Dialogue: The Mixed Game

Dialogue – The Mixed Game

Dialogue Studies (DS) Dialogue Studies takes the notion of dialogicity as central; it encompasses every type of language use, workaday, institutional and literary. By covering the whole range of language use, the growing field of dialogue studies comes close to pragmatics and studies in discourse or conversation. The concept of dialogicity, however, provides a clear methodological profile. The series aims to cross disciplinary boundaries and considers a genuinely inter-disciplinary approach necessary for addressing the complex phenomenon of dialogic language use. This peer reviewed series will include monographs, thematic collections of articles, and textbooks in the relevant areas.

Editor Edda Weigand University of Münster

Editorial Advisory Board Adelino Cattani

Marion Grein

Anne-Marie Söderberg

Kenneth N. Cissna

Fritjof Haft

Talbot J. Taylor

Světla Čmejrková

John E. Joseph

Wolfgang Teubert

François Cooren

Werner Kallmeyer

Linda R. Waugh

Robert T. Craig

Catherine KerbratOrecchioni

Elda Weizman

Università di Padova University of South Florida Czech Language Institute Université de Montréal University of Colorado at Boulder

University of Mainz University of Tübingen University of Edinburgh University of Mannheim

Université Lyon 2

Marcelo Dascal

Geoffrey Sampson

Valeri Demiankov

Masayoshi Shibatani

Tel Aviv University Russian Academy of Sciences

University of Sussex Rice University

Volume 10 Dialogue – The Mixed Game by Edda Weigand

Copenhagen Business School College of William and Mary University of Birmingham University of Arizona Bar Ilan University

Yorick Wilks

University of Sheffield

Dialogue – The Mixed Game

Edda Weigand University of Münster

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Weigand, Edda.   Dialogue : the mixed game / by Edda Weigand. p. cm. (Dialogue Studies, issn 1875-1792 ; v. 10) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1.  Dialogue analysis.  I. Title. P95.455.W43   2010 401’.43--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 1027 2 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8746 5 (Eb)

2010038021

© 2010 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

 

For Luigi and the incredible game

Table of contents

 Preface I���������� ntroduction: The simple and the complex

xi 1

P��� art I.  Rethinking theory: Patterns & beyond chapter 1 11 The state of the art 1.1 Starting from the simple: Models of language competence  11 1.1.1 The dogma of language as a sign system  11 1.1.2 The dogma of language as generative competence  13 1.2 The pragmatic turning point: From language competence  to communicative competence  16 1.2.1 The multi-level approach  17 1.2.2 The pattern approach  20 1.2.3 The logical normative approach  22 1.3 Trying to overcome the limits of the simple: Models of performance  24 1.3.1 Pragmatics as a perspective  25 1.3.2 Empirical pragmatics  27 1.3.3 Cognitive pragmatics   29 1.3.4 Discourse pragmatics  32 1.4 The universe of dialogism: Intertextuality, interpretation and polyphony  34 1.5 Summary: A plea for dialogue as interaction  37 chapter 2 The turning point in theorizing: Starting from the integrated whole 2.1 Towards a theory of competence-in-performance  39 2.2 Object and methodology: Uncovering the language myth  44 2.3 Justifying evidence: Evolution and culture  47

39

viii Dialogue: The mixed game

Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model chapter 1 Premises about the object: From human affairs to language 1.1 Human nature  56 1.1.1 Human beings as central reference point  56 1.1.2 Integration and interaction of human abilities  58 1.1.3 Human beings as dialogic individuals  59 1.1.4 Human beings as goal-directed beings  62 1.1.5 Human beings as persuasive beings  62 1.2 Environment  63 1.2.1 Human beings as ‘complex adaptive systems’  64 1.2.2 From standard cases to particular ones  65 1.2.3 Deriving subsystems by specialization  65 1.3 Culture  67 1.3.1 Human beings as cultural beings  67 1.3.2 Culture as an external system of values  68 chapter 2 The methodology: Principles of Probability 2.1 The general conceptual structure  71 2.1.1 Regularities, norms and principles  71 2.1.2 The role of rhetoric  72 2.1.3 Some introductory examples of how to proceed  74 2.2 Constitutive Principles  76 2.2.1 The Action Principle  76 2.2.2 The Dialogic Principle proper  79 2.2.3 The Coherence Principle  85 2.3 Regulative Principles  93 2.3.1 Regulating self-interest and respect  93 2.3.2 Regulating reason and emotion  105 2.4 Executive Principles  113 2.4.1 Basic sequencing principles  113 2.4.2 Principles of addressing the complex  115 2.4.3 Executive strategies  117 chapter 3 To sum up: The mixed game of human competence-in-performance

55

71

125



Table of contents

P��� art III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy chapter 1 Minimal versus complex action games chapter 2 Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts: The state of the art 2.1 Expressions versus functions  132 2.2 Infinite versus finite acts  135 2.3 Criteria and types  136 2.4 The debate on the autonomy of the speech act  138

129

131

chapter 3 The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts  3.1 Formal conditions or the inner logic of a holistic hierarchy  141 3.2 Basic minimal games  144 3.2.1 Declaratives  145 3.2.2 Exploratives  147 3.2.3 Directives  149 3.2.4 Representatives  153 3.2.5 To sum up  154 3.3 Derived types of action function  155 3.3.1 Declaratives  156 3.3.2 Exploratives  156 3.3.3 Directives  160 3.3.4 Representatives  162 3.4 Propositional patterns  173 3.4.1 Declaratives  174 3.4.2 Exploratives  180 3.4.3 Directives  186 3.4.4 Representatives  192 3.4.4.1 Propositional patterns of the simple claim to truth 3.4.4.2 Propositional patterns of the modal claim to truth

192 199

chapter 4 To sum up 

207

141

ix



Dialogue: The mixed game

P��� art IV.  The architecture of complex action games chapter 1 Extending the minimal game 1.1 Problems of understanding  211 1.2 Clarifying sequences  214 1.3 Providing arguments  215 1.4 The use of power  222 1.5 Extending the proposition  226

209 211

chapter 2 229 Complex human affairs: Dialogue in the stream of life 2.1 The complex whole  229 2.2 Decomposing the whole by specialization:  The emergence of institutions  233 2.3 Decomposing the subcomplexes: Towards a linear order  234 2.4 From purposes to communicative means: Rhetoric as an inherent part  236 2.5 Rethinking the empiricist position  237 2.6 Sample analysis of an institutional game  240 2.7 To sum up: The mixed game  248 chapter 3 Literary action games or touching on the mystery of life 3.1 Some remarks on the state of the art in Literary Studies  251 3.2 The functional core of the game: Expressing the inexpressible  254 3.3 Literary means of expression  258 3.3.1 Symbols  259 3.3.2 Metaphors  260 3.3.3 Multidimensional worlds  261 3.3.4 The author’s perspective  262 3.4 Conclusion: Polyphony of voices  264 chapter 4 To sum up: Dialogue in human affairs

251

267

Summary and outlook: Towards an understanding of the dialogic species 269 References Appendix Index

273 289 297

Preface 



Mustn’t we say at every turn: ‘I believe this with certainty’?





Wittgenstein

In this volume I propose a completely new approach to language. Having dealt with partial aspects in various articles during recent years, I can now expound the theory as a whole. It is an approach which is meant to show how human beings come to grips with the challenges of social life in dialogic interaction. The use of language cannot be separated from the use of other human abilities: integration is the name of ‘the mixed game’. Integration implies rejecting traditions of reductionism and addressing complexity in a holistic approach. In this sense the Model of the Mixed Game introduced in this volume represents the first theory of language which starts from the complex whole of human dialogic interaction. I am aware of the fact that I am starting an adventure into the complex which will not be approved of by those who wish to persist with traditional approaches. However, it seems to me that the time is ripe for such an endeavour. Concepts like integration, game, or complexity are being focused on in different disciplines. Attempts are being made to emphasize the unity of science in disciplines ranging from the natural and social sciences to the humanities to prepare the ground for a turning point in theorizing. It is this community of scholars who dare to look beyond the limits of tradition whom I am addressing when I use the pronoun we. Nobody is meant who is worried about being included. Any new beginning has to be clearly marked as a new course of action which deviates from traditional approaches. No one is in the possession of independent truth. In any case, truth remains human truth. We develop theories by providing arguments for what we believe to be true in the hope of advancing a bit more in our understanding of the complex whole. Complexity is not an issue that can be settled once and for all. In this sense, this volume represents an intermediate stage on the way to more advanced studies in the future. I wish to thank many colleagues and friends for their comments, oral and written, on earlier versions of the theory. Some of their voices can be heard in their publications approving or rejecting my view. I bear in mind the discussions, affirmative and controversial that we have had. I am greatly indebted to Italian colleagues of jurisprudence for the notion of the ‘mixed game’. In a discussion with members

xii Dialogue: The mixed game

of the “Consiglio Nazionale Forense” in Rome in 2002 they got to the heart of the issue by calling the dialogic action game ‘un gioco misto’. A big thanks is due to my assistants Stefanie Schnöring, Jörn Bollow and ­Sebastian Feller for their inspiring and encouraging remarks on central issues. Moreover, I am especially grateful to David Beal who has taken much effort and care to put the native touch to my English text. Last but not least I would like to extend a cordial thank you to Isja Conen and their colleagues from John ­Benjamins Publishing Company for offering useful advice whenever needed.  

Münster, July 2010 Edda Weigand

introduction

The simple and the complex

Looking back at the beginnings of the 20th century, the first century of modern linguistics, we recognize that we have made some progress in addressing and understanding our object-of-study ‘language’. In the course of the last century, language has turned out to be an extremely elusive object which has lost its clearly delimited structure as a sign system and has gone on to occupy adjacent areas of related disciplines. The theory of dialogic action games or the Mixed Game Model (MGM) made a fresh start by going to the heart of language and coming to terms with it as dialogue. De Saussure (1916) was well aware of this issue. He knew that the linguist’s real object is ‘la parole’. Nevertheless he started from the simple, from ‘la langue’, because his time was not yet prepared to address the complex. He therefore took the reductive path of abstraction and created the artificial concept of language as a sign system which was situated somewhere ‘in the underground’, underlying ‘la parole’. Abstraction from ‘la parole’ to ‘la langue’ was so complete that nothing was left of ‘la parole’ at the level of ‘la langue’. Two totally different objects which had nothing in common were established. Their correlation was simply a thesis. Linguists did not seem to be worried by this step towards total abstraction; de Saussure’s thesis became the dogma of modern linguistics which attracted above all ‘searchers after hidden laws’ (Searle 1972). In the following period Chomsky (e.g., 1965) confirmed de Saussure’s view of rule-governed abstraction but changed the structuralist static concept of ‘la langue’ into the generative dynamic concept of ‘competence’. Even a few decades ago, it seemed impossible to express doubts about the dogma of language as a sign system. Only a few voices dared to question this concept of language without, however, offering workable alternative views (e.g., Baker & Hacker 1984, ­Harris 1981). Even in our times, linguists resist abandoning the construct of a sign system and tend to arrive at a pragmatic view of language use by simply adding further parameters of the speech situation to the sign system. But structuralism not only proposed the methodology of abstraction; precisely the opposite was proclaimed as well, namely a rejection of any abstraction by totally ignoring the level of meaning. American structuralists very early on attempted to study language in a rigorously empirical way by recording and analysing Indian languages exclusively by means of formal criteria. In recent decades



Dialogue: The mixed game

this path has experienced a fresh revival through approaches which hypostasize the authentic oral text. Although empiricists proclaim that they are addressing ‘real’ language, what they are in fact addressing is only the tip of the iceberg, the part which is observable at the surface level. This part is however not independently accessible but determined in its performance by the part below the surface. Simple observation yields nothing. Observation has to be guided by reflection, by questions which go beyond what can be perceived, i.e. by goal-directed or reflective questions which arise from the complex unity of meaning and expression. The ‘New Science’ starts from the natural object, living beings, and tries to describe their behaviour and actions by means of goal-directed observation. According to Feynman (2001: 173), “making observations” must not omit “the vital factor of judgment about what to observe and what to pay attention to”. Performance is not a blind empirical process but means performance of human action and behaviour. The empiricists’ procedure of scrutinizing the authentic text is at its core a procedure of avoiding the complex. In their search for empirical ‘data’ they ignore the fact that ‘data’ can only be identified by reference to meaning (Weigand 2004a). De Saussure was well aware of this crucial point, from the very outset, when he pointed out that there is no empirical evidence as such, that the ‘signifiant’ needs the ‘signifié’ in order to count as ‘signifiant’. The same insight was again highlighted by Chomsky (1959) in his famous review article on Skinner. Language cannot be grasped either by empiricists dwelling on arbitrary changes at the surface level nor by ‘searchers after hidden laws’ trying to impose rules on the part of the iceberg below the surface of the water. Both approaches tear language apart. If we try to grasp language as a natural object, not restricted by methodological exigencies, it is comprehensible neither as the empirically observable part nor as the hidden part below. The issue is not only how to bring both approaches together; the issue is even more complicated. There is no object ‘language’ as such in performance; there is only the human ability of speaking which however cannot be separated from other abilities: speaking is integrated with thinking and with perceiving (Weigand 2009, 2010b). Everything human beings do is dependent on their abilities, which are capabilities and restrictions as well. They filter what enters our minds, be it by perception or cognition, and cannot be switched off. For human beings, truth is inevitably truth in the eye of the observer. If we start from the premise that the world is only recognizable as far as human abilities can reach, we have to conclude that everything, in the end, depends on human nature and the conditions of the environment in which human beings live. The question of interest is no longer whether language is genetically determined, as the generativists proclaim, nor whether culture makes man, as empiricists assert. The question is to what extent biology



Introduction: The simple and the complex

and culture interact. As Wilson (2004: 18f.) emphasizes, “each person is molded by an interaction of his environment, especially his cultural environment, with the genes that affect social behaviour”. Sociobiology becomes the basis for any theory of human behaviour (Wilson 1975, Lumsden & Wilson 2005). Human beings have a double nature: they are individuals and social beings at the same time. Recent neurological experiments on mirror neurons can be interpreted as confirming human beings’ double nature as well as the interaction of their abilities (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998, Weigand 2002a, Iacoboni 2008). Being oriented towards our own self we are at the same time oriented towards the other; perceiving the action of our fellow being and intending the same action are somehow interconnected. As social individuals we need abilities, such as speech, to address the other human being. The concept of language as a system of its own no longer makes sense but has to be redesigned as a concept of language as dialogue which is based on human nature and on the inherent integration of speech and other human abilities in dialogic interaction. ‘Language as dialogue’ is not restricted to the dialogic form but means the dialogic function or orientation, in principle, of any language use. This change from the artificial simple to the natural complex poses the question of how to address complexity in theory. In any case it requires a change in theorizing from reductionism to holism, from division and addition of separate parts to interaction of integrated components (cf. also Simon 1962). Descartes’ dualism of body and mind and his view of reason and emotion as separate areas are no longer tenable. Any human ability is an ‘embodied’ ability. There is no mind or any other ability without the brain. The new way of theorizing must take precautions against a procedure which starts with methodology as is usual in traditional theorizing. Martinet (1975) called it a fundamental methodological fallacy to cut the object-of-study so that it fits methodology. Instead of distorting the natural object to make it conform with methodological restrictions, a holistic approach starts from the attempt to achieve a first understanding of the complex whole by reflective observation and then derives methodology from it. There is in principle no other way of addressing the complex than by starting from the complex, as Austin (1962: 147) already told us when emphasizing that ‘the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating’. For any part of life, there is no simple at the beginning. Even the ostensibly simple units of mirror neurons reveal themselves to be complex multi-dimensional units, not only as cell tissue but as tissue which works by firing (Weigand 2002a). The notion of language as determined by the sociobiology of human behaviour inevitably cuts across disciplinary boundaries, not only within the humanities. Rethinking language also means rethinking academic boundaries. Even if in





Dialogue: The mixed game

a holistic approach linguistics can no longer be exclusively devoted to the study of verbal means of communication, language still remains the central focus. As a discipline, linguistics needs to specify its scientific interest in order to achieve a clear profile which is to some extent distinct from the profile of other disciplines that also deal with language, e.g., psychology or sociology. In my view, the central linguistic interest is directed at describing and explaining how human beings succeed in coming to an understanding in human affairs. Linguistics in this sense is not a discipline restricted to logical or rule-governed systems nor to the analysis of authentic texts but derives its principles from human beings’ needs and abilities (Weigand 2000a, 2002b). As a humanized linguistics it belongs to the circle of disciplines that jointly contribute to the study of humankind. Human abilities, in the end, are devices for survival and reproduction, and language is just one of them (cf. Wilson 2004: 2). Their very nature and interaction emerges on the basis of a view that considers the different disciplines from the natural and social sciences to the humanities as interrelated by consilience or the unity of knowledge (Wilson 1999). The complexity of life can never be grasped with absolute certainty. Western thinking, which has been based on a belief in certainty since antiquity, faces ‘the end of certainty’ not only in physics (Prigogine 1994, 1997; Toulmin 2001). The big question is how to deal with uncertainty in theory. More than half a century ago, physics showed the way in the change from classical physics to modern physics or quantum physics, from fixed rules to probabilities. Economics settled the issue in the move from rational economics to economics based on practical reasoning (Simon­ 1962, Kahneman & Tversky 2000). The humanities face the same challenge. ‘Living with uncertainty’ requires adapting to ever-changing conditions. Not only inferences but also rules of behaviour are applied with a certain probability. There is no absolute benchmark, performance never means perfect perfor­mance. In a world of change and chance human beings show extraordinary abilities created by the evolutionary principle of survival of the fittest: they are not the victims of chaos but are able to come to grips with the complex, ‘with whatever life throws at them’ (Sampson 2005: 193). I call this extraordinary ability competencein-performance. It is based on the integration and interaction of human abilities; the use of language is an integrated component of it. From modern physics and other disciplines we can learn that ‘theory’ cannot be restricted to rules and order abstracted from chaos outside of ‘theory’. If it is meant to be of any significance to human beings’ lives, it has to tackle the interaction of order and chance (Daneš 1995). This is precisely what human beings are able to do: as complex adaptive and creative systems they orientate themselves in ever-changing surroundings by mediating between order and disorder, ­between general regularities and individual particularities (Gell-Mann 1994).



Introduction: The simple and the complex

They know that ‘anything goes’ could be possible in performance, but they know, too, it would be possible only for a short while. Human beings first try to structure the complex according to rules but are, from the very outset, prepared to go beyond rules and to include chance. They act according to principles of probability. In a theory that aims to describe and explain how human beings proceed in dialogic interaction, principles of probability are the methodological basis. A theory which aims to come to terms with a phenomenon of life has to come to grips with open-endedness and can no longer be restricted to a closed system of rules. Simon (1962) made an interesting proposal about ‘the architecture of complexity’ in general which can also be related to the complexity of the mixed game and its core concept of competence-in-performance. Complexity does not result from the division and addition of parts, as for instance in hierarchies of generative tree structures, but from differentiating the complex whole in a hierarchy of derived subsystems. The complex whole is more than the sum of all the interactions among the subsystems. The theory of competence-in-performance is not a disguised theory of competence underlying performance. Traditional theorizing separated the level of competence from the level of performance and faced the problem of bridging the gap. There is however by definition no bridge between the level of rule-governed­ competence and the level of ‘anything goes’ in performance. The problem turns out to be a methodological pseudo-problem. The gap is bridged in human beings’ minds. Theorizing needs to be justified. To my mind, clear-cut arguments in theorizing about human abilities can be drawn from assumptions about human nature and the evolution of the species. Fortunately, our assumptions can nowadays rely on experimental proofs in biology and neurology (Wilson 2004, Damasio 2000, Lumsden & Wilson 2005). Not only the integration of human abilities but also the co-evolutionary interaction of the human genotype and culture can now be taken for granted. The well-known debate on ‘the language instinct’ turns out to be a speculative game played at the extremes (Weigand 2007a). Culture is not only a phenomenon which can be perceived in the external world, e.g., in certain customs. On the contrary, human beings are, to some extent, cultural beings. We need to know other cultures and languages in order to recognize the pecularities of our mother tongue. Linguistics is thus at its core a comparative discipline. A theory of the complex has first and foremost to address two basic questions: how can we grasp or circumscribe the whole, and how can we unlock it or what is the analytic key concept. The whole must comprise any variable which influences the phenomenon under analysis. For a theory of human competence-inperformance­ the minimal autonomous unit in which human beings can come to an understanding is the dialogic action game or the mixed game.





Dialogue: The mixed game

In the first century of modern linguistics, linguists continually changed their unit of analysis, from the smallest possible one, the phoneme or more precisely the distinctive feature, to the morpheme and to the sentence. By the pragmatic turn the limit of the sentence was crossed in two directions: linearly, from one sentence to the sequence of sentences or text, and vertically, by changing the sentence into the utterance and opening up the underlying level of speech acts. The following period moved from the monologic unit of the single speech act to the two-part dialogic sequence of an initiative speech act and its reaction. However, not even the sequence of action and reaction can count as the minimal autonomous unit of dialogic interaction. The level of action is not an autonomous level but points to human beings who carry out actions and reactions at the centre of the action game. Human beings are dependent on their abilities, their personal life story and on the cultural surroundings in which they live. We thus arrive at the cultural unit of the mixed game as the minimal autonomous unit in a theory of human competence-in-performance. The other question of the key concept that gives us access to the whole goes to the heart of human action and behaviour. The issue is: what is the driving force for the human species to engage in dialogic action? This is not an issue of actual games but the principal general issue. In order to find an answer we have to focus our attention on human nature. Due to human beings’ double nature as social individuals they are guided by an innate instinct of self-assertion and at the same time by the need to be accepted by other human beings. The self is always dialogically oriented towards the other self. Both needs are interrelated, and they are crucial for the survival and reproduction of the species. It is the needs and purposes of human beings as social individuals which give us the key to opening up the complex. Addressing the mixed game in a holistic theory means considering the complex whole as a hierarchy of interacting subsystems, among them human abilities such as speech, perception and thought. The way they interact can be thought of as a balanced system of rules, conventions, inferences and chance which works on the basis of probabilities. Principles of probability must not be derogatorily viewed as principles of ignorance; on the contrary, they represent powerful techniques for effectively addressing ever-changing conditions of performance. The results and insights gained within rule-restricted models are not totally wasted; but they do need to be basically re-interpreted within a holistic approach. When I first delineated my view of ‘language as dialogue’ more than two decades ago, I was convinced that developing a theory has to start from theoretical reflections and that a theory, in principle, has to be rule-governed. Weigand (1989a) thus represents a theory of communicative competence. Since then I have ­continually



Introduction: The simple and the complex

been confronted with examples which a rule-governed model is unable to describe and with arguments which go beyond a classical theory of competence. I therefore changed sides and opened up the theory of well-formed dialogues towards a theory of competence-in-performance in the second edition (Weigand 2003a). As it was a second edition, I could not go directly to the heart of the new object competence-in-performance but was, to a great extent, restricted to the outline of the first edition. It is therefore time to make a completely fresh start. Before starting a new theory, rethinking theory is needed. Part I of the book therefore deals with two objectives: stocktaking and addressing the turning point. Stocktaking requires a critical overview of the state of the art. The turning point becomes apparent when the necessity of going beyond the limits of reductive approaches is recognized. We are on the way to breaking the shackles of coded patterns and to addressing human action and behaviour from its origins in human nature. In order to pave the ground for a new beginning it is necessary to unmask fashionable, specious assumptions and techniques and to demonstrate the limits of orthodox approaches. The reader might miss a preliminary chapter in which the terms are defined. On the one hand, it cannot be the goal of the volume to give an overview of the multiple terms as they are used in the literature. Dialogue analysis does not represent a unified model but comprehends various approaches with differing terms and meanings. On the other hand, the model of the dialogic action game and its terms are developed in the volume step by step while going through the complex, from premises to methods, and indicating links back and forth. It would be counterproductive to sum up the results in advance. The terms are explained and defined when they are needed for argumentation. The definitions might also be extended later on. The reader is referred to the index which indicates the essential occurrences of a term and marks off the crucial ones. The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model (MGM) is expounded in Part II. Two issues are focused on: premises about the object, and the methodology to be derived from them. Premises about the object ‘competence-in-performance’ start from preconditions of human nature and include cultural influences and environmental conditions. The methodology consists of principles of probability, constitutive, regulative and executive. Constitutive principles describe the fundamentals of action, dialogue and coherence. The Action Principle defines action as the correlation between communicative purposes and means. The Dialogic Principle proper describes communication as dialogic action based on action and reaction. The single speech act thus turns out to be a dialogically oriented speech act. The Coherence Principle focuses on how the different communicative means interact in producing the utterance.





Dialogue: The mixed game

Coherence can no longer be restricted to textual phenomena but is established in the minds of the interlocutors. Regulative principles mediate between different human abilities and interests. They are especially crucial in controlling the double interests of human beings, their self-interest and the interest in being respected in the community, and in mediating between reason and emotion. Principles of politeness as well as principles of emotion are culturally dependent rhetorical principles which tell the interlocutors how to behave according to cultural conventions. Executive principles are sequencing principles. They are not only dependent on general action conditions and on institutional order but also include deliberate strategies which are applied in the interests of individuals and institutions. Part III of the book develops a taxonomy of minimal games on the basis of a dialogic speech act theory. According to the Dialogic Principle proper, speech acts are defined as dialogically oriented parts of the minimal sequence of action and reaction. The taxonomy starts from the general purpose of dialogic interaction and derives basic minimal games and subtypes by exclusively functional criteria. Part IV focuses on the ‘architecture of complex games’. Basic principles for a typology of complex games are discussed. As a result the distinction is made between extended minimal games, i.e. extended one-phase games, and multiphase games. Extended one-phase games open up minimal games by introducing sequences of clarifying and of negotiating divergent views. They can also come out of problems of understanding, including misunderstanding and non-understanding. Multi-phase games pose the complex mental challenge of structuring ‘dialogue in the stream of life’. In addition, as the Mixed Game Model intends to be a comprehensive unitary theory for all types of dialogic action games, literary action games are included and described as a special type of complex games. The last chapter ‘Summary and Outlook’ sums up the main steps and concepts of the MGM and draws conclusions for an understanding of the species.

part i

Rethinking theory Patterns & beyond

By the beginning of the 20th century de Saussure had defined language as a sign system by complete abstraction from language use and thus laid the foundation for modern linguistics. Even if in the decades to come some decisive changes were made, the issue of language has always been addressed by reduction of different kinds. No attempt at linguistic analysis started from the complex whole of language-in-use, which means the integrated use of different communicative means for communicative purposes. Eventually we have now arrived at a turning point where the complex can no longer be ignored or put aside but requires us to accept and respond to the challenge. In Part II, I will try to summarize the state of the art. This appears to be a risky endeavour since the set of existing models is hardly manageable. I hope I will not be expected to give a comprehensive overview; there is always the risk of underestimating and leaving out an approach or a piece of work which others consider essential. The history of modern linguistics superficially represents a confusing sequence of multiple models which can be chronologically ordered. A closer look however can reveal some progress in grasping the issue of language which can be outlined along rather simple guidelines. However different the approaches are, they can nearly all be assigned to the reductionist line. So-called pattern models of competence, language competence as well as communicative competence, undoubtedly belong there; the pattern is achieved by abstraction and reduction to rules, i.e. by simplification. There is also the counter-move which tries to avoid the limits of the simple by focusing, from the very outset, on empirical performance which allows any rule to be broken. Even if empiricists claim to grasp ‘real language use’, they reduce performance to the empirical level and ignore the basic fact that what counts in language use cannot be decided at the empirical level. Both the searchers for rules of competence as well as empiricists, are caught in the methodological trap of missing the complex object by either reducing it to rules or to what can be heard or perceived . The limits of both approaches can no longer be ignored. Addition is not the way to overcome these limits because there is no connection between those

10

Dialogue: The mixed game

­inherently incompatible areas. The object language has to be accepted in its c­ omplexity from the very outset as an integrated part of the complex human ability of competence-in-performance. Accepting the necessity of going beyond reductionism marks the turning point from models of the simple to an adventure into the complex.

chapter 1

The state of the art

1.1

Starting from the simple: Models of language competence

1.1.1 The dogma of language as a sign system Modern linguistics rests on a few fundamental dichotomies set up by de Saussure­ (1916) such as ‘synchrony versus diachrony’, ‘la langue versus la parole’, or ‘expression and meaning’. They represent the premises of his concept of language as a sign system which became the dogma of 20th century linguistics. Only very recently have some linguists recognized that the dogma represents a thesis not a pre-given truth. I will pick up a few points in order to demonstrate the artificial character of this concept of language. Even if de Saussure envisaged that ‘language’ or the central concept of linguistics means something like ‘language-in-use’ or ‘la parole’, he did not dare to address it directly. At the time he was writing it was a concept which was too complex to deal with. He addressed it via an underlying level of ‘la langue’ which he established by definition and total abstraction from all variables of use in the hope one day in the future of advancing from ‘la langue’ to ‘la parole’. He thus constructed ‘la langue’ completely according to methodological rules as a system of signs. The hope of arriving at ‘la parole’ by starting from ‘la langue’ turned out to be illusory. According to de Saussure the sign is defined as the arbitrary correlation of meaning and expression. How is it possible for a sequence of sounds to have meaning in and of itself? No reference is made to human beings who create and use signs; the sign itself is the agent, carries meaning. Meaning is defined by and according to strict convention connected with a sequence of sounds. Are we robots who operate strictly according to definitions in a system? How can we explain the fact that utterances like (1) Change is the only constant in the life of a society.

are not rejected because of an obvious contradiction between the defined meanings of the signs change and constant? Such utterances are accepted in language use because meaning is not defined but negotiated in use by the interlocutors.

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Part I.  Rethinking theory

Linguists might construct an artificial system of language which consists of signs and their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships. In language use however such constructs are of very limited significance. Language use means negotiating meaning and understanding in dialogue. Admittedly, negotiation cannot proceed completely arbitrarily but has to take account of conventions or routines. Conventions however are not strictly binding but are negotiated as well. They are not restricted to the use of single words but regulate the use of words in phrases or multi-word units. Language use turns out to be a complex network of phrases which has nothing to do with a system of signs. We not only have to leave behind the concept of the sign but also to reject the absolute authority of the native speaker when it comes to verifying lexical rules. Doubt has been cast on the method of introspection by a native speaker. We notice the intricacies of language use especially when comparing one language with another. A native speaker of English, for instance, would not consider the word deep as synonymous with high; on the contrary, these ‘signs’ taken in isolation seem to be antonyms. In language use however the German phrase mit tiefem Ernst cannot be translated literally but corresponds to English phrases such as with high seriousness or with (no) great seriousness (Weigand 1996a). What structuralists described as important relation­ships between the meaning side and the expression side of the sign system, e.g., polysemy, synonymy and antonymy, have to be re-described at the level of phrases. The issue of synonymy, polysemy and disambiguation turns out to be, to a large extent, a problem of theory, not of use. It is not definition or introspection by the native speaker which decide the conventionality of lexical phrases but the frequency of use checked in a representative text corpus. The single word thus gets its meaning in phrases. Nonetheless, it is not a completely empty unit. I will no longer avoid the question of the meaning of the single word. Structuralists consider the meaning of a sign to be a mental concept. The mental concept can refer to an object in the external world. Reference however is by no means a feature of single words, or even of nouns. Reference is a matter of the NP as used in the context of the whole utterance. If we consider the meaning of a sign to be a concept, it is by no means a defined concept but something like a ‘chunk’ of meaning, not yet analysed, indeterminate and open. The meaning which is, for instance, evoked by the sound sequence to fall is nothing more than a vague plot of meanings which becomes more determinate in phrases such as to fall down versus to fall back or to fall on one’s shoulder (Weigand 2006a). Communication however does not come about as a process of evoking concepts. The single word has to be put to use; only then, in phrases and utterances, can we grasp meaningful units.



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

Signs consisting of a verbal expression correlated with a defined concept of meaning are considered to be symbols which stand for something beyond the defined concept and can intersubjectively reach the mind of the interlocutor. The use of symbols is often regarded as a specifically human capacity. However, as Wilson (2004: 26) states, “the capacity to communicate by symbols and syntax does lie within the ape’s grasp”. It is not the existence of symbols and syntax as such, but their frequent and easy use that contributes to the evolution of the human species (Li & Hombert 2002). Human beings became able to identify various objects and to reach beyond the realm of the hic et nunc of the speech situation. But to call human beings the symbolic species (Deacon 1997) even in this refined sense is hardly appropriate because it is quite improbable that identifying objects would be of paramount importance to the species. For the survival of the species giving things a name is not sufficient but needs to be embedded in dialogic interaction. It is the use of differentiated techniques, among them symbols, in dialogic communication that contributes to the evolution of the human species as the dialogic species. The use of symbols goes beyond the use of gestures, which is restricted to the speech situation. Identifying, for instance, the object apple by the symbol apple is not restricted to apples present in the speech situation but can mean ‘fetch me an apple’, ‘I want an apple’. The thesis that language evolved out of gestures seems plausible (Weigand 2002a). Human beings could point to an apple using gestures and identify a concrete apple in the speech situation; gestures however make it clear that they are not used as symbols in order to give things a name but as communicative means for an action such as there is an apple, there is something to eat or give me the apple. In the same way, words are not used as isolated symbols but as utterance words, i.e. as carriers of an action. From an evolutionary perspective it is communication which shapes cognition and the development of symbols not vice versa. The discussion about language, cognition and communication is ripe with trivial theses such as ‘language is grounded in cognition’ or ‘language is needed for expressing thoughts’ which do not touch the nub of the issue. There is no object ‘language’ as such grounded in another object ‘cognition’. In accordance with human nature, there are human abilities of speaking and thinking and perceiving which are integratively used for communicative purposes.

1.1.2 The dogma of language as generative competence Besides the concept of language as a sign system there was another artificial concept of language which attracted great attention and attained the status of a

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dogma: Chomsky’s generative concept of language competence as the ability of an ideal speaker to recognize the grammatical sentences of a language and moreover to generate an infinite number of new grammatical sentences that had never been generated before (e.g., Chomsky 1965). Such an ability may at first glance seem surprising and in effect represents a step forward from the static structuralist system to a dynamic system that includes the speaker. At second glance however it contains decisive weak points that all derive from the fact that it is an artificial concept which starts from methodology and severely distorts natural languagein-use. It is true that Chomsky did not intend to develop a model for natural language use; but what sort of language was to be constructed out of mathematical rules? Variables of performance go straight into the wastepaper basket. Only in recent publications does Chomsky feel obliged to refer to ‘language use’ and ‘language as a natural object’ (e.g., Chomsky 2000). Yet what he describes as language use remains restricted by the generative paradigm and its concepts of the ideal speaker and grammatical sentences. The article by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) on “the faculty of language” demonstrates that the old Chomskyan hypotheses are still alive even if “language in the narrow sense” is now complemented by “language in the broad sense” or “language as a communicative system”. Language in the narrow sense is still considered to be “the abstract linguistic computational system alone, independent of the other systems with which it interacts” (p. 1571). What sense does it make to speak of interaction if the interacting systems are independent of one another? Chomsky, of course, needs this strange connection in order to defend his theory of “language in the narrow sense”. However, he then has to face the question of relevance. Artificially modelling language in the narrow sense may aim at simulating language or translating languages by computers. However not even in this computer area has generative grammar been really efficient. Let us consider the question of relevance by referring to a specific type of generative rule often cited as one of Chomsky’s great achievements, the so-called recursive rule which allegedly explains the ideal speaker’s ability to generate an infinite number of new grammatical sentences. At first glance this rule might seem extraordinary. A closer look brings us down to earth. The so-called recursive rule simply allows unlimited repetition of the same rule. Repetition is nothing spectacular in animal communication, for instance, in songs of whales or birds, as Li and Hombert (2002) pointed out. It is only in theory that repetition can be carried out infinitely. The recursive rule ultimately aims at explaining a phenomenon of language use which is indeed astonishing: the individual speaker’s ability to continuously produce new utterances. But what is really achieved by the introduction of recursive rules? The gap between an astonishing natural phenomenon and its alleged



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

formalization remains. The recursive rule does not touch upon the individual speaker’s competence-in-performance; it merely formalizes an ability – never realised or intended in practice – of the virtual ‘ideal’ speaker, namely the ability to keep adding new elements, for instance relative sentences, to an underlying or preceding kernel sentence: (2)

Look at the tree. Look at the tree which is there. Look at the tree which is there behind. Look at the tree which is there behind and which has no top. Look at the tree which is there behind and which has no top and which must be cut down. etc.

This type of play-acting at science may contribute to strengthening the circle of initiated scholars but does not represent a game we play in language use. Admittedly, Chomsky’s recursive rule refers to his concept of the ‘grammatical sentence’ and is not directed towards language use. Nonetheless, we cannot avoid questioning the sense of such games in the ivory tower. The phenomenon that human beings are able to produce ever-new utterances is still waiting for an explanation. I do not mean the fact that in spoken language anything goes. Infinite formal variation misses the point just as do recursive rules. Human beings’ ability to produce utterances never produced before derives from the complexity of meaning and from the fact that meaning is created through the eyes of individual observers and is integratively expressed by the use of different communicative means. Looking at natural language use, we might be baffled by quite a different question: Where have all the ‘sentences’ gone? In an authentic dialogue such as the following: (3) A One for her. B Eve, too.

we do not find sentences, we find utterances, i.e. communicative means, not just verbal ones. Verbal means are integrated with perceptual means. It is necessary to perceive what is going on in order to understand, in our case to see that B, the father, is cutting willow branches for the son, and A, the mother, asks him to cut a branch for the daughter: one for her, which is accepted by the father: Eve, too. Integration in the sense of interaction of the means – verbal, perceptual, and cognitive − is a constitutive feature of human communication. Even today the question of what makes up natural language is still bedevilled by controversial standpoints. Orthodox linguists, especially of a logical stripe, are still of the opinion that dealing with a few single words, signs, in isolation equates

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to dealing with natural language. On the other hand, many empiricists do not hesitate to claim that their transcripts of spoken language represent language. Chomsky’s great achievement has been to proceed on de Saussure’s path of liberating linguistics from philology and to introduce the process view of language. Nonetheless, generative grammar suffers from the shackles of a methodology which decides what counts as a grammatical sentence. The multiplicity and variety of syntactic constructions which occur in natural language use is far beyond its reach. No matter how we look at it, constructs or the simple do not point the way to human beings’ competence-in-performance. It might seem as if we could start from simple, independent modules, and rebuild the complex by a process of addition. However, dividing the complex whole into modules inevitably means cutting through connections which should not be severed and abstracting from features which are lost for ever. Such a technique is possible within predefined artificial systems which consist, by definition, of simple units and their relationships. If we try to deal with the complex, the problem is not the division and addition of parts but the integration and interaction of components in such a way that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. It requires a change of perspective by starting from the complex object and deriving an appropriate methodology from the way the complex works. The complex means human beings acting and reacting in the mixed game on the basis of their competence-in-performance. They try to satisfy their needs and to pursue their goals as social individuals in changing environments by means of their integrated communicative abilities.

1.2

The pragmatic turning point: From language competence to communicative competence

By the middle of the 20th century, slowly but inescapably, we were becoming aware of the limits of concepts of language as a sign system or as generative language competence. Fascination with clear formal structures changed to disillusionment, and the question ‘Can this be all?’ could no longer be avoided. However, the time was not yet ripe for making a totally fresh start even if compositional models had been completely demolished (Baker & Hacker 1984). The challenge to be faced was clear, namely, to go beyond the limit of the sentence, but the problem was: what could count as a reasonable candidate for the unit beyond the sentence? The situation, the text, the “perspective” of pragmatics (Verschueren 1987)? Beyond the sentence there is the world; beyond the sentence there is natural language.



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

The next problem immediately arose: what is ‘natural language’? I remember the moment when we recognized that ‘natural language’ meant ‘language use’. We were happy to have made a first big step forward which opened up the way to a concept of ‘language’ that included all the domains abstracted from it in sign theory: the speech situation, the speaker and the interlocutor, and the cultural background. Properly understood, this new pragmatic concept of ‘language use’ meant what de Saussure had called ‘la parole’. What seems clear now was not so clear a few decades ago. On the contrary, the problems posed by the so-called pragmatic turning point were enormous. Instead of simply defining pragmatics as the study of language-in-use, the new concept of pragmatics was bedevilled by a series of methodological problems such as the relationship between semantics and pragmatics (Levinson 1983). ‘La parole’ was only approached in a first tentative step by changing ‘language competence’ to ‘communicative competence’. Whereas Hymes (1972: 281) had introduced this term in sociological studies of performance as “competence for use”, in linguistics ‘communicative competence’ remained a term separated from performance and addressed at an underlying rule-governed level. Abstraction and the search for rules and conventions continued underground. There are, in my view, three major types of approaches to communicative competence: the multi-level approach which starts from the sign system, the pattern approach based on ‘well-formed’ speech act sequences, and the logical normative approach based on rational syllogisms.

1.2.1 The multi-level approach Although the pragmatic turning point has made it clear that language does not stop at the limit of the sentence, the sentence nevertheless remained the starting point of analysis in mainstream linguistics. The methodological obstacles, especially of the generative paradigm, were too strong to be simply set aside. Instead of making a fresh start with pragmatics as the study of the new object ‘language use’, the concept of pragmatics was tied to traditional concepts such as semantics. Pragmatics was artificially constructed as a specific sort of meaning, something beyond semantics, ‘speaker meaning’ or ‘contextual meaning’ (e.g., Leech 1983, Yule 1996). A ‘grammar of language use’ was considered to be a “daring metaphor” (Rehbock 1993, Weigand 1993b). The grammar of a language had to start from the sentence in the attempt to find ‘language use’ somewhere in the depth below the level of the sentence. Various levels were established: the levels of sentence types, modality and propositional attitudes, in the hope of arriving at the bottom where pragmatics waits to be discovered (cf. Rosengren 1992/1993 and

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Weigand 1994b). In trying to descend to the depth of meaning any reasonable sense of orientation was lost. Levinson was also fond of playing multi-level games and augmenting the number of technical terms without any scruple. His model of “presumptive meanings” (Levinson 2000) consists of various levels constructed on the basis of the sentence as a starting point. Levinson’s concept of pragmatics, roughly defined in 1983 as “non-semantic meaning” or more precisely as meaning that cannot be dealt with in truth-conditional semantics, has not changed. Pragmatics for him refers to an artificial area, to separating levels, to ‘l’art pour l’art’, to a methodological trap. Presumptive meanings are “utterance-type meanings” or “matters of preferred interpretations” (Levinson 2000: 1). The level of utterance-type meaning was introduced as a third level in addition to sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Whereas sentence meaning was defined by a fixed code, speaker meaning by the actual context or particularized conversational implicatures, utterance-type meaning was characterized by generalized conversational implicatures, so-called preferred interpretations. The whole approach was thus determined by mapping different levels and pushed to the forefront with a certain generative emphasis. We have the level of semantics as coded meaning and two levels of pragmatics, the token-level of speaker meaning and the type-level of utterance-type meaning. It remains unclear what Levinson intends when he stresses that there is only “a single level of representation” on which semantics and pragmatics “offer their own distinctive contributions” as “component processes” (p. 9). How is one to conceive of adding a performance level of particularized implicatures to what – as a whole – seems to be intended as a model of competence? It could be interpreted as an attempt to arrive at what I call “competence-in-performance”, an attempt however that proceeds via methodological fallacies. Levinson uses the usual mix of terms (p.14, italics EW): “the sum of what is said (roughly the truth-conditional content) and what is conventionally implicated” is “coded by the linguistic system”. What is “conversationally implicated” is added to the coded meaning. It is not coded but “rather inferred on the basis of some basic assumptions about the rational nature of conversational activity, as stated in the Cooperative Principle and its constituent maxims of conversations”. Why should we make the effort to try to separate the sense and nonsense of Levinson’s neo-Gricean approach? How do truth conditions come together with human interaction or “conversational activities”? Long ago, ­Kasher (1989: 79), a philosopher known for his preference for logical and generative approaches, told us that truth-conditional semantics is “incompatible with basic facts of language use”. Levinson does not hesitate to present the patently irrational view that truth-conditional semantics “is useful as a yardstick of human performance” (p. 7).



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

Levinson is right in emphasizing “the heterogeneous nature of meaning” (p. 21) but is wrong in concluding that this heterogeneous nature has to be modeled by separating linguistic theory from a theory of communication. Any argument justifying such a conclusion is missing. Complex phenomena may consist of different heterogeneous components; the components however are components of one integrated whole. Levinson confronts us with theoretical hypotheses without any reference to natural language use. He illustrates his hypotheses with a few simulated examples, precisely constructed in order to support the hypotheses. Numerous technical terms seem to be introduced in order to impress the reader. The term ‘generative’, however, has lost its appeal. Attempts to claim respectful attention for an approach by calling it ‘generative’ (Levinson 2000: 24, 362) risk being considered nugatory. In my view, the claim that natural language is being dealt with by presenting theoretical hypotheses and speculations results from a lack of experience in practical analysis. How can we make sense of “the natural language logical operators” (p. 72)? Natural language does not have ‘logical operators’; it is not a logical phenomenon at all. Nevertheless large parts of Levinson’s book deal with logical principles and with simulated logic-like examples. What is the real object of this theory? Without doubt a logic-like language, the fashionable “phenomena that modern Gricean pragmaticists wrestle with” (p. xvii). This mix of general rules and particular conditions, of logic and language, contains further inconsistent aspects (p. 6), among them allusions to logical game theory in Schelling’s sense of a “game of pure coordination” (1960) and to the old theory of language economy by Zipf (1949). The basic problem with this model arises from the fact that it is restricted to the level of information theory as taken over from Grice (1957, 1975, 1989). The crucial concept of dialogic action is dismissed; action is restricted to information transfer. It is the artificial notion of pragmatics as ‘non truth-conditional semantics’ and the missing concept of action which is the main cause of the failure of this approach. Yet the beginning of the book promised at least to throw some light on the darkness, for instance, when Levinson compared the “sketchy” nature of the utterance with Rembrandt’s drawing (p. 4). The feature ‘sketchy’ raised the hope that conclusions would be drawn as to some sort of ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ or even to the ‘end of certainty’ in language use (Weigand 2006a, 2009b). Our expectations were disappointed: Levinson admits that “we don’t really have the faintest idea how it [i.e. inferencing, EW] works”. I would like to replace we by ‘the generative neo-Gricean scholars’. Their attempts are “stabs in the dark” (p. 4) as Levinson himself calls it, lamenting “the primitive state of our knowledge in pragmatics” and characterizing the present book as “merely a working hypothesis” (p. xiv). It seems to be fashionable to make a stab in the dark and to make excuses for the

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lack of results in the hope that explicitly admitting the failure of an approach will somehow change its weakness into strength. Levinson’s multi-level approach starts from an artificial concept of pragmatics which is added as a separate part to “core linguistic theory”. By doing this, Levinson sticks to some fixed code of sign theory, e.g. to “encoded lexical meaning” (p. 376). As was the case with the concept of the ‘sketchy’ utterance, there is another point at the end of the book (p. 376f.) where one might think one has discovered some flash of light, when he seems to acknowledge that the artificial system has to be opened up. But this flash of light immediately dies. On the whole, Levinson confronts us with an intriguingly sophisticated exposition of an artificial ‘theory’ which despite multiple technical distinctions does not really address the complex but avoids it. It is simply too weak to admit that ‘he does not know’ and to refer to Grice who had already “foreseen from the beginning the problems we have here been grappling with” (p. 260). According to Levinson (p. 377) “the theoretical synthesis may or may not be successful”, “but that is not ultimately the most important issue, which is to keep those prominent pragmatic features in theoretical play”. Let us therefore leave this sort of ‘theoretical play’ to the neoGriceans, if they have the appetite for it (for Grice see below 1.3.3). Recently, however, Levinson made an interesting step forward towards overcoming the limits of artificial models. Together with Enfield he is on the way to devising a model of the “web of interconnected properties that together constitute human sociality” (Enfield & Levinson 2006: 12). Even if their exposition contains interesting individual features such as the assumption that interaction is “governed not by rules but by expectation” (p. 45), as a whole it is disappointing because they ignore the state of the art achieved in action theory when they only take simple adjacency pairs and turn taking regularities as their starting point.

1.2.2 The pattern approach In contrast to Levinson, who starts from the sentence, there is a quite different type of approach which starts from functional structures of speech act sequences. The limit of the sentence is crossed by transforming sentences into utterances and opening up the level of speech act functions. To some degree this type of approach can be considered as a first step towards the complex, but a step in which the complex is immediately reduced to rational patterns (Searle 2001). Typical proponents are Hundsnurscher (1980) with his model of Dialogue Grammar and Habermas (1981) with his sociological theory of communication. Dialogue Grammar continues the line of generative grammar by introducing generative principles into pragmatics and starting from the premise that the



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

competent native speaker can indicate in advance the various possible courses a specific dialogue type can take. The sequence of moves is considered to arise from conventional choices. The dialogic competence of the speaker and the interlocutor is the same, understanding is presupposed. Such methodological restrictions are the basis on which “well-formed dialogues” are constructed. Apart from this generative affinity which Dialogue Grammar has in common with the multi-level model, they are completely different models. Whereas the multi-level model starts from the simple module of the sentence, and tries to discover the complex via the addition of modules, Dialogue Grammar starts from what it believes to be the complex, namely the speech act, and aims to describe the sequencing of speech acts as a conventional pattern. On the one hand, Dialogue Grammar challenged the widespread view that there are no rules, no general conventions for connecting speech acts in sequences. On the other hand, it also challenged empiricist approaches such as that of conversational analysis by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1978) who started from ever-varying authentic texts and tried to discover rules by exclusively formal criteria. Two decades later, the direction taken by Dialogue Grammar has, to some extent, proved right: there are regularities of sequencing in dialogue whereas the empiricist approach is still struggling with infinite variables the significance of which is left in the dark (Weigand 2004a). Hundsnurscher’s model gained its power by replacing one extreme with another: the empiricist extreme of Conversational Analysis was replaced with the rule-governed pattern extreme of Dialogue Grammar. Such a radical change, however, already predetermined the limits of Dialogue Grammar from the very beginning. As a pattern model it is clearly a model of communicative competence and as such incapable of bridging the gap between competence and performance. What we now recognize as limits, the reduction to a single rule-governed pattern, was considered to be great progress two decades ago: we were able to design patterns of speech act sequences. For some time this was indeed a great step forward. Opening up the pattern was a task for the years to come. A first step in overcoming the limits of the classical model of Dialogue Grammar was made by Weigand (1989a) in developing a genuine dialogic speech act typology by which the equation of illocution and action was revoked and the concept of the dialogically oriented speech act introduced with the sequence of action and reaction. Even if Hundsnurscher (1992) admitted that the dialogic view amounts to a paradigm change in linguistics, he himself continued to use Searle’s taxonomy of single speech acts (1975a) and simply added the formal feature of sequence dependency. In addition, Weigand (1989a) went beyond the classical model of Dialogue Grammar by including cognitive means and accepting the concept of indirect speech acts.

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Weigand (1989a) did not however yet recognize from the start that even the two-part sequence of action and reaction cannot count as a minimal communicatively autonomous unit. Action and reaction are dependent on interacting human beings and the cultural environment. In accepting the well-formed dialogue as the object of investigation, language use was not yet clearly defined as natural phenomenon but remained severely impaired by methodological exigencies. What was considered to be the strength of the model – introducing generative principles into pragmatics −, turned out to be the major obstacle to opening up classical theorizing and going beyond generalizations. The hope of bridging the gap between competence and performance by continually differentiating the rules proved to be an illusion. I remember very well the time when we came across issues such as inferences or the individual situation and we refused to take them into account. It simply seemed unthinkable to include individuality in theory. Habermas (1981) also starts from well-formed or idealised dialogues in his sociological type of a functional pattern approach. Whereas Hundsnurscher was influenced by generative grammar, Habermas’ model of pure rationality can be understood as a reaction to the limits of empiricist sociological approaches. In contrast to Hundsnurscher, Habermas goes beyond Searle’s monologic, intentional speech act typology and offers a clearly dialogic, interactional speech act typology which is based on validity claims (Habermas 1991). These claims however are far removed from conditions of everyday life insofar as they exclusively take into account the reaction of consensus and are defined by criteria constructed in the utopia of Habermas’ ideal sociological world.

1.2.3 The logical normative approach Since antiquity Western thinking has been based on a belief in certainty. Generative grammar and logic supported this attitude by providing systems of mathematical and logical rules based on rationality. These rule-governed systems were applied to language by dismantling it until it fitted the system of rules. Scholars were not interested in the nature of the phenomenon but in searching for rules underlying the phenomenon. Even when complex concepts such as persuasion were focused on, for instance, in New Rhetoric (e.g., Perelman 1977), language use was immediately reduced to quasi-logical argument schemes. Only in recent years did scholars dare to go beyond the limitations of exclusively rational or logical systems and proposed opening up fixed codes by means of concepts such as ‘practical reason’ (Toulmin 2001) or ‘soft rationality’ (Dascal 1996b, Dascal & Gross 1999).



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

The Pragma-Dialectical Approach by van Eemeren and his group is an outstanding model explicitly based on logic and on Aristotelian dialectics. “Argumentation Theory” deals with argumentation as a defined normative concept. Features of the theory affect the object from the very outset (van Eemeren 2001: 11): “Argumentation can be defined as a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint …” Argumentation is thus restricted to criteria of reasonableness and it is “the task of argumentation theorists to determine which soundness criteria should be satisfied for the argumentation to be called reasonable”. These soundness criteria are investigated in terms of logical fallacies. Nonetheless, argumentation theorists recognized the need to complement logic with the pragmatic component of speech act theory. In this respect two problems arose: first, the principal problem of how to combine logic with speech acts and second, the problem of how to go beyond single speech acts as described in classical speech act theory. The first problem refers to the role of logical fallacies in performance. Pragma-Dialectics takes the road of “reconstruction” and presupposes that in performance we orient ourselves by reconstructing norms of reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 114f.). The question is: do we really act and behave by ‘reconstructing logical norms’? Modern linguistics decided to be descriptive linguistics. It is however not so simple-minded as to ignore norms completely. In performance we are aware of norms and sometimes obey them but we do not ‘reconstruct’ them. Norms are reference points for human action, but we are free to keep to them or not. They have thus to be included by describing them as potential benchmarks in a theory which is designed as a descriptive theory, such as the Mixed Game Model. In contrast to the descriptive view, the normative view of Pragma-Dialectics postulates a specific way of behaving as it should be, called “critical discussion” (Weigand 2006b). The second problem refers to the basic question of how to arrive at dialogue if we start from classical speech act theory. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 23) are aware of the necessity of taking account of the dialogic nature of speech acts and critically remark that “Searle’s basic theory […] applies only to illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts being disregarded”. The way chosen by the pragma-dialectic approach is to complement traditional speech act theory with techniques from other approaches such as conversational rules or to introduce a so-called “interactional act” in addition to the “communicative act” (e.g., van Rees 1992, Willard 1989). In recent years Pragma-Dialectics took the step of going beyond the limits of logic by including rhetoric and persuasion in what is called “rhetoric manoeuvring” (van Eemeren & Hout­losser 1999). As encouraging as such a step might be, it

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does not really change the starting premises of a normative background of reasonableness and amounts more to addition than to integration of rhetoric. Another attempt to describe ordinary language use via logic is made by Piattelli Palmarini (1995). Even if he deals with persuasion, i.e. with a topic of performance, and even if he recognizes the feature of irrationality in human beings’ behaviour, he nevertheless tries to reduce performance to logic and throughout the whole book deals minutely with syllogisms. The inconsistency of this procedure invariably leads to disappointing results such as the statement that sometimes syllogisms count and sometimes not. This approach simply ignores the fact that there is no bridge between performance and logic. Piattelli Palmarini rephrases the gap as a “mystery” and combines it with another mystery which he considers to be “the law of pragmatics” (p. 158), namely the Principle of Relevance put forward by Sperber and Wilson (1986). The trivial argument of relevance theory that what we are doing in dialogic interaction is done with some presumption of relevance is interpreted by Piattelli Palmarini as establishing relevance between logic and a certain context. I am still waiting to be enlightened about the usefulness of this ‘law of pragmatics’. To sum up: By the end of the 20th century the path of abstraction and generalization which led from language competence to communicative competence arrived at a crossroads. Artificial dogmas were shaken. The notion of a theory can no longer rest on a reduction of the natural object. Linguists were called on to settle the confusion which arises from the fact that theory and object drift apart. The concept of theorizing needed to be changed if we did not want to be bogged down in a theoretical game in the ivory tower.

1.3

Trying to overcome the limits of the simple: Models of performance

Various attempts were made to settle the dilemma between the classical way of theorizing and an ever-changing object. Some scholars tried to overcome the limits of the simple by dismantling compositional theory without offering an alternative view (e.g., Baker & Hacker 1984). Denying any type of rule or unit leads to chaos (Taylor & Cameron 1987). Denouncing the concept of language embodied in code models as a ‘myth’, Harris (1981) put forth the approach of “Integrational Linguistics”. However important the idea of integration is, its characterization by Harris remains obscure to me. How are we to understand his concept of “communication as integration” which is “governed by three kinds of factor: biomechanical, macrosocial, circumstantial” (Harris 1998: 29)? Very few and only simulated examples are offered which are of little help in illustrating what is meant. Moreover,



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

the central concept of the code model, the sign, is still accepted (Harris 1996). To my mind, the simple has been attacked but not really abandoned. Even the “total speech” of Toolan (1996) is based more on deconstructing coded devices than on paving viable new paths. “Integrational Linguistics” seems to mistrust any type of theory and to virtually refuse to develop an alternative theory. The situation we are confronted with is characterized by a multiplicity of approaches. We can appreciate this situation of a plurality of models as it draws our attention to ever new aspects and perspectives. We must however not stop and simply add different aspects and levels one to another but should try to see how they are integrated in the complex whole of human interactive performance. Going beyond orthodox theorizing will be inevitable. In this chapter I will give a short overview of approaches to performance which can be assigned to different headings: pragmatics as a “perspective”, pragmatics of authentic texts, pragmatics of inferences, and discourse pragmatics, whatever ‘discourse’ is intended to mean. The issue of a pragmatic or communicative grammar is not included because it is a specific issue of its own that needs to be dealt with separately. A few remarks on this issue are made in Part II in connection with the Principle of Coherence (see also Weigand 2003a). Being confronted by a multitude of models in this field I cannot deal with approaches which do not seem directly pertinent to my issue of language use in the mixed game. Among them are approaches by scholars in the US who are more or less bound to the American discipline of “Speech Communication” (e.g., Anderson, Baxter & Cissna 2004). They address dialogue as a more general communicative or rhetorical impulse by focusing on psychological, sociological or philosophical variables. As individual studies they can be completely different. We also find general reflections on dialogue as some sort of philosophical religion, for instance, dialogue as “meeting” (Cissna & Anderson 2008). What was put forth in Europe half a century ago, for instance, by Buber (1958), is now being addressed in America.

1.3.1 Pragmatics as a perspective Besides Levinson’s attempt to grasp pragmatics as an artificial type of non-truth functional meaning, we are confronted with another pretentious attempt at ‘understanding pragmatics’ put forth by Verschueren (1999). His starting definition of pragmatics as the study of language use sounds encouraging: “This base-level definition does not introduce a strict boundary between pragmatics and some other areas in the field of linguistics, such as discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, or conversation analysis.” However, it only seems to be an encouraging start

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­because one strict boundary remains, that between sign theory and use (pp. 2, 203). On the basis of the orthodox multi-level view, in sign theory different levels of “language resources” are distinguished, namely the traditional levels of phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics. This leads to the question (p. 2): “But where does pragmatics come in?” Having read Verschueren’s exposition up to this point, it becomes depressingly clear that the whole book is full of flaws. A more appropriate title would be ‘Misunderstanding pragmatics’. Even if pragmatics is now reasonably correlated with language use, the question for Verschueren is simply: how are the language resources of a sign system used, or how is the sign system put to use? Verschueren wants to avoid the impression of proposing a model based on addition and therefore introduces and defines pragmatics as a “perspective” (p. 2): “Pragmatics does not constitute an additional component of a theory of language, but it offers a different perspective [italics JV].” Verschueren’s idea of calling pragmatics a perspective is not new but goes back to a discussion at the pragmatics conference in Viareggio in 1985 (Verschueren 1987). How are we to understand this term? In any case, we should not shut our eyes to the fact that the ‘perspective’ is added to the sign system. Even if he claims “to explain precisely what that perspective entails” (p. 2), no precision is achieved throughout the whole book: ‘perspective’ remains a vague and empty term. However, the claims the book is full of are large (p. 6ff.): “the pragmatic perspective is intended to give insight into […] the link between language and human life in general”. The initial “question of how language resources are used” is rephrased as: “How does language function in the lives of human beings?” The question is indeed clear and crucial but the book does not provide any answer. The book simply complements the orthodox ‘multi-level view’ of language resources with an empty ‘perspective view’. Adding the ‘perspective view’ as an “allencompassing” view (p. 10) makes it possible to include any fashionable issue whatsoever. The issues are however not really dealt with but only very superficially touched upon in a simple, introductory way (cf. especially the terms “speech acts”, p. 22, or “conversation”, p. 37). They are inserted in a series of terms (mostly in Chapter 2) such as “negotiability”, “adaptability”, “flexible principles and strategies” (pp. 12, 60), “discourse” and “ideology”. No attempt to integrate the issues into a coherent whole is made even if Verschueren claims “to present a coherent theoretical framework” (p. xi) or the “nuts and bolts of pragmatics”. The list of terms also contains the term “context” (Chapter 3) which is widely used in the literature as some sort of wastepaper basket. Under this term Verschueren lists various other terms which seem to be of some importance in present-day pragmatic studies such as the “social world”, the “mental world”, “culture”, the “physical world”, and “discourse and ideology” (p. 237). ­Nothing



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

is left out in the attempt to deal with the ‘all-encompassing’ perspective of pragmatics. Even “speech genres”, “language games”, features of “dynamics” (Chapter 5) are added to components of “structure” such as old and new information, codes, and morphemes, mostly without any examples. Insofar as examples are given, simulated examples are mixed with authentic ones. The analysis is sometimes embarrassing in its simplicity and triviality. We are faced with incomprehensible, absurd statements such as “utterers or speakers should not be treated as if they were the unmistakable source of the meaningful utterances they produce” (p. 78). Verschueren’s claim that he has “defined a theory of pragmatics” (p. 224) inevitably raises the question: what makes up a theory? Can it simply be a set of concepts arbitrarily mixed together in an “all-encompassing” view, resulting from a combination of Searle’s orthodox speech act theory, Grice’s idealist cognitive view and the turn-taking methodology of conversation analysis? Verschueren himself seems to have noticed this heterogeneous mix when he attempts to defend it with phrases such as “trying to pull together different topics and orientations in a principled way”. In listing alleged fellow scholars and preceding activities on more than two pages in the preface he demonstrates his ambitious intention of making his mark in science, a mark which, when judged by the results, turns out to be irritating and disappointing. To sum up: Pragmatics as the study of language use does not simply mean putting the sign system to use via a ‘perspective’ or embedding it in a ‘context’ (Weigand 2009c). Natural language use is quite a different object which cannot be reached by starting from the construct of language as a sign system and complementing it by a vague ‘perspective’ in an ‘all-encompassing view’. We have to liberate ourselves from methodological fallacies such as “defining a theory”. Theorizing about a complex object means starting from the complex and deriving an appropriate methodology from it.

1.3.2 Empirical pragmatics Models of empirical pragmatics range from sociological conversation-analytical models to socio-interactional models and models of corpus linguistics. Conversation-analytical models of turn-taking (cf., e.g., Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1978) explicitly restrict themselves to formal criteria, whereas interactional sociolinguistic models along the lines of Gumperz (1982) include concepts of meaning and interpretation. As I have already dealt with “possibilities and limitations of corpus linguistics” (Weigand 2004b) and have reviewed interactional sociolinguistic approaches (Weigand 2004a), I will mainly focus on the central thesis

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which is common to all these approaches, the thesis of empirical evidence or the maxim of “trust the text”, as Sinclair (1994) put it. ‘Evidence’ is often used as a fashionable term in linguistics without going to the core of the phenomenon: what does ‘evidence’ mean? In principle, there is no evidence as such nor empirical evidence as such. Evidence is established in the human mind by relating questions or assumptions to empirical phenomena which might confirm them. In any case, we must first have an idea and then we can look for evidence for that idea (Feynman 2001: 173). It does not make sense to do it the other way round: scrutinizing so-called empirical ‘data’ the status of which is quite uncertain, in the hope of being enlightened by them. We know from de Saussure and Chomsky that empirical elements count as ‘data’ only insofar as they are correlated with meaning (Weigand 2004a). Otherwise they remain negligible formal variations. Attributing meaning to them by artificially ‘constructing grammar’ out of ‘emerging’ variations completely reverses what grammar is about (see below Part II 2.2.3). Looking for empirical evidence can be useful, for example, in sociological approaches which investigate the thesis that turn-taking represents a means of dominance in the group. Turn-taking is an empirical phenomenon and can therefore be used as empirical evidence for something beyond the empirical. By contrast, language use is not an exclusively empirical phenomenon. Spoken language reduced to the empirical level cannot therefore provide evidence for language use in dialogic interaction nor can it be the key or starting point for analysing the complex whole. It is consequently not justified to postulate that exclusively authentic texts are to be taken as examples and that they have to be meticulously transcribed according to notation codes which can hardly be read. Such a procedure only makes sense if the goal of analysis is, for whatever reason, documenting authentic, i.e. non-repeatable occurrences of speech. If the goal however is describing and explaining human interaction, the authentic text loses priority. The issue of evidence confronts us once again with the basic issue of what language amounts to. The empirical approach turns out to start with reduction insofar as it excludes all other variables that are inextricably interwoven with the ability to speak. It does not gain its orientation from the way human beings proceed in language use but from methodological exigencies which assign significance to any empirical variation of spoken language. Human beings proceed quite differently: they neglect most of these variations and instead try to come to grips with what is negotiated. What empiricists consider to be ‘real’ performance is distorted performance. Notation codes fix what in performance is not fixed but transitory. Language is reduced to the results of transcription. The crucial feature of being integrated with other communicative means, not only empirical ones, is ignored. What is needed is an integrative functional approach which tries to grasp



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

how the different communicative means are interconnected. There is no independent object language as such; speaking is only part of the communicative means by which we carry out actions. We do not ‘do things with words’ exclusively. The problem is that there is no general conventional pattern of how verbal, perceptual and cognitive means are connected. The connection depends on the individual speaker in the actual moment. Language thus gains its extraordinary capacity of being intersubjectively used for individual as well as social purposes. Let me be more precise in elaborating the difference between language and speaking: it is true that language as a natural phenomenon can only be grasped as the human capability of speaking (Weigand 2010b). Authentic language use is therefore indeed of special importance. However, speaking is not an independent object but an integrated component of the complex whole of human competencein-performance. When trying to understand competence-in-performance we cannot dismiss the concept of action. There are various concepts in circulation. Relating competence-in-performance to sociological concepts of action is of little help. We need a concept which is rooted in language. It is the concept of speech acts, dialogically reshaped, which establishes the connection between communicative means, among them speaking, and purposes of action.

1.3.3 Cognitive pragmatics Cognitive pragmatics is based on the crucial insight that we mean more than we say and this indeed marks an important step forward in our search for principles of how language works. Structural principles such as explicit expression of meaning and complete semantic representation are of no use. It is instead the mix of different communicative means and indeterminacy of meaning that makes it possible for us to mean more than we say. The problem is to explain how these different means cooperate in negotiating meaning. There is no simple link between the level of saying and the level of meaning. Yule (1996: 4), for instance, points to this missing link with the following example



(4) Her: So – did you? Him: Hey – who wouldn’t?

