Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

Joseph Kostiner Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

Joseph Kostiner

Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region

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Preface

The course at hand entitled Cooperation and Conflict in the Gulf Region is part of the module Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations of our B.A. Politics and Organization. Hence its subject is at the core of this module and takes the Persian Gulf region as an example to show how conflicts emerge, interact and intensify, but also how actors try to tackle these conflicts through international cooperation and build a security architecture in the Gulf region. The issues addressed theoretically in the other courses of this module are deepened here empirically. We have decided to take the Gulf region as a case in point because of the intense conflicts which concern not only the countries there but also Europe and the Western hemisphere. Due to its oil reserves the Gulf region has a central position in the world economy, and due to the struggle against Islamism and terrorism the unsolved security issues are in the main focus of International Relations. I am very glad that this course has been written by one of the profoundest regional experts: Prof. Dr. Joseph Kostiner. He has focused his research for many years on the history, politics, and societies especially of the Arabic countries in the Gulf region. Prof. Kostiner is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies in Tel Aviv and Associate Professor in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. He has visited the FernUniversität in Hagen many times and discussed issues concerning the international relations of the Arab world with students and researchers. These colloquies have always been very fruitful. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Kostiner for the good collaboration preparing this course. Georg Simonis Chair for International Conflicts and Environmental Policy

Hagen, July 2007

Contents

Preface List of Boxes About the Author Acknowledgments

5 11 12 13

Introduction

15

1 Emergence of Conflict 2 Regional Asymmetry 3 Geographical Disputes and Other Historical Sources of Tension Between Gulf States

17 19

Part One: The Iran-Iraq War

24

1 Introduction 2 Historical Sources of Conflict 2.1 Roots of the Historical Conflict 2.2 The Empires’ Legacies 2.3 Components of a Recurring Conflict 2.4 Another Component of Escalation: The Cold War and Western Attempts to Create an Anti-Soviet Alliance 2.5 Iran: The Gulf‘s Policeman 3 The Regional Status Quo 4 Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution 5 The War 6 Regional Impact of the Iran-Iraq War 6.1 The Tanker War 6.2 GCC and Kuwait 7 The Effect of the War on Iran and Iraq 7.1 Iraq 7.2 Iran 8 Economics in the Iran-Iraq War 8.1 Iraq 8.2 Iran 8.3 Neighboring Arab States

24 24 25 27 28

22

31 38 42 46 50 53 59 61 65 65 68 72 72 73 74

8

Contents

9 Conclusion

76

Part Two: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict

78

1 Iraq’s Passage to War 2 Kuwait: Confusing Friend and Foe 2.1 Kuwait’s Security: The Attitude Towards Iraq 2.2 Kuwaiti Responses to Iraq’s Demands 3 Inter-Arab Mediation of the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 3.1 The Legacy of Mediation 3.2 Background to the Gulf Crisis 3.3 Approaching Mediation 3.4 The Mediators and Their Actions 3.5 After 2 August 3.6 Epilogue and Conclusions 4 The Unique Role of the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 5 The Characteristics of the War 6 The Attempts at Post-War Accords 7 The Search for Gulf Security 7.1 The Arab Gulf States’ Indecisiveness: Basic Considerations 7.2 Difficulties in Arriving at a Security Arrangement 7.3 Divided Security and Growing Conflicts: Escalation of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Tension 7.4 Iran’s Bid for Regional Influence 7.5 The Saudi-Qatari Dispute 7.6 Gulf Security in the Fall of 1992 7.7 Attempts to Defuse Tensions: Attitudes Toward Egypt and Syria 7.8 Readdressing the Issue of a GCC Army 7.9 Limited Achievements

78 82 87 89 93 94 96 99 103 107 112 115 116 119 123 125 127 131 132 134 135 136 138 139

Part Three: Between the Gulf Wars: Restrained Conflict

141

1 Introduction 2 U.S. Foreign Policy Background: The Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars 3 U.S. Dual Containment 4 Iraq 4.1 1991 4.2 Perceptions in the Gulf 4.3 U.S. Policymaking toward Iraq

141 142 146 147 147 150 151

Contents

9

4.4 Iraq and the International Community 4.5 Iraqi Economy 4.6 Saddam’s Defiance 4.7 New U.S. Policy toward Iraq? 5 Iran 5.1 The Iranian Economy during the 1990s 5.2 Social Unrest in Iran 5.3 U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Iran 5.4 Iranian Foreign Policy Background 5.5 Iranian Foreign Policy in the 1990s 5.6 The Iranian Nuclear Issue 5.7 Europe’s "Critical Dialogue” 5.8 Iranian Escalation leads to U.S. Sanctions 5.9 Iranian Response to U.S. Sanctions 6 Limitations of U.S. Sanctions 7 Gulf States’ Security during the 1990s 8 Gulf State Border Issues during the 1990s 8.1 Unity in Yemen 8.2 The Saudi Arabia-Yemen Border 8.3 Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute 8.4 Oman-UAE Border 8.5 Gulf States and Iran Abu Musa – Two Tunbs Dispute

152 155 156 162 163 165 167 168 170 172 177 179 180 183 191 192 194 194 195 196 197 197 198

Part Four: Al–Qa’ida’s Challenge: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism, 1992–2005

201

1 Introduction 2 The Rise of Extremist Opposition 3 The 21st Century: Religious Extremism Turns into Fierce Opposition 4 Terrorism 4.1 Achievements 4.2 Saudi Responses 4.3 Two main points worth mentioning in retrospect 5 Responses to Religious Radicalism and Terrorism 6 The Making of Zarqawi 7 The Impact of Terrorism and the Iraqi War – The Gulf and Saudi Arabia 8 Regional Problems in the Gulf

201 205 210 214 219 219 222 223 225 235 239

10

Contents

Part Five: Conclusion

244

1 Causes of Conflict 2 The GCC’s Security Approach 3 The Build-Up to New Security Challenges

244 245 249

Appendices

251

Appendix 1: Chronology: Iran-Iraq War Appendix 2: Chronology: The Iraq-Kuwait War Appendix 3: The Iraq-Kuwait War - Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions Appendix 4: Maps Appendix 5: Middle East and Gulf Research: A Guide for Users I. Middle East Journals II. International Relations and Public Policy Research and Publications III. Internet Research Resources for the Gulf Appendix 5: Glossary

251 257

Bibliography

278

Books and Articles Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS; New York: Holmes and Meier) Middle East Periodicals English Language Periodicals and Journals

278

260 263 270 270 270 271 273

286 286 287

List of Boxes

Box 1: Box 2: Box 3: Box 4: Box 5: Box 6: Box 7: Box 8: Box 9: Box 10: Box 11: Box 12: Box 13: Box 14: Box 15: Box 16: Box 17: Box 18:

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 and 1930 Baghdad Pact The Eisenhower Doctrine The Ba’ath Party Dhofari Rebellion Carter Doctrine Arab Cooperation Council U.S. led Coalition Forces UNSCOM and UNIKOM The Nixon Doctrine Twin Pillars The Algiers Accord of 1975 Dual Containment U.S. and British Air Strikes, 1992–2003: Wahhabism Ikhwan Abdullah Azzam Sayyid Qutb

29 31 33 35 38 56 98 118 120 142 143 145 146 154 202 203 209 211

About the Author

Joseph Kostiner received his PhD at London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, in 1982 and is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. He was Chair of the School of History 2000–2004 and is Associate Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Prof. Kostiners fields of specialization are: history and current affairs of the Arabian Peninsula states, social history of the Middle East, state and nationbuilding in the Middle East. Prof. Kostiner is author of the following books: The Struggle for South Yemen (1984); South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy (1990); From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State: The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 (1993); Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-1994 (1996). Coeditor (with P.S. Khoury) of Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1991). Editor of Middle East Monarchies (2000). He has written many articles, including The Arab States of the Gulf before and after the Second Gulf Crisis (Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997, pp. 788–798) and The United States and the Gulf States: Alliance in Need (MERIA Journal Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998).

Acknowledgments

The assistance provided by the FernUniversität Hagen was the basis for the research underlying this book. I am grateful for Professor Dr. Georg Simonis of the FernUniversität for his help in facilitating this assistance, as well as for his continuous encouragement and friendship. A special thanks for additional financial assistance is owed to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and its head Dr. Dore Gold. The completion of this research was made possible as a result of special assistance from my friend Dr. Paul Marcus. I am indebted to both Dr. Gold and Dr. Marcus for their generous support. I would also like to extend my gratitude to professor Eyal Zisser, the head of Tel Aviv University´s Department of Middle Eastern History, and the head of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle eastern and African Studies, as well as to Professor Asher Susser, the former head of the Moshe Dayan center, for ongoing support. The kind hospitality of my relatives Dr. Margarette and Dr. Manfred Wächter provided me with a home whenever I stayed in Germany. Let this book be a token of appreciation for their kindness. I wish to thank Helmut Elbers, at the FernUniversität, whose assistance was an important contribution in bringing the manuscript to completion. I also wish to thank Sarah Ulmer-Sadeh and Brandon Friedman for their assistance. Mr. Friedman´s contribution made him a real intellectual partner in conceiving this book.

Introduction

The Gulf region has experienced continuous conflict throughout the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century: an Islamist revolution in Iran, three devastating regional wars, and a rising tide of Islamic radicalism that threatens the stability of every regime in the Gulf.1 A former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir Alan Munro, has stated: “This shallow inlet with its placid sea and shores is today a cockpit, or perhaps a cauldron, possessing natural resources, combined with fervid undercurrents, which can quickly transform it into a flashpoint for aggression.”2 Oil is the fuel for the industrialized economies of the world. The Gulf states possess approximately 62 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia alone possesses approximately 22 percent.3 Security in the Gulf is therefore critically important to the health of the international economy. This course will examine military, political, cultural, and socio-economic developments in the Gulf region that have led to conflicts and shaped regional security. Britain, which had been the hegemonic super-power in the region, announced in 1968 it would withdraw its forces from the Gulf by 1971. This decision was a product of a number of factors. First, the British domestic economy was too weak to support extensive overseas military commitments. Second, Britain’s failure to peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Suez issue undermined its resolve in the Middle East. Further, its presence in the Gulf was encountering increasingly violent local resistance. In 1971, when Britain removed its forces from the Gulf, it left a power vacuum which created conflict between states ambitious to fill its role as regional power.4 In 1969, the U.S. was overextended by its military commitments in Vietnam, and despite a certain amount of fear of Soviet influence in the Gulf region – and that of Soviet allies, South Yemen, for example – the U.S. adopted a power by proxy security policy in the Gulf. This policy was part of President Richard _________________________________________________ 1 Gary G. Sick, “The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gulf”, in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. Eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 11. 2 Alan Munro, “Defence Issues in the Gulf”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1997): p. 197-205. 3 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. 4 J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 45-103; Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 38-43.

16

Introduction

Nixon’s doctrine and became known in the Gulf as the “twin pillars” strategy, which relied on Iranian military power and Saudi Arabian cooperation and financing. This policy was a reflection of (1) new political constraints on the U.S. military as a result of Vietnam and (2) the new Gulf reality without British forces. The U.S. National Security Study Memorandum of 1969 recommended increased weapons sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia to help them deter Soviet influence in the region and to maintain stability between the smaller Gulf states. The U.S. viewed Iran and Saudi Arabia as friendly powers, capable of keeping the radical ideologies of Iraq and the Soviet Union at bay. The U.S. twin pillars concept meant relying on local military force in place of U.S. forces in the region. During the 1970s, the U.S. supplied Iran (and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia) with an enormous amount of advanced military weapons and technology to ensure their regional military power. Iran’s high level of modernization and larger population made it a better candidate for rapid military growth than Saudi Arabia. The U.S. also believed Iran’s local military power and Saudi Arabia’s financing and influence on the Gulf states would balance each other’s power in the region.5 The U.S. strategy for regional stability, a product of Cold-War strategic considerations, failed when Ayatollah Khomeini’s radical Islamic revolution erupted in Iran in 1978-79. Iran’s revolutionary leaders challenged the regional order and were not cowed by American power. On 4 November 1979 the U.S. officials in Tehran were taken hostage. On 14 December 1979 the U.S. announced it was creating a Rapid Deployment Force (“RDF“) for the Gulf region. On 26 December 1979 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan posing a new threat to the Gulf region. This added urgency to the U.S. decision to create and position a RDF in the Gulf. The RDF became operational on 1 March 1980. Three amphibious Marine forces and seven Army units designated 100,000 troops for rapid response to regional crises. The RDF initiated a major restructuring of the U.S. military command structure to meet the new threats to stability in the Gulf. The size of the RDF increased during the 1980s in response to the U.S. strategic emphasis on deterring the Soviet Union from invading a new and unstable Iranian regime.6 The U.S. policy during the 1970s was a loose strategy without a clear U.S. commitment on how to respond in the case of drastic domestic crises in the Gulf. Instead of clear commitments, the U.S. policy relied on (1) the goodwill and stability of its local allies; (2) balance of power between local Gulf powers, nota_________________________________________________ 5

Kupchan, pp. 38-43. Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); Kupchan, pp. 89-125.

6

Introduction

17

bly Iran and Iraq; (3) minimal local military involvement; and (4) limited engagement. The Arab Gulf states practiced a different approach to security. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s approach to regional security during the 1970s was to mediate conflicts before they reached the Kingdom’s borders. Unlike the U.S. approach, the Saudi strategy emphasized “soft power” rather than military strength. The Saudi regime attempted to appease radical regimes and religious groups so that they would not subvert or threaten the Gulf states. The Saudis also tried to coordinate its policies with the U.S. – Lebanon, 1976–78, Afghanistan, 1979–80 – but also rejected certain U.S. policies, such as the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978-79. The Saudi approach reflected, in part, Stephen David’s “Omnibalancing” theory, which explains that regimes try to tackle all threats – internal, as well as external – when considering the balance of power, whereas the typical approach to balance of power only considers countering external threats from other states.7 This meant attempting to thwart many problems simultaneously without a clear hierarchy of priority or rigid planning. The Saudi approach added to the partisan, casual, and undefined atmosphere of security that existed in the Gulf during the 1970s. Therefore there was no clear mechanism to prevent or contain conflicts in the Gulf. There was too varied a patchwork of defense arrangements, and no binding agreements with either of the two regional military powers, Iran and Iraq, that would prevent them from attacking each other, or their smaller Gulf neighbors. Thus Barry Buzan’s characterization of a security complex suits the Gulf:”A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Security complexes emphasize the interdependence of rivalry as well as shared interest.”8

1

Emergence of Conflict

Iran and Iraq have traditionally been the two most powerful states in the region. Both countries occupy geographically strategic locations, which border a number of politically sensitive areas. Further, their vast oil and gas reserves have provided them with wealth to build military strength and strategic leverage with the international community. _________________________________________________ 7

Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No.2, 1991, p. 233. Ayoob, p. 58 quoted from Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2nd edition, 1991), p. 190.

8

18

Introduction

In 1980, Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s rise to president in July 1979 was through Iraq’s Ba’ath party, which came to power in 1968 and espoused a radical pan-Arab, socialist ideology. However, under Saddam’s rule Iraq was a dictatorship. Saddam used a Sunni network that was based on ties of family, clan, and tribe to rule over a Shi‘i majority and Kurdish minority population. During the 1970s, Ba’ath power was underwritten by the massive explosion of Iraqi oil revenues. Between 1973 and 1975, Iraqi oil revenues increased by eight times. By the end of 1975, Iraq’s annual oil income was $8 billion. During the following years nearly 40 percent of oil income was used to purchase modern weapons for Iraq.9 Further, Iraqi active military manpower grew from 112,500 in 1974-75 to 535,000 in 1979-1980.10 In 1980, Iran was ruled by a new Islamic revolutionary regime that espoused the radical ideology of its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini did not accept the modern nation-state, which he saw as an artificial creation that divided the Muslim community, or ‘umma. Khomeini sought to re-unite the entire Muslim community under his banner of Islam: “Its ultimate goal was to launch an ‘ideological crusade’ aimed at bringing the genuine message of Islam to all peoples everywhere. In fact, Khomeini often compared the movement that brought him to power with the advent of Islam, and with its overall message extending to humanity at large.”11 Iran’s population was predominantly Shi’a, but its population contained a diverse ethnic mix that included Persians, Azeris, and Kurds. Khomeini also had access to great national wealth. Iran’s external cash reserves were $14.6 billion in 1979. And by 1980, Khomeini inherited the Shah’s military resources to back his expanionist threats. In 197475 Iran’s total active military manpower was 238,000, by 1979-80, it was 240,000.12 Iran and Iraq have a historical rivalry that harkens back hundreds of years: Arab versus Persian identity, Sunni versus Shi’a identity, Safavid versus Ottoman Empires, internal Kurdish rivalries between factions, and control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Gulf itself. Even the name of the Gulf is a historical source of rivalry. The Arabs claim it is the “Arabian” Gulf and,”Iran’s claim to the name of the Gulf is an ancient one and has been explained numerous times by contemporary Iranian historians. They assert that the Persian Gulf was _________________________________________________ 9

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 2001), pp. 193-235. 10 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), p. 57. 11 David Menashri, Post Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 173. 12 Cordesman and Wagner, p. 57.

Introduction

19

called the Persian Sea 2,500 years ago, when Darius, the Achmaemid king, called it ‘a sea which comes out of Persia ...”13 Iraq’s Ba’ath revolution in the 1960s radicalized a formerly monarchical state and threatened its conservative Gulf neighbors with its radical Pan-Arab agenda, which envisioned Iraq in the pre-eminent role. Iraq’s call for Arab unity and revolutionary ideology also threatened Iran’s Shah, who was a monarchical ruler of a non-Arab nation seeking regional prominence. Iran viewed a radical Ba’athist Iraq as a rival to its regional supremacy. In the 1980s, Iraq, which had been viewed in the early 1970s as a radical regime, became the standard bearer for the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies who were being threatened by Khomeini’s subversive attempts to spread his revolution. In the 1960s and 1970s the small Gulf states viewed Iraq as part of growing trend of radical pan-Arab nationalism that had spread to Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”). The Gulf states feared this emerging radical trend would destabilize their governments. However, by the end of the 1970s a new radical threat emerged. In 1975, Ba’athist Iraq, weakened by its battles with Kurdish insurgents, managed a rapprochement with Iran, which culminated in a settlement to the Shatt al-Arab border dispute. However, Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1978-79 jeopardized this settlement and introduced a new element of state-supported pan-Islamic radicalism into the region. Khomeini’s Islamic rhetoric sneered at international state borders and attacked the monarchical institution that governed the smaller Gulf states. Further, Khomeini initiated a relentless campaign of propaganda against Saddam’s Iraq.

2

Regional Asymmetry

The state of continuous conflict in the Gulf was a function of a fundamental asymmetry between the smaller Arab monarchical Gulf states and the larger regional powers, Iran and Iraq. This trend of conflict can be seen as parallel to state formation in the region, as well as to the maturation of the world economy and its need for fuel. The Gulf’s vast reserves of oil and gas magnify the importance of the balance power between the vulnerable smaller states and the larger regional powers. Oil and gas make the Gulf region an integral part of the world economy. As a result, any conflict in the region is likely to involve the international community. The asymmetry in the region is first a product of size. In 1981, the monarchical Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE _________________________________________________ 13

Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p.5.

20

Introduction

came together to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC“). Yemen, due to its historic instability, lies at the periphery, but, due to its geography, remains part of the region, nevertheless. The GCC states are much smaller than their larger neighbors, Iran and Iraq. Size, in this case, is measured in terms of geography and demography, more than economic wealth. To a certain degree, Saudi Arabia is an exception, physically, to the rest of its fellow GCC members. Its geographic area is 2,150,000 square kilometers, while Bahrain’s is 662 square kilometers. However, all of the Gulf states are scarcely populated and, therefore, less powerful, traditionally, than Iran and Iraq, because they have less manpower to draw upon for military strength. Therefore, their foreign policies are based, in part, on the natural limitations of their size and populations. Even the size of the populations of the Gulf states can deceive: many of the Gulf states are populated by a high percentage of resident foreign workers. Many of these workers are not eligible for military service. Bahrain, had a population of approximately 230,000 in 1970 and 350,000 in 1980. Today, it has a population of approximately 700,000. It is the smallest Gulf state. In 1995, Bahrain’s military forces consisted of 10,700 men. In 2007, it has roughly the same size military force, but additionally a 10,000 strong internal security force. It is ruled by a Sunni King, Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa, but has a majority Shi’a population. Kuwait is ruled by the Al Sabah family, and achieved full independence in 1961. Today, it has a population of 2.4 million and military manpower of 15,000–17,000 troops. Since 1970, Oman has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said. He has implemented an extensive modernization program. Oman’s first national census was taken in 1993. At the time it had a population of 2.017 million, including approximately 500,000 foreign nationals. Oman’s military forces grew from 15,000 troops in the early 1980s to 43,000 men in 1995, which is approximately its size today. In 2007, Qatar is ruled by Amir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, and has a population of approximately 885,000. Its population in 1970 was only 111,000, of which 45,000 were natives. By the mid-1970s, its population was 200,000. Its armed forces grew from 5,000 men in the early 1980s to 11,000 men in 1995. Saudi Arabia is ruled in 2007 by King Abdallah bin Abd al Aziz, and is the largest geographic GCC state. It has a population of more than 27 million. In 1984, Saudi Arabia only had 63,500 men in its regular armed forces. In 2007, its regular military forces consist of 124,500 men. The United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven emirates ruled by president Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan. The federation was formed in 1971, and today has a population of approximately 2.7 million. In 2007, the UAE has a military force of approximately 50,000 men, which is a large increase from 25,000 in 1980.14 _________________________________________________ 14 Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997); Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military

Introduction

21

These sparsely populated GCC states are, however, rich in natural resources. In 2005, the GCC states accounted for approximately 40 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 22 percent of that total. Qatar, comparatively oil poor, produces 11.4 percent of the world’s natural gas.15 The vast reserves of oil and gas in the Gulf have generated enormous wealth for the Gulf states. In 1974, 85 percent of the GCC states’ GDP was a product of trade in oil and gas products.16 This wealth has made these states both vulnerable and important. Their strategic importance is a product of the important role oil and gas play in the world economy. Oil and gas fuel industrialization, which is one of the driving forces behind economic growth. Furthermore, oil has increasingly become an integral part of the Western lifestyle, fueling wealthy societies built around automobiles and a tourism industry dependent on air travel. Therefore, there is political pressure from the Western societies to make sure the engines of the world economy have access to the fuel that drives them. This phenomenon was best exemplified by the 1973 oil crisis. The crisis emerged during the 1973 October Arab-Israeli War. On 17 October 1973, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya agreed to decrease oil production by 5 percent a month until Israel withdrew from the territories it seized during the 1967 Six-Day War. Further, these countries cut production by 25 percent the following months and halted all oil shipments to the pro-Israeli U.S., and the Netherlands. This oil embargo lasted until March of 1974. The production cuts by the OPEC plus Syria and Egypt were accompanied by a 400 percent increase in the price of oil. Prices climbed from $3 per barrel before the October War to approximately $20 in December 1973. Oil prices continued to rise and were in the neighborhood of $40 per barrel in 1980. The dramatic price increase shocked the international economy. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries reported an average inflationary increase of 7 percent, and unemployment increased by 2 percent. Further, the new price of oil generated tremendous wealth for the OPEC states. This crisis upset Western economies and elevated the strategic importance of Gulf politics to the international community.17 Due to the regional asymmetry of power, the smaller Gulf states depended on the balance of power between the two larger powers, Iran and Iraq, to main-

Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, Volume 1 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 15 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006, accessed at http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do? categoryId=6842&contentId=7021390 16 Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security, p. 5 17 Kupchan, pp. 44-53.

22

Introduction

tain regional security. During the 1970s, the Gulf states also relied, in part, on one of the larger powers to occassionally assist with their local security. For example, Iran’s military assistance under the Shah was instrumental to Oman’s ability to suppress the leftist insurgents in the Omani region of Dhofar in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite mutual security interests between the larger powers and the smaller Gulf states, they were hardly able to fully coordinate on a regional security policy. Iran’s dispute with the UAE over controlling the Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, which began when the British withdrew from the Gulf exemplified the regional disputes that undermined regional security cooperation in the 1970s.

3

Geographical Disputes and Other Historical Sources of Tension Between Gulf States

Ideological changes in the region have been a historical source of conflict in the Gulf, as well. Arab Nationalism, Khomeinism, Communism, and the broad background of the Cold War were all important historical factors that contributed to regional conflict. The Cold War affected the regional balance of power in the Gulf. The region’s powers, Iran and Iraq, were split between supporting the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Following the fall of the former Soviet Union, U.S. policy toward the Gulf also influenced the regional balance of power, and, perhaps unintentionally, sowed the seeds for future conflict. Territorial disputes between Gulf states were a function of the fact that borders between many of these artificially created states have not been fixed or regionally recognized. The Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq was a historical source of conflict dating back centuries, and a recurring bone of contention throughout the 20th century; it served as one of the catalysts that triggered the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s dispute with UAE over Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs islands began in the 1970s and has continued to the present. Saudi Arabia and Yemen have had a long-standing border dispute that may have reached a resolution – in principle – in June 2000. Bahrain and Qatar have referred their dispute to the International Court of Justice to rule on the sovereignty of the Hawar islands, the Dibal and Jidda shoals, and Zubarah. Oman and the UAE have reached a boundary agreement in March 2000, but the agreement has not been implemented. Territorial ambiguity, lack of clearly defined and recognized borders, and access to natural resources continue to stir tension between the GCC states and hinder coordinated multilateral GCC security agreements.

Introduction

23

Internal changes and political pressures in the smaller states have also caused regional conflict. Factors such as rapid social change, Shi‘i minority groups, and Sunni Islamic radicalism all create internal pressures that lead to internal and external conflict as well as threats to the status quo. The monarchical Gulf states are commonly viewed as “traditional” societies. This usually means that tribal social structures and Islam form the basis of local politics. Some argue this “traditionalism” leads to a political process where institutions are devalued because politics are personal, political participation is minimal, there is little in the way of civil society, political loyalty is a function of religious standards, and monarchical rule based on tribal elites is embedded in the culture. Further, this view leads some to conclude that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are outdated and weak. And that the traditional rulers are incapable of managing the cultural and economic changes that come with vast oil wealth. This impression is compounded by the inability of the monarchical regimes to defend themselves from threats presented by their larger neighbors.18 The problem with such perceptions is that they fail to recognize the flexibility and adaptability of ruling elites of the Gulf states, which is a function of their wealth. In fact, in many cases, they have been able to develop productive state institutions, manage their wealth, introduce political dialogue and mechanisms for political participation, and remain loyal to their cultural heritage. To be sure, the changes have been slow and in small measures and there are visible social problems, such as foreign labor explosion, rising unemployment for young, educated citizens, and population explosion. One of biggest security challenges caused by recent social and political changes in the Gulf has been the emergence radical Islamic groups, which are threatening the internal stability of the Gulf monarchies.

_________________________________________________ 18

F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 3.

Part One: The Iran-Iraq War

1

Introduction

The Iran-Iraq War was triggered by changes to the status quo in the region caused, in large part, by Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978-79. However, the reasons for war were subtle and complex, and included a variety of components. Iran and Iraq also had a longstanding history of conflict that can be traced back to the creation of the modern nation of Iraq – by European powers – following World War I. The historical legacy of conflict between the powerful ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in the two regions is centuries old. The original Arab-Islamic conquest of the Persian Sassanid Empire in 638 at Qadisiyya and the subsequent Sunni-Shi‘i division of the Muslim community of believers (or ‘umma) in 680 are two relevant examples that extend back to the 7th century of the modern era. However, the Iran-Iraq War was most directly a product of an immediate conflict that emerged when the regional goals and ambitions of Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein clashed.1 This chapter will attempt to address, (a) the historical sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq; (b) the regional status quo preceding the Iran-Iraq War and the regional goals and ambitions of Iran and Iraq, which led most directly to the conflict; and (c) the effect of the war on Iran and Iraq; (d) the economic factor in the war; and (d) the impact of the war on the Gulf littoral states, and their responses to the shifting challenges presented during the nearly nine years of fighting. The causes of war are complex and subtle, and any isolation of tightly bound historical forces is liable run the risk of oversimplification. To the extent that it is possible, this chapter will isolate direct causes of the war, but also attempt to weave the direct causes into a broader historical narrative.

2

Historical Sources of Conflict

There are four main sources of historical tension between Iran and Iraq: (a) access to, and control of, the Shi‘i holy sites in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Kar_________________________________________________ 1

Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 10-11.

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bala; (b) state manipulation of the Kurdish nationalist movement; (c ) Iranian control of the traditionally Arab region of Khuzistan in southwest Iran; and (d) the dispute over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which feeds into the Gulf. 2.1 Roots of the Historical Conflict Iran is predominantly Persian, while Iraq is Arab. Iran has a rich Persian cultural identity that pre-dates the 7th century Arab-Islamic conquest and Islamic conversion of the Persian Sassanid Empire. This pre-Islamic, Persian cultural history is viewed by Iranians as separate and distinct from the Arab bedouin tradition originating in the Gulf. However, the Shi‘i sect of Islam constitutes the majority in both Iran and Iraq and links the two regions. Shi‘i Islam is rooted in events that date back to the early days of Islam following the death of the Prophet. The Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-inlaw, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abu Talib engaged in a long struggle against Mu’awiya to become rightful successor to the Muslim Caliphate following the third Caliph, ‘Uthman’s, death. After Muhammad died there was a dispute regarding who should succeed him as Caliph, or leader, of the Muslim community. The majority backed ‘Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law and long time companion. ‘Ali eventually became the fourth Caliph, succeeding ‘Uthman, but many supported his rival Mu’awiya, the governor of Damascus. In 661, ‘Ali was murdered and his son, Hasan, abdicated his right to the Caliphate to Mu’awiyah. However, not all of ‘Ali’s followers accepted Hasan’s abdication. When Mu’awiyah died in 680, ‘Ali’s second son, Hussein, who hoped to re-claim the Caliphate, was accompanied into battle by a small group of loyal followers. They were massacred near Karbala, on the tenth day of the Moharram, in present-day Iraq by the Umayyad Caliph Yazid (Mu’awiya’s son) and his forces. Hussein’s grave is located in Karbala.2 Hussein’s defeat is commemorated by Shi‘is during ‘Ashura, memorialized on the tenth day of Moharram each year. The holiday includes pilgrimage to the Shi‘i holy shrines in Najaf (where ‘Ali is buried) and Karbala, in Iraq. The Shi‘i believers publicly mourn during the ceremonies on ‘Ashura, and even physically beat themselves in self-punishment for not coming to Hussein’s defense at Karbala in 680. ‘Ashura is one of the holiest days of the year for Shi‘is. Iranians are, for the most part,“Twelver” Shi‘is. The number refers to chain of twelve men (Imams) in ‘Ali’s blood line who possess religious authority _________________________________________________ 2 Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, Translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1964), p. 75; Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 10-13.

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passed down during the early centuries of Islam. ‘Ali and his sons Hasan and Hussein were the first three Imams. Imams were designated at birth, which was usually accompanied by some kind of miraculous sign of confirmation. The twelfth Imam is said to be in “occultation” (ghayba) where he is hidden from the world. God will determine when the Imam will reappear. It is believed this messianic return will occur before judgment day, and the Imam will lead the righteous to victory over evil forces and rule the world during a period of peace.3 Iranian Shi‘i religious identity is closely tied to the holy sites in Iraq, and Ayatollah Khomeini spent fourteen years of his exile from Iran in Iraq, before he was expelled by Saddam Hussein. Ayatollah Khomeini was not the first Iranian ruler to adopt Shi‘i Islam as the state religion. Shah Ismail’s Safavid dynasty from the 15th to 17th centuries was the first Shi‘i state in Iran in early modern times. Shah Ismail organized his empire around the theology and law of Twelver Shi‘ism. Six of twelve Shi‘i Imams are buried in Iraq, and the last Imam went into occultation in the Iraqi city of Samarra. Shah Ismail sought to capture the Shi’a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq to reinforce his empire’s Shi‘i identity. Safavid Persia4 was in perpetual conflict with the Iraq region of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. In 1510, Shah Ismail captured Iraq, only to relinquish it to the Ottoman Empire in 1514 after defeat in the battle of Chaldiran. In 1529, the Safavids re-captured Iraq, only to be expelled again by Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1534. War over Iraq recurred in 1548, and again between 1553–55. The Safavids were able to occupy Iraq from 1623 until 1638. In 1638, Sultan Murad IV and the Ottomans captured Baghdad; and the treaty of Zuhab, enacted in 1639, formally annexed Iraq into the Ottoman Empire and stipulated that two powers should not meddle in each other’s affairs. This treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire lasted for more than a century. Tensions between Iran and Iraq resumed in the 18th century. In 1733, Nadir Shah of Iran failed in his attempt to conquer Baghdad. And in 1746 another treaty was signed at Kurdan. In 1775, Iran occupied Basra and border conflicts continued. The troublesome areas were “Arabistan” in southwest Iran and the Zagros mountain region in the north, which was inhabited by the Kurds.5 _________________________________________________ 3 Andrew Rippin, Muslims, Their Beliefs and Practices (London: Routledge, 3rd Ed., 2005), pp. 124127. 4 Modern Iran was known as “Persia” by non-natives from antiquity until the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi in the first quarter of the 20th century, when he officially changed the name of the nation-state to “Iran” in 1935. See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (London: Orion Books, 2001), pp. 7. 5 Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iran and Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom & Helm and Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (Grafton Books, London, 1989), p. 8-9.

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2.2 The Empires’ Legacies The formerly Arab area in southwest Iran known as “Arabistan” played an important role in modern tensions between Iran and Iraq. Between 1690 and 1923 the Kabide Emirate6 was a semi-autonomous region extending from Ahvaz in the north, to the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the west, Hindian in the east, and the Gulf in the south. The emirate maintained its independence by playing Iran off of the Ottoman Empire. The Kabide Amir controlled access to the Shatt al-Arab waterway – which formed at the meeting of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and flowed into the Gulf – and collected tolls on traffic from the Gulf to the Ottoman port in Basra. In 1812–3, the leader of the Muhaisin tribe in southwest Iran carved out an independent principality for himself and established a port on the Shatt al-Arab at Khorramshahr (known in Arabic as Muhammarah). This caused tensions in the region to increase. In 1821, war broke out over control of the nomadic tribes that ventured across common borders. Iran invaded “Arabistan”, conquered the area and seized control of the new port in Khorramshahr. Arabistan became part of Iran. In 1823, with British assistance, the Treaty of Erzerum was signed. This treaty guaranteed protection for Shi‘i pilgrims traveling from Iran to Iraq’s holy cities and regulated tribal movement along common borders. In addition to Arabistan along the southwest Iran – Ottoman Iraq border, the Kurds in the north were a source of regional tension. The Kurds are a separate ethnic-racial group from the Arabs, Turks, and Persians. They trace their history back to Medes of the Bible and the Indo-European mountain tribes who settled in southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, and northwest Iran. The Kurdish language is part of the Indo-European family of languages, and is closer to Farsi than to Arabic. In 1824, in violation of the Treaty of Erzerum, Iran supported a Kurdish rebellion in northeast Iraq. By the Treaty of Erzerum in 1823, British and Tsarist Russian imperial power influenced relations between Persia and Ottoman Iraq. Fourteen years after the Treaty of Erzerum, in 1837, the Ottoman Empire invaded Arabistan and absorbed it into the Wilayet of Basra. Border tension also re-emerged between 1834 and 1840, due to the movement of Turkish tribes across the Iranian frontier. Iran, for its part, had supported the Kurdish rebellion in northeast Iraq in 1824. These problems were further aggravated by the persecution of Shi‘i Iranians in Iraq and the Ottoman invasion of Khorramshahr (Muhammarah). In 1847, with the assistance of the British and Russians, a second Treaty of Erzerum was signed. _________________________________________________ 6

The Kabide Emirate was a portion of the larger area that came to be known as “Arabistan” in the 20th century. Cordesman, p.11.

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The second Treaty of Erzerum was significant because it divided the border territory along the Shatt al-Arab waterway (known in Persian as the Arvand Rud). Iran was granted control over the east bank of the river and the Ottoman Empire controlled the waterway itself, and the west bank. Iran was granted navigation rights on the river and agreed not to involve itself in northern Iraq. In exchange for established rights on the Shatt al-Arab, Iran gave up territory in the Zuhab-Qasr-e Shirin area and also received the island of Abadan (formerly known as Khizr). The port of Khorramshahr was given to Iran in exchange for exclusive Iraqi control over Sulaimaniyya in Kurdish region of the north. The treaty gave Iran control over Arabistan and the Ottoman Empire control over the Shatt al-Arab. The second treaty of Erzerum established the territorial rights along the Iran-Iraq southwest border and the Shatt al-Arab. However, the treaty did not affect the problems that plagued the region. Arab tribes continued to move back and forth across the border, and the region surrounding the port of Khorramshahr continued to behave semi-autonomously. The border disputes, especially the conflict over control of the Shatt al-Arab, continued into the 20th century. In 1908, the British discovered commercial quantities of oil near Arabistan. This complicated the border conflict, and changed the emphasis of the British interest in the Gulf. Iran and the Ottoman Empire signed the Protocols of Tehran in 1911, which called for settling all outstanding border issues. In 1913, British, Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman officials met in Constantinople to establish borders and settle rights on the Shatt al-Arab. The new agreement awarded Iran six islands on the Shatt al-Arab between the Khorramshahr port and the Gulf. The British, seeking easy outlets through the Gulf for its new Iranian oil, may have used its influence to help Iran secure the new territory on the Shatt al-Arab. 2.3 Components of a Recurring Conflict World War I, the collapse of Tsarist Russia, and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire created big changes in the region. The independent nation of Iraq was established by the British Mandate in 1921 and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Iran also underwent a great change. The corrupt Qajar dynasty was ended, and, between 1921 and 1923, a new Iranian nationalism emerged as Reza Shah came to power. In 1923 and 1924, Reza Shah consolidated his power and suppressed Iran’s ethnic minorities in pursuit of his nationalist objectives. Reza Shah used his newly expanded military to crush the Arabs in the semiautonomous region of Arabistan. He expanded the province, renamed the area “Khuzistan,” suppressed the use of Arabic, and resettled the population to dilute the Arab majority. The Shah’s policies of ethnic suppression and resettlement, in

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combination with the establishment of a large British oil industry in Khuzistan, minimized the significance of the Arab factor in future border conflicts between Iran and Iraq. Following World War I, Iran and Iraq confronted one another as two sovereign states pursuing their respective national interests. It was at this point in time that lasting components of war were formed between Iran and Iraq. Each state was an ambitious entity seeking territorial achievements. There was a natural strategic competition between two large states for supremacy over the Gulf basin. Iraq was in a geographically inferior position and forced to compete for control of access to waterways and to the Gulf. The Shatt al-Arab was a natural epicenter of the tension between Iran and Iraq. Further, the common cross border ethnic-religious groups, such as the Kurds, Shi’is, and the Arabs of Khuzistan, blurred the solid lines of international boundaries. Iran refused to recognize the borders of modern Iraq, which it viewed as encroaching on its own interests. The Shi‘i religious scholars, or ulama, of Iraq, who were anti-British, sponsored anti-government resistance following the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1922 (see Box 1). Clashes between the British backed Iraqi government and the Shi‘i ulama increased and resulted in the Shi‘i ulama’s selfexile to Iran in 1923. With assistance from Iran, Iraq and the Shi‘i ulama reconciled and the ulama returned to Iraq with the understanding that they would stay out of Iraqi politics. By 1929 conditions between the two states had improved, and Reza Shah recognized King Faisal I’s Iraq. Box 1:

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 and 19307

In 1921, Great Britain installed the Hashemite, Faisal bin Hussein as king of Iraq. Great Britain wanted a formal treaty agreement after years of being the country’s mandate power and Iraq objected to being a mandate and wanted a treaty to represent a change in its status. This treaty was signed in October 1922, but not ratified until the spring 1924. The British high commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, was forced to issue an ultimatum to the Iraqi constituent assembly to ensure the treaty was ratified. However, despite the change in status, Iraq could not hide the fact that Britain was overwhelmingly in control of Iraq. Britain controlled Iraq’s financial affairs and maintained a virtual military occupation of the new state. Further, it retained mandate control until Iraq was capable of selfgovernment. The 1922 treaty was replaced by a new treaty in 1930. The treaty became the basis for Britain’s relationship with Iraq following Iraq’s independence in 1932. Domestic control of Iraq fell under the king’s authority, and defense of the borders was a responsibility of the new state, however issues of interna_________________________________________________ 7

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 66-67.

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Part One: The Iran-Iraq War tional security remained largely guaranteed by the British and their troops. The British retained full military access to Iraqi land for strategic purposes. The treaty was signed for twenty-five years, with renegotiation possible after twenty years. The new treaty took into account British interests in significant new oil discoveries made in Iraq in 1927.

The Kurds were also unhappy with the newly created Iraqi state. The Kurds of Mosul attacked the British mandate rule and then the subsequent central government in Iraq. In 1927, the Kurdish area of Iraq became an area of strategic importance when the British struck the largest oil reserve ever discovered – as of that date – near Kirkuk. In 1931-2, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani initiated a Kurdish insurgency for independence. It was crushed by a joint Iraqi-Turkish campaign in 1935. Despite diplomatic progress between King Faisal I and Reza Shah, border disputes still fostered underlying hostility. Iran was also not satisfied with Iraqi control of traffic on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. According to Iran, the thalweg – or median line of the deepest part of the waterway – was the boundary agreed to in 1913. In November 1934, Iraq brought the issue of the thalweg boundary on the Shatt al-Arab before the League of Nations. Iraq argued it had rights to (a) control over the entire waterway; (b) customs collections on all traffic; and (c) the right to control all warships on the waterway. Iran claimed that, (a) the border ran along the middle of the waterway; (b) both sides should enjoy free navigation on the water; and (c ) Iran should have free movement of its warships on the waterway.8 In the Spring of 1936, the two countries withdrew the case from the League of Nations, and entered into direct negotiations. Negotiations were affected by the leadership balance between Iran and Iraq, which had changed as a result of the death of King Faisal I of Iraq in 1933. His son, King Ghazi I, was not as adept at balancing the demands of Iraq’s various factions. In November 1936, Bakr Sidqi led a coup d’etat in Iraq that led to a period of internal chaos. In 1937, Iraq signed a treaty with Iran. The treaty was very favorable for Iran with respect to the Shatt al-Arab. It gave Iran, (a) control of the island of Abadan, and a four-mile anchorage area in front of Abadan where the Anglo-Persian company had a large oil refinery; (b) free anchorage to Iranian ships at the Iranian ports without paying Iraqi customs; (c) free navigation of all merchant ships; and (d) joint maintenance of the waterway. Iran gained a lot from Iraq’s political weakness at the time of the 1937 agreement. But the real winner appeared to be Brit_________________________________________________ 8

Abdulghani, pp. 4-17; Cordesman, pp. 11-13; Hiro, pp. 8-13.

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ish oil interests, which benefited from British political influence in both Baghdad and Tehran. However, despite another agreement, the two countries continued to dispute the execution of the agreed-upon boundaries. Four years later World War II erupted and Iran was occupied by foreign powers. Foreign occupation undermined Reza Shah’s nationalism doctrine and he abdicated the throne. During World War II both countries were weakened and used as staging areas for European powers to pursue their war interests.9 The Kurds, seeking to exploit the weakened state of the government during World War II, launched another rebellion against the Baghdad government. Mustafa Barzani (Ahmed Barzani’s brother) led the insurgency which failed. Barzani fled from Iraq to Iran, where he helped found the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946. The Shah crushed this entity and Barzani was forced to flee to the Soviet Union. After World War II the demands of the new Cold War ushered in a brief period of calm between Iran and Iraq. 2.4 Another Component of Escalation: The Cold War and Western Attempts to Create an Anti-Soviet Alliance By 1955, Iran and Iraq were being pressured to choose sides in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran and Iraq set aside their border disputes and attempted to jointly participate in a regional security agreement born out of the perceived threat of Soviet Communism to the region. The Baghdad Pact (see Box 2) was a security and defense agreement between Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. Box 2:

Baghdad Pact10

This was a defense pact involving Middle Eastern countries, from 1954 until approximately 1979. The Baghdad Pact was also known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was the term used after Iraq left in 1959. It was also referred to as Middle East Treaty Organization. The name comes from the signing that took place in Baghdad, Iraq in 1955. The treaty was initiated by the U.S. and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, consisting of most West European countries, Turkey, U.S. and Canada) as part of the intent to create worldwide anti-Soviet alliances. During the first stage of the pact, Turkey signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Pakistan. This was soon expanded to include Iraq and subsequently Iran and Great Britain. _________________________________________________ 9

Abdulghani, pp. 116-117; Cordesman, pp. 16-17; Hiro, p. 10-11. See http://lexicorient.com/e.o/baghdad_pact.htm, accessed 15 February 2007.

10

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Part One: The Iran-Iraq War The pact involved security and defense cooperation and refraining from interference in one another’s internal affairs. The pact which intended to secure the common protection of all the member countries never resulted in combat, but did succeed preventing Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union considered the pact “aggressive“. With the signing of the pact, Great Britain handed over its two air-bases to Iraqi national authorities. During its short career in the alliance, Iraq was the strongest regional participant, and even served as the leader in the Western alliance with the Arab world. The pact was designed to be open to new members, principally coming from the Arab League. Western countries even tried to pressure Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria to join, but without success. In fact Arab states, such as Egypt, became fierce opponents of the”imperialistic“ pact.

Baghdad Pact Chronology 1954 February: Turkey signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Pakistan. 1955 February 24: A military agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey, and the term ”Baghdad Pact“ begins to be used. – Iran, Pakistan and Britain join the Baghdad Pact. 1959 March: The new republican regime of Iraq withdrew the country from the alliance. 1965: Pakistan tried to get help from their allies in their war against India, but without success. 1971: In a new war with India, Pakistan tried once again unsuccessfully to get allied assistance. 1979: The new Islamic regime of Iran withdraws the country from CENTO, as the alliance was now known.

Iraq perceived the pact as advantageous because it allowed it to work with Iran and Turkey to suppress its Kurdish threat and to neutralize any Turkish designs on its territory. Iraq was also looking to extend its British alliance, which was set to expire in 1957. The Shah of Iran viewed the Communist threat seriously and viewed the pact as a means to protect its national security. In 1957, both Iran and Iraq moved towards closer relations with the West by endorsing the Eisenhower doctrine (see Box 3) and rejecting Nasser’s anti-Western agenda in Egypt.

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Box 3:

The Eisenhower Doctrine11

The Eisenhower Doctrine was outlined in an address to the U.S. Congress delivered in January 1957. It was part of the foreign policy of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The doctrine stated that the U.S. would use military force to respond to aggression against the U.S. Further, the doctrine stressed that countries that opposed Communism would be given aid and support by the U.S. The doctrine was, in part, a response to growing Soviet influence in Egypt under Nasser. It was designed to give Arab regimes in the Middle East an alternative to the growing influence of Nasser and his Soviet backers.

In July 1958, Iraq underwent a revolution when nationalist, republican military officers overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy. Iran viewed this development with alarm fearing Iraq would align itself with Nasser and his panArabism. In 1958, the new Iraqi revolutionary regime preserved its commitments to the Baghdad Pact and appeared eager to remain aligned with Iran and Turkey. It was not until 1959, that Iraq’s leader, Abdul Karim Qasim, succumbed to internal Communist pressure as well as pressure from Nasser in Egypt to withdraw from the U.S. conceived Baghdad Pact. It was also at this stage that Iraq began to make territorial claims on Kuwait. In 1959, unresolved border disputes and skirmishes between Iran and Iraq increased following the Iraqi revolution, and further aggravated tensions. Iran, backed by the U.S., also reasserted its claim that the thalweg was the boundary running through the Shatt al-Arab. Iran’s recognition of Kuwaiti independence in 1961 further antagonized Iraq.12 Iraq’s desire for a central role in Gulf politics was hindered by its ambitions regarding Kuwait during the early 1960s. Iraq based its claims on Kuwait on the fact that Kuwait had been part of the historical Ottoman vilayet of Basra. However, Kuwait always had its own internal independence, and in 1899 had signed a treaty of protection with Britain. In 1961 Kuwait declared its sovereign independence. In the early 1970s Iraq and Kuwait became engaged in border disputes, and clashed over ownership of the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan, which Iraq sought as a strategic counterbalance to Iran’s presence in the Gulf. Iraq’s new rulers demanded Iran relinquish its harbors in Khorramshahr and its refinery on Abadan. Iraq also extended its territorial claim in the Gulf an additional twelve miles, and made new claims on the Iranian province of Khuzis_________________________________________________ 11 Full text of the Presidential address outlining the doctrine can http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/midleast.htm, accessed 15 February 2007. 12 Abdulghani, p. 15-17 and 77-80; Hiro, pp. 10-11.

be

accessed:

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tan. In 1960, Iraq claimed sovereignty over the island of Abadan, and in 1961, Iraq demanded only Iraqi pilots could navigate ships on the Shatt al-Arab. The Shah responded by sending warships into the Shatt al-Arab and by stopping all toll payments to Iraq and the use of Iraqi pilots. Both countries moved troops into the area, but nothing serious occurred. Iran ultimately conceded to using Iraqi pilots on the waterway, but rejected all other Iraqi claims. Pro-Western Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi perceived the revolution in Iraq as a threat. Iran reacted by taking strategic steps to protect its interests with respect to the Shatt al-Arab, as well as re-orienting its foreign policy to balance a potential hostile Iraq. Iran built a large new oil export terminal on Kharg Island, which opened in 1965. The facility was intended to reduce the Iranian oil industry’s dependence on the Iraqi controlled Shatt al-Arab. However, Iran still relied heavily on its port at Khorramshahr and the refinery on Abadan. Iran also cemented its security bonds with the U.S. and sought terms with the Soviet Union to limit Communist aid to Iraq.13 Between 1958 and 1968 Iraq was weakened by political instability. Three coups and five different governments undermined its ability to assert its claims with respect to Iran. Iran increasingly defined its foreign policy positions in the early 1960s based on Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions in Egypt. Iran perceived Nasser’s panArabist agenda as a regional threat. When Qasim was overthrown in Iraq in 1963, the Shah of Iran was concerned the new Iraqi leadership would align itself with Nasser. Iran began to assist the Kurds in Iraq as a means to destabilize the Iraqi regime. In 1967, Nasser’s pan-Arabist agenda was checked by his failure to defeat Israel. Iraq, after rejecting an agreement with the Kurds, was fighting a Kurdish insurgency from 1961 to 1966. Three of Iraq’s five army divisions were engaged with the Kurdish insurgents. In 1966, Iran agreed to deliver arms from the U.S. and Israel to the Iraqi Kurds. In June 1966, Baghdad came to terms with the Kurds. These efforts were undermined when the Iraqi leadership was removed by the Ba’athist coup d’etat in July 1968. However, the Kurds were not easily deterred. They would play a crucial role in Iraq-Iran relations in the early 1970s. And while Kurdish leadership was often manipulated and exploited by foreign powers, they managed to be a painful thorn in the side of the new Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party of 1968 (see Box 4).

_________________________________________________ 13

Abdulghani, pp. 97-99; Cordesman, p. 17.

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Box 4:

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The Ba’ath Party14

The Ba’ath party was an Arab political party founded in Syria and spread to Iraq. Literally, the term means renaissance. Its main ideological objectives were secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab unionism. It emerged in Damascus in 1941 and assumed the Ba’ath name in the early 1950s. It gradually grew in power in Syria. In 1958 – with one of its founders, Salah al-Din Bitar, as foreign minister – it led Syria into the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR) with Egypt. The Ba’athists, like most other Syrians, quickly came to resent Egyptian domination, and the Ba’athist members of the union government resigned in December 1959. Syria withdrew from the UAR in 1961. Syria has been ruled by the Ba’ath party ever since. In 1969, Hafiz al-Asad assumed control of the Ba’ath party in Syria and the leadership of the country. He ruled until his death in 2000, and his son, Bashar al-Asad, succeeded him as the Ba’ath ruler of Syria. The Ba’ath ideology spread to Iraq, but it was not until the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958 that the Ba’ath party became a growing political force. The Ba’athists first came to power in a coup in February 1963, when Abd alSalam Arif became president. Less than one month later, in March 1963, the Ba’ath assumed power in Syria through a military coup d’etat. The Syrian Ba’athists interfered in Iraqi affairs and disputes between the moderates and extremists culminating in an attempted coup by the extremists in November 1963. In 1966, the Iraqi Ba’ath party severed ties with the Ba’ath party in Syria. In July 1968, a bloodless coup brought to power the Ba’athist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, and his close associate Saddam Hussein. Disputes within the party continued and the government periodically purged its dissident members. In September 1977, all members of the Ba’ath Regional Command also became members of the Iraqi state’s Revolutionary Command Council, which meant the party and state became indistinguishable. Al-Bakr resigned in 1978, and Saddam became president. Saddam and the Ba’ath party ruled Iraq until 2003 when Saddam Hussein was deposed by U.S. allied forces. Since their inception, the Ba’athist regimes of Syria and Iraq have often been diametrically opposed. Under Asad in Syria and Saddam in Iraq, both nations moved away from Ba’athist principles, although the ruling parties retained the Ba’ath name.

The Ba’athist coup of 1968 was more than a simple military power-grab; the new Ba’ath Party in Iraq was more sophisticated and organized than the group that _________________________________________________ 14 See Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London and New York: I.B.Tauris 1999), and http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Baathpar.html accessed 2006-2007.

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had come to power in 1963. In 1963 the Iraqi Ba’ath party had 850 active members. By 1968 Iraq had 5,000 active Ba’ath party members. Founded in Damascus, Syria in 1947, the Ba’ath party was a “nationalist, populist, socialist, and revolutionary” and believed in the “unity and freedom of the Arab Nation within its homeland.” The party rejected class conflict, but endorsed policies of land reform. The party also stood for the nationalization of natural resources, transportation, industry, and finance. The party ideology advocated the unionization of workers and peasants, but also supported limited private ownership and inheritance. At the international level, the Ba’ath party was viewed in its early days as a radical alternative to the pro-Western Arab monarchical regimes which had joined the Baghdad Pact and refused to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956. The Iraqi Ba’athist group that seized power in 1968 had already succeeded in establishing itself at the level of National Command (encompassing the party throughout the Arab world). In February 1966, at Ninth National Congress in Damascus, the Iraqi delegation split with the Syrian contingent and backed the Ba’ath Party founder Michel Aflaq. The Iraqi group held a separate Ninth National Congress in Beirut in February 1968, which initiated an intense rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath parties. In 1968, the five-member Ba’athist Revolutionary Ruling Command Council (“RCC”) in Baghdad consolidated its power over the state apparatus by purging the military of non-Ba’ath loyalists, and installing Ba’ath party activists as the head of government ministries. The RCC meticulously weaved the Ba’athist party machine into all aspects of government. Party members were given military training and installed in key military positions with orders not to act without party clearance from Ba’ath headquarters. The military ranks and officers were indoctrinated with Ba’athist ideology and parallel Ba’athist leadership bureaus were established for the military, police, and intelligence services. The goal of the RCC was to bring the military under civilian control. This initiative was led by Ahmad Hassan Bakr, the chairman of the RCC and the republic’s President. Bakr closest adviser was a young and ambitious Saddam Hussein. The fivemember RCC was expanded to fifteen members in November 1969, and nine of the ten new members were civilians. The 1970 Constitution stipulated a twothirds majority vote for new members of RCC, which insured a perpetual civilian majority. The RCC maintained control over the air force and elite army units.15 The Ba’ath party also tightened its grip on civil society by using cadres of party members to set up secret cells in organizations such as educational institutions, trade unions, and professional associations. Members of these cells kept _________________________________________________ 15

Hiro, pp. 18-21.

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their party affiliation secret and met regularly to evaluate their group’s behavior based on Ba’athist ideology. They reported their evaluations to party headquarters. Party membership grew from 5,000 in 1968 to 20,000 in 1974. Obtaining party membership was awarded only by graduating through a strict hierarchical progression through the ranks of sympathizer, supporter, candidate, trainee and then working member. A minimum of seven years was required to complete the progression. And then working members were expected to attend regular party meetings and participate in the activities of the Popular Army, as well as adhere to a strict code of personal conduct and behavior at home and at work. The Ba’ath party used this tight network of loyal party cadres to create a dual structure of state and party. This insured the state would always be subservient to the party, which had used its apparatus to penetrate and control the state. The Ba’athist regime became the beneficiary of the massive oil income that began to flow into its coffers in the early 1970s. Oil income increased from $75 million in 1972 to $8 billion in 1975. This wealth was used to enlarge its popular base of domestic support by funding economic and social projects, and paying generous state salaries and wages. The wealth was also used to project the Ba’ath ideology through a revolutionary foreign policy. Following Egypt’s defeat in its 1967 war with Israel, the Ba’athists wanted to replace Egypt as the pan-Arabist standard-bearer after Nasser’s defeat. The regime saw itself “as the guardian defending the Arab homeland and effecting Arab unity.” Iraq’s radical attack on the regional status quo made it a threat to its conservative monarchical neighbors in the Gulf. It viewed the borders dividing modern Arab states as superficial, temporary, and subject to change. In pursuit of its radical ideology, the Ba’athist regime provided financial and political support for numerous Arab national liberation movements in Africa and the Middle East. In the early 1970s the Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf were viewed by the conservative monarchical regimes of the Gulf states with great suspicion. On one hand the Iraqi state was conducting state-to-state diplomacy supporting the Gulf regimes; yet, on the other hand, the Ba’athist party apparatus was supporting revolutionary movements in the Gulf that were trying to undermine the monarchical states in the Gulf. For example, the Iraqi Ba’athists supported South Yemen, which was fomenting revolution throughout the Gulf. The rise of the Ba’athists in Iraq in 1968 followed by the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 created a power vacuum in the region. Iran sought to fill the British role as Gulf protector and guarantor of the incumbent Gulf monarchical regimes. With the assistance of U.S., Iran used its abundant oil wealth to build a modern, well-equipped military force. It turned itself into the unrivaled military power in the region. Iraq’s Ba’athist regime viewed this Iranian agenda with suspicion, seeing it as an attempt at Persian dominance in Arab territory.

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Iraq also viewed Iran as agent of imperial western interests. The Shah exacerbated this view when he stated:”Western Europe, the United States and Japan see the Gulf as an integral part of their security, yet they are not in a position to ensure that security. That is why we are doing it for them.”16 2.5 Iran: The Gulf‘s Policeman In the early 1970s Iran became the Gulf’s policeman, backed by military and technological support from the U.S. Iran demonstrated its strength in Oman, the Gulf, and in its support for Iraq’s Kurds, to Iraq’s dismay. Tensions regarding the Gulf were further heightened by Iran’s military build-up and further aggravated by Iran’s 1971 occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, which had belonged to the UAE emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. The islands were potentially rich in oil resources and strategically located. In addition, these three islands in combination with the Iranian islands of Qeshm, Larak and Hormuz, formed a protective ring at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. The bulk of Gulf oil was shipped through the Straits of Hormuz. Neither the U.S. nor Britain objected to the Iranian occupation of these islands. Iraq reacted by immediately cutting diplomatic ties with Iran and Britain. Iraq viewed Britain’s silence as “collusion between the United Kingdom and Iran to bequeath Iran the colonial role played by Britain ...” Iraq also objected to Iran’s 1973 intervention to suppress the Dhofari rebellion in Oman (see Box 5). Box 5:

Dhofari Rebellion17

Civil war erupted in the Dhofar province of Oman between 1968 and 1975. The insurgents called themselves”the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf” (“PFLOAG”). Support for the rebellion may have come from South Yemen. In 1973 the Shah of Iran provided military support to the Sultan of Oman against the rebels. In early 1974 an Iranian combat brigade was placed in Oman on a permanent basis. Iran continually swapped its officers and soldiers in this unit to ensure its combat-readiness. The latest Western weapons acquired by Iran were tested in Oman. In 1975, the PFLOAG was defeated. British commandos also assisted Oman defeat the rebels. Iran’s military support was critical, while Saudi Arabia provided important financial and diplomatic support to Oman. This was a manifestation of the U.S.’s ”Twin Pillars” strategy in operation. _________________________________________________ 16

Abdulghani, pp. 46, 79, 84; Hiro, p. 21. Henner Furtig, Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars (Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing, 2002) , p. 11

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The rebels in Oman objected to the rule of Sultan Sa’id bin Taimour and espoused Marxist and socialist views that were perceived by some as a potential Communist threat. In 1974, Oman and Iran signed an agreement for joint naval control of the Straits of Hormuz. In a practical and symbolic sense, control over the Straits of Hormuz was control over the commercial life of the Gulf. In the case of Oman, Iran had used its military strength to ensure the status quo. To increase the strength of its foreign policy hand in the region, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union. In April 1972, Iraq signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.18 Iraq’s pact with the Soviet Union alarmed the U.S., which was in the midst of the Cold War. In response, President Richard Nixon strengthened U.S. ties with Iran and agreed to supply it with any non-nuclear weapons it desired. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to cooperate with Iran in supporting the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The Kurds had launched a renewed insurgency against the new Ba’athist regime soon after it assumed power. In March 1969, they attacked the Kirkuk oil refinery which was the engine driving Iraq’s oil industry. The Kurds engaged the Iraqi military for almost one year, taxing Iraqi financial and military resources. In March 1970, facing an internal military plot and a Kurdish insurgency that was costing 30 percent of the country’s annual budget, the Ba’athist regime came to an agreement with Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”). The agreement was to grant the Kurds a degree of autonomy in the northern region where they constituted a majority. The Kurdish language was to be recognized as one of two official languages (Arabic, the other) in the Kurdish region, and the Kurdish nationality one of two Iraqi nationalities. The agreement also called for a Kurd be appointed vice-president of Iraq. The Ba’athist RCC immediately rejected the Kurdish nominee for vice-president. It also refused to grant autonomy to the Kurds in a region that produced three fifths of Iraqi oil revenue. Instead, the Ba’athist regime continued its Arabization plan in the Kirkuk area by resettling Arabs from south Iraq and deporting Shi‘i Kurds to Iran. In response, Barzani increased his Kurdish forces and cultivated relationships with the U.S., Iran, and Israel. In March 1974, seeking to neutralize the Kurdish threat, the Ba’athist regime sought to enforce the 1970 agreement for Kurdish autonomy in its northern region. It nominated a legislative council for Kurdistan in Arbil (or Irbil), the Kurdish capital. However, the Ba’athist regime excluded the oil producing areas of Kirkuk, Sinjar, and Qanaqin from the area. The KDP insisted on postponing the legislative council until a census could determine the exact numbers of Kurds _________________________________________________ 18

Abdulghani, p. 90; Hiro, p. 15.

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in the areas the regime was excluding from their control. The Ba’athists ignored this demand, which triggered a renewed Kurdish rebellion. In 1974, 45,000 Kurdish rebels engaged nearly 100,000 Iraqi troops. Iran’s support was crucial for the Kurds. Iran supplied the Kurds with U.S. and Israeli weapons, and used the military to assist the rebels with anti-aircraft missiles and artillery. Barzani claimed to have liberated 1.5 million Kurds inhabiting 25,000 square miles in northern Iraq, on the Iranian border. In January 1975, the Shah placed two army regiments in the “liberated” areas of northern Iraq in support of the Kurds.19 Iraq’s internal war with the Kurds was draining its human and economic resources. Some estimates indicate Iraq spent as much as $4 billion fighting the Kurds, and the Iraqi army suffered as many as 16,000 casualties in 1974 and 1975.20 Iraq badly needed a compromise with Iran to neutralize its Kurdish resistance. Iran, for its part, understood that the Kurdish resistance could easily spread to Iran, where the Iranian Kurds also harbored secessionist aspirations. Turkey and Algeria began to mediate between Iraq and Iran for an agreement. The Shatt al-Arab became the focus of agreement between Iran and Iraq to end Iranian support of the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The Shatt al-Arab flows through southern Iraq into the Gulf and begins where the Euphrates and Tigris rivers meet. It is a major shipping artery through the region. The growing economic importance of Abadan and Khorramshahr, Iran’s modern ports on the Shatt al-Arab, added weight to Iran’s claims on the Shatt al-Arab.21 The second Treaty of Erzurum in 1847 granted the Ottoman Empire control over the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq viewed itself as the modern successor to the Ottoman Empire with respect to its control of the Shatt al-Arab. Iran was entitled to unrestricted navigation on the Shatt al-Arab, but modern maintenance and control of the waterway was exercised by Iraq. Control over the Shatt al-Arab was considered strategically and culturally vital to Iraq. Iraq has limited coastline, and the Shatt al-Arab represented its connection to the Gulf. In March 1975, in exchange for Iran’s cooperation regarding the Kurds, Iraq conceded to Iran on the issue of the Shatt al-Arab boundary. Iran’s Kurdish support was critical to the KDP. After Iran withdrew its support, the Kurdish rebellion died out. The Algiers Agreement, concluded at a summit of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) in Algiers, established the line of deepest water, or thalweg, as the international boundary on the Shatt al-Arab. The agreement no longer limited Iran to the eastern bank of the waterway and gave it a shared control of traffic through the waterway. The agreement represented a significant achievement for Iran. Iran had argued for a thalweg bound_________________________________________________ 19 20 21

Abdulghani, p.90; Hiro, pp. 14-16. Abdulghani, pp. 154-155. Abdulghani, pp. 106-109 and 154-155; Hiro, p.14 .

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ary on the Shatt al-Arab for decades. Compromising on control of the Shatt alArab was a political defeat for Iraq.22 While Iraq may have suffered a political defeat in making concessions with regard to the Shatt al-Arab boundary, the waterway itself was not as strategically critical as it had been in years past. To be sure, it was still a defining issue in the region with the capacity to ignite tensions on both sides. However, Iraq had reduced its critical dependence on the Shatt al-Arab. It created new ports at Umm Qasr and al-Fao, and established offshore oil terminals in the Gulf. To reduce its dependence on Gulf ports, it created a new road through Turkey and Jordan and built two new pipelines that became operational in the late 1970s. One pipeline ran for 1,000 kilometers through Turkey and ended in Yumurtalik on the Mediterranean. The second pipeline ran through Syria to the port of Baniyas. The Algiers Agreement also awarded Iraq 240 miles of disputed border territory. This potentially limited the ability of both countries to foment ethnic unrest along the common border. The Algiers Agreement was viewed as a pragmatic step forward for relations between Iran and Iraq. The changing military realities contributed to this pragmatism. Following Britain’s 1968 declaration to withdraw from the Gulf, both Iran and Iraq initiated massive military build-ups. Iran – backed by U.S. technology – surely was the greater of the two, but Iraq, with Soviet assistance, also increased its air power, artillery, and armor. This military strength, on both sides, made each nation’s key economic installations vulnerable to attack regardless of how the Shatt al-Arab and the border issues were resolved. The Algiers Agreement brought an end to the arms race, which would reduce the influence of the two superpowers (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) in the Gulf region. The two countries were also interested in strengthening their economic position via OPEC. In the aftermath of the 1975 agreement, Iraq was also able to improve its image with the conservative Arab monarchical regimes, which now viewed the Ba’athist regime as less of a radicalizing agent and more accepting of the status quo in the Gulf. The agreement was also viewed as the beginning of normalized relations between Iran and Iraq.23 Iran’s perception of its historical relations with Iraq was articulated by Iran’s Foreign Minister in December 1965, when he said: “We have more than 1200 kilometers of common frontier with Iraq; evidences of the Iranian culture and civilization are visible all along the Eastern area of the Euphrates; the two nations are Musulmans; the Holy Shrines of our sacred Imams are situated in Iraq; remnants of the Iranian genius in art and workmanship are still standing in Iraq; the Iranians have always been ready from time _________________________________________________ 22 23

Abdulghani, p.152-155; Cordesman, p.19-21; Hiro, p. 17. Abdulghani, pp.152-155, Cordesman, pp.19-21; Hiro, p. 17.

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However, major ideological differences between Iran and Iraq remained. The two countries could not agree on a unified Gulf security system. Iraq still suspected Iran’s military ambitions in the Gulf and its close ties to the U.S. military. There was also some indication that Saddam Hussein, who was a principal negotiator of this agreement for Iraq, viewed the Shatt al-Arab agreement with Iran as a personal humiliation made during a time of weakness.25 During the first half of the 1970s several sources of tension emerged between Iran and Iraq: (1) the rivalry between the two nations for influence and dominance in the Gulf; (2) the pressure to align themselves with a Cold War superpower; (3) territorial rivalries as exemplified by the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab; and (4) Iran’s support of the Kurdish ambitions in northern Iraq. The Algiers Agreement appeared to bring some degree of resolution with respect to the latter two issues. Competition for influence in the Gulf continued, but domestic developments in both Iran and Iraq that began to change the course of Gulf relations as well as relations between Iran and Iraq. These issues will be further examined in the following section. In summary, the historical sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq can be grouped into three broad categories: (a) cultural: Persian versus Arab traditions; (b) religious: the Shi‘i and Sunni split; and (c) territorial: the on-going boundary disputes, as epitomized by the battle for influence in the Gulf and the Shatt alArab dispute. Each of these historical categories is useful for analysis; however, over time, the distinctions collapsed into one another contributing to a general, underlying political hostility between the two states.

3

The Regional Status Quo

Following the Algiers Agreement in 1975, the struggle for regional leadership and dominance in the Gulf became the central issue between Iran and Iraq. How_________________________________________________ 24

Abdulghani, pp. 20-21. Ralph King, Adelphi Papers 219, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 7.

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ever, this struggle was muted, somewhat, by each nation’s new domestic challenges. In March 1975, facing increasing internal opposition, the Shah ended Iran’s two party political system and created the government sponsored Hizb-i Rastakhiz, or Resurgence Party.26 Internal opposition in Iran focused on political repression, the Shah’s denigration of the country’s Islamic moral code and tradition, and socio-economic hardship. Iran’s race for Gulf dominance may have contributed to its social unrest. Urban poverty in Iran multiplied exponentially during the 1970s. And at approximately the same time (between 1975 and 1980), following the Algiers Agreement, Iran imported $15.5 billion in military equipment and weapons. In contrast, during the same period Iraq imported $8.1 billion in arms and equipment. These facts may have established Iran as the preeminent local power in the Gulf, but, paradoxically, it may have weakened the Shah ability to sustain his own rule. Meanwhile, the Algiers agreement had neutralized the Kurdish insurrection by ending critical Iranian support and freeing the Iraqi leadership confront growing Shi‘i unrest. The Shi is had been second class citizens in Iraq dating back to the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Shi‘is were denied public office under the Ottomans and Shi‘i ulama were not permitted to control waqfs (religious endowments). However, the Ottomans permitted the Shi‘i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala – containing the respective shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein – to operate as semi-autonomous regions. This changed in 1968 with the new Ba’ath resurgence in Baghdad. The secular Ba’ath regime shut down a theological college in Najaf, harassed Shi‘i ulama, and permitted the sale of alcohol in the Shi’a holy cities. The Shi‘i clergy resisted and were repressed. In the late 1950s, a secret Shi‘i resistance group called Al Daawa al Islamiya (The Islamic Resistance Call) was formed. The group was supported by Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim, the senior most Shi‘i cleric in Najaf, the main Shi‘i city in southern Iraq. In December 1974, Shi‘i religious processions were transformed into violent anti-Ba’athist demonstrations. The government responded by rounding up 25 Shi‘i leaders and executing five of them. The government also tried to co-opt the Shi‘i majority in southern Iraq by using oil revenues to fund development projects in impoverished areas. However, the Shi‘i grievances were more than socio-economic. The Shi‘i majority was absent from leadership positions in every branch of the government and the military. There were no Shi‘is on the Revolutionary Command Council. However, groups like Al Daawa al Islamiya, were not seeking representation from the Ba’athists. Al Daawa was ideologically opposed to Ba’athist rule. The secret group was formed in response _________________________________________________ 26 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran, Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 440.

