abstract knowledge structures (e.g., Rothbart, et al., 1978; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999, as described later; see Johnson et al., 1993; Tulving, 1983, for reviews). Thus, although it would be theoretically possible to retrieve and summarize large numbers of exemplars to generate valid population estimates, it would be inefficient to do so.3 This discussion makes clear the intimate relationship between form and function. The development, storage, and use of abstract knowledge are based, in part, on the need for efficient use of memory. Abstractions provide relatively large amounts of generalizable knowledge at relatively little cognitive expense, providing a healthy ratio of information gained to effort expended. Supporting this view is the impressive spontaneity with which perceivers draw abstractions from particular episodes. Past research has shown that perceivers derive abstract trait representations about the self and others relatively quickly and without being encouraged (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994). Other research has shown that the leap from behavioral perception to trait inference occurs spontaneously, if not automatically (see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996, for a review). Related findings in a variety of experiments led Hastie and Park (1986) to conclude that it was difficult to invent situations in which abstraction processes did not spontaneously occur (see also Anderson, 1989). Of most direct relevance to the concerns of this chapter, my work on stereotype representation (Sherman, 1996) demonstrated that much the same thing happens when perceivers are learning about social groups. As information about the group is acquired, trait summaries are extracted. Moreover, this research showed that group judgments were based on exemplars only when an abstract stereotype was not available. This suggests that there is a functional basis to the development of abstract stereotypes. It is more efficient to store and retrieve abstract stereotypes than it is to re-create group stereotypes anew each time they are needed by retrieving and summarizing information about particular group exemplars. Comparisons to Other Models Of course, the idea that stereotypes promote efficient social perception has a long history in social psychology. Both Lippmann (1922) and Allport (1954) focused extensively on the efficiency of stereotyping in their early analyses. More recent theoretical statements by Brewer (1988) and Fiske and Neuberg (1990) were also largely based on a functional analysis. Those models are specifically concerned with the extent to which judgments of individual group members are based on stereotypes about the groups to which they belong versus specific behaviors performed by the individuals. Both models rely on the distinction between “top-down’’ and “bottom-up” processing in their analyses. Whereas

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Page 181 top-down processing relies on preexisting knowledge (such as stereotypes) to deduce the properties of a new stimulus, bottom-up processing relies on raw perceptual input (such as observed behaviors) to induce the properties of a stimulus. Both models argue that top-down processing is more efficient than bottom-up processing in forming impressions of individuals. Clearly there are important similarities between these models and the developmental/representational model described earlier (Sherman, 1996). Most significant, all three models argue that stereotype-based social perception is more efficient than perception based on more specific kinds of information (exemplars, behaviors).4 However, there are important differences between the models as well. One obvious difference is that, whereas the developmental/representational model describes the formation of group impressions or stereotypes (although it may be generalized to impression of individuals; Klein et al., 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994), the dual process models developed by Brewer (1988) and Fiske and Neuberg (1990) are concerned with the formation of impressions of individuals. A second difference is that, whereas the developmental/representational model focuses both on the roles of efficiency in the initial extraction of abstract stereotypes and in their subsequent use, the dual process models focus only on the efficiency of using stereotypes that are already fully developed. Little attention is paid in the dual process models to exactly how and why stereotypes develop the way they do. Finally, and most important, the developmental analysis in our model is particularly concerned with detailing the evolving representational basis of stereotypes and how it is related to stereotype efficiency. In contrast, although they are concerned with the relative contributions of top-down (stereotype-based) and bottom-up (behavior-based) processes in social judgments, the dual process models are less concerned with the underlying representation of the top-down knowledge that is being applied and the implications that it has for stereotype use. Fiske and Neuberg suggested that stereotypes may be either abstraction or exemplar based (e.g., Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987), but no discussion was devoted to identifying the conditions that determine the type of representation or what difference the two types of representation would make in stereotyping processes. Although Brewer (1988) clearly defined stereotypes as abstract group prototypes, little attention was given to how the abstract nature of stereotypes particularly influenced information processing. Thus, whereas the developmental/representational model is a model of both representation and judgment processes, the dual process models are primarily models of judgment processes. As we see later, the focus on underlying representation in the developmental/representational model provides insights into questions surrounding stereotype efficiency and encoding processes that are not addressed by the dual process models. First, however, a broader discussion of stereotype efficiency and encoding processes is warranted. STEREOTYPE EFFICIENCY AND THE ENCODING OF SOCIAL INFORMATION As described previously, it is widely accepted that stereotyping is more efficient than individuation (Bodenhausen et al., 1999; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). This view has been supported by a considerable amount of research in recent years that has shown that stereotyping is particularly prevalent when attentional capacity is depleted. Whether due to physical depletion (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Kim & Baron, 1988), task difficulty (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pratto & Bargh, 1991), multiple task demands (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993), anxiety-induced arousal (e.g., Wilder & Shapiro, 1989), or positive moods (e.g., Stroessner & Mackie, 1993), situations that decrease the availability of processing resources have been shown to increase the extent to which perceivers rely on their stereotypes. Miser Models: Stereotypes as Crutches Historically, two different types of models have been proposed to account for the relative efficiency of stereotyping compared with individuation. First, many researchers have interpreted such findings from a cognitive miser perspective (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; for an overview, see Fiske & Taylor, 1984). According to this orientation, perceivers are miserly with their resources and devote as little processing capacity to a given task as possible — what Allport (1954) called “the principle of least effort” (p. 173). The application of this analysis to stereotyping is further rooted in the heuristic processing tradition in the judgment and decision making literature, which suggests that people often rely on short-cuts or heuristics to achieve resource conservation (March & Simon, 1958; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As such, miser models of stereotyping suggest that perceivers rely on stereotypes as judgmental heuristics to relieve themselves of the cognitive effort of having to systematically process individuating information. Alhough these models are clear that perceivers may be more or less motivated to

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Page 182 process systematically (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), stereotype use is always equated with processing in a miserly and unmotivated fashion. Thus, as perceivers become more miserly, stereotype use increases and individuation decreases; as perceivers become more motivated, stereotype use decreases and individuation increases. Of course, as capacity-saving devices, stereotypes are also presumed to be particularly useful when resources are depleted and careful processing is difficult to achieve. Given these models' historical basis in the judgmental heuristics tradition, it is not surprising that their primary focus has been on predicting the outcomes of judgment processes. In particular, they have been largely concerned with predicting the relative weights that will be given to category-based (i.e., stereotypes) and individuating information in determining the content of evaluative and descriptive judgments about group members. However, stereotypes and individuating information do not merely exert independent and separate influences on social perception. Rather, stereotypes and individuating information mutually influence and constrain one another. Of particular relevance to this chapter, stereotypes have been shown to have a significant impact on the manner in which stereotype-relevant individuating information is attended to, encoded, and retrieved. Furthermore, concerns for processing efficiency play an important role in determining exactly how stereotypes influence these processes. Though the miser models have not been so concerned with delineating these effects, other models have made them of central importance. Stereotypes as Filters The second type of model that has been proposed to explain stereotype efficiency is the filter model (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Garst, 1997; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Macrae et al., 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Stangor & Duan, 1991; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). In contrast to miser models, filter models are largely concerned with how stereotypes influence the processing of individuating information. Also, in contrast to miser models, filter models do not suggest that increased stereotype use is always accompanied by diminished reliance on individuating information. Rather, certain kinds of individuating information benefit from the use of stereotypes. Based on schematic principles of memory (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Neisser, 1976), these models suggest that information that is consistent with a stereotypic expectancy is encoded and represented in memory more completely than information that is unrelated to the expectancy. In contrast, information that is inconsistent with the expectancy is particularly unlikely to be successfully encoded into memory. Thus, stereotypes act as filters that let in information that confirms people's expectancies and keep out information that disconfirms them. There are two varieties of filter models. The weak or passive filter model suggests that the encoding advantage for consistent information is based on the fact that, because it fits with existing expectancies, it is simply easier to comprehend than inconsistent information. By providing this conceptual fluency to consistent information, stereotypes reduce the amount of capacity necessary to encode that information, freeing up processing resources for other tasks. The strong or active filter model further suggests that, because consistent information is easier to encode, attention is directed toward consistent and away from inconsistent information (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen et al., 1997; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Stangor & Duan, 1991; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Thus, stereotypes further promote efficiency by directing resources away from information that is difficult to encode and toward information that is easy to encode. This attentional hypothesis is based on the cognitive miser analysis that people generally prefer to do as little cognitive work as necessary. It is also derived, in part, from principles of selective exposure (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986), which suggest that people prefer to not attend to information that challenges their beliefs (see also Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume), particularly if they do not possess the resources to refute that information. Indeed, it is important to note that, as is the case with miser models, both filter models predict that the influence of stereotypes is especially likely to be observed when processing resources are low and efficient processing is at a premium. Thus, in these conditions, the encoding advantages for consistent over inconsistent information should be particularly strong. However, in contrast to miser models, these models suggest that perceivers who are particularly motivated to process target information may be especially likely to rely on their stereotypes to arrive at a preferred impression. STEREOTYPE REPRESENTATION, ENCODING FLEXIBILITY, AND STEREOTYPE EFFICIENCY Recently we have proposed and tested an alternative

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Page 183 model of stereotype efficiency that makes different predictions from both the miser and filter models (Sherman & Frost, 2000; Sherman, Lee, et al., 1998). This model is particularly concerned with the manner in which stereotyperelevant individuating information is attended to and encoded, and how concerns for efficiency influence these processes. The predictions for this model were derived in part from our earlier work on the mental representation of stereotypes (Sherman, 1996), in which the presence of an abstract stereotype was shown to reduce the extent to which stereotype-consistent group judgments were based on particular stereotype-consistent behaviors. In conditions in which perceivers possessed abstract stereotypes, they were freed from having to rely on specific stereotypical behaviors as the basis for their judgments. Note that the implications of these findings are opposed to the predictions of filter models (particularly strong filter models). Whereas those models suggest that stereotypes increase the encoding and influence of stereotype-consistent behaviors, our results suggest that stereotypes decrease the importance of carefully encoding stereotypical behaviors. Because stereotypical information is already provided by abstractions, the necessity of attending to, carefully encoding, and retrieving confirmatory behaviors is reduced (see also Johnston & Hawley, 1994; von Hippel, Jonides, Hilton, & Narayan, 1993; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). Moreover, whereas filter models suggest that encoding should be particularly biased toward expected information when capacity is depleted, our results imply that careful encoding of expected information is particularly unlikely under these conditions. If, as we have suggested, it is more efficient to rely on abstract knowledge than behavioral exemplars, then it would seem unlikely that stereotypical behaviors would be particularly well encoded when processing resources are scarce. What Is an Efficient System? However, our model is not a miser model. We do not wish to suggest that perceivers rely on stereotypes out of laziness or that stereotype use necessarily implies the disuse of individuating information. On the contrary, rather than minimizing effort, we argue that stereotype use is about maximizing efficiency — the amount of information gained for effort expended. Indeed, the other major impetus for our model was a theoretical consideration of what an efficient cognitive system ought to accomplish. A number of researchers have argued that cognitive systems that are either too stable or too flexible would be at an evolutionary disadvantage (e.g., Johnston & Hawley, 1994; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Tulving, Markowitsch, Kapur, Habib, & Houle, 1994). On the one hand, if knowledge is too easily changed, then it is not useful for making consistent predictions about the environment. Hence, there must be some stability in our expectations. On the other hand, if expectations are not open to alteration, they may not adequately represent the world. If expectancies have no predictive value, then they also are not very useful. At some point, people must be able to recognize that the data do not fit their expectancies, and they must revise them. Thus, for maximum predictive value, efficient systems must encode both invariances in the environment, which encourage the development of expectancies, and variances (unexpected events), which suggest that expectancy reorientation may be necessary (e.g., Johnston & Hawley, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Schank, 1982; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Tulving et al., 1994). Given the importance of each of these goals, it might be expected that there would be provisions in the cognitive system for encoding both expected and unexpected information when processing resources are scarce. This functional analysis is at odds with both miser and filter models. Both of those types of models propose cognitive systems that are inherently conservative. According to miser models, when resources are depleted, perceivers rely on their existing stereotypic expectancies to the relative exclusion of all novel behavioral information. Strong filter models suggest that, when capacity is low, people focus on confirmatory behaviors and direct their attention away from disconfirming information. Finally, weak filter models propose that, when resources are low, perceivers are unable to encode unexpected behaviors because they are simply too difficult to comprehend. Alhough people may want to encode this information, they are simply unable to do so. Thus, in all three models, the overwhelming trend is toward maintaining stability in existing expectations, particularly when capacity is restricted. In contrast, a model based on the notion of an efficiency-maximizing system suggests that efficient stereotype use ought to facilitate, in different ways, the encoding of both expected and unexpected individuating information when capacity is low. Encoding Flexibility and Stereotype Efficiency Recently, we have proposed and tested such an encoding flexibility model of stereotype efficiency (Sherman, Lee, et al., 1998). According to this model, stereotypes facilitate the encoding of consistent behaviors by providing explanatory frameworks that render those behaviors conceptually fluent. As such, those behaviors are relatively easy to comprehend, even when processing

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Page 184 resources are scant. This aspect of our model coincides with the passive filtering hypothesis. However, our model suggests that the conceptual fluency of consistent information has a different impact on the encoding of consistent and inconsistent information than do filter models. In particular, we argue that, because consistent information can be understood with relatively little effort, substantial attention is not devoted to encoding the details of this information (e.g., Graesser, 1981; Johnston & Hawley, 1994; Sherman, 1996; von Hippel et al., 1993), particularly when capacity is depleted. Instead, those resources may be redirected to assist in the encoding of inconsistent information, which is difficult to understand. Yet this does not mean that the inconsistent information is fully understood — only that the effort will be made. Thus, when capacity is low, conceptual encoding (encoding for gist meaning) favors consistent information, whereas attentional allocation and perceptual encoding (encoding for details) favor inconsistent information. As such, stereotypes do not merely simplify impression formation for lazy perceivers. Rather, they permit the flexible distribution of resources in a way that maximizes the amount of information gained for the effort expended. This encoding flexibility is functional because it promotes both stability and plasticity in the mental system. The results from a number of experiments have supported the predictions of this model. Three experiments tested our hypotheses about the distribution of attentional resources under different encoding conditions (Sherman, Lee, et al., 1998). In all three experiments, participants read stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information about a target person while either under a cognitive load or not. The first experiment measured the amount of time participants spent reading the consistent and inconsistent behaviors as a function of processing capacity. Results show that participants spent an equal amount of time reading consistent and inconsistent information when capacity was high, but spent a greater amount of time reading inconsistent than consistent information when capacity was low. Thus, participants were not directing their attention away from the inconsistent information when they were under load. The second experiment used a dual-task paradigm to examine the amount of attention paid to consistent and inconsistent information as a function of cognitive capacity. As participants read about the target, they were also asked to monitor auditory tones emitted by their computers. When capacity was high, participants responded to this secondary task equally quickly, regardless of whether it occurred during the encoding of consistent or inconsistent items. In contrast, when capacity was low, participants took more time to respond to the secondary task when it occurred as inconsistent items were being encoded than when consistent items were being encoded. This response interference demonstrates that greater attention was devoted to encoding the inconsistent than consistent items when capacity was depleted. Finally, the third experiment forced participants to attend selectively to either consistent or inconsistent information by presenting consistent and inconsistent items in pairs for a brief period of time. The results show that, when capacity was high, participants recognized consistent and inconsistent items from a pair equally well. However, when capacity was depleted, the inconsistent item in the pair was recognized with significantly greater accuracy than the consistent item. Together these three experiments provide strong evidence that, when processing capacity is limited, greater resources are devoted to the encoding of inconsistent than consistent information, which is in direct opposition to the predictions of filter models. Two other experiments tested our hypotheses about the perceptual and conceptual encoding of stereotypeconsistent and -inconsistent information (Sherman, Lee, et al., 1998). Once again, participants read stereotypeconsistent and -inconsistent information about a target person while either under a cognitive load or not. Subsequently, they engaged in a priming task that measured either perceptual or conceptual encoding. Both tasks required participants to identify words that were flashed very briefly (33 ms) on computer screens. The perceptual priming task examined the extent to which participants could identify words that had appeared in the original stimulus items, but were unrelated to the gist meaning of the items (e.g., the word salesgirl from the sentence, “Swore at the salesgirl”). Participants' ability to identify these words reflects the extent to which the perceptual details of the items had been extracted during encoding. In contrast, the conceptual priming task examined the extent to which participants could identify words that reflected the gist meaning of the original stimulus items, but had not actually appeared in those items (e.g., trait terms such as kind and mean). Participants' ability to identify these words reflects the extent to which the gist meaning of the items has been extracted during encoding (for a methodological overview, see Roediger, 1990). The first experiment showed that perceptual encoding was greater for inconsistent than consistent behaviors under conditions of both high- and low-processing capacity. The second experiment showed that, under high-capacity conditions, conceptual encoding was equally strong for consistent and inconsistent behaviors. In contrast, when encoding capacity was limited, the conceptual meanings of consistent behaviors were much

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Page 185 more likely to be extracted than the conceptual meanings of inconsistent behaviors. Thus, despite the attentional and perceptual encoding advantages for inconsistent information when resources were low, conceptual encoding favored consistent information under such conditions. These five experiments provide strong initial support for the encoding flexibility model of stereotyping. When resources are limited, stereotypes facilitate the encoding of both stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information. Inconsistent information receives greater attention and more thorough perceptual encoding. However, despite these advantages, conceptual encoding favors consistent information in these same conditions. Through these encoding flexibility processes, when resources are scarce, stereotypes are able to promote their own stability (through conceptual encoding) while maintaining vigilance (through attentional distribution and perceptual encoding) that reorientation may become necessary. We argue that this encoding flexibility is facilitated by an abstract representational structure of stereotypes. As described previously, well-developed stereotypes are stored as abstract knowledge structures that summarize grouplevel information across time, situations, and individuals (Sherman, 1996). As such, they may aid in understanding novel behaviors performed by novel group members. This is particularly true for behaviors and individuals that are congruent with the basic gist of the stereotype. Because the information provided by these acts/individuals is redundant with, and may be assumed by, the broader abstraction, perceivers need not attend carefully to it. Instead, those resources may be directed to assist in the encoding of other information that does not fit so comfortably with the stereotype (e.g., unexpected information), particularly when resources are low. If ever, it may be in the early stages of stereotype development, when group-based expectancies are too weak to support the formation of abstract stereotypes, that attentional allocation and perceptual encoding would be biased toward stereotype-confirming information (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Skov & Sherman, 1986). In such cases, the stereotype is less useful for inferring the meanings of novel stereotypical behaviors. As such, particular stereotypeconsistent acts demand greater attention. Moreover, the stereotype may not present a strong enough expectancy to produce clearly identifiable, inconsistent data that would draw special attention (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Sherman, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985). Finally, it may be that information that facilitates the establishment of an abstract expectancy that allows for future generalization may receive more careful processing than information that challenges an expectancy that is weak and ungeneralizable to begin with. Thus, prior to the completion of the abstraction process, consistent information may attract more attention and perceptual encoding than inconsistent information. However, as stereotypic expectancies congeal and become abstract, consistent information becomes redundant and may be readily inferred from the stereotype. At the same time, inconsistent information becomes easier to identify and gains in importance. As a result, resources are more likely to shift from consistent to inconsistent information. EFFICIENT PROCESSING INFLUENCES STEREOTYPE REPRESENTATION First I described how concerns for efficiency influence the initial development of abstract stereotypes. Next I showed that, once these abstractions are formed, they influence the efficiency with which stereotypes impact the subsequent encoding of stereotype-relevant information. Now I take the discussion full circle and describe how efficient encoding flexibility processes feed back into and influence the mental representation of stereotypes and stereotype-relevant information. One of the more important questions arising from our research on encoding flexibility has to do with the mechanisms of stereotype plasticity. The attentional and perceptual encoding advantages for inconsistent information under cognitive load must ultimately contribute to stereotype revision, but how? Among other reasons, we believe these encoding advantages are important for stereotype plasticity because they help people retrieve and reconstruct the details of unexpected events at a later time when greater resources are available for comprehension. Because these items of information are difficult to interpret during encoding (especially if resources are low), it is of particular importance to be able to retrieve their details at a later time, when their implications may be more fully understood. Retaining the details of these behaviors would also be important so that they may be compared to newly observed behaviors that may help clarify matters and promote conceptual consolidation (e.g., McClelland et al., 1995). In fact, a number of researchers have argued that the essential purpose of episodic memory is to record the details of unexpected events for later inspection and comparison (McClelland et al., 1995; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Schank, 1982; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). In contrast, retaining the specific details of expected information is not such a pressing matter. In this case, the basic gist may simply be extracted and stored as semantic memory.

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Page 186 Our demonstrations of attentional and perceptual encoding advantages for stereotype-inconsistent information are certainly consistent with this functional analysis of episodic and semantic memory. However, we may also make specific predictions about the extent to which the encoding of stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors would encourage the development and use of abstraction-based versus exemplar-based group knowledge. In particular, if people simply extract the basic gist of consistent behaviors and store it as semantic memory, then we would expect perceivers to quickly develop abstract group knowledge pertaining to those behaviors. This is essentially what Sherman (1996) showed. In contrast, if people are more concerned with retaining the perceptual and contextual details of inconsistent behaviors, then we would expect that the development and use of abstract knowledge pertaining to those behaviors would be substantially delayed, and the role of exemplar-based processes would be enhanced. The results of two recently reported experiments support these hypotheses (Sherman, Klein, et al., 1998). Participants were first randomly assigned to one of two social categories (overestimators or underestimators) based on a minimal group manipulation (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). Next, they were presented with positive or negative descriptors of members of either their ingroup or their outgroup. Finally, participants performed the previously described judgment priming task that assessed the extent to which group judgments depended on the retrieval of information about particular group members (Sherman, 1996). When the descriptors confirmed participants' expectancies that ingroups would be positive and outgroups would be negative, judgments about the groups did not involve the activation of specific exemplars. Instead, judgments were apparently based on abstract group summaries created during the encoding of the expected behaviors. In contrast, when the stimulus information suggested that the ingroup was negative or the outgroup was positive, judgments of the groups were constructed by retrieving from memory specific group exemplars (for related results, see Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & Stahlberg, 1995; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). This implies that perceivers did not form semantic summaries during the encoding of unexpected behaviors. These data suggest that, if perceivers are unable (or unwilling) to extract the basic gist of unexpected behaviors, those episodes may be stored and retrieved for future use. Based on our other work on encoding flexibility, we might expect that these encoding/representational differences between consistent and inconsistent behaviors would be particularly evident when processing capacity is restricted during the initial encoding of group behaviors, and inconsistent information is particularly difficult to comprehend. These studies demonstrate how the differential processing of stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information may influence the manner in which that information gets represented in memory. Because perceivers are relatively unconcerned with encoding the specific details of consistent behaviors, that information may be ‘‘semanticized” and stored as abstract knowledge relatively quickly. By contrast, perceivers' concerns with encoding the details of inconsistent behaviors delay the abstraction process and enhance the role of episodic memory in the representation of such information. Thus, not only does the initial abstract nature of stereotypes influence the manner in which stereotype-relevant behaviors are encoded, but those encoding processes also subsequently feed back into and influence the mental representations of stereotypes and stereotype-relevant information. In both cases, concerns for efficiency are an important contributing factor. ON THE NEED FOR ENCODING FLEXIBILITY I have argued that it is important to encode and represent the perceptual and contextual details of stereotypeinconsistent but not -consistent information. In part, this is because the meanings of inconsistent behaviors are relatively difficult to discern during encoding. As such, it is useful to be able to reconstruct the details of those behaviors at a later time when further attempts at comprehension may proceed. However, there is another important reason that perceivers would more carefully encode the details of inconsistent than consistent behaviors. If the details of consistent behaviors are forgotten or are temporarily inaccessible, perceivers may simply rely on their abstract stereotypes to infer the basic gist of what has occurred. On the contrary, if the details of inconsistent behaviors cannot be retrieved, the meaning conveyed by those behaviors may also be lost if the initial conceptual encoding of those behaviors has been less than ideal. This is because the basic gist of inconsistent information cannot be reconstructed from existing abstract group knowledge after the fact. Thus, the careful encoding of the details of unexpected information not only helps advance the ultimate conceptual consolidation of that information, but also acts as insurance against the irreplaceable loss of such information. We conducted an experiment to examine this issue in more detail (Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). One important kind of contextual information is source information. To fully benefit from episodic

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Page 187 memory, perceivers must be able to accurately attribute events to their proper source (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). Was the source of a news story the New York Times or the World Weekly News ? Was that great research idea mine or my graduate student's? Was it John or Juan who threw the first punch in the bar brawl? In this last case, stereotypes about the aggressiveness of Hispanic men may influence the likelihood that people attribute the first punch to Juan rather than John. In this experiment, we examined such source attributions for stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information. In particular, we were interested in the extent to which perceivers would misattribute stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors to a person who did not, in fact, perform them. After reading lists of stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors that did and did not describe a target person, participants were asked to engage in a source monitoring task that required them to accurately attribute the behaviors to their proper source. Some participants were placed under a cognitive load as they performed this source monitoring task. Results show that, when the true target behaviors and false behaviors shared a similar encoding context (i.e., were encoded in the same time and place), and were therefore easily confused, participants relied on their stereotypes as cues in the source monitoring task and misattributed more false stereotype-consistent than -inconsistent behaviors to the target. Because the proper source of the behaviors was difficult to discern under these conditions, participants relied on their stereotypes as judgmental cues (see also Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). However, an interaction with the processing capacity variable demonstrated that this effect was only found when participants' ability to rely on episodic memory was impaired by the imposition of the cognitive load. Thus, when participants needed to rely on episodic memory because there was source/context confusion, but were unable to do so because of the imposed cognitive load, they relied on the stereotype as a heuristic cue in making their source attributions. In contrast, the stereotype was not used as a source cue (i.e., an equal number of misattributions were made for stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors) when participants possessed full processing capacity, although source confusion was high. In this case, participants relied on a more systematic analysis of episodic memory to reconstruct the source information about the behaviors and make their attributions. These results highlight the necessity of carefully encoding and representing the episodic details of unexpected behaviors. When episodic memory is not available to perceivers, as in the cognitive load condition of this study, they may yet rely on abstract knowledge to guide social cognition. In such cases, the basic gist of stereotype-consistent behaviors may be inferred even if the details of those behaviors are inaccessible. In contrast, the ability to rely on abstract representations to fill in knowledge gaps does not extend to stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, for which there are no relevant abstractions. Therefore, it is of critical importance to retain the episodic details of these behaviors, particularly to the extent that their conceptual meanings have not been extracted during encoding. This suggests why the encoding flexibility processes outlined earlier (i.e., directing attentional and perceptual encoding toward unexpected behaviors when capacity is depleted) may be pursued in the first place: to ensure the adequate representation of unexpected events that may not be reconstructed if lost. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS That mental representations and cognitive processes are mutually constraining in memory and judgment processes is axiomatic. Nevertheless, social-cognitive research on representation and processing has frequently proceeded in an independent fashion, with too few explicit attempts having been made to take stock of what the findings in one domain imply for theoretical development in the other domain (notable exceptions include Carlston, 1994; Klein & Loftus, 1993; Smith, 1990, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Srull & Wyer, 1989; among others). The main goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate the utility of analyzing representation/processing dynamics in the context of stereotyping research. I began by describing research aimed at specifying the representational basis of stereotypical knowledge. The initial theoretical impetus for this research and the representational model that evolved from it were based, in large part, on a functional analysis of efficient information processing, and how it may be facilitated by the development of generalizable knowledge structures (e.g., Bruner, 1957b; Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 1992; Lippmann, 1922; McClelland et al., 1995; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Schank, 1982; Sherman & Klein, 1994; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). Thus, our theorizing about representation was heavily influenced by existing theories of processing from the outset. Subsequently, I described our recently developed model of stereotype efficiency and encoding flexibility. The development of this model was heavily influenced by the conclusions drawn from our initial work on stereotype representation. The representational perspective provided by that initial research enabled us to make novel (and sometimes nonintuitive) predictions about

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Page 188 stereotype-based encoding processes that had not been identified by prior models of stereotype efficiency. Thus, in this case, it was the knowledge of representational issues that informed the research on processing. Next, I presented research demonstrating how concerns about efficient processing and the differential encoding of stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information feed back into and influence the mental representation of stereotype-relevant information. Thus, not only does the representational nature of stereotypes influence processing, but so too do processing strategies influence the representational nature of stereotypes. Finally, I described an experiment that further illustrated how the representational nature of stereotypes influences encoding processes and why it is that efficient encoding proceeds in the manner that it does. Altogether, the research described in this chapter makes a strong case for the value of integrating analyses of mental representation and information processing. On Efficiency One common factor running through all of the research described in this chapter is that stereotypes and stereotyping are influenced by perceivers' need for cognitive efficiency. Both the initial development and nature of stereotypes as well as their subsequent uses in social perception are molded by such concerns. In no way is this meant to suggest that other factors (e.g., identity-related motives, ego-defensive motives, etc.) are not critically important in stereotyping processes. Nor is this meant to imply that efficiency concerns are necessarily the most important factor in understanding stereotypes. Nevertheless, it is clear that efficiency is one critical factor that must be considered in models of stereotype representation and use (cf. Bodenhausen et al., 1999; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Although the important role of cognitive efficiency in stereotyping has long been recognized (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Lippmann, 1922), the findings outlined in this chapter suggest that some refinements may be needed in how stereotype efficiency is conceptualized. The efficient stereotype typically has been conceived of as either a crutch or a filtering device. Both metaphors stress the effortreducing and simplifying properties of stereotypes as well as the conservative, stereotype-confirming nature of efficient processing. However, efficiency is defined here as the ratio of information gained (production) to effort expended (cost). As such, considerations of stereotype efficiency must consider not only savings in effort but also gains in information. Our research (Sherman & Frost, 2000; Sherman, Lee, et al., 1998) demonstrates that the primary motive behind stereotyping when capacity is depleted is not always simplicity for simplicity's sake. Perceivers are not so much interested in effort reduction per se as they are in efficiently distributing their resources. Furthermore, all aspects of efficient encoding are not motivated by, and do not necessarily result in, stereotype reconfirmation. Rather, both stereotype stability and plasticity are reinforced in different ways through the efficient use of stereotypes. It is important to emphasize that, in contrast to claims made by some researchers (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1990; Spears & Haslam, 1997), the idea that stereotypes are used to enhance rather than reduce information processing is in no way inconsistent with the view that stereotype use is often influenced by concerns for efficiency (for further discussion of this matter, see Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). To the contrary, stereotype contributions to information gain are one critical component of their efficiency, as demonstrated by our research. It may be true that researchers have tended to place greater emphasis on the effort reduction than the information gain side of the equation. However, our research in no way challenges (and, in fact, strongly supports) the basic point that stereotype use is influenced by the need for efficiency. Implications for Dual-Process Models of Stereotyping. The model of efficiency we have outlined and the accompanying data have important implications for a number of central issues in stereotyping research. Dual process models have been developed to account for the conditions under which judgments about individual group members are dependent on top-down, stereotype-driven processes versus bottom-up integration of target behaviors (see Bodenhausen et al., 1999, for a review). In both of the prominent dual process models of stereotyping (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), increases in stereotype use are associated with decreases in individuation, particularly in the amount of attention paid to and the encoding quality of stereotype-inconsistent information. That is, because perceivers are using their stereotypes, they need not expend extra resources on difficult individuating processes. However, our results show that decreases in processing capacity increased both stereotyping processes (via conceptual encoding) and certain individuating processes (attentional allocation toward and perceptual encoding of inconsistent compared with consistent information) at the same time. These results demonstrate that efficiencydriven stereotype use need not exclude individuation processes. In fact, they suggest that stereo-

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Page 189 type use and individuation should be conceived as two separate but related continua, rather than as mutually exclusive processing modes (see Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). As such, movement along the two continua may proceed along different dimensions of encoding at the same time. Thus, stereotyping may be increased via one mode of encoding (e.g., conceptual), while individuation is increased via a different mode of encoding (e.g., perceptual) simultaneously. The Interaction of Motivation and Processing Capacity in Stereotyping. In a related matter, our findings also shed light on the relationship between perceiver motivations and processing capacity in stereotyping. Dual process models of stereotyping suggest that motivations to individuate a target may override or diminish the influence of stereotypes (see Monteith, chap. 23, this volume). Yet these and other models of stereotype efficiency suggest that, when processing capacity is depleted, the impact of perceivers' processing goals are limited, The working model has been that motivations may be realized only if sufficient capacity is available. Thus, perceivers who may have initially been motivated by accuracy to individuate a target are presumed to abandon that motivation when resources are scant, and revert to more miserly pursuits such as purely heuristic processing or schematic filtering processes. In contrast, our results suggest that motivations continue to exert an important influence when cognitive resources are depleted (see also Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). In our efficiency studies, participants were largely motivated by concerns for accuracy and did not forsake those concerns when capacity was diminished. Rather, they distributed their resources in such a way that enabled them to flexibly encode different aspects of both stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information. Of course, there are many situations in which perceivers are motivated by concerns for ego-defense or social identity rather than by accuracy. In these contexts, we would expect that perceivers would, in fact, be especially likely to engage in miserly/filtering processes if resources are scant. Thus, stereotypes are flexible tools that are adapted to the current goals of the user. However, resource scarcity does not determine the processing goal, but rather how an already chosen goal is pursued. Conclusion The preceding analyses suggest that stereotypes are much more versatile tools than crutches or filters. Perhaps the metaphor of the Swiss Army knife, with multiple tools working simultaneously, better captures the flexibility with which efficient processing may be pursued. In terms of stereotyping, the tools correspond to different attentional, encoding (including perceptual and conceptual encoding), and inference processes that proceed in parallel. On some occasions, the tools may be working in concert toward achieving a single goal (e.g., stereotype confirmation). On other occasions, different tools may be used to pursue different goals at the same time (as in the case of encoding flexibility processes). One of the major challenges for future research on stereotyping should be to more closely examine how different processing conditions (e.g., variations in attentional capacity) and different processing motives (e.g., accuracy vs. defense vs. self-presentation) interact to determine how perceivers use stereotypes in forming impressions of others. This challenge must be met with a more complete understanding of cognitive efficiency that takes into account both effort reduction and information gain strategies, as well as both stability-maintaining and plasticity-seeking processes. Finally, progress in these endeavors can be greatly advanced by further attempts to integrate what is known about the mental representation of stereotypes and the processing of stereotype-relevant information. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this article was supported by NIMH Grant 55037 to Jeffrey W. Sherman. Thanks to Galen Bodenhausen, Jim Sherman, and Eliot Smith for their thoughtful comments. ENDNOTES 1. At still a third level, the mental representation of a stereotype may be defined in terms of a particular representational format (e.g., associative network models vs. localist connectionist models vs. distributive connectionist models). This level of analysis attempts to define at some hypothetical neural level the manner in which knowledge about a group is stored in memory. All of the prominent format models describe a memory system that is based on activation spreading between associated quasineuronal units or nodes that represent concepts or their features (e.g., connections or overlapping patterns of connections between social category representations and stereotypical features). Although the different models share much in common in terms of their basic metaphors, they make different assumptions about the nature of memory nodes, associations, and the ways that activation spreads through a representation. A full discussion of the implications of each of these models for stereotyping goes well beyond the scope of this chapter

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Page 190 (for an excellent review, see Smith, 1996). However, it is important to note that each type of format can (and must) account for the storage and retrieval of both exemplars and abstractions. As such, the issues surrounding the differential impact of abstraction- and exemplar-based stereotypes discussed in this chapter are largely independent of questions of format. 2. Note that demonstrations that accessible exemplars may influence group judgments do not indicate that abstract group impressions do not exist. Accessible exemplars may influence group judgments in addition to, and not instead of, preexisting abstract knowledge. In a similar fashion, the fact that group judgments may be influenced by contextual variations does not indicate a lack of abstract knowledge. 3. It is important to note that this is not an argument about economy of storage. In this model, all encountered exemplars may be retained in memory. However, storing those exemplars and using them are different matters. The point here is that retrieving and summarizing large numbers of exemplars is less efficient and more easily disrupted than activating a stored abstraction. 4. There are certainly cases in which attribute-based impressions are as easily derived as stereotype-based impressions. There are also cases in which stereo-type-based inferences depend more on bottom-up and less on top-down processes than attribute-based inferences. This has led some researchers to conclude that the distinction between stereotyping and individuation is not a useful one, and that stereotype use is not inherently more efficient than individuating (e.g., Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Although we concur that it is not necessarily the case that stereotyping will always be more efficient than individuation, we also believe that it just so happens to be true most of the time. This is the case for a number of reasons. For example, whereas stereotypes typically provide access to knowledge along a wide range of dimensions, many attributes do not generalize beyond their own specific meaning (Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990). Moreover, some kinds of individuating information (e.g., behavioral information) must be extracted in a bottom-up fashion, which is rarely the case for many stereotypes (particularly those associated with obvious physical characteristics). For a complete discussion of this matter, see Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Sherman (1999).

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Page 191 12 A Cornerstone for the Science of Interpersonal Behavior? Person Perception and Person Memory, Past, Present, and Future Leonard S. Newman University of Illinois at Chicago “To discover where the action is in psychology,” begins a recent undergraduate social psychology text, “look to social psychology” (Zimbardo, 1993). However, the typical beginning student may be surprised to learn that for many years much of the action has involved having people record their impressions of Donald – a man notable only for the ambiguity of his behavior (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977); recording how many of a hypothetical person's honest and dishonest behaviors study participants can remember (Hastie & Kumar, 1979); asking college freshmen and sophomores what they really think about the woman being interviewed on the silent videotape (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988); figuring out whether people spontaneously inferred that the secretary who solved the mystery halfway through the book is clever or that the plumber who slipped an extra $50 into his wife's purse is generous (Winter & Uleman, 1984); and determining what leads to the inference that the businessman who tripped over his girlfriend's feet while dancing the fox-trot did so because he is clumsy (McArthur, 1972). As the late Roger Brown (1986) observed, for “the new student” it is hard to “grasp what it is that led’’ the people who do this kind of research “to care about the questions they ask; the original lure is lost” (pp. 378–379). Brown need not have restricted that observation to the new student; some prominent social psychologists (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Ickes & Gonzalez, 1994; see also Neisser, 1980) have also registered their discomfort with a field dominated by such investigations (i.e., a field dominated by laboratory studies of person perception and person memory). Why have social psychologists devoted so much time and energy to observing in microscopic detail the processes involved in making sense of people's behavior? And why should they continue doing so? The remainder of this chapter is devoted to addressing these questions. PERSON PERCEPTION AND PERSON MEMORY As defined by Gilbert (1998), person perception (or personology, as he prefers to call it) is the study of how “people come to know about each other's temporary states (such as emotions, intentions, and desires) and enduring dispositions (such as beliefs, traits, and abilities).” Viewed in this way, the term person perception also encompasses much of the research that falls under the categories of impression formation, social categorization, social inference, attribution, and even social construct accessibility. In other words, person perception research is concerned with how, when we are exposed to other people's behavior, we figure out what they did, why they did it, and what kind of people – including how likable – they are. Classic studies in this area include those by Higgins et al. (1977), Jones and Harris (1967), and Anderson (1965a, 1965b). The priming research of Higgins et al. shed light on the processes involved in categorizing other people's behavior. Participants in their studies were asked to form impressions of people based on descriptions of their behavior that could be construed and evaluated in different ways (e.g., engaging in high-risk sporting activities). In a previous (and bogus) perception study, they had been exposed to trait terms that could be used to disambiguate the behaviors (e.g., adventurous, a favorable trait, or reckless, an unfavorable one). Higgins et al. found that interpretations of the behaviors tended to be consistent with the primed traits. These findings indicate that the sheer accessibility of trait concepts – regardless of whether the accessibility stems from an irrelevant source – significantly affects how social information is categorized. Jones and Harris (1967) focused instead on how people explain behaviors that they have already categorized. They asked participants to guess the true attitudes of people who had delivered

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Page 192 unambiguously favorable or unfavorable speeches about Fidel Castro. In some conditions, the speakers had been randomly assigned to the positions they took, and this was quite apparent to the participants. Nonetheless, participants underutilized this situational information and generally assumed that overt behavior (regardless of how constrained) reflected underlying attitudes and dispositions. Finally, Anderson (1965a, 1965b), building on a procedure introduced by Asch (1946), systematically varied the number, valence, and order of personality traits that were attributed to hypothetical people and asked participants in his study to form impressions of those people on the basis of the different trait aggregations. Together these three studies (all of which are being replicated and extended to this day) represent many of the traditional concerns of person perception researchers, including what determines how behavior is interpreted and categorized; how information about people, their behavior, and the situations they are in gets integrated when one tries to infer the meaning of their behavior; and how trait inferences and other pieces of individuating information are combined into a coherent (especially evaluative) impression (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Gilbert, 1998; Jones, 1990; Krull, chap. 13, this volume, for reviews of this research).1 In contrast, person memory is the study of how information about other people is represented in memory. The central issues are what kind of information gets stored, how it is organized, and what subset of that information is most accessible for later recall. Typical dependent measures in person memory studies include the recall and recognition of people's traits and behaviors, the order in which pieces of information are recalled, and the latency of response to memory probes. Hastie and Kumar's (1979) seminal research is perhaps the most frequently cited in this area. Participants in Hastie and Kumar's studies were told that a person could be characterized by a particular personality trait (e.g., intelligence or dishonesty) and then they were exposed to various behaviors performed by that person. Some of those behaviors were consistent with expectations, some were inconsistent (e.g., dishonest behaviors performed by an honest person), and some were irrelevant to the trait. Then participants were asked to recall the behaviors. This research is remembered most for its counterintuitive findings: Participants’ memory for inconsistent behaviors was better than their memory for consistent behaviors. But of more significance to the study of person memory is that those findings led Hastie and Kumar to propose a general model of how information about people is represented in long-term memory. This model was further refined on the basis of research by Srull (1981) and others. In general, the model assumes that information about a given person – behaviors, traits, and general evaluations – is stored in a particular location in a hypothetical memory space. Each piece of information occupies a node, and nodes can be connected by associative pathways. These pathways are formed when two pieces of information are thought about in relation to each other. The probability of recalling a piece of information is a function of the number of pathways leading to it. This kind of model can easily account for the prominence in memory of information that is incongruent with one's general impression of a person. Such behaviors prompt efforts to resolve the inconsistency, leading one to consider the behavior in light of other information one has about the person. That, in turn, leads to the formation of many associative links involving the incongruent information. If the beginning student of social psychology is surprised to discover how much effort has been devoted to studying person perception and person memory, another surprise is that the two research areas generally exist as separate literatures (cf. Wyer & Srull, 1989). Wyer and Carlston (1994) noted that a “limitation of research on the cognitive representation of social information is that, with a few exceptions, it has proceeded virtually independently of research on social inference” (p. 43). Newman and Uleman (1993) made the same point at some length, showing how certain distinctions that are quite prominent in social inference research (e.g., the distinction between categorizing or identifying behaviors in trait terms and inferring that the people emitting those behaviors have those traits; see Trope, 1986) have no obvious counterparts in many person memory models. More recent evidence of this sealing off of the two literatures is the chapter on “Personology” (Gilbert, 1998) in the latest Handbook of Social Psychology (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998). It is an extensive and thoughtful review of person perception research that has next to no references to the person memory literature. Person memory is covered in a separate chapter of the handbook (Smith, 1998). An assumption of this chapter, however, is that the two areas of research not only emerge from a common perspective but are inextricably bound. As social beings, we encounter other people; we categorize their behavior (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) and generate immediate, automatic impressions of them (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996); those impressions can be shaped by chronically or temporarily accessible knowledge structures (Higgins, 1996); we can generate alternative interpretations of a person's behavior and modify our

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Page 193 impressions of that person based on other, less accessible knowledge structures (Martin & Tesser, 1992); or, we can go beyond our initial impressions to take into account contextual information (Gilbert, 1989); our impressions and inferences are then stored in some organized way in memory (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Smith, 1998; Wyer & Carlston, 1994); some subset of that information can or will be retrieved when we later encounter the target person again; and how and how much we process new information about the person will be affected by our previous impressions (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Our representations of other people are shaped by what we infer about them and their behavior, and what we infer about people is affected by our preexisting representations of them. Both person perception and person memory researchers focus on the general cognitive processes involved when we make sense of each other's behavior, and to do justice to those processes, they need each other. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter (as much as possible) downplays the distinction between person perception and person memory research. THE PAST Beginnings To return to the question posed earlier, how did social psychology come to focus on these topics? One way to answer this question is to take a historical approach. To briefly recount a story told in greater detail by others (e.g., Gilbert, 1998): The earliest researchers who identified their specialty as person perception in the postwar period focused primarily on how accurate people are when judging each other's personalities. Another important topic was the assessment of individual differences in accuracy (see Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). It is not hard to see why social psychologists would find these to be interesting and important issues. Personality psychologists and clinicians, then as now, often relied on trait ratings to describe people and predict their behavior. Thus, a compelling question for the field was how good the judges are who provide these trait ratings. The hypothesis that skilled judges of personality would also be effective clinicians (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979) provided a related reason to determine what kinds of people make accurate trait ratings and in what circumstances they do so. Unfortunately, sophisticated methodological critiques of such research (e.g., Cronbach, 1955, 1958) had a paralyzing effect on researchers, and the study of person perception became mired in debates about the most appropriate way to conceptualize and measure accuracy. Reinvigoration of the area was fueled by the increasing attention paid to Asch's (1946) work. With his studies of impression formation, Asch essentially executed an ‘‘end-run” around the accuracy debate by focusing exclusively on the process of person perception. In the Gestalt tradition, Asch was interested in how people construct simple unified impressions of others based on knowledge about their distinct characteristics. His method was to present participants with lists of traits said to describe different people. He then asked participants to report their impressions of the people by writing brief descriptions of them and also by selecting from another list of traits the ones they thought best characterized them. Asch found that a simple additive model did not seem to account for his results: In other words, participants’ impressions did not seem to be a simple sum of their evaluations of the individual items on the list. For example, Asch found a strong primacy effect. Traits appearing earlier in a list were more likely to drive final impressions than those appearing later. In addition, some traits were more central than others; that is, certain traits (e.g., warm) consistently influenced and even polarized impressions more than others (e.g., polite). The questions Asch raised about how people integrate social information were addressed by many other researchers in the following years (see especially work by Anderson, 1974). In addition, his concern with how people deal with and resolve inconsistencies in their knowledge about themselves and others remains an important issue to this day, especially in the person memory literature. But as discussed by Gilbert (1998), Asch's findings and the specific variables he focused on were ultimately less important than his methods, especially because of their implications for the accuracy problem. In the context of a study like Asch's, in which people formed impressions of hypothetical people on the basis of lists of personality traits, the accuracy issue was meaningless. Instead, the interesting questions included what pieces of information were more influential than others and how manipulating the way in which information was received affected perceivers. This general approach was formally endorsed at a now legendary 1957 conference at Harvard University (Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). A group of the field's most influential thinkers declared that, indeed, social psychologists should focus on how , not on how well, judgments are made about people. Asch, of course, had already modeled how they might go about doing that. The work of Fritz Heider (an attendee at the conference), which culminated with his classic The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (1958), was equally influential. Heider's theorizing about the phenomenology of the average

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Page 194 person and “naive psychology” inspired other researchers to think more systematically about the processes people use to comprehend, explain, and predict behavior. It should be noted that although the preceding account has become widely accepted, other developments in psychology in the 1940s and 1950s seem to have also played a role in leading researchers to focus on the process of knowing other people. Tagiuri (1969) emphasized Lewin's work on leadership (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), which involved the question of how people perceive leaders; he also pointed to the work by Bruner and others on the motivational factors in perception (e.g., Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948), factors that were seen to be particularly important when the things being perceived were people. Finally, he noted that because the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) was in such heavy use by clinicians, the belief that we can learn about people based on their interpretation of human figures portrayed on TAT cards also led to an interest in that process of interpretation. These historical events provided enabling conditions for the development of research on the processes involved in interpreting and storing information about behavior, but they cannot explain why such research has continued to be carried out for so long in so many laboratories by so many people. Jones (1985) mentioned one cynical explanation: People were maybe attracted to Asch's work not only because it pointed the way out of an intellectual quagmire, but also because it was easy to replicate and extend. At the every least, Asch's procedures, along with the many paperand-pencil tasks that are descendants of those procedures (and the paper, pencil, and slide projector and paper, pencil, and computer tasks that are even more common as of this writing) are much easier to execute than the ones used in many other kinds of social-psychological investigations (see Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990). Yet it is doubtful that simple convenience could sustain the study of person perception and person memory for so long. Even if it could, this is obviously not how researchers in these areas explain to other people and themselves why they do what they do. An Organizing Framework for Social Psychology? Jones (1985) presented a cynical perspective on the history of person perception and person memory, but it is only fair to also give him credit for a more noble one. He also argued that “Person perception research was almost a syllogistic conclusion to the subjectivist premise: If people respond to the perceived environment and if other people are some of the most important entities in that environment, then it is important to study how people are perceived” (p. 87). In other words, Jones was saying that, given the field's most basic assumptions, the study of person perception is a necessary and primary aspect of the whole enterprise of social psychology. In the very first Handbook chapter on person perception, Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) made a similar point. They reminded their readers that “The first step in reacting to another is forming an impression of him. Later reactions depend on this first step. If there is to be a science of interpersonal behavior, it will rest upon a cornerstone of social perception” ( p. 650). This, then, is another way of understanding why so many social psychologists have devoted themselves to fine-grained analyses of how people make sense of each other's behavior: not because Asch showed them how, not because Heider told them to, and not because the research was easy to do, but because they were trying to create a cornerstone for the science of interpersonal behavior. Person memory researchers, from the time their specialty emerged as a distinct area of study (i.e., from the publication of the seminal 1980 volume edited by Hastie et al.), also seem to have claimed the same agenda. For example, Ebbesen (1980) pointed out: Most forms of social influence begin with or include a rather common event: one person observing the stream of another person's behavior. Conformity, imitation, group pressure, persuasion by communication, impression formation, and so on, generally involve one or more people (the observers) being exposed to the ongoing behavior of other people (the actors). Investigations of these social influence situations have focused primarily on ‘context’ variables that moderate the impact of an actor's behavior on an observer. Only peripheral attention has been given to the processes that determine: (1) how the observer extracts information from the ongoing behavior of the actor; (2) how that information is represented in the observer's memory; and (3) how the information that is in memory affects the behavior of the observer. (p. 179) Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, and Geva (1980) also claimed that “important social behaviors, such as conformity, aggression, and attitude change, may ultimately be found to be dependent on impression organization” (pp. 85-86). And Hastie and Carlston (1980) pointed out that, ‘‘For many of us, the goal of developing models for person memory grew out of a desire to extend accounts of the formation, representation, and retrieval of first impressions of other people”(p. 1). Indeed, in the preface to the 1980 book, the editors (Hastie et al.) wrote that, “we had concluded that an adequate theory of social memory was the necessary foundation for solutions to

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Page 195 many of the questions concerning social perception and judgment” (p. vii) that they had been interested in previously. Overall, what these scholars are saying is that if we conceptualize social-psychological phenomena as interactions in which people with social knowledge respond to the social situations they are in on the basis of how they make sense of their own or others’ behavior, social psychologists across the board could perhaps ultimately ground their investigations on the findings and principles yielded by person perception and person memory research. One could even argue that person perception and person memory researchers have always taken comfort in the idea that, although their investigations tend to trigger less immediate excitement and fascination than do the field's classic high-impact or “action” studies, their research was in fact foundational to the whole field of social psychology. Therefore, person perception and person memory have never been just other topics of study for social psychologists (cf. Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996). The long-term goal of researchers in these areas has been to develop models that could serve as common frameworks for the study of those issues that fall under the heading of “Interpersonal Phenomena” in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Gilbert et al., 1998) – classic topics such as altruism, aggression, interpersonal attraction, stereotyping, and social influence. What is exciting about person perception and person memory research is their promise to jointly occupy the same privileged and primary position in the study of interpersonal behavior that the general social cognition approach arguably holds in the study of social psychology defined more broadly. THE PRESENT Accomplishments The project undertaken by person perception and person memory researchers was thus a very ambitious one. And while it has certainly not been completed, much has been learned about how people interpret and represent social information. For example, among the contributors to this volume are researchers who have been intimately associated with the work in person perception that has taught us about, among other things, the stages of processing that occur when we form first impressions (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Krull, chap. 13, this volume; Trope & Liberman, 1993); the effects of accessible social information on person perception (Higgins & Brendl, 1995), and when assimilation to that information occurs and when contrast effects are found (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume; Wegener, Dunn, & Tokusato, chap. 17, this volume); the causal reasoning involved when we do the careful analysis of behavior that we often undertake to make sense of others’ behavior (Morris, Ames, & Knowles, chap. 9, this volume; Roese, chap 19, this volume); how goals direct and constrain social perception (Vorauer & Ross, 1993; Vorauer, chap. 16, this volume); and important individual differences in all of these processes (Moskowitz, 1993; Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume). As other contributors to this volume cover much of this ground, the focus here will instead be on representative developments in the study of person memory (see Wyer & Carlston, 1994, and Carlston & Smith, 1996, for more comprehensive reviews of this literature). The Resolution of Inconsistency. Much research has built on the early work of Hastie and Kumar (1979) and Srull (1981). Bargh and Thein (1985), for example, used both contextual and dispositional moderating variables to provide converging evidence for the hypothesis that expectancy-incongruent information is recalled more readily than congruent information because it receives extensive processing when initially encountered. As in the earlier studies, participants were presented with trait expectancies and lists of behaviors that varied in terms of their consistency with the expectations. Bargh and Thein found that when the behaviors were presented at a very rapid pace (1.5 seconds each), the recall advantage for inconsistent behaviors disappeared because participants in this condition were denied the opportunity to think about how they compared to the target person's other behaviors. In contrast, participants in a condition where presentation of the information was self-paced were able to do the kind of elaborative processing that increases the number of associative links between incongruent and other behaviors. They spent more time reading the incongruent behaviors, and, as a consequence, those behaviors were more easily recalled. Interestingly, for a subset of participants in the rapidly paced attentional overload condition, the pattern of recall was equivalent to that for participants in the self-paced condition. These were people for whom the trait in question – honesty – was chronically accessible. Bargh and Thein had identified in advance participants who regularly thought about and described people in terms of that trait. These are people who might be expected to be well practiced in processing information relevant to honesty (Higgins, 1996). Indeed, these participants were relatively unfazed by the overload manipulation: Like participants in the self-paced condition, they recalled more incongruent than congruent information. In summary, when either tempo-

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Page 196 rary situational factors or more enduring dispositional factors freed up cognitive capacity for participants, and only then, their recall performance matched that found by Hastie and Kumar (1979). Finally, Bargh and Thein (1985) highlighted the finding (previously reported by other researchers as well) that people not only devote attentional resources to comparing incoming information to their expectancies, but are also actively involved in developing and revising their expectancies. When participants were presented with sets of behaviors in which the majority were inconsistent with the experimenter-provided trait expectancy, they seemed to quickly revise those expectancies. The raw behavioral evidence was more important than the abstract trait in determining what participants treated as congruent and incongruent information. More recently, Sherman and Hamilton (1994) provided novel support for the hypothesis that the kind of extra processing received by expectancy-incongruent behavioral information involves the reactivation of previously encountered information about the person in question. Participants in their studies were led to believe that a target person was either friendly or intelligent. Then they were presented with a list of other behaviors performed by that person. The list contained equal numbers of congruent, incongruent, and irrelevant behaviors. Reading of the behaviors was periodically interrupted so that participants could answer a recognition question; specifically, they were presented with a behavior description and asked whether it was one of those they had already seen. Recognition latencies were fastest when the question followed an incongruent behavior. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that incongruent behavior cues people to bring into mind previously encountered information about the target person. This is less likely to be the case when congruent information is encountered, and that would account for why recognition latencies were longer when the recognition questions followed behavior descriptions of that kind. The results of studies focusing on trait moderators of behavior recall are also consistent with these findings. For example, people high in Need for Cognition (Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985) and Uncertainty Orientation (Driscoll, Hamilton, & Sorrentino, 1991) would be expected to process information more carefully than other people; indeed, they also recall higher proportions of expectancy incongruent information than do other people. Overall, Hastie and Kumar's (1979) and Srull's (1981) signature finding has been well replicated, and their account of that finding has been well supported. As noted previously, both the findings and the account were central to the development of the earliest person memory models. How Social Information Is Represented . Basic person memory models have undergone quite a bit of development in the last 20 years. A detailed discussion of those models is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, as just one illustration of their complexity, one of the most influential of them, Srull and Wyer's (1989; Wyer & Srull, 1989) makes the assumption that any one observed behavior can be coded in more than one way at the location in memory reserved for the person engaging in that behavior. A given behavior can be part of a trait-behavior cluster, which consists of a trait concept and the behaviors exemplifying that concept, and also part of an evaluative person representation, a subset of behaviors clustered together as a separate cognitive entity that allows one to form a general conception of how likable a person is. (For more on how knowledge about other people might be stored and represented see Chen, chap. 8, this volume; Sherman, chap. 11, this volume). Information-Processing Goals. Both person perception (Jones & Thibaut, 1958) and person memory researchers (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980a, 1980b) recognized early on that the goals or objectives with which people approach their social interactions will affect how they interpret and store information about other people. For example, Hamilton et al. (1980a) focused on the special memorial consequences of processing social information with an impression formation goal (perhaps the most common goal of participants in person perception and person memory experiments). They presented participants in their studies with a series of sentence predicates describing behaviors (e.g., ‘‘Cleaned up the house before company came”). In addition, they asked half of the participants to form an overall impression of the person who performed the actions and the other half to simply memorize the information. Overall memory for the behaviors was actually higher for people in the impression-formation condition. Hamilton et al. explained these results by arguing that an impression-formation set, more than a memory set, encourages people to think about various behaviors in relationship to each other and organize them in a coherent way. This organization, in turn, facilitates recall. In support of this explanation, Hamilton et al. (1980b) showed that the order in which impression-goal participants recalled behaviors indicated that they were clustering the behaviors in memory in terms of trait categories (intelligence, sociability, etc.). Information-processing goals also have implications for the relationship between judgments about people and recall of the pieces of evidence (behaviors,

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Page 197 traits, etc.) on which those judgments are assumed to be based. As Hastie and Park (1986) pointed out, it is usually assumed that “There ought to be a relationship between memory and judgment. Our intuition tells us that … evaluations of people should be related to the amounts of good and bad information we have about them” (p. 258). However, Hastie and Park's review of the evidence indicated that this commonsense assumption quite often turns out to be wrong. The key, they suggested, was whether the judgments in question are on-line or memory-based. When people construct judgments and evaluations while behavioral information is being received, they can later retrieve those judgments and evaluations directly. In other words, when judgments are made on-line, subsequent reports of those judgments are a reflection of how people reacted to and assessed the information when it was received, and not a function of whatever pieces of information happen to be accessible at the time of the report. For example, in the typical person memory experiment, although people are better able to recall behaviors that were evaluatively incongruent from the majority of the behaviors (e.g., the 3 dishonest behaviors in a set of 12 mostly honest ones), their evaluations of the target person are typically driven by the valence of the majority behaviors (positive, in this case). Incongruent behavior is more carefully processed, but much of that processing is devoted to attempts to explain it away or discount it (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Hastie, 1984). In contrast, when judgments are not made on-line, people have to rely on the evidence they retrieve from memory to reach reasonable conclusions. Thus, judgments are much more likely to directly correspond to what is remembered. Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) extended this research by showing that, relative to impression sets, the goal of simply understanding or comprehending information is also more likely to lead to memory-based judgments. Spontaneous Trait Inference. The work reviewed in the previous section would seem to imply that people generally do no more than superficially process social information unless they have the explicit goal of trying to figure people out. In fact, Wyer and Srull's (1989) model explicitly predicts that people will not interpret behavior in terms of abstract trait concepts unless some processing objective requires it. A research program initiated by Winter and Uleman (1984), however, challenged that idea. Winter and Uleman presented participants with a series of written descriptions of trait-implying behaviors (e.g., “The secretary solves the mystery halfway through the book”; “The tailor carries the old woman's groceries across the street”) each performed by a different person. Participants were asked to simply memorize this material; after a brief distractor task, they were presented with a list of cues to help them recall the behaviors. Word associates to both the sentence actors (e.g., typewriter, clothes) and their actions ( reading, assisting) helped boost recall relative to a no-cue baseline condition. The most effective cues of all, however, were personality traits ( clever, helpful ). Winter and Uleman concluded that participants had inferred those traits when the behaviors were initially encountered. Therefore, the trait concepts served as effective cues because they were implicitly present when participants encoded the behaviors (see Tulving & Thomson's [1973] encoding specificity principle). At the same time, few participants reported any awareness of having thought about the behaviors in terms of trait implications. In summary, participants seemed to have spontaneously inferred traits from behavior – that is, they inferred traits without intending to, without being aware of doing so, and with the investment of minimal cognitive resources. Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff (1985) developed an experimental procedure that made it even less likely that participants would consciously adopt the goal of inferring traits. In their study, behavior descriptions like those used by Winter and Uleman (1984) were presented as distractors in the context of a number-recall experiment. Participants had to read each sentence aloud while simultaneously rehearsing different sets of five numbers that they had been asked to memorize. Winter et al. also varied the difficulty of the number-recall task; some participants had to memorize single-digit numbers, whereas others had to memorize more complex strings (e.g., 14, 123, 44, 62, 105). Winter and Uleman's (1984) cued-recall results were replicated. In addition, the manipulation of cognitive load had no effect on spontaneous inference, leading Winter et al. to tentatively suggest that the trait inference process is an automatic one that is impervious to disruption and impossible to control. However, subsequent research has shown that spontaneous trait inference can be eliminated by even higher levels of cognitive load than were used by Winter et al. (Uleman, Newman, & Winter, 1992) or with the imposition of certain processing goals (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). But as Bargh (1989, 1994) argued, the automatic-controlled distinction is actually a continuum. Thus, although trait inference can be considered to be only a relatively automatic process, most cognitive processes of interest to social psychologists are complex enough that they consist of both automatic and controlled components. Alternative explanations for the results of studies using the basic cued-recall procedure developed by

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Page 198 Winter and Uleman (1984) have been proposed by some commentators (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1989, p. 146). Nevertheless, empirical support for the spontaneity of trait inference has now been found using a variety of procedures utilizing many different dependent variables (for a review, see Uleman et al., 1996). Overall, the evidence indicates that, although impression goals promote rich and elaborate trait interpretations and the complex organization of information in terms of trait categories, such goals are not necessary for trait inferences to occur. Self-Flagellation Clearly, much progress has been made in explicating person perception and person memory processes. Nonetheless, a reader of recent literature reviews will often detect a tone very different from pride. Instead, a certain amount of defensiveness and a somewhat self-critical quality – perhaps even what Jones (1985, p. 99) described as selfflagellation – are quite common. The writers of these reviews all had their own perspective on why these problems are maybe exaggerated, irrelevant, or actually signs of strength. But even among its most accomplished practitioners, one can detect a concern that work on person perception and person memory is becoming increasingly method-bound, self-referential, about nothing but itself, divorced from the real world, and not so clearly related to social behavior, which is presumably what social psychologists are most interested in. Such qualities would seem to be liabilities for any program of research seeking to position itself at the center of the study of interpersonal behavior. Wyer and Carlston (1994, pp. 42-43; see also Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, & Gruenfeld, 1992), for example, worried that The field has tended to focus on a restricted set of issues, processes, and paradigms, leaving many important aspects of social representation unexplored…Relatively little research has been conducted on the representations that are formed from information acquired in actual social interactions…The manner in which these social representations contribute to actual human behavior and interaction is even less clear…The conditions investigated often seem only remotely related to those in which people receive information in daily life. Earlier, Schneider (1991) discussed the complaints of critics who argued that “social cognition today is often driven more by model testing than by the traditional social psychological efforts to explain intuitively interesting and immediately important social phenomena …(it) can seem sterile and bloodless as much of the richness of the everyday social world gets processed and abstracted out …” (p. 530). And Smith (1994, p. 100) worried about his colleagues’ impression that ‘‘Endless investigations look at details of memory structure or question how many processes can dance on the head of a pin”. Such self-critiques are not new, however, and certainly do not signal a crisis in the field. Hastie, Park, and Weber, in their comprehensive review of the social memory literature in 1983, worried that theoretical advances in the study of how behavior is perceived, stored, and remembered had “occurred at the expense of developments in our knowledge of the structure of the real social world and its phenomena outside the laboratory” (p. 154). Fifteen years before that, Tagiuri (1969), in his Handbook of Social Psychology chapter on person perception, noted that “The technology is by now very complex and tends, at times, to obscure the main issues…How does the perception of the other relate to action toward him? This is…a complex problem. But was not the desire to understand this interplay one of the sources of the impetus for much work in person perception?” (pp. 432, 435). These issues were already on his mind in 1958, as noted in the introduction to the published volume that emerged from the influential Harvard conference mentioned earlier (Tagiuri, 1958), and one can find similar concerns about the relevance of person perception for actual interpersonal behavior in the very first Handbook chapter on the topic (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). In summary, person perception and person memory researchers have always engaged in some degree of selfflagellation. A USEFUL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS As discussed, social-psychological phenomena can be conceived of as interactions in which people respond to the situations they are in on the basis of how they make sense of their own or others’ behavior. Therefore, one could argue that the primary task of social psychology should be to understand how people make sense of their own or others’ behavior. It would follow that, despite their many bouts of self-criticism, person perception and person memory researchers could also take pride in having focused on a level of analysis that could be an organizing framework for much of the field. Arguments like that can be misleading, however. For example, Buss (1995) wrote that, “Because all behavior depends on complex psychological mechanisms, and all psychological mechanisms, at some basic level of description, are the result of evolution by selection, then all psychological theories are implicitly

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Page 199 evolutionary psychological theories”(p. 2). As Harris and Christenfeld (1995) pointed out, one could replace the references to evolution in that sentence with references to neurotransmitters or subatomic particles and it would make just as much sense. Their point, of course, was that social psychologists can adopt different levels of analysis (e.g., evolutionary, biological, cultural, and cognitive), and all are potentially useful for understanding social behavior (see also Schaller, 1997). Any social-psychological research enterprise will have its limitations, but the most important issue is whether people working in that area develop a level of analysis that other psychologists find to be a useful and important one for describing, explaining, and predicting social behavior. Therefore, the most important question for students of person perception and person memory is whether their contributions and insights have made an impact on social psychologists studying the field's classic topics. Have they focused on a level of analysis that other social psychologists have found to be useful for shedding light on those aspects of social behavior of interest to them? The answer is a resounding “yes.” The following brief review of evidence supporting that conclusion is by no means intended to be a comprehensive review of all the research informed by models of person perception and person memory, nor does it identify all of the content areas that have benefited from those models. Instead, it is a selective set of examples illustrating the kind of contribution the study of person perception and person memory has made toward understanding a variety of interesting and important aspects of interpersonal behavior. Aggression Aggressive behavior is one of social psychology's classic topics. Quite a few contextual variables playing a role in the inhibition or facilitation of aggression have been studied, such as crowding, heat, frustrating circumstances, and one's relative anonymity (Geen, 1998; Krebs & Miller, 1985). But a number of researchers (e.g., Kulik & Brown, 1979) have focused on our interpretations of others’ behaviors as proximal causes of aggression. Dodge and his colleagues (see Dodge & Crick, 1990) have found, among other things, that aggressive individuals are often predisposed to decide that other people's unpleasant behavior is intentional and specifically directed toward them. In developing this idea and designing research to test it, they have been guided by basic models of person perception and attribution, such as Jones and Davis’ (1965) explication of the processes involved in inferring intentions from behavior. Recently, Zelli and his colleagues (Zelli, Huesmann, & Cervone, 1995; Zelli, Cervone, & Huesmann, 1996) found that a more reliable predictor of individual differences in aggressiveness may be the extent to which people make spontaneous hostility inferences. Their research suggests that one can do an even better job of identifying aggressive people by looking at the kinds of inferences they make quickly, unintentionally, and without awareness than by looking at the kinds of judgments they make when they have a long time to deliberate about them. This research, of course, was made possible by the more basic work on spontaneous personality trait inference (Uleman et al., 1996; see also Tillema, 1998, for similar research on individual differences in loneliness). Altruism and Prosocial Behavior Similarly, the decision to engage in prosocial behavior and help other people can be analyzed in terms of social context factors, but altruism also depends in part on how we interpret the behavior of people in need and on the kind of people we judge them to be. Therefore, researchers interested in helping and resource allocation have also found the level of analysis occupied by person perception research to be a useful one. For example, Skitka and Tetlock (1992; see also Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) found that when resources were scarce, participants in their studies (especially those with a politically conservative ideology) were less likely to assist claimants (by allocating medication, housing, and bodily organs to them) when they believed that the claimants had behaved in such a way as to cause their own plights. Skitka and Tetlock were guided by a more general attributional model developed by Weiner (1986, 1993). Using the same model, Zucker and Weiner (1993) found that particular attributions for poverty (e.g., laziness) are reliably associated with a decreased willingness to offer help. A consideration of person perception processes was also necessary to interpret the results of social psychology's most well-known studies of helping behavior – Latané and Darley's (1970) research on bystander intervention. Latané and Darley found that a major determinant of people's willingness to take action in emergency situations is their interpretation of those situations as ones that call for intervention. One of the most important cues used to disambiguate situations is the behavior of other people who are present. Unfortunately, Latané and Darley pointed out, “If each member of a group is trying to appear calm and not overreact to the possibility of danger, each other member, in looking

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Page 200 to him for guidance, may be misled into thinking that he is not concerned” (1970, p. 41). In other words, people looking to others for information about how to avoid acting inappropriately often fail to consider that others are doing the same thing. They also might not appreciate how their own muted reaction is actually eliciting the same behavior in the people around them. When a person looks to others to define an ambiguous event, he or she often fails to adjust for the influence of both social norms and his or her own behavior on those other people. This can lead to what appears to be apathy and callousness. The extent to which people take into account situational pressures and constraints when interpreting each other's behavior has, of course, been a major focus of research and theorizing in person perception (Jones, 1990; Kelley, 1973). Person perception is thus intimately involved in the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, where group members assume that their own thoughts and feelings differ from others in the group (D. T. Miller & Prentice, 1994, 1996). Stereotyping A common theme in the stereotyping literature is that stereotypes often indirectly influence evaluations of other people and interactions with them by affecting how their behavior is interpreted (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; see Hamilton, Stroessner, & Driscoll, 1994, for a review). Some researchers have gone beyond documenting this general phenomenon and have attempted to conceptualize the effects of stereotypes in terms of different stages of information processing. For example, Kunda and Sherman-Williams (1993) argued that, regardless of whether people are affected by stereotypes when forming impressions, they still engage in the same basic person perception and person memory processes. Stereotypes, they proposed, can just bias the input to those processes – what Trope (1986) and others have called the initial identification (or categorization) of behavior. Kunda and Sherman-Williams localized the biasing effects of stereotypes at a stage of social information processing described by researchers developing more general models of person perception. This approach also allowed them to use the more general model to speculate about the broader consequences of the particular biasing effects they had identified. Delmas (1992) presented evidence that stereotypes can actually have such effects spontaneously: Therefore, one might preferentially construe a shove by an outgroup member as an instance of hostility rather than playfulness without even being aware that any inference has been made. This occurs even when out-group membership is based on a trivial distinction (e.g., with a minimal-group manipulation; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). Less work has been done to explicate in a precise way how social category information is incorporated into the more general person representations described by person memory researchers (cf. Gingrich, Houston, & Lupfer, 1998; Wyer & Martin, 1986). Stangor and Ruble (1989), however, adopted some of the experimental procedures developed by those researchers and used them to examine representations of groups and the processes involved in stereotype formation and maintenance. Participants in Stangor and Ruble's (1989) study were presented with behavioral information about two fictitious fraternities. The mix of information encouraged them to develop stereotypes about the groups’ relative extraversion. Then they were asked to recall the behaviors. Consistent with the results of most person memory studies, no recall advantage for expectancy consistent (i.e., stereotype consistent) information was initially found (see Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981). However, when more information was presented after the stereotypes had become well developed, participants subsequently recalled significantly more stereotype-consistent than stereotype-inconsistent information. This led Stangor and Ruble to propose that different processes are involved in stereotype formation (e.g., attributional processing) and stereotype maintenance (e.g., selective attention). For stereotypes to affect the processing of information about a person, that person must first be categorized in terms of some social category. Influential models developed by Brewer (1988) and S. T. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) suggest that an understanding of the circumstances in which people are viewed and treated simply as prototypical members of a group (i.e., the circumstances in which stereotypes will guide our interactions with others) is inseparable from an understanding of the circumstances in which attribute-by-attribute (or behavior-by-behavior) analyses of information about other people take place (i.e., the circumstances in which the kind of processing described in the person perception and person memory literatures is more important). According to S. T. Fiske and Neuberg (1990), category-based and piecemeal processing define two ends of a continuum of processes (although the former has priority over the latter). By contrast, Brewer (1988) described a branching sequence of stages in which category-based processing is the default and personalized processing only occurs when the observer has some degree of affective investment in the target (see S. T. Fiske, 1988, for a detailed comparison of the models). Brewer's model

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Page 201 also suggests that the kinds of detailed person representations described by the person memory literature are only formed as a result of personalized processing. Otherwise a person is simply represented in memory as a categoryexemplar (e.g., as just one of many Asians, elderly people, or nurses). In both models, however, the assumption is that, to understand the role of stereotyping in interpersonal behavior, one must take into account the alternative to stereotyping and the circumstances in which one or the other kind of processing is more likely to occur. And learning about the alternative boils down to learning what the person perception and person memory literatures have to offer. Conformity Conformity and obedience have long been among social psychology's most compelling phenomena (Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1974). D. T. Miller and Prentice (1996) analyzed such phenomena in terms of how people construct group norms. For example, to conform, one must first identify a norm specifying the expected behavior. In some cases (e.g., “How do other people really feel about drinking or premarital sex?”) the norm is ambiguous. To figure out what it is, one needs to interpret other people's behavior and determine why they are doing what they are doing and how they feel about it. The norms that people confidently identify as a result of such an analysis are often distorted. Much can go wrong in the construction of norms, including all of the things that can go wrong in and bias interpersonal perception. In fact, Miller and Prentice's discussion of the processes that lead people to conform behaviorally to a norm – be it a real norm or an illusory one – leads them to literatures like the ones on the correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and spontaneous trait inference (Uleman et al., 1996). Minority Influence Of course, people do not always bow to pressures to conform; sometimes lone dissenters prevail on the majority to accept their views. To understand the minority influence phenomenon, one could focus on how the style with which dissenters buck the majority affects their impact on the group (e.g., Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). One could also go one step further, however, and look at how group members perceive and form impressions of dissenters. That is the approach that Moskowitz (1996; see also Moskowitz & Chaiken, 2000) took, and he found that attributions for dissenter behavior play a significant and underexamined role in the minority influence phenomenon. Interpersonal Attraction Evaluations of people (or liking judgments) have long been common as dependent variables in person perception research,2 and recent models of person memory (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1989) assume that one's overall evaluation of a person plays a prominent role in one's cognitive representation of that person. Berscheid (1985), however, noted that person perception and attribution models have not played a direct role in framing the kinds of questions asked by students of interpersonal attraction, “although the processes by which attributions are made of another's dispositional properties are understood, of course, to be critical to an understanding of attraction’’ (p. 426). The importance of the processes by which people interpret and recall others’ behavior has thus been implicitly assumed: For example, the well-documented similarity-attraction relationship (Byrne, 1971) depends on the ability to determine that another person has particular attitudes, beliefs, and personality traits. THE FUTURE Red Herrings In summary, person perception and person memory researchers have provided other social psychologists with important conceptual tools and a useful level of analysis. However, one could also argue that what has been learned has not yet been exploited to the fullest, and students of person perception and person memory still have riches to share with other social psychologists. Unfortunately, those riches may stay locked up in the vault unless some challenges are embraced. Before outlining those challenges, it should be acknowledged that much of the landmark research that in the past ended up inspiring the field's conceptual development did so accidentally or serendipitously because the research yielded unexpected and surprising findings. For example, as noted before, the development of person memory models was to a great extent oriented around Hastie and Kumar's (1979) finding that, in some circumstances, people preferentially recall expectancy-inconsistent information – a finding that, according to the writeup of the study, was not expected. Similarly, a great many grant dollars have been spent trying to understand why participants in Jones and Harris’ (1967) study seemed to think that one can get a pretty good read on a speaker's political orientation by observing what he or

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Page 202 she is forced to say and do. This was a finding that did not directly follow from Jones and Davis’ (1965) correspondent inference theory. Nonetheless, some modest suggestions are offered. These suggestions are not the ones that might seem to follow most naturally from some f the standard self-critiques of the study of person perception and person memory. Therefore, it is necessary to first summarize what do not seem to be promising strategies for further invigoration of this area of research while acknowledging that these comments to a great extent echo those of others (e.g., Aronson et al., 1990; Mook, 1983; Ostrom, 1984; Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, & Gruenfeld, 1992). Worries about the fact that the vast majority of person perception and person memory studies are laboratory-based seem to suggest that it is incumbent on investigators to design more field studies. Unfortunately, this recommendation can be a vacuous one. If the issue is that laboratory studies have ignored, or held constant, or even overemphasized certain variables, then the task of the researcher is to specify what those variables are so that they can be operationalized and controlled for in some way. If that can be done in the field, then a field study would be appropriate. If that can be done in the laboratory, then a laboratory study would be appropriate. It is not clear what there is to be gained by simply translating laboratory studies into field investigations. An unexpected finding or a failure to replicate an effect originally uncovered in the laboratory would simply require one to construct an ingenious post hoc explanation. And if one did replicate an effect in the field, that would be satisfying, but even then it could well be that the field setting that was picked was as exotic or unrepresentative as the researcher's lab room. A related suggestion might be that the next step for person perception and person memory researchers is to determine whether their models hold up in the real world. The problem, of course, is the assumption that there is some obvious consensual definition of the real world . In this context, it apparently means “not the laboratory,” but that, of course, is about as coherent a category as “not Princeton University” or “not the airport.” In addition, the isolation of the laboratory environment from the real world should not be exaggerated. One can assume that interactions between research participants and between experimenters and their research participants, while not necessarily representative of all interactions, follow most of the normal rules that govern interpersonal behavior in other contexts. Experimenters who ignore those rules probably do so at their peril. Finally, concerns about the apparent artificiality of the tasks presented to participants in laboratory-based person perception and person memory research might be taken for a call for the use of more naturalistic materials. One could hardly object to naturalistic materials in principle. By itself, though, this recommendation is no more compelling than a call for more field studies, and for many of the same reasons. There may be something to be gained from seeing whether people will spontaneously infer generosity when presented with a film clip showing that “The plumber slips an extra $50 into his wife's purse” (Winter & Uleman, 1984) as opposed to a sentence describing that behavior. What is to be gained, however, needs to be explicitly spelled out. Needless to say, no one would claim that there are no differences between the processes involved in decoding text and those involved in extracting meaning from live social targets. For some research questions, compelling arguments have been made for the importance of those differences. For example, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) pointed out that one cannot reach conclusions about the ubiquity of stereotyping in everyday social interaction by manipulating social categories verbally (e.g., by identifying a person in writing as a “Black fireman’’) because the verbal labels force on people distinctions that they might not have made by themselves. In general, without some compelling framework for thinking about the theoretically relevant differences between naturalistic materials and those more typically utilized for well-controlled studies of person perception and person memory, it is not clear what the payoff will be for the researcher or the field. New Contexts What person perception and person memory researchers study are particular phenomena that take place in particular contexts involving particular people. Happily for them, there are still interesting and unexplored interpersonal phenomena crying out for an analysis in terms of person perception and person memory processes; populations of people clamoring to teach us more about those processes; and contexts just waiting for person perception and person memory researchers to arrive so that they can reveal to those researchers new dimensions of their theories and models. A few years ago, Wyer and his colleagues departed from their standard experimental procedures and imported person memory principles into a conversational context (Wyer, Budesheim, & Lambert, 1990; Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, & Swan, 1994; see also Wyer et al., 1992). In these studies, the researchers did what person memory researchers almost always do; that is, they presented participants with trait descriptions of

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Page 203 others and let the participants learn about a number of those people's behaviors. In this case, however, rather than just presenting the information in a disembodied way with a slide projector or computer, they embedded it in a conversation between two people. A superficial reading of the results of these studies would probably horrify the student of person memory processes. That is because, at first glance, almost none of the classic person memory findings were replicated, and the conclusion one might reach is that all one needs to do is tweak the classic research methodology a little bit for the whole study to blow up in one's face. In a darker frame of mind, one might even conclude that these studies suggest that past person memory studies are about nothing but themselves, and that the results of those studies tell us nothing more than what happens in person memory studies. A less superficial reading of these papers would lead to different conclusions. A full description of the complicated results of these studies is beyond the scope of this chapter. Recall, however, some of the most basic person memory principles: that is, people have and/or develop expectations; the relationship between those expectations and new information determines how they process that information; unexpected information, especially early in the impression formation process, leads to enhanced processing; and that in turn affects the memory trace. Wyer et al.'s studies actually fit neatly into that story. In this case, however, the expectations involved were not just trait impressions (as is usually the case in person memory studies), but expectations based on conversational norms. For example, we expect people to be charitable when describing others, and we expect people to be relatively modest when describing themselves. When people violate those expectations, such behavior attracts notice and causes an observer to process that information more deeply. That information, of course, is then more accessible for recall later. These, in fact, are the kinds of findings reported by Wyer et al. For example, participants were better able to recall the favorable statements people made about themselves, but recalled more unfavorable statements when a person was making them about someone else. In summary, these data actually were arguably compatible with the basic Srull and Wyer (1989) person memory model, but they forced that model to stretch to accommodate new and important variables. Note that it would not do justice to these studies to say that they simply represented an effort to see whether a model would replicate in a more naturalistic or real-world setting. As discussed earlier, research framed in that way is unlikely to advance theory. Instead, it was a project in which a model was tested in a context (one in which conversational norms were salient) that differed in a specific and potentially theoretically important way from the usual one in which it was tested (because those norms have important implications for attentional allocation). The result was that the model developed in an arguably interesting way that could generate whole new sets of questions. Hamilton, Driscoll, and Worth (1989) provided a related example of the usefulness of stretching a research paradigm's boundaries. They noted that typical person memory study is set up so that participants receive information related to one possible trait that a person might possess. There may well be social contexts structured in such a way that a person's behavior is diagnostic of one and only one personality characteristic, but it is arguably more typical to encounter people in situations where their behavior is informative about many possible traits – friendly or unfriendly, intelligent or unintelligent, adventurous or unadventurous, and so on. The Hamilton et al. data suggest that, in situations like that, people engage in processes during the encoding of behavior that person memory researchers would not be able to detect by using only the typical single-trait procedure. For example, people might devote effort to verifying that a behavior had been encoded in terms of the right trait concept, and this leads to an increase in recall of behaviors congruent with that trait (in contrast to the typical recall advantage for incongruent behaviors). Again, a small (but meaningful) change – one that essentially represented a different social context – led to an extension of existing person memory models. There are, of course, other social contexts with features that, from the perspective of our models, might vary in interesting ways from the ones usually studied. For example, it is not clear that person memory models have been extended to situations where people have a vested interest in or a preference for the way in which they judge and represent other people. A number of models of biased inference processes hypothesize that people construct justifications for their preferred judgments and inferences by searching memory for supportive information (e.g., Kunda, 1990; see also Baumeister & Newman, 1994). Often those judgments are about people, and, in some investigations, the biased inferences that have been studied are inferences about the dispositional properties of those people. To illustrate, Klein and Kunda (1992) found that when people were motivated to see a target person as being high in ability – because that person was going to serve as their partner in a history quiz game – they did in fact conclude that the target was very knowledgeable, whereas those motivated

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Page 204 to conclude the opposite – because that person was going to be an opponent – they judged the target to have relatively little knowledge (see also Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995, Study 3). In such investigations, predictions about how people selectively search their memories for information about people are rarely, if ever, informed by models of how we cognitively represent such information. It remains for future research to build bridges between the person memory and biased inference literatures. New Populations Instructors of undergraduate methods courses often give students an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge of research design by writing up critiques of other people's research. In all probability, most of those instructors (like the author of this chapter) find that a popular theme in those papers is the claim that not much can be concluded from the results of a study because the research participants came from a specific population (e.g., Texans, Ivy Leaguers, students at a business school, shoppers at a particular supermarket, etc.). Hopefully those instructors point out to their students that such critiques are useful only if one can specify (or at least speculate about) why the characteristics of a particular group cast doubt on the generality of a finding. Simply to suggest testing models or replicating effects with different groups of people is not to suggest much. Even Sears (1986), who bemoaned social psychology's reliance on college students as research participants (and described how they might make up a unique subpopulation) warned that selective conversion and replication of social psychology studies makes sense primarily “when there is reason to believe that findings might be biased by our peculiar data base” (p. 527). In other words, selective replication makes the most sense when a group of people not only differs from the population usually studied, but when people in that group differ in terms of processes that are central to a model or phenomenon. Such groups can help provide both tests of a model and systematic ways of thinking about revisions of the model. Studies involving participants from different age groups provide a case in point. A number of writers have pointed out that social psychologists do not do themselves any favors when they ignore developmental data (e.g., Higgins & Wells, 1986; Ruble & Goodnow, 1998). Not only do 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and 10-year-olds differ from college students, but they differ in interesting ways that could be helpful for testing or extending theories. For example, the overjustification effect – i.e., the tendency of salient incentives for an activity to undermine intrinsic motivation for that activity (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978) – is commonly assumed to be mediated by the use of the multiple sufficient causes schema and the discounting principle (Kelley, 1973; Morris, et al., chap. 9, this volume). This implies, of course, that if one can replicate the overjustification effect with 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), one needs also to demonstrate that children that young have developed a multiple sufficient causes schema (Newman & Ruble, 1992). If not, then one's model of the overjustification effect is in need of revision. Similarly, if one asserts that the bias toward explaining others’ behavior with person rather than situation attributions (the “fundamental attribution error”; Ross, 1977) derives from some more basic perceptual salience effect (i.e., the tendency to focus attention on the figural actor and not the “ground’’ or situation; see Gilbert & Malone, 1995, for a discussion), one must also explain why young children do not reliably display the same bias (Rholes, Newman, & Ruble, 1990). In recent years, cross-cultural investigations of the attribution of causes for behavior have been particularly informative. A number of researchers have taken advantage of opportunities to study populations of people that differ in theoretically interesting ways from the ones typically studied by North American and Western European social psychologists. For example, J. G. Miller (1984) found that her participants from the United States showed the expected tendency to explain others' behavior predominantly in terms of their stable dispositional qualities. This tendency, however, was notable only in its absence among a sample of Hindu participants she recruited from India. Morris and Peng (1994) replicated and extended these findings by comparing North American college students to a group of Chinese students (see also Krull, chap. 13, this volume). Archival studies of the kinds of causal accounts offered for behavior in newspaper reports have also yielded results that are consistent with these cross-cultural differences (Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996; Morris & Peng, 1994). In general, person perception processes begin to seem unfamiliar in many ways when social psychologists study people from cultures that, according to cross-cultural psychologists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1990), are more collectivist and less individualist than those found in North America and Western Europe. People in collectivist cultures (such as traditional Asian ones) are less likely than people in individualist ones to conceive of individual people as free, independent agents who are defined separately from their social contexts. That profound psychological difference

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Page 205 would seem to have implications for person perception and person memory, and it does. Some of social psychology's most cherished phenomena – e.g., the fundamental attribution error – suddenly become more complicated and less fundamental when we examine the social inferences and causal attributions of people without the individualist assumptions shared by the vast majority of the people who have contributed to our current data base (A. P. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Krull, chap. 13, this volume). In addition, the findings emerging from this research are forcing researchers to highlight certain distinctions that did not seem in need of sharpening before, such as those involving inferential goals. People might not universally approach social situations with the goal of extracting individuating information about the other people they encounter there (see Jones & Thibaut, 1958; Krull, 1993). The implications of these differences in beliefs about behavior for the representation of social information have been less extensively explored, with one exception being a now sizable literature on cross-cultural differences in descriptions of the self (e.g., Cousins, 1989; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995; for a review, see A. P. Fiske et al., 1998). But it seems safe to predict that current models of person memory need to be revised to accommodate the individualism-collectivism distinction. It is not obvious, for example, that trait-behavior clusters play a prominent role in the way people from collectivist cultures cognitively represent their acquaintances (cf. Srull & Wyer, 1989). Not only does cross-cultural research have the potential to change the way we think about phenomena like the fundamental attribution error, correspondence bias, and spontaneous trait inference (Duff & Newman, 1997; Newman, 1993), but it also raises some interesting meta-issues about the field. It suggests another level of analysis for a question posed earlier: Why did the study of person perception and person memory become so prominent in social psychology? Historically the field has been dominated by researchers from the United States (Jones, 1985), and perhaps these researchers focused so much on how people think about, perceive, and store information about each other because their culture encouraged them to see the individual as the proper unit of analysis for social psychology. Had social psychology first flowered in Asia, the history of the field would arguably look quite different. In summary, person perception and person memory research involving currently underrepresented populations can do more than just provide researchers with the satisfaction of learning that their findings are not simply an artifact of a narrow data base (Sears, 1986). Instead it can provide valuable opportunities to test, challenge, and enhance the generality of existing models. Other opportunities await. For example, Penn, Corrigan, Bentall, Racenstein, and Newman (1997) noted that, although “schizophrenia is inherently an interpersonal disorder in which problems result from faulty construction of the social environment and one's place in it” (p. 114), few researchers have actually adopted a social-cognitive level of analysis in their studies of patients with schizophrenia. Penn et al. issued a call for such research, which has the potential to provide unique tests of assumptions about the roles of variables such as cognitive capacity, social schemata, and interaction goals in person perception and person memory (Newman, in press). New Phenomena Social psychologists probably do not need to lengthen their list of effects and phenomena with catchy names. A more worthwhile project for person perception and person memory researchers would be a commitment to confront and analyze the “intuitively interesting and immediately important social phenomena” to which Schneider (1991, p. 530) alluded. In other words, there are quite a few interpersonal phenomena identified on the basis of both everyday observation and clinical experience that have not received the attention that they may deserve. Shedding light on those phenomena could, first of all, highlight the explanatory power and usefulness of current models. Even more important is the possibility that confronting messy and complex phenomena will lead to theory development and make researchers spell out more explicitly the connections among different social psychological models, methods, and effects. A successful example of a project of this kind is the experimental work of Andersen and her colleagues on the concept of transference (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen, Glassman, Chen & Cole, 1995; Chen, chap. 8, this volume). It has long been observed that a person frequently responds to others as if those other people were standins for important figures from the person's past, such as that person's parents (Scharff, 1992). In other words, how people construct their representations of others often seems to be guided not by normative considerations, but by the idiosyncratic personality configurations they have encountered in other individual people. Andersen and her colleagues have demonstrated that when particular personality traits are attributed to a target person, people have a tendency to misattribute other traits to that person in a way that could not be predicted from an abstract implicit personality theory (Schneider, 1973). Instead, people incorrectly recall that

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Page 206 targets with one attribute also have other characteristics simply because other people they have known have also possessed traits in that combination. The starting points of this work were basic models of social categorization and construct accessibility, and the tools and ideas borrowed from those literatures allowed the researchers to shed light on a long-recognized and fascinating phenomenon. What these studies also did, however, was expand our understanding of person perception by showing how representations of significant others can have direct effects on how we construe other people and their behavior. Another phenomenon recently reconceptualized using concepts developed in part by students of person perception is defensive projection. The idea that people sometimes seem to be quick to detect in other people those very qualities that they are motivated not to see in themselves is as familiar to lay people as it is to psychologists. However, it seems fair to state that the modal belief among experimental psychologists has long been that defensive projection is a cute psychoanalytic idea for which there is little evidence (Holmes, 1968, 1978). Skepticism about the existence of defensive projection might also have been fueled by the lack of precision of Freudian definitions of the phenomenon (see Sandler & Freud, 1985). Newman, Duff, and Baumeister (1997) recasted projection in terms of the literature on social construct accessibility. In other words, they framed the phenomenon of defensive projection as follows: Certain trait concepts (undesired ones) are often chronically accessible, and therefore they easily come to mind when making certain judgments (i.e., judgments about other people) and so are frequently inferred (i.e., projected). To explain why unwanted or feared traits might become chronically accessible, and thus readily available for use when disambiguating other people's behavior, Newman et al. (1997) built a bridge between the person perception literature and research on thought suppression. A now extensive literature shows that vigorous efforts to avoid a thought paradoxically boost the accessibility of that thought – a phenomenon known as the rebound effect (Wegner, 1992). Newman et al. (1997) proposed that similar rebound effects might be observed when the thought being suppressed is the possibility that one might possess an undesired personality trait. In a series of studies, they provided support for the hypothesis that people's efforts to avoid thoughts about specific self-relevant and threatening personality characteristics lead people to attribute those characteristics to others. Defensive projection thus occurs as a side effect of suppression, not as a result of a direct effort to make oneself feel better by expelling a threatening thought (cf. Vaillant, 1977). One contribution of this research, besides shedding light on defensive projection, is its articulation of connections between person perception and the literature on thought suppression. In addition, it suggests a rethinking of the concept of motivated person perception. Motivated person perception typically implies a direct desire to perceive a particular characteristic in another person for some self-serving purpose (e.g., Dunning et al., 1995; Klein & Kunda, 1992). The Newman et al. research on projection shows how motives can instead have indirect effects on person perception, by enhancing the accessibility of concepts that are then only incidentally used to construe other people's behavior. CONCLUSION This chapter began with the observation that the kinds of studies that beginning students of social psychology encounter in abundance – studies in which “an individual subject is exposed in isolation and in the laboratory to sets of trait or behavior words or sentences presented via slides or printed lists” (Landman & Manis, 1984, p. 113) – seem to be a far cry from the high-impact studies of conformity (Asch, 1956), obedience (Milgram, 1974), and bystander intervention (Latané & Darley, 1970) that usually define the field for nonspecialists. Social psychologists have been known to voice their displeasure with the prominence of such studies, and some have even accused person perception and person memory research of being a self-referential, esoteric, and even unexciting enterprise. In fact, even the most prominent person perception and person memory researchers have occasionally expressed discomfort with certain features of their research. The history of the study of person perception and person memory was then briefly reviewed, along with some reasons that these areas of research became so prominent in social psychology. This review suggests that person perception and person memory researchers have provided a level of analysis that has been useful for social psychologists studying a wide range of the field's classic topics. In fact, it could even be argued that social psychologists seeking to understand the kinds of phenomena with which the field has traditionally concerned itself handicap themselves if they ignore basic person perception and person memory research. In summary, students of person perception and person memory have contributed enormously to the understanding of interpersonal behavior and still have more insights to offer. However, the range of application of their models will

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Page 207 continue to expand only if they also continue to confront the challenges that will lead to conceptual and methodological growth. ENDNOTES 1. This definition could also be stretched to include the perception of groups, but a discussion of the similarities and differences between the processes involved in processing information about individuals and groups (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984) is beyond the scope of this chapter, as are the distinctions between self-perception and other perception (Bem, 1972; Prentice, 1990). 2. In fact, the evaluative component of impression formation dominated research before 1980 (Hamilton et al., 1980b). Hamilton et al. attributed this, in part, to the fact that researchers had at their disposal Anderson's (1968) widely utilized likableness ratings for a large set of personality traits.

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Page 209 Part III. Subjective Perception and Motivated Judgment

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Page 211 13 On Partitioning the Fundamental Attribution Error: Dispositionalism and the Correspondence Bias Douglas S. Krull Northern Kentucky University We often speculate about why things happen. Suppose we learn that a prestigious law firm hired a new attorney and within 3 years he is a partner in the firm. We might wonder why he was promoted so quickly. Is he incredibly talented? Is he the favorite nephew of the senior partner? Suppose we hear of an airplane crash. We might wonder about the cause. Did the engines fail? Was it the pilot's fault? Suppose we meet a colleague in another department and he seems grumpy. We might wonder why he acted that way. Is he a grumpy person? Is he just having a bad day? Such questions are ubiquitous, and, moreover, they are important. As Gilbert and Malone (1995) pointed out, the consequences of misunderstanding the behavior of others can be quite serious: Guilty people are set free, innocent people are jailed, poor political candidates are elected, people who thought they knew their dates are raped by them, wars are started, relationships are ended. It is difficult to overestimate the problems that can occur because we misunderstand the traits of other people and the causes of their behaviors. The question of how people understand and explain the behavior of other people is the domain of attribution theory. An attribution is an explanation or a judgment about the cause of some event. More specifically, the subset of attribution theory discussed in this chapter primarily deals with how people make judgments about a particular type of event — the behavior of others.1 This chapter compares and contrasts two aspects of what is often called the fundamental attribution error. Dispositionalism is the tendency to prefer dispositional attributions over situational attributions. Correspondence bias is the tendency to infer that dispositions correspond to behavior. It is suggested here that, although dispositionalism and correspondence bias are related phenomena, they are not identical, and a consideration of the differences and similarities may help clarify extant research and inform subsequent research efforts. This chapter also points out that, although the tendency to prefer dispositional attributions exists under some conditions, the tendency to prefer situational attributions exists under other conditions. Moreover, it is suggested that the tendency to infer that dispositions correspond to behavior is only one side of the coin because people also tend to infer that situations correspond to behavior. Thus, both correspondence bias and situational correspondence can be thought of as subsets of the more general tendency to draw correspondent inferences. PAST RESEARCH AND THEORY Contemporary attribution theory draws its ideas from many sources. Kelley's Covariation Principle can be found in the ideas of many writers, including Mill (1872/1973). Indeed, Hewstone (1990) indicated that White (1989) traced the covariation principle back to William of Ockham, who wrote during the 14th century. Hilton and Slugoski's (1986) Abnormal Conditions Focus Model makes use of Hart and Honore's (1961) insights about commonsense knowledge. Automaticity in impression formation, a cornerstone of many modern attribution theories, draws from both Icheiser's (1943) discussion of unconscious processes of interpretation and Michotte's (1946/1963) view that causality can be experienced immediately and directly. A consideration of the many individuals and ideas that have shaped contemporary attribution theory is beyond the scope of this chapter.2 Therefore, this consideration of the past of attribution theory begins with Heider. Heider is regarded as the father of attribution theory (Jones, 1985) and with good reason. Heider's (1944, 1958) insights laid the foundation for much of the research and theory in attribution. Consider three of Heider's ideas that have contributed to attribution theory. First, Heider suggested that when people view behavior, they want to understand the stable causes of the behavior so they can predict future behavior. He wrote:

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Page 212 It is an important principle of common-sense psychology…that man grasps reality, and can predict and control it, by referring transient and variable behavior and events to relatively unchanging underlying conditions, the so-called dispositional properties of his world (1958, p. 79). Thus, just as we may seek to understand why an apple falls to the ground so that we can predict the behavior of a piano if the rope by which it is suspended were to break, we also try to understand why people behave as they do so that we can predict their future behavior. This control function can be found in Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model and in Jones and Davis' (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory. Second, Heider stressed the distinction between personal and situational causes. This distinction is central to most research in attribution, and it seems to capture a great deal of commonsense reasoning as well, because people often make comments that seem to fall into one of these two categories. For example, if Luis observes that Sheila looks nervous, he might decide that she has an anxious personality or that she is in an anxiety-provoking situation. If Tamela sees a homeless person, she might decide that the homeless person is lazy or a victim of circumstances. If a student receives a high score on an exam, a teacher might decide that the student is intelligent or that the exam was easy. Heider's view in this matter did need some fine tuning. For example, he viewed these two types of judgments as hydraulically related (i.e., as one increases, the other decreases), prompting some researchers to assess attributions with a single internal-external or person-situation scale. This hydraulic assumption has not been strongly supported by subsequent research (e.g., Miller, Smith, & Uleman, 1981; Solomon, 1978; Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976; White, 1991), which suggests that these two types of causes should be assessed separately. Other theorists have criticized the distinction, suggesting that it has more to do with how attribution theorists think about causes than with how lay people think about causes (e.g., Antaki, 1988; Edwards & Potter, 1993). Nevertheless, most work in attribution has operated under the assumption that the universe of possible causes can be placed into one of these two fundamental categories. Third, although Heider suggested that people can attribute causality to either personal or situational factors, he noted that a personal attribution was the more likely of the two (see also Icheiser, 1943). Heider pointed out that an actor and his or her act tend to be perceived as a unit, and so personal factors tend to be seen as the origin of behavior. Heider (1944) wrote: “Often the momentary situation which, at least in part, determines the behavior of a person is disregarded and the behavior is taken as a manifestation of personal characteristics’’ (p. 361). Of course, this tendency is what Ross (1977) later called the fundamental attribution error. Two Landmark Theories Many attribution theorists used Heider's insights as a starting point for their own theories and research. Two such theories that are particularly relevant to the current theses are Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model and Jones and Davis'(1965) Correspondent Inference Theory. Each of these is discussed briefly. Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model. Suppose an acquaintance of yours, Alisa, says to you, “You've got to try Aldo's, that Italian restaurant on Main. It's terrific!” What kind of an attribution should you make about why she said this? Something about the restaurant might have caused her to offer such a fine recommendation. However, she might have said this because of something about her. Kelley suggested there are three types of information that you should consider. First, you should consider what other people have to say about Aldo's restaurant. This is called consensus information. Second, you should consider whether Alisa typically raves about restaurants. This is called distinctiveness information. If Alisa makes positive comments about every restaurant she samples, her comment on this occasion is not very distinctive. Finally, you should consider how Alisa has reacted to this particular restaurant at other times. This is called consistency information. Different patterns of these three types of information suggest different conclusions. For example, what would the pattern of low consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency suggest about the cause of Alisa's recommendation? Low consensus indicates that other people did not recommend Aldo's. Low distinctiveness indicates that Alisa makes positive comments about many restaurants. High consistency indicates that she consistently recommends Aldo's. Apparently something about Alisa's personality is the cause of her recommendation. In contrast, high consensus (others liked Aldo's), high distinctiveness (Alisa rarely raves about restaurants), and high consistency (Alisa often raves about Aldo's) suggests that something about the restaurant is the cause (e.g., McArthur, 1972). Of course, sometimes One may lack the ability, motivation, or information to perform such a sophisticated analysis. In this case, Kelley (1972a) suggested that we can use causal schemata to draw an attribution. For example, suppose one learns that Josh lost a racquetball

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Page 213 tournament. If one thinks that any of a number of causes (e.g., low ability, low effort, injury) might cause one to lose a racquetball tournament, a multiple-sufficient-causes-schema is applied. With this schema, if any cause is present, the effect will occur. So if one knows that Josh is injured, one should not draw an extreme attribution about his ability or effort because the injury alone could have caused him to lose (see Kun & Weiner, 1973; McClure, 1998; Reeder, 1993; Reeder & Fulks, 1980). This type of reasoning is an example of what is referred to as the discounting principle . The discounting principle states that, “the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are present” (Kelley, 1972b, p. 8). In contrast, suppose one learns that Josh won a racquetball tournament. If one thinks that a confluence of facilitating factors is necessary for people to win racquetball tournaments, then a multiple-necessary-causes-schema (where multiple causes are required to produce the effect) is applied. Here discounting is unnecessary because, even if Josh is not injured, a certain level of ability and effort is still thought to be required. Jones and Davis' (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory . Suppose you observe the following three behaviors. First, Stanley is in a hospital waiting room and he looks anxious. Second, Denise declines an all expenses paid trip to Japan. Third, at a party, you overhear Joe arguing that it is every person's responsibility to recycle, reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and protect wildlife. What should you conclude about the personalities of these individuals? Jones and Davis' Correspondent Inference Theory suggests that two pieces of information are important to consider. First, you should consider the prior probability or expectedness of the behavior. When people behave in ways that are completely expected (e.g., anxious-looking Stanley in the hospital waiting room), you should not conclude that peoples' behavior reflects their personalities (e.g., Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). Second, you should consider the distinctiveness or clarity of the behavior with regard to its implications about the person's personality. For example, if Zhitang buys one car rather than another and the cars differ in many respects, one cannot be certain why Zhitang made the choice he did. However, if the cars are identical except that one is red and the other is blue, one can conclude with confidence that his preference for a certain color is the reason for his choice (e.g., Newtson, 1974). In the case of Denise declining the trip to Japan, the low probability of her behavior suggests that a personality inference is warranted. However, it is not clear what type of personality inference should be drawn. Is Denise not interested in Asian cultures? Does she have important commitments that she wishes to honor? Is she afraid of flying? In summary then, when behavior is expected or does not have clear implications about personality, one cannot draw a correspondent dispositional inference.3 What about Joe, who argued at the party that people have a responsibility to be more environmentally conscious? The probability of his behavior is not particularly high, and so it would be appropriate to draw an inference about his personality. Moreover, although one could be mistaken, a clear and reasonable inference is that his comments reflect an underlying disposition — specifically, that he is an environmentalist. This is what Jones and Davis refer to as a correspondent inference . In Jones' (1990) words, A correspondent inference is a straightforward extrapolation from the behavior observed: The behavior is seen as corresponding to or reflecting an underlying disposition of the actor…for example, to call a person hostile after observing a hostile act would be to draw a correspondent inference (pp. 46-47). Two Different Theories - Two Different Questions - Two Different Judgments. The theories of Kelley (1967) and Jones and Davis (1965) address rather different questions. Kelley's model is a causal attribution theory. The goal of this theory is to explain how people should decide the cause of behavior. Jones and Davis' theory also addresses causal attribution (one should not draw a personality inference when behavior is expected because the behavior could be due to the situation). However, the primary focus of the theory (and particularly the focus of the research that followed) is to explain how people could draw correspondent inferences from behavior, or, as Jones and Davis stated it, how people go from acts to dispositions. In summary then, Kelley's model is a theory of causal attribution, but Jones and Davis' theory is a theory of correspondent (specifically trait) inference. This is not merely a semantic distinction. Both research and theory suggest that causal attributions and correspondent inferences are not the same type of judgment and are probably not drawn through the same mechanism (e.g., Bassili, 1989; Erickson & Krull, 1999; Hamilton, 1988; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; Johnson, Jemmott, & Pettigrew, 1984; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Semin & Marsman, 1994; Smith & Miller, 1983). Consider three findings that bear on this issue. First, Johnson et al. (1984) found that knowledge that a behavior was caused by situational forces did not immunize participants to the correspondence bias. These researchers concluded, “Correspondent inferences, these data suggest, may exhibit a startling independence from assessments of causality” (Johnson et al., 1984, p. 581).