It does not help to call such an example a “problematic case”. On the contrary, it is the usual case in language use and it is quite normal that observers often have ‘no idea what was communicated’ even if they speak the same mother tongue. What Yule calls a “frustrating area of study” refers to the so-called ‘observer problem’,

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which is a natural consequence of the fact that the action game is not only played by empirical means but essentially relies on cognitive means. In really problematic cases only the speakers know what is meant. Beyond what is said, there is the world which is perceived and reflected on by human beings. Human beings and their abilities are the central reference point. The problem is how the different human abilities of speech, thought and perception interact. In the same way as empiricists dodge or ignore the question by focusing exclusively on the ability to speak, cognitivists avoid it by singling out the ability to think. Within cognitive pragmatics we can distinguish between two main types of approach: the one based on the notion of inferences, the other on the notion of relevance. Since Grice’s article on “Logic and conversation” inferences have played an important role in pragmatics (Grice 1975). They are considered to be the missing link between what is said and what is meant. Grice drew our attention to two crucial phenomena, the cognitive and the non-conventional. They are however not really integrated into his framework of idealized maxims. By adding conversational inferences to some form of simple ‘information theory’ (p. 47) Grice constructs a strange mix of theoretically incompatible parts. How are we to understand his general Principle of Cooperation? If we take it as an overall principle, it will be an empty concept which adds nothing to the concept of communication. It can be taken for granted that human beings as social beings will not turn away if they are addressed by somebody else. If we take it as an idealistic concept, its counterpart, confrontation and conflict, will be ignored. As an idealistic concept it conforms to his other maxims such as “Avoid ambiguity” or “Be orderly” (p. 46). However, where can we find such idealistic principles in everyday or institutional performance? We do not start acting as ideal actors and then abruptly change to individual actors. In my view, cognition plays a double role in dialogic interaction, as meaning concept and as a means of communication. Insofar as inferences help human beings in their attempt to come to an understanding, they represent cognitive means. Cognitive means are techniques for establishing connections between what is said and what could be meant, either conventionally or individually. By means of individual inferences interlocutors tentatively relate the peculiarities of an individual case to potential meanings. In doing so, they do not simply add a separate, nonconventional part of inferences to the code of the sign system. All models which try to introduce Grice’s inferences into a theory of language and interaction by addition are doomed to fail. Action includes cognition. Dascal (1994) rightly points to the need to go beyond Grice and complement his theory of inferences with fundamentals of speech act theory. ‘Complementation’ however cannot simply mean the addition of two quite different models,



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

Grice and Searle (see Weigand 1996b), but has to be considered a form of interaction which requires restructuring the whole. The same is true of Leech (1983), who complements logical semantics with non-conventional pragmatics, and of Levinson’s neo-Gricean multi-level approach (see above). Besides the concept of inferencing there is another concept in pragmatics that has attracted much attention, the concept of relevance. As was the case with Grice’s Cooperative Principle, I always wondered what the point was in assuming such a general concept ‘relevance’ without indicating its reference point. It is simply banal to presuppose that utterances addressed to the other are ‘relevant’ for communication. Such general features of relevance and cooperation are inherent in the notion of the dialogic action game. Whereas Grice’s concept of inferencing refers to an essential part of dialogic interaction that has been ignored in traditional theorizing, the concept of relevance lacks substance. It can be compared with Verschueren’s “perspective” because it can be applied whenever any explanation is missing as an ‘all-encompassing’ concept which in effect explains nothing. In its original version by Sperber and Wilson (1986) ‘relevance’ seems to be something like a principle of economy − as already proposed decades ago by Zipf (1949) − which guides the exchange of information by observing that maximum effect is achieved at minimal cost. Communication is again reduced to the exchange of information. The trivial statement “that communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance” is offered as a “fundamental idea” (p. vii). Piattelli Palmarini (1995), in his misleading attempt to describe persuasion by means of logic, does not hesitate to consider ‘relevance’ as “the pragmatic law” (la legge pragmatica, p. 158) and to explain anything by simply referring to the “rule of relevance” (la regola della pertinenza, p. 147f.). His substitution of the vague term “relevance” by the equally vague term “context” does not clarify anything. Within cognitivist approaches there is another type of model, Langacker’s model of “Cognitive Grammar” (1987 and 1991), that should at least be mentioned because it again serves as a fashionable reference point for cognitivist and prototypical approaches. From a pragmatic point of view, Cognitive Grammar, which considers language as a ‘configuration of concepts’, is rather remote from the subject of actual language use (Weigand 2002c). It proceeds in the same way as generative grammar, i.e. by developing a methodology and then simulating examples which are intended to support the model. To sum up: Despite many wanderings, cognitive pragmatics has made an important step forward in our understanding of dialogic interaction by accepting the premise that we mean more than we say and introducing the non-conventional. The crucial issue of how the conventional and the non-conventional interact still awaits explanation.

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1.3.4 Discourse pragmatics Besides the terms ‘perspective’ and ‘relevance’ there is another proliferating term which, if at all, only seemingly lives up to expectations: the term ‘discourse’. It is again a term that is considered to be the all-encompassing basis of a ‘pan-discipline’­ discourse analysis (van Dijk 1985a, b; Weigand 1994a). Initially, ‘discourse’ simply meant ‘text’ (Harris 1952). Research into discourse concentrated on textlinguistic studies following the pattern of syntactic and semantic research (Harweg 1968/1979, Greimas 1970). The main issue was to find criteria which could define the text as the unit beyond the sentence. The issue of ‘text coherence’ or of what makes up a text however turned out to be a never-ending problem (Weigand 2000b). At the textsyntactic or textsemantic level no criteria for delimiting the unit of text could be found. After the pragmatic turn the concept of discourse was opened up in all directions and for all disciplines to the ‘uncircumscribed area’ of social interaction (Brown & Yule 1983: ix, van Dijk 1985a, Weigand 1994a). The “goal of a homogeneous ‘discipline’ with a unified theory” was regarded as “pointless” (Tannen 1989: 7f.). If ‘anything goes’, every aspect and method can be included. The ‘pan-discipline’ turns out to be a form of ‘pan-eclecticism­’ (Frawley 1987). What I consider to be a major deficiency was thus turned upside down and declared to be the advantage of multi-perspectivity and plurality of opinions (cf. also Titscher et al. 2000). To my mind, the present situation in pragmatics is characterized by a lack of orientation. Terms without clear profile seem to be preferred, such as ‘perspective’, ‘relevance’ or ‘discourse’, as they allow scholars to follow mainstream trends without digging deep. I am not ignoring the fact that discourse analysis also offers interesting studies which address a variety of social aspects (e.g., Wodak & Chilton 2005). A hotchpotch of multiple aspects and methods does however not make up a holistic theory. ‘Holistic’ means describing the complex as a unified whole which unfolds its structure if the proper key is found. The key to the complex of social interaction, to my mind, is action by communicative means. The main methodological fallacy of a pragmatics of discourse, relevance or perspective results from the belief that we could proceed without taking account of the crucial concept of action. Criticism levelled at Searle’s speech act theory is, to some extent, correct: Searle’s theory is indeed abstract, but this is no reason to ignore its basic assumptions. I wonder why only few attempts have been made to reshape it so as to apply to real language use in dialogic interaction. In this respect, I would like to mention Clark’s approach (1996) which, to some degree, takes account of action and tries to comprehend the whole. His term “ensemble” corresponds to what I call “action game”. Clark introduces interesting aspects such as the fact that human beings act as individuals. His view of



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

language use as a chess game however contradicts his emphasis on the individual. Moreover his concept of action is not really based on speech act theory but is reduced to knowledge and, once again, information exchange. So in the end the “ensemble” does not represent a consistently structured whole nor does it draw on a genuine speech act theoretical basis. Taking the situation in ‘discourse analysis’ as it is, i.e. with discourse as a term that can be freely used in various ways, I do not want to avoid the question of the relation between the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘dialogue’. There are possible equivalences: discourse in the narrow sense means either spoken language or the text in general, be it oral or written, discourse in the broad sense corresponds to something like the dialogic action game. Dialogue in the sense of ‘language as dialogue’ or ‘dialogic action game’ draws on the basic tenet that any form of language use, be it the dialogic or monologic form, is dialogically oriented at the functional level. This view of dialogue is based on two premises: language is primarily used for communication, and communication is always dialogic (Weigand 1991). These rough equivalences need to be examined more precisely. Whereas the term ‘dialogic action game’ already includes the key to its analysis, the term ‘discourse’ offers nothing in this respect. In pragmatics the text has lost its autonomous status. In order to delimit discourse in the narrow sense of text, i.e. in order to indicate where it begins and where it ends, we need to refer to its action function. We thus again arrive at the priority of function if we want to deal with discourse as a workable unit. Taking ‘discourse’ as verbal text we encounter another difficulty: verbal and non-verbal communicative means are integrated in the utterance. How could verbal means be analysed separately? The term ‘context’ takes account of the fact that the ‘incomplete’ text needs to be complemented by variables beyond the text in order to fully understand its meaning (Weigand 2009c). To sum up so far, the term ‘discourse in the narrow sense’ can be taken as referring to the verbal means, primarily spoken means, used in dialogic interaction. In this sense, discourse represents a component of dialogue. For reasons of clarity, I mostly prefer the term ‘verbal means of communication’ as this term makes it clear that we are dealing with a specific component of communication. Let us now consider the equivalence of ‘discourse in the broad sense’, i.e. of the ‘uncircumscribed area of social interaction’, with dialogue in the sense of the dialogic action game. We might use the term ‘discourse’ in this sense as long as we do not know how to handle the complex of dialogic interaction. The term discourse allows us freedom in choosing issues, methods and topics. We do not need to ponder types of action games but can use the fashionable term ‘discourse genres’ as they need not be defined but can be grasped ‘somehow’. Finally, I would like to mention a further specific meaning of the term ‘discourse’ as we find it, for instance, in phrases like ‘different worlds of discourse’

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which do not seem to be strictly directed to language use but to the different cultural worlds which determine our ways of living and talking. Phrases of this type are, for instance, characteristic of postmod­ern literary studies. Even if some of the premises of this circle sound extremely strange to me, this way of using the term discourse is somehow appealing as it tries to grasp ‘lan­­guage in the stream of life’ as something in the end elusive, beyond scientific rigour.

1.4

The universe of dialogism: Intertextuality, interpretation and polyphony

Some studies emphasize a concept of dialogue in the all-encompassing sense of ‘dialogism’ or ‘dialogicity’ as suggested by Bakhtin (e.g., 1981). Dialogicity in the Bakhtinian sense comes close to the general concept of dialogue at the functional level or ‘language as dialogue’ but also includes dialogue and interaction between words and texts. In this respect it represents a special pivot in literary studies. The catchphrase ‘The author is dead’ has become a favourite maxim of the deconstructionists (Barthes 1977: 148, Derrida 1977). Dialogic relations between words and texts need no longer be intentionally created by authors but wait to be discovered by the reader. The reader or literary critic has the “unlimited opportunity” to “invent interpretations and commentaries out of the world he himself constructs”, as Wilson (1999: 233) critically remarks. Within the literary universe of dialogism two subdomains are created: the domain of intertextuality or dialogue among words and texts, and the domain of interpretation or dialogue among the readers. The concept of intertextuality goes back to Bakhtin’s reflections on literary texts but can be applied to everyday dialogue as well. Discourse emerges as a continuity of interrelated texts during time. Bakhtin’s work represents rather a collection of interesting aspects than a concise theory and offers an easy starting point for multiple approaches to dialogic issues. The crucial idea of ‘texts relate to texts’ however comes to little. Dialogue is more than a network of relations. It is created by human beings turning relations into actions. Actions, to my mind, are intrinsically bound to agents who act intentionally (Anscombe 1957). An extended concept of action without intentionality or of words as agents as, for instance, defined by Cooren (2010), can only be understood as a metaphor. The universe of dialogism is not only displayed between different texts but also within one text by splitting the speaker into multiple voices. Bakthin’s term polyphony of texts refers to this dimension of different voices emerging from the text (Bakhtin 1984). The term can again be taken in a broad sense to include any voices the reader may identify and in a narrow sense including those voices that are conventionally or inferentially intended by the speaker. In the narrow sense,



Chapter 1.  The state of the art

many linguistic issues which go beyond the literal meaning of a text, such as indirect speech acts or metaphors, can be dealt with under the heading of polyphony (e.g., Ducrot 1972). Within the universe of dialogism the concept of dialogue emerges as multi­ dimensional dialogue which introduces further subdomains (see Part IV): − intertextuality between words and texts of different times − dialogue between readers about their different interpretations of a text − polyphony or splitting the speaker into different voices These subdomains however need a solid basis from which they can emerge and develop. This basis is constituted by an action-theoretic concept of dialogue as intentional action and reaction by human beings, which can then be modified mainly by extending the concept of action. Recently the concept of dialogism has been made the central topic in an interdisciplinary psychologic-linguistic study by Linell (2009) on “Rethinking Language, Mind, and World Dialogically”. On the one hand, we find many assumptions that are also fundamental for the MGM, such as “other-orientation” and ‘negotiation of meaning and understanding’ (p. 4f.). On the other hand, no structure of the whole is outlined in which these assumptions can find their place as interacting components. For instance, Linell rightly starts with the assumption that “the world is perceived through our bodies and senses” (p. 20) but does not arrive at the conclusion that the central reference point for any human theorizing is, in principle, human beings. One might even say that human beings are missing in his conceptual study. The purpose of the book is to give “a general overview of dialogical theories of human sense-making” (p. xvii). With the term ‘sense-making’ Linell opens up a general and vast area that allows him to deal with multiple conceptual subdomains ranging from interactionism, contextualism, relationism to semiotic mediation and signs as ‘dialogical entities’. All these subdomains are evoked as characteristic features of his concept of a ‘dialogical theory’ which arises as a construct from “a bundle” of dialogical theories (p. 11). He intends to introduce his “dialogical theory as an integrating framework” which is about “interactive sense-making in context, and the emphasis on other-orientation provides the applied association to ‘dialogue’” (p. 432). Real integration however is not achieved. It does not suffice to combine the subdomains of interaction, context and sense-making by means of the general idea of dialogism or “other-orientation” (p. 13). The nub of the difficulty results from the fact that the subdomains are not combined where they are combined in performance, namely in the minds and actions of human beings. Even if he frequently uses the term ‘action’, his concept of action is “not very specific”, as he himself concedes (p. 190), at least not specific enough to provide the basis of a theory of dialogic interaction.

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Linell (p. xxx) intends “to summarize in a relatively concise manner some aspects and elements of ‘dialogical’ or ‘dialogist(ic)’ approaches to language, communication and thinking”. We are confronted with numerous terms, to my mind, even rather unusual ones such as ‘languaging’ or ‘dialogicality’. Confronted by so many views on dialogue I miss the simple but efficient distinction between the dialogic form defined by turn taking and the general dialogic function of any language use (see below I 2.1). Instead he considers “‘dialogue’, when conceived of as or within ‘dialogism’” to be a metaphor which has an “abstract meaning” (p. 28). The ‘metaphor of dialogue’ is central to “dialogism”, which is a term at a “(meta-) theoretical” level, different from the term “dialogicality (sometimes appearing in the form of ‘dialogicity’)” which “refers to some essences of the human condition” (p. 7). I cannot share Linell’s position of favouring “an ecumenical definition of ‘dialogical theories’” when attempting “to bring together different scholarly traditions that are in some sense ‘dialogical’ or ‘dialogically minded’” (pp. xxix, 420). A theory cannot be built upon some “family resemblances” which supposedly exist between different theories in this area nor does “a fairly coherent theoretical framework” emerge in this way (p. 9). In some sort of self-criticism he concedes that ‘dialogical theory’, as he approaches it, “is a rather loose combination of only partially convergent trends in theorizings language, communication and thinking” (p. 433). He emphasizes his ambition “to find out what sorts of connections there are between aspects of these complex phenomena” and to search for “integrating explanations”. His analyses of some authentic dialogues demonstrate this ambition, at least in part, even if they do not proceed to the core of the issue because an efficient concept of action and interaction is missing. Linell refers to holism in assuming that “a dialogical account of sense-making would arguably incorporate some kind of holism” but immediately reduces holism to “a constrained holism” (p. 18). It is however not clear at all what he means by the term ‘holism’. General remarks on holism as “a claim that larger wholes are important, in addition to local actions” lead us nowhere. It is true that among the communicative approaches which try to come to grips with the complex, his conception of “a bundle, or combination, of theoretical and epistemological assumptions about human action, communication and cognition” (p. 11) certainly takes a salient position; it is however not a genuinely holistic account in the sense that it could outline ‘the architecture of complexity’. To my mind, it is in principle not so different from Verschueren’s attempt to grasp pragmatics by the overall concept of a ‘perspective’ (see above 1.3.1). The whole is however not a series of multiple aspects, including heterogeneous ones, held together by a ‘dialogical perspective’, but one integrated phenomenon which requires that we should find the key to integration.



1.5

Chapter 1.  The state of the art

Summary: A plea for dialogue as interaction

Let me sum up what we can take as guidelines for future research from this overview of the state of the art in the first decades of pragmatic research. It has become clear that more emphasis must be laid on the distinction between object and methodology. Otherwise there is the risk of losing our object and playing a methodological game. After the pragmatic turning point, the object-of-study has been identified as natural language or language-in-use. Unfortunately, a clear understanding of what language-in-use means has not been at hand and is often lacking even at the present time. There is the risk that empiricists will go astray in a field of empirical variability and arbitrariness of authentic discourse, and rationalists will lose the object ‘natural language’ in an approach that is in danger of becoming l’art pour l’art. As soon as the pragmatic turning point forced us to look beyond the sentence, it became obvious that the sentence and language use were completely different objects. A new beginning was required. However, not all linguists were ready to give up orthodox methodology; their starting point continued to be sentence linguistics even nowadays (e.g., Radford 2009). For them, the term ‘pragmatics’ became a problem. ‘Pragmatics’ was considered to be the analysis of contextual conditions which were added to the patterns of sentence linguistics. In this situation of trying to grasp the new object ‘language use’ numerous approaches emerged which focused on various aspects, such as conversational analysis of the aspect of turn-taking, or which put forth vague terms such as the ‘pragmatic perspective’, ‘context’, ‘relevance’, ‘discourse’ or ‘human sense-making­’, in their attempt to grasp the whole. The term ‘dialogue’ also proliferated in various guises, resulting in overall concepts of dialogicity, dialogism and recently even dialogicality. It is good to see that our view of language has broadened. However, as long as there is no solid basis, no pivot with which to select and connect the essential aspects, no real understanding can be achieved. The nub of the matter, to my mind, is the concept of action, which needs to be well understood and defined in its essentials (see below II 2.2.1). Dialogue cannot be grasped without considering it as dialogic interaction not restricted to turn-taking. Any language use is dialogically oriented, even without turn-taking, in the form of monologues. Nor is language use restricted to one type of action, namely information or knowledge transfer. Such a view remains completely on a pre-action and pre-dialogue level. ‘Giving information’ represents one type of action, which belongs to the representative type. All other action types are dismissed. I do not want to return to the discussion about whether even directives are to be described by including a level of knowledge transfer (e.g., Grewendorf 1979a, b). At the locutionary level every speech act can be considered as ‘transferring information’. Information

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in this ­locutionary sense means nothing else than ‘saying’ and does not refer to an action in the sense of ‘providing new information’ (see below Part III). Models based on the ‘common ground of knowledge incrementation’, as for instance Clark (1996: 39), do not represent a genuine action-theoretic approach. In conclusion, let me recapitulate a few points which are indispensable in making a fresh start: – Language use means dialogic action by human beings. – Language use means the use of language integrated with other communicative means. Integration implies interaction. – Human beings are both individuals and social beings who use conventional and individual techniques. – Meaning is not defined, understanding not presupposed. Instead, meaning and understanding are negotiated in dialogic interaction. – There is no bridge between abstract competence and ever-varying performance. The bridge is built in the minds of human beings by their ability of ‘competence-in-performance’.

chapter 2

The turning point in theorizing Starting from the integrated whole

2.1

Towards a theory of competence-in-performance

Having dealt with various attempts to come to grips with ‘the unit beyond the sentence’ (Weigand 1997a), we will now address the question of what ‘understanding pragmatics’ really means. ‘Understanding pragmatics’ presupposes acknowledging the incompati­bility of orthodox theory with the new object ‘language use’ as an object of performance. Starting from a methodology of reduction means distorting the natural object. Language is not an example for a theory. Before any theory can be designed, the object should be addressed by goal-directed observation in order to find out how it works. Observing verbal means has to be guided by the attempt to understand what they are used for and how they are used. Theory thus emerges from combined observation and reflection as a possible explanation of what can be observed. The first step in holistic theorizing aims at attaining an understanding of language use by grasping the minimal autonomous whole in which it works. The second step then aims at deriving an adequate methodology which retraces the way the natural whole works. Before I propose a theory of this type in Part II, it will be useful to prepare the reader by introducing a few crucial points and by analysing an authentic example which can illustrate what is implied by holistic theorizing. In my view any scientific endeavour is at its core directed at a better understanding of the complex which surrounds us. Such an attempt is intrinsically connected with a better understanding of human nature. Different disciplines are not separate, independent systems of knowledge but are connected on the basis of consilience (Wilson 1999). The complex is not stable but ever-changing. The world in which we live is perceived and understood by means of human abilities, not the world as such. We may remind us of the ‘Schleier von Sais’ (“The veiled image of Sais”) depicted by Schiller and Novalis to grasp the mystery of life. As long as we can only touch the veil but not look behind it, we will be unable to recognize any absolute truth. Human cognition remains human cognition. Human beings are however endowed with an extraordinary ability which allows them to come to grips with the challenges life forces on them: they are capable of adaptive

40 Part I.  Rethinking theory

and creative behaviour. Adaptation to the complex mix of order and disorder is one of the passwords of human beings’ competence-in-performance. As a first approximation, adaptation can be characterized as tentatively proceeding from standard cases to particular ones. Standard cases are regular cases governed by rules or conventions. If appropriate understanding cannot be achieved by regularities, the standard case has to be specialized by taking account of particular features which trigger off individual, non-conventional techniques of understanding. Meaning and understanding are thus negotiated from the very outset according to principles of probability. Even the normal, regular case is only a probable case. Adaptive behaviour must not be confused with proceeding by trial and error but presupposes some orientation towards probable courses of the affair. We do not simply go through a list of possibilities, one after another, but look for structure. Simon (1962) made some interesting comments on the “architecture of complexity” by describing it as a hierarchy of complex subsystems. He introduced two criteria which are constitutive to a genuinely holistic procedure: the “near decomposability” of the subsystems and their derivation from the whole by “specialization”. These two criteria are crucial for the theory I am going to propose in Part II. They form the basis for displaying the hierarchy of subsystems ranging from ‘minimal games’ described in Part III to ‘complex action games’ dealt with in Part IV. The hierarchy of complexity is quite different from the simple hierarchies we know from orthodox linguistics, which are based on division. The hierarchy of complexity is based on interaction. The whole is more than the sum of the subsystems. Interaction cannot be equated with the addition of parts achieved by division but means integration of the components. Human dialogic interaction is based on the integration of different abilities: the ability to speak is integrated with other abilities, mainly with the ability to think and to perceive. Human abilities are partly innate and partly learned by experience. There is no pure rationality; rationality is always human rationality, i.e. bounded or practical rationality, to use terms introduced by Simon (1983) and Toulmin (2001). Bounded rationality and reliance on probability principles do not mean ignorance: on the contrary, they mean superior rationality in adapting to the complex. The challenge for science will be to reflect in theory what human beings are able to do in practice, to a great extent unconsciously, by their competence-in-performance. What is needed is a change in theorizing from closed rule-governed systems to open theories based on probability. Competence-in-performance means being able to master the complexity of human affairs. A theory that takes this ability as its object-of-study has to start from the complex whole and needs a key concept to open it up. The minimal



Chapter 2.  The turning point in theorizing

complex whole must be the unit that guarantees the autonomous functioning of the whole. The whole is not simply human affairs or the world. The key to the world is human nature. As living beings we do not simply exist or think but have needs, desires, purposes and interests which are related to other human beings. They are the driving force of our actions and behaviour. It is these purposes and interests that allow us to circumscribe the minimal whole where dialogic action takes place and to open it up. Dialogic action not only means face-to-face dialogue with another interlocutor. As mentioned above (1.3.4), the term ‘dialogue’ comprises any form of communicative language use, including the monologic form without turn-taking. In this general sense, we can also speak of the dialogicity of language use. Strictly speaking, we should distinguish between two different terms of ‘dialogue’, one referring to the form, the other to the function of language use. The traditional dichotomy of the terms ‘dialogue versus monologue’ relates to the formal level and means the dialogic form based on turn-taking in contrast to the monologic form without turn-taking. At the functional level, both forms are dialogically directed according to the general dialogic principle of any communicative language use (Weigand 1986, 2003a: 35ff.). In this sense, a monologue is also directed towards an audience which, for instance, in the case of a speech is not expected to respond or which is only a virtual audience. In so-called inner monologues we are in a dialogue with ourselves. The scope of the general term ‘dialogue’ is therefore broader than the scope of ‘conversation’ which usually corresponds to the ‘dialogic form’ of turn-taking. Dialogue in the general sense of a fundamental dialogic principle means what Wilhelm von Humboldt (1827/1963: 138) emphasized centuries ago: “Es liegt aber in dem ursprünglichen Wesen der Sprache ein unabänderlicher Dualismus, und die Möglichkeit des Sprechens selbst wird durch Anrede und Erwiederung bedingt.” (“A pervasive dualism is at the core of language and the possibility of speech itself is determined by address and response.”) Dialogic interaction is therefore not restricted to turn-taking; the ‘response’ can also be a mental action and need not be verbally expressed. The question of the unit of description has been tackled in modern linguistics since its beginnings. We went from the phoneme to the morpheme and then on to the sentence. After the pragmatic turn we moved on from the sentence to the sequence of sentences as well as to the utterance or speech act and eventually to the sequence of speech acts. However, not even the level of actions can be considered as an autonomous level since actions depend on human beings and human beings depend on the world in which they live. ‘Language as dialogue’ means dialogic interaction which is action by human beings in cultural surroundings. The minimal autonomous whole thus emerges as the cultural unit of the dialogic action game in which human beings try to come to an understanding about how

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to coordinate their views and action. The action game is played as a mixed game by integrating different communicative abilities and techniques in negotiating coordinated action. In a strict sense, it is not only speaking that constitutes action. The basic thesis of speech act theory, that ‘we do things with words’ or ‘act by speaking’, has to be modified: speaking is an integrated part of acting. It is the complexity of our object-of-study which inevitably requires us to cross academic boundaries. The individual disciplines get their specific profile by the particular scientific interest with which they address the same object language. The aim of linguistics, as I see it, is to describe and explain language as an integrated part of dialogic interaction which necessarily requires taking account of the state of the art in neighbouring disciplines, not only of the humanities. Let us now finally turn to an authentic example which can verify and illustrate these premises of the mixed game. It is an example I used a few years ago in order to demonstrate the limitations of corpus linguistics (Weigand 2004b). Even if corpus linguistics has greatly improved linguistic methods by providing representative corpora which can justify presumed conventions, its concept of language – as long as it is restricted to a text corpus – cannot cope with dialogic interaction. Sinclair’s maxim “Trust the text” (1994) takes the object text to be autonomous. The example we are going to analyse is not in the slightest a special case which could be excluded from analysis; it is a normal example of language use. Let us start with the authentic text without any description of the context and see what the text yields: (5)

(in English translation) H Don’t let yourself get infected! E Are you ill? H Didn’t you see the water? Everyone’s got a hobby. F I’d never do that when we pay so much just for the cleaning. E Ah, now I understand. You’re right. No, I won’t let myself get infected!



(the original German text) H Lassen Sie sich nicht anstecken! E Sind Sie krank? H Haben Sie nicht das Wasser gesehen? Jeder hat sein Hobby. F Das würde ich nie machen, wo wir soviel bezahlen allein fürs Putzen. E Ah, jetzt verstehe ich. Sie haben recht. Nein, da lasse ich mich nicht anstecken!

I am quite sure that you will not understand what is going on in this action game. You may try to find some thread running through the text and arrive at an approximate partial understanding by guessing. But does guessing play a role in language



Chapter 2.  The turning point in theorizing

action? Not at all, we do not need to guess because we not only trust the verbal text but quite normally and unconsciously include what we know and perceive. Consequently, dialogic action is not action by verbal means but action by the integrated use of communicative means, verbal, perceptual and cognitive. In the action game we approach each other as social individuals with different cognitive backgrounds and cannot presuppose understanding. We negotiate meaning and understanding and have to tackle problems of different understanding. In our example, the first utterance, Don’t let yourself get infected! is not immediately understood by the interlocutor, instead he or she is the victim of a misunderstanding. Language-in-use can accept the risk of misunderstandings because they are normally immediately repaired, as in our example. It becomes evident that we have to go beyond the empirical level of the text and provide the reader with a description of the cognitive and perceptual background from which the interlocutors derive their cognitive and perceptual means of communication. An observer cannot understand the cognitive means, associations and allusions used in the game. Thus in our example H refers to a person not present in the action game without explicitly expressing it, a person who, some days ago, had spilled water on the ground when cleaning the roof of the house entrance: Didn’t you see the water? The action game takes place near the entrance of the house. It is therefore enough for H to raise his head and to look and move his body in the direction of the entrance hall, thus alluding by perceptual means to what had happened a few days ago, as well as ironically commenting on it: Everyone’s got a hobby. He deliberately only uses the anonymous term everyone and takes it for granted that the interlocutor will understand. His wife F, too, uses an anonymous phrase: I’d never do that, trusting that E will understand, because they are supposed to share knowledge as a result of the fact that all three live in the same house. She adds a critical comment on the price they have to pay for the cleaning of the hallway. All these means together, verbal, perceptual and cognitive, are necessary for E to come to an understanding and to arrive via negotiation at the right meaning of to be infected, namely ‘to be infected by a mania for cleaning’. There is no explicit disambiguation by verbal means. I think the conclusions to be drawn from this example are evident: when looking at authentic examples in a corpus we are in the same situation as Yule when observing the conversations of others (see above). We address the object conversation as an observer and cannot understand examples which require us to go beyond verbal means. Coherence is not established in the text but in the minds of the interlocutors who, as insiders of the game, try to understand and to give sense to what is going on in the action game (Weigand 2000b, Givón 1993). Trusting the text does not lead to an understanding of what is negotiated in interaction. The corpus therefore constitutes only a part of the complex object we are trying to

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investigate. To argue against Stubbs (1996: 233), the corpus is not a record of our behaviour because only part of the behaviour is recorded. To sum up: as has become manifest from the analysis of this authentic dialogue, it is not the authentic text as such which can explain what is going on in dialogic interaction. We have to look at the integrated whole of the game which is being played with various communicative means some of which are transparent only to insiders of the game. In the mixed game different cognitive and cultural worlds, different competences-in-performance interact and even misunderstandings are tolerated.

2.2 Object and methodology: Uncovering the language myth The issue of theorizing poses the problem of addressing the object-of-study with an adequate methodology. In Western science the assumption has prevailed that a theory has to reduce empirical variety by abstraction to a system of rules. Consequently it seemed legitimate to start from rule-governed methodology and to deconstruct the object in a way that fitted the methodology. This procedure resulted in the creation of artificial objects such as the sign system or theories of language competence and communicative competence. Performance was excluded as object of theoretical study. Many scientists find it difficult to break free from tradition. Despite the pragmatic turn the dogma of methodological rigour or formal precision still exerts power in science. Seuren (1998: 407), for instance, excludes pragmatics and language use from linguistic description because it seems “difficult to achieve the degree of formal precision considered desirable in the linguistic sciences today” (cf. also Gazdar 1979: 11). Chomsky (1975: 25; 2000) presupposes “human science-forming capacities” and talks about “our very limited progress in developing a scientific theory of any depth to account for the normal use of language”. He refuses to acknowledge the progress that has in fact been made in many studies of language use because they do not comply with his benchmark of “a scientific theory of any depth” or the benchmark of formal precision. His concept of “human science-forming capacities” simply does “not extend to this domain”. For him it is still generalizations which are “considered desirable in the linguistic sciences today” as they secure the foundations on which generative linguistics hopes to survive. There is no theory without generalizations, that is true; but they are not all. For orthodox theory, methodological rigour has priority over the question of whether the resulting object is of relevance to human life. The dogma of formal precision has strong and ancient roots. It is the belief in certainty or rather the



Chapter 2.  The turning point in theorizing

hope of finding certainty in generalizations and abstractions which has dominated Western thinking since Plato’s and Aristotle’s times. Sticking to eternal truths of, for instance, Plato’s ‘first true philosophy’, prevents philosophers from coming to grips with what is actually going on. Contemporary philosophical speech act theory has thus become an abstract theory which can easily be disregarded by linguists. For instance, in a volume of 1994 with the ambitious title “Foundations of speech act theory”, the same simple simulated examples are analysed, the same annoying questions are posed as fifty years ago (cf. Tsohatzidis 1994, Weigand 1996b). Why should we still tolerate absurd theses such as “that there is no important difference between formal and natural languages” (Vanderveken 1994: 99)? This is poor philosophy if it needs such a patently mistaken view in order to justify the type of language it is dealing with. Why is it so difficult to overcome the obstacle of formal precision in approaching natural language use? Even if some scholars are aware of the complexities of language use, they nevertheless persistently try to reduce them to logical rules. If this is not possible, they claim the reason for it to be a mystery (cf., e.g., Piattelli Palmarini 1995: 160). Formal precision was not only aspired to in logical and formalized models but, to a certain extent, also in pragmatic multi-level models and in the pattern model of dialogue grammar (e.g., Levinson 2000, Hundsnurscher 1980, see above 1.2). ‘Searchers after hidden laws’ (Searle 1972) never questioned the methodological stance of ‘we have to start from the model’ and ‘the model must be a rule-based or conventional system’. As a consequence, natural language use was excluded or was changed to well-formed dialogues. Pattern models are based on a code, on rules or conventions. A pattern model for dialogue is not really a model of dialogic language use as it is restricted to one pattern for both sides of the dialogue. Speaker and interlocutor obey the same rules. Language use is considered to be similar to a chess game with meaning defined and understanding presupposed. The pattern model allows choice, but only choice on the basis of certainty, i.e. rational or conventional choice that can be planned in advance (cf. Lewis 1969). If we admit that we are ‘living with uncertainty’, we have to recognize the limits of pre-planning (Toulmin 2001, Simon 1983). To come to terms with the complex requires us to go beyond rule-governed patterns and to adapt to ever-changing surroundings. Very early on, the pattern view of language had undergone severe criticism, to mention only Baker and Hacker (1984) and their brilliant critique of compositional models of language or Harris (1981) who exposed the code model of language as a myth. Taylor and Cameron (1987) joined them by arguing that there are ‘no units, no rules at all’ underlying language use. Despite such massive attacks, ‘searchers after hidden laws’ were not prepared to change their minds and to abandon what they believed to be solid ground. On the other

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hand, the critics did not make much effort to propose a new type of theorizing in order to rebuild what they had left in ruins. It seems to be the general opinion that where rules come to an end chaos begins. This amounts to allowing us the choice between two extremes: either there is a theory as rule-governed pattern or no theory at all. Very few scholars took up the challenge of thinking about a new constructive view that could lead the way out of the ruins. Brown (1995) drew our attention to the fact that understanding cannot be taken as guaranteed and joined attempts to design a ‘post-Chomskyan linguistics’ (cf. also Moore & Carling 1982). Clark (1996) tried to create an ‘ensemble’ of multiple aspects, which at least pointed to the whole where all the different variables of language use are joined together (see above 1.3.3). Similarly, Toolan (1996) proposed the concept of “total speech” which offers a new perspective even if it does not reach the status of a theory. These approaches faced the challenge of performance and took the first steps in mediating between the natural object and methodology. As the limits of sign linguistics, of language competence and even of communicative competence slowly but inevitably became manifest, problems arising from restricting language to patterns and definitions could no longer be neglected. Chomsky’s attraction was flagging. Beyond competence there is no wastepaper basket of performance but human beings who effectively act and react in performance. We are not victims of chaos and chance but masters of the complex. The ability to deal with complexity or human beings’ competence-inperformance­ forced us to rethink our understanding of science. A change in theorizing was inevitable. In other disciplines such a change had already been achieved decades ago, first of all in the so-called exact disciplines of science, for example, in physics, by establishing modern physics or quantum physics (e.g., Gell-Mann 1994), or in biology and chemistry (e.g., Prigogine 1994, Gross, Lewitt & Lewis 1996, Lumsden & Wilson 2005). The new wave crossed over to social disciplines such as economics (Simon 1997) where it led to the change from rational economics to practical economics, or to jurisprudence (Haft 1999) where legal dialogic action took priority over legal codes. The humanities however hesitated to accept that there was not only the choice between rule-governed theory and no-theory at all. Nonetheless, the necessity of going beyond patterns, of mediating between order and disorder has slowly been taken into consideration. Instead of focusing on pure rationality scientific interest turned to ‘rationality-in-life’, i.e. bounded rationality (Simon 1983). In modern science certainty has been replaced by probability, division of disciplines has been replaced by a crossing of disciplinary boundaries which properly understood means accepting the unity of knowledge or “consilience” (Wilson 1999). Consilience is the basis of the “stair-case model” of the different disciplines developed by Gell-Mann (1994: 111f.) who



Chapter 2.  The turning point in theorizing

emphasizes that “while the various sciences do occupy different levels, they form part of a single connected structure” ranging from physics or the natural sciences to the social sciences and the humanities. The central object-of-study in the humanities is human beings’ action and behaviour in cultural surroundings. At its core we are faced with the concept of intention which goes beyond strictly causal relations and is beyond the reach of orthodox theory. The postmodernist view of an action theory without intentions (e.g., Derrida 1988) does, according to Wilson (1999: 234), “not conform well to evidence” and “is blissfully free of existing information on how the mind works”. To sum up: The theory we are looking for must be a theory that starts from an understanding of the complex object and derives an adequate methodology from it. The complex object is human beings’ competence-in-performance, an amazingly far-reaching ability, but nonetheless an ability subject to human limits. The world as such, including our mind, remains beyond human reach. My aim is directed towards a theory of which I can say “I believe this with certainty”.

2.3

Justifying evidence: Evolution and culture

If there is no absolute truth, no evidence as such, then everything we state in a theory will, in the end, be theses within the scope of insight permitted to human beings. As long as the theory focuses on an object constructed and defined by human beings, such as traffic signs or logic, it might suffice if we were explicit and conformed to the inner consistency of the theory. The object of the theory in this case is methodology. If the theory however aims to explain a natural object of performance, we need criteria that allow us to verify its theses. Insofar as the theses refer to what can be empirically perceived, for instance, how words are used in utterances, we might ask native speakers whether they consider certain ways-of-use to be conventional usages. We must however not forget that their introspective knowledge is relative. Other native speakers might use the same words differently according to other conventions. If we want to verify presumed conventions precisely, we have to refer to representative corpora. Corpora inform us about the degree of conventionality by indicating percentages for the frequency of use (e.g., Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998). Yet, verification by frequency in a corpus can only confirm conventions related to the use of empirical means; its access to meaning is restricted, as could, for instance, be seen with Example (5) above (cf. Teubert 2010). If we are looking for criteria appropriate for verifying explanatory theories, native competence and corpora do not seem to be of much help.

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So let us pose the question in principle: how can we verify our assumptions about human beings’ action and behaviour in general and dialogic action in particular? Where can we find evidence for our claims? In my opinion, our reflections have to relate to biological findings on the basis of consilience and have to conform to the fundamental principle of the co-evolution of “genes, mind and culture” (Lumsden & Wilson 2005, Weigand 2007a). It is not only genes which determine human abilities; it is the interaction between genes and culture or the epigenetic rules which shape human behaviour. Culture however emerges from specific predispositions of the human genotype (Wilson 1999: 163). Wilson (p. 171) sums up “the steps of gene-culture coevolution, circling from genes to culture and back around to genes” as follows: Genes prescribe epigenetic rules, which are the regularities of sensory perception and mental development that animate and channel the acquisition of culture. Culture helps to determine which of the prescribing genes survive and multiply from one generation to the next. Successful new genes alter the epigenetic rules of populations. The altered epigenetic rules change the direction and effectiveness of the channels of cultural acquisition.

The focus is to be laid on the “new synthesis” of sociobiology (Wilson 1975), that is the synthesis of biology and sociology or of genes, mind and culture, which contradicts what is nowadays proclaimed as “New Biology” (Lipton 2008: xxvii). On the one hand, “New Biology” is nothing new. Calling it the “new science of Epigenetics” (p. xv) and not even mentioning Wilson (1975) or Lumdsen and Wilson (2005) simply ignores – deliberately or not – the fact that the term “epigenetics” had been introduced decades ago. On the other hand, explaining the term as “control above the genes” does not coincide with the original term. ­Lipton seems to put the whole emphasis on influences coming from the environment and to neglect the fact that the environment can take effect only if perceived and recognized by some genetic predisposition which Seligman (1970) called “prepared learning”. We know human beings are social beings, yet they are individuals. It is from this double nature that the basic motivations for human action emerge: self-assertion and respect for the other human being. Even if both forces can be biased quite differently in individual human beings, they are in principle interconnected: every individual being is simultaneously the other being for their fellow beings. From the very outset human beings have to negotiate their positions with other fellow beings in dialogue. Negotiation proceeds by the integrated use of different communicative means, verbal, cognitive and perceptual, as neurological experiments confirm (e.g., Damasio 2000). It is due to human nature that there is no



Chapter 2.  The turning point in theorizing

simple at the beginning. What might seem to be the simple, for example, the mirror neuron, turns out to be a firing cell, matter and energy at the same time. I am aware of the fact that there is, in principle, a divide between symbolic and dialogic theories of language. Symbolic theories take cognition as their starting point in putting forth theses such as ‘language is used for the expression of thoughts’. By contrast, dialogic theories consider communication as the driving force that caused language to evolve. This controversy between symbolic and dialogic models represents, in the end, a controversy about the human species. If we were hermits on an island we would not need language when reflecting in our minds. Nor would we be able to reproduce and to survive as a species. Here we are at the crucial point. Human beings are epigenetically programmed as social beings who need dialogue for reasons of survival. Communication could also proceed in a rough-and-ready way by gestures, without language, though with serious deficits. It is therefore plausible that by the time language evolved from gestures it was initially accompanied by unstructured sounds. Giving priority to the need for communication does not exclude the fact that language use can in addition fulfil other subordinate functions, among them the function of symbolizing. But it is precisely within communication that symbols attain their specific value because by the use of symbols dialogic interaction becomes free of the restrictions of the speech situation. Even if generativists continue to proclaim the symbolic species, sociobiologists have long ago provided solid arguments for the conclusion “that it is no longer possible to say […] that human behavior is symbolic behavior and symbolic behavior is human behaviour” (Wilson 2004: 26). The epigenetic rules based on the interaction between genes or human nature and culture are decisively influenced by the environment. We live in – not in front of – a world which changes and requires adaptation and creativity. When evolving from small groups to large societies, human beings had to organize their needs, i.e. to form specialized groups or institutions for the division of labour. Human needs and purposes come into play as the key concepts for explaining human behaviour. The environment, to a certain extent, includes culture. We can make the distinction between an environment which exists independently of human beings and the cultural environment as created by human beings. The complex of a culture not only comprises observable facts like habits and routines of everyday life but also evaluations that shape the image of the individual (Grein & Weigand 2007). Culture can be approached as a complex of evaluations which become in part visible in customs and can be changed and in part are innate and unconscious as mental attitudes. These innate attitudes or ‘culturgens’ can hardly be changed within one generation (Lumsden & Wilson 2005: Ixvi, Weigand 2007a).

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Part I.  Rethinking theory

Evaluations are rooted in human nature (Wilson 2004: 169ff.), in part due to genetic predispositions or so-called “prepared learning” (Seligman 1970) and in part due to the basic integration of human abilities. We not only perceive but also evaluate what is going on from our point of view. As human beings are social individuals, evaluation has to mediate between the interests of the group and individual interests. Depending on the environment different evaluations will be made and different human societies and cultures formed on the basis of some sort of ideology. The debate between “nativists” and “empiricists”, to use Sampson’s terms, starts from two extremes ‘nature versus culture’ both of which mark theoretical positions (Pinker 1994, Sampson 2005). Everyone who has experienced working with fellow human beings from foreign cultures knows that seemingly universal concepts such as rationality heavily depend on culture. Cognitive differences are deeply rooted, inherited over centuries and not easily made conscious, not to speak of being explicated or even changed. It is human nature, culture and the environment which determine human beings’ action and behaviour (Weigand 2007a):

human beings’ action and behaviour

human nature

culture

environment

Figure 1.  The integrated whole of human beings’ action and behaviour

These three pillars of human action and behaviour are closely interconnected: human nature in the strict sense means biology or the genes which interact with culture. Culture has an external and an internal face. The external face of culture is part of the environment or the world any interaction between nature and culture is dependent on.

part ii

The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

As explicated in Part I, I consider a theory as consisting of two parts: premises about the object and the methodology to be derived from the premises. The object is however not simply there in front of us; it is a specific scientific interest that allows us to identify our object-of-study by goal-directed observation and to select appropriate methodological techniques. object

theory



methodology

scientific interest

Figure 2.  Constituents of a theory

In this way the theory can face the basic scientific claim that the object should not be distorted because of methodological exigencies. The object of the MGM is a natural object, human beings’ dialogic competence-in-performance, i.e. an ever-changing object, more or less well-formed. The linguistic interest directed at this object is to describe how it works. A holistic theory of a natural phenomenon requires that the methodology conform to the object, i.e. to how human beings interact in performance. Simple hypothesizing will not do, even if we are aware of the fact that in the end any scientific statement on a natural phenomenon will be a statement of belief. Theories are weak as long as they only put forth theses and arguments which are again theses and not capable of verifying the starting hypotheses. Hypothesizing needs to be justified. The question is why the phenomenon should be shaped as we describe it. Theses about human actions must in the end be verifiable by human nature and the evolution of the species and criteria which start from premises about the object. The criteria should help us to design a rational or causal path from object to methodology. The path leads to crossroads which offer the choice of different routes. We have to make a decision, mostly a decision of no return. In doing so,

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Dialogue: The mixed game

we should look for consensus with other scholars and tackle counter-arguments. Nonetheless, errors cannot be excluded. A theory of human behaviour should not make claims as to how human beings should behave. A theory is not an instruction for action. Describing rules does not mean claiming that they should be obeyed; rules therefore do not have the form of maxims. In this sense, the MGM focuses on the object-of-study which is ‘human dialogic competence-in-performance’ and addresses it from a descriptive perspective. Competence-in-performance also includes knowledge of norms which are described without changing the theory to a normative theory (Weigand 2006b). The minimal autonomous unit for demonstrating how competence-inperformance works will be the mixed game. There is no need to introduce a further term ‘practice’ or ‘communicative practices’ (Gumperz 2003: 7ff.) beside theory. Practice is performance, or as Hymes (1972: 269) puts it: It is not that there exists a body of linguistic theory that practical research can turn to and has only to apply. It is rather that work motivated by practical needs may help build the theory that we need.

The theory describes action games of performance, i.e. practice. Describing performance means describing communicative means used by human beings in order to be more or less effective. In this sense, rhetoric represents an integrated part of competence-in-performance. Evaluating actual performance is another objective. It requires us to set up evaluative benchmarks which will inevitably be influenced by some sort of underlying ideology. Focusing on criteria for what can count as successful or effective interaction means distinguishing and evaluating rhetorical means. Benchmarks can be cultural conventions. In this case, dialogic principles can take the form of maxims, for instance, maxims of how to deal with emotions in certain cultures. Dialogic action is part of human action in general. Actions are constituted by pursuing specific purposes with suitable means. In my view we can distinguish between three types of action (see below II 2.2.1): practical actions which have a practical purpose and are carried out by practical means, for instance, constructing a house, mental actions carried out in our minds, for instance, making the decision to construct a house, and dialogic actions which have a purpose to be pursued in dialogue, for instance, informing a friend about our decision to construct a house or discussing different construction plans. As we can see from this example, practical, mental and dialogic actions are mutually connected. Dialogue can be in a dialogic or monologic form (see above I 1.3.4 and I 1.5), use the oral or the written medium, can be a dialogue with a real or virtual partner or an inner, silent dialogue with oneself. Even thinking turns out to be a dialogic enterprise (von Humboldt



Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

1827/1963: 138f.). As understanding usually means simultaneously taking a position, dialogue in monologic form also means dialogic interaction. Dialogue is not only a way of coming to an understanding with other human beings. Coming to an understanding intrinsically means an understanding about a state of affairs as is already contained in Searle’s formula F(p) indicating that the action function F is interconnected with the world p (Searle 1969: 39). Dialogue thus in the end means ‘dialogue in the stream of life’ (Wittgenstein 1981[1967]). There is no ‘text’ separate from the speaker and a ‘context’ around it. Dialogue is dialogue in and about the world. It is, in principle, human beings living in everchanging environments which is our starting point when delineating the way from the stream of life to language:

human nature



environment

culture

human action and behaviour

dialogic action action by commu- nicative means

practical action action by practical means

mental action action in the mind

dialogic purposes

practical purposes

cognitive purposes

e.g., discussing plans

constructing houses

deciding

Figure 3.  Action in the stream of life

The complex of human beings’ action and behaviour in the world can be structured according to purposes and means. The purposes we are confronted with in workaday and institutional life are not exclusively dialogic purposes but, from the very outset, intertwined with human affairs. Action games range from minimal (Part III) to complex games (Part IV). Though not even minimal games are simple games, complex games demonstrate a much higher complexity. They consist of a hierarchy of interacting subsystems which can be analysed as far as they are “nearly decomposable” (Simon 1962). We can, for instance, decompose the complex area of business dialogues by elaborating subsystems, for instance, meetings between chief executives which can again be differentiated according to their various purposes. The executives will tell us that the meeting is not scheduled for dialogic purposes but for economic reasons, in order, in the final analysis, to run a company effectively. The important role dialogue plays in complex economic interests and purposes makes it necessary for us to deal with and analyse it. In this sense, dialogue is intrinsically connected with the stream of life.

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Dialogue: The mixed game

On the basis of consilience, various disciplines are united in their study of the same complex object; their individual profile derives from their specific scientific interest in the topic. Consequently, crossing academic boundaries turns out to be inevitable. Linguistics as a discipline can no longer be defined as the ‘science of language’; there is no independent object language (Weigand 2010b). Linguistics as the discipline that deals with the human faculty of speaking finds its place beside other disciplines that also deal with human beings’ action and behaviour from their specific point of view, such as biology and neurology as well as economics, jurisprudence or media studies. The linguistic point of view, to my mind, focuses on language and its role in human affairs, i.e. on how human beings can come to an understanding about the world and their positions in the world.

chapter 1

Premises about the object From human affairs to language

We can now proceed and try to grasp our object ‘dialogic competence-inperformance­’ by a set of premises which will be the starting point for conclusions regarding an adequate methodology. Competence-in-performance as a human ability is rooted in human beings’ nature and shaped according to the exigencies of the environment or the world in which we live. The world is not a separate entity; it is the world as perceived and recognized by human beings. The complex ability of competence-in-performance comprises multiple human abilities, all in the end embodied in the brain. Human nature is not only shaped by genetic evolution. Sociobiology extended the Darwinian model by postulating the basic tenet of the coevolution of “genes, mind, and culture” (Lumsden & Wilson 2005). According to Wilson (2004: 18f.), “each person is molded by an interaction of his environment, especially his cultural environment, with the genes that affect social behaviour”. Consequently, “the question is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent”. This is in line with Simon (1983: 57) who states that genetic fitness “provides the basis for a genuine ‘social evolution’, i.e. for the survival of the group at the expense of others”. Culture ultimately is genetically rooted in what is called ‘genetic predispositions’ or ‘prepared learning’. This concept means “that animals and humans are innately prepared to learn certain behaviors, while being counter-prepared against – that is, predisposed to avoid – others” (Wilson 1999: 163, Seligman 1970). Culture can thus be grasped as part of inner human nature as well as of the external environment. It is however not only the cultural environment that shapes human beings’ behaviour. The culture-independent natural environment is of enormous influence as well insofar as it imposes certain exigencies on human life. The fact that it involves permanent change, for instance, requires human beings to be adaptive beings. The premises I am going to make about the object ‘competence-in-performance’ are therefore derived from the interaction between human beings’ sociobiological nature and their cultural or natural environment. The interactions of these subsystems allow us to verify the Mixed Game Model.

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Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

I am aware of the fact that developing a theory of dialogic action games means an adventure into the complex. We need to abandon orthodox postulates, for instance, of explicitness and completeness. I am however confident that we will not get lost in chaos when trying to expound a theory which retraces how human beings manage to deal with the challenges of social life.

1.1

Human nature

1.1.1 Human beings as central reference point The first and basic premise we inevitably have to make regards the limitations, in principle, of human cognition and perception or the view of human beings as a central reference point. Human beings and the world cannot be separated; human beings are the ultimate reference point for any thesis, any observation. Human abilities are capacities, qualifications, but at the same time limitations. As modern physicists admit, even the so-called laws of nature are laws elicited by human beings, within the restrictions of their cognition and perception, not the laws of nature as such. We are able to understand the world only as far as our abilities reach. Even if a few physicists, for instance, Hawking (1995: 185), claim that they will be able to detect the ultimate world formula within their lifetime, it will only be a human world formula. We are always thrown back to human limits, that is our destiny. Not even the self can be taken as certainty and might be exposed as a final illusion. It is perhaps for reasons of self-protection that the human species is not allowed to go beyond its abilities. Human beings are able to recognize the boundedness of their abilities, but they are definitely unable to overcome it. Human vision, human hearing is restricted by what human senses can perceive. In many respects, animals are superior to us. Our senses are the filters which circumscribe anything we can do. Equally, our cognition is human cognition. It depends on human abilities which determine what we consider facts, what we know, what we perceive, what we feel, what we express. Claims to truth in the sense of absolute truth or to certainty based on rule-governed independent systems are nothing but an illusion which we cling to in order to keep our peace of mind. Nevertheless, human beings as social beings need some certainty, intersubjective reliability, in their joint attempt to orient themselves in the complex. They create validity by means of definitions or empirical measures or through the institution of the law. All these human attempts to establish certainty are susceptible to breakdown. Even the law has to be interpreted and re-interpreted with respect to individual cases. There is no absolute objectivity; the world in which we live is our world.



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

I am quite aware of the far-reaching conclusions that follow from this view of human beings’ abilities. If everything is limited by human beings’ abilities, there will be no a priori insights, at least not in a strict sense. We might sustain a priori insights within artificial, completely rational systems but need be aware that these systems are constructed by human beings. The same is, in principle, true of a number of sentences which we know are ‘true’, true by experience or by laws of nature. Thus I can say it is a fact that my parents lived before my birth. It would be absurd to call it an opinion. Or take Moore’s example discussed at length by Wittgenstein (1972: vie): “Here is one hand, and here is another.” We have to concede that the notion of ‘facts’ in the simple sense of ‘something has happened or is happening’ is ultimately based on truth dependent on human perception and cognition. Even laws of nature are conditioned by human abilities. In principle, nothing can be defined independently from human abilities, nothing can be measured with absolute precision. Human abilities are therefore the key to meaning. The old linguistic problem of structuring the universe of meaning cannot be solved by hypothesizing a separate world and dividing it into speculative areas of meaning. The world has the structure we impose on it, a structure which is inevitably predestined by our abilities. Meanings can only be recognized insofar as we are able to recognize them. In order to achieve a reasonable, all-encompassing hierarchy of the universe of meaning it will therefore be appropriate to take human abilities as our starting point. In doing so, we will discover that human abilities are far more differentiated than is usually presumed. Figure 4 represents a first preliminary list (Weigand 1998a):

universe of meaning

human abilities be conscious, perceive, move, intend, speak, think,  feel, evaluate, wish, learn, know, behave socially ………..

Figure 4.  Human abilities as the key to meaning

According to folk psychology, we speak of five basic human senses: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, which are in Figure 4 all included in perceiving. There are however many more human abilities or ‘senses’: we are able to move, to think, to have intentions and to act. Thinking can mean different things: making connections, drawing rational conclusions, making casual, i.e. non-conventional chance inferences, identifying pertinent features, etc.; we are able to speak and to

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communicate, to have feelings and desires, to evaluate, to behave socially, to learn, and to know objects and persons. Additionally there is consciousness which, according to Damasio (2000), can be grasped as the ability to relate objects and events to our selves. There are presumably further abilities which can be differentiated depending on how fine-tuned the structure is which we want to achieve. In principle, any aspect of linguistic meaning needs to be identified by a human ability.

1.1.2 Integration and interaction of human abilities Human abilities in general are ‘embodied’ abilities, are in the end, rooted in the brain. Even our ‘sense of being a self is anchored in a body’ (Ramachandran 2003: 125). Human beings use their abilities as the brain allows, namely in an integrated manner and cannot do otherwise even if they wanted to. Dialogue depends on the integration of different communicative means as we saw when we analysed Example (5). Integration means interaction. This insight has finally been proven by neurological experiments, to mention only Damasio (2000) and the research on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998, Weigand 2002a, ­ Iacoboni 2008). The seemingly simple mirror neuron cannot be reduced to the material level of cell tissue; it is cell tissue which fires, i.e. an intrinsically functional phenomenon which is dialogically oriented to other living beings. Consequently, from an evolutionary point of view, human beings behave as dialogic beings. To carry out or to recognize a certain movement as a gesture, for instance, of greeting, is not only based on perceptive and cognitive abilities but also presupposes a certain intention which is directed towards the other human being. Intention dialogically directed seems to be the innate source of communication, first expressed by gestures and later combined with language. Such experimental results demonstrate that Descartes’ picture of separate domains of human abilities which we relied on for centuries is no longer tenable (Damasio 1994). There is no separate ability of speaking. It therefore does not make sense to restrict the notion of language to verbal means nor is it reasonable to separate a verbal object text from context, whatever type of context this could be, a perceptual context of the situation or a cognitive context of encyclopaedic knowledge. As there is no verbal text as such, there is no context as such (Weigand 2009c). Everything depends on human beings’ perception. Perceiving influences thinking, and thinking leaves its mark in speaking. Reason is influenced by emotion, and vice-versa emotion can be regulated or controlled by reason. There is no separate area of logical reason or pure rationality in life. Human abilities in the end are a device for survival and reproduction (cf. Wilson­ 2004: 2). Each individual ability is just one of the various techniques which



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

mutually support each other in enabling human beings to adapt to ever-changing surroundings. Communicative means and techniques are integratively used for communicative purposes. Against this background of integration, the question arises whether there is a subject matter ‘dialogue’ as such. As is the case with the single speech act, dialogue is always ‘dialogue about’. ‘Coming to an understanding’, the general purpose of dialogue, implies an ‘understanding about’. There is no action function as such nor a state of affairs as such. ‘Coming to an understanding’ goes beyond ‘understanding what is meant’, which is the hearer’s part in understanding the utterance of the speaker. Due to the innate integration of our abilities we are not restricted to understanding what our interlocutor said, unless understanding or interpreting the text is our exclusive, deliberate goal. In dialogue we inevitably take a position, positive or negative, and cannot help reacting mentally or by reactive speech acts or gestures. Action and reaction makes up genuine dialogue even in speeches. Dialogue means negotiating different positions and aims at coming to an understanding or agreement about these positions, be it in dialogic sequences of speech acts or in our minds. This does not imply that at the end of the dialogic process the interlocutors must share the same position. As is the case with the term ‘coming to an understanding’, ‘taking a position’ is also a relative term and implies ‘a position about’ human affairs which might range from reflection to practical action, from rather simple affairs to complex ones. Describing dialogic competence-in-performance includes rhetoric and specific knowledge in games for specific purposes. As we have learned from antiquity, rhetoric not only means knowing how to say it but also knowing what to say. The competence of professionals, for instance, of business executives, means being competent in dialogue as well as in economic affairs. Again, there is no separate theory of dialogue. It will always be a theory of dialogic action games as mixed games which are carried out by human beings in different areas of life on the basis of multiple interactions between the subsystems involved.

1.1.3 Human beings as dialogic individuals Orthodox linguistics seems to be based on a view of human beings which should have baffled us insofar as it clearly contradicts what we can observe. Language competence is considered to be some sort of competence which is the same for all speakers of a language. Rule-governed models of communicative competence assume one pattern for speaker and interlocutor. Meaning is defined and, consequently, understanding is presupposed. Only in post-Chomskyan linguistics has this view occasionally been problematized (e.g., Brown 1995). Slowly but inevitably the insight gained ground that human behaviour goes beyond ­generalizations and

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60 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

necessitates taking account of individuality and particular cirumstances. Problems of meaning and understanding can no longer be avoided (Weigand 1999b). On the one hand, human beings are individuals, i.e. different individuals, on the other hand they are not hermits but social individuals who have to reconcile their individual interests with social demands. Human competence-in-performance is always more or less individual, i.e. more or less different. There is no independent meaning, it is human beings who assign meaning to objects and events from their point of view. Meaning in dialogue is inevitably a concept open to negotiation. There are simple cases which do seem to be based on coded meaning, such as (6) Do you have a wholemeal loaf?

at the baker’s, and there is the other extreme of seemingly unlimited negotiation with examples such as (7) If you are homeless, you will find a home in Hong Kong because there all are homeless.

If we wish to achieve a unified theory of language use which includes simple and complex cases, we have to start from the premise that meaning in general is open to negotiation. The complex we live in is quite different from a fixed code of definitions. It is not a static system but ever-changing in time, dependent on human perception, evaluation, and interpretation. Having arrived at the ‘end of certainty’ we feel prepared to accept a concept of meaning which is flexible, in principle indeterminate, open for different understandings and diverse points of view. We do not live in a world of pre-established harmony, we live in different individual worlds which have to become related in dialogue in order to achieve an understanding over and above individual differences. In the process of coming to an understanding we are confronted with divergent understanding, misunderstanding and non-understanding as an inevitable consequence of interaction among individuals. As there is no independent concept of meaning defined in advance, there is never identical or complete understanding, not even within a homogeneous group. Understanding will always be gradual understanding. Problems of understanding can be accepted as they can be settled in the ongoing dialogue. Performance invariably includes concepts that go beyond generalizations and rules. We try to establish some sort of certainty to rely on, such as specific measurements of time or conventions and norms of behaviour. In the end however performance will always be a matter of probabilities, i.e. of habits and preferences, of uncertain knowledge and restricted memory, which inevitably include the risk of problems of understanding.



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

The premise of human beings as social individuals contradicts other theses about the human species such as the thesis of the symbolic species (Deacon 1997) or Dawkins’ thesis (2006) of the selfish gene (Weigand forthc.a). I do not want to deny that creating symbols represents an extraordinary human capacity but symbolizing does not seem to be a uniquely human capacity. According to Wilson (2004: 26f.), observing chimpanzees’ behaviour we must “erode to a large extent the venerable dogma of the uniqueness of man. […] The capacity to communicate by symbols and syntax does lie within the ape’s grasp.” What is uniquely human is the continuous and easy use of this capacity. Symbolizing though is not a selfsufficient capacity. The symbol is created in order to play its role in dialogue. To enable the survival of the species human beings do not need language in order to express their thoughts by means of symbols in their minds; they do however need language in order to come to an understanding with other human beings. Society is not the sum of single beings using symbols in their minds but a community of interacting individuals. As we have seen, research on mirror neurons not only verifies the integration of human abilities but also their dialogic nature. Human beings have to regulate their self-interest with their interest in being accepted as a member of the community. Regarding the double nature of human beings as social individuals, the question is posed as to which part gets the upper hand over the other. To my mind, evolutionary considerations lead us to give priority to the self-interest of the individual, yet without resulting in the view of human beings as selfish beings, analogous to Dawkins’ “selfish gene” (Weigand forthc.a). To my mind, Dawkins (2006: 2) has got things the wrong way round when he asserts that we misunderstand how evolution works if we assume “that the important thing in evolution is the good of the species (or the group) rather than the good of the individual (or the gene)”. It seems hardly sufficient to me to believe that in terms of evolution the individual counts as an individual. The individual counts insofar as it counts for the species. According to Wilson (2004: 197), “human nature bends us to the imperatives of selfishness and tribalism”. Any individual occupies a position between the two extremes of selfish versus altruistic behaviour. I completely agree with Wilson that “true selfishness […] is the key to a more nearly perfect social contract” (p. 157). The same conclusion is drawn by Gordon (1975) who makes the generalization that ‘man defending the honor or welfare of his ethnic group is man defending himself ’. Dawkins’ view that human beings are genetically programmed as individuals and can learn altruism by culture seems motivated by the catchword of the “selfish gene” and remains speculative.

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1.1.4 Human beings as goal-directed beings Having described human beings as social individuals who act in their own interest but who need to respect the interests of the others, we can now pose the essential question concerning the key to opening up the complex interplay of the components in the mixed game. The key must be the driving force of human action and behaviour. Action is constituted by the correlation of purposes and means. Purposes are of primary importance as they determine the means. The driving force of human action and behaviour results from human beings’ nature as intentional goal-directed beings. It is their needs and desires, purposes and interests as social individuals which cause them to act and provide the key to their behaviour. Pursuing purposes always implies having intentions. Intentions however do not yet make up action. They can remain in the mind of an individual without reaching the other. If I have the intention of cleaning the room, I need to put it into practical action. In the same way, I may have the intention of making a proposal but do not succeed in making it because other speakers hold the floor. For dialogic action we need a concept that goes beyond the mind of the individual and reaches our fellow beings. Communicative purposes are dialogically oriented purposes. Single speech acts, initiative as well as reactive, play their part in the action game at the level of interaction. The intentional speech act theory of Searle’s kind has to be replaced by an interactional, dialogic speech act theory (Habermas 1991). The term ‘goal’ includes purposes and interests. I consider purposes to be expressed in dialogue, directly or indirectly, as functions of individual speech acts or texts. They do not always coincide with our real interests, which we may keep concealed. In the end, it is our interests which determine what we say, how we present our purposes. Searle’s formula of the speech act F(p) therefore needs to be complemented by a superordinate predicate interest in order to comply with conditions of performance (see below 2.2.1).

1.1.5 Human beings as persuasive beings Human beings as social individuals have a basic interest in being accepted by the community. This does not contradict the fact that we are often involved in conflicts or that we might act out of indifference to or even with disdain for our interlocutor; nor does it mean that we give up our own interests in favour of the interests of our fellow beings. It means that human beings by their very nature tend to bring their dialogue partners over to their side. This is in the end what constitutes persuasion.



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

Despite many attempts to clarify and define the term persuasion, the issue still needs to be elucidated. Burke’s view (1950: 172) that ‘meaning is persuasion’ which baffled us in times of rule-governed linguistics goes to the heart of the issue. Perelman (1977), to some degree, grasps a crucial feature by focusing on what he calls ‘adherence’, even if he still sticks to logical syllogisms and does not really offer a pragmatic model of performance. Trying to gain adherence means aiming at acceptance. This is precisely the core of persuasion: trying to exert influence on the interlocutor in a way which is favourable for the speaker and raises hopes that they will gain acceptance. Persuasion is usually conceived of as belonging to rhetoric. Considering human beings as persuasive beings means giving up the traditional distinction between purely rational or necessary conclusions and argumentative or acceptable conclusions, which in the end relates to the distinction between absolute truth and truth from the perspective of the speaker. Rhetoric claims that it describes effective language use and offers rhetorical maxims or norms of how to behave. There is however no objective benchmark for what can count as effective. Of course, we may say we have used language effectively if we have achieved what we want; but effective language use cannot be restricted to factual results. On the one hand, the factual results may be dependent on other reasons; on the other hand, we might even have done our best in using appropriate communicative means but nonetheless have not achieved factual results. Effective language use means persuasive language use. What can count as effective or persuasive interaction depends on individual evaluation. Persuasion is a mental perlocutionary process; in the end, only the dialogue partners can tell us whether they have been ‘persuaded’. Consequently, effectiveness is not completely calculable nor rationally or conventionally achievable. Speakers try to be effective by means of rhetorical strategies. Rhetoric in this sense is a matter of how to use the means, including what arguments to choose, i.e. a matter of the speakers, not a matter of textual means as such (see below II 2.1 and 2.4).

1.2

Environment

Human competence-in-performance is not only determined by innate human abilities but is also shaped by the exigencies of the environment in which human beings live and interact. We can distinguish between a cultural environment which is created by human beings and perceivable as cultural habits or patterns of behaviour and an environment of inanimate nature which exists independently of human beings. Human behaviour is not only influenced by the cultural environment but also by the inanimate natural environment which induces further

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64 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

cultural habits. Accordingly, for instance, Eskimos have different cultural habits from people who do not live in arctic conditions. Human habits are however not always culture-specific. According to Wilson (2004: 21), “there are social traits occurring through all cultures which upon close examination are as diagnostic of mankind as are distinguishing characteristics of other animal species”, among them ethics, property rights, status differentiation, etc. These social traits, even if they occur through all cultures, can nevertheless be differently shaped and appear as different habits and attitudes. What is common to all of them is the fact that they are, in the end, based on evaluation. As mentioned above (I 2.3), perceiving means taking a position, and taking a position includes evaluating.