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to Ba’athist neglect of Islam and Islamic institutions, and to protest the Ba’athist state alliance with Communism and the Soviet Union. Tension between the Shi’is and the Ba’athist regime grew until it erupted in 1977. In February 1977, the government sealed off Karbala during a Shi‘i ceremony claiming a Syrian agent had been caught attempting to smuggle explosives into Imam Hussein’s shrine. Shi‘i pilgrims from Najaf to Karbala were stopped by the police. Riots and violent protests erupted, and Shi‘i protesters seized a police station in Haidariya. The police opened fire and killed several people. News of the incident triggered riots in Najaf, which lasted several days. Troops were called in, and 2000 Shi’is were arrested, including Hojat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir Hakim, the son of the Ayatollah. This incident was the most direct challenge to Ba’athist rule since it came to power. The country’s leadership had just implemented a 1976-1980 Development Plan and was trying to re-assert itself in the Gulf in the wake of the Algiers Agreement. Saddam Hussein, the Vice-President, responded to the Shi‘i incitement by persecuting Al Daawa mercilessly, and by granting the Shi’a masses increasing economic and political concessions. He co-opted Shi‘i leadership by incorporating them into the Ba’ath leadership, but altered the structure of the ruling councils so that the Shi‘i members only had nominal authority. Shi‘is remained marginalized and real power remained with the Sunni Ba’ath ministers, and more precisely, with those answering to Saddam Hussein. Indeed, Hussein had power and in 1978 could count on rapidly increasing oil wealth, which was a result of the artificially high price of oil created by OPEC’s oil policy which was meant to pressure the West for its support for Israel.27 Saddam Hussein was 31 years old when the Ba’ath party came to power in 1968. He was not a member of the RCC, but he was the closest adviser to the RCC chairman and president of the republic, Ahmed Hassan Bakr. Hussein had been raised by his maternal uncle, Khairallah Talfa, who was a cousin of Bakr. In 1969, Hussein won a place on the RCC. Hussein and Bakr dominated the party leadership by eliminating their enemies. Hussein negotiated the Algiers Agreement as Bakr’s vice-president, but by the mid-1970s he had surpassed Bakr and began to consolidate his power. Hussein needed Bakr in the 1970s because Bakr was a former military officer, and Bakr’s moderate tone and pious personality were respected by the older, conservative elements in Iraq. Hussein’s confrontation with the Shi‘is demonstrated his iron fist in dealing with challenges to state authority and distanced him from Bakr, who wanted a compromise with the Shi is. In July 1979, Hussein claimed to have uncovered a conspiracy against the regime. Hussein identified 68 Ba’athist civilian and mili_________________________________________________ 27

Hiro, pp. 20-29.

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tary leaders who were involved in the conspiracy. Six members of the RCC who were loyal to Hussein formed a tribunal that held a summary trial of the suspected conspirators. 21 of the conspirators were executed in August 1979, including five members of the RCC. Muhyi Abdul Hussein Mashhadi was a Shi‘i member of the RCC who was executed and accused of being one of the masterminds of the plot. Mashhadi had objected to the government’s harsh response to the Shi‘i demonstrations, and also suggested president Bakr’s successor should be selected through a free vote of the RCC. After the August 1979 executions, Hussein purged dissidents in every organized sector of civil society. At the age of 42, Saddam Hussein had tightened his grip on the Ba’athist regime in Iraq.28 In 1978, Iraq benefited from massive new oil wealth brought about by rapid increases in the price of oil. This led Hussein to moderate his position toward the West. Hussein could afford to pursue this strategy because Iraq’s new financial independence allowed him to distance Iraq from the Soviet Union. The new oil reserves demanded materials and technology from the West, and the new wealth created a new demand for consumer good imports. Hussein also initiated limited privatization and economic liberalization. He may have done this to ease his dependence on the Ba’ath party structure by creating a new group of economic elites who were loyal to his rule. At this juncture it appeared that Hussein was beginning to govern on a pragmatic rather than ideological basis. He was substituting his personality for ideology and this may have improved Iraq’s relations with the conservative Arab states and the West.29 Iraq’s discovery of new oil wealth in 1978 was not the only significant change for Iraq. Egypt’s September 1978 peace accord with Israel at Camp David, a mountain resort in Maryland, U.S., changed the dynamics of inter-Arab politics. Peace with Israel in 1978 was largely rejected by the conservative Arab states of the Gulf. Egypt was cast aside as the standard bearer for the Arab world. Iraq was eager to fill this role in place of Egypt. In 1978, Iraq hosted an antiSadat Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad, cementing its anti-Israel credentials and strongly suggesting its new ambition to play the leading role in Arab politics. Iraq even came to terms with Syria for a brief period of reconciliation in October 1978. The broadening anti-Shah movement in Iran during 1978 also allowed Iraq to play a larger role in regional politics, particularly in the Gulf.30

_________________________________________________ 28

Ibid. Gerd Nonneman, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities,” in Iran, Iraq, and The Legacies of War, Eds. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 171. 30 Abdulghani, p.171. 29

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Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution

Ayatollah Khomeini’s emergence in 1978 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran represented a radical ideological and expansionist threat to the Iraqi Ba’ath regime, as well as to the conservative Gulf monarchies. Since the end of World War II, the Gulf monarchies had been coping with the threats of pan-Arabism and Communist ideology. Iran’s militant Islamic regime represented a new kind of threat to the region. Khomeini rejected the concept of modern nationalism. He did not accept the legitimacy of the territorial nation-state, which he saw as an artificial creation that divided the Muslim community, or ‘umma. In fact, Khomeini sought to reunite the entire Muslim community under his banner of Shi‘I Islam: “Its ultimate goal was to launch an ‘ideological crusade’ aimed at bringing the genuine message of Islam to all peoples everywhere. In fact, Khomeini often compared the movement that brought him to power with the advent of Islam, and with its overall message extending to humanity at large.”31 Khomeini was 77 years old when he assumed power in February 1979. He had actively led the anti-Shah campaign for 15 years. Khomeini was born the son of the chief cleric of the town of Khomein, 220 miles southwest of Tehran. At 19, Khomeini became a student of Ayatollah Abdul Karim Hairi-Yazdi in Arak. Khomeini later moved to the holy city of Qom with Hairi-Yazdi. Khomeini completed his Shi’a theological studies in 1925, and two years later published his thesis on ethics and spiritual philosophy. His thesis was written in Arabic, a language he had learned as a child. Khomeini developed a reputation as a teacher who married ethical-spiritual problems with contemporary social issues. In 1941 Khomeini published a book attacking the nationalist dictatorship of Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1945 Khomeini became a Hojat al-Islam (“proof of islam”), which meant he held a rank one level below Ayatollah (“sign of Allah”). Khomeini had become a follower of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Borujerdi in 1936, when his teacher, Hairi-Yazdi, died. In 1961, following Borujerdi’s death, Khomeini’s followers encouraged him to publish his interpretations of the Sharia. His book, Clarifications of the Points of the Sharia, earned him the rank of Ayatollah. In 1963, in a series of public sermons in Qom, Khomeini denounced Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi’s “White Revolution.” In June 1963, Khomeini became a hero to the underclasses when he publicly attacked the Shah’s pro-Western, secular, dictatorial rule. In 1964 Khomeini was exiled to Turkey. From there he went to Najaf in Iraq, and continued to attack the Shah from Najaf until he was expelled by Saddam Hussein, at the Shah’s request, in late 1978. Khomeini and his _________________________________________________ 31 David Menashri, Post Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 173.

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followers used audio-cassette technology to mass distribute Khomeini’s prerecorded messages throughout Iran, despite his exile. Khomeini messages were embraced by the Shi‘i religious masses of Iran. Khomeini called for Muslim people to be ruled by the laws of Islam and governed by the ulama who exercised exclusive authority over religious law. Khomeini’s governing innovation was to create the concept of the velayat-e faqih or the “guardianship of the jurisconsult.”32 For Khomeini, only an Islamic state could protect Muslim interests and provide for the spiritual guidance of man. His vision was of a pan-Islamic region freed from geographic borders. In February 1980, Khomeini gave a speech declaring his intention to export his radical Islamic vision throughout the world. Khomeini’s ideology emerged in response to the corruption of Pahlavi dynasty and the secular rule of the Shah. Khomeini explicitly attacked the conception of a society ruled by a hereditary monarchy. Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology was a direct threat to the rulers of all the monarchical states in the Gulf. The Gulf’s proximity to Iran made it the closest target for Khomeini to begin to export his revolution. Furthermore, Khomeini’s ideology was Shi‘i, which might be expected to appeal to the large Shi‘i groups ruled by Sunni regimes throughout the Gulf.33 Khomeini’s regional revolutionary agenda became apparent in 1979 when he began sending religious emissaries to Gulf states to propagate his teachings. Khomeini’s son-in-law was expelled from Kuwait for politicizing his religious sermons and attacking the local political leadership. Another Khomeini emissary was expelled from Bahrain. Khomeini’s teachings and sermons began circulating throughout the Gulf on audio-cassettes. The Iranian Broadcasting Service, broadcasting to the Gulf in Arabic, encouraged the local populations to overthrow their “anti-Islamic” regimes. Iranian President Bani-Sadr attacked Gulf regimes and promised support to Islamic movements that would destroy them. Iran supported the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the Islamic Revolution Organization of the Arabian Peninsula. In December 1981, Bahraini security services stopped an Iranian backed coup attempt. The plot was conducted by agents from the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and trained in Iran and coordinated with Iranian officials. The new Iranian destabilizing influence in the Gulf created a renewed sense of Arab solidarity, which brought the Gulf closer to Iraq’s Ba’athist ideology.34 Khomeini’s politicization of Islam in Iran was in direct ideological conflict with Iraq’s secular Ba’ath regime. Ba’athists viewed Islam as part of their greater _________________________________________________ 32 33 34

King, p.8. Abdulghani, pp. 179-180; Hiro, pp. 33-34; King, p. 8. Abdulghani, pp. 196-200.

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Arab cultural heritage. Further, they viewed Khomeini’s radical ideology as a fanatical Shi‘i strain of Islam, at odds with the true beliefs of the religion. On a pragmatic level, Iraqi Ba’athist ideology relied on Arab nationalism to unite a diverse Iraqi population threatened by sectarian, ethnic, and religious divisions. The Ba’athist principles appealed to a greater Arab nation, which could unite Shi‘i and Kurdish majorities behind a ruling Sunni minority. In 1979, soon after Khomeini’s rise to power, a verbal war erupted between Iran and Iraq encapsulating the ideological clash between the two neighbors. Khomeini was interested in fomenting unrest in Iraq to consolidate his power at home and to assert his claim on the Shi‘i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Khomeini also had a personal score to settle with Iraqi Ba’athist leadership: in 1978 they expelled him from Iraq (at the Shah’s request) after having lived in exile there for fourteen years. Khomeini’s new Islamic revolutionary agenda threatened Iraq’s increasing influence in the region as the dominant Arab player in the region.35 A renewed competition for supremacy in the Gulf between Iran and Iraq reemerged following Khomeini’s rise to power. Iran sought to export its brand of revolutionary Islam to its Islamic neighbors, whereas Iraq was eager to play a leading role in guaranteeing the security status quo of its fellow Arab neighbors against the Iran’s new religious hegemony. Each side accused the other of expansionist ambitions. The ideological differences between Iran and Iraq escalated very quickly into a war of words and then a full-scale war. In March 1979, Iran declared it would not withdraw from the UAE islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs occupied under the Shah. In July 1979, Iraq threatened to “cut off the criminal hands” that challenged Arab sovereignty or threatened territorial integrity. Iran re-initiated its support for Iraqi Kurds and began supporting Iraq’s underground Shi‘i movements. On 1 April 1980, the Iranian backed al-Daawa party attempted to assassinate Iraq’s Deputy Premier, Tariq ‘Aziz. Soon after, Iran’s Foreign Minister made several statements calling for the destruction of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime. On 17 April 1980, the Iranian Foreign Minister send a statement to Arab governments calling for “the destruction of the Ba’athist Iraqi regime, (which is) another puppet of the world-devouring imperialism.” Also on 17 April 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini stated, “Iran will break Iraq and advance to Baghdad.” Khomeini also encouraged the Iraqi army and people to rebel against their government, stating, “The people and army of Iraq must turn their back on the Ba’ath regime and overthrow it ... because this regime that is attacking Iran ... is _________________________________________________ 35

King, p. 9.

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attacking the Koran and Islam ...” Khomeini’s rhetoric designed to incite Iraq’s Shi‘is to rebel against its own government was a miscalculation. Khomeini appears to have overestimated the Shi‘is’ loyalty to their co-religionists in Iran, and overlooked the level of penetration the Iraqi power structure had achieved in Iraqi society. The Ba’ath party’s influence extended into every major institution and organization in Iraq. In April 1980, Saddam Hussein, trying to prevent the emergence of another home-grown Khomeini and neutralize internal Shi’a resistance, had the revered Iraqi Shi‘i Ayatollah, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr put to death.36 Isolated terrorist violence between Iran and Iraq quickly re-ignited border conflict. Between June and September 1980, border clashes between Iran and Iraq increased in frequency and intensity. Iraq claimed there had been 193 border violations during this period. On 4 September 1980, Iraq claimed Iran used heavy artillery to shell the Iraqi border towns of Khanaqin, Mandali, and Zarbatiyah. Iraq also claimed Iran shelled its oil installations at Naft Khanah. These attacks triggered Iraqi responses that moved the two sides closer to war. On 17 September 1980, Saddam Hussein stated Iranians had violated the terms of the Algiers Agreement and Iraq would no longer abide by its terms. Hussein declared the control over the entire Shatt al-Arab would revert to Iraq. Severe border clashes followed this declaration, and on 19 September 1980 Iran announced that it had lost two fighter planes in clashes with Iraq along the Shatt alArab. The Iranian military reserves were activated and heavy fighting was reported along the Shatt al-Arab. On 21 September 1980, the Iraqis shelled the Iranian port of Khorramshahr, and Iranian planes attacked Basra. By 22 September 1980, Iraq had launched a full air invasion into Iran, striking at key strategic military locations. In September 1980, Iran’s leadership was still trying to consolidate its domestic power. Iraq, facing a disorganized and unprepared Iran that was directly attacking its stability, might have believed its best opportunity to both preserve itself and play a leading security role in the region was at hand. Thus, the war begun.37 The 1975 Algiers Agreement had ushered in a regional status quo between Iran and Iraq that Gulf states were comfortable with. Iraq’s image underwent a transformation as the region’s conservative regimes became comfortable with the post-Algiers Agreement status quo. In 1968, the Ba’athist regime was perceived by conservative Gulf monarchies as a radical regime capable of undermining regional stability in the Gulf by fomenting pan-Arabist resistance to traditional monarchical rule. By 1978, Egypt’s Camp David betrayal, the Algiers Agree_________________________________________________ 36 37

Abdulghani, pp. 184-189. Abdulghani, pp. 202-205; King, p.10.

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ment, and Khomeini’s rise to power all worked to transform Iraq’s image in the Gulf from a potential threat to a defender of Arab strategic interests. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 created a new set of concerns for the Gulf states and forced them to assess their regional security and political stability in the midst of a bitter regional power struggle.

5

The War

The Iran-Iraq War was fought for nearly nine years. Inexact estimates show a low figure of 450,000 Iranians killed and 600,000 wounded; and 150,000 Iraqis killed and 400,000 wounded. It was a long and bloody war. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 expecting an easy victory and a quick war. As mentioned above, Iraq’s perceived its attack to be a preemptive strike at a new Iranian regime which was openly hostile, but disorganized and vulnerable. Iraq hoped to take advantage of the internal strife in Iran by destroying the Islamic Republic and asserting its regional authority. Its hopes were dashed by developments on the battlefield. After early limited successes, using air strikes as a precursor to a massive ground invasion that occupied a large area of Iranian territory, Iraq found itself fighting a prolonged and plodding war. Iraq’s initial objective to gain control of both banks of the Shatt al-Arab waterway was unsuccessful. Internal strife and a collapse of Iran’s military command and political structure never materialized. A month into the war, the two armies were bogged down in a struggle that would test both ruling regimes. During the second year of the war, Iran managed to push Iraq out of Iran, neutralizing Iraq’s early success in the war. By mid-1981 Khomeini began to effectively consolidate control of the government and military. Bani-Sadr was removed as commander-in-chief and exiled from the country. Khomeini then appointed his own military leadership, which allowed Iran to mobilize hundreds of thousands of Revolutionary Guards. A few months later, Iran launched the first of four large ground offensives that would continue into the spring of 1982. Large numbers of casualties were taken on both sides, however, Iran managed to push Iraq out of Iranian territory. Iran employed huge amounts of manpower in these offensives, including its Basij, who were largely untrained religious volunteers. The Pasdaran and the Basij would flood the war zone with people, attacking “as waves of combatants”, with little regard for proper military tactics or

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their own safety. By the end of May 1982, Iran took back nearly 5,500 square kilometers of territory and inflicted large casualties on Iraq.38 Beginning in July 1982, during Ramadan, Iran went on the offensive attempting to capture Basra and conquer Iraq. Up until the end of August, Iran unsuccessfully tried to gain ground in Iraq. Iran suffered huge numbers of casualties during these attacks and benefited minimally, if at all. The Iraqi Army had dug in along its borders taking a strong defensive position. Iran appeared to be ready to fight a long war of attrition on the ground and was counting on its superior economic resources to help it outlast Iraq. The Iraqis developed a long-term strategy to attack Iran’s economic resources by targeting its oil exports in the Gulf. Iran’s offensives continued through 1983 and did not accomplish much. By 1984, both sides were beginning to feel the manpower and financial pressure from the fighting.39 In 1985, Iran continued to put its faith alternatively in offensive thrusts on the land front and in build-ups to suggest that such attacks were forthcoming. Iraq maintained a stubbornly defensive position that left it incapable of seizing opportunities for counter-offensives on the ground. Instead Iraq initiated large scale air-strikes against Iranian cities. Little changed during this phase of the fighting. The fighting continued on a large scale, involving thousands of men and large numbers of casualties, but little strategic ground was gained. Each side’s goals remained the same: Iran sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and Iraq tried to force a peace. Iran renewed its offensives in southern Iraq during 1986. The main objectives were to capture the Fao Peninsula and block Iraqi access to the Gulf, attack and capture Basra from the north, disrupt Iraqi oil production in the south, block Iraqi access to Kuwait, and support a Shi‘i uprising in southern Iraq. Iran was able to capture portions of the Fao Peninsula in February and March of 1986, but both sides suffered very high casualties. Iraq employed chemical weapons during these attacks. Iraq used such weapons (including: nerve agents, cyanide agents, and mustard gas) against Iran throughout the war with mixed success. As one military analyst notes, “while up to 8,500 Iranians were affected by gas during the Wal-Fajr 8 and 9 offensives, only 700 seem to have been killed or seriously wounded – an uncertain return in casualties for the size of the Iraqi effort and worldwide criticism of Iraq’s use of poison gas.”40 At the end of December 1986, _________________________________________________ 38

Foreign Report, 14 January 1982; Kayhan International, 30 March 1982 Kayhan, 29 November 1982; Radio Baghdad, 1 October 1982 – Daily Report, 14 October 1982; Radio Baghdad, 26 March 1982 – Daily Report 29 March 1982. Washington Post, 8 April 1982. 39 Radio Tehran, 13 July 1982 – Daily Report, 13 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 27 February 1982 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 29 February 1984. 40 Cordesman, p. 224

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and early 1987, Iran launched a series of failed offensives to capture Basra. Iran suffered tens of thousands of casualties in these poorly planned attacks. By early February 1987, Iran had as many as 17,000 dead soldiers and Iraq 6,000. Between December 1986 and April 1987 Iran may have had as many as 50,000 soldiers killed. These were the last serious ground offensives by Iran, who was experiencing political fatigue regarding the nature and strain of its military strategy. In 1987, the war was internationalized by the tanker war evolving in the Gulf. The war of attrition continued on the ground, and civilian populations were increasingly hit. Iranian ground forces remained entrenched east of Basra and continued guerrilla operations with Kurdish support in northern Iraq. The Iraqi air force increased its attacks in Iran and the lower Gulf. Iran retaliated by targeting Kuwaiti oil exports. Kuwait received superpower protection for its oil exports, which initiated a major U.S. naval operation. Iran and the U.S. were increasingly moving toward a confrontation. The UN peace initiative was being pushed back and forth, with the U.S. advocating for an arms embargo of Iran, and the U.S.S.R. resisting because it was seeking to develop ties with Iran. Iran used the UN peace process to both seek additional concessions and delay international action. Finally, the fighting continued on the borders and showed no signs of producing a decisive outcome. 41 In the spring of 1988, Iraq launched a series of land offensives that changed the course of the war. Iraq re-conquered the Fao Peninsula at the mouth of the Gulf, by mid-April 1988. In late May, Iraq needed only one day to re-conquer Salamoheh east of Basra. Iran had needed 50,000 soldiers killed to seize that territory in 1987. Iraq also won a series of small battles in Kurdish territory, driving back the combined Iranian-Kurdish forces from positions they had held for almost two years. Iran was facing increasing domestic pressure regarding its losses. On 13 June 1988, Iran launched an attack against Iraq near Salamoheh. Iran experienced some initial success, but was driven back and experienced heavy casualties again. At the end of June, Iraq launched an offensive at Majnoon quickly defeating Iranian forces and driving into Iranian territory. Iran again suffered thousands of casualties. Finally, on 12 July 1988, Iraqi forces attacked and captured the oil fields in the Zubaidat border area of Iran. Iranian forces put-up little resistance. On 20 July 1988, Khomeini accepted a cease-fire,

_________________________________________________ 41

Radio Tehran, 8 June 1987 – Daily Report, 3 July 1987; Radio Tehran, 15 October – Daily Report, 15 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 20 November 1987 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 23 November 1987; Radio Tehran, 11 December 1987 – Daily Report, 11 November 1987; The Economist, 16 January 1988.

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and on 8 August 1988, the UN announced a cease-fire would go into effect on 20 August 1988. 42 There appears to have been no clear winner or loser to this war. Iraq clearly had the upper hand on the battlefield, but Iran may have skillfully stopped a deteriorating military and economic situation from getting worse by accepting the cease-fire. Khomeini claimed success, “We have not been defeated or conquered in any field. Even in the war, the victory went to our nation. The enemies have achieved nothing.”43

6

Regional Impact of the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War broke out amid a series of troublesome developments in the region. The relatively weak Gulf states began to reassess their security interests in response to these shifting regional threats. There were four primary factors that mobilized the Gulf regimes to protect their interests: (1) the Islamic revolution in Iran, and fear of it spreading to their lands; (2) the 1979 Soviet invasion of Aghanistan; (3) the threat of unilateral American military action in the Gulf region in response to the Soviet threat; and (4) the escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict into war, and accompanying fear regarding its collateral effect.44 After the British withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, the Shah had positioned Iran as the regional policeman in the Gulf. In 1979, Khomeini’s revolution reversed Iran’s role in the eyes of its Gulf neighbors. Iran’s role was transformed from that of aspiring regional power enforcing the status quo to a radical regime seeking to undermine domestic stability throughout the region. Saudi Arabia, seeing the new security challenge, sought to take the lead in re-establishing Gulf security.45 Khomeini’s revolution awakened powerful historical forces in the Gulf states, which have large Shi‘i minority populations. These Shi‘is are often treated _________________________________________________ 42

Radio Tehran 1 July 1988 – Daily Report, 6 July 1988; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 17, 18, April 1988 – Daily Report, 18 April 1988; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 24 April 1988 – Daily Report 25 April 1988; al-Tadamun, 30 April 1988; Islamic Revolution News Agency (IRNA), 17,18 April 1988 – Daily Report 18, 19, April 1988; Radio Baghdad Voice of the Masses, 25, 26 June 1988; Radio Tehran, IRNA, 25 June 1988 – Daily Report, 27 June 1988; Radio Baghdad, 13, 15, July 1988, Radio Tehran, 13 July 1988, Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 16 July 1988 – Daily Report 14, 15, 18 July 1988. 43 Cordesman, p. 395-403; Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), Eds. Ayi Ayalon, Daniel Dishon, Haim Shaked, Colin Legum, Itamar Rabinovich ,Vol. VI-XII. 44 Ramazani, p. 126. 45 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia, The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 352-360.

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like second-class citizens by the Sunni ruling elites in the Gulf states. They do not have the same rights, privileges, or opportunities as Sunnis. In Saudi Arabia, where puritanical Wahhabi norms are endorsed by the state, Shi’is are particularly discriminated against. The ideological enmity between Sunnis and Shi’is, regarding each side’s claims to the Muslim Caliphate, is centuries old. Khomeini’s revolution mobilized these ideological and historical divisions and gave them a political-revolutionary dimension. The revolution in Iran resuscitated Shi‘i pride and identity and inspired Islamic radicals.46 In November 1979, Saudi Arabia suffered a radical Sunni attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, as well as Shi‘i unrest near its oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia. These events were led by radical Islamists inspired by Khomeini’s success in Iran. These events undermined Saudi Arabia’s ability to project itself as a regional security force. Instead, the events conveyed a sense of Saudi instability to its smaller neighbors, and ended the Saudi aspiration to fill the regional security role played by the Shah in the 1970s. In December 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which further galvanized radical Sunni Islamic elements in the Gulf. The Sunni Islamists viewed the Soviet invasion as an infidel attack on Muslim land. The Gulf regimes were powerless to do anything to stop the Soviet aggression. These events compounded Gulf sensitivity to the Iran-Iraq conflict and placed the monarchical regimes in an awkward, even paradoxical, position. The Gulf monarchies were now dependent on the U.S., and other Western powers, to guarantee their security against a potential Iranian threat; but such a dependence created the perception among radical Islamic elements in the region that these regimes were merely corrupt “puppets,” serving as proxies for imperial Western powers who also supported Israel.47 The Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)can be viewed, in part, as a reaction to the end of U.S.’s “Twin Pillars” policy (See also the discussion in Part 3) and a discomfort with the new Carter Doctrine. A U.S. official, James Noyes, articulated the basic premise of Twin Pillars policy during a Congressional meeting in 1973: “In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, we are willing to assist the Gulf states but we look to them to bear the main responsibility for their own defense and to cooperate among themselves to insure regional stability. We especially look to

_________________________________________________ 46

‘Abd Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.66 King, p. 32; Michael Sterner, “The Gulf Cooperation Council and Persian Gulf Security”, in Gulf Security and The Iran-Iraq War, Ed. Thomas Naff (Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University Press and The Middle East Research Institute, 1985), p.15. 47

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the leading states of the area, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to cooperate for this purpose.”48

There was not always cooperation between the “Twin Pillars.” Rather than cooperating on the basis of common interests, Iran and Saudi Arabia were competing for regional supremacy. However, as Henner Furtig has written: “Despite these graphic examples of different Iranian and Saudi Arabian ambitions and policies, their partnership within the ‘twin pillar’ policy still worked better than predicted by many experts. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran went so far in their oil policy as to harm the other irreversibly. Both monarchs knew very well that they had no alternative but to reach a certain level of understanding in order to protect their capacity for oil production and their export markets. They shared the opinion that open confrontation would only strengthen third parties, be they leftist radical forces in the region or their alleged Eastern bloc supporters. As a result, during the 1970s common interests prevailed.”49

The Twin Pillars concept ended in 1979 with Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The smaller Gulf states were challenged by new destabilizing factors into the region. In addition to handling internal subversion from Iran’s Islamic revolution, Iraqi regional ambitions in the Gulf, and battling leftist radicalism incubating in South Yemen, the Gulf states also had to deflect pressure from an encroaching superpower struggle. The new U.S. policy was designed to aggressively combat Soviet expansionism. The Carter Doctrine (see Box 6) reversed the Nixon Doctrine and promised U.S. direct military intervention in the Gulf if U.S. interests were threatened. The Gulf states were not eager to be dependent on the U.S., or other Western powers, for their state security. In 1979-80, when the idea for the GCC was still in its infancy, the oil-rich Gulf monarchies were still embittered by hardball American diplomacy that was conducted in the mid-1970s regarding the oil embargo. Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford, in 1975 speeches before the UN, had hinted at linking oil prices to food prices, which the Gulf states viewed as American intimidation. And following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf states were troubled by the “Carter Doctrine,” which used the threat of unilateral military intervention in the region to deter Soviet ambitions beyond Afghanistan. The Gulf states were concerned their backyard would be_________________________________________________ 48

Henner Furtig, Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars (Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing, 2002), p. 6. Furtig, p. 10.

49

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come, as Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia stated, “an arena for rivalry among foreign powers.”50 Box 6:

Carter Doctrine

Khomeini’s revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 prompted U.S. President Jimmy Carter to re-evaluate the U.S. foreign policy. The new policy reversed the approach of the Nixon Doctrine, which used regional allies, rather than direct U.S. military force, to project U.S. power. President Carter clarified the new situation in his State of the Union Address of 23 January 1980. Referring specifically to the Soviet invasion, Carter declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.“

During the crisis period leading to the Shah’s downfall in Iran, the Gulf states looked for ways to come together on a joint defense structure. However, there were misgivings regarding Iraq’s participation, due to Iraq’s regional ambitions as well as the fear of creating the impression that the Gulf states were ganging up against Iran. In June 1979, the Saudis held military maneuvers at Khamis Mushayt, near the North Yemeni border, to which all the small Gulf states were invited. The location was far from the Gulf, near the Red Sea, and was used as an excuse to exclude Iraq. The military exercises offered the Gulf states an opportunity to have an informal summit to discuss the issues they were confronting and the possibility of a common defense structure.51 Against this backdrop of events, the Gulf states created the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Spring of 1981. The Iran-Iraq War created an immediate impetus and added the urgency necessary to encourage this development; but also removed the two large regional powers from the equation, which had been the historical obstacle to regional cooperation in the past. The GCC was originally formed to address economic and social planning, but regional security coordination quickly became its most significant function. A group of bilateral agreements were made in 1982 to facilitate intelligence sharing between the Gulf states in response to terrorist activity, such as the attempted coup in Bahrain. These agreements also provided assistance for frontier control, and criminal extradition. The uniform foreign policy strategy adopted by _________________________________________________ 50 51

Ramazani, pp. 123-124. Safran, p. 355.

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the GCC was based on the principal of survival by pursuing neutrality and active mediation in regional conflicts. However, as former U.S. Ambassador to the UAE Michael Sterner notes, “They are thrown back on their traditional policy of trying to stay on friendly terms with everybody and hoping somehow this policy will see them through even these more difficult times.” Sterner also adds, however, that the Gulf leaders are”tough-minded realists” and suffer no illusions regarding the relative strength that this regional framework for cooperation can provide.52 The Gulf states lack the capacity to protect themselves from external threats. They generally have small populations inhabiting coastal communities where oil assets, shipping, and industry are all concentrated. Many of the states have large religious minority groups who may identify with elements of Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology. The nature of the tribal cultures supported by the Rentier economic model has created societies without representative institutions in many of the Gulf states. Add to the mix a large foreign work force legally excluded from state benefits, and there is a varied opportunity for destabilizing political forces. The significance of the GCC regional security framework in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War can be summarized as, (a) intelligence sharing to combat internal threats to member states; (b) a domestically acceptable framework for regular and earnest consultation on diplomatic initiatives regarding external aggression; (c) a venue for strategic economic regional planning; and (d) playing, or appearing to play, the role of regional mediator as a strategy for obtaining immunity from aggression by regional powers. Officially, the GCC adopted a neutral position during the war. However, the position from state-to-state within the Gulf was based on each states’s demography, economy, geography, and history. Oman is located at the far end of the Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz. Its relative isolation has insulated it from the demands of Arab nationalism. Oman has been able to both cultivate Western support and remain integrated in the Arab world. It was eager for Western military support to counter threats posed by radical leftist forces from South Yemen. Its geographical position on the Straits of Hormuz also demanded it to keep a watchful eye on Iran, who sought to dominate Gulf traffic. Kuwait, however, is defined by its proximity to Iraq. It adopted an Arab nationalist posture and a nonaligned foreign policy. Its large Shi’a population presented problems with respect to support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. The UAE emirates maintained separate interests that dictated a neutral position during the war. Dubai has enjoyed close commercial ties with Iran and has a large Iranian population. Sharjah _________________________________________________ 52 Joseph Kostiner, “The Gulf States Under the Shadow of the Iran-Iraq War”, Conflict Vol. 6, No. 4, 1985, p. 376; Sterner, pp.16-19.

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and Umm al-Qaiwan reap large revenues and income from the Mubarak oil field on Abu Musa island, which they jointly managed with Iran. Bahrain and Qatar also had significant commercial relationships with Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was very sensitive to the threat of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia’s oil fields were vulnerable to attack and are located in areas of the Kingdom predominately populated by Shi’is. Saudi Arabia’s military capability was unproven and largely incapable of mobilizing the massive military technology at its disposal. In addition, internal politics demand sensitivity in security and foreign policy with respect to its position in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a mutual security pact in February 1979, probably in response to the Islamic revolution. In February 1980, Iraq’s information minister stated, “any attack on any of the Arab Gulf states is a direct aggression against Iraq.” The GCC position on the war represented a compromise between two divergent views. The Saudi-Kuwait view on one hand, and the states of the lower Gulf on the other hand. The Saudi-Kuwait position supported Iraq and criticized Iran openly and forcefully. The lower states were divided. And the UAE itself was divided into two positions: Dubai, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwan were neutral. Abu Dhabi and Ras al-Khaimah were more pro-Iraqi. However, the UAE was effectively neutral. Bahrain’s position was somewhat closer to the SaudiKuwait position. Each of these positions represented a pragmatic way to navigate a path through the regional hostilities that existed during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian led Islamic radicalism, and leftist ideology spreading from Yemen, posed real threats to the small, resource rich states who were looking to maintain peace and stability in order to continue to prosper from oil and trade.53 The GCC adeptly navigated this delicate balance between Iran and Iraq throughout the war. In addition to the $30-$50 billion in financial assistance provided by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, they also sold Iraq’s oil on its behalf. Kuwait allowed its port facilities to be used for Iraqi supplies, and Saudi Arabia assisted Iraq avoid the Gulf with a connecting pipeline from Iraq through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also lobbied the U.S. on behalf of Iraq. The GCC also managed to keep channels of communication open with Iran. In 1985, Iranian foreign ministers met with representatives from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. From 1979-1981, during the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis, the UAE ignored U.S. sanctions and shipped American goods to Iran. In 1988, UAE President Zayid ibn Sultan Al-Nuhayyan stated, “The UAE enjoys close ties with Islamic Iran.” Even Saudi Arabia ostensibly turned a blind eye toward assisting Iran. In 1985 and 1986 it was Saudi arms dealer Adnan _________________________________________________ 53

Nonneman, pp. 167-173.

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Kashoggi who brokered the scandalous arms deal between the U.S. and Iran, which became known as the “Iran-Contra” affair.54 The GCC framework was implemented in various areas throughout the IranIraq War. The GCC backed Iraq as the lesser of two evils, but did not permit Iraq to use Gulf territory to stage military operations during the war. The GCC worked to balance the demands and involvement with superpowers. The GCC avoided provoking the Soviet Union and limited the U.S. military presence in their territory. The GCC also worked to subdue destabilizing forces active in the southern Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen, Kuwait, and the UAE developed a framework for cooperation, which allowed the GCC to assist the South Yemeni ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad move South Yemen in the direction of reconciling with neighboring Oman. The GCC also worked toward mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well, but to little effect.55 The Iran-Iraq War placed the Gulf states in a delicate position. Fearful of an Iranian victory, individual Gulf states essentially pursued a policy of defense by proxy during the Iran-Iraq War. By providing Iraq with financial support these states hoped to use Iraq’s war effort as a means to contain Iran’s regional revolutionary ambitions. However, this de facto policy came with a price: there was a Iranian backed coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981; terrorist bombings in Kuwait in 1983, 1985, and 1986; and an assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait in 1985. There were also Iranian military attacks on Kuwait, as well as attacks on Gulf oil tankers by both Iran and Iraq. 6.1 The Tanker War In 1983, Iraq made a strategic decision to broaden the scope of the war by attacking shipping and oil tanker traffic moving in and out of Iran and the Gulf. Iraq realized it could not rally international support for a peace agreement unless the war had a regional dimension. It wanted to actively draw in the southern Gulfstates as well as Western oil dependent countries. Iraq also realized Iran was having difficulty importing arms and food. Iraq thought attacking key Iranian economic sites would cause Iran to overreact in response and perhaps threaten its Gulf neighbors. Iraq also knew it would be able to initiate this kind of tactic with limited, or token, resistance from Western powers. The U.S. supported Iraq’s tactic because it was concerned an Iranian victory in the war would have a big impact on the _________________________________________________ 54

Barry Rubin, “The Gulf-States and the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Iran-Iraq War, Impact and Implications, Ed. Ephraim Karsh (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1989), p.127. 55 Kostiner, p. 377.

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stability of the Gulf states. The U.S. was less concerned about the impact of Iraq’s new strategy on the oil market. In the early 1980s oil was relatively cheap and supply exceeded demand. The U.S. also felt it could strategically cope with any Iranian attempt to close the Gulf or halt oil exports in response to Iraqi attacks. The U.S.S.R. also supported Iraq, having been rebuffed by the Islamic regime in Iran. And France had a strong financial interest in Iraq’s success: the French advanced Iraq nearly $7 billion of more than $10 billion in military and commercial sales from 1980 to 1984. Iraq began intensively implementing its new strategy in February 1984. Iraqi aircraft attacked Iran’s main oil terminal at Kharg Island, striking ships seven times between 25 February and 1 March. At the end of March, Iraq hit Turkish, Indian, and Greek ships near Kharg Island. Iran responded. Since Iraqi oil exports through the Gulf had been shut down, Iran’s response was directed against the Gulf states. On 7 May, Iran’s fighter aircraft hit a Saudi tanker. On 13 and 14 May, Iran attacked Kuwaiti tankers near Bahrain. On 16 May, a ship was attacking in Saudi waters near Jubail. The GCC failed to cope with these direct threats to commercial shipping through the Gulf, a shortcoming that came with potentially disastrous economic consequences for the region. In May through July 1984, the Saudis postponed turning the Iran-Iraq War into an international conflict by using its military to successfully thwart Iranian aggression. Responding to Iranian attacks on oil tankers in its territorial waters, Saudi Arabia was quick to shoot down an Iranian fighter jet on 5 June. This display of Saudi self-defense appear deterred Iran for the time being and delayed U.S. involvement in the war for at least two years, postponing international involvement in the war. In this particular case, U.S. involvement was avoided, but the GCC had no policy solution that could mitigate a threat to shipping concerns in the region.56 In mid-June 1984, a Kuwaiti tanker was hit near Qatar. This was Iran’s first attack in the southern portion of the Gulf, and it raised international concern. From the end of June until the end of July, Iraq launched a series of attacks on oil shipped to and from Iranian facilities in the Gulf. However, these attacks were having a limited effect. Iraq’s air force did not have the capability to launch massive or sustained attacks on Iran’s key facilities. The damage the Iraqi attacks produced was not causing serious economic harm to Iran. Therefore, the strategic and political impact of Iraq’s attacks throughout 1984 was limited. In 1985, the “War of the Tankers” began to escalate. Beginning in midAugust 1985 Iraq escalated its attacks against Iran’s main oil facility at Kharg Island. 90 percent of Iranian oil exports were exported from the facility at Kharg _________________________________________________ 56

Cordesman, p.195; Kostiner, pp. 380-2; Nonneman, p. 178.

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Island. Iraqi launched four large-scale attacks on Kharg Island between midAugust and mid-September 1985. Iran responded by using its Navy against shipping through the Gulf. More than 130 ships were attacked by both sides through September 1985. Iran threatened to attack ships going into southern Gulf ports. On 19 September 1985 an Iraqi raid on Kharg Island temporarily cut Iranian oil exports by 50 percent and led to Iranian President Khamene’i’s threats to close the Straits of Hormuz. Iraqi strikes continued, and, by the end of 1985, Iraq had attacked Kharg Island nearly 60 times. The total effect of these battles in the Gulf region was still relatively small. Iraqi air strikes were still not meaningfully damaging Iran’s oil exports. Iran had not actively targeted neighboring Gulf states’ shipping and was not yet openly putting military pressure on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, who continued to support Iraq financially. Iran did, however, succeed at sending messages to its Gulf neighbors. In December 1985, Iranian-backed terrorists launched a series of carbombings in Kuwait, including one directed at the U.S. Embassy. It also increased its harassment of shipping through the southern Gulf. And perhaps most seriously, in May 1985, the pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for attempted assassination on the Kuwaiti Amir, Jaber Al-Ahmad.57 The Tanker War continued throughout 1986 with little change. The number of Iraqi raids on Kharg Island increased dramatically, as did its attacks on the Iranian tanker shuttle between Kharg Island and Sirri Island in the southern Gulf. These attacks began to have an economic impact on Iran. Iran in turn increased its attacks on Gulf shipping, although the cumulative impact of these attacks was minimal. Tankers found they were generally safe from Iranian harassment if they used routes near Dubai and west of Qatar, during the night. 6.2 GCC and Kuwait In early 1987, Iran aggressively increased the frequency and severity of its attacks on Gulf shipping. It launched sixteen attacks in January and February, mostly striking at night. It began using missile attacks, which were capable of sinking ships, not simply damaging them. In March, an Iranian attack struck the Sedera igniting the ship on fire and killing seven crew members. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased their presence in the Gulf, in response to Iran’s new aggression. The U.S. viewed Iran’s new attacks as a sign it would begin targeting shipping that could affect Western oil supplies. 17 percent of the West’s oil passed through the Straits of Hormuz. The West was particularly _________________________________________________ 57

Assiri, p. 72.

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concerned over the fate of Kuwait, which in January 1987 requested U.S. protection, or “reflagging,” of its ships. Kuwait’s decision to seek international assistance was a GCC breakdown. At the seventh GCC summit conference in November 1986, Kuwait had demanded defense assistance from its fellow members. It requested that, (a) GCC forces should be positioned on Bubiyan Island, opposite the Iranian occupied Fao Peninsula; (b) Kuwaiti oil shipping should be protected through the Gulf, and (c) Kuwait should be included in the aircraft surveillance zones so that it could receive early warning of an Iranian attack. The GCC members rejected the Kuwaiti demands for assistance. It remained set on a course of neutrality. The collective notion was that the GCC should maintain contact with Iran to provide itself with long-term insurance depending on the outcome of the war. Additionally, Oman and the UAE were unwilling to jeopardize important commercial ties they had with Iran. Essentially, the independent interests of the GCC member states trumped any sense of a unified GCC defense mechanism. Kuwait had 13 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, which was almost more oil than Iraq and Iran combined. Since mid-September 1986, 15 of the 19 Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping were directed against ships coming to or from Kuwait. However, of the 284 attacks on Gulf shipping since the start of the Tanker War, only seven of the attacked ships had been Kuwaiti flagged. Yet, it is important to note that Kuwait was the only Gulf State that was shipping all of its oil through the Gulf. Saudi Arabia had pipelines that allowed it bypass the Gulf, if necessary. Iran’s naval attacks were creating a potential commercial crisis for Kuwait. Iran was harassing Kuwait to punish it for its support for Iraq. Iraq had been using the Kuwaiti port of Shuaiba to import arms and war material, as well as Kuwaiti air space to send its planes into the Gulf to attack Iranian oil targets. Kuwait also requested reflagging assistance from the Soviet Union and proposed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. split protection of the eleven Kuwaiti tankers. The U.S. was afraid of allowing the Soviet Union a foothold into GCC affairs. On 7 March 1987, the U.S. agreed to protect all of the Kuwaiti tankers.58 However, the reflagging of its tankers did not solve all of Kuwait’s problems. The Iranian revolution had politically penetrated Kuwait’s borders and the Kuwaiti Shi‘i population was openly challenging the state regarding grievances they hadn’t dared to express in the past. The Shi‘i support for Iran reinforced traditionally Sunni views in Kuwait that the Shi‘is were a subversive group who did not care if the Kuwaiti state survived. Kuwaiti mass media aggravated the Shi’a-Sunni divide by playing on popular emotions and historical divisions. The Kuwaiti authorities feared potential Shi‘i domestic uprisings and moved to curb _________________________________________________ 58 The Guardian, 17 May 1987; The Economist 27 June 1987; Radio Tehran 24 July 1987 – Daily Report 27 July 1987; Al-Hawadith, London, 2 June 1987 – Daily Report 20 October 1987.

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public political gatherings. By late November 1987, approximately 27,000 people had been deported for security reasons. Iran exploited Kuwait’s internal unrest by using its network of Arab and Iranian sympathizers in Kuwait to carry out attacks and sow dissent. In May 1987, Kuwait’s new $5 billion dollar AlAhmadi oil refinery was attacked and heavily damaged. In July 1987, a seaside bombing killed dozens of civilians sitting in cafes. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti-U.S. reflagging did not deter Iran. In July 1987, Iran began mining Kuwaiti shipping channels. Interestingly, despite being rejected by the GCC and offered reflagging protection from the U.S., the Kuwaiti authorities embarked on an active public relations campaign in the Arab world to minimize its relationship with the U.S. It portrayed the reflagging maneuver as strictly a commercial deal, and took pains to emphasize that the U.S. would not be allowed to establish bases or use Kuwaiti facilities to support its military forces. In fact, Kuwait’s defense minister, Salem Al-Sabah, said, “we would not allow U.S. bases to be erected in Kuwait no matter what they may be or in any form they may take and there is no way possible that pressure can be exerted on us from outside to erect such facilities.”59 This apparent contradiction, relying on the U.S. for protection but publicly declaiming the relationship, exemplifies the internal tension GCC states experience regarding their relationship with Western powers. The first two Kuwaiti tankers to be reflagged, the Bridgeton and the Gas Prince, sailed under the U.S. convoy protection on 22 July 1987. On 24 July the Bridgeton hit a mine on its shipping route. This blow was covered extensively in the media and was a propaganda victory for Iran. The U.S. was caught unprepared for the contingency of Iranian mines along its shipping routes. The U.S. sought immediate assistance from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but, while these states were willing to provide significant assistance, they were unwilling to agree to the formal basing arrangements the U.S. wanted. As a compromise, Kuwait leased two large barges to be placed in international waters in the Gulf, from which the U.S. could stage military operations in response to the Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain agreed to support these stations. Saudi Arabia also agreed to provide its four minesweepers to support the U.S. fleet in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia paid an immediate price for its support of Kuwait and the U.S. On 31 July 1987 Iranian “pilgrims” on the Hajj ignited a massive riot in Mecca. The Iranians attempted to get to the Grand Mosque in Mecca and met Saudi security forces. The battle between the Iranian rioters and the Saudi security

_________________________________________________ 59

Assiri, p. 107.

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forces left 402 dead and 649 injured, 275 of the dead were Iranian, 85 were Saudi security forces, and 42 were of other nationalities.60 Iran continued to escalate the Tanker war by striking outside the Gulf. In the Gulf of Oman, Iranian Revolutionary Guard boats attacked a Liberian chemical tanker outside the Straits of Hormuz. During late August and September of 1987, Iraq resumed its attacks on key Iranian oil installations and Iran retaliated blow for blow. In the most intense period of the Tanker war, between 23 August and 3 September 1987, twenty ships were attacked. On 3 through 6 September, Iran launched daily missiles at targets in Kuwait. The missiles were not effective, but they demonstrated Iran’s ability to strike across Kuwait. The GCC met to discuss the attacks on 12 September 1987, but little was accomplished. However, the U.S. augmented its naval forces in the Gulf, and was now positioned for a major war. There were eleven ships with nearly 4,500 crew members.61 This, apparently, did not deter Iran. On 20 September, an Iranian speed boat attacked a Saudi tanker in the Gulf. On 21 September, a British tanker was attacked by Iran and set on fire. Also on 21 September, the U.S. attacked and sunk an Iranian ship laying mines in the Gulf. The attack occurred as Khamene’i was at the UN, and was a major embarrassment to Iran, whose ship had been filmed laying mines after Iran had claimed it could not be held responsible for mining the Gulf. The Kuwaiti reflagging was a critical factor in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s continued aggression against Kuwaiti oil tankers (and the U.S., as a proxy) effectively internationalized the war, and tipped the balance of power in Iraq’s favor.62 In summary, during the 1980s, the GCC’s relationship to the West was fraught with contradiction. On one hand, the GCC did not want overt Western involvement in its regional affairs because of internal political pressures a close alliance with the West presented. This internal political pressure was a result of the popular view of America and the West as an imperial military force, in addition to a hegemonic cultural influence. But on the other hand, the GCC states relied on the West for military defense during a crisis and it needed Western technological expertise, to say nothing of the fact that its economies were dependent on the health of Western economies. The relationship with the West was _________________________________________________

Cordesman, pp. 301, 347. Cordesman, pp. 316-317. 62 IRNA, 30 August 1987 – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 1 September 1987; Tehran TV, 23 October 1987 – Daily Report, 26 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 2 October – Daily Report, 5 October 1987; Radio Tehran, 8 September – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 10 September 1987; Radio Tehran, 3 December – Daily Report, 3 December 1987. 60 61

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further complicated by the notion that the West was providing a security assurance for monarchical regimes with few elements of internal reform or liberalization. Nationality in the Gulf states is tightly restricted, there is little popular participation in government, and political opposition is strongly discouraged, if allowed at all. In essence, the West was guaranteeing a political status quo in the region which was antithetical to is own political principles.63 However, the West’s demand for oil played an important role in reaching a compromise regarding domestic politics in the Gulf. The importance of the formation of the GCC was as much symbolic as it was real. It was created as a means for the Gulf monarchies to project a coordinated policy of control over its regional foreign policy. In reality, this control was “something of a fiction”64 because these small Gulf monarchies lack the military firepower, manpower, and infrastructure to deal with a legitimate external threat. However, outside assistance – from the U.S. for example – must, for internal political reasons, be seen as being requested. The GCC provides an effective means to control subversive elements and officially coordinate such external security requests with a regional consensus.

7

The Effect of the War on Iran and Iraq

7.1 Iraq For Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War was Saddam Hussein’s war. The start of the war followed shortly after Saddam’s rise to power in 1979. Saddam made it clear to the Iraqi people that the war with Iran was his war. Saddam successfully convinced his people that he was leading Iraq in a defensive war that he would end if a stubborn Iranian regime stopped threatening Iraq. Saddam was able to use the war to generate mass support for his leadership and to enhance his authority against any potential internal rivals. He also succeeded in identifying the Iraqi regime with his personal leadership as much as Ba’athist ideology.65 Saddam successfully projected the image that he was seeking to end the war. Iraq began calling for ceasefires in September 1980 and by June 1982 it sought nothing more than a return to the pre-war status quo. While this can be attributed to Iraq’s failures on the battlefield, it can also be seen as Saddam’s _________________________________________________ 63

King, p. 40. Ibid, p. 48. 65 Radio Baghdad 14 March 1981 – Daily Report, 16 March 1981; Radio Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, 6 January 1981 – Daily Report, 7 January 1981. Al-Thawra, 24 November 1981 –JPRS, 9 February, 1982. 64

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success in portraying Khomeini and Iran as fanatical. At one point, Saddam even offered to fly to Tehran to make peace. Saddam was even positioning himself – and Iraq – as the reasonable party in the war. Saddam successfully appealed to the Iraqi people and convinced them he was their national symbol, and his survival was inseparable from the survival of the state itself. Saddam also adeptly manipulated public morale by insuring consumer goods remained available during the war; by compensating and providing for the families of the war dead, and by minimizing the costs of the war. Popular opposition to Saddam was never united and somewhat limited due, in part, to an effective state apparatus to combat it. Of course, war is a useful tool for rallying popular support and Saddam was able to exploit it.66 Saddam did face opposition from political rivals at the top. In mid-1982, Hussein’s authority was challenged during a period of battlefield failure. Saddam responded during the 9th Regional Congress of the Ba’ath Party, using the Ba’ath party system to purge opposition elements from the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1983, Saddam also defeated an internal challenge from his halfbrother, Barzan al-Tikriti, who was the head of the internal security forces. Saddam’s powerful personality and the pervasive reach of the Ba’ath party apparatus into all elements of civil society were important factors that enabled Saddam Hussein to unify Iraq’s sectarian population.67 The Shi‘i population in Iraq did not respond to Khomeini’s call to rise up against Iraq’s government. It is unclear exactly why this was, but some suggest by remaining passive during the war, Iraq’s Shi‘is showed themselves to be Arab Iraqis first and Shi‘is asecond. However, it may have been that the Iraqi Shi‘a were successfully co-opted or repressed by the government security apparatus. A combination of government propaganda emphasizing the ethnic divide between Persian Iranians and Arab Iraqis, and generous financial support from Saddam to the Shi‘i communities in Iraq may explain the Shi‘i quiescence during the war. The notion of a specifically Shi‘i Arab (as opposed to a Persian Shi‘i) identity is important. Saddam was governing a diverse Iraqi population that remained unified through a strong Arab identity propagated through Ba’athist ideology and a delicate balance of interests. Khomeini’s propaganda threatened Iraq’s delicate sectarian balance. Throughout the 1970s the Ba’athist had made great efforts to create a common identity in Iraq that would bridge the divisions between Sunni, Shi‘i, Arab, and non-Arab. Khomeini’s aggressive propaganda campaign directed at Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups was countered by Saddam’s persis_________________________________________________ 66

Le Monde, 25-26 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 17 July – BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 19 July 1982; Radio Baghdad, 27 June 1982 – Daily Report, 1 July 1982; INA (Iraqi News Agency), 5 January 1982 – Daily Report, 6 January 1982; Al-Thawra, 1 February 1982. 67 King, pp.11-13.

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tent appeal to his population’s unique Iraqi identity. This may have represented a slight shift away from the Ba’athist pan-Arab ideology.68 Saddam’s Ba’ath party – perhaps for reasons of expediency – was placing greater emphasis on Iraqi identity,“whilst not negating the reality of the wider Arab nation; in Arabist terminology, it represented the watani, or regional, at the expense of the qawmi, or pan-Arab, identity.”69 In fact, in 1982, the 9th Regional Congress of the Ba’ath party concluded that Iraqi nationalism took precedence over pan-Arabism. This dilution of Ba’athist pan-Arab ideology reflected Saddam’s pragmatic flexibility. Not only would a more narrowly defined Arab Iraqi identity help Saddam unify his people against Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, but it was also more palatable to the conservative Arab monarchical regimes in the Gulf who were financially supporting Iraq during the war. The Iran-Iraq War may have provided the impetus for shifting Saddam’s Ba’athist ideology from pan-Arab to Iraqi nationalism, but this concept of an Arab-Iraqi identity was not embraced by the Kurds. The Kurds opposed Saddam’s leadership just as it had opposed prior leadership from Baghdad throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Kurds used the war as an opportunity to continue their rebellion. The Kurds were largely unsuccessful, due to their own internal dissension and Saddam Hussein’s brutal repression. The Kurds were divided between the Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”), and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”). The KDP was backed by the Iranians and operated along the northern Iraqi border, in Iranian territory near Hajj Omran. The KDP had some military successes in 1985 and 1986. The KDP reported engagements with Iraqi divisions in Zakho and near Mosul. Reports in 1986 suggested the Kurds were threatening Iraq’s overland oil routes to Turkey. However, Turkey played the spoiler in any Kurdish ambitions during the Iran-Iraq War. It used its influence to rein in Iranian support to the Iraqi Kurds, and threatened to move its troops into northern Iraq to protect its interests regarding the Kurds. The Kurds do not appear to have benefited from the war. If anything, they appear to have been squeezed from all sides, and weakened by internal divisions. Iraq’s dependence on its Gulf neighbors for support during the war moderated its regional posture. During the war Iraq courted Turkey, established relations with the U.S., and limited its anti-Israel rhetoric. However, Iraq’s moderation might have been simply a facet of wartime expediency. Iraqi historical am_________________________________________________ 68 Radio Baghdad 27 June 1982 – Daily Report, 1 July 1982; Al-Thawra, 4 November 1981; Iraq, 15 March 1982; INA, 27 March – Daily Report, 30 March 1982. 69 King, p.15..

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bitions with respect to Kuwait and its aspirations to regional dominance did not indicate a tendency toward long-term moderation.70 The end of the Iran-Iraq War did not solve Iraq’s strategic military issues. The war did not allow Iraq to secure the Shatt al-Arab against an Iranian threat and it did not secure Iraqi access to the Gulf. Iraq’s pipelines to the West offered some measure of security, but they were not a complete substitute for Gulf access. It was not clear, as the war ended, whether Iraq understood the limits of its minor territorial gains from Iran and in its dealings with Kuwait. As the war ended, two key questions emerged regarding Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: (a) would it build on improved relations with Gulf states or would it return to pre-war regional ambitions to dominate the Gulf; and (b) how would it cope with its wardebts and oil-export policy. Iraq, perhaps predictably, used its post-war military superiority over Iran as opportunity to project its military power in the region and expand its influence over neighboring Gulf states. It also managed to turn its war-debts into grants and un-repaid loans.71 7.2 Iran The Islamic Revolution was less than two years old at the start of war. The war provided the ruling clerics with an opportunity to consolidate their power at a time when the initial revolutionary fervor was running out. As the war developed, the Islamic leadership had a natural platform from which to demonstrate their commitment and endurance to the cause of the Islamic Revolution: “We have been able to use the war to awaken the people and to fight the problems that threaten the revolution,” claimed Rafsanjani on the sixth anniversary of the Islamic revolution in February 1985.72 The war also provided the right environment for the establishment of the military-political wings of the Islamic government in the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Pasdaran. Iran had purged its armed forces following the revolution in 1978, and many experts considered Iran militarily weaker than Iraq in 1980. The army had suffered a 30 percent desertion rate since the start of Khomeini’s revolution. Additionally, Iran purged 12,000 men from its regular military. By the start of the war, Iran’s combat units had only 30-50 percent of normal manpower. Further, the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis ended Iran’s primary source of weapons, spare parts, and logistical training and support. These factors ushered in the early stages of developing its politically loyal Pasda_________________________________________________ 70 71 72

King, pp. 13-17. Cordesman, pp. 594-595. Hiro, pp.255-257; King, p. 20.

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ran/Revolutionary Guards Corps into a reasonable alternative to regular military forces.73 The war also created popular support that provided the Islamic Republican Party (“IRP”) with the time and cover to successfully eliminate its leftist opposition, the Tudeh Party and Mujaheddin-e Khalq. The war was also an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to deal its Kurds and other minority interests. However, the Khomeini regime’s obsession with removing Saddam Hussein and toppling the Iraqi Ba’ath regime took its toll on the Iranian people, who were forced to cope with political repression and economic stagnation. However, perhaps the drama of war drew public attention away from social and economic crises and united the people behind the Islamic Republic.74 During the early days of the war, from 1980 to 1982, Khomeini and the IRP backed the clergy as part of the governing mechanism in the new Islamic Republic. President Bani-Sadr, who advocated a lesser role for the clergy, was driven out of office in June 1981. Also in June 1981, the Mujaheddin-e Khalq declared an open attack on Khomeini. The group began targeting senior government officials in a ruthless bombing and assassination campaign. On 28 June 1981, an explosion at the IRP headquarters killed 74, including IRP leader, Ayatollah Mohammed Husseini Behesti. The newly elected President of Iran, Ali Rajai was killed in a bombing on 30 August 1981. This bombing also killed the newly appointed Prime Minister, Mohammed Javad Bahonar. The IRP responded by conducting a brutal campaign of executions. The Iranian government admitted to executing 2,000, and some outside experts put the number at more than 3,000.75 The public tolerated this campaign of repression, because Mujaheddin-e Khalq was viewed as sowing dissension during a critical early juncture in the war against Iraq. In July 1982, after the government hard liners had prevailed in the debate regarding the decision to invade Iraq, the Communist Tudeh party, which had been an IRP supporter, expressed its concerns regarding the war. Many Iranians harbored suspicions that the Tudeh Party was simply a mouthpiece for the Soviet Union, who opposed Iranian policies and supplied arms to Iraq. In February 1983, the Tudeh leadership was removed by Iranian authorities. In addition to eliminating its opponents, the Islamic leadership began to Islamicize the country’s institutions. Islamic guidelines were introduced into educational programs, and Islamic conduct was enforced in public places and places of employment. The legal system was revised to bring it into line with _________________________________________________ 73

Cordesman, pp. 88-89. Cordesman, pp.88-89; Hiro, pp. 255-257; King, p. 20. 75 Cordesman, pp. 117-118; Kayhan, 11 June 1981; Ettela‘at, 22 June 1981; Radio Tehran, 22 June 1981 – Daily Report, 23 June 1981; Ettela‘at, 7 July 1981; Ettela’at, 2 July 1981; Ettela‘at, 1 Sep74

tember 1981.

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Islamic jurisprudence. The Bonyad-e-Musta’azafin (‘Foundation of the Oppressed’) was established to redistribute wealth by seizing property and businesses on behalf of the poor. And the Bonyad-e-Shahid (‘Martyrs Foundation’) was set up to compensate the families of martyrs. And the Basij-i-Mostazafin (‘Mobilization of the Oppressed’) was created from which teenage volunteers were taken to serve in ‘human wave’ attacks during the war.76 The Kurds were also a factor in Iran. In fact, the government had been fighting a Kurdish insurgency in Iran since early 1979, which pre-dated the Iran-Iraq War by nearly a year. The Islamic Republic’s position was that the question of ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, was irrelevant in an Islamic Iran, and the government took a strong position against the rebellious Kurds. The Kurds in Iran were led by Dr. Abdulrahman Qasemlou’s Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran („KDPI”) and the Marxist Komala, headed by Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini. The Kurdish resistance in Iran was not insignificant. In June 1984, Iran sent 250,000 troops against 15,000 Kurdish guerrillas. By late 1984 and 1985, the scale of battle had been reduced and the Kurds were fighting on a smaller scale. In 1984, Iran also cooperated with the Turks to neutralize its Kurds. But Iran was frustrated over the Turkish presence in Iraq, which was negating a potential tactical advantage Iran had on its northern border with Iraq. Despite the combined efforts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the Kurds remained a thorn in the side of these regimes during and beyond the war. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran found itself diplomatically isolated due to its defiant rhetoric. It the beginning, Khomeini welcomed Iran’s isolation and seemed to embrace it as a sign of true independence. However, as the war progressed Iran adopted a more pragmatic approach. After temporarily exhausting its manpower and resources with several unsuccessful offensives in 1984, Iran softened the tone of its rhetoric in an attempt to prevent additional military aid to Iraq. Iran cultivated alliances with Syria and Libya to prevent a united Arab front in support of Iraq. These alliances were important because they emphasized the Islamic nature of the alliance and undermined the Iraqi characterization of the war as an Arab-Persian confrontation. Iran also developed relations with Turkey and Pakistan (which were allies with its U.S. enemy), that ensured their neutrality. Iran sought ties with many different countries to purchase arms. China, Brazil, and Israel are just a few examples of the countries Iran was doing business with. In late 1984, Iran also sought to improve its image in Europe, and _________________________________________________ 76

Tehran Times, 15 December 1980, Tehran Times, 27 November 1980; Radio Tehran, 11 February 1981 – Daily Report, 12 February 1981; Ettela‘at, 7 January 1981, Mizan, 24 May 1981, Ettela ‘at, 21 April 1981;, Tehran Times, 23 June 1981; Kayhan 12 October 1980; Ettela‘at, 18 February 1981; Kayhan International, 10 January 1981; Ettela‘at, 15 March 1981; Jumhuriyye Islami, 11 January 1981.

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sent someone to seek out the West German Foreign Minister. In 1985, Iran sent representatives to Japan and China to improve relations there.77 Perhaps most importantly, Iran sought to change its relationships with the Arab Gulf states to reduce the amount of external assistance to Iraq. This was a difficult task because it forced Iran to do a diplomatic tap dance. On one hand, Iran claimed it had no territorial ambitions in the Gulf and did not intend to widen its conflict with Iraq. However, it also said that while the revolution must be spread, it cannot be spread by force. The Gulf states, for their part, wanted normalized relations with Iran, but realized the Islamic regime, despite its diplomatic overtures, was not giving up its long-term vision to export its revolution to its Islamic neighbors.78 The Gulf states doubted Iran’s acceptance of the regional status quo, much the same way they doubted Iraq’s when the Ba’athist came to power there. Both radical ideologies espoused views that de-legitimized the sovereign rule of the conservative Gulf monarchies and sought to collapse the borders of their modern states into a vision of one state united by, religion in the case of the Islamic Revolution, and ethnicity in the case of pan-Arab nationalism. The Gulf states knew Iran envisioned itself as the regional power and would eventually try to engage in traditional regional power politics. Therefore, for the Gulf states, a strong Arab Iraq was the best strategic counter-balance to achieve normalized relations with Iran, given its regional aspirations.79 Iranian leadership viewed the war as a means to achieve revolutionary objectives. For example, Iran developed its own sophisticated small-arms military industry in response to its war needs. This was consistent with the revolutionary objective of a self-reliant Iran. Iranian leadership were keen on continuing the war for as long as they could continue to advance their revolutionary objectives. Only when it became clear to Khomeini and other Iranian leaders that its popular mass of support could not endure further economic hardship to continue fighting did they seek an end to the war. Military morale also appeared to be eroding. By 1987, the high number of Iranians killed in the fighting may have approached 700,000 and the number wounded 1.4 million. Additionally, the war made approximately two million Iranians homeless, and Iran’s economy remained stagnant from 1977 until the end of the war. However, the Islamic Republic, new_________________________________________________ 77 King, pp. 20-29; Kayhan Hava‘i, 19, 26 June 1985 and 10, 17 July 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 21 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 25 September 1985, 2 October 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 8 and 15 January 1986; Iranian Press Digest, 12 August 1985. 78 Kayhan Hava‘i, 29 May 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 7 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 28 August 1985; Kayhan Hava‘i, 18 December 1985; Jumhuriyye Islami, 9 May 1985; Ettela‘at, 28 April 1985. 79 King, p. 29.

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born at the start of the war eight years earlier, had endured and maintained power and had done it largely on its own.80 8

Economics in the Iran-Iraq War

Economics was a critical factor that dictated the outcome of the war. Oil wealth was a critical lifeline and strategic target for both sides throughout the war. Iraq entered the war with an economic advantage due to the economic disorder that prevailed in Iran following the revolution. Iraq also benefited during the war from generous external financial assistance provided, for the most part, by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with secondary contributions from a variety of states. This external assistance was the decisive factor that allowed Iraq to continue the war. Iran, however, was ultimately forced to end the war when Iraq’s attacks on its oil industry damaged its financial capacity to sustain its war effort.81 8.1 Iraq On the eve of war with Iran, Iraq’s economy was robust; primarily due to the oil boom of the 1970s. Despite large military and social spending, Iraq had $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves and very little foreign debt.82 At the start of the war Iran closed the Gulf to Iraqi oil exports. In March 1982, Iran also purchased Syria’s support by paying it cash and oil to close the Iraqi oil pipeline through Syrian territory. Iraq was left with a small pipeline through Turkey and overland transport. As a result, Iraqi oil exports shrunk to one-fifth of their pre-war level. This was a critical political victory for Iran. Iraq’s expected export earnings decreased by approximately $5 billion annually. Further, this meant that Iraq’s oil revenues were no longer meeting its war costs.83 The Iraqi government appeared to believe the war with Iran would be short, and continued military and social spending at pre-war levels, despite the shrinking oil revenues. As a result, between 1981 and 1983 Iraq incurred a deficit of $42 billion. And this debt was incurred despite receiving approximately $50 billion in aid from the Arab Gulf states. By 1982, the government realized the _________________________________________________ 80

Cordesman, p. 266; Hiro, p.259. Cordesman, pp.45-48; The Economist, 20 August 1988. 82 Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Economics of War: Economic Implications for the Region and World Oil Market,” in The Iran-Iraq War, Impact and Implications, Ed. Ephraim Karsh (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1989), p. 233. 81

83

Cordesman, p. 135; Kanovsky, p. 236.

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war could continue for several more years, and that they would have to institute economic reforms to slow the rate of debt. The rate of debt slowed, but Iraq oil exports could not keep up war spending. By 1987, excluding debts to Gulf state lenders, Iraq had accumulated $40-50 billion in external debt. In addition, foreign exchange reserves had evaporated from $35 billion to approximately $1 billion.84 The estimated loss for the Iraqi oil sector between 1980 and 1985 was $120.8 billion, including $23.4 billion in lost revenue. As a result, Iraq relied on it neighbors to finance its war with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided $25 to $50 billion in financial loans and grants. France granted $5 billion in loans to purchase military equipment. The U.S. granted credits to Iraq, and pressured its allies not to re-supply Iran. Egypt and Jordan supplied Iraq with arms and equipment. The Soviet Union also supplied Iraq with huge amounts of arms during various points in the war. Even despite the external financial assistance it received and limited overland oil exports, Iraq was financially weakened by the long war.85 8.2 Iran Oil revenues accounted for 95 percent of all Iranian income. The oil sector was badly damaged by the war. The cost of the war for the oil sector from 1980-1985 was estimated at $108.2 billion, including approximately $23.4 billion in lost revenue. The damage sustained by the Iranian oil sector between 1986 and 1988 appears to have been a contributing factor in limiting Iran’s ability to continue the war.86 Iran largely financed the costs of war on its own. Its external reserves shrank from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $6 billion in 1986-7. The war was costly for Iran. It needed to pay for arms imports on the open and black markets, especially after the U.S. cut off the supply of arms to Iran. The country’s infrastructure was badly damaged by the fighting. Cities such as Khorramshahr, Dezful, and Abadan were destroyed. The official Iranian total for the cost of the war as of 1986 was $309 billion.87 Oil exports and revenues were critical to Iran’s war effort. Until 1984, these revenues remained unaffected by the fighting. However, in 1984, Iraq began its war on Iran’s major oil terminal at Kharg island. Iranian oil revenues were reduced from $12.3 billion in 1983 to $10.9 billion in 1984. In August and Sep_________________________________________________ 84

Kanovsky, pp.237-239. Cordesman, pp. 2-5. 86 Cordesman, p. 2; King, p. 26. 87 King, p.26 85

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tember 1985, Iraq’s attacks on the main Iranian export terminal on Kharg island caused a brief but large reduction in Iranian oil exports. This forced Iran to secure its oil revenues by building export facilities further down the Gulf, out of range of Iraqi strikes. A shuttle was established between Kharg island and Sirri island; a floating terminal was opened at Larak Island in June 1986, and jetties were built on the islands of Qeshm and Jask in the Straits of Hormuz. Nevertheless, these steps did not prevent the Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations. Iraq may have hit Kharg island as many as 60 times by the end of 1985. In August 1986, Sirri island was hit and in November 1986, Larak island was attacked.88 The Iraqi campaign against Iranian oil exports applied considerable military and financial pressure on Iran, however it played an uncertain role in changing Iran’s long-term ability to continue the war. Iraq’s aerial attacks on Iran’s oil sector failed to have a drastic impact on Iran’s monthly oil exports. Iraq did not attack Iran’s more vulnerable refineries and power plants and the Iraqi air campaign also did not have a major impact on the civilian economy. It is more likely that the sharp crash in world oil prices in 1986 – which cut Iranian oil revenues nearly in half – had a greater long-term impact than Iraq’s aerial campaign against the Iranian oil sector. Iranian oil revenues were $6.6 billion in 1986 and $9.5 billion in 1987, compared to $13 billion in 1985 and $19-$20 billion in 1982 and 1983. In March 1988, the Iranian Budget and Planning ministry projected the government would need to cut social expenditures by more than 25 percent over the following two years, given the low revenues from oil sales. Iranian leadership realized it could not maintain public support for its regime if it had to cut social spending along those lines. Through its network of government backed clerics and mosques and its Islamic civil institutions, Iranian leadership could accurately assess the public mood. Iranian leadership also understood it was lacking arms (due to an increasingly efficient U.S. strategy to deprive Iran of new armaments), financial strength, and diplomatic support. The military balance of power had shifted definitively in Iraq’s favor.89 8.3 Neighboring Arab States Saudi Arabia was greatly effected by the Iran-Iraq War. It contributed approximately two-thirds of the $50 billion in aid delivered to Iraq by the Gulf states. And yet Saudi Arabia experienced drastic declines in oil revenue during the course of the war. Saudi oil revenues declined from $96-97 billion in 1981 and _________________________________________________ 88

Cordesman, pp. 185-186, 212.