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Page 214 Second, Bassili (1989) found that participants who were instructed to form impressions of targets showed significant trait activation, but participants who were instructed to allocate causality showed little trait activation even when covariation information suggested a person attribution. Bassili (1989) concluded, “The present results suggest that causal allocation places very little emphasis on trait concepts” (p. 293). Third, although a growing body of research suggests that trait inferences may display aspects of automaticity (see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996, for a review), research by Smith and Miller (1983) suggests that dispositional and situational causal attributions may be less automatic (see the discussion in Anderson, Krull, & Weiner, 1996, for possible exceptions). Perhaps as a result, causal attributions may also be less common than trait inferences. As Hamilton (1988) suggested, causal attributions may only typically be drawn when behavior is unexpected. Thus, correspondent inferences may often be relatively quick and effortless summaries of behavior that contribute to an impression, but causal attributions may typically be slower and more deliberate judgments that are most often prompted by surprising or unexpected information. Interestingly, as Hamilton (1988) pointed out, this suggests that when perceivers judge a behavior, they probably do not allocate causality (e.g., Kirsten's behavior is caused by her personality) and then zero in on a more specific inference (e.g., Kirsten is a friendly person). Rather, they may quickly draw an inference from behavior and then use this inference to draw a true causal attribution when one is needed. This distinction between causal attributions and correspondent inferences is important to the current discussion because the tendency to prefer dispositional over situational attributions (dispositionalism) and the tendency to infer that personality corresponds to behavior (correspondence bias) differ in essentially the same way. Dispositionalism is an attributional tendency, but correspondence bias is an inferential tendency. Of course Kelley's Covariation Model and Jones and Davis' Correspondent Inference Theory do have similarities. Both make use of Heider's trade-off between persons and situations. Both point out that if a behavior is typical (high consensus in Kelley's model, high prior probability in Jones and Davis' theory), it is not very informative about a person's personality. Both suggest that people desire to predict others' behavior. Moreover, neither theory necessarily describes what people actually do when they form social judgments. Rather, they are idealized models of what an astute perceiver could do. Kelley (1972a) wrote that his Covariation Model was ‘‘an idealized model and not descriptive of most everyday, informal attributions” (p. 152). Jones and McGillis (1976) wrote that Correspondent Inference Theory “does not summarize phenomenal experience; it presents a logical calculus in terms of which accurate inferences could be drawn by an alert perceiver” (p. 404). Jones and McGillis went on to point out that a major contribution of the theory has been to highlight deviations from a logical calculus. They wrote, “the role of the theory has been as much to identify attributional bias as to predict precisely the course of the social inference process” (p. 404). It is to two of these biases that we now turn. Dispositionalism and the Correspondence Bias In a classic review, Ross (1977) coined the term fundamental attribution error and defined it as the tendency “to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behavior” (p. 183). It may be worthwhile to partition the fundamental attribution error into two distinct tendencies: dispositionalism and the correspondence bias. Dispositionalism is defined here as the tendency to prefer dispositional over situational attributions (e.g., McArthur, 1972; see also Morris & Peng, 1994). Note that dispositionalism differs from the fundamental attribution error in at least two ways. First, dispositionalism need not be an error because dispositional factors can be more important than situational factors in determining behavior, but the fundamental attribution error is an error by definition because it involves a failure to estimate dispositions and situations correctly. Second, dispositionalism addresses the relative importance of dispositional and situational factors, but the fundamental attribution error does not. The assignment of greater weight to dispositional factors always qualifies as dispositionalism, but it need not be an error. In contrast, the attribution of behavior primarily to the situation never qualifies as dispositionalism, but it could be an instance of the fundamental attribution error, providing situational factors are insufficiently emphasized and dispositional factors overemphasized. Thus, the fundamental attribution error can only be identified if the true influence of dispositions and situations is known, but dispositionalism is present whenever dispositions are emphasized more than are situations. Correspondence bias is defined as “the tendency to draw inferences about a person's unique and enduring dispositions from behaviors that can be entirely explained by the situations in which they occur” (Gilbert & Malone, 1995, p. 21). Evidence for this tendency abounds (e.g., see Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979, 1990, for reviews). Indeed, Jones (1990) argued that the correspondence bias is “the most robust and ubiquitous

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Page 215 finding in the domain of interpersonal perception” (p. 164). This tendency differs from the fundamental attribution error in at least three ways. First, the correspondence bias need not be an error because personality can correspond to behavior even when situational forces are present. Second, whereas the fundamental attribution error involves a consideration of both dispositional factors and situational factors, the correspondence bias only pertains to the relationship between dispositional factors and behavior. Third, whereas the fundamental attribution error is a true causal judgment, the correspondence bias is not. It is important to highlight the differences between dispositionalism and the correspondence bias before proceeding. Recall that dispositionalism is a causal judgment that takes both dispositional and situational factors into consideration, with greater causality attributed to personality than to the situation. In contrast, correspondence bias is an inferential judgment about what personality is like. Although it is true that what is thought about the situation influences the production of correspondence bias, what is thought about the situation is irrelevant to the definition of correspondence bias. One may infer that the situation corresponds to behavior or that it does not, but if one infers that personality corresponds to behavior, one has displayed correspondence bias. For example, one may observe happy behavior in the context of a happy situation, infer that the person's situation is a happy one, and nevertheless infer that the person has a happy personality. In fact, whether behavior is thought to be caused primarily by personality or the situation is also irrelevant to the definition of correspondence bias. Strange as it may seem, one can attribute behavior to the situation and still infer that personality corresponds to behavior. For example, one may conclude that the situation caused a person to look knowledgeable and yet still infer that the person is knowledgeable (Johnson, et al.'s [1984] participants did exactly this). In summary, dispositionalism is displayed when behavior is attributed more to personality than to the situation, rather than when behavior is attributed equally or attributed more to the situation. In contrast, regardless of what is thought about the situation, the correspondence bias is displayed when personality is thought to correspond to behavior in a situation sufficient to produce the behavior. Of course, although dispositionalism and the correspondence bias may be distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. It is quite possible to display both dispositionalism and the correspondence bias simultaneously. As described earlier, correspondent inferences may be more automatic and more common than causal attributions, and often they may be the basis for causal attributions when a true causal judgment is made. If so, correspondence bias may also be more common than dispositionalism, but may be the basis for dispositionalism when a true causal judgment is made. PRESENT RESEARCH AND THEORY Having considered some of the background of attribution, particularly the theories of Kelley (1967) and Jones and Davis (1965), and having described two apparent deviations from the logical strategies outlined by these theories, we now turn to some of the explanations that have been offered for these tendencies. Why do people prefer dispositional attributions over situational attributions, and why do they infer that personality corresponds to behavior? Many different explanations have been offered for these tendencies, and no doubt both are multiply determined (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). In their recent review, Gilbert and Malone (1995) suggested that four mechanisms are responsible for the correspondence bias: lack of awareness of situational constraints, unrealistic expectations for behavior, incomplete corrections of dispositional inferences, and inflated categorizations for behavior. Let us notice whether each of these factors is also a cause of dispositionalism. In addition, let us notice that culture is a cause of dispositionalism and whether culture plays a role in the production of the correspondence bias. Explanations for the Correspondence Bias and Dispositionalism Lack of Awareness of Situational Constraints. It is often stated that dispositional bias occurs because behavior is salient (i.e., vivid, noticeable) compared with the relatively pallid situational background. Heider (1958) wrote that behavior “has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total field rather than be confined to its proper position as a local stimulus whose interpretation requires the additional data of a surrounding field-the situation in social perception” (p. 54). Many an attribution theorist has concluded from this that salient behavior is an explanation for dispositional bias in judgment. However, the extant literature suggests a somewhat different conclusion. The salience of actors does play a substantial role in judgments about people, as many experiments testify. For example, Taylor and Fiske (1975) had people observe a conversation between two people (actor A and actor B). When participants faced actor A, they rated actor A as the more dominant individual — the one who

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Page 216 set the tone and direction of the conversation. But when they faced actor B, they indicated that actor B played the greater role. Ross and Nisbett (1991) summarized the work on salience this way: To be succinct, what you attend to is what you attribute to. Indeed, there is no generalization coming from the Heider-inspired attribution literature of the 1970s that is better supported than this (p. 140). However, there is a difference between assigning greater causality to a salient person and attributing causality for salient behavior to an actor's disposition. Jones (1979) pointed out that, although people are more likely to make causal attributions to salient features of their environment than they are to nonsalient features (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978), it is not entirely evident that the salience of behavior should lead to person attribution rather than to situation attribution (p. 113). Quite so. Behavior may be salient, but why should salient behavior be attributed to dispositions rather than situations? Gilbert and Malone (1995, p. 30) explained, In classical attribution terms, behavior is an effect to be explained, and dispositions and situations are two possible causes of that effect. Why, then, should the salience of the effect facilitate attribution to one of those causes? It is not, after all, the person's dispositions that are salient, but the person's behavior. Indeed, in no other case would reasonable people argue that the salience of an effect “explains” its attribution: If a physical symptom such as vomiting were particularly salient, this would not explain why physicians attribute that symptom to a virus rather than to a bacterium. However, the salience of the situation is another matter. Skinner (1971) suggested that dispositional attributions increase to the extent that situations are inconspicuous. ‘‘If we do not know why a person acts as he does, we attribute his behavior to him” (p. 55). This corresponds to how attribution theorists have typically thought about behavior. If behavior is an effect that could be attributed to either personality or the situation, then as the likelihood that the situation is a cause of behavior decreases, dispositional attributions should increase. As we have noticed, this is the logic of Kelley's discounting principle. So, for example, if we see a man sleeping at a funeral and we know that he had to work all night, we might well attribute his behavior to the situation. In contrast, if we do not know that he worked all night, we may be more likely to attribute his behavior to his personality. Several findings in the literature suggest that a lack of awareness of situational forces can cause the correspondence bias. For example, in the well-known experiment by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977), participants were assigned one of three roles: quizmaster, contestant, or observer. For each triad of participants, the quizmaster was asked to generate 10 challenging questions using his or her general knowledge. Then the quizmaster posed the questions to the contestant while the observer looked on. We all know things that most other people do not know, and so one can imagine how challenging these questions might have been: What is Jesus' first statement in the Sermon on the Mount? What structure in the limbic system is involved in transferring new memories into permanent storage? Where is the Caspian Sea? Not surprisingly, contestants answered only about 4 questions in 10 correctly. Then the participants rated the general knowledge of the quizmaster and the contestant. On the surface, it seems that the quizmaster is more knowledgeable than the contestant. After all, the quizmaster knew the answers to all 10 questions. Of course the quizmaster had an advantage in being able to choose the questions, but this is not easy to appreciate. Observers rated the quizmasters' general knowledge higher than that of the contestants, and the contestants even rated the quizmasters' general knowledge higher than their own (they both displayed correspondence bias). Only the quizmasters did not indicate that they had greater general knowledge than the contestants. Why not? Perhaps in part because the advantage of being in the role of the quizmaster was very salient for them. One can imagine them thinking, “Of course the contestant couldn't answer most of my questions. I picked questions that most people can't answer. That doesn't mean I know more in general.” Thus, when people lack awareness of situations, or fail to fully appreciate their presence, they tend to infer that personality corresponds to behavior.4 Is a lack of awareness of situational forces also a cause of dispositionalism? Yes, although the findings are not as common or powerful as one might think. For example, research reveals that when an actor 'interacts with others who are salient because they are moving or brightly illuminated (McArthur & Post, 1977), or because they have red hair or a leg brace (McArthur & Solomon, 1978), the actor's behavior is attributed more to situational factors. Thus, this work suggests that dispositionalism is more likely when situations are less obvious. However, salience effects on dispositional measures are typically not obtained, perhaps because the salience work often used salient and nonsalient interaction partners. Even nonsalient interaction partners are

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Page 217 still physically present, whereas it is quite possible for powerful situations to have no physical manifestation (e.g., a woman is sad because her husband recently died). Thus, the research on salience may not have provided the strongest manipulation of salience. Recent work by Seger and Krull (1999) found that when otherwise salient situations are invisible (e.g., an employer is criticizing an employee and observers do not know why, rather than knowing that the employee behaved irresponsibly and cost the company a lot of money), situational attributions decrease and dispositional attributions increase. Unrealistic Expectations for Behavior. A second reason that people might be dispositionally biased is that they do not realize how situational forces are likely to influence behavior. Consider an experiment by Bierbrauer (1979). In this experiment, participants viewed a reenactment of Milgram's (1963) well-known obedience study. In Milgram's study, participants were asked by an authority figure to give potentially painful and dangerous electric shocks to another participant (actually a confederate, and actually the confederate received no shocks). Participants were asked to give shocks of increasing intensity, and the question of interest was the level of shock that participants would administer before refusing to continue. One might expect that participants would quickly refuse to obey the authority figure, but approximately 65% of the participants displayed complete obedience, stopping only when the maximum level of shock (450 volts) had been reached. Bierbrauer's participants observed an individual who administered the maximum level of shock; they were then asked to estimate the percentage of people who would display similar behavior. Bierbrauer's participants indicated that few people would behave in such an apparently despicable fashion, presumably concluding that the individual who they observed was atypical in some way — perhaps sadistic or particularly weak-willed (correspondence bias). In Bierbrauer's study, participants had unrealistic expectations about how people are willing to behave. Participants may also fail to appreciate how people are able to behave. For example, in work using the attitude attribution paradigm (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967), it seems that participants fail to realize that people are capable of writing convincing essays that oppose their own attitude (e.g., Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990; Reeder, Fletcher, & Furman, 1989). So when essays are more extreme than people expect, they tend to infer that the essayist holds an attitude that corresponds to the content of the essay. It seems that a failure to appreciate how situations influence behavior causes correspondence bias. Research suggests that this also causes dispositionalism. Consider the investigation of Pietromonaco and Nisbett (1982), based on Darley and Batson's (1973) well-known “Good Samaritan” study of helping behavior. In Darley and Batson's study, students who either were, or were not in a hurry encountered a person in need of help (a man lying in a doorway). Pietromonaco and Nisbett described a similar scenario (a woman who appears to have a knee injury and asks a student to call her husband) and asked their participants to indicate how several variables, including being in a hurry or not, would influence helping. In Darley and Batson's study, whether participants were in a hurry had a substantial influence on helping; 63% of those who were not in a hurry offered assistance, but only 10% of those who were in a hurry. Darley and Batson also found that the personality differences they assessed had little impact on whether people offered help. In contrast, Pietromonaco and Nisbett's participants indicated that whether a person was in a hurry would make essentially no difference, and they thought that personality differences would substantially influence helping. Apparently they failed to appreciate the power of the situation (i.e., a need to be elsewhere quickly), and so assigned a greater role to personality than was warranted. Incomplete Corrections of Dispositional Inferences . People may also display correspondence bias because they initially draw dispositional inferences that correspond to behavior and then fail to adjust these inferences sufficiently. To more fully appreciate this mechanism, consider a model of the social inference process developed by Gilbert and his colleagues (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). This model suggests that when people draw dispositional inferences about the behavior of others, a multiple-stage process occurs. First, people categorize the actor's behavior (e.g., John appears happy), next they characterize, or draw a dispositional inference that corresponds to the behavior (e.g., John must be a happy sort of person), and finally they may correct this inference by considering situational information (e.g., Then again, John and his family are about to leave on a vacation to Italy. Perhaps he's not such a happy sort of person after all).5 Gilbert and his colleagues also suggested that these three stages differ in their degree of automaticity. The first two stages were thought to be substantially effortless, but the last stage was thought to be more cognitively demanding. Thus, this model suggests that when people are distracted or unmotivated, they are still able to categorize behavior and draw a dispositional (correspondent) inference, but they may fail to correct this inference and so display correspondence bias.

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Page 218 Numerous investigations provide support for this model. In one study (Gilbert et al., 1988, Experiment 1), participants viewed a silent videotape of an anxious-appearing woman with the goal of diagnosing her personality.6 Participants were told that the woman was discussing either relatively anxiety-provoking topics or relatively calm topics. Half of the participants in each of these conditions also performed an additional task designed to make them cognitively busy. As expected, nonbusy participants considered the information about the topics and corrected their dispositional inferences. However, cognitively busy participants were less able to correct their inferences, and so displayed greater correspondence bias (see Tetlock, 1985; Webster, 1993, for similar work that manipulated motivation rather than distraction). Moreover, just as people may fail to adjust their initial dispositional inferences because they are unable to do so, they may also fail to adjust their inferences because they think their inferences are accurate. Research conducted by Reeder and his colleagues (e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Reeder & Spores, 1983; see also Miller et al., 1990; Morris & Larrick, 1995) suggests that, for some behaviors (e.g., behaviors related to immorality or high ability), people do not think adjustments are needed. In some cases, they are right. If a man beats his wife, one should conclude that he is abusive. In other cases, however, an adjustment is appropriate, and yet people may think it is not. For example, as mentioned earlier, people are not expected to write essays that strongly oppose their own attitudes (e.g., Reeder et al., 1989). As a result, when perceivers encounter a convincing essay, they may infer that the essayist's attitude is consistent with the essay or at least not strongly inconsistent. In summary, people may display correspondence bias because they fail to sufficiently adjust their initial correspondent dispositional inferences. Could a failure to correct an initial attribution lead to dispositionalism? Research suggests that a failure to correct could lead to dispositionalism if dispositional attributions are drawn first (see Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996). However, dispositional judgments are not always drawn first, and sometimes situational judgments may be drawn first (see Krull & Dill, 1996; Lee et al., 1996). Notice what might occur in the relatively neutral situation, where both dispositional and situational judgments are drawn simultaneously. If one fails to correct dispositional and situational inferences, both might correspond to behavior, and so correspondence bias would occur. But if one fails to correct dispositional and situational causal attributions, both might be rated as relatively extreme, and dispositionalism would not occur. Thus, it seems that a failure to correct is at best a partial explanation for dispositionalism, but it is a good explanation for the correspondence bias. Inflated Categorizations for Behavior. This fourth cause of the correspondence bias is quite different from the other three. The three causes that have been considered thus far are similar in that, in one way or another, they all pertain to the tendency for people to fail to use situational information. But the fourth cause of the correspondence bias does not have to do with failing to use situational information. Rather, it has to do with using situational information. Ironically, people's knowledge of the situation can cause them to perceive behavior differently and so display correspondence bias. The model of Trope and his colleagues explains how this can occur (e.g., Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997; Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 1988). Like Gilbert's model, Trope's model suggests that a multiple-stage process occurs when people draw dispositional inferences. First perceivers identify behavior (e.g., John appears happy), then they test alternative hypotheses about the target's disposition, including the hypothesis that the target's personality corresponds to the behavior (e.g., John must be a happy sort of person). This model suggests that situational information exerts opposite effects at these two stages. In the behavior identification stage, situational information may cause the behavior to be perceived as corresponding to the situation. For example, John's ambiguously happy behavior may be perceived as happier in a situation that is clearly a happy one (e.g., John appears even happier if one knows that he and his family are going to Italy on a vacation). In the hypothesis testing stage, this same situational information may be used to discount (e.g., John and his family are about to leave on a vacation to Italy, so perhaps he does not have a particularly happy personality). How can this model explain why inflated perceptions of behavior could lead to correspondence bias? Consider the following example. Suppose Prisca and Carl observe John, who looks happy. Prisca does not know about John's vacation, and so she perceives John's happiness accurately. But Carl knows that John is soon to be on a plane for Venice, and so, expecting him to be happy because of the situation, perceives even more happiness in John's behavior than is actually present (i.e., John looks extremely happy). Of course, as described earlier, Prisca might infer that John is a happy person because she does not know about John's happy situation. But Carl does know. In fact, it is Carl's knowledge of the situation that has caused him to perceive John's behavior

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Page 219 as exceptionally happy. Now suppose Carl estimates the influence of John's happy situation perfectly (e.g., “A trip to Italy would certainly make a person happy”) and also adjusts perfectly (“Therefore I should not infer that John's personality is as happy as his behavior would suggest”). Carl still might display correspondence bias because his perception of John's behavior was too extreme at the identification stage (e.g., ‘‘But anyone who looks that happy must be a happy sort of person, even if he is about to leave for Venice”). Thus, even if one discounts for the situation, one may fail to consider the effect of the situation on one's initial behavioral identification. Consistent with this, research indicates that when people expect a particular type of behavior, and when the behavior is sufficiently ambiguous to permit perceptual assimilation effects, people seem to perceive the behavior as more extreme and so display correspondence bias (e.g., Snyder & Frankel, 1976; Trope et al., 1988). In summary, people may show correspondence bias because, even if they estimate the power of the situation perfectly and adjust perfectly, their knowledge of the situation might bias their perception of the behavior, the information on which subsequent judgments or adjustments are based. Does inflated categorization also cause dispositionalism? This author knows of no research that has examined the effect of inflated categorizations on attributions, but there is reason to think that inflated categorizations may be substantially unrelated to dispositionalism. In classical attribution terms, behavior is an effect to be explained by a person's disposition or situation. The perception that behavior is extreme might increase the extremity or number of attributions, but there would seem to be no reason for it to cause a preference for dispositional over situational attributions. Moreover, although more extreme behavior (e.g., John looks extremely happy) should influence correspondent inferences (e.g., John must have an extremely happy personality), more extreme behavior may not lead to more extreme attributions. For example, both moderate and extreme happiness could be caused very much or very little by personality. Consistent with this reasoning, recent research has found that the extremity of behavior influences the extremity of both dispositional and situational inferences, but has little effect on dispositional and situational causal attributions (Erickson & Krull, 1999; Krull & Seger, 2000). In summary, it seems that not all causes of the correspondence bias are causes of dispositionalism. Could it be that a cause of dispositionalism is not a cause of the correspondence bias? Culture . Research suggests that some cultures seem to predispose people toward dispositional thinking. A wellknown and informative investigation of cultural differences was conducted by Miller (1984). She asked participants from the United States and India to draw attributions about events they had observed. Unlike most investigations in attribution, her participants included both adults and children of various ages. This range of participants enabled her to track the development of any cultural differences that might be found. Young children showed no cultural differences in attributions. However, as age increased, a fascinating pattern emerged. Participants in the U.S. displayed no increase in situational attributions with age, but dispositional attributions increased sharply. In contrast, Indian participants displayed no increase in dispositional attributions with age, but situational attributions increased sharply. Consistent with Miller's work, Morris and Peng (1994; see also Lee et al., 1996) found that, although U.S. participants favored dispositional attributions, Chinese participants tended to favor situational attributions. What is the cause of this cultural difference? Current theory suggests that it may stem from differences in how people view both the self (e.g., Cousins, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995) and others (e.g., Miller, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1982). People in individualist cultures (e.g., Australia, England, United States)tend to view the self as “a unique, bounded configuration of internal attributes” (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, p. 569). In contrast, people in collectivist cultures (e.g., China, Guatemala, India) tend to view the self as “inherently social — an integral part of the collective” (1994, p. 570). Markus and Kitayama (1991) pointed out that these differing views of the self can be seen in the folk wisdom in these different cultures. For example, in the United States, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease,” but in Japan, “the nail that stands out gets pounded down” (H. Yamada, personal communication, February 16, 1989). Thus, individualists seem to view themselves as autonomous individuals whose behavior is driven by their own attitudes and wishes, but collectivists seem to view themselves as a part of the groups to which they belong, and greater emphasis is placed on behaving in a manner that is consistent with the goals of those groups. The difference between individualists and collectivists extends to beliefs about others' behavior. Shweder and Bourne (1982) cited anthropological evidence from Africa, Bali, Central America, Central Asia, New Guinea, and Tahiti, and a study comparing North Americans to citizens of Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India, which suggested that, although individualists may be “culturally primed to search for abstract summaries of the autonomous individual” (p. 130), collectivists may be “culturally

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Page 220 primed to see context and social relationships as a necessary condition for behavior” (p. 129). Thus, individualists seem to view behavior as primarily caused by actors' personalities, but collectivists seem to view behavior as substantially due to situational forces. This cross-cultural research on the self and on how people think about the behavior of others suggests a simple conclusion about Miller's (1984) work on the development of attribution differences in the U.S. and India. It seems that people in different cultures develop different ideas about why people behave as they do (see Newman, 1991). In individualist cultures, people seem to learn that personality is the primary cause of behavior (and consistent with this reasoning, children's use of trait terms increases with age; e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973). But in collectivist cultures, people may learn that situations are the primary cause of behavior. Moreover, personality may indeed play a greater role in individualist cultures and situations may play a greater role in collectivist cultures (e.g., Argyle, Shimoda, & Little, 1978; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). If so, what type of attributions might we expect in these cultures? Attribution theorists have suggested that people draw attributions to enhance their ability to predict behavior (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), and so people should be expected to explain behavior with what they may believe the primary determinant of behavior to be: dispositions in individualist cultures and situations in collectivist cultures. This, of course, is just what the cross-cultural research has found.7 It seems that dispositionalism may be partially due to aspects of individualist cultures. Is the correspondence bias then confined to individualist cultures? No. A growing body of research suggests that the correspondence bias is universal (e.g., Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Krull, Loy, Lin, Wang, Chen, & Zhao, 1999; Toyama, 1990, 1998). For example, Krull et al. (1999) compared participants from the U.S. and Taiwan using the attitude-attribution paradigm (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967). Participants in both cultures strongly displayed correspondence bias, and the two cultures did not differ in the degree of correspondence bias. A second investigation compared participants from the U.S. and Hong Kong using the quizmaster paradigm (e.g., Ross et al., 1977). Again, participants in both cultures strongly displayed correspondence bias, and again, the two cultures did not differ in the degree of correspondence bias. Interestingly, some investigations have found that individualists display greater correspondence bias than collectivists when the situational constraints are very salient (e.g., Choi & Nisbett, 1998, Experiment 2). If individualists and collectivists display similar levels of correspondence bias with typical constraints, why might collectivists be better able to discount when situational forces are very salient? One possibility is that very salient situational constraints promote greater causal thinking. As described earlier, the causal theories of collectivists may be relatively situational, whereas those of individualists may be relatively dispositional. Thus, causal thinking may greatly enhance discounting for situations among collectivists, but not among individualists (although it may greatly enhance discounting for dispositions among individualists). It should be emphasized, however, that although there may be more exceptions in collectivist cultures, correspondence bias seems to be the rule across cultures. Situationalism As the work described to this point indicates, people sometimes favor dispositional attributions over situational attributions. However, people sometimes favor situational attributions over dispositional attributions (this tendency is referred to here as situationalism ). For example, as described earlier, people in collectivist cultures may prefer situational attributions over dispositional attributions (e.g., Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). Moreover, Hofstede's (1980) research suggests that a number of nations in Central America and South America (e.g., Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama) may be more collectivist than the majority of Asian nations. Little is known about the attributions drawn by people in Central America and South America, but if greater collectivism produces greater situationalism, then perhaps the cultures that are the most situational have not yet been investigated. Of course, even in the United States, people sometimes prefer situational attributions. For example, it has been suggested that when situations are not salient, people may prefer dispositional attributions. What if situations are very salient? Would we not expect people to prefer situational attributions when they see a person crying at a funeral, when they see a nervous person in a hospital waiting room, or when they see a happy person holding a child who has been rescued from a burning house? In support of this reasoning, Seger and Krull (1999) used scenarios similar to these and found that participants preferred situational attributions. Moreover, it cannot be determined from the extant work whether dispositional attributions or situational attributions are more common. As Gilbert and Malone (1995) pointed out, social psychology experiments are among the poorest vehicles for obtaining actuarial information about attributions. Because no effort is

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Page 221 made to select representative situations or subjects, such experiments cannot reveal the kinds of attributions people usually, normally, routinely, generally, or typically make (p. 28). Gilbert and Malone rightly noted that this should not be construed as a condemnation of the methods traditionally used by attribution researchers, because experiments in attribution are not designed to obtain actuarial information. However, although dispositional attributions may be more common, the available research does not allow us to draw this conclusion. Situational Correspondence A mountain of research demonstrates that people tend to infer that personality corresponds to behavior. Theorists might be tempted to conclude from this that people do not tend to infer that situations correspond to behavior, but that conclusion would be unwarranted. Attribution researchers often provide participants with situational information and ask for dispositional judgments, perhaps assuming that from such judgments it can be inferred what participants think about situations. However, such an assumption is false because dispositional and situational judgments are not strongly related. Thus, our method of asking participants to draw dispositional judgments may contribute to the dispositional bias that we so often find (see e.g., Furnham, Jaspars, & Fincham, 1983). Four mechanisms that cause the correspondence bias were discussed earlier. For example, as described earlier, Gilbert and his colleagues have suggested that when people draw dispositional inferences, they draw correspondent inferences and then may correct with situational information. But, because correction is cognitively demanding, when people are distracted or unmotivated they may fail to complete it, leaving them with correspondent dispositional inferences. Numerous experiments suggest that this model is consistent with how people draw inferences, providing those inferences are dispositional. But suppose people are drawing situational inferences? Krull (1993; see also Quattrone, 1982) suggested that when people draw a situational inference, the process is the mirror image of the dispositional inference model proposed by Gilbert and his colleagues. First, people interpret the actor's behavior (e.g., John appears happy), next they draw a situational inference that corresponds to the behavior (e.g., John's situation must be a happy one), and finally they may revise this inference (e.g., Then again, John could be a happy sort of person. Perhaps his situation is not such a happy one after all). Just as with Gilbert's model, the first two stages were thought to be substantially effortless, but the last stage was thought to be more cognitively demanding. If so, when people are distracted or unmotivated, they may still be able to interpret behavior and draw a situational inference, but they may fail to revise this inference and so display situational correspondence. Krull and Erickson (1995) conducted an experiment in which participants observed a silent video of an anxious woman with the goal of diagnosing the woman's situation. Participants were given anxious or calm dispositional information, and half of the participants in each of these conditions performed a tone-recognition task (designed to create cognitive busyness) while they observed the video. Non-busy participants were sensitive to the anxious or calm dispositional information, but cognitively busy participants were less able to take this information into account, and so displayed situational correspondence. A second experiment replicated this result using a rushing manipulation. Thus, although people may display correspondence bias because they insufficiently correct their dispositional inferences, people may display situational correspondence because they insufficiently correct their situational inferences. Research on the correspondence bias is often taken to suggest that it is relatively easy to process dispositional information and relatively difficult to process situational information. However, research on correspondence bias specifically directs participants to draw dispositional inferences. This is not surprising because the point of the work is to examine dispositional inferences. Nevertheless, we should not fail to take into account the constraints of the experimental situation and so infer that research on correspondence bias reveals how dispositional and situational information is processed rather than how dispositional inferences are drawn. Strange as it may sound, there may be nothing really dispositional about the correspondence bias. Rather, the research on correspondence bias and situational correspondence suggests that once initial inferences (whether dispositional, situational, or some combination) are formed, it often may be relatively difficult to revise those inferences with alternative information, regardless of whether this information is dispositional or situational. FUTURE RESEARCH AND THEORY Having considered some of the research and theory on dispositionalism and correspondence bias, let us now turn to the future. The material in this final section is organized into four areas: expanding research efforts (on situational judgments), model building (judgment

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Page 222 processes), generalizing (with regard to more naturally occurring judgments and to different populations), and, finally, a consideration of whether dispositionalism and correspondence bias should be construed as errors. Expanding Research Efforts Attribution theory is a broad field, and so it is a simple matter to point out areas that call for additional investigation. However, given the emphases of this chapter, one area deserves to be highlighted. More research is needed on situational judgments. Attribution theorists typically divide the universe of possible judgments into two categories: dispositional judgments and situational judgments. One might think that approximately equal numbers of investigations would have addressed each of these types of judgments, but that has not been the case. Attribution researchers often manipulate situational variables and measure dispositional variables. Hence, although much is known about the effects of situations on dispositional judgments, much less is known about how situational judgments are influenced by other variables. Yet research outside attribution theory suggests that situational judgments may be common and important. For example, Latane and Darley's (1970) work on helping behavior suggests that people use the reactions of others to determine whether an ambiguous situation is an emergency, research by Walden and colleagues on social referencing (e.g., Walden & Baxter, 1989) suggests that children use the emotional expressions of their parents as cues about the safety of the current situation (see also Schachter & Singer, 1962), and research on social norms suggests that people use the behavior of others as an indicator of how they should behave (e.g., Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). Given this interest in situational judgments outside attribution, it seems that situational judgments are worthy of the attention of attribution researchers. Moreover, the relative abundance of findings that pertain to dispositional biases may be substantially responsible for the prevailing view that dispositional bias is the norm and that situations are typically overlooked. There is the tendency to assume that the preponderance of dispositional bias in the literature reflects a preponderance of dispositional bias in the world, when in fact it may merely reflect attribution researchers' fascination with dispositional biases. Model Building A primary goal of research in attribution is to construct an accurate model of the process by which people draw social judgments. Clearly it is important to develop an accurate model, because this would not only suggest how a variety of factors are likely to influence judgments (and so, for example, would provide explanations for dispositionalism and the correspondence bias), but it would also provide organization for extant and future research. Two areas related to model building are discussed. Attribution Processes. Several theories of the social inference process have been considered (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986), but what about the process of attribution? The literature reveals a variety of ideas about the mechanisms by which attributions are thought to occur, ranging from more automatic, perceptually based processes (e.g., McArthur & Baron, 1983; Michotte, 1946/1963; Zebrowitz, 1990) or theory-driven processes (e.g., Abelson & Lalljee, 1988; implicit reasoning, Read, 1987) to more effortful and deliberate processes (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1991; explicit reasoning, Read, 1987). Anderson, Krull, and Weiner (1996; Krull & Anderson, 1997) have attempted to combine these views into a single model. According to their model, people can see causality, as when they perceive that a baseball caused a window to break. Explanations may also occur through theory-driven processes, as when people assume that a young man who buys a diamond ring intends to propose marriage to his sweetheart. Judgments may also be the product of more effortful deliberation, as when jurors weigh the evidence carefully during a trial. Of these three, a theory-driven process may be the most common, and attribution theorists have increasingly emphasized the importance of real-world knowledge in the attribution process (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1990; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986). For example, Abraham (1988) pointed out that the two scenarios, “Tom flung himself to the path” and “Tom fell on the path,” would produce different judgments even if the set of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information was constant. Cheng and Novick (1990; Novick, Fratianne, & Cheng, 1992) suggested that people fill in information that is not available with knowledge derived from their past experiences. Both Lalljee (1981) and Hansen (1985) suggested that people approach a scenario that calls for an explanation with a hypothesis and use available information to test that hypothesis. Thus, the current picture of the attribution process seems to be one that emphasizes theory-driven processing and common sense rather than one that is perfectly objective and only relies on content-independent logical principles. Additional research in this vein may be valuable. It is also interesting to consider whether attribution and inference processes are necessarily sequential or whether multiple judgments can be considered simulta-

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Page 223 neously. Read and Miller's (1993) model of social perception (see also Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997) suggests that multiple hypotheses may be evaluated in parallel. This would seem to be an area ripe for additional research. Integration of Work on Social Judgment Processes. Several research areas that have examined person perception processes have progressed substantially independently. For example, research has investigated the social inference process (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Trope & Alfieri, 1997; Uleman et al., 1996), and research has investigated the process of stereotyping (e.g., Devine, 1989; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995), but work in these two areas has not been integrated. However, when people actually interact with others, inferences and attributions may be drawn and stereotypes may be activated all at the same time, and these probably influence one another in interesting and important ways. Although behavior interpretations and inferences can display aspects of automaticity (e.g., Trope & Alfieri, 1997; Uleman et al., 1996), it seems likely that, in an actual interaction, stereotype activation could precede these other social judgments. Target persons can be placed in stereotype-relevant categories the moment they are observed, whereas behavioral cues may follow or be extended across time (some behaviors, such as facial expressions and posture, may be categorized instantly as well). When stereotype activation occurs immediately, stereotypes should influence inferences (see e.g., Moskowitz & Greene, 1998), attributions, and perhaps even the interpretation of behavior (see e.g., Sagar & Schofield, 1980). However, recent research suggests that stereotypes will not always be activated at the mere sight of a target person (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). When they are not, inferences and attributions may influence the likelihood that stereotypes will be activated subsequently. Integration of these and other areas would seem to be a worthy goal. Generalizing The tool of choice for attribution researchers has been the well-controlled laboratory experiment, and for good reason. The ability to establish cause and effect is the sine qua non of scientific investigation. However, even when such experiments are used, the goal of the research should not be to learn about the judgments that people draw in the laboratory, but to learn about the judgments that people draw in everyday life. In addition, although the vast majority of research in attribution has investigated the judgments of North Americans, some research must address the judgments of people in other parts of the world, if only to demonstrate that effects generalize to people everywhere. Each of these areas is discussed briefly. Spontaneous Judgments. In recent years, researchers have become interested in investigating inferences that people draw spontaneously (i.e., in the absence of prompting). This is important because if people only make certain judgments when experimenters ask them to, such judgments reveal little about how people think in their everyday lives. Of course, this interest also presented researchers with quite a logistical problem. How does one find out what people are thinking without asking them what they are thinking? Researchers have solved this problem in a variety of clever ways (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Lupfer, Clark, Church, DePaola, & McDonald, 1996; Winter & Uleman, 1984; see Uleman, et al. 1996, for a review). For example, Uleman and his colleagues have suggested that if people draw inferences spontaneously when they read behavioral scenarios, those inferences should later enhance recall for the scenarios. Thus, if when people read the sentence, ‘‘The secretary solves the mystery halfway through the book,” they infer that the secretary is clever, then the word clever should be a useful memory cue for the sentence. Some of this research has been criticized (e.g., D'Agostino & Beegle, 1996), and some of the research that has been taken as evidence of spontaneous trait inference probably actually shows spontaneous behavior interpretation (see e.g., Bassili, 1989; Uleman, Moskowitz, Roman, & Rhee, 1996; Whitney, Davis, & Waring, 1994, for discussions of the referent of spontaneous trait inferences). However, collectively the research suggests that spontaneous trait inferences can occur. Research on spontaneous inferences suggests that people draw dispositional inferences in their everyday lives, which is certainly encouraging to those of us who study such judgments in the laboratory. Consider three ways that this work could be extended. First, it seems that dispositional inferences can be drawn spontaneously. Can situational inferences? Few investigations have examined spontaneous situational inferences, but where they have been sought, they have been found (e.g., Duff & Newman, 1997; Krull & Dill, 1998; Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990; Lupfer et al., 1996). Most of these investigations suggest that trait inferences may be more spontaneous than situational inferences, but additional research is needed. As mentioned, our methods may be partially responsible for the widespread view that people are dispositionally biased. We should not make the same

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Page 224 mistake here by concluding that, because we have more often sought and found spontaneous trait inferences than spontaneous situational inferences, spontaneous trait inferences are more common or more spontaneous. Second, although spontaneous inferences (particularly dispositional inferences) have received considerable attention, few investigations have attempted to learn whether causal attributions can be drawn spontaneously (e.g., Smith & Miller, 1983; see also Kanazawa, 1992; Sanna & Turley, 1996; Weiner, 1985). Smith and Miller's (1983) work suggests that attributions are not spontaneous. However, as described earlier, Anderson and his colleagues (1996) suggested that attributions can be drawn through several different mechanisms. Even if some attributions are deliberate, systematic, and generally not spontaneous, perhaps perceptually based causal attributions (e.g., Rebekah sees that the rapid arrival of the baseball caused the window to break; e.g., McArthur & Baron, 1983; Michotte, 1946/1963; Zebrowitz, 1990) and theory-driven causal attributions (e.g., Victoria attributed the unexpected death of the ambassador to foul play; e.g., Abelson & Lalljee, 1988; Read, 1987) can be spontaneous. Third, although researchers have taken important steps toward learning about judgments that occur outside the laboratory, it may be worthwhile to even more closely mimic day-to-day judgment making. For example, most investigations of spontaneity have used sentences rather than actual behavior. As Newman (chap. 12, this volume) points out, the fact that experimental procedures differ from everyday life does not mean that there is a theoretical reason to expect differences between everyday judgments and judgments in the laboratory. However, there may be differences in how observed behavior and linguistic information are processed and evaluated (see e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Zajonc, 1980; Zarate & Smith, 1990). Consistent with this view, Roman, Howard, Moskowitz, and Mistry (1997) suggested that observed behavior is more likely than linguistic information to produce spontaneous trait inferences that are linked to the actor rather than merely to the behavior. In addition, research indicates that several aspects of sentence structure can influence social judgments. For example, Semin and Marsman (1994; see also e.g., Brown & Fish, 1983) found that people draw dispositional attributions for sentences that contain interpretative action verbs (e.g., to help) and state action verbs (e.g., to surprise), but situational attributions for sentences that contain state verbs (e.g., to admire). Pryor and Kriss (1977) found that sentences that focus attention on the actor (e.g., “John likes the car”) evoke more dispositional attributions, but sentences that focus attention on the object (e.g., “The car was liked by John”) evoke more situational attributions. Moreover, Mischel (1968) suggested that language may predispose people toward dispositional attributions because the terms used to describe personality are often the same terms used to describe behavior (e.g., we speak of friendly actions and friendly people, but we typically do not speak of friendly situations). Thus, it may be worthwhile to extend the work on spontaneity by using photographs, videotape, and interpersonal interaction, or by taking work on language into account when designing investigations, or both. Different Populations . Triandis (1994) pointed out that about 55% of the world population is Asian, about 21% is European, about 9% is African, about 8% is South American, and only about 7% is North American. However, the vast majority of social-psychological research has been conducted with North American participants. In a sense this is not surprising because social psychology is a young science, one must begin somewhere, it is easier to conduct research in one's own country, and most social psychologists live in North America (Smith & Bond [1994] estimate approximately 75%). In some scientific disciplines a neglect of work in other nations would present no problem at all. As Smith and Bond pointed out, it is unlikely that most experiments in physics would produce different results depending on the nation in which they were conducted. However, attribution theory is not physics; if attribution theorists wish to learn how people think about behavior, rather than how North Americans think about behavior, work must be extended to other cultures. Moreover, although important cultural differences in attribution have been found (e.g., Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994), little is known about the mechanism(s) by which these effects are produced. Are they produced by differences in chronically active categories? Are they caused by differences in inferential goals? Are they due to differences in causal theories? Do cultures differ in the degree or elements of automaticity for the mechanism(s) by which social judgments are produced? Clearly much more research is needed. Should Dispositionalism and the Correspondence Bias Be Construed as Errors? No chapter that has focused on dispositionalism and the correspondence bias as much as this one has would be complete without a discussion of error. Are these two tendencies errors? One does not have to look far through the attribution literature before one finds clear examples of errors. Consider three examples from the investiga-

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Page 225 tions described in this chapter. First, in the quizmaster study conducted by Ross and his colleagues (1977), participants seem to have overlooked the quizmaster's advantage of being able to choose the questions. As a result, when the contestant could not answer the questions, they concluded that the contestant was less knowledgeable than the quizmaster. Second, in Bierbrauer's (1979) study using Milgram's obedience paradigm, participants concluded that relatively few people would administer the highest level of shock, when in fact many people will. Third, in several investigations using the attitude attribution paradigm, participants seemed to believe that essay writers cannot write strong essays that oppose their own position (when they actually can), and so drew inferences that were overly correspondent (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Reeder et al., 1989). These investigations, and many more that could be named, show clear examples of errors. It seems that attribution researchers are capable of devising experimental scenarios in which people make mistakes. However, this is not very surprising. The more important question is: Do people frequently make errors in their day-to-day lives? To help answer this question, consider a study by Block and Funder (1986). Block and Funder wanted to identify the type of person who is most susceptible to the correspondence bias. To investigate this question, these researchers tested 14-year-olds using the quizmaster paradigm developed by Ross and colleagues (1977). The results indicate that, particularly for the boys, those who displayed greater correspondence bias were more competent and better emotionally adjusted. Although this finding might seem perplexing at first, it fits nicely with the literature on development. Block and Funder (p. 1201) explained that the correspondence bias: must, it seems, be based on a prior social competence, the ability to recognize and make appropriate attributions for differential task performance in the first place. That is, the recognition that better performance ordinarily implies greater ability must precede any tendency to use this principle too broadly. Such a developmental sequence is found in many areas of psychology (e.g., language acquisition; see Brown, 1973): First, behavior occurs without reference to a rule, then the rule is learned but applied too categorically, then finally the necessary exceptions to the rule are learned. Thus, just as dispositionalism may be present in individualist cultures because in those cultures people may learn that behavior is typically caused by personality, the correspondence bias may be present because people may learn that behavior typically reflects a correspondent disposition. Only after such basic rules are learned can people begin to learn about exceptions (see Newman, 1991). This reasoning is also consistent with current theories of inference and explanation, which suggest that people automatically leap to an obvious conclusion and then adjust by considering alternatives.8 It seems likely that people initially learn the rule that personality corresponds to behavior because this rule is typically correct. Certainly it is appropriate to draw correspondent inferences when constraining situational forces are not present, but Gilbert and Malone (1995) pointed out three instances in which it is appropriate to draw correspondent inferences in the presence of situational constraints (i.e., three instances in which correspondence bias is not an error). First, correspondence bias is not an error when people choose their own situations (selfinduced constraints). For example, suppose one observes professional boxer Mike “The mallet” Johansen pummeling an opponent in the ring and infers that he has an aggressive personality. Would this be an error? Probably not, because pacifists are unlikely to choose boxing as a profession. As Wachtel (1973) pointed out, in everyday life, situations are not randomly assigned. Rather, people often choose or create their own situations, and so situations in which people are found are often diagnostic of their personalities. Second, correspondence bias is not an error when situations are enduring (omnipresent constraints). For example, a student intern who works with a librarian for a day might behave in a quiet manner, and this might be due to the current circumstances. However, a person who becomes a librarian might, over the next 10 years, become a quiet person (see Higgins & Winter, 1993). It should be noted that such enduring constraints can also be self-induced constraints. People may go to college, join the peace corps, or enter a particular occupation in part because they want to change themselves. Third, correspondence bias is not an error when people would have engaged in the behavior regardless of whether constraints were present (superfluous constraints). For example, suppose there is a terrible famine in a distant land and Paul decides to give money to help. Rachel, who is very attractive, comes to his door and informs Paul that she is collecting money to help those who are in need because of the famine. On seeing Paul give money, an observer might attribute his generosity to a desire to make a good impression on Rachel, when in reality his generosity reflects his generous personality (see Gilbert & Silvera, 1996). In each of these cases, correspondence bias is not an error (and similar arguments apply to dispositionalism). Rather, a failure to draw correspondent dispositional inferences would be an error.

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Page 226 It is also important to recognize that, although some behaviors are actually caused by the situation, many behaviors that can be thought of as situationally determined are better described in terms of typical dispositions.9 Consider two examples. Nathan, who is African American, completes his degree in computer science and begins to look for work in his community. Unfortunately, of the seven companies that might hire him, five are not hiring at the moment. The other two are hiring, but those companies are controlled by racist CEOs and so are unwilling to hire Nathan. In this case, Nathan's inability to find work in his chosen field is indeed caused by the situation. Gilbert and Malone (1995) referred to situational forces of this type as behavioral constraints , where an actor's behavioral options are altered by forces beyond his or her control. The quizmaster paradigm of Ross and colleagues (1977) is also an example of this type of constraint; the contestant has no choice but to fail to answer some of the very difficult questions. In contrast, suppose Thomas, who is 15, goes to a party at a friend's house. His friends begin to pressure him to try some beer. Thomas initially refuses, but his friends keep pressuring him. Eventually he gives in. In this latter example, it might be true that many 15-year-old boys would succumb to the peer pressure, but Thomas' behavior is not actually caused by the situation. Thomas' behavior is diagnostic of his disposition, although his disposition may be fairly typical. Gilbert and Malone (1995) refered to situational forces of this type as psychological constraints , where the actor's behavioral options are not altered, but his or her perspective about those options is altered. The Milgram (1963) scenario is an example of this type of constraint; the teacher can disobey the experimenter's instructions to deliver electric shocks to the learner, although it is difficult to do so. This distinction between behavioral and psychological constraints has implications for how situational causality is viewed and whether it is correct or incorrect to draw a dispositional judgment. When behavioral constraints are present, it can be correct to conclude that behavior is caused by the situation. However, when psychological constraints are present, behavior is never caused by the situation, although the situation may be powerful. Even when consensus is high (i.e., most people behave in a particular way), which is often viewed as an indicator of situational causality, behavior may still be driven by dispositional factors. For example, Dodd (1985) asked college students what they would do if they could be invisible for 24 hours. Many responses, although not a majority in this case, involved criminal behaviors, and the most common response was “rob a bank.” If these participants actually had an opportunity to carry out such behaviors, would it be reasonable to conclude that their behavior was caused by the situation? Obviously not. Rather, it would be correct to draw a dispositional judgment because their behavior would reveal aspects of their personalities that are typically restrained by situational forces. Indeed, even in a much more coercive situation like that devised by Milgram (1963), a third of the participants eventually resisted. Thus, the behavior of those who delivered the highest level of shock is somewhat diagnostic of their personalities, and the behavior of people who commit atrocities during war, engage in violence during riots, and so forth is probably much more diagnostic, even if others behaved similarly. In summary, although there are instances in which dispositionalism and the correspondence bias are errors, it seems likely that, in most instances, they are not. Currently we can only speculate about the prevalence of error and accuracy. Although it is difficult to investigate the topic of error, it is not impossible (see e.g., Kenny, Kieffer, Smith, Ceplenski, & Kuklo, 1996). Given the potentially important consequences of truth and error for individuals and for society as a whole, it would seem worthwhile to investigate this topic further. CONCLUSION This chapter proposed that, although dispositionalism and the correspondence bias are related phenomena, they are not identical. It has also been suggested that the tendency to prefer situational attributions may be quite prevalent, and that both correspondence bias and situational correspondence can be thought of as manifestations of the tendency to draw inferences that match behavior. It is hoped that this chapter will help encourage additional research and theory development on these topics. In addition, even this circumscribed consideration of work in attribution reveals that a great deal has been learned about the judgments people draw from the behavior of others. It is also apparent that there are questions yet to be answered. This suggests that attribution theory is likely to be as vital an area of investigation in the future as it has been in the past. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Daniel Gilbert, Angie Lipsitz, Cyndi McDaniel, Len Newman, and particularly David Silvera for their valuable comments on earlier sections or drafts of this chapter. Chapters 1 to 4 of Miles Hewstone's (1990) book, Causal Attribution, were also very

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Page 227 useful and informative. ENDNOTES 1. Because this chapter focuses on dispositionalism and the correspondence bias, several theories that have been influential in attribution but that are not as relevant to these tendencies, such as the theory of Weiner and his colleagues (e.g., Weiner, 1986), are not discussed. 2. The interested reader is referred to the informative discussion of the history of attribution in Hewstone (1990). 3. Correspondent Inference Theory has been modified over time (see, e.g., Jones, 1990; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976). The terminology used by Jones (1990) is employed here. In Jones and Davis' paper, prior probability was discussed in terms of social desirability, and distinctiveness was referred to in terms of the noncommon effects associated with different choices. 4. One can imagine how this tendency to overlook role-conferred advantages might have important implications in day-to-day life. For example, social factors might cause individuals from traditionally disadvantaged ethnic groups to be found more frequently in low-status occupations. However, because such social factors may not be salient, people may assume that these individuals lack innate ability, just as they assume that contestants have lower general knowledge than quizmasters. 5. It should be noted that, although correction of a dispositional inference is often said to involve the consideration of situational forces, this need not be so. In fact, perhaps the most impressive demonstration of correction involved the consideration of an alternative disposition. Fein (1996) found that when people are suspicious of a target's motives, they tend to correct their dispositional inferences rather than accept behavior at face value. Similarly, when situational inferences are corrected, it seems likely that the alternative need not be dispositional. 6. It is worth noting that Gilbert and his colleagues typically instruct participants to diagnose either the target's personality or the target's situation because a main goal of that research is to examine effects of cognitive load on the revision of initial inferences. Because a goal is assigned, these initial inferences are not spontaneous, nor was the research intended to examine the spontaneity of inferences. Both the effects of such goals and the topic of spontaneity are addressed later. 7. A variety of other effects can also be thought of as manifestations of this cultural difference. For example, research by Jellison and Green (1981) suggested that people in individualist cultures may prefer dispositional attributions because internal judgments are more socially desirable in such cultures. However, internal judgments may not be more socially desirable in collectivist cultures. 8. Some might be tempted to devise an evolutionary explanation for this tendency or the processes involved. It should be noted that evolutionary psychology is subject to the same criticisms that can be leveled against Darwinism (e.g., Behe, 1996; Brown, 1996; Denton, 1986; Johnson, 1993). 9. Both Ross (1977) and Gilbert (1998) pointed out that attribution theorists' traditional distinction between dispositional and situational causality can be thought of as a distinction between characteristics that people have in common or typical dispositions (analogous to situational causality) and individual differences or atypical dispositions (analogous to dispositional causality).

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Page 229 14 Let's Not Forget the Past When We Go to the Future: On Our Knowledge of Knowledge Accessibility Diederik A. Stapel Willem Koomen University of Groningen University of Amsterdam Modern social psychology has witnessed several transformations of its subject matter. The past decades have witnessed the waxing and waning of research on cognitive dissonance and consistency theories (1950s and 1960s), and attribution research (1960s and 1970s). The latest – and perhaps most productive – transformation of social psychology's object of inquiry announced itself with the advent of the social cognition movement in the late 1970s. Philosophers of science, such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Latour, have emphasized the ways in which scientific theories and practices are bounded by the social context in which they have been developed. Every so often, each field of science redefines and recategorizes its topics of inquiry. What is hot now was not so hot then. An advantage of the existence of fads and fashions in scientific inquiry is that each new trend stimulates a host of new research directions and methodologies. A potential disadvantage is that scientific trends define themselves not only by suggesting that some questions (“How do people process unexpected information?’’) are more interesting than others (“How do people learn social norms and values?”), but also by implying that certain empirical findings are more interesting than others. One of the aims of this chapter is to demonstrate that, at present in the domain of knowledge accessibility research, a bias may be detected. Knowledge accessibility research investigates when, how, and in what direction activated mental representations may affect memory and judgment (see Higgins, 1996; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Within the current social cognition movement, knowledge accessibility research has been preoccupied primarily with understanding the impact of accessible knowledge on categorization and interpretation processes. Investigations of the effects of activated knowledge on other psychological processes, such as response generation and judgment construction, are relatively rare. Therefore, generalizations that are based on social-cognitive knowledge accessibility research are often overgeneralizations. More specifically, results from experiments designed to test the impact of a particular type of accessible information (i.e., traits) on a particular type of cognitive process (i.e., interpretation) guide theories about the impact of accessible information on impression formation in general (e.g., Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Following both Gigerenzer's (1991) argument that scientists' tools and methods often shape their theories and Griffin and Ross' (1991) concept of “egocentric construal processes,” we argue that researchers examining knowledge accessibility effects are not aware of the restrictions in their research designs and seem to be unable to make appropriate allowances for the possibility that other research perspectives may come to different conclusions than they do. In this chapter, we hope to show how different theoretical perspectives come to dramatically different conclusions by confronting the social cognition approach to knowledge accessibility effects with investigations of context effects in psychophysical, comparative, and social judgment. KNOWLEDGE ACCESSIBILITY A recurring theme in social psychology research is that a primary determinant of how people understand and evaluate new stimuli is their past knowledge (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). People understand the world by relating what they are currently experiencing to the knowledge they have previously accumulated. However, not all previous experiences or stored knowledge will affect the impression formation process to the same extent. Research on knowledge accessibility suggests that an important determinant of whether knowledge is used in the understanding and evaluation of social stimuli is the relative accessibility of that knowledge. How one understands and evaluates the world is, at least in part, a function of the kind of knowledge that is accessible during the impression formation process. Of course,

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Page 230 accessibility per se is not sufficient. Accessible knowledge guides our impressions only when that knowledge is applicable to the stimulus information: Ruminations about Chinese food are unlikely to affect our assessment of our brother's newborn daughter. Given the applicability of multiple cognitive structures, however, the cognitive structure that is most accessible is most likely to act as an escort to interpretation and evaluation. When we have just finished reading Melville's Moby Dick and ruminations about dangerous and enigmatic huge sea mammals are foremost on our minds, we are more likely to identify “a speck on the horizon” (see Bruner, 1957a, p. 41) as a whale rather than a ship or drilling platform. What we see is often directly related to what is on the top of our minds. The same target stimulus can be associated with different responses depending on what kind of knowledge is cognitively activated during the impression formation process. Knowledge accessibility research has excelled in demonstrating that all sorts of cognitive structures may exert an influence on all components of the impression formation process. Thus, knowledge accessibility may determine which stimuli are given attention, how those stimuli are encoded, the way in which they are stored in and retrieved from memory, and how they are evaluated and judged. Furthermore, accessible cognitive structures such as trait concepts (adventurous, friendly) social categories (professors, introverts), scripts (going to a restaurant, getting a Ph.D.), procedures (solving problems, considering alternatives), goals (I want to become rich), specific event memories (an accident in Chicago, a trip through the southwest), specific person exemplars (Richard Nixon, Marilyn Monroe), specific object exemplars (a tennis ball, an apple), expectancies (Gordon is a nice guy), attitudes (I like Ike), stereotypes (women are from Venus, men are from Mars), and actual (I am achievement oriented) and desired (If only I could be like Serena) self-states may all be applied when forming an impression or constructing a judgment of a target stimulus. In other words, accessibility is an important theoretical construct in many of social psychology's subdomains (for reviews, see Eiser, 1990; Higgins, 1989c; 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; Stapel, 1997; Strack, 1992a; Wyer & Srull, 1989). But what role do these accessible knowledge structures play in the perception of our social worlds? Do they act as rose-colored glasses, such that everything is painted in the same color and is given the same meaning as the accessible cognitive structures? Or are they typically used as an anchor, as a frame of reference to which everything else is compared? What is the direction of knowledge accessibility effects? When does knowledge accessibility result in assimilation (impressions shift toward the activated knowledge)? When does it yield contrast (impressions shift away from the activated knowledge)? When one examines the relevant literature in an attempt to answer these questions, one answer presents itself: It depends on the kind of literature one looks at. Different literatures give different explanations for the occurrence of assimilation and contrast. Depending on the theoretical meta-perspective from which one looks at the impact of accessible knowledge on impression formation processes, either assimilation or contrast is portrayed as the typical or standard effect. In today's social psychology, research that focuses on the ways on which cognitive structures such as stereotypes and expectancies affect the construal, evaluation, and recall of social stimuli constitutes the dominant perspective (see Griffin & Ross, 1991). However, besides this dominant perspective, there exists a more classic and therefore relatively dormant perspective in social psychology that focuses not on the interpretative but on the comparative processes that may be instigated by cognitively activated information. These two perspectives come to different conclusions when it concerns the direction of knowledge accessibility effects. Specifically, investigations of knowledge accessibility effects that take an information-processing perspective, and thus tend to emphasize the ways in which accessible knowledge affects the categorization or encoding of social stimuli, often conclude that assimilation is the most typical knowledge accessibility effect. Conversely, investigations that are rooted in studies of psychophysics and comparative judgment, and thus are especially interested in the ways in which accessible knowledge affects the representation of the comparison standards that are used in the construction of social judgment, tend to portray contrast as the most natural context effect. In the following pages we discuss the dominant (social cognition) and dormant (social judgment) approaches to the study of knowledge accessibility effects in more detail. We tell a tale of two histories. In doing so, we hope to come to an understanding of why social cognition researchers often conclude that the standard knowledge accessibility effect is assimilation, whereas social judgment researchers often concur that the most natural effect of contextually activated information is contrast. THE DOMINANT HISTORY: CATEGORY ACCESSIBILITY When one attempts to put a theoretical construct in a

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Page 231 historical context, every point of departure is arbitrary. However, we cannot be accused of recklessness when we write that the dominant approach to the study of knowledge accessibility effects probably received its major impetus from Bruner's (1957b) article “On Perceptual Readiness.” In this article, Bruner took up Bartlett's (1932) notion that one of the fundamental processes of perception is the connection of stimulus information with some stored category. Bruner proposed that the readiness with which a person classifies information in terms of a particular category is an indicator of the accessibility of that category. Thus, Bruner introduced a novel notion with which one could describe the role of expectancies and motivations on perception – the notion of category accessibility . Bruner defined accessibility as the ease or speed with which a given stimulus input is coded in terms of a given category under varying conditions. The greater the accessibility of stored categorical knowledge, the more likely it would be used to categorize stimulus information even when the stimulus information was impoverished or distantly related. As accessibility of the stored category increased, stimulus information would be more easily and swiftly recognized as a member of the category. As Higgins (1989c) wrote in his review of knowledge accessibility effects, a significant implication of Bruner's notion of accessibility is that the likelihood that people will apply a certain category when interpreting a stimulus is not a function solely of the match between features of the target stimulus and the activated category. Instead, other factors, such as expectancies, needs, motivations, or attitudes, can increase the likelihood that a particular category rather than an alternative will be applied during the interpretation process. Once a particular category is applied, features missing 'in the target stimulus that are part of the accessible category are filled in. An early demonstration of how category accessibility affects the ways in which people go beyond the information given appears in an experiment by Bruner, Busiek, and Minturn (1952). These investigators were interested in how the perception of objects in a particular category tends to be distorted toward (assimilated) the most typical object in that class. They designed an experiment to demonstrate how accessible category labels affect perception. In that experiment, they presented participants line-drawn figures in brief flashes on a projection screen. Some participants were told before each figure was shown that the drawing was of a particular object (“I am going to show you a figure resembling a pine tree”). Other participants were instructed that the drawing resembled ‘‘either a pine tree or a trowel.” Still others were given no specific instructions. In every case, the participants were asked to reproduce the figure. The result was a clear tendency to assimilate the figure to the typical instance suggested by the category label that was activated in the instructions. Bruner, Postman, and Rodrigues (1951) showed how this same kind of assimilation tends to operate in the perception of color. When respondents were asked to adjust a color wheel to match an ambiguously colored object that was shaped like and presented as a tomato , the match had much more red in it than if the object were objectively colored in the same ambiguous hue, but its shape and label activated the category lemon . Although Bruner introduced the term category accessibility in the late 1950s, in social psychology the use of this construct as a psychological variable did not bear fruit until the 1970s. Not surprisingly, this resurgence of the concept of accessibility coincided with the coming of the social cognition movement. Bruner's description of accessibility effects has an undeniable cognitive flavor: Accessible constructs are readily used in the processing (e.g., encoding, storage, retrieval) of information. Thus, in the mid-1970s, several studies demonstrated that, once a target stimulus is encoded, interpreted as an instance of a particular category, the implications of this encoding become relatively accessible and are therefore more likely to be used as a basis for subsequent judgments about the target than the original information. For example, Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) found that, once a person has constructed an explanation of an event involving himself or another person, this construction, rather than the information that has stimulated it, is used to predict the likelihood of future events. Similarly, Carlston (1980) showed that, once a judgment of a stimulus person has been made on the basis of all kinds of information, this judgment is subsequently used as a basis for later inferences about the person independent of the information on which the judgment was originally based. The findings of both the Carlston and Ross et al. studies suggest that the most accessible cognitions about an object or event (i.e., those that have been acquired and used most recently) have a major influence on future judgments. Or as Srull and Wyer (1979) wrote: “When individuals are asked to judge themselves or another person, they are unlikely to perform an exhaustive search of memory for all cognitions that have implications for this judgment. Rather, they are likely to base their judgment on some subset of these cognitions that is most readily accessible” (p. 1660). The most straightforward evidence for this claim came from studies employing what could be called the unrelated-task paradigm. In these studies, it was demon-

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Page 232 strated that simply activating a construct in one task was capable of increasing the accessibility of the construct sufficiently to give it precedence when participants categorized the behavior of a target person in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated task. One article can be considered seminal in its use of the unrelated task paradigm. Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) invited participants to participate in two tasks. Participants were first required to perform a “perception” task that involved exposure to a number of different trait concepts as part of a Stroop task. In one condition, participants were exposed to synonyms of the trait adventurous, whereas other participants were exposed to synonyms of the trait reckless . In an ostensibly unrelated subsequent study on “reading comprehension,” participants were given an ambiguous behavioral description of a stimulus person (Donald) that could be interpreted as either adventurous or reckless. It was found that participants who had had prior exposure to the adventurous concept perceived the stimulus person as more adventurous, whereas participants who had had prior exposure to the reckless concept perceived the stimulus person as more reckless. Similar effects were found in a subsequent and well-cited paper by Srull and Wyer (1979). These investigators also performed the unrelated-task paradigm to demonstrate that the surreptitious activation of trait concepts (hostile, friendly) may guide the interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus (friendly/hostile Donald) and induce assimilation. The assimilation effects reported in the Higgins et al. and Srull and Wyer studies have been replicated in many subsequent studies in which person judgments are preceded by trait priming (see Higgins, 1989c, 1996). However, the general hypothesis that accessible knowledge may guide interpretation processes has also been corroborated using knowledge other than trait concepts (see Higgins, 1996; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Next, we give some prominent examples of such findings in a discussion of assimilative interpretation effects of accessible stereotypes, attitudes, moods, and emotions. Stereotypes Stereotyping is the use of beliefs about a social group (stereotypes) in judgments of this group or its members. The traditional and predominant view, implicit if not explicit, in stereotyping research is that stereotypes lead to stereotyping. That is, stereotypes color the meaning of behavior such that the denotation and connotation of an accessible stereotype serve as a helmsman in the impression formation process. Hence, one of the most robust findings (Kunda & Thagard, 1996, p. 294) in the literature on stereotyping and social categorization is that judgments of individual group members tend to be assimilated toward the implications of the group (or the category mean) on dimensions relevant to the stereotype. For example, Sagar and Schofield (1980) showed that a shove was viewed as more violent when performed by an African American. Banaji, Hardin, and Rothman (1993) found that judgments of an ambiguous person description may be assimilated toward the implications of an accessible stereotype given that the target person is a member of the stereotyped group. Accessible stereotype-relevant knowledge is used in the interpretation of stimuli only if the social category of the target matches the activated stereotype. Thus, although the trait dependent is applicable to the interpretation of an ambiguously dependent target person, cognitive accessibility of this trait only affects judgments of ambiguously dependent women but not men because dependence is stereotypical of women and not of men. Likewise, priming information about aggression affects judgments of ambiguously aggressive men but not of ambiguously aggressive women because aggression is stereotypical of men (Banaji et al., 1993). Several investigations of the impact of activated stereotypes on person judgment have provided evidence suggesting that assimilation effects are most likely to occur when perceivers can use activated stereotypes in interpreting the target stimuli (see von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). That is, stereotypes are most likely to exert an assimilative influence on target evaluations when they are activated prior to participants' encoding information about target behaviors (Park & Hastie, 1987). For example, a Hispanic defendant is more likely to be judged as guilty of a crime when his ethnicity is identified before the case evidence is received. If evidence is presented prior to information about the defendant's ethnicity, no assimilation effects are obtained (Bodenhausen, 1988). Attitudes A number of studies have suggested that accessible attitudes may have similar interpretation effects as accessible stereotypes (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1986). For example, in a classic study by Hastorf and Cantril (1954), Princeton and Dartmouth fans viewed the same film of a hard-fought struggle between their respective teams. Despite the constancy of the objective stimulus, the opposing partisans' interpretations of what happened suggested two very different games. The Princeton fans' interpretations suggested a continuing

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Page 233 saga of Dartmouth atrocities, whereas the Dartmouth fans' interpretations suggested a hard-hitting contest in which both sides contributed equally to the violence. Accessible attitudes guide selective perception so one continues to see attitude objects in a manner congruent with one's attitude. A famous study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) also showed how the interpretation of complex social stimuli is often assimilated toward people's (chronically accessible) attitudes. The authors recruited both proponents and opponents of capital punishment and asked them to read a mixed package of evidence about the deterrent effect of the death penalty. As predicted, both sides took comfort from the evidence in support of their own position and had no problem seeing the flaws in the evidence for the opposing view. In the end, both sides came away with their views on capital punishment strengthened and further polarized. Houston and Fazio (1989) showed that this biased interpretation phenomenon occurs primarily (and perhaps exclusively) for people whose attitudes are highly accessible (see also Fazio, 1986; Fazio & Williams, 1986). Mood and Emotion The relation between mood and judgments is also often understood in terms of accessibility effects on the interpretation of social stimuli as caused by the spreading activation from the activated construct (mood). The general idea is that moods may influence categorization by increasing access to similarly toned social categories (a positive mood activates positive categories; see Forgas & Bower, 1987) or by directly providing perceivers with information concerning their feelings toward the target stimulus (“When I feel good in the presence of this target, this means I like the target”; see Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Thus, when participants encounter a target stimulus that can be categorized in either positive or negative terms, their mood leads to categorization of the target in terms of the mood congruent category (see Forgas, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). In the domain of person perception, several studies have demonstrated that moods may guide the interpretation of ambiguous behavioral information. Forgas and Bower (1987) showed that participants who were in a positive mood tended to see more positive than negative behaviors in a person perception task, whereas the opposite was true for participants in a negative mood. Similarly, Martin (1986) showed that subtle exposure to mood-inducing statements such as ‘‘I feel good” versus “I feel bad” led to assimilation effects in ostensibly unrelated judgments of an ambiguous person description (see also Stapel & Koomen, 2000). Similar to the assimilation effects of general mood states, there is evidence that the interpretation of our social world may also be affected by the specific emotions we feel during impression formation. The possibility that emotions influence how we encode complex social stimuli is suggested by everyday experiences that we see people with whom we are in love as more attractive than people whom we hate, that the same dark alley looks more ominous when we are afraid than when we are not, and that foods that are usually appealing look unappetizing when we feel disgust. In a series of lexical decision studies, Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Setterlund (1997) induced participants to feel happiness or sadness and then exposed them to a series of letter strings, some of which were words and some of which were not. The word lists used in the experiments included words related to happiness (e.g., delight), sadness (e.g., gloom), anger (e.g., rage ), and love (e.g., passion), as well as neutral control words. The findings revealed assimilation effects. That is, happy participants were quicker in recognizing happy words, whereas sad participants were quicker in recognizing sad words. Patterns of facilitation for anger and love words did not vary by emotional state of the participant. In other words, the facilitation effects were emotion-specific and not due to the general induction of positive versus negative affect. Niedenthal et al. (1997) explained these findings in terms of emotions increasing the accessibility of constructs that have been associated with these emotions. When an individual experiences an emotion, information that is associated with the emotion is more likely to come to mind and influence subsequent information processing. When we are happy, constructs related to experiences of happiness will become activated, and therefore ambiguous or impoverished stimuli are more readily interpreted in terms that are congruent with these accessible constructs (see Forgas, 1995; Niedenthal et al., 1997; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). IS ASSIMILATION THE DEFAULT? As our review of investigations of the impact of accessible trait concepts, stereotypes, moods, emotions, and attitudes on categorization and interpretation processes shows, the social cognition approach to the study of socialpsychological phenomena has documented abundant evidence for the notion that accessible knowledge is likely to result in assimilation effects. Reviews of the impact of expectancies (Neuberg, 1996), motivations, and goals (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996) on the interpretation of social stimuli have come to a similar conclusion. Accessible knowledge guides the interpreta-

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Page 234 tion of the social world and therefore assimilation is likely to ensue in social judgments. The abundance of assimilation effects in studies of knowledge accessibility effects has led some authors to conclude that assimilation is the “basic effect of recent and frequent activation” (Higgins, 1989c, p. 78) and one of the more “fundamental” findings of modern social psychology (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991, p. 170). Several researchers have argued that assimilation is the natural knowledge accessibility effect. Accessible knowledge is more likely to lead to assimilation than contrast in subsequent judgments (see Higgins, 1996; Martin, 1986; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). For example, Schwarz and Bless (1992a) wrote that “information that appears as potentially relevant to the task may result in assimilation or in contrast effects, depending on whether it is included in, or excluded from, the temporary representation that the individual forms of the target category. We assume that the default operation is to include the apparently relevant information” (p. 239; italics added). Similarly, Martin, et al. (1990) contended that assimilation is the most natural effect because the processes underlying it involve only a few cognitive steps: ‘‘contrast involves more cognitive steps than does assimilation” (p. 29). And indeed, several studies have convincingly demonstrated that assimilation effects seem to be more easily obtained than contrast effects when participants are distracted, low in need for cognition, or unaware of the impact of the activated information (see Higgins, 1996; Martin et al., 1990). However, it should be noted again that most of the studies demonstrating that assimilation effects require less cognitive resources than contrast effects have looked at the impact of accessible knowledge from a predominantly cognitive perspective. As Mervis and Rosch (1981) argued, one of the basic tenets of the cognitive or information processing perspective in modern psychology is the belief that categorization is one of the most fundamental aspects of cognition. As an offspring of cognitive psychology, social cognition research has emphasized the question how social knowledge may affect social categorization processes. It has been shown convincingly how different kinds of accessible cognitive structures (e.g., traits, attitudes, stereotypes) may guide the interpretation of target information. As Carlston and Smith (1996) argued, given that the encoding or interpretation of a stimulus involves the integration of that material with existing knowledge, it makes sense that these processes will tend to be influenced by the particular subset of cognitions that is most accessible. Logically, the influence of information that is used to fill in features missing in the target stimulus is assimilative. Hence, one may argue, a cognitive approach to the study of knowledge accessibility effects is likely to find interpretative assimilation effects. We believe that, because of the success of the social cognition movement in general and category accessibility research in particular, studies that have looked at the impact of accessible knowledge on processes other than categorization and interpretation have been largely neglected in theorizing about the consequences of knowledge accessibility for social judgment. Influence of accessible knowledge on interpretation processes that take place in the encoding stage of the impression formation process has thus been generalized to statements about knowledge accessibility effects in general. Studies that demonstrate the context-bound and comparative nature of social judgment and focus on the impact of contextually activated information in the judgment stage of the impression formation process are seldom cited in reviews of knowledge accessibility effects (e.g., Higgins, 1989c, 1996; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; Wyer & Srull, 1989), rarely integrated with findings concerning interpretation effects (e.g., Herr, 1986; Philippot, Schwarz, Carrera, De Vries, & Van Yperen, 1991), and thus relatively dormant in the dominant social cognition paradigm. THE DORMANT HISTORY: COMPARISON EFFECTS As everyday experience teaches us, there is no one-to-one relationship between people's objective circumstances and, for example, their levels of happiness and unhappiness. Of course, there are some kinds of events that we could expect would make almost anybody happy or upset, but we can all think of people who remain cheerful in the face of hardship and others who seem miserable despite no lack of both mental and material comfort. As demonstrated earlier, research on category accessibility effects suggests that when the same event makes one person happy and another unhappy, these persons may be categorizing the event differently. Social judgment research takes another approach and proposes that such judgmental differences may be the result of people comparing the target stimulus against different standards. Social judgment research focuses on the comparative nature of judgment. As Eiser (1990, p. 10) wrote in his review of the social judgment literature, “all judgments are comparative.” That is, there is no judgment when there is no (implicit or explicit) comparison. Our feelings and evaluations are experienced and made contextually, and thus they are determined by their

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Page 235 relationships to other affects and judgments. To say that the Sears Tower is tall, heartbreak is horrible, and Einstein is intelligent is to say that other buildings are less tall, other feelings are less horrible, and other people are less intelligent. The comparative nature of judgment implies that the context in which a stimulus is embedded may provide a frame of reference when constructing a judgment of this stimulus. Thus, chronically or contextually activated information may not only serve as an interpretation frame, but also as a comparison standard during impression formation. The first studies of how the context in which a stimulus is evaluated may act as a comparison standard in judgments of that stimulus were performed by researchers interested in psychophysical phenomena. Consider, for example, a task requiring participants to identify the intensity of a number of auditory tones that vary in their degree of loudness. Whether a tone is classified as very loud depends, among other things, on the other tones being judged in the experimental session. In the context of several relatively loud tones, a medium range tone is judged as louder than it would be in the context of several relatively quiet tones. This type of contextual influence is termed comparison contrast because judgments are contrasted away from the values in the surrounding context to which the target can be compared (Long, 1937). Beebe-Center (1929) demonstrated similar contrast effects in judgments of the pleasantness of visual stimuli. Participants rated particular colors as more pleasant if they were preceded by unpleasant colors than if they were preceded by more pleasant ones. Research on perceptual illusions has also convincingly shown that the context in which stimuli are presented may lead to comparison contrast effects in people's judgments. The perceptual illusion that is usually taken as the prototypical example of a perceptual contrast effect is the Ebbinghaus illusion (see Fig. 14.1). In the Ebbinghaus illusion, a central object that is seen in a context of surrounding larger objects appears to be smaller than a same-size central object that is perceived in a context of surrounding smaller objects (Coren & Enns, 1993). Contemporary explanations of these and other contrast effects are based on the same notions that underlie Helson's (1964) adaptation level theory (see Coren & Enns, 1993; Eiser, 1990). This theory, and its many elaborations, make the assumption that the sensory magnitude of any stimulus is judged in a relative way, using the magnitude of the surrounding context stimuli as a comparison standard. People experience the pleasantness, size, weight, or color of a target as relative to the contextually activated information because they see the Fig. 14.1. The Ebbinghaus illusion.

target in comparison with this information. Contextually activated information thus affects the representation of the reference points we use in constructing our judgments. Comparison contrast effects have also been found for judgments of psychosocial stimuli. Most notably, perhaps, Sherif and Hovland (1953) applied principles of psychophysical and comparative judgment to the domain of attitudes. They assumed that, similar to the impact of context on target stimuli, people's prior attitudes may distort their perceptions of other people's attitudinal positions. In general terms, their theory assumes that a recipient's own attitudinal position serves as a judgmental standard or anchor that influences where along an evaluative continuum a communicator's advocated position is perceived to lie. Thus, people's attitudes can be treated as chronically accessible knowledge that is used as a reference point in the evaluation of social events. The “main prediction” (Eiser, 1990, p. 61) of the Sherif and Hovland model is that, for judges who have strong attitudes, their attitude is likely to act as an extreme comparison standard with which relevant information can be contrasted. Moderate or neutral attitudinal positions thus tend to be contrasted away from a judge's own attitude. A prominent example of this mechanism is given by a study of Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985). These investigators presented pro-Israeli and pro-Arab student partisans (as well as some neutral students) with excerpts from television news coverage of the “Beirut massacre” of 1984. Whereas the neutral students rated the broadcast summaries as being relatively unbiased, the partisans' ratings showed contrast away from the judges' (extreme) attitudes. Pro-Arab and pro-Israeli viewers alike were convinced that the other side had been favored by the media, that their own side had been treated unfairly, and that these biases in reporting had reflected the self-interests and ideologies of those responsible for

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Page 236 the program. Comparable effects have been found for criminal judgments (Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976), judgments of affect (Manis, 1967), emotional expressions (Tanaka-Matsumi, Attivissimo, Nelson, & D'Urso, 1995), and the physical attractiveness of others (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980). The use of context information as a judgment anchor has also been demonstrated quite often in the domain of social comparison research, which investigates the relation between self- and other-judgments (Festinger, 1954a). A number of experiments have shown that people's self-perceptions are often contrasted against the surrounding context. When self-judgments are made in the context of others who perform much better than we do, our selfevaluations are likely to drop, whereas when such judgments are made in the context of others who perform worse, self-evaluations are probably augmented (see Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). This type of comparison contrast is illustrated by a well-known study of Morse and Gergen (1970). These investigators led participants to believe that they were interviewing for a position as a research assistant. Participants were asked to wait for the alleged interview in the company of another applicant –a confederate. In the ‘‘Mister Clean” condition, the confederate was impeccably well mannered and professional in all respects; in the “Mister Dirty” condition, the confederate was disheveled and slovenly. Compared with earlier appraisals of the self, the selfesteem of participants waiting with the undesirable confederate rose; the reverse was true for those who waited with the desirable confederate (see Suls & Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989). Although there is a tendency in social cognition research to assume that assimilation is the basic effect in all types of accessibility-driven judgments, students of comparative judgment have argued that contrast is the most natural effect of contextually activated information. For example, Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1983) wrote that “the predominant context effect in the social judgment literature is the contrast effect. It has often been noted that the judgment of a given target stimulus is inversely related to the values of the stimuli that accompany it” (p. 325). Similarly, Eiser (1990) argued that “the most predictable effect” of context stimuli on target judgments “is an effect known as contrast” (p. 11), and Brown et al. (1992) concurred that “it is well-established that judgments are influenced by the frame of reference that surrounding stimuli provide (Helson, 1964). The usual finding is a contrast effect: The judgment of a target stimulus is displaced away from the judgment of an anchor” (p. 717). One way to remedy this paradox is to point at the metatheoretical interests of the two approaches. Social cognition research is primarily concerned with issues of categorization and interpretation, whereas the social comparison/judgment approach primarily focuses on the context-bound and comparative nature of all sorts of social judgments. However, the observation that theoretical perspectives may create different empirical phenomena is not helpful when one is in search of a practical, psychological theory of assimilation and contrast effects – which we are. Thus again, we need to ask the inevitable question we posed before: When does knowledge accessibility result in assimilation? When does it yield contrast? Next we discuss how the dominant and dormant approach to knowledge accessibility effects have typically dealt with these questions. APPROPRIATENESS AND EXTREMITY Scientific reality is a little more complex than our tale of two histories may have suggested. Although the findings of experiments performed within the interpretative social cognition and the comparative social judgment paradigms have been taken to mean that accessible knowledge most typically results in assimilation and contrast, respectively, sometimes it is found that opposite effects occur. That is, both assimilation and contrast have been reported in both the social cognition and social judgment literatures. How have these “unnatural” (Srull, 1991) effects been accounted for? Typically in social cognition research an appropriateness and in social judgment research an extremity explanation is given. Appropriateness As Srull (1991) noted, within the social cognition paradigm “the standard interpretation” for the occurrence of contrast effects is that priming manipulations “become too salient, participants become aware of their possible biasing effects and they strategically attempt to counteract them” (p. 205). In accordance with this argument, several researchers began to consider the role of the perceived appropriateness of accessible information in the direction of knowledge accessibility effects (e.g., Bargh, 1992; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Strack, 1992a). Sometimes people are aware that a reliance on accessible information is inappropriate and that this may create a bias in their judgment. If people detect a bias, they are likely to instigate correction-for-bias processes to shift their judgments in a reverse direction. Thus, contrast effects can occur as a result of correcting for an expected assimilative effect (see Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995).

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Page 237 To examine the impact of appropriateness on knowledge accessibility effects, Martin (1986) examined what happens when trait concepts are primed blatantly rather than subtly. To increase the likelihood that the participants would associate trait activation with the priming task, the priming method blatantly activated the trait concepts. The participants were given a series of phrases and were asked to decide which of two personality traits they exemplified. They also indicated their choice by placing the number of the phrase under a column headed by the trait they selected. In the positive priming condition, boldness and self-assurance were primed. In the negative priming condition, foolhardiness and egotism were primed. Following this priming task, participants read ambiguous target person behaviors that were relevant to the activated trait concepts (see Higgins et al., 1977) and gave their impressions of the target person by rating him on scales bounded by the primed traits (e.g., reckless-adventurous). Martin (1986) found with this blatant priming task that participants rated the target person more positively in the negative conditions and more negatively in the positive conditions – a contrast effect. Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh (1987) found a similar awareness effect. They first exposed participants to a trait priming task and then asked them to form an impression of an ambiguous target person. Participants were divided into two groups; those who did and those who did not remember the primed constructs (measured through a free recall measure taken after the categorization task). A strong assimilation effect of priming was found among those participants who did not remember any of the primed constructs. However, a contrast effect was found among those participants who did remember one or more of the primed trait concepts. Using a slightly different paradigm, Newman and Uleman (1990) also found a contrast effect when the participants recalled blatantly primed trait concepts, whereas assimilation occurred when these concepts were activated more subtly and therefore not easily recalled. In a more direct test of the effect of memory for accessible knowledge on subsequent judgments, Moskowitz and Roman (1992) gave participants with either positive or negative traitimplying sentences (e.g., “He knew he could handle most problems that would come up” [confident] versus “He knew he was the best and didn't hesitate to tell people about it” [conceited]) the instruction to either memorize these sentences or form an impression of the actor, reasoning that participants instructed to memorize these sentences would spontaneously infer the relevant traits (e.g., confident vs. conceited) outside of awareness, whereas those instructed to form impressions would consciously infer these traits. After having been exposed to the trait-implying sentences, all participants were asked to judge an ambiguous (confident/conceited) target description on relevant rating scales. Assimilation was found under memorization conditions and contrast was found under contrast conditions, thus supporting the hypothesis that consciously inferring trait primes is more likely to result in contrast than when such primes are inferred nonconsciously. Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler, and Wänke (1993) reported similar results. These authors primed participants with either helpful or dishonest. Following a distractor task, the participants were or were not assigned to a reminding condition in which they were asked to remember information related to the primed words. All participants then were asked to judge a target person whose behavior could be interpreted as either helpful or dishonest. An assimilation effect of priming was found for the participants who were not reminded of the priming events prior to their target judgments. A contrast effect was found, however, for the participants who were reminded of the priming events (see Stapel, Koomen, & Zeelenberg, 1998). In summary, as Higgins (1989c) wrote in his review of social cognition studies of knowledge accessibility effects, “results of these studies suggest that the basic effect of recent and frequent activation – assimilation of subsequent input to the more accessible construct – is more likely to occur if perceivers are not conscious of the priming events when processing subsequent input than if they are conscious” (p. 78–79). Experimental conditions that increase the likelihood of awareness of the priming events ‘‘are more likely to produce a contrast effect on judgment than an assimilation effect. …And conversely, experimental conditions that increase the likelihood that participants' consciousness of a priming event will be suppressed …increase the likelihood that an assimilation effect will be produced (e.g., Martin, 1986)” (p. 78–79). Extremity In classic studies of psychophysics and social judgment, the factor most frequently considered in the explanation of context (or knowledge accessibility) effects is the perceived extremity or distributional norm of activated information. Extreme context information is more likely to be used as an anchor with which a target stimulus is contrasted than moderate context information. As Hogarth and Einhorn (1992, p. 14) put it, “The bigger the anchor, the harder it will fall.” As an illustration of the principle that stimuli close to an anchor tend to be assimilated, whereas those farther away tend to be contrasted, Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958) obtained

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Page 238 judgments, on a scale from 1 to 6, of a series of lifted weights ranging from 55 g to 141 g. The main manipulation consisted of the presentation of a standard anchor stimulus on alternate trials. The weight of this anchor ranged, depending on the condition, from 141 g to 347 g. Sherif et al. found that the heavier anchors produced contrast effects. However, with the 141 g anchor, the remaining stimuli were judged as heavier than in the noanchor control condition – an assimilation effect. The extremity of accessible knowledge as a moderator of assimilation and contrast effects also plays an important role in Sherif and Hovland's (1961) theory of attitudinal judgment. One of the key assertions of that theory is the assumption that attitude statements (e.g., “I like Ike”) can be ordered along an evaluative continuum. Specifically, the location of people's preferred attitude position determines how they judge attitude statements. When a single statement or position advocated in a message is relatively close to the judge's attitude, assimilation occurs – the statement or position is seen as relatively close to the judge's own attitude anchor. When an attitude statement advocates a position that is relatively discrepant to a person's attitude, contrast occurs – the statement or position is perceived to be farther from the person's own attitude. Discrepancy is then overestimated, and the magnitude of this overestimation grows larger as discrepancy or extremity increases. Herr (1986) imported these principles of psychophysical and attitudinal judgment to the domain of person perception and also demonstrated that when contextually activated information is extreme, contrast is more likely to follow, whereas assimilation is relatively likely to occur when activated information is moderate. Herr found that an ambiguous target person (friendly/hostile Donald) was judged as hostile when extremely friendly exemplars (e.g., Ghandi) were primed – a contrast effect. When context information was moderately extreme, assimilation was more likely: Donald was judged as relatively friendly when moderately friendly exemplars (e.g., Robin Hood) were primed. To explain these results, Herr suggested that target stimuli are more likely to be classified as belonging to the same category as primed exemplars when these exemplars are moderate. In this case, exemplar-target discrepancies are underestimated. Stimuli are less readily identified as members of the primed category when exemplars are extreme. When exemplars are different from the target, exemplar-target discrepancies are likely to be overestimated (see Herr et al., 1983; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Parducci & Wedell, 1990; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). A study by Manis, et al. (1988) demonstrated the importance of extremity in a study of laboratory-induced stereotypes. In that study, respondents were presented with vocabulary definitions that had presumably been obtained from the patients at two hospitals, Central Hospital and Metropolitan Hospital. They were to read each definition and indicate whether the patient who had produced it was schizophrenic. Extreme stereotypes were established by presenting the most disturbing definitions (e.g., “cushion: to sleep on a pillow of God's sheep”) as deriving from one hospital, whereas the nonpathological definitions (e.g., “cushion: a device for comfort”) were said to come from the other hospital. Moderate stereotypes were established by replacing some of the extreme definitions with midscale definitions. After this priming procedure, respondents judged a series of midscale pairs. One definition in each target pair was said to come from a patient at Metropolitan Hospital, the other from a patient at Central Hospital. The results reveal that moderate stereotypes led to assimilation; that is, target definitions that seemed to emanate from the more disturbed hospital population were regarded as more pathological than definitions that came from the less pathological hospital population. However, stereotypes that were extreme yielded contrast effects. Problems for Appropriateness and Extremity Explanations Both the social cognition and social judgment approaches to knowledge accessibility effects cannot account for all types of assimilation and contrast effects. On the one hand, the finding that the same priming stimuli (e.g., trait concepts such as friendly or hostile ) may result in assimilation or contrast depending on the awareness or perceived appropriateness of these stimuli is difficult to explain in terms of differences in the extremity of the priming stimuli (Martin, 1986). On the other hand, findings of studies that show that whether assimilation or contrast occurs is a function of the extremity of contextually activated information, independent of whether this information is presented subtly (e.g., Herr, 1986) or blatantly (e.g., Manis et al., 1988), are difficult to reconcile with explanations in terms of the perceived appropriateness of the activated information for the task at hand. However, some have argued that the impact of extremity on the direction of knowledge accessibility effects may be couched in appropriateness terms when one assumes that more extreme stimuli are more memorable (e.g., Carlston & Smith, 1996; Higgins, 1989c, 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Strack, 1992a). As Higgins (1989c) noted when discussing Herr's (1986)

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Page 239 finding that clear contrast effect occurs when priming extreme rather than moderate person exemplars, “Because of the greater novelty and distinctiveness of the more extreme primes, it is more likely they would be better remembered, and thus remain in consciousness, up until the point of judgment than the moderate primes” (p. 114). Evidence that comparison contrast effects may also be affected using subliminally presented priming stimuli seems to make such redescriptions of extremity effects into appropriateness effects less appropriate. This evidence was provided by Bevan and Pritchard (1963), who demonstrated subliminal contrast effects in a sound perception task using a subliminal anchoring tone positioned below individual thresholds of sound detection. That is, participants judged the stimulus sounds to be louder when first presented with a nonaudably soft anchor. This tendency toward contrast was only observed for stimulus values farthest away from the subliminal anchor. When the distance between the subliminal anchor and the stimulus series was decreased, assimilation effects were observed. These results are in correspondence more with an extremity rather than with an appropriateness account because, for the latter explanation, awareness of the prime stimulus is a prerequisite for the occurrence of contrast (see also Goldstone. Goldfarb, Strong, & Russell, 1962). Another set of findings that cannot be plausibly explained by corrective processes following awareness of accessible knowledge is reported in a recent article by Winkielman and Schwarz (1996), who subliminally primed participants with extreme exemplar information (e.g., names of big [e.g., “elephant’’] vs. small [e.g., “ant”] animals) and found contrast effects when moderate exemplars (e.g., names of moderately sized animals) had to be judged. Summary and Conclusion In conclusion, our discussion of both social judgment and social cognition explanations of assimilation and contrast effects has taught us the following concerning the impact of accessible knowledge on judgment: Social judgment research, with its focus on the context-bound and comparative nature of social judgments, has primarily demonstrated that accessible knowledge may be used as a comparison standard when people are constructing their judgments. When sufficiently extreme, this standard typically yields a comparison contrast effect, Thus, when one has just watched a documentary about Albert Einstein before one is asked to judge the IQ of a student, this student will be judged relatively less intelligent because Einstein constitutes an extreme scale anchor. Assimilation is thought to occur when accessible knowledge is not sufficiently extreme. Social cognition research, on the other hand, with its focus on information processing and categorization strategies, has primarily shown how accessible information may guide the categorization and interpretation of target information, and thus yields interpretation assimilation effects. In this research tradition, contrast effects have typically been explained with reference to awareness of the potential biasing influence of recently activated information. Such “awareness of the influence” (Strack et al., 1993, p. 53) may render the use of the accessible information inappropriate and thus prompt respondents to correct their judgments in a direction opposite to the sensed influence, resulting in correction contrast effects. In summary, previous research suggests that one may – at least – distinguish the following kinds of knowledge accessibility effects: interpretation assimilation (resulting from the use of accessible information as an interpretation frame), comparison assimilation (resulting from the use of accessible information as a moderate comparison standard), comparison contrast (resulting from the use of accessible information as an extreme comparison standard), and correction contrast (resulting from the feeling that accessible information may contaminate judgment). Because these different knowledge accessibility effects have largely been studied in two separate subdomains of social psychology research (i.e., social cognition and social judgment research), it is still quite unclear what features of a judgmental setting determine which of these effects is most likely to occur. Next we discuss a recently developed interpretation/comparison model of knowledge accessibility effects that tries to explain assimilation and contrast by integrating social cognition and social judgment paradigms. INTEGRATING INTERPRETATION AND COMPARISON EFFECTS: THE INTERPRETATION/COMPARISON MODEL Stapel, Koomen, and Van der Pligt (1996, 1997; see also Stapel et al., 1998; Stapel & Spears, 1996a, 1996b) were intrigued by the seemingly contradictory effects of accessible knowledge on person judgments. Whereas in social cognition research, the subtle priming of trait categories (e.g., hostile vs. friendly ) typically led to assimilation in judgments of an ambiguous, friendly/hostile target person (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979), social judgment research found that the activation of person exemplars of these categories (e.g., Adolph Hitler vs. Shirley Temple) led to contrast in judgments of the exact same ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Herr, 1986). Why would

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Page 240 trait concept priming be more likely to result in assimilation, whereas person exemplar priming would be most likely to yield contrast effects? Stapel, Koomen, and Van der Pligt (1996, 1997) argued that these priming techniques differ in the kind of information they activate and therefore in the role they play in impression formation. More specifically, based on the theoretical focus guiding social cognition versus social judgment research (interpretation vs. comparison), they postulated that, whereas primed trait concepts (e.g., hostility) are more likely to serve to interpret an ambiguous person description in the encoding stage of the impression formation process, primed person exemplars – if sufficiently extreme (e.g., Hitler) – are predominantly used as a comparison standard against which the evaluation of target persons is contrasted in the judgment stage. Thus, the distinction between the interpretative social cognition and comparative social judgment approach to the study of knowledge accessibility effects was linked to the judgmental consequences of two types of knowledge accessibility – trait concept priming and person exemplar priming. But why are accessible trait concepts less likely to be used as a comparison standard in person judgments than person exemplars? What determines whether accessible information is used as an interpretation frame (and results in assimilation) or as a comparison standard (and results in contrast)? Interpretation Relevance and Target Ambiguity The answer to the first part of the latter question is relatively straightforward. Obviously accessible information is only a guide to interpretation when there is something to be interpreted – that is, when the target stimulus is ambiguous rather than unambiguous (see Koomen, Stapel, Jansen, & In 't Veld, 1998; Stapel & Koomen, 1997; Stapel et al., 1997). Furthermore, to exert assimilative interpretation effects, information not only has to be cognitively accessible, but also applicable to interpretation of the target (Higgins, 1989c, 1996). Thus, when one is trying to form an impression of behavior that can be interpreted as persistent or stubborn (e.g., “She never changes her mind”), the accessibility of inapplicable constructs (e.g., adventurous vs. reckless ) exerts no effect, whereas the accessibility of applicable constructs ( persistent vs. stubborn ) may yield assimilative interpretation effects (see Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979). Hence, important determinants of whether accessible information is likely to yield assimilative interpretation effects are the extent to which the information has interpretation relevance and the extent to which the target stimulus is ambiguous (see further Higgins, 1989c, 1996). However, as Herr's (1986) exemplar priming study illustrates, not all kinds of accessible information that are relevant to the interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus result in assimilative interpretation effects. When judgment of an ambiguous, friendly/hostile person is preceded by the priming of hostile person exemplars (e.g., Hitler), the activated information leads to contrast effects, although it possesses interpretation relevance. Thus, the question arises what features determine whether contextually activated information will spark comparison processes. Distinctness and Comparison Relevance Brown (1953) and Helson (1964) noted that stimuli that do not provide judges with information perceived as distinctive and relevant are not used as subjective standards for purposes of comparison. Distinctness. The distinctness part of this notion suggests that when abstract trait concepts such as lust, hostility, or beauty are primed, they are perceived as less distinct than when specific prototypes and/or cultural icons that exemplify these categories are activated (e.g., Marilyn Monroe, Adolph Hitler, Cindy Crawford). A specific, prototypical exemplar or a concrete icon, such as a famous person, constitutes a distinct and separate entity with relatively clear object boundaries and is therefore more likely to be used as a comparison standard. An abstract trait concept or attribute with no clear object boundaries lacks the distinctness to be used as a comparison standard (see Wyer & Srull, 1989, p. 134). When abstract attributes such as trait concepts are relevant to interpretation of the target, however, they may exert their influence during encoding. Or, as Murphy and Zajonc (1993, p. 736) put it, such “diffuse” information “can ‘spill over’ onto unrelated stimuli.’’ Empirical evidence for the notion that whether assimilation or contrast occurs is dependent on the degree of distinctness of the activated information is provided by Martin and Seta (1983). These investigators asked participants to form impressions of two stimulus persons. Some participants were asked to read about both stimulus persons and then evaluate each, whereas others were asked to read about and evaluate one person and then read about and evaluate the other. Martin and Seta found that when participants formed their impressions simultaneously, the impression of the second person was assimilated toward that of the first. Thus, an assimilation effect occurred when the impression formation process of the first person was “unitized” with that of the second person, such that it served as an indistinct interpretation frame when an impression of that person was formed.