1.2.1 Human beings as ‘complex adaptive systems’ The environment is not stable and static but changes continuously in time. Life means ‘living with uncertainty’ (Toulmin 2001) or coming to grips with nonequilibrium processes and limited validity on the basis of probabilities. What is required is action which copes with conditions of uncertainty, i.e. which calculates probability. This is not the same as statistical calculations, which leave the individual in ignorance since they focus on groups and their probable development and not on the individual. Calculating probability in performance means calculating from the perspective of the individual who is trying to cope with relative truth and the limits of rules. Human beings are capable of orienting themselves according to action principles of probability within an environment that is not fixed but shaped and experienced in conditions of uncertainty and change. The environment has no meaning in and of itself nor is it structured independently of the human mind. It is therefore an artificial manoeuvre to define terms such as ‘context’, ‘frame’ or ‘scene’ as speaker-independent parts of a theory. Any perception of the environment depends on human abilities. Human beings can be influenced by an external ‘culture code’ of evaluation (Rapaille 2007) but, in principle, they are free to decide against it. In this respect, human action is quite different from action by robots or ants. The anthill seems to be a complex whole; the whole however results from a clearly determined code which does not allow individual action. The single ant is not really an individual ant which acts according to its own decision but a specific type of ant which acts according to the code. The same is true of robots, which behave as the code tells them. The code might allow them some leeway of arbitrary chance or infinite repetition. Nonetheless, it will remain a code, i.e., it starts from the simple and proceeds by adding further simple steps in linear or parallel order. The complexity of natural systems is, by contrast, constituted by the integration and interaction of complex



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

subsystems. Human beings cannot proceed by adding chance to a code. They are however endowed with an exciting ability, as powerful as it is natural, to address the ever-changing environment by adaptation. They are, as Gell-Mann (1994) puts it, “complex adaptive systems”. What does adaptation mean precisely? The core of adaptation in my view consists of grasping simultaneously as many variables as possible and proceeding step by step by including further variables. This is precisely what Simon (1983) calls focusing attention. Human beings are not helpless when faced with infinite variables but are able to cope with them by focusing attention on as many para­ meters as possible.

1.2.2 From standard cases to particular ones Adaptation means structuring the complex by focusing attention. We first focus our attention on finding out rules or regularities, i.e. standard or normal cases, and then look for specific circumstances and proceed to more particular cases by making individual inferences. The complex is not chaos, it is a mix of order and disorder, of rules and chance, of generalization and individualization. Coming to terms with the complex requires mediating between order and disorder by following rules and patterns as far as they go and by going beyond patterns when they come to their limits. In this sense, adaptation means focusing attention and proceeding from standard to particularized cases:

human beings addressing the complex

focusing attention



rules, conventions



standard cases

particularizing



individual inferences



particular cases

Figure 5.  From standard cases to particular cases

1.2.3 Deriving subsystems by specialization In his study on “the architecture of complexity” Simon (1962) addresses the difficult issue of how to open up and structure complexity. He considers complexity to be a hierarchy of interacting complex subsystems. The complex whole is more than the sum of all interactions between the subsystems and needs to be described in a holistic manner. The whole as well as its subsystems need to

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66 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

be ‘nearly ­ decomposable’ in order to allow the derivation of subordinate systems by specialization or differentiation. The hierarchy mirrors precisely how human competence-in-performance works. The complex whole of ‘dialogue in the stream of life’ must be viewed as a number of specialized functions and in doing so will yield all the types of action games we are engaged in. The condition of ‘near decomposability’ is a necessary precondition because otherwise we would be thrown into chaos. Since we are not the victims of chaos, it is not only a methodological precondition but a feature of the object. The technique of specialization emerges when human societies are growing. Division of labour is a necessary consequence of the fact that human needs are becoming more differentiated, more sophisticated, more demanding. Specific skills and knowledge, among them the use of symbols, are required for specific purposes (Searle 1995: 228). Living and working become separate activities, working is divided into different types of work which require expert knowledge and training. As a result specific organizational structures are needed which lead to the establishment of distinctive institutions. the complex whole: dialogue in the stream of life

specialization

hierarchy of complex interacting subsystems everyday life business

law

institutional life

instruction

health

the media

governance

.......

Figure 6.  Specialization of subsystems

Specialization can be considered as some sort of tree-structuring, however, treestructuring of a quite different type than Chomsky’s simple hierarchy of phrase structure trees (Sampson 2005: 141ff.). Whereas Chomsky’s trees divide an artificial unit into parts in a way that the unit can, by definition, be rebuilt by addition, complex tree-structuring of a natural hierarchy means specialization or the differentiation of the complex whole into subcomplexes. Every feature of the subcomplexes is contained in and derived from the whole. Step by step we proceed to subordinate complex systems not by division but by differentiation. In a holistic analysis of dialogic interaction, we start from the complex whole of negotiating



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

our positions and eventually arrive at speech act sequences at the bottom. Nothing gets lost by definition and abstraction, nothing has to be added. The distinction between everyday and institutional life may superficially appear as a distinction between situation types. In fact, it is a distinction based on ‘division of labour’, i.e. on specialized needs and purposes which inevitably emerge in complex societies. The key to the subsystems is the central driving force for human action, i.e. purposes and needs. The world we live in does not on its own make specific claims. It is human beings’ purposes, needs and desires in the world which call for structure. Consequently, the structure of the world is set up by human beings in their minds. Purposes and needs are addressed in dialogue. Normally, we do not begin a dialogue because we enjoy conversing – even if this might sometimes occur –, we enter a dialogue in order, for instance, to coordinate practical action or to get some information. Executives spend their time in meetings not for dialogic but for economic reasons. Yet, they proceed move by move in dialogue. Cognitive issues are processed dialogically in order to achieve an understanding either with ourselves in our minds or with others in dialogic interaction. It is the goal of the Mixed Game Model to clarify how the process of coming to an understanding about human affairs advances in different surroundings.

1.3

Culture

1.3.1 Human beings as cultural beings According to a widespread opinion which also underlies the ‘language instinct debate’, culture is seen in contrast to biology as something external that is learned by human beings (Sampson 2007, Pinker 1994, Weigand 2007a). Evidence from sociobiology which connects culture with the human genotype is simply ignored. In the chapter above on the environment we made the distinction between the natural environment, which exists independent of human beings, and the cultural environment, created by human beings. The cultural environment includes social patterns of behaviour which, to my mind, result from the basic human ability to evaluate the relations between human individuals and society or life in general. Evaluating, in this basic sense as an inborn trait of human behaviour, means taking a position on what is perceived (see above II 1.1.2 and 1.2). The question to be posed is: why do human beings mark themselves out by taking different positions in the same matter? Why do they evaluate the same thing differently, why do different cultures emerge? This question goes back to the evolution of human behaviour and finds an interesting answer in what psychologists call “prepared learning” (Seligman 1970, see above I 2.3). According

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to Wilson (2004: 65, 162, 169) we can assume certain genetic predispositions or “learning rules” which are differently shaped in kind and intensity in different individuals. Some sort of ethics, something like Kant’s ‘categoric imperative’, might even be considered innate (Wilson 1999: 260ff.). Linell (2009: 21f.) considers “morality” as an “intrinsic feature of any dialogue” in the sense that “we tend to evaluate what we perceive and understand in terms of what is good or bad, or what is the right or wrong thing to do”. To such genetic predispositions we might also allot human beings’ desire to find something that can provide everlasting meaning to their transitory lives. Ideologies and religions that overcome death are created. Works of art also try to express what goes beyond earthbound life (see below Part IV). Wilson (1999: 229ff.) has designated some genetic source even for the arts. human genotype



genetic predispositions evaluating prepared learning social patterns

religion

environment natural cultural

arts

Figure 7.  The sociobiology of human behaviour

Culture can thus be traced back to human nature and develops from there in coevolution with the genes (see above I 2.3). Conditions of the environment can affect the genes, resulting in what Lumsden and Wilson (2005: Ixvi) call “culturgens”. In this way we can explain why we can change our nationality but not so easily change our cultural identity. Culture influences everything: how we perceive and how we evaluate what is around us. In return, the external environment influences culture and can alter the epigenetic rules. Specific cultural patterns of behaviour evolve and can be changed over a longer period of time.

1.3.2 Culture as an external system of values Evaluation as the basis of culture becomes conventionalized or encoded as external cultural value systems. We are expected to conform to them as normative benchmarks for our behaviour. Conventionalized cultural habits and patterns of behaviour may, on the one hand, become empty routines which we follow unconsciously, without taking any notice of them. On the other hand, we may know that



Chapter 1.  Premises about the object

they are considered to be norms but nonetheless not comply with them. If they are inherited by cultural tradition over centuries, they can be internalized and, by way of coevolution, become part of human nature. Culture takes hold of us in the shape of internalized attitudes and preferences which we cannot easily change or dismiss. Even the way of thinking and what is considered to be rational is deeply affected by cultural evolution. Rationality is a Western value, not a universal feature. We negotiate meaning and understanding in dialogue in a way which is strongly influenced by culture. To give a concrete example: in order to understand the Italian utterance La mia famiglia mi aspetta, we have to know that the concept of the family represents an untouchable value in Italy which enters the meaning of utterances as a conventional feature. La mia famiglia mi aspetta thus simply means ‘I have to go to them and nothing can prevent me from going there’, which is quite unusual for northern European cultures. Even if the use of the term ‘culture’ seems to imply something specific and different from culture to culture, there are nonetheless cultural universals (Tooby & Cosmides 1990). Murdock (1945) lists the “characteristics that have been recorded in every culture known to history and ethnography”, for instance, agegrading­, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, cooperative labour, courtship, dancing, divination, ethics and many others (see also Wilson 2004: 21ff. and above II 1.2). These characteristics refer to patterns of behaviour which obviously play an important role in every culture but nonetheless are differently shaped from culture to culture. Behind them we again find different evaluations of events and relationships people are involved in, different attitudes and preferences which become visible in different habits and which can be grasped by different principles of behaviour. Compliments are a striking example of how different the benchmarks of evaluation are in different cultures (Weigand 2007a). Problems in cross-cultural interaction often do not arise from language problems. Language problems are given explicit expression and can be solved more easily. More difficult are problems which result from diverse ways of perceiving and these often remain unexplained. Among the culture-specific conventions of behaviour are rhetorical principles of the regulative type. They mediate, for instance, as principles of politeness between the interests of the individual and the respect to be paid to the interlocutor or as principles of emotion between reason and emotion (see below II 2.3). Cultures differ in the image they have of the individual human being as well as in the way they deal with emotions. Whereas Western culture gives primary importance to the interests and freedom of the individual, Eastern culture primarily considers the value of the individual with respect to the role they play in the community. Competition and confrontation in the West contrast with striving for harmony in the East, even if globalization has weakened the difference in performance.

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In the same way, northwest European culture hides emotion behind seemingly ‘cool’ behaviour whereas cultures in the south of Europe tend to accept that emotions are more openly demonstrated in public. Such cultural differences clearly shape dialogic interaction in private and public life and are reflected in culturespecific rhetorical principles. Cultural values normally have a long historical tradition. In our modern societies however a new type of culture is emerging which has deliberately been created for reasons of profit and success. We are swamped by terms such as media culture, business culture, political culture, culture of the law, etc. The media create the values that count in modern life: you have, for instance, to be dynamic, young and beautiful. Images are thus produced by the media and the market because of strategic interests. We are conditioned to behave in a certain way, we strive to ‘position ourselves’ by speaking and behaving as is expected of us by influential persons (Weizman 2008). Advertising agencies know more or less how they should position a product in the market if they want to achieve acceptance by the public (Rapaille 2007). Politicians and publicity agencies even conduct opinion polls in order to find out how people want them to be. Finally, there is yet another type of cultural values. As the face of our world changes, it may become politically expedient to create new identities by conceptualizing certain value systems. Creating cultural identities in this sense has to do justice to tradition as well as to current demands. The political issue of a European identity, for instance, not only means accepting national diversity as handed down by history but also means combining historical roots with present and future exigencies. In part history helps, but difficult decisions still need to be taken. To sum up: The premises about our object ‘human competence-in-performance’ listed above on the basis of human nature, the environment and culture should be considered as a first step in the adventure of addressing the complex. A lot remains still to be done in order to explain the interaction of the various parameters that play a role in the mixed game. It is a game of mediation between individuality and generality, between order and disorder, a game of adaptation to ever-changing­ surroundings and of focusing attention. Concentrating on the major points we can summarize the premises: – Human beings are social individuals determined by nature. – Human beings are adaptive beings determined by the environment. – Human beings are cultural beings determined by the coevolution of genes and culture. With these premises in mind, we will now address the methodology of the Theory of Dialogic Action Games.

chapter 2

The methodology Principles of Probability

2.1

The general conceptual structure

2.1.1 Regularities, norms and principles In accordance with the basic guidelines of a holistic theory of dialogue, we are now at the point where we have to develop an adequate methodology by deriving it from premises about the object. At the ‘end of certainty’ we have to look for a new way of ‘certainty’ which goes beyond rules and can cope with the law of everchanging performance, i.e. bounded or probability-based validity. To my mind, this new way of ‘certainty’ is provided by Principles of Probability. premises about the object



methodology

human competence-in-performance in the mixed game



principles of probability

Figure 8.  Deriving principles from premises about the object

Principles of probability do not mean ‘axiomatic principles’ as Linell (2009: 11) and Rommetveit (1990) use the term ‘dialogical principles’ nor do they mean playing at the level of ignorance by trial and error. On the contrary, they mean dealing with events of performance by estimating probability on the basis of everyday and institutional knowledge and by being prepared to change direction if understanding is missing or the course of events develops in a different direction than expected. When confronted with the complex we are not the victims of chaos but are able to master it by focusing our attention and trying to structure it according to regularities. Regularities are of different kinds: they can be causal rules as in natural sciences or coded rules as in structural linguistics. Rules are features of the object, independent of the user, whereas conventions are dependent on user groups. Regularities can be routines of language and action, for instance, lexical conventions or conventions of greeting; they can depend on different cultural evaluations. Rules and conventions can become norms, i.e. in certain frameworks

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they are considered the proper manner of behaviour. There are conventions of so-called ‘civilized behaviour’ which are expected in public or institutionalized games, such as norms of politeness. Norms are thus a parameter of behaviour and have to be included in the description without changing the descriptive theory to a normative one. In particular, cultural values are often taken as normative benchmarks. The mixed game and its principles of probability go beyond regularities and norms and include individual techniques and strategies. Even if some common conventional ground is to be respected, the speaker is, in principle, free to conform to rules and conventions or not. Even strictly grammatical rules might be disregarded by the user as is, for instance, the case in chat communication. In the end, it is always human beings who decide how to proceed in the complex. Whatever strategies are followed, whatever means are used, they are used on the basis of probability principles. First, we try to structure the complex according to general regularities. Where they come to an end, we go beyond rules and conventions and use individual inferences in order to create connections and understanding. All these techniques – rules, conventions, norms, strategies and individual inferences – are thus applied by the interlocutors on the general basis of Principles of Probability.

2.1.2 The role of rhetoric A special question which should be addressed is: what about rhetoric in the MGM? As mentioned above (see above II 1.1.5), rhetoric is considered to be rooted in human beings’ nature as persuasive beings. Human beings, consciously or unconsciously, strive to be accepted. In this general sense, rhetoric concerns the way human beings negotiate meaning and understanding. If we can take it for granted that human beings normally do not behave in a way which is unfavourable or harmful to them, rhetoric is not restricted to a specific part of language use which could be considered separate but is present everywhere in language use: meaning culture meaning is persuasion aiming at acceptance

means principles of negotiation

Figure 9.  Rhetoric in the mixed game

Rhetorical principles of negotiation, in general, aim at achieving acceptance or at what is often called ‘effective language use’, more or less effective. Rhetoric is always a matter of the speaker acting and reacting in a particular type of action



Chapter 2.  The methodology

game. It concerns any type of communicative means: the use of verbal means, or non-verbal means such as gestures and cognitive strategies which can remain concealed (Weigand 2009d). Rhetoric in the MGM means language use considered, consciously or unconsciously, to be effective by the speakers in actual performance. Models of rhetoric differ in what they take as their benchmark for ‘effective’ action (Weigand 2008b). Logical models of competence are restricted to formal syllogism. New Rhetoric in the wake of Perelman (1977) proclaims the importance of persuasion or ‘adherence’ but only deals with it on a logical basis. Models of persuasion do not start with so-called New Rhetoric. Already the sophists aimed at persuasion, which they tried to achieve with whatever means seem fitting. Being successful or effective in dialogue is not only a matter of conviction. Conviction is embedded in an all-encompassing view of persuasion which suggests different ways for different cases. In pragma-dialectic studies, effective action is defined as reasonable action (e.g., van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999). Literary models emphasize the aesthetic effect (e.g., Lausberg 2000). Superficially, we might grasp ‘effective’ as ‘having achieved what we want’. However not every effective action leads to concrete results nor have concrete results to be caused by a certain way of language use. Rhetoric in the sense of effective language use is, at its core, tentative, i.e. aiming at effectiveness. Strictly speaking, it is based on the intention of the speaker to be effective and is not a matter of the means as such. Whether the individual rhetoric of the speaker really will be effective, is in the end not dependent on the speaker but is a matter of perlocution. Traditional rhetoric focused on rhetorical means. Only texts that contained either syllogistic structures or specific figures were considered to be rhetorical texts. By contrast, rhetoric in the mixed game is not restricted to specifically marked parts of language use but is inherent in a concept of meaning as persuasion (Weigand 2006b, 2008a). Meaning as persuasion is meaning open to negotiation. traditional rhetoric

rhetoric in the mixed game

rhetoric of textual means syllogisms and rhetorical figures restricted to a subset of texts

rhetoric of the speaker meaning as persuasion inherent in dialogic interaction

Figure 10.  Concepts of rhetoric

Rhetoric in the mixed game describes different ways of negotiation and indicates appropriate conditions of their application without evaluating them from the perspective of the observer. As the unit of description is the mixed game, it goes without saying that context conditions are inherently included. By contrast, ­rhetorical

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maxims posit specific communicative means and techniques as norms by evaluating them from a certain ideological standpoint.

2.1.3 Some introductory examples of how to proceed Before describing in detail the individual Principles of Probability I will roughly demonstrate by a few introductory examples how methodological principles can be derived from the premises about the object. From the premise that human abilities are integrated abilities or abilities in interaction, the conclusion is to be drawn that there is no such thing as language as such. The ability to speak interacts with other abilities. Consequently, coherence can no longer be a matter of the verbal text alone but is ultimately established in the minds of the interlocutors: premise



interaction of abilities

methodology Coherence Principle: verbal, perceptual, cognitive means in integration

Figure 11.  Deriving the Principle of Coherence

If human beings are goal-directed beings, the theory needs an action-theoretic basis: goals and purposes as driving force



Action Principle

Figure 12.  Deriving the Action Principle

If human beings are social individuals, their communicative actions will always be dialogically oriented, either as initiative actions which make a dialogic claim or as reactions which are expected to fulfil this very claim. There is no single pattern underlying interaction; meaning and understanding are different for different individuals and open for negotiation. human beings as social individuals



Dialogic Principle proper

Figure 13.  Deriving the Dialogic Principle proper

If human beings are persuasive beings, any communicative means they use will in the end be used in order to be accepted by the community or to be more or less successful in their affairs. Consequently, rhetoric can no longer be a separate domain in describing performance; any means, any technique and strategy is used more or less persuasively. It is the objective of rhetorical programmes for



Chapter 2.  The methodology

­communication training to highlight specific means and techniques as norms or maxims to be followed in specific circumstances. human beings as persuasive beings



dialogic means as rhetorical means in general, no separation between grammar and rhetoric

Figure 14.  Consequences for rhetoric

These three basic or constitutive principles – the principles of action, dialogue and coherence – are accompanied by regulative and executive principles which are also derived from the premises. If human beings are social individuals, they have to regulate their self-interest and social concerns by means of principles of politeness. Politeness can mean respect for the other human being or can be used in the self-interest of the speaker in order to make things easier: human beings as social individuals



Regulative Principles of Politeness

Figure 15.  Regulating self-interest and social concerns

When human abilities interact, regulative principles are also needed to mediate between abilities which may turn out to be in opposition to each other, such as reason and emotion. Principles of Emotion mostly represent cultural expectations or conventions and are often expressed as normative maxims which tell us how to deal with emotions in dialogue: human abilities as integrated abilities



Regulative Principles of Emotion

Figure 16.  Regulating emotion and reason

If human beings are cultural beings, culture can no longer be an additional component but will be basic everywhere in human action. Culture is manifest from the very beginning in shaping the image of the individual human being and their relationship to the community. Regulative Principles of politeness and emotion are therefore in general culturally shaped: human beings as cultural beings



culturally shaped Regulative Principles

Figure 17.  The influence of culture

If human beings are goal-directed beings, they need principles of how to proceed in complex dialogues or of how to execute the sequencing of actions. Such Executive Principles guide the follow-up of actions and reactions in extended dialogues:

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human beings as goal-directed beings

Executive Principles in extended dialogues

Figure 18.  Strategic Principles

Executive Principles can take the form of strategies which are clearly directed towards effective language use or towards being successful in the process of negotiation. To sum up: In trying to develop a unified, consistent and justified theory of competence-in-performance in the mixed game we have to consider the distinction between object and methodology as crucial and give priority to the object. Having sketched some overall conclusions which can be drawn from the premises let me now proceed to develop more precisely the principles that guide human competence-in-performance. Basically, there are three types of principles: constitutive, regulative and executive ones. Constitutive principles are principles that constitute dialogic action in its fundamentals. Regulative principles come to work on the basis of constitutive principles. They regulate the interaction of subsystems which can turn out to be in opposition to each other. Executive principles guide the dynamics of the dialogic process.

2.2 Constitutive Principles Constitutive Principles constitute the basis of communication, i.e. action, dialogic directedness, and appropriate communicative means. They include the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle proper, and the Coherence Principle.

2.2.1 The Action Principle As a consequence of the premise that human beings are goal-directed beings, communication means dialogic interaction. The concept of action is basic to a theory of dialogue. It is however not satisfying to assume some action concept in the background, such as the sociological concept developed by Schütz (1971), to be added to the linguistics of the sign system as in various ‘interactional-sociolinguistic’ models in the wake of Gumperz (1982). What is needed in order to grasp dialogic interaction is an action concept that is inherently connected with language itself. In a first attempt it can be understood as Austin’s ‘in-locution’. I always wondered why the philosophical speech act theory only had an impetus on linguistics for a short period. An American colleague told me Searle’s speech act theory was too abstract and therefore useless for linguistics. It is right that



Chapter 2.  The methodology

­philosophical speech act theory is rather abstract insofar as it focuses on general universal concepts including the autonomy of the single act. Yet why ignore it completely rather than revising it? The basic idea of action as what happens in locution cannot be dismissed and is still waiting to be adapted to dialogic interaction. What we need is a general concept of action which is valid for any type of action, by speaking, by thinking, by practical means, and which can be specialized to fit each individual type. The first question therefore is: what is action in general? As just pointed out, we can distinguish between three types of action: practical action by virtue of physics, mental action by virtue of the mind, and verbal action by virtue of language. We should however have in mind that human abilities are integrated abilities. Only mental action, such as decision-taking, can be conceived of as completely mental. Practical action mostly proceeds alongside cognition, and the philosophical dogma of illocution, describing what happens in locution, only partially hits the point. Verbal action is only in part realized by speaking. Moreover, dialogic interaction does not presuppose interaction exclusively by speech acts but can also rely on gestures or practical actions. A further distinction has to be made with regard to the terms action and activity. We are involved in many activities, especially in the practical area, that cannot count as actions. I do not think that intention is the right criterion to use in order to distinguish between action and activity. Thus, for instance, we want to close the window. The practical action is closing the window which needs activities to be done such as approaching the window. Activities of this type might even be intentionally and consciously carried out but lack an independent purpose. I would therefore propose that we consider activities as auxiliary or routinized parts of action. With respect to dialogic action intention is an essential component of action but not yet sufficient to constitute action. Intention is a human ability that may remain closed in an individual’s mind. We need the concept of a social-interactive purpose that includes intention but goes beyond the mind of an individual and reaches the dialogue partner. We therefore have to give up the view of the autonomy of the single act as has been handed down from Aristotle to orthodox speech act theory. Dialogic acts are not autonomous in and of themselves but are by their very action function related to other acts which precede or follow in the sequence (cf. Habermas 1991). The purpose of an action is paramount if we want to define the concept of action. The purpose creates the unit of the speech act, but the speech act cannot be reduced to its purpose. In carrying out an action, we need devices in order to achieve our purposes. Devices are not simply any empirical data observable in and around the action nor are they restricted to empirically registrable data. ­Devices become means of action if speakers use them to pursue their purposes.

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We are reminded of de Saussure’s tenet that it is the relationship between expression and meaning which constitutes the expression of a sign. Even if we are no longer arguing within the limits of a sign theory, we are in the end dealing with the same fundamental relationship, now addressed as purposes and means and prompted by the speaker. We can differentiate the general concept of action by specifying the purposes and the means. We might distinguish between mental actions, practical actions and dialogic action carried out by means of speech act sequences (see above II). Mental action is constituted by mental purposes, such as making a decision. Practical action aims to achieve physical results by physical means. Dialogic action aims to negotiate meaning and understanding by means of speech act sequences. These basic types of action are mutually connected. Thus, for instance, a person wants to visit their friend. The question is: how to go there? They may decide to take their car and carry out a practical action or may start a dialogic action game by carring out the speech act of asking a friend to give them a lift. Accepting the view that even thinking proceeds dialogically, we might assign mental action to dialogic action and only distinguish between two basic types of action, dialogic and practical action. Mental action would then be equivalent with an inner dialogue. There is a further essential difference between practical action and communicative-dialogic action. Practical action can be carried out by individuals or by collectives of people. It may, in the end, have a mental goal, for instance, cutting down trees in order to have a clear view or taking the car in order to see a friend. The relationship between the practical action and the mental goal however goes beyond the practical action itself. The practical action of, for instance, cutting down a tree, is self-sufficient in itself. By contrast, the purpose of a communicative action is not an independent communicative purpose. Communicative purposes relate to a certain state of affairs, as indicated by Searle’s formula F(p). There is no action of informing, asserting or requesting as such; it is always ‘informing about’, ‘asserting that’ and ‘requesting that’. The action function can be considered as a higher predicate about a state of affairs in the world, called a proposition. As we have known since the time of Aristotle, the proposition consists of the functions of referring and predicating. According to classical speech act theory, the speech act thus includes three fundamental types of meaning: F action function

(p) (proposition)

referring and predicating

Figure 19.  The classical speech act formula



Chapter 2.  The methodology

In order to achieve a formula for the speech act which can be the basis of a theory of competence-in-performance we have to go beyond classical reductionist postulates such as Searle’s ‘principle of expressibility’ (1969: 19) or the assumption that everything can be explicitly expressed. Competence-in-performance means being aware of the fact that not everything is said or intended to be said explicitly, not only because of the complexity of meaning. Behind explicitly expressed purposes there are interests which remain concealed but need to be included in the formula as they influence the course of action. I therefore extended the classical formula of action by introducing a superordinate predicate interest (e.g., Weigand 2006b): interest [F (p)]

Figure 20.  The extended speech act formula

Interests represent the primary force of action and are rooted in human beings’ nature as social individuals (see above II 1.1.3). The functional components of action, indicated in Figure 20, determine the possibilities of how the action can be carried out. We thus arrive at the following complete formula of the Action Principle: interest [dialogic purpose [reference + predication)]

communicative means

Figure 21.  Formula of the Action Principle

Interests need not correspond directly to the purposes and related states of affairs. Insofar as they determine the choice of specific utterance variants for a speech act they belong to the Action Principle. As rhetorical strategies which determine the choice of speech acts in the sequence they represent the basic category of Excecutive Principles (see below).

2.2.2 The Dialogic Principle proper The methodology of the MGM consists of principles of probability which are all dialogic principles. Among them there is a basic principle or the Dialogic Principle proper on which the idea of dialogue rests. The Dialogic Principle proper is rooted in the premise that human beings are social beings. We do not communicate by means of single, independent acts. Every communicative act is dialogically related either to a preceding or a subsequent act. Consequently, the Action Principle explicated above does not describe an autonomous but a dialogically oriented act, or as expressed in W. von Humboldt’s terms (1827/1963: 138):

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Es liegt aber in dem ursprünglichen Wesen der Sprache ein unabänderlicher Dualismus, und die Möglichkeit des Sprechens selbst wird durch Anrede und Erwiederung bedingt. “An unchangeable dualism is at the origin of language and the possibility of speaking is itself conditioned by being addressed and by replying.”

Compared with von Humboldt, who grasps ‘language as dialogue’ rather precisely by “Anrede und Erwiederung” (“address and reply”), Linell’s definition of dialogism as “other-orientation” still remains within the reach of a single act (see above Part I 1.4). Using the Dialogic Principle proper we can now indicate more precisely what the general idea of dialogism really means. The Dialogic Principle provides a definition of dialogue as a sequence of action and reaction. Dialogue does not yet result from single unrelated utterances, not even from utterances directed to the interlocutor, nor from dividing a speech act into the front part, consisting of meaning by the speaker, and the back part, consisting of understanding by the hearer. Dialogue involves taking a position, and needs a reaction by the interlocutor, either carried out in the mind or explicitly expressed. This is precisely what human beings normally do; they are unable to restrict themselves to understanding what has been said. They inevitably reflect upon and take a position regarding what has been said. Dialogue is therefore constituted by the interactive purpose of coming to an understanding which is based on the sequence of action and reaction. Action and reaction are not two actions of the same type which are arbitrarily connected and only formally distinguished by their position in the sequence. They are functionally different types of action, initiative and reactive, which are internally connected by their very action function. Consequently, orthodox speech act theory, being exclusively based on illocution, has to be changed in its essence. Searle’s attempt to construct a theory of conversation starting from his theory of single illocutionary acts and putting them together by what he calls ‘collective intentionality’ is doomed to fail. Collective action is not yet dialogic action, even if it aims at a common goal. The nub of the matter is missing: the interdependence between the individual acts (Weigand 1995: 110; Searle 1992). It is the function of the act itself which is dialogically oriented, back and forth, and which inevitably leads to the sequence of two functionally different speech acts: action and reaction. If we take the illocutionary function to be the function of the initiative act, we might ask what the reactive act should be called. This terminological question prompted a debate about 20 years ago, when I first proposed basing speech act theory on two different types of action (Weigand 1984a). I do not want to take up the terminological discussion again. The question turned out to be of little



Chapter 2.  The methodology

importance. In most cases it is not even necessary to introduce a special term. It suffices to call the different actions ‘action’ and ‘reaction’. If in some cases different terms are needed, I will stick to the terms illocutionary act for the initiative act and perlocutionary act for the reactive act. The arguments for justifying these terms are still the same: first, there is no strict definition of the term perlocution; from the very outset, it has always been used to mean different things. Second, perlocution is a term which is connected with the interlocutor. Third, the distinction between ‘perlocutionary act’ and ‘perlocutionary effect’ can still be made (cf. Weigand 2003a: 13). And finally, there is no patent on terms. Change is necessary as research proceeds. Let us now ask more precisely what functional difference is implied by the distinction between an initiative and a reactive act. This is not an easy question to answer. What constitutes the feature of being initiative, of having the capacity to initiate a discourse, and what is the point of being reactive? It must be a functional feature of the speech act itself which is expressed in the utterance, because in many cases we can heuristically isolate the utterance and nonetheless know whether it can start a discourse or is intended to react. Take for instance the utterance You are right. We immediately know that it cannot be the beginning of a discourse but is a move in a sequence. Or take the utterance Of course! Again we do not need a formal feature of sequence dependency but immediately know from the very utterance itself that it will be a reaction. And we know even more. We can draw conclusions concerning the preceding act. In case of You are right the preceding act will be some kind of assertion expressing a claim to truth. In case of Of course! it can be an utterance expressing a claim to volition. Two essential points are thus confirmed: utterances differ in their capacity of being initiative or reactive, and they are functionally interrelated, or in other terms: action and reaction are different types of action which are functionally interdependent. They define each other mutually, the initiative action being primary insofar as it sets the claim. This is precisely what makes up the Dialogic Principle proper and what goes beyond a general principle of ‘other-orientation’. Yet what is precisely the functional difference between action and reaction? To my mind, an initiative act makes a dialogic claim and the reactive act fulfils this very claim. ‘Fulfilling’ not only means giving a positive answer. In a very general sense, it means going into the initiative claim which can also be done by a negative reply or by an utterance that does not take a position but postpones the decision. What is crucial is the internal functional relationship between action and reaction that is created by the very claim itself which is, on the one hand, made and, on the other hand, fulfilled:

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coming to an understanding

action making a claim illocutionary



reaction fulfilling the same claim perlocutionary

Figure 22.  The Dialogic Principle proper

The interrelation of action and reaction, represented in Figure 22 by the arrow, constitutes the basic Dialogic Principle proper. It is not a relation determined by a fixed code but emerges from the functional structure of the initiative action as a relation of expectancy. For instance, an initiative directive speech act which makes a claim to volition aims at a reaction which ‘fulfils’ this claim, i.e. a consent. The relation of expectancy is thus rationally based and has to a certain degree become conventional. Performance nonetheless is not restricted to rationality nor to conventionality but guided by Principles of Probability. In performance, in the end, every ‘law’ can be broken, ‘anything goes’. Having explained the term fulfilling the claim by either a positive or a negative reply or by postponing the reply, there is an interesting move left which – at first glance – may seem to postpone the reply but then turns out to be something else. It is a move which is clearly culturally shaped and occurs, for instance, frequently in Italian language use. German speakers living in Italy confronted with replies such as (8) Ne parleremo.

might first take this utterance literally for a while. After having been repeatedly confronted with the same reply – ne parleremo – they slowly learn that it is intended as telling the interlocutor that the speaker does not want to go into the point. Certainly, there are phrases in German and English, too, such as wir reden noch darüber/I’ll tell you tomorrow, but these phrases can be taken literally and referred to at a later time. I therefore consider the Italian reply as a typical example of what Pinker (2007: 397) calls ‘creative vagueness’ or ‘diplomacy’ (see also Premawardhena 2007). The clear-cut rational choice between a positive and a negative reply is thus extended to cope with the complex of human interaction (Weigand 2007a). The explanatory power of the Dialogic Principle proper does not stop at the general level of action and reaction (Figure 22) but allows us to differentiate step by step the complex notion of ‘coming to an understanding’ from which the principle starts. The individual action functions can be derived from this overall purpose of dialogue. In this way a dialogic speech act typology emerges by specializing basic speech act types. This sort of complex tree-structuring is different from



Chapter 2.  The methodology

Chomsky’s simple phrase structure trees which are based on division (see above Part I 2.1). The first step in differentiating the complex consists in recognizing that ‘coming to an understanding about the world’ is a general purpose at the level of interaction which, at the level of action, is based on an initiative and a reactive act. In the second step, we grasp the functional difference as well as the inherent correlation of both acts by the features of making a dialogic claim versus fulfilling this very claim. The next step confronts us with the issue of differentiating the claim. This is precisely the issue of a dialogic speech act taxonomy (cf. Weigand 2003a). In this chapter, I will restrict myself to deriving the basic claims and demonstrating the inherent power of the Dialogic Principle proper. The issue of a speech act taxonomy will be dealt with in detail in Part III. By means of ‘tree-structuring’ the complex we can distinguish types of action at the level of competence-in-performance. To my mind this is the level where the divergent views of Wittgenstein (2009[1953]) and Searle (1975a) can be reconciled. With Searle’s five fundamental speech act types we remain at the level of communicative competence, i.e. of universal distinctions and an overall order. In performance we never carry out fundamental actions but always specific subtypes. With Wittgenstein’s countless language games we move to performance. The contrast is resolved in the minds of human beings who are ‘competent-inperformance’, i.e. able to mediate between order and disorder, between fundamental types of competence and countless ways of performance. This issue of a dialogic speech act taxonomy is, in principle, an issue of the criteria which allow us to move from basic dialogic claims to more specialized ones. In order to achieve a consistent typology these criteria must be functional criteria and must be rooted in the human mind. It turns out that the various speech act types, in the end, draw on two different basic claims, namely a claim to truth and a claim to volition. These basic action claims rest on the basic mental states of belief and desire (Fodor 1987: x). What has always been postulated and searched for, the connection between mind and language, is thus established by correlating basic mental states with basic speech act claims (cf. Weigand 1991, 1996a). Sometimes intention is also considered to be a basic mental state. Intention is included in the action purpose. I therefore consider it redundant to represent it separately. As mentioned above (2.2.1), the intention to do something does not yet constitute an action. For an adequate speech act taxonomy the criterion of dialogic claims is not yet sufficient. We need to come to grips with declarative speech acts. A definition as speech acts which change the world is not convincing because to a certain extent the world is changed with every speech act. The peculiarity of declaratives consists in the fact that the reactive act does not follow after the initiative but is carried out simultaneously; it underlies the initiative act so to speak. ­Declaratives

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change the world by the very utterance itself. The reactive act is presupposed as confirmation; a negative response is excluded if the declarative is successfully carried out. There remains the difficult question concerning the pragmatic claim which defines declaratives. The best solution is arguably to relate declaratives to making and fulfilling a claim to volition. Combining both claims, the claim to volition and the claim to truth, does not help; what constitutes the declarative force is the fact that the claim is made and fulfilled at the same time. We have also to do justice to the outstanding role of speech acts of asking somebody a question, i.e. of explorative speech acts, which are totally marginalized by Searle (1975a) and subsumed under the type of directives. A simple example points to the nub of the matter: (9) Where are you going? – To the station. (10) Let’s go into the cinema. – OK, I’ll come with you.

It is clear that the reactive speech acts in these two examples do not belong to the same type. An explorative speech act aims at an answer (9), a directive at consent (10). This is suggestive enough to conclude that the initiative speech acts are also different. An explorative speech act makes a claim to volition which relates to knowledge, a directive makes a claim to volition which relates to practical action. To some degree they are the same because they have the claim to volition in common. This common claim is then, however, differently specialized and results in different types of speech acts. These criteria – types of the action claim and correlation with the reactive act – enable us to derive the basic minimal action games from the general dialogic function of language use: coming to an understanding



[action

[follow-up reaction necessary]

[claim to truth] acceptance repr

[follow-up reaction not necessary]

[claim to volition]

[directed to knowledge] explorative response

Figure 23.  Basic minimal games

reaction]

[claim to volition, made and fulfilled]

[not directed to knowledge] directive consent

decl (

confirm)



Chapter 2.  The methodology

Directives and exploratives are functionally distinguished by the criterion [±knowledge] and consequently by their respective reactive act. As it is representatives and directives which correspond to the fundamental human abilities of thinking and doing and thus to the basic mental states of belief and desire, one might consider exploratives and declaratives as subsidiary types: they provide missing knowledge and create interpersonal reliability. On the basis of the Dialogic Principle proper the fundamentals of a dialogic speech act taxonomy can be further differentiated. In this way, we can produce a taxonomy in which every speech act, initiative as well as reactive, finds its place (Part III).

2.2.3 The Coherence Principle Whereas the Dialogic Principle proper determines the speech act as a dialogically oriented act, the Coherence Principle determines how the various communicative means by which the action is carried out interact. Coherence has been a central concept of research since linguists went beyond the limit of the sentence. As long as linguistics was confined to the verbal level, coherence was inevitably considered to be a phenomenon located in the text. In pragmatics however the situation changed completely. Coherence turned out to be a never-ending problem (Weigand 2000b). Linguists were confronted with samples of a text that apparently did not have any textual element of connection such as Brown and Yule’s well-known example (1983: 196): (11) There’s the doorbell. – I’m in the bath.

A self-contradictory ‘zero-connector’ was introduced and the question of what creates textuality, i.e. of what nevertheless connects the single utterances, was left unanswered (e.g., Stati 1990, 1994). Scholars wondered about the strange fact that we are often unable to understand what is talked about in a conversation we observe although it is a conversation in our mother tongue (Yule 1996: 4). Instead of recognizing that we cannot ‘trust the text’, the level of the text remained an autonomous level (see above Part I 2.1). As a consequence of our premise that human abilities are integrated abilities, we have to give up the orthodox concept of coherence and the naïve conviction that the complex can be achieved by the addition of heterogeneous levels. There is no such thing as language as such, only the ability of speaking which is intrinsically connected with other abilities, mainly of thinking and perceiving (Weigand 2010b, c). Coherence has to take account of the integration of different abilities. It is therefore established in the minds of the interlocutors, not in the text (Givón 1993, Weigand 2000b). As a consequence, it is quite natural that we as observers

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are unable to understand what is going on in an action game played by others who are relying on cognitive means unknown to us. The interlocutors try to make sense of all the possible signals offered to them in the action game. They need to find out which of them are used as dialogic means and how empirical and cognitive means interact. Empirical means are verbal and perceptual means. The utterance as the carrier of the speech act must not be reduced to the utterance form but includes perceptual and cognitive means as well. Speaking is only part of acting. The Principle of Coherence is applied as the principle of understanding how the different types of dialogic means are integrated and balanced in the action game: dialogic purposes



verbal

dialogic means interaction of cognitive

perceptual means

Figure 24.  The Principle of Coherence

Coherence is thus established in the continual attempt to understand what the speaker meant. We take for granted that our interlocutors see what we see in the speech situation and what therefore does not need to be explicitly expressed. We not only rely on perceptual and verbal means but quite naturally use various types of cognitive means. Consciously or unconsciously, we refer to our knowledge and cognitive background, be it specific expert knowledge or workaday experience; we rely on conventions and rational conclusions as well as on particular, nonconventional inferences, associations, analogies and allusions and expect the interlocutors to do the same. Only in this way can we deal with the complexity of meaning. Not everything can be explicitly expressed, much has to be left to cognitive means, not only for reasons of economy of time. The integration and interaction of the means of dialogic action and especially the inclusion of cognitive means imply that understanding is at risk. This risk is increased by the fact that we are always different individuals who live in their own world, even if we live together. Inevitable differences in meaning and understanding can result in problems of understanding, misunderstanding or even non-understanding (Part IV 1.1). In principle, understanding is always gradual understanding, never complete. In cases of misunderstanding, coherence as established by the interlocutor is fallacious, in cases of non-understanding coherence is missing. Let me now illustrate the Coherence Principle by a few authentic examples. I will begin with a clear and simple authentic example of a minimal dialogue which is mainly based on the integration of verbal and perceptual means.



Chapter 2.  The methodology

(12.1) One for her. – (12.2) Eve, too.

“What a strange example!”, orthodox linguists might comment. “An example to be deleted”, the generativist would react. Yet it is a quite normal example of language use, an example which demonstrates that, in many cases, we cannot understand utterances on the basis of verbal expressions alone; we need to be insiders of the game. Insiders do not exclusively rely on verbal means; they perceive what can be seen in the speech situation and they draw their own conclusions. As observers we can take note of the speech situation: A woman and a man – we assume them to be mother and father – are walking around a lake with a little boy and a little girl – we assume them to be their children. The father cuts willow branches for the boy.

Whereas the interacting people or the insiders of the game integrate the different means without being aware of it and immediately understand how (12) is meant, we, as observers, have to bring together what we see and what we hear in order to establish coherence. In (12.1) the mother asks for a willow branch for the girl; in (12.2) the father agrees and cuts a branch for the girl, too. As long as we have to rely exclusively on corpora, which do not provide a precise description of the situation, we get into trouble when it comes to the analysis of meaning. Our next example is based on the integration of verbal and cognitive means. It is Brown and Yule’s example mentioned above which can now be explained more precisely and allows us to draw far-reaching conclusions: (13.1) There’s the doorbell. – (13.2) I’m in the bath.

Examples of this type very clearly demonstrate that we mean more than we say. In contrast to Cognitive Pragmatics (Part I 1.3.3) we can now explain how this comes about. In language use, we draw conclusions of different kinds and expect our interlocutors to do the same. These conclusions may run along rational lines or may refer to individual particularities which require special knowledge. Sometimes they are not conclusions at all, only associations, hints. We immediately understand the dialogic sequence of utterances such as in (13) as internally connected in our mind because we take them as utterances not as sentences. It is not even necessary to describe the speech situation. Over and above what is verbally expressed we refer to habits of our life and simply know that the ringing of the doorbell means or implies that someone should open the door. We also know that being in the bathroom normally means that we are not prepared to appear in public. We rely on the fact that our interlocutor will make the same inferences and will therefore understand what

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we mean. This is precisely the technique used in ‘indirect speech acts’ which express something without expressing it explicitly, only by inferences derived from literal meaning. Both utterances in our example are indirect utterances, connected by the conclusion: ‘if I am in the bathroom I am not prepared to open the door’. This connection between the two utterances via inferences is made on the basis of the Dialogic Principle proper which assigns to both utterances the same claim that someone is expected to open the door. The first utterance indirectly makes the claim directed to the interlocutor who indirectly goes into this claim in the second utterance. Some ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ remains which is characteristic of indirect speech acts. In the end, the connection is established by the rationally based correlation between making and fulfilling the same claim. It is the structure of the initiative act that allows us to expect a specific type of reaction, in our case the claim to volition leads us to expect consent. Rationally based expectancy and reference to common habits create conventions which, when applied by human beings, can be relied on with a certain probability. What I called reference to habits is usually dealt with as encyclopaedic knowledge or knowledge of the world and added as a separate component to the verbal component. Yet what is world knowledge? It is what we believe to know of and think about the world. Language is meant and understood ‘in the stream of life’ (Wittgenstein 1981[1967]), i.e. on the basis of our knowledge of everyday habits. Example (13) demonstrates that there is no independent world knowledge. The problem of listing it by enumerating an infinite number of items is revealed to be an absurd endeavour. So-called world knowledge or knowledge represented as items of a ‘frame’ or setting depends, to a large extent, on habits in standard situations of our life. Explaining how coherence comes about will occupy centre stage in an Utterance Grammar. Like any grammar, an utterance grammar deals with the correlation of meaning and expression, in pragmatic terms with the correlation of the meaning of speech acts and a corresponding set of utterances. I prefer to use the term ‘utterance grammar’ for what is usually called ‘communicative grammar’ or ‘pragmatic grammar’. The term ‘utterance grammar’ highlights the utterance as the unit of a grammar of language use in contrast to the sentence as the unit of a grammar of language as a sign system. The utterance as the carrier of the speech act is however not an independent unit as small as a single speech act. Its function is affected by being dialogically oriented. The ‘utterance’ as a complex of different means, verbal, perceptual and cognitive, must not be confused with the ‘utterance form’ which refers to the verbal means alone. An utterance grammar will aim to explain how speakers succeed in establishing coherence among the different communicative means offered to them in the action game.



Chapter 2.  The methodology

An Utterance Grammar which describes competence-in-performance has to tackle issues such as indeterminacy of meaning and reference to common and individual habits. It has to describe and explain the utterances used in mixed games as they result from the interaction of various parameters. An interesting question to be posed refers to the point where inferences start. Inferences may be individual inferences which start from some misfit between what is said and what is expected in the particular game, or may draw on common habits and be triggered off by our knowledge of conventional connections between certain events. The interesting point is that they are often tied up with lexical phrases. The lexicon should therefore indicate probable inferences as ‘presumptive’ meanings, to use Levinson’s term (2000). In our Example (13), it is the lexical phrase ring the doorbell that initiates the inference to ‘open the door’, and it is the lexical phrase being in the bathroom that initiates the inference to ‘not being prepared to appear in the public’. If we could include these habits or presumptive meanings in the lexical description, it would be possible even for a machine to connect both utterances by ‘rational’ probability conclusions and arrive at an analysis of I am in the bathroom as indirect refusal to open the door. The lexicon entries could be represented as follows: ring indirect [ringing (doorbell)] reason

[open the door] conclusion

bathroom [being (in the bathroom)] reason

[unable to appear in public/unable to open the door] conclusion

Figure 25.  The lexicon and its role in the process of inferencing

Coherence is thus achieved in the following rational way that brings negotiation down to patterns of probability:

The doorbell is ringing.

sentence type

[declarative sentence]

[declarative sentence]

Action Principle

repr

repr

–

(ringing (doorbell))

I am in the bathroom. (being (in the bathroom))

directiveindirect (open (y, door)) reprindirect (unable (open (the door))) Dialogic Principle directive consentnegative coherence

Figure 26.  Coherence on the basis of probability

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Rationality in this sense means soft rationality or practical reasoning based on probability and accepting a certain indeterminacy. If the lexical items which I consider to be phrases (Weigand 1998a) are annotated in this way, i.e. indicate presumptive relationships between events of human life, it will be possible even for machines to trigger off these sequences of bounded rationality and make machines ‘think’ along the lines of probability (Weigand 2009e). It becomes evident that the lexicon cannot be dealt with as an independent part of utterance grammar. On the contrary, it turns out to be the crucial connecting point between predication and action and is thus intrinsically integrated in the mixed game of dialogic interaction. What I demonstrated with respect to lexical units such as ringing the doorbell or being in the bathroom is also true of many other lexical units such as to wait, being late, etc., as can be seen in the following examples which are very similar to Example (13): (14) It’s late. – We’re going soon. (15) Doris is waiting at the airport. – I’ll fetch her. (16) It’s draughty. – I’ll close the window.

Examples like these demonstrate that indirect speech acts very often bear on their lexical items even if the conclusion to be drawn from the use of the lexical item is left to the interlocutor. The issue of the lexicon should therefore be completely revised. Probability concepts such as habits, preferences and evaluations enter the lexicon. They demonstrate once again that we cannot trust the text because the text is only a component in the mixed game. Human beings are adaptive beings who normally do not make a distinction between text and context, between acting and interpreting, but interact in the action game by integratively accounting for variables of different types. They cannot proceed otherwise even if they wanted to. As the Principle of Coherence focuses on the way the communicative means are used, it can be considered to be the basic principle of an Utterance Grammar. The lexicon seems to play a key role in the intricate interplay of different communicative means. There are no signs as such which carry meaning on their own and are put together compositionally but speakers who use communicative means of different kinds and of different pertinence. This complex issue of an utterance grammar needs to be dealt with in a separate volume. As my focus in this volume is on a theory of dialogue and not specifically on a theory of grammar I will not go into detail here about the various types of pragmatic grammars proposed in the literature ranging from ‘emerging’ grammars, discourse-based or corpus-based grammars to ‘construction grammars’ and so-called ‘functional’ grammars which – despite the term – also start



Chapter 2.  The methodology

from the expression side of language. What is valid for dialogue is in principle also valid for utterances, i.e., the starting point cannot be the expression side. As we do not have an overview of the communicative means, there is, in principle, no way which leads from verbal means to action functions. If we start from discourse, we end up by “searching in the dark”, as Thompson (1996), a proponent of a ‘functional’ grammar, called it. So let me restrict myself to focusing on a few essential points which can be derived from the Coherence Principle. – The utterance cannot be grammatically defined. The problem of how an utterance can be segmented from the rest of the discourse has to be solved at the functional level. A new utterance begins where it deals with a different action function. – In principle, we do not have an overview of the communicative means involved mainly because individual cognitive means are included. Adequate access to utterance grammar can only be achieved by starting from functions or meaning. – The device of ‘trusting the text’ is fallacious insofar as the empirical text is only a part of the communicative means used in the action game. In problematic cases, only the speaker knows what he or she meant. – As there is no overview of the means, the set of utterance variants which can be considered more or less dialogically equivalent is not closed. In particular, variations in the use of cognitive means, individual or creative, will always be possible. The basic question of an utterance grammar, i.e. the correlation between purposes and communicative means, can thus be represented as follows F(p)



{ open set of utterances }



Figure 27.  Utterance grammar



This formula draws on the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle proper specifying the individual speech act as dialogically oriented, and the Coherence Principle. The issue of an utterance grammar is however more complex because we need to include the category interest and Regulative and Executive Principles, which are intrinsically connected with any speech act (see below). The speech act therefore cannot be grammatically or extensionally defined by a list of utterances but remains a matter of probability (for the opposite view in the framework of a rule-governed model see Weigand 1984b).

– Nevertheless the set of utterances can be structured according to direct, indirect and idiomatic utterance types (Weigand 2003a). The indirect type is

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­constituted by a special marriage of the verbal and the cognitive. We might distinguish between the general term of indirect speaking covering every sort of inferencing (see Pinker 2007: 373ff.) and a more specific term of the ‘indirect speech act’ restricted to more or less rational or conventional conclusions. In this sense, for instance, only an utterance variant such as Would you have some money for me? counts as indirect speech act on a beggar’s sign whereas Today it is springtime but I cannot see it. represents a free indirect and creative variant of a blind beggar for the same purpose. – Differences in the communicative means are in principle connected with functional differences. Characterizing a series of utterance variants as communicatively equivalent invariably results in a more or less rough notion of equivalency. As speakers we are competent-in-performance and can distinguish between the subtle functional differences of the utterance variants and use them as rhetorically effective means in different action games. – An utterance grammar not only deals with the issue of how to express action functions. According to the formula F(p), action functions are related to propositional functions of reference and predication. The premises about our object competence-in-performance are also valid for predicating and referring. Human beings as central reference point structure the universe of meaning according to their abilities. Our basic mental states of belief and desire underlie the typology of speech acts, and our culturally shaped abilities determine how we perceive and think and consequently how we refer to individuals and groups and predicate them. – An utterance grammar represents an advance in the complex which has to tackle the interactions between the respective subsystems in the hierarchy of the whole of dialogic interaction. It is not at all Utopian to try to achieve this goal because the subsystems comply with Simon’s condition of near decomposability (Simon 1962). – Insofar as the utterance cannot be reduced to the rule-governed composition of verbal means, an utterance grammar can no longer be based on the traditional view of syntax and the lexicon. It has to deal with the interaction of different types of communicative means and techniques on the basis of probability principles. The units will no longer be single words, lexical and grammatical, but phrases, lexical ones for predicating, and grammatical ones for referring. What we need is a phrasal lexicon and a new concept of utterance syntax which would be a flexible, adaptive carrier of action. Only in this way will an utterance grammar succeed in describing and explaining language use as a network of phrases for action, reference and predication.



2.3

Chapter 2.  The methodology

Regulative Principles

Regulative Principles can be considered as corollary principles that come to work on the basis of Constitutive Principles. As they are rooted in human nature, they exert a permanent influence on human interaction and behaviour in the mixed game. Whereas the Coherence Principle is primarily an issue of understanding how different means interact, Regulative Principles mediate between opposing abilities and interests of the speaker such as the balance between the speaker’s selfish and social interests or the interplay between reason and emotion.

2.3.1 Regulating self-interest and respect Human beings have to regulate two basic groups of interests which are rooted in their double nature as social individuals: their interests as individuals and their interests as members of the community. The self is – with a shift in perspective – the other. On the one hand, we want to pursue our own purposes and interests, on the other hand, we are at the same time the other social being whose interests need to be respected. How self-interest and respect are balanced in the mixed game depends on the individual’s mind as well as on cultural ideology. Let us first grasp more precisely what this balance means and then see how it is expressed in different games. Self-interest in social interaction is basically directed towards achieving acceptance. It involves some sort of power which can range from persuasion or power by words to physical power (Weigand forthc.b). Achieving acceptance by words means having one’s purposes and interests agreed on by argumentation. As persuasive beings we tend to position ourselves in a favourable light. The question is: how can acceptance be achieved? It depends on the objective that is to be achieved and on the dialogic means by which the objective is introduced in dialogue. To tender the right arguments is an essential part of effective language action. In complex institutional games, specific expert knowledge is needed. You have to move people by what is said and how it is said, if you do not want to move them by sheer power. In the end, you will move people by words only if they see any interests of their own in the affair. Now the question arises: How far can I go for selfish reasons? Living in a community we are inevitably faced with the necessity of respecting the other human being. Self-interest and respect are not really opposing interests. Negotiating our positions must do justice to both. Otherwise even a dictatorship will fall one day. There is, consequently, no monologic rhetoric of speech. Rhetoric is, in any case, a dialogic matter of negotiating diverse positions. Respecting the other human

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being is usually dealt with under the heading of politeness. We can now define politeness more precisely as a component in the balance between self-interest and respect for the other human being. Describing politeness in terms of ‘face-redress’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 91ff.) only accounts for part of the phenomenon and not even the essential part. Should we believe anthropological studies which describe the human species as an inherently aggressive species always concerned about ‘face’? Politeness is not a negative phenomenon to be dealt with primarily in terms of ‘avoiding face-threatening acts’. At its core, it represents a positive concept, the concept of the respect to be paid to our fellow beings and expected for ourselves. Respecting the other human being is a dialogic attitude that goes beyond the “highly abstract notion of ‘face’”. The ‘positive’ as well as ‘negative face’ of Brown and Levinson (p. 13) are both defined monologically, i.e. self-reflexively towards the speaker, as the “desire (in some respects) to be approved of ” and the “desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions”. What is missing – and that is the crucial point – is the dialogic nature of paying respect. Politeness, at its core, means ‘the wish to respect the other human being’. The speaker necessarily has to balance their self-interest and the interests of fellow beings. Varying degrees between the two positions are possible, dependent on cultural conventions and the individual decision by the speaker. The speaker might even completely disregard respect and use means of politeness exclusively in their self-interest, as Western culture is often accused of. Used like this respect becomes an empty, manipulative concept in actual performance. If we want to make this distinction explicit between form and meaning, I would propose using the term ‘politeness’ if the focus is on specific expressions and retaining the term ‘respect’ for the genuinely positive meaning of respect. Let me outline in more detail how different degrees of the balance could emerge in different cultures. I start from human beings’ nature as persuasive beings. This universal attitude is shaped differently by different cultural evaluations of the relationship between the individual and the community. The specific cultural evaluation handed down through centuries can be regarded as some sort of ‘culturgen’ at work (Lumsden & Wilson 2005: Ixvi). Individuals can hardly free themselves completely from this cultural influence. As has been repeatedly emphasized in recent comparative studies on politeness (e.g., Grein & Weigand 2007), there seems to be a great difference between cultures of the Far East and Western cultures regarding the component which they put a premium on. Roughly speaking, Western cultures very much emphasize individual freedom whereas Eastern cultures evaluate the individual according to their role in the community. In Eastern cultures the group determines the value of the self, in Western cultures the reverse influence can be observed insofar



Chapter 2.  The methodology

as the self tries to maintain their position and to dominate others. It is this ­selfish drive for personal freedom that sets limits to the degree to which the other is respected in Western cultures, whereas in Eastern cultures it is the respect for the other human being that aims at reconciliation and harmony and sets limits to the individual’s freedom. We have to be cautious, though, because such a roughand-ready distinction will have to be more clearly differentiated by future studies. Human beings’ nature as social individuals will inevitably imply both cooperative as well as confrontative tendencies. achieving acceptance

[universal]

individual the self

[culture]



community the other

biased evaluation



West



the other the self bias on self-interest



confrontation

East the self the other bias on respect harmony

Figure 28.  The balance of self-interest and respect

Comparative studies (e.g., Cho 2005, Premawardhena 2007, Grein 2007) have differentiated subfunctions of politeness or respect resulting from differences in cultural evaluation. If there is a bias towards the community and the individual’s value is seen in its role for the community, respect includes consideration for others, modesty, solidarity, avoiding conflicts and striving for harmony. If the individual strives for personal freedom, respect will either mean sincere consideration or will become a formal concept that is functionally rather empty or masks distance and even manipulation. East

West

modesty solidarity attention avoiding conflicts harmony

reverence empty distance manipulation confrontation

Figure 29.  respect/politeness

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It has however to be questioned whether such an ideal picture of selfless brotherly love is still valid for Eastern cultures in our times of rapid societal change and global influences. The distinction between the East and the West needs to be differentiated as there are certainly distinctions between different cultures of the East, for instance, between the Japanese or the Korean culture, as well as of the West. We should be very careful and ask in every individual authentic case whether features such as solidarity, modesty, and consideration actually play a role as subfunctions of politeness. At least in Western cultures, they cannot be assigned to politeness without thinking. For Eastern cultures, the study by Cho (2005) strongly problematizes traditional views and demonstrates that ‘politeness’ is often as empty as in Western cultures and means nothing other than routines or even strategic instrumentalism. Having differentiated the balance between self-interest and respect by different functions of politeness, we can now ask how it is expressed by specific means and techniques. We will first concentrate on specific persuasive means which are related to the speaker’s self-interest. Attempts to achieve acceptance need to be differentiated according to the purpose of the actual action game and can mean acceptance of the dialogic claim to truth or to volition. The rhetorical means used can cover a wide range of different techniques, from the power of words and syntactic structures to the power of cognitive strategies and perceptual means of appearance. Let us begin with directive games. Rhetorical means for playing the directive game effectively will be means which aim to strengthen the claim to volition, i.e. in general persuasive means that increase the pressure on the interlocutor. A simple means is repeating the claim or insisting on it, which is not a specific means for directives but can be used as a sequencing principle in order to strengthen dialogic claims in general (see Part II 2.4.3). Other more sophisticated means are corollary actions such as an offer and threat which are specific for directives. Offers can have a double face: they range from gifts – material and immaterial such as help and advice – to enticement and bribes. Their ambiguous nature between paying or repudiating respect for the interlocutor demonstrates power in its positive and negative form. Threats can be considered to be a specifically Western means in order to push self-interest by completely disregarding principles of politeness. It would be interesting to investigate the conditions under which threats are used in Eastern countries, if they are used at all. There are a range of expressions with which we can try to move our fellow beings by means of an offer or threat. I will only mention the interesting possibility of distinguishing between an offer and a threat by means of the short conjunctions or and and. Prosper Mérimée (1983: 226f.) provides a nice literary example



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in French in his novel “Mateo Falcone”: the speaker, leur chef, is finding it difficult to get some information from a boy (cf. Weigand 1997b: 162f.): (17) … quand leur chef, convaincu que les menaces ne produiraient aucune impression sur le fils de Falcone, voulut faire un dernier effort et tenter le pouvoir des caresses et des présents. “… when the superior, convinced that threats would not make any impression on Falcone’s son, wanted to make a last effort and try out the power of caresses and presents.” “…als der Vorgesetzte, überzeugt, dass Drohungen keinen Eindruck auf den Sohn von Falcone machten, eine letzte Anstrengung unternehmen und die Macht von Zärtlichkeiten und Geschenken ausprobieren wollte.”

He first uses a threat to strengthen his claim to volition: (18) … cache-moi, ou je te tue. “… hide me, or I’ll kill you.” “… versteck mich, oder ich bringe dich um.”

As the threat does not have any effect, he tries to achieve his goal by means of an offer: (19) mais, tiens … sois brave garçon, et je te donnerai quelque chose. “but wait … be a good boy and I’ll give you something.” “aber wart mal … sei ein guter Junge, und ich werde dir etwas geben.”

As we can see, short, single words can have far-reaching functional consequences, and the power of an offer must not be underestimated. There are more subtle ways which do not use direct expression by words at all to strengthen the claim to volition and to move the other human being. It is primarily indirect suggestive means which rely on the appeal to emotions. Politicians and advertisers provide some interesting examples. In the internet we can read the anonymous story of a blind beggar sitting on the steps of a building. He has a sign in front of him which directly expresses what he wants: (20) I am blind. Please help me.

We are told that he receives very little money. An advertising executive passes by and writes another text on the sign which has a much better effect in moving the passers-by to donate money: ( 21) It’s springtime, and I can’t see it.

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The advertising executive’s text does not express any claim to volition directly but indirectly appeals to the reader’s compassion. Even if the story only provides single utterances, they are part of a dialogical action game which aims at practical action. A persuasive appeal to their emotions is more likely to move people than direct interference in their powers of free decision-making. In politics, too, appeals to compassion are a popular strategy. George W. Bush, for instance, used it in his famous State of the Union address to Congress on January, 28, 2003, which aimed to get acceptance for a pre-emptive war against Iraq in (see below Part II 2.4.3, Weigand 2009b). (22) Iraqui refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained: by torturing children while parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning. [Applause]

At the literal level, he presents a detailed terror scenario by means of a sequence of representative utterances which are used to move the audience by reference to human rights in an indirectly directive game. Other emotions also play a seductive role, for instance, in persuasive advertising texts which aim to influence the addressees’ actions and behaviour. The directive claim is mostly hidden, as in the headline of the following advertising text produced for the Allianz insurance company: (23) We are on your side, wherever you are.

What seems to be a representative speech act is dependent on a condition which is not explicitly expressed: if you are insured by us. This condition is precisely what the text aims at: ‘take out insurance with us’. The means used to strengthen the claim to volition are sophisticated means of persuasion that manifest the power of words and syntactic constructions. They appeal to certain desires, in this case the desire for support and assistance. Toyota proceeds similarly with this advertising text: (24) Toyota does not break down.

Again no direct directive is expressed; what is expressed is the assurance of reliability which is meant to induce the addressee to buy a Toyota. According to Rapaille (2007), such indirectly expressed aims are part of what he calls the “culture code”. His starting point is the assertion that “most people don’t know why they do the things they do” (p. 14). They are guided by the unconscious. Rapaille tries to detect these unconscious desires which differ from culture



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to culture by organizing conversational sessions. If a culture puts a premium on reliability and security, ads should relate to these values. If a culture likes freedom, even cigarettes can be advertised by promising this feeling. Reference to the unconscious once again demonstrates that you can move people only if they have some desire or see any interests of their own embodied in the subject matter. If this is not the case, people can hardly be moved by words and arguments. What remains is to use sheer power and oppression which, to my dismay, is recommended in trivial rhetoric (see below 2.4.3). In contrast to directive games, rhetorical means in representative games aim to strengthen a claim to truth. Rationality and the suitable selection of arguments play a primary role especially in cases of diverging opinions, i.e. in argumentative games (Part IV). However, as there is no absolute truth much depends on the speaker’s abililty to persuasively express his or her point beyond rational arguments. Rationality itself becomes a matter of persuasion as we can, for instance, see in phrases such as I am in favour of clear realities and facts or in plain language. They only allegedly refer to rationality; actually they imply that the opponent’s arguments lack clarity and plain language (Weigand 1999a: 59f.). Advantage for the speaker is achieved to the disadvantage of the opponent. Another skilful means, especially in political debates, relies on the power of certain persuasive words such as to deceive, to drag out, to be unable. Assertions based on such predications can simply be put forward without any argument as they cannot be falsified. They manifest an extreme position in the balance between self-interest and respect insofar as they push the speaker’s self-interest in complete disregard of any respect for the interlocutor. Consequently, they are often used in demagogic speeches and derogatory, provocative attacks such as the following authentic and well-known example: (25) (Schulz about Berlusconi in the European Parliament, cf. Weigand 2006) We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlusconi and Dell’Utri immunity procedures ... you would no longer have the immunity that you need.

Insinuations or derogatory predications of this type are also a convenient means in games which actually are directive games, as can be seen by the following authentic examples: (26) (Schröder, SPD, about his opponent Stoiber, candidate for the CDU/CSU) Sie möchten regieren, aber Sie sind unfähig dazu. “You want to govern but are not capable of doing it.” (supporting his directive claim to be elected)

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(27) (Bush about Sadam) The dictator is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving. (supporting his directive claim to accept the necessity of a pre-emptive war)  (Weigand 2009b: 253f.)

In a broad sense, such rhetorical means can be considered strategies of ‘colouring the facts’ or ‘positioning oneself ’ which has become a favourable topic in recent research, especially with respect to the media (cf. e.g., Weizman 2008; see below 2.4.3). Emphasizing certain events in front position and withholding others in the background also belongs to this type. Sometimes nothing but the loudness of the voice is used in order to increase the impact of the speaker’s claim. A recent example of the ‘magic’ power of words is the use of the word change in the last American election campaign (see Weigand 2009d). The power of words is also exploited in explorative games. Political games are again a very productive arena in this respect. Even if interviews are bound to the formal format of question and answer, they can have various functions, not only the simple cooperative function of providing knowledge. For political interviews, Bollow (2007) demonstrates that they often have the function of coaxing knowledge that is not willingly delivered or should not be made public. In this case a confrontational strategy is needed. An especially effective rhetorical technique is the use of certain words which trigger off presuppositions. Thus a cooperative interview could, for instance, start with the neutral question: (28) Wie ist ihr Gespräch mit dem Kanzler verlaufen? “How did your conversation with the Chancellor go?”

whereas the confrontational type relies on the power of words and uses, as in our authentic example, the following question: (29) Hat Ihnen der Kanzler den Kopf gewaschen? “Did the Chancellor give you a good telling off?”