89

Hiro, pp. 243-250.

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1982 to $16 billion in 1987. The oil price dropped from $32 per barrel to $15 in the early 1980s, reducing Saudi oil revenues by over 30 percent within six months. Between January and July 1986, oil prices dropped from $26 to $8 per barrel. In 1982 Saudi gross domestic product reached an unprecedented level of over 400 billion Saudi Riyals. In 1986 it dropped to 271 billion.90 At the same time that the House of Saud was pumping billions into the Iraqi war effort against Iran, successive budget deficits were slowing the pace of Saudi modernization. Saudi Arabia met its deficits by drawing on reserves and borrowing from the local economy. Overambitious projects were stopped or abandoned in response to growing economic uncertainty. The fourth Saudi development plan (1985-1990) reduced expenditures on infrastructures and shifted more resources to developing economic and human resources. Real GDP growth averaged 1.4 percent per annum, far below the 4 percent anticipated. Spending on prestige construction fell by 8.5 percent. Plans to construct an oil refinery in Qasim and a new international airport in the eastern province were abandoned. Completed high-rise office buildings in the major cities remained unoccupied reflecting low demand, declining revenues and slow economic growth. 91 The decline in Saudi revenues in the 1980s encouraged the government to promote the rhetoric of Saudisation, which meant gradually replacing foreigners with Saudis as the latter acquired education, training, and skills. This was a stated objective of the fourth five-year plan (1985-1990). In reality, this concept was never implemented or advanced.92 In 1985, Saudi Arabia abandoned its role as OPEC’s swing oil producer. It had no choice. It had to continue to produce oil at capacity to meet its mounting deficits. These deficits can be partially attributed to Saudi Arabia’s military spending. They spent $15 billion or approximately 22 percent of GDP on the military between 1985 to 1987. This may be attributed to fear of Iran’s hostile Islamic regime. During the early stages of the war, in 1981, Iran was careful not to use its Navy to provoke the Gulf states and the West. The UAE, in particular, was a valuable asset to Iran. Transshipment of goods to and from Iran went through the UAE. This relationship evolved following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian oil exports went through the Gulf, and Iran was dependent on two to four billion dollars in food imports that were shipped through the Gulf. Taking into consideration the strategic interests of Iran with the death of Khomeini, who had been _________________________________________________ 90 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambrigde, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 149-187. 91 Saudi Press Agency, 30 December 1987; al-Siyasa (Kuwait), 3 January 1988. 92 The Economist Country Report – Saudi Arabia (1988), No. 1, p. 11 & 14; No. 2, p. 11; No. 3. p 12.

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the revolution’s undisputed leader, and the beginning of the Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War, there were several reasons why its new leadership should want to court the GCC. First of all, GCC goodwill was essential for solidarity within OPEC when trying to secure stable oil production and prices. The Islamic Republic earned over 90 percent of its foreign exchange by exporting oil, OPEC’s ability to operate was paramount. Second, Gulf states offered a good prospective market for other Iranian exports, given their wealth. Third, the traditional ties between Iran and the Emirates of the Gulf are an asset to Iran since the ports of Dubai and Sharjah handle a significant portion of trade to and from the region. Fourthly, the financial surplus of the smaller Gulf Arab states could be invested, at least partly, in Iran, if the Islamic Republic could ensure the necessary preconditions. Finally, Iran would have the opportunity to use the GCC as a mediator between itself and Iraq.93

9

Conclusion

The sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq were not new. Ethnic, religious, and territorial tension had caused intermittent conflict in the region for centuries before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Competition for control of the Shi‘i holy sites in Najaf and Karbala was a constant source of historical tension, dating back to the Iranian Safavid Empire in the sixteenth century. Conflicts between the Safavids and the Ottomans led both sides to manipulate local tribal interests. This practice continued into the 20th century; the most conspicuous examples were the Kurds, and the Arabs in Khuzistan. And, the most persistent and unresolved source of conflict was the dispute over sovereign control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway that lay on the border between Iran and Iraq. It represented access to the Gulf and, perhaps, the greater issue of which power – or more specifically, which leader – would assume dominance in the Gulf region. Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini both assumed power shortly before the start of the Iran-Iraq War. They each represented a grand ideology that sought to project itself beyond its own borders. Caught in between these two aspiring regional powers, the Gulf states sought to protect themselves from the consequences of a dominant imperial threat at their doorsteps. The Gulf states feared Iran more than Iraq at the outset of the war, but they generally hoped for a resolution that would balance regional power between the two countries. The Islamic revolution and Ba’athist pan-Arabism presented ideological threats to the conservative monarchical Gulf regimes. Saddam and Iraq initiated the fighting in _________________________________________________ 93 Furtig, p. 97; al-sharq al-awsat, 15 May 1989; al-Majalla, 26 December 1989; Beirut al-Masa, 3 July 1989; Al-Dustur (London), 3 January 1989.

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1980, hoping to defeat the nascent Khomeini revolution before it could stabilize and continue to sow dissension in Iraq. Iraq feared a more mature and consolidated power structure in Iran, and hoped its initial military strikes would bring about a change of leadership in Iran. Iran, for its part, saw Iraq’s holy cities and its Shi‘i population as a natural extension of its Islamic revolution, and viewed its secular Ba’athist regime as an obstacle to regional Islamic rule.

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Iraq’s Passage to War

The reasons for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 can be explained by several factors. This chapter will address the links between the immediate factors that caused Iraq’s invasion, and the historical forces that were underlying the developing threat during 1990-1991. Specifically, the chapter will trace (a) Iraq’s passage to war and the issues that surrounded Saddam’s surprising invasion of Kuwait; (b) Kuwait’s historical relations with Iraq and its dealings with Saddam’s regime prior to the invasion; (c) the failure of Arab mediation during the diplomatic build-up prior to Iraq’s invasion; (d) the salient characteristics of the war; (e) the international community’s effort to develop a consensus and enforce a post-war accord with Iraq; and (f) developments in the Gulf community’s security environment in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 war. The common denominator underlying the several factors that led to Iraq’s invasion was Iraq’s need for cash to fund its state-building after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1988. Iraq was beset by economic difficulties typical of a post-war period: it owed about 45 billion dollars to Saudi Arabia, $15 billion to Kuwait, and another $10 billion to international banks. Iraq began releasing some tens of thousands of its circa 400,000 soldiers, which resulted in large numbers of young men in the marketplace and few jobs for them. Unemployment became a big problem. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that there were about a million Egyptian workers that had taken the place of Iraqis while the Iraqis had been recruited to fight the Iran-Iraq War, and now the Egyptians had to be dismissed back to Egypt, causing friction between the two Arab communities.1 Iraq was also seeking to lower the oil production of oil exporting states, most of whom had been neighboring Gulf states. Iraq believed that by enacting a low oil production, it would enable a major increase in its own oil production rate and create more reasonable prices, which had been relatively low at around $20 to $25 per barrel. However, the Gulf states which had their own interests were reluctant to lower their own oil production and were interested in selling as much oil as possible for the highest possible price (Kuwait was permitted by the _________________________________________________ 1 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 39.

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Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, OPEC, to produce 2.03 million barrels per day). Moreover, Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping oil from underneath the Rumayla oilfield, which belonged to Iraq.2 Iraq’s goals can also be understood in strategic terms, and related to its position as a major actor in the region. Iraq ended the Iran-Iraq War without any direct access to the Gulf waters, while its opponent, Iran, controlled the entire Eastern shore of the Gulf. Iraq’s nearest port to Gulf waters was Umm-Qasr, which is located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway south of the Gulf waters. Baghdad was therefore looking for a site that could become an Iraqi port in the Gulf waters. Iraq’s idea was to develop such a port to enable its own forces to have more control in the Gulf itself. In Iraq’s assessment Kuwait was in a position to allow Iraq to have its small islands Bubiyan and Warba, which were located near the crossing point of Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf waters. These islands were not settled when the Iran-Iraq War ended and therefore, in Iraqi perception, Kuwait should have no reason not to lease them to Iraq. However, Kuwait’s reluctance to oblige Iraq on that matter (see below) made Iraq feel itself inferior to Iran in any future reference. Another reason for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which is again related to its leaders’ state-building images, concerns Iraq’s interest in obtaining major subventions of finance, or at least a compensation from their neighboring Gulf states. To be sure, when Iraq started the war against Iran it did so under the belief that it could smash the unprepared and uncultivated Iranian army, as well as the young regime of the Islamic Revolution. Iraq did not consult any Arab neighbors prior to its invasion. However, once the war-tide had turned against Iraq (notably from 1982 to 1986), it developed a policy of trying to end the war and of enlisting most Arab states to support this policy. Iraq then started posing as the savior of the Arab states from the wrath of the imperialist Iranian Revolution. They claimed to be the first and ultimate buffer, sheltering the Arab world from Iran. The fact that most Arab states agreed to assist Iraq during these years and supported its policies, gave the Iraqi leaders the sense that they could also bank on Arab support after the war ended. In Saddam Hussein’s view, states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should be grateful for Iraq’s assistance in preventing the Iranian forces from harming these states. The Iraqis naturally expected that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would agree to abolish their debt and even increase the subventions that Iraq now required once the war was over and it was seeking

_________________________________________________ 2 Ibid, pp. 40-41, 48; Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-1991, The IraqKuwait Conflict and Its Implications (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 8687.

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economic development. Kuwait’s rejection of these demands (see below) was a major trigger that angered Saddam and provoked his will to invade.3 These goals can all be understood in terms of Realpolitik and rational terms of state-building. Saddam actually added to these goals and terms aspects of grandeur and of brinksmanship policies, which entangled him in conflicts and misunderstandings way beyond his original intentions. It should be mentioned that in the Arab world different states have developed for themselves different roles to play in the inter-Arab system and Saddam chose for himself the role of the ultimate hero-warrior. Saddam portrayed himself as a leader of the type presented in the mythology of “Thousand and One Nights“ or a new Salah al-Din (the leader who defeated the Crusaders in the year 1187): a leader of an entire Arab-Muslim region who strikes major strategic marks, without caring about the borders of a small and unimportant state. Saddam’s dialogue was consistent with his view of history, demonstrated by his focus on the fate of the entire Arab nation. Kuwait could be sacrificed for such a major ambition, and thus Saddam tried to pull himself above the immediate context of his entanglement with Kuwait. As some researchers point out, Saddam Hussein had also tried to emulate modern Arab leaders, such as Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, the president of Egypt during the height of pan-Arabism (he was president between 1954 and 1970). As such, he engaged in charismatic and sweeping policies which shocked other states in the region and put Saddam in a position of someone to be both revered and feared.4 Saddam therefore relied on his ability to generate support through myths, and he cultivated the general myth of pan-Arabism, namely finding a way of turning the Arabs into being great once more, like they had been in the Middle Ages. Then he further cultivated the myth of the need to compensate the Arab poor states, notably those who do not possess oil wealth. He was of course disregarding the fact that Iraq was a rich oil producing state, and instead he magnified Iraq’s economic hardships of the past Iran-Iraq War period. Thereby, he thought to win over the poor parties in the Arab world: Jordan, Yemen and the Palestinians, whose populations had no oil and lived in miserable conditions in their own states or as guest workers of the wealthy oil states, such as Kuwait. Another myth that Saddam hoped to try to employ was to act in a swift manner, pulling a strategic surprise. His cabinet minister Tariq ‘Aziz later explained that Saddam and his associates were aware that they could start a border _________________________________________________ 3

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 45-50 and 55-61; Charles R. H. Tripp, “Symbol and Strategy: Iraq and the War for Kuwait,” in The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, Eds. Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R. H. Tripp (Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, U.K.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 25-28. 4 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.241.

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skirmish with Kuwait that would cause a regional crisis, just by invading a small territory in Kuwait or taking over a Kuwaiti oilfield. The Iraqi leaders understood that they could get away with these tactics and then negotiate the withdrawal of their forces in return for financial subventions, which would have helped the Iraqi economy, but only to a small extent. Saddam therefore, chose to exercise a stunning maneuver, namely, to occupy Kuwait entirely, swiftly and dramatically.5 It is just possible to understand that Saddam was motivated both by state-building interests and Realpolitik on one hand, and by tactics of a cavalier shrouded in myth and fueled by his charisma, on the other. It is hard to distinguish what motivation led him more decisively between these two. Saddam tried to calculate realistically, but took too many risks and probed unclear edges in his politics. One can point out a few risks which already in the outset of the conflict were too complicated and hazardous. Thus, he started threatening the Gulf states that they must compensate him, but did not make a clear claim as to what he was after, at the inter-Arab summit in April 1990. On 22 April, he met the United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and talked to her about Iraq’s border problems with Kuwait, as well as with other states. Ambassador Glaspie’s conciliatory tone during that meeting was perceived by Saddam as U.S. indifference to Iraq’s border disputes in the Gulf. Saddam and his associates may have believed that the United States would actually comply with an Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and would not counteract it. Clearly, this was not what Glaspie had meant and surely it did not reflect U.S. policy. However, the way Iraq construed the Ambassador’s response attests to Saddam Hussein’s own misperception of the decision makers in Washington and U.S. policy making as a whole. Saddam thought that United States would gain nothing from defending Kuwait and would, therefore, leave it to be occupied by him. Saddam believed that Washington would not engage in fighting openly against Iraq, the fact that 12 U.S. Senators visited Baghdad on 12 April 1990 convinced that there was enough good-will towards him in the U.S. capital; and that in any case the U.S. was still under the Vietnam syndrome and would not react with a military response. He was sure to promise Ambassador Glaspie that there was not going to be any attack and that there would be negotiations with Kuwait, thereby engaging himself in a lie which only added to his misperception of the U.S. leaders’ propensity to fight back.6 Another entanglement concerned Saddam’s pledge to other Arab states, notably Egypt, to maintain a diplomatic course in regards to Iraq’s crisis with Ku_________________________________________________ 5

Tripp, pp. 25-29.

6

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 52-54; Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 110-114.

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wait. Saddam made this promise to the Egyptian president Mubarak in early May 1990, after his first threats against Kuwait had been voiced. His disregard for the Egyptian president, as well as for other major Arab parties, such as Saudi Arabia, led to the downfall of Saddam’s credibility in some important Arab eyes and denied him the support of these parties when he needed them most.7 This entanglement, however, was not as blunt as that which he had started escalating with Israel during late spring 1990. It is clear that Saddam used the Arab-Israeli issue as a means of diversion from the main arena of conflict in the Gulf and as a way to obtain legitimacy in the opinions of other Arab states, mainly to strengthen his position when criticized by the pro-Kuwait states. However, his pledge made already in April to incinerate”half of Israel“ in case Israel would attack Iraq had much ambivalent meaning: it sounded defensive, but also reflected Saddam’s continuing readiness for aggression and preparation for a possible real showdown. From an Israeli viewpoint, Saddam started preparing himself for a war with Israel. The fact that he had already developed long-range missiles that were able to carry chemical, as well as conventional warheads, and that he had envisioned the construction of the foiled “supergun,” by the Canadian weapons engineer Gerald Bull (Bull was killed in 1989 and according to Western Press reports by Israeli agents) suggested to some Israeli observers that Saddam was ready to embark on a war with Israel that would widely overshadow his Kuwaiti occupation. On 10 August, at an Arab League summit, following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sought to ‘Zionize’ the crisis and rally the Arab masses behind him by portraying himself as the champion of the Palestinians and Pan-Arabism. Saddam was using the Arab-Israeli issue to legitimize his invasion of Kuwait within the community of Arab and Islamic states. Saddam had hoped to quickly invade and occupy Kuwait and then let everybody digest and accept the occupation. A different scenario would have been difficult for Saddam to imagine or even cope with.8

2

Kuwait: Confusing Friend and Foe

Kuwait’s relations with Iraq played an important role in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The crisis, after all, arose partly from the two states’ interactions and mutual perceptions, leading to the questions of whether Kuwait’s policies stimulated Iraq’s invasion and whether Kuwait failed to recognize or better defend itself from Iraq’s aggressive intentions. We should not, however, underestimate the _________________________________________________ 7 8

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 97-99. Freedman and Karsh, pp. 34-35, 99-102.

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astuteness and resourcefulness of Kuwait’s leaders, which often helped them steer their country safely through surrounding dangers.9 Their policies challenging Iraq should therefore not be attributed to mere incompetence or ignorance of Iraqi politics. Rather, they stemmed from a view of Kuwait’s own national goals and security interests. By attempting to fulfill its national interests, Kuwait rivaled and challenged Iraqi interests. Kuwait’s problems in state-building formed the foundation for these goals. Kuwait originated from a chieftaincy, a loose tribal confederacy based on nomad groups and townsmen. The town-based al-Sabah family played a leading role, with other groups enjoying a considerable amount of political independence.10 Kuwait’s course of state-building evolved according to two principles. First was a trend toward government centralization, essential for establishing stability among nomadic and town-based groups. After the al-Sabahs established their borders in the 1920s, they developed an administration to run Kuwait and a military force to defend it. By using British assistance and oil wealth, the al-Sabahs succeeded in controlling Kuwait’s territory, devising a successful petroleum and commercial economy. From the 1950s, they started vigorously developing towns and infrastructure.11 The other principle, in keeping with tribal traditions, was the distribution of benefits among citizens to maintain internal social stability. The government subsidized business enterprises and the citizens’ welfare, including rights for almost free education, free health insurance, and no income taxes. A "distributive coalition of Kuwaitis widely sharing Kuwaiti wealth” (to apply Mancur Olsen’s phrase) evolved. The government focused on improving the position of the rich merchant families by treating them the way elders had once been treated in the tribe. They were given chances to engage in finance, trade, and real estate businesses. Following some fierce encounters with the authorities in 1921 and 1938, they also gained the right to advise and even criticize the government. This prerogative was institutionalized after Kuwait’s independence in 1961 in the National As-

_________________________________________________ 9

Hassan A. Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait: A Political Study (Kuwait, 1975). Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, “The Complexities of Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), pp. 1-24; Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 17-80. 10

11

Ismael, pp. 59-101.

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sembly, a 50-member elected, advisory body that functioned from 1962 to 1976 and again from 1981 to 1986.12 The 1980s brought security and economic crises that challenged Kuwait’s state-building principles and the government’s control over the country. Despite the government’s efforts, Kuwait was beset by repeated acts of Shi‘i terrorism perpetrated by foreign, professional hit squads and occasionally by Kuwaiti citizens. There were also continuous, mostly Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers in Gulf waters. It became evident that the government had a hard time defending Kuwait and keeping the Iran-Iraq War from spilling over onto its territory.13 The government’s resources and control was also affected by the mounting oil recession of the 1980s which brought a decline in Kuwait’s (and other oilstates’) production and income. The government was both forced to cut its own economic and development activities and face a recession. Thus, the development budget in 1986 was only 694 million Kuwaiti Dinars (1 KD = c. U.S.$3.20) of a total of KD 3.4 billion; in 1988, the overall budget deficit was KD 1.4 billion.14 In the mid-1980s declining international interest rates also cut the earlier high Kuwaiti income by 17 percent from its huge foreign investment (KD 1.7 billion in 1980–1981).15 Political and economic problems also affected the business elite, which challenged Kuwait’s other main state-building principle, social stability. Businessmen were hit by a crash in the unofficial stock market (Suq al-Manakh16) in 1982; a decline in the activity of government-employed contractors; a fall in the rent values of real estate; and losses resulting from overextended loans in bank investments.17 _________________________________________________ 12 J.E. Peterson, The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation, The Washington Papers No. 131 (Washington, D.C., 1988), pp. 27-61. 13 On the atmosphere of declining security in Kuwait, see Milton Viorst, “A Portrait at Large (Kuwait),” The New Yorker, 16 May 1988, pp. 43-79. 14 Financial Times, 11 February 1985; 25 February 1986; al-Anba’ (Kuwait), 26 April 1988; Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 26 June, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 27 June 1988. 15 Financial Times, 22 February 1984. 16 In 1982, the Suq al-Manakh, Kuwait's alternative bourse, or stock market, crashed. The Suq alManakh was largely unregulated and highly speculative. This unofficial market emerged in the later 1970s after the government imposed stricter trading regulations on Kuwait's primary stock market. Shares in the Suq al-Manakh were traded in companies banned from Kuwait's official stock market. Many of these companies were owned by Kuwaitis but registered and domiciled outside of Kuwait. There was little transparency in the companies traded on the Suq al-Manakh, and it was difficult to determine if the companies that were traded had any real assets. The market's crash in 1982 hurt the Kuwaiti economy and damaged its international reputation as a stable climate for investment. – See Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 97-100. 17 Al-Anba’, 26 April 1988.

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In the face of burgeoning security and economic problems, the government decided to disperse the National Assembly in August 1986, dealing a direct blow to the elite, whose members from different political convictions had constituted its majority. Motivated by a sense of political deprivation, former leading assembly members formed a "parliamentary movement” and, when the Iran-Iraq War ended in September 1988, demanded the assembly’s restoration.18 However, the immediate postwar period saw a serious attempt to recover from the previous crises and reestablish state-building strategies. This period offered new opportunities and brought about an atmosphere of optimism and vigor. Kuwait developed several avenues to improve its economic situation. The relative improvement and stability in oil prices (that is $17-$18 per barrel compared to $15 in the mid-1980s) enabled the oil minister, ‘Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, to breach the oil quotas of OPEC for Kuwait by producing considerable higher quantities to compensate for the former lean years. Already in 1989, Kuwait produced about 500,000 barrels per day above OPEC’s quota. The government’s oil revenue in 1989 was $9.3 billion, the highest since 1983 and 66 percent higher than in 1988.19 At OPEC’s meeting in Vienna in November 1989, Kuwait received 6.79 percent of OPEC’s production, equivalent to a quota of 1.5 million barrels per day (mbd) but Kuwait kept exceeding that limit to a level of 2.03 mbd. (Kuwait announced a reduction of about 200,000 barrels a day for May 1990).20 Higher oil revenue promoted economic activity in other areas. The government was especially keen to improve Kuwait’s traditional sources of wealth, namely, trade and financial business, and to turn Kuwait once more – as it had been until 1982 – into the main Gulf business center.21 Non-oil revenues for 1989 were estimated at KD 228.5 million, up by KD 176.5 million over the previous year.22 While the official budget deficit was up by 11 percent, in early 1990 government spending increased by 7 percent – the highest level in three years. In April 1990, the Central Bank manager ‘Abd al-Salim al-Sabah, expressed Kuwait’s confidence in public investment to stimulate economic activities.23 _________________________________________________ 18

Financial Times, 28 November 1989. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, pp 8-9; Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 27 April 1990. 20 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – Country Report, Kuwait, No. 1, 1990, p. 11; EUI-Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 11; Financial Times, 13 March 1990. 21 International Herald Tribune, 13 March 1989. 22 KUNA, 3 July 1989, in FBIS, 6 July 1989. 23 EIU Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 9; MEED, 27 April 1989; al-Sabah’s interview, AlAnba’, 14 April 1989. 19

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The policy of investment and increased public spending was mainly aimed at enhancing socio-political integration and tranquility. The "private sector” – that is, wealthy businessmen – were offered tempting investment terms and urged to invest in Kuwait’s economy. In December 1989, 1,350 of the main debtors of the al-Manakh collapse (about 54 percent of all debtors) whose debts had been covered by collateral were allowed to write off up to KD 250,000 of debt to let them resume activities and enter new business enterprises.24 The government also aimed at integrating other echelons in society: In July, expatriates were permitted to invest in Kuwait through local representatives acting on their behalf; non-Kuwaiti shop owners and craftsmen were permitted to conduct business without a Kuwaiti partner.25 Subsidies for food, education and health insurance were kept up to protect "the peoples’ needs,” namely, to keep the lower strata, notably the Shi’a, pacified.26 The government accompanied these measures by strengthening its rule and control of the Shi’a community. Thus, it occasionally cracked down on Shi’a to prevent terrorist activities. But after the war – as relations with Iran gradually improved – Kuwait’s leaders also tried to mend fences with local Shi’a. In June 1990, for example, a state security court acquitted four Shi’a accused of plotting to overthrow Kuwait’s political system. During 1989 the government increased its efforts to strengthen its grip on the country by appointing new governors and provincial councils to Kuwait’s five provinces.27 When members of the elite demonstrated demanding restoration of the national assembly and new elections, however, the government forcefully dispersed these gatherings and arrested participants. However, in April 1990, the emir, Jabir al-Ahmad, tried to meet the elite halfway, by announcing that a new national assembly would be elected on 10 June to include 25 appointed and 50 elected members. This plan fell short of the elite’s expectations but signified the authorities’ intention to ease tensions.28 What should therefore be kept in mind is that during the Gulf War’s aftermath, Kuwait was trying to rehabilitate its economy and ensure control over a society shaken by the events of the last decade. Rising economic opportunities met rising expectations for higher living standards. Kuwaiti authorities, keen to utilize their economic resources to the utmost and exert full control of their territory, were therefore inclined to refuse Iraqi demands for Kuwaiti territorial and economic concessions. _________________________________________________ 24

Financial Times, 13 March 1989. Arab Times, 22 January and 24 July 1989. 26 Finance Minister’s Jasim al-Khurafi’s interview, al-Ra’y al-’Amm, 30 July 1989. 27 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, September 27, 1989. 28 KUNA, April 23, 1990, in FBIS, April 24, 1990. 25

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In late 1988 and throughout 1989, Iraq insisted that Kuwait cease pumping oil from the disputed Rumayla oil field on the border and lower oil production to the OPEC quota to reduce the world oil glut and increase prices, and hence Iraqi profits. Yet Kuwaiti leaders deemed an economic upswing vital for social cohesion and were eager to take advantage of what they considered to be an era of "prosperity and growth.”29 Oil production was the key to this process. Kuwaiti leaders such as former minister of oil ‘Ali al-Khalifa regarded the oil-quota system, which set a limit to Kuwait’s production, as outdated. When asked about his OPEC colleagues’ different view, he replied, "I am not paid to make everybody happy”.30 Kuwait also disagreed with Iraqi territorial demands. It was reluctant to give up economic assets (such as Rumayla) or strategic ones such as Bubiyan Island. Iraq wanted to take over or lease this mostly unpopulated island due to its location at the Gulf’s northern end, but Kuwaiti authorities then redefined Bubiyan as a new development region. The government planed to build a new city, alSabiya, and link it through a causeway to the mainland. In 2015, it was supposed to have 250,000 people. By 1990, its planning had begun and a power station was built.31 2.1 Kuwait’s Security: The Attitude Towards Iraq Kuwait’s attitude toward Iraq was shaped by security considerations. Its leaders’ basic assumption was that the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War presented no danger of a new full-scale war since both protagonists, having suffered so heavily, were incapable and uninterested in resuming military activities. Crown Prince Sa’d ‘Abdallah stressed that the superpowers and international community had produced a cease fire between Iraq and Iran and would continue to guarantee peace in the Gulf.32 This perception was widely shared, and echoed by an academic, ‘Abd al-Reda Assiri, in his 1990 book predicting Iran and Iraq would be preoccupied with reconstruction. Assiri concluded that they posed only "minimal direct threats to the Gulf states in the short and medium terms. As a result, no hegemonic power may appear in the Gulf in the immediate future”.33 Given this basic assumption, Kuwaiti leaders believed that neutrality was the best security strategy suited for the postwar situation. In principle, Kuwait _________________________________________________ 29

Sa’d ‘Abdullah’s interview, Arab Times, December 12, 1989. Financial Times, March 13, 1990. 31 Al-Qabas, 25 March 1989; al-Siyasa, 7 February 1990; al-Qabas, 17 March 1990. 32 Sa’d ‘Abdullah’s interview, al-Watan al-’Arabi, 27 January 1989. 33 ‘Abd al-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1990), p. 199. 30

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had been following this approach for three decades. Being a small state (17,500 square kilometers) with only 40 percent indigenous population (of a total 2 million before August 1990), Kuwait had to keep good relations with all its bigger, more powerful neighbors. This attitude developed into a nonaligned policy among the superpowers and a strategy of mediation in Arab affairs. Kuwait’s neutrality was active, utilizing its financial abilities and its leaders’ shrewdness.34 Moreover, Kuwait’s tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War was no complete change of Kuwait’s neutrality. In Kuwait’s perception, Iraq was worth supporting as an essential security buffer against Iranian expansion but not as a full ally. Kuwait could not afford to take a totally pro-Iraqi partisan policy that would provoke Iran into retaliation. It thus tried to be cautious in assisting Iraq: taking a pro-Iraqi line in its media, using its ports to import and deliver to Iraq essential supplies and export small amounts of Iraqi oil, giving Iraq about $14 billion, and resisting Iranian-backed Shi‘i terrorism. But Kuwait did not join a defense pact with Iraq and maintained diplomatic relations with Iran for most of the war’s duration. Kuwait joined in founding the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 because its leaders were determined not to be an Iraqi satellite.35 When the war ended, Kuwait wanted to return to a balanced neutrality. Its leaders believed Kuwait could best benefit by getting along with all regional state, including Iraq and Iran, and mediating among them. Already in February 1988, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Washington Sa’ud Nasir al-Sabah tried to dissociate Kuwait from Iraq’s current offensive against Iran by declaring: "We are playing the role of a mediator between Iraq and Iran and we have never taken sides with one Islamic country against another.”36 In spring 1988, Minister of State Sa’ud al-’Usaymi played down the aid to Iraq: "We are giving aid to 64 Third World Countries. Why not Iraq?”37 Kuwait went on to normalize relations with Iran, restored to ambassadorial level in September 1989.38 Moreover, a high-ranking Kuwaiti delegation visiting Baghdad in February 1989 suggested to its hosts that the GCC states could bring Iran and Iraq together and stimulate postwar reconstruction.39 Kuwait also took other mediation tasks: leading Arab arbitration efforts among Lebanese factions and playing go-between for Turkey and Bulgaria over the expulsion of Muslims from Bulgaria. Kuwaiti leaders believed these activi_________________________________________________ 34

Ibid., pp. 32-91; Viorst, “A Portrait At Large.” On Kuwait-Iraq relations, see Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, pp. 69-98; R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 76-80, 126130; Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, The Gulf States and The War (London: Ithaca Press, 1986). 36 KUNA, 3 February 1988, in FBIS, 16 February 1988. 37 Viorst, “A Portrait At Large.” 38 KUNA, 29 September 1989, in FBIS, 29 September 1989. 39 Al-Anba’ (Kuwait), 8 February 1989, quoted by Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 135. 35

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ties would make their country so highly valued and well connected as to enhance its security. In Assiri’s words, Kuwait’s survival depended "on a combination of domestic support and its external role as donor/mediator. Kuwait’s political support for a variety of Arab causes, its political structure, its financial capabilities and its sense of mission make it a candidate to mediate interregional disputes, simultaneously neutralizing foes and acquiring friends.”40 Kuwait’s strategy of neutrality thus reinforced its assessment that there was no immediate serious danger. Iraq seemed no threat, Kuwait’s leaders reasoned, because – like themselves and Iran – it was too weak to embark on a new military adventure and had no reason to do so. They saw Baghdad’s main emphasis as economic growth facilitated through regional cooperation. Moreover, rather than viewing Iraq as a potential regional leader, Kuwait’s suggestions for regional economic cooperation show that its leaders thought that Iraq needed its help and thus did not want to antagonize Kuwait. At worst, Iraq might provoke a petty border dispute. But such issues were considered soluble through the same methods Kuwait was applying elsewhere – inter-Arab mediation in a spirit of compromise. A Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official, Khalid alHasan, called this approach "the old, Arab Bedouin way”.41 Kuwait believed that any problem it might have with Iraq could be handled by relying on neutralism and Arab solidarity. 2.2 Kuwaiti Responses to Iraq’s Demands Thus, Kuwait’s premises reflected several principles. First, it was not ready to accept Iraq’s territorial and economic demands. Second, while Kuwait objected to Iraq’s demands, it did not express a final refusal to negotiate the issues involved. This practice was in keeping with the common "Bedouin way” permitting both sides to bargain and yet stick to their policies without fearing serious escalation. Third, Kuwait offered Iraq cooperation in economic projects as a means of showing friendship to all regional states. Kuwait’s responses to Iraq’s demands in 1988 and 1989 succeeded in fending off these pressures without provoking Iraqi retaliation. During this period, Iraq focused particularly on renting or obtaining the islands of Warba and Bubiyan and on writing off its financial debt to Kuwait. Kuwait answered by asking Iraq for a comprehensive border settlement (during Sa’d ‘Abdallah’s visit in Baghdad in February 1989) and by announcing the development of al-Sabiya. Iraq, unprepared to give up any territorial demands, refused to make a comprehensive border settlement, and the issues were left pending. _________________________________________________ 40 41

Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 133. Newsweek, November 5, 1992.

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Kuwait also raised plans for development projects: the above-mentioned proposal of Iran-Iraq cooperation with the GCC states and a plan signed in March 1989 (set during Sa’d ‘Abdallah’s visit in February 1989) to supply Kuwait with fresh irrigation water from the Shatt al-’Arab. Kuwait undertook to finance the $1.4 billion pipeline to carry the water.42 According to some reports, Kuwait also continued providing Iraq with some financial aid – albeit far less than during the Iran-Iraq War – into 1989.43 In Kuwaiti eyes, the mix between postponing the border dispute, proposing economic projects, and maintaining some economic help for Iraq seemed to be working. During the Amir Jabir al-Ahmad’s September 1989 visit to Baghdad, he inaugurated the water project and was awarded an Iraqi medal for Kuwait’s assistance during the war. The border problem was not even mentioned during his visit.44 Kuwait felt so confident that it did not even conclude a nonaggression agreement with Iraq, like the Iraq-Saudi agreement of February 1989. Iraq started escalating its pressure on Kuwait in the spring of 1990. Now no longer satisfied with asking the Gulf states to cancel its debt to them, it demanded from Kuwait an additional $10 billion. Iraq also accused Kuwait of waging economic warfare by overselling its OPEC quota in order to swamp the market with cheap oil and rob Iraq of needed income. Iraq also demanded $2.4 billion for Kuwait’s alleged theft of its oil from Kuwait’s side of the vase Rumayla oilfield.45 Kuwaiti responses during this period indicate only small tactical shifts but no strategic sea of changes. Kuwait kept viewing its dispute with Iraq as soluble according to the "Bedouin way,” and responded accordingly. The Kuwaitis thus gave only partial responses, avoiding a definite reply to Iraq’s demands and refusing to concede territories or forego loans. Yet Kuwait still avoided delivering a final refusal and Jabir promised negotiations with Iraq once it officially recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty. In addition, Kuwait announced in May a reduction of about 200,000 barrels per day in its oil production (which had been 2.03 mbd, 500,000 over quota), but its oil minister al-Amiri further stated in July that Kuwait would propose scrapping the quota system altogether at OPEC’s October 1991 meeting.46 _________________________________________________ 42

Middle East Economic Survey, March 20, 1989; al-Siyasa, September 13, 24, 1989. See Gerd Nonneman, Iraq and the Arab States in the Gulf: Modified Continuity Into the 1990s. Paper presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 9 May 1990, p. 13. 44 Al-Siyasa, 13 and 24 September 1989. 45 See Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp. 126-128; Milton Viorst, “Report From Baghdad,” The New Yorker, 24 June 1991. 46 Financial Times, 13 March 1990; EIU-Country Report, Kuwait, No. 2, 1990, p. 11; al-Qabas, 16 July 1990. 43

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Kuwait’s perception of the dispute, even after Iraq made it public and official, also tallied with the traditional Arab outlook. In a cabinet meeting two weeks before Iraq’s invasion, Kuwait’s ministers stated that Iraq was either making threats merely in order to extort money, or, at worst (as Sa’d ‘Abdallah asserted) aiming to send troops into Kuwait in disputed border areas, namely, in Warba and Bubiyan islands or the Rumayla oilfield.47 They thought in terms of traditional border disputes, not envisioning a full-scale occupation. Kuwait’s response to Iraq’s mounting threats (and, after July 24, its heavy military buildup on the border) also reflected the perception that a common border dispute should be resolved through negotiations in a traditional inter-Arab framework. Kuwait first labored to display its inclination to Arab solidarity. Before Iraq made public the dispute, Kuwait defended Iraqi actions against nonArab parties, such as the execution for alleged spying of the British journalist Bazoft in March, or Saddam Hussein’s threat in early April to destroy half of Israel.48 After Iraq went public about its conflict with Kuwait, the latter stressed its generous contribution "to Arab causes, notably against Iran during the war without expecting anything.” Kuwait equally stressed”the need to adhere to the principles of consultation and understanding and holding a dialogue”.49 Kuwaiti leaders and newspapers urged Iraq to resolve problems through a peaceful dialogue.50 Kuwait thereby tried to set the rules as its leaders had perceived them. In practice, the Kuwaitis appealed for mediation to other GCC states, Arab League security-general Shadhli al-Qulaybi, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, and individual Arab states such as Egypt. Kuwait tended to rely on Saddam Hussein’s promise to President Mubarak of Egypt to avoid any attack as long as Iraq and Kuwait negotiated, and it put great hope on resolving the conflict at a 31 July meeting in Jidda.51 Although Kuwaiti cabinet members still disputed Iraq’s charges of stealing oil from Rumayla or waging economic warfare and did not agree to write off Iraq’s debt, they also did not reject any concession officially and finally.52 Hence, according to the "Bedouin way,” the Jidda meeting was perceived in Kuwait as a start for a long process of bargaining, displaying intransigence, and perhaps making some concessions. Kuwait did show some flexibility at Jidda. It did not send Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad, whose hard line toward Iraq made Baghdad denounce him as _________________________________________________ 47

Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990. Iraqi News Agency, 19 March (quoting Kuwait’s minister of information, Dr. Jabir Mubarak, 22 March); al- Ra’y al-Amm, 29 June 1986. 49 KUNA, 18 July 1990, in FBIS, 19 July 1990; al-Qabas, 16 July 1990. 50 KUNA, 24 July 1990, in FBIS, 25 July 1990. 51 KUNA, 26 July 1990, in FBIS, 26 July 1990. 52 Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990. 48

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"an American agent.” Sa’d ‘Abdallah later recounted that he, as head of the Kuwaiti delegation, agreed to write off Iraq’s debt and to lease Iraq the island of Warba (but not Bubiyan).53 He attributed the breakdown to the fact that Iraq’s delegation came only to deliver an ultimatum, repeat all the old Iraqi demands, and insist on total surrender in order to prepare the ground for an invasion.54 It seems logical that Kuwait – which believed that talks would continue and that bargaining was legitimate – was trying at the last minute to pull Iraq into a border agreement. Iraq, however, played according to different rules by delivering nonnegotiable demands and when its delegates were dissatisfied with the results, walked out. On 2 August, one day after the Jidda meeting ended, Iraq invaded Kuwait. To what extent did Kuwait provoke Iraq into the invasion? The "provocation” argument is not convincing.55 Kuwait’s sovereignty gave it a right to refuse Iraq’s demands.56 Moreover, Kuwait’s stand was not shaped by mere caprice but by what it considered essential to state interests and objectives. In addition, accusations of Kuwait’s provocation, when later made by Iraqi opponents such as former foreign minister Tariq ‘Aziz, focused on Kuwait’s style rather than Iraq’s demands: delays on writing off the loan or the effort to change OPEC’s quota rules. ‘Aziz further explained that the Kuwaiti policy of waging "economic warfare,” that is, overproducing oil became acute for Iraq only in December 1989.57 Therefore, even from an Iraqi viewpoint, Kuwait’s policy of overproduction was too short-lived to be really damaging. Hence, Kuwait’s policies were an irritant to Iraq but were partly changeable and accommodating. Kuwaiti policies can hardly be regarded a cause for Iraq going to war. Iraq’s decision to occupy Kuwait grew out of its belief that this would bring the financial and strategic assets needed to solve its economic and strategic problems. The fact that Kuwait refused to meet Iraq’s demands was not the cause of the invasion, but only a pretext for it. Why did Kuwait fail to prepare for an Iraqi invasion? Kuwait believed that Iraq preferred economic development to foreign adventures; that its security strategy of neutrality was effective; and that its reliance on negotiations, Arab mediation, and abstention from military preparations would avoid war and invasion. Following these assumptions instead of the evidence, Kuwait was strategi_________________________________________________ 53

Ibid. Financial Times, 18–19 August 1990; Minister of Defense Nawwaf al-Sabah’s interview, Der Spiegel, 24 September 1990. 55 This argument was raised, though not as a central theme, in Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.” 56 Uriel Dann, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Historical Observations, (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Shiloah Institute, August 1990). 57 Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.” 54

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cally surprised, like the Soviet Union in June 1941, the United States in December 1941, or Israel in October 1973. Kuwaiti post-invasion statements attest to this blunder. To give one example, Defense Minister Nawwaf al-Sabah said, "We simply could not imagine that the Iraqi head of state would lie to Egypt’s President… [and] Jordan’s King…. Furthermore, we did not want to inflame Saddam Hussein with a mobilization of our troops.”58 In Kuwait’s defense, most Arab parties shared its expectations that Iraq would not attack and that the "Bedouin way” would work. Even after Iraq’s occupation, its allies and apologists continued to state this line. After all, never in the Arab League’s history had one Arab state simply occupied another. A limited Iraqi-initiated skirmish was expected, but a full-scale invasion was Saddam’s real surprise, which cost Kuwait its independence.59 Finally, although Iraq later claimed that Kuwait had planned to bring in U.S. forces to fight it, Kuwait’s abstention from such alliance and over-reliance on neutrality and mediation was the factor that left it unable to deter or rebuff an Iraqi attack.

3

Inter-Arab Mediation of the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict

The task of containing the Iraq-Kuwait crisis within manageable proportions during June-July 1990, when it first broke into the open, fell primarily on the shoulders of other Arab states. A combination of factors – the historical legacy of inter-Arab mediation, the intimacy of leading Arab statesmen with one another, the supposed familiarity of Arab mediators with the dispute, expectations that Iraq’s past behavior towards Kuwait would serve as a precedent for the present, and Saudi Arabia’s presumed economic leverage – resulted in a nearly unanimous belief in both the Arab world and the West that they would succeed in defusing the crisis. Even after Iraq’s invasion on 2 August, certain Arab parties continued to seek an exclusively "Arab solution” to the conflict. The failure of Arab mediation thus warrants analysis, specifically the unfolding of the crisis and the unsuccessful attempts made to mediate it satisfactorily. It is a common contention that numerous mistakes were made during the crucial gestation period of the crisis, June-July 1990, which, far from defusing the crisis, had the effect of exacerbating it. These mistakes derived from a fundamental misreading of the situation, a mistaken (albeit understandable and not unreasonable) belief that Saddam Hussein would conduct his foreign policies in accordance with a long-established inter-Arab "rule of the game”: that conflicts _________________________________________________ 58 59

Nawwaf’s interview, Der Spiegel, 24 September 1990. Viorst, “Report from Baghdad.”

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between Arab parties were rarely, if ever, zero-sum. Arab mediators were thus working from a false premise, namely that the Kuwait-Iraq dispute, like all other inter-Arab conflicts, was amenable to deal-making. To be sure, a different sort of mediation, accompanied by serious efforts to deter Iraq or by greater pressure on Kuwait to satisfy Iraqi demands, would not ipso facto have guaranteed better results. The sort of inter-Arab mediation employed, however, devoid of sufficient pressure on either party, ensured failure. 3.1 The Legacy of Mediation The management of inter-Arab conflicts over the past half-century has been marked by a number of enduring features: (1) a strong propensity to contain the Arab states’ myriad disputes with one another within the”family,” often resulting in a readiness to compromise in return for an appropriate compensation or tradeoff; (2) the prominent involvement of one or more Arab mediators, whose activities have ranged from serving as "postmen” to leveraging agreements through a range of incentives and disincentives, providing appropriate trade-offs and collective face-saving mechanisms and conferring legitimacy on the outcome; and (3) the construction of flexible coalitions in order to strengthen the position of one side or provide a counterweigh against another. This "balancing” against a third party, often under urgent conditions, frequently compels the parties within a coalition to compromise their own bilateral disputes for the sake of the larger, coalition interest. The inter-Arab mediation dynamic has itself contributed on occasion to the formation of balancing alignments, or in certain cases functioned in lieu of balancing coalitions in order to manage the challenges of the hour. The social origins of inter-Arab mediation can be traced to wasta, a traditional, semi-institutionalized mechanism for settling conflicts between individuals, families or tribal groups in the pre-modern Middle East which is still practiced today. In its classical form, it enabled the weaker party to avoid being shamed, compensated the aggrieved parties for lost honor, and involved a variety of outside parties whose very presence both legitimized and guaranteed the outcome. To be sure, regional and international contexts had changed a great deal since 1945, the year in which a fully fledged Arab state system, with its own regional organization, the League of Arab States, came into being.60 Many of the old regimes and accompanying socioeconomic order were swept away, for example those in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya. The establishment of Israel and the subsequent protracted conflict with it both promoted inter-Arab coopera_________________________________________________ 60 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Crystallization of the Arab State System, 1945-1954 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993).

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tion and heightened inter-Arab divisions. Since 1955, Arab states such as Egypt, Syria and subsequently Iraq have promoted the ideology of radical pan-Arabism (al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya). At the same time, pan-Arabism completely dominated the intellectual discourse during the 1950s and 1960s, which in turn decisively influenced the political agenda. Repeated unification attempts, most notably the 1958-61 Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic which exacerbated interArab tensions further, and the years between 1958 and 1970 came to be known as”the Arab Cold War.”61 This period was marked by intense political struggles, both between conservative regimes and revolutionary, anti-Western regimes, and within the revolutionary camp. The extension of Soviet-American rivalry to the Middle East further exacerbated domestic and interstate conflicts, as did the growing power of Iran. Oil revenues altered capabilities and expectations, transformed labor and capital flows, and further raised the stakes in regional politics. The power of the state apparatus expanded significantly. By the 1980s, disappointment with state performances and prevailing ideologies, continued demonstrations of weakness towards the West, Israel and Iran, and a generation of rapid population growth and the accompanying strains on existing institutions, combined to provide fertile ground for a new-old phenomenon which challenged the status quo – Islamic fundamentalism. Notwithstanding these myriad changes, Arab politics and society were still heavily shaped by the combination of primordial sentiments (loyalties to subnational foci of identification such as family, clan, and tribe) and a political culture which placed great emphasis on personal, face-to-face diplomacy.62 Primordial sentiments often provide social change and expanding, heavy-handed state bureaucracies and are thus clung to by individuals and groups alike. Indeed, after almost half a century of independence, political and social development in the Arab world was still not behaving like Clifford Geertz’s hypothetical "integrative revolution,” in which primordial sentiments are transformed into the basis of civil society. Rather than being transformed, primordial sentiments had remained an integral part of the value system and continued to play an important role in domestic political life, notwithstanding the creation of "modern,” bureaucraticstate institutions. As for the modern Arab state system in the post-Nasser era, it was characterized by a combination of intensive conflictual and cooperative elements, with no single party able to impose its will. The combination of elements which _________________________________________________ 61

Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). For valuable analyses of Arab culture and society, see Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Halim Barakat, Arab Society (New York, 1988).

62

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would allow for real hegemony (a charismatic leader, unlimited resources, a strong military and a stable sociopolitical order) was lacking. Consequently, systematic constraints and limitations generated a perpetual need for mediators to play stabilizing roles, a need which was reinforced by the prevailing "tribal” norms of Arab societies. Thus, underlying domestic political modes of behavior were replicated, to a considerable degree, in interstate relations, even among socalled "revolutionary” regimes. The employment of pressure and threats, and the ultimate attainment in nearly all cases of an agreement to avoid overt armed conflict, closely resembled traditional tribal norms of conduct. As a result, within the inter-Arab state system, in spite of demands, pressures, and criticisms inherent in a system marked by high levels of conflict, Arab leaders were generally able to recognize what their Arab rivals and antagonists were seeking, and to find ways to accommodate them in part. The prevailing atmosphere was one of continuous bargaining under nearly all circumstances, without resorting to actual physical conquest of the rival party. As part of this ongoing, complex process, certain Arab states developed specializations as mediators, and the possibilities for brokering fruitful trade-offs between the protagonists in a particular conflict were magnified. These underlying patterns survived, and even increased in significance, during the profusion of changes that the Middle East as a whole and the inter-Arab system in particular has undergone during recent decades. At times they even served as a kind of early-warning system, identifying trouble spots and enabling them to be addressed in a reasonably effective manner. Whether one looks at matters from a societal-cultural angle or from a more conventional international relations perspective, then inter-Arab mediation stood out as a central component of the Arab regional system’s modus operandi. The importance of inter-Arab mediation was highlighted by two examples during the 1980s. Egypt’s return to the Arab fold was brokered by Jordan and Iraq as part of their efforts during the Iran-Iraq War to congeal a broad-based anti-Iranian wartime coalition, and in 1989 Saudi Arabia, assisted by Algeria, Morocco and Kuwait, nudged Syria and the feuding factions in Lebanon into signing the Ta’if framework agreement providing for the reconstruction of the Lebanese polity after fifteen years of civil war. 3.2 Background to the Gulf Crisis The origins of the Kuwaiti-Iraq dispute are bound up with the creation of the modern entities of Kuwait and Iraq in formerly Ottoman lands. Kuwait was established as a British protectorate in 1899 and unilaterally served from the last vestiges of Ottoman control in 1913. Mandatory Iraq emerged as part of the post-

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World War I territorial redefinition of the Middle East. The 1990-1991 crisis had its immediate origins in the two years following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the summer of 1988. Kuwait escaped from the Iran-Iraq War relatively unscathed, and hoped that its $14 billion of wartime aid to Iraq would be properly appreciated, and concluded that a more stable era in the Gulf was in the offing. A number of outstanding bilateral disputes between Iraq and Kuwait quickly intruded, however: border problems, notably Iraq’s desire to improve its access to the Persian Gulf by annexing or leasing the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan, Iraqi demands for Kuwait to abide by OPEC production quotas63 and support a rise in the price of oil in line with Iraq’s economic requirements, Iraq’s accusations that Kuwait was illegally pumping oil from Iraq’s share of Rumayla oilfield astride their common border, and acute Iraqi financial needs, encompassing not only the forgiving of debts, but also new large-scale capital infusions. The two parties held a number of high-level meetings on these issues, but achieved no results. The larger postwar geopolitical context contributed to the failure of Kuwait and Iraq to resolve their dispute. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait had gradually become a full participant in the broad Arab coalition supporting Iraq. With the end of the war in July 1988, however, Kuwait returned to its traditional policy of balancing between its two stronger neighbors to the north. Predictably, Kuwait’s overtures to Tehran aroused considerable ire in Baghdad.64 Ironically, developments in the overall inter-Arab system were thought to portend well for the postwar era. Two Arab sub-regional groupings were established at the beginning of 1989, officially aimed at promoting economic integration in the face of the challenge posed by the European Community’s unity measures: the Arab Cooperation Council ("ACC”, see Box 7), composed of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, and the Arab Maghreb Union ("AMU”), consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the eight-year-old Gulf Cooperation Council, composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Inter-Arab affairs now seemed to be organized along more ‘rational’ lines, based on concrete economic, political and sociocultural interests rather than on empty ideological bombast.

_________________________________________________ 63

OPEC’s official quota for Kuwait was approximately 1.6 million barrels per day, whereas Kuwait was pumping approximately 2 million barrels a day. 64 Mohamed Heikel (Muhammed Haykal), Illusions of Triumph (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 162.

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Box 7:

Arab Cooperation Council

A regional bloc created in 1989 and composed of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen. It was a formalization of the alliance between Egypt and Iraq that was revived during the Iran-Iraq War. In some respects it was developed to rival and compete with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The regional alliance was ruptured by the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991, during which Egypt was aligned against Iraq and contributed forces to the international coalition.65

In fact, the new regional groupings were largely ineffective in promoting their goals. Moreover, the overall inter-Arab ‘structure’ was now even less amenable to the mediation of the inter-Arab disputes. Apart from Egypt’s reconciliation with Syria and Libya, neither ACC nor GCC members placed a high priority on additional coalition-building with other Arab states. The absence of a wider rapprochement process was significant, for the emergence of regional blocs only exacerbated Kuwaiti-Iraqi tensions further. Whereas the GCC was formed primarily to bolster its own members against its northern neighbors through the promotion of common foreign and economic policies derived from the underlying common interests of the Gulf states, Iraq viewed the ACC primarily as a vehicle to advance its regional ambitions. Consequently, Kuwait and Iraq did not enjoy the benefit of belonging to a larger, common political coalition which could encourage bilateral fence-mending. The absence of effective coalition-building processes reinforced the initial tendencies of both Iraq and Kuwait to avoid involving in the dispute other Arab parties who, had they been furnished with the proper information about the burgeoning conflict, might have been able to navigate the conflict towards calmer waters. In light of their past successes in deflecting Iraqi pressure, the Kuwaitis were confident that they could again mange adroitly. They preferred to maintain an aura of calm over their security problems, and adopted a low profile so as not to irk the Iraqis unduly. For their part, the Iraqis had an overriding interest in avoiding outside Arab involvement, which they feared would bolster the Kuwaiti side and deflect their demands. Thus for almost two years, until the spring of 1990, potential Arab mediators were kept away from the deteriorating situation. Instead of ripening towards a solution, the dispute ripened towards disaster. In sum, the period predating the outbreak of the crisis was characterized by the following relevant features: (1) the simmering conflict was kept off the inter_________________________________________________ 65 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Continuity and change in the inter-Arab system,” in The Gulf Crisis and its Global Aftermath, Eds. Gad Barzilai, Aharon Klieman, and Gil Shidlo (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 33-50.

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Arab stage by both Iraq (in order to advance its still-hidden agenda of domination) and Kuwait (which sought to avoid compromising any of its assets); (2) potential mediators of the dispute were uninvolved and uninformed as to details; (3) no inter-Arab coalition framework existed within which any kind of rapprochement between Kuwait and Iraq could be promoted. The Arab League, which was theoretically supposed to function in this manner, was in practice incapable of doing so. 3.3 Approaching Mediation The crisis began to gestate during the early months of 1990, and Iraq and Kuwait slowly departed from their previous aversion to outside involvement. However, bona fide mediation, in other words any mediation which would entail significant compromises in order to reach an agreement satisfactory to both sides, remained out of the question. Mediation was acceptable only as an evasive tool, in order to mask their real intentions. At the same time, it could serve to legitimate their positions and achieve the support of other Arab parties. To Saddam Hussein, the Arab world could be useful only insofar as it provided appropriate forums within which to press and legitimate his demands. Saddam apparently hoped to obtain understanding of Iraq’s needs, and to raise sufficient alarm among Arab leaders as to the consequences of inaction to compel them to apply pressure on Kuwait to accede to Iraq’s demands. At the very least, a more favorable regional atmosphere might be created for the realization of those demands. The Kuwaitis, for their part, were unbending in their refusal to compromise any financial or territorial assets. For them, mediation could be successful only if it left these assets undamaged. Their confidence regarding Kuwait’s place in the inter-Arab system was high.66 During the winter and spring of 1990, Iraq was extremely vocal in challenging what it characterized as a combined Western-Israeli conspiracy to rob Iraq, and the Arab nation as a whole, of the fruits of its victory over Iran, and prevent Arab scientific, technological and military advancement. In retrospect, it seems that Iraq’s broadsides were designed to create an atmosphere of gathering regional crisis within which Iraq was being unfairly deprived of its just rewards, to legitimize its ambition to be seen as the guardian of the Arab nation, and to divert attention from its more immediate intentions.67 In May 1990, Baghdad indirectly linked Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to this ‘conspiracy’ for the first time. Speaking to a closed session at the _________________________________________________ 66

Assiri, p. 117. Ofra Bengio, ‘Iraq’ in Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 387-395. 67

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Arab summit conference in Baghdad on May 30, Saddam Hussein issued a thinly veiled warning that Iraq was being subjected to economic warfare by the actions of unnamed "Arab brothers.” He was referring to the precipitous drop in the price of oil during recent months, occasioned by the widespread violation of OPEC quotas and the resulting glut in the oil market. It was the first time that Iraq had mentioned its "Kuwaiti problem” to other Arab parties.68 The Iraqis may have believed at this stage that their demands would be met: their Foreign Minister, Tariq ‘Aziz, subsequently stated that Saddam had not even considered employing military force against Kuwait before the end of June.69 To bring further pressure to bear, the Iraqis concurrently pushed for a Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti-UAE summit to be convened. Arab leaders believed that they were capable of managing the conflict, and thus regarded Saddam’s bellicose statements merely as a prelude to mediation. However, they were not completely of one mind regarding the desirable outcome. For example, Jordan’s King Hussein was more sympathetic than were other Arab leaders to the Iraqi position, having long viewed Kuwait as miserly towards its poorer Arab brethren. The Kuwaitis, for their part, were incapable of recognizing the Iraqi threat for what it was. Hence, as the crisis evolved, Kuwait viewed Arab mediation in terms of process: the goal was not to have it broker a solution, but to initiate an extended process of negotiations which would be sufficient to defuse the crisis. It was only in mid-June that Kuwait began addressing the matter even in a bilateral context, indicating that negotiations to resolve the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute would soon commence.70 The Kuwaitis clearly did not grasp the imminence of the threat, or view it in existential terms. Kuwaiti leaders understood Iraqi warnings as simply another attempt at economic blackmail. At worst, they believed Iraq might provoke a military skirmish along their common border which could then be adjudicated by Arab mediation.71 The task at hand, in Kuwaiti minds, was to foster an atmosphere in inter-Arab cooperation within which Kuwait’s traditional status as an inter-Arab mediator and supporter of all-Arab causes (for example, in the struggle against Israel and against the challenge posed by Iran) would be remembered favorably. Before the summer of 1990, Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, had cultivated the status of inter-Arab mediation par excellence. Now the Kuwaitis’ own direct interests seemed to necessitate an atmosphere of calm, goodwill and security, something that inter-Arab mediation, they _________________________________________________ 68 Radio Baghdad, 18 July – Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES), Daily Report, 19 July 1990. 69 Viorst, p. 66 70 For example, al-Bayadir al-Siyasi, 12 June 1990. 71 Financial Times, 18 September 1990.

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believed, would foster. They appeared to have had no intention of making major concessions to the Iraqis, but were interested in initiating a period of prolonged bargaining during which pressure would be brought to bear on Baghdad to water down its demands. Kuwaiti vital interests would thereby be ensured. The wide gap between the positions of Iraq and Kuwait was highlighted by a meeting between Saddam and Kuwait’s Amir Sheikh Jabir on the sidelines of the May 1990 Baghdad Arab summit. According to Mohamed Heikel, the veteran Egyptian journalist and former confidant of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, Saddam’s requests for additional economic aid from Kuwait were, subsequently, countered by Jabir’s references to Iraq’s $14 billion debt to Kuwait, a legacy of the Iran-Iraq War. Both sides spoke in muted tones of their outstanding border issues and of the need to breathe new life into various joint committees discussing the matter. In doing so, they reinforced the feeling among other Arab parties that no real crisis existed, and that the two countries would settle their dispute amicably. In fact, however, Saddam and Jabir had agreed on nothing.72 The Kuwaiti leadership’s approach to the problem was further illustrated by its discussions with Iraq’s deputy Prime Minister, Sa’dun Hammadi, in Kuwait City on 25-26 June. Hammadi left believing that Kuwait was ready to accept Iraq’s demand that it should abide by OPEC production quotas and agree to a rise in the price of oil from $18 to $25 a barrel.73 The Kuwaitis, however, had understood this meeting to be only the first of many. On 10 July Kuwait’s promise to Hammadi was ostensibly confirmed at an OPEC ministerial meeting in Jidda, but the Kuwaitis immediately let it be known that they would observe OPEC price and production stipulations only until the autumn. The Iraqi pressure, according to Kuwaiti thinking, was quite containable, and other GCC leaders were of similar mind. According to the Iraqis, during a 9 July telephone conversation between Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and the Amir of Qatar (neither of whom ever denied the assertion) Fahd assured Qatar’s ruler that the Iraqis could adroitly be soothed by means of proper expressions of identification with their position, without requiring substantive concessions.74 During the first half of July, the Iraqis put their diplomatic campaign into a higher gear, sending Hammadi to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait again, as well as firing off a number of diplomatic messages to Arab leaders. Their efforts peaked on 16 July when Tariq ‘Aziz sent a long memorandum to the Arab League’s Secretary General, Chedli Klibi, for circulation amongst League members, detailing the alleged crimes of Kuwait and the UAE against Iraq. (Like _________________________________________________ 72 73 74

Heikel, p. 169. KUNA, 26 June 1991, FBIS-NES, 27 June 1991. Al-Tadamun, 29 October 1990, FBIS-NES, 30 October 1991.

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Kuwait, the UAE was accused of producing excessive amounts of oil and thereby driving down its price.)75 Iraq’s use of an all-Arab forum was designed not to encourage genuine mediation, but to fulfill three purposes: (1) to emphasize the justice of Iraq’s assertion that it deserved to be rewarded by the Arab world for defending the GCC states against Iran, rather than receiving a "poisoned dagger in our back;” (2) to alert the Arab "majors,” particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to the fact that a serious inter-Arab crisis could be avoided only if they acted swiftly to press Kuwait into concessions; and (3) to prepare public opinion in the region for further Iraqi action in the event of failure. One day later, on the anniversary of the Ba’ath party’s seizure of power in Iraq in 1968, Saddam went public with a blistering attack upon Kuwait and the UAE.76 Kuwait was now compelled to confront the Iraqis more directly, but did so in line with its existing strategy. On 18 July, Kuwait and the UAE attempted to neutralize Baghdad’s pitch to the Arab League by dispatching their own detailed memoranda to Klibi, rebuffing Iraq’s accusations and tendering some of their own, including Iraq’s continuous ‘transgressions on Kuwaiti territories,’ and called for an Arab League arbitration committee to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.77 Kuwait also dispatched envoys to a number of Arab capitals to explain its position. But the Iraqi verbal campaign escalated further, in order to increase Baghdad’s pressure on Kuwait. Another letter ‘Aziz to Klibi accused Kuwait of neglecting all of Iraq’s past attempts to solve their territorial dispute.78 As reports of large-scale troop movement southward began to filter out at the beginning of the last week of July, Kuwait finally began to grasp the seriousness of the dispute. But it is difficult to argue that Kuwait’s underlying posture changed substantively as a result of Iraq’s escalation. As part of Kuwait’s belated effort to check the Iraqis, it launched a media campaign emphasizing the need to adhere to "Arab principles of consultation and dialogue, not threats,” and the hope that the "geographical proximity and past experience” of the two countries would result in an amicable settlement.79

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Iraqi News Agency (INA), 18 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 18 July 1990. Radio Baghdad, 17 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 17 July 1990. KUNA, 20 July 1990, FBIS-NES 23 July 1990. 78 INA, 24 July 1990, FBIS-NES, 24 July 1990. 79 KUNA, 18 and 20 July 1990, FBIS-NES 19 and 20 July 1990; al-Anba (Kuwait) 26 July 1990; Milton Viorst, “After the Liberation,” The New Yorker, 30 September 1991, pp. 63-64. 76 77

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3.4 The Mediators and Their Actions At this point, the time-honored ‘mechanisms’ of inter-Arab mediation swung into high gear. In retrospect, however, the mediators were neither particularly creative nor resourceful, or in possession of any practical incentive to influence the disputants. As befitted his status as the senior "pan-Arab” civil servant, Chedli Klibi visited Kuwait on 21 July, Baghdad on 24 July and Kuwait again on 26 July. Klibi was, however, only a reporter of current thinking in each capital. His weakness reflected the Arab League’s inherent institutional weakness. Klibi’s lack of clout also stemmed from the fact that, as a Tunisian national, he did not have the support of a leading Arab state (by contrast, all other Arab League Secretary Generals have been Egyptians). Saudi Arabia was universally expected to play a leading role in mediating the dispute. Even more than the Kuwaitis, the Saudis had several qualities suitable to inter-Arab mediators. They often engaged in "checkbook diplomacy,” in other words defusing a dispute by using financial incentives to influence protagonists and maintain a universal image as a party genuinely interested in conflict resolution. The main thrust of Saudi Arabia’s promotion of inter-Arab consensus derived from its geopolitical and social vulnerabilities: lengthy borders, a large, thinly populated territory, only a small army to protect its oil wealth from potentially predatory neighbors, and a traditional tribal society experiencing the stresses of modernization. The promotion of inter-Arab conflict management was vital to keeping more powerful states at bay, and to preventing the pernicious influence of radical Arab nationalism (embodied by Ba’athists, Nasserists and Marxists of various stripes) from penetrating into Saudi society. The Saudis had logged considerable experience as mediators in many of the major inter-Arab conflicts of the preceding two decades.80 In this case, however, they chose not to assume their traditional self-designated role of mediator. Although Fahd was critical of Kuwait’s obstinacy at several points, the Saudis supported Kuwait’s oil policy, which was in line with their own. Active mediation would have had one of two effects: either it would have exposed them to Iraq’s anger and to charges of betraying a 1989 Iraqi-Saudi non-aggression pact,81 or it would have forced the Saudis significantly to modify their support of _________________________________________________ 80 For example, between Syria and Egypt in 1975-1976; between Syria and various factions in Lebanon over the past fifteen years between Syria and Yasir Arafat’s al-Fatah, assisting, for example in Arafat’s evacuation from Syria’s besieging forces in Tripoli in 1983; between Algeria and Morocco during the early and mid-1980s. It also took leading roles in formulating broadly based agreements at a number of inter-Arab conferences: the Arab summits held in Riyadh in 1976 and Fez in 1982, and the Ta’if meeting of Lebanese factions in 1989. 81 The initiative for the pact apparently came from the Iraqi side. The Saudis nevertheless hoped that it would help to moderate Iraqi behavior in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War.

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Kuwait. The Saudis therefore preferred to adopt a low profile, which in this case could not affect the actual dynamic of the conflict. Their minimal and essentially meaningless involvement during the first half of July was demonstrated by their willingness to hold a Kuwaiti-UAE-Iraqi-Saudi meeting on oil pricing policies. To Iraq’s great disappointment, the meeting was for oil ministers only, rather then taking place at a more appropriately senior level.82 At the end of July, the Saudis provided the venue, Jidda, for the last pre-invasion Kuwait-Iraq meeting. At bottom, the Saudis simply did not believe that Saddam would attack Kuwait.83 Whereas the Saudis had material incentives to offer but shied away from too much involvement, the Egyptians had nothing to offer in the way of sweeteners but sought a central mediating role. They were motivated by a desire to demonstrate Egypt’s crucial role in promoting regional stability, and to reconfirm the image of Cairo as self-styled "first among equals” in the Arab world. The Egyptian leadership, however, miscalculated doubly. First, it overestimated Egypt’s weight. Egypt’s contribution (in manpower and surplus Soviet-made weapons) to Iraq’s survival during the Iran-Iraq War, and its much publicized but untested commitment to the security of the GCC states in the face of the Iranian threat during the war’s latter stages, had reinforced Egypt’s image as a regional balancer. The result was an unjustified belief that its very involvement in mediation effort would ipso facto have an adequate stabilizing effect. Cairo’s second error was to underestimate the severity of the crisis, failing to recognize Iraq’s absolute determination that matters should not return to "business as usual.” This failure was a direct result, at least in part, of both Kuwait’s and Iraq’s earlier avoidance of inter-Arab involvement in the dispute. The Egyptians were therefore overconfident. Not having been let in on the real intentional of Iraq, their fellow ACC members, they played down its increasingly aggressive posture and continued to believe that Iraq was amenable to bona fide mediation right up to the last week of July. Mubarak’s personal involvement began with him receiving Tariq ‘Aziz and Jordan’s King Hussein on 23 July. Worried by reports of large-scale Iraqi troop movements towards the IraqiKuwait frontier, Mubarak flew to Baghdad the next day for a meeting with Saddam. He left the meeting with assurances that the Iraqi troops were engaged in routine maneuvers, with what he understood to be Saddam’s promise not to use military force to solve the dispute, and with Iraq’s consent to a high-level meeting in Jidda on 28 July between Iraq’s ruling Revolutionary Command Council Vice-Chairman, ‘Izzat Ibrahim, and Kuwait’s Crown Prince Sa’d ‘Abdallah. At Egypt’s suggestion, both Iraq and Kuwait toned down their acerbic media campaigns. Substantively, the Egyptians may have suggested discreetly that it would _________________________________________________ 82 83

Heikel, p. 171. Ghazi A. Ghosaibi, The Gulf Crisis (London and New York: Kegan Paul Intl., 1993), pp. 27-8.