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Page 241 When participants formed their impressions sequentially, however, the impression of the second person was contrasted with that of the first. In other words, when the impression of the first person formed a distinct entity, it served as a comparison standard when judging the second person. Judgment order is thus one important way in which the distinctness of accessible information can be manipulated (see Stapel & Spears, 1996a; Stapel & Winkielman, 1997). As social cognition research has shown, when an object is explicitly evaluated or judged, associated attribute information is clearly connected and confined to this object (see Parducci & Wedell, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Explicitly evaluating an object renders its mental representation concrete and distinct rather than abstract and indistinct. As Parducci has noted in several reviews of the relevant literature, contextual stimuli are most likely to become objects of comparison when they are explicitly judged (e.g., Parducci & Wedell, 1990). Comparison Relevance. The notion that context information is more likely to be used as a comparison standard when it has comparison relevance suggests that, when the task is to judge a target person, trait concepts may be perceived as not similar to the target category and therefore they will not be used as relevant comparison standards. Person exemplars, on the other hand, do belong to the same category as the target and can therefore be used as relevant anchors in person judgments. Objects that belong to the same category more readily invite comparison processes than objects that belong to dissimilar categories (see Brown, 1953; Manis, Biernat, & Nelson, 1991; Suls & Wills, 1991). A classic demonstration of the effects of comparison relevance is provided by Brown (1953). Brown had participants rate a series of lifted weights, first singly and then with an anchor stimulus interpolated after every four stimulus weights. Brown manipulated the weight of this anchor stimulus. The crucial manipulation, however, was that for half of the participants the anchor stimulus was indistinguishable visually from the other stimuli presented, whereas for the remaining participants the anchor stimulus in fact consisted of the tray on which the stimulus weights had been passed to the participants by the experimenter. The dependent variable was the strength of the contrast effect produced by the different anchors. As predicted, Brown found the greatest contrast effect when participants were presented with an anchor similar to the other stimuli they had to judge. When participants had to lift a tray and judge it on the same scale as the other stimuli, the size of the effect diminished significantly. Brown (1953, p. 210) therefore concluded: “The anchor, to be effective, must be perceived as a member of the same class of objects as the other weights.” The comparison relevance argument implies that in person judgments, not only trait concept primes, but also nonperson exemplar primes are not likely to be used as a comparison standard. Here the old adage “Do not compare apples with oranges” applies. In judging ambiguous friendly/hostile Donald, for example, we are most likely to compare Donald with other persons because they provide a relevant comparison standard, rather than compare him to trait concepts or other nonperson information. Thus, animal exemplars like Shark and Tiger are not likely to be used as a comparison standard when judging the hostility or friendliness of a person named Donald. These exemplars are not similar, do not belong to the target category (persons), and thus lack comparison relevance that makes contrast unlikely to emerge. However, because such animal names are likely to spontaneously prime the construct they exemplify (e.g., hostility), they may still activate information that is likely to be used to interpret a target person's behavior (see Smith & Zarate, 1990). This latter process should result in assimilation. Evidence for the Interpretation/Comparison Model Several studies provide evidence for the previous claims. For example, Stapel, Koomen, and Van der Pligt (1997) asked respondents to form an impression of an ambiguous target stimulus, friendly/hostile Donald. Before they were exposed to the description of Donald, respondents were primed with names of animal exemplars or person exemplars. Half of the participants were primed with names of either extremely hostile or friendly persons (Dracula, Hitler vs. Ghandi, Mandela). The other half of the participants were exposed to names of either extremely hostile or friendly animals (Shark, Panther vs. Puppy, Bunny). As predicted, assimilation was found in the animal priming conditions, whereas contrast was found in the person priming conditions (see Table 14.1). Thus, this pattern of findings indicates that exposure to rather extreme exemplar primes may result in assimilation as well as in contrast effects. Which of these effects emerges depends on the comparison relevance of these exemplars (see Stapel & Koomen, 1997, for a similar finding with detergent brand names as primes rather than animals). Recently, Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) found that the differences between traits and persons exemplars may also determine whether priming yields assimilation or contrast in ideomotor behavior. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) showed that exposing individuals to a series of words linked to a particular stereotype may

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Page 242 Table 14.1: Mean ratings (SD) of ambiguously friendly/ hostile Donald as a function of exemplar prime valence (friendly, hostile) and comparison relevance (relevant: person, irrelevant: animal). Prime ValencePrime TypeFriendlyHostileComparison relevant3.71 (.79)4.50 (1.29)Comparison irrelevant4.22 (1.12)3.50 (1.26)Note. Scale range is from 1 to 9. Higher scores indicate more positive ratings. influence behavior nonconsciously. Priming trait concepts influences subsequent behavior in an assimilative fashion. For example, participants who were subtly exposed to traits linked to the elderly stereotype (gray, old, wrinkle, ancient, wise) walked more slowly than participants who had not been primed with these words. Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) applied the interpretation/comparison perspective to the Bargh et al. studies. In several studies, the assimilative trait priming effects were replicated, but it was also found that activation of comparison relevant exemplars led to contrastive ideomotor effects. For example, Dutch participants walked faster when primed with a well-known exemplar of the elderly – the Dutch Queen Mother – who is over 80 years old. Similar effects have now been shown in the domains of attribution (Stapel & Spears, 1996a), stereotyping (Stapel & Koomen, 1998b), and expectancy (Stapel & Schwarz, 1998a), as well as in more applied settings such as responses to advertising (Stapel, Koomen, & Velthuijsen, 1998), political judgments (Stapel & Schwarz, 1998b; Stapel & Spears, 1996b), and issues relevant for organizational decision making (Stapel & Koomen, 1998a). The core of the interpretation/comparison model of knowledge accessibility effects focuses on the use of accessible information during impression formation. Distinct and comparison relevant information is more likely to be used as a comparison standard. Information that lacks these features is more likely to be used as an interpretation frame (cf. Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1989). The findings presented so far provide support for the notion that distinctness and comparison relevance may determine the direction of knowledge accessibility effects, but how do we know these assimilation effects are due to interpretation processes, whereas the contrast effects are due to comparison processes? First, there are several studies that demonstrate the impact of the ambiguity of the target stimulus on knowledge accessibility effects. These studies demonstrate that accessible knowledge which lacks distinctness and comparison relevance (e.g., trait concepts or nonperson exemplars) result in assimilation effects when the target is ambiguous but not when it is unambiguous. Thus, assimilative interpretation effects obtain only when judging a target requires interpretation (e.g., participants rate friendly/hostile Donald). No such assimilation effects emerge when the target stimulus is unambiguous and thus needs no interpretative efforts (e.g., participants rate one of their friends). Conversely, person exemplar priming results – when the exemplars are sufficiently extreme – in contrast effects that reflect the use of accessible information as a comparison standard when evaluating a target person. Accordingly, the emergence of such contrast effects is independent of whether the target requires interpretation. After extreme person exemplar priming, contrast effects obtain in judgments of both ambiguous and unambiguous targets (see Herr et al., 1983; Stapel & Koomen, 1997; Stapel et al., 1997). Second, Stapel, Koomen, and Van der Pligt (1997) demonstrated that the time at which priming stimuli are presented is essential in the case of trait concept priming, but inconsequential in the case of person exemplar priming. In an experiment in which the effects of trait concept priming and person exemplar priming were compared, it was manipulated whether these priming stimuli were presented before participants were exposed to an ambiguous target description or after they had read and encoded this description. The findings show that whereas trait concept priming resulted in assimilation effects only when these concepts were primed before an ambiguous target was encoded, extreme person exemplar priming resulted in contrast independent of whether these exemplars were primed before or after encoding. Thus, whereas trait priming results in assimilation only when there is something to be interpreted, person exemplar priming results in contrast independent of whether interpretation has already taken place. This is consistent with the hypothesis that assimilation effects following trait concept priming are the result of interpretation processes, whereas contrast effects following extreme person exemplar priming are the result of comparative judgment processes (see Koomen et al., 1998; Stapel & Koomen, 1997; Stapel et al., 1997; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). Third, the importance of distinguishing between the interpretative and comparative effects of different types of accessible knowledge is demonstrated by showing the opposite impact of extremity manipulations on person exemplar versus trait concept priming (Stapel et al., 1997). The notion that trait concept priming may only affect the interpretation process, whereas person exemplar priming may also induce comparison processes, implies that varying the extremity of priming stimuli will

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Page 243 Table 14.2: Mean ratings (SD) of ambiguous friendly/hostile Donald as a function of prime type (trait concept, person exemplar), prime valence (friendly, hostile) and prime extremity (moderate, extreme). Prime TypeTrait ConceptPerson ExemplarPrime ExtremityFriendly HostileFriendly HostileModerate4.35 (.88)3.99 (.88)4.73 (.98)3.62 (.84)Extreme4.66 (.98)3.59 (1.27)3.73 (1.18)4.64 (1.18)Note: Scale range is from 1 to 9. Higher scores indicate more positive ratings. lead to different effects when trait concepts are primed compared to when person exemplars are primed (see Table 14.2). As the extremity explanation of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment research implies, extreme person exemplars (Hitler vs. Mandela when judging friendly/hostile Donald) may provide an extreme enough standard for comparative judgment processes to result in contrast. However, when primed person exemplars are only moderately extreme (Napoleon vs. Robin Hood), it is more likely that these contrastive effects on judgments of ambiguous targets are not strong enough to override the assimilative encoding effects that are the result of exemplars spontaneously activating the categorical dimension they exemplify (remember the effects of priming animal and detergent exemplars). This trade-off between interpretation and comparison processes is less likely to occur, however, when the priming stimuli are relatively indistinct and lack comparison relevance. Opposite to the consequences of extremity for comparison effects of person exemplar priming, extreme trait concept priming strengthens the assimilative consequences of interpretation processes. Priming moderately extreme trait concepts ( unfriendly vs. considerate ) leads to assimilation and priming extreme trait concepts ( cruel vs. sweet) leads to even stronger assimilation (Koomen et al., 1998; Stapel & Koomen, 1997; Stapel et al.; 1997; see also Manis et al., 1988; Skowronski, Carlston, & Isham, 1993). The impact of extremity of priming stimuli on the direction of their effects has also been investigated by Moskowitz and Skurnik (1999). Similar to Stapel and Koomen and their colleagues, Moskowitz and Skurnik investigated the impact of trait versus person exemplar priming on person judgments. In their studies, the impact of extremity on person exemplar priming effects was replicated. However, they reported contrast effects after priming moderate trait concepts (instead of assimilation effects, as shown by Manis, Skowronski, Stapel, and their colleagues). Such contrast effects seem to be especially likely when the trait primes overlap a great deal with the target behavior and thus are more likely to instigate correction processes (see previous section on appropriateness). Summary and Conclusion The concepts of distinctness and comparison relevance shed a new, integrative light on the divergent effects of interpretative and comparative knowledge accessibility effects as studied in the social cognition and social judgment literatures, respectively. They suggest that an important determinant of assimilation and contrast effects that has largely gone unnoticed in the literature is the kind of information that is made accessible during the impression formation process. More specifically, comparison contrast is more likely to be the result of knowledge accessibility when the accessible information is relatively more distinct, has more comparison relevance, and is sufficiently extreme to be used as an anchor with which targets can be contrasted in the judgment stage of impression formation. The less these three features apply, the more likely it is that assimilation rather than contrast will occur in social judgments. Thus, our interpretation/comparison model of assimilation and contrast effects integrates the seemingly contradictory findings of studies of knowledge accessibility effects in the social cognition and social judgment literatures by emphasizing the differences in the kind of context stimuli used within these two research paradigms. Whereas in most social cognition studies, priming stimuli are typically (indistinct, comparison irrelevant) trait concepts, in social judgment studies, priming stimuli are mostly (distinct, comparison relevant) exemplars (see Eiser, 1990; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Nario-Redmond, 1995). Most important perhaps, the interpretation/comparison model relates this distinction between these types of priming stimuli (e.g., traits vs. person exemplars) to the components of the impression formation process on which stimuli are thought to exert an effect (interpretation vs. comparison). The interpretation/comparison model of assimilation and contrast extends previous theorizing on the components of the impression formation process on which knowledge accessibility may exert its effect. For example, Wyer and Srull's (1989) model of the role of memory and cognition in social judgments states that accessible

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Page 244 knowledge is more likely to be used during encoding when it consists of an indistinct attribute concept (e.g., a trait concept), whereas it is more likely to serve as an extreme comparison standard when a distinct attributeobject link (e.g., person exemplar) is activated (see also Philippot et al., 1991). Similarly, Trope's (1986) multiple-stage model of dispositional attribution processes implies that contextual knowledge has both an assimilative effect in behavior interpretation and a contrastive effect when it comes to constructing judgments about a particular person. In accordance with the present integration of interpretative and comparative knowledge accessibility effects, research testing Trope's model found that the relative strength of these assimilative and contrastive effects is affected by both target ambiguity and the order in which context and target information is presented (see Trope, Cohen, & Alfieri, 1991). The interpretation/comparison model is also consistent with Schwarz and Bless' (1992a) inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects. It predicts assimilation when a primed construct is included in the target and contrast when the primed information is excluded from the target. Although research testing the inclusion/exclusion model has not focused specifically on the processes (interpretation vs. comparison) underlying assimilation and contrast effects, in inclusion/exclusion terminology, our perspective suggests that it can be extended as follows: Broader and less distinctive priming stimuli that lack comparison relevance (such as trait concepts) are likely to be included in and assimilated to an ambiguous target. Likewise, narrow and distinctive priming stimuli that do have comparison relevance (such as person exemplars) are more likely to be excluded from and may be contrasted to such targets. Our conceptualization of assimilation and contrast effects is also in some ways similar to the Manis-Paskewitz (1984) model of expectation and contrast, which suggests that assimilative and contrastive influences may derive from exposure to the same exemplars. Similar to the present conceptualization, the Manis-Paskewitz model recognizes that the cognitive accessibility of exemplars of a given category may simultaneously affect our assessment of other targets in two ways: (a) by providing a basis for comparison when we have to judge the target (contrast), and (b) by guiding the interpretation and categorization of the target (assimilation). The pattern of results of the animal priming (Stapel et al., 1997) study supports the hypothesis that category exemplars can play the role of both interpretation frame and comparison standard in impression formation. Consequently, these studies extend the Manis-Paskewitz model and provide insight into the factors that may influence the relative strength of the assimilative and contrastive influences of category exemplar priming: When sufficiently extreme and comparison relevant, the contrastive effects of exemplars are likely to predominate their assimilative effects. Comparisonirrelevant exemplars, however, may play the role only of an interpretation frame and result in assimilation (see also Kahneman & Miller's [1986] discussion of local norms). Support for the interpretation/comparison model also comes from recent studies by Petty and Wegener (1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995) on the importance of naive theories of bias in the understanding of knowledge accessibility effects. As argued previously, in social cognition research, awareness of the priming influence is typically used as an explanation for the occurrence of contrast effects (see Srull, 1991). It is believed that accessible concepts “produce assimilation effects when the perceiver views them as internally generated and contrast effects when the perceiver recognizes them as stemming from external sources” (Carlston & Smith, 1996, p. 199). Petty and Wegener suggested that feelings of bias do not necessarily lead to contrast effects. They argued that whether correction for unwanted bias leads to assimilation or contrast is dependent on respondents' ‘‘naive theories of bias.” When respondents think that the priming event biases their judgments in a particular direction, they adjust their target ratings in a direction opposite to the theorized bias. Thus, when participants sense that the priming task instigates assimilation (contrast), they correct in the direction of contrast (assimilation). The discrepancy between results reported by Petty and Wegener (1993) and earlier research on priming and correction processes (e.g., Lombardi et al., 1987; Strack et al., 1993) can easily be reconciled with reference to our interpretation/comparison model. Previous studies primed trait concepts and found that judgments were contrasted with these traits when participants were warned against their biasing influence (Stapel & Koomen, 1999; Stapel, Martin, & Schwarz, 1998), reminded of the trait concepts just before they made their judgments (e.g., Stapel et al., 1998; Strack et al., 1993), or could recall them at the time of judgment (e.g., Lombardi et al., 1987). Petty and Wegener exposed their participants to a number of vacation locations that were either very popular (the Bahamas, San Francisco) or neutral (Minneapolis, St. Louis) and found contrast in uncorrected and assimilation in corrected judgments of moderate target cities (Indianapolis, Kansas City). Thus, Petty and Wegener used a procedure of extreme, comparisonrelevant, exemplar priming of which the “natural”

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Page 245 (uncorrected) effect is contrast. The finding that conscious attempts to correct for the biasing influences of primed, comparison-relevant exemplars on judgments leads to assimilation (Petty & Wegener, 1993), whereas correcting for the primed trait concepts leads to contrast is in accordance with the interpretation/comparison model (see Stapel et al., 1997). APPROPRIATENESS REVISITED It is important to note that the interpretation/comparison model is a model of information use , not a model of information disuse. It is a model of how information used during impression formation affects the impact of this information. Sometimes accessible information is not used at all during judgment. As noted before, information that is not interpretation relevant is unlikely to be used as an interpretation frame, and information that lacks comparison relevance is unlikely to be used as a comparison standard. At times, however, primed information is used not so much because of the relevance of features of the prime for the target, but because of the perceived inappropriateness of the activated information for the task at hand. Even when information is accessible and has interpretation and/or comparison relevance, it might not be consciously used if it is perceived as inappropriate. As the studies of Petty and Wegener (1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995) demonstrated, judgments of inappropriateness may dramatically change the impact of accessible knowledge on judgments. We think it is important to distinguish two distinctly different types of inappropriateness. When perceivers recognize that accessible knowledge is externally generated (“I have positive thoughts not because I like Donald, but because the sun is shining”), and thus inappropriate to use in the judgment process, they may decide not to use the accessible knowledge. However, when, one not only feels that accessible information is inappropriate but also senses that it actually biases or contaminates one's perception of the target stimulus, one may decide to correct for the unwanted bias in a way commensurate with the perceived bias (see Petty & Wegener, 1993). When one decides to ignore accessible information because it is “irrelevant for the task at hand,” the effect of the inappropriate influence should simply be eliminated (“I should not base my judgment of Donald on my preference for sunshine”), and no accessibility effects should occur because it does not enter the construction of judgment. When one senses that accessible information biases or contaminates one's perception of the target stimulus, correction should reverse the “natural’’ accessibility effect: When the perceived bias is assimilative, such correction processes are likely to produce contrast effects because the unwanted bias (“I like Donald) is suppressed in the target judgments (“I dislike Donald”). That accessible knowledge is ignored when it is judged as irrelevant is nicely demonstrated by Schwarz and Clore (1983), who observed that the impact of mood on judgments of life satisfaction was eliminated when participants attributed their current feelings to a transient source. For example, participants reported higher life satisfaction and a more elated mood in telephone interviews when called on sunny rather than rainy days (an assimilation effect). However, this difference was eliminated when the interviewer mentioned the weather as part of a private aside (“By the way, how is the weather over there?”), thus directing participants' attention to this source of their elated or depressed feelings. Similarly, recalling a sad life event did not influence participants' judgments of life satisfaction when they could attribute the resulting sad feelings to the alleged impact of the mess and smell of rotten fruit in the room in which the experiment was held (see Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1996). That the impact of accessible knowledge is reversed when perceivers feel that it may contaminate their judgments, is – as described earlier – demonstrated inter alia by Petty and Wegener (1993). When people sense that their judgments are being biased, they adjust their target ratings in a direction opposite to this bias (see also Martin et al., 1990; Stapel et al., 1998; Strack, 1992; Strack et al., 1993). Together these investigations demonstrate that it may be important to distinguish judgments of inappropriateness that lead to the elimination of accessibility effects (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and judgments that lead to the reversal of such effects (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1993; Stapel et al., 1997). It would be especially insightful when future studies can delineate variables that may either facilitate or hinder elimination or reversal effects. For example, for elimination effects to occur, it is essential that the impact of irrelevant information (the weather) can be isolated effectively from other relevant influences. Unfortunately, in the relevant literature, elimination and correction are often treated as interchangeable effects of the feeling that the use of accessible information is inappropriate (e.g., Carlston & Smith, 1996; Martin et al., 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Skowronski et al., 1993; Strack, 1992; Strack et al., 1993). We suggest that there are varieties of inappropriateness and that distinguishing these varieties will allow us to make more specific predictions when judgments that accessible knowledge is inappropriate will eliminate priming effects and when they will reverse these effects.

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Page 246 CONCLUSIONS Psychology is a fragmented science. Researchers working in different subdomains of psychological inquiry ask different questions, use different methodologies, and discover different truths or fundamental laws (Yanchar & Slife, 1997). In this chapter, we argued that to some extent even researchers that ask the same question – What determines the direction of knowledge accessibility effects? – may come to different answers because their investigations are guided by different theoretical perspectives. There are two histories one can tell when one is interested in the roots of modern studies of knowledge accessibility effects. The social cognition story aptly demonstrates how accessible knowledge may guide categorization and interpretation processes and yield assimilation effects. The social judgment story excels in showing how accessible stimuli are used as comparison standards in the construction of social judgments and yield contrast effects. In an attempt to integrate these two approaches to the study of knowledge accessibility effects, we have introduced the interpretation/comparison model of assimilation and contrast effects. The most important feature of this model is that it posits that when investigating the implications of knowledge accessibility on subsequent judgments it is essential to know what kind of knowledge is relatively accessible. Specifically, the extent to which accessible knowledge is distinct and comparison relevant is an important determinant of whether assimilation or contrast occurs. These two variables can be used to resolve the disagreement concerning what should be seen as the most common accessibility effect. One the one hand, social cognition studies typically find assimilation because the priming stimuli used in most of these studies lack comparison relevance and distinctness (e.g., trait concepts) and are thus unlikely to be used as a comparison standard. Social judgment studies, on the other hand, typically find contrast because the context stimuli used in these studies possess comparison relevance and distinctness (e.g., person exemplars) and are thus likely to be used as a comparison standard. As argued throughout this chapter, the comparison processes instigated by (comparison relevant and distinct) exemplar priming are of a completely different nature than the interpretation processes that follow (comparison irrelevant and indistinct) trait concept priming. Both processes are essential ingredients for the construction of evaluations and judgments (see Eiser, 1990; Higgins, 1996; Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Both interpretation and comparison processes may be guided by subliminally primed information (see Bargh, 1992; Bevan & Pritchard, 1963; Goldstone et al., 1962; Winkielman & Schwarz, 1996), and both processes may automatically ignite (uncontrolled) ideomotor behavior (see Dijksterhuis et al., 1997). This suggests that both assimilative interpretation and contrastive comparison effects may be affected by preconscious, automatic processes (cf. Bargh, 1997). As we await the final verdict on the “default” issue (see Martin, 1996), we would like to argue that the studies discussed in this chapter seem to provide evidence that both assimilation and contrast can occur as the result of spontaneous, uncorrected impression formation. In other words, to date there is no evidence that there is anything like one truly “natural” accessibility effect. It is more likely that there are several “natural” accessibility effects (see also Wegener & Petty, 1995). The focus of the interpretation/comparison model is on the type of processes -interpretation or comparison – that are instigated by accessible information to understand and predict the impact of knowledge activation on subsequent judgments. It is important to note that we do not want to argue, however, that our perspective on knowledge accessibility effects is an alternative to previous explanations, such as those that have explained the occurrence of assimilation and contrast in terms of the perceived extremity or appropriateness of the accessible information. Rather, as can be inferred from our extensive treatment of these variables, we suggest that over and above the effects of extremity and appropriateness, variables such as the comparison relevance and distinctness of accessible information may determine whether assimilation or contrast will occur. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by grant 575-70-074 from the Dutch Science Foundation (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek) and by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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Page 247 15 Illusory Correlation and Stereotype Formation: Tracing the Arc of Research Over a Quarter Century Steven J. Stroessner Jason E. Plaks Barnard College, Columbia University Columbia University Research on stereotype formation has developed substantially since the advent of the social cognition perspective nearly a quarter century ago. To appreciate the degree of change, one can compare how two authoritative reviews of the literature – one authored by Brigham (1971) and a more recent review by Hamilton and Sherman (1994) – differ in their discussion of the formation of stereotypes. Brigham bemoaned the lack of research on the processes underlying stereotype formation, noting that existing evidence indicated only that White children from an early age associated negative attributes with African Americans. The specific origin of these stereotypes was unclear, but Brigham raised the possibility that stereotypes reflect an overgeneralized ‘‘kernel of truth” that might be conveyed to children through societal or social learning variables. Given the prevailing view that stereotypes reflected the exaggeration of small group differences, he briefly speculated about how parents, peers, teachers, and the media help perpetuate stereotypes that have some basis in reality. By Hamilton and Sherman's review, a sizeable literature had amassed that recognized how basic cognitive processes, in and of themselves, contributed to the formation and maintenance of stereotypes. Although earlier theorists (e.g., Allport, 1954; Lippmann, 1992) alluded to the possibility that stereotypes might arise from the manner in which people process information about their social environment, a body of research supporting that view did not emerge until the advent of the “cognitive revolution” in social psychology. By utilizing methods largely developed by cognitive psychologists, social psychologists were able to identify how basic cognitive processes could produce perceptions of groups that were factually unwarranted. The mere categorization of social targets as members of groups, for example, led to the perception of group differences (e.g., Tajfel, 1969) and to the perception of homogeneity within groups (Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, & Hill, 1997; Wilder, 1978). Biases in attention were also implicated, such as when a contextually unusual or salient individual received inordinate notice, yielding exaggerated trait judgments and evaluations (e.g., Lord & Saenz, 1985; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) that might be generalized to their group. In contrast to earlier approaches that viewed stereotypes as exaggerations of real group differences, the social cognition perspective suggested that the ordinary cognitive processes involved in social perception were sufficient for the formation of stereotypes. Therefore, many stereotypes were likely to have no basis in fact. Stereotypes might form simply because of characteristics of individuals' information processing systems and not because stereotypes reflected an overgeneralized “kernel of truth.” The line of research best reflecting this view of stereotype formation focused on the formation of distinctivenessbased illusory correlations, beginning with a seminal article published by Hamilton and Gifford in 1976. This research was actually inspired by studies originally performed by Chapman (1967) on learning. Chapman found that experimental participants consistently overestimated the frequency of the co-occurrence of the two longest words presented in a series of word pairs. He suggested that the co-occurrence of the two stimuli might have been noticed because both words shared the unusual feature of length. If these word pairings did differentially attract attention, they would have been differentially accessible in memory, leading to the erroneous conclusion that the infrequent pair of stimuli appeared more often than they actually did. Hamilton and Gifford (1976) reasoned that similar processes might occur when individuals encounter information describing social groups. All cultures contain groups that vary in size, and members of infrequently encountered groups might be particularly likely to draw perceivers' attention. In addition, the frequency of desirable and undesirable behavior is also likely to vary, with negative behavior typically rarer than positive

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Page 248 behavior. If people tend to notice the co-occurrence of unusual or rare stimuli, they might be especially likely to notice the performance of negative behaviors by members of a small group. Individuals then might be especially likely to remember this co-occurrence, leading them to associate the minority group with the negative behavior even when the rate of negative behavior was the same across groups. Thus, the tendency to notice and differentially attend to unusual events might lead to the formation of erroneous perceptions of group differences. ILLUSORY CORRELATION AND STEREO TYPE FORMATION: HAMILTON AND GIFFORD'S ORIGINAL STUDIES To test this idea, Hamilton and Gifford (1976, Experiment 1) presented individuals with a set of sentences, each describing a member of one of two groups, A or B, performing either a desirable or an undesirable behavior. The sentence set included twice as many descriptions of Group A than of Group B behaviors, and more of the behaviors were desirable than undesirable. Members of Group A performed 18 and 8 desirable and undesirable behaviors, respectively, and Group B members performed 9 and 4 desirable and undesirable behaviors, respectively. Although the frequency of sentences for the two groups was unequal, the ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors was the same for both groups. Consequently, there was no relation between group membership and the desirability of performed behaviors. After reading the sentences, participants completed several measures designed to assess their perceptions of the two groups. Participants were provided with a list of all the presented sentences with the group membership information omitted, and they indicated whether a member of Group A or Group B had performed each behavior. Participants also estimated the frequency of undesirable behaviors performed by the members of each group. Finally, ratings were made of each group on a set of desirable and undesirable traits. Phi coefficients, a measure of perceived correlation, were computed from the group assignments and frequency estimates. Across all three measures, participants' judgments indicated an erroneous perception of an association between the smaller Group B and the performance of undesirable behaviors. Consistent with the notion that the Group B undesirable behaviors were psychologically distinctive, both group assignment and frequency estimate measures indicated that frequency of undesirable behaviors were overestimated to a greater degree for Group B than for Group A. Examination of the accuracy of judgments in the group assignment task provided additional insight regarding the nature of the bias. It appeared as if the greater accessibility of the distinctive information had two consequences for judgments. First, participants showed the greatest accuracy in correctly attributing undesirable behaviors performed by members of Group B to that group. Second, participants erroneously estimated that many of the negative behaviors actually performed by Group A members were performed by members of Group B. Finally, consistent with the frequency estimation and group assignment data, differential trait ratings were made of Group A and Group B, with members of Group B being judged less favorably than the members of Group A. A second experiment (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, Experiment 2) was conducted to rule out the possibility that the smaller group was judged less favorably simply because information describing the group was less frequent. This might occur if perceivers possessed a priori aversions toward small groups or if, via the mechanisms underlying the well-known mere exposure effect , developed a preference for the larger group. If illusory correlations result in the overemphasis of rare stimuli, then reversing the valence of the frequent and infrequent behavioral information should produce more positive perceptions of the smaller group. So when the majority of the behaviors were desirable, then illusory correlations linking Group B and the performance of desirable behavior should form. Indeed, that is what was found. Participants estimated that members of Group B performed a greater ratio of desirable behaviors and, consequently, showed an evaluative bias favoring the smaller group. Across the two original studies, the data were consistent with the notion that illusory correlations arose because the behaviors in the least frequent category, whether desirable or undesirable, were differentially noticed and received differential processing. This differential processing likely made these items more accessible in memory, meaning that they would have been retrieved more easily or more quickly at the time of judgment. Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) work on the availability heuristic suggests that the ease of retrieving the infrequent items should imply that there are many such items, and such an implication would likely produce two distinct consequences. First, the most accessible items (i.e., the infrequent items) would likely be correctly attributed to Group B. Second, a subset of infrequent behaviors actually performed by Group A would likely be erroneously attributed to Group B, further augmenting estimates of Group B's rare behaviors. Thus, a combination of accuracy (in judging the frequency of Group B's infrequent behaviors) and inaccuracy (in misattributing

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Page 249 some Group A infrequent behaviors to Group B) contributed to an erroneous perception of group differences. Hamilton and Gifford's original studies were influential because, contrary to the general assumption at the time that a stereotype likely represented the exaggeration of a “kernel of truth,” they demonstrated that an information processing bias alone could account for the development of stereotypes and the genesis of prejudice. Perceptions of group differences need not reflect any underlying group differences – individuals could “see” group differences that did not exist. Extending the Illusory Correlation Construct Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) basic findings have been replicated many times. Indeed, a meta-analysis conducted by Mullen and Johnson (1990) revealed that the illusory correlation effect was highly reliable and of a moderate magnitude. Moreover, illusory correlations have been observed in studies that used numerous procedures and measures not included in the original paradigm (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1989; Mullen & Johnson, 1990, for reviews). For example, two studies (Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985; Stroessner, Meiland, & Cook, 1999) assessed free recall of the presented items. The proportion of items recalled describing Group B's infrequent behaviors has been higher for the other categories of items. Furthermore, two studies (Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McConnell et al., 1994a, Experiment 2) examined the speed of participants' judgments regarding the group membership of the target who performed each behavior. In both studies, judgment latencies for correct attributions were faster for Group B's negative behaviors than for the other categories of items. Both findings are consistent with the notion that the least frequent category of information is differentially accessible from memory. Other studies suggest that illusory correlations have a more general impact on judgments than was implied by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). Acorn, Hamilton, and Sherman (1988) showed, for example, that the influence of illusory correlations is not constrained by the specific trait implicated in the behavioral information. In that study, the specific traits implied in the behavioral sentences varied across conditions. Regardless of the specific trait implicated in the set of behavioral sentences, judgments of Group B were less favorable than of Group A across multiple traits. This experiment suggests that the consequences of illusory correlations can be pervasive; illusory correlations can produce differing global evaluations of groups and judgments unrelated to the available information. Illusory correlations also can arise even without recognition and differential processing of the distinctive information during encoding, suggesting that illusory correlations might form in a wider set of circumstances than was previously thought. McConnell et al. (1994a, Experiment 1) presented participants with sets of items in which descriptions of Group B's undesirable behaviors were least frequent, but the presentation order was altered to affect the relative infrequency of those items at the time they appeared. So in one condition all of Group B's undesirable items appeared early in the sequence of items (making them indistinct at encoding), whereas in another condition the rarest items appeared only late in the sequence (presumably increasing their distinctiveness). Illusory correlations emerged in both conditions, however, although the items in the former condition could not have been perceived as distinct during encoding. Although the data from this experiment might seem to challenge the account of illusory correlations based on distinctiveness, McConnell et al. (1994a, Experiment 2) found in a subsequent study that Group B's undesirable items were indeed more accessible in memory regardless of when the infrequent items appeared in the set of behaviors. Specifically, as was mentioned earlier, judgment latencies for correct attributions in the group assignment task were faster for Group B's negative behaviors than for the other types of items. These results indicate that infrequency at the time of presentation is not necessary for illusory correlations to form. As has been shown by research in other domains (see Hunt & McDaniel, 1993), the distinctiveness of a stimulus can be influenced both by the salience of the item when it is encoded and by events that might make an item distinctive after encoding. As new items are encountered, for example, the relative frequency of both the new items and the items already stored in memory might be reassessed. An item that was not distinctive at encoding might become distinctive after the fact when perceivers retrospectively recognize the relative infrequency of the item. Thus, processes after encoding can lead to the retroactive perception of distinctiveness, vastly expanding the range of conditions under which illusory correlations might form. THE ATTENUATION OF ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS Although the effect has proved highly reliable, illusory correlations have been shown to be moderated by several variables. Mullen and Johnson's (1990) meta-analysis showed that illusory correlation effects tend to be larger when the distinctive behaviors are undesirable rather than desirable and when larger sets of behavioral items are

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Page 250 used. In addition to these variables pertaining to the nature of the available information, several variables regarding participants' processing goals, affective states, and group memberships have been shown to modify how that information is processed and, consequently, to influence the magnitude of the illusory correlation bias. Before proceeding with a discussion of these individual variables, it is useful to establish a framework for understanding why certain variables might either attenuate or augment illusory correlations. Although numerous factors might affect illusory correlations, we suggest that one way to organize the literature is to consider how each variable affects the thoroughness with which the available information is processed. In our view, a framework focusing on the relation between thoroughness of processing and formation of the bias provides a reasonably parsimonious accounting of the impact of diverse independent variables on illusory correlations, although each individual variable might not have been considered in these terms until now. Simply put, illusory correlations appear most likely to form when information is processed with a moderate degree of thoroughness. Variables that either increase or decrease the thoroughness with which available information is processed tend to decrease the magnitude of the bias. Thus, the relationship between thoroughness of processing and manifestation of the bias takes the form of an arc resembling an inverted U. We develop a general model relating the thoroughness of processing to the magnitude of illusory correlations below and consider specific variables that have been shown to moderate formation of the bias in relation to this model. Some recent controversies in the literature are reviewed, and future possible directions for research on illusory correlations are suggested. Thoroughness of Processing and Illusory Correlation Although the specific variables that have been shown to attenuate illusory correlations differ in a number of respects, it is useful to consider the degree that each variable influences the degree with which available information is processed. The present evidence indicates that illusory correlations are most likely to form when perceivers have the motivation and cognitive capacity to process available information with a moderate degree of thoroughness. If, on the one hand, a variable undermines the motivation or capacity to deliberatively process available information, illusory correlations are likely to be weak or are even eliminated. If, on the other hand, a variable promotes highly thorough processing, it is also likely that illusory correlations will not form. The reason this relationship resembles an inverted-U arc can be best understood by considering in detail the cognitive processes that are believed to give rise to the illusory correlation bias. According to Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) interpretation, the bias depends on the perceivers' ability to recognize that some group/behavior combinations occur less frequently than others. Once perceivers recognize that the different group/behavior combinations differ in frequency, then attentional biases that orient perceivers toward processing contextually rare or unusual stimuli come into play. Research from a number of domains suggests that contextually atypical or unusual information receives greater attention than information that is relatively typical or frequent (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliot, & DeWitt, 1990; Langer, Taylor, Fiske, & Chanowitz, 1976; McArthur, 1981; Tulving, Markowitsch, Kapur, Habib, & Houle, 1994). Within the illusory correlation paradigm, the realization that the infrequent behaviors performed by the smaller group occur with the lowest frequency should prompt perceivers to attend to and process that information more thoroughly than the other available information. This information might be more likely to be compared with other available information, might receive more thorough causal analysis, or might be elaborated in greater detail. All of these processes should serve to make these items particularly accessible in memory, and their greater accessibility facilitates the overestimation of this category of events and augments the impact of these events on judgments. The bias would be less likely for individuals who are not motivated or able to process the available information because they might not notice the important qualities along which the different categories of information differ. For example, they may not note that more of the items describe Group A than Group B or that the frequency of desirable and undesirable information differs substantially. Therefore, given poor processing, attention would not be differentially allocated to processing the Group B infrequent information and this information therefore would not be more accessible in memory to unduly impact judgments. If, however, processing is optimal, the frequency of all categories of information would be readily identified. Consequently, the equivalent ratio of desirable to undesirable behavior for both groups would be recognized, and there would be no basis for differential processing of the Group B infrequent information. Estimates of frequencies would be highly accurate, and illusory correlations would not form. Thus, illusory correlations likely depend on a level of processing sufficient to allow recognition of the existence of differential frequencies, but not so thorough to allow

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Page 251 highly accurate processing of that information. This emphasis on the role of motivation and capacity in influencing the thoroughness of processing is consistent with recent dual-process models in social cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Dual process models invoke two central principles to predict how motivation and capacity might influence the nature of social information processing. The first principle posits that social cognition is marked by a continual tension between, on the one hand, more detailed, elaborate, or systematic processing and, on the other hand, more cursory, algorithmic, or heuristic processing. Motivational and capacity variables have been found to lead people to address incoming information either more systematically or more heuristically (see Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1999). The second principle, termed the sufficiency principle , suggests that people, in general, are satisficers who process incoming information with only enough thoroughness to reduce the present uncertainty and no more. The reduction of uncertainty, according to this view, is necessary because of the aversive nature of doubt. Consequently, people are motivated to eliminate uncertainty as quickly and easily as possible (Kruglanski, 1990; Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999). The eagerness to reduce doubt often means that people apply the most accessible interpretation to the incoming data, and the most accessible interpretation, of course, may or may not be the most accurate interpretation. These two principles inform our understanding of illusory correlations. They suggest both that a moderate degree of processing might be quite typical in everyday contexts and that differences in motivation or capacity might serve to either increase or decrease the thoroughness of processing. In the typical experimental setting, and in many everyday settings, as information about the behavior of two targets is surveyed, people are likely to be more concerned with forming a satisfactory impression of each target than with forming the most accurate impression possible. As a result of this emphasis on forming impressions that are adequate rather than accurate, perceivers are not likely to engage in systematically processing each piece of incoming information and are likely instead to be influenced by whatever is accessible in memory (i.e., the infrequent behaviors performed by Group B in the illusory correlation paradigm). Variables that increase the thoroughness of processing should make perceivers less susceptible to relying on accessible information, undermining formation of the bias. In contrast, variables that dramatically decrease systematic processing might be expected to increase reliance on the availability heuristic. It is under these latter conditions, however, that the availability heuristic is unlikely to operate given that poor processing should attenuate the recognition and differential processing of the Group B, infrequent information. The prediction that illusory correlations can be attenuated by both systematic and deliberative processing is at first glance incompatible with the literature showing that illusory correlations are more likely to occur when information is processed in a memory-based rather than an on-line fashion. According to several authors (e.g., McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994a, 1994b, 1997; Sanbonmatsu, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1987), whereas on-line processing, which involves the formation of dynamic impressions during encoding, should eliminate illusory correlations, memorybased processing, which involves reliance on recall of relatively unelaborated information from memory, should promote their formation. In some respects, our model is compatible with the on-line/memory-based approach. Specifically, both approaches suggest that illusory correlations should be attenuated when processing is thorough but should be stronger when processing is moderate. The reasons why illusory correlations are affected, however, differ for these two approaches. The on-line/memory-based approach suggests that the effect is mediated by when the judgments of the group are formed. In contrast, our approach suggests that the effect is mediated by whether processing is sufficiently thorough to allow the accurate identification of the identical ratios of behavior for the two target groups. The two accounts also make divergent predictions regarding the consequences of poor processing. Under poor processing conditions, individuals would be either unwilling or unable to process information on-line, and judgments would likely be memory-based. Based on the on-line/memory-based distinction, illusory correlations might be expected to form. However, it is under these processing conditions that the rarity of the Group B, infrequent behaviors likely would not be recognized as rare, would not be deliberatively processed, and would be no more accessible in memory than the other categories of information. Thus, our approach implies a curvilinear rather than linear relation between the thoroughness of processing and the magnitude of the illusory correlation bias, allowing for the attenuation of the bias when processing is either extensive or poor. We now turn to a discussion of individual variables that have been shown to attenuate illusory correlations. Although we recognize that any Variable might alter the processing of information in a number of respects, we suggest that these Variables most likely undermined the formation of illusory correlations because they altered the thoroughness of processing. Research by Pryor (1986) provides an example of

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Page 252 the elimination of illusory correlations under conditions of deliberative processing. In this study, the standard illusory correlation procedure was used except that the instructions provided to participants were manipulated. Participants were given either a memory set or an involving impression set. In the former condition, participants were simply told to listen carefully to the items because they would be asked to recall them later. In the latter condition, participants were exhorted to “listen to each statement very carefully,” to “form a general impression of each group,’’ and to “consider the extent to which you might find the group as a whole to be likable or unlikable.” Only those participants who received memory set instructions formed illusory correlations. Participants in the impression set condition not only did not form illusory correlations, but they were more accurate in identifying presented traits from a list of presented and foil traits, suggesting that illusory correlations were precluded from forming because processing was more deliberate. The data suggest that motivated perceivers were able to accurately detect the equivalent proportion of undesirable information describing the two target groups. Beliefs about the nature of the target also can affect the thoroughness with which information describing the target is processed. Recent evidence suggests, for example, that information describing individuals and groups is typically processed with differing deliberation. Because individuals are usually perceived as more unified or coherent than groups, information describing individuals is more likely to be processed in an on-line, deliberative fashion than information describing groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Illusory correlations, therefore, would be more likely when information describes behaviors of different members of a group rather than behaviors of a single individual. Sanbonmatsu, Sherman, and Hamilton (1987) tested this idea by manipulating the type of target (group vs. individual) and the distinctiveness of a target (by having some participants focus on one particular target). Their results strikingly show that, for groups, the typical illusory correlation pattern was found; participants overassociated the salient group and the infrequent behavior. For individual targets, however, participants overassociated the salient individual and the frequent behavior. McConnell et al. (1994b) extended this work by providing more direct evidence that individual targets trigger deliberative processing. They found that perceivers recalled more information about and were more accurate and faster in assigning behaviors describing individual than group targets. Interestingly, these effects occurred only when participants were given nondirective instructions; strong impression formation instructions (that should instigate more deliberation) and comprehensibility instructions (that should undermine perception of distinctiveness) eliminated the effects of target. These data are consistent with the explanation that individual targets tend to instigate more deliberative processing than group targets and imply that differences in the perceived coherence of targets should influence the deliberativeness of processing, thereby moderating the formation of illusory correlations (McConnell et al., 1997). Just as systematic processing attenuates illusory correlations, so does very poor processing. Support for this proposition comes primarily from research examining the effects of positive and negative mood on illusory correlations. Studies suggest that happiness (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Sinclair & Mark, 1995; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992) and, in some circumstances, sadness (Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983) can decrease the thoroughness with which available information is processed. Reduced deliberative processing following the manipulation of mood has been attributed to a number of factors. Cognitive capacity may be reduced because positive and negative moods can activate associated material from memory, thereby decreasing the ability to attend to and deliberatively process other available information. Motivation to process can also be affected by mood, especially positive moods, either because individuals are motivated to maintain their mood and therefore avoid extensive processing or because a positive mood suggests that the environment is secure and nonthreatening, thereby signaling that deliberative processing is unnecessary. With these effects in mind, Stroessner, Hamilton, and Mackie (1992, Experiment 1) had participants complete a typical illusory correlation paradigm after viewing a video segment intended to induce a positive, negative, or neutral mood. Participants' in the neutral mood condition formed illusory correlations, but participants in the two other mood groups did not. Two measures suggested that illusory correlations did not form in the mood conditions because information was processed less deliberatively. First, frequency estimates in the positive and negative mood conditions were highly inaccurate for both target groups rather than just for Group B, indicating that information processing in general was quite poor. Second, when participants were allowed to control the presentation pace of the behavioral sentences (Experiment 2), participants in a neutral mood looked longer at the Group B, undesirable sentences compared with the other types of sentences. Participants

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Page 253 in the positive and negative mood conditions did not. Taken together, the studies showed that mood, by reducing the thoroughness with which the behavioral information was processed, undermined the perception of distinctiveness, thereby eliminating the formation of illusory correlations. A more recent study examined mood and whether both target groups were ingroups or outgroups (Stroessner et al., 1999). It was reasoned that if both target groups were ingroups, then the thoroughness of processing information about both groups would be increased (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Park & Rothbart, 1982). If this did occur, then the effects of mood might be either augmented or attenuated because of a shift in the placement of these conditions along the hypothetical U-shaped function described earlier. Specifically, processing by participants in positive and negative moods might be increased if targets were members of ingroups to the degree that the infrequent stimuli would be distinctive. Similarly, the processing of participants in a neutral mood might be increased by exposure to ingroup members to such a degree that illusory correlations might be attenuated. To examine this possibility, Stroessner et al. (1999) manipulated participants' moods and then presented them with stimuli in which both Group A and Group B were ingroups or outgroups. Consistent with the predictions, illusory correlations formed in the positive and negative mood conditions when the target groups were ingroups but not outgroups. Illusory correlations were attenuated, but not completely eliminated, in the neutral mood, ingroup condition. The accuracy of frequency estimates indicated that processing was poorest in the positive and negative mood outgroup conditions and was most deliberative in the neutral mood, ingroup condition. Processing in the other conditions, in which illusory correlations were most pronounced, appeared to be moderate. Thus, mood and ingroup/outgroup status combined to influence the thoroughness with which the behavioral information was processed, thereby affecting whether illusory correlations formed. Fiedler, Russer, and Gramm (1993) provided a similar demonstration that variables can act in concert to affect the thoroughness of processing, thereby impacting the magnitude of illusory correlations. In their study, participants were presented with sentences describing the behaviors of individual or group targets with either a distracting task or no distracting task. In conditions in which no distracting task was done during encoding, the typical result was found: Illusory correlations were weaker for individual than for group targets. In conditions in which a distracting task was performed during encoding, illusory correlations were stronger in the individual than in the group condition. Thus, introducing a distracting task during the encoding of information about a target that typically triggers thorough processing decreases the deliberateness of processing to moderate levels, increasing the bias. Introducing a distraction with a target that typically triggers moderate processing should produce poor processing, decreasing the bias. The evidence that illusory correlations can be diminished by either decreasing or increasing systematic processing relative to standard conditions comes from studies in which perceivers' processing goals, moods, or the nature of the targets were manipulated. It would be expected that more direct manipulations of the processing demands of the task or manipulations of perceivers' cognitive capacity would produce similar results. In fact, some preliminary evidence reported in a recent chapter suggests that this may be the case (Spears & Haslam, 1997). These authors reported that illusory correlations formed when experimental participants had moderate available capacity but did not when capacity was either higher or lower. Although the authors' interpretation revolves around a different mechanism than the one considered here (see following discussion), their results are consistent with the account suggesting that recognition of distinctiveness is most likely to occur when individuals have moderate processing resources. Motivation and Illusory Correlation The research reviewed above suggests that variables influencing perceivers' capacity or motivation to process available information leads to the moderation of illusory correlation. As used above, the term motivation simply describes the willingness to engage in systematic processing of information. Motivation, of course, can also be used to refer to processing in the service of achieving desired outcomes, and several studies have examined the formation of illusory correlations under conditions in which perceivers are motivated to reach particular judgments. For example, several studies have examined whether membership in one of the target groups affects formation of illusory correlations. Schaller and Maass (1989, Experiment 2) led participants to believe they were members of either the majority group, the minority group, or members of neither group, and used impression set instructions designed to induce on-line processing. Replicating Pryor's results, Schaller and Maass found that illusory correlations did not form for participants who did not believe they were members of either group. Participants who had been assigned to a group, however, made frequency estimates and evaluative judgments that

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Page 254 favored the ingroup (see also Schaller, 1991). Motivations involving the self can also influence both how thoroughly information is processed and what conclusions are desired. Sanbonmatsu, Shavitt, Sherman, and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1987; see also Sanbonmatsu, Shavitt, & Sherman, 1991) suggested that information about the self could moderate the formation of illusory correlations because this information would be processed with great deliberation. Thus, Sanbonmatsu et al. proposed that the self would elicit deliberative, on-line processing that would produce an illusory correlation reflecting an overassociation of the self with the frequent events. When the majority of behaviors were negative, however, this tendency should result in an association between the self and undesirable behaviors. In this situation, the individual may be caught between the cognitive tendency to overemphasize undesirable behaviors and the motivational tendency to self-enhance. For these reasons, it was predicted that illusory correlations would be attenuated when the formation of an illusory correlation might threaten self-esteem. To test this idea, Sanbonmatsu et al. instructed participants that they were either one of the targets performing a task or that they were to observe one particular target among several. Threat to self-esteem was manipulated by providing participants with feedback indicating that the salient target (either themselves or a salient other) had performed well or poorly on the task. Additionally, the importance of the task was manipulated by telling participants either that the task (a multiple choice quiz) was designed to test social trivia or social knowledge. Their results generally support their hypotheses. When the majority outcome was success, the salient target (either the self or the salient other) was judged to have performed better than the nonsalient targets. When the majority outcome was failure, the salient target was judged to have performed worse than the nonsalient targets. A notable exception to this pattern emerged, however, when the task was important. Under these conditions, the self was not judged to have performed worse than the others. Thus, on the one hand, the self shares properties with any individual target in that it might elicit deliberative processing. On the other hand, the self is unique in that selfenhancement motives can override these purely cognitive processes that underlie the illusory correlation bias. In a similar vein, Berndsen, Spears, and van der Pligt (1996) showed that one's vested interests can influence the formation of illusory correlations. In their study, participants were asked to estimate the frequency of students at their university who supported an unpopular policy proposal compared with students at another university. Students were also informed that the policy would be adopted at the university where the proposal received the strongest student support. Participants then read an equal number of statements favoring and opposing the proposal supposedly made by students at both universities. Although the frequencies were equal, students believed that more statements opposing the proposal (and in favor of their vested interests) were made by students at their own university. These results are consistent with the argument that a motive to avoid an unpopular outcome influenced the perceived frequency of statements consistent with students' prevailing attitudes. In summary, a sizeable literature suggests that illusory correlations can be influenced by variables that affect how systematically information is processed and by motivations to reach desired conclusions. Although numerous studies have been reviewed that reflect primarily either the impact of thoroughness of processing or motives for desired outcomes, it should be recognized that the motivation to process and motivations for outcomes are confounded in many contexts. One definitive conclusion that can be drawn from this literature, however, is that illusory correlations are not an inevitable consequence of information processing. Perceivers can be swayed by a host of (sometimes competing) motivational forces that can influence the processing of target information. This results in judgments that are systematically and specifiably different from those that typically emerge from illusory correlation studies. ALTERNATE ACCOUNTS OF THE ILLUSORY CORRELATION PHENOMENON Although the general robustness of illusory correlations is clear, there has been disagreement about what mechanism underlies the bias and, by extension, why the bias can be moderated. Several competing interpretations suggest that the bias can be partially or completely accounted for without assuming that infrequent information becomes distinctive and is differentially processed. Each prominent account is briefly reviewed in this section, and evidence bearing on these alternate accounts is summarized. A Motivational Critique Berndsen, McGarty, Haslam, and colleagues (Berndsen, Spears, McGarty, & van der Pligt, 1998; Haslam, McGarty, & Brown, 1996; McGarty, Haslam, Turner, & Oakes, 1993) argued that illusory correlations are rooted not in the differential processing of unusual information,

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Page 255 but in perceivers' basic motivation to make sense of the information presented in an experimental context. When presented with behavioral information describing the target groups' members, individuals perceive that their task is to detect the specific basis for the differentiation between the groups. According to this logic, participants believe it would be unlikely that group information would even be presented unless there were actual group differences. It then follows that perceivers would try to distinguish between the groups, even in the absence of group differences. Why, then, would there be a systematic bias to judge Group B less favorably than Group A? If the task induces a motivation to differentiate between the groups, it is unclear why approximately equal numbers of individuals would not make opposite differential evaluative judgments of the two groups, eliminating any systematic bias when judgments are collapsed across individuals. According to these authors, evaluations are more positive for Group A than for Group B because there is more evidence supporting a hypothesis that Group A is good and Group B is bad (18 and 4, respectively, in Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) than a hypothesis that Group A is bad and Group B is good (8 and 9, respectively). Viewing the data in this way, in fact, has led these authors to argue that illusory correlations may not be illusory at all. Differential judgments, according to McGarty et al. (1993), may reflect “the product of a process based on actual rather than illusory differences between groups” (p. 407; italics in original). Two lines of evidence are offered as support for this account. As evidence that perceivers are motivated to make differential group judgments in the absence of distinctive information, McGarty et al. (1993, Experiment 1) showed that illusory correlations form when participants are simply told that they will read twice as much information describing A as B but then are actually given no information. Moreover, illusory correlations form even when information is provided but without identification of targets' group membership (Experiment 2). As evidence that illusory correlations are attenuated if the motivation to differentiate the groups is reduced, Haslam et al. (1996) instructed participants in one condition of an experiment that the different groups in the experiment referred to individuals who were left- and right-handed. Illusory correlations were eliminated in this condition, but they emerged in conditions where participants were not given information regarding the difference between groups. Self-reports suggested that participants in the former condition were less motivated to make differentiated impressions of the groups. However, there is reason to question whether this account is completely independent from a distinctiveness view. Presenting individuals with information describing members of two groups likely does induce an expectation that the groups are different, and instructing participants that the two groups refer to left- and right-handed individuals might undermine that expectancy (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Spears, & McGarty, 1996). Neither contention is inherently inconsistent with the distinctiveness account. Instead, it is very likely that the attempt to differentiate the groups increases motivation to process the available information, allowing the tendency to differentially attend to and encode infrequent information to bias group perceptions. Providing information that the groups do not differ either reduces the thoroughness of processing or motivates processing to support the conclusion of no difference. Therefore, although Haslam, McGarty, and their colleagues should be credited for identifying an assumption implicitly conveyed within the illusory correlation paradigm, it is not clear that their account makes predictions that contradict a distinctiveness view. It is also not entirely clear why these authors contend that the illusory correlation effect does not constitute a bias. In the typical illusory correlation study, there exists a constant 2:1 ratio between desirable and undesirable information for both target groups; the only way the groups differ is that the number of items involved in the numerator and denominator of the ratio is twice as great for Group A than for Group B. Aside from the difference in the specific number of items, however, the samples reflect what would be obtained on average if one were to take multiple samples from the same population but simply doubled the sample size for Group A. Viewed in this way, there exists no basis for making different judgments of the groups because the information describing the groups' members is being derived from the same underlying population of behavioral descriptions. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the position that illusory correlations reflect the detection of real group differences. Information Processing Critiques Other alternate accounts suggest that mechanisms independent of a bias for distinctive information can account for the illusory correlation phenomenon. Rothbart (1981) argued that illusory correlations may reflect a perceived association between the frequent Group A and the performance of the frequent (typically, the desirable) behaviors. His rationale is that, because items describing Group A's frequent behaviors are most common by far, these sentences might be most accessible

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Page 256 in memory, resulting in more favorable judgments of Group A than of Group B. Thus, Rothbart would predict the typical outcome but for reasons quite different from those offered by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). Smith (1991) offered a similar argument that the bias might not be mediated by the distinctiveness of the infrequent stimuli, at least in all circumstances. Instead, Smith uses Hintzman's (1986) memory-trace model of memory to argue that processes of exemplar storage and retrieval can account for the bias. A computer simulation based on Hintzman's model can reproduce the typical differential evaluations of the target groups and cued-recall results because the model is sensitive to arithmetic rather than proportionate differences between positive Group A and Group B behaviors. Thus, because the difference between positive and negative behaviors is greater for Group A (18 - 8 = 10) than for Group B (9 - 4 = 5), the model predicts an association between Group A and performance of desirable behaviors. Fiedler and his colleagues have also critiqued the distinctiveness-based account (Fiedler, 1991, 1996; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994; Fiedler et al., 1993), arguing that illusory correlations can arise simply because different amounts of information describe Group A and Group B. Unless information is processed without error, Fiedler argued, estimates of frequency show regression to the mean. This regression tendency is even stronger with smaller samples because there are fewer opportunities to detect the correct proportion of frequencies. Thus, regression in estimates should occur for both Group A and Group B, but should be stronger for the smaller Group B than for the larger Group A. The differential loss of information for the two targets should result in judgments that Group B is less positive than Group A when most behaviors are desirable and less negative when most behaviors are desirable (i.e., the typical illusory correlation effect). This effect emerges, however, without any differential processing of the infrequent items. In fact, Fiedler argued that the bias results from more efficient extraction of information describing Group A and relatively poorer memory for the smaller Group B. Several findings have been offered in support of a differential information loss account. For example, Fiedler (1991) showed that illusory correlations emerge even when events occurred with zero frequency and, therefore, could not be perceived as distinctive. Moreover, Fiedler also showed in a replication of Hamilton and Gifford (1976) that estimates of Group B's undesirable behaviors approximate 50%, regardless of whether the frequent behaviors were desirable or undesirable in nature. According to Fielder, this pattern is more parsimonious with an account suggesting that Group B information was assessed with low reliability than with an interpretation suggesting that the Group B, infrequent information was more deliberatively processed, resulting in an overestimation of the frequency of this information. This contention is bolstered by Fiedler et al. (1993), who examined the accuracy of frequency estimates and group assignments and the reliability of judgments across multiple traits. Estimates were more accurate for Group A than for Group B, and trait judgments were more reliable for Group A as well. Hits and false alarms were computed from the group assignments, and these data reflect greater sensitivity for the more frequent desirable items than for the rare undesirable items. Moreover, there was a fairly high response tendency to incorrectly indicate that negative behaviors were performed by members of Group B. Finally, correlational analyses reveal that hit rates for the undesirable Group B behaviors were not strongly predictive of the bias. These results have led Fiedler (1996) to argue that “minority statistics are assessed with much lower reliability or accuracy than the same statistics in the majority, contrary to the presumed distinctiveness and memory advantage of rare events” (p. 635). Should Distinctiveness Be Abandoned? Each of these critiques suggests that illusory correlations might arise without any differential processing of the least frequent type of behavioral information. It is clear from this brief review that illusory correlations can occur in situations that preclude the possibility that any information is distinctive because of paired infrequency. If no information is presented (McGarty et al., 1993) or cells contain no information (Fiedler, 1991), biased processing of rare information cannot account for resulting illusory correlations. Thus, distinctiveness is not a necessary precondition for formation of the bias. Because illusory correlations arise when rare information is unavailable, however, does not imply that rare information plays no role when it is available. On the contrary, much recent evidence is consistent with Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) suggestion that the Group B, negative items are processed differently from the other items available. For example, Hamilton and Sherman (1989) reviewed data indicating that illusory correlations appear to reflect a devaluation of Group B rather than an enhanced evaluation of Group A (Sherman, Hamilton, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1989), and that phi coefficients were uncorrelated with evaluations of Group A but were significantly correlated with evaluations of Group B (Hamilton et al., 1985).

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Page 257 More recent evidence provides more direct support for the distinctiveness view. Among this evidence is the processing time data described earlier from Stroessner et al. (1992, Experiment 2). Participants in the standard (i.e., neutral mood) condition of that experiment looked longer at the Group B, undesirable items than the other items when they could control the pace of presentation, and these processing differences predicted the magnitude of the bias. None of the alternate accounts reviewed earlier can account for these findings. The higher proportionate recall from the Group B, infrequent cell (Hamilton et al., 1985; Stroessner et al., 1999) is also difficult to explain without invoking differential processing of those items. It is also important to clarify a potential misunderstanding of the distinctiveness account that arises in the Fiedler et al. (1993) discussion of low hit rates for the Group B, undesirable items. Fiedler et al. implied that the distinctiveness account views the accurate memory of Group B, negative items as the exclusive foundation of the bias. Given this interpretation of the distinctiveness account, the finding of low hit rates for these items would be problematic. We would argue, however, that a finding of low hit rates for the Group B, infrequent items does not rule out the distinctiveness account because the differential memory for the distinctive items is not the mechanism underlying the bias, but is instead a product of the processes that do. Specifically, the distinctiveness account suggests that infrequent items draw differential attention and processing during encoding, resulting in greater accessibility of those items in memory. Better memory for the infrequent items would be expected under many conditions. Illusory correlations could form, however, even in the absence of superior memory for infrequent items. If recall were equivalent for all types of items, illusory correlations could still form if some of the infrequent items were retrieved more easily or more quickly, implying (via the availability heuristic) that there are many such items available in memory. This would result in biased and inaccurate frequency estimates and lower evaluations of Group B and a bias to incorrectly assign negative behaviors performed by Group A to Group B – exactly the results reported by Fiedler et al. (1993). Thus, although it is surprising that hit rates for infrequent items were not higher (as was found in a more recent study by Johnson & Mullen, 1994), the identified response bias is not incompatible with the distinctiveness account. Other evidence supporting the distinctiveness view comes from studies assessing response latencies. Several studies have shown that judgments of Group B are made more quickly than judgments of Group A. Johnson and Mullen (1994; replicated by McConnell et al., 1994) found that correct assignments of negative behaviors to Group B were faster than correct assignments for Group A's behaviors or for positive behaviors performed by Group B, and these response latencies were predictive of the magnitude of the bias. All the alternate accounts might be expected to predict faster judgment speeds for Group A (although the basis for this prediction would differ for each account), and the finding that response times are faster for Group B poses a challenge to each account. Thus, it appears that the original interpretation proposed by Hamilton and Gifford (1976) continues to provide a compelling explanation for many instantiations of the bias. There is evidence that the infrequent items are processed differently from the other types of items, at least in some conditions. Yet it is also likely that the processes discussed in each of the alternate accounts might contribute to formation of illusory correlation or might be able to account for the bias under some circumstances. SOME FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN ILLUSORY CORRELATION RESEARCH As is clear from this review and others (Hamilton & Sherman, 1989; Mullen & Johnson, 1990), the research on illusory correlations has informed our understanding of the origin of stereotypes. The reason for the magnitude of this contribution can likely be traced to several factors. In contrast with the motivational explanations of stereotyping and prejudice that were dominant in the literature at the time (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954), Hamilton and Gifford (1976) provided an explanation for stereotypes based solely on cognitive mechanisms. Because illusory correlations could arise simply from commonplace, unmotivated biases in information processing, research on stereotype formation became less a special interest of clinical and motivational psychologists and more the focus of mainstream social psychologists. Illusory correlations also showed that stereotypes could form even when they were factually unwarranted. This conclusion likely provided some appeal in an era in which group differences were being deemphasized and there were no clear criteria for assessing real differences (a challenge that largely persists today). Illusory Correlations in the Study of Stereotyping For these various reasons, research on stereotype forma-

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Page 258 tion emerged almost exclusively from studies using the illusory correlation paradigm, perhaps to the relative neglect of other processes that are also involved in the formation of group beliefs. Brigham (1971), for example, highlighted the importance of stereotypes as beliefs that are learned from parents, teachers, and peers. Little research has focused on understanding how group beliefs provided by significant others influence how available information is processed or how reinforcement of stereotypical or egalitarian beliefs can influence developing knowledge structures. More work could also address how “kernels of truth” might be overgeneralized to produce unwarranted stereotypes. The illusory correlation paradigm, in fact, might be ideal for studying this issue as it provides a criterion against which the accuracy of judgments can be judged. Illusory correlations as defined by Chapman (1967) refer to perceived correlations that are not correlated or are correlated to a lesser extent than reported . Frequency distributions can be constructed that actually reflect degrees of association between group and behavior desirability variables. Illusory correlations would emerge if perceptions of group differences exceed actual differences, reflecting an empirical demonstration of the “kernel of truth” hypothesis. Identifying the conditions under which small group differences are correctly recognized or overgeneralized might be a valuable research endeavor. Illusory Correlations Across Content Domains Although we argue that the role of illusory correlations in stereotype formation has been emphasized to the neglect of other variables, we also suggest that the contribution of illusory correlations to the understanding of other important questions has not been emphasized enough. Several recent studies have shown that illusory correlations can occur across domains, leading to findings that can be counterintuitive given the prevailing accounts of the phenomena in question (e.g., McConnell, Leibold, & Sherman, 1997; Mullen & Johnson, 1995; Spears, van der Pligt, & Eiser, 1985, 1986). This should not be surprising. After all, Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) original research on illusory correlations in stereotyping was inspired by research on learning (Chapman, 1967) and on interpretations of psychodiagnostic tests (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969). Applying the illusory correlation construct to new issues might bring novel insights and provide a valuable heuristic function. One illustrative example is recent research on illusory correlations in procedural justice (Stroessner & Heuer, 1996). Traditionally, research on procedural justice has relied on motivation-based accounts to explain how individuals decide whether they have received fair treatment from others. Different theories have been offered to account for fairness judgments (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), but they typically start with assumptions about individuals' motivations in exchange relationships and make different predictions about the perception of fairness based on these differing assumptions. If illusory correlations result from basic biases in information processing, it seemed reasonable to suspect that fairness judgments might also be affected by those biases independent of motivational concerns. To see whether illusory correlations could arise to affect perceived fairness, Stroessner and Heuer (1996) had participants complete a standard illusory correlation paradigm except that the stimulus information described the treatment of group members by police officers. Participants received twice as many sentences describing the treatment of the members of Group A as Group B, and the treatments were either mostly fair or mostly unfair depending on the condition. Consistent with the standard illusory correlation findings, participants formed illusory correlations between the infrequent treatment and the smaller group. When treatment was typically fair, participants perceived that Group B was treated less fairly than Group A. When treatment was typically unfair, participants perceived that Group B was treated more fairly than Group A. Given the differences in perceived treatment, an interesting question regarded the potential effects of illusory correlations on subsequent judgments. In a second experiment (Stroessner & Heuer, 1996, Experiment 2), participants completed the illusory correlation task from the first experiment and then judged the guilt of a member of Group A and Group B in two legal cases in which evidence was mixed. Judgments were more lenient for members of the group that was (mis)perceived as receiving relatively poor treatment from the police. Moreover, fairness and guilt judgments were significantly correlated, suggesting that the differences in the guilt judgments reflected attempts to restore equity in treatment. Beyond highlighting the role of basic cognitive biases in procedural justice, these studies reinforce the notion that illusory correlations may occur in and have important consequences across a variety of domains. Illusory correlations might potentially arise in any context in which different types of information describing groups of different sizes is available, regardless of the exact nature of the information. These data also indicate that illusory correlations, once formed, can affect subsequent judgments. Illusory correlations may

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Page 259 be the foundation for biased processing of information encountered in a later, unrelated context and may lead to differential behavior toward group members. The possibility that individuals may act based on their illusory correlations offers an important topic for future research. Conclusion Although recent research on illusory correlations has focused on testing varying accounts of the bias, the accumulating evidence suggests that illusory correlations are multiply determined. Several factors including the biased processing of infrequent information likely contribute to the formation of illusory correlations. Of course, the importance of any single factor presumably varies across contexts, and future research needs to provide critical tests to identify the contexts in which each model best accounts for the phenomenon. Also important is the continued identification of variables that moderate illusory correlations. Our review suggests that variables that tend to increase or decrease processing relative to standard conditions will likely attenuate the bias, and we have discussed several variables including the nature of the targets and the affective state of the perceiver that fit well within this framework. According to our model, variables that influence either the motivation or capacity to process information systematically will likely influence whether illusory correlations are likely to form. In its ability to assist in the prediction of whether any potential variable might impact the formation of the bias, our model can potentially provide a useful heuristic function. Moreover, we believe that the model provides a framework for integrating findings derived from studies using divergent methods and measures and even for data that have been offered in support of alternate accounts of illusory correlation. It is our hope that the integration of diverse accounts and findings will facilitate the continued application of illusory correlation to understanding various important social psychological phenomena beyond the formation of stereotypes.

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Page 261 16 The Other Side of the Story: Transparency Estimation in Social Interaction Jacquie D. Vorauer University of Manitoba A well-known proverb advises individuals against ‘‘judging a book by its cover” when they are evaluating other people. It is clear, however, that this wisdom is often not put into practice. Decades of research on the correspondence bias (Jones, 1979) reveal that individuals are quite ready to jump to conclusions about others on the basis of limited or superficial information. Perceivers tend to infer that behavior on the surface reflects the person underneath even when this inference is unwarranted, as is the case when behavior is highly constrained by the situation (for a review, see Krull, chap. 13, this volume). The present chapter focuses on a complementary phenomenon that has received less attention from researchers and theorists, whereby (to twist the metaphor) individuals tend to “feel like an open book” when considering the judgments that others form of them. My colleagues and I use the term transparency overestimation to describe the case where people exaggerate the extent to which their true self has been revealed to an audience via their behavior – that is, where they perceive that their self has come to the surface although it has not (Vorauer & Claude, 1998; Vorauer & Ross, 1999). For example, individuals may overestimate how easy it is for someone else to tell that they hold tolerant racial attitudes. The correspondence bias and transparency overestimation represent two sides of the same coin, in that the former reflects what people infer from an individual's behavior and the latter reflects what that individual expects people to infer from it. Each of these biases represents a failure to appreciate how the actor's behavior may be nonrepresentative of his or her self – either because only a small sample of actions and remarks is under consideration or because the situation somehow led the actor to behave in an uncharacteristic manner.1 Both of these phenomena involve seeing behavior as full of meaning about the actor. However, for the observer the meaning that is attached to behavior is guided by the nature of the behavior, whereas for the actor the meaning attached to behavior is guided by his or her general self-knowledge. Thus, each person may hold a confident but conflicting perception of the information that the actor has conveyed. JUDGING OTHERS Much of the research that has been conducted to date on social perception has focused on individuals' impressions of other people. Even a brief review of this literature illustrates that there are a variety of ways in which individuals tend to be less than even-handed when making judgments about others. Consider, for example, research demonstrating primacy effects in impression formation (e.g., Asch, 1946), stereotyping (e.g., Kunda & ShermanWilliams, 1993), victim derogation (Lerner & Simmons, 1966), the group-serving bias or ultimate attribution error (Hewstone, 1990; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Pettigrew, 1979; Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989), mirror-image perceptions (Bronfenbrenner, 1961), and many others. Among all of these effects, the correspondence bias stands out as one of the most well-known and widely studied. Individuals' tendency to form impressions congruent with a target's behavior despite clear situational constraints on that behavior has proved to be a robust phenomenon across a range of interaction contexts. For example, individuals will draw conclusions about a target's attitudes from an essay he or she wrote, although the position adopted was assigned by the experimenter (Jones & Harris, 1967). Similarly, individuals will form impressions of a target's true warmth and friendliness from his or her behavior even when they are told that the experimenter instructed the target to act in a particular way (Napolitan & Goethals, 1979). Perceivers do no better at correcting for the influence of social roles than they do at correcting for lack of choice: They tend to make inferences about a target's knowledgeability and leadership qualities that are insensitive to the advantages or disadvantages conferred by the role he or she currently occupies (Humphrey, 1985; Ross, Amabile,

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Page 262 & Steinmetz, 1977). Moreover, individuals remain vulnerable to such errors when they are the agents of influence and when the potential for bias should therefore be salient to them. For example, people make correspondent inferences from a target's biased self-description when the bias has been induced by the tenor of their own earlier self-presentation (Banmeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989; see also Gilbert & Jones, 1986).2 JUDGING OTHERS' VIEWS OF SELF Research on the inferences that individuals make about others has often addressed individuals' attributions for their own behavior, using these self-inferences as a point of comparison (e.g., Brandstatter, Kette, & Sageder; 1982; Thomas & Pondy, 1977). Individuals' personal interpretations of their own actions have been examined quite extensively in achievement contexts as well (e.g., Weiner, 1986). However, individuals' beliefs about the impressions conveyed by their behavior to others ( metaperceptions) have not traditionally received much attention. Metaperceptions are intriguing in that they constitute relatively complex judgments, calling for some effort to take an outside perspective on one's own actions and remarks. Moreover, individuals might often find the single most interesting aspect of another person to be his or her reactions to themselves. Why might people often be preoccupied with learning how they are viewed by others? Particularly at early developmental stages or at times of uncertainty, individuals may seek social feedback to try to learn about themselves (Cole, 1991; McNulty & Swann, 1994) and to establish goals for behavior (Higgins, 1996). This process, whereby people look to another person's reactions to get a sense of their skills and attributes and to develop personal standards, corresponds to the looking-glass self advanced by Cooley (1902). Individuals have many additional reasons aside from the acquisition of knowledge about themselves and their capacities to be concerned about others' perspectives. In particular, researchers have argued that a need to belong is a fundamental human motivation, and that “the desire for interpersonal attachment may well be one of the most far-reaching and integrative constructs currently available to understand human nature” (Banmeister & Leary, 1995, p. 522). Research on the cognitive implications of the importance that individuals accord to their social relationships has generally focused on blurred distinctions between self and other (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) and the extension of self-enhancing biases to close others (e.g., Fincham, Beach, & Baucom, 1987). However, attaching value to being liked and accepted should also lead individuals to be concerned with understanding others' thoughts and feelings about them, and to readily draw inferences about how they are viewed from their own and others' behavior. Along these lines, Leary and his colleagues (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998) recently argued that the self-esteem system functions as a sociometer that monitors the extent to which the individual is included or excluded by others. According to this framework, people's apparent motive to preserve or enhance self-esteem actually reflects a more basic drive to avoid social exclusion. The sociometer helps individuals successfully maintain connections to other people by generating negative affective reactions when cues indicating disapproval are detected and by motivating efforts to restore inclusionary status when it is threatened. Also relevant here is Higgins' (1996) conceptualization of self-knowledge as a self-digest that summarizes what the world is like in relation to oneself. The self-digest framework emphasizes the adaptive benefits of being attuned to the social environment and the interpersonal contingencies that it involves. People's sensitivity to how they are viewed may be especially high in cases where they are emotionally attached to another person or where the person controls their access to desirable resources. For example, employees may be interested in their superior's opinion of them because they want to predict how he or she would react if they were to request a raise and because they want to plan behavior that will enhance their chances of success. A desire to avoid feared negative outcomes may also enhance people's interest in obtaining reflected appraisal information for prediction and behavior planning. For instance, knowledge as to whether another person has negative attitudes toward their group or is likely to reject social overtures can help individuals avoid discrimination and embarrassment. Finally, individuals may monitor how they are perceived in the interest of maintaining a sense of existential security. That is, they may look to others for confirmation that personally important and confidently held beliefs about themselves have social reality. It can be reassuring for people to feel that their attitudes and opinions are shared – and thus validated – by others (Tesser & Campbell, 1983). In a similar fashion, individuals' ability to confirm that there is consensus regarding something as important as their identity can be satisfying and contribute to their sense that they can understand and predict the world around them. Research and theory on self-verification processes underscore this need that people have to believe that others see them the same way that they see themselves (Swann, 1987).

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Page 263 A good deal of research supports the contention that individuals are concerned with understanding how they are viewed and suggests that metaperceptions may have an important impact in many situations where impressions of others have typically been emphasized instead. Consider, in particular, the extensive literature on self-presentation (Baumeister, 1982; Schlenker, 1980), which highlights people's desire to be viewed positively as well as their general preoccupation with how they are perceived by others. This research suggests that people will go to considerable lengths to convey desired impressions – even acting dumb when that seems apt to trigger a positive reaction in the other person (Zanna & Pack, 1975). Research conducted within a self-verification framework has also demonstrated that individuals will work to ensure that they are viewed in a certain way by someone else (Swann & Hill, 1982). Indeed, the desire for self-verification may guide individuals' choice of friends and close others (Swann, 1987). According to the theory, people seek out interaction partners who validate their self-views and avoid those whom they suspect will misperceive them. Individuals' inclination to focus on others' reactions to them is further underscored by research indicating that people tend to exaggerate the extent to which they are the cause and target of another person's actions. For example, Fenigstein (1984) found that in a series of classes ranging in size from 25 to 33, students' anonymous estimates of the probability that an exam singled out by their professor for its low or high quality was their own averaged approximately 25% and significantly exceeded their estimates of the probability that the exam belonged to the person next to them. Zuckerman, Kernis, Guarnera, Murphy, and Rappoport (1983) found that in small group discussions individuals were more likely to perceive themselves, rather than another participant, to be the cause and target of a confederate's statements. Finally, in a study by Vorauer and Ross (1993), participants watching another person's nonverbal bahavior as she listened to their audiotaped answers to personal dilemmas tended to make more comments about her reactions to them than about her personal qualities. It seems likely that the self-as-target phenomenon demonstrated across these different studies stems at least in part from individuals' enduring concern with understanding others' reactions to them. Several additional avenues of research have demonstrated that individuals' metaperceptions can have important consequences and thus suggest that people care very much about how they are viewed. For example, reciprocity effects in evaluations indicate that people's beliefs about how another individual feels toward them can be a key determinant of their feelings toward him or her (Curry & Emerson, 1970; Curtis & Miller, 1986). Other research has demonstrated that individuals' expected enjoyment of intergroup interaction is more clearly related to their beliefs about an outgroup member's expectations about them than to their expectations about the outgroup member (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998). A particularly dramatic illustration of the importance of metaperceptions is provided by recent research suggesting a link between perceived social rejection and reduced life expectancy for HIV-positive gay men (Cole, Kemeny, & Taylor, 1997). TRANSPARENCY OVERESTIMATION: A SYSTEMATIC METAPERCEPTION BIAS The research outlined in the previous section indicates that people are often focused on how they are perceived by someone else, and that the conclusions they reach in this regard can have important implications for their thoughts, feelings, and behavior. In view of the fact that individuals' metaperceptions can have such significant consequences, the question arises as to how well people do at estimating how they are viewed. To what extent might they be reacting to metaperceptions that deviate in a significant way from another person's actual impressions of them? Early research conducted within a symbolic interactionist framework suggested that individuals' metaperceptions might be more clearly connected to their own self-concepts than to another person's actual impressions of them. This conclusion was advanced by Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) in their review of a large number of correlational studies. Although Shrauger and Schoeneman were primarily concerned with assessing the evidence for the looking-glass self, their failure to find support for a clear connection between others' evaluations and individuals' metaperceptions or self-views also suggested low levels of metaperception accuracy. In a more recent and explicit effort to address metaperception accuracy, Kenny and DePaulo (1993) used the Social Relations Model (Kenny & La Voie, 1984) to analyze the data from eight separate investigations. Consistent with the findings of Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979), results indicate strong correlations between individuals' selfperceptions and metaperceptions. Kenny and DePaulo also found that there was a clear tendency for actors to think that they made a consistent impression across different interaction partners, although different partners actually tended to form different impressions. Relatedly, individuals' dyadic meta-accuracy was lower than their generalized meta-accuracy. That is, people were worse at deducing how they were perceived by a

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Page 264 particular interaction partner than they were at deducing how they were perceived by others in general. Subsequent research also using a social relations model approach to assess the accuracy of metaperceptions has replicated Kenny and DePaulo's (1993) basic findings in Israel – a cultural context where social norms dictate more direct communication of interpersonal evaluations (Shechtman & Kenny, 1994). Although such directness was expected to enhance metaperception accuracy, the results of this research suggest that individuals were in fact heavily influenced by their self-concept rather than by social feedback when estimating others' impressions. A key issue highlighted by Shechtman and Kenny's (1994) research is that individuals, tendency to believe that they are viewed similarly by different audiences could conceivably be a function of unclear interpersonal feedback. That is, perhaps it is not entirely reasonable to expect people to have distinct ideas about how they are viewed by distinct others if there is little information available to help them form differentiated judgments. Moreover, in the absence of information from other sources, why shouldn't people use their self-knowledge in their estimates of others' impressions? Recent research by Vorauer and Miller (1997) suggests, however, that individuals will neglect other potential sources of information about how they will be viewed (i.e., their own behavior) in favor of their general beliefs about themselves. Here participants were placed in a situation that was highly likely to influence their selfpresentations. They received information about their partner in the study that indicated that he or she was experiencing either very low or very high feelings of academic and social self-confidence at university. Participants subsequently described themselves to their partner. Participants' own self-descriptions were clearly influenced by their impression of their partner. When they perceived that their partner felt negatively about his or her university experiences, they described themselves in a more negative fashion, as compared with when they thought that their partner felt positively about his or her university experiences. However, participants' beliefs about how they were viewed did not vary across the two conditions. Results from other measures confirm the following overall pattern: Individuals' metaperceptions were connected to their general beliefs about themselves (assessed months prior to the experiment) rather than their current behavior, whereas the impressions that they conveyed depended on their current behavior but not on their general beliefs about themselves. Thus, individuals did a poor job of considering the implications of their current behavior for an observer's likely impressions of them. What is the mechanism by which individuals' metaperceptions come to be excessively connected to their selfknowledge? My colleagues and I focus on a cognitive account for transparency overestimation whereby private selfknowledge guides individuals' interpretations of their own behavior, leading them to see evidence of their attributes in their actions and remarks that they then assume is apparent to others. Because outside observers do not have access to the private knowledge, however, they form impressions that are less consistent with it. Our account of the mechanism by which individuals form metaperceptions is similar to the self-judgment process outlined by Kenny and DePaulo (1993).3 We emphasize, in addition, the link between the salience of individuals' self-knowledge and the magnitude of the transparency overestimation bias. There are two mechanisms by which heightened salience of self-knowledge might enhance individuals' feelings of transparency. First, individuals may see more of their self in their behavior when their own general beliefs about themselves are highly accessible (see Higgins, 1989c, for a review). Second, individuals may be less likely to appreciate the distinction between their own and another person's perceptions when their self-knowledge is salient. This contention is consistent with Higgins' (1981b) speculation that role-taking varies in difficulty “depending on the extent to which competing information relating to one's own characteristics and viewpoint is accessible and salient” (p. 129), and with research indicating that self-aware individuals are more likely to exhibit a false consensus effect by assuming that others' attitudes and preferences are congruent with their own (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). The greater the salience of individuals' self-knowledge, the more likely they should be to see evidence of their self in their actions and to blur the distinction between their own and another person's perspective on those actions (see Vorauer & Ross, 1999). Motivational factors might also enhance individuals' feelings of transparency. For example, although research on the desire for self-verification has focused on behavioral strategies for satisfying this goal or on how this goal guides one's interpretation of social feedback (Swann, 1987), exaggerating the quantity of accurate self-relevant information communicated by one's own behavior is also clearly consistent with this motive. My colleagues and I do not view motivation as necessary to the transparency overestimation phenomenon, however. Indeed, in some cases, the motivation to conceal some aspect of self might also enhance feelings of transparency if preoccupation with concealment heightens the salience of the

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Page 265 self-aspect in question. Below I review recent research examining factors influencing the degree of transparency overestimation that people exhibit with respect to personality traits, goals in negotiation, deception, and the communication of emotional states. In this more recent research, transparency overestimation is often assessed by asking individuals whether another person has an accurate impression of them along a particular dimension. These perceptions of transparency are compared to individuals' actual transparency, which is computed by assessing the match between individuals' selfperceptions and others' impressions. Previous metaperception research has typically followed a different procedure, whereby the correlation between individuals' self-views and estimates of another person's impressions of them is examined together with numerous other patterns. The more recent approach seems most suitable for examining transparency overestimation, because it circumvents the problem of individuals being forced to estimate another person's impression of them even if they believe that the person would feel totally unable to make a judgment from the available information. That is, the recent approach allows for the possibility that individuals might think that another person simply doesn't know. RECENT RESEARCH ON TRANSPARENCY OVERESTIMATION The Transparency of Personality Traits Individuals' metaperceptions often focus on another person's beliefs about their personal attributes. They might wonder, for example, whether an employer can tell that they are trustworthy or if a romantic interest can discern their intelligence and sense of humor. Vorauer and Ross (1999) conducted a series of three studies examining individuals' sense of how readily apparent their personality traits were to another person. Our main hypotheses were that people would overestimate the transparency of their personal attributes to others and that self-awareness would enhance transparency overestimation. Our hypothesis regarding self-awareness was based on its connection to selfknowledge accessibility. When people are self-aware, their consciousness is focused on their thoughts and feelings, their personal history, their body, or other personal aspects of themselves (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). A substantial body of research verifies that self-referent information is particularly accessible to individuals who are high in dispositional self-consciousness (Turner, 1978, 1980; Turner, Gilliland, & Klein, 1981). Research has also identified stimuli such as audiences, cameras, and mirrors that can induce a state of self-awareness and render self-referent information accessible (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1978; Geller & Shaver, 1976). Thus, we expected that self-awareness would exacerbate individuals' bias toward transparency overestimation through both the behavior interpretation and reduced perspective-taking mechanisms discussed earlier. Individual Differences in Self-Consciousness. Study 1 centered on individual differences in self-consciousness. Participants were presented with a series of personal dilemma situations and were asked to choose the best solution from a series of alternatives provided. The alternatives were constructed so that three of the four possible solutions would appear obviously unreasonable. Thus, virtually everyone chose the same solutions, and the behavior was quite nondiagnostic. Participants were then asked to indicate, for each of 30 different trait dimensions (e.g., perceptive, unethical), whether another person would be able to accurately judge their standing on the dimension on the basis of the solutions that they chose to the problems. That is, they indicated whether their traits would be transparent. Participants also completed the self-consciousness scale developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975). Consistent with our hypothesis, results indicate that participants who were high in self-consciousness felt that more of their traits would be transparent, as compared with participants who were low in self-consciousness. State Self-Awareness. The next two studies both centered on the effects of state self-awareness on feelings of transparency. Study 2 maintained the problem-solving task and dependent measure used in Study 1; the experimental manipulation involved varying whether individuals were asked to assess their personality characteristics before or after judging whether the characteristics would be transparent to another person. We assumed that when participants were prompted to consider their standing on a trait dimension prior to making a transparency judgment, their self would be more prominent in their mind and that their inferences about the meaning of their behavior would therefore be more strongly influenced by self-knowledge. They should thus feel more transparent. In addition to testing this hypothesis, Study 2 included judgments made by observers so that the extent to which individuals overestimated their transparency could be assessed. Results indicate that the manipulation significantly enhanced individuals' feelings of transparency, with a striking 22 of the 30 traits seeming transparent in the self-concept prime condition, as compared with 14 traits in the control condition. Moreover, the data on actual

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Page 266 transparency revealed that, although transparency overestimation occurred in both conditions, the bias was much stronger in the self-concept prime condition: On average, individuals were actually transparent on only eight trait dimensions.4 Interestingly, a measure of observers' judgmental confidence revealed that these individuals exaggerated their ability to accurately judge the actor's traits from his or her responses to the problem situations. Observers felt that they could accurately deduce the actor's standing on 12.5 dimensions. Study 3 was designed to provide an additional demonstration of a link between situationally induced self-awareness and feelings of transparency, using a considerably different manipulation than that adopted in Study 2. Many of the everyday contexts that individuals find most involving and impactful are those in which they are being evaluated by someone else. For example, consider applying for a job, giving a presentation, or asking someone for a date. A substantial body of theory and research indicates that individuals typically experience a state of self-awareness when they believe that someone else is evaluating them (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier & Carver, 1983). To explore the implications of self-awareness induced by evaluation for individuals' feelings of transparency, we manipulated the extent to which participants experienced the experimental context as evaluative in nature. All participants first responded to the problem situations. They were then led to believe either that they had a partner in the study who would be deciding whether to work together with them in the next stage of the study on the basis of their answers (high evaluative context) or simply that they would later be working together with the person (low evaluative context). A pretest confirmed that this manipulation did in fact vary participants' level of selfawareness. After the context manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the traits that the other person would be able to accurately discern from their answers to the problems. Consistent with our hypotheses, results reveal that participants' feelings of transparency were greatest when the context was highly evaluative in nature. Particularly interesting results were obtained when the 30 traits were coded by naive judges in terms of their relevance to a decision about whether to work together with someone else on a problem-solving task. When a dichotomous factor representing trait relevance was included in analyses, results indicate that actors' enhanced feelings of transparency in the high evaluative context condition were specific to those traits considered relevant to their partner's impending decision. Along similar lines, we conducted a separate analysis examining whether the effects of the context manipulation might also vary according to the centrality of the trait dimensions to individuals' self-concepts. For each participant we computed perceived transparency along idiosyncratically central versus noncentral trait dimensions. Trait centrality was determined from information provided by participants in a previous mass testing session. Results indicate that the context manipulation enhanced perceived transparency along central trait dimensions only. Both of these patterns of focused rather than general increases in perceived transparency are consistent with the tenet of self-awareness theory that “which dimension will become salient will be determined through the situational context, or…the chronic importance of certain personal dimensions” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, p. 8). Although the findings from this study conform well to predictions derived from a self-awareness framework, it is possible that the results instead reflect individuals' expectations about how much their partner would scrutinize their tape. Participants in the high evaluative context may have felt more transparent because they believed (perhaps justifiably) that their partner would pay closer attention to what they said, in order to make a good decision. The findings for trait centrality would seem to pose some difficulty for this interpretation. However, an egocentric version of an expected-scrutiny account in which individuals' own ideas about the trait dimensions that are important are imposed on their audience remains viable. This possibility highlights the likely bidirectional relationship between feeling transparent and scrutinized. Individuals' sense of what their audience is attending to may be driven by what is personally salient to them, such that these experiences go hand-in-hand and serve to perpetuate each other. The Transparency of Goals in Negotiation Individuals' interest in understanding how they are viewed is by no means limited to personality traits. In particular, people may often be concerned about others' impressions of their objectives and intentions. In the context of negotiation, the extent to which individuals perceive their goals to be transparent to the other party may be quite important to how the interaction unfolds. For example, exaggerating the transparency of one's objectives could contribute to hostility toward the other party. Transparency overestimation could lead individuals to perceive that the other party is being intentionally insensitive to their concerns, when in fact he or she cannot be sensitive to those concerns because he or she does not understand them. Transparency overestimation may also foster inadequate communication, because

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Page 267 individuals should be unlikely to try to express what they perceive as already apparent (e.g., cooperative inclinations). Vorauer and Claude (1998) examined the hypothesis that negotiators often believe that the other party is able to accurately deduce their objectives (e.g., to be cooperative or assertive, or to ensure a similar degree of compromise by all), when in fact the other party is uncertain about their goals or forms impressions that are different from negotiators' own self-perceptions. We also examined the hypothesis that transparency overestimation would be exacerbated when the salience of negotiators' goals was increased: The greater the accessibility of this self-relevant information, the more it should seem readily apparent to others. Thus, we expected that negotiators who thought about their goals ahead of time would feel more transparent than those who did not, because the former individuals would be particularly focused on their interpersonal motives during the interaction. As it would seem easier for perceptions to change than for goals to be translated into concrete actions that could readily be decoded by an observer, we anticipated that the effects of goal salience on self-perception would outpace its effects on behavior (i.e., actual transparency). Finally, we anticipated that the effects of goal salience would be most evident for a highly circumscribed as compared with an extensive sample of behavior. We reasoned that for constrained communications accessible self-knowledge would prompt negotiators to attach meaning to behavior that would otherwise seem ambiguous. For freer communications, where behavior is less ambiguous, the impact of accessible self-knowledge should be less dramatic. Participants were given the task of agreeing on solutions to a series of interpersonal dilemmas, which were pretested to be relevant to students' personal values and to have no easy or obvious answers. Each negotiation took place between a negotiator-participant and a phantom second negotiator who did not actually exist. This phantom procedure allowed us to maintain experimental control by holding the behavior of participants' fellow negotiator constant. Negotiations involved an exchange of written responses to the problems. Negotiators first made initial responses to the problems by circling preferred answers following a multiple-choice format and then responded to the second negotiator's ostensible initial answers. An observer-participant was also recruited for each session; this person had access to all of the information supposedly exchanged between the two negotiators. We manipulated goal salience by varying whether negotiators were asked to consider their goals for a few minutes prior to responding to the second negotiator. To aid their contemplation, they were given a list of five goals that they might pursue to varying degrees (e.g., “hold firm to my own personal opinions,” ‘‘make sure that each of us makes a similar number of compromises”). The second manipulation centered on the nature of the information exchanged between negotiators. In the constrained condition, negotiators responded to the second negotiators' initial answers by circling preferred solutions in a multiple-choice format. In the unconstrained condition, they were instructed that, in addition to indicating their preferred solutions, they should explain their reasons for choosing the solutions that they did and indicate the process by which they and their partner might ultimately reach a consensus. Negotiators' perceived transparency was assessed after the negotiation. These participants estimated whether the outside observer would be able to discern their goals from their responses during the negotiation. Actual transparency was computed from the extent to which the outside observer did in fact form impressions consistent with the negotiator's goals. A striking overall transparency overestimation bias was evident. Sixty percent of negotiators believed that the observer would be able to discern their primary objective, whereas only 26% of observers actually formed accurate judgments in this regard. Indeed, observers did no better than one would expect from purely random guessing. Our key hypothesis regarding the interactive effects of goal salience and behavioral constraint on transparency overestimation was also supported. Goal salience exerted greater influence on transparency overestimation in constrained than in unconstrained communications. For constrained communications, transparency overestimation occurred when negotiators' goals were high in salience but not when their goals were low in salience. In contrast, for unconstrained communications, negotiators overestimated their transparency regardless of goal salience. A second study by Vorauer and Claude was designed to highlight the role played by cognitive processes in producing transparency overestimation. Without denying that motivational forces might contribute to or enhance individuals' tendency to exaggerate their transparency, we sought to demonstrate that the phenomenon could occur in the absence of such motives. Our strategy was to create a group of observers who were told about the negotiator's goals and to assess whether these informed observers exhibited transparency overestimation on behalf of the negotiator. By comparing the judgments made by informed versus uninformed observers, we could isolate the effects of private self-knowledge from

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Page 268 the effects of motives such as self-verification or self-enhancement. The responses made by negotiators (and the second negotiator) in the unconstrained low-salience condition of Study 1 were compiled into booklets. Each booklet, corresponding to one negotiator in Study 1, was given to two observers. The uninformed observers estimated the negotiator's goals. The informed observers were given the negotiator's goal importance ratings; they then estimated whether an outside observer would be able to tell how important each of the goals was to the negotiator. Results reveal that the informed observers overestimated an uninformed observer's ability to discern the negotiator's goals, just as the negotiators did in Study 1. For example, although 62% of informed observers believed that an uninformed observer would be able to deduce the negotiator's most important goal, only 15% were actually accurate in this regard. This finding underscores the role of private self-knowledge in generating transparency overestimation, as the informed observers would have had no motivation to perceive the negotiator as transparent or to form particularly positive impressions of his or her goals. The Transparency of Deception Deceptive communications are another context in which feelings of transparency seem apt to play a figural role. Interestingly, although researchers have devoted a great deal of attention to factors predicting observers' ability to detect deception, there has been little examination of deceivers' perceptions of the success or failure of their own deceptive attempts. Recently, however, in a series of clever experiments, Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) explored an illusion of transparency in the context of deception. Their research provides clear evidence that liars overestimate the detectability of their lies. For example, in one study, participants were instructed to be deceptive when answering questions (e.g., “What brand of shampoo do you typically use?”) in front of a group of fellow participants. Liars' estimates of how many of their fellow participants would detect that they were lying dramatically exceeded the actual rate of detection. Additional results indicate a significant relationship between private selfconsciousness and feelings of transparency. Gilovich et al. also demonstrated that individuals exhibit an illusion of transparency with respect to concealing emotional states. In one study, participants tasting pleasant and unpleasant drinks and trying to conceal their reactions exaggerated the ease with which outside observers would be able to deduce when each type of drink was being tasted. Other related research demonstrates that individuals exaggerate how nervous they appear when giving a speech, feeling that their anxiety leaks out more than is actually the case (Savitsky & Gilovich, 1998). This finding fits well with recent investigations by Barr and Kleck (1995) indicating that people tend to overestimate their own facial expressiveness, These demonstrations of transparency overestimation would seem to have important implications for individuals' everyday social exchanges. An exaggerated sense of the extent to which one's nervousness is obvious to others may detract from performance in a self-perpetuating fashion (see Savitsky & Gilovich, 1998). An illusion of transparency with respect to deception might discourage people from lying to others. The Transparency of Emotional States Recently the situation in which a person is trying to communicate rather than conceal an emotional state has also been examined (Lederman, Savitsky, & Gilovich, 1998). The results of this research indicate that although participants trying to communicate one of Ekman and Friesen's (1975) basic six emotions (i.e., disgust, happiness, fear, anger, sadness, and surprise) did not exhibit transparency overestimation, they did overestimate their transparency with respect to less recognizable emotions (e.g., regret, jealousy, love). This finding has interesting implications for situations in which people endeavor to communicate feelings of romantic interest to someone else. If individuals exaggerate how obvious their feelings are to the other person, they may be overly ready to attach negative interpretations to their failure to respond (see Vorauer & Ratner, 1996). Lederman et al.'s research also revealed that transparency overestimation was related to the intensity with which individuals experienced the emotion that they were trying to portray. This correlational finding is consistent with the idea that transparency overestimation stems from individuals' difficulty in setting aside private self-knowledge to imagine an outside observer's perspective on their behavior: The richer the private self-knowledge is, the harder it should be to imagine it being inaccessible to others. An additional component of this study also highlights the potential role played by the intensity of private experience in this context (see Savitsky, 1997). Students involved in amateur acting were more likely to overestimate their transparency than were other participants: Perceived but not actual transparency varied across actors and nonactors. Conceivably the actors were more likely than nonactors to actually feel the emotions they were trying to portray. However, it is also possible that this finding reflects wishfulfillment. Actors may have been particularly motivated to believe that they

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Page 269 could effectively communicate the emotions they were trying to convey. Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) advance an analysis of transparency overestimation that is conceptually parallel in many ways to that presented by my colleagues and myself, in that it emphasizes the difficulty of setting aside salient self-relevant information to take an outside perspective on oneself. Indeed, the theoretical similarities are highlighted by Gilovich et al.'s consideration of the influence of private self-consciousness on feelings of transparency. Gilovich et al.'s approach is unique, however, in that they explicitly distinguish between feelings of leakage and curse of knowledge effects. The curse of knowledge refers to how it can be difficult to set aside one's own knowledge when imagining how things appear to someone else. For example, Keysar, Ginzel, and Bazerman (1995) found that when individuals made predictions about a negotiator's decision in a company-acquisition scenario, information that they were explicitly told was unavailable to the negotiator nevertheless affected the predicted decision (see also Fischhoff, 1975; Keysar, 1994). Gilovich et al.'s efforts to demonstrate feelings of leakage rather than curse of knowledge effects involved incorporating yoked observers into their studies. These yoked observers were provided with information about the actor's situation. For example, they were informed whether a lie was being told or an unpleasant drink was being tasted. Gilovich et al. found that these yoked observers did not show the illusion of transparency effect (Study 1c) or that they showed it to a lesser extent than did actors (Study 2b).5 Gilovich et al. (1998) described the distinction that they draw between feelings of leakage and the curse of knowledge as centering on the distinction between experiential and abstract knowledge. These authors reasoned that participants in their studies “probably were cursed by their own knowledge, but it was their experiential knowledge of their own internal states, and not their abstract knowledge… that prompted the illusion of transparency” (p. 345). It would generally seem quite difficult to give observers the full and complete information about an actor's thoughts and feelings that is necessary to clearly distinguish curse of knowledge from leakage effects. My colleagues and I have adopted a broader definition of transparency overestimation, considering both feelings of leakage and curse of knowledge to represent transparency overestimation effects. However, we do address a different but related distinction that centers on whether perceptions of one's own behavior are involved. The experience of individuals may be quite different if they perceive clues about themselves in their actions and remarks rather than simply assume that their self is obvious (see Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). My colleagues and I argue that our effects can be understood as the result of a process whereby self-knowledge guides the inferences that individuals draw from their own behavior, which are then assumed to be shared by outside observers. We demonstrate individuals' reference to their own behavior indirectly by manipulating the nature of the behavior sample under consideration and demonstrating that this factor affects feelings of transparency (see Vorauer & Claude, 1998). FACTORS ENHANCING THE CORRESPONDENCE BIAS VERSUS TRANSPARENCY OVERESTIMATION One implication of transparency overestimation research is that observers falling prey to the correspondence bias are unlikely to have their impressions corrected by feedback from the person they are judging. Actors may often fail to realize that they are being misperceived, such that they have no reason to try to change observers' impressions of them. Moreover, many of the factors that enhance the correspondence bias may also promote transparency overestimation. Thus, worsening bias on the part of observers may be accompanied, ironically, by more extreme perceptions on the part of actors that their true self has been communicated. Consider, in particular, Gilbert and Malone's (1995) recent analysis of factors contributing to the correspondence bias. Their review provides a useful framework for comparing the sources of transparency overestimation with those of the correspondence bias. The first key possibility that they discuss is that observers lack awareness of situational constraints. One source of this lack of awareness is the invisibility problem. Situational forces may be subtle in nature, temporally or spatially removed from the relevant behavioral episode, and may have little or no physical manifestation. Another source of lack of awareness is the construal problem. Observers may erroneously assume that the situation appears to the actor the same way that it appears to them. A second possibility highlighted by Gilbert and Malone is that observers have unrealistic expectations for behavior, in that they inaccurately estimate the power of the situation. Third, inflated categorizations of behavior may occur, whereby observers assimilate behavior to the situation. That is, when the nature of the situation is salient to observers, they may interpret behavior in a situation-congruent manner. For example, an anxiety-provoking situation may lead observers to see an actor's actions as particularly anxious. The final possibility is incomplete corrections of dispositional inferences. Observers may fail to