The utterance with the phrase den Kopf waschen/to give somebody a good telling off contains as presupposition what the interviewer suspects and wants to bring to light. Meaning is persuasion from the very outset, and the lexicon plays a crucial role. As action games are dialogic games, it is interesting to see how the interviewees deal with such provocative questions. When involved in a confrontational interview they can choose between different reactive strategies. In our authentic Example (29), the interviewee used an evasive strategy and responded: (30) Das Gespräch ist in angenehmer Atmosphäre verlaufen. “The conversation was conducted in a cordial atmosphere.”



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Another strategy could be to try to change the role and take the initiative by not responding at all but posing oneself questions and going beyond the formal conventions of an interview. As we see with these examples, the use of verbal means is connected with cognitive strategies which are not explicitly expressed (see below 2.4.3 Executive Strategies). declarative games do not really rely on a balance between the interests of the speaker and that of his or her interlocutor. Declarative speech acts, as they are defined by Austin and Searle, for instance, baptizing, do not aim at a follow-up reaction; confirmation or agreement is presupposed. These classical examples require an institutional or legal basis. Playing the game presupposes having the right status in the right circumstances and using the proper utterance form. To my mind, declaratives represent a much broader class than that conceived of by Austin and Searle. They also include conventional politeness phrases of everyday life, such as greetings, excuses, congratulations, condolences, etc. (see Part III). Playing the game in the case of politeness phrases means complying with conventional-normative exigencies. As every language has various conventional utterance variants for a speech act at its disposal, a rhetorically skilful speaker has to know the subtle differences between them in order to choose the proper variant in the actual situation. The use of a specific variant might also imply a persuasive streak, even if it is normally to a large extent a matter of form. There are, of course, many other ways of expressing the balance between self-interest and social concerns, especially if we compare different languages and cultures. The examples analysed so far are in some respect rather simple as the speaker’s self-interest showed up as clearly persuasive interest. There are however complex games the purpose of which cannot be fully grasped at the level of dialogic claims. Especially in institutional games it is very difficult to explain what ‘effective’ means (see above Part II 1.2 and below Part IV). Institutional games have purposes and interests that go beyond dialogic purposes. Business executives, for instance, are not engaged in dialogue because of dialogic claims proper. They are interested in the effectiveness of their company. In order to give rhetorical devices for optimizing their business competence-in-performance, we need to connect dialogic purposes and economic interests. Running a company effectively means above all making a profit or at least maintaining a position in the market (Weigand 2006c, Schnöring 2007). The complex cognitive challenge of explicating rhetorical principles in institutional games thus not only needs to refer to dialogic claims proper but also and above all to institutional conditions. What is considered to be effective or favourable depends on evaluation and preferences, individual and institutional, and on cultural habits and expectancies. As the theory of dialogic action games is a descriptive theory it does not set up

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ethical norms but describes existing expectations. These expectations may have the status of norms (see above Part II 2.1). Disregarding them may have certain social consequences. Insofar as rhetoric is in the end a matter of evaluation, it is dependent on culture and some underlying ideology. In modern societies, for instance, civilized behaviour can be considered as such a norm which is expected to be obeyed. In analysing the examples above we focused on rhetorical means used in the persuasive interests of the speaker. Let us now have a look at specific rhetorical means which are primarily used to express respect. Expressing respect can mean any degree in the balance of self-interest and respect and is not restricted to genuine reverence. An important distinction to be made in this regard refers to the distinction between direct and indirect expression. Respect or politeness can be directly expressed by grammatical categories and routines of address. A well-known and much discussed example is the category of honorifics in Eastern languages. Whereas in traditional grammars the category of honorifics is described as obligatory, recent pragmatic analyses demonstrate that its use can also be facultative or even strategical (Cho 2005). There are utterances without honorifics, and there are utterances where respect is expressed indirectly. The variants which go beyond the honorific code also include the use of polite forms for manipulative reasons. The alleged difference in language use between Eastern and Western cultures becomes blurred and can no longer be considered a strictly categorical one; we need to take account of meaning-in-use. Western languages also have a few remnant grammatical forms such as specific pronouns of politeness, for instance, Sie versus du in German or vous versus tu in French. Whereas traditional investigations analyse these pronouns according to a grammatical code and assign to them a meaning of respect (cf. Horst Simon 2003), pragmatic analyses demonstrate that such an analysis runs into insoluble problems. In present-day language, the use of these pronouns is no longer determined by functions of respect but by elusive criteria such as closeness, solidarity or sense of a common bond. The politeness pronoun Sie in German has become a formal routine to be conventionally used towards people we haven’t formed a friendship with. The formal use can be mitigated by using Sie in connection with the first name. In present-day Italian the polite plural form of address loro is slowly disappearing and changing to the more familiar 2nd person plural which sometimes, however, can imply some disparagement. Specific routines of address can also be considered as direct expressions of politeness. They may be meant as sincere expressions of respect but more often they represent formal routines. In German you may use the adjective verehrt in contrast to the conventional geehrt, for instance, in verehrter Herr Kollege. This



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may however also convey an ironic tone. Sincere respect can be emphasised by forms such as verehrte, gnädige Frau. Specific forms of address are used in institutions and specific settings, for instance, in German towards the rector (vice chancellor) of a university Magnifizenz, in English Magnificence. In French we find an interesting remnant of a grammatical category with the old subjunctive veuillez which can replace the normal subjunctive vouliez in order to express respect. In contrast to direct expressions, indirect forms of addressing the interlocutor are much more important. Addressing the interlocutor by making a dialogic claim basically means meshing with his or her action space. We therefore need to downsize and to mitigate our claim not only for reasons of respect but equally for persuasive reasons of self-interest. Persuasion is strengthened by polite forms. We can mitigate our claim by various forms of indirect speaking and forms of toning down. Ways of indirect speaking range from the well-known indirect speech acts to hints and allusions (Weigand 2003a, Pinker 2007). They result from cognitive means triggered off by verbal means. Indirect speech acts such as (31) Could you fetch Doris?

offer an action alternative to the direct claim (32) Please fetch Doris.

insofar as they can, in principle, be taken literally as an explorative act. The specific characteristic of indirect speech acts that makes them different from direct speech acts results from the fact that the action space of the interlocutor is not directly touched upon but is at least formally respected. Besides forms of speaking indirectly there are other ways of weakening the dialogic claim which however – in contrast to indirect speaking – do not offer an action alternative but only tone down the claim, for instance, the use of particles, modal categories and lexical items: (33) Please come. “Komm bitte!” (34) Won’t you please come now!? “Komm doch bitte mal!” (35) Perhaps you’ll come now? Vielleicht kommst du mal? (36) I would suggest we end the meeting. (37) (an order by the chief executive to the secretary): I am asking you to make three copies.

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Such downsizing devices are mostly used as formal routines and do not presuppose an honest feeling of respect. Intonation plays an important role in how they are meant. If the speaker leaves them out, the interlocutor might feel offended by what is considered rude behaviour. Toning down devices do not really diminish the functional claim. They are only an indication that the interlocutor is being formally respected by putting a premium on the ‘atmosphere’ of dialogue or so-called ‘dialogue culture’. English language use is well-known for its subtle ways of toning down what is meant, especially in negative replies, as can be illustrated by the following authentic example: (38) A We’ll have dinner together? B It seems that probably I will not be able to be in time. So please go ahead without me.

Not only negative replies need mitigating forms. ‘Pleas’ should also be accompanied by specific devices of politeness as they cannot make any claim and are completely dependent on the interlocutor’s willingness to comply. ‘Demands’ or ‘requests’, on the other hand, make a claim to volition which should also be downsized by special devices. ‘Orders’, in contrast, do not need any polite forms, as they are based on sanctions. They are however often combined with seemingly mitigating devices which do not touch upon the action function but are used for ‘atmospheric reasons’ (as in Example 37). In military situations, there is no place for polite forms, only for correctness. To sum up: We have dealt in some detail with Regulative Principles of self-interest and respect which are usually treated separately in the literature under the headings of rhetoric and politeness. For a theory that aims to grasp the natural phenomenon of human action and behaviour, it is crucial not to separate in theory what is intrinsically connected in life. A holistic theory has to address the balance between diverging forces and to describe them as they interact in the mixed game. Human beings as social individuals have to regulate their self-interests with social concerns. They are influenced by cultural conventions but will, in the end, decide as individuals on the means they use for expressing their position. If we consider purposes and needs to be the driving force for human interaction, the dialogic means will be more or less intended to be effective means. Regulative principles thus become rhetorical principles which influence the selection of dialogic means in the balance between selfish and social interests. Despite the double nature of human beings as social beings, there is a certain bias towards the self-interest of the individual, towards their interest in maintaining their position in the community. Ultimately, however, what seems to be in the



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selfish interest of the individual strengthens the survival of the species (Wilson 2004: 157f.). To my mind, in contrast to Dawkins (2006: 2), “the selfish gene” does not falsify the “assumption that the important thing in evolution is the good of the species (or the group) rather than the good of the individual (or the gene)”. It is due to this bias towards the self-interest of the individual that persuasion as a striving for acceptance plays a crucial role everywhere in dialogic interaction, even in dialogues which draw on rationality. Everything is coloured by the underlying interest in presenting oneself in a favourable light. We not only ‘position ourselves’ in the media, in everyday life we also tend, to some degree, to hide our true face. Maxims such as ‘be honest’, ‘say what you mean’, are simply unrealistic in respect of everyday performance. In problematic cases, only the speakers know what is really meant by what has been said. Persuasion not only influences the use of specific verbal means but as a strategy, consciously or unconsciously, underlies the dialogic sequence (see below 2.4 Executive Strategies). In negotiating individual purposes and interests in the mixed game, a cooperative strategy can change to open or concealed confrontation (see below). Persuasion may then become manipulation or even deception.

2.3.2 Regulating reason and emotion Regulative Principles not only shape the balance between self-interest and respect but also tell us how to mediate between reason and emotion. In our postCartesian­ times, we know that there is no reason without emotion, and emotion can be balanced by reason. I call the principles that mediate between emotion and reason Principles of Emotion insofar as it is emotion which is considered to be in need of regulation by reason if we want to play our part effectively, at least in northern cultures. Emotion has been broadly ignored in Western science since Aristotle, as it was considered a disturbing factor which had to be abstracted from. Science was decisively influenced by Descartes, who separated mind from body, reason from emotion. Eventually, neurology experimentally proved that emotion and reason do not represent separate arenas but interact with each other and other human abilities (Damasio 2000, Pinker 1997: 370). Emotions have recently become a favourite topic in a number of different disciplines. The humanities’ take on emotions includes the issue of how they are dealt with in dialogic interaction. This is at its core a rhetorical issue which is highly culturally-dependent. Different cultures evaluate emotions differently. Members of northern cultures are often surprised how freely emotions are expressed and talked about in southern cultures, even in the media. If we want to give a more precise description, the distinction between

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northern and southern cultures certainly needs to be differentiated as was the case with the distinction between the East and the West (see above). Emotions have the extraordinary feature that they can express themselves, even against the intention of the speaker. As physiological processes they are not totally controlled by human reason or intention. How else could we, for instance, explain blushing as an external marker of embarrassment? Physiological processes which are not prompted by intention cannot count as communicative means. Emotions can be intentionally and explicitly expressed by various lexical and grammatical means, i.e. by lexical phrases or by grammatical means of intonation and syntax, for instance, the exclamative sentence type. ‘Expressing emotions’ can be the action function of speech acts, expressive, constative and declarative, or an accompanying feature, for instance, anger in the speech act of reproaching (Weigand 2004c). In contrast to explicit expression, which is primarily an issue of utterance grammar, there are Principles of Emotion which underlie the sequencing of utterances and need not be explicitly expressed. As rhetorical principles they conform to cultural conventions and can also be strategically applied as executive principles (see below). There are three basic kinds of internal biological mediation between emotion and reason (Weigand 1998b): – Emotions are kept under control by reason. – Emotions can no longer be controlled and become dominating. – Emotion and reason are in conflict and lead to quarrels. Rhetorical Principles tell us how to deal with these kinds of internal regulation. We can make a bad impression and damage our position in interaction if we do not keep to them. For the culture of northern Europe, the following Principles of Emotion can be considered as conventional or normative rhetorical guidelines in public dialogue: – Act rationally and hide or control emotions. – Keep quiet, do not be provoked by the statements and emotions of your interlocutor. – Know yourself and your own sensitivity and vulnerability. Learn to take criticism. – Do not overreact. I am going to illustrate these principles of balancing emotion and reason by two well-known political debates (see appendix) that clearly demonstrate what is expected in public debates at an international level. The first is the parliamentary debate after the statement by the then new President of the European Union Council of Ministers, Silvio Berlusconi, in which he introduced the programme



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of the Italian presidency to the House, on 2 July 2003 (cf. Weigand 2006b). The German Social Democratic member Schulz takes the floor and heavily criticizes Berlusconi. The debate demonstrates both sides of the issue: emotions under control on Schulz’s side, and being unable to control one’s emotions on ­Berlusconi’s side. Schulz starts his criticism with a series of arguments followed by biting irony: (39) Nevertheless I am delighted that you are with us today and that I can have this debate with you.

His destructive criticism reaches its peak with the next utterance: (40) We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlusconi and Dell’Utri immunity procedures … you would no longer have the immunity that you need.

In clear words, Schulz asserts that Berlusconi was only able to become the new President of the EU Council of Ministers because the immunity procedures had been intentionally dragged out. The use of the verb to drag out refers to a mental act that in principle cannot be verified or falsified. It is actually an insinuation based on Schulz’s personal and deliberate evaluation of the case. Political texts are full of such persuasive devices (see above 2.3.1). Schulz however presents the insinuation as objective truth: (41) That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today.

In my view, this argument and especially the use of the word drag out reveal that Schulz is acting on the basis of a clearly calculated executive principle, the strategy of provoking and possibly even offending. He knows Berlusconi and can expect that he will not remain cool. In my view, this is exactly what he intended to bring about. He plays the game of provoking and is successful. As for himself, he is clever enough not to go beyond certain limits. It is above all Schulz’s perfect use of rhetorical means, of biting irony, disparaging evaluation and concealed insinuation which cause Berlusconi to lose his composure: (42) I would, of course, also like to thank the other Members who have spoken – Mr Graham Watson, Mrs Monica Frassoni, Mr Francis Wurtz – for wishing me success in my work. I must, however, reply to them and to all those who have given an utterly distorted view of Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come and enjoy something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating, which is Italy’s sunshine, its beauty, its 100,000 monuments and churches, our 3,500 museums, our 2,500 archaeological sites, the 40,000 historical houses in Italy, which we have not managed

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to destroy over the last two years. Mr Schulz, I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect! (Laughter, protests from the left) I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far-left newspapers, which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs.

What started as an argumentative game mainly based on reason, now changes to a personal and emotional conflict, a quarrel, leading to grave offence. The break can be clearly marked between Berlusconi’s use of sarcastic irony (42.1) … that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating … … which we have not managed to destroy …

and his losing control and massively offending Schulz with an utterance that was highlighted in the media: (42.2) I will suggest you for the role of guard.

Whereas Schulz’s sarcastic irony remains within parliamentary and argumentative rules, Berlusconi’s reference to a guard of a concentration camp breaks certain limits of ordinary civilized behaviour. Berlusconi even goes one step further: (43) You would be perfect.

In contrast to Berlusconi, who is unable to take Schulz’s criticism, Schulz in his turn even proves able to deal with Berlusconi’s heavy insult without losing control: (44) … my respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying a single word about this. However, I am quite clear in my mind that it is very difficult to accept a situation in which a President-in-Office of the Council, when he comes up against the slightest contradiction during a debate, loses his composure in this way.

Schulz expresses very clearly what is expected in a public debate, namely to control one’s emotions, to be able to take criticism and not to overreact. This is confirmed by the President of the European Parliament Cox who comments: (45) Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the ordinary rules of engagement.



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Even if we can never be sure about what goes on in another person’s mind, we can assume that Schulz could to a certain degree expect and calculate Berlusconi’s reaction and this enables him to take it without comment. Reason tells the interlocutors to behave within ‘the ordinary rules of engagement’. The individual may go beyond these ordinary rules, he will however be called back by others who consider these rules as norms that do not allow emotions to dominate in public speech nor to express comments which are “out of respect for the values we all share as Europeans” as another member of the European Parliament called it. But where are the limits? This game between keeping and losing composure is a game on the verge between reason and emotion. It can be planned by Executive Principles. An essential question remains: how can speech acts of provocation be distinguished from speech acts of insult? In my view, provocation is a calculated attempt to challenge the opponent, whereas an insult tries to hurt. It mostly happens unexpectedly and is not strategically planned; it is induced by emotions, and hits an opponent’s sore point. The difference between provocation and insult is not clearly marked because, as we have known since Austin’s times, whether an utterance actually offends comes out as a perlocutionary effect. What we consider to be provocation is taken as a personal insult by Berlusconi. A provocative speech act in my view often is a representative speech act with a claim to truth for a state of affairs which is described in a highly goading critical way and can thus provoke a contradictory reaction. Criticism however respects conventional limits of civilized behaviour and should therefore be taken by the interlocutor with composure. On the other hand, an insult makes a claim to truth for a state of affairs that touches a point which goes beyond what is publicly tolerated. An insult thus crosses conventional limits of civilized behaviour and intends to hurt. It cannot simply be rejected but makes claims for an apology. It could be weakened in retrospect by pretending that it was not meant offensively but nevertheless an apology would be expected if it had been taken as an offence. The limits however – we should keep this in mind – may differ from individual to individual. Even if Berlusconi had taken Schulz’s criticism as offensive he is – according to parliamentary conventions – not expected to lose his composure. Berlusconi refuses to withdraw his comments and only tries to tone them down by pretending that they were said ‘ironically’. He is thus unable to apologize and causes the debate to become an open conflict. Cox, the President, closes the debate with an expression of personal regret about the insult caused to Schulz: (46) I should like to say that personally I regret the offence caused to our respected Member and colleague, Mr. Schulz.

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The debate is a very good example of a complex mixed action game, and especially of the regulative principle of reason and emotion. It is a complex institutional game, at the level of the European parliament, not between two individuals. Schulz’s provocation can be considered provocation by a member of the left-wing party, not his own personal provocation. It is however a provocation verging on an insult insofar as he intentionally points to Berlusconi’s personal vulnerability and wins. Berlusconi could have countered the move at the parliamentary level by keeping to fundamental rhetorical principles such as: – Be prepared to be attacked. Learn to take criticism. – Keep cool. Don’t lose your composure. Whereas in this example of a parliamentary debate an open conflict was avoided because Schulz did not lose his composure, we are now going to take a look at another well-known public exchange of views in which we can observe how emotions and reason come into conflict and result in an open quarrel (see also Weigand 2008a). It is again a political action game, this time the Round Table discussion on television, the so-called ‘elefants’ discussion’, with the top journalists Brender and von der Tann interviewing the chief representatives of the political parties (see the original German text in the appendix). It took place immediately after the first exit poll of the German general election in 2005 that ended with an unexpected result: fewer votes than predicted for the CDU/CSU and Angela Merkel, more votes than predicted for the SPD and Gerhard Schröder. It is very interesting to see how Brender and Schröder come to blows with each other: Brender pursuing the line of logical argumentation and Schröder pursuing the line of power, which however is not real power insofar as the CDU/CSU gained more votes than the SPD. Taking the numbers into consideration the situation is formally clear: the CDU/CSU and Angela Merkel had beaten the SPD and Gerhard Schröder, who is still chancellor. This contradiction between the formal result and Schröder’s claim to remain chancellor makes the ‘elefants’ discussion’ a game where rationality and the institutional conventions of a television interview meet a rhetorical strategy in which simulating power is mixed with undigested emotions. Two rounds with different outcomes can be distinguished in this process of reason and emotion in conflict. Throughout the whole game Schröder takes the rhetorical route of attacking the media. Even if he has to admit that the SPD has lost, he claims to be the only one who ‘is in a position to form a stable government’. He even rhetorically insists: (47) No one apart from myself!



Chapter 2.  The methodology

The journalists feel still obliged to keep to the formal line of quoting percentages, though with growing indignation: (48) But you have only 34.2 per cent and so you at least can’t be the strong leader of a new government.

Again, Schröder simply insists on his claim by compensating for the lack of argument with emotion: (49) (defiantly) I’m sorry, of course I can.

Brender takes it with perfect external composure: (50) Oh, I see.

Only the interjection oh expresses his sense of being baffled. At this point the journalists give up ‘resignedly’. Whereas in this first round of ‘logic versus rhetoric’ an open conflict is avoided because the other journalist von der Tann saves the situation by taking his turn and addressing the chief representative of another political party, the second round ends quite differently. Schröder continues his aggressive line of insinuations against the media, ‘laughing’ at the end ‘mockingly’ at von der Tann. That’s the point where Brender interrupts ‘at the end of his tether’: (51) v. d. Tann: (to Schröder)After this period of courageous reforms you moved to the left in the election campaign. You ... (52) Schröder: (laughs at von der Tann)I'll leave your prejudices intact, but I think ... (laughs mockingly) (53) v. d. Tann: It's a prejudice I share with a lot of other people and it'd be nice if you let me keep it. (54) Brender: (finally at the end of his tether)Mr Schröder, I'll call you Mr Schröder now because I think this ... (55) Schröder: You can call me what you like. (56) Brender: form of insinuation is not the done thing in a public television broadcast. To express myself quite clearly it is not up to you to insinuate anything and not up to us either. (57) v. d. Tann: That was the Berlin Round Table discussion (Berliner Runde) on the ARD and ZDF ... (58) Brender: That was the election night debate between the party leaders (Elefantenrunde). Most of them will escape and retreat to the undergrowth, (turning to Schröder) one or the other will roll around on the ground a bit and tomorrow things will carry on as usual.

111

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The game thus changes to an open conflict. Brender hits back calling the Chancellor Mr. Schröder: (54/56) (finally at the end of his tether) Mr Schröder, I’ll call you Mr Schröder because I think this … form of insinuation is not the done thing in a public television broadcast. To express myself quite clearly it is not up to you to insinuate anything and not up to us either.

An open conflict or a quarrel begins where both interlocutors attack each other and no longer care about obeying the rules of civilized behaviour required in an institutional game. This point has been reached when Schröder derogatorily comments: (55) You can call me what you like. rebuke Brender (54/56) I’ll call you Mr Schröder …



counter-attack Schröder (55) You can call me what you like.

Figure 30.  Open conflict

Both thus leave behind the conventions of civilized behaviour. Conflicts and quarrels are accompanied by rising emotions and often lead to the game being abandoned. Brender’s turn (56) is very interesting with respect to the issue of how we deal with norms in performance. He evaluates Schröder’s behaviour as not the done thing in a public television broadcast and thus refers to what can be expected as conventions or norms of reasonable behaviour in the given institutional setting. Norms of civilized behaviour obviously play their role in the mixed game. The game as a whole is played at the extremes where logic is confronted with pure rhetoric. What happens when this occurs? The text demonstrates two possibilities. In the first round, rhetoric uncompromisingly maintains its position, defiantly, against any logical argument (49), logic is irritated and gives up (48, 50). At the end of the second round, logic loses its composure: Brender is finally at the end of his tether (54), and hits back. The confrontation between the logical and the rhetorical position thus ends up in an argument, in a quarrel whose flames Schröder has permanently fanned. The argument erupts when Brender no longer is able to control his emotions by reason. To sum up: We analysed parts of two complex authentic action games that clearly demonstrate that human beings try to control their emotions by reason especially in public institutional settings. Having emotions is part of human beings’ biology and emotions cannot be switched off. Culture deals with emotions according to



Chapter 2.  The methodology 113

rhetorical principles that tell us how we are expected to behave. Nonetheless we can set up our own rhetoric, contrary to cultural norms, which however risks giving rise to an open conflict.

2.4 Executive Principles Dialogic interaction is based on Constitutive Principles, mediated by Regulative Principles, and processed by Executive Principles. The speaker uses executive principles, consciously or unconsciously, mainly in order to tackle the following basic issues: – How to concatenate initiative and reactive actions in the dialogic sequence – How to open up the complex – How to play the game effectively The term executive principles refers to the way we process and plan our part in dialogue. Executive principles go beyond the limit of the utterance and pertain to action sequences or to techniques that help us to address the complex. They become strategies if they are deliberately used by the speaker in order to play the game effectively in their self-interest.

2.4.1 Basic sequencing principles The notion of dialogue in the MGM is based on the sequence of action and reaction which does not necessarily mean a sequence of speech acts but includes practical and mental actions. The correlation of action and reaction in the two-part sequence is explained by the Dialogic Principle proper. However only very few and simple dialogues are limited to a sequence of two speech acts. Usually, we have an initiative action followed by a sequence of reactive speech acts before the final reaction closes the sequence. How are we to explain the sequencing of reactions, one after the other? We do not need a further sequencing principle which would extend beyond the minimal game. The same dialogic principle proper is repeatedly carried out and structures the sequence in general insofar as every reaction can secondarily be again initiative and trigger off another reaction (cf. Weigand 2003a: 28): action reaction action reaction action reaction action

Figure 31.  The two-part dialogic principle

reaction action



reaction

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The two-part dialogic principle can therefore be considered the basic sequencing principle that connects the moves by prompting reactions in the sequence with a double function, primarily the reactive perlocutionary function and secondarily an initiative illocutionary function, with the exception of the last reaction. Some scholars assume a three-part sequence as the structuring pattern of dialogue, for instance, Sinclair and Coulthard (1975), Roulet (1992) or Moeschler (1985). As I demonstrated in various articles, for instance, Weigand (1995:101), any three-part sequence can be dissolved into two two-part sequences:



‘elicit’



‘reply’



initiative



reactive initiative

reactive

What time is it?

Two-thirty.

‘evaluate’

Very good, Denise

Figure 32.  Restructuring the three-part analysis

As can be seen from the example above (taken from Mehan 1985: 121), this type of a three-part analysis contains a special evaluative move which has been derived from educational discourse and cannot be generalized. Another important Sequencing Principle refers to the issue of how to analyse and describe the multiple ways of dialogic processing which go beyond the minimal game. In this respect, the category of ‘phases’ is very useful. Minimal games of action and reaction constitute the one-phase game. They can be extended by embedded sequences or by pre- and follow-up sequences. These sequences do not mean that we cross the limits of a one-phase game. How are we to understand the term ‘phase’? A phase neither represents a topic nor a situation but marks the scope of a specific dialogic purpose. This purpose can be negotiated by clarifying or argumentative moves which are embedded in the one-phase game. Multi-phase games, on the other hand, have a complex superordinate purpose that needs to be worked off in a sequence of subpurposes which are derived from the overall purpose. For instance, the complex game of ‘instructing’ during a teaching lesson can be processed as a series of subpurposes such as ‘repeating’, ‘motivating’, ‘introducing the new topic’ and ‘testing’ (Weigand 1989b). These subpurposes constitute the different phases of the complex game. Besides these two basic sequencing principles – the two-part dialogic principle and the phase principle – there are several other principles which affect the sequential course of dialogue. They can be techniques of opening up the complex or strategies in the self-interest of the speaker (see below). They can also be conventionally laid down in complex institutional games (see Part IV).



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2.4.2 Principles of addressing the complex In contrast to sequencing principles which follow a linear order, human beings have a number of extraordinary abilities which, when used simultaneously, allow them to tackle the challenge of the complex (see above Part II 1.2): – – – –

They can adapt to ever-changing conditions. They can focus their attention. They can use their abilities integratively. They can differentiate the complex whole and cooperate by division of labour.

These abilities are innate capacities which have evolved for survival reasons. They determine, in most cases unconsciously, how human beings address the complex. They can be turned into executive principles, which are consciously used, such as: – Try to get an overview of the whole. – Focus attention and include as many variables as possible. – Accept the risk of initially overlooking relevant variables which can later be included by specialization. – Try to find regularities and proceed from standard cases to particular ones. – Reflect on what is probably the case at hand: preferences and habits. – Adapt to changing conditions and change your route if necessary. – Try to look behind what is empirically expressed. – Get acquainted with specific institutional conditions. Such a tentative process does not mean trial and error as assumed by Sampson (2005: 4, 21) but represents a purposive process of practical reasoning which combines rationality and feeling and mediates between order and disorder, between rules and chance. Let me illustrate this process by a few authentic examples that demonstrate the necessity of going beyond rules in trying to come to an understanding. When confronted with complexity, we first try to find rules or regularities and then proceed to individual particularities, i.e., we proceed from standard cases to particular ones (see above II.1.2; Simon 1962). These particularities can result from chance or from individual features which can be expected with a certain probability such as habits, preferences and memory. The first authentic example illustrates a specific type of a representative utterance which is dependent on individual evaluation: (59) You are playing Game Boy again. (60) You are playing the piano again.

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A statement is made verbally, no evaluation is expressed. At least for playing Game Boy, there is no generally agreed upon cultural evaluation. Some parents might be pleased to see their child engaged in what they consider an intellectual activity, others – or even the same ones – might be annoyed by what seems to become a never-ending activity. For playing the piano, we might assume a positive cultural evaluation which however does not have to be valid in the actual case. The interlocutor, who is playing the piano, tries to make sense of the utterance first by applying rules: the utterance is a declarative sentence, in the indicative present tense, therefore a speech act of a statement. But why is this statement made? Why has attention been focused on the interlocutor’s playing the piano? In some cases, intonation is a valid device; in other cases, however, it does not provide a clear cue. In our authentic example, the intonation is not distinctive in expressing whether the statement is accompanied by satisfaction or anger. So far the rules have come to their limits. The interlocutor has to adapt to the particular situation and to look for individual features. What has been said and what can be perceived, e.g., by the facial expression of the speaker, has to be combined with cognitive means or inferences that depend on knowledge of the particular situation. Even if the interlocutors know each other well, there will always remain a certain leeway of uncertainty due to chance and the actual mood of the speaker. As there is no verbal context, in the end, only the speaker knows how the utterance is meant. This type of a representative utterance carries the risk of misunderstanding because it can either imply a positive or a negative evaluation which is not an inherent feature of the verbal phrase but depends on the speaker and the actual moment. Human beings do not immediately give up in such cases but go beyond rules and try to find some guideline by reflecting on what probably is the case. Thus the child playing the piano might know that her mother at the time of the utterance is usually involved in work connected with her job and needs silence. She will therefore probably take the utterance you are playing the piano again as a reproach: (61) A You are playing the piano again. B Shall I stop it? A No, it is o.k. I am going to work outside.

In adapting to the complex she starts with her mother’s habitual preference which – being a concept of probability – is not a secure guide and, in our case, leads to misunderstanding. Preferences can be the attitudes of individuals or general preferences attributed to cultural communities. As the complex whole is an open whole with different individuals acting and reacting at the centre, misunderstandings­ are likely to occur. They can be accepted, as they are usually corrected immediately as in our example (see below IV 1.1).



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Let us consider another example based on preferences which can guide or mislead our understanding. It is again an authentic example where a putative preference leads to misunderstanding (Weigand 1997a: 10): (62)

A B A B

Could you look after the yellow bushes? And you look after the roses. Shall we change? No, you look after the roses.

The first response by B, a child, is understood by A, the mother, as a reproach because A knows that B likes roses and could be envious if the other is allowed to look after them. Again, intonation is neutral, at least not so distinctive as to be a match for the presumed preference. Therefore A wants to invalidate the putative reproach by offering a change. In the last utterance the child clarifies that her first utterance was not meant as a reproach but only as a statement. She agrees, without being envious, that the other should look after the roses. We not only rely on putative preferences but also on habitual behaviour. Habits refer to action sequences that usually happen in a certain way, for instance, personal practices or cultural customs. They are tacitly presupposed among insiders of the game. We also have some expectations about what is in the memory of our interlocutors and accordingly select our communicative means. But again, we might be wrong in the actual case. In dialogic action games we permanently make individual assumptions, mostly unconsciously, for instance about what we can presuppose as being in the memory of our interlocutors. If we are of the opinion that the interlocutor still knows who we are talking about, we will not use proper names or definite descriptions but rely on pronouns. In verbal conversation, pronouns can be used more freely because possible misunderstandings can be corrected immediately (cf. Weigand 1996c). As Fox’s analyses (1987) demonstrate, referential distance for pronouns in conversational texts is much greater than in written texts where long-distance pronominalization is non-existent. It is however pointless to look for a rule-governed explanation. It is the speaker’s individual assumptions about what is probable in the memory of his or her interlocutors that guide the use of pronouns versus proper names or definite descriptions.

2.4.3 Executive strategies Executive Principles become strategies if they are deliberately used by the speakers in their self-interest as rhetorical devices. In dialogue we express our

118 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

­ urposes in a sequence of speech acts; in doing this, we can be guided by unp derlying interests which are not explicitly expressed and can even contrast with what is expressed (see the Action Principle above). Interests determine the strategies to be taken: interest [purpose (p)]

Figure 33.  Interests as superordinate strategies

Strategies extend over a sequence of actions and can be changed in the course of the action game. They are not usually expressed explicitly but nonetheless influence the communicative means and dialogic techniques decisively. We can roughly distinguish between: – – – –

sequential strategies strategies of evaluation and emotion strategies of evasion and cover-up strategies of cooperation versus confrontation

Executive strategies need to be adapted to the particular conditions of the game. Strategies of power, for instance, that might be successful with timid interlocutors can have the opposite effect on self-assured interlocutors. In our modern society, executive strategies dominate institutional games, for instance, in politics and the media, for which separate sophisticated techniques have been developed (Bollow 2007, Ozan 2010). Sequential strategies use the position in the sequence for persuasive reasons, for instance: – Place special emphasis on points that are favourable to you and put them in front position. – Push points less favourable into the background or don’t mention them at all. – Try to find out the weak points of your opponent and push them to the fore. Techniques of insisting and the use of presequences also play an important role in the sequential strategies. They are part of extended minimal games. By insisting we repeat and intensify our claim, by presequences we prepare the ground for effectively launching our actual purpose in the aftermath (for examples see Part IV.1): – If you believe you have a chance of success, insist on your claim, don’t let yourself be turned away immediately. – Before asking a big favour, clarify first whether the conditions of fulfilment can be met.



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We should however take account of the fact that ‘repetition’ is a move which is strongly culture-dependent. According to Dell Hymes (1972: 279), to repeat a question is taken as insult among the Araucanians of Chile. Strategies of evaluation are persuasive techniques of positioning oneself by positive values and attributing negative values to the opponent (e.g., Weizman 2008). Positioning oneself in a favourable light derives from the basic human interest ‘to please’, ‘fare una bella figura’, which is connected with human beings’ double nature as individuals and as social beings. The self is at the same time the other. For survival reasons, we need to be accepted by our fellow beings; meaning becomes persuasion from the very outset. To some degree, we are always on stage, not only in the media but also unconsciously in everyday life. The media emphasize this sort of role-playing and design the roles which are expected. The issue is: what are the criteria for being accepted, for cutting a good figure? The ‘image’ we want to present depends on the role we want to take and the group we want to belong to. For instance, what features are expected from the intellectual elite, from members of literary circles, from the ‘beautiful and young’ or from the dynamic and successful business executive? The criteria may be completely different in different cultures. Of course, we might feel strong enough to disregard the ‘culture code’ (Rapaille 2007) and put a premium on our individuality, but we cannot eliminate the fact that the ‘culture code’ influences us to some degree at the level of the unconscious. In our modern societies, dominated by the media and competition, positioning oneself in a favourable light is of crucial importance to institutions. It becomes a deliberate executive strategy of argumentation and often implies devaluing the opponent and facing confrontation and conflict. The strategies are: – We are the best. – Our opponent is unable to cope with the issue. Institutions have a ‘face’ that is presented, some sort of ‘institutional culture’ that is proclaimed, and have executive strategies which determine the course of action and which can be different from the institutions’ public image. It is the ‘culture code’ of societies which shapes institutional interests and determines the executive strategies taken. For a business company, for instance, we can assume that in our market-oriented society its basic interest is in making a profit at any cost, whereas the public face aims at presenting the image of a socially committed organization. The capitalistic interest in winning consequently determines the action games of advertising. Companies do not give information about how they are meeting genuine needs but proclaim that their products are the best and in order to make a profit even create needs and attract attention to new unnecessary products.

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In our democratic society the same is true of politics. We know that politicians are expected to behave as politicians, i.e. to take the role prescribed in their party’s programme. As politicians they depend on the democratic voting system. They therefore want to demonstrate ‘we are the best’ in order to gain votes, not only in parliament but wherever they address the general public. A prominent rhetorical example is provided by Schröder’s strategy in “the elefants’ discussion” (see above 2.3.2). He simply asserts that Angela Merkel is “a clear loser” and no one apart from himself is “in a position to form a stable government”. In another debate with Stoiber, the opposition candidate, he used the same strategy by stating: (63) They want to govern but are not capable of doing it.

A more subtle technique was used in a television debate on solar energy between Jürgen Rüttgers and Hermann Scheer (see below Part IV). Rüttgers claimed that he was speaking in plain language and implied that his opponent was unable to express his views clearly. The situation is the same in the media, both in the private and public sectors. The public mass media, for instance, are, on the one hand, obliged to present information objectively. On the other hand, they have to select items, i.e. to exclude some and to give priority to others. The media thus construct reality and shape opinions. They are not really free in their decisions but have to take account of viewing figures. Specific executive strategies in selecting the news and the transmissions result from the underlying basic interest in gaining higher viewing figures. It is their basic interest in attracting attention that leads the media to highlight catastrophies rather than normal events and to select news that satisfies the curiosity of the audience. It is however also to some degree inherent in the concept of ‘information’ that normal events are not foregrounded. We can continue the list of institutions and add jurisprudence and legal action games to it. The action game of the trial aims to find out what ‘really’ happened. What comes to light, is however only to a small degree circumstantial ‘evidence’. First and foremost, there are two parties and their interests in demonstrating what happened. Both parties want to maintain a position, to convince and persuade and, in the end, to win. They choose rhetorical strategies to support their position, either in defending their client or in accusing the opponent. The judge has to mediate between the biased descriptions of the defence lawyers and the prosecutors. Their own executive strategy will be to decide the case as impartially as possible. The analysis of legal dialogues cannot ignore such executive strategies behind what is said (for an authentic example see Weigand 2005a). Another type of persuasive strategy uses the appeal to emotion. We have already analysed some examples above when dealing with rhetorical principles which



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regulate self-interest and respect (2.3.1). The appeal to emotions is a preferred strategy in political speeches, for instance, in Bush’s speech to Congress in his State of the Union address of January, 28, 2003. In this speech which ends with the well-known phrase: If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning, Bush describes the situation in Iraq as a terror scenario (see above the Example 22 in 2.3.1) of torturing children while parents are made to watch etc. He uses this strategy in order to gain acceptance for a pre-emptive war. Whereas persuasive strategies of evaluation and emotion are intended to increase the speaker’s initiative claim, the interlocutor has other types of reactive strategies at their disposal. If they, for instance, do not want to be nailed down to a firm position, they may use strategies of evasion which range from postponing the decision to evading a response at all. Such strategies might even be applied as a means of power in the self-interest of the speaker as is recommended by trivial rhetoric advice: – Drag the matter out until the other one gives up. – Starve out the other one. A specific tactic used in political interviews is ‘taking the initiative’. The interviewee thus evades the commitment to respond by breaking the conventions of the interview. Schröder, for instance, at the beginning of “the elefants’ discussion” uses this technique by interrupting the journalist and starting off down the route of making insinuations with his ironic comment (Weigand 2008a; see the original German text in the appendix, www.visdp.de/special/extrablatt_visdp.pdf) (64) 01 Brender (journalist) Chancellor … 02 Schröder It’s nice of you to address me this way already. I think that’s nice.

Strategies of evasion are related to the tactic of cover-up which is often used as a prominent strategy in, for instance, business or political negotiations, where the parties start by concealing how far they are prepared to go. This strategy of concealment can be combined with other power strategies such as those recommended in blunt words by trivial rhetoric advice: – Lure your opponent out, provoke him, and see how far you can go. I will not proceed with this line of rhetoric, which might end up with lies, bribes and blackmail. In dialogic interaction human beings more or less regulate their behaviour according to principles of cooperation and confrontation without even being aware of it.

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It is of course possible to remain neutral; however the basic tendency to evaluate what is going on around us leads us to act either together with or against other human beings. It is human beings’ social nature that forces them to cooperate. It is human beings’ individual nature that brings about confrontation. Executive strategies shape this basic regulative condition while taking account of cultural ideologies and personal preferences which range from putting a premium on harmony and cooperation to deciding on confrontation and even a display of sheer power in certain situations. If we, for instance, take account of our interlocutor’s disposition to explode easily at critical points, we might prefer persuasive strategies such as: – Adapt yourself to your interlocutor, listen to them, avoid everything which could irritate them. Such seemingly cooperative strategies imply some power being deployed in a calculated way. In a different situation we might completely disregard the emotions of our opponents and proceed by contradicting and attacking them by means of strategies such as: – Telling them what’s what and being prepared to argue about it. Cooperation and confrontation cannot simply be equated with converging and diver­ging action, with an affirmative versus negative reply. Cooperation within an argu­menta­tive game means negotiating between divergent views. We can cooperate even if we make and take criticism. What counts are the underlying purposes and interests which unite or divide the parties (Weigand 2006c). The term ‘cooperation’ in this sense must not be confused with Grice’s principle of cooperation (see above I 1.3.3). Such an overall principle seems to exclude confrontation. Describing cooperation by submaxims of honesty, informativity, clarity and the like, ignores the nature of human beings and cannot cope with performance. Performance means more than giving information. We not only have informative representative games but other types of action games as well such as directives, exploratives and declaratives. Confrontation may lead to conflicts if diverging positions and interests are pursued in a way that does not recognize the position of the negotiating adversary. Humanity requires us to be tolerant of differences. If this principle is ­violated, conflicts will emerge. In conflicts emotions can become dominant and can lead to personal quarrels (Weigand 1988). The outbreak of a quarrel can be strategically planned as in our example of the debate between Schulz and Berlusconi (see above 2.3.2). This example also demonstrates that the adversaries in a conflict are often not able to solve the conflict themselves. They need a mediator who can chair the



Chapter 2.  The methodology 123

negotiations from an external or superior position. In the example Berlusconi contra Schulz, it was the duty of the President of the European Parliament, Cox, to take the role of mediator and to attempt to calm down the rising emotions. In disputes between labour and management it is the role of the mediator to achieve a compromise (Raiffa, Richardson & Metcalfe 2002). If mediation is not successful, a decision has to be made on a legal basis, for instance, by a judge in court. Strategies of cooperation versus confrontation are often used in order to support directive claims in extended one-phase games (see below Part IV). Cooperation does not imply helping the other social being altruistically; on the contrary, it is very efficient in achieving one’s own interest as can be seen by comparing the following two authentic examples (cf. Weigand 1999a). The first example is a dialogue between a girl and her mother. The situation is the following: The girl tries to persuade her mother to allow her to take part in a very attractive but also expensive school exchange programme with America. The mother has not yet decided and is more inclined to decide for a cheaper programme. (65) Girl We have to talk about America. I thought I could save, I could earn money by giving lessons and I would contribute the money which I have in my account. Mother Well, I’ll think about it. Be quiet, I tend to agree.

This is a simple but clear example of the use of an efficient strategy in a directive action game. Without expressing it explicitly, the central speech act of the girl that underlies her utterance is: please let me go to America and take part in the more attractive programme. Her strategy of persuasion consists of giving arguments in favour of her claim to volition: she could save, earn money, etc. These arguments have an effect on her mother because they demonstrate the girl’s motivation and her being prepared to invest money. They fall on fertile ground because the mother wants the best for her child. Argumentation becomes effective by cognitive means on the basis of a strategy of cooperation. No special rhetorical expressions are used by the girl, only facts, arguments offered for the future. There is no power in the negative sense of confrontation and oppression, no threatening of the sort: ‘If I cannot go to America, I will stay here and will no longer learn, only go to the disco.’ Cooperation is just the appropriate way of being successful in the ­particular action game achieved by respecting the action and decision space of the other and by contributing to solving the problem. The other example can be considered a counter-example because it uses the strategy of confrontation. The central speech act is again based on a claim to volition which is however disguised in the form of a representative speech act. First, the dialogue seems to evolve in an argumentative, rational manner but then

124 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

­suddenly changes into a display of power and oppression. In this specific action game, however, power is the wrong means to use because it is vacuous, only simulated. Interlocutor A who uses it does not really possess it. His claim to volition must therefore fail. (66)

A B A (angry) B A (very angry) B

We have asked you to present a joint working plan. Here it is. This won’t do. You cannot start with your position only. But I expressed it as you wanted it, some time ago. We won’t discuss with you. O.k., then I might as well go.

A tries to oppress the other by means of harsh undemocratic power: we won’t discuss with you, which might have been successful with a shy and timid interlocutor, but in the actual action game it leads to the dialogue breaking off. Now we could ask what could have been the right strategy. In any case, a more successful approach would have been cooperative problem solving like: ‘Let’s see how we can settle the problem.’ Both examples clearly demonstrate that there are, in principle, two different strategies for effective action: the positive strategy of cooperation and motivation and the negative strategy of confrontation, power and suppression. If human beings want to be successful in achieving their own interests, they should not completely disregard politeness, not even in cases where real power is involved. Respecting our fellow beings and the necessity for some basic cooperation are inevitable regulative demands that must not be ignored, not only for reasons of self-interest. Humanity needs to be protected. If we look back at the multiple principles and dimensions over and above the basis of constitutive principles, we will be astounded at the complexity of human interaction and the incredible human capacity to cope with it. Beside the regulative principles that mediate between diverging human abilities and interests we find executive principles which are purposively used in the self-interest of the speaker along the lines of cooperation or confrontation. At the centre of the action game are human beings functioning as complex adaptive systems who, consciously or unconsciously, focus attention and go beyond regularities whenever rules come to their limits. In the end, it is the maze of the individual human mind, hidden for the interlocutor, we have to cope with and find our way through.

chapter 3

To sum up The mixed game of human  competence-in-performance

In Part II, the Mixed Game Model was developed according to basic theoretical reflections on what makes up a theory. If the theory is about an object of performance, reductionism is considered to be a methodological fallacy as it constructs an artificial object by abstraction. The MGM starts from the natural object of human beings’ actions and behaviour in dialogic performance and tries to derive an adaquate methodology from it. The scientific interest in describing and explaining human beings’ competence-in-performance aims at a holistic theory which does not damage the natural object because of methodological exigencies. Its assumptions can be verified by evolutionary arguments and the survival needs of the human species. It is a usual and simple practice to set up models by starting from methodological postulates and to define the object in accordance to them. Counterexamples or awkward details are rejected as not belonging to the scope of the model or left to future analysis. The results of such models are conditioned by a methodology of abstraction or restriction to what can be empirically measured, and are therefore of little relevance for an understanding of what happens in the world. If a theory claims to be pertinent to actual phenomena, the first step has to be the attempt to grasp the natural phenomenon without any methodological pressure and to set up premises which are justified by adequate criteria. In this sense, a theory of human beings’ competence-in-performance has to be justified by criteria regarding human beings’ nature and the environment. According to the position of sociobiology, which has been experimentally confirmed (e.g., Lumsden & Wilson 2005), coevolution of biology and culture can be taken for granted. Human beings’ nature interacts with the ever-changing environment by adapting to it and learning from it. The environment is not only differently perceived by individuals but also differently evaluated in different cultures. The issue is not whether we make a decision either for biology or culture as seems to be required in the so-called ‘language instinct debate’ but how biology and culture interact and determine the complex human ability of competence-in-performance.

126 Part II.  The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model

If we are true to science-theoretical reflections of this kind, we will make premises about the object competence-in-performance that are derived from human nature, the environment and culture. These premises about human beings’ action and behaviour can be summarized as a view of human beings as – social individuals who are guided by individual as well as dialogic purposes and interests, – adaptive beings who are able to take account of ever-changing surroundings, – and as cultural beings whose actions and behaviour depend on external and internal cultural evaluations. From fundamental premises of this type about the object, conclusions can be drawn on how human beings are capable of addressing complexity and of coming to an understanding in dialogic interaction. By means of their competence-inperformance they are able to maintain their position in the mixed game of infinite variables. It is a game of performance and as such of bounded validity based on Probability Principles. Probability Principles comprise Constitutive, Regulative and Executive Principles. Constitutive Principles structure the game as a game of action which is always dialogically directed. It is played by the integrated use of communicative means which go beyond empirical means and include cognitive ones. On the basis of Constitutive Principles human beings follow Regulative Principles which mediate between their internal abilities and interests. In addition, human beings apply Executive Principles which determine the course of their action sequences. Regulative Principles relate to the need to respect the other human being when pursuing individual goals and to the mutual influence of reason and emotion. Executive Principles comprise various principles involved in structuring the sequence as well as in opening up the complex. They include strategic principles which are guided by interests behind openly expressed purposes. It is the interplay of these multiple principles used by human beings which makes up the mixed games of competence-in-performance, ranging from minimal games of action and reaction (Part III) to various types of complex games (Part IV).

part iii

Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

chapter 1

Minimal versus complex action games

Having explicated the Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the MGM in its fundamentals in Part II we now face the issue of structuring the vast field of different types of dialogic action games in which we are involved in everyday and institutional life. On the one hand, we are confronted with no types at all but with ever-changing performance, i.e. with innumerable games. On the other hand, we are not lost in endless variation but have the competence to master performance. Even within a world of uncertainty of meaning (Weigand 2006a), we have definable goals and interests which are the basis of the games and the key to opening them up. It is a theoretical consequence of our concepts of the speech act and the action game that a typology of action games cannot be completely different from a typology or taxonomy of speech acts. I use the terms typology or taxonomy as equivalent terms ignoring the difference I made in Weigand (2003a: 72f.). The single speech act represents a dialogically oriented component of the minimal game of action and reaction. The first structuring line we can draw in the field of action games distinguishes between minimal two-part games of action and reaction (Part III) and all other games which I group together as complex games (Part IV). Minimal games are defined by the purpose put forth by the initiative speech act. Complex games comprise two types: extended minimal games, i.e. one-phase games, and games which consist of more than one phase all derived from the complex purpose of the whole game. The term ‘phase’ turns out to be appropriate for structuring complex games. In the minimal game the purpose of the initiative speech act is either accepted or rejected. The minimal game is extended if the purpose is negotiated by additional subordinate sequences for various reasons. As long as we are dealing with the purpose of the minimal game, we remain within one phase. Complex games cross the limits of one phase and proceed in a series of phases with individual subpurposes. Argumentation, for instance, is a one-phase game negotiating different claims to truth. Planning, on the other hand, needs different steps or phases to achieve its complex goals. In the literature the issue of a dialogue typology is dealt with separately from the issue of a speech act typology (e.g., Hundsnurscher 1994, Henne & Rehbock 1982). Of course, if we only look at the ‘top of the iceberg’, dialogue texts and

130 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

s­ ingle speech acts do not seem to have much in common. If we try to understand the whole ‘iceberg’, i.e. human dialogic interaction, we recognize that both issues are intrinsically interconnected. In this sense, we will first develop a dialogical typology of speech acts, i.e. a typology of minimal games, thus laying the ground for structuring the field of complex games in Part IV. The derivation of the speech act typology in Part III is in the main based on Weigand (2003a).

chapter 2

Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts The state of the art

In the literature, many attempts have been made to distinguish different types of speech acts, and ultimately to distinguish all the types we carry out in dialogic interaction. I do not intend to give an exhaustive overview but will focus on research based on ordinary language philosophy and pick out a few points which have been controversially discussed. In this way I can prepare the ground for my own dialogic taxonomy. I will therefore not deal with approaches which, from the very outset, take a different direction, being based on assumptions incompatible with the basics of an action theory of performance, among them semiotic approaches and poststructuralist approaches. Regarding semiotics, we must pose the fundamental question: can there be a semiotic theory of performance? A theory of signs might be part of a semiotic-pragmatic theory; however, such a ‘pragmatic’ theory is artificially constructed by the addition of parts which do not exist as separate parts in natural language use. Using the terms ‘component’ versus ‘part’ underlines the issue at stake. The integration of components does not come about by the addition of parts; integration means the interaction of components which are interconnected from the very beginning. Including a system of symbols in a ‘pragmatic’ theory inevitably represents an artificial step which affects the whole theory and cannot cope with performance. In the same way, poststructuralist approaches can only be considered to be hypothetical constructions, far short of describing the actual behaviour of human beings. Such constructions pay little or no attention to biological facts and deny the existence of a universal human nature (Wilson 1999: 233f.). Postmodernism draws on Derrida’s deconstructive maxim “The author is dead” (e.g., 1988) and ignores the concept of intention as a basic concept of action. Eliminating intentionality and even the speaker results in considering texts or words as actors. In a model of dialogic interaction, texts or words represent communicative means which are intentionally used by speakers. If they are used without intention, for instance, out of absent-mindedness, they cannot in any way be considered as actors or as communicative means. Texts which cannot be assigned to individual

132 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

speakers do not justify changes in the notion of action. If their role seems to be worth analysing, the difference could be indicated by a different term classifying them, for instance, as actants rather than actors (e.g., Cooren 2010).

2.1

Expressions versus functions

A crucial question for any speech act taxonomy is the question regarding the adequate starting point. Whereas the empiricists maintain that the only access to speech act types is by means of expressions – speech act verbs, sentence types and categories of modality –, the functionalists stress the point that speech acts are intensionally functional concepts. Empiricists are mistaken if they assume that a semantic analysis of speech act verbs can count as a speech act taxonomy. Verbal expressions and speech acts are different objects. Verbal expressions are an integrated component of the utterance. Speech acts are defined at the functional level by their purpose. Purposes or speech act functions are universal concepts. Small differences in certain subfunctions might occur but the basic functions can be considered universal (e.g. Rosaldo 1982, Weigand 2003a: 39). By contrast, speech act verbs are expressions of individual languages; analysing speech act verbs results in lexical structures of an individual language. The English verb to ask, for instance, corresponds to two German verbs fragen and bitten. In contrast to Austin (1962) who in a preliminary attempt started from speech act verbs, Searle (1975a) rightly emphasized that we have to start from functional universal concepts. The issue of a speech act taxonomy is precisely the issue of types of F which can be defined in functional terms. It is simply incorrect to assert as Verschueren (1980: 35) did that we can only think and talk about speech acts by means of expressions of individual languages. On the other hand, Meibauer (1982) exaggerates when he considers types of F and speech act verbs to be completely independent of each other. They are interconnected as is demonstrated by the Action Principle: F(p)

{utterances, among them utterances with speech act verbs}

Figure 34.  The relationship between types of F and speech act verbs

The nub of the difficulty results from the fact that there is no coded correlation between the functional level F(p) of the speech act and the level of the communicative means. The semantics of speech act verbs differs in various ways from the action function of the speech act in which they are used:



Chapter 2.  Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts 133

– Speech act verbs are not only expressions for types of F such as to assert, to inform, but can also include propositional features such as the propositional feature of a future event in to predict or an evaluative component in to recommend (see Weigand 1993a). – Speech act verbs often do not precisely relate to a specific action type but can remain indeterminate regarding the action function, for instance, in German meinen. – Speech act verbs can be polysemous, e.g., to ask can be used for the directive as well as explorative type. – Meaning indeterminacy or polysemy can even tolerate contrary meanings. It is not at all the case that the contrary meanings of a lexical item fall out of use through semantic change (Weigand 2006a). Such lexical items can raise serious problems of understanding for foreign speakers. I will only mention a few Italian examples, for instance, richiamo, ribattere che, which can be used in the same syntactic context with quite different, even opposite meanings, richiamo for ‘call’, ‘retreat’, ‘reproach’, ‘attraction’, ‘reference’, ‘appointment’, etc., ribattere for ‘hit back’, ‘reject’, ‘refute’, ‘insist’, ‘reply’, etc. A very clear example is Italian intendere meaning ‘to mean’ as well as ‘to understand’. For native speakers these items do not seem to pose problems. The reason is probably that they have a better understanding of the whole linguistic, cognitive and cultural network. – Beside these differences relating to the semantics of speech act verbs, there are also differences due to cognitive principles of use. Speech act verbs can be used for a type of F which is stronger than that literally expressed by the speech act verb. For instance, in dialogues between executives and their secretaries to request “bitten” can be used for the speech act order if the executives want to demontrate politeness. – There is a further quite idiosyncratic case of difference between what is expressed and what is meant: a speech act verb can be used for an action function opposite to its literal meaning as, for instance, in ‘threats’ expressed by means of the speech act verb to promise: I promise you I’ll give you a clip round the ear if … “Ich verspreche dir ein paar Ohrfeigen, wenn ...” It is not only speech act verbs which are taken as the empirical starting point for setting up a speech act typology. The area is also accessed by other means of verbal expression such as sentence types and categories of modality (Weigand 2003a: 45). The arguments which can be made against this type of empirical access are in principle the same as those against speech act verbs: we do not have an overview of the communicative means and should avoid picking out verbal components without knowing their interactive role in the complex whole. As was the case with

134 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

speech act verbs, categories of sentence type and modality belong to the utterance. Sentence types play a remarkable role in the complex correlation between functions and expressions which needs to be elaborated in an utterance grammar (see Weigand 2003a). The utterance however is an integrated whole of verbal expressions and other communicative means and cannot be correlated with the action function in any coded manner. Let me finally give a short overview of the state of the art in the literature with respect to these controversial positions of empiricists and functionalists (see in more detail Weigand 2003a: 40ff.). Among the empirical taxonomies that follow Austin (1962) and start from speech act verbs I would like to mention, e.g., Vendler (1972), Campbell (1975), ­Fraser (1974), Ohmann (1972) and McCawley (1977). Katz’ s taxonomy (1977: 195ff.) is also based on a semantic analysis of speech act verbs even if he uses ‘purpose’ as the criterion of analysis; ‘purpose’ for him is no more than a lexical feature of performative verbs. Ballmer and Brennenstuhl’s (1981) alleged “speech act classification”, which is actually “a study in the lexical analysis of English speech activity verbs”, caused a heated discussion between empiricists and functionalists (e.g., Verschueren 1983, Meibauer 1982, Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1984). Most of the supporters of a speech act verb taxonomy proceed as so-called ‘splitters’, i.e., they start from the premise that there is a multiplicity of illocutionary acts and even assume, like Fraser (1974: 153), that there would be more acts than verbs (for the distinction between ‘splitter’ and ‘lumper’ cf. Verschueren 1983: 168). Also Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981) proceed as ‘splitters’ when setting up about 600 ‘categories’ of alleged acts. Recent publications provide nothing new (e.g., ­Vanparys 1994: 325). Even Alston’s approach (1994) espouses a completely orthodox speech act theory and identifies speech acts with speech act verbs. Beside this type of empirical taxonomy which starts from lexical means, there is another type based on the grammatical categories of sentence type and modality. Dik (1997.1/2), for instance, identifies, more or less, basic illocutions with sentence types. In doing this, he does not deal with illocution as a phenomenon at the action level but constructs illocution as a grammatical category whose pragmatic interpretation is left to a future theory of interaction. His approach resembles generative-semantic descriptions of the 1970s and fails to grasp the nature of the issue. Concepts of action cannot be grammaticalized. Compared with the large number of empirical attempts which do so there are very few speech act taxonomies which use functional criteria. Bühler (1934/1982) and Jakobson (1960) were forerunners. Even if they are often referred to as classical approaches, they are far short of being conclusive. Bühler’s three functions of language do not coincide with speech act functions as functions pursued by the



Chapter 2.  Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts 135

speaker and would need to be re-interpreted in terms of speech act theory. Such a re-interpretation however is hardly compatible with Bühler’s fundamentals. The same is true of Jakobson’s model which results in a list of heterogeneous and only partially communicative functions of action (see Weigand 2003a: 46). Other attempts are related to Searle’s functional taxonomy (1975a) which I will go into in more detail below when we come to talk about the issue of criteria. Hancher (1979), for instance, rightly criticizes the fact that Searle describes complex interactive speech acts such as an ‘offer’ or a ‘bet’ exclusively from the speaker’s perspective. Hancher does not however succeed in overcoming this weakness in his own attempt. Wunderlich (1976: 57) takes account of sequence dependency but does not really come to grips with the complex phenomenon of illocution when he defines it vaguely as ‘something that introduces new conditions of interaction’. Bach and Harnish (1979) define the speech act as an act which expresses an attitude. Like Hindelang (1978b) they exclude institutional acts. In recent years we have noticed a growing number of taxonomic attempts to deal with the problem but which propose nothing new. Tsohatzidis’ book (1994), for instance, appears under the title “Foundations of speech act theory” but provides nothing more than the orthodox foundations laid down decades ago (see Weigand 1996b). Speech act theory is reduced to a theory of sentence meaning and degenerates to a sort of ‘l’art pour l’art’. Types of speech acts are distinguished by means of sentence types and speech act verbs. Ulkan (1992) also presents an allegedly ‘fundamental study’ which however comes closer to a regress than a progress insofar as basic distinctions of speech act theory are set aside. The same is true of the papers in Vanderveken and Kubo (2002) which do not go beyond what has been achieved in earlier publications (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, ­Vanderveken 1990/1991). Progress is blocked by the absurd thesis that there is no essential difference between formal and natural languages. Speech act theory thus returns to logic and remains without relevance for language use.

2.2 Infinite versus finite acts Not only the question of where to start but also the question whether there are clearly distinguishable and enumerable acts at all has been controversially discussed. On the one hand, empiricists maintain that we can carry out infinite kinds of acts and, on the other hand, functionalists take it for granted that there is a small finite list of basic types. How can we interpret the diverging views taken by Wittgenstein and Searle on this issue? Wittgenstein (2009: 14e) considers it to be an impossible endeavour to compile a finite list of types of speech acts; according to him “there are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things

136 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

we call ‘signs’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’”. Searle (1975a: 369), by contrast, demonstrates that “there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language”. I do not think that the positions of Wittgenstein and Searle are indeed controversial insofar as Wittgenstein seems to refer to ever-changing performance whereas Searle’s reference point is the conventional system of competence underlying performance. It is not the case at all that theoretical attempts at a taxonomy must ‘lead to bankrupcty’ because there would be unlimited possibilities of action, as Verschueren (1983: 167 and 174) hastens to conclude in order to justify his approach based on speech act verbs. Verschueren is simply trapped by an unclear notion of action. In my view the positions of Wittgenstein and Searle can both be right, the difference results from different foci. Empiricists focus on ever-changing performance, functionalists on purposes of communicative competence. Our object however is neither performance nor competence as such. It is human beings who perform speech acts in action games according to their competence-in-performance. If we look at ever-changing action conditions we may be of the opinion that there are infinite games in performance. The key to performance is however the purpose of the game which can be defined by functional criteria. The purposes we pursue in performance are specified purposes: we issue, for instance, an order or a plea which both belong to the general type of directive speech acts. Consequently, the speech act taxonomy cannot stop at the general level of basic acts but has to proceed to the level of subtypes. In performance we might sometimes feel some uncertainty about our actions or do not want to be tied down. Nonetheless we do not move in a continuum of acts as Verschueren (1980: 36) tries to make us believe. In principle, we know what we are doing or can at least reflect on it.

2.3

Criteria and types

Types of acts cannot be intuitively set up but have to be justified by criteria. The crucial core of a taxonomy is the criteria which need to be verified. Actions as functional concepts require functional criteria, actions by human beings need to be verified by human nature. This principle of a consistent taxonomy is not always complied with in the literature: heterogeneous criteria are used, functional, formal, situative, institutional. Such a mix of criteria cannot constitute types of F. Let us concentrate on Searle’s taxonomy (1975a), which is certainly the most influential one (Weigand 2003a: 47ff.). Even if Searle, in his criticism of Austin (1962), stresses the necessity for a consistent deductive principle, his own taxonomy has some weak points in this respect. The fundamental phenomenon of



Chapter 2.  Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts 137

illocution which he takes over from Austin is not sufficiently defined but only vaguely paraphrased as ‘in-locution’, i.e. what occurs in speaking (Weigand 1984a: 8). From an ultimately undefined concept he cannot consistently deduce types of speech acts. His five basic speech act types are set up by intuition even if they are defined by their ‘illocutionary point’ at the level of the individual types. The illocutionary point is intended to be the purpose of the act: the purpose of representatives is ‘to commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition’, directives are ‘attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something’, commissives ‘commit the speaker to some future course of action’, expressives ‘express the psychological state of the speaker specified in the sincerity condition’, and declaratives ‘bring about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality’. No justification is given why precisely these types should be the basic ones. Searle lists twelve heterogeneous criteria ‘around which he will build most of his taxonomy’. They include three essential criteria, among them the illocutionary point, and “several others that need remarking” (p. 5). Beside the illocutionary point, great importance is attached to a criterion called ‘direction of fit’ which relates to the direction of fit between the world and the words and presupposes that the world, the speaker and the language are separate entities. In the MGM such a criterion is of no particular relevance. Searle’s condition of the ‘expressed psychological state’ of the speaker, i.e. the sincerity condition, is also one of the three ‘most important’ criteria; it might be justified in Searle’s theory of communicative competence but cannot be taken as realistic in performance. Moreover, the taxonomy stops at the level of basic acts and does not systematically tackle the issue of subtypes. A closer look at Searle’s criteria reveals further problems; I will pick out only few (for a more detailed account cf. Weigand 2003a: 47ff.): the most critical point refers to the fact that the taxonomy does not take account of reactive speech acts. “Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse” are mentioned among the twelve criteria but are not dealt with substantially, and are only referred to by speech act verbs such as reply and other verbal means which would perform “discourse-relating functions” (Searle 1975a: 349). The issue of the dialogic sequencing of speech acts does not seem to exist in Searle’s monologic speech act theory. Another criterion among the twelve is called ‘the strength with which the illocutionary point is presented’, also repeatedly taken up by the phrase “in varying degrees”. The examples given are speech act verbs, such as suggest, insist, swear, guess, which demonstrate that what is meant is not a gradual phenomenon but different subtypes of speech acts. Searle’s examples in general represent heterogeneous sets which cannot illustrate homogeneous types. Expressives, for instance, contain – according to Searle’s definition – speech acts which express the mental state of the speaker. The

138 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

examples however include cases which have nothing to do with the mental state of the speaker. Searle’s sincerity condition is simply not constitutive of conventional acts of politeness such as an ‘apology’ or ‘congratulation’. They are mostly expressed by routine phrases without any emotional involvement. Searle’s taxonomy was certainly an important advance in speech act theory. Nonetheless, a list of five allegedly basic types, placed one beside the other, is far short of being conclusive. The mutual relationships need to be clarified in a hierarchical structure starting from a comprehensive functional concept of interaction and systematically deriving from it the types of speech act classes by functional criteria.

2.4 The debate on the autonomy of the speech act Searle’s monologic view of speech acts, which is shared by many follow-up taxonomies, can be traced back to the Aristotelian premise of the autonomy of the single action. The premise might be justified by many practical actions, with communicative actions however it is to be abandoned. Searle (1992: 8) admits that there are a few speech acts which are related to a response, such as questions and answers or greetings, but decisively rejects a general feature of dialogicity. How can we understand his baffling thesis that representatives are not directed at anyone? Why else would they be expressed? As an expression of absolute truths the speaker has been pondering about in their mind? Searle’s philosophical speech act theory (e.g., 1969, 1975a) came under a lot of criticism for its abstractness and for being biased towards the speaker. Considering the individual speech act as an autonomous unit is of no help for scholars who focus on language use. Searle (1992) makes an attempt to grasp conversation as ‘collective action’; collective action is however not the same as dialogic action (Weigand 1995). A similar notion was used by Clark (1996), who considered language use as ‘joint action’. Like the term ‘collective action’, the term ‘joint action’ also lacks dialogic precision. Even if Clark points to interesting aspects, they are not integrated in what he calls ‘ensemble’. The term ensemble remains vague, without any analytical power. The main problem arises from his notion of communication. He assumes that communication aims “to make a piece of information common, to add it to the common ground” (p. 153). ‘Common ground’ relates to the cognitive area of knowledge. Speech acts are considered to ‘increment common ground’. In the end, action is thus based on knowledge, on the exchange of information, not really on the interactive process of coming to an understanding.