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be a good idea for the Kuwaitis to be forthcoming in the talks. They most certainly believed that the Iraqis would have to be offered something concrete in the matters of borders and improved access to the Gulf. They refrained, however, from active advocacy.84 On the face of it, Mubarak appeared to have locked the Iraqis safely into a diplomatic process that promised in time to defuse the crisis. Material incentive, either financial or political, would have enabled the parties to alter their overall expectations of the crisis from a ‘zero-sum game’ to one from which both sides could derive concrete benefits. Mubarak, however, did not possess the means of supplying any such incentives. He served only to provide the crisis with "first aid,” dealing with the tensions it had generated by tendering his good offices and winning vague pledges of non-aggression from Iraq. Rather than neutralizing the conflict, Mubarak had misread Saddam’s intentions, thus reinforcing the already prevalent false sense of security in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and indirectly facilitating Iraq’s invasion. Since Saddam was by now at least contemplating some form of military action, it seems likely that he was engaged in an elaborate deception of Mubarak. At the same time, Saddam may have been willing to give the Kuwaitis one more chance to make major concessions, and thus have sought to avoid tipping his hand too explicitly. Had he told Mubarak that the Jidda meeting would be the Kuwaitis’ final opportunity to avoid unilateral Iraqi action he would have risked Egyptian disapprobation, and might possibly have catalyzed the inter-Arab or even international coalition against him. By not being candid, he at least implied that the negotiations would be open-ended, thus confirming Mubarak’s own preconceptions. At bottom, Saddam expected Mubarak to serve as a messenger, but failed to clarify the message. Mubarak thus inadvertently misled his interlocutors: according to Kuwait’s Minister of Defense of the day, Nawwaf alSabah, his government "simply could not imagine that the Iraqi head of state would lie to Egypt’s president.”85 Buoyed up by Mubarak’s report, by a joint military exercise involving U.S. and UAE units, by the meeting scheduled to take place in Jidda, and by the addition of King Hussein and Yasser Arafat to the list of Arab mediators, the GCC states were more confident than ever that Iraq would not embark upon any military adventure.86 The Kuwaitis were sufficiently self-assured to carry on in their existing bargaining mode, making temporary concessions to Iraq regarding new OPEC pricing and production benchmarks at a ministerial meeting on 26–27 _________________________________________________ 84 85 86

Radio Cairo, 8 August 1990, FBIS-NES, 8 August 1990. Al-Anba (Cairo), 15 September 1991. The New Yorker, 24 June 1991.

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July, and then immediately indicating that the new guidelines would be reconsidered in the autumn of 1992.87 The Iraqis, by this time, had made up their minds to dally on further. While reassuring Saudi Foreign Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal that the Iraqi troops were headed for the Fao peninsula, not the Kuwaiti border, they had already decided that the Jidda meeting (which they delayed until 31 July) would be the last. Either the Kuwaitis would have to make major concessions, or Iraq would use force. Saddam’s hopes of Arab sympathy were not entirely unrealistic. According to Heikel, King Fahd, while not cognizant of the imminence of the Iraqi threat, urged the Kuwaitis to be flexible regarding oil production quotas and Iraq’s demands for access to the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, which would allow them to assert themselves more fully in Gulf waters. Fahd’s urgings were, however, reportedly looked upon with a jaundiced eye by Kuwait’s ruler, Sheikh Jabir.88 The Iraqis were no less firm in resisting Saudi Arabia’s efforts to compromise on essential interests, and Riyadh responded by adopting a low profile. In keeping with Iraq’s insistence upon the bilateral nature of the dispute, the Saudis provided the venue for the 31 July meeting, but were not present during the talk; nor did they interject themselves in any way. Fahd did not attend the meeting in person. According to the Kuwaitis, Kuwait agreed immediately to write off Iraq’s $14 billion war debt and to lease Iraq the island of Warba (but not Bubiyan). Iraq’s request for additional massive financial assistance, was, however, brushed aside. ‘Izzat Ibrahim, for his part, had come not to negotiate, but only to accept Kuwait’s capitulation.89 Pierre Salinger relates that the Kuwaitis angered Ibrahim further by suddenly demanding a solution to the problem of the demarcation of their common border, an issue not listed on the agenda.90 The Kuwaitis may have been preparing the ground for an eleventh-hour deal over their common border; alternatively, they may simply have been playing for time. After two short, unproductive meetings, Ibrahim left for home, rejecting a Kuwaiti suggestion that the two sides should issue an optimistic-sounding joint statement to the press. Amazingly, the Kuwaitis, entrenched in their conception of continuing mediation, still could not read the writing on the wall, and were under the impression that the talks were to be continued in Baghdad on 4 August. Just over 24 hours later, the Iraqis commenced their invasion. According to _________________________________________________ 87

Heikel, pp. 179-181. Al-Musawwar, 17 August 1990. 89 Ghosaibi, p. 27. 90 Pierre Salinger, with Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 74. 88

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Heikel, Saddam had decided only two days earlier (prior to the Jidda meeting) to occupy the whole of the country, instead of the border area and islands alone.91 Taken together, an absence of efforts to draw the two sides into a more inclusive inter-Arab coalition framework, the personal idiosyncrasies of would-be mediators, and the lack of any proper process by which compromises and tradeoffs might be promoted characterized the events leading up to the Jidda meeting. Consequently, the event was imbued with false expectations and misunderstandings. The two sides remained far apart in their strategic goals. Indeed, Arab mediation efforts contributed to a further exacerbation of the crisis, as each side understood the outcome of these efforts in diametrically opposed fashion: the Kuwaitis believed that negotiations would continue indefinitely without fear of an Iraqi attack, while the Iraqis were encouraged to persist in the illusion that a broad Arab understanding of their problems and the legitimization of their demands had been achieved. To be sure, Iraq was not given to understand that it would be permissible to attack Kuwait, but it believed that the prevailing atmosphere following an attack would be politically manageable. 3.5 After 2 August Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait on 2 August caught Arab mediators completely by surprise, and compelled swift reevaluation under extraordinary crisis conditions. For both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the time for mediation between Kuwait and Iraq had past, and the task at hand was to mobilize an effective anti-Iraq coalition in order to restore the status quo ante. Jordan, Yemen and the PLO, on the other hand, redoubled their efforts to mediate and contain the dispute within inter-Arab parameters. In doing so, they implicitly accepted Iraq’s demands as legitimate, at least in part.92 An unstated assumption underpinning Mubarak’s and Fahd’s action after 2 August was that Iraq’s swallowing up of Kuwait had fundamentally changed the inter-Arab”rules of the game,” that the Arab system was no longer able to regulate itself along the accepted lines of slow paced, continuous diplomacy. Mubarak felt personally humiliated and embarrassed, and also insulted by what he saw as Saddam having lied to him in pledging to refrain from employing force.93 Mubarak understood very quickly that the crisis would bring international diplomatic and/or military action that would replace Arab mediation _________________________________________________ 91

Heikel, pp. 190-192. For an elaboration of the activities of the Arab opponents to the Saudi-Egyptian strategy see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Inter-Arab Relations”, and Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Palestine Liberation Organization” in MECS, 1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, Press, 1992), pp. 155-158, 224-226. 93 Radio Cairo, 8 August 1990, FBIS-NES, 8 August 1990. 92

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whether the Arab states liked it or not, and favored unstinting cooperation with the U.S. in its efforts to force Iraq out of Kuwait. The chances of Saddam bowing to purely Arab entreaties were, in Mubarak’s view, exceedingly slim. To be sure, he was at first willing to countenance last-ditch efforts, spearheaded by King Hussein, to persuade the Iraqis to reverse their course. Mubarak rapidly came to believe, however, that Iraq could be forced to disgorge Kuwait only by widening the playing field to include nonArab, in other words Western actors. Concurrently, they sought to capitalize on the widespread instinctive revulsion among Arab leaders at Saddam’s action, and to mobilize an anti-Iraqi Arab coalition, even in the full awareness that complete consensus would be unattainable. Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd was no less stunned by Saddam’s action. Overnight, a new status quo had been created which, if left in place, promised to alter the Gulf region’s political and military balance of power. More immediate still was the possibility that the Iraqi army intended to occupy the Saudi oilfields in northeastern Saudi Arabia. The large-scale deployment of Iraqi units near the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, several small Iraqi incursions into Saudi Arabia, and the difficulty the Saudis had had in obtaining clarification from Baghdad of Iraq’s intentions, made the Saudis extremely nervous. Like Mubarak, Fahd gave short shrift to the possibility that Saddam would quickly agree to reverse his course, and thus had no interest in assuming a mediatory role himself. Fahd also viewed King Hussein’s efforts skeptically, and rebuffed his suggestions of a face-to-face meeting.94 Like Mubarak, Fahd was being pressed by the United States to take a strong stand against the Iraqi invasion. What concerned him most during the first few days after 2 August was the degree to which the United States would be willing to commit itself to confronting Iraq. While being urged by some of the Kingdom’s princes to invite American troops into Saudi Arabia, Fahd was acutely conscious of the risks involved in inviting "infidel” forces into the holiest lands of Islam, with regard both to his own population and to the Muslim world in general. He needed to be persuaded that the U.S. effort would not be another abortive one like that in Lebanon in 1983– 4, the 1980 effort to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran, and the U.S.’s failure one year earlier to keep the Shah in power.95 While mulling over America’s role, the Saudis had little interest in hosting a mini-summit in Jidda on 5 August. "What’s the point?” Fahd asked King Hussein on the night of 3 August.96 On 6 August Fahd made his decision: an American-led multinational force would be deployed on Saudi soil. Arab and Islamic participation was vital for symbolic _________________________________________________ 94 95 96

Heikel, pp. 214-215. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 239-277. Heikel, p. 209.

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purposes. At the same time, the Saudis were keen on keeping the numbers of Arab troops down to an absolute minimum, in order to avoid introducing the Trojan horse of subversive radical elements into the Kingdom.97 Ironically, Jordan, Yemen, and the PLO, who had not been full parties to the earlier mediation efforts, now took up the mediation banner. For them, the Iraqi invasion had redoubled rather than cancelled the need for mediation. King Hussein, in particular, believed that an "Arab solution” to the crisis (pacification by means of a continuing bargaining process that treated all parties’ claims as negotiable) was both more imperative than ever and still achievable. Proper and sustained mediation would eventually result in the restoration of at least attenuated Kuwaiti sovereignty, and in the necessary political, financial and territorial concessions to Iraq. To be sure, Jordanian-Iraqi relations had grown increasingly close in recent years, both economically and in the political-strategic realm.98 To be sure, King Hussein had viewed with equanimity Saddam’s intention to apply pressure on Kuwait. Nonetheless, despite Saudi and Egyptian propaganda claims, there is no evidence whatsoever that Jordan was a participant in a grand design against Saudi Arabia, or that King Hussein viewed Saddam’s actions favorably after the fact. At bottom, King Hussein was caught in a whirlwind of competing regional and domestic political currents – between the pan-Arab, anti-Western and proPalestinian fervor generated by Saddam and acclaimed by Palestinians in both the East and West Banks, and the pro-Western, pragmatic and legalistic orientations of the GCC states and Egypt – and felt compelled to try and salvage the situation.99 King Hussein was also quick to see, as if by dint of experienced instinct, that a war to drive Iraq from Kuwait might result in Israel’s involvement. Consequently, the thought of Jordan becoming a killing field in an Israeli-Iraqi exchange caused him deep concern. Jordan’s efforts were consistent with its incessant mediation efforts in the inter-Arab arena during previous years, most notably those designed to reconcile Syria and Iraq. Devoid of the financial and political clout necessary for all-Arab leadership, King Hussein concentrated on promoting wifaq wal-ittifaq (reconciliation and consensus). For Jordan, the mere act of mediation enabled it to be seen as a promoter of core Arab values, and thus served as an important source of both domestic and regional legitimacy. _________________________________________________ 97

Heikel, p. 25. For details, see Amatzia Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 51-70. 99 Laurie Brand, “Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan’s 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis Policy”, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1991), pp. 1-46. 98

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Yemen’s leaders shared many of King Hussein’s sentiments. Like Jordan, Yemen had supported Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War, and had even sent a brigade of combat personnel to assist in the fighting. Iraq was viewed as a model of a successful Arab state, combining military and technological development with an independent foreign policy, not in the service of great powers, but in the Arab world’s favor. Yemenis were especially opposed to Western involvement in the Gulf, owing to the legacy of British control over Aden, which had lasted until 1967. Like the Jordanians, the Yemenis believed that Iraq had some legitimate grievances against Kuwait. Moreover, Iraq’s criticism of alleged Kuwaiti greed, and its appeal to the "Arab masses” against the "rapacious oil sheikhs,” resonated widely in both Yemen and Jordan, among official circles and throughout the poorer sectors of their societies alike, thank in no small part to their experiences as expatriate laborers in the Gulf. Yemen’s leaders were thus unequivocal in actively promoting mediation of the conflict and rejecting blanket condemnation of Iraq. Foreign Minister ‘Abd al-Karim al-Iryani put it succinctly: "The Arabs should not adopt a condemnatory position towards any party in the conflict, because mediation and condemnation are irreconcilable.”100 King Hussein’s efforts and Yemen’s stand had a severe and decidedly negative effect on Jordanian and Yemeni relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The Gulf states’ sole goal was swiftly to return the situation to the status quo ante before Iraq’s swallowing up of Kuwait became irreversible. To be sure, Mubarak needed to cover himself against accusations that he had not taken advantage of inter-Arab mediation mechanisms, and therefore recommended to King Hussein, who had hastened to Alexandria to discuss the crisis with him on 2 August, that he should fly immediately to Baghdad to ascertain whether Saddam was willing to reverse his course. If Saddam agreed, the matter could be sealed diplomatically at a mini-summit in Jidda. The Egyptian President was, however, determined not to accept less than that. King Hussein, on the other hand, seems to have convinced himself that Saddam’s ambiguous responses to his pleadings at their 3 August meeting amounted to a tangible commitment speedily to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait, as long as the Arab states refrained from issuing any condemnation of Iraq.101 Was this King Hussein’s wishful thinking, in his concern to avoid a wider conflagration? Be that as it may, he subsequently maintained that Egypt’s condemnation of Iraq on 3 August had been issued before he had even been able to transmit Saddam’s reply. The Egyptians, on the other hand, claimed that they did wait until they had received what they deemed to be an unsatisfactory re_________________________________________________ 100 101

INA, 4 August 1990, FBIS-NES, 6 August 1990. Heikel, p. 208.

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sponse.102 Cairo’s censure of Iraq was followed a few hours later by an Egyptianorchestrated denunciation by an Arab foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of an Islamic foreign ministers’ meeting in Cairo. The Jordanians maintained that these two condemnations, marking the establishment of a newly formed antiIraqi coalition, hardened Saddam’s heart. The Jordanian mediation initiative was essentially a thin reed. It is difficult to conceive of Iraq pulling a volte-face less than 48 hours after the invasion without receiving anything from Kuwait merely in order to avoid Arab condemnation. It was almost equally inconceivable that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would allow the Arab foreign ministers who were coincidentally in Cairo to remain silent. Heikel offers some fragmentary evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein realized within 48 hours of the invasion that Arab and international resistance was greater than he had expected, and that because of this he was willing to consider altering course. However, the main address for Saddam’s feelers, if that is what they were, was George Bush. Despite the ‘premature’ Arab condemnation, the Iraqis were still willing to attend an Iraqi-Kuwaiti-Saudi-Egyptian mini-summit in Jidda on 5 August to work out the details of an Arab solution. For Baghdad, it was important at this juncture to try and forestall possible Western intervention, which could take place only with the Arab League’s imprimatur (in other words, with EgyptianSaudi approval). The President of Yemen, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salah, traveled to Baghdad on 4 August to lend a helping hand. However, Saddam’s unwillingness to attend in person if the Kuwaiti Amir was to be present (one of the absolute preconditions of the other three parties)103 indicates that the Iraqis saw the meeting only as a way of buying time and legitimating their interests, a mirror image of Kuwait’s expectations of the Jidda meeting less than a week earlier. Saddam’s message to Fahd on 4 August, reassuring him that the Iraqi forces would keep their distance from the Saudi frontier,104 was probably designed to improve the atmosphere and help make possible the convening of the Jidda mini-summit. Still the advocates of mediation continued to ply their wares. On 5 August, Yasser Arafat traveled to Alexandria from Baghdad and reportedly suggested that Kuwait should make far-reaching concessions in return for a commitment from Iraq to withdrawing its forces.105 From Alexandria, Arafat journeyed to _________________________________________________ 102 The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, White Paper: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990-March 1991 (Amman, August 1991), pp. 4-5; International Herald Tribune, 17 October 1990; MENA 2 September 1991, FBIS-NES, 4 September 1991. 103 Heikel, pp. 20-78. 104 Ibid, pp. 214-215. 105 WP, 7 August 1990.

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Jidda, where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to gain entrance to the GCC Ministerial Council meeting to present his case. His efforts were supported by Libya and Yemen, and more equivocally by Algeria, which issued an urgent appeal on 8 August for an Arab summit conference "to try, if it is not too late, to obtain a solution solely within the Arab community.”106 Two days later, on 10 August, Arab leaders convened in Cairo. Instead of achieving a renewed consensus, however, the summit confirmed the unprecedented level of inter-Arab polarization created by the Iraqi invasion. The Iraqi delegation to the summit, led by Ibrahim, felt under siege from the moment they arrived, and Mubarak and the Saudis ramrodded an anti-Iraq resolution through the summit without extended debate. The resolution, approved by only 12 of the 21 Arab League members, provided the basis for dispatching Arab military units to Saudi Arabia, and legitimized finally and fully the Saudi decision to invite the protection of the West.107 3.6 Epilogue and Conclusions The parameters laid down during the gestation of the crisis remained in place without substantial alteration until the war commenced on the night of 16– 17 January 1991. The Egyptian and Saudi-led anti-Saddam Arab coalition was firmly ranged against an Arab minority, spearheaded by Jordan, Algeria, Yemen and the PLO, which continued to advocate an "Arab solution” to the crisis. The failure of the efforts made by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to mediate the dispute successfully during July 1990 had, however, left them with an extremely bad taste in their mouths, and the belief that the inter-Arab”glass” – the set of minimal norms of interstate behavior which had, however shakily, governed interArab relations for the last 45 years – had been shattered. For them, as for Saddam, the conflict was now a zero-sum game: they were determined to show no flexibility and to concede nothing. The efforts of King Hussein, of Algeria’s Chedli Benjedid and of Arafat to revive Arab mediation during the remainder of the crisis were thus chimerical. Why had inter-Arab mediation failed to contain the Iraq-Kuwait crisis within manageable proportions? Several overlapping explanations stand out. Firstly, Kuwait and the potential Arab mediators (as well as the Western powers) were exceedingly slow to recognize the existence of a brewing crisis. Having finally become engaged, the potential mediator permitted Kuwait and Iraq to set the pace of negotiations, serving more as messengers than mediators. In contrast with the Lebanese crisis of 1989, no stable framework emerged to shape inter_________________________________________________ 106 107

Radio Algiers, 8 August 1990. Heikel, pp. 223-230.

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Arab diplomacy.108 Secondly, proper incentives, whether financial or political, were not tendered, nor were adequate proposals made for trade-offs (for example, suggestions to Kuwait that it ought to be flexible were not accompanied by proposals for sufficient compensatory incentives). Thirdly, lack of clarity plagued inter-Arab contacts and obscured underlying intentions, never more so than during the Mubarak-Saddam meeting of 24 July. Finally, the two sides’ understandings and expectations of Arab mediation efforts were poles apart. Arab mediation thus served to exacerbate the crisis, not to defuse it. Of course, more adequate mediation efforts might not have had the desired result of defusing the crisis in time. Saddam’s Iraq was eager to solve its economic and strategic post-Iran-Iraq War problems at Kuwait’s expense. More generally, a military and strategic imbalance had arisen in the Gulf, Iraq having been immeasurably strengthened during the Gulf War while Iran had temporarily turned inward. The imbalance was sufficient for Saddam to develop grandiose visions of regional leadership, believing that his bold actions in the Gulf could not be checked by the Arab world or by Iran, and would not be checked by the West. There can be little doubt that the character and personality of Saddam – the holder of "a Darwinian world-view in which only the fittest survive, and where the end justifies all means,” whose actions were marked by "tenacious perseverance, impressive manipulative skills and utter ruthlessness”109 – were crucial in shaping the course of events. The centrality of individual leaders in Arab politics produced, in this case, a monstrous outcome. It appears that Saddam and his Arab rivals were equally the prisoners of a number of misconceptions regarding inter-Arab diplomacy on the eve of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Saddam misconstrued Arab efforts to mediate a solution as an underlying unwillingness or inability to block the realization of his goals. His rivals incorrectly assumed prior to 2 August that the Arab world could ‘regulate’ itself, and that Saddam Hussein, like other ambitious Arab leaders before him, would test the limits of collective Arab norms, but not shatter them. The Kuwaitis, in particular, operated under the illusion that they were in the process of achieving their goals. They thus failed to sound proper advance warnings to the U.S. – this despite the increase in American-Kuwaiti consultations over the last few years, which had bolstered Kuwaiti confidence that the U.S. would not ultimately allow Kuwait to go under.110 Instead, the Kuwaitis preferred the old _________________________________________________ 108 The reference is to the Arab League’s tripartite committee, involving the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria, established by the 1989 Casablanca Arab summit to resolve the Lebanese crisis and whose efforts contributed to the signing of the Ta’if accords. 109 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 286, 291. 110 Viorst, “After the Liberation”, pp. 64-66, 72.

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method of publicly keeping Western powers at arm’s-length in order to avoid what they feared would be damaging political repercussions. Their failure to alert the U.S. contributed to America’s own lackluster response to the crisis in its early stages, which in turn reinforced Saddam’s misperceptions concerning America’s probable response, encouraging him further. Arab responses to the invasion were in large measure determined by what had preceded it. Consequently, they split, in unprecedented fashion, into two camps, rendering null the chances of successful mediation. At bottom, the failure of Arab mediation stemmed from a fundamental misreading of the situation. Arab mediation can be likened to a form of diplomatic deterrence. It works best when no one really wants to "shatter the glass.” Since Saddam’s challenge to the Arab conflict-management system was not a "traditional” one, however, the conditions which promote deterrence when the will to war is absent simply reinforced Saddam’s determination to invade Kuwait. The failure of Arab mediation in the Gulf crisis contains a number of lessons. (1) International crises are not always ripe for successful mediation. (2) Mediators of crises must properly recognize the underlying interests and motivations of the protagonists, and should be wary of the tendency to interpret information solely through the prism of previous episodes of a dispute: the past is not always a guide to the future. (3) The ability of Arab states to contain their disputes within purely Arab parameters must not be taken for granted, but should rather be evaluated case by case. (4) The institutionalization of inter-Arab alignments (for example, the Egypt/Iraq-led ACC) does not necessarily indicate that they will prove durable. (5) The personal predilections, foibles and idiosyncrasies of Arab heads of state are enormously influential in determining the behavior of their states during a crisis. (6) Western policy makers should not rely excessively on the evaluations of regional allies during the Gulf crisis which may have relevance for the future: the employment of full-scale military might by one Arab country against another in order to swallow it completely, and the participation of Arab armed forces alongside Western armies in a war against a fellow Arab state. (8) The GCC states do not have, either by themselves or together with other Arab allies, the ability to deter stronger regional forces (Iraq, Iran), and will remain for the foreseeable future dependent upon Western powers as the ultimate guarantors against an invasion or a military, territorial incursion directed against them.

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The Unique Role of the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict

The United Nations played a special role during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. It was the first time the United Nations authorized the use of military force to respond to a crisis. This point, in itself, makes the UN role unique. Further, the United Nations reacted quickly to events on the ground and passed timely resolutions that enabled the international community to act in concert. For example, on 2 August 1990, the same day Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council met and passed a resolution demanding Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from Kuwait (Resolution 660). The United Nations was able to successfully marshal the collective resources and support of the international community by swiftly addressing the fluid nature of the events, as they happened, in Kuwait. The United Nations proved adaptable to changing circumstances of the conflict. When it became clear that Iraq was not responding to international condemnation and calls for withdrawal, it passed economic sanctions (Resolution 661) just four days later. A week after its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq declared, on 9 August 1990, that it was annexing Kuwait as the nineteenth province of the country. The United Nations played an important role in mustering the international cooperation needed to follow up on its sanctions with enforcement. On 25 August 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 665, which provided the international community with a mechanism for enforcing the United Nations economic sanctions. Further, the international cooperation in enforcing the naval blockades against Iraq (Resolution 665), which became the backbone of the embargoes and economic sanctions, became a precedent for later international cooperation when military force against Iraq was required. The Soviet Union played an important role in the United Nations’ success during this conflict. The Soviet Union did not attempt to counter or obstruct Western consensus, and its support, as a historical ally of Iraq, was critical in garnering the support of other non-NATO countries like China, for example. The international cooperation facilitated a swift UN response to Iraqi intransigence. One month later, on 25 August 1990, following violations of the economic sanctions against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council implemented an air embargo (Resolution 670) on Iraq, which was the first of its kind. The UN was not solely acting with a heavy-hand against Iraq. It worked to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General to the Middle East, made two trips to Iraq in late August and early September to meet with Iraqi officials. His efforts to persuade Iraq to comply with UN resolutions failed. France and the Soviet Union, working with King Hasan of Morocco and King Hussein of Jordan, also tried to mediate during the crisis with no success.

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On 29 November 1990, the UN authorized the international community to use”all necessary means,“ which was further clarified to mean force, if Iraq did not comply with all eleven prior UN resolutions by 15 January 1991. This resolution represented the first time in modern history that an international peacekeeping organization voted to use force to halt aggression. The vote was 12-2, with China abstaining and Cuba and Yemen opposing the decision. The UN played a meaningful role during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. It provided a legal framework through which the international community was able to mobilize and respond to a rapidly evolving crisis, despite various and competing interests.111

5

The Characteristics of the War

On 15 January 1991, time ran out for Iraq. Unmoved by diplomatic pressure from international and regional representatives, its invasion of Kuwait would be challenged with force. The coalition forces that coalesced in reponse to Iraq’s aggression had to navigate the complicated legal details on their path to war against Iraq. However, due to technical legal constraints under International Law, the coalition operation against Iraq would be defined as a “police action,” that would roll-back Iraq’s aggression against another state and assert the will of the “community of nations.” “Operation Desert Shield,” became the first phase of the war and was carried out just five days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. This stage of the conflict was intended to secure Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from a potential Iraqi attack. The next phase of the war was called “Operation Desert Storm,” and was initiated after the Security Council passed Resolution 678 (29 November 1990).112 The Coalition strategy was straightforward and publicly advertised before the operation was executed. The Coalition planned to use a systematic and protracted aerial assault against key Iraqi targets. It was decided that these targets were to consist of the following: Iraq’s command, control, and communications in order to render its regime incapable of directing its military forces; areas where the weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological programs) were located; and the Republican Guard, the most efficient Iraqi force, in order to reduce Iraq’s ability for effective defense. The second component of the coalition’s strategy was a ground invasion based on “envelopment and maneuver” intended to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Iraq’s strategy was also clearly _________________________________________________ 111 112

Freedman and Karsh, pp. 144-153, 234-260; Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 134-168. Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 169-179.

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presented before the fighting started, and its goals were to create a”Vietnam” scenario for American forces in Iraq, and absorb the damage created by the U.S. aerial assaults.113 Under the command of U.S. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “Operation Desert Shield” massed coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and particularly on the Saudi borders with Kuwait. The immediate goals of the operation were defensive. The coalition forces were deployed in a manner to deter any further advance by Saddam’s forces. The initial fear after the invasion of Kuwait was that Saddam might not stop in Kuwait and was capable of quickly moving his forces through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia or one of its smaller Gulf neighbors. In addition to initiating Operation Desert Shield, the international community quickly tried to use political and economic sanctions to coerce Iraq into voluntarily withdrawing from Kuwait. These attempts failed, and the U.N subsequently authorized Resolution 678 (1990), which authorized the international coalition to use force against Saddam and Iraqi forces.114 The period of sanctions and negotiations also provided the coalition military forces to properly prepare and organize in advance of the war. A final diplomatic effort at resolving the crisis took place on 9 January 1991, with a meeting held in Geneva, Switzerland between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, and Iraq’s counterpart, Tariq ‘Aziz. The meeting ended in a deadlock and resolved nothing. 115 The air war between Coalition forces and Iraq’s military began on 16 January 1991 and lasted 39 days. The coalition began the war with a strategic air campaign which targeted Iraq’s air force infrastructure in order to isolate Saddam’s elite Republican Guard forces and cut Iraqi supply lines to Kuwait. These strikes also targeted known centers of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production and storage. The land invasion of Kuwait and southern Iraq by the multinational forces began on 23 February 1991 and lasted until Iraq requested a ceasefire. The Iraqi defense strategy was similar to its strategy in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi forces engineered heavily fortified defense lines along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border and hoped to lure Coalition forces into its “killing zones” where coalition forces would be trapped in fortified Iraqi positions. Iraq also feared an amphibious assault and established heavy defenses along the Kuwaiti coast and laid mines in the adjacent Gulf waters. However, many of Saddam’s best _________________________________________________ 113

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How Kuwait was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War”, in The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe. Eds. Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R.H. Tripp (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 67-104. 114 Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 169-179. 115 Freedman and Karsh, “How Kuwait was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War”, p. 70.

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equipped and trained Republican Guard units remained close to Baghdad to protect him from internal threats to his regime. Iraq’s best offensive threat was modified Scud-B missiles with extended range that were ultimately fired at Israel, including densely populated Tel Aviv and Haifa, as well as targets in eastern Saudi Arabia where the Saudi oil industry is concentrated. These missiles did not carry chemical or biological weapons, as many feared. After the war, Iraq’s disclosures to the UN revealed that it possessed thirty chemical warheads for its Scud missiles. Saddam unsuccessfully used these Scud missile strikes against civilian targets in Israel as an attempt to lure Coalition forces into a rushed frontal ground assault against his dug-in desert defense lines.116 During the air campaign at the beginning of the war (January and February 1991) the Coalition was flying approximately 2,000 air sorties a day. By 23 January, the Coalition had flown over 12,000 sorties. Following the extended and relentless aerial assault against Iraqi forces, U.S. General Colin Powell claimed that the Coalition strategy, for dealing with the Iraqi army in the next phase of the war, “is very simple: First we’re going to cut it off, then we’re going to kill it.”117 Box 8:

U.S. led Coalition Forces118

Country U.S. troops: British troops: Saudi Arabian troops: Egyptian troops: Syrian troops: Kuwaiti troops: Bahraini troops: Moroccan troops: Other

Manpower 540,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 20,000 7,000 3,000 2,000 10,000

On 29–30 January 1991, the Iraqi military attempted to take the iniative against the Coalition forces. An Iraqi force consisting of approximately 1,500 soldiers and 50 tanks attacked a Coalition position in Saudi Arabia. This surprise attack may have killed as many as 12 American Marines and 13 Iraqis. The Iraqis were _________________________________________________ 116

Ibid, p. 73. Quoted in Khadduri and Ghareeb, p. 172. 118 Dan Smith, The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution (London: Myriad Editions Limited, 2006), p. 95. 117

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able to temporarily occupy and capture the port of Khafji in Saudi Arabia during its slow rumble south along 70 kilometers of Gulf coast. However, on 1 February 1991, Saudi Arabian and Qatari troops immediately engaged the invading Iraqi troops in the city and, with back-up from the United States Marines, the Saudi led troops eventually re-captured Khafji. Iraq’s military planning and organization were not able to cope with its present position in Kuwait and the superiority of the coalition forces. Iraqi forces were quickly overwhelmed and pushed out of Kuwait and back across the Iraqi border. Southern Iraq was left unprotected and Coalition forces were able to establish victory in the wake of Iraq’s retreat. Egyptian President Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd met in Riyadh to discuss the possibility of the war spreading into Iraq. They jointly announced that their forces would not enter Iraq. On 2 March 1991, Iraq and a Coalition delegation began discussions for a cease-fire.119

6

The Attempts at Post-War Accords

Iraq accepted a formal cease-fire agreement at a meeting in Safwan on 3 March 1991. The Safwan accord required that Iraq agree to all previous United Nations Security Council Resolutions passed in response to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91. There were also a number of addendums to the UNSC resolutions designed to ensure Iraqi compliance and fulfillment. The Safwan accord imposed restrictions on Iraqi forces in Iraq. Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft were prohibited from flying or taking action that could be construed as hostile or dangerous to Coalition forces in southern Iraq. The Coalition remained vigilant following the ceasefire, and identified Iraqi forces moving surface-to-surface missiles and conducting flights into the no-fly zone. Coalition forces responded to violations of the accord by launching punitive strikes against Iraqi forces. On 3 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which confirmed the terms of the Safwan accord. The resolution stipulated that Iraq was, (1) to recognize its frontier region with Kuwait as defined under its 1963 Agreement, (2) to comply with establishment of a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and the future demarcation of borders between Iraq and Kuwait, (3) to release prisoners and restore Kuwaiti property, (4) to dismantle weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological, and (5) to obstain from future development weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 687 also removed _________________________________________________ 119 Freedman and Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War,” pp. 67-104; Khadduri and Ghareeb, pp. 169-179.

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some of the economic sanctions against Iraq prohibiting delivery of food and medicine but the UN air embargo against Iraq remained in place. A United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM; see Box 9) was given authority to identify and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, particularly ballistic missiles, chemical, and nuclear weapons. During the course of UNSCOM’s ongoing work in the mid-1990s it raised new questions regarding Iraq’s biological weapons program. Box 9:

UNSCOM and UNIKOM

An organization created by UN Security Council Resolution 687 in April 1991 to monitor Iraq’s termination and removal of its”weapons of mass destruction.” This monitoring process was supposed to include the destruction of all chemical and biological weapons and facilities. This process was also to include the destruction of all of Iraq’s long range (over 150 kilometers) ballistic missiles. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM): An organization established to monitor the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Its mission was to deter and observe any violations or hostile actions taken by one side against the other. It was later authorized to take direct action to prevent violations of the demilitarized zone.

In April 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (788) to prevent Saddam’s ongoing post-war repression of Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’a communities. The United States, Britain, and France unilaterally created two no-fly zones for Iraqi forces: one in the north (the Kurdish areas) and the other in the south (Shi‘i areas). Iraq challenged these no-fly zones in December 1992 and January 1993. On 15 August 1991, Resolutions 705 and 706 were passed by the UN Security Council proposing a system that would allow Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil over six months on the condition that 30 percent would be used for war reparations. An additional five percent of these funds would pay for UNSCOM expenses and another percentage was to cover other UN expenses in Iraq. The remainder of the funds was supposed to be placed in a monitored escrow account where the money could be used to purchase food and medicine for Iraqis. Saddam rejected this plan, recognizing it would erode his authority and control and undermine Iraq’s “sovereignty.” While officially accepting the terms of the UN cease-fire, Iraq proved unwilling to implement the terms of the accompanying UN resolutions, most importantly, resolutions 687, 707, and 715. Iraq hindered the efforts UNSCOM weapons inspectors by obstructing their at every opportunity. The UN passed Resolution 707, which demanded full access for inspectors to Iraqi facilities, as

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well as disclosures regarding weapons programs and suppliers. In September 1991, UN inspectors who tried to take documents from a facility in central Baghdad were confronted by Iraqi authorities and prevented from leaving. The confrontation ended in late September when the inspectors were allowed to leave with the documents. This “cheat and retreat” game between Iraqi authorities and weapons inspectors occurred several times during the early 1990s.120 Saddam’s strategy of “steadfastness” in its dealings with the UN may have been predicated on the notion that his unconventional weapons arsenal was the primary source of the regime’s strength, as perceived domestically and regionally. Iran, Iraq’s primary regional rival, was building its own unconventional arsenal, and it is likely Saddam wanted to maintain Iraq’s deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. Weapons inspections, therefore, became torturous exercises in order to enforce compliance. UN sanctions on Iraq were reviewed every 60 days, which resulted in an exchange of reports between Iraq and the UN documenting Iraq’s claims of compliance and the UN counter-claims of Iraqi non-compliance. The UN, backed by the U.S., Great Britain, and France, would then threaten military strikes, which would then result in reluctant and limited Iraqi compliance with weapons inspectors. The process bought Saddam time and allowed him project an image of strength and resistance. In July 1992, Saddam denied UN weapons inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and and Irrigation, which the inspectors believed contained documents related to the Iraqi weapons program. The inspectors decided to monitor the site to record any material or documents entering or leaving, which resulted in a series of choreographed anti-US demonstrations held by Iraqis outside the ministry. After 17 days the inspectors ended their attempts to monitor the site, claiming they were harassed and intimidated. After threatening force, the UN was able to reach a compromise with Iraq that allowed inspectors from neutral countries into the ministry. Shortly after this confrontation, the U.S., Great Britain, and France declared a no-fly zone in southern Iraq which prevented Iraqi planes from flying south of 32nd parallel. The no-fly zone was controversial. It did not have the support of the UN Security Council or Egypt and Syria, and while its stated purpose was to protect Iraq’s Shi‘a, the move was viewed as coming too late to benefit the Shi‘a who had been violently suppressed by Saddam’s forces at the end of the war. Iraq claimed that the no-fly zone was a violation of international law. In early 1993 Saddam’s disregard for post-war international demands on Iraq resulted in joint -- U.S., Great Britain, and France – military strikes on sites in central and southern Iraq between 13 and 18 January. The strikes were in _________________________________________________ 120

Al-Thawra, 18 October 1992.

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response to a series of provocations by Saddam, who had moved surface-to-air missile batteries into the southern no-fly zone; moved Iraqi forces into and out of the demilitarized zone established on the newly defined Iraqi-Kuwaiti border; obstructed the travel of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq; and harassed UN relief workers operating in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. Saddam may have believed that the approaching end of U.S. President Bush’s term (January 19) in office would allow his actions to go unanswered. Further, Saddam viewed the southern no-fly zone as a serious challenge to Iraqi sovereignty. The allied military strikes, which were not authorized by the UN, followed a final ultimatum to Saddam to withdraw his missiles from the no-fly zone. The allied military strikes included a missile strike on an Iraqi nuclear facility in Za‘franiyya, outside of Baghdad. The attack unintentionally hit the Rashid Hotel in Za‘franiyya killing two people. The attack on the nuclear facility killed 21.121 In April 1993, Kuwait arrested several individuals it claimed were Iraqi intelligence agents preparing to assassinate former US President Bush during his trip to Kuwait from 4-16 April 1993. The Clinton administration believed Iraq was responsible for sponsoring the assassination plot, and on 27 June 1993 launched 27 cruise missiles against Iraq’s intelligence service control center outside of Baghdad. The missiles again mistakenly hit the Rashid Hotel, killing several people.122 Facing hyperinflation and price incrases of more than 2,000% the international embargo against Iraq precipitated a serious and widespread crisis in Iraqi society. Iraq engaged in a number of tactics in fruitless attempts to have the trade embargo removed. One such tactic included officially informing the UN on 26 March 1994 that it would accept long-term monitoring of its weapons of mass destruction under Resolutions 618 and 715. Despite these tactics, the embargo remained in place and the Iraqi people bore the brunt of the sanctions, as the Iraqi middle class rapidly eroded under the economic pressures of the embargo and trade sanctions. In a 27 September 1994 speech, Saddam declared, “When the patience of some Iraqis begins weaken, or when we feel that Iraqis may become hungry, we will, by God, open the world’s silos for them and let he who hears us know that Saddam Hussein has spoken.”123 During the first two weeks of October 1994, Iraq massed troops on its border with Kuwait. 20,000 troops from two elite Republican Guard units were stationed 20 kilometers from the border with Kuwait. Some believed this was yet another tactic being employed by Saddam in an ef_________________________________________________ 121

The New York Times, 18 January 1993. Washington Post, 27 and 28 June 1993. 123 Babil, 28 September, 1 October – Daily Report, 5 October 1994; Iraq News Agency, 6 October 1994 – Daily Report, 6 October 1994. 122

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fort to focus international attention on lifting the trade sanctions against Iraq. The U.S. did not treat Saddam’s military build-up as a show, and responded by sending nearly 40,000 emergency troops to the region to deter a possible second invasion of Kuwait. By October 12, Saddam had backed away and restationed his military forces away from the Kuwait border. Less than one month later, on 10 November 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait’s independence in accordance with the borders established in 1993.

7

The Search for Gulf Security

Anxious to prevent the recurrence of a crisis similar to that of 1990-91, both the Gulf and the Western states perceived a need to establish an ongoing security arrangement in the Gulf. Achieving this aim, however, depended upon the successful execution of two basic antithetical policies: cooperation among all the Gulf states, despite inherent differences, and the accommodation of each state’s interests and strategic views. In effect, this meant that the parties involved sought a comprehensive or collective regional security arrangement, which would bridge the diverse and even conflicting interests of the Gulf states as the means for achieving effective security in the Gulf. The attempts to achieve such comprehensive security arrangement involved laborious efforts by several states to impose their regional perceptions on other states, as well as attempts by some states to maneuver others into marginal positions, leading to conflict among the parties concerned. The impetus for trying to reach a comprehensive arrangement came from the Arab Gulf states, within the framework of the GCC – the winners in the Gulf War and the leaders of the anti-Iraqi coalition. With the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, they were also the weaker states in the Gulf, with relatively small armies, populations and territories, giving them the most compelling interest in initiating a comprehensive security arrangement. The GCC states considered a number of strategic components in the formulation of a security plan: 1. 2.

The plan could be based on security pacts with Western states, whose credibility and efficiency had been proven during the Gulf War. Alliances could be made with Egypt and Syria, former anti-Iraqi coalition members, under the terms of the March 1991 Damascus Declaration124.

_________________________________________________ 124 Moreover, other options hinging on Arab military defenses were eliminated. In March 1991, right after “Desert Storm” and with Egyptian and Syrian encouragement, the GCC states signed the “Damascus Declaration,” entrusting GCC land defenses to Syrian and Egyptian infantry and armored

124

3.

4.

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However, the performance of their armies was considered less impressive than those of the West; the GCC states did not fully trust the governments of Egypt and Syria; and the financial demands which they put forward were deemed too steep. Iran and Iraq were potential security allies, particularly Iran, whose neutrality during the war had been a factor in the success of the anti-Iraq Coalition. Moreover, each of these rival powers could be utilized to balance the designs and the capabilities of the other. However, the past enmity of both states toward several of the GCC countries, Iraq’s continuous threat and Iran’s new ambitions and continuous hostility made the Arab Gulf states wary of fully incorporating either Iraq or Iran in a comprehensive security arrangement. The possibility of developing a joint or federal-led GCC security force was considered, although this involved surmounting each state’s differences in outlook.

During the rest of the year, the Gulf states oscillated between these options, considering various combinations. When initial attempts by the GCC to form a comprehensive Gulf security settlement during the winter and spring of 1992 failed, various local powers took advantage of the resulting vacuum, deriving from the absence of all-embracing security arrangements, and attempted to establish individual security zones of their own through claims and attacks on areas across their borders. The regional disputes that developed made the achievement of a regional security arrangement almost impossible. During the late fall and winter, mediation attempts to resolve these new disputes succeeded in restoring a measure of tranquility to the Gulf, but fell short of a comprehensive security arrangement.

forces. The United States encouraged this initiative, showing it did not seek to dominate all Gulf defenses but rather concentrate on air defense. Most important, however, was that the GCC states themselves were unenthusiastic about the declaration. They did not trust Egypt and Syria either politically or in terms of their military ability. The GCC states did not implement the accord nor did they approve a proposal by Sultan Qabus of Oman to establish a 100,000-strong Gulf army. They doubted their own citizens' military ability as much as their fellow Arabs' political intentions. Thus, the U.S. military role emerged as the GCC's post-“Desert Storm“preferable option. (see Joseph Kostiner, “The United States and the Gulf States: Alliance in Need,” in Middle East Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998.)

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7.1 The Arab Gulf States’ Indecisiveness: Basic Considerations The incentive to establish a comprehensive defense settlement in the post-19901991 Gulf War era came from the Arab Gulf states, which considered themselves the victims of the Iraqi invasion and the potential targets of future Iraqi aggression. In contrast to Iran’s passive role during the Gulf War, the Arab Gulf states had constituted a major component of the anti-Iraq coalition. On account of their contacts with the Western forces and their financial resources, the Arab Gulf states played an initiating role in cementing the Gulf’s future. They were first to put forward viable suggestions for Gulf security. Several options for a comprehensive regional arrangement were considered. First, there was the possible role for Egypt and Syria, which were not only the Gulf states’ allies against Iraq, but, according to the Damascus Declaration of March 1991, were also to participate in the future defense of the Gulf states, alongside the GCC states. Despite difficulties in implementing the 1991 Damascus Declaration, the Gulf leaders still viewed the role of Egyptian and Syrian armed forces as essential both politically and militarily, in constituting a vital addition to the Arab Gulf states’ ground forces. Massive armored and infantry troops had proven essential in the Gulf War, and in view of the Western forces’ withdrawal from the Gulf and the small size of the GCC states’ armies, the need for external military reinforcement was obvious.125 Iran’s participation in a comprehensive settlement was another possibility. For one thing, Iran’s passive role in the Gulf War had proved an essential element in the Coalition’s victory over Iraq. For another, the Arab Gulf leaders needed Tehran to act as a deterrent, in addition to Western, local, Syrian and Egyptians forces, against any further outbreak of aggression by Iraq against the Arab Gulf states. They were also anxious to ensure that Iran would abstain from any revolutionary subversion or other aggression by Iraq against the Arab Gulf states. GCC leaders were, therefore, careful both to commend Iran for its part in the war and to stress its present role as a”respected neighbor.”126 Another defense component involved cooperation among the GCC states themselves, notably in developing a combined GCC army, which was perceived as logical continuation of the member states’ military cooperation during the war as well as a manifestation of their will to establish their own ground force or part of it.127 Lastly, the GCC states were aware that their security depended upon assistance from Western states. Even though most of the anti-Iraq coalition forces had _________________________________________________ 125 126 127

al-Hawadith, 24 December 1991. Al-’Alam (London), 8 February 1992. Sultan Ibn ‘Abd al-’Aziz‘s interview, al-Wasat, 3 February 1992.

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left the Gulf, Western states could still offer major advantages to the Arab Gulf states. Politically, Western support served as the major deterrent against Iraq. Militarily, small Western forces, notably air force units, were able to provide effective initial blocking against an invader. Moreover, Western instruction was essential for the training and development of the local armies, and above all, Western weapons were needed by all the Arab Gulf states.128 Essential as each of these components was to the security of the GCC states, they could not be integrated into any sort of unified system because of inherent incompatibilities. While GCC leaders had developed implicit trust in the presence of Western forces, Iran, and to some extent Egypt and Syria as well, opposed the presence of Western forces in the Gulf, a reservation was also shared by local Islamic fundamentalist constituencies. However, exclusive reliance by the GCC states on their own small forces was impractical, and on their neighbors’ – notably Iran’s – too hazardous. Consequently, the Gulf leaders were faced with the complex challenge of finding a way to utilize each security component without contradicting the interests of the others in order to develop a workable regional security strategy.129 Addressing this issue at the 12th GCC summit in December 1991 and in the meetings of the foreign ministers in March and May 1992, the Gulf leaders failed to produce a viable policy and limited themselves to airing ideas and hopes. GCC Secretary General ‘Abdallah Ya’qub Bishara, depicting these hopes along with the difficulties involved termed the various security components”dimensions” as if there were a planned order or different but complementary local and international security tiers to be established gradually. He, as other Gulf leaders, stressed that that Gulf security was based on various elements besides the strategic-military one (for example, he said, the Gulf states were developing economic cooperation with Egypt and Syria and good relations with Iran as a basis for a formal security arrangement at a later stage). Bishara and other Gulf leaders also noted that the formation of a GCC army was a project for the future, and meanwhile had only a declaratory value, and that there were no concrete plans for military cooperation either with Egypt and Syria, or a coordinated policy with Iran. Bishara actually admitted the GCC states’ dependence on Western protection by stating that the GCC states wanted to enhance their strategic value in Western eyes, so as to gain more Western assistance.130

_________________________________________________ 128

Middle East, March 1992. ‘Abdallah Bishara’s interviews with al-Musawwar, 28 February 1992; al-Watan (Kuwait), 14 April 1992; KUNA, 3 May 1992. 130 Al-Sha’b (Cairo), 23 June 1992. 129

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7.2 Difficulties in Arriving at a Security Arrangement Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the GCC states most vulnerable to an Iraqi invasion, opposed reliance on large permanent Egyptian and Syrian forces, a view apparently accepted by the other Gulf states. Their reasoning, although never officially stated was the subject of speculation in the media, according to which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia considered the military performance of the Syrian and Egyptian forces unimpressive, as compared to Western forces, and could not trust these armies in time of need. They were also wary of the political price that the Egyptian and Syrian military presence could extract, namely, political pressure on and manipulation of the Gulf governments and subversion of local societies. Moreover, the GCC states could not overlook Iran’s objection to foreign forces in the Gulf. In addition, they objected to the high remuneration demanded for the Egyptian and Syrian military presence, estimated in the foreign media at $10 billion. Kuwait was reported to have stated these objections in a memorandum circulated among the Gulf states. Nevertheless, the GCC states could not overlook the fact that Egypt and Syria had been their allies during the war, and viewed their participation in Gulf security, according to the Damascus Declaration, as ample remuneration for services rendered. Kuwaiti leaders therefore stressed that the GCC states favored military agreements and hoped as well for military assistance by these two states in times of belligerency. However, they opposed a permanent or institutionalized agreement, preferring that Egyptian and Syrian assistance be offered as an act of Arab solidarity on an ad hoc basis limited to a specific time period and situation. Exchange visits between Syrian and Egyptians leaders and the leaders of the Gulf states during January – April, and an offer by GCC Secretary General Bishara to make his good offices available in the interest of forming a security arrangement, failed to produce any formal agreement. According to al-Sha’b, the Egyptian opposition paper, Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the GCC states, ruled out any possibility of Egyptian involvement in collective Gulf security. Consequently, the GCC states informed Egypt that they would not establish any cooperation agreement pending further consultation among themselves, whereupon, Egypt threatened to suspend consultations with the GCC131 regarding the implementation of the Damascus Declaration. The postponement of a comprehensive discussion among the GCC states on the implementation of the Damascus Declaration, scheduled for the GCC summit on 21 May in Doha, was further evidence of the failure of the GCC states to reach an agreement with Egypt and Syria, prior to the summit. _________________________________________________ 131

Al-Sha’b (Cairo), 5 May 1992.

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Oman’s proposal to establish a joint GCC army of 100,000, rejected at the GCC summit of December 1991, continued to be unacceptable in 1992. While all the states were committed to the development of their own armies, held joint military exercises, and had dispatched soldiers to help free Kuwait during the Gulf War, they had serious reservations about the formal establishment of a large joint army. First, such an undertaking would have required each state to make an ongoing budgetary commitment, as well as to submit to a regional command that would place its forces under the authority of foreign officers, possibly compromising its sovereignty thereby. Second, in light of the poor combat level of the GCC states’ military forces, the organizing and training of such an army would take years, whereas, the Gulf states felt they needed a large ground force immediately. Leaders of the Gulf states shelved the joint army project, describing it as being "under review” and "being studied.” Oman itself made it clear, as stated by its Minister of Information ‘Abd al-’Aziz al-Rawwas, that it would not press any issue "at the expense of violating any of the Gulf countries’ rights.”132 The Arab Gulf states also wanted to maintain friendly relations with Iran, but faced difficulties in establishing a joint institutionalized security arrangement. GCC leaders were suspicious of Iran’s revolutionary aims, but still, they could not ignore Iran’s presence and interests in the Gulf. Located in close geographical proximity, Iran had considerable influence on the GCC states’ Shi’a inhabitants, who constituted its potential fifth column. Iran took advantage of the GCC states’ gratitude for its position during the war to impress upon them its interest in being part of any future regional security arrangement and its objection to the possibility of exclusion from such plans. It conveyed a particular objection to Western forces dominating the Gulf, an issue which came to the fore when the U.S. closely monitored a North Korean ship allegedly carrying scud missiles to Iran, eliciting a claim by Iran that this activity restricted free movement of its own forces in the region.133 Although the GCC states did not initiate a joint pact with Iran, there were several states which continued to cultivate previously developed close relations with it. Thus Oman’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Ibn ‘Alawi, paid a visit to Tehran on 8 March.134 Saudi Arabia, however, played the opposite role, challenging Iran at the OPEC meeting in mid-February by demanding a high 35 percent market share and a minimum production quota of eight million barrels per day. Rivalry between the two was also reflected in competition over gaining influence in the ex-Soviet Muslim republics of Asia.135 Saudi Arabia, _________________________________________________ 132

Middle East Insight, Vol. 8 (March – April 1992), pp. 15-19. Akhir Sa’a, 5 February 1992; IHT, Salam, 10 March 1992. 134 Al-’Alam (London), 16 May 1992. 135 New York Times, 22 February 1992; Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 3 April 1992. 133

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and to some extent Kuwait and Bahrain, were anxious to avoid replacing Iraq’s waning dominance in the Gulf with that of Iran, which could once again threaten the security of the GCC. The formula for GCC-Iranian relations, adopted at the December 1991 GCC summit and during the following weeks, was based on a conceptualization of Iran as a”neighbor and partner” in the Gulf. GCC cooperation with Iran, however, would exclude the area of security, and would focus on freedom of navigation, fisheries, the environment and pollution. As depicted by GCC Secretary General Bishara, the Gulf states and Iran would avoid interference in each others’ affairs, and each state had the right to conclude security arrangements with any outside party.136 These policy statements failed to satisfy Iran’s interests and did not add to Gulf security. The only formal security arrangements favored by at least some of the Arab Gulf states were bilateral pacts with several Western nations. Kuwait, in immediate need of an efficient defensive arrangement vis-à-vis Iraq after its liberation, and disillusioned with Arab and regional forces, paved the way for these bilateral pacts by demonstrating complete trust in Western forces, which had been the key to its liberation. Moreover, unlike other Gulf states, Kuwait did not harbor any extremist, anti-Western fundamentalist opposition elements. On 3 September 1991, Kuwait concluded a 10-year security pact with the U.S., which stipulated stockpiling U.S. military equipment on Kuwaiti soil (including aircraft and naval units), stationing a small number of permanent American troops, holding joint maneuvers, and training the new Kuwaiti army. Kuwait reached similar agreements with Britain and France in October 1991, which were formally concluded in February and September 1992 respectively. Bahrain concluded a similar defense agreement with the U.S. in October 1991, and according to unconfirmed reports, Bahrain’s ruler also agreed to house the regional supervisory U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in their territory.137 The intention to establish a U.S. regional army headquarters in Bahrain, along with permission contained in the Kuwaiti-U.S. pact for American forces to be deployed in other Gulf arenas, were indications of aspirations by the GCC states and their Western allies to formulate a Western-led regional strategic arrangement. However, the establishment of such a pact ultimately hinged upon U.S.-Saudi cooperation, which was a focus of Washington’s Gulf strategy in 1992. Washington regarded Riyadh as the key decision maker for the entire GCC. Moreover, Saudi surface and naval bases were essential to any future deployment of U.S. forces. _________________________________________________ 136 137

Al-Musawwar, 28 February 1992; KUNA, 3 May 1992. Financial Times, 20 September 1991; al-Watan (Kuwait), 7 October 1991.

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Most important, the United States could draw on its special relationship with Saudi Arabia, namely, on mutual trust and cooperation, as had been demonstrated during the last war.138 Saudi Arabia, for its part, contemplated purchasing $7 billion worth of U.S. weapons (already approved by the U.S. Congress in 1991), including fighter aircraft, M1-A2 tanks, anti-armor missiles, combat vehicles, trucks and armored personnel carriers.139 Riyadh also encouraged other GCC states to follow suit and rely on Western armaments and defense arrangements. Saudi leaders repeatedly reiterated their gratitude for American assistance provided during the last Gulf crisis, and their confidence in U.S. policy in the Gulf as well as in the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process.140 Nevertheless, the Saudis refused to sign a defense pact with the United States, for several reasons. Riyadh feared that the presence of a U.S. force would stir up the growing Saudi fundamentalist opposition and ultimately led to the undermining of the government’s position. In addition, Saudi Arabia, as the leading GCC state, could not disregard Iran’s opposition to the concept of foreign forces in the Gulf. Furthermore, Saudi financial difficulties – reflected in a $836 million war debt that Riyadh still owed the U.S. – prevented the delivery of certain arms orders from the U.S., and may have deterred Saudi leaders from making even larger-scale commitments to Washington. The U.S. refusal to sell the Saudis what Washington viewed as unnecessary weapons angered Saudi leaders. Riyadh also had other postwar priorities besides maintaining U.S. forces in the Gulf. It wanted to build and arm its own army of circa 90,000 by the year 2000, and to increase its air and naval power as well. Thus, the issue of stationing a division-size U.S. force, and propositioning for even more forces, remained undecided,141 although there was an unofficial consensus by both parties in favor of it. In the absence of a formal agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, a Western-dominated regional arrangement was not feasible. In summary, the quest by the GCC states for a comprehensive regional security arrangement in early 1992 met with only partial success. Kuwait and Bahrain chose to rely on security agreements with Western states, on a bilateral basis rather than seek and join a comprehensive regional arrangement policy. Collectively, the GCC states maintained a nonbinding but amicable status quo with Iran, and relied on a limited, voluntary commitment by Syria and Egypt to come to their aid when necessary. They also planned to develop their own armies and _________________________________________________ 138 R.D. McLaurin, “Foundations of the Saudi-American Security Relationship”, Middle East Insight, Vol. 8 (March –April 1992), pp. 36-42. 139 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 December 1991. 140 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).Country Report, Saudi Arabia, No. 1, 1992, pp. 10-11. 141 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 December 1991, 4 April 1992.

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intensify mutual cooperation over the long term.142 This policy line had obvious shortcomings, namely the development of a power vacuum prompting the primary regional powers – Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia – to seek a substitute for a regional arrangement by enhancing and asserting their territorial ambition along their border zones. This led to disputes among larger and smaller neighbors and to mutual suspicion among the regional powers. Moreover, it prompted the smaller states, which felt insecure or threatened by their neighbors, to seek their own security arrangements following the Kuwaiti example.143 7.3 Divided Security and Growing Conflicts: Escalation of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Tension Iraq’s failure to change its hostile image, in the perception of the GCC states, discounted any possibility of regional cooperation with it. Nevertheless, Iraq aspired to play a de facto role as a balance against Iranian influence, hoping that the GCC states would recognize a strategic need to offset the threat posed by Iran. However, by early 1992 Iraq was completely disillusioned by the GCC’s, and especially Kuwait’s, security policies. Iraqi leaders, such as Sa’dun Hammadi, chastised Kuwait for its "blindness” about, and ignoring, Tehran’s past crimes against the GCC states, and accused Kuwait of selling out to Western interests in an act of subservience. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd was depicted as a camel used by the Americans who would be misled by his masters and left to die in the desert.144 The GCC states’ disregard for Iraq led to an escalation in tension between Iraq and Kuwait during the summer of 1992. In the absence of a regional security pact, Kuwaiti leaders requested the assistance of the UN Security Council to stop Iraqi aggression against their country in the border area. The Security Council responded by establishing a border commission to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. According to the report, published on 24 July, parts of the harbor city of Umm Qasr and of the Rumayla oilfield, hitherto under Iraqi sovereignty, were to revert to Kuwait.145 While this marked a territorial gain for Kuwait, it did not enhance its security. Iraq, viewing the commission results as unfounded and unjust146, interpreted the decision as a provocation and reiterated its claim over Kuwait, which it termed the”usurped part of Iraq,” echoing terminology used before and during _________________________________________________ 142

Sawt al-Kuwayt al-Duwali. 21 July 1992. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).Country Report, United Arab Emirates, No. 1, 1992, p. 4. 144 Al-Jumhuriyya (Baghdad), 16 February 1992. 145 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).Country Report, Kuwait, No. 3, 1992, p. 29. 146 Radio Monte Carlo, 27 April 1992; MEED 26 June 1992. 143

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the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.147 Iraq also renewed its obstruction of searches by UN inspectors for weapons of mass destruction on Iraqi territory. In response, the U.S. moved to bolster its military strength in the area by dispatching a battery of Patriot anti-missiles and anti-aircraft missiles to Kuwait and a third aircraft carrier to the Gulf.148 On 26 August, in a coordinated anti-Iraqi move, the U.S., Britain and France announced the imposition of an air exclusion zone on Iraqi aircraft, which forbade them to fly south of the 32nd parallel. This measure, similar to the one in effect in northern Iraq, was aimed at preventing Iraqi retaliation against the Shi’is in southern Iraq and against Kuwait, and forcing Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.149 However, while these steps deterred further Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, they failed to achieve stability, as Iraq’s aggressive intentions toward Kuwait remained unchanged. 7.4 Iran’s Bid for Regional Influence Many observers perceived Iran under President Rafsanjani as moving toward developing a pragmatic relationship both with its neighbors and with the Western states, based on cooperation and the recognition of all the parties’ interests. Some Western observers noted particular efforts by Iran to improve relations with the GCC states, reciprocating their declared policy of good neighborliness and noninterference in internal affairs. According to this view, Iran’s seizure of Abu Musa Island in the Gulf in April 1992, previously under UAE sovereignty, did not impair growing cooperation between Iran and the UAE nor did it alter the strategic status quo. Further, according to this view, although Iran objected to the presence of foreign powers in the Gulf, it displayed a conciliatory attitude toward this development in the interest of peaceful coexistence.150 While this assessment had validity in a global context, namely that Iran’s behavior did not threaten either the U.S. global dominance or world peace, judged from a narrower perspective, Iran undoubtedly escalated regional conflicts in the Gulf and added to the difficulties of achieving a regional security arrangement. Having emerged unscathed from the Gulf War, and earning praise from both the Western and the Gulf states for its policy during its course, Iran displayed growing confidence in regional affairs during 1992. At the same time, it was intent on revamping both its economy and its armed forces. These develop_________________________________________________ 147

INA, 2 August 1992; Damascus Radio, 3 August 1992. Jerusalem Post, 28 July 1992. Financial Times, 27 August 1992. 150 R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46 (3 September 1992), pp. 393-413; James A. Bill, “The Resurrection of Iran in the Persian Gulf,” Middle East Insight, Vol. 8 (March – April 1992), pp. 28-35. 148 149

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ments prompted Iran to adopt a pragmatic foreign policy in general and to pursue ambitious goals in the Gulf in particular. Iran resented being left out of the Damascus Declaration or any other regional security arrangement. As long as the prospects for such arrangements existed, it did not seek a conflict with Western forces or the Gulf states to advance its interests. The vacuum resulting from the failure of the GCC states to achieve a Gulf security arrangement in the spring of 1992 prompted Tehran to act. Iran had two goals in the Gulf: first, to neutralize the presence of Western – notably American – forces in several bases in GCC states and in Gulf waters, which, in Tehran’s view, constituted "a naval siege of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the pretext of disarmament and reducing Iran’s military presence in the Persian Gulf – our country’s vital economic route,” and was a "national disaster.”151 The second goal was to establish a balance of power vis-à-vis Iraq and the GCC states, the latter arming themselves and soliciting U.S. assistance. Tehran was thus striving both to improve its relations with several of the GCC states and, at the same time, to assert its military power and establish a zone of influence in the Gulf.152 An Iranian air raid near Baghdad on 5 April illustrated Iran’s readiness to use force against a rival state to advocate its regional position. In early April, Iranian forces, stationed on part of the Abu Musa Island153 for over two decades under a 1971 agreement with the emirate of Sharjah, seized control of the rest of the island, including the local school, police station and desalination plant, subsequently expelling hundreds of the circa 2,000 UAE and other nationals residing on the island. This act reflected both a historical and a strategic impetus. In 1971, just after Britain left the Gulf, Iran occupied Abu Musa along with the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands overseeing the Strait of Hormuz, signifying the Shah’s ambition to play the role of a regional policeman. Subsequently, Iran reached an agreement with Sharjah, authorized by the UAE, on Abu Musa, which allowed Iranian forces to control only part of the island.154 The full reoccupation of Abu Musa in April 1992 signified Tehran’s desire once again to assume a leading role in the Gulf and to actively defend its coastal region against other forces in the Gulf. Denying that it had violated UAE rights or changed the status quo in the Gulf, Tehran dismissed different protests lodged by the GCC states, deriding what it termed the "US-concocted Abu Musa issue.”155 _________________________________________________ 151

Salam, 10 March 1992. KUNA, 20 April 1992. Abu Musa is located circa 35 miles off of the Sharjah coast and circa 43 miles off the Iranian coast opposite, within the UAE territorial waters. 154 Al-Hayat (London); 9 April 1992; MEES, 20 April 1992. 155 Islamic Republic News Agency (Iran), 29 April 1992. 152 153

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The UAE and other GCC states reacted confusedly to Iran’s bid for power. Initially, they mounted a quiet protest, which was ignored by Iran. The UAE also sought closer ties with its GCC neighbors, notably Oman, and considered a defense pact with the U.S. Simultaneously, however, unlike the GCC counterparts, the UAE did not permit its forces to participate in military exercises with American forces in the Gulf, hoping to avoid straining relations with Iran further. However, additional discussions during the summer, between the UAE and Iran, failed to lead to a solution of the island issue, nor did raising the issue at the UN General Assembly by the UAE on 30 September produce any results.156 7.5 The Saudi-Qatari Dispute Although the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar did not develop into a major war, it was symptomatic of Gulf states’ incidents that continued to occur in the absence of a comprehensive security arrangement. Saudi Arabia grew increasingly resentful during the early summer of 1992 of Qatar’s longtime encroachment on the al-Khufus area, which had been ceded to Saudi Arabia by the UAE in 1974, and which left Qatar without land access to the UAE.157 Presumably, the Saudis feared that, in the absence of a regional security arrangement, they could lose control of this strategic area. Moreover, Qatar, in a quest for its own security, unilaterally extended its sovereign territorial waters to 12 nautical miles on 16 April and claimed jurisdiction over a further 12 nautical miles as well. This led to a dispute with Bahrain, which was referred for adjudication to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Seeking to ensure its security, Qatar, more than any other Arab Gulf state, drew closer to Iran in signing three cooperation agreements with it – on shipping, customs and the exchange of information – in May. Nevertheless, Qatar followed in Kuwait’s footsteps in signing a defense accord with the U.S. in June, of which no details were released, but the terms of which probably provided for joint exercises, stockpiling of American military hardware in Qatar, and access to Qatari strategic facilities. The accord was sharply criticized by Tehran,158 while the Saudis, in turn, were suspicious of Qatar’s vacillations and its contacts with Iran, in addition to their irritation with Qatar’s behavior at al-Khufus. An incident occurred at al-Khufus on 30 September when a Saudi armed patrol opened fire on a Qatari border-post. The Saudis initially dismissed the incident as an erroneous exchange of fire between careless Bedouin units on both _________________________________________________ 156

Middle East Insight, 25 September 1992, 9 October 1992; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).Country Report, UAE, No. 3, 1992, pp. 6-7; No. 4 1992, pp. 7-8. 157 MEES, 5 October 1992. 158 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).Country Report, Qatar, No. 3, 1992, pp. 16-17.

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sides, but on 14 October they acknowledged that the underlying reason for the incident was Riyadh’s refusal to concede the al-Khufus region to Qatar after it had been invaded by Qatari forces during the recent Gulf war.159 This meant that the shooting incident could have been, to some extent, premeditated, perhaps by the local Saudi military command, but the Kingdom’s authorities sought to minimize the significance of the skirmish. The Qataris, for their part, regarded the incident as an attack on their border-post that set "a grave precedent,” and announced that it would cease abiding by the 1965 agreement that demarcated most of the borderline between the two states. The Saudis, anxious to avoid a serious dispute with their neighbor, responded to Qatar by insisting that the 1965 agreement was valid and binding.160 The incident demonstrated the inter-state instability in the Gulf in the absence of a comprehensive security arrangement. 7.6 Gulf Security in the Fall of 1992 The attempts by the primary regional powers – Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia – to assert their power along their borders, and even extend their influence into adjacent regions across their borders during 1992, further diminished prospects for achieving a comprehensive regional security settlement. Preoccupied with the status of their border zones, the parties were not sufficiently motivated to work out a comprehensive security arrangement. They continued to rely on Western military forces through bilateral agreements focusing almost exclusively on the containment of Iraq while ignoring other dangers. Military cooperation with Egypt and Syria also remained limited to bilateral relations, and failed to develop according to the guidelines of the Damascus Declaration. Moreover, following new aviation restrictions imposed on Iraq by the West, Egypt expressed reservations about punishing Iraq too severely, for fear of intensifying internal disunity in that country. Cairo was particularly concerned about Iran replacing Iraq as a regional threat, signified by its arms purchases and the Abu Musa takeover. Egypt, in fact, emerged as Iran’s main adversary in the Middle East, making cooperation by the GCC states with Iran in a uniform Gulf security arrangement improbable. States such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which advocated a tough line against Iraq on the one hand, and states such a Qatar, the UAE and Oman, which did not want to alienate Iran, on the other, had difficulty in arriving at a security arrangement with Egypt. These constraints were reflected in the decision made at the GCC Foreign Ministers’ meeting at Doha on 30 December, to base the implementation of the Damascus Declaration on "bilateral understanding” _________________________________________________ 159 160

Al-’Usbu al-’Arabi, 12 October 1992. Saudi Press Agency (SPA), 30 September 1992, 1 October 1992.

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between each of the Gulf states and Syria and/or Egypt. The goal of comprehensive regional security, then, remained in spirit but not in practice.161 Interstate cooperation among the GCC members remained ineffective, impaired by their disparate strategic outlooks. While several GCC states, such as Oman, Kuwait and Qatar, maintained good relations with Iran, especially in the commercial area, Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s dealings with Tehran were marked by tension. Similarly, the general animosity toward Iraq was not fully shared by Qatar, the UAE and Oman, which, like Egypt, opposed disintegration in Iraq. Interstate cooperation on security matters was also harmed by the spate of border disputes. The GCC supported the UAE in opposing Iran’s takeover of Abu Musa, but the juxtaposition of the complaint made by the UAE at the UN General Assembly on 30 September, and the Saudi-Qatari incident at al-Khufus that same day, prompted Qatar to abstain from participating in GCC conferences and activities almost until the end of the year. Iran’s activities intensified interstate conflicts as well. In spite of its efforts to minimize the Abu Musa incident and maintain a close relationship with the GCC, on the basis of mutual hostility toward Iraq,162 Iran succeeded in maintaining relatively friendly bilateral relations with only half of the GCC states, such as Kuwait, Oman and Qatar who were less anxious about Iran’s ventures than the other GCC states. Iran’s expansionist signals, military maneuvers, and especially its purchase of the three Russian submarines were perceived as a strategic threat by most of the parties in the region during the course of the year. The submarines, two of which arrived in Iran in November, carried up to 18 torpedoes and/or 24 mines, were equipped with diesel-electric motors making them difficult to track, and were capable of sabotaging the oil flow in the Gulf, and particularly in the Strait of Hormuz. 7.7 Attempts to Defuse Tensions: Attitudes Toward Egypt and Syria The tension in the region led to a resumption of Syrian and Egyptian involvement in Gulf affairs, although not in the roles as providers of security forces. As previously mentioned, Syria, which had established close contacts with Iran after the Islamic Revolution had come to power in 1979, acted as a mediator between the UAE and Iran in the Abu Musa affair. Egypt, which had acted hostile towards Iran, nevertheless agreed to solve the problem "through diplomatic means,” namely, through Syria’s mediation.163 Visiting Tehran on 19 September 1992, Syria’s Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar’ handed Iran’s President Rafsanjani _________________________________________________ 161 162 163

Al-Safir, 18 August 1992; MEI, 11 September 1992. Radio Tehran, 10 September 1992. Al-Hayat (London); 21 September 1992; Radio Monte Carlo, 22 September 1992.