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Page 270 correct immediate or automatic inferences about an actor's attributes as a function of lack of motivation or ability. How well does this analysis capture the mechanisms underlying transparency overestimation? With respect to lack of awareness of situational constraint, the process seems to be quite parallel for actors as for observers. That is, situational forces might sometimes be quite invisible to actors too, contributing to transparency overestimation (e.g., Vorauer & Miller, 1997). Actors may also erroneously assume that an observer sees the situation the same way that they do (i.e., the construal problem). For example, during a negotiation, actors may make inferences about the impressions that they convey on the assumption that their defensive behavior occurs in the face of clearly competitive actions by the other party; the other party might not perceive that he or she is behaving competitively. Thus, the actor might feel that cooperative inclinations are transparent when they are not. The situation would also seem to be parallel with respect to unrealistic expectations for behavior, in that actors may not appreciate the power of the situation to alter the impressions that they convey (again see Vorauer & Miller, 1997). The inflated categorizations of behavior highlighted by Gilbert and Malone (1995) seem especially important to transparency overestimation. Here, however, behavior is assimilated to self-knowledge rather than to the situation. Individuals fill in the blanks in their own behavior with what they believe to be true about themselves. Behavior identification processes readily account for the finding that transparency overestimation is enhanced when selfrelevant information is salient, particularly for ambiguous samples of behavior. Indeed, it seems that attributions might be quite secondary to such behavior identifications. The relatively greater centrality of behavior categorization to transparency overestimation as compared with the correspondence bias presumably stems from the fact that, on balance, self-knowledge is more comprehensive and salient than information about the situation. The fourth factor highlighted by Gilbert and Malone (1995), incomplete corrections, presumably contributes to transparency overestimation in much the same was as it does to the correspondence bias. Individuals may fail to adjust their metaperceptions sufficiently to take into account constraints on the quantity of self-relevant information conveyed by their behavior to someone else. Such inadequate corrections may result from a lack of motivation and/or ability. For example, individuals' desire to be viewed in a manner consistent with their self-concept (Swann, 1987) may prevent them from correcting initial egocentric inferences regarding what another person would be able to accurately deduce from their behavior. Overall, then, it seems that actors and observers may perceive different impressions in behavior through largely parallel processes. They may reach divergent conclusions as a function of their divergent starting points. Observers are focused on behavior whereas actors are focused on self-knowledge, each embracing the most salient and immediate source of information. Indeed, the effects obtained for yoked observers who are provided with some of the self-relevant information considered by actors reveal that bringing actors' and observers' starting points closer together brings their inferences closer together. Factors such as the subtlety of situational forces or cognitive busyness should enhance both the correspondence bias and transparency overestimation, pushing actors and observers even further apart in their perceptions of the impressions conveyed. There is one factor, however, that may affect each bias differently. Social Bonds Generally speaking, social bonds are associated with reduced correspondence bias. When individuals make an explicit effort to empathize with an actor, they are less apt to draw dispositional inferences from his or her behavior (Gould & Sigall, 1977; see also Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Regan & Totten, 1975). Relatedly, people perceive less crosssituational consistency in the behavior of familiar as compared with unfamiliar others (Prentice, 1990; see also Aron et al., 1991). In addition, research confirms that the preference for dispositional rather than situational explanations for behavior is less likely to occur in collectivist as compared with individualist cultures (Miller, 1984). Why do social bonds have this effect? When a felt bond is accompanied by high levels of familiarity, individuals may have extensive background information about the actor that better places the current behavior in context. A felt bond may also motivate individuals to appreciate situational influences on behavior. In addition, research on the connection between liking and perceived similarity (e.g., Marks, Miller, & Maruyama, 1981) suggests that when individuals identify with an actor they may be more inclined to think that they would behave similarly in the same situation. Social bonds may have the opposite effect on transparency overestimation. Research on self-other merging suggests that individuals' representations of themselves and close others come to overlap. For example, Aron et al. (1991) found that when married couples

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Page 271 were asked to make me/not me judgments for a series of personality traits, response latencies were significantly longer for those traits that were perceived as inconsistent across self and spouse. The longer latencies suggested that individuals felt confusion about themselves regarding these inconsistent traits as a function of the close connection between their self-concept and their representation of their partner (see also Smith & Henry, 1996). When the distinction between self and other gets blurred in this manner, individuals may be especially unlikely to appreciate differences between their own and the other person's perspective. Because of the greater degree of self/other merging that occurs in collectivist cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), there may be an even more pronounced tendency in such contexts to feel that aspects of self are obvious to others. Relatedly, within an individualistic culture, the more similar or emotionally close individuals feel to someone else, the more they may assume that the other person will see their behavior the same way that they do. Although increases in actual transparency might also accompany the bond, feelings of transparency may be affected more dramatically than actual transparency by a felt connection between two people. Along these lines, J. Cameron (1998) found that the strength of the bond (as indicated by liking and perceived similarity) that previously unacquainted interaction partners felt with one another after engaging in a negotiation was positively related to their feelings of transparency but not to their actual transparency. This pattern remained when the analyses were modified to control for how positively individuals expected to be viewed by the other person. Such findings complement Swann and Gill's (1997) research on impression confidence and accuracy among college roommates and dating partners. Swann and Gill's results indicate that relationship length and involvement are more strongly related to confidence in judging another person than to accuracy in judging that person. Swann and Gill invoked the concept of representational richness to understand their effects. They argued that greater involvement and relationship length are connected to richer representations of another person, and that these richer representations inspire confidence even if they are not especially accurate. The concept of representational richness may apply to transparency estimation to some extent. That is, individuals may make some inferences from the sheer quantity of behavior the other person has been able to observe. However, individuals judging how they are viewed have access to their own self-knowledge in addition to behavior. Their self-knowledge will be prominent in their own mind and will likely overshadow any other information that is available. Thus, they will need to decide how much of a distinction to draw between their own representation of themselves and the other person's representation of them. It is here that self-other merging should exert an important influence. J. Cameron's (1998) findings suggest a significant role for individuals' felt connection to another person, and indeed it seems intuitive that social bonds should make a difference: A long acquaintance with someone does not guarantee feelings of transparency and a new but deep attachment can trigger powerful feelings of being understood. Although the effects of self-other merging on transparency estimation in close relationships have not yet been tested directly, the inverse scenario of perceived distance between self and other has been examined in work my colleagues and I have conducted on transparency estimation in intergroup interaction. META-STEREOTYPES: TRANSPARENCY ESTIMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERGROUP INTERACTION Interestingly, it has generally been the case in research demonstrating transparency overestimation that individuals have speculated about how they are viewed by someone who is quite similar to them. Often the other person has been of the same sex as the individual, and generally there is a shared identity as an introductory psychology student at a given university. Thus, intergroup interaction constitutes an intriguing context in which to examine transparency estimation. When individuals' interaction partner is an outgroup member, it seems that as a function of perceived dissimilarity they may be less ready to presume that the partner would see their actions and remarks the same way that they do. Indeed, the fact that an interaction partner belongs to an outgroup may serve as a strong cue to potential differences in perspective (Miller & Prentice, 1999; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995), leading individuals not to blur the boundary between self and other, but instead to perceive a gulf between them. What kinds of inaccuracies might individuals expect to occur in an outgroup member's impressions of them? Vorauer, Main, and O'Connell (1998) proposed that individuals possess meta-stereotypes regarding how their ingroup is viewed by different outgroups. Meta-stereo-types are defined as knowledge structures that reflect the relationship between the ingroup and outgroup, as well as individuals' ideas about the outgroup's likely perspective on that relationship. For example, a White Canadian heterosexual may expect his or her group to be seen as submissive and polite by Americans, as uptight and conservative by homosexual individuals, and as arrogant,

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Page 272 selfish, and materialistic by Aboriginal persons. The traits prejudiced and closed-minded may be part of both of the latter two meta-stereotypes. Individuals' meta-stereotypes should affect their metaperceptions during social exchanges with outgroup members. For example, when White individuals interact with an Aboriginal person, their meta-stereotype might lead them to perceive that he or she actually views them personally as possessing undesirable traits such as selfish and closed-minded. These feelings of low transparency may have important consequences for social behavior in the context of intergroup interaction. Thus, although past research on stereotype activation and application (see Blair, chap. 22, this volume; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume) has focused on individuals' stereotypes about outgroups, the current approach emphasizes how evaluative concerns can lead people to think about an outgroup's (ostensible) stereotype about them and examines the implications of such metastereotypes for intergroup relations. My colleagues and I demonstrated the influence of meta-stereotypes on metaperceptions by staging controlled interactions between White participants and an ostensible partner who was either an Aboriginal Canadian or a White Canadian (Vorauer et al., 1998, Study 3). First, participants were videotaped as they responded to questions about their university experiences and a variety of contentious social issues (e.g., abortion, welfare policy). Participants then viewed a videotape of their partner, believing that he or she was simultaneously viewing their videotape. The tapes shown to participants followed identical scripts and varied only in terms of the person's ethnicity; participants did not know their partner's ethnicity until this point in the study. Participants' metaperceptions were subsequently assessed along dimensions relevant and irrelevant to White Canadians' meta-stereotype about how their group is viewed by Aboriginal Canadians. High-prejudice persons believed Aboriginal partners would see them as closedminded, arrogant, selfish, unfair, prejudiced, and cruel. The ethnicity of their partner had no effect along trait dimensions irrelevant to the meta-stereotype. Sensing that one has been stereotyped would seem to represent the lowest possible level of felt transparency. More than feeling simply unknown, one feels actively misjudged. If our argument that metaperceptions are important to individuals' experience of their social interactions is correct, feeling misperceived should be associated with considerable psychological distress. Additional results from the interaction study described earlier provide evidence that it is. High-prejudice individuals had lower current self-esteem and self-concept clarity when their interaction partner was Aboriginal rather than White, and these effects were partially mediated by individuals' metaperceptions. Because individuals may react to such threats to self by derogating the other person (see Fein & Spencer, 1997) or by avoiding contact with outgroup members (Swann, 1987), these findings would appear to have important implications for prejudice and discrimination. These results also complement those from another study demonstrating that expecting to be stereotyped is associated with lower anticipated enjoyment of contact with an outgroup member and more negative emotions about intergroup interaction (Vorauer et al., 1998, Study 2). How do persons low in prejudice expect to be viewed by an outgroup member? Our results indicate that these individuals' metaperceptions are quite different from those of high-prejudice individuals. Persons low in prejudice appear to believe that an outgroup member will contrast rather than assimilate them with the meta-stereotype. Vorauer et al. (1998, Study 3) found that low-prejudice individuals sensed that they would be viewed as less closedminded, arrogant, selfish, unfair, prejudiced, and cruel by an Aboriginal as compared with a White partner, and here again the ethnicity of their partner had no effect along trait dimensions irrelevant to the meta-stereotype. Thus, lowprejudice persons appear to experience heightened feelings of transparency in the context of intergroup interaction, perceiving their attitudes and values to be particularly clear to outgroup members. We believe that high- and low-prejudice individuals' divergent metaperceptions can be understood in terms of their distinct self-concepts and different expectations about outgroup members' openness to individuating information. Highs should expect an outgroup member to focus on the ways in which they are similar to the stereotype and to be ready to apply it to them, whereas lows should expect an outgroup member to be sensitive to the ways in which they personally differ from the stereotypical White person. Low- and high-prejudice individuals' perceptions of contrast and assimilation (see Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume) might be enhanced by their respective personal feelings of distance versus closeness to the ingroup: Research indicates that lower levels of prejudice are associated with lower levels of identification with the ingroup (Masson & Verkuyten, 1993). Subsequent research has examined the extent to which high- and low-prejudice individuals' perceptions that they are viewed differently by an outgroup member as compared with an ingroup member are accurate. Vorauer and Kumhyr (in press) arranged for pairs of students

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Page 273 (either two White Canadians or one White Canadian and one Aboriginal Canadian) to have a casual get-acquainted discussion. At the end of the discussion, each pair member indicated his or her impressions and metaperceptions. The results for metaperceptions generally replicated the effects obtained by Vorauer et al. (1998). Low-prejudice White Canadians thought they were viewed more positively by an Aboriginal as compared with a White partner, whereas high-prejudice White Canadians thought they were viewed in a more stereotypical manner by an Aboriginal as compared with a White partner. Analyses of partners' actual impressions revealed no effect for partner ethnicity or for White Canadians' prejudice level. Indeed, neither Aboriginal nor White partners could discern whether they were interacting with a low- or high-prejudice White Canadian. Low- and high-prejudice individuals' respective feelings of being viewed particularly favorably or unfavorably by an Aboriginal partner were thus unwarranted. Although my colleagues and I view the divergent metaperceptions exhibited by low- and high-prejudice individuals in the context of intergroup interaction as reflecting these individuals' respective feelings of transparency and of being misread, our evidence for this view is currently indirect. It is possible that individuals' experience of contact with an outgroup member differs somewhat from our description. In particular, one may wonder whether high-prejudice individuals are also feeling transparent. Perhaps contact with an outgroup member activates specific components of individuals' self-concept, and this self-knowledge then exerts a greater influence on their metaperceptions than would be the case if they were interacting with an ingroup member. We do not think that this possibility is uninteresting or inconsequential. We have already seen the affective implications of individuals' metaperceptions in the context of intergroup interaction. As well, Vorauer and Kumhyr's (in press) research suggests that individuals' perception that they are viewed differently by an outgroup as compared with an ingroup member is unwarranted and that the potential for misunderstanding therefore exists. However, we do think that the process is somewhat more complex and that it has different effects on high-than on low-prejudice individuals. As suggested earlier, we believe that contact with an outgroup member activates the meta-stereotype knowledge structure for both high- and low-prejudice individuals. However, whereas low-prejudice individuals expect to stand out as different from the meta-stereotype, high-prejudice individuals instead expect to be assimilated to it. For highprejudice individuals, this process should produce the feeling of being misjudged rather than transparent. Preliminary evidence that high-prejudice individuals feel misjudged by out-group members is provided by Vorauer and Kumhyr's (in press) research. We asked participants to estimate how accurate either a White or an Aboriginal person would be at judging people along a series of dimensions that varied in terms of their relevance to the meta-stereotype. Results indicate that high-prejudice individuals expected an Aboriginal person to be less accurate than a White person at making judgments along stereotype-relevant dimensions; there was no such effect along stereotypeirrelevant dimensions. FUTURE DIRECTIONS A wealth of interesting questions regarding meta-stereotypes, and transparency estimation more generally, remain to be addressed in future research. Below I consider just a few of these. Meta-Stereotype Activation A thorough examination of the conditions prompting meta-stereotype activation would enhance our understanding of when category-based biases in individuals' metaperceptions are most likely to occur. For example, the situations that are most likely to produce inaccurate feelings of high transparency in low-prejudice individuals and unwarranted feelings of being misjudged in high-prejudice individuals could be identified. Note that for members of lower status groups and for intergroup relations not characterized by a clear status difference, the implications of metastereotype activation might be somewhat different and also need to be examined. The most pessimistic perspective is that encountering an outgroup member inevitably activates individuals' metastereotype. However, recent research on the activation of other-stereotypes (i.e., stereotypes about outgroups) suggests that there is greater flexibility. Individual differences in racial attitudes (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997) and contextual variables such as cognitive busyness (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) or motivation (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999) can influence the activation of these structures. There would seem to be room for even more optimism with respect to meta-stereotypes. Because adopting another person's perspective can require substantial effort (Higgins, 1981b; Hodges & Wegner, 1997), the circumstances in which individuals access these structures may be relatively circumscribed. In particular, meta-stereotype activation might be most likely when individuals are feeling concerned about how

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Page 274 they are evaluated by an outgroup member, either because they are dispositionally inclined to be focused on social evaluation or because the situation prompts such concerns. Data regarding meta-stereotype activation are provided by a recent series of investigations that used indirect measures to assess individuals' inclination to spontaneously consider an outgroup member's (ostensible) stereotypic expectations about them (Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000). In one study, White participants imagined having an interaction with an Aboriginal person before doing a word fragment completion task. Compared with participants who did not imagine intergroup interaction, those who did completed more fragments with traits relevant to the meta-stereotype. Importantly, this effect was not moderated by individuals' racial attitudes. Both low- and highprejudice individuals exhibited meta-stereotype activation by using more words such as racist and cruel in their completions when they had imagined intergroup interaction as compared with when they had not. Similar results were obtained in a separate study that examined responses to anticipated interaction with an outgroup member and that used response latencies on a lexical decision-making task to assess meta-stereotype activation. The fact that meta-stereotype activation was not related to the nature of individuals' racial attitudes is consistent with our thesis that racial attitudes predict what people do with the meta-stereotype rather than whether they think of it in the first place. In line with our belief that evaluative concerns trigger meta-stereotype activation, an additional finding obtained in the word fragment study described earlier was that participants' responses to the imagined intergroup interaction depended on their level of public self-consciousness. Imagining an interaction with an Aboriginal person was particularly likely to trigger meta-stereotype activation for those individuals who generally tended to be concerned with how they were viewed by others. In a further experiment, we found that individuals' metaperceptions were affected by partner ethnicity when the situation involved their partner evaluating them (i.e., deciding whether to hire them for a job) but not when the roles were reversed and the situation involved evaluating their partner. These results suggest that meta-stereotypes may come to play a more significant role in relations between dominant and lower status groups as members of lower status groups come to occupy positions of greater power in society. These findings also imply that reducing evaluative concerns during intergroup interaction might reduce the influence of meta-stereotypes. The question arises here as to whether meta-stereo-types might sometimes exert a positive influence on intergroup relations. Perhaps an alertness to negative impressions they might convey to an outgroup member can prompt individuals to work to behave in a more egalitarian fashion and to convey their values more clearly. Although the behavioral consequences of meta-stereotype activation have not yet been examined, we suspect that activation of these structures often has negative consequences for individuals' behavior during an exchange with an outgroup member. As the behaviors necessary to avoid being stereotyped may be unclear and framing the interaction from the other person's point of view may reduce individuals' feelings of control over the interaction, preoccupation with undesirable traits that might be ascribed to them could exert a disruptive influence on individuals' actions and remarks. In addition, meta-stereotype activation might divert individuals' attention from the positive goal of acting in line with their personal standards regarding treatment of outgroup members. This seems particularly likely in view of the finding that meta-stereotypes are readily activated (Vorauer et al., 2000) and research indicating that people's natural inclination for focusing on their personal standards for behavior toward out-group members tends to be rather weak (Monteith, 1996). Meta-Stereotype Application This discussion of future directions has centered on situational forces guiding meta-stereotype activation. There are also apt to be situational forces guiding meta-stereotype application. That is, individuals' sense of whether they will be contrasted with the stereotype of their group or assimilated to it likely depends on contextual factors as well as their racial attitudes. The extent to which the interaction setting provides people with a sense of control over the impressions they convey seems particularly important in this regard. Circumstances that reduce individuals' sense of control may leave them maximally vulnerable to feeling stereotyped. Consider in particular the different levels of control potentially afforded by group-on-group as compared with one-on-one interactions. In group-on-group interactions, individuals may fear being erroneously assimilated to the stereotype of their group to a greater extent than in one-on-one interactions, where they believe they can exert more personal influence over the information communicated. Indeed, group-on-group interactions may represent one context in which low-prejudice individuals also feel that the stereotype of their group will be applied to them. Future research along these lines will need to identify the separate effects of ingroup and outgroup size. Although

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Page 275 there are grounds for believing that both will be important, I suspect that the size of the ingroup will be most clearly connected to individuals' sense of being assimilated to the stereotype of their group. When one's fellow ingroup members are present, it may be easy to imagine how one will appear to be similar to them in the eyes of an outgroup member. Discrepancies Between Actors' and Observers' Judgments This chapter began with an analysis of two complementary phenomena – the correspondence bias and transparency overestimation. Each of these biases reflects a failure to appreciate how an actor's behavior might be nonrepresentative of his or her self. Because actors and observers “fill in the blanks’’ with distinct kinds of information – the information that is most salient to them – they reach conflicting conclusions about the impressions conveyed by the actor. Actors' inferences are driven by self-knowledge, whereas observers' inferences are driven by whatever behavior sample is available. In the context of intergroup interaction, the concept of meta-stereotypes introduces a parallel but different possible discrepancy. Again an observer's conclusions may diverge from what the actor expects him or her to conclude. Here, however, the divergence may stem from unequal reference to the metastereotype by each person involved in the interaction. Research on other-stereotypes reveals that people may abandon such stereotypes quite readily when they are provided with individuating information about another person (e.g., Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; see also Adams & Kunda, 1997). Thus, the outgroup member may be focused on the other person's current actions and remarks when forming impressions. But the person him or herself is unlikely to receive clear feedback about how he or she is viewed by the outgroup member. It is often socially awkward to communicate or receive explicit interpersonal evaluations (Blumberg, 1972). If people are left in the dark about the outgroup member's impressions, they may rely on the meta-stereotype because they are uncertain about how the outgroup member will react to them or their behavior and they have few other clues available. Thus, the meta-stereotype may be prominent in their own mind, even though it is not salient to the outgroup member. A tendency for the outgroup member to be preoccupied with other concerns – such as assessing how he or she is viewed – might also contribute to such differential stereotype salience across interaction partners. Indirect evidence for this dynamic is provided by Vorauer and Kumhyr's (2000) research demonstrating that individuals' sense of being viewed differently by an ingroup versus an outgroup member was not corroborated by the impressions actually formed by their interaction partners. Pilot data indicating reasonable agreement between White and Aboriginal Canadians regarding the content of the Aboriginal stereotype of Whites (Vorauer, 1997) provide further grounds for suggesting that the discrepancy demonstrated by Vorauer and Kumhyr stems from interaction dynamics rather than from other sources, such as disagreement about the content of cultural stereotypes. The pattern of divergence here would seem to be particularly ironic, in that it may be precisely the actor's desire to understand the outgroup member's reactions that leads to the activation of a knowledge structure that creates biased judgments. One intriguing possibility is that the greater the actor's desire for accuracy, the greater his or her reliance on the meta-stereotype may be. The more that actors are interested in knowing an outgroup member's reactions, the more effort they may make to adopt his or her perspective – cultural stereotypes included. Such a pattern would be quite distinct from that obtained for other-stereotypes, where accuracy motivation has been demonstrated to reduce individuals' reference to social categories in their judgments about outgroup members (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). CONCLUDING REMARKS Social perception research has long tended to focus on the impressions that individuals form of other people, and the literature on intergroup relations has generally maintained this emphasis. In the present chapter, I have argued that looking at metaperceptions formed on the other side of the interaction can reveal intriguing asymmetries in the nature of the conclusions that actors and observers draw about the impressions that have been conveyed. These asymmetries may have important consequences for everyday social interaction. When individuals hold erroneous assumptions about how well someone else understands their motives and feelings, their communication efforts may be inadequate, and they may be inclined to attach unwarranted negative interpretations to others' seemingly insensitive actions. When individuals mistakenly sense that an outgroup member has formed stereotyped impressions of them, they may avoid interactions with the person and reciprocate the negative evaluations they imagine that they have received. Future research on transparency estimation should continue to illuminate this side of the story and will hopefully lead to a fuller understanding of social behavior and interpersonal relations.

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Page 276 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by the University of Manitoba/Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grants program. I am grateful to Dan Bailis, Jessica Cameron, and Mike Ross for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. ENDNOTES 1. The phenomenon of transparency overestimation may seem to contradict the finding that actors are inclined to embrace situational explanations for their behavior (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973). However, it is important to note that the actor/observer effect focuses on actors' relatively greater awareness of the situation. In an absolute sense, both actors and observers may fail to appreciate the power of the situation to guide behavior. Moreover, individuals' explicit attributions for behavior can be distinct from the impressions they perceive. A woman could attribute her emotional outburst to her boyfriend being late for a social occasion (situational attribution) yet still feel that the outburst reflected her emotional or impatient nature (feelings of transparency). 2. A number of circumstances in which the correspondence bias is less likely to occur have been identified. For example, the bias is reduced when individuals are suspicious about the motives behind an actor's behavior (Fein, 1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990) or when they are personally motivated to attribute the actor's behavior to the situation (Klein & Kunda, 1992). 3. Kenny and DePaulo (1993) discussed an additional mechanism through which individuals might form metaperceptions that are congruent with their self-views. The self-theory process involves a person simply assuming that his or her personality is immediately apparent without any reference to behavior. The small level of dyadic accuracy achieved by participants in the research reviewed by Kenny and DePaulo is inconsistent with this possibility, however. 4. This modest (but greater than chance) accuracy that observers did achieve conceivably reflected their general understanding that people tend to have positive rather than negative self-views. 5. A word seems in order here regarding the apparently contradictory findings for yoked observers obtained by Gilovich et al. (1998) and Vorauer and Claude (1998). Whereas Gilovich et al. found either no transparency effect at all for yoked observers (Study 1c) or weaker effects for yoked observers than for actors (Study 2b), Vorauer and Claude found transparency overestimation effects for informed observers that closely matched those evidenced negotiators. How can these results be reconciled? Yoked observers' perceptions should more closely approach those of an actor the more closely the information that they are given approximates the information available to the actor him or herself. When actors' judgments are related to strong internal physiological reactions (as was the case in Gilovich et al.'s Study 1c), it may be difficult to truly bring observers to an equivalent informational position. One step toward achieving this might be to have the observer go through the experience him or herself, as was done in Gilovich et al.'s Study 2b. Because the judgments examined by Vorauer and Claude (1998) were likely not connected to such intense internal reactions, it may have been easier to provide observers with most of the relevant information.

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Page 277 17 The Flexible Correction Model: Phenomenology and the Use of Naive Theories in Avoiding or Removing Bias Duane T. Wegener Meghan Dunn Danny Tokusato Purdue University Federal Judicial Center Purdue University In the spring of 1998, President Bill Clinton was embroiled in a variety of controversies. Congressional inquiries probed for evidence of misdeeds in Democratic National Committee financing of the 1996 presidential/ vicepresidential campaign. Reports abounded regarding President Clinton's alleged extra-marital affairs with, among others, a White House aid – Monica Lewinsky. President Clinton was also sued for sexual harassment by Paula Jones. Yet throughout these allegations, grand juries, and hearings, President Clinton's job approval ratings soared to their highest point during his presidency. Some analysts scratched their heads. Others bemoaned a lack of interest in political matters on the part of the populace. Others simply claimed that people responded to job performance questions about the president by considering their own financial situation (which tended to be rather positive, given the healthy, growing economy and rising stock market). There is at least one other possibility. That is, because many people believed that the marital (and sexual) life of the president should be irrelevant to his job performance, poll respondents might have been attempting to correct their assessments of his job performance by making sure that they were not influenced by the negative press surrounding the yet unproven misdeeds in the past campaign or the allegations of marital unfaithfulness. If people engaged in this correction by consulting their own perceptions of how the various stories might negatively influence perceptions of the president (Wegener & Petty, 1997), rises in job approval might actually have been due to increases in perceived negative impact of reports about the president's personal life. There are many settings in which people might go out of their way to avoid bias. In some settings, people are explicitly warned of the inappropriateness of certain information and are instructed to disregard it (e.g., when judges instruct juries to disregard inadmissible evidence; see Fleming, Wegener, & Petty, 1999; Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, & Petty, in press). In other settings, people might be wary of bias and attempt on their own to avoid or remove its influence (e.g., in hiring or graduate admissions settings, where vigilant committee members might strive on their own to avoid negative biases toward stigmatized groups or positive biases toward familiar candidates). In the current chapter we discuss the flexible correction model (FCM; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener, Petty, & Dunn, 1998) as a way to organize many attempts to avoid or remove bias. The FCM relies on people's use of their own perceptions of the bias at work in a given judgment setting. The theory can be considered phenomenological insofar as social perceivers sometimes use their reactions to the target or setting in helping to assess the bias that is likely at work. Later in this chapter, we discuss some ways in which a person's reactions to the target might play a role in theory-based corrections. Before doing so, however, we discuss the social psychological backdrop for theory-based corrections as well as the FCM and the existing evidence in support of theory-based corrections. THE PRIMING/ACCESSIBILITY BACK-DROP Research in the social cognition tradition has long addressed biases in people's perceptions, both of self and others (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980, for reviews). Such work has investigated biases in diverse areas such as attribution (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977), memory (e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Ross, 1989; Stangor & McMillan, 1992), prediction of the future (e.g., Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Weinstein, 1980), impression formation (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1980; Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982), and decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In many of these settings, the source of

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Page 278 bias is an increase in availability or accessibility of particular events or concepts. Consider, for example, early studies of concept priming in impression formation (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979), where accessible constructs were shown to bias impressions in a direction consistent with priming stimuli (an assimilation effect). Such studies typically utilized a two-study paradigm in which some activity (e.g., unscrambling words that formed brief sentences; Srull & Wyer, 1979) in a supposed first study served to increase the accessibility of concepts relevant to ambiguous information presented in a following activity. Initially, such studies were concerned primarily with the existence of assimilation effects, demonstrating them using both disguised versions of explicit material (e.g., the sentence-unscrambling paradigm, the purpose of which should have been generally unclear to research participants) and even subliminal primes (of which participants could not be aware; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). Despite a focus on existence of assimilative priming effects, even early work on the topic began to search for limits to judgmental assimilation. For instance, Higgins et al. (1977) showed that priming effects on impression formation depend on the extent to which the accessible construct was applicable to the information presented about the target person. That is, if the construct could not easily be used to characterize behaviors of a target (despite being evaluatively equivalent to more applicable constructs), priming effects were reduced or eliminated (see also Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980; cf. Higgins & Brendl, 1995). More recently, however, primed constructs that are equally applicable to the presented target information (even the same primes across conditions) have been shown to be differentially impactful depending on whether primed reactions are viewed as inappropriate by research participants. For example, Martin (1986; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990) used blatant primes to create a situation in which reactions to the target would be viewed as inappropriately due to the primes, leading to attempts to partial out primeconsistent reactions to the target. Consistent with the traditional priming paradigms, Martin's (1986) approach begins by assuming that representations of a target might include both positive and negative elements. When a priming episode precedes the target, there is some overlap between reactions to the prime and reactions to the target (called setting). This setting process results in an assimilative bias in judgment, wherein perceptions of the target are more similar to the primes than when no primes have been encountered. However, if social perceivers identify some of their reactions as being reactions to the primes rather than reactions to the target (e.g., when the priming procedure was recent and blatant), they attempt to partial out the reactions to the primes (called resetting). This partialing process reduces the number of prime-consistent reactions, thereby reducing the assimilative bias. In addition, if the social perceiver mistakenly identifies true reactions to the target (i.e., elements that were present in the initial target representation) as being reactions to the context (i.e., the primes), this resetting can produce a contrast effect, in which reactions to the target are less like the context than if no contextual primes had been encountered. For a schematic representation of setting and resetting, along with a more thorough discussion, see Wegener and Petty (1997; cf. Martin et al., 1990). Schwarz and Bless (1992a) developed a similar model referred to as the inclusion-exclusion model. Similar to Martin's (1986) concept of setting, inclusion of information in a target representation is expected to result in an assimilation effect (with judgments of the target being more similar to the included information than when that information is not encountered). Also, similar to resetting, exclusion or subtraction of information from one's representation of the target is expected to lessen the impact of information that could have been included in the representation. According to the inclusion-exclusion view, exclusion can lessen assimilation or create contrast, assuming that the excluded information is sufficiently extreme to shift the reaction to the target. Moreover, the inclusion-exclusion view holds that excluded information can create this contrast due to the exclusion (as in resetting) or because the excluded information is used to define the scale anchor or to set up a standard of comparison. If a contrast effect is due to subtraction of the excluded information, then the contrast effect should be limited to that judgment target. However, if the contrast effect is due to use of excluded information as a standard of comparison, then the contrast effect could extend to other targets rated along that same dimension (see Schwarz & Bless, 1992a, for additional discussion). These models have both been viewed as correction models by regarding the exclusion and resetting processes as correcting for the overlap between the representation of the target and the context experience or information. The models share a great deal, including the assumption that default biases are assimilative and that corrections lessen this assimilation and can even lead to contrast. In both of these models, then, attempts to avoid use of inappropriately active concepts lead to judgments of targets that are less similar to perceptions of the priming stimuli than when no corrective attempts are

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Page 279 made. Because both of these models equate partialing or subtraction processes with higher levels of cognitive effort, they couple judgmental outcome (i.e., assimilation vs. contrast) with levels of effortful processing. For instance, Schwarz and Bless (1992a) explicitly noted that “the emergence of contrast effects requires extra processing steps, and more effort, than the emergence of assimilation effects” (p. 240). That is, the set-reset and inclusion-exclusion models equate assimilation with uncorrected default outcomes and contrast with corrected outcomes (see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for additional discussion). In many ways, the set-reset and inclusion-exclusion models formed a natural progression from the priming and concept accessibility work that preceded them. Each of these models provides a reasonable and important set of limiting conditions for when assimilation effects will occur. That is, when social perceivers can identify their reactions as having a source other than the target and when they possess the requisite motivation and ability to engage in effortful corrections, assimilation effects are less likely, and contrast can occur. Unfortunately, there appears to be real limits to the set-reset and inclusion-exclusion processes when thinking about social perception beyond priming and construct accessibility settings. For example, assimilation might not be the only type of uncorrected effect when dealing with stimuli capable of activating relevant concepts. For example, Herr (1986) found that extreme exemplars associated with hostility (e.g., Adolf Hitler) made an ambiguous target person seem less hostile (a contrast effect; see also Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Wegener, Petty, & Dunn, 1998). It is important to note that such effects need not rely on corrective exclusion or resetting. As noted by Petty and Wegener (1993), such contrast effects might be uncorrected and could be based on comparisons with an extreme anchor (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) or standard (e.g., Higgins, 1989c; see Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume). If contrast is considered as a possible default or uncorrected bias, then the setreset and inclusion-exclusion models are ill equipped to serve as general theories of bias correction (because they only deal with corrections for setting or inclusion, both of which are assimilative biases; see Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1997). THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FLEXIBLE CORRECTION MODEL Recognizing that the set-reset and inclusion-exclusion views were relatively incapable of addressing corrections for contrast, Wegener and Petty (1997; see also Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wegener et al., 1998) developed the flexible correction model (FCM) as a more general model of bias correction. On its most basic level, the FCM holds that corrections are aimed at removing the bias that social perceivers believe are associated with the factor(s) at hand. Consider, for example, a situation in which a person realizes that a bias might be operating (e.g., because the person has learned about a given judgmental bias in a psychology class). The direction of the perceived bias should influence the adjustments that are made. That is, if the perceiver believes that the bias is to make the target seem higher on a dimension of judgment than would normally be the case, the perceiver attempts to adjust assessments of the target to be lower. If the perceiver believes that the bias is to make the target seem lower on a dimension of judgment than would normally be the case, the perceiver attempts to adjust assessments of the target to be higher than his or her initial reactions. The perceived magnitude of the bias also matters. If the perceiver believes there is a small (or no) bias, he or she attempts to adjust assessments of the true qualities of the target less than if he or she believes that there is a large bias. Metacognition As this description makes clear, the FCM is a metacognitive theory, wherein people are “thinking about thinking” about people or objects in their environment. As is described in more detail later in the chapter, the FCM deals with traditional metacognitive subjects such as the momentary perceptions of whether or not an experienced reaction is to be trusted as well as “expanded’’ metacognitive forces such as the impact of existing beliefs on assessments of and adjustments to ongoing cognitive activity (cf. Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). When the FCM relies on naive theories of bias , this refers to one's perception of the likely bias(es) in the particular setting where the social judgment is made (or was made if attempting to correct a previous judgment). As noted by Wegener et al. (1998), this perception of bias would likely be influenced by existing beliefs about biases associated with features of the judgment setting as well as more momentary reactions that arise in the immediate setting. These more momentary reactions might often reflect and be influenced by phenomenal experience, and these experiences receive extended comment later in the chapter. Closely linked to this metacognitive grounding of the FCM is its building on social psychological notions of introspection and self-analysis. For some time in

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Page 280 social psychology, researchers have noted that people are likely to possess or generate naive theories about how various contextual factors might influence or have influenced their perceptions of targets. In social psychology, most of the emphasis regarding these theories has been on how incorrect those theories often might be (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, Laser, & Stone, 1982). The incorrectness of beliefs about one's own cognitive functioning has also received extended discussion in the metacognition arena (e.g., see Metcalfe, 1998, for a review). Regardless of whether metacognitive beliefs are accurate, however, people undoubtedly use them in many settings (see Wegener & Petty, 1998). It is this use of naive theories about bias that forms the basis of the FCM. Levels of Processing The FCM also shares a number of characteristics with models focused on amount of processing of judgment-relevant information. For example, the FCM explicitly uncouples judgment outcomes and effortful versus non-effortful processes. That is, part of the flexibility of the FCM is that either assimilation or contrast can be uncorrected or corrected effects. To the extent that corrected assessments of targets require greater cognitive effort than uncorrected assessments, corrected assimilation could require greater effort than uncorrected contrast despite the difficulty that the set-reset or inclusion-exclusion views would have with such a result (cf. Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Wegener & Petty, 1997). In certain respects, this uncoupling of outcome and process follows quite directly from models such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b) or heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). In these models of persuasion, two social perceivers could end up with the same overall evaluation of an object (e.g., liking a particular consumer product), but could do so for very different reasons. For instance, one person might have extensively processed information about the merits of the product. The other might have formed an equally positive view of the product, but did so based on a more cursory analysis, relying on the fact that a generally trusted source advocated buying the product or that there seemed to be a large number of positive qualities presented about the product, although the specifics of these qualities were not assessed. In studies of attitude strength, the level of scrutiny given to attitude-relevant information has been shown to predict how persistent the attitude is over time, how resistant the attitude is to counterpersuasion, and how likely the attitude is to influence future thoughts and behaviors (see Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). As noted in a later section of this chapter, the FCM similarly associates the overall amount of elaboration that goes into corrected or uncorrected assessments with the strength of the resulting assessments of targets (see discussions of Postulates 6 and 7). One has to be careful not to make the assumption that the various processes in the ELM or heuristic-systematic model are hydraulic processes. It is often the case that the output of effortful thoughts overwhelms simpler processes such as operant conditioning or source-related heuristics, but this does not mean that the simpler processes fail to occur (see Petty & Wegener, 1999). Similarly, in many cases, uncorrected processes might be overwhelmed by the corrections that take place, even though the same uncorrected processes might operate (at least when people become aware of potential biases after uncorrected processing of the target has occurred). Therefore, just as effortful persuasion processes might often overlay the operation of simpler processes, corrections might often overlay the operation of uncorrected processes. Naive Versus Implicit Theories Before presenting the specific postulates of the FCM and the social psychological support for them, it is worth commenting on our use of the term naive theory in this model. We refer to naive theories in much the same way that people have used terms such as lay beliefs (i.e., Wilson, Houston, & Meyers, 1998), subjective theories (i.e., Förster & Strack, 1998), or intuitive theories (Sigelman, Estrada, Derenowski, & Woods, 1996). As such, these theories harken back to Heider's (1958) naive psychology in which people's commonsense understandings of the workings of their social world were also capable of guiding their actions in that social world (see 1998 special issue of Social Cognition edited by Wegener & Petty). At times, such theories have also been referred to as implicit theories (perhaps, in part, relating such theories to traditions in implicit personality theory; see Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). The term implicit, however, has come to signify lack of access or awareness on the part of the social perceiver (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). As such, this term might often be less than optimal for naive conceptions of the world that can be noticed and often verbalized. Therefore, Wegener and Petty (1998) distinguished between existence and impact of theories in considering the appropriateness of the implicit theory terminology. That is, Wegener and Petty noted that one could have access to (and could report on) a naive theory but still be

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Page 281 unaware of effects of the theory on judgment. In such a case, the theory is explicit, but effects of the theory are implicit. Of course, when a theory or other construct is implicit (i.e., cannot be reported), only implicit measures can be used to assess the construct. When the construct is explicit, however, either implicit or explicit measures might be used. In this context, it is important to note that use of an implicit measure does not necessarily imply that the assessed construct is implicit (although it might often be). Likewise, it is important to note that either explicit or implicit measures can be useful in assessing implicit effects of constructs (i.e., one can be unaware of the effects of constructs even if the constructs are accessible and reportable). To appropriately use the term implicit, one would need to pay close attention to whether one is simply using an implicit measure (which might assess either an implicit or an explicit construct), attempting to measure an implicit construct (e.g., a theory to which one does not have access), and/or attempting to document an implicit effect (i.e., an effect of which one is unaware; see Wegener & Petty, 1998, for additional discussion). Regarding naive theories in the FCM, such theories could in principle be implicit or explicit, although we believe that such theories are often reportable (albeit often imperfectly). As described elsewhere (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998), the naive theories in the FCM are perceptions of bias perceived as applicable to a given judgment target and setting, and these theories could address anything in that setting including the target, aspects of the perceiver, aspects of the context in which assessments of the target are made, or combinations of these. Sometimes people possess relatively enduring theories about particular kinds of biases, and these theories might be used especially in settings that match well the features of that enduring theory. Especially when no strong theory is held that corresponds well with the given judgment setting, theories of bias might be constructed to fit the target and situation (e.g., by adapting and applying a related theory of bias or generating a new theory that seems applicable to the new circumstance; see Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998; cf. Martin & Stapel, 1998; Skurnik, 1998). In many cases, naive theories of bias probably start with relatively enduring ideas about potential biases that are screened for relevance to the particular instance, adapted if necessary, and applied as seems appropriate given the extent to which one detects or suspects bias to be removed. In many instances, people may well be unaware of the fact that they have used a particular theory(ies) in correction (i.e., implicit use of theories in correction), despite the fact that they might be able to reasonably report their perceptions of potential bias (i.e., explicit theories of bias; for additional discussion of these and related topics, see Wegener & Petty, 1997, 1998; Wegener et al., 1998; see also Anderson & Lindsay, 1998). THE FLEXIBLE CORRECTION MODEL Following are the basic postulates of the FCM presented by Wegener and Petty (1997) along with some discussion of the rationale underlying the postulates. Postulate 1 : Across judgment targets, perceivers, and situations, there is variation in the direction and magnitude of default (i.e., uncorrected) effects. According to the FCM, there is variation in the direction and magnitude of uncorrected effects of target-related, personal, and situational variables. That is, people are likely to differ from one another in their reactions to targets. For example, some people might interpret information about a target in line with a chronically accessible construct, whereas others might spontaneously compare the target with a well-known exemplar available in the same setting. One situation might provide a universally salient exemplar against which targets seem quite discrepant, whereas the same situation absent that salient exemplar might dispose social perceivers toward interpreting target information in a context-consistent manner. For some people, targets, or situations, these effects are large, but for others they are small. Whatever the source(s) of these variations might be, the FCM explicitly acknowledges this variability and separates it from the processes of correction. This means that a given correction might operate similarly even if instigated across differing magnitudes or directions of uncorrected bias. These properties of the FCM can be compared with the partialing models (i.e., the set-reset and inclusion-exclusion views), which assumed a default direction for context effects – assimilation – and directly related the amount of correction (and the size of the default bias) to the amount of overlap between reactions to the context and to the target. Postulate 2 : There are individual and situational differences in motivation and ability to identify potential sources of bias. If a person is unmotivated or unable to search for potential sources of bias, then his or her assessment of the qualities of the target will reflect his or her initial reaction to the target. To the extent that the perceiver is motivated and able to search for potential sources of bias, however, he or she will evaluate the potential biasing effect(s) of salient factors in the judgment setting (including factors external and internal to the perceiver). This is accom-

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Page 282 plished by consulting naive theories of the bias(es) associated with the salient factor(s). If a person lacks either the motivation or ability to search for potential sources of bias, then corrective attempts are unlikely and assessments of the target are likely to be similar to initial reactions to the target, regardless of whether initial reactions are based on effortful scrutiny of the target or more cursory analyses (see Postulate 1; see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1998). If motivation and ability to search for potential sources of bias are high, however, the perceiver is likely to evaluate potential biasing effects. These factors might often be in the setting, but salient biasing factors might also reside within the perceiver. For example, a person judging the violence of a target might view some situational factors as potentially biasing (e.g., the fact that a news program on television just finished reporting on a triple murder), but might also realize that certain biases might reside in his or her own beliefs (e.g., a belief that people in a certain profession all tend to be violent). Identification of possible bias is guided, in part, by people's beliefs or theories about how factors in the judgment setting (factors both internal and external to the perceiver) influence perceptions of targets. Some naive theories are likely to be stored in memory and are accessed when salient features of the biasing factor are present. Sometimes, however, such theories of bias are likely to be generated on-line as biasing factors are encountered. Stored theories could also be changed by experience of the specific biasing factor in the given judgment setting. As noted earlier, the naive theories that drive the FCM are the person's best estimate of the effect of the given factor being considered, regardless of whether that perception is in any way accurate or not (in fact, these theories are often incorrect in either direction or magnitude). Postulate 3 : If the person believes that no bias is operating, then the person's assessment of the qualities of the target will reflect his or her initial reactions to the target. If the perceiver believes that a bias is operating (regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of this belief), then correction depends on the level of motivation and ability to engage in theory-based corrections. If the perceiver is unmotivated or unable to engage in corrections, then the person's assessment of the target will reflect his or her initial reactions to the target. If the perceiver is motivated and able to correct (i.e., to attempt to debias) assessments of the target, then the perceiver engages in a correction guided by the theory of bias. If no potential bias is identified, then the person's assessments of the target will likely reflect his or her initial reaction(s) to the target. If the perceiver believes that a bias is operating and the perceiver is both motivated and able to attempt corrections, then the perceiver engages in a correction guided by the theory of bias. Many different factors could influence motivation or ability to engage in corrections. Some relevant motivations are quite global, such as motivations to engage in thoughtful activities (e.g., need for cognition; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Others might relate more specifically to bias, such as motivation to avoid incorrect judgments in particular (i.e., fear of invalidity; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989). Of course, situational variations in either global or specific motivations could also influence motivation to engage in corrections. It is also possible for people to identify a bias, but to be unmotivated to correct for it because the bias is viewed as legitimate or even necessary (Petty, Wegener, & Fleming, 1996; see Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997). Interestingly, if people are motivated to correct and are attempting to do so, but are unable to accomplish this because of distraction, bias might even be exaggerated in some circumstances. That is, when people are actively attempting to suppress a thought under cognitive load, this thought can become more accessible than when the thought is not being suppressed (Wegner, 1994), and this can lead to the thought having a greater contaminating effect on judgment (see Newman, Duff, Hedberg, & Blitstein, 1996). Qualities of the uncorrected target perceptions could also influence ability to correct (e.g., if uncorrected perceptions are well integrated with additional knowledge of the target, cf. Schul & Burnstein, 1985; see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for additional discussions). Postulate 4 : Theory-guided corrections work in a direction opposite to the perceived bias and in a magnitude commensurate with the perceived magnitude of the bias. To the extent that the perceived bias is large, the theory of bias will create pressure toward greater adjustment (and/or vigilance in seeking qualities of the target that are consistent with greater adjustment) in assessments of the target. When people identify a potential bias or biases and are motivated and able to engage in corrections, they attempt to adjust assessments of the target in a direction opposite to the perceived bias(es) and in a magnitude commensurate with the magnitude of the perceived bias(es). Therefore, corrections can go in different directions or in different amounts depending on the person's perceptions of the bias at work. Of course, this corrective attempt does not take place in a vacuum. That

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Page 283 is, available information (either knowledge about the target stored in memory or available in the judgment setting) might often be consulted as part of the correction process. Part of the theory-guided correction is likely to include seeking of information (in memory or the environment) that would support these corrected assessments. If no such supporting information can be generated or found, this might be one factor that could undermine theory-based correction. We assume that corrective processes ensue when people become aware of a potential bias (and are motivated and able to engage in corrections).1 Therefore, corrections for bias need not occur only after reacting to the target. People might also anticipate a bias and attempt to avoid it by changing how information about the target is gathered or scrutinized (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson et al., 1998). Especially before people have a great deal of experience with a given type of correction, such attempts would likely depend on some level of conscious awareness of the potential bias. However, with more experience of the factor and of the correction process, less conscious awareness of the bias might be sufficient for instigating the corrections (and the correction itself might become less effortful or routinized; Wegener & Petty, 1997; cf. Smith, 1989). Even in cases where awareness of the biasing factor(s) is quite conscious, the whole of the correction process generally would not be consciously reportable (consistent with Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). For example, people might often be unable to report which theory(ies) were used most in a correction even if the content of a theory(ies) is explicit (see Wegener & Petty, 1998). Regardless of the direction or size of uncorrected effects, corrections are driven by the perceptions of the bias in that judgment setting. That is, corrections are aimed at removing perceived rather than actual bias. Although perceived and actual bias might sometimes coincide, the two elements are conceptually distinct. That is, a person might believe that a particular bias exists (and might attempt to remove that perceived bias) when no bias exists or even when a bias in the opposite direction is objectively present. Postulate 5 : Theory-based corrections can be undermined by a variety of factors that undermine the extent to which the theory of bias is viewed as applicable to the judgment target and setting, the extent to which the theory serves the perceiver's judgment goals, and the extent to which the theory is accessible. A variety of factors might determine the nature of theories of bias and the likelihood that those theories guide corrections. A theory of bias could be learned through experience and stored in memory, or it could be generated on-line to address a particular target and judgment setting. Stored theories might have a greater basis in past experience (with the biasing agent, the target, or both), but generated theories might be more likely to be viewed as applicable for that particular correction. In many settings, the theory of bias that is used is probably some combination of a stored theory along with adjustments to the theory based on the perceiver's subjective experience of the context and target. Perceived applicability of a theory of bias to a given setting and target would also be likely to depend on a number of factors. For example, a theory of bias is more likely to be viewed as applicable if the perceived biasing factor matches the theory well (i.e., if the biasing factor in the setting has a close resemblance to the prototype or representation of the biasing factor within the theory of bias). The strength of the theory in terms of its integration with related knowledge and its accessibility in memory would also help to determine the perceived applicability of the theory of bias. If a theory of bias comes spontaneously to mind when the biasing factor or target is encountered, that theory is much more likely to be used if corrections occur. Perceived applicability could also be influenced by the extent to which the perceiver reacts to the target in ways that are consistent with the reactions predicted by the theory of bias. That is, if a person believes that a given biasing factor (e.g., a positive mood) makes him or her too favorable toward the target, this theory of bias might be more likely to be applied in the judgment setting if, in fact, the person is reacting to the target favorably. If reactions to a target are quite different from those predicted by a theory of bias, it might seem less likely that this biasing factor is really having an effect. Of course, a lack of reactions consistent with the theory might not undermine corrections if the theory of bias is relatively global. That is, some biasing factors might be viewed by some people as only having effects on certain kinds of targets or in certain kinds of settings, whereas other factors (or the same factors considered by other people) might be viewed as having effects across many kinds of targets and/or settings. If a factor like positive mood is believed not only to make people overly favorable, but also to make people less unfavorable than would normally be the case, then the theory could be applied across a wide variety of reactions to the target. Although the notion of being unbiased is certainly associated with goals of accuracy, the FCM acknowledges that other goals might often operate in social judgment settings. Some of these goals are directional.

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Page 284 For example, a person might want to view a coach or team from his or her university in a favorable manner or a coach or team from a rival university in an unfavorable matter. Other goals might be less directional, such as when jurors are asked to disregard illegally obtained evidence. In some of these cases, motivated corrections would support an accuracy goal, but in other cases corrections might actually oppose accuracy (e.g., if the disregarded evidence would lead to an accurate verdict if used; see Wegener et al., in press). Postulate 6 : Although corrections generally require more motivation and ability (i.e., more cognitive effort) than lack of corrections (unless corrections become routinized), both corrected and uncorrected assessments of targets can vary in effort put into that assessment. Postulate 7 : Just as differences in effort for uncorrected judgments create differences in persistence, resistance, and influence on thoughts and behavior, corrected assessments based on greater effort persist longer over time, are more resistant to attempts at changing assessments of the target, and are more likely to guide additional judgments and behavior toward the target than are corrected assessments based on lower levels of effort. We assume that theory-based corrections generally require more effort than a lack of correction, although at least some corrections might become routinized over many repetitions (cf. Smith, 1989; see Gilbert, McNulty, Giuliano, & Benson, 1992; Martin et al., 1990; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a). Even so, we postulate that corrections can vary in the extent of effort that goes into the correction. Some theory-based corrections are simply a one-time adjustment to an assessment of the overall qualities of the target, whereas other theory-based corrections also include scrutiny or even reinterpretation of a great deal of information relevant to the target. When a high level of cognitive effort is put into corrected assessments and those assessments become well integrated with related knowledge, those corrected assessments are more likely to persist over time than are corrected assessments based on less cognitive effort that are less well integrated (cf. Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).2 Because uncorrected processes can also require high levels of cognitive effort, observance of cognitive effort per se does not necessarily imply that corrections have occurred (e.g., Petty et al., 1998). The FCM is not the only view to postulate that corrections might be guided by naive theories (although, to our knowledge, the FCM work was the first to directly test a model of corrections based on naive theories). Some earlier writers in the social cognition area speculated that people might adjust responses or perceptions based on how they thought certain biases were unduly influencing them (e.g., see Higgins et al., 1977; Thompson et al., 1981; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987), but no model of correction was born out of these isolated comments. Since work on the FCM began nearly a decade ago (first reported in Wegener & Petty, 1992; see also Petty & Wegener, 1993), some theoretical articles have speculated that theory-based corrections might occur (e.g., Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Strack, 1992a; Strack & Hannover, 1996; Wilson & Brekke, 1994; see also Bargh, 1992; Strack et al., 1993). Although some of these papers made assumptions that were not consistent with the FCM (Strack, 1992a, 1992b; see Wegener & Petty, 1995, for discussion), much of what was said in those theoretical papers was quite consistent with the FCM and the data that were generated to test it (see Wegener et al., 1998). Initial Evidence Corrections for Contrast . As noted earlier, a crucial case for comparing the FCM to the previous set-reset and inclusion-exclusion models concerns the FCM's assertion that people can make theory-based corrections for perceived contrastive bias (i.e., bias in which the target is viewed as less similar to the context than when the context has not been encountered). Of course, a correction for contrast shifts judgments to be more like the context than when no correction occurs (where the contrast bias persists). Therefore, this type of correction is in a direction opposite to the partialing or subtraction of the overlap between reactions to contextual stimuli and representations of targets that is postulated by previous models (e.g., set-reset and inclusion-exclusion). In a typical correction-forcontrast study, relatively extreme exemplars are rated on some dimension, followed by ratings of more moderate targets either immediately or after an instruction not to let ratings of the contextual stimuli influence perceptions of the targets. For example, Wegener et al. (1998) had research participants rate three violent people (e.g., Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler) or three nonviolent people (e.g., Gandhi, the Pope) and then rate George Foreman and Arnold Schwarzenegger (either with or without a correction instruction). Pretests showed that people believed that the violent context (contemplating Hitler) would make the targets seem less violent than usual and that the nonviolent context (contemplating Gandhi) would make the targets seem more violent than usual (i.e., perceived contrast). This happened to match the pattern of judgments, when no correction instructions were given.

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Page 285 Consistent with the Herr (1986) result noted earlier, participants rated the targets as less violent when they followed the violent rather than nonviolent context people (a contrast effect). However, the opposite was found when people were asked not to let their assessments of the targets be influenced by their perceptions of the context people. The presence of a correction instruction led to ratings more like the context than when no correction instruction was given (e.g., targets were viewed as more violent when providing corrected rather than uncorrected ratings after contemplating Hitler – consistent with adjustments for the perceived contrastive bias; see also Wegener & Petty, 1995; for a replication, see Stapel, Martin, & Schwarz, 1998). This correction was in a direction opposite to the predictions of models claiming that people partial out overlap between context and target. That is, overlap between Hitler and Schwarzenegger would have led people to view Schwarzenegger as more violent, and corrections for perceived overlap should have created ratings of Schwarzenegger as less violent in corrected than in uncorrected settings. In the Wegener et al. (1998) violence-rating experiment, corrections in opposite directions corresponded to opposing theories about the impact of different contexts on ratings of the same targets (i.e., one context made the target seem too violent, the other made the target seem too nonviolent; see also Wegener et al., 1998, Study 1). In other studies, opposing corrections have been associated with opposing theories about the impact of the same context on different targets (Wegener & Petty, 1995, Studies 2 & 3) or with opposing theories about the impact of the same context on the same targets, but held by different people (Wegener & Petty, 1995, Study 4). Moreover, people who perceive greater bias have been found to correct to a greater extent than people who perceive less bias (Wegener & Petty, 1995, Study 4), and corrections consistent with naive theories of bias have been found when only subtle instructions are used (Petty & Wegener, 1993) and when no instructions are present (Fleming et al., 1999). Some researchers have suggested that the type of study just presented might best be understood as people reversing the valence of their target ratings between uncorrected and corrected conditions. That is, one alternative to theory-based corrections is that instructions to correct simply make people provide a rating of a different valence from their current reactions (Stapel et al., 1998). Although not originally designed for this purpose, a number of existing FCM studies provide problems for this alternative. In particular, a number of studies have included conditions in which respondents give the same uncorrected ratings but hold different theories of bias. For example, Wegener et al. (1998, Study 1) found no effect of context on people's uncorrected ratings of targets. However, pretests had shown (similar to the violence study presented earlier) that people believed that the two contexts would have opposite uncorrected effects on target ratings. If the change valence alternative is correct, correction instructions would lead to similar corrections for each context (because the uncorrected reactions were the same across these conditions). In contrast, theory-based corrections should push ratings in opposite directions across the conditions. The opposite corrections were, in fact, observed (for a similar effect comparing uncorrected and corrected responses in a persuasion paradigm, see the high-involvement conditions of Petty et al., 1998). Therefore, it seems that observed effects of correction instructions have been quite consistent with the theorybased FCM, but have been somewhat at odds with past theories (i.e., set-reset and inclusion-exclusion) and with recent alternatives. Awareness of Bias and the Motivation to Correct In addition to basic evidence supporting the possibility of theory-based correction, the FCM notion that motivation and ability to identify bias influences correction has also gained support. In much of the initial work on the FCM, this aspect of the correction process has been bypassed by providing social judges with blatant instructions not to let a particular aspect of the judgment setting influence their perceptions of the targets. Recent research by Stapel et al. (1998), however, included a less blatant instruction (which they termed a conditional instruction) that allowed investigation of the subtlety of bias as it relates to likelihood of theory-based correction. When encountering this conditional instruction (which led people to correct only if a bias was detected), participants were found to be more likely to correct if the bias was blatant rather than subtle (i.e., explicit rating of context items immediately prior to the targets vs. simply mentioning the context items – with no rating – during the instructions for the target rating task). Of course, this is entirely consistent with the FCM.3 The extent to which the bias is blatant versus subtle undoubtedly influences the ability of perceivers to detect the bias. Also, differing instructions could easily influence motivation to search for bias and might also affect the thresholds used by perceivers in identifying a reaction as being biased or otherwise unwanted. Although correction notions lend themselves quite naturally to issues of accuracy and accuracy motivation, the FCM explicitly acknowledges that other goals and

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Page 286 motives can also make certain effects on perceptions of targets unwanted (even if accuracy is not an issue or is enhanced by the otherwise unwanted influence; see Postulate 5). For instance, in some recent work, Fleming, Wegener, and Petty (1999) presented research participants with descriptions of evidence from a court trial that included evidence obtained in mild or severe violation of due process. Because the evidence was compelling and condemning, accuracy would best be served by use of the evidence. However, in this study, Fleming et al. obtained results consistent with both procedural and legalistic motivations determining whether mock jurors used the evidence in formulating their verdicts. When the evidence was ruled inadmissible by the judge (similar to the correction instructions used in much of the FCM research), participants' jury ratings were less influenced by the evidence collected in mild violation of due process when compared with the impact of that same evidence when it was deemed admissible. Because the evidence was still strong and condemning (and private judgments still proclaimed the defendant as very likely guilty), such judgments are consistent with legalistic rather than accuracy-based motives. Moreover, juror ratings were relatively uninfluenced (compared with the impact of the evidence when no information about collection of the evidence was given) by condemning evidence collected in severe violation of due process, regardless of whether the evidence was deemed admissible or inadmissible by the judge. Because the evidence was still viewed privately as condemning (as with the mild-violation conditions), this pattern was consistent with procedural but not legal or accuracy-based motives for correction (see Fleming et al., 1999, for additional discussion). Distinguishing Between Processing Effort and Correction The FCM posits that there is variation in the effort given to both corrected and uncorrected assessments of targets. Theory-based corrections might often require greater effort on the part of social perceivers than when no corrections occur (because corrected assessments are influenced by corrective processes that go beyond – are added on top of – uncorrected processes that would normally operate).4 However, according to the FCM, experience with a particular bias or correction could serve to routinize the process, see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998; see also Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Therefore, although corrected assessments might generally require greater effort than uncorrected assessments, if one were directly comparing the effort put into uncorrected reactions to the target and the effort put into correction processes per se, one might identify some situations in which the correction processes receive more effort than uncorrected processes and other situations in which correction processes receive less effort than uncorrected processes. Consider, for example, literature on the sleeper effect in persuasion (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Pratkanis et al., 1988). The sleeper effect is most likely when message recipients have extensively scrutinized message content prior to encountering some reason to disregard (correct for) impact of the message (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty, Wegener, Fabrigar, Priester, & Cacioppo, 1993; Priester et al., 1999). In this way, after some period of time, when people have forgotten any reasons why the message should be disregarded (or, at least, such reasons are not as accessible as reactions to the message content), there can be increased impact of the message (i.e., the sleeper effect; see Priester et al., 1999, for additional discussion). One way to understand such effects is to consider such situations as instances in which processing of the merits of the attitudinal position was more extensive (more elaborated, more effortful) than the corrective attempt to disregard the message. Consistent with the FCM, if effort (extensiveness) in correction were increased, the corrected assessment of the position would be more likely to persist over time. In this regard, it is also important to note that strength properties of corrected assessments of targets are not presumed to be solely attributable to cognitive effort alone within the FCM. Although there might be some effects of how much effort per se people have put into corrected or uncorrected assessments, the FCM is aligned with previous work (e.g., on the ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) in regarding strength properties as being due to high levels of elaboration (which generally entails high levels of cognitive effort, but also implies relation of target assessments to related knowledge and scrutiny of reasons – internal or external to the social perceiver – to support or oppose the assessment of the target; see also Petty et al., 1995). Petty et al. (1998) conducted an FCM-based study designed to show that correction processes need not be engaged when cognitive effort is at high levels. Half of the Petty et al. participants engaged in a replication of many past studies of attitude change. That is, participants encountered either a likeable or dislikeable communicator presenting a persuasive message under either low- or high-processing conditions (in this case, a combination of high relevance and low distraction in high-processing conditions and low relevance and high distraction in low-

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Page 287 processing conditions; cf. Chaiken, 1980). Results in these conditions replicate past findings, with greater impact of source likeability under low- rather than high-processing conditions. Importantly, however, consistent with the FCM, exertion of effort in assessing the merits of the advocated position (and the different judgmental outcome under high-processing conditions) did not necessarily mean that corrections had occurred. When a correction instruction was inserted before attitude measures asking judges not to let any nonmessage factors influence their attitudes, people who encountered the message under low- versus high-processing conditions corrected for source likeability to the same extent. The result was that people in low-processing/correction-instruction conditions were not influenced by source likeability, and people in high-processing/correction-instruction conditions had more favorable attitudes when the message was presented by a dislikeable rather than likeable source. This suggests that high levels of effort can be given in assessing the merits of a position or target without the necessity of corrective attempts, and corrections can occur that modify the reactions that would have been created by either low- or high-effort uncorrected processes. If the lack of source effects in high-processing conditions had been due to corrections, then it would have been likely for correction instructions to have relatively little additional impact in these conditions (and proportionally greater impact in low-processing conditions, where no corrections had presumably occurred). This was not found. Instead, people in high- and low-processing conditions corrected to the same extent, and this resulted in the dislikeable source becoming more persuasive than the likeable source in highprocessing/correction conditions. Issues of effort and correction are also relevant to data presented by Martin (1996; discussed by Martin & Stapel, 1998, as Martin, 1997). Martin used a similar paradigm to that used in a number of FCM studies, such as the violence study described earlier (e.g., see Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wegener et al., 1998; cf. Stapel et al., 1998). In Martin's study, however, he added uncorrected conditions in which he attempted to vary the effort participants were to give to ratings. When participants were told to exert little effort and to report the first thoughts that came to mind, the judgment effect was assimilation (i.e., targets were rated as more attractive when following attractive rather than unattractive context people). However, when judges were told to be accurate and that they would have to justify their answers later, contrast was the result (the same result as in the typical uncorrected conditions in past studies; e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1995). The typical theory-based correction for perceived contrast was found when correction instructions were given (as in Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wegener et al., 1998). Martin (1996; Martin & Stapel, 1998) preferred to understand these effects as an implicit reset correction overriding the default assimilation effect when effort was high and no explicit correction instruction was given. However, this effortful but implicit reset correction was thought to be followed by a theory-based correction when the explicit instruction was given. There are a number of reasons that this interpretation seems less than likely. For instance, the reset interpretation suggests that high levels of cognitive load would produce uncorrected assimilation effects of the extreme exemplars and that the typical contrast effects of extreme exemplars would only come about when cognitive effort is relatively high. Recent data suggest, however, that this is simply not the case. For example, Moskowitz and Skurnik (1999) showed that extreme exemplars continue to create contrast effects even when the priming episode has been interrupted (Experiment 3) or when social perceivers are placed under high levels of cognitive load (Experiment 4). Because both of these conditions are thought to disrupt reset corrections (Martin, 1986; Martin et al., 1990), this suggests that the typical contrast effects of extreme exemplars are not the result of implicit reset corrections. Therefore, it seems more likely that the instructions to put forth low effort and report “top of the head” reactions might have changed the more natural comparison-based contrast effects (e.g., by instigating acquiescence or similar low-effort processes, see Schuman & Presser; 1981). Regardless of whether an implicit reset effect ever occurs when theory-based corrections are not engaged (or even prior to their engagement), this does not seem to undermine the utility of the FCM in predicting and understanding the circumstances in which theory-based corrections are most likely. Finally, the FCM approach and the results from Petty et al. (1998) also suggest that social perceivers can exert a great deal of effort attempting to seek correct or accurate assessments of a target without necessarily also being concerned about avoiding bias. In other words, seeking correctness does not necessarily imply avoiding wrongness. In terms of the Petty et al. study, participants might have exerted a great deal of effort scrutinizing the merits of the attitudinal position in high-processing/no-instruction conditions (and in doing so, they were not influenced by their liking or disliking of the source of the appeal), but they might have done so without any explicit attempt not to be influenced by this likeability (or dis-

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Page 288 likeability) bias. When participants were more likely to attempt not to be affected by this bias (i.e., when correction instructions about nonmessage factors were given), those in both the low- and high-processing conditions corrected to the same extent. Again, this result cannot be accounted for by relying on the “valence-switching” alternative raised by Stapel et al. (1998) because different corrections occurred for the likeable versus dislikeable source in the high-processing conditions, despite the uncorrected judgment outcomes being the same for these two groups (see earlier discussion). Phenomenology in the FCM There are a variety of aspects of the FCM that are potentially influenced by phenomenal experience by social perceivers. For instance, in many cases (but certainly not all), corrections begin with some experience of (reaction to) the target. Within the FCM, reactions to targets might influence which enduring theories of bias are activated. That is, theories that naturally explain positive (negative) biases might be more likely to be activated when positive (negative) reactions to targets are experienced. For example, people might naturally think that a smiling facial expression would tend to make them view targets more favorably than might otherwise be the case. If so, theories about smiling bias might be more likely considered if one's reactions somehow seem overly favorable. The same theory of bias might be less likely to be considered if one's reactions to the target are generally quite negative. In a similar vein, reactions to targets might influence whether certain theories are perceived as applicable to the particular judgment setting and target. That is, if more than one potentially relevant theory of bias is activated, theories that explain the kind of reaction being experienced might often be more likely to be viewed as relevant to the experienced bias. In an initial study bearing on this possibility, Dunn (1997) provided research participants with a description of the facial feedback effect (see Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) as affecting the favorability of perceptions of targets (with smiling expressions leading to favorable, and frowning expressions leading to unfavorable, reactions). When participants encountered attractive or unattractive targets after a warning not to allow facial expressions to influence ratings, corrections in line with the described biases were more likely when the context-independent attractiveness of the target matched the presumed influence (i.e., when smiling participants encountered attractive targets and when frowning participants encountered unattractive targets). As noted by Wegener and Petty (1997), these kinds of matching effects between reactions to targets and theories of bias would greatly depend on factors relating to the breadth or globality of the theories (i.e., the extent to which the theory specifies a particular target or type of reaction that results from the bias as opposed to being viewed as encompassing many targets and types of reactions). For example, a relatively specific theory might say that positive moods dispose people toward positive reactions toward new people, whereas a more global version of the theory might include the possibility that positive moods not only bring about positive reactions, but also reduce any potential negative reactions that might otherwise arise when meeting a new person. Of course, the global theory would be more likely to be applied in settings where reactions are not particularly positive but in which the existence of a positive mood is salient. Both of these possible functions of reactions to targets (i.e., effects on activation of theories and on perceived applicability) also hold implications for long-term accessibility of theories of bias. That is, the relative frequency and strength with which a theory is activated will influence its accessibility, and theories that are viewed as applicable (and are used) often as opposed to infrequently should also become more accessible than competing theories that are viewed as applicable less often. Reactions to a target might also influence the content of theories of bias. For example, if no currently held theories seem to apply, then a new theory can be generated for that particular instance, and that theory (given sufficient attention and thought) could be remembered for future use in similar circumstances. If seemingly relevant theories of bias do not sufficiently account for the experienced reactions, these reactions can force a change in the theory or the creation of a theory to account for the divergence from current theory-based expectations about likely bias. Another way in which phenomenal experience relates to theory-based correction is that theory-based correction is hypothesized to depend (at least initially) on subjective experience or awareness of bias. At times, one might feel too positive or too negative toward a given target. Perhaps this would be compared to an expectation of reactions (e.g., based on recollection of past experiences, or assessments, of the target). This experience of bias could also be tied to an experience predicted by an enduring naive theory that is consulted in the process of attempting to identify potential biases. However one conceptualizes the subjective experience of detecting a potential bias, it is important to note a distinction in the FCM between awareness of a potential bias and aware-

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Page 289 ness of the correction process. Saying that a person becomes aware (on some level) of a potential bias is not the same as saying that the correction process is fully conscious or that the person could report how he or she used naive theories in that process. On the contrary, we believe that it would be unlikely for a person to be able to report processes such as: I thought that my reactions to the target were much more positive than the last time I thought about this target, so I retrieved and generated some potential theories of how that bias might arise; the reactions themselves suggested that two of the theories were more plausible than the others, so I used those to guide my search for a more reasonable assessment and thought about some reasons why that assessment seemed to make sense. This would be especially unlikely because (consistent with the FCM) repetition of certain corrections might lead to routinization of those operations (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998; cf. Smith, 1989). Finally, there are also a number of ways in which subjective experiences (e.g., an experience of outrage, pride, or insecurity) could influence which judgment goals are adopted by the social perceiver (e.g., accuracy, justice, selfenhancement, etc.). These different orientations to the setting in which targets are assessed could, in turn, influence which naive theories are consulted, adapted, and generated, as well as influencing if and how those theories might be used by the particular person in that setting. Therefore, there are a variety of ways in which phenomenal experience could impact corrections based on naive theories (perceptions) of bias. Some of those are outlined in the previous paragraphs. Which aspects come into play depend on the particular judgment setting, the target (and knowledge associated with the target), as well as the past and recent experiences of perceivers relevant to the target and potentially identifiable biases. CONCLUSION We have found the FCM to be quite useful in outlining the potential role of perceptions of bias in bias corrections. By conceptualizing corrections as driven by naive theories of bias (both enduring and newly generated theories), the FCM goes beyond past partialing or subtraction views that were developed within the longstanding priming/construct accessibility tradition. One important way in which the FCM goes beyond these perspectives is by uncoupling judgment outcomes (i.e., assimilation vs. contrast) from categories of judgment process (i.e., corrected vs. uncorrected; effortful vs. noneffortful). According to the FCM, assimilation or contrast can be relatively effortful or effortless and can be either corrected or uncorrected outcomes (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997; see also Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999). These and other flexibilities inherent in the model open up a variety of interesting and useful research directions (see also Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998). Although the current chapter has focused on social judgment and impression formation/priming settings (see also Stapel & Koomen, chap. 14, this volume), it is important to note the variety of settings to which the FCM is applicable, including attribution (see Krull, chap. 13, this volume; Morris, Ames, & Knowles, chap. 9, this volume), attitudes and persuasion (see Liberman, chap. 18, this volume; Petty et al., 1998; Stone, chap. 3, this volume), selfperception (see Hetts & Pelham, chap. 7, this volume; Vorauer, chap. 16, this volume), categorization and stereotyping (see Blair, chap. 22, this volume; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume; Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume; Sherman, chap. 11, this volume), and more (see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for a review). As one example of ways in which correction notions take these literatures in somewhat different directions, we believe that it is potentially important to note the relation between correction phenomena and work on stereotype rebound. In many circumstances, researchers in this area have used easily controllable measures (e.g., writing an essay; Macrae et al., 1994) without acknowledging that a finding consistent with stereotype rebound depends on the absence of corrections. Paying attention to potential corrective processes suggests a number of hypotheses about when stereotype rebound would and would not occur (e.g., that rebound on such measures would be more likely for targets for which social judges are not motivated to engage in corrections; that such effects would be most likely for social perceivers low in motivation to correct for such biases; and that less controllable measures might be more capable of showing rebound even for people who would like to correct for stereotypic biases if the stereotype has indeed been activated in those people). Although some similar hypotheses can be generated from alternative perspectives (see Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998), we believe that explicit use of correction terminology could add to this literature by connecting the phenomena to issues of bias identification, enduring and constructed theories of bias, theory accessibility and applicability, and strength of corrected assessments. It is our hope that the FCM serves in part to spark interest in widely applicable models that accentuate

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Page 290 commonalities in process across research domains. We suspect that such models and research perspectives will be prominent in the future of work on social cognition, just as a social-cognitive approach has become common across the wide variety of social-psychological topics. ENDNOTES 1. This does not mean that perceivers can necessarily consciously report the correction processes that they undertake, although people might often be able to report their perceptions of the bias associated with a given context and target. It is important to note, however, that there are potential difficulties with such assessments, including that in retrospective reports a person might report lack of an effect of the biasing factor because of corrections rather than because of a lack of perception of potential bias. 2. Although corrections might generally require more effort than a lack of corrections, this should not be taken as suggesting that corrected assessments of targets should necessarily persist over time or resist changes more than uncorrected assessments. Because uncorrected assessments are more directly based on reactions to the target (and such reactions might be recalled or recur on additional presentations of the target), there might be a variety of settings in which uncorrected assessments tend to persist and resist change to a greater extent than corrected assessments (see Petty & Wegener, 1998, for similar comments regarding comparison of changed and unchanged attitudes; see also Priester, Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1999). 3. For some reason, Stapel et al. (1998) seemed to agree with the FCM that likelihood of identifying a bias moderated the likelihood of theory-based corrections, but believed that corrections in response to blatant instructions were based on the uncorrected judgments themselves rather than associated theories of bias (i.e., the changing valence alternative noted earlier; see Stapel et al., 1998, p. 803). In addition to difficulty accounting for existing FCM research (see earlier discussion), use of theories of bias would seem to provide a more parsimonious explanation across conditions of the Stapel et al. research. That is, rather than referring to a different set of processes depending on whether participants detected the bias on their own or were directed to it by the experimenter, it seems quite possible that theory-based corrections took place in both cases. As is discussed later in this chapter, we would posit that reactions to a target can, at times, influence theories of bias, and variations in correction instructions can influence likelihoods of perceiving bias. We believe, however, that the whole of the data (the Stapel et al., 1998, work included) is quite consistent with the FCM. 4. One possible exception to this would be when anticipation of bias or detection of bias early in one's dealing with a target(s) (and efforts at avoiding or removing that identified bias) actually prevent or change the operation of uncorrected processes that would ordinarily underlie perceptions of the target(s).

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Page 291 18 Exploring the Boundaries of Rationality: A Functional Perspective on Dual-Process Models in Social Psychology Akiva M. Liberman National Institute of Justice This chapter reconstructs ‘‘dual-process” model in social psychology in functional terms. I argue that the basic idea behind early dual-process model concerned whether certain biases in judgment were the result of nonrational intrusions on judgment or whether they were instead the result of bounded rationality. This idea was implicit in early conceptions, but has not been fully explicated. After describing the theoretical idea and its genesis, I illustrate how it was productive in generating empirical research. In the final section, I contrast this functional reconstruction with more conventional descriptions of dual-process model. Much of the chapter can be thought of as a discussion of the meaning of the word heuristic . The notion of heuristics as it emerged in cognitive psychology was central to the development of dual-process model in social psychology and to the functional argument implicit in them. Chaiken (1980) made this connection clear in her work on the heuristic view of persuasion and later the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Therefore, although my functional reconstruction is relevant to a variety of dual-process model, I focus on the HSM. (I briefly discuss models of stereotyping as well.) The HSM is also pitched quite broadly. Although initially developed for persuasion, it was intended for broader application, as indicated in “The HSM Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context” (Chaiken et al., 1989). This breadth of conception is important for my critical discussion of processing distinctions in the chapter's last section. HISTORY 1. Social Psychology: The Functional Question About Biases in Judgment Social psychologists have long been concerned with errors and biases in judgment. One recurring question has been whether these errors reflect suboptimal attempts to acquire accurate knowledge about the world or whether these errors reflect quite different underlying motives, such as self-esteem maintenance and group identification. As Markus and Zajonc (1985) put it in their Handbook chapter on the Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology: Was faulty information processing to be explained by assuming an interference from “hot” factors, such as motives, moods, and emotions, or was it simply a matter of various inadequacies in the programs that operated on information? (p. 177) In the 1960s, “hot” mechanisms (i.e., motivational) were emphasized in social psychology. Cognitive dissonance theory suggested that motives for psychological (vs. logical) consistency led people to distort their representations of the world, and even of their own experience (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Around 1970, selfperception theory offered the alternative “cold” (i.e., cognitive) theoretical explanation for these distortions (Bem, 1967, 1972). At the same time, attribution theory's description of people as lay scientists (Kelley, 1967, 1973) also helped cold cognitive processing become the dominant perspective. But even in the context of attribution theory, the hot side reemerged in concern with self-serving attribution biases, in which people systematically take more credit for success than for failure. Whether such biases were driven by cold information-processing limitations or by hot self-serving goals was vigorously debated (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Such debates ultimately turn on the goals (not necessarily explicit) or functions of people's judgments. As Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) asked, “Of what use to a man are his opinions?”1 Various functional taxonomies were proposed, such as Katz's (1960) four func-

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Page 292 tions: knowledge, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and utilitarian functions. When people form judgments, their goals may be to acquire accurate knowledge about the world, bolster their egos, express their values, etc. For the current purposes, what is important is to distinguish between judgments formed in order to acquire accurate knowledge about the world versus for other purposes. (For reviews of the various proposed functions of attitudes, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Pratkanis, Breckler, & Greenwald, 1989). Put another way, one's goals can be rational or nonrational. In this sense, “nonrational” need not be pejorative; it merely implies striving for something besides knowledge and accuracy. (Katz actually took a harsher perspective in the beginning of his 1960 article, contrasting a rational image of man with a distinctly unappealing irrational image.) Functions Applied to Biases. Whether a bias or influence is ultimately caused by hot or cold factors is a functional question. There are two basic answers: a bias is either due to cold inadequacies in the programs, or it is due to hot motivational factors. If the former, then people are being rational (but bounded), in the sense of striving for knowledge and accuracy. If the latter, then people are not being rational, in that they are not primarily striving for accurate knowledge (i.e., they are not trying to be rational), which is why they let considerations other than accuracy bias their judgments. Of course, rational and irrational functions need not be mutually exclusive – a point to which we return. Functions Between and Across People. Much of the research explicitly derived from a functional perspective has concerned individual differences in the psychological functions of judgment. This research attempts to classify people according to the primary psychological functions that attitudes or judgments serve for them. Most commonly, researchers attempt to identify an individual's dominant functional orientation, which should be manifest across many attitudes. Thus, Smith, Bruner, and White's (1956) classic “Opinions and Personality” searched for broad personality differences in the functions of their subjects' attitudes. Taking a case study approach, Smith et al. conducted clinical interviews with 10 men to explore the psychological functions being served by each man's attitudes toward Russia (during the cold war) and how that attitude related to his personality. Prentice's (1987; Abelson & Prentice, 1989) striking work on “Attitudes as Possessions’’ provides a contemporary example. Comparing attitudes to material possessions, Prentice asks: What psychological functions do people's possessions serve for them? After classifying individuals regarding whether their possessions primarily serve utilitarian or value–expressive functions, Prentice finds that those individuals' attitudes show similar functional orientations. Snyder's work on self-monitoring (e.g., Snyder & DeBono, 1987, 1989) also focuses at the personality level. People are classified as either high self-monitors (concerned with social presentation and adjustment), or as low self-monitors (more concerned with expressing their own values). With a variety of attitudes, Snyder and his colleagues find that people are more persuaded by persuasive appeals that match their own functional orientation. High self-monitors are more persuaded by sociallydriven arguments, whereas low self-monitors are more persuaded by value-expressive arguments. An individual difference approach can also be applied more narrowly, focusing on the function served by some specific attitudes rather than attitudes in general. For example, Katz and Sarnoff focued on the functions served by prejudicial intergroup attitudes (Katz, 1960; Sarnoff, 1960; Sarnoff & Katz, 1954), and Herek (e.g., 1986) has focused on the functions served by heterosexuals‘ attitudes toward homosexuality. Individual differences are not the only application of a functional perspective, however. A functional perspective can be applied to commonalities across people (e.g., Shavitt, 1989, 1990), and functional issues surface in a wide variety of social-psychological research. As one example, consider terror management theory (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997), which argues that self-esteem (as part of a larger psychological apparatus) serves to defend against fear of mortality. These researchers find that making people's mortality particularly salient motivates attempts to raise or protect self-esteem in a variety of domains. This is a functional argument, but not focused on individual differences. More often, when applying a functional perspective across people, theorists focus on particular domains of judgments or behavior. For example, Tajfel (1978) argued that the ingroup-outgroup distinction serves to bolster self-esteem – a functional claim about people in general. As another example, Trope (1982) proposed a selfassessment perspective on achievement behavior. His studies show that people's motivation to engage in achievement behavior is driven in part by how diagnostic or informative one's performance will be about one's own abilities. Essentially, Trope argued that achievement behavior is in the service of knowledge, rather than simply serving self-esteem. Thus, Trope advocates a rational perspective regarding achievement motivation. Functional questions can also be applied more narrowly to particular influences and biases on judgments. One bias whose functional basis has received considerable attention is the self-serving attribution bias,

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Page 293 in which people take more credit for their achievements than for their failures. Is this self-serving bias driven by selfesteem, or is it merely a side effect of differences in perspective and knowledge concerning oneself versus others (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tetlock & Levi, 1982)? Although rarely discussed together with the functional approach to attitudes, this is our functional question once again, contrasting rational and nonrational functions. The same question can be posed regarding many other biases. For example: Does the biasing effect of communicator attractiveness in persuasion operate in the service of knowledge or serve nonrational functions such as self-esteem (perhaps via identification with the communicator)? In summary, the functional question is a recurring topic in social psychology. Most explicitly discussed regarding individual differences, functional questions have also emerged in many other domains, including explanations of biases. 2. Heuristics in Cognitive Psychology Within cognitive psychology, too, errors and biases were a topic of much interest. But issues of hot versus cold sources of bias have not been focal; hot biases have largely been outside cognitive psychology's research agenda. (Following disaffection with the motivated perception claims of Bruner's [1957b; Bruner & Postman, 1947] New Look in Perception [e.g., Fodor, 1983], cognitive psychology generally avoided such issues of motivation.) Instead, the agenda was to explain errors (as well as accomplishments) in information-processing terms. Put another way, the knowledge function was generally assumed to underlie judgment; only judgments motivated by accuracy were considered appropriate topics of investigation. In cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, a distinction emerged between algorithms and heuristics. Algorithms, which guaranteed correct solutions, had been the initial focus of attention in computer science and artificial intelligence. These algorithms were generally all-or-nothing affairs. They did not exhibit “graceful degradation” or generate approximate solutions when unable to reach a definitive conclusion; instead they provided no solution at all. However, work on problems such as chess suggested that algorithmic approaches were insufficient to describe how humans solve problems (Chase & Simon, 1973). Instead, people and computers must often rely on heuristics, which generate approximate and adequate solutions rather than optimal ones. Thus, artificial-intelligence researchers strove to identify and program such heuristics, whereas cognitive psychologists sought to uncover the heuristics that people use in their judgments. Importantly, this work developed around well-formed problems with guaranteed, correct solutions. Thus, problems with known (algorithmic) solutions based on statistical principles (e.g., Bayes' theorem) became objects of particular inquiry. All of this work suggested the notion of bounded rationality – that people are strategic and flexible information processors who use heuristic approaches to solve problems. These approaches lead to errors and systematic biases, but at the same time show people's flexibility in the allocation of cognitive resources and the ingenious ways in which people obtain approximate solutions to complex problems. When all was said and done, there seemed to be two modes or approaches to solving problems: algorithmic, optimal, and correct approaches versus heuristic, suboptimal, and approximate approaches. 3. Importing Dual Problem-Solving Modes to Address the Functional Question The notion of heuristics, and particularly the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982), was closely attended by social psychologists. By about 1980, social psychologists were borrowing the idea of two approaches to problem solving and using it to address some instances of their own long- standing functional question. If people use heuristics that sometimes produce systematic biases in judgment, then those resulting biases seem to be rationally driven, rather than indicating nonrational intrusions. Therefore, the notion of heuristics suggested that the domain of rational judgments was larger than previously thought, and larger than the realm of algorithmic approaches. Note that in cognitive psychology's exclusive concern with cold processes, this issue of rationality was not raised. People might be stupid, and they might not strive very hard to solve problems, but there was little consideration of whether people's judgments were being driven by nonrational (nonknowledge) goals. In contrast, in social psychology's greater eclecticism, both rational and nonrational concerns were assumed to play a role in judgment. Thus, to social psychologists, the notions of heuristics, bounded rationality, and cognitive misers suggested an expanded realm of rationality. Social psychologists thus began to examine whether some apparently nonrational influences on judgment and opinion might be reconceptualized as rational. For example: Why are likeable communicators more persuasive than unlikeable communicators? The old answer was obvious: Perceivers were being nonrational. That is, they

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Page 294 were not trying to be accurate; instead, maybe they were trying to identify with the communicator. Now, there was a new possible answer: Maybe people somehow used likeability in a judgmental heuristic. Maybe people thought that a simple rule of thumb such as “nice people can be trusted to tell the truth” was good enough to improve judgmental accuracy (compared with tossing a coin). A second example: Why do perceivers let the racial identity of target persons bias their impressions? The nonrational answer was that perceivers were boosting their self-esteem by believing in the superiority of their own race. The rational answer was that stereotypes have a kernel of truth that can be used in bounded attempts to reach accurate impressions. (Although this was not a new idea about stereotypes [e.g., Allport, 1954], but it could now be integrated with the broader notion of heuristics.) The Unmentioned Third Type of Judgment. Thus, the boundaries of rationality seemed open to expansion via the notion of heuristics. Social psychologists expressed these possibilities in “dual process” (or dual-mode) models, borrowing the idea of two approaches to problem solving that had emerged in cognitive psychology. These models describe two modes or processes of judgment. One mode is an optimal judgment mode (derived from algorithmic problem solving), and the other is a more efficient, but less accurate mode (derived from heuristic problem solving). Theoretical work focused on elucidating the new heuristic mode of judgment, and empirical work focused on demonstrating such heuristic processes in judgment. The theoretical language and emphasis were borrowed from cognitive psychology's concern with information-processing mechanisms. Thus, the notion that accuracy and knowledge is the goal/motive/function of judgment was either left implicit or postulated as an underlying assumption (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). But within the landscape of social psychology (in contrast to the landscape of cognitive psychology), there was a third type of judgment – nonrational judgment. Implicitly, then, describing various influences on judgment as heuristic implied that these judgments were rational but bounded, rather than nonrational. At heart, then, this was a suggestion about the functional nature of these influences. Thus, these dual-mode models implicitly offered a functional distinction between rational and nonrational judgments. Described more fully, a tripartite typology was implied, with two categories of rational judgment, algorithmic and heuristic, and one category of nonrational judgment. To say that people are using a heuristic is essentially a functional statement about how and why people use particular information. And to suggest that a certain bias is heuristic is to implicitly suggest that it is rational. (In the final section of the chapter, I argue that the two broad judgment modes do not serve as well for delineating two types of processing, that a heuristic is not a type of process.) THE EMPIRICAL PROGRAM Importantly, the functional notion of heuristics suggests that whether particular biases are rationally-driven heuristics or irrational need not be solely a speculative or philosophical issue. It can be explored empirically. Defining and Identifying Heuristics . The empirical program around heuristics derives from the functional definition of a heuristic. A heuristic is a moderately diagnostic way to generate a judgment, known to be suboptimal, but relatively easy to use compared with more optimal judgment strategies. People use the heuristic as a proxy for more optimal judgment strategies.2 The two critical features are moderate diagnosticity and relative ease of use. Moderate diagnosticity means the heuristic provides a better basis for judgment than chance but does not guarantee correct judgment. That is, users of the heuristic believe that the judgments it generates correlate with accurate judgments. Relative ease of use explains why people rely on the heuristic. Thus, “people use X as a heuristic device” means people use X as a proxy for costlier but more accurate judgmental strategies. Such a claim is inherently an empirical one. Importantly, then, whether some bias/influence is serving as a heuristic is not an a priori theoretical determination, but rather a testable hypothesis. Labeling a judgment effect as a heuristic is not the starting point of an empirical investigation, but its result. One might say that the goal of the empirical program is to chart the boundaries of rationality, delineating which effects are rational (in the sense of striving for correct beliefs about the world) and which are not. The goal of this empirical program is to classify judgment effects in functional terms. First-Generation Research: Heuristics and Compensatory Patterns Many studies conducted under the dual process rubric can be described in terms of this functional question. Each study investigates whether people use some particular kind of information as a heuristic. If so, we can call its influence rational; if not, it reflects a nonrational intrusion into judgment. I illustrate with several studies. Because these studies are not generally described in these

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Page 295 functional terms (although some papers can be read this way), I refer to my descriptions as a functional reconstruction of the studies. (In the chapter's final section, I compare the functional reconstruction of such studies with more common process constructions.) First-generation studies investigated the implication that heuristics are proxies for superior judgmental strategies. Each study takes a bias/influence/effect on judgment and investigates whether subjects use it as a proxy for a more diagnostic but more difficult judgment strategy. Heuristics as Proxies: Reducing Heuristic Use in the Basic Motivation Design Example 1: Communicator Likeability in Persuasion . Why are likeable communicators more persuasive? Chaiken (1980, Study 1) investigated this question. In functional terms, the study investigated whether the influence of communicator likeability is rational and heuristic, as opposed to nonrational. For this to be a reasonable question, we must first assume that communicator likeability affects persuasion; otherwise the question is pointless. Therefore, the study should include a baseline condition showing this bias; if the bias is not found at baseline, then the study cannot address the functional question. (This requirement would seem trivial were it not often overlooked.) Second, we assume that (perceivers think) communicator likeability is moderately diagnostic of a communication's accuracy – perhaps because they think that likeable communicators are more trustworthy than unlikeable communicators. The basic design then provides two alternative bases for judgment and varies the strength of each. The first is the factor under investigation – likeability. (Chaiken's college student subjects read an interview with a male college administrator who either praised undergraduates [likeable] or insulted them [unlikeable].) The second is a superior basis for judgment, but is more difficult to use; in persuasion studies, this superior basis is generally message content. (To vary persuasiveness, Chaiken provided either a strong message with six persuasive arguments or a weak message containing only two arguments.) How would we know whether people use one strategy, the other, or both? The basic experimental approach is to vary the implications of each judgmental strategy. We vary both whether the communicator is of high or low likeability and whether the message content is more or less persuasive. When the experimental manipulation of a factor affects judgment (in a main effect), this indicates that subjects used that factor in judgment. So these experimental manipulations are surrogates for measures of on-line processing.3 So far, this generates a basic 2 × 2 design. Finally, we add a motivational manipulation designed to heighten the importance of the knowledge function; I refer to this as knowledge motivation .4 Chaiken's subjects either expected to be interviewed, later, about their opinions on the topic of the message (high motivation) or on another topic (low motivation). (To accomplish this, Chaiken took two different topics – that people should sleep much less than 8 hours a night, and that the university calendar should change to a trimester system – and factorially crossed the actual message topic with the expected discussion topic.) Low motivation is the baseline condition under which we expect to find our bias; high motivation is the test condition. Would high motivation lead people to abandon likeability as a proxy in favor of the more costly but more accurate judgment alternative? If so, the effects of likeability and argument strength should be compensatory; that is, as people rely more on the superior judgment basis (larger effects of message strength), they will rely less on the heuristic (smaller effects of likeability). Other patterns of results would suggest that the baseline effect of likeability (under low motivation) is not due to likeability's use as a heuristic. For example, if we find a likeability main effect unaffected by knowledge motivation while the message content effect increases under high motivation, we would surmise that the baseline likeability effect serves some other function. Subjects are not using likeability as a proxy for message content. What happened? Sure enough, Chaiken found that when knowledge motivation was increased, message strength's effect on judgment increased while communicator likeability's effect decreased. Likeability seemed to serve as a proxy for message strength – a heuristic. Thus, the baseline effect of likeability seems to reflect bounded rationality rather than nonrationality. Example 2: Celebrity Endorsement Effects in Advertising. Petty, Cacioppo, and Schuman's (1983) investigation of celebrity endorsements provides a second example. Does the biasing effect of celebrities on product choice serve some nonrational function – perhaps self esteem via identification with the celebrity – or does it sometimes serve as a heuristic? Perhaps a heuristic such as “famous people know how to look good’’ might be used for fashion and beauty products. To investigate this, Petty et al. asked subjects to read a razor ad containing two endorsements and then rate the product. They varied the persuasiveness of the ad's text and also who endorsed the razor – sports celebrities or unknown citizens. Presumably people think that reading the ad is a more reliable way to judge the razor than relying on the endorser, but also takes somewhat more

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Page 296 effort. Thus, we have two bases for judgment. Knowledge motivation was manipulated via whether the product was available to subjects. Among other things, subjects were told that the product would soon be test-marketed either in their own city (high motivation) or in another area of the country (low motivation). Thus, we have the basic three-way design. What happened? Petty et al. found the compensatory pattern indicating proxy use: Under high motivation, the endorser's celebrity status effect decreased, whereas the ad's content effect increased. Apparently subjects used celebrity endorsements as a proxy for their own evaluations, but when sufficiently motivated, they evaluated the product and gave the endorsements less weight. Had a noncompensatory pattern been found, with high motivation increasing the ad content's effect but not diminishing the celebrity effect, we would conclude that (low-motivation) subjects had not used celebrity status as a heuristic device. Instead, we would conclude that the biasing effect of endorser celebrity had served some other function. Example 3: Audience Effects in Persuasion . As a final example, consider Axsom, Yates, and Chaiken's (1987) investigation of audience effects. Why are judgments influenced by others' opinions (a.k.a. the band-wagon effect )? In functional terms, is the biasing effect of others' opinions in the service of knowledge? As with likeability, we have alternative nonrational explanations related to attitudes' social functions. Perhaps the biasing effect of others' opinions serves an affiliative function. (This is related to one of social psychology's oldest questions: Are conformity effects normative or informational [Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelman, 1958]?) Axsom et al. used the same basic empirical design, assuming that relying on audience opinions (i.e., applause) to judge a message is moderately diagnostic, but less diagnostic than the arguments in a debate (i.e., message content). They asked subjects to listen to a taped debate about whether probation should be used as an alternative to imprisonment and manipulated both bases for judgment. To heighten knowledge motivation, Axsom et al. used a smorgasbord of involvement manipulations, including personal relevance of the issue. Subjects were told the policy was being considered either in their own (high motivation) or a distant (low motivation) state. To test whether subjects use audience cues as a heuristic, we check whether the biasing effects of the audience is compensatory with the effect of message content. Does the audience effect decrease as the message effect increases? As it turned out, yes. Subjects used others' opinions as a proxy for evaluating the debate. Again, a noncompensatory pattern of results would lead to other conclusions. Had high motivation raised the message content effect but not diminished the audience effect, we would conclude that audience response was not a proxy for message content, but was serving some nonrational function instead.5 The Importance of Alternative Functions. Each of the preceding investigations is interesting only because the factors investigated – communicator likeability, celebrity status, and others' opinions – might serve alternative functions. We expect social factors like these to engage social motives or functions, but these very alternatives narrow the conclusions we can draw from each study. That is, although these biases serve as heuristics in these studies, they probably serve nonrational functions at other times. Perhaps communicator attractiveness serves as a heuristic in judgments about fashion, but only serves nonrational functions in political discussions. Because classroom settings with students highlight knowledge and accuracy goals (see Sears, 1986), generalizing heuristic findings to other settings would require considerable research to delineate boundary conditions. I illustrate the importance of alternative functions with one research example that would not be interesting in functional terms (nor was it conceived in these terms). Petty and Cacioppo (1984) investigated the effects of message length using our basic three-way design. Recast in our functional terms, the empirical question would be: Is the biasing effect of message length a heuristic used in the service of knowledge? Yet it is hard to see what alternative function would plausibly be served by a message length bias. For our purposes, then, the empirical exercise would be almost pointless (although results do show message length serving as a heuristic).6 Instigating Heuristic Use: The Basic Ability-Deficit Design A second basic strategy to investigate whether a bias serves as a heuristic is to undermine subjects' ability to use a superior judgmental basis and see whether they turn to the heuristic. I illustrate with a stereotype study. Many stereotyping studies tend to use two bases for judgment precisely along the lines described here. Subjects are given two bases for judging an individual, group membership and individuating information. In many studies, the group membership information is much easier to process (although this need not be the case; see Liberman, Newman, & Chaiken, 1998). (Stereotype studies also use the basic motivation design already illustrated, and sometimes find the compensatory pattern suggesting that stereotypes are serving as judgmental heuristics; e.g., Locksley et al., 1980, 1982.) The logic of an ability-deficit design is the converse

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Page 297 of the motivation design. In a motivation study, we attempt to eliminate (or reduce) the bias; in an abilitydeficit study, we try to instigate the bias by interfering with subjects' ability to use alternative bases for judgment. A nice example using stereotypes is provided by Bodenhausen (1990). Subjects evaluated cases of alleged misconduct of college students. While the cases were held constant, the accused student's identity was sometimes stereotypically associated with the violation: an athlete accused of cheating on an exam, a Hispanic student accused of physically attacking his roommate, and an African-American accused of selling drugs. The superior basis for judgment, of course, involved the particulars of the case rather than stereotypes. To vary difficulty in evaluating the case, Bodenhausen varied whether subjects participated at a good or bad time of day for them, based on their self-reported biorhythms. He found that when subjects participated at their peak time, their guilt judgments showed little biasing effect of stereotypes. However, when they were off-peak, their guilt judgments showed greater stereotype bias. Apparently, when the judgment was more difficult to make, subjects used the stereotype as a heuristic.7 SECOND-GENERATION RESEARCH: BEYOND COMPENSATORY PATTERNS First-generation research looked for a compensatory pattern as evidence that a bias was serving as a heuristic or proxy for more effortful judgment. Although this simple interpretive framework neglects various important considerations, it serves as a reasonable first approximation. Second-generation research uses more complex designs to deal with these additional complications. Space limitations preclude more than brief illustrations. Compensatory Patterns Revisited: Switching Strategies or Switching Functions? To recap the general logic of the three-way motivational design: People use a heuristic only as a quick and dirty alternative to a better judgment strategy; when sufficiently motivated, subjects used the better alternative instead. Subjects switch between alternative strategies that serve the same function. However, the functional perspective also suggests a quite different meaning for a compensatory pattern. When we raise knowledge motivation, perhaps subjects switch the basic function of their judgment to knowledge and accuracy, from some other function. For example, perhaps the biasing effect of communicator status for an unimportant judgment (i.e., under low knowledge motivation) serves a self-esteem function via the subject's identification with the communicator. However, when the judgment is made more personally important, perhaps subjects put their self-esteem goals aside and focus on accuracy, and therefore attend to message content. This would generate a compensatory pattern, with high knowledge motivation reducing the effect of communicator status while increasing the effect of message content. To tease apart these alternative interpretations of a compensatory pattern, we could add conditions to explore what happens if we raise knowledge motivation but undermine the utility of the superior judgment strategy. If the bias served as a heuristic, it should reemerge. But if the bias served a nonrational function (under low knowledge motivation) that was put aside under high knowledge motivation, then the bias should remain negligible even absent better bases for judgment. This is essentially the design of Chaiken and Maheswaran's (1994) investigation of source credibility. Subjects read a pamphlet about an answering machine and then made a consumer judgment. In the usual threeway motivational design, message content was varied (either a strong or weak pamphlet), as was source credibility (Consumer Reports vs. K-Mart). Knowledge motivation was also varied with high- (but not low-) motivation subjects told that their opinions could affect decisions about the product's distribution in their area. In our terms, the experiment asks: Is the biasing effect of source credibility heuristic and rational, or nonrational? Sure enough, the compensatory pattern was found. Under low knowledge motivation, source credibility had a large biasing effect, which diminished under high motivation while the content effect increased. Yet, if credibility serves another function under low knowledge motivation which is abandoned under high motivation, then we might get this same pattern of results. And so a third variation on message content was included, in which the pamphlet was mixed and somewhat contradictory. In our terms, this mixed message undermined the message content's utility as a basis of judgment. (Note that this design actually combines the motivation and ability designs described earlier.) Would the source credibility effect be reinstated even under high knowledge motivation? Sure enough, the credibility effect reemerged, suggesting that the compensatory pattern reflected a switch in strategies for reaching accurate judgment, rather than a switch in function. Persistent Biases: Expectancy Effects The preceding deals with an alternative explanation for finding a compensatory pattern. Now we consider the