Chapter 2.  Controversial issues in setting up a taxonomy of speech acts 139

In recent decades a growing number of approaches have given serious consideration to the dialogic perspective. Stati (1982) relatively early acknowledged the general dialogicity of language use. Other attempts to develop an interactional taxonomy were, for instance, made by Rosengren (1979), Motsch (1994), and Sbisà (1989, cf. Weigand 1993c). Geis (1995) promised a dialogic view in his book on “Speech acts and conversational interaction” but only offers a mix of heterogeneous approaches. ‘Conversation’ is understood as producing and understanding utterances (p. xi). The focus is therefore not on the sequence of utterances but on single utterances and on how the speaker’s and the hearer’s part in producing and understanding the utterance are related. A genuinely dialogic view would require us to consider the hearer as an interlocutor who reacts in the sequence of actions. There have been various other attempts at adapting speech act theory to dialogue, for instance, by complementing it with techniques of conversational analysis (e.g., van Rees 1992, Moeschler 2002) or Gricean principles (e.g., Dascal 1994). The crucial issue however cannot be settled by complementation but relates to the core of speech act theory which has to be changed in its fundamentals. A first step in this direction was made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 23) who were well aware of the necessity of taking account of the dialogical nature of speech acts. They distinguished between speech acts ‘in reaction to’ and ‘in anticipation of ’ speech acts performed or to be performed by the other party. Like Weigand (2003a) they critically remarked that “Searle’s basic theory […] applies only to illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts being disregarded”. A definitively interactional speech act theory was presented by Habermas (1981, 1991) who classifies speech act types by claims of validity (“Geltungsansprüche”). The framework however is an ideal sociological one which is not pertinent to ordinary language use (Weigand 1995). To sum up: There have been many attempts to come to grips with the central question of the types of action we carry out in communication. Searle’s taxonomy provides a solid point of departure which however needs to be revised in crucial points. Habermas rejects Searle’s intentional speech act theory and demonstrates that the right direction is towards an interactional approach. However both taxonomies remain within constructed worlds, Searle’s philosophical-monologic and Habermas’ ideal-sociological world. The same is true of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s approach which is imprisoned in a ‘reasonable’ world. None of them tackles the challenge of human beings’ competence-in-performance.

chapter 3

The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts

3.1

Formal conditions or the inner logic of a holistic hierarchy

A taxonomy which lives up to its name cannot simply be a list of types intuitively set up but has to meet some formal conditions of consistency and completeness. The derived subtypes have to be distinct and their mutual relationships should be transparent (cf. Weigand 2003a: 74ff., Ballmer 1979). The emphasis is on ‘derivation’ of subtypes from a complex whole, i.e. on the structure of a holistic taxonomy. In the case of a dialogic speech act taxonomy, the complex whole consists of all possible dialogically oriented speech acts which are interrelated as initiative and reactive acts in the minimal sequence of action and reaction. The taxonomy which I developed in my book on ‘Sprache als Dialog’ (2003a) meets the conditions of such a derivation even if I then did not know what Simon had proposed in his article on ‘The architecture of complexity’. A holistic taxonomy means a hierarchy which differs from the generative hierarchy of a division into parts. Division is not derivation, no more than addition means integration. Derivation means differentiation, specialization of the whole. For a taxonomy of speech acts, the whole means dialogic interaction. The key to opening up the whole can be gained by answering the question why human beings are in dialogic interaction with each other. We act and react in the action game because we want to ‘come to an understanding’. This general concept of the purpose or interactive claim allows us to derive different ways of coming to an understanding by differentiating the purpose. Interests behind the purposes can be ignored in the taxonomy of minimal games; they determine as strategies the sequence of purposes or the course of interaction in complex dialogues. The criteria of derivation need to be functional criteria if we want to comply with the inner logic of a holistic taxonomy which alone can justify the taxonomy. The general purpose of coming to an understanding presupposes that we start from the level of interaction in the minimal game, i.e. from the two-part sequence of action and reaction. Minimal games are constituted by the Action Principle which implies the Dialogic Principle proper. The other principles described above

142 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

are not constitutive of the key criterion, which is the purpose of the game; they play their part in distinguishing between subtypes.

coming to an understanding

action reaction dialogic principle proper

Figure 35.  Minimal games

The MGM describes performance according to principles of probability which are used as guidelines for human competence-in-performance. Rationality plays an important role, not as an independent guideline but under the conditions of ever-changing performance. The relation between the initiative and the reactive speech act is, to a certain extent, determined by rationality: for instance, an initiative speech act which expresses a claim to volition aims at a reactive speech act of consent. In this sense, the relation between action and reaction, in Figure 35 indicated by an arrow, represents a relation of expectancy not of necessity. Complying to reasonable behaviour can be expected but is not guaranteed in performance. Deriving subtypes from the complex whole crosses different levels. Constitutive criteria allow us to derive basic types of the action function F by differentiating the general dialogic purpose. The basic types can then be further differentiated towards derived types of F by modifying criteria. Finally, propositional criteria allow us to derive subpatterns or propositional patterns of F(p): constitutive criteria basic types of F [basic purpose]

[coming to an understanding]

basic action

reaction

basic action

reaction

…….

modifying criteria derived action reaction derived action reaction …… derived types of F [modified purpose] ___________________________________________________________________________ propositional criteria prop. type action propositional patterns [propositional specification]

reaction

prop. type action

Figure 36.  The complex whole of minimal action games

reaction ……



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 143

To give an example: at the level of basic types the general purpose of coming to an understanding is differentiated according to basic claims to truth and volition. We thus achieve basic types of minimal games, among them, for instance, representatives. Basic types lead to modified types by differentiating the basic claim; in the case of representatives the claim to truth leads towards derived types, for instance, assertions. Assertions can be further differentiated according to propositional criteria, for instance, the criterion of a future event; we thus arrive at the propositional subpattern of a prediction. I take the term ‘illocution’ primarily in the sense of the illocutionary function F, whereas for Searle (1969: 31) ‘illocution’ comprises the whole speech act F(p). For instance, I use the term ‘representative’ primarily for the action function of making a claim to truth but occasionally for the whole representative speech act as well. If the difference between action function and speech act class needs to be marked explicitly, I will distinguish between a ‘representative’, i.e. a type of action function, and a ‘representative speech act’. Before starting the taxonomy by putting the inner logic into action, I would like to remark on two points: so-called metacommunicative acts and terminological questions. In the literature metacommunicative acts play a remarkable role which even seems to allocate a separate area of communication to them. Metacommunication however does not open up an own type of communication; ‘metacommunication’ is ‘communication about communication’. What specifies metacommunicative acts is a propositional criterion. Utterances like I start from the assumption…, we are now addressing the first point…, to sum up… do not have a specific function of action but express explicitly what is being done at this point. The state of affairs expressed in the proposition of such speech acts refers to the structure of discourse: i declare (that I start from …)

‘Metacommunicative acts’ of this type are comparable with speech acts such as ‘defining’, ‘abbreviating’ and the like. In contrast to Weigand (2003a), I no longer classify them as metacommunicative or structural speech acts but consider them as a subtype of declarative speech acts (see below 3.4.1). Dealing with metacommunication as a separate and distinctive type of action is to my mind misleading. Metacommunication means communication about discourse matters. With regard to questions of terminology, we need to reflect on our choice of terms for action types. On the one hand, we want to be as precise and clear as possible, on the other hand, extremes should be avoided. In principle, I take over Searle’s terms as far as possible even if their meaning has to be adapted to dialogic conditions. For new classes I use English expressions such as acceptance or consent which, in capital letters, indicate that they are meant as universal

144 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

classes. One might also think of coining Latinized terms in order to mark the universality of the term as well as its function as a scientific term, as I did in Weigand (2003a). Even if this might be useful in some cases, the practice of using latinized terms, in general, did not prove suitable for reasons of clarity; we only ran the risk of producing strange, artificial terms. Regarding notation, I use capitals and quotation marks. Capital letters indicate universality. In order to mark action types as functional types, I also use simple quotation marks, e.g., ‘reproach’ or ‘advice’. A last word has to be said about the terms ‘typology’ and ‘taxonomy’. As mentioned above, in Weigand (2003a: 72ff.) I made a distinction between these two terms in the sense that a typology classifies multiple empirical units whereas a taxonomy starts from a complex whole. The use of these terms in the literature is however not conclusive. I therefore no longer consider it necessary to make such a terminological distinction. Like Searle, I will use both terms without making any difference between them.

3.2

Basic minimal games

In Part II (2.2.2), minimal games were derived at the basic level by the Action Principle and Dialogic Principle proper. The constitutive criteria of derivation proved to be two basic claims: a claim to truth and a claim to volition which coincide with the basic mental states of belief and desire. In addition, the type of declaratives is distinguished by the pecularity that they do not need a follow-up reaction. The reactive act is presupposed as a confirmation, i.e. it underlies the initiative act so to speak. In this way, we can distinguish between four basic twopart sequences of speech acts:

coming to an understanding reaction] [action

[follow-up reaction necessary]

[follow-up reaction not necessary]

[claim to truth] [claim to volition] [claim to volition, made and fulfilled] acceptance repr [directed to knowledge] [not directed to knowledge] explorative response directive consent decl ( confirm)

Figure 37.  Basic minimal games



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 145

The taxonomy claims to be an exhaustive taxonomy, i.e. a taxonomy capable of classifying and including every speech act that occurs in performance. Before systematically deriving the subtypes and propositional patterns from the basic minimal games let us have a closer look at the individual basic types.

3.2.1 Declaratives Declaratives are the type of speech acts which first drew Austin’s attention to the fact that ‘we are doing things with words’ or that speaking is acting, in utterances such as (Austin 1962: 5): (67) ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ – as uttered when smashing the bottle against its bow.

Austin called them ‘exercitives’. They are unique by their coincidence of making and fulfilling the claim to create a specific state of affairs by declaring its existence. The acceptance by the audience is presupposed; a follow-up reaction is therefore not necessary. The declarative claim to volition is at the same time made and fulfilled; it cannot be problematized or negotiated. In the literature, the objection is sometimes made that it is not only declaratives that create a world but that other speech act types do so as well (e.g., Katz 1977: 220). Such an objection results from an unclear concept of what it means to create a world. Directives, representatives and exploratives make a specific pragmatic claim which however needs a follow-up reaction to be fulfilled. Only then is a ‘world created’. By contrast, declaratives make and fulfil the claim to create a world, and so a ‘world is created’ by means of the declarative utterance. Declarative minimal games can thus be represented as follows: declarative claim to volition made and fulfilled follow-up reaction not necessary

(

confirmation)

Figure 38.  The basic type of declarative

In order to guarantee that the declarative act comes into force, specific action conditions have to be fulfilled. Human beings cannot create a world as they like. The declarative function is restricted to specific states of affairs and, in some cases, requires a specific status function of the speaker as, for instance, in the example above. Status functions mostly have a legal basis. Declarative games are however not restricted to institutional games. In everyday games we are expected to comply with certain politeness conditions by means of utterance routines such as

146 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

(68) A Thank you. B Cheers. / You’re welcome.

“Danke.” “Bitte.”

I consider such conventionalized utterances to be declaratives of everyday talk as they create what is expected as civilized behaviour. They mostly occur in dialogic pairs: (69) A Sorry. B No problem.

“Entschuldigung.” “Bitte.”

In the following I will indicate the German equivalents only if they demonstrate special expressions beyond literal translation. Even if the reactive speech act can be expected for politeness reasons, it is not necessary for the initiative speech act to be successful. It can only confirm but not negotiate the initiative speech act. The declarative speech act can be questioned but not affected in its force: (70) A Thank you. B Why? I didn’t do anything for you.

As mentioned above (III 2.3), there is no sincerity condition to be met by such utterances; no sincere feeling of gratitude or regret is presupposed. The declarative claim to create a specific state of affairs is mostly expressed by explicitly performative utterances which contain a specific speech act verb such as to baptize/christen, to thank, to regret etc. These verbs specify the propositional state of affairs but do not create different derived subtypes. We will deal with propositional patterns below (3.4.1). The declarative claim itself cannot be modified; it is in any case a claim to create a world by declaring its existence. The declarative function F is therefore best represented by declare, as proposed by Searle (1975a: 360). The scope of declaratives however goes beyond what Searle (1975a: 358) considers to be declaratives. Declaratives guarantee intersubjective reliability in various areas of human life, often on a legal basis, such as: declare



married baptized excuse abbreviated

[civil law] [religion] [social relations] [language]

Figure 39.  The scope of declaratives

According to Wilson (1999: 186), social contracts, the core of declaratives, are “more than a cultural universal”. Contract formation “is a human trait as characteristic of our species as language and abstract thought”.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 147

Speech acts with declarative force also occur as reactive speech acts, in directive and in explorative games (see below 3.2.3 and 3.3.2).

3.2.2 Exploratives Exploratives serve to fulfil one of human beings’ basic needs, the need to be informed or to get the information necessary for action. Human beings are innately curious beings, they search for ultimate explanations and want to know what happened in the past. They need knowledge not for their own minds but in order to share what is in their minds with their fellow beings and to achieve an understanding of the world. It is all the more astonishing that in Searle’s taxonomy such an essential type of interaction is not included as a separate type but is subordinated to directives. Exploratives have something in common with directives: the claim to volition. They are however fundamentally different with respect to where the claim to volition is directed: exploratives are directed at knowledge, directives refer to practical actions by the interlocutors. This crucial difference becomes manifest in a dialogic speech act typology through the reactive act: the reaction after an explorative act is not interchangeable with the reaction after a directive act. Explorative minimal games can be represented as follows: explorative claim to volitionknowledge



± response

Figure 40.  The basic type of explorative

As the initiative and reactive acts define each other mutually, an explorative speech act cannot be subsumed under directives. Whereas after a directive a speech act of consent is expected, the expected reaction after an explorative is a response. A response is every action that takes up the claim to knowledge even by stating ignorance: (71) Do you know ‘Citizen Kane’? – No, I’m sorry.

In Searle’s monologic view, reactive acts do not exist as a separate type of action beside the illocutionary type. A response would arguably be dealt with as a representative speech act. I do not want to go into the debate about the autonomy of the single act again (see above III 2.3 and 2.4). The monologic position is largely a position which ignores the functional difference between action and reaction or between making and fulfilling a claim. Representatives are initiative speech acts which make a claim to truth, responses and consents are reactive speech acts which fulfil a claim to volition.

148 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

According to the basic Sequencing Principle (see above II 2.4.1) reactive speech acts need not be the last speech act in the sequence but can be followed by other reactive acts. In this case, they secondarily take on an initiative function in a double-layered structure and can trigger off further reactive speech acts, as in our next example: (72) What did you do yesterday? – We went climbing.

– Oh, always sporty.

explorative – response representativeinformative – comment

The utterance We went climbing is primarily a reactive speech giving the required information after an explorative. Secondarily its claim to truth can be commented on by a further reactive speech act. Giving information is not restricted to a reactive speech act. We give information not only if we are asked for it. In this case, ‘giving information’ constitutes an initiative, truly representative speech act of informing , for instance: (73) Izak Rabin is dead. (74) Berlusconi has lost his immunity.

Informative initiative speech acts of this type presuppose the interest of the public in being informed. They represent a derived subtype of representatives (see below) which has to be distinguished from responses. In the literature we are confronted with sophisticated terminological differences between the terms ‘response’, ‘reply’ and ‘answer’, in German between ‘Antworten’ and ‘Erwiderungen’ (see Weigand 2003a: 84f.). I do not think that these terminological problems are worth dealing with in detail. If I need a defined term, I use the term response for the reactive speech act which fulfils the claim of a preceding explorative and the term reply in the general sense of a positive or negative reaction after an initiative act of any sort. In this sense, a response and a consent are different reactions, whereas a reply in the general sense of reaction can include a consent. The use of the term ‘answer’ is not precisely defined, nor are the terms ‘response’ and ‘reply’ closely restricted to their defined use. A reaction or reply can also be elusive, i.e. it avoids fulfilling the claim of the preceding act. In traditional literature, explorative speech acts are often connected with the sentence type of question sentences. It is however evident that we will run into trouble if we directly correlate verbal means and action function. There is no way to action by starting from expression because we do not have an overview of how the different types of expression interact. It is the aim of an utterance grammar (see above II 2.2.3) to clarify the correlation between action and communicative means. There are many utterance forms of different sentence types which might be candidates for an explorative speech act, such as



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 149

(75) You’ve been away for a long time.

indirectly asking: ‘where have you been’. Conversely not every question sentence expresses an explorative speech act, to call attention to rhetorical questions or to question sentences which indirectly express a directive function: (76) Can you get something for me? (77) Are you going to mow the lawn?

A certain type of utterances might make us wonder how to classify them as they seem to maintain a position between exploratives and directives: (78) Will you tell me how old you are? (79) Can you tell me what the time is? (80) Would you let me know the time of your arrival?

In my view, one should not meditate too long on how to classify them. The peculiarity of these utterance forms is a formal one: they make explicit what is implied in any speech act, namely the locutionary act of saying. I therefore consider them as utterance variants of an explorative speech act. The following utterances are a bit different: (81) A Tell me where you’ve been. B All right, I’ll tell you. (82) Won’t you tell me where you are going?

Here we have special markers, the sentence type ‘imperative’ and the particles not, in German nicht and doch, which indicate that the utterances refer to preceding utterances and emphasize the interlocutor’s preparedness to give the answer. I therefore tend to classify them as directives which, directly or indirectly, aim to change the interlocutor’s attitude. But again, questions of this type are to be dealt with in an utterance grammar.

3.2.3 Directives Directives are speech acts that aim to change the world, not to create a world like declaratives. They are defined by a claim to volition which – in contrast to exploratives – aims at a future action or behaviour by the interlocutor: (83) A Come and see me tomorrow! B I am sorry, I already have an appointment. (84) A Be kind to your parents! B I’ll try.

150 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

The corresponding reaction is a speech act of consent (“Handlungszusage”): directive claim to volition directed to a future action or behaviour of the interlocutor

± consent

Figure 41.  The basic type of directive

If the action requested can be carried out in the speech situation, the speech act ‘consent’ can be replaced by the practical action itself which fulfils the initiative claim: (85) Close the door. – [the door is being closed]

The speaker can include themself in the directive claim: (86) Let’s go mountaineering.

Some languages provide a specific grammatical category, the ‘hortative’, for this type: (87) Let’s go climbing. “Gehen wir klettern.”

In this case the directive comes very close to being a proposal which introduces a possible action as suitable. Proposals are of the representative type and only indirectly make a directive claim (see below propositional patterns of representatives 3.4.4). How an utterance like (86) is to be actually classified, as directive or as a proposal, depends on how the speaker meant it. Utterances of this type confirm the thesis that speech acts can overlap. They overlap at the level of expression, not at the level of definition. The overlap can even be intended by the speaker who wants to slightly weaken the directive claim or not be tied down to it. In connection with directives another class of speech acts has to be dealt with, Searle’s class of commissives which is missing in my typology. The issue is whether there is indeed a basic action class of commissives which ‘commit the speaker to some future action’, moreover a class which, according to Searle, can appear as initiative. For Searle, directives and commissives come very close together as they are assigned the same direction of fit, which leads him to draw the conclusion that they might even belong to the same class. Commissives however are not selfreflexive­ directives nor do they normally occur as initiative speech acts. We do not open a dialogue by promising: (88) I promise to attend the lecture.

On the contrary, the usual sequence would be:



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 151

(89) A Let’s attend the lecture. B OK, I’ll be there.

The problem however is not solved by accepting the reactive nature of promises. What then would be the difference between simple consents and promises? Entangled in this knot of questions is another interesting point. Searle classifies utterances in the future tense without any further device such as commissives. In my view, we can see here a difference in the use of the grammatical category future in English and in German. In German, at least for my native speaker competence, ich werde kommen is much weaker and not yet a promise. A promise needs a specific device such as (90) Ich verspreche zu kommen. / I promise to come. (91) Ich werde ganz bestimmt kommen. / I’ll most definitely come.

In contrast to German, the English future tense seems capable of expressing a feature of commitment. The real core of the question however does not refer to speech act devices but to the intrinsic nature of the act: what does it mean to commit oneself to a future action? Where is its place in the sequence? At the functional level, English is not different from German. Pondering on Searle’s class of commissives we seem to open up a box with various types of speech acts. We have speech acts of consent after a directive speech act and speech acts of ‘commissives’ which underwrite the consent. What distinguishes them is a difference in the sequence position: directive – consent – asking for commitment – ‘commissive’

Figure 42.  The ‘commissive’ sequence

Searle’s commissives actually have their place in the fourth move of the sequence. They take up the reaction of consent and strengthen it by their feature commitment: (92)

A B A B

I invite you to my party tomorrow. Thanks, I’ll come. Can I rely on it? Sure.

Making a commitment constitutes a declarative speech act. Committing oneself to a future action is not an autonomous act but strengthens the preceding speech act of consent as a sequence-dependent declarative speech act. That’s however not the whole problem. In the box of Searle’s ‘commissives’ we also find declarative speech acts of commitment which occur in representative

152 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

or explorative games and strengthen a preceding speech act which announces a future action:

( 93) A If John comes to see us, I’ll take a day’s holiday. B Nothing’ll come of it. A I promise you. Utterances which announce an action, I’ll take a day’s holiday, can be initiative speech acts. They are however not ‘commissives’, even if in English they are expressed in the future tense, but they inform about the speaker’s intention to carry out an action in the future, as is demonstrated by the following authentic example: (94) A What plans have you got for the near future, minister? B I’m going to America. That’s not a promise but a declaration of intent.

Such ‘declarations of intent’ are not declarative speech acts in the strict sense of committing oneself to a future action. An intention is not yet the action. I therefore take them as informative speech acts of the representative type (see below 3.3.4). As these examples demonstrate, committing oneself to a future action involves different reactive speech acts of the declarative type. There is no unified class of ‘commissives’ as defined in Searle’s terms. One might wonder why Searle did not notice that his favourite class of speech acts is actually a reactive class. There might be rare cases in which a dialogue seems to begin with a promise: (95) Next month I promise my workers a day off.

Such utterances are however completely context-dependent, i.e. they react to a specific situation. Another reason for introducing a class of ‘commissives’ might be the fact that there is a speech act verb to promise. The existence of a speech act verb does not however guarantee the existence of a speech act type. Speech act verbs, like lexical items in general, are expressions for complex meanings which are bound to specific ways-of-use (see above 2.1). Up to this point, we have discussed Searle’s notion of ‘commissive’ in the sense of a speech act of ‘committing oneself to a future action’. ‘Committing oneself ’ can however also mean ‘committing oneself to the truth of past events’; in this case it also appears as a declarative feature. Corresponding speech act verbs are to swear, to testify, to assure, to guarantee etc. (see below propositional patterns of declaratives 3.4.1): (96) I swear/testify that I have told the truth.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 153

Searle (1975a: 348) lists these verbs as examples of “differences in the force or strength” and assigns them to representatives (p. 354). Human communities need speech acts that create reliability, not only for future actions but also for claims to truth. It is therefore very likely that they mirror an inborn need of the human species (Wilson 1999: 186). In order to have declarative force, they need to be clearly and unmistakably expressed, especially in institutional games (Weigand 2003a: 223f.).

3.2.4 Representatives Representatives are based on a claim to truth and aim at acceptance. According to the premises of the MGM, there is no absolute truth, only the speaker’s claim to truth. The strength of the claim can vary considerably, ranging from definite conviction to uncertain, cautious belief. Consequently, the basic class of representatives consists of multiple subtypes, as we will see in the next chapter on ‘derived subtypes’. representative claim to truth The South is there.

–

–

± acceptance You’re right./I agree with you. You’re wrong./I can’t agree. No, you’re mistaken.

Figure 43.  The basic type of representative

Even if representative games do not always explicitly contain dialogicity, they are without doubt dialogically directed. In institutional representative speeches, for instance, the audience may not be allowed to react verbally; nonetheless they cannot avoid reacting mentally. In inner dialogues, we are talking and reflecting with ourselves about the world. Searle’s position of rejecting the general view of dialogicity with the argument that representative speech acts are not directed to anyone is completely incomprehensible. Why else should they be expressed? Obviously he is still encumbered by traditional philosophical thinking (Searle 1992). It is a matter of course that the reactive speech act is not restricted to positive acceptance but can range from complete to partial acceptance and to nonacceptance­. The representative claim to truth can therefore be the starting point for multiple games of argumentation (see Part IV).

154 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

3.2.5 To sum up The dialogic speech act taxonomy we are developing is based on action types which – – – –

create a world: declaratives change the world: directives express the world: representatives ask questions about the world: exploratives

These basic action types are dialogically directed, i.e. they make a dialogic claim with the initiative act which is taken up by the reactive act. The reactive act need not be verbally expressed but can be a mental or practical act. The declarative act makes and simultaneously fulfils the claim. Because of their dialogic nature, these action types constitute minimal action games. In certain respects, we might consider exploratives and declaratives to be supportive actions for representatives and directives: exploratives provide the knowledge needed for representing the world, declaratives create the intersubjective guarantee needed for joint action. In the end, the taxonomy rests on the basic mental states of belief and desire which are the cognitive correlate of human action (Weigand 1991/2009a: 105). Let me once again compare our dialogic taxonomy of minimal games with Searle’s monologic speech act taxonomy. Even if both have some basic points in common, they inevitably result in different action types. Under the influence of philosophical tradition Searle maintains the monopoly of illocution, i.e. the autonomy of the single speech act. From a linguistic point of view, single speech acts represent a heuristic unit, not the unit of dialogue. Searle’s philosophical bias is also evident in the fact that he considers speech acts primarily in functional, universal regards and pays less attention to the issue of how they are expressed in different languages. His neglect of the fundamental role of exploratives in language use may also be due to his philosophical point of view. Another fundamental difference results from the fact that Searle’s speech act theory is a theory of communicative competence and therefore based on rules and conventions. By contrast, the dialogic taxonomy is intended to structure competence-in-performance by means of principles of probability. Both taxonomies cannot therefore strictly speaking be compared. Searle’s taxonomy stops with setting up basic speech act types. The issue of how they are further differentiated to form subtypes is not really addressed; occasionally a few speech act verbs are indicated. Apart from the fact that Searle himself heavily opposed an approach via speech act verbs, the verbs he indicates suffer from heterogeneity, especially the examples for expressives and



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 155

­commissives. Trying to derive homogeneous subtypes will inevitably lead to sorting them out. Searle does not make any effort to justify his taxonomy; instead, he starts from an empty definition of illocution and intuitively sets up five classes. By contrast, our dialogic taxonomy is derived from human beings’ nature and the exigencies imposed by the environment. Human beings’ actions and behaviour are determined by epigenetic rules which allow us to verify the taxonomy by means of evolutionary criteria on the basis of Wilson’s sociobiological explanation. Even if we cannot start with expressions when searching for types of action, the expression side can provide a subsidiary criterion if considered from the point of view of language economy. Approaches to language economy maintain that languages develop time and effort saving expressions for frequently used meanings (Zipf 1949). We can therefore expect that fundamental speech act types have economically short grammatical expressions at their disposal. Such economical expressions are provided by the grammatical category of sentence types. There are indeed near-universal sentence types which relate to the basic classes of representatives, exploratives and directives: the declarative sentence, the question sentence and the request sentence. Declarative speech acts need a speech act verb in combination with a certain syntactic-grammatical pattern. In addition, there are other economical grammatical means such as mood, word order and sentence intonation. The situation with reactive speech acts is not so clear; one might take the position in the sequence as a feature of economic expression. This is not the place to deal with the issue of how speech act types are expressed which is the issue proper of an utterance grammar. I only want to make a final remark in order to avoid misunderstandings. Even if there are grammaticalsyntactic means which can be correlated with basic speech act types, the correlation is far from 1:1. Verbal means interact with perceptual and cognitive means so that we do not have a limited set of possible combinations. On the other hand, an economical expression is not in every case the one that is best suited for communicative success. Saving time and effort often conflicts with rhetorical principles, for instance, of politeness. But again this would be an issue to be dealt with in a volume on ‘Utterance grammar’.

3.3

Derived types of action function

Following the inner logic of the taxonomy, basic function types have to be differentiated according to derived types by modifying criteria. Modifying criteria are functional criteria that differentiate F without touching on the proposition. Modifying the initiative act also modifies the reactive act.

156 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

3.3.1 Declaratives Declaratives comprise multiple types as can be seen from the various speech act verbs used in declarative utterances: to christen/baptize, to give in one’s notice, to define, to classify etc. These types however refer to different states of affairs and do not affect the declarative function of creating a state of affairs by declaring its existence (see above 3.2.1). The declarative function remains the same for every type and does not allow of modification. What is differentiated by different speech act verbs is the propositional state of affairs to be created. A speech act of baptizing and a speech act of defining do not differ in function but in the object to be created: on the one hand a certain status of a person, on the other hand a certain status of a unit of language. Declaratives therefore do not have different derived types but a series of different propositional patterns which will be dealt with below (3.4.1). It is however worth mentioning that Searle (1975a: 361) distinguishes a derived declarative type which he calls representative declarations (assertive declaratives 1979a: 20). This type is conceived of as a mix of declaratives and assertives (see below 3.3.4) by creating a certain state of affairs which can be judged as true or false. The verdict, for instance, has, according to Searle, declarative as well as assertive force, insofar as it can be judged according to what has happened. In my view, this argument is not convincing. A verdict is a declarative act and constitutes the declarative game of issuing the verdict (Weigand 2005a). The fact that it can be judged according to what has happened is part of another game which includes other actants and does not affect the declarative action function of the verdict.

3.3.2 Exploratives Explorative speech acts are of fundamental importance for communication. In Searle’s taxonomy however they are not a separate basic type. In traditional grammar the focus is on the sentence type ‘question sentence’ which is not an adequate starting point for understanding explorative speech acts. In linguistics, ‘questions’ are mostly addressed from a logical point of view (e.g., Zaefferer 1984). Besides, there have been attempts at classifying different types of ‘question actions’ by means of various criteria, formal, semantic, thematic and pragmatic. Formal criteria do not prove helpful for the issue of functionally modifying the explorative claim. We know that question sentences can have various functions and not only the function of getting knowledge. Questions are a format which is exploited in various games. We have, for instance, tendentious questions which are indirect directive speech acts and express a certain expectancy regarding the reaction:



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 157

(97) Aren’t you coming too?

We have tag questions such as (98) Marvellous weather, isn’t it?

which are actually representatives and come close to rhetorical questions: (99) What’s the point of studying to become a teacher nowadays?

And we have provocative questions: (100) Didn’t you assert the opposite a week ago?

A special case are didactic questions which can aim at drawing the students’ attention to the essential points or, quite differently, at examining how much the students know. Sequence-dependent questions do not change the action function. In the second move, the interlocutor can request more precise information before giving an answer (Part IV 1.2); in the third move, the speaker can repeat his question and thus increase the strength of the action function (Part IV 1.4). Interviews are games in the format of question/answer which are not restricted to the explorative function; on the contrary, interviews can take over various other functions. Political interviews, for instance, often have representative claims by means of underlying presuppositions: (101) Did XY give you a good telling off this morning? “Hat Ihnen XY heute morgen den Kopf gewaschen?”

They can be expanded to near-argumentative games or be used to check the sincerity of the interviewee (Bollow 2007). The question of how the explorative claim to knowledge can be modified in order to attain derived explorative games cannot be addressed by means of formal criteria. Modification means functional differentiation. The starting point has to be the claim to knowledge or the purpose of the explorative act. Question sentences which do not have this function are excluded. How can this purpose be differentiated? We might think of combining the claim to knowledge with different thematic variables. Different themes however are propositional criteria and do not modify the basic explorative function. We might also think of relating the claim to different games, for instance, institutional games of teaching or political interviews. In this case, however, as we just saw, the ‘question’ is no longer strictly and exclusively related to the explorative function. To my mind, the claim of the explorative act is modified to correspond with the

158 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

reason or purpose of why it is issued. A claim to knowledge can be made for reasons of knowledge, of action and of reliability. This functional differentiation corresponds to different reactive sub-types, representative, directive or declarative: [knowledge]

response [representative] knowledge in order to know

explorative [action] claim to knowledge

response [directive] knowledge in order to act

[certainty]

response [declarative] knowledge in order to create status functions or to confirm reliability



Figure 44.  Derived types of exploratives

In Figure (44), exploratives are not included among possible responses. If an explorative is followed by an explorative (102) A Do you have sky dry on your notebook? B What do you mean by ‘sky dry’?

the reactive explorative does not count as genuine response because it does not fulfil the claim of the initiative explorative speech act. On the contrary, it is sequence-dependent and subordinated to the initiative act, asking for more precise information. Let us consider some examples of the three derived types. Representative exploratives aiming at knowledge in order to know might be considered the central type explorative speech act. The claim to volition refers to being informed. Information can bear on facts or on argumentative interpretation: (103) A What’s the time? B Exactly 12 o’clock. (104) What’s Hans’ telephone number? (105) Is the weather going to stay fine, what do you think? (106) A Who do you think has taken the parcel? B It must have been someone who knew what was in it.

Directive exploratives aim at knowledge which is needed for action: (107) How am I going to do that? (108) What am I to do? (109) What can I do?



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 159

(110) What should/can we do? (111) What do you advise me to do? (112) Shall I come to your place?

With exploratives of this type the speakers want to get guidelines for their action. Guidelines can be given as advice or instruction, i.e. as indirect directives (113), or as direct directives (114): (113) A What am I to do? B That’s up to you. Above all you have to stay calm. (114) A Shall I come to your place? B Yes, come and help me.

Directive exploratives can also be expressed as ‘offers’ referring to possible desires of the interlocutor (see below 3.4.2 and 3.4.3): ( 115) Would you like another piece of cake? “Darf es noch ein Stück Kuchen sein?”

‘Offers’, ‘advice’ and ‘instruction’ represent propositional patterns we will be dealing with below (3.4). Exploratives aiming at reliability mostly occur in specific institutional games, for instance, after elections or in court. The response represents a declarative speech act: (116) A B

Do you accept the post you have been elected to? “Nehmen Sie die Wahl an?” Yes, I accept. “Ja, ich nehme die Wahl an.”

(117) A B

Are you prepared to stand as guarantor? “Erklären Sie sich bereit, die Bürgschaft zu übernehmen?” Yes, I am prepared to do so. “Ja, ich erkläre mich bereit.”

(118) A Do you swear that you have told the truth? B Yes, I swear.

They also occur in everyday use: (119) A Are you definitely going to come? B I promise.

A final remark must be made regarding the distinction between initiative and reactive representatives, directives, and declaratives. As reactive speech acts

160 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

they represent responses coming after the explorative act, i.e. they primarily fulfil the initiative explorative claim. Secondarily they can make a claim to volition regarding practical action (114) or a claim to truth (103) which however is presupposed and dominated by their reactive function. Reactive directives and reactive representatives can therefore close the sequence. Obviously, declaratives can also be sequence-dependent, not only in the case of a promise, i.e. in the fourth move of a directive game (see above 3.2.3), but also after explorative speech acts as in (116).

3.3.3 Directives Directive action games are defined by a claim to volition which is directed to a future practical action or change of behaviour by the interlocutor; they therefore aim at a reactive speech act of consent. Attempts at a typology of directives mostly use heterogeneous criteria and distinguish numerous subtypes (e.g., Hindelang 1978a). If we adhere to functional criteria, the issue is quite different. In my view, only three subtypes can be derived by differentiating the directive claim to volition: – the claim of an order (or iussive) defined by the availability of sanctions – the claim of a request (or monitive) relying on mutual cooperation – the claim of a plea (or petitive) appealing to the helpfulness and kindness of the interlocutor The type order is not adequately addressed by the gradual criterion of illocutionary strength; orders are backed by sanctions which, in the end, have a legal basis. Sanctions presuppose status functions within institution-like hierarchies. The family, with the parents’ right to tell their children what they have to do, also represents an institution. Even if there are various speech act verbs for different institutional games, such as to order in military games, to direct in administrative games, the action function of an order does not change. Directives which are not backed by sanctions pose the problem that there are mostly no clear formal devices to distinguish between requests and pleas. In English and German there is the grammatical category of the imperative which, combined with please “bitte”, can also be used in pleas: (120) Please forget what I’ve just said.

The difference between a request and a plea draws on a difference in the relationship between the interlocutors. Either the relationship is considered to be one of mutual cooperation between partners which allows them to make a claim to



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 161

volition, or it is a relationship between people without any commitment towards each other. Requests rely on mutual cooperation, whereas pleas have nothing to rely on except emotional closeness, and completely depend on the interlocutor’s willingness to help. The speaker who makes the plea is often subordinate to the interlocutor. The distinction between a request and a plea also depends on cultural conventions and on how the individual speaker assesses the relationship. Certain activities can be considered to be ordinary duties which can be requested or to be totally voluntary help and kindness which can only be asked for. By differentiating the initiative claim to volition we simultaneously differentiate the reactive function of consent. In this way, the following subtypes of minimal directive games can be derived:

directive claim to volition





[claim to be fulfilled]

[+ sanction]

order

obedience



consent

[no claim to be fulfilled]

[– sanction] request

consent

plea

grant

Figure 45.  Derived types of directives

Examples: (121) order (father to young daughter) A You’re home at 8 o’clock! B O.k. (122) request (among friends) A Can you bring a glass of milk, please. B Yes, certainly. (123) plea (between customer and salesperson) A Would you please put the book aside for me for one day? B Yes, for one day, but no longer.

In the literature ‘proposals’ and ‘desires’ are often classified as directives. In my view there is a difference between them which should not be dismissed by classifying them as directives (see the next chapter 3.3.4 and 3.4.4.2).

162 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

3.3.4 Representatives Representatives are based on the mental state of belief: what we hold true can be expressed by a representative speech act. Truth is, in any case, established by human beings in different degrees of certainty and dependent on different conditions. Even the ‘laws of nature’ are not independently laid down in nature but set up by human beings. It is therefore not surprising that representatives confront us with various subtypes. The issue is to derive them as economically and rationally as possible. Human beings express their claims to truth not in order to produce absolute truths which need no reaction but in order to achieve a commonly accepted view of the world. We negotiate claims to truth in dialogic games of argumentation in order to come to grips with the uncertainty of life. We can also set up artificial systems, for instance, logic based on internal, seemingly eternal truths. Sentences of logic are however ‘incapable’ of expressing a representative speech act (also Katz 1977: 187). We therefore start from the basic minimal game of action and reaction, i.e. an initiative representative speech act which aims at a reactive speech act of acceptance. According to the principles of a holistic hierarchy, subtypes need to be derived by differentiating the primary function, i.e. the claim to truth. The first fundamental distinction to be made is between ‘truth hold for certain’ and ‘truth hold for conditional, possible or desirable’. In a first step I therefore distinguish between a simple claim to truth ‘that it is so’ and a modal claim to truth ‘that it would/could/should be so’. representative claim to truth



[simple claim to truth] ‘that it is so’

acceptance

[modal claim to truth] ‘that it would/could/should be so’

Figure 46.  Differentiating the claim to truth

Let us start with the branch of the simple claim to truth. The first distinction to be made here refers to the feature whether truth is taken to be clear or empirically evident or whether it is to be proved (see below Figure 14). assertives express a claim to truth which is not immediately evident and has to be proved if the interlocutor asks. Sometimes they seem to be considered to be the central representative type and even equated with representatives in a simplistic and sweeping way (cf. the different terms in Searle 1975a and 1979a). Assertives aim at a speech act



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 163

of acceptance: the speaker wants to have their world view confirmed. Assertives are not accepted on the basis of faith but on the basis of reasons and arguments: (124) Our economy is going downhill. assertive

Unfortunately you’re right there. acceptance

(125) Our economy is going downhill. assertive

How can you say that? I don’t see it acceptancenegative that way.

In the case of doubts or objections as in (125), the claim to truth must be negotiated by putting forth arguments pro and contra (Weigand 2006b). Not every assertive speech act can rely on rational arguments. Sometimes we have a certain feeling that something is true. The interlocutor in this case cannot do other than believe it: (126) Doris is hatching something up. – How do you know that? – I’ve got a feeling.

Sometimes we refer to metaphysical powers in order to support our claims to truth, for instance, with religious oaths which have declarative force. Oaths can only be believed: (127) I wasn’t in the disco. I swear it.

All right, we’ll believe you/accept your story this time.

Contrary to Searle (1975a: 354f.), I do not consider swearing to be a representative speech act. Oaths do not make a claim to truth but create a metaphysical validation of the speaker’s sincerity, i.e., they make a declarative claim (see above 3.2.3). In talking about personal experiences, the speaker knows what has happened. It would simply be absurd to make a claim to truth for them; their sincerity is tacitly presupposed on the basis of cooperative behaviour. The narrative statement changes to an assertive speech act if it is called into question: the speaker might be mistaken or their sincerity does not seem reliable. In this case, the speaker might refer to witnesses or take swearing as a guarantee of sincerity. Normally, we call on God and submit to the sanctions provided in faith for the misuse of the name of God: (128) I swear by the Almighty God to tell the truth.

Religious sanctions are replaced by legal sanctions if we commit perjury in court. Swearing is not possible with abstract propositions. In this case, rational arguments are needed because the speaker’s sincerity is not at stake: (129) *I swear: the mind is immortal.

164 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

There is another speech act type which I allot to the simple claim to truth even if its truth is neither based on rational arguments nor on empirical evidence. I call this type identifier: (130) What kind of herb is that? – That’s St. John’s wort. What kind of tree is that, the one that has a wonderful scent? – That’s a lime tree.

This type of speech act has mostly been ignored in speech act taxonomies. Identifiers are based on knowledge which refers to definitions. They give objects a name not in the sense of declaratively creating the name but in the sense of identifying the object in relation to existing nomenclature (Weigand 2002b: 74). We normally expect identifiers to be accepted. They can be thrown into doubt if the speaker’s competence is questioned. They can be justified by scientific explanation or consulting a reference book. In the examples above, identifiers appear in reactive position after an explorative speech act. They can also be near-initiative, for instance, in lessons which are intended to instruct and to impart knowledge. In this case, they are introduced as terms in a didactic game as if an explorative speech act was preceding them (Weigand 1989b): (131) What you can see here in this picture is a very special type of fish: the Eurasian dolphin.

Unlike assertives and identifiers, the representative speech act of the simple claim to truth can also refer to events the truth of which is presupposed. This is the type of speech act which imparts new information: (132) On Sunday it’s Doris’s birthday.

I call speech acts which initiatively impart new information informatives. Normally, the truth of the news is believed by the interlocutor but, in principle, it could also be called into question. The feature ‘new’ is not an independent feature attributed to an object but a predicate in the mind of the speaker who assumes that the message is new and interesting for the interlocutor or that the interlocutor might have forgotten it. The same is true of news in the media which is evaluated according to the criteria of the media and preselected by journalists. Informative speech acts normally aim at being taken note of by the interlocutor, especially in institutional memos: (133) I am sending the enclosed decree for your attention. “Anliegenden Erlass übersende ich mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme.”



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 165

‘Taking note of ’ means reacting accordingly, i.e. adapting one’s action and behaviour. In face-to-face interaction, the speaker wants a verbal reaction expressing the interlocutor’s opinion on the news. I call this reactive speech act comment (cf. also Posner 1980, Searle 1990: 417): (134) Hans has got married again. – Oh, I am pleased. informative comment

If the interlocutor responded: I take note of it, this could have additional meaning in everyday dialogue, something like: No comment/I’ll refrain from commenting. New information is also given reactively, in responses after an explorative speech act (see above 3.3.2). Being reactive, responses impart the knowledge requested by the preceding speech act and normally do not aim at a comment. What I call ‘new information’ has traditionally been dealt with quite differently, in terms of ‘theme/rheme’ or ‘topic/comment’. The issue of what counts as ‘given’ versus ‘new’ was central and largely discussed in the Prague school of Functional Sentence Perspective. It was always difficult for me to understand how the quality of ‘new’ could be attributed to sentence constituents according to rules without taking account of the individual speaker (see Weigand 1979). Another important representative subtype of the simple claim refers to truth which appears obvious. This is the type of statements which I call constatives. They can relate to the speaker’s inner world or to the external world. Making a statement on one’s inner mental state is different from making an assertion on personal experiences (example 59) which could also be verified by witnesses. Searle (1975a) assigns speech acts which make a statement on the inner mental or emotional state of the speaker to his class of expressives. Referring to the inner world is however a propositional feature and does not differentiate the claim to truth of constatives. The inner world of the speaker is open to themself but closed to the interlocutor who has to believe the speaker. If the constative relates to the external world, it relates to what can be perceived empirically. Consequently, the claim to truth need not be specifically accepted but is expected to be confirmed. (135) Look, the tree’s got buds. – Oh yes, spring’s coming. constativeexternal world confirm I don’t feel well today. – I believe you, you don’t look well. constativeinternal world believe

Due to the fact that the truth is obvious, no strong claim is needed to express it. The reaction is often simply a sign of taking note of and acknowledging validity such as hm or even only a mental reaction without any verbal sign. The

166 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

i­ nterlocutor can also comment on the constative utterance. In this respect, constatives are close to informatives. In performance, the difference between putting forth new information and drawing attention to what is obvious can be blurred. The speaker uses constatives to make a statement about their inner world without being emotionally affected. Constatives are thus different from speech acts which focus on the speaker’s emotional involvement. In my taxonomy of 2003, I called this type ‘expressives’. However, in order to avoid confusion with Searle’s class of expressives, I now prefer to call them emotives. As mentioned above (2.3), Searle’s class of expressives is heterogeneous and contains in most part declaratives such as congratulate or condole. Emotives do not have a place in Searle’s taxonomy. Emotives are what Bühler (1934/1982: 28) called “Kundgabe der Gefühle”, ‘announcing/expressing emotions’, which is not a simple statement but implies emotional affect or being overwhelmed by emotions, for instance: (136) How wonderful it is here!

To my mind, speech acts of this type, constitute a subtype of representatives, not a separate basic type as in Bühler’s classification; they not only announce emotions but also express a specific state of affairs. The expression is emotion-loaded and this determines the form of the utterance and distinguishes emotives from neutral constatives. In English and many other languages, the utterance form is mostly a sentence type of its own, an exclamatory sentence combined with emotional intonation and sentence accent. The claim to truth is even more weakened than with constatives due to the overwhelming emotion which dominates what is being said. As a consequence, the reactive speech act is also modified: emotives aim at empathy and compassion: (137) What a wonderful view! – Yes, marvellous. emotive empathy

The fact that there is a special sentence type to express emotives must not induce us to equate a category of expression with a category of meaning. The correlation between expression and function is not 1:1. The pragmatics of exclamations is still waiting to be analysed. This might be the reason why emotives are not uniformly dealt with in the literature. In traditional grammars, such as the Duden grammar (1995: 591), they are dealt with as ‘exclamations’ at the level of grammar, not at the level of speech acts. Whereas Searle ignores emotives, Bühler exaggerates them by hypostatising them as a basic functional type. Besides sentence type and intonation, typical devices of emotives are interjections, particles and routine phrases, for instance:



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 167

(138) Ooh, isn’t it cold! Oh, you’re there! [surprise]

Utterances like curses do not always have a communicative function but can also be used to calm emotions down: (139) What a blasted nuisance! Damn!

A further device is emotional word order which can be combined with particles in German: (140) Tut mir das (aber) leid!

In English intonation is used instead of the particle: (140') I am sorry.

The emotive speech act is thus distinguished from the constative I’m sorry/es tut mir leid which can also be used as indirect ‘apology’ with a declarative function. Before we go on to deal with the other branch of representative subtypes based on a modal claim to truth, let me illustrate the derivation achieved so far using the following figure:

representatives to take as true



assertives

[simple claim to truth ‘that it is so’]

[to be proved] [rationality] accept

[not to be proved]

identifiers

accept [new]

informatives



[modal claim]

[definition]



acceptance

comment [obvious]

constatives

confirm/believe

[emotional] emotive

Figure 47.  Derived representative types of the simple claim to truth

empathy

168 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

The modal claim to truth is based on three major subtypes: ‘that it would/could/ should be so’. To some degree this distinction coincides with von Wright’s modal logical description (1969: 5f.) which distinguishes between an epistemic logic of certainty, a doxastic logic of belief and a deontic or normative logic. The first subtype ‘that it would be so’ is bound to a condition ‘it would be so if …’ and therefore dependent on another non-existent state of affairs. I call this type conditional. Conditionals aim at a speech act of acceptance which can be weakened to a speech act of belief if they relate to the speaker’s mind or inner world: (141) If we had a different government, things would be better. conditional

You’re right.

(142) If we had a different government, I wouldn’t be able to stand it here. conditional

I believe you.

acceptance

belief

The term ‘conditional’ is used in the literature in various ways (e.g., Hancher 1979: 5, Ohmann 1972). For our definition it is decisive that the claim to truth is dependent on the condition, i.e., the conditional constellation as a whole represents one speech act. By contrast, other subordinate clauses, such as causal or concessive ones, add a speech act of their own (cf. Hundsnurscher 1993). The claim to truth is not always expressed with assertive definiteness but is often qualified: ‘that it could be so’. I call speech acts of this type which express the possibility of a state of affairs deliberatives. They are referred to by means of speech act verbs such as assume, presume, suppose, suspect, believe, consider. (143) John might come. – No, that’s not possible. John will probably come. I don’t think so. deliberative acceptance

Even if the reactive speech act can contain the speech act verb believe, the speech act type can be classified as a speech act of acceptance: we accept the possibility of an action or event and can give rational reasons for this. From a comparative point of view it is interesting to note that some languages have a grammatical category to express this type of a ‘moderated assertion’ as, for instance, Latin and Greek with the construction of the ‘potentialis’ (144) or Italian with the grammatical category of the ‘conditional’ (145): (144) λέγοι/εἴποι ἄν τις – dicas, dixeris – one could say – man könnte sagen ε῏ιδες ἄν – cerneres – one could have seen – man hätte sehen  können



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 169

(145) direi – I would say – ich würde sagen

A deliberative speech act can also be bound to a condition: (146) If the sun didn’t exist, it could be possible that there wouldn’t be life on earth. – Yes, that’s true, that could be possible.

The speech act type of a conditional can therefore include assertive conditionals (141) and deliberate conditionals (146). In the literature deliberative speech acts are dealt with differently. Utterances which contain speech act verbs such as suppose, believe, be of the opinion are sometimes described as expressions of ‘propositional attitude’ which are separated from speech acts (e.g., Lang & Steinitz 1978). The discussion focuses not only on verbs but especially on the corresponding sentence adverbials. It is completely incomprehensible why a special functional type of propositional attitude should be established and separated from speech act types. Verbs like suppose, believe, be of the opinion etc. have the peculiarity that they can express a mental act which is not verbally communicated but can express a speech act as well. The difference in meaning results from the fact that on the one hand, there is no utterance at all, and on the other hand, the verbs are parts of utterances. We need not say I hereby express my opinion; it suffices to say I am of the opinion. The same is true of verbs which express an emotional state such as I regret. If these verbs are used in speech act reports, they are equivocal: (147) He regretted/was of the opinion that he could not participate.

In order to decide whether the speech act report refers to a speech act or to a mental act, we need more context. The so-called test of performativity does not work if the use of verbal means is not explicitly expressed: (148) I hereby express my opinion. *I hereby am of the opinion.

Consequently, the so-called performativity test cannot count as being generally valid. Searle (1975b), in his article on indirect speech acts, counter-intuitively describes utterances with think, believe as indirect assertives. Epistemic logic differentiates different degrees of the deliberative claim to truth by starting from adverbials such as possibly, perhaps, presumably, probably (e.g., Caton 1966, Aijmer 1980, Hintikka 1962). By contrast, the simple claim to truth is expressed by adverbs such as certainly, surely, definitely, undoubtedly. As discussed above (2.1), there is no direct correlation between expressions and functions. The

170 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

deliberative claim to truth establishes the subtype of possibility which can be derived by functional criteria from the general representative claim to truth. At the level of communicative means we might distinguish between the use of different adverbs such as possibly, presumably, probably and attribute to them a gradual difference in meaning between possible and probable truth. However I hesitate to introduce a further differentiation of the speech act type of deliberatives. In language use the distinction is not so clear, as we can see in the following examples: (149) It is possible that there would no longer be life on earth. It’s plausible. (150) If we had another government, things would be better. – That’s possible./Possibly./Probably. (151) He was of the opinion that this could happen. He thought that this could happen. He asserted/maintained that this could happen.

For reasons of descriptive economy, I will not continue to differentiate the type of deliberatives. Whereas at the functional level of the taxonomy we are trying to derive clear-cut speech act types by functional criteria from the complex whole, at the level of communicative means the margins can be vague. This demonstrates once again that starting from expressions will not result in action types, at most in what might be called speech act syndromes. Besides speech act verbs and adverbs, the category future can be used as a device for the deliberative function in German and other languages. The same is true of English, where the category future seems, in addition, to be capable of expressing a feature of commitment (see above 3.2.3). The category future can be disambiguated in combination with adverbs and particles: (152) John wird (wohl) arbeiten. I suppose John will work.

Other grammatical devices are modal verbs such as can, could, should, ought to or may, might: (153) It could be that Henry is already at home. Henry could/might/may be at home already. Henry should be/ought to be at home already.

The fact that we have grammatical expressions which do not clearly distinguish between different possible truths also justifies, to a certain extent, the decision not to divide up the deliberative type.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 171

Besides conditionals and deliberatives there are two further classes which belong to the representative subtype of a modal claim to truth. They both make the claim ‘that it should be so’ which can either mean a desire or a norm. I call speech acts which express a desire and include emotional involvement desideratives. Their emotional involvement distinguishes them from stating a desire and also from directive speech acts, even if expressions such as to wish or desirable can also be used in an indirectly directive utterance. The desire can refer to the past and can include the impossibility of being fulfilled. The speaker may express a desire for themself or for the partner or for a third person. The reactive speech act can express belief or acceptance dependent on the state of affairs. Preferred phrases contain hopefully or desiderative if only: (154) Hopefully it will work this time! – I believe that you’re nervous. desiderative belief (155) If only there were more jobs! – You’re right, we’d all like that. desiderative acceptance

Speech acts of desire belong to multiple categories (see below their propositional patterns 3.4.4.2). Whether they belong to desideratives or constatives, cannot always be clearly decided by the interlocutor. If they aim at an action by the partner, they can be considered indirectly directive speech acts (Searle 1975b: 65). They can also be phrased in the conditional mood: (156) I’d like you to keep your mouth shut. (157) It would be nice if you came home a bit earlier.

Utterances of this type do not represent direct directives; the difference between a claim to volition and describing a state of affairs as desirable is not cancelled out. The modal claim to truth ‘that it should be so’ can also be a normative claim. I call speech acts of this type normatives. In the literature they are often dealt with as directive speech acts. The corresponding reactive speech act however unambiguously decides that they belong to representatives. Normatives do not aim at a speech act of consent but at acceptance of the norm: (158) You should be stricter with your daughter. – You’re right. normative acceptance

Conforming to the norm can only be expected secondarily and not inherently. Normatives are therefore indirect directives like desideratives if they refer to an action by the partner. Normatives can be combined with a deliberative function: (159) You should probably be stricter with your daughter. – You might be right.

172 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

We can now illustrate the complete derivation of the representative claim by differentiating the branch of the modal claim:

representatives

acceptance



[simple claim to truth [modal claim] ‘that it is so’] [‘that it would be so’]



conditional

acceptance/belief



[‘that it could be so’] deliberative



desiderative

[‘that it should be so’]

acceptance

[desire] belief/acceptance

[norm] normative

acceptance

Figure 48.  Derived representative types of the modal claim to truth

In the Figures (47) and (48), the complexity of the representative class becomes obvious. The term acceptance appears at the uppermost level as an all-encompassing general term and at the level of subtypes as a more specific term dependent on the preceding initiative speech act. I don’t consider it necessary to avoid this double use of the term by introducing a further term. The distinction between the simple claim to truth and the modal claim to truth is mirrored on the expression side not only by the use of different lexical means but also by different grammatical devices. The simple claim to truth corresponds to the indicative whereas the modal claim corresponds to the use of the subjunctive in combination with modal verbs. Even if there is no one-to-one correspondence between expressions and functions, such a fundamental grammatical distinction as that between indicative and subjunctive can be taken as confirming the distinction between a simple and a modal claim to truth. Some speech act types might be missed in the taxonomy of representatives, namely deceptive speech acts and fictional ones. To my mind they are not based on a special claim to truth which could be inserted among the other claims to truth differentiated above. They result from a special way of presenting the claim to truth. Deceptive speech acts contravene the principle of cooperation, the claim to truth is deceptively pretended. They are not at all non-communicative. Searle’s



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 173

sincerity condition is far from performance. Among the various ways of negotiating meaning and understanding there is unfortunately also the use of deception. By contrast, fictional speech acts do not deceive but simulate the claim to truth in a way that the simulation is expected to be recognized (Searle 1979b, Weigand 2005b). Deceptively as well as fictitiously presenting a claim to truth may refer to any subtype of representatives.

3.4 Propositional patterns According to the inner logic of the taxonomy explained in the introductory chapter (3.1), we first derived subtypes of F by differentiating the general communicative function and are now in a position to specify the subtypes according to features of the proposition they are related to. By systematizing what Searle (1969) called propositional rules, we achieve patterns of full speech acts F(p). They rely on the inner dependence between the action function and the state of affairs, i.e. on certain combinatorial restrictions set up by the action function. I call them propositional patterns or propositional subtypes. The various taxonomies presented in the literature do not consistently take account of the double-layered structure of the taxonomy which is due to the combination of action function and proposition. They use heterogeneous criteria, primarily aspects of the social situation, which would first have to be checked whether they influence the action function. A typology of situations does not lead anywhere. We may issue a request in different situations without any effect on the force of the request. Situative criteria can play a role in the taxonomy insofar as they affect the action function, i.e. insofar as they work as functional criteria. In this way, an order, for instance, is bound to the criterion of sanctions, or a declarative requires specific action conditions, such as status functions, to be successfully performed. Propositional patterns do not come up by the use of specific speech act verbs either. It might seem to be so, but again, the speech act verb is an action device, part of the utterance, not of the functional structure. The set of speech act verbs in a language does not coincide with the set of speech act types. There are many more speech act verbs than types. Speech act verbs can be a device for the communicative purpose, e.g., to assert, but can also express locutionary features, for instance, to whisper, or include propositional features, e.g., to advise (see below 3.4.4.1). Contrary to Katz’s view (1977: 204), it is not difficult at all to distinguish between speech act verbs and action types. The Action Principle tells us where they play their role in the correlation of communicative purposes and means. Speech act verbs are expressions of individual languages, part of the ­communicative means. Action types, on

174 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

the other hand, are near-universal functional structures. Their correlation would have to be described in an utterance grammar (see above Part II 2.2.3). If we try to elaborate specific propositional subtypes, we have to tackle the problem that types of F and types of propositions can to a great extent be rather freely combined. Searle’s propositional rules are not at all sufficient nor are they always adequate. The first restriction we have to place refers to the limits of our everyday and institutional world. What is imaginable in dreams or science fiction goes beyond what we describe by propositional rules for the world in which we live. However, even if we restrict ourselves to describing what is possible in our ordinary world we get into trouble. The reason arguably is that complexity does not accept definitorial restrictions. Facing performance inevitably means facing variations, vagueness and the vagaries of life. I will therefore orient myself towards propositional types which are to some degree profiled by specific verbal means, for instance, speech act verbs or grammatical devices. We can assume that these types are to some extent highlighted in our perception of states of affairs in performance. One might object that we are leaving the universal scope of the taxonomy by referring to the lexical and grammatical epressions of individual languages. On the one hand, we are aware of their relative validity as heuristic devices. However, this does not necessarily imply that the meaning of these expressions is also languagespecific. We might find the same meaning in other languages expressed by other language-specific devices. On the other hand, we must not ignore the fact that the functional taxonomic distinctions are not absolutely universal at all but represent near-universal distinctions which can be modified by cultural particularities. A final remark should be made on the notation. If it is necessary to clearly distinguish between action types and propositional patterns, I use capitals for action types, basic as well as derived types, and single quotation marks for propositional patterns. In this way, an ‘advice’, for instance, is marked as a propositional pattern belonging to the action type of representatives. If the difference between action types and propositional types is not at stake, propositional types can also be indicated by capitals, such as advice. By contrast, speech act verbs are marked, as usual, by italics, for instance, to advise.

3.4.1 Declaratives As mentioned above (3.2.1 and 3.3.1), the declarative function does not allow modification. Propositional subpatterns therefore start immediately from the fundamental declarative action function of creating a world by communicative means. The declarative utterance fulfils the speaker’s claim to volition and creates a piece of the world, if the appropriate action conditions are observed. No



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 175

follow-up utterance is required even if there are in some cases remaining reactive utterances of confirmation, for instance: (160) Thank you. – You’re welcome.

Declarative speech acts are normally expressed by an explicitly performative utterance which contains a performative verb, for instance: (161) I’m giving in my notice for the end of the month.

The proposition is mostly not separately expressed as is the case with other explicitly performative utterances, for instance: (162) I am asking you to respond to my question.

This particularity sparked off the dispute over the issue whether action function and proposition are separable (Verschueren 1979: 6). Taking account of the fact that utterance structure and functional structure are not directly correlated oneto-one, we cannot conclude from the use of different propositional verbs that there are different declarative action functions such as giving in one’s notice, christening, getting married etc. As already mentioned above, there is only one declarative declare which is combined with different propositions: (163) I hereby give in my notice. I hereby declare that I’m giving in my notice. (164) I hereby close the meeting. The meeting is closed. I hereby declare that the meeting is closed.

The question might arise why declarative utterances can mix the declarative function with the propositional predicate and assign the declarative function to the explicitly performative use of the propositional verb. On the one hand, declaratives in institutional games must be clear and definite due to their legal basis. The piece of world which is to be created by the utterance must be explicitly expressed. On the other hand, it does not seem necessary to explicitly express the declarative function because it is expressed by issuing the utterance. It is therefore sufficient to use the propositional verb in the construction of the explicitly performative utterance, i.e. in the syntactic form of first person singular, indicative, present tense, active. In this way, the verb which expresses the propositional predicate becomes the performative verb. We might see in this construction a case of language economy and compare it with the use of the grammatical category ‘indicative’ in representative speech acts. Starting from the general declarative formula

176 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

declare the existence [state of affairs]

Figure 49.  The declarative formula

we can now derive propositional patterns according to different states of affairs which can be created by solely declaring their existence. The foremost distinction to be made refers to the speaker who is about to create a world, whether they are human beings or supernatural forces. Human capacities can create social relationships and individual conventions of language use. All other areas such as the empirical world beyond language or cognitive phenomena like reason and emotion cannot be created by human beings simply by declaring their existence; they presuppose supernatural capacities. Interestingly, languages like English and German do not provide specific speech act verbs for that area; the declarative function of ‘creating’ and its propositional state of affairs have to be expressed separately, for instance, to create light, to turn into stone. We can regard this increased effort of expression as conditioned by speech economical reasons because speech acts of this type are rather rare in ordinary action games nor are they genuinely communicative speech acts. The corresponding declarative utterance can use the grammatical category ‘subjunctive’ or a substitute form to mark the declarative function:

(165) And God spoke: Let there be light. And there was light. Und Gott sprach: Es werde Licht. Und es ward Licht. 

(Moses 1.1.3.)

Supernatural or magical declaratives must be distinguished from magical directives (Jacobson 1960: 355). Magical directives make a claim to volition which relates to actions to be carried out by non-human objects. Human beings can create a world ‘with words’ in the fields of interpersonal relationships and of language itself. Declaratives which refer to language are usually called meta­communicative speech acts. I consider the term metacommunication a bit confusing because ‘metacommunication’ is performed for communicative purposes (see above 3.1). Declaratives referring to language are communicative speech acts. They create a propositional state of affairs which belongs to language and communication. The term ‘metacommunication’ simply means ‘communication about communication’ and does not signify an extra or superordinate area over and above communication: declaratives communication [language] meta-communication

Figure 50.  Declaratives related to language



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 177

Metacommunication in this sense is not restricted to declaratives; also representatives, directives and exploratives can refer to language and be considered ‘metacommu­nicative’ acts. Declaratives which refer to language represent a relatively homogeneous pattern, closed in itself, which is also distinguished in Searle’s taxonomy (1975a: 360). They use speech act verbs such as to name, dub, classify, define, abbreviate which very economically express the declarative function as well as the propositional state of affairs if they are used in the syntactic form of the explicitly performative utterance: (166) I define ‘dialogue’ as a correlation of action and reaction. [I declare that I define ‘dialogue’ as a correlation of action and reaction.]

I consider so-called metacommunicative acts to be declaratives if they create linguistic data by the very utterance. Utterances with phrases such as I come to the conclusion, I’ll begin with ..., I’ll summarize can, in this way, be regarded as creating a certain feature of language use by expressing it. I therefore no longer call them ‘meta-communicative’ or ‘structural’ speech acts as I did in my book “Sprache als Dialog” (2003a: 15). The area of language is the only empirical field in which human beings can create world by means of ‘words’. The central pattern of declaratives however refers to the abstract area of creating social relationships. Three subtypes can be distinguished: – creating a specific status of a person, object or situation, mostly in institutional games – creating reliability and commitment between human beings – creating social relationships by the use of politeness conventions In the literature only the first pattern of status-creating speech acts is generally classified as declaratives. Examples are utterances with speech act verbs such as baptize/christen, appoint, abdicate, depose, witness, give notice, join, resign (for instance, with respect to an association), bless, curse, condemn/sentence, pardon. They usually presuppose an institutional legal or religious basis. In court, the utterance (167) I regret.

can express a genuine feeling but can also serve to grant the speaker a specific status by mitigating a penalty. Status-creating declaratives not only refer to the status of persons but also to the status of objects and situations, for instance, in case of naming a ship or in utterances with propositional verbs such as to declare war, to open/close a meeting. Moreover, they can also occur as reactive speech acts after an explorative speech act (see above 3.3.2).

178 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

In contrast to status-creating speech acts, the other two subtypes distinguished above – creating commitment and adhering to conventions of civilized behaviour – are mostly categorized differently in the literature. Searle combines the feature of creating commitment with a future action of the speaker and categorizes this pattern of a ‘promise’ as the basic speech act class of commissives. He ignores the fact that such an action pattern normally does not appear in the initiative position but is the fourth move in a directive sequence (see above 3.2.3). In this case, making commitment strengthens the reactive speech act of a consent. Creating commitment can however also be a separate declarative speech act. Corresponding speech act verbs are, for instance, to commit oneself/to undertake to do something/to obligate oneself, to guarantee, to sign/conclude a treaty, to stipulate in a contract, to lay down in a will, to vouch for someone, to agree, to give one’s agreement/consent, to cancel/annul. Normally, such utterances have a legal basis and might also appear initiatively (see below example 170). Assurances and oaths also belong to this declarative pattern; they are a guarantee either of a representative claim to truth (see above 3.3.4): (168) I swear that I didn’t do it.

or of strengthening a consent after a directive speech act: (169) I swear that I will comply with the conditions.

An ‘assurance’ on a legal basis or an ‘oath’ are stronger than a ‘promise’ (see above 3.2.3) as they can virtually not be cast into doubt. In this way, social structures are created which can be relied on. Practical cooperation needs reliability and commitments, so future action can be planned with virtual certainty. Contracts or a legal basis are however not in every case a necessary precondition. Complying with private arrangements can also be a matter of honour, for instance, (170) I undertake to look after the child in the morning and you look after him in the afternoon.

To my mind, the much discussed speech act of a ‘bet’ is also a declarative. If we disregard the fact that a bet is only carried out by means of an interactive sequence of utterances, the bet is similar to an oath: both back up a representative claim to truth: (171) John will win. I bet a bottle of champagne. – And I bet that he’ll lose.

For both partners, a commitment is created which will have consequences.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 179

The third propositional type of declaratives, the type of creating social relationships by the use of politeness conventions, mainly refers to routines of behaviour such as expressing congratulations, condolences, thanks or excuses. In the literature these speech acts are mostly attributed to Searle’s class of expressives (e.g., Katz 1977: 211f.). I have already pointed to the heterogeneity of this class of ‘expressives’ (see above 2.3 and 3.3.4). Insofar as these utterances represent routines of behaviour, they need not express sincere feelings: (172) Congratulations on passing the exam! My compliments! You did that fantastically.

In particular, negative replies are often combined with a polite but meaningless phrase:

(173) I regret that I can’t come. I’m sorry that I can’t come. Speech acts of this type create a network of conventions of civilized behaviour. Due to their frequent use in everyday talk, shortened forms have been developed which confirm that they are mostly empty routines and have nothing to do with sincerity conditions: (174)

I’m sorry. Congratulation. My condolences. Thanks.