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a note from Syrian President Asad expressing mild criticism of Tehran’s position and stressing the need to solve the crisis peacefully. Oman also quietly attempted to mediate the dispute. Their appeal may have provided the impetus for dispatching an Iranian emissary to Abu Dhabi to negotiate terms, as an effort that turned out to be unproductive. Syria’s main achievement was in convincing both states to avoid escalating the conflict.164 Since its efforts constituted the ongoing constructive mode of communication that the UAE had with Iran, Syria was urged to continue in this role. Shar’, visiting Abu Dhabi in early January 1993, confidently declared that only Syria was capable of mediating between Iran and the GCC states.165 Egypt, for its part, initiated a quiet process of mediation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which peaked during the late weeks of 1992. The Syrian and Egyptian initiatives also helped somewhat to ease the tension between Egypt and Iran and between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Expressing support for Syria’s mediation efforts, Egypt stressed its hope that Iran would not only honor the sovereignty of the Gulf states, but resume diplomatic relations with Egypt as well. Saudi Foreign Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal, visiting Cairo in late November 1992, focused on Iran’s Gulf policy and also expressed hope for good relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.166 Nevertheless, the possibility of arriving at a comprehensive security arrangement in the Gulf that would involve Iran and the signatories of the Damascus Declaration was remote by the end of 1992. The Arab Gulf states distrusted Iran’s intentions and characterized their own relations with Iran as deficient in many respects, a view that contrasted with the neighborly attitude the GCC states had expressed in the early part of the year. In an interview in December, GCC Secretary General Bishara noted six basic differences dividing the GCC and Iran: Tehran’s perception of the Gulf as an Iranian waterway; Iran’s objection to the international ties cultivated by the GCC states; differences over the GCC states’ broader Arab ties, notably with Egypt; differences over the Arab-Israeli peace talks; differences over oil pricing and production; and differences in approach to the "new world order,” by which Bishara probably meant relations U.S. global supremacy.167 Iran, for its part, reiterated its hopes to develop friendly relations with the Gulf states. However, it adamantly maintained that the Abu Musa and neighboring Tunb Islands constituted an integral part of its territory, as declared by its acting commander of the navy in November.168 _________________________________________________ 164

Al-Wasat, 28 September 1992; Sourakia, 5 October 1992. Al-Hayat (London), 11 January 1993. 166 Sourakia, 5 October 1992; MENA, 29 November 1992. 167 Al-Ahram, 12 December 1992. 168 Ha’aretz , 2 December 1992. 165

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Furthermore, despite growing appreciation by the GCC states for Egypt and Syria during the course of the year, they were still reluctant to make a collective commitment to a permanent Syrian-Egyptian military presence in the Gulf, fearing potential Egyptian and Syrian political pressure as well as the possibility of being dragged into an Egyptian-Iranian conflict. Several states, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman had different defense agreements (i.e., arms purchasing and military consultation) with Egypt, but strictly on a bilateral basis, according to the recommendation of the GCC conference of 30 September.169 A new idea for Gulf security broached by Egypt in December – establishing a comprehensive pan-Arab security forum with Iraq’s participation, thereby bridging the Iraqi-GCC gap,170 reflected Egypt’s anti-Iranian interest in its perception of Gulf security but did not elicit a positive response from the GCC states. 7.8 Readdressing the Issue of a GCC Army A need to reconsider the question of establishing a GCC army resulted from the Kuwait-Iraq and the UAE-Iran incidents that occurred in the spring, which demonstrated the inability of the GCC states to repel aggression initiated by neighboring countries. This option was also recommended to the GCC by the United States. Although Washington still focused on bilateral security arrangements and arms sales on a county-by-country basis, U.S. acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, in a meeting on 22 September with the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, stressed the significance of developing a GCC army as a "tier” of Gulf security (along with assistance form the Western states).171 Nevertheless, when the idea was discussed on 24–25 November, at a meeting of GCC Defense Ministers in Abu Dhabi, the majority of the GCC members rejected it, presumably as a consequence of their border disputes, conflicting attitudes toward Iran, and a unanimous preference for bilateral security arrangements with Western states. The absence of Qatar’s representatives from the conference was evidence of conflicts among the GCC states at the time. Rather than develop a new army, the Ministers decided to focus on the "Peninsula Shield” formula, namely, enlarging the sizes and enhancing cooperation among the individual GCC armies. Accordingly, each state would develop its own army, gradually increasing their combined size to 100,000 in 15 years and making the Penin_________________________________________________ 169

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report, Kuwait, No. 4, 1992, p. 11; MEI, 4 December 1992. 170 Al-Ittihad al –’Usbu’i, 10 December 1992. 171 WF, 23 September 1992.

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sula Shield the framework of Gulf military forces.172 This decision constituted an admission of the Gulf states’ inability to operate a fully unified army or a joint security agreement at the time. 7.9 Limited Achievements By the end of 1992, the GCC states’ most meaningful achievement had been the easing of tensions among the GCC members and restoring the relations to what they had been in the winter and spring of 1992. President Mubarak, intensifying his mediation efforts in December, visited both Qatar and Saudi Arabia, urging Qatar’s ruler, Khalifa Ibn al-Thani to pay a visit to King Fahd. Thanks to Egypt’s efforts, on 21 December, during al-Thani’s visit to Riyadh, an agreement to end the Qatari-Saudi dispute was announced. Its terms were not publicized.173 Immediately thereafter, on 22–23 December, Qatar participated in the GCC’s 13th summit held in Abu Dhabi. The disputes between the Gulf states and Iraq and between the UAE and Iran were not resolved; but the Qatari-Saudi reconciliation enabled the GCC states to resume broad discussions among all their members. Significantly, the decisions at the 13th summit were merely a repetition of those made at the previous summit concerning the need to reinforce the spirit of cooperation, resolve disputes by peaceful means, and develop defense capabilities articulated in generalized statements. No specific plans or even guidelines regarding regional security were adopted.174 As at the beginning of the year, the GCC states were still faced with various options and challenges in arriving at a security arrangement in the Gulf, but no decisions were made on any of them either individually or in a combination format. Each of the GCC states continued to rely primarily on Western forces for its security needs, while several also contemplated new arms deals with the U.S., British and French defense industries. The year 1992 was marked by the escalation and subsequent diminution of conflicts in the Gulf region, developments that were exacerbated by the failure to achieve a comprehensive security arrangement and in turn impeded efforts toward reaching such an agreement. Strategies of defense cooperation which appeared as security options for the GCC states in early 1992 turned out to be major sources of security danger. Iraq, still harboring hopes to recapture Kuwait, and still capable of attacking other Gulf states through subversion, the use of long-range weapons and inva_________________________________________________ 172 173 174

Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 November 1992; Middle East Insight; 4 December 1992. GNA (Bahrain), 21 December 1992. GNA (Bahrain), 23 December 1992.

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sion, remained a primary enemy. Iran, which also emerged as a formidable Gulf power during the course of the year, evoked growing fears of its intentions in the Arab Gulf states despite its attempts to allay their suspicions. Egypt and Syria took on the role of informal allies of the GCC states, whose practical contribution amounted to Syria’s mediation between Tehran and the Gulf capitals and Egypt’s mediation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, tension between Egypt and Iran escalated during the year, threatening to turn regional Gulf disputes into larger-scale conflicts. As for the GCC states, not only did they fail to establish a unified force, but they tended to become entangled in local border disputes which emerged as an additional impediment to future Gulf security. Western policies, notably those of the United States, continued to focus on bilateral security arrangements in the Gulf rather than on a comprehensive regional strategy, despite the relatively limited effectiveness of these bilateral agreements. All of these limitations accounted for serious ongoing threats to Gulf security during 1992.

Part Three: Between the Gulf Wars: Restrained Conflict

1

Introduction

In 1988, the Iran-Iraq War ended and in 1989 the Berlin Wall came down. The Cold War was over and the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1991, Saddam Hussein was defeated by U.S. led international forces, following his invasion and destruction of Kuwait. Despite his defeat, which reduced Iraq’s military power, Saddam’s cruel and repressive regime remained in place. Former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir Alan Munro, has stated,"...the Gulf War liberated Kuwait but did little to make the Gulf a safer place or to solve the chronic tensions which have turned this region into one of the main preoccupations of defence planners around the world...”1 The period following the Iraq-Kuwait War introduced a new phase in Gulf relations. The U.S., as the world’s unrivaled lone superpower, began playing an ever greater role in regional politics and its military presence in the region was conspicuous and would eventually become problematic. The policies the U.S. initiated in the Middle East, beginning with the Madrid Conference in November 1991, included initiating the Arab-Israeli peace process and implementing containment and confrontation with Iraq and Iran, and dictated the future course of security in the Gulf. As Richard Herrmann and R. William Ayres have stated, “... in the absence of serious global systemic geopolitical competition, the politics of the Gulf have been affected largely by the contests between the United States and Iran and Iraq.”2 U.S. policy in the Middle East has historically been driven by three main objectives, “energy security; Israeli security; and a general desire for stability and the protection of friendly regimes.”3 However, Arab Gulf states do not share all of the U.S. objectives, and must navigate their own set of political, cultural, and strategic challenges. Historically, Arab Gulf monarchies have defined their security in relation to the regional pow_________________________________________________ 1

Alan Munro, “Defence Issues in the Gulf”, Asian Affairs Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1997), p. 198. Richard K. Herrmann and R. William Ayers, “The New Geo-Politics of the Gulf: Forces for Change and Stability,” in The Persian Gulf at the Millenium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, Eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 37. 3 Jon B. Alterman, “The Gulf States and the American Umbrella”, in Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, Ed. Barry Rubin (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), p. 163. 2

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ers, Iran and Iraq. And since Iran and Iraq were now the focus of the U.S. containment strategy in the region, the GCC states and the U.S. had a common strategic starting point. However, Arab Gulf states have reservations concerning the U.S.’s ability to defend them against every risk and are always wary of appearing to be bed-fellows with the U.S., regardless of how much or little they actually depend on or need U.S. support. A Lebanese journalist has described the Saudi’s preference for the American role in the Gulf, “We want you to be like the wind. We want to feel you, but we don’t want to see you.”4 This chapter will examine: (1) U.S. “dual containment” policy in the region and how it emerged and evolved based on the conflicts addressed in the two previous chapters; (2) the evolution of Iran and Iraq’s relations with the U.S. during the 1990s; and (3) how the GCC states have reacted to the increasingly visible U.S. role in the region, and how they were affected for better and worse.

2

U.S. Foreign Policy Background: The Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars

In 1969, the Nixon doctrine (see Box 10) was introduced as America’s new foreign policy. This doctrine called for America to rely on regional proxies (or countries acting on the behalf of the U.S.) to defend themselves and their neighbors and to make sure American interests were adhered to in a given region. In exchange, America would focus on combating the Soviet threat globally.5 Box 10:

The Nixon Doctrine

In July 1969, as a product of the American experience fighting in Vietnam, U.S. President Richard Nixon announced a new direction for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. would continue to honor its global commitments and deter nuclear threats and conventional war, but it would expect its local allies to be primarily responsible for their own local deterrence. The U.S. would continue to support local allies with funds and military aid, but those allies would be expected to use its troops and fight for their own defense. This U.S. policy would lead to the ”Twin Pillars” policy in the Gulf.

In the Gulf, the Nixon doctrine evolved into the “Twin Pillars” strategy (see Box 11). This strategy was conceived in the wake of the British withdrawal from the _________________________________________________ 4

Ibid, p. 163. quoted by Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 103.

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Gulf in 1971. The former Arab British protectorates, South Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE were all newly formed states and vulnerable to Soviet influence. Soviet warships began patrolling the Gulf in 1968. The Nixon administration did not believe the Soviet Union was a big threat to the Arabian Peninsula, and could be controlled by a strong regional power. Iran, with its newly armed military seemed ideal for the role of regional policeman. However, experts in the U.S. State department advised that an American supported Persian state policing the Arab states of the Peninsula would foster anti-U.S. sentiment. To avoid this problem, the Nixon administration sought to establish Saudi Arabia as its “Twin Pillar” in the region.6 If Iran, in practice, became the U.S.’s surrogate policeman of the Gulf, then Saudi Arabia’s role was to ensure the free flow of oil to the West. Saudi King Faisal, despite being economically and militarily weaker than Iran, was able to maneuver diplomatically and capitalize on Saudi Arabia’s superior oil reserves and its legitimacy with Arab states to achieve regional parity with Iran during the 1970s. Further their regional aims converged on the issues of (a) keeping the Soviet influence out of the region, and (b) preventing radicalism of any kind. As Henner Furtig has written regarding the partnership between Saudi Arabia and Iran, "…their partnership within the ‘twin pillar’ policy still worked better than predicted by many experts. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran went so far in their oil policy as to harm the other irreversibly. Both monarchs knew very well that they had no alternative but to reach a certain level of understanding in order to protect their capacity for oil production and their export markets. They shared the opinion that open confrontation would only strengthen third parties, be they leftist radical forces in the region or their alleged Eastern bloc supporters. As a result, during the 1970s common interests prevailed.”7

Box 11:

Twin Pillars

An extension of the Nixon Doctrine, ”Twin Pillars” was part of a broader effort to reduce American commitments abroad. Iran and Saudi Arabia would play the role of U.S. regional allies in the Gulf region. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, benefited greatly from America’s new reliance on regional proxies to project power, receiving a virtual blank check from Nixon and Kissinger to purchase enormous sums of American military hardware. _________________________________________________ 6

Rosemary Hollis, “The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful?“ in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War , eds. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 196. 7 Henner Furtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars (London and New York: Ithaca Press, 2002), p. 11.

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The decision to rely on the Shah as America’s regional proxy represented America’s (or the Nixon administration and Henry Kissinger’s) one dimensional view of the Shah. The U.S. viewed the Shah as a loyal ally with a shared world view as evidenced by the Shah’s foreign policies, which included: opposition to Nasser and other radical Arab regimes; support for Israel; opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union; and alliances with conservative Gulf monarchies. However, the U.S. either did not see, or chose to ignore, the Shah’s extraordinary excesses driven by the exponential growth of his oil wealth. The Shah’s ambition to make Iran into an independent, modern global military power, at all costs, seemed beside the point to the U.S. administration. Most Iranians saw this relationship as another example of the Shah acting as America’s puppet. In fact, the expression “policeman of the Gulf,” which is how the Shah would often be called, was translated into Farsi as “gendarme,” and was a servile allusion. Iranians believed the Shah was again subordinating Iran to the U.S. However, America’s new policy gave the Shah tremendous new leverage with the U.S. In 1972, President Nixon met with the Shah and they reviewed the Twin Pillars strategy. Following this meeting, and despite the objections of professionals in the U.S. Pentagon, the Shah was sold any non-nuclear weapon he wanted from the U.S. Whereas in the past he had to plead, cajole, and demand the latest U.S. military technology from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, now he was sold virtually whatever he asked for. And since he was asked to look after American regional interests, the U.S. was reluctant to interfere with internal politics and policies of Iran. Human rights and political and economic reform, which had all been important issues for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ Iran policy were generally ignored or subordinated by the Nixon administration. The Shah’s increased freedom led to increased ambitions. He began to see Iran’s role in the region in grander terms. He may not have had imperial designs of conquest, but he began to view Iran as the regional arbiter, “the ruler from whom all had to seek permission and indulgence.” Iran’s new role prompted it to become actively involved in the Cold War struggle between the U.S. and Soviet satellites. In 1973, the Shah sent troops to Oman to assist Sultan Qabus battle the Dhofari rebels who were supported by the radical Marxist government of South Yemen. Also in 1973, Iran assisted the proAmerican Pakistani dictator suppress the Baluchi rebels on a common PakistaniIranian border. And from 1976–1978, the Shah provided arms to the Somalis in its war against Soviet-backed Ethiopia. However, the Shah also took opportunities to pursue his own regional goals. In 1971, Iran occupied (for further clarification see pp. 196 – 198) Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs, which belonged to the UAE. The Shah opposed any permanent U.S. military base in the Gulf, and objected to the U.S. Naval base in Bahrain.

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The Shah transferred American weaponry to Pakistan during its war with India in 1971, in violation of U.S. law. Iran also transferred American weapons to Turkey in its 1974 war with Greece. Further, in 1972 the Shah convinced the U.S. to support the Kurds in Northern Iraq in their insurgency against Baghdad’s Ba’athist regime. The U.S. had twice before turned down the Kurds request for support in Iraq. However, at the Shah’s request the U.S. sent millions in aid. In 1975, the U.S. was caught offguard by the Algiers Accord (see Box 12) between Iran and Iraq, which granted Iran very favorable border gains from Iraq in exchange for Iran’s abandonment of the Kurds. Box 12:

The Algiers Accord of 19758

Iran and Iraq agreed to end disputes regarding significant border issues, following an OPEC meeting in Algeria in March 1975. The accord, signed June 13, 1975, resolved the on-going dispute regarding the border between Iran and Iraq along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The waterway begins at the meeting point of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and flows into the Gulf. The accord defined the boundary as the thalweg, or the deepest point in the waterway. As a result of the accord, the Shah of Iran agreed to stop supporting Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq who had been fiercely resisting the Ba’ath regime’s control over the northern region of Iraq. The accord unraveled in 1979, following Khomeini’s ascent to power in Iran. Saddam Hussein declared the agreement void in 1980 during the build-up to the Iran-Iraq War.

Additionally, the Nixon agreement with Iran severely limited the U.S. intelligence presence in Iran. Over time, the Shah had objected repeatedly to U.S. intelligence gathering in Iran. The Nixon administration complied with the Shah’s requests and the levels of CIA reporting from Iran in the 1970s dropped to levels below that of the late 1940s. Thus, the U.S. was surprised when the Islamic revolution erupted in 1978–1979. The Islamic revolution in Iran ended the U.S. reliance on Iran as a "twin pillar”, and introduced a new Iranian regime which was hostile to the U.S. The U.S., in turn, began to lean more heavily on Saudi Arabia, and initiated a relationship with Saddam Hussein in Iraq to counter Khomeini’s radical anti-Western posture.

_________________________________________________ 8

See http://www.mideastweb.org/algiersaccord.htm accessed in 2006 and 2007.

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U.S. Dual Containment

The U.S. policy of dual containment (see Box 13) was born out of the Clinton administration’s vision of bringing stability to the Middle East during the 1990s. The U.S. government wanted to stabilize the Gulf region following the IraqKuwait War and to move forward with the Arab-Israeli peace process. Its policy toward Iraq was straightforward: It believed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was “irredeemable” and it sought full compliance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions before the U.S. would support lifting sanctions against Iraq. The administration was determined to advance the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. However, Israel and many Arab states felt threatened by Iran’s aggressive foreign policy. Israel in particular felt that it needed assurance from the U.S. with respect to the Iranian threat in order to move forward with the peace process. Dual containment was the strategy introduced to cope with this issue. It was conceived by Martin Indyk, Clinton’s first senior director of Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and articulated in a speech he delivered on 18 May 1993. Box 13:

Dual Containment9

“Dual Containment” was the U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf formulated during U.S. President Bill Clinton’s term in office. Dual containment attempted to isolate both Iran and Iraq, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system, and encouraging regime change in Iraq. As some scholars have pointed out, “dual“ containment did not mean “duplicate“ containment. The U.S. tactics and tone toward Iraq and Iran were significantly different. The economic sanctions and weapons inspections with respect to Iraq were used to enforce internationally agreed-upon UN cease-fire resolutions that ended the IraqKuwait war in 1991. The approach toward Iran was to use U.S. initiated economic sanctions to incentivize Iran to give up its support for terrorism and support regional participants in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The dual containment policy pursued (a) strict enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq, (b) made efforts to persuade Europe, Russia and Japan to deny Iran access to international capital and arms markets, and (c) continued American military commitments to Saudi Arabia and the smaller monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

_________________________________________________ 9

F.Gregory Gause III, “The Illogic of Dual Containment”, Foreign Affairs (April/May 1994).

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The basic premise of dual containment, as outlined by Martin Indyk, was that both Iran and Iraq were hostile toward American interests in the Middle East. Therefore, it would be foolish to adopt the strategy of building up one to balance the other, as the U.S. had tried to do in the past. This recognition was the lesson learned by the U.S. from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Further, it stems from this conclusion that it would be foolish to ally with or support any regime that is antagonistic toward the U.S. and its allies. Dual containment was an effort to move away from the Cold War balanceof-power politics engaged by the U.S. during most of 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s the U.S. supported a strong Iran as means to counterbalance the strength of the Soviet-supported Pan-Arab Nationalism movement. In the 1980s, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. increasingly supported Iraq in its war against Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. Indyk’s vision was an attempt to move away from this history. The U.S., as the Cold War victor, was now an unrivaled world power, and felt it did not need to rely on either Iran or Iraq to achieve its regional goals in the Middle East. Instead, the U.S. would pursue a policy that would attempt to aggressively contain both hostile regimes. However, the methods and tactics applied to each would differ significantly.10

4

Iraq

4.1 1991 Saddam Hussein incorrectly assessed the world’s reaction to his invasion of Kuwait. His military paid a heavy price in 1991. In late February 1991, after expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it became clear that the U.S. led coalition forces had the capability to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein’s government. However, the U.S. military had not planned to invade Iraq and had not made logistical preparations for the necessary military support, or devised a plan to secure the country and administer the government once Saddam’s regime was removed. The first President Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, have written that the UN mandate was to free Kuwait and there was never an option to overthrow Saddam Hussein.11 There was a military strategy to seize Baghdad in the event that Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass destruction or _________________________________________________ 10

Hollis, pp. 200-201;Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy, From Khomeini to Khatami (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 190-192; Pollack, pp. 260-262. 11 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) ,pp. 488-492.

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set Kuwait’s oil fields on fire. And Saddam did set Kuwait’s oil fields on fire, but the U.S. still decided not to invade Iraq and remove Saddam from power. The primary reasons the U.S. did not depose Saddam in 1991 were, (1) the Bush administration believed Saddam Hussein would not be able to survive very long after this defeat and his generals would oust him; (2) the U.S. was not ready and did not want the responsibility of occupying and rebuilding an Arab state; (3) the U.S. believed a strong and unified Iraq was necessary to balance the regional power of Iran’s Islamic Republic; (4) the U.S. was concerned an invasion would trigger a fragmentation of Iraq, with serious consequences; and (5) the U.S. was eager to initiate the Arab-Israeli peace process and did not want the situation in Iraq to be a distraction or undermine that process. On 1 March 1991, Shi’i soldiers in Basra began to spontaneously demonstrate against Saddam Hussein, and soon violence had erupted throughout Basra between rebellious soldiers and units loyal to the regime. The revolt spread to other cities in southern Iraq, including Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriya, Samarra, Amara, Hillah, and Diwanniya. The Kurds in the north, who recognized the opportunity and had carefully planned for it, also revolted against the government and by 19 March had seized the northern cities of Irbil, Dahuk, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniyya. To a certain extent, the U.S. incited Iraqis to revolt. In mid-February, President Bush had made two speeches that were broadcast in Iraq, calling for Iraqis to "take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside.”12 The U.S. military also air-dropped leaflets into Iraq with a similar message. However, the Bush administration did not want to support this kind of uprising. It felt that it was a precursor to the fragmentation of Iraq and chaos. Saudi Arabia and Egypt also had similar concerns. The U.S. was afraid Iraqi Shi’is would align themselves with Iran, and the Kurds would spread their movement and create a regional problem by agitating against Turkey. Further, administration officials believed that Iraq’s generals would eventually initiate a military coup that would remove Saddam Hussein from power in a much tidier and stable manner. However, Sunnis began to rally behind Saddam in response to the revolt. In terms of numbers the revolt was not massive. There may have been 100,000 Shi’is in the south and 40,000–50,000 Kurds in the north who were participating in the armed uprising. These were not large numbers. Many Shi’i tribes did not participate, and the U.S. provided no support or assistance to the

_________________________________________________ 12

Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 17-20; Hollis, p.200; Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm, The Case for Invading Iraq (New York, Random House, 2002), p. 48.

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uprising, so Saddam’s main forces who had remained loyal were able to crush the revolt.13 In mid-April 1991, under auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 688, which called for Saddam Hussein to end his repression of the Kurds and Shi’is, the U.S., Great Britain, and France established a zone of protection for the Kurds in northern Iraq. The coalition forces provided humanitarian care for 500,000 Kurdish refugees, and established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, preventing Saddam from using his air power to attack the Kurds. A key event in 1991 was UN Security Council Resolution 687 which set the terms for the cease-fire with Iraq that ended the Gulf War. The resolution stated that Iraq would, (1) recognize the adjusted Kuwait-Iraqi border; (2) accept a UN guarantee of the border; (3) allow the UN to position a peace observer force in a zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border; (4) acknowledge and re-affirm the Chemical Warfare and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties; (5) allow the UN to conduct weapons inspections and destroy all biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, and related equipment and supplies; (6) return or free Kuwaiti prisoners; (7) accept liability for Kuwait’s losses; (8) accept liability for pre-war debts; and (9) renounce terrorism.14 The main problem with this resolution was that it was predicated on poor assumptions. The first assumption was that the U.S. air campaign at the start of the war had destroyed most of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction facilities. The second assumption was that in the wake of such a colossal defeat, Iraq would be eager to cooperate with the terms of UN Resolution 687 in order to remove the sanctions against it. The third, and most misguided assumption, was that Saddam Hussein would not remain in power for long, following the war. The international community, including the U.S., believed Saddam Hussein would be toppled by an internal military coup. Because of these assumptions, the terms of the UN resolution were not sufficiently detailed to ensure their longterm success. According to some observers, there was also ambiguity within the UN Security Council regarding the intentions of the sanctions imposed by Resolution 687: were they intended to change Iraq’s behavior or change the Iraqi regime? Be that as it may, Saddam’s survival would present a persistent and serious problem to the international community throughout the 1990s.15

_________________________________________________ 13 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1995) pp. 449-457, 516. 14 Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 9. 15 Graham-Brown, pp. 17-20, 62-65, 78-80; Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 46-54.

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4.2 Perceptions in the Gulf There is a strain of thought in the Gulf (which does not reflect the views of the various governments and may not reflect the position of the majority of the population in the Gulf states) that claims that the U.S. allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power following the Iraq-Kuwait War to ensure the GCC states would remain dependent on U.S. military presence in the Gulf. This presence, according to this stream of thought, has allowed the U.S. to assert its "economic and cultural hegemony” in the region and pushed the Gulf states toward an economic and strategic alliance with Israel. Some intellectuals in the Gulf states also believe the U.S. military presence in the Gulf necessitated by Saddam’s survival was part of a strategy by the U.S. to get Gulf states to spend its petrodollars on vast amounts of American weapons and security infrastructure. One Gulf academic estimates $82 billion has been spent by Gulf states on security since 1991.16 It is important to point out that these ideas have little basis in fact as an actual U.S. policy foundation. The flaw of U.S. policymakers in 1991 was that they were thinking for the short term. They expected Saddam Hussein to be toppled by his own generals within a short time and then they expected Iraq to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687 in order to be relieved of tough sanctions. When this did not happen, U.S. policymakers realized they did not have a strong contingency plan for Saddam’s survival and were left to cobble together a containment policy to deal with Saddam. Further, this perception regarding the U.S. and Saddam overlooks three critical historical episodes in the Gulf with respect to threats posed by Iran. First, Iran in the early 1990s used its military to seize full control of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands in the Gulf belonging to two separate emirates of the UAE. Iran continues to occupy these islands, which is a source of on-going regional tension. Second, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a consistent history of sponsoring and supporting terrorism and fomenting unrest within the Arab Gulf states. Some of this activity can be linked to the U.S. military presence in the Gulf, but certainly not all of it. Third, during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait requested U.S. reflagging protection in response to Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. Oil shipments through the Gulf remained a critical national security issue for the U.S. and the West, independent of the situation with Saddam. These three points highlight the importance of Iran’s role in stability of the Gulf, and suggest a strong logic for the U.S. military presence in the Gulf independent of Saddam and Iraq. _________________________________________________ 16 Abdullah al-Shayeji, “Dangerous Perceptions: Gulf Views of the U.S. Role in the Region”, Middle East Policy Journal Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1997).

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4.3 U.S. Policymaking toward Iraq When it became clear that Saddam had regained his control over Iraq following his defeat during the Iraq-Kuwait War, and was not going to be quickly removed by his generals, the question emerged regarding the best way to deal with his regime. Within the U.S. government the policy debate focused on how much political, military, and diplomatic resources should be devoted to dealing with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The debate was not whether to engage or sanction Saddam – there was a general consensus in the U.S. policy community that Saddam Hussein’s government was evil and unwilling to change – but whether to try and sanction and contain him, or confront him with direct military force. The dovish group in the U.S. believed Saddam was weak, and could be contained without using a great deal of resources. This group believed the U.S. should be focusing on issues like NATO membership, China, India’s transformation, rebuilding Eastern Europe, and supporting Russia through its transition period. There were two groups who took a harder line. A group of military officers who had served in the Gulf and government officials in arms control, generally felt another armed conflict with Saddam was inevitable and since he would not give up his nuclear programs he should be removed before he had time to develop them. The second hawkish group advocated an aggressive form of containment using diplomatic and military pressure. Sanctions combined with military responses to violations or challenges to the sanctions. They also promoted supporting regime change through covert action and supporting opposition groups. This group believed Saddam Hussein would challenge and threaten the international community as long as he was in power, and in order to successfully deal with him, the U.S. would need to make its policy toward Iraq a high priority. Naturally, this group consisted mostly of the U.S. government’s Middle East regional experts.17 The most important difference between the three groups was the amount of resources each policy would consume. The dovish policy would be light on resources and allow government officials do deal with other global issues and crises. The most hawkish position – immediate regime change – involved a fullscale military confrontation and would be the most expensive and least popular to the public. This made it unlikely to be supported by the senior government decision-makers who answered to public opinion. The second, milder, hawkish position was also a resource-hungry proposition. It required aggressive monitoring and sanctions along with appropriate military engagement when necessary. _________________________________________________ 17

Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 56-57.

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This path was also less appealing to general policy makers who had other important issues to attend to. Therefore, the initial U.S. policy toward Iraq became something along the lines of the dovish position outlined above.18 It is important to differentiate between the U.S. containment policy toward Iraq versus Iran. The U.S. “dual containment” policy did not mean duplicate containment. The U.S. was not trying to weaken the Iranian regime with its containment, as it was the Iraqi regime. Iran was viewed as a less immediate threat, but also a more difficult challenge. The U.S. was attempting to use Iranian containment to put pressure on Iran to change its ways and give up its bad behavior. Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s assistant for National Security Affairs during his first term in office, stated that the U.S. had no objection to the Islamic element of Iran’s regime. Specifically, the U.S. was trying to contain Iran’s extremist behavior, such as (1) attempts to secretly acquire nuclear weapons; (2) its support for global terrorism; (3) opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process; (4) its attempts to undermine friendly regimes in the Middle East and North Africa; and (5) its treatment of women and religious minorities within its own borders.19 4.4 Iraq and the International Community In May 1991, Saddam Hussein’s internal security service uncovered and quashed a coup plot led by a former Republican Guard general, Bariq Abdullah. Another coup plot was discovered in June 1992, which resulted in the arrests of nearly 300 military officers and civilians. Many were executed. This plot was led by Saad Jabr, the son of former Prime Minister Salih Jabr. Conspirators included General Bashir Talib, one of the original Republican Guard commanders in 1963, and former Ambassador Jassim Mukhlis. Further, there was an active Shi’a guerrilla insurgency operating out of the Hawizeh and an-Nasiriyah marshes in southern Iraq. Saddam Hussein responded to this insurgency with brutal ferocity. The marshes were drained and the guerrillas were hunted relentlessly. The U.S., Great Britain, and France responding to Saddam’s extensive use of aircraft and helicopter gunships on the Shi‘i insurgents declared a southern no-fly zone over Iraq to limit Saddam’s ruthlessness toward Iraq’s Shi'is. The wave of internal dissension in Iraq can be attributed to the increasingly dire economic situation. Some form of humanitarian relief had to be granted to the Iraqi people who were facing a serious food crisis. In August 1991, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 706, which allowed Iraq to sell $1.6 billion in oil through an escrow account in order to buy humanitarian supplies. How_________________________________________________ 18

Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 55-58. Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 2-4; Gary G. Sick, “Rethinking Dual Containment”, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-32. 19

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ever, Saddam rejected this resolution as a threat to his authority. He realized if the UN was feeding and providing essential services to his people, then his role as sovereign ruler was being marginalized. Saddam took limited measures to restore basic services, such as functioning electricity, sanitation, and water to his people. Inflation grew 2,000 percent and earnings dropped to a tenth of pre-war figures. In June 1991 Saddam Hussein also set in motion a plan to foil UN led weapons inspections teams seeking to enforce sanctions on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Saddam believed the sanctions were short-lived and that the U.S. and its allies were not ready to pursue a long, drawn-out struggle with him. He believed the sanctions would not be prolonged because he would be able to bribe or trick the inspection teams into declaring Iraq disarmed, which would lift sanctions against his regime. Saddam did not view the sanctions as forcing him to choose between keeping his weapons of mass destruction or lifting the sanctions. Saddam was trying to force the UN to lift the sanctions, and, at the same time, devise a strategy that would preserve his secret weapons program. A central feature of this conflict during the 1990s was the cat-and-mouse game between Saddam and the international community. The international community was trying to get Saddam to abide by the terms of UN ceasefire agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 687, by cooperating with a transparent arms inspections process. However, Saddam had no intention of cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors. Saddam put his son Qusayy in charge of a Concealment Operations Committee, which was in charge of concealing Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and obstructing weapons inspections teams. However, UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were diligent and persistent in their investigations of Iraq’s weapons programs. In June 1991, they discovered an undeclared program to enrich uranium. This program forced Qusayy to admit that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program; he turned over large amounts of weapons designed to satisfy inspectors that Iraq was coming clean. However, Iraq continued to conceal the most valuable weapons, equipment, documentation, and personnel involved in research and development. In August 1991, the weapons inspectors found further evidence of weapons and nuclear development. They also found sixty-thousand documents describing the Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. In May 1992, Iraq was forced to admit it had a biological warfare program, but declared the program defensive. The weapons inspectors were having a large amount of success and destroying far more of Saddam’s weapon’s program than had been destroyed during the U.S. air strikes in the early stages of the 1991 Gulf War. In December 1991 and January 1992, Saddam Hussein began violating terms of the ceasefire. He was "harassing” the coalition planes enforcing the

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southern no-fly zone in Iraq. Saddam would repeatedly challenge the international enforcement of the no-fly zones in Iraqi airspace. He also prevented weapons inspectors from conducting their work. He sent personnel into Kuwait under the pre-text of retrieving equipment. The international community acted resolutely and condemned Saddam’s defiance. On 11 January 1992 coalition forces launched 110 fighter jets to destroy Saddam’s air defense installations in southern Iraq. They followed-up on 18 January 1992 with cruise missile strikes against a manufacturing complex used in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The next day the coalition air forces attacked targets missed during the initial strikes. Saddam backed-down and announced a ceasefire20. In the spring of 1993, the day before former President Bush was scheduled to visit Kuwait to commemorate the victory in the Gulf War, Kuwait announced that it uncovered an Iraqi plot to assassinate the former President and the Amir of Kuwait. There was good evidence to support the Iraqi hand in the plot. On 26 June 1993, the U.S. responded to the affront by launching 23 cruise missiles at the Iraqi intelligence service headquarters in Baghdad, destroying the complex (Box 14 lists this and other air strikes). Box 14:

U.S. and British Air Strikes, 1992–200321:

December 1992: An Iraqi Mig-25 fighter plane was targeted for violating the no-fly zones in Iraq. January 1993: Iraqi radar and surface-to-air missile sites were targeted for Iraqi attacks and radar locks on coalition forces. In addition, a nuclear research facility was hit after Iraq refused to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. June 1993: Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad was targeted following Saddam Hussein’s assassination attempt on U.S. President George H.W. Bush in 1993. April 1994: Iraqi military sites are targeted following Iraqi radar locks on coalition aircraft. December 1998: Biological, chemical, and nuclear facilities are targeted following Saddam Hussein’s continued non-cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. Iraqi air defense sites are also targeted following Iraqi radar lock-ons on coalition aircraft. April 2002-2003: Iraqi military sites are targeted in response to the general threat of Iraqi sponsored terrorism and its development of weapons of mass destruction. _________________________________________________ 20 21

Graham-Brown, pp. 105-116; Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 60-64. Smith, p. 97.

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During the remainder of 1993 Saddam remained quiescent. If anything, he appears to have worked hard at doing what he could to conceal the remaining parts of his weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms program. However, the sanctions were taking their toll, and by early 1994 the humanitarian situation in Iraq went from bad to worse. Hospitals, water, and sanitation facilities were affected by increasingly frequent power outages. The regime’s supply of hard cash was running dry and Saddam continued to refuse UN support to sell oil for food and humanitarian supplies. Instead the regime printed more money, which increased inflation. The economic and humanitarian problems also led to internal challenges to Saddam’s power. The Sunni al-’Ubayd tribe, known for its loyalty to the regime, revolted, which led to a crack down on ‘Ubaydi military officers and security officials. On 28 December 1993, Saddam survived a roadside bomb attack on his motorcade. In January 1994, a Republican Guard officer opened fire on Saddam, but was killed before he could hit the ruler. In May 1994, in response to the effect of the sanctions, Saddam pushed the UN to ease the sanctions. Iraq pressed Russia to force the UN Security Council set a deadline for lifting the sanctions if the weapons inspectors were satisfied there was sufficient progress toward disarmament. The U.S. blocked this deadline by arguing it was not in the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687. In September 1994, Saddam was forced to cut monthly food-rations by one-third to manage supplies. At this point the weapons inspectors believed Iraq had been effectively disarmed of its weapons programs, but the UN would not make this declaration because the U.S. was opposed to a move that would lift the sanctions at this stage. 4.5 Iraqi Economy Iraq’s per capita income per year dropped from $2,108 in 1989 to under $1,000 in 1992–1995, a more than 50 percent reduction. In 1979, Iraqi per capita income was $8,161. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iraq had debts of between $50 to $60 billion. This figure may have been higher. Some analysts have said the total was closer $80 billion. In addition, Iraq had short-term debt (2–4 years) of $35– $45 billion, which amounted to $7–8 billion principal and interest payment per year. The Iraq-Kuwait War deepened Iraq’s financial crisis, but it is hard to say precisely how severely the war in combination with sanctions effected Iraq. Iraq kept much of its economic statistical data secret. Iraq may have lost as much as $85 billion in potential oil revenues due to sanctions between August 1990 and July 1995. Its industrial sector almost came to a standstill, and its infrastructure

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suffered greatly. Pressure on Iraqi citizens was immense. Per capita income declined to $609 in 1992 and between $450-500 by 1995. Iraq was not food selfsufficient; when the sanctions were imposed and the food supplies on hand ran out, Iraq was unable to produce enough food to meet its needs. Iraq’s agricultural sector was poorly developed and highly inefficient. Under the Ba’ath regime Iraq became a net importer of food. Agriculture accounted for 11 percent of GDP, but used 30 percent of the workforce. From 1990 to 1995 Iraq also experienced some particularly bad harvests. This scarcity of food contributed to a widespread drop in caloric intake and malnutrition. Further, Iraq experienced hyper-inflation, and by 1994, the cost of basic necessities and simple consumer goods had gone up by nearly 5000 percent. The government began providing food rations to provide poor Iraqis with the basic food necessities, however after 1993, these rations were largely inadequate. The combination of food shortages and hyper-inflation meant that there were serious social problems developing in Iraq during the 1990s. Theft, begging, and prostitution increased as people were forced to look for alternative ways to survive. Deteriorating infrastructure caused the sanitation, sewage, and water facilities to break down leading to health issues. Health care declined too, due in part to an inability to acquire the basic medicines, vaccines, and necessary supplies. Iraq imported $500 million in medical supplies before the Iraq-Kuwait War, and by 1994 it was only importing $130 million. The Iraqi poor were suffering and the Iraqi middle class was eliminated when it was forced to rely on its savings to cope with inflation.22 4.6 Saddam’s Defiance By early October 1994, Saddam was desperate to lift the sanctions. The constant internal attacks combined with the deteriorating economic situation and the possibility that the sanctions could continue indefinitely were putting a tremendous amount of pressure on Saddam. He responded by threatening the international community. On 2 October 1994, Saddam sent his Republican Guard divisions along with regular troops to the Kuwaiti border. This prompted a serious and large response from the U.S., Great Britain, and France. The U.S. increased its number of troops in the Gulf from 13,000 to 60,000. The expanded U.S. presence in the Gulf allowed it to reinforce its troops much faster than at any point in the past. The UN tried to preempt another military confrontation by passing UN Security Council Resolution 949 calling for Saddam to withdraw his forces from the Kuwaiti border immediately. The U.S. and Great Britain threatened immedi_________________________________________________ 22

Graham-Brown, pp, 63-87; Cordesman and Hashim, Iraq, Sanctions and Beyond, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 130-150.

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ate strikes if Saddam did not withdraw. Saddam backed down, and fearing a retaliatory strike he signed the U.N. decree establishing Iraq's border with Kuwait. 23 In December 1994, the head of Iraqi intelligence (the Mukhabbarat), Wafiq al-Samara’i, left the regime and went to Kurdistan where he contacted U.S. intelligence operatives. He provided convincing information that Saddam had hidden large parts of his chemical and biological weapons program and was not complying with UN sanctions on disarmament.24 In early March 1995, a CIA covert program in Kurdistan led to a Kurdish led military operation against Saddam’s regime. The operation, which had a low likelihood of success, was not coordinated with the U.S. policymakers or the U.S. military, who did not hear about it until it was underway. Because the operation was not coordinated with the U.S. military, there was no way the U.S. could provide proper support to the Kurds. U.S. officials had to inform the Kurds to cut short their rebellion before it was wiped out. In April 1995, in response to growing international concern regarding the Iraqi humanitarian crisis, the UN created the "oil-for-food deal,” Security Resolution 986. This resolution established a system that allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion in oil every six months to buy food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. Saddam rejected this program, which immediately caused the Iraqi currency to lose nearly half of its value in May and June. In May, Saddam discovered another attempted coup led by a Sunni General, Muhammad Madhlum ad-Dulaymi. The General was executed and his mutilated body delivered to his family, triggering a revolt by his tribe in Ramadi. This revolt took weeks to suppress. Saddam was also struggling to control his own family; his unstable son Udayy was creating problems. In August Udayy publicly attacked his uncle with an AK-47, which prompted a valued member of Saddam’s intelligence services, Hussein Kamel, who had also been feuding with Udayy, to defect to Jordan. Hussein Kamel turned out to be a key official in Saddam’s secret weapons program. Iraq, fearful of what Kamel would reveal, claimed he had been a "rogue” actor, secretly hiding information on the weapons programs. Weapons inspectors were shown 650,000 pages of information on the Iraqi weapons program that were "discovered” on Kamel’s chicken farm. Kamel also helped the inspectors by providing valuable, detailed information about Saddam’s nuclear weapons program. For example, in August 1990 Saddam had _________________________________________________ 23

Babil, 8, 9 October – Daily Report, 21 November 1994; Al-Jumhuriyya, 1 October 1994; The New York Times, 12, 13 October 1994; Alif Ba, 26 October 1994; Al-Hayat, 18 October 1994; Iraqi News Agency (INA), 10, 15 October – Daily Report 11, 17 October 1994. 24 Al-Hayat, 4 December 1994; International Herald Tribune, 15 March 1995; Radio Monte Carlo, 17 March – Daily Report, 20 March 1995; Babil – 13 March 1995.

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ordered a rapid uranium enrichment to create one nuclear weapon to be loaded onto a missile and fired at Tel Aviv, Israel if coalition forces moved to depose him. Kamel also indicated Saddam had readied 166 bombs and 25 missile warheads with biological agents to be used if the coalition moved against him. Kamel’s disclosures undermined any trust the UN weapons inspectors had put in the progress of their work.25 In January 1996, Iraq’s financial situation was precarious. Saddam agreed to the oil-for-food deal, but as soon as the news strengthened Iraqi currency, Saddam withdrew his agreement. Instead, a series of important new developments began to strengthen his position. First, Saddam uncovered an extensive coup plot that had been carefully backed by the CIA. The conspirators were members of nearly every branch of the military and security apparatus. This had been the U.S.’s best attempt to overthrow Saddam, and when it failed the U.S. had little prospect for covert regime change. Second, internal fighting between the two Kurdish political parties, PUK and KDP, over fees for smuggling Iraqi oil into Turkey through Kurdish territory, led to the KDP requesting assistance from Saddam. This Kurdish civil war allowed Saddam to send his forces into the nofly zone in the north, and reassert his military authority in the north. His Republican Guard forces assisted the KDP to crush the PUK. This was a violation of the sanctions, which forbid Saddam from repressing his people with military force.26 The U.S. thought this violation of UN Security Council Resolution 688 deserved a tough response. It began to plan as series of air strikes against southern Iraq. However, the U.S. plan was stymied when Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused to allow the U.S. to stage the air strikes from bases in their territory. There was little sympathy in Turkey for the Kurds, and there were increasing internal problems for the Saudi Royal family for allowing the U.S. to stage military operations from its territory (indeed, even to be based on its territory). The Jordanians also turned down the U.S. request. The U.S. settled for an expanded southern no-fly zone and 44 cruise missile strikes at Iraqi air defense systems. This was a major victory for Saddam. He had violated the terms of the sanctions and paid a small price in return. The U.S. efforts to respond forcefully were thwarted by deteriorating cooperation from local partners, which also indicated a breach in the containment policy toward Iraq. In November 1996, dealing from a position _________________________________________________ 25

Graham-Brown, pp. 63-87; Al-Hayat, 26 May – Daily Report, 30 May 1995; Al-Hayat, 15 August 1995; Al-Qadisiyya, 31 July – Daily Report, 8 August 1995; Al-Thawra, 3 August 1995; IRNA,16 January – Daily Report, 17 January 1995; The New York Times, 13 August 1995; Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 71-76. 26 Financial Times, 16 September 1996, 6 November 1996; Iraqi TV, 18 November 1996; Iraqi News Agency, 28 March 1996; Country Report, Iraq, No. 1, 1996, p. 18; Country Report, Iraq, No. 3, 1996, p. 16;

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of increasing strength, Saddam finally agreed to execute the UN oil-for-food program that was intended to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people.27 Saddam repeated his pattern of behavior. Faced with internal threats to his regime and the opportunity to use force to assert his control over it, he defied international sanctions in order to strengthen his domestic position and maintain control over Iraqi territory. The international community’s resolve to strictly enforce the terms of the sanctions was weakening in proportion to the length and breadth of the Iraqi people’s humanitarian crisis. Saddam exploited this weakness and used it as a wedge to divide members of the international community on the issue of maintaining the sanctions. In 1997 and 1998, Saddam Hussein would begin to get the upper-hand in the U.S. effort to contain him. After six years of sanctions and confrontation, many countries were tired of dealing with Iraq. The oil-for-food program represented a genuine humanitarian gesture, nevertheless it undermined the sanctions and relieved economic pressure on Iraq, and also created a political weapon for Saddam. Most of the humanitarian food and medicine and other goods were smuggled out of Iraq for resale on the black market throughout the region. For example, in Jordan pharmacists asked their customers whether they wanted the name-brand, "Iraqi” version of a medicine, rather than the "generic” version. Saddam also enforced a steady method of propaganda generation to convince the world his people were suffering. Western journalists were not permitted to interview an Iraqi official until they filed at least one story regarding the suffering of the Iraqi people due to the sanctions. And news organizations complied. In the fall of 1997, Saddam made it clear he also intended to obstruct further attempts to enforce the sanctions that would uncover his weapons of mass destruction. Saddam blocked one surprise weapons inspection and hindered inspectors’ efforts in other ways. The UN responded by passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1134, which imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials if they continued to interfere with the inspections. Unfortunately, this resolution was not popular and France, Russia, and China abstained from voting. Iraq sensed the international community was fragmenting, and Saddam went on the offensive. He announced Americans would not be permitted to participate in future inspections and demanded the American inspectors already in Iraq leave. He threatened to shoot down American U-2 spy planes that were supporting the weapons inspection teams. When the UN announced they were enforcing the travel restrictions on Iraqi officials, Saddam responded by withdrawing from the oil-for-food program until a deadline was set to lift the sanctions. The U.S. and Great Britain began to send increased troops into the region, but they met resis_________________________________________________ 27

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tance from the international community. The Saudis indicated they would not support an attack because they deemed the violations too insignificant. The Saudis wanted the U.S. to negotiate more and claimed their people were unhappy with the suffering of the Iraqi people. The Saudi Royal family may have been responding to internal pressure from religious leaders and radical groups increasingly dissatisfied with the U.S. military presence in the region. As one scholar has noted, "It is regime security, not simply state security, than animates decision makers in the region. The former includes the latter, as ruling regimes for their own interests do not want to be subject to foreign attack, but goes beyond the external dimension to include domestic political stability.”28 Russia volunteered to mediate and went to Iraq. They were able to negotiate the U.S. terms, which were to allow all of the inspectors to continue work. The Russians agreed to push the UN to set a timetable for lifting the sanctions.29 In January 1998, only two months later, Saddam repeated the episode. He prevented the weapons inspectors from doing any work and demanded the UN lift sanctions by the end of May or the inspections would end immediately. The U.S. again began building up troops in the region to enforce a violation of sanctions. However, there was little international support. Russia and China publicly opposed any use of force to enforce the sanctions. The Saudis continued to refuse to allow the U.S. to use bases in its territory to enforce the sanctions. Only Kuwait was willing to allow the U.S. to stage military operations from its territory. "In the Gulf leaders’ eyes, conspiring to attack Iraq would be viewed as an act of betrayal to Arab interests and would actually weaken their states’ defense in the future.”30 Even public opinion in the U.S. was confused and generally not supportive of another military operation in Iraq. Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Iraq in February in an attempt to resolve the crisis. The U.S. had asked him not to go, afraid that concessions he would make would undermine the inspection teams. Annan signed an agreement that was supposed to resume the weapons inspections without restrictions, but Annan also agreed that "restricted procedures” would be used at eight facilities where inspectors believed weapons materials were being stored. Saddam had won another small gain from the UN He had forced Annan to travel to Iraq and negotiate with him. He was able to impose restrictions or procedures on the way the inspectors would perform their work. And he demon_________________________________________________ 28 F. Gregory Gause, III, “The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC States”, The Persian Gulf at the Millenium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, Eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997), p.62. 29 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 87-89. 30 Joseph Kostiner, “Divided Securities in the Gulf”, Chicago Tribune, 18 March 1998.

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strated that only Great Britain and the U.S. were willing to use force to get Iraq to comply with the sanctions. Shortly after this episode, weapons inspectors discovered nerve gas on fragments of missiles that had been cleaned and destroyed by Iraq – in violation of the terms of the inspections. On 4 August 1998, Saddam suspended Iraqi cooperation with the inspections and demanded changes to the leadership and personnel of the inspection teams. He allowed the weapons teams to remain as monitors, but they were not free to do their work. Saddam wanted a reduced role for the Americans and British. The U.S. was temporarily distracted from the issue because on 7 August al-Qa’ida bombed the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The UN issued a condemnation, but refused to declare Iraq in "material-breach” of the ceasefire. In October, Saddam again challenged the inspectors. He expelled ten American members of the inspections team, and demanded a review of Iraqi compliance and a called for a deadline to be set to lift the sanctions. The UN condemned Saddam again, but refused to declare him in breach of the sanctions. However, this time the U.S. was ready to act. It secured Saudi permission to fly support missions from Saudi bases. Kuwait and other GCC states agreed to allow their bases to be used for strike missions. On 14 November, just as the U.S. and British launched its planes to strike Iraq, Iraq’s spokesman appeared on CNN and announced Iraq would permit the inspectors to return and perform their work. The UN immediately accepted this gesture, and the British pressured the U.S. to abort the mission. Saddam has successfully avoided attack despite defying sanctions again. On 15 December, the weapons inspectors made a formal report to the UN that Iraq continued to obstruct and deceive the weapons inspectors. On 16 December, the U.S. and Britain launched a four-day air and missile attack on Iraq. These strikes targeted Saddam’s grip on power, attacking sites critical to Saddam’s control of the state. The strikes seem to have had a destabilizing effect on the regime and triggered renewed internal opposition. Grand Ayatollah Sadiq alSadr began preaching for small-acts of protest against the regime. His words reached thousands of Shi’is in southern Iraq. However, in February, Saddam had Sadr and his two sons killed in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf. This sparked Shi’a riots in cities across the country, including Baghdad. Saddam was forced to use Republican Guard and other special units to suppress these riots. Despite renewing another round of internal rebellion in Iraq, the U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq did not threaten Saddam’s grip on power. He was able to defy international sanctions and remain firmly in power. Containment was having a diminishing effect on Iraq.31 _________________________________________________ 31

Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 92-94.

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4.7 New U.S. Policy toward Iraq? In December 1998, on the last day of the air strikes, U.S. policy appears to have changed. President Clinton delivered a radio address stating the new U.S. policy was to replace Saddam’s regime by direct military force. President Clinton said that Iraq had made it clear that it would not obey the obligations of its UN ceasefire or live in peace with its neighbors. However, this was a short-lived policy change. In March 1999, NATO initiated an air campaign against Serbia and its strongman, Slobodan Milosevic, in an attempt to make him stop his ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. This campaign lasted three months, and was narrowly successful. By the end of it, President Clinton’s administration had lost its political will to pursue an extended military campaign to topple Saddam’s regime in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. returned to its ineffective policy of containment.32 The U.S. attempted to renew the international consensus for a tougher stance on Iraq. It helped craft a new UN resolution 1284, which expanded the oil-for-food program but kept in place the military embargo and the UN control of Iraq oil revenues. More important, the new resolution set the terms for a new weapons inspection team. On this point, the U.S., attempting to build a strong international consensus for enforcing the sanctions, made a big compromise to France. The U.S. agreed to lift remaining economic sanctions if Iraq complied with key components of the remaining disarmament tasks. The U.S. agreed to this softer position in exchange for French support. However, the French reneged. When the French learned Russia was abstaining from the vote, they also decided to abstain. The resolution (in its softer form) passed, but Russia, China, Malaysia, and France had abstained. This did not convey to Saddam the tougher stance the U.S. had hoped to project with the new resolution. Containment began to disintegrate as President Clinton’s term in office came to a close. Iraq trade was worth $17 billion by 2000, and Saddam was able to use it as a political weapon against the sanctions. Since many countries felt that the U.S. had lost its will to remove Saddam, and the UN had demonstrated that there were no real penalties for violating the sanctions against Iraq, many countries adopted the position that they should put themselves in a position to profit. Smuggling Iraqi oil around the UN sanctions exploded between 1999 and 2001. Oil revenues finding their way around the UN controlled program were five percent of the total in 1999, by 2001 they accounted for 20 percent of Iraq’s oil revenues. Syria opened the Iraqi-Syria pipeline in violation of UN sanctions. They pumped as much as 200,000 barrels per day at times. The Syrians also _________________________________________________ 32

Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 99.

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lifted their embargo on Iraq and permitted a free flow of goods between their borders. Iraq figured out how to game the UN oil-for-food program and earn revenues outside the control of the UN Iraq charged illegal surcharges on every barrel of oil sold through the program, and the surcharges were payable to accounts outside UN control. Companies eager to get the oil, complied. Dubai in the UAE, Jordan, and Turkey all helped Iraq smuggle illegal oil to market in violation of the sanctions. And they profited. They also smuggled goods into Iraq. At the close of 1990s, the international community had little to show for its effort to contain Saddam Hussein.33 Iraqi containment began strong. The multilateral sanctions employed and supported by the international community to contain Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War in 1991 was an enormous show of world cooperation. However, ultimately Saddam Hussein’s resolve to remain in power appeared to be stronger and more durable than the international consensus to contain him in the 1990s. Saddam Hussein’s violations of the UN sanctions started small and increased in scale and brazenness over time when he saw he could drive a wedge into the international public consensus against him by playing on humanitarian concerns and ideological differences.

5

Iran

The U.S. approach toward containing Iran was much different than the approach toward Iraq. Some have argued that Iran should not have been categorized in the same way as Iraq.34 Martin Indyk, an advisor to President Clinton on Middle East affairs, explained the means to contain Iran as, (a) working with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, in order to convince them not to assist Iran in developing its military or nuclear capacity to pose a regional threat; (b) maintaining economic pressure on Iran as long as it threatens U.S. interests in the region; and (c) maintaining counter-terrorism and arms embargo sanctions to prevent its continued support of terrorist groups. The U.S. recognized the limitations of its unilateral containment policy toward Iran. Without an international effort, it would be difficult to prevent Iran from obtaining armaments and nuclear materials from other countries. In substance, the Iranian side of the containment equation consisted of very little initial direct policy action. The U.S. was even one of the largest consumers of Iranian oil at the time. The U.S. was hoping its con_________________________________________________ 33

Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 92-104. Gary G. Sick, “Rethinking Dual Containment”, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-32; Marschall, pp. 190-192. 34

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tainment policy would limit Iran’s ability to create problems in the region until such a time as Iran decided to change its aggressive foreign policy behavior. In essence, the U.S. was hoping to contain Iran with its statements and influence, rather than with specific tactical actions.35 Following the Islamic revolution, which deposed the Shah, Iran became a theocratic state ruled by religious leaders who carry on Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of Shi’a Islam. There is no separation between state and religion,”Khomeini succeeded in the millennial drive not merely to create a state for Shi’ism, but to create a theocratic Shi’a state in which the clerics hold all the strings of power and dictate the laws of the state, and direct most of the institutions.”36 The Islamic revolution was almost contemporaneous with a group of Iranian students seizing the U.S. Embassy and taking U.S. hostages. This episode would last for over a year, and was”a turning point in the history of the Islamic Revolution.” It was a triumph of the fundamentalists in the revolution and signaled the weakening of the nationalists. The fundamentalists were supported by the religious clerics, or ulama, the lower classes, and the traditional middle class, or bazaaris. The fundamentalists did not have the skills to manage the country’s foreign policy adequately. They failed to articulate a policy with clear objectives. However, they changed the direction of the country’s foreign relations. They developed a vehement anti-Americanism which was a central focus of the new ruling class.37 Shi’i religious clergymen hold the key positions in all branches of government. The head-of- state, or Faqih or Rahbar, and commander of the armed forces is Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i. The Iranian Constitution, which was approved in 1980 and revised in 1989, makes”Twelver” Shi’ism the official state religion.38 There is an 86 member Assembly of Experts which monitors the performance of the head-of-state. However, candidates for the Assembly of Experts are screened by the Council of Guardians (also Guardian Council), which itself is _________________________________________________ 35

Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 262-263. Saleh al-Mani’, “The Ideological Dimension of Saudi-Iranian Relations”, in Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability, Ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), p. 160. 37 Mohsen M. Milani, “Iran’s Gulf Policy: From Idealism and Confrontation to Pragmatism and Moderation”. in Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability, Ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), p. 85. 38 Twelver Shi’ism refers to chain of twelve men, Imams, in ‘Ali’s blood line who possess religious authority passed down during the early centuries of Islam. ‘Ali was the Prophet Muhammed’s cousin and son-in-law. ‘Ali and his sons Hasan and Hussein were the first three Imams. Imams were designated at birth, which was usually accompanied by some kind of miraculous sign of confirmation. The twelfth Imam is said to be in “occultation” (ghayba) where he is hidden from the world. God will determine when the Imam will reappear. 36

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subject to the authority of the head-of-state. The twelve-member Council of Guardians consists of six clergymen and six lay persons who review all laws to make sure they conform with religious law and the Constitution. The Council also screens all political candidates for ideological and religious appropriateness. There is also a 290 seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis. It is a legislative body, but all of its decisions are reviewed by the Council of Guardians. The Majlis does have some independence, and has struck down laws proposed by the executive branch of the government.39 Following the Iran-Iraq War and Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June 1989, Iranian leadership realized the Iranian economy was suffering serious structural problems and felt it needed to make some pragmatic policy changes to address the issues. In order to institute reform, there was a recognition the government’s power base would need to be de-radicalized. The Constitutional revisions of 1989 consolidated the roles of the President and the Prime Minister, into that of an executive-style President with strong policy making powers, although the head-of-state, or faqih, remained the supreme authority. Former Speaker of the Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was elected to the newly defined position of President in 1989. He declared economic reform was his most important priority and made it clear he would not be influenced by religious ideologues in pursuit of this reform. In the first Majlis election following Khomeini’s death Rafsanjani and Khamene’i carefully screened the candidates to insure that radical elements could not run for election. Rafsanjani’s supporters won a majority in the Majlis, which allowed him to replace hard-line ideologues with technocrats in the civil service. These events moderated the Iranian government to a certain degree by limiting the day-to-involvement of the hard-liners in Iranian politics. Thus, Rafsanjani was free to attempt badly needed economic reform.40 5.1 The Iranian Economy during the 1990s Iran’s economy was suffering from a crisis brought about by a combination of (a) revolution, (b) the nine year Iran-Iraq War, (c) rapid population growth, and (d) a drop in oil prices. Poor management also contributed to the crisis, and nearly every aspect of the economy was affected. The need for reform was

_________________________________________________ 39

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 26-27; David Menashri, “Iran,” Middle East Contemporary Survey (Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 402, 405. Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 27-29.

40

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driven by the failure of the radical political economy implemented during the first ten years of the Islamic Republic.41 Rafsanjani’s economic reform was encapsulated in his First Five Year Plan of 1990–1994. The reformers hoped to establish a solid foundation for a modern Islamic society that would ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic. There was considerable initial success. The Iranian economy grew dramatically between 1988 and 1991, due to high oil revenues, increased post-war domestic consumption, and government spending on domestic issues rather than international conflicts. However, declining oil prices in 1991 had a drastic impact on Iran’s fragile economy. Iran’s oil revenues fell to almost one-third of pre-revolution income. In terms of real purchasing power, oil prices in the early 1990s were lower than the early 1970s, while at the same time Iran’s population had nearly doubled. Iran’s oil infrastructure was also in poor condition and needed an overhaul, which prevented Iran from producing oil at maximum capacity. Iran recognized its problem, and attempted to improve the deteriorating situation by investing $7 billion in its oil sector between 1991 and 1993.42 Diminishing oil revenues combined with borrowing from international financial markets slowed economic growth in Iran. By 1993 Iran’s growth had slowed, causing a cash shortage as its debt began to rise to very high levels. Total debt increased from $6.9 billion in 1989 to $23.4 billion by 1993.43 Inflation soon became a major problem for Iran. As the Iranian Rial lost its value, it became increasingly difficult for the technocrats trying to implement reform to plan effectively. The government could not structure or control its spending because its currency was losing stability.44 Iranian economic reform was largely a failure for the following reasons: (1) 65 percent of funds for the Five Year reform plan came from oil revenues, which dropped significantly after 1991. This led to the broader problem, which was that 90 percent of government revenue came from oil, leaving the government vulnerable to major shifts in oil prices. (2) Continued failure of agricultural policy that traces back to the Mohammed Reza Shah’s failed agricultural reform, leav_________________________________________________ 41 Ibid, pp. 30-33; Zalmay Khalilzad, “The United States in the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony”, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 98. 42 Furtig, p. 235; Echo of Iran; No. 62 (March 1993), p. 15; IRNA, 1 March – Daily Report, 2 March 1993; Financial Times, 8 February 1993; Le Monde, 6 April 1993. 43 Kamran M. Dadkhah, “Iran and the global financial markets,” in Iran Encountering Globalization, Problems and Prospects, Ed. by Ali Mohammadi, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 90. 44 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p. 43; Abrar, 1 May – JPRS, 8 June 1993; Country Report (Economist Intelligence Unit), Iran, No.1, 1993, p. 18; Financial Times, 8 February 1993; Kayhan International, 1 March – Daily Report, 5 March 1993; Le Monde, 6 April 1993; Radio Tehran, 17 October – Daily Report, 19 October 1993.

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ing Iran dependent on food imports. (3) Heavy capital investment in expanding the oil industry’s infrastructure consumed large portions of the government capital without providing commensurate short-term results. (4) Iran was unable to properly manage foreign borrowing. Iran’s foreign debt increased from almost zero in 1989 to $28-34 billion in 1993. When oil prices dropped, slowing Iranian revenues, Iran fell behind on making payments to its lenders, which led to rapid inflation. (5) Iran’s debt crisis stopped the government from importing subsidized foreign consumer goods and other basic commodities. (6) Various elements of reform were not implemented, including managing exchange rates, lifting barriers to privatization of industry and foreign investment, removing government subsidies, and providing incentives for skilled expatriates to return. In particular, the government was unable to privatize many of the large companies, or bonyads, controlled by the clergy.45 Rafsanjani’s economic reform failed to create lasting economic growth in Iran and living standards were poor.46 Adjusted per capita income remained lower than it was during the last five years of the Shah’s rule. 5.2 Social Unrest in Iran In June 1993, Rafsanjani was re-elected President, although 13 million voters, nearly half the electorate, did not vote. The Majlis reflected the public’s growing discontent with the government’s failure to improve the economic situation. In August 1993, following two days of debate, the Majlis rejected Rafsanjani’s choice for Finance Minister, Mohsen Nurbakhsh.47 In 1994, riots, which had taken place across Iran in 1992 regarding the poor economic situation, resumed. In August 1994, Qazvin, an industrial city in the Zanjan province, experienced a large demonstration of approximately 100,000 people. Troops ordered to restore order killed dozens, wounded hundreds, and arrested nearly 3,000. Riots also erupted in Tabriz in August 1994, and again in September. The Iranian army and Pasdaran command did not view its role as enforcing domestic control, and may have resisted being used in this capacity.48 _________________________________________________ 45

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 37-40. Iran Times, 12 February 1994; Kayhan International, 15 April – Daily Report, 23 April 1993. 47 Iran Times, 20 August 1993; Financial Times, 17 August 1993; The New York Times, 17 August 1993; Ettela‘at, 18, 26 August 1993. 48 Asef Bayat, “Squatters and the State: Back Street Politics in the Islamic Republic,” Middle East Report, Vol. 24, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 10-11; Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 45-48; Michael Eisenstadt, Iran’s Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, D.C.:Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 1996), pp. 41-42; Abrar, 8 June 1993; Economist, 13 June 1992; Ha‘aretz, 10 June 1992; International Herald Tribune, 8 October 1994; Radio Tehran 3 June – Daily Report, 4 June 1993. 46

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In 1995, demonstrations and riots continued in response to rising prices of food, gas, and public transportation. Prices were raised during Iran’s Nourouz, New Year’s celebration in March 1995, and this led to riots in some of Tehran’s poorest suburbs, such as Ribat Karim, Ali Shah Avaz, Islamshahr, and Akbarabad. This was notable because these areas had been considered the most loyal supporters of the Revolution and the government. These poor neighborhoods had sent many large numbers of its young people to die in the Iran-Iraq War.49 The U.S. sanctions in May 1995 contributed to the mounting social pressure in Iran because it sparked market panic which triggered inflation. Iran’s Rial to dollar exchange rate went from 3,500 to 1, to 7,000 to 1. The massive inflation further reduced the government’s ability to meet its debt payments. Iran couldn’t import foreign consumer goods and Iran’s bazaar merchants used the opportunity to profiteer from the predicament by raising prices on its goods. The average Iranian squeezed between massive inflation and rising domestic prices, had very little purchasing power, which led to widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s reforms.50 5.3 U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Iran In 1995, the Clinton Administration banned all trade with Iran, and under pressure from Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, initiated a covert action program against Iran. Gingrich refused to pass a bill approving funding to the U.S. intelligence community unless it included authorization for up to $20 million to block Iranian actions overseas and to stimulate Iranian political democratization and reform. The bill did not authorize the U.S. to use lethal force or make efforts to overthrow the Iranian government. However, the bill was viewed as a direct provocation by Iran who threatened the U.S. with a lawsuit in the World Court. The Iranian foreign minister claimed the U.S. was engaging in”outright terrorism” and instigating”anarchy in foreign relations.”51 In the summer of 1996, President Clinton signed a bill sanctioning foreign companies investing more than $40 million in Iranian or Libyan energy sectors. Europe, who received up to 20 percent of its oil from Iran and Libya, was strongly against this bill. Iran’s major European trading partners, Germany, Britain, Italy, and France called the legislation illegal. Iran claimed the U.S. was trying to gain a monopoly over the world’s energy sources. Southern Gulf states _________________________________________________ 49

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 45-48; The Independent, 5 April 1995; Ha ‘aretz, 5 April 1995; Voice of Mojahed, 5 April – Daily Report, 6 April 1995. 50 Iran Times, 22, 29 April 1994; Radio Tehran, 31 May – Daily Report, 1 June 1994; Radio Tehran, 21 November – Daily Report, 22 November 1994. 51 Ettela‘at-e Hava’i, 5 May 1995; Jomhuri-ye Islami, 7 May 1995; Salam, 3 May 1995.

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opposed the bill, and Turkey stated it would not let the bill affect its expanding trade with Iran. In fact, the bill seemed not to deter many countries from dealing with Iran. Turkey made a deal to import $23 billion worth of Iranian gas over 20 years. Pakistan and Malaysia signed economic deals with Iran. Pakistan agreed to a $1.2 billion deal to build a joint refinery and pipeline that extended to India. Malaysia’s state-owned oil company Petronas bought a $300 million stake in the development of Iran’s offshore oil fields. Britain, Israel, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi of the UAE supported the U.S. policy, but they were a minority. Japan, Russia, and China, for example, did not adopt the U.S.’s hard line policy. They believed in searching for moderate partners in Iran, and believed that trade and investment itself moderated Iran’s conduct. They believed the U.S. policy was a self-fulfilling prophecy which did as much to drive Iran towards extremism as it did to contain it. States such as China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia did not support the U.S. efforts to limit Iran’s military build-up and drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction. There has been considerable tension between the U.S. and Russia over Russia’s bilateral relations with Iran. Russia has signed civilian nuclear deals with Iran and has also agreed to a number of arms supplies deals.52 At the time of the sanctions, France was one of Iran’s major trading partners. French companies are heavily invested in Iran. A French oil company substituted for an American company following the implementation of the U.S. economic embargo of Iran in mid-1995. A French company installed the mobile telephone network in Iran. A French automotive maker has licensed an Iranian company the rights to produce one of its cars. The French have a joint stock company deal with Iran to export Gas to Europe. French petroleum engineering companies had contracts to build petrochemical plants in Arak and Tabriz, in Iran. France has imported billions in agricultural and oil products from Iran, and, in turn, exported billions in consumer goods to Iran. France clearly has an economic stake in its relations with Iran. Germany was also key trading partner for Iran. In 1993, Germany was the largest exporter to Iran, at $6 billion in goods. Iran was Germany’s third largest non-European trading partner. Germany lent billions to Iran in the early 1990s at very favorable terms. Germany claims it was aware of Iranian efforts to obtain dual-use nuclear weapons technology, and that it closely monitors Iranian intelligence operations in Germany. Germany believed political and economic en-

_________________________________________________ 52

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 15-17.