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Page 298 opposite: a complexity that would prevent heuristic use from showing up as a compensatory pattern. If biasing information (e.g., likeability) is processed quickly and with little effort, then that information might create expectancies, which could then impact the slower processing of message content, particularly when the message's strength is ambiguous. If so, message content might seem more persuasive when coming from a more likeable source. This would interfere with a compensatory pattern because, even after abandoning use of likeability as a heuristic, high knowledge-motivation subjects would show a likeability effect.8 To investigate this possible reason for a noncompensatory pattern, we would vary the key mediator of such expectancy effects – ambiguity. Space precludes describing and interpreting a study with such a design here.9 Loose Ends: Multiple Functions, Accuracy, and Bias A given bias might serve as both a heuristic and also serve another function. That is, different functions need not be mutually exclusive. I argued earlier that some social biases might serve different functions at different times, which limits our ability to generalize broadly about a bias's function from a particular study. It is important to stress that the rational pursuit of accuracy does not preclude other biases from operating even simultaneously. The logic behind the compensatory pattern of results, discussed earlier, turns on this assumption. That is, if some bias (e.g., communicator attractiveness) serves a nonrational function, then it should not be eliminated simply by increasing knowledge motivation. Understanding how multiple functions or goals interact is one of the large challenges for contemporary social cognition, and it has received much attention in recent years. Yet the question of how multiple functions interrelate and are integrated stands outside the scope of the functional research program described here.10 This research program neither turns on a particular resolution of that question nor informs it in any important way. Instead, it focuses on charting the boundaries of one particular function – the rational pursuit of accurate knowledge. (A parallel research program might focus on another function, but this would not concern “heuristics” in its original usage and as used here, in which referring to something as a heuristic implies a goal of accuracy.) DISTINGUISHING FUNCTION AND PROCESS In contrast to the functional description I have provided, most research conducted under the rubric of dual-process model has been presented quite differently. In keeping with the cognitive roots of the dual-mode conception, the models have often been presented as describing two types of processing, such as heuristic versus systematic, or stereotype-based versus individuated. This is particularly true of later versions of these models. Similarly, the empirical studies are described as investigating processing. First, some type of processing is classified as heuristic on some a priori basis (in contrast to some other type of processing). Then the conditions under which each type of processing is used, and how they inteact, is investigated. Initial work strove to show that, under reduced motivation and/or ability, people were likely to switch from systematic processing to heuristic processing. The general finding is that people are more likely to use heuristic processing under low motivation or when cognitive resources are limited, and more likely to use systematic processing when they have more motivation and greater cognitive capacity. (Later work also attempts to examine whether people also use “heuristic processing” to serve other functions. Whether this question is meaningful depends on whether “heuristic processing” is clearly defined a priori as distinct from other types of processing, in a way that is independent of function. I address this question below at some length.) How does this processing conception relate to the functional conception? At one level, the two conceptions focus on different boundaries of heuristics. Whereas the focus of this chapter concerns the boundary between rationallydriven heuristics and nonrational biases, the conventional descriptions focus on the boundary between a heuristic mode of judgment and a more optimal rational mode of judgment. Yet the difference between functional versus processing descriptions runs deeper. Functional descriptions concern ends, whereas processing descriptions concern means. In principle, the same processes can serve different functions, and the same function can be served by different processes. Thus, if a heuristic refers to using some information to serve some function, then it probably is not also a distinct type of processing. (A claim that a particular function utilizes a distinct type of processing might be made, but it would be a strong claim requiring strong evidence.) The Two Research Programs This means/end distinction leads the studies described earlier to be framed differently in the context of a processing research program rather than a functional research program. The critical difference is how and

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Page 299 when one classifies some influence as heuristic. In the functional context, the end result of the study is to classify an effect as heuristic (and rational) or not. In the processing context, classification of the bias as a heuristic is the departure point of the study; classification of the bias as nonheuristic is not considered. The research program concerning function asks a why question (in terms of functions, goals, or motives): Why do people exhibit certain biases? Although elucidating the processes used for various functions may help one fully answer the question, any such process description is subordinate to the focal functional question. That is, process descriptions may serve as premises or mediators, but the goal and conclusion of the inquiry concerns the function being served by a bias. In contrast, a research program concerning a type of processing (e.g., heuristic processing) would ask how or when questions: Under what circumstances do people use a particular type of processing? How does this processing type interact with another type of processing? Any statements about psychological function (or motive) are subordinate to the focal question concerning cognitive processes. Psychological functions are either assumed (generally the case in research in cognitive psychology, decision making, and early social cognition), manipulated as independent variables, or perhaps measured to serve as covariates. The experimental manipulations already described – (raising) knowledge motivation and (reducing) ability – are also put to different use in the two programs. In the functional program, these manipulations are part of an inferential strategy to determine whether a bias is serving as a proxy for more optimal strategies. Because this conclusion is assumed in the processing program, these experimental manipulations do not serve this inferential purpose. Instead, variations in motivation and ability are part of a strategy of sampling the circumstances under which heuristics are used. Although not incompatible, these two research programs are conceptually distinct and ask different questions. Unfortunately, shifts in meaning of the critical term heuristic have made them difficult to distinguish. Two Distinct Types of Processing? The thesis of this chapter is that the provocative idea in these dual-process model was an idea about function rather than processing. To be sure, these models did offer a rough distinction between effortful, careful attempts to reach judgment as contrasted with quick and dirty approaches to judgment – a contrast that is key to the functional argument already elucidated. Subsequent developments of these models generally turned to trying to build finer processing models around the two rough processing modes. In so doing, the functional argument and its research program were obscured. By moving processing to the center of a research program, researchers considerably raise the premium for their processing distinctions to be principled and well-defined. Without well-defined processes, the research program cannot move much beyond the general statement that people are often more systematic and effortful when they have more motivation and greater cognitive capacity. With processes that are well-defined a priori, process-centered research can consider more complex questions, such as how the different processes interact, whether they proceed in parallel, and whether one process can affect the other (e.g., Chaiken, et al., 1989). Unfortunately, the broad processing distinctions of these dual-process model are generally not sufficiently principled to serve as processing models. The processing distinctions do not stand up to the kind of test that would be required in cognitive psychology, where a processing distinction requires both strong theoretical justification and strong empirical support (i.e., in the form of dissociations). Even with empirical support, which of several related distinctions is the right one to make is an important topic of debate. To take one example, Tulving proposed distinguishing episodic memory (memory for specific events) from semantic memory (factual knowledge). Despite its descriptive utility, whether this distinction is tenable has been debated on various grounds, both empirical and theoretical (Tulving, 1984, and commentaries; Schachter & Tulving, 1994). The broad dualprocess model in social psychology generally do not meet this kind of standard. How were dual-process model developed from the rough distinction between quick and dirty approaches to judgment versus careful and effortful approaches? First, the algorithmic/heuristic distinction was largely used as metaphor. Most social judgment tasks have no normative baselines for correct judgment, and thus no algorithmic approaches to guarantee correct judgment; all judgment approaches are heuristic. Therefore, dual-process model in social psychology generally eschew the term algorithm , and instead use other more relative terms, such as systematic , to contrast with heuristic .11 One Versus Many Items of Information. Three basic tactics have been used to transform the two rough problemsolving modes into models with two different processes. One tactic is to distinguish between judgment that relies on one item of information (or very few items) as contrasted with judgment that relies on a much broader set of information. When judgment is based on one

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Page 300 Table 18.1: The Function-centered versus Process-centered Research Programs. Functional Research Program Process Research ProgramMain QuestionA why question: Why do people show certain systemic biases?A when question: Which type of processing do perceivers use, under what circumstances? (Also, how do different types of processing interact?)Role of ‘‘Heuristics”The endpoint of the research is to determine whether some bias is (being used as) a heuristic (i.e., is being used as a proxy for more optimal judgment strategies).Heuristics are considered a type of processing; classification of an effect as heuristic processing is a priori. The research goal is to see when people use that heuristic.Functional AnalysisThe research aims to determine what function is being served by a particular bias: Is it a side effect of efficient strategies in the service of accuracy (rational), or is the bias in the service of some other function (nonrational)?In cognitive psychology and much social cognition work, accuracy is assumed to be the function of judgment. ---------------- Later social cognition work also attempts to examine whether people also use heuristic processing in the service of other functions. (To be meaningful, this requires a clear a priori definition of heuristic processing.)Main Research Conclusion from Studies DiscussedA variety of social biases sometimes serve the rational function of knowledge and accuracy (e.g., source likeability effects on persuasion, audience or bandwagon effects on persuasion, and some stereotype effects on judgment).People use more effortful processing strategies when knowledge motivation is raised and they have the necessary cognitive resources. item of information, then the process leading to that judgment might be called heuristic . (A particular mechanism may also be posited for deriving the judgment, such as retrieval of a simple rule from memory [e.g., Chaiken et al, 1989], but this does not seem essential and boils down to perceivers relying on a correlation between the type of information provided and the dimension of judgment.) In contrast, the more systematic type of processing involves consideration of many items of information, as well as various processes to integrate that information. Thus, perhaps these integrative processes can distinguish the more systematic mode of processing from the heuristic mode. However, heuristic processing is then a subset of more systematic processing. That is, systematic processing includes analyzing the implication of each of multiple items of information, considering the congruence of their implications, and integrating them in various ways (perhaps by averaging them, weighing them for reliability, discarding some, or using other inferential and integrative strategies). Yet it seemed problematic to refer to a subset of processes as a different type of processing than the broader set of processes that include it. With such definitions, it seems quite odd to discuss whether these two modes proceed in parallel, interact with each other, and so on. Instead, one would be better off distinguishing the processes involved in deriving inferences from single items of information from those processes involved in integrating information. The latter might include comparative judgments, averaging, logical inference processes, and the like, as well as attributional processes and Bayesian integration. Different Types of Information . A second tactic for distinguishing two types of processing has been to hinge the processing types on two different types of information, such as source cues versus message content in persuasion. Dual-process model of persuasion have focused on distinguishing message content from other kinds of peripheral information, whether characteristics of the source (e.g., likeability, attractiveness) or message features besides content, such as a message's length (e.g.,

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Page 301 Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). For applied purposes in contexts where it is important to distinguish those types of information, such as in advertising, such models may be very useful. However, for the basic science task of distinguishing types of processing, this strategy merely shifts the burden for a principled distinction to the information typology: Can the two types of information be distinguished a priori? And if so, why should these different types of information be handled via different processes? These questions are addressed, for instance, when different perceptual modalities are involved. Thus, we expect auditory versus visual information to be processed via different mechanisms (i.e., processes), at least at the perceptual end. Even so, whether different higher-order processes are involved in processing information from different perceptual modalities is much less clear (e.g., Fodor, 1983). (Which kinds of information are processed by specialized mechanisms is also a critical issue in attempts to use evolutionary considerations to identify mental modules; e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1994.) In social psychology, the information categories are generally too loose to anchor a processing distinction. In persuasion models, for example, should a formal style of language be categorized as message content or as a peripheral cue? Should any source information, maybe related to expertise, be thought of as central or systematic rather than peripheral? This theoretical issue has remained unresolved, for example, in the heuristic-systematic model. Heuristic cues is a basic theoretical term used for the nonmessage-content features investigated empirically. Yet it has proved difficult to provide a definition that would allow one to determine a priori what is or is not a heuristic cue. In the functional reconstruction of the model, the problem proves to be illusory: There is no a priori basis for categorizing types of information as heuristic cues. Instead, determining which cues serve as heuristics (in particular contexts) is the goal of an empirical inquiry, not its prerequisite. Moreover, even with clearly distinguished types of information, the microprocesses used to process them are generally the same (e.g., memory retrieval processes, categorization processes). This makes the utility of a processing distinction questionable (see e.g., Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Instead, it would be clearer to discuss types of information directly rather than types of processing. What is gained, for example, by recasting the question “How do communicator variables interact with message variables on judgment?” into “How does heuristic processing interact with systematic processing?” Utilizing Other Processing Distinctions. A third tactic used to build two broad processing types has been to utilize other processing distinctions, such as automatic versus controlled processing, on-line versus memory-based judgment, implicit versus explicit judgment, and semantic versus episodic memory. These distinctions might serve as the basis of dual-process model. Yet it is not clear what we gain by incorporating these distinctions into a broad processing duality. (Broad processing models may need to incorporate several such distinctions, which are likely to interact to generate more than two simple types of processing.12) For the current argument, the central point is that the attempt to mate the broad processing modes with other processing distinctions obscures the functional nature of heuristics. For example, using the distinction between automatic and controlled processing (a distinction that may be overly simplistic; e.g., Bargh, 1989), Chaiken et al. (1989) argued that heuristic processing is more like automatic processing than is systematic processing. This buries the functional argument considerably and shifts the meaning of the basic terms. Although heuristics must be relatively easy, they are also strategic and thus generally not truly automatic (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Of course, often-used strategies may become proceduralized and automatized. But once they can no longer be controlled strategically, the word “heuristic” may describe them poorly. Two Processing Strategies? Possibly, these tactics could be combined to distinguish between two gross processing strategies . For example, imagine that (a) certain specific types of information (vs. other types), (b) are more often used as the sole bases of judgments, without perceivers considering and integrating additional information. Perhaps, also, (c) these quick judgments are more likely to be reached using specific processes (e.g., memory-based vs. online processes, implicit vs. explicit processes). Empirical findings of this sort, regarding specific types of information (e.g., sex or age), would be quite important and might provide grounds for distinguishing between heuristic versus systematic (or stereotypic vs. individuated) processing strategies. However, establishing such empirical regularities would require quite different experimental strategies (such as systematically sampling different types of information) than are common in the dual process literature. Importantly, this is a different level of analysis than processes. A variety of questions that apply to processes do not seem meaningful regarding processing strategies (e.g., Do they proceed serially or in parallel? How/when do they interact?). Unfortunately, in discussing types of processing, the dual process literature often shifts between these levels of analysis. As a result, the meaning of the term heuristics has been doubly confused: First,

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Page 302 the functional implications are usually ignored. Second, the term has been used intermittently to refer to a broad processing strategy and also to a process that could interact with other processes. In summary, the two broad judgment modes of early models serve fairly well to make a functional argument. However, the broad judgment modes do not serve as well for delineating two types of processing (see also Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).13 Heuristic is a functional description of how people use some type of information, implying that moderately diagnostic information is serving as a heuristic, rather than serving some non-rational function. In its original usage, a heuristic is not a type of process, but rather describes what some process is being used for. We may choose to use the term in another way, but unacknowledged slippage in the usage of a critical term is problematic. Heuristics, Stereotypes, and Individuating Information The basic argument just outlined also generally applies to dual-process model of stereotyping. The functional reconstruction focuses on the implications of these models for an old issue in stereotyping: Do (negative) stereotypes serve nasty outgroup derogation goals (in the service of self-esteem, associated with ingroup-outgroup distinctions) or do they serve as rational heuristics? This is our functional question again. Several models apply the basic dual-mode idea to stereotyping (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Chaiken et al., 1989; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Although details differ, the general structure is similar, and presentations generally focus on distinguishing between processes rather than between functions. These dual-process model of stereotypes are also generally pitched quite broadly. Like the distinction between source cues and message content, a broad distinction between stereotypic versus individuating information is too fuzzy to undergird a processing distinction. Is a student's college major categorical or individuating information? How about sexual orientation? Any type of individuating information can serve as a basis for categorizing and stereotyping people (see Smith & Zarate, 1992). Thus, while a broad distinction between group membership and individuating information is useful for many purposes, it will not support the basic-science task of distinguishing qualitatively different processes in a simple way (see Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Liberman, et al., 1998). Some narrower distinctions seem more principled in this regard. For example, one might argue that a certain limited set of person categories is basic (a la Rosch et al., 1976), or that certain categories (perhaps, sex) are used at a more primitive stage in impression formation or have a more central place in person memory. If so, different processes might operate on this information. An evolutionary approach to stereotyping might also try to build such a distinction, focusing on biologically important characteristics such as age (see Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998). But in each case, only specific types of person categories – and not person categories per se – would engage processes different than those used for individuating information. The process models would be narrow. Instead, successful process models involving stereotyping will involve activation and inhibition processes (see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998), memory retrieval versus on-line judgment (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986), dynamic processes such as how early preliminary judgments guide information search (Sherman, chap. 11, this volume), and other processes (e.g., Blair, chap. 22, this volume; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume; Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). But many of the microprocesses involved seem relevant both to the use of grouprelated as well as more individuated information (Liberman et al., 1998). (Fiske and Pavelchak's (1986) model of category-based versus piecemeal judgment may be principled in this regard, if construed as turning on memorybased versus on-line judgment.) Whether broad dual-process model of stereotyping succeed as process models, their functional implication that stereotype use is (sometimes) rational rather than nonrational has been appreciated, sometimes to the consternation of stereotype researchers (e.g., Fiske et al., 1991). Of course, as Allport (1954) pointed out long ago, some stereotypes may serve one function while others serve another. Most important, the dual-mode (really, the triplemode) idea, when applied to stereotypes, suggests that this is not merely a philosophical or ideological argument. An empirical approach can be used to map which particular stereotypes do and do not serve as rationally driven heuristics, and in what contexts. Dualprocess model of stereotyping make an important contribution by focusing empirical inquiry on this long-standing issue. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS In summary, the broad dual-process model that emerged around 1980 carried many of the concerns that now dominate social cognition, both concerning processing and function or motivation. The processing concerns of these models were explicit. Two decades later, the processing types they

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Page 303 distinguished no longer seem principled enough in processing terms. Finer processing mechanisms are the focus of much current social cognition work. Whether a broadly conceived dual process model can be built from them is unclear. I suspect that no single bifurcation will do justice to the complex processing picture that is currently emerging. The ambitious early attempt to map broad categories of information (or input) onto broad types of processing also foreshadowed a large theme of contemporary social cognition research. The task of mapping types of social information onto the cognitive processes that utilize them is currently underway in a great deal of research. For example, current research on stereotypes asks which features spontaneously evoke person categories, and when – and which – stereotypic information is processed in more implicit rather than explicit fashion. The emerging story is both more subtle and more complex than would have been predicted even in 1990. The functional arguments of dual-process model, I have argued, were more implicit. One attraction of these models was their implicit extension of rationality to a variety of social influences and biases. In addition, these models generated an empirical research agenda exploring these functional implications. That research suggests that a variety of social influences on judgment – including consensus, communicator likeability, and some stereotypes – may result at times from perceivers‘ strategic attempts to use these factors to acquire accurate knowledge, rather than simply reflecting the intrusion of other social motives on judgment and belief. This functional message of early dual-process model was left implicit in much of the early research inspired by those models. To appreciate these implications, therefore, requires reconstructing those dual-process model in functional terms, redefining basic terms, and reinterpreting empirical investigations. The issue of rationality is just one of the functional issues that has emerged again and again, in different guises, throughout the development of social cognition. Once functional issues are seen as broadly relevant and not restricted to individual differences, one begins to see functional issues lurking behind a great deal of social cognition. On the surface, the 1980s were largely marked by a focus on cognition, with little reference to motivation or functions, but I have attempted to show that functional issues remained implicit in some of that work. By 1990, the interrelationship of motivation and cognition moved to center stage (e.g., Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996), and concern with attitude function has reemerged (e.g., Gastil, 1992; Maio & Olson, 1995; Murray, Haddock, & Zanna, 1996; Pratkanis, Breckler, & Greenwald, 1989; Shavitt et al., 1994). As we enter the second century of social psychology, concern with motivation and function seem poised to reemerge as a dominant concern of social cognition. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the National Institute of Justice. The extensive comments of Len Newman, Doug Hazlewood, and Jeff Sherman are gratefully acknowledged. ENDNOTES 1. Although this work is often described as being about attitude functions, the ideas were meant to apply to opinions and judgments more generally, back when the domain suggested by the term attitudes encompassed much of what we now call social cognition . 2. In this chapter, I reserve the term heuristic for its initial meaning implying a rational goal of accurate knowledge, and I avoid using the term for easy approaches to serving other functions. 3. Some studies obtain thought listings and other such process measures, but their theoretical role is very similar, albeit assessed within rather than between people (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; but cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 4. Considerable empirical and theoretical work concerns which particular involvement manipulations raise which motives, but these distinctions are beyond the scope of this chapter (see e.g., Johnson & Eagly, 1989, 1990; Lieppe & Elkin, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). 5. The Bayesian argument would seem to conflict with this general interpretive framework. At the heart of the Bayesian argument is that when multiple (say, two) cues to a judgment are each somewhat diagnostic, but one is considerably more reliable than the other, then the best judgment is not abandonment of the less reliable in favor of the more reliable, but usage of both, in combination. Lay Bayesians, then, should not abandon the heuristic under high motivation, but rather should integrate both judgment bases. However, most work on lay judgment has found that people are not generally Bayesian in this sense, and often only use inferior bases of judgment as proxies or heuristics (Kahneman et al., 1982).

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Page 304 6. Despite the similarity between the HSM and Petty and Cacioppo's (1981, 1986a, 1986b) elaboration likelihood model (ELM), I apply the functional reconstruction explicitly to the HSM but not the ELM, even while considering their empirical studies equivalently. To my reading, the main difference between the two models is the central theoretical idea around which they were developed. The HSM's central theoretical idea concerns heuristics – the topic of this chapter's functional reconstruction. In contrast, the ELM's central theoretical idea concerns recipients' elaboration of a message. Thus, the ELM's central route to persuasion is via processing of message content and the thoughts stimulated by that content. The goal of understanding how a message's content exerts its persuasive impact emerged from attempts to distinguish whether message effects were mediated primarily by relatively passive reception of message content or primarily by the recipient's relatively active cognitive responses to that content (Greenwald, 1968; McGuire, 1969, 1985; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). To model message effects, nonmessage effects also need to be considered. In the ELM, these were termed the peripheral route to persuasion. Noncontentbased heuristics were included in this peripheral route, but were not focal. Thus, as illustrated by the study of message length just discussed, a functional reconstruction centered on the question of whether persuasion effects are heuristic seems less appropriate for the ELM. 7. Interestingly, the basic design for instigating heuristic use is a two-way rather than three-way motivation design. Why this asymmetry? The ability design takes the absence of a bias as a baseline and tries to instigate it by interfering with a more difficult route to judgment. If the bias appears, we can infer fairly straightforwardly that subjects are using the bias as a proxy for that more difficult route. In contrast, the motivation design takes a bias as the baseline and tries to eliminate it. To infer from subjects' abandonment of the bias that they were using it as a proxy for a more difficult basis for judgment, we must provide – and vary – that alternative bias and find the compensatory pattern. 8. This is essentially Trope's (1986) reasoning about two opposite ways in which situational information can affect dispositional inference. Situations can disambiguate behavior so as to increase dispositional inference, and yet the discounting of situational influences can serve to decrease dispositional inference. With two such opposed effects, Trope argued, researchers' inattention to either effect can frustrate their attempts to investigate the other. 9. How we interpret a study with this design depends heavily on whether the message is ambiguous – in the sense of being highly consistent with multiple interpretations – or merely non-diagnostic (see Trope, 1986). Thus, in contrast to my interpretation above, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) interpreted the results with their mixed message as reflecting just such an expectancy effect with an ambiguous message. However, to my reading, the message seems more mixed and nondiagnostic than ambiguous. Subjects' thought listings showed a source credibility effect, supporting their interpretation. Yet subjects' ratings of message strength were not affected by source credibility, as should mediate expectancy effects. 10. Trope and Liberman (1996) recently offered a theoretical account in which bias and accuracy are not at odds even in principle. Many others portray the pursuit of particular conclusions (i.e., biases) as in conflict with accuracystriving (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Kruglanski, 1989; Baumeister & Newman, 1993; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 11. Note that the problem-solving distinction is not a process distinction. For example, the availability heuristic (Kahneman et al., 1982) is not a process, but instead indicates how a memorial process is used heuristically to allow people to make judgements about relative frequency. 12. For some narrower dual-process model, the process distinctions may be principled. Yet the functional implications may also be clear. For example, Trope and Liberman (1993) proposed a dual process approach to the correspondence bias, in which dispositional inference results from use of a particular heuristic, pseudodiagnosticity. If correct, one implication of such an explanation for the correspondence bias is that it is rational, rather than serving some nonrational function. 13. In a recent target article in Psychological Inquiry , Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) presented a single-route persuasion model. Developed simultaneous with and completely independent of this chapter, they offer a related critique of dual-process model of persuasion but without reference to any sort of functional reconstruction.

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Page 305 Part IV. Control Over Cognition and Action

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Page 307 19 The Crossroads of Affect and Cognition: Counterfactuals as Compensatory Cognition Neal J. Roese Simon Fraser University The opposition of emotion and rational thought is perhaps one of the oldest dichotomies invoked to explain the vagaries of human behavior. Capricious acts become scrutable when observers can attribute divergent extremes of action to momentary victories by opposing psychological forces. Probably for this reason, the placement of passion and rational thought in a state of tension served many thinkers well in their quest to understand human nature. Hume (1740/1985) wrote that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’’ (p. 462). On the other hand, observers from Plato to Freud believed it imperative for reason to command the passions in order to avoid wreck and ruin. This depiction of tension served academic psychologists well through the early decades of the 20th century.1 The view was appended from the 1960s onward by the notion that cognition is a necessary component for the subjective experience of emotion. Appearing in the 1980s was the more complex view that emotion may be a crucial linchpin in the generation of those cognitions that are essential for successful social functioning. Thus, the activation of cognitions relating to assessment, explanation, and planning may be directly instigated by negative affect; deficits in emotional functioning may impair social problem solving. The goal of this chapter is to consider these views not as contradictory theses but, as sequential developments toward a more complex yet satisfactory understanding of the interface between affect, cognition, and social functioning. Considered are two pathways through which affect can mobilize or demobilize cognition. Throughout the discussion, counterfactual thinking assumes a central position as a particularly clear example of compensatory cognition. Affect and Cognition in Tension A tug of war between emotion and reason was an essential component of Freud's theorizing (e.g., 1920, 1923/1960). To him, emotion was the more basic, primary control mechanism, although a simple one. A crude homeostatic rule (termed the pleasure principle ) governed behavior to the extent that pleasure was sought and pain was avoided. This control mechanism was capable of steering simple organisms to success under many circumstances, but situated within the complexity of human civilization, it could often be “inefficient and even highly dangerous” (Freud, 1920, p. 278). Reason, therefore, exerted a controlling force over emotion, such that it “demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction…” (p. 278). For example, drives toward instant gustatory and sexual gratification may lead to theft or rape. Such low-level passions, with potentially dangerous consequences for the individual and society as a whole, are restrained by the opposing forces of reason. This view echoes through much of Western literature: Impulsivity, lack of self-control, and submission to passion have been depicted, in works such as Hamlet and Macbeth, for example, as roads to ruin. Without appropriate rational restraint, unbridled passion could lead to self-destruction (Ellis, 1994). By contrast, Rousseau's Social Contract, the Romantic movement in 19th century art and literature, and 1960s North American hippie culture exalted the primacy of affect as the pathway to enlightenment, creativity, and healthy living. Regardless of which pole was deemed superior, these various perspectives were erected on a foundation that separated affect and cognition as polar opposites. Such a view continues to play a role in psychology, particularly in light of advances in neuroanatomy. Basic emotions have been linked in part to the limbic system – a structure functionally and anatomically distinct from the frontal neocortex, the seat of considering, deciding, and planning. To some, the distinction between emotion and reason is further reified by functional analyses of brain anatomy (see LeDoux, 1995).

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Page 308 Cognition as Determinant of Affect Beginning in the 1960s, work by Stanley Schachter stimulated the view that cognition may be a key determinant of emotional experience. According to this view, internal signals such as physiological arousal are interpreted cognitively in various ways; the content of the interpretation then dictates the unique timbre of the resultant emotional experience (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Thus, subjective construal was posited to be the key determinant of affect. An illustrative example is misattribution, in which an essentially incorrect inference determines an emotional experience. Although caused directly by a hot cup of espresso, for example, a teenager on a first date might attribute her beating heart to the emotion of love (White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981). This attribution process is rapid and implicit: Observers may label it inferential error, but to the young lover the emotions are palpable, real, and utterly inescapable. Subsequent models were aimed at specifying the full range of human emotional experience by pointing to the dimensional structure of explanations coupled to nonspecific physiological arousal (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993; Clore, 1994; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Thus, for example, explanations varying in terms of internal versus external attributions or construal of others' underlying motivations could account for a diverse range of felt emotions. A prominent offshoot of this view was the linkage of goal perceptions to affect: “only the recognition that we have something to gain or lose, that is, that the outcome of a transaction is relevant to goals and wellbeing, generates an emotion” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 354; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). This general perspective – that human emotion depends crucially and essentially on higher order cognition – dominated theoretical work on affect and cognition throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. Bernard Weiner (1985) elaborated these ideas further by devising a classification scheme for the various attributions, or causal explanations, that individuals derive from social experience. He then linked this scheme to specific kinds of emotions. For example, anger derives from the attribution of a negative behavior to causes that are internal, stable, and controllable. Sympathy, in contrast, may apply to the exact same behavior if the attribution centers on a cause that was uncontrollable rather than controllable. A key component of Weiner's model was his separation of affect into two types: one that is attribution-dependent, and thus embraces the full range of human emotions in the Schachterian theoretical sense, and another that is attribution-independent. This latter type of emotion was viewed as nonspecific yet valenced. It was construed as an initial positive or negative gut reaction to a social event, with the observation that negative gut reactions trigger attributional thinking in the first place. This assertion is central to this chapter and is considered from several theoretic vantage points. Neuropsychological research has pointed to a similar distinction between a “quick-and-dirty subcortical pathway” involving the thalamus and amygdala, through which rapid responses to dangerous stimuli are effected, and a cortical pathway, by which sensory information receives detailed but slower appraisal involving higher cognitions (LeDoux, 1995, p. 223; see also Izard, 1993; LeDoux & Scherer, 1987; Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). Although many of the uniquely human emotional experiences, such as love and hate and glee and angst, are dependent on specific cognitions, research in this period also documented the reverse causal relation – that of affect on cognitions of specific content. For example, negative moods might incite motivational impulsion to restore a positive mood (i.e., mood repair), unleashing a variety of self-serving attributions and inferences (Taylor & Brown, 1988). A desire to avoid unpleasant feelings of regret that might derive from possible inept actions in the future influences ongoing decision making (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). Through strictly cognitive mechanisms, mood may also influence attributions (Forgas, Moylan & Bower, 1990), creativity (Isen, 1993), stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1993), and forecasts for the future (Forgas & Moylan, 1987). Finally, emotion may lead to biased recall and reconstruction of the past (Bower, 1981; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). These various demonstrations of the impact of affect on cognition center on specific directional judgments; the focus of this chapter, however, is on the broader role of affect in mobilizing the gears and pulleys of cognitive judgment in the first place. This process is considered in the next section. Affect as Component of Cognitive Process In the last 20 years, a rather different view of the relation between emotion and reason has emerged. This view is based not on opposition, but rather on reciprocal process yoked to the same functional goal. In this light, emotion is construed as a precursor to successful problem-solving cognitions. Without emotion, decision making falters and behavior grows inept. Emotion and reason operate together in a symphony, their voices and movements interlocking at various levels to achieve a gestalt functionality that explains human behavior in its daily effectiveness. As biologist Edward Wilson (1998)

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Page 309 summarized, “Emotion is not just a perturbation of reason, but a vital part of it’’ (p. 106). Here we are dealing with a class of thinking that I will call compensatory cognitions. These are specific inferences designed to correct a problem, remediate a mishap, and right the course of ongoing action. These are thoughts central to what might be construed as social navigation. Just as mariners steer clear of stormy weather but also actively maintain and even regain control when stormy seas are unavoidable, compensatory cognitions are invoked to help individuals steer clear of social debacles. A child new to baseball misses her swing at bat but then thinks to herself, probably implicitly: Swing sooner! My grandmother thinks, quite explicitly but alas too late: I should have left my husband sooner! My colleague down the hallway, attempting to predict and remediate the future, admonishes me: Go up for tenure as late as possible! These thoughts, be they focused on the past or the present, are inherently goal-oriented, centering on the means by which key personal desires, wants, and necessities may be strategically sought and achieved. Compensatory cognitions are ignited by negative affect. Depressed, dysphoric, angered, and anxious mood states unleash them, setting into motion processes aimed at remediation (see also Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). That negative affect activates compensatory cognitions is echoed through numerous recent writings by social cognition theorists – most notably Klaus Fiedler (1988), Norbert Schwarz (1990) and Shelley Taylor (1991). Frijda (1988) argued that: “emotions exist for the sake of signaling states of the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer need response and action” (p. 354). Diverse implications of this view have spread through clinical psychology (Nesse, 1991), neuropsychology (Damasio, 1994), and even organizational behavior (Sitkin, 1992). My goal is to tie together some of these implications by way of a specification of distinct pathways by which affect might trigger compensatory cognitions. Three types of compensatory cognitions are considered here. This list is not exhaustive, yet it embraces many of those cognitions assessed in social cognition research. Causal Attributions. These cognitions are aimed at explaining the causes of events and behaviors (Kelley, 1972b). As Weiner (1985) noted: “once a cause or causes are assigned, effective management may be possible” (p. 548). Indeed, it is axiomatic for the enterprises of science, engineering, and medicine that specification of underlying causal processes (as opposed to mere symptoms) confers the power to manipulate and control the natural world, for better or worse. Although the functional consequences of attributions were essential to the seminal theorizing of Heider (1958) and Kelley (1972b), empirical assessments of functional effects of attribution came much later. For example, attributions can be retrained to be more accurate and thus efficacious as part of psychotherapeutic intervention (Försterling, 1985). Failure attributed to unstable and controllable causes rather than stable and uncontrollable causes inflates perceptions of personal control, heightens persistence on tasks, and betters performance (Perry & Penner, 1989; Wilson & Linville, 1985). Moreover, observers judge attributors who are more accurate to also be more likeable, suggesting interpersonal benefits of insightful attributions (Försterling & Rudolph, 1988). These findings suggest two paths by which attributions influence performance: a biased path, in which positive illusions involving inflated perceptions of self-efficacy unleash greater task persistence (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and an unbiased path, in which more accurate attributions confer heightened knowledge of situational contingencies, producing more strategically efficacious social functioning (Försterling, 1994). Counterfactual Thoughts. These are cognitions that depict alternatives to past events (Roese, 1997). These are often determinants of causal inferences (Wells & Gavanski, 1989) or even proxies for causal conclusions (Simon & Rescher, 1966): A photographer trailing Princess Diana moments before her death in an automobile was convinced that had he not been trailing the Mercedes on his scooter, the accident would still have occurred – his counterfactual specification of this alternative version of events amounted to a short-hand, conversational espousal of his blamelessness and hence causal disconnection from the accident (but see also Spellman & Mandel, 1999). Experimental manipulations of counterfactual thinking produce improvements in performance on simple tasks (Roese, 1994). Such effects may be due to the impact of counterfactual thinking on causal inference (Wells & Gavanski, 1989), on perceptions of control and self-efficacy (Nasco & Marsh, 1999), or on self-motivating musings of better possible futures (Taylor & Pham, 1996). Plans. Plans derive from a mix of expectancies and intentions, each of which has received prominent attention in social psychology. Unlike the first two classes of cognitions, these thoughts focus on the future rather than on the past. Expectancies are inferences regarding the likelihood of occurrence of a future event, whereas intention refers to a specific decision to perform some behavior in the future (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). Intentions usually relate to an expectancy that the intended behavior has some utility. More specifically, intentions may refer to the decision to work toward a

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Page 310 specific goal (i.e., goal intentions) as well as the selection of specific acts designed to bring about the goal (i.e., implementation intentions, see Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Causal attributions and counterfactual thinking have been shown to influence expectancies and intentions (Roese, 1994; Weiner, 1985), but expectancies and intentions also influence causal and counterfactual thinking (Sanna & Turley, 1996; Weiner, 1985). Of course, not all causal attributions, counterfactuals, or plans are corrective – many are utterly useless. Yet for present purposes I assume that some subset of these cognitions are sufficient to aid action. The scope of the present analysis embraces all of these compensatory cognitions, but most of the specific examples center on counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thoughts offer a particularly clear pipeline into the mechanics of compensatory cognition, as their very essence is situated inherently within the cognitive manipulation of goals. In most instances, counterfactuals are representations of unobtained goals – of what not only might have been, but what should have been and what was intended to have been. What was the last “if only” thought you had? Most likely it was that you should have taken the garbage out before the cat got to it, that you should have sent your mother's day card off earlier, that you should have remembered to get an oil change sooner – you probably did not muse on what your life would be like without gravity or with eight arms. Counterfactual thoughts adhere to the goals and concerns central to everyday life. Compensatory Cognitions and Goals Contemporary understanding of compensatory cognitions in general, and counterfactual cognitions in particular, traces its roots to the computational theorizing that ignited the cognitive revolution in the 1950s. Specifically, attempts to model both computer program function and human cognitive function in terms of information processing centered in part on conceptual descriptions of control, goals, and action. One seminal project was Newell and Simon's (1964) conceptual programming device designed to achieve varieties of goals. At its core was the meansend analysis – a feedback loop based on comparisons of actual states to goal states: The problem is defined by specifying the given situation (A) and a desired situation (B). A discrimination process incorporated in the system of means-end analysis compares A with B, and detects one or more differences (D) between them, if there are any. With each difference, there is associated in memory a set of operators (Op), or processes, that are possibly relevant to removing differences of that kind. The means-end analysis program proceeds to try to remove the difference by applying, in turn, the relevant operators (Simon & Newell, 1964, p. 295; italics in original). Similarly, the TOTE (test-operate-test-exit) sequence was specified by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) in their seminal analysis of the cognitive underpinnings of goals. These ideas formed the basis for more elaborate socialcognitive models of human action (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990b; Gray, 1994). A comparison process between an actual state and an unobtained (and hence counterfactual) goal state form the essence of these operations; a search then ensues for actions that might have been performed to have facilitated goal realization. Inferences gleaned from this analysis are then channeled into scripts for future action, action intended to reduce the discrepancy between the actual and the counterfactual. The essential argument here is that negative affect triggers these problem-solving cognitions (see Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume, for application of these ideas to prejudice reduction). However, if there is a failure to experience negative affect to its full extent, these compensatory cognitions are not activated, or at least insufficiently activated such that decision making will appear to be relatively less effective. Suggestive Evidence The importance of affect for decision making has been illuminated by research on brain-injured patients for whom affect is apparently impaired. The crossroads of affect and compensatory cognition seem to be centered in the prefrontal cortex, particularly the dorsolateral region. Damage to this area produces a syndrome of deficits that have the paradoxical form of extreme social dysfunction coupled with relatively intact raw cognitive ability (Saver & Damasio, 1991). In other words, patients seem inept in planning their lives, interacting with family members, and preserving their working relationships while evidencing normal competence in a range of cognitive skills (Damasio, 1994). In assessment tasks, the deficit is particularly apparent in insensitivity to longterm positive and negative consequences of current decisions (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In patients with prefrontal cortex damage, what seems to be missing is the ability to recruit the informational fruits of negative or positive affect into ongoing decision making. Although such patients can manipulate, sort, describe, and comprehend various prospects or choices, they are unable to tag them with implicit affective labels, thereby precluding a relatively rapid and

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Page 311 effortless rank-based decision process. Without affect integrated to compensatory cognition, such patients wallow in endless indecision. Global deficits in compensatory cognitions, from counterfactual simulation to planning of future behaviors, are the measurable result (Knight & Grabowecky, 1995). Considered in the next section are further specifications to the channel through which affect aids social functioning. TWO PATHWAYS FROM AFFECT TO COMPENSATORY COGNITION Inferential Pathway This first pathway centers on the impact of affect on compensatory cognitions by way of intervening inferences. Schwarz (1990) argued that affective experience may generate brief or even implicit questions and answers centering on “how do I feel about it?” That is, affect may suggest information that may then lead to specific inferences, which then activate compensatory cognitions. Negative affect may suggest to the individual that all is not well, and this specific inference may trigger ameliorative thought processes (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For example, individuals undergoing a positive mood induction may infer that a current task has progressed satisfactorily, leading them to terminate the task. Individuals in a negative mood may infer from their affective state that progress on their current task is unsatisfactory, resulting in their continued persistence (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993). In general, past research has shown that individuals engage in inferential calculus aimed at interpreting and even correcting for experienced emotion in light of its informational value (Bem, 1972; Olson & Roese, 1995). Martin et al. (1993) presented a compelling demonstration of this basic logic – one rooted to the idea that the same affective experience might suggest different conclusions as a function of the nature of a currently active goal. Participants were placed in either happy or sad moods, but, in addition, completed tasks according to one of two rather different goals: one centering on task enjoyment and the other on task quality. That is, participants were instructed to terminate the task when it was no longer enjoyable versus when it was deemed to be satisfactorily completed. In the case of a task enjoyment goal, a positive mood provides information that the task is indeed being enjoyed, thereby increasing task persistence. By contrast, in the case of a task completion goal, positive affect signals adequate achievement of the goal, thereby reducing task persistence. The findings indeed confirmed these predictions. This pattern was replicated and extended by Hirt, Melton, McDonald, and Harackiewicz (1996), who also measured goal-related inferences after the mood induction. Using path-analytic regressions, these researchers demonstrated that inferences regarding the nature of the task mediated the impact of affect on performance. Although these researchers did not measure compensatory cognitions per se, the pattern of evidence supports the argument that goal-related inferences mediate the impact of affect on compensatory cognitions. Is an inferential pathway the sole mechanism by which affect influences compensatory cognitions? In other words, if a goal-related inference is a requirement for affect to produce effects on social judgment, then ‘‘moods have few, if any, motivational or processing implications” (Martin et al., 1993, p. 317). Further, this would suggest that affect is simply one of many sources of informational input to social judgment (cf Forgas, 1995), deserving no special or separate theoretical status. The next section explores a contrary view, that affect directly influences compensatory cognition without mediating goal-oriented inferences, and thus occupies a privileged theoretical status. Noninferential Pathway A second pathway by which affect may activate compensatory cognitions is without any mediating inference (i.e., by direct activation). Rather than asking “how do I feel about it?” at some implicit level, with the answer to this question generating compensatory cognitions, this second pathway may occur without any intervening inferences deriving from the information value of affective experience. Rather, affect is wired directly to compensatory cognitions, much as a motion sensor is wired directly to an alarm: Tripping the sensor sets off the alarm via a simple, closed hard link. A related view is that affect determines processing style, with negative mood inducing a systematic and positive mood inducing a heuristic style of thinking. The key feature of these various conceptions is that affect influences cognitive process independently of content-based inferences. Evidence for such a pathway is preliminary and hampered to an extent by its reliance on an affirmation of a null hypothesis (i.e., that intermediary inferences do not play a role in the content of specific cognitive responses). One recent experiment tested the hypothesis that mood manipulations can influence the mere activation of compensatory cognitions (Sinnett et al., 1998). Induction of negative mood resulted in heightened accessibility of self-relevant goals, and this effect was greater for individuals high in emotional clarity. Along these same lines,

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Page 312 negative affect activates self-relevant counterfactual thinking in which the particular content of such thoughts varies widely (Roese & Hur, 1997). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the mere process of counterfactual generation can be primed independently of its inferential content (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). In addition, the assertion of an unmediated pathway derives some support from the classification of different human brain regions, such as the frontal neocortex and the limbic system, according to both their anatomical and functional significance (Pinker, 1997): These systems work in tandem, integrated by many twoway connections. The amygdala houses the main circuits that color our experience with emotions. It receives not just simple signals (such as of loud noises) from the lower stations of the brain, but abstract, complex information from the brain's highest centers. The amygdala in turn sends signals to virtually every other part of the brain, including the decision-making circuitry of the frontal lobes (pp. 371372). Negative affect evoked within the limbic system provides a simple signal, as in a burglar alarm, that problems are afoot, automatically activating via direct neural pathways the compensatory cognitions processed by the frontal neocortex. Finally, related evidence emerges from examination of the thought processes of depressed individuals. Because such individuals experience chronic dysphoria, they may experience a heightened activation of compensatory cognitions. The notion that under some circumstances depressed individuals may be more accurate or even more rational than nondepresssed individuals was a recurrent theme throughout the 1980s (Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988). For example, Yost and Weary (1996) showed that depressed individuals processed social information more systematically than nondepressed individuals. Depressed individuals evidence hyperactivation of counterfactual thoughts and also thoughts regarding personal control (Markman & Weary, 1997), which in turn may bring about desires to erect and facilitate goals for future action. However, it would be a vast mistake to presume that such effects confer success in everyday life. Rather, these individuals may be experiencing an overdose of compensatory cognition. That is, normal inhibition or shutdown of compensatory cognitions may have ceased, such that dysphoric individuals persist at or ruminate on goals long after any potential benefits have been exhausted. A dysthymic patient might waste an entire lunch hour waiting in a long line at the bank, abandoning the goal of banking only after she is terribly late for work (see Kramer, 1993, p. 170). In normally functioning individuals, compensatory cognitions are mobilized by negative affect, but are rapidly shut down after they are no longer needed (Taylor, 1991). Evidence bearing on the hyperactivation of compensatory cognitions by depressed individuals, those chronically experiencing negative affect, lends some support to the notion of a direct pathway from affect to cognition. This view would lead to the related prediction that chronic depletion or flattening of affect results in the hypoactivation of compensatory cognitions. Such is the focus of the next section. FURTHER EVIDENCE Counterfactual Thinking and Schizophrenia Schizophrenia offers yet another avenue by which the relation between affect and compensatory cognitions may be probed. We have seen that increased negative affect may result in the hyperactivation of compensatory cognitions. Further evidence would take the form of hypoactivation of compensatory cognition, where the machinery responsible for negative affect is broken. That is, dysfunction in the basic experience of affect may interfere with the activation of compensatory cognition, producing corresponding detriment to social behavior. The subcategory of schizophrenia marked by flattened affective experience provides the opportunity for further testing of these ideas. To the extent that schizophrenic patients experience negative symptoms – blunted affect and/or inappropriate displays of affect – they may also experience chronic disruptions in counterfactual thinking. In these individuals, something very basic about the mere experience of emotion is disordered. If we assume that the fruits of compensatory cognition in general, and counterfactual thinking in particular, are brought online by negative affect, then individuals for whom affect has been flattened may be far less adept at mentally manipulating counterfactuals and drawing useful conclusions from counterfactuals. These ideas are all the more intriguing given that an alternative hypothesis seems just as plausible at first glance. That is, one might assume counterfactual thinking to be relatively hyperactive in schizophrenic patients. After all, counterfactuals are fictional mental constructions: By definition, they are fantasy events that most definitely did not occur. And a key feature of schizophrenia is the mental generation of fictional events – delusions and confabulation – along with an inability to discriminate between these and reality (Marengo, Har-

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Page 313 row, & Edell, 1993). A preliminary study tested these ideas by examining responses to counterfactual-tinged questions among schizophrenic patients and casematched controls (Hooker, Roese, & Park, in press). In this study, the principal measure of counterfactual thinking was the counterfactual inference test (CIT), an instrument designed by the authors especially for use among clinical populations. The CIT contains four tracheotomize questions derived from the social-psychological literature on counterfactual thinking. Each question described two individuals experiencing similar events. One of the two events was intended to evoke a more salient counterfactual alternative, either because it is relatively unusual (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) or because it came relatively closer to having happened, temporally or spatially (Kahneman & Varey, 1990). The questions were intended to tap counterfactual thinking (“Who thinks more about how X could have been avoided?”), general rumination (“Who spends more time thinking about X?”), general emotional consequences (“Who is more upset by X?”), and regret (‘‘Who regrets X more?”). All such dependent measures have been sensitive to counterfactual manipulations in the published literature (see Roese, 1997). Participants circled one of three possible responses: the name of the first individual described, the name of the second individual described, or a “same/can't tell” option. In their original forms in the counterfactual literature, 90% of respondents selected the predicted response that was associated with greater salience of a counterfactual. The findings indicate the inability of schizophrenic patients to manipulate counterfactuals in the same manner as case-matched controls or college student controls. Whereas the control participants, as in the previous published literature, selected the high counterfactual salience option (e.g., Jack is selected to be more upset after missing his train by 5 minutes more often than Ed, who missed his train by an hour) roughly 90% of the time, schizophrenics selected this option at no greater than chance levels. Of course, it is plausible that global cognitive dysfunction explains this effect: Perhaps the schizophrenic patients were mentally dysfunctional to the extent that they could perform no cognitive task as well as controls. This was not the case, however: Scores on tests of general cognitive ability and attention did not account for the variation in Counterfactual inference. However, CIT scores were correlated with the Zigler scale of general social functioning (Zigler & Levine, 1981), suggesting that deficits in counterfactual ability were related to decrements in social skills. These findings are suggestive that dysfunction in the basic experience of affect interferes with the activation of compensatory cognition, such as counterfactual thinking, and that this in turn has a detrimental effect on social behavior. Although clearly preliminary, it is nevertheless provocative to consider this demonstration as the gateway to new research avenues by which the link between affect and compensatory cognition may be explored. Counterfactuals and Regulatory Focus A more complex interplay among affect, goals, and compensatory cognition emerged from recent research linking counterfactual thinking to regulatory focus (Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999). Operating from the premise that negative affect activates counterfactual thinking, this research demonstrated that differing effects accrue as a function of two different kinds of negative affect – that resulting from a thwarted promotion goal versus that resulting from a thwarted prevention goal. According to Higgins (1997), a promotion focus centers on acquisition of positive goals – a concern with advancement, accomplishment, and realization of desired end states. It involves a sensitivity to the presence or absence of a positive end. A prevention focus, by contrast, centers on preserving an absence of unwanted occurrences. It involves a sensitivity to the presence or absence of negative ends, and hence a concern with security, protection, and maintenance of the status quo. Promotion failure versus prevention failure evoke qualitatively different affective experiences: dejection and agitation, respectively. The distinction between dejection and agitation was important as a determinant but not as a consequence of counterfactual activation. That is, although manipulations of counterfactual thinking produced no differential effects on the emotional experience of dejection versus agitation, the manipulation of dejection versus agitation differentially activated additive versus subtractive counterfactuals (Roese et al., 1999). Thus, additive counterfactuals (e.g., “If only I had studied before the exam…”) were more common in response to dejection, whereas subtractive counterfactuals (e.g., “If only I had not gone to the party the night before the exam…”) were more common in response to agitation. But why might this pattern have emerged? The answer may lie in the notion that dejection and agitation might send different signals to the individual regarding the nature of particular kinds of goal failure, with counterfactuals constructed strategically to confront these kinds of failure. Indeed, the kinds of causal conclusions expressed by the counterfactuals varied according to their functional effectiveness in confronting failures of promotion versus failures of prevention (Roese et al., 1999, Experiment 2).

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Page 314 Counterfactual additions were typically used by participants to express causal sufficiency, whereas counterfactual subtractions were more often used to express causal necessity. Sufficiency is more parsimoniously expedient for reaching promotion goals because one need specify only one action that facilitates goal attainment. By contrast, understanding necessity would not be as useful because such causes may not be enough, in and of themselves, to bring about that desired goal. Nevertheless, an understanding of necessity is more parsimonious for reaching prevention goals. With necessity information, the required avenue by which a negative outcome occurs may be eliminated, thereby effectively preventing the outcome's occurrence. An understanding of sufficiency would not be as useful in this case because removing one sufficient cause cannot preclude the operation of other causes that are sufficient to bring about that same undesired outcome. An example may clarify this pattern. If Hannibal has the goal of reaching Rome, and all roads lead to Rome, then he can locate any road to find himself soon in Rome – no further search for roads is needed. In contrast, an understanding of necessity is less parsimonious for fulfilling promotion goals. A food supply is necessary for the journey to Rome (without it, Hannibal will starve along the way), but food by itself will not bring Hannibal to Rome. That is, even when necessity has been identified, a search for further procedural information may be required to achieve the promotion goal. However, if Hannibal has the goal of avoiding an avalanche, but avalanchescan only be suffered while traveling through mountains, then Hannibal need only bypass mountains to circumvent the danger of avalanches – no search for further causal information is required. Sufficiency, however, is of lesser utility for the fulfillment of such a prevention goal. Once in the Alps, a loud noise may be sufficient to trigger an avalanche, but refraining from noisemaking will hardly prevent an avalanche; an earthquake might as easily unleash an avalanche even as Hannibal remains utterly silent. This pattern of results is compatible with the inferential pathway described previously, in that dejection and agitation imply divergent informational inferences regarding goal blockage. Dejection signals promotion failure, whereas agitation signals prevention failure (see Schwarz & Clore, 1996). However, some have argued that cognitions regarding promotion and prevention are localized in anatomically distinct brain regions (Gray, 1994), suggesting the possibility that the noninferential pathway might also underlie these findings. The experiments in Roese et al. (1999) were clearly not designed to distinguish between these possibilities, yet future social cognition research more closely aligned with the cognitive neurosciences may offer answers to what are here presented merely as possibilities. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: AFFECT AND COMPENSATORY COGNITION This chapter explored a variety of ways that affect is related to compensatory cognition. Historically, the traditional view of affect and cognition coexisting in a state of oppositional tension was first supplanted by the view that cognition is an important determinant of cognition. Of interest here was the more recent view that affect is a determinant of cognition, but one that operates not only as an influence on specific directional inferences, but also as an initial trigger of a class of thinking labeled compensatory cognitions. I reviewed two pathways by which affect might act as a precursor to compensatory cognitions: an inferential and a noninferential pathway. To conclude, I consider several conceptual directions for future theory that tackle the interface between affect and compensatory cognition. Loop Versus Linear Process Social cognition theorists have relied, to a large extent, on process models that are inherently linear: Step 1 leads to Step 2 leads to Step 3, and so on. Such models are intuitively appealing, in part, because they are easy to grasp and because they take on the narrative structure of a traditional story. In the classical narrative The Iliad, the abduction of Helen by Paris led to the attack by the Greeks on Troy, which led to 10 years of battle climaxed by the slaying of Hector by Achilles, followed by the incursion into Troy with the ruse of the gigantic wooden horse, through which the Greeks achieved final victory over Troy (Rieu, 1950). Thus, in the traditional narrative, one event leads to another and each is described in the order in which it occurred. Twentieth-century literature, however, has sometimes experimented with nonlinear forms. In Joseph Heller's (1961) Catch-22, a novel that pokes fun at military bureaucracy, it is not just that the beginning is the end of the story, but that the entire sequential structure has been scrambled. Events are strung together not temporally but semantically. Yossarian, standing completely nude, accepts the Distinguished Flying Cross from General Dreedle. Although Yossarian claims simply that he does not want to wear clothes, Captain Wren offers the ludicrous explanation that “a man was killed in his plane over Avignon last week and bled all over his clothes” (p. 228). The Avignon mission, however, is described in detail in the novel

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Page 315 in the very next chapter (as well as in several other points, including the harrowing climactic chapter), but in the novel's real time, the Avignon mission precedes the nude medal presentation by 1 week – and according to Wren, of course, Yossarian is not wearing clothes because of what happened over Avignon. Human consciousness operates similarly: We remember the past and plan the future in fits and starts, darting here and there, blasting from one concept to another, linking ideas based on their semantic content rather than their temporal relation. Johnson and Sherman (1990) hinted at how a nonlinear view of cognitive process could be incorporated into social cognition: Past, present, and future fold backward and forward like Japanese Origami. They collapse onto each other, emerge from each other, and constantly determine each other, as we construct and reconstruct both past and future in the present (p. 482).2 An important offshoot of this notion is that future theorists may refrain from constructing theories specifying that X causes Y, and then at a much later time generate a new theory and a new publication to state that Y also causes X. Rather, the prospect of reciprocal causation ought to be apparent from the start (McGuire, 1973). Several current models of affect attempt to explain the sources of emotional experience by pointing to cognitive antecedents, such as goals, progress toward goals, or inferences regarding goals (Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1990a; Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Lazarus, 1991). These models are sometimes described in an exclusionary, monocausal manner – as if the story ends with the answer to “what causes affect?” As the present review shows, it is overly simplistic to explain the origins of affect by pointing to goals, because goals may be triggered by affect in the first place. And affect is obviously multiply determined – certainly by goals and inferences, but also by food, weather, and Prozac, to name just a few. But the essential point is that the debate regarding the primacy of affect or cognition is now moot: ‘‘Because the goals and means are woven into a multiply nested control structure of subgoals within subgoals within subgoals, no sharp line divides thinking from feeling, nor does thinking inevitably precede feeling or vice versa [notwithstanding the century of debate within psychology over which comes first]” (Pinker, 1997, pp. 373374). With models of reciprocal causation, of internested process loops, social-cognitive theory becomes more powerful when it references both activation and inhibition as dual-control mechanisms (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). As we move toward a view of the mind as one of interconnected components, affect and cognition will be viewed as equal-status units, reciprocally influencing each other and jointly operating within a larger gestalt whole. Thinking Is for Doing The interest in goals as conceptual substrates for theories of social cognition will likely continue to expand because goals are essential to Fiske's (1992) recent restatement of William James' dictum that thinking is for doing (see also Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999). Social cognition has the power to provide a truly global grasp of the mind by chaining specific processes to their functional consequences (e.g., Liberman, chap. 18, this volume). In the same way that anatomical structures in plants and animals may be understood by biologists in terms of their functional raison d'être, human cognition is best understood by framing theory by the global situations in which humans find themselves: assessing and explaining negative events, negotiating resources with others, and planning future actions relating to social relationships. One offshoot of assumptions of pragmatic social cognition is a move away from endless catalogs of inferential biases toward a deeper understanding of how social cognition operates effectively much of the time. For example, one can approach counterfactual thinking from the angle of decision making theorists and point to the biased judgments of satisfaction as a function of contrasts to specific counterfactual anchors (Mellers et al., 1997). But bias and function are perhaps two sides of the same coin. Although satisfaction may be deflected by counterfactual anchors, those same anchors feed into a cascade of inferences that enable individuals to learn from mistakes and make better decisions the next time (Roese, 1999). As many have noted, it is difficult to define “accuracy” within the social arena in any meaningful manner (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Nevertheless, it is usually possible to define performance increments in relative terms. If relatively more measurable gain accrues with rather than without a specific inference, then a meaningful theoretical conclusion has been reached. CODA The opposition of passion and reason is a view deeply entrenched in the philosophy and literature of Western civilization. Freud's major influence on theoretical psychology continues to be his detailed specification of the explicit and implicit tensions between passion and reason. It would be wrong to disavow this perspective completely; it describes with alacrity the conflicts that many of us experience daily (I may crave pepperoni

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Page 316 pizzas, but I know I will be dead from atherosclerosis in 20 years if I devour them without restraint…). A metaphorically similar tension is now reflected in recent theory on implicit attitudes and stereotypes: Implicit disliking of a social group might be restrained by explicit liking (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Nevertheless, the view of tension was supplanted in the 1960s and 1970s by a more detailed exposition of the impact of cognitions on affect, specifying a linear process model by which cognitions assume priority. Although the impact of affect on specific directional cognitions, such as self-serving biases, stereotypes, and forecasts was also documented at the same time, only more recently have theorists argued that affect in and of itself may mobilize compensatory cognitions. The present chapter detailed some particular pathways by which negative affect mobilizes attributions, counterfactuals, and plans, but the intention was not to specify yet another linear causal pathway. Rather, affect and cognition are not specifiable in terms of linear sequence or causal priority: They are reciprocally interconnected and deeply interwoven into a complex tapestry of mind and action. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project was completed while I was supported by National Institute of Mental Health FIRST grant MH55578. I thank Galen Bodenhausen, Wendi Gardner, Christine Hooker, and Kim Quinn for their helpful criticisms and witticisms. ENDNOTES 1. The present discussion relies on a generic definition of affect, without any differentiation between different kinds, such as emotion versus mood. This was done to avoid an odd bit of circularity in previous writings. Emotion has been defined as an affective state explicitly related to object appraisal, whereas mood involves no such appraisal (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). If a research program restricts itself to studying emotions and then demonstrates that they depend necessarily on cognition, the result is a tautology: What has been demonstrated is the definition itself. 2. Sorrentino and Higgins (1986) made a similar point in relating motivation to cognition. In their case, the Möbius strip of Escher's graphic artistry played the same metaphorical role as Johnson and Sherman's (1990) origami.

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Page 317 20 Goals and the Compatibility Principle in Attitudes, Judgment, and Choice C. Miguel Brendl INSEAD, Fontainebleau Most theories of social cognition share the assumption that the basic modules from which behavior emerges are mental representations. Consequently, much research has focused on the properties of individual mental representations, such as their level of activation (accessibility) or the degree to which they share associations with other representations. The current chapter discusses another fundamental principle involving mental representations. The relations between different mental representations may be as important for the prediction of behavior as the property of each single mental representation. This chapter hypothesizes that goals may play a central role in determining these relations. Consider Example (a): (a) Experimental participants look at a pair of dim light bulbs, one right one left, and are to press one of a pair of reaction time buttons, one right one left, as soon as one bulb lights up. They respond faster when they may press the right button for a right side light than for a left side light. In this example, stimulus and response correspond by both being on the right side; as a result, the response is facilitated compared to them being on opposite sides. More generally, compatibility compared with incompatibility between side of stimulus and side of response facilitates responding. As is suggested in greater detail later, the following examples may also be instances of a more general principle of compatibility between stimuli and goals. (b) People are more concerned about the amount of money that they could win in a gamble when asked for how much money they would sell their right to play the gamble than when deciding which one of two gambles to play. (c) People weight positive information more when deciding which politician to vote for than when deciding whom not to vote for. (d) People weight positive behavior more heavily than negative behavior when they judge the ability of others, but vice versa when they judge their morality. (e) People are more persuaded by a positive than by a negative message frame when they decide about using sunscreen lotion, but vice versa when considering getting a mammogram. Examples (c) to (e) involve responses to positive and negative stimuli. These types of stimuli are weighted to different degrees into an overall judgment (c and d), and this may impact responding. The persuasiveness of a stimulus – here a message – depends on a behavior depending on whether it is framed positively or negatively (e). It is suggested that these effects stem from how well the stimuli correspond, or are compatible to, the goal driving the response. We call this form of compatibility goal compatibility. Stimuli and goals are mental representations. The better the correspondence between these representations, the larger the assimilative impact of the stimulus on the response. Here assimilative means that the stimulus pulls the response in its direction on a dimension of positive versus negative valence. For example, negative information is weighted heavier into a decision to reject than to accept a job candidate because negative information corresponds better to a reject decision. Compatibility effects of the kind described in Example (a) are extremely powerful and robust. Yet this principle has received surprisingly little attention in social psychology. The goal of this chapter is to review findings suggesting that the principle of compatibility underlies a number of framing effects and positive-negative asymmetries in judgment and choice (Examples [b] to [e]). To date these phenomena have been considered as independent of each other. A second theme of the chapter is to introduce the concept of compatibility of stimuli to goals.

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Page 318 COMPATIBILITY IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF PSYCHOLOGY Compatibility in Perception and Motor Performance Students of perception and motor performance refer to compatibility as stimulus-response compatibility (S-R compatibility). “The term S-R compatibility (Fitts & Seeger, 1953) is commonly used to describe the extent to which the ensemble of stimulus and response combinations comprising a task result in a high rate of information transfer” (Simon, 1990, p. 31). The research area of stimulus-response compatibility (for overviews, see Hommel & Prinz, 1997; Proctor & Reeve, 1990) was originated by Fitts and colleagues (Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Fitts & Seeger, 1953). Working with perceptual-motor tasks, they recognized that task performance was generally affected by how well a response corresponded to a stimulus display. Correspondence is not formally defined, but in typical experiments one can expect unanimous agreement on which conditions are compatible versus incompatible to a response. Let us use the Simon Effect (e.g., Simon, 1990) as an example. In Simon and Small (1969), participants were to press a left versus right key as fast as possible when they heard a high versus low pitch tone, respectively. Thus, tone pitch served as a response signal. However, when participants heard either tone in the left ear, they reacted faster when tone pitch signaled a left versus a right response, vice versa for hearing a tone on the right side. Thus, participants could not help but process the information about which side the tone signal came from, although this information was task irrelevant. Only tone pitch was relevant. When the sides implied by tone pitch and tone location mismatched, reactions were slowed down (Simon, 1990).1 According to Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and Osman (1990) SR compatibility effects arise when the irrelevant stimulus dimension, the relevant stimulus dimension (i.e., the signaling stimulus dimension), or both have dimensional overlap with the response dimension, where dimensional overlap refers to commonalities, similarities, or correspondences. Similarly, compatibility has been defined in terms of feature overlap of stimulus and response dimensions (Hommel, 1997). Kornblum et al. (1990) explained S-R compatibility effects by assuming that dimensional overlap leads to an automatic (in the sense of involuntary) activation of a response program and to a nonautomatic activation of a response confirmation program that checks whether the automatically activated response matches the response required by the task instructions. A mismatch requires additional processing time due to stopping the activated response process and initiating a new one. This model bears an interesting similarity to a dominant model of stereotyping (e.g., Devine, 1989; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume). According to this model, stereotypes are activated automatically, but their effects on behavior are controlled by nonautomatic processes. In both models, a stimulus activates a concept (either a motor program or a stereotype) automatically, and it is only through effortful processes that the effects of this activation on behavior can be inhibited. Other accounts of S-R compatibility assume that incompatible compared with compatible mappings of stimuli to responses involve additional translation steps (e.g., Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Hommel, 1997). Not surprisingly S-R compatibility effects do not arise between stimulus and response as such, but between mental representations of these. More surprising, however, it is not the representation of the physical movements that is involved. This was shown by having participants rest their fingers on the response keys in choice reaction time experiments with crossed or uncrossed arms (e.g., reaching for the left key with right or left hand). Fast reactions were determined by correspondence of stimulus location and response key (e.g., both left), not by location of stimulus and hand (Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 1970; Wallace, 1971). The same results were obtained when participants pressed their two response keys not by crossing their arms, but by crossing chopsticks that they held (Riggio, Gawryszewski, & Umilta, 1986). Even more surprising, it is also not the representation of the response (e.g., pressing the left key with either hand or a stick) that is involved in S-R compatibility. According to Hommel (1997), the intended effect of an action drives S-R compatibility. This intended effect could be pressing the key, but it could also be an event that is caused by pressing the key. Intended effects have to be perceptible, so they could involve bodily perceptions (e.g., the pressure on one's finger) or perceptions of events in one's environment (e.g., a light turning on). Consider the following evidence for this notion of intended response effects (also reviewed in Hommel, 1997; Prinz, 1998). Participants responded to a tone by turning a steering wheel to the right or left holding it on its bottom half (Guiard, 1983). Note that when the top of the steering wheel is turned right, as if one turns a car right, the hands holding the wheel's bottom move to the left. Reactions were faster when the side of the tone and the direction in which the top of the steering wheel turned were the same rather than opposite, not when the direction in which the hands moved were the same rather than opposite. Thus, the

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Page 319 effect the hands had on the movement of the steering wheel mattered for S-R compatibility, not the movement direction of the hands. Another experiment highlights the role of intention (Hommel, 1993, Experiment 1). In a Simon task, like the one described earlier, participants pressed a right or left key in response to a high-versus low-pitched tone. Again, the tone originated on the left or right side. In addition, pressing a key on one side (e.g., left) caused the flashing of a light on the opposite side (e.g., right). One condition consisted of “classic instructions”: Press the left-hand key after hearing the low-pitched tone and press the right-hand key after hearing the high-pitched tone. As expected from previous research, when the tone pitch called for pressing, for example, the left key, response times were faster when the tone originated on the left than when it originated on the right. Now consider the following novel instructions that reversed the classic Simon Effect: Produce the right-hand light following the low-pitched tone and produce the left-hand light following the high-pitched tone. When the tone pitch called for producing the left light (by pressing the right key), response times were faster when the tone originated on the left than when it originated on the right. In summary, it was compatibility between location of sound and intended effect (e.g., light) that produced the Simon Effect, not compatibility between location of sound and location of response. This section concludes that S-R compatibility effects are not driven by compatibilities of stimuli to responses, but instead by compatibilities of stimuli to intended effects of responses. Hommel (1997) suggested that the mental representation of a motor response (e.g., move right index finger) is linked back to the mental representations of its intended effects (e.g., turn on left light). The latter in turn is linked back to mental representations of stimuli that define the conditions of responding (e.g., high tone pitch). Because of the linked representations of intended effects and stimuli, an intended effect can also activate representations of task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions. For example, if the intended effect is to turn on a light on the left, then leftness is a feature that is part of the representation of the intended effect, and the mental representation of the stimulus dimension left versus right is activated and receives additional attention. In the prior Simon task, the side on which the tone originates is task irrelevant. However, because of the additional attention the side dimension receives, side of origin of a tone originating on the left instead of the right is processed. This processing slows down reactions possibly because the (wrong) left side response program is activated and needs to be inhibited. Thus, an intended effect of a response determines which stimulus dimensions (e.g., left-right, loud-soft, high-low) cause compatibility effects. The case is now made that “intended effects of actions” are, in fact, a specific instance of goals. Therefore, this research suggests that compatibility of stimuli to goals should affect behavior in domains outside of reaction time tasks. Further, this research suggests that goals determine which stimulus features facilitate or inhibit responses on the basis of compatibility relations. This generalization from S-R compatibility is labeled goal compatibility. Compatibility in Judgment and Decision Making The perceptual-motor tasks discussed in the previous section can also be viewed as simple choice tasks. A person needs to choose between turning on a light on the left or right side. Thus, the previous research suggests that compatibility effects of stimuli to responses (or goals) could also affect choices other than in reaction time experiments. In fact, there is strong evidence for this assumption. In judgment and decision making (i.e., preference choices; for a review, see Shafir, 1995), the principle of compatibility was recognized early on by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968). They assumed that a compatibility relation between choice options (stimuli) and response types affects choices. For example, consider the now classic preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971), which was replicated in a Las Vegas casino with real betting (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973). Bets either offered a high probability of winning a small amount of money (now called probability bets ) or they offered a low probability of winning a large amount of money (now called $ bets ). There were also two kinds of responses called choice and pricing. In choice, participants chose between either playing a probability bet or a $ bet. Most participants preferred the probability bet. In pricing, participants were granted the right to play a single gamble and then asked for how much money they would sell this right. Participants asked for more money to sell $ bets than probability bets, although the bets were identical to the ones in the choice task. Thus, in choice, people preferred probability bets to $ bets, whereas they had the opposite preference in pricing. The authors concluded: “The overdependence on payoff cues (i.e., the dollar dimension) in pricing a gamble suggests a general hypothesis that the compatibility or commensurability between a cue dimension and the required response will affect the importance of the cue in determining the response” (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973,

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Page 320 p. 20; parentheses added). In other words, because the response of determining the dollar value of a single bet involves dollars but the response of choosing between two bets does not, the stimulus dimension involving dollars (i.e., the amount of dollars a gamble can win) is weighted heavier in pricing than in choice. This explanation assumes that a stimulus dimension is more compatible to a response if the response involves the same dimension (e.g., dollars) as the stimulus dimension. Currently, a more formal theory of determining compatibility relations is lacking. Subsequent research investigated two potential sources of compatibility effects in decision making; scale compatibility and strategy compatibility (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Scale compatibility assumes that the weight of an input component (a stimulus dimension) is enhanced by its compatibility with the output (a response mode). Two sets of reasons are assumed to underlie this effect: (a) In the case of noncompatibility, additional mental operations are assumed to reduce the impact of a stimulus on a response; (b) A certain response mode may prime or draw attention to the compatible features of a stimulus (Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Thus, scale compatibility is a close analogy to models of S-R compatibility in perceptual-motor tasks, which assume that the compatibility relations to stimuli are determined by the response. Again, a theory of what makes stimuli compatible is currently lacking, but there are cases where there is high agreement based on intuition that some stimulus-response combinations are more compatible than others (cf. Slovic et al., 1990). For example, participants were presented with two pieces of information for each of a series of companies: Their rank in terms of 1987 profitability and the 1986 market value measured in shares (dollars). Participants were then asked to predict 1987 market values, either by ranking the companies or by estimating their market values in dollars. When responding in terms of ranks, ranking information was weighted heavier into the judgment than dollar information and vice versa when responding in dollars. The stimulus that was more compatible (or similar) to the response dimension had more impact on the response. A similar effect was obtained in predicting academic performance in terms of letter grades versus class ranks. Consider now the second source of compatibility effects discussed – namely, strategy compatibility. As an example, let us look at a phenomenon called prominence effect . Participants read about two applicants for a production engineer position: One is superior to the other in technical knowledge but inferior in human relations (Tversky et al., 1988, Problem 1). Participants did one of two tasks. For the matching task, one attribute of one applicant was not fixed, and participants needed to determine its value such that both options appear equally preferable. For the choice task, participants simply picked between the two applicants. According to the prominence hypothesis, participants should weigh the more important or (prominent) attribute (i.e., technical knowledge) heavier in a choice response than in a matching response. This is exactly what happened. The authors suggested that this effect is due to compatibility as well. Specifically, they suggested that when making a choice response, people base their decision only on the more important of the two attributes, choosing the option with the better value on the important attribute. This requires only ordinal – better versus worse – information to be considered. When making a matching response, however, it is inherent to the task that both attributes – technical knowledge and human relations – need to be compared on one quantitative dimension because one dimension needs to be traded off for the other. For example, a certain degree of skill in human relations needs to be equalized with a certain degree of superiority in technical knowledge. Therefore, quantitative considerations are more compatible with a matching response and weigh heavier in matching than in choice. In contrast, ordinal considerations are more compatible with a choice response and weigh heavier in choice than in matching. Fischer and Hawkins (1993) pitted predictions for scale and strategy compatibility against each other and found strong evidence for strategy compatibility and little evidence for scale compatibility. Although other studies find strong evidence for scale compatibility, these results suggest that, just as in S-R compatibility effects in perceptualmotor tasks, compatibility may not arise between the stimulus and response. In the present examples, responses are associated with choice strategies and, information that is more compatible with a given strategy is weighted heavier. Thus, the compatibility relation between stimuli and response is indirect because it is mediated by choice strategies. Fischer and Hawkins' (1993) participants compared two choice options on a scale ranging from strongly prefer A to strongly prefer B . This response is interesting because participants need to make an ordinal (i.e., qualitative) response as in choice by using a quantitative response scale as in pricing. The preferences elicited by this scale were virtually identical to the ones elicited by a choice task, but different from the ones elicited by a matching task. This finding suggests that the difference between choice and matching is not due to using an ordinal versus a quantitative response scale. It is again consistent with the idea of mental representations at

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Page 321 earlier processing stages rather than the representation of the response being the critical feature driving S-R compatibility effects. As yet another form of S-R compatibility in judgment and choice, Tversky et al. (1988) also pointed out that compatibility effects can be induced by semantic correspondence between the required response and the stimulus material. As an example they cited research on judgments of similarity. According to the Contrast Model of similarity judgments (Tversky, 1977), the similarity of two objects increases with the salience of the features they both have in common and decreases with the salience of the features that are unique to each object. Compatibility suggests that when the task requires judging similarities, people should weight common features more than unique features, whereas when the task is judging differences, people should weight unique features more than common features. Accordingly, more than half of the participants in a group judging similarities rated West and East Germany to be more similar than Ceylon2 and Nepal, whereas more than half of the participants in a group judging differences rated West and East Germany to be more different than Ceylon and Nepal (Tversky, 1977). Participants knew more common and unique features for the first pair than for the second pair. Presumably, due to compatibility between type of judgment and type of feature, similarity judgments weight common features more heavily and difference judgments weight unique features more heavily. This results in the paradox of one pair of objects being both more similar and more different than another pair depending on whether similarity or difference is being judged. The previous section concluded that compatibility effects do not arise between stimulus features and response representations. The research finding of much stronger evidence for strategy compatibility than for scale compatibility is consistent with this view (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). The hypothesis that compatibility effects are often driven by goal-stimuli relations is consistent with the prior evidence. Responses that could as well be conceived as goals were, for example, choosing between two bets versus evaluating the selling price of a bet or making a similarity versus a difference judgment. For example, subjects may have had the goal to choose, the goal to set a selling price, and so on. Although this evidence does not favor a goal interpretation over a response interpretation, it is consistent with both. However, a pure response interpretation is difficult to reconcile with evidence for strategy compatibility. As we see later, it is also possible to conceive of strategies as goals, albeit this being a post hoc interpretation. Next, we discuss unique evidence for the goal interpretation in decision making. Compatibility in Evaluative Judgments In social psychology, the role of compatibility was discovered as part of accentuation theory (Tajfel, 1959).3 A Accentuation theory assumes that when differences between a number of objects are judged on some physical Dimension I, differences on the physical dimension are accentuated when another irrelevant Dimension II is superimposed on the physical Dimension I, such that Dimension II is correlated with Dimension I. For example, in Tajfel and Wilkes (1963), participants judged the length of each of eight individually presented lines of different lengths (I). Each line was labeled either with a letter A or B (II). When the four shorter lines were labeled A and the four longer lines were labeled B , the difference in estimated lengths between the “border lines’’, (i.e., the longest line of the short set of lines and the shortest line of the long set of lines) was larger than when the letters were assigned randomly to the lines.4 The link of accentuation theory to compatibility was made by replacing the physical dimension by another evaluative dimension and applying accentuation to attitudes and social judgment (Eiser & van der Pligt, 1988; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972). When there are two evaluative dimensions, they can be compatible or incompatible to each other. Consider an experiment by Eiser and Mowrer White (1974), in which children read 10 statements about adult authority that were presumably made by several other children. Half of the statements were in favor and half were opposed to adult authority. Children were divided into groups according to their attitude toward adult authority. Thus, adult authority constituted an evaluative dimension that for some children was anchored positively at the pro-authority end and for others at the contra-authority end. The participants' task was to make trait ratings for each statement on bipolar scales (e.g., adventurous-unadventurous, impatient-patient) of the kind of person who had made the particular statement. All of the trait ratings were clearly evaluative constituting the second evaluative dimension of this experiment. The trait rating scales were arranged such that their positive endpoint was either matched to the pro-authoritarian statements or contra-authoritarian statements. For example, on the rating scales, either the positive trait (e.g., patient) implied pro-authoritarianism and the negative trait (e.g., impatient) implied contraauthoritarian or, vice versa, the negative trait (e.g., unadventurous) implied pro-authoritarianism and the positive trait (e.g., adventurous) implied contra-authoritarian.

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Page 322 Whether the two evaluative dimensions were congruent (i.e., compatible) or incongruent depended on the child's attitude toward authoritarianism. Consistent with the predictions from accentuation theory, participants' trait ratings of the children showed larger differences between children who made pro- versus contra-statements when the trait rating scales were evaluatively congruent with their own evaluations than when they were incongruent (for related experiments, see Eiser & Mowrer White, 1975; Eiser & van der Pligt, 1982). Presumably, when an evaluative dimension, such as one's own liking/disliking of statements about authoritarianism, is superimposed on another evaluative dimension on which judgments are made, such as unlikeable to likeable traits, judgments on the relevant evaluative dimension are accentuated by the irrelevant evaluative dimension if both dimensions are compatible. Here compatibility is established by equal polarity of both evaluative dimensions. Note the superimposed evaluative dimension has this effect, although it is irrelevant for the judgment at hand. This is the most surprising part of these findings. Whether I like a given statement a person made about authoritarianism is irrelevant for determining the “true” trait level of that person, even when the judged trait is related to authoritarianism. These findings suggest that when a goal is to make an evaluative judgment, evaluative stimulus dimensions that are irrelevant will accentuate the judgment if both stimulus dimensions are equally poled.5 The Compatibility Principle We have reviewed compatibility phenomena in three different domains: in choice reaction time experiments (perceptual-motor tasks), preference choices, and evaluative judgments. In all three domains, two important questions evolved: (a) Which factor determines which stimulus dimensions cause compatibility effects? (b) How are compatibility effects mediated? The evidence in the domains of perceptual-motor tasks and preference choices suggests that it is not the response that determines which stimulus dimensions are involved in compatibility effects. Rather, mental representations preceding the response stage appear to determine which stimulus dimensions or features have compatibility relations (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Guiard, 1983; Hommel, 1997). In many cases, goals may constitute such a preceding mental representation. Even if compatibility relations arise between goals and certain stimulus features, it is not self-evident why these relations would affect the response. Several types of explanations have been offered, and they potentially apply to all three domains in which compatibility effects were found. A late-stage representation (of the response, task instructions, or goal) may prime representations of stimulus features in memory (e.g., left, money). Perceived stimulus features that map onto (are compatible with) these features receive additional weight in the overall percept. In judgment, this suffices to explain heavier weighting of these features. In reaction time tasks additional assumptions are necessary. This view would be consistent with already discussed explanations for compatibility effects in perceptual-motor tasks (Hommel, 1997; Kornblum et al., 1990) and in judgment and decision tasks (Tversky et al., 1988). It would also be consistent with a connectionistic model, the BIAS model, capable of explaining accentuation effects in evaluative judgments (Fiedler, 1996). An additional principle by which compatibility relations could unfold their effects is by requiring additional mental transformations or information processing stages as a result of goal-incompatible stimulus features having been activated. This would slow down reactions (Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Hommel, 1997; Kornblum et al., 1990), increase effort and error, and reduce confidence and impact in judgements and choice (Tversky et al., 1988). According to Tversky et al. (1988), the compatibility principle consists of an enhancement of the weight of any input component by its compatibility with the output. Note that this conceptualization of compatibility effects allows application to judgments. Although the sources of compatibility are poorly understood, in all three domains, the same source is assumed – that is, some notion of feature overlap, similarity, or correlation between a late-stage representation and stimulus features. In concluding this section, I would like to remind of the evidence showing that in perceptual-motor tasks compatibility effects are not driven by stimulus compatibility to responses, but instead by stimulus compatibility to intended effects of actions. The next section elaborates why intended effects of actions are an instance of goals and why these results therefore suggest that goals may often be at the heart of compatibility effects. Goals For explaining how individuals guide their behavior in the environment, the concept of goals has proved useful. Goals are representational structures, and thus cognitive objects, but they are also motivational structures. We discuss both properties of goals. Goals have been conceptualized as representational structures by cybernetic theories (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990a; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), which

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Page 323 explain behavior regulation in terms of feedback loops, sometimes additionally in terms of feedforward loops. Loops include two important elements: a reference value and movement of the organism either toward (i.e., approach) or away from (i.e., avoidance) the reference value. Approach is regulated by negative feedback loops because they decrease the distance to a positive reference value. An example is the well-known TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) model, which posits that the individual compares – that is, tests – the desired state of the world (e.g., a nail hammered into the wall) continuously with the actual state of the world (e.g., a nail sticking out from the wall) and acts or operates to reduce the discrepancy of these states (i.e., hit with the hammer) until the desired state of the world is reached. Avoidance is regulated by positive feedback loops because they increase the distance to a negatively valenced reference value (e.g., avoiding to touch a hot stove; Carver & Scheier, 1990b). In this chapter, when referring to goals, we subsume both the direction of movement (i.e., approach or avoidance) and the reference value. I call the reference value the end state of the goal . Direction of movement and end states can be conceptualized on various levels of abstraction. For example, on a very abstract level, the end state may be a positive self-evaluation. On a medium level, the higher level might be served by an end state of performing well in a psychology experiment. On a very specific level, the latter end state might be served by an end state specifying a physical event (e.g., switching on a light quickly in a Simon task). The level of abstraction of an end state is central for a number of theories of behavior regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990a; Hoppe, 1931; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Miller et al., 1960; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Powers, 1973; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). Classic cybernetic theories divide an action into levels of superand subordinate feedback loops that each regulate increasingly specific segments of an action. The theory of action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987) argues that higher levels of action identification reflect why one engages in an action, and lower levels of action identification reflect how one engages in an action (see also Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). In other words, superordinate goals provide significance for subordinate goals, and subordinate goals provide the instructions for what to do in order reach superordinate goals. Subordinate goals serve as tools and strategies for superordinate goals. Accordingly, action identification theory proposes that people can identify the same action at different levels of abstraction. For example, a phone conversation might be identified as exchanging gossip until the transmission quality turns poorly, at which point one may identify one's action as making oneself understood (by speaking loudly). Note that by some authors only reference values at a medium level of abstraction are termed goals. Reference values at higher levels of abstraction may be termed needs, values, or motives (Geen, 1995). I am not aware of evidence that would allow us to identify different functions in compatibility effects for different abstraction levels of goal-type concepts. Therefore, for simplicity, all levels of abstraction of reference values in behavior regulation are termed goals unless otherwise noted. In the future, however, it may turn out that level of abstraction needs to be taken into account when explaining compatibility effects. In cybernetic tradition, I also refer to end states in a most general way by subsuming in them intentions, physiological needs (e.g., hunger as negative end state), or chronic general values (e.g., fairness). All of the previously noted features can be conceptualized in purely cognitive terms. However, goals also have motivational features to which we now turn. Lewin (1926) made a number of assumptions that are still highly influential today. He assumed that intended actions (i.e., goals) were grounded in higher level intentions (e.g., a hoped for job) or in needs. Intention (i.e., will) to reach a goal creates a quasi-need – a state of tension that has the same properties as a physical need but results from setting a goal. Events that satisfy the goal are then a means to satisfy the quasi-need, and this way they gain positive valence and draw attention to them even when we are not aware of the goal. Thus, goals create positive and negative valence because they divide events into ones that support goal pursuit and ones that interfere with goal pursuit (cf. Brendl & Higgins, 1996). Also, goals can automatically activate associated mental representations and this way, as Lewin anticipated, aid the organism in noticing good opportunities to execute a previously activated goal (Bargh, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1993). His example is unintentionally noticing all mail boxes on the street when we want to drop a letter. Once the letter is dropped mail boxes escape our attention. Tension persists over a long time until the goal is reached (e.g., the letter is mailed), at which point the quasi-need is satisfied and the tension discharged. Today this still seems to be a valid point to distinguish motivationally laden from purely cognitive representations. The accessibility of a recently activated cognitive representation, for example, decays over time (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). Consistent with the motivational tension hypothesis, participants more often took up an activity on their own free will when they had previously been interrupted at this activity before reach-

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Page 324 ing their goal than when they had reached their goal (Ovsiankina, 1928) and memory for interrupted tasks was better than for uninterrupted tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927). Atkinson and Birch (1970) took Lewin's assumption one step further by assuming that a motivational tendency that is not being acted on even increases in strength over time. Recently, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, & Barndollar (1997, Experiment 2) provided evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Let us summarize the features of goals that are of relevance for the discussion of compatibility of stimuli to goals. Goal-like mental representations are organized hierarchically in means-end relationships. A goal specifies an end state. This end state can be abstract, such as forming an impression of another person, or it can specify a concrete event in the environment, such as turning on a light. A wish differs from a goal in terms of the effort a person is willing to apply to a goal (Geen, 1995). Goals can become or remain active, for example, as a result of the active higher order goals or needs, an intention, or an interrupted goal pursuit. Goals can activate relevant mental representations – that is, goals can serve as primes (see also Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). Note that this section on characteristics of goals is far from comprehensive, but rather focused on the compatibility question. Goal Compatibility The compatibility principle introduced earlier now leads us to the hypothesis that goal compatibility is an important determinant of social cognition. A goal can prime stimulus representations, and these activated representations subsequently affect perception of stimuli. Importantly, as the findings reviewed earlier reveal, compatibility not only affects speed of responding, but leads to an increased weighting or impact of these representations on one's judgment and choice. Perceived (external or internal) information that is compatible/incompatible with an active goal facilitates and/or impedes the intended behavior. At the same time, perceived information is weighted heavier into a judgment when it is more compatible with a goal active during the judgment. The subjective value one places on an object or target person affects the decision to choose a particular object or the judgments made regarding that person. Brendl and Higgins (1996) posited that the subjective value of an object is affected by the perceived degree to which an object supports a currently active goal. The compatibility of the object to the currently active goal could determine perceived goal-supportiveness, and therefore perceived subjective value where compatibility would not necessarily increase objective goal supportiveness. As in the accounts discussed previously, compatibility could increase merely as a result of degree of feature overlap, similarity, or typicality of an object to a goal. In Brendl, Markman, Messner, and Higgins (in preparation), participants rated the likelihood of betting $25 at a casino as higher, the less similar the physical format of these $25 were to cash. Note that the goal at a casino is to maximize cash. The likelihood of betting was highest for gambling chips, intermediate for a cash voucher, and lowest for cash presumably because of increasing subjective value of these objects due to increasing compatibility to the underlying goal. In another study, Brendl et al. replicated this finding on two levels of compatibility (cash and gambling tickets) with real choices. On the grounds of conversational norms (Hilton, 1995), one might argue that the likelihood of gambling was increased because gambling chips and gambling tickets have the purpose of gambling, and so people gamble more with them. However, in a related experiment, participants judged the likelihood of gambling as higher when someone would risk a previously won winnings-check rather than previously won cash (Brendl, Markman, & Higgins, 1998). If anything, a winnings-check's purpose would be to save it rather than use it for gambling, suggesting that conversational norms cannot account for these results. Another study provides further evidence that it is the compatibility of objects to active goals rather than to responses that affects subjective value. In a field experiment (Brendl, et al., in preparation), participants indicated how much money they would pay for a lottery ticket that could win a prize of $1,000. We varied the active goal by carrying out the study in two types of locations: a university bursar's office, where participants were about to pay bills, versus several university cafeterias. Thus, the goal of paying a bill was more active at the bursar than at the cafeterias. We also varied the compatibility of winning the lottery prize (stimulus) to the goal. Winning a bill waiver was more compatible with the goal of paying bills than winning a cash award. Participants at the bursar were willing to pay more for a lottery ticket that could win a bill-waiver than were participants at cafeterias. Demonstrating a reversal of preference, participants at the bursar were willing to pay less for a lottery ticket that could win a cash award than were participants at cafeterias. Thus, the lottery ticket seemed more valuable when it was more compatible with the currently active goal, although the objective value of each lottery ticket was identical. When the stimulus – here a $1,000 prize – was more compatible with the

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Page 325 currently active goal, it had more weight in judging the value of a lottery ticket. Note that this result is consistent with the hypothesis of compatibility of stimuli to goals, but it is difficult to account for in terms of compatibility of stimuli to responses. The responses were identical at the bursar and at the cafeterias. What presumably differed at these locations was the activation of the goal of paying a bill. However, this study can be criticized because the goal activation level was not experimentally manipulated. Therefore, we conceptually replicated this study by manipulating a goal concept experimentally. In this study (Brendl et al., in preparation), goal activation was manipulated through the strength of a need. We examined habitual smokers in Germany. After long lecture classes, smokers typically congregate outside the classroom to smoke a cigarette. Presumably these students have a goal to smoke a cigarette in part because they have a physiological need for nicotine and in part because there is a social norm to smoke after class. Thus, we can reasonably expect students to have the goal to smoke a cigarette after class. Students who just had a long (smoke-free) class were either asked to participate in our study before or after they had their post-class cigarette. That is, these students were smoke deprived versus satisfied, respectively. To indirectly assess the strength of the need to smoke at the outset of the experiment, as their first task the students were shown a scale with pictures of 14 cigarettes ranging in length. Smoke-satisfied participants judged a real cigarette to be shorter than smoke-deprived participants, confirming a difference in smoking need. Subsequently, participants were offered the opportunity to buy lottery tickets worth about 15 cents each. They could purchase as many tickets as they wanted. Subjects were told that the lottery consisted of a drawing of tickets on a specific day (at least 9 days later). For half of the participants the lottery prize was 50 DEM (about $30), and for half of the subjects the prize was presumably a carton of cigarettes (worth DEM 50).6 A Thus, this study is analogous to the previous one performed at the bursar's office, except that the goal is smoking a cigarette, and the prizes are now cash and cigarettes. The choice data replicate the basic pattern of results obtained in the bursar's office study. Smoke-deprived participants (hypothesized to have an active smoking goal) bought more lottery tickets that could win cigarettes than tickets that could win cash. In contrast, smoke-satisfied participants (hypothesized to have a passive smoking goal) bought more lottery tickets that could win cash than tickets that could win cigarettes. Because the lottery drawing was held at least 9 days after participants' decision to buy lottery tickets, we ruled out the alternative explanation that people purchased lottery tickets to satisfy their current need. In other words, buying lottery tickets was not instrumental for the current goal to smoke, and therefore any alternative explanation based on actual instrumentality or need satisfaction can be ruled out by these results. This study suggests that people do not accurately predict their own future choices. Such a result is consistent with other research indicating that people are bad at predicting their own future preferences and affective states (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Kahneman & Snell, 1992). Our participants' preferences were strongly influenced by whether they had just smoked, although the outcome of the lottery would not be known until much later (when people's motivational state would likely be different). Thus, people who were smoke deprived appeared unaware that the preference would change 10 minutes later after having had their post-class cigarette. One possibility is that people are poor at mentally simulating degree of motivational activation, and therefore do not have access to the degree to which a goal will drive compatibility relations. In other words, although people might be able to mentally simulate the type of action associated with a goal (e.g., the act of smoking), they might have a hard time simulating the experience of being motivated to smoke. Although this hypothesis still needs to be tested, it follows naturally from assuming compatibility of stimuli to goals. Because people should be proficient at mentally simulating their responses (i.e., the mere action), such a hypothesis would be difficult to derive from assuming compatibility of stimuli to responses. Thus, results of this experiment are again difficult to reconcile with an assumption of compatibility to responses because the responses were identical for smoking-deprived and smokingsatisfied participants. In summary, compatibility relations are not bound to a specific content area. Introducing valence by positive versus negative framing of a stimulus (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) might automatically invoke compatibility effects to active goals if valence and goals have systematic compatibility relations. Because some goals are always active in an individual, compatibility of frames to goals would not be just any other variable that affects perception, judgment, and choice, but one that would always be at work. This reasoning suggests that the mere compatibility of the valence of a stimulus with a particular goal is enough to affect one's cognition and behavior. This fundamental interaction of stimulus valence (e.g., framing) and goal as a determinant of cognition and behavior has been the subject of recent investigations, to which we now turn.

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Page 326 GOAL COMPATIBILITY AS MEDIATOR OF FRAMING EFFECTS AND POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRIES Compatibility is a powerful cognitive principle, yet it has received little attention in social cognition. Especially in its motivational-cognitive version of goal compatibility, this principle appears to be applicable to questions raised in social cognition. The remainder of the chapter focuses on two related questions that have initiated a lot of research: (a) In judgment and choice, when does positive information weigh heavier than negative information (and vice versa; e.g., Anderson, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kanouse & Hanson, 1971; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Solomon & Corbit, 1974; Taylor, 1991)? (b) How does framing a problem affect judgment and choice (e.g., Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)? Approach and Avoidance Goals: The Hedonic Principle and Regulatory Focus When will the valence of a stimulus be compatible or incompatible with a goal? It is suggested that this depends on the type of goal – more specifically, on whether goals are associated with approach versus avoidance motivation. Positive stimuli should be compatible with approach goals and negative stimuli should be compatible with avoidance goals. Let us take a step back and first consider the concept of approach/avoidance goals. Higgins (1997) distinguished two levels on which approach versus avoidance can take place. One level is the hedonic principle, according to which approach is geared toward positive end states and avoidance is geared away from negative end states. The other level of approach versus avoidance is regulatory focus. Regulatory focus assumes needs that are superordinate goal concepts and strategies that are subordinate goal concepts in the service of needs. According to regulatory focus, there are two distinct survival needs: nurturance and security. The regulatory focus in the service of nurturance is called promotion focus , whereas the regulatory focus in the service of security is called prevention focus . Although both needs constitute positive end states (i.e., positive hedonic value), the two regulatory foci differ on an approach/avoidance dimension. In a promotion focus, people are inclined to use approach strategies, whereas in a prevention focus they are inclined to use avoidance strategies, although the superordinate need – that is, the final goal – is positive (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). A prototypical example for the latter would be a safety goal (a positive end state) enacted strategically by avoiding dangerous situations (negative end states). Unless noted otherwise, approach and avoidance in the following refers to regulatory focus – that is, to the approach strategies associated with promotion focus and to the avoidance strategies associated with prevention focus. Two findings from regulatory focus research are of particular importance for the following discussion. First, goals that involve what one would ideally do (hopes, wishes, aspirations) involve a promotion focus. Goals that involve what one ought to do (responsibilities, duties, obligations) as well as safety concerns involve a prevention focus. Second, a promotion focus involves a sensitivity toward the presence and absence of positive outcomes, whereas a prevention focus involves a sensitivity toward the presence and absence of negative outcomes (Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). For example, seeing that one has invested in the more profitable of two stock options can be experienced as “hoping to gain and actually gaining money” versus “fearing to lose but actually not losing money.” In both cases, you are better off by the same degree than your reference point, thus the valence of this event is positive, but the gain is associated with approach motivation (hope) and the nonloss with avoidance motivation (fear). People in a promotion focus should tend to frame the situation spontaneously in terms of a gain, whereas people in a prevention focus should tend to frame the situation spontaneously in terms of a nonloss. Similarly, seeing that one has invested in the less profitable of two stock options can be experienced either as “hoping to gain but actually not gaining money’’ versus “fearing to lose and actually losing money.” In both cases, you are worse off by the same degree than your reference point, thus the valence of this event is negative, but the nongain is associated with approach motivation (hope) and the nonloss with avoidance motivation (fear). People in a promotion focus should tend to frame the situation spontaneously in terms of a nongain, whereas people in a prevention focus should tend to frame the situation spontaneously in terms of a loss (Brendl, Higgins, & Lemm, 1995). In summary, four types of events (or features) are distinguishable on two dimensions: valence and regulatory focus (Table 20.1). It follows that when information and a goal correspond in terms of both valence and regulatory focus, they are more compatible than when they mismatch on either one of these dimensions (for evidence, see Brendl et al., 1995). Valence and regulatory focus of information are

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Page 327 Table 20.1: Regulatory focus crossed with valence

confounded in many studies and restricted to the two cases in which positive features are present or negative features are present (as represented by the gray cells in Table 20.1). For these cases, I propose that positive object features (meaning positive valence and promotion focus – i.e., the presence of positive features) are more compatible with approach than avoidance goals. Vice versa, negative object features (meaning negative valence and prevention focus – i.e., the presence of negative features) are more compatible with avoidance than approach goals. The far more complex case is when goal and information correspond on one dimension but not on the other. Framing With Valence and Regulatory Focus Confounded Consider the following demonstration of a framing effect. Schul and Ganzach's (1995) participants read about alloys, with each consisting of a number of supposedly positive and negative features. When participants were to rate how good alloys were, they weighed positive features heavier than when they had to rate how bad the alloys were. These effects were mediated by memory accessibility. When the list of alloy characteristics was available to participants during judgment, thus undermining effects of accessibility from memory, they displayed a smaller framing effect than when the judgments had to be made from memory. These results are consistent with goal compatibility: Positive framing (negative framing) presumably activated approach goals, which in turn primed positive features (negative features) in the representation of the alloys, resulting in heavier weighting of positive (negative) features. This study suggests that positive (negative) frames can set approach (avoidance) goals. In addition, this study provides unique evidence in support of the hypothesis that compatibility effects involve the priming of stimulus representations presumably by goals. Beyond being affected by explicitly provided frames, people can create their own positive or negative frame or may be similarly influenced by a frame implied by the experimental situation. Thus, in a given situation, positive or negative information might be weighted heavier because the situation implies a positive or negative frame. What may look like an overweighting of positive or negative information characteristic to a specific situation may in fact be a framing effect driven by goal compatibility. Consistent with this view, Schul and Ganzach (1995) in the above paradigm found with Israeli participants that labeling the right side of the rating scale positive instead of negative (and the left side negative instead of positive) led to a heavier weighting of positive features. Note that Hebrew is read from right to left. Thus, presumably the right-side anchor of the rating scale affected the activation level of approach versus avoidance for the judgmental goal and led to a compatibility effect. The following study shows that frame-based goal compatibility effects are probably not bound to the laboratory. Each participant made the (simulated) decision of which parent to award custody of a child. One parent was described in terms of average features only (e.g., reasonable rapport with the child, average working hours), whereas the other parent was described in terms of both positive and negative features (e.g., very close relationship with the child, lots of work-related travel). When the question was framed in terms of awarding rather than rejecting custody, more participants awarded custody to the positive-and-negative feature parent than to the average feature parent (Shafir, 1993). Presumably the award decision activated the positive features of the

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Page 328 positive-and-negative feature parent more strongly than the negative features because it implies an approach goal. In contrast, the reject decision activated the negative features of the positive-and-negative feature parent more strongly than the positive features because it implies an avoidance goal (for related results, see Ganzach & Schul, 1995). Similar preference reversals were shown for preferring versus canceling trips, taking versus postponing courses, choosing versus giving up lottery tickets, voting for versus not voting for political candidates, and choosing versus rejecting lotteries or persons (Ganzach & Schul, 1995). In contrast to the previous results, Ganzach (1995, Experiment 2) had participants either choose or reject one of three job candidates, and the candidates' positive features were evaluated more positively in the reject framing condition than in the accept framing condition. There was one critical difference to the previous study, however. In the accept framing condition, one of the three candidates was clearly inferior, whereas in the reject framing condition, one was clearly superior. The remaining two candidates were comparable in terms of their mean qualifications. My interpretation of these results is that participants' first step in choosing was probably to exclude the inferior candidate from the choice set requiring acceptance and to exclude the superior candidate from the choice set requiring rejection. Thus, participants would an instant ago have made a first choice that was based on negative features in the accept condition but on positive features in the reject condition. They might simply have kept this frame for the remaining step of their choice – that is, they might have evaluated the two remaining candidates in terms of negative features in the accept condition but in terms of positive features in the reject condition. Thus, the constellation of the stimuli might have led participants to actively reframe the problem and override the frame explicitly provided by the experimenter. Viewed this way, these results suggest again that people spontaneously create their own frames that then cause compatibility effects. Positive-Negative Asymmetries In information-integration paradigms in impression formation (Anderson, 1981), participants typically read about several positive and negative behaviors that a target person displayed. A critical question is whether positive or negative behaviors weigh heavier when participants form one overall integrative judgment of the target person based on both types of behavior. When the behaviors and judgment are about ability (e.g., intelligence), participants weigh positive behaviors heavier than negative behaviors. In contrast, when the behaviors and judgment are about morality (e.g., honesty), participants weigh negative behaviors heavier than positive behaviors (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; see also Wojciszke, 1994). What is it about the ability and morality domains that causes these differences? Reeder and Brewer (1979) suggested that both ability and morality were represented by hierarchically restrictive schemata. For example, for the domain of morality, people assume that a moral behavior could be caused by a moral as well as by an immoral person, but that an immoral behavior could only be caused by an immoral person. For the domain of ability, the schema implies that extremely skillful behaviors (e.g., winning a Nobel Prize) presuppose high ability, whereas less skillful behaviors (e.g., flunking a test) are consistent with low or high ability (e.g., because one was sick). Skowronski and Carlston (1987, 1989) proposed that these different degrees of informativeness of positive and negative behaviors are related to the cue diagnosticity of these behaviors. The more diagnostic a behavior is for a trait category, the more the perceived probability that the person displaying the behavior belongs to that category and the less the perceived probability that the person belongs to alternative categories. Skowronski and Carlston (1987) provided the first experimental demonstration of this positivity effect for ability-related behaviors along with evidence for a negativity effect for morality-related behaviors. In addition, they measured the cue diagnosticity of these behaviors and found that, in the ability domain, positive behaviors were more diagnostic than negative behaviors. The reverse was true in the morality domain (for replications, see Ganzach & Schul, 1995; Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Skowronski & Carlston, 1992; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). Let us consider whether goal compatibility could also account for this positive-negative asymmetry. Imagine the following thought experiment. In most circumstances, would you think that other people you meet would ideally be intelligent or would you rather think that they ought not be unintelligent? In most circumstances, would you think that other people you meet would ideally be honest and fair or would you rather say that they ought not to be dishonest and unfair? Brendl and Vosgerau (1998) gave participants behaviors to read that displayed varying degrees of either ability or morality. Participants were asked to rate for each behavior the degree to which people ought not behave in the described negative way versus would ideally behave in the described positive way. The results show that our

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Page 329 participants more often endorsed that people would ideally display intelligent behaviors than that they ought not display unintelligent behaviors. In contrast, our participants thought that people ought not display immoral behaviors more than they thought people ideally display moral behaviors. As discussed earlier, ideal and should/ought frames (as well as ideal and ought self-discrepancies) have been shown to be associated with a promotion versus prevention regulatory focus, respectively (Roney et al., 1995; Shah et al., 1998). Recall that a prevention focus involves an avoidance orientation on a strategic level (Higgins et al., 1994). Thus, at least when it comes to the perception of other people,7 A the ability domain appears to be associated with approach goals and the morality domain appears to be associated with avoidance goals. Consider (a) that standards that we ideally want to meet are approach related and standards that we feel we ought to meet are avoidance related, and (b) that our standards for other people appear to involve ideal standards for the ability domain and ought standards for the morality domain. It follows for our impressions of other people that the ability domain should be more strongly associated with approach standards, whereas the morality domain should be more strongly associated with avoidance standards. According to self-discrepancy theory, ideal standards8 A are socialized by reward/nonreward contingencies and ought goals are socialized by punishment/nonpunishment contingencies (Higgins, 1991). It seems to make intuitive sense to assume that moral standards are primarily held as ought standards. Moral behaviors have a necessity character presumably because not meeting them is associated with punishment. For example, we are not usually rewarded for obeying speed limits, but we are punished for not obeying them. To draw a connection of ideal standards and the ability domain is quite speculative. Note however that it is also not clear why ability and morality would be associated with their respective types of schemata. The cue diagnosticity approach and goal compatibility need not necessarily be competing explanations. It may be that diagnosticities change as a result of the compatibility of positive or negative behaviors to approach or avoidance goals. In summary, this section suggests that approach versus avoidance goals as a result of their respective compatibilities to positive and negative stimulus features can result in a stronger weighting in impression judgments of positive versus negative information, respectively. Note how widespread goal compatibility effects might be. This results from goals always being present and having to be either of the approach or avoidance type. Framing With Valence and Regulatory Focus Unconfounded Although investigators usually refer only to positive versus negative frames, this language can be misleading as they might be referring (a) to both valence and regulatory focus (e.g., a loss vs. a gain), (b) to framing regulatory focus while holding valence constant (e.g., a loss vs. a nongain), or (c) to framing valence while holding regulatory focus constant (e.g., a loss vs. a nonloss) (cf. Table 20.1). Let us focus on framing valence while holding regulatory focus constant. One way to make such frames comparable is to base both frames on the same action-outcome contingency, which involves a choice between acting or not acting. One frame describes the choice either in terms of acting, the other in terms of not acting. For example, “if you do x, you will lose $50” versus “if you do not do x, you will not lose $50.” As you can see, the action frame involves a negative outcome, the nonaction involves a positive outcome, while both involve a prevention focus (cf. Table 20.1) – that is, a focus on preventing a loss. It is exactly this type of framing that is so common in persuasion research in the health domain (Rothman & Salovey, 1997, for a review). An important question in the health domain is whether health professionals should use positive or negative frames in their attempts to convince people of healthy behaviors. Should they, for example, point out the negative consequences of eating food high in cholesterol or should they rather point out the positive (or non-negative) consequences of not eating food high in cholesterol? Rothman and Salovey (1997) reviewed evidence suggesting that when one has personal involvement in a health-related issue, the type of frame that is superior depends on whether the promoted health behavior is a prevention behavior or a detection behavior. Prevention behaviors are geared at avoiding future illness (e.g., putting on sunscreen to prevent skin cancer). Detection behaviors are geared at detecting current illness (e.g., getting a dermatological exam to detect skin cancer). In one study of prevention behavior (Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough, & Martin Drake, 1993), participants were exposed to messages that were aimed at persuading them to request a take-home sample of sunscreen high enough in sunscreen protection to be effective in preventing skin cancer. It was pretested that White women are especially involved with skin cancer. The message was framed positively, in principle saying: “If you use high protection sunscreen you decrease your risk of getting skin cancer.” The alternative message was

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Page 330 framed negatively, in principle saying: “If you do not use high protection sunscreen you increase your risk of getting skin cancer.” White women requested more sunscreen of the highly protective kind when they had been exposed to the positive than to the negative frame (see Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993, for similar results in the domain of condom usage). Consider now detection behaviors, where there is substantial experimental support for the persuasive advantage of negative over positive frames (see Rothman & Salovey, 1997, for a review). For example, frames stressing the negative consequences of not performing BSE (breast self-examination) have been shown to be more persuasive than frames stressing the positive consequences of performing BSE (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). An advantage of this type of negative frame was also found with actually performed mammograms 12 months after the communication (Banks et al., 1995). In summary, for highly involved people, a positive frame is most persuasive when it comes to prevention behaviors, but a negative frame is most persuasive when it comes to detection behaviors. Positive versus negative here describes the valence of the consequences of engaging or not engaging in a behavior. Thus, just as in impression formation (ability-morality), we have here another positive-negative asymmetry that flips from positivity to negativity effects for different content domains (prevention vs. detection). It is possible that goal compatibility can account for the reversal of this positive-negative asymmetry as a function of prevention versus detection domains. Recall that goals can be conceptualized in terms of a hierarchy where lower levels represent specific goals that serve higher level abstract goals. Clearly both prevention and detection behaviors serve to maintain one's health. Thus, they serve the same abstract goal. However, this abstract goal is reached by quite different strategies – by different “how-to’’ goals (i.e., more specific subordinate goals). In the case of prevention behaviors, the how-to goal is to avoid negative health factors – more specifically, to avoid influences (e.g., sun exposure) that might cause disease in the future. The immediate goal of a prevention, then, is to bring about the absence of a negative outcome. In contrast, in the case of detection behaviors, the how-to goal is to detect the presence of negative features – more specifically, to detect symptoms showing that one has a disease.9 A It might seem counterintuitive that people would be motivated to look for the presence of a negative feature, but keep in mind, this behavior serves a higher level goal of maintaining or improving one's health. Goal compatibility suggests this: The better the goal and message frame match (i.e., the more compatible they are), the more impact the message will have on behavior. Our analysis of the message frames used in prevention and detection health contexts suggests that a match versus mismatch can exist in the valence of the end state of an action goal and the valence of the end state described in the message. Note that this becomes apparent only by considering valence and regulatory focus separately as displayed in Table 20.1. A prevention behavior's immediate end state is positive – it is the absence of a negative outcome. Thus, a message framing the action outcome of a prevention behavior positively rather than negatively should be more compatible and thus more persuasive. Specifically, framing the action outcome in terms of the absence of a negative outcome rather than the presence of a negative outcome should be more persuasive. The reported evidence suggests that it is more persuasive to say “Engaging in prevention will result in not getting skin cancer (the absence of a negative outcome)” than to say “Not engaging in prevention will result in having skin cancer (the presence of a negative outcome).” A detection behavior's immediate end state is negative – it is the presence of a negative outcome. It requires noticing a disease's symptom – the presence of a negative feature. Thus, a message framing the action outcome of a prevention behavior negatively rather than positively should be more compatible and thus more persuasive. Specifically, framing the action outcome in terms of the presence of a negative outcome rather than the absence of a negative outcome should be more persuasive. The reported evidence suggests that it is more persuasive to say “Not looking for a symptom will result in having skin cancer (the presence of a negative outcome)” than to say “Looking for a symptom will result in not having skin cancer (the absence of a negative outcome),” In conclusion, the present and previous sections show that positive-negative asymmetries in judgment and choice that appear to be domain specific can sometimes be due to approach versus avoidance goals being associated with these content domains. Such an association is expected to lead to goal compatibility effects with stimulus valence. Goal compatibility, therefore, has the potential to explain and predict why some domains may be associated with positivity (negativity) effects. SUMMARY This chapter started out by reviewing research on stimulus-response compatibility in perceptual-motor tasks.