Indirect forms are also possible which avoid the declarative explicitness such as (175) Sorry.

for an ‘apology’. To my mind, speech acts of ‘greeting’ can also be dealt with as declarative speech acts if they are no more than formal routines. I do not consider them, like Searle (1969: 64f.), to be speech acts without a proposition. They declare, i.e. keep alive or establish, social relationships which can be propositionally specified as ‘recognizing and acknowledging the other human being’. The same is true of small talk, which solely serves to support social relationships, for instance, with our neighbours or during a party. It is of little interest what is talked about. Declaratives which relate to communicative conventions of behaviour can have follow-up utterances which confirm or accept what has been created by the declarative speech act. In this way a speech act of ‘greeting’ is followed by a greeting in return, or specific adjacency pairs are used such as

180 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

(176) Thanks. – You’re welcome. My condolences. – Thank you. May I introduce Mr. … – Pleased to meet you.

The declarative function is not dependent on these reactions. Thanks, for instance, carries out its function (and usually does so in Britain) even if no you’re welcome follows. We can give an overview of the various propositional patterns of declaratives and their mutual relationships by the following figure:

declaratives [creating a world]





[human]

[social relationship]

[supernatural]

[language]

[status]

[commitment]

[civilized behaviour]

baptize/christen open a meeting

to commit oneself

to apologize

to define

to create light

Figure 51.  Propositional patterns of declaratives

Figure (51) demonstrates a much larger scope of the declaratives than can be assumed according to the literature. Moreover, the view that declaratives are by definition institutional speech acts is not confirmed. Some of them relate to institutional states of affairs, such as the verdict of a judge; others are frequently used in everyday talk.

3.4.2 Exploratives The fundamental speech act type of exploratives has been differentiated above into three derived subtypes according to the type of knowledge they aim at (Figure 44): knowledge in order to know, to act or to create reliability. We are now going to ask what propositional patterns can be distinguished. The question of the criteria that could be applied turns out to be a rather difficult question. In the literature there have been attempts to distinguish explorative actions ­according to



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 181

different thematic types (e.g., Hindelang (1981: 215). However they do not achieve a systematic and consistent typology because the criterion ‘thematic’ itself remains unclear and arbitrary; propositional and functional criteria are mixed. Moreover, in principle, exploratives can relate to any ‘thematic’ state of affairs whatsoever. Specific patterns are not profiled. Other approaches use the syntactic distinction between sentential or yes-no questions and word questions which is indeed a distinction regarding the propositional state of affairs, as can be seen in the following examples: (177) Are you coming? – He asked her whether she was coming. (178) When are you coming? – He asked her when she was coming.

Obviously semantic differences of the proposition have become grammaticalized. The question is whether this distinction relates to specific explorative subtypes or to exploratives in general. Declarative exploratives always seem to be sentential whereas representative and directive exploratives can be sentential as well as word questions: (179) [declarative] (180) [representative] (181) [representative-directive]

Do you accept the will? Are you coming? – When are you coming? Shall I go to the doctor? – When should I go to the doctor?

According to Lyons (1977: 760), the distinction between sentential questions and word questions represents a universal semantic distinction which is independent of the specific utterance structures of individual languages. It is however difficult to grasp this distinction in a way that it can be useful in distinguishing the propositional patterns of explorative speech acts. Let us first look briefly at the literature and the various utterance types of sentential questions and word questions before we try to find out the essentials of this distinction with respect to speech act theory. Aspects which are subordinate in this respect, such as the sequence dependency of questions in return or the use of questions for indirectly directive speech acts, will not be taken into account. The literature on sentential and word questions is vast, so it is difficult to give an overview. There are logical approaches, general-linguistic investigations and recently speech act theoretic studies side by side. However none of them are satisfactory, as is also confirmed by Grewendorf ’s critical overview of questionlogical investigations (1978). Grewendorf himself however does not provide any approach of his own which could overcome his criticism. To my mind, the logic of questions and its numerous problems are only of little help for an action theoretic approach on exploratives.

182 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

Let’s start with utterance types of sentential questions, for instance: (182) Are you going away on holiday this year? (183) Shall we go away on holiday this year? (184) Can I rely on that?

Examples like (182) are representative explorative speech acts which aim at knowledge for the purpose of knowledge, whereas exploratives like (183) aim at knowledge for the purpose of action and declarative exploratives like (184) aim at knowledge for the purpose of reliability. They expect a response which combines the proposition of the question with a claim to truth or volition. Thus a representative, directive or declarative speech act is created which is primarily a reactive speech act of response, for instance: (185) Shall we go away on holiday this year? – Yes, we should go away.

The response is not restricted to a simple positive or negative reply as is usually assumed in the literature but also includes utterances expressing a modal claim to truth like (186) I don’t know yet. Perhaps. Let’s see.

Such utterances are not always used as genuine responses which express a modal claim to truth. They can also be used in order to avoid a response. If this is considered to be raising a terminological problem, we might use the term response for genuine responses after an explorative speech act, the term reply for apparent responses and the term answer as a general term for any reactive speech act (see above 3.2.2). After a directive explorative speech act such as (185), the response can change from a modal representative to a directive speech act: ( 187) Shall we go away on holiday this year? – I think we should go away. – You’ve been thinking about it too long, we’re going!

Some utterances in the form of sentential questions already indicate what response is expected by the use of specific particles: (188) Wouldn’t you like another cup of tea? Surely you’re not going there?

Such tendentious questions can change to rhetorical questions:



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 183

(189) Aren’t we having lovely weather?

However we can no longer consider rhetorical questions to be explorative speech acts. If any response is expected, it has the function of confirmation. Rhetorical questions are therefore virtually representative speech acts. A simple response no does not seem to be appropriate. The negative reply would have to be based on arguments as is the case with a speech act of non-accepting in representative games. Tendentious questions can also change to so-called tag questions which result from the combination of a declarative sentence with question tags containing an auxiliary verb or a question particle: (190) The weather is wonderful, isn’t it? – Yes, indeed.

Tag questions can virtually be representative speech acts and aim at confirmation as in this example, or they can be used as indirectly directive speech acts with a clear claim to volition: (191) You’re mowing the lawn, aren’t you? … or?

One might even call this type of an indirectly directive speech act an ‘explicitly indirect’ speech act. In the literature, sentential questions are usually dealt with in connection with so-called disjunctive questions or alternative questions: (192) Are you going to the seaside or the mountains this year?

The issue is whether yes-no questions could be described as shortened alternative questions as is often assumed (Hundsnurscher 1975), or whether alternative questions represent a separate type of explorative speech act (e.g., Bolinger 1978a). As can be concluded from the discussion above, yes-no questions cannot be paraphrased by alternative questions and therefore do not represent shortened alternative questions. They not only allow a positive or negative response but also modal modifications in between (see example 186). Alternative questions, on the other hand, point to two (or more) possibilities which are already fixed in the initiative utterance. If the possibility of choice is not correctly indicated, it can also be corrected. A response to (192) therefore would not only be (193) I’m going to the seaside not the mountains.

but also (194) Neither nor, this time I’m going to the Sahara.

Yes-no questions and alternative questions seem to have in common that the interlocutor is expected to combine a proposition with a claim to truth or volition.

184 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

This criterion means they would be distinct from word questions. The proposition however is different: in yes-no questions it is already fixed by the question of the speaker, in alternative questions it has to be decided by the interlocutor. To my mind, yes-no questions and alternative questions therefore represent different propositional patterns. This difference however only exists from the point of view of a competence model. In a model of competence-in-performance it goes without saying that interlocutors are not constrained to keeping strictly to grammatical patterns. The interlocutors’ competence-in-performance may result in variations; performance factors may even break up the patterns completely. The real question is whether the syntactic distinction between yes-no questions and alternative questions is indeed based on an essential semantic-pragmatic difference. Alternative questions like (195) Are you going to the seaside or the mountains this year?

could also have the response (196) Neither nor, we’re staying at home. We don’t know yet. Let’s see what we do.

Such responses demonstrate that even the proposition ‘going away’ could be questioned. This being said, we can conclude that the usual distinction between yes-no questions and alternative questions is a distinction at the competence level, made by surface syntactic criteria. The real criterion, the universal semantic distinction Lyons is talking about, is virtually not touched upon. This is, to my mind, the distinction between an explorative speech act which aims at an action, representative, directive or declarative, and an explorative speech act which aims at semantically specifying a constituent of the action more precisely. In this way we grasp a propositional difference which is syntactically expressed by the difference between sentential questions and word questions. In contrast to sentential questions, word questions do not aim to make a pragmatic claim but to complement the proposition either by introducing new facultative constituents such as adverbials of time, place, manner or reason (197), or by specifying a constituent which is already given in the text or situation (198): (197) When / where / how / why are you coming (from)? (198)

We’re having guests. – Who’s coming? Which house do you like most? Who are you giving that to? What are you doing there?



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 185

Not only parts of speech but also the whole proposition can be questioned: (199) What could have happened?

As was the case with sentential questions, the reactive speech act does not have to be representative: (200) Well, where are we going on holiday this year? – You know already, we’re going to Malta! And that’s that! What am I supposed to do now? – You’re painting the leaves green now!

In connection with word questions, there are multiple questions which question more than one constituent of the proposition (e.g., Bolinger 1978b): (201) When are we going where on holiday? Who are you giving what to?

Multiple questions are complex word questions which are directed towards more than one element at the same time. If the constituents which are questioned are facultative expansions, they can be coordinated; otherwise the predicate has normally to be repeated: (202) When and where are we going on holiday? Who are you giving something and what are you giving them?

Beside the propositional distinction which results from the syntactical distinction between sentential questions and word questions, propositional patterns can be distinguished according to speech act theoretical criteria with respect to the expected reaction. In this way, directive exploratives can aim to get ‘advice’ or ‘instruction’ or can be polite ‘offers’ and ask for what the interlocutor wants (see above 3.3.2). There is such a vast variety of structural possibilities that I doubt whether a systematic description of the multiple cross-constellations could be achieved at all within reasonable limits. To sum up: The complex field of explorative speech acts was first differentiated towards derived speech act types which were then distinguished according to propositional patterns. The derived speech act types result from the different purposes the claim to knowledge is directed at, so that different minimal action games are accounted for: representative, directive and declarative exploratives games. Propositional patterns of the representative and directive subtype can be distinguished according to the near-universal semantic distinction between asking for an action, i.e. for making a pragmatic claim with regard to different types of knowledge, and asking for specifying or complementing constituents of the action. At the surface level, this distinction is mirrored in the syntactic types of

186 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

sentential questions, yes-no questions as well as alternative questions, and word questions. Propositional patterns can also be distinguished by speech act theoretical criteria regarding the reaction which is aimed at.

3.4.3 Directives Directives include the derived subtypes of an order, a request and a plea which are correlated with a specific reactive speech act of obedience, consent and granting. The proposition of directives in general relates to an action or behaviour of the interlocutor which is in the sphere of human abilities and can be deliberately influenced: (203) Close the door. (204) Be reasonable.

Magical directives which address objects (cf. Jakobson 1960: 355) are excluded. Regarding propositional patterns, the question has to be posed whether we can distinguish specific patterns for individual subtypes. Wunderlich (1976: 159ff.) presents a typology of directives which, at least in part, is based on propositional criteria, among them − directives requesting a certain result (205) Tidy up your room.

− directives requesting an activity (206) Go for a walk.

− conjunctive requests (207) Fetch a crate of beer and hand the bottles in.

The typology is not related to directive subtypes but to directives in general and does not go beyond the general statement that directives aim at actions and behaviour within the reach of human abilities. We do not however perform basic acts in general but always specific derived subtypes which set up specific propositional conditions. It is these conditions we want to find out in order to distinguish between propositional patterns. Let us therefore consider the individual subtypes one by one. The case of the subtype of an order, with the Latinized term iussive, turns out to be rather simple. Orders rely on sanctions or means of exerting pressure. It would be contradictory in itself to combine such a function with an action or behaviour that is normally voluntary. Utterances like



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 187

(208) Be nice.

cannot be orders. They normally cannot be reported with speech act verbs such as to order or to command: (209) *Be nice, he commanded.

Conversely, an utterance such as (210) Clean my shoes.

is usually issued as an order. Consequently, an order is connected with a proposition expressing an action or behaviour which is normally only reluctantly performed, which implies work or trouble or is exclusively in the interest of the speaker. The expected reactive speech act is a speech act of obediance. An order can also be directed at both the speaker and the interlocutor: (211) After we’ve eaten, the car will be packed.

Over and above such a general characterization, it is difficult to design specific propositional patterns of orders. The only speech acts which seem to be profiled are speech acts of ‘provoking’ or ‘challenging’. In this case, the speaker’s action does not rely on some legal or authoritarian hierarchy but on a quite different type of sanction, namely of lost honour or of not being accepted in the community. There are specific speech act verbs and phrases which refer to this minimal game of challenging somebody and accepting a challenge. It might however be questioned whether a speech act ‘challenge’ can indeed be classified as an order. Katz (1977: 209ff.) describes a challenge as a separate speech act type, which, to my mind, is not very convincing. In any case, challenges belong to directives; they are different from simple requests due to the sanction of lost honour. The action or behaviour expressed in the proposition of a challenge represents some sort of test which has to be passed by the interlocutor and requires some proof of courage. Whether an action represents a challenge, depends on the conditions of the game. An utterance like (212) Jump off the wall.

can be a challenge depending on conditions such as the age of the interlocutor or the height of the wall. There is another propositional pattern which belongs to orders, namely the order to refrain from doing something. We refer to this pattern with the speech act verbs to forbid, to prohibit: (213) I forbid you to eat the butter with your fingers. (214) You shouldn’t eat the butter with your fingers.

188 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

Let us now deal with the other subtype of directives which I call requests for which the Latinized term monitives can be used. They do not rely on sanctions but are nonetheless issued with a claim to fulfilment. Such a claim presupposes readiness to cooperate. The propositional rule of requests can therefore be described as ‘cooperative action or behaviour’. The interlocutors’ willingness to cooperate will hardly be achieved in the case of an action or behaviour which is to their disadvantage. Requests are often expressed as indirect speech acts which, at least formally, show expressions of politeness: (215) Could you go to the doctor with Doris?

With utterances of this type the problem becomes manifest that requests and pleas are mostly not distinguished by specific devices. As described above (3.3.3), the difference is a functional one, ‘having’ or ‘not having a reasonable claim to fulfilment’. Requests which are directed at both the speaker and the interlocutor can be expressed by a specific grammatical category, the so-called ‘hortative’, which in English uses the phrase let’s, in German lassen or the subjunctive: (216) Let’s go swimming. (217) Gehen wir schwimmen. / Lasst uns schwimmen gehen. (218) Gehen wir spazieren. / Ambulemus.

If the German lassen is used in the singular, it means a ‘plea’, not a ‘request’: (219) Lass uns bitte, bitte klettern gehen.

Obviously the functional difference between a ‘request’ and a ‘plea’ is made explict here. As was the case with orders, it is not easy to find specific propositional patterns which properly fit the claim of a ‘request’. Forms of address can be seen as a specific pattern: they request the interlocutor to be attentive. Only the name of the interlocutor is expressed, i.e. the component which varies from case to case, leaving the action function and proposition unexpressed. Forms of address can therefore be considered as shortened forms which have been developed due to frequent use in everyday communication. Addressing the interlocutor can, of course, also be part of orders and pleas. In the literature, ‘instructions’ are sometimes also dealt with as directive speech acts. The action type of instructing or teaching is however difficult to grasp and cannot be simply equated with directives (see below 3.4.4.1).



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 189

There remains the third subtype of directives: pleas or, to use the Latinized term, petitives (Weigand 2003a). In contrast to orders and requests, the speaker wants the interlocutor to fulfil the plea but cannot make a claim to fulfilment. Pleas intend to induce the interlocutor to a certain action or behaviour. However, whether the interlocutor complies with the plea, is completely up to them. To issue a plea therefore only makes sense under the condition of a certain social relationship which allows the speaker to expect the interlocutor to fulfil the plea for the speaker’s sake or at least to consider fulfilment possible. The propositional rule therefore characterizes the expected action or behaviour as a favour or help voluntarily done out of kindness or love. If the social relationship is deep enough, the plea can also refer to something which demands some sort of sacrifice. Special emphasis is needed if the plea demands more than a favour. Emphasis is achieved by referring to the importance or urgency of the plea or to some moral commitment resulting from the special social and emotional relationship between speaker and interlocutor: (220) You can’t refuse this request, you know what it means for me. … you know what I’ve done for you.

As can be seen with such examples, pleas are not the weakest directive form. If there is indeed a special emotional relationship, it can be much more effective to make a plea than a request. As already mentioned, ‘pleas’ and ‘requests’ are often not distinguished in the utterance form. An utterance like (221) It would be nice if you phoned.

can be made as a plea or with a claim to fulfilment. Not even the performative verbs to ask, to make a plea, German bitten, are functionally unambiguous. For reasons of politeness the expression is formally weakened without touching upon the specific directive function. The utterance (222) I’m asking yu to write this out again, please.

issued by a chief executive and directed at their secretary remains an ‘order’ even if expressed with the performative verbs to ask, in German bitten. There are however specific expressions which clearly point to the speech act of a plea, such as the performative verbs to implore, to beseech, in German anflehen, or phrases which justify the plea by reference to emotions: (223) Don’t come home so late, otherwise I’ll worry.

190 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

Pleas must not be equated with desires. Desires are representative speech acts and only indirectly directives (see below 3.4.4.2). To some extent, ‘invitations’ can be attributed to pleas. ‘to invite somebody’ can however not fully be paraphrased with ‘to ask someone to come to see oneself ’. Special cultural habits have to be taken into account. Finally, we have to discuss some interesting patterns which are not so easy to describe: first, the pattern of ‘asking for permission’. To my mind, it has to be dealt with in a similar way to ‘promising’ (see above 3.2.3), i.e. as a sequential pattern. To permit something presupposes that something is forbidden which must not be explicitly expressed but is known to the community. The speaker asks for the ban to be lifted which, by the reactive speech act, can be permitted: action condition:

directivenot to do pleapermission



± consentnot to do ± consentpermission

Figure 52.  Asking for permission

The speech act of ‘permitting’ is thus not a separate functional type ‘permissive’ as Katz (1977: 215f.) assumes but arises from the specific propositional feature of something being forbidden. ‘Consenting permission’ represents a reactive speech act in the sequence after a speech act of asking for permission. (224) A

Please allow me to stay out till 10 pm. I’m asking to be allowed to stay out till 10 pm. Let me stay out till 10 pm. May I stay out till 10 pm.

B All right, I’ll let you. All right, you can/you’re allowed to stay out till then. As far as I’m concerned, if you like.

As can be seen by these examples, there are specific expressions for ‘asking for permission’ and ‘consenting permission’, such as phrases with the modal verbs can, may, which demonstrate the frequency and importance of this pattern. A specific case is the following: (225) Female visitors are allowed till 10 pm.

which seems to be an initiative speech act giving permission. In this case, however, a potential speech act of asking for permission is presupposed, i.e. utterance (225) is, in effect, a masked ban. Also, we have to reflect upon the issue of where the patterns of an ‘offer’ and a ‘threat’ belong since these are much discussed in the literature but lack a ­convincing



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 191

description (e.g., Fraser 1975, Wunderlich 1976: 272ff., Vandeweghe 1977). The description I gave in my book ‘Sprache als Dialog’ (2003a: 149), which assigns them to the representative class of informatives, does not convince me any longer. There are, it is true, two types of offers, the simple and the complex. The simple type (226) Would you like something to eat? Would you like a whisky? Would you like another roll?

consists of conventional politeness routines which anticipate and ask for a possible desire on the part of the interlocutor. I therefore prefer to assign them to explorative games, more precisely to the subtype which aims at knowledge in order to act (see above 3.3.2). The complex type ‘offer’, however, clearly belongs to directive games. There are two ways of intensifying a claim to volition: by presents and by punishments, i.e. by positive and negative conditioning or by offers and threats (Weigand 1997b): (227) Mum, can you wash my hair? Then I’ll tidy my room up. – Hm, that’s an offer. (228) Stop smoking. Otherwise you’ll have to look for your own flat. – You can’t threaten me.

Even if threats can come close to blackmail, especially if emotions are touched upon, blackmail can be distinguished from threats by the use of illegal means of pressure or pressure arising from betrayal: (229) Give me the money, or I’ll show the letters to your wife! – You can’t blackmail me.

Basically, offers and threats strengthen the directive claim to volition: Do x, then I’ll do ypositive.

offer

threat Do x, otherwise I’ll do ynegative. If you do not refrain from doing x, I’ll do ynegative.

Figure 53.  offer and threat

We can also distinguish two types of threat. If the claim to volition has not been obeyed, the threat changes to an announcement of revenge: (230) You’ll regret that. Just come round to my place!

192 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

In the literature there are other patterns which are attributed to directives, such as ‘suggest’, ‘advise’, ‘warn’ (cf., for instance, Hindelang 1978a and my review in Weigand 2003a: 141–143). To my mind, they belong to representatives (see below) and are only indirectly directives. To sum up: At a general level, propositional rules can be outlined which connect the derived subtypes with specific features of the state of affairs, such as actions based on sanctions versus actions based on cooperation versus actions granted as a favour. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to give a distinctive image to specific propositional patterns of the individual subtypes.

3.4.4 Representatives Representatives stand out by their complexity. Several subtypes can be derived starting from the distinction between a simple and a modal claim to truth. Representatives of the simple claim refer to what is possible or conceivable in our ordinary world. States of affairs which are only possible in the world of dreams are excluded. We cannot honestly assert what is impossible to our everyday experience. Utterances like the following cannot be taken seriously as assertions but represent obvious nonsense: (231) *I have established that ideas are green. *Ich have established that that person is walking on air.

Modal representatives, on the other hand, such as desires or conditionals, can refer to unreal states of affairs and nonetheless seriously express the modal claim to truth: (232) If I only were a bird! If I were a bird, I could come home more often.

Over and above the restriction to a real, conceivable world, there are virtually no further restrictions for the simple claim to truth: it can be related to being or acting as well as to empirical or abstract matters.

3.4.4.1 Propositional patterns of the simple claim to truth Let us start with the outstanding representative type of assertives. We assert something which is not evident to direct perception but needs reflection. The proposition therefore describes a state of affairs which is possible, conceivable, i.e. a state of affairs which needs reasoning to be justified. Consequently, assertives show a special affinity to abstract, rational matters, to arguing between thesis and antithesis in theory:



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 193

(233) Language is a system which assigns expressions to contents (assert linguists).

Empirical states of affairs can be asserted if they are not directly perceivable in the speech situation: (234) The earth is round (asserted Columbus).

The claim to truth of assertives can also relate to evaluating a state of affairs according to criteria which are not empirically manifest: (235) John has a specially close relationship with his mother. (236) It isn’t good that John has such a specially close relationship with his mother.

Over and above the restriction of a deducible or evaluated state of affairs there are no further restrictions for the proposition. Specific patterns of assertives are the types of ‘prediction’, ‘advice’ and ‘warning’. ‘Predictions’ refer to a future state of affairs which has not clearly shown up yet in the speech situation: (237) It will snow tomorrow.

Future states of affairs which are foreseeable are combined with a statement or an informative speech act: (238) John is coming tomorrow; he wrote that in his last letter.

In contrast to the ‘assertive’ pattern of predictions and its corresponding speech act verb to predict, there is no specific verb for ‘stating’ a future event which is obviously going to happen. To my mind, ‘advice’ and ‘warnings’ are also propositional patterns of assertives. The assertive claim can also be weakened to a deliberative claim. In the literature however they are mostly dealt with as directive speech acts (e.g., Vendler 1972: 20) or as a separate speech act type (e.g., Searle 1969: 67, Katz 1977: 200ff.). Austin (1962: 40) already considered advice to be assertive. If we advise an action, we assert that it is suitable in a certain problematic situation: (239)

I advise you to go to the doctor. If I were you, I’d go to the doctor. You should go to the doctor. Go to the doctor.

From the feature of ‘being suitable’ we can indirectly deduce that the action should be carried out. This is the reason why advice can be expressed by means of the grammatical category imperative. The imperative as verbal expression however

194 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

is not correlated 1:1 with the action function of a directive. In problematic cases, only the speaker knows how they intend the use of the grammatical category. There is a clear functional difference between a directive and a piece of advice, namely the possibility of withdrawing if the advice becomes problematical: (240) I urgently recommend that you to go to the doctor. – No, that’s the last thing I want to do! – It was just a piece of advice. You have to make the decision. It’s your decision.

With directives the decision to act is made by the speaker, whereas with advice it is left to the interlocutor. The possibility of withdrawing represents a strong argument in the debate on whether advice is representative or a directive. A further argument is the fact that an advice cannot be connected with the particle please, in German bitte. If the particle occurs: (241) Please go to the doctor.

the utterance changes to a directive speech act. In addition, the reactive speech act of acceptance after advice confirms that it is representative: (242) I advise you to go to the doctor. – You’re right, I should do that.

From the fact that the advice is accepted, we can only indirectly conclude that it will be followed. Advice is normally sequence dependent and follows an explicit or implicit explorative speech act of ‘asking for advice’ (see above 3.3.2 and 3.4.2): explorativeaction What should I do? Can you advise me?



responseaction advice If I were you …

Figure 54.  advice

Only in cases when a relationship is especially close is advice given initiatively. Warnings represent the negation of advice and are, therefore, also more or less assertives. If you warn against an action, you assert or believe that the action is dangerous, not advisable in a specific situation: (243)

I’m warning you not to go to the doctor. I wouldn’t go to the doctor. You shouldn’t go to the doctor. For heaven’s sake don’t go to the doctor.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 195

Warnings are also indirectly directive speech acts. An action which is not advisable should rather not be performed. Propositional patterns which contain specific features such as ‘suitable’ or ‘dangerous’, are rationally predestined to work as indirect speech acts. A well-known example is Strawson’s utterance (1971) (244) The ice over there is very thin.

which has been differently analysed in the literature (Weigand 1993 in contrast to Hundsnurscher 1990). Warnings and advice are evaluative speech acts and therefore different from the neutral speech act of informing: (245) What would you advise me to do then? – I’m not allowed to advise you, only give you information.

They can also be issued hypothetically: (246) If you take so many pills, you won’t be able to think properly. If John comes, I advise you not to say anything about this matter.

Warnings can come close to threats (see above 3.4.3) if they are used in the negative hypothetical form as a means of exerting pressure: (247) If we don’t hurry, we’ll be late. If you don’t work hard, you’ll fail your exams.

Next to assertives in the branch of the simple claim to truth we find identifiers which have in common with assertives that the claim to truth is not empirically evident. They are different insofar as their claim to truth is not based on rationality but refers to definitions or classifications. Knowledge of these systems can be presupposed among experts. An identifying speech act occurs after an explorative speech act or in sequences of instruction. Questioning its claim to truth means questioning the speaker’s competence. Identifiers are justified by detecting the underlying system: (248) What kind of herb is that? – That’s St. John’s wort. – But St. John’s wort looks different. – Yes, there are different kinds of St. John’s wort.

Identifiers relate to systems of classification or nomenclatures which are created by human beings in order to come to grips with the multiplicity of nature. The proposition of identifiers consists of an equation: F ‘ it is so’

(p) (x = y)

Figure 55.  identifiers

196 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

The issue of propositional subpatterns of identifiers is not a linguistic issue but an issue of the corresponding discipline, in our example (248), the discipline of biology. informatives are also based on the claim ‘it is so’ which is, in this case, dominated by the feature ‘news’. Informing someone means telling something which is presumably new to the interlocutor. The emphasis is not on the claim to truth, which is normally presupposed. The expected reaction therefore is not the speech act of taking up the claim to truth but a speech act of commenting on the news: (249) Izak Rabin has been murdered. – Oh, that’s terrible. (250) I’m going to South Africa. – Oh, another crazy idea.

In general, everything which is possible in our world can be the object of information, even events which are hardly conceivable. An attempt to systematize all these possible states of affairs does not seem possible nor would it be reasonable. Only a few patterns are linguistically relevant, among them the pattern which is traditionally called indirect speech or speech act report (Weigand 2003a). In speech act reports, we refer to speech acts performed in the past or by other persons: (251) John: “I was attacked by a tiger.” [direct speech] John told us that he had been attacked by a tiger. [indirect speech]

We can use speech act verbs such as to inform, to tell, to report, to describe and many others. Speech act reports can be classified as an informative pattern as they inform about what has been said or about the fact that this speech event has occurred: (252) What did he say? (253) How do you know that he was attacked? – John told us.

Speech act reports or indirect speech are speech about speech, which is often called metacommunication. As I explained above (3.1), I consider metacommunication to be communication about communication, not an area outside or different from communication. Speech act reports communi­cate what has been said: (254) I am informing you that John told us that he had been attacked by a tiger.

In oral discourse, the speech act report does not need an explicit speech act verb but can be simply expressed by speaking: (255) John told us that he had been attacked by a tiger.

It is the speaker referred to by us who performs this report not John.



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 197

A special sort of ‘informing’ in the sense of ‘transmitting knowledge’ can be embedded in games of teaching or instructing. Transmitting knowledge can refer to encyclopeadic knowledge (256) and to knowledge about how to act (257): (256) A molecule consists of atoms. Gears adjust the speed of the engine to the speed of the car. (257) At 50 kilometres per hour you change into third gear. Change into third gear.

We should however not forget that the purpose of teaching or instructing is difficult to grasp and cannot be equated with ‘transmitting knowledge’. Teaching, in principle, remains an attempt, a tentative enterprise; whether the teacher is successful, depends, in the end, on the student’s mind (cf. Weigand 2006d). Whereas with assertives the claim to truth is not immediately evident but has to be justified by arguments, constatives refer to events the truth of which appears to be manifest. We not only communicate if we have something to say but also talk about things which are obvious, either empirically so for everybody or internally for the speaker. No real claim to truth is needed. The reactive speech act of acceptance is weakened to confirmation or, in the case of an internal state of affairs, to belief. We have thus already distinguished two propositional types of constatives, the one relating to the external, empirical world and the other to the internal world, mental states and feelings of the speaker. The pattern of stating something in the external world does not seem to be controversial. On the other hand, the pattern of stating mental states, feelings and desires is not dealt with uniformly in the literature. Searle (1975a), for instance, sets up a separate basic class of ‘expressives’ for speech acts which express feelings. ‘Desires’ are often attributed to directives or not dealt with as speech acts at all but as propositional attitudes (see above 3.3.4). As long as propositional attitudes remain mental concepts, closed in our minds, the distinction may be justified. However as soon as they are verbally expressed, we are, without any doubt, dealing with speech acts. We can express our feelings by means of statements or informative speech acts: (258)

I regret that I wasn’t able to see the film. I hope to find time. I’m sorry that you went. Even if it is possible to invest your money more profitably, I want to own my own house.

198 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

In contrast to informatives, statements are not made in order to tell someone something new but primarily in order to have a talk with somebody about one’s feelings or to come to grips with one’s feelings. In certain institutionalized contexts, explicitly expressing a certain feeling can have declarative force, for instance, expressing regret in court: I regret the deed (see above 3.4.1). Such utterances do not have to be sincere statements; they comply with certain institutional conditions. Another example is a confession of love such as I love you which can also be considered as having declarative force over and above a simple statement (cf. Schwarz 1984). In speech acts of emotives mental and emotional states of affairs are expressed with emotional emphasis. The expected reaction is a speech act of empathy: (259) It’s so marvellous, here! – emotive

Yes, you’re right, it’s wonderful. empathy

Empathy is also at the core of games of consoling (see below Part IV 1.4): (260) I’m completely devastated. – You mustn’t feel like that. Things can only get better.

In emotive speech acts, emotion is speaking, in statements perception and reason determine expression. The claim to truth is weakened in emotives, truth is taken as given or presupposed. With regard to propositional patterns, the overwhelming emotional involvement of emotives can refer to external events, as in (259), or result from emotions towards the communication partner: (261) You’re such a darling! (262) You idiot! Get out, I don’t want to see you again!

Utterances which tell somebody off, like (262), often contain exaggerations and must not be taken literally. The speaker wants to ‘work off emotions’, to ‘get them off their chest’ and to hurt the partner; after a while such exaggerations are withdrawn and forgotten: I didn’t mean it like that. Obviously, sometimes we are not able to control our emotions. Whereas emotives directed at the partner are dialogically oriented speech acts, we also express emotions, not directed at anybody, solely in order to get rid of them, for instance, by utterances like: (263) Damn!



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 199

In doing this we can influence and calm down our emotions simply by speaking. No interlocutor is needed; we are not even speaking to ourselves. In this case the function ‘getting rid of emotions’ or ‘working off emotions’ does not represent a communicative-dialogic function.

3.4.4.2 Propositional patterns of the modal claim to truth conditionals are a frequent topic in logical literature (e.g., von Wright 1957, Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973). They are also dealt with in a few approaches to speech act theory (e.g., Lauerbach 1979, Tedeschi 1977). As logical problems are not pertinent to our approach, we will focus on a few principles from the point of view of speech act theory. Whereas representatives of the simple claim to truth relate to a real or possible world, conditionals can go beyond possible worlds and also relate to states of affairs which, in principle, are unreal or belong to the past and can no longer be changed: (264) When you come, we’ll go and have an ice again. If you had come, we’d have gone and had an ice again. If you were a bird, you could come home more often.

Whereas the English language has two different, unambiguous conjunctions at its disposal: if and when, the German conjunction wenn can relate to a condition as well as to time. In addition, the conditional use can be clearly marked in both languages by the use of the subjunctive: (265) When you come, we’ll go and have an ice again. “Wenn du kommst, gehen wir wieder Eis essen.”

[temporal]

If you came, we’d go and have an ice again. “Wenn du kämst, gingen wir wieder Eis essen.”

[conditional]

When you’re here again, we’ll be going … If you come/came, we’ll go …

[temporal] [conditional]



Conditionals can relate to an external state of affairs as well as to the inner world of the speaker. Correspondingly, the reactive speech act will be acceptance or belief: (266) If the sun didn’t exist, there’d be no life on earth. – Yes, that’s right. If I didn’t have my children, I wouldn’t know what to do. – I (can) believe you.

The claim of conditionals can also be further specified:

200 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

(267) If I didn’t have my children, I’d probably/perhaps go to South Africa now.

The modal claim to truth of conditionals can obviously range from assertive to deliberative but apparently cannot be constative: (268) “If I was alone, I’d have to give up the house”, she claimed/said/assumed, *established. “Wenn ich allein wäre, müsste ich das Haus aufgeben”, behauptete/meinte/ vermutete sie, *stellte sie fest.

Conditionals are not only subpatterns of representatives: (269) If you come, phone first. Would you come and have an ice with me, when you come/if you came?

In contrast to representative conditionals, the pragmatic claim of directives and exploratives is not affected by the condition; there is no need to postulate a modal claim to volition. Declaratives cannot be conditioned. deliberatives make a claim to possible truth: ‘it could be so’. The proposition is also qualified by such a claim: it must relate to a state of affairs which is conceivable in our ordinary world. We can meditate about being and acting, about empirically perceivable states of affairs as well as about abstract matters. Beyond our ordinary world, in fictitious contexts or in dream worlds everything is possible. There is however a special affinity between the deliberative claim to truth and making hypotheses about abstract subject matters. ‘Proposals’ are an important, clearly designed propositional pattern of deliberatives. In the literature they are often classified as directives. They are, of course, close to directives but first of all they aim to be accepted and are only indirectly related to directives. Even if they are expressed by the category imperative or hortative, grammar is not an unambiguous device for the speech act function. In problematic cases only the speaker knows how they meant the utterance: (270) Where shall we go on holiday this year? – Let’s go to Paris.

Proposals indicate a possibility of action which is considered to be convenient or useful and can indirectly imply carrying out the action. In German the particle doch can be seen as a device for the deliberative nature of proposals which is first accepted and then turned into a directive speech act: (271) Where shall we go on holiday this year? – Let’s go to Paris. Yes, we could do that. Okay, let’s do it. “Wohin sollen wir dieses Jahr in Urlaub fahren? – Fahren wir doch nach Paris. – Das wäre in der Tat eine Möglichkeit. Also machen wir das.”



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 201

Proposals evaluate possibilities of action according to their usefulness under specific conditions. As was the case with advice and warnings (3.4.4.1), they are normally sequence-dependent; their proposition is complex and contains the feature of evaluation. In contrast to advice and warnings, they relate to an action to be carried out by both the speaker and the communication partner: ‘advice’ assertive (an action by the speaker is useful) (an action by the speaker is dangerous) ‘warning’ assertive ‘proposal’ deliberative (an action by speaker and interlocutor could be useful)

Figure 56.  Advice, warnings and proposals in comparison

All three propositional patterns are evaluative speech acts which by their very evaluation indirectly and quasi-inherently imply a directive speech act. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1980:865) confirms such an analysis of proposals by paraphrasing to suggest with to put forward for consideration, as a possibility. Searle (1975a: 354) and Fraser (1974: 150) also assign proposals to representatives. The difference between assertive advice and deliberative proposals also shows up by the use of different modal expressions: (272) I suggest we could go to Paris. “Wir könnten nach Paris fahren, schlage ich vor.” I advise you to go to Paris. “Du solltest nach Paris fahren, rate ich dir.” *You could go to Paris, I advise you.

*Du könntest nach Paris fahren, rate ich dir. *You should perhaps go to Paris, I advise you. *Du solltest vielleicht nach Paris fahren, rate ich dir.

Again, it becomes evident that the essential difference between proposals and pieces of advice results from the difference between the deliberative and assertive action function which is combined with a propositional difference: proposals relate to joint action, pieces of advice to the action of the interlocutor. There remains the modal claim to truth ‘it should be so’ to be dealt with which can be ‘desiderative’ or ‘normative’. Desideratives can be divided into speech acts which can be fulfilled and speech acts which are, in principle, not realizable. Another propositional distinction refers to the fact that the speaker can express a desire for themselves or for other persons: (273) I hope it works this time! “Hoffentlich klappt es diesmal!”

202 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

The state of affairs can also go beyond the speaker’s personal situation and refer to general social conditions: (274) If only the government had thought about that earlier! “Wenn sich die Regierung das doch früher überlegt hätte!”

Consequently, desires expect a reactive speech act of belief and empathy (273) or of acceptance (274). Utterances like (275) I would like you to keep your mouth shut.

may pose the sophisticated problem whether they state or perform a desire (see above 3.3.4). Intonation would only be a faint clue as to the distinction. In this case, only the speaker themself can decide. On the other hand, as we will see, there are special devices in most languages which clearly mark an utterance as a desiderative speech act and also differentiate between different propositional patterns. Desires that can be fulfilled relate to the future; their proposition refers to a possible or conceivable state of affairs (examples 276). Desires that cannot be fulfilled refer to all temporal stages and to states of affairs which are not conceivable, not possible or no longer realizable (examples 277): (276) I hope I manage to reach the bank! “Hoffentlich gelingt es mir, das Ufer zu erreichen!” I hope I reach the bank! I hope I pass the exam! If only I pass the exam! “Wenn ich doch/bloß die Prüfung bestünde!“ (277) If only I were a bird and could fly! If only I had wings! “Wenn ich doch Flügel hätte!” If only I hadn’t done that! “Hätte ich das bloß nicht getan!” If only I had passed the exam!

As can be seen with these examples there are various specific devices and grammatical constructions for desideratives such as I hope “hoffentlich” for desires which can be fulfilled or constructions with desiderative if only “wenn doch/bloß”. The if-type is combined with the subjunctive, the mood of what is not yet fulfilled or can, in principle, no longer be fulfilled as it relates to the past. Due to



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 203

the ­emotional involvement desideratives use the exclamation sentence type, frequently strengthened by particles such as doch/bloß in German, or in English only in if only. Some languages such as Greek have a special grammatical category, the optative. This grammaticalization of desiderative speech acts can be interpreted as a principle of speech economy and confirms their importance in everyday language. Obviously they express a basic human need. The other type of modal claim ‘it should be so’ refers to normative speech acts which set up a norm and aim at a reaction of acceptance. Setting up a norm indirectly implies following the norm; normatives are therefore indirectly directive speech acts. Normatives set benchmarks which are needed to regulate the social life of human beings. The proposition of normatives refers to human action or behaviour but can also relate to inanimate objects. We might distinguish between two different types, generic versus definite normatives. Generic normatives set up general norms: (278) A teacher should be punctual. Climbing trousers should be comfortable.

Definite normatives set up norms for individuals or individual objects: (279) As a teacher you should be punctual. Your climbing trousers should be comfortable.

Normally, the modal verb should (subjunctive mood II) is used as grammatical device. The indicative shall might also be considered as a device for directive speech acts (Weigand 2003a: 179). A clear propositional pattern of normatives is provided by the speech acts of reproaching. In the literature, ‘reproaches’ or ‘accusations’ are described as part of the sequence ‘reproach – justification’ (Fritz & Hundsnurscher 1975, ­Muckenhaupt 1978); the core of a ‘reproach’, its action function, however is not gone into. ­Searle’s taxonomy does not include a basic type where they could belong. The problem is solved as soon as we introduce a separate representative-propositional type of normative. The propositional state of affairs of normatives refers to an action or behaviour which is negatively evaluated, for instance: (280) You’ve left the light on again.

The underlying norm is consequently also phrased in the negative: ‘it should not be so’. In addition, ‘reproaches’ are, at least to some degree, combined with an emotional component of annoyance or anger. We can thus describe ‘reproaches’ functionally by the following pattern:

204 Part III.  Minimal action games or the issue of a speech act taxonomy

‘reproach’ [normativenegative (eventnegative)] + emotion

Figure 57.  The speech act of reproaching

This functional structure is often heavily transformed on its way to utterance structure so that almost no explicit device of reproaching is left. In our example the particle again can be taken as a clue which is however unequivocal only in connection with a specific intonation. Intonation alone may but need not be a clear device. If the action or behaviour expressed in the proposition is not yet in itself negative, reproaches can come close to being pieces of advice: (281) You really should work harder.

The comparative however indicates that the actual state is not yet considered to be sufficient; this is strengthened by the particle really. The representative nature of reproaches is confirmed by the fact that reproaches aim at a reaction of acceptance, in the affirmative combined with a declarative ‘apology’, in the negative as rejection combined with a ‘justification’: reproach

+ acceptance: ‘apology’ − acceptance: ‘justification’

Figure 58.  Sequences of reproaching

(282) You’ve left the light on again. – Sorry, I was in a hurry. (283) You’ve left the light on again. – I did that on purpose, so that people wouldn’t think the house was empty.

To sum up: Representatives turn out to be a very complex array of derived types and propositional patterns. The complexity is due to the fact that the claim to truth can be specified in various ways, which is also mirrored in approaches of modal logic. Moreover, propositional patterns mainly arise from different evaluations of the state of affairs: as being suitable, dangerous, possible or not acceptable. They are clearly profiled by various communicative means, most notably by different speech act verbs. Let me finally address the point that representatives frequently show up as evaluative speech acts. In the Mixed Game Model, which rejects the thesis of an objective truth, the speaker’s claim to truth always contains an evaluative component. Evaluating and taking position is fundamental for human beings. Beyond that, specific evaluations have developed because they are essential for human life: advising what seems useful, warning of what seems dangerous, proposing what



Chapter 3.  The issue of a dialogic taxonomy of speech acts 205

could be useful action, and reproaching what does not seem acceptable. The action of setting up benchmarks itself constitutes the speech act of normatives. Beside those propositional patterns which are inherently evaluative, there are two other types of action which we normally refer to when we speak of evaluating other people’s action: to praise and to criticize, “loben” and “tadeln”: (284)

You did that well/badly. I don’t think what you did was good. I don’t like/I disapprove of what you did. You did that really well!

As can be seen with these examples, they are mostly sequence-dependent reactive speech acts: (285) Look, I painted that today. – You did that really well!

Their action function can vary from ‘stating’ to ‘asserting’ and ‘informing’, or can even be ‘expressive-emotive’, as in the last example. ‘To praise’ comes close to ‘making a compliment’ which changes from being a statement to a declarative speech act if it results from politeness routines (see above 3.4.1). As positive versus negative feedback speech acts, ‘praising’ and ‘criticizing’ are indirectly directive speech acts. The speaker intends to influence the interlocutor’s behaviour by strengthening as opposed to weakening it. As in any other case, the utterance form is not a clear indicator of the action function. Expressive-emotive utterances, for instance (285), could even be intended ironically without any difference in intonation. I do not want to take up once again the old controversy of whether the use of specific adjectives can count as a specific speech act, for instance, the use of good as a recommendation (Weigand 1993). Everything depends on the whole of the action game.

chapter 4

To sum up

Part III systematically develops a taxonomy of minimal games which are the core units of dialogue. The minimal game consists of an initiative and a reactive speech act which are interdependent. We do not communicate by means of single speech acts. The single speech act is part of the dialogic sequence of action and reaction. Systematizing a taxonomy of minimal games means developing a dialogic speech act taxonomy in which any speech act, basic or derived, initiative or reactive, finds its place. The criteria on which the taxonomy relies are, on the one hand, general criteria of structuring complexity and, on the other hand, criteria on which human dialogic action is based. The MGM as a holistic theory starts from the complex whole and opens up complexity in a hierarchy of interacting components which all derive from the complex starting concept. Human dialogic action is in its functional fundamentals based on the Action Principle and the Dialogic Principle proper. The Action Principle starts from basic human needs, purposes and desires. Based on human beings’ nature as social individuals speech acts are dialogically related. Initiative speech acts make a dialogic claim which by its very nature expects a certain reaction. The minimal game of action and reaction is therefore based on rational and conventional expectancy which – being a principle of probability – can be violated in performance. The taxonomy of minimal games is based on functional criteria by means of which the complex starting concept – coming to an understanding – is differentiated. Step by step, action types can be derived. First, basic action types can be derived from basic mental states; second, subtypes are derived by differentiating the claim; third, subtypes are then distinguished according to certain propositional features. The structure of complexity is thus evolved as a structure of differentiating or specializing the complex whole. Nothing is added from outside, everything is contained within from the very outset. Reality or human action and behaviour in performance is complex, but the structuring mind of competence-in-performance is guided by relatively simple principles.

part iv

The architecture of complex action games

On the basis of the MGM, a comprehensive unified typology of human dialogic interaction can be developed by using the purpose of the game and specific sequential conditions as crucial criteria. Whereas the minimal game can be clearly defined as a one-purpose game processed by action and reaction, beyond the limit of the minimal game we are faced with complex games of manifold structure. It is not always easy to make a distinction between them. Human action and behaviour are rooted in mental states of belief and desire. The claims to truth and volition in minimal games directly relate to these mental states. Complex games proceed in an intricate way. Nonetheless, whatever we do, it will be some sort of expressing our views about the world and of coming to an understanding about the actions to be done. In trying to give a rough outline of the ‘architecture of complex games’ I am aware of the fact that such an advance will invariably remain a challenge to science in the years to come. My critics might be reminded of the necessity to give up any claim to explicitness or completeness in the area of complexity. My guess would be that we take the term ‘phase’ as a first structuring guideline and distinguish between extended one-phase games based on one purpose which is sequentially negotiated and multi-phase games based on a complex purpose which needs to be differentiated and addressed in a sequence of phases:

dialogic action games

minimal games

complex games



complex games in the narrow sense

complex games in the root sense

one-phase games reaction action

extended one-phase games one purpose negotiated in the sequence

multi-phase games complex overall purpose to be differentiated into subpurposes

Figure 59.  Typology of action games

210 Dialogue: The mixed game

Extended one-phase games represent complex games in a narrow sense. They remain within the scope of one purpose. We know that in performance we usually do not achieve our purpose in the two-part sequence of the minimal game. There are various reasons why a sequence of negotiating is either embedded or added as a pre- or follow-up sequence. Insofar as meaning is not defined in advance but negotiated by different human individuals, problems of understanding and misunderstanding lurk in the background, information may be missing or claims to truth and volition need to be strengthened by argumentation or the use of power. The proposition can also be extended and can refer to various topics or states of affairs. Multi-phase games, on the other hand, have a purpose which is complex from the very outset. The environment in which we live is not yet structured according to our needs and purposes. Sometimes we do not even know precisely what purpose is actually at stake and what steps should be taken in what order. Life is not a matter of rational competence, it is not completely in our hands. Life happens in performance, subject to regularities and chance, with some degree of probability. It is not only the state of affairs that needs analysis. It is the purposes themselves that are complex, purposes such as consulting, teaching, planning, stocktaking, problem solving and decision making which need to be differentiated and processed in multi-phase games. When analysing complex games of this type we need to derive subpurposes from the complex overall purpose and to place them in linear order. Life not only happens in everyday and institutional games. With a shift in perspective human beings try to transcend the limits of their abilities and give sense to their transitory lives in games of religion. The desire to ‘express the inexpressible’ can also relate to games of art, among them literary games which draw on life as imagined in our minds. Imagination, emotion and desire in this metaphysical sense go beyond what can be expressed by ordinary language use and need specific creative means.

chapter 1

Extending the minimal game

It is easy for us to imgine that there are multiple ways in which the minimal game can be extended. We might structure them according to the purpose of the minimal game at the centre, for instance, by extended directive or representative games. This would however not yet catch the major point of why we enlarge minimal games by means of subordinate sequences. I therefore prefer to focus on the reason for extending the minimal game. Even if the term ‘minimal’ seems to suggest ‘short games’, we will see that the two-part sequence can be extended over a rather long stretch of dialogue. To my mind, it is mainly extended for the following reasons: – – – – –

1.1

problems of understanding clarifying sequences providing arguments using power extending the proposition

Problems of understanding

Human competence-in-performance is always individually shaped and is not totally the same ability with every human being. Meaning is not a clear-cut, defined entity nor is there ever complete and identical understanding. Whereas in an earlier article on misunderstanding in the framework of a model of communicative competence I distinguished between the type of understanding and that of misunderstanding (Weigand 1999b), in the model of the mixed game I would like to stress that understanding-in-performance will always be gradual understanding, subject to negotiation. In the main we proceed on the basis of coming to an understanding and do not usually encounter problems. However, the fact that there is no identical understanding for both the speaker and their interlocutor implies that problems of understanding can arise which can impede the smooth course of dialogue and cause a shift from understanding to misunderstanding or non-understanding. Hearers are subject to misunderstanding without being aware of it. They move on in dialogue on the basis of

212 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

putative understanding which does not fit what the speaker meant. Usually they will be immediately corrected by the speaker who has been misunderstood. The one-phase game is extended by such correction sequences which clearly mark cases of misunderstanding. Of course, misunderstanding can also remain undetected and irritating or even lead to what has been called ‘miscommunication’ (Weigand 1999b, Schegloff 1987). In contrast to misunderstanding, non-understanding is a mental action in the mind of the hearer who is aware of their lacking understanding. Consequently they will signal their non-understanding and request some explanation. In this case the one-phase game will be extended by sequences which aim at settling insufficient understanding by providing more detailed information or giving additional explanations. It is these sequences which make obvious the mental events of misunderstanding and non-understanding:

problems of understanding

correcting misunderstanding carried out by the speaker

settling non-understanding asked for by the hearer

Figure 60.  Misunderstanding versus non-understanding

Another question to be posed is: could misunderstandings be avoided? There are many reasons why they occur: on the one hand, there is the risk of misunderstanding the means of communication, i.e. of not-identifying precisely the communicative means the speaker has used, for instance, because of disturbing noises or absent-mindedness, or because the interlocutor establishes coherence differently from the speaker. Empirical means, verbal or gestural, can be unclear or ambiguous and can cause inferences which were not intended by the speaker (see in more detail Weigand 1999b). Beside such reasons that bear upon the utterance side, there is a reason, in principle, which derives from the complexity and uncertainty of meaning we live with. It is due to this complexity that meaning, in principle, cannot be completely and explicitly expressed. Any attempt at mentioning every seemingly relevant detail would be futile and only end up in a clumsy sequence which would extend dialogue beyond any reasonable period of time. Nonetheless, the meaning the speaker has in mind would remain, at least to some degree, their individual meaning and would be inextricably embedded ‘in the stream of life’, i.e. connected with probability phenomena such as habits and preferences. Problems of understanding, misunderstanding and non-understanding cannot be reduced to some lack of information which the speaker could rectify



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 213

in advance. ­Problems of ­understanding are intrinsic to life. To consider dialogic interaction as a matter of competence-in-performance means accepting different competences-in-performance which inevitably include the risk of misunderstanding. Misunderstandings mainly arise from the fact that life is not a rule-governed matter. Human beings know how to tackle performance by proceeding from standard cases to particular ones. We have already illustrated executive principles of this type by a few examples in Part II (2.4.2). Let us analyse a further example and focus on how the minimal game is extended by moves which correct the pending misunderstanding. The situation is the following: A is preparing a meal in the kitchen. B is in the living room next to it. Both rooms are connected by a door. ( 286.1) A I want to hear the news. Keep the door open. (286.2) B That’s not possible. Our neighbour is at home. (286.3) A Keep the door open. I am coming. (1) (2) actiondirective reactionnegative consent actionstatement

misunderstanding

(3) reactionnon-acceptance actiondirective, insisting correction

Figure 61.  Correcting misunderstanding

The example demonstrates the basic sequencing principle by which every reaction within the sequence is at the same time subordinately an initiative action. The minimal game of (286.1) and (286.2) is thus extended by the correcting utterance (286.3). Obviously, we orient ourselves according to concepts that are inherently concepts of probability, in this case habits which – though usually valid – can change. In our example, two habits are in conflict: − News is listened to in the living room because the television is there. − Sometimes, when A is preparing a meal in the kitchen, he listens to the news from the kitchen through the open door. In this case the television has to be turned up very loud, which is only possible if the neighbour is not at home. B’s misunderstanding arises because A does not say which habit he is drawing on. B infers that A wants the door to be open so that he can hear the news from the kitchen. This inference is wrong in the present case: A meant the door to be open so that he could carry the meal into the living room. The risk of misunderstanding is inevitable mainly for two reasons:

214 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

− When relying on our knowledge of habits, it is always possible that we draw false inferences. − We mean more than we say. Not every single detail can be expressed because of time-economical reasons and because we are not always aware of every piece of information that would be necessary in order to avoid misunderstanding. In our case A does not tell B that he has finished preparing the meal and wants to hear the news in the living room. Living in a world of uncertainty means accepting the risk of misunderstanding and non-understanding. This risk is worth taking because it makes dialogue capable of dealing with an unlimited, ever-changing world. Moreover, resulting problems will usually be immediately settled in the ongoing dialogue.

1.2

Clarifying sequences

Often we are faced with explorative sequences which are part of the dialogic claim proper of the minimal game but are either embedded in or precede the two-part sequence. If they are embedded, then the hearer wants to have more information about terms or conditions of the minimal game before taking a decision, for instance: (287)

A B A B

Let’s go to the cinema this evening. Is there an interesting film? There is Benigni’s “La vita è bella”. Oh, very fine, let’s go.

The underlying functional structure is the following: directive explorative

consent response

Figure 62.  Embedded clarifying sequence

Such embedded clarifying sequences can, in principle, occur in every minimal game: (288)

A B A B

Can you buy trainers there? What do mean by “trainers”? Shoes for jogging. No, they haven’t got them.

explorative explorative

response response

Figure 63.  Clarifying within an explorative sequence



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 215

In this case, we have a subordinate explorative speech act following up the paramount explorative speech act of the sequence and a subordinate response preceding the paramount response. Clarifying sequences of this type are not restricted to one embedded question and can extend the minimal game ­considerably. If explorative sequences precede the minimal game, they have a purpose which goes beyond getting more information. They are in fact used by the speaker for persuasive reasons: the speaker wants to clarify the conditions in advance before launching their claim. Such presequences are well-known in the literature; they are, for instance, formally described in conversational analysis (e.g., Jacobs & Jackson 1982) as well as with respect to their function in dialogue grammar (e.g., Weigand 1995: 114). They are primarily used to prepare the ground in directive games: (289) A What are your plans for the week-end? B Up to now nothing. A So we could do something together. B That’s a great idea.

The formal schema of extending the minimal game by presequences of this type is the following: explorative

response directive

consent

Figure 64.  Presequences

Persuasive presequences can be considered to be persuasive ‘hedges’ which are set up before the actual dialogic claim is expressed.

1.3

Providing arguments

Beside problems of understanding and clarifying sequences, the reason for extending the minimal game can also be the wish or need to justify one’s claim. Providing an argument shifts to a subordinate level. In doing this we can have a double goal: strengthening versus mitigating our claim. We can, for instance, strengthen the claim of an initiative speech act by justifying it in advance: (290) You know we are committed to submitting the final version by the end of this month. So let’s make every effort to comply with this deadline.

216 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

Or we can, for reasons of politeness, mitigate negative reactive speech acts by argumentative presequences: (291) You know I am very busy these days and cannot afford to participate in the trip.

In principle every type of speech act can be justified by arguments, however not every claim can be modified by arguments (Weigand 2006b). A declarative speech act is not open to negotiation. A verdict, for instance, can subsequently be justified by arguments but not changed in its validity. If the argument is accepted, the minimal game has been extended by an argumentative sequence but does not yet represent a genuine, full-blown action game of argumentation. A game of argumentation is based on diverging views (Weigand 2006b, van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002). Even if negotiating divergent views can extend over a large stretch of dialogue, as long as it is still the same starting positions which are negotiated, we remain within a one-phase game which proceeds in a double-layered structure. The superordinate level is constituted by the starting positions which are primarily representative or directive in nature. Arguing in seemingly explorative games of the type “What shall we do?” refers to the appropriateness of possible actions which is evaluated at a representative level (see below 2.6). The subordinate level is constituted by providing arguments which aim to strengthen or to weaken the respective starting positions. In terms of speech act theory, providing arguments, in any case, proceeds at a representative level. It implies at least two different speakers who deliberately take different positions with regard to a central issue and use specific rhetorical means and strategies to strengthen their position. The speakers do not have to be real speakers. Speeches delivered by one speaker can also relate to counter-positions of other virtual speakers. At the end of argumentative negotiation, the double-layered structure returns to the starting positions in one of the following ways: − abandoning one position completely − achieving a compromise − sticking to the initial positions, i.e. with no change at all In games of argumentation every party will act in their own interest by using specific rhetorical principles in order to push their view through. Even if the structure of the game is to some degree formally determined as an extension of the starting dialogic positions, it is not formal criteria such as turn-taking that could explain the strategies at work. Formal criteria of turn-taking may point to certain functional features, such as dominance or taking the initiative; their interpretation however needs comprehension of the whole.



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 217

It might seem as if negotiating diverging views in games of argumentation comes close to games of conflict. A distinction however has to be made between argumentative games and rising conflicts or even quarrels. Whereas argumentation is based on cooperative efforts to remove obstacles and to come to some common understanding, conflicts arise if the respective interests of the parties are completely different and negotiating a common position becomes extremely difficult or even impossible. Conflicts can change to quarrels if emotions gain the upper hand and cause the interlocutors to deviate from civilized ways of behaviour as was the case with Berlusconi’s attack on Schulz (see above II 2.3.2; also Weigand 1988). Before analysing an authentic argumentative game, let us reflect on the underlying structure of argumentative games. I am going to consider argumentation from the perspective of Western culture but am aware of the fact that we are dealing with a strongly culture-dependent phenomenon. Whereas in the West argumentation in one’s own interest represents a common strategy of communication, there are cultures in which “argumentativeness is impolite” (Willard 1989: 87). According to the starting positions, there are primarily two types of an argumentative game: the representative and the directive one. Representative games are based on a claim to truth which relates to a certain state of affairs and aims at acceptance by convincing the interlocutor. The claim is in principle open to discussion. The reaction can include doubts or clear rejection. Any position needs to be backed by arguments. Arguments can be accumulated and listed consecutively before the interlocutor is given their turn. Argumentative representative games therefore have different structures: – They can appear as speeches to the public which are formally monologic and leave the reaction to the people’s minds. – They can be formally regulated as institutional debates. – They can proceed rather informally as discussions. Argumentation as negotiation of divergent views on a subject matter in representative games thus emerges as a structure which is mainly determined by the Action Principle and the Dialogic Principle proper. There is an initiative speech act, the thesis, which is completely or partially rejected by the interlocutor or called into doubt. Rhetorical Principles play a crucial role in this process of mutually defending and attacking the respective positions. As just mentioned, the end of argumentation is predestined: either the initial diverging positions remain the same, or one position is successful, or both positions are modified and join a compromise:

218 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

representative type of argumentation thesis

−acceptance, anti-thesis partial or complete rejection



arguments

arguments

argumentation

thesis, anti-thesis, compromise

Figure 65.  Argumentation in a representative game

In contrast to the representative type, the directive type of argumentation aims at consent by persuading the interlocutor. I am using here the term ‘to persuade’ in the narrow sense in contrast to ‘to convince’, even if convincing is also affected by persuasion in the general sense of ‘meaning is persuasion’. The directive type starts from a claim to volition which is not immediately consented. Consent can, in principle, be refused because of problems of practicability, of usefulness or of motivation (cf. also Hindelang 1980). Accordingly, arguments for strengthening the directive claim will have to dispel the problems of practicability, demonstrate usefulness and motivate the interlocutor. We can therefore presume an underlying structure of directive argumentative games as follows:

directive type of argumentation

directive



− consent

arguments arguments

problems of practicability problems of usefulness problems of motivation

dispelling the problems of practicability demonstrating usefulness motivating the interlocutor



argumentationrepresentative



consent, refusal, postponing

Figure 66.  Argumentation in a directive game



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 219

Providing arguments in order to persuade the interlocutor in directive games is determined by executive strategies of cooperation versus confrontation and implies some use of power (see the next chapter; for authentic examples see Part II 2.4.3). Let us now analyse an authentic game of the representational type, namely the debate on television in 1997 between Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers, the then German minister of science and research, and Dr. Hermann Scheer, the then president of Eurosolar, on the topic “Solar energy – vision or madness?” (shortened and in English translation; for the original German text see the appendix). Our focus here is on elaborating the underlying structure of the authentic debate (cf. Weigand 1999a). (292) P presenter, R Rüttgers, S Scheer P Dr. Rüttgers, I think he can start off. [points to S] 1S Mr. Rüttgers, what we just heard, your comment on madness comes from a speech about the solar cell programme. How can you reconcile your evaluation of this as madness with the fact that today a 100,000 roof programme is being carried out in Japan, a programme that is almost identical to the programme of ours that has so far been rejected, but is still being discussed. In other words I would describe it as madness on the part of technology policy – not to launch such a programme. 2R In a case like this I am in favour of clear realities and facts. It is a fact that a 100,000 roof programme would cost DM 5.5 billion and would raise the share of solar energy of total electricity supply to 0.04 %. This is a proportion which I think is simply mad. But it is correct that we must exploit every opportunity presented in solar energy, we are doing that. First of all, we must see to it that the price comes down. Your example from Japan is inappropriate. In Germany electricity is available everywhere. The programme in Japan is being carried out on islands where there is no electricity, we have a completely different cost structure when we have to first put down power lines on these islands. 3S There are more practical examples such as façades. 4R We have a programme running for that. 5S The problem is not that nothing is being done. Incidentally your statement about DM 5.5 billion is not correct. Jobs were created. DM 6 billion was given to the Transrapid magnetic levitation vehicle. This has never had the prospects of success of solar cells. Today we are in the macabre situation that there are seven solar cell producers in India and only two very small ones here. 6R You see that is precisely what you have not understood. In the age of globalisation it is not important where I produce, whether in Germany or in America, or where there’s more sunshine. 7S No, I disagree with you completely. Like you I am a political representative in this country and I, of course, want these jobs to be created as far as possible in this country [applause].

220 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

8R But you won’t keep a single job in this country if you can’t offer your products at competitive prices. 9S I can’t accept this ‘too expensive’ as an argument. With these technological leaps you have first of all preliminary investments. 10R I admire your commitment to solar energy very much, but we mustn’t throw out the baby with the bathwater. You don’t really mean to say that you can replace other sources of energy with solar energy. If you drop out somewhere now, you will be damaging those who have to make decisions in 2020. In plain language this means that we have to do everything we can to give solar energy and wind energy and all the other sustainable energies a fair chance. P And I must make a decision now, too. Probably that’s not fair either. I would like to thank both our guests for their debate on this important issue.

The underlying starting positions of thesis and anti-thesis are clear:

claim I (R): claim II (S):

Solar energy is madness. Solar energy is vision.

Among the arguments supporting these claims are the following: For claim I: the argument that costs are too high and that it is therefore necessary to reduce the costs the arguments that labour is too expensive in Germany and that therefore production should take place in India the argument that we should not exaggerate and not only focus on solar energy the argument of ‘giving all types of energy a fair chance For claim II: the argument using the example of Japan the argument using façades as a further example the argument that we should create jobs in Germany the argument using another project, the Transrapid vehicle, which costs the same but has far less chance of success the argument that it is necessary to give support in advance By negotiating divergent views, Rüttgers arrives at a modified claim which represents a compromise:

claim III (R): Solar energy is madness if we do not make sure we reduce the costs. There are prospects for success if we take account of the development of other types of energy.

Rüttgers appears to win the debate in the end by this compromise of giving all types of energy a fair chance.



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 221

The whole authentic debate has a clear underlying structure which precisely corresponds to the general structure of the representative type in Figure (65): Solar energy is madness

Solar energy is vision.



argumentation



All types of energy have to be supported.

Figure 67.  Coming to a compromise

Depending on the complexity of the proposition about solar energy, meaning and understanding is negotiated and finally presented as a claim to truth which represents a compromise supported by both interlocutors. On the way to this compromise various rhetorical means are used which range from means of rationality and logic to means of persuasion and power and which underline the character of the game as a mixed game. There are no arguments as such but arguments chosen which are dependent on individual interests. Even so-called clear ‘facts’, numbers and programmes are evaluated differently and arbitrary benchmarks imposed to present one’s claim as we can, for instance, see with the argument using Japan. We find strategies such as ‘hit back immediately’ or ‘throw out the challenging argument immediately’ as well as Gricean maxims like ‘be brief, clear, rational’ (Grice 1975) which are strategically applied. Phrases such as in plain language or I am in favour of clear facts present the speaker in a positive light and simultaneously imply the converse for the interlocutor. Rationality thus becomes a matter of persuasion. Among the rhetorical principles there is the populistic appeal for jobs in our country by Scheer (7) as well as appeals to fairness, tolerance and moderation, for instance, in Rüttger’s final position of ‘giving all sustainable energies a fair chance’. For power used in a positive way we can also take as an example Rüttger’s appreciation of his opponent I admire your commitment to solar energy (cf. Leech 1983: 132). The formally regulated structure of this example is due to the fact that it represents an institutional game which takes place on stage in television between a politician and a representative of a pro-solar agency. Nonetheless the game is played as a mixed game: reason and emotion play their part, rational structure joins persuasive means and strategies in the mutual attempt at being successful in the game.

222 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

1.4

The use of power

Power has many faces; I can only address a few. Power can be used in our selfinterest­ or in the interests of the other human being. It can range from motivation, offering help and cooperation to confrontation, pressure, oppression, manipulation and even deceptive persuasion. Power, in general, means some intrusion into the interlocutor’s ability to make free decisions about how to act. It can have a legal basis or be more apparent than real in cases of simulated power. It is exerted in various ways, either by verbal means such as words and arguments or by cognitive means such as appeals to emotions or ideals which need not be explicitly expressed. The magic of words such as change can inspire people to engage in a political campaign (cf. Weigand 2009d), or provocative phrases can elicit information which would not be willingly exposed (cf. Bollow 2007; see above II 2.3.1). Games of power are primarily persuasive games of the directive type (Weigand 2001). If the directive claim to volition does not immediately receive consent, the use of power in its positive as well as negative form can help to push it through. As we have just seen, providing arguments represents an effective means which can be used in support of the directive claim. The choice of arguments can follow a cooperative versus confrontational strategy (see authentic examples in Part II 2.4.3). Respecting the interlocutor and proceeding cooperatively will be a persuasive strategy in using power in the positive sense. Proceeding confrontationally does not necessarily mean power in the negative sense. Sometimes we do not know what is best for us and need some push by friends even against our will. Confrontational strategies may rely on sanctions or be simply based on simulated power. Simulating power may draw on arguments but does not need arguing. In contrast to real power deriving from status functions or emotional and social commitments, simulated power is only based on the rhetorical strategy of confrontation without any real basis. The strategy of simulating power is often used in political action games as was, for instance, the case in the spectacular Round Table discussion on television after the German elections in 2005 (see Part II 2.3.2). Chancellor Schröder pretended to have or simply simulated having the power of being the only strong leader able to form the government, which in the future course of events turned out to be wrong. Expressing one’s claim resolutely or increasing the volume of one’s voice may seem to strengthen one’s case but usually it means nothing more than simulating power. Besides the cooperative versus confrontational use of arguments and the strategy of simulating power, there are various other techniques to strengthen one’s claim



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 223

by exerting power. A simple but effective means is the technique of insisting, i.e. repeating our claim if we do not immediately receive the expected response (cf. Hundsnurscher 1981). In principle we can insist on every claim. We use this technique especially if we do not consider the preceding rejection as definite. A nice example of such a game is the following authentic dialogue between a three-yearold boy and his father (translated from Martens 1974: 182): (293)

Boy Father Boy Father

Could you clean my teeth? You can do it yourself. No, you do it. Alright.

directive no consentnot definite directive insisting consent

As we see, a three-year-old child already knows very well if a rejection is to be interpreted as definite or leaves some space for negotiation. He is also capable of using the appropriate utterance variant for his directive claim in different moves, the initiative move and the insisting one. Insisting does not necessarily presuppose a negative reply. In explorative games, for instance, it can be the case that we are not content with the information received and want to be informed in more detail. We need however to elicit this information from an interlocutor who does not want to talk about it. It is precisely this obstacle in the mind of our interlocutor which we try to overcome by insisting as the following authentic dialogue between a mother A and her child B returning from school demonstrates: (294)

A B A B A B A B

Com’è andata oggi a scuola? Schifo. Puoi spiegarmi? Schifo. Ma cosa significa schifo? Schifo. Raccontami un po’, vorrei saperlo. Schifo.