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gagement with Iran, rather than sanctions, was the best way to temper Iran’s extremists.53 Both France and Germany’s relations with Iran were strained in February and March 1996, when Iran publicly approved a series of Islamist suicide bombings in Israel that killed 60 people. The French and Germans responded with harsh criticism and threats to re-evaluate their relations with Iran. Iran responded quickly and distanced themselves from the terrorist attacks. President Rafsanjani claimed,”terrorism will lead nowhere.” In 1995, Japan was heavily dependent on Iran for its oil. It also was a major trading partner and lender to Iran. Japan believed political and economic engagement with Iran was the best way to promote stability in the region, however Japan was sensitive to U.S. policy given its close trade and diplomatic ties with the U.S. The southern Gulf states all view Iran as a potential threat. Saudi Arabia has taken a very cautious approach toward Iran. It has maintained contact with Iran’s leaders over such delicate issues as the Hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, and Iran’s relationship with Saudi Shi’is. Dubai, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have good relations with Iran. Oman exchanged naval visits with Iran, the first Gulf state to seek improved military relations with Iran following the IranIraq War. Following the U.S. sanctions on Iran in 1995, companies from Egypt, Finland, Holland, India, South Africa, and South Korea continued to invest and do extensive business with Iran. The U.S. sanctions and pressure were having a limited effect.54 5.4 Iranian Foreign Policy Background In 1989, Iran created a Supreme National Security Council to coordinate the various government institutions that play a role in foreign policy. The council is headed by the President and includes two representatives of Khamene’i; the head of the judiciary; the Chief of the General Staff; head of the Plan and Budget Organization; and the ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence. This council facilitated adopting pragmatic policies toward the Kuwait crisis in 1990– 1991, as well as toward the new former Soviet states that were emerging along _________________________________________________ 53

George A. Nader, “Interview with President ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani”, Middle East Insight, Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 7-14; Patrick Clawson, Business as Usual? Western Policy Options Toward Iran (Washington, D.C.: American Jewish Congress, 1995), pp. 30, 34. 54 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 18-23; Geoffrey Kemp, “The United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf,” in Allies Divided, Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 101-122.

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its borders during the 1990s. However, the council also appears to have supported assassinations of opposition leaders and extremist anti-Israel policies. This tension between pragmatic diplomatic policies on one hand, and ideologically-oriented extremism on the other, has prevented Iran from adopting a consistent and coherent foreign policy since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.55 Iran’s Foreign Ministry was completely destroyed and re-built during the first ten years of the Islamic revolution. After the Revolution the career diplomats under the Shah were purged and amateur revolutionary ideologues replaced them. However, during the course of the Iran-Iraq War, former pediatrician Ali Akbar Velayati reshaped the Foreign Ministry into a more professional organization by doing things like creating the Institute for Political and International Studies to provide research expertise to the Ministry. However, the role of the Foreign Ministry in supporting acts of terrorism remains murky. In fact, it is difficult to determine how deeply senior leaders in government were involved in approving or directing activities of the government’s Ministry of Information, Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Revolutionary Guards. Such activities included scientific and industrial espionage, covert nuclear materials acquisition, spying on Iranian expatriates in Germany, Scandinavia, and France, and assassinating high profile Iranian dissidents. Western intelligence agencies believed these covert activities were directed at high levels of government, and required very tightly coordinated activity between various government institutions, including resources and personnel from the Foreign Ministry. The Majlis also played a legislative oversight role in Iranian foreign policy. It has exerted considerable pressure on government officials to ensure its policies are consistent with national interests and the ideology of the Republic. Tax-exempt religious “charitable” organizations also played a nebulous role in Iran’s foreign policy. The Bonyad-e-Musta’azafin funded Islamic movements throughout the Middle East, and the Bonyad-e-15 Khordad was the organization that offered to pay for the head of British author Salman Rushdie for his religious blasphemy. The West viewed Iran as a potential threat to regional stability. However, Iran also had cause to feel threatened. It recently fought an eight year land war against Iraq, who invaded Iran. Iran also fought a two year naval war with the West during the Iran-Iraq War. During the Iraq-Iran War Iranian cities were targeted by Iraqi air strikes, as was its oil facilities which are Iran’s critical economic infrastructure. Iran shares a vital shipping channel, the Shatt al-Arab and a 1,449 kilometer border with an unstable Iraq in the midst of a civil war. _________________________________________________ 55 Ahmed Hashim, The Crisis of the Iranian State (London: Adelphi Papers, 296, 1995), p. 45; Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 123-125.

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Iran shares nearly 500 kilometers of border with Turkey, which is fighting a low-level war against its Kurdish population. The Kurdish issue has caused Turkey to venture into Iraq, and is a major source of tension with Iran. Iran has a 7 percent Kurdish minority of its own, that it fought for five years to suppress during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran shares a 35 kilometer border with Christian Armenia, which has a ongoing conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan shares a 179 kilometer stretch of border on Iran’s northwest, and a 432 kilometer border on Iran’s north. 24 percent of Iran’s population is Azeri, and Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia threatens to involve Iran. Iran has a 909 kilometer border with Pakistan, which is unstable and struggling with its internal radical elements. Iran and Pakistan both have Baluchi minorities that work to create unrest along the common border. Iran has a 939 kilometer border with Afghanistan, which is also unstable and struggling to assert any kind of central authority over its territory. Iran has 992 kilometer border with the young state of Turkmenistan and 740 kilometers bordering the Caspian Sea. But Iran’s largest stretch of contiguous border, and perhaps its most important, is its 2,440 kilometer coastline on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Iran appears to have reduced its support for extremist movements in the southern Gulf states since Khomeini’s death. It claims to want improved relations with the conservative Arab monarchies of the Gulf. It has made diplomatic overtures to Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. Further, Iran even returned six airline planes to Kuwait that it had seized and flew to Iran during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.56 5.5 Iranian Foreign Policy in the 1990s The common theme of Iran’s foreign policy posture during the 1990s was its claim to be acting defensively in response to real threats at its borders. This point should not be minimized, "... the leadership presides over a multi-ethnic society where Persians make up no more than 50 percent of the population, with sizable minority communities (e.g., Kurds, Armenians, Azeris, Baluchis) challenging the social cohesion in geostrategic border areas, and where linguistic differences (e.g., Turkish, Arabic) test the people’s national identity. Enter the turmoil and civil unrest along Iran’s northern and eastern periphery, and the specter of serious spillover associated with the unraveling of neighboring states, especially the nascent repub_________________________________________________ 56

Ibid, pp. 123-127.

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lics of the former Soviet Union, poses an incalculable threat to Iran. Moreover, the Tehran regime must cope with armed attacks against oil and military installations in Khuzestan by the Mojahedin-e Khalq, an opposition group operating out of Iraq.”57

However, Iran’s defensive posture was difficult to reconcile with its aggressive extremist rhetoric and support of international terrorism. It is this gap between Iran’s official foreign policy statements and its political rhetoric and subversive actions that make analyzing its position so difficult.58 Three general themes appeared to drive Iran’s extremist foreign policy in the 1990s: (1) with the demise of the Soviet Union and the destruction of Iraq’s military, Iran saw itself in competition with America’s peacetime military buildup in the Gulf following the first Gulf war with Iraq. This enhanced American relations with GCC states and formal military agreements with Qatar and the UAE added to the Iranian perception that it was being threatened by the U.S. (2) Iran viewed the rising tide of Islamist movements in the Middle East, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan as portending a new era in the Middle East, one which shared common goals with Iran’s revolutionary ideology. (3) In 1991, the U.S. (and the Soviet Union) initiated the Madrid Conference to bring together Israel and its Arab counterparts. Iranian ideologues were fiercely against any kind of relations with Israel. Khomeini’s ideology was rooted in anti-Zionist and antiSemitic beliefs. Iran viewed the U.S. as using its strength to pressure weak Arab states into making concessions to Israel. Iran organized an opposition conference to the Madrid Conference that was held in Tehran. Iran’s obstruction of the U.S. efforts to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process would lurk beneath the surface of Iranian foreign policy throughout the 1990s59. In July 1988, Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a cease-fire in Iran’s war with Iraq. This followed Iran’s mounting economic problems and severe battlefield defeats in April and July 1988. This was one of the Islamic Republic’s first pragmatic diplomatic decisions. It also marked the end of Iran’s attempt to use its military to export the Islamic revolution. Some of Iran’s political elites realized its ability to reform its economy and reconstruct itself after a costly, damaging war was dependent on building relations with the outside world and pursuing a pragmatic diplomatic policy. _________________________________________________ 57 Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, “The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and Iran”, in Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability, Ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), p.332. 58 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p. 127. 59 Marschall, pp. 18-24; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 248-249, 253-255.

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Under Rafsanjani, Iran for the most part, toned down its ideological rhetoric and revolutionary agenda. Indeed, Rafsanjani charted a new course that appeared to be more moderate, “If we define pragmatism as a philosophy based on ‘accepting the world pretty much as it is and working with compromise and caution to move it in incremental steps along a preferred path,’ then Rafsanjani’s new Gulf policy was remarkably pragmatic and moderate in temperament”.60 Rafsanjani was eager to pursue foreign policies that led to normalized relations with the Western world in order to add new Western technology and participate in the international capitalist system. Rafsanjani, and the technocrats in charge of Iranian economic reform, viewed this as the way to rehabilitate the economy and transform the Islamic Republic into a success story along the lines of the ‘Asian Tigers’. In the minds of some of Iran’s moderate political elites, this kind of transformation would lead to the Islamic Revolution being exported by peaceful means. However, the regimes hard-liners did not share this view. The conservative ideologues viewed Rafsanjani’s goals as a betrayal of the revolution and worked hard to undermine the reform movement. This fissure, between ideologue hard-liners and pragmatic reformers, has led to a great deal of inconsistency in Iran’s foreign policy following the IranIraq War. Iran’s head of state, Ayatollah Khamene’i, Khomeini’s successor, shares his revolutionary mentor’s radical ideological position toward the West. He believes his Islamic Republic is obligated to combat Western political and economic domination of the Islamic world. Further, he also feels the Islamic Republic is engaged in a battle to prevent the U.S. post-Cold War cultural hegemony. To a large extent, Khamene’i’s conservative outlook limited Rafsanjani’s ability to direct Iranian foreign policy toward a moderate position. Any moderate steps Iran took toward establishing pragmatic relations with the U.S. were viewed with deep hostility.61 The conservative outlook can also be seen as a product of the fundamental historical distrust between Iran and the U.S.: “The origins of this enmity are several: they include, from the Iranian perspective, the role of the United States in elevating the Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to the throne of Imperial Iran in 1953, the undisguised intention of the United States government in the military defeat of Iran by Iraq ... Adding to the strain from the U.S. perspective are: violent actions and incarceration of the U.S. diplomats then in Iran which followed the Iranian revolution; the postrevolutionary Iranian government’s inflammatory rhetoric questioning the legitimacy of both the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and of the U.S. spon_________________________________________________ 60

Milani, p. 90. Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 121-123; Echo of Iran, No. 62 (March 1993), p. 18; Ettela‘at, 28 August and 7 October 1993; Financial Times, 8 February 1993; Radio Tehran, 3 November – Daily Report, 4 November 1993. 61

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sored Middle East peace process; the attempts of the post-revolutionary government to subvert Arab Gulf regimes with whom the United States enjoys cordial and economically important relations; and the undisguised intentions of Iran to complicate and perhaps at times interfere with U.S. access to Gulf oil.”62

Iran’s hostility toward the U.S. manifested itself in Iranian foreign policy following its war with Iraq and the first Gulf War, through the concept of “asymmetric warfare.” Iranian leadership understood it could not fight the U.S. forces directly (it witnessed the U.S. demolish Iraqi forces that had beaten Iran into submission just three years earlier). However, Iran also realized the U.S. had specific limits on its ability and willingness to use military force. Iran learned its lessons from the Iranian-American hostage crisis in 1979–1980, the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in the mid 1980s, but also from the Tanker War in 1987 and 1988, and the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. Iran’s strategy was asymmetric because it would attack the U.S. consistently but at levels that would not trigger the U.S. to engage in a direct military response against Iran. The method of these attacks could be diplomatic, propaganda, financial subversion, or support for terrorist proxies. The goal of these attacks, according to one former U.S. official, was to inflict enough punishment to drive the U.S. from the Gulf, but without creating enough incentive to cause the U.S. to attack Iran and topple the Islamic Republic.63 Following the first Gulf War, beginning in 1991 and 1992, Iran’s foreign policy served as an aggressive counterbalance to U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Iran provided financial and military support to a number of different Islamic organizations and governments. They funded Muslim resistance groups around the world, in places such as Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kashmir. Iran created deep new political ties with Sudan’s Islamic government, providing military and intelligence support. The Iranians provided support to Egypt’s radical Islamist group, Gama’a Islami, in attempt to undermine Hosni Mubarak’s regime, which was playing an integral role in the U.S. led peace process. Iran also funded Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, two groups that carried out extensive terrorist operations against Israel in the 1990s. Iran may have been providing $30 million annually to the nascent Hamas in the early 1990s.64 _________________________________________________ 62

Jamal S. Suwaidi, “The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and Iran”, in Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability, Ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), p. 333. 63 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 255-258. 64 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 7 October 1992; Al-Wafd, 24 November 1992 and 5 December, 1992; Akhbar al-Yawm, 29 August 1992; MENA, 13 November 1992 – Daily Report, 13 November 1992; Ruz alYusuf, 7 December 1992.

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In addition to funding and support, which were less visible to the public and its neighboring states, Iran also took some bold and public steps to assert itself in the international arena. In 1992, Iran evicted the UAE from Abu Musa Island in the Straits of Hormuz. The island had been jointly administered since the Shah sent occupying forces to the island following the British departure from the Gulf in 1971. Also in 1992, Iran flexed its military muscles by holding joint naval and air maneuvers in the Gulf. These two Iranian actions were construed by the Arab Gulf states of the GCC as being a clear message from Iran that it intended to take a confrontational position with its smaller Arab neighbors.65 Iran also actively engaged its intelligence and military apparatus in funding and supporting Shi’i terrorist organizations operating in the Gulf states and Lebanon. Iran denies Israel’s right to exist and has supported terrorist operations against Israeli targets worldwide. In October 1991, Iran held a conference called, "International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution of Palestine.” Representatives from organizations such as Hamas, Hizballah, and PFLP-GC attended this conference. Iran also provides funds, arms, explosives, and military advisers to these organizations. Iran appears to have been involved in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina that killed eighty-five and wounded approximately 200. It also provided support to a Hizballah attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. Iran appears to have supported Hamas and Hizballah’s May 1996 bombings in Israel, prior to the Israeli election for Prime Minister. While condemning terrorism, Iran also made public statements offering moral support to the Palestinians following multiple suicide bombings in Israel during February and March 1996.66 In April 1996, just a month before Hizballah initiated a major campaign of rocket attacks in Israel, Iran sent ten flights to Lebanon carrying arms and between 500–900 rockets. These attacks contributed to undermining any progress in the peace process. There is some debate among experts regarding whether Iran’s support for terrorism against Israel is directly or indirectly approved and supported by Iran’s top leadership.67 Iran also conducted extensive surveillance and intelligence gathering operations on American personnel and facilities throughout the Middle East. Iran built-up its military in a defensive posture. Its goal was to build its defenses to _________________________________________________ 65

Al-Qadisiyya, 1 September – Daily Report, 3 September 1992; Davar, 25 September 1992; Financial Times, 11 September 1992 and 13 October 1992; The New York Times, 13 September 1992. 66 Der Spiegel, 14 October 1996; IRNA, 11 March – Daily Report, 12 March 1996; Jomhuri-ye Islami, 28 February and 6 March 1996; Kayhan, 11 March 1996; Salam, 17 February and 5 March 1996; Tehran TV, 11 March – Daily Report, 11 March 1996. 67 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 157-163; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 255-258, 266-267.

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deter any attack on its territory or its critical oil producing infrastructure from the Gulf. Specifically, one could say the Islamic government of Iran was motivated to protect itself from the kind of invasion the U.S. had launched against Iraq in 1991. Iran also built up its navy and air force in order to project power in the Gulf.68 Iran used the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to purchase large amounts of Soviet military hardware on the cheap from Russia, China, and North Korea. Iran purchased $1.4 billion worth of equipment from Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Iran acquired Kilo-class submarines, SU-24 strike aircraft, MiG-29 fighters, advanced naval mines, and miscellaneous ground force equipment. From China Iran purchased $1.3 billion worth of anti-ship missiles, missile patrol boats, air-to-surface missiles, and technology for its own ballistic missile development. North Korea provided Iran with most of ballistic missile technology and hardware. It provided Iran with Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, as well as technology to develop other short and medium range ballistic missiles. The Iranian regime views these weapons acquisitions as defensive and the best way to protect its survival. Finally, Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. A nuclear weapons arsenal was viewed by Iran as the best way to deter its enemies, especially the U.S.69 5.6 The Iranian Nuclear Issue U.S. military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman has noted, “there is little doubt that Iran’s search for weapons of mass destruction is the most threatening single aspect of its behavior.”70 There are several possible objectives for Iran’s nuclear weapons program and they are not mutually exclusive: (1) Iran may simply want deterrent power to ensure its regime’s survival; (2) Iran wants a nuclear weapons program to elevate its status as a regional power; (3) Iran could gain leverage over the U.S. by”trading nuclear capability for economic support, as North Korea has; and (4) Iran could use its nuclear program to blackmail the Gulf states into increasing oil quotas and investing in Iran. As UAE political analyst Jamal Suwaidi notes, “Intimidation is most efficient, and economic appeasement the most likely response, when the relative disparity of military power is greatest.”71 _________________________________________________ 68

Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 255-258. Ibid. Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p. 307. 71 Jamal S. Suwaidi, “The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and Iran”, in Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability, Ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), pp. 339-340. 69 70

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On 26 September 1994, CIA director James Woolsey warned Iran was 8–10 years away from building nuclear weapons. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry had stated that Iran was somewhere between 7–15 years away from becoming a nuclear country. Woolsey also stated Iran was engaged in covert attempts to acquire nuclear materials from Russia. Iran also negotiated public nuclear deals with Russia. In early 1995, Russia agreed to build a maximum of four nuclear power reactors in Iran for approximately $1 billion. This issue presented President Clinton with a quandary regarding relations with Russia. On one hand, U.S. Congress was denouncing Russia’s deal with Iran and calling for the U.S. to withhold aid to Russia in response. On the other hand, Ashton Carter, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Security, declared the U.S. should not cut aid to Russia since the aid was meant to be used to dismantle former Soviet nuclear arms. The U.S. applied whatever pressure it could to get Russia to cancel the deal with Iran. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher offered Russia $100 million in aid to construct modern nuclear reactors and to help clean-up nuclear waste sites. Russia went ahead with its deal with Iran. In September 1994, Russia rejected Woolsey’s claims and stated its won intelligence community had no evidence that it was the center of Iran’s covert attempts to obtain nuclear weapons related material. In April 1994, President Clinton announced the U.S. would not renew its nuclear cooperation treaty with Russia. The treaty had provided for cooperation on nuclear fusion, nuclear safety, and studies on the effect of radiation on the environment. The U.S. claimed Russia was going to supply Iran with gas centrifuge technology which could be used to enrich uranium to weaponsgrade level. Russian President Boris Yeltsin denied such claims. In 1995, the Russian Foreign Minister Yvgeni Primakov issued a report on the nuclear ambitions of a number of countries, including Iran. The report states there was no convincing evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Further, the report said,”The current state of its industrial potential is such that, without help from outside, Iran is not capable of organizing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.” The Russians attacked America for its hypocritical double-standard claiming America ignored the nuclear development of its strategic allies, Israel and Pakistan, but attacks Iran for the same development. Arguing from a different angle, Russia also claimed that according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”) Iran was permitted to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This claim continues to be the focus of controversy regarding Iran’s on-going diplomatic war in defense of its nuclear program.72 _________________________________________________ 72

Cordesman and Hashim, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 16-19; Richard A. Falkenrath, “The United States, Europe, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Allies Divided, Transatlantic Policies

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Under the Shah, Iran had actively pursued nuclear energy as a means to buttress its weak electric power infrastructure. Considering the Shah’s enormous military spending, he did not spend much on developing nuclear weapons. Khomeini dismantled the Shah’s nuclear program at the start of the Iran-Iraq War because it is said he believed nuclear weapons did not conform with Islam. However, in the mid 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was believed Iraq was developing nuclear weapons, Iran re-activated its nuclear weapons program in the event that Iraq was able to produce and use such weapons. It devoted considerable resources to it, which has continued since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. However, assistance appears to have come from sources outside the former Soviet Union. Iran appears to have been provided critical aid by Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan since the 1980s. The nuclear issue and Iran’s weapons of mass destruction is an unresolved source of conflict in the region. It is unclear whether U.S. containment effectively hindered Iranian efforts to advance its nuclear weapons program.73 5.7 Europe’s "Critical Dialogue” In December 1992, prior to the Clinton administration taking office, the European Union (“EU”) announced its policy of engaging in a dialogue with Iran, given its importance in the region. The EU defined this as a”critical dialogue” meant to engage Iran in a way that would convince it that there were rewards for good behavior. The EU saw room for Iranian improvement in areas such as human rights, terrorism, and things like the death sentence fatwa against author Salman Rushdie. It also thought Iran should not obstruct the Middle East peace process or engage in arms procurement that would threaten regional stability, though it did acknowledge Iran’s right to acquire the means to defend itself. The U.S. perception of the EU policy was that, “it was little more than a facade for European trade with Iran despite Iran’s persistence in taking actions that Europe too found distasteful if not abhorrent.” European companies were profiting from their business with Iran and European governments were reluctant to jeopardize trade relations with Iran by taking a hard-line. Only a staunch public

for the Greater Middle East, Eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1997), p. 207. 73 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p. 297; Falkenrath, pp. 212-214, Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 259; for a detailed chronology of A.Q. Khan’s assistance to Iran see Michael Laufer, “A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Issue Brief, Vol. VIII, No. 8 (7 September 2005).

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outcry in European countries could move governments to take a firm position on Iran’s misbehavior. For example, in October 1993, Germany invited Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian to visit Germany and meet with his German counterpart, Bernd Schmidbauer. Fallahian was, ostensibly, the man behind Iranian terror activity, and news of his visit created an uproar in Germany. The German press, opposition political parties, and human rights groups sharply questioned Chancellor Kohl’s government regarding its dealings with Fallahian. Indeed, Fallahian had been implicated in the September 1992 Berlin murder of Kurdish dissidents by Iranian agents. Indeed, following the German trial regarding these murders, which found the Iranian government responsible for the murders, there was some public momentum for a change in European policy toward Iran. However, despite public outcry in several European countries to shut down relations with Iran, there was no change in the EU policy to engage with Iran.74 5.8 Iranian Escalation leads to U.S. Sanctions Between 1992 and 1996, Iran took active steps to drive the U.S. out of the Gulf, expand its regional influence, and undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran supported opposition groups throughout the Gulf. It provided financing, arms, and military advisers to Hizballah in Lebanon. It supplied Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas with funds during a period when these two organizations were increasing their terrorist attacks against Israel in response to the 1993 Oslo Accords. Iran also provided funding to the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party), which was a terrorist group in Turkey. The support for the PKK was likely in response to Ankara’s growing alliance with Israel during the 1990s. In March 1992, with support from the Iranian Embassy, Hizballah bombed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 1994, Hizballah, with Iranian support, bombed a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires killing 85 and wounding over twohundred. Iran also objected to Jordan’s 1994 peace agreement with Israel. In 1993, Iran’s deputy minister of foreign affairs traveled to Baghdad to assess Saddam Hussein’s willingness to enter into an alliance with Iran. This was despite the fact that in 1992 Iranian warplanes had bombed Iraq, where it believed Iranian opposition group Mujahidin-e Khalq was operating from. Iraq ultimately turned Iran down, but talks would continue throughout the 1990s. _________________________________________________ 74

Marschall, pp. 195-198; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 262-265; Johannes Reissner, “Europe, United States, and the Persian Gulf,” in Allies Divided, Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 123-142.

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In January 1995, Iran had closed a deal with the Russians to build a nuclear research center in Iran. The Russians and Chinese continued to sell weapons to Iran, despite tireless and repeated U.S. efforts to persuade them otherwise. Iran’s terrorist sponsorship, weapons build-up, nuclear progress, and rhetorical defiance created great concern in Israel. Specifically, Iran’s involvement with the Palestinian terrorism and support for Hizballah was considered a serious problem. Israel, facing popular internal pressure to do something about Palestinian terrorism in the wake of its 1993 peace deal, requested that the U.S. put more pressure on Iran to reign in the terrorist groups it was supporting. The U.S. containment policy may have lacked a bite to accompany its bark. The U.S. was Iran’s third largest trading partner by 1995. It was Iran’s sixth largest purchaser of exports and largest purchaser of its oil. Given the levels of commercial ties with the U.S., Iran may not have felt like it had to pay a price for its recalcitrant behavior in the international arena. Further, since the U.S. was doing such a large volume of business with Iran, the U.S. had almost no leverage in Europe or elsewhere to exert pressure not to do business with Iran.75 However, in 1995, the Republicans in Congress began to make the U.S. policy toward Iran a political issue, resulting in a toughening of U.S. policy by the Democratic administration. Robert Pellatreau, Assistant Secretary of State, in his testimony to Congress on 2 March 1995, summed up U.S. position towards Iran – and also the initial failure of U.S. containment – by stating that,”Our policy towards Iran is to pressure Tehran to abandon specific policies we find abhorrent and a threat to vital American interests, including its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its sponsorship of terrorism and violence designed to undermine the Middle East peace process, its attempts to destabilize countries of that region, and its record of human rights abuses. It is apparent that Iran will not be convinced to change its behavior until the world community exacts a sufficiently high economic and political price.”76 Iranian President Rafsanjani, a pragmatist, realized the extent of Iranian trade with the U.S. He realized the importance of such trade to the economic recovery of Iran. Therefore, when political momentum for economic sanctions began to grow in U.S. Congress, Rafsanjani tried to conciliate the U.S. and prevent U.S.-Iranian relations from coming head-to-head. Iran was considering its first new oil production agreement since the revolution for two offshore oil fields. It was a contract worth potentially $1 billion. It would be the first foreign contract awarded by the Islamic Republic and many expected the contract to go to the French energy giant Total. On 6 March 1995, Iran announced that the U.S. firm Conoco had won the contract. _________________________________________________ 75 76

Economist, 25 February 1995; The New York Times, 29 March 1995. Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p. 14.

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However, the Clinton administration would not allow it. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who had been deputy secretary of state during the Carter hostage crisis and conducted the final negotiations that led to their release, criticized the deal as running counter to U.S. policy objectives. Specifically, it would give Iran a huge cash injection. It could then use those funds to go out and purchase weapons the U.S. was trying to stop it from getting. The U.S. was also extremely frustrated with Iran’s role in fomenting terrorism and undermining the Middle East peace process. On 14 March 1995, President Clinton announced the deal was inconsistent with U.S. policy and signed an executive order prohibiting all oil development deals with Iran. Iran had hoped the U.S. would accept the deal, exposing the hypocrisy behind the U.S. policy, which would remove any hesitancy Europe, Japan, and Russia might have regarding on-going deals with Iran for arms or nuclear assistance. The Conoco deal and Congressional pressure forced the Clinton administration to come to terms with the weaknesses of its containment policy. It could not demand cooperation from Europe if the U.S. was getting rich doing business with Iran. On 6 May 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order banning all trade and financial relations with Iran, including subsidiaries of American corporations. The U.S. trade embargo did not have an immediate impact on Iran and did not change Europe’s position regarding trade and arms deals with Iran. As German Economic Minister Gunter Rexrodt stated,”We do not believe that a trade embargo is the appropriate instrument for influencing opinion in Iran and bringing about changes there that are in our interests.”77 The fact that the stronger U.S. policy toward Iran did little to mobilize a multilateral international consensus played into the hands of Congressional Republicans who pushed for pressuring the Iranians even more directly. Newt Gingrich, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, relentlessly and publicly pushed the Clinton Administration to allocate $18 million to the CIA covert action program designed to subvert the Islamic regime of Iran. There were a number of problems with Gingrich’s efforts. First, there was little evidence that the Iranian population was ready to take action against their government, despite being widely dissatisfied with it. Typically covert actions programs are only effective when there is some initial popular momentum that can be buttressed and built-upon with covert money and personnel. In the case of Iran in 1995, there was little evidence to suggest this was the scenario. Second, the U.S. intelligence community harbored a heightened sensitivity to pursuing such a course after the Mossadegh coup. Third, Iran had identified the CIA covert action program operations headquarters for Iran in Frankfurt, Germany. This had allowed Iran to shut down whatever _________________________________________________ 77

Quoted in Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 273.

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nascent operations the U.S. had initiated up until that point, meaning there was no place to direct the new money Gingrich was allocating. Fourth, since Gingrich had conducted the whole debate regarding an Iranian covert action program publicly the Iranian leadership was now familiar with the U.S. intention and was able to use it in Iran’s defense.78 Many argue that Gingrich conducted the debate in public precisely because he knew covert action was not a credible option. Since the CIA was unlikely to execute a covert action program, Gingrich used the debate itself as a form of pressure on Iran. The magnitude of the debate served to inform Iran’s leadership, Europe, Japan, Russia, and the Iranian people just how serious the U.S. was about getting Iran to change its behavior. The weakness of this tactic, of course, is that Iran and the U.S. have a long and troubled relationship that is based on the Iranian perception of perpetual U.S. covert interference in Iran’s internal affairs. Unlike the U.S. intelligence community which may have had a good grasp of the damage done by the U.S. role in the Mossadegh coup in 1953, it is hard to say if Gingrich had the same historical understanding of Iran’s anti-American sentiment. In any case, the public debate did not cause Iran to moderate its position. Instead, it inflamed the anti-American component of Iranian revolutionary ideology and foreign policy among Iran’s leaders. 5.9 Iranian Response to U.S. Sanctions Iranian leadership responded to the U.S. sanctions and move toward a covert programs of subversion with fiery rhetoric. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claimed covert U.S. action would be a violation of international law and and an act of state sponsored terrorism. He called for the UN to react to the U.S. position. The Majlis announced it would allocate $14.3 million to “uncover and neutralize thr American government’s plots and interferences in the internal affairs of Islamic Iran.”79 Hizballah made public statements that it was ready to strike out at American targets all over the world. Many experts feel, at this point, Iran’s anger toward U.S. policy began to manifest itself through terrorist attacks via proxy groups, which was aimed at undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East. In late February 1996, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad carried out four suicide attacks in nine days against Israel killing fifty-nine Israeli civilians. Hamas has received training and support from Iran, and many believe Islamic Jihad is also directed by Iran. In March 1996, Hizballah increased its attacks on Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and used a new tactic of attacking from civilian positions. Therefore, Israel’s retalia_________________________________________________ 78 79

Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 271-275. Country Report (Economist Intelligence Unit), Iran, No. 1, 1997, p.11.

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tory strikes claimed Lebanese civilian lives. This in turn, prompted Hizballah to attack Israeli civilians by launching Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. In early April, Israel lauched its "Grapes of Wrath” operation to end the rocket attacks on its civilians. The success of Israel’s operation was debatable, and in any case it led Iran to increase its funding to $100 million per year for Hizballah in Lebanon. A by-product of Iranian backed terrorism against Israel, was that it may have changed the course of Israeli politics. Rabin and his successor Peres had pushed hard for the Middle East peace process, but in May 1996, after Grapes of Wrath and the wave of Palestinian terrorism, the Israeli people elected Benjamin Netanyahu who was more security oriented and less intent on pursuing the peace process. In the summer of 1996, in the Gulf, Iran was assisting Shi’a opposition groups in Bahrain foment popular unrest. Bahraini officials claimed to have uncovered a plot to overthrow the government. The groups, Bahraini Hizballah and Al-Quds Forces, claimed to have received guidance and support from Iranian intelligence. It is unclear whether the timing of the plot had anything to do with the announcement, during the summer of 1995, that a full American naval fleet would be headquartered at a base in Bahrain. Meanwhile, there appeared to be a genuine popular Shi’i protest movement taking place against the Bahraini government. It is also unclear to what extent this popular movement was aided by Iranian elements. The issue concerned the Saudis who warned Iran, through backchannels, to stop meddling in Bahraini affairs. The Saudi government even mobilized its National Guard units in the event Bahrain’s government needed support. In June 1996, GCC officials issued a statement calling for an end to Iran’s meddling in Bahraini internal affairs. Ten days later, on 25 June 1996, a truck bomb exploded and wiped out half of a building at the Khubar Towers complex in eastern Saudi Arabia. Khubar Towers housed American military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia following the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. Nineteen Americans were killed and 372 were wounded. The Party of God of the Hijaz, or Hizballah al-Hijaz, was believed to be responsible for the operation. This group was created and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. It had been directed, as early as 1994, to begin planning for attacks against Americans in Saudi Arabia. However, it was the Congressional debate in 1995, regarding the covert action program directed against Iran that put the specific operation against the Khubar Towers in motion. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards provided training, support, and explosives. The bomb design was provided by Lebanese Hizballah. This information was discovered by Saudi Arabia’s internal security services, which moved quickly to apprehend the responsible parties. However, Iranian sponsorship of an attack against the U.S. on Saudi soil was a very deli-

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cate situation for the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia walked a fine line in its relations with Iran. The Saudi Royal family was concerned the U.S. would launch a military strike against Iran in retaliation for Khubar, and this would put Saudi Arabia in a difficult diplomatic position, both internally with respect to its Shi’a community and externally in the greater Arab-Muslim world. Therefore, the Saudis were reluctant to share their evidence with the U.S. Saudi Arabia was not entirely satisfied with U.S. decisions in the Gulf since the war in 1991. The Saudis had hoped the U.S. would remove Saddam Hussein from power. Further, they saw the U.S. responses to continued Iraqi aggression in the region as unsatisfactory. For example, they saw the U.S. missile strikes against Iraq as weak responses to the attempted assassinations of former President Bush and the Amir of Kuwait. Some Saudi officials were fearful that providing the evidence against Iran in the Khubar Towers attack would generate another weak U.S. response, which would prompt Iran to lash out at Saudi Arabia in response. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the U.S., told the Clinton administration Saudi Arabia would provide the U.S. with the evidence if the U.S. would guarantee a large military strike against Iran. The U.S. response was that it could not make such a promise before it saw the information Saudi Arabia had. Saudi Arabia interpreted this response to mean the U.S. was unlikely to launch a major operation against Iran, and withheld the information.80 In August 1996, U.S. initiated secondary sanctions against Iran, by sanctioning all foreign corporations investing more than $20 million in the Iranian and Libyan oil industries. The sanctions would bar those foreign companies from any commercial transactions with the U.S. This bill was designed to pressure EU countries into getting tougher about their policy toward Iran and Iranian terrorism. And following the new sanctions, Iran could not get offers from foreign companies for eleven different contracts it offered for oil field development. From 1996 until 1998, when the EU and the U.S. were able to come to terms on a tougher Iran policy, the only contract signed with Iran for oil development was by the French company Total.81 However, these sanctions did nothing to deter Iran from its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of terrorism, or its undermining the Arab-Israeli peace process. In 1996, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati described Iran’s strategy for dealing with the international community as based on three ideas, (a) political and economic ties with its neighbors; (b) strengthening relationships with countries outside the Middle East that have common interests with Iran; and (c) strengthening relations with the”supraregional” states of China, Russia, Germany, and France. Velayati made it clear that Iran was pursuing ties with the _________________________________________________ 80 81

Kemp, pp. 101-122; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 280-285. Marschall, pp. 192; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 289.

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former Soviet Central Asian states, Pakistan, and Turkey to outmaneuver the U.S.’s attempts at containment. Iran also opened rail links from Iran to Turkmenistan.82 However, Iran encountered problems trying to strengthen its relations with Germany. In April 1997, a German court issued a guilty verdict against four Lebanese men and an Iranian for killing Iranian Kurdish leaders at a restaurant in Berlin in 1992. Further, the court found the killings had been ordered by Iranian leadership, including Khamene’i, Rafsanjani, and Minister of Information and Security, Fallahian. Iranian government ministers publicly denounced the verdict and claimed it was part of a Zionist conspiracy. Iran announced it would file a lawsuit against the German firms that developed chemical weapons used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Germany withdrew its ambassador from Iran and expelled four Iranian diplomats from Germany who were believed to be intelligence officers. Iran then expelled four German diplomats. The European Union backed Germany by suspending all ministerial meetings with Iran. However, this was temporary and a few months later the EU resumed its diplomatic contacts with Iran. However, despite a German court finding Iran responsible for sponsoring terrorism on European soil, Germany and the European Union did nothing to limit or end its commercial trade with Iran.83 In 1996 and early 1997, Iran appears to have recognized it pushed the U.S. into a position where it was seriously contemplating a range of military options in retaliation for the Khubar Towers attack. Iran was also worried about pushing the Europeans too far and jeopardizing trade relations that were critical for its ailing economy. Iran’s behavior became less aggressive. Iran stopped aggressive surveillance on U.S. personnel abroad. Its warships kept their distance from U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf. And it appears to have discontinued support for Bahraini opposition groups. In March 1997, Rafsanjani met with Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah and apparently communicated to the Saudis that Iran would reduce its provocations. The Iranians toned down their behavior during the Hajj to Mecca, and the Saudis resumed direct flights to Iran. Also in May 1997, the Iranian Presidential election was won by reformer, Hojat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami. Khatami had been minister of culture and Islamic Guidance twice: 1982– 1986 and 1989-1992. In 1992 he had been forced to resign by hard-line clerics for being too liberal with Iranian media and entertainment. From 1992–1997, leading up to his election, Khatami had been head of Iran’s National Library, which is not a natural stepping stone to the Presidency of the Islamic Republic. Khatami was allowed to run for office precisely because Iran’s ruling elite did not view him as an ambitious candidate or threat to their choice for the position, _________________________________________________ 82 83

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 24-25. Marschall, p. 196; Reissner, p. 139; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 290-291.

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‘Ali Akbar Natiq Nuri. And the public may have voted for Khatami exactly because he was not endorsed or supported by the ideologues of the Islamic regime. The public voted for Khatami because they were looking for change. In the end the question was: how come the regime did not manipulate the election in 1997 the same way it did for Rafsanjani in 1993? The answer appears to be that it tried, but voter turnout was high, 91 percent compared to 53 percent in 1993, and Khatami won by such a wide margin it could not possibly announce Nateq Nuri as the winner without sparking some kind of popular unrest.84 Khatami was able to make some rapid changes because the conservatives in the Islamic regime were stunned by his victory and wary of opposing Khatami too strongly in the beginning for fear that such opposition would create a popular backlash. Khatami replaced Iranian Foreign Minister ‘Ali Akbar Velayati, who had served in that position for sixteen years, since the beginning of the revolution. Velayati was replaced by Kamal Kharrazi, the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations. Kharrazi had been criticized in the past by hardline officials for spending too much time in the U.S. and involved too deeply in American culture. Khatami also forced out the minister of Information and Security, Fellahian, who had been convicted in Germany. Khatami made changes to Iran’s foreign policy posture toward the U.S. He promoted what he called a”dialogue between civilizations” and claimed that Iran would”avoid any course of action that may foster tension ... We will shake the hands of all countries and nations who believe in the principles of human respect.”85 Khatami’s moderation was subtle, yet important. He focused on a bridge between civilizations through intellectual links between Iranians and Americans, rather than direct political relations. He steered Iran’s U.S. policy away from contentious issues and tried to promote an optimistic probe for cultural common ground in areas such as scholarship and sports. Khatami did mention that Israel was a country with which Iran would never have good relations. However, he appeared to modify that position in comments he made during an interview with U.S. television network CNN in January 1998.86 Public opinion in Iran appeared to support Khatami’s cautious steps toward moderation. Iranian newspapers appeared to reflect a public dialogue about whether Iran’s hard-line isolationist approach to its foreign policy was in its own best interest. Further, the newspapers appeared to question the ideological sincerity of Iran’s hardline position toward the U.S., “Iran still sticks to an extremist approach, the paper explained out of fear of losing its ‘last card’. In fact, even if the United States were to ac_________________________________________________ 84

Marschall, pp. 142-143, 193-199; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 310-311. David Menashri, Post Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 206-210; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 310-320. 86 Menashri, pp. 210-211; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 318-319. 85

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cept all Iran’s conditions, the paper noted, Iranian officials would refuse to retreat from their approach since animosity to the United States had become an issue of prestige for Iran. Enmity towards the United States, the paper added, has turned into ‘an instrument (vasileh) with which to settle domestic ‘infighting’ and to put spokes in the wheels of other factions.”87 This kind of public collective soul-searching was as much of an achievement in terms of domestic politics as it was a signal of possible change in foreign policy. However, Khamane’i did not appreciate this kind of public debate. He remained committed to the hardline ideological approach outlined by Khomeini. Velayati, the former long-standing Foreign Minister, also publicly adhered to the hardline approach. Velayati was against any kind of dialogue with the U.S. and believed such an approach would not produce any kind of positive results. Many of Iran’s conservative newspapers echoed his assertions and cautioned against becoming ‘submissive’ to America’s ‘arrogant conditions’.88 On 17 June 1998, the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, delivered a speech that was an olive-branch to the new Iranian regime. Albright did not condemn the Iranian state, instead she expressed the desire to”build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.” She alluded to the possibility of future relations. Further President Clinton, in April 1999, tacitly acknowledged the U.S. legacy of interference in Iranian domestic affairs. However, these statements, large political overtures, were firmly rejected by Iran’s hardliners who remained intransigent on the issue of reducing tension with the U.S.89 Khatami modified a number of Iran’s foreign policy positions in 1998. He sent informal envoys to the U.S. to make it clear Iran sought a careful rapprochement with the U.S. In his CNN interview he explicitly condemned terrorism and his unofficial envoys to the U.S. confirmed he was taking steps to reign in Iran’s terrorist operations. He stated that Iran objected to the Middle East peace process, but claimed that Iran would not obstruct the self-determination of all parties. One of Khatami’s vice-presidents granted an interview to an Israeli daily paper, the first such interview given by an Iranian leader since the Islamic revolution. The vice-president claimed to support a dialogue between the citizens of Iran and Israel, but said it was too early for an official political dialogue. And Khatami’s regime took tangible steps to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors. A large symbolic step was taken when Saudi Crown Prince ‘Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference ("OIC”) in Tehran in December 1997. This, in turn, encouraged other Arab heads of state to attend in response to Khatami’s declared policy of”tension reduction” _________________________________________________ 87 88 89

Menashri, p. 211. Menashri, p. 215. Menashri, p. 218-220.

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(tashanoj-zadai). In February 1998, former President Rafsanjani visited Saudi Arabia and met with its leaders. Rafsanjani also visited Bahrain, which was a big step forward for both states. Bahrain harbored deep mistrust Iran following Bahrain’s Shi’a social unrest between 1994 and 1996. Bahraini authorities suspected Iran’s support behind these activities. Rafsanjani’s visit indicated there was potential for a new kind of relationship between the two states. In May 1999, President Khatami visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Khatami’s visit was, in turn, reciprocated with a visit to Tehran by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. By July 2000, there was discussion of security cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia on issues such as crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking. These events indicate Khatami was trying to direct Iran toward reconciling with its Gulf neighbors.90 Iran also, for the first time, cooperated with the UN multilateral sanctions against Iraq by preventing Iraq from smuggling oil through Iranian waters in the Gulf. This was viewed as a serious diplomatic gesture toward the U.S. by Iran. However, internal political developments would serious limit Khatami’s ability to take his foreign policy moderation much further. In July 1999, the Majlis introduced a bill that would have sharply limited the press freedom and other cultural reforms in Iran that had been introduced by Khatami’s regime. This bill triggered student protests. Conservative activists responded by physically attacking the student protesters in their dorm rooms at Tehran University. This, in turn, triggered an enormous wave of protests and riots in Tehran. 10,000 students and other reformists took to the streets to do battle with conservative enforcers and security services. It appeared there was national gathering momentum for a revolutionary change. The street combat lasted for six days. Khatami met with Khamene’i to discuss the situation, though it is unclear what was said between them. On the sixth day of fighting, Khatami publicly denounced the protesters and claimed their demonstrations were undermining the nation and the progress of reform. The next day government forces ended the fighting by crushing the reformists and arresting 1,400. When Khatami chose not to support the reformists demonstrating in the streets he ensured Khamene’i and the conservatives would be able to re-consolidate power. In essence, Khatami conceded to the hard-liners.91 From the summer of 1999 forward Khatami would be able to accomplish little in the way of foreign policy that was not in line with what the conservative _________________________________________________ 90

Shireen T. Hunter, “Outlook for Iranian-Gulf Relations: Greater Cooperation or Renewed Risk of Conflict”, in Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States, Ed. Joseph Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 427-449. 91 Menashri, pp. 144-148, 150-151.

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clerics wanted. This included any kind of rapprochement with the U.S.92 This was perhaps best demonstrated by Iran’s response to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s 17 March 2000 speech. Her speech was historic, "In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Moreover, during the next quarter of a century, the United States and the West gave sustained backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah’s government also brutally repressed political dissent ... Even in more recent years, aspects of U.S. policy towards Iraq during its conflict with Iran now appear regrettably short-sighted, especially in light of our subsequent experiences with Saddam Hussein.”93

The U.S. was publicly accepting responsibility for its role in the 1953 coup and its effect on Iran. Clearly this was an important diplomatic overture from the U.S. to Iran, and its tone was unmistakably apologetic and conciliatory. Khamene’i, and not President Khatami, provided Iran’s response in a speech delivered at Mashhad: "Just a few days ago an American minister delivered a speech. After half a century, or over 40 years, the Americans have now confessed that staged the 28th Mordad (August 19, 1953) coup. They confessed that they supported the suppressive, dictatorial, and corrupt Pahlavi shah for twenty-five years. Please pay attention ... It is only now they are admitting they they were behind the coup d’etat ... The question is what good does this admission – that you acted that way then – do us now? ... An admission years after the crime was committed, while they might be committing similar crimes now, will not do the Iranian nation any good.“94

Khamene’i’s statement ended the Clinton’s administration’s attempt to reconcile with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khamene’i’s statement also indicated Khatami’s diminished capacity to maneuver within Iranian politics. Khamene’i and the hardliners had prevailed in Iran’s internal battle for control of Iranian domestic and foreign politics. _________________________________________________ 92 93 94

Menashri pp. 148-150; Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 334-335. Pollack, p. xxv. Pollack, pp. xxv-xxvi.

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Limitations of U.S. Sanctions

The U.S. policy of "containment” was politically and militarily oriented, failing to fully account for the economic dimension of sanctioning Iran. As noted above, businesses from many countries continued to invest in and trade with Iran, limiting the impact of U.S. sanctions. Unlike the sanctions against Iraq, the U.S. sanctions against Iran were not multilateral. The U.S. imposed such sanctions without an international consensus, which, therefore, limited their effectiveness. As noted above, without the support of the international community, the pressure of the sanctions was relatively limited. Further, disharmony between European and the U.S. policies regarding Iran allowed the Iranian regime to exploit its relationship with both sides. Iranian containment was directed at two problematic policies Iran has not altered. First, the U.S. was trying to prevent Iran from sponsoring terrorism in the Middle East and undermining the Arab-Israeli peace process. Second, the U.S. wanted to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear weapons programs. In both cases, it is hard to see how sanctions were able to successfully affect Iran’s policies. In fact, any progress made in the case of both terrorism and nuclear weapons development during the 1990s was a product of changes made by Khatami’s regime as part of his political reform movement, rather than as a product of American pressure or containment.95 The U.S. concept of dual containment did not explicitly address a mechanism for ensuring the continued stability of the friendly GCC regimes or resolving the disputes between these states that prevented multilateral strategic defense cooperation. Many of the conservative GCC regimes had already established bilateral defense arrangements with the U.S, but a comprehensive regional security arrangement for the GCC was not one of the objectives of dual containment.96 The U.S. policy did not appear to address a broad policy plan for relations with friendly GCC regimes. The bilateral security agreements with the Gulf states created internal political pressures for the conservative Arab governments that ruled the Gulf states, whose populations did not appear to favor Western military involvement in the region. Further, the multilateral international sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s government that were causing a humanitarian crisis for the Iraqi people were not popular in the Arab world. Neither were punitive military air strikes against Iraq _________________________________________________ 95

Kemp, pp. 101-122; Reissner 123-142. Zalmay Khalilzad, “The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony,” Survival Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 95-120. 96

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for violation of UN resolutions. These actions were viewed by Arab citizens as inconsistent, given the U.S.’s close alliance with Israel and its willingness to ignore Israel’s deviance from UN directives. This has led to the impression among some Gulf citizens that the governments of the Gulf states are supportive of U.S. policies that are harmful to fellow Arabs and Muslims.97

7

Gulf States’ Security during the 1990s

The guiding security principal for the small Arab states in the Gulf has been to navigate around the aggressive regional ambitions of their larger regional neighbors, Iran and Iraq.98 Principally, the Arab Gulf states have done whatever they can to pacify and appease Iran and Iraq when confronted with the pressure and regional ambitions of their larger neighbors. This strategy derives from traditional tribal practices which are the heritage of many Gulf Arab states. This heritage espouses a basic philosophy regarding protection and security, which is that hostility and cooperation are never permanent and can readily be interchanged. An enemy can become a friend and a friend an enemy. Security was based on shifting dynamic of loose agreements and changing circumstances. In the 20th century, the Arab Gulf states, which are very young political entities, have relied on a great power to guarantee their security. Great Britain protected Kuwait from Saudi ambitions in 1920–21, and from Iraqi designs in 1938– 39 and again in 1961. More recently, the Arab Gulf states have relied on the U.S. to guarantee their sovereignty. In 1987–88, the U.S. provided critical protection for Kuwaiti oil tankers seeking protection from Iranian attacks in the Gulf. In 1991, the U.S. expelled Iraq from Kuwait following its devastating invasion. However, the Gulf states are careful not to over-rely on U.S. protection and actively seek the kind of alliances and dynamic relationships noted above. The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 was supposed to provide some measure of stability and uniformity for the six Gulf states who are members, however the reality has been that more often they do not all see eye to eye on many matters. Individual Gulf states often have different perceptions of who is an enemy and who is a friend. Indeed, even within certain states there are sometimes disputes on such matters. For example, during the Iran-Iraq War the Emirates of the UAE were divided on their position with respect to their security _________________________________________________ 97 Rosemary Said Zahlan, “The Impact of U.S. Policy on the Stability of the Gulf States: A Historian’s View”, in Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States, ), Ed. Joseph A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 351-365. 98 Joseph Kostiner, “Security for the smaller Gulf States: Improvised Arrangements,” (unpublished essay).

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and diplomatic posture toward Iran and Iraq. In the 1990s, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have quarreled over border issues, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have argued over Saudi rapprochement with Iran in the wake of the Abu Musa aggression (see below), and Qatar and the UAE established diplomatic contact with Iraq aggravating Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This kind of fractious behavior has undermined any kind of consistent security policy. In fact, since tactics and alliances shift quickly and often, it has been almost impossible for the GCC to implement any kind of consistent overarching long-term strategy. Reliance on U.S. power has been one of the few constants in Gulf security during the 1990s. The Gulf states lost faith in inter-Arab diplomacy to deter aggression after the failure to prevent Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Following the Gulf War, and Kuwait’s 1992 military pact with the U.S., many of the Gulf states reached out to the U.S. to establish official or unofficial security agreements. However, the Gulf states’ reliance on U.S. power as a security guarantee has come at social and political costs. The U.S. provides protection against external threats, but its policies toward the Gulf in the 1990s were not popular. Many feel U.S. security is as much of a liability as it is an asset. Saddam Hussein’s resilience throughout the 1990s was a source of discomfort to the Arab monarchies of the Gulf. Egypt and Syria blamed the U.S. for sanctions that appeared to punish Iraq’s Arab population for the misdeeds of its despot. This criticism was a source of embarrassment for the Gulf states who were aligned with American interests. Further, many Gulf states felt the U.S. containment policy toward Iran was not flexible enough and did not account for Iran’s positive overtures toward the Gulf states (the UAE and its dispute regarding Abu Musa and the two Tunbs being the big exception). However, the Gulf states objectives during the 1990s had some contradictory elements, which was entirely consistent with its historical legacy regarding its security arrangements. For example, many Gulf states wanted to build relations with Iran as a means of limiting Iran’s support for terrorism and opposition support in the region. However, Iran’s objective in such relations was to separate the Gulf states from their reliance on the U.S. military presence for security. Ultimately, Iran’s regional ambitions posed as much of a threat to Gulf security as the terrorism the Gulf states were looking to minimize. However, by relying on relationships with Iran and the U.S. the Gulf states were trying to prevent an over-reliance on any one security option. In essence, the Gulf states were attempting to balance competing threats and security options. Each strategy contained a component of safety and also a component of liability. By multiple strategies, the Gulf states were attempting to balance the various internal and external challenges to their security.

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The limitation of balancing competing security tactics is that it creates a barrier to implementing any kind of institutionalized policy. In the ever-shifting climate of improvisation and bargaining there is little room for lasting pacts and long-term security strategy. Essentially, the Gulf states are sacrificing consistency for flexibility.

8

Gulf State Border Issues during the 1990s

The Arabian Gulf states are young. Kuwait gained its independence in 1961, and Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE in 1971. Oman became a viable state entity in 1970. Their political boundaries have not been finalized and serve as an on-going source of regional tension and negotiation between the Gulf states. The following negotiations were important issues for the Gulf states during the 1990s. 8.1 Unity in Yemen The unification of Yemen Arab Republic (“YAR” or North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (“PDRY” or South Yemen) in 1990 was a significant regional development. The Yemen sits at the southern most tip of the Arabian Peninsula, across the Red Sea from the Western Horn of Africa. It lies south of Saudi Arabia and west of Oman. The PDRY had been the Soviet Union’s strategic launching point in the Middle East for years, and opposed reunification with the capitalists in the north. Saudi Arabia had historically feared a unified Yemen because it was worried the Communists from the south would dominate the unified state. Saudi Arabia was always wary that a reunified Yemen would weaken their influence on northern Yemeni tribes and cause conflict over unresolved border issues. However, in 1990 the Saudis were willing to support reunification. Since 1979, Kuwait had worked hard to foster a unification between the two parts of Yemen. The crumbling Soviet regime was no longer able to economically support the PDRY by 1990. Aden’s port was in the midst of development and its newly discovered oil fields needed cash to continue to operate. A unified Yemen would be able to attract foreign investment for critical infrastructure projects. The YAR would benefit from access to the port in Aden and from the PDRY’s more lucrative oil fields. In May 1990, the two states of Yemen unified into the Republic of Yemen. Two months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Yemen opposed the U.S. led intervention against Iraq. Yemen had allied itself with Baghdad in response to Saudi opposition to unification. Yemen’s decision to oppose the U.S. led war against Iraq had severe economic consequences. Saudi Arabia expelled 1 million Yem-

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eni workers, which devastated families in Yemen living from monies sent home by family members working in Saudi Arabia. GCC states cut economic aid to Yemen, as well. The combined economic impact shook the stability of the newly unified state. Following a tense three year period, during which southerners felt disoriented by the wave of change to their region and exploited by their richer northern neighbors, in May 1994, the southern contingent led by the vicepresident attempted to secede from the unified state. However, President Saleh was able to maintain control of the military and preserve Yemen’s unity despite a little more than a month of violence. He responded to the crisis by amending the constitution but preserving a strong democratic rule of law. As a result of weathering the violent secessionist movement, President Saleh won the confidence of his Saudi neighbor and demonstrated Yemen’s unity could endure despite ideological differences between north and south.99 8.2 The Saudi Arabia-Yemen Border Saudi Arabia and Yemen had a low-intensity border war in recent years. The 1934 Treaty of Taif was supposed to end the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It was the first treaty between two Arab states. The early conflicts focused on claims to the province of ‘Asir. ‘Asir borders the Red Sea and is situated southwest of the Hijaz in the southwestern part of the Arabian Peninsula. ‘Asir is a strategic location and is larger than the combined size of Jordan and Lebanon. From 1934 until 1962, Yemen and Saudi Arabia enjoyed cooperation and support between them. In 1962 the Yemeni revolution undermined its relationship with the monarchy of Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni civil war from 1962 to 1967 was viewed as threatening to the Saudi Kingdom because it placed Nasser’s Egyptian revolutionary troops in the Arab Peninsula. Following Egypt’s withdrawal from North Yemen in 1967 and Britain withdrawal from South Yemen in 1968, a radical Communist regime took over in South Yemen. Saudi Arabia realized it had common interests with North Yemen against South Yemen and normalized relations with North Yemen in 1970. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen renewed the 1934 Treaty of Taif. North Yemen felt snubbed when it was left out of the GCC when it was formed in 1981. In 1984, North Yemen discovered oil which reduced its economic dependency on Saudi Arabia. North Yemen also allied itself with Iraq, which was a cause for serious concern in Saudi Arabia. In 1988, Egypt, Jordan, _________________________________________________ 99

Joseph A. Kechichian, “Unity in the Arabian Peninsula,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf States. Ed. Joseph A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 281-302; Joseph Kostiner, Yemen, The Torturous Quest for Unity, 1990-1994, (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1996).

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Iraq, and Yemen formed the Arab Cooperation Council which further concerned Saudi Arabia who did not want their interference in the Arabian Peninsula. The GCC states viewed Yemen’s alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War as a betrayal after years of providing economic support. Saddam Hussein had pushed for Yemeni reunification as a means for increasing his influence on the Peninsula. In 1990, Yemen reunified. However, the process was messy and aggravated relations with Saudi Arabia. The border tension focuses around a 1,000 mile stretch of land running from the”Empty Quarter,” the barren desert area, which extends all the way to the common border with Oman. It is in this area that oil companies have been prospecting for new reserves for Yemen. Since 1992, the two countries have had bilateral negotiations to finalize the border. However, the 1994 Yemeni civil war severely damaged relations between the states. President Saleh of Yemen believed Saudi Arabia was instrumental in trying to break up the state to pursue its own interests. Following the 1994 Yemeni civil war, President Saleh visited Jidda in an attempt to improve relations. This paved the way for the February 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”). The MoU reestablished the existing borderline in the west that was demarcated by the 1934 Treaty of Taif. The eastern border remained a point of negotiation and source of conflict. In December 1995, Eritrea invaded the Yemeni island of Greater Hanish, which Yemen believed was encouraged by Saudi Arabia. Relations were strained until June 2000 when the two states suddenly fixed a boundary. Yemen was able to lay claim to Duwaima Island, the site of a serious clash between the two states, and Saudi Arabia received the Wadia on the central borderlands where there had been violence in 1969.100 8.3 Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute In December 1999, Bahrain and Qatar agreed to full diplomatic relations between each other for the first time. Since that time, the two states tried to resolve their dispute regarding the Hawar islands, the Dibal and Jaradeh shoals, and Zubarah. However, they were largely unsuccessful, and the case went before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). In May 2000 and in May 2001 a verdict was issued. The main point of dispute, the Hawar islands, were deemed property of Bahrain. Zubarah was ruled as belonging to Qatar. Dibal shoal was granted to Qatar, while Jaradeh was labeled an island, not a shoal, and belongs to Bahrain. _________________________________________________ 100

Richard Schofield, “Down to the Usual Suspects: Border and Territorial Disputes in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf at the Millenium,” in Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States, Ed. Joseph A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 214-216; Mohammad A. Zabarah, “Yemeni-Saudi Relations Gone Awry”, Ibid, pp. 263-280.

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Jaradeh’s new status as an island pushed the maritime boundary between the two states a little further eastward. 8.4 Oman-UAE Border At the end of March 2000, Oman and the UAE announced the conclusion of a May 1999 agreement to set a border between the two states. The border has not been fixed, just the agreement on a border. This border agreement has been negotiated on since the 1950s, although there was no dispute on substantive issues. The border between the emirate of Abu Dhabi and Oman was set in 1999, following an agreement in 1993. Oman is working with the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah to come to a final agreement, based on negotiations since the 1950s. 8.5 Gulf States and Iran Kuwait had many reasons to feel threatened by Iran. Iran repeatedly pressured Kuwait throughout the Iran-Iraq War. It targeted Kuwait’s oil industry with missile attacks and sabotage, and used a variety of military tactics to threaten and attack Kuwaiti shipping. Further, Iran actively supported terrorism within Kuwait, which included an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti Amir. Iran’s fighter jets remain minutes away from Kuwait. Kuwait’s troubled history with its own minority Shi’i population makes Iran’s Shi’i influence a constant source of instability. Kuwait has chosen to engage Iran to moderate its position toward Kuwait. Kuwait refused to support the U.S. trade ban against Iran. Oman has also been eager to stabilize its relations with Iran. Oman’s Musandam Peninsula is separated from the Iranian coastline by only 60 to 100 kilometers. The Straits of Hormuz sit in between and link the Persian Gulf with the Gulf Oman. A significant percentage of the world’s oil production is shipped through this waterway. The shipping channels through the Straits are 30–35 kilometers long and only 8–13 kilometers wide. The channels are divided into an inbound and outbound route, each two kilometers wide. Iran’s main naval base at Bandar-e Abbas sits just across the straits from Oman’s small naval base at Ghanam (Goat) Island. Iran also has smaller naval bases near Oman on the islands of Qeshm, Larak, and Jazireh. Oman’s northern Qu’oin islands, As Salmah, Didamar, and As Salamah are difficult to defend and vulnerable to Iran. Qatar and Iran have disputed ownership of Qatar’s North Field gas field in the Gulf. However, Qatar and Iran have enjoined cordial relations and Qatar even had to refuse an Iranian proposal of a military alliance. The Iranian speaker of the Majlis visited Qatar in 1995 and asked Qatar to convey to the members of the

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GCC that Iran wanted to play a role in Gulf security and wanted to resolve the ongoing dispute regarding the Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs. In May 1996, Iran’s Defense Minister visited Qatar, despite Qatar’s new agreement to base U.S. Air Force fighters in its territory.101 Saudi Arabia is a long-standing regional rival of Iran. There is a history of ideological, political, and strategic tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The ideological tension begins with the official Sunni Wahhabi doctrine of the Saudi state, which has nothing but contempt for Iranian Twelver Shi’ism, and which aggressively discriminates against Saudi Arabia’s large Shi’a minority. During the Iran-Iraq War, in which Saudi Arabia provided extensive financial support to Iraq, Iran politicized the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) by creating demonstrations there against the”enemies of Islam.” Even after pledging not to create disturbances during Hajj, Iranian authorities encouraged a massive anti-American demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in 1993. Iranian officials and media publicly attack the Saudi Royal family and the Iranian intelligence apparatus maintains contacts with anti-Saudi Shi’is in the Kingdom’s eastern province where most of the Saudi Shi’is reside. Additionally, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two of OPEC’s biggest oil producers, frequently fight over issue of production and pricing.102

Abu Musa – Two Tunbs Dispute In April 1992, Iran became involved in a serious dispute with the UAE over the islands of Abu Musa and the two islands lesser Tunb and greater Tunb, referred to collectively as”the two Tunbs.” The islands are situated in the Gulf north of Dubai and south of Qeshem island. These islands are strategic assets. They allow Iran to defend its naval bases in the lower Gulf and to threaten oil tanker traffic through the Gulf, which accounts for 20 percent of the world’s oil. The dispute pre-dates the Islamic Republic of Iran, and extends back to the 19th century. Iran claims it had staked its claim to the islands before the British seized control of the islands in 1887. The UAE claims Iran had never controlled the islands in modernity, while the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah controlled the two Tunbs and the Emirate of Sharjah ruled Abu Musa. There is some dispute over the historical nature of the control that the Emirates exercised over the islands, as well as whether the Emirates had paid tribute to Iran for such control. Whatever _________________________________________________ 101

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 126-129; Marschall, pp. 121137. 102 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 129 & 138; Marschall, pp. 121-137.

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the case may be, the British enforced control of the Emirates until the day before they withdrew British forces from the Gulf in 1971. On that day, 30 November 1971, the Shah’s marines invaded and captured control of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. They faced little resistance from local forces and no objections from the international community including Britain and the U.S. The Shah provided compensation to the Emir of Sharjah for seizing the island and allowed many Arabs from the UAE to continue to inhabit the island. In 1971, the Shah also came to an agreement with Sharjah to split oil and gas revenues derived from the island, with 55 percent to go to Iran and 45 percent to Sharjah. Abu Musa’s status remained uncertain from 1971 until 1992. The UAE continued to invest in operations on the island and to grant workers from the UAE visas to work on the island. Then in 1992, Iran suddenly declared full sovereignty and control over Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. It expelled Arab workers with visas from the UAE, as well as Arab residents on the island. Iran claimed it was not receiving its proper share of oil and gas revenues from offshore production near the island. Iran then made a visible display of its military power. It conducted a joint military exercise that lasted from 25 April until 4 May 1992. The exercise involved 45 ships, 150 small boats, air force planes, and covered 10,000 square miles of ocean. The exercise was designed to practice closing the Straits of Hormuz to an outside invader. The UAE reacted to Iran’s brazen move by doing what it could. It offered to lease the entire island to Iran and increase the Iranian share of oil and gas revenues. When Iran rejected this offer, the UAE asserted its authority over the two Tunbs and enlisted the assistance of the GCC and the Arab League to negotiate with Iran. At the end of September 1992, Iran ended talks on the issue by declaring that the GCC and Arab league states were conspirators of the U.S., enabling its military presence in the Gulf. The UAE then tried appealing to the UN and the International Court of Justice at the Hague. Iran reacted by increasing its military presence on Abu Musa, as well as greater Tunb. Iran was positioning its forces and military equipment to use these islands as military bases. However, while it its true that control of these islands provides greater proximity to Gulf shipping channels, which are only ten to fifteen kilometers from either side of the Tunbs, it is worth noting that Iran also has capable military positions on islands throughout the Gulf. Iran has larger military bases on the islands of Qeshem, Hengam, and Larak islands. Each of these islands is closer to the Strait of Hormuz than Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. This issue has not been conclusively addressed or resolved in the years since Iran’s full occupation and control of the islands. The GCC has done little, and Iran appears intransigent in the face of international pressure, when there has been any. The UAE, which has disparate interests due to the loose nature of its

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confederation of Emirates, is reluctant to press the issue, which might effect Dubai’s lucrative trade relations with Iran.103

_________________________________________________ 103

Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, Dilemmas of Dual Containment, pp. 131-135; Marschall, pp. 121142; Richard Schofield, “Down to the Usual Suspects: Border and Territorial Disputes in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf at the Millenium,” in Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States , Ed. Joseph A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 234.

Part Four: Al–Qa’ida’s Challenge: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism, 1992–2005 Part Four: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism

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Introduction

The Saudi Arabian Kingdom was built on an alliance established in 1774 between a Saudi tribal chieftain, Muhammad Ibn Saud, and a Muslim clergymen, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. The new state's goals drew on the teachings and preachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. As a state ideology, Ibn 'Abd alWahhab's principles had a distinct message of bigotry and puritanism, also evident in his actions, which will be explained in the subsequent section. This chapter will examine, (1) the roots of the modern Saudi Kingdom and the religious ideology it draws upon; (2) the relationship of this ideology to the rise of extremist opposition in the Saudi state; (3) recent trends in extremist opposition in Saudi Arabia; (4) terrorism in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf region; (5) the Saudi state's response to opposition and terrorist groups; (5) the rise of Zarqawi in Iraq and its impact on the region; and (6) the impact of terrorism and the U.S. war in Iraq on the Gulf region. This chapter deals with many recent events and given the highly volatile nature of current events in the region, there may be new factors that reshape the way we analyze and think about these issues. It is important to bear in mind that extremist opposition trends in Saudi Arabia have occurred against the broader background of conflict in the region and on its periphery: The Iran-Iraq War, the Afghanistan-U.S.S.R. conflict, the Iraq-Kuwait War; and the increased U.S. military presence in the Gulf region throughout the 1990s, were all important factors that affected the way events were unfolding in Saudi Arabia. Of course, some events played a greater role than others, and this chapter will attempt to integrate and expand on these events and their influence. First, the fight against shirk (or polytheism; involvement of paganism with monotheism) was aimed at eliminating the tendency of Muslims to mix godly and human traits in their prayer and daily conduct. In the Wahhabi doctrine (i.e., taking after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab; see Box 15), the association of God's name with human conduct was strictly forbidden. Therefore, the Saudis undertook to "purify“ Islamic sites and mosques, and persecute the guilty Muslims (mushrikin), who were punished with death. The Jihad, or holy war, against

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unpurified Muslims, and/or against infidels, or non-Muslim unbelievers, became a deeply rooted doctrine: In the late 18th, early 19th, and early 20th centuries, through different periods, the Saudi state became an aggressive menace, raiding neighboring states. Box 15:

Wahhabism

Wahhabism is an Islamic movement named after Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab (1703–1792). Wahhabism became the state-sanctioned form of Islam in Saudi Arabia during the early 20th century, when the House of Saud conquered the Arabian Peninsula under the auspices of Wahhabi religious legitimacy. Wahhabism is the state ideology and leading religious stream in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is also prominent in Qatar, to a lesser degree. Wahhabism’s founder, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, believed the Muslim world was being corrupted by unwanted innovations (bida’) – including shirk, or abuse of God’s monotheistic image, and neglect of the holy law (shari’a). He wanted to purge Islam of foreign influences in an Islamic revival. Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab placed a heavy emphasis on tawhid (monotheism), and condemned many traditional Muslim practices as shirk (polytheism). He also gave jihad an unusual prominence in his teachings. The Wahhabis called themselves Muhawwidun (monotheists). Wahhabis differ from mainstream Sunni Muslims in that they do not follow a particular Islamic school of legal jurisprudence, or madhab. Wahhabis claim to interpret the words of the Prophet Muhammad directly, using the four established madhabs for reference. However, Wahhabism is often associated with the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, which is considered the most puritanical and legalistic school of jurisprudence.

Second, the heavy reliance on the Shari'a, the religious holy law, as the actual state constitution and exclusive moral guide for society, is also manifested in violence. People have been punished for crimes in the most literal way: hanging, stoning, and amputation of limbs. People who seem to cease following the Shari’a properly, may be declared by clerics to be committing takfir (turning to sin and unbelief) a principle initiated by the cleric Muhammad Ibn-Taymiyya, (d. 1328), which was interpreted to mean that permission was given for their blood to be spilled. In the 20th century, a special "moral police” was established in Saudi Arabia to control people’s public behavior. The members of this corps were allowed to apprehend men and women who failed to dress modestly in public or to join in public prayer, and then to beat and humiliate them.1 _________________________________________________ 1

Rashid Rida, ed. Majmu’at al-Tawhid al-Najdiyya, (Cairo: 1927), p.136.