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Page 331 The main conclusion was that it is the compatibility of stimuli to goals and not the compatibility to the actions that affects responding. Specifically, it is assumed that active goals prime specific stimulus features in memory (e.g., left side, money, positive features) because these are part of the goal. When stimulus features that map onto (i.e., are compatible with) these primed stimulus representations are actually encountered and perceived, they facilitate the intended behavior. When perceived stimuli are contradictory (incompatible) with the primed stimulus representations, they may inhibit the intended behavior. Also, when stimulus features that map onto these primed stimulus representations are actually encountered and perceived, they are weighted heavier into a judgment. We reviewed evidence showing that when perceived information is more compatible with a goal, reaction times are faster, attitudinal judgments are more extreme, and choices are more affected by this information. It was then hypothesized that some positive-negative asymmetries and some framing effects in judgment and choice are the result of goal compatibility. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that valence (positivity vs. negativity) has a compatibility relation to approach-avoidance goals (including prevention and promotion goals). Framing can set approach-avoidance goals, thus leading to differential sensitivity to positive and negative information. The context may also activate either approach or avoidance goals essentially having the same effect as an explicit frame, but looking like a general positive-negative asymmetry because context is usually not varied in an experiment. Thus, goal compatibility might be involved in,the well-known positive-negative asymmetry in impression formation, which shows that positive behaviors are weighted heavier than negative behaviors in the ability domain, whereas this relation reverses in the morality domain (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Some initial evidence was reported that the ability versus morality domains are associated with approach versus avoidance standards, respectively, suggesting that positive versus negative information should be more compatible with these standards, respectively. We also interpreted framing effects on behavior following health-related persuasive messages in terms of goal compatibility. On the basis of unconfounding valence and regulatory focus, we suggested that the advantage of negative frames in detection behaviors and positive frames in prevention behaviors (Rothman & Salovey, 1997) could be due to strategic goals of these behaviors – namely, to bring about the presence of negative features (negative valence) or the absence of negative features (positive valence). When the valence of the goal and frame match rather then mismatch persuasion is facilitated. A number of the studies reported earlier were originally motivated by assumptions that negative information or negative frames have a larger impact on judgment and behavior than positive information (or sometimes vice versa). However, across a variety of domains and tasks, the evidence suggests that, even if processes exist that generally weight either positive or negative information heavier, such processes cannot predict behavior independent of considering how compatible the information or frame is to a goal. Thus, if we want to predict positivity or negativity effects, it is necessary to consider goal compatibility because its effects are powerful enough to override effects of other processes that might be involved. Goal compatibility is an important moderating factor – one that cannot be ignored because, in judgment and choice, either approach or avoidance goals are always present and positive or negative information is also always present. Thus, goal compatibility effects involving valence should be the rule rather than the exception. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by a Transcoop award (with Arthur Markman) from the German American Academic Council as well as by grant DFG BR1722/1-2 from the German Science Foundation. I would like thank Maya Bar-Hillel, Tory Higgins, Daniel Kahneman, and David Krantz for helpful comments on the unpublished research reported in this chapter. ENDNOTES 1. In this particular study, incompatibility interfered with performance, but there are also studies in which compatibility facilitated performance (Simon, 1990). 2. Now Sri Lanka. 3. I am grateful to Klaus Fiedler, who suggested the relation of compatibility and accentuation theory to me (personal communication, March 1998; see also Fiedler, 1996). 4. Tajfel realized that the irrelevant dimension could be an evaluative dimension and applied accentuation to prejudice. For example, high- and low- prejudiced participants were found to accentuate differences in skin color (Tajfel, 1959). In this way, accentuation theory became an important precursor of social identity theory

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Page 332 (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 5. For accentuation effects on judgments of correlation see Spears, Eiser, and van der Pligt (1987). 6. Although we really conducted the lottery, the people who had won cigarettes also received cash and the lottery stakes were returned to all participants. 7. For the ability domain, it is conceivable that the predominance of ideal over ought standards diminishes or vanishes when the self rather than other people are the targets of judgment. People have goals such as “I ought to be intelligent.” 8. These are called ideal and ought self-guides in the theory. 9. This makes detection behaviors very frightening to many people. Note also that another higher level goal of detection behavior might be to reduce uncertainty, which is a stressful state that people avoid as an end in itself (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

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Page 333 21 Preconscious Control and Compensatory Cognition Gordon B. Moskowitz Princeton University It is a general principle in Psychology that consciousness deserts all processes when it can no longer be of use. The tendency of consciousness to a minimum of complication is in fact a dominating law … Now if we analyze the nervous mechanism of voluntary action, we shall see that by virtue of this principle of parsimony in consciousness the motor discharge ought to be devoid of sentience. If we call the immediate psychic antecedent of a movement the latter's mental cue , all that is needed for invariability of sequence on the movement's part is a fixed connection between each several mental cue, and one particular movement. For a movement to be produced with perfect precision, it suffices that it obey instantly its own mental cue and nothing else, and that this mental cue be incapable of awakening any other movement. Now the simplest possible arrangement for producing voluntary movements would be that the memory-images of the movement's distinctive peripheral effects, whether resident or remote, themselves should constitute the mental cues, and that no other psychic facts should intervene or be mixed up with them. – James (1890/1950, pp. 496–497) Control is typically equated with deliberate, conscious, and effortful exertion of the will. By its common use it would seem that a controlled process is the opposite of an automatic process. But can control, volition, and goal pursuit occur automatically? The possibility that automaticity and control are not polar opposites is neither a radical nor novel thought (see, Bargh, 1990; James, 1890/1950, above). The cocktail party effect is a good example of individuals preconsciously scanning the environment for information relevant to the self, presumably because this is information they are motivated to detect. Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies (1948) found that words that people valued were perceived more readily (lower thresholds of recognition) than words less valued, despite these words being presented outside of conscious awareness. Similarly, Kelly (1955) discussed individuals as scanning the environment for “blips of meaning.” In the early years of the cognitive revolution in social psychology, Markus (1977) showed words relevant to the self-concept were responded to more quickly on a reaction time task, whereas Higgins, King, and Mavin (1982) and Bargh (1982) found that self-relevant words that were chronically accessible to individuals guided attention and judgment. What these experiments share is a notion of chronicity: Although some deal with the self-concept, others with values, and yet others with volition, they all posit that, over time and with practice, these concepts come to operate prior to conscious awareness and without conscious intent. The current chapter examines the issue of whether goals are activated and operate preconsciously, extending this discussion to temporary goals (as opposed to those that are chronically accessible). Temporary goals are posited to have preconscious effects when (a) triggered directly by cues in the environment (due to associative links between the goal and its relevant cues; e.g., Ach, 1935; James, 1890/1950) and (b) a discrepancy between one's desired and actual level of goal attainment triggers cognitive activity aimed at reducing this discrepancy and focuses the cognitive system toward goal relevant stimuli (a process labeled compensatory cognition ). The reason the notion of preconscious control does not seem intuitively obvious is partly a problem of language. Definitions of control, volition, intention, and goals (see below) typically mention conscious choice as a central feature. But the belief that control is conscious and effortful is not merely based on the use of these words in the vernacular. This assumption is also made explicit by models in social psychology that place control on the opposing endpoint of a continuum with automatic processing. And this conception of control is not unique to social psychology, but has its roots in cognitive psychology, where social-psychological approaches to automaticity evolved (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975). Before addressing the adequacy of a dichotomous conceptualization of control and automaticity, and the more intriguing question of whether control can be automatic, we must first address what is meant by automaticity and control.

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Page 334 AUTOMATICITY AND CONTROL: DEFINITIONS What is Automaticity? The term automatic is used often (and loosely) to describe a process that occurs without awareness or intent. This tendency to cash in on the currency provided by the term automatic when describing a phenomenon arose partly from the fact that automaticity was at one time conceived of as the simple absence of consciousness in any component of a process. Additionally, this conception of automaticity is intuitively appealing given the phenomenology of an automatic process; they feel as if they occur without one wanting or initiating them (Logan, 1989). But what is automaticity? Automaticity and Control as Opposites . Early conceptualizations of automatic processing in cognitive psychology equated it with lack of conscious control over the process (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The issue of whether the process was instigated by an act of conscious choice or whether it was triggered directly from the environment was not of consequence. If one deliberately willed a process to occur and yet it was capable of running to completion without the intervention of conscious monitoring (i.e., the process was autonomous), the process was said to be automatic (despite the initiation of the process coming from a conscious act). This analysis made it evident that there are several stages of cognitive processing (e.g., attention, categorization, construct activation, spreading activation, inference), some of which may not involve conscious control. Further, there are several features that define whether conscious control is or is not being invoked for each of these stages of information processing. Bargh (1989) stated that, as of the late 1970s/early 1980s, “an automatic process was defined as satisfying the criteria of being unintentional, involuntary, effortless (i.e., not consumptive of limited processing capacity), autonomous, and occurring outside of awareness ” (p. 3, italics in the original). Thus, in early definitions, automatic processing was described as having occurred so long as some subset of these stages satisfied some subset of these criteria/features. Automaticity and Consciousness as Opposites . Because most cognitive processes contain components that occur outside of awareness, practically all processes would be called automatic if a lack of conscious awareness was the criterion for automaticity. Therefore, Bargh (1984) defined automaticity with the requirement that consciousness not be involved at any stage of information processing, lest the term automatic be rendered meaningless. Even if a process simply required the act of focusing attention on the appropriate triggering stimulus, this act of selective attention presupposes a conscious act of will and would not be automatic. Automatic processes, instead, were defined by Bargh as those under the immediate control of the environment, requiring only the presence of the triggering stimulus (essentially equating it with what James, 1890/1950, called habit). This definition explicitly puts automaticity and consciousness in opposition, but is silent on the relationship between automaticity and control. Varieties of Automaticity . The concept of automaticity evolved in the 1980s as it became apparent that most processing contained some subset of the features of automaticity. As an example from my work with Jim Uleman, trait inference processes were found to be unintended and outside of awareness, yet capable of being disrupted both by goals (Moskowitz & Uleman, 1987) and strains on cognitive capacity (Newman, Uleman, & Winter, 1992). Another example, from cognitive psychology, is the Stroop Effect. In the Stroop Effect, stimulus information that is not attended to (even deliberately being ignored) produces interference with attentive processes. However, intention can modulate Stroop Effects, making it controllable (e.g., Logan, 1980; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Priming effects fall into a similar category of control. Logan (1989, p. 57) stated that: “evidence suggests that subjects must attend to the prime in a way that makes it relevant to the task requirements in order for priming to occur … priming effects are not driven by mere stimulus presentation. They are not beyond strategic control.” Such findings led Bargh (1989) to propose that the automatic-controlled dichotomy was simplistic and led to false conclusions about the nature of processing. Instead, just as James (1890/1950) described varieties of attention, Bargh proposed varieties of automaticity allowing for the possibility that features of automaticity (attention, awareness, intention, and control) need not all occur together but could be treated independently and appear in combinations. Thus, automaticity was seen as conditional, and types of automaticity were said to exist dependent on the conditions (the pattern of features of automaticity that were present). The three general varieties of automaticity were described as preconscious automaticity (which is marked by all features of automaticity occurring together), postconscious automaticity (which has unintended effects but requires some form of conscious processing such as selective attention), and goal-dependent automaticity (which is initiated by acts

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Page 335 of conscious willing). Automaticity as Retrieval . Logan (1989) defined automaticity as a memory phenomenon governed by the principles that govern memory: ‘‘automatic processing is processing based on single-step, direct-access retrieval from memory … the theory assumes that retrieval from memory is an obligatory consequence of attention; whatever is related to the current focus of attention is retrieved” (p. 65). Retrieval is assumed to take time, and each association to a cue has its own retrieval distribution. Which response is elicited is essentially the end result of a horse race between constructs, with the response reflecting what construct was retrieved more quickly. What is Control? According to Webster's (1986) New World Dictionary, control is defined as the power to direct or regulate, whereas the will is defined as the power of the individual to control his or her actions. Psychologists' use of the term control is essentially equivalent to these lay conceptions; it refers to the ability of the individual to direct and regulate behavior and cognition. Wegner and Bargh (1998, p. 450) stated that “to control something is just to influence it in a certain direction … [formal] analyses typically begin by distinguishing two features of control – a control action (the influence) and a control criterion (the direction). Control involves acting upon something until a certain criterion is reached” (italics in original). Implicit in these definitions of control is the description of an organism that causes its own behavior and for whom, therefore, can accurately be made attributions of responsibility and disposition. Control describes an organism whose responses are not solely caused by the situation and determined by the stimuli in the environment.1 Rather, control suggests responses that exist to address a desired state specified by the individual's volition, bringing that desired state into being. Volition can be defined as, turning once again to Webster's (1986) New World Dictionary, the exercising of the will to produce a conscious decision. When volition results in one having produced a specific object or end that one has decided to strive to attain, one has established a goal. Therefore, control is essentially the ability to select, pursue, and regulate a goal. The mechanism through which psychologists posit that individuals translate volition into action and pursue their goals is via intention. An intention is something held in mind as a purpose, plan, or design. That is, prior to a response (e.g., behavior) and subsequent to initial acts of volition (e.g., setting a goal) is the mental act of deciding to respond in a manner that serves one's goal. Intentions, in this way, are mental states that translate goals into reality. This definition of intention as the tool of volition, as with the definition of volition, seems to presuppose deliberation and consciousness by implicating constructs such as design and purpose. Two Approaches to Conceptualizing Goal Regulation. Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) identified two general classes of theories that examine goal effects on action and cognition. The first is goal content theories, and these are focused on how the structure and themes of one's goals affect responses. The second is self regulation theories, and these models move the focus away from questions such as what are the effects, source, and content of goals? Instead, focus is placed on the issue of how goals regulate cognition and behavior (the mediating processes). Within regulatory models are two types of approaches to control – one more cognitive, one more motivational. The motivational approach to examining control mechanisms conceives of goals as something attractive that the individual develops a commitment toward attaining. This establishes a link between the goal and the wants/desires of the individual, with the goal then pulling the individual in the direction of goal attainment. A common example for describing such models is the feeling of one's attention being grabbed or drawn to an object that addresses one's goals. When one is carrying an important letter that needs to be sent, mailboxes seem to appear in the environment where they had previously gone unnoticed (without the individual consciously scanning the environment for mailboxes). This perspective is in the tradition of Kurt Lewin's theorizing and is reflected in the models of action control (e.g., Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994) and action phases (e.g., Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). The cognitive approach to examining control mechanisms in social psychology grew out of Craik's (1947, 1948) engineering system analysis and Miller, Gallanter, and Pribram's (1960) TOTE (test-operate-test-exit) model. A common metaphor for describing such models is the regulation of heat in one's house. A goal is set by establishing a criterion level – setting the desired temperature. A test is then conducted whereby a thermostat registers the existing heat and a comparison is made to the desired level of heat. If it is below the criterion level, action is taken to raise the temperature, another test is run, and the process continued until the criterion is attained. In socialpsychological models, describing the regulation of goal pursuit (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981) goals specify a standard or reference criterion. Control is said to be analogous to a negative feedback loop in

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Page 336 which one takes appropriate steps toward, and monitors progress toward, reducing the difference between an existing state and the reference criterion. Individuals, of course, have many goals they are simultaneously entertaining, and even more that are available to them and capable of being triggered by the current circumstances. A criterion, or current goal pursuit can be set through “the simple process of activation of schemas in memory, through construal of situations and persons” (Scheier & Carver, 1988, p. 306). Thus, a criterion may be triggered/activated like other cognitive constructs (Kruglanski, 1996). Once a standard (reference criterion) is activated, it is tested against existing perceptual input to ascertain whether the standard has been attained. If a difference between criterion and existing values is detected during this test phase, operations are performed in which the cognitive and behavioral system is tuned toward reducing the discrepancy. The individual initiates responses to compensate for the shortcoming. In this manner, cognition and behavior are compensatory as one seeks to adjust an existing state so it conforms with a reference value. Thus, compensatory behavior and compensatory cognition refer to responses aimed at reducing the perceived discrepancy between desired and existing levels of goal attainment. Preconscious Control Logan (1989) pointed out that the phenomenology of automaticity does not exclude the possibility of controlling automatic processes. In fact, automatic processes develop through routinely performing tasks that we need and desire. Habitualizing components of goal-directed processes allows us to become more efficient at performing common tasks that serve our goals. Bargh (1997) similarly argued that, rather than control opposing the concept of automaticity, preconscious processing is the servant of control, with much of everyday social life under environmental control (triggered automatically by the presence of relevant cues). This is the case simply because relegating the activation and enactment of such processes to the nonconscious allows routinely desired states and circumstances to be efficiently and effortlessly pursued. Thus, goals are believed to be capable of being habitualized and placed under the direct control of the environment (what Bargh, 1990, called an auto-motive ); it is, in fact, routine. Bargh (1997) warned that this case for the nonconscious nature of control may suggest that much of consciousness exists simply as a rationalization for (imposing meaning and sense on) the conscious products of automatic processes. Of course, given that such processes become automatic only after having previously made a conscious decision to enact and engage them makes clear that consciousness is not merely an epiphenomenon. Consciousness is essential for the development of control, but can be removed from being involved in control processes through, like any skill acquisition and mental task, practice and routine pursuit. Thus, this logic argues that consciousness and effort are constructs separate from control (yet required initially for control to take place), allowing for the theoretical possibility that, although control can be effortful, it also can be effortless. Preconscious control is a common component of social life – it is just less intuitively obvious than conscious control (given lay conceptions of control and volition), more invisible or difficult to detect (given it is concealed by conscious rationalization), and more threatening to the individual's sense of identity (as it superficially suggests to the individual that action is determined by the environment alone). The Ghost in the Machine and the Little Man in the Head Although most social psychologists do not consider control over a response to a stimulus to be a pure product of reinforcement history, psychological conceptions of control do stipulate that one must first have some prior experience with the stimulus to provide one with a range of appropriate responses. This includes experience that is passive and involuntary (such as observing an act performed by others or when one is being acted on by others). James (1890/1950, p. 487) stated that voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary functions … reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances. The nerve-centres are so organized that certain stimuli pull the trigger of certain explosive parts; and a creature going through one of these explosions for the first time undergoes an entirely novel experience … if, in voluntary action properly socalled, the act must be foreseen, it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can perform an act voluntarily for the first time … when a particular movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. Of course, this turn of events in describing control takes us dangerously close to requiring a discussion of whether free will exists at all or whether what we call control is simply a ghost in the machine (Ryle, 1949) –a set of learned contingencies among stimuli, contexts,

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Page 337 and responses. If we accept that the will does exist as something more than a ghost in the machine, we still must face difficult questions regarding problems of the executive (Neisser, 1967): How is the will to be directed if there is not some homunculus that specifies the nature of control? This chapter does not address these compelling philosophical points, instead it takes as its starting point the assumption that the individual establishes associations between stimuli in the environment and his or her desires. Whether this is due to reinforcement history (potentially raising the ghost in the machine problem) or to a free will that somehow specifies those links between desires and responses (potentially raising the homunculus problem) is not addressed. Let us turn now from examining the definitions of automaticity and control (and the possibility for preconscious control that is either implicitly promoted or discouraged by those definitions) to the evidence for preconscious control. THE HISTORY OF PRECONSCIOUS CONTROL Auto-Mobile: William James and the Notion of Ideo-Motor Action Is anything else required in the mind to produce willed responses other than a “mental conception made up of memory-images of [passive movement] sensations, defining which special act it is” (James, 1890/1950, pp. 492– 493)? James answered this question by asserting that “there need be nothing else, and that in perfectly simple voluntary acts there is nothing else in the mind but the kinaesthetic idea, thus defined, of what the act is to be.” Determination and a “feeling of innervation” are not required when willing an act. James discussed two ways in which behavior can be triggered despite one not having conscious intent to perform the behavior at the time of its occurrence. The first is consciously forming an intention to act when the appropriate circumstances should later arise. When a cue associated with the intention later presents itself, the goal-directed response is initiated despite one not consciously willing the goal at that point in time. The second is when a cue simply activates a mental representation that includes a behavioral response even though an intention to act had not been previously planned. Consider these in turn. Conscious Intent and Automatic Behavior. If an intention to act has been formed, James (1890/1950) believed that the actual occurrence of the behavior need not be consciously regulated. This may happen when the behavior in question is routinized through experience so that it requires merely the presence of a cue that signals the appropriate conditions are in place for the behavior to be initiated. Despite the fact that behavior can occur without consciously willing it at the time the triggering stimulus is observed, James believed that people still experience behavior as willed. This suggests that these feelings of determination are epiphenomenal, arising only after the production of a behavioral response. But, as stated earlier, the fact that such feelings originate after the behavior does not necessarily make the will epiphenomenal. Although conscious acts of will are not required at the moment the behavior is produced, they are (in the form of an earlier-formed intention) needed for the response to occur. This type of preconscious control over action has been analyzed in the century since James' writing and can be said to fall within the category of goal-dependent automaticity. Acts such as typing and driving can be initiated by a conscious decision, but the behavior need not be consciously regulated. To James (p. 519) this occurred because ‘‘often-repeated movements follow on their mental cue. An end consented to as soon as conceived innervates directly the centre of the first movement of the chain which leads to its accomplishment, and then the whole chain rattles off quasi-reflexly.” Construct Activation and Automatic Behavior. If mental representations of behavior can be consciously linked to a cue through an intention, with the cue subsequently triggering the behavior without conscious intervention, a logical next question would be whether goal-directed behavior can fall within the domain of preconscious automaticity. Thus, in his chapter on the will, James (1890/1950) next posed the question of whether the representation of a behavior can be directly triggered by a cue in the environment (i.e., behavioral control without conscious intervention at any stage, simply through construct activation): “must there be an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement can follow?” (p. 522). James answered his own question, and in this case turned to the notion of “ideo-motor” action, or the “sequence of movement upon the mere thought of it. Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action” (p. 522, italics in original). Elegant and easy to grasp examples of this are offered by James, mostly in the domain of consciously willing not to do something only to find oneself engaging in the undesired act: the woman who, in the early morning, finds herself getting dressed despite conscious thought having last placed her

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Page 338 in bed dreading the cold awaiting outside the covers; the “stuffed” man who, after a big dinner, further stuffs nuts into his mouth on perceiving them on the table; the host retiring to his bedroom to dress for his party only to find himself in his pajamas and getting into bed. These ideas have received empirical attention only relatively recently. A series of studies have examined whether the accessibility of a construct leads individuals to behave in a manner consistent with the behavioral representation that is part of that construct (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Carver, Ganellen, Froming, & Chambers, 1983; Dijksterhuis, et al., 1998; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996; Roman, Moskowitz, & Rivero, 1993). Such an influence on behavior would only be an instance of ideo-motor action if the impact of the activated construct were unmediated. The mere activation of the construct must be followed immediately and unhesitatingly by the behavior without the intervention of construal processes or consciousness. However, proving a lack of mediation is a difficult task as critics can claim that researchers failing to find mediation have simply failed to adequately measure the mediating mechanism.2 The burden of proof remains, as James suggested over 100 years ago, on researchers to delineate when behavior is purely stimulus-driven versus mediated. Two Types of Preconscious Control The ideo-motor hypothesis specifies that willed behavior comes to be triggered by preconscious processes. However, James (1890/1950, p. 526) did not believe that ideo-motor processes were beyond control, stating that “every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximus degree whenever it is not kept from doing so by an antagonistic representation.” Behavior that has been linked, by habit, to a cue may be a natural effect of the cue's presence, but one can be prevented from engaging in the behavior by interference from alternate responses similarly associated with the cue. Control of a cue-directed response is just as easy as its initiation. Therefore, James' chapter on the will introduces two important conceptions of preconscious control. The first is that, through experience, willed behavior comes to operate as a quasi-reflex so that intended behavior is initiated and regulated without conscious monitoring. The response is simply activated by the presence of a relevant cue. The second conception of preconscious control discussed by James (1890/1950) is that even automatic responses, such as the quasi-reflexive responses found in ideo-motor action, can be controlled by the activation of competing preconscious responses. Several preconscious responses may be triggered by a given stimulus, and these responses can either facilitate or inhibit one another. This interaction of preconscious responses can include two cognitions in competition (such as when two different word meanings are activated by the same string of letters) or the competition between activated goals and semantic content (such as when chronic egalitarian goals and stereotypic traits are each linked to the same social group). The New Look: Control From Interference Between Chronically Accessible Representations Response competition and facilitation is the proposed mechanism behind an important class of psychological phenomena. Preconscious control of this type is what is used to describe the ability people exhibit to select among stimuli that are not consciously perceived. Phenomena such as early versus late filtering in selective attention (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman & Geffen, 1967) and perceptual defense (e.g., Bruner, 1957b) depend on the seemingly paradoxical fact that people perceive without having experienced perceiving (Erdelyi, 1974). These phenomena represent an important demonstration of preconscious control – the goals and needs of a perceiver direct attention and judgment without the individual being aware of an influence. Take as an example the finding that recognition thresholds in perception are dependent on the needs and values of the perceiver. Postman et al. (1948) presented words on a screen below the threshold for conscious recognition, with presentation speed gradually slowed until the word could be consciously identified. The subliminally presented words were values that one could embrace to varying degrees, with some being of central importance to the individual. Words describing values that participants embraced were perceived at a faster rate than words valued less. This finding of higher thresholds of recognition for undesired words (perceptual defense) and lower values for desired words (selective sensitization) suggests that people are avoiding and approaching stimuli prior to recognition (Bruner, 1957b). The possibility that motivated reactions to stimuli occur prior to consciousness is further illustrated by McGinnies' (1949) finding that one may have autonomic responses to a subliminally presented stimulus. Participants had galvanic skin response changes as a function of subliminally presented, emotionally charged visual information before being able to issue a verbal response

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Page 339 signaling conscious perception of the stimulus. Similar effects are found in the domain of judgment. Bruner and Goodman (1947) proposed that the need associated with a stimulus leads to the perceptual accentuation of the stimulus, with the degree of the effect increasing as the individual's need for the stimulus increases. Participants were asked to hold an object in their palm and draw it using a variable circular patch of light controlled by a knob. The object was either a coin or a disc the size of a coin. Drawings of coins were distorted relative to discs of the same size, with the size of the effect varying with the value of the coin (quarters were distorted more than nickels). Additionally, distortions in estimations of coin sizes were greater for poor participants (who presumably needed money more) relative to rich participants. This tradition of research came to be called the New Look because at the time it presented a novel empirical approach to perception, attention, and judgment – a focus on the selective and subjective nature of information processing. Rather than describing an organism who transcribes physical stimuli directly into mental representations under the direction solely of what Bruner and Goodman (1947, p. 34) called the autochthonous determinants of perception ("the electrochemical properties of sensory end organs and nervous tissue"), the New Look described an organism that passively manipulated the data according to his or her needs, motives, and values across a series of processing stages (Bruner, 1957b). Although terms like filtering and defense describe the effects found in the New Look research, they also conjure up images of preconscious decisions being made to protect and serve the individual by a “man in the head” deciding what stimuli to allow to pass through a metaphorical gate and enter consciousness. However, New Look theorists urged ignoring this baggage associated with the terminology used to describe the effect and suggested a mechanism for control that did not involve a homunculus – simple processes of response competition between categories linked to a cue: [perceptual defense] can now be economically conceptualized in terms of interference among competing hypotheses … the emotionally charged word may automatically generate a response, such as activating the category, but a competing response, whether that competing response be conscious or not, can inhibit the expression of the automatic activation. (Postman, 1953, p. 300) failure to perceive is most often not a lack of perceiving but a matter of interference with perceiving. Whence the interference? I would propose that the interference comes from categorizations in highly accessible categories that serve to block alternative categorizations in less accessible categories. As a highly speculative suggestion, the mechanism that seems most likely to mediate such interference is probably the broadening of category acceptance limits when a high state readiness to perceive prevails … the range of inputs that will produce a match signal for a category increases in such a way that more accessible categories are likely to “capture” poor-fitting sensory inputs. (Bruner, 1957, p. 145) Parallel distributed processing accounts of the Stroop Effect (e.g., Cohen, Servan-Schreiber, & McClelland, 1992) have used computer modeling to examine the possibility of response competition of the sort Bruner described as a mechanism for preconscious control. Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) provided a connectionist model in which processing is assumed to take place in a system of interconnected modules. Within the modules are processing units that receive inputs from other units and adjust the output signals that are transmitted accordingly. Processing is said to occur when a given unit is activated, and this activation spreads across modules (requiring connections between modules as well as within them). A series of connected modules form a pathway, and the speed and accuracy with which processing occurs depends on the flow of information along the pathway. Because modules receive and send input, control can occur when the processing along one pathway and the processing along a second pathway intersect – they share a module. If the processing along these two pathways conflicts, the module can control processing along the pathways by “altering the responsiveness of the processing units in a pathway.’’ Thus, goals can have preconscious effects if they serve to alter the spread of activation along pathways, increasing the signal along one pathway and inhibiting the propagation of signals across the other pathway.3 The Cohen et al. (1992) modeling results demonstrate that well-documented effects of cognitive control, such as control over the Stroop Effect (Logan, 1989), can be accounted for by this mechanism of competition between categories that intersect along a shared module. We return to this notion of competing pathways, one of which is more dominantly associated with a cue, when discussing stereotype control later in the chapter. The point here has simply been to suggest that goals exert control not by a homunculus making decisions, but through simple processes of response competition. Although metaphors such as “the width of category acceptance limits,” and “connection weights that alter the responsiveness of processing units,” and “the raising and lowering of perceptual thresholds serving as filters” do not address the question of how goals ultimately produce these shifts in the perceptual apparatus, they do provide

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Page 340 a way to demonstrate how the apparatus can be manipulated in the service of goals. All this occurs without the goal being consciously adopted in the current situation or awareness of any movement in the machinery. Chronically Accessible Constructs The research from the New Look perspective illustrates that the cognitive system is tuned toward goal-relevant information without one's awareness of an intentional search for those stimuli. However, in the 1970s, researchers turned toward demonstrating a similar type of preconscious control over cognitive responding – one that emerged not from one's goals, motives, needs, or values, but from the chronic accessibility of semantic information relevant to the self. Much like the cocktail party effect reveals that one's name has a preferred status in the perceptual field, leaping above the din, so too does information linked to the self. Markus (1977) defined self-schemas as “an organization of the representations of one's past behavior,” claiming that such organizations operate as far more than a storage house or depository for self-relevant information. They serve an important processing function that guides attention, encoding, and retrieval of information. Although this position is similar to the type of preconscious control discussed in Bruner's (1957b) notion of perceptual readiness, gone is any reference to needs. What is described as allowing the individual to actively, although preconsciously, determine the outcomes of their cognitive processing is the activation of a cognitive structure – a schema. Bargh (1982) provided an elegant demonstration of the impact of the chronically accessible self-construct on attention. Participants performed a dichotic listening task that required them to attend to one ear (through a shadowing task) and ignore the other ear while independent pieces of information were presented to each ear. Selfrelevant words were then presented to the attended channel for some participants and to the unattended channel for others. The aim of the experiment was to show that when self-relevant information was presented it automatically captured attention. This was demonstrated by having participants perform a reaction time task (shutting off a light, as quickly as possible, that appeared at random intervals) simultaneous to the dichotic listening task. In support of the notion that chronically accessible, self-relevant information has automatic effects on attentional focus, Bargh found that when a self-relevant word was in the attended channel, people were faster to turn off the light. When such words were in the ignored channel, people were slower to turn off the light presumably because the chronically accessible information captured attention, distracting participants away from their task. Bargh and Pratto (1986) made a similar demonstration using a Stroop-like paradigm. Chronically accessible constructs were presented in colored inks, and participants were to name the ink color. Participants were reliably slower at naming the color of the ink when the word content was of a construct that was chronically accessible to them. They concluded that attention was directed by an automatic mechanism associated with the chronic state of readiness of particular constructs. Despite the fact that such research professes to examine “cold” cognition, it remains possible that chronically accessible, self-relevant information, as assessed in the research reviewed above, does in fact represent preconsciously operating goals and needs. People with specific types of self-schemas (e.g., chronically accessible constructs) were selected by Markus (1977) and Bargh (1982) by responses to a scale assessing the importance of various traits to the self-concept. The importance of these traits might not merely reflect that these semantic concepts are descriptive of the individual, but that these are attributes that are valued and pursued by the individual – chronic goals. Intentions as Linkages and Quasi-Needs: Temporary Goals and Preconscious Control Research of the sort reviewed thus far from the New Look and on chronic sources of accessibility might lead one to conclude that the ability to exert preconscious control over cognition requires a chronic state of readiness that would promote approaching or avoiding that stimulus. But is a history of goal pursuit, where chronic tendencies develop through repeating and practicing intended behavior over time, required for preconscious control? Despite the absence of research on this issue until quite recently, its theoretical viability has been with the field for quite some time. Ach (1935) believed that goal-directed behavior could be triggered by the mere presence of an appropriate cue, and that this preconscious initiation of a goal pursuit did not require a chronic association between the cue and the response. Ach posited that the manner in which the will is typically translated into action is through specific plans in which a particular behavior is linked to the presence of a particular stimulus in the environment. Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) called this type of goal-pursuit one directed by “implementation intentions” – e.g., pursuing the goal of writing a chapter is accomplished by forming specific plans that link action

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Page 341 initiation to specific cues, such as “I will write a paragraph summarizing Ach's definition of intention as soon as I get seated on the commuter train.’’ Sitting on the train will then trigger the intended behavior. For the intention to have the greatest likelihood of producing goal attainment, the intention was said to need to be accompanied by commitment to the goal and determination to perform the specified behavior in the specified context (Ach, 1935). Given appropriate levels of commitment and determination, goal-directed behavior was said to be triggered by the presence of the cue to which it had been linked through an intention. Although the initial formation of such plans requires a conscious choice, the pursuit of them does not. Kurt Lewin posited a second manner in which temporary goals could operate in the preconscious, posing a model that attacked Ach's S-R conceptions. To Lewin (1951), rather than goal-directed behavior being equated with linkages and associations/plans connecting specific behaviors to specific cues, goal pursuit was likened to the manner in which need states are satisfied. Lewin made this similarity explicit by calling intentions quasi-needs. Intentions were likened to needs because having goals that are not attained was believed to lead the individual to experience a tension state that energizes goal-directed responses (just as need states are described as a tension arising from tissue deficits that energizes responses to reduce the deficit). Much like the tension associated with a need such as hunger can be reduced by approaching one of many possible types of food, Lewin believed the tension associated with an intention could be reduced by multiple goal-relevant objects and multiple routes toward goal attainment. Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) called this type of goal-pursuit as one directed by “goal intentions” – e.g., pursuing the goal of writing a chapter is accomplished by various sections of the text being worked on at any given point in time, with the opportunity to work on any piece partly determined by the state of the individual (such as how important a deadline is thought to be) as well as the resources in the current environment (such as whether relevant books and articles are available). Thus, rather than an intention representing an association between one stimulus and one course of action, the quasi-need was said to specify a valence being established between the goal and the various stimuli in the environment relevant to the goal. The valence represents the strength of the association between an object in the environment and the goal – the ability of the object to address the goal. The presence of an object with sufficient valence (and thus the ability to reduce a tension state) triggers action relevant to the object that will allow attainment of the goal. Continuing with the example of writing a chapter, sitting in one's office might trigger goalrelevant activity because the works of Ach on the bookshelf will have acquired sufficient valence to address the goal of writing a paragraph on Ach and direct action away from surfing the Internet. However, riding a commuter train might be less likely to trigger goal-relevant activity in the domain of chapter-writing (in the absence of a specific plan) despite the presence of one's laptop (and the opportunity it affords to act toward the goal). The laptop may not have acquired sufficient valence to address the goal of chapter-writing to compete with the alternate goal of reading yesterday's baseball news (and the valence developed between that goal and the issue of the New York Times sitting beside one's laptop). Preferences Need no Inferences The notion of valence as a “vector” linking objects and intentions that can lead to the preconscious initiation and direction of responses is one that has received some attention, and the attention has been directed at both ends of this metaphorical vector. On one end is research exploring whether objects in the environment specify responses due to the qualities inherent in the object. On the other end is the idea that the strength of one's goals and preferences can determine the meaning the objects seem to project, and, thus, determine attention, perception, judgment, and behavior. The meaning inherent in objects. The concept of valence is similar to McArthur and Baron's (1983) discussion of affordance. Taking a Gibsonian perspective, McArthur and Baron (p. 215) stated: “the information available in events specifies, among other things, environmental affordances, which are the opportunities for acting or being acted upon that are provided by environmental entities.” Thus, there are properties inherent in some objects that simply reveal to the perceiver appropriate ways to respond. Research on spontaneous trait inference (STI) takes this assumption as its starting point. STIs are said to occur when an observed behavior draws out an implicit response – a trait inference about the person performing the observed behavior. Such inferences are only likely to occur when the observed behavior is diagnostic enough to clearly suggest an interpretation (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992). When there is meaning inherent in the data, inferences are drawn by the perceiver in a preconscious fashion, without an explicit goal of trait inference formation being required. When behavior is not diagnostic, forming an inference is dependent on the

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Page 342 explicit (conscious) goals of the perceiver, such as an instruction to form an impression (e.g., Hamilton, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989). But to what goal are STIs speaking? Such passively occurring trait inferences are believed to develop from the fact that individuals possess a chronic goal to understand and control their environment. This goal is then served by categorization processes and the formation of trait inferences. Therefore, valence may develop between this goal and an observed behavior if traits are inherent in the observed behavior that are capable of “speaking to” this goal (i.e., the inferred traits provide a sufficient explanation as to why the observed person acts as he or she has; Heider, 1944). Thus, STI is a case where the meaning inherent in an object leads to a preconscious response because of the ability of that object to address a preconscious (in this case, chronic) goal (Moskowitz, 1993). Another instance where the inherent properties of an object are said to trigger a response because of the object's ability to address a preconscious goal is when the affect or evaluation associated with an object is automatically activated (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Automatic activation of affect (also called automatic attitude activation) occurs when the mere presence of an object leads to the activation of positive or negative evaluative responses that are linked to that object. What preconscious goal is addressed by an object automatically triggering the positive or negative evaluation associated with it? According to Lewin (1935), positive evaluation is linked to approach motivation and negative evaluation is linked to avoidance motivation. Thus, automatic activation of affect is linked to, and in the service of, a primary need of the organism – survival. That is, for functional reasons, such as facilitating approach and avoidance responses, stimuli need to be quickly identified as being either appetitive or aversive; automatic evaluation accomplishes this. Zajonc (1980) laid the groundwork for the possibility that affective appraisal could occur automatically by asserting that preferences need no inferences; affect may be activated separate from and prior to cognitive responses. This essentially meant that cognitive and evaluative responses were believed to be the products of separate processing systems. Rather than affect being the result of a cognitive appraisal of a stimulus, affective reactions were believed to be capable of being generated prior to cognitive analysis of the stimulus. Murphy and Zajonc (1993) provided support for this possibility by showing that affect could be activated by presenting faces subliminally. The facial expressions depicted positive or negative emotions, and the valence associated with the faces was then shown to influence the judgment of an ambiguous (neutral) stimulus. The stimulus, a Chinese ideograph, was liked more when it was preceded by the subliminal presentation of a face with positive (as opposed to negative) valence. It is not a great leap from Zajonc's (1980) notion of early affective appraisal to the notion that evaluation can be automatically activated (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1990; Fazio et al., 1986). From this perspective, the inherent properties of the stimulus trigger an association with evaluation; affect is simply revealed by the mere presence of the stimulus. For example, Fazio et al. defined the strength of an attitude as represented by this link between an object and an evaluation, asserting that a strong attitude is one where the properties of the object simply elicit the affective response. Bargh et al. extended this logic by asserting that any object triggers an evaluation regardless of the strength of the attitude. Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson (1997) suggested that not only do such evaluative responses exist for the purpose of providing fast feedback about the affective nature of a stimulus, but the processing system has been so tuned toward evaluative responses that separate systems for evaluating positive and negative affect have evolved (supplanting the notion of affect as a bipolar construct). This again is consistent with a functional account of automatic attitude activation, where such responses are said to occur for the purpose of preparing the organism to approach or avoid a stimulus that is either desired or undesired. The empirical support for motivation being involved in the processes that produce automatic attitude activation is limited. Two recent experiments address this possibility. Cacioppo, Priester, and Berntson (1993) used arm flexion (pulling the arm toward the self) versus arm extension (pushing the arm away from the self) as an approximation of approach and avoidance motives. Participants evaluated ambiguous objects (Chinese ideographs) while their arms were either flexed or extended. These neutral objects were shown to be evaluated more positively during arm flexion (for a conceptual replication using reaction time measures, see Chen & Bargh, 1999, Experiment 1). Of course, although participants were not aware of the link between their arm movements and their evaluations, they were certainly aware that they were making an evaluation, as they were explicitly asked to do so. Thus, this research provides evidence for positive evaluation and approach being compatible responses (see Brendl, chap. 20, this volume, for a review of the literature on goal compatibility). However, it does not examine

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Page 343 automatic evaluation or the possibility that these compatible responses are preconsciously linked. Chen and Bargh (1999) address this issue more directly by borrowing a paradigm from Solarz (1960). Chen and Bargh (1999, Experiment 2) asked participants to move a lever when a word appeared, with the direction of the lever movement (arm flexion versus extension) manipulated. The words were either positive or negative in valence, although participants were not asked to attend to this feature of the stimulus. When asked to flex the arm, participants were faster to respond when the words were positive than negative. When asked to move the lever through arm extension, participants were faster when words were negative in valence. Such findings suggest that the valence inherent in an object is automatically activated, and that this activation is compatible with the appropriate corresponding response of approach or avoidance. Although such compatibility is not direct evidence that a goal is automatically linked to an evaluation, it certainly provides compelling evidence for the existence of a link between evaluation and approach-avoidance goals. At the least, such research demonstrates that there are properties inherent in objects that preconsciously speak to the preferences of an individual and activate these evaluative systems prior to cognitive appraisal. The Meaning Sought out by the Individual. The preceding section specifies that preferences can be triggered prior to cognitive appraisal and that preferences, by virtue of early activation, may direct subsequent cognitive processing. But the valence between an object and one's goals can lead to automatic responses occurring in the opposite direction as well. While diagnostic stimuli may activate a goal, an accessible goal may determine what stimuli are attended to and capture attention. This power of goals to lead to preconscious control over the perception of goalrelevant stimuli has already been explicitly demonstrated and reviewed in the research from the New Look perspective. More recently, however, Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) extended our understanding of such implicit effects of the affective system. Their work demonstrates that the strength of the associative link (valence) between one's affect and a stimulus is partly determined by the value the object possesses for the person. If one possesses strong affect (e.g., an object is highly desirable, one has a strong attitude), then the associative link between one's affect and the object will be stronger. As noted earlier, Fazio et al. (1986) already demonstrated that, as the strength of this associative link increases, the likelihood of affect being activated from the mere presence of the attitude object increases. Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio turned this idea of auto-evaluation on its head. Not only does seeing the object lead to the evaluation being activated, but the strength of the evaluation is associated with the likelihood that the object will be seen. Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio proposed that preconscious scanning of the objects in the environment activates the evaluation of these objects. An activated evaluation then triggers the associative link between the evaluation and the object, focusing attention toward the object. It is through such a process that the enormous amount of objects that bombard our perceptual apparatus is proposed to be filtered, guaranteeing that attention is focused on those stimuli that have hedonic consequences for the individual. For example, Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (Experiment 1) found that individuals were more likely to notice those objects (e.g., a squirrel) in a display containing multiple objects (e.g., squirrel, umbrella, bicycle, flower, etc.) for which they had stronger object-evaluation associations in memory. To demonstrate that these effects were not driven by conscious intent (e.g., intentionally searching for objects in the briefly flashed display about which they felt strongly), Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (Experiment 3) had participants perform a task where they were to intentionally ignore the attitude objects. Rather than focusing attention on the briefly flashed display of objects to report as many of the objects as possible, the display was presented as a distractor. At the end of the experiment, a surprise recall test for the distractors was given. As predicted, recall for the objects favored those items that had higher attitude accessibility. Despite the goal to ignore distractors, those that were highly accessible captured attention. It is not merely positive and valued information that is capable of directing attention. Strong object-evaluation links should exist for negatively valued objects as well. Indeed, from a functional perspective, it has been argued by some that negatively valued objects need to acquire an even greater influence over perception so that objects harmful to the individual may be detected early enough to be avoided before causing harm. Thus, not only has it been posited (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1997) that positive and negative affect have evolved separate evaluative systems, but we need not assume that positive and negative evaluation are weighed equally in terms of their ability to direct processing. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) reviewed robust findings that people place greater weight on those aspects of a situation that suggest risk, loss, and negative consequences. Fiske (1980) found that negative information is weighed more heavily in impression formation. Pratto and John (1991) proposed that negative stimuli (e.g., with potential for

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Page 344 harm) are more likely to be automatically attended to than positive stimuli (those that are appetitive) due to the ability of negative stimuli to address one's more pressing (because they require immediate action) needs. To demonstrate the attention-directing power of an activated negative evaluation toward undesirable and disliked objects, Pratto and John (1991) used a Stroop-like color-interference paradigm. Participants were instructed to name the color of the ink in which a word is written. But rather than the words that were to-be-named spelling out the names of opposing colors (e.g., the word blue written in red ink), the words were traits. They found (Experiment 1) that undesirable traits produced greater interference with the color-naming task than desirable traits. Pratto and John (Experiment 2) made the point that it is not that both positive and negative information is attended to equally and the negative information is then consciously blocked from consciousness. Rather, automatic vigilance – the preconscious pursuit of negative stimuli – leads to the interference effect. PRECONSCIOUS CONTROL: GOAL ACTIVATION AND REGULATION, COMPENSATORY COGNITION, AND INTERFERENCE EFFECTS Thus far, a case has been built for the theoretical viability of the preconscious operation of goals. Such ideas are present (and well developed) in William James' discussion of quasi-reflexive behavior and in Kurt Lewin's writing on concepts such as intentions as quasi-needs and valence. The theoretical conception of preconscious control is also consistent with empirical work on automatic evaluation (e.g. Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986) and the idea that preferences are independent of (and may be activated prior to) cognitive processing (e.g., Zajonc, 1980). We turn next to recent evidence that accompanies the theoretical notion that has developed throughout the 20th century, and reviewed in the previous section, promoting the possibility for the preconscious activation and regulation of goals. Surprisingly, prior to the 1990s, the empirical work in social psychology that directly addressed the automatic regulation of goals was limited to the New Look research of the 1940s and 1950s. As reviewed already, such research demonstrated that needs and values with a chronic state of heightened accessibility (i.e., perceptual readiness) influenced perception, attention, and judgment. However, rather than extending these findings beyond the case of chronic goal states to the preconscious activation and effects of temporary goals, or to examining the mechanisms through which preconscious control emerged, the field generally eschewed the examination of the preconscious operation of goals and motives. The empirical findings from the New Look were influential not in initiating a renaissance in social-psychological examinations of motivation that now incorporated automatic processing. Instead, with the advent of the cognitive revolution in psychology, the focus during the 30 to 40 years following the New Look movement, to the extent that it was concerned with preconscious processes, was placed on cognitive processes involved in attention, judgment, and memory. The influence on such processes was said to originate not from the goals of the perceiver, but from the activation of cognitive constructs such as traits, attitudes, and stereotypes. Unintended Effects of Consciously Activated Goals Srull and Wyer's (1986) review of goal effects on cognition points out that the preconscious operation of goals was not abandoned during the cognitive revolution in psychology. Instead, research during this period addressed the unintended influence of consciously chosen goals on cognitive processing. Cognitive Tuning. For example, research on cognitive tuning (e.g., Brock & Fromkin, 1968; Cohen, 1961; Zajonc, 1960) has assigned participants to conditions that differ in terms of the tasks or goals they are asked to perform. Zajonc (1960) instructed half of the participants to transmit impressions of a target person to others (i.e., to play the role of communicators), whereas the other half were told to receive impressions of the target person formed by others (i.e., to play the role of recipients). These goals exerted an effect in that communicators polarized and distorted stimulus information to a greater extent than recipients. Depth of Processing. Similar to the cognitive tuning research, Craik and Lockhart (1972) suggested the style with which information is processed (from shallow to deep) varies as a function of one's processing goals. For example, deeper processing is found when one processes information with a goal that promotes self-reference and the activation of self-schemas (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). More shallow processing emerges when one engages in information processing with a goal that focuses attention on specific and isolated features of a stimulus (e.g., Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). Impression Formation Versus Memorization . Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980a) demonstrated that recall for information was affected by whether participants had the goal of memorizing information or forming

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Page 345 an impression when encoding that stimulus information. When forming an impression, subsequent tests of recall revealed that information was organized in memory in clusters of related traits; thematically related information was stored together. Additionally, an impression formation goal has been found to lead to better recall of stimulus information than the goal of trying to memorize (e.g., Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1981, Srull, 1981; 1983; Srull & Brand, 1983). Thought Suppression . According to Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987), the conscious goal of suppressing a particular thought (such as attempting to not think about food when dieting or fasting) can activate the very construct (food) one is attempting to avoid. This “ironic effect” is believed to arise because thought suppression activates two processing systems: an effortful operating system and an automatic monitoring system (Wegner, 1994). The operating process seeks thoughts to serve as distractors, the monitoring process is tuned to detect failures of mental control. The latter task is simpler and this greater efficiency allows the monitoring system to run unchecked even when there are drains on attentional resources (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992). Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) proposed that the monitoring system's detection of suppressed thoughts serves as a form of repetitive priming, with residual activation persisting after conscious attempts at suppression have stopped. This would account not only for ironic effects of thought suppression, but would explain the accessibility of thoughts related to the object of suppression at levels of activation even greater than if one had focused on the thought (hyperaccessibility). Perspective Taking. Simply taking the perspective of another person can also influence how information is processed. Anderson and Pitchert (1978) found that participants asked to take the perspective of a burglar “casing’’ a home attended to, noticed, and recalled different features of a house compared with a person asked to examine the exact same information regarding the house from the perspective of a person intending to buy the home. Regan and Totten (1975) found that actor-observer differences in attributional processing (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971) were attenuated when participants were asked to take the perspective of the person they were observing. Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Paek (1998) proposed that miscommunication often arises because most utterances are ambiguous in that they have multiple meanings and communicators fail to take each other's perspective into account in attempting to make sense of an utterance. Instead, an utterance is somewhat automatically interpreted in terms of the perceiver's own egocentric biases, using one's own accessible knowledge, and only later is the perspective of the communication partner taken into account (for similar anchor and adjustment notions of correction in social cognition, see Krull, chap. 13, this volume; Wegener, Dunn, & Tokusato, chap. 17, this volume). Davis, Conklin, Smith, and Luce (1996) further found that following perspective taking one perceives greater overlap between ratings of the self and the target whose perspective one has taken; one sees an increased number of features, such as self-descriptive traits, as overlapping with the target. Finally, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000b) found that perspective taking exerted an unintended influence on two separate processes related to intergroup perception. Perspective taking reduced the accessibility of stereotypes related to an outgroup and, in a minimal group paradigm (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), increased ratings of an outgroup (participants taking the perspective of an outgroup did not display ingroup favoritism). Intended Effects of Unconsciously Activated Goals The previous section has revealed that consciously adopted goals have unintended and preconscious effects. However, despite the fact that adopting a goal leads to the various subroutines necessary for goal pursuit (such as attention to, increased accessibility for, and encoding/organization of information relevant to the goal) proceeding in the preconscious, the activation of the goal was still described as requiring consciousness. Thus, intent is assumed to require conscious deliberation either in the form of a self-selected choice to pursue a goal or through an explicit instruction to adopt a goal. As an example, most people assume participants in the Milgram (1963) experiment would not persist in administering shocks to the clearly suffering victim had they not (a) been given an explicit instruction to persist by the experimenter and (b) agonizingly deliberated over whether to continue to conform with that instruction. However, the notion of preconscious control suggests that perhaps far less than conscious deliberation is required to produce such behaviors; something as simple as the activation of a goal to be aggressive. Carver et al. (1983) used a sentence construction task (Srull & Wyer, 1979) to prime participants with words related to aggression. Participants were then placed in a situation where they had to shock another person every time that person incorrectly answered a question. The length of time the shock lasted was longer for participants primed with aggression. Although not as dramatic as the Milgram

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Page 346 studies, where participants persist in shocking the victim at ever-increasing levels and despite the victim's screams, this research demonstrates the impact of passive primes on (shocking) behavior. Reflecting on the Carver et al. (1983) findings, Bargh (1990) proposed the auto-motive model. This model added a component to research on goal pursuit that made an important theoretical assumption that moved such research to the domain of preconscious control (Bargh, 1997, p. 29): Once activated, functionally transparent or automated skills can interact with the environment in a sophisticated way, taking in information relevant to the goal's purposes, and directing appropriate responses based on that information, without the need for conscious involvement in those responses. The auto-motive model of goal-directed action (Bargh, 1990) added just one assumption to this idea: The entry point or trigger that starts the goal into operation can itself be subsumed and removed from conscious choice. This addition returns us to the theorizing of James (1890/1950) by asserting that, for a goal to be activated, there need not be conscious deliberation at any stage. That is, beyond the fact that the decision to pursue a goal can lead to responses that do not require conscious monitoring, there is the important additional question of whether the decision to pursue a goal is required for goal pursuit to be initiated. Can volitional activity be triggered and engaged in without one needing to consciously regulate either the activation of the goal pursuit or the subroutines involved in the pursuit? It is this question that defines preconscious control. Preconscious goal pursuit involves not merely the unintended or automatic effects of goals, but the preconscious forces that determine the particular goal the individual will pursue. Goals as Knowledge Structures . Kruglanski (1996) and Bargh (1990) proposed that goals are mental representations that are stored in memory and capable of being activated. Because links between stimuli and mental representations lead to the increased accessibility of such representations given the presence of the appropriate stimuli (see Stapel, chap. 14, this volume), goals should similarly be able to be activated. Bargh (1990) hypothesized that this process would operate in precisely the same manner as the activation of other mental representations such as stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989), trait constructs (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), and attitudes (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986) – either through spreading activation or through direct links to a relevant stimulus. Such links are said to develop through experience. Conscious deliberation regarding the pursuit of a goal given a specific set of circumstances leads these two events to be paired. The consistent choice to pair a goal and a situation leads to the development of an associative link between these two events. Over time, this link develops enough strength such that conscious deliberation is no longer needed for the goal to be activated given the appropriate circumstances (Bargh, 1990). However, research on the activation of goals in the absence of conscious deliberation to pursue the goal has been limited. Chartrand and Bargh (1996) approached this shortcoming by cleverly focusing on two information processing goals that are known to have a variety of preconscious effects – impression formation and memorization. These goals had previously only been given to research participants explicitly through an experimenter's instruction. Chartrand and Bargh reasoned that if consciously providing people with impression formation versus memorization goals yields differences in how information is processed, the same pattern of effects should be found if these goals are preconsciously activated. The effects of an activated construct should not depend on what the source of a construct's activation is; what matters only is that the mental representation is activated (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992). In support of this, rather than providing conscious instructions to adopt impression formation versus memorization goals, Chartrand and Bargh (1996, Experiment 1) primed these goals using a sentence completion task and examined the effects of these primed goals using a paradigm borrowed from Hamilton et al. (1980). In this paradigm, behaviors of a target person are presented as a list, and a surprise recall test later assesses both memory for the behaviors and clustering in free recall. Hamilton et al. found that recall for the information was better when participants were asked to form an impression as opposed to when explicitly asked to remember the behaviors. Additionally, these two goals led to differences in how information was organized in memory. Consistent with the findings of Hamilton et al., Chartrand and Bargh's participants with primed impression formation goals had higher clustering scores and recalled a greater number of behaviors during the recall test. A similar goal-priming paradigm was used by Bargh and Barndollar (1996). In these studies, goals were activated through a word puzzle that contained either words related to achievement or affiliation goals. The effects of the primed goals were then assessed through participants' behavior with a partner on a subsequent set of word puzzles worked on in tandem. The partner was actually a confederate of the experimenter instructed to perform poorly on the task. The behavior being examined was whether participants chose to be affiliative oriented (taking time to console and help the partner) or achieve-

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Page 347 ment oriented (trying to attain the highest individual score on the task). The priming from the first task was carried over to, and determined one's performance on, the subsequent team task. Participants primed with achievement goals performed better on the word puzzle task than those primed with affiliation goals. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller (1990) primed goals of deliberating (being reflexive) versus implementing (being action oriented). These goals were activated by instructing participants to think about a personal problem through either a deliberative (thinking about alternative solutions to the problem) versus an implemental (thinking about a specific solution and how to enact it) mind-set. When later asked to work on a separate task that involved completing a partially told fairy tale, participants pursued this task in a manner consistent with their earlier goals. Those who earlier had the goal of thinking about alternatives completed the story by writing about alternatives the protagonist of the story might choose between. Those who earlier had the goal of thinking about specific courses of action completed the story by writing about specific actions taken by the protagonist. What separates this type of research from that on the unintended effects of consciously chosen instructional tasks described in the prior section is that, although participants are consciously adopting the goal, the effects being examined are not on the task to which the goal is relevant. Rather, the goal is accessible from its prior use on the goal-relevant task (thinking about a personal problem) and capable, therefore, of having that accessibility carry over to a new task (story completion) where the goal is no longer relevant. In priming paradigms of the sort just described, what is essential to label the process preconscious is that participants lack awareness that the construct in question (in this case, a goal) is accessible and exerting an influence on judgment or behavior. It is assumed that participants do not realize that a mental representation has been activated from conscious exposure to goal-relevant items in tasks such as solving word puzzles, completing sentences from jumbled sets of words, or adopting a particular mind-set. However, one way to guarantee that the activation is beyond the participants' awareness and control is to present the priming stimuli subliminally so that participants are never conscious of these stimuli. To illustrate that goals are preconsciously activated, Chartrand and Bargh (Experiment 2) flashed words relevant to impression formation goals at participants at a pace too fast for conscious recognition. They then replicated a classic finding in social cognition – that the type of goal one has at encoding determines whether impression formation occurs on-line or whether impressions are constructed from memory at the time one is asked for an impression (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986). Once again, simply activating the goal (this time, subliminally) was enough to trigger the effects of the goal on information processing. Consciously choosing the goal was not necessary to influence whether impressions were formed on-line versus constructed at recall. Chronic Goals. Although Chartrand and Bargh (1996) demonstrated that an experimenter's presentation of goalrelevant words led to activation of the goal, this does not address the question of how such goals are typically activated in the course of everyday life. One manner in which this may occur is through the individual's frequent and committed pursuit of the goal so that it is chronically paired with a set of environmental features. This would lead to the eventual movement of goal pursuit from consciousness so that the mere presence of relevant stimuli may serve to activate the goal. Moskowitz, Salomon, and Taylor (2000) tested this basic premise of preconscious control by identifying individuals with chronic goals to be egalitarian and fair toward African Americans. This chronic goal should lead to the pairing of the goal with the presence of an appropriate stimulus – an African American. A consequence of this should be that when encountering an African American, the goal to be egalitarian would be automatically activated. How can we determine whether goals are activated preconsciously and that control is occurring prior to the conscious will exerting an influence? Priming paradigms employing reaction time measures are one way to assess implicit processes; they allow for category activation to be assessed at speeds too fast for conscious control to be exerted (Fazio et al., 1986; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977). Moskowitz et al. (2000, Experiment 2) tested whether an African American face automatically activated egalitarian goals by using a lexical decision task in which letter strings immediately followed primes (a face) presented for 200 milliseconds. On critical trials, the letter strings were varied so that they were words either related to egalitarianism or words (matched for valence and frequency in the English language) irrelevant to egalitarianism. It was found that chronic egalitarians responded faster to egalitarian-relevant (but not irrelevant) words when they followed African American (but not White) faces. Response times of nonchronics did not differ as a function of either word type or prime type. Thus, having chronic goals is different than one merely being schematic for egalitarianism, because being schematic would have led to increased sensitization to egalitarian-related words regardless of what type of face

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Page 348 preceded them (e.g., Higgins et al., 1982; Postman et al., 1948). Instead, a specific cue (an African American face) was required to produce faster responses to goal-relevant words, suggesting implicit activation of a goal. Implementation Intentions Automatic activation of goals has thus far been said to occur following (a) incidental exposure to goal-relevant stimuli outside of conscious awareness (through subliminal priming), and (b) incidental exposure to goal-relevant stimuli when one is conscious of having been exposed to the stimuli but not aware of the relevance of those stimuli to one's goals or goal-relevant behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Automatic activation of goals has also been said to occur when a goal has a chronic state of perceptual readiness and is linked, through a history of associative learning, with specific environmental cues. This can lead to the goal being triggered by the mere presence of a goalrelevant cue (Moskowitz et al., 2000). The two types of preconscious control discussed by Moskowitz et al. (2000) and Chartrand and Bargh (1996) differ from each other along two important dimensions. First, Chartrand and Bargh described the effects of temporary goals, those adopted within an experimental context, whereas Moskowitz et al. discussed goals operating preconsciously because of chronic links to stimuli. Second, Moskowitz et al. focused on goals selected by the individual, whereas Chartrand and Bargh focused on goals that are incidentally triggered not by the intention to pursue the goal, but through incidental exposure to goal-relevant words. An important future direction for research on preconscious control would be the merging of the questions along these two dimensions. Can temporary goals, those selected by the individual within a specific context, that have no history of associative links or chronic associations, be activated automatically? Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) suggested this is possible through the formation of implementation intentions that link temporary goals to specific environmental features through a plan specifying the precise manner, time, and situations in which the goal is pursued. When given the goal of planning the implementation of a goal, cognitive processes are initiated that are quite different from those emerging when one simply deliberates about the pursuit of that goal without a plan. People are less distracted by irrelevant information, they are particularly efficient in processing information related to implementation-related issues, and information related to the desirability and feasibility of attaining the goal is analyzed in an overly optimistic manner (Gollwitzer, 1993). These features facilitate goal achievement because they allow the individual to cope with problems of goal pursuit, such as being distracted with irrelevant things, doubting the attractiveness of the pursued goal, or being pessimistic about its feasibility. Such processes would be even more powerful promoters of goal attainment were they to be so efficient and effortless that they could operate automatically. Reminiscent of Ach's linkage theory of intention (described earlier), implementation intentions would therefore create strong associative links between mental representations of situations and goal pursuit despite the goal not being chronically pursued, but temporary. An implementation intention essentially furnishes a goal with strong commitment to a plan that specifies links between goal-directed behavior and a stimulus. This commitment to pursuit of the goal given the presence of the stimulus should allow for that goal pursuit to proceed in as automatic a fashion as automotives that are commonly only achieved through repeated and consistent pairing of goals and environmental features. In essence, an implementation intention is an act of will that shifts the conscious control of goal-directed action to the environment so that, as with a habitualized response, situational stimuli can directly elicit goal-directed action. Therefore, it would not matter if the source of the commitment were chronic or originating from a temporary instruction. What would matter for preconscious control is that the commitment is strong enough to establish links that can be passively triggered. Gollwitzer (1993) reviewed the results of several doctoral dissertations that support the notion that implementation intentions lead to goals being preconsciously activated by goal-relevant stimuli as well as having the beneficial effects of facilitating attention to goal-relevant stimuli and initiating goal-directed responses. In one study relevant to preconscious control (Malzacher, 1992), participants were given the goal of expressing their displeasure with an experimenter who had acted in an unacceptably rude and mean manner toward them earlier in the experimental session. Some of the participants were asked to furnish this goal with an implementation intention that specified when (e.g., as soon as the experimenter is seen) and how (e.g., by asserting that the negative words used by the experimenter were unacceptable and improper) such displeasure would be expressed, and to commit to this plan through practicing exactly what would be said and when. As part of an ostensibly separate experiment run by a different experimenter participants then performed a reaction time task where response times to words were measured. Some of these words were negative traits that had previously been

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Page 349 linked to the experimenter through the implementation intention. Unbeknown to the participants, these words were preceded by subliminally presented primes that on some trials consisted of the face of the experimenter and on other trials consisted of neutral faces. If an automatic link between the experimenter and the negative traits had been formed via the implementation intention, then responses to the negative words should have been facilitated by the presence of the experimenter's face (the cue that triggers the goal). As expected, participants responded faster to the negative trait words following subliminal exposure to the experimenter's face than they did following exposure to other faces, and they responded more quickly than participants without an implementation intention, but who had a simple goal to express displeasure with the experimenter. Such a finding suggests that a goal supplemented by an implementation intention can mimic the effects of a chronic goal. Compensatory Behavior As reviewed earlier, Lewin (1951) described the intention to pursue a goal as a quasi-need in that, similar to needs, unfulfilled goals create a psychological tension –an experienced state of lacking a sense of closure. This state of tension, although not equivalent to tissue deficits that accompany need states, similarly drives the individual to engage in behavior resulting in tension reduction. To attain closure, the individual engages in a variety of steps to compensate for this deficit. First, one will perseverate on the goal when the ability to pursue the goal is either blocked or disrupted (Zeigarnik, 1927) and will have increased commitment to the goal when goal pursuit is threatened (e.g., Wright & Brehm, 1989). Additionally, one will resume goal-directed behavior when such blocks to goal pursuit are removed and an opportunity to persist with the goal-relevant behavior affords itself (Ovsiankina, 1928). This point can be extended to also say that people persist in behaviors that will bring about the goal when challenges arise (Locke & Latham, 1990); if one route to goal attainment is blocked, the individual can engage in alternate behaviors that are relevant to the goal (Mahler, 1933). Multiple acts can allow one to attempt to compensate for a lack of closure and bring about the desired goal. However, this does require conceiving of goals at a somewhat more superordinate level than a link between a specific action and a specific environmental cue. This discussion suggests another way in which goals may be activated: If goals perseverate when a goal pursuit is blocked or disrupted, then the realization that one's goals are not attained (such as one experiences a failure along a goal-relevant dimension) should activate the goal pursuit. When one falls short in the pursuit of a goal, especially a goal that has personal relevance and to which one is committed (e.g., it is linked to important features of the individual's self-concept and self-definition), it triggers the goal. The activation of the goal would subsequently subside with the elimination of the tension state, such as when one's behavior can compensate for the shortcoming. Thus, rather than the mere presence of a goal-relevant object triggering these goals, goal activation occurs when a discrepancy exists between one's actual and desired level of goal attainment. The notion that goal-directed behavior results from discrepancies between a desired end state (that one has willed through an act of intention) and one's current state (the failure to attain closure) is reflected in several theories that describe goal-directed behavior not as caused by links to specific cues (as specified by the auto-motive model), but as compensatory acts aimed at restoring the closure that was disrupted by a blocked or unfulfilled goal. Symbolic Self-Completion . One such theory is the theory of symbolic self-completion, which conceives of individuals as striving to attain certain types of higher order goals called self-defining goals. The desired end state of such goals is the specification of an identity (such as being a professional musician). As there are many indicators that one possesses an identity, the theory posits that people are engaged in an ongoing process of collecting indicators (such as gigs, fans, and sales of recorded music for a musician) of having attained the desired identity (e.g., Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). The theory further postulates that whenever shortcomings with respect to one type of symbol are encountered, one experiences a state of incompleteness, which leads to compensatory efforts that take the form of either pointing to the possession of alternative symbols or acquiring new symbols. The goal to attain these symbols persists until reached. Readiness to act toward the activated goal is greatest when the tension associated with feelings of incompleteness is high. Tension is greatest when an individual is committed to a goal – for example, when it is self defining. An identity one is not interested in possessing, which lacks commitment (such as the musician who is not committed to the goal of being an excellent cook), is not going to trigger feelings of incompleteness when shortcomings and failures are experienced. A wide range of studies, relying on a variety of self-defining goals and symbols of self-completion, have demonstrated that people engage in compensatory

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Page 350 behavior in the face of failure (e.g., Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981, 1982). For example, Gollwitzer et al. (1982) asked students to pick a domain of interest (a self-definition) that was relevant to them and then had them list at least six mistakes they had made in this domain. A control group listed mistakes made in an irrelevant domain (cooking). Participants then wrote a biographical essay about their prior involvement in the domain they picked. They were instructed to take no more than 15 minutes on this task and were provided with an alternative (more attractive) task they could turn to once finished. Relative to the control group, the participants who had experienced a state of incompleteness (undermined on a relevant dimension) wrote essays for a longer period of time before turning to an alternate task. Self-Discrepancies and Self-Standards. Some discrepancy reduction theories of goal pursuit conceive of goals as specifying a performance standard. According to Bandura (1989, 1991), goals have no motivational consequences per se, they specify conditions (standards) that allow for self-evaluation. If the goal is attained, then self-evaluation is positive; failure to attain the goal leads to negative self-evaluation. Goals stimulate acting toward goal attainment when people cognize a discrepancy between the status quo and the goal, pushed by the negative self-evaluation and pulled by the anticipated positive self-evaluation that is linked to closing the gap between the status quo and the goal (Bandura & Cervone, 1983). Self-discrepancy theory (e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986) proposes that one not only evaluates current performance against a standard, but that there are different types of standards that may be established to guide one through the self-evaluation process. These include performance standards that represent what one ought to attain (i.e., what one should accomplish) and standards representing what one can ideally attain (i.e., what one would hope to accomplish in the best possible case). Discrepancies arising when one's actual performance falls short of one type of standard will result in different emotional and motivational consequences than discrepancies arising when one's actual performance fails to meet the other type of standard. Higgins (1989a) summarized a set of experiments showing that a discrepancy between one's actual state and an ideal state will lead to dejection-related emotions (such as sadness, depression, disappointment). However, a discrepancy between one's actual state and the state one ought to have attained leads to the experience of agitation-related emotions (such as anxiety, fear, guilt, and restlessness). Thus, the experience of a discrepancy from a performance standard has different consequences as a function of the type of standards one uses as a self-guide. For example, high-and low-prejudice people differ in the types of standards they hold regarding how they ought to respond to members of stereotyped groups. Low-prejudice persons are less likely to endorse stereotypes and are more concerned with living up to the standard of being egalitarian. Despite that they may not differ in the likelihood that a stereotype will be activated to start with (Devine, 1989; see Blair, chap. 22, this volume for a review of implicit stereotyping), these types of individuals differ in how they use a stereotype once activated. Devine (1989, Experiment 3) asked research participants to list as many alternate labels and slang words for the group Black Americans that they could think of as part of a task ostensibly about how people informally talk about groups. The logic was that listing slang words forces people to not only use stereotypic words, but also to be cognizant of the fact that they know these words and perhaps sometimes use them outside of the lab. Low-prejudice participants should experience the tension associated with the discrepancy aroused by this task. Next participants were asked to list their personal thoughts about these labels and about African Americans more generally. The thought listing task was provided as an opportunity for participants to perform compensatory actions aimed at reducing the tension (through the types of traits and belief statements they listed). Indeed, low-prejudice participants used this task to express positive beliefs about the group, whereas high-prejudice people were more likely to use negative and stereotypic traits (and fewer belief statements). Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) demonstrated that one reason for the differential use of stereotypes between these groups is because of differences as to whether self-discrepancies are experienced once stereotypes are activated. Low-prejudice persons experience discrepancies when their sense of what they ought to do has been undermined by the knowledge that stereotypes are sometimes activated and exerting an influence on what they actually do. This discrepancy between ought and actual standards should trigger agitation-related emotions such as guilt. However, because high-prejudice persons do not endorse the same standards of what ought to be done, they are less likely to experience a discrepancy. If they do note the difference between what they should do and what they actually do, they are less likely to experience emotions and motives that will trigger a compensatory response because they are not committed to that standard. Devine et al. (1991) made low-and high-prejudice people aware of the discrepancy between their actions and how they should

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Page 351 act. Low-prejudice people were shown to experience feelings of guilt, but high-prejudice people did not. Monteith (1993) extended these findings. A discrepancy arising from awareness of one's prejudice produced negative affect that motivated both cognition and behavior aimed at reducing the discrepancy. Attention was allocated to stimuli relevant to the discrepancy, and behavior was initiated to search for indications of the discrepancy. These responses are compensatory in that they allow the individual to specify the conditions that produced the discrepancy and establish coping strategies to be utilized in the future (see Monteith, chap. 23, this volume for a more detailed review of current work on prejudice as discrepancy arousing). Compensatory behavior following a perceived discrepancy could qualify as a case of preconscious control. This would require that the individual was not aware that the discrepancy either increased the accessibility of a goal construct or that the activated goal influenced behavior. In the research conducted thus far on compensatory behavior, the likelihood that these conditions have been met is low. Granted, these studies did not set out to examine whether compensatory action is automatic. Instead, a discrepancy is typically introduced by making one's shortcomings salient to the individual. Then the individual is placed in a situation that clearly affords an opportunity to address those shortcomings. Given the closeness in time between the activation of a state of incompleteness and the response aimed at addressing it, it is likely that the discrepancy is still the focus of conscious attention and participants are consciously seeking to reduce it. This possibility that participants are consciously focused on restoring a sense of completeness is compounded by the similarity of the discrepancy-arousing task and the discrepancy-reducing task (e.g., feeling tension due to one's responses on a test about a group and making judgments about that same group). Additionally, participants are aware of the fact that they are making responses (e.g., making judgments of groups, writing lists of traits and beliefs, etc.) and potentially are aware that these responses can be used to address their experienced sense of incompleteness. However, the effects of a discrepancy on action need not be examined in this fashion. The Zeigarnik effect shows us that disrupted goals remain active over time. Mahler's (1933) research shows us that alternate behaviors can substitute for the disrupted behavior. Thus, the preconscious effects of discrepancies on compensatory behavior could be examined by distancing the goal activation from the behavioral response (so that the goal is active but not salient) and by making the behavior task one that is not so directly linked to a goal that has been undermined or disrupted. Compensatory Cognition Plans to initiate behavior are not the only responses that can address a discrepancy. Cognitive processes also prepare one to respond in goal-relevant ways and allow one to regulate goal pursuit. For example, Roese (chap. 19, this volume) identifies attributions as a primary type of compensatory cognition. Similarly, spontaneous trait inferences were said to be preconscious processes of attribution triggered by a discrepancy. The discrepancy was said to be between the chronic goal of understanding the people, behaviors, and events in one's environment and the uncertainty and lack of understanding that exists when one observes behavior (Heider, 1944). Trait inferences that provide these explanations occur quickly and preconsciously, and thus represent a prototypic case of compensatory cognition. A question of central concern for this chapter is whether compensatory cognitive responses occur automatically and qualify as a type of preconscious control. We turn next to recent research and directions for future research addressing this possibility. Selective Attention in the Service of Goals. Moskowitz (2000a) examined this question by not merely using a cognitive response that was superficially dissimilar to the task that aroused the discrepancy, but by employing a task that could not be consciously controlled. Participants' cognitive responses were made toward stimuli presented too fast for conscious recognition and reacted to at speeds that suggest conscious intervention would not be possible. Such research was aimed at demonstrating that the early stages of cognitive processing – where attention is selectively used to screen stimuli – are in the service of goals that have been activated by a discrepancy. Moskowitz (2000a) manipulated the activation of goal striving by either undermining a participant's sense of efficacy on a self-relevant goal or affirming their sense of efficacy on that goal. Affirming one's sense of efficacy in goal pursuit was chosen as a comparison against creating a sense of incompleteness to avoid the possibility that any differences in subsequent cognitive responses would reflect simple construct activation. Each of the two groups would have spent equal time thinking about the goal construct and the semantic constructs that accompany it. Where they differ is in whether incompleteness was experienced and whether compensatory strivings would have been activated. Thus, rather than mere goal activation, it was posited that feelings of incompleteness related to the goal would be activated, and that this

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Page 352 would trigger preconscious cognitive responses aimed specifically at addressing the shortcoming (such as increased vigilance or perceptual sensitivity to goal-relevant items). In Experiment 1, participants were college athletes who were asked to describe, in writing, a time in which they had either failed or succeeded at an important athletic event, focusing on the consequences of this success/failure for them and their teammates. After having their self-defining, athletic goals either undermined or affirmed in this way, participants performed a Stroop-like task where they were asked to name (by speaking into a headset microphone attached to a timer) the color of the ink of various words presented on a computer monitor. The words presented were either relevant or irrelevant to the goal of being athletic. People who had been undermined or made to feel incomplete in their goal strivings showed automatic attention effects. Their responses (pronunciation speeds) to goal-relevant words were reliably slower than individuals who had affirmed their sense of efficacy on the goal. When irrelevant words were presented, there was no difference between the groups. Thus, a state of incompleteness remained active over time and was capable of automatically directing attention away from a focal task and toward discrepancy-reducing stimuli. Moskowitz (2000a, Experiments 2 and 3) replicated this preconscious influence on attention by changing the experimental task so that facilitation in response times as well as distraction effects could be examined. The experimental task required participants to attend to two moving stimuli on a monitor – one moving vertically on one side of a fixation cross and the other moving vertically on the other side of the cross. Which side of the cross the moving objects were on was varied from trial to trial. Participants were instructed to indicate (by pushing a button) whether the vertically moving item was moving up or down. Response times from the initiation of movement to the participant's response were recorded by the computer. The movement on each trial lasted only 200 milliseconds. The objects in motion were actually words, with some of the words being goal-relevant and some being irrelevant. Additionally, these words were sometimes presented as distractors (moving in the horizontal plane in this task) or as focal objects (moving in the vertical plane in this task). When an egalitarian goal was undermined, implicit processes of goal regulation were shown to be initiated. Goalrelevant words presented as distractors served to slow down one's responses on the focal task for these participants relative to those who had affirmed their sense of efficacy on the goal. Responses for these two groups to irrelevant words presented as distractors (horizontally moving) were not reliably different. Similarly, when the words of interest were presented in the vertical plane, facilitation in response times was evidenced by individuals who had been undermined but not for those who had been affirmed. However, these differences in response times were not found for irrelevant words. These experiments suggest that when a goal striving is activated, it leads to implicit attempts to pursue the goal. Compensatory cognition is initiated preconsciously to allow for the implicit regulation of a goal. The term compensatory cognition is meant to signal the belief that the responses following the goal are taken as an attempt to reduce the state of incompleteness or lack of efficacy in a relevant domain. Cognitive processing is initiated that will allow one to respond to stimuli relevant to the incomplete goal striving and reduce the sense of failure that one is experiencing. Similar to Chartrand and Bargh (1996), this research demonstrates that activated goals can exert a preconscious influence over cognition. Temporary goals, however, were activated not by people being presented goal-relevant words, but by their own contemplation of a failure in goal pursuit. Regulatory Focus . Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes (1994) proposed that a strategic component to goal regulation exists that specifies a general tactic used for regulating the steps taken toward goal pursuit. Higgins et al. argued that because all behavior is motivated by the desire to either approach pleasurable stimuli or avoid aversive stimuli, the strategies used toward goal pursuit are geared toward either approach or avoidance (see Brendl, chap. 20, this volume, for a review). A strategy that regulates goal pursuit through a focus on approaching a desired or ideal state is called a promotion focus , whereas a strategy that regulates goal pursuit through a focus on avoiding undesired states that represent behaviors one should not engage in to attain the goal is called a prevention focus . Higgins and colleagues (e.g., Förster & Higgins, 1998; Förster, Higgins, & Strack, 2000; Higgins et al., 1994; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) argued that the type of regulatory focus accessible during goal pursuit affects the manner in which the goal is regulated. Regulatory focus can have both conscious and preconscious effects on goal regulation, and the regulatory focus can be adopted without conscious intent, as demonstrated through both priming paradigms that temporarily activate a regulatory focus as well as examining individuals with chronic styles of regulatory focus. For example, Förster and Higgins (1998) examined what they dubbed the goal looms larger effect : “the value of a success increases as one is closer to the goal. The

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Page 353 greater the value of succeeding, the stronger the motivation to succeed” (p. 1117). Thus, although each success reduces the discrepancy associated with not yet attaining the goal, the remaining discrepancy continues to motivate the individual to pursue the goal. In fact, the individual is even more motivated the closer he or she gets to attaining the goal because each subsequent success will be able to resolve an even greater percentage of the discrepancy (Brendl & Higgins, 1996). To examine the influence of regulatory focus on the goal looms larger effect, Förster and Higgins relied on a paradigm (described earlier) where arm flexion and arm extension were used to represent approach and avoidance motives. The strength of these motives was assessed by the strength with which participants pressed a button while their arms were either flexed or extended. Using chronic measures to divide people into groups according to regulatory focus in Experiment 1 and priming procedures to assign participants to promotion and prevention focused groups in Experiment 2, a consistent pattern of results was found. As participants moved closer to goal attainment, those people with a promotion focus pressed with greater force when they were flexing their arm, whereas those with a prevention focus pressed harder when extending their arm. Participants were not aware that their arm position was exerting an influence on their strength of button press nor that a particular regulatory focus was more accessible than the other. Förster et al. (2000) extended the preconscious effects of regulatory focus to the domain of recall. It was predicted that high-prejudice people would endorse stereotypes and, therefore, would be more likely to have a discrepancy aroused by stereotype-inconsistent behavior. This assumption requires regarding a disconfirmed stereotype as an instance of prevention failure for high-prejudice people. The discrepancy aroused by such a failure would motivate people to engage in compensatory cognitions, such as increased vigilance and attention to stereotype-inconsistent information (as well as information about the context in which such behavior occurred). It was further predicted that regulatory focus would exert an influence over these effects, because people with a prevention focus are more tuned toward detecting mismatches, such as a behavior that is inconsistent with an expectancy or stereotype. Consistent with these predictions, participants with a prevention focus and higher prejudice scores had enhanced memory for information incongruent with their stereotypes. Counterfactual Thoughts. A counterfactual thought is a cognition focused on the discrepancy between an event and an alternative reality. This alternative reality is represented as thoughts about what might have been, should have been, and was intended to be (Roese, chap. 19, this volume). Roese describes counterfactual thoughts as a type of compensatory cognition because they are, by definition, representations of goals that have not been attained. Such thoughts triggered by an undesired event, where the alternative and desired event is easily imagined, lead to feelings of disappointment and regret (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Roese suggests such emotions be construed as a precursor to successful problem-solving cognitions. Counterfactual thoughts are goal oriented and aimed at compensating for the unattained state made salient by the counterfactual event. They are central for social navigation because they are thoughts that involve assessment, explanation, and planning. Interference and Inhibition: Competition Between Preconscious Responses There is now a growing body of evidence that goals are not only pursued and regulated through conscious acts of intention. Goal pursuit can be preconsciously initiated by the goal being activated through (a) incidental exposure to the goal construct (either in the form of behavior that is relevant to the goal or words that are synonyms for the goal), (b) the goal being linked to specific environmental stimuli (either through chronic associations developing with time and practice, or through temporary plans that link the goal and a specific stimulus), and (c) failure, feeling incomplete, and being undermined in a goal-relevant dimension (thus triggering compensatory responses that are not only determined by the strength of one's commitment to the goal, the feasibility of attaining the goal, and the desirability of attaining the goal, but by regulatory focus). The fact that goals are automatically activated and trigger cognitive processes that facilitate goal attainment introduces yet another manner through which preconscious control can occur. Goals can compete with, interfere with, and inhibit other automatic processes. Because goals exert an impact on the early and preconscious stages of information processing, unwanted thoughts and bad habits (or any response that might otherwise run unchecked and uncontrolled) could potentially be disrupted or prevented by an incompatible goal. Essentially, control over cognitive processes can occur via a preconscious “battle” between opposing constructs. This is an important component to add to models of control because conceiving of control as requiring effort and conscious intent is equivalent to saying that control can only occur after an unwanted process has been initiated. Control in such cases is equated with processes

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Page 354 of adjusting or correcting an event that has already occurred. A preconscious battle between constructs, including activated goals, introduces the possibility that control is not only a matter of correction, but prevention . The importance of this conception lies in the fact that a correction model of control reveals many limitations to selfregulation. The attempt to suppress an unwanted thought can lead to those thoughts not only rebounding, but being even more accessible than if one had not attempted to suppress them (Wegner, 1994). One may lack the awareness that an unwanted process (such as the activation of a stereotype) has occurred and, therefore, fail to initiate goaldirected attempts at control. Even when one is both aware that an unwanted thought has occurred and is motivated to correct it, one may lack the cognitive resources (due to distraction, cognitive load, multi-tasking, rumination, etc.) to engage in the effortful processes required for control (for a review, see Moskowitz et al., 1999). Preconscious control would not be subject to these limitations. Instead, goals could strategically (although unconsciously) be used to combat unwanted thoughts and behaviors. Two forms that interference and competition between constructs can take are now reviewed: (a) one construct is activated instead of an alternate (stimulus relevant) construct, and (b) two constructs are activated and one suppresses the other if the two are incompatible. These two types of interference essentially describe a race between constructs to capture a stimulus, with the placement of the finish line being all that differs between them (in the former case, the race is finished before one of the two constructs has been activated; in the latter, it is finished when the stimulus has been categorized). These types of control are linked to Logan's (1989) discussion of automaticity as retrieval (reviewed earlier), where retrieval is assumed to take time, and each association to a cue has its own retrieval distribution. Which response is elicited is determined by what Logan likened to a horse race between constructs, with the winner being the construct that was retrieved more quickly. Constructs in a Race to Activation. One way an automatic process may be disrupted and controlled is by an incompatible construct being activated prior to and instead of it. For example, rather than a stereotype being the strongest association to an outgroup, it remains possible that an alternate construct could be linked, through training, to the outgroup. Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin (2000) had participants complete a training session in which they learned nonstereotypic associations to an outgroup. This led to stereotypic associations failing to be activated in the outgroup's presence. Skurnik, Moskowitz, and Johnson (2000) found a similar type of disruption of preconscious processes. In their research the preconscious process was the tendency to label familiar information as true (what Begg, Anas, & Faranacci, 1992, called the “illusion of truth” and Gilbert, 1991, called ‘‘Spinozan processing”. Skurnik et al., found that individuals who had repeated exposure to a set of information that was mostly false later were more likely to label familiar information as false, rather than true. The robust and preconscious bias toward inferring that information is true had been controlled. This type of research demonstrates that passive processes can be disrupted and replaced by new associations that are also automatically linked to the stimulus. Constructs Activated in Parallel in a Race to Capture a Stimulus . Similarly, in cases where two constructs are activated, competition between them can determine how a stimulus is categorized. The more dominant category is not merely used, but suppresses the competing category. Although research has not examined goals as one of the activated constructs, there is reason to believe that goals will be activated and compete with incompatible (and facilitate compatible) constructs. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) showed this competition between activated constructs by examining two stereotypes relevant to the same stimulus. Participants observing a Chinese woman eating noodles with chopsticks had the Chinese stereotype activated while inhibiting the stereotype of women, whereas people observing a Chinese woman putting on make-up in front of a mirror had the female stereotype activated and the Chinese stereotype inhibited. Macrae et al. posited that, given the existence of multiple ways to categorize a person, there is an interplay of both excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms that regulate the activation of these categories. When one category is dominant and is used to categorize a stimulus, alternative categories that had been competing to capture the stimulus are suppressed. The role of suppression is to reduce the interference resulting from these distracting and competing categories. The suppression of constructs that fail to win this race to categorization is particularly pronounced when the competing constructs are incompatible with each other, such as when stereotypic and counter-stereotypic categories are activated. Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996) found that priming a stereotype facilitated access to stereotype-consistent traits and inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. Rothbart, Sriram, and Davis-Stitt (1996) obtained similar results for exemplars. Category label primes increased the ability to retrieve typical category members and limited access to atypical members.