‘How was school today?’ ‘Dreadful.’ ‘Can you explain it to me?’ ‘Dreadful.’ ‘But what does it mean: dreadful?’ ‘Dreadful.’ ‘Can you tell me, I would like to know.’ ‘Dreadful.’

Not only does the mother insist on being informed more precisely, but the child also reactively insists on blocking the talk. If we take the term ‘insisting’ as simply ‘repeating what we want to achieve’ we can also include games of repeated attempts such as consoling or teaching. Whether teaching leads to learning or consoling to being consoled, depends, in the end, on perlocutionary effects. Such ‘perlocutionary games’ range from minimal and extended games to complex and never-ending games (Weigand 2006d). We find consoling in minimal games as a reaction to emotive speech acts (see above Part III 3.4.4.1):

224 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

(295) I am completely destroyed. – Stand up! Life goes on.

Teaching or instructing in minimal form responds to an explorative speech act (Part III 3.3.2): (296) What step follows next? – Click the button.

By repeating the attempts at consoling or instructing, the minimal game becomes an extended one-phase game. Complex games of consoling and teaching proceed in various sub-phases of complex games. Teaching can comprise phases of informing, evaluating and repeating; consoling can aim at showing empathy or encouraging and pointing to new possibilities. In institutional games, the use of power can rely on the hierarchy of status functions. Executives can back their claims by sanctions. Even if in our days team work and a cooperative business culture is highly appreciated, in the end, in problematic cases the executives will decide on the basis of their status. Especially if they have to issue an order for an action which usually is not carried out willingly, it can be expected that persuasive moves of motivation and even of concessions will not have the desired success (for a simulated example of this type cf. Weigand 2003a). The following authentic example demonstrates how the power of status functions is exerted in a business meeting (taken from the text corpus of authentic business dialogues recorded and transcribed by Schnöring 2007). The chief executive decides the course of action even if he gives some leeway to discussions with subordinate managers and is prepared to change his decision. Yet it is always he who determines the strategic measures: (297) … beforehand we want to communicate with each other as follows: every employee can buy a maximum of two items for their own personal use. But is expressly not allowed to sell these on to a third party.

One of his colleagues very cautiously questions this decision: (298) Is that right, two items?

The chair makes clear that he is prepared to discuss this point: (299) We can discuss that.

After a short discussion he determines the course of action: (300) Well, shall we say three? Agreed? Three items per employee. The precise procedure will be laid out again. That’s dealt with that topic, hasn’t it? Right?



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 225

We see clearly how the hierarchy of status functions finds expression in specific speech acts, for instance (299), giving permission to discuss the point, but on the other hand, we also see that politeness and cooperation are attributed a high value by the business culture of this company. Finally there are a few ways of using power which I subsume under the heading of supporting actions. They all aim to increase the pressure of a directive claim by the use of different means: offers and threats, appeals to emotions, and underlying strategies such as playing one’s cards close to one’s chest. We have already dealt with offers and threats and appeals to emotion in Part II (2.3.1 and 2.4.3). The strategy of not putting one’s cards on the table is dominant in games of bargaining in which every party tries to get as much as possible and to offer as little as necessary (Weigand 2001). Games of bargaining can be conceived of as having a double-layered structure: the game starts from directive claims of both parties which have to be negotiated step by step towards a joint agreement. How much the parties are prepared to give and how much they in any case want to receive is kept concealed. Often a mediator is needed to achieve a fair compromise or to make negotiations a win/win game for both parties (e.g., Fisher, Ury & Patton 1991). There is some literature on this type of game which mostly uses rule-governed­ schemata, such as the work of Raiffa and his group (e.g., Raiffa, Richardson & Metcalfe­ 2002) or analyses on the basis of some sort of dialogue grammar which elaborate general rule-governed structures of bargaining (e.g., Hundnsurscher 2001, Dannerer 2001). Authentic texts are rare (cf. Schnöring 2007). In my article (2001), I therefore used the simulated text of a training course which clearly demonstrates the two levels of such games: the level of the directive starting positions which are openly expressed and the level of underlying, concealed purposes and interests which are negotiated by rhetorical strategies of power. Negotiation proceeds by making concessions, on the one hand, and making counter-demands, on the other hand. Strategic principles can, for instance, be evading, insisting, or trying to get proof. The central question to be addressed in this respect refers to the conditions which allow the game to be played successfully. Everyday and institutional experience tell us that, in the end, it will not be rhetoric, not this or that strategic principle but hard interests which cause the parties to move. Only if they need each other, is there a chance for compromise. Rhetoric will be useful for single, limited issues, and in negotiating individual conditions if there is a basis of joint will and preparedness. If there is no will to move, negotiation will become much harder, if not impossible. Unfortunately, sometimes only a different type of power may cause people’s minds to move: legal or even military power.

226 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

1.5

Extending the proposition

Finally let us discuss the issue whether there is a type of extended one-phase game which emerges from extending the proposition of the central speech act as, for instance, in: (301) Let’s have fun this evening: we could take a bath and relax, then go out for dinner and afterwards walk by the sea.

The whole utterance can be taken as a proposal to have fun which is subdivided into several events. The reason for extending the proposition could be to describe more precisely what ‘having fun’ might mean. To my mind, the issue at stake is an issue of the utterance not of the game. The game can remain a minimal game of a proposal related to the expected reaction of accepting or rejecting the proposal. Let’s go one step further and consider so-called monological texts, for instance, representative speeches, lectures or narratives. Telling a story might proceed by telling what happened in different periods, all of which make up the story. The same is true of interviews or examinations which consist of various questions, all of which make up the explorative game. The superordinate purpose remains the same; it is divided into a series of sub-purposes of the same kind related to specific propositions. One could raise the question whether texts of this type represent a one-phase game. As long as the series of sub-purposes remains the same kind as the purpose of the whole text, for instance, various questions taken from an exam, I consider such games to be one-phase games which are extended by differentiating the overall action function with respect to different partial functions of the same type and their respective subpropositions. There are – surprisingly – also extended declarative games which are of this type. I am aware of the fact that a declarative speech act, in principle, does not allow negotiation but is carried out by one utterance issued in appropriate action conditions. On the other hand, there are entire texts with declarative force, for instance, legal texts or small talk. In small talk we create or confirm social relations, nothing else. We are not allowed to deepen what has been said or to substantially negotiate it. Regarding legal texts, not every part of the text carries declarative force. Legal texts are the result of negotiations among experts which have been put in codified form. Outstanding examples are legal codices, verdicts and contracts. Their purpose is to establish intersubjective validity, and reliability, in cases of possible conflict (Weigand 2005a). Good examples of extended declarative texts are European contracts. They contain explicitly declarative formulae, for instance,



Chapter 1.  Extending the minimal game 227

(302) By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’.

besides declarative sequences of utterances without an explicit declarative marker (cf. L.Wunderlich 2003: 399). Programmes of political parties or statutes of associations are also the results of negotiations among the representatives which have been laid down in a binding or legal text. The couching of the text requires much work which involves negotiating divergent views and selecting the right words capable of covering underlying differences. To sum up: Minimal games are one-phase games based on one purpose which is processed in the two-part sequence of action and reaction. The phase can be extended in multiple ways, all resulting from action sequences which go beyond the minimal sequence of action and reaction but remain part of one phase dominated by one purpose. The reasons why we need to go beyond the minimal sequence of action and reaction are different: there may be problems of understanding, missing information and the need to support our dialogic claims by arguments or the use of power. The purpose of a one-phase game may also relate to complex states of affairs which need to be addressed by differentiating the proposition. What unites them all is the fact that their paramount purpose is a purpose as defined by a dialogic typology of speech acts, such as the representative, directive, explorative or declarative purpose.

chapter 2

Complex human affairs Dialogue in the stream of life

Whereas one-phase games are to some extent within our grasp as they can be directly traced back to speech act functions, for multi-phase games the situation is different: we are confronted with complex purposes related to complex states of affairs, i.e. with a network of subcomplexes which needs to be elaborated. Such multi-phase games confront us with a twofold challenge: to analyse the complex purpose, i.e. to clarify what is at stake, for instance, in ‘planning’, and to clarify how to proceed in putting the subpurposes in linear order.

2.1

The complex whole

The challenge of the real complex, to my mind, can be rendered as the challenge of games we are involved in, knowing that we have to settle them in conditions of uncertainty with no predesigned path staring us in the face. These are games that will take time and will have to be accessed by multiple endeavours, in linear or parallel order, but the issue of what individual endeavours are to be made and in what order has not at all been predetermined. Such games are mostly called by empty names, for instance, “meetings” or “discussions”, and even the points on the agenda, for instance, “The company’s progress” or “Defending the results”, do not precisely indicate what is at stake. These games touch upon the fundamental issue of dialogue analysis which has up to now only been metaphorically addressed by ‘dialogue in the stream of life’ (Wittgenstein 1981[1967]). In everyday as well as in institutional life, we are always confronted with the complex, which has no independent structure of its own but waits to be structured according to our needs. In linguistics this field of complex games is still elusive. There are few reliable guidelines. That is not surprising because the complex cannot be addressed from within well-guarded borders of disciplines. According to Lumsden and Wilson (2005: xIvi), it needs “intensified dialogue among the arts, humanities, and sciences of human nature. […] A substantive familiarity with science, including especially evolutionary science, is once again de rigueur for respectable philosophy of mind.” Respectable philosophy is a philosophy on the basis of consilience,

230 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

i.e. a philosophy which “cuts through the levels of organization from society to mind and brain” (Wilson 1999: 205). Encouraging results have been achieved in the field of ‘the co-evolutionary process of genes, mind, and culture’ (e.g., ­Lumsden/Wilson 2005, Wilson 1978), and also by other approaches that cross disciplinary boundaries, e.g., Gell-Mann (1994), Damasio (2000), Prigogine (1997), Ramachandran­ (2003) or Simon (1983). We might join Lumsden and Wilson­ (2005: xIvi) in being optimistic: We “know something is happening. The synthesis, indisputably, is under way”. We have to focus on ‘synthesis’. It is beside the point to separate language and thought as Levinson (2003: 43) does and even to maintain: “The reason we have a developed vocabulary (instead of the limited repertoire of other animals) is that we have found it helps us to think”. Thought does not need the “food” of vocabulary. Words or more precisely the faculty of speaking is needed for dialogic interaction. The starting point for any advance in the complex requires us to circumscribe the complex. In accordance with the premises of the MGM, we grasp the complex as the dialogic action game which is played by human beings on the basis of their competence-in-performance, i.e. their ability to come “to terms with whatever life throws at us” (Sampson 2005: 193). There is no complex in front of us, we are at the centre of the complex and shape it according to our abilities. To my mind, that is what Wilson (1975) called “the new synthesis”, which, in my terms, means the synthesis of human nature, environment and culture. It is the game of life or the synthesis of innumerable interacting variables put to action and interpreted by human beings. The challenge is to open up this complex and to deduce subcomplexes step by step not by abstraction but by distributing the load of the whole and differentiating the components. Human beings are, on the one hand, able to grasp the complex in their minds but, on the other hand, their actions need to proceed linearly. Consequently, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the complex subcomplexes must be ordered as subsequent steps to be passed through in actual dialogue. We are thus confronted with the issue of structuring the complex as a hierarchy of interacting complex subsystems, a holistic hierarchy which is more than the sum of all the interactions. We can hope to cope with this issue only under the condition that the whole and its subsystems are “nearly decomposable” (Simon 1962); otherwise we would be exposed to chaos. The condition of near-decomposability is met by the general characteristics of action, namely that it is decomposable as an action function or purpose related to a state of affairs: F(p). As human beings distinguish between being and appearing, the action function can again be divided into what is openly presented, the communicative purpose F, and what is hidden behind, the concealed interest which can even be the opposite to the purpose. In any case, the condition of neardecomposability is constitutive not only for individual speech acts or minimal



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 231

games but for complex games as well, even for the challenge of life which we may grasp with Sampson’s words as ‘coming to terms with (whatever life throws at us)’. Other essential features of what near-decomposability might mean are contributed by the necessity of a ‘division of labour’ in growing societies which is achieved by human beings’ abilities of focusing attention and specializing in different areas. We can therefore decompose the complex whole as a complex of interacting subsystems: f(p)i

F (p)

f(p)1 f(p)ii

f(p)2

f(p)3

…..

…..

Figure 68.  Decomposing the complex whole

For analytic purposes the structure is oriented towards what is presented. Interests are considered as intervening forces in the background. To give an example: We can assume a complex subsystem or an area of specialized action called ‘business’. The complex goal of any company will be to effectively run the company: [effectively run (the company)]. This complex subsystem consists of various subcomplexes, e.g., production and marketing, which by their effective interaction contribute to the functioning of the whole. In its essentials, the procedure of deriving subcomplexes is comparable to the issue of deriving individual speech acts from the general purpose of communication (Part III). Superficially, it seems to be some sort of ‘tree-structuring’ (Simon 1962, Sampson 2005) but in essence it is totally different from what generative grammar has defined as tree-structure. Generative tree-structuring does not start from complex performance but from an artificial symbol S which is formally divided into parts by the tree. Tree-structuring the complex, by contrast, starts from a natural phenomenon which is structured by distributing its meaning load among interacting subcomplexes. I therefore prefer the terms ‘specialization’ or ‘differentiation’ because the whole is differentiated not divided into parts. A generative tree consists of parts, and all the parts add up to the whole. The complex whole however is not the result of the addition of parts. Any subcomplex is again complex and internally connected with the whole. The criteria used to arrive at subcomplexes are functional features of the whole which become more specific, unfolded step by step. In the case of speech act types, the starting point is the general purpose of dialogue, namely coming to an understanding, projected to the minimal unit where understanding can be achieved. From the complex purpose

232 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

at the top all criteria can be derived by which the concrete action types at the bottom are distinguished. In the case of complex dialogues, it is the ‘game of life’ we have to start from, not life as such but the game to be played by any individual in various human affairs as a mix of interests, needs and purposes. Unfolding or differentiating the complex means decomposing the complex into subcomplexes step by step by specialization, i.e. creating a hierarchical structure, not simply by listing components. In performance human beings are confronted with the outcome of this process at the bottom, i.e. with concrete steps in linear order, which they are going to carry out or have to interpret in specific action games. Their technique is primarily the practitioners’ technique of coming to terms with a concrete event at a concrete spot in the linear time sequence of actions. They tentatively proceed by adaptation, i.e. by using regularities as far as they go and being prepared to change direction if necessary. Tentatively proceeding is not proceeding by trial and error but by taking decisions on the basis of deliberately evaluating probabilities. The game of life as a complex mixed game is based on human beings’ abilities and needs, i.e. in the end on their basic mental states of belief and desire. We want to come to an understanding with our fellow beings about what we hold to be true of the world and about what we want to happen. Beliefs and desires are the basis not only for individual actions but as well for complex actions in human affairs. Desire is directed to practical action and to knowledge as well. We are by nature curious to know what is at stake. Exploring what is at stake represents to some degree a precondition for our beliefs and desires. Another precondition for human beings’ living together as social individuals refers to a certain degree of mutual reliability. Very interestingly, Wilson (1999: 245) lists “reliance on long-term social contracts” among the “most distinctive qualities of the human species”. The desire for intersubjective validity could be satisfied by common acceptance in the early days of the human community; in modern societies in most cases a legal basis is needed. the game of life as a mix of belief and desire for carrying out practical action for attaining knowledge for establishing intersubjective validity

Figure 69.  The mixed game of life

From the very beginning, the dynamics of evaluating and deciding becomes a crucial feature of the game of life, as human action is not a programmed response, not even in very similar situations, but depends on intention, choice and decision (see Lumsden & Wilson 2005: xxxix).



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 233

2.2 Decomposing the whole by specialization: The emergence of institutions Having circumscribed the complex whole as a hierarchy of interacting subcomplexes we are now confronted with the issue of identifying these complex subsystems. To my mind, we can orient ourselves towards a basic distinction which developed out of the necessity of division of labour in growing communities (Part II 1.2.). Division of labour meant specialized labour or area-specific action complexes which needed some organization within the working group. Institutions were about to develop. In the growing human community the pending labour had to be divided among various groups which can be considered as precursors of what we nowadays call institutions. They had to take care of, for instance, the basic activities of producing certain goods, of exchanging these goods with other goods produced by other groups, of having a means with the status function of money for changing goods, of instructing others in learned skills and techniques, of caring for health problems, etc. When the individual groups increased in terms of the number of their members and when different groups for the same specific purpose also emerged, they needed a solid organizational structure which could no longer only bear on collective acceptance but had to be sustained by law. Diverging interests and conflicts could no longer be informally settled. There had to be those who are entitled to decide and those who are committed to carrying out the decisions. Hierarchies in rights and duties were set up and backed by sanctions. This step of creating organizational hierarchies can be considered a decisive step in creating an institution insofar as it includes a shift from function by virtue of physics and natural abilities to function by virtue of status (cf. Searle 1999: 125). According to Searle (1995: 228), it is the capacity to make something symbolize which creates institutions. Whereas in primitive societies certain persons may have a specific status or reputation, for instance, as a witchdoctor, without any legal basis, for modern societies status functions need to be backed by a specific organizational structure on a legal basis. Institutions thus derive from basic needs and purposes of the species by introducing organizational structures which include the power of status functions. What is important for dialogic interaction is the fact that status functions have direct consequences for dialogic actions insofar as they include the right to decide over and above arguments and the possibility of exerting sanctions. Truth is no longer a matter of arguments but becomes a matter of power. It is thus the increasing complexity of growing communities and the diversity of labour which necessitates specialization and the establishment of institutions as legally based organizations for specific purposes. For actions in everyday life,

234 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

such as planning a journey, we can rely on experience and practical knowledge, for actions in institutions, for instance, planning the future course of a company, we need highly specialized expert knowledge of the area which can only be marginally terminological knowledge. It is thus not only status functions but also the difference in knowledge which distinguishes games in everyday life from games in institutions. The specific profile of institutional actions mostly results from specific institutional affairs to which these actions are related. division of labour in the growing community everyday games natural order informal agreement physis, ability practical knowledge

institutional order legal basis status functions area-specific knowledge

business law the media health care instruction ........

production of goods subgroups

institutional games

exchange of goods subgroups

marketing

........

subgroups

Figure 70.  The emergence of institutions

2.3

Decomposing the subcomplexes: Towards a linear order

Going down in the hierarchy we approach the difficult issue of distinguishing the components which by their interactions constitute the subcomplexes. These interactions can run parallel in different departments, for instance, business departments of marketing, research, the laboratory in the pharmaceutical industry; in the end however any dialogic interaction proceeds in linear order as a sequence of actions in time. To my mind, there are a few basic action complexes any institution is confronted with, among them stocktaking, planning, problem solving and creating reliance. In general, stocktaking refers to a sequence of events in the past by reporting and evaluating what happened. planning, as a consequence, refers



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 235

to a sequence of actions in the future by announcing and evaluating what is to be done in order to achieve a predesigned goal in limited time. problem solving starts from an uncomfortable situation regarding which first has to be clarified what is at stake before proposals can be made for solving the problem. Finally, creating assurances and intersubjective validity by commitments is a necessary step for reliable negotiations in any institution. stocktaking (past actions)

effectively running an institution

planning (future actions)

solving (problems)

creating (assurances)

Figure 71.  Basic action complexes

These four complexes of action roughly correspond to the basic types of minimal games, representative, directive, explorative and declarative. They are however not exclusively correlated with one speech act type, for instance, stocktaking with representative sequences. Stocktaking not only means making claims to truth but includes other supportive actions as well, for instance, explorative ones. In the end, stocktaking aims at knowing the position already achieved or at evaluating the state of affairs at a certain time. The other complex actions are also not restricted to one action type. Planning means deciding the future course of action which necessitates determining the goal and evaluating possible alternatives for achieving it, and problem solving means getting to know what is at stake and settling inconveniences. There are, of course, other subcomplexes of action, for instance, instructing, consulting and motivating, which are subordinated or, at least, related to the basic four. consulting aims at evaluating alternatives of action and putting forth a suitable one; it can thus support interactions of planning. motivating aims at inducing volition to act and can also be regarded as part of a planning process; the same is true of instructing. I classified these subcomplexes using expressions from ordinary language such as to plan or to solve problems which are only rough-and ready terms. What the actions mean is different from how expressions are used. How the complex action of ‘effectively planning the future course of a company’ can be broken down into constitutive actions does not result from a semantic analysis of how the verb to plan is used. It is rather the cognitive challenge of decomposing the complex down to the level where the components have to be brought into a linear order. Let us make a first step in this direction by decomposing, for instance, the complex of stocktaking. stocktaking will in any case comprehend a sequence of

236 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

r­ eporting speech acts: report (state of affairs). Reporting comes about by a sequence of constative speech acts which refer to actions, events, or situations in the past. Those propositional states of affairs can be further differentiated with respect to different areas the reported object refers to. Stocktaking however is not yet done by just reporting; it includes evaluating the results, mostly by comparing them with the results in other areas or by drawing conclusions to future consequences. Those speech acts are no longer constative acts; they include a decision based on some truth which is not open to our eyes but asserted or concluded. We can thus roughly decompose stocktaking as a sequence of reporting and evaluating:

stocktaking (actual state of affairs)

reporting (past events) evaluating (the results) sequence of constatives assertivesevaluative

subcomplex

interaction of subordinate subcomplexes linear sequence of speech acts

Figure 72.  Decomposing stocktaking

In our analysis of an authentic business meeting below we will reconsider and complete this issue of decomposing stocktaking.

2.4 From purposes to communicative means: Rhetoric as an inherent part Having determined what actions are to be carried out and in what order, the final step of analysis is directed towards the issue of how they are to be carried out. This is the step where the communicative means are at stake. As there are always alternative means of communication, it is again a step of choice and decision. The communicative means and strategies to be taken strongly depend on cultural conventions and on the institution’s purposes and interests (cf. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998). In an administrative institution they will be different from those in a competitive institution like business. Moreover, every institution has to decide upon its individual ‘institutional culture’. The decision about a more socially and team-oriented culture or a more authoritarian one will strongly influence the selection of the means and strategies to be used. In the end the selection will be directed towards effective, successful action. Rhetoric becomes a very important and deliberately exercised part of institutional action (Part II 2.1.2). Rhetoric or effective language use in institutions is, to a great extent, determined by underlying strategies of cooperation versus confrontation which do not coincide with strategies among members of the institution versus strategies



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 237

t­ owards other institutions. Cooperation relates to the common interest of an organization and may include confrontation at lower levels. The institution as a weorganization represents an ingroup which not only has to maintain its position in relation to rival outgroups, the others, but also sometimes to settle internal diverging interests among we-members (cf. Weigand 2006c). Because of such underlying strategies, organizations mostly have a double face, one that is presented with purposes openly expressed and one behind it, the ‘real’ face, with interests in striving for success which are not made public in our competitive society. The empirical surface, i.e. the institution’s appearance in performance or practice, is therefore not a direct guide to the underlying purposes and interests. Rhetoric however cannot be restricted to the selection of communicative means and strategies. Rhetoric includes both the choice of how and of what is to be said, for instance, of what arguments can be considered useful for strengthening specific positions. The choice is dependent on evaluative criteria and therefore, in the end, on some ideology. Rhetorical questions are always questions of how action could be optimized. Optimizing performance cannot simply start from practice but needs benchmarks which are not directly evidenced in authentic texts. They presuppose reflection on how the whole is to be decomposed and put to action.

2.5 Rethinking the empiricist position At this point, I think, we should take up the issue of the authentic text once again and discuss its role in the complex whole. The empiricist postulate that we have to start from what is called ‘reality’ and to transcribe any empirically noticeable element whatsoever, unfortunately seems to claim some quasi-dogmatic status. Yet, what does ‘reality’ mean? To my mind, the postulated procedure of first recording and meticulously transcribing what has been said and possibly perceived, and will never be said and perceived again in this way, contrasts strikingly with what we as interlocutors do in ‘real’ performance. First, there is the principal problem that empiricists speak of data which are not at all data but arbitrary elements listed without knowing if they are relevant. Elements become data only if we can attribute some meaning to them. On the other hand, the linguist as observer may ignore perceptual elements which are of crucial importance for the insider participating of the game (Weigand 2004a). The issue of the ‘data’ points to the question which lies at the heart of the problem: Is indeed any element of spoken language worth recording? If we focus on our own competence-in-performance, we become aware of the stark contrast between empiricist methodology and the way we actually proceed and this

238 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

sheds a dubious light on what empiricist call ‘reality’. Human beings are neither bogged down in empirical chaos nor do they start from alleged methodological exigencies but approach the complex ‘reality’ quite differently. They are not worried about possibly losing an empirical element and do not hastily chase after whatever might turn out to be relevant. On the contrary, they accept the complex and its basic features of uncertainty and variability of expression. They deal with it by adapting to ever-changing action conditions in negotiating meaning and understanding. There is no recording of every empirical detail; instead human beings focus attention on what might emerge as coherent meaningful constellations. Focusing attention means trying to simultaneously grasp as many parameters as possible and letting the rest pass by. We know that not every element is relevant and do not care that some are lost. We trust that we will establish coherence in our minds. Being competent-in-performance means letting elusive elements elude us and focusing on what counts on the spot. It is therefore completely beside the point to put forth the dogmatic postulate of starting from authentic texts and concentrating on any empirical element in a chaotic flux or even deriving ‘grammar’ from it. Transcriptions are momentary, transitory transcriptions and lose significance in the next moment. By contrast, being competent-in-performance in no way means adapting to chaotic empirical features but means focusing our attention on what might turn out to be meaningful real ‘data’. The empiricist thesis that we have to start from any detail of the authentic text turns out to be a deadend if it is taken as the starting point for theorizing on the complex whole. It contradicts any reasonable concept of science insofar as it overlooks the crucial factor that we must first evaluate what to observe and to focus on (Feynman 2001: 173). If there is no pre-reflection and if we operate in complete abstraction from meaning we will not get anywhere. The concepts of ‘standard language’, ‘mother tongue’, the ‘native speaker’ are all connected to meaning. They were problematized when it turned out that they cannot be strictly defined. However they still exist and count (Weigand 2010a). Recording and transcribing simply means documenting what can be heard and seen. From the perspective of the observer what can be heard and what can be seen need not be connected. The ability to speak is isolated from and unconnected with other abilities of the speaker which possibly interact and determine whether variations of speaking are relevant or not. So the question of relevance should not be begged by proponents of spoken language. As insiders of the dialogic game we are not confronted with authentic verbal texts; we speak and think and perceive simultaneously and expect our interlocutors to do the same. Moreover, we do not care about casual variations because we know that they are of little relevance. They occur because perfect performance is impossible. The complexity of performance necessarily introduces the overall law that any regularity can be broken. Empirical



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 239

variability is not only due to casual factors such as absent-mindedness but also, among other factors, to ignorance of rules. Searching for rules by starting from authentic texts means searching for ‘language’ by starting from ‘speaking’ or even equating ‘language’ with ‘speaking’. Human beings use their ability of ‘speaking’ on the basis of their competence-in-performance, i.e. in integration with other abilities. By focusing on competence-in-performance we do not ignore rules and abandon ourselves to the ever-changing individual moment of speaking. In contrast to the ‘reality’ of the game, empiricists give priority to speaking and even end up in ‘constructing grammar’ from speech, i.e. in completely dissolving language by the methodological view of grammar as ‘emerging’ from discourse (Hopper 1987, Weigand 2010a). I would like to illustrate the consequences of such a concept by a simple example: The term corpus in German takes the grammatical genus neutrum according to its Latin origin: das Corpus. Most speakers, however, do not know Latin and say der Corpus. Checking the frequency of both usages in a representative corpus of German would certainly result in a higher frequency of the use of der Corpus. We might therefore consider der Corpus as conventional use and in this way ‘construct language’ out of ‘speaking’. The criterion ‘frequency of use’ is without any doubt of great importance for language change or for what counts as conventional use. As soon as possible variations some day result in conventional use, we have indeed the case that speaking influences language. This case is well known in descriptions of language change as diachronic process due to historical chance (cf. Hundsnurscher 1988, Weigand 2006a). It has nothing to do with the overall methodological principle of ‘grammar emerging from speaking’, i.e. of prescribing relevance to any variation whatsoever in spoken language. Whether a variation counts can only be said in retrospect. Creole languages are another case of ‘regularities’ which emerge from speaking and become conventionalized in language. In our global society, communication is far from being exclusively communication between native speakers. Cross-linguistic communication is becoming more and more the norm and may lead to some sort of ‘grammar’ which emerges from irregularities of speaking. Again, we are called upon to rethink traditional concepts of ‘standard language’ and ‘mother tongue’ and to raise the question of what makes our native competence so unique. This is however a question which proponents of ‘emerging grammar’ seem to ignore. I think it has become clear that we cannot hide our heads in the sand of empirical chaos if we want to deal with performance. We must grapple with the challenge arising from appearances and what is behind them. Those sceptics who still have doubts and who are not prepared to distance themselves from the fetish of authenticity can be safely ignored. This does not mean that we should disregard

240 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

authentic texts. On the contrary, they are part of the action game, the verbal component of our competence-in-performance. They can however not be the starting point if we want to elaborate rhetorical principles for practice, for instance, in business games. Rhetorical principles of optimizing competence-in-performance cannot straightforwardly be derived from the appearances of actual cases. We have to reflect upon evaluative criteria which could be benchmarks for testing authentic games. Optimizing means knowing what is to be optimized and how it could be done in specific environments. For a complex whole, for instance, a business company, it is very difficult to diagnose as an observer whether a dialogue is going well or should be improved in the interests of the company. In any case, we have to presuppose some understanding about the architecture of the complex whole before testing authentic dialogues and making proposals for optimizing practice. Authentic texts can help us by demonstrating some principles of competence-in-performance at work which might confirm our theoretical reflections. In addition, they can help us to detect paths of interaction which we might have overlooked. It is for these reasons that we are now going to analyse a sample of an authentic text.

2.6 Sample analysis of an institutional game I will take as an example a part of an authentic text, originally in German, of a complex business meeting as it is recorded by Schnöring (2007) (see also Weigand 2006c). Before analysing the text, I would like to glance briefly at the literature in the field of business dialogues (for a detailed report on the state of the art cf. Schnöring). Economic research focuses on economic reflections about the market, the organization of a company, management tasks, public relations, etc. Dialogue and communication remain bland catchall terms which, if at all, are analysed using expressions from ordinary language such as ‘discussion’, ‘talk’ or ‘strategy meeting’. On the other hand, linguistic research in this field is mainly based on conversational analysis and reduces the object to meticulous analyses of empirical ‘data’, i.e. to a corpus of transcribed authentic texts and audiovisual recordings (e.g., Brünner 2000: 2). The state of the art in the field of business dialogues can therefore be characterized in the main by two separate strands of research which exist side by side in two different disciplines and which neglect principles of consilience. The various action games that take place in a business company are however not dialogic games, on the one hand, and financial or economic games, on the other. They are games dealing dialogically with economic objectives. What is needed is a genuine interdisciplinary effort to address the complex integrated



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 241

whole of human interaction in business companies. In this respect, Schnöring (2007) represents a first valuable attempt at bringing together reflection in economics and linguistics with the analysis of authentic texts. Let us now start from the complex whole of a ‘strategy meeting’ in business, as it is called by the chief executives. In the area of business dialogues a strategy meeting represents a subcomplex which, generally speaking, aims at ‘economic dialogic action’ or ‘tackling economic issues in dialogic interaction’. In a capitalistic society, the purposes in business which belong to the areas of ‘exchange of goods’ or ‘offer on demand’, among others, are basically determined by the dominant interest of win, i.e. of ‘making a profit’ or of ‘maintaining one’s position’ in a competitive market: win [exchange of goods]

Figure 73.  Games of business

In the end, the numbers will decide whether the company has been successful at the market. Numbers will influence every individual step, for instance, what types of goods are to be produced and offered for sale, or how a specific type, for instance, of car, will be advertised. Even an advertising spot such as Toyota doesn’t break down. finds its place in the complex hierarchy of economic action as part of a directive subgame that relates to the general purpose and dominant interest: win

[directive

(buy(x,y,z))]

interestwin

[purposeclaim to volition (propositionbuy(x,y,z))]

Figure 74.  Advertising in business

Furthermore, besides purpose and interest, the organizational structure of the company as an institution has to be taken into account from the very beginning. The meeting represents the hierarchy of status functions from the senior executive with general responsibility, two other executives with partial responsibility for specific regions to a few subordinate heads of department: senior executive with general responsibility

executives for specific regions



heads of department

Figure 75.  Hierarchy of status functions

The topics of the agenda give us a first cue about what is to be dealt with. Calling the dialogue a ‘strategy meeting’ does not yet tell us what is at stake. The ‘strategy

242 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

meeting’ might turn out to be a single action game or belong to a series of action games. We are faced with an astonishing feature of performance: human beings might be very well experienced in practice and have a good grasp of what is to be done but nevertheless are unable to call things by name. This is the case with the chairperson, the senior executive, who is competent in structuring and leading the meeting but uncertain in calling the concrete steps by name. As observing linguists we have to interpret and evaluate what we observe by considering it against the background of some conception of the whole. In this way, we can interpret what is called on the agenda the company’s progress in the first quarter of the new financial year as an action game of stocktaking and what is called defending the results as an action game of planning. It is not the authentic text, not the empirical elements themselves which tell us what they mean. We need an integrative approach which combines reflection and empirical observation in order to gain insight into such complex games as strategic management meetings. Let us now focus on these two action games of stocktaking and planning and try to describe them as subgames of the complex whole. The issue is: what makes up ‘stocktaking’ versus ‘planning’? How can we decompose these complex subsystems? As mentioned above (2.3), stocktaking in any case means reporting on the past and evaluating the moves of the past according to the numbers set as a goal for the whole company and for its individual departments. Evaluating however does not only mean indicating whether the numbers have been achieved or not. It also requires reasoning, i.e. reflecting upon the reasons and relating the results or numbers achieved to the measurements taken in the individual departments: reporting [on the whole] numbers

evaluating [the whole] achieved numbers planned

reasoning [the whole] results measurements

reporting [on specific fields] − numbers − measurements

evaluating [specific fields] − numbers − measurements

reasoning [specific fields] measurements results

Figure 76.  stocktaking

As these steps are to be gone through in the meeting, they have to be dialogically organized by the senior exective as chairperson: it is his task to call upon the points of the agenda, to give the floor to those who want to speak or to ask for comments on the current points. We will thus find various speech acts in the text that do not directly bear on subpurposes of stocktaking but on the organization of speaking, i.e. mainly declarative speech acts of chairing the meeting.



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 243

Now having decomposed stocktaking to some degree in our minds let us see how it is dealt with in the authentic text (303) (see the original text in German in the appendix). It is impossible to go through the whole text nor would it be useful to do so. The dialogue consists of various turns the order of which is not strictly fixed but could be varied to a certain extent. Nevertheless, there is some thematic order manifested by the agenda and the internal structure of the individual points of the agenda. The speech acts of the chairperson, the senior executive, such as opening the meeting, indicating the topics to be discussed, allotting the turns, have declarative functions. Moreover, he has the status of the most senior manager and therefore he decides in the case of controversial issues. As chairperson he opens the meeting by calling the first point of the agenda: (303.1–19) (1) I would suggest that we start with the agenda immediately. We wrote on the agenda again the company’s progress in the first quarter of the new financial year with which we can on the whole be really very satisfied […] Because at all events […] regarding turnover things look in general better. […] By and large I think we are about one per cent below last year’s figures […] We had overall planned on a minus of three per cent – so at any event we can be satisfied.

In (1) the chief executive uses the ‘hedged performative’ I would suggest which is not really a suggestion but a declarative speech act setting up the first point of the agenda in a polite manner that characterizes his sense of business culture for the company. He calls this first point the company’s progress which, strictly speaking, indicates a propositional topic. The specific goal is not really expressed by write on the agenda even if the talk is clearly structured and demonstrates that the chairperson has a good grasp of what has to be done in practice: dialogic purpose to write on the agenda

(state of affairs) (the company’s progress)

Figure 77.  The company’s progress

The question is: Did we comply with our plan? which is not simply a question of knowledge but a question that includes evaluating a network of variables. The chairperson has already decided this issue in his mind. He reports on economic data and evaluates the correlation of plan and result. evaluating presupposes reporting. Both represent specific speech acts as described in the dialogic speech act taxonomy in Part III. In our case they refer to business affairs expressed in the proposition:

244 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

F representativeevaluative

(p) (state of economic affairs)

we can be satisfied

− with the financial quarter − that we are one per cent below the previous year

Figure 78.  evaluating business affairs

The next step in the process of stocktaking refers to differentiating the overall result as indicated by the chairperson according to specific regions and sectors. For this purpose the chairperson allots the turns to the other managers who are responsible for specific regions asking them to report on their part. Again he is very polite and uses indirect speech acts:

(2) We can go straight away to the sectors again. I don’t know if you want to comment on any individual aspects. Are there any comments anyone would like to make?

Even if we can assume that he already knows the data for the different regions, this data has to be put on the table. The chairperson’s explorative speech act Are there any comments anyone would like to make? initiates a sequence of reports which are classified as comments, i.e. not really as news but as illustrative or more precise details. The dialogue thus continues with several reports on the respective regions, for instance:

(3) But we can see quite clearly [...] that in my sector the East is making a negative contribution. [...] For that reason the relationship to the plan is of course significantly negative because there had been a lot of optimism and confidence. (4) You could say: OK everything’s still fine in Bavaria. Well, there too we have significant problems. [...] Well, the Munich shops have been making a loss.

Again we see both comments are immediately connected with numbers, calculated as a relationship between planned and achieved results. The next step in analysing and evaluating the course of the company calls for reasoning as expressed by one of the managers: (5) What’s the reason then why our figures are so good?

Reasoning again represents a step that integrates cognition in finding out the reasons and dialogue in evaluating and negotiating their role for the course of the company. The reasons for being profitable or unprofitable are seen in specific measures that have been taken in different regions:



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 245

(6) And I can only emphasise: it’s very important for our branches in the East to have special stock. (7) And things ... I just want to mention this at this point again have gone very well in Münster. Well the closing down sale in Münster was really great and we really managed to sell off lots of old stock. (8) And could I just add again: Payback-Card. Payback was also a really very very great help in the West. That’s an important point ... that really caused gigantic interest ...

These different practical measurements are evaluated with respect to their influence on calculating the numbers. Evaluations are pervasive throughout the whole meeting, for instance: (9) That’s gigantic. Our expectations regarding Payback were exceeded tenfold. [...] Sensational. (10) It’s a fantastic marketing instrument too. (11) If we look at the following: it’s in the area of watches for young people that we’ve dramatically lost ground [...]

What the chairperson has called the company’s progress has thus been dealt with in a dialogic game of stocktaking by means of a sequence which goes through the following steps: – stating the relationship between planned and achieved results by expressing it in numbers – evaluating the overall result – differentiating the overall result for specific regions and sectors – reasoning by relating different results to specific measures – evaluating the measures The chairperson summarizes the result of the talk at the end of this first point: (12) But even so I would say that I believe we can say today – as in recent years too – that we will jointly achieve the goal we’ve set ourselves [...] Because that’s an important number too.

Stocktaking has thus achieved a positive result. Let us now structure the second point of the agenda which is called defending the results: (13) Yes, well the results are great. And of course the more exciting bit starts now: defending the results. That’s an unaccustomed pleasure. But it also hurts,

246 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

doesn’t it? Because up to now we’ve always hoped that there’d be a positive result. And now it really hurts [...] when there’s some money in the till that you’ve got to take some out again each month.

What is meant is the action game of planning, i.e. drawing conclusions from stocktaking to the issue of how to continue the positive course in the future. Planning means setting up the future goal and deciding on the measures to be taken. We can thus expect the following sequence of actions:

planning

fixing the goal

proposals for achieving the goal with specific reference to fields and measures



evaluating the proposals by arguments

deciding the course of the action

Figure 79.  The action game of planning

Let us see how the authentic meeting deals with this point. Whereas during the first point of stocktaking the senior executive could restrict himself to chairing the meeting and allotting the turns to his colleagues, he now becomes dominant when future success or losses are at stake. Most of the time he is speaking, he decides and determines the course. Thus he declares the goal: (14) Our goal is roughly 10 million. [...] that in principle that every month’s result has always to be considerably better than the previous result.

And he determines the strategic measures: (15) I think the chances aren’t bad. But in the final analysis everything depends primarily on turnover and gross proceeds. Right? And of course what’s important in defending the results is that we single-mindedly put into practice our restructuring measures in order to get rid of old stock. Perhaps a word about our products: [...] And we had announced and discussed the following measure with regard to that. That we want to recall the goods from the branches [...] that we want to send out recall lists [...]

The other managers have the right to make proposals. To give an example: the chair had proposed: (16) … beforehand we want to communicate with each other as follows: every employee can buy a maximum of two items for their own personal use. But is expressly not allowed to sell these on to a third party.



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 247

One of his colleagues very cautiously questions this decision: (17) Is that right, two items?

The chair makes clear that he is prepared to discuss this point: (18) We can discuss that.

After a short discussion he decides: (19) Well, shall we say three? Agreed? Three items per employee. The precise procedure will be laid out again. That’s dealt with that topic, hasn’t it? Right?

We clearly see how the hierarchy of status functions finds expression in specific speech acts but, on the other hand, we also see that politeness is attributed a high value by the business culture of this company. Now let us bring both subgames together as the main pillars of ‘strategy meetings’. Strategy in business means relating any step to the uppermost interest win. The action game of planning is profiled as a follow-up activity to stocktaking. From reasoning about the past, proposals on future measures are derived and specific strategic decisions taken.

strategy meeting

stocktaking win looking back

planning drawing conclusions

evaluating the achieved results by correlating numbers and measures

setting up new strategic goals and deciding on suitable measures

sequences of reports evaluations

sequences of goals proposals

reasoning

evaluations

decisions

Figure 80.  The complex game of a strategy meeting

Figure 80 only roughly indicates the essential steps. Stocktaking and planning are expressions taken from ordinary language use, expressions for processes that guide and control human action not only in business but in general. Often planning is not clearly distinguished from problem solving (e.g., Fritz 1982), and indeed there is a certain affinity which, in some cases, can make it difficult to separate both action games. I would however see a difference between a game of ‘problem

248 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

solving’ which starts from a problematic, uncomfortable situation (e.g., we are making losses) and aims at elaborating ways of settling this problem and, on the other hand, a game of planning which, to my mind, starts from an already fixed goal and aims at tracing paths, evaluating and deciding on measures to achieve this goal, if possible by taking into account the results of previous stocktaking. Whereas in ‘problem solving’ the issue is an open question: “What is to be done?” and even includes eliminating the problematic affair, the issue in ‘planning’ means fulfilling certain criteria known from the very outset, for instance, in our case, continuing the successful course. I think it has become obvious that we need an integrative approach combining reflection and empirical analysis in order to get insight and achieve a deeper understanding of what is going on in such complex games as strategic management meetings. Even if the senior executive does not use action theoretic terms, he knows the decisive steps to be taken by experience. It is his economic and rhetorical competence-in-performance that enables him to successfully chair the session. He has decision-making power which is at the same time directive power. He decides on the goals and the essential measures that will lead to practical actions. His decisions are expressed, on the one hand, by declarative speech acts that create fixed points of orientation, and, on the other hand, by directive speech acts with binding strength that initiate and determine the course of actions. The hierarchy of positions we can observe at the top level runs through the whole company. As a whole the company represents a cooperative ingroup that has a joint goal and interest. The hierarchical structure attributes different status functions to the individual members and subgroups. The subgroups are at the same time in- and intergroups that will sometimes compete or have conflicts with each other even if they all have to coordinate their activities for the benefit of the company.

2.7 To sum up: The mixed game In trying to sum up this chapter on ‘dialogue in the stream of life’, I think it has become evident, especially from the sample analysis of an authentic business game, that human beings do not carry out dialogues and alongside carry out specific mental or practical tasks. They have mental objectives and practical needs which are to be dealt with in dialogue. In order to understand what is going on in these dialogues we cannot divide the complex into parts, such as the dialogic ‘text’ to which we add the ‘context’ (Weigand 2009c), but have to refer to human beings who act and react in culturally shaped units, i.e. in specific dialogic action games. All the parameters derived from the nature of human beings and the



Chapter 2.  Complex human affairs 249

e­ nvironment, in our case the business environment, are integrated in the ‘mixed’ game. Nevertheless we can distinguish between mental actions such as decision making and practical actions such as the marketing instrument of Payback and dialogic actions such as discussing pending decisions and arguing for or against payback measures. In order to advance in this adventure in the complex we have to take an integrative approach that combines theoretical reflection and empirical observation. What is crucial is the fact that businessmen are not engaged in dialogue because of dialogic purposes proper. Their primary interest and purpose is ‘effectively running a company’, i.e. an economic purpose which needs dialogue to be achieved. In this respect there is no decisive difference between everyday and institutional games. Even everyday games are not carried out because of dialogic purposes proper. In any case, we want to negotiate our positions in human affairs. Even small talk is usually not carried out because of the pleasure of conversing but because we feel socially obliged to exchange some words. Differences in the games, everyday or institutional, result from differences due to specialization and institutional order as noted above (2.2). If we look at complex meetings in a business company, there is no point in closely analysing where business affairs turn into dialogic affairs. We know that within a big business company dialogue makes up a very essential part of the management. About 70% of the working time of a manager is spent in dialogue. But what does dialogue here mean precisely? Obviously it refers to spending time in meetings. However, not only in meetings, i.e. in open dialogues, management is dialogue, and dialogue management. Thinking about management also proceeds dialogically in the minds of executives, in an inner dialogue of the manager with him- or herself. The overall objective of ‘effectively running a company’ poses first and foremost a mental challenge. Mental issues are usually simultaneously dialogic issues. They are tackled in dialogue, be it an inner dialogue of a speaker who wants to get an issue clear in his or her mind or be it an explicit dialogue with others. Dialogue as a process of negotiating meaning and understanding starts by decomposing the whole into subcomplexes and ends up in a linear sequence of speech acts. Decisions about practical actions and rhetorical strategies are included. Calculating the costs, i.e. numbers, can be considered the specific key for business dialogues in capitalistic societies, and this is also made clear in our sample of an authentic text. For business action as competitive action there must be a balance between money to be spent and money to be made that guarantees the company’s survival. Economic expertise and successful strategies in economic decisions are needed in order to be profitable or at least to achieve some balance. This key aim of making a profit or of balancing the numbers is expressed by the

250 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

category win. To comply with this aim, expert knowledge is required which not only includes rational and mathematical thinking but also experience in practical reasoning. There is no single predetermined strategy which can guide actions under uncertain conditions. There is a complex scenario of variables which requires flexibility and adaptation to ever-changing exigencies in a way that the effectiveness of the action taken is guaranteed or, at least, can be expected (Simon 1983: 15). Rhetoric plays an important role in business negotiations not only by smoothing superficial atmospheric conditions of business culture but also by persuasively positioning one’s claims and carrying through the rigour of calculating costs and benefits. The question of how to optimize practice includes the question of how to evaluate authentic dialogues. Evaluative criteria cannot yet be found in the authentic texts. Evaluation will turn out differently if carried out from inside the company or by an external observer. Authentic texts are the result of performance and are only a tiny portion of the whole. As the result of performance they may or may not be part of a successful game. How can we know if we only take into account the authentic text as an observer? One way to tackle this issue would be to compare dialogues in successful companies with dialogues in malfunctioning companies (cf. Simon 1983, Toulmin 2001). There is however no direct correlation between successful companies and their recorded authentic dialogues. Even dialogues in successful companies are sometimes bad dialogues. The alternative is to face the challenge of decomposing the complex and identifying benchmarks for potentially successful action. Authentic performance can then be evaluated with respect to those benchmarks that we have set up in our minds.

chapter 3

Literary action games or touching on the mystery of life

Complex action games not only arise out of specialization. Beyond everyday and institutional affairs human beings have always been attracted by what lies behind ‘reality’ or what gives sense to their transitory lives. Ordinary language use does not seem to be sufficient or appropriate for these ultimate questions. They are the subject of the arts as well as of religion. We approach them in our imagination or dreams by parables or symbols such as, for instance, ‘the veil of Sais’ in Schiller’s poem and Novalis’ novel. There is however no strict separation between human life on the ground and in the imagination. The arts are also integrated in the view of consilience, as ­Wilson (1999: 258) concludes: “Now, with science and the arts combined, we have it all.” In this sense, I am going to describe what I consider to be the nuts and bolts of ‘literary games’ (Weigand 2005b, 2007b).

3.1

Some remarks on the state of the art in Literary Studies

In the traditional view the disciplines are clearly separated. There is grammar, there is rhetoric and there are the arts or aesthetics. Grammar is considered to be rule-governed, a rhetorical text has to contain specific so-called rhetorical figures, and the arts belong to an area which – in the layman’s view – is not accessible to ‘normal people’ but presupposes special talent. Literary studies aim to analyse texts of the arts or literary texts. There seems to be a strict boundary between literary and linguistic studies of the arts which, to my mind, bears on methodology and ignores the fact that the object-of-study is the same for both disciplines. Jakobson’s ‘linguistic poetry’ (1960), for instance, defines poetry with respect to formal methods but does not really touch upon the crucial question of the phenomenon ‘poetry’ itself which is a question of meaning. Works of art are not created as a play of forms or schemata. If this seems to be the case, as, for example, with Mondrian, the play of forms transcends the level of the forms and expresses not only forms but something behind or deeper (Wilson 1999: 241). What makes up the arts or poetry cannot be reduced to one level but is in any case

252 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

a ­multidimensional ­phenomenon which demands a holistic approach. The necessity to cross disciplinary boundaries is self-evident (cf. Leech 1969, Sell forthc.). According to widespread opinion, linguists deal with ordinary language use whereas scholars of ‘Literary Studies’ deal with a specific type of text called literary text. Even if we have in recent years observed increasing attempts by linguists to analyse literary texts, they have focused on specific aspects such as dialogic patterns from a linguistic point of view (e.g., Hundsnurscher 1998, Weigand 1988). The basic question for literary studies ought instead to be the question of what defines the quality ‘literary’. The issue of the criteria which justify calling a text ‘literary’ has by no means been settled. This basic question however no longer seems to be a central question at all. On the one hand, literary scholars seem to presuppose that everyone knows what ‘literary’, ‘aesthetic’ or ‘the arts’ mean. On the other hand, there is an answer which seems to be agreed upon: literary texts are considered to be texts which either deal with fictional events (Wellek & Warren 19563) or have specific formal features. Literary texts however cannot be restricted to fiction if we do not want to exclude literary autobiographies or historical texts. The focus of interest has somehow been diverted from the essence of ‘literariness’ to the issue of the text and its author. A tacit mainstream opinion seems to prevail which considers the text to be an autonomous object. Postmodernism and its hovering authority Derrida (e.g., 1977) whose deconstructive philosophy culminates in the maxim “The author is dead” (see above I 1.4) has been very influential in this respect. Postmodernism pays little or no attention to biological facts and denies the existence of a universal human nature (Wilson 1999: 233f.). ­Derrida is right in considering truth to be relative. Yet this cannot mean that truth is completely arbitrary nor that readers are totally free to construct their world and their interpretation of the literary text as they like. They may do this but then it remains their private affair and no one needs to pay any attention to their opinions. Our world is not a chaos of unlimited opportunities; it is perceived and shaped by human beings according to their biological nature. If we neglect this basic condition it means that taking up the cause of individual freedom will only conceal the prison of methodological constructions within which we are operating. It is all the more interesting to meditate about the reason for Derrida’s popularity (see also Wilson 1999: 234). To my mind dwelling in the dark and opening up unlimited possibilities of interpretation which can extend from the rational to the irrational may be fascinating to human nature since it seems to fit in with the human desire to lift the veil which hides ultimate knowledge. Beside Derrida, Bakhtin (e.g., 1981) had a decisive influence on literary studies, and his ideas crossed over to linguistic studies (see above I 1.4). I think we can summarize his rather complex position as embodying principles of ­dialogicity



Chapter 3.  Literary action games or touching on the mystery of life 253

and polyphony. Bakhtin was aware of the fact that the literary game is a game played at various levels, with multiple meanings, some of them intentionally brought in by the author, some in the air evoked by words and texts. His term ‘dialogicity’ can be used in various ways, between authors as actants as well as between texts as actants. ‘Dialogicity between words’ or ‘intertextuality’ is based on the assumption that words and texts refer to other words and texts of other speakers and unfold their full meaning in an array of polyphony. The concept of polyphony is compatible with the view that meanings are not defined but negotiated in dialogue and are to some degree individual and ‘in the air’. We encounter aspects which play a role in any dialogic action game. What is missing is a consistent and comprehensive theoretical basis that enables us to grasp the whole game on the basis of consilience. Kristeva (1969) also takes the position of emphasizing intertextuality and extends Bakhtin’s view of dialogicity by including poetry. She continues the postmodern line taken by Derrida and radically reduces dialogicity to dialogicity between texts. Reference to authors is emphatically rejected. Jakobson’s formal position on poetic language has thus been overcome; but a ‘dialogue’ among texts which have lost their authors remains a vanishing metaphor. It is the objective of literary interpretation and criticism to elaborate intertextuality and the polyphony of literary texts. It can also be the objective of linguistic analysis to compare, for instance, different analyses of the same text. The concept of interpretation puts the reader at centre stage. The dialogue on the text between readers who are more or less experts in literary criticism may address the text from the traditional position of an ‘aesthetic of reception’ or from the postmodern position as a text without an author, which offers unlimited possibilities of interpretation. The debate on the ‘theory of authorship’ in literary studies continues (cf., e.g., Jannidis et al. 2000). The concept of a ‘theory’ of authorship relegates the author to a metaphorical existence. There is however, in any case, an author who produced the text. And – presupposing ‘language as dialogue’ – there is an addressee or an audience whom he or she addresses. Texts are therefore dependent on their authors, and their authors are dependent on the world in which they live, which consists in part of an individual, and in part of a common, culturally determined world. Every text, whether a literary or an ordinary language text, is a component in a dialogic action game. The notion of action presupposes intentionality and an actor capable of intentional action. The text represents the communicative means by which the author creates his or her world. The author is present everywhere in and between the lines of the text. A text may cause reactions in the reader; in doing this the text does not become the actor but remains the communicative means by which these reactions are brought forth (see above Part II 2.2.1 and III 2.).

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The dialogue among readers on the text presupposes the dialogue between the author and his or her readers (see above Part I 1.4). It is another, secondary, issue whether texts, and not only literary texts, can survive their authors. This, however, does not mean that the author can be totally ignored and the feature ‘literary’ is completely transferred to the aesthetic of literary reception (e.g., Jauss 1982). The view that the action comes into existence through the receiver is again an artificial construction. If a text, literary or scientific, is read long after the time of its production, text and reader are part of another action game which still includes the author even if faded away by time and, to some degree, only ‘hidden’ in the text.

3.2

The functional core of the game: Expressing the inexpressible

Having explicated some relevant literary issues focused on in literary studies, let us now reflect upon a fundamental point before bringing them together in a unified picture (see Weigand 2005): how to define the concept ‘literary’; what makes up literariness? This issue is first and foremost a question regarding the object and we should be careful not to be trapped by methodology. The object requires an answer to the question: why do we write and read ‘literary texts’? Obviously it is not a formal game alone. It might be the case, for instance, in abstract art or poetry, that form itself is to a certain degree meaning; but then again there is more than pure form. Means of expression become expressions only if they are used for functions or meanings. In cases when they are used as decoration one might speak of skilfulness or craft. The question however we are focusing on goes beyond craft. It is the question of what qualifies an object as being ‘literary’ or as an object of the arts. Purely formal features such as rhyme normally do not suffice; they make the text a well-written piece of craft. The structuralist attempt to describe poetry exclusively with respect to formal adequacy was therefore necessarily doomed to failure (e.g., Jakobson & Lévi-Strauss 1962). There must be more in a text in order for it to count as literary. Let me illustrate this by a first example, a poem by Eduard Mörike: (304)

Frühling läßt sein blaues Band Wieder flattern durch die Lüfte. Süße, wohlbekannte Düfte Streifen ahnungsvoll das Land. Veilchen träumen schon, Wollen balde kommen. Horch, von fern ein leiser Harfenton! Frühling, ja du bist’s! Dich hab ich vernommen!



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In this poem there is such an abundancy of formal features such as rhyme and metaphor, that one is tempted to classify it solely as a piece of craft. However over and above the formal features there is something more, not directly expressed, eine Ahnung, a feeling in the face of a beautiful landscape in springtime. It is the emotion of spring in the air which causes the author to personify spring: Frühling, ja du bist’s!, Dich hab ich vernommen! The poem therefore can be classified as a complex expressive-emotive speech act, and it is the expressiveemotive function which can make the text a literary text if the audience agrees. Aesthetic conventions and taste which guide the evaluation of so-called literary texts change with time. A text highly appreciated centuries ago may nowadays be evaluated as sentimental. Moreover we can see that even expressive-emotive speech acts are dialogically orientated: Horch, von fern ein leiser Harfenton! and aim at empathy by the reader or interlocutor. Another poem of the expressive-emotive type is the famous poem by Joseph von Eichendorff “Mondnacht” (“Moonlit Night”, transl. by Walter A. Aue): (305)

Es war, als hätt der Himmel Die Erde still geküsst, Dass sie im Blütenschimmer Von ihm nun träumen müsst.

It was like Heaven’s glimmer caressed the Earth within that in Her blossom’s shimmer She had to think of Him.



Die Luft ging durch die Felder, Die Ähren wogten sacht. Es rauschten leis die Wälder, So sternklar war die Nacht.

The breeze was gently walking through wheatfields near and far; the woods were softly talking so bright shone ev’ry star.



Und meine Seele spannte Weit ihre Flügel aus, Flog durch die stillen Lande, Als flöge sie nach Haus.

Whereat my soul extended its wings towards skies to roam: O’er quiet lands, suspended, my soul was flying home.



The poem is based on the overwhelming emotion and experience of a moonlit night which cannot be directly expressed, only compared with hypothetical metaphors: Es war, als hätt der Himmel die Erde still geküsst … “It was like Heaven’s glimmer caressed the Earth within”. The other formal features such as rhyme and melody confirm the expressive-emotive function. However, as we all know, this type of a well-formed literary text is not at all the usual one in modern poetry. The traditional means have broken down and are no longer capable of expressing the author’s intention. The multiplicity and variety of texts which claim to be called literary is amazing. From a formal point of view anything seems to go. There are literary texts, for instance, those by Peter Handke, which do not conform to the rules and conventions of ordinary language

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use (Weigand 1993d). An extreme example are dadaistic poems which deliberately break ordinary language conventions (cf. Weigand 2003a: 38). It is however not only formal creativity which causes the author to break conventional rules. Formal creativity can even be found in everyday language use, for instance, in Das ist Schnee von morgen. or especially in advertising texts such as Hier ist guter Rat Feuer. advertising cigarettes. The question therefore still remains: What makes up literariness? It must be something beyond verbal means, something which – like coherence – is not in the text but in the mind of the interlocutors. It is the specific intention of the author to express something beyond the words, based on a deep emotion or experience which urges him to communicate to his fellow human beings. Even if nowadays dialogicity and intertextuality seem to be broadly accepted, I remember very well the period when we had to argue explicitly for the view that poems are dialogically orientated and have a communicative purpose (Weigand 2003a: 38). Let us therefore have a look at another example of a poem by an unknown author in which dialogicity is explicitly expressed: (306) Sein ohne Wiederkehr

Fragst, du, wann die Möwen ziehen wieder übers Land – nimmermehr, nur eine Ahnung bleibt von einem Sein ohne Wiederkehr.

This poem is remarkable not only because it dialogically addresses its audience. At first glance one might even doubt that it is connected with expressing something beyond the words. What however lies behind the concrete picture, behind the surface of the empirical perception is a recurrent theme in literature, the ‘Leitmotiv’ of ‘time that passes for ever’. We find it, for instance, again in Amos Oz’ novel “My Michael” (2001: 136): “Let me tell you that time doesn’t stand still. Time waits for no man.” What makes up a literary text is thus primarily based on recurrent basic meanings, on ultimate questions or on the mystery of life. From an action-theoretical point of view it is the communicative intention which creates a literary text, the intention to express the inexpressible or at least something which allows valuable insights into the underlying ‘truth’ of life. This claim constitutes the core of the literary action game which can be classified as a sub-type of the representative action game, or more precisely as a sub-type of the expressive-emotive action game:



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initiative action by the author (the literary text)

reaction by the reader (up-take, i.e. taking a position)

making the claim of representing/expressing (the inexpressible)

fulfilling the claim acceptance/empathy

Figure 81.  The functional core of the literary game

According to the general principle of dialogicity, a literary text is not only created by the author’s claim or desire to create a poem. The poet’s intention must be taken up and accepted by the audience in order for the text to become commonly acknowledged as literary. Thus, from a dialogic point of view, the term ‘reception’ for the role of the hearer in literary studies falls rather short. Dialogue means more than expressing and trying to understand the expressed. Dialogue means action correlated with reaction not only with understanding. And indeed, this is what human beings obviously do; they cannot do otherwise, even if they wanted to. Reception includes reaction, i.e. taking a position, changing one’s life or refusing to be influenced. Integration of different abilities – in this case receiving, i.e. trying to understand, and taking a position – is a basic condition of human behaviour. If we grasp the feature ‘literary’ as being rooted in a basic desire of human beings to look behind the veil of so-called reality, the literary action game primarily rests on meaning, and not on specific means of expression. The literary claim to express the inexpressible comprises the whole literary text (cf. also Falck 1994: 56) and requires us to go beyond everyday expression, to look for new ways of expression which allow the text to rise above everyday talk. Because of the complexity of the claim, literary meaning cannot be reduced to one interpretation. It is wide open to different dimensions and consequently to different understandings. The literary text is not addressed to one individual but to the more or less general public and will inevitably cause different reactions in different readers. Figure (81) thus only represents the functional core of the game which is connected with various subgames, among them also the dialogue among the readers. Over and above the basic level of action and reaction or the dialogue between the author and his or her readers the literary game is displayed as a multidimensional game which includes polyphony or the multiple voices of the author and other authors and opens up the dimension to other texts of other times. Meaning is displayed at various levels: meaning is persuasive as described in rhetoric, meaning is creative, as described in literary studies. Persuasion and creativity are gradual phenomena to be found everywhere in language use (Harris 1981: 153). Rhetoric and the arts are embedded as components in a unified theory of consilience. As gradual phenomena they run counter to closed systems; perfection is unknown in performance. Communicating effectively, being persuasive,

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starts from striving to be successful, and creativity blossoms where there is no upper limit. The literary intention to express something beyond ordinary human reach is not restricted to texts which express feelings or describe imaginative events but can, for instance, also underly biographies and autobiographies and historical descriptions of wars. There might be other interests, too, which influence the process of writing: for instance, the wish to write a bestseller and therefore the intent to please a mass audience. Such intentions cannot claim to be literary intentions. Whether texts produced with these intentions are literary texts is another question. Imagination is not restricted to creating new mental worlds of reflection and emotion. It can also mean creating new empirical worlds, for instance, in fairytales where animals can speak, or in science fiction. Whether such texts can claim to be literary texts depends on whether they succeed in bearing meaning beyond what is said. One might object that going beyond everyday limits also represents the claim of religious texts. There are indeed different ways of lifting the veil which conceals the ultimate truth, the literary way, the religious way and the attempt by modern physics to find the ultimate equation. The issue of what makes the difference is an intricate one. I would propose explaining literary texts as being based on some sort of synaesthesia or integrated feeling and perceiving, whereas religious texts are based on faith or certainty beyond the human sphere, and scientific texts rely on balanced rules of new mathematics and new biology.

3.3

Literary means of expression

In order to express the inexpressible the author is free to combine different means of communication – verbal, perceptive and cognitive means –, and is free to change and create new means. The specificity of the literary game lies in the specific quality of the literary action function which has consequences for the means of communication. The literary means are multiple and differ in different literary periods, genres and with different authors; they result from adhering to well-formedness as well as from breaking conventions. Literary means aim to create meaning over and above literal meaning. The seemingly direct expression is at the same time an ‘indirect’ expression. Especially cognitive means, the so-called ‘dialogicity’ in the sense of ‘intertextuality’ but also individual associations, become extremely important. Our literary and cultural knowledge may lead us to consider different texts to be connected. Meaning over and above literal meaning can also be evoked by distorted or grotesque



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description. Well-known literary means are, for instance, symbols, metaphors, melody, rhyme or specific sound sequences. Polyphony and intertextuality are also mirrored by techniques of analogy and contrast in the recurrent up-take of basic themes by different authors through different times. “Playing on universal themes” is a constitutive feature of the arts (Wilson 1999: 244). In principle these means can be used in everyday talk, too. It is, for instance, metaphors we live by (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). In a very general sense, all these means are indirect means because the ‘inexpressible’ can only be indirectly touched upon. Even if expressed, it remains not expressed, or – as Antonio Tabucchi (2000: 10) called it – “il racconto di ciò che per definizione non è raccontabile”. Let us now analyse a few literary examples which demonstrate different ways of expressing the inexpressible and which arise from the complexity of literary polyphonic meaning.

3.3.1 Symbols (307) Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Die Beiden

Sie trug den Becher in der Hand – Ihr Kinn und Mund glich seinem Rand –, So leicht und sicher war ihr Gang, Kein Tropfen aus dem Becher sprang.



So leicht und fest war seine Hand: Er ritt auf einem jungen Pferde, Und mit nachlässiger Gebärde Erzwang er, daß es zitternd stand.



Jedoch, wenn er aus ihrer Hand Den leichten Becher nehmen sollte, So war es beiden allzu schwer: Denn beide bebten sie so sehr, Daß keine Hand die andere fand Und dunkler Wein am Boden rollte.

The poem “Die Beiden” by Hugo von Hofmannsthal represents a very famous symbolic poem. It deals with ‘love’ without naming it. Of course, it contains other literary means as well, such as the perfect rhyme structure. What makes it more than a rhymed verse is the attempt by the author to describe something inexpressible. He describes love by describing the movements of the persons and objects. I hesitate to call the movements of human beings a symbol of their emotions. Movements are bodily expressions of emotions. However the specific movements denn beide bebten sie so sehr, dass keine Hand die andere fand are not only described as

260 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

empirically perceptual movements but are interpreted movements which result in the symbol of ‘dunkler Wein, der am Boden rollte’. Describing the emotion love as something which goes beyond words necessitates finding other ways of expressing it. There are conventions which have been developed for dealing with this claim, among them the use of symbols. Symbols are words which express concrete objects or events but mean something beyond the concrete. And it is not the words in themselves but the intention of the author which makes the words the carrier of a meaning which is not in itself expressed by the words. Thus symbols are words-in-use, in literary use, offered by the poet and expected to be taken up by the reader in their joint attempt at negotiating meaning and understanding.