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Third, the inclination of the Wahhabis to see themselves as superior to other Muslim denominations, and to view their own religious sites and prayers as the most”purified” among all Muslims, led them both to disregard other Muslim communities and to seek to subjugate them. However, the defeat, in 1818, of the first Wahhabi-Saudi state by an Egyptian force, followed by the failure of the second state (1821–1891) to root itself, which led to its deterioration and demise, attested also to the collapse of the central authority of both the supreme ruler and the supreme clerics, and consequently left the Saudis with no authority to decide when and where to carry out a Jihad. As a result, tribal groups raised their own preachers, who made their separate interpretations, regarding conducting raids and spreading their religion. Even when a new ruler, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz”Ibn Saud,” the founder of the third and incumbent Saudi Kingdom, who reigned from 1902 to 1953, initiated the Ikhwan movement circa 1912 (see Box 16), and organized the main Saudi tribal groups into a standing army, they continued to raid beyond the borderlines and the limits that Ibn Saud had set. The Ikhwan symbolized a wild outgrowth of the Saudi-Wahhabi state; uncontrollable by authorities and a danger to its neighbors. Box 16:

Ikhwan2

In 1904 the combined Rashidi and Ottoman forces were defeated by Ibn Saud (as ‘Abd al-’Aziz ibn ‘Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faysal ibn Turki ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad Al Sa’ud became known outside Arabia). The name Ikhwan literally means brethren, in Arabic. Ibn Saud established Ikhwan communities in which the Bedouin tribesmen were supposed to settle and adopt a sedentary way of life. By 1915 there were more than 200 settlements and in excess of 60,000 men in readiness to heed Ibn Saud call for warriors in his continuing battles to unite the peninsula. They were supposed to constitute both an obedient core of settlers, and a standing army for the Saudi leader. The Ikhwan became dedicated and zealous followers of the young Saud leader. The greatest of the Ikhwan successes was the conquest of the Hijaz after World War I, but the bold exploits of the Ikhwan also marked the beginning of their end. When Sharif Hussein, the Hashemite ruler of the Hijaz, entered into military negotiations with the Al Rashid, Ibn Saud’s reaction was swift and severe. He sent the Ikhwan against the Al Rashid stronghold at Hail, which was captured with little difficulty in 1921. Emboldened by their success, the Ikhwan disregarded orders and crossed the border into Iraq and Transjordan. The raiding and plundering of their Hashemite ally aroused the British, who counterattacked with devastating effect, using armored cars and aircraft. With _________________________________________________ 2

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Part Four: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism their help Ibn Saud conquered the holy cities of the Hijaz in 1924–1926. Recognizing that the wild forays of the Ikhwan could only be a constant irritant and source of danger to his leadership, Ibn Saud began to form a more conventional and more disciplined army. Renewed Ikhwan raids against defenseless groups in Iraq incensed the British, who were trying to stabilize the region, and finally compelled Ibn Saud to force the submission of the Ikhwan. When the Ikhwan leadership disobeyed Ibn Saud, he took to the field to lead his army, which was now supported by four British aircraft (flown by British pilots) and a fleet of 200 military vehicles that symbolized the modernization that the Ikhwan abhorred. After being crushed at the Battle of Sabilah, the Ikhwan were eliminated as an organized military force in early 1930. However, the spirit of ”untamed,“ zealous Wahhabi sentiments did not fade away in Saudi Arabia, where it resurfaces once every few years.

Nonetheless, in the 20th century, notably under Ibn Saud and later under Kings Faysal (r. 1962–1975) and Khalid (r. 1975–1982,) the Saudi state learned to control and defuse the violence it radiated. Several reasons account for this process. The Ikhwan were destroyed militarily, and subjugated during 1929 and 1930. Saudi Arabia never again constituted a threat to its neighbors. Moreover, it stopped using force in its regional and international affairs. As part of nationbuilding, Ibn Saud shifted the focus of his state interest to hosting the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and to finding and profiting from oil. As part of launching a process of centralization, Ibn Saud sought to control the "wild” tendencies of Wahhabism.3 To this end, a supreme council of clerics was established, and the authority to make binding religious rulings (or opinions: fatwas) was vested in this council. The main clerics married into the Royal family, and functioned as moral advisers to the King and the main ministers. Religion was thereby incorporated into the high echelons of the Saudi monarchy, but it was also put under state control. Since the 1960s, the growing oil income also served to contain Islamic extremism. The government allocated the emerging business opportunities (in sectors such as banking, insurance, advertising, and construction) and top jobs in the public administration to those leading families and tribal clans that had been trusted by the royal leaders and by the government. This policy is known as "rentier” capitalism, when oil funds serve as a source for "rent” distributed to societal groups. We may call this system "Faysal’s Order,” named after the king who had inaugurated it. Thus, executive-level public and private business posi_________________________________________________ 3

Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, from Chieftaincy to Monarchical State, 1916-1936 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 22-35.

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tions were held by a "loop” of elite families who acted as patrons to lowerranking "clients,” namely, families of the lower classes. Under this system of financial distribution, the government was able to control the economy and deprive potential opposition of financing. Moreover, the government thereby gained control over all important tribes and families.4 These circumstances were not conducive to the rise of radical religious opposition. There were only sporadic outbursts of religious violence, such as the attack and occupation, on 20 November 1979, of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a group of radicals. In this case, the compound was recaptured after three weeks, and the perpetrators were sentenced to various punishments.5 This was an exception to a long period of relative calm in the area of religious radicalism.

2

The Rise of Extremist Opposition

Several reasons explain the rise of Islamic extremist opposition groups in Saudi Arabia since the early 1990s. New socio-economic conditions in Saudi Arabia have certainly set the stage for the rise of Islamic extremist opposition groups. In the 21st century, Saudi Arabia’s population grew to approximately 24 million, including about 18 million Saudi citizens and about five million foreign workers. Approximately 50 percent of the Saudis are below the age of eighteen. From 1992–2005, the Saudi Kingdom had an average annual budget deficit of about $20 billion, when the average price of oil dropped to less than $25 per barrel (and sometimes to less than $20 per barrel) from $41 per barrel in 1981. Several major problems resulted from the shifting economic situation in Saudi Arabia. One must bear in mind that "Faysal’s Order” was crafted when the size of the Saudi population was between seven and eight million, and the number of Saudi citizens was fewer than five million; the rest were foreign workers. Given the fact that the general Saudi population has tripled since that time, it is unlikely that the royal patronage and allocation of jobs and business opportunities, incorporated within "Faysal’s Order,” could grow, and function well, if it was extended to 19 million Saudi citizens. Hence, more and more Saudis found themselves out of the "loop of patronage.” Many new university graduates were recipients of jobs obtained through the elite families’ protection. However, since _________________________________________________ 4

Khaldun Hasan al-Naqib, al-Mujtama ‘wa al-dawla fi al-khalij wa al-jazira al-arabiya (Society and the State in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula), (Beirut: CAUS, 1987); Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 76-140. 5 James Buchan, “The Return of the Ikhwan, 1979,” in The House of Saud, Eds. David Holden and Richard Johns (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982), pp. 511-526.

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the population has tripled in recent years the patronage system has become less effective, and, as a result, many young people do not feel obligated to the elite families. Thus, they were more likely to point out the flaws of the regime and to criticize the Royal family more than ever before. Official reports noted an unemployment rate of about 15 percent among 18– 25 year olds: Unofficially, it was often argued to be closer to 30 percent. In 2003, experts estimated that the regime would need to create about 200,000 jobs per year, which would necessitate about $40 billion per year in new investments. This did not seem to be a realistic objective.6 In addition, unemployment hit various sectors and geographical regions. Academics living in major cities were affected, and used their skills to voice either open or veiled criticism of the government. In the southwest, members of the peripheral Ghamid tribe in ‘Asir', who had been employed by security forces, were hit by unemployment as were tribesmen in the al-Jawf area in the north.7 Bastions of opposition thus grew in several areas all over the realm, while some universities became centers of opposition. In the 1990s, public criticism concerning deficiencies in the Royal family grew, and was expressed in new modes of activity. The fact that the Royal family had failed to devise a successful strategy to prevent Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and a possible invasion into Saudi territory, despite all the money invested in new weapons, and which led King Fahd to invite Western forces to defend the Kingdom, further eroded their image of invincibility and political wisdom. A new image was attached to the royal leaders, attributing to them administrative malfeasance, nepotism, and preferential appointment that discriminated against many Saudis who were "outside the loop,” as well as corruption and a hedonistic life style. The fact that three supreme leaders, King Fahd (b. 1921), his half-brother and Crown Prince Abdullah (b. 1923), and the King’s full-brother and Minister of Defense, Sultan (b. 1924), were now old men, and that King Fahd had suffered a stroke in 1996, further indicated their eroding ability to rule. Moreover, these leaders were also divided into family factions, which made it clear that problems of royal succession also affected their conduct. There was King Fahd and his six full brothers, all of them in senior positions, including Minister of Defense Sultan and Minister of the Interior, Na’if. Crown Prince Abdullah led a counter-faction striving for power.8 _________________________________________________ 6

The Middle East, July & August, 1994; The Economist, 18 March 1994. Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War“, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2002; Financial Times, 5 October 2001. 8 Champion, pp. 216-308. 7

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The trend of criticism was manifested in a wave of public petitions submitted to King Fahd in 1991 and 1992 by clergymen, journalists, and academics in newspaper articles as well as in cassettes and cyber-letters. The tone and the content of the demands were revealing: Liberal elements, advocates of human rights, and critics of women’s role in society loomed behind the first petition submitted to the King, after the liberation of Kuwait in April 1991. Later on, the authors were silenced by the royal leaders, probably by threatening their jobs and freedom of movement. However, clergymen as well as self-styled Islamists and university-educated theologians (see below), came to dominate these petitions and cyber-letters. The criticism had several themes. There were complaints shrouded in demands to reform the regime: to stop discriminatory practices in public appointments, the removal of unjust taxes, as well as demands for judicial reform, and for guaranteeing basic rights of both individuals and society. In this case, the demands for judicial reform were framed as a call for the proper implementation of the Shari’a (holy law) principles. Not only did Islamic concepts and idioms dominate the public discourse, but it was also clear that the principle of Shari’a rule was widely accepted by both the leaders and their critics as a constitutional foundation for the Saudi public. Interestingly, the new wave of criticism did not relate only to internal affairs. The Islamic critics also demanded that the Saudi foreign policy should focus on fighting the enemies of the Islamic ‘umma (community). While most ordinary Saudis accepted the U.S.-Saudi alliance as a strategic necessity, the petitioners were critical of both Saudi reliance on Western forces as the Kingdom’s main defense, and of their fighting other Muslim states, such as Iraq. Moreover, in the mid-1990s, the Saudi alliance with the United States was regarded by the religious community as a symbol of wrongdoing on the part of the Kingdom’s leaders, which sounded very critical when explained in religious terms.9 The Saudi-U.S. alliance was viewed as a bond with an infidel power; and that U.S. forces being stationed on Saudi land defiled its sanctity as the home of the two holy places of Islam. The fact that Islam’s holy sites, Mecca and Medina, are located in the Hijaz, which is 800 kilometers from the Gulf Region where Western forces were stationed, was disregarded by the Islamists. They also ignored the fact that the Saudi government avoided signing an official military pact with the United States and settled for an unofficial arrangement. Furthermore, the fact that United States did not terminate the stand-off with Iraq’s Saddam, _________________________________________________ 9

Champion, pp. 216-308; Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 52, 2000); Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and The Politics of Dissent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

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and actually acquiesced to his rule, was deemed in the Gulf as a Washingtondesigned "conspiracy” to entrench its military presence throughout the Gulf and capture its oil.10 This "conspiracy” was referred to as "an attack against Islam” with universal applications. According to this theory, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States was planning to subjugate Islamic states in order to control the world – a startling reversal of Samuel Huntington’s "Clash of Civilizations.”11 The combination of criticism over internal issues and the Kingdom’s reliance on United States forces found support among some academics and students. In the late 1990s, they numbered perhaps only a few thousand, but their complaints were widely heard. Thus the high unemployment and new outlets of criticism led to the rise of religious extremism. Several developments mark this process. The typical Wahhabi originating from Najd, the core area of Wahhabism, was pious and puritanical, but, as mentioned earlier, was withdrawn from state politics and was hardly interested in world-wide Islamic issues. Most Wahhabis regarded themselves as superior in moral-religious terms to other Muslims and, for the most part, had not involved themselves in regional Islamic problems. However, this situation changed somewhat due to various factors. Since King Faysal’s time, in an attempt to balance the consumer life-style and modern secular curricula with religious measures, the seven Saudi universities developed studies in theology (‘aqida) and encouraged students to engage in such studies. Many, indeed, chose these programs: They became engineers or lawyers who were also religious experts. They lacked the official diplomas (ijaza) of a clergyman (‘alim), but, in the Islamic tradition, they could become preachers and lay specialists sufficiently versed in the Qur’an and Wahhabi texts to argue religious issues and participate in religious discourse. An entire generation of academics and students adopted this mode, and puritanical Wahhabi doctrine became culturally integrated into Saudi society. The use of Ibn-Taymiyya’s tafkir argument thus achieved new popularity12. In addition, Saudi universities employed some foreign, Muslim-Arab lecturers to reinforce their academic faculties. Both Muhammad Qutb (the brother of _________________________________________________ 10

Abdullah Al-Shayeji, “Dangerous Perceptions: Gulf Views Of the U.S. Role in the Region”, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1997). 11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 12 Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou; The New York Times, 11 June 2001; The New York Times, 27 December 2001; Hamza al-Hasan, “Al-Unf al-Siyasi fi al-Mamlaka: Masadiruhu, Askaluhu. Wa a Faquhu [The Political Violence in the Kingdom: Sources, Forms, Scope]”, 13 December 2002, accessed at: http//:www.gulfissues.net/mpage/gulfarticles/article0017.htm; Khalid al-Faysal on Arabiya TV cited in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, No. 752, 23 July 2004; Gwenn Okruhlik, “Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report Online, 24 July 2006.

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the Egyptian religious extremist Sayyid Qutb, who was sentenced to death in Egypt in 1966) and the Palestinian extremist ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam (later a founder of al-Qaeda, see Box 17) came to teach in Medina and Riyadh. They created interest in the fate of other Islamic groups: the Palestinians, the Iranians, the Afghans, the Central Asian and the Balkan Muslims. They also introduced concepts originating in Muslim-Brethren thought: specifically, the need to replace the incumbent lax Islamic regime with fundamentalist, Shari’a-based regimes; and the binding duty to fight any non-Muslim adversary engaged in a rivalry with Muslim peoples. Thus, the mode of criticizing the United States as an infidel power and the Saudi regime as its collaborator became an extremist, religious message.13 Box 17:

Abdullah Azzam

Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989) was a central figure in the global development of the radical Islamist movements. Azzam built a scholarly, ideological, and practical paramilitary infrastructure for the globalization of the Islamist movements during the Mujahadin struggle against the Soviets in Aghanistan in the 1980s. Azzam’s philosophical rationalization for global jihad and practical approach to recruitment and training of Muslim militants from around the world was developed during the Afghan war against Soviet occupation. He published two influential books outlining his ideology in Defence of Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan. Azzam and Usama Bin-Ladin spent considerable time together in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Azzam is believed to have been one of the primary ideological influences on Usama Bin-Ladin.

In the 1990s, following the first wave of petitions, several groups emerged that actually manifested the new mode. Each consisted of a relatively flamboyant preacher whose texts and cassettes spread among students, academics, officials, school teachers, journalists and scientists. Such preachers were Safar al-Hawali and Salman al ‘Awdah, both of whom had supporters in Burayda, north of alRiyadh in the al-Qasim region. And ‘Aaid al-Qarni, in Abha, in the ‘Asir region located south of the Hijaz. As academics and self-styled theologians (al-Hawali had been the Dean of the Islamic Studies faculty in the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, and al ‘Awdah taught at the Imam Muhammad University in Riyadh) they voiced fierce criticism against the established ‘ulama, who followed the _________________________________________________ 13 Hrair Dekmejian, “The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia”, The Middle East Report, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1994); International Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?” No. 31 (21 September 2004).

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policies of the Royal Family. They depicted the enemy as "the West” and "the secularists” who favored Western ways (ilmaniyyin) as its servants.14 These new extremists regarded the war with Iraq in 1991 as a wanton ambush by the West on a brother Islamic state, and they called for the new extremist opposition clergymen receive an effective advisory role to the rulers. The government was required to follow (as already raised in the 1992 petition) Islamic interests, carried out by an Islamic army. Thus, the legitimacy of the Saudi government and of its incumbent, officiating clergy was doubted, and replaced by Shari’a Islamic values. In 1994, a popular gathering to protest al ‘Awdah’s arrest by the government attracted several thousand supporters.15

3

The 21st Century: Religious Extremism Turns into Fierce Opposition

Saudi society consisted of tribal, regional groupings and never formed a unified community. Rather than developing into one nation, Saudi groupings continued to exhibit regional-tribal characteristics that influenced their cultural and political conduct. As already mentioned, an active religious opposition emerged in ‘Asir. It drew on the unemployed elements of the local Ghamid tribe, and on the massive number (c. 2,000) of ‘Asiris who had fought in Afghanistan and developed a "Jihadi” animus against superpowers and their local supporters. Interestingly, the ‘Asiris, who had a natural ethnic bond with Yemenis, became close with the Yemeni Jihadists in Afghanistan. Through these contacts, they were exposed to Egyptian Muslim Brethren ideologies via a Yemeni-fundamentalist clergyman, ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who had been in Afghanistan and acquainted himself with the ‘Asiris. Al-Zindani’s ideas drew from those of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (see Box 18), which propagated the view that the West and its "subservient” Arab allies were nothing but a new idolatry, and that these regimes should be destroyed as the Prophet Muhammad had destroyed the pre-Islamic idol worshipers.16

_________________________________________________ 14

Fandy, Saudi Arabia and The Politics of Dissent; Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou; Gwenn Okruhlik, “Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Report (24 October 2001); Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State”, Strategic Insight, Vol. 14 (March 2005). 15 Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou; Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State”. 16 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda, The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); International Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?“, Middle East Report No. 31 (21 September 2004).

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Box 18:

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Sayyid Qutb

Born 9 October 1906, Qutb was an Egyptian intellectual author and Islamist associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the 1950s and 1960s. He is best known for his theoretical work on redefining the role of Islamic fundamentalism in social and political change, particularly in his books Social Justice and Milestones or Signposts on the Road. His extensive Quranic commentary, In the shades of the Qur’an has contributed significantly to modern perceptions of Islamic concepts such as jihad, jahaliyyah, and umma. He condemned the existing Arab regimes as a manifestation of a new form of idolatry and barbarism, the new jahaliyya, which he argued must be eradicated in the same way that the Prophet Muhammad dealt with the first idol-worshippers. Qutb was jailed in the 1950s and 1960s, and then executed by Egyptian authorities in August 1966. Qutb’s writings have had a strong influence on modern radical Islamic movements. Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, carried on the work of his brother as a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia, where Qutb’s radical ideas were spread with success.

Zindani himself had known Usama Bin-Ladin in Afghanistan, and had influenced his thought. A group of Zindani’s followers in Yemen were behind the attack on the U.S. warship”Cole” in October 2000 in Aden – an act that considerably inspired the ‘Asiris. Several ‘Asiris were among the fifteen Saudi citizens who took part in the attacks of 11 September 2001. The town of Abha, the capital of ‘Asir, which also is the seat of a college for Shari’a studies, became the center of an insurgent religious movement, which produced members of alQa’ida and many of its supporters. Thus, the ideas of the Muslim Brethren, channeled through Yemen, penetrated Saudi Arabia and gathered momentum in ‘Asir.17 A different arena of opposition evolved in the northern region of al-Jawf which borders on Jordan and Iraq. There, in response to the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada, and to what appeared to be passive and limited assistance provided to the Intifada by the Arab states, some 4,000 inhabitants of al-Jawf, notably from its main town, al-Sakaka, initiated a continuous series of proPalestinian demonstrations that often turned into riots.18 In 2002–2003, their slogans were critical of the Saudi Royal family, and their frustration reflected the poverty and deprivation typical of that region. Political violence continued into 2004, when unofficial news spread of the assassinations of the region’s deputy governor and the police chief of the region’s top Shari’a court. As in ‘Asir, the _________________________________________________ 17 18

Majallot al-Sunna, No. 110, November 2001 (in Arabic); al-sharq al-awsat, 7 January 2004. Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War“; Financial Times, 5 October 2001.

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Muslim-Brethren opposition elements were often influenced by fundamentalist principles stemming from the Jordanian-Palestinian Hizb al-Tahrir party, which rejected any regime not fully based on Shari’a principles. Likewise, bastions of opposition emerged in places like the southern part of the Gulf, where the Dawasir tribe roamed. That area, and the cities of al-Qasim, north of Riyadh, swarmed with Wahhabi radicals. In the Hijazi cities, activities of anti-Saudi groups also were reported. In these two areas, as in ‘Asir and alJawf, opposition feelings were kindled by local, tribal and regional loyalties that originated from pre-Saudi occupation in the 1920s. Such feelings rose again as the luster of the Saudi Royal House period began to fade. Moreover, these feelings were also influenced by the non-Wahhabi Islamic denominations that had governed these regions before the Saudi occupation. Although Wahhabi norms became the prescribed legal denomination of the Saudi State, Shafi’i principles, which had been the erstwhile religious denomination19 of the majority in the Hijaz and ‘Asir, had not completely disappeared. Usama Bin-Ladin presumably came from a Shafi’i family, true of many inhabitants of Hawdramat (South Yemen) where his family had originated. However, it seems that Bin-Ladin used this position not to reject Wahhabism, but, in fact, to approach it from the viewpoint of an outsider who was interested in minimizing the differences between the Shafi’i and the prevailing Wahhabi denominations. Thus, he tried to bring the various denominations as well as Muslim-Brethren principles together and bridge the differences among them. Likewise, he sought to unify Muslims of different nationalities: Yemeni, Saudi, Palestinians, Egyptians, Afghanis and Pakistanis. This was manifested in the actual formation of al-Qa’ida during the early 1980s in Afghanistan, where fighters from all those countries were operating together under the joint religious leadership of clergymen such Zindani of Yemen, Zawahiri of Egypt, the Palestinian, Azzam, and others.20 In addition to the earlier-mentioned ‘Asiris, there were probably hundreds of Saudis from the Hijaz, al-Qasim, and Najd who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s, and returned to Saudi Arabia in the 1990s with experiences of fighting and expelling a superpower from a Muslim territory. The common denominator of these al-Qa’ida elements was an ideological principal, over-simplified but widely supported: to create Shari’a rule, fight Western "occupying forces” (i.e., those stationed in Muslim states), and to weaken the local regimes that support them.21 Bin-Ladin led the Saudi opposition _________________________________________________ 19 There are four legal-theological denominations, or schools, in Sunni Islam: Hanbali, Hanifi, Maliki, Shafi’i. Wahhabism is a puritanical derivative of the Hanbali legal school. 20 Al-Quds, al-’Arabi (London): 23 February 1998. 21 Mati Steinberg, “The Theology and Strategy of al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad” (in Hebrew), Qeshet Hahadasha, No. 12, 13, 14 (2005).

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up the ladder of extremism to greater heights than any of his predecessors. First, because he accused King Fahd personally of the guilt of shirk for serving an infidel power, the United States, and for acting as a legislator over the Saudi state, which is a role reserved for God. Second, Bin-Ladin advocated that Jihad should spread to all the "occupied” Muslim communities, beginning with Saudi Arabia, which had become "a colony of the U.S.” Accordingly, Jihad must even reach the heart of the United States. Echoing the killer of President Sadat, he declared that George W. Bush was the”Pharaoh” of the times, who must be destroyed. After leaving the Kingdom in 1994 for Sudan, Bin-Ladin re-established alQa’ida along the lines of a universal body capable of attacking targets all over the globe22. Saudi authorities stripped him of his Saudi citizenship in 1994, preferring to keep him away from the Kingdom. The authorities ignored his activities, which included channeling money to terrorist causes, on the condition that he would not return to act in the Kingdom itself. A tacit agreement might have been concluded between Bin-Ladin and the Saudi Secret Services to this effect. "Isn’t it better to go off and fight a foreign Jihad rather than hang around the mosques without a job and cause trouble in Saudi Arabia?” asked a Saudi official relating to Bin-Ladin and his followers.23 However, the tacit cooperation with Bin-Ladin lasted only until May of 2003, when his followers started terrorizing the Kingdom. In conclusion, it seems that two ideological strands were at work in the Saudi opposition: One was the "wild” stream of Wahhabism, consisting of people who were critical of the Saudi leadership and its cooperation with the West, in particular. They rejected the authority of the established ‘ulama and preached for Jihad and Tafkir. Most of them were clergymen supported by their followers, continuing the roles of Hawali and ‘Awdah. The second consisted of former Afghanistan fighters, of mixed denominations, who were interested in cooperating with the radical Wahhabis. Both streams were also influenced by regional and tribal motives. The first group advocated a religiously dominated lifestyle (sahwa) and were most critical of the establishment. Three main clergymen are worth mentioning. Muhammad Bin al-Shuaybi was active in Buraydah in the region of alQasim, justifying the 11 September attacks against the United States. He issued a religious opinion that anybody who supported an infidel during a war with a Muslim party was himself an infidel. This wording seemed to be a call against Saudi leaders. In Riyadh, Ali al-Khudayr issued religious rulings against moderate clerics, journalists, and thinkers who called for coexistence with the West. In _________________________________________________ 22 23

Ibid. The New York Times, 27 December 2001.

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the words of a critic of al-Khudayr, he accused them of "Exclusion, monopoly over truth … (and) the criminalization of opponents.”24 Nasr al-Fahd of Riyadh stood out as another clergyman, and a member of a relatively well-to-do family, who propagated views similar to those of Ali al-Khudayr. These clergymen were not participants in terrorist groups. Rather, they voiced their arguments through the Internet and/or by preaching in mosques, and their messages were sometimes propagated by means of audio and video cassettes.25 Their influence lies in their ability to introduce an opposition agenda that most Saudis had to encounter and either agree with or reject. They were able to place a question mark on the Kingdom’s cooperation with the West; cooperation that had hitherto prevailed. Moreover, they addressed the issue of political violence as a legitimate tool to be used in Saudi relations with the West, and visà-vis lenient Saudis who were willing to compromise their religion.26 However, they did not call for direct revolutionary action against their leaders, or for a complete downfall of the Saudi regime. They did not cross this line.

4

Terrorism

The second group embarked on terrorist activities. Sporadic activities had occurred in earlier years, but a full campaign of terrorism commenced on 12 May 2003. It was a response to the American occupation of Iraq, which was tacitly and covertly supported by the Saudi government and, to some degree, received overt Saudi assistance, notably in servicing U.S. air strikes. The terrorist activity was also a preemptive action against the Saudi government which was planning to arrest many of al-Qa’ida’s activists. Bin-Ladin and Saudi al-Qa’ida leaders were presumably those who decided to depart from the cease-fire that had prevailed between al-Qa’ida and the Saudi authorities. They activated what had probably been dormant cells of tens of al-Qa’ida members residing in the Kingdom27. The al-Qa’ida organization in the Arabian Peninsula under Bin-Ladin has focused on overthrowing the Saudi monarchy, specifically by dividing Saudi Arabia from the West. The initial regional organization of al-Qa’ida was led by Yusef al-’Ayiri, of Yemeni origin, who reported directly to Bin-Ladin. ‘Ayiri’s and his lieutenants were responsible for setting up five autonomous cells, which _________________________________________________ 24

al-Watan, Riyadh, in Mideast Mirror, 24 November 2003. Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State,” Strategic Insight, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 2005). 26 Mati Steinberg, “The Theology and Strategy of al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad”. 27 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 21 January 2003. 25

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would be exclusively focused on operations in Saudi Arabia. The organization was able to create an entire infrastructure of safe houses, ammunition depots, and support networks.28 The five cells established by ‘Ayiri were the centers from which all terrorist activity directed against the Saudi state originated. The first cell was the largest and the strongest, and was directly responsible for the May 2003 attacks, headed by Turki al-Dandani, and was the first group to demonstrate that al-Qa’ida had become a major threat within the Arabian Peninsula. The second cell, headed by ‘Ali ‘Abd-al Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi (Abu Bakr al-Azdi), carried out the 12 May attacks in Riyadh. The third cell was led by a Yemeni national, Khalid alHajj, who was thought by some to be the "real head” of the al-Qa’ida network in Saudi Arabia. Abdulazziz al-Muqrin was the leader of the fourth cell, which was largely responsible for the November 2003 bombings. However, it was the fifth cell that proved to be the most important, for it was where the others cell members took refuge after their own strongholds had been destroyed. The fifth cell became the most prolific in Saudi Arabia. This group was also responsible generating the heaviest impact, such as the 29 December bombings of the Interior Ministry and the Security Recruitment Office, as well as other major attacks in 2004.29 During the fighting, ‘Ayiri and other commanders were killed and replaced by lower-ranking activists. There were protracted disagreements among the leaders with regards to the timing and potential targets of attack.30 ‘Ayiri was often very vocal with his concerns regarding the ill preparation among his fellow members, as well as the lack of time, shortage of resources, and insufficiency of supply routes from Yemen. In addition, with recruitment not being as high as expected, there were various issues which concerned ‘Ayiri enough to postpone the missons, despite other al-Qa’ida members wanting to forge ahead. For example, Ayman alZawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon, who became the theological advisor to BinLadin, disagreed with ‘Ayiri and felt that operations should begin immediately.31 And despite the traditional al-Qa’ida approach of extreme patience and a slow and steady development of support networks capable of inflicting a major attack, Zawahiri’s suggestion of attacking soft targets repeatedly, such as Americans _________________________________________________ 28 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 2005), p.4. 29 Cordesman and Obaid, “Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists”, p. 4; Toby Jones, “Violence and the Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Report, 13 November 2003; Gulf States Newsletter , Vol. 28, Issue 736 (11 June 2004). 30 sawt al-jihad cited in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, No. 601, 31 October 2003. 31 Cordesman and Obaid, “Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists”, p. 5; for background on al-Zawahiri and his role in al-Qa‘ida, see Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin-Laden,” The New Yorker, 16 September 2002.

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inside of Saudi Arabia, as a way of paralyzing the Saudi government was the actual approach taken. However, with time this method proved to be a miscalculation, and was later over-ruled by Bin-Ladin because it compromised the future strength of al-Qa’ida. In terms of its development, Saudi terrorism can be divided into three main stages: (1) from May to August 2003, when the attacks were directed against Westerners residing in Saudi Arabia, mainly in residential and military compounds. (2) Between August and November 2003, when the attacks were also directed against Saudi security forces and offices32. Saudi civilians, in cars or as bystanders, were also targeted. As a consequence, the perpetrators came under mounting criticism for the bloodshed, even from sympathetic clergymen, such as Khudayr and al-Fahd. The terrorists, as a result, began to choose their targets more carefully. (3) Between November 2003 and during 2004, they turned mainly to abducting and killing Western residents and visitors who had been working for Saudi security bodies. These were more limited operations, which, nevertheless, caused continuous backlash in Saudi cities (see chronology of alQa’ida attacks). The following figures show the chronology, between 1995 and 2004, of terrorist attacks related to or inflicted by the al-Qa’ida organization33: 1995 November 13: Saudia Arabian National Guard Headquarters in Riyadh bombed. First of the new wave of terror attacks, and the start of the wind down of the U.S. presence in the Kingdom. Seven U.S. killed: One military, six civilians. 2003 May 12: Suicide bombers attack housing compounds for foreign workers in Riyadh. 35 are killed, including nine bombers, and 200 wounded. Al Hamra, Vinnell and Jedewahl compounds. June 14: Raid in Mecca kills five Islamic militants and two security agents. July 28: Raid on farm in Al Qasim kills six militant and two police. September 23: Raid in Jizan kills al-Qa’ida operative wanted by the FBI. November 3: Clash with terrorists in Mecca kills two and finds large weapons cache. November 8: Suicide bombers blow up in Riyadh compound housing foreigners and Saudis, killing at least 18. The old Boeing compound, now called Muhaya compound.

_________________________________________________ 32 33

al-Watan (Riyadh); 31 December 2004. Figures according to “Al-Qaeda,” www.globalsecurity.org in Cordesman and Obaid, pp. 6-8

Part Four: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism 2004 January 28: Gun battle in Riyadh kills one al-Qa’ida and five police. April 21: Suicide bomber kills five, including two senior police officers in attack on government building in Riyadh. The al-Haramayn Brigades (an alQa’ida alias) claim responsibility. May 1: Gunmen kill five Westerners in an attack on an oil office in Yanbu: four attackers and one policeman die. Some 50 people are injured. May 20: Police battle militants near Burada, killing four. May 22: Terrorists kill German expatriate, Herman Dengel, head chef of Saudi Catering Company on a Riyadh street. May 29–30: Militants attack an oil company and housing compounds in Khubar. Seven Saudi policemen and 22 civilians are killed. 50 hostages are taken. June 6: Simon Cumbers, an Irish cameraman working for the BBC, is shot dead in Riyadh. June 8: Gunmen kill American Robert Jacob, of Vinnell Corp., in Riyadh. June 12: American Kenneth Scroggs is shot dead in Riyadh. Al-Qa’ida claims responsibility. June 18: Kidnappers behead Lockheed Martin employee Paul M. Johnson, Jr., in Riyadh. August 3: An Irish civil engineer, Tony Christopher, is shot dead in Riyadh. August 30: Gunmen fire on U.S. Consulate vehicle in Jidda. September 15: Edward Muirhead-Smith, a British engineer, is killed in Riyadh in an attack claimed by al-Qa’ida. September 26: Frenchman Laurent Barbot is shot dead in Jidda. October 18: Top ranking militant Abdel Majed al-Manaya is among three terrorists killed in Riyadh. November 4: Saudi Security forces arrest seven people, including a wanted terrorist suspect. The seven were apprehended during a raid on a cyber café in Buradah. Two security personnel were wounded in a shootout preceding the arrest. November 6: 26 Saudi religious scholars sign and release and open letter calling on Iraqis to fight Americans and considering it jihad. Two days later the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, released an official statement making it clear that the letter from these scholars represented neither the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the senior religious scholars of the country. November 9: In a predawn raid, security forces kill one wanted terrorist and capture three others after a shootout in Jidda. The daily Al-Riyadh quoted a witness as saying that Sultan al-Utaibi, from Saudi Arabia’s list of 26 mostwanted terrorists, was killed in the confrontation. A substantial arms cache was found in the house where the suspected terrorists were discovered. The cache included machine guns, hand-grenades and various types of ammunition. According to local press reports, the four-member group planned to attack a Jidda compound coinciding with firework celebrations during the Id al-Fitr holiday.

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Part Four: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism Additionally, security forces arrested three suspects north of Riyadh on the highway to Qasim. November 11: The Interior Ministry announces that King Fahd ordered the release of those militants who surrendered to security authorities as a result of the June amnesty offer. November 12: Saudi security forces arrest five suspected terrorists in two operations in Riyadh and Zulfi. Three of the suspects were detained in Riyadh and two in Zulfi. Weapons and ammunition were reportedly seized in these operations. The next day an Interior Ministry spokesman stated that these individuals were not directly involved in violence, but were suspected of supporting extremist thought. November 13: The U.S. Embassy releases warning message to remind of security concerns surrounding the death of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. November 17: A security officer is killed and eight officers wounded during a raid on a terrorist hideout in Qasim. Five suspects were arrested during the raid, and two of them were wanted by authorities and linked to al-Qa’ida. One reportedly belonged to the list of the 26 most wanted. He was not identified by name. November 27: Saudi security forces in Jidda kill a terrorist suspect later identified as Isam Siddiq Mubaraki. This man was linked to plotters of the November 2003 al-Muhaya housing compound attack in Riyadh. One additional suspect was arrested in conjunction with the killing of Mubaraki. Additionally, police found a cache of arms in Mubaraki’s car. December 2: Saudi Security forces announce the arrest of four suspected terrorists in various parts of the country. Two were arrested in Artawiya and the other two were captured in the vicinity of Hafar al-Batin and Buradah. December 6: Militants storm the U.S. Consulate in Jidda, killing five U.S. employees. Three gunmen were also killed. December 29: Ministry of the Interior and the special forces recruitment office bombed; a bystander was killed, and seven suspected al-Qa’ida members were shot dead later in the evening.

As the chronology shows, many of the attacks, which were targeted at civilians, were aimed at destabilizing the Saudi Kingdom. These civilians included both foreign workers, on whom the Saudi economy survives, as well as Americans, in an effort to compound the tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia that had erupted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, in the attempt to target certain segments of the population, Saudi civilians were killed as well. Ultimately, Bin-Ladin wanted to overthrow the Royal Family and the Saudi govern-

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ment, whom he held responsible for allowing the U.S. to establish its military presence on soil of the Saudi Kingdom.34 4.1 Achievements The terrorists did not attack main oil installations or major government ministries, or perhaps failed in their attempts to do so. Nevertheless, the terrorists had achieved two goals in their struggle: 5.

6.

They spread their influence broadly in different areas. In one of his letter to his followers, ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, a cell commander of al-Qa’ida, who became leader of the entire al-Qa’ida network in the Kingdom, addressed his people in what he called "bastions and regiments” in the "mountains, cities and among the sympathizers.” While al-Muqrin’s words may not be completely reliable it is clear that terrorist groups rooted themselves in major cities, in the Gulf and Najd, and in rural areas, such as al-Jawf and ‘Asir. The discovery of stashes of arms and ammunition in such places, arrests of terrorists, and their actual activities, demonstrate that they were, indeed, able to spread out. The terrorists also were able to pose a strategic "image-threat” to the Kingdom. The possibility of attacks on oil installations caused Saudi leaders to press other oil-exporting states to lower prices and increase their own production and sales, so as to maintain a high level of supply and keep the price around $50 per barrel. The Saudis did not want the terrorist attacks to affect the price of oil, which could hurt Western economies. The Saudis, however, also did not want to appear too cooperative with the West. However, their fear of losing credit in Western markets was a real threat, which the Saudi leaders had to avert. Moreover, a certain image of the Kingdom’s internal dismantling spread in the West, which damaged the sense of stability attributed to Saudi Arabia.35

4.2 Saudi Responses Saudi intelligence had been receiving information throughout the 1990s regarding the plannings and inter-workings of al-Qa’ida but had been unable to truly _________________________________________________ 34 Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & The Next Generation of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005). 35 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism Network (Washington, D.C., Regnery, 2003); International Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?”.

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respond until 2003. Following the 12 May 2003 attacks in Riyadh, a list of senior operatives connected to ‘Ayiri was drawn up and the first al-Qa’ida cell was infiltrated by the Saudi government.36 As a result of this raid, al-Ghamdi surrendered and al-Dandani was killed, and the rest of the remaining members fled, later re-connecting with various other nascent cells. This dispersion caused problems, because it forced the other cells to share their resources, thus lowering their own supplies. The influx of new members also undermined their autonomy, thus making it easier for the Saudi government to infiltrate the remaining cells. Rebuilding the network was difficult. The leaders appointed after alGhamdi were not successful in creating their own cells. In addition, ‘Ayiri was killed in a shootout with Saudi security forces at a roadblock in June 2003. Later in March of 2004, Khalid Ali Hajj was ambushed and killed by Saudi security forces in Riyadh, who was then succeeded by Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin, until his death in June 2004.37 Once this top tier of leadership was destroyed, lessexperienced militants took charge, which also served to weaken the power of each individual cell and the network as a whole. A major weakness of the al-Qa’ida organization has been its poor recruitment effort and turnout. Although Bin-Ladin expected a much larger turnout of recruits and volunteers to replace all those that had been lost, this was not the case. The heavy blows that the Saudi government forces had dealt to the top ranks of the organization, severely depleted the quality of the leadership and members, and even forced al-Qa’ida to begin recruiting young and very inexperienced men to their call for Jihad.38 The Saudi response to the new crop of militants was able to severely affect the capability of al-Qa’ida by mid-2004. Often due to lack of manpower and infrastructure, the militants were forced to carry out missions hastily and without the proper planning. However, despite the problems facing al-Qa’ida, it still remained a serious threat to the safety of Saudi civilians and the foreign population living on Saudi soil. Al-Qa’ida remains committed to funding, training and encouraging future operations on Saudi territory, as well as in other countries (such as Iraq and Chechnya), as does Saudi Arabia to deterring it. The events of 11 September 2001 brought a considerable amount of attention to Saudi Arabia and its efforts in combating militarism. As a result, a few weeks after the attacks, Saudi Arabia agreed that it would allow U.S. planes and troops stationed in that country to participate in military action against Bin-Ladin _________________________________________________ 36

Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts: The Changing Paramilitary and Domestic Security Apparatus (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 February 2005), p.4-5. 37 Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts”, pp. 4-5. 38 Ibid.

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in the war in Afghanistan.39 On September 20th, the Kingdom also announced that it would sever ties with the Taliban on the grounds that the Taliban government "continues to use lands to harbor, arm, and encourage those criminals (alQa’ida) in carrying out terrorist atrocities which horrify those who believe in peace and the innocent and spread terror and destruction in the world.”40 Internal security action was taken in Saudi Arabia as well. After 9/11 over 600 individuals were detained, and nearly 2,000 were questioned, for suspected ties to terrorism.41 During the period following May 2003, the Saudi Kingdom could confirm that it had been successful in dismantling the major al-Qa’ida cells which had been operating from within its own territory. Many public warnings were addressed to the militants informing them to surrender for the sake of their own safety; even offering those al-Qa’ida members amnesty for those who had not been directly involved in violent attacks. Various methods of monitoring the Saudi financial infrastructure against illegal activity have been enforced, as well as a number of measures on the local scale. The security of many locations throughout Saudi Arabia have been improved, especially at public buildings and residential facilities. The Saudi government demonstrated that it had a good understanding of the key elements and individuals involved, thus strengthening its counter-terrorism activities. In order to enhance the quality and performance of the security and intelligence forces, a Royal Decree was issued calling for 25 percent pay increase for those forces and all supporting units, as well as reorganizing the security efforts to augment the training program and utilize better equipment. Through its cooperation with other countries, Saudi Arabia learned of new techniques and programs and was better able to organize the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard and the regular military forces. They even established a new command authority within the Ministry of the Interior to fight terrorism.42 Although progress was slow, initial efforts were in place and with time it became clear that al-Qa’ida was not having as much success against Saudi Arabia’s new system. Despite allegations which appeared in some Western media publications that the Kingdom had participated and furnished material in order to support alQa’ida, specifically in the 11 September attacks, the U.S. 9/11 Commission found that no such evidence existed.43 The Commission’s report also denied that Saudi nationals were inappropriately allowed to leave the United States in the days following the attacks. Although the 9/11 report clearly absolves Saudi Ara_________________________________________________ 39

Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts”, p. 11. “U.S. Consulate Attackers are Vilified,” www.news.scotsman.com 41 Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts”, pp. 11-12. 42 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts”, p. 12. 43 Ibid, p.19. 40

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bia from any direct financial connection with al-Qa’ida, the Commission did acknowledge the failure of the government in properly supervising Islamic charities within the Kingdom.44 Thus, some low-level responsibility did fall upon Saudi shoulders. 4.3 Two main points worth mentioning in retrospect First, the ideological foci of the Saudi opposition as a whole were its objections to the presence of Western forces on Saudi land as well as in the entire Gulf, to its government’s cooperation with Western states, and to the corruption and religious laxity of its leaders. The more radical opposition can be characterized by its more aggressive characteristics: (1) They encouraged Muslims to take part in Jihad, namely, in fighting Western forces and Western hegemony as a whole. The extremist clergy, belonging to this category, justified the attacks of September, 2001 and kept encouraging followers to walk the path of its perpetrators. (2) They brought to life once again Ibn Taymiyya’s principle of Takfir, depicting their rivals, whether Christians, Jews, Westerners or Muslims who did not follow the radicals’ particular way, as infidels or as Muslims becoming infidels. Extremist groups of Egypt’s Muslim-Brethren had used this concept to justify the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, and, through the involvement of elements such as Ayman al-Zawahiri (who had been involved with the assassins of Sadat, captured, but later released), with al-Qa’ida, the concept was revived in a Saudi context. Jihadi clergy thus depicted Western values, including the liberal treatment of women, the open family life, and even the way people dress, as wrong and forbidden to Muslims. Second, the social structure of the opposition groups has not been fully unraveled. It is clear, however, that in keeping with the Saudi social tradition, opposition elements do not appear as isolated individuals. Rather, they have appeared as extended families or clans (or as one researcher called them, "genealogies”) involving several family members simultaneously, sometimes from different generations or branches. They have originated, as previously mentioned, from some peripheral regions or from the main cities of Najd, the Hijaz, alQasim (north of Najd) and ‘Asir. And they are mostly from minor families of the middle, or lower-middle, classes. As such, they mostly come from "out-of-theloop” clans that had not previously benefited from the Saudi politics of cronyism and formed a "secondary strata” of new activists. Many were school-age, between 15 and 20, when recruited, and are now close to 30. These activists have been organizing themselves into small groups of cells and small followings. _________________________________________________ 44

Ibid.

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They also have appeared as "disciples” of a certain teacher or master, loyal to his opinions and interpretations. These were usually relatively small groups, but sometimes they would form larger groups that were connected through the subscription based web-sites of their masters, where they would take part in religious-political debates, electronically.45 Thus, the leader who was responsible for the establishment of the al-Qa’ida cells in Saudi Arabia and for the spreading of its ideology was Yusuf ‘Ayiri, whose training originated in both Afghanistan and Yemen. His disciples were activists such as Faris al-Zahrani, Abdullah al-Rushund, and Abd al-Aziz alMuqrin, all of whom were killed in clashes with Saudi forces. ‘Ayiri and his disciples managed to issue an underground newspaper, Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of the Holy War), which became the main ideological organ for al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia. Numerically, these Saudi terrorists were estimated from ca. 150 up to ca. 400 men.46

5

Responses to Religious Radicalism and Terrorism

The Saudi government was ambivalent toward the radical developments evolving in their Kingdom. On one hand, they sought to suppress radicalism, which could endanger their regime. On the other hand, the authorities could not turn their backs on Wahhabi Islam, which was the legitimizing cornerstone of their regime. Therefore, they denounced the radicals, but kept nurturing Islam. In the same vein, Saudi authorities were directing radicals to advance Islamic causes in other states: They allowed private funds to be channeled through charity foundations to support mosques and Islamic community activists in Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the United States. In fact, these funds often were used for terrorist activities, for example, the "al-Haramayn” foundation was used to facilitate Jihadi groups in Chechnya and the Balkans. Saudi funds were passed on to Hamas fighters, and also for families of Palestinians who had been killed in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The Saudi Minister of the Interior, Na’if ibn ‘Abd al-’Aziz headed a foundation for the compensation of participants in the Intifada.47 Likewise, the Saudi authorities did not stop the radicals’ preaching, but, in 1997, established a new supreme council of the clergymen (‘ulama), the main aim of which was to overrule the religious opinions of the radicals on their _________________________________________________ 45 Gwenn Okrulnik, “Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia”, Current History, January, 2002; al-Hayat, 15 September 2003; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 July 2004, 5 July 2004, 8 December 2003. 46 Cordesman and Obaid, “Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts”. 47 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom; Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou.

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"home ground,” i.e. in common, Islamic terms. Thus, in recent years, they have been arguing two main points: The first, that the terrorist activities precipitate internal struggle and chaos (fitna) among believers which is counter-productive and forbidden by the Shari’a. The second is that the King, who is also the leader (Imam) of the Wahhabi community, has the right to make supreme policy decisions. This right was reinforced in the "basic law” that the Saudi government had legislated in 1992, to offset any attempt to shatter the fabric of the Saudi regime. Hence, by using precedents from the Prophet Muhammad’s conduct they argue that the King alone possesses the right to declare jihad and/or to cooperate with foreign, even "infidel,” forces. This demonstrates that the authorities do not wish merely to use force to suppress the terrorist opposition, but instead seek to "bring back” the exaggerating elements that had gone "too far” in their religious interpretation. In a comment made by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah in late May 2004 (after the government had used force to eliminate four main terrorists) he called upon those who "went astray” to return to the "right path.” In so doing, the government has sought to avoid a major internal conflict and to depict the terrorists as a marginal and containable problem. Moreover, ‘Abdullah’s declaration, made at the same time, that the "Zionists” had loomed behind many of the Saudi terrorist incidents, was designed to cause a similar effect: to direct the accusation of terrorism toward common, foreign enemies of Islam, as Zionists were considered, rather than towards indigenous Saudis.48 The main Saudi effort to ease the government’s tension with the extremists (the ‘ulama as well as with al-Qa’ida members) was the initiative to embark on a”national dialogue” (al-Hiwar al-Watani), which Crown Prince ‘Abdullah started in November 2002. The immediate aim of this initiative was to present to the public the religious opinions of relatively moderate clergymen, who would counteract and discredit the arguments of the radicals. A duel of fatwas evolved between the parties and more opinions entered the dialogue, turning it into a broad discourse. The highlights of this discourse were demands made by "liberal” elements to allow a greater measure of freedom of the press, and to implement a promise, already made by the government in 1992, to hold elections for provincial councils. These signs of "democratization” and "reform” were appreciated in the United States. The Minister of the Interior, Prince Na’if, made it clear, however, that Western hopes to turn the Kingdom into a "Constitutional Monarchy” were premature. For example, Prince Na’if stated in April 2003 that election results can be fixed in advance, or, to put it simply, that democratization was not an immediate option. In June 2003, a journalist, Jamal Hashoogi, the former editor _________________________________________________ 48

Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou.

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of the daily al-Watan, entered this discourse by stating that the Saudis should learn not only from Ibn-Taymiyya – one of the most radical Islamist thinkers, who inspired the ideas of Takfir – but that from other, more moderate thinkers, as well. Hashoogi lost his job as editor, but his statement, accompanied by others of a similar nature, indicated that various opinions were vying for dominance, and that the Jihadist position had not won over the public.49 The national dialogue could be viewed in a broader context, as an attempt to create a new ideological solidarity, or a new consensus among the different religious trends. As such, the national dialogue had a healing, state-building function: to rebuild stability in Saudi society, and to do so through an open discourse. In such a discourse, the voices of religious radicals would be diluted and mixed with more moderate preaching, so as to blunt the edge of the radicals’ works and depict terrorism as a marginal issue. The rise of more moderate or liberal clerics in the public sphere demonstrates that this policy has had some relative success. The government probably did not believe in its ability to overpower terrorism by means of public discourse. Therefore, it did not shy away from using force. Since May 2003, approximately 1,000 suspects were detained, and about 2,000 clergymen were questioned. Security forces cracked down on several terrorist cells, discovering and destroying tons of explosives and arms. Several "charity foundations” that had been channeling money for the funding of terrorism, notably the al-Haramayn fund were shut down. Shoot-outs with terrorists occurred daily. The series of blows peaked in June 2004, when some of the leading terrorists were killed. This led to a lull in the terrorist activity. However, the infrastructure of many young Saudi cells still exists and could be reset into an operational mode. In summary, the radical potential in the Wahhabi upbringing of Saudi extremists and the globalized connection with radical Muslims in other states and centers still exists. The readiness of Bin-Ladin to start another campaign is also undoubted. The possibility of a new extremist, or terrorist, wave in Saudi Arabia is most tangible.

6

The Making of Zarqawi

With the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, there was a reason for alQa’ida to be involved in the region. However, once the Soviet troops had been removed, there was less justification. Despite the withdrawal of "infidel” forces, al-Qa’ida kept their organizational base of operation there until the 1991 Gulf _________________________________________________ 49

Nimrod Raphaeli, “Demands for Reform in Saudi Arabia”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 2005).

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War, and the U.S. intervention in Iraq. After the U.S. invasion in 1991, men like Bin-Ladin and Zawahiri came to believe that U.S. policy was really a secret attempt to conquer and rule Muslim lands, and to strengthen the local Gulf governments, whom they considered their "near enemy.” Furthermore, these "near enemies” were products of U.S. policies50. Thus, the final decision of al-Qa’ida was to abandon the war against the”near enemy” and focus on targeting the "far enemy,” such as the U.S. and its supporters. Al-Qa’ida put its new plan in action, and various early victories confirmed the organization’s strength. For example, the U.S. withdrawing troops from Somalia in 1993; and the first World Trade Center attack; as well as the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam. These attacks elicited a minimal response from the U.S. and gave Bin-Ladin international recognition. With a heightened sense of self-confidence, Bin-Ladin planned his most spectacular and devastating attack: to bomb New York City and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001. The multiple suicide attacks of 11 September horrified the West and forced the U.S. to take immediate action, and, as a result, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan. This move took Bin-Ladin by surprise and eliminated the sanctuary that al-Qa’ida depended on for its terrorist network, and the organization had to scramble for a new central power base. But, al-Qa’ida is a resilient network and although the invasion of Afghanistan left the organization without a base, there was a new opportunity for them to regain their power. The U.S. incursion into Iraq provided al-Qa’ida with room to maneuver, and opportunity. After the defeat of the Iraqi military, the U.S. forces found themselves facing a new enemy. Although al-Qa’ida was not a supporter of Saddam Hussein, they seized the opportunity to fight the infidel invader.51 Al-Qa’ida’s decision to move their operations to Iraq can be explained as a strategic decision in order to maximize its ability to battle the U.S. The possibility of a U.S. invasion into Iraq provided al-Qa’ida’s leaders with a fruitful opportunity to launch a guerrilla war on terrain unfamiliar to U.S. forces.52 AlQa’ida regarded the Iraqi invasion as a new opportunity to act against the U.S., just as Afghanistan had been its opportunity to defeat the Soviet Union’s occupying forces. Bin-Ladin also played an important role in the Iraqi arena. In his February 2003 message to the Iraqi people, Bin-Ladin encouraged them to face and defeat _________________________________________________ 50 Quintan Wictorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East Policy, vol. 8 (2001), no. 4. 51 Will Waddell, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Evolution,” OmniNerd, 30 December 2005 (http://www.omninerd.com/2005/12/30/articles/45) , pp.4-5. 52 Ely Karmon, “Al-Qa’ida and the War on Terrorism After the War in Iraq. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006).

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the American invasion and gave examples illustrating how the U.S. military was not invincible. Bin-Ladin also stressed the importance of the Iraqi people coming together, regardless if they were Arabs or non-Arabs (Kurds), Sunnis or Shi’a, to resist the invasion. The Iraqi government under ousted Saddam Hussein supported this notion and the Vice President, Taha Yassin Ramadan, called those who committed suicide attacks against American soldiers, martyrs, and encouraged Arabs outside of Iraq to turn every country in the world into a battlefield. Upon the fall of Baghdad, al-Qa’ida posted a statement on the Internet indicating that guerrilla warfare was the most effective method Muslims could use to continue the conflict with the "Crusader Enemy.” This call to arms worked, and despite the American warnings, Damascus allowed thousands of volunteers, many from Syria, to cross its border into Iraq and fight in the war against the Americans. Thus, the Iraqi insurgency and terrorist campaign was planned even prior to the war; based on a coalition of ex-Ba’athists, army intelligence officers, Iraqi Sunni Islamists, and Muslim volunteers from within the Arab world, as well as from Europe, all with the tacit support of Syria and, most likely, Iran.53 The strong insurgency combined with some important American strategic errors led to continued violence and uncertainty in Iraq. With Saddam’s regime disbanded, there was no regular army or police forces, which resulted in complete chaos. The situation in Iraq was then used by al-Qa’ida to export their fight to the rest of the Middle East. The following quote demonstrates the effect of alQa’ida’s activities in Iraq: "During the summer and fall of 2003, Iraqi insurgents emerged as effective forces with significant popular support in Arab Sunni areas, and developed a steadily more sophisticated mix of tactics. In the process, a native and foreign Islamist extremist threat also developed which deliberately tried to divide Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ites, Kurds and other Iraqi minorities. By the fall of 2004, this had some elements of a low-level civil war, and by June 2005, it threatened to escalate into a far more serious civil conflict.”54

Ultimately, the Iraqi insurgents and terrorists were able to use the international media as a vehicle for showing the world their attacks, through high casualties and high publicity. The insurgents also focused on Iraqi government targets as a way to prevent Sunnis from participating in the newly-formed government, as well as a means of adding the most tension to the conflict between Sunnis and

_________________________________________________ 53

Karmon, p.3. Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 June 2006), pp.11-12.

54

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Shi’a, and Arabs and Kurds; all of which added to the problems of establishing a legitimate government in Iraq.55 One individual helped to play a major role in the Iraqi insurgency, despite the many groups and individuals involved, and he was the Jordanian-Palestinian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was considered the most dangerous leader of the most dangerous group associated with al-Qa’ida, and a close associate of Bin-Ladin. Although he was originally involved in a base in Afghanistan, Zarqawi moved to Iraq and began establishing a network, from which he coordinated terrorist activities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Russia. Al-Zarqawi was considered to be the leader of the terrorist group al-Tawhid in Jordan, where he had been imprisoned. At some point in April 2003, he broke away and created his own organization called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) with its operational headquarters based in the Iraqi town of Fallujah. This organization first became visible to the world when U.S. citizen Nicholas Berg was captured and beheaded in April 2004, supposedly by Zarqawi himself, on video, which was broadcast on the Internet. There were other radical Sunni Islamists groups such as Zarqawi’s, and they were called "neo-Salafis” or "Takfiris,” and they believed that they were fighting a region-wide war in Iraq, which would then extend to the rest of the world. These groups were involved in mostly civilian attacks, primarily through suicide bombings, kidnappings, and beheadings and were composed of many foreign volunteers and young Arabs. For example, Zarqawi’s group is mostly composed of non-Iraqi volunteers who originate from neighboring countries, and according to some researchers, the multi-national composition of these groups could also explain the close alliance between Zarqawi and Bin-Ladin.56 Zarqawi and his groups have been successful in their terrorist and guerrilla activities and therefore have attracted the involvement of more and more recruits. As far as can be established, Zarqawi had initially operated in Iraq independently of al-Qa’ida. Despite the belief that Zarqawi was the representative of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, the truth is that it was only in December 2004 that an alliance was made, based on strategic interests and common goals. While there may have been cooperation between Zarqawi and Bin-Ladin prior to the war, this can not be proven; only the connection the two formed in Iraq has been visible. In what appeared to be a package deal, Bin-Ladin publicly announced Zarqawi was going to be designated as the head of al-Qa’ida’s operations in Iraq.57 _________________________________________________ 55

Karmon, p.4. Karmon, p. 4; Jonathan Randal, Osama, The Making of a Terrorist (London: Tauris, 2005), pp. 296-297. 57 Karmon, p. 3; Nimrod Raphaeli, “The Sheikh of the Slaughterers: Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi and the Al-Qa’ida Connection,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, No. 231 (1 July 2005), p. 2. 56

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The Iraqi al-Qa’ida organization, through their chief of media, outlined the identity of the organization and its aims in Iraq. The document stated that alQa’ida in Iraq was comprised of Muslims from the followers of the tradition and the community of believers who try to please Allah by committing themselves to keeping his orders. In addition, its central goals were designed to: ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Renew pure monotheism which was sullied by the filth of polytheistic elements. Wage jihad for the sake of Allah, so that His message be supreme, and in order to recapture all of the lands of the Muslims from the hands of the infidels. Come to the aid of Muslims everywhere and reclaim the Islamic dignity which has been soiled by the (foreign) invaders. Re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet’s example.

Among these goals, it was also stated that spilling the blood of those Muslims’ whose character has become impure is acceptable. This concept of killing fellow Muslims was also described in a 90 minute audio file on the Internet, in which Zarqawi provided legitimacy for the collateral killing of Muslims during the act of killing infidels. Zarqawi also used the Internet to glorify beheading as a method of killing his victims.58 However, the beheadings were intended for Western infidels who had penetrated Muslim territory, both civil and military personnel. In Iraq, Zarqawi vacillated between various strategies, but one strategy was to attack U.S. forces. However, due to the U.S. material superiority, most direct action has been difficult, and thus Zarqawi was forced to resort to suicide bombings. The suicide attacks have worked more effectively because they proved to be extremely destructive and demonstrated an intense commitment to the cause. But in 2005, Zarqawi decided to change his target, and he began to attack Iraq’s Shi'i population. Since Zarqawi adheres to the strict Sunni Salafi doctrine, he considers Shi'i Muslims to be heretics and not true Muslims; however, this strategy has failed to deter the Iraqi Shi'i population, since they are more numerous then the Sunnis in Iraq and proved extremely strong in the face of recent attacks. Zarqawi continued stressing the importance of the Jihadist cause and also put political action on the same level as the violence in his attempts to build public support. In a letter that was intercepted, Zarqawi stated these objectives, and also claimed that America will leave Iraq. Further, Zarqawi claimed that _________________________________________________ 58

Raphaeli, pp. 3-4.

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when America leaves Iraq al-Qa’ida will seize control and establish an Islamic state in the former Iraq, and then they will be able to subvert the surrounding regimes and form a true Caliphate.59 Whether this letter was forged or real, one cannot know for sure; however, it does seem that Zarqawi’s continuous attacks on the Shi'i population was an attempt to incite civil war and create a situation so chaotic that the U.S. forces would have no choice but to leave, thus allowing Zarqawi to assume a leadership position. The insurgents’ efforts in Iraq were originally to attack and eventually drive out the Coalition forces, however this plan has shifted toward attacking the Iraqi government and its forces in an attempt to cause the political process to fail. But,”What makes the most extreme Sunni insurgents, who are largely ‘neoSalafi’ different, is that many see a civil war as an end in itself, and as part of a much broader struggle for an Islam dominated by their narrow view of Sunni Puritanism.” They believe that they are fighting for a form of Sunni extremism region-wide that will not only ensure their dominance in Iraq, but will also eliminate and Christian or Jewish presence.60 Furthermore, with the goal of achieving this Sunni puritan state, Sunni Islamist insurgents have been more than willing to use excessive and severe violence against anyone who does not have the same vision for Iraq and definition of Jihad as they do, including Shi’is, Kurds, and personnel of the newly implemented Iraqi regime (such as government officials, military, security and police services). The ultimate goal of these insurgents is not to merely win in Iraq, but to win in a broader sense, to affect the entire Arab region and eventually the world. These neo-Salafi insurgents are a small part of the overall insurgency in Iraq. It is impossible to estimate how many members there are in this subsection, but experts guesstimate that they compose 5–10 percent of the total insurgency, with the total number of insurgents somewhere between 15,000 and 60,000. While it is unknown whether these numbers are changing, increasing or decreasing, it is clear that they continue to carry out deadly attacks on soft targets, such as Shi'i and Kurdish civilians, and poorly protected recruits, police, journalists, diplomats, contractors and officials, which occur daily. One of the most effective and dangerous aspects of this insurgency is the involvement of foreign volunteers, because it is this group that has done the most to add to the civil war in Iraq between Iraq’s Arab Sunnis and its Arab Shi’is, Kurds, and other minorities. Many of these lower level volunteers come from a variety of countries and have little training, or even prior membership in similar extremist groups, thus their commitment to martyrdom is often grounded on _________________________________________________ 59

Yassin Musharbash, “What al-Qaeda Really Wants”, Spiegel Online, 12 August 2005. Anthony Cordesman, New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency: The War for Civil War in Iraq (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 27 September 2005), p. ii.

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ambiguous ideological and religious footing. Most of the suicide bombers in Iraq appear to be foreign Jihadists, one U.S. defense official even estimated that as of July 2005, Iraqis had directly carried out less than 10 percent of more than 500 suicide bombings.61 Whatever the numbers may be, it has caused much concern among officials and counter-terrorist experts in the Gulf and other Arab countries, that some clerics and Islamic organizations have been recruiting young Arabs and men from various Islamic countries and bringing them into the Iraqi conflict through countries like Syria. Often this occurs on an individual basis, not through a highly organized group like al-Qa’ida, and thus, there is no way of stopping it. Many of the men involved in this process will not be killed in the war in Iraq and will establish the foundation of a whole new generation of trained Jihadists. Despite the many different groups fighting in the Iraqi insurgency, for the most part they have a common belief structure and approach to war-fighting. There seems to be little difference between Ansar al-Suna, Ansar al-Islam (other smaller fundamentalist and violent groups active in Iraq and other Arab states), and Zarqawi’s group, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. What these different groups do is adapt their names in an attempt to appeal to various sectors of the Muslim society for recruitment, such as Islamist Arabists, Salafists, neo-Salafists, etc. One of the most dangerous tendencies of these groups has been their concerted effort to turn their attention away from the Coalition forces and focus instead on creating religious conflict both in Iraq and in the broader Islamic community, as a whole.62 The Shi’is response to the situation in Iraq has evolved from restrained to active confrontation. In the early stages, while actions and statements made by Zarqawi and other Sunni extremists led to increasing tensions between the two groups, the Shi'is did not initiate large-scale actions in response. However, this situation changed over time. The Shi'is began striking back on an increasing scale, and they were linked to kidnappings and incidents of torturing Sunnis. They also seized a Sunni mosque in Baghdad.63 Various organizations have been accused of assassinations and kidnappings, both in Northern Iraq and in areas near Basra. Also, the Shi’i and Kurdish employees of the new Iraqi military and security forces have become increasingly violent in dealing with the civilian population in Sunni areas. This could be a means of expressing their sectarian loyalties, but it appears to be adding to the tension in Iraqi society. _________________________________________________ 61

Cordesman, “New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency”, pp. i-iii. Ibid; Nabil Sharif al-Din, Bin Ladin, Taliban, al-Arab wal-Ummamiyat al Usuliyya (Bin Ladin, The Taliban, the Arab Afghan and fundamentalist Groups) (Cairo: Madbuli, 2002). 63 Cordesman, “New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency”, p. iv. 62

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An important aspect of the neo-Salafi Islamist extremist groups is that their struggle extends far beyond the Iraqi borders, as does their support base. The Zarqawi group, in particular, has strengthened its ties to outside terrorist groups. For example, in October 2004, Zarqawi publicly pledged allegiance to Bin-Ladin and changed the name of his group from Al Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) to Al-Qa’ida in the Land of Two Rivers.64 Although there is no evidence that the two men had ever met face to face, it is obvious that they were working together. This type of international affiliation provided much more money and support for the organization, and the end result was an informal network of neo-Salafi hate groups that extend to Europe and the U.S., as well as countries in the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia. The attacks that have been carried out on Shi’is and Kurds in Iraq have been numerous. However, there is no way to know which organization is responsible for which attack, when often different Sunni Islamist extremist groups claim responsibility for the same attack. The following is a chronological listing by the Associated Press, of the most serious suicide bombings that have been carried out between August 2003 and July 2005 in an effort to provoke ethnic and sectarian conflict between Iraqis65: August 19, 2003: A truck bomb explodes outside of the UN headquarters building, killing 22 people. August 29, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside a mosque in the city of Najaf, killing more than 85 people, including Shi’a leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Although officials never gave a final death toll, there were suspicions it may have been higher. October 27, 2003: Four suicide bombings target International Red Cross headquarters and four Iraqi police stations in Baghdad, killing 40 people, mostly Iraqis. February 1, 2004: Twin suicide bombers kill 109 people in two Kurdish party offices in the city of Irbil. February 10, 2004: A suicide bomber exploded a truckload of explosives outside a police station in Iskandariyah, killing 53 people. February 11, 2004: Suicide attacker blows up a car packed with explosives in a crowd of Iraqis waiting outside an army recruiting center in Baghdad, killing 47 people. March 2, 2004: Coordinated blasts from suicide bombers, mortars and planted explosives strike Shi’i Muslim shrines in the city of Karbala and in Baghdad, killing at least 181 and wounding 537. April 21, 2004: Five blasts near police stations and a police academy in the southern city of Basra, killing at least 55 people. _________________________________________________ 64 65

Ibid. Ibid.

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July 29, 2004: A suicide car bomb devastates a busy street in Baquba, killing 70 people. August 26, 2004: A mortar barrage slams into a mosque filled with Iraqis preparing to march on the embattled city of Najaf, killing 27 people and wounding 63. September 14, 2004: A car bomb rips through a busy market near a Baghdad police headquarters where Iraqis were waiting to apply for jobs, and gunmen opened fire on a van carrying police home from work in Baquba, killing at least 59 people and wounding at least 114. September 30, 2004: A series of bombs in Baghdad’s al-Amel neighborhood kill 35 children and seven adults as U.S. troops hand out candy at a government ceremony to inaugurate a new sewage treatment plant. December 19, 2004: Car bombs tear through a Najaf funeral procession and Karbala’s main bus station, killing at least 60 people and wounding more than 120 in the two Shi’i holy cities. February 8, 2005: A suicide bomber blows himself up in the middle of a crowd of army recruits, killing 21 people. February 18, 2005: Two suicide bombers attack two mosques, leaving 28 dead, while an explosion near a Shi’i ceremony kills two other people. February 28, 2005: A suicide car bomber targets mostly Shi’i police and National Guard recruits in Hillah, killing 125 and wounding more than 140. Some of the dead and injured are at a nearby market. March 10, 2005: A suicide bomber blows himself up at a Shi’i mosque during a funeral in the northern city of Mosul, killing at least 47 people and wounding more than 100. April 24, 2005: Two insurgent bombings, one in the town of Tikrit, and another in a Shi’i neighborhood in Baghdad, killing a total of 29 Iraqis and injuring 74. May 1, 2005: A car bomb obliterates a tent crowded with mourners for the funeral of a Kurdish official in the northern city of Tal Afar, killing 25 people and wounding more than 50. May 4, 2005: Bomb explodes among Iraqi civilians applying for police jobs in Irbil, killing 60 people and wounding some 150. July 16, 2005: Suicide bomber detonates explosives strapped to his body at a gas station near a Shi’a mosque in the central city of Musayyib, blowing up a fuel tanker and killing at least 54 people and wounding at least 82.

There is no way of knowing if these neo-Salafi Sunni extremists will be able to succeed in provoking a civil war through violence and hatred, but it is clear that Iraq is far from being a secure country. Iraq’s stability depends on its future political process, the way in which the insurgency is handled, and if the Sunni population can be convinced to join the political arena rather than the insurgency.

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Although Iraq’s political leadership has thus far resisted efforts to drag Iraq into an all-out civil war, while still attempting to include Sunnis in the political process, there are still many serious concerns that the insurgency will prevail and incite civil war. The current political leaders have been unsuccessful in producing a clear picture of how the political process in Iraq will work, they have not dealt with the issue of how to properly include the Sunni components of society, and instead they have sought to merely strengthen their own power. Moreover, the constitution and the referendum to decide on Iraq’s future seems to be more decisive than uniting, and it may turn into a polarized system along ethnic, sectarian, and religious lines, which will only exacerbate the country’s problems in the future.66 Despite some talk about Iraqi political parties shifting towards being more secular and national, what seems most likely to happen is that the Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’is differences will intensify, which will lead to increasing Kurdish separatism. The neo-Salafi radical Islamist effort to incite civil war will be difficult to defeat, unless the Iraqi government and Coalition forces are able to deny them the mix of popular support, manpower, and tolerance, which they need in order to continue their attacks. Small groups will continue to be able to carry out extremely violent attacks against soft targets, as well as carry out selective assassinations, fund terrorist attacks, and buy hostages. Furthermore, these smaller groups can piggyback on the actions of larger Iraqi Sunni nationalist insurgents in places where they feel will most promote civil war, while exploiting the problems of the constitutional process, and/or of elections that deny power to Sunnis. All of these things are working to their advantage.67 Their ability to exploit problems in politics and government, as well as tensions between Coalition forces and the Iraqi people, have enabled these various groups to gain more and more support. Thus, the response of the Coalition forces and of the Iraqi government military and security operations must be short of repression, but strong enough to suffocate the insurgency and allow the government to regain its footing in Iraq. In addition, there is a need to improve the economic situation for Sunni Iraqis. While there are no statistics on the economic situation in Iraq, it is clear that Sunnis are facing high levels of unemployment, and do not see a reprieve in the near future, based on the fact that most government funds are going to Shi’a and Kurdish areas for both security and internal political reasons.68 Ultimately, the _________________________________________________ 66

Cordesman, “New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency,” p. vi. Cordesman, “New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency,” pp.vi-vii. 68 Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27 (2004), pp. 7-24. 67

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economy is not being used as an effective weapon for mitigating the likelihood of a civil war. In addition, the pressure for civil war involves Iraq’s neighbors. For example, Syria very openly tolerates and supports Sunni neo-Salafi extremist operations on its territory. According to Cordesman, "A broader and more intense civil conflict could lead other Arab states to take sides on behalf of the Sunnis – although Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are just a few of the states that have deep sectarian divisions of their own. Any major divisions within Iraq could reopen the Kurdish issue as it affects Turkey, and possibly Iran and Syria as well.”69 But, the most serious threat in Iraq’s vicinity is Iran, which already plays a role in the political instability in Iraq and if it were to take on a more aggressive one, it could become involved in an effort to reshape the entire Gulf.70 With the threat of a possible coalition between a Shi'i government in Iraq and Iran, the need to include the Sunni population in the new Iraqi government becomes even more apparent. While it may be an exaggeration to surmise that the situation in Iraq could lead to a wider clash between Sunnis and Shi’a in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East, the possibility exists. The fact remains, that Bin-Ladin, al-Masri, and other Islamic extremists are intentionally seeking a situation where civil war in Iraq will incite a larger, more global war. The battle in Iraq is only one step in the wider goal of these neo-Salafi extremists to capture the entire Arab and Islamic world, thus making the outcome in Iraq of critical importance.