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Page 355 Macrae and MacLeod (1999) examined similar types of interference and suppression between competing constructs in the domain of memory and forgetting. The inability to remember information may be caused by interference from a competing representation that blocks the desired information from reaching consciousness. Macrae and MacLeod extended the research of Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994) by positing that the retrieval of social information is regulated by implicit processes leading to the temporary forgetting (suppression) of competing constructs. When one wants to remember the name of a date one is meeting at a restaurant, this is served by names of past dates taken to that restaurant being automatically suppressed. Retrieving a specific item from memory leads to the suppression (rather than activation) of relevant, but competing, items. Goals and Interference Effects . Goals, as constructs represented in memory that can be activated, should similarly be capable of competing with incompatible constructs to determine how a stimulus is categorized. The ability for goals to exert preconscious control by disrupting the activation of alternative constructs linked to the same stimulus has been a focus of research in my lab. Goal activation has been examined as arising from both chronic and temporary sources. The construct we have examined has been the stereotype linked to a specific group and implicitly activated when encountering group-relevant stimuli. The competing goal we have examined has been the desire to approach being egalitarian and fair toward members of these groups (but see also Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000b, where perspective taking goals were shown to interfere with stereotype activation through the self-concept being activated instead). The goals and competing constructs chosen to be examined in this series of studies were selected to serve two purposes. In addition to allowing us to examine the question of whether goals compete with incompatible constructs to determine which construct is activated, this approach allows us to further examine mechanisms of stereotype control. That is, goals may be able to preconsciously disrupt the activation of a stereotype, thus leading to control over stereotypes not through one being motivated to correct for the use of a stereotype, but by preventing the activation (and perforce the use) of the stereotype to start with. Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal (1999) examined interference between stereotypes of women and chronic egalitarian goals toward women. A pronunciation task was used to assess if the stereotype of women was activated. Individuals with and without chronic goals were asked to pronounce words flashed on a monitor. Each word immediately followed an image that remained on the screen for 200 milliseconds. On critical trials, the image was the face of either a woman or man and the words were either stereotype-relevant or -irrelevant. If a stereotype was activated, a priming effect would be found where stereotype-relevant words are pronounced faster than irrelevant words, but only following stereotype-relevant faces. Moskowitz et al. (1999) found that nonchronics displayed a facilitation in response time (relative to chronics) when pronouncing stereotypic attributes after stereotypic primes. Facilitation was not found when these words followed stereotype-irrelevant primes. Individuals with chronic egalitarian goals did not differ in their responses to stereotyperelevant words as a function of the type of prime. This pattern of activation for nonchronics and control for chronics was found even when responses were made at speeds where responses could not have been mediated by conscious attempts to suppress a stereotype (when target words followed primes by 200 milliseconds). The findings suggest that chronic egalitarian goals can disrupt an automatic link between a group representation and its stereotype – stereotype activation is not inevitable. Moskowitz et al. (2000) found an identical pattern of results using the African American stereotype and participants selected on the basis of whether they had chronic goals to be egalitarian and fair toward African Americans. This paradigm does not provide direct evidence that goals had been activated and interfered with the activation of the stereotype, so in a second experiment (reviewed earlier) Moskowitz et al. replaced stereotype-relevant words in the task with egalitarian-related words. In support of the hypothesis, African American faces (but not White faces) facilitated responses to egalitarian words (but not control words) for chronics (but not nonchronics). However, perhaps the clearest test of the hypothesis that goals are activated and competing with the stereotype comes from research in which goals to be egalitarian are temporarily created in the lab (Gollwitzer, Schaal, Moskowitz, Hammelbeck, & Wasel, 2000; Moskowitz, 2000b). Thus, similar differences in the activation of stereotypes for individuals randomly assigned to goal conditions could only be differing as a function of the differences in goal activation. What sort of temporary goals could lead to preconscious effects of this sort so that the activation of stereotypes linked through history to a target are interfered with? As reviewed earlier, the commitment necessary to produce automatic activation of a goal can arise from one having formed implementation intentions that are attached to the goal. For example, Gollwitzer et al. (2000) had partici

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Page 356 pants all adopt the goal of being fair and egalitarian toward women. Half of the participants, however, furnished these goals with implementation intentions. When a goal is furnished with a plan and commitment to the goal provided by the plan, the initiation of the response can be turned over to the environment so that all that is needed is the presence of the appropriate stimulus. Gollwitzer et al. found that only participants with implementation intentions were able to control the automatic activation of stereotypes. Moskowitz (2000b) found a similar effect of goals that were assigned to participants in the lab interfering with the activation of an African American stereotype. Finally, through what mechanism do activated goals prevent the activation of a stereotype? One possibility, as reviewed earlier, is that one construct is activated in place of the other. Rather than a stereotype being activated, an egalitarian goal is activated. An extension of this line of reasoning would be the possibility that not merely does one construct's activation interfere with the activation of incompatible constructs, but that incompatible constructs are inhibited so that the activation potential of those constructs is actually reduced. Practice at associating a goal with a stimulus can lead to the implicit activation of the goal in the presence of a stimulus (Bargh, 1990). However, what happens when one has practiced the goal of suppressing a construct in the presence of a stimulus? Single instances of adopting a suppression goal have been shown to lead to the hyperactivation of the to-be-suppressed construct rather than its inhibition (Wegner, 1994). However, if suppression attempts could be routinized through practice (or through contextual conditions that create a strong enough commitment to the goal), perhaps the presence of a relevant cue would trigger inhibition rather than activation of the to-be-avoided construct. Fox (1995) suggested that a process perhaps better labeled as spreading inhibition can be produced if attention is repeatedly focused on ignoring a stimulus and the semantic content associated with it. Rather than facilitation being found, practice at avoiding a construct can result in that construct being implicitly inhibited. Tipper (1985) labeled this inhibition of ignored stimuli negative priming . Neill, Valdes, and Terry (1995) described spreading inhibition from negative priming as represented by a slow down rather than a facilitation to words linked to the ignored category. Thus, if chronic egalitarians are skilled at inhibiting stereotypes, it is likely that the presence of stereotype-relevant cues does more than activate their egalitarian goals and prevent the activation of stereotypes. Moskowitz et al. (1999) provided initial evidence that the stereotype may be inhibited by the presence of a stereotype-relevant cue (such as a member of the stereotyped group) by demonstrating that chronics exhibit a slow down in response times to stereotype-relevant words in a negative priming task (where the stereotypic prime is to be ignored rather than attended to). Moskowitz et al. suggested that, in the case of stereotyping, categorization of a person as having dark skin, or female features, or religious attire would occur as a natural part of the preconscious processes of perception and categorization. However, the semantic content linked to the category by virtue of cultural stereotypes (violent or emotional or zealot) could be inhibited as a function of categorization, rather than activated. Such inhibition would be produced by attempts to ignore and suppress the stereotype by people who have automated these processes. CONCLUSIONS Volitional Control Need Not Involve Correction Conscious goals are known to lead to effortful attempts to explicitly control cognitive processing. Chaiken and Trope's (1999) book on dual process models reveals that the past 20 years have seen much research focused on how goals moderate cognition by initiating processing that corrects automatic processes. For example, Gilbert (1989) and Tetlock (1985) suggested goals trigger an adjustment in attributional reasoning so that automatic trait inferences are modified by a consideration of situational constraints; Martin (1986), Moskowitz and Roman (1992), Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler, and Wänke (1993), and Wegener and Petty (1995) demonstrated that contrast effects emerge when the goal to have an unbiased judgment leads one to correct for perceived influences on judgment; Devine (1989), Fiske and Neuberg (1990), and Kruglanski and Freund (1983) posited that goals to be accurate lead one to remove or dissociate from one's judgment the automatic biasing influence of a stereotype; and Gilbert (1991) hypothesized that information is automatically encoded as true and later adjusted to determine whether it is false. Thus, the field has been focused on the ability of conscious goals to correct the output of automatic processing rather than on the ability for goals to prevent those processes. However, goals are capable of being involved in the construction, not just the correction, of one's responses. Control over an automatic process is not merely a question of overturning the output of that process, but of a struggle between those processes and other preconscious responses. Such control may come in

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Page 357 the form of competing beliefs that are also automatically linked to a stimulus (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2000; Skurnik et al., 2000), but it also may come in the form of goals. Volition may operate preconsciously, with the important consequence that control over cognition and behavior need not be dependent on capacity or awareness of bias that correction processes demand to be successful. The Implicit Activation and Regulation of Goals Research on cognitive control has not only addressed the effortful correction processes triggered by consciously adopted goals. It has also been firmly established that goals can disrupt implicit cognitive processes such as those involved in the Stroop Effect (Logan, 1980), priming effects (Smith, 1979), stereotype activation (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997), and spontaneous inference (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). Yet two issues of central concern to preconscious control are not components of the research listed earlier. The first issue involves the nature of the goals that are examined. The goals of interest in this chapter are not merely instructional tasks that manipulate attention to specific parts of a stimulus array or place participants under cognitive load, but goals that specify the approach or avoidance of an end state selected by the individual. Preconscious control incorporates goals that require the stimulus to be analyzed for meaning specifically because the meaning associated with the stimulus is central to the goal. For example, a goal to be egalitarian to Jews might prevent stereotypes of Jews from being inferred although it requires that one has categorized another person as Jewish. This is a different type of effect of volition than when a goal creates attention deficits that prevent one from being able to analyze the target and categorize the person as Jewish. The second issue that distinguishes research on preconscious control concerns the awareness of goal activation and regulation. Preconscious control not merely involves goals having implicit and unintended effects, but the implicit activation and regulation of goals. But future research must do more than demonstrate goals are capable of being activated prior to or in parallel with other cognitive constructs. Further research needs to examine the mechanisms through which goals are regulated and the manner in which compensatory responses are triggered and impact on responses. Questions concerning the interplay of goals and cognition at the preconscious level, the mutual influence exerted (e.g., facilitation and inhibition) by the variety of constructs linked to a stimulus, and issues regarding the compatibility between preconscious responses must be addressed. How are goals involved at the early stages of making sense and responding to the social world? Such explorations will also raise important practical questions regarding how people prevent unwanted behavior, how stereotypes can be controlled, how desired outcomes can be more efficiently pursued, and what legal implications surround the issue of volition being as effortless and automatic as cognitive processes typically thought of as the dominant or default response (e.g., Fiske, 1989). Social Cognitive Neuroscience In the 1970s, social psychologists turned to cognitive psychology for paradigms and ideas. The resulting examinations of issues such as how information is structured and organized in memory and how activation of related concepts occurs (given the assumptions about organization and storage) have helped provide a better understanding of social perception and interaction. Cognitive neuroscience currently provides similar opportunities for social psychologists to examine issues that previously had been considered out of reach, particularly as cognitive neuroscience moves beyond simply providing images of what brain areas are involved in different types of cognitive functioning. Although not meaning to imply that social psychologists should all start booking time for use of an MRI machine, social cognition can benefit from new methodologies and paradigms. Three recent examples provide illustrations, while Cacioppo, Berntson, and Crites (1996) and Lieberman and Ochsner (in press) provide a detailed analysis. Wegner (1994) found that cognitive load can cause people to perform behaviors they are trying to avoid. The regulation of behavior not only fails under these conditions, but an unwanted and counter-intentional response is produced. Mitchell, Macrae, and Gilchrist (2000) proposed that individuals display such failures in control because cognitive load disrupts fronto-executive processes that govern control over automatic processes. Cognitive neuroscience informs the investigation of this hypothesis of Mitchell et al. concerning behavioral self-regulation in a variety of ways. First, support for the hypothesis is provided by prior research on patients who have suffered damage to the prefrontal cortex. Such damage leads to an inability to suppress inappropriate yet overlearned (automatic) responses on tasks, such as the Stroop task, that are sensitive to frontal functioning (Mitchell et al.). Second, to test the hypothesis, Mitchell et al. lean on a paradigm borrowed from cognitive neuroscience in which participants engage in a task known to involve fronto-executive processes – the antis-accade task. In this task, the participant fixates on a cue

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Page 358 in the center of a display while a peripheral stimulus appears. They are to suppress the reflexive response and instead intentionally saccade in the opposite direction. Third, another task is needed that will disrupt the ability of the prefrontal cortex to exert the control over a reflex (a saccade to the stimulus) required for the antisaccade task. Mitchell et al. suggested this disruption of one's ability to suppress reflexive saccades is provided by the n-back task , in which one views a series of letters or numbers and responds by asserting whether a current item in the series matches an item that preceded by n places. Mitchell et al. reviewed neuroimaging evidence that a 1-back task (in which a current letter is judged against the letter immediately preceding it) makes significantly fewer demands on prefrontal operations relative to the 2-back task. The Mitchell et al. research shows that participants are less able to suppress an unwanted but automatic reflexive saccade when engaged in a 2-back task, suggesting that control over reflexive responses requires the engagement of the prefrontal cortex. Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) reported on research by Lengfelder (1995), in which the automatic nature of implementation intentions was examined by relying on patients with frontal lobe injuries. Gollwitzer and Schaal reported that a reliance on evidence from research in neuroscience allows the use of such patients to shed light on whether implementation intentions represent a case of preconscious control. These patients are said to have problems with conscious control of action but not control over habitual or reflexive action. The data reported show that patients with frontal lobe injuries displayed weakened performance on the Tower of Hanoi task (a measure of conscious control), but that action initiation was faster for frontal lobe patients provided with implementation intentions. Gollwitzer and Schaal concluded such evidence provides direct support for the notion that implementation intentions induce automatic control – self-regulation without conscious control. Finally, recent fMRI research has started to address basic questions of social cognition, particularly those involving cognitive control in domains such as stereotyping. For example, Lieberman, Hariri, and Bookheimer (in press) found that a perceptual matching task involving outgroup faces led to activation in the amygdala. This suggests that simply seeing the faces of outgroup members leads to an automatic response, in this case, an avoidance (fear) response. This is consistent with much of the reaction time evidence that suggests automatic affective and semantic responses to outgroup-relevant stimuli (such as faces and group names; see Blair, chap. 22, this volume). However, when the same outgroup faces were presented as part of a labelling task, where participants were to match the faces to the group label that described the face, there was no evidence for amygdala activation. Instead, activation was seen in the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with controlled processing. Apparently, thinking of faces in a semantic context (e.g., linking them with group-relevant traits and category labels) triggered controlled processing that interfered with the “automatic” effects. Such work uses fMRI data to suggest that automatic activation of stereotypes is not inevitable. Rather, processing goals can determine the nature of activation, presumably by affecting what constructs are made accessible, where attention is focused, and what brain regions are used. Social psychology is rooted in the understanding of the social forces that impact on individual cognition and behavior. And while we must not confuse the level of analysis and goals of the neuroscientist and the social psychologist, these disciplines can be better integrated and the methodologies can be gainfully employed to help social psychologists build better models of phenomena of central interest to the field, such as questions relating to control and goal pursuit. Endnotes 1. Control is often discussed as both the opposite of determinism as well as the opposite of automaticity. This has often led to what could be characterized as the false conclusion that automaticity, therefore, is equated with determinism; that to respond outside of consciousness is to respond without the will. 2. For example, a person primed with rudeness or professor may be more likely to act rudely (by interrupting another person, for example) or intelligently (by higher scores on intelligence tests, for example) not because of an ideo-motor response, but because the situation is more likely to be construed as one that calls for rudeness or as an opportunity to display intelligence. 3. However, computer models do not address the homunculus issue as they do not examine how the system decides to allocate control. It simply includes in the model “task demand units” (goals) that dictate allocation of attention and activation along pathways.

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Page 359 22 Implicit Stereotypes and Prejudice Irene V. Blair University of Colorado, Boulder “Whites today are, in fact, more prejudiced than they are wont to admit,” concluded Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe (1980, p. 557) nearly two decades ago. With over 80 demonstrations that stereotypes and prejudice can operate without the perceivers' awareness or intention (i.e., implicitly), psychologists today have even more evidence for this conclusion. However, it is no longer a one-liner. With the development of sophisticated experimental techniques, we have obtained an increasingly fine-grained and complex picture of intergroup bias. Moreover, we have come to understand that, in addition to being more prejudiced than people are wont to admit, they may also be more prejudiced than they can admit.1 The experimental study of implicit intergroup bias began soon after Crosby et al. concluded that Whites had something to hide. By adapting theories and methods from the study of implicit memory and unconscious perception, stereotype and prejudice researchers gained access to a new level of analysis. Particularly influential was the theory of spreading activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Posner & Snyder, 1975). According to this theory, concepts in one's cognitive representation of the world are spatially organized, such that associated concepts (e.g., bread - butter) are closer together than unassociated concepts (e.g., bread - doctor ). Because of this arrangement, the activation of one concept causes the activation of nearby, associated concepts, but not distant, unassociated concepts through the process of spreading activation (for discussions of alternative accounts, see Neely, 1991; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). As a consequence, the presentation of one concept (e.g., bread) facilitates the subsequent processing of an associated concept (e.g., butter), compared with an unassociated concept (e.g., doctor ). Most important, this sequence of events can occur without the perceiver's awareness or intention (i.e., implicitly), and it can be manipulated and studied experimentally. In one of the first demonstrations of implicit intergroup bias, Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) showed that participants were faster to identify paired letter strings if they were consistent than inconsistent with the stereotype. Hence, students were faster to identify Whites-ambitious and Blacks-lazy, than Whites-lazy and Blacks-ambitious. A few years later, Devine (1989) demonstrated that even subliminally presented cues could result in intergroup bias. And recently, researchers have measured implicit intergroup bias through neurological and physiological indicators (e.g., Osterhout, Bersick, & McLaughlin, 1997; Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997). For example, Osterhout et al. showed that event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were sensitive to the stereotype consistency of a statement (e.g., “The secretary bought herself a plane ticket” vs. “The secretary bought himself a plane ticket’’). The excitement generated by the availability of methods to study implicit intergroup bias has produced a large and growing literature with strong evidence for the prevalence of such biases in society. Implicit racial and ethnic bias has received the greatest attention, with over 30 studies showing that Whites have relatively strong implicit negative associations with Blacks (or other non-White groups) and positive associations with Whites (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2000; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2000; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998; Vanman et al., 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997, in press; Wittenbrink, Judd, Park, & Stone, 1997; for evidence of implicit race stereotypes, see Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997). Evidence for implicit gender bias has also begun to

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Page 360 accumulate, specifically the tendency to implicitly associate males with stereotypically masculine attributes (e.g., aggression, strength) and females with stereotypically feminine traits (e.g., dependence, weakness ) (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Blair, Ma, & Banaji, 1998; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2000; Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, in press; Macrae et al., 1995; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Calvini, 1999; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, in press; von Hippel et al., 1997; for evidence of implicit prejudice toward women, see Brauer, Wasel, & Niedenthal, 2000). In addition, implicit age bias (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 1999; Levy, 1996; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990), generalized implicit ingroup-outgroup bias (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 1999; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), and implicit bias toward a variety of occupational and societal groups (e.g., Blair, 2000; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996, 1998; Kawakami et al., 1997; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994) have all been demonstrated. In addition to providing evidence for implicit stereotypes and prejudice, this literature has also advanced our understanding of a number of issues central to intergroup bias. For example, we know more about the conditions under which stereotypes are activated (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1997), and we have a better understanding of the processes that lead to biases in social judgment and behavior (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Levy, 1996). As one indication of the growing interest in implicit intergroup bias, a quick count shows that almost all of the research has occurred in the last 9 years. From 1990 to 1999, nearly 40 papers were published on the subject, compared with only 3 papers in the prior 9-year period. With the fast growth of research on implicit intergroup bias, a summary and integration of this work may help clarify some of its central issues. The purpose of this review is not to present an exhaustive examination of research, but to provide a focus for those issues that have emerged as important in understanding this new phenomenon. Hence, we focus on two related issues: (a) the meaning of implicit intergroup bias, and (b) the controllability of implicit intergroup bias. THE MEANING OF IMPLICIT INTER-GROUP BIAS With the accumulation of evidence that intergroup bias operates implicitly, one is faced with the question of meaning. This question can take several forms. First, one may inquire about the social importance or significance of implicit intergroup bias. This question often arises in the context of experimental measures whose social significance is not readily apparent. For example, one of the most common methods for studying implicit intergroup bias is the sequential priming procedure (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Fazio et el., 1995; Wittenbrink et el., 1997). In this procedure, the participants complete a series of trials on which they are exposed to sequentially presented pairs of words (primes and targets) and are required to make a simple judgment about the second, target word. Implicit intergroup bias is revealed if the participants are faster to respond to targets that are preceded by a stereotype- or prejudice-consistent prime, compared with targets that are preceded by an inconsistent prime. The difference in response time typically ranges from 10 to 30 milliseconds (ms.). On the scale of life events, such a difference may not seem particularly important (but see Banaji, 1995). In addition to questions of social significance, one may also ask what implicit measures reveal about other psychological constructs. This question is typically raised in considering the relation between implicit and explicit measures of intergroup bias. Defining Implicit Intergroup Bias First some definitions are in order. There are a number of terms that have been used to describe psychological phenomena that occur without an individual's awareness or intention (e.g., automatic, unconscious, implicit, spontaneous). Although there are clear conceptual distinctions among phenomena that differ along these dimensions (Bargh, 1994), the term implicit is used here to describe phenomena that occur without awareness or intention, and explicit is used to describe phenomena that occur with awareness and intention. This choice in terminology stems from the desire to (a) avoid the historical and theoretical baggage of other terms (e.g., unconscious), (b) highlight the connection of this work with work in other fields (e.g., implicit memory) and (c) avoid the implications of conclusions that are empirical questions (e.g., controllability). The dichotomy of implicit and explicit implies that phenomena can be clearly categorized as one or the other. It is important to acknowledge that a more accu-

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Page 361 rate representation is a continuum along which phenomena range from more implicit to more explicit. As Bargh (1989, 1994) and others have argued, almost all observable responses are probably the result of implicit and explicit processes. For the purposes of this review, however, a simple dichotomy will suffice, and we can begin with a working definition of implicit intergroup bias as the influence of group-based evaluation (prejudice) or belief (stereotype) on response without the perceiver's awareness or intention. In addition to conceptual choices, we must make closely related empirical choices about the measures and procedures that reveal implicit intergroup bias. Because measures are never process pure, it is virtually impossible to clearly separate tasks that reveal implicit versus explicit phenomena (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). However, for the present purposes, experimental procedures are included that examine intergroup bias in a manner that convincingly shows that participants were not aware or did not intend the effect. Such procedures typically expose participants to a stimulus that primes or activates their cognitive representation of a particular group, including associated attributes, evaluation, and behavioral intentions. This activation (and the content of the representation) is then measured through participants' judgment, behavior, or other response (e.g., response time). The critical aspect of priming procedures is that participants are either unaware of the influence of the prime on their response, or such an influence cannot be easily controlled and can be assumed to be unintentional. The prototypic example of a priming procedure would be the measured effect of subliminally presented stimuli on target judgments. Of course not all procedures are so clear cut. For example, the two-part unrelated tasks procedure relies on participants' naiveté to conceal the influence that events in the first task may have on their response in the second task. Until participants become more sophisticated about priming techniques, however, it remains unlikely that they would associate the presence of an Asian assistant in one task, for example, with the words they generate to complete word fragments in a second task.2 The Social Significance of Implicit Intergroup Bias When the study of implicit stereotypes and prejudice began some 15 years ago, the field was excited by the experimental techniques that made such work possible. The interest was not purely academic, however. The possibility that people make significant social decisions and behave on the basis of stereotypes and prejudice, without intending or even being aware of doing so, had important and potentially explosive social implications. Although the cognitive processes underlying stereotyping had been studied for some time, the speed and stealth with which those processes operate had not been fully appreciated. With the advent of subliminal priming techniques, it became abundantly clear that intergroup bias may influence social behavior without any awareness on the part of the perceiver. Moreover, early evidence that implicit intergroup biases occur among even well-meaning, low-prejudice people raised the specter of an uncontrollable “cognitive monster” (Bargh, 1999). Concern is warranted in light of demonstrations that implicit intergroup bias affects socially significant behavior. One such behavior is social judgment – the interpersonal perceptions that affect many of life's outcomes, ranging from tennis partners to bank loans. Research on implicit intergroup bias in social judgment has provided clear evidence that such biases do occur. For example, in one of the earliest studies of implicit intergroup bias, Devine (1989) found that subliminally activated stereotypes of African Americans resulted in exaggerated judgments of a target's hostility (see also Lepore & Brown, 1997). Similarly, Banaji et al. (1993) found that participants judged a female but not a male target as more dependent following exposure to dependence primes, whereas they judged a male but not a female target as more aggressive following exposure to aggression primes (see also Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). Research has also begun to examine the impact of implicit stereotypes on other socially significant behavior. For example, Chen and Bargh (1997) demonstrated that implicit stereotypes may influence interpersonal hostility. That is, after the stereotype of African Americans had been automatically activated through subliminal exposure to pictures of African Americans, participants behaved with more hostility in a subsequent interpersonal interaction. Moreover, this behavior produced responsive hostility from the other interactant, and both participants emerged with the belief that the other person was hostile – behavior and judgment instigated by information of which neither person was ever aware. Bargh et al. (1996), Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998), and Levy (1996) also provided evidence for the influence of automatically activated stereotypes on significant personal behavior. For example, in a startling revelation of the implicit effects of negative stereotypes on targeted group members, Levy (1996) found that subliminal exposure to negative stereotypes of the elderly led to significant decrements in the memory performance of

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Page 362 elderly but not young participants. Conclusion. Both social judgment and behavior have been shown to be influenced by implicit intergroup bias. Although additional research is needed to increase our understanding of the range of situations that may be affected by implicit intergroup bias, there is good evidence that such biases can affect important aspects of social life. Implicit Measures and Underlying Psychological Constructs What do implicit measures reveal about an individual's attitudes and beliefs? This second question of meaning is a bit more difficult to answer. When faced with a new phenomenon, researchers typically seek to understand it by comparison to more established phenomena. In measurement terms, we attempt to establish its convergent and discriminant validity by showing how well it relates to conceptually similar phenomena and how different it is from conceptually distinct phenomena (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). For example, a new form of prejudice ought to be only moderately correlated with other forms of prejudice and uncorrelated with unrelated constructs, such as social desirability. Researchers have sought to understand implicit intergroup bias primarily through its relation to explicit intergroup bias – a more established and better understood phenomenon. If the correspondence is very good, implicit intergroup bias ought to have the same general psychological properties as explicit intergroup bias; if the correspondence is moderate, implicit intergroup bias probably shares some of the same psychological properties with explicit intergroup bias, but also has some unique properties; and if the correspondence is poor, implicit intergroup bias is probably a very different phenomenon, whose psychological properties must be determined through other means. Although more than 25 studies have examined the relation between implicit and explicit intergroup bias, a clear understanding of their relation has not emerged. Table 22.1 presents a summary of this research (for a similar survey, see Brauer et al., 2000). One can see from this table that some studies have found relatively good correspondence between implicit and explicit intergroup bias (e.g., Vanman et al., 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), whereas others have found no such correspondence (e.g., Devine, 1989; von Hippel et al., 1997). With evidence for both correspondence and dissociation between implicit and explicit measures of intergroup bias, simple answers to the question of what implicit measures reveal about an individual's attitude or belief (as understood through explicit measures) are not forthcoming. For example, it is not the case that only certain measures or target groups produce correspondence and others produce dissociation. Moreover, the relation between implicit and explicit measures ranges from being somewhat negative to highly positive: It is not the case that, if obtained, correspondence is very small and necessarily difficult to capture. It is clear that implicit and explicit measures of intergroup bias are correlated under some but not other conditions. The task we face is to identify those conditions and thereby obtain a better understanding of both phenomena. A Measurement Account for the Uncertain Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Bias. As explicated by Campbell and Fiske (1959), careful attention must be given to methodological issues before conclusions can be drawn regarding the meaning of a new measure. As applied to the present issue, one must be careful about concluding that a dissociation of implicit and explicit measures of intergroup bias indicates different psychological constructs until methodological differences are taken into consideration. The difficulty, of course, is the separation of methodological and psychological contributors to an effect. The now widely accepted solution proposed by Campbell and Fiske is to determine the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures by comparing correlations within a multitrait-multimethod matrix. To conclude that implicit and explicit intergroup biases are different psychological constructs, one would need to demonstrate that a set of implicit measures of intergroup bias correlate better with each other than with a set of explicit measures of bias, and that the explicit measures correlate better with each other than with the implicit measures. If the intra-set correlations are not higher than the inter-set correlations, one cannot assume that the underlying constructs are different. Similarly, to conclude that implicit and explicit intergroup bias are the same psychological construct, one would need to show that they correlate better with each other than with implicit and explicit measures of conceptually different constructs. This is a simplification of the full matrix and the conditions needed to satisfy validity requirements. However, the necessity of using multiple methods to establish both convergent and discriminant validity ought to be clear. Unfortunately, little research has taken advantage of the multitrait-multimethod approach to understand implicit intergroup bias (but see Brauer et al., 2000; Dovidio et al., 1997; von Hippel et al., 1997). Moreover, the psychometric properties of implicit measures have been generally ignored. For example, in one of the most

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Page 363 Table 22.1: Summary of research on the relation between implicit and explicit measures of intergroup bias, roughly ordered by size of effect. StudyImplicit MeasureExplicit Measurer*Fazio et al.(1995, Study 2)Evaluative race priming (Black vs. White. faces; positive vs.negative adjectives)Modern Racism Scale(MRS)-.28Banaji & Greenwald(1995, Study 3)Bias in favor of males in false fame attributionsAttitudes about genderequality-.10Dovidio et al.(1997, Study 3)Subliminal evaluative race primingMRSOld-fashioned Racism .01-.07Gaertner & McLaughlin(1983, Study 1)Semantic/evaluative race priming (negative Blackstereotypes vs. positive White stereotypes)§Multifactor Racial AttitudesInventory (MRAI) ns**Gaertner & McLaughlin(1983, Study 2)Semantic/evaluative race priming§MRAI ns**von Hippel et al.(1997, Study 1)Linguistic Intergroup Bias (abstract stereotypic behavior &concrete counter-stereotypic behavior for Blacks vs. Whites)MRS .01von Hippel et al(1997, Study 3)Linguistic Intergroup Bias (males vs. females)Attitudes TowardWomen (ATW) .01von Hippel et al(1997, Study 2)Linguistic Intergroup Bias (Blacks vs. Whites)MRS.03Lepore & Brown(1997, Study 3)Subliminal priming of Black stereotype on positive vs.negative target ratingsModified MRS .03†Banaji & Hardin(1996, Study 1)Semantic gender priming (male vs.female roles; male vs. female pronouns)Explicit genderstereotypes.04Rudman et al.(in press, Study 1)Gender Implicit Association Test (IAT; male vs. femalenames; male vs. female stereotypic traits)Semantic differentialATWAmbivalent Sexism (ASI).09.05.06Greenwald et al.(1998, Study 3)Race IAT (Black vs. White names; positive vs. negativewords)MRSDiversityDiscriminationFeeling thermometerSemantic differential.07.23.06.13.20Rudman et al.(in press, Study 3)Gender IATSemantic differential& ASI.12Devine (1989, Study 2)Priming of Black stereotype on hostility ratingsMRS.13†Rudman et al.(in press, Study 2)Gender IATSemantic differential& ATW.13Fazio et al.(1995, Study 1)Evaluative race primingMRS.15Hense et al. (1995)Implicit memory: stereotypic vs. counter-stereotypic traitsSemantic differential.15†Dasgupta et al.(2000)Race IAT (names)Race IAT (pictures)Semantic differentialFeeling thermometerMRSDiscriminationDiversitySemantic differentialFeeling thermometerMRSDiscriminationDiversity .24 .23-.13 .01-.02 .38 .21 .02 .08 .14Kawakami et al. (1998)Semantic race priming (Black vs. White labels; Blackstereotypic traits)MRS, Feeling thermometerExplicit stereotypes .16 .25Fazio et al.(1995, Study 4)Evaluative race primingMRS and Motivation toControl Prejudice .22†‡Dovidio et al.(1997, Study 1)Subliminal evaluative race primingMRSAttitudes Toward Blacks .15.28

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Page 364 Brauer et al. (2000)

Subliminal female prime on target ratings of emotionality Subliminal evaluative gender prime, lexical decision task (LDT) Evaluative gender priming, evaluative judgment Evaluative gender priming, category inclusion judgment

Modern Sexism (MSS) ASI MSS ASI MSS ASI MSS ASI

Greenwald et al. (1998, Study 2)

Asian IAT (Japanese vs. Korean; positive vs. negative)

Blair (2000, Study 2)

Sexual orientation IAT (gay vs. heterosexual; pos. vs. neg.) Attitude Toward Gay Men .33

Locke et al. (1994)

Stroop task

MRS

.33

Wittenbrink, Judd, Park, & Stone (1997, Study 2)

Semantic/evaluative race priming (LDT)§

MRS Pro-Black Anti-Black Diversity Discrimination

.28 .40 .19 .19 .29

Wittenbrink, Judd, Park, & Stone (1997, Study 3)

Semantic/evaluative race priming (LDT)§

MRS Pro-Black Anti-Black Diversity Discrimination

.26 .28 .06 .18 .39

Wittenbrink et al. (in press, Study 1)

Semantic/evaluative race priming (LDT)§

MRS Pro-Black Anti-Black Diversity Discrimination Thermometer MRS Pro-Black Anti-Black Diversity Discrimination Thermometer

.40 .17 .12 .26 .24 .19 .18 .13 -.14 .14 .14 .16

MRS Pro-Black Anti-Black Diversity Discrimination

.41 .33 .17 .32 .32

Semantic/evaluative race priming (evaluation judgment)§

Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park (1997)

Subliminal semantic/evaluative race priming (LDT)§

Feeling thermometer Semantic differential

.08 .05 .24 .20 -.01 .28 .28 .10 .58 .04

Moskowitz, Salomon, &Semantic/evaluative race priming (Black vs. White; negative Chronic goal of fairness Taylor (2000, Study 1) Black stereotypes vs. neutral attributes) toward Black Americans

.36†

Moskowitz, Gollwitzer Semantic gender priming (male vs. female; stereotypic vs. Chronic goal of fairness et al. (1999, Study 3) nonstereotypic female attributes) toward women

.37†

Moskowitz, Gollwitzer Semantic gender priming et al. (1999, Study 4)

.40†

Chronic goal of fairness toward women

Lepore & Brown (1997 Study 2)

Subliminal priming of Blacks on pos. vs. neg. target ratings Modified MRS

.42†

Vanman et al. (1997, Study 3)

Facial EMG in response to photos of Blacks vs. Whites

MRS

.48†

Dovidio et al. (1997, Study 2)

Subliminal evaluative race priming

MRS Old-fashioned Racism

.60 .49

*A positive correlation indicates congruence between implicit and explicit measures. **Reported as nonsignificant, but no statistic provided. †Converted from F-value. ‡Interaction of MRS & MCP in predicting implicit prejudice, such that MRS & implicit prejudice were positively related for participants low in motivation to control prejudice. §Implicit prejudice was defined as the association of a Black prime with negative Black stereotypes and the association of a White prime with positive White stereotypes.

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Page 365 careful studies of implicit-explicit correspondence, Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997) measured explicit prejudice with five scales and provided their internal reliabilities as well as their intercorrelations as evidence for their convergent validity. In contrast, neither the internal reliability of the implicit prejudice measure nor convergent measures for the construct were provided. This lack of attention to the measurement properties of implicit measures is certainly not unique to this study. Indeed, in nearly all of the research that has examined the correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of stereotypes or prejudice, the reliabilities of the measures have only been provided for the explicit measures (but see Blair, 2000; Kawakami & Dovidio, 1999). If a measure of implicit intergroup bias is not demonstrated to have at least adequate reliability, it is difficult to interpret its correspondence (or lack thereof) with an explicit measure of intergroup bias. Table 22.1 reveals that researchers have utilized many different measures of implicit intergroup bias. For example, some measures rely on response time, others rely on target judgments, and still others use facial EMG. Moreover, stimuli are sometimes subliminal or supraliminal; words or pictures; names, adjectives, or personality traits. This variety ensures us that implicit intergroup bias is not a function of one specific procedure. However, without adequate attention to the psychometric properties of each measure, it is far from certain that the measures are assessing similar constructs and that they are equally sensitive in revealing those constructs. It is possible that the unstable relation between implicit and explicit intergroup bias may be due to differences in the measures used across studies (for a similar argument, see Kawakami et al., 1998). Indeed, Brauer et al. (2000) recently argued that there may be different types of implicit prejudice. In particular, they suggested that some measures reveal the activation of implicit prejudice, whereas other measures reveal the application of implicit prejudice. Another measurement issue is the specificity with which prejudice has been defined in implicit and explicit measures. Explicit measures tend to define intergroup bias at a more specific level than implicit measures (Wittenbrink, Judd, Park, & Stone, 1997). For example, a standard explicit measure of race prejudice, the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), assesses a person's positivity or negativity toward Black people in specific content areas (i.e., a combination of evaluation and belief). In contrast, a standard implicit measure of race prejudice is the association of White with positive words and Black with negative words regardless of stereotypicality (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995). A series of experiments by Wittenbrink, Judd, Park, and Stone (1997) highlight the need to attend to this issue. Specifically, they found that correlations between Modern Racism and responses on an implicit measure of prejudice were higher when implicit prejudice was examined as a combination of evaluation and belief (i.e., the association of positive White stereotypes with Whites and negative Black stereotypes with Blacks), compared with evaluation or belief alone. In another experiment, Wittenbrink et al. (in press) also demonstrated that the nature of the judgment task (conceptual vs. evaluative) can also influence the implicit-explicit relation. Higher correlations between implicit and explicit prejudice were observed when conceptual rather than evaluative judgments were made in the implicit task. A Motivational Account for the Uncertain Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Bias. Fazio et al. (1995) and Dovidio et al. (1997) have proposed that implicit and explicit measures are both valid indicators of intergroup bias; they just reveal different aspects of bias and thus predict different types of intergroup behavior. Specifically, implicit and explicit intergroup bias involve different levels of participants' motivation. By definition, an implicit measure constrains the role that motivation may play in response (e.g., through lack of awareness or high cognitive load).3 In contrast, an explicit measure typically enhances the role of motivation by focusing participants' attention on the target issue, and it gives them the opportunity (low cognitive load) to respond accordingly. Due to this motivational difference, implicit and explicit measures of prejudice ought to show little correspondence because people who are motivated to be low prejudice will alter their responses on explicit but not implicit measures of prejudice (but see Moskowitz et al., 1999). However, implicit prejudice ought to be a better predictor of more implicit behavior (i.e., behavior that is ambiguous with respect to prejudice), and explicit prejudice ought to be a better predictor of more explicit behavior (i.e., behavior that is clear with respect to prejudice). Fazio and Dovidio provided evidence for their model across several experiments (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995). In these experiments, participants completed an implicit measure of race prejudice and explicit measures of race prejudice. Participants' friendliness and interest during a subsequent interaction with a Black experimenter were used as measures of implicit social behavior, and explicit race judgments (e.g., judgments of a Black defendant's guilt, evaluations of the Black experimenter) were used as measures of explicit social behavior. As predicted, implicit prejudice was found to be generally uncorrelated with explicit preju-

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Page 366 dice. However, implicit and explicit prejudice were uniquely predictive of the different social behaviors: Implicit prejudice was a better predictor of participants' friendliness and interest during the interaction with the Black experimenter, whereas explicit prejudice was a better predictor of explicit race judgments. Fazio et al. (1995) provided further support for the role of motivation in distinguishing between explicit and implicit prejudice by measuring participants' explicit motivation to control prejudice with a scale developed for that purpose. Consistent with their model, they found that when participants' motivation to control prejudice was low, implicit and explicit measures of prejudice showed more substantial correspondence. A Representational Account for the Uncertain Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Bias. In one of the earliest analyses of implicit prejudice, Devine (1989) proposed that implicit and explicit measures of prejudice ought to be dissociated due to the differential role that motivation plays in those processes. However, Devine also introduced an additional, representational difference between implicit and explicit prejudice. She proposed that as a part of socialization, every member of a culture has knowledge of the cultural stereotypes, and that knowledge constitutes the primary representation of social groups. A secondary representation is developed as people form their own attitudes and beliefs. In this manner, people may experience a dissociation between their primary (prejudiced) and their secondary (nonprejudiced) group representations. Devine suggested that, because the secondary representation is acquired much later in life, it does not operate at an implicit level and can only affect explicit (motivated) responses. Accordingly, implicit measures reveal the largely uniform cultural representation of social groups, whereas explicit measures reveal more varied personal representations of the groups (for similar theorizing, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Devine supported her dissociation theory across three studies. In one study, Devine showed that both high- and lowprejudice participants had equivalent knowledge of the cultural stereotype of African Americans, including the trait hostile . In a second study, Devine demonstrated that such knowledge could be automatically activated and bias judgment, regardless of personal beliefs. Specifically, both high- and low-prejudice participants who had been subliminally exposed to stereotypes of African Americans (e.g., ghetto, musical) rated a target as more hostile than participants in a control group. Finally, in a third study, Devine showed that high- and low-prejudice participants produced different controlled responses toward African Americans in a thought-listing task. Although Devine's theory accounts for many of the studies that have failed to find correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice, recent work by Lepore and Brown (1997) suggested that personal attitudes may result in representational differences that are measurable at the implicit level (see also Kawakami et al., 1998; Moskowitz et al., 1999; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Although agreeing that all members of a culture have knowledge of the cultural stereotypes, Lepore and Brown proposed that the strength of various stereotypes differs for high- and low- prejudice people: High-prejudice people have relatively strong negative stereotypes and weak positive stereotypes, whereas low-prejudice people have relatively strong positive stereotypes and weak negative stereotypes. Hence, when only the (neutral) category representation is primed, negative traits are primarily activated for high-prejudice people and positive traits are primarily activated for low-prejudice people. However, if the priming procedure activates the stereotype directly, as was done by Devine, the same traits are activated for high- and lowprejudice people. In support of their thesis, Lepore and Brown showed that subliminal priming with evaluatively neutral labels and associates of Black people resulted in higher negative target ratings for high- but not lowprejudice participants, whereas such priming produced higher positive target ratings for low- but not high-prejudice participants. When negative stereotypes were included as primes, however, the responses of high- and low-prejudice participants were similar. Conclusions . Measurement, motivational, and representational explanations have all been advanced to account for the associations and dissociations that have been observed between measures of implicit and explicit intergroup bias. Although each explanation cannot fully account for the diversity of results presented in Table 22.1, they are all important pieces of the puzzle. Based on the complexity of the phenomena, a reasonable suggestion is that we move beyond the simple question of “same” versus “different.” It is clear that there is some overlap between implicit and explicit intergroup bias, but the overlap is small enough to presume that the two constructs have distinct properties. Although most of the literature has focused on whether implicit and explicit forms of intergroup bias are statistically independent, such independence is difficult to establish and interpret. We (Blair, 2000) recently proposed that it may be more productive to examine how the two forms of bias are influenced by or relate to other variables of interest (cf. Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995). As an example of such an approach, we examined

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Page 367 the relations among personal contact and community norms and implicit and explicit prejudice toward gay men. Based on current theories of intergroup bias, we hypothesized and found that participants' (personal) contact experiences with gay men were a better predictor of their explicit than implicit prejudice, whereas the norms of their childhood community were a better predictor of their implicit than explicit prejudice. These functional dissociations were obtained even though participants' implicit and explicit levels of prejudice were significantly correlated. By looking beyond that simple correlation, a more complete and interesting picture of prejudice was obtained. It is clear that additional research is needed to fully understand the psychological constructs and processes underlying implicit and explicit measures of prejudice. However, it is also clear that our conceptions of intergroup bias have been challenged by this puzzle, and its resolution is sure to provide us with a richer understanding of intergroup bias. THE CONTROLLABILITY OF IMPLICIT INTERGROUP BIAS As the study of implicit intergroup bias has developed, the controllability of implicit phenomena has become a thorny issue (see Bargh, 1999). By definition, an implicit process occurs without intention or awareness. Hence, by definition, implicit intergroup bias is not a controlled phenomenon, at least not in the usual sense of the word (but see Fiske, 1989; Moskowitz et al., 1999; Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). As such, Bargh (1999) recently characterized it as a cognitive monster – a construct that lurks in the shadows of our mind, ever present and ready to bias perception and behavior. Like most monsters, our ability to control implicit intergroup bias seems unlikely. A different perspective is provided by a consideration of implicit intergroup bias as a disease. To make the analogy more concrete, consider heart disease, which is similar to implicit intergroup bias on several dimensions: Heart disease is a social problem that manifests itself through individuals; it takes a long time to develop, and it occurs without an individual's intention and awareness, making it an implicit process with many of the accompanying problems. For example, it can be difficult to convince someone that he or she has a disease serious enough to warrant radical changes in behavior. Of greatest relevance to the present discussion is that we have not assumed that heart disease is uncontrollable and inevitable just because it operates in an implicit manner. In fact, an enormous amount of resources have been devoted to controlling heart disease. For example, in 1997, the American Heart Association spent $107.5 million on research, $78.5 million on public health education, and $46.2 million on community support and services. This work has paid off and a number of control strategies are now available – some proactive (e.g., diet, exercise, and reductions in stress) and others more reactive (e.g., medication & surgery). Such strategies demonstrate that a formerly uncontrolled process can become controlled with adequate information and motivation. As reviewed earlier, there is strong evidence that stereotypes and prejudice operate without an individual's intention or awareness, providing the appearance of uncontrollability. A number of recent studies, however, suggest that implicit intergroup bias may be more like a disease than a monster in this regard. The first piece of evidence comes from demonstrations that certain identifiable groups of people have lower levels of implicit intergroup bias than others (see Table 22.1). For example, Moskowitz and colleagues (e.g., Moskowitz et al., 1999; Moskowitz et al., 2000) have shown that people who are chronic in their motivation to be egalitarian toward low-status groups (e.g., women, African Americans) do not have the implicit biases toward those groups that nonchronics possess. Indeed, when presented with social category cues, chronic egalitarians have been shown to inhibit the stereotype associations (Moskowitz et al., 1999) and produce egalitarian associations instead (Moskowitz et al., 2000). Although the correlational nature of the data prevent firm conclusions about the underlying process, one potential account for such findings is that chronic egalitarians (and some low-prejudice people) have learned to alter or inhibit implicit intergroup bias with extended practice (see also Devine & Monteith, 1999; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume). The intriguing question these findings raise is how do people begin to moderate implicit intergroup bias? There are three general approaches to control that have been shown to have potential in moderating implicit intergroup bias: stereotype suppression, attentional control, and promotion of counterstereotypes. Stereotype Suppression An intuitive strategy to combat stereotypes is suppression, or the intentional act of banishing stereotypes from thought. Unfortunately, this strategy is not always successful when we examine implicit stereotypes. As first demonstrated by Macrae and colleagues (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen,

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Page 368 Milne, & Jetten, 1994), attempts to suppress stereotypes may result in the increased activation of the stereotypes, and the stereotypes may become more influential after the suppression attempt than they would have been without any suppression. In the first demonstration of stereotype rebound, Macrae, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) instructed participants to avoid using stereotypes as they wrote a description of the life of a skinhead. Although these participants were successful in suppressing their stereotypes as instructed, their subsequent responses reflected greater stereotype accessibility, compared with participants who had not initially suppressed their stereotypes. For example, the suppression participants were faster to respond to stereotypic traits of skinheads in a lexical decision task than the no-suppression participants. Other research, however, suggests that rebound is less likely to occur under certain conditions (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998). For example, Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998) found that stereotype rebound did not occur for low-prejudice perceivers. Similarly, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000b) showed that participants who took the perspective of the target did not produce stereotype rebound. More significantly for the present purpose, however, is research by Gollwitzer and colleagues (Gollwitzer, Schaal, Moskowitz, Wasel, & Hammelbeck, 2000; for a review, see Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998), which has shown that suppression can actually result in reduced levels of implicit stereotypes if the perceiver forms an implementation intention. An implementation intention (see Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume) is the act of linking a specific behavior to a specific situational cue (“I will do X when situation Y arises”). When an implementation intention has been formed, the specified behavior becomes implicit in the sense that it is initiated by the specified cue without further conscious intervention. To examine the effectiveness of implementation intentions in suppressing implicit stereotypes, Gollwitzer et al. motivated all participants to judge a target in a fair and unbiased manner. In addition, participants in the implementation intention condition were given the specific implementation intention, “And whenever I see Ina, I will ignore her gender.’’ In a subsequent task, participants' implicit gender stereotypes were measured in response to the cues Ina and Bea . As predicted, only participants who had formed the implementation intention failed to produce implicit gender stereotypes when presented with Ina. This suppression effect, however, was very specific. All participants demonstrated strong implicit gender stereotypes when presented with Bea regardless of strategy. Attentional Control Strategies Another option that perceivers may use to control implicit stereotypes and prejudice is a bit more subtle in its strategy. Instead of trying to suppress stereotypes, perceivers may be able to moderate stereotype activation by simply changing their focus of attention. The idea is deceptively simple: The less one attends to social category cues, the less stereotypes are likely to be activated and bias subsequent responses. Attentional focus is certainly not a new strategy in controlling stereotype effects. For a number of years, Fiske and her colleagues have explored how the amount and type of attention directed toward a target moderates the influence of stereotypes on subsequent judgments (e.g., see Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Although that work did not explore the effects of attentional focus on implicit stereotypes, the general principle ought to apply: The focus of one's attention determines which associations and processes are activated. Research has demonstrated three ways by which the focus on stereotypic cues can be reduced and result in the moderation of implicit stereotypes. Task Goals. Macrae et al. (1997) studied attentional focus by presenting the participants with a series of primetarget trials: The primes were pictures of common inanimate objects or women, and the targets were stereotypic or counterstereotypic traits associated with women. Attentional focus was manipulated through the type of processing given to the picture primes. In one condition, the participants were asked to judge whether each picture was an animate or inanimate object, whereas the participants in a second condition were asked to judge whether a white dot was present or absent on each picture. Although these tasks may not seem so different, they effectively manipulated attention to the (female) features of the photographed women because such attention would have only been useful for participants with the animacy-judgment task. Macrae et al. anticipated that this difference in attention would affect the strength with which the female pictures implicitly activated the female stereotype, as measured by subsequent response facilitation to stereotypic target traits. As expected, the pictures of women facilitated responses to the stereotypic traits only when the participants paid attention to the women's features; implicit stereotype activation did not occur when the participants' attention was focused away from those features. Research by Banaji and Hardin (1996) also suggests that implicit stereotypes can be moderated by controlling attentional focus. Specifically, they examined implicit stereotype priming in two experiments, varying across

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Page 369 the experiments participants' focus on the critical social category (gender). In both experiments, the primes were stereotypically masculine and feminine roles and occupations, and the targets included male and female pronouns. In the first experiment, the participants' task was to judge whether the targets were male or female pronouns (e.g., he vs. she ), whereas in the second experiment the participants' task was to judge whether the targets were pronouns (e.g., he vs. all). Although significant stereotype priming was observed in both experiments, the effect obtained with the gender-focused task was more than twice as large as the effect obtained with the pronounfocused task. Although one must be cautious in making comparisons across experiments, these results provide additional evidence that attentional focus may moderate implicit stereotype activation. Cognitive Busyness . As a third example of attentional control, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) demonstrated that the cognitive busyness of participants moderated implicit stereotype activation, as revealed through stereotypic word completions in the presence of an Asian assistant. Specifically, the participants in one condition were kept cognitively busy by rehearsing a random string of digits while they completed the word fragments, whereas participants in the other condition had no additional task while they completed the word fragments. As expected, the cognitively busy participants produced fewer stereotypic word completions than the not-busy participants. Although these results were interpreted in terms of the cognitive capacity required for stereotype activation, they also imply that when one is concentrating on a task that takes attention away from the target's social category, implicit stereotypes are less likely to be activated. The Resolution of Visual Attention . As a final example of the importance of attention, Macrae et al. (1999) examined whether social cues presented outside the attentional spotlight would implicitly activate the relevant social category. In two experiments, the participants were instructed to focus on making judgments about a series of male and female names presented in the center of the computer screen (focal names). On each trial, the focal names were presented with additional stimuli that were supposed to be irrelevant to the task (flankers). The flankers were either gender-neutral items (e.g., chair, table ) or names that were inconsistent with the gender of the focal name. Importantly, these flankers were presented either very close to the focal names or more distantly. Macrae et al. found that when the flankers were inconsistent names, they only interfered with the focal judgments if they were presented close to the focal names. Relatively distant flankers had no influence on the focal judgments. These effects were obtained even though the participants had clearly processed both the near and distant flankers (i.e., in a subsequent task, they were able to categorize the flankers faster than words they had not seen before). One implication of these results is that manipulations of attentional resolution may moderate the implicit activation of social category information. Although the four sets of experiments used different manipulations of attentional focus and different measures of implicit stereotypes, they all provided support for the utility of attentional control as a strategy to moderate implicit stereotypes. This strategy is not without risks, however. A large literature has shown that stereotyping is often increased by distraction and cognitive load (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Moreover, many task and social goals require that perceivers pay attention to potentially stereotypic cues (Bargh, 1999). For example, one may need to locate the new assistant, who has been described as “A petite woman with long blond hair.” It would be virtually impossible to avoid the social cues in such a situation. Notwithstanding such caveats, the strategy of directing one's attention to task versus social category information deserves more thought as an effective means of implicitly controlling the activation of stereotypes. The Promotion of Counterstereotypes The forgoing review has shown that perceivers may suppress stereotypes with an implementation intention or avoid stereotypes by manipulating the focus of their attention. Another approach to stereotype control is the promotion of counterstereotypes. This strategy is based on the assumption that most group representations include both stereotypic and counterstereotypic associations. By definition, the stereotypic associations are stronger and more highly accessible than the counterstereotypic associations. However, certain conditions may increase the accessibility or activation of the counterstereotypic associations; once they are activated, such associations ought to pose a challenge to the dominance of stereotypes in information processing. Indeed, because stereotypes and counterstereotypes are negatively associated, the activation of counterstereotypes may both facilitate the processing of counterstereotypic information and inhibit the processing of stereotypic information (see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996). Because explicit intentions and thoughts can be used to activate implicit processes (Macrae et al., 1994; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996, 1998; cf. Bargh's, 1989, description

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Page 370 Fig. 22.1: Mean stereotype priming by task constraint and expectancy strategy (adapted from Blair & Banaji, 1996, Experiment 3).

of goal-dependent automaticity), we first examined these ideas by testing the influence of intentional counterstereotypic expectancies and mental images on implicit stereotypes. Intentional Expectancies. In several experiments, we (Blair & Banaji, 1996) examined the potential for perceiver expectancies to moderate implicit stereotypes, as measured through the response-time advantage for processing gender stereotypic (e.g., skirt-Jane, pants-John ) versus counterstereotypic prime-target pairs of stimuli (e.g., pantsJane, skirt-John ). Accordingly, we manipulated participants' expectancies prior to the priming task by instructing half of the participants to expect stereotypic prime-target trials and the other participants to expect counterstereotypic prime-target trials. In truth, all participants received both stereotypic and counterstereotypic trials, with the expected trial type on only 63% of the trials. We examined the effectiveness of the intentional expectancies under both high and low task constraints: One block of trials was completed with a 350 ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; high constraint) and one block of trials at a 2000 ms SOA (low constraint). As expected, participants with the counterstereotype expectancy produced significantly lower levels of the implicit stereotype than participants with the stereotype expectancy, especially when the time constraint was low (2000 ms. SOA). Indeed, with the low constraint, participants with the stereotype expectancy produced strong stereotype priming, whereas participants with the counterstereotype expectancy produced a complete reversal of the effect (see Fig. 22.1). These results suggest that with sufficient resources, perceivers may be able to eliminate stereotypic responses by intentionally activating counterstereotypes. Of great interest, however, were the results produced under the high task constraint. If explicit expectancies are ineffective in combating implicit stereotype effects under such constraints, the participants with the stereotype expectancy and the participants with the counterstereotype expectancy would have produced the same strong stereotype priming effect. However, if explicit expectancies can moderate stereotype priming despite a high task constraint, then participants with the counterstereotype expectancy would have produced a smaller priming effect than participants with the stereotype expectancy. We obtained the latter pattern of results (see Fig. 22.1). Moreover, with a counterstereotype expectancy, the participants failed to produce a statistically significant priming effect. A second experiment showed that, even with a higher task constraint (250 ms SOA), participants with a counterstereotype expectancy continued to avoid producing a significant priming effect. Taken together, the results of these two experiments suggest that one may moderate implicit stereotype effects by intentionally activating counterstereotypes, especially

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Page 371 when task constraints are low. As one of the first tests of the controllability of implicit stereotypes, these experiments have raised important questions (see Bargh, 1999). Primary among them is the question of whether implicit stereotypes can be so easily moderated by explicit strategies, especially under high task constraints. As the result of years of socialization, implicit stereotypes are expected to be more impervious to explicit strategies. In addition, a critical assessment of the experimental design shows that the lack of an appropriate baseline (i.e., a group of participants who completed the tasks under the same conditions, but without an expectancy strategy) makes it difficult to determine whether the counterstereotype expectancy actually reduced stereotype priming under the high task constraint. It is possible that we failed to obtain significant priming in that condition for reasons unrelated to the strategy manipulation. Because the same participants completed an earlier priming task without an expectancy, Bargh (1999) suggested that a comparison of their performance on that task with their performance on the subsequent expectancy task can reveal whether the priming effect was significantly reduced by the counterstereotype expectancy. However, other research completed in our lab suggests that participants become fatigued by lengthy priming tasks and, as a result of reduced cognitive resources, the priming effects tend to increase over time. Because the expectancy task always came second, it is difficult to interpret change effects (or the lack thereof) as the result of the expectancy or other variables, such as fatigue. Despite the lack of an appropriate baseline, one way to distinguish between a strategic versus random effect is to examine the correlation between the priming effects produced under the high versus low task constraint, because task constraint was manipulated within-subjects. Under the low constraint, we obtained very clear evidence that responses were the result of the expectancies. If responses under the high constraint were also influenced by the expectancies, the two effects ought to be correlated. Significant correlations in both experiments supported an interpretation of the effects as due to the explicit expectancies, under both high and low task constraints. In the first experiment, a comparison of the 350 ms and 2000 ms SOA conditions yielded a correlation of .33 across the two expectancy strategies. In the second experiment, the comparison of the 250 ms and 2000 ms SOA conditions, in which all participants had a counterstereotype expectancy, yielded a correlation of .42. Although these correlational data suggest that the intentional activation of counterstereotypes moderates implicit stereotypes, this conclusion is weakened by the lack of a clear demonstration that such a strategy can significantly reduce implicit stereotype effects from baseline levels. To determine whether such a reduction could be obtained, we (Blair et al., 2000) recently conducted a series of tests with another intentional counterstereotype strategy. Mental Imagery. Mental imagery is the conscious and intentional act of creating a vivid and realistic mental representation of a person or event – seeing it with the mind's eye. Research over the past three decades has established that mental imagery has many of the same characteristics as a real experience (Kosslyn, 1994, 1995; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998), and it is a unique cognitive process that allows people to retrieve information, solve problems, and understand situations in a manner different from other cognitive processes (for a review, see Kosslyn, 1995). A number of researchers have emphasized the importance of the objective (visual) attributes of social groups in categorization and stereotyping (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Carlston, 1994; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Green & Ashmore, 1998), which suggests an important role for mental imagery in stereotyping. As a first step in testing this possibility, we (Blair et al., 2000) conducted a pilot study in which the participants were asked to make a series of judgments about a target group (women, African Americans, the elderly). After these judgments, we asked the participants whether they had spontaneously created a mental image of the group or its members to help make the judgments. In support of the potential role that mental imagery may play in stereotyping, a majority of the participants reported that they had spontaneously used mental imagery to make judgments about the target group. Moreover, those participants who reported imagining a typical group member made more stereotypic judgments than the participants who did not imagine a typical group member. Although these results were correlational in nature, research in other domains supports the idea that stereotypic mental imagery may increase the accessibility of stereotypes (e.g., Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Carroll, 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982; Hirt & Sherman, 1985; Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983). By the same token, counterstereotypic mental imagery may increase the accessibility of counterstereotypes, resulting in a reduction in implicit stereotypes. In the first test of this hypothesis (Blair et al., 2000, Study 1), participants were asked to either imagine a strong woman or a control event (a typical Caribbean vacation) and then complete a measure of their implicit

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Page 372 stereotype of men and women. In this study, the measure was an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998; Rudman et al., in press), in which the participants were required to categorize a series of words along two dimensions – gender (male or female names) and strength (words indicating strength or weakness). In the stereotype-consistent block of trials, the male names were categorized with strong words and the female names were categorized with weak words; in the stereotype-inconsistent block of trials, the arrangement was reversed. Implicit stereotypes are indicated in this task when the judgments are significantly faster during the stereotypeconsistent block compared with the stereotype-inconsistent block of trials. As predicted, the participants who had engaged in the counterstereotypic imagery of a strong woman produced lower levels of the implicit stereotype than the participants with the control imagery (24 ms vs. 95 ms). In subsequent experiments, we also demonstrated that the counterstereotypic imagery reduced the implicit stereotype relative to (a) imagery of a weak woman, (b) imagery of a strong man, (c) no imagery, and (d) an explicit suppression strategy. As an indication of the generality of the effects, we found that, in addition to moderation of the IAT effect, the mental imagery also moderated implicit stereotypes as revealed through recognition false alarms and word-detection sensitivity (d-prime). Although additional research is needed to explicate further the manner in which explicitly activated counterstereotypes moderate implicit intergroup bias, the possibility that people can control this bias through such a strategy has been opened. However, we caution that the practicality of explicit counterstereotype strategies is unknown. Intentionally working against default thought processes is a resource-consuming task that may be difficult to maintain in the face of other demands, as indicated by Blair and Banaji (1996). Recent findings by Kawakami et al. (2000), however, suggest that even effortful strategies can be successfully learned. In those studies, the participants completed a relatively lengthy training session in which they were presented with a series of photographs of target group members (e.g., skinheads, Black people), paired with stereotypic and nonstereotypic traits. The participants in the stereotype-negation condition were instructed to “try not to think of cultural associations” and to respond “no” to the stereotypic traits and “yes’’ to nonstereotypic traits. Following this training, the participants' implicit stereotypes were measured. Over a series of experiments, Kawakami et al. found that the participants who had undergone the negation training produced significantly lower levels of implicit stereotypes compared with untrained participants. Moreover, the effect of the negation training was shown to persist for 24 hours. These results suggest that, with enough practice, an initially effortful counterstereotype strategy may not need to be constantly maintained to be effective (cf. Devine & Monteith, 1999; Monteith & Voils, chap. 23, this volume). Situational Promotion of Counterstereotypes. We have shown that counterstereotypes may be made more accessible through intentional strategies. Another approach is to promote counterstereotypes through changes in the perceiver's environment. Like expectancies and mental imagery, frequent and consistent exposure to counterstereotypic information should increase the accessibility of counterstereotypes. Although there is substantial evidence that exposure to counterstereotypic information can moderate explicit stereotypes (e.g., Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995; Hewstone, Macrae, Griffiths, Milne, & Brown, 1994; Weber & Crocker, 1983), little research exists on the effects of such exposure on implicit stereotypes. In some of the first experiments to examine such an effect, we (Blair et al., 1998) manipulated participants' exposure to counterstereotypes through a series of sentences that the participants read. In the counterstereotype condition, the sentences contained a large number (66% or 75%) of counterstereotypic events (e.g., “Sally threw the football”; “John played with the doll”), whereas in the control condition, all of the sentences were stereotype-neutral (e.g., “Dale told a humorous story”; “Rita swam at the beach”). The consequences of exposure to counterstereotypes on implicit stereotypes were measured in a subsequent priming task (i.e., response time to male and female names following masculine and feminine primes at a 200 ms SOA). We found that, by itself, the sentence manipulation did not affect the overall strength of participants' implicit gender stereotypes. However, when we examined individual differences in participants' explicit stereotypes and gender schemas, we found that the counterstereotypes had affected some of the participants. Specifically, participants who possessed weak explicit stereotypes or a weak gender schema produced lower levels of implicit stereotypes after exposure to the counterstereotypes. Because even those moderation effects were generally weak, the overall pattern of data suggests that simply being exposed to counterstereotypic information in such a passive form is not enough to combat implicit stereotypes. Stronger support for the potential power of the situation is provided by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2000;

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Page 373 see also Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2000), who showed that more vivid presentations of counterstereotypic information can have a powerful effect on implicit prejudicial associations. Specifically, they provided participants with photographs and descriptions of well-known Americans. In the first experiment, participants in a pro-Black condition received photographs and descriptions of admired African Americans (e.g., Bill Cosby) and disliked White Americans (e.g., Timothy McVeigh), whereas participants in an anti-Black condition received photographs and descriptions of disliked African Americans (e.g., O.J. Simpson) and admired White Americans (e.g., John F. Kennedy). Subsequently, participants' implicit prejudicial race associations (White-positive, Black-negative) were measured with an IAT. Dasgupta and Greenwald found that participants in the pro-Black condition produced significantly weaker prejudicial associations than participants in the anti-Black condition. A subsequent experiment showed that the pro-Black condition also produced weaker prejudicial associations than a neutral, no-exemplar condition, and that the reduction persisted for 24 hours. These results provide strong support for the effects that exposure to counterstereotypic information can have on implicit intergroup bias. Although our culture is largely stereotype-consistent (e.g., social roles and status tend to covary with social groups, and stereotypic media images abound), people can and do make choices about their immediate environment. For example, a person can choose to read the Sports Illustrated swimsuit edition or Ms . magazine; they can choose to listen to the Rush Limbaugh show or NPR. Such choices may influence whether stereotypic or counterstereotypic associations are activated. Conclusions By nature, implicit intergroup biases are difficult to detect and control. They operate swiftly and silently and, once begun, are difficult to stop. Understanding these difficulties, however, is the first step in developing effective control strategies. Although research on the control of implicit intergroup bias has just begun, three control strategies have been demonstrated to have potential. A perceiver may avoid implicit intergroup bias by suppressing stereotypes with implementation intentions, avoiding highly stereotypic cues or actively thinking about and seeking out counterstereotypic information. Although they are different in approach, all three of the strategies are proactive. The focus is on preventing the activation of intergroup biases before they can influence perceptions and behavior. Each of the three approaches has shown promise in effectively moderating implicit intergroup bias. However, these possibilities are not the same as feasible or probable strategies. Each strategy has drawbacks, and none of the strategies has been tested in actual interactions. Moreover, the effectiveness of any control strategy is likely a function of particular properties of the situation. For example, focusing one's attention away from stereotypic cues may be the most effective strategy in some situations, whereas acknowledging the presence of stereotypic cues and actively thinking about counterstereotypes may be the most effective strategy in other situations. Additional research is needed to identify those conditions and additional means by which implicit stereotypes can be controlled. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS The last 10 years of research have provided us with a new perspective on stereotypes and prejudice. By examining the implicit operation of these constructs, we have come to understand that intergroup bias may operate more quickly and efficiently than previously thought, and it can exert its influence without our awareness or intention. As a natural extension of the cognitive principles known to play a role in social interaction, these discoveries may not seem particularly new or exciting. However, the revelation of the implicit operation of intergroup bias has changed our understanding of this phenomenon in several ways. First, research on implicit intergroup bias has led to renewed interest in the interaction of social environment and cognitive process. The possibility that implicit intergroup bias may occur despite an individual's personal beliefs and attitudes has focused attention on the powerful role that society plays in creating life-long biases. In addition, we are faced with the reality that these biases may be widespread throughout society. This is a radically different perspective on intergroup bias, and its implications for jurisprudence and other social institutions have yet to be explored. Second, research on implicit intergroup bias has given us a greater appreciation for the difficulty of changing or eliminating intergroup bias. We now know that simply teaching people to appreciate group differences and admonishing them to avoid bias will not eradicate it. Rooted in a lifetime of socialization and maintained through efficient and silent cognitive processes, intergroup biases are well entrenched. People do not have the ability to turn them off as they please, just as they cannot rid themselves of an implicit biological process, such as heart disease, by willing it to go away. Although this characterization of intergroup bias sounds

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Page 374 like bad news, it does bring us closer to a more accurate understanding of the process and thus closer to solutions. For example, we now know that proactive as well as reactive strategies must be utilized to effectively moderate intergroup biases. Finally, the last 10 years of research have made us acutely aware of our need to understand the relation between implicit and explicit processes. Do implicit and explicit intergroup biases operate independent of each other? Can explicit processes inhibit implicit ones? In what ways are implicit and explicit processes fundamentally interdependent? These are questions we have only begun to define and address. If this beginning is any indication, however, we have much to look forward to. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by an IMPART grant from the University of Colorado. The insightful comments on an earlier draft of the chapter from Mahzarin Banaji, Reid Hastie, Jennifer Overbeck, Bernadette Park, and Bill yon Hippel are greatly appreciated. ENDNOTES 1. The term prejudice has historically been used to denote a person's attitude toward a social group, including both beliefs and evaluations associated with the group. However, consistent with current usage, prejudice refers to an individual's positive or negative evaluation of a social group, and stereotype refers to an individual's beliefs about or attributes associated with a social group. Because it is also useful to have a general term for biased category-based responding, the phrase intergroup bias is used to encompass both stereotypes and prejudice. This term is especially applicable to research on implicit biases, which often compares responses to two groups on a particular dimension (e.g., evaluative associations to Blacks vs. Whites). 2. Response time measures can also be ambiguous in terms of underlying process. In semantic priming tasks with appropriate parameters (e.g., subliminal primes; very short stimulus onset asynchrony), response time is conventionally accepted to reveal an implicit process. In other tasks, however, response time may indicate more explicit processes. For example, Augoustinos, Ahrens, and Innes (1994) found that low-prejudice participants were faster to endorse positive stereotypes of Aborigines and slower to endorse negative stereotypes, compared with high-prejudice participants. Although the speed with which participants responded was probably not an intended response, it was the result of conscious and intentional stereotyping. 3. In keeping with tradition, motivation is treated here as an explicit construct (i.e., an intentional process of which people are generally aware). However, it is important to note that motivation may also operate in an implicit manner (see Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume).

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Page 375 23 Exerting Control Over Prejudiced Responses Margo J. Monteith Corrine I. Voils University of Kentucky Early approaches to reducing prejudice1 were primarily aimed at producing stereotype, attitude, and behavioral change among individuals whose attitudes presumably were highly prejudiced. This was the goal of research that was intended to change prejudiced attitudes through propaganda (e.g., oral presentations and movies), education, and therapeutic and group interaction techniques (see Harding, Kunter, Proshansky, & Chein, 1954; Simpson & Yinger, 1965; Stephan, 1985). Rokeach's (1973) self-confrontation technique likewise was intended to reduce the prejudice evident in people's attitudes and values, as was research investigating the effects of intergroup contact (Amir, 1969) and cooperative learning (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978). There continues to be some much-needed emphasis on understanding the potential effectiveness of various strategies for reducing prejudiced attitudes and changing stereotypic beliefs (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; Pettigrew, 1997). However, recent advances in social psychology have underscored the need to understand how prejudice also might be reduced among individuals who do not espouse stereotypic beliefs or prejudiced attitudes (i.e., low-prejudice individuals). To those who are unfamiliar with current social-psychological theory and research on stereotyping and prejudice, the idea that prejudice-reduction research should focus on low-prejudice individuals at all might raise some puzzled brows. Reducing prejudice among people who do not hold prejudiced attitudes? The difficulty is that advances in social cognition research investigating stereotype activation and use (see Blair, this volume) have revealed that even individuals who hold low-prejudice attitudes are capable of engaging in prejudiced responses due to automatic stereotype activation and use. Furthermore, reducing prejudiced responses among such individuals is not easily accomplished. The problem centers on just how much control individuals can exert over prejudiced responses that result from rather automatic stereotype activation and use (see Bargh, 1999; Blair, chap. 22, this volume, Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). Our goals in this chapter are to review the impressive advances that have been made during the last couple of decades in understanding the social-cognitive factors that encourage prejudiced responses even among individuals who hold low-prejudice attitudes; to discuss strategies that can be used for the conscious control of prejudiced responses along with limitations of these strategies; and to present theory and research suggesting that individuals may be able to learn how to control automatic stereotype activation and use through practice and efforts at deautomatizing the automatic processes involved in stereotyping. We believe that much remains to be learned about issues of control in stereotyping and prejudice. However, due to the status of accumulated knowledge about issues of control, the research tools available through social cognition methodology, and the prevalence of individuals who are motivated to control their prejudice within society, we believe that rapid progress can potentially be made in this area. Thus, our final goal is to identify issues that we believe are particularly important to consider in future research that attempts to understand the processes by which Control can be exerted over prejudiced responses. STEREOTYPING AND CONTROLLING PREJUDICED RESPONSES As a consequence of the civil rights movement and its aftermath, there appeared to be a fundamental shift in the nature of prejudice toward particular groups (primarily Blacks and women) in the United States (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994). Expressing prejudiced beliefs and engaging in prejudiced behaviors became less socially acceptable, and many people appeared to adopt a more egalitarian stance in the attitudes that they reported (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985). However, at the same time, research continued to reveal prejudiced responses

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Page 376 even among people who professed that they were not prejudiced (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Sigall & Page, 1971). Thus, when social cognition began to emerge as a prevailing approach to theorizing and experimentation during the mid-1970s, researchers were faced with the task of attempting to understand the paradox between people's professed beliefs and their actual responses. The focus and methods characteristic of social cognition lent themselves well to understanding the reasons for this paradox. Although some researchers suggested that the attitudinal shift was more apparent than real (Crosby et al., 1980), other researchers argued that genuine changes in people's attitudes had occurred, but that prejudiced responses persisted for reasons that were largely rooted in the nature of social cognition (e.g., Devine, 1989). A two-part lesson emerged from such research. First, this research identified a variety of cognitive mechanisms that result in stereotype formation, thus establishing the extremely high likelihood that most people will form stereotypes.2 Second, the research revealed that, once stereotypes are developed, they often exert undue and even unwanted influences on social perception, judgment, and behavior. As research on the development of stereotypes is reviewed elsewhere in this volume (see chapters by Schaller; Sherman; Stroessner), we focus here on cognitive factors that encourage stereotype use. The Use of Social Stereotypes The cognitive approach to stereotyping has revealed important reasons why stereotypes, once formed, are likely to be applied in social perception and interaction. In part, stereotypes are likely to be used because people are limited in the amount of information they can actively process. This argument dates back to Lippman (1922) and Allport's (1954) discussions of categorization and stereotyping as natural and adaptive responses to the need to simplify the overwhelmingly complex social environment. People are limited in their capacity to process information, and stereotypes help them make sense out of complex information encountered in everyday life. Besides simplifying the environment, stereotypes are useful because they utilize less cognitive energy than the alternative – individuating. Ample research has attested to this point. For example, Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Neuberg, Pratto, & Allman, 1986; cited in Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) presented participants with mental patient category labels and accompanying attribute information sets that were either consistent or inconsistent with the category label and varied in size. Participants took longer to read attribute information that was inconsistent (i.e., individuating) rather than consistent (i.e., stereotypic) with the target's category label. Furthermore, this effect was exacerbated by larger attribute set sizes. Research investigating the effects of attentional resources on trait judgments has also underscored the efficiency of stereotype use (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Pratto & Bargh, 1991). For example, Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffiths (1993) found that participants who were cognitively taxed recalled more stereotype-consistent than inconsistent information about a target, whereas participants who were not taxed recalled more stereotype-inconsistent information. Furthermore, the target was rated more stereotypically under high than low cognitive load. The cognitive savings that result from stereotyping can be used elsewhere in turn, as demonstrated by Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994). This research employed a dual-task paradigm in which participants formed impressions of individuals based on trait descriptions while they simultaneously performed a secondary task. When stereotypic labels were provided along with the trait information (e.g., the label artist provided along with the trait creative), recall for the trait information was enhanced. Moreover, participants who were provided with the trait labels performed better on the secondary task than participants who did not have this additional information. This latter finding underscores the energy-saving properties of stereotypes: When stereotypes are activated and used as a basis for social information processing, cognitive resources that otherwise would be occupied are made available. In summary, stereotype use is highly likely because stereotypes allow us to make quick decisions and judgments, they allow us to make judgments when our resources are being directed elsewhere, and they free up resources that can be used in other ways. In addition, stereotypes are likely to be used because they frequently have a long history of repeated activation and, therefore, can be very easily activated. This argument formed the basis for Devine's (1989) application of cognitive theories (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1987) to understanding the dissociation between automatic and controlled processes in stereotyping and prejudice. Devine suggested that, because major societal stereotypes are learned from a young age and are repeatedly activated (e.g., through the media), stereotype activation eventually occurs automatically (i.e., without intention, awareness, or effort). In

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Page 377 contrast, Devine argued that personal beliefs running contrary to stereotypes are less well practiced and thus require controlled processing (i.e., intention, awareness, and effort) to be activated. This analysis suggests that group membership cues (e.g., race, gender) serve to activate stereotypes automatically, and prejudiced responses inevitably occur unless one has the motivation, attentional resources, and time to bring one's personal beliefs to mind as a basis for alternative responses. Devine's (1989) findings supported her analysis. A first experiment demonstrated that low- and high-prejudice White participants were equally knowledgeable of the cultural stereotype of Blacks.3 In the second experiment, a stereotype priming procedure was used in which stereotypes were activated below participants' conscious awareness. This stereotype activation procedure subsequently resulted in more stereotypical evaluations of a target. This finding emerged regardless of level of prejudice, thus demonstrating automatic stereotype activation among low-and high-prejudice individuals alike. However, the third experiment demonstrated that, when participants were given the opportunity to consider their personal beliefs about Blacks thoughtfully and consciously, differences between low-and high-prejudice participants did emerge. When asked to list their personal beliefs about Blacks, high-prejudice participants listed content that was highly consistent with the cultural stereotype of Blacks, whereas low-prejudice participants listed nonprejudiced beliefs. Devine argued that the low-prejudice participants were able to override the effects of automatically activated stereotypes in this task because plentiful cognitive resources allowed them to do so. The literature now includes an enormous body of research demonstrating the implicit manner in which stereotypes can be activated and applied (see Blair, chap. 22, this volume). Qualifications have been placed on the idea that stereotype activation is an inevitable consequence of the presence of relevant group membership cues (see Bargh's analysis of conditional automaticity, 1989, 1994; Blair & Banaji's investigation of the role of counterstereotypical expectancies, 1996; Gilbert & Hixon's examination of cognitive busyness, 1991; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor's investigation of the implicit activation of egalitarian goals, 2000). Nevertheless, the fact remains that stereotype activation is likely and conscious control over its effects is difficult to attain. If those who wish to avoid the unfair and biased treatment of others due to the operation of stereotypes are to do so, they must learn to exert control over the passive activation of stereotypes or, once stereotypes have been activated, over potentially prejudiced responses. The Control of Prejudiced Responses Despite the ease with which stereotypes are activated, they need not be applied as a basis for responding (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989). Past social cognition research has focused primarily on the possibility that stereotype control might be exerted relatively late – after stereotypes have been fully activated, but before they are applied. However, control theoretically can be exerted over prejudiced responses at a variety of levels, ranging from relatively early to late in the stereotype activation and application process (see Devine & Monteith, 1999, for a similar analysis). One control strategy that can be used to override potentially prejudiced responses entails the conscious generation of an egalitarian response that can serve as a replacement. For example, people can generate and state their lowprejudice beliefs in relation to stereotyped groups (Devine, 1989). The conscious generation of egalitarian responses may also occur when people are not explicitly asked to state their personal beliefs. For instance, one can evaluate a joke that plays on stereotypes unfavorably rather than favorably (Monteith, 1993). However, one potential problem is that some situations may not provide clear criteria for knowing exactly what sort of response would be egalitarian (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996). Another problem is that some situations do not provide the opportunity for a single, egalitarian response, but rather require that one gather and integrate considerable information (e.g., evaluating a job applicant). In such instances, a second type of control strategy that entails gathering individuating information may be useful. According to the leading models of person perception (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), perceivers can go beyond category-based (and associated stereotypic) information that is available from the most limited perceptual processing by taking the time and making the effort to gather additional information. Another method for exerting control involves implementing a correction strategy. To date, the most comprehensive correction model is Wegener and Petty's (1995, 1997; see also Wegener, Dunn, & Tokusato, chap. 17, this volume) Flexible Correction Model (FCM). According to the FCM, correction processes are driven by social perceivers' naive, conscious theories about the potential influence of any contextual factor(s). These theories suggest the direction and magnitude of possible bias, and perceivers then correct (i.e., remove or avoid the influence of the bias) in a direction opposite and in an amount commensurate with the perceived bias. Thus, to the extent that perceivers believe that target characteris-

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Page 378 tics (e.g., race) influence their perceptions, they may correct for those biased perceptions. For instance, people may have a theory that negative stereotypes about gays cause them to maintain a greater interpersonal distance between themselves and gays than would otherwise be the case. They can correct for this bias by standing closer to a gay person than they would have had their theory not been considered. Finally, in some situations, individuals may attempt to control potentially stereotypic thoughts and responses by employing suppression strategies, whereby they attempt to banish stereotypic thoughts from the mind. As demonstrated in Macrae, Bodenhausen, and their colleagues' research (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; see Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998, for a review), this strategy has the potential to backfire in the form of a rebound effect (i.e., people may have even more stereotypical responses than if they had never attempted suppression in the first place). For example, Macrae, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that participants who initially suppressed stereotypes while writing a passage about a stereotyped target later showed high levels of stereotype use relative to a comparison group that had never suppressed stereotypes in the first place. Why does stereotype rebound occur? According to Wegner (1994), attempts to suppress unwanted thoughts initiate a conscious operating process that searches for distracter thoughts. For example, rather than think about stereotypes in connection with stereotyped targets, one can search for alternative, more egalitarian thoughts. At the same time, an automatic, ironic monitoring process searches the contents of consciousness to determine whether the unwanted thoughts are present; if they are, the operating process then can be signaled to search for alternative distracter thoughts. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and their colleagues have argued that the searching activity of the ironic monitoring process serves to prime the unwanted thought repeatedly. Therefore, when the individual is no longer actively attempting to find distracter thoughts, the unwanted thought may rebound due to its heightened accessibility. Despite these possible pitfalls of using suppression as a stereotype control strategy, there appear to be conditions under which it can be successfully employed and not result in heightened accessibility or use of stereotypes. For example, Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998) argued that people with low-prejudice attitudes toward the target group should not be prone to stereotype rebound following suppression efforts because these individuals have ready replacements for stereotypic thoughts (i.e., based on their egalitarian beliefs), and rebound is less likely to occur when replacement thoughts are available (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Also, low-prejudice individuals have a strong motivation to avoid prejudiced responses (e.g., Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), which likewise decreases the likelihood of the possible paradoxical effects of thought suppression (Kelly & Kahn, 1994). Consistent with this reasoning, Monteith et al.'s findings reveal no evidence of stereotype rebound in the form of increased stereotype use or accessibility among low-prejudice participants after an initial period of stereotype suppression. Such findings suggest that suppression efforts are not doomed to fail, but can be used successfully by some people to control cognition and behavior. Boundary Conditions for Stereotype Control Of course, for any of the control strategies discussed in this section to be initiated, individuals must have the necessary motivation to control potentially prejudiced responses. Only low-prejudice individuals are internally motivated to initiate the control strategies, because they experience a strong internal motivation to control the sort of biased and discriminatory treatment that can result from automatically activated stereotypes (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Plant & Devine, 1998). High-prejudice individuals may be externally motivated to control potentially prejudiced responses in a more limited number of situations, such as when salient social norms suggest that prejudiced responses are unacceptable (see Monteith et al., 1998). Likewise, because outcome dependency motivates people to process information about others more thoroughly (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), control efforts may be instigated among high-prejudice individuals when they are dependent on members of stereotyped groups for important outcomes. Being highly motivated to be accurate (Brewer, 1988; Neuberg, 1989) or feeling accountable for one's actions (Tetlock & Kim, 1987) may also encourage high-prejudice persons to control their prejudice. Even with sufficient motivation, other conditions must be met for the control strategies discussed thus far to be effectively implemented. For example, as Wilson and Brekke (1994) underscored in their discussion of mental contamination, people must be aware of the potential for their judgments, emotions, and behaviors to be biased in a given situation before they realize that some control strategy must be implemented. This is indeed problematic in the case of unconscious stereotyping effects. As Banaji, Hardin, and Rothman (1993) concluded, “Implicit stereotype effects undermine the

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Page 379 current belief in the role of consciousness in guaranteeing equality in the treatment of individuals irrespective of sex, color, and national origin” (p. 280). Also, even if people realize that they have some potential for bias, they will fall to correct for it effectively if they underestimate their degree of bias or overestimate their ability for control (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). A final important condition for employing conscious and effortful strategies of mental control and cognitive correction is that people must have the time and cognitive capacity to carry out the control strategy (Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Devine, 1989; Higgins & King, 1981; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pratto & Bargh, 1991). For example, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) asked students who were about to graduate from a teaching program to evaluate a composition that was supposedly written by an 8th grader who either was or was not a member of an ethnic group that was positively stereotyped in terms of intelligence. They found that, even when participants believed they would have to explain the basis for their evaluations of the composition, their evaluations were biased in a stereotype-consistent manner unless they were not under time pressure to complete the evaluation. To be sure, stereotype control can be effective at times. This message is one that past social cognition researchers have underscored, as demonstrated in the following statements by some of the leading researchers: The idea that categorization is a natural and adaptive, even dominant, way of understanding other people does not mean that it is the only option available. (Fiske, 1989, p. 277) … the use of automatically supplied input in consciously produced judgmental output is not mandatory. (Bargh, 1994, p. 30) … prejudice need not be the consequence of ordinary thought processes. Although stereotypes still exist and can influence the responses of both high-and low-prejudice subjects … there are individuals who actively reject the negative stereotype and make efforts to respond in nonprejudiced ways. (Devine, 1989, p. 16) Such optimism is fitting when perceivers do not lack motivation, awareness, or cognitive resources. Nonetheless, if control can be achieved at a different, earlier level of the stereotype activation and application process, the potential for unbiased and equal treatment would be greater (see Blair, chap. 22, this volume). One possibility is that one's egalitarian goals may prevent stereotype activation itself (see Moskowitz, chap. 21, this volume). Another possibility, which we turn to next, is that the automatic processes that give rise to prejudiced responses may be deautomatized. PUTTING THE BRAKES ON PREJUDICE:DEAUTOMATIZING THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN STEREOTYPING The successful and efficient execution of ordinary tasks in life requires that people not only have the ability to automatize frequently executed behaviors, but also to deautomatize the same behaviors when their execution is no longer adaptive. For example, the behaviors necessary to drive from Point A to Point B may be executed in a largely automatic manner. However, when changes are introduced to the well-learned route, such as a new stop sign at an intersection, one must deautomatize the automatically activated inclination to drive through the intersection without stopping. Clinical research (e.g., Beck, 1976; Kanfer & Gaelick, 1986) has long emphasized the importance of controlling and changing the processes that give rise to automatically activated constructs (e.g., changing automatic, depressive styles of thinking). Such change presumably occurs through a process of self-regulation, during which individuals “…‘deautomatize’ troublesome behavior patterns” and then “…‘reautomatize’ newly learned and more adaptive behavior chains’’ (Kanfer & Gaelick, 1986, p. 296). Although such work suggests that control can be achieved over implicit processes and their unwanted consequences, it does not specify the actual mechanisms for gaining control. Monteith (1993), and more recently, Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Kephart (1999) developed theory for understanding how self-regulatory mechanisms might result in deautomatization of the processes involved in stereotype activation and use. The self-regulation framework begins with the idea that group membership cues (e.g., the presence of a Black person) can activate a stereotype automatically, which can result in a prejudiced response (Devine, 1989). Such a response constitutes a discrepancy from low-prejudice individuals' standards for how they believe they should respond. If low-prejudice individuals become aware that they have engaged in a discrepant response, several consequences should follow. First, because the discrepant response constitutes a violation of how low-prejudice individuals believe they ought to respond, feelings of guilt should be experienced (Higgins, 1987). These affective reactions should heighten individuals' motivation to avoid discrepant responses in the future (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957; Stone, chap. 3, this

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Page 380 volume; Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, chap. 2, this volume). The self-relevant discrepancy also should serve to heighten self-focused attention, which likewise should instigate attempts to regulate or control subsequent prejudiced responses (see Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1986, 1987). For example, imagine a tired, hungry, and hurried grocery shopper named Pat. During a seemingly endless search for a desired product, Pat spots an African American woman wearing a blue smock who is scanning the contents of a shelf. Pat quickly approaches the woman and asks where the desired product is located, only to receive a confused look and then the reply: “I don't work here.” (As Feagin [1991] noted, Blacks often endure situations in which Whites mistakenly assume that they are “the help.”) Realizing the mistake, Pat feels embarrassed and guilty over the faulty inference, and attention becomes focused inward as he comes to terms with having responded to the woman in a stereotypic way. Pat is likely to regulate his subsequent behavior so as to avoid another potentially prejudiced response during the shopping trip. However, what implications will Pat's experience have for controlling his prejudiced responses in the more distant future? According to relevant theory (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo et al., 1999), certain other events should occur during an initial discrepancy experience that should facilitate more long-term control. Extrapolating from Gray's (1981, 1982, 1987; Gray & McNaugton, 1996; see also Patterson & Newman, 1993) neuropsychological model of motivation and learning, the occurrence of a discrepancy should result in the immediate activation of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS). This activation causes a brief increase in arousal and an automatic, momentary pausing or interruption of ongoing behavior (i.e., behavioral inhibition; Fowles, 1980; Gray, 1982; Patterson & Newman, 1993). The mental and behavioral sequence that led to the discrepant response is tagged with a “faulty, needs checking” indicator (Gray, 1982), and then exploratory-investigative behavior is initiated to search for indications of the discrepant response. This allows the individual to identify environmental stimuli that were present when the discrepant response occurred. Importantly, these attentional and investigative behaviors should work in concert, causing an association to be built between cues present when the discrepant response occurred, the discrepant response itself, and the punishment (i.e., guilt and self-criticism) that results from engaging in the prejudiced response. Therefore, cues for control4 are established through a process that Patterson and Newman (1993) labeled retrospective reflection. Revisiting Pat, the shopper, to illustrate these discrepancy-associated consequences, when he mistakenly assumes his fellow shopper works at the store, arousal should increase, and he should pause momentarily. An association should be built between environmental stimuli (e.g., the store, the woman, the product he was unable to find, or, more generally, Blacks), his discrepant response, and the guilt he experiences. The establishment of cues for control is at the heart of the theory because, theoretically, these cues enable individuals to learn to gain control over the rather automatic processes involved in stereotype activation and use. Specifically, the cues for control serve as warning signals that a discrepant response may occur: When they are present in subsequent situations, the BIS should be activated again, causing heightened arousal and a slowing of ongoing behavior (i.e., behavioral inhibition). Consequently, the response-generation process should be slowed and executed more carefully (see Gray, 1982; Nichols & Newman, 1986; Patterson, Kosson, & Newman, 1987; Patterson & Newman, 1993). This would allow low-prejudice individuals to interrupt patterns of responding that are based on automatic processing and to initiate controlled processing. Thus, the stereotype-based response can be inhibited, and an alternative response can be provided instead. Importantly, the self-regulation model does not just suggest that controlled processing can be used to override what would be prejudiced responses. Although the model suggests that this can and does occur, it also concerns the processes whereby ongoing mental and response-generation processes are interrupted so that the individual has the ability to bring controlled processes to bear. In addition, the model suggests that this process of inhibition and replacement may well become routinized so that nonprejudiced responses are provided on a consistent basis. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELF-REGULATION MODEL Awareness of Prejudice-Related Discrepancies A critical prerequisite to self-regulating prejudiced responses is that people are aware of and willing to recognize their prejudiced responses. Acknowledgment of discrepant responses (i.e., responses discrepant from the ideal of acting in an egalitarian manner) is necessary for the instigation of discrepancy-associated consequences that ultimately should facilitate control. Although some contemporary theories suggest that people are unwilling to acknowledge prejudiced tendencies

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Page 381 (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986), discrepancy-related research suggests otherwise (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1996a, 1996b; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Monteith & Walters, 1998; Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, Monteith, 1999). In this research, participants imagine themselves in a variety of situations involving members of a target group (e.g., Blacks). For each scenario, participants report their personal standards for how they should respond (e.g., “I should react to all supervisors the same, regardless of their race”). Then participants consider the situations again and, this time, they report how they actually would respond in the situations (e.g., “I would feel awkward having a Black supervisor’’). After reverse scoring relevant items so that higher ratings always reflect more prejudiced woulds and shoulds, each should rating is subtracted from the corresponding would rating. These differences are then summed across scenarios to yield an index of the extent to which participants report being prone to discrepant responses. Thus, discrepancy scores can range from small (i.e., high degree of consistency between participants' reports of their personal standards and actual responses) to large (i.e., high degree of inconsistency between participants' would and should ratings). Results of this research reveal that a majority of the sampled populations report being prone to discrepant responses. Also, the experience of discrepancies among low-prejudice individuals produces negative self-directed affect (e.g., feelings of guilt).5 A limitation of this research, however, is that discrepancies have been assessed using a self-report methodology in response to hypothetical situations. People may not actually have the self-insight necessary for generating accurate theories about their susceptibility to stereotypic biases, so they may overestimate or underestimate the extent to which they actually engage in prejudiced responses (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegener, et al., chap. 17, this volume; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). People also may be motivated to protect their egalitarian self-images, so they are unwilling to admit their prejudiced feelings, thoughts, and behaviors to others and possibly even to themselves (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). If self-reported proneness to discrepancies does not correspond to the actual state of affairs, recognition of discrepant responses in real-world situations would seem unlikely, and discrepancy-associated consequences would be unlikely to be instigated in many situations. To investigate the accuracy of self-reported discrepancies, Monteith and Voils (1998) recruited individuals who varied in their self-reported proneness to discrepancies and examined whether systematic differences in the likelihood of actually engaging in prejudiced responses were found. In an experiment ostensibly concerning the psychology of humor, participants listened to jokes told via an intercom system. Four of 18 jokes played on the stereotype of Blacks. During a joke-evaluation task, participants simultaneously performed another task that served to create either high or low distraction. Thus, the design of the experiment included two factors: discrepancy level (which varied continuously) and distraction (which was manipulated between participants). The joke evaluation task was used because many low-prejudice individuals report positive responses to stereotypic jokes despite their beliefs that positive responses are inappropriate (Monteith, 1993). Monteith and Voils (1998) reasoned that, regardless of participants' self-reported discrepancy scores, the racial jokes would be evaluated unfavorably in the low-distraction condition (i.e., when cognitive resources were plentiful). However, if self-reported discrepancies provide accurate reflections of people's actual proneness to discrepancies, the racial joke evaluations should be more favorable among participants with large than small discrepancies in the high-distraction condition (i.e., when cognitive resources are taxed). Results indicate that evaluations of the racial jokes were unfavorable in the low-distraction condition regardless of discrepancy proneness. However, in the high-distraction condition, participants with large discrepancies evaluated the jokes more favorably than those with small discrepancies. This pattern of findings suggests that people appear to have enough insight into their potential for stereotypical biases, and they are willing enough to report their perceptions of biases so that self-reported discrepancies are reliably related to the actual likelihood that prejudiced responses will occur under conditions that favor such responses. Because people's reports of their propensity for violating their low-prejudice personal standards corresponded to their actual propensity for prejudiced responses, it seems likely that people do detect their prejudiced responses in real-world situations. Such discrepancy detection should set in motion the self-regulatory consequences described by the self-regulation model. Evidence for the Initiation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms. After low-prejudice individuals detect their discrepant responses, a variety of consequences must follow if the discrepancy experiences are to facilitate the subsequent control of prejudiced responses. Monteith (1993, Experiment 1) investigated several possible consequences of discrepancy activation: affective consequences, self-

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Page 382 focused attention, and attention to discrepancy-relevant stimuli. In this research, participants who were either low or high in prejudice toward gays evaluated a gay or straight individual's application for law school. Participants who evaluated the gay applicant were led to believe they had evaluated him negatively simply because of his sexual orientation. Subsequently, low-prejudice participants who were experiencing a discrepancy reported relatively high levels of negative self-directed affect and showed heightened self-focus (as assessed by the proportion of selfreferent pronouns used in a thought-listing task). These participants also were focused on their recent discrepant response (as assessed by the proportion of discrepancy-focused thoughts used in a thought-listing task). Finally, they took a relatively long time to read an essay about why discrepant responses occur and how to reduce their occurrence, and they recalled much of the material from the essay, suggesting that they were engaged in exploratory-investigative behavior designed to search for indications of their discrepant response. Monteith (1993, Experiment 2) also investigated whether a discrepancy experience would heighten low-prejudice individuals' motivation and ability to avoid prejudiced responses in a subsequent situation. Low-and high-prejudice participants initially completed a task that served to activate either a prejudice-related or prejudice-unrelated discrepancy. Then in a supposedly unrelated study on humor and jokes, participants indicated how funny, witty, and creative they thought 12 jokes were. Two of the jokes played on the stereotype of gay men. The results indicate that low-prejudice participants who experienced a prejudice-related discrepancy evaluated the jokes about gays unfavorably relative to the other participants. These findings indicate that an initial discrepancy experience can facilitate low-prejudice individuals' ability to exert control over potentially prejudiced responses in a subsequent situation. Note, however, that the opportunity for having prejudiced responses occurred only a short while after the initial discrepancy experience. Although occasions that require individuals to control their prejudiced responses may sometimes arise only a short time after initial discrepancy experiences, the time lag may often be much longer. In such instances, the establishment of cues for control through initial discrepancy experiences and the presence and operation of such cues in subsequent situations will be necessary for the successful control of prejudiced responses. Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo et al. (1999) reported four experiments that examined cues for control. In addition to replicating some of the self-regulatory findings reported by Monteith (1993), the first three experiments used a paradigm that enabled the researchers to study the establishment of cues for control. White participants believed they were completing a study that examined people's abilities to control autonomic levels of physiological arousal. After reading a short article concerning the control of autonomic responses, two electrodes were attached to participants' fingers that ostensibly measured the level of negative arousal they were experiencing while they viewed various pictures. Participants were told that they would view a picture for 3 seconds and that a bar graph that depicts the negative arousal they experienced in relation to the picture would appear. After viewing the feedback, participants would press the space bar to proceed to the next picture. Following these instructions and practice trials, participants completed three rounds of picture-viewing trials that were of central interest and attempted to reduce any negative arousal they supposedly were experiencing across the rounds. There were two experimental conditions, and participants in both conditions believed they were able to reduce their level of arousal for five pictures. However, in the racial feedback condition, participants believed they consistently had high negative arousal to three other pictures that included Blacks and consistently low arousal for three different pictures. In the nonracial feedback condition, participants believed they consistently had high negative arousal to the three pictures that did not include Blacks and consistently low arousal for those that did include Blacks. Thus, all participants were presumably unable to control their levels of negative arousal for certain pictures, but whether this was for the pictures that included Blacks varied across experimental conditions. Two key dependent measures were collected to examine whether cues for control were being established. First, an affect measure was administered after the picture-viewing and feedback portion of the experiment to determine whether participants were experiencing negative self-directed affect. The experience of such negative consequences of one's responses is essential for the establishment of cues for control (cf. Gray, 1982). Second, during the pictureviewing process, the time participants took to view their arousal feedback on the computer screen was recorded (ms). This pausing time measure assessed the extent to which participants stopped and reflected on their arousal feedback, which is also necessary for the establishment of cues for control (Nichols & Newman, 1986; Patterson, Kosson, & Newman, 1987; Patterson & Newman, 1993). The results reveal that participants in the racial feedback condition reported greater levels of negative self-directed affect than participants in the nonracial

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Page 383 feedback condition. They also paused longer to view their feedback in relation to these slides than participants in the nonracial feedback condition. Finally, negative self-directed affect was correlated with pausing time in relation to the slides that included Blacks, but not with pausing time for any of the other types of pictures. This key finding suggests that cues for control were established as a consequence of the presumably prejudiced reactions participants had to the racial slides. Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo et al.'s (1999) final experiment investigated whether the presence of already established cues for control in situations that afford prejudiced responses triggers BIS activity and, more specifically, results in behavioral inhibition. Such inhibition enables individuals to engage in prospective reflection (Patterson & Newman, 1993) so that one can generate a response that is personally acceptable, rather than generating a stereotypic response based on automatic processing. The cues for control used in this research consisted of Blacks paired with stereotypic descriptions. Our reasoning was that, because many low-prejudice individuals report having discrepancy experiences in which Blacks are paired with stereotypic responses and guilt (e.g., Devine et al., 1991), these stimuli would constitute cues for control and trigger behavioral inhibition. In contrast, the same stimuli were not expected to serve as cues for control among high-prejudice individuals because such individuals do not hold internalized standards for avoiding prejudiced responses, nor do they feel very guilty when they respond in prejudiced ways (Monteith, 1996a; Monteith & Walters, 1998). Low-and high-prejudice participants completed a dual-task activity. One task, which purportedly assessed visual memory, involved determining whether photographs of people presented one at a time on a computer screen were identical to photographs that the participants had viewed earlier and pressing a specified key on the keyboard to indicate a response. The second task involved generating a verbal response to person descriptions that were presented one at a time on the computer screen. For example, one person description was “This person has to do a lot of reading,” and a reasonable response would be “college student.” Trials for the two tasks occurred sequentially, such that immediately after participants responded to a photograph, a person description appeared, participants provided a verbal response, then another photograph appeared, and so on. Sometimes the photograph was of a Black male and sometimes it was of a White male. In addition, some of the person descriptions had been constructed so that the most natural responses to them would be stereotypeconsistent. For example, “drug addict” is a natural response to “This person uses needles for recreation.” Our prediction was that the pairing of Black photographs with stereotype-consistent person descriptions would result in an immediate interruption of ongoing behavior among low-prejudice but not high-prejudice participants, causing them to take longer to provide a verbal response to the person description. The results were consistent with expectations. Low-prejudice participants for whom the stereotypic descriptions were paired with Black photographs showed evidence of behavioral inhibition, but no evidence of behavioral inhibition was found among low-prejudice participants when the same person descriptions were paired with White photographs. In contrast, high-prejudice participants took equally long to generate responses to the person descriptions regardless of the type of photograph with which they were paired. These findings are encouraging in the sense that cues for control not only appear to be established, but also appear to function to interrupt ongoing responses by signaling the need for careful processing. Reaching the Discrepancy-Not-Prone State After establishing and learning to respond carefully in the presence of cues for control, deautomatization requires routinizing the self-regulation process so that it can operate independently of controlled processing resources and, finally, the atrophy of the automatic associations that formerly encouraged prejudiced responses (see Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo et al., 1999). If people can self-regulate themselves to a discrepancy-not-prone state in this way, then one ought to be able to identify individuals who experience a great deal of success at avoiding potentially prejudiced responses. There is emerging evidence that some people do experience such success. For example, findings that some people report small discrepancies (e.g., Devine et al., 1991) along with corroborating behavioral evidence of success at avoiding discrepant responses (Monteith & Voils, 1998) point to people's success. Additional evidence that people can reach a discrepancy-not-prone state stems from recent investigations demonstrating that stereotypes apparently are not automatically activated among some individuals. For instance, Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995) found that the presentation of Black faces did not activate negative evaluations in some Whites. Lepore and Brown (1997) found that subliminal presentation of the category Black people resulted in negative impressions of a target person who exhibited stereotype-ambiguous behavior among high-but not low-prejudice participants. Finally, Kawakami, Dion, and Dovidio (1998) found that

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Page 384 low-prejudice participants responded to stereotypic words following a White prime just as quickly as when following a Black prime, even at an SOA of 300 ms, which precluded conscious control. Although a different paradigm was used in each of these studies, the findings converge in showing that some individuals may be able to avoid engaging in prejudiced responses because negative evaluations or stereotypes are not activated among some people. Other research suggests that stereotypic associations do exist in memory, but some people are able to avoid their negative influence. Two programs of research have supported this idea. First, Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (1999) found evidence that stereotypic associations exist in the minds of persons who are able to avoid prejudiced responses (i.e., discrepancy-not-prone). In this research, participants varying in self-reported discrepancies completed the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to measure the extent to which they have negative implicit associations about Blacks. Discrepancy-prone and not-prone individuals evidenced an implicit pro-White bias to the same degree. Second, Moskowitz and colleagues (e.g., Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz et al., 2000) have shown that, although stereotypic associations are present in memory, their activation can be controlled by the simultaneous activation of chronic egalitarian goals. In one study (Moskowitz et al., 1999, Experiment 4), stereotype inhibition occurred for chronics (i.e., persons who are highly committed to egalitarianism) at an SOA that precluded conscious suppression of stereotypes. In summary, these findings suggest that some people have indeed reached the discrepancy-not-prone state. FUTURE CHALLENGES In a recent provocative and insightful analysis of stereotype activation and use, Bargh (1999) made a case against current evidence for the controllability of the effects of automatic stereotype activation. He began his analysis by noting the early social cognition research in the 1960s (e.g., the attributional research of Kelley, 1967), in which “individuals were assumed to be largely in executive control of their perceptual and judgmental facilities’’ (Bargh, 1999, p. 362). During the next two decades, with the shift in emphasis to the mindless (e.g., Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978) and then automatic (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985) manner in which social-psychological processing was shown to operate in a variety of domains, cognitive control was seen as quite unlikely. Bargh continued to the present, noting that there appears to be another shift now back in the direction of conscious control. After a critical analysis of the recent research that purportedly supports this shift in thinking, he concluded that it is unwarranted by extant findings. He argued that, “once a stereotype is so entrenched that it becomes activated automatically, there is really little that can be done to control its influence” (p. 378). In our view, future research needs to meet certain challenges before firm conclusions can be reached about just how controllable automatic stereotyping effects are. These challenges include (a) keeping the social in social cognition ; (b) placing greater emphasis on individual differences; (c) further examining the mechanisms of discrepancy reduction and ultimate outcomes; and (d) increasing emphasis on the broader role of social norms in creating and maintaining automatic stereotyping effects. We believe that, by considering these issues, a clearer understanding of exactly what can be done to control automatic stereotyping effects will be achieved. Keeping the Social in Social Cognition The goal of social cognition research is to use an information-processing model to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of social phenomena in a direct manner (Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989). With this goal in mind, social cognition research has relied on creative research procedures to determine underlying stereotype representations and the ease with which stereotypes can be activated. For example, stereotypes can be activated outside of conscious awareness by presenting terms related to the stereotype of Blacks in participants' parafoveal visual field (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997); by presenting stereotype-related words (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), ethnic group labels ("BLACK"; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), or faces of members of stereotyped groups using a masked priming procedure (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996, Experiment 3; Chen & Bargh, 1997); by presenting stereotype-related words or faces at so brief an interval (e.g., 300 ms stimulus onset asynchrony) that controlled processing is prevented (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Fazio et al., 1995; Moskowitz et al., 1999); or by having participants complete a scrambled sentence test (Banaji et al., 1993; Bargh et al., 1996; see Srull & Wyer, 1979). Another clever procedure, the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998), measures negative implicit associations by comparing the ease with which people can pair White names with pleasant words and Black names with unpleasant words versus reverse pairings. These are powerful techniques, and, although they

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Page 385 are important and highly informative, they do not by themselves establish the effects of automatic stereotype activation. To assess the effects, one must examine how activated stereotypes subsequently influence the types of feelings, judgments, and evaluations participants have in relation to others. The others of interest presumably are members of stereotyped groups. This is the point at which the social seems to have slipped from social cognition in a number of important studies. Specifically, when the effects of automatic stereotype activation have been assessed and found to operate independently of people's self-reported beliefs, they often have not been assessed in relation to reactions of members of the stereotyped groups (for an exception, see Banaji et al., 1993). For example, Devine (1989; see also Lepore & Brown, 1997) had participants evaluate a race-unspecified target who likely was assumed to be White (cf. Wittenbrink et al., 1997) following stereotype priming. Bargh et al. (1996, Experiment 3) examined how priming the stereotype of Blacks affected participants' reactions to a White target, as did Chen and Bargh (1997). We presumably want to generalize to instances in which the perceiver sees a member of the stereotyped group, and the automatically activated stereotype then influences the perceiver's reactions to the target. Thus, these experiments leave the question that would seem to be of ultimate interest unanswered: What would have happened if these studies had used Black targets rather than White targets?6 Race of the target may well matter (Wyer, Sherman, & Stroessner, 1998), at least for some individuals (see following section on individual differences). Previous research has shown that primed constructs will not influence responses when participants have other communication goals (Sedikides, 1990) or are highly motivated to form an accurate impression (Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994). Low-prejudice individuals' goals and motivations include not responding in prejudiced ways. Thus, when responding to members of the stereotyped group, those goals are likely to be activated and may well override any effects of automatically activated stereotypes (see Moskowitz et al., 1999). Of course, researchers might wish to restrict low-prejudice individuals' ability to engage in any sort of processing that would provide potential replacements for stereotype-based responses to determine whether the effects of stereotyping would then emerge. The likely argument in such research would be that perceivers often are distracted and hurried in the real world, so that creating such conditions is necessary for simulating the actual situations in which perceivers respond to members of stereotyped groups. Such an experimental situation again begs the question of what would actually happen in the real world. In real-life situations, perceivers often do have choices (see Fiske, 1989), such that they can determine where they would like to direct their attentional resources. Thus, perceivers may choose to minimize distractions (e.g., turn off the radio) so as to better attend to the stereotyped group member. Greater Emphasis on Individual Differences Given the ultimate goal of understanding the extent to which individuals can control potentially prejudiced responses, individual differences in prejudiced attitudes and in the extent to which stereotypes are automatically activated must be taken into account. Perhaps some persons (e.g., low-prejudice, discrepancy-not-prone) are extremely successful at control, or perhaps they are not. Without systematic investigation of the effect of individual differences in explicit and implicit beliefs on stereotyping, researchers remain unable to answer important questions about controllability. The importance of considering individual differences has been highlighted by the emerging collection of research identifying individual differences. For instance, Dunton and Fazio (1997) created a two-factor scale that assesses the motivation people have to control prejudice. They found that more motivated individuals expressed less prejudiced responses even if negative attitudes were automatically activated in the presence of a Black person among these people. In contrast, less motivated individuals reported attitudes that were consistent with their automatically activated attitudes. Plant and Devine (1998) created a two-factor scale that distinguishes internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Whereas internal motivation is characterized by internalized nonprejudiced standards, external motivation is characterized by a desire to comply with society's nonprejudiced standards. Consistent with the distinction between the two types of motivations, Plant and Devine found that persons who are high in internal motivation felt most guilty as a result of having prejudice-related discrepancies from personal standards. Also, individuals high in external and low in internal motivation reported more positive attitudes about Blacks when the responses were made publicly rather than privately. Another individual difference that has emerged is the extent to which individuals possess chronic egalitarian goals. Moskowitz's research (Moskowitz et al., 1999; Moskowitz et al., 2000) has shown that some individuals have chronically accessible egalitarian goals that control stereotype activation. In

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Page 386 summary, these individual differences must be considered if we are to understand the extent to which stereotype control is possible. The current Zeitgeist of research investigating stereotype activation and application centers around individuals who hold self-reported low-prejudice attitudes. However, additional attention to individuals who hold high-prejudice attitudes also seems in order, because the issues to be understood differ from those involved in understanding persons who hold low-prejudice attitudes. There is no reason why social cognition research cannot be applied more broadly to gain a better understanding of high-prejudice individuals, and there are many reasons why this would be a laudable goal. One issue that might be explored is what types of cognitions enable high-prejudice individuals to maintain their prejudiced attitudes in the face of low-prejudice, egalitarian values held by contemporary society. As Myrdal (1944) noted long ago, such inconsistency creates conflict and a tendency toward change (see also Rokeach, 1973). In an attempt to address this issue, Monteith and Walters (1998) found that high-prejudice individuals who experience little moral obligation to temper their prejudice view themselves as egalitarian, but they define egalitarian in a way that does not conflict with prejudice. Gaining a better understanding of high-prejudice person's cognitive associations with prejudice-related values may prove useful for identifying possible avenues for change. Further Examination of the Mechanisms of Discrepancy Reduction and Ultimate Outcomes Investigations of whether and how people who are so motivated may be able to learn to deautomatize the processes involved in stereotyping are in the early stages, and numerous challenges remain ahead. The field now understands how the activation of social information can become automatized, but can it then be deautomatized and, if so, how? This important question requires researchers to consider cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral factors concurrently. Consequently, researchers need to move away from the use of single measures (e.g., Was the stereotype activated? Was the stereotype applied?) to the use of multiple and varied measures in single experimental sessions. Investigations need to focus on a variety of questions. For example, how effective are previously established cues for control at interrupting ongoing behavior so that a potentially prejudiced response may be avoided? How similar do cues for control need to be across situations for them to cause ongoing behavior to be slowed? Longitudinal research is also needed to track the course of discrepancy reduction with experiences and across time. Of course, future research also needs to examine possible impediments to successful control (e.g., do people rationalize their prejudiced responses?), including an examination of metacognitions about abilities for control' (e.g., Do people have a sense of self-efficacy about their ability to control their prejudiced responses?). The Broader Role of Social Norms in Creating and Maintaining Automatic Stereotyping Effects Social cognition researchers have tended to assume that all stereotypes operate in a similar manner. For example, according to Hamilton and Trolier (1986, p. 152), “… the cognitive approach assumes that the fundamental nature and functioning of all stereotypes is the same. As cognitive categories, all stereotypes are assumed to have the same basic structural properties and to influence information processing in the same way.” However, for most Americans, the stereotype of Blacks is better learned than the stereotype of real estate agents. Associations between traits and the category are likely to be stronger in the case of the stereotype of Blacks, the stereotype is likely to be more easily activated, and greater efforts at self-regulation are likely to be necessary for controlling the possible stereotyping effects. Thus, stereotypes of Blacks and of real estate agents are not likely to have the same structural properties (i.e., in terms of strength of associations) or to have the same impact on information processing. Future social cognition research will need to take possible differences between stereotypes into account to achieve a more complete understanding of issues of stereotype control. Perhaps the most important issue to consider in this context is the broader role of social norms in shaping the social stereotypes that reside in the mind and the material conditions of society. The ultimate influence of social norms on stereotypic thinking is not limited to which stereotypes are learned and reinforced, but extends to which stereotyping effects people are motivated to control. Gender stereotypes are a good case in point. For example, Banaji et al.'s (1993) research on gender stereotyping revealed that male and female participants who were primed with a stereotype of females (dependence) subsequently evaluated a female but not a male target as being more dependent relative to the dependent ratings provided by participants in a neutral priming condition. In contrast, male and female participants who were primed with a male stereotype (aggression) tended to evaluate a male but not a female target as highly aggressive relative to participants in a

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Page 387 neutral priming condition. Although it seems important to determine whether individual differences (level of sexism, discrepancy proneness) moderates these effects, clearly participants were not hesitant to apply activated stereotypes to relevant targets, and they only applied the stereotypes in relation to relevant targets. As Fiske and Stevens (1993) pointed out, gender stereotypes may be fundamentally different than stereotypes related to race, age, or disability. First, gender stereotypes are strongly prescriptive; they inform women and men of what they should be like, rather than simply being descriptive stereotypes. Second, norms against the expression of sexism are not as strong as norms against the expression of other forms of prejudice. Third, many stereotypes about women are benevolent in nature, such as the idea that women should be helped and protected (Glick & Fiske, 1996). These factors, which are all related to the social context in which stereotypes are developed and maintained, may contribute to a general disinclination to attempt to self-regulate one's sexist responses. CONCLUSIONS Our review of relevant literature led us to conclude that there are many reasons, stemming from social cognitive factors alone, that stereotypes are likely to be used as a basis for responding to members of stereotyped groups. Our review also suggested that individuals can use many strategies for controlling prejudiced responses, but that these strategies have important boundary conditions related to perceivers having sufficient motivation, awareness, and cognitive resources to implement the strategies. Nevertheless, we are optimistic about the potential for control over prejudiced responses because we believe there is sufficient theoretical reason and empirical support to expect that stereotyping is a process that can be deautomatized. Future research may reveal just how much control is possible, and we identified a variety of issues that we believe should be considered as this research unfolds. Although our position is that the processes involved in automatic stereotyping effects can be controlled and changed, we wish to underscore a distinction between what people can do and what they ultimately will do. Exerting control over prejudiced responses is no easy task. Even the most highly motivated individuals will no doubt experience frustrations and difficulties of a variety of forms. Thus, an important future challenge for researchers examining issues of control in stereotyping is to understand not only how people can exert control over prejudiced responses, but also how they can be encouraged to persist in their efforts to do so. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by Grant 1R29MH56536 from the National Institute of Mental Health to Margo Monteith. ENDNOTES 1. Prejudice is often defined as a negative attitude (held consciously or unconsciously) toward individuals who are members of a particular group or toward a group as a whole. We have assumed this definition when using the term prejudice herein. However, we use prejudice responses to refer to responses that people have that result in biased or unfair treatment of members of stereotyped groups regardless of whether prejudiced attitudes gave rise to the responses. Prejudiced responses may include feelings, thoughts, or behaviors. We believe that prejudice-reduction strategies must be designed to reduce not only prejudiced attitudes but also prejudiced responses. 2. According to sociocultural explanations, stereotypes are acquired through the direct or indirect teachings of parents, peers, and the media. For example, according to Ehrlich (1973), “Stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of society.… No person can grow up in a society without having learned the stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups” (p. 35). Rather unwittingly, stereotypes and racial attitudes are acquired through social learning by about age 5 (Goodman, 1952; Rosenfield & Stephan, 1981). This early learning occurs prior to when children have had the experiences and developed the cognitive abilities to form beliefs that potentially differ from the views of influential social agents (see Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996, for a summary of stereotype research involving children as well as adults). Notwithstanding the importance of social learning processes in the formation of prejudice, cognitive mechanisms and their associated biases can result in the formation of stereotypes regardless of whether one's intergroup experiences or social influences encourage stereotypic thinking. 3. Throughout this chapter, readers can assume that participants were not members of the stereotyped group. For example, if stereotypes about Blacks were examined in research, the participants can be assumed to be either nonBlack or White.