3.3.2 Metaphors Another famous literary text dealing with love, the novel “Victoria” by Knut Hamsun, uses metaphors (1994: 35–37), again a convention for dealing with the inexpressible as long as the metaphor is still creative and alive. Calling creative metaphors a convention might cause surprise because traditionally they have been thought of as breaking conventions. This traditional view however misses the point. Language use is not at all limited to rules and conventions, there are conventional procedures such as metaphors for going beyond conventions. Metaphors, even creative metaphors, are used equally in literary and everyday action games, and in contrast to symbols they name the object they are metaphors for. (308) What, then, is love? A wind whispering among the roses – no, a yellow phosphorescence in the blood. A danse macabre in which even the oldest and frailest hearts are obliged to join. It is like the marguerite which opens wide as night draws on, and like the anemone which closes at a breath and dies at a touch. Such is love. It can ruin a man, raise him up again, then brand him anew. … What, then, is the nature of love? Ah, love is a summer night with stars in the heavens and fragrance on earth. But why does it cause the young man to follow secret paths, the old man to stand on tiptoe in his lonely chamber? … Such is the nature of love. No, no, it is something different again. … Love was God’s first word, the first thought that sailed across his mind. He said, Let there be light, and there was love. … but all love’s ways are strewn with blossoms and blood, blossoms and blood.

This passage very clearly demonstrates the difference between a symbol and a metaphor and also the difference between a metaphor and a comparison. Metaphors try to express the inexpressible nature of a phenomenon by calling it something else: What then, is love? A wind whispering among the roses, no, a yellow



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phosphorescence in the blood, a danse macabre … Such is love. The repeated attempt to grasp ‘love’ points at something which is in the end inexpressible. Comparisons are also used to approach the phenomenon ‘love’: it is like the marguerite and like the anemone … There is a clear formal difference between a metaphor and a simile, a comparison. It is however not so easy to clarify the functional difference. I do not want to go into the broad literature on metaphors (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Human beings live with experiences which in the end go beyond words. Words therefore must be able to deal flexibly with meanings. It is the principle of indeterminacy of meaning which allows human beings to use metaphors creatively in their attempt to express the inexpressible. In my view, metaphors straightforwardly break the empirical surface of life and accept other dimensions over and above everyday perception, reasoning and feeling whereas similes still take account of the empirical limits and everyday dimensions of life by using particles such as like.

3.3.3 Multidimensional worlds Trying to express the inexpressible implies breaking the empirical limits of everyday perception, which allows us to build up multidimensional worlds. There is not only one history that happens, one time that passes for ever but different histories that happen in the same time. Time and history thus become a multidimensional ‘reality’, which according to modern physics is not unreal at all. A possible literary means for describing multidimensional reality is what Tabucchi (2000: 8) calls “l‘eteronimia”, that is, the dissolution of the person, for instance, of the Portuguese author Pessoa who invents Bernardo Soares, the author of his pseudo-autobiography “Il libro dell’inquietudine di Bernardo Soares”. The dissolution of the person consequently causes the dissolution of the genres ‘autobiography’ and ‘first-person novel’ and is only a natural consequence of taking account of the fact that there is no reality, no ‘real life’ to be told in an autobiography but only life perceived and interpreted through the filter of the author’s abilities. This is precisely the point which distinguishes a literary autobiography from an everyday or popular autobiography and from a historical biography. Everyday reasoning might not be burdened by looking beyond the surface of the self. It is taken for granted that there is a public interest in knowing the circumstances of the life of a person well-known for his or her achievements in a specific area. On the other hand, a literary autobiography is in search of the self, a self which is not the unity of one person but includes other virtual persons and in the end is unknown to the author. These parallel virtual lives distributed among different

262 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

pronouns I, you or the 3rd person, are not unreal or fictional but ‘real’ in the sense of a multidimensional world. They manifest the search for the mystery of life in an unknown inner area called ‘soul’ or ‘anima’. This search for the self unites literary autobiographies such as Rilke’s “Malte” or Pessoa’s “Bernardo Soares” and even autobiographies from remote cultures such as Gao Xingjian’s “Lingshan” or “Soul Mountain” and distinguishes them from non-literary life stories. There might be other features of a life story which are dealt with in so-called literary autobiographies, such as the feeling that we are different persons in different phases of our life. In this case, however, we subsequently become different persons during the passage of time. Distributing life among different persons in this sense can be found, for instance, in the autobiographical text “Kindheitsmuster” by Christa Wolf and is simply a means of expressing the distance we feel to the person we once were in earlier periods of our life.

3.3.4 The author’s perspective Finally, I would like to deal with another interesting literary resource, namely the author’s perspective or point of view. In the end, it is always the author who tells the story even if he or she seems to be one of the actors. Telling the story from the perspective of the experiencing person opens up the possibility of entering the psyche of the person without the filter of describing it. The author’s perspective seemingly coincides with the perspective of the acting person. Individual worlds can thus be directly described as they are perceived, in a rational as well as an irrational manner. This means of description allows conclusions as to the thoughts and feelings or lack of feelings of the experiencing person. What linguists call the observer problem thus seems to be excluded. Let us take Amos Oz’ novel “My Michael” as an example. The whole story is told from the perspective of the acting and experiencing person Hannah. ­Hannah seems to be the author. Thus Amos Oz opens the door into the inner world of Hannah without commenting on it. On the one hand, she has a very detailed perception of the minute concrete things of everyday life; on the other hand, she changes without any break into dreams, desires and other virtual dimensions of herself such as the parallel life of Yvonne Azulai. She is always in search of something beyond the perceivable surface of events, related to the search for the self in autobiographies but not the same. Hannah calls it ‘the solution of an equation’ on which she depends (p. 165): (309) I asked myself, what is this impenetrable glass dome which has fallen on us to separate our lives from objects, places, people, opinions? […] words are



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always indistinct because of the glass, which is not even transparent. It is only from their expressions that I manage to guess something of their meaning.

The problem of life is thus intrinsically connected with words, more precisely with the crucial linguistic question of the correlation between expression and meaning. The literary issue gets right to the heart of the linguistic point. Words are always indistinct and only allow meaning to be approached by guessing. It is the basic indeterminacy of meaning which is taken as a failure by Hannah. From a linguistic point of view however this indeterminacy of concepts is a necessary precondition for bridging the gap between different individuals in communication. It is in the end not the single words which have meaning; but human beings create and negotiate meaning and understanding by words-in-use in dialogue (Weigand 2006a). Hannah’s search for the inexpressible mystery of life is – because of its inevitable failure – accompanied by a desire to leave life or to arrive at ‘real’ life. She is always ‘ready for the journey’ (p. 132): (310) I say these things so as not to sit silent all evening and seem rude. The sudden pain: Why have I been exiled here? Nautilus. Dragon. Isles of the Archipelago. Come, oh come, Rahamin Rahaminow, my handsome Bokharian taxi-driver. Give a loud blast on your horn. Miss Yvonne Azulai is all ready for the journey. Ready and waiting. Doesn’t even need to change. Absolutely, ready to leave. Now.

And she tries to take Michael with her (p. 165): “Start up, Michael, start off; I have been ready and waiting for years.” Everyday real life is nothing but a series of meaningless details. There is nothing to be grasped which could fulfil her deep desire, only an ‘impenetrable glass dome’. At the end of the novel Hannah however no longer feels involved in ‘real’ life and loses her interest in the solution of the equation (p. 214): (311) But the word ‘reason’ is meaningless to me. I do not know and I do not care to know. […] So too now I do not take the trouble to unravel or solve. I watch sideways. Only I am much more tired now. And yet, surely something has changed after all these dreary years.

The contrast between Hannah being on the one hand an insensitive, indifferent person unable to have deep emotions and on the other hand full of dreams is not solved. What remains seems to be her saying farewell to everyday life: “Farewell, Michael.” and her flight into dreams.

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3.4 Conclusion: Polyphony of voices I think it has become evident from the passages analysed that ‘expressing the inexpressible’ is not a phenomenon which could be straightforwardly put into words. In principle, the desire to lift the veil which covers ‘reality’ as such remains unfulfilled. It is expressed in Michael’s question (p. 142): “What was the reason? Surely somewhere, in heaven or on earth, there must be some reason.” Creating meaning that goes beyond the limits of everyday meaning requires creating communicative means which go beyond the normal use of words, among them symbols, metaphors, and comparisons. The author’s initiative action in producing a literary text (Figure 81 above) can thus be differentiated as follows: literary meaning

literary means

creating meaning



breaking down words

representing/expressing (the inexpressible)



different degrees of indirectness, e.g., symbols, metaphors, comparisons, describing multidimensional experiences

Figure 82.  Producing a literary text

It is in the end the complexity of meaning that is at the core of the literary game, not only of the text itself but of the network of texts which are referred to and evoked by the author. The ‘polyphony of voices’ emerges from the attempt to grasp the inexpressible and reflects literary meaning as a multidimensional indeterminate concept. Readers try to cope with the complexity of literary meaning by comparing different interpretations and understandings and opening up the dialogue among readers and professional literary scholars. The basic literary game between the author and the reader (Figure 81) is surrounded by subgames of literary criticism which transcend different times and cultures: basic game

subgames

polyphony of voices within and between texts

dialogue among scholars and readers

expressing the inexpressible

Figure 83.  The whole of the literary game



different up-takes depending on different readers in different times and cultures



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If we trace the issue of literariness back to the issue of meaning and understanding, it loses its specifically literary profile and becomes a fundamental linguistic issue as we have already seen with Amos Oz. There are no strict boundaries between literary and everyday action games, only gradual distinctions. Boundaries are established by scientists and their models. Again, it is apparent that complex objects require us to cross academic disciplines, in this case the traditional disciplines of linguistics and literary studies. The object to be studied is not a puzzle of separate parts which can be assigned to different disciplines. It is a complex whole based on the interaction of integrated subsystems, among them intentions, abilities and basic desires of human beings.

chapter 4

To sum up Dialogue in human affairs

Part IV attempts to analyse complex games that go beyond minimal games. We distinguished three types of complex games: the extended minimal game which is still a one-phase game, multi-phase games of ‘dialogues in the stream of life’, and literary games. The type of the extended minimal game is mainly a type of structure. The minimal structure of action and reaction is extended by sequences which precede or follow or are embedded in the minimal two-part sequence. The reason for extension may be problems of understanding that go beyond the usual differences in negotiating meaning and understanding and include misunderstanding and non-understanding. Extending the minimal sequence may also result from claims to more precise information. A major reason is diverging views which are negotiated by the parties by means of arguments or the use of power. In contrast to the extended minimal game, which is a one-phase game based on one central purpose, multi-phase games have a complex purpose which needs to be divided into subpurposes and accessed in a series of phases. The complexity of these games mostly results from the complexity of their purposes which are not directly related to the basic speech act types of the minimal games. Multiphase games are ‘dialogues in the stream of life’ (Wittgenstein 1981[1967]), ­everyday and institutional life, and demonstrate the fact that dialogic functions are entwined with real-life affairs. In principle, there is no ‘coming to an understanding’ as such but always ‘coming to an understanding about human affairs’. The issue is: how to analyse complex purposes such as ‘planning’ and ‘stocktaking’ in different areas of life? How to describe the complex interactions of the subsystems? How to improve the working and well-being of institutions? The main issues of this chapter on ‘dialogues in the stream of life’ are decomposing the whole into subpurposes by specialization, lining them up in linear order, and asking how the dialogue proceeds at the level of the communicative means and techniques. A sample analysis illustrates how these steps might work in a complex business game. Finally the ultimate questions posed by the arts are taken up in Chapter 3 with the issue of literary games. Literary games are characterized as going beyond

268 Part iv.  The architecture of complex action games

real-life affairs and as searching for something which is in principle hidden or ‘veiled’ from human eyes. The general topic of Part IV is ‘complex games’ which might imply that there are simple games. ‘Simple’ and ‘complex’ are relative terms. There is in principle no simple game. Even the ‘simplest’, the minimal game, is already complex insofar as it means interaction by human beings according to their competence-inperformance­ under conditions of uncertainty. In the end, the complex is human beings themselves who try to come to grips with life. It is human nature in interaction with the environment which determines what we believe we know and what we want to achieve. It is the sociobiology of our abilities which shapes how we proceed in dialogic interaction.

Summary and outlook Towards an understanding of the dialogic species

The Theory of Dialogic Action Games or the Mixed Game Model addresses the fundamentals of human interaction and behaviour and proposes a new holistic methodology which bridges the gap between competence and performance by focusing on the human ability of competence-in-performance. Human beings and their abilities are at the centre of the action game. Human abilities are capacities and limitations at the same time. The term action game comprises all human beings’ action and behaviour in specific environments. The environment, often called context, is not a separate part which might be added to the text. The environment is shaped by human beings’ senses. Human abilities, ultimately embodied in the brain, are the proper starting point of any scientific enterprise. The brain is no longer a black box; recent developments in neurology make visible how it works, at least basically. The interconnection of various subsystems is crucial. The game we play in performance emerges as a mixed game which requires a holistic description. Language is a crucial player in the game, however it is a player which cannot be isolated, which does not exist as an independent object or a set of rules but interacts, from the very beginning, with other human abilities. Even if linguistic approaches are beginning to recognize the limits of reductionism, they have not totally ceased from addressing language as a sign system and adding on interaction or pragmatics. Language-in-use however is not a sign system put to use, nor is it the chaos of spoken language. Language-in-use means speaking as an integrated component of competence-in-performance. At this turning point from reductionism to holism we are confronted with the issue of what we want to find out. We must not go back to setting up methodological claims which ignore our object-of-study. According to Feynman (2001: 173), “making observations” must not omit “the vital factor of judgment about what to observe and what to pay attention to”. Our goal is in the end to find out how human beings’ abilities work. We need to start from the goal-directed observation of performance in an attempt to first grasp the complex whole and second to derive an appropriate methodology from it. The complex object of competence-in-performance cannot be addressed by abstraction or division into separate parts. Describing and explaining­

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competence-in-performance means taking account of the interactions of complex subsystems which in their entirety are more than the sum of the parts. We can find some orientation in Simon’s general design of “the architecture of complexity” (1962). By adapting it to ‘language as dialogue’ we can grasp the complex whole as the cultural unit of the mixed game. The analytic key is to be found in human beings’ minds and their capacity to come to grips with complexity. Human beings are considered to be purposive beings. It is their needs, purposes and interests which are at the core of any analysis and which give us the key to opening up the complex. Human beings’ behaviour is neither exclusively determined by biology nor by sociology but according to epigenetic rules dependent on both. Human abilities are sociobiologically shaped as the result of the “co-evolution of genes, mind, and culture” (Lumsden & Wilson 2005). An adequate theory that aims to describe human beings’ behaviour requires ‘consilience’ or the unity of knowledge gained in the natural as well as social sciences (Wilson 1999). Evolutionary reflections are crucial for our understanding of human beings’ behaviour and consequently for our view of the human species. Human beings are considered to be social individuals, guided by needs and purposes. They are integrational beings who are able to adapt themselves to ever-changing conditions of the environment by Principles of Probability. They are cultural beings whose attitude towards habits of life is to a great extent pregiven by epigenetic rules (Wilson 1999: 171). Conditions of the environment interact with human nature and, in the long run, will be genetically reflected. If we take human survival needs as the driving force in evolution, we have to grasp them more precisely. As individuals human beings are guided by self-interest­, as social individuals they simultaneously have to take account the interests of their fellow beings. Their actions are therefore determined by regulating self-interest­ and social concerns. As integrational beings their abilities such as speaking, thinking and perceiving as well as reasoning and having emotions interact and regulate each other. All these subsystems find their place in the complex hierarchy of the human mind and enable human beings to mediate between the order and disorder of performance. Rules and conventions structure standard cases; individual assumptions and inferences differentiate them to particularized cases. The human brain is certainly the most complex and exciting thing amongst the mysteries of the universe. All our abilities are rooted in the brain; from emotions to self-awareness, they are all inevitably embodied abilities. We might suspect like Ramachandran (2003: 115) mirror neurons to be “at least partly involved in generating our sense of ‘embodied’ self-awareness as well as our ‘empathy’ for others”. However, this does not allow us to decide the question whether there is a substantial difference between human and animal capacities. We are aware of the fact that animals are also able to communicate, and even more: animals are also



Summary and outlook 271

social beings, oriented by needs which are individual as well as social needs. The difference seems to be a gradual one. So let us pose the question in principle: what makes up the human species? In the literature different theses have been discussed (Weigand forthc.a): human beings as the symbolic species (Deacon 1997), as selfish beings (Dawkins 2006), as intersubjective beings (Trevarthen, e.g., 1999), and – as I would like to emphasize – as social or dialogic individuals. The use of symbols is certainly a near-unique human ability; however, does this suffice to call human beings the ‘symbolic species’? To my mind, what makes up a species must be justified by evolution and survival needs. Regarding the use of symbols, I don’t see an urgent need for human beings to use symbols in order to survive. What is important for the species is communication in the sense of dialogic interaction. For this purpose symbols are certainly useful. Human competence-in-performance is greatly improved by the ability to refer to persons, objects and events not present in the situation, a capacity which animals are lacking. The crucial point however is not the symbol as such but its use in dialogic interaction. Dawkins’ catchword of the ‘selfish gene’ suggests considering human beings as selfish beings even if he emphasizes that the gene must not be equated with the individual (Weigand forthc.a). Like many others (e.g., Wilson 2004: 157ff.), I cannot accept his general statement (Dawkins 2006: 2) that we misunderstand how evolution works if we assume “that the important thing in evolution is the good of the species (or the group) rather than the good of the individual (or the gene)”. Dawkins’ distinction between inborn selfishness and culturally learned altruism is questioned by the sociobiological assumption of epigenetic rules according to which “the genes hold culture on a leash” (Wilson 2004: 167). The issue is resolved by accepting the double nature of human beings as social individuals. Trevarthen’s position of human beings as intersubjective beings is a first step towards human beings as dialogic beings. As was the case with symbols, ‘the shared mind’ (Zlatev et al. 2008) does not yet suffice to underwrite survival. For survival needs, the intersubjective mind must engage in intersubjective dialogic action. So what does it mean to emphasize that human beings are the dialogic species? Let us start from a comparison with animals. In recent times our knowledge about the abilities of animals has been greatly extended. Animals have extraordinary abilities, for instance, the Keas or the Caledonian crows: they are able to take account of action conditions and their future consequences, to create sophisticated tools, they have emotions, are endowed with practical reason, can evaluate, learn and teach their young. So what is missing? On the one hand, even if we accept that animals can have such abilities, the gradual difference in complexity and effectivity remains. On the other hand, there is a substantial difference which is not easy to grasp as it shows up in many facets. It can be called ‘self-awareness’, not only in the simple sense of connecting abilities to our self but mainly in the sense of being

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able to look behind appearance and to ask ‘why’. Self-awareness is different from self-recognition, or to put it as Wilson (1999: 245) does: “The great apes have the power of self-recognition, but there is no evidence that they can reflect on their own birth and eventual death. Or on the meaning of existence – the complexity of the universe means nothing to them.” Self-awareness in this sense has to do with intention, with distancing oneself from what happens and with advancing by reasoning, not only by trial and error. It shows up in remembering past events and emotions, in being conscious of one’s behaviour and of having such complex feelings as ‘satisfaction’, in referring to events, persons and objects not present in the actual game, in accepting truth as a matter of belief, in questioning what we believe about the world and above all in questioning ourselves and finding pleasure in reflection and argumentation as such. Animals might discover things and techniques by trial and error, and they might even enjoy this activity. However they seem to be to a great extent instinctdriven whereas human beings are able to question and resist their instincts and needs. However, what does ‘instinct’ precisely mean? Can intention be included? Could we call the human ‘pleasure of finding things out’ (Feynman 2001) a human instinct? We are touching upon the old and ultimate question of free will. Aren’t even reason and intention embodied abilities which are, in the end, guided by epigenetic processes? During a long evolutionary process, human beings have been endowed with various astonishing abilities. Human beings as social individuals need an intersubjective mind in order to get along even without dialogic interaction, and they inevitably have to create symbols to allow them to talk about the past and the future. It is in the end their competence-in-performance or the ability to experience and negotiate meaning and understanding in dialogue which enables them to develop societies, institutions, complex cultural systems, or, in general, civilization. Self-awareness also means being aware of our nature as social individuals. In this sense of the whole complexity of the term, I consider human beings to be the dialogic species. The Theory of Dialogic Action Games attempts to delineate their dialogic needs and abilities and to demonstrate how they are deployed in mixed games of negotiating meaning and understanding. Dialogue is a term capable of comprehending human beings as social individuals. Human nature requires human beings to play the mixed game of body, emotion, mind and culture and it equips them to play the game with competencein-performance on the basis of principles of probability which combine general rules and individual assumptions and accept creativity in an open game. Playing the game is, at its core, action. A theory which misses the basis of action will not stand up to the goal of explaining what the human species is capable of achieving in the face of the challenges of life.

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Appendix

The political debate between Berlusconi and Schulz (II 2.3.2) Debates of the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.eu.int/home/default_en.htm) Sitting of Wednesday 2 July 2003 The programme of the Italian Presidency […] Schulz (PSE). – (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to reply to Mr Poettering­, who was waxing positively lyrical about the Presidency representatives who have travelled from Italy today: Berlusconi, Fini, Frattini, Buttiglione – I was even worried that he was going to move on to Maldini, Del Piero, Garibaldi and Cavour! But there is one person he forgot, and that is Mr Bossi. He is also a member of the Italian Government, and the least utterance from this man is far worse than anything that inspired this House to censure Austria and oppose the Freedom Party’s inclusion in the Austrian Government. We ought to talk about him as well! (Applause) I realise that you are not responsible for your ministers’ IQs, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, but you are responsible for what they say. The comments made by Mr Bossi, your Minister for Immigration Policy, which you mentioned in your speech, are totally incompatible with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. As President-in-Office of the Council, it falls to you to defend those values, so I call on you to defend those values against your own minister! I would like to pick up on a point made here by Mr Di Pietro. He said that we should not allow conflict of interest to infect Europe. Yes, he is quite right, and we have now found ourselves in a difficult situation for some days in this House whenever we talk about the Italian Presidency, because we keep being told, ‘now you must be careful not to criticise Berlusconi because of what he is doing in Italy, because the European Parliament is not the right place for that’. Why should that be? Is Italy not a member of the European Union? (Applause) Of course the European Parliament is the right place, and I shall tell you why. The members of Italy’s Parliament are elected to concern themselves with your actions as the Prime Minister of Italy, and we are elected to debate what you do as President of the European Council; that is our responsibility. You talked about the area of freedom, security and justice, and about the Tampere process. You used a single term, Europol, but you did not use those three terms. I wanted to remind you about that and ask if you could say a few words about those three concepts. What do you intend to do to speed up the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s office? (Applause) What do you intend to do to speed up the introduction of the European arrest warrant? What are you planning to do about the mutual recognition of documents in cross-border criminal

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proceedings? I think you could do with a little reform in your own country when it comes to the authenticity of documents. If you were to implement that reform in your own country, the European arrest warrant could then come into force much more quickly. Nevertheless, I am delighted that you are with us today and that I can have this debate with you. We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlusconi and Dell’Utri immunity procedures – Mr Dell’Utri being your right-hand man, who by way of exception is here today for once – if she had not done that, you would no longer have the immunity that you need. That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today! (Heckling) […] 23 contributions by members of the parliament Berlusconi, President-in-Office of the Council. – (IT) […] I would, of course, also like to thank the other Members who have spoken – Mr Graham Watson, Mrs Monica Frassoni, Mr Francis Wurtz – for wishing me success in my work. I must, however, reply to them and to all those who have given an utterly distorted view of Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come and enjoy something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating, which is Italy’s sunshine, its beauty, its 100 000 monuments and churches, our 3 500 museums, our 2 500 archaeological sites, the 40 000 historical houses in Italy, which we have not managed to destroy over the last two years. Mr Schultz, I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect! (Laughter, protests from the left) I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far left newspapers, which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs. […] President. In the course of Mr Berlusconi’s vigorous and colourful response to the debate, a remark was made in respect of one of our colleagues, Mr Schulz, who, under the Rules of Procedure, is entitled to make a statement to the House if he so wishes. I would like to make that quite clear before I invite President Prodi to speak. What I will do first, following procedure, is hear President Prodi and then, if he wishes, I will invite Mr Schulz to make a personal statement at the end of the debate, as provided for under Rule 122. (Protests) Barón Crespo (PSE). – (ES) I am speaking to ask you, as President, to protect the rights of the Members, in particular the honour of Mr Schulz. (Applause) You have made a proposal. I would ask you, as well as giving the floor to Mr Schulz, to call on Mr Berlusconi, the President-in-Office of the Council, to withdraw those comments, out of respect for the values we all share as Europeans. (Applause)



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President. It is perhaps better that we should deal with this matter directly. I do not want to open up a whole debate. There is considerable emotion in the House regarding this. It is very clear that a Member is entitled to make a contribution in a debate and to have it responded to with some serenity. In this case, in the vigour and flow of his response, Mr Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the ordinary rules of engagement. (Mixed reactions) I will first hear Mr Schulz, who is entitled to speak, and then I shall return to the President-inOffice of the Council, if he wishes to respond. We will close the debate after hearing Mr Prodi. Schulz (PSE). – (DE) Mr President, thank you for giving me the floor. I do not need three minutes. I will be very brief. During his statement, if the translation was correct, Mr Berlusconi said that a director is currently shooting a film in Italy about the concentration camps, and was inviting me to take the role of the Kapo … (Heckling) … that is to say, the role of the SS henchman. I have only one thing to say to you in response: my respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying a single word about this. However, I am quite clear in my mind that it is very difficult to accept a situation in which a Presidentin-Office of the Council, when he comes up against the slightest contradiction during a debate, loses his composure in this way. (Loud and sustained applause from the left and centre left) (Standing ovation) Berlusconi, President-in-Office of the Council. – (IT) Mr President, who was not in the Chamber to hear Mr Schulz’s speech? That he should insult me seriously on a personal level, gesticulating and in a tone of voice that really is unacceptable in a Parliament like this. I said what I said ironically. If you are all unable to understand irony, I am sorry. But I will not withdraw what I said ironically unless Mr Schulz withdraws the personal insults he made. I said it ironically; he did that maliciously! (Applause from the right, uproar on the left) President. Colleagues! Please, could we have some calm! There are many colleagues who wish to make points of order and to speak. We are running very late. I will not take those points. I wish to say, as President of the House, that I personally regret the tone that the latter part of this morning’s debate has taken. It is unfortunate. It is a distraction from the European business we have in hand. It is regrettable. I should now like to invite the President of the European Commission to close this debate in some serenity and then to proceed to the vote. (Sustained applause) [...] contribution by Romano Prodi President. I know that many colleagues wish to speak, but we have considerably run over our time. Before closing this debate and handing over to one of the Vice-Presidents to conduct the vote, I should like to say that personally I regret the offence caused to our respected Member and colleague, Mr Schulz. (Loud applause) The debate is closed.

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The original German text of the political debate of the Berlin Round Table discussion (II 2.3.2) The German original text of the “elephants’ discussion” (www.visdp.de/special/extrablatt_visdp.pdf) 01 Brender Herr Bundeskanzler… 02 Schröder Is ja schön, dass Sie mich jetzt schon ansprechen. Find ich nett. 03 Brender Sind Sie jetzt schon zurückgetreten oder was? 04 Schröder Nein nein, überhaupt nicht Herr Brender, überhaupt nicht Herr Brender. 05 Brender Ach so, na ja ich meine nur, das wäre ja…Weil Sie ja, weil Sie das verwundert. 06 Schröder Ja ja, ich frage ja nur. 07 Brender Also ich sage noch mal: Herr Bundeskanzler, das sind Sie ja noch, bis zur Neuwahl eines Neuen… 08 Schröder Das bleibe ich auch. Auch wenn Sie dagegen arbeiten. 09 Brender (stockt) Ob wir dagegen arbeiten? Sie haben von Medienmacht und Medienkampagne geredet... 10 Schröder: Zu Recht wie ich finde, zu Recht wie ich finde. 11 Brender Ich weise darauf hin, dass ARD und ZDF das nicht vorzuwerfen ist. 12 Schröder (wiegt den Kopf abschätzend hin und her). 13 Brender Nicht alles was Ihnen passt… 14 Schröder Der eine sieht es so und der andere sieht es so, Herr Brender. 15 Brender Nicht alles was Ihnen nicht passt ist Medienkampagne. 16 von d. Tann (wacht auf, schaltet sich ein) Also das ist schon eine starke Beschuldigung. 17 Brender: Meine Frage war: Sie wollten stärkste Partei werden, das haben Sie… 18 Schröder Sehr knapp, wahrscheinlich nicht. 19 Brender Sie haben das nicht erreicht, Sie haben das drittschlechteste Ergebnis der sozialdemokratischen Partei dieser Republik erreicht. 20 Schröder (grinst überheblich) Das ist, das ist…Das ist doch das, was Sie fortsetzen. 21 Brender Ist es nicht erlaubt, Sie zu fragen, ob Sie auch verloren haben. 22 Schröder Natürlich ist das erlaubt. 23 Brender Ja also. Bitte. 24 Schröder Verglichen mit dem letzten Wahlergebnis haben wir verloren, ist doch gar keine Frage. Aber verglichen mit dem, was in dieser Republik geschrieben und gesendet worden ist, gibt es einen eindeutigen Verlierer und das ist nun wirklich Frau Merkel. Und das sollten auch Sie mal zur Kenntnis nehmen (zu Brender). Das ist ja doch so. Und deswegen sage ich… 25 Brender Herr Schröder, vielleicht haben Sie nicht zugehört. Der Kollege hat Frau Merkel gerade darauf hingewiesen, dass sie verloren hat. 26 Schröder Darf ich auch mal reden oder wollen Sie mich ständig unterbrechen? Wir haben verloren, ist doch gar keine Frage. Und das schmerzt mich. Aber verglichen mit dem, von wo wir kamen, Herr Brender, ähm, von 24 Prozent nämlich, verglichen mit dem was wir erleben mussten in den letzten Wochen und Monaten, bin ich wirklich stolz auf meine Partei, auf die Menschen, die mich unterstützt haben, die uns gewählt haben und die uns ein Ergebnis beschert haben, das eindeutig ist. Jedenfalls eindeutig, dass niemand außer mir in der Lage ist eine stabile Regierung zu stellen.



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27 28 29 30 31

von d. Tann Herr Bundeskanzler. Schröder Niemand außer mir! von d. Tann Sie kamen von 38,5 % im Jahre 2002. Schröder Ja. Ja, ist ja richtig. von d. Tann Also haben Sie reichlich verloren. Sie haben nicht so viel gewonnen, wie Sie jetzt darstellen. 32 Schröder: Aber schauen Sie mal: In Ihren Sendungen ist gesagt worden, Frau Merkel ist bei 49, bei 45, bei 43. Jetzt ist sie bei knapp 35, oder etwas mehr. 33 von d. Tann Und die Messungen waren zur Zeit immer korrekt. 34 Schröder Ja aber… Ich weiß nicht ob Sie korrekt waren, nur… 35 von d. Tann Herr Bundeskanzler. 36 Schröder Ich finde nur irgendwie…dass Sie einfach mal einsehen müssen. 37 Brender In unseren Sendungen ist das nachvollzogen worden… 38 Schröder Ja? 39 Brender … was in den Meinungsumfragen aller Institute beschrieben worden ist. Das ist nicht nur in unseren Sendungen gesendet worden, sondern in allen Zeitungen geschrieben. 40 Schröder Aber, entschuldigen Sie mal. 41 Brender Ich weiß ja nicht welche Zeitung Sie lesen, aber zumindest … 42 Schröder Alle… alle. 43 Brender …wir müssen uns da nichts vorwerfen lassen. Ich würde Ihnen aber bitte noch eine Frage stellen. 44 Schröder Bitte. 45 Brender Bitte, wenn wir…wenn wir noch einmal die Begründung im Bundestag, die Sie zur Auflösung zu Neuwahlen gegeben haben… 46 Schröder Wollen wir den Wahlkampf fortsetzen, oder was haben Sie mich jetzt gefragt. (Stoiber kichert irritiert) 47 Brender Ich frage Sie jetzt – und das Ergebnis heute sehen. 48 Schröder Ja. 49 Brender Ist diese Begründung eingeholt worden, nämlich die Grundlage für eine stabile Regierung zu legen. 50 Schröder Ich finde schon. Ich finde schon, dass meine Entscheidung… sehr… kompliziert… wie ich fand auch mutig, zu sagen, ich möchte für eine Politik, die in Wahlkämpfen diskutiert worden ist, in den Ländern eine neue Legitimation durch das Volk. [...] Und wissen Sie, was mich besonders freut – wenn ich das noch sagen darf – das sich die Menschen in Deutschland ihr Recht herausgenommen haben so zu entscheiden, wie sie wollen und nicht so zu entscheiden, wie die Meinungsmacher das wollen. (Alle sprechen durcheinander.) 51 Brender Aber Sie haben nur 34,2 Prozent und damit kann man zumindest nicht der starke Führer einer neuen Regierung sein. 52 Schröder (trotzig) Aber entschuldigen Sie, natürlich kann ich das. 53 Brender Ach so. 54 von d. Tann (resigniert) Gut. (wendet sich zu Westerwelle)

[…..]

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89 90 91 92 93 94

95 96

von d. Tann (zu Schröder) Sie haben sich nach dieser Zeit der mutigen Reformen im Wahlkampf nach links bewegt. Sie haben … Schröder (lacht von der Tann aus) Ich will Ihnen Ihre Vorurteile ja lassen, aber ich meine… (lacht spöttisch) von d. Tann Es ist ein Vorurteil, das ich mit vielen teile und es wär nett, wenn Sie es mir ließen. Brender (am Ende entnervt) Herr Schröder, ich sage jetzt Herr Schröder, weil ich finde diese… Schröder Sie können sagen was Sie wollen. Brender … Form der Unterstellungen geziemen sich nicht in einer öffentlichen Fernsehsendung. Um das ganz klar zu sagen. Sie haben uns nichts zu unterstellen, wie wir Ihnen nichts unterstellen. von d. Tann Das war die Berliner Runde in ARD und ZDF… Brender Es war die Elefantenrunde. Die meisten ziehen sich jetzt in Ihr rettendes Gebüsch zurück, (an Schröder gewandt) der eine wälzt sich noch ein bisschen und morgen geht es dann weiter.

The original German text of the debate between Rüttgers and Scheer (shortened, IV 1.3) P

Ich denke, er hat den ersten Hieb, Herr Dr. Rüttgers. [zeigt auf Scheer]

1S Herr Rüttgers, was wir eben gehört haben, Ihre Äußerung mit dem Wahnsinn, kommt aus einer Rede zu dem Programm für Solarzellen. Wie können Sie vereinbaren: die Äußerung, die Bewertung Wahnsinn, mit der Tatsache, dass heute ein 100.000-Dächer-Programm in Japan praktiziert wird, ziemlich identisch mit unserem Perogramm, das bisher abgelehnt ist, aber noch in der Beratung ist, das heißt, ich bezeichne es als technologie- und industriepolitischen Wahnsinn, ein solches oder ähnliche Programme nicht aufzulegen. 2R Ich bin in einem solchen Fall für klare Realitäten und Fakten. Faktum ist, dass ein 100.000-Dächer-Programm 5,5 Milliarden DM kostet und den Anteil der Solarenergie an der Stromversorgung in Deutschland auf 0,04 % anheben wird. Das ist eine Relation, die finde ich schlichtweg wahnsinnig. Richtig ist aber, dass wir im Solarbereich alle Chancen nützen müssen, das tun wir. Jetzt müssen wir erstmal dafür sorgen, dass der Preis runter kommt. Ihr Beispiel von Japan hinkt. In Deutschland gibt’s ja keine Ecke, wo es nicht Strom gibt. Das Programm, was Sie in Japan angesprochen haben, ist das Programm, wo ja auf Inseln, wo es gar keinen Strom gibt, denjenigen, die da leben, überhaupt eine Energie zur Verfügung stellen. In einem solchen Fall haben wir eine völlig andere Rechnung, als wenn ich erstmal Stromleitungen auf die Inseln legen muss. 3S Nein, nein, wir hätten da zahlreiche praktikable Beispiele, etwa wenn es um Fassaden geht. 4R Dazu wissen Sie, dass wir da ein Programm laufen haben. 5S Ja, ja, aber das Problem ist nicht, dass man nichts tut. Und Ihre Aussage mit den 5,5 Milliarden stimmt im übrigen nicht. Es ist präzise vorgerechnet worden, dass so ein Programm den Grundstein legen würde für Arbeitsplätze, drei oder viermal soviel wie durch die Transrapid-Förderung, da wird 6 Milliarden fast spendiert, und es hat niemals die Perspektive, wie das bei Solarzellen der Fall ist. Wir sind heute in der makabren Situation, dass in Indien sieben Solarzellenproduzenten da sind und bei uns nur noch zwei ganz kleine.



Appendix 295

6R Sehen Sie, das ist das, genau was Sie wiederum nicht verstanden haben. Es kommt in der Zeit der Globalisierung nicht darauf an, wo ich produziere, ob in Deutschland oder in Amerika, weil da unter anderem mehr Sonne scheint als hier in Deutschland. 7S Nein, da bin ich mit Ihnen völlig anderer Meinung. Ich bin gleichzeitig, und Sie auch, politischer Repräsentant in diesem Land, und ich will natürlich, dass diese Arbeitsplätze dann möglichst auch in diesem Land stattfinden [Applaus des Publikums]. 8R Sie werden keinen Arbeitsplatz hier in diesem Land halten, wenn Sie nicht Ihre Produkte zu kostengünstigen Preisen anbieten. 9S Das mit dem zu teuer, das möchte ich noch sagen, kann ich als Argument nicht akzeptieren. Man hat bei solchen technologischen Sprüngen zunächst einmal Vorinvestitionen. 10R Ich schätze Ihr Engagement für die Solarenergie hoch ein, aber man darf nicht das Kind mit dem Bade ausschütten. Sie wollen doch nicht sagen, dass Sie mit der Solarenergie andere Energiequellen ablösen können. Wer jetzt irgendwo aussteigt, der versündigt sich an denjenigen, die im Jahr 2020 entscheiden müssen. Was im Klartext bedeutet, alles tun, damit die Solarenergie, genauso wie die Windenergie, wie die anderen regenerativen Energien, eine faire Chance bekommen. P Ich muss jetzt auch entscheiden. Wahrscheinlich ist das auch nicht fair. Ich bedanke mich aber bei den beiden für den inhaltlich auch wichtigen Streit in dieser Frage.

The original German text of the business meeting (IV 2.6)   (1) Ich würd’ vorschlagen, dass wir direkt in die Agenda einsteigen. Wir hatten uns noch mal auf die Agenda geschrieben die Geschäftsentwicklung für das erste Geschäftsquartal des neuen Geschäftsjahres [...] mit dem wir in der Summe denk’ ich wirklich sehr zufrieden sein können. Denn wir haben uns hier auf jeden Fall [...] was den Umsatz angeht in Summe besser dargestellt. [...] Insgesamt denk’ ich werden wir ein Prozent unter Vorjahr liegen [...] Dass wir – in Summe hatten wir drei Prozent minus geplant – auf jeden Fall zufrieden sein können.   (2) Wir können auch gleich in die Bereiche noch mal reingehen. Ich weiß nicht, ob Sie im Einzelnen da noch mal ‚nen bisschen kommentieren wollen. Gibt’s da noch Anmerkungen Ihrerseits?   (3) Aber es ist einfach ganz deutlich zu sehen […] dass in meinem Bereich sich da der Osten als negativer Beitrag zeigt. [...] Das Verhältnis zum Plan ist aus diesem Grund natürlich auch bedeutsam negativ, weil viel Optimismus und Zuversicht war.   (4) Man kann ja sagen: Ok, in Bayern ist die Welt noch in Ordnung. Also, wir haben auch dort deutliche Schwierigkeiten. [...] Also die Münchener Geschäfte haben ‚nen Minus gemacht.   (5) Woran liegt’s denn, wenn man gute Zahlen schreibt?   (6) Und ich kann nur betonen: Es ist ganz wichtig für die Ostfilialen ‘nen extra Warenprogramm zu haben.

296 Dialogue: The mixed game

  (7) Und Münster muss man ... will ich an der Stelle auch noch mal sagen ist ja hervorragend gelaufen. Also der Ausverkauf Münster war richtig Klasse und es ist gelungen, richtig viel Altware auch wirklich abzuverkaufen.   (8) Und darf ich das noch mal ergänzen: Payback-Card. Payback hat uns im Westen übrigens sehr sehr stark geholfen. Das ist ‚nen Thema ... ‚nen Riesenthema gewesen ...   (9) Das ist gigantisch. Also die Erwartungen von Payback sind um das Zehnfache übertroffen worden. [...] Also sensationell. (10) Das ist ein tolles Marketinginstrument auch. (11) Wenn man noch mal Folgendes sieht: Dass wir gerade in den jungen Markenbereichen in der Uhr dramatisch verloren haben [...] (12) Aber, ich sag’ mal trotzdem glaube ich können wir heute schon sagen – wie in den letzten Jahren auch – dass wir unser Bestandsziel gemeinsam schaffen werden [...] Weil das ja auch ‚ne wichtige Größe ist. (13) Ja, also das Ergebnis ist toll. Und jetzt beginnt natürlich das viel Spannendere, nämlich die Ergebnisverteidigung. Das ist ein ganz neues Lustgefühl. Tut aber viel mehr weh. Ja? Weil bisher haben wir immer gehofft, hier kommt ‚nen positives Ergebnis. Und jetzt tut es richtig weh [...] wenn Sie einmal Geld in der Kasse haben, dass Sie jeden Monat davon wieder was rausnehmen müssen. (14) Unser Ziel ist rund 10 Millionen. [...] dass wir im Prinzip immer, deutlich, jeden Monat besser sein müssen als im vorigen Ergebnis. (15) Ich glaube, die Chancen stehen nicht schlecht. Aber alles hängt letzten Endes in erster Linie erst mal von Umsatz und Rohertrag ab. Ja? Und wichtig in der Ergebnisverteidung ist natürlich, dass wir unsere Befreiungsschlagmaßnahmen konsequent umsetzen. Vielleicht zur Ware: [...] Und dazu hatten wir folgende Maßnahme ja auch damals schon angekündigt und besprochen. Dass wir die Waren aus den Filialen zurückrufen [...] dass wir Rückruflisten rausschicken wollen [...] (16) … würden wir gerne im Vorfeld wie folgt kommunizieren: Jeder Mitarbeiter darf maximal zwei Teile für seinen privaten Bedarf kaufen. Ausdrücklich kein Weiterverkauf. (17) Ist das richtig mit den zwei Teilen? (18) Wir können drüber diskutieren. (19) Also, machen wir drei Teile? Einverstanden? Drei Teile pro Mitarbeiter. Abwicklung wird dann noch mal genau beschrieben, wie’s ist. Und dann haben wir das Thema durch. Ja?

Index

Numbers in italics indicate major occurrences. A abbreviate  177 abdict  177 ability  2, 30, 57ff. absent-mindedness  239 abstraction, abstract  1, 192, 238 accept  167, 172 acceptable  204 acceptance  153, 167, 194 actant  132 action, act  19, 29, 30, 32, 37, 42, 47, 50, 53, 76ff., 80ff., 186, 230, 272 action complex  235 action function  132 action game  32f., 209 basic minimal  84 typology of action games 209 action and reaction  21, 80 dialogic action  38, 249, see also dialogic successful action  225, 250, see also successful supporting actions  225 types of action  52, 173, 207 see also principle activity  77 actor  131f. adaptation, adaptive, adapt    4, 39, 40, 59, 64f., 70, 115, 126, 232 addition  3, 141 address  188 forms of address  188 routines of address  102 adherence  63 adverb, adverbials  170 sentence adverbials  169 advertising  241

advice  159, 185, 192ff., 201 aesthetics, aesthetic  251, 255 agree  178 give one’s agreement╇ 178 allusion  103 analogy  259 anflehen╇ 189 annul  178 answer  148, 182 apologize╇ 180 ‘apology’  138, 167, 179, 204 appoint  177 argumentation, argument    23, 99, 123, 129, 197, 210f., 215ff., 233 directive type  218 representative type  218 art  210 work of art  68 artificial  24 ask  189 asking  84 assertives  162, 167, 192 assertion  192 moderated assertion  168 assume  168 ‘assurance’  178, 235 assure  152 attention  65 focusing  65, 70, 115, 231, 238 attitude  69, 197 see also propositional authentic  2, 25, 28, 44, 237ff. author, authorship  252f. the author’s perspective  262 autobiography  261 B ‘baptize’  156 baptize  177, 180

bargaining  225 be of the opinion  169 behaviour  47, 50, 60, 62, 186 key to  62 civilized  72, 108, 111, 146, 178f., 180 begin with  177 belief  83, 144, 153f., 209, 232 believe  165, 167, 172 believe  168f. beseech╇ 189 ‘bet’  178 biology  5, 54 New Biology  48 bitte╇ 194 bitten  189 blackmail  191 bless  177 body  272 brain  269f. business  101, 119, 121, 224, 231, 241ff. business culture  224, 250 games of  241ff. business meeting  240 C cancel╇ 178 casual variations  238, see also variation certainly  169 certainty  4, 71 belief in certainty  4, 44 end of certainty  4 chairing  242 chairperson  243 ‘challenge’  187 chess  33, 45 choice  232 christening  175

298 Dialogue: The mixed game

christen  177, 180 civilization  272 claim  81 making and fulfilling  81f. mitigate  215f. strengthen  215f. truth  83, 144, 153 volition  83, 144 clarifying sequences  211, 214f. classification  195 classify  177 close a meeting  177 code  18, 24, 25, 45, 60 co-evolution  5, 47, 48, 125, 230 cognition, cognitive  13, 30, 39, 67, 86 cognitive means  21, 30, see also means pragmatics  29 coherence  43, 85 Coherence Principle  74, see also principle collective  80, 138 come to the conclusion  177 comment  148, 165, 167, 196 ‘comment’  165 commissive  150f., 178 commitment  151, 177f., 180 commit oneself  151ff., 178, 180 common ground  138 communication, communicative 29, 49 grammar  25 community  69 comparative  5, 95 comparison  260 compassion  98, 166 competence  1, 22 communicative  16, 46, 59 generative  13 language  14, 16, 46 competence-in-performance    4, 5, 6, 7, 29, 38, 39, 40, 47, 51, 125f., 213, 238, 269 optimizing  240 competition, competitive    69, 249 completeness  56 complex, the complex, complexity  1, 230f., 268 architecture of complexity    5, 40, 65

compliment make a compliment╇ 205 component  131 compositional  24, 45 compromise  218, 221 concession making concessions  225 conclude a treaty  178 condemn  177 conditional  168, 172, 199f. assertive  169 deliberative  169 ‘conditional’  168 condolence  179 confession  198 of love  198 confirm  165, 167 conflict  108, 111f., 122, 217 confrontation, confrontational 69, 95, 100, 105, 118, 121f., 124, 219, 222, 236f. congratulation  138, 179 consciousness  58 consent  147f., 151, 161, 186, 218 consider  168 consideration  96 consilience  4, 46, 54, 257 console  223f. constatives  165, 167, 197, 236 constitutive  75 see also principle consulting  210, 235 context  26, 31, 53, 58, 73, 248, 269 context-dependent  152 contract  146, 178, 226, 232 contrast  259 convention, conventional    21, 31, 38, 45, 60, 71f., 82, 88, 207, 260 conversational conversationally implicated 18 conversation-analytical  27 conviction, convince  120, 153, 217 cooperation, cooperative, cooperate  105, 115, 118, 121f., 124, 192, 219, 222, 236f. corpus  12, 44 corpus linguistics  27 cover-up  118, 121

craft  254 create light  180 creative  4, 40, 82, 210, 257 criteria  142 constitutive  142 modifying  142, 155 propositional  142 criticize  205 culture, cultural  3, 5, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 67ff., 75, 94, 112, 126, 271 culture code  64, 98 culturgens  68 cultural value  68, 70 habit  68 institutional  236 universals  69 curse  167 D dadaistic  256 ‘dangerous’  195, 204 data  28, 237f. debate  217 on television  219 deceptive speech act  172, 222 decision making, decide    210, 232, 246, 249 take decisions  232 declaratives  101, 143, 145f., 151f., 154, 156, 176, 198, 248 representative  156 propositional subpatterns 174ff. declare war╇ 177 decomposable see also nearly decomposable decompose  233, 249 define  156 define  177, 180 definition  56, 164, 167, 195 deliberatives  168, 172, 200 ‘demand’  104 depose╇ 177 derivation, derive  66, 141, 231 describe  196 desideratives  171f., 201 desire  62, 85, 144, 154, 161, 171, 197, 202, 209f., 232, 257 dialogic  79, 139 dialogic action  38, 43, 52f., 78



dialogic action game  1, 5, 7, 33, see also game theory of dialogic action games  1, 51 types of dialogic action games  129ff. dialogic individuals  59, see also individual Dialogic Principle proper    74, 79ff. see also principle dialogic species  13, see also species speech act taxonomy/ typology  21, 83, 85, 129, 141ff. see also speech act dialogic theory  49, see also theory dialogicality  36 dialogicity  34, 138, 153, 252f., 256 dialogism  34ff. dialogue  1, 33, 35, 41, 52, 59, 67, 80, 272 breaking off  124 inner  52 multi-dimensional  35 well-formed  21, 22 dialogue analysis  7 Dialogue Grammar  20, 21, 225 differentiation, differentiate    5, 66, 115, 141, 207, 230 direct  91, 159 direction of fit  137 directives  147, 149ff., 154, 159ff., 193, 216 derived types  161 indirect  171, see also indirect propositional types  186ff. disciplinary  3 boundaries  3 discourse  25, 32 pragmatics  25, 32ff. discussion  217, 229 dissolution of the person  261 division of labour  66, 231, 233 documenting  238 dream  192 dub  177 dürfen╇ 190

Index 299

E East  69, 94, 96, 105 economy, economic  155, 240ff., 249 language economy  155, 175 effective  63, 72f., 101, 104, 113 embodied  3, 58 emotion, emotional  8, 58, 69f., 75, 93, 98, 105ff.,118, 121, 165, 189, 198, 210, 272 emotional affect  166 appeal to  97, 120f., 222, 225 calm down emotions  199 emotives  166f., 198 expressive-emotive  205 emphasis  198 empathy  166f., 198, 224, 257 empirical  1, 2, 27, 28, 134, 238 see also pragmatics see also evidence empiricist  50, 132, 134f., 237 environment  2, 3, 49, 50, 55, 63ff., 269 cultural  55, 63 natural  55, 63 epigenetic  49, 68, 155, 270 ethics, ethical  68, 102 evaluation, evaluate  49, 50, 52, 63f., 67, 90, 118f., 121, 193, 201, 204, 224, 232, 236, 242, 243ff. ever-changing  4, 24, 45, 51 evidence  2, 47 empirical  2, 28 evolution, evolutionary  4, 5, 47, 55, 125, 155, 270ff. genetic  55 social  55 see also co-evolution exclamation, exclamatory sentence  166, 203  see also sentence excuse  179 executive  75f. see also principle expectancy  82, 88, 142, 207 expert  234, 250 explicitness, explicit  56, 86 exploratives  147ff., 154, 156ff. propositional types  180ff. explorative sequence  214 expression  132, 155

‘expressives’  137, 165f., 197 expressive-emotive  205, 255f. F face  94 fallacy  23 favour  189, 192 feeling  197 fictional  172f. fixing the goal  246 forbid  187 formal, formalized  45, 254 frequency  12, 239 functional  132, 134, 141, 207, 231 functionalist  132, 134f. future  151, 170 G game  8, see also dialogic action game complex  8, 53, 129, 231 extended one-phase 8, 227, 267 of life  230, 232 literary game  210, 251ff., 257, 264, 267 minimal  8, 53, 127ff., 227, 230 mixed game  232 multidimensional  257 multi-phase  8, 267 one-phase  8, 129, 227, see also phase gene  48 genotype  5 generalization, generality  59, 70 gesture  58 getting married  175 give notice  177 giving in one’s notice  175 goal  62 goal-directed  62, 269, see also observation good  205 grammar  28, 88, 238, 251 communicative  88 construction  90, 239 corpus-based  90 discourse-based  90 emerging  90, 239 functional  90 pragmatic  88, 90 utterance  88ff., 91

300 Dialogue: The mixed game

grammatical, grammaticalized 134, 174 category  155, 168 grant  161, 186 greeting  179 group in- and intergroup  248 guarantee  152, 178 H habit  60, 64, 88, 90, 115, 213 harmony  69, 95 help  189, 222 hierarchy, hierarchical  232 hint  103 hoffentlich  202 hopefully╇ 171 I hope  202 holism, holistic  3, 6, 32, 36, 51, 65, 71, 141, 207, 230, 269 honorifics  102 honour  178 hortative  150, 188 human  180 human beings  3, 70, 126 nature  3, 5, 41, 48, 49, 50, 56ff. cultural beings  67ff. I identifier  164, 167, 195 ideology  68 idiomatic  91 if╇ 199 if only  171, 202 illocution, illocutionary    80f., 143, 154 strength  137, 153 imagination  210, 258 imperative  149 implicature  18 particularized  18 implore  189 indeterminacy  263, see also meaning indicative  172, 175 indirect  88, 91f., 97, 103, 149, 159, 171, 179, 188, 195, 205, 258 indirect speech  196 see also speech act

individual, individuality  4, 22, 38, 59f., 69f., 71, 230 inexpressible  254, 257, 263 express the inexpressible  256 inference  4, 25, 30, 89 inform, informatives    148, 164f., 167, 195ff., 224 inform  196 information  31, 122, 138, 147f., 158 initiative  80f., 159 take the initiative  101, 121 in-locution  137 insinuation  107, 111 insist  118, 223, 225 instinct  272 institution, institutional    101, 110, 118, 145, 175, 180, 217, 224, 233f., 240ff. institutional culture  236 instruction, instruct  159, 185, 188, 197, 224, 235 insult  108f. integration, integrational, integrative, integrated  24, 28, 36, 38, 40, 48, 58, 64, 85, 115, 141, 248, 257 Integrational Linguistics  24 intention, intent, intentional    22, 58, 62, 77, 83, 131, 139, 152, 232, 272 interaction, interactional, interactive  5, 22, 31, 40, 58, 64, 80, 139 interest  4, 41, 60, 62, 79, 93, 118, 222, 230, 232 linguistic  4 scientific  4 see also self-interest interjection  166 interpretation  27, 34ff., 253, 257 intersubjective  56, 271 intertextuality  34ff., 253, 258 interview  100, 157 intonation  155, 166f., 202, 204 irony  107f. iussive  160, 186

J join  177 joint  138 justify, justification  5, 47, 51, 125, 136, 197, 204 K key concept  5f., 62 knowledge  4, 37, 46, 59, 85, 88, 147, 158, 180, 234 encyclopaedic  88, 197 können  190 L language  1, 11, 28f., 54, 83, 180, 230, 239, 269 change  239 competence  14 Creole  239 as dialogue  3 instinct  67 natural  17, 45 language use  17, 27, 37 spoken language  237 standard  238f. lassen  188 lay down in a will  178 learning  50 prepared  50, 67 legal  120, 175, 178, 226f., 234 lecture  226 let’s  188 lexicon, lexical  89f., 92, 103, 134, 174 linear order  210, 229, 232, 234, 249 linguistics, linguistic  54 corpus  27 humanized  4 modern  9 post-Chomskyan  46 literary, literariness  210, 252ff., 262, 264, see also game literary studies  251ff. logic, logical  19, 22ff., 45, 58, 73, 111f., 181, 199 deontic  168 doxastic  168 epistemic  168f. normative  168



M machine  90 magical  176, 186 management  249 manipulation  105, 222 mean  87, 214 meaning  12, 19, 27, 29, 57f., 60, 73, 78, 88, 211, 238, 257, 264 meaning indeterminacy, uncertainty  133, 212 recurrent  256 means  21, 53 of action  77 cognitive  21, 30, 86, 258 communicative  29, 44, 48, 73, 91, 236 literary  258ff. perceptual  86 rhetorical  107, 216, 221 verbal  33, 86 media  120 mediator  122 meeting  229 strategy  247 melody  259 memory  115, 117 mental  12, 52f., 77f., 165, 169, 207, 209, 248f. metacommunication, metacommunicative  143, 176f., 196 metaphor  259ff. methodology, methodological    3, 37, 44, 51, 71ff. mind  48, 67, 83, 85, 272 minimal game  8, 127ff., 142, 209 basic minimal games    84, 144ff. unit  52 whole  41 mirror neurons  3, 58 miscommunication  212 misunderstanding  44, 60, 116f., 211ff. mixed game  5, 42, 59, 125f. Mixed Game Model  1, 51ff., 207, 269 modal, modality  103, 132ff., 170, 172, 201

Index 301

modesty  95f. monitive  160, 188 monologic  41, 52f., 137f., 147, 226 mood  155 mother tongue  238f. motivation, motivate  124, 218, 222, 235 multi-level approach  17, 20, 26 myth  24, 44 N ‘name a ship’  177 narrative  226 native speaker  12, 47, 238 nativist  50 natural  64 near decomposability  92, 230 need  6, 62, 67, 229, 232 negotiation, negotiate  29, 38, 48, 59f., 72, 210, 225 neo-Gricean  18 neurology  5, 54 ‘new’  164f., 196 news  164 New Science  2 nomenclature  164, 195 norm, normative  22ff., 52, 60, 69, 71f., 74, 102, 109, 112, 171 normatives  171f., 203 notation  144, 174 O oath  163, 178 obedience  161, 186f. object  3, 24, 37, 44, 51 objectivity  56 obligate oneself╇ 178 observation  2, 39 goal-directed  39 observer  29 ‘offence’, offend  107f. offer  96, 159, 185, 190f., 225 open a meeting  177, 180, 243 oppression  222 order  104, 160f., 186 organization, organizational  233 P pardon  177 parliamentary  110

part  131 particular  18, 40, 60, 65, 115 particle  103, 149, 166f., 170, 182 pattern  9, 20, 45f. perceive  2 perception  6, 30, 58, 198 perceptual  86 performance  2, 22, 24, 52, 60, 125 optimizing performance  237 performative  175 explicitly  175 hedged  243 performativity test  169 perhaps╇ 169 perlocution, perlocutionary    81, 223 permission  190 asking for  190 consenting  190 giving permission  225 persuasion, persuasive, persuade 22, 24, 62f., 72f., 99, 105, 118, 120, 215, 218, 222, 257 petitive  160, 189 phase  114, 129, 209 extended one-phase game 210ff. multi-phase game  114, 209f., 229 one-phase game  114, 209 philosophy, philosophical    45, 77, 138, 153f., 229 phrase  12, 92 routine phrase  166 planning  129, 210, 234, 242, 246f. plea  104, 160f., 186, 188f. make a plea  189 please  194 plurality  25 poem  255 poetry  251, 254 politeness  8, 69, 94ff., 133, 138, 145, 216 conventions  177, 179 pronouns  102 politics, political  98, 100, 106f., 110, 120f., 222 programme  227

302 Dialogue: The mixed game

polyphony  34ff., 253, 257, 264 polysemy  133 positioning  100, 105, 118f. possible  204 possibly  169 post-Chomskyan linguistics    46, 59 postmodernist  47 postpone  218 post-structuralist  131 potentialis  168 power  98ff., 110, 118, 121, 124, 210f., 222ff., 233 simulating power 110, 124, 222 practice, practical, practitioner 22, 52f., 77f., 115, 150, 178,   232, 234, 248f. optimizing  240, 250 practicability  218 Pragma-Dialectical Approach 23, 73 pragmatic, pragmatics  1, 16,   17f., 20, 24f., 32, 37 cognitive  29ff. discourse  32ff. empirical  27ff. perspective  25ff. praise  205 predication  92 prediction  193 preference  60, 69, 90, 115ff. premises  51, 55ff., 126 presequence  114, 118, 210, 215 pressure  222 presumably  169 presume╇ 168 principle  5, 71ff. Action Principle    7, 76ff., 79, 207 Coherence Principle  7, 74, 85ff., 91 Constitutive Principles    7, 75ff. Dialogic Principle proper    7, 74, 79ff., 82, 207 Principles of Emotion  105ff. Executive Principles    8, 75f., 113ff. Principles of Probability    64, 71ff., 207 Regulative Principles    8, 75f., 93ff., 105ff.

Relevance Principle  24 Rhetorical Principles  69, 217 Strategic Principles  76 probability  4f., 64, 213 see also principle probably  169 problem solving  123f., 210, 234, 247 profit making a profit  249 prohibit  187 ‘promise’  178 promise  133 proposal  150f., 161, 200f., 246 proposition, propositional    142, 207, 211, 226 attitude  169, 197 propositional patterns  173ff. provocation, provocative, provoke  107, 109, 157, 187 purpose  6, 41, 53, 62, 67, 77, 80, 132, 142, 209, 227, 230ff., 236 purposive  270 Q quarrel  108, 110, 112, 122, 217 question  156 action  156 alternative  183f., 186 didactic  157 disjunctive  183 multiple  185 provocative  157 rhetorical questions  157, 182 sentence, sentential  148, 156, 181f., 184, 186 sequence-dependent  157 tag questions  157, 183 tendentious questions    156, 182 word question  181, 184, 186 yes-no question  181, 183f., 186 R rationality, rational  20, 22, 46, 50, 58, 69, 82, 88ff., 99, 105, 110, 142, 167, 192, 195, 207 bounded rationality  46 rationality-in-life  46 reaction, reactive  80f., 147, 159 reality  238, 264

reason  22, 58, 93, 105ff., 198, 272 practical  22, 115 reasonableness  23 reasoning  192, 242, 272 reception  257 recommendation  205 recording  238 recursive  14 reduction, reductionism    3, 9, 125 reference  92 refusal  218 regret  198 regret  169 regularity  71 relevance  24, 30ff., 238 reliability  153, 159, 177, 232 creating reliance  234 religion, religious  68, 210, 258 repetition, repeat  119, 223f. reply  148, 182 negative  179, 216 reporting  236, 242f. report  196 representatives  138, 153ff., 216 derived types of the simple claim  162ff., 167 derived types of the modal claim  172 propositional types  192ff. propositional types of the simple claim  192ff. propositional types of the modal claim  199ff. ‘reproach’  203f. request  104, 161, 186, 188 resign  177 respect  93ff., 102 response  147f., 182 declarative  158f. directive  158 representative  158 revenge  191 rhetoric, rhetorical  22f., 52, 59, 63, 72f., 75, 92, 102, 107, 111f., 217, 221, 225, 236f., 251 New Rhetoric  22, 73 rhetorical question  149, see also question trivial rhetoric  121 see also means, see also principle



rhyme  254, 259 rule  4, 45, 59, 71f., 239 S sanction  160, 173, 186, 192 say  29, 214 scientific  258 self-awareness  271f. self-interest  61, 93, 104f., 222 see also interest selfish  61, 93, 271 semiotics, semiotic  131 sentence  15f., 174 exclamatory  166 sentence type  132ff., 148, 155, 166 see also question sentence╇ 177 sequence, sequential  115, 209 commissive  151 position  151 three-part  114 two-part  114 sequencing principles  114 strategies  118 shall╇ 203 should  293 sign  12, 25f., 46 sign system  1, 11 sign a treaty  178 simile  261 sincerity condition  137f., 146, 173, 179 situation  173 small talk  226, 249 social  55, 93 social individuals  3, 61, 126, 232, 270 social relationships  177, 180 sociobiology  3, 48, 55, 67f., 125, 155, 268 socio-interactional, socialinteractive  27, 77 sociological  27, 76, 139 solidarity  95f. speaker native speaker  12, 47 speaking  2, 29, 42, 54, 58, 239 specialization, specializing    65f., 82, 141, 207, 231, 233 species  8, 269 dialogic  13, 269, 271

Index 303

symbolic  13 speech  6, 30, 59, 217, 226 Speech Communication  25 speech economy  203, see also economy speech act  8, 20, 29, 77f., 85, 207 indirect  88 report  196 syndrome  170 theory  45, 154 types  154 verb  132ff., 170, 173f. speech act typology, taxonomy 21, 22, 82f., 127ff., 141ff., 154, 207, 209f. criteria  83 standard  40, 65, 115 state of affairs  78 statement  197f. see also constative status  177, 180 status function  160, 173, 224f., 233, 241 statutes  227 stipulate in a contract╇ 178 stocktaking  210, 234, 236, 242, 244f. strategy, strategic  8, 71, 76, 105, 113, 117ff., 216, 224f., 236 cognitive  101 evasive  100, 121, 225 meeting  247 sequential  118 stream of life  229, 267 structural  29 subjunctive  172, 188, 202 subordinate clause  168 subtype  154f. successful  225, 250 ‘suggest’  192, 201 summarize╇ 177 suppose╇ 168f. supernatural  176, 180 surely  169 surroundings  4, 47 survival  4, 13, 58, 105, 115 suspect  168 ‘suitable’  195 swearing  163 swear  152 symbol, symbolic  13, 49, 131, 259, 271

species  13, 61, 271, see also species theory  49, see also theory synaesthesia  258 syntax, syntactic  92, 181 syntactic-grammatical pattern  155 synthesis  230 T take note of  164f. taking a position  67, 257 taking position  204 taxonomy  8, 127 see also typology, speech act typology teaching  188, 197, 210, 223f. tell  196 term  7 terminology  143f. testify  152 text  28, 53, 58, 85, 91, 131, 248, 252 thanks  179f. theme, thematic  157, 181, 243, 259 theme/rheme  165 theory  9, 24, 46, 50, 51f., 125 dialogic  49 holistic  125 symbolic  49 of dialogic action games  51, see also dialogic theorizing  3, 24, 39ff., 46 thesis  218 anti-thesis  218 think  169 thinking  2, 52, 58 thought  6, 30, 230 threat  96, 133, 190f., 195, 225 three-part sequence  114 toning down  103f. topic/comment  165 transcribing  238 tree-structure  66, 82, 231 trial  120 trial and error  232 truth, true 2, 45, 56, 57, 83, 144, 233 absolute  47 modal claim  162, 167f. simple claim  162, 167 truth-conditional  18

304 Dialogue: The mixed game

turning point  16, 39 turn-taking  27, 28, 41, 216 types  154 basic types  144ff. derived types  155ff. subtypes  207 see also typology typology  8, 21, 129, basic types  142 derived types  142 propositional patterns  142 see also taxonomy, speech act typology, types two-part sequence  114 U uncertainty  4, 64 understanding  53, 59f., 80,   86, 211 coming to an understanding 53, 59, 80, 207, 231 non-understanding  211f.

problems of understanding 210ff. see also misunderstanding undertake to do  178 undoubtedly  169 unit of analysis  6, 41 minimal  52 unity of knowledge  4, 46 universal  174, 181 usefulness  218 utterance  15, 86, 88, 91, 134, utterance grammar    88ff., 91, 134, 155 V value  68 variation, variability  238f. verbal  77, 86 see also means verdict  156, 180, 226 verify  47, 55, 125, 136 virtual partner  52

volition  83, 144, 149 vouch for someone  178 W warning  192f., 194f., 201 wenn  199 wenn doch  202 wenn bloß  202 West  69, 94, 96, 105 when  199 whole  41, 50 circumscribe the whole    5, 230 win  120, 247, 250 word  12, 131, 263 word order  155, 167 world inner, external  165 multidimensional  261 real, possible, unreal  199

In the series Dialogue Studies the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 10 WEIGAND, Edda: Dialogue – The Mixed Game. 2010. xii, 304 pp. 9 FELLER, Sebastian: Lexical Meaning in Dialogic Language Use. 2010. vii, 184 pp. 8 VITANOVA, Gergana: Authoring the Dialogic Self. Gender, agency and language practices. 2010. vi, 175 pp. 7 KOIKE, Dale April and Lidia RODRÍGUEZ-ALFANO (eds.): Dialogue in Spanish. Studies in functions and contexts. 2010. xiii, 324 pp. 6 COOREN, François: Action and Agency in Dialogue. Passion, incarnation and ventriloquism. With a foreword by Bruno Latour. 2010. xvi, 206 pp. 5 WEIGAND, Edda: Language as Dialogue. From rules to principles of probability. Edited by Sebastian Feller. 2009. viii, 410 pp. 4 BARALDI, Claudio (ed.): Dialogue in Intercultural Communities. From an educational point of view. 2009. viii, 277 pp. 3 WEIZMAN, Elda: Positioning in Media Dialogue. Negotiating roles in the news interview. 2008. xiv, 208 pp. 2 WEIGAND, Edda (ed.): Dialogue and Rhetoric. 2008. xiv, 316 pp. 1 GREIN, Marion and Edda WEIGAND (eds.): Dialogue and Culture. 2007. xii, 262 pp.