7

The Impact of Terrorism and the Iraqi War – The Gulf and Saudi Arabia

The terrorism taking place in Saudi Arabia has caused the Saudi government to address its terrorist problems. The complexities of the Saudi domestic political environment must be kept in mind as King Abdullah tries to contain the fight against al-Qa’ida while attempting to nudge the Kingdom towards meaningful reform while maintaining popular support. It is not surprising that not all of those involved have the same objectives, although there are some overlapping agendas among the different groups.

_________________________________________________ 69

Cordesman, “New Patterns of the Iraqi Insurgency,“ p. vii. Ayelet Savyon, “Iran and the War in Iraq”, MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis Series, NE 128, 26 March 2003. 70

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The House of Saud for example, or the Royal family, is reportedly divided on the speed and direction of the reform movement.71 Some of the members are said to be sympathetic to the reformers, but lack the authority to impose their will on the rest of the Royal family. Therefore, operations against terrorism complicate the intra-family dynamic, which is then aggravated by rumors of the Royal family’s financial involvement with al-Qa’ida, leading to more stress within the ruling family. In addition, the reform agenda also confronts powerful institutional interests within the ruling family; the central issue of corruption and the thought of a truly independent judiciary represents a major area of concern and opposition within the family. All of these different factions have combined to fuel the disagreement within the House of Saud regarding the best way of dealing with terrorism and al-Qa’ida, while retaining its current position, politically and economically. Another group with an opinion is the religious establishment. The Najd Wahhabi establishment of clerics, in partnership with the House of Saud, continues to be a central player in the political arena. With regard to the war on terror within the Kingdom, the House of Saud cannot successfully engage in such an endeavor without the support of its religious establishment, due to the latter’s control over mosque activities. In addition, the religious establishment is facing the issue of a growing number of dissident clerics who are preaching an antiAmerican, anti-Western message, and advocating a return to the country’s Islamic roots. Thus, the tense relationship between the House of Saud and the religious establishment has only added to the problem. Merchant families in the Hijaz and Riyadh are another group with a great interest in the reform process. The prospect of opening up the country’s economy could be promising for these merchant families; however, the prospect of real competition in a transparent system operating in accordance with the standard practices of the global economy could also threaten their business venues.72 Furthermore, it is imperative that the House of Saud align themselves with these merchant families and keep them satisfied, otherwise they could potentially provide financial and political support to al-Qa’ida and other militant groups. Yet another group involved in this process is the”Reformers,” who demand a constitutional system of government that will address the issue of women’s right in a non-conservative way, which obviously puts the "Reformers” at odds

_________________________________________________ 71

James A. Russell, “In Defense of the Nation: Terror and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Strategic Insight, The Center for Contemporary Conflict, 3 October 2003. 72 Madawi al-Rasheed, “Circles of Power: Royals and Society in Saudi Arabia”, in Saudi Arabia In The Balance, Eds. Aarts and Nonneman (New York: New York University Press 2006), pp. 185-213.

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with the religious establishment.73 In addition, these "Reformers” wish to end state corruption, and establish a more modern system of government in Saudi Arabia. This particular group has a lot to lose in the fight against al-Qa’ida, but still cannot align themselves with the U.S. in fear that they will lose all legitimacy. The final category has been the silent majority. It is impossible to gauge the attitude of nearly 18 million Saudi citizens to determine whether they support such reforms or Bin-Ladin.74 To the extent that a silent majority can be identified, these groups are made up of the wider Saudi populace, and hold the key to the Kingdom’s economic and political future. No matter what the opinions are of the various Saudi interest groups, it is the attitudes of the Saudi people that will determine the success of the Saudi leadership in their battle against terrorism. The battle against terrorism within the Kingdom has become intertwined with the domestic, political forces’ attempts for political and economic reform as well. The Royal family will have to deal with these simultaneous issues while under the eye of the international community. It remains to be seen whether or not King Abdullah and the Kingdom can deal with both terrorism and reform at the same time, but what is clear is that if it fails to do so the consequences will be extreme. Setting aside all the distrust of the Royal family, the Shi’is embraced King Abdullah when he ascended to the throne in August 2005. Many consider him to be Saudi Arabia’s best chance for political and social reform. However, despite embracing the new king, the Shi'i community remains skeptical of the Kingdom’s ability to effectively deal with the challenge of sectarianism. While King Abdullah has supported the Shi'i in the past, he is often viewed as insufficiently proactive when it comes to various forms of discrimination against the Shi'i community in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Shi'i political strategy has been on-going since the early 1990s. The most popular political network, the Shi'i Islamic Reform Movement headed by Hasan al-Saffar, has worked diligently to promote relations with both the ruling family and the Saudi Arabian Sunnis. Through trial and error, the Shi'i community has learned that violence is not an effective means for achieving their goals and has since focused their efforts on holding meetings. After King Abdullah came to power, he held two significant meetings with the Shi'i delegations, who quickly mobilized to support the new king and to cooperate with him more closely. On 17 September 2005, five Isma’ili leaders from Najran met with King _________________________________________________ 73

Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics the Sahwa and the Saudi State”, Strategic Insight, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 2005; http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/JonesMar05). 74 James A. Russell, “In Defense of the Nation: Terror and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Strategic Insight, The Center for Contemporary Conflict, 3 October 2003.

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Abdullah and offered to pledge their loyalty if the king were to put an end to state policies directed against them and other Shi'i communities.75 King Abdullah’s willingness to meet with these Shi'i activists and groups indicated his commitment to the minority Shi'i population. However, while the King understands the problem his ability to enact reform remains to be seen. King Abdullah’s actions as crown prince, prior to his ascension to the throne, provide little evidence of his commitment to the Shi'i cause. Shi’is enjoy the right to observe the ‘Ashura holiday, the holiest of holidays, as well as celebrating the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and are less restricted when it comes to the building of Shi'i mosques. However, the more severe forms of discrimination still exist, including: the unfettered publication of anti-Shi’a religious texts, anti-Shi’ism in schools, restrictions on employment in the government and in private business, and the Royal family’s refusal to include Shi’is in representative numbers in its national institutions. All of these things are powerful reasons to doubt King Abdullah’s ability to enact reform. In addition, the rest of the Royal family does not share the same desire for reform as King Abdullah claims to have. The hostility towards Shi’is remains deeply ingrained among the wider Saudi population. These roots of hatred can be traced back to the state’s historical reliance on a particularly extreme interpretation of Wahhabi Islam. But today’s anti-Shi’ia sentiment is also a culmination of political decisions that were made by the government during the late 1970s and 1980s, when Saudi leaders feared a potential Shi’a uprising as a result of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian Revolution. As a means to counter this Iranian threat, Saudi Arabia used its ideological efforts to present the Shi’is as a global enemy, by publishing and distributing key monographs justifying an anti-Shi’a position. Even after Khomeini’s death, these publications continued, and furthermore, well-known clerics issued fatwas condoning and even mandating the killing of Shi’is. The Iraq war has once again provoked sectarian ill. Internet discussion forums are full of vitriolic denunciations of Shi’is inside the Kingdom and out. Furthermore, the appearance of cooperation between Shi’i power brokers and the U.S. in Iraq has caused even more hostility and anti-Shi’a sentiment.76 Speculation that the U.S. and the Shi’is are actively working together to alter the sectarian shape of the region were fueled even further by the belief that Iran is also actively promoting a”crescent” of Shi’a-dominated polities stretching from Iran to Lebanon. Saudi Arabian Shi’a political leaders are aware of the current, fragile situation. They believe the present time is a good opportunity to reform their _________________________________________________ 75 Toby Jones, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report, No. 45 (19 September 2005); International Crisis Group, “The Shi’ite Question in Saudi Arabia”, 19 May 2005. 76 Ibid.

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current political situation and enhance their position, similar to the Shi’is in Iraq.77 Ultimately, the Shi’is in Saudi Arabia are caught in a delicate balance between demonstrating their loyalty to the state, while outmaneuvering claims that they are preternaturally bonded to their co-religionists elsewhere in the region. In addition, it is important to note that Saudi involvement in Iraq is significant, representing some 61 percent of Islamists killed and some 70 percent of Arab suicide bombers. This can be explained, as was stated earlier, by the extreme Wahhabi hostility towards the Shi’is and its support of the Sunni minority in Iraq. The new strategy of global jihad has been implemented on the ground; for example, in January 2005, eight Kuwaiti soldiers, five of whom were officers, were arrested after being identified as working for al-Qa’ida to plan attacks against U.S. troops. On 19 May 2005, a car bomb detonated in Doha, the capital of Qatar, destroying an English speaking school and a theater full of Westerners.78 These incidents came after suspected al-Qa’ida leaders in Saudi Arabia urged militants to wage holy war against crusaders in the Gulf region. However, it is interesting to note that al-Qa’ida has left Dubai relatively untouched. Its nightlife and business district are dominated by non-Arab multinational firms, which are exactly what al-Qa’ida has been targeting in neighboring Gulf states. In addition, foreigners are even allowed to own property freeholds in Dubai. While al-Qa’ida declares that it seeks to cause economic harm as a means of driving out the infidel, it has not inflicted the same terrorism on Dubai. One Middle East analyst claims it is likely that there is a pact between state leaders and al-Qa’ida, due to the fact that large sums of Taliban and al-Qa’ida money (hundreds of millions) have been smuggled into Dubai. Unlike the situation in Saudi Arabia, where al-Qa’ida turned its back on the state, Dubai is too useful, financially, to al-Qa’ida, for it carry out terrorist attacks there. However, if this relative peace in Dubai were to come to an end, it would bring chaos to the region, but also allow al-Qa’ida to take one step closer to achieving its ultimate goal of driving out the infidel.

8

Regional Problems in the Gulf

Out of the three sub-regions in the Middle East, the Gulf is most in need of security reform, since it is most affected by the shock waves of the ongoing Iraq war. The security order of the Gulf, even prior to March 2003, is decrepit and too weak to be able to assist Iraq in its reconstruction needs. The Gulf urgently needs _________________________________________________ 77 78

Ibid. Karmon, p.10.

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a new security arrangement in order to provide a stable and secure environment in a post-Saddam Iraq, thus allowing it to develop economically, culturally, and democratically over the next 20 years in relative peace. Furthermore, the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is another dark cloud over the Gulf and reason for it to reform now before it could be too late. A new security system could encourage the development of external relations with Iraq based on security cooperation and not hegemonic designs. The current system in the Gulf can be applied to a new system, and therefore it is not necessary to completely abandon the old system. However, for the foreseeable future, the Gulf states remain dependent on the protection of the United States, which has been safeguarding the Gulf based on its oil interests and the situation in Iraq.79 These bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Gulf states provide the security that the GCC was not able to provide, notably, against a foreign invasion or weapons of mass destruction. Measures can be taken to improve domestic security within the Gulf, but first the threats need to be identified, these include: threats from extremists, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, money laundering, and health and environmental disasters. Each of these transnational threats poses severe consequences for the Gulf region’s stability. Ultimately, these threats cannot be solved by military means or through bilateral alliances with the U.S.; they demand direct cooperation between the Gulf states within the region on various levels, including: political, military, law-enforcement, intelligence, customs, engineering, and scientific. Only through a collective effort can these issues be dealt with and therefore used to improve the security system in the Gulf. The flaws in the current security system are numerous, and, therefore, must first be dealt with in order to make room for a new approach. First, despite the benefits that the U.S. and the Gulf states derive from their bilateral arrangements, the system is inadequate. For example, the system is not as stable as it used to be, which is a concern for the U.S., and with growing anti-Americanism among their populations, the Gulf states are concerned about a continued U.S. presence in the region. Second, although the U.S. has reassured the Gulf states that it is a reliable and enduring partner in the region, a clear plan and new vision for keeping its forces in the post-Saddam Gulf is lacking, especially since any pending withdrawal of troops is likely to cause regional insecurity. Third, the U.S.– Gulf State alliances need to adapt to changing security relations in the Gulf, specifically with regard to Iraq and Iran, where the various Gulf states have different opinions as to the best way of dealing with the situation. Fourth, there needs to be _________________________________________________ 79

Michael D. Yaffe, “The Gulf and a new Middle East Security System”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 2004), p. 123.

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some sort of mechanism for bringing Iraq into the GCC security partnership, something which is essential for Kuwait given the long-standing border tensions between the two. Fifth, the strong reliance of the GCC on the U.S. has become an impediment for the development of long-term strategic capabilities of the Gulf states, despite the U.S.’s encouragement for cooperation between the Gulf states themselves. And finally, it should be mentioned that some states in the Gulf do not feel that the security system has been significantly altered. In fact, as Yaffe states in his article "The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System,” there are only five events that would create the need for a new security system: "A just and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian and the IsraelSyria conflicts; the elimination of Israel’s ‘unsafeguarded’ nuclear program; Iranian compliance with its nonproliferation agreements and improved relations with the United States; Iran’s return of the three disputed islands to the UAE; and the establishment in Iraq of a stable, moderate regime supported by Sunnis.”80

These points of concern reflect the attitude of many of the Gulf states and also explains the difficulty of achieving a common level of agreement between them. Since they view different problems as most important, it is difficult to establish a security order which reflects the divergent priorities while still providing real security. In addition, there are many critics of the Gulf states’ heavy reliance on outside powers for their own security issues. For example, many Arabs feel that if Iran were to help the United States in stabilizing Iraq, this would be tantamount to helping the U.S. engage in another war, either in Iran or Saudi Arabia; therefore, it is not in the region’s interest to help make the U.S. job in Iraq any easier. This fits into a wider discussion as to whether the United States is attempting act as a balancing power in the region or trying to push the entire region, through both coercive and peaceful means, towards greater liberal transformation. Some Arabs, for instance, argue that the history over the past few decades indicates that U.S. presence in the region does not guarantee security, or enhance stability, but rather it often destabilizes the balance between regional states. In addition, since the U.S. does not hold the same security perceptions as the small Gulf states, the U.S. cannot perceive potential threats against Kuwait, as Kuwaitis do. Furthermore, the GCC states need to take an active role in how they plan to deal with their strategic disputes, one suggestion being to redefine their relationships with one another to focus on trade and finance, and less on territory. _________________________________________________ 80

Yaffe, p. 125.

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The irony of the situation in the Gulf is that the Iranian regime, on the one hand has serious problems with U.S. policies, while its population is very proWestern, while on the other hand the GCC states have American friendly regimes, but its citizens are very anti-Western. This dichotomy undermines the regional stability. Moreover, the Iranian threat, as perceived by the United States, plays a role in the U.S.-GCC relations; however, the GCC will have a difficult time achieving Gulf security if they exclude major players like Iran and Iraq. Ultimately, the Gulf states have to balance "hard security with soft security,” meaning that while weapons build-up and military forces are needed, so are better regional diplomatic relations. There are numerous issues impeding the GCC’s ability to form a comprehensive security agreement. These obstacles include: intra-GCC rivalry; lack of a unified threat perception (for example, GCC states disagree on whether Iran or Iraq should be regarded as the major enemy); U.S. special partnerships and preferential policies to reward GCC states for their military facilities; and persistent fear of regional hegemony in regard to larger states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran.81 However, the main hindrance to constructing a regional security pact remains the over-involvement of the U.S., and the unofficial, but practical bilateral deals that are made between the U.S. and individual Gulf states. Furthermore, since the U.S. defines the general standards for diplomacy in the region, how it perceives a country translates into reality; for example, when the U.S. defines Iran as within the "axis of evil,” it creates a very negative dynamic in the overall balance. According to many Iranians, the world oversimplifies the Iranian debate as the conservatives versus the reformists, a dynamic that had concrete consequences for the security within the Gulf region. Many Iranians also feel that the national interests of the United States and Iran in the region are rather similar, if taken from the perspective that Iran has a "natural” influence on the region and on Iraq, in particular. However, while Iran may not have a clear intent to exploit the situation in Iraq for their own benefit, they have made it quite clear that they do not wish to improve their relations with outside powers. In defense of the Iranian position, it can be said that many Iranians feel that the overall context of the U.S. is negative, and most believe that the intentions of the U.S. are only self-fulfilling. With respect to Iraq, Iranians disagree whether or not the improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations would have a positive impact on Iraq, because the extent to which Iran has clout within the Shi’i community in Iraq is unknown.82 While it is true that the U.S. may not be able to appropriately _________________________________________________ 81 Michael Kraig and Riad Kahwaji, “Conference Report”, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 1-39. 82 Kraig and Kahwaji, pp. 11-12.

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communicate with the Shi’is in Iraq, it should not be assumed that Iran would be any more successful. Ultimately, the situation in Iraq has a heavy influence on the security of the wider Gulf region. Questions, such as the U.S.’s role in the region, the necessity of military inputs by external powers, and evolving realities of intra-Arab and Arab-Persian security politics, all hold major significance in the region. Without clear answers to these types of questions, it is impossible to subscribe to a comprehensive security pact among the Gulf states.

Part Five: Conclusion

Several decades of complicated Gulf conflicts indicate that the local actors have indeed been part of security complexes, characterized, in part, by friends and foes engaging in enmity and cooperation, which binds them in a common web of conflict and cooperation. Sometimes, local parties have even alternated their policies, going from cooperating with and defending their neighbors to demonstrating hostility and warring against them. The roles and goals of the different conflicts changed from conflict to conflict: yesterday’s aggressor turned into a present-day defender, or, into a would-be victim. Therefore, it is difficult to classify Gulf conflicts and/or to discern a common internal structure or hierarchical order among the parties involved. However, one obvious characteristic of the conflicts is the chain of causation between them. Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in Iran and its regional effect was the primary destabilizing factor in the region. It prompted Iraq to attack Iran, which led to the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq’s ambition to emerge from this war as the strongest strategic power in the Gulf was frustrated by the realities of 1989–1990, and, as such, motivated Saddam to invade Kuwait in 1990. The power of the Western-led coalition freed Kuwait and prompted the U.N Security Council to pass resolutions imposing sanctions on Iraq, which led to the U.S. dual containment policy during the 1990s that proved to be ineffective. The Saudi decision to invite Western military forces into the Kingdom in order to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990–1991 galvanized an extremist Islamic opposition. These factors combined to lay the ground work for the next stages of Gulf conflict. The war against terrorism manifested regional instability caused by emerging radical anti-U.S. sentiments, as well as the U.S.’s attempt to assert its power against hostile, Anti-American regional parties by conquering Iraq in 2003. Thus, each conflict sowed the seeds for the one that followed.

1

Causes of Conflict

The fluid sources of hostility between local actors contributed to the complex and changing nature of the conflicts. Conflicts stemmed from, (a) predatory interests of the two local powers, Iran or Iraq, against their smaller oil-rich GCC neighbors. Another root of regional conflict was (b) entangled relations of the Iran, Iraq, and the GCC states with outside parties. The assistance of the Arab states and the U.S. to Iraq during its war with Iran, or the international coalition

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between Western and Arab states against Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait are two cases-in-point. The external parties may have intervened primarily to balance an expansionist and aggressive local power, but their involvement contributed to the polarization between the local conflicting parties, and exacerbated deep-seated enmity in both Iran and Iraq toward the West. Entangled relations gave Iraq the misimpression that the West would acquiesce to its invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia’s entangled relations caused it to request Western military in its defense against Iraq in 1990–1991, which alienated certain groups in Saudi society and ultimately gave rise to Al-Qa’ida Conflicts also emerged from (c) disagreements regarding policies and territorial disputes between the GCC states. This was not a primary source of conflict, but rather an escalating factor: such disagreements prevented the GCC states from adopting a unified strategy. They mostly remained divided on the issue of local threats: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait viewed Iraq as the primary enemy, while the United Arab Emirates viewed Iran as their foremost threat. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar maintained on-going disputes with one another, which were indicative of the suspicion the smaller GCC states harbored toward the ambitions of the larger and richer Saudi Kingdom. The smaller states feared the Saudis were attempting to manipulate and control them within the GCC framework, fostering an atmosphere of distrust within the GCC that was an obstacle to adopting a common security strategy.

2

The GCC’s Security Approach

The individual Gulf states that comprised the GCC, each took responsibility for their own security and initiated corresponding individual strategies. They did so despite their relatively small territories and weak militaries. However, these states addressed their security with an awareness of their vulnerability and a sense of urgency and an understanding that their state security could not be entirely delegated to external powers, even a protective Western superpower. Further, because the Gulf states were at the forefront of events that led to each Gulf conflict, they were forced to formulate security strategies to cope with emerging conflict. These strategies relied on various tactics, such as military defense or diplomatic negotiations to ward off an outbreak of violence. In general, the GCC states projected an overall-strategy of soft-power. This was due to the fact that as smaller states they needed to rely more on peaceful tactics such as conflict regulation and mediation in order to avoid war and violent conflict, if at all possible. Interestingly, for more than two decades Washington accepted the role of contractor rather than initiator of defense strategy in the Gulf. U.S. leaders were content to allow their GCC allies to enhance their states’ role as mediators and

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conflict-managers by down-playing the U.S.’s role as the main military guarantor in the Gulf. During this period, Washington accepted a low military profile in the Gulf. From the U.S.’s point of view, such a position was effective and compatible with the position of its GCC allies. When the U.S. military role unexpectedly grew, as it did during the Kuwait reflagging operation during the Iran-Iraq war, and during the war against Iraq in 1990–1991, the U.S. was subsequently willing to withdraw and meaningfully reduce its forces following the conflicts. Moreover, during the 1990s, the U.S. did not interfere with the GCC states as they formulated their own individual defense strategies. For example, the U.S. did not interfere when the GCC states diversified their defense policies by pursuing diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran, whom the U.S. was trying to sanction and contain. In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, the GCC states sought policies that would distance them from both protagonists. They pursued policies that would highlight their unique position as monarchical regimes of tribal origin, with abundant oil-wealth, seeking stability and regional tranquility. To this end, they pursued diplomacy that augmented their relative neutrality with respect to Iran and Iraq. It is true, however, that this was a lop-sided neutrality, which leaned heavily toward Iraq with financial and logistical assistance, in addition to supporting Baghdad’s positions regarding the war in order to prevent an Iranian triumph. Nevertheless, the GCC states did not want a clear Iraqi triumph either, and were careful to disassociate themselves from any overbearing tilt towards Iraq. They avoided contributing military forces to Iraq’s war effort, or opening an additional front against Iran. They also demonstrated their role as a mediator in Inter-Arab disputes, during this period. The Saudis led the Arab states to accept the 1982 Fez Resolutions for peace with Israel, and the Ta’if Accord regarding Lebanon in 1989. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates simultaneously attempted to mediate the dispute between North and South Yemen during the 1980s, as well. These policies bestowed an agreed upon identity on the GCC states, highlighting its role in pursuing peaceful mediation whenever possible.1 The Gulf states hoped that the end of the Iran-Iraq War would bring them recognition from the other Arab states as well as the international community for their role, in the words of one Kuwaiti scholar, ‘Abd al-Reda ‘Assiri, as "donor-mediators.”2 Their essential role as mediators and economic pacifiers was supposed to allow _________________________________________________ 1

The thesis of “Gulf identity,“ represented through foreign policy is stressed in a new publication by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy (London: Routledge, 2006). 2 The idea comes from Assiri’s book, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990).

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them to play an important role in shaping the post-war regional order in the Gulf. Moreover, this role should have bestowed on the GCC states a position of immunity from regional aggression, as a donor-mediator deserved. Much to ‘Assiri’s and the Gulf leaders’ dismay, his book regarding the role of donor-mediators appeared less than four months before Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraq’s invasion demonstrated the futility of the mediator’s role. Despite employing mediation and other peaceful negotiating tactics, this strategy failed to provide the GCC with the requisite regional stability and immunity from invasion by a stronger regional power. The GCC states appeared to learn their lesson: in January and February 1991, during the international coalition’s war to liberate Kuwait, GCC army units from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait participated in the military engagement. Further, the GCC states began to rely more heavily on Western military power as its security guarantor against a future invasion. However, the GCC states also continued to pursue mediation tactics and diplomatic negotiations as part of their security strategy. The monarchical rulers of the Gulf states realized that foreign invasion from a strong regional power was not the only threat to their state security. As such, employing Western military forces could not be their only security measure. In the 1990s, intra-regional disputes between Gulf states became a more common problem. They also sought different security tactics to thwart internal dissension within their states, which also emerged as a security challenge in the 1990s. They used police-action and direct negotiations with terrorist and Islamist opposition leaders and the states supporting them in order to cope with and defuse this growing challenge. The GCC leaders, therefore, continued to regard diplomacy as an important part of their security strategy. However, the diplomatic approach employed by the GCC in the 1990s was not as comprehensive as it had been in the 1980s. It also did not have clear-cut goals, and it did not represent an attempt to form a unique regional identity for the GCC states. Each state sought to supplement its reliance on U.S. and British forces with various diplomatic initiatives in an attempt to reinforce and diversify its state security. But each state used different tactics toward this end. Thus, the GCC states looked for Syria’s and Egypt’s support, and also sought to befriend Iran in order to moderate its position vis-à-vis the GCC (however, Iran’s 1992 takeover of Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs islands alienated the United Arab Emirates, which turned to Iraq to balance Iran’s encroachment). Each GCC state also tried to influence the U.S.’s "dual containment” policy, by advocating positions toward Iran and Iraq which favored its individual state interests. Thus, the GCC states adopted complex and contradictory security tactics. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait followed an anti-Iraq policy, while the United Arab Emirates pursued an anti-Iranian line, and Oman remained open to improving relations with both Iran

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and Iraq. The conflicting security approaches were further complicated by interstate territorial disputes between Qatar and Bahrain, as well as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Each GCC state was therefore using diplomacy to respond to initiatives and challenges from other GCC states or regional powers. In effect, each state was trying to enhance its position at the expense of the others, while simultaneously dealing with inter-GCC problems and maintain a reasonable and continuous level of cooperation. Indeed, during the 1990s and into the early 21st century, the security approach of the GCC states can best be characterized as "maintenance” in order to prevent the organization from collapsing due to contradiction and internal differences. This approach was the remnant of the "donor-mediator” approach of the 1990s. To conclude, the GCC security perception can be summarized in the following terms: 1.

2.

3.

Reliance on U.S. force to defend against tangible, large scale threats. For example, to deter or combat a military invasion or territorial takeover carried out against a GCC state, or the possibility of a ballistic missile attack with the potential for mass destruction. However, as previously noted, the U.S. and other Western forces are regarded as a liability to the ruling Gulf regimes when faced with other security challenges, such as terrorism, internal insurrection, and hostile propaganda campaigns. Reliance on regional mediation and pacification as means to secure the cooperation of states such as Egypt and Syria. This places the GCC states, and more specifically Saudi Arabia, in a position to aid agreed upon Arab causes. Examples of such causes include inter-Palestinian fighting and mediating disputes that appear intractable, such as the Syrian-Lebanese dispute. The Gulf states are interested in cultivating their images as patriotic Arab parties, while at the same time cooling down the turbulent strategic arena of the GCC. Thus, thanks to this policy, the GCC states could refuse actual cooperation with Egypt and Syria according to the Damascus Declaration of March 1991, but still secure their goodwill and support against any aggression directed toward the GCC states. The GCC states do not expect military support from the other Arab states, but need their support, as leading and credible Arab-Islamic states. In the inter-GCC arena, the GCC states aimed to bridge over their own disagreements and tension and coordinate security action. The policy of maintenance was a factor in this process.

Part Five: Conclusion

3

249

The Build-Up to New Security Challenges

Moreover, from a year 2007 perspective, it seems that the maintenance approach has lost its effectiveness in the 21st century. It is true that the GCC states have stuck together and still try to practice diplomacy as a means to augment their state security, however during the last few years the relevance of this approach has been lost. The problems of Gulf security have grown more complex during the 21st century. A case-in-point has been Iraq: following the U.S.’s 2003 invasion, the GCC could stop fearing an invasion from Saddam’s regime. However, Iraq became a failed state and a venue for regional terrorism and ensuing civil war. These developments resulted in new and complex regional implications. Thus, Sunni and Shi’i terrorism, or the rise of Iranian power, spread beyond Gulf confines and became a prime security concern for the U.S., Israel, and the European Union. It is their response to sectarian terrorism and the challenge of Iraq which really matter in determining the security strategy in the Gulf and beyond. Another measure which in the past contributed to ability to regulate and stabilize conflicts in the region was the collapse of balancing and weakening tactics used against Iran and Iraq and between themselves. In the 1980s, Iran and Iraq crippled each other in a long war. During the 1990s, Iraq was bogged-down recovering from its 1991 defeat and reacting to UN sanctions, while Iran was attempting to revive its economy and rebuild following the Iran-Iraq War. Under Khatami’s leadership, Iran appeared ready to display increasing cooperation towards the GCC states. The U.S. military power (and its immense potential which could be quickly mobilized and operated in the Gulf) was a constant deterrent for both Saddam’s Iraq and Iran’s forces.3 As previously mentioned, for the majority of the past twenty five years, the U.S. deferred to the Gulf states the role of strategic initiator in regional matters. However, it is a historical irony that Washington’s military intervention in the region in the 21st century, which supposedly brought U.S. power in the region to its height, shattered the regional balance of power. In late 2001, it was the U.S. campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which destroyed a main Sunni and al-Qa’ida allied opponent to the Shi'i regime in Tehran. In 2003, the U.S. occupation of Iraq led to the destruction of Saddam’s regime, which, though weakened since the 1991 war, was still a formidable regional force to balance Iran. Moreover, the U.S. entanglement in the Iraqi swamp reduced its ability to act militarily against Iran, despite its inclusion by President Bush in the "axis of evil.” Thus Iran emerged from the U.S. military campaigns with weakened regional rivals, undeterred and insufficiently balanced by neighboring states or by _________________________________________________ 3

Zalmay Khalilzad, “The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony”, Survival, Vol. 37, No.2 (Summer 1995), pp. 95-120.

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U.S power. Tehran’s ambitions could thereon develop uninhibited as a new danger for the Gulf states and beyond. Iran’s power, sectarian terrorism, and state fragmentation developed into new security problems for the region. In the early 21st century, the GCC states lost their ability to limit, manage, or meaningfully distance their states from the main security perils in the Gulf.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Chronology: Iran-Iraq War1 1975: The Algiers Agreement was signed by Iraq and Iran memorializing the joint use of the Shatt al-Arab waterway with international boundary in the middle. Iran ended support for Iraqi Kurds. October 1978: The Shah of Iran faced mounting pressure from a growing revolutionary movement led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who, operating in exile from Najaf, Iraq, was expelled from Iraq by the Iraqi government at the Shah’s request. 1978–1979: Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran. February 1979: An Islamic revolutionary regime, led by Khomeini, assumed power in Iran. June 1979: The Shi ‘is of Southern Iraq and Baghdad began to riot. July 1979: Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq. He also assumed the positions of Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and general secretary of the Regional Command of the Ba’ath Party. August 1979: Iraqi senior party and state officials were executed. Officials of the Revolutionary Command Council, Ba’ath Party Regional Command, provincial, and local governments were killed for perceived disloyalty. October 1979: Iraq demanded revisions to the 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran. November 1979: Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took diplomats and other employees hostage. Iran breeched the 1959 mutual military agreement it had with the U.S. December 1979: Iranians held a referendum to approve the new Islamic constitution. Tehran also claimed it fought off an Iraqi military venture into Iran. January 1979: Abu al-Hasan Bani-Sadr is elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. February 1980: Periodic border skirmishes between Iran and Iraq evolved, in addition to hostile propaganda from both sides. April 1980: Tariq ‘Aziz, the Iraqi deputy premier, survives an assassination attempt. Iraq claims Iranian backed groups are responsible. A week later, the Iraqi state is believed to have assassinated Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir Sadr, the prominent leader of the Iraqi Shi’a community. Khomeini calls for the Iraqi people and military to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. July 1980: A military coup by monarchist officers is stopped in Iran. Summer 1980: Iraq deported thousands of Shi’is to Iran. August 1980: Saddam Hussein traveled to Riyadh to meet with the Saudi King. Some believed Saddam presented his plans for war against Iran to Saudi Arabia during this visit. _________________________________________________ 1

See Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989).

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4 September 1980: Iran directed artillery fire against the Iraqi towns of Khanaqin and Mandali. 17 September 1980: Saddam broke the Algiers Agreement of 1975 and claimed Iraqi control over the whole Shatt al-Arab waterway. 22 September 1980: Iraq invaded Iran at eight separate locations by land, and conducted air strikes against Iranian airfields, military bases, and economically critical sites. The Iran-Iraq War had started. 23 September 1980: Iran responded by bombing military and economic targets in Iraq. 28 September 1980: UN Security Council Resolution 479 called for an end to the newborn conflict. Iraq announced it would accept a cease-fire if Iran acknowledges Iraqi control over the Shatt al-Arab. Iran rejects the UN calls for an end to the conflict. 30 September 1980: The U.S. delivered AWACS reconnaissance planes to Saudi Arabia for its defense. October 1980: Khomeini appointed president Abu al-Hasan Bani-Sadr Chairman of Iran’s Supreme Defense Council. November 1980: Iraq captured Khorramshahr. The Iraqis were not able capture Susangard. December 1980: Military progress bogged down due to heavy rains during the winter. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected cease-fire. January 1981: As part of its continued military restructuring, Iran merged the Baseej militia with its Revolutionary Guards Corps. Iran attempted a counteroffensive in the Dezful-Susangard area, which was a failure. March 1981: Iran launched a major offensive against Iraq. May 1981: The Gulf Cooperation Council is established by the monarchical states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The first accusation that Iraq used chemical weapons is heard. June 1981: Israeli warplanes struck the Iraqi”Osirak” nuclear reactor, near Baghdad. Khomeini dismissed Bani-Sadr from his position as president of Iran. July–August 1981: Iran launched a series of small and unsuccessful attacks near Abadan, which was under Iraqi siege. September 1981: The Iranian free Abadan and regained control of the city. October 1981: Hojat al-Islam Ali Hussein Khamene’i was elected president of Iran. November–December 1981: Iran managed to regain lost territory near Abadan and north of Susangard in a series of small victories. January 1982: Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas destroyed the Iraqi oil pipeline to Turkey. March 1982: The Iranians drove Iraqi forces from the Dezful-Shush area. April 1982: Iraq faced an intensifying insurgency from its Kurds in northern Iraq. Syria closed the pipeline that transports Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. Saddam announced that he would withdraw Iraqi forces from Iran if it would assure the end the conflict. Iran launched a major offensive in the southern part of Iran. May 1982: Iran’s offensive retook Khorramshahr and drove the Iraqi forces out of Iraq. Shi’is in southern Iraq rioted against the government. June 1982: Israel invaded Lebanon. The Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council announces it is ready for a cease-fire, but Iran rejects the overture. Iraq announced it was withdrawing from Iran, but retained control over small sections of Iranian territory.

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July 1982: An assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein failed. Iran rejected UN Security Council Resolution 514, which called for an end to the armed conflict and a withdrawal of armed forces to the international border. An Iranian offensive to capture Basra, in southern Iraq, failed. August 1982: Iraq announced that any vessel entering Iran oil terminal at Kharg Island in the Gulf, was subject to attack. October 1982: Iran’s attempts to capture the Iraqi town of Mandali failed. November 1982: The Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq was formed in Tehran, Iran for the purpose of overthrowing the Ba’athist Iraqi government. Iranian forces experienced some limited success during offensives in the Musian area. February 1983: The Iranian offensive to capture the Basra-Baghdad road near Amara, in the Fakeh area of Khuzistan, was largely unsuccessful. March 1983: Iraq struck Iran’s Norouz oilfield in the Gulf. April 1983: Iran experienced another failed offensive in the Ein Khosh area, in an attempt to reach the Basra-Baghdad highway. Iraq struck Dezful with surface-to-surface missiles. May 1983: The Iranian government dissolved the communist Tudeh Party, and sends 18 Soviet diplomats back to the Soviet Union. July 1983: Iranian offensive in Kurdistan won the garrison town of Hajj Umran. Iran launched another offensive west of Mehran in the central sector, which yielded limited gains. October 1983: Iran launched an offensive in Kurdistan near Panjwin and won some limited territory. France delivered Super-Etendard fighter aircraft to Iraq, which were capable of firing upgraded anti-ship missiles. This was a significant upgrade for the Iraqi air force. February 1984: The UN agreement not to attack population centers was ignored. Iraqi missiles were launched at Dezful; and Iranian artillery targeted Basra, Khanaqin, and Mandali. This begun a cycle of strikes from both sides on population centers. Iranian forces failed to cut-off the Basra-Baghdad highway. Iran also launched its Khaibar offensive across the Haur al Hawizeh marshes. March 1984: Iran’s Khaibar offensive into the marshlands won the oil rich Majnoon Islands from Iraq. The UN announced that its experts determined that Iraq had employed chemical weapons against the Iranians. Iraq used its French Super-Etendard fighters against Iranian ships. April 1984: Iraq escalated the Tanker War in the Gulf. May 1984: Iran responded to Iraqi strikes on its shipping by striking ships serving Saudi and Kuwaiti ports in the lower Gulf. Iran activated its naval units of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. June 1984: The UN Security Council publicly condemned attacks on ships servicing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and urged all states to respect free navigation through the Gulf. Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian fighter jet that it claimed had violated its airspace. A new UN sponsored ceasefire on population centers took effect, with UN monitors placed in Tehran and Baghdad to monitor its observance. July 1984: The West German Foreign Minister became the first senior Western leader to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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August 1984: In response to Iraq’s escalated attacks on Iranian shipping in the Gulf, especially on its primary oil terminal at Kharg Island, Tehran established a tanker shuttle between the Kharg terminal and its Sirri Island oil terminal in the lower Gulf. October 1984: Iran regained disputed territory in the central border sector, which it had lost to Iraq at the start of the war. December 1984: The end of the year reinforced the increasing trend towards attacks on shipping interests in the Gulf. January–March 1985: Iraq claimed to have hit 30 Iranian oil tankers in three months. March 1985: Iraq initiated another round of attacks on population centers, with strikes on Ahvaz and Bushehr. Iran retaliated with surface-to-surface missile strikes on Baghdad and artillery fire directed at Iraqi border towns. Iran launched a major offensive from the Haur al Hawizeh marshes aimed at capturing the Basra to Baghdad road. The Iraqi counterattack proved too strong, and Iranian forces were driven back to the marshes. April 1985: A cease-fire was announced regarding attacks on cities. May 1985: Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal visited Tehran in an unsuccessful attempt to broker a ceasefire. There was an Iranian-sponsored unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Kuwaiti Amir. Iraq renewed its attacks on population centers, and intensified its strikes on Kharg Island and Iranian shipping interests in the Gulf. June 1985: A pro-government rally was held in Tehran and attended by between one and five million people. Baghdad announced it was suspending strikes on Iranian cities for two weeks. July 1985: Iran announced it would stop and search all ships in the Gulf suspected of transporting military or contraband items to Iraq. August 1985: Iraqi intensifies sustained strikes against the Kharg Island oil terminal. Khamene’i was re-elected president of Iran. September 1985: Iranian attack on Rawandoz in Kurdistan achieved a small victory. Iran was unable to launch another offensive on Basra from the marshes, due to Iraq’s steady assaults on its forces. Iran received 508 U.S. made Tow missiles in a secret arms-forhostages deal made with the Reagan administration. October 1985: Iraq’s air strikes on Kharg Island continued. November 1985: Between September and November 1984, Iran inspected 300 ships in the Gulf. The Council of Experts named ‘Ali Montazeri as the successor to Khomeini. January 1986: U.S. President Reagan authorized the CIA to purchase 4000 Tow missiles from the U.S. Defense Department and to sell them Iran through Israel. February 1986: Iran launched three simultaneous offensives against Iraq. Iranian forces successfully captured the Fao Peninsula, which gave Iran a strategic southern base and a renewed hope in their possibility for victory. Iran’s offensive in the Suleimaniya region of Kurdistan brought additional territory under its control. 1000 U.S. made Tow missiles were delivered to Iran through Israel. The UN Security Council issued Resolution 582 calling for an immediate end to the war. March 1986: Iraqi attempts to recapture Fao peninsula failed. The UN generated a report on the use of poison gases in the war. The UN Security Council publicly censured Iraq for its use of chemical weapons in the war.

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April 1986: There was an increase in Kurdish guerrilla activity in northern Iraq. U.S. law enforcement officials arrested ten of eighteen people involved in two arms deals intended to supply Iran with U.S. made combat aircraft, tanks, and Tow and Hawk missiles. May 1986: Iraqi air raids on refineries in Tehran and Isfahan, caused Iran to import refined oil products. Iraq captures Mehran, and offered to exchange it for the Fao peninsula. Iran rejected the offer. An official U.S. visit to Tehran, by former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, was unsuccessful. July 1986: Iraq increased the volume of air strikes against Iran’s economic sites and infrastructure. Iran recaptures Mehran. August 1986: Iraq successfully attacked Iran’s Sirri Island substitute oil terminal. Iran announced it would export gas to the Soviet Union. This trade had been suspended since April 1980. September 1986: Iran launched a small successful offensive in the Hajj Umran area of Kurdistan. Iraq conducted a successful air raid on the Lavan oil terminal south of Kharg Island. October 1986: Fuel and power shortages in Iran prompted the government to urge citizens to conserve energy. Iran, with assistance from Kurdish guerrillas, successfully sabotaged an oil pipeline in Iraq near Kirkuk. November 1986: An article in a Beirut based newspaper, Al-Shiraa, uncovered the secret U.S. arms deals with Iran. Iraq’s air raids extended far into Gulf during a strike on Iran’s Larak Island oil terminal. December 1986: Iran launched a major offensive, Karbala-Four, against Iraqi forces outside of Basra. The offensive was a failure. January 1987: Iran launched another major offensive, Karbala-Five, to capture Basra. At the same time, they launched an offensive in the central sector near Qasr-e Shirin. Iran also launched two supporting offensives in the south, as residents of Basra begin fleeing the city. Iraq attacked Tehran and other Iranian cities with bombs and surface-to-surface missiles, prompting Iran to retaliate with its own attacks on Iraqi cities using artillery and surface-to-surface missiles. Rafsanjani announced Iran had no interest in spreading the war to other states in the Gulf, and calls on the Gulf states to withdraw their support for Iraq. February 1987: At the urging of the Soviet Union, Iraq ended its attacks on Iranian cities. Iran declared the Karbala-Five offensive over, which had brought Iranian forces close to Basra and damaged the Iraqi air-force. March 1987: Iran again achieved small victories in Kurdistan. The U.S. agreed to reflag and escort Kuwaiti oil tankers. The U.S. expressed concern regarding Iranian tests of Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles in the Straits of Hormuz. April 1987: To prevent Iraq from transferring troops north, Iran launched another offensive against Basra. An attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein near Mosul failed. May 1987: Iran established a naval base on Farsi Island. A Soviet freighter was hit by a mine in the Gulf. A Kuwaiti-chartered Soviet tanker hit a mine in the Gulf, near Kuwait. Two Iraqi missiles hit an American ship in the Gulf and killed 37 crewmen. June 1987: Iran won more territory in Kurdistan. Khomeini dissolved Iran’s ruling Islamic Republican Party.

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July 1987: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 598 calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of military forces. Iraq accepted the resolution on the condition that Iran also would. The first Kuwaiti supertanker, reflagged and escorted by U.S. warships, hit a mine in the Gulf. September 1987: U.S. and European naval warships arrived in the Gulf, including those capable of mine hunting the Gulf waters. U.S. naval helicopters destroyed an Iranian vessel that the U.S. claimed was laying mines. Iran did not provide a clear response to UN Resolution 598. October 1987: Iran and Iraq closed down their respective diplomatic missions in each other’s countries, which had thus far remained open. The U.S. Congress voted to embargo all Iranian imports. An Iranian Silkworm missile hit an American flagged supertanker in Kuwaiti waters injuring eighteen. U.S. warships destroyed two Iranian oil platforms. Iran struck Kuwait’s Sea Island oil terminal. November 1987: Khomeini announced a strategy of continual offensives to deny Iraq recovery time. December 1987: Iran launched several attacks in Fakeh north of Basra. January 1988: Small Iranian offensive was launched near Mawet in Kurdistan. Iraq bombed Saqqez in northern Iran, renewing its attacks on Iranian cities. Iran responded by attacking Baghdad, and Iraq hit Tehran with a long-range missiles for the first time. March 1988: Iran launched two separate offensives in Kurdistan and, assisted by Iraqi Kurds, Iran captured Halabja in Kurdistan. The Iraqi air force dropped chemical bombs on Halajba, killing as many as 4000 people. Iran and the Iraqi Kurds have seized control of considerable territory in Kurdistan. April 1988: The Iraqis used chemical weapons and were able to recapture the Fao peninsula. Iraq ceased to attack Iranian cities. Iran launched an offensive near Panjwin area of Kurdistan. U.S. warships destroyed two Iranian oil rigs. May 1988: Iraq launched offensives in the north and center areas of the war-zone, and then in Shalamche in the south. Iraq captured the Shalamche area using chemical weapons. June 1988: Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani commander-in-chief of the military, replacing Khamene’i. Iraq captured Mehran using poison gas, as well as the Majnoon Islands in the marshes, and Mawet in Kurdistan. July 1988: An American warship misidentified an Iranian passenger jet for a fighter jet, and shot the Iran Air plane out of the sky, killing 290 people. The Iraqis regained territory in the Panjwin district and the Musian border area. Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, unconditionally. Iraq launched offensives in the north, central, and southern areas of combat. They succeed in the south and center, failing in the north. Iran is able to retake some area in the south, near Ahvaz. August 1988: The UN reported that Iraq used chemical weapons extensively during the spring and summer of 1988. At the end of the month, a ceasefire took effect, suspending the fighting.

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Appendix 2: Chronology: The Iraq-Kuwait War1 January–June 1990: Increased Iraqi public claims on Kuwait. 2 August 1990: Iraq invaded Kuwait, claiming it was supporting a popular revolution. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 660, and the U.S. froze Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets and imposed a trade embargo on Iraq. 4 August 1990: The European states announced sanctions against Iraq, including a halt to all oil and arms trade with Iraq. French and British warships moved toward the Gulf and Saudi Arabia mobilized its military forces. 5 August 1990: U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared that the Iraqi invasion ‘will not stand’. 6 August 1990: The UN Security council passed resolution 661. The resolution prohibited all trade and financial transactions with Iraq, and diplomatic and cultural relations and services to Iraq. Saudi Arabia formally requested U.S. military assistance. 7 August 1990: Turkey closed its pipelines to Iraqi oil shipped to the Mediterranean Sea, and authorized U.S. combat aircraft to be transferred to Turkish air-bases. 8 August 1990: Iraq formally annexed Kuwait. 9 August 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 662 declaring the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void. The 82nd Airborne Division were the first U.S. troops to arrive in Saudi Arabia. 10 August 1990: The Arab League voted to send troops to Saudi Arabia. 12 August 1990: Saddam Hussein linked the conflict with Kuwait to the Israeli occupation of Arab land. President Bush ordered all U.S. naval ships to stop Iraqi all Iraqi oil exports, and to enforce the embargo authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 661. 15 August 1990: Iraq withdrew from territory seized during its war with Iran, making troops available for Kuwait. 16 August 1990: Iraq took foreign nationals hostage in Iraq and Kuwait with the intent of using them as human shields at strategic military installations. 18 August 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 664 demanding the release of third-party foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. U.S. naval vessels fired the first shots of the conflict at Iraqi tankers trying to run the blockade. 25 August 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 665 to use all measures to enforce the trade embargo on Iraq. 28 August 1990: Iraq declared Kuwait to be its nineteenth province. 9 September 1990: Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki and jointly condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and demanded Iraq’s withdrawal. 10 September 1990: Iran and Iraq announced the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. 25 September 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 670 declaring that air traffic was included in the sanctions on Iraq. _________________________________________________ 1

See Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R.H. Tripp Eds., The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996).

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29 October 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 671 again condemning Iraqi mistreatment of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraqi occupied areas. 4 November 1990: Syrian troops arrived in Saudi Arabia. 8 November 1990: President Bush ordered 200,000 U.S. troops to the Gulf. 15 November 1990: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria rejected calls for an Arab summit and emphasized the priority on defeating Saddam Hussein, first. 23 November 1990: President Bush, in response to Syria’s support for the Coalition against Iraq, met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad to discuss the Gulf crisis. 28 November 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 677 censuring Iraq’s attempts to change Kuwaiti demographic records. 29 November 1990: The UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force against Iraq if the crisis was not resolved by 15 January 1991. This vote represented the first time in modern history than an international peace-keeping organization voted to use force to halt aggression. The vote was 12-2, with China abstaining and Cuba and Yemen opposing the decision. 30 November 1990: President Bush proposed diplomatic talks with Iraq. Saddam Hussein accepted but demanded that Palestinian issues be linked to the Kuwait crisis. 7 December 1990: Iraq released all foreign hostages held in Iraq. 11 December 1990: The U.S.S.R. announced it would not commit its troops to Coalition forces. 13 December 1990: The U.S. Embassy staff left Kuwait. 21 December 1990: Saddam Hussein announced he would not withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the January 15 deadline. 23 December 1990: Saddam Hussein declared that Israel will be the first target if fighting starts. 28 December 1990: The U.S. sent two of its aircraft carriers to the Gulf. 29 December 1990: Poland joined Coalition forces, sending two ships and medical personnel to the Gulf. 30 December 1990: Saddam Hussein called for an Islamic meeting to discuss a Holy War if the Coalition attacked Iraq. 8 January 1991: President Bush requested formal permission from U.S. Congress to authorize the use of force against Iraq. 9 January 1991: U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz met in Geneva, Switzerland. The meeting resolves nothing. 12 January 1991: The U.S. Congress authorized the use of force to carry out the UN resolutions. 15 January 1991: The UN deadline passed and the Coalition forces did not attack Iraq, which remained in Kuwait. Iraq closed its border with Turkey. 16 January 1991: The French National Assembly authorized the use of force against Iraq, and placed its troops under U.S. command. Greece allows the U.S. to use its military bases and ports. 17 January 1991: Operation Desert Storm was initiated at 02:30 Baghdad time. Coalition forces launched air strikes against strategic sites in Iraq: telecommunications, airfields, missile launching sites, etc. Turkey opened its air bases to for Coalition strikes against Iraq. Jordan and the PLO condemned the Coalition attack.

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18 January 1991: Iraq fired eight conventionally armed SCUD missiles at Israel, striking Haifa and Tel Aviv. A U.S. Patriot ground-to-air missile intercepted a SCUD missile aimed at the U.S. base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 January 1991: The Coalition attack is supposed to have destroyed all of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities. 20 January 1991: Iraqi SCUD missiles hit Israel and Saudi Arabia. U.S. sent Patriot missile systems to Israel. Iraqi television broadcasts interviews with U.S. and British prisoners. 21 January 1991: Iraq announced it would use the Coalition prisoners as human shields. The U.S. and the International Red Cross responded by criticizing this behavior as a violation of the Geneva Convention. 22 January 1991: Saddam Hussein destroyed the Kuwaiti oil wells. A SCUD missile landed in Tel Aviv, Israel. These Iraqi strikes on Israel did not win it Egyptian or Syrian support, and instead strengthened the Coalition. 23 January 1991: The President of Yemen declares the U.S. was trying to destroy Iraq. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia approached the UN Security Council hoping to broker a cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the Coalition. Their approach did not work. 24 January 1991: Iraq began dumping oil into the Gulf. Millions of barrels dumped into Gulf waters presented difficulties for Coalition war ships in the Gulf, endangered the ecology of the area, and threatened damage to Saudi Arabia’s desalination plants. 26 January 1991: Twenty-four Iraqi aircraft were flown to Iran for protection. The Soviet foreign minister warned the U.S. not to destroy Iraq in its raids. 27 January 1991: Fifteen more Iraqi aircraft were flown to Iran for protection. Saddam Hussein threatened to use poison gas against Israeli citizens. 30 January 1991: Iraqi troops crossed into Khafji, bordering Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, initiating the first ground action in the war. 31 January 1991: U.S. and Saudi forces re-captured Khafji and took 500 prisoners. 1 February 1991: France allowed U.S. bombers leaving from England to use its airspace. U.S. Department of State accused Jordan of violating UN sanctions by purchasing Iraqi oil. 4 February 1991: Iraq moved some military equipment into civilian areas, taking advantage of Coalition forces reluctance to attack areas in which there was a high risk of civilian casualties. 5 February 1991: Reports indicated 80 percent of Iraq’s oil refineries had been destroyed. The Iraqi government ended all fuel sales to civilians. 6 February 1991: Iraq broke diplomatic ties with Egypt, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. King Hussein gave a speech critical of Western policies in the Middle East, suggesting some support for Iraq. 15 February 1991: Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait, but its demands were unrealistic and rejected immediately by the Coalition. 17 February 1991: India refused to allow U.S. military aircraft to refuel at its air bases. Iraqi foreign minister Tariq ‘Aziz visited Moscow to discuss ending the conflict. 19 February 1991: The UN authorized the International Red Cross to send water purification equipment to Iraq to ease civilian suffering. China declared its skepticism over the U.S. goals in the Gulf region.

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20 February 1991: President Bush issued an ultimatum to Iraq, demanding withdrawal within four days, a release of all prisoners, and full disclosure on all Iraqi land mines. U.S. forces capture 500 prisoners of war. 22 February 1991: Soviet President Gorbachev announced a peace plan agreed to by Iraq. It called for Iraq to begin its withdrawal from Kuwait within one day, to be completed within three weeks, and a cancellation of all UN Security Council Resolutions. President Bush demanded an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal within twenty-four hours, but stipulated it needed to be completed within a week. The UN did not endorse either position. 24 February 1991: Iraq rejected the U.S. ultimatum, President Bush ordered U.S and Coalition forces into Kuwait. 25 February 1991: An Iraqi SCUD missile landed in the U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 Americans. The Iraqi army is encircled by Coalition forces and begins a retreat to the Euphrates River. 27 February 1991: Iraqi forces pushed out of Kuwait. At 23:00, Iraq informed the United Nations it accepted Security Council Resolutions. 28 February 1991: President Bush ordered a cease-fire. Operation Desert Storm is officially ended at 08:00 Gulf time. 2 March 1991: UN authorized Resolution 686. A retreating unit of Iraqi Republican Guards attacked U.S. troops following the cease-fire. 4 March 1991: Iraq released Coalition prisoners. 6 March 1991: President Bush announced the end of the war in a message to Congress.

Appendix 3: The Iraq-Kuwait War - Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions1 Resolution 660, 2 August 1990: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was condemned and the UN demanded that Iraq’s forces withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally. The resolution called for negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait to reach a settlement. Resolution 661, 6 August 1990: The Security Council announced economic and arms sanctions on Iraq. Non-compliance with Resolution 660 was cited as Iraq’s violation of Kuwait’s sovereignty. Food and medical supplies were permitted to be delivered to Iraq for humanitarian purposes. Resolution 662, 9 August 1990: Declared Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait illegal and called for it to end, and requested that all states reject Iraq’s claim on Kuwait. Resolution 664, 18 August 1990: Placed responsibility for foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait on Iraq. Further, called for their immediate release from Kuwait, with protection _________________________________________________ 1

See Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R.H. Tripp Eds., The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996).

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and care for their safety. Demanded that Iraq reverse its orders to close embassies and consulates in Kuwait and reinstate diplomatic immunity and other privileges. Resolution 665, 25 August 1990: Established a naval blockade of Iraq. UN member states asked to cease maritime traffic in and out of Iraq to reinforce sanctions implemented in Resolution 661. Resolution 666, 13 September 1990: Humanitarian declaration over foodstuff shortages within Iraq. Asked member states to coordinate food aid to Iraq through the UN’s arrangement with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Resolution 667, 16 September 1990: A censure of Iraq’s treatment of diplomatic missions and personnel, especially third-party nationals. Demanded their release and assurance of their well-being. Called for Iraq to allow states to access their diplomatic missions and personnel being held in Iraq and Kuwait. Resolution 669, 24 September 1990: Re-asserted the sanctions of Resolution 661 and further defined the administrative execution of the sanctions. Resolution 670, 25 September 1990: Expanded the scope of the blockade on Iraq by reducing the amount of air traffic allowed into and out of Iraq. Flights into and out of Iraq and Kuwait were limited to UN sanctioned humanitarian relief flights. Requested that member states detain Iraqi maritime vessels in their ports, and reject any overflights of aircraft bound for Iraq. Reasserted demands from Resolution 661 freezing Iraqi foreign assets and protecting Kuwaiti assets. Resolution 674, 29 October 1990: Censured Iraq for holding third-party nationals hostage. Expressed concern regarding Iraq’s treatment of Kuwaiti population. Declared Iraq liable for all loss, damage, and injury created by Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait. Called for member states to gather evidence regarding damages, losses, or injuries created by Iraq’s invasion. Reasserted that a peaceful resolution to the crisis was still being sought. Resolution 677, 28 November 1990: Identified Iraq’s ongoing attempts to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait by destroying the civil records maintained by Kuwait as a grave concern. Resolution 678, 29 November 1990: Set January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraq to fully implement all UN resolutions relating to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The UN authorized its member states to employ”all means necessary” to enforce Iraqi compliance. This resolution represented the first time in modern history than an international peace-keeping organization voted to use force to halt aggression. The vote was 12–2, with China abstaining and Cuba and Yemen opposing the decision

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Resolution 686, 2 March 1991: Established the conditions for the formal cease-fire agreement. Iraq was asked to comply with all twelve previous UN Security Council Resolutions regarding the conflict, in response to Coalition forces ending their offensive. Set conditions for Iraq to meet in order for there to be an official end to the conflict. These conditions included rescinding all claims on Kuwait; accepting responsibility for all damages, injuries, and financial losses caused to Kuwait and third-parties; releasing all Kuwaiti and foreign nationals in captivity; return of all Kuwaiti property; ending all hostile or provocative actions; releasing all prisoners of war; producing Iraqi military commanders to meet with their Coalition counterparts to discuss the terms of the cease-fire; and disclosing information on all mines, unconventional, chemical, and biological weapons in Iraq. Resolution 687, 3 April 1991: Officially set the terms of a formal cease-fire and end to the conflict. The key points of the cease-fire were Iraq’s recognition of Kuwait and its full disclosure of its weapons programs. Specifically called for an end to Iraq’s nuclearbiological-chemical weapons programs and forbade its renewal in the future. Formed a special UN commission to carry out site inspections in Iraq. Iraq was expected to provide full cooperation to the inspections teams and to provide comprehensive information on all of its programs regarding”weapons of mass destruction.” Iraq was also ordered to pay Kuwait for damages to Kuwaiti property.

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Appendix 4: Maps The following maps are all taken from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection (University of Texas at Austin). Its website provides many more good maps concerning the Middle East (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html).

Persian Gulf Region (Political) 1981 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/persian_gulf_region.jpg

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Iran (Political) 2001 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_pol01.jpg

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Iraq (Political) 2004 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol_2004.jpg

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Kuwait (political) 1996 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kuwait_pol96.jpg

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Saudi Arabia (political) 2003 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/saudi_arabia_pol_2003.jpg

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Abu Musa and the Tunbs (Strait of Hormuz) (Political) – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg

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Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates (Political) 1976 – http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kuwait_bahrain_pol_1976.jpg

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Appendix 5: Middle East and Gulf Research: A Guide for Users I. Middle East Journals The list below includes scholarly journals that often contain articles and essays covering social, economic, and political issues in the Gulf region. This list is not comprehensive, but it is a strong sample of available material. The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies CEMOTI: Cahiers d’Études Sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien, The International Journal of Middle East Studies Iranian Studies Israel Affairs Magreb – Mashrak Mediterraneans-Mediterraneanes The Middle East Journal The Middle East Report Middle East Review of International Affairs Middle East Studies Orient

II. International Relations and Public Policy Research and Publications The following list contains publications that contain articles and essays about international affairs and public policy issues. They are international in scope, but often contain material on the Gulf and the Middle East. Adelphi Papers and Survival, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; London, United Kingdom. Annual Report, published by Gulf Research Centre, Dubai, The United Arab Emirates. Arab Strategic Report, published by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies; Cairo, Egypt. Policy Briefs and Working Reports, published by Centre for European Policy Studies; Brussels, Belgium. The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, published by The Institute for Political and International Studies; Tehran, Iran. Discourse: an Iranian Quarterly, published by Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies; Tehran, Iran. Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations; New York and Washington, D.C., U.S. Middle East Policy Journal, published by Middle East Policy Council; Washington, D.C.,U.S.

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Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), published by Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv, Israel. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, published by Centre for Strategic Research; Ankara, Turkey Policy Focus, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Washington, D.C., U.S. Policy Briefs, published by The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; Washington, D.C., U.S. RSIS Working Papers, published by International Relations and Security Network run by Center for Security Studies at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology; Zurich, Switzerland. SIPRI Research Reports and SIPRI Policy Papers, published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Strategic Assessment, published by Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (now Institute for National Security Studies); Tel Aviv, Israel. The Rand Center for Middle East Public Policy, Santa Monica, California, U.S. Washington Quarterly, published by Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., U.S.

III. Internet Research Resources for the Gulf There is a voluminous amount of information and data on the internet regarding the Gulf region. The following links have compiled a very wide selection of links to relevant Gulf material, which makes them good internet sites from which to conduct research. Internet research is fluid and resources are continuously added to, removed, and modified. Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Bergen: http://www.smi.uib.no/links/international.html The Gulf/2000 Project: http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/reference.shtml Gulf Research Center (Dubai): http://www.grc.to/ International Relations and Security Network: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ll/index.cfm Middle East Review of International Affairs: http://meria.idc.ac.il/research-g/research_guides.html MENIC – University of Texas http://menic.utexas.edu/ http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html

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Moshe Dayan Center Library at Tel Aviv University: http://www.dayan.org/framelib.htm Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre For Islamic Countries (SESRTCIC): http://www.sesrtcic.org/links.shtml Virtual Library International Affairs Resources: http://www2.etown.edu/vl/mideast.html

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Appendix 5: Glossary Amir (emir): Lord, or prince, endowed with power in the classical Muslim world; chief of a political or military group, also a head of a tribal entity or state. al-Qa’ida: Militant Islamic organization and network (believed to be) responsible for the September 2001 attacks in the U.S. Its main goal is the creation of an Islamic state. ‘Ashura: The celebration on the tenth day of the Hegira month of Moharram, when Shiites commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Kerbala on October 10, 680. ‘Ashraf (sing. Sharif): The descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. ‘Atabat: It literally means ‘thresholds’ or ‘doorways’ and indicates the Holy Cities of Shi’ism: Najaf, Karbala, al-Kazimiyya, Samarra, in Iraq. Ayatollah: It literally means ‘sign from God’; and is a title in the hierarchy of the Shi’a clergy. Baseej: Primarily Iranian teenage religious volunteers recruited from Iran’s poor areas to serve at the front of massive military offensives during the Iran-Iraq War. Al-Daawa al Islamiyya: A secret Shi’a resistance group based in Iraq and founded to resist Ba’ath rule in Iraq. Ghayba: Occultation. This refers to belief of Shi’is that the Imam has gone into hiding, and will reappear at a time appointed by God. Faqih: A jurist specializing in Muslim law. Fiqh: Collected and codified Muslim jurisprudence. Fitna: Disorder or sedition in Islam. Something that divides the community of believers in Islam. Fatwa: A legal opinion based on the holy texts of Islam, in answer to a question about a precise case, which is usually provided by a recognized Islamic legal scholar. Hajj: The pilgrimage to Mecca and one of the Five Pillars of Islam. It takes place during a specific Hegira calendar month according to strict ritual.

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Hojat al-Islam: Literally,”proof of Islam”, it refers to a Shi’a cleric holding the rank below Ayatollah. Hamas: Palestinian Islamic political organization with origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, winner of the 2006 Palestine legislative elections. Listed by the U.S. and EU as a terrorist organization. Hanbali: One of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. The most strict and puritanical of the schools, one of its derivatives, Wahhabism, is prominent in Saudi Arabia. The Hanbali school is characterized by a strict and literal interpretation of the holy texts of Islam. Hanafi: One of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam that is prominent in Turkey and India. Hashemites: Arab dynasty, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Hereditary guardians of Mecca for a millennium, until 1925; their descendants now rule the Kingdom of Jordan. Hegira (Hijra): The flight of the Prophet Muhummad from Mecca to Medina in September 622, marking the discovery of Islam and the establishment of the Hegirian Muslim Calendar. Hizballah: Shi’a group formed in 1982 and based in Lebanon with both a civilian and a military branch. Israel, and the U.S. has labeled Hizballah a terrorist organization. Imam: A guide or director or community prayer. For Shi’is, an Imam is a descendant of ‘Ali and whose being is holy and sacred and whose vocation is to exercise extreme authority. Islamic Jihad: Militant Islamist group operating in Palestine territories and which rejects any accommodation with Israel. Labeled a terrorist organization by Israel, the U.S., and the EU Jahiliyya: The term used in Islam to denote the pagan or barbaric period before the revelation of Islam; referring to a period of idolatry and barbarism. Jihad: Holy war. The effort to spread Islam within society or the world by any means. It is prescribed in Islamic law (shari’a) as something to be carried out against the infidels or unbelievers. Karbala: Shi’a holy city in Iraq. One of the centers for Shi’a pilgrimage.

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Kurds: An ethnic racial group, they trace their history back to Medes from the Bible and Indo-European mountain tribes who settled in southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, and northwest Iran. Khuzistan: Iranian territory inhabited by Arabs and known as Arabistan before Reza Shah changed the name in the 1920s. It possesses large quantities of Iran’s oil resources. Madrasa: A traditional school where Islamic religion and law are taught. Mahdi: A Messiah who will come to restore religion and justice. For the Shi’is, the Mahdi is the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who disappeared in 874, and expected to return. Maliki: One of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. It is prominent in North and West Africa. Mujahidin (plural of mujahid): Soldiers or fighters engaged in jihad. Often used as part of a name of various militant Islamic groups. Mujahiddin-e Khalq: Iranian leftist opposition party to the Islamic Republic of Iran, who conducted militant attacks against the clerical regime in Iran. Mujtahid: a Shi’a cleric qualified to deliver independent opinions on matters relating to the Islamic law, or Shari’a. Mullah: A title used to identify a religious cleric. Used primarily in Islamic Asia. Muslim Brotherhood: Influential Islamist organization founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. Mustadafin: The disinherited or downtrodden. Najaf: Shi’a holy city in Iraq. One of the centers for Shi’a pilgrimage. Pasdaran: Iranian military force considered ideologically loyal to the principles of Iranian Islamic Revolution. This force was created after the Khomeini came to power. Qadissiyya: the battle in 633 C.E. during which the armies of Islam conquered Zoroastrian Persia. Qawmi: Arabic term for Pan-Arab unity, beyond state borders.

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Salafi/Salaf: Followers of the pious Islamic ancestors (salaf) known for their extreme rigor in religious practice. Sayyid: A descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, similar to the term sharif. Shafi’i: One of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. It is prominent in Southeast Asia and East Africa and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Shari’a: The Islamic laws extracted from the holy texts of Islam and traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Shi’ia Islam: The party of ‘Ali, or shia ‘Ali, which is the Islamic doctrine claiming legitimate leadership of the Community of Believers is linked to blood descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. The line of Imams begins with ‘Ali, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. Shi’is are the second largest Islamic denomination, and include approximately 15 percent of the world’s Muslims. They are located mainly in Iraq and Iran, where they constitute the majority, but there are also large Shi’i communities in Lebanon, India, Pakistan, and Bahrain. Shirk: Engaging in polytheistic religious beliefs, misuse of God’s oneness contrary to Islamic monotheism. Sunni Islam: The doctrine of majority of Muslims, which follows the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the legal tradition derived from it. Sunnis constitute approximately 85 percent of the world’s Muslims. Sunni Muslims believe the first three successors to Muhammad, while not directly related by blood, were rightly chosen from the community for their leadership abilities, in contrast to the Shi’is. Takfir: The process of a Muslim turning to sin and unbelief, making him an unbeliever. Thalweg: Median line of the deepest part of a waterway used as an international boundary. Tikrit: Hometown of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Tudeh Party: Marxist opposition group in Iran, with links to U.S.S.R.; eventually eliminated by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Umma: the community of Muslim believers. ‘Ulama (plural of ‘alim): A doctor of Islamic law.

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Velayet-e Faqih: Doctrine of the guardian of the Islamic jurisprudent formulated by Khomeini during his years in exile in Iraq. This concept gave supreme governing authority to Khomeini and became the basis for Iran’s theocratic constitution. Wahhabism: A Sunni Islamic doctrine derived from the Hanbali school by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703–1792) and his followers. Al-Wahhab was a preacher who advocated a puritanical and rigorous form of Islam that still dominates Saudi Islam today. Watan: Arabic term for homeland.

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Middle East Periodicals Akhir Sa’a (Egypt) Al-Ahram (Cairo) Al-‘Alam (Iraq) Al-Anba’ (Kuwait) Al-Bayadir al-Siyasi (Palestinian Territories) Al-Hawadith (Lebanon) Al-Hayat (London) Al-Ittihad al –’Usbu’i (Abu Dhabi, UAE) Al-Musawwar (Egypt) Al-Qabas (Kuwait) Al-Quds al-Arabi (London) Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Kuwait) Al-Safir (Lebanon)

Bibliography Al-Sha’b (Cairo) Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London) Al-Siyasa (Kuwait) Al-Tadamun (Cyprus) Al-Wasat (Bahrain) Al-Watan (Riyadh) Al-Watan (Kuwait) Al-Watan al-Arabi (Lebanon) Arab Times (Kuwait) Gulf News Agency (Bahrain) Ha’aretz (Israel) Jumhuriyya (Baghdad) Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) Iraq News Agency (INA) Islamic Republic News Agency-IRNA (Iran) Majallat al-Sunna Salam (Iraq) Saudi Press Agency (SPA) Sawt al-Kuwayt al-Duwali (London) Sourakia (London) Al-’Usbu al-’Arabi (Lebanon)

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