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Page 388 4. Following Gray (1982), Monteith (1993) referred to these cues as cues for punishment . Consistent with the thinking of Monteith et al., we use the phrase cues for control instead because we believe that it is more descriptive of the actual function of the cues. Specifically, the cues function to facilitate control over unwanted responses (or responses that could result in negative consequences). 5. Because many college settings may encourage individuals to recognize their stereotypical biases and to feel guilty about them, it is important to demonstrate that discrepancies and their associated affect are experienced among nonstudent samples as well. Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, and Monteith (1999) found evidence that this is the case. 6. We do not mean to suggest that the effects of target characteristics (e.g., race or gender) on the likelihood of applying stereotypes have not been examined. For example, studies conducted prior to the advent of the social cognition approach have shown that stereotypes are more likely to be applied to members of the stereotyped group than to other people (Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). However, as the social cognition approach became more prevalent, with its focus on demonstrating automatic stereotype activation despite individual differences in selfprofessed beliefs, researchers often have not examined the role of target characteristics. We believe it is very important to examine the role of individual differences (e.g., in self-professed beliefs and automatic stereotype activation) in the likelihood of applying stereotypes to actual members of stereotyped groups.

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Page 475 Author Index

A Abelson, R. P. 152, 222, 224, 292, 315, 322, 323 Abercrombie, N. 94 Abraham, C. 222 Abrams, D. 92, 93, 264 Abramson, L. Y. 59, 62, 71, 312 Ach, N. 333, 340, 341, 348 Achee, J. W. 311 Acorn, D. A. 249 Adams, B. 275 Adorno, T. W. 5, 22, 27, 28, 257 Ager, J. 80 Agustsdottir, S. 113 Ahrens, C. 374 Ajzen, I. 160 Alfieri, T. 218, 223, 244 Allen, V. L. 168 Allison, S. T. 81, 95 Allman, C. 376 Alloy, L. B. 59, 312 Allport, G. W. 11, 90, 91, 119, 164, 180, 181, 188, 247, 257, 294, 302, 376 Altemeyer, B. 27 Altermatt, E. R. 71 Altom, M. W. 126 Amabile, T. M. 216, 261 Ames, D. R. 143, 154, 195, 289 Amir, Y. 375 Anas, A. 354 Andersen, S. M. 8, 14, 125, 128, 131-137, 141, 142, 190, 205, 206 Anderson, A. 168 Anderson, C. 371 Anderson, C. A. 129, 131, 135, 214, 222, 224, 281 Anderson, J. R. 177 Anderson, M. C. 355 Anderson, N. H. 54, 127, 180, 191-193, 326, 328 Backman, C. W. 60 Anderson, R. C. 345 Anderson, S. W. 310 Antaki, C. 212 Antone, C. 329 Arcuri, L. 186 Argyle, M. 8, 220 Armbruster, T. 256 Armor, D. 371 Armstrong, S. L. 129, 130 Arndt, J. 114 Aron, A. 8, 135, 136, 262, 270 Aron, E. N. 8, 135, 136, 262, 270 Aronson, E. 41-45, 47, 48, 51-53, 55, 56, 90, 191, 194, 202, 375 Aronson, J. 3, 8, 10, 47, 84 Arrowood, A. J. 81 Asch, S. E. 3, 5-7, 10, 127, 131, 192-194, 201, 206, 261 Ashburn-Nardo, L. 379-383, 388 Asher, T. 173 Ashmore, R. 142, 359, 371 Ashton, W. 217 Aspinwall, L. G. 82 Astington, J. W. 147, 148 Atash, M. N. 23 Atkinson, J. W. 62, 324 Attivissimo, D. 236 Auer, J. C. P. 272, 274 Augoustinos, M. 374 Austin, G. A. 180 Austin, J. L. 9 Axson, D. 296 B Bachman, J. G. 113 Back, K. W. 7, 8 Bakhtin, M. 10

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Page 476 Balch, P. 119 Baldwin, M. W. 3, 8, 56, 91, 115, 133, 135, 141 Balin, J. A. 345 Banaji, M. R. 3, 10, 105, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 139, 187, 223, 232, 278, 280, 316, 359-361, 363, 368370, 372, 377, 378, 384-386 Bandura, A. 59, 350, 379 Banks, S. M. 330 Baranski, J. V. 37 Bargh, J. A. 3, 7, 11, 30, 57, 69, 105, 107-109, 108, 110-113, 115, 116, 120, 122, 123, 125, 128, 133, 134, 139, 141, 181, 195-197, 236, 237, 241, 242, 246, 278, 284, 301, 302, 323, 324, 333-336, 338, 340, 342-344, 346-348, 352, 356, 359-361, 367, 369, 371, 375-377, 379, 384, 385 Barkow, J. H. 301 Barlow, D. H. 62 Barndollar, K. 324, 346 Baron, J. N. 89, 153 Baron, R. S. 181 Baron, R. 222, 224, 341 Baron-Cohen, S. 147 Barr, C. L. 268 Barr, D. J. 345 Barsalou, L. W. 130, 177 Bar-Tal, D. 168 Bartholomew, K. 115, 117, 133 Bartsch, K. 147 Bassili, J. N. 213, 214, 223 Bassok, M. 60 Bateson 9 Batres, A. 37 Batson, C. D. 217 Batts, V. 132, 365 Baum, A. B. 8, 42, 134 Baumeister, R. F. 3, 5, 7, 8, 60, 105, 107, 109, 114, 116, 120, 122, 131, 167, 203, 206, 262, 263, 284, 304 Baxter, A. 222 Bazerman, M. H. 269 Beattie, A. E. 181 Bechara, A. 310 Beck, A. T. 27, 28, 379 Beckmann, J. 335 Beebe-Center, J. G. 235 Beegle, W. 223 Begg, I. M. 354 Beggan, J. K. 116 Behe, M. J. 227 Belk, R. W. 116 Bem, D. J. 43, 90, 91, 207, 291, 311 Bem, S. L. 90, 91 Benbow, C. P. 84 Benet, V. 157 Benson, J. E. 284 Bentall, R. P. 205 Bentler, P. M. 33 Berger, J. 89 Berger, P. L. 4, 10, 90 Berger, S. M. 81 Berkowitz, L. 44, 45, 48, 308 Bernat, G. 119 Berndsen, M. 254, 255 Berntson, G. G. 342, 357 Berry, D. C. 105, 110, 122 Berscheid, E. 43, 201 Bersick, M. 359 Bessenoff, G. R. 180, 185, 186 Bettelheim 91 Bevan, W. 239, 246 Beyth, R. 277 Biernat, M. 85, 241 Billig, M. 8, 345 Birch 324 Birrell, B. 180 Bishop, G. D. 168 Bjork, E. L. 355 Bjork, R. A. 108, 109, 122, 355 Blaine, B. 114, 120 Blair, I. 111, 112, 223, 272, 289, 302, 350, 358-360, 364-366, 370-372 Blaney, N. 375 Blank, A. 384 Blanton, H. 47, 49, 52, 54, 59, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 164

Blass, T. 22, 37, 38 Blatt, S. J. 167 Blaxton, T. A. 109 Bless, H. 76, 86, 87, 178, 230, 234, 236-238, 244, 245, 278-280, 284, 356 Blitstein, J. 282 Block, J. H. 62, 67, 69, 117, 144, 225, 339, 370, 372 Blumberg, H. H. 275 Blumberg, S. J. 325 Blumenfeld, P. 64, 67 Blumer, H. 9 Bobo, L. 375 Bodenhausen, G. V. 116, 178, 181, 182, 188, 190, 207, 223, 232, 252, 297, 302, 308, 315, 345, 354, 357, 359, 360, 367-369, 376, 378, 379 Bolinger, D. 9 Bond, M. H.224 Bond, R. N.61, 62, 110, 133, 350 Bonett, D. G. 33 Booker, J.109 Borgida, E.275 Borkenau, P. 328 Boss, A. 113 Bosson, J. 120, 121 Boster, J. S. 167 Bourhis, R. Y. 91, 95 Bourne, E. J. 156, 219

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Page 477 Bower, G. H. 233, 308, 323 Bowers, C. 119 Bowers, J. 109 Bowers, K. S. 38 Bowlby, J. 5, 6, 8, 115, 116, 133 Boyd, C. 30, 36, 173 Boyd, J. T. 137 Boyd, R. 144, 170 Boyes-Braem, P. 126 Bradbury, T. N. 136 Braddock, J. H. 118 Bradley, G. W. 277 Braiker, H. B. 37 Braly, K. 90, 163, 169, 171 Brand, J. F. 174, 241, 268, 345 Brandstätter, E. 80, 83 Brandstatter, H. 262 Bratslavsky, E. 109, 122 Brauer, M. 217, 360, 362, 363, 365 Brehm, J. W. 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 54, 349 Brekke, N. 275, 284, 378, 379, 381 Brendl, C. M. 134, 142, 195, 278, 315, 317, 323-326, 328, 342, 352, 353 Brennan, S. E. 9, 10, 13 Brewer, M. B. 8, 76, 80, 85, 86, 151, 164, 178, 180-182, 188, 200, 201, 218, 302, 328, 371, 377, 378 Brewer, W. F. 128 Brickman, P. 37 Brief, A. P. 152 Brigham, J. C. 178, 247, 258 Bright, J. E. H. 91, 110, 122 Broadbent, D. E. 110, 122, 338 Brock, T. C. 304, 344 Brody, N. 110 Brofenbrenner, U. 261 Bromley, D. B. 220 Bromley, S. 118, 359, 376 Brophy, J. 66 Brown, D. R. 240, 241 Brown, J. D. 59, 60, 62, 85, 86, 105, 113, 114, 120, 236, 308, 309, 312 Brown, J. S. 30 Brown, P. M. 254 Brown, R. 91-95, 97, 99, 100, 111, 119, 199, 223, 273, 359, 361, 363, 364, 366, 372, 383-385 Bruner, J. S. 19, 125-128, 131, 134, 139, 143, 180, 187, 193, 194, 198, 230, 231, 280, 291-293, 333, 338-340 Brycz, H. 328 Budesheim, T. L. 198, 202, 203, 284 Budner, S. 22 Bugental, D. 133, 141 Bullemer, P. 110, 123 Bundy, R. P. 345 Burgess, D. 92, 94, 96-98, 100, 102 Burhans, K. K. 71 Burnstein, E. 282 Burrows, L. 111, 241, 338, 359, 384 Burton, A. M. 110, 122, 123 Burton, M. D. 152 Bush, E. S. 66 Busiek, R. D. 231 Buss, A. H. 27, 265 Buss, A. R. 150 Buss, D. M. 199 Buss, R. R. 110, 122 Butler, J. L. 60, 120 Butler, R. 61 Buunk, B. P. 59, 61, 75, 76, 82 Bylsma, W. H. 82, 117 Byrne, D.201 C Cacioppo, J. T. 116, 280, 282, 286, 294-296, 301, 303, 304, 342, 343, 357 Caddick, B. 93, 94, 97 Calder, B. J. 153 Calvini, G. 360 Cameron, J. J. 271 Campbell, D. 362 Campbell, D. T. 165, 170 Campbell, J. 79, 80, 262 Cantor, N. 78, 80, 113, 127, 128, 131, 134, 139, 192 Cantril, H. 232 Caputo, C. 136, 276

Carlsmith, J. M. 42-46, 50, 291 Carlsmith, M. 194 Carlston, D. E. 112, 125, 128, 187, 192-195, 198, 223, 231, 234, 238, 243-245, 326, 328, 331, 371 Carnap, R. 144 Caroll-Wilson, M. 62 Carpenter, S. L. 113, 371 Carr, H. 107, 109, 122 Carrell, S. E. 8, 141 Carrera, P. 234 Carruthers, P. 145, 147 Cartwright, N. 144 Carvallo, M. 101 Carver, C. S. 49, 57, 59, 265, 266, 310, 315, 322, 323, 335, 336, 338, 345, 346 Case, R. 10 Castelli, L. 357, 360 Carlin, G. 117, 123 Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. 170 Ceplenski, D. 226

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Page 478 Cervone, D. 199, 350 Cesa, I. L. 132, 152 Chaiken, S. 21, 30, 110, 189, 201, 232, 251, 280, 287, 291, 292, 294-297, 299-304, 330, 342, 356, 385 Challis, B. 361 Chambers, W. 338 Chanowitz, B. 250, 384 Chapman, J. P. 126, 258 Chapman, L. J. 126, 247, 258 Chartrand, T. L. 105, 107-109, 115, 116, 122, 346-348, 352 Chase, W. G. 293 Chein, I. 375 Chen, M. 111, 241, 338, 342, 343, 359-361, 384, 385 Chen, S. 125, 128, 132-134, 136-140, 152, 196, 205, 220, 251 Cheng, P. W. 222 Cherry, E. C. 113 Child, P. 78, 113 Chiu, C. 152, 153, 156-160 Choi, I. 156, 220 Christenfeld, N. 199 Christie, C. 85 Church, M. 223 Churchland, P. 145 Cialdini, R. B. 80, 222, 371 Cioffi, D. 81 Claire, T. 131 Clark, H. H. 9, 10, 13, 168 Clark, K. B. 91, 119 Clark, L. F. 223 Clark, M. L. 119 Clark, M. P. 91, 119 Clark, R. D. 168 Clarke, R. B. 165 Claude, S. 261, 267, 269, 276 Cline, J. 115 Clore, G. L. 233, 245, 308, 311, 314, 316, 323 Cloward, J. 91 Coffman, T. L. 163 Cohen, A. R. 43, 344 Cohen, J. D. 339 Cohen, O. 218, 244 Cohen, R. M. 252 Cole, D. A. 62, 262 Cole, S. W. 14, 133, 134, 205, 263 Collins, A. 129, 130, 136, 308, 323, 359 Collins, N. L. 136 Collins, R. L. 3, 61, 75, 76, 81 Colvin, C. R. 62 Comer, R. 45 Conklin, L. 345 Conley, T. D. 3 Contreras, J. 91 Conway, L. G. 68, 163, 171, 172, 174 Conway, M. 113, 308 Cook, H. 249 Cook, S. W. 28 Cooley, C. H. 4, 114, 119, 262 Cooper, J. 41, 43-45, 47-57, 84, 97, 121 Corbit, J. D. 326 Coren, S. 235 Corneille, O. 139 Corrigan, P. W. 205 Cosmides, L. 301 Costa, P. T., Jr. 33 Costanzo, P. 67 Cousins, S. D. 156, 205, 219 Covert, M. V. 62 Cowan, W. B. 376 Cox, M. G. 128 Craft, J. L. 174, 318 Craik, F. I. M. 344 Crain, A. L. 41 Crandall, C. S. 173 Crandall, V. C. 63, 72 Crelia, R. A. 86, 234, 278 Crick, N. R. 199 Crites, S. L., Jr. 357 Crits-Christoph, P. 133

Crocker, J. 78-80, 83-85, 113, 114, 118-120, 178, 182, 197, 372 Cronbach, L. J. 193 Crosby, F. 118, 119, 359, 376 Cross, W. E., Jr. 118 Crowe, E. 326, 352 Currie, G. 147 Curry, T. J. 263 Curtis, R. C. 3, 16, 263 Cushman, D. 9, 172 Czapinski, J. 326 Czyzewska, M. 113 D D'Agostino, P. R. 223 Dakof, G. A. 61 Dallas, M. 108, 109 Damasio, A. R. 110, 309, 310 Damasio, H. 310 Damon, W. 10 D'Andrade, R. G. 143, 155 Daniel, S. A. 109, 143, 226, 331 Darley, J. M. 6, 43, 79, 85, 199, 200, 206, 217, 222 Dasgupta, N. 359, 363, 372, 373 Davidson, W. 66

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Page 479 Davis, J.A. 113 Davis, K. E. 43, 150, 173, 212-215, 220, 227 Davis, M. H. 345 Davis, P. A. 223 Davis, T. 121 Davis-Stitt, C. 247, 354 Dawkins, R. 172, 173 De La Ronde, C. 14 de Vries, N. 93, 234 Deaux, K. 63-65, 69, 83, 371 Debner, J. A. 109, 361 DeBono, K. G. 292 Deci, E. L. 62, 69, 204 DeCoster, J. 187 DeGrada, E. 23 Deininger, R. L. 318, 322 DeKay, M. L. 131 Delmas, F. 200 Denes-Raj, V. 117, 123 Dennett, D. C. 106, 143, 145 Denton, M. 227 DePaola, S. J. 223 DePaulo, B. M. 121, 263, 264, 269, 276 Derenowski, E. B. 280 Derry, P. A. 113 Descartes, R. 6, 105, 106 Deutsch, D. A. 338 Deutsch, J. 338 Deutsch, M. 7 Devine, P. G. 44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 57, 69, 111, 116, 164, 169, 171, 223, 289, 318, 346, 350, 356, 359-363, 366-368, 372, 375-379, 381, 383-385 Dewey, J. 3, 4, 19-21 DeWitt, M. J. 250 Dichtel, M. 79 Dickerson, C. A. 45 Diener, C. I. 62 Dienes, Z. 105, 110 Dijksterhuis, A. 241, 242, 246, 338, 354, 360, 361, 369 Dill, J. C. 218, 223 DiMaggio, P. J. 89, 90 DiNubile, M. 236 Dion, K. 359, 383 Dizadji, D. 56 Dodd, D. K. 226 Dodge, K. A. 199 Donahue, E. 33 Donovan, J. E. 33 Doosje, B. 93, 100 Dorfman, D. 112, 123 Dorfman, J. 106 Dovidio, J. F. 111, 117, 169, 171, 354, 359, 360, 362-366, 375, 376, 381, 383, 384 Downey, G. 135, 136 Downey, H. K. 152 Downs, D. L. 115, 262 Driscoll, D. M. 196, 200, 203 Driver, R. E. 79 Duan, C. 182 Duff, K. J. 107, 156, 205, 206, 223, 282 Dugan, P. M. 166, 249 Dunbar, K. 339 Duncan, B. L. 45, 55, 200, 388 Dunn, J. 148 Dunn, M. 195, 277, 279, 288, 345, 359, 377 Dunning, D. 61, 113, 204, 206 Dunton, D. C. 111, 169, 359, 383, 385 D'Urso, T. 236 Duval, S. 38, 265, 266, 379 Dweck, C. S. 59, 62, 66, 71-73, 151, 153, 159 Dye, M. 85 E Eagly, A. H. 95, 165, 189, 232, 280, 291, 292, 303 Ebbesen, E. B. 194 Ebbinghaus, H. 107, 235 Eccles, J. S. 59, 62-65, 67, 71, 165 Edell, W.S. 313 Edwards, D. 172, 212 Edwards, L. A. 69

Effler, M. 22 Effrein, E. A. 113 Egerton, J. 175 Ehlich, P. 37 Ehrlich, H. J. 387 Eich, E. 109 Einhorn, H. J. 237 Eisenstadt, D. 375 Eiser, J. R. 83, 230, 234-236, 243, 246, 258, 321, 322, 332 Ekman, P. 121, 268 Elkin, R. A. 303 Ellemers, N. 92-94, 99, 100, 164 Elliot, A. J. 54, 56, 57, 164, 169, 171, 350, 378 Elliot, J. M. 250 Ellis, A. 307 Ellsworth, P. C. 193, 194 Elsbach, K. D. 90 Elster, J. 89 Emerson, R. M. 4, 263 Emery, G. 27 Emmons, R. A. 71 Endler, N. E. 38 Engels, F. 3

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Page 480 Enna, B. 66 Enns, J. T. 235 Epstein, S. 60, 107, 113, 117, 123 Erber, R. 135, 137, 345, 378 Erdelyi, M. H. 338 Erickson, D. J. 213, 219, 221 Eskenazi, J. 113 Estrada, A. L. 280 Etcoff, N. L. 247 Evans, N. 111, 359 Evett, S. R. 377 Eyerman, R. 89 F Fabrigar, L. R. 173, 286, 290 Fagot, B. J. 66 Falender, V. J. 113 Farber, I. E. 30 Farinacci, S. 354 Farnham, S. D. 117, 120, 121 Fazio, R. H. 44, 45, 51, 52, 56, 57, 76, 81, 83, 97, 110-113, 120, 121, 169, 232, 233, 236, 279, 342-344, 346, 347, 359, 360, 363, 365, 366, 383-385 Feagin, J. 380 Feather, N. T. 62 Feeney, J. A. 133 Feffer, M. 10 Fehr, B. 115, 141 Fein, S. 227, 272, 276, 359 Feingold, A. 64 Feist, G. J. 113 Feldman, M. 170 Feldman, N. S. 79 Feldman, S. I. 135, 136 Fenigstein, A. 27, 264, 265 Fennema, E. 66, 67 Ferrari, L. 261 Festinger, L. 3, 7, 8, 41-43, 46, 49, 50, 53, 59, 75, 78, 79, 90, 182, 236, 291, 379 Fetzer, B. K. 277 Feys, J. 116 Fiedler, K. 153, 166, 253, 256, 257, 309, 322, 331 Fincham, F. D. 8, 135, 136, 221, 262 Findlay, J. C. 168 Fine, M. 119 Fischer, K. W. 10, 128, 178, 320-322, 330 Fischhoff, B. 269, 277, 330 Fish, D. 91, 224 Fishbein, M. 160 Fishbein, S. 308 Fisher, J. D. 80 Fiske, A. P. 5, 6, 117, 205 Fiske, D. 362 Fiske, S. T. 3, 7, 41, 69, 85, 126-128, 135, 137, 173, 180-182, 188, 192, 200, 215, 216, 247, 250, 275, 277 302, 343, 356, 357, 367, 368, 376-379, 385, 387 Fitts, P. M. 318, 322 Flament, C. 345 Fleming, M. 277, 282, 285, 286 Fletcher, G. J. O. 135, 136, 217 Fodor, J. 143, 145, 293, 301 Fogarty, S. J. 113 Folkman, S. 332 Fong, C. 359 Fong, G. T. 113 Forcey, B. 79 Ford, T. E. 8, 96, 165 Forgas, J. P. 233, 308, 311 Förster, J. 280, 352, 353 Försterling, F. 309 Fowles, D. C. 380 Fox, E. 191, 356 Frankel, A. 219 Fratianne, A. 222 Frenkel-Brunswik, E. 5, 257 Freud, A. 206 Freud, S. 3, 5, 16, 17, 91, 106-108, 125, 132, 307 Freund, T. 20-22, 38, 181, 356, 376, 379 Frey, D. 182 Frey, K. S. 59-61, 63, 72 Fried, C. B. 41, 45

Friedman, M. 37 Friedman, R. 63, 326, 352 Friesen, W. V. 121 Frijda, N. H. 309 Froming, W. J. 338 Fromkin, H. L. 38, 168, 344 Frost, L. A. 183, 188 Fu, J. H. 159 Fuhrman, R. W. 179 Fujioka 78, 113 Fulero, S. 180 Fulks, J. L. 213, 218 Funder, D. C. 225 Furman, K. 217 Furnham, A. 221 Fussell, S. R. 9, 10, 168 G Gaelick, L. 129, 133, 379

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Page 481 Gaertner, S. L. 111, 169, 171, 359, 363, 366, 375, 376, 381 Gaes, G. G. 79 Gaines, B. 13, 61, 116 Galanter, E. 310, 322 Galinsky, A. D. 53-55, 251, 312, 315, 345, 355, 368 Ganellen, R. J. 338 Gant, L. 80 Ganzach, Y. 327, 328 Gardiner, J. M. 109, 110, 122 Gardner, R. C. 168 Gardner, W. L. 342 Garfinkel, H. 9 Garst, J. 182 Gary, M. 359 Gastil, J. 303 Gastorf, J. W. 79 Gati, I. 129 Gaus, V. 61 Gavanski, I. 309 Gawryszewski, L. G. 318 Geen, R. G. 199, 323, 324 Geertz, C. 5, 89 Geffen, G. 338 Geis, F. 69 Geller, V. 265 Gelman, S. A. 131 Gentner, D. 126, 130, 131, 141 Gerard, H. B. 7, 296 Gergen, K. J. 77, 78, 80, 81, 85, 213, 256 Gerrard, M. 82, 84 Geva, N. 194 Gibbons, F. X. 59, 82, 84 Gick, M. L. 131 Giesler, R. B. 14, 78, 236 Gifford, R. K. 247-250, 255-257 Gigerenzer, G. 229 Gilbert, D. T. 61, 78, 86, 111, 115, 116, 149, 156, 164, 181, 191-193, 195, 201, 202, 204, 211, 214-218, 220-227, 236, 262, 269, 270, 273, 284, 315, 325, 354, 356, 359, 360, 369, 376, 377 Gilbert, G. M. 163, 171 Gilchrist, I. 357 Gill, M. J. 271 Gilliland, L. 265 Gilovich, T. 268, 269, 276 Gingrich, B. E. 200 Ginzel, L. E. 269 Giordano-Beech, M. 61 Girgus, J. S. 59, 62, 64, 71 Gist, P. L. 125, 132, 152 Giuliano, T. A. 277, 284 Glaser, J. 359 Glass, D. 45, 262, 263 Glassman, N. W. 125, 128, 132, 133, 205 Gleitman, H. 129 Gleitman, L. R.129 Glick, P. 387 Glos, B. 79 Glymour, C. 144 Gochberg, B. 59 Goethals, G. R. 79, 85, 137, 261 Goethe, J. W. 106 Goffman, E. 9 Gold, D. A. 89, 126, 128, 146 Goldfarb, J. 239 Goldman, A. 89 Goldman, A. I. 143, 145 Goldstone, G. 239, 246 Goldstone, R. L. 126, 129, 130 Gollwitzer, P. M. 60, 61, 69, 70, 111, 189, 223, 233, 273, 286, 310, 323, 324, 335, 340, 341, 347-350, 355, 356, 358, 360, 364, 368, 384 Gonzales, M. H. 194 Gonzalez, R. 191 Goodman, C. D. 339 Goodman, M. E. 387 Goodnow, J. G. 180 Goodnow, J. J. 204 Gopaul-McNicol, S. A. 119 Gopnik, A. 144, 146-148, 161

Gordon, P. C. 129 Gordon, S. 126 Gotlib, I. H. 62 Gould, R. 270 Govender, R. 110, 342 Grabowecky, M. 311 Graf, P.109, 116 Gray, J. A. 310, 314, 380, 382, 388 Gray, W.126 Green, J. 227 Green, R. 371 Greenberg, J. 41, 47, 49, 54, 57, 82, 114, 133, 167, 292, 304, 380 Greene, D. 153, 204 Greenwald, A. G. 105, 111-114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 187, 280, 292, 303, 304, 316, 359-361, 363, 364, 369, 372, 373 Greulich, F. 59, 61 Grice, H. P. 9, 172 Griffin, D. W. 31, 115-117, 121, 136, 229, 230, 320 Griffin, J. J. 13, 61, 78 Griffiths, R. 181, 372, 376 Gross, P. H. 200 Gruder, C. L. 79, 81 Gruenfeld, D. H. 198, 202 Guarnera, S. M. 263 Guiard, Y. 318, 322 Guidano 133 Guisinger, S. 167

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Page 482 Gump, B. B. 113 Gumperz, J. J. 9 Gurin, P. 91, 93 Gurr, T. R. 89 Gurtman, M. B. 117, 360, 384 Guskin, K. 69 Gutierres, S. E. 236 H Ha, Y. W. 185 Habib, R. 183, 250 Hackman, J. R. 95 Haddock, G. 303 Hafer, C. 90 Halberstadt, J. B. 233 Hall, J. A. 165 Hallahan, M. 204, 218 Hamilton, D. L. 166, 177-182, 185, 188, 196, 200, 203, 207, 213, 214, 247-252, 255-258, 342, 344-346, 386, 387 Hammer, E. D. 167 Hammer, E. Y. 167 Hampson, S. E. 130 Hancock, R. D. 13 Hannah, D. B. 197 Hannan, M. T. 152 Hannover, B. 284 Hansen, R. D. 222 Hanson, L. R. J. 326 Harackiewicz, J. M. 69, 311 Hardee, B. B. 132, 365 Hardin, C. D. 3, 5, 8, 9, 11-14, 111, 117, 120, 121, 125, 128, 133, 134, 139, 140, 142, 167, 232, 278, 360, 378, 384 Harding, J. 375 Harmon-Jones, E. 41, 42, 45, 46, 49-51, 56 Harris, C. R. 199 Harris, P. L. 148 Harris, V. A. 156, 191, 217, 220, 261, 277 Harrow, M. 312 Hart, D. 10 Hart, H. L. A. 211 Hasbroucq, T. 318 Hasher, L. 115, 334 Haslam, S. A. 83, 84, 139, 163, 164, 166, 168, 188, 253-255 Hastie, R. 131, 152, 154, 178, 180, 191, 192, 194-198, 200, 201, 222, 232, 302, 347, 360 Hastorf, A. H. 193, 232 Haugtvedt, C. P. 280, 284 Hawkins, S. A. 320-322 Hawley, K. J. 183, 184, 250 Hayes, A. F. 113 Hayman, C. A. G. 109 Hazan, C. 3, 115, 133 Heckhausen, H. 335, 347 Hedberg, D. A. 282 Heider, F. 3, 5, 7, 10, 19, 29, 35, 42, 80, 127, 128, 131, 143, 149-151, 154, 193, 194, 211, 212, 215, 216, 220, 280, 309, 342, 351 Heier, H. 117, 123 Heller, J. 314 Helmholtz, H. 107 Helson, H. 235, 236, 240 Henry, S. M. 271 Hense, R. 360, 363 Hepburn, C. 275 Herek, G. M. 292 Hermsen, S. 354, 360 Herr, P. M. 76, 81, 83, 234, 236, 238-240, 242, 279, 285 Herzog, T. 204, 218 Hetts, J. J. 105, 114, 117-121, 289 Heuer, L. B. 258 Hewstone, M. 92, 97, 164, 181, 211, 217, 261, 372, 376 Higgins, E. T. 3, 7-11, 13-15, 38, 49, 51, 52, 57, 59, 61-63, 67, 69-72, 86, 110, 112, 113, 123, 125, 127-129, 133135, 139, 142, 167, 191, 192, 195, 204, 225, 229-232, 234, 237, 238, 240, 246, 262, 264, 273, 277-279, 284, 303, 313, 315, 316, 323, 324, 326, 329, 333, 348, 350, 352, 353, 379 Hill, C. A. 263 Hill, J. 247 Hill, S. 94 Hill, T. 113 Hilton, D. J. 172, 211, 213, 222, 324 Hilton, J. L. 125, 132, 152, 183, 276, 350 Hinkle, S. 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 119

Hinkley, K. 128, 134, 135, 141, 142 Hinrichs, J. V. 318 Hixon, J. G. 14, 61, 111, 116, 164, 181, 202, 223, 224, 273, 359, 360, 369, 376 Hodges, S. D. 273 Hoffman, C. 90, 95, 166 Hoffman, L. W. 64, 66, 67 Hogarth, R. M. 237 Hogg, M. A. 5, 82, 92, 93, 100, 168 Holden, G. W. 69 Holmes, D. S. 206 Holmes, J. G. 3, 7, 8, 37, 115, 121, 131, 136 Holyoak, K. J. 129, 131 Hommel, B. 318, 319, 322 Hong, Y. 152, 153, 156-160, 220 Honore, A. M. 211

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Page 483 Hooker, C. 313 Hoorens, V. 116 Hoppe, F. 323 Hops, H. 62 Hopson, D. S. 119 Horney, K. 133 Horowitz, L. M. 115, 117, 133 Horowitz, M. J. 133 Houle, S. 183, 250 Houston, C. E. 280 Houston, D. A. 200, 233 Hovland, C. I. 30, 76, 83, 235, 237, 238, 279, 286 Howard, A. 111, 359 Howard, J. 8, 89, 180, 186 Howard, P. B. 224 Hsee, C. K. 315 Huesmann, R. L. 199 Hull, D. L. 170 Hume, D. 106, 307 Humphrey 261 Hunt, R. R. 249 Hunter, A. J. 274 Hunter, S. B. 119 Hur, T. 312, 313 Hurst, N. 90, 95, 166 Huston, A. C. 67 Hutcherson, H. W. 223 Huttenlocher, J. 10 Hutton, D. G. 120, 262 Hyman, H. H. 79 Hymes, C. 110, 326, 352 Hymes, D. 9 I Icheiser, G. 149 Ickes, W. 191 Ingerman, C. 113 Innes, J. M. 374 Insko, C. A. 164 In ‘t Veld, K. H. R. 240 Isaacs, E. 168 Isen, A. M. 308 Isham, J. T. 243 Ito, T. 359 Iyengar, S. 89 Izard, C. E. 308 J Jaccard, J. 80 Jackman, M. R. 10, 90, 95 Jackson, J. R. 111, 169, 359, 383 Jacoby, L. L. 108, 109, 122, 361 Jakobs, E. 328 James, W. 3, 4, 10, 19, 20, 52, 59, 80, 89, 91, 106-108, 112, 116, 149, 333, 334, 336-338, 344, 346 Jamison, A. 89 Janet, P. 106 Janis, I. 6, 37 Jansen, S. S. 240 Jaspars, J. M. F. 221 Java, R. I. 109, 110, 122 Jellison, J. M. 227 Jenkins, H. M. 81 Jenkins, J. M. 308 Jensen, C. 180 Jessor, R. 33 Jetten, J. 345, 368, 378 John, O. P. 33, 173, 343, 344 Johnson, B. 111, 359 Johnson, B. C. 119 Johnson, B. T. 303 Johnson, C. 111, 166, 249, 257, 258, 359 Johnson, D. 126 Johnson, E. J. 38 Johnson, J. 371 Johnson, J. T. 137, 213, 215 Johnson, M. K. 180, 187, 315, 316, 354 Johnson, P. E. 227

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Johnston, W. A. 183, 184, 250 Jones, C. R. 110, 113, 133, 191, 232, 277 Jones, D. K. 128 Jones, E. E. 7, 43, 79, 84, 113, 120, 150, 153, 156, 173, 191, 192, 194, 196, 198-200, 202, 205, 211-217, 220, 227, 261, 262, 270, 277, 345 Jones, S. S. 131 Jonides, J. 183 Josephs, R. A. 41, 52 Jost, J. T. 3, 5, 10, 83, 85, 89-98, 100-102, 119, 164, 167, 168, 279 Joubran, R. 109, 122 Judd, C. M. 33, 111, 131, 179, 253, 359, 362, 364-366, 373, 384 Judice, T. N. 23 Jung, C. G. 5, 106, 107 Jussim, L. J. 165

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Page 484 K Kahn, J. H. 378 Kahneman, D. 76, 81, 86, 116, 166, 181, 238, 243, 244, 246, 248, 277, 293, 303, 304, 313, 325, 326, 343, 353 Kanazawa, S. 224 Kanfer, F. H. 379 Kanouse, D. E. 326 Kaplan, M. F. 22, 30, 36 Kapur, S. 183, 250 Karasawa, M. 116 Kardes, F. R. 110, 342 Karlins, M. 163, 164, 169, 171 Karniol, R. 128 Kashima, Y. 159 Katz, D. 90, 163, 169, 171, 292 Katz, L. B. 196, 344 Kauff, D. M. 110 Kaufman, J. 49 Kawakami, K. 111, 354, 357, 359, 360, 363, 365, 366, 372, 383 Keedian, E. 141 Keenan, K. 67 Keil, F. 126, 130, 131, 146 Kelley, C. M. 108-110, 122 Kelley, H. H. 3, 37, 76, 150, 151, 153-155, 161, 200, 204, 212-215, 220, 291, 309, 384 Kelly, A. E. 378 Kelly, G. 333 Kelly, W. L. 106 Kelman, H. C. 296 Keltner, D. 271 Kemeny, M. E. 263 Kenney, G. 59, 70, 164 Kenny, D. A. 226, 263, 264, 269, 276 Kenrick, D. T. 236 Kentle, R. J. 33 Keough, K. 329 Kephart, C. 379 Kernis, M. H. 263 Kerr, N. 277 Kette, G. 262 Keysar, B. 269, 345 Kieffer, S. C. 226 Kiersted, G. W. 56 Kihlstrom, J. F. 78, 105, 106, 108, 112, 113, 127, 154 Kim, H. S. 181 Kim, J. I. 378 Kim, S. H. 213 King, G. A. 69, 110, 333, 379 Kirby, D. M. 168 Kirker, W. S. 112, 344 Kirkpatrick, L. A. 115 Kitayama, S. 3, 5, 6, 78, 83, 116, 117, 156, 205, 219, 271 Kitt, A. S. 79 Klatzky, R. L. 131, 133, 190 Klayman, J. 185 Kleck, R. E. 268 Klein, S. B. 105, 112, 178-181, 185-187 Klein, H. M. 265 Klein, R. 61, 62, 350 Klein, W. M. 82, 113, 204, 206, 276 Klem, A. 173 Kluegel, J. R. 91, 93, 94 Knee, C. R. 115, 117, 217 Knetsch, J. L. 116 Knight, R. T. 311 Knobe, J. 150 Knowles, E. D. 143, 156, 195, 289 Koestner, R. 79 Koivumaki, J. H. 137, 212 Komatsu, L. K. 126, 130, 142 Koomen, W. 30, 76, 86, 195, 229, 233, 237, 239-243, 272, 279, 289 Kornblum, S. 318, 322 Korth, B. 79 Kosinski, J. 91 Kosslyn, S. 371 Kosson, D. S. 380, 382 Kotler-Cope, S. 110, 122 Kramer, G. 252 Kramer, P. 312

Kraus, S. 131 Krauss, R. M. 9, 10, 168 Krebs, D. L. 199 Kriss, N. 224 Kruglanski, A. W. 20-23, 31-36, 38, 39, 101, 150, 159, 173, 181, 195, 251, 279, 302-304, 336, 346, 356, 376, 379 Krull, D. S. 13, 14, 60, 111, 149, 156, 191, 192, 195, 204, 205, 211, 213, 214, 217-223, 261, 289, 345 Kübler, A. 237, 356 Kuhl, J. 335 Kuhn, T. S. 144, 229 Kuiper, N. A. 82, 112, 113, 344 Kuklo, J. 226 Kulik, J. A. 113, 199 Kumar, P. A. 191, 192, 195, 196, 200 Kumhyr, S. 272, 273, 275 Kun, A. 213 Kunda, Z. 56, 77, 81, 82, 87, 113, 131, 132, 166, 188, 190, 200, 203, 204, 206, 232, 261, 273, 275, 276, 301, 302, 359, 375 Kunst-Wilson, W. R. 109, 110 Kunter, B. 375

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Page 485 Kuyper, H. 59 L La Voie, L. 263 Lage, S. 201 Lakatos, I. 145, 229 Lakoff, G. 143 Lalljee, M. G. 222, 224 Lalonde, R. N. 93, 119 Lambert, A. J. 198, 202, 203 Landman, J. 206 Landreth, C. 119 Lange, J. E. 3, 11 Langer, E. 250, 384 Lanier, K. 121 LaPrelle, J. 82 Larrick, R. P. 153-155, 160, 218 Laser, P. S. 280 Laskey, A. 178 Lassiter, G. D. 121 Latané, B. 168, 169, 174, 199, 200, 206 Latham, G. P. 349 Lauden, L. 145 La Voie, L. 263 Law, J. 109 Lawhon, J. 79 Lazarus, R. S. 308, 315, 332 Le Bon, G. 5 Leaper, C. 67 Leary, M. R. 3, 7, 8, 114, 115, 167, 262 Lederman, S.A. 268 LeDoux, J. E. 110, 307, 308 Lee, A. Y. 183, 184, 188 Lee, F. 204, 218, Lee, H. K. 205, 219 Lee, M. G. 109, 122 Lefcourt, H. 31 Legant, P. 137, 276 Leggert, E. L. 62, 73, 151 Leibniz, G. W. 106 Leibold, J. M. 258 Leippe, M. R. 375 Leirer, V. O. 196, 344 Leitenberg, H. 62 Lemm, K. M. 326 Lenney, E. 63, 64, 72 Lenton, A. 360 Lepore, L. 111, 223, 273, 359, 361, 363, 364, 366, 383-385 Lepper, M. R. 153, 204, 231, 233, 235 Lerner, M. J. 38, 84, 90, 95, 101, 261 Leslie, A. M. 147 Leuenberger, A. 204 Levi, A. 38, 291, 293 Levine, J. M. 85, 168, 313 LeVine, R. A. 89 Levinger, G. 37 Levinson, D. J. 5, 22, 257 Levitt, K. 116 Levy, B. 360, 361 Lewicki, P. 113, 115, 128, 139, 178 Lewin, K. 3, 5, 6, 30, 91, 93, 128, 194, 323, 335, 341, 342, 344, 349 Lewinsohn, P. M. 62 Lewis, L. 371 Leyens, J. 84, 127, 139 Liberman, A. 189, 195, 280, 289, 291, 296, 302, 304, 315 Liberman, N. 323 Licht, B. G. 72 Lichtenstein, M. 181, 182, 185, 196, 197, 279 Lichtenstein, S. 319 Lichtman, R. R. 79 Lieberman, M. D. 8, 113, 357, 358 Light, L. L. 109 Lillard, A. 155 Lim, D. T. K. 116, 120 Lin, J. 220 Lind, E. A. 258, 361 Linder, D. E. 43

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Lindsay, D. S. 109, 110, 361 Lindsay, J. J. 281 Lindzey, G. 192 Lingle, J. H. 126, 127, 194 Linville, P. E. 112, 128, 178, 309, 330 Liotti, G. 133 Lippitt, R. 194 Lippmann, W. 178, 180, 187, 188, 247 Little, B. 220 Litz, B. T. 37 Liu, M. 91 Livesley, W. J. 220 Lobel, M. 7, 59, 75, 82 Locke, E. A. 349 Locke, V. 359, 364 Lockhart, R. S. 344 Locksley, A. 275, 296 Lockwood, P. 77, 81, 82, 87 Loftus, E. 359 Loftus, J. 179, 180, 187 Logan, G. D. 334-336, 339, 354, 357, 376 Lombardi, W. J. 110, 133, 237, 244, 323 Long, L. 235 Lopez, D. F. 8, 141 Lord, C. G. 233, 247

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Page 486 Lord, K. A. 85, 236 Lowery, B. 11, 13 Loy, M. H. M. 220 Luborsky, L. 133 Luce, C. 345 Luckmann, T. 4, 10, 90 Luhtanen, R. K. 83 Lui, T. J. 46 Lumsdaine, A. A. 286 Lupfer, M. B. 200, 223 Lutz, C. 155 Lydon, J. 30, 36, 39 Lyman, S. M. 90 Lynch, M. 45, 114 Lytton, H. 64, 67, 69 M Ma, J. 360 Maass, A. 164, 168, 186, 253 Mac Iver, D. 71 Mackie, D. M. 10, 84, 95, 119, 168, 180 181, 252, 387 MacKinnon, C. A. 10 MacLean, P. D. 110 MacLeod, C. 359 MacLeod, M. D. 355 Macrae, C. N. 164, 181, 182, 188, 190, 223, 289, 302, 315, 345, 354, 355, 357, 359, 360, 367-369, 372, 376, 378 Magnusson, D. 38 Magnusson, J. 199 Maheswaran, D. 297, 304 Mahler, V. 349, 351 Main, K. J. 263, 271, 274 Main, M. 115, 117 Maio, G. R. 303 Major, B. 65, 75, 78-80, 82, 85, 87, 89, 90, 95 Malle, B. F. 150 Malone, P. S. 115, 149, 201, 204, 211, 214-216, 220, 221, 225, 226, 269, 270, 315 Malzacher, J. T. 348 Mandel, D. R. 309 Manderlink, G. 69 Mandler, G. 109, 110 Manis, M. 83, 85, 206, 236, 238, 241, 243 Mann, L. 37, 199 Mannetti, L. 23 Mansbridge, J. 91 Manstead, A. S. R. 90, 92, 100 Manzella 134 Maoz, T. 218 Maracek, J. 45, 276 March, J. G. 181, 331 Marengo, J. T. 313 Margetts, E. L. 105 Mark, M. M. 37, 144, 147, 163, 252 Markman, A. B. 130, 131, 141, 324 Markman, E. M. 131 Markman, K. D. 312 Markowitsch, H. J. 183, 250 Marks, G. M. 120, 151, 270 Markus, H. R. 3, 5, 6, 41, 44, 56, 78, 80, 83, 112, 113, 117, 128, 205, 219, 271, 291, 301, 333, 340 Marques, J. M. 84 Marsh, H. W. 113 Marsh, K. L. 309 Marsman, J. G. 213, 224 Martijn, C. 328 Martin, C. L. 65 Martin, L. L. 76, 86, 193, 200, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 244-246, 278, 281, 284, 285, 287, 288, 311, 356 Martin, J. 89, 95 Martin, J. M. 62 Martin Drake, C. 329 Maruyama, G. 270 Marx, K. 3, 10, 94 Masland, T. 91 Masson, C. N. 272 Masuda, T. 156 Mathews, R. C. 110, 122 Maurer, T. 372 Mavin, G. H. 110, 333 Mayseless, O. 21, 22

McArthur, L. Z. 191, 212, 214, 216, 222, 224, 341 McCann, C. D. 13 McCauley, C. R. 165, 169, 178 McClelland, J. L. 179, 180, 183, 185, 187, 339 McClintic, S. 65 McClure, J. 213 McConahay, J. B. 132, 365, 375, 381 McConnell, A. R. 166, 249, 251, 252, 257, 258 McCrae, R. R. 33 McDaniel, M. A. 249 McDonald, C. D. 223, 311 McFarland, C. 79 McGarty, C. 83, 254-256 McGeorge, P. 110, 122 McGhee, D. 111, 359, 360, 384 McGillis, D. 214, 227 McGinnies, E. 194, 333, 338 McGraw, K. M. 90, 95, 113 McGuire, C. V. 78, 99, 113 McGuire, W. J. 11, 78, 85, 89, 99, 113, 304, 315 McKinley, S. C. 179 McKoon, G. 359

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Page 487 McLaughlin, J. P. 111, 359, 363 McMillan, D. 182, 277 McNaughton, B. L. 179 McNaughton, N. 380 McNulty, S. E. 262, 284 McPartland, J. M. 118 Mead, G. H. 3, 4, 9, 10, 16, 78, 119 Medin, D. L. 125, 126, 129-131, 141, 142, 146, 160 Medvec, V. H. 268, 269 Meiland, P. A. 249 Mellers, B. A. 315 Meltzoff, A. N. 144, 146, 161 Menon, T. 158, 159 Meresko, R. 25, 27 Merleau-Ponty, M. 9 Merton, R. K. 79 Mervis, C. B. 126, 234 Mesquita, B. 155 Messick, D. M. 81, 95 Metalsky, G. I. 59 Mettee, D. 45 Meyer, D. E. 20, 347 Meyerowitz, B. E. 330 Meyers, J. M. 280 Michela, J. L. 61 Michotte, A. 222, 224 Milberg, S. J. 181 Milesi, A. 186 Milgram, S. 201, 206, 217, 226, 345 Mill, J. S. 211 Millar, M. G. 78, 80 Miller, A. G. 217, 218, 224, 225 Miller, C. T. 79 Miller, D. T. 76, 79, 81, 84, 86, 131, 168, 182, 199-201, 238, 243, 244, 246, 264, 270, 271, 276, 291, 293, 353 Miller. F. D. 212-214 Miller. G. A. 310, 322, 323, 335 Miller. J. G. 142, 155, 156, 204, 219, 220 Miller. K. 263 Miller. L. C. 128, 131, 132, 136, 143, 153, 223 Miller. N. 270, 359 Miller N. E. 30 Miller-Johnson, S. 67 Mills, J. 41-43 Milne, A. B. 164, 182, 223, 345, 354, 357, 359, 360, 367, 368, 372 Minsky, M. 182 Minturn, A. L. 231 Mischel, W. 128, 131, 132, 134, 135, 139, 141, 192, 224 Mishal, M. 217 Mistry, R. 224 Mitchell, S. A. 133 Mitchell, J. 357, 358 Mitchell, T. R. 95 Mlicki, P. P. 92, 99 Moghaddam, F. M. 92, 119 Moll, J. 354, 360 Molleman, E. 82 Monteith, M. J. 56, 189, 272, 274, 286, 289, 302, 310, 318, 350, 351, 367, 368, 372, 375, 377-384, 386, 388 Montepare, J. M. 302 Mook, D. G. 202 Moore, B., Jr. 89 Moore, J. 78, 80 Moreland, R. L. 8, 85, 113 Moretti, M. M. 52, 135 Morgan, M. 153 Morland, J. K. 119 Morris, K. A. 78, 236 Morris, M. W. 143, 153-160, 195, 204, 214, 218-220, 224, 289 Morrow, W. R. 25 Morse, S. 77, 78, 81, 85, 236 Moscovici, S. 201 Moskowitz, G. B. 3, 19, 22, 29-31, 36, 69, 76, 77, 111, 112, 123, 156, 159, 165, 173, 180, 182, 189, 192, 195, 197, 200, 201, 214, 223, 224, 233, 237, 243, 251, 273, 279, 284, 286, 287, 289, 302, 309, 310, 312, 315, 324, 333-335, 338, 340-342, 344-348, 351, 352, 354-357, 359, 360, 364-368, 374, 375, 377, 379, 380, 384, 385 Mosso, C. 92, 94, 101, 102 Mowrer White, C. J. 321, 322 Moylan, S. J. 308 Mullen, B. 79, 84, 85, 91-93, 95, 100, 166, 249, 257, 258

Mumme, D. 69 Mummendey, A. 92, 93, 100 Muraven, M. 60, 109, 120, 122 Murphy, D. L. 252 Murphy, G. L. 125, 126, 129, 130, 141, 146 Murphy, J. F. 263 Murphy, S. T. 109, 240, 342 Murray, J. 3, 7, 8, 37, 115, 121, 131, 133, 136, 190, 303 Mussweiler, T. 76 Myers, D. G. 168 Myrdal, G. 386 N Naccarato, M. E. 3, 19, 22, 36, 159, 165, 182, 195, 282, 380 Nadler, A. 80 Naffrechoux, M. 201

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Page 488 Nail, P. R. 219, 323 Nakamura, G. V. 128 Nakamura, Y. 110 Napolitan, D. A. 261 Narayan, S. 183 Nario-Redmond, M. R. 243 Nasco, S. A. 309 Neely, J. 347, 359 Neill, W. T. 356 Neisser, U. 182, 191, 337 Nelson, D. 360 Nelson, D. E. 41 Nelson, G. 8, 135, 262 Nelson, S. 66, 236 Nelson, T. E. 83, 85, 238, 241 Nelson, T. O. 279 Nesse, R. M. 309 Neter, E. 60 Neuberg, S. L. 22, 23, 29, 31-36, 39, 135, 173, 180-182, 188, 200, 233, 275, 302, 356, 368, 376-378 Newcomb, T. M. 3, 10 Newell, A. 310 Newman, L. S. 29, 71, 107, 111, 113, 123, 131, 156, 180, 191, 192, 195, 197, 203-206, 214, 220, 223-225, 237, 282, 284, 296, 304, 334 Newman, J. P. 380, 382, 383 Newsom, J. T. 22, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 Newtson, D. 213 Nichols, S. 380, 382 Niedenthal, P. 62, 80, 233, 360 Nisbett, R. E. 11, 57, 107, 117, 136, 143, 144, 149, 153, 156, 159, 166, 204, 205, 215-217, 220, 270, 277, 280, 293, 345, 381 Nishida, T. 157 Nissen, M. J. 110, 123 Nolen-Hoeksema, S. 59, 62, 64, 69, 71 Noller, P. 133 Nordland, R. 91 Norenzayan, A. 156, 159 Nosofsky, R. M. 129, 179, 180, 183, 185, 187 Novak, D. W. 84 Novick, N. J. 85, 222, 236 Nurius, P. 80 Nuttin, J. M. 116 O Oakes, P. J. 5, 83, 84, 100, 139, 164, 168, 188, 254 Oatley, K. 308 O'Brien, M. 30, 36, 166, 173 O'Connell, G. B. 263, 271 Ogilvie, D. M. 80, 142 Ohta, N. 109 Oishi, S. 70 Oldham, G. R. 95 Oleson, K. C. 375 Oliver, P. E. 89, 102 Olson, J. M. 90, 121, 303, 309, 311 O'Malley, P. M. 113 O'Reilly, R. C. 179 Orsillo, S. M. 37 Ortony, A. 308, 323 Osgood, E. E. 42 Osman, A. 318 Osterhout, L. 359 Ostrom, T. E. 3, 194, 202, 304 O'Sullivan, M. 121 Otten, S. 200, 360 Ovsiankina, M. 324, 349 Oyserman, D. 80 P Pacini, R. 117, 123 Pack, S. J. 263 Padawer-Singer, A. 78, 85 Paek, T. 345 Page, R. 376 Pallak, M. S. 44 Palmeri, T. J. 179 Parducci, A. 76, 83, 238, 241 Park, B. 111, 128, 131, 152, 169, 173, 178-180, 197, 198, 232, 253, 302, 347, 359, 362, 364-366, 372, 373, 384 Park, S. 313 Parker, J. W. 113

Parker, K. C. H. 3, 19, 22, 159, 165, 182, 195, 282, 380 Pascal, B. 106 Paskewitz, J. 244 Patterson, C. M. 380, 382, 383 Pattison, D. A. 173 Paul, B. 225, 359 Paulhus, D. L. 60, 116, 120, 121 Pavelchak, M. A. 302 Peeters, G. 326 Peirce, C. S. 9, 19, 20 Pelham, B. W. 13, 14, 60, 70, 86, 101, 105, 111, 114, 117-121, 156, 191, 195, 217, 289 Peng, K. 143, 155, 156, 204, 214, 219, 220, 224 Penn, D. L. 205 Penner, K. S. 309

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Page 489 Penner, L. 360 Pennington, G. L. 313 Pennington, N. 131, 152, 222 Pepitone, A. 236 Peplau, A. 38 Perdue, C. 117, 360, 384 Perie, M. 113 Perloff, L. S. 277 Perner, J. 148 Perry, R. P. 199, 309 Peterson, P. 66, 67 Petrullo, L. 193 Pettigrew, T. F.97, 213, 261, 375 Petty, R. E. 116, 154, 236, 244-246, 251, 277-290, 294-296, 301, 303, 304, 356, 379 Pfeffer, J. 89 Pham, L. 14, 309, 371 Philippot, P. 83, 234, 244 Piaget, J. 10, 146, 147, 161 Pickar, D. 252 Pierro, A. 23 Pietromonaco, P. 110, 217, 278, 346, 384 Pilkington, N. W. 30, 36, 39 Pinel, E. C. 325 Pinker, S. 301, 312, 315 Pitchert, J. W. 345 Pittman, T. S. 44 Piven, F. F. 91 Plant, E. A. 378, 385 Pleban, R. 78, 80 Plewe, S. H. 250 Pomerantz, E. M. 59-61, 67, 69-73, 164 Pondy, L. R. 262 Poole, G. J. 45 Popper, K. R. 144 Porter, J. R. 118 Porter. L. E. 119 Posner, M. I. 107, 116, 333, 334, 359, 376 Post, D. L. 216 Post, R. M. 252 Postman, L. 194, 231, 333, 338, 339, 348 Potter, J. 172, 212 Powell, M. C. 110, 342 Powell, W. W. 89, 90 Powell-Hopson, D. 119 Powers, B. 62 Powers, W. T. 322, 323 Pratkanis, A. R. 112, 113, 286, 292, 303 Pratto, F. 110, 118, 119, 173, 181, 340, 342-344, 376, 379 Predmore, S. 13, 61, 116 Prentice, D. A. 79, 105, 128, 136-138, 141, 168, 200, 201, 207, 270, 271, 292 Presser, S. 287 Pribram, K. H. 310, 322, 335 Priester, J. R. 286, 290, 342 Prinz, W. 318 Prislin, R. 45 Pritchard, J. F. 239, 246 Proctor, R. W. 318 Proshansky, H. 375 Pruyn, J. 82 Pryor, J. B. 194, 224, 251 Pyszczynski, T. 49, 57, 82, 114, 167, 292, 304, 380 Q Quattrone, G. A. 156, 221 Quinlan, S. 80 R Rabbie, J. M. 82 Racenstein, J. M. 205 Radloff, C. E. 137 Radloff, R. 79 Rappoport, L. 263 Ratcliff, R. 359 Ratner, R. K. 268 Raymond, P. 110 Read, S. J. 13, 128, 131, 132, 136, 141, 143, 152, 222-224 Reber, A. S. 110 Recchia, S. 65 Reeder, G. D. 151, 213, 217, 218, 225, 328

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Reeve, T. 318 Regan, D. T. 121, 270, 345 Reicher, S. 5, 83, 168 Reingold, E. M. 107, 109 Reis, H. T. 8, 115, 117 Rempel, J. G. 37, 136 Repucci, N. D. 66 Rescher, N. 309 Reznik, I. 134 Rhee, E. 205, 219, 223 Rhodewalt, F. 45, 113 Rholes, W. S. 13, 71, 110, 113, 133, 191, 204, 232, 277 Richards, J. M. 85 Richardson, K. D. 80 Richardson-Klavehn, A. 108-110, 122 Richerson, P. J. 170

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Page 490 Ridgeway, C. 89, 91 Riecken, H. W. 7 Rieu, I. E. 314 Riggio, L. 318 Rips, L. J. 129, 130 Rivero, J. C. 338 Rivkin, I. 371 Robalo, E. M. 84 Roberts, R. E. 62 Roberts, T. 63, 66, 72 Robinson, R. J. 27 I Rocher, S. 166 Rocho, S. A. 84 Rodrigues, J. 231 Roediger, H. 109, 361 Roese, N. J. 110, 195, 307, 309-315, 351, 353 Rogers, C. R. 114, 133 Rogers, T. B. 112, 344 Rohde, P. 62 Rokeach, M. 22, 375, 386 Roman, R. J. 30, 31, 105, 111, 195, 205, 219, 223, 224, 237, 338, 341, 346, 356, 385 Rommetveit, R. 9, 10 Romney, D. M. 64, 67, 69 Roney, C. 326, 329, 352 Rosaldo, M. Z. 155 Rosch, E. 126, 130, 234, 302 Rosenberg, M. 47, 52, 53, 78, 119, 152 Rosenfield, D. 387 Rosenthal, R. 121 Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R. 254, 256, 343 Ross, L. 11, 137, 143, 144, 149, 212, 214-216, 220, 225-227, 229-231, 233, 235, 261, 263-265, 271, 277, 291, 293 Ross, M. 113, 195, 204 Rosselli, F. 387 Rothbart, M. 8, 169, 173, 180, 185, 186, 196, 247, 253, 255, 256, 354, 372 Rothman, A. J. 111, 125, 128, 133, 134, 139, 142, 232, 278, 326, 329-331, 360, 378 Rousseau, J. J. 106 Rovee-Collier, C. 109 Roy, M. 8 Roy, S. 274 Rubenstein, C. 133 Rubin, M. 25 Rubin, Z. 38 Rubini, M. 101, 173 Ruble, D. N. 59-61, 63-65, 67, 69, 71-73, 79, 200, 204 Ruderman, A. 247 Rudman, L. 359, 360, 363, 372 Rudolph, U. 309 Ruesch, J. 9 Ruggiero, K. M. 119 Ruscher, J. B. 167 Rush, J. 27, 373 Russell, B. 5, 6, 20, 21 Russell, J. 239 Russin, A. 354, 360 Rutstein, J. 308 Rutter, M. 71 Ruvolo, A. P. 80 Ruvolo, C. M. 178 Ryan, C. S. 179, 253 Ryan, R. M. 62, 69, 204 Ryff, G. 80 Ryle, G. 145, 336 S Sachdev, I. 91, 95 Saenz, D. S. 247 Safran, J. D. 133 Sagar, H. A. 119, 200, 223, 232, 388 Sageder, J. 262 Sainsbury, R. S. 81 Sakuma, M. 114 Salancik, G. R. 89 Salomon, A. R. 347, 359, 364, 377 Salovey, P. 178, 326, 329-331 Saltz, E. 80 Salvi, D. 186 Samuelson, W. 95 Sanbonmatsu, D. M. 110, 251, 252, 254, 342

Sande, G. N. 137, 261 Sanders, G. S. 79, 83 Sandler, J. 206 Sandvoid, K. D. 45 Sanford, R. N. 5, 22, 257 Sanitioso, R. 113 Sanna, L. J. 224, 310 Sansone, C. 69 Sarnoff, I. 292 Sartre, J. P. 6 Sattath, S. 320 Saver, J. L. 3 10 Savitsky, K. 268, 269 Saxon, J. L. 59, 70, 71, 164 Schaal, B. 69, 111, 189, 223, 273, 286, 355, 358, 360, 368, 384 Schachter, S. 3, 7, 8, 222, 299, 308 Schacter, D. L. 43, 44, 57, 105, 106, 108, 109, 180, 183, 185, 187 Schadron, G. 166 Schaffer, M. M. 126

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Page 491 Schaller, M. 30, 36, 68, 163, 164, 166, 169, 171-174, 199, 253, 254, 376 Schank, R. C. 132, 152, 179, 183, 185, 187, 322, 323 Scharff, J. S. 206 Schaufeli, W. B. 82 Scheier, M. F. 27, 49, 57, 59, 265, 266, 310, 315, 322, 323, 335, 336 Scher, S. J. 41, 50 Scherer, K. 308 Schiefele, U. 59 Schlenker, B. R. 8, 113, 120, 263 Schneider, W. 108, 334, 376 Schneider, D. J. 127, 129, 131, 164, 193, 198, 205, 206, 345, 378 Schoeneman, T. J. 263 Schofield, J. W. 119, 200, 223, 232, 388 Schooler, J. W. 106 Schopenhauer, A. 106 Schopler, J. 164 Schpitzajzen, A. 21, 38 Schreiber, H. J. 92, 93, 100, 339 Schroeder, C. 131 Schul, Y. 282, 327, 328 Schuman, H. 287, 375 Schwartz, J. L. K. 111, 359, 384 Schwarz, N. 3, 76, 83, 86, 87, 178, 230, 233, 234, 236-239, 242, 244-246, 278-280, 284, 285, 308, 309, 311, 314, 316, 356 Scott, M. B. 90 Seamon, J. G. 110 Searle, J. R. 9, 145 Sears, D. O. 204, 205, 296 Sears, R. R. 30 Sechrist, G. B. 168 Secord, P. F. 60 Sedikides, C. 70, 113, 127-129, 131, 135, 164, 229, 230, 232, 234, 385 Seeger, C. M. 318 Seeley, J. R. 62 Segal, Z. V. 133 Seger, C. A. 110, 115, 117 Seger, C. R. 217, 219, 220 Seidel, M. 141 Seidman, E. 71 Sekaquaptewa, D. 111, 183, 359 Selby, H. A. 155 Seligman, M. E. P. 62 Selltiz, C. 28 Selman, R. L. 10 Semin, G. 186, 213, 224 Senter, M. S. 90, 95 Seta, J. J. 86, 234, 240, 278 Setterlund, M. B. 233 Shafir, E. 319, 327 Shah, J. 63, 326, 329, 352 Shaigan, S. 61 Shaklee, H. 153 Shames, V. A. 106 Shantz, C. U. 10 Shantz, F. C. 25 Shapiro, P. 181 Shaver, K. 150 Shaver, P. 3, 133, 265 Shavitt, S. 254, 292, 303 Shaw, B. E. 27 Shaw, D. 67 Shechtman, Z. 264 Shedler, J. 83, 238 Sheffield, F. D. 286 Sherif, M. 3, 5, 6, 76, 83, 167, 168, 235, 237, 238, 279 Sherman, D. A. 204 Sherman, J. W. 177-188, 190, 196, 246, 289, 368, 376, 378, 385 Sherman, S. 371 Sherman, S. J. 76, 81, 83, 166, 179, 185, 207, 236, 249, 251, 252, 254, 256-258, 279, 315, 316, 384 Sherman-Williams, B. 200, 261 Sherry, D. F. 180, 183, 185, 187 Shestowsky, D. 173 Shiffrin, R. M. 108, 334, 376 Shimamura, A. P. 109 Shimoda, K. 220 Shoda, Y. 132, 134, 135, 141 Shrauger, J. S. 116, 263

Shweder, R. A. 89, 156, 219 Sidanius, J. 10, 92, 95, 100, 118, 119 Sigall, H. 270, 376 Sigelman, C. K. 280 Sikes, J. 375 Silberman, E. K. 252 Silver, W. S. 95 Silvera, D. H. 225 Silverman, R. A. 93 Simmons, C. H. 38, 261 Simon, B. 38, 85 Simon, H. A. 293, 309, 310 Simon, J. G. 181 Simon, J. R. 318, 330 Simon, L. 41, 47, 48, 54, 101, 114 Simpson, G. E. 375 Sinclair, L. 3, 56, 273, 359 Sinclair, R. C. 252 Sinclair, S. 11-13 Singer, E. 79 Singer, J. E. 44, 57, 108, 222, 308 Sinnett, L. M. 312 Sitkin, S. B. 309 Skevington, S. 92, 93, 100

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Page 492 Skinner, B. F. 108, 216 Skitka, L. J. 199 Skov, R. B. 185 Skowronski, J. J. 127, 128, 223, 229, 230, 232, 234, 243, 245, 326, 328, 331 Skurnik, I. 47, 76, 77, 243, 251, 279, 281, 284, 287, 289, 354, 357 Sloman, S. A. 109, 130 Slovic, P. 277, 293, 219, 320 Slugoski, B. R. 222 Small, S. M., Jr. 318 Smallberg, S. A. 252 Smith, A. 345, Smith, C. 91, 92 Smith, D. M. 173 Smith, E. E. 126, 130 Smith, E. R. 11, 91, 93, 94, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132,133, 139, 177-179, 187, 190, 192, 193, 195, 198, 212-214, 224, 234, 238, 241, 244, 245, 256, 271, 283, 284, 289, 302 Smith G. 80, 81 Smith J. 113 Smith J. A. 226 Smith L. B. 131 Smith M. B. 291, 292 Smith M. C. 357 Smith P. 100 Smith P. B. 224 Smith P. K. 145, 147 Smith R. H. 213 Smith S. M. 280, 284 Snapp, M. 375 Snell, J. 325 Snow, D. A. 89 Snyder, C. R. 38, 168 Snyder, C. R. R. 107, 116, 333, 334, 359, 376 Snyder, M. L. 219, 292 Sohn, D. 63 Solarz, A. 343 Solomon, L. K. 216 Solomon, M. 89 Solomon, R. L. 326 Solomon, S. 114, 167, 212, 292 Somers, M. M. 31 Sorrentino, R. M. 38, 196, 303, 316 Spalding, L. R. 117, 121 Spears, R. 92, 93, 100, 164, 188, 239, 241, 242, 253-255, 258, 328, 332 Spellman, B. A. 309 Spencer, M. B. 119 Spencer, S. J. 41, 45, 52, 114, 272, 359 Sperber, D. 9, 10, 89, 170 Spicer, C. V. 368, 378 Spiegel, N. H. 121 Spores, J. M. 213, 218 Sriram, N. 354 Srull, T. K. 41, 110, 111, 125, 127-129, 133, 134, 142, 185, 187, 192, 193, 195-198, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207, 230232, 234, 236, 239-242, 244, 277, 278, 342, 344, 345, 384 Stahlberg, D. 186 Stangor, C. 3, 11, 164, 165, 167, 168, 173, 182, 200, 277, 360 Stanley, W. B. 38, 110, 122, 213, 208 Stapel, D. A. 30, 76, 83, 86, 195, 229, 230, 233, 237, 239-245, 272, 279, 281, 285, 287-290, 346 Stark, H. A. 108 Statham, A. 4, 83 Staw, B. M. 153 Steeh, C. 375 Steele, C. M. 3, 8, 10, 41, 45-47, 52, 53, 65, 84, 114, 119 Steffen, V. 95 Steinmetz, J. L. 216, 262 Stein-Seroussi, A. 14, 61, 116 Steller, B. 347 Stephan, C. 375 Stephan, W. G. 375, 387 Stepper, S. 288 Stevens, L. E. 387 Stillwell, A. M. 60, 120 Stipek, D. 65, 71 Stitt, C. L. 178, 247, 354 Stone, J. 41, 45, 48-57, 289, 379 Stone, J. I. 121, 280 Stone, M. 359, 364, 365 Story, A. L. 113 Strack, F. 76, 230, 236-239, 244, 245, 280, 284, 288, 352, 356

Strauman, T. 61, 62, 350 Strausser, K. S. 262 Stroebe, W. 321 Stroessner, S. J. 181, 200, 247, 249, 252, 253, 257, 258, 376, 385 Strong, J. 239 Strube, M. J. 8, 70 Stryker, S. 4, 83 Smart, A. E. 78 Sullivan, H. S. 3, 5, 10, 125, 133 Suls, J. 59, 79, 236, 241 Surber, C. F. 153 Susser, K. 252 Susskind, J. 387 Sutton, R. I. 90 Swallow, S. R. 82 Swan, S. 202 Swann, W. B., Jr. 3, 13, 14, 59-61, 113, 116, 120, 121, 262-264, 270-272, 277 Swim, J. K. 165

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Page 493 T Tafarodi, R. W. 113, 115 Tagiuri, R. 143, 193, 194, 198, 280 Tajfel, H. 8, 60, 76, 82, 89, 92-94, 100, 164, 247, 292, 321, 331, 332, 345 Tambor, E. S. 115, 262 Tanaka-Matsumi, J. 236 Tanchuk, T. L. 171 Tangney, J. P. 62 Tannenbaum, P. H. 42 Taub, D. 237 Tares, P. A. 44 Taylor, C. M. 112, 347, 359, 364, 371, 377 Taylor, D. M. 92, 119 Taylor, K. L. 61, 75 Taylor, R. 113 Taylor, S. E. 3, 7, 41, 59-62, 75, 79, 82, 85, 113, 114, 120, 126-128, 137, 178, 181, 182, 192, 212, 215, 216, 247, 250, 263, 277, 308, 309, 312, 326 Teasdale, J. D. 113 Teplin, L. A. 119 Terdal, S. K. 115, 262 Terry, K. M. 356 Tesser, A. 60, 62, 70, 75, 76, 78-80, 85, 114, 193, 262 Testa, M. 82 Tetlock, P. E. 38, 90, 199, 218, 291, 293, 356, 378 Thagard, P. 131, 132, 188, 232, 301, 302 Thaler, R. H. 116 Thein, R. D. 110, 133, 195, 196, 302, 347, 384 Thibaut, J. W. 7, 76, 196, 205, 258 Thibodeau, R. 41, 45, 47, 51, 52 Thomas, K. W. 3, 105, 226, 262 Thompson, E. P. 102, 302, 304, 385 Thompson, L. L. 113 Thompson, M. M. 3, 19, 22, 23, 30-35, 37, 159, 165, 173, 182, 195, 282, 380 Thompson, W. C. 284 Thomson, D. M. 197 Thomson, D. W. 141 Thorn, T. 357, 360 Thornton, D. 81 Tice, D. M. 3, 8, 60, 109, 112, 113, 120, 122, 262 Tillema, J. L. 199 Tipper, S. P. 356 Tong, J. Y. 159 Tooby, L. 301 Tooman, G. 368, 378 Tota, M. E. 110, 113, 133 Toth, J. P. 107, 109, 361 Totten, J. 270, 345 Toyama, M. 220 Trafton, J. G. 179 Treisman, A. 338 Triandis, H. C.5, 6, 117, 205, 224 Trolier, T. K. 166, 177, 249, 386 Trope, Y. 21, 59, 60, 192, 195, 200, 218, 219, 222, 223, 242, 244, 251, 292, 304, 323, 356 Trudeau, J. V. 113 Trzebinski, J. 128 Tudor, M. 8, 135, 262 Tulving, E. 108, 109, 117, 180, 183, 197, 250, 299 Turley, K. J. 224, 310 Turnbull, W. 79, 182 Turner, B. S. 94 Turner, J. C. 5, 16, 76, 78, 82-84, 89, 92-95, 97, 100, 139 164, 168, 188, 254, 332 Turner, R. G. 265 Turner, T. J. 323 Tversky, A. 126, 129, 133, 166, 181, 248, 277, 293, 313, 320-322, 325, 326, 343 Tykocinski, O. 326 Tyler, T. R. 89, 90, 95, 258 Tyler, R. B. 111, 117, 359, 360, 384 U Uleman, J. 29, 39, 111, 123, 156, 180, 191, 192, 195, 197-199, 201, 202, 205, 212, 214, 219, 223, 237, 334, 344, 357 Umilta, C. 318 V Vaillant, G. E. 206 Valdes, L. A. 356 Vallacher, R. R. 49, 50, 56, 143, 152, 322, 323

Vallone, R. P. 235 van der Pligt, J. 239-242, 254, 255, 258, 321, 322, 328, 332 van Hook, E. 112, 123 van Knippenberg, A. 82, 92, 93, 100, 338, 354, 360, 361, 369 Van Selst, M. 116 Van Yperen, N. W. 234 Van Zandt, B. J. 110 VandenEijnden, R. J. J. M. 78 Vanman, E. J. 132, 223, 359, 362, 364

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Page 494 VanYperen, N. W. 61 Varey, C. A. 313 Vargas, P. 111, 183, 232, 359 Vasquez-Suson, K. A. 377 Velthuijsen, A. S. 242 Verkuyten, M. 272 Voils, C. I. 272, 286, 289, 302, 310, 318, 367, 372, 375, 379, 381, 383, 384, 388 von Hippel, W. 111, 183, 184, 232, 359, 360, 362, 363 Vorauer, J. D. 195, 261, 263-265, 267-276, 289 Vygotsky, L. S. 6, 10 W Wachsmuth, J.O. 86 Wachtel, P. 225 Wagner, U. 61 Walden, T. A. 222 Walker, I. 359 Walker, L. 258 Wallace, R. J. 318 Walters, G. L. 381, 383, 386 Wang, C. F. 220 Wänke, M. 178, 237, 356 Wanshula, L. T. 22, 30 Ward, A. 271 Ward, C. 92, 261 Ward, W. 311 Ward, W. D. 45 Waring, D. A. 223 Wasel, W. 69, 111, 189, 223, 273, 286, 355, 360, 368, 384 Washington, R. E. 118 Waters, G. 163 Wattenmaker, W. D. 130 Watzlawick, P. 9 Wayment, H. A. 60, 61 Weary, G. 312 Weber, E. H. 106 Weber, J. G. 76, 80, 85, 86 Weber, R. 131, 197, 198, 374 Webster, D. M. 22, 23, 31, 32, 35, 38, 173, 218 Wedell, D. 83, 238, 241 Wegener, D. T. 154, 173, 195, 236, 244-246, 251, 277-290, 345, 356, 377, 379, 381 Wegner, D. M. 49, 50, 56, 107, 120, 143, 152, 206, 273, 277, 282, 322, 323, 335, 345, 354, 356, 357, 378 Weick, K. E. 89, 90 Weiner, B. 61, 151, 199, 213, 214, 222, 224, 227, 262, 308-310 Weingartner, H. 252 Weinstein, N. D. 277 Weiskrantz, L. 109 Weldon, M. 361 Wellman, H. M. 143-145, 147-149, 159, 161 Wells, G. L. 309 Wells, H. H. 7 Wells, R. S. 204 Wencel, H. 67 Wenzlaff, R. M. 13 West, S. G. 23, 158, 321 Westen, D. 107, 108 Wetherall, M. 5, 168 Wheatley, T. P. 325 Wheeler, L. 8, 78, 79, 81, 82 White, G. L. 308 White, L. 345 White, P. A. 147, 211, 212 White, R. K. 194 White, R. W. 291 Whiting, G. C. 9, 172 Whitney, P. 223 Whyte, L. L. 105 Wicklund, R. A. 38, 44, 60, 61, 70, 265, 266, 349, 350, 379 Wiegand, A. W. 56 Wigfield, A. 59 Wilder, D. A. 181, 247 Wilke, H. 92, 93 Wilkes, A. L. 76, 321 Wilkes-Gibbs, D. 168 Williams, C. J. 111, 169, 233, 359, 383 Williams, J. E. 119 Williams, J. G. 8

Willingham, D. B. 110, 123 Wills, T. A. 59, 81, 107, 236, 241 Wilson, D. 9, 10 Wilson, E. O. 308 Wilson, S. R. 79 Wilson, T. D. 57, 106, 107, 280, 283, 284, 309, 325, 378, 379, 381 Wimmer, H. 147 Winkielman, P. 83, 239, 241, 308 Winnick, W.A. 109 Winslow, M. P. 41 Winter, L. 39, 111, 191, 197, 198, 202, 223, 225, 334 Winton, W. 113 Wisniewski, E. J. 131, 160 Witherspoon, D. 108, 109, 122 Wittenbrink, B. 111, 125, 131, 132, 135, 141, 152, 359, 360, 362, 364-366, 373, 384, 385 Wittgenstein, L. 3, 5, 10, 126 Wojciszke, B. 328 Wolfe, C. 359 Wolfson, A. 69

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Page 495 Wood, J. V. 59-61, 75, 78, 79, 83, 236 Woods, T. E. 280 Worth, L. T. 203, 261 Wright, J. C. 132 Wright, R. A. 349 Wright, S. C. 92, 93, 119 Wrightsman, L. S. 28 Wurf, E. 3, 78, 113 Wyer, N. A. 178, 385 Wyer, R. S., Jr. 41, 110, 111, 125-128, 133, 134, 142, 181, 187, 192, 193, 195-198, 200-203, 205, 207, 230-232, 234, 239-243, 277, 278, 284, 311, 342, 345, 384 Wylie, R. C. 105, 116 Y Yates, S. M. 296 Ybema, J. F. 75, 76, 82 Yinger, J. M. 375 Yohannes, J. 173 Yonelinas, A. P. 109 Yost, J. H. 312 Yost, L. W. 62 Young, H. 360 Yzerbyt, V. 84, 139, 166 Z Zabbini, S. 186 Zacks, R. T. 115, 334 Zajonc, R. B. 41, 44, 109, 110, 128, 175, 224, 240, 291, 301, 308, 342, 344 Zanna, M. P. 22, 30, 31, 44, 45, 57, 121, 263, 303, 309 Zarate, M. A. 128, 129, 133, 178, 179, 224, 241, 302 Zbrodoff, N. J. 334 Zebrowitz, J. R. 152, 222, 224, 302 Zeckhauser, R. 95 Zeelenberg, M. 237, 308 Zeigarnik, B. 324, 349, 351 Zelditch, M., Jr. 89 Zelli, A. 199 Zhang, J. 157 Zhao, X. 220 Zigler, E. 313 Zimbardo, P. G. 6, 191 Zucker, G. S. 199 Zuckerman, M. 79, 121, 263 Zukier, H. 127, 131 Zuroff, D. C. 127, 137, 138 Zuwerink, J. R. 350, 375, 378, 381

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Page 497 Subject Index

A Ability 281, 282 Above average effect 120 Abstract concepts 241, 242 Accentuation theory 321 Accessibility 63, 69, 110, 122, 166, 229–245, 248, 250, 257, 278, 279, 283, 288, 339, 346, 351 Accuracy goals 293, 294, 300 Achievement 62, 65, 67 Activation 346, 347, 350, 351, 354, 357 Adaptation level theory 235 Affiliation 7 Affordance 341 Aggression 199 Algorithm 293, 299 Ambivalence 20, 30, 97, 98 Anchoring 230, 239, 242 Anxiety 62, 64, 70–72 Applicability 128, 134, 139, 230, 240, 278, 283, 288 Approach motivation 323, 342, 353 Appropriateness 236, 239, 245, 246 Assimilation 75–87, 230–245, 278–281, 287 Associationism 20, 21, 38 Associative knowledge 164 Attachment 5 Attachment theory 115, 116–177 Attention 334, 340, 343, 351, 352 Attentional focus 366, 367 Attitude 232, 235, 238 Attitude-Behavior relation 36 Attitude functions 291, 292 Attraction 201 Attribute relevance 93, 99–100 Attribution 61, 66, 96, 97, 154, 172, 173, 09 Audience effects 296 Authoritarianism 22, 27, 28, 32 Automatic evaluation/attitude activation 110, 111, 117, 342, 344 Automatic inference 156 Automatic processing/automaticity 197–198, 301, 318, 333, 334, 340, 343, 354, 356 Auto-mobile 337 Auto-motive (model) 336, 345, 348, 349 Availability heuristic 248, 257, 251 Avoidance motivation 323, 342, 353 Awareness of bias 283, 285, 289 B Balance theory 7 Behavior regulation 323 Behavioral inhibition system 378, 381 Belief in a just world 101 Beliefs Copying fidelity of 172 Fecundity of 172 Belongingness, need for 167, 174 Biases 291, 298 Bicultural perceivers 157 Big 5 32 Bounded rationality 293 Bystander intervention 199–200 C Categorization 164, 229–245, 247, 374 Causal inference 166, 172–173 Causal thinking 143 Central trait 127 Child's theory of mind 146 Choices 319 Chronic accessibility 133, 333, 339, 340 Chronic goals 340, 344, 347, 351

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Page 498 Classical view 126 Closure 349 Cognitive constraint 368, 369 Cognitive dissonance theory 36, 37, 41–58, 90 Accessibility of cognitions and 50–52 Action identification theory and 49–50 Aversive consequences model and 44–46 Cognitive consistency and 42–44, 50–51 Free choice paradigm and 46–47 Hypocrisy paradigm and 45, 48 Self-affirmation theory and 46–48 Self-consistency theory and 51–52 Self-standards model and 49–52 Trivialization and 47–48 Cognitive-experiential self-theory 117 Cognitive load 156, 354, 357 Cognitive resources 374, 379 Cognitive revolution 89 Cognitive structures 230 Cognitive style 173–174 Collectivist culture 219–220 Common ground 9, 10 Common information input 167 Communication 9, 168–169, 171–175 Communication likelihood 171–172 Communicator likeability 295 Comparative judgment 230 Comparison 246 Assimilation 239 Contrast 230, 235, 236, 239 Effects 234 Relevance 241, 243, 244, 245 Compatibility principle 322 Compensatory behavior 336, 349, 351 Compensatory cognition 336, 351, 352, 353 Complexity I72 Concrete concepts 241 Conformity 6, 168, 201 Connectionism 152 Connotation 232 Consciousness 239, 334 Conservatism 100 Construction of reality 90 Contrast 75–87, 230–245, 278–280, 284, 285, 287 Contrast model of similarity judgments 321 Control 333, 335, 336 Controlled processing 301 Conversation, rules of 172–173 Correction 236, 243, 244, 279, 284, 285, 287, 375, 345, 353, 354, 356, 357 Correspondence bias 111, 211–226 Correspondent inference (theory) 213, 214 Counterfactual thoughts 309–314, 353 Counterstereotype expectancy 368, 369 Covariation Model (Kelley) 212–214 Cues for control 378, 380, 381, 384 Culture 155, 163, 168–169, 175–176 Cultural norms 166, 174–176 Cybernetic theories 322, 323 D Deautomatization 377, 381, 384, 395 Decision making 319–321, 324, 325 Depression 27, 28, 29, 32, 62, 64, 70–72 Detection behaviors 329 Diagnosticity 294 Dimensional overlap 318 Discounting principle 150, 213 Discrepancies 349–351, 377, 378, 379 Disidentification 93, 99 Dispositional inference 149 Dispositionalism 211–226 Dissociation of implicit & explicit processes 109, 111, 116, 120, 121, 122 Distinctiveness 85, 86 Dogmatism 22 Dual-process models 21, 251, 291, 299, 356 Stereotyping 180–182, 188–189 Dynamic social impact theory 168 E

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Ebbinghaus illusion 235 Effortful processes 318 Egalitarian/egalitarianism 347, 355, 356 Responses 375 Goals 377, 382, 383 Self-image 379 Values 384 Ego 5 Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 280, 304 Elemental view 127 Encoding stage 230, 234 Epistemic goals 165, 173–174 Epistemics 3 Essentialism 95 Esteem goals 164 Evolution, biological170, 173

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Page 499 Evolution, social 170–176 Exemplar 126, 241 Nonperson 241 Expectancy 309–310 Exploratory-investigative behavior 380 Extremity 236, 238, 239, 243 F Facilitation 338, 357 Failure 349, 352, 353 False belief 147 False consciousness 92, 101 Family resemblance 126 Feature positive effect 81 Features 127 Flexible correction model 277–290, 375 Focus Prevention 326 Promotion 326 Regulatory 326 Folk psychology 143 Frame of reference 230, 235 Framing 325, 326–328, 329, 330 Functions291, 292 Functionalism 107–108 Fundamental attribution error 214–215 G Gender 79, 85 Gender socialization 66, 68, 69, 72 Gender stereotyping 384, 385 Ghost in the machine 336 Goal compatibility 319, 324 Goal 283, 286, 291, 322–324, 335, 340–355 Activation 349 Communication 168 Consensus 167 Epistemic 165 Esteem-related 164 Impression 174–175 Information processing 196–197 Regulation 352 Social influence 167 Goal content theories 335 Goal intentions 341 Groups Attribution to 157 Perception of 157 Group consciousness raising 93, 94 Group membership 253–254 Guilt 377, 380 H Hedonic principle 326 Heuristics 291, 293, 294, 295 Heuristic processing 299, 300 Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) 280, 291, 304 Holistic view 127 Holocaust 91 Homunculus 336, 337, 339 Humor 10 I Ideo-motor action 337, 338 Ideology 90, 91, 101 Identification5 Identification with the aggressor 91 Identity 60, 63, 65, 67 Ideology 10 Ideomotor behavior 246 Illusory correlation 164, 166, 247–259 Implementation intention 340, 347, 348, 355, 357, 366 Implicit association test 361, 362, 370, 371 Implicit group-regard 118, 119 Implicit learning 110, 122 Implicit memory 107, 108–110, 117, 122 Implicit personality theory 127 Implicit self-evaluation Culture and 117–118, 122 Ethnicity and 118–119 Implicit self-regard 114–123

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Culture and 117–118, 122 Ethnicity and 118–119 Construct validity of 119–120 Functions of 114–115, 122 Implicit stereotypes and prejudice Influence on social judgment & behavior 359 Relation with explicit measures 360–365

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Page 500 Controllability 365–371 Implicit theories 143, 280, 281 Impression formation 30, 193, 229, 230, 232, 240, 252, 328, 344, 346 Impression management 174–175 Incompleteness 349, 350–353 Inconsistency resolution 192, 195–196, 201, 202–203 Individual differences 383, 384 Individualism/collectivism 6, 204, 205 Individualist culture 219–220 Individuating information 302 Individuation 374, 375 Information seeking 60, 61 Inhibition 353–357 Intended effects of actions 319 Intent/Intention 150, 335, 340, 344, 345 Interactionist perspective 22, 37, 38 Interference 334, 338, 339, 344, 353–356 Internalization 100 Interpersonal relationships 37 Interpretation 229, 230, 232, 235, 239, 245, 246 Frame 235 Relevance 240 Intersubjectivity 8, 10 Intolerance of Ambiguity 22, 36 Issue involvement 30 J Judgment anchor 236 Judgments Difference 321 Evaluative 321 Similarity 321 Justice 90 Justification 90–91 K ‘‘Kernel of truth” hypothesis 247, 249, 258 Knowledge function 292 L Lay Epistemology 21, 22, 36 Lay theories 100, 143 Leadership 37 Legitimacy 89, 93–95, 97–99 M Marxism 89, 94 Medical adherence 37 Mental imagery 369, 370 Mental representation 241 Mental states (inference of) 143 Mere exposure effect 110, 248 Metacognition 279, 280 Meta-contrast principle 84 Metaperception(s) 262–265, 270, 272–274, 276 Meta-stereotype(s) 271–275 Minority Influence 201 Modules (innate) 145 Mood 250, 252, 253, 257, 259 Motivation 281, 282, 285, 250–255, 258, 259, 291, 295, 322–324, 376, 383 Motor performance 318 Multiple sufficient causes 153 N Naïve theories 279–282, 289 Name letter effect 116 Need for closure 22, 23, 31, 36, 100, 159 Need for cognition 173, 196, 234 Need for consensus 167 Need for structure 173–174 Negative feedback loop 335 Negative priming 356 New Look 339, 340, 343, 344 Nonrational judgment 291, 292 Nonverbal behavior 120 Norm theory 86 O Outgroup favoritism 89–101 Overjustification effect 204

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Page 501 P Parsimony, illusion of 167 Pausing time 380 Perception 230, 231, 232, 235 Perceptual defense 338, 339 Perceptual motor tasks 318 Perceptual readiness 231, 344 Person memory 191-207 Definition and examples 192 Effects of conversational context 202-203 Effects of processing goals 196-197 External validity of research 198, 202 Goals of researchers 194-195 Relation to person perception 192-193 Representation of information 192, 196 Person perception 191-207 Cultural factors 204-205 Definition and examples 191-192 External validity of research 198, 202 Goals of researchers 194-195 History 193-194 Relation to person memory 192, 193 Personal need for structure 31 Personal fear of invalidity 31 Perspective taking 9, 10, 345, 355 Persuasion 295, 296, 329 Phenomenology 288 Philosophy of mind 145 Plan 335, 340, 341, 348, 355 Pluralistic ignorance 200 Positive distinctiveness 164 Positive instance 81 Positive-negative asymmetries 328 Possible selves 80-83 Pragmatism 4, 20, 21, 38 Preconscious control 333, 336, 338, 343-347, 351, 354-357 Preference reversal 319 Prejudice 271-274, 350, 374-385 Automaticity/implicit nature of 13, 111, 112 Effects on self-evaluation 118-119 Prevention focus 352, 353 Priming 29, 133, 157, 232, 237, 238, 239, 242, 244, 334, 347 Awareness of 237, 244, 245 Blatant 237 Default effects 230, 233, 234, 236 Distinctiveness 240, 241, 243, 244 Exemplar 240, 241, 242 Procedure 358, 359, 361, 362, 367, 368, 370 Subliminal 239, 359, 361, 362, 364 Subtle 237 Prevention behaviors 329 Procedural justice 258 Processing distinctions 299 Procrastination 30 Projection 206 Prominence effect 320 Promotion focus 352, 353 Prosocial behavior 199-200 Prospective reflection 381 Prototype 126 Psychoanalysis 5 Psychophysics 230, 235, 237 Psychosis 7 Q Quasi-need 323, 341, 344, 349 Quasi-reflex 337, 338, 344 R Rationalism, rationality 5, 6, 291, 293, 294, 300 Rationalization 95, 100 Rebound 376 Reference criterion 335, 336 Reflected appraisals 119 Regulatory focus 313-314, 352, 353 Related-attributes hypothesis 79 Relativism 4 Response competition 338, 339 Retrospective reflection 378

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Rigidity about personal habits 27, 28, 29, 32 Roles, agentic 165 Roles, communal 165 S Scale compatibility 320 Schizophrenia 312-313 Schema 127 Scripts 152 Selective sensitization 338

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Page 502 Self-as-target phenomenon 263 Self-assessment 59, 60, 63, 65 Self-awareness 265-266 Self-consciousness 27, 28, 29, 32, 265, 268-269, 274 Self-defining goals 349 Self-discrepancy (theory) 62, 67, 80, 81, 329, 350 Self-enhancement 60, 61, 63, 65, 113, 116, 120, 267 Self-esteem functions of 114-115 Self-evaluation 75-87 Self-evaluation maintenance 80, 86 Self-focused attention 378, 380 Self-guides 62, 63, 67, 70 Self-improvement 59, 60, 63 Self-presentation 60, 112, 113, 262-264 Self-reference effect 112 Self-regulation 115, 122, 335, 353, 377, 381, 384-385 Self-schema 112, 113 Self-serving attributional bias 291, 293 Self-stereotyping 11 Self-verification 14, 60, 61, 63 116, 120, 262-264, 267 Separation anxiety 5 Shared reality 167, 175-176 Shared reality theory 3, 8, 10 Significant other 132 Representations 133 Significant symbol 4 Similarity, judgments of 321 Simon Effect 318 Simpson, O.J. 15 Situation attribution 155 Situational correspondence 221 Situationalism 220-221 Sleeper effect 286 Social comparison 7, 59, 75-87, 236 Social cognition 3, 229-245 Social dominance orientation 101 Social evolutionary framework 170-176 Social identity 82, 83 Social identity theory 92-94, 97, 99-100, 164 Social influence 167-169, 170-171, 174-175 Social judgment 230-245 Social norms 166, 174-176, 382, 384, 385 Social role theory 165 Socialization 66, 68, 69, 72 Sociometer hypothesis 115 Solipsism 4 Somatic marker hypothesis 110 Spontaneous trait inference 29, 197-200, 334, 341, 342, 351 Spreading activation 346, 359 S-R compatibility 318 S-R compatibility effects 319 Standard 335 Statistical/logical reasoning 30, 165, 166 Status 89-101 Status quo biases 95 Stereotype(s)/Stereotyping 20, 29, 36, 63-66, 68, 69, 72, 89-101, 163-176, 200-202, 232, 238, 247-259, 297, 302, 318, 350, 353-357 Accuracy of 165 Activation 355, 356, 375 Attention 181-184 Conceptual encoding 184-185 Contents of 163-166, 170-176 Definition of 164 Development 178-181, 185-186 Encoding flexibility 182-185 Erroneous 165-166 Ethnic 163, 165, 169, 171 Expectancy 368, 369 Formation 247, 257-259 Functions of 164-165 Gender 165 Implicit nature of 111, 112, 359-374 National 169 Origins of 163-176 Perceptual encoding 184-185 Rebound effects 289

Representation 178-181, 185-186, 364, 367 Shared 163, 166-176 Source memory 186-187 Suppression 365, 366 Traits-eye view 170-171 Use 374 Stigma 173 Strategy compatibility 320 Stroop Effect 334, 339, 340, 343, 352 Suppression 376 Symbolic self-completion 349 Synergism 38 System justification theory 89-101 Systematic processing 300 T Team decision making 37 Tension 341, 349, 350 Terror management theory 114, 167 Theories 130, 140

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Page 503 Theory of action identification 323 Theory of mind 145 Theory theory 143 Threat 100 Thought suppression 206, 345, 354, 356 Tolerance of injustice 94, 95 TOTE 335 Trait activation 237, 240, 241, 242 Trait inference 149 Transference 125, 132, 205-206 U Uncertainty orientation 196 Unconscious processes 89, 101 Historical study of 105-108 Unrelated-task paradigm 231, 232 V Valence 341, 343, 344 Varieties of automaticity 334 Verdicts 286 Vigilance 344 Volition 335 W Will 335 Working self-concept 78 Z Zeigarnik effect 351

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